GUIDE TO THE MT9 LIBYAN BEDOUIN FILE

[The MT9 Libyan Bedouin file is concerned with the Arabic-speaking nomadic and partially sedentarized Bedouin tribes living in the Libyan Desert, specifically within Cyrenaica and the Western Desert of Egypt. Material on groups living within the Siwa Oasis in northwestern Egypt and within the southern oases (e.g., Kharga) is not included. Most of the material in the file deals with the Cyrenaican Bedouin as described by Peters and Evans-Pritchard and their closely related kinsmen, the Awlad (Aulad) 'Ali of the northern coast of Egypt between Alexandria and the Libyan border.

There are nine sources in the file, all of them in English. The major sources in the file are 1: Obermeyer, 2: Mohsen, and 3: Evans-Pritchard, all of them by anthropologists. 1: Obermeyer is concerned with the community of al-Qasr near the town of Marsa Matruh on the Egyptian coast and is basically an analysis of the political structure of the Bedouin of al-Qasr. It also contains general historical background and discussions of ecology, economy, kinship, and social organization. 2: Mohsen is an analysis of the way disputes are settled among the Awlad 'Ali, but also contains material on the ecological and historical backgrounds of the area, tribal organization, political structure, leadership, and marriage as a form of contractual relationship. 3: Evans-Pritchard is concerned with the origin and development of the Sanusiya Order in Cyrenaica, which resulted in a strong and effective political organization for the whole area. It contains ethnographic and historical information and is strong on the relations of the Order with foreign governments (Turkish, British, and Italian). Three sources by Emrys Peters (4: Peters, 5: Peters, and 6: Peters) discuss lineage and political organization, the feud, and the family among the Cyrenaican Bedouin. 7: Abou-Zeid discusses the sedentarization of nomads in the Egyptian Western Desert and Egyptian government projects in the area. 8: Kennett discusses bloodmoney among the Western Desert tribes and 9: Murray gives some data on the culture history and tribal organization of the Awlad 'Ali and a few other groups. Brief introductions to the culture of the Bedouin can be found in chapter 2 of 3: Evans-Pritchard and in 7: Abou-Zeid. The file contains a great deal of information on socio-political and religious organization, and limited data on other aspects of Bedouin culture. Therefore, it can be used for a number of comparative purposes, but is not a well-rounded file. The researcher should note the specific area or tribal focus of each source used, since it is not clear how homogeneous the culture is. There are differences since the basic settlement pattern is changing from a nomadic-seminomadic way of life to a sedentary one. The file was processed in 1974-1975.]

MARKING DECISIONS

'ailat--the lineage into which a "clan" is divided and hence the sections of a tribe in which these lineages are found--613/619

Arab administrators under Italian rule; elites or townspeople of mixed ethnic origin--563

'awaaqil--political authority groups composed of tertiary groups--613/571/692

'awaiyid--recognized legal codes--671

baraka--blessing or spiritual power--778

barawa--to sever social ties with undesirable persons; banishment--675/681

biyut (sing. bait)--small lineages or extended families with a depth of 5 to 6 generations from present day to their founders--613

Corporations--groups constituting a single community in the summer, interlinked by reference to an ancestor 4 or 5 ascending generations away: also called "tertiary groups"--621/613

daraieb--tribal ways--671

fatha--the beginning chapter of the Koran; the initial ceremony in marriage, having the effect of a contract--779/584

Governor--although a political position established by the Egyptian government, it is usually occupied by a Bedouin--635

Grand Sanusi--head of the Sanusi Order--793

iktitab--tribal adoption of a person or groups into the tribe--563/619

'izba--a multi-nucleated settlement or cluster--621/361

kabara--a face-saving compensation of fine--558/681

laf--the process by which unrelated stranger groups graft themselves through some fiction onto the genealogical tree of of a clan or tribe--608/619

Marabtin--as marabouts or holy men--792; as "client tribes" --619

mardi--a mediator and go-between of some status within a bait--627/554/628

mi'ad--the public hearing--627/628

mintaqa--a subdivision of a tribal area into smaller units--631/423

mudirs--sub-district heads--634

nagei--camps; primary communities--621

naja--the extended family--596

nazzar--an expert who assesses the amount of compensation due for inflicted wounds--683/463 qabila--a tribe or primary tribal division--619

rajal khair--third party arbitrators--627

rajal salih--a third party arbitrator and a holy man--627/792

Sanusi order--an order of Sufis (Darwishes) who are Sunni or Orthodox Muslims--795

shaib--head of the extended family--596

shaikhs--general information on these headmen will be found in 554; specific information on their roles as heads of kin groups, tribes, or religious groups will be marked for 614, 613, 619, or 793; specific information on shaikhs as political representatives of tribal segments in a district--634

'umda--in rural areas, headman of the village and immediate surroundings--622; representatives of tribal segments within districts (according to Mohsen)--634

wakils--a guardian of a girl, generally the father, but if dead or an invalid then the brothers or uncle--429/593

PREFACE

101

121

This study is based on data collected during the period of June of 1964 to May of 1965. The focus of the research was a permanent Bedouin community, the 'Aishaibat tribe of al-Qasr near the town of Marsa Matruh in the Western Desert of Egypt. Al-Qasr was selected for study because of its sedentary and relatively nucleated settlement pattern which rendered it accessible and manageable in the time allotted for research; also, because this community had been designated by the government as one undergoing rapid social change. The Marsa Matruh area, as a focus for anthropological research, was first suggested to me by Professor Ahmad Abou-Zeid, an Egyptian anthropologist who has written on the problems of social change in the Western Desert.

My original research plan was designed as an ethnographic survey of Bedouin society in the al-Qasr area, and a concentration on the specific problems related to the government's policy of integrating the Bedouins, socially and politically, into the national society. I was interested in the various ways in which the Bedouins of the Marsa Matruh area conceptualized the aims of the government, and in the structural reorganization, if any, of Bedouin politics and political thought under the impetus of social change programs.

CHAPTER II

ECOLOGY AND HISTORY

619 Awlad Ali are a number of Arabic-speaking semi-nomadic tribes of
101 sheep and goat herders who inhabit the northern part of the Western
162 Desert of Egypt. The total population of Awlad Ali, according to the 1965 preliminary census, was about 100,000 inhabitants. This estimate is, however, very tentative and fluctuates from one year to the next, depending on the circumstances of the pasture in the area. The
131 area they occupy consists of the narrow strip of fertile land which extends along the Mediterranean coast from near Alexandria in the east some 350 miles westward to the UAR-Libyan border town of Sallum, and varying in width from ten to thirty miles. Vegetation in the area de-
132
133 pends on rainfall, supplemented by a number of artesian wells. The rainy season extends from November to March, but the rain is extremely erratic in nature, varying from one year to another and from one place to the next. Draught has been experienced every three to four years, one of them being experienced at the time of the study. The water situ-
312 ation is further aggravated by the low technological level of the people
[181] which prevents them from making the best use of the available rain water. There have been some attempts made to store as much of the rain water as possible, but these attempts are usually made by individuals and in too crude and primitive a way to prevent most of the water from being lost by seepage or by evaporation. The most commonly used method of water preservation in the area is digging cisterns in the ground. But most of these cisterns are too shallow to keep large amounts of water. Some deeper wells are found in the area and are called "beer sama"

565 Arabian ways. In Egypt necessity has slowly subjugated the
167 exiles to the peasant yoke. They long resisted but, like the
Bedouin nomads coming from the Sinai Peninsula, had in the
end to submit or perish. The absence of a substantial peasantry
in Cyrenaica is one of the characteristics which most distinguish
it from the Arab societies of Palestine, Syria, Iraq, Egypt, and
565 the Maghrib. The peasant can be dominated. He is fixed to the
earth and can be made to surrender it and till it for others. The
Cyrenaican Bedouin is fixed to no place and cannot be forced to
sell his birthright by bad seasons or intimidation. This has
565 meant that there have not been in Cyrenaica any social enclaves
632 attached to the towns through which the towns and administrative
centres could lord it over the Bedouin. Outside the towns
*[648] all is Bedouin and the Turkish Administration, and afterwards
[619] the Italian Administration, found that they could not get a
grip on the Bedouin of Cyrenaica as they could on the peasantry
of Tripolitania.

632 Nevertheless the towns and the Turkish, and later the Italian,
*648 Administration in them affected the tribal system by acting as
619 a pull on those tribal segments which lived nearest to them, so
that the tribes which lay between the towns and the steppe
were attracted towards one or other of these poles. The political
structure of Cyrenaica as a whole exercised in this way a significant
influence on the segmentary tribal system.

IV

619 The Bedouin who became followers of the Sanusiya Order
178 and whose country and way of life I have described are divided
into tribes and tribal sections owning different tracts of the
[793] country. This tribal system existed in Cyrenaica long before
the Grand Sanusi preached there and it continued to exist after
*[795] his grandson Sayyid Muhammad Idris had fled the country
and the Sanusiya Order had been abolished and its lodges
destroyed by the Italians. It is the fundamental structure of
Bedouin society which the Sulaimid tribes brought with them
from Arabia.

619 The Bedouin of Cyrenaica are Arabs. The Arabian tribes
• 101 who conquered the country and settled in it mixed with the
144 indigenous Berbers, as is evident in their physical features to-

day, but even ethnically the Bedouin are more Arabian than 619
the people of Egypt, the Sudan, and Tripolitania, while 101
culturally they are as completely Arab as any people in the [144]
world, proud Tamim and Quraish not excepted. In essentials
their language is that of the Hilalian invasion of the eleventh 197
century and no foreign language competes with it. The Berber- [191]
speakers are a handful in the distant oasis of Aujila, and even
there they are bilingual, and the insignificant fractions of Jews
and Cretans in the towns speak Arabic, the Cretans being
Muslims as well. The Italian immigrants left the country of 619
their own accord during the late war. Thus the obstacles to [167]
complete Arabization in the Maghrib (Tripolitania, Tunisia,
Algeria, and Morocco), a Berber culture, large Jewish colonies,
and European colonization are to-day all absent in Cyren-
aica. In all essential matters also the Bedouin of Cyrenaica [184]
are like Bedouin tribesmen elsewhere in the Arab world: they
have the same tented, pastoral, way of life, the same social
organization, the same laws and customs and manners, and the
same values.

The people of Cyrenaica are linked to the classical Arab 177
world of the east, to Egypt and the Jazirat al-'Arab (Arabia,
Palestine, Iraq, and Syria) rather than to the Maghrib; to the
sacred towns of Islam and to Umayyad Damascus, 'Abbasid
Baghdad, and Fatimid Cairo. More particularly they are linked
to Egypt, with which their country has had political ties from
the earliest times, and which is their natural market. The [133]
desert comes down to the sea at the Gulf of Sirte and separates
Cyrenaica from Tripolitania and these two countries have
always gone each its own way. Cyrenaica was linked to Graeco-
Egypt, Tripolitania to Phoenician Carthage. Cyrenaica went
with Byzantium, Tripolitania with Rome. Indeed, as Despois
says: 'The Greater Syrtis is without dispute one of the most
decided frontiers, natural and human, to be found anywhere in
the world.'[1]

During the last few decades this separation has been brought [995]
into relief again by the rise of the Sanusiya Order, for whereas
almost to a man the Cyrenaicans follow the Order politically,
the Tripolitanians, except for the Bedouin tribes, have shown a
lively animosity towards it. Moreover tribal ties between the 619

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[1] Op. cit., p. 45.

Chapter XVI

THE WESTERN BEDOUIN (EL MUGHARBA)[1]

"*The Moor is of a free and open nature.*"—Othello.

General Remarks—The Arab and the Libyan—The Sa'adi Tribes and the Murabitin—Bedouins of the Northern Littoral—Awlad 'Ali—Jawabis—Jumei'at—Samalus—Shiheibat. 000

Sinai has been called an "epitome of Arabia", and the pilgrim certainly feels well on the way to Mecca as soon as he crosses the Suez Canal, but it is equally true that Algiers is not so very far west of the "Arab's Gate" at Alexandria. The skies of Mariut are coloured with much the same blue as those of Andalusia, and, though the Sierras are lacking, the historian instinctively begins to look for the Alhambra as soon as he crosses the causeway to Amriya. The reason [167] is not so very far to seek, there is more of the Libyan than the Arab in the tribes that hardly a century ago flooded back into Egypt from Cyrenaica. Yet in spite of numerous resemblances, these two races are divided as the goats from the [771] sheep by this essential difference that while the "Berbers"[2] are religious and often superstitious (traits of a converted race), his religion sits so lightly on the Arab that he has almost reverted to his early paganism. But though this is true, it is far from obvious, and a traveller will not find anyone in the Western Desert to admit that he is not of pure Arab descent.

This snobbishness was evident so long ago as the time of Ibn Khaldun (1332–1406), who found it advisable to represent the Tuareg, as descended from a respectable but mythical Arab conqueror, Ifrikias ibn Sufi. Ibn Khaldun asserts that when Ifrikias himself returned to Arabia, the Ketama and Sanhaja tribes remained behind and became absorbed in the people of the country. All this is pure

---

[1] Mugharba means literally "westerners", and is used in Egypt to denote generally all the Bedouin west of the Nile. But there is a tribe in Cyrenaica who content themselves with this simple title, and so confuse the issue. [101]

[2] All the indigenous races of North Africa are lumped together under this barbarian title by the Arab historians.

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361
131
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
JABAL
AL-AKHDAR
SALLUM
AL-QASR
MARSA MATRUH
ALEXANDRIA
Libyan
Plateau
CYRENAICA
SIWA
CAIRO
WESTERN
DESERT
LIBYA
U. A. R.
SCALE APPROX. :
1 INCH = 176 MILES

EGYPT AND CYRENAICA

FIGURE I

*613
423
311
241
491
133
102


SEA
N
('AILIT SHRAIF)
('AILIT ABU QARASA)
('AILIT DAWLAT)
('AILIT SULWATIYYA)
('AILIT ZALLAT)
('AILIT ZAGHARAT)
OLIVES AND VEGETABLES
ROAD TO MARSA MATRUH
('AILIT MA'FAS)
('AILIT LAZUMI)
PLATEAU
BARLEY
ROAD TO AL-SALLUM
(KAMAILAT TRIBE)
WADI
PASTURE
DESERT

FIGURE 3a. LINEAGE TERRITORIES OF AL-QASR.

102
133
131



FIGURE 4

LAND FORM MAP OF AL-QASR SHOWING DRAINAGE PATTERN

SCALE = 1:250,000

MEDITERRANEAN
LIBYAN DESERT
PLATEAU
AL-QASR
MARSA MATRUH
'IZBA SECTOR
SHA'IR WI MAR'A SECTOR

102
312
361
423
311
133



FIGURE 5

SAMPLE OF LAND TENURE IN IZBA SECTOR

WHITE SAND DUNES
UNCULTIVABLE STONEY HILL
SCALE = 1:4,000 (APPROX.)
○ = WELLS
□ = PERMANENT DWELLINGS

1: Obermeyer E-5 (1964-1965) 1969 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9 'Aishaibat

102
423
312
361



FIGURE 6
SAMPLE OF LAND TENURE IN SHA'IR WI MAR'A SECTOR

SCALE = 1:4,000 (APPROX.)
O = WELLS
□ = PERMANENT DWELLINGS
N

2: Mohsen E.O-5 (1958-1966) 1971 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9
Awlad Ali

184

APPENDEX II


MEDITERRANEAN SEA
البحر الأبيض المتوسط
الاسكندرية
ALEXANDRIA
ليبيا
LIBYA
SENENIAH
MANPIE
GNA
KATTA
GENEISHAT
AWLAD KHANEUF
اولاد خنوف
EISEIBAT
جميعات
GEMEIAT
اولاد خروف
AWLAD KHAROUF
سناقه
SANAGKA
قطايفه
KATAIFA
جميعات
GEMEIAT
سمالوس
SAMALOUS
AGGARY
شنيشات
SHENEIBAT
AGGARY
AGGARY
ASHREI
جوابيس
GWABIS
سنيشات
SENEISHAT
AWLAD ALI
أولاد علي
القطارة
QATTARA DEPRESSION
SIWA OASIS
واحة سيوه
قبائل البدو
وخريطة طرق الساحل الشمالى
BEDWIN TRIBES
ROAD MAP OF NORTH COAST
REFERENCE
علامات

102
131
619
491
361
133

795* 793 159 175*

touch with the lodges of his Order in Cyrenaica, Tripolitania, the Western Desert of Egypt, and the Sudan.

795* 797 793 159 175*

In moving the seat of his Order to Jaghbub, the Grand Sanusi was probably most influenced by his decision to direct his missionary propaganda southwards. It is understandable that he should have made this decision. His was a missionary mind and the Order he had founded a missionary Order, and the pagan and semi-pagan countries of the Sahara and the Sudan, and of Equatorial Africa beyond them, offered endless scope for conversion to the faith. Moreover, his Order was already reaching the limits of its expansion in North Africa. It had won over the nomad and semi-nomad Bedouin tribes of Cyrenaica, Tripolitania, and Egypt, and the oases folk under their influence, but was not making, and was not even in its heyday to make, much impression on the peasants and townsmen up against whom it now found itself in Northern Tripolitania and the Nile Valley. Dammed to west and east the Order

795* 648* 175* 131 102 ●


Scale
0
500
1,000
1,500 kms.
Italian expansion into Tripolitania and Cyrenaica
1911 – 1932
MOROCCO
ALGERIA
TUNISIA
TRIPOLITANIA
CYRENAICA
Al-Baida (1843)
Mizda
Al-Tabaqa
Saukna
Jalu
Jaghbub (1856)
British line of defence 1914-1917
French expansion into the Sahara
1902 – 1914
Wau-al-Kabir
Kufra (1895)
FEZZAN
EGYPT
Kawar
TIBESTI
Qiru (1899)
BORKU
ENNEDI
KANEM
ANGLO EGYPTIAN SUDAN
FRENCH SAHARA
CHAD
WADAI
DARFUR
Thin arrows indicate Sanusiya expansion
Thick arrows indicate movements of European Powers

The Spread of the Sanusiya in North Africa.

795* 793 797 159 175*

3:Evans-Pritchard E-4, 5 (1942-1944) 1949 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9 (1837-1942)
Sanusi

102
*795
171

[P.24]


ALGERIA
TUNISIA
TRIPOLITANIA
FAZZAN
See inset
CYRENAICA
WESTERN DESERT OF EGYPT
AL-KAFARA
ARABIA
SUDAN
WEST AFRICA
Scale
0 250 500 750 1,000 kms.
CYRENAICA
Scale
kms.0 50 100

Distribution of Sanusiya Lodges in North Africa and Arabia.

CYRENAICA

1 al-Jarfan
2 Umm Rukba
3 Janzur
4 al-Marassas
5 Umm al-Razam
6 Umm Hafain
7 Martuba
8 Darna
9 al-'Azziyyat
10 Mara
11 Khashm Rzaiq
12 Maraziq
13 Bishara
14 Tart
15 Shahhat
16 al-Fayidiya
17 al-Makhili
18 al-Nayyan
19 al-Hamama
20 al-Haniya
21 al-Zawiya al-Baida
22 Qafanta
23 al-'Arqub
24 al-Qasrain
25 Tamaitha
26 Anbalu al-Huwaiz
27 Mirad Mas'ud
28 Qarabarbi
29 al-Marj
30 al-Qasur
31 Taukra
32 Dariyana
33 Asqafa
34 Banghazi
35 Umm al-Shakhanab
36 al-Tailimun
37 Msus
38 al-Qatafiya
39 Aujila
40 al-'Arq
41 al-Libba
42 al-Jikharra
43 al-Khatt
44 Marada
45 Jaghbub

EGYPT

46 al-Akhsab
47 al-Shih (Barrani)
48 al-Mithnan
49 Shammas
50 Najaila
51 Umm al-Rakham
52 Baqush (Sidi Harun)
53 '*Ailat* Bin Musa
54 Fuka
55 al-'Awama
56 al-Jamaima (al-Dhaba)
57 Abu-Shinaina
58 al-Hammam
59 Sidi Musa
60 Yadim al-Abairish
61 al-Ghait
62 Haush 'Isa
63 al-Qara
64 Gharmi
65 al-Zaitun
66 al-Sabukha
67 al-Gharbiya
68 Taba'
69 al-Bawiti
70 Mandisha
71 Farafra
72 al-Qasr
73 al-Rashda
74 Balat
75 Ismant
76 al-Qalamun

ARABIA

77 al-Wajh
78 al-Ais
79 al-Madina
80 al-Haura
81 Yanbu' al-Nakhl
82 Yanbu' al-Bahr
83 al-Khaif
84 al-Safra
85 Subh
86 Badr
87 Ziba
88 Rabigh
89 Jidda
90 Abu Qubais (Makka)
91 al-Tayif
92 Muna
93 al-Husainiya

TRIPOLITANIA

94 Ghadamis
95 Darj
96 Sinawin
97 al-Haraba
98 al-Rujban
99 al-Qal'a
100 Mizda
101 Tarabulis
102 Masallata
103 Bani Walid
104 Misurata (2)
105 Sirt
106 al-Naufiliya
107 al-Tabaqa
108 Hun
109 Saukna
110 Waddan
111 Zalla

FAZZAN

112 al-Fuqha
113 Birqin
114 Sabha
115 Ghudwa
116 Dlaim
117 Murzuq
118 Taghaghan
119 Umm al-Aranab
120 Zuwila
121 Tamassa
122 al-Qatrun
123 Wau al-Kabir
124 Wau al-Namus
125 Ghath
126 Qanit

AL KAFARA

127 Tazirabu
128 Bazima
129 Ribiyana
130 al-Hawari
131 al-Taj
132 al-Jauf

SUDAN

133 Bardai
134 Quru
135 Wajanqa al-Kabira
136 Wajanqa al-Saghaira
137 Yarda
138 'Ain Kalak
139 Faya
140 al-Fashir
141 Jabal Murrah
142 Abaish
143 Bir Alali
144 Jajiduna
145 Zinder
146 Kano

[P. 25]

102
795*
171

3:Evans-Pritchard E-4, 5 (1942-1944) 1949 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9
(1837-1942)
Sanusi

[P. 30]

102
132
133


Shahhat
Darna
Taukra
Al-Marj
Banghazi
Tubruq
500
600
400
300
200
150
100
50
Over 500 metres
200-500 metres
Under 200 metres
Isohyets showing mean annual aggregates in mms.

Rainfall and the Plateau Area.

102
13


Steppe
Semi-Desert
Desert
Mediterranean Maritime
Mediterranean Plateau
Scale
0 25 50 75 100 kms.

Climatic Zones.

[P. 32]

102
137


Al-Jashsha
Al-Batnan
Al-Barqe
Al-Sirwal
Al-Hamra
Al-Baida
WADI AL-MRA
WADI AL-FARIGH
Al-Daffa
Al-Barqa
Al-Qardaba
Scale
0
50
100
25
75
kms.
Forest

Distribution of Forest.

102
312
233


Shahhat
Darna
Al-Marj
GOATS AND CATTLE
Banghazi
SHEEP AND CAMELS
Zt. Msus
Bir Tinjidhir
Bir Hakaim
MOSTLY STONY ARID COUNTRY
Ajadabiya
CAMELS
Approx. Line of springs
" Southern limit of well water in summer
" Southern limit of grazing in spring

Pastoral Zones.

KEY

102 1. al-'Arq
2. al-'Arqub
133 3. Asqafa
131 4. Aujila
361 5. al-'Azziyyat
6. Banghazi
619 7. Bishara
8. Dariyana
9. Darna
10. al-Fayidiya
11. al-Hamama
12. al-Haniya
13. al-Huwaiz
14. Jaghbub
15. Janzur
16. al-Jarfan
17. al-Jikharra
18. Khashm Rzaiq
19. al-Libba
20. al-Makhili
21. Mara
22. Marada
23. al-Marassas
24. Maraziq
25. al-Marj
26. Martuba
27. Mirad Mas'ud
28. Msus
29. al-Naufiliya
30. al-Nayyan
31. Qafanta
32. Qarabarbi
33. al-Qasrain
34. al-Qasur
35. al-Qatafiya
36. Shahhat
37. al-Tailimun
38. Talmaitha
39. Tart
40. Taukra
41. Umm Hafain
42. Umm al-Razam
43. Umm Rukba
44. Umm al-Shakhanab
45. al-Zawiya al-Baida


19°
20°
32°
31°
30°
29°
Banghazi
Suluq
Al-Zuwaitina
Ajedabiya
Al-Naufiliya
Al-Agaila
Marada
A L M A G H A R B A
W A D I A L - F A R I G H

THE CHI

[facing P. 34, A]

102
133
131
361
619


21°
22°
23°
24°
25°
32°
31°
30°
29°
Marsa Susa
Darna
Al Qubba
Al-Qarqab
Khawalan
Marawa
Slanta
Tolmeita
Tobruk
'Akrama
Al-Burdi Sulaiman
Al-Sallum
Bir Hakeim
Jaghbub
AL-'ABID
AL-BARA'ASA
HASSA
FAYID
'ABAIDAT
FAWAKHIR
WADI AL-MRA
ZUWAIYA
AL-AWAJILA
Aujila
Al-Jikharra
Jalu
AL-MAJABRA
Contours in metres
Tribal boundaries
Towns
Place names
Zawiyas
Scale
0 10 20 50 80 110 kms

EF TRIBES OF CYRENAICA (after De Agostini)

[facing P. 34, B]

619 spond different social statuses. Some are classed as *Marabtin bil baraka*, 'client tribes with the blessing' or *Marabtin al-Fatha*,
619 'client tribes of the prayer', and they often claim to be Sharifs.
778 These 'sacred' tribes, such as the Aulad al-Shaikh and most of

● 102
619
361
131


TUNISIA
Tarabulis
Masallata
AL-AMAMRA
Misurata
Al-Rujban
Al-Qal'a
Al-Haraba
Bani Walid
AL-HARABA
AL-RUJBAN
AL-MASHASHA
Mizda
URFALLA
AULAD BUSAIF
Sirt
AL-QADHADHFA
Al-Naufiliya
Sinawin
Ghadamis
Darj
Al-Tabaqa
AL-ZINTAN
SULIMAN
AL-MAGHARBA
AL-ZAWIYA
AL-HARABA
AL-MAQARHA
RIYAH
AL-JAMA'AT
Saukna
Hun
Waddan
Zalla
AULAD
Al-Fuqha
Birqin
AL-HUTMAN
AL-HASAUNA
Sabha
Tamassa
Ghudwa
Umm Al-Aranab
Zuwila
Murzuq
Taghaghan
Dlaim
Wau Al-Kabir
Wau Al-Namus
Ghath
Al-Qatrun
AL-HARABA → Names of Tribes
Al-Haraba → Sanusiya Zawiyas
Boundary Lines
Scale
0 50 100 150 200 400 kms.

The Chief Sanusi Bedouin Tribes of Tripolitania.

619 the Masamir and Farjan, live among the *Sa'adi* as equals in
778 virtue of the prestige they derive from their descent, or supposed descent, from saints, though the free tribes do not regard
[173] them as quite like themselves. Their ancestors are almost invariably believed to have come from the west, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, or Tripolitania. This move of pious men to

and of the consistency between lineages of a clan and segments 619
of a tribe. In explanation of it a few words must first be said 614
about the terms *qabila*, *'aila*, and *bait*. *Qabila* is the word 613
generally used to denote a tribe or primary tribal division.


AL-DARSA
MASAMIR
MARABTIN
AL-SHABARQA
AL-BAKHAYIT
AL-QALABTA
Al-Mahamda
'At Brahim
'At al-Mzatal
AL-MUASA
Balrabat
Al-Slaikh
Al-Aqta'
AL-BARA'ASA
'AILAT FAYID
AL 'ABAIDAT
Tribal Boundaries
1st Subdivision
2nd Subdivision
3rd Subdivision
Al-Aqta' 4th Subdivision
Sanusiya Zawiya:-
Built
Not completed
Marabout Tomb
Scale
0 1 2 3 4 kms.

102 •
131
619
778
795*
613

The Divisions of the Hasa Tribe.

'Ailat are the lineages into which a clan is divided and hence 619
the sections of a tribe of various sizes in which these lineages are 614
found and after which they take their names. *Biyut* are small 613
lineages, or extended families, with a depth of five or six generations from the present day to their founders. It must be noted, however, that all these terms are relative and are used in a more or less comprehensive sense according to the context.

for they might then settle the matter by surrendering their 795*
claims to the zawiya.[1] Another way in which a lodge obtained 793
rights in land was by asking permission of its owners to sow it. 425
Constant repetition of this favour eventually gave the zawiya
rights of use in it in perpetuity.

The tribesmen also assisted the Shaikh of the lodge in the 795*
cultivation of the lands, though most of the work was done by 793
241
476



102 ●
795*
491
241
423

Sanusiya Estates of the Zawiyas of Shahhat, Tart, al-Fayidiya, and al-Zawiya al-Baida.

the zawiya community itself. At sowing time the Shaikh would 795*
pitch his tent near the area to be cultivated and prepare a com- 793
munal meal, taking with him some sacks of rice for the purpose. 241
The local Bedouin then came with their draught animals and 476
sowed and ploughed for a couple of days on behalf of the
zawiya. The same procedure took place at harvest time.
Besides gifts of land and voluntary service in cultivating, the [794]
Bedouin were expected to pay a tithe to the lodge at harvest
time and after lambing. No doubt many of them paid annual
dues but it is unlikely that any strict record was kept or that
payment could have been enforced had they been averse to
making it.

That it was expected that the Bedouin might promise services 175*
more readily than perform them is suggested by an interesting 795*
document, dated 1307 A.H., found by the Italians at the 794

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[1] Savarese, op. cit., p. 193.

*175 only on condition that nothing reached Turco-German hands.
*648 No Sanusiya lodges were to exist on Egyptian soil (they had
*795 already been razed to the ground in the Marmarica), though
728 alms might be collected from Egyptian adherents to the Order. Sayyid Idris's property in Egypt was to be respected. Jaghbub oasis, though in Egypt, was to be administered by the Sayyid.

The agreement signed at 'Akrama settled affairs between the Sanusi and the British. The British got the military security they needed. The terms were very favourable to the Sanusi. The *status quo* was preserved, the Italians being left in control of those parts of Cyrenaica in which they had established themselves—the coastal towns and a few inland posts—and the Sanusiya Order retaining the rest of the country. The Sayyid had saved the organization of the Order his grandfather had founded in Cyrenaica, and though he was not formally recognized as more than the Head of a religious Order he was, in fact and of necessity, treated as though he were, as indeed he was, also the secular ruler of an independent people. The accords were signed without consultation with the Turks and without their consent, so whereas Sayyid Ahmad had fought the Italians and British as representative of the Sultan, his cousin made peace with them in his own right.

• 102
*175
*648



The disposition of Italian and Sanusi positions in October 1916.

*175
*648
*795
728
[793]

The least satisfied party were the Italians. They had embarked on a colonial war and had not been successful in waging

l

*175 lished on their own account, and the Italians considered
*648 illegally, a camp at Khawalan of about 100 men and a number
*795 of small posts, shown on the map, with about 15 to 30 men in each. Their headquarters force was at Ajadabiya.

As stated at the end of the last chapter, Gen. Bongiovanni seized the 'Mixed Camps' on 6 March 1923. Though this day may be regarded as the date of the recommencement of hostilities in Cyrenaica, the first operational phase proper was a drive to the south of Banghazi. The country there offered fewer difficulties to mechanized movement in the grand style than the plateau country, and it was near the main Italian base. The objective was the little village of Ajadabiya, the Sanusi seat of government and military headquarters, called grandiloquently by Bongiovanni after its capture the '*Roccaforte della Senussia*'.[1] The Italians seem to have believed that they had only to take it for resistance to collapse everywhere, much as it had collapsed in Old Tripolitania after the chief centres had been occupied. [701] The Sanusi forces, under their Commander, Qajja bin 'Abdalla, a Qur'ani of Tibesti, were unable to defend the village against so large and well-equipped a column, and after they had been worsted in several fights they retired, leaving the jubilant

[102]
[712]
[701]



Distribution of Sanusi forces in March 1923.

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[1] *Proclama alle popolazioni*, 1923, p. 5.

*175 situation which had developed there in 1915 seemed likely to
*648 develop again. Concerted operations from Cyrenaica and
Tripolitania were, therefore, planned. To facilitate them from
*795 the Cyrenaican side the Italian line was advanced in March 1927 from Qaminis–Tailimun–Suluq–al-Shlaidima to Ajadabiya–Sawunnu–Msus; and Teruzzi, always an advocate of combining political with military action, decided to try what

● [102]



The Italian conquest of Cyrenaica.

diplomacy could do to ease the task of the soldiers. He had
[793] some success, with the aid of the treacherous Sanusiya Shaikh
Sharif al-Ghariyani, in that he was able to arrange a meeting in
[619] June in the *barqa al-baida* with a number of tribal Shaikhs and to persuade 13 of those belonging to the Magharba Shammakh to make submission. This pacification of the Magharba near Ajadabiya, indispensable to operations in the Sirtica, had an immediate result in the uncontested occupation of al-Qatafiya towards the end of September and of al-'Aqaila a few days later. Sayyid Saddiq al-Rida collected a small force to the south of the Wadi al-Farigh to prevent a further advance but neither he nor his father, a man lacking both vigour and spirit, had the character of the Bedouin and both were wavering. The son entered into correspondence with the Italians and the father

*175 [P. 224]
*648
102
167
487
233
131


Apollonia
CIRENE
Giovanni Berta
DERNA
Luigi Razza
Beda Littoria
Luigi di Savoia
Tolmeta
Oberdan
Maddalena
BARCE
Tocra
Baracca
Tecnis
Marava
Slonta
Driana
el Abiar
BENGASI
Boundary of area to be colonised
Boundary of area for Organised Government Settlement
Narrow gauge railway
Main roads
Tracks for passage of Arab Flocks
Provincial boundary (Bengasi Province)
Scale
0
25
50
75
100 kms.

The Italian plan for the colonization of northern Cyrenaica.

175 between the Bedouin and the Berbers (1954:46-47). G. W.
114 Murray informs us that the Bedouins of the Egyptian Western
619 Desert themselves believe this to be the case (1935:33, 247).
I agree that the Cyrenaican Bedouin are the descendants of the Banu Sulaim; nevertheless, and despite what Murray says, my informants (when they knew) claimed to be descendants of the Banu Hilal. They refer to their ancestress, Sa'ada, as al-Hilaliyya, "she of the Banu Hilal."

175 Data concerning the Awlad 'Ali migratory history are
167 insufficient for a satisfactory reconstruction of the process.
As we have noted, there were two invasions of North Africa by the Arabs. The first, about 643 A.D., was a shock wave from the Arab conquest of Egypt in which the Arabs defeated the Luwata Berbers who were living in eastern Libya. The second invasion, in the 11th century, took place at the hands of the Banu Hilal and Banu Sulaim and penetrated into the North African countryside. As a result, the Banu Salaim tribe settled in Cyrenaica where they intermingled with the Luwata
[103] Berbers. That part of Cyrenaica which they claimed as their territory they called the Jabal Akhdar (i.e. "Green Mountain"), a plateau region set back from the coast. The Bedouins of al-Qasr refer to the Jabal Akhdar as their original homeland (see Figure 1).

We hear nothing more of the Banu Salaim until the 17th century. At this time, segments of the tribe began drifting

102
361
131
●103


JABAL AL-AKHDAR
SALLUM
AL-QASR
MARSA MATRUH
ALEXANDRIA
Libyan Plateau
CYRENAICA
SIWA
CAIRO
WESTERN DESERT
LIBYA
U. A. R.
SCALE APPROX. :
1 INCH = 176 MILES

EGYPT AND CYRENAICA

FIGURE I

312 cisterns spread throughout the Western Desert. Many of them are still used by the Bedouins for watering their livestock. The southernmost part of the catchment area provides grazing for sheep. Northward near the coast, where the soil deposit permits, barley is cultivated.

311 The Bedouins divide al-Qasr into "the good life"
823 (*ma'isha simha*) on the coast, and "the bad life" (*ma'isha*
[103] *wihsha*) in the desert. *Ma'isha simha* consists of two zones: the *shatt* or *sahil* (i.e. "the coast," "as far as one can still see the sea"), and the area of *sha'ir wi mar'a* ("the barley and pasture area"). *Ma'isha wihsha* is the zone beyond the plateau where nothing grows, the *daf'a* or *sibta* ("uncultivable
361 land which is sandy and stoney"). All of the Bedouins of al-Qasr are settled permanently either on the coast or just south in the barley and pasture area. Nomadic and semi-nomadic activity disappeared generations ago in this part of the desert.

823 When the Bedouins speak of al-Qasr, they are referring
103 to an area which is traditionally defined. When the Egyptians
131 speak of al-Qasr, they are referring to a "village" only recently incorporated. The difference is a substantial one and not merely a difference in dialect. The Bedouins use the term *mintaqit al-Qasr* ("the area, or territory, of al-Qasr"): the Egyptians say *qaryit al-Qasr* ("the village of al-Qasr").
000 As the Bedouins view it, the Western Desert is the *watan*

[p. 230]

APPENDIX I

CYRENAICAN PLACE-NAMES FREQUENTLY MENTIONED IN THE TEXT

103

Spelling in the text	*Italian spelling*
al-Abyar	el-Abiar
Ajadabiya	Agedabia
‘Akrama	Acroma
al-‘Aqaila	el-Agheila
al-‘Arqub	el-Argub
Aujila	Augila
al-‘Azziyyat	el-Ezzeiat
(al-Zawiya) al-Baida	Zauia el-Beda (Beda Littoria)
al-Banba	Bomba
Banghazi	Bengasi
Banina	Benina
al-Burdi Sulaiman	Bardia
Dariyana	Driana
Darna	Derna
al-Fayidiya	el-Faidia (De Martino)
(Bir) Hakaim	(Bir) Hacheim
al-Haniya	el-Hania
Jaghbub	Giarabub
Jalu	Gialo
Janzur	Gianzur
Jardis al-‘Abid	Gerdes el-Abid
al-Jikharra	Gicherra
Khawalan	Chaulan
al-Makhili	el-Mechili
Marawa	Maraua
al-Marj	el-Merg (Barce)
Massa	Messa (Luigi Razza)
Msus	Msus
al-Naufiliya	en-Nofilia
al-Qaiqab	el-Ghegab
al-Qasur	el-Gsur
al-Qatafiya	el-Gtafia
al-Qubba	el-Gubba (Giovanni Berta)
al-Sallum	es-Sollum
Shahhat	Sciahhat (Cirene)

Spelling in the text	*Italian spelling*
al-Shlaidima	esc-Sceleidima
Slanta	Slonta
Suluq	Soluch
Susa (Marsa)	Susa (Marsa) (Apollonia)
al-Tailimun	Tilimun
Taknis	Tecnis
Talmaitha	Tolmeta
Tart	Tert
Taukra	Tocra
Tubruq	Tobruch
al-Zuwaitina	ez-Zuetina

121 for comparative study, they do not represent the ethnological entity known as the Awlad 'Ali. However, one might heuristically think of al-Qasr as a post-tribal or pre-peasant stage of social change, and on this basis generate some hypotheses about the sedentarization process or other specific cultural processes.

126
104 The translation of the Arabic documents presented here were made in the field. In most of the cases, translating took place on the spot and this may account for some of the awkward phraseology. Arabic terms and names have been transliterated according to the system used by Cowan in An Introduction to Modern Literary Arabic (1958) with certain exceptions: long vowels are shown by a double vowel; the guttural stop is indicated by an apostrophe; and the glottal stop is indicated by the use of a short "e," such as in 'aiela ("family").

000 I owe a great deal of gratitude to my former teachers who have given freely of their time and knowledge and have shown an interest in my training in anthropology and Middle
122 Eastern studies. I would like to thank in particular Dr. William Sanders, of Pennsylvania State University, who introduced me to anthropology; Dr. David Bidney, of Indiana University, and Dr. P. J. Vatikiotis, now of the London School of Oriental and African Studies, who were my advisers in anthropology and Middle Eastern studies during my graduate training; Dr. Irfan Shahid, now of Georgetown University, who instructed me in the Arabic language; Dr. Vincent Cantarino, of Indiana University, who instructed me in Arabic literature

APPENDEX I

GLOSSARY OF ARABIC TERMS USED

104
601

Abb	أب	father
'acd	عقد	contract
Akh	أخ	brother
'amar el dam	عمار الدم	unity of blood (vengeance group)
'amd	عمد	intention
'amm	عم	father's brother
'aqila	عاقلة	wise man; leader of a bait
bait	بيت	house
bait el shan'a	بيت الشنعة	house of the dreadful deed
baraka	بركة	blessing
barawa	براوة	to ostracize from membership in a particular group
bint	ابنة	daughter
bint 'amm	بنت عم	father's brother's daughter
bint haram	بنت حرام	illegitimate girl
beer sama	بير سما	sky well
diyya	دية	bloodmoney
daraieb	درايب	the tribal laws and customs
'eila	عيلة	family
el-fatha	الفاتحة	the beginning chapter of the Koran; the initial ceremony in the marriage
feddan	فدان	acre
ghish	غش	cheating, or unfair deal
ibn	ابن	son
ibn 'amm	ابن عم	father's brother's son
iktitab	اكتاب	tribal adoption

● 104 jad	جد	grandfather
[601] jaddah	جدة	grandmother
kabara	كبارة	face-saving compensation
kabila	قبيلة	tribe
katl	قتل	killing
khate'	خطأ	by accident
kishk	كشك	dried milk
[601] khal	خال	mother's brother
Koran	قرآن	the Islamic sacred book
mahr	مهر	bridewealth
mardi	مرضي	go-between
maleh	مالح	sour milk
mi'ad	ميعاد	tribal hearing
murabiteen (sing., murabit)	مرابطين (مرابط)	holymen, client tribes
Mustagilleen	مستقلين	independent tribes
nagei'	نجع	camp
nazala	نزالة	refuge
nazzar	نظار	one who assesses the amount of compensation for wounds and bodily injuries
nasafa	نصفة	compensation for a wife
omda	عمدة	a government appointed tribal leader
sayem	صائم	a male who fasts the month of Ramadan, an adult
sadaqa	صدقة	obligatory tribute
sa'adi	سعادي	the original tribes of Awlad Ali
sheikh	شيخ	any tribal leader, or an old man

● 104 **sura**	سورة	**a chapter in the Koran**
Shei'a	شيعة	**the unorthodox sector of Muslim practices**
Sunni	سنّى	**the orthodox Muslim group**
shar	شر	**evil**
thebeiha	ذبيحة	**a sacrifice**
[601] **ukht**	أخت	**sister**
umm	أم	**mother**
watan	وطن	**homeland**
wakil	وكيل	**a legal guardian**
zawya	زاوية	**a religious center**
zena	زنا	**adultry**

128 development of the Order which sprang from their association. The Sanusi of Cyrenaica, and elsewhere, are so called because they adhere to the Islamic Order of the Sanusiya which takes its name from its founder al-Sayyid Muhammad bin 'Ali al-Sanusi and has been directed by his descendants. I have, therefore, described briefly the nature of an Islamic Order and how this particular Order became established and spread. The Sanusiya differs from most other Orders not so much in its teachings and rites as in its political and economic organization, a development arising from its absorption into the Bedouin tribal structure, but owing much also to opposition from the outside, particularly to the Italo-Sanusi wars. For this reason I have described in the latter part of the book Italo-Sanusi relations at some length. If in doing so I have sometimes expressed indignation, I do not wish it to be thought that I have any but friendly feelings for Italy and her people, or that I believe the Italian colonial record to be very different from the records of other Colonial Powers.

● 104
128 I have transliterated Arabic words in the simplest way. The Arabist will know, or can easily discover, how they are written in Arabic, and those who do not know the language would be little the wiser had I transliterated them differently. For the uninitiated it need only be said that the letter 'q', which stands for the Arabic letter *qaf*, has in Cyrenaica the value of a hard 'g' as in the English word 'goat', that 'gh', which stands for the Arabic letter *ghain*, has the value the Parisian gives to the 'r' in 'Paris', and that ', which stands for the Arabic letter *'ain*, is a guttural sound peculiar to Arabic. I have not been entirely consistent in the spelling of Arabic words in that I have retained the usual English spelling of such words as Cairo, Mecca, Kufra, Caramanli, and Koran, and that I have treated some Arabic words as though they were English words and have, therefore, not italicized them and have given them the common English plural form, e.g. Shaikhs, qadis, Sharifs, mudirs, and zawiyas. I have used the Arabic names of places instead of classical or Italian names: Shahhat, Marsa Susa, and al-Marj instead of Cirene, Apollonia, and Barce. If I need to excuse myself for this on the grounds that Cyrenaica is to-day an Arab country, no apology is needed for using the Arab names for the sites of recently built Italian colonial settlements, in naming

which the Italians commemorated persons who for the most part 104
might well be forgotten. To aid the reader I have listed at the 128
end of the book the chief place-names mentioned in the text with their Italian equivalents. It will be observed that the Italian way of writing Arabic words is different from our way: where we write Suluq, Tubruq, Banghazi, and Jaghbub, they write Soluch, Tobruch, Bengasi, and Giarabub.

I have cut the book to half its original size and have con- 128
sequently been compelled to omit a mass of detail. I have also restricted references to quotations and to statements which seem particularly to require the citation of an authority. Much of the omitted detail and many of the deleted references will be found in various articles and papers I have published on the Sanusi elsewhere. In a few instances I have not been able to check references because the books cited are unobtainable in England.

I acknowledge the generous help of many British and Arab 000
friends, especially of Major-General D. C. Cumming, Muhammad Shafiq Effendi Hamza, and the warm-hearted companion of my travels Salih bu 'Abd al-Salam.

I thank Mr. E. L. Peters and Miss Sonya Gregory for help 128
in preparation of the maps.

E. E. E.-P.

OXFORD
April 1948

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CHAPTER VII

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

121 In this study I have attempted to understand and
128 to describe the structure and process of Bedouin society
●105 in al-Qasr by utilizing the data of politics. The primary assumption of the study has been that political analysis must proceed along lines which give recognition to, and focus upon, the centrality of the concept and structure of authority and the way in which it contributes to an orderly social process. This study has dealt with the structure and function of authority and, as much as possible, its theory and practice in both contemporary and historical Bedouin society. Authority in al-Qasr is intimately tied up with the system of rights and obligations obtaining between individuals which is expressed through a structure of social roles. At another level of social organization, the rights and obligations inherent in a structure of authority inform a segmentary lineage system. Part of this study aims to understand and to underline the organizational principles from which the Bedouins of al-Qasr derive their meaning of authority, social roles, and social interaction.

In the first part of the study some of the general

128 historical aspects and specific economic facts of the Bedouin
105 social process were made explicit. The intention of the first
121 two chapters was to indicate the scope and dynamics of culture change now occurring through the growth of a market economy and the expansion of political awareness in al-Qasr. The economic transformation of Bedouin society and the move towards political integration into the larger Egyptian society are, more and more, reflected in a shift from dependence upon communal-based social ties to associative relationships based upon private landholding, individual competitive participation in the national economy and profit-keeping, and new rights and obligations brought on by the activities of national and provincial level politics.

The first part of this study also sought to understand the meaning of social change in al-Qasr. Due to historical experiences and ecological factors, social structure and social change carry different meanings for the Bedouin recipients and the Egyptian agents of change. In some cases, it was seen, it is even dubious that Egyptian officials are responding to the felt needs of the Bedouins. As background to a later discussion of authority and change, we tried to understand what the felt needs of the Bedouins are at this time. One aspect of this problem was to define the traditional units of Bedouin society as opposed to the modern administrative units, and to consider change in light of this contrast. My

128 concern with the nature of al-Qasr's past not only helps us
105 to understand the Bedouin present but should also help us
121 to conceive of the Bedouin future. What data I was able to collect concerning the historical development of the Bedouin authority structure and its place in the economic transformation of Bedouin society relate to the later discussion of the ascribed nature of leadership roles and the probability that, in the future, access to political roles will become a matter of individual achievement and a heightened awareness of things political. In connection with this we saw that the Governor of Marsa Matruh through the institution of new bureaucratic structures, such as the Governor's Council and new electoral guidelines, is fostering political change in this direction.

Although the largest part of this study dealt with the political aspect of traditional roles and structures, the contention was that traditional complexes are increasingly unable to deal with the cultural problems of the day. This applies to economic as well as political structures, as the first part of this study is intended to show. But among the New Nations and, in particular, whenever we are dealing with tribal and peasant communities, "the most striking changes have been the decline in the authority of the elders in terms of both community and family organization . . . (because) the life experience of the elders . . . is at best only partially relevant to the current needs) (Halpern 1967:123).

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Authority represents and maintains a legitimate political order and an allotment of power. Without a system of authoritative norms, conflict could not be restrained and no social system could survive (Parsons 1960:183). As the concept of authority and its meaning undergo change so also do the appropriate structures and the power distribution between persons and groups change. The structure and dynamics of authority in al-Qasr were investigated through an analysis of the categories and interrelations of the Bedouin segmentary lineage system. This analysis was based primarily upon a definition of the organizational concepts and principles of Bedouin society such as unilineal rule of descent, residence, cognation, and contractual agreement and alliance.

While knowledge of these structural principles is fundamental to an understanding of Bedouin society, it was noted that a strict reliance on them would tend to limit one's understanding of politics in al-Qasr since they in fact conceal the nature of power and the functioning of semi-institutionalized roles. Nevertheless, these structural principles are informed by a set of key beliefs and values which are inculcated during the socialization process, and in a complementary way all of these concepts lend support to a corporate structure of authority. This corporate structure of authority which was discussed in terms of the concept and leadership role, or office, of _'aqila_ was claimed to be the

128 basis of social control in traditional Bedouin society. To
•105 a large extent the corporate authority structure in al-Qasr
121 is still intact but is undergoing change at this time. Change of the rule of consensus and the way in which it has reference to traditional principles of organization for the regulation of politics is the subject of the final two chapters in this study.

The unilinear principle and its corollary, the corporate group, were defined as the basis for the structural division of Bedouin society into groups. Within the context of a traditional struggle for ecological advantage and a growing participation in the modern political process of interest group conflict, the lineage groups of al-Qasr were considered as political, or authority, groups. The membership and boundaries of these political groups parallel those of structures formed through an alliance of tertiary segments of the lineage system which is itself sanctioned by the rules of unilineality, marriage, residence, and adherence to a legal and moral code known as the rawaabit al-'awaaqil ("the bonds of the wise men"). The central political notion of Bedouin society, and the one which converts a kinship group into a political group, is that of 'aqila. The 'aqila principle, which is manifest in the role of the corporate leader, refers to both the idea of collective responsibility and to a politically instituted office. The concept of 'aqila is essential to an understanding

128 of internal social control and political group interaction
• 105 in Bedouin society. In order to grasp the meaning of _'aqila_
121 in Bedouin society it was necessary to explore something of
the history of the concept.

Max Weber (1947:143-145) has drawn attention to the political significance of collective responsibility and the way in which it is related to the concepts of corporate leadership and self-help (blood-revenge) in traditional societies such as the Bedouins of al-Qasr represent: "All are held responsible for the action of any one . . . (and) the action of certain members, the 'representatives,' may be binding upon the others." Blood-revenge, or the law of self-help, is an instance of regulation through convention, and this practice, Weber claims, leads to "solidarity." Weber further claims, and is supported by the evidence which I present here concerning the concept of _'aqila_, that we are likely to find a representative office especially where money must be collected and administered in the interest of the group (p. 145).

In modern political anthropology, Evans-Pritchard was the first to clearly equate kinship relations with political relations: he conceived of kinship groups as political conflict groups within the framework of a balanced opposition between structurally and ideologically similar units (1940:190). I have obviously found this conceptualization of tribal

128 politics very helpful, but the major emphasis of my study was
121 the authority structure rather than the kinship structure.
105 Authority was considered in terms of two aspects, both of which tell us something about kinship structure: in one way authority is the property of relations which obtain between persons and roles of a group, and it acts to define the structural boundaries and to secure the structural continuity of the group; in another way, authority is the property of a tertiary group expressed at the secondary level of the lineage structure and represented by the office of 'aqila. In this last sense, authority defines the group vis a vis other groups and acts to promote political order in society. Authority, in view of these two aspects, was described as operating at the various levels of the lineage structure, i.e., the familial, the internal and external levels. I sought to clarify the discussion by defining concepts and roles which characterize authority and political action at these various levels. One role, the shaib, which functions solely at the familial level of the authority structure was described; the fully institutionalized authority role of 'aqila was analyzed as were a number of only partly institutionalized roles, or power roles. The most important of these power roles was seen to be that of the rajal khair. The institutionalized roles, and this includes the shaib or head of the household, were described as functioning

128 121 105 according to public expectational patterns while the non-institutionalized roles, being by definition less impinged upon by structural norms, could function outside these patterns. This distinction between types of roles was seen to be the basis of the rajal khair's ability to manipulate persons and events in a play for power. These three levels of authority were factored out from one another solely for analytical reasons. In reality, the one shades into the other: the authority of the shaib at times overlaps with that of the 'aqila, and the power of the rajal khair and rajal salih at time impinge upon, and detract from, the rightful influence of both the shaib and the 'aqila. Role analysis, as it is used in this study, I consider one of the most important methods available for an investigation of a political problem.

Through political role analysis it was shown that the role of 'aqila is the most important for an understanding of the structure and functioning of Bedouin society. Political, or authority, groups are defined in terms of the presence or absence of this role; hence the whole political structure proceeds from this concept. The legitimacy of the 'aqila, and therefore the legitimacy of the political order which obtains, stems from an explicit legal agreement among members of the tertiary and secondary groups known as the rawaabit al-'awaaqil. These bonds are a contract between the 'aqila and the other members of the corporate group, a mutual pact which

128 sets forth the rights and duties of the political office and
121 the corporate members. The duplication and reciprocal honor-
•105 ing of this contract by tertiary groups related, in fact or fiction, according to the unilineal principle gives rise to a political alliance of groups who are viewed as "one corporate body" at the secondary level of the lineage structure by all outsiders. Structural relations between secondary groups in Bedouin society are chartered in accordance with the several principles of social organization, such as marriage, contract, residence, and also according to the process of conflict control.

Actual conflict in al-Qasr usually takes place between secondary groups even though it is sometimes expressed as conflict between primary or tribal groupings. Coalition for the attainment of political goals and the process of conflict control at the supra-tertiary levels of the lineage hierarchy depend upon the recognition of mutual usefulness and a common means for settling disputes and re-establishing social harmony. The problem-solving device which assures the conditions of an orderly social process is the system of Bedouin customary law, a set of legal and moral norms (Fortes and Evans-Pritchard 1940:20), known as the 'awaiyid Awlad 'Ali ("the customs of the sons of 'Ali").

The customary law of the Bedouins of al-Qasr was described and a number of case studies occurring at the various levels of the lineage and authority structure was

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105 presented. According to the moral and legal norms of the Bedouins, conflict control is effected formally and informally. A primary value of Bedouin society instructs all men to mediate conflict whenever possible lest quarrels spread to involve more people and a wider loss of rights. Redress of wrongs takes place through the intervention of, what were defined as, either a mediator at the informal level or an arbiter at the formal level of conflict control. If neither of these peace-making mechanisms is invoked, or should both fail in their attempt to restore social harmony, then the law of self-help, or blood-revenge, may operate. This method of controlling conflict is, according to most of the Bedouins, to be avoided at all costs.

The notion of the "third party" to conflict was developed in this study. It was pointed out that in the case of the triadic relationship in conflict control it is the rajal khair or the rajal salih who usually becomes involved, and that this role has the right to mediate but not to judge. This is in fact the distinction which the Bedouins themselves make between the roles of arbiter-'aqila and mediator-"third party." This differentiation between political roles is equivalent to a distinction between formal authority and informal power.

In order to further explicate the political role-set in Bedouin society a classificatory distinction was made

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between traditional roles and modern legal roles; the former category included the _'aqila_, the _rajal khair_, and _rajal salih_, while the latter was made up of the _'umda_ and the _shaikh._ The roles of _'umda_ and _shaikh_ have been historically imposed upon the Bedouins from without and thus were not viewed as indigenous to the al-Qasr political system. The role classification used here, which is borrowed from the work of Max Weber, is purely analytical for in reality both of the modern legal roles figure importantly in any complete treatment of Bedouin authority and its structure. All of the role-players who make up the internal and external authority structures of al-Qasr were considered to be members of a "status group" who possess high "status-honor" which is based upon family and wealth and, to a lesser extent in modern times, age.

Finally, the concept of the "cultural broker" was introduced in an attempt to delineate the nature of political change in al-Qasr. In the last chapter of the study the case study of Hajj 'Ali was used to develop the idea of "cultural broker." In some ways, the first five chapters of this study serve as a background to the discussion of Hajj 'Ali as a "cultural broker." The dynamics of the historical, economic, and political situations, the changing meanings of kinship concepts and other structures, and the growing tendency to trust secular as opposed to sacred and traditional authority, all of these factors converge to attach importance and immediacy

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to an understanding of the role of "cultural broker" in the present and future of al-Qasr.

Hajj 'Ali provided us with an example of the secularization of traditional society. This process has been described as one "whereby men become increasingly rational, analytical, and empirical in their political action (Almond and Powell 1966:24). A number of the critical attitudes held by Hajj 'Ali had to do with the Bedouin conception of marriage, law, and authority; in each case it was seen that he questioned the legitimacy of Bedouin tradition and, eventually, would like to steer the Bedouins of al-Qasr away from this world view into the larger Egyptian political community. Besides Hajj 'Ali's discontent with the _'awaiyid Awlad 'Ali_ and other Bedouin customs, it was suggested that he desired change in al-Qasr's traditional structures and ideas because of his own design upon higher status and authority in the Egyptian bureaucracy of Marsa Matruh, a reference group with which all members of the "status group" identify.

What is happening in the case of Hajj 'Ali and al-Qasr is a sign of the times as far as the New Nations are concerned. The growing need for centralization in order to compete on the international market transforms the traditional structures of the New Nations whenever and wherever it must. But this process is not just a matter of induced change; it is not a one-sided affair. Inherently, any social structure,

128 including "traditional" ones, is a dynamic mechanism for the
121 solution of cultural problems. Related to this is the fact
•105 that the individuals who manipulate these mechanisms are creative and responsive agents of change themselves. The need for central coordination and cooperation with national governments sets the stage and provides the stimuli for new cultural responses and devices which result in novel and creative internal reorganization and reintegration around new cultural patterns (Moore 1958:1-28). The case of Hajj 'Ali illustrates the beginnings of such a reorganizational process in al-Qasr.

The main objective striven for in this study deals with only one aspect of the problem of change in the New Nations, but it is an important aspect: all politically-oriented researchers should try to explain the legitimacy and the dynamics of authority and structure in society. In my particular case, discussion centered on lineage theory and its corollary the corporate group, and authority was treated in terms of political role analysis and local leadership patterns. Change was viewed almost wholly as an endogenous process, but the importance of exogenous forces was not played down. It was claimed that an essential part of the "cultural broker" role was to legitimate the authority of the nation-state in order to effect change and legitimate his own authority role.

Conflict control was seen as a life-long process. As

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128 culture change takes place, new bases for conflict arise and
121 new devices for control come into being. Politics was viewed
105 as the process of problem solution by the group, from the family level to the total societal level. Politics involves the struggle for, and the legitimation of, power, and functions to bring about some kind of an ideological adjustment between political groups: "Systems of beliefs are made in the image of an idealized home, and there one loves and obeys one's parents, loves the remaining members of the family, and treats all other persons as outsiders" (De Grazia 1948:49).

A struggle for power characterizes Bedouin society as it does any other human society. Equality in al-Qasr, as in all human societies, is an ideal and only an ideal. Inequality, in reality, persists and structures the patterns and issues of conflict in Bedouin society. There are possessors and non-possessors of property and wealth: there are possessors and non-possessors of "status honor." Consequently, there are possessors and non-possessors of authority, for authority derives from property and "status honor." But in al-Qasr, and in every human society, property is not the singular prerequisite of "status honor" and authority. (In this sense, one fundamental aspect of Marxian theory is totally incorrect.) We saw in the cases of 'Amm Salih the "holy man" and the prospective 'aqila of Bait Braik, that authority is determined in terms of a complex of structural and ideational

128 factors. Nevertheless, in al-Qasr inequality does exist and
121 is related to an unequal distribution of authority between
●105 individuals and groups, and the important point is that this
is the basis of conflict. As culture change proceeds along with al-Qasr's need to be integrated into the national society, the threat to the traditional distribution of power and authority will foster new patterns of conflict; new means for dealing with conflict will also have to be found. Creative individuals such as Hajj 'Ali will have a hand in the new processes of conflict control and cultural invention. Traditional patterns of conflict and political structures provide meaning and a semblance of stability to al-Qasr society, but when conformity to political values becomes relative to motives of expediency, when politics become secularized, then instability and change in structures follow. And traditional concepts must be redefined and reevaluated to cope with the new conditions.

121 In the case of the New Nations, political change seems to be reflected in a shift from traditional organizational principles to a modern bureaucratic principle which entails a higher differentiation in the political structure. And, as Fortes (1953:24) has noted, unilinear descent groups, such as the Bedouins of al-Qasr, tend to break down when specialization sets in.

The notion of viewing social change in terms of a shift to the bureaucratic structural principle is not, of

● 105 The judicial process among Awlad Ali of the Western Desert of
Egypt has been dealt with in the context of political organization of
105 the group. The main feature of the political organization of Awlad Ali
613 is the absence of centralized leadership. The only formally recognized
leadership is that of the aqila, the leader of the bait tribal segment.
105 The sources of the aqila's authority derive from a number of sources,
613 one of which is his judicial role. It is through him that disputes involving
629 members of his bait are solved. The process by which he performs
this crucial function is that of informal mediation in which both
the personal qualities of the aqila, as well as the weight of his tribal
[592] segment, play an important role. This is especially important in a society
with no court system or formal hearing and where durability of any
settlement depends on its being accepted by the parties involved.

105 The main aim of the judicial process is to affect reconciliation of
182 the parties and to restore a certain degree of social order and cohesion
627 that was disrupted by the dispute. The need to restore the social order
[619] and to maintain friendly relations between tribal members is a response
to certain aspects of the natural and social environment in which the
105 group finds itself. Natural resources in the area are very meager, and
182 subsistence activities require that the tribesmen constantly move with
619 their herds for pasture throughout an area already divided among the
233 various tribal segments. Since the place and nature of pasture differ
from one year to the next, the identity of the specific tribal unit which
would be sought for help varies correspondingly. This creates a general
feeling of dependency that characterizes the social relations in the area.

105 On the other hand, there is always a feeling of rivalry and hostility
578 between the different tribal segments which goes back to the era of
571 tribal warfare. Thus, the social relations among the tribal population
are characterized by a certain amount of ambivalence which is hidden behind
a facade of formality in the way tribal members treat one another
105 in day-to-day activities. There are certain rules of etiquette describing
571 the way members of the same tribal segment should behave toward one
576 another and toward other tribesmen and outsiders. Failure to abide by
[589] these rules may subject the violator to a symbolic fine of a goat or a
[574] sheep slaughtered for a feast to which everyone is invited. These feasts,
[182] or dinners as they are called, have various functions, the most important
105 of which is the integrative one. In an area where the population is usually
571 dispersed, these dinners offer an opportunity to the tribesmen who
574 happen to be in the area at the time of the feast to attend, where they
182 eat, meet other tribesmen, and exchange information about what is happening
in other parts of the area. It is from such dinners that the tribesmen
get to know about the available pastures, about the prices of sheep
and goats in different markets, and about who is doing what and where.
The occasion also signifies the restoration of the violator of the rules
to the social life of the group and the reinforcement of those rules.
105 This is also true with the tribal meetings, or mi'ad, which are held to
627 announce settlements in more serious cases. It is on this basis that
182 [illegible] the mi'ad should not be considered as a tribal court. It is more of a
574 social occasion where food and drinks are served and where parties involved
and all those invited by them talk about everything except the
[illegible] dispute itself. In certain instances, the financial settlement agreed
upon in the informal mediation is exaggerated when announced in the mi'ad

105 so that part of it may be reduced in honor of some prominent members
629 182 who are attending the meeting. When part of the financial agreement is
681 reduced in honor of a person, this creates an obligation on the part of
554 that person to reciprocate in a similar situation when one arises. This
creates an active interest in the settlement on the part of individuals
who otherwise are not involved, and insures the durability of the settlement. The social cohesion is maintained.

105 The need to keep friendly relations with all tribesmen is reflected
571 578 in the judicial process in its procedural aspect, as well as in judicial
627 reasoning, that is, the logic according to which facts in certain cases
182 are assessed. With regard to procedures, there is an emphasis on avoiding face-to-face confrontations between the disputing parties until an agreement has been reached by means of the mediators. Only then is it that the parties see and talk to one another. This is especially true in serious cases such as homicide or serious assault where face-to-face confrontation is likely to lead to more hostilities.

105 The emphasis on reconciliation may explain, at least in part, the in-
571 formality of the judicial process. Leaving the process of dispute settle-
627 182 ment informal gives it a measure of flexibility which permits the treatment of each case as unique without being tied down by rigid formal rules. This does not mean, however, that there are no rules to be followed, or that there is no place for legal precedents. It simply means that the rules are very general and that the legal precedents are used merely as a guide in solving similar cases. The main guide remains, however, the desire to achieve a successful settlement that satisfies all parties. It is only through achieving such successful settlements that the social order is maintained and the tribal cohesion is secured.

*175 Order was 'not a true and proper State but something very
*648 similar'.[1] We have seen how these political functions were
*795 further developed under the rule of Sayyid al-Mahdi and how
793 under the rule of Sayyid Ahmad al-Sharif what may justly be called an embryonic State came into being. The Head of the Order was by this time less the religious Head of an Islamic fraternity than the leading representative of a nascent nationalism which became increasingly conscious of itself in the long struggle against the Italians under Sanusiya leadership. In this struggle the Order became more and more a political organization which directed, administratively, economically, and militarily, the entire Bedouin population, and morally the entire population of Cyrenaica, Bedouin and townsmen alike, against the common enemy. When truce was made in 1917, whatever the Italians and British may have asserted to the contrary, they had, in fact, to treat with Sayyid Idris not only as the Head of a religious Order, but also as the Head of a political organization which represented, and alone represented, the political aspirations of a people. As events turned out, the Italians, by destroying the Sanusiya organization, cut out the intervening structure of lodges and Shaikhs and made more evident the political status of the Head of the Order.

105 What has happened during the century which has passed
*175 since the first Brothers of the Order began to build the lodge
*648 and till the soil at what is now al-Zawiya al-Baida must be
*795 viewed in relation to Bedouin tribal structure. A man coming
793 from outside and with religious authority established himself as Head of the acephalous Bedouin society of Cyrenaica, and circumstances in which that whole society was forced to act for a long period of time against external enemies transformed his religious fraternity into a political organization. The Sanusiya Order from the first identified itself with the Bedouin and laboured to bring about tribal unity under its aegis. Under
[668] Turkish rule nationalist tendencies, as distinct from, and overriding, tribal loyalties, were latent, and the role of the Sanusiya within the frame of the Ottoman Empire was still predominantly religious rather than political; but when the Italians sought to subjugate the Bedouin their resistance, in the very clear moral issue presented to them, manifested itself

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[1] Op. cit., p. 11.

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as a nationalist movement, with a corresponding effect on the 175*
character of the Sanusiya Order and on the status of its Head. 648*
The final stage in the transformation of a religious revival into 795*
a political movement was brought about by the clash of Euro- 793
pean arms. Amid the roar of planes and guns the Bedouin learnt [668]
to see themselves more clearly as a single people, the Sanusi of
Cyrenaica, in a wider world, and came to be regarded as such by
those engaged in the struggle.

613 kin also exist. Two ways of naming these clusters are adopted—
602 all groups, whether they are elementary families, an odd assort-
121 ment of kindred sharing a common tent for reasons of expedi-
178 ency, or tribal groups, have a name. Sometimes these clusters are
621 named after a prominent living male, or a deceased kinsman of
the same kind. Sometimes these little groups are named after a
173 woman, perhaps the grandmother of the group.[15] Thus a small
551 group of two or three tents will be distinguished from another
similar cluster within the camp, and so on for a number of groups, depending on the size of the camp. Most camps, however many tents they contain, have names for progressively inclusive clusters of tents until a twofold named division is reached. Tertiary segments that are forced to split contain therefore two groups with names already attached to them. When a split occurs, the name of the tertiary segment is pushed into the area of ambiguity and the names of what were previously two clusters become the names of two new tertiary segments, with a minimum adjustment in usage and a minor re-shuffle at the tertiary level of segmentation. Names cannot continue to be pushed into this area of the genealogy interminably, otherwise it would gradually expand into a vast pool of names. For a few generations the name dispensed with in this way becomes one of those ancestors about whom there is argument when genealogies are given. In the course of time, name after name is subjected to the process of elision and eventually will cease to be of concern to anyone.

105 I now summarize the main points of the discussion. The evi-
dence that has been examined suggests that the mechanical de-
613 vices of telescoping, fusion of names, and extinction of lines do
173 not affect orders of segmentation superior to that of the tertiary
178 order, and that in conditions of a completely stable population,
[551] these devices alone would suffice to retain the form of the genea-
logical structure. But, it was argued, conditions of complete stability cannot be assumed; the evidence of the present distribution of population among the numerous tertiary groups clearly points to marked fluctuations occurring within these small groups. This being so, proliferation of these groups in some areas at some

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[15] The naming of groups within a tertiary segment is an interesting study in itself, but it would be outside the limits of this discussion to make more than a brief mention of it.

times, must follow, and conversely, while proliferation takes 105 place here, combination will be taking place elsewhere as the 613 population of groups decreases. The condition which compels 173 proliferation is the alteration in the relationship of man and ani- 178 mals to the natural resources; and when this alteration builds up to an acute pressure on water and land, one group of a divided segment must move off to seek water elsewhere.

The next task was to demonstrate where this kind of change occurred on the genealogy. The sudden irregularity in the number of segments at the tertiary order, compared with the uniformity at others, provided a clue. Other evidence also pointed to this as a significant order in this context: there is ambiguity displayed with regard to the identity and positioning of ancestors here; members adopted into a lineage are grafted on to it here; clients are attached to tertiary sections; groups of noblemen, when they are detached and move off to another tribe, break away at this point. This is where change occurs, but, it was agreed, in understanding the way in which it takes place, certain forms of marriage have to be taken into account. Particular emphasis was placed on cross-cousin marriage with the mother's brother's daughter, and to women outside the tertiary segment, since the effect of these forms of marriage is to produce two or more clusters of cognatic kindred in camps largely composed of agnates, and to emphasize the line of cleavage in a lineage segment. So that when, therefore, a split occurs, the line it takes is predetermined. Proliferation, even when necessary, does not finally come about, however, until an occasion permits the separation of groups to be demonstrated by a violation of the conditions of membership of a group. Details of three such occasions were offered: the demand for blood-money between agnates who previously had constituted a politically undivided section; behaviour contrary to the demands of agnatic kinship in attendance and gift-giving at funerals; and failure to participate in a pilgrimage to the saint's tomb of a particular section. But another query [551] remained: how are the newly formed groups named? It was seen that names already in daily use by the small group of people concerned came to assume a new significance, while the name which had previously spanned them all is disregarded and pushed into the area of ambiguity whence later it is elided altogether.

105 613 173 178 Change due to the normal and inevitable process of proliferation is thus managed within the structural limits of the tertiary section without disturbing any of the superior orders in the system. The latter remain fixed over long periods, but the tertiary sections of a particular secondary action may be reduced in number over a few generations while another secondary section may show a corresponding increase in the number of its segments.

121 178 613 161 By combining the various factors involved in change, it is possible to understand the details of lineage proliferation, or at least to travel along a well signposted road. In the light of this analysis, moreover, it is unnecessary to assume a stable population in each and every segment over long periods; the mechanisms of readjustment allow for substantial irregularities and fluctuations in population. It is possible that they are also sufficient to contain significant increases in the aggregate population. They could almost certainly control minor fluctuations, but it is seriously doubted whether a population increase sufficient to produce a country-wide and acute water shortage could be met merely by the proliferation of tertiary lineage segments. But to deal with this problem other aspects of the Bedouin genealogy and details of Cyrenaican history, which have necessarily been omitted from this discussion, would have to be taken into account, and this is best left for another article.

178 166 villages and towns, especially at Mersa Matrouh which is the seat of the local government. The second world war was also influential in changing attitude and social values. Men who were employed as unskilled labourers during the war by the different combating armies became accustomed to paid jobs and to cash remuneration, which had previously been practically unknown to them. When the war ended, it was not easy for those workers to go back to the old nomadic life with all its hardships and insecurity. Some of them preferred to migrate to the Delta, while the others decided to settle down to work in the desert villages and towns as servants or as unskilled labour in the local government departments, schools, hospitals, etc. Most of the younger men now prefer to follow their example; the settled sedentary life is thus gaining ground all the time at the expense of livestock husbandry.

000 But important as they may be in accelerating the drift from nomadism to sedentary life, these factors fall beyond the scope of this paper and need not be discussed further in this context. We shall be concerned with the plans and schemes which are deliberately designed to deal with the settlement of the nomadic and semi-nomadic clans. But before going on to consider this problem we should like to give a brief outline of the area itself so as to establish a clear idea about the general setting, and to see the projects themselves against a background of the whole social life. This should help us to understand more clearly the motives underlying the projects and to discern the effects they may have on the social situation.

133 105• Geographers generally divide the Western Desert into three main divisions, each of which has its outstanding characteristics.

1. The northern strip which extends some 500 kilometres along the coast from the west of Alexandria to the Egyptian-Libyan border. This strip, known as the *Dera'a Bahari*, consists mainly of fertile cultivated land which extends some 20 to 30 kilometres to the south, tending generally to become narrower to the west till it almost vanishes at Sollum near the frontiers.
2. To the south of this green coastal zone lies a high plateau in which are a number of depressions, the most important being the Qattara Depression.
3. The rest of the area; i.e. the extreme southern region, is real arid desert.

The coastal zone is the only really inhabited and cultivated part of the desert; beyond it there is hardly any prospect for cultivation. It is also a vital centre to which the scattered clans and groups of herders come to gather round the water points and the artesian wells during the dry season when the water becomes scarce in the southern parts.

132 105 The climate of the desert varies between the Mediterranean climate to the north and along the coast, and the sub-tropical dry climate in the southern parts. The dry season is usually very warm, tending to grow hotter southwards; while the wet season, usually extending from November to March, is generally mild especially in the north. Rainfall is very erratic and varies greatly from year to year and from one place to another. But on the whole, there is more rain in the north than in the south, and in most years rain falls in the southern parts only on very rare occasions. Rain may come quite suddenly and cause torrential floods which sweep away dwellings, crops and animals alike. This is typical of the Sallum area.

162 105 According to the 1947 census, the Bedouins of the Western Desert number 68,161. Only 23,444, i.e. less than the half of the population, are engaged in

7:Abou-Zeid E-5 (no date) 1959 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9
Egypt

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livestock husbandry as their main occupation while the rest earn their living by such other means as agriculture, fishing, stone-cutting, trade, etc. But whatever his main job may be, a man is likely to possess a number of sheep which he usually entrusts to a professional herdsman if he cannot look after them himself. This means that all sectors of the population have an active interest in livestock. Livestock, or rather sheep, are the most important and most esteemed item of wealth, and pastoral values still rank very high in spite of the obvious attraction of other types of work. On the other hand, pure nomadism is not practised, except perhaps by some small groups of camel-herders living in the far south of the area. The tremendous majority of the herdsmen are sheep-herders, whose movements are much more restricted than the movements of the real nomads. They have permanent settlements to which they retire when the grazing season is over, and there they practise agriculture, which they consider a secondary and supplementary occupation.

Most of the inhabitants of the Western Desert belong to the Awlad Ali clans who originally came from Libya. Some less important and less numerous clans, the Morabiteen clans, also live there as 'clients' of the more powerful Awlad Ali. A certain degree of correspondence exists between clan segmentation and the distribution of lands, both pasture-land and the fertile arable areas of the northern strip being distributed among clans and lineages in a clearly defined manner. A man cannot make use of the grazing ground, much less of the cultivation ground, known to belong to a different clan or lineage except under certain conditions and only obtaining the owners' permission. This does not mean, however, that clans and lineages are localized. For in spite of the natural tendency of kinsmen to cluster together and to live near to each other, the members of the same clan-segment may be widely dispersed, and the inhabitants of any specific locality, especially near the coast, usually belong to different clans. Nevertheless, a certain clan may be more strongly represented in a particular locality than all the other clans.

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The problem of water supply is, naturally, the most crucial problem with which the people have to cope. The absence of surface water, the shortness of the wet season, the low rainfall and the meagreness of the subterranean resources in most parts of the desert, especially inland, impose drastic limitations upon their activities. Apart from the few artesian wells found in the northern coastal zone, rain is the main source of water supply. It is, however, a very unreliable source because of its irregularity. Moreover, a considerable amount of rain-water is lost by seepage through the sand and by evaporation. The situation is further aggravated by the fact that not all the functioning wells yield potable water or even water suitable for the irrigation of fields. The water of a large number of these artesian wells is charged with a high percentage of dissolved salts. This water can only be used for domestic purposes. Certain experiments are now being carried out at Ras-el-Hikma and Fuka to see whether such saline water could be used for irrigating the pasture-lands.

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The two main complementary occupations, i.e. livestock husbandry and the cultivation of barley, are seriously affected by the water situation. The strip of arable land which extends along the sea coast varies in breadth from place to place and from year to year according to the rainfall. In good years it may stretch some 10 to 20 kilometres southwards, but in bad years the cultivation becomes rather patchy and is confined to a very narrow strip only a few kilometres wide. The people are never sure of their crops, and in really

bad years the returns may be so poor that grain and flour have to be sent from 105 the Delta to avert famine. The failure of the crop may also compel whole 243 clan-segments to migrate with their animals to the Delta. In this respect, 311 the semi-nomadic clans of the Western Desert represent a real burden on the national economy of Egypt.

Livestock husbandry, which is by far the most important and highly valued 105 occupation, is itself subject to the variability and the erratic nature of rainfall, since it is the rain which determines the abundance of herbage and, consequently, 231 the number of animals reared. Pasture land is found mainly to the south of the cultivated land. Sometimes, the fallow patches among the barley fields are also covered with grass and other pasture plants suitable for grazing. Pasture plants usually persist between December and May; during the summer, the land becomes arid hard desert with only few dispersed patches of dry grass. The grazing season *par excellence* is from November to April, during which period barley stands in the fields. After the first showers of November, barley is sown and the young men soon move with their flocks to the pastures, leaving the older people to look after the fields. As the dry season advances, the flocks are moved northwards to the cultivated lands so as to be nearer to fodder and to water-holes. Thus, the movements of the herders are rhythmic and regulated by the division of the year into two major seasons: the wet season and the dry season. The wet season is the period of plenty during which the animals are well fed; the dry season is the period of starvation for the flocks which must then rely on such fodder as barley straw and on the drying grass. Any movements of animals that may take place during that season are carried out on a very limited scale. In exceptionally bad years the people are compelled to dispose of their animals, or at least of a large part of the flocks, or they may send them away to their friends and relatives who may be living near vegetation. Sometimes, the herdsmen find themselves compelled to cross the frontiers to Cyrenaica for pasture.

We can see then from this brief account to what extent the water situation 105 is responsible for determining the modes of living in the desert and for channelling human activities and imposing certain limitations on these activities. Development projects and sedentarization schemes planned for the Western Desert and its inhabitants must, therefore, give a great deal of importance to the question of water and its availability. In fact, most of the contemplated projects envisage the possibility of better exploitation of the existing water supplies as well as the tapping of potential resources.

Rightly or wrongly, it is generally assumed in Egypt that nomadism and 178 semi-nomadism represent a phase of deterioration which is no longer compatible with the actualities of modern life and therefore should be abolished. 312 For, apart from the fact that it is responsible for the hardships and insecurity 657 suffered by the desert dwellers and the consequent ill effects on the national economy, especially in bad years, nomadism as practised in the Western Desert and under the prevailing circumstances is wasteful and destructive. Vast stretches of land which could be reclaimed at little cost and cultivated intensively are simply left for grazing without any serious endeavour to make better use of them. Under the contemplated sedentarization projects it is intended to increase the cultivated area, to improve the pastures by introducing new pasture plants of higher nutritive value in areas where agriculture is not

1: Obermeyer, Gerald Joseph. Structure and authority in a Bedouin tribe: the 'Aishaibat of the Western Desert of Egypt. Dissertation(Anthropology) -- Indiana University, 1968. University Microfilms, Publication, 69-10, 572. Ann Arbor, University Microfilms, 1969 [1973].

3, 13, 344, 1, 1; 10 text figures; 6 tables; bibliography.

HRAF copy.

[This study, based on the data collected by the author during the period of his fieldwork from June 1964 to May 1965, is an analysis of the political structure, authority, and leadership roles in the relatively permanent 'Aishaibat Bedouin coastal community of al-Qasr, near the town of Marsa Matruh in the Western Desert of the United Arab Republic (Egypt). As a background for this political analysis the author presents a general cultural history of the Libyan Bedouin dating from 639 A.D. with the Arab conquests of Egypt up to 1965, at the time of the author's fieldwork. Additional supplementary material relates to social change, land use, land tenure and rights of ownership, kinship and marriage patterns and the specific history of settlement in al-Qasr. Obermeyer draws his data together in a concise summary chapter which concludes this work (p. 320 ff.).]

Field date: 1964-1965
Analyst: John Beierle

Evaluation: Ethnologist-5
Processed in 1974

2: Mohsen, Safia K. The quest for order among Awlad Ali of the Western Desert of Egypt. Dissertation (Anthropology) -- Michigan State University, 1970. University Microfilms, Publication, 71-31, 266. Ann Arbor, University Microfilms, 1971 [1974].

6, 3, 196 l; glossary; tribal map; bibliography.

HRAF copy.

[This study, based primarily on the author's fieldwork among the Awlad Ali of the Western Desert of Egypt (UAR) between August 1965 and August 1966, deals with the way in which disputes are settled within a tribal society with no centralized political authority. One manner in which this is done is through the application by local political leaders of a set of formal rules or "tribal ways" known as the daraieb." Emphasis in this study, however, is not on the rules themselves but the manner in which they are implemented through judicial reasoning tied to the social and political reality of the group. This procedure is clearly illustrated in the homicide and bodily injury cases presented in chapter six. As a background for the legal and judicial analysis indicated above, Mohsen provides data on the ecological and historical features of the Awlad Ali as a general matrix for the understanding of the group's total context of action. Also presented as background information is a detailed analysis of the tribal organization, political structure and leadership, and marriage as a form of contractual relationship--a factor of some importance in Awad Ali judicial proceedings. The final chapter in the source presents a summary of the author's data and concomitant conclusions.]

2: Mohsen

Field date: 1958, 1965-1966
Analyst: John Beierle

Evaluation: Ethnologist, Lawyer-5
Processed in 1974

3: Evans-Pritchard, Edward Evan. The Sanusi of Cyrenaica. Oxford, At the Clarendon Press, 1949.

8, 240 p.; 4 plates; 13 maps; 2 appendices (including a select bibliography); index.

HRAF Copy.

[This source, with the exception of chapter 2 which deals with the tribal organization and certain aspects of the general ethnography of the Bedouin of Cyrenaica, is concerned primarily with the origin, development and cultural history of the Sanusi Order--an Order of Sufis who are Sunni or orthodox Muslims--within the Cyrenaican region of Libya. The author traces the development of the Order from its inception in 1837 by the Grand Sanusi Sayyid Muhammad bin 'Ali al-Sanusi through its religious-political role during the Italian-Sanusi wars and subsequent periods of peace (1911-1932) to its final collapse at the end of the second war in 1932. The author, a well-known anthropologist, had the opportunity to study this group during a period of approximately two years (1942-1944) while serving as Political Officer to the third British Military Administration of Cyrenaica.]

Field date: 1942-1944
Analyst: John Beierle

Evaluation: Government Official, Ethnologist-4, 5
Processed in 1974

4: Peters, Emrys Lloyd. The proliferation of segments in the lineage of the Bedouin of Cyrenaica [Libya]. In Louise E. Sweet, ed., Peoples and Cultures of the Middle East: An Anthropological Reader. Volume 1: Cultural Depth and Diversity. Garden City, Natural History Press, 1970: 363-398.

HRAF Copy.

[This article discusses in detail the various dynamic socio-cultural processes involved in lineage fragmentation and the resulting development of each segment thus formed. The mechanical processes discussed -- telescoping, fusion of names and extinction of lines -- were found not to affect orders of segmentation higher than that of the tertiary order (small camps or seasonal communities), and in conditions of stable population, these devices alone would be sufficient to retain the form of the genealogical structure. Since conditions of stability in the population cannot be assumed, and as a matter of fact there is generally a marked fluctuation in the population of the tertiary groups, proliferation of such groups is common. Such proliferation is generally induced by the relationship of man and animals to the environment, to the effect that when sufficient pressure develops on natural resources, one group of a divided segment must move off to seek land and water elsewhere. The author then attempts to demonstrate how these changes have actually occurred in the genealogies of the Cyrenaican Bedouin over the years.]

Field date: 1948-1950
Analyst: John Beierle

Evaluation: Ethnologist-5
Processed in 1974

5: Peters, Emrys Lloyd. Some structural aspects of the feud among the camel-herding Bedouin of Cyrenaica. Africa, 37 (1967): 261-282. London, International African Institute, 1967.

HRAF Copy.

[In this article the author analyzes internal disturbances, in terms of Bedouin social organization, precipitated by homicide, using a lineage model as a framework for his discussion. The arrangement of data collected here corresponds closely to the Bedouin's own ideas of their relationships. The lineage model then comes under the author's scrutiny with the result that he believes because of the fact it does not cover several important areas of social relationships, nor is it an accurate predictor of possible future events, it should be abandoned. This is especially true since the model is not a sociologically oriented one, but instead is really a frame of reference used by particular people as a means of gaining a commonsense knowledge of their own social relationships. The author then turns his attention to the role of the feud--a set of hostile relationships between tribal groups--which cannot be terminated, but at best can be understood in part by reference to the ordered division of the tribal organization. The political structure is then discussed to some length including quite a bit of information on the integrative function of marriage in tying agnatic groups together.]

Field date: 1948-1950
Analyst: John Beierle

Evaluation: Ethnologist-5
Processed in 1974

6: Peters, Emrys Lloyd. Aspects of the family among the Bedouin of Cyrenaica. In Meyer F. Nimkoff, ed., Comparative Family Systems. Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1965: 121-146.

HRAF copy.

[In this source the author presents a survey of certain specific aspects of Cyrenaican Bedouin family life which he observed while in the field over a twenty-seven month period between 1948-1950. Although much of the data collected deal with patterns of marriage, there are some other very interesting bits of information here on the father-son relationship, the sister's son-mother's brother relationship, authority diversification between the lineage/ community and the family, the preference for males in the society, division of labor by sex, the Bedouin ideal family type as a unit of production, a detailed discussion of the composition of a particular camp, and economic, kinship and other factors affecting camp structure.]

Field date: 1948-1950
Analyst: John Beierle

Evaluation: Ethnologist-5
Processed in 1974

7: Abou-Zeid, Ahmad M. The sedentarization of nomads in the Western Desert of Egypt. International Social Science Journal, 11 (1959): 550-558. Paris, UNESCO, 1959.

Yale: N10 In77 11.

[This source is a brief sketch of the various programs the Egyptian Government has devised for settling the nomads of the Western Desert and of the effects noted so far. Abou-Zeid briefly discusses three projects: the Wadi-el-Natrun project, which is developing salt and soda resources and establishing of new industry; the Qattara Depression project which will improve the environment by filling the depression with water from the Mediterranean; and the Ras-el-Hikma project, which is designed to improve the grazing potentialities of the Western Desert. Some projections of the effects of these programs on the life and culture of the Bedouin are given.]

Field date: no date
Analyst: Timothy J. O'Leary

Evaluation: Anthropologist - 5
Processed in 1974-1975

8: Kennett, Austin. Bloodmoney--Western Desert. In his Bedouin Justice; Laws and Customs among the Egyptian Bedouin. Cambridge, At the University Press, 1925: 60-78.

Yale: P70 K394 925.

[This source presents a study of the laws relevant to the paying of bloodmoney among the Libyan Bedouin occupying the western desert region of the United Arab Republic. The author gathered his data while serving as British Administrative Officer in the Libyan Desert around the year 1921. The major work from which this chapter was taken deals with the general topic of Bedouin justice and therefore covers other Bedouin groups--the Sinai Arabs, Eastern Desert and additional Western Desert Bedouins--outside the scope of the immediate file foucs. This particular source contains several case histories illustrating the violation of Bedouin legal norms particularly in reference to the taking of human life and the resulting payment of bloodmoney as settlement of the debt so incurred. Interesting insights are found throughout the source on concepts of liability, legal norms and judicial procedures.]

Field date: ca. 1921
Analysts: John Beierle, marker
Martin Malone, checker

Evaluation: Government Official - 5
Processed in 1974-1975

9: Murray, George William. The Western Bedouin (El Mugharba). In his Sons of Ishmael; A Study of the Egyptian Bedouin. London, George Routledge and Sons, 1935: 271-283.

2 plates.

Yale: Nkd76 935m.

[Although this source is somewhat deficient in over-all ethnographic coverage it does present a general background on the cultural history and tribal organization of the Western Bedouin settled in the northern and western portions of the United Arab Republic. Primary emphasis is placed on the history and tribal organization of the Awlad 'Ali, with some additional data on the Jumei 'at, the Samalus and the Shiheibat.]

Field date: ca. 1910-1935
Analyst: John Beierle

Evaluation: Ethnologist, Geographer -3, 4
Processed in 1974

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*795 which the soul experiences God. It is suffused with knowledge: 786 not with *'ilm*, intellectual and traditional knowledge, but with *ma'rifa*, gnosis, wisdom. The Grand Sanusi and his successors [785] very strongly disapproved of external aids to this end, such as processions, music, movements of the body inducing convulsions, piercing the flesh with sharp implements, and such other means as are used by some Orders, and steered a middle course between the illuminative, or intuitive, school of Sufi writers and *795 the rational, or intellectual, school. Thus Sayyid Ahmad al-Sharif, his grandson, has in his writings, as Moreno points out,[1] exhorted followers of the Order not to depart from the rational, the chief aim of the Sanusiya being to make a man a good Muslim rather than a good mystic. Mysticism is something added to orthodox faith and morals, not a substitute for them.

*795 It is for this reason that, as Sayyid Ahmad insists, perfection 787 is to be sought through spiritual identification with the Prophet Muhammad rather than with God, at any rate for ordinary people. This is to be attained by contemplation of the essence of the Prophet and by an inner knowledge of him through constant imitation of his actions, attention to his words, and blessing him. The contemplation should be so intense that veneration of the Prophet pervades the adept till at last he hears only his name and has only his form before the eyes of the intellect. Then the Prophet becomes his sole guide and counsellor.

*795 As this is not a treatise on Sufism there is no need to give further details about the mystical content of the Sanusiya. It should, however, be stressed that the rigorous orthodoxy of the Order, and especially its insistence on conformity to the original teachings of the Prophet, meant that the faith and morals which the Prophet preached to the Bedouin of his day, and which they accepted, were equally suited to the Bedouin of Cyrenaica, who in all essentials were leading, and still lead, a life like to that of the Bedouin in Arabia in the seventh century. In particular, [793] the refusal of the Grand Sanusi to allow the more demonstrative forms of ecstasy, which, together with lack of organization and [786] direction, characterize so many of the Sufi Orders of North [157] Africa, enabled the Bedouin to adopt his teachings and ritual, for Bedouin are an undemonstrative people and it is difficult to imagine them piercing their cheeks with skewers, eating glass,

• [713]

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[1] M. M. Moreno, *Brevi Nozioni d'Islam*, 1927, p. 58.

795*

or swaying into convulsions. Indeed, it is noticeable that the [793]
Orders which permit such practices, notably the 'Arusiya, [786]
'Isawiya, Rifa'iya, and Sa'adiya, so popular in the towns of [157]
Libya, have made no converts among the true Bedouin.

It is unnecessary to discuss further the mystical side to the 795*
Sanusiya for another reason. The Bedouin of Cyrenaica with 771
whom this book is concerned have only the slightest knowledge
of either the religious teachings or the ritual of the Order, and
are interested in neither. They belong to the illiterate class of
the *Muntasabin*, the simple adherents of the Order who follow
its Shaikh personally and politically. It is very seldom, if ever,
that the Bedouin know the special prayers and litanies of the [789]
Order, and their use of them, if any, is restricted to getting a [212]
scribe to write them on paper so that they can sew them up in
leather and tie them to their bodies. It is only a tiny educated
minority who regularly recite the prayer formulas and litanies.
These are the *Ikhwan*, the Brothers of the Order. They live in 795*
the lodges of the Order and hold prayer-meetings there. Among
the Brothers are some who have been raised to the position of
Shaikhs of lodges, generally, in past times, after special training
at the University of the Order at Jaghbub oasis, where they have
received a diploma from the Head of the Order or from one of
his family or inner circle. This inner circle, the *Khawass*, consists
vaguely to-day of a few senior members of the Sanusi
family and two or three learned Brothers and does not function
as a Body, but in the past it was, according to Sayyid Muhammad
Idris, an official Council controlling the affairs of the Order
and was composed of four Shaikhs of the Order, who were not
of the Sanusi family, under the presidency of the Head of the
Order, who had to be a member of the founder's family. As [178]
Dr. Adams points out,[1] the fact that this inner circle is no longer
a determinate Body indicates a change in the character of
the Order, a development of its political, to the detriment
of its religious, functions. This development has favoured the
interests of the Sanusi family to the disadvantage of the Order
as a whole.

The *Shaikh al-Tariqa*, Head of the Order, advised in past 795*
times by his Council, appoints the Shaikhs of the lodges and 793
these Shaikhs can ordain Brothers and the Brothers can receive

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[1] C. C. Adams, 'The Sanusiya Order', *Handbook on Cyrenaica*, 1944, p. 31. [113]

795*

praise of which many poems have been written by Brothers of 793
the Order. The Grand Sanusi forbad music, dancing, and sing- 784
ing in the recitations of the Order, but in this he was at one with 114
all the official spokesmen of Islam. Most reformist movements [272]
in Islam tend towards asceticism. [533]

Far from being extreme ascetics, however, the Sanusi [535]
Brothers eat and dress well, even using scent, and are amiable 795*
and merry companions. The Tunisian scholar and traveller 157
Muhammad 'Uthman al-Hashaishi, who travelled in 1896 via [785]
Malta, Tripoli, and Banghazi to Kufra to visit al-Sayyid al-Mahdi and met the leading Brothers of the time, remarks that 'they are fond of diversions, honest jesting. I have visited many of their zawiyas and I have made the acquaintance of many of their notables: I have seen only cheerful and smiling faces, welcoming me with benevolence and kindness. May God reward them!'[1]

The Grand Sanusi discouraged the trappings of poverty by 795*
his example, his exhortations, and his insistence on the Brothers 793
being self-supporting. Although the Heads of the Sanusiya 735
Order, like the Wahhabi leaders, encouraged settlement on the land, they can hardly have hoped to have greatly influenced the Bedouin to this end; but they insisted on the lodges of the Order supporting themselves by agriculture supplemented by stock-raising, and thereby took a stand against *ittikal*, the dependence for livelihood on alms and not on labour which some mendicant Orders have advocated.

The Order has always been, in fact, conventional as well as 795*
orthodox. In its early period it was essentially a missionary 797
Order with the limited aim of bringing by peaceful persuasion the Bedouin Arabs and the peoples of the Sahara and the Sudan to a fuller understanding of the beliefs and morals of Islam, while giving them at the same time the blessings of civilization: justice, peace, trade, and education. Its principles were, as Shaikh Muhammad 'Uthman says, simply 'to do good and avoid evil'.[2]

The accusation of fanaticism is not borne out by either the 795*
character of the Bedouin adherents of the Order or by its actions.

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[1] Mohammed ben Otsmane el-Hachaichi, *Voyage au Pays des Senoussia à travers La Tripolitaine et les Pays Touareg*, 1912, p. 128 (1st ed., 1903). [113]

[2] Ibid., p. 86.

and the insufficiency of the fall elsewhere. It follows that only 132
on the plateau can there be forest, and only there is a settled [137]
and purely agricultural way of life possible; and it was there [241]
and on the coastal fringe that in ancient and modern times [167]
European colonists settled.

The rains in Cyrenaica fall only in winter, from October to 132
April. In the absence of irrigation the planting season is thus 241
clearly delimited. So is the grazing season to the south of the 233
plateau, for in summer the grasses wither and the wells dry up, [221]
compelling shepherds to drive their flocks northwards to the plateau, thus producing the kind of seasonal nomadism known as transhumance. The variation in total rainfall from year to year and the distribution of its fall over the winter months are of the utmost importance for agriculturalists in Cyrenaica. There is still some obscurity, but it is an observed fact that every few years in Cyrenaica there is a year in which the fall of rain is insufficient, or too badly distributed, to raise an adequate crop. In a mixed economy this fact must have given an overwhelming bias towards pastoralism.

The water supplies of the plateau, which depend entirely on 132
rainfall, are sufficient for the needs of the Bedouin and their 312
flocks. The clayey soils are, however, very exacting and running spring water is rare, being for the most part restricted to the triangle Darna–Slanta–al-Haniya. On the western part of the plateau water is conserved in cisterns and wells and on the maritime and *barqa* plains, in the Sirtica and Marmarica, and generally to the south of the plateau, in wells.

The distribution of vegetation in Cyrenaica follows variation 132
in degree of precipitation. Where there is much rain there is 137
forest. Where there is little rain there is steppe. Where there
is no rain there is desert. The forest is thick but mainly squat 137
and of very limited extension. An Italian estimate[1] of its distribution is shown on the accompanying map. It is predominantly Mediterranean in type, the juniper and the lentisk being the two commonest trees of the country. Forest ceases a few miles to the south of the high watershed of the plateau and gives way to steppe. The well-known route Tariq 'Aziza is generally regarded as the dividing line between the two kinds

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[1] Dott. Giovanni Manzoni, 'Memorie sui boschi della Cirenaica', *Notiziario Economico della Cirenaica*, 1929. [113]

useful mostly for transport and ploughing, though they give a 231
good milk yield and a fair harvest of wool. There are horses, of
Berber rather than of Arab type, in every big camp. They are
kept for the saddle alone, being much used in old days for
hawking, and are a sign of wealth and social position.

The census figures for domesticated animals are probably
highly inaccurate. The flocks and herds were certainly much [648]*
greater, especially for camels and horses, before the Italians
ravaged the country. The Turkish figures for 1910 were
713,000 sheep, 546,300 goats, 83,300 camels, 23,600 cattle, and
27,000 horses, and it has been reckoned that by 1933 these had
been reduced to 98,000 sheep, 25,000 goats, 2,600 camels,
8,700 cattle, and 1,000 horses.[1] Before the outbreak of the [648]*
second Italo-Sanusi war in 1923 the normal export to the [439]
markets of Egypt was 80,000 sheep and goats a year, and it was
reckoned that a settled Cyrenaica could produce annually for
export at least 100,000 to 150,000 sheep and goats and 6,000
camels. The country used to satisfy a considerable portion of
Egypt's meat requirements. It also exported clarified butter 234
in big quantities, 91,835 kilograms being the figure for 1922 and 439
75,462 the figure for 1923.[2]

Although the Bedouin are by practice and inclination 243
shepherds first and cultivators afterwards, all plough. Barley [262]
and some wheat are a staple food. Indeed, in most years they
cultivate a surplus of barley which they trade, and it may be
said that for the most part they are self-supporting as far as
their flour requirements go. On the southern slopes of the
plateau and in the *barqa* plain ploughing begins from the middle
of October to the middle of November, according to the rains.
The coastal belt is sown a little later and the plateau in December
and January when the grasses begin to sprout. By mid-April
the first harvest, that of the *barqa* and the southern slopes of
the plateau, is being reaped, and on the plateau reaping goes
on from May to the end of August. Everywhere barley is sown
greatly in excess of wheat, for wheaten bread is not considered [231]
a necessity and barley is required for horses as well as for men.

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[1] Jean Despois, *La Colonisation Italienne en Libya: Problèmes et Méthodes*, 1935, p. 44; Hans w:son Ahlmann, *La Libia Settentrionale*, 1930, p. 78. (First published in 1928.) [113] ●

[2] *L'Oltremare*, Mar. 1930; *Rivista delle Colonie Italiane*, 1934, p. 885; Francesco Coro, *Settantasei Anni di Dominazione Turca in Libia*, 1937, p. 82. [113]

Europeans consider to be a low level of civilization. They do 433
not feel the need for expensive roads and ports, electric light, 511
wireless sets, telephones, schools, churches, newspapers, and 182
so forth; and clearly their economy could not support them.
Time and again colonists, tempted from their homes by the 182
short sea routes and the wooded plateau, have settled in the 167
country and dispossessed the Bedouin, but in the end it is the
Bedouin, and not the colonists, who have survived. When one
looks at the massive Phoenician, Greek, Egyptian, and Roman
ruins and the already half-ruined Italian towns, villages, and
farms, and then on the flimsy tents of the Arabs, one cannot
but reflect that the race is not always to the swift nor the battle
to the strong.

III

Even in the steppe country it is difficult to find a Bedouin 361
naja', camp, for the camps are pitched in hollows and on the
slopes of wadis and their feeders for shelter from rain and wind
and too many visitors. On the plateau they are hidden in the
forest. One cannot, therefore, make more than a very approxi- 161
mate estimate of the population of any part of the country, or 162
of its distribution, by bare observation. It can, however, be
said that at present the country is underpopulated and that the
population is badly distributed between town and country, the
urban part of it, which is almost entirely unproductive, being
too large in relation to the whole.

There have been a number of estimates of the population by 161
early travellers who visited the country in Turkish times. They 175
had to make a guess at the population figure, aided by Turkish
censuses. It has been suggested on the basis of their reports
that the country then supported round about 250,000 souls.[1]
The Turkish census of 1911 gave the population as 198,345,
excluding Kufra.[2] Taking into account the various estimates
which were made during the Italo-Sanusi wars, in the interval
between them, and since, it may be said that to-day the total
population of Cyrenaica is probably round about 200,000, of
whom about a quarter live in the towns, the remainder being
tented Bedouin and a few thousand oasis dwellers.

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[1] Dr. Gotthold Hildebrandt, *Cyrenaïka als Gebiet künftiger Besiedelung*, 1904, p. 317. [113]

[2] Coro, op. cit., p. 20.

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If the Bedouin of the country number no more than 150,000 it is evident that density of population outside the towns must be very low indeed. Ricci's map, based on Col. De Agostini's census, shows a density of 0 to 5 per sq. km. for all the tribes of Cyrenaica except the 'Arafa, the Darsa, and the Hasa, all plateau tribes, for which he gives a density of 5 to 10.[1] Col. De Agostini, in his exhaustive monograph,[2] written before the worst Italian excesses, reckoned the native population of Cyrenaica at 185,400, of whom 181,750 were Arabs and 3,650 Jews. Of the Arabs about 25,000—I give round figures—were living in urban centres, about 7,000 in the oases, and about 150,000 were tented Bedouin. Of the Bedouin he classed only 16,000 as nomads, 35,000 as semi-nomads, and 99,000 as stable. His classification into nomads, semi-nomads, and stable was, as he recognized, arbitrary, since there is no reliable criterion of stability among a tented people, but it gives a useful indication of relative mobility. By 'stable' Col. De Agostini meant normal residence in a determined area within which the tents are pitched here and there for watering or other reasons and with periodic movements for sowing and pasturing, even though some days away from their usual seat, as we find among the 'Arafa tribe and a considerable part of the Hasa, the Darsa, and the 'Abaidat tribes. By 'semi-nomads' he meant those Bedouin who spread with greater frequency and more widely either in their own territory or towards zones of sowing or pasturing where they remain for a long time on account of less prosperous conditions in their own territory, such as we find in the Magharba tribe and parts of the 'Awaqir, the Bara'asa, and the 'Abaidat tribes and in many of the more important client groups. By 'nomads' he meant Bedouin who, although they possess their own territory or recognized centre, emigrate for long periods to distant, and not always the same, objectives, and are almost always fractionized into small groups for reasons of watering and pasturing; or Bedouin who normally wander in desert territories, giving themselves exclusively to rearing camels. As examples of nomads in this sense he mentions the Aulad Shahin section of the 'Abaidat tribe and many units

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[1] *La Cirenaica—Geografica-Economica-Politica*, edited by Olinto Marinelli, 1922-3.

[2] *Le Popolazioni della Cirenaica*, 1922-3, p. 444.

of the more independent client tribes. In other words, all the 161
Bedouin of Cyrenaica are nomadic in some degree, some more 162
and some less, and Col. De Agostini rightly stresses that 114
whether they move much or little they all have the same
characteristics when compared to peasants and townsmen.[1]
They are all *bwadi*, as the Cyrenaican dialect has it, people of
the tents, and they see themselves as a single people against
the *hadur*, the citizens.

I have so far said nothing of the towns of Cyrenaica or of 632
their inhabitants. They play a minor part in this story, which
is about the Bedouin, but they cannot be entirely left out of it
on account of their economic and political relations with the
Bedouin, so I take this opportunity to give a brief account of
them.[2]

Banghazi, which is supposed to be called after the saint Sidi 175
Ghazi, buried in the town, is on the site of the classical Berenice. 632
It is believed that after the disappearance of the Graeco-
Roman community the site was unoccupied till the fifteenth
century, when it was reoccupied by immigrants from the
mercantile communities of the Tripolitanian coast, among
whom Misuratans, both Muslims and Jews, preponderated in
numbers and wealth. The Genoese Della Cella, who passed [162]
through the fly-infested town in 1817–18, in the time of the
Caramanlis, says that it then contained about 5,000 inhabitants,
at least half of whom were Jews.[3] Shaikh Muhammad 'Uthman [441]
al-Hashaishi, who was in the town in 1896, says that the [167]
greater part of the traders were immigrants from Sfax and the [114]
Island of Jerba—he was himself a Tunisian and often tended
to exaggerate Tunisian influence—with some Greeks and a few
Italians. 'As to the Turks, they do not give themselves to
trade.' At this time Banghazi was a very simple, mostly mud-and-rubble,
town, and the learned Shaikh makes a point of
telling us that there were no posts or telegraphs, nor even a
railway, save a line of three kilometres joining the official

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[1] Ibid., pp. 32–3.

[2] The historical information is chiefly derived from Agostini, ibid., pp. 413–43.

[3] Paolo Della Cella, *Narrative of an Expedition from Tripoli in Barbary to the Western Frontier of Egypt in 1817*, 1822, pp. 194–5. (First published in
1819.) F. W. and H. W. Beechey (*Proceedings of the Expedition to explore the* [113]
Northern Coast of Africa from Tripoly Eastward in 1821 and 1822, 1828, p. 299)
consider Della Cella's estimate too high. Theirs is 2,000.

of Cyrenaica.[1] The Bedouin remember with gratitude, as I have 771
often heard them declare, the moral and cultural benefits 797
brought to them by the Order. If they have fallen from the low 793
religious and literary standards to which the Sanusiya raised a 795*
fraction of them it is due to the virtual extinction of its teaching
office during their long struggle with the Italians.

II

The Bedouin the Grand Sanusi found in Cyrenaica were not 771
only Muslims but also inveterate devotees of saints, the 792
Marabtin (sing. *Marabat*) or Marabouts, as they are called in 793
European accounts of North Africa, and the Grand Sanusi was 776
in the long tradition of these holy men. Therefore, although I 778
have touched on the matter in Chapter I, I need not excuse myself
for treating it again in its Cyrenaican context, for Bedouin
attachment to the Sanusiya springs from their personal devotion
to the Grand Sanusi and his family, and not the other way
round, and the Grand Sanusi derived his sanctity, and thereby
his power, from the fact that he was a Marabout. The Bedouin
are familiar with saints and ignorant of Orders. To them the
Grand Sanusi was a saint and wonderworker, and a man with
baraka, an ample measure of God's grace which flowed through
him to ordinary folk; but there was nothing extraordinary about
him. They knew his kind of old. When he died his tomb
became a shrine, the largest and richest in Cyrenaica it is true,
but only one among very many, dating from the Companions
of the Prophet Muhammad, through the Martyrs who were
killed fighting for the faith in Cyrenaica, to the pious and learned
men of yesterday and the day before. His successors, by their [613]
kinship with him, and in virtue of their spiritual legacy from
him, became heirs to his *baraka*; and so, to a lesser degree, have
the heirs of the other religious teachers who came to Cyrenaica
from the west, who died and were buried there, and whose
descendants are the *Marabtin bil baraka* lineages of to-day.
The authority the Grand Sanusi had over the Bedouin of Arabia
and North Africa can be parallelled by the careers of many holy

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[1] Giuseppe Macaluso, *Turchi, Senussi e Italiani in Libia*, 1930, p. 32; Giglio, op. cit., p. 22; and Arcangelo Ghisleri (quoting Andrea Pedretti), *Tripolitania e Cirenaica dal Mediterraneo al Sahara*, 1912, p. 132. [113]

residential community but felt no strong obligation to one another nor the need for common action. Religious Orders in such communities tend to become fractionized along the lines of social cleavage into sub-urban and sub-sub-urban lodges, each serving a few families in its vicinity and leading its own life with its own following and resources independently of the others. Social life in the towns is amorphous. There is no structure corresponding to the tribal system. The Sanusiya became dominant because it shunned the towns and sought its converts among the Bedouin and built its centres within the tribes. The Sanusiya Brotherhood was founded on a Bedouin brotherhood. 795*
369
182

It is of great interest to note that the Sanusiya held a place in relation to other Orders in western Arabia like to that which it held in Cyrenaica. The learned Dutch Arabist, Snouck Hurgronje, who spent a year in western Arabia in 1884 and 1885, states that in the towns the Order 'has remained to this day highly honoured, but by no means overtopping its sister orders. For the districts of the Hejâz, inhabited by Harbis and other Beduins, it possesses however the highest significance, for its practical mission has succeeded in bringing to a great extent under its leadership the sons of the desert who are refractory to all authority and are far removed from the official Islam.'[1]

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[1] C. Snouck Hurgronje, *Mekka in the latter Part of the 19th Century*, 1931, pp. 55–6. (First published in 1888–9.) [113] ●

*175 *648 *795 [998] of the right of sanctuary within the precincts of the lodges of the Order. It is complimentary and written in the fulsome language of such documents.[1]

Nevertheless, the Turks were under no illusion. They did not believe that the Sanusi loved them, but they knew that if it came to a decision the Order and the Bedouin would support them against any of the Christian Powers of Europe. This is evident from the correspondence found in the archives of Tripoli by the Italians when they captured the town in 1911.[2] Shaikh Muhammad 'Uthman, writing in 1896, says frankly that the Turks were ill disposed towards the Sanusiya and would have liked to have taken Sayyid al-Mahdi to Istanbul and there given him a palace, the Turkish equivalent for *résidence forcée*, as they had done with Abu al-Huda, the Head of the Rifa'iya Order, and Shaikh Dafir, the Head of the Madaniya Order; and he adds that the Sayyid, on his side, had no liking for the Turks. When the Shaikh was in Banghazi the Shaikh of the Sanusiya lodge there was dismissed from his post by the Sayyid because he had allowed himself to be corrupted by the Turkish Authorities.[3]

The Ottoman Government was not much concerned about the exact juridical status of the Sanusiya Order, a question which greatly exercised Italian writers at a later date when this had become an important issue in their dealings with the Order. There were hundreds of Bedouin tribes and dozens of religious Orders in the Ottoman Empire and the Turks were matter-of-fact people who wisely left such questions alone. In the mosques under the Order's control the name of the Sultan was proclaimed at Friday prayers, but this means very little. Doubtless the Grand Sanusi and his successors took the view that the Caliphate had been usurped by the Ottoman Sultans—they could hardly have taken any other view—but it had long been in Ottoman hands and Turkey was the only independent Muslim Power capable of protecting Muslim interests. In practice also they accepted the secular authority of the Sultan as ruler of the Ottoman Empire.

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[1] Salim bin 'Amir, op. cit., May 1944.

[113] [2] Published in 1912 with the title *Relazione fra Turchi e Senussi. Documenti rinvenuti nell' Archivio di Tripoli* (Ufficio Politico Militare). Quoted by Macaluso, op. cit.

[3] Op. cit., pp. 65–6 and 106.

Turkish administration in 1910, and the Banghazi district, which came directly under the Governor of Cyrenaica for administration. Attached to each district were the sub-districts shown in the list below,[1] in which the tribes attached to each sub-district are also given. The Bara'asa came under Banghazi, although they lived well to the east, for political reasons, the tribe being exceptionally rebellious.[2] 175* 648* 634

175*
648*
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619

Districts	*Sub-districts*	*Tribes*
Banghazi (directly dependent on the Governor)	Suluq	'Awaqir
	Qaminis	
	Barsis	
	Sidi Khalifa	
	Slanta	Bara'asa
al-Marj	al-Marj	'Arafa and 'Abid
	al-Haniya	Darsa
Darna	al-Sallum	'Abaidat
	Tubruq	
	al-Banba	
	al-Qubba	
	Shahhat	Hasa
Ajadabiya	Marsa Braiqa	Magharba
Aujila and Jalu	—	Awajila and Majabra
Kufra	—	—

The administration was very slapdash by European standards. Indeed, Shaikh Muhammad 'Uthman says darkly: 'There is at Banghazi no organization, political, administrative, or financial. I say no more about this matter: it will be understood why.'[3] This was, of course, an exaggeration, for however simple the administration may have been, and perhaps for that reason, it worked—with a good deal of grumbling it is true, but without undue conflict. 175* 648* 631 Revenue was collected and would have exceeded the cost of the very cheap administration of the country if the proceeds of some taxes had not been sent to Istanbul. Much of this revenue came from import and export duties, but the bulk of it was derived from taxes on herds and a tenth of the harvest in kind, the collection of which was in the hands of the mudirs. It was the task of these mudirs, who were generally literate 175* 648* 651 634

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[1] *Notizie relative al Sangiacato della Cirenaica e alle Mudirie dipendenti dal Mutassarifato di Bengasi* (Ufficio Politico Militare), 1913.

[2] Fabrizio Serra, *Italia e Senussia*, 1933, p. 17; idem in *La Cirenaica*, 1922-3, p. 182.

[3] Op. cit., pp. 59-60.

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*648

thirteen times the usual blood money, to the dead man's son. In 1898 the Darsa and Bara'asa threatened to prevent the Turkish Government from cutting cypress trees on their tribal lands for telegraph poles, although the trees were in law State property, and the matter had to be settled by negotiation, the Turks agreeing to pay for the trees on condition that the Bedouin helped in the cutting of them.[1] Turks and Bedouin managed in this kind of way to accept the presence of the other in a spirit of mutual tolerance. Just as the Sanusiya did not ask the Bedouin to change their way of life, but only to lead better lives, so the Turkish officials did not ask them to change their way of life, but only to pay taxes and, within reason, to keep the peace. In general we can agree with Professor Gregory's summary of the position when he wrote in 1909: 'The Turks apparently know how far they can go in interference with the Arabs, and during recent years have on more than one occasion altered their policy to avoid conflict with the natives.'[2]

II

The momentous events which took place in Turkey in 1908 made little difference to the political situation in Cyrenaica. In that year the 'Young Turks' gained control in Turkey and in the following year deposed the Sultan 'Abd al-Hamid II, who was succeeded by Muhammad the Fifth. The declaration of 'Liberty, Equality, Fraternity, and Justice' was coldly received by the Arab population of Banghazi, and the attempt by a section of the Turkish officials to create in the town a local branch of the Committee of 'Union and Progress' met with the strongest opposition. The two Cyrenaican delegates elected to the Parliament at Istanbul in the elections which followed the new constitution were both candidates of the party opposed to 'Young Turk' policy. Both in Tripolitania and in Cyrenaica the Arabs, citizens and Bedouin, were outraged by the revolutionary and rationalist leanings of the 'Young Turks', who aimed at the destruction of the Caliphate and of the religious Orders which

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[1] Savarese, op. cit., pp. 162–3.

(13) [2] J. W. Gregory (and others), *Report on the Work of the Commission sent out by the Jewish Territorial Organization under the Auspices of the Governor-General of Tripoli to examine the Territory proposed for the Purpose of a Jewish Settlement in Cyrenaica*, 1909, p. 13. See also Coro, op. cit., p. 19; Giglio, op. cit., p. 36; and Ismail Chemali, *Gli Abitanti della Tripolitania*, 1916, p. 39.

3:Evans-Pritchard E-4, 5 (1942-1944) 1949 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9
(1837-1942) Sanusi

*175 *648 *795

afterwards Marsa Matruh. The British made a counter-offensive in January 1916. Consistently beaten in a series of encounters, the forces of Sayyid Ahmad and Nuri Bey were finally routed at al-'Aqqaqir, to the west of Marsa Matruh, on 26 February 1916, by Gen. Peyton, an engagement in which Ja'afir Bey and his staff were captured. On 24 March al-Sallum was reoccupied. British armoured cars did great damage among the scattered Bedouin, 'shooting all loaded camels and men within reach'.[1] Seeing his men hopelessly routed and confused Sayyid Ahmad retired with a small bodyguard to Siwa oasis, then to al-Bahariya, Farafra, and finally al-Dakhla, in all of which oases in the Western Desert of Egypt there was a large Sanusi element. It is often said by writers, and the view seems to have been held by British Intelligence, though I do not know on what evidence, that he intended to link up with a revolt (November 1915) of 'Ali Dinar, the Sultan of Darfur in the Egyptian Sudan, though the Sultan had never been friendly towards the Sanusiya. It is quite possible that the Turks or the Sayyid, or both, had some such crazy plan. Anyhow, 'Ali Dinar's rising was crushed without difficulty and he was killed in the autumn of 1916.

After his defeat at the hands of the British, Sayyid Ahmad had at least the good sense to realize that his people were too exhausted to continue the struggle, that negotiations would have to be entered into, and that overtures from him were not likely to be acceptable to either the British or the Italians. He therefore, in the interests of his country and of his Order, handed over political and military control in Cyrenaica to Sayyid Idris. Sayyid Idris's brother, Sayyid al-Rida, was to assist him on the plateau and Sayyid Hilal in the Marmarica. Sayyid Safi al-Din was placed in charge of Sanusiya interests in the Sirtica, Sayyid Muhammad 'Abid in Fazzan and the *qibla*, and Sayyid 'Ali al-Khattab in the oases of Kufra. Sayyid Ahmad remained religious head of the Sanusiya *tariqa*.

It was, therefore, with Sayyid Ahmad's consent, indeed approval, that Sayyid Idris entered into negotiations with the British from Ajadabiya, whither he had repaired in the winter of 1915, before the attack in the Western Desert, to avoid being implicated in an action he could neither countenance nor stop.

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[1] W. T. Massey, *The Desert Campaigns*, 1918, p. 150.

*175 *648 *795 619 [602] [183] save the Italians much labour and danger. The policy had very limited success, for in practice the Patriots recruited from every tribe and every section. Bedouin sentiments about kinship and its obligations worked both ways. If it was a duty to avenge a slain kinsman it was no less a duty to protect and aid a living kinsman, and the sense of kin and its compelling influence in conduct, all that is meant by *'asabiya* in Bedouin values, are the life and the soul of the Romany world.

It took the Italians a long time to realize that the Bedouin mind was not all of one piece but a Joseph's coat of conflicting interests. These interests excluded each other as the social situation evoked one loyalty to the detriment of another and it was, therefore, only in terms of their social structure that the apparent inconsistencies of Bedouin behaviour could be understood. Consequently the Italians were for ever suffering disappointments and accused the Bedouin, with increasing resentment and bitterness as the struggle continued, of disloyalty and treachery. Among the collaborationists, the *mtalyanin*, the Italianized, as the Patriots called them, there was every degree of participation from passivity, the refraining from taking an active part in the resistance, to full co-operation with the Italian army as spies, guides, informers, and administrative officials; but even those guilty of the worst complicity could, especially when some personal tie was involved, do the guerrillas a good turn. Many poor Bedouin near the towns joined the Italian forces as one kind or other of irregulars, police, and friendlies, and as labourers and camelmen, and it was found that these, while drawing Italian pay and rations, did not hesitate to assist the Patriots when an opportunity offered itself. Desertions to the enemy with full equipment were frequent. Italian rifles and ammunition and even pay were often handed over to the guerrillas. After an engagement the ground was left strewn with live ammunition for the guerrillas to glean. Many reported fights between the Patriots and the submitted population were undoubtedly inventions to cover gifts of ammunition, supplied by the Italians, from the Italian-sponsored irregulars to the Patriot bands. These native battalions constituted, in fact, 'a sort of supply depot of men, arms, and ammunition for the Sanusi formations'.[1] Information about Italian troop move-

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[113] [1] 'La pulizia del Gebel Cirenaico', by 'Gadria', *L'Oltremare*, Dec. 1930.

of resistance. It was useless to try to destroy this plant of the 175*
resistance by striking at its visible foliage, for when the fighting 648*
bands were hard pressed, they dispersed and resided among 795*
the *sottomessi* for repose, recuperation, and refitting.[1] Serra, 619
looking back across the years of struggle, with their mixture of compromise and ruthlessness, optimism and disillusionment, tells the same sombre story. The implacable hostility of the Arabs to their Christian conquerors was as formless as it was ineradicable. Everybody and everything were against the invaders, but in a flaccid and crumbling opposition which inhibited a precise reaction. The enemy, he complains, habitually withdrew from the struggle. The environment offered nothing to the Italians and everything to the Bedouin, whose culture was unexacting and unpretentious. The Shaikhs had authority only so long as they opposed the Italians, and if they co-operated with them they lost it and could only regain it at Italian expense. The population was unstable, adventurous, and accustomed to such privations that they did not recognize the limits of resistance to the hardships of war. In one thing alone there was constancy and reality, the hatred they had for their Christian conquerors, which persisted in spite of all appearances and all protestations of friendship.[2] When Graziani took charge of the operations in 1930 he likened the Cyrenaican situation to 'a poisoned organism which sets up, on one point of the body, a purulent bube. The bube in this case was the fighting band of 'Umar al-Mukhtar, resulting from an entire infected situation.'[3]

In this semi-darkness of suspicion and uncertainty, this twilight of confidence, when every human being was a foe, the friend behind no less than the enemy in front, every thicket an ambush, and every crag and boss a sniper's nest, the campaign became distorted to unreality. It was a fantastic shadow-show in which dozens of unrelated episodes were thrown at the same time on to a gigantic screen.

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[1] 'La pacificazione della Cirenaica', *Rivista delle Colonie Italiane*, 1932, p. 330.

[2] Op. cit., pp. 152–3. See also 'Che cosa è il Gebel Cirenaico', by the same writer, in *L'Oltremare*, May 1928.

[3] Op. cit., p. 64.

elusive an enemy.[1] Corrado Zoli (later Governor of Eritrea) 175* tells the same story, how after 1923 began a long cycle of 648* exhausting '*campagne di grande polizia*', repeated every year, 795* and frequently two or three times in the same year, against an elusive enemy who kept the Italian forces in constant movement and alarms by endless surprises, incursions, raids, and ambushes; making use of his great mobility, powers of dispersal, tactical independence, and perfect knowledge of the insidious terrain, to avoid decisive encounters.[2] And in *Cirenaica Pacificata* Graziani tells us how the Arabs spoke during the long campaign, right up to its conclusion, of the two Governments of Cyrenaica, Italian and Sanusi, as 'the Government of the Day and the Government of the Night'.

V

In January 1923 the position was as follows: Italian posts to the south of Banghazi were up to some 50 km. from the Capital on the line Qaminis–al-Tailimun–Suluq; in the region between Banghazi and Talmaitha on the line al-Rajma–al-Marj–Qasr Libiya, running to a mean distance of 25 km. from the coast; and in the Shahhat area on the line al-Fayidiya–al-Qubba up to some 40 km. from the coast. In the region of Darna and between Tubruq and the Egyptian frontier the country was tranquil and was, in appearance at any rate, controlled by the Italian civil and military authorities as far as the southernmost encampments of the 'Abaidat. The Italians considered that the northern 'Awaqir, the 'Arafa, the Darsa, the Hasa, the northern Bara'asa, and the 'Abaidat were organized on the basis of the constitution of 1919.[3] In fact, however, their authority was negligible beyond the immediate vicinity of the towns and military posts. To the south of the Italian posts were the 'Mixed Camps' of al-Abyar, Taknis, Slanta, al-Makhili, and al-'Akrama, in each of which there were between about 100 and 300 Sanusi troops and rather more Italian troops, though the Italian garrisons were at the mercy of the Sanusi, since they were isolated in unfriendly country. The Sanusi had also estab-

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[1] Attilio Teruzzi, *Cirenaica Verde*, 1931, pp. 338–9.

[2] 'La completa Conquista e l'Occupazione definitiva della Libia', *Rivista delle Colonie Italiane*, 1932, p. 169.

[3] Mondaini, op. cit., pp. 480–1.

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should the Italians find themselves at war with a European power. Efforts to obtain the extradition of the Sanusi leaders in Egypt were unsuccessful.[1]

The organization of the Order within Cyrenaica had been entirely disrupted during the years of war. The zawiyas had been destroyed by gun-fire, had fallen into ruin through neglect, or were being used as military posts by the Italians. Their Shaikhs had been scattered by the years of war and in 1930 had been rounded up and exiled at the same time as the properties of the Order had been confiscated on the grounds that while the Sanusiya existed as a corporation it would continue from its lodges to spread disaffection. The confiscation of the estates of the Order was viewed as the final act in its extirpation.[2]

When the Italians invaded Cyrenaica in 1911 they hoped that the Bedouin might remain neutral. They therefore declared repeatedly during the early stages of the war that the privileges of the Order and the customs of the people would be respected.[3] It can hardly be doubted that they did so in bad faith, for Giolitti had won support for the war among the peasants of southern Italy by promising them the exploitation of an Eldorado in Libya. Certainly, as the Italians themselves had to confess, they were not believed.[4] In retaliation for the support the Order gave the Turkish cause the Italians began to sequestrate its estates in those parts of the country where they had obtained a footing. At the end of 1913, Gen. Ottavio Briccola, the first Governor of Cyrenaica, ordered sequestration of its lodges and in the following year further instructions provided for seizure of the properties of the twelve lodges at that time in Italian hands. It is doubtful, however, whether these measures were intended to constitute complete and final confiscation. It is more likely that, as the Italians themselves say, they were temporary war measures to prevent the resources of the Order being used to support Sanusi forces operating all over the country against them, as a retaliation, and to provide a pawn with which to bargain when the Sanusiya decided to come to terms.

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[1] Giglio, op. cit., p. 110.

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[2] 'Italia e Senussia', *L'Oltremare*, Aug. 1930.

[3] Bourbon del Monte Santa Maria, *L'Islamismo e la Confraternità dei Senussi*, 1912, p. 240.

[4] *Norme Sommaire* for Political Officials, Aug. 1912, pp. 5–6.

*175 *648 727 In 1932 the Bedouin were released from the concentration camps into which they had been herded in 1930 and were allowed to return to their tribal territories. In spite of their losses in manpower, stock, and arms, it was felt that the closest watch must still be kept on them. Local officials were, therefore, instructed to keep detailed lists of distribution of tents, and soldiers were posted to picket the camps and prevent any movement without a permit from an Italian official. Any breach of the regulation, which was in force till 1938, was punished with imprisonment. This supervision by what amounted to a strict pass system was finally given up by Balbo, as it was found that it irritated the Bedouin without serving any useful purpose.

*175 *648 Like other governments that have had dealings with nomads, the Italian bureaucrats in charge of the administration could not abide that they should live free from their interference. It was held that it was wicked to be a nomad and that it was the duty of an administration to compel them to settle. Graziani declared that the nomads are 'enemies, and destroyers, of agriculture. Everywhere, in fact, the nomad has passed he has destroyed woods, trees and fields.' Therefore, 'the nomads have no justification and no right to claim to stay in areas of assured development, such as those of the Cyrenaican plateau, rich in promise of tree and cereal culture, but ought to be excluded from it for ever, leaving room for thousands and thousands of Italian arms which are stretched out there, anxious to begin again to till and make fruitful this ancient Roman earth'. Graziani held, furthermore, that not only must the Bedouin be kept off the fertile plateau, but must be stabilized in the country on the edge of the steppe where, in his opinion, they had sufficient and suitable land for pasturing and sowing. They would there find themselves in an environment perfectly responding '*alla loro natura di rapsodi del deserto*'. Here their every move, every halt, every camp ought to be under rigid supervision by government officials. Braida adds that by 1935 Graziani's plan had been put into operation in its main proposals.[1] The plateau was reserved for metropolitan colonization and the steppe for the Bedouin, who were subject to such rigorous control that it might be regarded as a prelude to

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[113] [1] Graziani, op. cit., p. 123; Vittorino Braida, *Memoria per l'Ufficiale dei Reparti indigeni della Cirenaica*, 1935, pp. 61–3.

rendered in fighting faithfully for Italy.' On this point Balbo, 175*
who replaced Graziani, was equally emphatic: 'Chiefs do not 648*
exist any more—there are only citizens with equality of duties 619
and rights.'[1] Tribal Shaikhs, therefore, were not asked to advise
the Government or to co-operate with it in any official capacity
and the subsidies they had received in the pre-Fascist and early
Fascist periods were withdrawn. Cyrenaica under the Fascists
was administered by decrees issued by a Governor directly
responsible to the Minister for the Colonies at Rome. Under the [646]
Organic Law of 1927 a General Council with very limited
advisory functions was allowed for, and Arabs chosen from the
notables of the sedentary population and Shaikhs of the Bedouin
tribes could be nominated to sit on it by the Minister for the
Colonies on the recommendation of the Governor. Its constitutional
importance was nil, because it never came into operation.
It was replaced by the Law-Decree of 1934, by which 175*
Tripolitania and Cyrenaica became a single colony with the 648*
seat of its administration at Tripoli. The new colony was divided 631
into four commissariats (Tripoli, Misurata, Bengasi, and Derna) 619
and a military territory of the Sahara. Each commissariat came
under a Prefect and was divided into administrative sections:
departments, residencies, and districts, all under Italian officials.
It was recognized that the Bedouin were divided into tribes and
sub-tribes. At the head of each was a Shaikh chosen in accordance
with tribal custom and nominated by the Head of a
commissariat. The Shaikh of a tribe was personally responsible
to the competent Italian authority for order and security within
the tribal territory. His functions and powers were those
accorded him by tribal custom. The Shaikhs of the sub-tribes
came under his control and had within their sub-tribal areas
functions analogous to his. All that this meant was that certain
tribal Shaikhs were recognized as such in so far as they were held
responsible for any shortcomings of the Bedouin, but were
accorded no privileges and had no representation. Consultative
councils, where allowed for, were composed of administrative
officials. So long as the Bedouin obeyed the Government and 175*
submitted to whatever curtailments of their freedom and rights 648*
it chose to enact, they could stew in their own juice until the 619

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[1] Italo Balbo, *La Politica Sociale Fascista verso gli Arabi della Libia*, 1938. [113]

*175 *648 Italians had more leisure to devote to breaking up tribal life altogether.

[619] The final decree of the Fascists affecting Arab status was issued in 1939. It incorporated Tripolitania and Cyrenaica within the Kingdom of Italy, and to quiet any dismay this might cause among the Effendiya of the towns it offered them certain privileges, mostly nominal. The decree in no way affected the Bedouin. Indeed very little of the unceasing flow of legislation which poured from the Italian bureaucrats and lawyers in the form of Laws, Royal-Decrees, Royal-Law-Decrees, Ministerial Decrees, and Governatorial Decrees affected the Bedouin. The vast majority of these rules and regulations in no way touched their lives and they remained in blissful ignorance of their content. They had little or no money, they settled their own cases with the aid of their Shaikhs and religious teachers, they made their own trading arrangements, they provided their own labour, and so on. Where a law affected them it could often be eluded or circumvented. As the Bedouin
[181] themselves say, '*Sama' min gher ta'a*', 'To hear without obeying', is one of their chief characteristics. The Italians in any case, sitting comfortably in their offices and entirely out of touch with the people, relied on their Cyrenaican police and minor officials to report breaches of regulations, and if they did not choose to do so, the law became a dead letter. Also it cannot be assumed that because there were regulations great efforts were always made to enforce them. 'The gap between the letter of the law and daily practice, wide in all countries, becomes an abyss in Italy.'[1]

With all their regulations and petty interference the Italians were most careful not to offend Arab opinion in religious matters. From the moment of their invasion of Libya they vociferated their respect for Arab custom, culture, and religion. Thus the Minister Bertolini said to the Arabs in a discourse at Tripoli in 1914: 'We will respect your religion and your customs; we know the splendour with which your civilization has already illumined the world and we do not intend in any way to threaten it. . . .'[2] The Italians prided themselves on their Islamic policy and claimed that as a result of it and of their justice and of their

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[1] James Meenan, *The Italian Corporative System*, 1944, p. 340.
[2] Mondaini, op. cit., pp. 327–8.

care for the material welfare of their Muslim subjects their 175* colonies were the only ones in which the Muslim subjects of 648* European powers were not in a state of suppressed revolt.[1] Balbo said:

> 'The Government has never favoured in Libya any form of religious proselytism directed to the conversion of Muslims to another faith. On the contrary it has shown its interest in favour of Islamic cult by making important donations for the restoration of old mosques and for the construction of new ones, even in the desert territories where the nomads have never till now been able to kneel to the Almighty in sacred precincts.'[2]

They built mosques, restored the tombs of well-known saints, including that of the most famous of Cyrenaican saints, Sidi Rafa', which their troops had destroyed in the fighting, and celebrated zawiyas (other than those of the Sanusiya Order). They respected Islamic law and custom. While the civil, commercial, and penal codes and their rules of procedure were as in Italy, the personal status and law of inheritance of Muslims were guaranteed in all laws and decrees from the beginning of their occupation, and nothing might be taught in the schools contrary to Islamic principles. They issued ordinances defining the status and duties of the mufti and of qadis and to ensure the proper functioning of the Shari'a Courts and the *auqaf* (religious endowments) administration. They founded a religious training college at Tripoli to serve the two Libyan countries and make it unnecessary for students to go to al-Azhar in Egypt or al-Zaituna in Tunisia for koranic instruction, for in those places they were subject to anti-Italian propaganda. Their prefects attended Islamic ceremonies on important feast-days, especially on the Birthday of the Prophet, and distributed alms on these occasions. The Prefect of Darna even re-established the *zarda*, a festal excursion at the beginning of spring, for the students of the town, though this was hardly an Islamic function. They went further. They built mosques in their concentration camps. They permitted the kuttabs (local koranic schools) to remain open although they disapproved of them. They gave special facilities for the pilgrimage to Mecca and established an Italo-

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[1] R. d. C., 'L'Italia per i suoi sudditi musulmani', *Riv. delle Col. It.*, 1938, pp. 1177–91. (113)

[2] Op. cit., p. 9.

lodges. The Italians, who had some small schools in Libya even 175*
before 1911, gave considerable attention to educational matters 648*
from the earliest days of their occupation. The first educational programme for Libya, drawn up by the Arabist C. A. Nallino, was not accepted by the Central Government because it was felt that the proposals did not give the Administration effective control over the schools and that consequently education could not be sufficiently directed to political ends. Military conquest must be consolidated by moral conquest. This feeling hardened under the Fascists into an educational policy designed to meet the new programme of colonization. Mixed schools and classes were abolished in favour of schools for Italian boys and schools for Arab boys or, where they had to be taught in the same building, separate classes for each. Teaching, except of the Koran to the most junior pupils, was entirely in the hands of Italians. In the curriculum Italian took precedence over Arabic and it was intended that it should become eventually the sole medium of instruction. Arab boys learnt under the system to write Italian with greater facility than their own language. The aims of this education were to satisfy the cultural ambitions of the Arabs, while keeping them under control and preventing them from reaching a level of cultural equality with the Italians, and to provide minor government officials and a means of intercommunication by which the Arabs could more easily be employed in menial work.[1] It seems that by 1940 there were twenty-three schools for Arabs in Cyrenaica. Some of these were in centres within reach of Bedouin and a number of medical clinics were also opened in Bedouin areas. Less use was made of the schools than of the clinics.

Thus in every department of public life power and authority 175*
were retained by the Italians in their own hands and the people 648*
of the country had no representation in the Government and 563
were not consulted about plans for their future. It was, however, necessary for the Italians to employ a number of Arabs in minor administrative posts, because they could not themselves make contact with the people, and in the Islamic courts, where they could not themselves function. After 1935, when Italy

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[1] Dr. R. Micacchi, 'L'Instruction publique en Libye de 1912 à 1924', *Institut Colonial International*, 1926, and 'L'Enseignement aux indigènes dans les colonies italiennes dépendant directement de la Couronne', ibid. 1931.

[1113]

Weisse Götter, who avoided all contact with the natives that was 175*
not unavoidable, and they rejected also the French policy of 648*
cultural assimilation and social and political equality with the *évolués*.[1] In 1938 the Under-Secretary for Italian Africa, Teruzzi, the ex-Governor of Cyrenaica, described the fundamental principle of Fascist native policy as a steering between the Anglo-Saxon colour bar and the French policy of assimilation which was not merely a middle course but an entirely new direction. At the same time he rejected the concept of indirect rule 'which leaves to the native chiefs very wide autonomy, not only administrative but also political, and which leads therefore inevitably to a slow detachment of the colony from the mother country'. The Italian policy was to regard their colonies as extensions of Italy beyond the seas.[2]

Had the Italians been content, as in the first years of their 175*
occupation, to restrict their immigration to the towns, where 648*
there was scope for a new element as traders, artisans, officials, 167
and professional men, a symbiosis might have developed, for the Arabs were at that time incapable of these functions on an adequate scale, and the problem of adjustment might never have become acute; but when they began to organize mass colonization of the country-side, questions of status and racial interrelations appeared to present no other solution than that proposed. Even had racial miscegenation not been prohibited it could hardly have taken place between Catholic Italians and Muslim Arabs. Cultural assimilation was also unlikely because both Italians and Arabs were civilized peoples with a long cultural history behind them and it was most improbable that the Arabs would give up their religion, law, and language. No other solution seemed feasible, therefore, than that advocated by Balbo, the policy of parallel development in cultural matters and structural co-ordination within the framework of the Fascist State. The Arabs were to remain Arabs in speech, religion, personal law, customs, and manners, but their tribal structure was to disappear and its place was to be taken by political and economic institutions similar to those of their Italian fellow Libyans. 'We shall have in Libya not rulers and ruled, but

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[1] Oskar Schmieder and Herbert Wilhelmy, *Die faschistische Kolonisation in Nordafrika*, 1939, pp. 79–80. [113]

[2] Italo Neri, 'Politica Indigena', *Riv. delle Col. It.*, 1938, pp. 1301–2. [113]

measures would have convinced the Bedouin that they were 175* compensated for the loss of their kinsmen, their lands, and their 648* independence. In the event they were inadequate and they [167] came too late.

Italian policy in Cyrenaica, like the colonial policies of other European powers, was full of contradictions. It is not within the scope of this book to discuss them, but I would draw the reader's attention to the changes this policy underwent during the thirty years between their occupation of the country and their embroilment in the late war. They were tactical changes demanded by the development of local, domestic, and international situations. There was no fundamental difference between the aims of the Fascist Government and the aims of pre-Fascist Governments. All intended to wrest Cyrenaica from [167] its inhabitants by force of arms and by peopling it with Italians to exploit it for Italian economic, political, and above all strategic, purposes. They were attempting no more than other Colonial Powers had done before them, but they had waited too long, till the tide of colonial expansion was turning and the right of Europeans to rob native peoples of their lands was beginning to be challenged. Even so, it was not of their choosing or out of deference to humane considerations, but on account of military weakness and incompetence, that they made a truce with the Sanusi in 1917, and on account of domestic difficulties that they prolonged this truce to 1923. As soon as Mussolini had restored order in Italy he resumed the war Giolitti had begun, although he had been one of the most hostile critics of it at the time. When Graziani had crushed resistance the original plan of 175* colonization was acted on. The migratory swarms from Italy 648* of peasants, officials, traders, and hangers-on of all kinds, 167 threatened the very existence of the Bedouin, who saw themselves being forced either to eke out their lives in the desert as a scarcely tolerated class of shepherds or to sink to the level of landless wage-earners in the country districts and of unskilled labourers in the towns. The Italians intended this to be their fate,[1] and it might well have been if events in Europe had not

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[1] Giuseppe Daodiace, 'Latinità e colonizzazione nell' Africa del nord', *Riv. delle Col. e d'Oriente*, Feb. 1927, pp. 13–14; Filippo Lo Bello, *Rivista Coloniale*, 1925, p. 38; and Paolo D'Agostini Orsini di Camerota, *L'Italia nella politica africana*, 1926, p. 132. [113]

*175 *648 641 was expected to run the country with machinery with which they were totally unacquainted. Arabs being what they are, and circumstances being what they were in 1919, the constitution could hardly have been other than a failure. Indeed it is not surprising that Fascist writers later poured scorn on these well-meant efforts of pluto-democracy.[1] They were particularly shocked by the grant of Italian citizenship to the Arabs, especially as these same Arabs were exempted from compulsory military service. Under Federzoni, the first Fascist Minister for the Colonies, policy was in this matter, as in others, completely reversed. All agreements with the Sanusi were, as has been noted, torn up, and into the waste-paper basket with them went the local Parliament and the constitution of 1919. In its place was issued by the Royal Decree of 26 June 1927 the *Legge Organica per l'Amministrazione della Tripolitania e della Cirenaica*. In a sense this was a new, and Fascist, constitution though its constitutional content was subordinated to its administrative and judicial content. By it the Arabs ceased to be *cittadini italiani* and became *cittadini italiani libici*, they lost the right to free exercise of military and civil careers outside the colonies, electoral rights (parliament had in any case been abolished), the right to petition to the National Parliament, &c., and there was no mention of the liberty of the press, of the right of meeting, of freedom from military conscription, and of the protection of the Arabic language in public instruction. In general, the Arabs were no longer equal with the Italians before the law. Metropolitan citizenship might still be asked for under certain conditions. Application of this decree was several times postponed and it appears never to have come into operation.

*175 *648 Bedouin resistance in both Tripolitania and Cyrenaica still caused the Italians much trouble even as late as 1929 and on both military and political grounds it was deemed advisable to place the two countries under single direction. This was done by the Royal Decree of 24 January 1929 which placed the two colonies under Pietro Badoglio and by the Royal Decree of 3 December 1934, *Ordinamento Organico per l'Amministrazione della Libia*, which, as described in the last section, divided the single colony into four provincial commissariats and a mili-

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[113] [1] Alberto Stern, 'Il nuovo Ordinamento Fondamentale della Tripolitania e della Cirenaica', *Rivista delle Colonie Italiane*, 1934, p. 1027.

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The first 20,000 new colonists for Libya were given a tremendous send-off in March 1938 and their settlement was completed during the following eight months. Those who came to Cyrenaica, probably more than half of the 20,000, partly went to complete the villages already in existence and partly to occupy the new holdings prepared for them at Baracca, Oberdan, D'Annunzio, and Battisti. The Cyrenaican quota of another 20,000 immigrants, the second wave of demographic colonization, was supposed to have followed in October 1939 to constitute the population of the newly constructed villages of Mameli, Sauro, and Filzi, but not all of them appear to have arrived. These two waves of mass immigration brought the number of farms to over 2,000 and the number of agricultural colonists to over 15,000 persons, making round about 50,000 Italian colonists of all kinds. Northern Cyrenaica had become in population and in appearance, as well as in law, part of Italy. Banghazi and Darna had become modern Italian towns which might well have been on the shores of Sicily or southern Italy. Modern roads cut through the plateau and for mile after mile were lined with Italian farmhouses and every few miles bisected Italian village centres. A railway ran from Banghazi to Suluq and from Banghazi to al-Marj and was in process of extension to Darna. An aqueduct was being built to carry water from Mara, near Darna, to the colonial villages as far to the west as those on the farther edge of the plain of al-Marj. Banghazi had been made into a modern port. Airlines to Banghazi ran from Rome, Tripoli, and Tubruq.

I have given a short sketch of Italian colonization of Cyrenaica only in order that the effect it had on the Bedouin may be better understood, for what concerns us is the fate of Muhammad, Mehemmed, Ahmad, and Abu Bakr, who with their flocks and herds were driven from the more fertile parts of the plateau to make way for Michele, Antonio, Italo, and Cesare. For over twenty years the Italians had been unable to colonize Cyrenaica for, as Graziani bluntly observed, 'It is plain that when one is making war one cannot plant trees, neither can one sow corn.'[1] Once resistance had been overcome it was merely a question of finding a legal formula for depriving the owners of the land of

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[1] 'Panorama economico della Cirenaica', *Rivista delle Colonie Italiane*, 1933, p. 295.

*175 *648 [167 563] thirty-two holdings, for the Bedouin showed no inclination to work as serfs the lands they had worked as freemen: 'In their daily attitude coldness and scepticism were apparent so that the part they took in collaborating was purely formal.'[1] A pastoral village, furnished with veterinary and stud services and offices for the collection, classification, and weighing of wool, was built at Nahiba (Jardis al-'Abid) and another was planned to be built at Verde (Jardis al-Jarrari). Some may consider that these measures are evidence of Balbo's sincerity. The Bedouin believed that he intended to destroy them by guile as surely as Graziani had destroyed them with machine-gun and bomb.

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When Giolitti landed troops in Cyrenaica and Tripolitania in 1911 he started his country on the road to ruin. The first Libyan war was from 1911 to 1917. In the midst of it Italy was involved, from 1915 to 1918, in the first Great War. From 1921 to 1932 she was again engaged in prosecuting her colonial war in Libya, first in Tripolitania, then in Cyrenaica also. From 1934 to 1936 she participated in the Spanish civil war. In 1935 and 1936 she conquered Ethiopia. In 1939 she seized Albania. From 1940 to 1944 she was engaged in the second Great War. It was appropriate that disaster should overcome the Italians in Cyrenaica, that the Bedouin of that country who had suffered so much at their hands should witness their humiliation, and that it should fall on the head of Graziani, who became Governor of Libya when Balbo was killed at Tubruq on 28 June 1940.

As the day of retribution drew near the Italians showed some uneasiness about the situation in Cyrenaica and, as I have recorded, they made belated attempts to conciliate the Arabs. *175 *648 *795 793 Their uneasiness was partly due to the presence of the Sanusi leader Sayyid Idris and of a number of notable Cyrenaican and Tripolitanian Shaikhs in exile in Egypt. It could hardly be doubted that they would approach the British with offers of assistance should Italy enter the war on the side of Germany. This is what happened. In October 1939, when Italy's participation seemed imminent, the Cyrenaican and Tripolitanian

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[113] [1] Giuseppe Palloni, *The Action of the Italian Government in Favour of the Lybian Agriculture*, 1945, p. 31.

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APPENDIX II

A SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY

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1950, but his kind of tyranny was absent from the Cyrenaica of that period. From the 795
mid-nineteenth century until the Italian invasion of 1911, the Sanusi Order estab- 175
lished itself, spread its lodges throughout the tribes and in other more remote lands [613]
until it became what Evans-Pritchard speaks of as a theocratic empire.[1] The lodges [778]
served as areas of sanctuary and their staffs adjudicated disputes. Leaders of the [793]
Order had the power to coerce and the Bedouin obeyed. They obeyed out of personal
regard for some of them in 1950, but the religious authority previously used by the
leaders had given way to the political power they now exercised as functionaries in
a state system. In the meantime, the country had been ravaged by the long Italo- [648]
Sanusi wars. Throughout the nineteen-thirties after suffering terrible privations and reduction in numbers through slaughter in war, death in concentration camps, and exile, the Bedouin were ruled by the Italians. During the Second World War the armies of three major contestants fought their battles where the Bedouin now tend their flocks and herds. After the war they were left to fend for themselves, with a minimum of administrative interference.

In the light of all this the conception of an equilibrium system is of little heuristic 121
value, still less its derivative concept of a repetitive system. This does not mean, however, that an account of part of the social life of the Bedouin as it existed in 1950 must be nothing more than a disconnected piece of history, unrelated to a prior state of things and wholly useless for the understanding of the contemporary oil-producing cum mixed pastoral–agricultural economy. It would be little more than a piece of social historiography if the analysis was based on the concept of a total social structure of functionally interconnected parts, forming what Leach describes as 'a delicately balanced mechanism rather like the various parts of a wrist watch'.[2] Such a viewpoint would effectively exclude any possible comprehension of changes save those present as part of the dynamics of a system; its only answer to change is an account of a different system. If, instead, attention is focused on the analysis of a field of components arranged in a specific fashion to meet the interests of men at a particular time, it then becomes possible to see how a shift in their positions, the addition of new components, or the elimination of others produces this or that effect. It can make intelligible what has gone before, and if the future cannot be anticipated it can be demarcated within rough limits.

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modern territory of his tribe. See also Hamilton, 1856.

[1] Evans-Pritchard, 1949. In this book a brilliant account is given of the development of the Order, and how it came to unify and provide centralized political leadership for the tribes. [175] [795] [613]

[2] Leach, 1961, p. 6.

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Résumé

ASPECTS STRUCTURELS DE L'HOSTILITÉ CHEZ LES BÉDOUINS DE CYRÉNAÏQUE

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Le propos essentiel de cet article est d'examiner l'utilité du lignage pris comme modèle pour l'analyse d'une institution sociale particulière. On considère généralement que les Bédouins de Cyrénaïque fournissent un exemple d'un système basé sur le lignage, *par excellence*, et si le lignage en tant que modèle a le potentiel analytique qu'on lui accorde en général, on pourrait alors comprendre, grâce à cela, les composantes d'une institution de la société Bédouine. Les faits choisis pour l'analyse sont ceux qui sont liés aux réajustements des rapports sociaux, nécessités par une rupture des accords pacifiques normaux provoquée par des homicides sous leurs différentes formes.

Dans la première partie de l'article, l'auteur donne un aperçu de la généalogie des groupes de populations concernées. Il analyse en détail les différents modes de conduite en relation avec les différents types d'homicides, en terme de structure de lignage. Il en tire la conclusion que chaque mode de conduite spécifique vis à vis de l'homicide peut être relié aux différents stades de la stratification sociale. Mais pour démontrer ce processus général, certains homicides, qui sont considérés par les Bédouins comme des cas spéciaux, doivent être exclus.

Dans la seconde partie de l'article, l'auteur tente de prouver que ces ' cas spéciaux ' sont aussi fréquents et institutionnalisés que ceux examinés dans l'analyse structurale, et, par conséquent, doivent être compris de la même façon. Si, cependant, les faits se rapportant à ces 'cas spéciaux ' sont considérés avec tout leur poids dans l'analyse, le lignage en tant que modèle, se trouve inadéquat. La conclusion que l'on en tire, est que la structure du lignage n'est pas un modèle sociologique, mais une conceptualisation que se font les Bédouins de leurs rapports sociaux. Ils se trouvent dans l'obligation d'utiliser ce concept car il est, en certains points, en accord avec la réalité et fournit une solution complète, si on met à part certains cas spèciaux. Sous l'angle sociologique, cela implique que l'on considère certains faits comme marginaux, ou en opposition avec l'ordre habituel des choses. L'auteur émet l'hypothèse qu'il n'y a aucune raison de les envisager ainsi. Par conséquent, le lignage en tant que modèle, considéré comme une référence de base pour l'analyse, doit être abandonné et l'on doit adopter une autre référence de base qui permette d'inclure les ' cas spéciaux '. De plus, ce point de vue s'applique non seulement à l'analyse des homicides, mais aussi à l'analyse d'autres problèmes (par exemple, la distribution du pouvoir) et fait apparaître l'inanité de la théorie du lignage. Mais si le lignage d'une population est relégué au rôle d'un fait, ou d'une série de faits, parmi d'autres, l'analyse qu'apporte cet article permet non seulement d'envisager un plus grand nombre de problèmes, mais permet aussi une approche plus directe de l'étude des changements sociaux sur le plan théorique.

Second, the fiction that nothing has happened, which characterises the 585
father's behavior, does not cease with the termination of the celebrations. 593
Each morning, soon after daybreak and before the camp is astir, the groom must leave his bride and repair to his father's tent to lie at his father's side "as he always had done in the past, as if he had not left him." This conventional ruse is followed, not just for the seven days of wedding festivities, but is continued after the groom has moved back into the camp proper, and pitched his tent alongside his father's, with the ropes of the two tents crossing.

In matters other than sleeping arrangements, this fiction that "nothing
has happened" is maintained. Marriage does not mean the immediate creation [592]
of a wholly separate domestic unit. Save for the appearance of an additional
tent, the ordinary run of daytime activities is scarcely altered. To 593
mention perhaps the most important feature of the relationships between 264
father and son, the groom continues to eat with his father. As yet, the son 571
does not use his own bowl,[1] and may not, indeed, do so for several years. 182
The important symbolism of "eating together" or "eating out of the one bowl," the act of commensality creating a bond of fellowship about which Robertson Smith[2] wrote so eloquently can only be referred to here in one of its many aspects. Bedouin themselves stress that eating together is a strong bond, and the communal meal is always used for this purpose after the settlement of a dispute, or at the conclusion of a blood-money agreement,
and so on. It is significant also in the sense that those who partake of a [574]
meal accept the authority of the host; he becomes their protector, and a blow against one of them is struck at him also. Even if the guest is an enemy,[3] as long as he has eaten from another's bowl his life is safe.

The slaughter of an animal for another person creates a bond which has its 571
roots in the intimate connection between man and his animals. In a very 231
vivid way, the Bedouin view their animals as part of themselves, as part of 264
their *Risiq*, their general wealth, in which their sons are included. It is this 182
mystical association between a man and his animals which distinguishes a
meal consisting of the meat of an animal slaughtered from ones' own flock [574]
or herd from a meal consisting of meat bought from a butcher's shop — often [186]
given by the plateau peoples of Northern Cyrenaica to their guests, but which the camel-herding Bedouin of the south regard as despicable hospitality. A slaughtered animal is the food, *par excellence,* which establishes this bond

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[1] When Bedouin take their meals, they eat from large wooden bowls imported from [415]
south of the Sahara. It is a matter of custom that a man does not eat alone unless it is [439]
unavoidable, a custom of such strength, that, when, one day, only an elder, occupying a tent the ropes of which were crossed with mine, was left in camp, he brought his [123]
bowl into my tent "so that I will be eating with a man."

[2] William Robertson Smith. *The Religion of the Semites.* 3rd ed. London: Macmillan, 1927. [113]

[3] A stranger entering a camp is under no obligation to give his identity. Few do so
until they have partaken of a meal. In the past, the Bedouin claim, the period of [574]
anonymity could last for 40 days, but nowadays, they say they limit it to two only. I [609]
have known strangers enter a camp, receive entertainment, and leave without offering any specific identity.

621 were imminent, because the marriages of two of the men were anticipated, 571 two others harboured more distant hopes and boys in all the tents would soon [554] be youths. The composition of this camp, caught at a moment in time, was a function of the age and sex distribution of its inhabitants. All camps show regularities in their structure, but their content is dynamic. Certain general features persist, but the alignments of people undergo change with [128] equal persistency. What priority is given to each of these considerations, which component occupies the nucleating centre for others, will depend on the problem under analysis, for while I have stressed that this or that is important, I do not wish to suggest that any single factor has an absolute importance compared with others, except in relation to a specific problem.

•113

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maintained to this day in the desert between the last two and the Sa'adi, though they are relaxed in the cultivation. 619 651

The Jumei'at, who used to be "Murabitin" to the Beni 'Una, are now nominally so ~~to~~ the Awlad 'Ali, but are not required to pay tribute. Other tribes, such as the Jawabis and 'Awarma, are in an intermediate stage between the Sa'adi and the Murabitin. The Awlad 'Abd es-Sallam, the Samalus ed-Diminat, and perhaps the Fawakhir, call themselves "Murabitin bil Baraka", a priestly caste which, in Tripoli, used to receive special privileges from the Turkish Government. 619 [778]

Though the Sa'adi tribes despise the Murabitin as serfs, they respect them for their piety and resort to them for the writing of charms. [186]

While the Murabitin tribes generally may be suspected to contain more Libyan blood than the Sa'adi, there are other tribes such as the 'Amayim, the Jahama, and the Tarhuna, who have come to Egypt from further west than any of the above, and who seem to be quite definitely "Berber", though, of course, none of them will admit it. These are known euphemistically as 'Arab el-Gharb.

Even some of the Juheina, settled east of the Nile in Sharqiya, are scorned by Klippel as "d'origine berbère, se pretendant section d'une tribu d'Arabie".[1]

Awlad 'Ali.—This tribe, by far the most important of the Western Bedouin, occupies with its vassals the whole north coast of Egypt from Salum to Alexandria. Like the others, they claim descent from the Beni Suleim, alleging their ancestor 'Ali, son of 'Aqar, to be a grandson of that Dib, or Abu Dib, mentioned by Ibn Khaldun. Their enemies, however, allege that he was a Jew. "When the Arabs occupied the north coast of Africa, there was a notable, a Jew, who owned property at Saqiet el-Hamra in Morocco. This man welcomed and entertained the Arab sheikh Ez-Zanati. He became very popular with the sheikh, who gave him his daughter named Sa'ada, on condition that he embraced Islam before the marriage contract was made out."[2] Another version calls the Jew Yana, and says that he had two daughters. Of these Sa'ada was the [131] 619 173

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[1] E. Klippel, "Etudes sur le folklore Bédouin de l'Egypte," *Bull. Soc. Khédiv. de Géogr.*, vii, 10, Cairo, 1911. [113]

[2] From information collected by Muhammad Bey Wasfi.

[concluding, i]

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114

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121 However, the political climate of Egypt at the time of my research made such a study impracticable. In reorienting my research, I decided to confine my study to al-Qasr and an analysis of "micropolitics" at the local community level.

The aim of the present study is, then, an understanding of the political structure of al-Qasr. Also, since no group exists in isolation and relations with others are mainly a matter of politics, I have tried to present here the structural and ideological bases of politics in al-Qasr. This study is concerned with politics in the traditional sense and in the modern sense. An analysis of the traditional meaning of politics necessitates a discussion and understanding of the structural principles of Bedouin society and the manner in which they function in defining the rights and obligations contained in social relationships. Such an analysis also seeks to establish a base level from which we can perceive and understand the political process in al-Qasr and the modern context of Bedouin politics. The main focus of the political analysis in this study is upon authority and leadership roles, as they were in the past and as they are in the present.

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*613 I should hasten to make one thing clear at this time, for it directly affected the way I went about my research and the type of data which I collected. In al-Qasr, there exists communication boundaries, and even barriers, corresponding to the structural and territorial lines of the lineage system.
[178] The 'Aishaibat tribe of al-Qasr, once a nomadic tribe, is now

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sedentary, but the semi-autonomous nature of the lineage segments is maintained to a large extent. The result of this is a de-emphasis of the "we-feeling" among the population of al-Qasr and an absence of "sense of community" (Easton 1965:332). By "community," I refer to a pattern of relatively intensive, face-to-face social relationships, and the values of solidarity and common goals to which these give rise. 121 *613 571 The relationship between lineage structure and territoriality was such that kinship segments within the same lineage unit might go days, and even weeks, with no inter-communication, and the degree of communication between separate lineage units of the tribe was less intensive than this. Such a communication pattern made observation difficult. The fact that Bedouin tribal society relatively lacks the group ceremonial aspect compounded the difficulty of gaining an overall perspective of structural relations, and of witnessing the bases and nature of social interaction outside the lineage structure. All of this emerges from a communication structure and kinship structure differentiated into corporate groups which "discourage close participation of members in the social relations of the larger society" (Wolf 1957:7).

121 The structural arrangement of al-Qasr was such that, in plain language, not a great deal was happening in the sociological sense. I say this about al-Qasr in comparison with, for instance, a full-blown village community. [123] Consequently, I observed from day to day that which I could,

175 with one move, the Caliph sent these Bedouins into battle in order to enforce authority in his western Berber provinces. This order set in motion the great "Hilali invasion." The tribesmen of Banu Hilal and Banu Sulaim literally slashed their way across eastern North Africa laying waste to towns and fields as they went (Ibn Khaldun 1925:29; Brockelmann 1939: 204).

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648 The Arab Bedouins recruited Berbers as they went, especially in Libya. Between the years 1052 and 1054, these marauding nomads sacked the rich agricultural lands of Tripolitania and Tunisia, lands which had been in production since the time of the Romans (Mahdi 1964:21). The Banu Sulaim, according to Ibn Khaldun (1925:136), concentrated their action in an area from Alexandria to Tripolitania. It was over this region, which includes Cyrenaica in eastern Libya, that they established their rule. Ibn Khaldun states that the two tribes agreed to divide the conquered territory between them, the eastern lands going to the Banu Sulaim and the western lands to the Banu
175 Hilal (1925:33-34). Such a division of territorial rights in
571 Arab Bedouin society is representative of a set of authority
182 relationships. Differentiation in the locus of authority,
*[613] whether it be horizontal or hierarchical, is a method of maintaining political order among segments of the lineage structure.

175 Evans-Pritchard states that the Cyrenaican Bedouins
114 are descendants of the Banu Sulaim and represent an admixture
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175 114 619 between the Bedouin and the Berbers (1954:46-47). G. W. Murray informs us that the Bedouins of the Egyptian Western Desert themselves believe this to be the case (1935:33, 247). I agree that the Cyrenaican Bedouin are the descendants of the Banu Sulaim; nevertheless, and despite what Murray says, my informants (when they knew) claimed to be descendants of the Banu Hilal. They refer to their ancestress, Sa'ada, as al-Hilaliyya, "she of the Banu Hilal."

175 167 Data concerning the Awlad 'Ali migratory history are insufficient for a satisfactory reconstruction of the process. As we have noted, there were two invasions of North Africa by the Arabs. The first, about 643 A.D., was a shock wave from the Arab conquest of Egypt in which the Arabs defeated the Luwata Berbers who were living in eastern Libya. The second invasion, in the 11th century, took place at the hands of the Banu Hilal and Banu Sulaim and penetrated into the North African countryside. As a result, the Banu Salaim tribe settled in Cyrenaica where they intermingled with the Luwata Berbers. [103] That part of Cyrenaica which they claimed as their territory they called the Jabal Akhdar (i.e. "Green Mountain"), a plateau region set back from the coast. The Bedouins of al-Qasr refer to the Jabal Akhdar as their original homeland (see Figure 1).

We hear nothing more of the Banu Salaim until the 17th century. At this time, segments of the tribe began drifting

175 then came the Awlad 'Ali.

619 Around the year 1800, the Awlad 'Ali were able to
726 defeat the Hanadi with the help of another Cyrenaican tribe
167 dwelling in the area, the Jumi'at. The Jumi'at were a vassal
tribe who changed their allegiance from the Hanadi to the
Awlad 'Ali after this war. The Hanadi, as the Banu'Una
before them, were forced into the Nile Valley. Today, they
[131] live in Sharqiyya Province and are no longer distinguishable
from the peasant population.

175 According to Evans-Pritchard, the Awlad 'Ali were still
619 in possession of eastern Cyrenaica in 1800. Then there occurred
726 "long and savagely fought" wars ending with the expulsion of
●114 the Awlad 'Ali. But this time schedule seems unlikely since
the Awlad 'Ali were already at war with the Hanadi when
175 Napoleon landed near Alexandria in 1798. The Bedouin war has
648 been amusingly described by the French historian Lacroix (in
181 Murray 1935:30) who accompanied the Napoleonic expedition:

> At five o'clock, the first Bedouin were seen on the flank of the army, and shortly afterwards one saw four or five hundred; it was the tribe of Henady, the fiercest Arabs of these deserts. They were almost naked, swarthy, and lean; their horses seemed wornout hacks; save for the helmet, it was Don Quixote as represented in the engravings ...if these five hundred Arabs had been Mamelukes, they would have been able to obtain a great success at this first moment, when the soldiers' imaginations were alert and ready to receive any impression, but these Arabs were as cowardly as the Mamelukes, who had charged an hour before, were brave.

648 177 241 tions and innovations in agriculture which the Egyptians bring to the desert. On the other hand, the Bedouins do not get the modern materials which they need to increase the production of their land. This is most serious when it comes to heavy farm machinery, such as tractors, and the spare parts to keep it functioning. Furthermore, seldom did a man in al-Qasr receive the number of olive seedlings that he requested. This invariably led to bitterness between Bedouins and Egyptians.
648 177 Most of the Bedouins believe that the desert is a difficult (wihsha) life, and they favor change. They want to know, for instance, why an American would leave home to live such a life.
● [114] At a Governor's Council meeting which I attended, the Bedouin representative from al-Qasr did not protest government interference. He complained that the Governor was not furnishing the materials and facilities which the Bedouin needed if he was to become "modern" and "educated." The Bedouins' major complaint about the Egyptians is not that they are trying to change the desert, but that they are not changing it fast enough!

361 directly on the Mediterranean coast. The _'izba_ sector is
631 just 14 kilometers due west of Marsa Matruh, and about 300
131 kilometers due west of the coastal city of Alexandria.

161 In 1960, the population of the whole Western Desert
162 was 98,000, the majority being of Bedouin stock. Considering that Egypt is a country with a 2 - 1/2 per cent rise in birth rate per year, the desert population would have been about 127,000 in 1965 when I was in the field. The town of Marsa Matruh, which is the capital of the Province of Matruh (formerly the Western Desert Province) has a population of about 7,000. With increasing economic and political concern for the desert provinces and the oases, this number should continue to rise.

131 _Mintaqit al-Qasr_ (see Figure 4)[2] is an area which measures about six kilometers from east to west along the sea, and about ten to fifteen kilometers on a north-south line extending into the desert as far as the Libyan plateau. The
162 population of al-Qasr is less easy to determine. In 1960, al-Qasr, by official count, consisted of 225 families, 595 males and 749 females, or a total of 1344 souls. Al-Qasr, as
[631] the Bedouins define it, includes the _garya_ and six other demographic cections separately defined by the Egyptian government. The population of this al-Qasr is 2,996, 1,287 males and 1,709
• [114] females. There is reason to doubt any census figures of the al-Qasr area because the Bedouins are reluctant to reveal their

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1. [See p. 67--Analyst]

162 true numbers. As recipients of aid programs, their rations
•114 are based upon the number of members per family. For these
[657] purposes, they are anxious to present as high a population
figure as possible. They exaggerate their livestock count in
order to receive more fodder, and, at other times, underestimate
their numbers to escape taxes.

162 For purposes of this study, the Bedouin population of
161 al-Qasr is about 1,500 to 3,000. Most of this population lives
361 on the coastal area and in the cultivable wadi areas. The
remainder is scattered south of the plateau region, near the
621 desert proper. The 'izba sector of al-Qasr may be described
*613 as a nucleated cluster or settlement, but due to the nature
of the Bedouin segmentary lineage system, with its relatively
autonomous kin-based residence groups, this sector lacks the
usual degree of social interaction and integration associated
621 with the village or hamlet. The 'izba might be described as a
*613 multi-nucleated settlement or cluster. Each lineage has its
423 own mintaqa. Each mintaqa usually has a small dry-goods store
631 owned and operated by a lineage member and catering chiefly
443 to his own lineage-mates. Water and land in the 'izba sector
423 are individually owned. In the barley-pasture area, rights
*613 and privileges of ownership are vested in the corporate group,
621 even though the Bedouins and the government claim that tribally
423 owned land is illegal. All land boundaries, whether a mintaqa
or an individual's plot, are well-marked and well-known. The

173 *613 619 597 that in those days it was important "to have men to go to war; Hajj 'Ali came from the Sinai with many men and wrote his name into the books of Lazumi." Today, in the Lazumi genealogy Hajj 'Ali's name appears as the brother of Taram, ● [114] both are claimed as sons of Mighawsiz. This kind of data is difficult to uncover and I may have missed gathering other cases of ideological kinship ties.

*613 [171] The specific unilinear principle which operates in al-Qasr is partrilineality, common to the Middle Eastern culture area. A corollary principle is the corporate group. *613 571 Together, these two rules structure the social world of the individual and effectively define a range of social choices for him. The individual's social relations and social roles are relative to the rights and obligations of the people related to him through his father. In a sense, the social world for the individual in al-Qasr is his father's group and its network of relationships with other similar groups; he would not think of leaving this group of his own free will though, in reality, he could. The Bedouins believe [181] [829] that a man cannot be happy if he lives with strangers, i.e., outside his corporate group. This value holds up today to the extent that a man will expect his son to return to the desert even after his education as a merchant, a government clerk, or an army officer.

Structural differentiation in al-Qasr is not solely

619 the bureaucratic principle. Here we are concerned with the
177 traditional situation.
[121]

The 'Aishaibi Bedouins of al-Qasr are a residence
619 group. Each sub-group of the tribe, i.e., the secondary and
*613 tertiary units, is assigned their own territory (mintaqa).
571 Kinship and residence are the primary determinants of group differentiation; agnates who dwell together represent concrete authority structures, or political groups. This follows from the fact that patterns of political action, or what we call political structures, most often deal with the exercise of legitimate authority--as opposed to power. Power relations do occur and when present complicate the situation. In al-Qasr, power relations and structures emerge when the principle of cognation or contracted alliance form groups which crosscut the effectiveness of local, agnatic political structures. But, in al-Qasr, as in most societies, political action usually takes the form of the exercise of authority (Southall 1965:120).

173 The genealogical map as an idological charter argues
114 against the formation of power relations. Genealogical re-
*613 lations represent a set of social relations each replete with
571 definite rights and obligations. Fallers (1956) has noted the tendency in segmentary lineage societies to cast all
*613 authority relations in a unilinear genealogical mould. The
829 Bedouin visualize their world, extending from Alexandria to
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*613 study of the whole Western Desert, or in an analysis of contemporary politics in Marsa Matruh.

The Bedouins of al-Qasr are, in this study, the 'Aishaibat of the 'Ali Ahmar of the Awlad 'Ali tribe. [191] The Bedouin tribal unit throughout the Middle East is described as a segmentary lineage system. Something of the meaning of this concept has already been made clear in our discussion of the structural principles of Bedouin society. This type ● [114] of society has been adequately analyzed by Evans-Pritchard (1940), Fortes (1945 and 1949), Smith (1956), Middleton and Tait (1958), and Peters (1960). My own ideas about the segmentary lineage society as it functions in al-Qasr derive from these sources.

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[642] Politically, the 'Aishaibat of al-Qasr are a stateless society; they have no centralized political institution. The lineage system is the structural framework for social and political relations. The basis of government, i.e., the regulation of authority relations, is the balanced pnotraction of corporate groups which support institutional uniformities in the form of similar organization, ideology and procedure (Smith 1956). Although the various groupings of the segmentary system can be analytically identified, and each grouping thinks of itself as a distinct group, in actuality, it is difficult to define the groups because of the way in which each fuses into lesser or greater differentiated units in one

593 not considered bad for a man to beat his wife." In the case
593 of ill-treatment by the husband, her father may take the
*613 matter to the corporate head. Traditionally, the corporate
[792] head would order the husband to move his tent next to the
tend of the "holy man" or some other third party, so that
he would be dissuaded against such behavior. Another reason
[586] for this is so that the girl might have witnesses to support
her petition for divorce should the husband continue to beat
her. I heard of no wife-beating while I was in al-Qasr.

595 The Quran states that a man may lawfully take four
[779] wives, but that if he feels he cannot treat each of them
equally, he should take only one (Sura IV:3 and 129). The
Bedouins are conscientious in practicing this rule, though
595 perhaps not for religious reasons. If a man has more than
593 one wife, he must spend an equal amount of time with each.
Conflict between co-wives is lessened by the fact that a man
will have separate tents, or rooms in the case of a house,
for each wife. A man will not buy a dress or a piece of jewelry
for one wife without buying a copy of it for all other wives.
595 On a trip to the Siwa Oasis, I was accompanied by a man who
593 had three wives and wished to bring them a gift of basketry
•114 upon his return. He was successful in buying two baskets
which were similar but could not find a comparable third in
[431] the oasis market. In dismay, he made a gift of the baskets
to me and returned with no souvenirs at all. One of my in-

582 171 effect of cross-cousin marriage which is a way for kinship groupings to interrelate and to increase the integration of a larger population.

582 171 114 Such an explanation of parallel-cousin marriage may suffice for an analysis of politics in the tribal mountain villages of Kurdistan. Because Barth (1954:68) found that 48.0 per cent of the Kurd marriages were with the father's brother's daughter, we must assume that this type of relationship is politically significant. But we must question the fact that Murphy and Kasdan arrive at the same conclusion when dealing with parallel-cousin marriage as an abstract concept. If this type of marriage is really politically rational behavior, then it should be the normative practice in the Middle East. In other words, Murphy and Kasdan are explaining a phenomenon which exists only as a cultural ideal, and one which may have never really been a general practice at all--except in those few cases of adaptation to ecological extremes, such as pure nomadism and mountain tribalism. The few records which we have on the marriage practices of pre-Islamic and early Islamic Arabia indicate that parallel-cousin marriage was highly atypical in the Mecca and Hijaz areas. For instance, of the 71 marriages recorded for the Quraish only 9 were with father's brother's daughter and 32 of them were within the secondary group. In the Hijaz, only 15 of 113 marriages, or 3.3 per cent, were with the parallel-cousin (Patai 1962: Ch.6).

582 (Patai 1962:Ch. 6).

171 The point of this is that most of the Middle East's inhabitants are villagers dependent upon agriculture. The dominant form of marriage is not parallel-cousin marriage. As a matter of fact, marriage may or may not be considered exogamous depending upon the level of segmentation at which one wishes to draw the line for his definition of endogamy. Ayoub (1959) suggests that parallel-cousin marriage be considered only as an extreme expression of an overall preference for endogamy. She found in a sample of 514 marriages from a Syrian village that 9.1 per cent of them were with the parallel-cousin while 63.4 per cent were within the secondary group. She concludes from this that intra-lineage marriage is frequent enough that it cannot be accounted for by random mate selection.

582 In 'Ailit Ma'fas of al-Qasr, out of 197 recorded
162 marriages over a period of five generations the frequency of
*[613] parallel-cousin marriage was 11.1 per cent and marriage within the lineage was 41.6 per cent of the total. Of these 197
[595] marriages, only 39 were cases of polygny and most of these involved a man taking two wives (see Table 5 below).

582 The confusion over the presence or absence of parallel-
•114 cousin marriage in the Middle East is related to the question
196 of whether or not the researcher and the native are talking about the same thing. In Qasr, for instance, the term

[TEXT CONTINUED ON PAGE 116]

582 "parallel cousin" (i.e. bint 'amm) is perfectly interchangeable
•114 with the term "parallel-cousin once removed" (i.e. bint ibn
196 'amm, "daughter of the father's brother's son"). After I
[124] had familiarized myself with the genealogies of al-Qasr, I
began to realize that many of my informants were using the
term bint 'amm to refer to the parallel-cousin once, twice,
or even thrice removed. When I pointed this out to one of the
Bedouins, he replied: "So what, there is nothing forbidden
about this type of marriage." Table 5 shows that this is
582 indeed the case. There are a number of cultural ideals
183 which influence the practice of marriage in al-Qasr: endo-
182 gamy is encouraged because it cements and intensifies corpor-
ate ties; exogamy is desired because it widens the web of
kinship; men prefer younger women to older women and may
utilize their cousin-right privilege to realize this preference.

582 The Bedouins of al-Qasr define the bint 'amm over a
829 wide range. One informant said that "all of the girls of the
Awlad 'Ali tribe are my bint 'amm, we are all one." Another
said to me, that "any girl of the 'Ali Ahmar is a man's bint
'amm." And yet another informed me that "a man of the
Qinaishat tribe will reserve his daughter for me before he
will give her to an outsider." Ideologically, a bint 'amm
seemed to be anything except the father's brother's daughter.
This is quite convenient for the Bedouins because an ideologi-
cal concept can be placed anywhere along the scale of actuality

000 kin groups of the parent who does not determine descent. A
182 corollary aspect of the filiation principle in al-Qasr is the
601 602 practice of collaterally extending the term, *khal*, to include
604 many others besides the real mother's brother. This usage
•[114] of classificatory terminology, like that in the case of *bint
'amm*, leads to confusion for the fieldworker. When an in-
601 604 dividual marries into an outside group, or even within the
561 secondary group, the wife's brother becomes *khal* not only to
182 the offspring of the marriage, but to all the children (*awlad*)
at the same generation level as the offspring. All boys of the age of sister's son will refer to his mother's brother as *khali* ("my mother's brother"). Besides extending the web of kinship, this practice also has the function of uniting age-mates of the local descent group.

604 Throughout this discussion of mother's brother, I
582 have been stressing the fact that the sentiment which a
[829] Bedouin develops toward this person is to be construed as a
political value, i.e., a behavioral disposition relevant to the political process. It is patent then that the sister's son-mother's brother relationship should be more crucial in exogamous marriages, for in these cases cognation becomes the principal mechanism for establishing authority relations and effecting political alliance. In endogamous marriages, cognation complements the other structural principles which define the corporate group, and makes it the corporate group *par excellence*.

121 content will be obeyed by a given group of persons" (Weber 1947:152). In the next chapter, it will be useful to distinguish between the concept of authority and that of "power." Mainly, we are concerned here with the legitimate exercise of authority in the regulation of conflict involving members of an "imperatively coordinated group" (1947:153), or corporation, at both the internal and external levels of the Bedouin political system.

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571 It has already been stated in the last chapter that political action occurs at all levels of the social structure; it is not peculiar to the external relational system. The tendency to differentiate structurally between "domestic relations" and "political relations" began with Evans-Pritchard (1940:148) who analyzed the Nuer political system as "an expanding series of opposed segments from the relations within the smallest tribal section to intertribal and foreign relations." This definition could serve as a description of the political system of the Bedouins of al-Qasr, or of any other segmentary society. Fortes (1949; 1953:26) first used the terms "domestic relations" and "political relations." He arbitrarily limited political action to the lineage structure, and assigned "person-to-person relations" to the sphere of kinship or domestic organization. Southall (1953), who applied the ideas of Max Weber, isolated what he referred to as two different types of authority: the "familial" and

121 •114 *613 571 the "political." Previous studies, then, indicate that a conceptualization of a division between spheres or foci of authority relations is fundamental to an understanding of the political aspect of segmentary societies. There is no need, however, to relegate the political to any particular social area if "we generally mean by 'political,' things that have to do with relations of authority . . ." (Weber 1947:155). Conflict, and the need for it to be regulated, occur at all levels of the lineage system, from the family to the tribal level. Authority must be exercised if the system is to
[554] persist. The legitimate exercise of authority in al-Qasr is expressed through two structures: an authority role and authority groups, the _'aqila_ and the tertiary segments, the corporate sole and corporate groups.

121 554 The analysis which follows considers society as a composite of authority groups and authority roles. Roles are the basic elements of social structures which "order the human beings who make up the society" (Nadel 1957:11). The authority role is a focus for the study of politics at all levels of the social structure, and, also, the basis for extending role analysis. For the most part, political action in al-Qasr, from the family to the tribal levels, takes the form of the exercise of legitimate authority. Power, as illegitimate control, exists in the form of extra-processual authority roles which we will discuss in the next chapter.

*613 675 571 6. every member of the tribe who submits a complaint without first consulting his _'aqila_, (i.e. who goes to the government before the _'aqila_),

539 7. every member of the tribe shall back the members of his _bait_ against an opponent without right,

8. every member of the tribe who has proved against him the showing of sympathy toward another tribe knowing that this tribe is antagonistic to his own tribe,

9. every member of the tribe who has proved against him that he helped a relative in payment or in a quarrel against his brother.

we signed this document and declare that these customs are valid from the date of today and everyone who disobeys them pays a _dhabiiha_ ("lamb") and 10 L.E. without any objection if any of the items of the above items is proven against him.

Date: August 8, 1953
The _'awaaqil_ (signatures or stamps):
Abd al-Ruwaf (Bait Firjani)
Hussain 'Umar (Bait 'Umar)
Shi'ath Abd al-Hadi (deceased, Bait Braik)
'Atiya 'Umran (Bait Kailani)
Khalid Idris (Bait Muhammad)

•114 619 675 *613 In the _rawaabit_, or contract, just noted the term "tribe" refers to the secondary segment (_'aiela_). Murray (1935:315n) has also pointed to an instance of the Bedouins' use, in a formal document, of the word _qabiila_ ("tribe") when reference to "some smaller division, such as _'eila_ is clearly meant."

675 681 [183] *[613] Through the _rawaabit_ norms are expressed and action is oriented with respect to them. If it is otherwise, sanctions may be brought to bear to insure conformity to norms. The minimal sanction which the _'aqila_ may impose is the _dhabiiha_

671 They said that if a man
562
684 insisted on keeping a promiscuous wife, his family would
681 "write a barawwa aginst him." I heard of no sex offenses in
•[114] al-Qasr while I was there.

671 The penalty for stealing, according to the *'awaiyid*,
685 is that the thief shall pay compensation, by himself, in the
amount of four times the value of the stolen object. On the
*[613] other hand, if the thief is a poor man, he will pay thrice the
value of the stolen object and the remaining fourth will be
paid by his lineage.

671 The *'awaiyid* recognizes the territorial claims of the
685 lineage. Disputes arising over conflicting claims to land
*613 and wells are handled at Bedouin courts in much the same way
578 as personal injury cases are, with one exception. Usually, a
[554] larger number of elders and *rajal khair* will be consulted in
an advisory capacity by the *'awaaqil* handling the case. The
'awaaqil consider the specific history of a particular piece
of land or well (for instance, each well is known by its own
name), and determine the ownership in accordance with the
testimony of elders and individuals of high social status.
Most of the problems over land and water rights in al-Qasr
have reference to what is still considered lineage-owned
685 territory in the barley-and-pasture sector. In the *'izba*
578 sector, conflict over land ownership rights, since they are
648 rights which are registered with the government, is settled
in the Egyptian court of law. Only one such case came up while

577 According to this 'aqila, the "good man" is the "good Muslim"
771 who observes the pillars of Islam (fasting, praying, making
183 the pilgrimage, and alms-giving). Also, the "good man" does
not steal or lie, and this leads, importantly enough, to social
accord.

121 In light of the preceding discussion of authority and
681 law, we can now offer a description of the Bedouin judicial
121 process in action. Southall (1956:121-151) has drawn the
681 distinction between internal and external delicts on the
•114 bases of kinds of sanctions rendered, and whether or not
chiefly authority mediates conflict. Such a distinction can
be only partially applied in the case of the Bedouins of the
Western Desert. The kind of sanctions operating in the internal
political system do differ from those applied in the external
political system, though not to the same degree which is true
121 of Southall's Alurland. On the other hand, since Bedouin
681 society, lacking political centralization, cannot be characterized
692 as a segmentary state with distinct spheres of authority
642 at successive levels of the lineage structure, the intervention
or non-intervention of chiefly adjudication and decision-making
cannot serve as a basis for differentiating political
*[613] action. Rather, the lone political office of the 'aqila
[627] involves itself in all arbitration which cannot be successfully
concluded by the mechanism of familial authority. There are
[648] just two exceptions which apply to this latter statement:

121 external system, however, the law recognizes retaliation, a
681 life for a life. Still, even in this case, Bedouin values
682 [182] expressed through the _'awaiyid_ try to avert bloodshed and
[671] feuding by showing "the good path" and providing the means
for settlement through compensation.

Just as the Bedouin accepts the _'awaiyid_ as a set of
681 682 of ideals calculated to regulate conflict, he paradoxically
182 claims the right to impose retaliatory sanctions as a just
[671] conclusion to conflict. One Bedouin said that the greatest
[673] sin which a man or group can commit is to accept the _diiya_
and then take his blood-revenge and return the money. Presumably,
a person or group commits no outrage if they refuse
the _diiya_ with the understanding that blood-revenge will be
[626] taken. In al-Qasr, retaliation and the _'awaiyid_ are mechanisms
[671] of social control and dispute settlement. A political office
* [613] exists, i.e. the _'aqila_ which functions over the total range
[692] of political action, and the process of adjudication and
compensation in the form of indemnity payment represents an
institutionalized alternative to retaliation. In all cases
of dispute, ritual or religious sanctions back up social
[776] sanctions. God is a third party to all conflict, and this is
[695] made manifest in the reading of the _Fatiha_ or the oath-taking
128 ceremony. In order to describe how authority and sanctions
68 operate in Bedouin society, a number of examples are presented
[124] below. Some of the cases are the statements of informants about
[114]

128 what happened; some of them are my translations of legal docu-
68 [124] ments which informants permitted me to see; a few of the cases
[114] happened while I was in the field and represent my reporting
of what happened. I have arbitrarily divided the cases into
those involving personal injury and those concerning property
rights. In each case, I indicate at which level of the authority
structure the conflict and settlement has taken place.

Legal Cases Pertaining to Personal Injury

578 Two cases of killing have been discussed previously.
681 Below are a number of cases dealing with personal injury which
occurred in the external political system at the various levels
of segmentation. The first three cases involve conflict
* [613] [619] between secondary lineage segments of the 'Aishaibat tribe;
[648] the next two cases take place at the primary and sub-tribal
levels, but note that secondary segments are the actual function-
ing units involved; the final case, an unusual one, deals with
conflict with "foreigners" at the tribal level. Note that the
* [613] _'aqila_ as a corporate representative is active in these cases.
[182] The third case presented below is a translation of an actual
[778] document showing how the _nazaala_ (discussed above) functions
as a formal mechanism of conflict regulation.

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562 The second, rather complex, case occurred while I was in the field. Once again, the role of the "holy man" is shown to operate in cases dealing with women. Shown here also is an interesting example of the cultural definition of abnormality.

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792 No Date. Case: Quarrel between 'Ailit al-Abaidi ('Ali Abyad) and 'Ailit al-Afrad ('Ali Abyad) over marriage rights. A man from al-Abaidi agreed that his daughter could marry a man but the rest of the 'aiela did not approve of this marriage. Since the man could not go to his 'aqila, who disapproved of the marriage, he took his problem to a "holy man." The "holy man" decided that the girl should marry the man she wanted to marry, but he was afraid that this would cause trouble in the [586] 'aiela. The "holy man" decided to marry the man and woman, and then to divorce them for a period of one year so that the conflict would abate. The girl's father knew of this marriage but the other members of the 'aiela did not. After a period of one year, the groom went to the "holy man" and said: "Decide anything that I can do, but I must have the girl." The "holy [681] [684] man" decided to make him pay a kubaara (expiation) fee of 100 L.E. to the girl's 'aiela, and he married them again.

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582 Date: 1965. Case: Quarrel within a tertiary segment of the Qinaishat tribe concerning marriage rights. A girl from the Qinaishat tribe had refused to marry her paternal cousin, but he was insistent upon his right to have her.

554 It would be considered "wrong" for the members of
571 [577] this group to present themselves at an al-Qasr wedding party,
[585] or the annual celebration held in honor of a local saint of
[796] the area. When I inquired about the conspicuous absence of
[124] some of my chief informants from such gatherings, I was told
[431] that "they will send their gifts," or that "it is not decent
554 that they come to something such as this." In terms of
571 182 Bedouin social structure, there are a number of plausible
561 explanations for this "status separation." Fathers should
[593] not attend public affairs at which their sons may be "performing,"
i.e., young men should be allowed to play a public
role outside the confines of the father-son authority
structure. By virtue of the extension of the father role,
and its corresponding authoritarian attitude, every member
of the elder age-set commands certain rights and obligations
which would prevent the free expression that is the hallmark
of Bedouin parties. Conversely, and at the more general
level, members of the "status group" who wish to remain
members of this circle accept certain restrictions on social
[114] intercourse. At the five different Bedouin "parties" which
I attended, there were "elders" present, but none of them
could be classified as members of the "status group." Bedouins
plainly state that elders should not attend parties, but, on
the other hand, they show much more concern and emotion when
they say that a member of the "status group" should not "be

554 tional symbol of wealth. A comparison of wealth between
571 the "status group" and "other members" of al-Qasr, and the
556 picture of stratification which emerges, are shown on Table 6.

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TABLE 6

COMPARATIVE DATA ON SOCIO-ECONOMIC STRATIFICATION IN AL-QASR[1]

Average Per Person	Status Group	Others
OLIVE - trees	661	86
SHEEP - head	402	30
LAND - acres	91	5

554 One most important way of accruing "status honor"
571 in al-Qasr is by acting the part of the third party in conflict
627 situations. The role of the third party represents an effective
*613 and acceptable way of bypassing formal litigation through the
[778] office of *'aqila*. For instance, by mediating through the
process of *nazaala*, the third party prevents feuds.

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[114] [128] [1] This data is both approximate and partial. Some data are excellent and completely reliable, others are not so dependable. Factors which could conceivably change the picture here presented would be a count of land and animals outside al-Qasr which would be extremely difficult to obtain. Also, some land is not in the name of the owner but in the names of relatives. Of all the data, land data is the most unreliable. Nevertheless, the addition of new data, I feel, would only serve to substantiate the picture of socio-economic stratification shown here.

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his role.

The people of al-Qasr identify 'Amm Salih as the "holy man" in the area. In my interviews, when I asked for the name of a party, besides the 'aqila, who solves the Bedouins' problems, the answer was either Hajj 'Ali, the rajal khair, or "the Jaraira family." (This refers to 'Amm Salih and his brother.) When I asked for the name of a man who could tell me "how the Bedouin should act," the only name mentioned was that of 'Amm Salih.
[124]
[627]

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'Amm Salih says that he solves many problems, not all of which deal with marriage and divorce. He claimed that he could settle conflicts over land and water. Just as a man may choose to go to the rajal khair, so also might he go to the rajal salih. Often enough, the selection of a "third party" will be determined by his propinquity. One 'aqila told me: "Salih Jaraira is a good man . . . If two men wish to accept Jaraira's decision, and if he lives near them, it is all right. If Jaraira cannot solve the problem, then they will return to the 'aqila. The 'aqila can solve it or he can call in other 'awaqil who can solve it."
* [613]
[571]

● [114]
When I asked 'Amm Salih for case studies of problems which he has handled, he said that he would not reveal them because they are private affairs. He was willing, however, to describe the method in which he solves a problem.

> 554 Lying is bad (haram), but this is "the lie of a
> 792 peace-maker" (kadhib musaalih). For instance, if
> 627 you have a quarrel with Yunis here, then I have
> [577] words with both of you. I use different words with each of you. I use different words than those which you used in the quarrel--I use good words. This is to bring you two together again. Maybe I see that you are going to kill, or I hear bad words from you; I do not go and tell him what you said.

'Amm Salih said that it is his "duty" to mediate disputes, and that he never hesitates "because God will reward me later." He did not want the quarrels to grow into wars. He also bases his pleas for conciliation upon moral discoure, the method used by the other traditional authorities.[3] 'Amm Salih said that in trying to solve a problem, "I give priority to the elder. I go to the younger man and tell him that he should make peace with the elder because no one cares more for him than his antagonist, and that he really cares more for his antagonist than for any other." The rajal saalih mediates but does not arbitrate: he attempts to redress the balance of good relations but does not impose judgements.

554 This approach to conflict regulation is not that of
792 the 'aqila in his formal role, but it is similar to what the
627 rajal khair would use. The main procedural difference between
*613 [779] the two informal roles (i.e. rajal khair and rajal saalih) is that, in each case, the rajal saalih reads the Fatiha with

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● [114] [3] The approach which I used in my interviews with 'Amm Salih derives from the work of John Ladd as presented in his book, The Structure of a Moral Code, 1957.

634 no coincidence, then, that the present *'umda* and *shaikh* are
*613 the sons of the former *'umda* and *shaikh*. This reveals not
666 428 only the structural rules of succession, but also indicates
[578] that "social honor," and thus power, still resides with these
families.

It is important to note that since the time of their
[178] inception, these roles have not changed *'aiela* or even *bait*
in al-Qasr. When the former *'umda* from 'Ailit Lazumi died,
634 *613 his eldest son petitioned to the *'awaaqil* of the 'Aishaibat
666 that he be approved to succeed to his father's position.
428 The *'awaaqil* met and made their decision. One *'aqila* who
571 was present at the election said: "The office of *'umda* should
stay in the Lazumi family since the father was *'umda*. The
'awaaqil agreed on the son. But the son will be accepted to
follow his father only if he is good. If he is not good, the
'awaaqil will find a new *bait*." Although the Bedouins speak
of "the *'awaaqil*" electing the *'umda*, it must be remembered
that it is the "status group" which makes the decision, and
that the *'awaaqil* are only part of this group. The names of
[627] the men who elected the present *'umda* include less *'awaaqil*
and more *rajal khair*.

•114 Before I arrived in the field, the present acting
634 *'umda* of the 'Aishaibat tribe was elected to the national
666 parliament to represent the province of Marsa Matruh. The
election of his replacement was not scheduled to take place

•114 until sometime after my departure from the field.[5] Never-
634 theless, before I left the field I discussed the pending
666 election with some of my informants and members of the
114 634 "status group." The interviews reveal that the "status
666 group" still intends to dominate the area of power relations
124 829 with the government. As one informant said: "The present
*[613] *'umda* and the one before him were from Bait Bu Taram of
'Ailit Lazumi, and the next one will be from Bu Taram also."

634 The tenacity of traditional politics and the influence
571 of the "status group" are reflected in the affairs surrounding
666 the election of a new incumbent to the office of *'umda*. In
this situation, all Bedouins become concerned more with the
distribution of power than with the actual person who will
124 fill the authority role. One informant, an *'aqila*, gave
*613 indication that formal authorities support the "status group"
634 and the distribution of power which they represent and maintain.

> 571 666 Mustafa, the brother of the *'umda*, takes his place while he is in Cairo attending Parliament. The *'umda* told me that he was going to ask the *'awaaqil* to sacrifice (i.e. slaughter a lamb) and write a paper making Mustafa the new *'umda*. (Here I told the informant that I had spoken with Mustafa about this, and he told me that he did not want to be the *'umda*).
> Even if Mustafa does not want to be the *'umda*, the *'awaaqil* will force him to accept . . . It should remain in the same family, it would be a shame if the office went to another family. Mustafa's father and brother were *'umdas* before him. If the office left the family,

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[5] Technically, the 'Aishaibat were without an *'umda* while I was in the field. However, he spent enough time in Matruh that he was able to carry on his duties until his successor could be named.

156 with four wives. It is not hard to understand why the people
159 of al-Qasr consider Hajj 'Ali a rajal khair par excellence.
554 For instance, when I asked one man if he could give me some
627 examples of court cases, he replied: "The one who is not an
124 'aqila pays no attention to anything save getting food for
his children. The rajal khair has money and men (a reference
to the "old days" when a person needed cohorts for battle),
and so he always pays instead of us. He lends us money and
helps us in doing anything, like Hajj 'Ali does." In another
124 interview, one man showed great respect for Hajj 'Ali's tradi-
156 159 tional status and modern ability to deal with the outside
554 world by giving him the honorific title of "shaikh," and
439 showing that the Bedouins of al-Qasr put their trust in him:
472 "When the olive merchants come from Alexandria, they go to
245 Shaikh 'Ali, someone who knows about olives. They ask him
what kind of olives al-Qasr has. He shows the merchants, and
they say: 'I will give you so much for them.' They make an
agreement, and Hajj 'Ali collects the olives and gets the
price for them."

156 In terms of local politics, I would guess, but do
159 not have data to prove, that Hajj 'Ali was the third party
554 [627] most frequently referred to in seeking a termination of
[114] conflict. He was commonly asked to participate in these
matters not only by the disputants themselves but also by
the 'aqila or other third party presiding. He was sometimes

635 population of the whole Western Desert, and representatives
[648] of the Egyptian government employees working in the province.
[634] The Bedouin representatives appointed to this council need
not be an *'umda* or a *shaikh*, although they may be. The
oldest Bedouin member of the council, who happens to be an
'umda, told me that "the Governor picks the men who he feels
understand the problems of the people."

635 The Governor himself thinks that every Bedouin on
124 his council is an *'aqila*. He replied to my question about
*613 the criteria for membership on the *Majlis al-Muhafza*: "I
am using a new selection system. Rather than choose the
'umda or *shaikh*, I choose the *'aqila*. Every man on the
council is an *'aqila*, and the number is determined by the
population of the area . . . But I appoint more men from the
[619] 'Ali Ahmar (see Figures 3 and 7)[1] than from other tribes.
This is because they are more numerous, and they are near
Matruh where I am able to contact them immediately. The
'Ali Ahmar are represented by six men and the other tribes
by just three men."

156 Hajj 'Ali is one of these six men and the only member
159 of the Council who resides in al-Qasr. I attended and ob-
554 served the December meeting of the Council. The Governor
635 sat at the head of a long table with the Egyptian representa-
648 ●[114] tives on either side of him. At the other end of the table
sat the Bedouin representatives, Hajj 'Ali among them. Purely

[1] [See pp. 65 & 77 respectively--Analyst]

Chapter I

THEORETICAL BACKGROUND

The Comparative Studies of Law

This study is based on field work carried out among Awlad Ali, of the 121 [114] Western Desert of Egypt, between August 1965 and August 1966. The study deals with the processes by which order is maintained within a tribal society with no centralized authority. One way that order is maintained is through 121 671 the application of a set of formal rules known to the people of the area as "the daraieb" or the tribal ways. These rules are kept in force by an elaborate, yet informal, judicial process in which the tribal political leaders play the most important part.

The main focus of the study is not the rules themselves but rather the ways in which they are implemented, or the judicial process. More specifically, the study deals with the ways in which the process of dispute settlement is related to certain realities of the social and political life of the group.

Concern with the legal systems of non-literate societies has been an 121 114 671 interest of anthropologists since the classical monographs of the nineteenth century (Maine 1861, 1871; and Fustel de Coulanges 1864), directed the attention of anthropologists to the laws of ancient civilizations. Those monographs were followed at a later date by the work of anthropologists such as Malinowski (1926), Hogbin (1934), and Schapera (1938). In more recent years most anthropological work on legal systems has been done in Africa. Most notable among these are Gluckman's treatise on the Barotse of Northern Rhodesia (1955, 1963), Bohannan's account of the Tiv of Nigeria (1957), and Howell on the Nuer Law (1954). Other studies of primitive law

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in other parts of the world include Llewellyn and Hoebel on the Cheyenne (1941), Pospisil's analysis of the Kapauku Papuan la (Pospisil 1958), Smith and Roberts' description of the Zuni law (1954) and Laura Nader's work on Zapotec law.

Despite this interest in the comparative study of legal institution among anthropologists, yet the fields of legal anthropology still lacks a coherent body of theory to bear upon the analysis of the institutions described. The theoretical questions represented in most of these writings seem to center around two main problems: the problem of definition, and that of methodology. With regard to the problem of definitions the various writers seem to be influenced by one or the other of two main schools of jurisprudence: the analytical school and the sociological school. The analytical school flourished in the late nineteenth century following the writings of its leader, John Austin, the British jurist. According to the analytical school law is a set of rules imposed upon society by a sovereign will. The picture is that of a supreme authority standing high above society and issuing its command downwards. This supreme authority is the creator and the ultimate source of law. These views are exemplified in Austin's famous definition of law as "a rule laid down for the guidance of an intelligent being by an intelligent being having the power over him" (1885: 316-7). Since the will of that political superior has to be exact, the only way to express it, according to Austin, is by means of legislation. According to the views of this school, the existence of a supreme authority is a prerequisite to the existence of law. Any social rules of observances existing before or without the issuing authority are not considered law. This excludes from being law rules which were not enacted such as the British common law, as well as all forms of primitive customary law.

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Later, members of the analytical school shifted the emphasis of their definition of law from its enactment by a supreme authority to its enforcement by that authority. Salmond defined law by reference to a court. Law, according to him, is "the body of principles recognized and applied by the state in the administration of justice" (1946:41). Gray, another member, went even further to deny the name, law, to a statute until it has been used as a basis of decision by the court (1921:82). Similarly, Diamond, who has contributed to the study and appreciation of 'primitive' law, hardly goes beyond arguing that societies without courts have no laws (Diamond 1935).

The influence of the analytical school on the anthropological writings on law is reflected in two ways. In the first place, it led some writers to maintain that since primitive societies lacked a supreme authority in the Austinian sense, they had no rules that may be called 'legal' and that among these societies "custom is the King" (Seagel 1941:iii). In the second place, the concept of the court as stated by members of the analytical school seems to influence to a greater or lesser degree the definition of law by many anthropologists, a point which will be discussed later in the chapter.

The sociological school of jurisprudence came as a reaction against limitations inherent in the analytical school with its glorification of the supreme will. According to the views of this school, law develops within society of its own vitality. It is not an artificial creation of a supreme will but is spontaneous and independent of any formal authority. These views do not exclude the notion of enforcement of law by a supreme authority which becomes necessary as the society reaches a certain level of complexity, but unlike the analytical school, the supreme authority in the latter case is not the creator of law but a creation of it.

The movement was led by Von Saveigny, the French jurist who viewed law as a rule existing for the purpose of regulating the actions of the

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individual in the interest of the whole community (1937). He regarded law as one of the many factors of the morphology of society. Roscoe Pound continued that tradition in his famous article, "The Scope and Purpose of Sociological Jurisprudence" (1910-11), in which he viewed law as "one side of the process of social control...a task or great series of tasks of social engineering." The purpose of law, according to Pound, is to eliminate friction and waste in the satisfaction of the human needs (1910-11;591-619).

To turn from jurists to anthropologists, we find the list of those who subscribe to the sociological view quite extensive. To try to enumerate them would be a very lengthy endeavor. Malinowski states that law and order arise out of the very process which they govern. He sees laws as existing in all human societies and attributes the failure of the analytical jurists to perceive the existence of legal systems among primitive societies to the faulty habit of identifying the legal system with the person or organ possessing the power to make laws and enforce them. He defined law as a body of binding obligations, regarded as a right by one party and acknowledged as a duty by the other, kept in force by a special mechanism of reciprocity and publicity inherent in the structure of their society" (1926:58). Radcliffe-Brown (1933), Lewellyn and Hoebel (1941), Hoebel (1961), Bohannan (1957) and Gluckman (1955, 1965) to give examples, all view law as an aspect of the society independent of any sovereign in the Austinian sense. This does not mean that they all agree in their definition of law. For they exhibit a considerable difference in their views. The difference, however, does not stem from their view of the sociological rather than the formal nature of law, but in their attempt to separate law from other aspects of social life of the group.

The main difficulty with the sociological view of law is that it does not provide a reliable criteria by which one can differentiate between that

aspect of the social life that one may call law and other aspects. This does not pose any problem for those who use the concept of law in a very wide and general sense to man "the totality of people's culture" (Hartland 1924:191). But for later writers, who tend to take a more or less restricted view of law, the problem was there. Malinowski states that the rules of law in primitive society stand out from other social norms in that they are felt and regarded as "obligation of one party and the rightful claim of another." This, of course, gives law a very broad definition and does not really help in distinguishing law from non-law. 121 114 671

One of the most commonly used criterion is that of a "sanction" behind the legal norms. But the mere fact that legal norms have sanctions behind them does not help in drawing the line between them and other norms since all norms are backed by sanctions of some kind or another. It is the kind of sanction, then, not just any sanction, that differentiates law from non-law. In other words, there are classes of sanctions that may be called "legal sanctions." For Malinowski, the loss of reciprocal relations in primitive society constituted the sufficient basis for the legal sanctions (1934). Allen (1958) maintained that legal sanctions are "completely compulsory." "No one is under an absolute compulsion to visit the barber or to wear garments " (1958:59), while, on the other hand, members of the society are under an absolute compulsion not to steal or take the life of another person. Like Malinowski's notion of the loss of reciprocal relations, Allen's concept of "absoluteness" as the basis of legal sanctions is not adequate. For even under the modern legal system, were the penalty for stealing or murder specific and clear, the individual is not under an "absolute" compulsion not to steal or kill. He still can, and the mere existence of the penal institution in modern societies is a living proof that many do violate the legal norms if they are willing to take the risk of such violation, the same risk the person takes who violates the norm 121 114 671 681

121 114 671 681

of modesty and walks naked in the streets. Some may even find it easier to accept the risk of penalty for stealing than the social sanctions for violating the norms of modesty.

But although the notion of absolute vs. relative compulsion is arbitrary and artificial as a criterion for defining legal rules, yet Allen is close to another related and widespread criterion of legal sanctions, that is, the idea of the "use of force." Hoebel maintains that "the really fundamental sine qua non of law in any society - primitive or civilized - is the legitimate use of physical coercion.... The law has teeth, teeth that can bite if need be..." (1961a:26) Pound defines law as "social control through the systematic application of the forces of a politically organized society" (1910-11:591). This definition has later been adopted by Radcliffe-Brown (1940) who considers the obligations imposed upon the individual but for which there is no sanction backed by the use or the possibility of use of physical force as merely a matter of social conventions or custom but not law.

121 114 671 681 625

It is evident, then, that those who used the concept of "coercion" as the basis for their distinction of law needed a further specification of the concept. For, as Hoebel has noticed, "There are as many forms of coercion as there are forms of power...and only certain methods and forms are legal" (1961:26). He states that coercion by gangsters is not legal coercion; neither is the parents' physical coercion if it is extreme in form. The essential element in legal coercion according to Hoebel, is "the general social acceptance of the application of physical power, threat or, in fact, by a privileged party, for a legitimate cause, in a legitimate way, and at a legitimate time." The privilege of applying physical force constitutes, according to Hoebel, the official element in law. The person who is recognized as having the right to exercise force is the symbol of authority. This does not mean that he has to be an official or a holder

of any permanent office; it is any person who is exercising the legiti- 121
mate use of force. Simple as the above argument might seem, it really 114 671
offers very little in refining our conception of legal sanctions. For we 681
are still left with the question of how a person acquires the right to 625
exercise the physical force. What gives his action the legitimacy that
is otherwise lacking in other forms of coercion? In trying to deal with 121
this problem anthropologists resorted to a concept that is used by the 114
analytical jurists, that is, the court. There is a basic difference, how- 671
ever, between the anthropologists' view of the court and that of the ana- 692
lytical jurists. The latter see the court as the ultimate source of law:
court creates the law. Anthropologists, on the other hand, tend to use the
court as the source of law but as a criterion of its existence. An example
of such views is Max Radin who maintained that the infallible test "for
recognizing whether an imagined course of conduct is lawful or unlawful...
is to submit the question to the judgment of a court" (1938:1145).

Anthropologists differed among themselves, however, on what constitutes 121
a court. While Radcliffe-Brown (1940) insists that it must be a body of 114
people acting on behalf of the community as a whole and therefore does not 671
exist in all societies, Hoebel (1961), on the other hand, extends the con- 692 626
cept to include the diffused public opinion or sentiment of the people in 625
a given society as a kind of court that gives legitimation to the use of
force by individuals or groups in the absence of a recognized body acting
on behalf of the community. He sees a court in cases of self-help where
the aggrieved party or his kinsmen carry on the procedures of redress
without the intervention of a third party. He maintained that if the pro-
cedures are right, there will be "at least the compulsion of recognized
'legal' procedure, though the ultimate court may be the 'bar of public
opinion'" (1961:25).

The concept of the court has been prominent in the writings of several 121
other anthropologists besides Radcliffe-Brown and Hoebel. Bohannan 114
(1957, 1964, 1965), Redfield (1964) and Pospisil (1958) all imply the 671
existence of a court of some kind or another as the identifying mark of 692
the existence of legal rules. In his attempt to distinguish between law
and custom, Gluckman thought of law to exist "as a series of acceptable
judgments of rightdoing and wrongdoing in particular cases" (1955:262).
Custom and other social observances function as corpus juris and as such
a basis for the judgment of where the behavior of one of the litigants in
a case is reasonable or unreasonable, lawful or unlawful. As such, custom
is a source of law, but not law itself. It becomes law when drawn upon in
passing judgment in a given case. In commenting on a passage on the Nuer 121
by Evans-Pritchard, Gluckman made it clear what he meant by the court. 114
"This passage shows that even in a society where 'self-help' is the enforcing 671 626
sanction, people judge situations of dispute in terms of rights 692
and duties, and wrongs....Therefore, it seems fair to say that among the 171
Nuer, though they have no courts, there is a process of judgment by mediators
and ordinary people in which custom and morality as part of the corpus
juris constitute 'sources of law' for particular decisions" (1955a:263).

The importance of the above passage from Gluckman is his distinction 121
between the concept of the court and the judicial process, a distinction 114 671
lacking in the writing of most other anthropologists dealing with the
study of law. Failure to distinguish the two aspects of the legal system
resulted in confusing a basic societal process with one of the mechanisms
through which the goals of that process achieved in certain societies.
In its broadest sense, the judicial process refers to the ways disputes [692]
are settled within society. Since didsputes arise out of the very nature [626]
of social interaction, some form of dispute settlement is found in all [627]
societies.

The form which the process of dispute settlement takes differs from 121
one society to another. In certain societies disputes are settled through 627
a process of informal mediation undertaken by go-betweens; in others it 692
is by means of self-help; still in others, it is by way of court. In so- 695
cieties with courts the process of dispute settlements is undertaken by judges who "take and assess the evidence, examine what they regard as the facts, and come to a decision in favor of one party rather than another" (Gluckman 1965:183).

Within a given society, disputes are settled in accordance with a set 121
of principles that reflect the basic goals and values of that society. As 627
long as the settlement of a particular dispute proceeds according to these 626
principles, the settlement is supported by the public opinion of that so- 671
ciety. This is true whether the process is carried on b y means of informal 692 182
mediations or through a court system. It is this public opinion as the ex-
pression of the basic societal values and not the court as a special mechan-
ism that gives legitimation to the judicial decisions. To equate opinion [114]
with the court as Hoebel (1961) did, or to look at the court as the ultimate
source of legitimation as did Radcliffe-Brown (1940) and others (Redfield
1964, Bohannan 1965), is to create an unnecessary confusion which tends to
undermine meaningful cross-cultural comparisons. Whatever the differences 121
among anthropologists with regard to the definition of the court, their 127
main interest in the concept so far has been as a tool for the definition 671
of law. The interest in the concept gave rise to a methodological approach 114
which came to characterize the literature in legal anthropology, namely, the case-study approach, cases having been utilized in a number of ways by legal anthropologists. In their book on the Cheyenne, Llewellyn and Hoebel (1941) introduced the analysis of "the trouble case." This was followed by a number of studies utilizing the case study method either to

document statements concerning the substantive law of the society studied, 121
or to abstract and elucidate that law. An example of the first technique 127
is Howell's analysis of the Nuer court decisions (1954) where he collected 671 114
a large number of court cases, classified them and abstracted the substantive aspect of the native law. Gluckman's study of the Lozi (1955) represents the second technique. Smith and Roberts used the same method of case analysis to abstract certain principles of the Zuni law (1954), and Nader utilized it in her study of the Zapotecan law (1964). The list of those who utilized the case-study approach is quite extensive, and the range of the societies they studied is quite varied. But most of them share the interest in the substantive rather than in the procedural aspect of the law.

When referring to the procedural aspect of the law one should keep 121
in mind the difference between the technical and the abstract components 671
of procedural law. The first refers to the activities and steps involved [627]
in the settlement of disputes in the society as well as the person or body [692]
undertaking the responsibility of such settlement. The second involves a 121
number of abstract principles reflecting the values of the society with re- 181
gard to the goals of the judicial process, and which the judicial persons 671
use as a guide in achieving a settlement or in passing a judgment of one 114
kind or another. These are the bases of judicial reasoning. Although judicial reasoning represents one of the most interesting and important aspects of the judicial process, it attracted very little attention among legal anthropologists. With the exception of Gluckman and his analysis of the concept of "reasonable man" among the Lozi (1955a), no significant work has been done in this area. In dealing with the concept of the reasonable man, Gluckman was more interested in discovering universals in laws than in the process of judicial reasoning as such. He implied that an

element of reasonableness is a universal principle in any judicial logic. 121
Nadel reacts to Gluckman's implication of the universality of the concept 181
suggesting that it is valid only in certain contexts, and that the cases 671
reported by Gluckman from which he abstracted that concept are minor ones. 114
Nadel maintained that the principle seems inadequate in major crimes such as homicide, witchcraft or assault. "If I am right, the Lozi would, in these situations, discard their guiding fiction of 'reasonable man' for the sharper dichotomy of things simply lawful and unlawful, permitted and forbidden" (1956:162).

METHODOLOGY

One of the characteristics of legal anthropology is the absence of a 121
coherent body of theory that could be utilized in the analysis and inter- 124
pretation of the ethnographic data. What do exist, however, in the area of the ethnography of law are a variety of what may be called "tools of analysis." These are mainly methods and orientations which help to direct the researcher's attention to a certain area of behavior which describes best the phenomenon under study. Their main purpose is to help the researcher isolate particular portions of the phenomenon he is studying and as such enables him to conceptualize the problem. A number of these tools have been employed in the present study. One of these tools is Turner's "social drama" which was employed in the analysis of the political leadership and the judicial process. Since this approach depends upon the intimate knowledge of the sequential development of a given case, or cases, over a period of time, it was quite difficult to employ it in more than that particular context. As will be apparent in the later chapters, the judicial
process among the group is highly informal. Most of the disputes are settled [627]
by means of mediation which is done behind the scene and with a great deal of secrecy.

I managed, however, during my stay to be closely in touch with one 12
of the major cases and with almost all the parties involved. This case
was used as the basis for the "social drama" analyzed in chapter three
of the present study.

In addition to the social drama, I have used the case study method 121
to analyze aspects of the substantive law of the group especially with 127
regard to concepts such as that of criminal responsibility and the nature
of the contractual relations as exemplified by the marriage contract.
Cases utilized in the study include ones that I observed myself as well [124]
as cases taken from texts and some which were told to me by informants.

Most of the data was collected through the time-honored technique 123
of participant observation which was facilitated by the fact that the 122
group spoke the native language of the researcher (or vice versa). Formal 124
interviewing was conducted on a very limited scale, thirty-five extensive 125
questionnaires in all. These questionnaires were originally designed and
administered to supplement the life history material and to assess the
attitudes of the particular people involved with regard to particular
issues. Some of the results of these questionnaires are used in the
chapter. Due to the non-representation of the sample interviewed, these
results are used merely as illustration and not as representing any kind
of statistical frequency.

ENTRY TO THE FIELD

It is common among anthropologists to talk with nostalgia about their 114
field experience and about the group they studied. This usually gives the
impression that field work is always an enjoyable experience. Although my
field work seems at the present time to have been a pleasant experience,
especially when comparing it to the pressures of everyday living in a

114 114 122 123

"modern industrial society," it was not easy work. This, despite the fact that there was no language barrier, seeing that I spoke the same language of the group, or rather they spoke my native language; I had no problems of introduction because I had worked in the area and become acquainted with a number of the tribal members in 1958. When I went to the field, I then sought out these old friends who introduced me to other members of the group.

114 123 177 [657]

At the beginning, I made a deliberate effort to avoid associating with the government officials who worked in the area, even though they were quite willing to help and seemed to have an intimate knowledge of the people in the area. I had thought that any identification with the government would put me in a suspicious situation as far as the tribal groups were concerned, and thus prevent me from having good rapport with them. Later, however, I realized that the relationship between the government officials in the area and the tribal population was extremely good, and they always looked to the government as a source of aid and support to them. There was no conflict of interest between the state administration and the tribal groups. In fact, people accepted me more readily whenever they knew that I had worked for the Egyptian government. This later developed into a time-consuming and disappointing experience when many of the tribal members came to me asking for help getting employment in the government projects in the area, or to have their sons accepted in certain government schools, or to get some favored treatment from the government relief organizations.

114 123

The difficulty I encountered in my field work stemmed from the interplay of three major factors: the reliance on the case study method which necessitates the intimate knowledge of the events, facts, and parties involved in each case; being a female anthropologist in a society where women by definition are barred from public participation and particularly

from the process of dispute settlement; and the semi-nomadic nature of 114
the population in the area. 123

The reliance on the case-study method and especially that of Turner's 114
"social drama" which requires extensive and detailed knowledge of the se- 123
124
quential development of a number of cases over a long period of time proved 627
to be a major task in a society where disputes are settled not in formal 578
hearings, but by means of informal mediation and behind the scene negotiations. These activities covered a large area, and were shrouded in a great deal of secrecy. The assumption is that the parties involved in the dispute should be given the privacy and chance to arrive at an acceptable settlement without being conscious of or influenced by the opinion of non-interested parties. The public hearing, or the mi'ad, loves the announcement of the agreement arrived at in private. As will be seen later, very little factual information about the dispute is discussed in the mi'ad. No record is kept of either the discussion in the mi'ad or the preceding negotiations. The process of dispute settlement is, then, highly decentralized. To be able to follow one particular dispute involves the constant reliance on informants not only to acquaint the anthropologist with the places of negotiations, but also to fill the gaps in the information about the process of negotiation itself.

As a woman anthropologist, I found myself at a disadvantage in a 114
society where women were excluded from public participation. It is true 123
that from the very beginning of the field work I was never cast into the 562
role of the native woman, yet, my position as a woman posed a certain number of problems. When I first arrived in the area, I made a deliberate effort not to identify with the native women. When it was suggested to me that the relatively short skirts I wore were not practical for riding donkeys

or walking in the strong winds characteristic of the area, and that the 114 ●
floor-length native dress would be more appropriate, I refused the advice 123
for fear of being identified in the minds of the people with the natives, 562
and thus being treated in the same way. The possibility of being identified with native women was not very strong, because from the very beginning I did not act like one. I did things and talked about things that native women had never done or talked about. I drove a car, read, and wrote, and talked about national and local politics. More important than that though, to the tribal population, was that I was a member of the bar association of Egypt, and that I had practiced law for a year in Cairo. Every time I was introduced, the fact that I was an attorney was made evident. This gave legitimacy to my interest in studying the tribal legal system, and in many ways they were flattered than an attorney, especially a woman city attorney, would be interested in their law. Yet, in native clothes or not, in the native female role or not, I was still a woman, and as such I was not part
of any serious activity, especially those of dispute settlement. My mere 114
presence in any part of the dispute settlement made the gathering seem some- 123
how less serious. At the beginning of the field work a deliberate effort 562
was made to keep me from knowing anything about the whereabouts of the nego- 627
tiations or what was going on. I had to bribe men, women and children to [124]
tell me where the negotiations were taking place and who they involved, and then appear on the scene uninvited. This condition lasted for about two months. At that time the news of my presence in the area spread around, and I had attended many of the negotiations that men became less conscious of my presence. In fact, some even asked me to attend the meetings where some parts of the negotiations were conducted and give them my opinion as to the fairness of the settlement.

Yet, even when the problem of role definition was solved, it was 114
still difficult to follow closely all aspects and phases of any particu- 123
lar dispute. This was mainly the result of the semi-nomadic nature of 361 [627]
the population. In settled communities, the anthropologist usually finds himself in the midst of the social life of the community. He might not be a part of it, but at least a major portion of it is happening around him. In the case of nomadic or semi-nomadic populations, the situation is different. There were no large tribal concentrations in the area. The [621]
largest residential unit was the camp, and it consisted of no more than thirteen tents which changed in composition quite rapidly. In one camp, out of the thirteen tents which were there when I joined, only six remained unchanged by the time I left three months later. Originally I had planned to stay in the small village of El-Hammam, which was believed to be in the tribal route of the major tribal segment in the area. It took [487]
me only a few weeks to realize that the tribal segments did not follow any definite migratory route, and for more than four weeks I saw nothing of the life of the group more than the few individuals who came occasionally to the small settlement to buy tea or sugar, or to catch the train to Alexandria. It was then that I decided to leave the settlement and live with the camp. My stay in the camp was very insightful as far as information about the daily activities of the camp members and the relationship between the camp and other tribal segments in the area. But the camp was a very small group and fairly isolated. Besides, there was no way of knowing how typical that camp was to the other camps in the area. I finally decided that the best strategy was to live with a number of camps in the surrounding area for relatively short periods of time, making my base of operation a relatively settled camp in close proximity to a number of other camps.

619 173 Awlad Ali themselves are divided into three major sections: Ahmar (the Reds); Abiad (the Whites); and Senenah. Each of these sections is referred to as "tribe" and sometimes "tribes." The first two major sections, those of Ahmar or the Reds and Abiad (Whites), are named after their mothers, the wives of Ali (founder of Awlad Ali). The Whites are named after their white mother, and the Reds after their Sudanese mother who, owing to her dark complexion, was known as El-Hamra (the red one).

613 114 551 [595] In the past, writers such as Robertson-Smith (1903) have interpreted the reference to female names in patrilineal genealogies as indicating an earlier matrilineal descent. I tend to agree with a more recent writer, E. Peters (1959), who explains the reference to female ancestors by two factors: patrilineal descent and polygyny. According to him, it is a way of distinguishing full brothers from half brothers and a means to show this genealogically. "The concept of the 'one womb', of maternal origin, is a critical one in the context of social cohesion, but it does not deny patriliny; on the contrary, it serves a sense to enforce it. Female names can be used to show a greater notion of cohesion than the mere use of male names, and the significance of a female name . . . is that it is symbol of full brother unity at the highest political level." (p.29).

613 551 173 619 This can be further supported by evidence from my own data which show that reference to female names occur more frequently in charts where tribal names rather than proper names are used. In genealogies using proper names, informants rarely, if ever, trace their descent to an ancestress. But when charts of tribal names are used, it is not

CHAPTER V

POLITICAL LEADERSHIP AND JUDICIAL PROCESS

69 627 628 One of the most idstinguishing aspects of the legal system of Awlad Ali is the absence of any formalized judicial structure. Disputes are solved mainly through the mechanism of informal mediation rather than through formal hearings of a court during which the facts of each case are presented and judgment based on the facts is passed. This does not mean that formal hearings are not known on the area. For the "Mi'ad" or tribal hearing is a common and very important practice in the tribal proceedings. The Mi'ad, however, is not a tribal court. It is merely a gathering of all interested parties and anyone else who wished to attend, in which the agreement reached behind the scenes by means of negotiations are announced.

628 613 683 [114] The first Mi'ad I attended was held in the house of Sheikh Mughaieb, the Aqila (tribal leader) of bait Mughaieb of the Sanagrah tribal segment in the area of Hammam, 60 miles west of Alexandria. The case that was to be settled at the Mi'iad involved the assaulting of Sheikh Mughaieb ty two younger members of bait Dauoud who lived in a nearby camp. The dispute started when Ali, the youngest brother (14 years old) of the two assailants, found a piece of iron in the desert. Suspecting that it was a mine, he took it away from the camp to the small garden in the backyard of Sheikh Mughaieb's house, surrounded it with dry weeds and set fire to it. The piece of iron was in fact a mine and it exploded, damaging the trees and a window on the Sheikh's property. At the sound of the explosion Sheikh Mughaieb rushed out and found the boy trying to run away from

613 627 156 [196] to Qudura and to tell him that Hakim wanted to show his respect. This means in everyday parlance that Hakim was willing to pay him money. Qudura agreed to meet Hakim the following day.

● [114] [431] [594] On the day of the meeting, to which I was invited, Hakim arrived with his son and gifts of three goats, tea and sugar. One of the goats was slaughtered and supper was prepared for the guests. While the guests were eating, Hakim and Qudura disappeared inside one of the tents for more than an hour. When they finally joined the gathering, Hakim announced that he and Qudura were now brothers and that it was his fault that Qudura was angry because he had accused him of being stupid and misunderstanding the content of the message sent to him after the meeting of the Aggary awawil. "I admit," said Hakim, "that I might have meant at one time and probably said it to sheikh Qudura that I wanted him to be the Aqila of bait Asabei'. Now that I have admitted this, Sheikh Qudura should not have any grudges against me or my son." Then Qudura addressed the gathering and said, in a very cold and dry manner, "I am glad that Hakim has come to this senses and admitted his mistake." The gathering lasted for most of the evening, spent mostly in behind-the-scenes meetings involving Hakim, Qudura and different guests. Then as the last guest left, Shei'eb, who had been inside the tent throughtout the evening came out and said that Hakim was a fool and that Qudura had tricked him into admitting publicly that he had lied and that Qudura still refused to take the oath.

613 619 578 [521] Qudura's stand created a strong reaction which affected almost all the tribal segments in the area. The case overshadowed any other event and was the main topic of discussion. The reaction was mixed, however.

613 681 a request and examine the reasons behind it in an attempt to remedy them if possible. They have to be sure first of all that by his request the person is not avoiding the paymnet of his share in a particular case. [695] If this is proven to be the case, then no barawa is granted unless the person pays all his debts to the amar. This, like the amar's barawa of the individual, has to be put in writing.

613 578 [114] I left the area a month after the meeting held at Qudura's camp. By the time I left, bait Asabei' was almost in a chaotic situation. Many thought that the outcome would be in favor of Qudura, who would emerge from all the happenings as the leader of bait Asabei' as a whole. Others thought that the only possible outcome was for bait Asabei' to be divided into two or even three separate units with their own respective leaders.

Analysis

114 627 All events of the second phase occurred while I was in the area. Nonetheless I was not able to observe directly all of these events, due to the nature of the judicial process among Awlad Ali which relies, as has been mentioned earlier, on informal mediation and influence, rather than on formal court hearings. Most of the above events happened behind [124] closed doors and with a great amount of secrecy. For this reason I had to rely partly on informants' accounts of what exactly had happened between the parties involved.

613 627 182 The dispute in its two phases revealed a major weakness in the social structure of the major bait of the Aggary family. As the events of the case unfolded, they shed light on some of the important principles

582 time of the study. I have no information about the marital history of
[114] the men included in the genealogies. This is particularly important if
[586] we realize that the frequency of divorce in the area is quite high and
that there is a certain prohibition against ever marrying within a certain degree of relationship of his first wife.

582 According to the Koraan, a man is forbidden to marry certain
779 classes of women. Some of these women are permanently prohibited and others are only temporarily so. Marriage is forbidden with what are called the "maharem" (sing. mahram or non-marriageables). They are one's female ascendants and descendants; the former wives of one's ascendants or desendants; one's sister and the female descendants of one's sister and brother; one's paternal and maternal aunts and the sisters and aunts of the ascendants; one's mother-in-law and all female ascendants of one's wife. Marriage with the first cousin and the half-brother's half-sister (from another marriage) is therefore permitted. The second category of
[853] forbidden women are those related to the man by nursing. The wet nurse takes the place of the mother, and her relatives are treated as if she was the actual mother of the person in question.

In addition to the above, there is the prohibition of the simultaneous marriage of two women who are related to each other to the extent that had one of them been male and the other female, they would have come to the forbidden degree in marriage. This latter prohibition is not a permanent one and is restricted to the marriage of the two women at the same time. As soon as the marriage with one of them is dissolved, there is no prohibition on marrying the other one. Yet, although aware of the lecense given by the Islamic law to such marriage,

593 606 The case persisted for more than two months with no sign that either
557 party was willing to give into the demands of the other. I left the
586 area before any solution to the case was achieved.
[114]

Another relevant case is one which involved a dispute between
584 578 Hassan Hassanein from the Sanagrah tribe and the father-in-law of his
606 daughter who was also from the same tribe and who lived in the same
area. The case started when Hassanein was visited by a friend from the
[574] Esheibat tribe in Matruh, an old man of 60 or 70 years. During the night
that this guest spent at Hassanein's house, they got to talking about
marriage and the fact that although his guest was a wealthy and respected
[595] man, he had only one wife. After a lengthy talk, it seemed
that the old man was convinced that he should have a second wife and
asked Hassanein if he knew of a suitable girl to marry. Hassanein suggested
584 his daughter's sister-in-law. Hassanein took the prospective
583 groom to the tent of his daughter's father-in-law and discussed the
578 606 matter with the father of the prospective bride who agreed to marry his
daughter to Hassanein's guest if he paid the sume of 200 pounds, in addition
to slaughtering a number of goats and presenting him with the
[779] appropriate presents. When the man agreed to the terms, the fatha was
read to signify the agreement between the two parties. Hassanein left
the man to spend the night in the camp of his future in-laws. In the
morning the groom told the bride's father that he must go to nearby
Alexandria to bring the money for the bride price. When he came back
late that afternoon, he paid the money and set a date for the wedding
the next Thursday and then left for Matruh to prepare for the arrival
of the new wife.

684 of drastic actions taken in cases of adultery. Of the fourteen cases
613 562 of adultery that I examined furing my field work, none resulted in the
593 killing of the adulteress, and only three resulted in the murder of her
[114] partner. In all three cases where the adulterer was killed, the avenger
684 682 was the husband; and in all three cases, the husband had to pay the
613 bloodmoney to the murdered man's kin group. His payment of the bloodmoney, among other things, may indicate that the right of the husband to kill the adulterer is not completely accepted among Awlad Ali. All
[628] agree, however, that such killings never result in blood feuds because of the shameful circumstances in which the victim dies.

684 It was very difficult to obtain any detailed or reliable information
126 about adultery cases. All the above mentioned fourteen cases were gath-
[124] ered from the informants, twelve of which were cases which had already been solved. For the two cases which were still open at the time of the study, information was quite vague. Usually such cases are conducted with a great amount of secrecy, with the involved parties referring to them as cases of theft, or merely by saying that the cases involve women. Only when the adultery leads to the killing of the adulteress or the adulterer are more details publicly known about the case.

684 But while the right to retaliate for the shameful action of an adulterous wife is vague and diffused, the right of the husband for compensation from the adulterer remains clear and undisputed. In this resepct, adultery is treated very much like theft; the adulterer has stolen the husband's exclusive right to his wife's sexual activities. The com-
[583] pensation for this offense is estimated at L.E. 20, in addition to the
[586] mahr, if the husband decides to divorce his wife as a result of her adultery.

581 Marriage does not deprive the woman of some rights of her own.
585 The customary law gives the wife three basic rights corresponding to
562 those of the husband's sexual services, domestic work, and obedience.
671 Corresponding to the first of these, the wife has the right to have a
normal sexual life with her husband. This right, however, is not an ex-
clusive one, since the husband can marry more than one wife. A woman
585 can be divorced from her husband without having to return the mahr if
586 she claims that the husband is unable to perform his sexual duties. In
593 such cases, the marriage is usually dissolved quietly. In certain rare
instances, the husband may deny his wife's accusations. If both insist
585 on their stand, one or both may ask to be submitted to "bait el-shana'a,"
586 or house of the dreadful deeds. Reports are extremely vague about the
593 exact procedures involved in this case. Some informants stated that the
627 married couple would live in a tent without sidewalls so that everybody
could see what goes on inside. Most informants, however, insist that it
merely means that the couple move their tent near that of a respectable
man whose word is believed and honored. This man is supposed to keep a
close watch on the couple's activities, by listening or looking through
holes in the tent. His verdict determines the future of the marriage.
588 If the wife is justified in her claim, the husband is forced to divorce
681 her and to forfeit his mahr. If, on the other hand, the verdict is for
558 the husband, he not only can divorce her and get back the mahr, but is
also entitled to kabara, or compensation, for his injured pride. There
● 114 is no case of bait el-shana'a in the area during the time of the field
178 work, and most people insist that this practice is something of the past
583 when the mahr was relatively high and was paid in livestock, in which

585
586
593 case its return to the husband would have caused great financial in-
627
[114] convenience for the wife's family.
[778]
(583) Corresponding to the second right, the husband's right to his
581 wife's domestic work, is the wife's right to maintenance. The husband
585 has to support his wife. This includes providing her and her children
562 with adequate food and proper clothing. If the husband fails to do so
593 because of poverty, sickness, crop failure or unexpected disaster, the
wife's brother or father provides her and her children with the neces-
[586] sary food and clothing. If the husband's failure to fulfill his duties
is due to neglect, the wife can leave him and go to her father or brother
who talks the matter over with the husband who, in turn, either agrees
to their demands or has to divorce his wife and forfeit his mahr.

593 Finally, corresponding to the husband's right to his wife's obedi-
562 ence is the wife's right to fair treatment by her husband. There are a
[779] number of ways in which the wife is mistreated. One is excessive punish-
ment; although the right of the husband to punish his wife is provided in
the Koraan, the punishment must be excessive or severe. Awlad Ali draw
a line between acceptable and severe punishment. A punishment is severe
if it results in something that other people can see or hear. If the
husband insults his wife or her family and others hear the action, or if
he beats her and this results in visible traces, then the punishment is
severe.

593 A wife considers herself mistreated if the husband, when married
595 to more than one, treats any of the other wives better than he treats
562 her. Although the wife cannot deny her husband the right to have ad-
ditional wives, he must give them all equal treatment. This includes

586 divorce only under specific circumstances in the absence of which the
626
593 husband can force her to live with him. Following the Koraanic rules,
[562] Awlad Ali give men the right to dissolve the marriage at will and with-
[779] out any necessary justification; however, they differentiate between
cases where divorce is justified and those in which it is not. In a case of justifiable divorce, the husband can take back the mahr and possibly all other marriage expenses. In the case of unjustifiable divorce, the husband forfeits his right to regain the mahr. Divorce is justified whenever one or more of the husband's rights are violated by the wife or members of her family. Not all degrees of violation are considered as justification for divorce, however. Only intolerable violations can be considered as such. In deciding whether or not an act constitutes an
[183] intolerable violation, Awlad Ali judge it against the standard of the reasonable man, the customary man, and what he would have tolerated in a similar situation.

586 What constitutes reasonable behavior does not only vary according
183 to the situation and the manner in which the actions are taken, but also
554 with the relative position in the social structure of the parties involved and their initial relations to one another. In the case of divorce, what constitutes grounds for justifiable divorce in one case may not be sufficient grounds for justifiable divorce in another. In one of
586
183 the cases I witnessed during the year of study, a man who divorced his
554 wife because of her insistence that he buy her meat from the market
511 every day of the week, was forced to forfeit his right to redeem the
[114] mahr on the basis that the wife's actions had not established a basis for justifiable divorce. In the negotiations that followed, the position of the husband, as well as that of the family of the wife, were discussed.

[P. iii]

PREFACE

THIS account of the Sanusi of Cyrenaica would not have been 114 written if a number of accidents had not led me to their country during the late war, but the seed of it was planted long before the war. I had acquired during three years' residence in Egypt [122] and through travels in other Arab lands some knowledge of Arab history and culture, a little experience of Bedouin, and proficiency in spoken Arabic. During the war a year spent as Political Officer in the Alawite Territory of Syria added to both knowledge and enthusiasm. I had been acquainted with some of the Sanusi exiles in Egypt as far back as 1932 and had visited Darna and Banghazi by sea; and it had long been my hope that I might some day, when the Italians had ceased to rule the country, have a chance to visit the interior. This wish came true when in November 1942 I was posted as Political Officer to the (third) British Military Administration of Cyrenaica. I spent over two years in the country, the greater part of them among the Bedouin, particularly the more nomadic sections. Inhabited Cyrenaica is a small country and as in the course of my wanderings, mostly in its southern steppes and the desert beyond them, I covered more than two thousand miles by horse and camel I came to know something of its Bedouin tribes. My duties, it is true, prevented me from carrying out any systematic inquiries of a sociological kind, but the contact with the Bedouin they entailed enabled me to read the literature which forms the basis of this study in the light of my own experience. My labours have been but a small return for the hospitality of the tents and the many kindnesses of my Bedouin hosts.

I have not attempted to write a history of Cyrenaica, but 128 only of the development of the Sanusiya Order among the Bedouin tribes of the country. I have, therefore, said nothing of the centuries of Greek colonization and Roman and Byzantine rule, nor of the little known centuries of Arab and Turkish rule until 1843, when the Grand Sanusi founded his first zawiya, or religious lodge, on the Cyrenaican plateau. Also, I have not aimed at giving a comprehensive account either of the Sanusiya Order or of the Bedouin tribes, but I have described both only in so far as seemed necessary to an understanding of the political

*795 into the Order ordinary members. This is done simply by the
[793] two persons concerned shaking hands and reciting the *fatiha*,
the opening verse of the Koran, together. These categories can
hardly be regarded as grades and I can cite the authority of
Sayyid Muhammad Idris to support the opinion that they have
never meant more than that some persons were recognized as
more learned than others and therefore better qualified to recite
the longer and more advanced religious exercises.

II

*795 The Grand Sanusi's desire to create around him a society
793 living the life of primitive Islam and his missionary zeal gave an
impression, enhanced by the austerity of his Bedouin followers
and the remoteness of the Sahara, of excessive puritanism and
fanaticism; and some writers have compared the Sanusi movement to the Wahhabi movement on account of these supposed
● 114 traits. Duveyrier's account,[1] used very uncritically by other
*795 writers, is largely to be blamed for the exaggerated stories of
648 the secrecy, puritanism, fanaticism, power, and numbers of
the Order that were current at the end of the last century and
in the first decade of the present century and which much
prejudiced it in the eyes of European Powers with interests in
North Africa. With Duveyrier it was an axiom that any foolhardy European who got himself killed in North and Central
Africa had been assassinated by Sanusi agents and that any
setback to French interests was due to their propaganda.

*795 It is true that the Grand Sanusi, like the founder of the
793 Wahhabi movement, aimed at restoring what he conceived to
be the original society of the Prophet. Neither was peculiar in
784 doing so, for every Muslim preacher must have the same aim.
114 The Grand Sanusi forbad the drinking of alcohol and the taking
[273] of snuff and at first, though not absolutely, smoking. But all
[276] Muslims are forbidden alcohol and many who are neither
Sanusi nor Wahhabi think that smoking is best avoided. It is
[272] untrue, as has been asserted, that the Sanusi are forbidden
coffee. The Bedouin of Libya do not drink coffee, only tea, in

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[1] H. Duveyrier, *La Confrérie Musulmane de Sidi Mohammed ben 'Alî es Senoûsî et son Domaine géographique en l'Année 1300 de l'Hégire = 1883 de notre ère*, 1884.

795*

praise of which many poems have been written by Brothers of 793
the Order. The Grand Sanusi forbad music, dancing, and singing 784
in the recitations of the Order, but in this he was at one with 114 •
all the official spokesmen of Islam. Most reformist movements [272]
in Islam tend towards asceticism. [533]

Far from being extreme ascetics, however, the Sanusi [535]
Brothers eat and dress well, even using scent, and are amiable 795*
and merry companions. The Tunisian scholar and traveller 157
Muhammad 'Uthman al-Hashaishi, who travelled in 1896 via [785]
Malta, Tripoli, and Banghazi to Kufra to visit al-Sayyid al-Mahdi and met the leading Brothers of the time, remarks that 'they are fond of diversions, honest jesting. I have visited many of their zawiyas and I have made the acquaintance of many of their notables: I have seen only cheerful and smiling faces, welcoming me with benevolence and kindness. May God reward them!'[1]

The Grand Sanusi discouraged the trappings of poverty by 795*
his example, his exhortations, and his insistence on the Brothers 793
being self-supporting. Although the Heads of the Sanusiya 735
Order, like the Wahhabi leaders, encouraged settlement on the land, they can hardly have hoped to have greatly influenced the Bedouin to this end; but they insisted on the lodges of the Order supporting themselves by agriculture supplemented by stock-raising, and thereby took a stand against *ittikal*, the dependence for livelihood on alms and not on labour which some mendicant Orders have advocated.

The Order has always been, in fact, conventional as well as 795*
orthodox. In its early period it was essentially a missionary 797
Order with the limited aim of bringing by peaceful persuasion the Bedouin Arabs and the peoples of the Sahara and the Sudan to a fuller understanding of the beliefs and morals of Islam, while giving them at the same time the blessings of civilization: justice, peace, trade, and education. Its principles were, as Shaikh Muhammad 'Uthman says, simply 'to do good and avoid evil'.[2]

The accusation of fanaticism is not borne out by either the 795*
character of the Bedouin adherents of the Order or by its actions.

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[1] Mohammed ben Otsmane el-Hachaichi, *Voyage au Pays des Senoussia à travers La Tripolitaine et les Pays Touareg*, 1912, p. 128 (1st ed., 1903). [113]

[2] Ibid., p. 86.

795*

divine blessing, since it was because the Bedouin believed the [792]
Sanusi family had the same virtue that they accepted their [798]
leadership. [776]

The resemblance often alleged between the Sanusi and the [778]
Wahhabi movements, on the grounds of like puritanism, 795*
literalism, and fanaticism, cannot be substantiated. It is 171
obvious that there must be resemblances between new religious [114]
movements: they usually claim to be a return to primitive faith and morals and they are generally missionary and enthusiastic. There is no great significance in such common characteristics of the two movements. Nor is there any reason to suppose that the Grand Sanusi was directly influenced by Wahhabi propaganda. A more significant comparison between the two might be made by tracing their developments from religious into political movements. Both started as religious revivals among backward peoples, chiefly Bedouin, the Wahhabi movement in the Nadj in the eighteenth century and the Sanusi movement first in the Hijaz and then in Cyrenaica in the middle of the nineteenth century; the *Ikhwan* organizations of the two movements have much in common; and both ended in the formation of Amirates, or small Islamic States.

Both movements have created States, the Wahhabi in Arabia and the Sanusi in Cyrenaica, based explicitly on religious particularism. In doing so they have only done what any movement of the kind is bound to do in a barbarous country if it is to continue to exist, namely, to create an administrative system which would ensure a measure of peace, security, justice, and economic stability. A religious organization cannot exist apart from a polity of a wider kind. But they did not create the sentiment of community which made the growth of governmental functions and the emergence of a State possible.

Religious divisions in Islam have commonly been the expres- 795*
sion of a sense of social and cultural exclusiveness. The support 182
given to the 'Alids in Persia and Arabia, to the Umayyads in 177
Africa and Spain, to the Fatimids in Egypt, to the Kharijites 171
by the Berbers in North Africa, and the adoption of extreme Shi'ite doctrines by the mountaineers of Syria and by the Kurds, and of Isma'ili teachings in parts of India, were all reactions against foreign domination as much as revolts against orthodoxy. The religious deviation was the expression of the intense desire

*795 the territories of Kawar, Tibesti, Borku, Ennedi, Darfur,
793 Wadai, Kanem, Chad, the Azger, the Air, and Baghirmi. Its
797 teachings were spread as far as Senegal. The work of organizing
159 this propaganda fell largely to Sayyid al-Mahdi's two principal
*175 lieutenants. Sidi Muhammad al-Barrani operated in Kanem,
where he founded a lodge at Bir Alali on the route to Chad and
*795 organized bands among the Aulad Suliman, Zuwaya, Majabra,
793 Tibbu, and especially the Tuwariq, to oppose the advance of
159 the French into Central Africa; and afterwards in the Borku.
Muhammad al-Sunni, and his son al-Mahdi, operated in Bornu
*175 and Baghirmi, where he entered into relations, politically un-
*648 fruitful, with the Sultans of those countries, and in the Wadai,
where he strengthened the good relations existing between the Sultan of that country and Sayyid al-Mahdi. In 1899 Sayyid al-Mahdi transferred the seat of his Order to Qiru (or Quru) oasis, between Borku and Tibesti, to direct better its propaganda, to administer the extensive regions won to it, and to organize resistance to the French.

● [114] It is sometimes said in European books that one reason why Sayyid al-Mahdi went from Jaghbub to Kufra was his desire to increase the distance between himself and the Turkish Administration of Cyrenaica, but I have not found any evidence to support this view. On the other hand there can be no doubt that he was alarmed by the military and political activities of the French, about which he seems to have been well informed. The French were hastening to reach the limits of the sphere allotted to them by the agreements with England of 1898 and 1899 about the partition of Central Africa. In January 1902 they seized Bir Alali (Kanem) and destroyed the Sanusiya zawiya there. At the end of May, or at the beginning of June, in the same year Sayyid al-Mahdi died. His brother, Sayyid Muhammad al-Sharif, had predeceased him at Jaghbub in 1896.

*795 In general the energies of the Sayyid al-Mahdi had been
793 directed to the Sahara and the Sudan and the main events during
159 his headship of the Order took place off the Cyrenaican stage.
I have not thought it necessary, therefore, to give more than a
*175 brief summary of his career and of the political history of the
Order in Central Africa. He saw the Order his father had founded rise under his direction to the height of its expansion

161 If the Bedouin of the country number no more than 150,000
162 it is evident that density of population outside the towns must
be very low indeed. Ricci's map, based on Col. De Agostini's
● 114 census, shows a density of 0 to 5 per sq. km. for all the tribes of Cyrenaica except the 'Arafa, the Darsa, and the Hasa, all plateau tribes, for which he gives a density of 5 to 10.[1] Col. De Agostini, in his exhaustive monograph,[2] written before the worst Italian excesses, reckoned the native population of Cyrenaica at 185,400, of whom 181,750 were Arabs and 3,650 Jews. Of the Arabs about 25,000—I give round figures—were living in urban centres, about 7,000 in the oases, and about 150,000 were tented Bedouin. Of the Bedouin he classed only 16,000 as nomads, 35,000 as semi-nomads, and 99,000 as stable. His classification into nomads, semi-nomads, and stable was, as he recognized, arbitrary, since there is no reliable criterion of stability among a tented people, but it gives a useful indication of relative mobility. By 'stable' Col. De Agostini meant normal residence in a determined area within which the tents are pitched here and there for watering or other reasons and with periodic movements for sowing and pasturing, even though some days away from their usual seat, as we find among the 'Arafa tribe and a considerable part of the Hasa, the Darsa, and the 'Abaidat tribes. By 'semi-nomads' he meant those Bedouin who spread with greater frequency and more widely either in their own territory or towards zones of sowing or pasturing where they remain for a long time on account of less prosperous conditions in their own territory, such as we find in the Magharba tribe and parts of the 'Awaqir, the Bara'asa, and the 'Abaidat tribes and in many of the more important client groups. By 'nomads' he meant Bedouin who, although they possess their own territory or recognized centre, emigrate for long periods to distant, and not always the same, objectives, and are almost always fractionized into small groups for reasons of watering and pasturing; or Bedouin who normally wander in desert territories, giving themselves exclusively to rearing camels. As examples of nomads in this sense he mentions the Aulad Shahin section of the 'Abaidat tribe and many units

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(113) [1] *La Cirenaica—Geografica-Economica-Politica*, edited by Olinto Marinelli, 1922-3.

[2] *Le Popolazioni della Cirenaica*, 1922-3, p. 444.

of the more independent client tribes. In other words, all the 161
Bedouin of Cyrenaica are nomadic in some degree, some more 162
and some less, and Col. De Agostini rightly stresses that 114
whether they move much or little they all have the same
characteristics when compared to peasants and townsmen.[1]
They are all *bwadi*, as the Cyrenaican dialect has it, people of
the tents, and they see themselves as a single people against
the *hadur*, the citizens.

I have so far said nothing of the towns of Cyrenaica or of 632
their inhabitants. They play a minor part in this story, which
is about the Bedouin, but they cannot be entirely left out of it
on account of their economic and political relations with the
Bedouin, so I take this opportunity to give a brief account of
them.[2]

Banghazi, which is supposed to be called after the saint Sidi 175
Ghazi, buried in the town, is on the site of the classical Berenice. 632
It is believed that after the disappearance of the Graeco-
Roman community the site was unoccupied till the fifteenth
century, when it was reoccupied by immigrants from the
mercantile communities of the Tripolitanian coast, among
whom Misuratans, both Muslims and Jews, preponderated in
numbers and wealth. The Genoese Della Cella, who passed [162]
through the fly-infested town in 1817–18, in the time of the
Caramanlis, says that it then contained about 5,000 inhabitants, [441]
at least half of whom were Jews.[3] Shaikh Muhammad 'Uthman
al-Hashaishi, who was in the town in 1896, says that the [167]
greater part of the traders were immigrants from Sfax and the [114]
Island of Jerba—he was himself a Tunisian and often tended
to exaggerate Tunisian influence—with some Greeks and a few
Italians. 'As to the Turks, they do not give themselves to
trade.' At this time Banghazi was a very simple, mostly mud-
and-rubble, town, and the learned Shaikh makes a point of
telling us that there were no posts or telegraphs, nor even a
railway, save a line of three kilometres joining the official

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[1] Ibid., pp. 32–3.

[2] The historical information is chiefly derived from Agostini, ibid., pp. 413–43.

[3] Paolo Della Cella, *Narrative of an Expedition from Tripoli in Barbary to the Western Frontier of Egypt in 1817*, 1822, pp. 194–5. (First published in 1819.) F. W. and H. W. Beechey (*Proceedings of the Expedition to explore the Northern Coast of Africa from Tripoly Eastward in 1821 and 1822*, 1828, p. 299) [113]
consider Della Cella's estimate too high. Theirs is 2,000.

613

complicate the more direct relationship of the distribution of 619 groups of people to the ecology.[3] [13 182]

The Cyrenaican genealogy, then, is a conceptualization of a hierarchy[4] of ordered territorial segments. The groups stemming from the ancestor at the third order of segmentation are referred to as tribes, and each tribe is the apex of a three-tiered order of segments, which, following customary practice, are referred to as primary, secondary, and tertiary. The latter, the tertiary segment, 621 represents the group of people who, for a period of six to eight 613 months, gather together and live in what, for all intents and purposes, is a single discrete residential group.[5] This tertiary group is also the smallest political group. It has its own homeland, with its [423] water supplies, pastures, and ploughland. In this homeland live most of its members. It is a lineage segment, and most of the agnates of this segment live on their own homeland.[6] It is also the [682] vengeance group, which means that any one of its members can [628] be killed in vengeance for a homicide committed by any other, and that the obligation to exact vengeance falls on all members alike, regardless of relationship to the victim. Likewise, its members pay blood money as a group, and although when they receive it, a bigger portion goes to the nearest agnate of the victim, the remainder is distributed equally among all its members. The number of generations which supervene between the founding ancestor of a tertiary segment and the living is usually four or five, but there is little consistency in this number. Some tertiary

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[3] This part of the discussion is necessarily brief, but further amplification [114] will appear in two subsequent articles now in preparation, one of which is concerned with a general treatment of Cyrenaican genealogies, and the other with a discussion of the effects of ecology on the social organization of the Bedouin.

[4] I use the word hierarchy here since, although segments of any order display many like features, the orders represent distinct and progressively more [128] embracing interests, and these differences are of such consequence that to consider one order of groups as a facsimile of a superior or inferior order can only lead to confusion. A tertiary group, that is to say, may possess many of the characteristics of a secondary group, but the one is a fundamentally different sort of group from the other, as I shall show in my forthcoming article on the feud. (cf. Smith, M. G. 1956.)

[5] This statement does not apply to the Darsa and the Hasa tribes, two of [619] the plateau tribes in Cyrenaica. The statements in this article are confined [128] almost exclusively to the camel herders of the semi-desert.

[6] This, admittedly, is too general a statement to make about such an important issue, but I would prefer to leave its documentation and precision for an article on the analysis of the composition of Bedouin camps.

Although I must confess that I now
173 find it difficult to accept Evans-Pritchard's view of genealogical
178 growth and development as stated for the Nuer, it was the view
613 I originally held with regard to Bedouin genealogies. Indeed,
551 thinking in genealogical terms only, it appears inevitable that the
114 addition of successive generations can only mean the lengthening
of the genealogy, or, if the length is to remain constant, extrusion of ancestral names must take place at the apex of the genealogy. If this view is to be accepted, several other conclusions must be accepted with it. The genealogy, as far as it goes at least, is an accurate record of descent—some names may have been lopped off at the top, but otherwise the genealogy represents a faithful statement of succession. Again, if successive generations are to be added to the genealogy, then its base must continually expand laterally. From what is known of contemporary Bedouin genealogies, there is no evidence which leads to the supposition that their base is progressively widening. With regard to the authenticity of the names in the genealogy, above the point of tertiary segmentation, I hope to show in a subsequent article on Bedouin genealogies in general, that names above the tertiary point of segmentation have remained fixed for very long periods of time, and that they bear slight relation to the passage of generations over the last century at least; moreover, in this article I hope to demonstrate that what manipulation of the genealogy takes place does not affect more than about four or five ascending generations from the living.

121 Part of the difficulty in a study of this sort lies in the strong
173 temptation to think of the genealogy *per se*, even though it is
613 readily admitted that it has a value in itself for the Bedouin. Yet
even in these terms the genealogy must always represent an ordered grouping of people, and these people live on strips of territory. The starting point of the analysis then ought to begin with the territorial ordering of groups of people. The relation of groups of people to land, moreover, is determined by the carrying capacity of that land, and it is this prerequisite which is the main variable in discussing genealogical manipulation, and not the
[182] other way about. The main landmarks of the Cyrenaican ecology
are fixed points which cannot be manipulated to fit in with the genealogy; it is the genealogy which must be altered to comprehend the distribution of people in their ecological setting.

613 At the next level of segmentation (this now being the tertiary
619 order in any given tribe) the number of segments which appear
621 is conspicuously irregular. For the Magharba tribe, the four secondary segments, 'Ali, Mansur, Subh and Nasr are divided into thirteen, six, four, and four segments respectively. Similar irregularity appears in other tribes.[11] The pattern of the genealogy is always one of regularity in the number of segments at all points in it except for the point of tertiary segmentation where conspicuous irregularity becomes immediately evident. Since these
613 segments constitute the summer camps of the Bedouin, this is not
619 surprising, for these small groups will show greater susceptibility
621 to details of local water supplies, pasturing facilities, ploughland
133 areas, and topographical features than would the numerically
182 larger and structurally superior groups occupying larger areas of territories of greater ecological importance. If we follow the line
131 from Sa'ada to Nasr again, the bifurcation at the first order of segmentation is consistent with the division of the country into the permanently green high altitudes of the plateau, and the extended low-lying plain area of the western half of the country.
[134] Between the territory of the Magharba tribe ('The White Plain') and that of its neighbour tribe, the 'Awaqir ('The Red Plain'), there is a major soil difference, which is such a conspicuous feature of the landscape, and so sharply defined, that one is almost aware when one has crossed the tribal boundary. Within the Magharba tribe, a prominent dry river valley cuts the territory in two, the landscape to the west of it being characteristically serrated, making travel in an east-west direction difficult, while to the east the landscape is much more docile and undulating. The four sections of the ash-Shamakh branch again represent four quite distinct areas. The territory of one section is almost conterminous with the narrow belt of sand dunes along the coast; the territory of another is a block of rough and tumbled land in the west; the territory of a third, in the centre, is made up of a few low-lying shallow valleys; and the territory of the fourth,

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[114] [11] It is necessary here to warn the reader that, brilliant an ethnographer as Agostini undoubtedly was, his grouping of tribal sections is not always correct. I had his book (Agostini 1922–23) with me in the field and checked his tribal survey. I found that at several important points his ordering of the segments was incorrect. I should add that the differences between Agostini and myself are not due to the kind of changes discussed in this article.

619 change their structural position only rarely. The latter change
621 sometimes does, however, occur, and there is evidence to show
182 that it does. For example, Agostini (1922–23, p. 323) in his tribal
166 survey, records a section named Barsha as one of the groups stemming
613 from Nasr.[12] In the genealogies I was given, the name did
not appear, and even after some questioning, what information
was known about it was concealed. Some time later the name
[578] cropped up accidentally in conversation, and I was then told that
at one time it had been one of the Nasr groups, but that after a
quarrel during a year of water shortage, the Barsha folk went
to live with people with whom they had maternal connexions,
and in whose territory there was ample water that year, and
never returned. The group, a tertiary one, was detached from the
tertiary point of segmentation in the genealogies, and tied on to
a tertiary group of another tribe in its new homeland.

178 To summarize briefly the argument thus far, the mechanical
173 devices of telescoping, fusion of names, the ejection of those
619 names which cease to be of any social consequence, and the
621 elision of names at or around the fifth ascending generation,
613 taken together point to the importance of the tertiary order of
segmentation in discussing the problem of maintaining the form
of the genealogy constant in face of its natural tendency to alter;
further, evidence of changes (adoption into a lineage, detachment
from it, the inclusion and exclusion of clients) was presented,
and this again led to the conclusion that the tertiary point
of segmentation is critical in this respect. This being so, the manner
[128] in which change actually occurs, still remains to be shown,
and this is best done, perhaps, by discussing the mode of proliferation
of tertiary segments. In order to do this adequately, it
is necessary to say something briefly about certain features of
Bedouin marriage.

582 Among the Bedouin there exists a preferential form of marriage
605 between a man and his father's brother's daughter. Parallel
cousin marriage of this sort carries with it the exclusive right of
a man to this cousin. Without his consent no one else can marry
her, and to attempt to do so would be to risk the marriage arrangements
being nullified after negotiations had almost been

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[114] [12] Barsha's position is incorrectly given as a sub-group of Haiba; it should be shown as structurally equivalent to Haiba. See also note 11.

A F R I C A

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SOME STRUCTURAL ASPECTS OF THE FEUD AMONG THE CAMEL-HERDING BEDOUIN OF CYRENAICA[1]

E. L. PETERS

WHEN a Bedouin kills another in Cyrenaica, one of a number of consequences 682
ensues. According to the Bedouin, the particular consequence is determined by 571
the genealogical positions of the persons or groups concerned. In the first part of 829
this article an analysis of the disturbances in social relationships precipitated by 128
homicide is made, using a lineage model as a framework. In this part of the discussion the arrangement of the information corresponds closely to the view the Bedouin give of their relationships. Additional information is then presented to show [613]
that this lineage model neither covers several important areas of social relationships nor enables an accurate prediction of events to be made. This raises the issue: can the 121
comprehensive power of the model be increased by complicating it, or does complexity destroy its utility? The argument advanced is that the lineage model is not a 613 571
sociological one, but that it is a frame of reference used by a particular people to give them a common-sense kind of understanding of their social relationships. For sociological purposes this means that the lineage model, with its supporting theoretical presuppositions, must perforce be abandoned. In the latter part of this article [128]
some of the implications of adopting this position are discussed. Particular stress is [578]

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[1] This study is based on field-work in Cyrenaica carried out over a period of twenty-seven months from January 1948 to December 1950. The field-work was made possible by the award of a Horniman Studentship and of a Treasury Senior Studentship in Oriental Languages and Cultures. I wish to express my thanks to both awarding bodies. The paper was presented in its first form to a seminar at Manchester University. Modified versions were read at Oxford and Cambridge and at University College London in 1963. In a Manchester seminar, Professor W. J. M. Mackenzie raised issues which led me to reconsider my mode of analysis. Professor Ely Devons read a draft of the article, and offered valuable suggestions. I also wish to thank Professor Gluckman for the 12
many profitable discussions we have had on the institution of the feud. My interest in the feud stems [114] ←
directly from Evans-Pritchard's work on the institution among the Nuer. I am most grateful to him for his help and encouragement while I was pursuing my researches. Finally, anyone writing on the feud must acknowledge the contribution made to its understanding by Dr. Elizabeth Colson.

Thanks are due to the Association of Social Anthropologists for a grant from the Radcliffe-Brown Memorial Fund towards the publication of this paper.

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682 To complete this general statement, two further circumstances are cited by the 602 Bedouin. If a man kills a related person who is not an agnate (it is expressed as killing the mother's brother) the breach in relationships must be healed as quickly as possible. The convention for dealing with this is that the offender, bound hand and foot, mounted on a horse, is sent to the camp of ' the owner of the blood ', in the company of a holy man, there to make an offer of his life, saying: ' Here is my knife, my life is yours; here is my shroud, my life is yours.' No Bedouin would agree for a moment to undertake this journey if he thought the offer might be accepted. In Bedouin sentiments a life offered in this way cannot be taken. It is the convention which precedes a peace meeting and blood money. Any other way of dealing with the confusion, which spreads as a result of a homicide between cognates, is excluded.

682 Secondly, if a woman is killed, whatever the intersegmentary distance, the homicide is said to be accidental, because a man never ' intends ' to kill a woman. Blood-562 money arrangements are made as soon as possible, and the wealth—half that of a 613 man—passes to the deceased's father, not to her husband, for a woman's ' bone ' always belongs to her father. Obviously women cannot be allowed to enter into 582 feud; since it is demographically compelling (apart from other reasons) for some of 591 them to marry outside their natal groups, then they might well find themselves residents in the enemy's camps, if they were to become involved in feuds.

121 This statement of the different means available for the regulation of homicide at 682 the several orders of tribal segmentation is the view the Bedouin themselves hold of their relationships. An analysis of the facts presented thus far could bring out a 613 number of interesting points with regard to the relativity of morals, the typification 829 of acts by their social context, the significance of the orders of segmentation, and so 619 on. Rather than proceed along these lines, however, it is more urgently necessary to reflect on the significance of the fact that the arrangement of the material in terms of what is usually called the lineage structure coincides with the Bedouin ordering of the same details. It is, of course, important to note that the account is not based on mere hearsay evidence. Each statement made can be documented from known homicides, and to this extent the model that has been used is consistent with reality. The model, nevertheless, can only be a representation of what a particular people, the Bedouin, conceive their social reality to be; it is a kind of ideology which enables them, without making absurd demands on their credulity, to understand their field of social relationships, and to give particular relationships their *raison d'être*. But, as will be shown, it would be a serious error to mistake such a folk model for sociological analysis. Such an error is difficult to avoid because the Bedouin, when defending their view, are able to cite enough bits and pieces of reality to make their argument con-121 vincing. The flaw in the reasoning is seen when it can be shown that its consequences are absurd. As an example of what is meant, the statement that feud is attached to 114 groups at the secondary order of segmentation may be considered. If the statement 613 were true, if each and every secondary section were at feud one with the other (and 619 in a structural sense this ought to be so), then each tribe would be divided into small 829 mutually hostile groups, which completely lacked any possibility of movement, even 578 for pasturing purposes. Presented with this, the Bedouin would argue that this is not in fact so, because secondary and primary sections are interlinked in many ways. That is, they evoke what to them are contingencies to explain why they are at feud with one

121 part of a secondary section but not with another. Once contingencies are permitted
613 to enter in, the lineage model ceases to be of use, for what is implied is that at all
114 times some parts of sections structurally situated for feuding do not in fact feud.
[619] Other facts can be adduced to show that the structural view is inadequate but, before
[829] proceeding to examine these, some general objections to the lineage theory need to
[578] be raised. In the first instance, the corner stone in the theory of lineage systems is that they consist of parts which are in balanced opposition. It is no accident that the idiom generally used in discussing the segmentation of a lineage system is that segments bifurcate. Indeed bifurcation is necessary if lineage theory is to make sense, because if at any order there are more than two segments, then combinations can occur which are not comprehended by the theory. In the Cyrenaican lineage the number of segments at the tertiary order is haphazard, in some cases as few as two but in others as many as a dozen or so. Where there are many segments at this order it is rather pointless to speak in terms of balanced opposition. Moreover, at the secondary order of segmentation the number of segments are fairly consistent throughout the tribes, but they number more than two in all of them. It is also a fact that combinations occur and, moreover, these may be between the tertiary segments of two 'opposed' secondary segments.

121 Secondly, in lineage theory groups come together to constitute larger segments in
613 opposition to like segments. Yet in lineage societies there is a lack of instituted
571 authority, there are no chiefs distributed throughout the land as heads of segments
of the hierarchical orders. This being so, then it is not possible for all the sections of,
622 say, a secondary section to come together; there is no one to command the action.
114 In fact, sections combine in Cyrenaica, but not in the way they should according to the lineage structure. In order to discuss this adequately, a lengthy diversion into an analysis of the distribution of power would be necessary. The matter must rest here with the admittedly somewhat dogmatic assertion that there are men who wield power over groups of varying populations, and that the extent of their domains cannot be understood by reference to orders in the lineage. Perhaps it is for this reason—because, that is to say, lineage theory effectively blocks the exercise—that relatively little has been written about the problem of leadership in these societies.

121 Thirdly, all segments should be fairly equal in numbers of people and economic
613 resources, if the theory of lineage were to have substance in reality. In Cyrenaica
114 the population of one tertiary segment may be three times or more that of another.
[621] Both may be structurally equal in the sense that they are named groups segmenting as a pair of brothers from a common father. As political groups, however, this equality has little meaning. Further, with regard to economic resources, some sections possess several wells and a territory of such extent that it straddles two or even more of what might be called micro-ecological areas. With marked preponderance in numbers and superiority of resources, some groups have grown into dominance, and the evidence points to the existence of this dominance in the past also. However, 'like' sections may appear on a lineage chart, in political action there is conspicuous
[619] disparity. Each tribe possesses one tertiary section or more with a claim to be the
[621] owners of the 'Golden Stirrup'; these are large tertiary groups with relatively plentiful resources, with allies in other groups, and, in sum, with the power to terrorize other tribal groups.

121 613 562 114 These three objections to the lineage theory as a useful model for examining the consequences of homicide are serious enough in themselves, but another objection renders it still less satisfactory. This fourth objection relates to the implication that lineage theory cannot take account of women. Indeed, in some of the accounts of the political organization of lineage societies, the impression is given that they are all-male societies: women belong only to the domestic and kinship realms. In terms of the theory, this must be so. Women, the marriage links they create, the forms of relationships that derive from marriage, the right of men to joke with others by virtue of a link through women, their rights to demand favours of men who are not their agnates, their right to expect contributions to bridewealth or blood money from maternal relatives—all these, and other forms of behaviour, have been dealt with as patterns of behaviour which interfere with or disturb agnation, or that cut 121 613 across lineage affiliations. Such metaphors can only be justified if it is accepted that precedence must be given to agnation, to what people say they think their lineage relationships to be, and that there is some kind of primacy about what have frequently been called jural rules which constitute the structure, while behaviour which is not governed by these rules is to be relegated to the position of secondary forms having the effect of intruding only. But these secondary forms of behaviour are as impelling, as persisting, and are as much a part of social life as any of the so-called jural rules. [582] It is possible to go further than this, and state that in societies where there is a high incidence of marriage among agnates of the local group, as occurs among the Bedouin, jural rules rarely appear in their 'pure' form in behaviour, since, in groups of this sort, each and every person constitutes a bundle of roles by virtue of the fact that he is one of a very complex cognatic group; a particular role, it is true, may take precedence in a particular situation, but all roles are present in each situation and affect behaviour. Precedence can only be given to specific forms of behaviour in relation to situations. There is no such thing as a general primacy with regard to any form. The concept of agnation as the centre of all political problems, disturbed or disrupted by, say, matrilaterality, is as inadequate as saying that the nucleus which pulls all other components into position is matrilaterality with agnation as a disturbing element. In reality there are numerous components present in all situations, which should not be lumped together under such categorizing terms as agnation and matrilaterality, but which combine as separate components in a kaleidoscopic range of clusters.

121 613 682 674 829 Some of the components of behaviour subsumed under the notion of matrilaterality are briefly given here in order to appreciate more fully the consequence of inter-group marriage. Of paramount importance is the fact that, in Bedouin sentiment, to kill a relative is as sinful an act as the killing of a close agnate. When such a homicide did occur, during my period of residence among them, the Bedouin response was to assert that the offender was out of his mind—it was inconceivable that he could have [602] committed the offence otherwise. Their attitude was reminiscent of the horror they display when a man kills his father or a full brother, and represents a much stronger reaction than is manifested when a man kills an agnate of, say, the third or fourth degree. They have every reason to be disturbed by the killing of a mother's brother, [604] for, whatever personal affections may be involved, a crucial link is threatened. Their reasoning, however, is that relationships with the mother's brother are characteristically easy, that they are not demanding, that there is much joking in them, and that to

121 celebrated war between the 'Abaidat and the Bara 'asa tribes occupying a large part
619 of central and eastern Cyrenaica. This war took place a hundred years ago, so that the
682 evidence is mainly hearsay, but it is significant that when asked for details of the
726 groups taking part the Bedouin make it clear that the entire tribes were not at war—
[173] some sections on both sides are said to have remained on friendly terms. Yet when
121 wars are discussed in a general fashion, the Bedouin insist that tribes confront each
619 other as such. If it is pointed out to them that men might be ranged against their
726 maternal relatives the Bedouin mumble apologetically that they would not kill their
maternal relatives—a lame argument since in the heat of battle men cannot make this
602 kind of discrimination. Details of other wars also illustrate the point that only parts
of tribes face each other in strife, for though the stories of past events may be inaccurate
there is genealogical evidence to substantiate their claims that certain groups
were linked in the past, and in any case their statements assert that where these links
exist they are not prepared to engage in hostilities. The several parts of each tribe,
121 like the parts of primary and secondary sections, have as many different sorts of
619 relationships as there are groups, and the general statement that tribes are warring
571 units merely obscures the interest there is in their relationships. Tribes, further, lack
the leadership to make war. I repeat that leadership does exist, but not even the
121 greatest leaders, past or present, can rightly be described as leaders of their tribes,
619 using the term in its structural connotation. Literature on the subject gives the
613 impression that there are tribal leaders, because successive administrations have used
554 the tribes and their divisions as a framework for attempting to rule the Bedouin, but
the details of the power domains of individual leaders make it clear that they have
little to do with the ordered divisions of tribes. A leader within part of one tribe may
carry with him tertiary sections of another tribe, and if major hostilities break out
between parts of these tribes, the sections of both which are joined as allies and
related as kinsfolk will not fight against each other, for sections so linked enjoy
stronger connexions than the structurally linked tertiary sections of a very large
[682] secondary section. Consequently the statement that homicide results in tribal war
[114] when the offender and his victim are members of two separate tribes is not merely
incomplete, not merely a simplification, it is wrong.

121 A point which has been implicit throughout the second part of this paper needs
613 now to be made quite explicit: groups do not come together in their respective
structural genealogical orders. During my entire residence in Cyrenaica I did not
571 see a group of agnates larger than a tertiary tribal section assemble for any purpose.
[114] It is true that the occasions when large groups are required to assemble are infrequent.
[648] It is also true that although the British Administration was serving a caretaker role
only, it may have had an affect on the nature of tribal gatherings. Despite this qualification,
there were several occasions when I expected tribal groups to assemble in
lineage order if the fusion of sections in relation to like sections has any meaning in
practice. Large groups of men did gather to dispute claims to wells, to argue about
rights to ploughland, and to make peace. In every case that I recorded the agnatically
closest groups of the main participants were absent, while members of genealogically
more remote groups were present in strength. This statement applies to gatherings
[628] in the camps and in the administrative centres. One of the biggest gatherings I
witnessed assembled in an administrative office in a village near the coast in the

south-west of the country. Most members of the two tertiary groups directly concerned 121
in the dispute were present. The agnates of the collaterally linked groups of 613
the principals were unrepresented; indeed collaterals of one of the principals made 571
it quite explicit that they were opposed to their genealogical allies and considered 628
their perusal of the matter tiresome. The bulk of the crowd present was made up
of men linked to the principals in a variety of different and non-agnatic ways, and it
was they who provided most of the argument once the issue had been opened. It 121
follows, therefore, that an analysis of political organization and behaviour in Cyrenaica 613
which is based on lineage theory leads to a gross misrepresentation. For, what 114
I am arguing is not that the lineage model in its rarefied state is too simple, not that
additional facts must be injected into it to complicate it, but that it does not provide
an admissible basis for analysis.[1] The complication of something that is founded in
error can only lead to complicated error, however many facts of real life are introduced
in an attempt to give it substance. The Bedouin conception of their social [829]
relationships in terms of a genealogical ordering of groups is a fact of their social
life, and in relation to some problems it is an important fact. My objection to the use
which has been made of a people's ideology of their relationships is that it has been
elevated from its status as a component of social life to such a position of universal
dominance in all sets of social relationships that 'every sociological problem', as
Fortes writes of the Tallensi, 'hinges on the lineage system'.[2]

If the ordering of groups within the frame of the Bedouin genealogy is abandoned 121
as a basis for analysis, it does not follow that the only remaining view is that of small 613
groups of people distributed throughout the country enjoying relationships merely 571
as units. Regularity in relationships does exist, it is urgently necessary, and it persists; 578
but this regularity is not consistent with a lineage model. Ultimately, feud is a
violent form of hostility between corporations which has its source in the competition
for proprietory rights in land and water. This competition makes it necessary for
groups to combine to prevent the encroachments of others in similar combinations
and also to expand their resources whenever the opportunity arises. The significant
groups in a discussion of the feud are these power groups, and it is their composition,
the shifting alliances within them, the growth and diminution in the power of tertiary

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[1] Dr. Paul Bohannan has distinguished in his writings between what he calls folk systems and analytical systems. The distinction, as he sees it, is set out clearly in the statement 'a certain field of Nuer relationships is explained by Nuer in terms of an agnatic genealogy. This is the folk system. The same field is explained, in English, by Professor Evans-Pritchard, as a lineage system based on the principle of segmental opposition. This is an analytical system' (Bohannan, 1957, p. 5). What is the difference? Is it only a difference of language? Bohannan's analytical statement is little more than a generalisation of what is in the folk system. An analytical system, in his hands, is a sophistication of a folk system, for it is the latter which provides him with his analytical framework. The act of creativity on the part of the social anthropologist about which he writes (Bohannan, 1963, p. 14) is the revealing of a folk system through analysis. But he does not
depart from the framework set by informants—the 121
agnatic genealogy is the lineage, and the fission and 613
fusion of parts, the opposition of like segments and 114
so on is explained by informants in different languages 171
as adequately as it is explained by social anthropologists in English. Bohannan's viewpoint is made clearer, perhaps, in his discussion on the arrangement of facts relating to Tiv law. Here he considers what he should do once he has elicited all the facts, and he argues against setting them out as an arrangement of the procedural law of Tiv courts because, 'The error would be that the arrangement is not part of *the Tiv way of looking at it*, and hence would be false' (Bohannan, 1957, p. 69. Italics mine). Why? The Tiv are not the social anthropologists. Is the test of an analytical model its consistency with a folk comprehension?

[2] Fortes, 1945, p. 30.

121 sections constituting the combinations which makes the facts of feud intelligible.
613 Furthermore, several different types of power structures exist which serve the differ-
[577] ent interests of the people composing them, and these are interlinked in combinations
[578] of superior span. But the formation of these structures and the modes in which they
combine are quite unlike the articulations in a lineage system. Characteristically, the
segments in a lineage system are conceived of as building up hierarchically to span
what is spoken of as a total society, the apex of the system affording a spectacular and
fixed definition of its boundaries. Had I been using this concept in this paper the
[173] founding ancestress of the nine Cyrenaican tribes, Sa'ada as named by the Bedouin,
would have served this purpose and would have been given inappropriate promi-
121 nence. The views presented here have the consequences of retreating from a concept
184 of a total society. The people to whom the facts given are related are the camel-
herding tribes only. Some of them have relations of many kinds with the cow-herding
233 folk who inhabit the northern plateau area, and these relations are also significant
619 for the analysis of a wide range of problems; genealogically both cow and camel
herders are seen as part of a single structure, but the differences between them with
regard to their economy, the size, composition, and distribution of their residential
units, their political and ritual life is so great that to conceive of them as a single social
121 structure is not useful. Moreover, the far western tribal sections have relationships
619 of such urgency with their neighbours in Tripolitania (who are excluded from Cyrena-
ican genealogies) that to cut off these relationships as lying outside Cyrenaican society
would be quite unwarranted. The same can be said of the relationships of the tribal
sections in the eastern part of Cyrenaica with their genealogical cousins, the Aulad
'Ali of Egypt, who, although residing across a national border, are closely linked to
some of the Cyrenaican Bedouin. Some tribes also have to rely on the people of the
southern oases for an item of diet and an outlet for surplus wool, and the net of kin-
ship is spread out to include them. In these cases they come into contact with other
[177] ethnic groups such as Berbers and Tibu, and through the oases they extend their lines
of communication southwards to Wadai, Chad, and Bornu. As an indication of the
effectiveness of these links, it is only necessary to add that people inhabiting Cyrenaica
make periodic and regular visits to these far southern places, and that in 1948 a
shaikh, living near Ajadabiya in south-western Cyrenaica, collected blood-money
contributions from kinsmen in Wadai. A single structure cannot possibly include,
for analytical purposes, these sorts of relationships.

121 Finally, it must be stressed that the facts given here refer to the period 1948 to
114 1950. Since then oil has been discovered in large quantities near the territory of a
tribe where I spent most of my time while resident in the country, and where there
[315] was one tin shack in 1950 there is now a modern port with roads extending south-
wards from it into the wilderness. I see no reason to assume that social relations as
I observed them are present today or that they were the same at any time in the past
175 either. Before the advent of the Sanusi Order in the early eighteen-forties, it is known
795 that one lineage at least was dominantly powerful and that its leader tyrannized a
613 large part of Central Cyrenaica.[1] His descendants constituted a powerful group in

[1] Smith and Porcher, 1864. These two archaeologists met this leader and continued their archaeological researches around Cirene only with his goodwill, although the site is not on the territory of his tribe as I knew it in 1950. They also speak of him as inhabiting a castle which also lies outside the

Chapter

7

Aspects of the Family Among the Bedouin of Cyrenaica*

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Marriage and the Father-Son Relationship

When a marriage takes place among the Bedouin of Cyrenaica, a nuptial 585
tent is set up some distance away from that of the groom's father. There is 593
no particular significance about the nuptial tent itself, but it must be pitched at a distance so that the father "will not see it" — although, obviously, in a country of large level plains, it stands out conspicuously. This pretence that the tent remains unseen by the father is pushed to the point of his denying any knowledge of what is afoot. A middle-aged or elderly man with a family adopts a similar attitude to any marriage in which his son participates, as groom or as guest. An elder, the father of three unmarried sons (one of [535]
whom, in his late twenties, was known to be getting impatient about marriage), when I asked after his eldest son, insisted that he was away with the [831]
camels, although the son was conspicuous in a semicircle of young men encouraging a blindfolded maiden in the movements of her seductive dance outside a wedding tent in his full view. Prior to the wedding festivities, the

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* I wish to express my gratitude to Mr. R. Werbner for reading this essay in manuscript. 128

The information presented is based on 27 months fieldwork carried out during 114
1948 to 1950, among the Cyrenaica Bedouin. I am indebted to the Trustees of the 122
Horniman Studentship Fund, and the Committee for Treasury Studentships in Oriental Languages and Cultures, for making the research financially possible.

233 wandered over the boundary of Abd el Salam's grazing
685 rights. The juvenile members of Abd el Salam's family
[578] came out from their tents in a body, to drive off their
intruding second cousins with their camels. An altercation
ensued, and the excitement grew; and eventually a pitched
battle with sticks and stones began among the lads.

683 One of Abd el Kerim's sons, leaving his brother to hold
on for a moment, ran back the half mile to call his father, who returned with him to the scene of the fight carrying his gun. On arrival at the camels, Abd el Salam's sons set on him in a body. Abd el Kerim pointed his gun at one of them and took aim; whereupon one of the other family from behind laid him low with a blow on the top of his head, sufficient to fell an ox.

• [114] Abd el Kerim was carried back to his tent, where the
writer witnessed the horrible sight of sympathetic but homicidal relatives pawing his open wound with their filthy fingers. A large hole had been knocked in the side of his head, and portions of brain were visible. After some
[694] months of surgical treatment Abd el Kerim came out of
hospital; and, as the blow was reported to have affected
his reason, a case was brought on his behalf by some of his
relatives, claiming damages from the family of Abd el
[682] Salam. However, before the case was fully completed,
Abd el Kerim was taken ill, was re-admitted to hospital,
and died. The case therefore became one of bloodmoney,
and was dealt with in the usual way.

683 The interesting point about the case, however, lies in
682 the decision of the court, when the first claim for damages
695 was brought up. A very strong line was adopted by the
672 sheikhs, and in the opinion of the court the wounds received by Abd el Kerim were only what he might reasonably expect. They maintained that, after the way in which he had behaved, he was lucky to have got off as lightly as he did. The sheikhs protested that he ought never to have gone out from his tent, and mixed himself up in a fight between a lot of boys. If he had any authority at all, he

175 Historically, the modern aspect of role differentiation
177 and political specialization began with the appointment of
554 Mitkhatri 'Adam at Sidi Barrani, west of Marsa Matruh. This
631 was under Muhammad 'Ali Pasha. The new role was that of _'umda_,
648 the same term used for the village leader in the Valley of the
Nile. The first Bedouin _'umda_ died in 1909. At this time,
under the British, another political role was instituted.
This new role, that of _shaikh_, was a kind of vice-_'umda_ position.
The son of the first _shaikh_ is now about 80 years old
• [115] and still lives in Marsa Matruh. (He was my chief informant
for Bedouin history.) During this early period, there were
few government officials in the desert, and, according to my
informant, "there was need for only a few _'umdas_ and _shaikhs_.
But later there was a need for more and more. The job of these
men in those times was to work for the Egyptians in their
dealings with the Bedouins of the desert." The number of
incumbents in the offices of _'umda_ and _shaikh_ increased as
the political needs of the British grew.

175 According to the Bedouins, the British administration
648 did not arrive in the desert until about 1914. Up until that time, matters were in the hands of the Egyptians who governed the desert province for the colonial government. When the British arrived in Marsa Matruh, the opening of World War I was at hand. The Bedouins say, quite proudly, that the British knew of their sympathy for, and cooperation with, the Sanusi against the Italians in Cyrenaica.

648 177 423 size in the barley and pasture area of al-Qasr would not permit a subsistence level economy. Just as important is the political implication of any attempt at large-scale land reform in al-Qasr. The pattern of land distribution in al-Qasr reflects an intimate relationship between the structural principles of Bedouin society, especially the lineage system and territoriality. (In a later chapter we will discuss this relationship.) The ramifications of land reform would amount to a structural rearrangement of al-Qasr society and would make redistribution of land difficult to administer, or even to imagine. A reorganization of property relations is, in effect, a basic change in the authority structure. Therefore, the Bedouins want no part of land reform. There is a law which forbids the ownership of "more than 100 feddans (one feddan=one acre) of agricultural land. This shall also apply to barren and desert land."[1] [115] One of my informants, a large landowner, claims that this "law only applies to the Nile Valley where there is plenty of water. If the government wants the Bedouins to abide by that law then they must take care of us. I would gladly trade this land (which was considerably more than 100 feddans) for 100 feddans in the Nile Valley." The traditional tribal structure of Bedouin society

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[1] "Decree for the Amendment of the Agrarian Reform Law in the Southern Region," Department of Information, Cairo, July 25, 1961.

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558
the victims' families sent their representatives to demand that the money be paid. To face the situation, a meeting of all the Awaqil of Eilat Aggary was called and Sheikh Selouma, the Aqila of bait Eweidha, took the responsibility of notifying the other Awaqil. The meeting was held in

● [115] the tent of Hemeida (my driver and informant) from the Sanagrah tribe. Each bait was represented by its Aqila with the exception of bait Asabei', from which both Shei'eb and Hakim were present. Since bait Asabei' was the only bait which did not submit to its share of the bloodmoney, the discussion centered around the inability of Shei'eb to collect it. In a gesture which he meant to appear as helping out Shei'eb, Hakim offered to pay not only his share but that of all members of bait Asabei', and followed his offer by handing the money to Sheikh Selouma. After this act which was a complete surprise to Shei'eb, Sheikh Slouma, the Aqila of bait Eweidha, suggested that Hakim should be considered as the Aqila of bait Asabei' instead of Shei'eb, who had demonstrated his inability to collect from members of his own bait. He emphasized the fact that he had nothing against Shei'eb who had legitimately acquired his position as Aqila by means of succession. But he insisted that the survival of the Amar depended upon the fulfullment of its financial obligations to outsiders and that Hakim was wealthy and could pay. Shei'eb did not comment and the rest of the Awaqil nodded indicating their agreement with Sheikh Selouma.

[124] The above is the summary of events that happened before I came to the area, and which were told to me by informants including the parties involved. Since most of these events occurred more than ten years ago,

000 STRUCTURE AND AUTHORITY IN A BEDOUIN TRIBE: THE 'AISHAIBAT OF THE WESTERN DESERT OF EGYPT

by

Gerald J. Obermeyer

Submitted to the
faculty of the Graduate School
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the
Department of Anthropology, Indiana University
Bloomington, Indiana

[Title Page]

1: Obermeyer E-5 (1964-1965) 1969 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9
'Aishaibat

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[Introductory, p. i]

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PREFACE

101

121

This study is based on data collected during the period of June of 1964 to May of 1965. The focus of the research was a permanent Bedouin community, the 'Aishaibat tribe of al-Qasr near the town of Marsa Matruh in the Western Desert of Egypt. Al-Qasr was selected for study because of its sedentary and relatively nucleated settlement pattern which rendered it accessible and manageable in the time allotted for research; also, because this community had been designated by the government as one undergoing rapid social change. The Marsa Matruh area, as a focus for anthropological research, was first suggested to me by Professor Ahmad Abou-Zeid, an Egyptian anthropologist who has written on the problems of social change in the Western Desert.

My original research plan was designed as an ethnographic survey of Bedouin society in the al-Qasr area, and a concentration on the specific problems related to the government's policy of integrating the Bedouins, socially and politically, into the national society. I was interested in the various ways in which the Bedouins of the Marsa Matruh area conceptualized the aims of the government, and in the structural reorganization, if any, of Bedouin politics and political thought under the impetus of social change programs.

121 However, the political climate of Egypt at the time of my research made such a study impracticable. In reorienting my research, I decided to confine my study to al-Qasr and an analysis of "micropolitics" at the local community level.

The aim of the present study is, then, an understanding of the political structure of al-Qasr. Also, since no group exists in isolation and relations with others are mainly a matter of politics, I have tried to present here the structural and ideological bases of politics in al-Qasr. This study is concerned with politics in the traditional sense and in the modern sense. An analysis of the traditional meaning of politics necessitates a discussion and understanding of the structural principles of Bedouin society and the manner in which they function in defining the rights and obligations contained in social relationships. Such an analysis also seeks to establish a base level from which we can perceive and understand the political process in al-Qasr and the modern context of Bedouin politics. The main focus of the political analysis in this study is upon authority and leadership roles, as they were in the past and as they are in the present.

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114
*613 I should hasten to make one thing clear at this time, for it directly affected the way I went about my research and the type of data which I collected. In al-Qasr, there exists communication boundaries, and even barriers, corresponding to the structural and territorial lines of the lineage system. [178] The 'Aishaibat tribe of al-Qasr, once a nomadic tribe, is now

121 sedentary, but the semi-autonomous nature of the lineage segments
114 is maintained to a large extent. The result of this is a de-
*613 [178] emphasis of the "we-feeling" among the population of al-Qasr
[186] and an absence of "sense of community" (Easton 1965:332). By
[571] "community," I refer to a pattern of relatively intensive,
face-to-face social relationships, and the values of solidarity
and common goals to which these give rise. The relationship
121 *613 between lineage structure and territoriality was such that
571 kinship segments within the same lineage unit might go days,
and even weeks, with no inter-communication, and the degree
of communication between separate lineage units of the tribe
was less intensive than this. Such a communication pattern
made observation difficult. The fact that Bedouin tribal
society relatively lacks the group ceremonial aspect compounded
the difficulty of gaining an overall perspective of structural
relations, and of witnessing the bases and nature of social
interaction outside the lineage structure. All of this
emerges from a communication structure and kinship structure
differentiated into corporate groups which "discourage close
participation of members in the social relations of the larger
society" (Wolf 1957:7).

121 The structural arrangement of al-Qasr was such that,
in plain language, not a great deal was happening in the
sociological sense. I say this about al-Qasr in comparison
[123] with, for instance, a full-blown village community. Conse-
quently, I observed from day to day that which I could,

121 recorded that which people said in formal and informal inter-
123 views, and hoped that events would materialize to corroborate, in one way or another, that which I heard or suspected.

123 Since al-Qasr lacked the "space-time component of communal living together" (Firth 1961:27), I was not able to select a central vantage point from which I could view the everyday life of the Bedouins. More importantly, since the Bedouins interpret social structure in terms of a close relationship between residence and group membership, by the very fact that I chose to live in al-Qasr, and so had to live in the territory of some one lineage, I threatened my own objectivity and that of the Bedouins toward me.

123 In consideration of the time element, I made the
*613 decision to live with the most prestigious lineage in al-Qasr. I felt that this association would give me more freedom of movement in the field, and would provide me with access to more data in a shorter time. What I did not know at the time of my entry into the field was that the Bedouins prize neutrality and objectivity just as much as the anthropologist.
[829] As the Bedouins often said: "A man should only speak about the things he knows."

121 This is a study of the Bedouins of al-Qasr. They are not nomads nor are they even primarily pastoralists. Various degrees of nomadism and pastoralism exist in the Western Desert of Egypt among the different units of the Awlad 'Ali tribe. Therefore, while the Bedouins of al-Qasr may represent a case

121 for comparative study, they do not represent the ethnological entity known as the Awlad 'Ali. However, one might heuristically think of al-Qasr as a post-tribal or pre-peasant stage of social change, and on this basis generate some hypotheses about the sedentarization process or other specific cultural processes.

126
104 The translation of the Arabic documents presented here were made in the field. In most of the cases, translating took place on the spot and this may account for some of the awkward phraseology. Arabic terms and names have been transliterated according to the system used by Cowan in *An Introduction to Modern Literary Arabic* (1958) with certain exceptions: long vowels are shown by a double vowel; the guttural stop is indicated by an apostrophe; and the glottal stop is indicated by the use of a short "e," such as in 'aiela ("family").

000 I owe a great deal of gratitude to my former teachers who have given freely of their time and knowledge and have shown an interest in my training in anthropology and Middle
122 Eastern studies. I would like to thank in particular Dr. William Sanders, of Pennsylvania State University, who introduced me to anthropology; Dr. David Bidney, of Indiana University, and Dr. P. J. Vatikiotis, now of the London School of Oriental and African Studies, who were my advisers in anthropology and Middle Eastern studies during my graduate training; Dr. Irfan Shahid, now of Georgetown University, who instructed me in the Arabic language; Dr. Vincent Cantarino, of Indiana University, who instructed me in Arabic literature

122 and took the time to serve on my dissertation committee; Dr. Alan Merriam, of Indiana University, who taught me anthropology, served on my dissertation committee, and showed a sincere interest in my future; Dr. Harold Driver and Dr. John Messenger, both of Indiana University, who taught me anthropology.

128 I would also like to thank Dr. Richard Antoun, of Indiana University, who took the time and interest to serve on my dissertation committee and who offered valuable suggestions which have vastly improved the study offered here.

000 I owe a great and special debt of gratitude to Dr. John Kennedy, of the Neuro-Psychiatric Institute of U.C.L.A., who served as my adviser during a two-year stay in Egypt. He, more than any other, has influenced by own approach to anthropology. I am glad to have this opportunity to thank him for being a good friend and a brilliant teacher.

I must thank Dr. David Bidney a second time for serving as chairman of my dissertation committee and for being a good friend and guide throughout my graduate training period.

Finally, to my wife Judith Criste Obermeyer, I owe the
greatest debt which words cannot express. Without her constant
support and encouragement this study would never have been
128 written. I am grateful for her aid in preparing this manuscript,
but this is only an insignificant part of her contribution to
the total effort.

122 During the course of my graduate training, my fieldwork

122 and the writing-up stage, I have received financial support and assistance from a number of sources which I would like to recognize and thank at this time. The United States Office of Education supported me over a two-year period at Indiana University through a National Defense Title VI Fellowship for the study of Arabic. The Carnegie Seminar in Political and Administrative Development of Indiana University, under the direction of Professor Fred Riggs and Professor William Siffin, provided me with a summer's employment and a small research grant prior to my leaving for the field. The American University in Cairo supported me over a two-year period, the first year with a research fellowship at the Center for Arabic Studies, and the second year with a research grant to carry out the field study which is presented here. I would like to thank, in particular, Dr. Laila Shukry el-Hamamsy, the Director of the Social Research Center of the university, who helped me a great deal and took an interest in my work.

Finally, the University of Chicago awarded me a Carnegie Fellowship for the Comparative Study of New Nations which permitted me the time to prepare the greatest part of
000 this dissertation. I am especially grateful to the members of the Committee for the Comparative Study of New Nations who make it their practice to give the graduate student a unique experience in intellectual fellowship. During my stay at Chicago, I gained intellectual insight and stimulation in particular from the ideas and work of Professor Leonard Binder, Professor

OOO Clifford Geertz, and Professor Edward Shils. My association with the Committee has greatly influenced my concept of anthropology and my feelings about the role of anthropology in the future.

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PART ONE

INTRODUCTION: HISTORY AND CHANGE

[P. 1]

CHAPTER I

THE BEDOUINS OF AL-QASR: PAST AND PRESENT

General Historical Background

121 No full historical account of events leading up to the present study is intended here. Only a fragment of history, a backdrop to the discussion of al-Qasr Bedouin society is offered. The account is an effort to trace, historically, the arrival of the Bedouin into the Egyptian Western Desert.

175
167 During the Arab conquest of Egypt in 639 A.D., tribesmen made only a few forays into Upper Egypt. But these sojourns represent the first intrusion of the Bedouin strain into this part of the world and were the vanguard of a force which would conquer all of North Africa. The Bedouin tribesmen of the Arab army found the pastures of Upper Egypt similar to their traditional habitat in Arabia, and certain trible segments settled in the area.

175 In 647 A.D., Muslim troops under the command of Ibn abu-Sarh pushed across the Western Desert as far as Tripoli in present-day Libya. This was an expeditionary force, and not until about 670 did permanent Arab occupation come to Libya. Historical sources are vague about the nature of the relationship between the Arabs and the Berbers of the newly

175 conquered lands. Generally, the Berbers fought assimilation and change when and where they could, just as they had in their confrontations with the Greeks and Romans. But as the Arabs took more and more of the "sown" lands of North Africa, Berber resistance decreased. Only in mountainous areas, such as the Kabyle region (from the Arabic qabaa'il, i.e., "tribes"), were the Berbers successful against the Arabization process.

Around the time of 908 A.D., the Ismaili Shi'a sect, based in the Yemen, established a western mission in Tunisia. This outpost grew into the Fatimid Dynasty, and in 969 the Fatimids were able to capture Egypt from the central Islamic empire. By the 11th century they had reached their zenith as a religious and political power. At this time, their rule was threatened internally by two Bedouin tribes, the Bedouin element in Egypt, the Banu Hilal and Banu Sulaim.

175
167 In his Histoire des Berberes (trans. 1925), Ibn Khaldun states that the original homeland of these two tribes was the Najd area of Arabia. They were dangerous predators who spent their summers raiding along the frontiers of Syria and Iraq: the Banu Sulaim even attacked pilgrims traveling to and from Mecca (1925:28-166). Some segments of these tribes found their way into the delta region of Egypt where they became troublesome to the Fatimid Caliph, and were promptly exiled into Upper
175 Egypt. Apparently, they were responsible for discord among the other tribes there, for in an attempt to solve two problems

175 with one move, the Caliph sent these Bedouins into battle in order to enforce authority in his western Berber provinces. This order set in motion the great "Hilali invasion." The tribesmen of Banu Hilal and Banu Sulaim literally slashed their way across eastern North Africa laying waste to towns and fields as they went (Ibn Khaldun 1925:29; Brockelmann 1939: 204).

175
648 The Arab Bedouins recruited Berbers as they went, especially in Libya. Between the years 1052 and 1054, these marauding nomads sacked the rich agricultural lands of Tripolitania and Tunisia, lands which had been in production since the time of the Romans (Mahdi 1964:21). The Banu Sulaim, according to Ibn Khaldun (1925:136), concentrated their action in an area from Alexandria to Tripolitania. It was over this region, which includes Cyrenaica in eastern Libya, that they established their rule. Ibn Khaldun states that the two tribes agreed to divide the conquered territory between them, the eastern lands going to the Banu Sulaim and the western lands to the Banu
175 Hilal (1925:33-34). Such a division of territorial rights in
571 Arab Bedouin society is representative of a set of authority
182 relationships. Differentiation in the locus of authority,
*[613] whether it be horizontal or hierarchical, is a method of
maintaining political order among segments of the lineage structure.

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114
619 Evans-Pritchard states that the Cyrenaican Bedouins are descendants of the Banu Sulaim and represent an admixture

175 114 619 between the Bedouin and the Berbers (1954:46-47). G. W. Murray informs us that the Bedouins of the Egyptian Western Desert themselves believe this to be the case (1935:33, 247). I agree that the Cyrenaican Bedouin are the descendants of the Banu Sulaim; nevertheless, and despite what Murray says, my informants (when they knew) claimed to be descendants of the Banu Hilal. They refer to their ancestress, Sa'ada, as al-Hilaliyya, "she of the Banu Hilal."

175 167 Data concerning the Awlad 'Ali migratory history are insufficient for a satisfactory reconstruction of the process. As we have noted, there were two invasions of North Africa by the Arabs. The first, about 643 A.D., was a shock wave from the Arab conquest of Egypt in which the Arabs defeated the Luwata Berbers who were living in eastern Libya. The second invasion, in the 11th century, took place at the hands of the Banu Hilal and Banu Sulaim and penetrated into the North African countryside. As a result, the Banu Salaim tribe settled in Cyrenaica where they intermingled with the Luwata Berbers. That part of Cyrenaica which they claimed as their [103] territory they called the Jabal Akhdar (i.e. "Green Mountain"), a plateau region set back from the coast. The Bedouins of al-Qasr refer to the Jabal Akhdar as their original homeland (see Figure 1).

We hear nothing more of the Banu Salaim until the 17th century. At this time, segments of the tribe began drifting

175 167 eastward toward the Nile Valley. It is not possible to determine the exact conditions associated with this migration, but they probably parallel later movements which are connected with tribal conflicts over land and water rights. In 1689, Bedouins from Libya raided Egyptian oases in the Western Desert (Murray 1935:29). From this date on, for a period of some forty years, records show a continual movement of Bedouins out of Libya into Egypt. Some groups went as far as the Nile Valley and were eventually assimilated into the peasant population there. Tribal movements at the end of the 17th century involved whole tribes and also tribal sections and fragments. Thus in some cases, authority relations arising from territorial bonds were dissipated; but in other cases, political ties were strung across the Libyan Desert from Cyrenaica to the Nile Valley. "Today there is not a Cyrenaican tribe, or even large section, which has not some of its members in Egypt, often whole lineages" (Evans-Pritchard 1954:49-50).

175 619 726 167 [648] Evans-Pritchard's study of the Sanusi, valuable for its analysis of Italian colonial records, shows that the Awlad 'Ali were driven from Cyrenaica by its sister tribe, the Harabi, with the help of the Turkish rulers of Libya. This took place, he says, about 150 years ago. When the Awlad 'Ali arrived in Egypt, they found the Hanadi tribe already there. In a chain of conflicts, the Hanadi had displaced the Banu'Una, forcing them into the Nile Valley:

175 then came the Awlad 'Ali.

619 Around the year 1800, the Awlad 'Ali were able to
726 defeat the Hanadi with the help of another Cyrenaican tribe
167 dwelling in the area, the Jumi'at. The Jumi'at were a vassal
tribe who changed their allegiance from the Hanadi to the
Awlad 'Ali after this war. The Hanadi, as the Banu'Una
before them, were forced into the Nile Valley. Today, they
[131] live in Sharqiyya Province and are no longer distinguishable
from the peasant population.

175 According to Evans-Pritchard, the Awlad 'Ali were still
619 in possession of eastern Cyrenaica in 1800. Then there occurred
726 "long and savagely fought" wars ending with the expulsion of
114 the Awlad 'Ali. But this time schedule seems unlikely since
the Awlad 'Ali were already at war with the Hanadi when
175 Napoleon landed near Alexandria in 1798. The Bedouin war has
648 been amusingly described by the French historian Lacroix (in
181 Murray 1935:30) who accompanied the Napoleonic expedition:

> At five o'clock, the first Bedouin were seen on the flank of the army, and shortly afterwards one saw four or five hundred; it was the tribe of Henady, the fiercest Arabs of these deserts. They were almost naked, swarthy, and lean; their horses seemed wornout hacks; save for the helmet, it was Don Quixote as represented in the engravings ...if these five hundred Arabs had been Mamelukes, they would have been able to obtain a great success at this first moment, when the soldiers' imaginations were alert and ready to receive any impression, but these Arabs were as cowardly as the Mamelukes, who had charged an hour before, were brave.

175 According to Murray, on July fourth "thirty Sheikhs of the
648 Hanadi, the Awlad 'Ali, and the Beni'Una made their peace
with the new power" (1935:30).

175 The version of history provided by my informants is
186 no radical departure from these facts. But there are a few
124 differing aspects which represent ethnocentric highlights on
(648) history. For instance, the Bedouins of al-Qasr have a few
stories which exaggerate the fact that the Harabi needed the
cooperation of the Turkish rulers to defeat the Awlad 'Ali
and to force them out of Cyrenaica. Also, the Bedouins point
out, the Jumi'at tribe begged the Awlad 'Ali to come and
rescue them from the oppression of the Hanadi.

175 Shortly after 1800, Muhammad 'Ali, the Ottoman
619 viceroy, drove the French from Egypt and supported the Hanadi
648 against the Awlad 'Ali. The Egytian ruler felt that political
control over the Awlad 'Ali would insure the security of the
whole desert, and especially Egypt's western frontier with
Libya. Despite the alliance between the Hanadi and Muhammed
'Ali's forces, the outcome was a temporary victory for the
Awlad 'Ali. This event actually set the stage for a transformation of Bedouin tribal society.

175 After the defeat of the Hanadi and the Pasha's troops,
648 the Awlad 'Ali were given preferential treatment by Muhammed
'Ali. He wisely secured the Hanadi tribe in Sharqiyya Province.
Then he granted the Awlad 'Ali, by right of usufruct, the

175 648 [651] territory of the whole Western Desert. They were also exempted from land taxes, military duty, and forced labor on the irrigation projects of the Nile River. In return for these privileges, the Bedouins were expected to guard the frontiers of Egypt and to furnish warriors for the expeditionary forces of Muhammed 'Ali. The Pasha, who was in the process of carving out his own empire independent of the Ottomans, needed warriors, a role which traditionally excluded the fallahin of the Nile Valley. Bedouin horsemen from the Western Desert fought with Muhammad 'Ali in his Wahhabi campaign of 1815 in Arabia. They also aided the Pasha's son, Ismail, in the conquest of the Sudan.

Muhammad 'Ali instituted the practice of granting to the Bedouin leaders land in the rich Nile Valley. He made it explicit that the leaders were to dwell upon this land: their role, as it was officially stated, was to provide a liaison between the Pasha and the tribes. In fact, the leaders were hostages. By controlling them, Muhammad 'Ali was able to exert proper pressure on the Bedouins when and where it was needed (Baer 1957:84-98).

175 648 651 423 Bedouins did not pay land taxes, but neither did they "own" the land; they simply had the right of usufruct. The law stated that only those who paid land taxes had the right to purchase and own their land. But along with ownership of land came the onerous responsibilities of corvée labor on the

175 Nile dikes and military conscription. The term "Bedouin"
648 came to mean, as it was defined by the government of Egypt,
651 one who did not legally own land and hence was not subject to
423 forced labor or military service. On this basis, the Director
[162] of Recruiting Office in a 1904 census distinguished three kinds
of Bedouin (Murray 1935:31):

290,095 - settled and living in their own farm colonies
240,880 - living among the fallahin
70,472 - real Bedouin or nomads

601,447

175 By the end of the 19th century, Bedouin society had
177 undergone a great deal of change. Politically, the Bedouins
648 were subordinates in a dominant-subjective authority relationship with the central regime of the Nile Valley. As a result of external political control, nomadism was curtailed and the Bedouins were forced to settle on the land to raise what few crops they could. These new political and economic conditions are the major aspects of the sedentarization process. Bedouin dependence on the central authority of Egypt and their reliance on horticulture increased with time. Nor did the entry of Britain into Egypt in 1882 change the material and social condition of the Bedouin.

175 The British, in the style of the politics of colonial-
648 ism, reorganized the administrative structure of Egypt. The Western Desert was given the status of a province; command

175
648 posts were established there, and Marsa Matruh became the capital town. The Western Desert was administered by British officers who had under their command a garrison of Egyptian soldiers. Their assignment was to secure the colonial borders. This task included keeping the Awlad 'Ali within the boundaries of Egypt. The policy of the British provincial government was to avoid interfering with the Bedouin process of law and conflict regulation unless it threatened the peace and security [124] of the desert. My informants said that the British interfered with Bedouin justice only under the threat of large-scale tribal warfare.

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[619] The political relationship which the Bedouins of the Awlad 'Ali tribe had with the Sanusi Order of Islam in Libya was historically not so important compared to that of the other Cyrenaican tribes. The Sanusi Order, classified as a Sufi tariiqa ("mystic order"), was actually quite orthodox in its attitudes and practices. This is a function of the socio-religious conditions of its origin during the 18th-19th century revival of orthodoxy in Islamic Arabia (Gibb 1955: [793] 127-145). Muhammad bin 'Ali al-Sanusi founded his order, al-Sanusiyya, near Mecca around the year 1837. The Sanusi doctrine may be considered orthodox, or secularly oriented, in that it rejects the fundamental goal of Sufism, mystical union with God.

The Sanusi Order, from the very beginning, strove for a return to pure Islam. It made its greatest headway among

175 the Bedouins of the Hijaz area. This Sanusi success aroused
795 the jealousy and animosities of the orthodox 'ulama ("clergy")
[798] of the Mecca area. Al-Sanusi was forced to flee the Arabian
[793] peninsula, and in 1843 he founded his first zawiya ("lodge"),
[346] al-zawiya al-baida, in Cyrenaica. The Sanusi doctrine was as
acceptable to the Bedouins of Cyrenaica as it had been to the
[793] tribes of the Hijaz. The person and teachings of al-Sanusi
al-kabir ("the grand Sanusi"), as he came to be known, fit
into the "holy man" religious tradition of Cyrenaica and even
spread beyond into the Sudan and Lake Chad area. The Order
[793] showed primary concern for the people of the desert: the
[346] Sanusi shaikh ("holy man") cared for the poor, and the zawiya
[485] became rest stops, storehouses, and religious centers where
[794] Bedouin children were taught their Quranic lessons. Through
175 the zawiya, the Sanusiyya became a political and economic
795 integrating factor in the desert, and al-Sanusi became the
346 legitimate authority of the Bedouins. The zawiya became a
182 very important part of the traditional desert economic system.
[793] Today one zawiya remains near al-Qasr but it is scarcely used.
The Bedouins say: "Before, when Alexandria was far away by
camel, we could get what we wanted at the zawiya. Now that we
have trucks and trains no one goes to the zawiya."

175 The fortunes of the Bedouin became linked with those
795 of the Order. When the Sanusi became involved in full-scale
648 conflict with the Italian colonial power, the Bedouins bore

175 the brunt of the war. With Bedouin warriors, the Sanusiyya
795 religious order became a political force for the Italians to
648 reckon with.

From 1911 until the start of the world war in 1914, the Sanusi Bedouin army fought the Italians in the desert and harrassed them in the coastal area. In November, 1914, the Turks entered the war on the side of the Germans, and in May, 1915, Italy joined the Allies. As a result of the declaration of alliances and the expansion of the war, the Sanusi army was sent into Egypt against the British. This move brought the Awlad 'Ali into contact with the Sanusi army. Before this, they had had little involvement in the war. This relative inactivity of the Awlad 'Ali can hardly be explained by the notion that they were "an unwarlike peoples," as Evans-Pritchard (1954:127) has characterized them. The Awlad 'Ali were not in the mainstream of Sanusi war activities in Libya. Also, the British exerted a great deal of control over them in contrast to that which the Italians were able to gain over the Cyrenaican Bedouin.

In 1915, the Sanusi army captured the British Libyan outpost at Sallum, and in January of 1916 they were threatening the town of Marsa Matruh. But within a month's time, by the end of February 1916, the British had routed the Sanusi army, and the following month had retaken Sallum.

During the Marsa Matruh campaign, some of the 'Aishai-

175 795 648 bat from al-Qasr joined the Sanusi army. The importance of their contribution to the Sanusi effort is vague, even though most of my informants claimed that their fathers "fought the British." Some of the al-Qasr activity was on a part-time basis. [124] One informant, whose father was the paramount leader of the 'Aishaibat tribe in 1916, told me that his father "used to take his rifle and ride out every morning to join the troops of Sayyid Ahmad al-Sharif (the grandson of al-Sanusi al-kabiir), and there he would kill many British soldiers. Then he would come home again at night." There was at least one group of al-Qasr Bedouins who joined the Sanusi in Libya before the start of the war. After the end of the fighting, this group returned to Egypt and asked to be pardoned by the British. They appealed to the Governor of Marsa Matruh that there should be no reprisals taken against them since the Turks had actually forced them to fight for the Sanusi. The British Governor, who was fluent in the Bedouin dialect and considered a great man by the Bedouins, replied to them in the form of a famous Bedouin proverb: "The ropes can be stretched far enough for forgiveness."

175 177 554 631 648 Traditionally, the Bedouins of the Marsa Matruh area were held in check by an officially created political structure which dated from the time of Muhammad 'Ali. This structure depended upon two political roles for the control of the Awlad 'Ali, the _'umda_ and the _shaikh_, neither of which had previously existed in the Bedouin authority system.

175 177 554 631 648 Historically, the modern aspect of role differentiation and political specialization began with the appointment of Mitkhatri 'Adam at Sidi Barrani, west of Marsa Matruh. This was under Muhammad 'Ali Pasha. The new role was that of *'umda*, the same term used for the village leader in the Valley of the Nile. The first Bedouin *'umda* died in 1909. At this time, under the British, another political role was instituted. This new role, that of *shaikh*, was a kind of vice-*'umda* position. The son of the first *shaikh* is now about 80 years old [115] and still lives in Marsa Matruh. (He was my chief informant for Bedouin history.) During this early period, there were few government officials in the desert, and, according to my informant, "there was need for only a few *'umdas* and *shaikhs*. But later there was a need for more and more. The job of these men in those times was to work for the Egyptians in their dealings with the Bedouins of the desert." The number of incumbents in the offices of *'umda* and *shaikh* increased as the political needs of the British grew.

175 648 According to the Bedouins, the British administration did not arrive in the desert until about 1914. Up until that time, matters were in the hands of the Egyptians who governed the desert province for the colonial government. When the British arrived in Marsa Matruh, the opening of World War I was at hand. The Bedouins say, quite proudly, that the British knew of their sympathy for, and cooperation with, the Sanusi against the Italians in Cyrenaica.

175 Sanusi against the Italians in Cyrenaica. "When the British
648 reached Matruh, they jailed all of the *'umdas* and *shaikhs*
554
631 (two *'umdas* and five *shaikhs*, at that time). Then they chose
new leaders, from the families of the old leaders, to work
with them." But, "these men did not fight with the British,
they only acted as their guides in dealing with the Bedouins
of the desert. When the old leaders were released from jail,
they returned to their positions of political office. While
they were in jail, their replacements had only helped the
[178] British with supplies." Apparently, the British saw the need
of maintaining the continuity of the Bedouin authority structure.

175 Data on the condition of the Bedouins of the Western
648 Desert between the two world wars are absent. The Bedouins
say that they lived with no trouble, or any help, from the
Egyptians. The Bedouins have no fond memories of their
experiences during World War II. They first heard of the war
in 1940 when the Italians marched into Western Desert from
Libya. The Germans occupied al-Qasr from May to October of
1942, when the famous General Rommel had his headquarters at
Marsa Matruh. The British had told the Bedouins, in 1940,
that they should flee the Italians, and that unless they did
175 they would be held responsible for their actions. Most of the
648 people of al-Qasr agreed to go to refugee camps at Amriyya
722 near Alexandria for the duration of the war.
166
[556] Some of the Bedouins refused to leave for Amriyya.

175 These were the wealthy group who had large numbers of sheep
648 and camels. In fact, most of the animals taken east to
722 Amriyya died on the way or were expropriated by the British.
556 'Umran Kailani, "who owned one thousand camels" and was the
166 shaikh of the 'Ali Ahmar section of the Awlad 'Ali at the time,
refused to go to Amriyya. The Bedouins say that he was treated
very well by the Germans who asked him to form a local government
and promised him all the help and supplies that he
needed. It is difficult to obtain figures on how many Bedouins
made the migration to the Nile Valley and how many remained
[162] behind in the Al-Qasr area. One informant told me that before
the war there were about 80,000 members of the Awlad 'Ali in
the Western Desert and that out of this number, about 30,000
remained behind.

175 Those who sought refuge at Amriyya returned to the
648 al-Qasr area at the end of 1942 after the defeat of the Germans
727 at al-Alamain. They found things greatly changed. Before the
war, there had been about twenty buildings in the al-Qasr area
and most of these were bombed out by the air war. The loss of
animals and the damage to the land made the resumption of
normal life quite difficult for the Bedouins. Underneath,
the land was literally a bed of anti-tank and anti-personnel
mines left by the advance and retreat of three different
armies. This restricted Bedouin travel and everyday food-
648 getting activities. This condition, which still exists, has
727

648 727 important effects on contemporary al-Qasr. There remain about
11 million land mines in the ground between Marsa Matruh and
648 727 165 164 Sallum. Accidents connected with these mines take one thousand
Bedouin lives every year, and cause about 10,000 injuries
annually. (Reported in al-Ahram, January, 1965). This danger
limits the areas in which the Bedouins can use the tractor, and,
as a result, a great deal of the coastal land must be plowed
by hand. In al-Qasr, physical disfigurements resulting from
mine mishaps were quite common, and most families have had
members killed in this way. In one al-Qasr lineage, 'Ailit
Ma'fas, there have been sixteen men killed by mines since
1943.

Change and Present Attitudes

648 177 Political and economic changes, begun at the turn of the century, have continued into the present. The Bedouins of al-Qasr have been increasingly drawn into the political and economic life of the Egyptian national community. They have come to depend upon the national market for their products and upon governmental agricultural subsidies for their security. The net result of this process has been a sedentary Bedouin society which is not quite tribal and not quite peasant. Al-Qasr has this in-between quality--what Fallers (1961) has called the tertium quid quality.

It is difficult to gauge the feelings of the Bedouins
[829] of al-Qasr about the social changes taking place. They complain

648 177 829 about the lack of concern shown toward the Bedouins throughout the history of their relations with the Nile Valley: they complain that the Egyptians have no right to take over the desert and order their lives for them. They say that "the Egyptians know nothing about the desert"; that "they do not know how to live in the desert and should take our advice on these things." "They (the Egyptians) have given us nothing, we had all of this before they came. Jamal Abd al-Nasser did not invent socialism (ishtarikiyya): the Bedouins have always had it. We have always shared and taken care of one another." The Egyptians are still "outsiders" to the Bedouins. They are referred to as "fallahin" or "peasants."

Interestingly enough, the Bedouins include President Nasser in their own in-group. They insist, in a half-serious way, that he is of the Awlad 'Ali because he is originally from Upper Egypt. One can compare the roles of Nasser and the Grand Sanusi in some ways. Both leaders made special [778] efforts to bring the Bedouins into a new community, to share their "good fortune" with them; also, both leaders are considered to be possessors of charisma, or baraka ("blessing") by the Bedouins. One may hear unkind remarks about "holy men" or "government officials," but never about Nasser or the al-Sanusi family. One Bedouin said: "Jamal Abd al-Nasser works hard and tries to do good for the people, but his officials are very lazy and do not care about us." While the Bedouins 000

While the Bedouins
795 771 respect the Sanusi family they, nevertheless, wear their
829 religion lightly. An informant, speaking of the merits and
demerits of the conservative Muslim Brethern Association, said
that "you should never listen to a holy man, for he will lead
you straight to hell!" But upon meeting any member of the
[576] Sanusi family, all Bedouins greet him by kissing his hand.
[778] Besides a show of deference, this ritual act, in theory,
transfers baraka from al-Sanusi to the layman.

648 The citizenship exemptions granted the Bedouins by
641 Muhammad 'Ali have been rescinded by Abd al-Nasser. This
has been one aspect of his program to imbue the Bedouin with
political consciousness and promote participation in the
nation-state. The Bedouins say that this is the way it should
be: they want the right to own land and to accept the
responsibility of defending the homeland. But they still do
[651] not pay land taxes, and they feel justified in this because
the desert "is very poor soil, and not like that of the Nile."
Nor do they always heed the call to military duty, though they
insist that they do.

648 Egyptian land reform laws would be impractical, or
177 impossible to apply, in al-Qasr. In the Nile Valley, such
423 laws were necessary. The majority of the Egyptian peasants
can survive on less than one acre of land, and farms of
under five acres comprise 44 per cent of the agricultural
land area in the Nile Valley (Warriner 1962:204). Plots this

648 177 423 size in the barley and pasture area of al-Qasr would not permit a subsistence level economy. Just as important is the political implication of any attempt at large-scale land reform in al-Qasr. The pattern of land distribution in al-Qasr reflects an intimate relationship between the structural principles of Bedouin society, especially the lineage system and territoriality. (In a later chapter we will discuss this relationship.) The ramifications of land reform would amount to a structural rearrangement of al-Qasr society and would make redistribution of land difficult to administer, or even to imagine. A reorganization of property relations is, in effect, a basic change in the authority structure. Therefore, the Bedouins want no part of land reform. There is a law which forbids the ownership of "more than 100 feddans (one feddan=one acre) of agricultural land. This shall also apply to barren and desert land."[1] One of my informants, a [115] large landowner, claims that this "law only applies to the Nile Valley where there is plenty of water. If the government wants the Bedouins to abide by that law then they must take care of us. I would gladly trade this land (which was considerably more than 100 feddans) for 100 feddans in the Nile Valley." The traditional tribal structure of Bedouin society

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[1] "Decree for the Amendment of the Agrarian Reform Law in the Southern Region," Department of Information, Cairo, July 25, 1961.

648 makes the welfare aspects of "Arab Socialism" meaningful,
177 but the Bedouins of al-Qasr feel that they are already
[423] practicing "Socialists."

The Bedouins feel that the programs of the government
are insufficient: the desert is extra harsh and aid should
compensate for this. On the other hand, the Egyptians who
administer the aid programs claim that the Bedouins do not
differentiate between "giving cooperation" and "receiving aid."
[181] Agricultural advisers complain that the Bedouins are lazy. One
agronomist whose job it was to teach the Bedouins how to
cultivate the olive tree said that they did not want to learn:
"They want us to plant the trees, water them and care for
them, harvest the olives, and then they will take them to the
market and sell them!" This statement is typical. The
[186] Bedouins reply: "The Egyptians did not teach us how to grow
the olive. Our fathers planted the olive here long before
they came into the desert." The Bedouins feel that the
Egyptians should follow their advice concerning the use and
control of water in the desert; that if they did the olive
[186] would flourish and life would be easier. "The Egyptians,"
they say, "are lazy and cannot keep up with our requests for
more seedlings. They cannot furnish us with what we need to
improve our lives. All we hear is: 'tomorrow, tomorrow'!"

[241] The Bedouins do not understand the methods of modern
hydrology and agronomy. They see no reason for the experimenta-

648 tions and innovations in agriculture which the Egyptians bring
177 to the desert. On the other hand, the Bedouins do not get
241 the modern materials which they need to increase the production of their land. This is most serious when it comes to heavy farm machinery, such as tractors, and the spare parts to keep it functioning. Furthermore, seldom did a man in al-Qasr receive the number of olive seedlings that he requested. This invariably led to bitterness between Bedouins and Egyptians.
648 Most of the Bedouins believe that the desert is a difficult
177 (wihsha) life, and they favor change. They want to know, for instance, why an American would leave home to live such a life.
[114] At a Governor's Council meeting which I attended, the Bedouin representative from al-Qasr did not protest government interference. He complained that the Governor was not furnishing the materials and facilities which the Bedouin needed if he was to become "modern" and "educated." The Bedouins' major complaint about the Egyptians is not that they are trying to change the desert, but that they are not changing it fast enough!

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
JABAL
AL-AKHDAR
SALLUM
AL-QASR
MARSA MATRUH
ALEXANDRIA
CAIRO
Libyan
Plateau
SIWA
CYRENAICA
WESTERN
DESERT
LIBYA
U. A. R.
SCALE APPROX. :
1 INCH = 176 MILES

EGYPT AND CYRENAICA

FIGURE I


SA'ADA
JIBARNA
AQAQRA
BANI SALLAM
BARAGHUTH
'AWAQIR
'ARAIBAT
MAGHARBA
JAWAZI
FAWAYID
HARABI
AWLAD 'ALI
SHARAI'
HANADI
BAHAJA
BANI 'UNA

THE GENEALOGY OF THE CYRENAICAN BEDOUIN

FIGURE 2

CHAPTER II

THE ECOLOGY AND ECONOMY OF THE AL-QASR AREA

Changing Patterns of Land Use

131 Al-Qasr is located in the Northwestern Coastal Zone,
a relatively fertile littoral region forming the northern
edge of the Egyptian Western Desert. Extending from Alexandria
to Sallum on the Libyan border, the Zone is some 500 kilometers
in length and reaches south into the desert some 20 to 50
134 kilometers. A deep soil deposit and a relatively high average
132 rainfall of about 15 centimeters (20 centimeters of rain would
241 be considered "high") permit limited agriculture in this
region.

133 Due to the drainage pattern of the coastal area there
is a fair supply of underground water. The rain percolates
[172] down through coastal sand dunes and is trapped in man-made
underground galleries dating from Roman times. Farther into
312 the desert, cisterns, which also date from Roman times, catch
the rains draining off the Libyan plateau to the south. This
plateau and the catchment area form the southern boundary of
the greater al-Qasr settlement area (see Figure 4). The
General Desert Development Authority, an agency of the government, estimates that there are about 3,000 of these

312 cisterns spread throughout the Western Desert. Many of them
are still used by the Bedouins for watering their livestock.
The southernmost part of the catchment area provides grazing
for sheep. Northward near the coast, where the soil deposit
permits, barley is cultivated.

311 The Bedouins divide al-Qasr into "the good life"
823 (ma'isha simha) on the coast, and "the bad life" (ma'isha
[103] wihsha) in the desert. Ma'isha simha consists of two zones:
the shatt or sahil (i.e. "the coast," "as far as one can still
see the sea"), and the area of sha'ir wi mar'a ("the barley
and pasture area"). Ma'isha wihsha is the zone beyond the
plateau where nothing grows, the daf'a or sibta ("uncultivable
361 land which is sandy and stoney"). All of the Bedouins of
al-Qasr are settled permanently either on the coast or just
south in the barley and pasture area. Nomadic and semi-nomadic
activity disappeared generations ago in this part of
the desert.

823 When the Bedouins speak of al-Qasr, they are referring
103 to an area which is traditionally defined. When the Egyptians
131 speak of al-Qasr, they are referring to a "village" only
recently incorporated. The difference is a substantial one
and not merely a difference in dialect. The Bedouins use the
term mintaqit al-Qasr ("the area, or territory, of al-Qasr"):
the Egyptians say qaryit al-Qasr ("the village of al-Qasr").
000 As the Bedouins view it, the Western Desert is the watan

131 view it, the Western Desert is the *watan*
619 ("homeland") of the Awlad 'Ali tribe, and is subdivided into
631 tribal zones each referred to as a *mintaqa*. *Mintagit al-Qasr*
is part of *mintaqit qabilit 'Aishaibat* (i.e. "the area of
al-Qasr" is part of "the territory of the 'Aishaibat tribe").
131 Each tribal *mintaqa* is further broken down into contiguous
619 parcels of land belonging to lineages, and these are also
*613 referred to as *mintaqa*; for instance, there is *mintaqa*
631
[423] *'ailit Ma'fas*, i.e. "the territory of the Ma'fas family."
In the al-Qasr segmentary lineage society, genealogical
ties and local ties are coincidental. The boundaries of
al-Qasr are defined by the agnatic lines of the 'Aishaibat
tribe and include the *sahil* and *sha'ir wi mar'a* zones.

361 To the Egyptians, a *qarya* ("village") is a nucleated
631 cluster of permanent dwellings with some degree of social
integration: al-Qasr is a *qarya* for administrative matters.
The Bedouins, who think in terms of kin-based residence groups, tribal boundaries, and political and economic symbiotic relations, see the Egyptian *qarya* as only a sector of al-Qasr. They refer to this sector as the *'izba*, i.e., "farm" or "rural settlement." The *'izba* is land fertile enough to support a secure and sedentary life. "The *'izba*," the Bedouins say, "is the seed of the *madiina*" (city).

[[21]] For my own purposes, the Bedouin sense of al-Qasr is
the more useful concept. Al-Qasr is all of the territory of
[[131]] the 'Aishaibat tribe. Situated at 31°N and 27°E, al-Qasr is

361 directly on the Mediterranean coast. The _'izba_ sector is
631 just 14 kilometers due west of Marsa Matruh, and about 300
131 kilometers due west of the coastal city of Alexandria.

161 In 1960, the population of the whole Western Desert
162 was 98,000, the majority being of Bedouin stock. Considering
that Egypt is a country with a 2 - 1/2 per cent rise in birth
rate per year, the desert population would have been about
127,000 in 1965 when I was in the field. The town of Marsa
Matruh, which is the capital of the Province of Matruh
(formerly the Western Desert Province) has a population of
about 7,000. With increasing economic and political concern
for the desert provinces and the oases, this number should
continue to rise.

131 _Mintaqit al-Qasr_ (see Figure 4)[1] is an area which
measures about six kilometers from east to west along the sea,
and about ten to fifteen kilometers on a north-south line
extending into the desert as far as the Libyan plateau. The
162 population of al-Qasr is less easy to determine. In 1960,
al-Qasr, by official count, consisted of 225 families, 595
[631] males and 749 females, or a total of 1344 souls. Al-Qasr, as
the Bedouins define it, includes the _qarya_ and six other demographic
sections separately defined by the Egyptian government.
The population of this al-Qasr is 2,996, 1,287 males and 1,709
[114] females. There is reason to doubt any census figures of the
al-Qasr area because the Bedouins are reluctant to reveal their

[1] [See p. 67--Analyst]

162 true numbers. As recipients of aid programs, their rations
114 are based upon the number of members per family. For these
[657] purposes, they are anxious to present as high a population
figure as possible. They exaggerate their livestock count in
order to receive more fodder, and, at other times, underestimate
their numbers to escape taxes.

162 For purposes of this study, the Bedouin population of
161 al-Qasr is about 1,500 to 3,000. Most of this population lives
361 on the coastal area and in the cultivable wadi areas. The
remainder is scattered south of the plateau region, near the
621 desert proper. The 'izba sector of al-Qasr may be described
*613 as a nucleated cluster or settlement, but due to the nature
of the Bedouin segmentary lineage system, with its relatively
autonomous kin-based residence groups, this sector lacks the
usual degree of social interaction and integration associated
621 with the village or hamlet. The 'izba might be described as a
multi-nucleated settlement or cluster. Each lineage has its
*613 423 own mintaqa. Each mintaqa usually has a small dry-goods store
631 owned and operated by a lineage member and catering chiefly
443 to his own lineage-mates. Water and land in the 'izba sector
423 are individually owned. In the barley-pasture area, rights
*613 621 and privileges of ownership are vested in the corporate group,
even though the Bedouins and the government claim that tribally
423 owned land is illegal. All land boundaries, whether a mintaqa
or an individual's plot, are well-marked and well-known. The

423 boundary marker is usually a pile of stones, a tree, a wadi, or, a line recorded on paper by two parties and given to a third to hold in case of future differences of opinion.

342 361 [656] In the extreme southern pastoral zone, there were few permanent houses but with new government land registration laws the number is increasing. The settlement pattern in this area might be characterized as a scattered homestead type, "homesteads" being defined as tents or houses whose location is permanent. Tents are seldom, if ever, moved these days even during a heavy rainy season. [657] This is because barley production has increased, and, mainly because government aid programs supply fodder for the sheep. Bedouin shepherds in the pasture area change dwelling places, but only to move their tents from their winter protective hiding places out into the open for the springtime, or to move from their tent into the stone house for the cold, rainy winter. In either case, no real change in location is involved.

342 The tent is called bait al-'Arab ("house of the Arabs"). There are two types: the bait al-saif ("summer house"), and the bait al-rabi'a ("spring house"). The summer tent, made of "gunny" and flour sacks sewn together, is for protection from the sun. The spring tent is the real Bedouin tent. It is [286] woven from the wool of the sheep and camel hair, and is used [237] during the winter. Most Bedouin now say that they cannot afford [435] the 125 Egyptian pounds (1 pound = $2.80) which the bait al-rabi'a costs to make or buy.

342 costs to make or buy. In the 'izba sector, most of the Bedouin have a summer tent which they place next to their stone house for the hot months. According to the governmental community [657] development program, in order to own land and register it properly one must build at least one room upon it. The one- [735] room house (daar) is not common in al-Qasr: it is a symbol of poverty. The multi-roomed house (duwaar) is common. It is [333] built of large pieces of cut sandstone which are quarried in [316] al-Qasr. Those who can afford it build the duwaar and surround 342 it with a wall in compound fashion. Only one man in al-Qasr 556 is rich enough to afford two of these compound-type houses. The size and style of a house reflect status. Traditionally, [184] a man furnished a tent for each wife and for each married son. Although this is still the custom in parts of the desert, in al-Qasr the private room (daar) in a duwaar has replaced the private tent.

596 The basic residential unit is called naja' (literally, "hamlet"). It is composed of the father, his wife (wives), his unmarried children, and married sons and their families. The naja' takes the name of the father who is called the shaib ("elder," literally, "white-haired one") of the group. In the naja', the word of the shaib is law, and the members' chief duty is unquestionable obedience. The average naja' in al-Qasr consists of about three or four houses or tents.

History of Settlement in al-Qasr

173 The settlement of al-Qasr took place about 200 years
[166] ago when the Awlad 'Ali first came to the area from Cyrenaica.
[175] No historical documentation for this period exists. The
173 various versions which the Bedouins offer are both vague and
*613 ethnocentric with reference to lineage. A point of consensus
[712] is that the zone was first claimed by Abu Mahjuba who built
a large fort (qasr = "fort" or "castle") near the coast. The
Bedouins say that Abu Mahjuba settled in the area of al-Qasr
because "he knew good land when he saw it." He belonged to
no one lineage, "he was 'Aishaibi only." All of the lineages
of al-Qasr claim that their ancestors came with Abu Mahjuba
and settled on the land at that time. Abu Mahjuba has been
mythologized: he belongs to all of al-Qasr, a symbol of
local group solidarity and fraternal equality.

173 Al-Qasr represents the end of nomadic life for the
361 'Aishaibat tribe. According to the Bedouins, each tribe and
[198] lineage took that part of al-Qasr which it preferred. If the
members of the segment wanted to grow vegetables, they took
land on the coast; if they preferred the "old way of life,"
they set up their tents in the sha'ir wi mar'a area and raised
sheep. "Everything was fine," they say, "there were no land
registration laws--a man was free." Al-Qasr was settled
[619] "after the wars" (with the Hanadi), and it was only then that
the Awlad 'Ali broke up into tribes. The 'Aishaibat took the

173 land along the coast: "This land was free, and the man who
[361] planted on it owned it. We call this (method of claiming land)
[425] _wad'a-l-id_ ("laying on of the hand," i.e. seizure). There was
[423] plenty of freedom in those days. A man could farm or keep
animals." Planting and caring for the land is not novel to
the Bedouins of al-Qasr.

423 The Bedouins claim that the pattern of land distribution
425 established during the time of Abu Mahjuba prevails today.
656 Further, they say that these rules will never change, no matter
[178] what laws come out of Cairo: "Land registration can mean nothing
where the tribes are concerned, for no Bedouin would be willing
to take the land of another Bedouin. The government forces us
to register our land so that it can be stated in the newspaper that they are giving the Bedouins land."

*613 The relationship between ecology and lineage territory
423 is not striking, such as in the case of the Cyrenaican Bedouins
182 of Libya (Peters 1960). In most cases, lineage territories run
on a north-south line cross-cutting the coastal garden and
southern pastoral zones. Hence, lineage territories are, generally, ecologically similar rather than contrasted. However,
*613 there are exceptions. 'Ailit Shraif lineage (see Figure 3a
423 below), at the western end of al-Qasr's _'izba_ sector, settled
182 there "because of the abundance of underground water in this
241
[312] area: the ground is rocky here and the water comes out fresh
[361] like the Nile." Their founder, Sayyid Shraif, "specialized"

*613 in farming, and he found this land "good for raising mint and
423 vegetables." To the southeast of the *'izba*, the lineages of
182
241 Lazumi and Ma'fas found the land suitable for barley and
[312] grazing. This area is rain-fed. There are no wells and so
vegetable crops are not possible here. The members of these
lineages say that their ancestors were "real" Bedouins in
Cyrenaica, and did not wish to become farmers in Egypt. It
*613 is interesting to note that the Lazumi and Ma'fas are the
182 richest lineages in all of al-Qasr. They were, perhaps, better
184
241 able to maintain the traditional style of life which all of
the Bedouins claim is "the best." But all Bedouins of al-Qasr
depend to some degree upon horticulture or arboriculture.
[231] And most families own a few sheep or goats. Both Lazumi and
Ma'fas garden in their coastal sections, and Shraif members own
sheep.

656 Land registration has a history in the Western Desert.
423 The government attempted it a number of times, but with little
success until 1959 when the General Desert Development Organization
(GDDO) undertook its program of land reclamation. But the
361 Bedouins were settled long before this. In al-Qasr, the Bedouins
342 began to erect permanent stone dwellings on the land about the
178 time of the First World War. In the Matruh area, elder informants
agree that before 1914 the Bedouins lived in tents outside the
361 town area. When the British came, they began to move into town.
648 Many of the Bedouins built houses in Matruh between the years

361 648 1925 and 1930 because, as they point out, the British administration provided employment for "the poor Bedouin." 361 556 178 The wealthier Bedouins who owned camels and large numbers of sheep remained in the desert. Just the reverse is happening at the present time. The rich men who see the advantages in business, and the comforts which Matruh offers, can also afford the change of residence or the maintenance of two residences.

175 423 657 In 1922, the Egyptian government first registered land in al-Qasr. At this time, they sanctioned the tribal division of territory which existed. There was no attempt to force political integration upon the Bedouins. Egypt has never had a nomad problem as have other Middle Eastern countries. The history of Egypt is essentially the history of the Nile Valley. Consequently, it is not odd that we find no mention of the Awlad 'Ali in the historical record. The Bedouins of the Western Desert were resigned to their place in the desert, and the central government saw no particular advantage or disadvantage in this.

423 648 Concern for the Bedouin minority in Egypt emerged only with nationalistic programs of modernization. In 1954, the Fourth United Nations Social Welfare Seminar for Arab States in the Middle East convened in Baghdad. From this meeting came some general recommendations for dealing with the problems of the Bedouin. The major proposal was calculated to transform

423 648 the structure of both the nomadic and the sedentary tribe: "Settlement should take place on the basis of granting each individual capable of working in agriculture a piece of land, the area to be fixed by the state, calculated to ensure the raising of his living standard and to enable him to support himself and his legal dependents on condition that he start cultivation of the land. When distributing the land, care should be taken that a family be settled on a single piece of land composed of the total of the plots granted to its members, the family being composed of relatives to the first grandfather" (Abu-Zeid n.d.).

From this point, each Arab country dealt with the problem of the nomad in its own way, some effectively and others not so effectively. 423 657 656 Not until 1958 did Egypt make a formal effort to integrate the Bedouins of the Western Desert into the national society. And it was not until 1960 that the so-called "Desert Law" of 1958 (U.A.R. Law Number 124) was activated and enforced. The most important provision of this law followed the plan formulated at the Baghdad conference: "There is no recognition of tribal possession of land which is considered as belonging to the State, and whenever a family develops and plants on a holding, this gives it the right, if approved, to the issue of a title to it by the government." Law Number 124 also provided that land occupied by buildings or orchards before 1957 can be owned by the occupants at a low

423 cost payable over a period of thirty years. As pointed out
657 by Professor Abu-Zeid (n.d.), this law is welcomed in part
656 because the garden area to which it really applies (the garden area in al-Qasr would be the *'izba* sector) is not considered "tribal territory" or lineage-owned as are the barley and pasture regions.

653 Governmental activity growing out of the "Desert Law"
177 has been an important catalyst for social, economic and
*613 political change. All of these aspects of change had repercussions on the lineage system and the authority structure of the Bedouins. In 1959, the government entered al-Qasr with the goal of revitalizing and reorganizing the hydraulic system of the area. The revival of the Roman water system, especially the network of cisterns covering the southern region of al-Qasr, and, on the coast, the restoration of the well system and underground galleries, the drilling of new wells and the intensification of olive farming have all led to a levelling of economic differentiation between lineages and between individuals.

657 In 1956, the Egyptian government passed the Cooperative
177 Law (U.A.R. Law Number 217) establishing agricultural cooperative
474 societies throughout the country. But not until 1959 did this law have any impact on the tribes of the Western Desert.
[433] Generally, the cooperative society has served as a primary
and successful agent of social change in the desert. It has

657 sanctioned the direction of economic development from a
177 pastoral to a market-oriented, agricultural mode of production.
474 Land reclamation and development projects administered by the
433 cooperatives encourage the Bedouins to produce cash crops.
In this way, Al-Qasr is being drawn into the national economy.
Price changes and seasonal commodity preferences in the Nile
Valley now affect the economy of al-Qasr. The generation of a
[181] cash economy has created a competitive spirit and a degree of
individual independence which cuts across tribal loyalty and
affiliations. The cooperative society, in this manner, tends
to be a "social equalizer."

657 But economic transformation as the intended goal of the
177 Cooperative Law is far from being an accomplished fact. Al-
178 Qasr is still a traditional Bedouin society in the sense that
474 the lineage structure is the framework in which economic and
*613 social relations take place. Because the cooperative society,
as a new basis for association, threatens the dominance of the
lineage principle, it has become the focal point for a struggle
between the old and new.

The major problem encountered by the government officials
657
177 in this program is that the cooperative society, as a central
474 agent for the dispensation of aid products, becomes a pawn in
661 tribal power politics. The government, forced to rely upon the
435 prestigious and wealthy men for the initiation of an innovative
program, found itself unable to prevent profiteering and the

657 177 474 661 [435] sale of goods on the black-market. Tribal leaders, or members of a "status group," in whose hands the operation of the cooperative society had been placed, confiscated more than their share of food and fodder and resold it either in the Nile Valley or to their own tribesmen for whom it had originally been intended. The government could not really prosecute the guilty parties for fear of jeopardizing the entire program. Nor could they convince the cheated tribesmen that they had [673] been treated unfairly by their leaders. For one thing, the Bedouins did not consider that their leaders were committing a wrong; furthermore, any Bedouin who would go to the government to inform on another Bedouin would be subjected to a [577] trial by Bedouin justice. It is still the traditional codes of Bedouin law and honor, and not the modern judiciary system, which prevail in al-Qasr.

474 The cooperative society in al-Qasr is one of thirteen in the general area of Marsa Matruh. It began with a membership of twenty-five, twenty-two of these were from the 'Aishaibat tribe. Today, the enrollment is 139 official, and another 195 "unofficial" members. The unofficial members represent unregistered branches of the al-Qasr cooperative. The Bedouins [735] explain that they cannot allow any members of the tribe to go hungry, and, therefore, they will distribute food to all those who need it (Zein, n.d.). This, of course, shows that those [661] cooperative officers who do profiteer are not entirely oblivious

474 of the needs of their tribesmen; that, in fact, the patronage
661 system is relative to the traditional situation. Unavoidably,
474 the al-Qasr cooperative society is dominated by one tribe:
619 107 of its members are from the 'Aishaibat, while only 32 are
from other tribes. This relationship between traditional and
modern structures is common throughout the Western Desert.
When a new cooperative is organized within the boundaries of
a certain tribal mintaqa, members of the local tribe will
resign from other cooperatives to join "their own." Thus,
when a new cooperative was founded in Marsa Matruh, twenty
members of the Jum'iat tribe left the al-Qasr branch to join
the new chapter which catered largely to the needs of the
Jum'iat in the town.

474 The World Food Program of the Food and Agriculture
747 Organization (F.A.O.) of the United Nations operates through
433 the cooperative society. It has had an impact on the economy
177 of the Bedouins of al-Qasr. In 1963, this organization, with
the cooperation of the U.A.R. government, proposed to stabilize
economic conditions in the Western Desert by providing 4,000
Bedouin families (20,000 persons) with enough food and fodder
to help them through the three dry summer months. The program
was designed to encourage mixed and settled farming through
the reclamation of 20,000 acres of arid desert land, while its
range improvement project was to furnish pasturage for 500,000
sheep throughout the Northwestern Coastal Zone. In al-Qasr,

747 177 433 this number included pasturage for 11,000 sheep (Abu-Zeid n.d.: 19-27).

[474] F.A.O. has encountered a number of serious problems and the program has received setbacks. The program, as an agent of social change, failed to take proper measure of the structural and ideological aspects of the Bedouin traditional system. Range improvement projects were carried out with disregard for existing tribal boundaries (the *mintaga*) in the desert. In one case, the Bedouins removed fences on *their* property, and allowed sheep to destroy an entire experimental range area. Food distribution has fallen short because polygyny as a structural feature of marriage and the Bedouin family was not taken into account. The government estimated five persons per family, and planned to distribute food to 4,000 families. They were only able to subsidize 3,281 families. Aid officials failed to consider the strength of Bedouin values. To qualify
747 177 474 426 for government aid, a Bedouin must belong to his local cooperative society. Some Bedouins wish to remain independent of government business, and others cannot afford the 50 piasters membership dues. A man may borrow money from another, of course, but in al-Qasr a "debt" is actually a particular kind of social relation which, like all others, carries with it a set of specific rights and obligations. A debt among Bedouins is a
[571] complex relationship: it may draw two parties together, or it may be, as it is with the Kachins of Burma (Leach 1954:153),

747 the basis of conflict. Bedouins may be unwilling to contract
177 such a potentially significant relationship for the 50 piasters
474 426 it takes to join the cooperative society. In yet another area,
571 program administrators concerned with nutritional improvement
747 have ignored the culturally important areas of food preferences
177 and, more seriously, food prohibitions. The Bedouins, who
262 subsist mainly on their own animal products, barley bread, and
a few fresh vegetables, are extremely hesitant to accept what
they consider ritually "unclean meat from foreigners," powdered
milk, dried fish, and Kraft cheese. They are willing to
747 177 accept grain, flour, and the cottonseed cakes which are used
as fodder. In other words, the Bedouins seem to be presented
[178] with poor alternatives which may tend to reinforce choices
[433] related to the traditional productive organization, i.e.,
pastoralism. The exogenous stimuli to change are so culturally
objectionable that they actually generate conflict situations
and misunderstanding between agents and recipients of change.

747 Government programs have aimed at one aspect of
177 Bedouin society, the economic structure. They have ignored
433 the cultural underpinning of social organization, the system
of meanings in terms of which social action takes place
(Geertz 1957:32-54). The relationship between social and
economic behavior is, of course, an extremely important one.
But the economic structure cannot be transformed independently
of a specific cultural structure.

433
233 The Bedouin of al-Qasr idealize the life of the pastor-
183 alist. It is a dominant theme in their culture. Gardening
241 and arboriculture are perceived by the Bedouins as involving
[461] long hours of work, anxiety over waiting for profits, and
complex market operations. They understand the logic and
[556] operation of the sheep market. Sheep are a store of value, a
source of security, and a medium of exchange. In a good year
of rain, a man can reap a good crop of barley, and buy more
sheep against the inevitable bad year to come. While most
472 Bedouins are, in one way or another, involved with the modern
433 cash economy which ties al-Qasr to Marsa Matruh, the Bedouins
241 who go into the production of cash crops on a large scale are
434
177 those who can afford the risk of failure and who can survive
the meager profits of the initial stage. These are the men who
can adjust their world view from that of the pastoralist to
that of the entrepreneur. There are only a few of these men
in al-Qasr but they dominate the economy. Through them, most
of the Bedouins of al-Qasr are linked to the national economy.

Land and Economy

433 The period between 1960 and 1964 was one of significant
177 economic change in al-Qasr. Dependence upon farming increased
178 while pastoralist activities became less important. In the
past, none of the Bedouins now living in al-Qasr were "nomads;"
even my oldest informants had moved only once or twice to

433 plant a small crop or graze their animals on the land of
177 relatives. In terms of economic specialty, the economy of
178 al-Qasr has for some time been a mixed one. Traditionally,
433 dependence was upon animal products with relatively few
177 vegetables being grown in the _'izba_ sector of the coast and
178 the barley sector to the south. Now, over one-half of the
241 registered land in al-Qasr is aboricultural land, and much
311 more land is given over to the growing of vegetables than in
the past. Correspondingly, the barley land has decreased.
The Bedouins still use barley primarily for fodder but much
of this comes from the government. With the shift to olive
arboriculture and government aid in the form of flour and
grain, naturally the barley crop has become less crucial.
But it remains indispensable for many Bedouins during this
transitional period. All Bedouins of al-Qasr are concerned
with securing a good livlihood. They express this idea in
the term _ma'isha simha_, and, as I have noted, they identify
it with the garden coastal sector of al-Qasr. The security
of a cash economy and participation in the national economy
433 have been realized by the Bedouins. I have no figures on the
241 amount of land registered prior to 1960, but, as of 1964,
311 al-Qasr consisted of 2,000 registered acres. Over one-half
434 of this land is in the garden area of al-Qasr, and is planted
with orchards. All of this land represents cash crops. Planted
in between the orchards are vegetable gardens. These gardens

These gardens

433 furnish staples for local consumption and more cash crops for
241 the Marsa Matruh market. Matruh is dependent upon these
311 vegetable goods from al-Qasr, to the extent that the Governor
434 has forbidden the Bedouins to truck their goods to the higher
443 [656] priced market in Alexandria.

654 The success of arboriculture in al-Qasr has been the
245 result of a well-organized reclamation program in this area
177 by the government. The relatively good supply of fresh water
433 and the proximity of a large market town has made al-Qasr an atypical case in the government's attempt to transform the desert pastoral economy. Since 1960, the government's program has met with a great deal of success. Such results have, of course, induced the Bedouins of al-Qasr to accept change, and have further enhanced the future of the program. The figures below show, as of 1964, the plant distribution of orchards in the 'izba of al-Qasr, and indicate the measure of success attained by the governmental reclamation program.

The environmental conditions of al-Qasr are particularly well-suited for the olive tree: the olive has been the basis of the economic transformation of al-Qasr. The Bedouins tend to play down the government's role in developing olive arboriculture in the al-Qasr area. But before 1960, only the very
[556] wealthy men could afford to deal in the olive market, since it involves a great initial financial risk. Hence, prior to the entry of the government's program, there were 2,743 olive trees

TABLE 1

ARBORICULTURE IN AL-QASR, 1964

245
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Plant	Acres	Plants Distributed	Successful Plants
Olive	947	40,399	32,488 (80%)
Almond	57	2,570	1,752 (67%)
Fig	66	10,537	(experimental stage)
Grape	.5	512	512 (100%)
Peach	2.5	804	200 (20%)

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245
177
433
[556]

in al-Qasr, and these were distributed among only 27 men. Most of these men also owned large numbers of sheep.

In 1960, the government began planting olive trees on the registered land of individuals living in the _'izba_ sector. This plan also involved instructing the Bedouins in the care of the tree: an individual who had traditionally depended on the rains now had to learn irrigation farming. This aspect of the program, learning modern "water discipline," was a source of conflict for the Bedouin with his pastoralist outlook on life. The olive tree must be watered twice weekly. The Bedouins say that this made them feel like "peasants." The Bedouins were also apprehensive over the fact that the olive tree did not bear its first fruit, i.e., the first cash

654 245 crop, until five to seven years after planting. To alleviate
177 the difficulties of this period of apprehension, which the
433 Governor of the desert province refers to as "the dangerous
[747] period," the United Nations F.A.O. aid program was designed
and put into operation in al-Qasr.

654 A Bedouin may purchase an olive seedling from the
245 government for the price of two piasters (about six cents).
177 This same seedling costs the government 26 piasters. Once
433 through "the dangerous period," a Bedouin can expect a yield
435 of 120 to 150 kilos of olives from one tree. Olives sell for about 15 piasters per kilo. Or, at a cost of 5 piasters per kilo, the olives can be converted into oil. One ton of olives will render about 23 per cent oil. Olive oil is now considered a luxury item in Egypt, and the market price is very high. But only the Bedouin with a large harvest of olives finds it profitable to sell his product on the oil market. These conditions have made many Bedouins willing to convert from horticulture and sedentary pastoralism to arboriculture.

654 Between 1960 and 1964, the government reclamation
245 program has planted a total of 9,514 olive trees on land
177 registered to 124 individuals. The average distribution of trees, about seventy-six per man, is indicative of one of the problems related to change in al-Qasr and about which we have spoken earlier. Most of the trees have gone to men who, before

654 245 177 1960, were olive tree owners. One individual, who owned 400 trees before the reclamation program, now owns 1,400 trees. His increase has not all been at government expense, but a large share of it has been. Of the 9,514 trees planted by the government, 4,666 of them have been planted in the barley and wadi area to the south; 4,848 in the garden area on the coast. In the southern sector, a Bedouin who owns at [312] least ten acres of land may have the government drill a well and erect a windmill pump on his property. For this, he pays [452] 350 Egyptian pounds (approximately $1,000.00) over a thirty-year period. The Bedouin is willing to undertake this contract, and also to take land out of barley production, because he sees the future security of the olive market. Because of this, also, he is willing to agree on land boundaries and to register his land with the government.

657 Economic transition would not be possible, nor could the Bedouins afford to hazard it, were it not for government welfare payments in the form of staple products. These rations stabilize the mixed economy of the al-Qasr while promoting a shift to a fuller dependence on agriculture. Of the thirteen 657 474 cooperative societies in the Matruh area, al-Qasr is the largest and has been designated as a pilot project for the whole Western Desert. Al-Qasr garners the largest share of government aid, and, consequently, is heavily dependent upon it. The table below shows the amount of aid given monthly to

TABLE 2

657
474
AID PER MONTH TO THIRTEEN COOPERATIVE SOCIETIES OF MATRUH AREA, 1963

	No. of Families	Beef	Fish	Oil	Cheese	Tea	Powdered Milk
al-Qasr Aid:	308 (1344)*	1008	604	604	1209	201	1209
Total Aid:	627 (3134)*	2350	1410	1410	2826	470	2820

*Number of Persons

al-Qasr during the year 1963. This amount is compared with the total amount of aid given to all thirteen cooperatives in the area.

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233
During this period, 1960 to 1964, the government has succeeded in stabilizing the pastoral sector of the economy. The Bedouins are given barley and cottonseed-oil cakes as fodder for their animals. Consequently, they must depend upon their own barley crop only to a minimal degree. There are 144,804 sheep in the Marsa Matruh area, as of 1963. In al-Qasr, 332 men own 9,958 sheep, about 30 sheep per man. One sheep requires a kilogram of barley and six kilograms of cottonseed [474] cake per month. The table below shows the amount of fodder distributed to al-Qasr and the whole Matruh sector, in 1963, through the cooperative societies.

TABLE 3

FODDER DISTRIBUTED IN MATRUH SECTOR, 1963

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	No. of Sheep	Kg. of Barley	Kg. of Cottonseed Cakes
al-Qasr	9,958	85,392	56,928
Total Distribution	144,804	1,303,236	868,824

the cooperative societies.

243 Barley is the important staple in al-Qasr: it is used for bread and fodder. About one-half of the Bedouins plant barley on a small scale. The wealthy individuals who own large flocks of sheep plant up to 100 acres of barley. Barley is planted in October and harvested at the end of April. Two methods of cultivation are used: plowing and seeding takes place either before the rains, i.e., the 'afiir system, or, after the rains, i.e., the haraati system. After harvesting, [251] the grain is threshed and stored in two-meter deep pits (matmuura). Grain stored in this fashion can be preserved for three years.

244 The main vegetables raised in al-Qasr are onions, radishes, peppers, and mint. Mint is the only dependable [263] cash crop of those mentioned. It is used by the Bedouins [272] in tea, and tea drinking is a ceremony which takes place at all times of the day in the desert.

244 all times of the day in the desert. The Bedouins had most
of these crops before the government came to al-Qasr. Since
[177] 1960, however, the Bedouins have been planting new crops such
as okra, squash, cucumber, tomato, spinach and melon. All of
244 these are plants adopted from the Nile Valley. Vegetables
312 are grown by means of irrigation or dry-farming. Where there
is no well water, an individual will cultivate without irrigation.
In this case, crops are planted in the spring after the
rains. This method is called ba'ali. Irrigation makes it
possible for a man to obtain four crops during the year, but
usually, the Bedouin is more concerned with security than
with profit. Therefore, most Bedouins try for one good crop
244 and allow a portion of the land to remain fallow. Land which
has been planted all year around needs at least one year's
rest before it can be replanted. The vegetable harvest
usually takes place in July or August.

241 The government has attempted to introduce other crops
177 into al-Qasr which have failed. Failure is related to two
312 main problems in al-Qasr: salination arising from the short
supply of fresh water, and the Bedouin's misunderstanding of
the techniques of successful irrigation farming. Figs have
245 not been successful in al-Qasr due to the nature of the soil
177 itself. The almond tree has succumbed to the climate of al-
[132] Qasr. This tree blooms in April during the khamsin season,
fifty days of hot, dry winds blowing in from the Sahara. The

245 blossoms of the tree are stripped away by these winds before
177 the fruit can mature.

178 Traditional values affect the Bedouins' perception of
517 their new life. Men are fond of gathering for their ritual
272 three cups of mint tea and recalling "the good old days." In
[829] those days, they say, men only had to ride, shoot, and drink
233 tea. In the past, there was a great deal of security in
178 owning animals which are not as dependent on the rains as
422 is agriculture. During a year of bad rains, a Bedouin could
233 always move his flock to Libya or to the Nile Valley: "When
731 we have a bad year, we take our animals to the grass of our
166 relatives. When they have a bad year, they come here." In
167 the drought year of 1960, 20,000 Egyptian Bedouins migrated
to Libya in search of pasturage. This caused an international
[648] conflict and King Idris of Libya, for a short time, closed the
border to Bedouins. The conflict was finally resolved, and
the Bedouins were given permission to use the pastures of
Cyrenaica. None of the Bedouins of al-Qasr were involved in
this movement.

233 The Bedouins who have settled in the *'izba* sector of
al-Qasr also prefer to keep some sheep. The security which
they represent is worth the time and expense of maintaining
233 them and paying a shepherd to look after them. The Bedouins,
178 in the past, paid their shepherds one sheep for every ten
465 sheep that he tended. Payment was made twice a year. Today,

233 178 with the movement toward a cash economy, this has changed.
[465] The shepherd receives 8 to 10 piasters for each head of sheep
which he tends. The Bedouins who have taken up farming can
spare none of their family for sheep-herding chores. If he
[497] can afford it, during the dry season, a Bedouin may ship his
sheep to the Nile Valley by train at 12 piasters per head.
But the government will not accept sheep for shipment unless
they are accompanied by a shepherd. The role of shepherd
has become a very specialized one in the al-Qasr area. Few
[554] of the al-Qasr Bedouins are shepherds, and the role is
reserved for the poorer men without land.

241 Plowing in the garden area is done by hand. Usually,
407 the plow is pulled by a donkey but occasionally, if one can
492 afford it, a camel or a horse will be used. A man and his
[462] sons handle all of the agricultural chores with the exception
178 of the winnowing process which the women do. Traditionally,
241 barley was threshed by camels plodding on it. The Bedouins say
492 that this is the best way because the soft feet of the camel
do not crush the kernel. Now, however, very few men can afford
[407] a camel. Threshing is done with a heavy wooden sled pulled by
241 a donkey or a horse. Tractors, when available, are used for
407 agricultural plowing in the southern barley zone. This zone,
434 during the year 1963, also became important for raising water-
433 melons (batiikh), and this product figures to be an excellent
cash crop for al-Qasr. Melons and barley can bring high profits

241 407 when planted in large quantities. The southern zone of al-Qasr
434 is best suited for these crops, and the tractor is necessary
433 for a successful crop.

407 Tractors are rented through the cooperative society.
474 Local cooperative officers are responsible for seeing that all
[427] members share in the use of the tractor. But, in fact, officers
and their closer relatives monopolize the tractors. The gov-
[654] ernment has allotted to the al-Qasr cooperative five tractors.
They feel that it would jeopardize the whole program of economic
reform if they were to dictate the way in which the tractors
407 are to be used. Consequently, the tractor, like the rations
619 of foodstuffs, has become a pawn in tribal power plays. In
474 one case, not in al-Qasr, a tractor-driver who was a member of
the 'Ali Abyad tribe insisted that members of the 'Ali Ahmar tribe pay him a 50 piaster "tip" to have their fields plowed. Because of situations such as these, most Bedouins prefer that cooperative membership coincide with local group membership. It is better, they say, if the 'Aishaibat of al-Qasr have their own cooperative because they know how to handle problems among themselves. The government, during this transitional period, seems to agree.

407 One reason that tractors are monopolized by a small group is that there are not enough of the machines to handle the plowing. Of the five tractors in al-Qasr, seldom were more than two working simultaneously. Often, this was a result of

407 the lack of spare parts. Three of the tractors were Russian-built, and two were Egyptian made. The Bedouins say that the Russian tractors are the better.

407 241 654 [132] In 1964, the Western Desert received its heaviest rainfall since 1947. To take advantage of this, local government officials of the reclamation project requested an additional fifty tractors for plowing on the coastal zone. They received only six additional tractors. In that year, the thirty-nine tractors used in the entire Western Desert were able to plow 15,240 acres of land. During this period of economic change, 731 233 [654] [166] a bad barley crop causes a fodder shortage for the animals, and seldom is the aid program able to compensate for this. Consequently, there is a need to ship sheep to the Nile Valley, or to seek permission to take them to the pastures of Cyrenaica. Both situations create tremendous difficulties for both the [432] [435] Bedouins and the government. A third alternative for the Bedouin is to buy barley on the black-market. In doing this, he must pay six times the normal cost of grain, and risk reprisals.

177 657 Prior to 1960, change in al-Qasr might be characterized as a steady and endogenous process of sedentarization. It had been taking place for about a century and a half. Exogenous change, social and economic, may be identified with the desire of the government to reclaim land in al-Qasr for agricultural use, and to integrate the Bedouin into the national economy.

177 657 This program cannot be divorced from the fundamental political aim of the government which is to make the Bedouins politically-conscious participants in the Egyptian political community. The reform program, which has been only outlined here, has had ramifying effects on the Bedouin traditional systems, especially the political, and that is a major concern of this study. Changes in one structure of society are apt to have repercussions in other structures. This seems particularly the case where the economic and political structures are concerned. Economic change has been a background to political structural change in al-Qasr. Political change is historical in al-Qasr, but it has been accelerated in the period starting with 1960. For these reasons, we are interested in both the traditional and the modern systems.

177 433 434 Change will continue to occur in al-Qasr. This is because the advantages of cash crops and a market economy are obvious to the Bedouin. He can even have more of what has been traditionally valued if he is successful in the modern market system. He can buy a sheep for 10 L.E.; a goat for [435] 8 L.E.; a horse for 90 L.E.; a camel for 150 L.E.; and a fine spring tent for 125 L.E.. A Bedouin knows that he must, as an individual, register his land, build a stone house on it (which costs about 100 L.E.), and learn the technique of irrigation farming. All of the Bedouins of al-Qasr are to some degree willing to do this for the ma'isha simha which it

177 433 434 brings. The future of the olive tree on the coast, and the growing importance of the melon crop in the southern sector will be the bases of a modern al-Qasr. The table below gives 177 434 435 some indication of what the Bedouins of al-Qasr can hope for, in terms of material profits, by a shift to a cash economy. Prices are approximate, and as of 1964.

TABLE 4

PRICES OF KEY PRODUCTS IN AL-QASR, 1964

Crop	Price Per Unit	Possible Profit
Barley	3 L.E. per ardab (120 kg.)	20 L.E. per acre
Melon	6-12 piasters each	70-100 L.E. per acre
Mint	Few piaster per bunch	150 L.E. per acre
Olive	15 piasters per kg. of olives	1 tree=150 kg. of olives =22.5 L.E.
	40 piasters per kg. of oil	1 tree=30 kg. of olive oil =12.5 L.E.

423 *613 Land Tenure and Rights of Ownership

Traditionally, an individual's rights in the land were of usufruct and tenancy. Sovereignty over the land was vested in the corporate secondary lineage group (see Figure 7). The territory of al-Qasr is a division of lineage zones, and more will be said about this in the next chapter since it relates directly to the structural organization of Bedouin

423 society. Private ownership of land with sovereign rights
*[613] over it is now the normal practice in al-Qasr. Rights are
[178]
[596] held by the family head, the shaib. If the family head is deceased, land tenure rights are held jointly by the sons.

In the area beyond the plateau, in the extreme
[184] south of al-Qasr, land rights to grazing and water still are
*[613] associated with lineages. But here agriculture is impossible.
[241] The type of rights over the land varies with the method by which it is exploited. The southern and coastal sections of
[433] al-Qasr represent the old and the new, the pastoral traditional mode of production and the modern agricultural cash economy.
[233] But, as noted, of the total population only a few Bedouins are actually engaged in pastoralist activities. Hence, tribal tenure rights, in general, are not overly important at this time. Not too long ago they were, and many cases in the recent
[671] history of Bedouin customary law relate to conflicts over land and water in the southern region. The Bedouins say that
[178] traditionally no lineage could use the pasturage or water of
*[613] another without some agreement, usually of long standing,
[233] made beforehand. Now, they say, permission is not needed.
[675] In the old days, these agreements were made between lineage representatives, not individuals per se. Today, the grass
178 and water in the southern zone are claimed, though not in a
423 legal sense, by the families using them: the rights of usufruct over the land are closer to rights of sovereignty

178 than they were in the past. These conditions reflect a change
423 in social and authority relations.

423 In the 'izba sector of al-Qasr, as of 1964, there were
432 two cases of land purchase. In one case, land was sold to an
Egyptian, "an outsider" from the Nile Valley. This, of course,
could only occur where such a transaction would be upheld by
423 the Egyptian government. Land ownership, when it involves
registered land, is absolute. This, to a great extent, works
*[613] to lessen the influence of the lineage structure on property
423 relations. The law governing property, whether in traditional
178 or modern al-Qasr, reflects a set of social relationships.
571 When an individual can own property in the absolute sense,
rather than with respect to his being a member of a group
which enjoys sovereign rights of ownership, then, there has
been a change in traditional corporate relations (Herskovits
[184] 1952:260). This has definitely been the case for most of
al-Qasr, and it is adumbrated in the southern sector where
a person's rights over land are nearly absolute. A compar-
423 ison of land tenure patterns on the coast and in the southern
184 region reflect not only the contrast between methods of land
use, but, also the fact that as land becomes valuable it
becomes scarce and land holdings become fragmented (compare
Figures 5 and 6).

428 When the head of a household dies, his eldest son
596 inherits his authority, but all of the sons share equally in

428 the father's property. The egalitarian spirit of the Bedouin
596 inheritance rule functions to maintain the unity of the family,
and, at another level of social complexity, the structural
continuity of the corporate group. Ideally, the surviving
sons will keep intact their father's estate, his land and
animals, and will work it as a unit. And this is generally
596 the case in al-Qasr. On the other hand, there is also the
594 implicit assumption in the structural principle of the
*613 Bedouin segmentary lineage system that each individual will
183 eventually establish a unit of his own, separate from but
interrelated with, the main household. As a result, there
596 usually develops some division of property and labor among
593 surviving brothers. Whether or not this division is formally
agreed upon, and, whether or not it is assigned by the father
or the eldest son is largely arbitrary. In some cases, the
father makes such a decision before his death and prepares
his sons for it. The father's concern is that good relations
be maintained between his sons after his death. Just as the
father mediates conflict between his sons during his life,
so he hopes to maintain peace between them after his death.
The Bedouins say that a father should be fair when dealing
with his sons, and that he should never favor one over the
other.

428 Inheritance is determined through the patrilineal
*[613] lineage principle. The Bedouins of al-Qasr claim that they

The Bedouins of al-Qasr claim that they
428 follow the Islamic laws of inheritance, in which case, a
562 surviving daughter is entitled to one-half the share of a
surviving son (Quran IV: 177). But, in only two cases did
[423] women own land in al-Qasr: one woman was the only close
survivor of her father, and, the other woman was a widow
without sons. In fact, my informant even admitted that these
cases were exceptional, that the women were permitted to keep
the land only because the brothers of the deceased men, who
are the "rightful heirs" after the sons, did not want the
land. The Bedouins insist, on the other hand, that a girl
can claim her share of the inheritance: "It is her right."
But she will never do such a thing "because she respects
her brothers too much to accept the land which is offered to
her."

428 When the father's estate is large, certain measures
are taken to divide it between his sons. In some cases, the
division may be somewhat complex and determined over a period
of time. One example of this in al-Qasr involved a wealthy
man whose own property was divisible into parts roughly
corresponding to ecological subdivisions. The subdivisions
of the estate became the shares of the sons, and could then
be separated but remain symbiotically dependent. Ecological
relationships affirm social relations. The following is an
[159] account of inheritance rules in al-Qasr:

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> I am 45 years old and my eldest brother is 53 years old. I have two younger brothers. When my father died, we four sons inherited the property of our father jointly. I told my older brother to divide the land the way in which he wanted . . . My father had divided his land into four parts before he died. Each part was a separate "farm" so that a son could raise barley or olives, as he liked . . . But my brother told me to make the decision. As it turned out, my youngest brother was the first to make his choice of the four parts. He took his land but we still kept all of our sheep together. One year later, my older brother took his share of the land, but Jabril (the next to the youngest brother) and I remained together, and still remain together. Some men want to be on their own and others do not. Our eldest brother was the first to separate his animals from the collective herd . . . When the decisions were made to divide the land between us, we got the local "holy man" to go around the area with us and to witness the boundaries. This is done so that later if a brother changes his mind, or wants to take different land, the true borders will be known. We recorded them on paper and the "holy man" knows them . . . In matters of inheritance, all sons get equal shares, but in a case where there are ten camels and three sons, then, each gets three camels and the tenth goes to the eldest brother.

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562
[431]
[583]

Any property which a female may own, if it is land or livestock, will go to her sons upon her death. In al-Qasr, such property will usually be sheep which a woman may accumulate through gift-giving. In one case, which is unique in al-Qasr, a woman received thirteen camels from her husband at the time of her wedding. (This was not the brideprice, for that goes to the bride's father.) At the time of her death her camels numbered seventy, and they were divided equally among her five sons. Concerning lesser items, such as clothing and jewelry, and also chickens, these are

428 562 [422] inherited by a woman's daughters. The carpets and the tent, which are woven by women, are not their property to pass on for they belong to the head of the household, the shaib.

596 177 178 [124] Economic change in al-Qasr has had its impact at the level of production mode, and, also, it has affected the composition of the basic family structure. One informant, who is now nineteen years old, remembers growing up in a household composed of his grandfather, father, father's brothers and their families. Since that time, his father has built another house away from the family home; one uncle has moved to Marsa Matruh and opened a shop there; his youngest uncle has built a house not far from the family home; and one uncle remains with his three wives in the original house. 182 177 *613 433 434 This fission-type process is not uncommon in a segmentary society, although as a traditional process, it represented a mechanism for dealing with ecological pressures. In the modern case, in al-Qasr, the process of fission in the Bedouin social structure proves to be an adaptive mechanism also: the fragmentation of lineage property and relations is a positive condition for the transition to a cash and market economy. Among most of the families of al-Qasr, as market orientation increases brothers begin to economically differentiate their tasks and interests with an eye to individual profits.

FIGURE 3

LINEAGES OF AL-QASR


SA'ADA
'AQAR
'ALI 'AQAR
'ALI ABYAD
'ALI AHMAR
SINAINA
QINAISHAT
'AISHAIBAT
KAMAILAT
'AILIT MA'FAS
'AILIT LAZUMI
'AILIT SHRAIF
'AILIT ZALLAT
'AILIT ZAGHARAT
'AILIT DAWLAT
'AILIT ABU QARASA

*613
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311
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
SEA
N
('AILIT SHRAIF)
('AILIT ABU. QAR ASA)
('AILIT DAVLAT)
('AILIT SULVATIYYA)
('AILIT ZALLAT)
('AILIT ZAGHARAT)
OLIVES AND VEGETABLES
ROAD TO MARSA MATRUH
('AILIT MA'FAS)
('AILIT LAZUMI)
PLATEAU
BARLEY
ROAD TO AL-SALLUM
(KAMAILAT TRIBE)
WADI
PASTURE
DESERT

FIGURE 3a. LINEAGE TERRITORIES OF AL-QASR.

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133
131



FIGURE 4

LAND FORM MAP OF AL-QASR SHOWING DRAINAGE PATTERN

SCALE = 1:250,000

MEDITERRANEAN
AL-QASR
MARSA MATRUH
LIBYAN PLATEAU
DESERT
'IZBA SECTOR
SHA'IR WI MAR'A SECTOR

102
312
361
423
311
133

FIGURE 5

SAMPLE OF LAND TENURE IN IZBA SECTOR


WHITE SAND DUNES
N
UNCULTIVABLE STONEY HILL
SCALE = 1:4,000 (APPROX.)
○ = WELLS
□ = PERMANENT DWELLINGS

102
423
312
361

FIGURE 6

SAMPLE OF LAND TENURE IN SHA'IR WI MAR'A SECTOR


SCALE = 1:4,000 (APPROX.)
O = WELLS
□ = PERMANENT DWELLINGS
N

[P70]

000

PART TWO

STRUCTURE AND AUTHORITY

CHAPTER III

KINSHIP AND POLITICAL ORGANIZATION

Principles of Social Structure

*613 The division of Bedouin society into groups is explained in terms of certain principles of organization, the most pervasive of these being unilineality or the lineage *613 619 principle. According to this structural rule, an individual born into a tertiary lineage segment (see Figure 7)[1] automatically becomes a member of each successive and more inclusive group represented by the higher levels of segmentation. The status, rights, and obligations of the individual with respect to other members of the tribe are in this way determined on the basis of kinship. An individual gains political status in the tribe, as a societal unit, only through membership in a tertiary group. Theoretically, group membership is based on birth, but there are certain "legal fictions" which represent exceptions to this rule. In al-Qasr exceptions are rare, but a few do exist. For instance, there is one case of [597] individual adoption, and in another case, a whole tertiary 173 segment was grafted on to a lineage stem. The latter case *613 happened four generations ago when Taram Mighaiwiz of 'Ailit 619 Lazumi adopted Hajj 'Ali "as his brother." The Bedouins say 597

[1] [See p.77--Analyst]

173 that in those days it was important "to have men to go to
*613 war; Hajj 'Ali came from the Sinai with many men and wrote
619
597 his name into the books of Lazumi." Today, in the Lazumi genealogy Hajj 'Ali's name appears as the brother of Taram, [114] both are claimed as sons of Mighawsiz. This kind of data is difficult to uncover and I may have missed gathering other cases of ideological kinship ties.

*613 The specific unilinear principle which operates in [171] al-Qasr is partrilineality, common to the Middle Eastern culture area. A corollary principle is the corporate group. *613 571 Together, these two rules structure the social world of the individual and effectively define a range of social choices for him. The individual's social relations and social roles are relative to the rights and obligations of the people related to him through his father. In a sense, the social world for the individual in al-Qasr is his father's group and its network of relationships with other similar groups; he would not think of leaving this group of his own free will though, in reality, he could. The Bedouins believe [181] that a man cannot be happy if he lives with strangers, i.e., [829] outside his corporate group. This value holds up today to the extent that a man will expect his son to return to the desert even after his education as a merchant, a government clerk, or an army officer.

Structural differentiation in al-Qasr is not solely

*613
571
the result of the patrilineal principle even though it is by far the most ideologically significant. Other principles lend structure to associative relationships which may or may not complement those established by the unilinear rule. It is the operation of these other principles which give complexity to the social and political organization of al-Qasr. They may be identified in terms of residence, cognation and social compacts, or the establishment of contractual relations above and beyond those defined by patrilineality. The force of these four structural principles constitute the range or the structural constraints within which individuals and groups in al-Qasr conduct their social relations. Specifically, we are not interested in all social relations. The main interest here is in those relationships in which individuals or groups struggle for control, or attempt to exercise power. Our interest is, then, the political aspect of social relations or, what Max Weber discussed in terms of, power and established authority (Bendix 1962:290-297).

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*613
[121]
It is necessary to discuss the lineage system in al-Qasr because in a segmentary society, kinship and politics are analytical aspects of the same process. In the political structure of al-Qasr, we note first of all that the tertiary and secondary segments (see Figure 7 below) are the functionally significant units. Bait 'Umar, the tertiary segment diagramed in Figure 8 below, is typical: it is an autonomous political unit with a discernible authority structure and

*613 formal leadership. Ideologically, group solidarity at this level is explained solely in terms of patrilineality; in fact, local contiguity and explicit contractual ties are
*613 just as important. When we add to this the principle of
582 cognation in the form of the Bedouin preferred form of marriage, parallel-cousin marriage, the resulting structure is what Emrys Peters (1965) has called "the corporate group
[183] *par excellence*." But, as we shall see later, father's brother's daughter-marriage is more of a cultural ideal than it is a social reality in al-Qasr.

*613 The interplay of kinship, residence and contract ties
554 defines a corporate structure of authority and also informs
571 an external system of authority relations including all who claim descent from 'Ali 'Aqar, son of the mythological Sa'ada. The feeling of "corporateness," and the concomitant structural demands upon the individual changes as the scope of political action widens. This degree of corporate feeling is related to the structural differentiation between what has been interpreted as "domestic relations based on kinship and descent" and "the field of political relations" (Fortes 1953:26). In
121 this study, I maintain that both the internal and the external
*613
554 systems of relations are "political" since power and legitimate
571 authority are exercized in both. Therefore, rather than use the terms "domestic" and "political," I shall refer to the internal system of political relations and the external system

121 *613 554 571 of political relations. The structural differentiation between them relates to certain specifics of role differentiation and articulation, and corporate goals. Different roles function differently in different spheres of politics. This is clear when we consider that the two structural aspects of corporate group politics serve the double purpose of insuring local autonomy while promoting integration into the larger lineage segments. This I will cover more thoroughly in the next chapter. Most of the discussion here deals with social structure and, in particular, the internal elements of the corporate group.

*613 619 In the total societal context, the tertiary segment is pivotal for the conceptualization of two models: the Bedouin's model of his tribal system, and the observer's model of a segmentary lineage system. Both of these constructs are shown in Figure 7.[1] Both genealogical models can be completed by the addition of Figures 2, 3, and 8, extending the systems both horizontally and vertically.

Theoretically, all of the levels of the Awlad 'Ali tribal system constitute a political community, i.e., the various segments shown in Figure 3 regulate and maintain relations with each other through complementary opposition (Fallers 1963). But in fact, political action of any functional significance rarely occurs beyond the secondary lineage level. In terms of the structural principles, agnation, real or

[1] [See p. 77--Analyst]

*613 fictive, has practical political consequences only at the
619 tertiary and secondary levels of segmentation. Most political
activity in al-Qasr is the result of either cooperation
or conflict between corporate groups the size of Bait 'Umar
or 'Ailit Ma'fas. 'Ailit Ma'fas is made up of five structurally
replicated political groups such as Bait 'Umar. Toward outsiders,
[609] these five groups act as one; they represent a corporate
*613 entity before the rest of the tribe. As a member of 'Ailit
619 Ma'fas, an individual has jural status in the whole tribe.
554 He also has the means and the moral obligation to articulate
his interests and to settle his arguments with other members
of the tribe. When an individual is involved in an activity
which relates to matters of power and authority, he is playing
a political role in the political process. The units which
make up the internal and external political systems of the
121 'Aishaibat tribe of al-Qasr are roles. Roles then are the
*613 analytical focus of this study. Of course, I realize that
619 the concrete entities present in al-Qasr are human beings.
554 I only use roles as methodological constructs in order to
abstract from, and to understand, Bedouin behavior. By
conceptualizing sets of roles as structures, we will be able
to understand the internal and external political structures
as well as the traditional and modern political structures
of Bedouin society. In al-Qasr, these political roles and
structures emerge from the more generalized kinship structure

[TEXT CONTINUED ON PAGE 79]

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
SA'ADA
(1) 'AQAR
TRIBE (2) AWLAD 'ALI
TRIBE (3) 'ALI AHMAR
PRIMARY (4) 'AISHAIBAT
SECONDARY (5) 'AILIT MA'FAS
TERTIARY (6) BAIT 'UMAR
(7) BAIT ('AIT) ABD AL-MALIK

FIGURE 7

GENERATIONS AND TERMINOLOGY OF TRIBAL STRUCTURE

1: Obermeyer E-5 (1964-1965) 1969 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9
'Aishaibat

173
*613
601


BRAIK
(BAIT) KAILANI
(BAIT) YUNIS
(BAIT) MUHAMMAD
ABD AL-MALIK
YUNIS
JIBRIL
ABD AL-LATIF
YA'QUB
ABD AL-RAHMAN
ABD AL-HALIM
ABD AL-SALAM
FARAJ
ABD AL-RAHMAN
'ALI
ABD AL-HAMID
ABD AL-'AZIZ
'UMAR
ABD AL-'AL
QASSIM
ABD AL-MALIK
JAD AL-MULA
ABD AL-MUNSIF
NAJI
SALIH AL-DIN
ABD AL-NASSIR
KAMAL AL-DIN

[P.78-A]

1: Obermeyer E-5 (1964-1965) 1969 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9
'Aishaibat

173
*613
601


MA'FAS
HASSAN
QASSIM
BAIT 'UMAR
(BAIT) 'UMAR
HANAISH
ABD AL-QADAR
IBRAHIM
MUHAMMAD
'ALI
ABD AL-KHALIQ
SALIH
YUNIS
ABD AL-RAHIM
MUHAMMAD
'ALI
IBRAHIM
SA'AD
'ATIYA
'UMAR
TAHIR
FARAJ
QASSIM
RIZQ
SAFI
ABD ALLAH
NUWAIJI
HAMAD
MAUHI AL-DIN
SA'ID
IBRAHIM
ABD ALLAH
JIBRIL
RIYID
'ISLAIB
ABD AL-KARIM
BAGHI
JAB ALLAH
HIMAIDA
MAS'UD
HASSAN
MUHAMMAD
ABD AL-NASSIF
RAMADAN
FATH ALLAH

[P.78-B]

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
MUSA
HAMAD
(BAIT) FIRJANI
(BAIT) SALAH
HUSSAIN
MAHMUD
ABD AL-RAWAF
MUSA'ID
NASIF
SALIH
ABD AL-KARIM
MANSUR
ABD AL-RAWAF
ABD ALLAH
'ISA
GHAITH

FIGURE 8

GENEALOGY OF BAIT 'UMAR

▲ = 'AQILA

[P. 78-C]

121 *613 619 554 and are related to the organizational principles mentioned
above.

619 The Awlad 'Ali represent a cultural entity whose
membership is defined in patrilineal terms. Cutlurally, and
genealogically, they are related to the Cyrenaican Bedouin
but distinct from the Egyptians of the Nile Valley. The
619 political system of the Awlad 'Ali can be extended to include
177 Cyrenaicans "as Bedouins" but it can only interact with the
Egyptians "as foreigners." This means that the Awlad 'Ali possess common roles, structures, and cultural institutions which can articulate with those of the Cyrenaican Bedouin. In the case of the Egyptians, however, social interaction calls forth new cultural categories and new structural elements in Bedouin society. This is the basis of political change in al-Qasr. Role differentiation and ideological replacement are taking place vis a vis the nation-state: the traditional political structure of the Bedouins is adapting to the Egyptian political environment. In the language of the "politics of modernization," this process is referred to as "politicization" or "political socialization." We shall deal with this process in later chapters.

The principles which relate the Bedouins of al-Qasr to other Bedouins of the Western Desert and Libya are the organizational principles of kinship, residence, and contract; but the principle which relates them to the Egyptian state is

619 the bureaucratic principle. Here we are concerned with the
177 traditional situation.
[121]

The 'Aishaibi Bedouins of al-Qasr are a residence
619 group. Each sub-group of the tribe, i.e., the secondary and
*613 tertiary units, is assigned their own territory (*mintaqa*).
571 Kinship and residence are the primary determinants of group
differentiation; agnates who dwell together represent
concrete authority structures, or political groups. This
follows from the fact that patterns of political action, or
what we call political structures, most often deal with the
exercise of legitimate authority--as opposed to power. Power
relations do occur and when present complicate the situation.
In al-Qasr, power relations and structures emerge when the
principle of cognation or contracted alliance form groups
which crosscut the effectiveness of local, agnatic political
structures. But, in al-Qasr, as in most societies, political
action usually takes the form of the exercise of authority
(Southall 1965:120).

173 The genealogical map as an idological charter argues
114 against the formation of power relations. Genealogical re-
*613 lations represent a set of social relations each replete with
571 definite rights and obligations. Fallers (1956) has noted
the tendency in segmentary lineage societies to cast all
*613 authority relations in a unilinear genealogical mould. The
829 Bedouin visualize their world, extending from Alexandria to
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*613 Libya, as a territorially segmented one corresponding to the
829 lineage divisions of the tribe. They say that every Bedouin
173 knows the owner of each centimeter of this world. Not only
571 does the genealogy represent a set of property relations, it
also represents and upholds a set of authority relations. In
*613 Cyrenaica also (Peters 1960), the Bedouin genealogical map
173 corresponds to the distribution of groups on the ground.
571 Kinship relations as social relations in Bedouin society may
be properly interpreted as property relations between groups.
Property relations as part of the Bedouin world view are an
essential premise upon which the social and political order
rests, although it is not the only premise.

619 The 'Aishaibat are identified with the al-Qasr portion
*613 of the Awlad 'Ali homeland. The 'Aishaibi segments are
separate and contiguous on the ground. Figure 3a[1] shows the
correspondence between the 'Aishaibi genealogical and territorial divisions at the secondary lineage level of segmentation.

121 That kinship as an organizing principle in segmentary
*613 societies cannot be considered apart from local contiguity
is an old and well-known fact. Sir Henry Maine (1917:76-79)
in analyzing the evolution of "political ideas" noted the
interrelationship between "the principle of local contiguity"
and the central principle of the "connexion in blood," how
they combine to become "the condition of community in political

[1], [See p. 66--Analyst]

121 *613 functions." The political system as a structure with reference to the territorial principle and descent system is the unit which the political analyst seeks to understand. To do so, he must concentrate his attention upon the local descent group, the corporate group (Fortes and Evans-Pritchard 1940:11; Leach 1954:128). Structural analysis in terms of functional group differentiation is preliminary to political content and political role analysis (Smith 1966:113-129). The objective 121 of this chapter is to define the basic political unit in Bedouin society and the set of authority relations which characterize it. We are looking for, what Maine referred to as, the "Corporation" and its "Public Officer" or "Corporation sole."

[128] The rest of this chapter is a discussion of the internal domestic structure of authority and the complex of values and beliefs which the Bedouins of al-Qasr express about a desired social order in terms of their principles of organization. Associative relationships based on kinship, residence and contract are morally supportive and hence authoritative; they structure as well as reflect a world order. Such relationships validate traditional authority and contribute to a system of social control.

619 Lineage Structure and Formal Categories

Not all residents of al-Qasr are members of the Awlad

619 'Ali tribe. There is one lineage, the Sulwatiyya shown in *[613] Figure 7a, which does not claim descent from Sa'ada and hence are no relations of the Awlad 'Ali Bedouin. Nor are any serious ideological claims for tribal membership provided by them or their Awlad 'Ali neighbors. The first social differentiation found in al-Qasr, then, is between those who belong to the Sa'adi tribes and those of the Marabit tribes. In terms of Bedouin social ideal types, the Sa'adi tribesmen are warriors, known for their courage and generosity; the Marabit tribesmen are weak and dependent on the protection [792] which the Sa'adi offers them. The Marabit tends to specialize in the role of "holy man." The dichotamy here is a reflection [171] of the structural differentiation, common to North Africa, between sacred and secular tribes, or client and protector tribes.

619 173 539 The Sa'adi-Marabit division in al-Qasr is defined geographically, in name, and in Bedouin tradition and myth. Here is the way in which the Marabit "holy man" of al-Qasr conceives of the difference between the two types and its origin:

> They are brothers and there is no difference. The Sa'adi is always one step in front of the Marabit, he handles things for the Marabit and helps him. In political matters the Sa'adi is more advanced . . . When the Marabit is in trouble, the Sa'adi will defend him. They are two different groups because the Sa'adi are from one mother. Once Sa'ada was riding in a caravan through the desert.

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> Her riding booth struck a tree and she found herself stranded there in the tree; her camel had gone and the rest of the caravan noticed nothing and continued on. Then a Marabit passed by and saw her there. He helped her down and they later married. She already had three sons to a former husband: Ali Ahmar, Ali Abyad and Sinaina. The Marabit also had children from another marriage. He was very rich and they could afford to live together. One day thieves began to harrass the man, but when the three Sa'adi sons offered him their help he told them not to bother with the thieves, that they would go away. But they did not, and they continued to harrass the man for a long time. The three sons were still very young at this time. When they grew up they asked the Marabit for arms and horses with which to fight off the thieves. They received them and succeeded in driving off the thieves. The Marabit was very happy and offered the three sons one-half of his wealth, and he was very rich. The sons refused this generous offer saying to the Marabit that they were no different from his other sons and would take only one-tenth of his wealth.

619 The differentiation between the Sa'adi and Marabit has structural consequences only in that it defines psychological types and tends to assign them to certain roles in society. By his [181] psychological make-up, the Marabit, who is weak and retiring, is unfit for the tasks which the Sa'adi undertakes, i.e., war, trade, and politics. It is, nevertheless, expected that the Marabit will act as a support mechanism for the secular operations of the Sa'adi. Usually, this support takes the form of financial contributions.

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675 Each Marabit group is related through contractual agreement to a Sa'adi group. For instance, the Sulwatiyya lineage of al-Qasr are members of the Jumi'at tribe, a Marabit tribe; when identifying themselves they will say

619 675 "Jumi'at, Marabtiin (plural of Marabit) of the 'Ali Ahmar."
All Marabit tribes of the Western Desert are affiliated as
*[613] clients with Sa'adi tribes. Further, since the tertiary
group of the Marabtiin functions in the same way as that of
the Sa'adi, it is this group which enters into compacts with
Sa'adi tertiary groups. Traditionally, the Marabit group's
[682] main support activity was to share in the payment of the
blood-money with its Sa'adi protector group. In return, the
Marabit group was given land in the protector's territory
and could depend upon them to contribute to any Marabit
blood debt which might come due. Also, it was considered the
[628] [682] duty of the Sa'adi to revenge the death of a member of his
client group since the Marabit "was weak and could not face a
[608] tribe." But there is no attempt to construct fictional kinship
links between Sa'adi and Marabit groups.

[672] In al-Qasr today, contractual relations between Sa'adi
and Marabit are still based upon collective responsibility in
the blood-feud. However, since this traditional means of
conflict control is an extremely rare occurrence, the mutual
obligations of the parties are expressed in different forms.
[648] In any conflict between the Bedouins and the Egyptian government, the Marabtiin are expected to support their respective
[666] Sa'adi groups. In any modern elections which a Sa'adi might
enter, the Marabit is expected to give him his vote. A few
examples will make clear the relationship between the Sa'adi

619 675 and the Marabit.

*[613] The Qit'an tribe, based partly in Libya and partly in Egypt, is a tribe in the same sense that the Awlad 'Ali is one, i.e., at the secondary level of the lineage system. [166] [175] This tribe moved into Egypt sometime around 1900. The Bedouins of al-Qasr estimate that "50% of the Qit'an are with Ali Ahmar, 30% with Sinaina, and 20% with Ali Abyad." 619 675 578 In 1956, certain events occurred in Libya which brought about a declaration of independence from Sa'adi domination by the Qit'an in that country. The Qit'an felt that their numbers were sufficiently large enough that they should represent themselves in the Libyan parliament. In other words, the Marabtiin were no longer willing to settle for the traditional social categories and role structures allotted to them. After these events in Libya, some members of the Qit'an came to Egypt and informed their brothers about the formation of the tribe as a separate entity, and convinced the Egyptian Qit'an to do the same--which they did.

The Bedouins say that the Governor of Marsa Matruh encouraged the Qit'an tribe to increase their numbers in the area after he learned of their desire to be free from Sa'adi domination. There had been a small number of Qit'an in the town of Marsa Matruh. This number quickly grew in size and political strength so that it could challenge the power of the 'Ali Ahmar who are considered the dominant tribe in this

619 675 578 area of the Western Desert. And, according to the Governor of the province, it is the 'Aishaibat of al-Qasr who are the most powerful of the three primary segments of the 'Ali Ahmar; for example, they have succeeded in sending their 'umda (chief) to the National Assembly in Cairo. In fact, it was over the [666] election of the 'umda in 1964 that the split between the Marabit Qit'an and the Sa'adi Ali Ahmar became an open one and produced political rumblings among the tribes. This case makes explicit the relationship between the two types of tribes in the Western Desert, and gives an important instance of the operation of structural principles in defining groups and group relations.

619 675 666 578 During the national elections of 1964, it was the traditional duty of the Marabit to vote for his affiliated Sa'adi candidate. Since the Qit'an are allied in a client-protector relationship with the Ali Ahmar, all of the Marabtiin of this tribe should have given their votes to the 'umda of the 'Aishaibat who was seeking office to the National Assembly. But, instead, the Qit'an ran a candidate of their own--largely at the urging of the Governor, it is said. But, despite this Marabit opposition, the 'Aishaibat were successful in getting their 'umda elected. Furthermore, 619 675 578 626 the 'Aishaibat said that this rebellion of the Marabtiin could not go unpunished, that reprisals would be taken. The type of sanction which the 'Aishaibat directed against the

619 Qit'an is one which is employed in both the internal and
675 the external systems of political relations: it is an or-
578 626 ganized sanction taken by the corporate representatives
against socially disapproved behavior. Against the Marabtiin,
619 it involved a closure of group affiliation and protective
675 alliance usually obtainable through affinal ties. The Qit'an
578 *613 were prohibited from marrying into the 'Aishaibat primary
626 582 segment. The sanction was tested while I was in the field.

> In March of 1965, 'Umda Ziyad of the Qit'an contracted a marriage for his son with one of the secondary groups of the 'Aishaibat. He went through all of the marriage preliminaries and paid a brideprice of 70 E.L. (Egyptian pounds). But afterwards, the girl's family, following the advice of the 'Aishaibi corporate heads, returned the brideprice and refused his offer. The 'Umda of the Qit'an then went to talk to the brothers of the girl (for her father was dead) and told them that he would pay a brideprice of 1000 E.L. "but I want the girl." He paid them part of the brideprice (for they had agreed in the face of this unusual offer) and sent a car to pick up the girl. The arrangement did not succeed, for the paternal cousin of the girl who, according to Bedouin custom and tradition, had a prior claim on her, stopped the car at gunpoint. The corporate heads had told the cousin that this was his right, and in this case, his duty. Then the corporate heads of the 'Aishaibat called a council, and the members met with the brothers of the girl. They told the brothers: "You know what happened at the time of the election. 'Umda Ziyad is 'Ali Ahmar and he should have voted for our _'umda_, but he tricked us." The brothers refused to be persuaded by the tribal leaders. They said that if anyone from the 'Aishaibat would pay them more than 1000 E.L., they would give their sister to him. The leaders warned the brothers that if they went through with this marriage they would each be fined 200 E.L. Finally, and after this meeting, the leaders went to 'Umda Ziyad himself with the threat, that were he to go through with this marriage "all of the 'Aishaibat will begin to fight you." The _'umda_

> 619 could not afford to risk such large scale conflict
> 675 and so he withdrew his offer of marriage to the
> 578 brothers. After this, as a display of authority and
> *613 an attempt to maintain something of the alliance
> 626 between their group and the Qit'an, the 'Aishaibi
> 582 leaders made the public announcement that the girl
> could marry anyone else, but not the son of 'Umda
> Ziyad.

619 The various sets of authority relations operative in the al-
675 Qasr area are obvious from this account, but they will be
*613 better defined as the discussion proceeds. Here, I only
wanted to make clear that the relationship between Sa'adi
and Marabit is one based upon contract and local contiguity,
and reinforced by cognation. There is no unilinear basis
for the relationship and no attempt to fit it into a "unilinear
[582] genealogical mould." The structural differentiation between
Sa'adi and Marabit seems to reflect a dominant-subjective
relationship, in the sense discussed by Weber (1947) and
Southall (1956), but its possible class overtones are played
down by the fact that there are normally no objections to
[851] intermarrying between groups. The Bedouin of al-Qasr say,
"what is the difference, the children from such a marriage
will be Sa'adi anyhow?"

The Sa'adi-Marabit differentiation is relatively
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*613 unimportant for a study of al-Qasr itself, since the Marabit
number is so small--one lineage consisting of five brothers
and their families. The contrast between Sa'adi and Marabit,
secular and sacred tribes, becomes more important for a

619 *613 study of the whole Western Desert, or in an analysis of contemporary politics in Marsa Matruh.

The Bedouins of al-Qasr are, in this study, the 'Aishaibat of the 'Ali Ahmar of the Awlad 'Ali tribe. The [191] Bedouin tribal unit throughout the Middle East is described as a segmentary lineage system. Something of the meaning of this concept has already been made clear in our discussion of the structural principles of Bedouin society. This type [114] of society has been adequately analyzed by Evans-Pritchard (1940), Fortes (1945 and 1949), Smith (1956), Middleton and Tait (1958), and Peters (1960). My own ideas about the segmentary lineage society as it functions in al-Qasr derive from these sources.

*613 571 [642] Politically, the 'Aishaibat of al-Qasr are a stateless society; they have no centralized political institution. The lineage system is the structural framework for social and political relations. The basis of government, i.e., the regulation of authority relations, is the balanced protraction of corporate groups which support institutional uniformities in the form of similar organization, ideology and procedure (Smith 1956). Although the various groupings of the segmentary system can be analytically identified, and each grouping thinks of itself as a distinct group, in actuality, it is difficult to define the groups because of the way in which each fuses into lesser or greater differentiated units in one

*613 situation or another (Middleton and Tait 1958:11). The most
571 effective approach to understanding the segmentary society,
121 in view of this dynamic situation, is to isolate the function-
*613
571 ally significant unit and to analyze its social and political
relations (Fortes 1945). This is what I attempted to do in my study of the 'Aishaibat of al-Qasr.

*613 In al-Qasr, the secondary segment, i.e., 'Ailit Ma'fas, is the basic unit of the social structure. This statement must be qualified seeing that this unit consists of a balanced opposition of smaller tertiary segments, and action at the secondary level is a resultant of political consensus at the tertiary level. However, the ties which emerge from descent, residence, marriage, and contract are highly moral and utilitarian ones; with reference to tribal politics, we can state that corporate action is consensual and most functional at the secondary segment level. We may consider this group, in terms of two levels of corporateness, the basic unit of 'Aishaibat political structure.

*613 All of the segmentary groups of the 'Aishaibat are
619 bound together by the same patrilineal principle; they all trace descent to 'Ali the son of Sa'ada. This principle also links them to the "noble tribes" of Cyrenaica who claim descent from this same ancestress. This principle is the genealogical and ideological basis of a man's claiming to be "Sa'adi," or "Awlad 'Ali," or "Aishaibi," etc. In theory,

619 the segmentary system is considered by the Bedouins to be a
*613 monolithic unit: "The Awlad 'Ali are one." But, as with all
other segmentary lineage systems, in al-Qasr levels of segmentation reflect degrees of corporateness.

*613 Furthermore, the ideology of structural unity dissolves
178 before the empirical evidence of fission and fusion, processes
619 characteristic of the segmentary society in general. These
processes are not common in al-Qasr during the present time. But they must have been in the past, because the segments which Murray (1935) names as making up the Ali Ahmar include only one of those which currently comprise the tribe. The
[578] only admission of fission which I could obtain from my informants was that, at one time, 'Ailit Ma'fas was a tertiary
[124] segment of 'Ailit Lazumi (see Figure 3). I received this
information from a number of my key informants so that it can be accepted despite a denial to the contrary by some of my other informants. There is no empirical link below the secondary level to be discovered in the genealogical maps of these two groups; kinship ties have been manipulated to coincide with ideological claims. The fact that these two lineages are now the wealthiest and most powerful in the al-Qasr area may be an indication that economic and political motivations undermined the unity of 'Ailit Lazumi in the
*613 past. We shall have occasion to return to this opposition
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578 between the Lazumi and the Ma'fas when we discuss political

*613 178 578 [194] office in modern Bedouin society. Also, we will return to the processes of fission and fusion when we discuss Bedouin law. I will be able to show through the use of legal documents how one tertiary unit went through a process of fission, fusion and re-fusion with its secondary unit.

The capacity for fusion and fission is a result of a number of structural situations. First of all, it is the exercise of choice on the part of the tertiary segment members who have contracted alliance in the form of collective responsibility with other tertiary segments of the lineage. The choice to break off from the major group may be of two kinds; a severence of political ties with one group in favor of a new group or the natural process of segmentation as a response to ecological conditions. In the latter case, no new political alliances are formed, and it usually involves a married son going off to begin his own camp. It is only an expansion of the major or secondary group. But the former case is one of decimation: the secondary group contracts. In both cases, authority is exercised, either between father and son, or, *613 578 177 178 between heads of corporate groups. In al-Qasr, the capacity for either type of fission is limited by the political environment of the Egyptian nation-state, the highest level of authority which the Bedouin encounters. The classic functioning of the segmentary lineage system is, in the case of al-Qasr, being changed by extra-system factors. The

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578 Bedouins, always a minority in Egypt, have been undergoing a transition to peasantry since about 1800. Probably since that time, Bedouin society has been, to use Easton's (1959) emphasis, a "segmentary society" rather than a "segmenting society."

196 Formal Bedouin categories of kinship are confusing; depending upon the situation they use the concepts of bait, 'ait, 'aiela and gabiila interchangeably. The term bait literally means "house," the term bait al-'Arab may mean "the tent" or "the people of the tent." "People of the tent"
[594] may refer to either the nuclear family of one man, or the nuclear families of a man, his brothers and his sons, and
[596] their spouses and offspring. In the latter case, the ex-
[621] tended family is referred to as the naja'. A naja', or camp, usually consists of three or four tents. The word bait may
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*613 refer to the tertiary and the sub-tertiary groups, and occasionally one might even refer to the secondary group as a bait when he wishes to emphasize the quality of corporateness. The term 'aiela, literally "family," is the word used most often to designate the secondary lineage segment. The diminutive of this word, i.e. 'ait, usually refers to the subtertiary group but it commonly designates the secondary group
[619] also. The term gabiila, "tribe," is the only word used for the primary and supra-primary lineage groupings. These are
196 the general Bedouin usages and their frequency will vary not

196 only from area to area but also from person to person.

121 In terms of the Bedouin social structure, it is useful
*613 to discuss politics as a set of authority relations operating
571 in a problem-solving situation. This operation takes place at all levels of the lineage system with the exception of the sub-tertiary group; below the tertiary group level authority is purely a function of certain kinship roles. Since we cannot analytically separate the political aspect of the role "family head" from the moral aspect of the role "father," it seems best to designate this type of authority as being something distinct from political authority. We will call this type of authority either "familial" or "domestic," and "political authority" will be considered to exist in cases where there is some degree of role specialization and role differentiation with respect to decision-making and problem-solving. As I conceptualize it, then, the tertiary group is a political group because it is structurally identified with a corporate office, or institutionalized role of leadership. At the end
[128] of this chapter, and in the next chapter, I will elaborate on this because it is a focal point of the study.

121 Structural principles designed to promote integration
571 in a society also shed light on the degree of coercion and
181 conflict in social "organization." Individuals and groups in society have interests and values which they seek to maximize in the face of competition and opposition from other individ-

121 uals and groups. Radcliffe-Brown (1952:199) spoke of social
571 relations existing where there was "some adjustment of
181 respective interests, by convergence of interest, or by limitation of conflicts that might arise from divergence of interests." When a person or group has an interest in an object, material or immaterial, that object has a certain value for the person or group. Thus does the study of social structure become, for Radcliffe-Brown, "the study of interests and values as the determinants of social relations." Convergence of interests side by side with a divergence of interests characterizes any society, and all societies are segmented on one basis or
121 another. I have found it enlightening to consider the seg-
571 ments of al-Qasr Bedouin society as "interest groups." Interest groups are the real groups which one can observe in either integration or conflict. They are real in the sense that their behavior can be observed. They are real in that they can be defined by a stable pattern of authority relations whereas other groups are non-existent in this sense. The tertiary group and the secondary group, in so far as it is a coordination of replicate corporate groups, are real groups in al-Qasr whereas the primary and tribal levels are theoretical or quasi-groups. That is, they are only potentially interest groups, seeing that, for the time being, they lack the common interests and coordinated activity to be classified as an authority, or political, or interest group.

Familial Authority and Rights and Duties in Kin Relations

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The analysis of authority structure, whether it has reference to a group as small as the family or as large as the nation, assumes as its unit of study the social position or the role. The role is the organized complex of rights and duties by which individuals, or categories of individuals, participate in an interactive process. Roles are linked together into a set, or a structure, by the rights which incumbents claim and the duties they fulfill (Linton 1936:113; Parsons and Shils 1951:23; Gluckman 1963:185). The heuristic value of role analysis is well established. Role theory has been referred to as "the highest level of generalization about social phenomena that has yet become in any sense operational (Southall 1959:17).

Since all social roles possess rights and duties just because they are defined with respect to other roles, we may assume that each and every social role has an authoritative aspect to it. The authoritative aspect of roles refers to the way in which authority positions relate in order to give form to an authority structure. We want to know how the authority positions at all levels of the authority structure function, but for the time being we are concerned with familial authority relations. Until we understand the operation of authority at the familial level, which is the source of legitimate political authority in a kin-based

121 moral community, we cannot proceed to a discussion of the
571 554 internal and external systems of political relations.

577 As a result of the socialization process, and through
181 relations with other members of the family, an individual
[867] comes to recognize that his conduct is measurable by certain standards of, what is considered by the group to be, good and bad, right and wrong. In al-Qasr, such standards are intrinsically correct, or "decent" as the Bedouins say; obedience to the authority representing these standards is interpreted as a "duty." The authoritative aspect of the role of household
[596] head (shaib al-bait), and the moral obligations which it represents, emerge from and reinforce values and structural arrangements central to Bedouin social order, namely, respect for authority and devotion to social groups, the two basic elements of morality defined by Durkheim (Parsons 1937:382-385).

577 The value placed upon social order, and the structural
571 mechanisms for insuring its realization and extension--kinship,
181 residence and contract--inform an authority structure which
182 ranges between filial piety at the family level and a set of legal norms at the level of the external political system. The fact that the Bedouins of al-Qasr are interested in integrating a larger population into their authority structure means that a common value is operative in the range of it; also that one sphere of authority will tend to merge into another.
[593] Hence the father-son authority relation has importance for
[691] the strength of Bedouin customary law in the desert. The

577 571 high value placed upon conformity to rules governing authority
181 relations makes Bedouin society of al-Qasr less individualistic
182 than, for instance, the Iatmul of New Guinea who "set no exaggerated value upon extremely orderly behavior" (Bateson 1958:31). Social cohesion in al-Qasr is sustained through what Durkheim called "mechanical solidarity."

593 The Bedouin father is in a disciplinary position over his washuun, his wife (wives) and his children. (The word, washuun, must be of Berber origin for I am unable to trace it in Arabic.) Although the father has the right to beat his washuun, the Bedouins say that he does so "only in rare cases, when it is necessary." During my time in the field I heard of no physical punishment being dealt out by a father.

The dyadic relationship of father and son roles is the focal field of authority in the family. The pattern of behavior in this relationship is marked typically by restraint on the part of the son. The father orders and the son obeys unquestioningly. If the father accidentally uses a taboo
[192] word, such as 'ammar which in standard Arabic means "to fill" but in the Bedouin dialect means "to have sexual intercourse," the son will immediately depart the scene in a high state of embarrassment. In this way, the boy is not only excluded
[561] from gatherings and activities in which his father participates, but he is also made to maintain a respectable social distance from his father's age-set. There are other ways of

593 handling the potential conflict between father and son and the successive generations which they represent; these are mechanisms which preclude intimacy between the father and the son. The social statuses of father and son are not

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permitted to overlap by their being participants in, or even present at, festive occasions, such as circumcision and wedding parties, occasions which are marked by erotic poems and lewd songs. It would be "wrong" for a father to accompany his son to one of these parties. In the one instance that I did observe a father and son together at a wedding party, the Bedouins explained the rare occurrence by pointing out that this was the man's only son, and so he treated him "like a brother."

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The Bedouins of al-Qasr recognize the aloofness of the father from the son and justify it as a training period to prepare the boy for the time when he will be on his own. One young man explained the underlying rationale of the father-son relationship in this way:

> There are different kinds of fathers. One wishes to make his son a man, to make his son self-dependent at an early age. Other fathers destroy the personalities of their sons. For instance, the first type of father gives his son the responsibility of selling something, or buying something, or of supervising a chore in his own place. But the second type of father is usually soft with his son; he doesn't depend on his son due to his young age. He is very cautious with him and will not send him anywhere, and if he does he will ask someone to look after him. Of course, the first type of father is good and the second type is bad.

593 In al-Qasr it is a rare sight to see a father and his young son together, and it is only slightly more common to see the father with the grown son. The second case may simply be a reflection of the division of labor since the son, once grown, takes over the economic tasks of his father.

593 The most important duties of a father toward his
867 son are three:. he must teach him generosity, courage and
584 courtesy; he must see that the boy learns the Quran; and he
872 must arrange a good marriage for his son. According to
593 Peters (1960:34), the Cyrenaican Bedouin father must attend
852 to three things for his son, namely: his circumcision, his
[872]
[583] education in the Quran, and his bridewealth when he marries.
In al-Qasr, the Egyptian school teachers have succeeded in
[177] showing the Bedouin that circumcision is a private family
593 affair and not a public ritual. Although all fathers still
852 see to it that their sons are circumcised, the father is no
178 longer responsible for "making a circumcision party." In
[626] fact, the father who does insist on following the old ways
[431] by hiring a dancer and publicly marking his son's rite de passage, will be ridiculed as one "who only wants to make money from the ritual gift (naquut) given the boy."

593 The son recognizes the rights which the father has over him through a show of respect and obedience. A boy shows deference toward his father by not smoking, singing, or reciting poetry of any kind in his presence. During the

During the
593 present time when most of the Bedouins own a transistor radio,
[207] a son will not even listen to songs or poetry broadcast over
[177] the air if his father is within hearing distance. I once
witnessed a well-meaning father try unsuccessfully to get his
ten year old son to sit down and listen with him to the news
593 on the radio. This automatic deference paid to the father
561 is extended to all male elders: the father-son relationship
is the model for authority relations between generations.
[276] But there are degrees in which the model is applied to behavior; for instance, a boy will not smoke in front of his
older brother, his uncles and grandfather, but will feel no
uneasiness about smoking in the company of an elder with
whom he has no immediate authority relationship.

593 The filial piety which marks the father-son authority relationship is owed to the father until his death. As the son grows older, he may show a little less constraint but he still plays the role of the subordinate. For example, I never saw a son argue with his father over anything during my stay in the field, with one serious exception. One man who had broken off friendly relations with his brother objected to the presence of his brother's sons at the wedding of his own daughter. When he threatened to cause a public scene to embarrass his nephews before the other guests, his own sons defended the right of their cousins to be at their sister's wedding. They told their father that his quarrel

593 was with his brother and not his brother's sons. When the
father persisted with his intention to embarrass his nephews,
his sons, as a last alternative, threatened to leave him.
In the face of this threat, the father capitulated.

The rights and duties of the father-son relationship,
although they do not change in sentiment, will change in
content during the lifetime of the father. The main change
[421] in content will be a reflection of a change in property re-
593 lations. The Bedouin believe that this is the way it ought
577 to be; they say that

> A son must respect and obey his father. The son must do anything that he can to help and please his father. When the son grows up and begins to earn money, he must contribute generously to his father. A son pleases his father by giving him money and helping him to be comfortable.

593 In boyhood and manhood, the father has disposal over his son's
596 labor. As long as a son lives in his father's naja' this is
[464] so. One son, who worked for an American oil company in the
desert, regularly turned over his pay check to his father.
It is the father who decides where the son will live, and,
whether or not he will have his own domicile away from the
[591] main naja'. When the son marries and brings his wife to the
naja', he will usually set up his tent next to his father's
tent. The tent is given to the boy by his father. During
593 431 the son's growing-up period, he will be given, as gifts on
various occasions, a sheep or a number of sheep which will
be kept with the father's flock.

593 be kept with the father's flock. Only in the case of a
[591] man's owning, or using, a large piece of land in the pasture area of al-Qasr will his son live away from the main part of the *naja'*, i.e., away from his father's tent. The son then serves as his father's shepherd.

593 In the *'izba* sector of al-Qasr, the pattern is gener-
591 ally the same except that the son will be given a room in
184 the house rather than a tent when he marries. Since the land in this area is more scarce and a matter of official ownership, the son is not likely to have his own house during his father's lifetime.

593 When the son does marry, the marriage proceedings may
584 be initiated by either the son or the father. But, under no circumstances that I heard of, would the son approach the father with the idea of his marriage; the son should communicate his desire to marry, first of all, to either his father's brother or his mother's brother. As the Bedouins
593 say, "Marriage is an agreement between fathers." What they
584 mean is that marriage is an agreement between tertiary groups.
*613 A father upon hearing of his son's wish to marry, for the boy's uncle will immediately tell the father, consults with the head of his tertiary group about such a proposed marriage. This is not a formal procedure but, certainly, the father would not go ahead with the marriage without making the matter public. In other words, marriage in al-Qasr is a

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*613
[593] public corporate affair and not a private one.

The head of the boy's tertiary group then relays the information about the marriage to the heads of the other tertiary segments which make up the secondary group. Again, this is an informal procedure but all corporate representatives must be informed of, and must approve of, the proposed marriage. Thus is the corporate channel of communication kept open and the corporate network of authority relations maintained through a reciprocal exchange of rights and duties. It is, as Fortes (1949:209) has noted, the lineage principle which compels a man to consult and gain the support of his lineage-mates in any matter of importance, or even in trivial matters. Demands are channeled through the corporate lines, "for no jural act takes place except in the framework of the lineage system."

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[593] If the father should not consult the secondary group concerning his son's marriage--he may anticipate objections and consider his son's desires above those of the group--there are sanctions, forms of moral coercion, which can be applied by the group. First, a man may be fined if he goes through with an objectionable marriage; added to this, the man may be denied access to the preferred channels of marriage which exist within the lineage; lastly, dependent upon the gravity of the situation, the man may be threatened with expulsion from the lineage group.

593 The daughter and wife roles are also subject to the
dominant role of father in al-Qasr Bedouin society. The
father has virtually the right of life and death over his
daughter in certain situations. But in no case does he have
593 this right over his wife. The differentiation in right here
*613 is again a matter of the authority principle operating within
the framework of the lineage system. A man's daughter belongs
[851] to his patrilineage or authority group while his wife belongs
to the authority group of her father. There is an obvious
[582] exception to this statement about Bedouin society, for given
the practice of parallel-cousin marriage a man and his wife
can belong to the same authority group, the same tertiary
593 group. Even so, only the father has the right of life and
death over the girl who is his daughter. The Bedouins say,
"The bones of the girl belong to the father." There are two
593 situations in which a father may rightfully put his daughter
684 to death: when she is found guilty of pre-marital intercourse
(loss of virginity), or if it is proved that she has had any
extra-marital sexual activity. In either case, if the husband
were to kill the girl he would be guilty of murder and his
group would have to forfeit blood-money or be threatened with
retaliation. I heard of no such actual cases.

593 The father's major duty toward his daughter is to
584 provide her with "a good marriage." This, of course, parallels
his duty toward his son and emphasizes that a father is con-

593 cerned with his own and his group's status in marriage arrange-
[584] ments. One informant said that a rich man must marry into a
[581] rich group. The Bedouin have a saying which is relevant here:
*[613] "Your bait is equal to the bait into which you marry." Before
her marriage the girl's duty toward her father is to respect
and obey him. After her marriage "her only duty is that she
[758] must visit him from time to time. If he becomes sick, and
he has no wife, she must care for him and nurse him."

593 It was a common sight to see a Bedouin father fondle
834 his daughter of age six years or younger, but beyond this
age physical intimacy ceases. The Bedouin say that a father should not kiss or hold on his knee a daughter over the age of eleven. After the girl marries, a definite avoidance custom characterizes the father-daughter role relationship. The Bedouin say that the father will not see the face of his daughter after her marriage. This means that the married daughter remains veiled before her father, and even before her older brothers. This type of avoidance custom is rare by comparison with the cross-cultural data (Driver 1966).

593 A wife obeys her husband concerning all matters:
"she does not even leave the house without his permission." A woman may go and complain to her father if her husband does not provide for her, i.e., with food and clothing, or if he unjustly beats her or continually threatens to beat her. On the other hand, if a woman is in the wrong "it is

593 not considered bad for a man to beat his wife." In the case
593 of ill-treatment by the husband, her father may take the
*613 matter to the corporate head. Traditionally, the corporate
[792] head would order the husband to move his tent next to the
tend of the "holy man" or some other third party, so that
he would be dissuaded against such behavior. Another reason
[586] for this is so that the girl might have witnesses to support
her petition for divorce should the husband continue to beat
her. I heard of no wife-beating while I was in al-Qasr.

595 The Quran states that a man may lawfully take four
[779] wives, but that if he feels he cannot treat each of them
equally, he should take only one (Sura IV:3 and 129). The
Bedouins are conscientious in practicing this rule, though
595 perhaps not for religious reasons. If a man has more than
593 one wife, he must spend an equal amount of time with each.
Conflict between co-wives is lessened by the fact that a man
will have separate tents, or rooms in the case of a house,
for each wife. A man will not buy a dress or a piece of jewelry
for one wife without buying a copy of it for all other wives.
595 On a trip to the Siwa Oasis, I was accompanied by a man who
593 had three wives and wished to bring them a gift of basketry
114 upon his return. He was successful in buying two baskets
which were similar but could not find a comparable third in
[431] the oasis market. In dismay, he made a gift of the baskets
to me and returned with no souvenirs at all. One of my in-

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One of my informants, a wealthy man and a poet, said that since he could not love two women equally he would never take a second wife. He also said that he was unwilling to give his daughter to a man who refused to promise him that she would be his only wife.

593 Throughout his life, the father is dominant and his washuun is subjective. He is the master of his naja' and the [596] social behavior of his wife and offspring toward him has both a moral and a pragmatic aspect. They show respect and obed- [768] ience because "it is the decent thing to do;" further, just as he provides for their material needs while he is alive, so the property which he leaves them will sustain them after 428 his death. As we have already noted, in theory, the daughters [562] inherit one-half of the shares which the sons receive; in fact, females inherit only if they are the sole survivors of the male. But the surviving wife, or wives, will take a cash amount equal to their brideprice from the husband's estate. The Bedouins say that this price will be paid before any other inheritance shares are distributed. 768 In addition, the wife has the right to remain in her husband's house or tent, and it is the duty of the eldest son to look after her. She may remain at home until death, provided she never brings a man who may be considered a prospective husband into the house.

593 The rights and duties involved in the father-washuun relationship show that the ideal authority structure of the

593 family is a dominant-subjective one. But the rights and
duties of the father have no legal sanctions. His authority
grows out of the moral and mutual dependence, the common
interests and value, which hold the family together. The
593 authority relations learned in the family become the norms
183 of behavior to be applied by the individual in a wider-scale
867 network of social relations. The son learns the discipline-respect relationship which is the model of behavior between generations. The subjective role which the daughter plays in the father-daughter relationship prepares her for the role of wife.

Marriage and Kinship Relations

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The parallel-cousin, the father's brother's daughter, is the preferred mate in Bedouin marriage. Parallel-cousin marriage in al-Qasr is more of an ideal than a practice. In fact, parallel-cousin marriage is not practical in the case where social order depends upon the integration of a larger and clearly segmented population. Endogamy of this kind in this type of society works against survival in a double-edged way: economic security through cooperation with a larger group is discouraged, and political security through
171 coalition is undermined. In the Middle East, as elsewhere,
582 cross-cousin marriage is the normative practice which functions
"as a counterweight to the tendency of unilineal descent group-

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ing to harden social barriers" (Fortes 1953:29).

Wood (1959:74) notes that only 13.3 per cent of the marriages in a Palestinian Arab village, and 9.1 per cent of the marriages in a Syrian Druze village were parallel-cousin marriages. But although parallel-cousin marriage was infrequent, marriage within the secondary group was consistently high. This is true in general for the Middle East. Baer (1964:64) reports that 62.2 per cent of all the marriages in a southern Iraqi village were between members of the secondary group. Rosenfeld (1957), in a comparative study of three Palestinian villages, found the frequency of parallel-cousin marriage to be less than 13.0 per cent in all three villages while the frequencies for intra-secondary group marriage were 33.7 per cent, 31.5 per cent, and 55.8 per cent.

The function of parallel-cousin marriage has been variously explained. The early Orientalists claimed that this form of marriage "strengthened kin ties and kept property in the family" (Westermarck 1925:151). It was noted that the ties between cousins are stronger than those between spouses, that "blood ties are indissoluble but that of matrimony is very precarious" (Lane 1908:161). Patai (1962:170-173) seems to make parallel-cousin marriage a condition for society in the Middle East: this type of marriage functions to keep property in the family; it assures continuation of group harmony in that it presents no new adaptive social situations;

582 171 and, the individual has been socially conditioned to prefer his father's brother's daughter.

582 183 All of these explanations are as plausible as they are obvious. They are, in fact, the same explanations which the Bedouins themselves offer for their marriage ideal. But one cannot help noticing that the explanations offered actually concern an ideal in Bedouin social behavior, and not a practice. Theories showing the logic of parallel-cousin marriage are placed along side the fact that this type of marriage is statistically atypical.

582 428 [671] If, as Islamic Law decrees, the daughter did inherit some share of her father's property, then parallel-cousin marriage as an attempt to keep land in the tertiary group would be logical. But we know that usually the sons inherit all of the father's property, Islamic Law to the contrary (Levy 1957:245-246). In this case, parallel-cousin marriage can only be seen as an ideal which functions side by side with the other ideal of a girl's right to inherit.

582 171 Barth (1954), and Murphy and Kasdan (1959) have stressed the political advantages which attach to parallel-cousin marriage in the context of factional struggle. The general idea is that political differentiation between collateral branches of the lineage structure is intensified and political autonomy enhanced by the practice of turning affinal bonds inward. Parallel-cousin marriage then has the opposite

582 171 effect of cross-cousin marriage which is a way for kinship groupings to interrelate and to increase the integration of a larger population.

582 171 114 Such an explanation of parallel-cousin marriage may suffice for an analysis of politics in the tribal mountain villages of Kurdistan. Because Barth (1954:68) found that 48.0 per cent of the Kurd marriages were with the father's brother's daughter, we must assume that this type of relationship is politically significant. But we must question the fact that Murphy and Kasdan arrive at the same conclusion when dealing with parallel-cousin marriage as an abstract concept. If this type of marriage is really politically rational behavior, then it should be the normative practice in the Middle East. In other words, Murphy and Kasdan are explaining a phenomenon which exists only as a cultural ideal, and one which may have never really been a general practice at all--except in those few cases of adaptation to ecological extremes, such as pure nomadism and mountain tribalism. The few records which we have on the marriage practices of pre-Islamic and early Islamic Arabia indicate that parallel-cousin marriage was highly atypical in the Mecca and Hijaz areas. For instance, of the 71 marriages recorded for the Quraish only 9 were with father's brother's daughter and 32 of them were within the secondary group. In the Hijaz, only 15 of 113 marriages, or 3.3 per cent, were with the parallel-cousin (Patai 1962: Ch.6).

582 (Patai 1962:Ch. 6).

171 The point of this is that most of the Middle East's inhabitants are villagers dependent upon agriculture. The dominant form of marriage is not parallel-cousin marriage. As a matter of fact, marriage may or may not be considered exogamous depending upon the level of segmentation at which one wishes to draw the line for his definition of endogamy. Ayoub (1959) suggests that parallel-cousin marriage be considered only as an extreme expression of an overall preference for endogamy. She found in a sample of 514 marriages from a Syrian village that 9.1 per cent of them were with the parallel-cousin while 63.4 per cent were within the secondary group. She concludes from this that intra-lineage marriage is frequent enough that it cannot be accounted for by random mate selection.

582 In 'Ailit Ma'fas of al-Qasr, out of 197 recorded
162 marriages over a period of five generations the frequency of
*[613] parallel-cousin marriage was 11.1 per cent and marriage within
the lineage was 41.6 per cent of the total. Of these 197
[595] marriages, only 39 were cases of polygny and most of these
involved a man taking two wives (see Table 5 below).

582 The confusion over the presence or absence of parallel-
114 cousin marriage in the Middle East is related to the question
196 of whether or not the researcher and the native are talking
about the same thing. In Qasr, for instance, the term

[TEXT CONTINUED ON PAGE 116]

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	GENERATIONS					
	5th	4th	3rd	2nd	1st	Total
EXOGAMY						
Extra-Awlad 'Ali	3	11	20	24	3	61
Extra-'Ali Ahmar	1	2	2	1	0	6
Extra-'Aishaibat	1	3	6	4	1	15
Extra-'Ailit Ma'fas	0	1	15	12	5	33
	5	17	43	41	9	115 (58.4%)
ENDOGAMY (within 'Ailit Ma'fas)						
FaBrDa	1	2	8	10	1	22
FaBrSoDa	1	3	3	2	0	9
FaFaBrSoDa	0	0	3	10	5	18
FaFaBrSoSoDa	0	3	1	7	0	11
FaFaFaBrSoDa	0	0	0	0	3	3
FaFaFaBrSoSoDa	0	0	3	4	3	10
FaFaFaBrSoSoSoDa	0	0	1	2	0	3
FaFaFaFaBrSoSoDa	0	0	0	3	0	3
FaFaFaFaFaBrSoSoDa	0	0	0	0	3	3
	2	8	19	38	15	82 (41.6%)
Total	7	25	62	79	24	197

TABLE 5

HISTORY OF EXOGAMY AND ENDOGAMY FOR 'AILIT MA'FAS

582 114 196 [124] "parallel cousin" (i.e. bint 'amm) is perfectly interchangeable with the term "parallel-cousin once removed" (i.e. bint ibn 'amm, "daughter of the father's brother's son"). After I had familiarized myself with the genealogies of al-Qasr, I began to realize that many of my informants were using the term bint 'amm to refer to the parallel-cousin once, twice, or even thrice removed. When I pointed this out to one of the Bedouins, he replied: "So what, there is nothing forbidden about this type of marriage." Table 5 shows that this is indeed the case. 582 183 182 There are a number of cultural ideals which influence the practice of marriage in al-Qasr: endogamy is encouraged because it cements and intensifies corporate ties; exogamy is desired because it widens the web of kinship; men prefer younger women to older women and may utilize their cousin-right privilege to realize this preference.

582 829 The Bedouins of al-Qasr define the bint 'amm over a wide range. One informant said that "all of the girls of the Awlad 'Ali tribe are my bint 'amm, we are all one." Another said to me, that "any girl of the 'Ali Ahmar is a man's bint 'amm." And yet another informed me that "a man of the Qinaishat tribe will reserve his daughter for me before he will give her to an outsider." Ideologically, a bint 'amm seemed to be anything except the father's brother's daughter. This is quite convenient for the Bedouins because an ideological concept can be placed anywhere along the scale of actuality

582 depending upon the needs of the situation.

829 But one is able to differentiate between the various 582 meanings of bint 'amm in al-Qasr. First of all, the Bedouins 196 make an initial dichotamy between the bint 'amm daira (daira = *613 "homeland") and the bint 'amm shaqiiqa (shaqiiqa = "full sister"). The first term refers to any girl within the primary level of segmentation, i.e., the 'Aishaibat, and the latter term refers to the actual father's brother's daughter. Any marriage within the secondary group, i.e., 'Ailit Ma'fas, is referred to simply as a bint 'amm marriage--even if it is really a bint ibn 'amm marriage. A man has an actual moral claim upon his bint 'amm shaqiiqa: such a marriage is an agreement between their fathers who are brothers. A man cannot claim his bint 'amm daira but he might assume that if she is not claimed by her father's brother's son (ibn 'amm), his claim will be favored over that of an outsider.

582 The differentiation between these two types of cousin role is made in terms of rights and obligations which define social relations in al-Qasr. Social action is based upon these expectations of behavior. In al-Qasr, a man really does claim his bint 'amm shaqiiqa. If his claim is thwarted, he will attempt to do something about it, and whatever the consequences, his group is committed to back him in this [182] matter. Parallel-cousin marriage may be an important basis [578] for integration, or it may be the cause of bitter conflict.

584 582 A girl has the right to refuse to marry her ibn 'amm. But if she exercises this right, he can actually insure that she remains unmarried for the rest of her life. While I was in the field there were three cases of a girl refusing to marry her cousin. In one, the boy was persuaded into allowing the bint 'amm to marry his rival. In this case, the rival presented the girl's cousin with a sheep and a small cash sum. The Bedouins say that a man will claim his cousin even if he does not wish to marry her. He will wait until someone does wish to marry the girl, and then he will demand a payment from the suitor for the right to marry his cousin. In another case, a man and his daughter of a Marabit tribe came to al-Qasr to plant a small patch of barley during the rainy season. While they were there, the father married the girl off to a member of 'Ailit Ma'fas. The father did this despite the fact that her cousin back in her own territory had made explicit his claim to her. The father, when he returned home, * [613] [686] was fined 30 L.E. by his lineage, the money going to the girl's cousin as a "expiatory payment." The father could afford to do this considering the large brideprice which he received from 'Ailit Ma'fas, and the fact that he had no other sons or daughters to marry off meant that he need not fear the closure of marriage channels by the group. In the third case, a girl openly refused to marry her cousin because she loved another man. To avoid conflict, her father said that

582 [584] she could marry no man.

582 578 Most of the older Bedouins say that bint 'amm marriage as it is practiced in the desert is an evil, that it causes nothing but trouble. They say that if there are bad feelings between two men they will place claims upon each other's sister with the intention of preventing the girls from ever marrying. The younger Bedouins say that "it is better to marry the bint 'amm than to let a stranger take her." The [182] [571] [586] claim on the bint 'amm, of course, should be seen as a basis for social relationships between groups, regardless of any conflict it may or may not lead to. This is why the Bedouins say that a man "will never divorce his bint 'amm, because if he does that means that she is no good." It follows, then, that if "she is no good" none of her other paternal cousins will marry her. Implicit here is the reference to the making [182] and breaking of group ties. Similarly, to regulate and to maximize kinship ties, a man can claim only one of his father's brother's daughters. In the case where there is only one bint 'amm, her eldest cousin has first claim to her. 582 578 159 This sometimes causes conflict between brothers as the following informant's story indicates.

> The father of Salih and Aziz was dead which meant that Aziz, being the elder, would have to furnish the brideprice if Salih were to marry first. In fact, Salih wanted to marry his bint 'amm. Aziz refused him permission to do so: Aziz had first claim to the bint 'amm, and, also, he thought that the brideprice which

> 582 her father was asking was too high. Salih was angry,
> 578 so angry that he swore to kill any man who tried to
> take his bint 'amm. He went away to the Nile Valley
> 159 to earn enough money to pay the high brideprice. In
> the meantime, the cousin of the brothers came and
> paid Aziz for the permission to marry the girl. Salih
> returned, but, of course, he could not kill his own
> paternal cousin. He became ill and went into a sleep
> which lasted for three days. Salih had always been
> known for his powerful voice but when he awoke he had
> a very weak voice. Salih never spoke to his brother
> again. He died seven years ago without every marrying.

582 This story has aprocryphal aspects which announce this to be
578 an important issue in Bedouin culture. The subject of parallel-
829 cousin marriage is a complex one surrounded by controversy and
contradiction. The older Bedouins say that the practice is a
[182] source of conflict, but they will usually insist that at
least one of their sons marry his bint 'amm to insure the corporate link with the brother. In support of their complaints, they say that bint 'amm marriage is not morally sanctioned: "We do not like it and it is not right. But if we try to stop our sons from taking their cousins they will put a gun on their shoulder and go after her." On the other hand, this is contrasted with the complaints of the elders that their sons no longer respect their marriage habits, that they are marrying anyone these days: "Our sons resent the bint 'amm marriage because it is an agreement between fathers."
582 While I was in the field, three marriages took place; one was with the bint 'amm, and the other two were outside the secondary group but within the primary group, i.e., inter-lineage.

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178 Only one of the three weddings was conducted in the
traditional way with three nights of dancing previous to the
wedding and a large feast on the wedding day. The Bedouin
say that a man can no longer afford to do things the old way.
584 The procedure of the marriage arrangement begins when the boy
informs his uncle that he wishes to marry. Then the uncle,
[583] the father and other males of the group meet with the father
of the prospective bride to arrange the marriage, an important
part of which is the establishment of the brideprice (hulwaan
584 or mahr). Before going to see the girl's father, the boy's
*613 father consults with his secondary lineage group, as I have
already mentioned. Then he should wait for a period of
seven days, for the girl's father, "who has heard about the
marriage," must consult with his group and wait for a period
of one week during which time any member of the girl's
584 lineage may claim her. After this time, the ties proposed
[695] by the marriage are ritualized by two preliminary acts:
the writing of the contract (ma'azuum) between the fathers,
and the offering of a lamb by the groom which solemnizes his
intentions and the marriage (dabah fi-l-walliyya). After
[431] another waiting period of about two weeks, during which
time the boy buys gifts of clothing and jewelry and presents
them to the girl at her home, the wedding celebration begins.
585 On the day of the wedding, the girl is delivered to the
groom's residence. The girl remains in the groom's tent, or

585 room, until he arrives for the test of her virginity. The
groom "takes blood with his finger," wipes it on the white
toga which his bride had been veiled with, and hands it to
the older women waiting outside the tent. In the meantime,
[792] the two fathers have met with the _faqiih_ ("holy man") who
[675] witnesses the agreement on the _mahr_ payment. They read the
Fatiha of the Quran together and conclude the marriage contract.
The old women, carrying the toga with the virginal
blood on it--a symbol of honor to both of the groups concerned
with the marriage--parade around the guests' tent
showing it, while all the time letting out shrill victory
cries (_zaghaariid_ = "trilling cries of joy"). The toga is
then pinned-up on the side of the guests' tent for all to
585 see. Animals are slaughtered and the feast begins. The
574 central activity of the feast takes place in the guests'
[576] tent, the tent of the male guests. The groom's father, in
the traditional role of host, does not sit down to eat with
his guests but directs the seating and feeding of them.

585 Should it happen that the girl is not a virgin, the
684 wedding would end on the spot, and the girl would be sent
away or killed by her father. My informants said that this
has never happened in al-Qasr. One key informant told me
that such a thing never happens because the groom would never
permit it to be known that "his cousin was not a virgin." In
other words, the groom will get the blood from somewhere,

585 [684] probably by pricking himself, and will wipe it on the toga.

About two weeks after the wedding, the bride and
585 606 groom take a lamb or a goat and go to spend a few days with
[574] the bride's parents. The Bedouin say that the relationship
between the groom and his in-laws is extremely important.
The man should treat his wife's mother and father as if they
were his own. "When a man's father-in-law and mother-in-law
come to visit him, he must slaughter a lamb for them. He
must respect both of them. Remember, this man and woman are
the grandparents of his children."

585 The marriage, then, is only the first step in the
571 ritualization of new group bonds established between the
182 families of the bride and groom. Bonds are subsequently in-
[574] tensified through a process of visitation, gift-exchange and
[431] [782] sacrifice. The most important factor linking the two groups
*[613] is the actual presence of the bride in the midst of her hus-
band's group, for she remains, in terms of the patrilineal
585 principle, a member of her father's lineage. This is made
*613 perfectly clear by the fact that she is referred to, never
551 by her name but, by the name of her tribal grouping if she is
571 other than 'Aishaibi. If she is of the 'Aishaibat tribe,
182 she will be referred to as bint of so-and-so. Hence the
[193] Bedouins stress the importance of extra-group bonds by re-
ferring to the women in their residence group as al-Qinaishiyya
or al-Kamailiyya, for instance (-iyya is the Arabic feminine
marker).

182 marker).

*613 551 571 [585] In al-Qasr, if a man's mother is 'Aishaibiiya, he will refer to her as ummi ("my mother"): if she is otherwise, he will refer to her by the tribal tag, i.e. al-Qinaishiyya. A man will also add the name of his mother's tribe, to identify himself with the tribe and to symbolize tribal links, as an appendage to his own full name. The use of the maternal appendage by an individual links him to his mother's tribe through the idea of what Peters (1960:29) has called "the concept of the one womb of maternal origin."

In the case of al-Qasr, this maternal appendage refers to links with the mother's tribe at the primary level (see Figure 9). For instance, two brothers of the Bait Abd al-Malik might wish to differentiate between their maternal origins for some reason or other; one would refer to himself as Yunis Abd al-Malik al-Kamailiyya and, the other as Jabril Abd al-Malik al-Qinaishiyya. This is shown in Figure 9, page 125.

*613 604 Although a person is obviously related to the mother's tribe through the mother, this matrilateral structural relationship is expressed as one between the individual and [182] his mother's brother's tribe. The set of relationships surrounding the sister's son-mother's brother dyad is central to Bedouin political organization; it is the basis for the formation of relations of alliance along cognatic lines.

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571 FIGURE 9 - USE OF MATERNAL APPENDAGE OR SUFFIX


WIFE FROM KAMAILAT TRIBE
ABD AL-MALIK
WIFE FROM QINAISHAT TRIBE
YUNIS ABD AL-MALIK AL-KAMAILIYYA
JABRIL ABD AL-MALIK AL-QINAISHIYYA

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182 The sister's son-mother's brother relationship receives a high degree of attention in al-Qasr. No other kinship relationship except for that between the father and the son is better defined. Peters (1965:135) sees the importance of the sister's son-mother's brother relationship to be based on the need for economic symbiosis. This factor, but also the necessity for political cooperation, probably account for the central significance of this relationship. One chief political value, i.e., one type of behavior valued by the group and [181] relevant to the political process (see LeVine 1960), which [867] Bedouin children learn relates to the desire to avoid con- [865] flict, especially if it concerns their mothers' tribes. Children are taught that any quarrel, however slight at first, could conceivably grow to become a large-scale tribal war.

604
182 war.

The Bedouins of al-Qasr are conscious of the practicality
604 of external kinship ties. The role of mother's
602 brother becomes a significant symbol for the maintenance
182 of these ties. Boys are supposed to respect their khal
("mother's brother") in order "to avoid wars which could end
the world." The Bedouins claim vehemently that "no quarrel
can happen between me and a member of that tribe because
my brother has married into that tribe." They make the value
[181] of the mother's brother link very explicit: "Marriage into
other tribes makes quarrels impossible."

604 There are many Bedouin proverbs pointing to the place
538 of the mother's brother in the social structure. Proverbs,
in any culture, trace out areas of behavior which have become
important. Kenneth Burke (1957:256) says of proverbs, that
they are "strategies for dealing with situations. In so far
as situations are typical and recurrent in a given social
structure, people develop names for them and strategies for
handling them. Another name for strategies might be attitudes."
[829] The Bedouins likewise look upon proverbs as templates for behavior. They say that "we should heed proverbs
because they are the words of the elders; they are like a
white flag which marks the way, and people should not go
beyond these flags."

A most common proverb which elevates the mother's

604 538 brother to special place in the social structure states that
[539] "Two-thirds of the boy belongs to the khal, and he is like the
father: the remaining one-third is divided equally between
the father and the khal." The Bedouins are always quick to
point out to the stranger, such as I was, that this means
there is only one-sixth of the boy which belongs to the
father. A clearer case of the ideology of kinship versus
[539] descent could not be had. Another proverb has it that "the
good which you see in a boy comes from khal khalu ("the
maternal uncle of his maternal uncle"). Any kinship relation
may be the basis for a new network of social relations by
making use of the classificatory principle. The Bedouins
[539] exaggerate the status and role of the mother's brother by
saying that "when a boy does good or bad, one wants to know
the name of his khal not the name of his father." This
statement, which favors cognatic links over patrilineal ties,
is not true but such an attempt at emphasis indicates that
this relationship is something of value in the Bedouin society.

604 In the case of any conflict "between his tribes," the
578 Bedouins say, "the boy must support the tribe of his khal."
This, of course, does not mean that the individual should
take up arms against his patrilineal corporate group, but
that he should seek to mediate the conflict. The political
562 593 value of conflict avoidance and conflict control is also
554 182 578 conspicuous in the dual role which the mature female plays

562 593 in Bedouin society, that is, the role of wife-daughter. The
554 principles of patrilineality and cognation do not work against
182 each other when the girl marries outside her corporate group,
578 nor does her new dual role present a case of role conflict.
562 593 On the contrary, the wife-daughter role functions to bind to-
554 182 gether two groups which are structurally differentiated by
578 the rule of patrilineality. During time of peace, the wife-
*613 daughter acts as a bond-maker by carrying gifts back and
[431] [628] forth between the two groups, often bringing some of her
[574] younger patrilineal relatives back to her husband's house or
562 tent for short visits. During a time of conflict or war, the
593 Bedouins point out, she is the only person who can cross the
554 battle lines unharmed. She is a match-maker as well as a
[726] [584] peace-maker. Often she influences the selection of mates by
individuals in both her husband's group and her father's
562 group. The Bedouins say that "after the bint 'amm, a man
593 should marry his bint khal ("mother's brother's daughter")
554 because she is like his bint 'amm." Usually, over a period
582 of a few generations, a given direction in marriage is sustained (see Figure 10), and it is one function of this wife-daughter role to accomplish this important political action.

562 The role of wife-daughter, then, may be seen as one
593 important aspect of what Fortes (1953:33) calls, "complemen-
554 *613 tary filiation," the essential mechanism which provides the
182 link between the corporate groups of al-Qasr society and the
kin groups of the parent who does not determine descent.

000 kin groups of the parent who does not determine descent. A
182 corollary aspect of the filiation principle in al-Qasr is the
601 602 practice of collaterally extending the term, *khal*, to include
604 many others besides the real mother's brother. This usage
[114] of classificatory terminology, like that in the case of *bint*
'amm, leads to confusion for the fieldworker. When an in-
601 604 dividual marries into an outside group, or even within the
561 secondary group, the wife's brother becomes *khal* not only to
182 the offspring of the marriage, but to all the children (*awlad*)
at the same generation level as the offspring. All boys of
the age of sister's son will refer to his mother's brother
as *khali* ("my mother's brother"). Besides extending the web
of kinship, this practice also has the function of uniting
age-mates of the local descent group.

604 Throughout this discussion of mother's brother, I
582 have been stressing the fact that the sentiment which a
[829] Bedouin develops toward this person is to be construed as a
political value, i.e., a behavioral disposition relevant to
the political process. It is patent then that the sister's
son-mother's brother relationship should be more crucial in
exogamous marriages, for in these cases cognation becomes the
principal mechanism for establishing authority relations and
effecting political alliance. In endogamous marriages, cog-
nation complements the other structural principles which
define the corporate group, and makes it the corporate group
par excellence.

000 par excellence.

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867 The inculcation of political values is part of the socialization process. A Bedouin boy is taught that his khal is a very special person, and one whom he should admire. It is commonplace in al-Qasr to hear small boys matching the exploits and skills of their maternal uncles, bragging and exaggerating about their khal: this one is a great horseman, and that one is a great marksman with the rifle. On the other hand, if the mother's brother is from within the local group, rights and obligations toward him will be structured in terms of other kinship roles which take precedence according to the

604 rule of descent. For instance, in the ideal-typical case of
602 bint 'amm marriage the mother's brother of sister's son would
582 also be the father's father's brother's son in relation to ego. This would mean, in another way, that ego's mother's
[605] brother is also ego's father's parallel cousin. Male parallel cousins "are like brothers," and so ego would be expected to behave toward this person not as a "mother's brother" but as a "father." Whereas the boy enjoys a certain freedom of expression and comradeship with his exogamous mother's brother, he would have to pay "father-like" respect and obedience to his endogamous mother's brother.

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582 The crucial importance of the khal, and the political significance of the bonds which this role represents, is made clear in the following statement of an informant who contrasted

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582 the exogamous and endogamous mother's brother.

> If the khal is from outside the tribe, we can do no wrong to him if he does no wrong to us. If the khal is a member of the tribe, he is respected; but not like the khal from outside the tribe. The feeling between a man and his khal is much stronger if the khal is from outside the tribe. Within my own 'aiela (secondary group), I respect the maternal uncles of Bait so-and-so as much as I respect the maternal uncles of my own bait (tertiary group).

[829] Ideas and sentiment about the mother's brother as they are related to complementary filiation should be interpreted as having a definite influence on marriage practice and politics in al-Qasr.

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*613 A sample from the marriages of 'Ailit Ma'fas (see Figure 10 below) shows that endogamous marriages are no more frequent than those which function to bring a new member into the corporate group--although the man's spouse never really becomes a member of the lineage. [587] Only five of the seventeen marriages were within the 'aiela, and one of these was a case of sororate which acted to maintain an already established tie. Six of the marriages were with groups not belonging to the Awlad 'Ali tribe. In each of these cases, with the exception of one, the marriage represents the establishment of ties between groups who live in areas contiguous with one another. Four of the marriages shown in Figure 10 were within the primary segment, i.e., with other lineages of al-Qasr; three out of these four were contracted with

[TEXT CONTINUED ON PAGE 133]

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
'Umar Hassan Ma'fas =
1. Lazumi of 'Aishaibat
2. Suwaitat of Jumi'at
3. Masamir in Libya
4. Kàmailat of 'Ali Ahmar
Abd al-Malik =
1. Bait Kailani of Ma'fas
2. Kamailat of 'Ali Ahmar
3. Sister of #1
Yunis = 1. FaBrSoDa
2. Jumi'at
Jabril = 1. FaBrDa
Ya'qub = 1. Lazumi of 'Aishaibat
2. Suwaitat of Jumi'at
Abd al-Latif = 1. Harabi
2. Bait Braik of Ma'fas
3. Lazumi
4. Suwaitat of Jumi'at
5. Dawlat of 'Aishaibat

FIGURE 10

Endogamic and Exogamic Marriages in Bait 'Umar of 'Ailit Ma'fas

*613 'Ailit Lazumi, the other lineage, along with 'Ailit Ma'fas,
582 considered to be the most powerful in al-Qasr. In the fourth
[423] case, Abd al-Latif's marriage into 'Ailit Dawlat, this individual
owns an olive orchard in Dawlat territory, adjacent
to that of Ma'fas, which he purchased from a member of his
*613 wife's lineage before their marriage. In every case, with
582 one exception, marriage ties are intimately related to property
421 relations, cognation with local contiguity. The two groups
become politically entwined, and property relations become
a basis for authority relations.

*613 All things considered, complementary filiation is as
important in Bedouin society as it is in other societies:
"The bilateral family is the focal element in the web of
[533] kinship" (Fortes 1953:33). As one Bedouin wedding song puts
it: "The bride is the flower of the stem," the stem here
symbolizing her tertiary group.

583 The amount of brideprice which a man is expected to
554 pay will depend upon his status as an "outsider" or an "insider,"
556 and his position on the prestige scale which is figured largely
in terms of wealth. A man adds to his prestige and reputation
when he pays beyond the "going price" to obtain a bride for
his son. On the other hand, if a man is an "outsider," he is
expected to pay well beyond the normal brideprice for the
privilege of marrying into the family, and he receives no
additional prestige unless he goes even higher than what is

583 expected. The price is set by the corporate group but can
554 vary, and usually does, from one tertiary segment to another.
556 The wealthier tertiary segments tend to have higher bride-
prices. This is explained by the fact that they occupy a
"higher status" on the prestige scale, and also, by the fact
that they wish to carefully control and maintain this status.

[435] For instance, "between cousins" of 'Ailit Ma'fas the
mahr is fixed at 60 Egyptian pounds, but "a man can pay more
out of generosity if he wishes." Hence, a member of the
Ma'fas lineage can increase his prestige within and without
his family by paying beyond that which is expected of him.
In this case, "generosity" is the variable related to a man's
583 place on the scale of prestige. On the other hand, in another
554 "poorer" lineage, 'Ailit Zagharat, the *mahr* is 30 L.E. to
556 members of the in-group but "the stranger will pay 60 to 80
435 L.E., according to the father's wealth." The largest and
most famous *mahr* payment in the area was made by the wealthiest
man in al-Qasr who paid seven camels (each worth about 150 L.E.)
for his son's wife. The highest fixed *mahr* in al-Qasr was
that of Bait Bu Tarram of 'Ailit Lazumi. It was 100 L.E.
for members of 'Ailit Lazumi and, accordingly, much more for
strangers. This *mahr* is in contrast to the average for the
area which is about 30 L.E. within the secondary group.

586 Divorce is a forbidden topic of conversation in al-Qasr.
521 Any talk about one's wife, mother, or sister is considered in-
784 judicious.

586 judicious. Another issue which enters here is the desire on
829 the part of the individual to maintain his privacy--especially
where an infringement of it could result in a change of his
tax status. The Bedouins think that it is wise to keep the
government uninformed about the exact size of their family.
586 When I first asked a question concerning divorce, I was
829 politely taken aside and told that I do not speak about
123 divorce to a man, and especially when his sons are present.

586 Two cases of divorce took place while I was in the
field. In the one, the wife claimed that her husband was
impotent. She took this complaint to her father who then
confronted the husband with it; the result was a divorce.
Although the man denied that he was sterile, this was his
second childless marriage and he felt it wise not to contest
the case. It becomes very important to know, in the case of
Bedouin divorce, which partner cannot meet the requirements
of the marriage. If it is the woman, she will return to
her father's house and the father must then return the price
of mahr (brideprice). If it is the husband, when his wife
returns to her father's house he must pay her (not her father,
in this case) a sum, called mu'akhkhir al-sadaaq ("the balance
of the marriage contract"), which is equal to that of the
original mahr. Actually, there are three times when a mahr
[583] price may be paid in al-Qasr: the original mahr is paid at
[968] the time of the marriage; the mu'akhkhir al-sadaaq is paid
[595]

586 [583] [768] [595] at the time of divorce (if the husband is in fault), and also at the time of the husband's death; and, sadaaq al-musaama ("price of friendship") is paid to the wife when her husband takes a second, third or fourth wife.

586 158 The second divorce case which happened while I was in al-Qasr involved, what seems to be, an instance of psychotic behavior. A girl, who had married shortly before I arrived in the field, would fall into a deep sleep every time she entered her husband's house. Each time her father would come for her and take her home until she had recovered. But upon her return, three different times, she became ill again. Finally, her father and the husband agreed that this marriage would not work, and the father returned the mahr to the man. This case lasted over the period of almost a year while I lived in al-Qasr. I suggested to the father that perhaps his daughter did not wish to be married to this man but he assured me that "she loved him very much."

586 If the girl's father is dead, so that she cannot return to his house at the time of divorce, she will go to live with the brother who needs her services. 586 587 [593] [583] It then becomes the duty of the brother to make another marriage for his sister, and in the case that he does it becomes his right to claim the mahr for himself. The Bedouins say that virginity, or the lack of it, in the case of the divorced woman is no issue; just so a man knows "she is from a good family."

586 Naturally, according to the rule of patriliny, all
851 children from a marriage belong to the husband and become
*613 members of his lineage. Should divorce occur while a woman
is nursing, she will take the child with her and it will be
returned after weaning. Sometimes the husband will permit the
wife to keep one child--always a girl--in order "to keep her
company."

587 The practice of the sororate has been noted. The
Bedouins also believe that "a man should marry his brother's
widow so that she will have someone to help her with the
children." But I have no data on the frequencies of these
12 practices. When I gathered my data on marriage, my informants
58 would give me only the name of the tribe or lineage into which
a man married, and never did I get the name of a man's wife.
[829] (One lineage in al-Qasr, entirely refused to give me data
on genealogy or marriage because, as one leader said, "it is
not decent to speak of these things with people.") Sororal
595 polygny is forbidden (Quran IV:23), and the Bedouins say
that a man cannot marry more than one bint 'amm. Marriage
182 practices, such as sororate and levirate, I interpret as
[587] patterns which maintain structural continuity and political
advantage. The custom of permitting a man to marry only
[582] one of his father's brother's daughters may be seen as a
precaution against intensifying authority relations and the
degree of segmentation.

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this aspect of the corporation clearly.

The concept of the corporation as a sociological construct was first used by Maine (1904). The concept was a central one in the work of Max Weber (1947; 1954). As it was used by Maine, and later by Radcliffe-Brown, the corporation as a collection of rights and duties functioned primarily to maintain struetural continuity in society. Weber was concerned mainly with the political aspects of the corporation; this follows from his theoretical and empirical focus on political action and the exercise of authority. The two main elements of the corporate group as a social relationship according to Weber are that it is limited and defined by rules of admission, and that the administration of the group is carried out by functionaries, incumbents of political roles. An explicit structure of authority is the key to Weber's concept of corporate group: "Whether or not a corporate group exists is entirely a matter of the presence of a person in authority, with or without an administration staff" (1947: 145-146). Weber did differentiate analytically the corporate group from the other concept, first defined by Maine (1907: 108-110), the "Corporation sole" or "Public officer." However, he insisted that one could not exist without the other. Any analysis of the structure of authority in society must focus on both of these concepts.

The conditions for the formation of a corporate group

The Corporate Group

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*613 Two key concepts have derived from Radcliffe-Brown's (1952:32-49) notion of kinship as a reflection of juridicial relations. Fallers (1956:14), discussing the expression of these concepts in segmentary societies, refers to them as "the lineage principle and its corollary, the corporate lineage group." For Radcliffe-Brown, kinship organization represented social order and this was the basis of societal survival: a social system in order to survive must conform to certain conditions. 121 602 571 Adaptive mechanisms, expressed through the institutions of a society, consist of a "network of relations between individuals and groups" (1952:43). These social relations represent a collection of rights and implied duties which reside either with an individual or a group. Though reference is made to the place of the individual in society, the idea of the group is central in the theory of Radcliffe-Brown.

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621 Most important is the group referred to as "corporation:" a collectivity of individuals "who jointly exercise some right or rights," and who share common interests deriving from residence and kinship (1952:45). The corporation has rights _in rem_ over its members; thus, the group imposes certain duties and obligations on other persons with respect to the rights of a particular person who is a member of the corporation. The law of blood-revenge is seen by Radcliffe-Brown to bring out

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are, as Radcliffe-Brown correctly stated, the existence of kinship ties and common residence. But, as Weber noted, the expression of corporation is absent without a structure of authority. The corporate authority structure functions to allot group membership and political status; to formulate and enforce a rule of succession governing the transmission of property and roles; and to define and assign rights and duties of group members toward others. Group rights over members, as rights _in rem_, produce mutual rights for members which entitle them to protection against external enemies. Hence the corporate group is characterized by internal functions which define and control relationships between members, and external functions which identify the group within a given structural context where it has jurisdiction and governs its relations with other elements in this environment. Within this context, the corporate group is representative of any individual member. Both the internal and external functional aspects of the corporate group operate through the office of a specialized role whose incumbent has authoritative and representative powers. This is the role, or office, which Maine referred to as the "Corporation sole," and which Weber later called the _Leiter_ ("chief").

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In al-Qasr, the corporate lineage group is composed of agnates who reside together in a _mintaqa_, and who accept as legitimate and morally binding an explicit process of

*613 decision-making which allocates values in society. This
621 process orders the internal and external political relations
571 of corporation members. The corporate office which acts to
regulate internal affairs, and to represent the group in
external affairs is a unique status in al-Qasr having only
one incumbent at a time. In Bedouin society, then, the
corporation is to be considered distinct from the corporate
sole (Smith 1966).

621 The corporate group, although based on common interests
626 and values, is not an integrated body simply in terms of
571 consensus. Coercion also maintains corporate relationships.
[183] Consensus derives from the code of the group (Nadel 1951:
161), a set of common ideals. But in practice, the group
must exert coercive pressures, sanctions, against individual
behavior which threatens the welfare of the collectivity.
Coercion may be seen as a necessary condition for what Durkheim
called "mechanical solidarity." In al-Qasr, as in most
societies, the desire for conformity to norms predicates
coercive measures; coercion and consensus derive from the
same cause, i.e., the requirement of some degree of integration.
621 The corporate group and its authority structure is the
571 mechanism which insures, through political means, the necessary
182 degree of integration for the survival of al-Qasr
[121] society. In order to understand the phenomenon of social
change occurring in al-Qasr, politics as an aspect of culture

621 should be thought of as an adaptive mechanism. This will help
571 us to understand two structural features of the Bedouin politi-
182 cal system: the establishment of cognatic alliances and the
121 differentiation of political roles. In tradition and modernity,
the integration and the survival of the Bedouin social system
have depended upon the proliferation of these features.

121 It is quite obvious that "a corporation can only form
621 itself on the basis of a common interest" (Radcliffe-Brown
571 1952:45); that any social relationship, or political group
[626] is characterized by both "pragmatic contents" and "moral
aspects;" and that "political sentiments" as part of the
group's moral and legal norms are enforcible by secular
sanctions brought to bear on individuals or groups (Fortes
121 and Evans-Pritchard 1940:20). But the discovery of what
underlies a "common interest," "moral aspect," and "political
sentiment" is a subtle problem which varies from culture to
culture. It deals with what Weber referred to as "problems
of meaning," and ultimately, the legitimation of the normative
system. What makes morality and sentiments meaningful and
sanctions legitimate is a value, a connecting element between
the social and cultural systems, "the constitutive symbolism
which grounds the identity and solidarity of the community"
(Parsons 1966:17). It is unlikely that such a value will
ever be obvious, no matter how essential it is, because

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> a tradition is not a mere observed fact like an existing custom . . .; it is an idea which expresses a value judgment. A certain way of acting is regarded as right; a certain order or arrangement is held desirable. The maintenance of the tradition is the assertion of this judgment (Radin 1935:63).

121 For al-Qasr, I have traced social ideas, social action,
181 and social order to a central traditional value which promotes
621 group consciousness, solidarity, and corporateness. Such a
571 value does not derive from Islam, for Bedouin tradition
171 preceded Islamic tradition, and much of the latter derives
from the former. According to Robertson Smith (1903:26-62), the structurally significant unit in pre-Islamic Arabia was the hayy: "a collection of people of the same blood" who lived together and fought together. But, that which actually bound the members with a sense of corporateness to the hayy was the law of blood-revenge. For Smith, the key element in the Bedouin corporate group was the existence of a covenant of blood responsibility. The group was bound by a compact of mutual responsibility, the group had rights in rem over its members, and within the group there could be no blood-feud. Around this idea of mutual responsibility revolve the traditional values which are the basis of corporate grouping in Bedouin society: "The greater part of the traditions of the Arabs turns on blood-revenge and war . . . " (Smith 1903:26).

Smith developed his analysis of Arabian society in terms of certain structural principles: patrilineal ideology,

121 residence, cognatic ties, and contractual relations are all
181 seen to be structurally important in early Arabian society.
621 Structural differentiation into groups is based on the
571 lineage principle and sustained through "the law of blood-
171 revenge." And it is important to note that the *hayy* was
characterized by a structure of authority, it was "guided
in war and on the march by one chief" (Smith 1903:44). The
121 law of blood-revenge as an expression of group rights *in rem*
621 and a system of mutual protection point up the importance of
571 contractual relations in Bedouin society. Whether or not
675 real blood ties are involved, a contract must be present or
there can be no corporate group. Contract legitimizes authority
and provides the basis for the lateral extension of the group;
it is primary though it functions coordinately with a principle
of cognation, residence, adoption, etc. Contractual ties
121 operate outside of kinship at times but will always be validated
621 by it eventually, "for a legal fiction is always adopted to
571 reconcile an act with a principle too firmly established to
675
608 be simply ignored" (Smith 1903:62). "Blood brothers," in
597 al-Qasr, are defined both biologically and ideologically. As
[602] noted in the case of al-Qasr, there were at least three cases
of contractual adoption in which one individual and two whole
corporate groups "wrote their names into the books of the
'Aishaibat tribe" (*katab jinnsiyya 'Aishaibiyya*). The integration or adoption of elements in al-Qasr takes place on the

121 basis of an agreement "to share the good and the bad" by
621 571 all parties concerned. Once the integration is effected,
675 patrilineal ideology and legal fiction succeed in concealing
608 597 the jointure.

The concept which derives from ancient Arabia, and
621 which expresses fully the structural principles of Bedouin
571 society is that of *'aqila*. The *'aqila*, in al-Qasr, is the
*613 head of the corporate group, the tertiary unit or *bait*. A
[884] person becomes part of the Bedouin jural body when he reaches
the age of 15, begins to keep the Ramadan fast, and is expected
to pay his share of the blood-money. At this time, a man
621 acquires rights over his corporate lineage-mates and they
571 *613 over him: they claim a share in the indemnity ("blood-
672 money" - *diiya*) of each other, and are under obligation to
[682] contribute equal shares to any *diiya* which becomes due from
the group as a whole. Further, each corporate member is
morally bound to support his lineage-mates by swearing the
oath (*yamiin*) on the behalf of any who are accused of false-
hoods in the course of litigation. All of these rights and
obligations are guaranteed by the presence of an *'aqila*.

*613 The tertiary *bait* is the minimal corporate group. It usually includes three to five generations of members. Tertiary units which are descended from a common ancestor combine through contractual relations into the maximal corporate group, the secondary unit or *'aiela*. Beyond the secondary level

*613 of lineage segmentation, ties based upon any of the structural principles may obtain, but they are not ritually legitimated by the principle of blood responsibility. A functional corporate group cannot be defined beyond the secondary level. The Bedouins of al-Qasr make an explicit distinction between a group which is _'asaba_ and one which is not. The term _'asaba_ derives from the verb, "to bind," and is translated as "paternal relations" or "agnates." The tertiary and secondary segments are considered to be _'asaba_. Only these segments can be represented by an _'aqila_.

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The _'aqila_, the focus of authority in the corporate tertiary group, is an elected head. The concept of _'aqila_ is itself an expression which entails mutual support and collective responsibility: the concept of _'aqila_ is equivalent to that of corporate group. Wehr (1961) translates the word _'aqila_ as "a clan committed by unwritten law of the Bedouins to pay bloodwite for each of its members." In pre-Islamic Arabia, the _'aqila_ must have been "the juristic personality" (Weber 1954:157). In early Islamic Arabia, we know the penal codes of the ancient schools of law came to differentiate between the offender (i.e. the individual) and the _'aqila_ (i.e. the group) concerning the payment of blood-money. During Umayyad times, the _'aqila_ was the group listed on the _diwaan_ (account books), and was considered a tribal grouping of some order which was responsible for paying the _diiya_

*613 196 174 682 (Schacht 1953:207).

So, in pre-Islamic Arabia and later, the _'aqila_ and not the culprit was responsible for payment of the _diya_ or for retaliation. And the _'aqila_, which means every single corporate member, risked its life in the face of retaliation from without. According to Islamic law, only the killer may be retaliated upon. But in pre-Islamic Arabia and in al-Qasr, any member of the killer's corporate group may be revenged upon. The Bedouins say that revenge should be taken upon the best man of the family, for this will cause the most damage. Both the legal schools of Madina (Maliki) and Kufa recognized the principle of self-help, or collective responsibility, for payment or retaliation in cases of homicide and wounding. And, according to Coulson (1964:49), "they both called the group which shoulders the burden the _'aqila_."

*613 The _'aqila_ in al-Qasr, which is an uncentralized system, is a corporate sole and a political office. It functions both in internal domestic (i.e. within the tertiary segment) authority relations, and at the level of external authority relations. The _'aqila_ is a symbol of his corporation and, as such, speaks for its members in matters of social regulation and the enforcement of political decisions growing out of conflict situations. Political order in al-Qasr depends [571] upon the values inculcated and the type of authority exercised within the corporate group (Southall 1956:27). The model of

571] The model of
*613 corporate authority structure, i.e., that which makes the
[593] corporation-corporate sole relationship meaningful, is the
[604] father-son-father's brother triad. The submission of the son in the fundamental dyadic and triadic relationships of Bedouin society is carried over to the, just as axiomatic, relationship between corporate member and corporate sole. Peters (1965:127) is enlightening on this point when he says

> [593] All men of a corporation, in any event, "speak with one word" at a moot, and a son, by his assent to the common view, also supports his father; in so doing he yields to the political authority of his corporation, and not that of his father.

The structure of authority relations which obtains within and between the groups of al-Qasr, then, is reflected in the idea or concept of _'aqila_. It is meaningful to the Bedouins. The social order which it represents is legitimate because of the moral attribute and obligation which attaches to its symbolization in the political office. At the same time, this focus or office of authority tends to become pivotal for the extension of a sphere of moral judgments and authority relations along with the expansion of social structural relations and promotion of common interests. Easton (1959) has referred to this expansion as "the political community," and Middleton and Tait (1958) as "the jural community." At all levels of society, conflict and consensus take place in terms of certain ideas concerning good and bad, operational

*613 571 concepts of what is desirable and undesirable. "Every structural arrangement," Raymond Firth has said, "has its moral attributes of obligation" (1961:212). This is most essential in an uncentralized system, such as that of al-Qasr, where no institutions exist outside of the corporate group for the introduction of new principles of organization and association.

181 578 577 *[613] [571] Among the Bedouins, the conceptualization of an authority structure in the role of _'aqila_ relates to the high value which they place upon a peaceful and orderly world. Children in al-Qasr are taught that one of their serious duties in life is to mediate conflicts, especially, when they are potentially [554] situations which may lead to protracted conflict. And, in a segmentary society where a member's status links him to many different groups in differing degrees of importance, all quarrels are potential group wars. The Bedouin child knows that his elders, and God, want him to follow "the path of the good" (_tariiq al-khair_). Mainly, this involves helping others to follow "the path of the good" by "bringing them back together" when they are in conflict. When two individuals quarrel and refuse to return to "the path of the good," this *[613] brings _'aib_ ("shame") to each of the persons. When two individuals quarrel, setting off a group conflict, this brings _'ar_ ("shame") to the respective corporate groups of the individuals (Abou-Zeid 1966). Against individuals who persist [626] [784] in the ways which cause _'aib_ to himself, or _'ar_ to his group,

181 certain sanctions of both a secular and sacred nature may be
578 imposed: expulsion from the group and the curse of God are
577 626 ultimate coercive interventions in the process of conflict
784 regulation.

*613 The role of _'aqila_ presents the corporate group as
181 "one person" in opposition to other similarly defined groups.
182 Thus, Fortes says (1953:25), "the way a lineage system works
571 depends on the kind of legal institutions found in the society," and this is a function of its political organization. The Bedouin political organization is characterized by two aspects: the internal political system, and the external political system. Both systems are regulated by the same values and norms. Authority relations within the corporate level are founded on values inculcated in the socialization process, and prescribe political behavior for all who come under the jurisdiction of the respective _'aqila_. Authority relations outside the corporate level are conducted through the _'aqila_. This political role as a functional part of the lineage structure operates in terms of kinship values; politics at the external level are characterized by no new principles.

*613 Politics in al-Qasr, and elsewhere for that matter, is
571 a process of problem-solving and conflict regulation between
182 individuals and groups. Political action occurs at different levels of the lineage structure, and each is demarcated as a focus or sphere of authority. But all authority stems from

*613 571 182 the central value and traditional institution of _'aqila_ which has always existed and is still binding. All authority is referable in some way and in varying degrees to the office of _'aqila_ which alone represents "the legitimate exercise of imperative control" (Weber 1947:153). Because private interests clash with the duties and obligations of social roles and corporate interests, political action, or the exercise of authority and the regulation of conflict, may be assigned to levels of
128 the social structure and analyzed in this way. In this chapter we have discussed the social structure of al-Qasr, and have touched on what gives structure and meaning to political action. We have seen that the structure of authority operating through the office of _'aqila_ deals with both an internal and an external system of political relations, a corporate group and a societal unit. The purpose of the following discussion will be to make clear some of the abstractions and concepts used here in outlinging structure and authority in Bedouin society.

CHAPTER IV

THE STRUCTURE OF AUTHORITY

The 'Aqila as a Political Role

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The role of _'aqila_ is the single specialized role in Bedouin political organization. Although it is possible to differentiate another authority role, that of the _shaib_ (elder), this role is primarily a kinship role and in this sense is not an institutionalized political complex of rights and obligations. The _'aqila_ represents a unique political status in al-Qasr having one incumbent at a time: "The present incumbent is merely a link in a chain of indefinite extent, the temporary custodian of all the properties, powers and privileges which constitute the office" (Smith 1966;117).

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The role of _'aqila_ is instituted at the tertiary structural level of the lineage system. In theory, each tertiary _bait_ has its own _'aqila_. But, in fact, not every tertiary segment is large enough and, therefore, powerful enough to constitute an authority group in the political structure of the lineage. [128] In the next section, we will draw a distinction between authority groups and tertiary groups. The _'aqila_ acts alone in juridical matters concerning his own

*613 segment. He acts in concert with other *'awaaqil* (plural of
554 *'aqila*) of the tertiary segments of his secondary group when
571 lineage matters call for decision-making at this level.
*613 Tertiary segments are replicate groups descended from one
571 ancestor, they operate with a common ideology pursuant of
183 common interests and goals. As we shall see, this common
675 ideology is expressed in a kind of code, or contract, which
all members of the group swear to uphold and abide by according
to the principle of blood responsibility. Tertiary codes in
[181] al-Qasr are a reflection and an affirmation of a wider system
of values and norms which bind the Bedouins of the Western
Desert together into a political system. This wider normative
[671] system is expressed in the customary legal system of the
Bedouins known as *'awaiyid Awlad 'Ali* ("the customs of the
Awlad 'Ali tribe").

*613 The primary duty attached to the office of *'aqila* is
578 the regulation of conflict. It is worth noting here that
571 conflict regulation is not equivalent to conflict resolution.
554 The latter process carries with it the intimation that the
causes of conflict have been treated and resolved, that conflict
has been eliminated. Nothing could be further from the truth
in a segmentary society where the various segments actually
constitute conflict groups; consequently, conflict between
groups or individuals who represent groups may be contained
but never forgotten. Conflict is an ongoing process among

*613
578 the Bedouins. Conflict regulation treats the expressions of
571 social conflict and not its causes.

554 The *'aqila* regulates conflict between the members of
his tertiary segment, between this group and the other groups
of the secondary unit, and between secondary units of the
tribe. He operates in both the internal and external systems
*613 of authority relations. The *'aqila* may pre-empt the authority
578 of the *shaib* in the sphere of familial authority, though, the
593 Bedouins say, this seldom happens because the son is willing
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[596] to obey his father. Having been reared in the culture, and
as a future father himself, the son supports the respect-
*613 discipline principle of Bedouin society. But in extreme cases,
578 such as the threat of a father to disown his son, the explicit
593 approval of the *'aqila,* and of all the *'awaaqil* of the secondary
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554 corporate group, is necessary. This is the procedure in all
cases of banishment. In one case (which I document below), a
man disinherited his younger brother with the formal approval
of his *'awaaqil*.

*613 The tertiary group in Bedouin society is by definition
682 the blood-vengence group. However, in view of the common
578 values and pragmatic interests of its members, the secondary
[181] group fulfills this function. Traditionally, when revenge
[681] killings were carried out according to the *lex talionis*, it
was usually at the hand of some member of the victim's tertiary
group. In the case of protracted conflict, such as extended

*613 feuds or war, secondary groups, and even whole tribes, became
682 involved. If the tertiary group is in the structural sense
578 a blood-revenge group, the _'aqila_ is the corporate sole of the
*613 blood-revenge corporation: an important function of the
554 _'aqila's_ office derives from this. The _'aqila_ is responsible
682 for the collection and distribution of the blood-money. It
578 is this specific authoritative function of the office which
is the necessary condition for the existence of a corporate
group. If there is no _'aqila_ to collect blood-money, then a
kinship segment is not a corporation and it will merge into
another group headed by an _'aqila_ in order to realize collective
benefits.

*613 Bait Braik of 'Ailit Ma'fas (see Figure 8) had no
554 _'aqila_ while I was in the field. Their _'aqila_ had recently
died and his office had not yet been filled. The person who
[666] would succeed to the office was known by all, but still his
election or formal appointment did not take place. In other
*613 words, the office of _'aqila_ will remain vacant until conflict
554 and the need to regulate it force an election. The Bedouins
578 were pleased about the vacant _'aqila_ office in Bait Braik:
"Thank God that it is vacant. When it is necessary, we will
meet and name an _'aqila_." Any of the _'awaaqil_ of the lineage
[682] can mediate conflict, but no _'aqila_ is willing to take the
responsibility of collecting the blood-money from another man's
bait.

*613 682 435 436 178 [571] Each member of the corporate group contributes an equal share to the blood-money due in a compensation case. The blood-price for intentional killing is presently set at 400 L.E. In the olden days, the blood-price was 100 camels. If a man had no camels, he was expected to contribute his share in cash, the value to be assessed at current market prices. Eventually, cash came to replace camels altogether in [231] the exchange of blood-money. This reflects the growing unimportance of the camel in the Western Desert. Today, there [556] is only one man in al-Qasr who may be considered a "camel owner," and he is the richest man in the area. Since at least 1935 the blood-price has been met with cash.

*613 682 554 571 When it has been decided that the right of blood-revenge as a retaliatory measure is to be waived, the _'aqila_ must go to each member of the group for his share of the blood-money. Each _'aqila_ of the secondary group does this, and together their collections make up the 400 L.E. blood price. For instance, if there happens to be 400 men in a secondary lineage group, then the share which each contributes will be 1 L.E. The _'aqila_ must account for his own group's share even if this means making up deficiencies from his own pocket. It is for this reason that the _'aqila_ "should be rich." Though the _'awaaqil_ of al-Qasr are generally members of the "status group," this is not always the case. Hussain, the man destined to become the _'aqila_ of Bait Braik, was comparatively poor. He admitted to this fact, and said that for this reason he was reluctant to become an _'aqila_: "The _'aqila_ is responsible for his _bait_.

*613 682 554 571 He must pay the diiya with the shares which he collects from the others. It makes no difference if the 'aqila must pay with his own money. He is responsible for this matter before the whole tribe."

*613 554 682 The collection of the diiya is only one aspect of the process of conflict regulation, but it stands out as the fundamental manifestation of the office of 'aqila. In the course [692] of office, an 'aqila will spend much more time arbitrating disputes, but it is his responsibility concerning blood-money which defines his position and his jurisdiction as corporate 682 178 [626] ones. During the present period in al-Qasr, the practice of blood-revenge has all but disappeared as a mechanism of social control. Nevertheless, the possibility of its happening is not too remote. The payment of blood-money is the alternative [619] [721] [829] to blood-revenge, and blood-revenge is a condition for all-out tribal warfare--something which the Bedouins look upon with horror. One informant once likened a primary-level war between the 'Aishaibat and the Kamailat (should it ever occur) to *613 682 554 578 "the end of the world." The 'aqila as a representative of a group can prevent war by preventing reciprocal homicides: by presenting his share of the blood-money he regulates conflict and promotes integration. The blood-money is usually paid over a period of from one to two years. In this case, the [571] notion of "debt" represents a contingent, institutionalized social relationship for the purpose of maintaining political order.

000 order.

*613 554 666 The _'aqila_ is elected by the elders of the secondary lineage group. The election usually takes place when these men are gathered for some festive occasion, such as a wedding. [578] The name of the man chosen to succeed to the political office will not be made public until it is absolutely necessary, i.e., in the case of conflict within the man's _bait,_ or more especially, in the case where blood-money is due. According to the Bedouins, the only qualification for the office of _'aqila_ is wisdom--the ability to arbitrate disputes. *613 554 556 On the other hand, it is implicit that the _'aqila_ be a member of the "status group." Prestige commands respect and obedience, and prestige in al-Qasr usually comes with wealth. In general, the _'aqila_ is an elder, i.e., one with wisdom, and a member of a wealthy and influential family.

*613 554 [428] Technically, the _'aqila-ship_ is not inherited, but succession tends in this direction. An _'aqila_ must "speak the good and show men how to follow the path of the good." Not all men have the ability to do this, and, the Bedouins say, it is natural that such a great gift resides with a particular family "because the son learns from the father." All of the _'awaaqil_ in al-Qasr claim that they knew how to settle disputes before they became _'awaaqil_. If they had not, they would not [428] have been worthy of the office. Actually, the choice of an _'aqila_ is a restricted one: the office may pass, according to

*613 554 428 [666] the unilineal rule, only to the son or the brother of the former _'aqila_. In Bait 'Umar, for instance, the office went from father to son to brother (see Figure 8). The election amounts to a choice between the son or the brother, and partiality is usually shown towards the eldest of the two candidates.

The _'aqila's_ term of office may be terminated by the members of the _bait_. Such an action may be the result of *613 554 687 ineffectiveness due to old age, or it may stem from a violation of the norms of the office by the incumbent. Two cases of an _'aqila_ being impeached were reported to me. One, which did not take place in al-Qasr, was brought about when the _'aqila_ was accused of taking a bribe, and favoring one party to the conflict over the other. The second case, which happened about fifteen years ago in al-Qasr, involved an _'aqila_ from 'Ailit Ma'fas. This man informed Egyptian officials that his fellow tribesmen were storing guns and ammunition beyond the quantity permitted by national security laws. Not only was this man removed from his _'aqila-ship_, but he was also expelled from his tertiary segment, and hence the tribe. *613 554 But, in most cases, term of office is ended by death or senility. The Bedouins say: "An _'aqila_ will be removed if he can no longer solve problems; if he says bad things about his tribe; if he is too old, or too lazy; in other terms, if he is not a good man, he is removed."

*613 554 578 692 Conflict regulation, in the formal sense, is the province of the 'aqila. All complaints should be taken before the 'aqila. In al-Qasr, every individual has certain rights, and when any of these rights are infringed upon he may demand a redress of wrongs: he demands his rights, or exercises haqq al-'Arab ("the right of the Arabs"). The haqq al-'Arab is opposed to the haqq Allah, "the right of God," which concerns crimes against religion (i.e., wine-drinking, apostasy). The dichotamy represents private claims over against the claims of a religious state which is characteristic of Islamic society. [688] In al-Qasr, crimes against religion have never occurred, and if they did they would be handled in Marsa Matruh by the local shaikh ("holy man").

*613 554 69 The litigation process is initiated when an individual appears before his 'aqila with a claim, and the statement: "I do not wish so-and-so to take any of my rights." The 'aqila first attempts to persuade each party "to return to the path of the good," to come together and to cease quarreling. This type of moral persuasion is preliminary to a full court-hearing in which both parties will appear with witnesses before their respective 'awaaqil, and other "third parties" who aid the 'awaaqil in their decision. The decision reached by the court is morally binding upon both parties. [671] [178] According to recent innovation in Bedouin customary law, the details of the litigation and the decision reached by the court are to be recorded

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554 on paper in triplicate, one copy going to each litigant and
69 a third copy to the chief of police of the Marsa Matruh sector.
[671] In practice, though, a copy usually goes to the litigants, but
[178] not to the chief of police (who had not a single Bedouin court
case in his files).

*613 As is not the case in Islamic law, in Bedouin customary
695 law the decision of the judge may be appealed. The system of
692 appeals may even function at the level of familial authority,
[671] i.e., the son may, in theory, appeal a ruling by his own
father. The Bedouins insist that this is an important right
of every man. In the situation where a man wishes to appeal
a decision of his own *'aqila*, he will generally take his claim
to another *'aqila* of his secondary group. When an appeal is
to be made, it is done with the permission of the *'aqila* who
rendered the original decision. The one who appeals his case
does so with the understanding that the decision returned by
the court of appeal will be final and binding. Further, if
[681] the court of appeal concurs with the findings of the original
court, the plaintiff pays a double fine (twice the original
fine), and also pays his own *'aqila* an expiation fee (*kubaara*).

69 The Egyptians have preferred to leave the Bedouins of
648 al-Qasr to settle their own disputes except in the more serious
[682] criminal matters. Police from Matruh will enter homicide cases
[685] and those conflicts over property rights which threaten to
explode into tribal warfare. But these types of conflict have

69 648 been infrequent in al-Qasr. The *'awaaqil* of al-Qasr and the
police of al-Qasr have an agreement that Bedouin problems are
the jurisdiction of the desert leaders, and that the police
will intervene only when their help is requested. The
Bedouins claim that in the 1930's, the Egyptians tried to do
away with Bedouin law but soon discovered their own penal code
609 to be inoperative in the desert. Against "outsiders," the
69 Bedouin is duty bound to protect his kinsmen, and hence justice
could not be satisfied. One *'aqila* said that "only the *'awaiyid*
*613 *Awlad 'Ali* can maintain order because it stops wars through
682 182 payment of blood-money." If a Bedouin, for some reason or
692 other, takes his case to the police in Matruh, he will be
648 returned to his *'aqila*; he will be told that they can do
*613 nothing for him without the permission of his *'aqila*. There
are exceptions to this rule which complicate modern Bedouin
692 judicial procedure. For instance, in cases which involve
685 government property, such as olive trees and government-
648 operated water systems, a man may legitimately deal with the
*613 police. In one case in al-Qasr, a man's goats destroyed a
number of his neighbor's olive trees. The police decided that
the owner of the goats should pay the value of the trees. In
another case, a man who had constructed small earth dikes in
such a way that rain water was prevented from flowing onto
his neighbor's land was forced against his will to remove the
obstruction. His neighbor had taken his complaint to the

692 police and not to his 'aqila. This was a serious case because
685 the police were forced to imprison the dike-builder for two
648 days before he would agree to their demands. The two men in-
*613 volved in the conflict were from different lineages, and it
soon became necessary for Bedouin justice to intervene even
after the matter had been settled by the police. The
'awaaqil of each man met, along with other notables of the
tribe, and investigated the area where the dikes had been;
they listened to witnesses and tried to calculate the amount
of water which each man should receive. In the end, the
decision of the police was upheld.

692 Although, ideally, litigation should be instigated
691 through the office of the 'aqila, alternatives do exist. As
*613 noted in discussing the values of Bedouin society, it is the
[577] moral obligation of each and every person to moderate between
conflicting parties; any one conflict situation may be modera-
ted by many well-meaning parties. Or, if a person suspects
prejudice on the part of his own 'aqila, he may choose to take
627 his claim to another 'aqila, or third party. The notion of a
554 third party to a conflict, when it does not refer to the 'aqila
692 or a close kinsman who may act as an arbitrator, has reference
to a non-institutionalized role in al-Qasr. This role-holder,
the Bedouins call rajal khair ("good man") or qawaal al-khair
("the speaker of the good").

"Role differentiation implies organization" (Levy

554 1952:165), and the role rajal khair along with the other roles
627 concerned with political action, the 'aqila, shaikh, and 'umda,
692 represent political organization in al-Qasr. Although the role of rajal khair is not institutionalized to the same degree that the others are, we shall see in the next chapter that it is an important one for an understanding of power relations in al-Qasr. All of these roles carry with them some type of right to make binding decisions in matters regarding conflict regulation. That is, an individual should take his
*[613] claims to the 'aqila, but may take them to any of the other political specialists. In any of the cases, the litigants concerned become bound by the decision of the third party.
*[613] But only at the hand of the 'aqila can a decision be made
[695] which will effect a whole group, i.e., only an 'aqila can
[682] give judgment against a corporation for the blood-money in a case of homicide (Schacht 1953:328).

691 If, however, blood-money is not an immediate concern,
692 the litigants may utilize any and all of the political roles
*613 available in the judicial system. A statement from one of my
554 informants, an 'aqila, is useful here.
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> The bait is made up of thirty or fourty men, and there is one most important man (rajal kabiir), the 'aqila. The 'aqila puts an end to problems, he sees who deserves this and who deserves that. Problems must be settled. It happened five or six years ago that I and my paternal cousins quarreled over land at Wadi Raml. I went to the police station and complained to the shaikh of the 'Aishaibat. I asked him to choose a person to judge

> 691 between me and my cousins, according to Bedouin law
> 692 (*yinafth al-'awaiyid bainaana*). I went to the *shaikh*
> because my cousins did not agree that we go to the
> *613 *'aqila* right away. We agreed that the *shaikh* would
> choose the third party, and the judgment would be
> 554 binding on both of us. The *shaikh* chose Bu Halaiqa as
> 629 the third party, and Bu Halaiqa chose three others as
> consultants. (Two of the three were *rajal khair*, and
> the other was an *'aqila*.) The judgment was that my
> cousins were in the wrong. They were fined 10 L.E.
> and a *dhabiiha*("blood sacrifice"). 'Ali intervened and
> did not allow my cousins to pay the fine. He had them
> write a paper stating, that if they resume this quarrel
> in the future they must pay the fine plus another 10 L.E.
> fine. (Hajj 'Ali is a rajal khair.)

695 Sometimes the Egyptian police must be brought into a judicial
648 affair to insure the execution of a judgment. In one case,
696 an individual in al-Qasr did not accept the decision of his
'aqila; his *'aqila* wrote the decision on paper and sent him
to another *'aqila*. The second *'aqila* agreed with the first,
but the man also refused this decision. The second *'aqila*
wrote his decision on paper and sent it to the *shaikh* of the
'Aishaibat in Matruh. The *shaikh* summoned the culprit and
sent him to the police station. Finally, the police were able
to convince the man to pay his fine, and also his expiation
fee to his own *'aqila*. My informant said that this was a
minor affair, and that had it been a serious offense committed
by the man he would have been threatened with expulsion from
the corporate group.

*613 As the corporate sole, the *'aqila* has political authority
554 which is legitimate and morally binding on all who wish to
571 maintain their status in the group and tribe. Any individual

*613 554 571 or whole tertiary group may be expelled from the lineage group, or if they so desire, they may resign their status in the group. In either case, and both cases rarely occur, the permission and approval of the _'aqila_ are required. Or, I should say, the approval of the _'awaaqil_ is required, for both cases represent structural changes which affect the juristic personality and constitution of the maximal corporation. The legitimacy of the _'aqila_ and the whole political structure are tied up together. Social structure and authority roles are both objects of legitimacy, as Easton (1965:278-301) says, and hence the legitimacy of the _'aqila_ in al-Qasr flows from the structural legitimacy of a segmentary political system. Thus in al-Qasr, politics operates through authority groups in opposition to one another, each represented by an authority role. An _'aqila_ once told me that "the tribe of the _'aqila_ gives him the authority to judge between its members." Another _'aqila_ said that "the _'awaaqil_ are bound [675] by a contract (_rawaabit_) to perform their duty on behalf of their _bait_." The _rawaabit_ ("bonds") we will discuss in the next section.

Spheres and Focus of Authority

121 Authority, as it is used in this study, refers to the Weberian notion of "imperative control" (_Herrschaft_); that is, "the probability that a command with a given specific

121 content will be obeyed by a given group of persons" (Weber 1947:152). In the next chapter, it will be useful to distinguish between the concept of authority and that of "power." Mainly, we are concerned here with the legitimate exercise of authority in the regulation of conflict involving members of an "imperatively coordinated group" (1947:153), or corporation, at both the internal and external levels of the Bedouin political system.

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571 It has already been stated in the last chapter that political action occurs at all levels of the social structure; it is not peculiar to the external relational system. The tendency to differentiate structurally between "domestic relations" and "political relations" began with Evans-Pritchard (1940:148) who analyzed the Nuer political system as "an expanding series of opposed segments from the relations within the smallest tribal section to intertribal and foreign relations." This definition could serve as a description of the political system of the Bedouins of al-Qasr, or of any other segmentary society. Fortes (1949; 1953:26) first used the terms "domestic relations" and "political relations." He arbitrarily limited political action to the lineage structure, and assigned "person-to-person relations" to the sphere of kinship or domestic organization. Southall (1953), who applied the ideas of Max Weber, isolated what he referred to as two different types of authority: the "familial" and

121 114 *613 571 the "political." Previous studies, then, indicate that a conceptualization of a division between spheres or foci of authority relations is fundamental to an understanding of the political aspect of segmentary societies. There is no need, however, to relegate the political to any particular social area if "we generally mean by 'political,' things that have to do with relations of authority . . ." (Weber 1947:155). Conflict, and the need for it to be regulated, occur at all levels of the lineage system, from the family to the tribal level. Authority must be exercised if the system is to [554] persist. The legitimate exercise of authority in al-Qasr is expressed through two structures: an authority role and authority groups, the 'aqila and the tertiary segments, the corporate sole and corporate groups.

121 554 The analysis which follows considers society as a composite of authority groups and authority roles. Roles are the basic elements of social structures which "order the human beings who make up the society" (Nadel 1957:11). The authority role is a focus for the study of politics at all levels of the social structure, and, also, the basis for extending role analysis. For the most part, political action in al-Qasr, from the family to the tribal levels, takes the form of the exercise of legitimate authority. Power, as illegitimate control, exists in the form of extra-processual authority roles which we will discuss in the next chapter.

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554 Here we are interested in the way in which roles and groups, and a whole structure of authority, operate over a wide area.

In the previous section, I presented the 'aqila as a specialized political role in Bedouin political organization. As Radcliffe-Brown (1940:xviii-xxi) has pointed out, in the political analysis of segmentary societies it is necessary to isolate incipient authority roles which function to make decisions concerning rightness and wrongness in disputes and which represent the community, giving voice to public sentiment. The notion of society as a functional system of authority roles and authority groups is clear in Radcliffe-Brown's treatment of politics.

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*[613] Local groups of political significance, i.e., authority groups, are identified by the status position, or office, referred to as 'aqila. The political relations within a local tertiary group, and between it and similar groups of a lineage and tribe, must be seen as relationships between authority roles.

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*613 In the domestic field of political relations, the authority of the Bedouin 'aqila shades into the familial authority sphere of the household head (shaib). The shaib, as senior agnate of his naja', is dominant over the other males of his tertiary sub-unit, but not to the extent that he can pre-empt any of their rights as members of the tertiary corporate group.

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[578] A shaib, by virtue of his age, is supposed to possess the wisdom which it takes to regulate conflict.

600 to possess the wisdom which it takes to regulate conflict.
*613 Theoretically, as one _'aqila_ said, conflict should be stopped
578 at the familial level, either by the father or the paternal
593 uncle, and should never reach the level of the _'aqila_. Once
[604] before the _'aqila_, conflict assumes new structural poses, or
different orientation in authority relations. Authority here
is differentiated in terms of the context: the father's authority relates to the familial structural level, and beyond this
level the father _per se_ cannot exercise legitimate authority.
*613 The _'aqila_, who is responsible for internal order and external
578 relations exercises legitimate authority at each level of the
182 political structure. The authority of the _'aqila_ is checked
and prevented from growing into naked power in that any single
'aqila must consult with the other _'awaaqil_ of the secondary
segment concerning matters which may concern the structural
nature and continuity of the group.

*613 In many respects, the authority structure in al-Qasr
559 corresponds to that defined for the Lugbara of Uganda
571 (Middleton 1960). The structural levels (see Figure 7 above)
171 of 'Ailit Ma'fas (secondary), Bait 'Umar (tertiary), and 'Ait
Abd al-Malik (sub-tertiary) are approximately equivalent to
Middleton's major, minor, and minimal lineages (1960:7-9). But
[596] whereas among the Lugbara authority roles are purely kinship
roles, i.e., genealogically senior heads are responsible for
internal control and representation, among the Bedouins of

*613 554 571 171 596 al-Qasr there is definite role differentiation between the shaib and the 'aqila. The incumbents of the two roles may have exactly the same genealogical position in the tertiary segment, but they will never have the same social status. There are as many elders as there are households, but there is only one 'aqila for each group. Another difference between the Bedouins and the Lugbara is that in the latter society a kinship role which doubles as an authority role does not occur above the familial (i.e. shaib) level.

*613 554 596 The difference between the shaib and the 'aqila is the distinguishing factor between informal and formal social control. The shaib acts in accordance with the values implied by Bedouin authority structure: the action of the 'aqila is legitimate in the explicit terms of the Bedouin authority structure. These two spheres of political action represent familial and internal (or domestic) levels of authority and authority relations. Legal matters which affect the whole tertiary segment are dealt with at the internal level. 627 596 685 Affairs of a purely personal nature and of lesser importance are dealt with at the familial level of authority. For instance, it happened that the dog of one man killed a neighbor's chicken. No one sent for the 'aqila. They sent for the shaib of the woman who owned the chicken, i.e., they sent for her husband. He spoke to the woman, his wife, to determine the value of the chicken and this price he demanded as compensation

627 596 685 *[613] from the owner of the dog. If the man had refused to pay the price of the chicken, as demanded for settlement, then the next step would have been to inform the appropriate *'aqila* to bring greater force, and perhaps greater sanctions, to bear.

*613 571 682 Bait 'Umar (Figure 8) is one of the authority groups of al-Qasr, a corporate group represented by a corporate sole. Both the tertiary corporate group and the corporate sole are referred to, according to the ancient tradition of the Bedouins, as an *'aqila*. This group is a blood-revenge group, and is referred to as *'umraa al-dam* ("donator of blood"), or *waliiy al-dam* ("executor of a blood feud"). It is the group which [681] decides whether or not retaliation will be taken according to *lex talionis*, or if blood-money as compensation for the loss of one of its members is acceptable. The Bedouins say that no amount of money can replace a human life, that blood-money is only a means to prevent the loss of more men. This group, when it functions as *waliiy al-dam* ("executor of a blood feud"), has the authority to demand retaliation; to waive it entirely; or to demand, along with blood-money, that the guilty party be punished by his *'aqila*. When this group pays or receives blood-money it does so as a partner in the larger corporate group, the secondary segment. The principle of collective responsibility interplays with the other structural principles of Bedouin society. The convergence represents

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the conversion of small authority groups into larger ones. Political order depends upon this convergence of principles and the affirmation of the values and institutions which the principles imply. In turn, the resulting political organization helps to maintain the "body of interconnected moral and legal norms" (Fortes and Evans-Pritchard 1940:20).

When blood-money is paid out, all of the tertiary groups contribute an equal share. When blood-money is received, the group of the killed man receives one-half of the diiya and the remainder is divided equally among the members of the secondary group. The distribution of blood-money was explained as follows:

> The one-half of the diiya which goes to the murdered man's bait belongs to his sons. If the man was not married and had no sons, then the money goes to his brothers or those closely related to him (bi-dam), like his uncles or paternal cousins. If the man was married and had only daughters, and they had no brothers, these females can claim the diiya only if they are married to someone in the tribe. (Here the word tribe refers to the secondary lineage group.) If they are married to someone from outside the tribe, the female will take no money because her husband will not contribute to the next diiya in the tribe.

This is the ideal situation. But blood-money distribution is relative to the level at which conflict takes place, i.e., depending upon the nature of the relationship between the authority groups concerned. For instance, it means a great deal if the groups concerned are of the same secondary segment.

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In 1947, party A of Bait 'Umar, 'Ailit Ma'fas accidentally shot party B of Bait Muhammad, 'Ailit Ma'fas. Since both parties were of the same family, _'awaaqil_ from 'Ailit Lazumi, a third party, were called to adjudicate. The _'awaaqil_ decided that a _diiya_ of 400 L.E. should be paid to Bait Muhammad. Of the 400 L.E. _diiya_, Bait 'Umar was to pay 200 L.E. and the rest of the secondary group, with the exception of Bait Muhammad, was to pay 200 L.E. The brother of the killed man said that they would accept the 200 L.E. from Bait 'Umar, but would take only 100 L.E. from the rest of the family. The 300 L.E. _diiya_ then went to the brothers of the killed man who had no sons and whose father was deceased. The _diiya_ was paid in one week's time.

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Although I have tended to use the terms tertiary segment and corporate group interchangeably, the two are not structurally synonymous. Not every tertiary segment is a corporate group or authority group. Just as tertiary corporate groups combine into larger secondary corporate groups so do tertiary groups which lack size and property, i.e., political power, ally themselves together under one _'aqila_ to form corporate authority groups. Subsumed under the secondary segmental heading of 'Ailit Ma'fas (see Figure 8) are eleven structurally separate tertiary segments, but the corporate authority structure of 'Ailit Ma'fas includes only five groups. Thus there are only five politically significant authority groups, or _'awaaqil_, which represent 'Ailit Ma'fas to the outside world. Six of the tertiary segments are numerically small enough that they have found it politically advantageous to consolidate "in sharing the good and the bad." The combination of tertiary segments into authority groups is as follows:

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Authority Group		Components	No. of Persons	Total Persons
I.	Bait 'Umar	Bait 'Umar	73	73
II.	Bait Kailani	Bait Kailani	67	67
III.	Bait Firjani	Bait Firjani	31	43
		Bait Salih	12	
IV.	Bait Muhammad	Bait Muhammad	27	30
		Bait Yunis	3	
V.	Bait Braik	Bait Braik	6	32
		Bait Abd al-Hadi	6	
		Bait Fadl	3	
		Bait Mahaishi	8	
		Bait Maraja	9	
			245	245

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These five groups represent the political structure of 'Ailit Ma'fas. Authority relations between the 245 members, and between the five groups, proceed with reference to the five _'awaaqil_ of the secondary group. External relations of 'Ailit Ma'fas, either in the form of demanding rights from other secondary segments, or of meeting obligations toward these groups, proceed through the five _'awaaqil_ "speaking with one voice." One group in 'Ailit Ma'fas, Bait Musa, migrated to the Nile Valley sometime during the 1930's. Bait Musa no longer possesses jural rights or obligations in the lineage. But jural relations are not always severed as a result of moving. 'Ailit Shraif, another secondary group in al-Qasr, has one _bait_ in the Nile Valley which maintains its

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jural status in the lineage by contributing its share of the blood-money.

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The consolidation of tertiary groups into authority groups may shed some light on the dual process of fission and fusion common in segmentary societies. The structure of authority groups which make up a secondary group is a reflection of the way in which tertiary segments grow and segment, or decline and fuse, into other groups. In the process, one group, or many small groups of agnates, are incorporated under a name other than that of their genealogical ancestor. Through time, and in the interest of group solidarity and political order, real biological ties may be obscured: the regulation of political relations favors ideological jural ties over genealogical ties which indicate lineal differences. With reference to 'Ailit Ma'fas, perhaps in the future, Bait Yunis, with only three members, will be totally submerged into the authority group, Bait Muhammad, so that the individual, Yunis, will be dropped from the genealogy of 'Ailit Ma'fas. Then the descendents of Yunis will be linked to Muhammad, the founder of Bait Muhammad, by an artificial link, though the patrilineal ideology will define it as a descent link. During the period of solidification, there is apt to be confusion concerning the exact nature of kinship ties. For instance, in al-Qasr, there was a great deal of argument about whether or not 'Ailit Ma'fas was once a segment of 'Ailit Lazumi. As I

*613 571 178 have noted previously, informants very definitely disagreed over the matter; by looking at the two genealogies one is unable to say one way or the other. The process of fission and fusion in the form of secession and adoption is another instance of genealogical manipulation through patrilineal ideology. In this case, patrilineal ideology also may succeed in concealing real biological links in favor of political relations. We shall see below how secession and adoption actually function in Bedouin society.

*613 675 554 571 We have said that the authority of the *'aqila* is legitimate at each structural level. The Bedouins of al-Qasr often legitimate the authority of the *'aqila* in writing, and, at the same time, make an explicit statement of social compact which outlines the pragmatic and moral values of the corporate group. The corporate charter in al-Qasr is a document of self-interest which defines expectations and consequences for corporate members: it governs the conduct of members in situations relevant to internal order, and gives the *'aqila* powers of representation in external affairs. The charter is a [181] reflection of the high value the Bedouins place upon security and order, and is a condition for a legal system of wider *613 675 571 scope. Max Weber (1947:120) has expressed the idea of social relationship as contract so well that it is worthwhile to quote him extensively here.

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> The meaningful content which remains relatively constant in a social relationship is capable of formulation in terms of maxims which the parties concerned expect to be adhered to by their partners . . . The more rational in relation to values or to given ends the action is, the more is this likely to be the case . . . The meaning of a social relationship may be agreed upon by mutual consent. This implies that the parties make promises covering their future behavior, whether toward each other or toward third persons. In such cases each party then normally counts, so far as he acts rationally, in some degree on the fact that the other will orient his action to the meaning of the agreement as he (the first actor) understands it . . . But in part also they are motivated each by the value to him of his "duty" to adhere to the agreement in the sense in which he understands it.

The idea of "duty" makes collective responsibility meaningful, and the authority of "the third party," or 'aqila, legitimate.

The ties which bind the corporate group may be defined in terms of the structural principles of kinship and residence. But these ties must be affirmed and further defined by contractual obligations which inform an authority structure. Further, the legitimacy of authority relations beyond the tertiary level is based mainly upon contractual alliance. The relationship between contract and the other structural principles is a mutually reinforcing one. Kinship and residence alone cannot be the basis for the existence of a corporate group. The Bedouins of the Western Desert in their statements of contractual alliance not only proclaim the conditions for brotherhood, but, also, the consequences for those who do not meet these conditions. A Bedouin, or a whole corporate tertiary

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segment, may choose to belong to, or to secede from, the larger corporate group. This element of choice helps to define the authority of the corporate sole. Authority is illegitimate, i.e. it is mere power, when control is exercised against the will of the subjects (Weber 1947).

Above, I have said that authority is legitimated beyond the tertiary level, i.e., at the secondary level, through contractual alliance. By that I mean the same agreement on values is replicated by the authority groups of the lineage. The five authority groups of 'Ailit Ma'fas are bound together by what the Bedouins call "the bonds of the _'awaaqil_" (_rawaabit al-'awaaqil_). Below I present a number of examples of the _rawaabit_ from al-Qasr. Then I continue on to show the nature of the corporate group, and the dynamics of structure and authority in Bedouin society.

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BONDS BETWEEN THE 'AWAAQIL OF 'AILIT MA'FAS

1. Every member of the tribe who has proved against him an intrigue concerning the _'aiela_,
2. every member of the tribe who claims against his brother a case which has no basis,
3. every member of the tribe who shifts a border of the borders of a land from one place to another place,
4. every _'aqila_ is responsible for his followers and must present each with the right direction if he does not convince him first (i.e. if he fails at moral discourse, he must arrange the court session),
5. every member of the tribe who departs from the opinion of his _'aqila_ and who follows the wrong and erroneous

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6. every member of the tribe who submits a complaint without first consulting his _'aqila_, (i.e. who goes to the government before the _'aqila_),

7. every member of the tribe shall back the members of his _bait_ against an opponent without right,

8. every member of the tribe who has proved against him the showing of sympathy toward another tribe knowing that this tribe is antagonistic to his own tribe,

9. every member of the tribe who has proved against him that he helped a relative in payment or in a quarrel against his brother.

we signed this document and declare that these customs are valid from the date of today and everyone who disobeys them pays a _dhabiiha_ ("lamb") and 10 L.E. without any objection if any of the items of the above items is proven against him.

Date: August 8, 1953
The _'awaaqil_ (signatures or stamps):
  Abd al-Ruwaf (Bait Firjani)
  Hussain 'Umar (Bait 'Umar)
  Shi'ath Abd al-Hadi (deceased, Bait Braik)
  'Atiya 'Umran (Bait Kailani)
  Khalid Idris (Bait Muhammad)

114 619 675 *613 In the _rawaabit_, or contract, just noted the term "tribe" refers to the secondary segment (_'aiela_). Murray (1935:315n) has also pointed to an instance of the Bedouins' use, in a formal document, of the word _qabiila_ ("tribe") when reference to "some smaller division, such as _'eila_ is clearly meant."

675 681 [183] *613 Through the _rawaabit_ norms are expressed and action is oriented with respect to them. If it is otherwise, sanctions may be brought to bear to insure conformity to norms. The minimal sanction which the _'aqila_ may impose is the _dhabiiha_

675 ("blood sacrifice") and a fine of 10 L.E. The most serious
681 sanction which the group, through the 'aqila, can administer
*613 is banishment. In this case, the decision "to wash one's
hands of another" may originate with the 'aqila but must be
executed by the next of kin, or the process can originate
with the next of kin and be carried out with the approval of
the 'awaaqil. In any case, it is an ultimate negative sanction
which ranks with blood-revenge in degree of seriousness, since
social and political status is withdrawn from the person. A
banished person is no longer protected in accordance with the
principle of collective responsibility, and his group may no
675 longer demand blood-money for his life. The charter of 'Ailit
*613 Lazumi presented below is similar in most respects to that of
571 'Ailit Ma'fas with the exception that it makes provision for
681 the barawwa, the act of banishing from the group. The document
was issued in four copies to each of the 'awaaqil of Lazumi.
Note that in both charters thus far shown, not only are the
individuals of the group bound by the rules but, also, the
'aqila comes under the rule of law.

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BONDS BETWEEN MEMBERS OF 'AILIT LAZUMI AL-'AISHAIBAT, (Wednesday, January 19, 1952)

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681 In the name of God the Merciful and Compassionate

539 In the presence of 'Umran Kailani, Hajj 'Ali, the 'awaaqil and individuals of Bait Bu Jafaila who signed below, this agreement took place and the 'awaaqil of this 'aiela are:

675 1 - Hajj Salah Bu Jafaila, 'aqila of Bait Bu Halaiqa
*613 2 - Kuraim Juhami, 'aqila of Bait Uthman
571 3 - Ruwaf Jadalla, 'aqila of Bait Jadella
4 - Muftah Tahir, 'aqila of Bait Tahir

681 539 Every 'aqila is responsible for his family whether conconcerning the occurrence of problems, and collecting money from his family, or other matters. Every person who rejects the opinion of the 'aqila, or reports to the government without the consent of the 'aqila will be subjected to a fine of 10 L.E. and a dabiha according to the 'awaiyid. And every person who delays in carrying out the decisions of the 'aqila and all that he indicates will also be subject to the same fine. And also, any one who delays in swearing the oath or in supporting his family, and in so doing loses the interest which belongs to the 'aiela, he will be subject to the same fine. Any of the 'awaaqil who cause the loss of any right of the rights of the members of the 'aiela will also be subject to the same fine. And any member who makes false claims against any of the other members of the 'aiela is subject to the same fine. And any 'aqila or member from the members of the 'aiela who has proven against him an intrigue, or a quarrel, or prejudice between him and his brother or paternal cousin is subject to the same fine. He is also subject to the same fine who has proven against him prejudice in favor of another party against his paternal cousins, that is to say, the members of this 'aiela. And every 'aqila or individual who delays in signing and accepting these bonds, or in executing them, is considered an outsider by this 'aiela and the 'aiela will not be responsible for him in the future, and this will be considered a barawwa for him from the 'aiela.

This was issued in four copies to the 'awaaqil, and all previous bonds are cancelled from this date and are no longer effective.

Signatures and stamps of 'awaaqil and witnesses.

675 681 The barawwa (literally: "the act of putting outside") is a formal procedure, formal enough to entail having the process notarized as a legal document according to Egyptian civil law. The Bedouins say that the legal document of barawwa is "to show that we have washed our hands of the

675 culprit, and are no longer responsible for his acts." The
681 barawwa is not only the imposition of a most severe sanction
675 by the group, but it is also the withdrawal of all positive
681 sanctions which would apply to an individual as a member of
571 the group. The withdrawal of sanctions means the withdrawal
of the right of reciprocity; consequently, the banished no
longer comes under the rule of succession, and he has no
[421] rights over either persons or things. The banished may claim
no property of the property of the group other than that which
he takes with him, and he may claim no women from the group.
675 The barawwa, naturally enough, is uncommon in al-Qaşr. The
681 last occurred in 1957, the declaration of which is reproduced
below.

DECLARATION OF BARAWWA

Law Office of Abd al-Rahman
Marsa Matruh

50 milleme tax
stamp

On this date the following came: Kuraim Juhami of the 'Aishaibat on behalf of himself and his paternal uncle, and their 'umda, the first party. And there also came Sa'ad Uthman on behalf of himself and his children, the second party. The reason for the coming together of these two parties is in order to ask the barawwa from each other. Since they have all agreed by their own will without any force or ill feeling that the two parties shall not be responsible for each other's actions, it is a valid agreement that can never be rejected. No one from either of the parties is responsible to the other in supporting oaths, in paying for wounds, or in paying blood-revenge (diya), and no one from either party involved in barawwa will take girls from the other. This barawwa became a dividing line between the two parties, and if later there appears a fraternity paper, the barawwa will be cancelled and be to no avail. This paper is signed

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by us and by the below mentioned witnesses to be used when it is necessary. This barawwa was issued in two copies at the hand of each of the two parties to be used in time of necessity.

Approving what is included, the first party, Kuraim Juhami (stamp)	Approving what is included the second party Sa'ad Uthman (stamp)

Witness to this:
Abd al-Rahman, the lawyer
Date: September 24, 1957

STAMP OF MINISTRY OF WAR
BORDER GUARDS
MATRUH SECTOR

Signatures or stamps of eight witnesses.

1 - Copy to Marsa Matruh Police Station
2 - Copy at the hand of the first party
3 - Copy at the hand of the second party

Seen and the original must be kept in the files of the administration of complaints, and a copy must be delivered to each of the two parties.

Signed: Colonel Ahmad Sa'ad
Marsa Matruh Police Station

Date: October 12, 1957

*613 The rawaabit in Bedouin society is essentially a
675 charter at the tertiary level, but it structures relations
571 at the secondary level. At the tertiary level, the charter functions to establish group boundaries and identity, and to
*613 express the conditions for membership. Group solidarity and
571 maintenance at the tertiary level is a necessary condition for structural continuity of the larger secondary corporation: the lineage persists through these groups with replicate
060 functions, structures, and a common ancestor. That the

*613 173 That the secondary segment is as significant as the tertiary group seems to be indicated by the Bedouin tendency to mythologize the founder of the secondary group. For instance, Ma'fas is a nickname literally meaning "the big-footed one;" the Zagharat take their name from a man who used the zaghaariid ("shrill cry of joy" used by women) as his battle-cry; Abu Qarasa means "father of bread-loaf;" Sayyid Shraif was a very "noble" (shraif - "high-bred, noble") man. Along with each name there are a number of different myths to explain it: hence Ma'fas was a cattle thief who left large footprints in the mud so that all would know of his daring exploits; Abu Qarasa baked hugh loaves of bread to honor his in-laws when they visited him. On the other hand, there are no myths about *613 178 founders of tertiary segments. Tertiary segments might, in the future, disappear from the Bedouins' genealogy, either because of death, barawwa, or secession, but the secondary group survives these events. It is the secondary segment, as we shall see in our discussion of law and sanctions, which is structurally important for the political community of the Awlad 'Ali.

*613 571 Because the secondary level is the more structurally important, seeing that the greater benefits of collective responsibility derive from it, the tertiary group surrenders part of its autonomy to it. The tertiary group does so in just the way that the individual member of any polity allows

*613 public obligations to temper private interests. This temper-
*613 ing process in Bedouin society is effected through the agree-
571 ment, or bonds, between the _'awaaqil_ of the secondary group
675 as representatives of the members of the tertiary groups.
The _'aqila_ and the members of a tertiary group submit to structural arrangements of organization and procedure at the secondary level of interest and authority. All this is symbolized in the duplicate copies of the _rawaabit_ and the name of the "famous" ancestor.

*613 I do not underestimate the importance of the tertiary
571 segment. I realize that internal order at this level is what prevents anarchy at the secondary level. And I do not mean to imply that integration is necessarily any greater at the tertiary level than at the secondary level--it may or it may
*613 not be the case. Conflict is more difficult to detect at the
571 tertiary level than at the secondary level due to the practical
578 value which the Bedouins place upon stable relations between brothers and immediate relatives. But conflict does take place, and the Bedouins do attempt to regulate it at this level.

*613 The Bedouins say that blood-revenge and the feud
682 cannot possibly operate at the tertiary level. On the other hand, homicide does occur "between brothers." We have already described the case of manslaughter in 'Ailit Ma'fas and the manner in which it was dealt with: no retaliation would have

*613 been justified in this case since the killing was accidental.
682 In another case of killing which occurred between tertiary units of the same secondary group, we see what happens in the
*613 case of intentional killing. This case of murder in 'Ailit
682 Lazumi is interesting and valuable because it illustrates
571 the dynamics of authority relations within the secondary segment, and the degree to which authority relations are manageable without a resulting structural change.

> *613 In 1959, a rearrangement of authority relations took
> 682 place within 'Ailit Lazumi: Bait A and Bait B agreed
> 571 that they would be collectively responsible for each
> 675 other, and Bait C and Bait D made a similar compact. The compacts involved the sharing of diiya and kubaara (expiation) payments. Shortly after 1959, Bait A and Bait C quarreled, and the result of the litigation was that the 'awaaqil ordered Bait A to pay a kubaara of 20 L.E. to Bait C. Bait B, as the partner of Bait A, decided to pay 10 L.E. of the kubaara and Bait A paid the other 10 L.E. But Bait D protested this sharing of the kubaara saying that Bait B is a third brother and, as such, should act as a quwaal al-kahair ("a speaker of good"); that no brother should take sides against the others. As a result of this incident, the split between the two groups (A-B and C-D) became deeper. Afterwards, one group would not contribute to the diiya involving members of the other group even if it concerned external conflict with other secondary groups. This division in 'Ailit Lazumi was finally ended in 1960 when a member of Bait A killed a member of Bait B--the killing was within the same contractual alliance. At this time, the whole lineage decided to forget its differences and, all together, paid Bait B its diiya.

*613 Ideally, conflict should not be permitted to threaten
578 the structural continuity of the secondary corporation, but it
[681] happens. Usually, however, safety mechanisms such as the barawwa and the right to secede are effective enough to prevent structural deterioration.

*613 structural deterioration. Secession, the right to break
571 authority relations, and adoption, the right to contract
675 new authority relations, are rights of the authority group.
681 This can be noted in the "Declaration of Barawwa" presented
578 earlier. It was stated in that document that "the reason
[597] for the coming together of these two parties is in order
to ask the barawwa from each other." Further, mention was
made of a "fraternity paper" which would cancel the effects
of the barawwa. So, secession can be a means of regulating
[597] conflict, and it can become the basis for a re-integrative
move; that is, an adopted party may decide to secede from its
foster lineage and return to its original lineage, or secondary
group.

*613 Secession, as distinct from segmentary fission as a
571 response to ecological demands, represents a structural
[578] change in authority relations short of distrubing the structure
of the secondary group. In a process of secession, i.e.,
breaking with the secondary group, joining a new secondary
group, and returning to the "blood-brother" group, the fundamental condition of "belonging" is the acceptance of collective
responsibility. This is a most important point. The office
*613 of 'aqila, the Bedouin charters, and the raison d'etre of the
571 corporation revolves about the notion of sharing in the blood-
681
675 money. This can be shown by an extremely interesting document
belonging to 'Ailit Abu Qarasa of al-Qasr. Here the process

*613 of secession, and the nature of the collective responsibility
571 principle in Bedouin society are made clear. The occasion of
681 the writing of this document was the issuance of a "fraternity
675 paper."

BONDS BETWEEN MEMBERS OF 'AILIT ABU QARASA

*613
571 Thanks to God alone and nothing survives but His
681 kingdom, praise and peace to Him Who will never
have a Prophet who is greater than Himself.

539
675 It came into our hands on 10 Shawal 1363 (September 9, 1944), the *'awaaqil* of 'Ailit Abu Qarasa of the 'Aishaibat; and the reason for their coming together is in order to merge 'Ailit Abu Qula with the other *buyuut* as they were in the past. And this is in accordance with the agreement of all the parties to this paper. By the free will of all it became, as of this day, that all of the mentioned *buyuut* will be connected with the other *buyuut* in receiving and giving. But all blood-money of the mentioned *buyuut* which was due before the date 3 Shawal 1361, that is to say all debts for past offences, they and their former relatives will be responsible for. After this date, which is 3 Shawal 1361, each of the mentioned *buyuut* will share the good and the bad equally. And the *'awaiyid* which the mentioned *buyuut* agreed upon are the following:

1 - First, he who intentionally beats his brother in the *'aiela* will pay by himself and no one from the *'aiela* will pay anything with him.

2 - But the offense which takes place within the *'aiela*, the fine for it will be distributed in such a way that the first half of the payment will go to the offended *bait* and the second half will be distributed among all of the mentioned *buyuut*.

3 - The offense which happens to the *'aiela* from an outside party, half of the payment goes to the *'aiela* and the second half to the offended *bait*.

*613 4 - The thief from the mentioned *buyuut* will be
571 responsible for himself alone, and his relatives
681 in blood (i.e. his *bait*) will be responsible for
him.

539 5 - The one who is known to lie under oath from
675 the mentioned *buyuut*, everyone who supports him
must be a blood-relative from his *bait*.

6 - The one who delays paying the share which is requested by the *'aiela*, his rich relative will pay.

7 - The one who asks for a *barawwa* from the *'aiela* will pay what is asked for, and at the same time will also pay 20 L.E. *barawwa* fee for every man who fasts.

8 - The one who supports his relative from some other *'aiela* against his paternal cousin will be required to pay 10 L.E. as a fine.

Signatures or stamps of the *'awaaqil* of 'Ailit Abu Qarasa, and the *'awaaqil* of 'Ailit Ghriba (who are the former relatives of Bait Abu Qula, the reconciled *bait*).

*613 Every point of the above *rawaabit* shows the moral
554 and political significance of the secondary group in the
571 Bedouin community. Membership in a secondary compound
[675] authority group entitles one to political status without
which the individual could not survive. The Bedouin community shares certain activities, relationships, and goals so that the aims of any individual can be achieved only by participation in social action with others: this the Bedouins have in common with every other human community (Firth 1951:41). Specifically, in considering society in terms of authority roles and authority groups, we are interested in the political community in which the Bedouins participate.

619 The boundaries of the Bedouin political community
*613 may be defined so as to include all of those authority groups
571 which operate in accordance with the recognized legal code
[671] of the Western Desert. This code is referred to as 'awaiyid
Awlad 'Ali, i.e. "the customs of the sons of 'Ali." The
members of the Awlad 'Ali tribe identify with each other as
a group. They recognize their common heritage and speak of
"the Awlad 'Ali as one." But more importantly, the Awlad 'Ali
represents a political community because they are "prepared
to regulate their differences by means of decisions accepted
as binding because they are made in accordance with shared
political norms and structures" (Easton 1959:229). Recalling
the discussion of familial authority and internal and external
systems of authority relations, we may think of the Bedouin
political community as a composite of authority or jural groups
"within which there are a moral obligation and a means ultimately to settle disputes peaceably" (Middleton and Tait 1959:9).

*613 In al-Qasr, political order and the articulation of
571 political relations between secondary corporate groups depend
681 upon something besides structural and ideological uniformities.
628 Although blood-revenge and feuding do not take place at the
626 internal system of authority relations, they are common means
of controlling the distribution of authority and power between
secondary units. Though these mechanisms or sanctions are
[671] considered "the right of the Arabs," since they do threaten

*613 571 peace and security in the desert they are discouraged by
681 means of the moral and legal norms expressed in the _'awaiyid_,
628 or law of the Bedouins.

626 671 Conflict regulation between secondary groups is the
*613 function of the _'awaaqil_ who act as legitimate representatives
571 in terms of the _rawaabit_, and as legitimate judges and decision-
578 makers in terms of the _'awaiyid_. Not all conflict in the external political system is, in terms of our structural levels, between secondary authority groups, but seldom is any group larger than the secondary unit mobilized for political
619 action. In other words, even where we note that conflict is
*613 between two primary units, i.e., the 'Aishaibat and the
571 Kamailat, there is probably, in fact, political action taking
578 place between two secondary groups within the respective primary groups. However, there always exists the very real possibility that greater conflict will be generated involving primary and even tribal units.

128 In the next section of this chapter, I will discuss Bedouin law and sanctions within the framework of the lineage structure and the authority levels at which they operate. The following section will further illustrate the legitimacy and dynamics of authority and structure in Bedouin society.

Law and Political Order: 'Awaiyid Awlad 'Ali

671 [792] A "holy man" in al-Qasr, who has intimate knowledge of both the Quran and Bedouin law, has this to say on the subject of the 'awaiyid Awlad 'Ali:

> 671 171 The Sharii'a (Islamic Law) was given by God, and it guides man concerning what is good and what is bad: it is for all Muslims. The 'awaiyid was made by man for the Bedouins: it is for settling problems and evaluating damages. The 'awaiyid is natural, made by man and the Awlad 'Ali for settling the problems of the Bedouins. It is different from the Sharii'a. The Awlad 'Ali made the 'awaiyid, not the ashraaf ("holy men"); but the "holy men" approved it. The 'awaiyid agrees with the Sharii'a, but not in everything for it is not from the Sharii'a. Shari'it Muhammad ("the law of the Prophet") is one thing and the 'awaiyid is another. The Sharii'a says an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth, and a life for a life: the 'awaiyid also says an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth, and a life for a life, but in a different way: the 'awaiyid involves money. The 'awaiyid judges a situation; the dhabiiha ("blood sacrifice," usually a lamb as an expiatory fee) and the fine are paid and the problem is solved . . . The 'aqila is better than the government for settling problems in the desert. [672] The government may put a man in prison, and if he dies there you will be responsible to his father and brothers. There is a more liberal judgment here in al-Qasr, and God prefers that we settle our problems through peace . . . [673] If a man dies in prison, it is no sin before God but the Bedouins consider it a sin.

671 At the present time, the customary law of the Awlad 'Ali prevails in al-Qasr, and, I suspect, this body of legal and moral norms will be the basis for Bedouin social and political action for some time in the future. In any case, it furnishes us with a base-line from which any future studies of social

671 change in al-Qasr must proceed.

671 Bedouin law should be considered within its historical
177 context, especially as it has reference to the Maliki school
of Islamic Law. The Maliki school, or "rite," (madhhab) of
law is considered to be the most conservative interpretation
of the doctrine of the Prophet Muhammad. Therefore, the
Maliki school is thought to reflect the society and tribal
traditions of pre-Islamic Arabia more dependably than any of
671 the other three schools of law. For instance, the Maliki
177 school, in the domain of family law, stresses the importance
428 and the primacy of agnate rights and claims. This is especially so in matters of inheritance: the law states that
in the absence of agnate heirs the property of the deceased
passes, not to female survivors but, to the central treasury
[562] of the State. This single legal aspect helps us to understand the Bedouin practice of disallowing the female to
inherit and should be a consideration in any study of Bedouin
succession rules.

175 Maliki Law was introduced into North Africa during
671 the ninth century, and became the official legal doctrine of
177 the Berber dynasties. It was first taught in this part of
the world, probably, by Yahya ibn Yahya, a student of Malik
ibn Anas, the founder of the school. Murray (1935:313)
presents a valuable legal document from the Western Desert
in which the name "Yahya" is frequently cited as the authority

175 671 177 for legal interpretation. For instance: "We are also told by Yahya that (the Caliph) Mu'awiya ibn Sufian said that a wound on the body should be assessed at half the value of that wound on the head or face" (1935:324). 671 177 Maliki law, derived in large part from the Bedouin traditions of Arabia, may be seen to characterize the legal norms of the tribal-based social structure in the Western Desert. The Bedouins of al-[428] [562] Qasr themselves claim that they are within the bounds of Islamic Law when they deny the female the right to inherit, though they do have other, and more secular, justifications for the practice.

671 182 648 As we have already noted, in the above quote from the "holy man" of al-Qasr, the Bedouins feel that the _'awaiyid_ can succeed where governmental law will fail. They say that "the government does not understand the problems of the Bedouins," that "government troops cannot function in the desert." They feel that they need the _'awaiyid_ for the sake of political order itself: "If the Bedouins did not have the _'awaiyid_, they would eat each other. The _'awaiyid_ is so important that a man who commits a wrong in town will lie to the government, and then dutifully return to the tribe for Bedouin justice."

[656] In 1933, the government "abolished" the _'awaiyid_ and insisted that the Bedouins settle their difference in the civil courts in accord with Egyptian law. According to

671 the Bedouins, the government soon discovered their own error,
182 for they were unable to effectively manage group and tribal
648 political relations: "They (the government) found out that they could not solve murders in the desert. They would arrest the killer but the trouble continued between families (i.e. feuding went on). There were more killings instead of less, and, finally, the government asked us to return to the *'awaiyid* because it alone can solve murders in the desert." I was unable to document the claim that the government had "abolished" the *'awaiyid* in 1933, but a number of officials who worked at the Governor's Office in Marsa Matruh said that it was true.

671 In al-Qasr, and in the Western Desert in general,
641 adherence to law and political order rests upon the conviction
577 that each individual and territorial group have guaranteed
571 rights which are related to honor and property. A violation
554 of any single man's honor or property may easily be interpreted, according to the principle of collective responsibility, as an offense against the rights of a group. And in this sense, legal and moral violations in Bedouin society are relative to the structure of interrelations, and they must be regulated with reference to the various levels of the authority structure.

181 Bedouins place a high value on political order, but
641 also on the idea that political order can only be guaranteed
578 through a man's willingness "not to allow another to take any
571

181 of his rights;" a man should be courageous enough to fight
641 578 for what belongs to him and his family. These values, which
571 become political values in a tribal context, coupled with the
idea of self-help make for a political order which is ultimately
based upon the law of blood-revenge and feud. At least this
is the case where the external system of authority relations
578 is concerned. But force as the ultimate mechanism for the
571 establishment of political order is better considered an
182 extreme, and only one of the mechanisms used by the Bedouins
in the process of conflict regulation. The attempt is to
establish a balance of rights, concerning honor and property,
and not to go beyond another's boundaries lest he retaliate.
Force, as a coercive institution, can never be the sole basis
of political structure, as Schapera has shown in the case of
the Bergdama and Bushmen (1956:211-221). Thus the Bedouins
[681] say blood-revenge would be impossible within the secondary
* [613] corporate group; relations this important cannot be based
[682] upon force. In the case of homicide within this group compensation is immediately forthcoming.

571 Also, it has been pointed out that self-help and
672 collective responsibility do not operate indiscriminately.
* 613 That is, an individual cannot depend upon the backing of
[578] his group irrespective of his own motivations in a particular
situation which calls for retaliation or threatened the group
with retaliation. Individual responsibility figures in cases

571
672 other than those dealing with blood-revenge too. For instance,
*613 in matters concerning personal debts incurred, the group is
571 not responsible for the individual. The Bedouins say that if
672
*613 a man has the money he must repay his debts: if he does not
426 have the money, then he must ask a rich relative to pay his
debts for him. He is then in debt to his relative and, out
of respect for him, should not borrow money or go into debt
[558] again. If he does, he will bring dishonor (_'ar_) to his
[681] family and they will, ultimately, banish him. There was dis-
682 agreement among my informants as to whether or not they
*613 should contribute to a _diiya_ which was compensation for an
829 intentional slaying. Some said that they would not question
124 the motives of their kinsman who has killed because "we are
together in the good and the bad, and I must pay for him
just as he must pay for me." But others held the opinion,
which I feel was a prevailing one, that one must take into
account the justifiability of the killing. This seems to
have been the case in the past, for the Bedouins say that
traditionally the _bait_ of the killer had to pay one-half
of the _diiya_.

*613 All things political somehow relate to the payment
682 of blood-money. We have seen that the essential function
681 of the _'aqila_, and even the condition of his taking office,
182
571 refers to the responsibility of collecting the _diiya_ from
the members of his group. The criterion of being a member

*613 of the group, of joining a new group, or of becoming a man,
682 all refer to the notion of sharing in the payment of the *diiya*.
681 All obligations and sanctions which carry the force of law in
182 Bedouin society also are directly related to compensation and
571 retaliation. Weber (1954:110) has stated the general case:
"The *wergilt* debt as set by the judge was the most ancient
debt and all forms of obligation have derived from it."
[171] Evans-Pritchard (1940:171) has stated the particular case:
". . . Nuer law, in so far as it applies to a study of
political relations, must be treated in connexion with the
blood-feud." The blood-feud and the *diiya* are institutions by
which authority groups interact and political order is main-
681 tained. Blood-revenge, or the threat that it may take place
578 and spread, is a most serious sanction in the Bedouin political
682 system. Of the twenty-two cases of conflict in al-Qasr about
which I have good details, nine of these deal with homicide
or attempted homicide, and thirteen involve quarrels over
rights to land, water, and women which could have led to
violence had not arbitration succeeded. In fact, seven of
the nine cases of personal injury began over property rights.

*613 Rules regarding the *diiya* in Bedouin society apply
682 at all levels of the lineage structure. This seems important
to note for it points up an unusual degree of autonomous
authority at the tertiary level. Research on segmentary
societies has often stressed the fact that compensation is

*613 impossible within the corporate group. Middleton and Tait
682 (1958:19) have generalized on this point, and Wagner (1940:
218) has been very explicit: "When a breach of law occurs
within a given group (lineage, sub-clan, or clan) and the
nature of the offence is such that it affects those interests
which are specific to the group and not further divisible,
a restoration of the breach by compensation is obviously
impossible, as it would necessitate the splitting of the
group into two units . . . " The Bedouins avoid division in
[672] such cases by holding the whole secondary group responsible
for the diiya, and usually the share of the diiya which would
be forthcoming from the killed man's tertiary segment is excluded
from the total payment. It seems that either the
Bedouins represent an atypical case, or Africanists have
failed to make a sharp and analytical difference between
the blood-vengeance grouping and the group which actually
shares in the paying and receiving of blood money.

671 Bedouin law and political order, then, center on
[682] the institution of blood-revenge or retaliation. The payment
[626] of compensation as a prevention of blood-feud is a central
concern of the _'awaiyid Awlad 'Ali_. Murray (1935:313-328)
presents a Bedouin legal document "signed with the seals of
twenty-two _sheikhs_ testifying to the accuracy of the code"
which set forth the main tenets of the _'awaiyid_ of the
Western Desert. I checked the contents of this document with

67] I checked the contents of this document with
[124] my own informants who agreed that it was authentic and
represented the *'awaiyid* as it should be practiced. Almost
[682] the whole of the *'awaiyid* refers to the circumstances surrounding the occurrence of killing and the payment of the
[128] *diiya*. The case studies which I present below reflect the
'awaiyid as it was practiced in 1935.

682 Blood-money is calculated relative to three things:
whether or not a killing was premeditated or accidental; the
sex of the victim; and whether or not the victim was a freeman
or a slave. The full *diiya* is paid in the case of intentional
killing, and three-fourths of this amount is due in the case
[562] of accidental killing. The *diiya* for a woman is one-half
that for a man whether or not the killing is intentional.
[567] There are no slaves in al-Qasr, only their descendents who
are now freemen. In the case where a pregnant woman is killed,
the foetus will be examined and should it prove to be a male
then the full *diiya* will be due.

578 An important mechanism for conflict regulation in
682 the Western Desert is the *nazaala*, i.e., "the act of taking
*613 refuge." If a killing is committed, the killer immediately
778 seeks protection by going to the residence of a neutral third
party. The third party, who may or may not be an *'aqila*, and
his lineage give protection to the whole tertiary segment of
the killer. This may involve the actual relocation of the
killer's *bait* to the residence of the protecting group for

578 682 *613 778 the period of one year. During the period of sanctuary, it is hoped that two things will happen: that the killed man's group will be placated and agree to compensation rather than retaliation as a means of conflict regulation; and, that over this period of one year the killer's family will pay the diiya.

The practice of nazaala is one means of differentiating between internal and external political relations. Killing between tertiary groups of the same secondary lineage would never be mediated by the nazaala, rather, compensation would immediately be paid and the matter settled--or at least never again mentioned. The Bedouins believe that killings at any level should be forgotten for fear that hostile feelings, or even feuding, will re-emerge. This excerpt from my field notes shows this.

> Hajj Sabr asked if I would take him in the jeep to Ras Abu Laha. As we passed Umm al-Rakham, the territory of 'Ailit Amarik (Marabtiin affiliated with 'Ali Abyad) west of al-Qasr, he told me about a feud which took place there five years ago. The quarrel began, as most do, over the rights to a piece of land: 'Ailit Amarik and a lineage of the Qinaishat tribe both laid claim to a strip of land between their territories. One man from the Qinaishat was killed, and, in revenge, the Qinaishat killed three men and wounded four from 'Ait Amarik. The government intervened to stop the killing. It became settled when the 'awaaqil met at the zawiya of Umm al-Rakham. They ate together and resumed brotherly relations. Since Hajj Sabr was one of the third parties involved in this settlement, I asked him if I might read his copy of the document on this case. He replied: "Shame, shame! If you begin to ask about this case, it may start all over again. There are still bad feelings between the two tribes."

*613 778 182 682 The nazaala as a regulatory mechanism functions only between secondary segments. This indicates that blood-revenge as a negative sanction is operative only in the external system of political relations. Political relations at this level, where the feeling of corporateness is relatively lacking, are in delicate balance. Therefore, once conflict is successfully mediated and the injury redressed, it is best forgotten, for it is unlikely that either party feels their rights have been completely restored.

683 Sanctions against personal injury, besides killing, are dealt out in terms of fines, the fines being figured as proportions of the diiya. Every part of the body has a price on it: the Bedouins say, "Banu Adam kill-i-filuus" ("The sons of Adam are all money"). A proportion of the diiya is due for injury to any of the following parts of the body: the beard, hair on the head and the nape of the neck, and eyelashes; wounds to any part of the body; fractures and dislocations of bones; the tongue and the teeth; the testicles and the breasts; and the loss of mind. Bodily injuries are [463] evaluated by a considered expert, the nathaara ("the keen-eyed one"). [305] If the services of a nathaara become necessary in al-Qasr, the barber in Marsa Matruh (the same person who performs most of the Bedouins' circumcisions) fills the role. [178] But the Bedouins say, "Now that we are educated we are able to make our own evaluations."

682 683 671 Since Bedouin law, and not Egyptian law, still prevails in al-Qasr, personal injury cases must be expedited according to the 'awaiyid lest the greater sanctions embodied in the principle of self-help follow. Sanctioned fines for death and bodily injury are standardized in al-Qasr and in the [124] [627] whole Western Desert. One informant, a rajal khair ("good man") who sometimes adjudicated quarrels, possessed an authoritative paper which listed the injury and ensuing fine prevailing in al-Qasr when I was in the field. Below are the contents of this paper. The comments in parentheses were made by the man as I translated the paper: they were offered as the rationale behind Bedouin law.

L.E. 400 - for inflicting an injury upon a person which renders him sterile.
400 - for the intentional death of a man with a gun or knife.
400 - for causing the loss of a man's nose, ("Because to cut up a man's nose is to make him ugly.")
400 - for causing the loss of a man's eyes, 200 L.E. for each eye, ("Because without eyes a man can do nothing.")
400 - for causing the loss of a man's ears, 200 L.E. for each ear, ("Because a deaf man cannot work.")
300 - for the death of a man if caused by beating with sticks or stones, ("This is unintentional, for if you really wanted to kill the man you would use a better weapon.")
200 - for the intentional death of a woman with a gun or knife.
150 - for the loss of a hand.
150 - for the loss of a leg.
10 - for the loss of a front tooth, ("Because it is bad for a man's appearange.")
5 - for the loss of a rear tooth.

671 Implicit in the 'awaiyid is the assumption that the
562 woman is less responsible for her deeds and something of a
weakling. The Bedouins have a proverb which says that "the
devil whispers in the ear of the woman." If a woman slays a
[682] man, intentionally or accidentally, the diiya is considered
671 as for unintentional killing. Where sex offenses are con-
562 cerned, it makes a difference if the act takes place in the
684 man's (i.e. the husband's) tent or in the desert, and, of
course, it makes a difference whether or not it is a case
of rape or adultery. If a man finds another man and his
wife in his dwelling in the act of adultery, he may kill
the man and pay the diiya for unintentional killing. From
this diiya, he deducts the amount of the bride-price and
50 L.E. for trespassing. The fine for rape ranges from
10 L.E. to 100 L.E. On the other hand, if intercourse takes
place with the woman's consent, the fine is only 5 L.E. or
10 L.E. If a virgin is deflowered, the fine will be 100 L.E.,
and the man will have to marry her, paying the bride-price
asked for by the girl's father and going through the normal
procedure for marriage. Where offenses involve unmarried
women, all fines are paid to the father. In cases concerning
married women, fines go to the husband. According to the
[586] Bedouins, it would be a great dishonor to the man's family
[558] if the husband were not to divorce his wife after it becomes
known that she has been promiscuous. They said that if a man

671 562 They said that if a man
684 insisted on keeping a promiscuous wife, his family would
681 "write a barawwa aginst him." I heard of no sex offenses in
[114] al-Qasr while I was there.

671 The penalty for stealing, according to the 'awaiyid,
685 is that the thief shall pay compensation, by himself, in the amount of four times the value of the stolen object. On the
*[613] other hand, if the thief is a poor man, he will pay thrice the value of the stolen object and the remaining fourth will be paid by his lineage.

671 The 'awaiyid recognizes the territorial claims of the
685 lineage. Disputes arising over conflicting claims to land
*613 and wells are handled at Bedouin courts in much the same way
578 as personal injury cases are, with one exception. Usually, a
[554] larger number of elders and rajal khair will be consulted in an advisory capacity by the 'awaaqil handling the case. The 'awaaqil consider the specific history of a particular piece of land or well (for instance, each well is known by its own name), and determine the ownership in accordance with the testimony of elders and individuals of high social status. Most of the problems over land and water rights in al-Qasr have reference to what is still considered lineage-owned
685 territory in the barley-and-pasture sector. In the 'izba
578 sector, conflict over land ownership rights, since they are
648 rights which are registered with the government, is settled in the Egyptian court of law. Only one such case came up while

685 I was in al-Qasr, and each party to the conflict hired
578 Egyptian lawyers in Marsa Matruh to represent them. As one
648 litigant in this case told me: "The Bedouins prefer to settle
their own land disputes because the government's way of
handling these things costs money and long periods of waiting."

69 The notion of jurisprudence in tribal cultures, in
121 general, seems to be one which concentrates on the restoration
578 of a disturbed balance rather than one concerned with formality
and procedure. To a great extent, this is true in the Bedouin
case also. However, the absence of institutionalized ways of
dealing with conflict is more characteristic of the internal
*613 system of political relations. Conflict within the secondary
578 segment, we have noticed, may be regulated at the familial
[593] level of authority by the shaib, or one acting in his place:
[596] it is hoped by the Bedouins that quarrels never become serious
enough to prompt intervention by the 'aqila. On the other
hand, the 'aqila, as a legitimate representative of his
authority group, will almost always become involved in conflict
regulation falling within the sphere of external political
relations, i.e., conflict between secondary, primary, or tribal
segments.

The 'aqila as the most effective mechanism of social
*613 control has become institutionalized through time in Bedouin
578
182 society. At the interactional level of secondary lineage
group relations, conflict may easily expand into feuding or,

*613 ultimately, all-out warfare: the role of _'aqila_ is most
578 critical at this level. Abou-Zeid (1966:259) has suggested
182 an explanation for the delicate balance of political relations which exists between secondary lineage groups. He thinks that

> [577) . . . in the segmentary society of the Bedouin of the Western Desert . . . honour has played, and still plays, a most vital role in the field of social control, besides providing an effective code of morality . . . A slight offence inflicted against a lineage . . . is taken as an unfavorable humiliation requiring immediate retaliation to wipe out the shame, regain honour, and restore the same relations as formerly between the groups.

682 Homicide and wounding cases, which usually develop over con-
683 flicting claims to land or water rights, are most prone to
578 lead to grand-scale conflict. Thus the _'aqila_ will always
*613 mediate and adjudicate these cases whereas he will not necessarily intervene in those cases involving tertiary groups where appeals to moral solidarity and kinship unity may succeed in restoring relations. It is difficult to muster evidence for this contention since conflict between tertiary groups is more of a private matter than it is public, and, once settled, such conflict is not likely to be discussed, or even admitted.

*613 Most of my details on conflict regulation and the
578 judicial process in al-Qasr involve political action between
619 secondary or primary groups, eighteen of the twenty-two cases
681 in fact. Of the nine cases dealing with personal injury (eight

*613 578 619 681 cases of homicide and one case of wounding) one was at the tribal level; three at the primary level; three at the secondary level; and two at the tertiary level. Of the thirteen cases dealing with property rights over land, water, or women, none took place at the tribal level; four were at the primary level; seven at the secondary level; and one at the tertiary level. One case dealing with marriage rights took place within a tertiary segment and concerned the legitimacy of a man to claim his bint 'amm. Twelve of the twenty-two cases occurred within the 'Aishabat tribe. Of the ten cases of conflict involving units from outside the 'Aishaibat, six cases were between primary units, three cases were between secondary units, and one case involved the 'Ali Ahmar with the Harabi of Libya.

In almost every case involving primary units and tribal units, the two opposing authority groups were actually secondary groups who had the backing of their primary groupings. The case in which the 'Ali Ahmar mobilized to deal with a problem in Libya probably represents an atypical case in history. It is unlikely that tribal groups of this size [648] could mobilize in time of war or peace, and in this particular case the good international relations of Egypt and Libya were at stake.

784 695 681 There is another realm of sanctions which can be invoked in cases concerning homicide, wounding, theft, and

681 property disputes, and I shall briefly discuss this before
695 I proceed to describe Bedouin legal processes. Besides the
784 threat of blood-revenge and fines of money, the individual,
or group, who violates the moral and legal norms of Bedouin
society may be faced with sanctions of a sacred nature. In
695 any case where clear evidence is lacking, one litigant may
request that that other party swear the oath (yamiin Allah)
*613 in support of his claim. In all three corporate charters
695 presented earlier in this chapter, those of 'Ailit Ma'fas,
695 'Ailit Lazumi, and 'Ailit Abu Qarasa, support of lineage-
mates through the oath was a condition of group membership.
[692] Collective responsibility not only applies in the case of
secular things, i.e., sharing the blood-money and the
exercise of blood-revenge, but also where the possible curse
of God is concerned.

695 When one party to conflict requests that the oath be
administered as a means of settling a dispute, the other
party will always accept because it is assumed that in this
way both litigants "will get their rights." The party taking
695 the oath must be supported by a number of his relatives
602 ('umraa al-dam) who are willing to risk the consequences, and
*613 who are chosen by the other party. If a man is unable to
muster the required number of kinsmen to take the oath, and
the number is always relative to the seriousness of the offense
of which he is accused, then this is taken as a sign of his
untruthfulness and he loses his claim.

695 untruthfulness and he loses his claim. According to the
602 'awaiyid, the number of supporters required in a homicide or
613 wounding case is fifty; in a case involving the rightful
671 ownership of land or a well the required number is twenty-five; in a case of conflicting claims over a camel, five relatives must swear in support of the claimant; and in matters concerning smaller animals, such as sheep, the number of supporters will depend upon the number and price of the animals. But, of course, the number of supporters will always be relative to the size of the groups involved, and so the 'awaiyid is not always followed to the letter of the law.

695 The time and place of the oath is fixed by the 'awaaqil
(692) adjudicating the given case. It is administered either at the tomb of a "holy man," or at the mosque in Marsa Matruh, and always on a Friday, the Muslim Sabbath. There is a standard text to the oath and this is given in the instructions of the
695 'awaaqil to the litigants. The Bedouins, with few exceptions,
784 believe in the effectiveness of the oath of God. The rationale is that no man is willing to lie and suffer the wrath of God. The curse which results from a "bad oath" usually takes the form of an accident or misfortune to the swearer or a member of his family. The Bedouins believe that divine sanction operates not only against the one who makes a bad oath, but also against the one who bears false witness against another and causes him to take the oath.

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The following excerpt from my field notes concerning Bedouin law will show the earnestness with which informants upheld the function of the oath as a legal sanction.

> I know that you want to find out whether or not the oath will prove the guilt or innocence of a person. Well, it will. First of all, if a man is known to be a liar, those of his relatives who are supposed to support him will refuse to swear the oath. And, if they do take the oath and know that the person is lying, then definitely something bad will happen to both him and them. I will give you a case which will prove what I say. Years ago, there was a quarrel between an 'aiela of Awlad Kharuf ('Ali Abyad) and 'Ailit Abu Qarasa of the 'Aishaibat over the rightful ownership of a Roman well in the desert. The well originally belonged to our family (i.e. 'Ailit Abu Qarasa). The Abu Qarasa requested that the oath be used to settle the matter, and that twenty-five of the Awlad Kharuf swear that the well belonged to them. They swore the oath and the case was finished: the well went to the Awlad Kharuf. The Abu Qarasa could say nothing more since the oath had been taken. But listen to this: within one month's time of taking the oath, seven of the twenty-five Awlad Kharuf swearers were buried. At the present time, only three of the original swearers are still living. One of these three begot only girls, and when these girls married all of their marriages ended in divorce. Another of the three survivors has a son who lost an eye and an arm in an accident. And the third man, he has not married yet. Some of these men who died were very young at the age of death. You see, if I steal 10 L.E. and swear that I did not, then God will punish me ten-fold. God's punishment may strike my animals, my family, or my money; God will take his vengeance through these three means. You should always remember that the life of one man is worth one-hundred wells.

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*[613]
The man who swears the oath places himself and his group in ritual danger. The above description of the oath and its possible consequences show that the Bedouins believe divine punishment can work indirectly. One case-study presented

695 784 below will show how a "bad oath" can work directly on the false witness.

784 626 626 681 Divine sanctions enter into other aspects of the Bedouin judicial process and function to maintain social control in al-Qasr. If we can speak of a standard, or minimal sanction, in Bedouin law it would be the dhabiiha and 10 L.E. In any case, however small the offence might be, the litigant found to be in the wrong will have this judgment made against him. But in almost every case "the [788] [272] party who takes his rights" will refuse the dhabiiha and 10 L.E. and insist instead upon a ritual three cups of tea. An individual refuses the dhabiiha as an act of brotherhood and thanksgiving that the quarrel has been settled. The Bedouins point out the practical factor that very few men in al-Qasr can afford to part with even one lamb. On the 626 681 682 264 other hand, in more serious cases, such as homicide, which occur in the external sphere of political relations and threaten to disintegrate the political community, the parties involved will actually eat a whole meal together. In this case, the dhabiiha is accepted, for the act of commensality is deemed necessary for reconciliation.

626 182 771 But whether or not conflict is concluded by a simple ritual or a large feast, the prevailing mood is one of gratitude that the secular bonds of brotherhood and a pre-ordained sacred order have been maintained. The Bedouin

626 process of conflict regulation is ritually sanctioned and
182 the political order sacralized in a public way at the conclusion
771 of litigation when the parties involved and the
'aqila read the *Fatiha* (the first *sura* of the Quran). For
671 the Bedouins, the *'awaiyid* is the enactment of the word of
771 God, and the man who follows the *'awaiyid* follows the commandments
771 of God. One *'aqila* speaking of the final authority which
776 directs Bedouin society said this:

> 577 God knows all things. God made the world and gave man a brain with which to think. Therefore, he gave man two choices: the good, and the bad. If a man follows the good, he does not steal, kill, or lie. God gave us Muhammad the Messenger, and he taught the ignorant to follow the word of God. You are an educated man, and so you must choose the good path and follow it. I do not read but I follow the Quran.

577 It follows, then, that "the good man" represents an
183 important Bedouin cultural ideal which is legitimated by
771 reference to the sacred. The practice of this ideal leads
[829] to "the good society." Another *'aqila*, in reply to my
question concerning the definition of a "good man," answered:

> A good man should follow God, and through this he will be a perfect man because such a man could make no mistakes. You could find no better person than this. The good man fasts, prays, makes the pilgrimage, and helps the poor. He avoids stealing and lying; these are the most important things to avoid . . . All men aim to do good. Some men think that they are doing good, but they cannot tell good from bad: this is the origin of badness . . . A man aims to do good so that the Arabs will thank him for it. The Arabs (i.e. the man's fellow Bedouins) will say that he is doing good and that he is following the good path.

577 According to this 'aqila, the "good man" is the "good Muslim"
771 who observes the pillars of Islam (fasting, praying, making
183 the pilgrimage, and alms-giving). Also, the "good man" does
not steal or lie, and this leads, importantly enough, to social
accord.

121 In light of the preceding discussion of authority and
681 law, we can now offer a description of the Bedouin judicial
process in action. Southall (1956:121-151) has drawn the
121 distinction between internal and external delicts on the
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114 bases of kinds of sanctions rendered, and whether or not
chiefly authority mediates conflict. Such a distinction can
be only partially applied in the case of the Bedouins of the
Western Desert. The kind of sanctions operating in the internal
political system do differ from those applied in the external
political system, though not to the same degree which is true
121 of Southall's Alurland. On the other hand, since Bedouin
681 society, lacking political centralization, cannot be character-
692 ized as a segmentary state with distinct spheres of authority
642 at successive levels of the lineage structure, the intervention
or non-intervention of chiefly adjudication and decision-
making cannot serve as a basis for differentiating political
* [613] action. Rather, the lone political office of the 'aqila
[627] involves itself in all arbitration which cannot be successfully
concluded by the mechanism of familial authority. There are
[648] just two exceptions which apply to this latter statement:

121 first, the government may enter into conflict cases which
681 are judged to be out of control and involving the larger tribal
692 units; secondly, litigants, whether exercising internal or
648 external political relations, have the right to take their
case to a rajal khair. Both exceptions represent informal
[626] processes of social control in al-Qasr: the first case rarely
happens, and the second case seems to occur quite frequently
but no recordings of the settlement are made.

681 Sanctions in the Bedouin legal system conform to what
121 Radcliffe-Brown referred to as secondary sanctions: "These
are concerned with the actions of persons or groups in their
effects upon other persons or groups" (1952:209). Also, it
[671] would seem that Bedouin law is one of private delicts as
opposed to a law of public delicts:

> [692] In the procedure of a law of private delicts a person or a body of persons that has suffered some injury, loss or damage by infringement of recognized rights appeals to a constituted judicial authority, who declares some other person or body of persons within the community to be responsible and rules that the defendant shall give satisfaction to the plaintiff, such satisfaction frequently taking the form of the payment of an indemnity or damages. A private delict is thus an action which is subject to what may be called a restitutive sanction (Radcliffe-Brown 1952:213).

681 In Bedouin society, delicts are private since they involve
675 individuals or lineage groups, but the restitutive sanctions
671 to which they give rise are backed by communal consensus expressed through public approval in general, and by the twin

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675 charters of Bedouin society, the *rawaabit al-'awaaqil* and
671 the *'awaiyid Awlad 'Ali*. Again, following Radcliffe-Brown
121 (1952:212-219), sanctions expressed in al-Qasr may be con-
681 sidered civil as opposed to criminal sanctions since, even in
682 the case of intentional homicide, the emphasis is upon resti-
182 tution and the restoration of the "good society" rather than
[671] upon punishment. The Bedouin legal system is one which deals
with private delicts, and which depends upon secondary social
sanctions and ritual sanctions for the arbitration and settle-
ment of disputes.

121 Since neither a dichotamy between private and public
681 delicts nor a differential distribution of authority at the
various levels of the lineage structure obtain in the uncentral-
ized political system of the Bedouins, political action and
type of sanction will be described in terms of whether or not
they occur in the internal political system of the secondary
or domestic group, or in the external system where interaction
between secondary, primary, or tribal segments takes place.

The most striking difference between the two systems
of political action rests with the fact that the *lex talionis*,
retaliation regulated by custom, does not operate within the
121 secondary group. In the two cases of killing between tertiary
681 groups of 'Ailit Ma'fas and 'Ailit Lazumi already given, com-
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* [613] pensation was immediately paid: the incidents were both
settled and "forgotten." In conflict situations arising in the

121 external system, however, the law recognizes retaliation, a
681 life for a life. Still, even in this case, Bedouin values
682 [182] expressed through the 'awaiyid try to avert bloodshed and
{671} feuding by showing "the good path" and providing the means
for settlement through compensation.

Just as the Bedouin accepts the 'awaiyid as a set of
681 682 of ideals calculated to regulate conflict, he paradoxically
182 claims the right to impose retaliatory sanctions as a just
[671] conclusion to conflict. One Bedouin said that the greatest
[673] sin which a man or group can commit is to accept the diiya
and then take his blood-revenge and return the money. Presumably, a person or group commits no outrage if they refuse
the diiya with the understanding that blood-revenge will be
[626] taken. In al-Qasr, retaliation and the 'awaiyid are mechanisms
[671] of social control and dispute settlement. A political office
*[613] exists, i.e. the 'aqila which functions over the total range
[692] of political action, and the process of adjudication and
compensation in the form of indemnity payment represents an
institutionalized alternative to retaliation. In all cases
of dispute, ritual or religious sanctions back up social
[776] sanctions. God is a third party to all conflict, and this is
[695] made manifest in the reading of the Fatiha or the oath-taking
128 ceremony. In order to describe how authority and sanctions
68 operate in Bedouin society, a number of examples are presented
[124] below. Some of the cases are the statements of informants about
[114]

128 what happened; some of them are my translations of legal docu-
68 [124] ments which informants permitted me to see; a few of the cases
[114] happened while I was in the field and represent my reporting
of what happened. I have arbitrarily divided the cases into
those involving personal injury and those concerning property
rights. In each case, I indicate at which level of the authority
structure the conflict and settlement has taken place.

Legal Cases Pertaining to Personal Injury

578 Two cases of killing have been discussed previously.
681 Below are a number of cases dealing with personal injury which
occurred in the external political system at the various levels
of segmentation. The first three cases involve conflict
* [613] between secondary lineage segments of the 'Aishaibat tribe;
[619] the next two cases take place at the primary and sub-tribal
[648] levels, but note that secondary segments are the actual functioning
units involved; the final case, an unusual one, deals with
conflict with "foreigners" at the tribal level. Note that the
* [613] *'aqila* as a corporate representative is active in these cases.
[182] The third case presented below is a translation of an actual
[778] document showing how the *nazaala* (discussed above) functions
as a formal mechanism of conflict regulation.

578 *613 682 Date: 1947. Case: Quarrel between 'Ailit Dawlat and
'Ailit Zagharat of the 'Aishaibat concerning murder. The
quarrel began over the ownership of land. Members of the
Dawlat assaulted a member of the Zagharat but he did not
die. Then members of the Zagharat killed a member of the
[571] [692] Dawlat in revenge for the beating. Many 'awaaqil from the
tribe came to judge this case. They told the Dawlat and the
Zagharat: "Shame on you, you are of one tribe." The decision
of the 'awaaqil was made according to the 'awaiyid Awlad 'Ali.
A diiya of 400 L.E. was judged against 'Ailit Zagharat. The
diiya was collected from all of the members of the Zagharat,
and it was paid over the period of three years. The diiya
was divided into two parts: one-half went to the sons of the
killed man, and the other half went to the 'aiela.

Date: 1946. Case: Quarrel between 'Ailit Dawlat and 'Ailit
Zagharat concerning murder. The conflict began when a member
of the Dawlat argued with the Zagharat about a piece of land.
One night when the man from the Dawlat and his father were on
their way home some members of the Zagharat ambushed and killed
the father. They did not bother the son because he was only a
[571] [692] boy. The 'awaaqil settled the case, and the Zagharat paid a
400 L.E. diiya. In 1959, after all those years, the son and
[683] his uncle ambushed the man from the Zagharat who had shot the
father; they shot him four times. The man did not die but his
leg was paralyzed and he lost the sight in one eye. The

578 *613 682 683 Dawlat, on the decision of the *'awaaqil*, paid a 200 L.E. *diiya* for the leg and the eye. After this, the two families resumed friendly relations.

[539]

> In the Name of God the Merciful,
> It is the day, 28 Muharram 1382, the same as 1 July 1962. This agreement took place between the following parties: 'Ailit Abu Qarasa and 'Ailit al-Zallat. The reason for this agreement is the quarrel which happened on Wednesday, 24 Muharram, and 27 June. Out of this quarrel resulted the death of the late Juwaida Abd al-Salam. This agreement is made in the presence of the *'awaqil* of the two parties and with their full approval (also present was Hajj 'Ali, an important *rajal khair* about whom we will have more to say). The offending group, namely 'Ailit al-Zallat, will go to live with Hajj Sabr Hamad al-Dawlat at Ras Abu Laha area, according to the way of the *nazala* among the Awlad 'Ali. 'Ailit al-Zallat may walk between Wadi Umm al-Shitan and Wadi al-Hawari on the west side, the sea on the north side, and the borders of the Qinaishat land on the southern side without a *nazil* (i.e. one from the protecting party). And if they go out from these mentioned borders, they must be accompanied by one from 'Ailit Dawlat. And if they go beyond the mentioned borders, without a *nazil*, no one from the protecting party has a right to stop them. And if any from the other party offends them within the mentioned borders, then 'Ailit Abu Qarasa will be subject to whatever is decided against them in accordance with the *'awaiyid Awlad 'Ali*. This agreement was made and signed in the presence of the *'awaqil* of the Abu Qarasa, and the period of *nazala* will be one year beginning the date of today. We hope for the help of God.
>
> Signatures or seals of eleven men.
> Signature and approval of Marsa Matruh Police Office
> Dated: 1 July 1962

578 *613 682 Date: 1919. Case: Quarrel between 'Ailit Zallat ('Aishaibat, 'Ali Ahmar) and 'Ailit Hafiyan (Awlad Kharuf, 'Ali Abyad) concerning murder. The problem began over the ownership of a well. Three men from the Hafiyan were killed, and in revenge the

578 Hafiyan killed three members of the Zallat. This feud lasted
*613 over a period of 25 years. It happened one time that an
682 'aqila of 'Ailit Zallat was walking in the desert and stopped
578 for a visit at a naja', the owners of which he did not know.
574 He soon discovered that "he was in front of the Hafiyan them-
*613
682 selves." He tried to conceal his own identity, intending to eat the meal which they offered him and then escape in the dark. But the Hafiyan soon discovered that one from the Zallat was their guest. They told him that they would send men of their tribe with him to give him safe conduct through the desert. They also said that they wished to get together and make peace. Then they made peace, and its conditions were made through the 'awaaqil. No diiya was transferred because each had killed an equal number of men. Then members of the two groups lived together for two or three days and made a feast, they slaughtered sheep and the problem was over. This problem came to an end in 1938.

578 The next case, dealing with wounding, is presented in
682 the form of two documents. It is valuable for the way in
*613 which it illustrates the judicial process and ritual sanction.
[619] Note that in the first document the case seems to concern two primary segments, i.e., the 'Aishaibat and the Kamailat, but the second document, the "Day of Oath," clearly indicates that the parties involved are 'Ailit Ma'fas ('Aishaibat) and 'Ailit Mahatha (Kamailat), two secondary groups.

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Date: 24 January 1946
Marsa Matruh

1st Party: 'Awaqil of so-called Harun Abd al-Zain of al-Kamailat

2nd Party: 'Awaqil of so-called Hamad Idris of al-'Aishaibat

Both parties, the first and the second, met before the 'awaaqil and witnesses to solve the prevailing problem between them concerning the wounding of so-called Harun Abd al-Zain who claims that this wound is from Hamad Idris. In the presence of the 'awaaqil all agreed that Hamad Idris should swear the oath and be supported by the below named. And the text of the oath which they will say, is: "By the truth (i.e. haqq, which also refers to a divine attribute) of the owner of this shrine, I swear that this bullet which hurt Harun is neither from me nor do I know who shot the bullet at the time of his injury." And a number of sixteen men must support him at the shrine of Sidi Yunis al-Jaraira on the date of Friday, the 29th of Saffar, 1946. And if any does not present himself for the oath, then the wounds which are present in Harun Abd al-Zain will be from the 'Aishaibat tribe. And if all swear this oath, the two parties will be even with each other. After this, none of them will hold anything against the other. This was issued in the presence of all of their 'awaaqil and with their satisfaction without any force or ill-will.

(On the original document is presented a list of the sixteen men from the lineage of Ma'fas of the 'Aishaibat who were chosen by the Kamailat to support Hamad Idris in the Oath.)

All of the seventeen above mentioned (including Hamad Idris) must be present at the shrine of Sidi Yunis al-Jaraira on the day Friday, 29 Saffar, in order to swear the oath, and this is what took place at the hand of witnesses, and God is the best witness.

Signatures or seals of all 'awaaqil who were present.

Day of the Oath:

It is on the day Friday, the last of the blessed month of Saffar, 1946. The 'Ailit Ma'fas of al-'Aishaibat, and with them 'Ailit al-Mahatha of al-Kamailat, came in order to swear the oath at the shrine of Shaikh Yunis al-Jaraira. And they swore this oath and the Kamailat became reconciled

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578 that they had received their rights in this case. And
*613 the two parties are satisfied by this according to the
692 witnesses present.

539 Signatures or seals of four witnesses.
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578 The next case represents the only time in the memory
682 of informants that all of the 'awaaqil of the 'Ali Ahmar met
*613 to intervene in a case of conflict. This case is extremely
692 unusual because it may be the only time in Awlad 'Ali history
571 that political mobilization of this scale has taken place. As
619 noted, political action, in war or peace, usually involves
[177] only secondary segments. In view of this, the case probably
[648] reflects an instance of social change: the Egyptian government,
anxious to maintain good relations with Libya, encouraged and
facilitated the settlement of this dispute by furnishing
transportation and cutting administrative red tape so that
the 'awaaqil of the 'Ali Ahmar could handle this case in a
most expeditious way. Here is a case where Bedouin traditional
[182] political structures function adequately in the modern situation.
Note here also that, in certain circumstances, the diiya payment
can be divided symbolically and specifically to place guilt and
to indicate the seriousness of a crime.

619 Date: 1963. Case: Quarrel between the tribe of 'Ali Ahmar
682 (Egypt) and the Harabi (Libya) concerning murder. A young
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*613 boy of 'Ailit X was visiting his sister in Libya. He learned
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619 that one old man kept a large sum of money at home. One day
*613 the boy went to beg a watermelon from the old man, but really
682 he went to learn the layout of the man's house. In the night,
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[685] the boy returned to the man's house and demanded his money.
The man refused saying that he had no money. The boy stabbed the old man to death. The boy then went to his sister's house and washed the blood from his hands, and had the girl clean the blood from his robe. The police came to the sister's house in search of the boy, but he was hiding in a cave nearby. The police asked the sister: "Where is your brother, he has killed your mother?" The girl was horrified and told the police where they could find her brother.

*613 All of the 'awaaqil of the 'Ali Ahmar met at the farm of
619 'Umda Ibrahim. There were forty-one 'awaaqil plus 'Umda Ibrahim.
571 They proceeded to Libya by bus, and took forty sheep
682 with them as a kubaara. In Libya, they met with officials of
578 the Libyan government and the 'awaaqil of the Harabi tribe.
682 The Harabi asked for a diiya of 3000 L.E. The blood-money
578 asked for was extra high for two reasons: a young man had
619 killed an elder; and the murder was connected with in-
*613 tentional theft. After discussing the crime, the Harabi
[685] reduced the price to 700 L.E. They did this out of respect
for the 'Ali Ahmar who had come so far, and who had paid money for the sugar and tea. All of the 'Ali Ahmar contributed to

682 the *diiya*: the Qinaishat paid 50 L.E., the Kamailat paid
578 50 L.E., but the 'Aishaibat, the tribe of the killer paid
619 600 L.E. Of the 600 L.E. paid by the 'Aishaibat it was
*613 distributed as follows: 'Ailit Lazumi and "Ailit Ma'fas each paid 100 L.E. because they are rich; 'Ailit Dawlat paid only 30 L.E. because they are poor, and each pays according to their means. The *'aiela* of the killer, although they are poor, had to pay 70 L.E., and the *bait* of the killer had to pay 300 L.E. All paid according to their means, except the killer's *bait*. This was a special case, it never happened before and will never happen again and this is why the killer's *bait* had to pay more. The killer's *bait* was very poor, so what they did not have they had to beg from the richer families of the tribe.

Legal Cases Pertaining to Property Rights

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*613 In general, property in al-Qasr is owned either by an individual or by a tertiary group; seldom, in these days, is property held by the secondary lineage group. If we followed
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*613 classic segmentary lineage theory, seeing that the tribal
182 political structure and the *'awaiyid* are still functionally
[671] intact, we might suppose that land and water possession are rights in usufruct and not of ownership. The Bedouins themselves insist that the rights to land and water are rights of ownership. They state that all of the lineage-owned land, with few exceptions, was parcelled out to tertiary groups a

423 *613 182 [691] long time ago. This seems to be supported by the evidence shown below, for often conflict over land and water rights is represented by litigation between individuals and not groups.

422 562 *613 I have arbitrarily assigned to the classification of property rights the rights over women. I have done this because a man acquires such rights as a member of a lineage jural group and secures them with the backing of public opinion and the 'awaiyid. Also, though a man in al-Qasr does not "own" his wife, he does have the legal rights to certain things related to her: he has the right to her sexual favors, and the right to claim her offspring for his own lineage.

685 695 Settlement in cases dealing with the infringement of property rights, if they do not lead to personal injury cases, will usually be concluded by arbitration or oath-taking, either of which brings the two parties into agreement.

691 685 *613 578 692 Date: 1964. Case: Quarrel between Bait 'Umran and Bait Idris of 'Ailit Ma'fas over the ownership of a well. The 'awaaqil sent for the two parties involved, and they met on Wednesday, market day. And the 'awaaqil told the two parties: "This is a shame ('aib), you must be friends because you are from the same tribe." The 'awaaqil knew "from past history and from truthful elders" that the well belonged to 'Ait Idris. The 'awaaqil made 'Ait 'Umran change their minds about their claim [695] to the well. Before the litigation 'Ait 'Umran had insisted

691 685 that 'Ait Idris take the oath as proof that the well was
*613 owned by them. Upon the decision of the 'awaagil, however,
578 'Ait 'Umran refused to allow 'Ait Idris to swear the oath
692 "because we are all one family." This means, as one 'aqila
695 actually stated at the conclusion of the case, that " 'Ait
Idris is indebted to 'Ait 'Umran."

423 The following two cases which occur in the external
675 system of political relations, one within the 'Aishaibat
*613 territory and the other dealing with land rights in the
territory between two primary authority groups, indicate the
formal aspect of Bedouin adjudication in establishing contracts.

[539] Date: 12 August 1963. A Contract of Agreement on Land Rights.
Agreement and satisfaction took place between Hussain Karim al-Dawlat of al-'Aishaibat and Khalid Idris al-Ma'fas of al-'Aishaibat, the first and second party. And the reason for this agreement is that each of the two parties own cultivable land at Ras Wadi Madwar. The two parties wish to make a dividing line between this linear piece of land and to declare the borders. The two parties agreed on the following: first, the beginning of the border extends from the eastern side at south Ras Raqabit al-Shumar to the western side at Hatiyid and is shown by stone markers; secondly, this line should be established from the east to the west, and this is a dividing line between the two parties and was executed by them and with their satisfaction; thirdly, whoever rejects or modifies this line will be responsible in front of law and the 'awaiyid Awlad 'Ali; each party is responsible for his children and relatives as to their actions regarding this line which is the subject of the agreement; fifthly, this contract of agreement which defines the borders between the two parties was issued in two copies, a copy to each party to use when it is needed.

Signatures or seals of seven men.

423 Date: 12 October 1954. There came to us (i.e. the 'awaqil)
691 on this day, Khalid Idris of al-'Aishaibat and Yunis Abd
578 al-Nabi of al-Kamailat. The reason for their coming is a
*613 quarrel over land rights at Wadi al-Hijnaiya. And we put
[539] distinct markers between the land of the two parties, the
first, Khalid Idris, and the second, Yunis Abd al-Nabi.
And the boundary passes by the distinct markers; the
first is the wadi marker, the second to the sea and beside
the tree, and the final marker we put east of Halima well.
This is a decision between the two parties in the presence
of the following witnesses:

Signatures or seals of five men.

619 The case given below indicates, by the use of two
578 documents, the process of conflict settlement involving two
secondary segments of al-Qasr, one Sa'adi and one Marabit.
[671] 'Ailit al-Sulwatiyya, though genealogically not members of the
Awlad 'Ali and holders of a client or vassal status in traditional times, are within the jurisdiction of the 'awaiyid Awlad 'Ali. They claim their rights under it by virtue of the fact of their residence in al-Qasr. The power of ritual sanction is clearly illustrated by this case.

578 Date: 30 July 1964, Marsa Matruh. First Party: Shaikh
685 Khalid Za'aluk al-Sulwatiyya and four relatives. Second
691 Party: Khalid Idris of 'Ailit Ma'fas and three relatives.
619 They are present. The cause of these two parties coming to-
423 gether is a quarrel over a well named Halima. Since the choice
[695] to swear the oath has been made by the two parties, Khalid
Idris, the second party, will swear the oath supported by
twenty-four members of his 'umraa al-dam ("blood group") to

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578 be chosen by Shaikh Khalid Za'aluk, the first party. The text
685 of the oath which Khalid Idris will swear is: "By the truth
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619 of the owner of this tomb (maqaam), and this book of God, I
695 swear that you (i.e. the 'Ailit Sulwatiyya represented by
[539] Shaikh Khalid Za'aluk) have neither work of hand nor a
grandfather's stake in this well." If any of the oath-takers are missing on the day of the oath, the well will be owned Khalid Za'aluk. And if they swear the oath, the well will be owned by 'Ailit Ma'fas.

The date of the oath will be the first Friday of month nine,
[778] 1964. The oath will be taken at the shrine of Sidi 'Awam, and the swearing will deal with the well only. For the land which is west of the well belongs to Khalid Za'aluk and his family, and the land to the east of the well belongs to Khalid Idris and his family. And the water which is west of the well belongs to Khalid Za'aluk. The two parties agreed to this. (Each party, and five witnesses, i.e. rajal khair, for each party, signed the document.)

423 Date: 30 July 1964. I, Khalid Za'aluk, have decided to cancel
619 the oath which was supposed to have been sworn on 9 September
578 1964 at the shrine of Sidi Awam. Khalid Idris and the oath-
691
[695] takers were present and were stopped from taking the oath.
And the well named al-Halima which was the cause of the quarrel

423 619 578 691 (nizaa'a) belongs to Khalid Idris and his brothers. This happened with the satisfaction of both tribes, and this renunciation of claim is valid from today. This paper concerning the ownership of land around the well is valid from today also. And this happened between the parties: (Signatures or stamps of both parties concerned.)

(There appeared the signatures of twenty-three of the twenty-four men who were to have sworn the oath.)

Only twenty-three oath-takers were present: 30 July 1964.
I, Shaikh Khalid Za'aluk, agree on the signatures of only twenty-three oath-takers. (Signature of Khalid Za'aluk.)

648 671 578 We have mentioned that the 'awaiyid prevails in al-Qasr, but have also noted that where the security of the desert is threatened the government is likely to intervene. The government enters tribal conflict in al-Qasr with the tacit approval of the Bedouins. As one informant remarked: "The 'awaiyid is the best way to handle problems, but the police will handle what the 'awaiyid cannot."

423 691 578 619 648 *[613] [634] Date: 1964. Case: Quarrel between al-Afrad ('Ali Abyad) and 'Aishaibat ('Ali Ahmar) over water rights. Many members of both tribes took part in this conflict. The government had to intervene: they formed a peace committee made up of all the 'awaaqil of both tribes and the 'umda and shaikh from each tribe.

423 each tribe. It was decided that the water which flows through
691 the wadi after the rains should be divided equally between the
578 two tribes, and that no one should be stopped from using the
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648 water. Had not the government intervened in this conflict, and had not they collected all of the weapons from the Bedouins, this problem would have resulted in the death of many men and even greater problems.

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685 Theft is condemned by the Bedouins: "Everything in the desert is loose. We must punish the thief quickly and severely." It is a fact that the man who goes to steal and
[682] accidentally kills in the act will have judged against him
[829] the full diiya, i.e., the amount for intentional killing. On the other hand, the people of al-Qasr insist that "Bedouins do
[671] not steal." But legal norms exist to sanction violations against cultural ideals. The following case shows how social and ritual sanctions operate to enforce ideals.

619 Date: 1964. Case: Quarrel between the tribe of Kamailat and
578 the tribe of 'Aishaibat over the theft of 16 L.E. Muhammad of
685 'Ailit Ma'fas was accused of stealing 16 L.E. which belonged
*613 to Ahmad of 'Ailit Idris, Kamailat. The theft occurred while the two were residing at a hotel in Marsa Matruh. There were twenty other persons in the hotel that night. The accused said: "I did not take anything."

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578 said: "I did not take anything." The 'awaaqil of both parties
685 met and told the accused: "If you have anything give it to
*613 us; if you do not have anything then swear the oath to this
695 fact." Members of 'Ailit Ma'fas said that the boy was innocent
[571] and told the 'awaaqil that the boy should have his rights
[692] according to the 'awaiyid (i.e. he should be allowed to swear
the oath to establish his innocence). The boy accused of the
theft, his father, and two other members of 'Ailit Ma'fas
selected by the accusers swore the oath and the problem was
619 over. Two months later, the accuser from the Kamailat lost
578 his eye in an accident, because swearing the oath has con-
685 sequences for both parties. A bad oath will work against the
695 one who makes it; there will be a curse upon him, his children,
784 and his money. And the bad effects of an oath will also work
against the one who falsely accuses another making him swear
the oath.

582 The final two cases deal with marriage rights. The
562 first illustrates a number of things which I have touched on
*613 in the previous discussion of marriage: that a man may choose
792 to ignore the jural structures of the lineage group where the
desires of his offspring are concerned; that the female is
not the totally subjugated person which one might expect to
find in the strongly patrilineal Bedouin society; and that the
role of "holy man" functions in the marital area of authority
relations.

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562 The second, rather complex, case occurred while I was in the field. Once again, the role of the "holy man" is shown to operate in cases dealing with women. Shown here also is an interesting example of the cultural definition of abnormality.

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792 No Date. Case: Quarrel between 'Ailit al-Abaidi ('Ali Abyad) and 'Ailit al-Afrad ('Ali Abyad) over marriage rights. A man from al-Abaidi agreed that his daughter could marry a man but the rest of the 'aiela did not approve of this marriage. Since the man could not go to his 'aqila, who disapproved of the marriage, he took his problem to a "holy man." The "holy man" decided that the girl should marry the man she wanted to marry, but he was afraid that this would cause trouble in the 'aiela. The "holy man" decided to marry the man and woman, [586] and then to divorce them for a period of one year so that the conflict would abate. The girl's father knew of this marriage but the other members of the 'aiela did not. After a period of one year, the groom went to the "holy man" and said: "Decide anything that I can do, but I must have the girl." The "holy man" decided to make him pay a kubaara (expiation) fee of [681] [684] 100 L.E. to the girl's 'aiela, and he married them again.

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582 Date: 1965. Case: Quarrel within a tertiary segment of the Qinaishat tribe concerning marriage rights. A girl from the Qinaishat tribe had refused to marry her paternal cousin, but he was insistent upon his right to have her.

*613 he was insistent upon his right to have her. She went to
619 see the "holy man," al-Sanusi, who lives near al-Qasr. (Al-
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582 Sanusi is a descendent of "the Great Sanusi," the founder of
793 al-Sanusiyya, who now lives in Egypt after having been exiled
from Libya.) Al-Sanusi decided to keep the girl at his farm
*613 until he could decide a course of action. One night, the
619 girl's cousin secretly came to the Sanusi farm and found her
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582 room. The girl was sleeping. The cousin struck a match, the
793 girl awoke and was frightened. She jumped from her bed and
683 began to run, in so doing she fell down a flight of stairs
and suffered a rupture. This was a serious offense which the cousin had committed, and al-Sanusi decided that he should call all of the _'awaaqil_ of the area to inform them of this. In the meantime, he sent the girl back to her home and the cousin continued to bother her concerning his rights over her.

[584] The cousin went so far as to "offer the blood-sacrifice for her," a stage in the marriage process which signifies that the union has been consented to by both families. The girl's father was dead, and her brothers and uncles were unable to keep the cousin away from the girl. (It may be assumed that they were conscious of his rights to _bint 'amm_.) They had even beaten him once. All of the _'awaaqil_ of 'Ali Ahmar and
[692] 'Ali Abyad, and the Marabtiin in the al-Qasr area came to meet with al-Sanusi at his farm. He (al-Sanusi) said that they all

*613 must come because he, himself, was a Libyan and a member of
619 no tribe in Egypt. Al-Sanusi's petition was two-fold: he
578 said the cousin should be punished for violating his right of
582 privacy and property, and the question concerning the cousin's
793 right to the girl should be settled. The *'awaaqil* decided
683 that al-Sanusi should be awarded a *kubaara* of 1000 L.E. from
692 the tribes of the area, and that the girl should be permitted
to marry no man of the Qinaishat tribe. Al-Sanusi refused to
accept the *kubaara*, and this was the correct thing to do since
the *kubaara*, especially a large one, is only offered ritualistically. The *'awaaqil* took note of the cousin's rights to his
bint 'amm: they said that since the girl refused to marry him
it would not be right if she married anyone else from the tribe.
*613 Furthermore, the *'awaaqil*, on the basis of the cousin's behavior
619 in this matter, decided that the cousin was insane and should
734 be committed to an asylum. They informed the police in Marsa
[648] Matruh of this diagnosis and decision, and the police came and
transported the boy to the mental hospital in Cairo where he
is today. The uncles of the boy signed the papers which committed him.

1: Obermeyer E-5 (1964-1965) 1969 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9
'Aishaibat

CHAPTER V

STRUCTURAL DIFFERENTIATION AND AUTHORITY

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Political Role Analysis: Theoretical Framework

There is current confusion over the definition and use of concepts in political analysis. Ideas concerning power, influence, authority, and the general notion of leadership itself, are variously treated and dealt with equally well. But in every case, a necessary and common aspect of political studies is that of role analysis.

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"Role" is that part of the actor's behavior which constitutes and defines his participation in the social interactive process (Parsons and Shils 1951:23). Political roles define who does what with respect to the political aspect of the social interactive process, i.e. in the system of authority relations. In a most general sense, political role structure may be divided into the two categories of "followers" and "leaders" (Leach 1954:8-10; Easton 1965:205). From the level of the family to the largest social grouping, persons are assigned by the group, or take it upon themselves, to make and help execute decisions. This is to say, that some degree of leadership exists in all social groupings. Whether or not such leadership is institutionalized is another question with which we shall

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deal in the course of this discussion.

No political system can persist without a separation of duties between decision-makers and others. The specialized function of decision-making in the political sphere helps "to bring about some adjustment or accommodation in conflicting demands and to implement any settlement where necessary" (Easton 1965:206). It follows then that there is no society without some type of authority role, however simple, and, we assume, that this role can be defined.

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I do not consider this point a debatable one, though writings on the subject of political organization in primitive society seem to indicate that I should consider it debatable. For example, Steward (1938:247) reports on small bands of American Indians in the Basin-Plateau region who are without chiefs (leaders?). Sharp (1958:5) states that the Yir Yoront cannot tolerate even "mild chiefs"; Schapera (1956:93) notes that "chiefs everywhere in South Africa" are only part-time specialists, and this is taken to mean that the Bushman and Bergdama are without political roles. Service (1966:51) defines "leadership" as "administration" and finds that it is unstructured, which moves from one person to another, and, above all, cannot be associated with the word "chief."

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All of these discussions consider specialization to mean full-time spent in role-playing and the singularity of role assignment. On these bases conclusions are reached as to the presence

121 554 or absence of political roles in primitive societies. It is obvious that in no society does an individual play one, and only one, role. Every social role is, in some degree, a part-time role. Even at the apex of role specialization and structural complexity (the presidency of the United States, for instance), an individual plays his political role along with others. Also, in trying to determine the presence or absence of roles in a society, it should be kept in mind that the notion of institutionalization refers to a process and not a state of being. Therefore, in any one society at any one point in time, there may be a number of roles "happening." This, it seems, will especially be the case in the dynamic field of politics.

121 554 571 In political analysis, influential and leadership roles may be viewed in terms of differential responsibility. Authority is the institutionalization of a responsible relationship between the leader and other members of the collectivity wherein the former has the right to expect support from the latter in given situations (Parsons 1960:183-186). A role which is imbued with power, but not authority in the analytical sense which I wish to bring out here, lacks this institutionalized right to expect support. M.G. Smith (1966:127) makes this analytical distinction most clearly:

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> As a regulatory capacity, authority is legitimated and identified by the rules, traditions, and precedents which embody it and which govern its exercise and objects. Power is also regulatory, but is neither fully prescribed nor governed by norms and rules.

Authority is always attached to specific roles while power is a generalized control over others. For instance, power may be based on religious or economic grounds and operate with equal influence in the political sphere. The basis of the legitimacy of authority is the backing which it receives from the legal system. Power, however, is the probability that one actor within a social relationship will be able to carry out his will regardless of the basis on which this probability rests (Weber 1947:152). Power over others is a type of influence which may operate without their consent, their "will," or even their awareness and understanding. For instance, when one party controls property or other values essential to person's existence, he has power over those others (Goldhamer and Shils 1939).

Influence of the authority type is explicit and institutionalized control of certain symbols which emphasizes group goals. Power-type influence is the control of goods and symbols, often the inexplicit manipulation of these things, which emphasizes particularistic goals usually with a private individual referent. Power and authority are two types of influence. For analytical purposes, they may be considered at opposite ends of a scale of institutionalization. In this

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way, each may be considered as having aspects of the other attached to it: a power role may at times take on an authoritative aspect, and an authority role, when its incumbent "pulls rank," may be said to be exerting power rather than authority.

I have found it necessary to utilize the concepts and ideas discussed here in order to understand the distribution of power in al-Qasr. The range of authoritative action is wide in Bedouin society, and no simple dichotamy between power and authority will suffice to explain it. However, authority does crystallize at certain points in the al-Qasr social structure, and political rights and duties at these reference points become relatively formal and well-defined. When we speak of the crystallization of authority roles, we refer to a tendency toward legitimacy as a process of institutionalization taking place in society. Authority among the 'Aishaibat tribe is legitimate, public, and representative because it is distributed and exercised with reference to imperatively coordinated associations, or corporate groups.
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Furthermore, the manner in which authority is segmented and distributed informs and legitimates the Bedouin lineage structure. On the other hand, power and power roles possessing no legitimate or representative influence with reference to the lineage structure, may actually inform "structures" and "modes" which combine and "are quite unlike the articulations

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in a lineage system" (Peters 1967:280).

My own study indicates that authority roles are more easily studied since they are more easily observable. Power roles are subtle simply because they are less institutionalized; closer field work is required if we are to understand their structure and function. Al-Qasr is characterized by segmentation in communication structure which follows the lines of lineage segmentation. As a consequence of this, social intercourse is of a restricted nature wherein each lineage group tends to be its own audience. In cases such as these, where social interaction is anything but intense, the character of political relations between groups is difficult to perceive. Thus the operation of influence at the informal level, i.e. power, is difficult to comprehend. But it seems absolutely necessary that politics per se be studied in the tribal situation, and the only way that I can handle it in the al-Qasr case is to consider leadership in the context of an institutionalization process.

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There are precedents for this approach, and these also serve to point up the importance of leadership studies in primitive societies. Radcliffe-Brown (1940:xi-xxiii), referring to decision-making processes in tribal societies, was convinced that even in cases of contingencies, and seemingly "spur of the moment" group activities, careful observation would show that "they were directed by leaders who had some

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measure of recognized authority" (p. xv). Radcliffe-Brown conceived of politics as a process, and actually worked with concepts of increasing specialization in decision-making and role differentiation to bring this out (p. xxi). The structural focus of political analysis is the role: he reminds us that analytical concepts such as the "State" do not exist in the phenomenal world, that there exists only individuals who play roles and interrelate as possessors and non-possessors of authority (p. xxiii).

More recently, Pospisil (1968:201-222) has claimed that all societies necessarily possess authority roles by virtue of the fact that justice and its administration is "vested in the decision-making activity, irrespective of its informality or subtlety, of an individual or group of individuals of influence." According to Pospisil, law and conflict regulation upon which political order rests cannot be divorced from "the decision-making process of authority or group leaders" (1968:206). In his study of the Kapauku Papuans, Pospisil (1963:52-55) describes the basis of a "power" struggle between different "authorities."

In this study, I have tried to use the concepts of decision-making process, power-authority continuum, and role-structure for an analysis of Bedouin leadership. Such an approach may be better suited for a study of peasant or modern-complex societies where roles are more differentiated

121 554 571 and better defined, but I feel that the area of leadership in tribal society is more complex and less well studied than we are led to believe. Both the decision-making process and some kind of authority are present in all societies, but we know less about such universals in tribal society. It is as Easton (1965:205) has said: "Even in the smallest group, we can expect to find that the power and responsibility of caring for recurring matters as well as crises tend to reside in the hands of the few."

Status and Role Differentiation

554 565 Although structural differentiation along class lines does not exist in al-Qasr, status differential does exist and a discussion of it is essential for an understanding of Bedouin authority structure. Classes exist only where individuals at a specific socio-economic level "become conscious of their common interests and organize themselves"(Linton 1936:110). Status stratification in and of itself is not indicative of a class structure, for "a size beyond the possibility of facial recognition" is an additional prerequisite (Bierstedt 1957:404).

554 571 Authority structure in al-Qasr, like any of the other structures of society, constitites a system of roles. The actors who act out the roles in this particular system occupy a special status, or position, in the Bedouin social system

554 and political structure. This group of actors corresponds
571 to Max Weber's concept of stand, or "status group," a group set apart from the rest of society by the amount of "status honor" which its members possess. In content, "status honor" is normally expressed by the fact that above all else a specific style of life can be expected from all of those who wish to belong to the circle. Linked with this expectation are restrictions on social intercourse" (Gerth and Mills 1946:186-188).

In the course of daily observation in al-Qasr, one begins to understand that certain persons communicate more frequently and more easily with certain others; that the member families of this group tend to intermarry; and even that the men of this group tend to dress similarly. In each case, they visibly and socially set themselves apart from other Bedouins in al-Qasr and the surrounding area: one can identify a member of this "status group" on the streets of Marsa Matruh. They do not represent a well-structured group, least of all an association. More concisely, Weber refers to these individuals as

> A status group (which) is always somehow societalized, but is not organized into an association. Commercium, in the sense of "social intercourse," and connubium among groups are the typical characteristics of the mutual esteem among status equals; their absence signifies status differences (Gerth and Mills 1946:300).

554 It would be considered "wrong" for the members of
571 this group to present themselves at an al-Qasr wedding party,
[577] [585] or the annual celebration held in honor of a local saint of
[796] the area. When I inquired about the conspicuous absence of
[124] some of my chief informants from such gatherings, I was told
[431] that "they will send their gifts," or that "it is not decent
554 that they come to something such as this." In terms of
571 Bedouin social structure, there are a number of plausible
182 explanations for this "status separation." Fathers should
561 [593] not attend public affairs at which their sons may be "performing," i.e., young men should be allowed to play a public
role outside the confines of the father-son authority
structure. By virtue of the extension of the father role,
and its corresponding authoritarian attitude, every member
of the elder age-set commands certain rights and obligations
which would prevent the free expression that is the hallmark
of Bedouin parties. Conversely, and at the more general
level, members of the "status group" who wish to remain
members of this circle accept certain restrictions on social
[114] intercourse. At the five different Bedouin "parties" which
I attended, there were "elders" present, but none of them
could be classified as members of the "status group." Bedouins
plainly state that elders should not attend parties, but, on
the other hand, they show much more concern and emotion when
they say that a member of the "status group" should not "be

554 seen" at any such function. It would appear that the mechanism
571 at work here is not simply a device to provide the younger
182 generation with a tension-release situation, but also a
561 symbolic expression of the difference between the possessors
[154] and the non-possessors of authority, a confirmation of the
political order.

[578] The avoidance practice, or separation, between the
old and the young in the "party" situation is a structural
fact of Bedouin society, and, though it may ultimately be
defined as a conflict control or legitimating mechanism, in
the context of culture change new aspects and meanings attach
554 to the phenomenon. The "status group" is an agent of change
571 in al-Qasr; its members can afford to gamble in the market
178 economy of Marsa Matruh since they possess the reserve capital
[471] (in the form of sheep) and the social prestige which permits
[439] this. The "status group," with business and social relations
[177] in Marsa Matruh, enjoys both the benefits of associational
ties with the Egyptians and the communal ties with their
fellow Bedouins. They see themselves as being different from
their fellow tribesmen, and they tend to face more towards
Marsa Matruh than al-Qasr. In short, they are the "cultural
brokers" who support an ideology of change, they extol the
benefits of a new way of life over and against the old.

[789] One repudiation of tradition which constitutes an
[796] attempt to define the style of life of the "status group"

554 571 178 789 796 concerns magic. Each August there is a celebration in honor of al-Qasr's local saint. At these celebrations, the darwish performs his special skills such as putting a red-hot iron to his tongue, or standing on a skin drum held high by his two assistants. No member of the "status group" attends these affairs because the darwish and his magic "belong totally to the old way of life." This is a restriction on social intercourse. It may also be a rejection of the saint's sacred power, or reluctance on the part of the "status group" to 554 571 183 share authority. The ideology which the "status group" in al-Qasr has developed embodies attitudes of cooperation and patience with induced programs of change. These attitudes are invoked in varying degrees corresponding to motives of economic gain, desire for power, and altruistic concern. But the result is a "status group" mood which may be described as one of disdain for the old way of life. Ideology and discontent in al-Qasr are mainly evident among the members of the "status group."

554 556 571 * [613] The pool from which the members of the "status group" are recruited consists of the "status honor" possessors of three lineages (two Sa'adi and one Marabit). These have been, traditionally and presently, the wealthiest and most influential in al-Qasr. Wealth in al-Qasr is defined in terms of three things: sheep, land, and olives. Olives are becoming the measure of wealth in the modern al-Qasr: sheep are the tradi-

554 tional symbol of wealth. A comparison of wealth between
571 the "status group" and "other members" of al-Qasr, and the
556 picture of stratification which emerges, are shown on Table 6.

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TABLE 6

COMPARATIVE DATA ON SOCIO-ECONOMIC STRATIFICATION IN AL-QASR[1]

Average Per Person	Status Group	Others
OLIVE - trees	661	86
SHEEP - head	402	30
LAND - acres	91	5

554 One most important way of accruing "status honor"
571 in al-Qasr is by acting the part of the third party in conflict
627 situations. The role of the third party represents an effective
*613 and acceptable way of bypassing formal litigation through the
[778] office of _'aqila_. For instance, by mediating through the
process of _nazaala_, the third party prevents feuds.

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[1] This data is both approximate and partial. Some data are excellent and completely reliable, others are not so dependable. Factors which could conceivably change the picture here presented would be a count of land and animals outside al-Qasr which would be extremely difficult to obtain. Also, some land is not in the name of the owner but in the names of relatives. Of all the data, land data is the most unreliable. Nevertheless, the addition of new data, I feel, would only serve to substantiate the picture of socio-economic stratification shown here.

554 process of nazaala, the third party prevents feuds. In this
571 sense, the third party is a legitimate moral and political
627 influence, but not formalized to the degree as that of the
*[613] 'aqila. A discussion of the authority structure in al-Qasr,
then, requires that the allocation of authoritative action
in terms of the loci, or roles, of political influence be
designated.

[792] The central place of the third party role in the
Bedouin political structure is manifested in the many laudable
terms which refer to it: rajal khair ("good man") is the
most general and often used referent; rajal saalih ("pious
man") refers almost always to a "holy man," a specialized
role in al-Qasr; quwaal al-khair ("the speaker of good");
and fa'aal al-khair or 'amaal al-khair ("the doer of good").
The latter three roles are approximately equivalent to that
of rajal khair, though some informants argued that rajal khair
is especially designated because he mediates quarrels while
the fa'aal al-khair or 'amaal al-khair help a man when he is
in financial difficulties.

554 The functioning of the third party in conflict mediation
571 is formal to the degree that two parties agree on his
627 intervention and to abide by his decision; but the structuring
*613 of the third party is informal by comparison with the institutionalized
182 role of 'aqila. However, the existence of
the third party role, and its various expressions in al-Qasr

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[182] politics, and the fact that it is differentiated from the role of 'aqila, are the bases for conceptualizing a structural division of political duties and authority distribution.

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571 Role differentiation in the authority structure may be discussed from two points of view: the degree of difference between authoritative decision-making roles and the other roles, and, the way in which one authoritative role differs from another. These refer to the different degrees of specialization characterized by any one role as compared to another. I have already discussed the way in which the role of 'aqila differs from other social roles (such as the kinship roles) in the authority structure of al-Qasr. In the following [128] discussion, I focus on role differentiation in the non-institutionalized aspect of the authority structure, on power and influence.

Societies differ from culture to culture in the complexity of role differentiation. Within any one culture it may differ from social domain to social domain. The political system in al-Qasr is from this point of view structurally simple, the assignment of duties in the traditional authority structure being divided between the 'aqila and the third party.
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What legitimate influence is possessed by the third party is derivative from the "status honor" of its members. The exception to this is the rajal saalih who derives his power [792] or influence as a result of his special relationship with God.

554 571 627 Thus within the "status group" a difference exists between those members whose power might be considered "secular" (i.e. the rajal khair), and those whose power might be considered "sacred" (i.e. the rajal saalih). Their right to mediate and to overseer the execution of decisions binding on parties to conflict derives from this status. In a way, authority role patterns may be seen to overlap, and the "status group" impinges on the legitimate authority of the 'aqila by virtue of the fact that they are, for one reason or another, his status equals inside and outside the political structure.

554 571 182 *613 This structural division of political duties for dealing with conflict corresponds to Eisenstadt's (1965:30) differentiation of roles in terms of degrees of instituional-ization. The role of 'aqila is present and enduring in each tertiary authority group. There is an incumbent who can be pointed out. His rights and privileges are circumscribed, and his duties and obligations are well defined: the power of the 'aqila role is limited by the very fact that it is 554 571 182 627 institutionalized. The role of the third party, or the mediator in Bedouin society, is less institutionalized, and therefore, less structured and less confining with respect to the kind and amount of influence which the role-player might exert.

The role of the rajal khair, and this implies reference to all third parties, carries with it power. When power is

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*[613] When power is institutionalized, such as it is in the role of 'aqila, it becomes authority. This is the Weberian notion of power and authority which has been used by Bohannan (1958) for an analysis of, what he refers to as, "extra-processual events." "Extra-processual events" refers to the operation of power in everyday social relationships, whenever some people make others do what they want them to do. In other words, possessors of "status honor" are also possessors of power, and, I would claim, by virtue of this, such people are recruited into decision-making roles. Not only do members of the "status group" manipulate others in everyday dyadic social relationships, but, more importantly, in the context of conflict control they are able to dominate in political triadic relationships. Furthermore, since they are not structurally bound in their decision-making role, i.e., they operate across group and lineage lines, they accrue even more power and widen their power-base or support structure. What is highlighted in this kind of political role analysis is the fact that different individuals play the game of power politcs in various ways, and with varying degrees of success. (128) In the next chapter, I will bring out this very point by presenting a case study of one such role-player.

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627 When we contrast the roles of 'aqila and rajal khair, we are defining a political role-set. In an attempt to differentiate between the two roles further than we already have,

554 571 *613 627 and to clarify the concept of political role structure for al-Qasr, we may make the useful analytical distinction between an "arbitrator" and a "mediator." George Simmel (Wolff 1950), in his discussion of the sociological significance of the third element, i.e. "the triad," notes the important difference between the "mediator" who only guides "the process of coming to terms," and the "arbitrator" who "ends up by taking sides" (1950:146-149). In the process of mediation, the termination of conflict is in the hands of the parties themselves, and there is no final authority to which one may appeal. In the process of arbitration, the 'aqila may, after deciding that mediation has been unsuccessful, impose his will over the wills of the litigants and appeal to the rawaabit as the final authority. The mediator attempts to reduce "will" to "understanding" (Simmel 1950:148). Mediation may be considered an initial stage of most Bedouin judicial processes; thus the mediating and arbitrating attributes of political authority are not always separate, as in the role of 'aqila. In so far as the regulation of conflict is a political mechanism for the reduction of strain, then " . . . the existence of the third element serves the perpetuation of the group" (1950:152).

554 571 627 The rajal khair and the "status group" in al-Qasr have much in common with Evans-Pritchard's tut role in Nuer society (1940:178-181).

> 554 A tut in this rather wide sense of 'man of good standing,'
> 571 or 'social leader' is usually a scion of an important
> 627 lineage, the head of his own family, and master of his
> homestead and herd . . . (His) authority is never formalized.
> [177] He has no defined status (i.e. specifically delimited
> position), powers, or sphere of leadership . . . Beyond
> his domestic groups a tut has authority in his village
> only in the sense that he takes a prominent part in
> questions of procedure and other discussions.

The non-institutionalized third party role in al-Qasr has power and influence in political affairs, and this condition arises from certain structural features and economic facts about Bedouin society. In a word, outside the lone formal role of 'aqila, a person's political influence is directly related to the traditional influence which attaches to his family, or to his economic status. In all cases, the person of "good" family and sufficient wealth has a high status on the social prestige scale of al-Qasr. The people who have high esteem do not have prescribed roles to play in al-Qasr, but their roles are indeed important. Furthermore, the rajal khair role can be just as important as any political role which is prescribed, and it may even become more important.

554 Besides the 'aqila and the third party, there exists
571 two external but related roles which form part of the total
177 system of Bedouin authority. The roles of 'umda and shaikh
[634] represent institutionalized offices. They function, however,
more as structural aspects of the Egyptian governmental
authority structure. Of course, no complete separation
between the two structures can be claimed. It is recognized

554 that these officers, as representatives of the Bedouin, must
571 figure in both structures. Therefore, we must understand
177 and explain the relationship between the two sets of roles
extant in the Bedouin total political structure, one set
pertaining to the traditional authority structure and the
other to the relatively new legal authority structure of
the nation state.

554 The one factor common to all Bedouins in politically
571 influential roles is that they possess a high degree of
"status honor," and thus belong to the "status group" of
al-Qasr. The "status group" is responsible for political
order in al-Qasr and the political links which it maintains
with other systems, Bedouin and Egyptian. Bedouins say that
responsible action in conflict control belongs to one who
knows how to give a man his rights while maintaining the
honor of both parties; at the ideal level, it is the duty
of all to do this. The fact that the power group and "the
rich" comprise two coterminous groups is accidental and
even incidental to the Bedouins. In theory, there could be
a person of low economic status but who would belong to the
"status group" simply as a result of his ability to mediate.
*[613] The authority of the 'aqila and the governmental offices of
[177] 'umda and shaikh are legitimate only where formal litigation
[627] is concerned. Beyond this, they may have influence, not
legitimate authority, and in this case, they switch roles
and operate as a rajal khair.

554 571 and operate as a rajal khair.

There are two primary types of political roles in al-Qasr, the traditional and the modern legal. Modern legal political roles have been decreed from above by the government. The traditional roles of 'aqila and "third party" represent autochthonous roles emerging from Bedouin social and cultural structures. Bedouin traditional roles correspond to Weber's ideal-type "traditional authority" which is based upon "piety for what actually, allegedly, or presumably has always existed" (Gerth and Mills 1946:296). The role of 'aqila is "traditional" rather than "legal" despite its fully institutionalized status. The relatively modern roles of 'umda and shaikh are what I term here "legal"; these offices are not, nor did any of my informants consider them to be, roles natural in the Bedouin political system. The legitimacy of these roles stems from, what Weber called, "legal authority" in which "submission . . . is based upon an impersonal bond to the generally defined and functional duty of office" (1946:299). In this case, the norms to which conformity is demanded are not those espoused by the 'aqila or the "third party," but are established by national governmental decrees and regulations.

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128 In the remaining part of this chapter, the attempt is to show two things which I consider essential to an understanding of Bedouin political structure and a perspective of

128 Bedouin culture change: how the Bedouins perceive their authority structure, and how political authorities relate to members of the political system.

Traditional Roles

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627 The authority and role of the 'aqila has been discussed so that I can devote attention to the "third party" roles in this section. No formalized document exists to stipulate the rights and duties of the "third party," such as exists for the 'aqila in the form of the rawaabit al-'awaaqil. Nevertheless, Bedouin litigants have certain expectations of a rajal khair when he mediates in a case of conflict. Before a rajal khair agrees to take part in the judicial process, the disputants make it explicit that they will accept his decision as final and binding. Such an agreement is not put into writing. On the other hand, a rajal khair can intervene into a dispute on his own. In so doing, he may gain in prestige relative to the manner and degree of success with which he handles the problem. By saving face for both parties in the quarrel, by cajoling an ingratiating attitude from both parties, the rajal khair may reinforce or augment his "status honor" and his local following.

*[613] A person occupying the office of 'aqila can participate in the process of conflict regulation as a rajal khair. We noted that this is a case of role-switching. It is conceivable

554 571 627 *613 then that the *'aqila* can increase his prestige and status beyond the limits of his formal role. When he does take the role of *rajal khair*, he does so only in conflict cases involving two lineages other than his own. Where any member of his own lineage is concerned, an incumbent *'aqila* cannot be considered a neutral "third party" which is a prerequisite of this role. This factor constitutes a limit on the power of the *'aqila*.

One *'aqila* explained the relationship between the *rajal khair* and *'aqila* roles in this way: "The two are equal. The *'aqila* is responsible for one *bait*, but the *rajal khair* solves any problem in any place, for any *bait*. He goes to them or they come to him. I am, for instance, responsible for the members of *Bait 'Umar*, but it is quite possible that any other *bait* can ask for my advice in a problem. And so I go as a *rajal khair*."

In a general sense, the office of the *'aqila* represents an ideal, while the real aspects of conflict regulation in al-Qasr center around the role of the "third party." In fact, many of the cases formally handled by the *'aqila* afterwards undergo readjustment, as it were, by a *rajal khair*. 554 571 627 This is done by the *rajal khair's* suggesting a "more reasonable" settlement which is agreeable to both sides. For example, in a case of conflict over water rights the following was reported: "The *'awaqil* passed the judgement that they should pay a

554 dhabiiha and 10 L.E. But Hajj 'Ali intervened and did not
571 let them pay the fine. Instead, he had them write a paper
627 declaring that should they reopen this matter, they would
have to pay the old fine plus a new fine of the same amount." Simmel (Wolff 1950) notes that the mediator saves group unity through his "intellectuality," but that he is also an exploiter of the situation. It is obvious that Hajj 'Ali could have increased his "status honor" in the eyes of both parties to this conflict. The rajal khair who is facile enough to salvage the honor of both parties in a dispute increases his chances for future mediation and, hence, the chance to further augment his "status honor." The minimal fine involved in most of Bedouin litigation indicates a concern, not with punishment per se, but with "taking one's rights" and lawful share of honor. Social harmony is viewed in terms of an equitable distribution of honor. The power which a rajal khair has over litigants, which derives from his status in the social structure, contributes to this social harmony necessary for the persistence of the community.

554 The Bedouins say that one goes to the rajal khair,
571 or rajal salih, because he knows that he will "get his
629 rights." Litigation is entered into with the understanding
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[691] that neither party will emerge a "loser." On the other hand,
*[613] the 'aqila, who is expected to be dispassionate and totally
objective, must rule on the rightness or wrongness of an act;

554 hence the rajal khair represents a face-saving mechanicsm
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627 and an alternative which is needed. The rajal khair may even
[829] violate group norms in acting to restore the balance of
*[613] honor: he may lie with intent to deceive, behavior which at
[577] any other time would be considered "wrong" by the Bedouin.
An informant said that

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> the real rajal khair is a man who goes to men in a quarrel and asks them to be on good terms and to avoid the devil. He uses good judgement in quarrels. In this case, he may even have to lie. He goes to both parties and listens to them insult each other, but when he returns he tells each that the other is a good man and wishes to settle the quarrel. He tells them: 'Do not let the devil interfere.' He tells each that the other wants his friendship.

554 I pursued the detail that a rajal khair may lie to restore
571 peace, since other informants had made a point of this. My
577 informant then explained:
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> I don't want to commit myself because no one knows if the rajal khair is really lying; the men at the time of the quarrel do not know that he is lying. Not all men are rajal khair: there are only a few. The rajal khair puts himself in trouble to help others, therefore, the people do not want to harm him (by thinking ill of him). The rajal khair must be a good man and help others, and he always speaks the truth. He lies but he is doing good, and the people do not want to harm him. When the rajal khair lies, a man does not lose his rights. A man tells the rajal khair this; he tells him that he does not want to lose his rights, and he does not care what he says as long as he does not lose his rights.

554 571 *613 627 [539] One _'aqila_, who is famous for the sharpness of his tongue in dealing with litigants, was explicit about the authority of the _rajal khair_ as compared to his own in matters of conflict regulation:

> Both are one (i.e. the _'aqila_ and the _rajal khair_), for the _rajal khair_ can also finish a problem. The _rajal khair_ tries to solve the problem, but only the _'aqila_ judges (_yahkum_). The _rajal khair_ worries about the feelings of the two men involved, but the _'aqila_ cares only about justice and what is right . . . The _rajal khair_ does not want the two men to lose one another. It is a friendly way to solve problems.

554 571 627 829 *613 Bedouins of low status in al-Qaṣr who are economically linked to the _rajal khair_ in what resembles a patron-client relationship permit this fact to influence their own interpretation of the authority structure. A common view of the _'aqila's_ formal authority indicates that the Bedouins themselves are conscious of a structural comparison of political roles, but not of the underlying economic conditioners at work.

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> There are good men and there are bad men: the _rajal khair_ is the opposite of a bad man. The _rajal khair_ is not responsible for his group, but the _'aqila_ is. The _'aqila_ is chosen from among the elders of the _bait_ so that he is not always a good man. But when they want a man to solve problems, they get him from among the _rajal khair_. The _'aqila_ is responsible before the _'umda_ and _shaikh_, and he is responsible for collecting and receiving the _diya_.

554 571 627 182 The _rajal khair_ represents a vital element in Bedouin society. He is a symbol of security, the man to whom one

554 571 627 182 [181] [556] turns in times of need dealing with financial and personal problems. In view of the value stress which the Bedouins place upon generosity, manifest in the redistributive system of the lineage, the wealth of the rajal khair is the wealth of the community. Wealth divides, not only possessors from non-possessors, but also, seekers after security from power seekers. It is as Peters (1965:145) has noted in Cyrenaica: generosity, not being entirely altruistic, wins repute and repute is an important aspect of political power.

554 682 627 *613 829 In an interview concerning the justice of blood-revenge, there was general agreement that if a man kills intentionally, then blood-revenge must be taken by the murdered man's bait against someone in the murderer's aiela. But one prominent man (a rajal khair) protested that "the best man in the killer's family must not be harmed." This statement generated a rather heated debate. One man said: "The best man should be killed for this is right in the Bedouin type of justice." (This comment was made by a man who is the 'aqila of a low-status lineage in al-Qasr.) The first speaker's reply to the protest was this:

> [178] Nevertheless, it all depends upon the character of the best man . . . if he is evil and on bad terms with your family, then he will be the first one to be killed. But if he is a good man, then you kill the murderer himself . . . You must never kill a rajal khair because he may do good in the future. In the old days, the killing started right away, and all problems were big ones: today there is negotiation--people are improving.

554 One *'aqila* claimed that the *rajal khair* is a person
627 who shares in his own authority and presides when he is
*613 away, but he separated the "rights" of the two roles. The
[779] *'aqila* is able to force two parties in conflict to read the
[578] *Fatiha*, the first *sura* of the Quran, in order to terminate
the problem; this is beyond the rights of the *rajal khair* whose
influence is not directly supported by sacred sanctions. But
[784] the role of *rajal khair* does have its "sacred" aspects, for
all Bedouins know that "you should never harm a *rajal khair*
or God will punish you for this." I never heard this same
thing said about the *'aqila*.

554 Historically, it was perhaps the case that the *rajal
627 khair* was the person of high status who represented the authority
*613 of an absent *'aqila*. The role never became institutionalized
182 but functioned as a support and substitute role in a structure
dominated by that of the *'aqila*. In a segmentary society
627 where the various structures exist in opposition to one
628 another, it is important that an institution, such as a third
182 non-partisan element, exists to facilitate communication
578 between parties for the purposes of conflict regulation.
Besides the *rajal khair*, an example of this would be the
traditional case of the wife from an outside tribe who alone
was permitted freedom of passage between the two warring
parties. Her purpose, it was assumed, was that of peace-making.

554 The rajal khair, then, is a broker in social relation-
571 ships, a manipulator of loyalties. As a member of the "status
627 group," he can afford to spend time and money in courting his
fellow tribesmen, and, as a result, can accrue prestige and
loyalty. This role, like that of the 'aqila, is a secular
[681] one. The sanctions which it controls are as economical as
those of the 'aqila's are political. In this sense, they
are differentiated from the role of rajal saalih whose
sanctions are sacred in nature.

554 The traditional role which we define as that of the
792 rajal saalih, "the holy man," was probably much more important
[178] in the past than it is today. In al-Qasr, there are only two
rajal saalih who share in traditional power: the one is a
resident of al-Qasr proper, and the other, a member of the
prestigious Sanusi family, lives near Marsa Matruh.

The rajal saalih of al-Qasr, i.e. the local "holy
man," is assured of status because he is an ashraf, one who
claims descent from the family of the Prophet. He is also a
[561] member of the elder age-set, and while he is not rich, he
cannot be considered poor. Though the "holy man" al-Sanusi
[793] lives near Matruh, he participates in the authority structure
of al-Qasr and is a member of the "status group." He is
sometimes referred to as rajal saalih kabir, "a great holy
man," by virtue of his Sanusi heritage.

[771] The relative unimportance of this role as compared
to that of the rajal khair in conflict regulation is a function

554 of the Bedouin attitude, or lack of it, toward religion.
792 Since the time of Muhammad, the Bedouins have been considered
771 notoriously bad Muslims. Today, the Bedouins tend to joke
about their lack of zeal, and often point out that "holy
619 men" are not to be trusted.[2] This is seen in Sa'adi behavior
771 toward the Marabtin tribes who are their vassals. Theoretically,
792 the Marabtin who trace descent to the Prophet and might be
554 [778] considered "sacred Tribes" should be respected by the "secular"
Sa'adi tribes. But the Sa'adi of al-Qasr tend to deride the
554 Marabit. For instance, the "holy man" of al-Qasr, 'Amm Salih,
792 is a Marabit and well-known for his ability to successfully
627 mediate in conflict situations. But one informant, pointing
619 out this gift which 'Amm Salih possesses, said: "Amm Salih
is a good man, he is not a Marabit." But 'Amm Salih identifies
himself as a "rajal saalih" and a "Marabit"; he sees no role
conflict here.

771 The Bedouins also joke about the manner in which they
[522] practice the "pillars of Islam." Especially, they make light
of the fact that they are irregular in mosque attendance.
They say, with a slight smile, "we pray in the desert." A
[124] common way for an interview to end was by an informant rising
and saying: "Now I must wash for prayers." This happened

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[184] [2] Professor Abou-Zeid also notes this trait in his study of the Bedouin near Sallum, on the Libyan border (1966:248).

771 at any time of the day! As one Bedouin put it: "According
to the idea of goodness (salih), we are not good. This is
because we do not pray, we are part-timers in prayer."

554 A good rajal saalih is considered by the Bedouin to
792 have a special "blessing" (baraka), a concept somewhat
778 equivalent to that of mana. Someone such as 'Amm Salih
is thought to have baraka, and this type of power naturally
increases his influence and enhances his status. The following
[124] informant's account brings this out and shows something of
the magico-religious element at work in Bedouin power relations.

> [539] Hajj 'Ali does not believe in magic but he respects
> the "holy man" like anyone else. He owns a field
> from which are taken stones for building houses.
> One day he saw some men taking stones from this
> field. They were digging near a well so that the
> well would not be able to hold water after they had
> finished. Hajj 'Ali told the men to stop digging.
> One man answered: "I am cutting these stones for
> the Jaraira family (the family of 'Amm Salih), and
> only a few more and we will be finished." Hajj
> 'Ali replied: "For the Jaraira as for anyone else,
> we don't favor anyone, so stop the work now."
> Then Hajj 'Ali went home, never thinking that they
> would cause any trouble for him, and he was
> afraid of no harm. He slept and he had a dream.
> [787] In the dream he saw three of the Jaraira family,
> all of whom were dead and whom he had known in life.
> In the dream they only watched him and spoke no words.
> In the morning Hajj 'Ali went to the co-operative
> society's office and there he met 'Amm Salih. He
> said to him: "'Amm Salih, I want to tell you something."
> Then he related the whole story to him, and said:
> "I had no fear that you would do me any harm. But
> last night I saw your relatives in my dream; I had
> not even thought of them yesterday, so they are not
> [828] the cause of the dream. (The Bedouins believe that
> dreams reflect, and are connected with, what you saw
> or did during the day). So come and take all of
> the stones that you want, even if you are going to
> build a palace."

554 It is interesting to note that Hajj 'Ali is one of the most
[571] powerful members of the "status group" in al-Qasr. He is
[178] also a leading proponent of social change and a critic of
the old way of life which includes belief in magic. One can
[792] see how 'Amm Salih's influence and status might work in other
areas of social action.

554 Although it is conceivable that a rajal salih can
792 be asked to intervene in any type of conflict, it is more
627 likely that he will preside at cases involving marriage and
[695] divorce. The rajal saalih may also be asked to serve as a
[691] witness or consultant in litigation cases. The Bedouins
* [613] point out that the "holy man," like the rajal khair, is apt
[829] to be more trustworthy than the formal authority, the 'aqila.

> Sanusi is a good man and the people should listen to him. He is a rajal khair, a rajal saalih, not an 'aqila. He is better than an 'aqila--he is our brother. He is much better than the 'umda because he never changes the truth. The 'umda may go and accuse me wrongly to the government but Sanusi would never do this.

554 It is, of course, difficult to decide whether Sanusi's
792 charisma stems from the fact that he is a rajal salih, or the
facts of his wealth and family. Most probably it is a little
of both, the sacred as well as the secular. 'Amm Salih, on
the other hand, is neither wealthy nor from a particularly
prestigious family by economic standards of al-Qasr: he
derives his influence and status from the sacred aspects of

554 792 his role.

The people of al-Qasr identify 'Amm Salih as the "holy man" in the area. In my interviews, when I asked for [124] [627] the name of a party, besides the 'aqila, who solves the Bedouins' problems, the answer was either Hajj 'Ali, the rajal khair, or "the Jaraira family." (This refers to 'Amm Salih and his brother.) When I asked for the name of a man who could tell me "how the Bedouin should act," the only name mentioned was that of 'Amm Salih.

554 792 627 'Amm Salih says that he solves many problems, not all of which deal with marriage and divorce. He claimed that he could settle conflicts over land and water. Just as a man may choose to go to the rajal khair, so also might he go to the rajal salih. Often enough, the selection of a "third party" will be determined by his propinquity. One 'aqila told me: "Salih Jaraira is a good man . . . If two men wish to accept Jaraira's decision, and if he lives near them, it is all right. If Jaraira cannot solve the problem, then they * [613] [571] will return to the 'aqila. The 'aqila can solve it or he can call in other 'awaqil who can solve it."

[114] When I asked 'Amm Salih for case studies of problems which he has handled, he said that he would not reveal them because they are private affairs. He was willing, however, to describe the method in which he solves a problem.

> 554 Suppose the donkey of A (a man present at the interview)
> 792 gets into the barley of B (another man present). This is
> 627 actually a serious matter since it could conceivably lead
> to a big fight between A's *'aiela* and B's *'aiela.* First,
> I separate them and make each go to his home. Then I
> get A's three brothers (his father is dead), we take a
> *dhabiiha* (lamb) and go to B's place and all eat together.
> [779] After the meal, we read the *Fatiha* (opening *sura* of the
> Quran) together to show that all is forgiven. After the
> *Fatiha* has been read no trouble will start because this
> is done in the presence of the Jaraira.

[784] He explained that reading the *Fatiha* in bad faith would bring
the same curse from God that a bad oath would bring. He also
*[613] claimed that only he and the *'aqila* have the authority to
command men to read the *Fatiha*.

554 'Amm Salih says that he uses the *'awaiyid* as a guide
792 in solving problems, and that it is necessary because
627 "quarrels spread like fire, it is like fire; they spread to
671 killing and war." He was the only person in al-Qasr who
554 tried to conceptualize the difference between the *'awaiyid
792 Awlad 'Ali* and the *Sharii'a*. 'Amm Salih said that it is
627 wrong to lie, according to both the secular and the sacred
671 authority codes: "One who lies exceeds the word of God,
779 577 and God will punish him for this. No one can know how this
[784] punishment will take place, only God will know this . . .
Sometimes a car goes off the road and people will say that it
is the punishment of God. But you never know because the
554 punishment of God comes in the after-life." I asked him:
792 "If this is so, why may the *rajal khair* lie in trying to
627 settle quarrels?" He replied:
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> Lying is bad (haram), but this is "the lie of a peace-maker" (kadhib musaalih). For instance, if you have a quarrel with Yunis here, then I have words with both of you. I use different words with each of you. I use different words than those which you used in the quarrel--I use good words. This is to bring you two together again. Maybe I see that you are going to kill, or I hear bad words from you; I do not go and tell him what you said.

'Amm Salih said that it is his "duty" to mediate disputes, and that he never hesitates "because God will reward me later." He did not want the quarrels to grow into wars. He also bases his pleas for conciliation upon moral discoure, the method used by the other traditional authorities.[3] 'Amm Salih said that in trying to solve a problem, "I give priority to the elder. I go to the younger man and tell him that he should make peace with the elder because no one cares more for him than his antagonist, and that he really cares more for his antagonist than for any other." The rajal saalih mediates but does not arbitrate: he attempts to redress the balance of good relations but does not impose judgements.

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This approach to conflict regulation is not that of the 'aqila in his formal role, but it is similar to what the rajal khair would use. The main procedural difference between the two informal roles (i.e. rajal khair and rajal saalih) is that, in each case, the rajal saalih reads the Fatiha with

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[3] The approach which I used in my interviews with 'Amm Salih derives from the work of John Ladd as presented in his book, The Structure of a Moral Code, 1957.

554 the disputants. As noted, the *rajal saalih* shares this right
792 with the *'aqila*. The *rajal khair* does not have recourse
627 to this mechanism which amounts to divine approval of the
*613 binding decision of the "third party." 'Amm Salih in his
779 discussion of the Bedouin moral code corroborated this point: "Any *'aqila* can read the *Fatiha*. In this way, he and the two parties involved terminate the quarrel. This is a way to show that all agree on the settlement. Originally, only the *rajal saalih* did this, but now the *'awaaqil* do it in all cases." It would be interesting to know if in Cyrenaica both roles perform this function or if it belongs only to the role of *rajal salih*.

554 I cannot generalize concerning this role for the whole
184 of the Western Desert. Sayyid al-Sanusi and 'Amm Salih seem
627 to be special men. On the other hand, the *'aqila* and the
792 *rajal khair* are roles which we would expect to find all over
*613 the desert, and in Libya also. The *'aqila* is the focus of institutionalized traditional authority structure, and the *rajal khair* and "status group" represent the power structure.
554 This attempt to differentiate between authority and power
121 is essentially one which deals with the more general problem of leadership. Any study of the structure of authority must have reference to the notion of leadership. Role analysis seems the best method of dealing with leaders and their functions. Role analysis together with the conceptualization of institution as a process is an adequate way of dealing with the tendency

554 toward legitimacy and the phenomenon of change in the
121 political structure. Peters (1967:271-279), in a long
awaited discussion of the political aspect of Cyrenaican
Bedouin society, adumbrates this problem of differentiating
between instituted authority and the distribution of power:

> In order to discuss this adequately, a lengthy diversion into an analysis of the distribution of power would be necessary . . . there are men who wield power over groups of varying populations, and the extent of their domains cannot be understood by reference to orders in the lineage. Perhaps it is for this reason--because, that is to say, lineage theory effectively blocks the exercise--that relatively little has been written about the problem of leadership in these societies (i.e. lineage societies).

554 Foci of power and authority change and at times
178 irrespectively of the lineage structure. The role of the
792 rajal saalih was more influential during the days of the
571 Sanusiiya movement than it is today. At that time, "holy
[795] men" controlled economic, and thus political, relations
through the zawiya system: they were in a position to command
respect and obedience and could be considered a "status group"
in their own right. Today, "holy men" are rarely found among
the members of the "status group." As one informant phrased
it: "They used to solve problems more in the past than now.
People in the old days were not educated as they are today:
554 the mind of the son is larger than that of the father. In
178 the past, the "holy man" was so important that were he to ask
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[792] you for your cloak, you would have immediately given it to him. God was pleased with them at that time."

This notion of changing foci of authority and power cannot be divorced from the related political phenomena of the tendency toward legitimacy and the role institutionalization

128 process. In the next chapter, I will attempt to show how such a conceptual framework can be utilized in an analysis of culture and political change.

Modern Legal Roles

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[177] The roles of _'umda_ and _shaikh_ were created and imposed upon the Bedouins by Muhammad 'Ali sometime during the early part of the nineteenth century in order to facilitate administration, maintain security in the desert, and protect the Western frontier.

[619] Both of these roles are representative offices at the primary level of the tribal structure. The 'Aishaibat have an _'umda_ and a _shaikh_ who reside in Marsa Matruh and work in close relation with the Governor. In terms of a chain of command, these offices receive demands which may originate either with the Governor in Matruh or with Bedouins in al-Qasr. But these offices are subservient to both the Governor and the Bedouins since no decision-making powers of any consequence resides with them. With reference to the two authority

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[635] structures, the Egyptian and the Bedouin, the _'umda_ and the

634 554 *shaikh* are administrators, not executives, in the service of
[571] the Governor and the "status group" of al-Qasr. Nevertheless,
[635] under the influence of the bureaucratic principle, as a new
structural principle in Bedouin society, these offices could
conceivably become seats of power.[4]

634 The *'umda* and *shaikh* are described as "elective" offices
554 by the Bedouins but, in fact, they are appointive just like
666 the office of *'aqila*. Theoretically, every man has a vote
571 but, actually, only the members of the "status group" vote.
Paradoxically, perhaps, the Bedouins stress two major qualifications for these offices: the *'umda* and the *shaikh* must be men "who know the needs of the Bedouin of the desert, and know how to talk to the Governor"; and, "they must be men who do nothing without the permission of the *'awaaqil* (i.e. without the permission of the "status group" who elected the *'aqila* in the first place).

634 The two offices are not equal in prestige and status
554 neither in the eyes of the Bedouins or of the Egyptians. The
office of *shaikh* is the lesser office. It amounts to a clerical post, and the *shaikh* really functions as an assistant

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[635] [4] The Governor, who is of Bedouin origin, has already recognized this potential and has moved to eliminate the possibility of a more powerful *'umda* representing a more powerful "status group." When I left the field, the Governor was in the process of drawing up new ground rules for electing the *'umda* and the *shaikh* which would call for public elections on a "one man, one vote" basis.

634 to the 'umda. Both offices are for a life-term, only being
554 terminated by bad behavior or senility. At the expiration
634 of an incumbent's term, the "status group" meets in al-Qasr
571 to decide upon his replacement. The name of a "nominee"
635 is passed on to the Governor who is expected to approve the
666 Bedouins' selection of a representative to the government.
[178] It is this "status group"-controlled process which the
[177] Governor seeks to change. Since these are officially held
offices in the U.A.R. governmental structure, he feels that
elections to fill their vacancies should be a public affair.
Naturally, he will exercise more influence over the naming
of candidates in this way, and the Bedouins perceive this as
a challenge to the traditional structure of leadership and
control of external relations.

634 The offices of 'umda and shaikh are even more heredi-
*613 tary than that of 'aqila, which theoretically should not be
666 the case. By definition, the role of 'aqila is functional at
[428] the bait level, and so the recruitment pool of candidates
for this office is inherently limited. By comparison, the
offices of 'umda and shaikh should go to the "best men" in
the tribe, and, therefore, the recruitment pool should be
634 tribal-wide. But, in fact, these two offices are considered
*613 "the property" of the wealthiest lineages in the al-Qasr area.
666 There is a traditional rationale behind this fact: there is
428 the structural necessity for, and conscious practice of, an
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634 asymmetrical power relationship between commoners and "status
*613 group" which maintains political order. The Bedouins say of
666 the *'umda's* office, as they did of the *'aqila*, "if the son is
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[571] worthy of the office, then he should take his father's place."
Such a statement is usually qualified by noting that if the son does not possess the qualifications of the office, of course, he will not succeed. This is not simply a case of power politics, there is more to it. Behind the inheritance of the *'umda* and *shaikh* office is a logical concern and attempt to sustain a balance of political and social relations.

The "inheritance" of the *'aqila's* office is explained by showing that the candidates for the office are limited to the brothers and sons of the incumbent, the former *'aqila*. The offices of *'umda* and *shaikh*, in contrast, have a recruitment pool which includes, potentially, every man at the primary tribal level, the 'Aishaibat. The rule of succession, where the modern legal roles are concerned, is a mechanism for maintaining, what is considered by most Bedouins to be, the
634 legitimate distribution of power in al-Qasr. Once the roles
*613 of *'umda* and *shaikh* have been "captured" by a *bait*, for
666 political power resides at the tertiary level of the lineage
428 structure, any attempt to change the distribution or locus
578 of power will be culturally transformed into a threat to the
honor, not of the individual, but of his *bait* and *'aiela*. And this is a basis for conflict in Bedouin society. It is

634 no coincidence, then, that the present 'umda and shaikh are
*613 the sons of the former 'umda and shaikh. This reveals not
666 only the structural rules of succession, but also indicates
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[578] that "social honor," and thus power, still resides with these
families.

It is important to note that since the time of their
[178] inception, these roles have not changed 'aiela or even bait
in al-Qasr. When the former 'umda from 'Ailit Lazumi died,
634 his eldest son petitioned to the 'awaaqil of the 'Aishaibat
*613 that he be approved to succeed to his father's position.
666
428 The 'awaaqil met and made their decision. One 'aqila who
571 was present at the election said: "The office of 'umda should
stay in the Lazumi family since the father was 'umda. The 'awaaqil agreed on the son. But the son will be accepted to follow his father only if he is good. If he is not good, the 'awaaqil will find a new bait." Although the Bedouins speak of "the 'awaaqil" electing the 'umda, it must be remembered that it is the "status group" which makes the decision, and that the 'awaaqil are only part of this group. The names of
[627] the men who elected the present 'umda include less 'awaaqil
and more rajal khair.

114 Before I arrived in the field, the present acting
634 'umda of the 'Aishaibat tribe was elected to the national
666 parliament to represent the province of Marsa Matruh. The
election of his replacement was not scheduled to take place

114 until sometime after my departure from the field.[5] Never-
634 666 theless, before I left the field I discussed the pending
election with some of my informants and members of the
114 634 "status group." The interviews reveal that the "status
666 group" still intends to dominate the area of power relations
124 with the government. As one informant said: "The present
829 *[613] _'umda_ and the one before him were from Bait Bu Taram of
'Ailit Lazumi, and the next one will be from Bu Taram also."

634 The tenacity of traditional politics and the influence
571 of the "status group" are reflected in the affairs surrounding
666 the election of a new incumbent to the office of _'umda_. In
this situation, all Bedouins become concerned more with the
distribution of power than with the actual person who will
124 fill the authority role. One informant, an _'aqila_, gave
*613 indication that formal authorities support the "status group"
634 and the distribution of power which they represent and maintain.

571 666

> Mustafa, the brother of the _'umda_, takes his place while he is in Cairo attending Parliament. The _'umda_ told me that he was going to ask the _'awaaqil to_ sacrifice (i.e. slaughter a lamb) and write a paper making Mustafa the new _'umda_. (Here I told the informant that I had spoken with Mustafa about this, and he told me that he did not want to be the _'umda_).
> Even if Mustafa does not want to be the _'umda_, the _'awaaqil_ will force him to accept . . . It should remain in the same family, it would be a shame if the office went to another family. Mustafa's father and brother were _'umdas_ before him. If the office left the family,

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[5] Technically, the 'Aishaibat were without an _'umda_ while I was in the field. However, he spent enough time in Matruh that he was able to carry on his duties until his successor could be named.

124 If the office left the family,

> *613 all of the lineages would be fighting over it . . . The
> 634 job should stay in Bait Bu Taram; if this is impossible,
> 571 then it should stay in 'Ailit Lazumi. In any case, the
> 666 _'awaaqil_ will decide.

578 A change in the present locus of legal authority in
634 the Bedouin-Egyptian government structural relationship
178 would amount to a re-structuring process, and could lead to
121 serious conflict. In the very least, it would call for a
clear explanation and new statement of social reality since
it would challenge what is, and "has always been," a legitimate
distribution of power and political order.

634 The office of the _shaikh_ is not a potential power-
554 base by comparison with the office of _'umda_. The _shaikh_,
rather than being in direct communication with the Governor, executes the official orders made known to the _'umda._ As an administrator, he takes care of issuing drivers' licenses, notifies men of their military draft status, etc. The government sees this as a necessary post because of the difficulty of contacting Bedouins deep in the desert. In one sense, the _shaikh's_ office is becoming less functional as the Bedouin move in from the desert and begin to take part in the national society, but in another sense it is becoming more functional as bureaucracy and red tape become increasingly complex. But the _shaikh_ remains in the shadow of the _'umda_. He never substitutes for the _'umda,_ for this would infringe on the rightful power of the _'umda's_ family; when the _'umda_ is absent,

634 his brother sits in his place.

554 The present *shaikh* is a member of 'Ailit Ma'fas, and
634 this is to offset the fact that the office of *'umda* is in
*613 'Ailit Lazumi. It reflects the need to distribute official
554 power and to symbolize the real power structure. Historically,
the Lazumi were more powerful than the Ma'fas. These two
lineages are the largest, wealthiest, and most influential
in al-Qasr and among the 'Aishaibat. When the present
[666] *shaikh's* father decided to retire due to old age, he requested
[571] that his son be allowed to take up his role. The *'awaaqil*
of the 'Aishaibat in al-Qasr approved this "nomination" and
[556] the son was "elected." It is a fact that the *shaikh's* father
is the richest man among the members of the 'Ailit Ma'fas
and that the *'umda's* father was the richest man of 'Ailit
Lazumi.

571 Power groups tend to interact so as to enhance not
*613 the official authority structure but the political *status quo*
582 (Peters 1967:279). This explains a practice of the "status
group" which Max Weber referred to as "connubism," the tendency
of the members of this group to exchange women among themselves.
*613 In Figure 10,[1] the marriages of 'Ait Abd al-Malik of Bait 'Umar
582 of 'Ailit Ma'fas show that out of seventeen marriages only
four of these were within the 'Aishaibat, and that three out
of four of these marriages were with 'Ailit Lazumi. Even
more impressive is the information obtained from considering

[1] [See p. 132--Analyst]

*613 all of the marriages in the history of 'Ailit Ma'fas (see
582 Table 1).[1] From a total of 197 marriages, 33 were within the 'Aishaibat tribe. Of these 33 marriages with the other lineages of al-Qasr (see Figure 3 for the lineages of al-Qasr), 2 were with 'Ailit Abu Qarasa, and 2 with 'Ailit Zallat, 4 each were with 'Ailit Zagharat, 'Ailit Dawlat, and 'Ailit Shraif, but 17, or just over 50 per cent, were with 'Ailit Lazumi.

634 For the time being, the offices of _'umda_ and _shaikh_
554 seem to be modern symbols of the traditional power structure rather than loci of real power, though this does not preclude their becoming so in the future. But for the present, these roles are considered "not of the people, not of the desert,
634 they belong to the government." Here is the way one _'aqila_
554 explained it:
*613

> The _'umda_ is higher in the government but the _'aqila_ is the responsible one in the _'aiela_. The _shaikh_ has nothing to do with _'awaqil_, he only makes contact between them and the government . . . The _'umda_ gets the request from the government and asks the _'awaqil_ to handle the situation, but he does not tell them how
> 634 to do it . . . The _'umda_ and _shaikh_ go to meetings with
> 635 the Governor, then they tell the _'awaqil_ about the
> *613 matters discussed. There is no direct contact between the Governor and the _'awaqil_ . . . The _'umda_
> 554 comes to the _'awaqil_ concerning general problems . . . If the Arabs need something from the government, they go to the _'umda_. They tell him to go and tell the Governor what they want . . . The _'umda_ represents them and he does good in this. God only knows if he is doing a good job. If he is not it will show in the next election.

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554 From the standpoint of the political system of al-Qasr, we might conclude that the _'umda_ and _shaikh_ are roles

[1] [This should read Table 5. See p.115--Analyst]

634 554 of little significance in the authority structure. Very few
people of the al-Qasr area have had any contact with these
634 officers, and very few want any contact. On the other hand,
554 the direction of change in al-Qasr and the bureaucratic growth
178 of the government in the Western Desert makes it likely that
all Bedouins will be drawn into the total authority structure,
and that the roles of *'umda* and *shaikh* will expand. These
roles will not increase in terms of traditional prestige and
status, but they may gain the authority which they do not possess
now. This is in view of the fact that the traditional authority
structure remains relatively intact. The *'umda* and the
shaikh have no traditional basis of authority, so they cannot
make decisions which are morally binding for Bedouins of al-
634 Qasr at this time. It is obvious, of course, that the *'umda*
635 may refer to the Governor, and even the use of governmental
554 force, as the basis of his legitimacy. But this has never
178 happened. The incumbent *'umda* is still a Bedouin, and this
prevents him from challenging the traditional ways. Also,
the Governor is concerned with restricting the *'umda's*
influence not increasing it.

634 I do not mean to imply that there is, or will be, a
613 struggle for power between traditional authority represented
178 by the *'aqila* and modern legal authority represented by the
578 *'umda*. Such a struggle could not actually occur since when,
and if, the *'umda* came to represent authority in a newly

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structured situation the traditional authority structure would have disappeared from the scene.

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But, there is a struggle for authority recognition going on in al-Qasr. It is related to the change from the old basis of traditional authority to a new basis of legal authority. At the heart of this struggle is the role of the rajal khair. The rajal khair has a firm public basis for establishing himself in an authoritative and representative role. Traditionally, the rajal khair has faced inward and outward: he has used his ascribed position on the al-Qasr prestige scale to augment his status and influence, and, at the same time, his economic rationality has oriented him toward Marsa Matruh. [648] In the present stage of culture change, the rajal khair is in a position to combine his ascribed and achieved attributes to gain entrance to a new reference group, the Egyptian bureaucracy. This offers him a new kind of prestige as well as affording him new opportunities for power, and even authority, over his fellow Bedouins.

The rajal khair, in view of his movement between the old and new in Egypt, maintains a tertium quid status in two camps. While he has one foot in the traditional community because of his role in conflict regulation and the manipulation of traditional values, the rajal khair also has a foot in the

178 modern camp. He has been able to enter into dialogue with
554 modernizing agents because his intra-tribal "status honor"
627 renders him public recognition at the institutional level,
and because his worldly style of life allows him to, in part,
identify with a modern reference group.

554 The 'aqila & ~~and~~ the 'umda might be seen as the two
178 extremes of a temporary and emerging authority structure for
634 the Bedouin of al-Qasr: the traditional authority bound to
*613 the old moral order, and the modern legal authority identified
wholly with an, as of yet, outside political and moral order.
[627] Ideally, it seems that only the rajal khair, who is neither an
'aqila nor an 'umda, is in the structural and ideological
position to assume leadership and to guide the Bedouins during
this period of culture change.

CHAPTER VI

AUTHORITY AND CHANGE: A CASE STUDY

Theoretical Orientation

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Eric Wolf (1956) was one of the first political analysts to perceive the importance of "the nation-oriented person," the nexus between the local community and the nation state, for a theory of culture change. He described the Mexican "broker" as a power-seeker:

> An individual who seeks power and recognition outside his local community must shape his behavior to fit these new expectations . . . he must learn to function in terms which characterize any complex stratified society in which individuals can improve their status through the judicious manipulation of social ties . . . Individuals who are able to operate both in terms of community-oriented and nation-oriented expectations then tend to be selected out for mobility. They become the economic and political "brokers" of nation-community relations, a function which carries its own rewards (pp. 1071-1072).

Wolf felt that the "brokers" provided the anthropologist with a key concept for the analysis of leadership in situations of change where local communities are being integrated into larger systems. The basic function of the "broker" is to relate community-oriented persons, "who wish to stabilize or improve their life chances, but who lack economic security

121 and political connections," with nation-oriented persons who operate at a national socio-cultural level of integration (1956:1075-1076).

Clifford Geertz (1960) has also examined the role of a "cultural broker" in Indonesia as an instance of "a vigorous, imaginative regional leadership, able to play a cultural middleman role between peasant and metropolitan life, and so create an effective juncture between traditional cultural patterns and modern ones" (1960:229). In the case of the Mexican "broker" described by Wolf, the major means of consolidating and obtaining power both at the regional and the national levels were through political channels. In the case of the Indonesian "broker," both religious and political channels are the means by which the local Muslim teacher, or kijaji, has obtained power: traditionally, he was a specialist in communication of Islam to the countryside, and today he has taken on the role of local party leader (Geertz 1960:230).

121 In al-Qasr, the rajal khair seems to be the Bedouin
554 counterpart of the Mexican and Indonesian "broker." With a
627 firm economic base in the local community, and with his ability
557 to adopt new patterns of public behavior, i.e., "he knows
how to speak to the Governor and public officials," the role of rajal khair provides the means for one to move upwards through political channels (Wolf 1956:1071). Within the context of a newly emerging authority system based upon the

121 structural principle of bureaucracy, the rajal khair lacking
554 legitimacy in the traditional lineage-based system may en-
627 visage an authoritative role and increased chances to "improve
557 his status through the judicious manipulation of social ties."

121 Leadership studies in the context of cultural change,
554 such as those which deal with "broker" types, have important
178 implications for a more general and fundamental theoretical
problem: the role of the individual in culture and society. Radin, as early as 1927, Redfield (1960), Geertz (1960), Fallers (1964), and Mead (1964) have spoken of "primitive philosophers," "the hinge group," "the cultural brokers," "the new men," and "the evolutionary clusters." All terms have direct reference to role types constructed from the observation of individuals possessed of the ability and creativity to offer new ideas and methods of dealing with the pressing cultural problems of their times. The unitary goal of all these researchers was to understand culture change through a focus on the way in which the individual manipulates his cultural resources.

121 I would maintain that, especially in political analysis, the approach and focus of the researcher is directly related to his ontologic position concerning the concepts of culture and human nature. That is to say, whether or not the researcher believes that "man has no choice in life, that culture determines his behavior," then he will or will not find it relevant

121 to his problem to investigate something other than the structural categories of society; something such as ideas and other creative acts of leaders. It has been noted that leadership studies are lacking in the analyses of tribal societies. I find it no mere coincidence that this is also the area of research in which kinship, for the sake of kinship, has been studied and restudied. This is also the area of research in which, as Easton (1959) rightly notes, kinship analysis is erroneously identified with political analysis; in which social structures are elevated to the ontological level.

David Bidney (1953) has articulated the basic issue of the debate between "the superorganic evolutionists" and the "humanistic school," the former defending a theory of cultural determinism and the latter insisting upon freedom of thought and action for man. Since 1953, data have tended to support Bidney's claim in favor of cultural freedom, that culture may be investigated at different levels, and that, in fact, freedom of scientific thought is a prerequisite of any science of culture (1953:179). Other scientists concerned with both particular cultural problems and a general scientific theory of culture are increasingly in agreement with this position (see Geertz 1962 and 1964; Cohen 1962; Mackenzie 1967).

Leadership studies, it would seem, and the creative cultural dynamics of the "Third World" (Worsley 1964) certainly bolster empirically Bidney's contention that

> The traditional ... societies have suddenly awakened to a consciousness of their underdeveloped condition and have demanded and been granted, often reluctantly, the rights to control their own cultural destinies. The new watchword is Freedom--freedom from alien control and freedom to rule themselves and to participate more fully in the cultural achievements of mankind (1967).

The Era of the New Nations, more than any other period in history, supports the methodological imperative of "a culture" and "Culture" toward which the anthropologist must orient himself if he is ever to arrive at a valid conception of man, society, and cultural evolution. In the New Nations, cultural innovations have most certainly been introduced by individuals which "deliberately promote and encourage cultural progress" (Bidney 1967:xxvii).

I have suggested in another place (Obermeyer 1967:6) that a Weberian model of society, which takes cognizance of both objective and subjective reality, approaches the methodological needs which Bidney insists upon for a scientific theory of culture. Furthermore, Weber's model is directly related to his view of political action "which seeks to encompass both the very great limitations that every social situation imposes upon the individual and the great opportunities for action that are inherent in the instability of social

121 structures (Bendix 1962:261).[1] Structural analysis, to be sure, is essential but it is also important that we have an understanding of the process by which individuals strive for and achieve certain roles, and the various ways in which they "manipulate, and even create, elements of the culture that evaluates them" (Fallers 1963:163). The very antithesis of this approach is represented in a leadership study by Marshall Sahlins (1963) who, in view of his cultural deterministic ontologic position and his stress on purely structural features, comes to a predictable conclusion: "Perhaps we have been too long accustomed to perceive rank and rule from the standpoint of the individuals involved, rather than from the perspective of the total society" (p. 300). It seems hardly realistic to accuse anthropologists of ignoring social structure in pursuit of the creativity of the individual.

Both Wolf (1966) and Geertz (1960) have acknowledged the primary place of Robert Redfield's work in their conceptualization of culture change. Redfield (1953;1960; 1962) explained culture change by reference to a process involving the divergence and convergence of two ideal types, "the great

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[1] In connection with a considered synthesis of the theories of David Bidney and Max Weber, I have also suggested that the approach of the symbolic interactionist school of sociology may be useful. This school emphasizes that the individual reacts to social constraints not by conforming but by confirming the social structure. Interestingly enough, there are indications that Durkheim's thought was developing in the direction of symbolic interaction (see Stone and Farberman 1967).

121 tradition" and "the little tradition." The "little tradition" refers to peasant or folk culture, and the "great tradition" to a specialized and systematized body of thought which is, in most cases, esoteric, written, related to religion, and the property of an intellectual group (1960:40-59; 1962:302). Of course, Redfield's notion of a "literati" does not apply in the Bedouin case. But in an earlier work (1953:44) Redfield drew attention to the more general concept of "intelligentsia" which further refines the scope and types of leadership. Redfield refers to "the member of the intelligentsia . . . (who) belongs to two worlds, not one; he is a marginal man." He then goes on to differentiate between the "literati" type and the "intelligentsia" type, stating that the former type uses literacy to carry on the sacred tradition while the member of the "intelligentsia" may use literacy "to admit
121 the ways of the world outside." While the rajal khair does
554 not become the representative of the great and sacred tradition
627 of Islam, he does utilize the bureaucratic means at hand to
177 admit the outside world into al-Qasr. The rajal khair may be
[571] considered a member of an "intelligentsia."

121 Gustave von Grunebaum (1962) has used Redfield's model of cultural dynamics to understand change and social mobility in the Arab World with special reference to Egypt. The author, an Islamicist, states that the "great tradition" of orthodox Islam in contrast to popular Islam is recognized as "the more

121 advanced" and is assumed "to have authority"; that the "great tradition" is represented in the writings and public actions of the political elite; and that "social prestige is dependent on its adoption (or at least on its profession)" (1962:69). Implicit in von Grunebaum's analysis, and also contained in Redfield's model, is the employment of reference group theory to understand human behavior in society. In
121 177 571 181 the al-Qasr case, I have tried to show that "status group" members repudiate many of the traditional ways of life while at the same time identifying more and more with the Egyptian "status group," the bureaucrats of Marsa Matruh. The implication here is that the Bedouin "status group" is in the process of taking on the values of a new reference group to which they do not yet belong but to which they seek admission.

The bureaucrats of Marsa Matruh, like those of Cairo and Alexandria described by von Grunebaum, represent the "great tradition." The "status group" of al-Qasr while aspiring to the "great tradition" emulate certain of the behavioral traits and expectations of the elite group. For
[771] instance, they are conspicuous for their regular attendance at Friday mosque services in Matruh. Merton, who has developed reference group theory, points out that "men frequently orient themselves to groups other than their own in shaping their behavior and evaluations" (1957:234). This type of behavior, or "anticipatory socialization," is the process of taking on

121 177 571 181 the values of a non-membership group in order to "find readier acceptance by that group and make an earlier adjustment to it" (Merton 1957:265). In a relatively closed society such as al-Qasr, when those who qualify for membership in other reference groups are able to do more than merely aspire, when they actually anticipate and adjust their behavior to a type of status consciously desired, the local authority and social structures are likely to be transformed.

121 571 554 We can generalize from the literature on social stratification that the hierarchial structure characteristic of traditional societies carries with it a relationship of mutual obligation. The "inferior" owes rent, respect, loyalty, obedience, etc., while the "superior" owes, in return, protection, advice, help in emergency, action in conflict regulation, representation in extralocal matters, etc. (Hagen 1962: 55-86; Parsons 1953: 108). 121 554 * [613] [627] In al-Qasr, the _'aqila_ fulfills only one of the functions of the "superior," that which deals with conflict regulation. The _rajal khair_ role, as I have developed it, may function in full capacity as a "superior." 121 554 627 The _rajal khair_ dominates the internal system through power derived from rank on the prestige scale: he is prominent in the external system as member and representative of a new power structure based on national and political consciousness. Traditionally, _rajal khair_-dominance was not by force but through influence and prestige: in the new situation, with a

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fully organized government behind the role, the element of force may enter into the rajal khair style of domination. Thus far, the 'umda and the shaikh roles have functioned through the traditional roles of the 'aqila and the rajal khair, that is, the "status group." In the future, this pattern may change. It is also possible that new roles will emerge. This is what I wish to explore.

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The "status group" of al-Qasr operating with a sense of identity with a modern reference group deem themselves responsible for making decisions on the behalf of "the people" or "the Bedouin." Members of the "status group" would occasionally dress in Western clothes; they would hunt gazelle for sport; they owned the few autos there were in the area; and a few partook of alcoholic beverages. Their rights and obligations in social relations are still relatively stable and depend on the ascribed values of al-Qasr Bedouin society, but one can detect the start of a power struggle within the group. It is a competitive desire for social mobility and is stated in terms of the achieved attributes considered important by the reference group to which they aspire, the Egyptian society. For example, one sometimes heard the complaint from various members of the "status group" that the Governor was not giving proper recognition to those "who understood the ways of the Bedouin," and "those who could speak for the Bedouin."

121 554 571 156 My approach here is to state the problem of authority and change using a case study of one man whom I consider the most prestigious member of the "status group" of al-Qasr. He is a member of the "status group" by virtue of his wealth and family connections; he has reinforced and enhanced his "status honor" by the practice of intervening into various conflict situations and mustering support, favors, and loyalty as he goes; and he has proved his "superiority" by excelling in the outside business world. All this he has done while remaining a "good Bedouin."

124 554 156 The name of Hajj 'Ali appeared time and time again as my research progressed and increasingly concentrated on the authority structure.[2] I asked questions which required the informants to name a person in al-Qasr to whom he would go if he needed help, money or advice. I asked: "Who is the leader of the Bedouin?";"Who knows the wants and needs of the Bedouin most intimately?" On the basis of the data collected [571] in this manner, I was able to perceive a "status group" and gain an idea of the real leaders of al-Qasr. It also gave me a working knowledge of the local role structure. Hajj 'Ali's name came up with the highest frequency in the questionnaires, and my observations and interviews with him corroborated his central place in the authority structure. [126] I also recorded the life history of Hajj 'Ali's son, and gained valuable insights from this data.

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[2] The name, Hajj 'Ali, is of course a pseudonym.

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I know that Hajj 'Ali consciously and actively seeks to be a leader among the Bedouin, that he seeks a place in the new governmental structure in Marsa Matruh, and hence that he desires power, however benevolent his intentions may be. In what follows, I hope to bring this out by presenting Hajj 'Ali as himself and as a "cultural broker."

When I say that Hajj 'Ali desires power I mean nothing derogatory. Power-seeking is a kind of social phenomenon which characterizes man-in-society around the world; the quest occurs in primitive and modern groups, and university structures alike (Moore 1958:1-30). Hajj 'Ali's desire for power, and also authority, has not wrought change in the whole structure of the al-Qasr social system. As we shall see, Hajj 'Ali is discontent with the present structure of al-Qasr and feels that the Bedouins must accept change. His discontent is related to the changing conditions in and about al-Qasr; the chance to express it or re-channel it, at this time, derives from his ascribed place in the al-Qasr system. Whether his desire for power is a result or a cause of his discontent I cannot tell. Only a personality study in depth could answer this question.

In terms of this study, one way to look at Hajj 'Ali's case is to view it as his attempt to convert power in the internal system into authority in the external system. But in this context "external" refers to the national level rather

156 than the Awlad 'Ali societal level. In the traditional
554 system, his influence and power have been informal, and,
121 although this has been advantageous over against the formal
role of _'aqila_, his political activity was ultimately limited
by this structural differentiation and definition of authority.
[177] In gaining access to the bureaucratic structure of Egyptian
officialdom with its firm allocation of rights and duties,
Hajj 'Ali could operate as an authority within the total authority
structure which has reference to both the internal and external
political relational systems of al-Qasr.

Practical Application

*613 In al-Qasr, the two most influential and powerful
lineages, 'Ailit Lazumi and 'Ailit Ma'fas, each have a
[634] "most powerful _bait_." We have noted that in 'Ailit Lazumi
it is Bait Bu Taram which controls the office of _'umda_: in
*613 'Ailit Ma'fas it is Bait 'Umar which has Hajj 'Ali. Hajj 'Ali
159 is fifty three years old. He has married five times, divorced
581 one wife, and at present has four wives. Whatever his motives
156 for these marriages, at least some of them have obviously
[595] been made as economic and political moves. A check on his
wives' tribal origins will show this. In each case, Hajj
'Ali's wife is from a lineage which holds land contiguous to
his own property in the _'izba_ sector of al-Qasr. The one
exception to this is a marriage contracted to establish ties

*613 with Bait Bu Taram of 'Ailit Lazumi. These marriages and
159 their resultant alliances enhance the political power and
581 social status of Hajj 'Ali within and without al-Qasr.
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159 Although he has no education himself, and neither reads
156 nor writes, Hajj 'Ali has sent his son to the University of
873 Alexandria. Hajj 'Ali's son is the only boy from al-Qasr
[212] ever to attend the university. Hajj 'Ali desired that his
son study law at the university or enter the military academy
"and become an officer." But his son objected to this, saying:
"Either way I will be employed by the government and will not
be permitted to travel and see other countries." Hajj 'Ali did
not argue with this: he said that his son should study what
he wished. The son is now studying in the Faculty of Commerce
156 at Alexandria. Hajj 'Ali is also sending his daughters to
159 the primary school in al-Qasr. Not all of the Bedouins believe
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562 that girls should receive an education.

156 Hajj 'Ali places among the "status group" in terms
159 of wealth. Although he has now committed himself to olive-
554 farming as a way of life, he remains one of the biggest sheep
472 owners in al-Qasr. Therefore, he is identified with both traditional and modern symbols of status. Hajj 'Ali differs in
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159 one important way from other members of the "status group"
554 in that he owns three small general stores, two in al-Qasr
443 and one far to the west in Sallum. This fact has several
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472 significant implications. Shops in al-Qasr (there are five
*[613]

156 of them) cater largely to the needs of the lineage in whose
159 554 territory they are located. They are operated mostly on a
443 credit basis. Lineage members, as debtors, feel gratitude
423 472 but also, and more importantly, loyalty toward their kinsman
*[613] and creditor. Hajj 'Ali is the only member of al-Qasr who
[452] owns two shops, and the only Bedouin in the whole Western Desert
who owns three shops. His brother owns a shop in Matruh.
156 Furthermore, the shop in Sallum is in a strategic position on
159 the Libyan border which, coincidentally or not, is a point
554 443 for importing, and also smuggling, foreign goods into Egypt.
439 The possession and utilization of foreign products is definitely
472 a status symbol all over Egypt. Hence, the person in this
area who can control, however slightly, the distribution of
such goods has a lever with which to exact prestige and
favors from the "status group" in al-Qasr who now welcome
these symbols (tobacco, pistols, rifles, radios) and the
bureaucrats of Marsa Matruh who crave them (food goods,
clothing materials, car parts).

156 Besides all this, Hajj 'Ali is involved in a small
159 stone-cutting operation which supplies stones for house
554 [316] building, he cooperates with his three brothers in a well-
[312] cleaning concern, and contracts government heavy equipment
[427] to build earth dams. The material evidence of his status
[342] is that he is the only man in al-Qasr with two compound-type
[595] houses (one he built thirteen years ago), and the only man
with four wives.

156 with four wives. It is not hard to understand why the people
159 554 of al-Qasr consider Hajj 'Ali a *rajal khair* *par excellence*.
627 For instance, when I asked one man it he could give me some
124 examples of court cases, he replied: "The one who is not an
'aqila pays no attention to anything save getting food for
his children. The *rajal khair* has money and men (a reference
to the "old days" when a person needed cohorts for battle),
and so he always pays instead of us. He lends us money and
helps us in doing anything, like Hajj 'Ali does." In another
124 156 interview, one man showed great respect for Hajj 'Ali's tradi-
159 tional status and modern ability to deal with the outside
554 world by giving him the honorific title of "*shaikh*," and
439 472 showing that the Bedouins of al-Qasr put their trust in him:
245 "When the olive merchants come from Alexandria, they go to
Shaikh 'Ali, someone who knows about olives. They ask him
what kind of olives al-Qasr has. He shows the merchants, and
they say: 'I will give you so much for them.' They make an
agreement, and Hajj 'Ali collects the olives and gets the
price for them."

156 In terms of local politics, I would guess, but do
159 554 not have data to prove, that Hajj 'Ali was the third party
[627] most frequently referred to in seeking a termination of
[114] conflict. He was commonly asked to participate in these
matters not only by the disputants themselves but also by
the *'aqila* or other third party presiding. He was sometimes

156 He was sometimes
159 asked to sit-in as a witness for important contractual
554 matters. Note that in the rawaabit al-'awaaqil of Bait
675 Shafaila of 'Ailit Lazumi (presented in Chapter Four),
Hajj 'Ali who is neither from 'Ailit Lazumi nor an 'aqila
was present to sign and validate this document.

156 Hajj 'Ali, then, operates in the micropolitical
159 system and the traditional authority structure of al-Qasr.
554 But what is just as important, he has secured a firm foothold in the modern bureaucratic structure of the near-by
town. He straddles both camps. The Governor of Marsa Matruh
635 was an important aid to my understanding of Hajj 'Ali's
634 role as "broker." The Governor claimed that the British
156 first introduced the roles of 'umda and shaikh; they did this
159 to "control the Bedouin" and to "get the men out of the tents."
554 He explained in his own way what he considered to be the
124 [648] structural differentiation of political roles in al-Qasr.

> *[613] Let me tell you, these fellows are very clever. They have an 'umda . . . he comes to my office and says: "I want this and this." I say, "No." Then he goes back to the 'awaqil and tells them that, and then these fellows begin to think in what way they can get what they want. But the 'umda is nothing; it is the 'aqila whom the Bedouins listen to and love . . . The 'umda is elected (at this time) by the Bedouins. They put forward a man who hesitates, one who can say yes or no . . . But there is a real leader for the people, this is a man such as Hajj 'Ali, here is a man the Bedouins love.

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156 The Governor said that Hajj 'Ali speaks well and
159 thinks well. Twice in the interview the Governor said that
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635 Hajj 'Ali "became an _'aqila_ by his way of life." Of course,
156 the fact is that Hajj 'Ali is not an _'aqila_ at all. Although
159 554 I feel that the Governor should understand the Bedouin authority
*[613] structure, he is not alone in his misconceptions. The chief
156 agricultural engineer for the G.D.D.O., who works very closely
159 with the Bedouins of al-Qasr, also thought that Hajj 'Ali
554 was the _'aqila_ of Bait 'Umar in 'Ailit Ma'fas. Furthermore,
*613 and most impressive of all, one _'aqila_ in 'Ailit Dawlat and
his four sons all thought that Hajj 'Ali was the _'aqila_ of
Bait 'Umar. There is more here than just ignorance of
Bedouin society on the part of officials, and disinterest
on the part of the Dawlat _'aqila_. There is good reason for
these different parties to mistake Hajj 'Ali as a key
traditional "authority," or spokesman for his corporate group.
It seems clear that in their respective dealings they must
have encountered Hajj 'Ali in some kind of representative
capacity. The _'aqila_ who insisted that Hajj 'Ali was an
'aqila, even after I pointed out that he was not, lived
outside the _'izba_ sector and hence mistook an important
rajal khair for an _'aqila_. The Governor understandably
mistook the most influential man in al-Qasr as an _'aqila_.

635 There are other traits which qualify Hajj 'Ali as
648 the singular leader of the Bedouins. A few years back, the
[554] [156] Governor of Marsa Matruh formed a Governor's Council
[159] (_Majlis al-Muhafza_) made up of representatives of the Bedouin

635 population of the whole Western Desert, and representatives
[648] of the Egyptian government employees working in the province.
[634] The Bedouin representatives appointed to this council need not be an *'umda* or a *shaikh*, although they may be. The oldest Bedouin member of the council, who happens to be an *'umda*, told me that "the Governor picks the men who he feels understand the problems of the people."

635 The Governor himself thinks that every Bedouin on
124 his council is an *'aqila*. He replied to my question about
*613 the criteria for membership on the *Majlis al-Muhafza*: "I am using a new selection system. Rather than choose the *'umda* or *shaikh*, I choose the *'aqila*. Every man on the council is an *'aqila*, and the number is determined by the population of the area . . . But I appoint more men from the
[619] 'Ali Ahmar (see Figures 3 and 7)[1] than from other tribes. This is because they are more numerous, and they are near Matruh where I am able to contact them immediately. The 'Ali Ahmar are represented by six men and the other tribes by just three men."

156 Hajj 'Ali is one of these six men and the only member
159 of the Council who resides in al-Qasr. I attended and ob-
554 served the December meeting of the Council. The Governor
635 sat at the head of a long table with the Egyptian representa-
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[114] tives on either side of him. At the other end of the table sat the Bedouin representatives, Hajj 'Ali among them. Purely

[1] [See pp. 65 & 77 respectively--Analyst]

156 administrative business took up most of the time at the
159 meeting, and only the Governor and the Egyptians took part
554 635 in the discussion. At the conclusion of the meeting, the
648 Governor asked if any present had comments to make. Hajj
[871] 'Ali rose, and delivered a formal and well-prepared speech
[537] on the inadequacies of the educational facilities in Matruh.
He noted that the Governor had promised the Bedouins that if they sent their sons in from the desert for secondary schooling, their material needs would be taken care of, but that in fact the Governor had not kept his promise for there was not enough space and beds for the boys. The Governor apologized for this condition and said he was trying to correct it. I noted that a few Egyptians found something amusing about this incident, but that all of the Bedouins present were serious and nodded in agreement with the points made by Hajj 'Ali.

156 We should note that Hajj 'Ali was the only Bedouin to
159 speak up at the meeting, that he spoke in the formal, tradi-
554 tional manner, and that he showed concern for the real problems
635 of the Bedouins. Hajj 'Ali is careful to protect his identity as a Bedouin, and in this he differs from the 'umda and most of the "status group."

121 In situations of induced change, the cultural problems
156 involved differ in their conception and immediacy as defined
159 554 by the agents and the recipients of change. Hajj 'Ali, who
177 635 is both an agent and a recipient of change, is intimate with

121 the problems of the Bedouins of al-Qasr. He knows how to
156 phrase them, and his place on the Majlis al-Muhafza gives
159 him the right and the opportunity to air them. This is the
554 role of the "cultural broker." Before the meeting of the
635 council, Hajj 'Ali had gathered a group of the men from al-
177 Qasr and they had talked about which demands should be presented to the Governor. This is purely a political process which Hajj 'Ali manipulates. The formulation and presentation
[648] of demands became, in the hands of Hajj 'Ali, "inputs" into the Egyptian political system with the hope that they will materialize as "outputs" and the satisfaction of needs - to use the terminology of David Easton's "systems analysis" (1965b).

156 On another occasion, Hajj 'Ali demonstrated his
159 status and political leadership and the fact that he has
554 assumed the position of spokesman for the Bedouin of al-Qasr
635 during this period of change. Once each year the Governor
177 makes a tour of al-Qasr to inspect the school, the cooperative building, the government experimental farm, and the area in general. After the inspection tour, he holds a reception in a ceremonial tent set up for the occasion. At this time, he states his evaluations and opinions, distributes some clothing material to the poorer families of the area, and asks for suggestions from the Bedouins who sit on the ground before the tent. The only suggestion forthcoming from the Bedouins was

156 by the secretary of the cooperative society who requested
159 that the government furnish bus service between Matruh and
554 al-Qasr. The Governor thought this a good idea and said he
635
177 would inquire into the matter.

156 As the Governor suggested that the meeting be adjourned,
159 Hajj 'Ali stood up, faced the Governor and began another of
554 his formal speeches in the rich tradition of Arabic; it was
635 the best Arabic I had heard spoken in the desert. This speech
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537 was for the benefit of all present, Bedouins and officials
alike. Hajj 'Ali made no requests but simply thanked the
Governor for honoring al-Qasr with his presence. In this
short well-prepared tribute, he said:

> We feel the efforts of the government and we can scarcely imagine or dream of this development. For instance, we were living in tents and now only five per cent remain in tents while the remainder are in houses. We were dressed simply, but now we are dressed in poplin material. Those who could afford one set of clothes now can afford two. Thanks be to God, all this is due to Jamal Abd al-Nasser.

156 It is significant, of course, that smiles once again
159 played on the faces of the Governor's entourage and nothing
554 but admiration on the faces of the Bedouins. As Hajj 'Ali
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537 spoke he did not face the Governor directly but turned aside,
speaking both to him and the Bedouins--Hajj 'Ali, the Bedouin,
had been sitting on the ground before the Governor. The
[634] _'umda_ and _shaikh_ had accompanied the Governor on his tour

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159 and they sat on chairs inside the tent. I returned to
554 Marsa Matruh in the 'umda's car (1964 Ford, highly polished)
635 537 with the 'umda and the shaikh. They openly joked about Hajj
[634] 'Ali and his manner of presentation; they repeated some of
[122] his "stilted" phrases and laughed. Hajj 'Ali gave last year's
[522] reception speech also. This is because, his son says, Hajj
'Ali is considered a fine speaker by the Bedouins of al-Qasr.

121 We can see how these details carry larger implications
177 within the context of political and social structures under-
178 going change. It is the stuff which the anthropologist finds
important for an understanding of the process of change.

156 If I have established thus far that Hajj 'Ali is
159 politically active and representative in both the traditional
554 and the modern systems, then the attempt is now to prove that
177 he consciously seeks to change the traditional in the direction
178 of the modern for political and moral reasons, and for social
and personal reasons.

156 Hajj 'Ali, when he spoke with me, inevitably came
159 around to the subject of international politics, whether this
554 was the question of Israel or the image which America's racial
177 problems presented. Hajj 'Ali was the only man from the whole
178 124 Marsa Matruh area who was neither shaikh nor 'umda to attend
829 the nomination of Jamal Abd al-Nasser in January of 1965. In
[571] all of this, I detect a move on the part of Hajj 'Ali to
identify himself with an Egyptian reference group and to

156 draw al-Qasr into the Egyptian political community. He has
159 committed himself to work hand-in-hand with the Governor of
554 Marsa Matruh in introducing changes connected with economics
177 and education into al-Qasr. He does not conceal this fact.
178 When I spoke with him about helping me with my study of
124 changing attitudes in al-Qasr, he said: "I might have the
829 time to do this, but before I decide you will have to bring
[571] me a letter from the Governor stating that he wishes me to cooperate with you." The identity and responsibility which Hajj 'Ali feels for his role of agent of change is indicated in his remark to me that he had heard "there were others in the desert who feel and think the way I myself do."

156 Hajj 'Ali is discretely aware of the status difference
159 between himself, as a member of the "status group," and the
554 others of al-Qasr. As Weber would say, he perceives the
571 difference in "style of life." I was invited to Hajj 'Ali's
574 house for 'iid al-fitr, the feast marking the end of Ramadan.
796 I thought that this would be a good opportunity to observe
123 the "leaders" of al-Qasr together. I was very much surprised to find present no members of the "status group" but only
[556] their exact opposites. On the occasion of this feast it is
[735] the custom that the rich treat the poor. As an additional surprise, we had a very simple meal of bread, dates, peanuts, and tea. Hajj 'Ali explained to me: "My neighbors do not have my economic advantages, and I do not think it is proper

156 to serve other than what they eat." Hajj 'Ali is not only
159 conscious of social stratification in his society, but he also
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571 has a great deal of empathy with the less endowed, a pre-
574 requisite of a traditional Bedouin leader and an advantageous
796 one for a modern leader.
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He is aware of most traditional institutions and how
156 they relate to conditions of modernity. Hajj 'Ali, whose own
159 marriages speak for his political acumen, sees only disadvantages
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829 in the cousin-right marriage custom of the Bedouins. His
582 interest in getting on with the business of change, so to
speak, has led him to question a basic right contained in the
Bedouin principle of lineage structure and corporate membership.

> A thing which I do not like about our customs is the idea that a man has a right to his uncle's daughter. The man binds his cousin and in the end he might not marry her and will be the cause of her never marrying. He gives himself the authority to decide whom she may or may not marry. If he knows she desires to marry a certain man, he says: "She can marry anyone but not that one."

[562] Here he challenges the traditional right of the individual
male in Bedouin society, favoring the rights of the female.
[177] The emancipation of the female, especially in rights and
[178] duties concerned with the marriage contract, is an element
[562] of the modernization process in Egyptian society and the
Middle East in general.

*613 The bait, as a political group, is in part structurally
602 defined by the corporate principle which states that blood-kin
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*613 602 571 682 at this lineage level must bear collective responsibility in matters of compensation and blood-revenge. This principle, as we have seen, is extended until the whole 'aiela is included in a symbolic expression of corporate group solidarity. In order for this expression to persist, of course, the mechanism, or ideology, of blood-revenge must be maintained. [124] All of my informants, though they disagreed over the details of revenge, insisted that it was the inviolable right of the Arabs. 156 159 554 829 682 But Hajj 'Ali took exception to the practice of blood-revenge for a number of reasons. He said:

> The world changes. Before it was only the 'awaiyid Awlad 'Ali and the Border Guards which kept order. The government now enters into the matter of killings. Personally, I do not agree with the custom and the way it operates. In the case of killing, for instance, someone who is not worth anything, and has no brains, kills one from another tribe. Then the tribe of the [778] killer asks for the nazaala, and a third party becomes involved. The third party agrees to guard the killer's bait for twelve months and the business of all those involved must stop. A member of the third party's family must accompany each member of the killer's tribe. But even after the twelve months one must live in fear at his own home, for after the twelve months the tribe of the deceased will try to kill the best man in the killer's tribe. How many good ones do we have in one tribe? I have heard that in Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia the deceased man's family has the right to kill the killer only . . . (I then commented that perhaps blood-revenge functions to discourage killing in the desert.) But there are unbalanced people who actually commit murder just to tease their tribe: they have nothing to fear because no one is interested in killing them in retaliation.

In challenging the Arabs' traditional right to blood-revenge, Hajj 'Ali--besides questioning a structural basis of

156 the group--in effect questions a great deal about the whole
159 traditional authority structure. Blood-revenge functions as
554 829 a deterrent to social disorder in that it represents an
682 automatic mechanism for restoring a balance of good relations
[182] in the society. Actually, Hajj 'Ali exaggerated to make a
point when he spoke of the existence of "unbalanced people."
682 A person would indeed be "unbalanced" who did not take into
672 consideration the repercussions of his acts with respect to
*613 the personal danger and the dishonor and shame it would bring
to his 'aiela and bait. Although the 'aiela members are
willing to share in the blood money for accidental or unpremeditated killings, it is wrong to suppose that the Bedouins
do not attempt to weigh the justifiability and culpability
[671] in matters of killing. The very existence of the 'awaiyid
Awlad 'Ali argues against this. Obviously, the dichotomy made between killing in the 'awaiyid, i.e., intentional and accidental, and the concomitant gradation in compensation points to some kind of reasonable consideration in cases of killing.

156 Hajj 'Ali is discontent with yet another aspect of
159 the traditional authority structure. He questions the logic
554 and authority represented in the oath as a sacred sanction.
695 This says something about the degree of secularization which
829 Hajj 'Ali has undergone. Although he does not say so, he apparently favors a more secular and logical procedure for determining a man's guilt or innocence.

> 156 159 554 695 829 Another thing which I do not like about our old ways is the idea of swearing the oath. For instance, if I steal 1,000 L.E. from you, then you will accuse me. The 'aqila will then come to me and say: "If you did not steal the money, swear the oath." Some of my family will support me in this, swearing that I did not steal the money. The swearing of the oath will take place at a tomb, in the presence of the Quran. This tomb belongs to a dead man, and they tell you that he is a saint. First of all, the thief will swear the oath and then they will believe him; and, secondly, what is the sense of swearing in front of a dead body?

[784] Hajj 'Ali made no mention of God or of the Bedouin belief that misfortune will be visited upon the one who swears the oath in bad faith. There is an Arabic proverb which Hajj 'Ali repeated here which says in effect that "the thief will always swear."

156 159 554 829 178 Hajj 'Ali actively challenges the traditional basis of the Bedouin moral and political community. Striving to do away with prescribed cousin-right in marriage and the mechanisms of blood-revenge and the oath as means of supporting law and order in al-Qasr is a course which we might expect from an Egyptian official who seeks to integrate the Bedouins into national society. And, in fact, these are all customs which the Governor believes must eventually be eradicated. It is not surprising that Hajj 'Ali's son believes that "it is not civilized" to lay claim to his cousin for, like his father, he also is redefining morality vis a vis "civilization."

It appears obvious in all that he says, including his comments at the Governor's reception, that Hajj 'Ali has

156 undertaken to transform his rajal khair role into an authority
159 which transcends the bounds of the local community. During
554 my talks with him, he never once insinuated that the people
829 of al-Qasr, nor even the 'Aishaibat or 'Ali Ahmar (terms
178 he rarely ever used), owe anything to a larger entity or
community known as "the Bedouin" or "the Awlad 'Ali."
If Hajj 'Ali is to legitimate his own authority in a new
political system, he must, at the same time, show the Bedouins
829 the legitimacy of the new political community. The Bedouins
178 must feel a moral commitment toward the new national political
177 community or else it has no meaning or authority. Most of the
Bedouins of al-Qasr still take it for granted that the allocation
of political values and distribution of power in terms of
traditional and modern legal roles will be carried over into
the modern community and its politics. Hence, if anyone should
[634] go on to Cairo to represent the Bedouin of the Western Desert,
[648] naturally it should be the 'umda or the shaikh "who knew how
to deal with the Egyptians." The majority of the people of
the al-Qasr area see change coming but do not conceptualize
it as any threat to the traditional authority structure.

156 Hajj 'Ali anticipates the change as fundamental
159 enough to require a new sense of identity. I think this is
554 evident in the following statement in which he takes issue
829 with the traditional way of doing things and appears to be
178 preparing himself for a role in the readjustment process.
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> There is another objection which I have concerning our customs. I mean the case of elections. For instance, one from the 'Aishaibat and one from the Sanagra, of the 'Ali Abyad, are nominated. Then, each man must vote for the one from his own tribe. He must vote for the 'Aishaibi even if the other is the better man. But, we should consider that the best man is the man with the best qualifications. 'Umda Ibrahim, for instance, knows how to greet an official or a minister, but he does not know the _'awaiyid_ nor the problems of the Bedouins. His brother (who will probably be the next _'umda_) is a good man and is educated, but he does not know the _'awaiyid_ either.

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666 This view contrasts sharply with the traditional stand of most Bedouins in al-Qasr, including the members of the "status group." For instance, one _'aqila_ voiced what is a prevalent opinion when he said:

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> If a man chooses to become a political candidate against a Bedouin, he must understand that the members of the tribe should and would vote for their _'umda_ because he is a member of their own tribe. Even if a man is crazy and his opponent has the highest college degree, the Bedouins must vote for the man from their own tribe.

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Hajj 'Ali is modern in his evaluation of the political situation here: a politician should know the problems of his constituents rather than follow principles based on traditional relationships. His motive is not to promote the _'awaiyid_ as a good way of life, for we know he does not think this to be the case. Instead, Hajj 'Ali believes that in order to help the Bedouins through a period of change one must know what they are changing from. Through his negative appraisal of

156 the 'umda, Hajj 'Ali seems to imply that he himself is capable
159 of understanding and leading the Bedouins during this period.

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178 Hajj 'Ali has formulated some positive and constructive
177 ideas relating to the period of transition which now faces
829 al-Qasr, and they are related to his analysis of the pressing
needs of the day.

> The Bedouins need many things: they need factories
> as there are in the Nile Valley. For the desert,
> here in particular, we need olive presses. This
> will raise the profits of the farmer . . . We need
> [244] a factory for canning tomatoes, for the whole desert
> plants them and the transportation is such that we
> [489] cannot get them to the market . . . The biggest
> change in the desert results from the presence of
> 12,000 government workers; there were only 20 or
> [871] 30 before the World War. There were no schools,
> now there a few. You cannot find a six year-old
> boy who does not go to school; about thirty per cent
> of the girls in al-Qasr go to school also . . .
> Another cause of change is due to the fact that
> everyone now watches his neighbor, he sees what he
> [207] does and he imitates him. Today, I listen to the
> radio and tomorrow my neighbor buys one. Evolution
> (tatawwar) is taking place, and the people here are
> [212] realistic about it. For instance, I do not know
> reading and writing, and sometimes I must dictate a
> letter to my son . . . My son knows better than I,
> and I know better than my father did, who lived in
> al-Qasr for thirty five years without knowing anything about the streets of Marsa Matruh.

156 Hajj 'Ali is both subjective and objective about
159 change, as we can note from the comment about the radio.
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178 In a non-doctrinaire fashion, Hajj 'Ali stresses the great
177 value of education while being aware of his own deficiencies
in this area. However, as a counterbalance, he seems to

156 imply that one cannot be educated and know the 'awaiyid at
159 the same time--the attitude of a self-made man. Hajj 'Ali
554 178 realizes his marginal position between the new and the old,
177 and his attitude concerning change through education seems
to be that of an unselfish leader. Elaborating further on
156 the role of education, Hajj 'Ali showed insight into some of
159 the psychological aspects underlying social change:

> 554 178 As I said before, the people here are realistic about
> 177 change. There are now only about three or four of
> 829 us who send our sons to study at the university, the
> 871 rest of the people are waiting to see what these boys
> will amount to. The other day, one of our educated boys, an officer in the army, came to visit al-Qasr. All of the women are now hoping to see their sons become as successful as this. This is exactly like the first time we cultivated olives in the desert: the Bedouins mocked those who planted the olive. After the olive began to show profits, everyone regretted that they did not cultivate it. Time is changing, and the people are changing. Education is the basis of everything in any nation. Now the agricultural engineer directs me, telling me what to do and how to do it . . . and before 1952 (pre-Nassar regime) they knew nothing about us and we had nothing.

156 As culture and social change proceeds in al-Qasr, it
159 is evident that Hajj 'Ali and the national political community
554 are becoming legitimate authorities in the eyes of the Bedouins.
829 This is indicated by the following event. One month before
574 I left the field, the first vice-President of the Republic was
648 expected to visit the province of Marsa Matruh, and al-Qasr
was named as one of the places which he would tour. Hajj
'Ali took it upon himself to set up three tents in the tradi-

156 tional style of Bedouin hospitality--"as we used to do in
159 Cyrenaica"--and spent a total of 50 L.E. for the welcoming
554 ceremony. "This money was from his own pocket," as the
829 Bedouins of al-Qasr complained after it was learned that
574 the vice-President would not visit Matruh after all. As
648 a matter of fact, all of the Bedouin leaders who had been
invited to the reception by Hajj 'Ali refused to eat the
food, for they said that it had not been prepared for them.
[576] This act was taken as a show of respect for Hajj 'Ali and
anger with bureaucrats.

156 Hajj 'Ali is the representative of al-Qasr to the
159 Arab Socialist Union which meets in Marsa Matruh and has
554 648 cell meetings in al-Qasr. The socialist cell in al-Qasr
668 meets about three times a month. When I asked why Hajj 'Ali
[124] was the man chosen to represent all of al-Qasr at section
meetings of the Union, the reply was: "Because he is a member
[635] of the _Majlis al-Muhafza_." There was one section meeting
of the Union in Matruh while I was in the field. The theme
of the meeting was "The Meaning of Socialism." Hajj 'Ali
attended this meeting.

156 In sum, it seems not too far afield to say that Hajj
159 'Ali is prepared to take over the leadership of the Bedouins
554 in a much more sophisticated manner than one could possibly
expect from the traditional style of politics. Hajj 'Ali's
[634] comments about the _'umda_ and the _'umda_'s probable successor

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imply that he feels they are not really equipped to represent their traditional constituency. Hajj 'Ali, as everyone in al-Qasr knows, is traditional and modern at the same time. It seems that he has only alienated those whom he threatens and those who are a threat to him, i.e., the _'umda_ and the _shaikh_.

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He may not be educated, but he knows the _'awaiyid_; at the same time he stresses the fact that his son will have the education which he never had. Empathy is a primary trait of the charismatic leader and the "cultural broker" who seeks to manipulate social relations. No one could explain to me why Hajj 'Ali did not have an education while his brother (who is only three years younger) and other members of the "status group" do read and write. He perhaps only became concerned in the period of change. Hajj 'Ali, the "cultural broker," is more politically conscious and creative within the context of two worlds in change.

1: Obermeyer E-5 (1964-1965) 1969 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9
'Aishaibat

CHAPTER VII

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

121 In this study I have attempted to understand and
128 to describe the structure and process of Bedouin society
105 in al-Qasr by utilizing the data of politics. The primary assumption of the study has been that political analysis must proceed along lines which give recognition to, and focus upon, the centrality of the concept and structure of authority and the way in which it contributes to an orderly social process. This study has dealt with the structure and function of authority and, as much as possible, its theory and practice in both contemporary and historical Bedouin society. Authority in al-Qasr is intimately tied up with the system of rights and obligations obtaining between individuals which is expressed through a structure of social roles. At another level of social organization, the rights and obligations inherent in a structure of authority inform a segmentary lineage system. Part of this study aims to understand and to underline the organizational principles from which the Bedouins of al-Qasr derive their meaning of authority, social roles, and social interaction.

In the first part of the study some of the general

128 historical aspects and specific economic facts of the Bedouin
105 social process were made explicit. The intention of the first
121 two chapters was to indicate the scope and dynamics of culture change now occurring through the growth of a market economy and the expansion of political awareness in al-Qasr. The economic transformation of Bedouin society and the move towards political integration into the larger Egyptian society are, more and more, reflected in a shift from dependence upon communal-based social ties to associative relationships based upon private landholding, individual competitive participation in the national economy and profit-keeping, and new rights and obligations brought on by the activities of national and provincial level politics.

The first part of this study also sought to understand the meaning of social change in al-Qasr. Due to historical experiences and ecological factors, social structure and social change carry different meanings for the Bedouin recipients and the Egyptian agents of change. In some cases, it was seen, it is even dubious that Egyptian officials are responding to the felt needs of the Bedouins. As background to a later discussion of authority and change, we tried to understand what the felt needs of the Bedouins are at this time. One aspect of this problem was to define the traditional units of Bedouin society as opposed to the modern administrative units, and to consider change in light of this contrast. My

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concern with the nature of al-Qasr's past not only helps us to understand the Bedouin present but should also help us to conceive of the Bedouin future. What data I was able to collect concerning the historical development of the Bedouin authority structure and its place in the economic transformation of Bedouin society relate to the later discussion of the ascribed nature of leadership roles and the probability that, in the future, access to political roles will become a matter of individual achievement and a heightened awareness of things political. In connection with this we saw that the Governor of Marsa Matruh through the institution of new bureaucratic structures, such as the Governor's Council and new electoral guidelines, is fostering political change in this direction.

Although the largest part of this study dealt with the political aspect of traditional roles and structures, the contention was that traditional complexes are increasingly unable to deal with the cultural problems of the day. This applies to economic as well as political structures, as the first part of this study is intended to show. But among the New Nations and, in particular, whenever we are dealing with tribal and peasant communities, "the most striking changes have been the decline in the authority of the elders in terms of both community and family organization . . . (because) the life experience of the elders . . . is at best only partially relevant to the current needs) (Halpern 1967:123).

128 Authority represents and maintains a legitimate
105 political order and an allotment of power. Without a system
121 of authoritative norms, conflict could not be restrained and no social system could survive (Parsons 1960:183). As the concept of authority and its meaning undergo change so also do the appropriate structures and the power distribution between persons and groups change. The structure and dynamics of authority in al-Qasr were investigated through an analysis of the categories and interrelations of the Bedouin segmentary lineage system. This analysis was based primarily upon a definition of the organizational concepts and principles of Bedouin society such as unilineal rule of descent, residence, cognation, and contractual agreement and alliance.

While knowledge of these structural principles is fundamental to an understanding of Bedouin society, it was noted that a strict reliance on them would tend to limit one's understanding of politics in al-Qasr since they in fact conceal the nature of power and the functioning of semi-institutionalized roles. Nevertheless, these structural principles are informed by a set of key beliefs and values which are inculcated during the socialization process, and in a complementary way all of these concepts lend support to a corporate structure of authority. This corporate structure of authority which was discussed in terms of the concept and leadership role, or office, of _'aqila_ was claimed to be the

128 basis of social control in traditional Bedouin society. To
105 a large extent the corporate authority structure in al-Qasr
121 is still intact but is undergoing change at this time. Change of the rule of consensus and the way in which it has reference to traditional principles of organization for the regulation of politics is the subject of the final two chapters in this study.

The unilinear principle and its corollary, the corporate group, were defined as the basis for the structural division of Bedouin society into groups. Within the context of a traditional struggle for ecological advantage and a growing participation in the modern political process of interest group conflict, the lineage groups of al-Qasr were considered as political, or authority, groups. The membership and boundaries of these political groups parallel those of structures formed through an alliance of tertiary segments of the lineage system which is itself sanctioned by the rules of unilineality, marriage, residence, and adherence to a legal and moral code known as the rawaabit al-'awaaqil ("the bonds of the wise men"). The central political notion of Bedouin society, and the one which converts a kinship group into a political group, is that of 'aqila. The 'aqila principle, which is manifest in the role of the corporate leader, refers to both the idea of collective responsibility and to a politically instituted office. The concept of 'aqila is essential to an understanding

128 of internal social control and political group interaction
105 in Bedouin society. In order to grasp the meaning of 'aqila
121 in Bedouin society it was necessary to explore something of
the history of the concept.

Max Weber (1947:143-145) has drawn attention to the political significance of collective responsibility and the way in which it is related to the concepts of corporate leadership and self-help (blood-revenge) in traditional societies such as the Bedouins of al-Qasr represent: "All are held responsible for the action of any one . . . (and) the action of certain members, the 'representatives,' may be binding upon the others." Blood-revenge, or the law of self-help, is an instance of regulation through convention, and this practice, Weber claims, leads to "solidarity." Weber further claims, and is supported by the evidence which I present here concerning the concept of 'aqila, that we are likely to find a representative office especially where money must be collected and administered in the interest of the group (p. 145).

In modern political anthropology, Evans-Pritchard was the first to clearly equate kinship relations with political relations: he conceived of kinship groups as political conflict groups within the framework of a balanced opposition between structurally and ideologically similar units (1940:190). I have obviously found this conceptualization of tribal

128 politics very helpful, but the major emphasis of my study was
121 the authority structure rather than the kinship structure.
105 Authority was considered in terms of two aspects, both of which tell us something about kinship structure: in one way authority is the property of relations which obtain between persons and roles of a group, and it acts to define the structural boundaries and to secure the structural continuity of the group; in another way, authority is the property of a tertiary group expressed at the secondary level of the lineage structure and represented by the office of *'aqila*. In this last sense, authority defines the group vis a vis other groups and acts to promote political order in society. Authority, in view of these two aspects, was described as operating at the various levels of the lineage structure, i.e., the familial, the internal and external levels. I sought to clarify the discussion by defining concepts and roles which characterize authority and political action at these various levels. One role, the *shaib*, which functions solely at the familial level of the authority structure was described; the fully institutionalized authority role of *'aqila* was analyzed as were a number of only partly institutionalized roles, or power roles. The most important of these power roles was seen to be that of the *rajal khair*. The institutionalized roles, and this includes the *shaib* or head of the household, were described as functioning

128 according to public expectational patterns while the non-
121 institutionalized roles, being by definition less impinged
105 upon by structural norms, could function outside these
patterns. This distinction between types of roles was seen to be the basis of the rajal khair's ability to manipulate persons and events in a play for power. These three levels of authority were factored out from one another solely for analytical reasons. In reality, the one shades into the other: the authority of the shaib at times overlaps with that of the 'aqila, and the power of the rajal khair and rajal salih at time impinge upon, and detract from, the rightful influence of both the shaib and the 'aqila. Role analysis, as it is used in this study, I consider one of the most important methods available for an investigation of a political problem.

Through political role analysis it was shown that the role of 'aqila is the most important for an understanding of the structure and functioning of Bedouin society. Political, or authority, groups are defined in terms of the presence or absence of this role; hence the whole political structure proceeds from this concept. The legitimacy of the 'aqila, and therefore the legitimacy of the political order which obtains, stems from an explicit legal agreement among members of the tertiary and secondary groups known as the rawaabit al-'awaaqil. These bonds are a contract between the 'aqila and the other members of the corporate group, a mutual pact which

128 sets forth the rights and duties of the political office and
121 the corporate members. The duplication and reciprocal honor-
105 ing of this contract by tertiary groups related, in fact or fiction, according to the unilineal principle gives rise to a political alliance of groups who are viewed as "one corporate body" at the secondary level of the lineage structure by all outsiders. Structural relations between secondary groups in Bedouin society are chartered in accordance with the several principles of social organization, such as marriage, contract, residence, and also according to the process of conflict control.

Actual conflict in al-Qasr usually takes place between secondary groups even though it is sometimes expressed as conflict between primary or tribal groupings. Coalition for the attainment of political goals and the process of conflict control at the supra-tertiary levels of the lineage hierarchy depend upon the recognition of mutual usefulness and a common means for settling disputes and re-establishing social harmony. The problem-solving device which assures the conditions of an orderly social process is the system of Bedouin customary law, a set of legal and moral norms (Fortes and Evans-Pritchard 1940:20), known as the 'awaiyid Awlad 'Ali ("the customs of the sons of 'Ali").

The customary law of the Bedouins of al-Qasr was described and a number of case studies occurring at the various levels of the lineage and authority structure was

128 121 105 presented. According to the moral and legal norms of the Bedouins, conflict control is effected formally and informally. A primary value of Bedouin society instructs all men to mediate conflict whenever possible lest quarrels spread to involve more people and a wider loss of rights. Redress of wrongs takes place through the intervention of, what were defined as, either a mediator at the informal level or an arbiter at the formal level of conflict control. If neither of these peace-making mechanisms is invoked, or should both fail in their attempt to restore social harmony, then the law of self-help, or blood-revenge, may operate. This method of controlling conflict is, according to most of the Bedouins, to be avoided at all costs.

The notion of the "third party" to conflict was developed in this study. It was pointed out that in the case of the triadic relationship in conflict control it is the rajal khair or the rajal salih who usually becomes involved, and that this role has the right to mediate but not to judge. This is in fact the distinction which the Bedouins themselves make between the roles of arbiter-'aqila and mediator-"third party." This differentiation between political roles is equivalent to a distinction between formal authority and informal power.

In order to further explicate the political role-set in Bedouin society a classificatory distinction was made

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105 between traditional roles and modern legal roles; the former category included the _'aqila_, the _rajal khair_, and _rajal salih_, while the latter was made up of the _'umda_ and the _shaikh._ The roles of _'umda_ and _shaikh_ have been historically imposed upon the Bedouins from without and thus were not viewed as indigenous to the al-Qasr political system. The role classification used here, which is borrowed from the work of Max Weber, is purely analytical for in reality both of the modern legal roles figure importantly in any complete treatment of Bedouin authority and its structure. All of the role-players who make up the internal and external authority structures of al-Qasr were considered to be members of a "status group" who possess high "status-honor" which is based upon family and wealth and, to a lesser extent in modern times, age.

Finally, the concept of the "cultural broker" was introduced in an attempt to delineate the nature of political change in al-Qasr. In the last chapter of the study the case study of Hajj 'Ali was used to develop the idea of "cultural broker." In some ways, the first five chapters of this study serve as a background to the discussion of Hajj 'Ali as a "cultural broker." The dynamics of the historical, economic, and political situations, the changing meanings of kinship concepts and other structures, and the growing tendency to trust secular as opposed to sacred and traditional authority, all of these factors converge to attach importance and immediacy

128 121 105 to an understanding of the role of "cultural broker" in the present and future of al-Qasr.

Hajj 'Ali provided us with an example of the secularization of traditional society. This process has been described as one "whereby men become increasingly rational, analytical, and empirical in their political action (Almond and Powell 1966:24). A number of the critical attitudes held by Hajj 'Ali had to do with the Bedouin conception of marriage, law, and authority; in each case it was seen that he questioned the legitimacy of Bedouin tradition and, eventually, would like to steer the Bedouins of al-Qasr away from this world view into the larger Egyptian political community. Besides Hajj 'Ali's discontent with the 'awaiyid Awlad 'Ali and other Bedouin customs, it was suggested that he desired change in al-Qasr's traditional structures and ideas because of his own design upon higher status and authority in the Egyptian bureaucracy of Marsa Matruh, a reference group with which all members of the "status group" identify.

What is happening in the case of Hajj 'Ali and al-Qasr is a sign of the times as far as the New Nations are concerned. The growing need for centralization in order to compete on the international market transforms the traditional structures of the New Nations whenever and wherever it must. But this process is not just a matter of induced change; it is not a one-sided affair. Inherently, any social structure,

128 including "traditional" ones, is a dynamic mechanism for the
121 solution of cultural problems. Related to this is the fact
105 that the individuals who manipulate these mechanisms are creative and responsive agents of change themselves. The need for central coordination and cooperation with national governments sets the stage and provides the stimuli for new cultural responses and devices which result in novel and creative internal reorganization and reintegration around new cultural patterns (Moore 1958:1-28). The case of Hajj 'Ali illustrates the beginnings of such a reorganizational process in al-Qasr.

The main objective striven for in this study deals with only one aspect of the problem of change in the New Nations, but it is an important aspect: all politically-oriented researchers should try to explain the legitimacy and the dynamics of authority and structure in society. In my particular case, discussion centered on lineage theory and its corollary the corporate group, and authority was treated in terms of political role analysis and local leadership patterns. Change was viewed almost wholly as an endogenous process, but the importance of exogenous forces was not played down. It was claimed that an essential part of the "cultural broker" role was to legitimate the authority of the nation-state in order to effect change and legitimate his own authority role.

Conflict control was seen as a life-long process. As

128 culture change takes place, new bases for conflict arise and
121 new devices for control come into being. Politics was viewed
105 as the process of problem solution by the group, from the family level to the total societal level. Politics involves the struggle for, and the legitimation of, power, and functions to bring about some kind of an ideological adjustment between political groups: "Systems of beliefs are made in the image of an idealized home, and there one loves and obeys one's parents, loves the remaining members of the family, and treats all other persons as outsiders" (De Grazia 1948:49).

A struggle for power characterizes Bedouin society as it does any other human society. Equality in al-Qasr, as in all human societies, is an ideal and only an ideal. Inequality, in reality, persists and structures the patterns and issues of conflict in Bedouin society. There are possessors and non-possessors of property and wealth: there are possessors and non-possessors of "status honor." Consequently, there are possessors and non-possessors of authority, for authority derives from property and "status honor." But in al-Qasr, and in every human society, property is not the singular prerequisite of "status honor" and authority. (In this sense, one fundamental aspect of Marxian theory is totally incorrect.) We saw in the cases of 'Amm Salih the "holy man" and the prospective _'aqila_ of Bait Braik, that authority is determined in terms of a complex of structural and ideational

128 121 105 factors. Nevertheless, in al-Qasr inequality does exist and is related to an unequal distribution of authority between individuals and groups, and the important point is that this is the basis of conflict. As culture change proceeds along with al-Qasr's need to be integrated into the national society, the threat to the traditional distribution of power and authority will foster new patterns of conflict; new means for dealing with conflict will also have to be found. Creative individuals such as Hajj 'Ali will have a hand in the new processes of conflict control and cultural invention. Traditional patterns of conflict and political structures provide meaning and a semblance of stability to al-Qasr society, but when conformity to political values becomes relative to motives of expediency, when politics become secularized, then instability and change in structures follow. And traditional concepts must be redefined and reevaluated to cope with the new conditions.

121 In the case of the New Nations, political change seems to be reflected in a shift from traditional organizational principles to a modern bureaucratic principle which entails a higher differentiation in the political structure. And, as Fortes (1953:24) has noted, unilinear descent groups, such as the Bedouins of al-Qasr, tend to break down when specialization sets in.

The notion of viewing social change in terms of a shift to the bureaucratic structural principle is not, of

121 course, original with this study. It was the basis of Weber's (1947) treatment of social change and was one of the conceptual points of his secularizational process. Firth (1961:50) spoke of this bureaucratization process as involving the recognition of new problems and the need for "extra-organizational" roles and decision-makers to deal with them. Gluckman (1963:78) noted that in the future social ties and cleavages, fission and fusion processes, will be studied in the context of modern bureaucratic politics.

The problem of social and political transformation is what I consider the most important province of the modern anthropologist. It is a problem which demands investigation at the local community level, in both the real and the ideal, the scientific and the native, sense of the term. Such investigations should aim at answering the questions so well stated by May Edel in the case of Uganda (1965:358):

> To what degree are the boundaries of the moral community--the group within which common moral fellowship is acknowledged--changing, becoming wider and more inclusive . . . To what extent are (new factions) a tribal legacy deeply rooted in the divergent loyalties and institutions of the past, and destined to be a genuine source of long-range difficulty in Africa?

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'aqila--head of the corporate group
'asaba--paternal relations or agnates
'awaiyid Awlad 'Ali--the recognized legal codes of the Western Desert
bait--the minimal corporate group, which includes three to five generations of members
bait al-rabi'a--spring house (tent)
bait al-saif--summer house (tent)
barawwa--the act of banishing from the group
daar--the one-room house
dhabiiha--a standard or minimal sanction in Bedouin law
diiya--blood money
duwaar--the multi-roomed house
faqiih--holy man
hulwaan--see mahr
khal--mother's brother
ma'azuum--the marriage contract
mahr--brideprice agreement
naja--the basic residential unit composed of a father, his wife (wives), his unmarried children and married sons and their families

azaala--the act of taking refuge or sanctuary
qasr--fort or castle
qawaal al-khair--"the speaker of the good", a third person who serves as arbitrator in a conflict
ajal khair--"good man", a third person acting as arbitrator in a conflict
rajal soalih--a third person arbitrator in a dispute, usually a holy man
awaabit--contracts
shaib--elder, literally the white-haired one; head of the extended family
sharii'a--Islamic law
'umda--village chief; representative to the government of tribal sections within districts
washuun--wife (wives)
yamiin--an oath

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[For information on the effects on the Bedouin economy of various branches of the United Nations (e.g., the Food and Agricultural Organization), see categories 747 and 433.]

[For information on the Bedouin _'ailit_ lineage groups, the _biyut_ (sing. _bait_), corporate land holding groups (tertiary groups), the _'awaaqil_, political authority groups composed of tertiary groups, and the _'aqila_ or head of the corporate group, see category 116, pp. iii-v, 4, 28, 30, 33-35, 38-39, 58-61, 64-66, 71-95, 104-108, 114-118, 121, 123-125, 128, 131-133, 137-141, 145-192, 197-203, 206-212, 215-229, 231-236, 241-242, 248-264, 268-272, 276-285, 294-295, 298-304, and 310-312.]

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[For additional information on the role of the 'aqila as mediator or arbitrator in disputes, see also categories 627 and 628.]

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[For additional information on the 'aqila, the head of the corporate group, see also category 613.]

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[For general information on the payment of blood-money in retribution for homicide, see category 682.]

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[For generalized information on the rajal khair and rajal soalih -- third party arbitrators in a dispute -- see categories 627 and 628.]

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THE QUEST FOR ORDER AMONG AWLAD ALI OF THE WESTERN DESERT OF EGYPT

By

Safia K. Mohsen

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ABSTRACT

THE QUEST FOR ORDER AMONG AWLAD ALI
OF THE WESTERN DESERT OF EGYPT

By

Safia K. Mohsen

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[671] The study deals with the ways in which disputes are settled within a tribal society with no contralized authority. One way these disputes are settled is through the application of a set of formal rules known as "the daraieb" or the tribal ways. These rules are kept in force through an elaborate, yet informal, judicial process in which the local political leaders play a key role.

The main focus of the study is not the rules themselves, but rather the ways they are implemented. More specifically, the study examines the ways in which judicial reasoning is related to certain realities of the social and political life of the group. Using mainly the case-study method, this relationship is examined.

The first part of the thesis provides an account of the historical and ecological features of the groups total context of action. This is followed by a rather detailed analysis of the tribal organization of the group. In dealing with the tribal organization two modes of analysis are employed. A structural form of analysis which focuses on the hierarchy of groups and subgroups by which the tribal members order themselves; and a description of these groups in terms of the processes through which they are maintained. In this context, special

[Introductory, P. V]

121 attention is paid to the nature of political leadership; the domains
128 within which the leaders function, the bases of their political
support and how all these are related to their role in dispute settlement.

Through the analysis of cases some of the salient features of the process of judicial reasoning are examined in the remaining part of the thesis. Distinction is made here between cases involving personal injuries and those arising from contractual relationships.

Finally, a concluding chapter summarizes the main findings of the study.

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My profound thanks are due to my doctoral committee whose composition has changed considerably from the beginning of the original research design until the completion of the thesis, and yet, all members of which allowed me a continuity of my basic orientation. They were Professors Marc Swartz, Charles Hughes and Leonard Kasdan, who, in that order, acted as Chairman, and Professors Bernard Gallin and Iwa Ishino, who acted as members of the committee.

While in the field, my task was made much easier by the patience-hospitality and cooperation extended to me by all members of Awlad Ali without whose help the study would not have been possible. To all of them I extend my apology if unintentionally I misinterpreted their culture.

Finally, my thanks to Professor Ahmad Abu-Zeid of the University of Alexandria whose help, comments and friendship made the field work a totally new and worthwhile experience.

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Chapter I

THEORETICAL BACKGROUND

The Comparative Studies of Law

This study is based on field work carried out among Awlad Ali, of the Western Desert of Egypt, between August 1965 and August 1966. The study deals with the processes by which order is maintained within a tribal society with no centralized authority. One way that order is maintained is through the application of a set of formal rules known to the people of the area as "the daraieb" or the tribal ways. These rules are kept in force by an elaborate, yet informal, judicial process in which the tribal political leaders play the most important part.

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The main focus of the study is not the rules themselves but rather the ways in which they are implemented, or the judicial process. More specifically, the study deals with the ways in which the process of dispute settlement is related to certain realities of the social and political life of the group.

Concern with the legal systems of non-literate societies has been an interest of anthropologists since the classical monographs of the nineteenth century (Maine 1861, 1871; and Fustel de Coulanges 1864), directed the attention of anthropologists to the laws of ancient civilizations. Those monographs were followed at a later date by the work of anthropologists such as Malinowski (1926), Hogbin (1934), and Schapera (1938). In more recent years most anthropological work on legal systems has been done in Africa. Most notable among these are Gluckman's treatise on the Barotse of Northern Rhodesia (1955, 1963), Bohannan's account of the Tiv of Nigeria (1957), and Howell on the Nuer Law (1954). Other studies of primitive law

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in other parts of the world include Llewellyn and Hoebel on the Cheyenne (1941), Pospisil's analysis of the Kapauku Papuan la (Pospisil 1958), Smith and Roberts' description of the Zuni law (1954) and Laura Nader's work on Zapotec law.

Despite this interest in the comparative study of legal institution among anthropologists, yet the fields of legal anthropology still lacks a coherent body of theory to bear upon the analysis of the institutions described. The theoretical questions represented in most of these writings seem to center around two main problems: the problem of definition, and that of methodology. With regard to the problem of definitions the various writers seem to be influenced by one or the other of two main schools of jurisprudence: the analytical school and the sociological school. The analytical school flourished in the late nineteenth century following the writings of its leader, John Austin, the British jurist. According to the analytical school law is a set of rules imposed upon society by a sovereign will. The picture is that of a supreme authority standing high above society and issuing its command downwards. This supreme authority is the creator and the ultimate source of law. These views are exemplified in Austin's famous definition of law as "a rule laid down for the guidance of an intelligent being by an intelligent being having the power over him" (1885: 316-7). Since the will of that political superior has to be exact, the only way to express it, according to Austin, is by means of legislation. According to the views of this school, the existence of a supreme authority is a prerequisite to the existence of law. Any social rules of observances existing before or without the issuing authority are not considered law. This excludes from being law rules which were not enacted such as the British common law, as well as all forms of primitive customary law.

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Later, members of the analytical school shifted the emphasis of their definition of law from its enactment by a supreme authority to its enforcement by that authority. Salmond defined law by reference to a court. Law, according to him, is "the body of principles recognized and applied by the state in the administration of justice" (1946:41). Gray, another member, went even further to deny the name, law, to a statute until it has been used as a basis of decision by the court (1921:82). Similarly, Diamond, who has contributed to the study and appreciation of 'primitive' law, hardly goes beyond arguing that societies without courts have no laws (Diamond 1935).

The influence of the analytical school on the anthropological writings on law is reflected in two ways. In the first place, it led some writers to maintain that since primitive societies lacked a supreme authority in the Austinian sense, they had no rules that may be called 'legal' and that among these societies "custom is the King" (Seagel 1941:iii). In the second place, the concept of the court as stated by members of the analytical school seems to influence to a greater or lesser degree the definition of law by many anthropologists, a point which will be discussed later in the chapter.

The sociological school of jurisprudence came as a reaction against limitations inherent in the analytical school with its glorification of the supreme will. According to the views of this school, law develops within society of its own vitality. It is not an artificial creation of a supreme will but is spontaneous and independent of any formal authority. These views do not exclude the notion of enforcement of law by a supreme authority which becomes necessary as the society reaches a certain level of complexity, but unlike the analytical school, the supreme authority in the latter case is not the creator of law but a creation of it.

The movement was led by Von Saveigny, the French jurist who viewed law as a rule existing for the purpose of regulating the actions of the

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individual in the interest of the whole community (1937). He regarded law as one of the many factors of the morphology of society. Roscoe Pound continued that tradition in his famous article, "The Scope and Purpose of Sociological Jurisprudence" (1910-11), in which he viewed law as "one side of the process of social control...a task or great series of tasks of social engineering." The purpose of law, according to Pound, is to eliminate friction and waste in the satisfaction of the human needs (1910-11;591-619).

To turn from jurists to anthropologists, we find the list of those who subscribe to the sociological view quite extensive. To try to enumerate them would be a very lengthy endeavor. Malinowski states that law and order arise out of the very process which they govern. He sees laws as existing in all human societies and attributes the failure of the analytical jurists to perceive the existence of legal systems among primitive societies to the faulty habit of identifying the legal system with the person or organ possessing the power to make laws and enforce them. He defined law as a body of binding obligations, regarded as a right by one party and acknowledged as a duty by the other, kept in force by a special mechanism of reciprocity and publicity inherent in the structure of their society" (1926:58). Radcliffe-Brown (1933), Lewellyn and Hoebel (1941), Hoebel (1961), Bohannan (1957) and Gluckman (1955, 1965) to give examples, all view law as an aspect of the society independent of any sovereign in the Austinian sense. This does not mean that they all agree in their definition of law. For they exhibit a considerable difference in their views. The difference, however, does not stem from their view of the sociological rather than the formal nature of law, but in their attempt to separate law from other aspects of social life of the group.

The main difficulty with the sociological view of law is that it does not provide a reliable criteria by which one can differentiate between that

aspect of the social life that one may call law and other aspects. This does not pose any problem for those who use the concept of law in a very wide and general sense to man "the totality of people's culture" (Hartland 1924:191). But for later writers, who tend to take a more or less restricted view of law, the problem was there. Malinowski states that the rules of law in primitive society stand out from other social norms in that they are felt and regarded as "obligation of one party and the rightful claim of another." This, of course, gives law a very broad definition and does not really help in distinguishing law from non-law. 121 114 671

One of the most commonly used criterion is that of a "sanction" behind the legal norms. But the mere fact that legal norms have sanctions behind them does not help in drawing the line between them and other norms since all norms are backed by sanctions of some kind or another. It is the kind of sanction, then, not just any sanction, that differentiates law from non-law. In other words, there are classes of sanctions that may be called "legal sanctions." For Malinowski, the loss of reciprocal relations in primitive society constituted the sufficient basis for the legal sanctions (1934). Allen (1958) maintained that legal sanctions are "completely compulsory." "No one is under an absolute compulsion to visit the barber or to wear garments " (1958:59), while, on the other hand, members of the society are under an absolute compulsion not to steal or take the life of another person. Like Malinowski's notion of the loss of reciprocal relations, Allen's concept of "absoluteness" as the basis of legal sanctions is not adequate. For even under the modern legal system, were the penalty for stealing or murder specific and clear, the individual is not under an "absolute" compulsion not to steal or kill. He still can, and the mere existence of the penal institution in modern societies is a living proof that many do violate the legal norms if they are willing to take the risk of such violation, the same risk the person takes who violates the norm 121 114 671 681

of modesty and walks naked in the streets. Some may even find it easier to accept the risk of penalty for stealing than the social sanctions for violating the norms of modesty. 121 114 671 681

But although the notion of absolute vs. relative compulsion is arbitrary and artificial as a criterion for defining legal rules, yet Allen is close to another related and widespread criterion of legal sanctions, that is, the idea of the "use of force." Hoebel maintains that "the really fundamental sine qua non of law in any society - primitive or civilized - is the legitimate use of physical coercion.... The law has teeth, teeth that can bite if need be..." (1961a:26) Pound defines law as "social control through the systematic application of the forces of a politically organized society" (1910-11:591). This definition has later been adopted by Radcliffe-Brown (1940) who considers the obligations imposed upon the individual but for which there is no sanction backed by the use or the possibility of use of physical force as merely a matter of social conventions or custom but not law.

It is evident, then, that those who used the concept of "coercion" as the basis for their distinction of law needed a further specification of the concept. For, as Hoebel has noticed, "There are as many forms of coercion as there are forms of power...and only certain methods and forms are legal" (1961:26). He states that coercion by gangsters is not legal coercion; neither is the parents' physical coercion if it is extreme in form. The essential element in legal coercion according to Hoebel, is "the general social acceptance of the application of physical power, threat or, in fact, by a privileged party, for a legitimate cause, in a legitimate way, and at a legitimate time." The privilege of applying physical force constitutes, according to Hoebel, the official element ~~in law.~~ The person who is recognized as having the right to exercise force is the symbol of authority. This does not mean that he has to be an official or a holder 121 114 671 681 625

of any permanent office; it is any person who is exercising the legiti- 121
mate use of force. Simple as the above argument might seem, it really 114
offers very little in refining our conception of legal sanctions. For we 671
are still left with the question of how a person acquires the right to 681
exercise the physical force. What gives his action the legitimacy that 625
is otherwise lacking in other forms of coercion? In trying to deal with 121
this problem anthropologists resorted to a concept that is used by the 114
analytical jurists, that is, the court. There is a basic difference, how- 671
ever, between the anthropologists' view of the court and that of the ana- 692
lytical jurists. The latter see the court as the ultimate source of law:
court creates the law. Anthropologists, on the other hand, tend to use the
court as the source of law but as a criterion of its existence. An example
of such views is Max Radin who maintained that the infallible test "for
recognizing whether an imagined course of conduct is lawful or unlawful...
is to submit the question to the judgment of a court" (1938:1145).

Anthropologists differed among themselves, however, on what constitutes 121
a court. While Radcliffe-Brown (1940) insists that it must be a body of 114
people acting on behalf of the community as a whole and therefore does not 671
exist in all societies, Hoebel (1961), on the other hand, extends the con- 692
cept to include the diffused public opinion or sentiment of the people in 626
a given society as a kind of court that gives legitimation to the use of 625
force by individuals or groups in the absence of a recognized body acting
on behalf of the community. He sees a court in cases of self-help where
the aggrieved party or his kinsmen carry on the procedures of redress
without the intervention of a third party. He maintained that if the pro-
cedures are right, there will be "at least the compulsion of recognized
'legal' procedure, though the ultimate court may be the 'bar of public
opinion'" (1961:25).

The concept of the court has been prominent in the writings of several 121
other anthropologists besides Radcliffe-Brown and Hoebel. Bohannan 114
(1957, 1964, 1965), Redfield (1964) and Pospisil (1958) all imply the 671
existence of a court of some kind or another as the identifying mark of 692
the existence of legal rules. In his attempt to distinguish between law
and custom, Gluckman thought of law to exist "as a series of acceptable
judgments of rightdoing and wrongdoing in particular cases" (1955:262).
Custom and other social observances function as corpus juris and as such
a basis for the judgment of where the behavior of one of the litigants in
a case is reasonable or unreasonable, lawful or unlawful. As such, custom
is a source of law, but not law itself. It becomes law when drawn upon in
passing judgment in a given case. In commenting on a passage on the Nuer 121
by Evans-Pritchard, Gluckman made it clear what he meant by the court. 114
"This passage shows that even in a society where 'self-help' is the enforcing 671 626
sanction, people judge situations of dispute in terms of rights 692
and duties, and wrongs....Therefore, it seems fair to say that among the 171
Nuer, though they have no courts, there is a process of judgment by mediators
and ordinary people in which custom and morality as part of the corpus
juris constitute 'sources of law' for particular decisions" (1955a:263).

The importance of the above passage from Gluckman is his distinction 121
between the concept of the court and the judicial process, a distinction 114
lacking in the writing of most other anthropologists dealing with the 671
study of law. Failure to distinguish the two aspects of the legal system
resulted in confusing a basic societal process with one of the mechanisms
through which the goals of that process achieved in certain societies.
In its broadest sense, the judicial process refers to the ways disputes [692]
are settled within society. Since didsputes arise out of the very nature [626]
of social interaction, some form of dispute settlement is found in all [627]
societies.

The form which the process of dispute settlement takes differs from one society to another. In certain societies disputes are settled through a process of informal mediation undertaken by go-betweens; in others it is by means of self-help; still in others, it is by way of court. In societies with courts the process of dispute settlements is undertaken by judges who "take and assess the evidence, examine what they regard as the facts, and come to a decision in favor of one party rather than another" (Gluckman 1965:183). 121 627 692 695

Within a given society, disputes are settled in accordance with a set of principles that reflect the basic goals and values of that society. As long as the settlement of a particular dispute proceeds according to these principles, the settlement is supported by the public opinion of that society. This is true whether the process is carried on b y means of informal mediations or through a court system. It is this public opinion as the expression of the basic societal values and not the court as a special mechanism that gives legitimation to the judicial decisions. To equate opinion with the court as Hoebel (1961) did, or to look at the court as the ultimate source of legitimation as did Radcliffe-Brown (1940) and others (Redfield 1964, Bohannan 1965), is to create an unnecessary confusion which tends to undermine meaningful cross-cultural comparisons. Whatever the differences among anthropologists with regard to the definition of the court, their main interest in the concept so far has been as a tool for the definition of law. The interest in the concept gave rise to a methodological approach which came to characterize the literature in legal anthropology, namely, the case-study approach, cases having been utilized in a number of ways by legal anthropologists. In their book on the Cheyenne, Llewellyn and Hoebel (1941) introduced the analysis of "the trouble case." This was followed by a number of studies utilizing the case study method either to 121 627 626 671 692 182 [114] 121 127 671 114

document statements concerning the substantive law of the society studied, 121
or to abstract and elucidate that law. An example of the first technique 127
is Howell's analysis of the Nuer court decisions (1954) where he collected 671
a large number of court cases, classified them and abstracted the substan- 114
tive aspect of the native law. Gluckman's study of the Lozi (1955) represents the second technique. Smith and Roberts used the same method of case analysis to abstract certain principles of the Zuni law (1954), and Nader utilized it in her study of the Zapotecan law (1964). The list of those who utilized the case-study approach is quite extensive, and the range of the societies they studied is quite varied. But most of them share the interest in the substantive rather than in the procedural aspect of the law.

When referring to the procedural aspect of the law one should keep 121
in mind the difference between the technical and the abstract components 671
of procedural law. The first refers to the activities and steps involved [627]
in the settlement of disputes in the society as well as the person or body [692]
undertaking the responsibility of such settlement. The second involves a 121
number of abstract principles reflecting the values of the society with re- 181
gard to the goals of the judicial process, and which the judicial persons 671
use as a guide in achieving a settlement or in passing a judgment of one 114
kind or another. These are the bases of judicial reasoning. Although judicial reasoning represents one of the most interesting and important aspects of the judicial process, it attracted very little attention among legal anthropologists. With the exception of Gluckman and his analysis of the concept of "reasonable man" among the Lozi (1955a), no significant work has been done in this area. In dealing with the concept of the reasonable man, Gluckman was more interested in discovering universals in laws than in the process of judicial reasoning as such. He implied that an

element of reasonableness is a universal principle in any judicial logic. 121
Nadel reacts to Gluckman's implication of the universality of the concept 181
suggesting that it is valid only in certain contexts, and that the cases 671
reported by Gluckman from which he abstracted that concept are minor ones. 114
Nadel maintained that the principle seems inadequate in major crimes such as homicide, witchcraft or assault. "If I am right, the Lozi would, in these situations, discard their guiding fiction of 'reasonable man' for the sharper dichotomy of things simply lawful and unlawful, permitted and forbidden" (1956:162).

METHODOLOGY

One of the characteristics of legal anthropology is the absence of a 121
coherent body of theory that could be utilized in the analysis and inter- 124
pretation of the ethnographic data. What do exist, however, in the area of the ethnography of law are a variety of what may be called "tools of analysis." These are mainly methods and orientations which help to direct the researcher's attention to a certain area of behavior which describes best the phenomenon under study. Their main purpose is to help the researcher isolate particular portions of the phenomenon he is studying and as such enables him to conceptualize the problem. A number of these tools have been employed in the present study. One of these tools is Turner's "social drama" which was employed in the analysis of the political leadership and the judicial process. Since this approach depends upon the intimate knowledge of the sequential development of a given case, or cases, over a period of time, it was quite difficult to employ it in more than that particular context. As will be apparent in the later chapters, the judicial
process among the group is highly informal. Most of the disputes are settled [627]
by means of mediation which is done behind the scene and with a great deal of secrecy.

I managed, however, during my stay to be closely in touch with one 12
of the major cases and with almost all the parties involved. This case
was used as the basis for the "social drama" analyzed in chapter three
of the present study.

In addition to the social drama, I have used the case study method 121
to analyze aspects of the substantive law of the group especially with 127
regard to concepts such as that of criminal responsibility and the nature
of the contractual relations as exemplified by the marriage contract.
Cases utilized in the study include ones that I observed myself as well [124]
as cases taken from texts and some which were told to me by informants.

Most of the data was collected through the time-honored technique 123
of participant observation which was facilitated by the fact that the 122
group spoke the native language of the researcher (or vice versa). Formal 124
interviewing was conducted on a very limited scale, thirty-five extensive 125
questionnaires in all. These questionnaires were originally designed and administered to supplement the life history material and to assess the attitudes of the particular people involved with regard to particular issues. Some of the results of these questionnaires are used in the chapter. Due to the non-representation of the sample interviewed, these results are used merely as illustration and not as representing any kind of statistical frequency.

ENTRY TO THE FIELD

It is common among anthropologists to talk with nostalgia about their 114
field experience and about the group they studied. This usually gives the impression that field work is always an enjoyable experience. Although my field work seems at the present time to have been a pleasant experience, especially when comparing it to the pressures of everyday living in a

"modern industrial society," it was not easy work. This, despite the 114
fact that there was no language barrier, seeing that I spoke the same 114
language of the group, or rather they spoke my native language; I had 122
no problems of introduction because I had worked in the area and become 123
acquainted with a number of the tribal members in 1958. When I went to the field, I then sought out these old friends who introduced me to other members of the group.

At the beginning, I made a deliberate effort to avoid associating 114
with the government officials who worked in the area, even though they were 123
quite willing to help and seemed to have an intimate knowledge of the people 177
in the area. I had thought that any identification with the government would put me in a suspicious situation as far as the tribal groups were concerned, and thus prevent me from having good rapport with them. Later, however, [657]
I realized that the relationship between the government officials in the area and the tribal population was extremely good, and they always looked to the government as a source of aid and support to them. There was no conflict of interest between the state administration and the tribal groups. In fact, people accepted me more readily whenever they knew that I had worked for the Egyptian government. This later developed into a time-consuming and disappointing experience when many of the tribal members came to me asking for help getting employment in the government projects in the area, or to have their sons accepted in certain government schools, or to get some favored treatment from the government relief organizations.

The difficulty I encountered in my field work stemmed from the interplay 114
of three major factors: the reliance on the case study method which 123
necessitated the intimate knowledge of the events, facts, and parties involved in each case; being a female anthropologist in a society where women by definition are barred from public participation and particularly

from the process of dispute settlement; and the semi-nomadic nature of the population in the area. 114 123

The reliance on the case-study method and especially that of Turner's "social drama" which requires extensive and detailed knowledge of the sequential development of a number of cases over a long period of time proved to be a major task in a society where disputes are settled not in formal hearings, but by means of informal mediation and behind the scene negotiations. These activities covered a large area, and were shrouded in a great deal of secrecy. The assumption is that the parties involved in the dispute should be given the privacy and chance to arrive at an acceptable settlement without being conscious of or influenced by the opinion of non-interested parties. The public hearing, or the mi'ad, loves the announcement of the agreement arrived at in private. As will be seen later, very little factual information about the dispute is discussed in the mi'ad. No record is kept of either the discussion in the mi'ad or the preceding negotiations. The process of dispute settlement is, then, highly decentralized. To be able to follow one particular dispute involves the constant reliance on informants not only to acquaint the anthropologist with the places of negotiations, but also to fill the gaps in the information about the process of negotiation itself. 114 123 124 627 578

As a woman anthropologist, I found myself at a disadvantage in a society where women were excluded from public participation. It is true that from the very beginning of the field work I was never cast into the role of the native woman, yet, my position as a woman posed a certain number of problems. When I first arrived in the area, I made a deliberate effort not to identify with the native women. When it was suggested to me that the relatively short skirts I wore were not practical for riding donkeys 114 123 562 or walking in the strong winds characteristic of the area, and that the 114 123 562 floor-length native dress would be more appropriate, I refused the advice for fear of being identified in the minds of the people with the natives, and thus being treated in the same way. The possibility of being identified with native women was not very strong, because from the very beginning I did not act like one. I did things and talked about things that native women had never done or talked about. I drove a car, read, and wrote, and talked about national and local politics. More important than that though, to the tribal population, was that I was a member of the bar association of Egypt, and that I had practiced law for a year in Cairo. Every time I was introduced, the fact that I was an attorney was made evident. This gave legitimacy to my interest in studying the tribal legal system, and in many ways they were flattered than an attorney, especially a woman city attorney, would be interested in their law. Yet, in native clothes or not, in the native female role or not, I was still a woman, and as such I was not part of any serious activity, especially those of dispute settlement. My mere 114 123 562 627 presence in any part of the dispute settlement made the gathering seem somehow less serious. At the beginning of the field work a deliberate effort was made to keep me from knowing anything about the whereabouts of the negotiations or what was going on. I had to bribe men, women and children to [[24] tell me where the negotiations were taking place and who they involved, and then appear on the scene uninvited. This condition lasted for about two months. At that time the news of my presence in the area spread around, and I had attended many of the negotiations that men became less conscious of my presence. In fact, some even asked me to attend the meetings where some parts of the negotiations were conducted and give them my opinion as to the fairness of the settlement.

Yet, even when the problem of role definition was solved, it was still difficult to follow closely all aspects and phases of any particular dispute. This was mainly the result of the semi-nomadic nature of the population. In settled communities, the anthropologist usually finds himself in the midst of the social life of the community. He might not be a part of it, but at least a major portion of it is happening around him. In the case of nomadic or semi-nomadic populations, the situation is different. There were no large tribal concentrations in the area. The largest residential unit was the camp, and it consisted of no more than thirteen tents which changed in composition quite rapidly. In one camp, out of the thirteen tents which were there when I joined, only six remained unchanged by the time I left three months later. Originally I had planned to stay in the small village of El-Hammam, which was believed to be in the tribal route of the major tribal segment in the area. It took me only a few weeks to realize that the tribal segments did not follow any definite migratory route, and for more than four weeks I saw nothing of the life of the group more than the few individuals who came occasionally to the small settlement to buy tea or sugar, or to catch the train to Alexandria. It was then that I decided to leave the settlement and live with the camp. My stay in the camp was very insightful as far as information about the daily activities of the camp members and the relationship between the camp and other tribal segments in the area. But the camp was a very small group and fairly isolated. Besides, there was no way of knowing how typical that camp was to the other camps in the area. I finally decided that the best strategy was to live with a number of camps in the surrounding area for relatively short periods of time, making my base of operation a relatively settled camp in close proximity to a number of other camps.

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[627]

[621]

[487]

2: Mohsen E.O-5 (1958-1966) 1971 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9
Awlad Ali

CHAPTER II

ECOLOGY AND HISTORY

619 Awlad Ali are a number of Arabic-speaking semi-nomadic tribes of
101 sheep and goat herders who inhabit the northern part of the Western
162 Desert of Egypt. The total population of Awlad Ali, according to the
1965 preliminary census, was about 100,000 inhabitants. This estimate
is, however, very tentative and fluctuates from one year to the
next, depending on the circumstances of the pasture in the area. The
131 area they occupy consists of the narrow strip of fertile land which extends
along the Mediterranean coast from near Alexandria in the east
some 350 miles westward to the UAR-Libyan border town of Sallum, and
132 varying in width from ten to thirty miles. Vegetation in the area depends
133 on rainfall, supplemented by a number of artesian wells. The
rainy season extends from November to March, but the rain is extremely
erratic in nature, varying from one year to another and from one place
to the next. Draught has been experienced every three to four years,
one of them being experienced at the time of the study. The water situation
312 is further aggravated by the low technological level of the people
[181] which prevents them from making the best use of the available rain water.
There have been some attempts made to store as much of the rain water
as possible, but these attempts are usually made by individuals and in
too crude and primitive a way to prevent most of the water from being
lost by seepage or by evaporation. The most commonly used method of
water preservation in the area is digging cisterns in the ground. But
most of these cisterns are too shallow to keep large amounts of water.
Some deeper wells are found in the area and are called "beer sama"

312 (literally, sky-wells, to indicate that they are dug to receive and
[172] preserve rain water). Most of these are ancient Roman pools which were
claimed either by the government or by individuals, and are put into
[653] use again to store rain water. Recently, the government has erected a
number of dams to preserve the rain water in exceptionally good years
from flowing into the sea. All this, however, is not enough to provide
the tribal population in the area with a permanent supply of water because of the limited capacity of the cisterns and the pools and the scarcity of rain and its erratic nature. Recent attempts have been made to tap the underground water in some parts of the area. A large number of wells were sunk, especially along the coast.

433 The economy of Awlad Ali is based on livestock husbandry, supple-
221 mented by occasional cultivation of barley. Owing largely to the variation in the amount of rainfall, the sources of food in the area have the important characteristic that the place and amount of their occurrence vary from one year to the next. Throughout most of the area, the tribal populations are concerned predominantly with warding off shortages in the food supply by moving with their flocks to areas where grazing lands are available.

233 Awlad Ali keep a variety of domestic animals, the most important
of which, from the economic point of view, are sheep and goats. The
[433] economy of Awlad Ali is based on the utilization of the products of
[237] these two animals. These products are milk, meat, wool, and hides.
[262] Milk and its products constitute the basic element of the people's
[272] diet. Milk is never consumed fresh.. It is always made into sour milk
272
252 (maleh), kishk (dried milk), or butter.

236 Wool is also very important to the economy of Awlad Ali. Lamb's
286 wool is either sold or spun and woven into rugs. Goat's wool is spun
and woven to provide the cover for the tents.

231 Sheep and goats are rarely slaughtered for meat except on special
[262] occasions. Most male and many female lambs and kids are sold in the
[432] market and the money is used to buy the necessary supply of food (like
[438] tea, sugar, salt, etc.), clothes, and other household items. Most of
438 these items are obtained from the shops in the settled communities in
439 the area, although some of the major items can be obtained only from
443 large urban centers like Alexandria.

231 The other domesticated animals that Awlad Ali keep are the donkey
492 for transport and riding, a few camels for heavy transport and also for
[236] wool, very few horses for riding on special occasions (they are con-
[554] sidered as a status symbol for those who own them), and the dog to
guard the camp and to protect the herds from wolves and other predators.
235 Poultry are usually kept for meat and eggs which are sometimes sold by
432 the women in the nearby markets.

233 The main occupation in the area is stock raising. Grazing lands
137 extend generally south of the cultivated land in the northern strip.
[132] The growth of pasture plants is affected by the amount of rainfall in
a particular year. Low rainfall causes acute shortages of pasture and herbage, and leads to the death of animals by both starvation and thirst. Pasture plants comprise a wide variety of bushes, scrub, and many other species of grasses, most of which have a very short life span. These plants normally persist from December to May; then the land is turned into arid, hard desert with only a few dispersed patches of dry grass.

233 The grazing season extends between November and April. As the dry season
221 advances, the flocks are moved northward to the cultivated lands so
as to be nearer to fodder and to the waterholes which stand usually
very close to the coastal zone. During the dry season, animals live
mainly on barley straw and very little dry grass. In exceptionally bad
years, the people are compelled to dispose of their animals or to sell
some of them in order to be able to maintain the rest. In such years
the shepherds find it necessary to cross the border to the permanent
pasture of Cyrenaica in northeastern Libya, or to move to the Delta
where they may purchase the right to graze in wheat fields after reaping
the crop.

243 Grain crops, mainly barley, are also grown in the area. Depending
on the rainfall, pockets of land characterized by deep alluvial soil
and underground water at various depths are cultivated with barley and
other grain crops. Barley cultivation is preferred by the people because
[246] it grows quickly and matures faster than wheat; also, it can be
cultivated in a range of soils and climates; it is mostly used as animal
feed. Barley straw is also used as fodder for animals. Because of
[132] the erratic nature of rainfall, barley production is hazardous in most
[233] of the region. For this reason, pastoralism remains the most important
[433] mode of subsistence and cultivation becomes secondary. Cultivation
is done on the basis of shifting cultivation, which means that the
areas cultivated vary from one year to the next following the rainfall.

Land Tenure

423 Most of the cultivable lands, as well as the grazing lands, are
311 under tribal occupation. Awlad Ali have, by custom and usage, had for

423 311 many generations a recognized right by the Egyptian government to use the land for grazing and cultivation, and the tribal concept is that the land belongs to the tribe.

The concept is true with regard to wells and cisterns. But legally speaking, land belongs to the state, and the tribal populations in the area have only the right of usufruct. This does not mean that the land is exploited jointly by all members of one tribe or tribal segment, or that a man can cultivate or graze his flocks in any part he chooses, for there is a certain correlation between the right of usufruct and the distribution of the tribes in the area on the one hand, and the inner tribal segmentation on the other. Although land is not [556] an object of ownership in itself, and wealth is not spoken of in terms of land, yet, the distinction between ownership and usufruct in the 423 311 619 area is sometimes very hard to draw. Each tribal segment has its name associated with a specific area of land which it regards as its own and whose boundaries it defends against other tribal segments. The tribal segment whose name is associated with a certain locality not only has the right to use the land, but this right is also vested in it to the exclusion of other segments. Within such an area, each subsegment has the right to a portion of the land to the exclusion of the other subsegments. While individual members of the tribal segments know the land belonging to their tribal segments, their right is not associated with a specific patch within the total area. Individuals usually cultivate different patches within that total area as the need may arise; but one cannot cultivate a patch in an area belonging to another tribal segment except under certain conditions. This does not mean that the individual cannot claim the right to a specific patch, for not only

423 311 619 can he do this, but he can also sell that right. The right to sell the share of the tribal land has recently become recognized in the Western Desert, and the usufruct right is being treated in the same way as ownership.

423 311 619 233 While the boundaries of the cultivable land belonging to the tribe are guarded, when it comes to grazing land, the boundaries are not so much enforced. The tribes of the Western Desert of Egypt are quite tolerant in allowing members of other tribal segments to graze their flocks wherever grazing lands are available. Everyone from any tribe can graze his flocks in areas that offer better pasture. But in doing so, he does not have the right to use the wells and cisterns of the tribal segment. [312] [432] Water is scarce and valuable. Cisterns are owned by the tribal segments, and if an outsider wants to use the water, he has to buy it from the owner for the whole season for a sum ranging between $100-$180.

423 656 In 1958, with the extension of the Mariut irrigation project, a Desert Land Possession Law was enacted and came into force in 1960. This law restates the right of the government to the ownership of the land, and therefore does not recognize the tribal possessions of the land, even when they have made certain improvements in it, such as planting trees or digging wells. However, it gave the right of the occupants of a certain area of land to request either the purchase of the land or its lease for a period not exceeding nine years, granted that such is made within one year of the passing of the law. Failing to do so within one year, the government will either remove the plants and buildings, or confiscate them without compensation.

423 656 The above law met with opposition from the tribal population in the area. As a result of this opposition, a new law was enacted in 1964 (Law #100). Although this later law eliminated some of the shortcomings of the previous one, it is not itself without disadvantages. The 1964 law recognizes the Bedouins' right of ownership only in areas where the fairly permanent trees were planted before 1958. Rain-fed areas cultivated from season to season are excluded. The new law also provides for the sale and transfer of land. Any person can purchase up to 50 feddans (acres) provided that he can develop it into an economic enterprise. The law also provides for the distribution of arable lands in such a way as to permit each head of household to own 10 feddans and to be provided with water possibilities. The price of this kind of land is to be paid over a period of 30 years. Settlers are encouraged and helped in planting trees and building dikes. So far, 8,600 feddans [312] irrigated by windmills have been possessed by members of Awlad Ali tribes, and titles to their holdings are being issued.

233 423 656 With regard to grazing lands, no legislation has yet been issued, and the government feels that at this stage of development, it is essential to start educating and inducing the tribal population of the Western Desert in initiating and implementing new programs for preventing overgrazing and controlling the number of flocks.

The Group

619 The name Awlad Ali covers a number of ethnically distinct groups. In addition to Awlad Ali proper (the descendents of Ali), referred to as the Sa'adi, it includes a number of Murabiteen (holy men) tribes who are attached to various segments of Awlad Ali and occupy an inferior political position. The name also includes various peasant

619 [563] The name also includes various peasant groups and individuals who migrated from the Nile valley and who were incorporated into the tribal organization by a system of tribal adoption called "Iktitab." Most of these peasant groups came to the desert [701] to avoid military drafting by becoming part of Awlad Ali, who, until [554] 1947, were exempted from serving in the Egyptian army. Although groups and individuals thus adopted become part of the pedigrees of the adopting tribal segments and are supposed to enjoy equal status, yet, insofar as their origin is still remembered, they are looked down upon by the Sa'adi and occupy a position somewhere between that of Awlad Ali Sa'adi and that of the Murabiteen.

619 173 The Sa'adi tribes consider themselves to be the descendants of a certain Aqqar Ben Sa'ada or Aqqar El-Sherif, a descendant of Bani Suleim, who settled in Cyrenaica in the Fifth Century. Although they claim to [144] be of pure Arab ancestory, all sources agree that a considerable amount of mixture between Arab and indigenous Berber populations took place during the period they have been in North Africa.



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Fig. 1. The Sa'adi Tribes

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* The exact relationship of the Gemeiat tribe to the Sa'adi tribes is not exactly known. Many informants, as well as accounts of earlier travelers in the area, assert that descent from Hkadiga, a sister of Ali and Harb, and therefore are cousins of Awlad Ali. Others, especially members of Sa'adi tribes, themselves, deny any genealogical

619 Until two centuries ago Awlad Ali lived in eastern Cyrenaica.
173 After the death of Aqqar, his two sons, Ali (founder of Awlad Ali) and
Harb (founder of Harabi tribe on chart), competed for the leadership of
619 the tribe. This competition involved their respective tribes in a
173 bitter war which existed for more than fifty years. In one of the major
726 battles between the two tribal segments, the Harabi segment with help
[648] from the Caramanli rules of Tripoli were able to defeat Awlad Ali and
to drive them eastward across the Libyan-Egyptian borders into the
Egyptian Western Desert. This happened about 150 years ago. At that
time, the area was occupied by the Hanadi, a warlike cousin of Awlad
Ali, who had established a system of dominance over the Murabiteen
tribes who are believed to be the original inhabitants of the desert.
The area also was inhabited by the Gemeiat tribe, which, although believed
to have Murabiteen status, yet were not treated as clients of
the powerful Hanadi, as were the other Murabiteen tribes in the area.
With the help from the Murabiteen, Awlad Ali were able to defeat the
Hanadi and to drive them eastward into the Nile Delta, where they
settle now as cultivators.

619 During the rule of Muhammad Ali (1815-1848), the warlike Awlad
175 Ali were frequently used by the government to subdue the tribal uprisings
648 in the Delta and other parts of Egypt, and to hold the Mamlukes
in check. There was no organized army in Egypt at that time except for
a few remnants of the Turkish soldiers. The tribal population of
Awlad Ali agreed to supply Muhammad Ali with fighting men on the condition
that they would be provided with food and arms and also exempted

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[619] connection to Gemeiat and insist that they are a Murabiteen tribe who acquired
[173] their relatively higher status through their assistance to Awlad
Ali during their fight with the Harabi.

619 175 648 from forced labor in government projects and released from the payment of taxes. The government agreed to these demands, and on their part, Awlad Ali helped Muhammad Ali extensively in his military expedition in Syria and Arabia and were a major factor in the battle of 1815 at Bissel where he succeeded in breaking Wahabi power. They also helped his son, Ismeal, in his expedition to the Sudan.

Later, when the Egyptian army was organized, the government exempted [701] Awlad Ali and other tribal groups which helped in the military conquests from military service, but required them to undertake the guarding of the desert roads and the frontiers of Egypt. Also, in [423] exchange for their previous services, they were given the right to use the land of the Western Desert and left the question of its distribution among the various tribal segments to the native tribal leaders. 619 175 648 642 Finally, in 1832, Awlad Ali were granted a form of legal and political autonomy whereby the government acknowledged the tribal legal and judicial system as the means to settle disputes between members of the tribe. The government also recognized the authority of the native tribal leaders and allowed the tribal populations to be governed by their own native system of leadership.

This political autonomy of Awlad Ali existed until 1947. Although their usefulness to the government had long ceased to exist, they had continued to enjoy the privileges they had obtained earlier. This was partly due to the fact that the various governments that came after Muhammad Ali showed no interest in the area occupied by Awlad Ali. There were no taxable lands in the area, no natural resources of any promise, and the tribal population did not present any particular prob- 000 lem to attract the attention of the government. There was some smuggling

There was some smuggling
439 of goods across the Libyan border, but this smuggling was done on a
648 very small scale. Before the Egyptian government imposed restrictions
on imports, the prices of the goods in the Libyan market were close to
their prices on the Egyptian market. Except for a very few items which
were not found on the Egyptian market, smuggling goods from Libya offered
653 a very limited financial gain to the smugglers. In recent years, this
situation has changed, however. With population increase in Egypt
threatening disaster, and with the cultivable land in the valley reaching
its maximum productivity, the attention of the government was drawn to
the fertile yet dry land of the northern strip of the Western Desert as
a possible means of expanding the cultivated area. A number of projects
are taking place at the present time under the land reclamation act. The
most important of these projects is the Eastern Mariut project which is
directed toward the irrigation of the lands of the Western Desert
through the channelling of the flood waters of the Nile into a network
of canals covering an extensive area of the northern strip of the Western
315 Desert. Also, recently, oil has been discovered in the area, and since
457 the end of the Second World War, the area has been a major attraction
for tourists.

439 More important is the increase in traffic of smuggled goods from
[651] Libya. Custom restrictions on imported goods to Egypt have created a
[656] scarcity of American and British manufactured goods which raised their
price on the Egyptian market and made smuggling a profitable activity.
An opposite-direction smuggling of sheep and goats from Egypt to Libya
[315] created a great shortage in the Egyptian meat market. Before the discovery of oil in Libya, the Western Desert area supplied the Egyptian

439 market with more than one-third of its lamb meat. The other two-
[315] thirds of the lamb market was supplied from the Sudan, the Delta, and
[315] from Libya. Oil industry in Libya attracted a large number of the young
[178] tribal members in Libya, who had originally undertaken the main task of
[464] sheep pastoralism. As a result, the population of sheep and goats in
Libya dropped sharply. Not only did the Libyan market become unable
to supply the Egyptian market, but it was also unable to support itself
and was forced to pay high prices for the Western Desert sheep and goats.
[457] The price became even more attractive after the devaluation of the
Egyptian pound which gave higher value to the Libyan currency, and
hence, the price of sheep. In the last decade, the number of smuggled
sheep reached a point where it created a great shortage of lamb meat in
Egypt. All government attempts to stop smuggling activities in either
direction have failed.

657 All these factors attracted the attention of the government to the
area and its people. The need to control the tribal population became
evident. But since it is difficult, if not impossible, to control a
population which is constantly on the move, the first step the government
took to control the tribal population was to settle them in permanent
villages. A number of projects are underway. The aims of these
[654] projects are to increase the cultivated land and to improve the pastures
[137] by introducing new and highly nutritive pasture plants in areas where
agriculture is not feasible. Attempts have also been made to promote
local crafts and industries. The intentional efforts of the government
[178] to settle the tribal population is supplemented by the gradual drift of
[464] many tribesmen, especially the younger generation, to seek part-time or

657 full-time employment with the government projects in the area and
[178] settle in fairly permanent houses near the place of work.
[464]
With the movement toward settling down, the relative legal and
657
701 political autonomy which Awlad Ali once enjoyed is breaking down. This
642 was reflected first in the loss of military exemption. In 1947, the
draft law was applied to all tribal populations in Egypt, including
Awlad Ali. The application is not seriously enforced, however, due
to the fact that births are still not recorded in the area. In 1954,
657 the "omda" or mayorship system practiced in the rural areas of Egypt
634 was extended to the Western Desert with certain modifications to fit
177 the tribal organization of populations in the area. This put a strain
on the native system of leadership, a point which will be covered in
657 later chapters. Finally, and along with the extension of the omda sys-
692 tem, the jurisdiction of the legal system of the state was extended
177 over the area. This resulted in a duality in the judicial process.
178 The tribal law, with its traditional tribal mediators, is still functioning side by side with the modern court system of the state law. In many cases, especially in criminal cases, the individual is tried under both systems, and sometimes receives two different judgments for the same offense. Various efforts are being made to minimize the effects of this duality. In civil cases, the problem does not seem serious, since it is the parties themselves, or one of them, who voluntarily bring the case to the attention of the legal authorities. Therefore, they can choose between the traditional legal system and the modern courts of law. So far, civil cases are brought to the modern court system only when the native procedures fail to achieve a settlement. As such, the

657 692 177 178 modern court system may be viewed as a form of appeal to the tribal justice. One has to be careful, however, in calling such a procedure an appeal, since the tribal proceedings have no relevance in the court proceedings.

69 681 177 The duality is more serious in criminal cases. When an act is defined as illegal by both the tribal and modern law, persons committing it come automatically under the jurisdiction of both laws. As long as such acts remain unknown to the police, the duality of procedures is not undertaken. This is possible in minor cases of assault or theft or adultery. But in major cases, such as homocide or serious assault resulting in the serious injury of a tribal member, it is difficult to keep the news a secret from the authorities. The funeral proceedings in the former cases and the medical attention needed in the latter cases [627] [521] are hard to conceal. Besides, serious cases start a whole series of mediations and go-betweens which always become the general knowledge in the entire area and the subject of conversation among the people. When the authorities know about such cases, they have to take immediate action to bring the offender to trial, even when the government authorities know that the tribal proceedings are being conducted in the case. Some attempts are made by both the tribal law and the modern law to minimize the effect of that duality. It is common that when the district attorney knows that a certain criminal case has been successfully solved according to the tribal proceedings, to ask for the minimum penalty for the offense. On the side of the tribal proceedings, once the case has been solved, the witnesses needed to testify for the prosecutor are instructed by their fellow tribesmen to refrain from giving the information

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required for the indictment of the offender according to the modern legal system. If this is not possible and the offender is sentenced by the government court, only half the tribal settlement is paid, and the rest is postponed pending the release of the offender. If the offender is executed or he dies in prison, then the unpaid part of the settlement is dropped.

CHAPTER III

TRIBAL ORGANIZATION

121 In discussing the tribal organization of Awlad Ali two modes of
619 analysis are employed. One is a structural form of analysis in which
emphasis is on the hierarchy of groups and subgroups by which the
tribesmen order themselves. This view of the system is an outside
one regarding all smaller units as parts of a delimited whole: Awlad
Ali. The other mode of analysis involves the description of some of
these groups in terms of the processes by which they emerge and maintain themselves.

The first problem one encounters in pursuing the first kind of
121 analysis is that of definition of the tribal boundaries. It has been
619 mentioned earlier that the name Awlad Ali includes a number of groups
563 of different ethnic backgrounds. Some of these have been incorporated
into the tribe by the system of tribal adoption known as "Iktitab."
Such groups consider themselves as Awlad Ali and are considered as
such by Awlad Ali proper as well as by outsiders. Other groups such
121 as the Murabiteen are not thus incorporated into the tribe; and although
619 they consider themselves to be Awlad Ali, they are not viewed as such
by Awlad Ali themselves who prefer to keep the position of the
Murabiteen distinct as an inferior group. On the other hand, many
[167] Awlad Ali have moved outside the area of the Western Desert and have
become settled cultivators on the banks of the Nile. These retain a
vague and remote genetic connection to the name Awlad Ali.

To avoid this problem, it is best to define the tribe by political rather than by ethnic criterion. There is no paramount chief of the

There is no paramount chief of the
121 tribe at the present time; yet, the unifying force is the recognition
619 by the group of the tribal law, the Daraieb, as a binding set of rules
671 [643] and as the regulator of behavior within the area. In these terms,
Awlad Ali are a clearly delimited group, and it is in terms of the
jurisdiction of these rules that Awlad Ali are treated as a unit for
administrative purposes by the Egyptian government. Viewed this
way, Awlad Ali will be defined as those who recognize and abide by
the Daraieb or the customary law. This includes the Murabiteen tribes
[563] as well as all those who became part of the tribal organization of
Awlad Ali by means of Iktitab. Since the territorial jurisdiction of
the Daraieb is limited to the Western Desert of Egypt, those groups
and individuals of Awlad Ali origin who have moved on a permanent basis
from the area will be excluded from the group. Groups and individuals
who live in the area but are not part of the tribal organization of
Awlad Ali are not subject to the Daraieb.

619
173 Awlad Ali of the Western Desert of Egypt are an offshoot of the
Cyrenaica tribes who in turn believe themselves to be the descendants
of a unique ancestress Sa'ada.


Syrenaica tribes
Sa'ad
Baraghuth
'Aggar
El-Saghir
Jibran
Harb
Ali
Tribe
Abiad
Ahmar
Senenah
Tribe
Awlad Kharouf
Awlad Mansur
El-Sanagrah
'Eila
El-'aggary
Gedeidah
Bu-Mutair
Bait ('Eila)
El-Asabei
Yousef
'afash
Helleis
Daghash
Bait
Semeida
Yunis
Makhum
Hussein

619 173 Awlad Ali themselves are divided into three major sections: Ahmar (the Reds); Abiad (the Whites); and Senenah. Each of these sections is referred to as "tribe" and sometimes "tribes." The first two major sections, those of Ahmar or the Reds and Abiad (Whites), are named after their mothers, the wives of Ali (founder of Awlad Ali). The Whites are named after their white mother, and the Reds after their Sudanese mother who, owing to her dark complexion, was known as El-Hamra (the red one).

613 114 551 [595] In the past, writers such as Robertson-Smith (1903) have interpreted the reference to female names in patrilineal genealogies as indicating an earlier matrilineal descent. I tend to agree with a more recent writer, E. Peters (1959), who explains the reference to female ancestors by two factors: patrilineal descent and polygyny. According to him, it is a way of distinguishing full brothers from half brothers and a means to show this genealogically. "The concept of the 'one womb', of maternal origin, is a critical one in the context of social cohesion, but it does not deny patriliny; on the contrary, it serves a sense to enforce it. Female names can be used to show a greater notion of cohesion than the mere use of male names, and the significance of a female name . . . is that it is symbol of full brother unity at the highest political level." (p.29).

613 551 173 619 This can be further supported by evidence from my own data which show that reference to female names occur more frequently in charts where tribal names rather than proper names are used. In genealogies using proper names, informants rarely, if ever, trace their descent to an ancestress. But when charts of tribal names are used, it is not

613 uncommon to find reference to female names. This indicates that it is
551 only when the unity of the full brothers becomes politically signifi-
173
619 cant that the name of the mother rather than the name of the father is
used. This may explain why the occurrence of female names in Awlad Ali
[595] genealogies is not as common as one might expect judging from the fre-
quency of polygynous marriages among the group.


Awlad Mansur
Mutair
'aggary
Gedaidah
Bu-Zewah
El-Hafian
El-Marries
Suliman

Fig. 3. Recognized tribal segments of Awlad Mansur (a segment of Awlad Ali)


Mansur
Bu-Asabei
Bu-Mutair
'aggar
Muhammed
Bu-Zewah
Abdellah
Hussein
(Hafian)
Muhammed
Suliman
Muhammed
Suliman

613 619 173 551 The two charts show the same unit of Awlad Mansour. The first of the two charts shows the tribal segments in which Eilat Gedaida (a female name) appears as one of the segments. When the actual genealogical chart of one of the living members of that segment was drawn, descent was traced to Mohammed, the husband of Gedaida, as shown on the second chart. In this case Gedaida is not a member of Awald Mansour segment. The unity of the full brothers is emphasized without changing the affiliation of the segment. It is simply a means of carrying on the patriline using the mother's name. This is not always the case, however. Examination of other cases in which the female name was used reveals the fact that in certain instances using the female name is a means of carrying on the line of descent through a daughter. This meant incorporating within the tribal segment a whole group of individuals who otherwise would have belonged to a different patriline. Carrying the line through 613 619 551 597 the daughter in this manner has the same result as adopting her husband unto the tribe. The question then is why wasn't adoption used. Examination of the two cases in which this happened indicates that a possible explanation may be that this occurs whenever the husband is unadoptable. Adoption is possible whenever a man does not have any tribal affiliation. 613 619 551 597 554 In one of the two cases the husband belonged to the Gemei'at tribe, a Murabiteen tribe which enjoys a relatively higher status than the other Murabiteen tribes by virtue of their being the original settlers of the area and helping the Awald Ali in their fight with the Hanadi, yet compared to Awlad Ali proper occupies an inferior position. In this case, relating to the patriline of the mother carried with it a

613 definite political advantage. In the second case in which the female
619 name was used, the husband was a member of the Bara'asa tribe of Libya.
551 Although this tribe is one the powerful tribes of Libya, it has no
597 554 political influence in the Egyptian Western Desert. Changing affiliation carried with it the strong political support of the mother's tribal segment.

619 In general the Reds occupy the western half of the coastal area of
131 the Western Desert from the town of Matruh westward to the Libyan border, while the Whites occupy the eastern part which stretches to Alexandria. The Senenah are fairly scattered although their largest concentration is located in the extreme western part overlapping that of the Reds. The territorial division of the area among the three major sections of Awlad Ali is not a strict one. Historical evidence shows that there has been
[174] a considerable tribal displacement throughout the area. This displacement occurred mainly during the intratribal war era and during the Second World War when the area was a main battlefield. In general, however, there is a significant relationship between territorial distribution and tribal segmentation, and this is especially true on the higher levels of segmentation than on the lower ones.

619 Each of the three sections of the apex of a three-tiered order of
613 segments which, following the native usage, will be called Kabila (tribe), Eila (family), and Bait (house).

619 The first order referred to as tribes are structurally equivalent
173 units but of highly variable size. Each of them has its traditional history. Some of these histories are important to the tribe as a whole.

619 Such traditions differentiate between these segments which otherwise
[173] occupy an equivalent position in the formal system.

This level of segmentation has no particular political significance except that it is at this level that the client tribes of Murabiteen are attached. People in the area differentiate between Awlad Ali proper, who are called the Sa'adi, and the Murabiteen tribes. Murabiteen tribes occupy a special position which tends to complicate the formal analysis of the tribal organization of the Awlad Ali. The Murabiteen are a number of tribes of varying sizes and origin which are attached to the Sa'adi tribes as their vassals or clients. They exhibit the same principles of tribal organization as the Sa'adi tribes escept that they have no common origin similar to that of the latter groups.

619 The original division of the Murabiteen tribes among the Sa'adi was
173 made in the famous meeting at El-Haqfa in which the division of land was also made and the Awlad Ali law was first enacted. The number of client groups attached to each Sa'adi tribe reflects the relative prestige and power of thatparticular tribe at the time of the meeting. Having a re-
619
173 latively large number of client tribes meant, in addition to prestige of
651 the patron tribe, large financial support. Until half a century ago this financial support was in the form of an obligatory tribute or "sadaqa" which the client tribes had to pay. This tribute is no longer
[178] mandatory, but the client groups are still expected to present members
[431] of their patron tribes with gifts on occasions such as weddings, funerals
619 or feasts of the tribal saint. Large vassal groups also meant support in fights. Although the client groups did not constitute part of the vengeance group of their Sa'adi, when the Sa'adi tribe fought, their client

619 groups were expected to help. For these reasons the Sa'adi tribes competed
619 and even fought among themselves for the newcoming Murabiteen
721 groups which continued to migrate into the area, escaping the strong dominance of the Cyrenaica Bedouins..Many of the major tribal wars which occurred in the area before the turn of the century had as their major cause the competition over the Murabiteen.

619 As a vassal group the Murabiteen tribes are kept in an inferior
778 position. This inferiority has certain manifestation, the most obvious
184 of which is the deprivation of the Murabiteen of the right of "nazala"
682 or refuge. When a person is killed the killer and his kin unit seek refuge
778 at a neutral tribal segment, and for a period of twelve months they
613 are safe from the revenge of the victim's kin group. The victim's family
[671] cannot follow them to the refuge place, for to do this is to violate one of the basic principles of Awlad Ali law. The philosophy behind the rule of "nazala" is to give time for "the blood to cool off" as one of the informants described it. It also gives the host group a chance to start immediate negotiations with the victim's group to settle permanently the dispute. As soon as the murderer's group takes refuge, which is done either by moving along with their tents and flocks and settling in the locality of the host group or symbolically by having the head of the host group send one of his sons or male relatives to pitch his tent in the locality of the murderer's group, the head of the host group contacts the victim's group, informs them that he has been chosed by the murderer's group in accordance with the right of nazala, and asks for their permission to grant his protection to the murderer's group. To ask for the permission of the victim's group is a matter of formality since, by custom, they cannot refuse to grant this permission except on one single ground:

682 if the host group is genealogically close enough to the murderer's group
778 as to be themselves part of the vengeance group. As soon as the per-
613 mission is granted the head of the host group starts negotiations on behalf of the murderer. Since the basic reason for the nazala is to avoid the direct confrontation between the two opposing groups, the first task of the negotiations is to define which places and markets each group can go to during the year of the nazala. Once this has been agreed upon, the difficult task of settling the dispute begins. The success or failure of the negotiations depends on the skill of the negotiator and the weight his tribal segment has in the area. This makes it of extreme importance for the murderer to select the tribal segment which can affect such a settlement. In cases where the host group is not particularly powerful, the victim's group pretends to agree to a settlement in order to have the murderer and his group leave the locality of the host group and then takes revenge by killing the murderer. This cannot happen when the host group is powerful, since such an action would automatically make the host group enemies of the victim's group.

619 With very few exceptions which will be dealt with later, the right
184 to offer refuge is limited to the Sa'adi tribes. No Murabiteen tribe can
778 grant refuge to a murderer, although they themselve can seek refuge at a
682 Sa'adi tribal segment if one of them is involved in murder.

619 Another less conspicuous manifestation of the inferior position of
184 the Murabiteen relative to the Sa'adi is the fact that the bloodmoney
[682] for the Murabit is two-thirds that for the Sa'adi man. Also, until very
[582] recently, marriage of a Sa'adi to a member of the Murabiteen tribes was
considered by the Sa'adi as a very poor choice and was discouraged.

619
184 In recent years this has changed, however. The increased importance
178 of wealth in the recently introduced money economy relaxed the endogamous
582 tendency that was characteristic of the Sa'adi tribes.

619 In discussing the position of the Murabiteen tribes it is worth
184 noting that not all the Murabiteen tribes in the area occupy the same
position. Some enjoy relatively higher positions than the others. Actually,
there are two kinds of Murabiteen in the area: Mustaqillen (independent
Murabiteen); and the dependent Murabiteen. The latter are
further subdivided into Murabiteen bil-baraka (with the blessing); and
Murabiteen bil-sadaqa (with the tribute). The only independent Murabiteen
in the area is the Gemei'at tribe. These are the original settlers
[173] of the area. Because of their help to Awlad Ali against the Hanadi, the
latter were defeated and Awlad Ali were able to occupy the Western Desert.
For their part the Gemei'at tribe was granted its independence by Awlad
Ali and were given one-third of the total area as their homeland (watan).
619 In theory, the Gemei'at tribe occupies the same position and has the same
184 rights as the Sa'adi tribes, including the right to offer their protection
778 which is denied to all other client groups. In practice, however,
682 this seems to be of no practical value. None of my informants could remember
a single case in which a murderer has taken refuge at a segment
619 of the Gemei'at tribe. The importance of the nazala is not merely to be
778 safe from the pursuit of the victim's group but rather to provide the
184 mediators who undertake the crucial task of negotiation on behalf of the
682 murderer and his gorup. It is the ability to settle the dispute on a
627
628 permanent basis that offers the actual long-lasting protection, even
after the time of the nazala expires. To be successful in his pursuit,

619 778 184 682 627 628 the negotiator has to have behind him the full weight of his tribal segment. Since the origin of the Gemei'at tribe as a Murabiteen tribe is well known, any negotiator has to rely almost entirely upon his own skill to affect any settlement; even if he is able to affect such a settlement, there is no guarantee that it will be permanent.

619 792 The Murabiteen bil-baraka and Murabiteen bil-sadaqa occupy the same position as vassal groups. The only difference between the two is that the first, the religious men, are much more respected than the latter. They are feared by the other tribes because of the belief that they have direct contact with the religious and spiritual world and can harm those who dare to offend them in one way or another. Because of this factor [627] [628] and of their neutral position with regard to the rest of the tribes, they play an important role in mediation and dispute settlement.

619 184 174 792 The origin of inferiority of the Murabiteen tribes in general is hard to account for. Kenneth (1925) believes that hundreds of years ago the Murabiteen were essentially the holymen. They learned to read and write the Qoraan and grouped themselves around the "zawias' which were the centers of learning and religion. While indulging in their religious practices their flocks ere grazed miles away in the open desert under the charge of the Sa'adi shepherds, who originally were the poor paid workers of the Murabiteen. These shepherds, living out in the open, were busy fighting away the raiders attempting to steal their flocks. As time passed the Sa'adi shepherds became not only tough fighters but also wealthy. This latter end was achieved partly as a result of successful raids on neighboring tribes. Later when the Sa'adi planned a large raid, they entrusted their flocks to the Murabiteen, who by that time had become dependent upon the Sa'adi for their protection from the raids of other tribes.

619 184 174 792 [651] The picture was reversed then with the poor Sa'adi shepherds becoming the masters, acquiring great wealth and prestige because of their fighting ability, and the holymen becoming the shepherds and clients of the Sa'adi fighters. In the old inter-tribal wars, the Murabiteen stood a very limited chance so the Sa'adi tribes adopted them and in return for a yearly tribure guaranteed theprotection of the Murabiteen from external aggression.

As time passed, the main difference between the Sa'adi and Murabiteen tended to diminish. One or two outstanding Murabiteen tribes fought their own battles without seeking the protection of the Sa'adi and remained independent, while a few others rose up and fought on with the protector against a common foe (the case of the Gemei'at tribe is an example) and in return were emancipated from the stigma of serfdom and accepted by the Sa'adi as almost equals. Other Murabiteen tribes remained attached to their Sa'adi protector as client groups.

Ibn Khaldoun also saw the inferiority of the Murabiteen tribes as stemming from a mode of tribal relations adapted to inter-tribal warfare (1845).

613 The Eila

The Eila represents the next level of tribal segmentation among the Awlad Ali. The Eila is the most important political unit. Although the Eila lacks any formally recognized leadership, its importance stems from the fact that it constitutes the vengeance group or Ámar El-Dam (unity of 613 672 682 the blood). This means that it bears a corporate responsibility for the actions of its members. Anyone of its members can be killed in vengence for a homocide committed by any other, and the duty of revenge for any

613 672 682 member falls on all members alike, regardless of the exact genealogical relationship to the victim. When bloodmoney is to be paid, its members pay it as a group, divided among all male adults; and although when they receive it, a bigger portion goes to the nearest agnates of the victim, the remainder is distributed equally among all its members.

613 The genealogical depth of the Eila is usually five generations. This is not always true, however, In certain instances the number of generations intervening between the founder of the Eila and its living members is nine or even ten. Naturally, the more generations the larger the size of the Eila. Sometimes the Eila becomes so numerous that it is [217] hard to keep records of all members who are supposed to share in the payment of the bloodmoney in a specific case. When the size of the Eila reaches this point, one of two things may happen. The first is an attempt to make lists of the members. Many of the Eilas have such lists. This 613 675 is usually accompanied by a tendency toward writing down the specific rules and regulations of the vengeance group. These lists are referred to as Amar papers. They constitute a formal statement of an otherwise informally recognized responsibility of the group for certain actions of its members. The other is a tendency toward the fission of one or more of its constiuent units which, after separation, establishes itself as an independent Amar. The factors underlying this process of fission are discussed in the next chapter.

[539] The following is an example of an Amar paper, that of the Eilat Aggary, which was put into effect in 1954.

IN THE NAME OF GOD THE FORGIVER

613 675 539 The following Awaqil (sing. aqila, the leader of a bait) representing the various "buite" (sing. bait, the tribal segment below the level of eila) of the Aggary Family were witnesses to the treaty and their signatures signify their commitment and that of their respective buite to the content of this agreement.

(a list of the various awaqil)

The above signing awaqil agreed unanimously on the content of the document and all the conditions included. No objection by any of the above persons was noted at the meeting.

Article 1:

The content of this document should be kept as a secret of the Aggary Family. It constitutes the Aggary Amar in accordance with the customs and the Daraieb of Awlad Ali. The content of the document should be revealed only at the request of both parties of a dispute which involves a member of the Amar.

Article 2:

[627] Peace should exist between members of the Amar. No secret grudges or open disputes should be permitted between them. In case such an unfortunate situation exists, the other non-involved members of the Amar should intervene between the disputants, try to solve the dispute, and prevent it from damaging the solidarity of the Amar. They should investigate the facts of the case and force the guilty party to compensate his brother (the wronged party) without giving the former a chance to object.

Article 3:

[681] When the Amar is called upon because of obligation involving the payment of money, all the Awaqil should meet and decide the amount of money that should be collected from each Bait of the Aggary Family. It becomes then the responsibility of each Aqila to collect the amount from his Bait.

Article 4:

[681] [885] The share of each Bait is based upon the number of "Sayems", (literally, "fasting males", which is interpreted to mean 15 years of age or over), regardless of whether or not they have a source of income for themselves. The share of those without means of their own is distributed among the other members of the Bait.

613
675 Each Aqila is responsible for submitting to the Amar a list of the
539 Sayems in his bait, and this will be the basis for establishing the
[681] share of the bait in payment or receipt of the money.

[885] **Article 5:**

No Aqila can act on any matter involving loss or gain to the Amar without the presence of the other Awaqil of the Amar, unless an urgent matter occurs in which waiting for the rest of the Awaqil might jeopardize the interest of the Amar. In such cases the Awaqil present can act on behalf of the Amar as a whole.

Article 6:

[672] The following acts should not involve the Amar as a whole and the offender is considered individually (or with his own Bait) responsible
[673] for them:

1. Theft and cheating.
2. Insult or disrespect of a younger member of the Amar to an older person whether from the Amar or not.
3. Entering someone's tent or home without permission.
4. Seduction of women (including rape and adultery).

[681] In all the above cases the individual has to bear the responsibility for his own actions. For to let the Amar pay for him in such circumstances is to encourage him and other such members of the Amar to commit more of such acts and bring disgrace to the Amar. If the offender is unable to pay for his crime, his nearest male kin should pay for him in accordance with the Awlad Ali Daraieb. Such payments are considered as personal debts which the offender has to pay back as soon as he is financially able.

Article 7:

[627] When an older person does injustice to a younger one, the latter should take his complaint to the Aqila of his own bait. The Aqila in turn should take the matter up with the Aqila of the older man or to all the awaqil of the Amar if the matter is serious enough. The awaqil must assess the facts and prevent the older man from doing any more injustice to the younger man and have the former compensate him for any damage he might have caused the younger man by his actions. If the awaqil fail to do this and if their failure resulted in the younger insulting or hurting the older, his acts become no longer an individual responsibility for which he has to pay alone, and the Amar should pay for him.

Article 8:

[627] No members of the Amar should take sides in disputes involving families or individuals outside the Amar unless the awaqil in the Amar investigate the matter and the reasons for the dispute and decide that the Amar as a whole should be on one side of the dispute or the other.

613 675 539 **Article 9:**

The Amar should never fight on the side of the wrongdoer, because if it does, it will have to pay with him for his wrongdoings.

Article 10:

[628] Any dispute or fight involving a member of the Amar and an outsider should be reported to the awaqil in the Amar who are supposed to take the matter up with the other party. If the awaqil are convinced that the outsider is the aggressor or that he is at fault, they should try to make him accede to the demands of the members of the Amar, using all their efforts to convince him and the aqila of his bait. [619] If he refuses, they should call him for a "Miad" (tribal meeting) in which all parties involved should be represented by their respective awaqil.

Article 11:

[563] [619] With regard to "iktitab" (tribal adoption), an outsider wanting to join the Aggary Family or one of its constiuent buite must be asked first about the reason or reasons for his desire to join. This must be done in order to know what kind of person he is and whether he will become a burden and liability to the Amar. If he proves to be of reputable standing, the aqila of the bait he wants to join can accept him without consultation with the rest of the awaqil. If on the other hand he is found to have grudges against someone or if someone has a financial claim over him, then the aqila of the bait cannot accept him without consultation with the other awaqil in the Amar. If all the awaqil agree to accept him, he is considered like one of the Eilat Aggary, having the same rights and bearing the same responsibilities.

Article 12:

A memberof the Amar who wants to separate himself from the Amar and get a "barawa" has to state his reasons beforehe can be released from the obligations of his membership in the amar. If his request to get the barawa was because of injustice he suffered by the Amar or any of its members, the awaqil have the duty to straighten the injustice and restore his rights. If, on the other hand, his request for the barawa was to avoid paying the Amar, then he cannot be released from his membership unless he pays all of his share, or else he must return all that the Amar has paid him until the time he asked for the barawa.

Article 13:

[695] [693] If one of the Amar is accused of an offense for which he is tried by the legal system of the state, the Amar as a whole share the expenses of hiring an attorney to defend him. This, however, is done after the awaqil are sure (by means of administering the oath) that he is innocent and that the accusation is false.

613 Written agreements such as the above are becoming more common in
625 the area. The need to have the responsibility of the vengeance group
[178] or the Amar recorded and the names of its members listed stems from the
[361] increase in the geographical mobility of individuals and separate house-
[464] holds seeking jobs with the government organizations in the area or with
the various industries in the towns and cities outside the Western Desert.
233 The uncertainty of pastoral nomadism and the delicate balance which exists
178 between pastures, animal population, and human population is pushing an
182 ever-increasing number of people to abandon the way of life which they
had lived for generations. Animals are extremely important to sustain
233 the pastoral life of Awlad Ali. Once the balance between the pasture and
182 the animal population is upset by a draught, a segment of the human popu-
731 lation has to make new adjustments. This adjustment is first made by
166 moving with one's flocks to areas in the Delta or in the Cyrenaica region
of Libya. This is a short-term adjustment, however, and cannot be con-
tinued for long periods of time. Pastures in the Delta have to be pur-
chased, and in most cases the owner of the herd has to sell part of his
[619] herd to feed the rest. The Cyrenaica pasture is very limited and re-
stricted by the strong tribal control of the Cyrenaica Bedouins, who in
general are not friendly with many of the tribal segments living in the
233 Egyptian Western Desert. If the draught continues beyond a certain time,
731 the individual owner of a herd may find himself forced to sell the herd
464 434 and seek other modes of subsistence in the form of part-time or full-time
182 employment as a semi-skilled or unskilled worker with the government or
industrial organizations. Such jobs are usually viewed as a temporary
source of income to help the individual and his immediate family live

233 through a hard year and to help him replace the herd he has lost. In
731 many cases a dry year is followed by another and many of these employed
464 find themselves depending more and more on their income from the jobs.
434
182 The security of the employment is often compared favorably with the un-
certainty of nomadic existence, and many decide to abandon the pastoral
life on a more or less permanent basis. But even when one makes such a
decision, he usually retains a strong affiliation with his original way
613 of life. He retains an active interest in the affairs of his Amar, es-
182 pecially those from which he can benefit in one way or another. One im-
682 portant gain he might get is through sharing in the receipt of bloodmoney
for the killing of any member of the Amar, and having the Amar paid in
his behalf. But while asserting their membership in the Amar at the time
of such distribution, very few, if any, would show themselves when the
membership of the Amar is called upon for the collection of bloodmoney
which the Amar has to pay for a murder committed by one of its members.
613 It is known in the area that members of one bait of the Aggary Amar (Bait
682 Ahmad) have never paid their share of the bloodmoney of the last twenty
578 years, but always claim their share in the distribution of bloodmoney.
Many members of that Bait claim that the Bait has long been separated from
the Aggary Amar, although this claim is denied by the rest of the Amar as
well as by those members of Bait Ahmad who claim their share in the re-
ceipt of bloodmoney.

613 Disputes such as these, which are not limited to the Aggarty, led
675 many Amars to attempt to make comprehensive lists of all members of the
578 Amar and to require a written agreement in case of separation of a given
Bait from the Amar.

613 Another factor which led to the need to formalize the rules of the
578 Amar was the increase in the kind of disputes for which there is no pro-
672 vision in the customary law of Awlad Ali. Such disputes arise mainly out
671 of situations which are relatively novel to the area. A large number of
681 these situations involve the relationship between the tribal population and the government authorities recently taking a major part in managing the affairs of the area. There were no rules in Awlad Ali law to guide decisions in cases involving financial liability of a member of the Amar in cases such as confiscation of smuggled goods, destruction of government property, or false testimony leading to the conviction of a fellow tribesman by the government authorities. The list of cases such as these is rapidly increasing. Many members of the Amar refuse to share in the payment of liabilities arising out of such cases on the basis that since no provision has been made in the customary law of Awlad Ali, then the Amar as a whole should not take corporate responsibility for such actions. They assert that corporate responsibility of the Amar is the exception rather than the rule and therefore, where there is no specific rule, the responsibility is an individual one. Others insist that it is the corporate responsibility of the Amar in such matters that maintains the Amar as a group and gives incentives to the members to retain their membership in the Amar, and therefore, should be the rule rather than the exception, covering any form of liability unless individual responsibility is specified.

613 This made it essential to specify in some kind of formal statement
672 which liabilities are to be considered collective for which the Amar has
675 to pay as a corporate unit and which are to remain as individual responsibility. This is done either by listing the cases of individual

613 672 675 responsibility, leaving any other situation a collective responsibility, or by specifying the cases of collective responsibility, implying that all other responsibilities are as a rule individual ones. The Amar paper of the Aggary, for example, chose to list offenses for which the Amar is not responsible, leaving the rest of the liabilities to be covered by the Amar as a whole. This is not always the case. In some papers offenses for which the Amar is responsible are the ones listed leaving the general rule as the non-responsibility of the Amar.

613 671 675 It is in this respect that the Amar papers are considered an important source of legislation. Although the new rules incorporated in an Amar paper start with the limited applicability to members of the Amar, yet, as time passes and as these rules affect the relationship of the Amar members to outsiders, one rule may acquire a wide practice and become part of the customary law itself. An example of the point in

613 671 675 682 question is the rule regulating the payment of the bloodmoney in cases where the murderer is tried by the state courts for the same crime. In cases of arrest of the murderer by the government, only half the bloodmoney is paid and the other half is withheld until the trial is over. If the killer is acquitted by the court, then the other half becomes immediately due for payment. If, on the other hand, as mentioned before, the killer is convicted, half the bloodmoney is postponed until the person completes his sentence and is released unharmed and with his full senses. If he dies in prison or sustains an accident which affects his physical or mental capacities, the rest of the bloodmoney is automatically dropped. This rule was first included in a number of Amar papers, especially those of the Eilat of Awlad Kharouf tribe. In less than twenty years since it

613 671 first appeared, the rule has become a practice so common that other Amars
675 find it unnecessary to specify it in their own papers.

682 Another new rule which is in the process of acquiring a great amount
613 of consensus among the tribal population of Awlad Ali is that of the re-
672 675 sponsibility of the Amar for the payment of the lawyer's fees for members
[693] of the Amar who are tried by the government (Article 13 of the Aggary
[695] papers). Another less agreed upon rule is that of the responsibility of
613 the Amar for the financial losses caused by the confiscation of smuggled
672 675 goods or the payment of money for the destruction of government property
439 by a member of the Amar. Where smuggling is an important source of in-
[434] come for the group, Amar papers usually include rules making it a corporate responsibility; other Amar papers, especially those of tribal segments not deeply involved in smuggling, make it an individual responsibility, while still others leave it intentionally with no specific rule, as in the case of the Aggary Amar paper.

613 The Aggary document is a relatively elaborate one. Not all Amar
[675] papers, or at least the ones I had a chance to examine, are as detailed.
[131] Eilat Aggary is the largest Amar in the area of Dera'el Bahari, which
extends from Alexandria 60 miles westward to the town of Alamein. The
613 distinctive characteristics of the Aggary Eila is that it is composed
563 mainly of peasant groups who joined the Aggary by means of tribal adop-
619 tion. Of the 16 Baits constituting the Aggary Amar, only three are believed to be Awlad Ali proper. The attractiveness of the Aggary for the peasant groups seeking to be adopted by the tribal population of the area may be partly explained in terms of the location of Eilat Aggary in an area relatively close to the Delta from where these groups usually migrate.

613 563 619 This makes it possible for those adopted by the tribe to keep in touch with their relatives and friends they left behind in the Delta while enjoying the military exemption gained from their adoption by the Awlad Ali population. It is also believed that Eilat Aggary, made up mostly of peasants themselves, are very lenient in the conditions they put for tribal adoption. Finally, the Eilat Aggary is not among the most powerful tribal segments of Awlad Ali, possibly because of their composition. This assures the adopted peasant groups an equal status not normally obtained if adopted by one of the powerful tribal segments of Awlad Ali.

613 [675] The Amar paper of the Aggary explicitly states some of the basic characteristics of the Amar as a unit in the tribal organization of Awlad Ali. The most distinctive aspect of the Eila or the Amar as a political unit is the absence of any formalized leadership. Although the Amar is viewed by outsiders as a corporate group as far as its legal responsibility in certain cases, from the standpoint of its members, the Amar is no more than the sum total of its constiuent units or Baits. This is shown in the Amar paper of Aggary which states that matters affecting the Amar be decided upon by all the bait represented by their respective leaders, the awaqil. There is no formalized authority above the
613 554 627 awaqil, although one of the awaqil might acquire a position of informal leadership by virtue of personal or other qualities. He will be considered as a mediator and go-between for the various leaders of the Baits. In the case of the Aggary, Sheihk Selouma, the Aqila of Bait Eweida, has acquired such a leadership among the Eilat Aggary. Although Shiehk Selouma is relatively young, (he is about 40 years old), he has the reputation of getting things done. His Bait is the wealthiest in the

His Bait is the wealthiest in the
613 Aggary and he himself has recently acquired a great amount of wealth,
554 627 mostly from smuggling goods across the Libyan borders. Because of his
[556] position as a Government Sheihk, he is believed to have influencial con-
nections in the government. He is the only member of the Aggary Amar
who has a car. He considers himself to be the spokesman of the Aggary
Family, and he is known to be able to persuade the reluctant awaqil to
conform to decisions made by the rest of the awaqil. In a number of in-
[682] stances he was able to collect bloodmoney from members of the Amar who
had previously refused to pay. Some people in the area believe that had
it not been for the persuasive abilities of Sheihk Selouma, the Aggary
Amar could never have persisted, and it would have long ago been divided
into smaller units due to the lack of agreement among its members. The
613 lack of formalized leadership of the Amar or the Eila makes consensus of
extreme importance for the Amar. The emphasis on the unity of the Amar
[675] is stated in Article 2 and is implied in a number of other articles in
[578] the Amar paper of Aggary. Disagreement among the awaqil is very rare al-
613 though not unknown in the area. The relative consensus among the awaqil
682 stems from the fact that the Amar as a group has a fairly limited function.
[182] Until very recently the only practical function of the Amar was the collec-
tion of money to pay for a murder committed by one of its members. Since
establishing the innocence or guilt of the accused is not the duty of the
Amar, once his guilt has been established, there is no question about
613 the payment. Disagreements are likely to occur in the case of new circum-
682 stances where money has to be paid, since payment in such cases are not
578 yet institutionalized, even when specified in a given Amar paper. This
000 has not yet become a major problem. If any disagreement between the

613 If any disagreement between the
578 responsibility of the majority of the awaqil to persuade the minority to
571 conform to the majority's decision. This is usually done by simple personal
613 persuasion. In certain instances, however, when a particular aqila
554 is known for being troublesome to the Amar, refusing to abide by the majority
571 578 decisions, an attempt may be made by the others to build up popular support around another person in the Bait which the aqila represents. If this strategy is successful, it might lead to replacing the aqila by another who is more abiding to the Amar's decisions. This approach is more likely to succeed if the aqila is not a popular person in his own Bait, for if he is popular, any attempt by the other Baits to disqualify the aqila would be viewed by the members of his Bait as interference in their own affairs and might lead them to rally even more strongly around their leader.

613 The other tendency occurring when the size of the Eilat increases is toward the separation of one or more of its constiuent Baits. Originally
613 682 this was done by merely refusing to share in the payment of bloodmoney. If this refusal continued, it was considered as a sign of
[178] separation of the Bait. In recent years this created problems with an increasing number of individuals claiming separation from the Amar to avoid the payment of the bloodmoney, while claiming membership when distribution
613 is done. This led many tribal segments to require that the
675 "barawa" or separation of individuals or tribal units from any particular Amar should be put in writing, after getting the approval of the Amar to which he belonged. When the approval is given and the separation in put in writing, it is announced to all other tribal segments. If this is
[672] done, members of the separated tribal segment are not held responsible

613 [675] [672] for the actions of the members of their former Amar, nor is the Amar responsible for theirs.

Units thus separated establish themselves as separate Amars. These units are commonly referred to as Eila, thus retaining the structural label of the higher order of segmentation. This is not always the case, however, and other segments may refer to them as Baits rather than as Eilat. This explains, at least in part, the tendency toward blurring the formal scheme on the next level of segmentation, that is, of the Bait, and may account for the variable meaning of the term Eilat itself.

The Bait

While the Eila or Amar-el-dam is the most important political unit by virtue of being the vengeance group and therefore, the individual's major support group, it is the Bait that constitutes the most visible political unit.

613 423 The Bait is the only corporate land-holding group. While the Eila is usually associated with a certain geographical locale which it considers as its homeland or "watan", it rarely, if ever, utilizes this land as a corporate unit. Instead, the land is divided among the various Baits constituting the Eila. The land of the Bait is not divided and each member of the Bait can, at least theoretically, cultivate or graze on any part of it.

613 But the one important characteristic of the Bait which distinguishes it as a political unit is the existence of a formally recognized leadership in the position of the Aqila (lit. wiseman). The Bait is the only structural unit with such formalized leadership. The Aqila is responsible for all members of his own Bait whose number varies from 20 to 60

613 individuals. He settles disputes among them and represents them in their
[627] disputes with outsiders. He is also the spokesman of his Bait in all
matters involving the relationship of the Bait with the other tribal seg-
[682] ments. He is responsible for the collection of the bloodmoney from mem-
bers of his Bait and has the authority to confiscate property of individual
members who refuse to pay their share. When a member is financially unable
to pay his share, the Aqila is expected to pay for him and collect at a
later time when the member is in a position to make such payment.

613 Originally the position of the Aqila was a hereditary one with the
428 position passing from father to son. However, in recent years the rigid-
178 ity of the patrilineal descent as the basis of succession to the position
of the Aqila has been modified radically and other principles of selec-
613 tion have been introduced. The working of the principles underlying the
128 selection of the Aqila will be analyzed in detail in the following chapter
through the close examination of one of the major legal cases which oc-
curred during my stay in the area.

613 Thus each Bait is a division of one of the Eilas and this has its
[423] place in the formal tribal system. It constitutes a group with definite
usufruct rights to land and a formally recognized leadership.

621 But the actual residential units in which Awlad Ali live are not
[613] baits but parts of them in the form of separate camps or "nagei". The
camps constitute the primary communities of Awlad Ali. A camp consists
[594] of a number of tents ranging from four to twelve. Each tent is usually
occupied by one nuclear family of a husband, his wife and children. In
[595] cases of polygynous marriages, each wife usually occupies one tent with
[361] her children. Each camp is separated from the next one by a distance
which ranges from two to ten kilometers.

621 which ranges from two to ten kilometers. The camp coincides with the
233 herding unit. The herd of the camp is usually grazed as a unit, often
621 by a paid shepherd hired by the members of the camp as a whole. Origi-
233 nally the camp moved as a unit for grazing. This was essential in the
621 era of the tribal warfare and raiding where the security of the herd
361 178 and that of the people depended on such collective movement. In a type
of organization adapted to periodical movement, the camp offered the
optimum sized community: small enough to permit easy movement and large
enough to offer the kind of protection which individual families could
621 not have offered. In this era the camp seemed to have been a closely
178 knit group. Many of the informants still remember the time when the
622 361 camp was under the strong control of the headman who made the major de-
233 cisions of where and when the camp should move. It was those decisions
that determined the safety and the security of the group. The headman
had strong authority over members of his camp. Such authority was based
mainly on his ability to exercise valid judgments as to whether or not
the group should move and the route that it had to take if movement was
decided upon. At the present time, and with the diminishing of raiding
and tribal warfare in the area, the authority of the headman seems to
have diminished along with it. The camp appears at the present time to
be mostly a residential unit with minimal leadership and with a rapidly
changing composition. Different families join the camp at different
times during the year.

621 Although the membership of the camps is drawn from the bait, a camp
613 does not, in terms of its genealogical composition, make up a descent
segment of that Bait. The membership of a camp is based on a completely

621 613 different principle from the principle of patrilineal succession characteristic of the bait and all other units on the higher levels of tribal segmentation.

Some of the camps I visited were composed of three patrilines, while others contained individuals belonging to five patrilines. In some camps each tent belonged to a different patriline, some of which did not even belong to the same bait. The composite nature of the camps is particularly clear in the case of what the people in the area called "nagei gheir aseil" or the artificial camp. This kind of camp is usually found near the towns and settled communities of the area. They include one or two tents of individuals belonging to the bait whose land the camp is built one, and who give the camp its name, but the rest of the tents are occupied by individuals from different baits or even tribes and also by
621 outsiders who came to work in the area. Such a camp does not act as a unit for any purpose. It has a rudimentary structure, and is held together by mere physical proximity of its members which stems from the need of "wanas" or togetherness. The composition of the artificial camps is highly changeable with new members joining and others leaving throughout the year. When I joined the camp of Ragi from the Sanagra tribe, it consisted of twelve tents. Four of the twelve tents were occupied by
[563] Sheihk Ragi (two tents for the two wives) and his two married sons, five occupied by members of tribal segments other than Sanagrah, and four by workers who came from Alexandria to work for the government project in the area. One week after I joined the camp another tent was added to
[563] the camp. It belonged to a man from the Geneishat tribe of the Natruh area. He came with his wife to work on the new irrigation project which

621 563 had started in the area at that time. No special permission was required for the newcomer to join the camp. He only got the permission
of the person whose tent was at the far end of the camp to put his tent
[574] next to it. The first night after the man joined the camp, his next
door neighbor slaughtered a goat in honor of the new member and invited
all members of the camp.

621 Leaving the camp also does not require any permission, although the
622 custom specifies that before one leaves he should inform either his
[576] neighbor or the headman of his time of departure. With the exception of
[613] cases where the headman of a particular camp is at the same time the
Aqila of the bait, the headman of the camp has no authority over the mem-
622 bers of the camp. He is usually called upon to solve minor problems be-
627 tween brothers or husband and wife, or give his opinion in decisions of
minor importance. "A headman is like a father," said one informant, "we
call him kabir el-nagi (the old man of the camp)." When a member of the
627 613 nagei is involved in a serious dispute with another, the one to handle
the case is the aqila or awaqil to whom the two disputing parties belong.

619 Group	Leadership	Identifying aspects
613 Kabila	None	Client groups attached.
621 Eila	None	Vengeance group, Vaguely defined tribal land ("watan").
Bait	Aqila	Corporate land-holding. Formally recognized leadership.
[622] Nagei	Headman	Residential unit with unsegmented structure.

CHAPTER V

POLITICAL LEADERSHIP
AND
JUDICIAL PROCESS

69 627 628 One of the most idstinguishing aspects of the legal system of Awlad Ali is the absence of any formalized judicial structure. Disputes are solved mainly through the mechanism of informal mediation rather than through formal hearings of a court during which the facts of each case are presented and judgment based on the facts is passed. This does not mean that formal hearings are not known on the area. For the "Mi'ad" or tribal hearing is a common and very important practice in the tribal proceedings. The Mi'ad, however, is not a tribal court. It is merely a gathering of all interested parties and anyone else who wished to attend, in which the agreement reached behind the scenes by means of negotiations are announced.

628 613 683 [114] The first Mi'ad I attended was held in the house of Sheikh Mughaieb, the Aqila (tribal leader) of bait Mughaieb of the Sanagrah tribal segment in the area of Hammam, 60 miles west of Alexandria. The case that was to be settled at the Mi'iad involved the assaulting of Sheikh Mughaieb ty two younger members of bait Dauoud who lived in a nearby camp. The dispute started when Ali, the youngest brother (14 years old) of the two assailants, found a piece of iron in the desert. Suspecting that it was a mine, he took it away from the camp to the small garden in the backyard of Sheikh Mughaieb's house, surrounded it with dry weeds and set fire to it. The piece of iron was in fact a mine and it exploded, damaging the trees and a window on the Sheikh's property. At the sound of the explosion Sheikh Mughaieb rushed out and found the boy trying to run away from

628 683 613 the area. He caught him and slapped him and ordered him not to do it again. After a short while the boy returned with his two older brothers who protested Sheikh Mughaieb's hitting their younger brother. The argument developed into a fight during which the two brothers hit Mughaieb with a heavy stick over his head making him unconscious.

The Mi'ad was held two weeks after the incident. When I arrived at Sheikh Mughaieb's house, the meeting was being held in the guest room in the back of the house. Present at the meeting were Sheikh Mughaieb, his father, two distant relatives of Mughaieb who were visiting the area at the time; Sheikh Mutair, the Aqila of the powerful bait of Mutair located some twenty miles east of Mughaieb; the two assailants, their father who at the same time was the Aqila of their bait, and two neighbors of Sheikh Mughaieb.

[576] For the first half hour or so nothing was said. People were sitting silently except for occasional greetings of "how are you?" and the response of "thank God for everything". Tea was served frequently. Then [779] Sheikh Mutair addressed the gathering and read the "fatha" or the beginning passage of the Qoraan (which appeals to God to show his right ways to the believers and to guide them to wisdom). He then said, "In the blessed presnece of all these honorable guests and with the help of God and his prophet we will clear the hearts of those concerned of the grudges caused by the shameful and unfortunate incident in which the devil has played a major role." Then Sheikh Karim, the Aqila of the bait to which the accused belonged, continued the speech saying that this shameful thing should never have happened and that his sons must [867] have been possessed by the devil to have done it. After all, they have been brought up to respect their elders and especially Sheikh Mughaieb, who was like a second father to him.

628 683 613 [576] who was like a second father to them. He praised Sheikh Mughaieb for being understanding. He then said that Sheikh Mughaieb was very generous and that his sons had come to Mughaieb the day before and kissed the top of his head (an expression of respect for forgiveness). He said that no money, no matter how great, could erase the harm done by his sons but that he had offered to pay Sheikh Mughaieb the sum of 400 pounds as "kabara" or face-saving compensation. (The kabara will be discussed in a forthcoming chapter, but for the time being it is worth noting that the above amount is the maximum for such compensation since it equals the bloodmoney for a man). Then he turned to Sheikh Mughaieb and asked him to accept it in front of the respected guests. Sheikh Mughaieb then spoke for the first time and said that the two boys were like sons to him and that he had no hard feelings toward them anymore, since he believed that young people were sometimes carried away in their actions. He then proceeded to say that in honor of the honorable guests who took the time to attend the hearing he was forfeiting half the amount. At that time a woman brought the food the women were cooking for the gathering, and Sheikh Karim asked Mughaieb, "How about the honor of the good women of the house who have done all the work and cooked all the food? If you ask me, they deserve at least another hundred pounds." Mughaieb said, "All right, fifty pounds for the home of the women, but no more." After that Sheikh Karim paid the amount of a hundred and fifty pounds to Sheikh Mughaieb and shook hands with him. He also shook hands with the two young men who had assaulted him, and the gathering started the dinner and tea.

627 628 Not all Mi'ads in the area proveed with that smoothness. Many of them are characterized by shouting and arguments and frequently no .

627 628 [123] agreement is reached. In fact, later one of the people attending said that my presence made everything run smoothly in that particular Mi'ad because they felt that they should show me how peaceful Awlad Ali were. This was mainly supported by my own observation of other Mi'ads, some of which are described later, where parties were less understanding of one another and where no forfeiting of any part of the compensation occurs. This is particularly true when the Mi'ad is held to acknowledge the failure of the negotiators to reach an acceptable agreement among the parties. [681] This is also true when one of the parties to a dispute denies the charge and insists on not paying any kind of compensation. In such cases the Mi'ad is held to decide upon a different course of action, usually the administration of the oath, as will be discussed later in the chapter. [182] Despite its typical nature, the Mi'ad described above exemplifies the nature of the Mi'ad and its purpose as a process of making public what has been achieved in private negotiations. No evidence is presented and evaluated in the Mi'ad, no hearing of witnesses, no passing of judgment based on the evaluation of the facts of the case. Actually, the facts of the case are never presented and a person who is not acquainted with them before hand has no way of learning what the dispute is all about by merely listening to the discussions of the Mi'ad.

628 613 The key role in the process of mediation in dispute settlements is done by the Aqila or the leader of the bait. When a dispute occurs between members of different baits, each party goes to the Aqila of his bait who takes immediate steps tomeet with the Aqila of the other party and discuss the matter with him in an attempt to reach a settlement. He acts as a representative of members of his bait and defends their interests in

628 the settlement achieved. In many such interest is best served by taking
613 into consideration the welfare of the other party to the dispute as well.

613 Reasonableness is an important prerequisite for the success of the
554 Aqila in performing this functions in dispute settlement. This is true
157 whether the Aqila is dealing with disputes between members of his own
bait or between members of his bait and outsiders. But while reasonableness and the personal qualities constitute important assets for the Aqila,
613 they are not the basis of his political authority. Proven abilities are
554 admired but they are, or had been until very recently, irrelevant to the
178 question of succession to the position of Aqila. The structurally significant source of the Aqila's authority is patrilineal succession. This principle has recently been challenged under the impact of social and economic changes that are taking place in the area. To analyze the role
121 of the Aqila and the source of his authority, I shall utilize, to some
613 extent, Turner's concept of "social drama" by presenting and analyzing a
128 case of dispute whose developmental stages happened over a period of more than eleven years. The major part of these developments occurred at the time of the field work and I had a chance to observe at lease part of it. The case in all its phases offers a rare example of a disturbance that happened in the social life of a particular tribal segment. It offers what Turner called "... a limited area of transparency in the otherwise opaque surface of regular, uneventful social life" (p. 93). The political unit involved is that of bait Asabe'i, the largest in size of all baits in the Aggary Eila. As events of the case unfolded themselves, some of the important principles of social structure, at least as they operate at a given point, were revealed.

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EILAT AGGARY AND ITS CONSTIUENT BAITS

BAIT	NUMBER OF ADULT MALES (Sayems)[1]	AQILA
Eweidha (El-Burg)*	28	Ta'eb
Eweidha (El-Alamein)*	31	Selouma
Yusef**	30	Suliman
Helleis	22	Hussein
El-Asabei'	56	Shei'eb
Abdel Hamid*	20	Haj Musa
Risq**	30	Yadem
Afash	25	Nayer
Daghas**	25	Daghash
Bul-Yazid*	21	Haj Shousha
Makhyum**	23	Abdel fattah
Hussein**	17	Masri
El-Ramly**	25	Salem
Rashwan**	30	Rashwan
Attya*	31	Masu'd
Abdella*	22	Abdel Galil

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[1] Numbers are taken from the Amar list which is used to distribute the amount of bloodmoney on the various baits. An adult male or "sayem" is anyone 15 years of age or older. The word "sayem" means fasting individual and the age of 15 is when a child is forced to observe the duties of fasting.

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** Refers to adopted tribal segments (Muktatibeen).
* Baits of doubted origin. Some claim these baits are adopted, while others insist that they are Awlad Ali proper.

7

BAIT EL ASABEI'


Bakhatrouh
Hamad
Osman
Yunis
El-Safi
Sai'ed
Qudurah
Bu Elewah
El-Sawi
Samsoum
Elewah
Madhi
Embewa
Hamad
Seluma
Kassem
Fathalla
Sinqor
Seluma
Edris
She'ib
Hussein
Hakim
Rabbuh
Besseisi
Rubei'
Fayid

PHASE I

613 578 682 [464] In September of 1956, Mansur from bait Eweidha of the Aggary Eila, who works as a driver in one of the government projects in the area, went to Alexandria with a friend, a member of the Gemei'at tribe. In one of the bars there, Mansur got drunk and entered into an argument with his friend. The argument turned into a fight during which he hit his friend with a broken bottle. Two days later, the friend died. A settlement was made between Mansur and the victim's family and bloodmoney was established at L. 300.

613 682 683 Two weeks after the above incident, the same person, Mansur, was driving the government car on his regualr duty when he ran over two members of the Sanagrah tribe who were sitting on the side of the road, killing one and breaking the leg of the other. Another settlement was made with the families of the victims. The bloodmoney for the dead man was established at L. 300 and another L. 50 was set as the compensation for the broken leg of the other man.

The total sum of compensations in the two incidents was divided among the sixteen baits constituting the Aggary Amar. The share of each bait was decided in proportion to the number of adult males (sayems) in each. The share of bait Asabei' alone was established at about L. 100.

613 682 683 672 558 As the Aqila of Bait Asabei', Shei'eb was responsible for collecting the money from members of his bait. But for the following six months he was unable to collect from any member of his bait, including Sheikh Hakim, Shei'eb's cousin and the wealthiest person in bait Asabei' and the Aggary Amar as a whole. Most of them gave the execuse that it was a bad year and they had lost most of their herds. When the money was not collected,

613 the victims' families sent their representatives to demand that the money
682 be paid. To face the situation, a meeting of all the Awaqil of Eilat
683 Aggary was called and Sheikh Selouma, the Aqila of bait Eweidha, took the
672 responsibility of notifying the other Awaqil. The meeting was held in
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[115] the tent of Hemeida (my driver and informant) from the Sanagrah tribe. Each bait was represented by its Aqila with the exception of bait Asabei', from which both Shei'eb and Hakim were present. Since bait Asabei' was the only bait which did not submit to its share of the bloodmoney, the discussion centered around the inability of Shei'eb to collect it. In a gesture which he meant to appear as helping out Shei'eb, Hakim offered to pay not only his share but that of all members of bait Asabei', and followed his offer by handing the money to Sheikh Selouma. After this act which was a complete surprise to Shei'eb, Sheikh Slouma, the Aqila of bait Eweidha, suggested that Hakim should be considered as the Aqila of bait Asabei' instead of Shei'eb, who had demonstrated his inability to collect from members of his own bait. He emphasized the fact that he had nothing against Shei'eb who had legitimately acquired his position as Aqila by means of succession. But he insisted that the survival of the Amar depended upon the fulfullment of its financial obligations to outsiders and that Hakim was wealthy and could pay. Shei'eb did not comment and the rest of the Awaqil nodded indicating their agreement with Sheikh Selouma.

[124] The above is the summary of events that happened before I came to the area, and which were told to me by informants including the parties involved. Since most of these events occurred more than ten years ago,

613 682 it was impossible to verify the actual facts or to know what exactly
683 happened. But since the parties involved are still alive and since these
672 events are closely related to present-day happenings, the case is still
558 alive in the minds of the parties involved as well as those of outsiders-
(124) Naturlaly, each party tries to present the facts in such a way as to
613 support his own claims. Shei'eb, for example, insists that Hakim had
682 683 bribed members of bait Asabei' to refuse to pay their share in order to
156 embarrass him and make him appear as unable to perform his duties as
558 Aqila. "Hakim always had his eyes on becoming the Aqila of bait Asabei'," said Shei'eb, "but he had no business becoming the Aqila, so he had to make me look bad to the other Awaqil.... He likes to be looked up to as a big man, but it wouldn't work." While other members of bait Asabei' deny that Hakim had bribed them, they agree with Shei'eb that Hakim is a
156 dishonest man. In fact, Hakim's reputation is so widespread in the area
551 that it has earned him the nickname of "the thief". The nickname was
788 given to him a few years ago when he went to Mecca for a pilgrimage with
685 another fellow tribesman. The latter told the story that while in Mecca Hakim had found a purse with two hundred pounds in it. He was supposed to return the purse to the authorities or it would be considered as stealing if he kept it. Stealing in Mecca is not only a crime but also a great sin which makes the holy trip void for the offender. Hakim told his companion that he had given the purse to the authorities. But later, on their way back from Mecca, the friend found the purse hidden in Hakim's luggage. When the story was known in the area, he was referred to as
156 "the thief". Other accounts of Hakim's dishonesty are told throughout
685 the area, including stories of how he acquired his wealth through stealing
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156 [685] [439] equipment from the government projects and from smuggling sheep and merchandise across the Libyan border. Although some of these stories might be exaggerated, they all point to the fact that Hakim, despite his wealth, is not the most popular or reputable individual in bait Asabei', and that although Shei'eb is not a popular individual either, he definitely comes up the winner in any popularity contest between the two. The question is
156 why Hakim was selected by the Awaqil to replace Shei'eb. The case in-
613 volved more than Shei'eb's inability to collect the money from members of
558 his bait. Shei'eb's ineffectiveness seemed to have been taken as an ex-
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683 cuse rather than as the direct cause. Many Aqaqil, before Shei'eb, had failed in collecting money from their own bait without being subject to direct challenge. What seems to be involved is more than a challenge to a particular member, Shei'eb. It is a challenge to the whole principle by which Shei'eb acquired his position as Aqila of bait Asabei': patrilineal succession.

156 Shei'eb is the youngest of four sons of the former Aqila of bait
159 Asabei', Sheikh Elewa. For more than fifty years Sheikh Elewa was the
613 undisputed Aqila of bait Asabei'. He also had considerable influence
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683 among other tribal segments throughout the whole of the Western Desert
554 by virtue of his position as "nazzar", that is, the expert who assesses the amount of compensation for wound inflicted in a liable case. The
[428] position of nazzar is a hereditary one and had been handed down from
[779] father to son. The basis for his assessment of wounds are a number of old books believed to be obtained from Mecca and contain all the judgments of famous Islamic leaders in their assessments of wounds.

[428] Eleven years ago when Sheikh Elewa became blind and too old to

156 exercise his functions, he invited all the important people in the area
159 into a large gathering during which he announced that he was handing the
613 463 sacred books to Shei'eb, who was to become the nazzar and also to succeed
683 him as the Aqila of bait Asabei'. Although at that time Shei'eb was
554 fairly young, twenty-six, nobody questioned Sheikh Elewa's decision.
428 [579] "He is the Aqila," said one informant, "and he has the right to decide
which of his sons is to succeed him. After all, he knows his sons better
than anybody else and knows which one is best for the job." Most people
156 thought that Sheikh Elewa, being still alive and with clear thinking,
159 613 would help Shei'eb in performing his duties as Aqila. A few months after
554 Shei'eb took over his father's position, it became apparent that he was
578 too immature for the job. He tried to use his position to take money
[661] from members of his bait and when they refused to give him any money, he
entered into fights with a number of them. Rumors spread that he took bribes from the disputing parties who came to him for him to assess the legal compensation for wounds to raise or lower his estimate. But still people within bait Asabei' as well as outside it respected Sheikh Elewa's decision and did not challenge Shei'eb openly. But as time passed the dissatisfaction with Shei'eb grew. This dissatisfaction came mainly from members of the Amar who were affected directly by Shei'eb's actions, especially those actions which resulted in the payment of compensation for wounds inflicted in fights.

PHASE II

439 On the evening of May 16, 1966, two members of the Geneishat tribe of Matruh area came to Burg-el-Arab with a large shipment of smuggled cigarettes to leave with their partner in the area, Hadi, from the

439 Aggary Eila. When they arrived with the cigarettes, Hadi was not at his tent; he was in the market of the nearby town selling sheep. They left the cigarettes and left for Alexandria to arrange for their distribution. In Alexandria they met Rabbuh Hakim, the son of Hakim, who married a girl from Alexandria and lived there. He made his income from buying smuggled goods at wholesale prices and selling them at a profit. When he met the two members of the Geneishat tribe and learned from them about the shipment they left at Hadi's place, he wanted to buy it. But they refused on the grounds that Hadi had already contacted someone and that all they could do was to give the first option to that individual. Two
439
625 hours after the conversation between Rabbuh Hakim and the Geneishat, the police officer on duty at the station of Burg el-Arab received an anonymous call from Alexandria informing him that a shipment of smuggled cigarettes worth more than three thousand pounds was hidden in Hadi's olive mill (which was not in use at that time). The call was overheard by a member of the Sanagrah tribe who works as a detective with the police. He tried to warn Hadi of the police raid but it was too late. The officer found the cigarettes in Hadi's olive mill in the exact place where the informant said they would be. The cigarettes were confiscated and Hadi was arrested and later released when the officer didn't find enough evidence to prove that he knew about the shipment or that it belonged to him.

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578 The confiscation of the cigarettes enraged both Hadi and his partners. They went to Sheikh Ta'ib, the Aqila of bait Eweidha to which Hadi belonged. They told him about their conversation with Rabbu in Alexandria and said that they thought he was the one who informed the police about the shipment. Ta'ib said that Rabbu must have done this because of old

685 grudges that he had against Ta'ib when the latter dissolved the partnership
627 which had existed between them for more than ten years, because of
598 Rabbu's attempt to cheat Taieb in dividing the profit gained from smuggling
goods. They asked Sheikh Ta'ib to be their mediator to Sheikh
Hakim and his son. Ta'ib went to Hakim himself and informed him of the
accusations directed against his son and asked to arrange for a "Mi'ad"
or legal hearing. Hakim agreed and told Taieb that his son accepted
Taieb as a mardi and would abide by whatever decision he made. After
that both parties to the dispute wrote specifying their agreement on Taieb
as a mardi and all signed it. (It is not customary to write the agreement
on the mardi but Taieb insisted on that on the grounds that he did
not trust Hakim or his son and that several times they had backed down
on their promises). The Mi'ad was held and all interested parties attended.
It lasted only half an hour, most of it spect drinking tea. Nobody
presented his case or any facts related to it since both parties had
apparently discussed it earlier with Taieb. The only one to speak was
Sheikh Taieb. He stated that Hadi and his partners believed that Rabbu
had informed the police which caused them to loose merchandise worth
685 more than three thousand pounds. He also said that the accusation had
627 been denied by Hakim on behalf of his son, after having his son swear by
578 the Qoraan that he hadn't informed the police. Then in the traditional
695 phrase, Taieb said, "I therefore follow the Awlad Ali Daraieb and make
[671] the judgment to the oath. Rabbu will have to take the oath supported by
fourteen male members of his bait to be selected by the Geneishat." He
added that he had discussed the matter with both parties before announcing
it and that both had agreed to it.

685 The Geneishat selected the tomb of the saint where the oath was to
627 be administered. According to the customary law of Awlad Ali, the plain-
778 tiff is the one to decide which saint is to be sought for the taking of
695 the oath by the defendant. Each saint has his own reputation and some
[671] are said to be more effective in certain kinds of disputes. The saint
[776] selected in this case was Sidi Dmain. Sidi Dmian's tomb is in the
Beheira province some 60 miles east of the area of Burg el-Arab. He is
[732] known to cause the blindness of those who dare to swear falsely by him,
[784] and at least four cases of blindness in the area have been attributed to
[671] false oaths at Sidi Dmain. Also according to the law, it is the plain-
tiff who selects the persons from the defendant's kin unit who are to
685 support him in the oath. Following this rule, the Geneishat, with the
627 help of Hadi, selected the fourteen men from bait Asabei to swear with
695 Rabbu. The number of men that were required in this case was considered
613 very conservative. The usual practice in estimating the number of sup-
[803] porters in any case is done by establishing the value of the damage or
compensation and dividing it by ten. The result is the number of men
needed to give the oath. If there were not enough adult males in a given
kinship unit to fulfill the number needed, some or all the men would
have to be sworn twice or three times and each time a person takes the
oath he is considered as a separate person until the number needed is met.

Following this rule, and since the value of the property confiscated in the above case was over three thousand pounds, 300 persons should have been sworn in support of Rabbuh. Since this would have complicated the matter greatly, it was agreed that fifteen men were enough. Taieb gave the justification for limiting the number to 15 that trade and, as

685 such, deviates from the normal pattern of cases dealt with by the cus-
627 tomary law in the conventional way. The men selected by the Geneishat
695 included, in addition to Rabbu and his father Hakim, Shei'eb and his
613 three brothers, Hakim's cousin Samsoun and his four brothers and Hakim's
uncle Sheikh Qudura and his sons. The date of the oath was set for June
tenth. Two days before, the two parties involved in the dispute invited
a number of the important people of other tribal segments in the area to
[492] be witnesses to the oath. All involved started to travel to the tomb of
[494] Sidi Dmain, some on donkeys, others by bus or train. At six o'clock on
[497] the morning of the oath everybody gathered in the courtyard outside the
[778] tomb of the saint. The granddaughter of the saint works as a mediator
[787] between the spirit of her grandfather and his followers announced that
[776] the saint was ready for the oath and everybody went inside preparing for
the oath. Before the oath was taken the Geneishat asked Hakim if his son
and the fourteen men they had chosen were present and Hakim said they
were. Since the Geneishat were from a different tribal segment and
lived outside the area, they had no personal knowledge of most of the
[212] men who were to take the oath. Knowing the reputation of Hakim they
asked the men to present their identification cards to check them against
[747] the list they had. At that time Hakim said that some of the men didn't
have identification cards because they had not applied for aid from the
World Food Program. Then the Geneishat demanded that those without cards
should be identified by members of other tribal segments who had come as
witnesses. Hakim refused and then admitted that one of the men was ab-
sent and that he had put another in place of him. But when the Geneishat
learned that the one to be absent was Sheikh Qudura, they insisted that

685 627 695 613 [578] no one else could take his place. They were mainly angry at Hakim's attempt to cheat them and refused Hakim's offer to substitute ten men for Qudura. The temper of the meeting was becoming very tense; then Taieb, who was working very hard to achieve a settlement between the disputants, took the Geneishat aside and tried to convince them to accept another man instead of Qudura. When he found that to be impossible, he asked them to agree to a postponement of the oath until they saw what prevented Qudura from coming as he had promised. The Geneishat agreed to the postponement because of the absence of one of the men to swear. [671] According to Awlad Ali Daraieb, if one of the individuals to take the oath fails to show up in the saint's tomb for any reason or if he comes but refuses to take the oath, the whole case for the defense fails, and the judgment is awarded automatically for the plaintiff. In this case the Geneishat were entitled to immediate compensation for their confiscated goods. Nobody knew the reason that led the Geneishat to forfeit their right to immediate compensation and to give Hakim and his son a second chance despite their intense dislike for the latters. Some attribute this to the skill of Taieb and the respect he commands among all tribes. Others believe the Geneishat movement to be a reciprocal act to bait Asabei' as a whole which long ago had one a similar favor for the Geneishat. Still others beliebe it to be a gesture of good will on the part of the Geneishat who needed to retain a good and friendly relationship with the tribal segments on their smuggling route.

No date was set at that time for the oath. The parties as well as 685 627 578 the witnesses returned to their houses. Hakim then took Shei'eb and went to visit Qudura to see why he hadn't come to the oath but Qudura

685 refused to see them. Later Hakim had Shei'eb spread the rumor that Qudura
627 had taken a bribe from the Geneishat to refuse to take the oath, and the
578 story of an old dispute between Qudura, on the one hand, and both Hakim
[521] and Shei'eb, on the other. This dispute dates back to the time when the
613 156 Awaqil of the Aggary Amar decided to replace Shei'eb with Hakim as the
554 Aqila of bait Asabei'. Shortly after the decision of the Aggary Awaqil
578 was publicly known, Qudura was very unhappy and refused to recognize it. His reaction was not out of loyalty to Shei'eb whom he thought was a very unfit person for the position, but it stemmed rather, from a deep resentment of Hakim. According to my information, Qudura's position was met with sympathy by the majority of the people outside the Aggary Amar who share with him the belief that Hakim was a dishonest person who could not be trusted as a representative of bait Asabei'. It was at that time that the stories of Hakim's dishonest dealings were being discussed publicly, mainly by Qudura and members of his camp. At that time many believed that Qudura was the best man for the position of Aqila of bait Asabei' and that he was the only qualified member of that bait. He was the oldest able man in the bait, and although he was poor, yet he was known throughout the area for his honesty and sound decision. In fact many people in the area told me that they believe Qudura to be the only honest member of bait Asabei'. Realizing that Qudura was getting all the attention, Hakim sent his son Rabbu to Qudura with a message that Hakim acknowledged Qudura as the Aqila and that he (Hakim) had neither the time nor the interest in taking the position himself. Hakim also conveyed the view that he would support Qudura if the latter denounced Shei'eb and appointed himself in his place. Qudura agreed and a date

613 156 was set for a meeting in which Quadra was to announce his decision.
554 Meanwhile, Qudura stopped attacking Hakim and directed his attack to-
578 ward the inadequacy of Shei'eb as the Aqila.

The meeting was held two weeks later and all the important people in the area were invited. After dinner was served Qudura announced his agreement with Hakim to become the Aqila of bait Asabei' replacing Shei'eb. Everybody expected Hakim to support Qudura in his claim, but instead Hakim directed his comment to Qudura telling him that there had been a misunderstanding on Qudura's part and that all his message to Qudura was to acknowledge the latter as the Aqila for his own camp alone not for bait Asabei' as a whole as Qudura claimed. This annbuncement was a surprise to everyone in the meeting since this meant recognizing the camp of Qudura as a separate bait, a result which nobody, including Qudura, had ever anticipated. Qudura was very angry and dissolved the meeting immediately. Ever since that incident, the relationship between
578 Qudura and Hakim has been very unfriendly. Almost all of my informants
156 explained Qudura's failure to show up at the oath as a means of revenge
695 against Hakim who had embarrassed him among the people who attended the
685 627 meeting. Qudura himself had told me later that the reason for his not
[124] coming to the oath was that he was not sure that Rabbu was innocent:

> Rabbu has been known to do these thins (inform the police) and I cannot trust him. I cannot take a false oath and endanger myself for someone like Rabbuh. Besides, Hakim never came to me to discuss the oath like he did with all the others who were to swear with them. If he had brought his son and come to me before I would have been able to tell whether they were lying or not, and If not, I would have sworn with a clear conscience and without fear. The oath is something that one does not take lightly. It involves the supernatural.

613 627 When Qudura refused to see Hakim and Shei'eb, Hakim asked Sheikh
156 196 Saleh, the Aqila of one of the most powerful baits in the area, to talk

613 629 to Qudura and to tell him that Hakim wanted to show his respect. This
156 means in everyday parlance that Hakim was willing to pay him money.
[196] Qudura agreed to meet Hakim the following day.

[114] On the day of the meeting, to which I was invited, Hakim arrived
[431] with his son and gifts of three goats, tea and sugar. One of the goats
[574] was slaughtered and supper was prepared for the guests. While the guests were eating, Hakim and Qudura disappeared inside one of the tents for more than an hour. When they finally joined the gathering, Hakim announced that he and Qudura were now brothers and that it was his fault that Qudura was angry because he had accused him of being stupid and misunderstanding the content of the message sent to him after the meeting of the Aggary awawil. "I admit," said Hakim, "that I might have meant at one time and probably said it to sheikh Qudura that I wanted him to be the Aqila of bait Asabei'. Now that I have admitted this, Sheikh Qudura should not have any grudges against me or my son." Then Qudura addressed the gathering and said, in a very cold and dry manner, "I am glad that Hakim has come to this senses and admitted his mistake." The gathering lasted for most of the evening, spent mostly in behind-the-scenes meetings involving Hakim, Qudura and different guests. Then as the last guest left, Shei'eb, who had been inside the tent throughtout the evening came out and said that Hakim was a fool and that Qudura had tricked him into admitting publicly that he had lied and that Qudura still refused to take the oath.

613 Qudura's stand created a strong reaction which affected almost all
619 the tribal segments in the area. The case overshadowed any other event
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[521] and was the main topic of discussion. The reaction was mixed, however.

613 Other tribal segments outside the Aggary amar supported the position of
619 Qudura, and most took his position to prove their notion about his hon-
578 esty and the fact that despite his poverty, he could not be bribed. They
156 were also pleased with Qudura's trick which demonstrated Hakim's dishonest
613 techniques. Within the Aggary amar, the general sentiment was still with
578 Hakim although his confession of cheating Qudura made it difficult to
156 support him openly. They directed their attack against Qudura who in their view violated the solidarity of the amar and even of his bait and showed it as divided and noncohesive. They were also fearful that Qudura's
[685] refusal to pay would cause the amar to pay the Geneishat the full compensation for the action of Rabbuh, a sum which, as one said, would put the amar in debt for generations to come. The strongest impact of the events affected bait Asabei' itself and left it one step from complete fission into three distinct groups. Shei'eb, finding the tide turning against Hakim, found a chance to assert his claim to the position of the Aqila, stating openly that he would never forfeit his hereditary right. On the other hand, finding the popularity of Qudura increasing rapidly, he started attacking him verbally and even threatened to beat him. He in-
[681] sisted that Qudura and his sons should be excluded from the amar and given the barawa.

613 The word "barawa" is derived from the Arabic verb "bara" which means to
681 cure one's self of an illness. It also means to sever social ties with
[192] undesirable persons. The term is used among Awlad Ali in a much restrited sense to refer to the process by which a tribal segment detaches itself from any responsibility for the actions of a particular member. It is

613 681 mainly a declaration that, that particular person is no longer a member of the tribal segment and that his actions should not in any way reflect upon the tribal segment. The tribal segment referred to is usually the amar since it is only politically corporate group amoung Awlad Ali. The procedure is usually undertaken in cases of habitual offenders whose actions consistently bringing liability to the amar or disgracing it in relations with other tribal groups in the area. Due to the seriousness of the procedure (since it leaves the individual without the protection of his group), it is restricted. First, to announce the barawa of any of its members the amar has to get the unanimous agreement of all adult males of the gorup as represented by their Awaqil of their respective
[675] baits. Lately such decisions have to be put in writing. The barawa
[593] from the amar does not include the man's father, brothers, or sons.
[672] These immediate relatives remain responsible for his actions even if they desire to detach themselves from such responsibility. This is mainly maintained not so much for the protection of the repeated offender but rather for the protection of unsuspecting people who happen to have dealings with him and who would be protected by the corporate responsibility of the man's immediate kin. In addition to repeated offenders, the
[626] barawa or the threat of it is used to back the awaqil in their exercise of persuasion to get members of their baits to agree to their decisions, expecially those affecting the amar, like the collection of bloodmoney or the taking of the oath.

A man, on his part, may ask to be given a barawa from his amar. In this case, as shown in the amar papers of Aggary, he has to give good reasons for such a demand. The awaqil of the amar meet and discuss such

613 a request and examine the reasons behind it in an attempt to remedy them
681 if possible. They have to be sure first of all that by his request the
person is not avoiding the paymnet of his share in a particular case.
[695] If this is proven to be the case, then no barawa is granted unless the
person pays all his debts to the amar. This, like the amar's barawa of
the individual, has to be put in writing.

613 I left the area a month after the meeting held at Qudura's camp.
578 By the time I left, bait Asabei' was almost in a chaotic situation.
[114] Many thought that the outcome would be in favor of Qudura, who would
emerge from all the happenings as the leader of bait Asabei' as a whole.
Others thought that the only possible outcome was for bait Asabei' to be
divided into two or even three separate units with their own respective
leaders.

Analysis

114 All events of the second phase occurred while I was in the area.
627 Nonetheless I was not able to observe directly all of these events, due
to the nature of the judicial process among Awlad Ali which relies, as
has been mentioned earlier, on informal mediation and influence, rather
than on formal court hearings. Most of the above events happened behind
[124] closed doors and with a great amount of secrecy. For this reason I had
to rely partly on informants' accounts of what exactly had happened between the parties involved.

613 The dispute in its two phases revealed a major weakness in the
627 social structure of the major bait of the Aggary family. As the events
182 of the case unfolded, they shed light on some of the important principles

613 underlying the authority of the Aqila and the source of his political
627 support. Three such principles were evident in the above case: patri-
182 lineal succession, wealth, and social and personal renown.


Ability to deal fairly with disputes involving members of his bait and outsiders
(wisdom and social renown)
Ability to fulfil financial obligations of the bait (wealth)
Patrilineal succession
other tribal groups
'Eila
Bait

613 To better understand the importance of the three principles to the
554 authority of the Aqila, it is important to examine the domains within the
Aqila normally functions. First, the Aqila is the leader of a certain
kinship unit: the bait. Historically, the bait has been the main field
of action for the Aqila and from it he draws his main political support.
613 As the leader of his bait, the Aqila settles disputes among members of
627 his bait and represents the group for political and administrative pur-
554 poses. His function is to hold the bait together by preventing major
disputes between members from leading to the fission of the group into
smaller, separate units. He performs his function by exercising authority
and/or personal influence to establish long-lasting agreements.

613 554 [157] [428] [556] In performing his functions within the bait, personal qualities such as wisdom, soundness of ideas, personal persuasiveness are of importance. But the main basis of his authority is patrilineal succession. The Aqila has no economic power to speak of. Although many aqila are among the wealthiest members of their baits, many more are among its poorest. The nature of the economic process and the pastoral life of Awald Ali is such that the economic position of the individual is always flucuating. Nor does the Aqila have any military power at his disposal, or any command of the use of force to back his decisions or to make them binding [428] upon members of his bait. The main source of compliance to the Aqila's decisions comes from the knowledge that the Aqila has the authority to make such decisions and that he has acquired this authority through the legitimate channel of patrilineal succession.

613 428 562 [619] Where membership in formal groups is transmitted by descent, Awlad Ali always choose the patriline. The son of Awlad Ali is regarded as Awlad Ali even though his mother might not be from the tribe, while a woman who marries outside the tribe transmits no rights in the tribe to her children. The importance of agnatic kin is reinforced by an solidary of brothers which is extended laterally to patrilateral cousins. It is also shown in the fact that sons are favored in inheritance usually to the exclusion of daughters. The male line is viewed by Awlad Ali as the natural principle when it comes to anything which is inheritable, whether property or position. In an attempt to defend Shei'eb's position and his right to be the Aqila, one informant told me: "The main purpose that a man has in life is to have sons because it is the son who makes the man live forever. Daughters don't count. A man gives his son

613 everything ... his property, his name, and anything he can give him, like
428 the position of the Aqila. This is only natural." While the office of
[562] the Aqila is inherited through the male line, there seems to be no special regard for seniority. Any son of the Aqila can succeed him in the position and it is usually left to the Aqila to select the son who is to
613 succeed him. This decision is not usually the subject matter of brother-
428 ly rivalry since the position of Aqila is regarded more as a duty than
593 as a privilege. There has been only one case in the entire area of the Western Desert in which such a decision has lead to open fighting between brothers. "When my father became very old and his eyes bothered him, he told me that I should become the Aqila and could not say no to him," said Shei'eb. "I didn't want to become the Aqila but this was the choice of my father and I have to obey .... You owe it to your father and family to carry on his responsibilities the same way you carry his name." It was patrilineal succession upon which Shei'eb based his case. Most uninterested parties believe that he and he alone had the legitimate claim to the position.

613 The importance of patrilineal succession as the basis of the Aqila's
627 authority may be better understood by contrasting it to a closely related
554 position, that of the "mardi". A man within a bait may acquire, by virtue of personal qualities, a reputation for wisdom and soundness of opinion which may overshadow that of the Aqila. Such a person becomes known throughout a certain area as a successful mediator and go-between; and therefore is called upon to solve disputes not limited to members of his own bait. He thus acquires an informal position which cuts across a number of baits and sometimes larger political units.

613 627 554 [192] The word mardi is derived from the Arabic verb "yardi" which means to accept or agree upon. The mardi therefore is the person who is accepted by one or both parties to a dispute as a mediator. If he is accepted by only one of the parties, his work is more that of a legal representative of that party. He makes all efforts, using all powers of persuasion to get the other party to concede to the demands of the party he represents. If, on the other hand, he is chosed by both parties to a dispute, he acts as an impartial judge and avoids taking sides in the case. His fame is determined by his ability to achieve permanent, long-lasting settlements. His success in this area depends, in addition to personal qualities, upon the respect he has within his own tribal segment and the weight that tribal segment has among other tribal segments. Similarly, his success and the fame he gets as a mardi may give him considerable influence within the bait. But this influence does not develop [182] [428] into authority because the mardi in this case does not have an established basis for the effective maintenance of that authority, in this case, patrilineal succession.

613 554 682 The other domain within which the Aqila performs his duties is that of the Eila or the amar. His main function within this area is to represent his bait in matters involving the collection or the distribution of bloodmoney within the vengeance group. Within the amar, the aqila is considered successful insofar as he is able to fulfill his bait's financial obligations to the amar. This ability is in turn determined by his success in collecting money from individual members of his bait and/or his willingness to pay from his own money for those members who are unable or unwilling to pay their share. Where kinship ties are strong, the Aqila

613 usually has no difficulty collecting the individual shares. His own
682
[554] financial ability is rarely called upon. When a member is unable to
[178] pay for any reason, his share is divided among the able members. However,
in recent years this seems to be changing, especially among the baits
closely located to the settled communities or the urban centers. Among
613 these baits individual mobility has increased significantly with a large
178 number of younger members either leaving the area for the urban centers
166
464 or accepting salaried jobs with the government organizations. Among
369 certain baits in the area of Burg el-Arab, for example, the percentage
of adult males engaged in such jobs sometimes reaches sixty percent.
More than thirty-five out of fifty-six males constituting bait Asabei'
have a full-time or part-time job.

613 The individualistic attitudes accompanying the dependency on salaries
178
166 and living in towns and cities have their effects on the kinship
464 ties among members of these baits. With the prevalence of the individualistic
682 attitudes among members of a certain bait, they become more
369 reluctant to pay their financial obligations and the Aqila finds it more
and more difficult to rely, for the fulfillment of the bait's financial
obligations, on the willingness of members to pay. His success within
613
554 the domain of the amar becomes more determined by his ability to pay
556 from his own money for those members of his bait who refuse or are unable
682 to pay. Wealth becomes an important asset for the Aqila's performance
of his duties within the amar. When this happens, there seems
to be a certain shift in the source of political support for the Aqila.
613 In a well-integrated bait the popularity (or unopopularity) of the Aqila
554 among the other Awaqil of the amar had very little influence on his

613 position as the leader of the bait. The principle of patrilineal succession
554 is so respected in such baits that it overshadows any other consideration.
613 554 This continues to be the case as long as the kinship ties
428 within the bait remain strong. When the kinship ties in a given bait
178 weaken, the principle of patrilineal succession also weakens. This is
[166] more likely to occur in baits where a relatively large number of the
[464] members leave the area permanently or for a more or less prolonged period
613 of time, seeking jobs on a part or a full-time basis. Many of these
178 members maintain only a minimal contact with their respective baits.
166 They become more reluctant to fulfill their kinship obligations, especially
464 561 when they entail any financial liability. The older members
369 complain about how younger persons are less loyal to their elders and
how selfish they have become. "All they care about is their jobs and
the pleasure they get from the city; they are becoming city people."
Younger members, on the other hand, maintain that their reluctance to
fulfill their kinship obligations stems from their feeling that they
do not get anything in return. "Life is expensive and money is hard to
obtain. I cannot make enough money to support myself and my wife and
children and at the same time pay my cousin's financial debts," said a
member of eilat Asabei', who works as a driver with the Desert Organization
in Alexandria.

613 When this happens, there seems to be a tendency toward shifting the
554 emphasis from the bait to the eila or the amar as the source of the political
[556] support of the Aqila. This is turn makes wealth an important
basis of the Aqila's power. No more can the bait impose an ineffective
Aqila on the amar unless it is ready to back him by their own share of
money. If this is lacking as was the case with Shei'eb, there is nothing

613 554 that prevents the Awaqil of the amar from rallying support around another person.

613 178 554 In the case of the Aggary amar Hakim was their choice as the man to replace the original Aqila. What happened in the Aggary amar could never have happened if bait Asabei' were more cohesive than it was or if the kinship ties "were still strong and durable" as one important member of the Sanagrah tribe commented. "If there was any respect to the forefathers left, Hakim could never have agreed to replace Shei'eb....Nobody would dare take a position from someone who inherited it from his father.... but bait Asabei' is not as it used to be."

613 628 554 The third domain within which the Aqila normally pursues his activities is that of the wide scope of tribal society in the area. The Aqila represents his bait in all matters involving the bait either as a unit or any particular member of it with other tribal segments. When an individual from the bait is involved in a dispute with a member of another tribal segment, the Aqila acts as the legal representative and the attorney of that member trying to achieve a settlement which is not fair for his client but also fair for the other party. To be successful in this area, the Aqila relies on his own personal qualities and persuasive abilities. If the Aqila is known to be fair and honest, a quick and permanent settlement is usually achieved since he is trusted also by the other party. If, on the other hand, he has the reputation of using dishonest techniques, mistrust prevails and achieving a settlement is usually delayed.

Like the domain of the amar, the present field of activities is no major source for the Aqila's political support in the baits where kinship solidarity is strong. His success in solving disputes between members

His success in solving disputes between members
613 of his baits and outsiders might enhance his prestige within the bait,
628
554 but it is not a substitute for patrilineal succession as the basis of
[428] the Aqila's authority. But in less integrated baits the situation is
[627] different. The ineffectiveness of the Aqila in solving disputes may
lead members of his bait to seek another man as their representative who
would act as a mediator in their behalf. If this continues for a long
time the Aqila might find himself with no functions and the new person
would become a de facto Aqila.

613 The Aqila represents the only effective indigenous form of leader-
554 ship among Awlad Ali at the present time. The camp headman provides
622 another form of leadership on the camp level, but, as mentioned before,
the leadership of the headman is very limited and involves minimal
634 authority. In addition to the indigenous leadership represented by the
622 Aqila, there is the superimposed administrative structure of the govern-
656 ment representative in the form of the "omda" system introduced into the
177 area by the government decree no. 1187 of 1958. The system of omda or
mayorship is essentially that applied to the rural areas of Egypt with
certain modifications to fit the tribal organization and the semi-nomadic
existence of the populations of the Western Desert. In rural areas, the
622 omda is the administrative head of the village. He is appointed by the
[554] government from among the village inhabitants who have certain qualifi-
[212] cations with regard to education (must be able at least to read and
[556] write), wealth (own at least 5 feddans of land in the area), and sound
reputation. As such, the omda system in the rural areas is a territorial
system. The omda's authority covers the territory of the village and
all individuals living in it regardless of their kinship affiliation.

622 His main function is to manage the affairs of the village, apprehend
554 crininals, report and register births and deaths, collect taxes and
represent the government in all matters involving the relationship be-
tween the government and his village. Because of his position as the
[661] representative of the govrernment, he usually enjoys a considerable
amount of power which, over the years, many omdas have used it to obtain
personal benefits.

361 In 1958 the committee appointed for the examination of the possi-
631 bility of applying the system to Awlad Ali noticed that villages in the
sense of a compact settlement similar to that existing in the rural area
simply do not exist in the Western Desert region. There are a few
settled communities in the area but they are scattered homes or a few
stores. These communities have no identifiable boundaries or adminis-
631 trative existence. The area as a whole is divided into ten adminis-
634 trative districts, each having a police station. These districts cor-
[625] respond to the old Senusia Zawyas which played an important role in
[795] maintaining order in the era until the First World War. Until that time
[175] the area was divided into fourteen zones each of which was under the
795 jurisdiction of one of the zawyas. The zawyas were mainly religious
175 centers, or shrines, inhabited and directed by a member of the Senusi
[793] order of Cyrenaica. The role of the head of the zawya was to teach the
Qoraan and spread the teachings of the Senusi order. One of the ways
[794] the zawyas attracted followers was through distribution of food and
clothing to those who joined it. The zawyas also provided places of
[778] refuge for those who needed protection since no one could force his way
into the sacred zawyas. Because of their religious position which put

795 Because of their religious position which put
175 them outside the tribal structure, the leaders of the zawyas played a
627 significant role in mediation and settling disputes between various tri-
793 bal segments. At their disposal was their ability to ostracize anyone
[626] who did not abide by their decision from the zawyas, which meant depriving him from all the benefits, social as well as religious, that membership in the zawyas offered.

795 After the First World War when the British replaced the Turks as
175 governors of the area, the zawyas were closed and the religious leaders
177 [648] ordered to leave. The zoning established by the zawyas existed, however,
[631] and was used as the basis for the redistricting of the area. Police
[625] stations replaced the religious centers. From the standpoint of the tri-
619 634 bal population itself, the districts have no psychological or political
[795] reality. The zawyas were originally established in the areas of tribal
[361] concentrations. But the area itself did not have any political identity. The only reality from the standpoint of the inhabitants was the tribal reality and affiliation which cut across many of these districts. Many of the tribal segments inhabiting one district were and still are hostile
177 to one another. To transform the zones into administrative districts and
634 to establish one office of leadership for the whole district was to im-
619 pose a political unity nonexistent among the tribal segments inhabiting
[622] the district. To avoid this difficulty, the government supplemented the territorial principle of the omda system in the rural area with the principle of tribal representation and came up with a system which seems to suite the situation in the Western Desert. For each of the districts, a list of all tribal segments which habitually occupy the area and whose tribal land is located within the district, is made. The most powerful

554 The most powerful
177 and numerous segments are then represented by the omda, and the lesser
634 ones are represented by a sheikh. Unlike the system in the rural areas
619 where the sheikh is a subordinate to the omda, the sheikh in the Western
[622] Desert does not occupy the same position. Instead he has the same functions and occupies, with regard to his tribal segment, the same position the omda occupies with regard to his. He does not take orders from the omda and has direct relations with the administration. Sheikhs and omdas from one district are supposed to meet periodically in the police station and discuss with the police officer in charge of the station matters concerning the district and their own tribal groups. The only difference between the omda and the sheikh in the Western Desert seems to be the label of the office. The label itself carries a certain amount of prestige to the tribal segment represented by the omda, since it is an acknowledgement by the government of its importance. This is why many of the tribal segments try to be represented by an omda rather than by a sheikh. In certain districts where two or more strong tribal segments compete for the honor of being represented by an omda, the district may have two or more omdas representing the strong tribal segments and a number of sheikhs representing the lesser tribal groups in the district. Not every tribal segment in a district is represented by an omda or even a sheikh, however. Very small tribal segments may join together and have one sheikh, while others may agree to be represented by one of the larger segment's sheikh or omda.

634 Obviously, the number of omdas and sheikhs differ from one district
554 to another depending on the number of important tribal segments in each.
619
657 There is no specific rule whereby a certain tribal segment is considered

634 by the government to be significant enough to be represented. This matter
554 is left almost entirely to the ability of members of a given tribal segment
619
657 to convince the authorities that their group is sizable enough to
give them the right of omda, or at least sheikh's representation. A segment
represented by a sheikh may later ask for an omda because of the
prestige involved. It is worth noting in this respect that the various
tribal segments in the area are eager to be represented in the government
administrative structure. Gaining prestige among the other tribal
segments is only one motive for such eagerness. Unlike the omda in the
[622] rural areas who functions mainly as a representative of the government
to the village, the omda or sheikh in the Western Desert is a representative
of the people to the government. This is not a theoretical difference
but involves a real difference in the relation of the government
and the omda, on the one hand, and between the latter and the people
622 his represnets, on the other. The omda in the village is a symbol of
554 authority to his people. He is the undisputed ruler of the village. His
657 authority is backed by his ability to mobilize and use the force put at
his diposal by the government, in the implementation of his decisions.
Since he is appointed by the government and not elected by the people,
he does not have to rely on his popularity to hold or maintain office.
His main concern is to please the government, rather than the people of
the village to whom he is merely a symbol of authority. There is very
little that the village omda can bring to his people form the outside,
while he has to implement government policies, collect taxation, apprehend
criminals, all tasks which the villagers are not eager to have done.

634 666 657 554 619 635 The situation is quite different in the Western Desert. Although it is the government, represented by the province council, which makes the final decision in appointing the omda or sheikh, yet this appointment is made on the basis of nominations given by the gribal segment or segments which he would represent. Since the tribal segment usually nominates one person, the decision of the council is limited to the examination of the credentials of the nominee and to see if he meets the basic requirements of the law. If a certain nominee is rejected by the council, a very rare occurrence, the matter goes back to the tribal segment to make another nomination. In practice, then, the omda of the Western Desert is elected by the people and the appointment by the government of the omda is significant only in cases where the omda is to represent more than one small tribal segment and each nominates one. Here the council has to choose between the various nominaees and appoints the best qualified. 634 554 657 619 [622] Unlike the omda of the village, the tribal omda is a real representative of his people. Despite the fact that he becomes part of a governmental structure, his basic function is to look after the interest of his tribal group. Or, as one informant put it, "The omda is the servant of the people." In many cases the best interest of the tribal segment is served through full cooperation of the omda with the government. So far there seems to be very little conflict between the interest of the tribal populations and that of the government. There is very little in [651] the area that the government demands or needs. There is no taxable land to speak of. There are only a few acres of barley land and even these are minimally taxed. 634 554 657 The main responsibility of the omda to the government is to report births and deaths and give a yearly list of young men

634 who reach the age of military service. He is also supposed to report
554 the presence of any fugitive or crininal in his district and report
657 crimes accurring in that district and which involve members of the tribal segment he represents.

634 The first two duties of the omda to the government do not involve
554 any conflict of interest. Unlike the rural areas where sons are con-
657 sidered a very important economic asset to their parents, and therefore,
562 701 there is a general resentment of military service which takes the sons
178 away and deprives the parents of their important work around the fields, Awlad Ali look at military service as an opportunity to have their sons go to the city, obtain guaranteed payment, and escape the hardship of nomadic existence. Economic activities
[233] in the area do not require the cooperation of a large number of individuals, and most of the grazing of animals is done either by a paid shepherd or by one of the grown-up sons. Although there still exists an
[183] ideology which values having many sons, yet with the cessation of hostilities between the tribal segments, their presence in the area has lost its
[464] value. Many of the younger generation are seeking jobs with the government projects in the area or in the city. Neither one is easy to find. Joining the army is increasingly considered as an easy alternative.

634 The omda's function which seems to involve some conflicting loyalties
554 is that of reporting crimes involving members of his tribal segment. But
657 674 even this does not pose a serious problem as it might seem. Almost all minor crimes committed against property or persons as well as all civil disputes are left to be handled by the tribal proceedings. The duties of the omda are limited to reporting the cases of murder and serious assault

1 On the basis of one percent of the yearly yield.

634 which result in permanent bodily harm. Reporting such cases is a fairly
554 minor proceeding since such cases come to the knowledge of the authorities
657 through other channels, mainly from talks involved in the mediation
674 for the bloodmoney or from the hospital to which serious assault cases
[743] are usually taken. Besides, reporting a crime does not mean convicting the offender. This latter depends on evidence which, in case the dispute has been settled by tribal proceedings, is hard for the police authorities to find.

634 While the government demands do not impose serious conflicts of
554 loyalty on the part of the omda, if successful, his position with the
657 government can bring to his tribal segments great benefits. These benefits are usually in the form of various social and economic aids including fodder for the animals and food and clothing for the people during the dry years. Other benefits including providing the tribal population with olive trees and helping them clear many of the old Roman wells and establishing wind mills for nominal fees. Not everyone in the area can have such benefits. Some do not even know they exist. A successful omda could manipulate the administration to get as many benefits for
[871] his tribal segment as possible.. Some successful omdas were able to have
[474] the government build schools in their districts, establish cooperative units to market local products such as wool, sheep, and olive oil.

634 This should not lead us, however, to conclude that the position of
554 the omda in the Western Desert does not involve any kind of conflicting
657 loyalty or that he is always supported by his people or even trusted by
578 them. One informant said that the omda of his biat is "...government man, not ours....He would sell us all if this pleases his masters in the

634 government." But due to the nature of the representation and the spe-
554 cific relation of the government to the area, the position of the omda
657
[578] does not pose serious demands upon the loyalty of the omda to his tribal
group.

634 Because of the omda's ability to bring benefits to his tribal seg-
554 ment from the government, the ability to manipulate the administrative
657
666 officials is the most important basis for the nomination of a given
individual for the position of the omda. "The omda is one who can
speak city talk and knows how to deal with the government officials."
Age is not important; young people know more about city ways than old
people. "A man may be a cheat, but as long as he can get our things
done, he is the best man for the job...of course, we don't want to
nominate someone with a bad reputation who may blacken our face in
front of everybody. However, if he has a bad reputation the council
would not approve his appointment...he just has to be someone who can
get things done..."

159 Muftah Mughaieb, the sheikh of the Sanagrah tribal segment in the
634 district of Haman, described the circumstances of his nomination as
554 follows:

> 657 Before the former sheikh of that tribal segment died (he
> 666 578 was Muftah's uncle), one member of the group got into an argu-
> 625 ment with the police officer in charge of the police station in
> the district. The tribesman insulted the police officer who insisted on arresting him. Rumors also had it that the police officer was using his authority to reduce the share of the tribal segment in the government aid which was badly needed during that particular year. Sheikh Muftah, whose father is the Aqila of

159 bait Mughaieb of the Sanagrah tribe, went to the officer and apologized
634 to him on behalf of the whole group and invited him to a
554 lavish dinner party. The charges against the tribesman were soon
657 dropped, and it was concluded that it was because of the way Muftah
666 had handled the situation. Since that incident, Muftah has been
[578] known as an expert in handling the government officials. One year
[625] later, the sheikh of the tribal segment died, and a meeting was
held during which the important members of the Sanagrah tribal
segment in the district decided to nominate Muftah for the position
of the sheikh, vacant by the death of his uncle. Muftah, who
was attending the meeting, was asked to accept the nomination, and
he agreed. "...I accepted the nomination reluctantly." Muftah
later told me, "I did not really want to become the sheikh. The
159 position does not bring any personal benefit, and it involves a
634 lot of responsibility. The sheikh has to act as an attorney for
554 his tribe, represent it to the government and competes with other
657 sheikhs to bring his people things that the other sheikhs cannot
get for theirs, like more membership in the cooperative units or
in the socialist union. And what does he get in return? Nothing...
not even the gratitude of his people. To them, he is a servant of
the tribe, and his duty is to look after its interest. If he
doesn't, then everybody is quick to criticize him. I had to accept
the nomination because I felt it was my duty to do so and not
to embarrass the awaqil and the important people of the tribe who
[465] put their confidence in me. As far as the government, all I get is
six pounds a month."

634 554 619 "The omda or sheikh is both a blessing and a curse to his tribe," said one member of the Aggary 'eila. "He can bring benefits to his tribe, but at the same time, he has to report his own people if one of them breaks the city laws... His position is like that of a double-edged razor."

Most of the people in the area, however, tolerate the negative aspects of the omda's functions as a moderate price for the possible benefits they may get through his position. This is why each tribal segment does its best to be represented by an omda, or at least by a sheikh.

Within his tribal segment he enjoys a great deal of respect. He does not, by means of position alone, command any power over members of his group similar to the power the omda of the village has over his [613] people. It seems, however, that although the position itself does not carry with it any power, yet, when the holder of that position is at the same time a native tribal leader or aqila, it tends to enhance his position as a tribal leader and to give him more respect among members of his tribal unit as well as among the rest of the tribal groupings. 634 554 619 182 657 613 This may be explained by the fact that the establishment of the omda system in that area did not involve direct interference with the native political system except in a minimal way, mainly to keep the tribal populations in the area from interfering in the progress of various government projects in the area. As such, the system did not impose too many demands upon the tribal loyalties of the omdas or sheikhs. In the relationship between the government and the tribal population, the balance so far has been in favor of the latter, who, by means of

634 omda representation, are taking from the government much more than
554 they are giving in return. Being the link between his people and
619 the government in such a system gives the aqila a new basis of
657 political support.
613

CHAPTER V

MARRIAGE: A CONTRACTUAL RELATIONSHIP

593 A survey of all disputes occurring among the eilat Aggary in the
578 last five years shows that more than 70% were disputes over "women,"
the usual phrase referring to cases involving marital relations. Disagreement
over matters arising out of quarrels between husband and wife
or between one of the spouses and his or her in-laws often constitute
593 the basis for these disputes. What seems to make marriage and the
578 family particularly productive of conflict is the fact that although
602 residence is commonly virilocal, and the majority of the women leaving
613 their own families to live with the husband, the woman retains her
[591] membership in her father's family after the marriage, and her agnatic
group keeps an active interest in her, even after she is married. Marriage
then brings face to face the interests of two groups. These interests
affect the relationship between the married couple; and, more
importantly, the relationship between the latter affects the interests
of their respective groups. This, in many instances, leads to direct
conflict between the two groups.

581 The position of the Awlad Ali daraieb with regard to marriage relations
671 is based on the Islamic law with minor modifications to suit the
585 requirements of local life. According to the Muslim law, marriage is
675 a civil contract affected by the request of one party and the agreement
of the other. No witnesses are needed for the legalization of the
marriage, according to some of the Shi'a sects, although the Sunni schools
of Muslim jurisprudence insist that two adult male and two adult females

581 are necessary for the validation of the marriage contract. Modern
585 legal systems which took as their basis the Islamic law of marriage
671
675 and the family further required the registration of the marriage contract for the marriage to be legal.

584 The request and necessary response forming the marriage are sup-
585 posed to be carried on by the parties involved. However, if either the
429 groom or the bride is not of age, or is mentally unqualified, the trans-
593 action is carried on by his or her guardian, or "wakil." The wakil is
the father, unless he is dead or an invalid, in which case the brothers
[604] become the wakils. If the person has no brothers, then the uncles be-
[184] come the wakil in the order stated. According to certain Sunni sects in Islam, a woman marrying for the first time is always represented by her wakil, even if she is of age. The assumption is that a woman who has never been married does not have the experience that enables her to enter into any kind of legally binding relationship such as marriage.

585 Following the original Islamic idea, marriage among Awlad Ali is
675 an oral agreement between the groom or his father and the guardian
593
429 (wakil) of the bride-to-be (her father, if alive, or her closest male
[604] kin in the following order: her brothers, her uncles, her grandfather).
585 A religious man is sometimes asked to perform the marriage, although it
792 is not required. Some persons might invite a member of the Murabiteen
[619] tribe or holy men to witness the marriage on the basis that his presence
[778] gives "baraka," or blessing, to the marriage. Before the application of
585 the State legal system to the area, marriage contracts were not regis-
656
177 tered. In recent years, however, and with the increased mobility of
[675] the tribal populations, more and more marriages are being registered in
[634] the administrative districts. Still, according to the unofficial estimates,

Still, according to the unofficial estimates,
585 only about ten per cent of all marriages are registered, and these are
656 mainly mixed marriages involving a tribal person and a non-tribal one
177 or a tribal member who is not living in the area anymore. The reason
582 is that such a spouse, especially when he is the husband, is not under
619 the control of the tribal customs and therefore cannot be forced to fulfill
his obligations if he fails to do so. Most of the tribal population
[581] still feel that marriage is a personal and family affair that
should be kept away from the State legal system.

584 Marriage among Awlad Ali is a relatively informal procedure. When
593 a man decides to marry a certain girl, he informs his mother who, in
turn, informs his father. The father may have objections to his son's
choice of the bride. Such objections may be based on already strained
relations between the two families or the questionable reputation of
the girl or any member of her family. In such cases, the father tries
to dissuade his son from going ahead with the marriage. The father is
[583] usually successful in controlling his son's choice when the latter is
dependent on his father for the payment of the bridewealth called "mahr"
and for the support of his new household. This is usually the case in
the man's first marriage. In subsequent marriages and in the cases
where the son has independent means of support for himself and his
bride, the father's control of the son's choice is minimal, and asking
the father's approval is a matter of formality. In second and subsequent
593 595 marriages, the approval of the older wives is essential. The
584 older wives have no right to object to the husband taking an additional
wife, but they have the right to object to the choice on the basis that
the new bride is hard to get along with or that there is animosity between
her family and the families of the other wives which makes

593 595 cooperation between the wives in household activities difficult. The
584 wives have to have reasonable grounds for their objection to the new
[431] bride. But even then, the husband could still marry the woman of his
choice, although in this case he has to bring gifts to the other wives
as "nasafa," or making-up present.

584 If the family has no objections to the marriage, the proceedings
593 start. The initial proceedings are undertaken by the women on both
sides. The groom's mother or a female relative of his mother's generation
or older visits the mother of the prospective bride and tells her
of her son's intention to marry the latter's daughter. The bride's
mother then discusses the matter with the girl's father who has the
[429] final say in the matter. If the father is dead, then the authority on
giving the girl in marriage goes to her brother or closest male kin in
the order specified before. The girl has no say in the matter of marriage
and cannot refuse to complete the marriage, although after marriage
she can resort to a certain practice which helps her to terminate the
marriage without the consent of her guardian, as will be seen later in
584 the chapter. From this moment until the conclusion of the marriage
[583] negotiations are done by the men of both families. The first thing to
be discussed is the amount of bridewealth, a "mahr." If the two families
agree on the marriage, a small ceremony is held. This ceremony is called
[779] "el-fatha" in reference to reading the first "sura" of the Koraan known
as el-fatha, or "the beginning." The ceremony includes members of the
[675] two families and very few friends. After the fatha is read, the agreement
is achieved. This is considered as an engagement and means that the girl
is spoken for and therefore no other man can ask to marry her.

To break the fatha agreement, the father of the prospective bride

584 [686] has to have a good reason. If he breaks it without sufficient reason, he may be liable to pay "kabara," or fine, for insult to the prospective groom and his family. Adequate reasons for breaking the fatha agreement vary from one case to another and include such things as the discovery that the prospective groom or any of his family is of questionable character. This applies to the groom as well as to any member of his immediate family, the implication being that if he has such a person close to him, he is likely to be influenced by him in his treatment of his wife. If, however, the questionable character of the groom or the member of his family was known to the guardian of the bride-to-be before the fatha was read, then to break the agreement is considered unjustifiable. This has been upheld in a number of cases which I recorded during my stay in the area. One of these cases involved the agreement
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627 between a member of the Sanagra tribe in the area of Alamein to marry his daughter to a member of the powerful Bara'sa tribe in Libya. After the fatha was read, a wealthy merchant from Alexandria saw the girl and asked her father to marry her, and the father agreed. To justify his breaking of the fatha agreement, the father claimed that he had discovered that the first prospective groom and his father were involved in smuggling goods across the Libyan borders. In the Mi'ad that was held upon the request of the first groom and his father, the father claimed that the bride's father had known about the smuggling and even participated in the distribution of the smuggled goods. The father of the bride was made to pay the sum of ten pounds as kabara to the first groom and to pay him another ten pounds for the expenses of the ceremony in which he had slaughtered two goats. The settlement was based on the fact that all indications show that he must have known about the smuggling activities

584 686 [627] of his future in-law before he agreed that his daughter marry him. So, to break the agreement on the basis of discovering that defect is not permissible and is a kind of behavior not to be encouraged. To encourage such behavior would lead to the waste of time and money and would lead to the disgrace of the fatha as a preliminary agreement.* Permitting the father to break the fatha agreement when discovering an unknown condition related to the prospective groom or his family, is to apply an important principle in the Islamic law with regard to all
686 contractual relations. This principle maintains that any contractual agreement pertains only to the facts and conditions specified at the time of the contract. This implies that the conditions of the contract have to be explicitly stated. A deliberate effort to conceal an undesirable condition has the equivalent effect of specifying the existence of its opposite. Such concealment invalidates the contract and permits the aggrieved party to dissolve the contract on the basis of cheating or unfair deal, or "ghish."

If, on the other hand, no deliberate attempt is made to conceal the undesirable condition at the time of the contract, then there is no basis for dissolving the contract on the basis of cheating or unfair
584 deal. Thus, in the case above, neglecting to mention the fact that the
686 groom and his father were involved in smuggling could not be taken as the basis for unfair or unreasonable behavior on the part of the groom, unless there was proof that they intended to cheat and conceal that fact deliberately, and that they knew that if not concealed, the fact would affect the acceptance of the bride's father to the marriage. All indications of the case above point to the lack of intent to defraud. On the

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* The same rule applies to the breaking of the "fatha" agreement by the groom.

584 contrary, there is enough evidence to indicate that the father of the
686 bride by participating in smuggling should have known about that fact, or at least it would not have affected his decision had he known about it. The grounds for unreasonable or unfair behavior is therefore not present in the above case.

If, on the other hand, the condition is specified at the time of the contract which is proven later to be false, then the behavior is
[585] considered as unreasonable. An example is the case of Mahdi, who, after reading the fatha to marry a woman from his tribe, was discovered to have had tuberculosis and was forced to forfeit the gifts and other expenses on the basis that he had had the illness for a long time and knew about it, but he deliberately concealed it when he asked to marry the girl. Not all concealed conditions are considered as an adequate basis for the breaking of the fatha. Only conditions are adequate which, had they been known at the time of the agreement, would have made the party's decisions different. One case involved a man who had concealed the fact that he had a wife in Alexandria when he asked to marry a tribal girl. Although the intention to conceal the fact was very evident, for this is the first question that the girl's father or her guardian asks the suitor, yet, breaking the fatha agreement by the girl's father when he discovered the previous marriage was considered as unfair and unreasonable since, had he known about the marriage, it would have made no difference in his decision. The go-betweens disagreed, however, on this. One of them thought that although the concealed condition is by itself not objectionable, yet, the mere act of concealment indicated a bad character on the part of the prospective groom, and that by itself, apart from the concealed condition, is not a good basis for marriage relations. The bride's father did not have to pay kabara, although he held

The bride's father
584 did not have to pay kabara, although he held
586 a big feast in which he slaughtered three sheep and invited the groom,
558 his father and a number of his friends and friends of the girl's father
in honor of the groom as a compromise.

583 Before the fatha is read, the two families usually agree on the
amount of bridewealth, or "mahr", to be paid by the groom or his father.
The amount of bridewealth depends upon a number of criteria, important
among which is the relative position of the bride's and groom's families
and the degree of relationship that exists between them. The lowest
mahr is usually paid in the case of cousin marriages. The amount ranges
from 10 to 50 pounds. Sometimes when the groom cannot afford any mahr,
he pays only the religiously required sum of 25 Egyptian piasters.
This is never the case if the groom and bride are more distantly related.
When the groom is an outsider or a member of another tribe, the
mahr is usually much higher. Several cases of mahr of more than 2,000
pounds are reported in the area. There was a case in which the mahr
reached 10,000 Egyptian pounds ($22,000). The amount of mahr also depends
on the beauty of the bride. In the case of the highest known
mahr mentioned above, the woman was known to be of great beauty. There
[587] is no distinction made between previously married women and ones married
for the first time. In the case above, the woman was married three
times before, and the mahr was apparently higher than that paid for her
[602] in her first marriage. Increasing the mahr according to the kinshp
distance between the bride and groom reflects the preference of endogamous
582 marriages. The preferred marriage match in the area is that of
the patrilateral parallel cousin marriage. The father's brother's son,
"ibn 'amm," has an undisputed claim over his cousin, "bint 'amm." Even
when they are of incompatible age, or even if the man is married or for

582 some reason or other cannot marry his cousin, he still has that legal
claim on his cousin. She cannot marry another man without the consent
582 of her cousin. He has the right to forcibly take her away and even
682 kill her or her husband in protection of his right. Although in the few cases where this had happened in the past, the groom had to pay full blood money. Such killing, however, was considered as justified and never resulted in retaliation or feuds among the tribal segments involved.

582 However, it is difficult to call cousin marriage among the group
124 "preferential" marriage. In a limited quantitative study I asked 35 tribal members who have unmarried daughters over the age of 12 the following question: "If you had your choice, to whom would you give your daughter in marriage: your brother's son or another man who is wealthier or more respected?" Twenty-six said they would rather have their daughters married to someone other than their nephews. The reasons given were that their nephews did not make enough money to either pay her a good mahr or to support her without outside help. The nine who preferred to marry their daughters to their nephews emphasized the fact that the girl's cousin is likely to look after her interests and take care of her more than the outsider "who may not fear God in his treatment of my daughter," as one of the respondents to the questionnaire expressed it. They also said that their nephew is more under their control than the outsider. They further maintained that a person is likely to know his nephew more than he knows an outsider or a more distant relative. One of the informants put it, "Even if my nephew is a cheat, at least I know that this is all that is wrong with him." All thirty-five informants felt that they were obliged to give their daughters in marriage

582 124 to their nephews if the latter demanded "because it is the right of the girl's cousin." And all but two said they would ask the permission of the girl's cousin before marrying her to an outsider, even if they knew that the nephew had no intention of marrying her himself, "to prevent the development of difficulties in the future."

On the other hand, when the same group was asked, "If you had your choice, would you rather marry your cousin or another woman who was wealthier or more beautiful," they answered as follows:

Marry their cousin	11
Marry someone else	24
Total	35

Two reasons were given by the eleven who chose to marry their cousins. The first is that they knew more about the temperament and the moral character of their cousin than about the other woman no matter how beautiful or wealthy she might be. Four of the eleven respondents said they would like to marry their cousin because they could not afford to pay the high bridewealth for a distant relative or an outsider. Although the sample I selected was by no means representative of the total tribal population in the area, yet, it points at least to the fact that parallel cousin marriage is considered by the father of the girl more as a duty or obligation than a choice, while from the standpoint of the suitor, it is viewed as a right which he can invoke at will.

582 557 It seems that many invoke such a right even when they have no serious intention of marrying their bint'amm. The purpose apparent in the numerous cases where this happened was to obtain money from the prospective groom who has to get the approval of the cousin to prevent trouble. In some cases the man invokes his right to force his uncle or the groom to concede to some demands, such as the sale of the right to use a piece

582 of parley land or a well or to make him a partner in a business or smug-
557 gling activities or even as revenge on his uncle by keeping his daughters
582 unmarried. In 1961 the heads of 25 prominant baits of various tribes
557 in the area of Matruh met and decided that the right of ibn 'amm had
178 become a major problem, and that invoking that right when the man had
613 no intention of marrying the girl had resulted in a number of disputes
that became serious over a period of time. They felt that the time was
suitable to revise that right and make it subject to the concept of fair
behavior applicable to other rights. They wrote a new rule which speci-
582 557 fies that the man has the right to prevent his cousin from marrying an
178 outsider or a more distant relative only if he himself intends to marry
613 675 her either in the present or in the reasonable future. If the circum-
stances show that he cannot do so, then he forfeits the right.

[558] To prevent his cousin from marrying another man without a proven
[681] intention on the part of the man to marry her himself in the fore-
seeable future, is considered as an unreasonable behavior for which
ibn 'amm could be liable to pay kabara to his uncle as well as to the
prospective groom. It also denies him the right of taking her away from
[683] her marital residence by force. If he does this, he would be liable to
the compensation for assault. The agreement was signed by the awaqil
and is considered binding as far as the baits they represented are con-
cerned. Other tribal segments in the area refuse to abide by the agree-
ment and consider it as a pretentious departure from the ways of Awlad Ali
which should not be encouraged. Even within the tribal segments involved
in the agreement, there have been reports of individuals who refused to
[629] abide by the agreement. In certain of these latter cases, the ibn 'amm
selected as his mardi a member of a tribal segment not involved in the
agreement and therefore not morally bound to abide by
its contents.

000 agreement and therefore not morally bound to abide by its contents.

582 The lack of serious intentions to marry one's cousin is reflected
in the actual frequency of patrilateral parallel cousin marriage in the
582 area. The following table is taken from the genealogies of five camps
621 in the area of Burg el Arab. The camps belong to different tribal
613 groupings:
619

Agnatic cousins	5
Other cousins	12
Within the bait (other than above)	9
Within the Eila (other than above)	13
Within the tribe (other than above	11
With members of the client tribe	15
With outsiders	9
Total	74

The above table shows that the frequency of patrilateral parallel cousin
marriage is less than eight per cent of the total marriages included in
582 the genealogies of the camps studied. It also shows that the largest
619 frequency of marriage is with a member of a client tribe of Murabiteen.
In the majority of the fifteen cases (eleven cases), it is the woman
who is a member of the Murabiteen tribe while the man is a member of the
Sa'adi tribe. The Murabiteen tribes from which the wives came are not
always the clients of the particular tribal segment to which the husband
[583[belonged. One explanation of the popularity of marriage to the Murabiteen
is that the bridewealth among them is generally less than it is for the
Sa'adi girls. It therefore gives the man the advantage of lower bride-
582 wealth without the lack of choice involved in the cousin marriage. It
is important to bear in mind, however, that the sample given above is
by no means representative of the entire tribal population. Furthermore,
the material presented above was based on the actual marriages at the

582 time of the study. I have no information about the marital history of
[114] the men included in the genealogies. This is particularly important if
[586] we realize that the frequency of divorce in the area is quite high and that there is a certain prohibition against ever marrying within a certain degree of relationship of his first wife.

582 According to the Koraan, a man is forbidden to marry certain
779 classes of women. Some of these women are permanently prohibited and others are only temporarily so. Marriage is forbidden with what are called the "maharem" (sing. mahram or non-marriageables). They are one's female ascendants and descendants; the former wives of one's ascendants or desendants; one's sister and the female descendants of one's sister and brother; one's paternal and maternal aunts and the sisters and aunts of the ascendants; one's mother-in-law and all female ascendants of one's wife. Marriage with the first cousin and the half-brother's half-sister (from another marriage) is therefore permitted. The second category of
[853] forbidden women are those related to the man by nursing. The wet nurse takes the place of the mother, and her relatives are treated as if she was the actual mother of the person in question.

In addition to the above, there is the prohibition of the simultaneous marriage of two women who are related to each other to the extent that had one of them been male and the other female, they would have come to the forbidden degree in marriage. This latter prohibition is not a permanent one and is restricted to the marriage of the two women at the same time. As soon as the marriage with one of them is dissolved, there is no prohibition on marrying the other one. Yet, although aware of the lecense given by the Islamic law to such marriage,

582 779 and although they are not considered wrong or sinful, there is a general feeling of distaste among the tribal population to such marriages. They usually attribute this distaste to the fact that if the marriage with the first sister did not work out, there is no reason to expect the marriage with the second to be successful.* Although this might account, in part, for the low rate of cousin marriage in the group when present wives of the individuals are taken into consideration, yet, the effect of that practice should not be exaggerated. For although that prohibition might curb the marriage with the cousin who is the sister of a previous wife, it does not restrict the marriage with another cousin who is a cousin, rather than a sister of the first wife.

584 431 During the period that follows and until the marriage is final, the groom is supposed to bring gifts to the bride. These gifts are usually a wide silver bracelet that is used as an engagement ring. Also gifts of clothes and jewelry are quite customary. Such gifts become the private property of the bride and are to be returned only if the engagement is broken for fault on the part of the bride or any member of her family. In such cases, her father has to return all the gifts his daughter has accepted as well as the expenses that the groom's visitations have cost him.

585 583 779 431 The marriage is affected and finalized by the payment of the bridewealth. In Islamic law the bridewealth is supposed to be paid to the bride herself as a gift and not to her father, which had been a significant departure from the pre-Islamic practice where two types of bridewealth were paid: the sadaqa paid to the father of the bride or her

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[587] * This does not apply to cases where the first wife dies. In such cases, it is not objectionable to marry her sister, although the incidences of sororate are rare among the population.

585 legal guardian and considered a bride price to compensate the father or
583 the legal guardian of the bride. In earlier times the bride received
779 431 none of the mahr, although she usually got a sadaq or bridal gift for
[178] herself. In Islamic Arabia, the mahr and the sadaq became indistin-
[171] guishable and were given to the woman and took the form of a legal gift
for affecting the marriage. The Koraan no longer contains the concept
[178] of the purchase of the wife, and the mahr becomes a compensation which
the woman has to claim in all cases. The Koraan demands a bridal gift
for a legal marriage: "And give them whom ye have enjoyed their reward
as a wedding gift" (Sura, iv. 24), and again, "And give the women their
[586] dowries voluntarily" (Sura, iv. 3). According to the Koraan, the mahr
remains the property of the wife and remains her own even if the marriage
is dissolved by divorce. But although it took the form of a gift, the
mahr remained in Islamic law a prerequisite for the legalization of the
marriage. It is only upon the giving of the mahr that the marriage is
considered valid. No marriage is legal, according to the Islamic law,
unless that transfer of the mahr is affected. Mutual consent of the
two parties to forfeit the mahr does not change that rule, and the mar-
58 riage is considered void. According to Muslim jurisprudence, marriage
675 is a contract ('acd) made betweeen the bridegroom and the bride or her
184 wali or guardian. An essential element in that contract is the mahr.
The jurists themselves are not sure about the nature of the mahr. Some
regard it as practically a purchase money or as an equivalent ('iwad)
for the possession of the woman and the rights over her, so it is like
a price paid in a contract of sale; while other jurists see in the mahr
a legal symbol, a mark of honor and a proper legal security of property
for the woman.

583 Among Awlad Ali the payment of the bridewealth signifies the com-
[584] pletion of the marriage contract. The mahr is not paid to the woman but
583 to her father or closest male kin. Usually the mahr is paid in money.
178 This, however, seems to be a recent phenomenon. Until the turn of the
century, according to informants, the mahr was paid only in sheep and
583 goats. The practice is still followed by a number of tribal segments
178 of Ali Ahmar who occupy the western most part of the area where pasture
184 is more abundant and reliable and where the permanent pasture of the
green mountains of Cyrenaica is close by. Other tribal segments still
insist that at least one-fourth of the mahr should be paid in livestock,
583 but the majority of the people accept money. The main purpose of the
[584] mahr among Awlad Ali is to legalize the marriage contract and to put
[182] emphasis on the reciprocal oblications that the marriage created between
the two families of the bride and the groom. It also works as an in-
surance for good behavior on the part of both the husband and the wife.
583 If the husband mistreats his wife or fails to give her the rights legally
593 hers by marriage, he risks the chance of losing the mahr and being forced
586 to divorce her. On the other hand, if the wife fails to behave in the
customary way expected from a wife, the husband could divorce her and
have the right to get back his mahr. This is particularly inconvenient
in cases where all or part of the mahr is paid in livestock, in which
case it becomes part of the father's herd and hard to take away in case
of divorce. It is therefore in the interest of her family to keep the
marriage. In this way their interference in the marriage is checked.
[591] This is especially important among Awlad Ali where, although the mar-
[592] riage is usually patrilocal, the woman retains membership in her father's
household even after marriage.

593 As a girl in her father's household, the woman is under the direct authority of her father, who is responsible for her. When the father dies, this responsibility, as well as the authority, goes to her brother or her closest male kin in the order specified earlier. At marriage the
[591] girl usually moves to live with her husband, and this subjects her to
[606] his control and sometimes to that of his parents, if the couple lives with them. But the authority of the husband over his wife remains
593 secondary to that of her father. The woman's membership in her father's
574 household does not cease with marriage, and the strength of her relations to her kin is maintained by their frequent visits to her new residence and by her occasional visits to them. This right of visitation
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574 cannot be denied by the husband who not only has to allow such visits,
606 but is also required to treat members of his wife's family, especially her father, with great respect and hospitality. If the husband fails
[586] to do so, the wife's father can order her to leave her husband and go back to his household with him.

This point is illustrated by the case of Muftah from the Esheibat tribe in the area of Matruh, whose older daughter is married to Hemeida from the Geneishat segment, which lives in the area of Fokah some 80 miles to the east of Matruh. One winter day in 1965, while passing near the area where his daughter lived, Muftah decided to pay her a visit. When he arrived, her husband was not at home; he was in the market in a nearby town selling sheep. When he came back late that evening, he greeted Muftah with the customary slaughter of a goat and invited the neighbors to the occasion. After dinner Muftah wanted to rest. It was a very hot night, so his son-in-law brought a rug and spread it outside the tent in the cool air. After that he retired to his tent where he spent the night inside.

593 spent the night inside. In the morning Muftah ordered his daughter to
574 pack her clothes because she was to leave with him. He refused to give
606 586 her husband any explanation as to why he was taking his daughter away.
The husband could not prevent him from taking her away because, as he
said, "He is her father and has the right to take her away with him at
any time."

When the wife did not return for two weeks, her husband went to her
father's house to take her, but her father refused to let her go. Hemeida
593 574 then went to a religious man in the area and asked him to intervene in
606 the matter and see why Muftah had taken away his wife. He also asked him
586 to arrange a mi'ad with Muftah to discuss the matter.

627 792 The religious man was selected in this case because he was a close
friend of Muftah and was believed to have influence over him. He was
also known throughout the area to be fair and of sound opinion. It is
important in the cases of disputes that the person selected as a mardi
is known as a wise and fair man. It is only then that he is able to
mediate between the two parties without being accused of taking sides.
792 The religious men, members of the Murabiteen tribes in the area, by their
619 relative position outside the formal tribal organization of the Sa'adi
627 tribes, are the most likely candidates for such activity. Yet, this is
554 not always the case. For this aspect of assumed impartiality is frequently balanced off by the fact that these religious men lack the support of a powerful tribal segment behind them. To be effective, the mardi
has to be respected, not only for his personal qualities, but also for
being a member of a respectable tribal segment whose power lends authority to the mardi's decision. This is not usually the case with the client
000 tribes of Murabiteen. Wealth in many cases is also considered an important

Wealth in many cases is also considered an important
792 requirement for the selection of the mardi. This does not mean that
627 religious men in the area have no role in dispute settlement, for they
554 do. It simply means that the mardi is selected according to a number
[556] of criteria that vary from case to case, and that in some of these
cases sound wisdom and fairness characteristic of religious men are
not enough basis for their selection as mardis. This means that the
religious men have no special mediatory role based on their religious
nature alone. In certain cases religious men offer the best possibility for mediation; in others, a non-religious person might offer a
better chance for settling the dispute. In cases of women seeking
[586] divorce from their husbands, the wealth of the mediator, more than any-
(556) thing else, seems to determine the selection of the man whom the woman
asks to negotiate on her behalf, a point to which I will return later
in the chapter.

593 The Mi'ad was held in the house of Muftah. Present at the mi'ad
574 were Muftah, his son-in-law, Hemeida, the heads of households in Muftah's
606 camp (one of them was his brother and the other five were members of
586 different tribal segments), my driver (who was a member of the neighbor-
627 ing Sanagrah tribal segment), myself, and the religious man. After the
792 tea was served, the religious man said that the discussion should start.
He reminded the gathering that this case is a family one and should not
develop into a larger dispute. "After all, the daughter's husband is a
son, and the case is actually a misunderstanding between a father and a
son and should be viewed in that context." Then he turned to Muftah and
said that in that spirit he was asking him why he had taken his daughter
away from her husgand. Muftah said that he had taken his daughter away

Muftah said that he had taken his daughter away
593 to punish Hemeida for what he thought was disrespectful behavior. He
574 606 then proceeded to descirbe how Hemeida, after bringing the blanket out
586 for Muftah, went inside and spent the night with his wife, defying the
627 basic rule of not showing intimacy in the presence of older people,
792 888 especially the parents or parents-in-law. For, to show such intimacy
is a sign of disrespect. He demanded that Hemeida pay him "kabara"
[681] for his injured pride. The term kabara refers to the adjective "kebir"
[558] (lit. respected or big man). Kabara is the fine paid for belittling
someone by word or deed. Muftah insisted that he would not allow his
daughter to return to her husband until Hemeida had paid that kabara.
Hemeida conceded the fact that intimacy constitutes an insult; but he
insisted that his action did not constitute an act of intimacy with his
wife, but was a matter of convenience and necessity, since he had only
593 two blankets, and the only one left was that inside the tent. Muftah
574 became angry and started shouting at Hemeida, who, in turn, started
606 586 shouting back; it became impossible to follow what was being said.
627 The religious man interfered in the discussion, trying to stop the argu-
792 ment between Muftah and Hemeida. The others attending the mi'ad also
[578] interfered. The religious man and two neighbors took Muftah outside
the tent while Muftah's brother tried to calm Hemeida down. The other
members of the group also calmed Hemeida, reminding him that he was the
younger person and must be more tolerant of older people. They also re-
minded Hemeida that Muftah was his father-in-law and had the right to take
his daughter away any time he chose. They urged him to "defeat the devil"
[681] and to apologize to his father-in-law and pay him kabara. He seemed
convinced but insisted that all he was going to pay was five pounds and
a goat. Muftahb brother and one of the neighbors then left the tent and

593 went to see Muftah and his company. Half an hour later the religious
574 man came and took Hemeida aside and talked to him in a very low voice,
606 then left the tent again. A few minutes more had passed; everyone re-
586
627 turned to the tent; Muftah was not angry anymore. The religious man
792 read the fatha, or the beginning sura of the Koraan, then said that the
[779] souls were now pure and that Hemeida was considered as a son of Muftah
and that disagreements such as this should not alter the good relations
between the two. He said that the devil had found his way into the souls
of the two people, but now, thanks to God and the good people present,
they both had come back to their senses. Hemeida then rose and went to
where his father-in-law was sitting and shook hands with him. Then he
[681] handed the religious man ten pounds which the latter passed to Muftah
and promised to send him a goat as a gift to his daughter. Muftah left
the tent and went to the tent of the women. When he came back he announced
that a goat had been slaughtered and that everyone was invited to eat.
Everybody then left and Muftah promised to return his daughter to her
husband the following day.

593 While the right of the father to take his daughter away from her
606 husband constitutes a check on the authority of the latter and insures
557 the wife good treatment by her husband and her in-laws, not infrequently
586 that right has been invoked for personal or individual interest on the
part of the woman's father or her closest male kin. Several cases have
[429] been cited in the area where the father or guardian had invoked the right
to force the husband to concede to certain demands of the wife's guardian,
even when the wife objected to those demands or disagreed with her guard-
ian. One of these is the case of Mabroka who is married to a distant

593 606 557 586 member of the same tribe. At the time that the dispute had occurred she had been married for fifteen years and had four children ranging in age from thirteen to two years. The husband possessed a piece of land on the coast where a few olive and fig trees were growing. The husband, Mukheimer, made no use of either the land or the trees. Then, in 1966, the father became employed by the government organization in the area where his daughter and her husband lived and where the land was. He asked his son-in-law to give him the right to use the land for one pound a year. Mukheimer, who at that time worked part-time for the same government organization as a driver, refused. The reason was that his job with the government made it possible for him to apply for a power pump to be installed over the Roman well that existed on the land, and he intended to utilize the land himself. All attempts to convince Hukheimer to let him use the land failed. Then one day Mukheimer came back to his tent to find that his father-in-law had taken his wife and the youngest child and left the other three children with the second wife. The father-in-law told the second wife to inform Mukheimer that if he wanted his wife and child back, he had to think about the land he wanted to take possession of. Mukheimer tried to discuss the matter with his father-in-law, buth the latter refused to see him. After a month there were rumors that the daughter was not happy that her father had taken her away from her husband and children and that she wanted to go back to her family. She asked a number of people to help her, including myself, since her father was one of my informants at that time; but he insisted that the only way Mukheimer could have his wife and child back was by giving him the rights to the land. Mukheimer, on the other hand, threatened to divorce his wife and marry another woman if his father-in-law did not return his wife.

593 606 557 586 [114] The case persisted for more than two months with no sign that either party was willing to give into the demands of the other. I left the area before any solution to the case was achieved.

584 578 606 Another relevant case is one which involved a dispute between Hassan Hassanein from the Sanagrah tribe and the father-in-law of his daughter who was also from the same tribe and who lived in the same area. The case started when Hassanein was visited by a friend from the [574] Esheibat tribe in Matruh, an old man of 60 or 70 years. During the night that this guest spent at Hassanein's house, they got to talking about marriage and the fact that although his guest was a wealthy and re- [595] spected man, he had only one wife. After a lengthy talk, it seemed that the old man was convinced that he should have a second wife and asked Hassanein if he knew of a suitable girl to marry. Hassanein sug- 584 583 578 606 gested his daughter's sister-in-law. Hassanein took the prospective groom to the tent of his daughter's father-in-law and discussed the matter with the father of the prospective bride who agreed to marry his daughter to Hassanein's guest if he paid the sume of 200 pounds, in addition to slaughtering a number of goats and presenting him with the [779] appropriate presents. When the man agreed to the terms, the fatha was read to signify the agreement between the two parties. Hassanein left the man to spend the night in the camp of his future in-laws. In the morning the groom told the bride's father that he must go to nearby Alexandria to bring the money for the bride price. When he came back late that afternoon, he paid the money and set a date for the wedding the next Thursday and then left for Matruh to prepare for the arrival of the new wife.

584 Two days after the groom left, the bride's father (who is at the
578 same time Hassanein's daughter's father-in-law) came to Hassanein and
606 686 told him that the marriage was called off and that he should send a
letter to the groom telling him the news. The reasons given by the
[574] bride's father were that the groom showed improper manners when he
[579] stayed overnight at the camp and that he followed the prospective bride
to the water well to have a close look at her. He gave the money to
Hassanein and asked him to return it to the man in Matruh. Hassanein
was very disappointed and considered this an insult to him, since he
was the mediator in that marriage, and insisted that the bride's father
584 go on with the marriage. When the latter refused, Hassanein went to his
578 daughter and ordered her to leave with him. Her husband was there and
606 could not refuse to let her go with her father, even when Hassanein
686 made it clear that her husband could not have her back unless his father
627 586 kept his agreement with Hassanein's guest. Elewah, the daughter's husband, asked for a mi'ad to discuss the matter with his father-in-law. The mi'ad was held in Hassanein's house and was attended by Hassanein, his son-in-law, and two people from a different lineage, each selected by one of the disputing parties. Hassanein refused to give any reason for taking his daughter away from her husband except that he was exercising his rights. Eleway, on the other hand, insisted that Hassanein was not justified in his actions and that it was not right to punish him for something that his father did. The two representatives tried to calm both parties and to reach an agreement but were not successful. The mi'ad dissolved with Hassanein not only insisting on keeping his daughter, but also threatening to marry her to a rich man in the area. The case was not solved by the time I left the field.

593 586 Taking his daughter away from the marital residence is treated as an undisputed right of the father. This is true whether he is justified in his actions or not and whether the girl approves of her father's decision or not. The general view is that the father, having raised his daughter, is entitled to her obedience and that taking her away from her husband, even against her will, is the symbol of authority over her. It also signifies that the girl has someone to look after her, to protect her and prevent the husband or any member of his family from mistreating her. Awlad Ali differentiate, however, between cases in which the father has exercised his right in an arbitrary and unreasonable manner and those in which he has reasonable grounds for his actions. A father is considered justified in taking his daughter away if her husband or members of his family fail to fulfill their obligations towards the wife or members of her family. Mistreatment of the woman (the definition of which will be discussed later), and disrespect to members of her family, or preventing her from visiting her family or them visiting her in the customary specified manner are always justifiable grounds. As a
[681] justifiable action, the father is not obliged to return his daughter until he gets full apologies and any gifts for the woman or himself that he considers as kabara. If the husband refuses to concede to the demands of the father, the latter can force him to divorce her without having to return the bridewealth to the husband. Although the father's right still exists when no justifiable grounds are present, in this case he is required to return his daughter to her husband after a short period. If he refuses,
[681] the husband is entitled to ask for a kabara. He also can divorce his
[583] wife and is entitled to get back his mahr and possible all the marriage expenses. It is this possibility of having to pay back the mahr and

593 586 and expenses to the husband that constitutes the most important check
(583) on the otherwise undisputed right of the father to take away his
daughter.

593 The woman, on the other hand, cannot refuse to go with her father,
562 for this means that she would be disobeying him. A woman who disobeys
586 her father is not worthy of his name. He can cut her off from the
family, which means that she is left without any support or protection.
A woman who is cut off from her family is left vulnerable to her husband
and to society. She will have nobody to defend her or to be responsible
for her actions. The responsibility for the woman's behavior is not
transferred by marriage to the husband or his family.

682 If the woman kills or assaults someone or causes damage to property
683 for which compensation is required, her male kin pays the blood money or
602 the compensation on her behalf. It is sometimes stated that if the woman
613
562 has grown-up sons, they, and not her family, pay for her. Since the
593 children belong to their father's family, it may seem like transfering
the responsibility for the woman's actions to her husband's family. However, in all three cases where this happened, the woman was quite old,
her father was dead, and her brothers were either dead or had moved outside the area and had cut off all relations with the area. She also had
no nephews in the area. In such cases, the sons were the woman's closest
male kin.

682 On the other hand, if the woman is the victim of murder or assault
683 for which blood money or compensation is to be paid, the husband is the
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562 one to benefit from the situation. To understand why this happens, we
have to consider the contractual nature of marriage among Awlad Ali. It
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583 has been mentioned earlier that before marriage is final, the prospective

584 husband or his father pays the woman's father the bridewealth, or mahr.
583 In exchange for the mahr, the husband expects his father-in-law to outfit his daughter with such items as rugs, blankets, and a few other household items, like cooking pots, serving dishes, and a metal or wooden chest
[422] to keep her clothes in. These items become the private property of the wife, but the husband has the right to use them. In addition, the man
581 expects to gain certain rights to the woman. The customary law of Awlad
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585 Ali gives the husband three basic rights over his wife: the right to her sexual services (including the right to bear him children); the right to her labor in domestic activities; and the right to her obedience. Of the three rights, the first is the most exclusive. Not only doesthe husband have a complete monopoly over his wife's present sexual services, but he also has the right, if the girl has never been married before, to be the
[583] first to use such services. If he discovers that she is not a virgin, he can send her back to her father and get back his mahr.

581 The other two rights are not as exclusive. The husband's right to
585 his wife's domestic labor does not prevent her from occasionally helping
593 out in her father's or brother's household, especially if they live nearby. Finally, the husband's right to be obeyed by his wife is always subordinated to that of her father, who retains the ultimate authority over his daughter.

682 If the woman is killed or injured, the husband is deprived of all
683 or some of her services, depending on the seriousness and the permanence
581 of the injury, and therefore is entitled to compensation. The right of
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593 avenging the woman's murder remains, however, that of her family, since she is still a member of that family.

684 The contractual nature of marriage is most clearly manifested in
613 the case of the wife's adultery. Since the woman belongs to her agnatic
562 group, her behavior has direct effect on the honor of that group.
593 It is, therefore, the responsibility of her closest kin to keep an eye on her. If the woman commits adultery, it is her father or her male kin who is supposed to avenge the honor of the family by taking drastic actions, including killing, against the adulteress and/or her partner. But the marriage usually takes the woman away from the close watch of her family and puts her under the supervision of her husband who becomes entrusted with the duty of guarding her, and therefore partially responsible for her action. His responsibility is enhanced by the fact that although the wife's behavior does not affect him or his family, it has a definite effect on the honor and reputation of his children (Abou-Zeid, 1965).

684 The gravest insult that one can direct to a person in the area is
578 to describe his mother of being of disrepute. In their joking relations,
562 young men usually refer to eachother's father as being a dog or a theif
593 [522] or a cheat, but none could refer to the mother. A woman of questionable reputation affects the reputation of her family in general and her children in particular. Any reference to the mother in the form of an accusation is supposed to be cleaned only by blood. Not only does this apply to the woman's voluntary behavior, but also to her physical and mental
(934) condition. If a woman loses her mind, the news is usually kept a secret,
684 especially by her children. The responsibility for retaliation in the
613 case of adultery, then, is divided between her nearest kinsman and her
562 husband. This gives both sides a vague and undetermined right of re-
593 venge. This division of the right of revenge explains the infrequency

684 of drastic actions taken in cases of adultery. Of the fourteen cases
613 562 of adultery that I examined furing my field work, none resulted in the
593 killing of the adulteress, and only three resulted in the murder of her
[114] partner. In all three cases where the adulterer was killed, the avenger
684 682 was the husband; and in all three cases, the husband had to pay the
613 bloodmoney to the murdered man's kin group. His payment of the blood-
money, among other things, may indicate that the right of the husband
to kill the adulterer is not completely accepted among Awlad Ali. All
[628] agree, however, that such killings never result in blood feuds because
of the shameful circumstances in which the victim dies.

684 It was very difficult to obtain any detailed or reliable information
126 about adultery cases. All the above mentioned fourteen cases were gath-
[124] ered from the informants, twelve of which were cases which had already
been solved. For the two cases which were still open at the time of
the study, information was quite vague. Usually such cases are conducted
with a great amount of secrecy, with the involved parties referring to
them as cases of theft, or merely by saying that the cases involve
women. Only when the adultery leads to the killing of the adulteress
or the adulterer are more details publicly known about the case.

684 But while the right to retaliate for the shameful action of an
adulterous wife is vague and diffused, the right of the husband for com-
pensation from the adulterer remains clear and undisputed. In this re-
sepct, adultery is treated very much like theft; the adulterer has stolen
the husband's exclusive right to his wife's sexual activities. The com-
[583] pensation for this offense is estimated at L.E. 20, in addition to the
[586] mahr, if the husband decides to divorce his wife as a result of her
adultery.

681 The ten pounds paid to the husband in this case is considered as
558 a kabara for the husband's injured pride. The kabara is one of the
[684] vaguest and least determined fines in the tribal law. As a face-saving
device, it varies from one case to another. It is determined in each
case by the seriousness of the insult, the publicity of that insult
(insults in a public place require a much larger kabara than insults
[561] in a private place). The relative age of the insulted and the offender
is also taken into consideration in assessing the kabara. If the in-
sulted is older than the offender, the kabara is much higher than if the
situation were reversed. In fact, in the last case the insulted might
[554] not be able to collect any kabara at all. The relative status of the
two parties is also a factor. A member of a Murabiteen tribe who insults
a Sa'adi is likely to be charged with a larger kabara than the reverse
situation. The amount of kabara is left for the bargaining of the two
parties and their representatives and varies greatly from one case to
another. As such, the kabara is not exactly a fine or an independent
punishment. In most of the cases it is an additional punishment added
to a regular one. It is hard to imagine a crime in which the victim is
not considered in one way or another insulted or belittled. The only
681 specified kabara that I found in the tribal law was in the case of adul-
558 tery. The kabara in that case is the same regardless of the relative
684 position of the people involved. The kabara differs, however, according
to a standardized set of circumstances surrounding the place in which the
adultery is committed. Adultery committed in the husband's tent requires
kabara of the maximum L.E. 20; adultery within the camp of the husband
but outside his tent can bring a kabara of only L.E. 10, while adultery
committed outside the camp brings a mere L.E. 5. The justification for

681 this variation is that committing the adultery within the camp of the
558 husband constitutes a greater humiliation, since it affects his honor
684 among his neighbors. Also, adultery inside the tent of the couple carries with it the possibility of rape, while adultery outside the tent
at least implies an element of consent on the part of the wife. The
[583] penalty in the case of adultery is the return by the wife's father of
the mahr and all other expenses of the marriage ceremony and the gifts
the husband had presented during the engagement period. This is a
further indication that the father of the wife is still responsible
for her behavior even after she is married. It is in this respect that
the crime of adultery differs from theft. In the case of theft, the
[685] thief has to return twice the amount stolen and in the case of repeated
offenders, four times the amount stolen. This is in addition to a certain amount of money as kabara. Yet, in the latter case the kabara is
not specified and is subject to the proof by the victim that the theft
constituted an insult to him. This insult is assumed in the case of
adultery, which makes the kabara in the case of adultery part of the
punishment--an integral part of the punishment. The kabara is not among
[613] the collective responsibility of the amar and is paid only by the person
involved, unless he is totally unable to pay or refuses to pay. In such
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593 cases, his closest male kin (his father, son, or brother) pays on his
681 behalf with the understanding that such payment constitutes a debt which
684 should be repaid. The person paying on his behalf in this case can go
558 to his tent and take by force anything of value, such as blankets, utensils, or even sheep and goats, and keep them as pawns until the debt is
paid.

581 Marriage does not deprive the woman of some rights of her own.
585 562 The customary law gives the wife three basic rights corresponding to
671 those of the husband's sexual services, domestic work, and obedience.
Corresponding to the first of these, the wife has the right to have a
normal sexual life with her husband. This right, however, is not an exclusive
one, since the husband can marry more than one wife. A woman
585 can be divorced from her husband without having to return the mahr if
586 she claims that the husband is unable to perform his sexual duties. In
593 such cases, the marriage is usually dissolved quietly. In certain rare
585 instances, the husband may deny his wife's accusations. If both insist
586 on their stand, one or both may ask to be submitted to "bait el-shana'a,"
593 or house of the dreadful deeds. Reports are extremely vague about the
627 exact procedures involved in this case. Some informants stated that the
married couple would live in a tent without sidewalls so that everybody
could see what goes on inside. Most informants, however, insist that it
merely means that the couple move their tent near that of a respectable
man whose word is believed and honored. This man is supposed to keep a
close watch on the couple's activities, by listening or looking through
holes in the tent. His verdict determines the future of the marriage.
[583] If the wife is justified in her claim, the husband is forced to divorce
[681] her and to forfeit his mahr. If, on the other hand, the verdict is for
[558] the husband, he not only can divorce her and get back the mahr, but is
also entitled to kabara, or compensation, for his injured pride. There
[114] is no case of bait el-shana'a in the area during the time of the field
[178] work, and most people insist that this practice is something of the past
[583] when the mahr was relatively high and was paid in livestock, in which

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case its return to the husband would have caused great financial inconvenience for the wife's family.

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Corresponding to the second right, the husband's right to his wife's domestic work, is the wife's right to maintenance. The husband has to support his wife. This includes providing her and her children with adequate food and proper clothing. If the husband fails to do so because of poverty, sickness, crop failure or unexpected disaster, the wife's brother or father provides her and her children with the necessary food and clothing. [586] If the husband's failure to fulfill his duties is due to neglect, the wife can leave him and go to her father or brother who talks the matter over with the husband who, in turn, either agrees to their demands or has to divorce his wife and forfeit his mahr.

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Finally, corresponding to the husband's right to his wife's obedience is the wife's right to fair treatment by her husband. There are a number of ways in which the wife is mistreated. [779] One is excessive punishment; although the right of the husband to punish his wife is provided in the Koraan, the punishment must be excessive or severe. Awlad Ali draw a line between acceptable and severe punishment. A punishment is severe if it results in something that other people can see or hear. If the husband insults his wife or her family and others hear the action, or if he beats her and this results in visible traces, then the punishment is severe.

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A wife considers herself mistreated if the husband, when married to more than one, treats any of the other wives better than he treats her. Although the wife cannot deny her husband the right to have additional wives, he must give them all equal treatment. This includes

593 595 562 providing them with the same kind of food and clothing.* It also includes dividing his time equally between them, spending one night in each wife's tent. The first wife, being the chief one, has certain privileges: her tent is the guest house, food is brought to her residence, and she is the one to divide it among the other wives, and her house is the place for the husband to stay if he becomes sick and unable to move every night from one tent to another. Other than the exceptions given to the first wife, the husband has to treat all his wives equally.

593 [586] Normally, such cases of mistreatment do not result in divorce unless they are persistent. In most cases, if the wife is mistreated, she goes to her father's or brother's house or sends for them to come and take her. 593 431 For the husband to bring her back to his tent, he must pay her "nasafa." This is a gift given by the husband to his wife as an acknowledgement of guilt and as a form of apology for not giving her fair treatment. In some cases the nasafa is equal to what the husband originally paid as mahr.

581 585 626 These are some of the rights that marriage gives both men and women in the tribal society of Awlad Ali. These rights, however, are useless unless they are backed by certain means of enforcing them. 586 626 593 The husband's rights are guaranteed by his ability to dissolve the marriage at will. According to Islamic law, a man can divorce his wife by simply pronouncing the sentence "I divorce you" in the presence of credible witnesses. [779] [562] No justification for divorce is demanded from the husband according to the Koraan. No such privilege is given to the wife. She can obtain a

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* With provision for wives with more children.

586 626 divorce only under specific circumstances in the absence of which the
593 husband can force her to live with him. Following the Koraanic rules,
[562] Awlad Ali give men the right to dissolve the marriage at will and with-
[779] out any necessary justification; however, they differentiate between
cases where divorce is justified and those in which it is not. In a
case of justifiable divorce, the husband can take back the mahr and pos-
sibly all other marriage expenses. In the case of unjustifiable divorce,
the husband forfeits his right to regain the mahr. Divorce is justified
whenever one or more of the husband's rights are violated by the wife or
members of her family. Not all degrees of violation are considered as
justification for divorce, however. Only intolerable violations can be
considered as such. In deciding whether or not an act constitutes an
[183] intolerable violation, Awlad Ali judge it against the standard of the
reasonable man, the customary man, and what he would have tolerated in
a similar situation.

586 What constitutes reasonable behavior does not only vary according
183 to the situation and the manner in which the actions are taken, but also
554 with the relative position in the social structure of the parties in-
volved and their initial relations to one another. In the case of di-
vorce, what constitutes grounds for justifiable divorce in one case may
not be sufficient grounds for justifiable divorce in another. In one of
586 183 the cases I witnessed during the year of study, a man who divorced his
554 wife because of her insistence that he buy her meat from the market
511 every day of the week, was forced to forfeit his right to redeem the
[114] mahr on the basis that the wife's actions had not established a basis
for justifiable divorce. In the negotiations that followed, the position
of the husband, as well as that of the family of the wife, were discussed.

586 The husband had a big herd by the standards of the tribe (600 sheep
183 and goats). In addition, he also cultivated a large stretch of the fig
554 511 land in the coastal area and was making good money. In other words, the
husband could afford the standard of living the wife demanded. The other
question that was discussed was the actions of the wife herself. She was
the daughter of one of the wealthiest members of the same tribe as her
husband; and according to the people who knew her, she was used to meat
every day of the week. In other cases, similar demands by the wife to
have a certain kind of food or to be clothed in certain kinds of material
were considered as an intolerable situation, and the husband was justified in his divorcing her and had the right to retrieve his mahr. This
was obvious in the case of one of my informants whose wife insisted that
every time he went to Alexandria, he bring her silk material for a dress.
Since the husband could not afford to meet her demands, her insistence
was considered as grounds for the husband. The assessment of reasonable-
586 ness on the part of the husband in his divorce action and therefore his
183 554 right to the mahr paid is frequently influenced by the relative position
of the husband and the wife's guardian in the social structure. An influential man who marries his daughter to a poor relative or nephew rarely
has to return the mahr.

586 Although women among Awlad Ali are not given the same legal right
562 of divorcing the husband by pronouncing the "dismissal formula," they are
given the right of certain customary procedures which in practice give
them equal facilities for dissolving the marriage. This is known as the
574 right of the woman to "throw herself." This means that the woman takes
all her clothes and sometimes her children and goes to the dwelling of

586 the man she chooses. She informs him before she enters his house that
562 she is the wife of so and so and the daughter of so and so and that she
574 is throwing herself on him to protect her from her husband with whom
she no longer wishes to live. Like the right of refuge, the man cannot
[778] refuse to let her in; and from this moment until her dispute with her
husband is resolved, she is considered as his house guest and is entitled to all the hospitality a guest receives. If he refuses to ex-
[627] tend that hospitality or refuses to take her in, she can ask for a mi'ad
[681] and is entitled to kabara from him. There has been no reported incidents
in which a man refused that right to a woman. As soon as she settles
down in the host's house, the latter takes immediate measures to find
the husband and to convince him to let his wife go. In doing this, the
man uses all the power of persuasion. The man selected for this purpose
586 is usually a respected man who can put pressure upon the husband. Some-
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574 times he has to bribe the husband to release the wife, paying from his
554 own money. The man has to have money, not only to be able to support
[556] the wife during her stay in his house and to bribe the husband, but also
because in certain instances he has to pay the husband the mahr that the father of the wife had taken in order to free her. The next step after getting the agreement of the husband to divorce his wife is to contact the father of the wife or her guardian and convince him to pay the mahr to the husband. If the father does not agree, or if he is financially unable to do so, the man on whom the woman has thrown herself is supposed to pay from his own money. In cases where the woman left the husband to be married to another man with whom she had had a relationship, the respected man tries to have the future husband pay the present husband the mahr he is supposed to pay the woman after she is divorced from her

586 562 574 554 husband. In a number of cases the husband was willing to divorce the woman after a promise by the man that she would pay him the mahr when she got married. In most cases, however, the process costs the man a considerable amount of money. Sometimes, when the woman is young and attractive, the man finds it to his advantage to keep her as his wife, since she will cost him no more expenses. On the other hand, the man cannot refuse a woman the right of refuge, since to do this or to deny her the right of hospitality will make him liable to pay kabara if she made the refusal known publicly. On the other hand, it is prestigious to be known in the area as a man to whom women go to be released from their husbands. In fact, a man who acquires a reputation of getting wives released is likely to be sought as mardi in other cases as well.

Due to the nature of his role in mediating, the woman must be careful in selecting the man over whom she throws herself. These considerations are manifested in the following case taken from my field notes.
[584] [583] Hadia was forced by her father to marry a man from the same tribe who paid her father L.E. 100 as mahr. She did not want to marry him because she was in love with someone else of whom her father did not approve. One month after she was married, she left the tent and never came back.
586 562 574 554 634 Later, she appeared in the house of Omda Ali, the chief of another tribe, and everyone knew that she had thrown herself on him. She later told me why she had selected Omda Ali and not the Omda of her own tribe. "Because my husband works for the Omda of my own tribe, and I thought he would be biased. Of course, I couldn't have gone to my father; he was the one who forced me to marry that man. Omda Ali is very respected and can support me... He is also rich and is known for releasing wives from their husbands." Omda Ali called the husband in and asked him to divorce

586 his wife. The husband agreed but insisted that she pay him L.E. 300
562 (this included the mahr and the marriage expenses). The Omda tried to
574
554 reduce the amount but could not. He then tried to get the father to
634 pay, but the father refused. He had to pay the husband L.E. 200 of
his own money and promised that the rest would be paid when the woman remarried (it would be paid from the mahr). The husband divorced Haida. One week later she was married to her lover. I have no information about whether or not the 100 pounds was paid.

586 In another example, Sabha was forced by her father to marry her
562 cousin (ibn 'amm). She could not live with him, so she threw herself
574
554 on one of the holy men in the area. The holy man convinced the hus-
792 band to divorce Sabha and then went to her father and convinced him to
pay back the mahr to the husband, and the case was settled. People say
(626) that both the husband and the father agreed to the demands of the holy
man because they were afraid of his supernatural curse. Sabha went back to her father's house.

586 It is obvious from these and similar cases that the success or
562 failure of the procedure depends on the careful selection of the man
593 on whom a woman throws herself. It is also apparent from the above
(554)
(574) examples that his right of refuge is resorted to only in cases where the
woman cannot go to her father or to her closest kin to help her get a divorce because he is either unable or unwilling to help her. A father is unable to help if the husband is powerful or if he is the woman's ibn 'amm (father's brother's son) who has, according to the tribal law, the undisputed right to marry his bint 'amm (father's brother's daughter). The father is usually unwilling to help his daughter if he is the one

586 562 who forced her to marry the husband, or if she was cut off from the
593 family for some reason or another.

586 From the frequency of women using this right in the area, it
562 seems that no social disapproval is associated with it, nor is there
574 a social stigma attached to women who throw themselves. They seem to
626 find it as easy to find a husband as those women divorced voluntarily
by their husbands or with the help of their fathers. In fact, as was
586 562 mentioned earlier, many of them marry the rich men over whom they
587 throw themselves. As to the amount of mahr paid for their subsequent
[583] marriages, the fact of throwing themselves does not seem to be a factor
[574] in determining the amount of mahr paid. In one of the cases, the woman
threw herself on an 'aqila of one of the Geneishat tribe after her
father refused to help her get a divorce from her husband who had married
a second wife without first asking the first wife's permission.
[429] When the Geneishat member succeeded in convincing the husband to divorce
his wife, the latter had no place to stay so remained in the
house of her protector who acted as her guardian in place of her father
[583] who had refused to take her back in his home. While staying in the
house of her protector, she got many marriage offers; one of the suitors
offered a mahr of L.E. 4,000 ($10,000), one of the highest mahrs reported
in the area. She agreed, and the marriage was affected. This
mahr is about ten times the mahr she got for her first marriage. This
586 562 procedure offers the woman a considerable guarantee of her marital
rights. It also gives her, as far as the ability to dissolve the marriage,
a status close to that of her husband. This relative equality
is reflected is reflected in the lack of stigma associated with divorced

586 562 women in the Western Desert, and that the women usually have no difficulty in finding another husband.

586 562 593 768 While the right of "throwing herself" offers the wife some guarantee of her rights, her main guarantee is derived from the security she gets from retaining membership in her father's family. After the death of the father, the woman's claims extend to the households of her brothers. She acquires in them the same rights she had in her father's household, and the brothers take the responsibility of their father in [428] protecting and defending their sister. The woman achieves this continuation of support partially through forfeiting her rights of inheritance to her brothers.

562 428 [199] Awlad Ali recognize the right of the daughters to inherit in their father's estate. They accept the system of inheritance specified in the Koraan which gives the woman half the share of her brother. In practice, this is usually side-stepped. Only sons inherit their father's [233] [311] property. The justification given for the non-inheritance of women is that the main items of inheritance in the Western Desert, livestock and the right of land use, require certain protection and care which are be- 233 yond the culturally defined roles of women. Livestock require moving 562 from one grazing ground to another, almost always crossing tribal lands 428 belonging to various tribal segments, some of whom might be hostile. It also requires the ability to protect the herds from predators and from raids, especially in earlier times. Similarly, land requires preparation and protection against trespassers, especially when the barley is growing.

562 428 593 Women, however, are supposed to be compensated by their brothers for their shares. But very few would actually ask their brothers for

562 such compensation. In forfeiting her rights of inheritance, a woman
428 secures for herself and her children the continuous support of her
593 kin-group and the protection of her rights. This support was denied
in the few cases I was able to collect in which the woman demanded her
share of inheritance. The following is one of these cases. The material
159 presented is a summary of the life history of Fatma, who at the time of
562 the study, was a shopkeeper managing the small general store she owned
428 near the railroad station of Burg el-Arab, some fifty miles west of
593 [444] Alexandria. She also practiced healing and midwifery on a part-time
[754] basis.

Fatma was the only daughter with four sons of sheikh El-Asi, who
at one time was the aqila of bait Hussein of the Sanagrah tribal segment
[627] in the area. He was also known as a mardi and was frequently sought in
[755] mediation of disputes. He was believed to have supernatural power which
he used to cure people for a certain amount of money. During his life-
[454] time, he had acquired a sizable sum of money which he invested in live-
[233] stock. At the time of his death his herd, which numbered more than 900
[422] sheep and goats, was considered the finest in the area. He had no barley
[423] lands because his camp was deep in the desert, but he had fine grazing
land.

Throughout the area the four sons were known for being arrogant and irresponsible. Three of them were employed by one of the irrigation projects carried on by the government in the area as construction workers; the fourth looked after the herd of his father. All four were known as chasers of women, and they frequently went to Alexandria to visit prostitutes and drink liquor.

[444] Fatma was first married when she was eighteen to a man from Alexandria who had opened a general store in the area where her father

159 562 428 593 444 lived. Five years ago the husband died in a mining accident leaving Fatma with a ten-month-old boy. By that time, her father had been disabled, and her brothers wanted to manage her husband's store on her behalf. Knowing that her brothers were greedy, she refused and insisted that she take care of the store herself. The brothers objected on the grounds that it was not customary for a decent woman to be exposed to the customers in the store. When she insisted, the brothers threatened her. When the threats did not work, they beat her. After that, she [625] went to the police station in the area, filed a complaint against her brothers, and asked for police protection. The police officer in charge brought the brothers in and warned them that if they interfered with the store, not only would he arrest them, but he would also use his influence to get them forced from the irrigation projects where three of them worked. The threat worked, and they became friendly with their sister, buying things for the store whenever they went to Alexandria and sometimes helping in the store with her consent when she was on housecalls as a midwife. 159 562 428 593 233 [587] A year later Fatma was married for the second time to a distant cousin; a few months later her father died. In a family meeting that followed the funeral, Fatma made her announcement that she was claiming her share of her father's herd. The brothers were angry and tried to beat her. But the older members of the bait who were present at the meeting stopped them and told them that Fatma had all the right to claim her share of the inheritance according to Awlad Ali ways and that there was nothing that they could do about it. [578] She was characterized in that meeting as "bint haram" (illegitimate child), an insult used to refer to those who show selfishness in their kinship obligations. When she left the camp with her share of the herd, this seemed to have severed

159 562 the relationship between her and her brothers.

428 Following her action and until the time of the study, they had
593 never visited her and she had never visited them. Her husband took
[237] care of the herd; and the arrangement worked out all right until the
159 562 husband told Fatma one day that he was going to marry a second wife.
593 She refused, but he went ahead with the marriage without her consent.
595 He brought the new wife to live with Fatma in the same tin hut in which
they were living. He started to pay more attention to the new wife and
to neglect Fatma; whenever the latter complained, he beat her. Then,
before one of the religious feasts, he sold two of Fatma's sheep and
[164] bought his new wife a dress and a silver bracelet. When Fatma objected
and they argued, he hit her with a stick on the head; she was hospitalized for a week with a serious head wound. While in the hospital, she
went to her brothers who lived only two miles away, but they refused to
159 come to her assistance. She then went to sheikh Elewa (the aqila of
562 Bait Assbei) and threw herself on him. He met with the husband and con-
594 593 vinced him to divorce Fatma. He kept forty sheep of Fatma's herd as com-
595 pensation for the mahr he had paid her and the marriage expenses, then
586 took his new wife and moved from Fatma's hut. Fatma then returned and
159 562 managed her financial affairs successfully herself. She managed the
444 store and hired a shepherd to take care of the sheep. At the time of
[233] the present study she was respected by almost everybody in the area, including members of the local administration. She is known to be reason-
[229] able and of sound opinion, and her store functions as the meeting place
[521] for many of the tribal mi'ads and for casual conversations. She is also
considered as a liason between the tribal population in the area and the
local government administration, and is respected by both sides.

159 156 This apparently is not a typical case, nor is Fatma by any means
562 representative of a typical tribal women. It is a case of a marginal
woman who had revolted against the tribal definition of a female role.
[428] She violated the customary ways of her society and claimed her share of
[593] her father's inheritance; and by doing this, she forfeited her right to
[183] protection by her brothers. She was able to do this because of her mar-
[625] ginality which enabled her to draw upon sources of protection outside
the tribal pattern, the police. It is interesting to note here that by doing so, she was not totally eliminated or ostracized from her society; rather, her role was redefined as that of a man, and she was treated as such.

CHAPTER VI

HOMICIDE AND BODILY INJURIES

Part 1: Homicide

579 Fighting is quite common among Awlad Ali. Many of these fights
involve a large number of individuals and result in many casualties
579 and sometimes even deaths. Fighting is considered "shar," or evil,
673 for according to Awlad Ali, it threatens the social cohesion which is
182 highly valued in the area. Yet, although undesirable, fighting and
[682] even homicide are not considered a crime against society and sometimes
are viewed as necessary to safeguard individual and collective rights
in the absence of an established authority which could protect these
[177] rights. Although this absence of an authority is remedied now by the
[692] introduction of state administrative justice, this has not yet achieved
enough efficiency and recognition to replace the old tribal system.

619 In the tribal system, there is no concept of individual punishment
681 inflicted upon the suspect. There is no recognized authority to inflict
692 it. The mardi or the 'aqila who performs the function of dispute settle-
[629] ment in the case of homicide has no power to pass or inflict any punishment.
His role is restricted to mediation between the two parties involved
682 as was earlier mentioned. Homicide, like all other wrongs among Awlad Ali,
673 are private wrongs affecting the individual or a group of individuals.
[182] The main purpose of the tribal proceedings in the case of homicide is to
restore some form of harmony and order among the group. This harmony is
sometimes restored by killing the murderer or any member of his vengeance
682 group, or amar. Feuds may result from such killing, and a few instances
628 of feuds have, in fact, been recorded in the area (although not in the

682 last two decades). But a feud in the form of extensive, long-term killing
628 between two groups is very rare among Awlad Ali. The principle of
life for life upon which a feud operates would rarely lead to a permanent
settlement or peace, even when the sense of revenge is satisfied for the
682 moment. Among the group, this form of permanent settlement is more likely
to be achieved through the payment of bloodmoney, or "diyya." The payment
of the diyya is based on the assumption that the group has lost,
in the deceased, an economic asset. It has been deprived of his services,
both in supporting his immediate family and in the collective
activities of his amar. This is illustrated in the distribution of the
bloodmoney. Only half of the bloodmoney is paid to the immediate family
of the victim, the other half being divided equally among adult
males of his amar or vengeance group. This is intended not only to
satisfy their sense of indignation and curb their desire for revenge,
but also to insure that when the time comes to share in the payment of
the bloodmoney, they will pay.

628 The cessation of feuds in the area seems to coincide with the cessation
619 of inter-tribal and intra-tribal warfare. During the era of tribal
726 warfare, the killing of a tribesman meant the loss in the fighting power
178 of his tribal segment, and feuding, with its emphasis on life for life,
had the purpose of restoring the balance in fighting power among the
[682] groups involved. Monetary compensations were not known in the area during
that time, according to the informants' accounts, but they were usually
restricted to cases where either the victim or the killer was a
178 non-tribal person. With the cessation of tribal warfare, the death of
682 a tribal member became more an economic, rather than a political, loss,
619
726

178 and compensation became more and more accepted in settling murder cases
682 [619] among the tribal population. Bloodmoney, or diyya," was established
[729] among compensations for injury in general. This scale of compensation
682 is based on the amount of loss of normal activities the injury caused
the victim with death being the total loss of such activities. The
compensation for homocide is estimated at L.E.400 for intentional killing, and L.E. 300, for unintentional killing. Although reference here
682 673 is made to "intention," the assessment of that intention and its defini-
672 tion are quite different from the general usage of that term among modern jurists. Among modern jurists, the term refers to a state of mind which implies that the offender willfully and knowingly committed the prohibited act. This means, first, that the person is able to recognize the nature of his act and to distinguish between right and wrong. Secondly, it means that the person was in a position to choose between committing the act and not committing it and took the former path. According to this view, individuals under temporary or permanent insanity, children under the legal age (the definition of which varies from one legal system to another), non-human beings and objects are not capable of having criminal intent, since they are incapable of having a will of their own. Similarly, individuals who are capable of having a will but, because of certain circumstances their freedom of choice was impaired, cannot also have intentions. Intention, then, in the modern legal conception is a psychological quality that connects the offender with the prohibited result or results. It is this psychological connection that differentiates in modern legal systems between murder and manslaughter, between attempted murder and simple assault, between first and second degree murder, and between justifiable

682 and unjustifiable homicide. To examine responsibility in homicide
672
673 among Awlad Ali and their definition of "intentional" and "non-
intentional" killing, let us first present some of the cases collected
from the area.

682 CASE #1: The Case of the Broken Rope

672 This is one of the classical cases which is told throughout
312 the entire area. There is some slight variation in the way it is
[184] told, but all accounts refer to the fact that Hemeida from the
[428] 'Esheibat tribe inherited the right to use a large area of tribal land in which there was an old Roman well not used for a long period of time and which was full of sand. One day he invited the awaqil of his tribal segment, as well as his neighbors, to consult them on how to clear the well, since without it the land was almost useless. They all decided it was a good idea and offered their help. On the day the well was to be cleared, they all gathered around the well. Among those present was Do'ah, a poor member of the 'Esheibat tribe who worked as a paid shepherd for Hemeida. He was watching from a distance when Hemeida called upon him to give a hand. The well, like all Roman wells in the area, is about fifty feet deep and fifteen feet in diameter, and narrows as one goes down the well. To be cleared, someone has to be lowered by a rope to the bottom of the well to dig up the sand. Hemeida's cousin, Ali, agreed to go down, and the gathering looked for a sturdy rope which they found at one of Hemeida's neighbors. As the group was tying Ali to the rope, Hemeida suggested that Ali was too heavy for the rope and that it would be a good idea if a slimmer man did the job. At this point, everybody looked at Do'ah, since he was the thinnest

682 672 312 person in the crowd. So, Do'ah volunteered to be lowered down to clear the well. He then proceeded to the well, glanced at the bottom of it, and threw a small stone to see if there was any water left in it. The stone made a faint splash indicating that there were a few inches of water. After that, he examined the rope and the equipment used. Satisfied with everything, he tied the rope around himself and was lowered very slowly and carefully by the crowd at the top of the well. As Do'ah was more than half-way down, the rope broke, and he fell. When the crowd called him, Do'ah answered in a faint voice telling them that he was hurt but that he would be all right. The crowd then looked for a spare rope to lower somebody to get Do'ah but could not find any in a nearby camp. They sent a man to get a rope from the next camp, but by the time a man was lowered to get Do'ah, he was dead; he had drowned in six inches of water.

682 672 [625] [613] Since the place of the accident was close to the police station, word got to the officer who, after investigating the case, ruled it as accidental death. But while the government authorities were investigating the case, members of the Bait to which Do'ah belonged were proceeding with the customary ways of Awlad Ali to claim bloodmoney for their dead kinsman. The idea was that a life had been lost, and that regardless of the police investigation, someone must pay for it. The question was who. Since the well belonged to Hemeida, Do'ah's relatives insisted that he was the one to pay the bloodmoney. Not denying the fact that someone had to pay for the death of Do'ah, Hemeida insisted that the one to pay was the

682 owner of the rope, since it was the broken rope that had caused
672 the death of Do'ah. The case stayed unsolved for more than two
months, a record for dispatching of criminal cases in the area.
682 In the final Mi'ad, the main question was whether or not the owner
672 of the rope was responsible for the death of Do'ah, and therefore
627 liable for the payment of the bloodmoney. After extensive negotiations with the parties involved, Sheikh Selouma, the aqila of Hemeida's Bait, who had also been accepted by Do'ah's family as the Mardi in the case, convened the Mi'ad and announced the settle-
682 ment. His announcement came after reading certain passages of the
672 Koran and reminding the parties that they were all members of Awlad
627 Ali and therefore brothers. He stressed the necessity of all bro-
695 thers having clear hearts toward one another and not allowing worldly
disputes to leave any impurities among friends. He then came to the conclusion that there were two things responsible for the death of Do'ah. The first was Hemeida's decision to clear the well, for had it not been for that decision, the accident would not have happened. The second thing responsible was the rope whose breaking was the direct cause of the death. The responsibility here applies only to the rope and not to the owner of that rope. The reason Sheikh Selouma gave for not holding the owner responsible for the death of Do'ah was that the rope by itself is not a lethal weapon for which the owner has to exercise a great deal of caution in lending it. To make the owner responsible for the death of Do'ah would, according to Sheikh Selouma, discourage anyone from lending anything to his neighbor for fear of becoming liable for any harm it might cause.

682 672 627 695 "...It means that I will never lend my cooking pot to my neighbor lest his child trip over it and I would be asked to pay his bloodmoney."

So, the bloodmoney was divided into two sections, one to be paid by Hemeida, and the other to be the responsibility of the rope, which meant that the victim's relatives only took home half of the bloodmoney.

683 CASE #2: The Case of the Curious Neighbor

682 578 672 This is the case of 66-year-old Selouma whose barley land bordered that of Muftah, a distant member of the same tribe. A small area of rocky land separated the two areas. Throughout the time that Muftah was preparing his land for barley cultivation, Selouma used to sit on the dividing rocks, observing his neighbor work on his land and making jokes about the amount of time and effort Muftah was putting into his land, especially when it looked like a dry year, anyway, and no barley would be cultivated. For more than a week Muftah tolerated his neighbor's remarks. "I always said to myself, 'Don't follow the devil... He is an old man and doesn't know what he is saying.' But that day I could not take it any longer. My wife and children were sick, and I didn't have any money to bring them medicine or even food. I wanted to finish preparing the land because it looked like it was going to rain that day. I went to the area I was working on when Selouma started his jokes. I was mad. I took a small stone and threw it at him to scare him and make him stop. The stone hit his leg. It was a small stone, and I didn't think it would harm him. Actually, he stood on his

683
682 feet after that and left." It seems that later the wound got infected.
672 Six months after the incident, Selouma was taken to the
[578] hospital with an infected wound, and three days later he died from
that infection. Selouma's son, Ali, demanded that Muftah pay a
full bloodmoney (L.E. 400) for the death of his father, since the
death was directly caused by the wound inflicted by Muftah. Muftah
denied the charges and claimed that the infected wound which caused
683 the death of Selouma was not the one inflicted by the stone. Mediations
682 continued for some time, and when no agreement was achieved,
672 the aqilas of the two baits to which the parties belonged declared
695 that the decision should be made by the oath which Muftah had to
613 take if he insisted on his claims that the wound was not caused by
his action. Since the case involved the life of a man, Muftah had
to be supported in his oath by fifty-five adult male members of
[671] his 'amar, or 'eila. In accordance with the Daraieb, the selection
[778] was done by members of Selouma's Bait who also selected the tomb of
the saint where the oath would be undertaken. On the date the oath
was to be taken, the disputing parties, as well as all the notables
of friendly tribal segments who were invited to witness the oath,
went to the tomb of the saint. As they started with the procedures,
[784] two of Muftah's cousins who were to support him in the oath and his
uncle refused to swear on the grounds that they were not sure that
Muftah was telling the truth and therefore could not subject themselves
to the supernatural hazards of taking a false oath. Attempts
by other members who were to support Muftah were made to force the
three men to swear, since their refusal meant that the bloodmoney

683 was to be paid unconditionally and consequently would cost all
682 members of the amar; but all these attempts failed. At this point,
672 there was no doubt on the part of the attending crowd about Muftah's
695
613 responsibility for the death of Selouma. The question was, how much had he to pay. The amount requested by Selouma's son was that for "intentional" killing on the basis that Muftah had willfully thrown the rock knowing that it might harm Selouma, especially considering his age.

683 After long and intensive negotiations with the interested
682 parties, a Mi'ad was set in which it was announced that Muftah had
672 to pay the amount of L.E. 200. In his reasoning, he stipulated
627 that the wound which had caused the death of Selouma, although it was intentional on the part of Muftah, was inflicted by a stone which in itself is not a lethal weapon, and therefore the death was an unintentional one for which the bloodmoney is customarily estimated at L.E. 300. He also stated that in the excitement that
[845] followed the death of Selouma, Muftah's pregnant wife had lost the child. The bloodmoney for the still-born infant was estimated at L.E. 100, which was deducted from the amount of bloodmoney that Muftah had to pay.

CASE #3: The Case of the Trespasser

311 This case occurred during the year of the fieldwork which was
423 the second dry year the area experienced. Rain had not fallen ex-
613
[132] cept in a very few places. One of these places was near the small town of Sidi Barrani in which the land belonging to Yadem and his Bait was found. Yadem had sown his barley which at that time had grown to about five feet high. Surrounding the cultivated land

311 was a large area of grazing land which also belonged to the Bait
423
613 of Yadem. The area attracted a large number of tribesmen who
233 brought their herds for grazing. One of these was Kuraiem from
311 Awlad Kharouf tribal segment. He brought his wife and child and
619
613 a herd of more than two hundred sheep and goats. Although it is
not proper for one to cultivate the land belonging to another
tribal segment, yet, when it comes to grazing land, no such restriction is imposed. Only the permission of the aqila of that
tribal segment is required, and even that is granted so automatically that many tribesmen do not bother to ask for such permission. Kuraiem took this permission for granted and pitched his
233 tent in the grazing land of Yadem and his Bait. Yadem, however,
311 was disturbed because he thought that Kuraiem grazed his flocks in
578 an area very close to his cultivated barley, so close that he feared
that the animals might eat the growing barley. When Yadem asked
Kuraiem to move a little further and Kuraiem refused, they entered
into an argument during which Yadem told him that if he did not
move by the following day, he would break his neck. The following
morning Yadem went with his brother to see if Kuraiem was still
there. Both Yadem and his brother were armed with heavy sticks.
As they reached Kuraiem's tent, they hit him with the sticks on
[682] the head. Kuraiem fell on the ground, and they kept hitting him
until he was dead.

682 In due course, Kuraiem's family claimed L.E. 400 bloodmoney
672 for the intentional killing of Kuraiem. Yadem and his family rejec-
[627] ted the claim and insisted that the killing was unintentional. The
Mi'ad was held, and the two Mardis selected by the two parties

682 agreed that the sticks were not by nature lethal weapons. The
672 latter, according to the tribal law, are only guns and knives,
627 since they give the victims no chance to defend himself. They
ruled the case unintentional killing for which only L.E. 300
should be paid.

682 Since Yadem and his brother were arrested by the police for
625 their crime, the payment of the bloodmoney was postponed until
692 the case was settled according to the state legal system. Only
half of the bloodmoney was paid and the rest was postponed until
the case was decided upon by the legal system and Yadem released.
682 This is obviously a case in which the nature of the killing was
672 decided upon by drawing upon the material aspect of criminal
673 causation. The nature of the weapon used was the major determinant
[411] of the crime. Only guns and knives are defined as lethal; all
others are non-lethal by nature, although they might cause the
death of the victim. Death caused by a non-lethal weapon is considered as unintentional regardless of whether or not the actor intended the results, while death by a lethal weapon, even without the intention of killing, is classified as intentional killing, as appears in the following case.

CASE #4: The Case of the Threatened Tribesman

613 For more than five years Bait El-Mawi from the Sheibat tribe
628 had been in a continuous state of feud with Bait El-Asi from the
Gemeiat tribe. One night, during a Khamasein sand storm when visability was extremely low, Abd-el-Galil from Bait El-Mawi heard a noise outside his tent, and the dogs were barking indicating that a stranger was there. Being sure that someone was approaching

613 the tent and fearing that he might have been a member of the
628 feuding Bait intending to harm him or members of his family,
Galil took his gun and went outside to see who was there. He
called on the person to identify himself. When he got no answer,
he warned him that unless he identify himself, he (Galil) would
fire his gun in the air as a warning. After a short period of no
613 response, Galil fired his gun in the air. A moment later, Galil
628 heard a cry coming from the direction of a small hill at the side
682 of the tent. When Galil went there, he found Salem, a member of
a neighboring camp, lying on the ground with a bullet wound in his
stomach. He told Galil that his wife was sick and that he had
come to borrow Galil's donkey to take her to the doctor in the
nearby medical center. He had taken the short cut to Galil's tent
when he was hit by the bullet which Galil had fired in the air.
Galil took his wounded neighbor to the medical center, but Salem
died before they reached it.

682 The Mi'ad was held, and Galil and his family had to pay L.E. 400
672 to the victim's kin group. The amount was that specified for in-
627 tentional killing, since the wound that caused the death was in-
673 flicted by a lethal weapon.

CASE #5: The Case of the Startled Shepherd

233 This case involves Idris, a poor member of the Sheresat tribal
[464] segment. He earned his living by working as a hired shepherd for
[519] 'Awwad from Bait Ibrahim in the area of Gharbaniat. During the dry
[312] season, each shepherd takes his flocks to the water wells near the
coast and leaves them there for three or four hours to get their
fill of drinking water. That afternoon, Idris, waiting for the

233 animals to drink, sat on the edge of the well with his feet in the
cool water of the pool completely absorbed in his thoughts amidst
the quiet surroundings. Passing by the pool at that time was Mahdi
233 576 from a neighboring tribal segment. Seeing Idris (whom he had not
165 known), he shouted the customary greeting, "Peace on you." Startled
by the voice of Mahdi, Idris lost his balance and fell in the deep
water of the pool. Mahdi rushed to help him, but the water was too
deep, and Idris drowned. Feeling sorry for Idris, Mahdi took the
flock and went back to the camp of Idris where he informed the
682 latter's wife of what had happened. A few days later, Mahdi was
627 paid a visit by Sheikh Elewa, the aqila of Bait Asabei' and known
[613] mardi in the area who informed Mahdi that the family of Idris was
demanding the payment of the sum of L.E. 300 for the death of their
682 relative. A Mi'ad was set for the following week. In that Mi'ad,
627 and after Mahdi admitted that it was his greeting that had startled
672 Idris and caused him to fall in the well, the two Mardis represent-
613 ing the two parties agreed that the payment of the sum of three
hundred pounds was in order and that Mahdi and his amar must pay it
to the victim's family as soon as possible. At first, Mahdi seemed
to accept the judgment of the two Mardis, especially when both were
prominant members of some of the influential tribal segments in the
area. But Mahdi was a poor man, and his amar was very small in num-
ber, which made the payment of the bloodmoney almost impossible.
682 Although appeal in the ordinary legal sense does not exist in such
627 a system like that of Awlad Ali, where no judgment is forced upon
672 any of the disputing parties, and where the pronouncement of the
695

682 settlement is usually made after the parties have agreed to it,
627 yet, in certain instances where one of the parties later feels that
672 the settlement was not just or that he was coerced into accepting
695 it, he may ask for a second Mi'ad during which new procedures start
in the case. In the present case, although Mahdi had originally
accepted the judgment of the awaqil, as time passed and he realized
that he was unable to pay the bloodmoney, he started to question
682 the feasibility of the settlement. He discussed the matter
672 with Sheikh Suliman el-Gerery from the Murabiteen tribe of Gerera,
695 a tribe whose members are feared throughout the area for the belief
554 that they have certain supernatural powers. Sheikh Suliman himself
792 [776] is highly respected, and people believe that after his death he will
become "wali" or a saint. After hearing Mahdi's complaint, Sheikh
Suliman told him that the settlement was unjust and told him that he
would do something about it. The following Thursday, Sheikh Suliman
called on Mahdi and asked him to bring his donkey and follow him.
They rode to a small desert town called Bahig where the local market
613 is held every Thursday. On market day, the awaqil of various tribal
517 segments usually gather in front of the general store in the town
571 drinking tea and chatting until their sons or the younger members
443 576 of their families sell the sheep and buy the necessary items. Everyone
passing by the gathering is expected to greet the gathering, getting
off his donkey as a sign of respect to the prominent people.
[889] Failure to greet a fellow tribesman is considered a serious offense
liable to a fine of more than L. 50 and ten goats in certain cases.
[673] It is considered a very serious crime. One informant once told me,
000

124 One informant once told me,
576 "If you don't greet me, this means that you hate me, and if you
829 hate me, there is no limit to the kind of harm you can do me and
my family. One who hates you can kill you, and none can walk
safely anywhere if he fears that he will be killed."

682 As Sheikh Suliman and Mahdi reached the general store, every-
689 one was gathering there as usual, including the two awaqil who
672 were involved in the original settlement. Sheikh Suliman told
695 554 Mahdi not to dismount his donkey and not to say the customary
792 greeting as they passed by the gathering. When they passed the
576 gathering, everyone stood to greet Sheikh Suliman who ignored them
and left with Mahdi. No one believed that Sheikh Suliman, who
should be the guard of the tribal tradition, should commit such an
unforgivable violation of the norms of the people. The next morn-
682 ing the whole area was talking about a big Mi'ad to "take the right"
689 from Sheikh Suliman and Mahdi, who had insulted the gathering. The
672 695 Mi'ad was held a week after the incident. During the Mi'ad, Sheikh
554 Suliman was asked to explain his behavior, and his answer was, "How
792 do you want me to greet all those people who were sitting in front
576 of the store? There were more than thirty men in that gathering,
627 and I was afraid that if I said the customary greeting, I might
have startled some of them causing them to harm themselves, leaving
me with the payment of so many bloodmoneys." Immediately, the
attendants of the Mi'ad knew what Sheikh Suliman was referring to,
and that his action was to prove that the settlement reached in
the case of Mahdi was wrong and that it set a very dangerous precedent which would cause people to avoid greeting one another, "and
hatred will prevail among brothers and nobody will be safe in his
own home."

000 627 own home." The following morning a Mi'ad was called for by the two
613 aqila who achieved the first settlement, and in it, Mahdi was re-
682 leased from his obligation to pay the bloodmoney, although he was
695 asked to pay the sum of fifty pounds to the widow of the deceased
as a gesture of friendship.

CASE #6: The Case of the Careless Guest

574 The present case involved Ali from the Geneishat tribe who
682 lives in the desert town of Matruh where he has a general store.
He goes on frequent visits to Alexandria to get supplies for his store. On one of these trips he passed by the camp of 'Awad from a different tribal segment. Hungry and tired, Ali decided to spend the night at the camp and continue his trip the following morning. He went to the first tent in the camp which happened to be that of 'Awad, who welcomed him and ordered his wife to prepare dinner for the guest. He then invited other members of the camp to have tea with the guest as a gesture of hospitality. When Ali sat down to eat, he took off his shoes, and put his rifle against a pile of rugs and blankets behind him. As the group was chatting, a goat belonging to one of the invited neighbors entered the tent where the men were sitting. Afraid that it might soil the carpets which he had put out for the guest, Awad chased the goat out of the tent. On its way out, the goat touched the guest's gun which fired, killing Hussein, the brother-in-law of one of the neighbors.

682 The local authorities were notified of the incident, but after
627 conducting a preliminary investigation, they filed the case as acci-
dental death. The tribal proceedings continued, however. After

682 627 negotiations between the parties involved were conducted by their respective awaqil, a Mi'ad was set, and the settlement was announced. 682 672 627 According to the terms of the settlement, three factors contributed to the death of Hussein: the goat, whose activity was directly related to the death by causing the gun to fire; the host, who had chased the goat, causing it to run over the gun and fire it; and the guest, without whose negligence in leaving the gun loaded the accident would not have happened. The bloodmoney was divided into three equal parts, one of which was to be paid by Awad, the host, the other to be paid by Ali, the owner of the gun, and the third part to be attributed to the responsibility of the goat and therefore would not be paid.

CASE #7: The Case of the Adulterous Wife

684 For more than a year, rumors spread in the area of Burg El-Arab that Ghenewa's wife was having an affair with Goma'h, a friend of her husband and a member of a nearby camp. Ghenewa was operating a small store and was also involved in smuggling goods from Libya; both required him to be away frequently and for fairly extensive periods of time. According to the rumors, as soon as he left, his wife would put a white cloth on the laundry line as a sign indicating to Goma'h that the husband had left and therefore the former could come and visit her. When the husband heard the rumors, he was furious and decided to test his wife. He pretended that he was going to Alexandria as usual, went to the train station, waited until the train had left, and then returned to his tent. As he entered the tent, he found his wife and his friend in a compromising situation. Before [682] he could do anything, the friend grabbed a kitchen knife and attacked

684 682 the husband, who reached for his gun and fired at Goma'h. Three days later the latter died in the hospital from the gun wound.

684 682 672 The case was investigated by the police and brought to trial, but the case was dismissed as justifiable homocide by reason of self defense. The tribal proceedings, however, required Ghenewa to pay the bloodmoney for intentional homocide, since the weapon used was a gun. Out of the L. 400 bloodmoney, the sum of L. 20 kabara for committing adultery with the wife was deducted. None had questioned the right of Ghenewa to kill Goma'h in the process of defending himself.

671 672 In his essay on "The Early History of Malice Aforethought" in English law, Maitland discussed the "utter incompetence of ancient law to take note of the mental elements of a crime" (1911:327). This statement seems to apply to certain aspects of the tribal law of Awlad Ali. If one causes the death of another, even accidentally, he is liable to
671 672 171 compensation. This attribute is not restricted to Awlad Ali law, for it has been documented by a number of other studies. Peristiany found this to be the case among the Potok (1954), and Dundas documented it among the Kikuyu (1921). In his analysis of injury and liability among the Barotse, Gluckman maintained that "whatever the motivation of the killer or the circumstances surrounding the deed, bloodmoney has to be paid if a member of one grouping of kinsmen was killed by a member of some other group. The mental element seems to be irrelevant. What is important is that "murder" is committed within social relationships where blood compensation is due (1963:205). Similarly, Howell gives us one of the most comprehensive accounts of the Nuer "rule of law" and

671 672 171 the irrelevance of intention in establishing liabilities for homocide or injuries (1954).

672 682 The neglect of intention in assessing liability in cases of homocide is evident in the cases presented above (Cases 1,2,4,5 and 6), where compensation was paid although there was no intention established on the part of the offender.

[192] Awlad Ali use the Arabic word "katl" to refer to any killing. This is different from the word "mut" which means death by natural causes. They further differentiate between "katl 'amd," or intentional killing 682 672 673 and "katl khata," or unintentional killing. Although reference here is made to "intention," yet, from the above cases it is evident that the basis of establishing that intention is from the type of weapon used in effecting the death of the victim. Intentional killings are those caused [411] by a lethal weapon. Lethal weapons are defined as guns or knives. Death caused by a non-lethal weapon, no matter what the intentions of the offender, is defined as non-intentional, even when the circumstances of the act indicates the actual existence of an intention on the part of the offender to cause the death of the victim (as in Case #3 above). The assumption is that the use of lethal weapons, such as daggers or guns, implies intention and possibly a certain degree of premeditation, since these weapons have no other important use. Moreover, the probability of death by a lethal weapon is much greater than from other non-lethal weapons. These give the victim a chance to defend himself, a chance which he does not have in the cases of killing with a gun or dagger. In other words, Awlad Ali, in assessing responsibility for homocide, "operate with a legalistic psychology in which intention is is presumed from action" (Gluckman, 1963:207).

682 672 In practice, Awlad Ali do look at actual circumstances to assess the intention of the offender. Although compensation is always required, the readiness of the victim's kin group to accept a financial settlement and the final amount to be paid in a given situation is affected by the presence or absence of an intention on behalf of the offender. In assessing the actual intention of the offender in each case, the mediators rely on the circumstances of the crime as well as on the past history of the relationships between the offender and the victim. Although this actual intention of the offender does not change the payment of bloodmoney, the deceased's kin are more agreeable to the acceptance of the financial settlement if the killing is unintentional than if it is intentional and the possibility of revenge is much less imminent. Unintentional killing, regardless of the weapon used never results in blood feuds. The possibility, on the other hand, is much greater in the cases where the circumstances of the offense indicate an intention on the part of the killer to take the life of the victim. It is for this reason that the right of [978] nazala, or refuge, discussed in an earlier chapter, is resorted to only in the case of intentional killing. Of all the cases described in the chapter only in the case of the trespasser did the killers' kin group seek refuge by moving to another area where they were protected until the dispute was solved by another neutral tribal segment. It is important to note that killing in the above case was not done by a lethal weapon but by sticks, and as such was defined by the tribal law as "unintentional" as far as the formal amount of compensation required was concerned. Not all cases where the intention of the offender to kill [671] the victim is clear carried with it the threat of revenge. The tribal law takes into consideration certain mitigating circumstances, such as the role of the victim in initiating the act of the offender.

000 the role of the victim in initiating the act of the offender. In the
684 682 case of the adulterous wife (Case #7), the intention of the husband to
672 kill the wife's lover was clear from the evidence; yet, the husband's
kin group never attempted to take refuge, and the victim's group was
eager to settle the case with the least amount of publicity. On the
682 672 other hand, killing in circumstances that offend the tribal standards
183 of chivalry, like killing from ambush or during the night, are the most
difficult to solve and pose the greatest chance for retaliation.

682 Although the traditional amount of compensation is not determined
672 by the actual intentions of the killer, but rather by assumed intentions
[673] as deducted from the type of weapon used in causing death, yet, the final
amount paid is usually determined by such intention. The actual intention works as the basis for bargaining between the victim's kin and the kin of the killer. Kin of the victim of an intentional killing are less likely to agree to any reduction of the amount, and with the threat of retaliation or revenge present, the killer's kin are bargaining from a weaker point. This is not the case in unintentional killings or where the victim's behavior instigated the reaction of the killer. In such cases, the victim's group is more willing to accept a lesser amount of compensation, and the killer's group, while not in a good bargaining position, at least are not under the threat of revenge. And since they do not resort to the right of refuge, their daily activities are not disrupted. In this case, they could sustain the bargaining activities for a relatively longer period of time. Also, there is usually a strong
[626] pressure on the victim's group to accept reduced compensation in the
case of unintentional killing from the rest of the tribal members. If

682 they refuse to accept reduced compensation, they are viewed as unreason-
672 able by the rest of the groups in the area. One way in which such pres-
[626] sure is brought to bear upon the victim's acceptance of reduced compansation
682 is in the mi'ad, or the public hearing, in which the settlement achieved
672 627 is announced. The common practice is for the killer's group to agree to
pay the full amount specified by the traditional scale for compensation
(L.E. 400 for killing with a lethal weapon and L.E. 300 for killing with
a non-lethal weapon). Then, in the final mi'ad in which such agreement
is achieved, a number of important members of non-involved tribal segments
are invited to the mi'ad. During the mi'ad and immediately following the
announcement that a settlement has been achieved and that the kin group of
the killer has agreed to pay the traditional bloodmoney, the mardi or any
one of the attendants to the mi'ad asks the victim's group to defer part
of the payment in honor of important members of the tribal segments pres-
682 ent at the meeting. Sometimes a portion of the payment is forfeited in
672 honor of the tent or the women of the household who prepared the food or
even for the blessing of one of the saints in the area. In the case of
the curious neighbor (Case #2) above, out of the original amount specified
for the death by non-lethal weapon estimated as L.E. 300, only L.E. 100
was actually given to the victim's kin group. In addition to the L.E. 100
deducted because of the death of the unborn infant of the offender, an-
other hundred pounds was deducted in honor of certain important members
[683] who attended the gathering. It is interesting to note that the L.E. 100
is compensation for the loss of the use of a leg in the formal scale of
compensations for injuries as will be shown shortly. No such reduction
in the amount of bloodmoney was done in the case of the trespasser where

682 672 Although the weapon used was not lethal and therefore was classified as an unintentional killing, yet the nature of the crime and the obvious intention on the part of the killers made reduced payment difficult to achieve.

Another way of reducing liability and the amount of money paid in cases of unintentional killing is by taking into consideration all the intervening variables that contributed to the death of the victim and asking them to share the blame. The working of this principle is illustrated in the case of the broken rope where the rope was assigned half the responsibility for the death of the victim. It is also present in the case of the careless guest where the responsibility was divided three ways with the host paying one third, the owner of the gun paying another third, and the goat sharing the responsibility for the rest of the bloodmoney. It is interesting to note the difference in the responsibility to the owner of the gun in the above case and the owner of the rope in the case of the broken rope. The owner of the rope was not held responsible for the death caused by his rope, the same way the owner of the goat in the case of the careless guest was not held responsible for the actions of the animal. Both the goat and the rope are not dangerous things by themselves for which a certain degree of care in handling is required. If such normally harmless things cause injury or death to a person, the owner is not held responsible.

682 672 41 67 [574] The situation is quite different in the case of the gun and the responsibility of its owner. By nature, the gun is a weapon of death, and for that reason the tribal law has required certain precautions in its use or handling. Among such precautions is the requirement that a guest,

682 as soon as he settles in the host's place, should unload the gun. In
672 411 addition to reducing the possibility of the gun being accidentally fired
671 and harming someone, this act expressed the trust of the guest in his
594 host and signifies the ability of the latter to protect his guest against
any harm. A person visiting another does not need his gun for protection
682 and therefore must unload it. If the owner of the gun fails to take this
672 customary precaution and leaves his gun loaded, and because of that fail-
411 ure the gun causes the death or injury of a person or even damage to prop-
erty, the owner is held responsible for that result. The same rule applies
to other deadly weapons, such as knives or daggers, as well as to animals
683 which are dangerous by nature, such as dogs. Each tent in the area has a
672 231 dog. Starting the first weeks in the puppy's life, he is trained to
guard the tent and to bark at the approach of any stranger. It is also
trained to attack any intruder who comes within fifty yards of the tent
unless accompanied by a member of the tent. When one goes to visit an-
other, he usually stays away from the tent until someone from the tent
hears the dog barking and comes out to get the guest. Most dogs would
not attack a person as long as he is the safe fifty yards away from the
tent. Occasionally, a dog goes behond the safe distance and b ites an
individual passing by or a guest waiting to be let inside the tent. If
the injured person is able to prove, usually by taking the oath, that
he was more than fifty yards away from the tent at the time he was at-
tacked by the dog, the dog's owner is liable to the victim for the in-
jury inflicted by the dog. If, on the other hand, evidence shows that
the victim was bitten by the dog while being less than fifty yards away
from the tent, then there is no responsibility on the part of the dog's

683 owner. This means that an element of neglect has to be proven on the part
672 of the owner of either a lethal weapon or a dangerous animal before he
231 is held responsible for the fdamage they cause. But whether dangerous
or not, the role of such objects or animals, in causing the death or injury of the victim, is taken into consideration in assessing the exact amount to be paid as compensation.

682 In assessing the intention and consequently the amount of the tradi-
672 tional bloodmoney to be paid, the behavior of the offender is judged according to a traditional standard of reasonableness. In the case of the curious neighbor, Muftah, in his attempt to evade the payment of the full bloodmoney, presented an elaborate account of his neighbor's actions including the provocative statements that the latter had said, the jokes, and even the insults he had directed against Muftah. His attempt was to show that throwing a small rock at his neighbor was not an unreasonable behavior considering the provocations of that neighbor whose behavior was itself unreasonable. Although the victim's behavior was unreasonable, the response of Muftah to the provocations of his neighbor was also considered as unreasonable. He could have followed the traditional means of asking a third party to interfere and prevent the neighbor from continuing his insults. Instead, Muftah took the direct and unreasonable response which eventually led to the death of Selouma. It is that element of reasonableness that led to the reversal of the original settle-
682 ment in the case of the startled shepherd (Case #4). When considering
672 a certain behavior in the context of reasonableness, the mediators draw
627 not only upon the immediate facts of the case under consideration, but
also upon the careful inquiry into the long history of interrelations

682 672 627 between the parties involved. The relative position of both the offender and the victim and their relationship to one another is taken into account. What is reasonable behavior in one case may not be so in another. Past disputes are taken as indications of the present situation, although they may not be directly related to the present dispute.

672 673 It is possible to say, then, that Awlad Ali recognize two types of intentions: an assumed intention deducted from certain material aspects of the act itself, like the type of weapon used in causing the death of the victim, and an actual intention which is quite similar to that utilized in modern jurisprudence in the sense that it pertains to a state of mind on the part of the offender that connects him in a special way with the prohibited results. The assumed intention works to set the initial guide for the traditional scale of bloodmoney. It sets the basis upon which compromise could be achieved. Actual intention, on the other hand, determines the actual course the specific case takes as well as the final amount of money paid as a settlement.

Part 2: Bodily Injuries

683 Awlad Ali recognize compensation for all sorts of bodily injuries sustained intentionally or accidentally. An elaborate scale of compensations is set as a basis for compromise. The basic principle involved is that an injury should be met by compensation in direct ratio to its severity, and the severity is assessed by the extent of a man's disability. Disability, in turn, is measured by the extent to which a man is prevented from participating in the communal activities which enable him to defend and maintain himself and his family according to the customary standards they are used to. It is a collective, as well as an individual, concern. A head injury or an injury to the hand may amount to a very serious defect if the person is unable to cultivate the barley fields or move with the herds for grazing or holding a gun to defend his family and group against an intruder who intends to do him harm. Death is considered the maximum disability, as are other injuries that take the person totally out of the collective activities, as in the case of injury
683 resulting in paralysis or blindness. All other injuries are compensated
435 by a fraction of the bloodmoney for homicide or L.E. 400.

Scale of Compensation for Bodily Injuries

El damiah Sughra (a small wound which does not cut the skin)	L. 3
El damiah kubrah (a small wound which cuts the skin)	L. 6
El fakhera (a wound which cuts the skin and reaches the flesh under it)	L. 12
El badi'a (a wound which cuts the flesh on both sides)	L. 25
El mutifah (severe cuts to the flesh)	L. 30

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El malta (a wound which cuts the skin and flesh and reaches the fat next to the bone)	L. 35
El muwadiha (a wound which cuts the skin, the flesh and the fat next to the bone and leaves the latter exposed)	L. 50
El hashima (skull fracture)	L. 100
El munkala (a head injury in which a piece of skull is removed)	L. 150
El maimuma (a head wound that causes permanent brain damage)	L. 400
Damage to the head hair:	
if permanently damaged	L. 100
if grew back without damage	L. 20
(The above rule applies to the hair of the beard, mustache and eyelashes.)	
Fracture of the hand: for each finger	L. 50
Fracture of the arm: for each bone	L. 50
Fracture of the leg: for each bone	L. 100
Broken ribs (unspecified number)	L. 100
Fracture of the foot	L. 100
Paralysis or severance of the fingers: each joint (except those of the thumb)	L. 33
Paralysis or severance of the thumb: each joint	L. 50
Loss of two ears	L. 400
Loss of one ear	L. 200

If hearing is impared, the defect is measured in relationship to the total utility of the ears, and compensation is estimated accordingly.

Complete loss of the eyesight	L. 400

Partial loss: to be assessed in proportion of that loss to the total utility.

Nose: if totally cut off	L. 400
Piercing the nostrils	L. 100

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If the two lips are cut off:	L. 400
just the lower lip	L. 300
just the upper lip	L. 200
Visible piercing of the lips	L. 50
The tongue: if results in total loss of speech	L. 400
Partial loss of speech is measured in proportion to that total loss.	
All the teeth	L. 400
Each tooth	L. 50
Testicles: if cut off	L. 400
The entire genitals	L. 800
The breasts:	
of a nubile woman	L. 200
of an old woman	L. 100

683 As in the case of homicide, the above scale of compensation works only as a basis for compromise rather than as a definite or exact fine. 683 To assess the amount of injury and therefore the category of compensation, 629 the victim and his group, as well as a representative of the offender, 463 have to take the injured person to the "nazzar" who examines him and defines the kind of injury sustained. The nazzar is usually a member of [619] one of the Murabiteen tribes who is known to possess a number of shari's books specifying the injuries and the amount of compensation required in each case. Before he assesses the wounds, both parties have to swear that [465] they will accept his judgment, and they pay him a token fee that varies according to the ability to pay and the position of the parties involved. 683 The amount of money estimated by the nazzar is not necessarily the final amount of money paid. For, as in the case of homicide, it is subject to deductions in honor of various members who attend the meeting in which

683 the settlement is announced. This deduction is determined by the same
683 factors involved in the case of homicide, such as the relationship be-
672 tween the parties involved and the presence or absence of an intention
on the part of the offender to cause bodily harm to the victim, as well
as the role the victim played in provoking the actions that led to his
683 injury. Injuries sustained during a fight are not as serious as injur-
672 ies sustained by ambushing the victim. In the latter case, the victim
673 had no chance to defend himself. Also, the number of people involved in
the actions that led to the injury enter as a variable. If more than one
individual attacks a victim, it is considered more serious than a man-
to-man fight.

105 The judicial process among Awlad Ali of the Western Desert of
Egypt has been dealt with in the context of political organization of
105 the group. The main feature of the political organization of Awlad Ali
613 is the absence of centralized leadership. The only formally recognized
leadership is that of the aqila, the leader of the bait tribal segment.
105 The sources of the aqila's authority derive from a number of sources,
613 one of which is his judicial role. It is through him that disputes in-
627 volving members of his bait are solved. The process by which he per-
forms this crucial function is that of informal mediation in which both
the personal qualities of the aqila, as well as the weight of his tribal
[692] segment, play an important role. This is especially important in a so-
ciety with no court system or formal hearing and where durability of any
settlement depends on its being accepted by the parties involved.

105 The main aim of the judicial process is to affect reconciliation of
182 the parties and to restore a certain degree of social order and cohesion
627 that was disrupted by the dispute. The need to restore the social order
[819] and to maintain friendly relations between tribal members is a response
to certain aspects of the natural and social environment in which the
105 group finds itself. Natural resources in the area are very meager, and
182 subsistence activities require that the tribesmen constantly move with
619 their herds for pasture throughout an area already divided among the
233 various tribal segments. Since the place and nature of pasture differ
from one year to the next, the identity of the specific tribal unit which
would be sought for help varies correspondingly. This creates a general
feeling of dependency that characterizes the social relations in the area.

105 On the other hand, there is always a feeling of rivalry and hostility
598 between the different tribal segments which goes back to the era of
571 tribal warfare. Thus, the social relations among the tribal population
are characterized by a certain amount of ambivalence which is hidden behind
a facade of formality in the way tribal members treat one another
105 in day-to-day activities. There are certain rules of etiquette describ-
571 ing the way members of the same tribal segment should behave toward one
576 another and toward other tribesmen and outsiders. Failure to abide by
[589] these rules may subject the violator to a symbolic fine of a goat or a
[594] sheep slaughtered for a feast to which everyone is invited. These feasts,
[182] or dinners as they are called, have various functions, the most important
105 of which is the integrative one. In an area where the population is usu-
571 ally dispersed, these dinners offer an opportunity to the tribesmen who
594 happen to be in the area at the time of the feast to attend, where they
182 eat, meet other tribesmen, and exchange information about what is happen-
ing in other parts of the area. It is from such dinners that the tribes-
men get to know about the available pastures, about the prices of sheep
and goats in different markets, and about who is doing what and where.
The occasion also signifies the restoration of the violator of the rules
to the social life of the group and the reinforcement of those rules.
105 This is also true with the tribal meetings, or mi'ad, which are held to
627 announce settlements in more serious cases. It is on this basis that
182 [illegible] the mi'ad should not be considered as a tribal court. It is more of a
[illegible] social occasion where food and drinks are served and where parties in-
volved and all those invited by them talk about everything except the
[589] dispute itself. In certain instances, the financial settlement agreed
upon in the informal mediation is exaggerated when announced in the mi'ad

105 so that part of it may be reduced in honor of some prominent members
629 who are attending the meeting. When part of the financial agreement is
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681 reduced in honor of a person, this creates an obligation on the part of
554 that person to reciprocate in a similar situation when one arises. This creates an active interest in the settlement on the part of individuals who otherwise are not involved, and insures the durability of the settlement. The social cohesion is maintained.

105 The need to keep friendly relations with all tribesmen is reflected
571 in the judicial process in its procedural aspect, as well as in judicial
578
627 reasoning, that is, the logic according to which facts in certain cases
182 are assessed. With regard to procedures, there is an emphasis on avoiding face-to-face confrontations between the disputing parties until an agreement has been reached by means of the mediators. Only then is it that the parties see and talk to one another. This is especially true in serious cases such as homicide or serious assault where face-to-face confrontation is likely to lead to more hostilities.

105 The emphasis on reconciliation may explain, at least in part, the in-
571 formality of the judicial process. Leaving the process of dispute settle-
627 ment informal gives it a measure of flexibility which permits the treatment
182 of each case as unique without being tied down by rigid formal rules. This does not mean, however, that there are no rules to be followed, or that there is no place for legal precedents. It simply means that the rules are very general and that the legal precedents are used merely as a guide in solving similar cases. The main guide remains, however, the desire to achieve a successful settlement that satisfies all parties. It is only through achieving such successful settlements that the social order is maintained and the tribal cohesion is secured.

APPENDEX I

GLOSSARY OF ARABIC TERMS USED

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Abb	أب	father
'acd	عقد	contract
Akh	أخ	brother
'amar el dam	عمار الدم	unity of blood (vengeance group)
'amd	عمد	intention
'amm	عم	father's brother
'aqila	عاقلة	wise man; leader of a bait
bait	بيت	house
bait el shan'a	بيت الشنعة	house of the dreadful deed
baraka	بركة	blessing
barawa	براوة	to ostracize from membership in a particular group
bint	بنت	daughter
bint 'amm	[illegible] عم	father's brother's daughter
bint haram	بنت حرام	illegitimate girl
beer sama	بير سما	sky well
diyya	دية	bloodmoney
daraieb	درايب	the tribal laws and customs
'eila	عيلة	family
el-fatha	الفاتحة	the beginning chapter of the Koran; the initial ceremony in the marriage
feddan	فدان	acre
ghish	غش	cheating, or unfair deal
ibn	ابن	son
ibn 'amm	ابن عم	father's brother's son
iktitab	اكتاب	tribal adoption

104 jad	جد	grandfather
[601] jaddah	جدة	grandmother
kabara	كبارة	face-saving compensation
kabila	قبيلة	tribe
katl	قتل	killing
khata'	خطأ	by accident
kishk	كشك	dried milk
[601] khal	خال	mother's brother
Koran	قرآن	the Islamic sacred book
mahr	مهر	bridewealth
mardi	مرضي	go-between
maleh	مالح	sour milk
mi'ad	ميعاد	tribal hearing
murabiteen (sing., murabit)	مرابطين (مرابط)	holymen, client tribes
Mustagilleen	مستقلين	independent tribes
nagei'	نجع	camp
nazala	نزالة	refuge
nazzar	نظار	one who assesses the amount of compensation for wounds and bodily injuries
nasafa	نصفة	compensation for a wife
omda	عمدة	a government appointed tribal leader
sayem	صايم	a male who fasts the month of Ramadan, an adult
sadaqa	صدقة	obligatory tribute
sa'adi	سعادي	the original tribes of Awlad Ali
sheikh	شيخ	any tribal leader, or an old man

104 **sura**	سورة	a chapter in the Koran
Shei'a	شيعة	the unorthodox sector of Muslim practices
Sunni	سنّى	the orthodox Muslim group
shar	شر	evil
thebeiha	ذبيحة	a sacrifice
[601] **ukht**	أخت	sister
umm	أم	mother
watan	وطن	homeland
wakil	وكيل	a legal guardian
zawya	زاوية	a religious center
zena	زنا	adultry

APPENDEX II


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YARAWA
GENEISHA
اولاد خروف
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SAMALOUS
AGGARY
سهيبات
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AGGARI
AGGAR
ASHRET
جوابيس
GWABIS
صرحات
SEXETHAT
AWLAD ALI
أولاد علي
منخفض القطارة
QATTARA DEPRESSION
SIWA OASIS
واحة سيوة
قبائل البدو
وخريطة طرق الساحل الشمالي
BEDUIN TRIBES
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2: Mohsen E.O-5 (1958-1966) 1971 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9
Awlad Ali

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[Information on the relationship of the omda and shaikh in their respective roles as district representatives of tribal segments to the Egyptian government will be found in Category 657.]

[For information on the marabtin or "client tribes, " see Category 619.]

[For information on the adwar or guerrilla bands which functioned as a military unit in the Italo-Sanusi wars, see Category 701.]

[For information on the warfare of the Sanusi, particularly in reference to the Italian-Sanusi wars, see Category 648.]

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Libyan Bedouin MT9

[For information on the political role of the omda (umda) as a representative of the more powerful and numerous tribal segments within an administrative district, see Category 634.]

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[For the role of the marabouts as arbitrators in the settling of disputes between tribal groups, see Categories 619 and 792.]

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Libyan Bedouin MT9

[For information on the Bedouin concept of laf in which a stranger group, sometimes of "client tribe" origin, attaches itself to the dominant clan in an area, and through some fiction, myth or fraud grafts their branch of descent on to the genealogical tree of this clan, see Categories 608 and 619.]

[For additional information on tribal "adoption" wherein peasant groups or even individuals were incorporated into the tribal organization under the Bedouin term iktitab, see Categories 563 and 619. For information on laf, the term used to describe the process in which groups graft themselves onto the genealogical tree of a tribe, see Categories 608 and 619.]

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Libyan Bedouin MT9

[For information on the barawwa, the act of banishing from the group, as a form of legal document, see Categories 675 and 681.]

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Libyan Bedouin MT9

[For general information on the functional role and status of the shaikh (or shaikhs), see Category 554; for specific information on their political functions as representatives of district tribal segments, see Category 634; for information on their roles as heads of their respective kin groups, see pertinent 61 Categories; information on their roles as religious leaders will be found in Category 793.]

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Libyan Bedouin MT9

[Information on the Grand Sanusi of the Bedouin of Cyrenaica, religious head of the Sanusiya Order, will be found in Category 793.]

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Libyan Bedouin MT9

[For general information on the payment of blood-money in retribution for homicide, see Category 682.]

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Libyan Bedouin MT9

[For information on the role of the Arab "elite," groups of townsmen from Banghazi and Darna of mixed ethnic backgrounds, who functioned as administrators under Italian rule, see Category 563.]

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Libyan Bedouin MT9

[For information on the establishment of schools and medical clinics in Libya by the Italian government for the benefit of the Bedouins, see Categories 175 and 648.]

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[For information on the omda, the administrative head of the rural village, see Category 622.]

[For information on informalized mechanisms for adjusting and applying sanctions within the community and between communities, see Categories 627 and 628.]

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(1837-1942) Sanusi

THE SANUSI
OF CYRENAICA

000

BY

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OXFORD
AT THE CLARENDON PRESS
1949

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(1837-1942) Sanusi

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PREFACE

THIS account of the Sanusi of Cyrenaica would not have been 114 written if a number of accidents had not led me to their country during the late war, but the seed of it was planted long before the war. I had acquired during three years' residence in Egypt and through travels in other Arab lands some knowledge of [122] Arab history and culture, a little experience of Bedouin, and proficiency in spoken Arabic. During the war a year spent as Political Officer in the Alawite Territory of Syria added to both knowledge and enthusiasm. I had been acquainted with some of the Sanusi exiles in Egypt as far back as 1932 and had visited Darna and Banghazi by sea; and it had long been my hope that I might some day, when the Italians had ceased to rule the country, have a chance to visit the interior. This wish came true when in November 1942 I was posted as Political Officer to the (third) British Military Administration of Cyrenaica. I spent over two years in the country, the greater part of them among the Bedouin, particularly the more nomadic sections. Inhabited Cyrenaica is a small country and as in the course of my wanderings, mostly in its southern steppes and the desert beyond them, I covered more than two thousand miles by horse and camel I came to know something of its Bedouin tribes. My duties, it is true, prevented me from carrying out any systematic inquiries of a sociological kind, but the contact with the Bedouin they entailed enabled me to read the literature which forms the basis of this study in the light of my own experience. My labours have been but a small return for the hospitality of the tents and the many kindnesses of my Bedouin hosts.

I have not attempted to write a history of Cyrenaica, but 128 only of the development of the Sanusiya Order among the Bedouin tribes of the country. I have, therefore, said nothing of the centuries of Greek colonization and Roman and Byzantine rule, nor of the little known centuries of Arab and Turkish rule until 1843, when the Grand Sanusi founded his first zawiya, or religious lodge, on the Cyrenaican plateau. Also, I have not aimed at giving a comprehensive account either of the Sanusiya Order or of the Bedouin tribes, but I have described both only in so far as seemed necessary to an understanding of the political

128 development of the Order which sprang from their association. The Sanusi of Cyrenaica, and elsewhere, are so called because they adhere to the Islamic Order of the Sanusiya which takes its name from its founder al-Sayyid Muhammad bin 'Ali al-Sanusi and has been directed by his descendants. I have, therefore, described briefly the nature of an Islamic Order and how this particular Order became established and spread. The Sanusiya differs from most other Orders not so much in its teachings and rites as in its political and economic organization, a development arising from its absorption into the Bedouin tribal structure, but owing much also to opposition from the outside, particularly to the Italo-Sanusi wars. For this reason I have described in the latter part of the book Italo-Sanusi relations at some length. If in doing so I have sometimes expressed indignation, I do not wish it to be thought that I have any but friendly feelings for Italy and her people, or that I believe the Italian colonial record to be very different from the records of other Colonial Powers.

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128 I have transliterated Arabic words in the simplest way. The Arabist will know, or can easily discover, how they are written in Arabic, and those who do not know the language would be little the wiser had I transliterated them differently. For the uninitiated it need only be said that the letter 'q', which stands for the Arabic letter *qaf*, has in Cyrenaica the value of a hard 'g' as in the English word 'goat', that 'gh', which stands for the Arabic letter *ghain*, has the value the Parisian gives to the 'r' in 'Paris', and that ', which stands for the Arabic letter *'ain*, is a guttural sound peculiar to Arabic. I have not been entirely consistent in the spelling of Arabic words in that I have retained the usual English spelling of such words as Cairo, Mecca, Kufra, Caramanli, and Koran, and that I have treated some Arabic words as though they were English words and have, therefore, not italicized them and have given them the common English plural form, e.g. Shaikhs, qadis, Sharifs, mudirs, and zawiyas. I have used the Arabic names of places instead of classical or Italian names: Shahhat, Marsa Susa, and al-Marj instead of Cirene, Apollonia, and Barce. If I need to excuse myself for this on the grounds that Cyrenaica is to-day an Arab country, no apology is needed for using the Arab names for the sites of recently built Italian colonial settlements, in naming

3:Evans-Pritchard E-4, 5 (1942-1944) 1949 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9
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which the Italians commemorated persons who for the most part 104
might well be forgotten. To aid the reader I have listed at the 128
end of the book the chief place-names mentioned in the text with their Italian equivalents. It will be observed that the Italian way of writing Arabic words is different from our way: where we write Suluq, Tubruq, Banghazi, and Jaghbub, they write Soluch, Tobruch, Bengasi, and Giarabub.

I have cut the book to half its original size and have consequently been compelled to omit a mass of detail. I have also 128
restricted references to quotations and to statements which seem particularly to require the citation of an authority. Much of the omitted detail and many of the deleted references will be found in various articles and papers I have published on the Sanusi elsewhere. In a few instances I have not been able to check references because the books cited are unobtainable in England.

I acknowledge the generous help of many British and Arab 000
friends, especially of Major-General D. C. Cumming, Muhammad Shafiq Effendi Hamza, and the warm-hearted companion of my travels Salih bu 'Abd al-Salam.

I thank Mr. E. L. Peters and Miss Sonya Gregory for help 128
in preparation of the maps.

E. E. E.-P.

OXFORD
April 1948

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CHAPTER I

ORIGIN AND EXPANSION OF THE SANUSIYA (1837–1902)

I

THE Sanusiya is an Order of Sufis or, as they are sometimes called, Darwishes. They are Sunni or orthodox Muslims. This means that in faith and morals they accept the teachings of the Koran and the *Sunna*, a collection of traditions about the life and habits of the Prophet, whose example in all matters should be followed by believers. Most orthodox Muslims recognize two further doctrinal sources, *ijma'*, general agreement among those of the faithful capable of holding an opinion on such matters, and *qiyas*, determination of what should be believed or done by analogy with the teachings and life of the Prophet. The founder of the Sanusiya Order, like other teachers of some of the more rigidly orthodox groups, such as the Wahhabi, rejected both, though, in practice, he made use of what amounts to analogy. Of the four canonical rites of orthodox Islam the Sanusi of Cyrenaica, like the founder of their Order, follow the Maliki, the rite dominant throughout North Africa. 795*

The Sanusiya is, therefore, a highly orthodox Order. It is not a sect, but a fraternity. The enemies of its founder were never able to convince any disinterested person that he was guilty of heresy, though they attempted to do so; and it was only in very small matters that they were able to accuse him of departing from the Maliki rite. Even its Sufism is conventional and austere. The Wahhabi, those stern and ruthless critics of the sects and Orders of Islam, found in it no *bid'a*, innovation, which in the eyes of these fanatics amounts to heresy, and, alone among the Sufi Orders, they have tolerated its presence in the Hijaz. 795* 798

Sufism is Islamic mysticism. Orthodox Islam tends to be a cold and formalistic religion. The gulf between God and man, spanned by the bridge of the Imams among the Shi'ites, is too wide for simple people, and its rules and regulations deprive it of warmth and colour. The need for personal contact and tenderness finds expression in the cult of saints, in Sufi 795*

*795 mysticism, and in the ritual of the Darwish Orders, all of which tend to be frowned on by the puritans and Pharisees of Islam and sometimes by its secular rulers.

In every religion there will be found people who, like the Sufis, feel that while formal acceptance of the tenets of the faith and conscientious performance of its duties are sufficient for righteousness and salvation, they do not satisfy the deeper longings of the soul which seeks always by entire love of God a perfect communion with Him. Human souls are rays of the divine sun imprisoned in the material world of the senses. The aim of Sufism has been to transcend the senses and to attain through love identification with God so complete that there is no longer a duality of 'God' and 'I', but there is only 'God'. This is brought about by asceticism, living apart from the world, contemplation, charity, and the performance of supernumerary religious exercises producing a state of ecstasy in which the soul, no longer conscious of its individuality, of its bodily prison, or of the external world, is for a while united to God.

*[175] In the first centuries of Islam the Sufis were quietists, individuals, often with a speculative bent, pursuing their lonely quest of God, and tending to become hermits. In the twelfth century Darwish Orders impregnated with Sufi ideas and ideals began to come into prominence and in course of time they became widespread and immensely popular with the common people, the poor, the humble, and the unlettered, especially in the towns. Indeed, there is a good deal of truth in Père Lammens's claim that the Darwish Orders 'have really flourished only among the intellectually backward . . . . and in regions where anarchy reigns'.[1] The popularity of these Orders, which have many social functions, is doubtless to some extent to be accounted for by the almost complete absence of corporate life in Islam. In becoming social institutions, and sometimes political movements, in the Arab lands they have shed most of their original content of mysticism.

The very wide following which these Orders attracted and the great influence thereby gained by their leaders excited the suspicion, and often the open hostility, of the official exponents of Islamic doctrines and traditions, the '*Ulama*, or clergy, who

[1] Le R. P. H. Lammens, *L'Islam*, 2nd ed., 1941, p. 181.

furthermore scented heresy in them. To protect himself against 795* accusations of doctrinal irregularities, it was customary for the founder of a new Order or sub-Order to demonstrate in his initial treatise, as the Grand Sanusi did, his orthodoxy by showing how his teachings followed those of some famous theologian whose orthodoxy was acknowledged by all. The Orders also aroused the enmity of the religious aristocracy of the Sharifs, descendants, or supposed descendants, of the Prophet Muhammad, who saw the common people looking to the Shaikhs and Brothers of the Orders for the blessing they had considered their exclusive privilege; and of the secular rulers, often themselves Sharifs, whose duty it was to support the clergy in the preservation of orthodoxy and who, on their own account, mistrusted popular movements of any kind, especially when, as was often the case with the Darwish Orders, they were associated with particularist aspirations. Opposition from these sources has not lessened—it has probably increased—the popularity of the Orders among the masses, who, rather dumbly but quite rightly, are irritated by governments and meddlers of all kinds. The humble have always sympathized with the Orders and have supported them as they support all those who, standing on common ground, can yet point the way to Heaven, and a brighter way than that offered by the cold learning of the official clergy.

For an Islamic Order is a way of life, and so it is called in Arabic a *tariqa*, a road, a path, a way. The various Orders counsel their followers to take different paths, stressing the role of reason or intuition, and differing from one another in the means they advocate of reaching the goal, but the paths lead to the same end, the identification of the soul with God by the elimination of all worldly desires and distractions.

The followers of an Order are aided to reach the desired state 795* in which the body sheds its corporeal garment of the senses by 786 the recitation of a *dhikr*, a religious formula, often accompanied, but not among the Sanusi, by violent rhythmic jerkings of the body and, in certain of the Orders, by music. According to Sufi teachings it should be repeated until even the words no longer make any impression on the senses and nothing but the form of the Divine Name is left. There results a completely passive, or empty, state, known to mystics of all religions, in

*795 which the soul experiences God. It is suffused with knowledge: 786 not with *'ilm*, intellectual and traditional knowledge, but with *ma'rifa*, gnosis, wisdom. The Grand Sanusi and his successors [785] very strongly disapproved of external aids to this end, such as processions, music, movements of the body inducing convulsions, piercing the flesh with sharp implements, and such other means as are used by some Orders, and steered a middle course between the illuminative, or intuitive, school of Sufi writers and *795 the rational, or intellectual, school. Thus Sayyid Ahmad al-Sharif, his grandson, has in his writings, as Moreno points out,[1] exhorted followers of the Order not to depart from the rational, the chief aim of the Sanusiya being to make a man a good Muslim rather than a good mystic. Mysticism is something added to orthodox faith and morals, not a substitute for them.

*795 787 It is for this reason that, as Sayyid Ahmad insists, perfection is to be sought through spiritual identification with the Prophet Muhammad rather than with God, at any rate for ordinary people. This is to be attained by contemplation of the essence of the Prophet and by an inner knowledge of him through constant imitation of his actions, attention to his words, and blessing him. The contemplation should be so intense that veneration of the Prophet pervades the adept till at last he hears only his name and has only his form before the eyes of the intellect. Then the Prophet becomes his sole guide and counsellor.

*795 As this is not a treatise on Sufism there is no need to give further details about the mystical content of the Sanusiya. It should, however, be stressed that the rigorous orthodoxy of the Order, and especially its insistence on conformity to the original teachings of the Prophet, meant that the faith and morals which the Prophet preached to the Bedouin of his day, and which they accepted, were equally suited to the Bedouin of Cyrenaica, who in all essentials were leading, and still lead, a life like to that of the Bedouin in Arabia in the seventh century. In particular, [793] [786] [157] the refusal of the Grand Sanusi to allow the more demonstrative forms of ecstasy, which, together with lack of organization and direction, characterize so many of the Sufi Orders of North Africa, enabled the Bedouin to adopt his teachings and ritual, for Bedouin are an undemonstrative people and it is difficult to imagine them piercing their cheeks with skewers, eating glass,

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[1] M. M. Moreno, *Brevi Nozioni d'Islam*, 1927, p. 58.

795*

or swaying into convulsions. Indeed, it is noticeable that the [793]
Orders which permit such practices, notably the 'Arusiya, [786]
'Isawiya, Rifa'iya, and Sa'adiya, so popular in the towns of [157]
Libya, have made no converts among the true Bedouin.

It is unnecessary to discuss further the mystical side to the 795*
Sanusiya for another reason. The Bedouin of Cyrenaica with 771
whom this book is concerned have only the slightest knowledge of either the religious teachings or the ritual of the Order, and are interested in neither. They belong to the illiterate class of the *Muntasabin*, the simple adherents of the Order who follow
its Shaikh personally and politically. It is very seldom, if ever, [789]
that the Bedouin know the special prayers and litanies of the [212]
Order, and their use of them, if any, is restricted to getting a scribe to write them on paper so that they can sew them up in leather and tie them to their bodies. It is only a tiny educated minority who regularly recite the prayer formulas and litanies.
These are the *Ikhwan*, the Brothers of the Order. They live in 795*
the lodges of the Order and hold prayer-meetings there. Among the Brothers are some who have been raised to the position of Shaikhs of lodges, generally, in past times, after special training at the University of the Order at Jaghbub oasis, where they have received a diploma from the Head of the Order or from one of his family or inner circle. This inner circle, the *Khawass*, consists vaguely to-day of a few senior members of the Sanusi family and two or three learned Brothers and does not function as a Body, but in the past it was, according to Sayyid Muhammad Idris, an official Council controlling the affairs of the Order and was composed of four Shaikhs of the Order, who were not of the Sanusi family, under the presidency of the Head of the
Order, who had to be a member of the founder's family. As [178]
Dr. Adams points out,[1] the fact that this inner circle is no longer a determinate Body indicates a change in the character of the Order, a development of its political, to the detriment of its religious, functions. This development has favoured the interests of the Sanusi family to the disadvantage of the Order as a whole.

The *Shaikh al-Tariqa*, Head of the Order, advised in past 795*
times by his Council, appoints the Shaikhs of the lodges and 793
these Shaikhs can ordain Brothers and the Brothers can receive

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[1] C. C. Adams, 'The Sanusiya Order', *Handbook on Cyrenaica*, 1944, p. 31. [113]

*795 into the Order ordinary members. This is done simply by the [793] two persons concerned shaking hands and reciting the *fatiha*, the opening verse of the Koran, together. These categories can hardly be regarded as grades and I can cite the authority of Sayyid Muhammad Idris to support the opinion that they have never meant more than that some persons were recognized as more learned than others and therefore better qualified to recite the longer and more advanced religious exercises.

II

*795 The Grand Sanusi's desire to create around him a society 793 living the life of primitive Islam and his missionary zeal gave an impression, enhanced by the austerity of his Bedouin followers and the remoteness of the Sahara, of excessive puritanism and fanaticism; and some writers have compared the Sanusi movement to the Wahhabi movement on account of these supposed 114 traits. Duveyrier's account,[1] used very uncritically by other *795 writers, is largely to be blamed for the exaggerated stories of 648 the secrecy, puritanism, fanaticism, power, and numbers of the Order that were current at the end of the last century and in the first decade of the present century and which much prejudiced it in the eyes of European Powers with interests in North Africa. With Duveyrier it was an axiom that any foolhardy European who got himself killed in North and Central Africa had been assassinated by Sanusi agents and that any setback to French interests was due to their propaganda.

*795 It is true that the Grand Sanusi, like the founder of the 793 Wahhabi movement, aimed at restoring what he conceived to 784 be the original society of the Prophet. Neither was peculiar in doing so, for every Muslim preacher must have the same aim. 114 The Grand Sanusi forbad the drinking of alcohol and the taking [273] of snuff and at first, though not absolutely, smoking. But all [276] Muslims are forbidden alcohol and many who are neither Sanusi nor Wahhabi think that smoking is best avoided. It is [272] untrue, as has been asserted, that the Sanusi are forbidden coffee. The Bedouin of Libya do not drink coffee, only tea, in

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[1] H. Duveyrier, *La Confrérie Musulmane de Sidi Mohammed ben 'Alî es Senoûsî et son Domaine géographique en l'Année 1300 de l'Hégire = 1883 de notre ère*, 1884.

795*

praise of which many poems have been written by Brothers of 793
the Order. The Grand Sanusi forbad music, dancing, and singing 784
in the recitations of the Order, but in this he was at one with 114
all the official spokesmen of Islam. Most reformist movements [272]
in Islam tend towards asceticism. [533]

Far from being extreme ascetics, however, the Sanusi [536]
Brothers eat and dress well, even using scent, and are amiable 795*
and merry companions. The Tunisian scholar and traveller 157
Muhammad 'Uthman al-Hashaishi, who travelled in 1896 via [785]
Malta, Tripoli, and Banghazi to Kufra to visit al-Sayyid al-Mahdi and met the leading Brothers of the time, remarks that 'they are fond of diversions, honest jesting. I have visited many of their zawiyas and I have made the acquaintance of many of their notables: I have seen only cheerful and smiling faces, welcoming me with benevolence and kindness. May God reward them!'[1]

The Grand Sanusi discouraged the trappings of poverty by 795*
his example, his exhortations, and his insistence on the Brothers 793
being self-supporting. Although the Heads of the Sanusiya 735
Order, like the Wahhabi leaders, encouraged settlement on the land, they can hardly have hoped to have greatly influenced the Bedouin to this end; but they insisted on the lodges of the Order supporting themselves by agriculture supplemented by stock-raising, and thereby took a stand against *ittikal*, the dependence for livelihood on alms and not on labour which some mendicant Orders have advocated.

The Order has always been, in fact, conventional as well as 795*
orthodox. In its early period it was essentially a missionary 797
Order with the limited aim of bringing by peaceful persuasion the Bedouin Arabs and the peoples of the Sahara and the Sudan to a fuller understanding of the beliefs and morals of Islam, while giving them at the same time the blessings of civilization: justice, peace, trade, and education. Its principles were, as Shaikh Muhammad 'Uthman says, simply 'to do good and avoid evil'.[2]

The accusation of fanaticism is not borne out by either the 795*
character of the Bedouin adherents of the Order or by its actions.

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[1] Mohammed ben Otsmane el-Hachaichi, *Voyage au Pays des Senoussia à travers La Tripolitaine et les Pays Touareg*, 1912, p. 128 (1st ed., 1903). [113]

[2] Ibid., p. 86.

*795 The desire to establish in North Africa conditions in which
793 Muslims might live by their own laws and under their own
798 government, as they did in Arabia under the first four Caliphs, led the Grand Sanusi and his successors to oppose the Turkish
177 way of life and the influences and innovations of Western Christendom, but their intransigence in these matters did not imply intolerance, far less aggressiveness. Though some writers have made assertions to the contrary, the Sanusi have never shown themselves more hostile than other Muslims to Christians and Jews, and the Grand Sanusi and Sayyid al-Mahdi scrupulously avoided all political entanglements which might bring them into unfriendly relations with neighbouring States and the European Powers. The Brothers of the Order
*795 were discouraged from discussing political questions. Nor were
793 the Sanusi intolerant towards fellow Muslims who differed from
798 them. Shaikh Muhammed 'Uthman records of Sayyid al-Mahdi that 'the persons he dislikes the most are those who speak ill of Muslims'.[1] The leaders of the Sanusiya have always tolerated other and rival Orders, even when they have disapproved of their rites. The Grand Sanusi had himself been a member of a succession of Orders before he started his own and he allowed, as his successors have done, members of other Orders to belong to the Sanusiya at the same time.

*795 The leaders of the Order have also been tolerant towards the
792 cult of saints, unlike the iconoclastic Wahhabi, who have destroyed even the tombs of those nearest to the Prophet him-
798 self. The view held by the doctors of orthodox Islam is that,
776 though intercession through a saint is unlawful and the only
778 mention of him during prayers at his tomb should be to ask the mercy of God on his soul, it is permissible to show respect to his tomb and his memory. The heads of the Sanusiya have, however, always tolerated among their Bedouin followers a regard for holy men and their tombs which goes beyond mere respect. It is unlikely that they felt any repugnance to the cult, because they counted among their forbears several saints and were themselves brought up in North Africa where the cult of saints is widespread and very near to the hearts of the common people; and they could not have remonstrated with the Bedouin for believing that holy men and their tombs are sources of *baraka*,

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[1] Op. cit., p. 121.

795*

divine blessing, since it was because the Bedouin believed the [792]
Sanusi family had the same virtue that they accepted their [798]
leadership. [776]

The resemblance often alleged between the Sanusi and the [778]
Wahhabi movements, on the grounds of like puritanism, 795*
literalism, and fanaticism, cannot be substantiated. It is 171
obvious that there must be resemblances between new religious [114]
movements: they usually claim to be a return to primitive faith and morals and they are generally missionary and enthusiastic. There is no great significance in such common characteristics of the two movements. Nor is there any reason to suppose that the Grand Sanusi was directly influenced by Wahhabi propaganda. A more significant comparison between the two might be made by tracing their developments from religious into political movements. Both started as religious revivals among backward peoples, chiefly Bedouin, the Wahhabi movement in the Nadj in the eighteenth century and the Sanusi movement first in the Hijaz and then in Cyrenaica in the middle of the nineteenth century; the *Ikhwan* organizations of the two movements have much in common; and both ended in the formation of Amirates, or small Islamic States.

Both movements have created States, the Wahhabi in Arabia and the Sanusi in Cyrenaica, based explicitly on religious particularism. In doing so they have only done what any movement of the kind is bound to do in a barbarous country if it is to continue to exist, namely, to create an administrative system which would ensure a measure of peace, security, justice, and economic stability. A religious organization cannot exist apart from a polity of a wider kind. But they did not create the sentiment of community which made the growth of governmental functions and the emergence of a State possible.

Religious divisions in Islam have commonly been the expres- 795*
sion of a sense of social and cultural exclusiveness. The support 182
given to the 'Alids in Persia and Arabia, to the Umayyads in 177
Africa and Spain, to the Fatimids in Egypt, to the Kharijites 171
by the Berbers in North Africa, and the adoption of extreme Shi'ite doctrines by the mountaineers of Syria and by the Kurds, and of Isma'ili teachings in parts of India, were all reactions against foreign domination as much as revolts against orthodoxy. The religious deviation was the expression of the intense desire

*795 of a people to live according to their own traditions and institutions.
182 To-day this desire is expressed in the political language
177 of nationalism. In the past it was expressed in religious movements.
171 Arab nationalism is not a new phenomenon. Only its
[668] dress is new.

*795 As will be seen in the chapters which follow, conditions in
Cyrenaica were particularly favourable to the growth of a
182 politico-religious movement such as the Sanusiya became. It
was cut off by deserts from neighbouring countries, it had a homogeneous population, it had a tribal system which embraced common traditions and a strong feeling of community of blood, the country was not dominated by the towns, and the Turkish administration exercised very little control over the interior. It was, as will be seen, the tribal system of the Bedouin which furnished the Order with its political foundations just as it was the tribesmen of the country whose hardiness and courage enabled it to stand up to the succession of defeats it had to endure.

*795 The reasons for the political success of the Sanusiya Order in
793 Cyrenaica will appear in the course of this account, and here I
wish to draw attention to one of them only. It has been said
182 that its rites and teachings were, like the Bedouin character,
[792] austere without being fanatical, and that it tolerated the cult
[798] of saints to which the Bedouin were accustomed, the Grand
Sanusi becoming, in fact, a kind of national saint; but it must be added that the acceptability of its teachings and the fact that the Grand Sanusi could at once be placed by the Bedouin in the familiar category of *Marabtin*, holy men coming to preach and settle in Cyrenaica from the west, cannot alone account for the remarkable success of the Sanusiya movement. The Bedouin of Cyrenaica had heard similar teachings before from similar teachers and had paid them the same degree of attention as they paid to the Grand Sanusi, but these earlier missionaries won only a personal and local following for themselves and their descendants, whereas the Grand Sanusi established himself and his family as leaders of a national movement, a position they have now held for three generations.
Leaving aside the remarkable personality of the Grand Sanusi
[792] and without here discussing whether the time at which he
[798] taught was particularly favourable to the growth of the move-

ment to which his teachings led, it may be said that the great 795*
difference between the Grand Sanusi and the earlier holy men 793
whose tombs are homely landmarks all over Cyrenaica was that, 182
while they were, all of them, in the eyes of the Bedouin, Mara- [792]
bouts, the Grand Sanusi was also the head of an Order which [778]
gave to him and his successors an organization. Moreover, unlike the Heads of most Islamic Orders, which have rapidly disintegrated into autonomous segments without contact and common direction, they have been able to maintain this organization intact and keep control of it. This they were able to do by co-ordinating the lodges of the Order to the tribal structure.

III

The more recent Islamic Orders are to be found principally 795*
in North and West Africa. The Sanusiya is one of the most 793
recent of them. Its founder was an Algerian scholar, al-Sayyid 159
Muhammad bin 'Ali al-Sanusi al-Khattabi al-Idrisi al-Hasani,
a very remarkable man, mystic, missionary, and Marabout. 175*
The Sayyid Muhammad bin 'Ali al-Sanusi is usually spoken of in Cyrenaica as *al-Sanusi al-Kabir*, the Grand Sanusi, and I generally refer to him thus in this book.

The Grand Sanusi was born of a distinguished family of Sharifs at a village near Mustaghanim in Algeria about 1787. Early in life he became noted for his intelligence, piety, and profound learning, considered fitting ornaments to his noble birth. He studied first at Mustaghanim, then at Mazun, and later at the famous mosque school at Fez in Morocco, where he learnt theology, jurisprudence, exegesis of the Koran, and the other usual subjects of a Muslim student of the time. There he seems to have developed an interest in mysticism, having come under the influence of the Moroccan Order of the Tijaniya Darwishes. He left Fez when in the early thirties in order to make the pilgrimage to Mecca, though a Turkish biographer says that one of his reasons for leaving Morocco was to avoid possible unpleasantness with the authorities, who were alarmed lest his propaganda for the greater unity of Islam, his life's aim, might have political consequences.[1] They had small cause for alarm as his efforts seem to have made little impression on the

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[1] Salim bin 'Amir, *Majallat 'Umar al-Mukhtar*, No. II, 1943-4, p. 2.

*795 people of Fez, but, if the story is true, the suspicion of those in
793 authority would have been his first experience of the kind of
159 opposition he was later to encounter in Cairo and Mecca.

*175 He went from Fez to southern Algeria and thence to Qabis, Tripoli, Misurata, and Banghazi, preaching everywhere or his way. He had already gathered around him his first disciples (*Ikhwan*), mostly Algerians, and in their company he made his way to Egypt by the coastal route from Banghazi and stayed there a few weeks. He had intended to study at al-Azhar, but he seems to have aroused the jealousy of the Shaikhs of the University and to have irritated them by his reforming zeal and his speculations, and so departed for Mecca. Short though his stay in Cairo had been it is probable that the independence of the Khedive Muhammad 'Ali and the cultural and intellectual revival going on there left their mark on his mind.[1]

He remained in the Hijaz for about six years, studying under a number of Shaikhs at Mecca and al-Madina. He is said to have returned to Mustaghanim in about 1829 and not to have visited the Hijaz again till 1833. On this second visit, which lasted for eight years, he was accompanied by a considerable number of disciples from the west. He continued his reformist agitation and his studies under learned Shaikhs at Mecca. The man who influenced him most, and whose favourite pupil he became, was Sayyid Ahmad bin Idris al-Fasi, the fourth Head of the Moroccan Order of the Khadiriya or Khidriya Darwishes, a branch of the Shadhiliya Order, and later the founder of a new sub-Order of his own, the Idrisiya or Khadiriya-Idrisiya. Sayyid Ahmad Idris had aroused the hostility of the doctors of the Maliki rite at Mecca, by whom he was regarded as unorthodox, and went into exile into the Yaman, where he was accompanied for two years by the Grand Sanusi. On Sayyid Ahmad Idris's death in the Yaman, his two chief disciples organized his followers into two new sub-Orders, the Mirghaniya and the Sanusiya, the latter being organized and led by the Grand Sanusi, who established its headquarters at Mt. Abu Qubais, near Mecca, in 1837. This year is regarded as the official date of the foundation of the Order.

It will have been noted that the Grand Sanusi was influenced by a wide range of Sufi tradition and had affiliated himself to a

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[1] Salim bin 'Amir, *Majallat 'Umar al-Mukhtar*, No. I, p. 12.

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number of Orders before he founded his own. It has been recorded that he was influenced by the Moroccan Tijaniya Order and that at Mecca he became the favourite pupil of the founder of the Idrisiya Order, which derived its tenets from the basic Shadhiliya Order. In his student days he became a member of other Orders: Shadhiliya, Nasiriya, Qadariya, and perhaps others.[1] His catholicism was not peculiar among the Sufis, and in his case he seems to have joined a large variety of Orders with the deliberate intention of learning their rites and doctrines at first hand so that he could combine all that was best in each of them in a new Order which would be the crown of Sufi thought and practice. It must not be supposed that on this account his teaching was a mere amalgam of the tenets of earlier Orders. Original it was not, but it was a consistent and carefully thought out way of life.[2]

The new Sanusiya Order made such rapid progress, especially among the Bedouin of the Hijaz,[3] that it excited the jealousy and fear of the various authorities in Mecca, the *'Ulama*, the Sharifs, and the Turkish Administration. There can be little doubt that the real objections to the Order were that it threatened the prestige and privileges of these authorities, but they were framed in less revealing language. It seems to have been held against the Order that it lowered Sufi standards to accommodate itself to Bedouin laxity in religious matters, and that it verged on heresy. [798]

Faced with serious opposition the Grand Sanusi did what his teacher Sayyid Ahmad Idris had done in similar circumstances: he left the Hijaz, in about 1841, accompanied by many of his disciples, to return to his native land. After spending some months in Cairo, he continued his journey westwards to Siwa oasis, where he was taken sick and spent several weeks recuperating and instructing the people of the oasis in the faith. In the following year he reached Tripoli by the desert route. On his way to Qabis from that town he heard of the new French advances in his homeland and decided in view of them to return to Tripoli and thence to Banghazi. It would appear therefore

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[1] Ibid., p. 6; Adams, op. cit., p. 22.

[2] Carlo Giglio, *La Confraternità Senussita dalle sue Origini ad Oggi*, 1932, p. 17.

[3] A. Le Chatelier, *Les Confréries Musulmanes du Hedjaz*, 1887, *passim*.

*795 that he did not choose Cyrenaica as his field of labour but was
793 compelled to settle in Libya for a time because the road to the
159 west was closed by the French and the road to the east by the
*175 authorities in Cairo and Mecca. The Grand Sanusi was a
cosmopolitan, a townsman, and more at home in the schools and libraries of Fez, Cairo, and Mecca than amid the lentisk and juniper of the Cyrenaican plateau or the thyme and wormwood of its rolling plains. Even after founding in 1843 what has become the Mother Lodge of the Order, al-Zawiya al-Baida, on the central Cyrenaican plateau, not far from the ancient city of Cyrene, and while the Sanusi movement was still young in the country, he returned in 1846 to Mecca and stayed there till 1853. Altogether he spent only about ten years of his teaching life in Cyrenaica, whereas he spent some twenty years in the Hijaz.

On his return to Cyrenaica he seems to have felt the need for greater solitude. He was then nearing seventy years of age and doubtless felt that what was left to him of life should be given
*[648] to contemplation, prayer, and study. It may be true also, as is
commonly stated in books written by Europeans, that he desired to place a wide stretch of desert between himself and the Turkish authorities who, as the Sanusiya movement grew, began to take greater interest in it. He therefore first went to live for a short while at al-'Azziyyat on the southern edge of the plateau, where he built a zawiya, and afterwards at Jaghbub, about 160 km. from the sea.

[873] Jaghbub, now to become the centre of the Order and the seat
of an Islamic University second only in Africa to al-Azhar, was till 1856, when the Grand Sanusi made it his seat, an uninhabited oasis, in which the water was brackish, highly sulphurous, and insufficient to irrigate more than a small area of gardens. It was not a place for luxurious living, though it seems to have been healthy and, unlike Siwa, free from malaria; but it had certain political advantages. It was out of reach of
*[648] the Turkish, French, or Egyptian governments, it was on the
[487] main pilgrimage route from North-west Africa through Egypt
to Mecca, and this pilgrimage route bisected at the oasis one of the trade routes from the coast to the Sahara and the Sudan. Moreover, since Cyrenaica is a peninsula, it was the most central point he could have chosen at that time to be in equal

795*
touch with the lodges of his Order in Cyrenaica, Tripolitania, 793
the Western Desert of Egypt, and the Sudan. 159
175*

In moving the seat of his Order to Jaghbub, the Grand Sanusi was probably most influenced by his decision to direct 795*
his missionary propaganda southwards. It is understandable 797
that he should have made this decision. His was a missionary 793
159
175*


Scale
0 500 1,000 1,500 kms.
Italian expansion into Tripolitania and Cyrenaica
1911 – 1932
MOROCCO
ALGERIA
TUNISIA
TRIPOLITANIA
CYRENAICA
Al-Baida (1843)
Mizda
Al-Tabaqa
Saukna
Jaghbub
Jalu (1856)
British line of defence 1914-1917
Wau-al-Kabir
Kufra (1895)
FEZZAN
EGYPT
french expansion into the Sahara
1902 – 1914
Kawar
TIBESTI
Qiru (1899)
BORKU
ENNEDI
KANEM
ANGLO EGYPTIAN SUDAN
FRENCH SAHARA
CHAD
WADAI
DARFUR
Thin arrows indicate Sanusiya expansion
Thick arrows indicate movements of European Powers

795*
648*
175*
131
102

The Spread of the Sanusiya in North Africa.

mind and the Order he had founded a missionary Order, and 795*
the pagan and semi-pagan countries of the Sahara and the 793
Sudan, and of Equatorial Africa beyond them, offered endless 797
scope for conversion to the faith. Moreover, his Order was 159
already reaching the limits of its expansion in North Africa. 175*
It had won over the nomad and semi-nomad Bedouin tribes of Cyrenaica, Tripolitania, and Egypt, and the oases folk under their influence, but was not making, and was not even in its heyday to make, much impression on the peasants and townsmen up against whom it now found itself in Northern Tripolitania and the Nile Valley. Dammed to west and east the Order

[Facing P. 16]



THE TOMB OF THE GRAND SANUSI (HASANAIN PASHA)

3:Evans-Pritchard E-4, 5 (1942-1944) 1949 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9
(1837-1942)
Sanusi

795*
793
764
531

*795 poured its vitality southwards along the trade routes to the
793 interior of Africa, into Fazzan and the various regions that are
797 to-day called the French Sahara and French Equatorial Africa.
159 Until France opened up the Atlantic seaboard, much of the
*175 Central African trade found its way along the oases-routes to the ports of Cyrenaica and Tripolitania and there were, therefore, well-established social connexions running from the Bedouin tribes of Cyrenaica and southern Tripolitania through the oases-dwellers to the tribes of the interior, for the nomads of Libya controlled the routes and to a large extent supplied the transport for the caravans. These connexions allowed an easy ingress to the Sanusiya. The two Cyrenaican tribes who chiefly traded with the Sahara, the Majabra and the Zuwaya of the oases of Jalu and al-Jikharra, had already been won over to the Order. The Zuwaya, who had date groves in the distant oasis archipelago of Kufra, over 700 km. to the south of Jaghbub, had already promised the Grand Sanusi a liberal donation of palms and water if he would build a zawiya there, and he had sent one of his followers to supervise the erection at al-Jauf of a lodge which became known as Zawiyat al-Ustad. Also, the Order had gained a foothold in the Wadai. While still a student at Mecca the Grand Sanusi had made friends with Muhammad Sharif, a prince of the Wadai, who in 1838 became Sultan of that country and furthered the interests of the Order there. It is said also that the Grand Sanusi bought a caravan of slaves on its way from the Wadai through Jaghbub to the coast and, having freed and educated them, sent them back to the Wadai as his missionaries.[1] The Order was also infiltrating from Mizda in southern Tripolitania, where a lodge was founded in 1845, and from the lodges in the oases of the Sirtican hinterland into Fazzan.

*795 In Jaghbub oasis the Grand Sanusi set about the construc-
793 tion of his headquarters, a large mass of stone buildings, some
of them two-storied, enclosing a mosque and school which were,
159 for Cyrenaica, on an imposing scale. Around these central
*175 buildings and courts were the houses of the *Ikhwan*, many of
346 them teachers in the school, of the students, of whom Shaikh Muhammad 'Uthman says that there were over 300,[2] and of the Sayyid's family. There were also guest-rooms, quarters for the

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[1] Duveyrier, op. cit., pp. 18-19.

[2] Op. cit., p. 88.

795*

slaves, kitchens, and wells. The oasis depression was studded 793
with date palms and just outside the main entrance to the village 159
were small irrigated gardens and wind-mills. The people had 175*
to use the brackish water for ordinary purposes, but sufficient [346]
fresh water for tea was obtained from infrequent showers by [241]
hollowing out cisterns in the rocks at the top of the western [379]
escarpment of the oasis. [312]

The Grand Sanusi was not only a very learned man and a [217]
writer of distinction but also a bibliophile with a fine library of some 8,000 volumes,[1] mostly works on Islamic law and jurisprudence, mysticism, philosophy, history, koranic exegesis, poetry, and astronomy and astrology. Round him were many men capable of making good use of this substantial library. Indeed, it would have been difficult to have found anywhere in the Islamic world at that time, outside Cairo, a circle of better scholars. Poetry was one of the arts most cultivated at the oasis and I have been told by Arabs that it reached a high level of excellence. Shaikh Muhammad 'Uthman, himself a poet, wrote that at Jaghbub one meets 'literary men of distinction, whose writings eclipse those of the poets of Iraq and of Andalousia'.[2]

The whole community at Jaghbub may have numbered round about 1,000, but it is not possible to make more than a guess at the figure. As the oasis produces little except dates, the supply problem must have been considerable, and we know that the Grand Sanusi kept herds of camels to the west of the oasis, where there is scrub grazing, and at al-'Azziyyat, to transport supplies from the coast. The community lived very largely on the surplus revenues, mostly goods in kind, sent annually by all the zawiyas of Cyrenaica.

The community was centred round the University. It was, [873]
in fact, almost purely a University society, and its importance as such in the history of the Sanusiya Order is very considerable. Here, under his personal supervision and the supervision of his disciples, far from worldly distractions, the Grand Sanusi was able to train the future leaders of the Order. The Shaikhs of the lodges of the Order were appointed by him from among his intimate circle of disciples, many of whom had followed him

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[1] Duveyrier, op. cit., p. 24; Muhammad bin 'Uthman, op. cit., p. 88; Sir Richard Burton, *Personal Narrative of a Pilgrimage to al-Madinah and Meccah* (Memorial Edition), 1893, vol. ii, pp. 24–5.

[2] Op. cit., p. 88.

*795 from Algeria and the other countries of the Maghrib on his
793 travels backwards and forwards to Arabia. He found in
159 Cyrenaica a tribal structure of a simple kind on which it was
*175 possible to build a missionary organization, but not out of which it could be built. He brought this organization with him to Cyrenaica, a band of devoted followers whose allegiance had been tried by many vicissitudes. It must be remembered also that these intimates of the Grand Sanusi were foreigners to the Bedouin of Cyrenaica, with whom they had no ties of kinship, so that they stood always outside the tribal system and were not involved in the ancient loyalties and feuds inherent in Bedouin society. The missionary organization, the Sanusiya
*795 Order, was separate from the tribal system, and by centring
793 it in the distant oasis of Jaghbub the Grand Sanusi prevented it
797 from becoming identified with any one tribe or section of the
159 country, as it might have become had it been centred in Cyrenaica
*175 proper. As we will see, it was the local attachment of the tribes to the zawiyas in their territories, and the attachment of the Shaikhs of these zawiyas to the Head of the Order, which made the Order so effective a missionary Body, and eventually enabled it to become a political force.

*795 The Grand Sanusi died at Jaghbub on 7 September 1859 and
793 was buried there. Later a magnificent shrine, furnished with
ornate trappings, was erected over his bones and was sur-
159 mounted with a white cupola, which gleams several miles away
*175 as one approaches the oasis. The shrine is of Egyptian craft-
764 manship and seems incongruous in its desert surroundings and
[177] unfamiliar among a simple people.

There can be no gainsaying that al-Sayyid Muhammad bin
*795 'Ali al-Sanusi was a great man and his life's work a great
793 achievement. He is said to have been tall and of a distinguished
159 appearance, an eloquent speaker, and a wise teacher.[1] His religious personality may be estimated by the fact that many Algerians, Tunisians, and Moroccans were so inspired by his teaching and example that they left their homes and followed him on his travels and at his orders went as missionaries into new lands, and by the fact that the Bedouin of Arabia and Libya, who are a reserved and unheeding people, accepted him as their guide in things both spiritual and temporal.

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[1] Adams, op. cit., p. 10.

The mere physical achievement of the man was remarkable. 795*
He had studied assiduously since he was a small boy in the 793
Koranic school of his home and in other schools of North Africa 159
and Arabia, and was still acquiring and sifting knowledge in his 175*
library at Jaghbub up to his death. He had taught in the schools in Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Tripolitania, Cyrenaica, Egypt, the Hijaz, and the Yaman. Months of his life had been spent in travelling by the slow camel caravans of those days. He had [788]
thrice made the pilgrimage to Mecca. In spite of these activities he had found time to write a number of treatises. He had started his career as the head of a new missionary Order late in life—he was about 50 years of age when he founded his first zawiya in Arabia, and in the next twenty years he had made the Sanusiya the dominant Order in western Arabia and in North Africa from the Nile Valley to the borders of Tunisia and from the Mediterranean to the Sahara. When he died it was still intensifying its activities in the areas where it was already dominant, building everywhere new lodges, and was still expanding, mainly into the Sahara and the Sudan.

IV

When the Grand Sanusi died his two surviving sons, al-Sayyid Muhammad al-Mahdi and al-Sayyid Muhammad al-Sharif, were minors, so a regency of ten Shaikhs was appointed to control the affairs of the Order till the elder, Muhammad al-Mahdi, was old enough to take over their direction. When he did so he dealt primarily with the general affairs of the Order, leaving religious instruction in the hands of his brother.

The Grand Sanusi had been typical of the great itinerant teachers of his day: international in outlook and intent on the pursuit of holiness and learning rather than guided by secular distractions and ambitions. Mecca was the centre of his world and to it he tended always to gravitate. The Sayyid al-Mahdi was more definitely a Cyrenaican. Born in 1844 in a cave at Massa, near the Cyrenaican Mother Lodge of al-Baida, he was brought up among the religious families of the country and among the Bedouin. He studied under his father, the erudite Moroccan Sidi Ahmad al-Rifi, Sidi 'Ali bin 'abd al-Maula, Sidi 'Umran bin Baraka, and others of his father's circle of pupil-

[TEXT CONTINUED ON PAGE 21]

3:Evans-Pritchard E-4.5 (1942-1944) 1949 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9
(1837-1942)
Sanusi

[P.20]

*795
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*175


al-Sayyid Muhammad bin 'Ali al-Sanusi
(1787–1859)
al-Sayyid Muhammad al-Mahdi
(1844–1902)
al-Sayyid Muhammad al-Sharif
(1846–1896)
al-Sayyid Muhammad Idris
(1889–)
al-Sayyid Muhammad al-Rida
(1890–)
al-Sayyid Ahmad al-Sharif
(1873–1933)
al-Sayyid Muhammad 'Abid
(1881–1939)
al-Sayyid 'Ali al-Khattab
(1888–1918)
al-Sayyid Muhammad Hilal
(1893–1929)
al-Sayyid Muhammad Safi al-Din
(1895–)
al-Sayyid al-Saddiq
(1908–)
al-Sayyid al-Hasan
(1913–1938
al-Sayyid Shams al-Din
(1908–)
al-Sayyid al-Hasan
(1913–)

savants, and later at Mecca. He is said to have been an eloquent 795*
and inspiring leader and he was evidently an able organizer. 793
Unlike his father the Grand Sanusi and his nephew Sayyid 159
Ahmad al-Sharif he has left no writings behind and he seems 175*
to have had less interest than they in literature and speculation.
He lived an austere life and was considered by his followers to
have been a saint and worker of miracles as great, or greater,
than his father.

The Order expanded considerably under Sayyid al-Mahdi's
leadership, particularly into the Sahara and the Sudan, and its
greatly extended missionary enterprises demanded his personal
attention. The conversion of the heathen and semi-heathen [797]
tribes of these regions created political problems and the trading
activities of the Order required organization. The trade routes [487]
through the Libyan oases to the coast had increased in importance
since the rise of the Sudanese Mahdi in 1881 had closed
the Nile route. Personal direction was difficult from Jaghbub,
so in 1895 Sayyid al-Mahdi moved the seat of the Order to
Kufra, a more central position than Jaghbub in the theocratic
empire being slowly built up. He first went to live at the
zawiya of al-Ustad but shortly afterwards built a new zawiya,
in which he resided, on a site which became known as al-Taj.
He departed from Jaghbub amid the lamentations of his
followers, only some of whom he was able to take with him to
Kufra, leaving the rest behind at Jaghbub, with his nephew al-Sayyid
Muhammad 'Abid as his titular representative there. 175*

There are few places in the world so remote as Kufra oasis, 795*
but it was at the centre of the Sanusi empire and the meeting- 793
place of a number of important desert routes. Before Sayyid 159
al-Mahdi made it the seat of his Order, Kufra had been little 487
more than a watering place for caravans and the centre for the 437
wandering Tibbu tribes of the region, though the Zuwaya of [361]
al-Jikharra went there each year to collect dates. It now became
an emporium through which caravans were constantly passing
and exchange was carried on. The Sanusiya profited both
by directly engaging in trade and transport and through
customs dues.

The little village of mud and palmwood houses at al-Taj also 795*
became a centre of religious life and propaganda. The mis- 793
sionary efforts of the Order intensified all over Fazzan and into 159
175*
[797]

*795 the territories of Kawar, Tibesti, Borku, Ennedi, Darfur,
793 Wadai, Kanem, Chad, the Azger, the Air, and Baghirmi. Its
797 teachings were spread as far as Senegal. The work of organizing
159 this propaganda fell largely to Sayyid al-Mahdi's two principal
*175 lieutenants. Sidi Muhammad al-Barrani operated in Kanem,
where he founded a lodge at Bir Alali on the route to Chad and
*795 organized bands among the Aulad Suliman, Zuwaya, Majabra,
793 Tibbu, and especially the Tuwariq, to oppose the advance of
159 the French into Central Africa; and afterwards in the Borku.
*175 Muhammad al-Sunni, and his son al-Mahdi, operated in Bornu
and Baghirmi, where he entered into relations, politically un-
*648 fruitful, with the Sultans of those countries, and in the Wadai, where he strengthened the good relations existing between the Sultan of that country and Sayyid al-Mahdi. In 1899 Sayyid al-Mahdi transferred the seat of his Order to Qiru (or Quru) oasis, between Borku and Tibesti, to direct better its propaganda, to administer the extensive regions won to it, and to organize resistance to the French.

It is sometimes said in European books that one reason why
[114] Sayyid al-Mahdi went from Jaghbub to Kufra was his desire to increase the distance between himself and the Turkish Administration of Cyrenaica, but I have not found any evidence to support this view. On the other hand there can be no doubt that he was alarmed by the military and political activities of the French, about which he seems to have been well informed. The French were hastening to reach the limits of the sphere allotted to them by the agreements with England of 1898 and 1899 about the partition of Central Africa. In January 1902 they seized Bir Alali (Kanem) and destroyed the Sanusiya zawiya there. At the end of May, or at the beginning of June, in the same year Sayyid al-Mahdi died. His brother, Sayyid Muhammad al-Sharif, had predeceased him at Jaghbub in 1896.

*795 In general the energies of the Sayyid al-Mahdi had been
793 directed to the Sahara and the Sudan and the main events during
159 his headship of the Order took place off the Cyrenaican stage.
*175 I have not thought it necessary, therefore, to give more than a
brief summary of his career and of the political history of the Order in Central Africa. He saw the Order his father had founded rise under his direction to the height of its expansion

and political importance. Except for two or three lodges 795*
founded after his death the distribution of the lodges shown on 793
the map—two in Algeria, and some elsewhere which were not 159
completed, are not marked—is that of 1902. All the Bedouin 175*
of Cyrenaica and of the Sirtica, and most of those in the Western Desert of Egypt, followed the Order and there was no part of these regions which had not established in it a Sanusiya lodge; and even in the towns of Cyrenaica it had an influential following in the more cultured administrative and commercial circles. In southern Tripolitania the Order had slowly increased its authority and advanced it to the west, while it was the dominant power in Fazzan and in the central Sahara. It had retained a powerful following among the Bedouin of the Hijaz.

After Sayyid al-Mahdi's death the fortunes of the Order 795*
declined. This was chiefly due to the attack on it by the powers 793
of Europe whose greed for possessions in Africa and Asia was 159
bringing them rapidly to disaster. For his part Sayyid al-Mahdi 175*
showed himself anxious to avoid any action which might enable 648*
these powers to accuse him of political designs. He wished only to be left alone to worship God according to the teachings of his Prophet, and when in the end he fought the French it was in defence of the religious life as he understood it. In its remarkable diffusion in North and Central Africa the Order never once resorted to force to back its missionary labours. Shaikh Muhammad 'Uthman says of Sayyid al-Mahdi that the only orders he gave his followers were to pray and to obey God and His Prophet, that he avoided making any show of his power, considerable though it was, and that he held himself apart from political questions, fleeing from all considerations of that kind.[1] The Sanusiya Order co-operated with the Turks in the administration of Cyrenaica, although the Sanusi family and the Brothers of the Order disapproved of their way of life, but it resisted Turkish demands for assistance in their war of 1876–8 against the Russians. It refused the aid asked for by 'Arabi Pasha in Egypt in 1882, and by the Sudanese Mahdi in 1883, against the British. Sayyid al-Mahdi likewise rejected diplomatic overtures by the Italians and Germans. But when the French invaded its Saharan territories and destroyed its religious houses, and when later the Italians, also without

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[1] Op. cit., pp. 118–19.

[TEXT CONTINUED ON PAGE 26]

3:Evans-Pritchard E-4, 5 (1942-1944) 1949 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9 (1837-1942) Sanusi

102
*795
171

[P.24]


ALGERIA
TUNISIA
TRIPOLITANIA
CYRENAICA
see inset
FAZZAN
AL-KAFARA
WESTERN DESERT OF EGYPT
ARABIA
SUDAN
WEST AFRICA
CYRENAICA
Scale
kms. 0 50 100
Scale
0 250 500 750 1,000 kms.

Distribution of Sanusiya Lodges in North Africa and Arabia.

CYRENAICA

1 al-Jarfan
2 Umm Rukba
3 Janzur
4 al-Marassas
5 Umm al-Razam
6 Umm Hafain
7 Martuba
8 Darna
9 al-'Azziyyat
10 Mara
11 Khashm Rzaiq
12 Maraziq
13 Bishara
14 Tart
15 Shahhat
16 al-Fayidiya
17 al-Makhili
18 al-Nayyan
19 al-Hamama
20 al-Haniya
21 al-Zawiya al-Baida
22 Qafanta
23 al-'Arqub
24 al-Qasrain
25 Talmaitha
26 Anbalu al-Huwaiz
27 Mirad Mas'ud
28 Qarabarbi
29 al-Marj
30 al-Qasur
31 Taukra
32 Dariyana
33 Asqafa
34 Banghazi
35 Umm al-Shakhanab
36 al-Tailimun
37 Msus
38 al-Qatafiya
39 Aujila
40 al-'Arq
41 al-Libba
42 al-Jikharra
43 al-Khatt
44 Marada
45 Jaghbub

EGYPT

46 al-Akhsab
47 al-Shih (Barrani)
48 al-Mithnan
49 Shammas
50 Najaila
51 Umm al-Rakham
52 Baqush (Sidi Harun)
53 '*Ailat* Bin Musa
54 Fuka
55 al-'Awama
56 al-Jamaima (al-Dhaba)
57 Abu-Shinaina
58 al-Hammam
59 Sidi Musa
60 Yadim al-Abairish
61 al-Ghait
62 Haush 'Isa
63 al-Qara
64 Gharmi
65 al-Zaitun
66 al-Sabukha
67 al-Gharbiya
68 Taba'
69 al-Bawiti
70 Mandisha
71 Farafra
72 al-Qasr
73 al-Rashda
74 Balat
75 Ismant
76 al-Qalamun

ARABIA

77 al-Wajh
78 al-Ais
79 al-Madina
80 al-Haura
81 Yanbu' al-Nakhl
82 Yanbu' al-Bahr
83 al-Khaif
84 al-Safra
85 Subh
86 Badr
87 Ziba
88 Rabigh
89 Jidda
90 Abu Qubais (Makka)
91 al-Tayif
92 Muna
93 al-Husainiya

TRIPOLITANIA

94 Ghadamis
95 Darj
96 Sinawin
97 al-Haraba
98 al-Rujban
99 al-Qal'a
100 Mizda
101 Tarabulis
102 Masallata
103 Bani Walid
104 Misurata (2)
105 Sirt
106 al-Naufiliya
107 al-Tabaqa
108 Hun
109 Saukna
110 Waddan
111 Zalla

FAZZAN

112 al-Fuqha
113 Birqin
114 Sabha
115 Ghudwa
116 Dlaim
117 Murzuq
118 Taghaghan
119 Umm al-Aranab
120 Zuwila
121 Tamassa
122 al-Qatrun
123 Wau al-Kabir
124 Wau al-Namus
125 Ghath
126 Qanit

AL KAFARA

127 Tazirabu
128 Bazima
129 Ribiyana
130 al-Hawari
131 al-Taj
132 al-Jauf

SUDAN

133 Bardai
134 Quru
135 Wajanqa al-Kabira
136 Wajanqa al-Saghaira
137 Yarda
138 'Ain Kalak
139 Faya
140 al-Fashir
141 Jabal Murrah
142 Abaish
143 Bir Alali
144 Jajiduna
145 Zinder
146 Kano

[p. 25]

102
795*
171

3:Evans-Pritchard E-4, 5 (1942-1944) 1949 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9
(1837-1942)
Sanusi

*795

*175 provocation, did the same in Cyrenaica, the Order had no
[159] choice but to resist.

[793] But though it was attacks from the outside which destroyed
*[648] the theocratic empire of the Sanusiya, it may be considered
doubtful whether in any case such extensive territories could
have been maintained under single direction. The economic
and political organization of the Order was crude, even when
elaborated in the days of Sayyid al-Mahdi in response to
increased trading activities and to the need of maintaining
peace in the petty and barbarous states that had come under
its influence. Its administrative machinery was at no time
adequate for effective control over such wide domains, with
their poor communications and their manifold tribal, racial,
[578] and cultural divergencies. To these weaknesses must be added,
after Sayyid al-Mahdi's death, personal rivalries within the
Sanusi family on the lines of which cracks began to appear in
the loose empire, and it is probable that even if it had not been
attacked by the Powers of Europe it would have broken up
into a number of principalities, or spheres of religious influence,
ruled by various members of the family. It might indeed be
*[648] possible to sustain the thesis that it was the Italian occupation
[182] of Libya which prevented the complete break-up of the Order
by rallying the outraged sentiment of the Bedouin to its side as
the symbol of their common resistance to conquest and alien
rule.

The administrative organization of the Order in the time of
Sayyid al-Mahdi was simple indeed. Each lodge of the Order
[794] lived on its own revenues, derived from endowments, tithes,
contributions of money, goods, transport, and labour, and sent
its surplus to Jaghbub and Kufra for the maintenance of the
University and of the Sanusi family and for the general purposes
[628] of the Order. The Shaikh of each lodge arbitrated in disputes
in the district in which it was situated and could generally
wield spiritual sanctions sufficiently weighty to compel
acceptance of his awards. The Shaikh of a lodge was appointed
by the head of the Order and was responsible to him. There
was, however, so little centralized planning that new lodges
seem occasionally to have been founded by the initiative of
influential families without the head of the Order hearing of the
new foundation till its completion. In the more distant parts

the lodges were largely autonomous, or came under the control 795*
of a local Mother Lodge, such as Mizda in Tripolitania and Abu 175*
Qubais in Arabia. After the death of Sayyid al-Mahdi, a member of the Sanusi family sometimes installed himself as local director of the affairs of the Order, as Sayyid Muhammad 'Abid did in Fazzan. Without going into further detail it may be said that though central control existed it was cumbersome and that though there was an organization it was inadequate to deal with situations such as that which faced the Order on the death of Sayyid al-Mahdi, which demanded a rapid marshalling of its dispersed resources.

V

The dynastic situation which had formed after the death of 795*
the Grand Sanusi formed again after the death of Sayyid al- 793
Mahdi: his surviving sons, Sayyid Muhammad Idris and Sayyid 175*
Muhammad al-Rida, were minors. The leadership of the Order therefore passed to Sayyid Ahmad al-Sharif, son of Sayyid Muhammad al-Sharif, Sayyid al-Mahdi's younger brother; though for the first few years its political direction seems to have been largely in the hands of the experienced old Shaikh Ahmad al-Rifi, the last of the intimates of the Grand Sanusi and the principal adviser of Sayyid al-Mahdi.

Sayyid Ahmad al-Sharif's leadership of the Order falls into 795*
three periods, from 1902 to 1912 when he was resisting the 793
French in the Sahara, from 1912 to 1918 when he was in 175*
Cyrenaica directing the Bedouin against the Italians and the 159
British, and from 1918, when he went into exile, to 1933, the 648*
year of his death at al-Madina in Arabia. It is only the second
period with which this book is directly concerned and I will [128]
therefore summarize very briefly the events in the Sahara, leaving to a future chapter a more detailed account of the events in Libya which led to the Sayyid's appearance in Cyrenaica at the head of the Sanusiya Militant.

The French advance continued. After the loss of Bir Alali in 795*
1902 Sayyid Ahmad moved his headquarters from Qiru back 175*
to Kufra, where he was protected by an immense desert and 648*
diplomatic immunity, since the British took the view that the [159]
oasis belonged to Turkey. In 1906 the French took Kawar and [793]

*795 Bilma and in the following year occupied 'Ain Kalak, killing
*175 Sidi Muhammad al-Barrani, the Shaikh of the Sanusiya lodge
*648 there and the foremost of al-Sayyid al-Mahdi's missionaries in the Sahara. In 1909 they occupied Abaish in Wadai and sent an expedition against Masalit. As they advanced they everywhere destroyed or suppressed the lodges of the Order. In 1913 and 1914 they occupied Tibesti, Borku, Wajanqa, and Ennedi, at the same time as the Italians occupied Fazzan from Tripolitania. Though the Sanusiya had minor military successes and temporarily regained some of its territory, it had lost all political control in what is now known as the French Sudan. While the Franco-Sanusi war was in progress in the Sudan Italy, in 1911, declared war on Turkey and landed troops at various points on the Libyan coast, the conquest of Tripolitania being the primary objective. From the first the Sanusiya entered the fray and when Turkey abandoned the contest in 1912 the Order continued the struggle in its own name.

128 At this point I must break off my account of the history of the
*795 Order to show how it achieved its paramountcy in Cyrenaica, because the development of the Order is tied up with a certain
121 set of social relations in Cyrenaica and has been circumscribed by them. Only in Cyrenaica did the Sanusiya in the end establish itself firmly because only there existed conditions which permitted its taking root strongly.

[P.29]

CHAPTER II

THE BEDOUIN OF CYRENAICA

I

In the last chapter I recorded the development of the Sanusiya. 128
In this chapter I give a brief description of Cyrenaica and of the way of life of the Bedouin who live there and an equally brief account of the history of these Bedouin and of their tribal system.

The geographical isolation of Cyrenaica proper, the large 13
peninsula which juts into the Mediterranean from the Bay of al-Sallum to the eastern Sirtica, has greatly affected its history. It is cut off from the Nile Delta by 700 km. of semi-desert and from Tripolitania by 650 km. of the Sahara round the shores of the Sirtica, while to the south of it stretch endless desert wastes, for Cyrenaica proper is only just over 200,000 sq. km. with a Saharan hinterland of over 500,000 sq. km. On the other hand the coast of Cyrenaica lies only 300 km. from Crete and 400 km. from the Greek mainland, and it belongs by climate and vegetation to Europe.

The physiographic features of the country which influence 133
to any extent the life of its people can rapidly be summarized. 137
Northern Cyrenaica is a calcareous mountain rising to a tableland, *al-Jabal al-Akhdar*, the Green Mountain, so called from its evergreen forests. To the north its slopes rise steeply from the sea or its littoral, while to the south it billows gently towards the great Saharan desert. The two major divisions of the country are known as *al-jabal*, the mountain—or *al-ghaba*, the forest, since its northern part is covered with bush—and *al-barr*, the steppe. The mountain and the steppe alike fall into 133
a number of zones, the principal of which are shown in the accompanying sketch-map. There is a narrow strip of coastal plain which broadens towards Banghazi and then spreads southwestwards into the great *barqa* plain. Animal transport can [492]
only mount the plateau from the coast by steep and infrequent paths which lead up deep ravines to the first terrace, the so-called *arqub* country, a succession of thickly wooded ridges broken into myriad bosses and cut deep by many wide wadis,

[TEXT CONTINUED ON PAGE 31]

102
132
133


Shahhat
Darna
Taukra
Al-Marj
Banghazi
Tubruq
500+
600
400
300
200
150
100
50
Over 500 metres
200-500 metres
Under 200 metres
Isohyets showing mean annual aggregates in mms.

Rainfall and the Plateau Area.

102
13


Steppe
Semi-Desert
Desert
Mediterranean Maritime
Mediterranean Plateau
Scale
0 25 50 75 100 kms.

Climatic Zones.

the steep sides of which make east–west journeys slow and 133
arduous. To the west this broken country levels down, and in a
bay in the hills lies the extensive treeless, but very fertile, basin
of al-Marj, known to Europeans as the Barce Plain. It was [167]
colonized in classical times and again recently by the Italians.
The Arabs call this first terrace *lusaita* (*al-wasaita*), the middle
part, because it lies between the coastal plain and the plateau
tableland formed by *al-zahir*, the second terrace. This table- [172]
land is famous for its Graeco-Roman ruins and is dotted also
with the deserted farms of Italian colonists. It mounts to a
narrow third terrace, at about 875 metres above sea level, from
the top of which one can look down on these settlements.

The plateau slopes southwards through a juniper belt. There 133
forest ends and it continues to roll to the southern steppe in 137
stony undulations dissected by many wadis. In the plain at its
foot there is plenty of grass and low scrub, and vegetation is
thick in depressions, but the country becomes increasingly
desolate the farther to the south one journeys towards the life-
less wastes of the Sahara. The eastern part of Cyrenaica is more [132]
arid than the west or centre. The Marmarica, the *batnan* of the
Arabs, is characterized by low hills rising from the coastal belt
and prolonged towards the south to create a succession of crests
of several kilometres in depth. The mean annual rainfall is low [132]
and wells are restricted to the coastal belt. However, there is, [312]
probably in most years, a certain amount of grazing to some
fifty miles from the coast during the rains. The Sirtica, the
extension of Cyrenaica to the west, is a vast rolling treeless
plain traversed by a series of wadis running north–south which
in their spread provide most of the summer grazing. Wells are [312]
found only near the coast but pasturage is plentiful till the [233]
Wadi al-Farigh is reached.

The rainfall very exactly determines the vegetation belts and 132
thereby limits human distribution and imposes a certain way of life. The amount of precipitation depends on a number of circumstances. Mean annual rainfall decreases from west to east. Altitude also affects it. More significant, however, are the variation with latitude, the seasonal rhythm, and annual irregularities. The accompanying map shows how rainfall decreases rapidly from the coast, how only the very limited plateau area is subject to heavy precipitations (400–550 mms.),

[TEXT CONTINUED ON PAGE 33]

[P. 32]

102
137


Al-Jashsha
Al-Batnan
Al-Barqe
Al-Sirwal
Al-Hamra
Al-Baida
WADI AL-MRA
WADI AL-FARIGH
Al-Barqa
Al-Qardaba
Al-Daffa
Scale
0 50 100
25 75 kms.
Forest

Distribution of Forest.

102
312
233


Shahhat
Darna
Al-Marj
GOATS AND CATTLE
Banghazi
SHEEP AND CAMELS
Zt. Msus
Bir Tinjidhir
Bir Hakaim
MOSTLY STONY ARID COUNTRY
Ajadabiya
CAMELS
Approx. Line of springs
" Southern limit of well water in summer
" Southern limit of grazing in spring

Pastoral Zones.

and the insufficiency of the fall elsewhere. It follows that only 132
on the plateau can there be forest, and only there is a settled [137]
and purely agricultural way of life possible; and it was there [241]
and on the coastal fringe that in ancient and modern times [167]
European colonists settled.

The rains in Cyrenaica fall only in winter, from October to 132
April. In the absence of irrigation the planting season is thus 241
clearly delimited. So is the grazing season to the south of the 233
plateau, for in summer the grasses wither and the wells dry up, [221]
compelling shepherds to drive their flocks northwards to the plateau, thus producing the kind of seasonal nomadism known as transhumance. The variation in total rainfall from year to year and the distribution of its fall over the winter months are of the utmost importance for agriculturalists in Cyrenaica. There is still some obscurity, but it is an observed fact that every few years in Cyrenaica there is a year in which the fall of rain is insufficient, or too badly distributed, to raise an adequate crop. In a mixed economy this fact must have given an overwhelming bias towards pastoralism.

The water supplies of the plateau, which depend entirely on 132
rainfall, are sufficient for the needs of the Bedouin and their 312
flocks. The clayey soils are, however, very exacting and running spring water is rare, being for the most part restricted to the triangle Darna–Slanta–al-Haniya. On the western part of the plateau water is conserved in cisterns and wells and on the maritime and *barqa* plains, in the Sirtica and Marmarica, and generally to the south of the plateau, in wells.

The distribution of vegetation in Cyrenaica follows variation 132
in degree of precipitation. Where there is much rain there is 137
forest. Where there is little rain there is steppe. Where there
is no rain there is desert. The forest is thick but mainly squat 137
and of very limited extension. An Italian estimate[1] of its distribution is shown on the accompanying map. It is predominantly Mediterranean in type, the juniper and the lentisk being the two commonest trees of the country. Forest ceases a few miles to the south of the high watershed of the plateau and gives way to steppe. The well-known route Tariq 'Aziza is generally regarded as the dividing line between the two kinds

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[1] Dott. Giovanni Manzoni, 'Memorie sui boschi della Cirenaica', *Notiziario Economico della Cirenaica*, 1929. [113]

137 of country. The whitish soils of the steppe support worts and
[134] other scrub bushes and some drought-resisting trees in the beds
of wadis and they are well covered with annual and perennial
grasses and other plants which yield excellent pasturage in the
[233] springtime. However, except in the Wadi al-Mra, where camels
can be kept the year round, there is little grazing beyond the
line Msus–Bir Tinjidhir–Bir Hakaim.

233 The Bedouin of the forest area are essentially a goat people,
137 though they also keep many sheep and cattle, and it is mostly
through the medium of the goat that the vast natural wealth
of the forests of Cyrenaica is transformed into human wealth.
The animal is hardy and frugal, and has the great merit of
preferring tree and shrub to grass and of being a catholic feeder.
Just as the forest would be useless to the Bedouin without the
goat so the much vaster stretches of steppe would be useless to
them without the sheep and camel which turn its grasses and
233 scrub into food. Thus Cyrenaica is fundamentally a pastoral
[181] country, primarily a country of sheep farming, and its people,
as they say themselves, have the hearts of shepherds and not of
peasants. While agriculture and pastoralism are both practised,
the bias of nature and tradition is towards animal husbandry,
by which the rich vegetation of the country is turned into milk,
butter, meat, wool, hides, and draught and transport.

II

13 In Cyrenaica stand always contrasted the mountain and the
221 plain, the forest and the steppe, the red soils and the white, the
233 region of goats and cows and the region of sheep and camels,
settled life and nomadism.

221 True nomadism is very rare. A few Fawakhir, Minifa, Huta,
and other tribal fragments herd only camels, or if they possess
233 other animals keep them with kinsmen near the plateau, and
can therefore wander pretty well where they please. They may
be found anywhere between the Nile, Fazzan, and the Sudan.
Their spirit is that of an Aulad 'Ali tribesman who said to me:
'We call no place our home. It is wherever there is grass and
water.' Semi-nomads are numerous. Those with land on the
[241] plateau cultivate there, then graze southwards, and return
again to the plateau in the dry season to water their flocks.

KEY

102 1. al-'Arq
133 2. al-'Arqub
3. Asqafa
131 4. Aujila
361 5. al-'Azziyyat
619 6. Banghazi
7. Bishara
8. Dariyana
9. Darna
10. al-Fayidiya
11. al-Hamama
12. al-Haniya
13. al-Huwaiz
14. Jaghbub
15. Janzur
16. al-Jarfan
17. al-Jikharra
18. Khashm Rzaiq
19. al-Libba
20. al-Makhili
21. Mara
22. Marada
23. al-Marassas
24. Maraziq
25. al-Marj
26. Martuba
27. Mirad Mas'ud
28. Msus
29. al-Naufiliya
30. al-Nayyan
31. Qafanta
32. Qarabarbi
33. al-Qasrain
34. al-Qasur
35. al-Qatafiya
36. Shahhat
37. al-Tailimun
38. Talmaitha
39. Tart
40. Taukra
41. Umm Hafain
42. Umm al-Razam
43. Umm Rukba
44. Umm al-Shakhanab
45. al-Zawiya al-Baida


19°
20°
32°
31°
30°
29°
Banghazi
Soluq
Al-Zuwaitina
Ajdabiya
Al-Naufiliya
Al-'Aqaila
Marada
AL MAGHARBA
WADI AL-FARIGH

THE CHI

[facing p. 34, A]

102
133
131
361
619


21°
22°
23°
24°
25°
31°
30°
29°
AL-'ARAFA
AL-HASA
AL-'ABID
AL-BARA'ASA
AILAT FAYID
Al-Qubba
Khawalan
Darna
'ABAIDAT
'Akrama
Tobruk
Al-Burdi Sulaiman
Al-Sallum
Bir Hakaim
FAWAKHIR
WADI AL-MRA
Jaghbub
AL-AWAJILA
AL-MAJABRA
Aujila
Jalu
Contours in metres
Tribal boundaries
Towns
Place names
Zawiyas
Scale
0 10 20 50 80 110 kms

EF TRIBES OF CYRENAICA (after De Agostini)

[facing P. 34, B]

Those of the *barqa* plain may never camp on the plateau but they move freely between grazing grounds, permanent water supplies, and ploughland. 221 233

Of the plateau tribes, the Darsa, the 'Arafa, most of the Hasa, and a number of 'Abaidat and 'Awaqir sections remain there throughout the year. The Bedouin met with wandering about in the southern grazing grounds after the rains are the 'Abaidat Ghaith, 'Awakla, and Shahin, some of the Hasa Shabarqa and Bakhayit, the whole of the small *'Ailat* Fayid tribe, large numbers of Bara'asa Husain, Tamiya, and Masa'id, 'Abid Mansur and Jabar, 'Awaqir Sdaidi and Brahim, and numerous small client groups more or less affiliated to these tribal sections. The nomadic sections are generally richer than the others in sheep and camels, and are also more vigorous, independent, and warlike. Politically, they are the leading sections of the tribes to which they belong. The foremost Shaikhs of the 'Abaidat, Hasa, Bara'asa, 'Abid, 'Awaqir, and Magharba are all to be found during the rains farther away in the steppe than most of their fellow-tribesmen. 221 233 619

The move southwards starts in December after the barley has been sown, or part of a group may take the animals south while the rest finish the ploughing. Most of these semi-nomads return to the plateau in May, when water becomes scarce, but some, including some of the most powerful elements, remain to the south of it permanently. There are many advantages in this annual move to the south. Rain falls and the grasses spring up in advance of the plateau, and grazing is more abundant and of a better quality. On the other hand, the grasses of the plateau and its southern slopes are still green when the desert grasses, except in specially favoured depressions, are withered. By their annual oscillation the Bedouin thus give their animals the best grazing at all seasons of the year. Sheep mostly lamb round about November, which is the month in which new grasses spring up in the *barr*, so that the move southwards gives the sheep the richest grazing at a time when they need it most; and the warmer conditions prevailing in the south suit the lambs. At the same time, the Bedouin in southern grazing grounds are compelled to live very largely on milk food, and the combination of rich pastures with the dropping of their young by sheep, goats, and camels, enables them to live on the country to a great extent. 221 233 [243] [262]

221 them to live on the country to a great extent. In normal times
233 the Bedouin drive their animals on the hoof to Egyptian
[439] markets, slowly, along this rich southern pasture belt, grazing as they go, so that they arrive in good condition. Finally, there can be no doubt about the correctness of the Arab claim that a few weeks residence in the open steppe is a tonic for man and beast.

233 It must be remembered that there are no water problems at
312 this time of year. Sheep, goats, and camels do not have to be watered from the time the first rains make grass till the end
423 of April or early in May: even horses do not drink until well into April. This fact is important, because it means that the prolific pastures can be grazed by all without dispute, since the wells, which belong to tribal sections or families, are not drawn on. While rain is still falling regularly human requirements are met from pools. To the south of the Tariq 'Aziza, generally speaking, there is no ownership in land—there are no *hudud*, boundaries, as the Arabs say—and anyone may cultivate or graze where he pleases, but there is strict ownership in wells; whereas to the north of the Tariq 'Aziza there is less narrowly restricted ownership in water, which is here spring water in abundance, but there are well-defined rights in arable.[1] The water of the southern wells is essential for the Bedouin who own the country and who live in it all the year round, and their rights are respected by those who graze
233 there. Sheep and goats need only drink every second or third
312 day, even in the hottest weather, so that in the period of meagre pasturage they have a wide range of grazing from the wells, and the dry grasses, supplemented by evergreen shrubs of the goosefoot family, are sufficient nourishment for them. Wells are numerous in the steppe but few of them last out the summer.

233 The animals grazed in the southern steppe are mostly sheep and camels. The Bedouin say 'Cattle and goats do not migrate;
[221] camels and sheep do'. Camels are essential to nomadic life as it is impossible to move camp without them, and the richer Bedouin are in camels the more frequently they move, seeking
231 richer pastures. Cyrenaican dromedaries are heavy beasts,

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[1] Enzo Savarese, *Le Terre della Cirenaica*, Pt. II, 1928, Chap. VII; Massimo Colucci, *Il Regime della Proprietà Fondiaria nell' Africa Italiana*, vol. i, 1942, pp. 210 seq. and 220 seq.

useful mostly for transport and ploughing, though they give a 231
good milk yield and a fair harvest of wool. There are horses, of
Berber rather than of Arab type, in every big camp. They are
kept for the saddle alone, being much used in old days for
hawking, and are a sign of wealth and social position.

The census figures for domesticated animals are probably
highly inaccurate. The flocks and herds were certainly much [648]*
greater, especially for camels and horses, before the Italians
ravaged the country. The Turkish figures for 1910 were
713,000 sheep, 546,300 goats, 83,300 camels, 23,600 cattle, and
27,000 horses, and it has been reckoned that by 1933 these had
been reduced to 98,000 sheep, 25,000 goats, 2,600 camels,
8,700 cattle, and 1,000 horses.[1] Before the outbreak of the [648]*
second Italo-Sanusi war in 1923 the normal export to the [439]
markets of Egypt was 80,000 sheep and goats a year, and it was
reckoned that a settled Cyrenaica could produce annually for
export at least 100,000 to 150,000 sheep and goats and 6,000
camels. The country used to satisfy a considerable portion of
Egypt's meat requirements. It also exported clarified butter 234
in big quantities, 91,835 kilograms being the figure for 1922 and 439
75,462 the figure for 1923.[2]

Although the Bedouin are by practice and inclination 243
shepherds first and cultivators afterwards, all plough. Barley [262]
and some wheat are a staple food. Indeed, in most years they
cultivate a surplus of barley which they trade, and it may be
said that for the most part they are self-supporting as far as
their flour requirements go. On the southern slopes of the
plateau and in the *barqa* plain ploughing begins from the middle
of October to the middle of November, according to the rains.
The coastal belt is sown a little later and the plateau in December
and January when the grasses begin to sprout. By mid-April
the first harvest, that of the *barqa* and the southern slopes of
the plateau, is being reaped, and on the plateau reaping goes
on from May to the end of August. Everywhere barley is sown [231]
greatly in excess of wheat, for wheaten bread is not considered
a necessity and barley is required for horses as well as for men.

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[1] Jean Despois, *La Colonisation Italienne en Libya: Problèmes et Méthodes*, 1935, p. 44; Hans w: son Ahlmann, *La Libia Settentrionale*, 1930, p. 78. (First published in 1928.) [113]

[2] *L'Oltremare*, Mar. 1930; *Rivista delle Colonie Italiane*, 1934, p. 885; Francesco Coro, *Settantasei Anni di Dominazione Turca in Libia*, 1937, p. 82. [113]

243 They could not sow a better crop. There are wild varieties of
barley in Cyrenaica and the country is in every way suited to
its culture. It is very hardy, stands up to drought, and easily
holds its own against the grasses, which are ploughed in with
the seed on the plateau. When the barley and wheat have
[251] been reaped, the grain is stored in *kuf*. On the plateau these
are ancient tomb-caves; elsewhere they are holes dug in the
ground.

[931] In a bad year, and even more in a succession of bad years,
the Bedouin have experienced famine, but in most years the
barley, and to a lesser extent the wheat, give an abundant
[433] yield. Bedouin have told me that they expect from sowing in
the beds of wadis up to a hundredfold of barley and in the
barqa up to fiftyfold. On the plateau the yield is smaller and
in the Marmarica and Sirtica much smaller. In Turkish times
[439] there was a large export of grain from Cyrenaica. Mondaini says
that it was to the mean annual value of 40,000 Lire Sterling
for the years 1885 to 1900.[1] Much of this surplus was bought
by English brewers.

433 The Bedouin way of life is well adapted to their environment.
182 Given the inconstancy of the rainfall and the distribution of
water supplies they would be foolish indeed were they not, at
any rate in part, shepherds. They are not, of course, in all
433 respects self-supporting. They make their winter tents and a
439 good part of their equipment, carpets, sacks, and so forth, from
182 the wool of their beasts, but some things the Bedouin regard as
[237] necessities have to be imported, notably tea, sugar, some rice,
and cloth, especially the *jird*, the woollen cloak of the country.
They trade these with surplus stock on the hoof, skins, wool,
clarified butter, surplus barley, and honey and wax, so that
they are in an economic sense self-supporting.

433 Cyrenaica is a rich country for Bedouin, a poor country for
182 Europeans. Bedouin generally have no overhead expenses in
[556] production. I say generally, because rich men sometimes
[233] employ shepherds, though this is usually the practice of urban
[464] merchants engaged in the sheep trade. Bedouin use their own
labour and that of their families and animals. What is perhaps
[511] more important is that they are prepared to live on what

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[1] G. Mondaini, *Manuale di Storia e Legislazione Coloniale del Regno d'Italia*. 1927, p. 308.

Europeans consider to be a low level of civilization. They do 433
not feel the need for expensive roads and ports, electric light, 511
wireless sets, telephones, schools, churches, newspapers, and 182
so forth; and clearly their economy could not support them.
Time and again colonists, tempted from their homes by the 182
short sea routes and the wooded plateau, have settled in the 167
country and dispossessed the Bedouin, but in the end it is the
Bedouin, and not the colonists, who have survived. When one
looks at the massive Phoenician, Greek, Egyptian, and Roman
ruins and the already half-ruined Italian towns, villages, and
farms, and then on the flimsy tents of the Arabs, one cannot
but reflect that the race is not always to the swift nor the battle
to the strong.

III

Even in the steppe country it is difficult to find a Bedouin 361
naja', camp, for the camps are pitched in hollows and on the
slopes of wadis and their feeders for shelter from rain and wind
and too many visitors. On the plateau they are hidden in the
forest. One cannot, therefore, make more than a very approximate 161
estimate of the population of any part of the country, or 162
of its distribution, by bare observation. It can, however, be
said that at present the country is underpopulated and that the
population is badly distributed between town and country, the
urban part of it, which is almost entirely unproductive, being
too large in relation to the whole.

There have been a number of estimates of the population by 161
early travellers who visited the country in Turkish times. They 175
had to make a guess at the population figure, aided by Turkish
censuses. It has been suggested on the basis of their reports
that the country then supported round about 250,000 souls.[1]
The Turkish census of 1911 gave the population as 198,345,
excluding Kufra.[2] Taking into account the various estimates
which were made during the Italo-Sanusi wars, in the interval
between them, and since, it may be said that to-day the total
population of Cyrenaica is probably round about 200,000, of
whom about a quarter live in the towns, the remainder being
tented Bedouin and a few thousand oasis dwellers.

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[1] Dr. Gotthold Hildebrandt, *Cyrenaïka als Gebiet künftiger Besiedelung*, 1904, p. 317.

[2] Coro, op. cit., p. 20.

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161 162 114 If the Bedouin of the country number no more than 150,000 it is evident that density of population outside the towns must be very low indeed. Ricci's map, based on Col. De Agostini's census, shows a density of 0 to 5 per sq. km. for all the tribes of Cyrenaica except the 'Arafa, the Darsa, and the Hasa, all plateau tribes, for which he gives a density of 5 to 10.[1] Col. De Agostini, in his exhaustive monograph,[2] written before the worst Italian excesses, reckoned the native population of Cyrenaica at 185,400, of whom 181,750 were Arabs and 3,650 Jews. Of the Arabs about 25,000—I give round figures—were living in urban centres, about 7,000 in the oases, and about 150,000 were tented Bedouin. Of the Bedouin he classed only 16,000 as nomads, 35,000 as semi-nomads, and 99,000 as stable. His classification into nomads, semi-nomads, and stable was, as he recognized, arbitrary, since there is no reliable criterion of stability among a tented people, but it gives a useful indication of relative mobility. By 'stable' Col. De Agostini meant normal residence in a determined area within which the tents are pitched here and there for watering or other reasons and with periodic movements for sowing and pasturing, even though some days away from their usual seat, as we find among the 'Arafa tribe and a considerable part of the Hasa, the Darsa, and the 'Abaidat tribes. By 'semi-nomads' he meant those Bedouin who spread with greater frequency and more widely either in their own territory or towards zones of sowing or pasturing where they remain for a long time on account of less prosperous conditions in their own territory, such as we find in the Magharba tribe and parts of the 'Awaqir, the Bara'asa, and the 'Abaidat tribes and in many of the more important client groups. By 'nomads' he meant Bedouin who, although they possess their own territory or recognized centre, emigrate for long periods to distant, and not always the same, objectives, and are almost always fractionized into small groups for reasons of watering and pasturing; or Bedouin who normally wander in desert territories, giving themselves exclusively to rearing camels. As examples of nomads in this sense he mentions the Aulad Shahin section of the 'Abaidat tribe and many units

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(113) [1] *La Cirenaica—Geografica-Economica-Politica*, edited by Olinto Marinelli, 1922-3.

[2] *Le Popolazioni della Cirenaica*, 1922-3, p. 444.

of the more independent client tribes. In other words, all the 161
Bedouin of Cyrenaica are nomadic in some degree, some more 162
and some less, and Col. De Agostini rightly stresses that 114
whether they move much or little they all have the same
characteristics when compared to peasants and townsmen.[1]
They are all *bwadi*, as the Cyrenaican dialect has it, people of
the tents, and they see themselves as a single people against
the *hadur*, the citizens.

I have so far said nothing of the towns of Cyrenaica or of 632
their inhabitants. They play a minor part in this story, which
is about the Bedouin, but they cannot be entirely left out of it
on account of their economic and political relations with the
Bedouin, so I take this opportunity to give a brief account of
them.[2]

Banghazi, which is supposed to be called after the saint Sidi 175
Ghazi, buried in the town, is on the site of the classical Berenice. 632
It is believed that after the disappearance of the Graeco-Roman
community the site was unoccupied till the fifteenth
century, when it was reoccupied by immigrants from the
mercantile communities of the Tripolitanian coast, among
whom Misuratans, both Muslims and Jews, preponderated in
numbers and wealth. The Genoese Della Cella, who passed [162]
through the fly-infested town in 1817–18, in the time of the
Caramanlis, says that it then contained about 5,000 inhabitants,
at least half of whom were Jews.[3] Shaikh Muhammad 'Uthman [441]
al-Hashaishi, who was in the town in 1896, says that the [167]
greater part of the traders were immigrants from Sfax and the [114]
Island of Jerba—he was himself a Tunisian and often tended
to exaggerate Tunisian influence—with some Greeks and a few
Italians. 'As to the Turks, they do not give themselves to
trade.' At this time Banghazi was a very simple, mostly mud-and-rubble,
town, and the learned Shaikh makes a point of
telling us that there were no posts or telegraphs, nor even a
railway, save a line of three kilometres joining the official

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[1] Ibid., pp. 32–3.

[2] The historical information is chiefly derived from Agostini, ibid., pp. 413–43.

[3] Paolo Della Cella, *Narrative of an Expedition from Tripoli in Barbary to the Western Frontier of Egypt in 1817*, 1822, pp. 194–5. (First published in 1819.) F. W. and H. W. Beechey (*Proceedings of the Expedition to explore the Northern Coast of Africa from Tripoly Eastward in 1821 and 1822*, 1828, p. 299) consider Della Cella's estimate too high. Theirs is 2,000. [113]

175 residence of the Pasha to a garden ; and that the town possessed
632 only one machine for grinding corn.[1] The population increased
considerably in the last decades of Turkish rule, reaching the
175 figure of 16,500 in 1911.[2] In 1922 the population was 22,740,
162 the great majority of whom were Arabs from the Maghrib,
632 though some were immigrants into the town from the more
sedentary Bedouin of the neighbourhood. It included also over 2,000 *qulaughla*, descendants of Turkish officials and troops and Arab women, and a large number of *shawashna*, descendants of Arab men and Negresses, with a sprinkling of *'abid*, full-blooded Negroes. There were also about 3,000 Jews and about 3,600 Europeans, almost all Italians. These elements, except for the Italians who left during the late war, are found in all the towns of Cyrenaica. There are also a few Cretans, the remnant of a small community exiled by the Italians.

Darna stands on the site of the Greek town of Darnis, from which the Arab name is presumably derived. It seems that it continued to be occupied throughout the Arab period, but was given new life through the settlement there of Muslim refugees from Spain at the end of the fifteenth century. According to tradition, towards the end of the seventeenth century the town was developed by a certain Muhammad Bey who organized irrigation and other public works there. The population was much increased by the settlement of merchants from the coastal towns of Tripolitania and of other countries of the Maghrib, either by direct migration or from Banghazi. When Della Cella
[731] visited the town in 1816 the population had been reduced by
pestilence from 7,000 to 500.[3] In 1911 it was about 9,500[4] and in 1922 it was about 9,700 (not counting Italians) of whom 250 were Jews and the rest Muslims.

Al-Marj, the Italian Barce, was the site of the ancient city of Barke, famous in Greek times and to Arab historians of the first centuries after the Arab conquest of Cyrenaica. It fell into decay after the Hilalian invasion and was only a heap of ruins till 1842, when the Turkish administration built a fort there, a Sanusiya zawiya being constructed shortly afterwards. In 1922
175 the population, of very mixed origins, was 1,540. The other
632 centres in Cyrenaica are no more than villages around admini-
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[1] Op. cit., pp. 52 and 59.

[2] Coro, op. cit., p. 99.

[3] Op. cit., p. 177.

[4] Coro, op. cit., p. 102.

strative posts and contain not more than a few hundred persons. 175
Shahhat and Tubruq had been Turkish posts before the Italians 632
made them administrative centres. Taukra and Talmaitha had 621
been Sanusiya lodges. Suluq and Qaminis were Italian
creations. Marsa Susa (Apollonia) was first occupied by Cretan
refugees during the Turco-Greek war of 1897. Ajadabiya, the
town of which the Arab historian al-Bakri of the eleventh
century spoke in such glowing terms, had ceased to be a settled
centre until the Turks made it an administrative post. During [648]*
the period of truce between the Sanusi and the Italians from
1917 to 1922 it became the seat of the Sanusi Amir, Sayyid
Mahammad Idris, and afterwards an Italian administrative and
commercial centre.

It has been noted that almost all the townsmen of Cyrenaica 632
are immigrants from the west, from Morocco to Tripolitania, 162
and the Bedouin regard them as foreigners and often with some 369
distaste, especially the Tripolitanian immigrants. It is true [186]
that there is a small element of Bedouin origin in the towns,
for the more stable and poorer Bedouin living near towns sometimes drift into them; but when they do so their descendants soon lose their links with the tents and their tribal status. The road to town life is a way along which there is no return, for the townsmen are not only foreigners, but their food, their speech, their dress, their manners, their interests, their loyalties, and in general their way of life and their sentiments, are different. The Bedouin visit the towns from time to time, but they do not feel at home in them, and they do not look at home in them either. In a town one can spot a Bedouin at a glance by his appearance, his step, his dignity, his naivety, and his loud voice, which sometimes startles the shopkeeper with whom he disputes a price.

The road to the towns is not only a way along which there is 632
no return, but is a one-way track. A Bedouin can become a 369
citizen, but a citizen can never become a Bedouin. He cannot 641
live the life of the tents. Hence the Bedouin say that while it is always bad for a Bedouin girl to marry a townsman, it is possible for her to adapt herself to urban life, but it is out of the question for a Bedouin to marry a townsman's daughter, for it is impossible for her to become a daughter of the tents.

The *bwadi*, Bedouin, and the *hadur*, citizens, are separate

632 communities. They are strangers to each other who meet but
369 do not mix. There is a barrier between them and each distrusts
641 the other. Nevertheless there is a measure of economic interdependence
between them, and the tribes and the towns affect
each other politically. In Turkish times the urban population,
632 which, as we have seen, was small and contained a high proportion
439 of Jews, was engaged in trade and domestic industries.
438 The townsmen bought from the Bedouin animals, hides, wool,
clarified butter, honey, beeswax, and ostrich feathers (ostriches
369 were still hunted in the southern steppe in those days), and they
supplied the Bedouin with those things he required but could
not, or would not, make for himself: tea, sugar, rice, cloth,
horseshoes, musket balls, flints, gunpowder, and earthenware.
The urban craftsmen also made leather goods, manufactured
salt from sea water, and conducted trade and exchange. Imports
came by sea from Tripoli, Marseilles, London, Malta, Alexandria,
and Crete, and overland from Alexandria.

But the townsmen of Cyrenaica never dominated the country
as they dominate most of the Arab lands, where through usury,
intimidation, monopoly of trade, and influence in the administration
and the courts they have reduced the countryman to
the position of landless labourer or *métayage* serf. There was
nothing in the Bedouin way of life which gave an opening to the
usurer. Moreover, the towns had no monopoly of trade for, if
necessary, the Bedouin could, since they were self-supporting
in necessities, either go without urban supplies or obtain them
overland from Egypt, as they showed during their war with the
[565] Italians. Consequently there were no rich landowning families
living in the towns at the expense of the country-side, no aghas,
beys, and pashas; and an educated middle class hardly existed
outside the small official circle and lacked both wealth and
influence. In general it may be said that in Cyrenaica the towns
were not parasites on the country, but had their proper functions
as trading centres and suppliers of the needs of the Bedouin
population. The markets were free, not tied to town societies.

632 Nor could the Bedouin be coerced by force or law. The tribes
*648 were largely inaccessible and they were stronger than the towns,
369 even with the administration behind them. The Bedouin were
not afraid of the Turkish Administration, which sat very lightly
on their shoulders, and they did not use the courts. The

The
Turkish Administration was centred in the towns but operated, 632
as will be explained later, through the contacts of its local 648*
officials, who were generally Arabs of the country, with the leading 571
tribal Shaikhs, with whom they made friends. These officials 369
were townsmen or sons of Bedouin who had received an urban
education and they acted as links between the citizen communities
and the Bedouin. Through Bedouin relations with
town merchants and officials what was happening in the world
outside Cyrenaica percolated to the most distant tents. Another 795*
channel of political and cultural infiltration was the network of 571
Sanusiya lodges. The Shaikh of the Sanusiya lodge at Banghazi 648*
was regarded as the ambassador of the head of the Order to the 177
Governor of Cyrenaica and he was chosen for qualities which 632
fitted him for this role. He was consulted by the Governor on 793
matters in which the tribes were involved, and through him 369
and the Brothers of the lodges of the towns news of the outside
world reached the Head of the Order in the distant oasis of
Kufra and the Heads of the local lodges, whose relations with
the Bedouin in their localities were intimate. Thus, as will be
seen, the Bedouin had a general idea of what the revolution of
the 'Young Turks' meant and were aware of the impending crisis
long before the Italian attack on their country was delivered.
But though maintaining communications with the towns, 632
neither the tribal Shaikhs nor the Sanusiya allowed themselves 571
to be subordinated to them or identified themselves with urban 795
interests. The Bedouin Shaikh did not, like the Syrian landowner, 369
feel any need to have a town house, and the Sanusiya
ever remained a country and Bedouin Order and directed its
affairs from the desert.

Town and country kept apart, with the towns dependent on 632
the country and not the country on the towns, because there 369
was in Cyrenaica no client peasantry bound by debt, need of 565
protection, and trade monopoly to the towns. The Bedouin
did not settle on the land where they would be an easy prey to
the usurer, overseer, and tax collector. Those who were defeated [167]
in the great tribal wars of the past and in the inter-tribal and
inter-sectional fighting of more recent times migrated to Egypt
and settled there as *fallahin*, and not in Cyrenaica. In Cyrenaica 565
there is not the spur of adverse climatic conditions or the lash 167
of land shortage to drive them to depart from their ancient

565 Arabian ways. In Egypt necessity has slowly subjugated the
167 exiles to the peasant yoke. They long resisted but, like the
Bedouin nomads coming from the Sinai Peninsula, had in the
end to submit or perish. The absence of a substantial peasantry
in Cyrenaica is one of the characteristics which most distinguish
it from the Arab societies of Palestine, Syria, Iraq, Egypt, and
565 the Maghrib. The peasant can be dominated. He is fixed to the
earth and can be made to surrender it and till it for others. The
Cyrenaican Bedouin is fixed to no place and cannot be forced to
565 sell his birthright by bad seasons or intimidation. This has
meant that there have not been in Cyrenaica any social enclaves
632 attached to the towns through which the towns and administra-
tive centres could lord it over the Bedouin. Outside the towns
*[648] all is Bedouin and the Turkish Administration, and afterwards
[619] the Italian Administration, found that they could not get a
grip on the Bedouin of Cyrenaica as they could on the peasantry
of Tripolitania.

632 Nevertheless the towns and the Turkish, and later the Italian,
*648 Administration in them affected the tribal system by acting as
619 a pull on those tribal segments which lived nearest to them, so
that the tribes which lay between the towns and the steppe
were attracted towards one or other of these poles. The political
structure of Cyrenaica as a whole exercised in this way a signi-
ficant influence on the segmentary tribal system.

IV

619 The Bedouin who became followers of the Sanusiya Order
178 and whose country and way of life I have described are divided
into tribes and tribal sections owning different tracts of the
[793] country. This tribal system existed in Cyrenaica long before
the Grand Sanusi preached there and it continued to exist after
*[795] his grandson Sayyid Muhammad Idris had fled the country
and the Sanusiya Order had been abolished and its lodges
destroyed by the Italians. It is the fundamental structure of
Bedouin society which the Sulaimid tribes brought with them
from Arabia.

619 The Bedouin of Cyrenaica are Arabs. The Arabian tribes
101 who conquered the country and settled in it mixed with the
144 indigenous Berbers, as is evident in their physical features to-

day, but even ethnically the Bedouin are more Arabian than 619
the people of Egypt, the Sudan, and Tripolitania, while 101
culturally they are as completely Arab as any people in the [144]
world, proud Tamim and Quraish not excepted. In essentials
their language is that of the Hilalian invasion of the eleventh 197
century and no foreign language competes with it. The Berber- [191]
speakers are a handful in the distant oasis of Aujila, and even
there they are bilingual, and the insignificant fractions of Jews
and Cretans in the towns speak Arabic, the Cretans being
Muslims as well. The Italian immigrants left the country of 619
their own accord during the late war. Thus the obstacles to [167]
complete Arabization in the Maghrib (Tripolitania, Tunisia,
Algeria, and Morocco), a Berber culture, large Jewish colonies,
and European colonization are to-day all absent in Cyren-
aica. In all essential matters also the Bedouin of Cyrenaica [184]
are like Bedouin tribesmen elsewhere in the Arab world: they
have the same tented, pastoral, way of life, the same social
organization, the same laws and customs and manners, and the
same values.

The people of Cyrenaica are linked to the classical Arab 177
world of the east, to Egypt and the Jazirat al-'Arab (Arabia,
Palestine, Iraq, and Syria) rather than to the Maghrib; to the
sacred towns of Islam and to Umayyad Damascus, 'Abbasid
Baghdad, and Fatimid Cairo. More particularly they are linked
to Egypt, with which their country has had political ties from
the earliest times, and which is their natural market. The [133]
desert comes down to the sea at the Gulf of Sirte and separates
Cyrenaica from Tripolitania and these two countries have
always gone each its own way. Cyrenaica was linked to Graeco-
Egypt, Tripolitania to Phoenician Carthage. Cyrenaica went
with Byzantium, Tripolitania with Rome. Indeed, as Despois
says: 'The Greater Syrtis is without dispute one of the most
decided frontiers, natural and human, to be found anywhere in
the world.'[1]

During the last few decades this separation has been brought [195]
into relief again by the rise of the Sanusiya Order, for whereas
almost to a man the Cyrenaicans follow the Order politically,
the Tripolitanians, except for the Bedouin tribes, have shown a
lively animosity towards it. Moreover tribal ties between the 619

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[1] Op. cit., p. 45.

619 two countries are weak. On the other hand, Cyrenaican tribes and tribal sections, notably the Aulad 'Ali tribe, speaking the same dialect and with the same customs as their cousins still in Cyrenaica, stretch unbroken from al-Sallum to Alexandria, and are also numerous in the Bahaira province of Egypt and in the Fayum. The Cyrenaican Arabs form to-day numerically by far the most important Bedouin element in Egypt, and apart from those who have remained tented there, there are many who have settled on the land.

*175 619 In its general outline the history of the Arab conquest of Cyrenaica is well known. 'Amr ibn al-'As, during the Caliphate of 'Umar, conquered Syria and Egypt and in 643 overran Cyrenaica, then occupied by Berber tribes and under the nominal rule of Byzantium. He met with little resistance, and within seventy years the whole of North Africa, from Sinai to the Atlantic, was in Muslim hands. It seems, however, that the original conquerors only settled as garrisons in the coastal towns, and neither controlled the hinterland nor had any considerable ethnic influence on its Berber peoples. Bedouin settlement on a big scale and the complete Arabization of the indigenous Berber population took place from 1050 or 1051 in the famous Hilalian migration.

*175 167 619 The Bani Sulaim and the Bani Hilal came originally from Nadj. They are of Mudarid stock, the Bani Sulaim being the senior branch. They passed into Upper Egypt as a result of the check to the Carmathian movement in Arabia, in which they were involved, and settled there; but they were inclined to be troublesome in a country little suited to their traditional way of life, so during the reign of the Fatimid Caliph al-Mustansir, his Vizier encouraged them to reconquer Tripoli and Tunis from the Berbers, who had again asserted their independence. Arab historians have compared their migration to that of locusts or wolves. The Bani Hilal passed westwards into Tripolitania and Tunisia, where many Bedouin tribes claim descent from them to-day. The Bani Sulaim mostly settled in Cyrenaica. It must be added that the nobility and the historical exploits of their forbears are for the most part unknown to the Bedouin of Cyrenaica.

619 The present-day descendants of the Bani Sulaim are spread from Egypt to Tunisia. Those of Cyrenaica are divided into

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two main branches, the Jibarna and the Harabi. The Jibarna tribes are 'Awaqir, Magharba (some list the 'Araibat section of this tribe separately), 'Abid, and 'Arafa. The Harabi tribes are 'Abaidat, Hasa, *'Ailat* Fayid, Bara'asa, and Darsa. These tribes are shown on the diagram below, which presents them as tribes and not in the genealogical fiction of proper names. Strictly speaking, the Bara'asa should not appear on this chart since it is only one section of this tribe, the Aulad Hamad, who are true Harabi. However, it has become customary to class them as Harabi.



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Attention is drawn to other names on this chart. The Aulad 'Ali, who have a fraternal relationship to the Harabi, about a century and a half ago lived in eastern Cyrenaica, but were compelled to migrate to Egypt by pressure from the Harabi, who received support from the Caramanli rulers of Tripoli. To-day they occupy the Mediterranean littoral from al-Sallum to Alexandria. Another branch of the Aqaqra, the Sharai', who migrated to Egypt, have become *fallahin* and are now found only as scattered families. When the Aulad 'Ali entered Egypt they found the Hanadi in possession of part of their present-day territory and drove them out of it. These Hanadi are now settled in the Sharqiya Province of Egypt. As will be noted from the chart, they belong to the Bani Sallam branch of the *Sa'adi* family of tribes. The Hanadi had previously dispossessed their brothers the Bani 'Una and this tribe is now completely absorbed in the *fallahin* population of Lower Egypt. A third fraternal branch of the Bani Sallam, the Bahaja, were also expelled from the Bahaira and are now settled in the Sharqiya and Gharbiya Provinces of Egypt. Of the Jibarna group, the Fawayid used to occupy the part of the plateau and plain now occupied by the Hasa, the Bara'asa, and the 'Abid. They were driven out of their country early in the nineteenth century, at the

619 same time as the Jawazi, by a combination of the 'Awaqir, the
167 Magharba, and the Bara'asa, assisted by the Caramanli rulers of
131 Tripoli, and are now settled in the provinces of Fayum, Bani Suef,
*175 Bahaira, and Minya in Egypt. The Jawazi used to live in the
country now occupied by the 'Awaqir, and they now mostly live
in Minya Province of Egypt and in the Fayum. Another struggle
which greatly altered the tribal distribution in Cyrenaica was
*[648] two wars, the last about 1832, of the Magharba and 'Awaqir,
aided by their Jibarna kinsmen the 'Abid and 'Arafa, against
the tribes which occupied the *barqa* and the remnants of which
now range the littoral of the western Sirtica. These tribes are
known as *al-'Arab al-Gharb*, the Western Arabs.

*175 So, in 1800 the Harabi and Jibarna tribes, which are now in
131 undisputed control of all Cyrenaica outside the towns, occupied
619 only part of the country, mostly the central, and the most
northerly reaches of the western, plateau. The Jibarna were
cut off from the southern steppe by the Fawayid and Jawazi,
the whole of the *barqa* was occupied by *al-'Arab al-Gharb*, and
the eastern part of the plateau by the Aulad 'Ali. The wars by
[726] which they drove out their rivals were long and savagely fought
and many incidents in them still form part of Bedouin tradition.

*175 As a result of these tribal wars the descendants of the Bani
Sulaim invaders of Cyrenaica and the Maghrib thus began to
131 return eastwards with a quota of Berber blood about the end of
167 the seventeenth century and pushed out the tribes they found
619 dwelling in the Western Desert of Egypt and pressed them into
the Delta, where they were absorbed by the *fallahin*. The first
intruders from the west were pushed to the Nile by stronger
tribes coming behind them and these by yet stronger. They
pushed one another like trucks on a siding. The Hanadi pushed
out the Bani 'Una and the Aulad 'Ali pushed out the Hanadi,
being themselves pushed on from behind by the 'Abaidat and
other Harabi tribes. Besides the migration of whole tribes from
Cyrenaica into Egypt there has taken place an exodus of many
tribal sections and fragments, owing to intertribal fighting, until
to-day there is not a Cyrenaican tribe, or even large section,
which has not some of its members in Egypt, often whole
619 lineages. The Bedouin of Cyrenaica know their kinsmen in
167 Egypt and sometimes when the price of sheep is low in the
602 Egyptian markets they leave their animals with them to sell on
439 their behalf when prices rise.

their behalf when prices rise. There are said to be 30,000 619
'Harabi' alone, excluding the Bara'asa, in Egypt, most of them 167
in the Fayum, while the Aulad 'Ali and their client aggregates 162
number nearly 40,000.[1]

V

The Arabs of Cyrenaica distinguish between those tribes which 619
are *Sa'adi* and those which are *Marabtin*. The *Sa'adi* tribes are
so called after Sa'ada of the Bani Sulaim, their ancestress. They
are those nine tribes who hold the country by right of conquest:
the 'Abaidat, the Hasa, the *'Ailat* Fayid, the Aulad Hamad
(Bara'asa), the Darsa, the 'Abid, the 'Arafa, the 'Awaqir, and
the Magharba. The *Marabtin* tribes use the earth and water by
grace of the *Sa'adi* tribes of whom they are to a greater or lesser
degree clients. Savarese says that their status in Turkish times
lay between that of clients of ancient Roman law and that of
serfs of the glebe in western Europe in the Middle Ages.[2] The
Sanusiya did much to lessen the difference in status between
free and client tribes in Cyrenaica and to-day the larger groups
of *Marabtin*, although they may in theory live on *Sa'adi* land,
do in fact live independently and pay no fees to the owners of
the land. Sometimes violent disputes, and even wars, have
broken out between free tribes and their clients, such as the
famous battles between the 'Awaqir and the Shahaibat. More-
over, one has only to note that the predominance of the leading
sections of some free tribes is due to the support of powerful
client fractions to realize that, though the clients may be
considered not to have the full status of a noble Arab tribe, the
relationship between them and the owners of the country is often
one of mutual dependence. Thus the leading section of the [162]
powerful Bara'asa tribe is the *'Ailat* Hadduth which in De
Agostini's lists numbers 2,520 persons, of whom only 630 are
true Bara'asa, the remainder being clients; and the leading
section of the 'Awaqir, the *'Ailat* Suliman, counts 1,200 clients
out of a total of 1,940. Where the relationship is one of mutual
dependence the two tribes are expected to help each other in
the payment of blood-money.

The client tribes are of different categories to which corre-

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[1] G. W. Murray, *Sons of Ishmael*, 1935, pp. 277 and 296.

[2] Op. cit., p. 56.

619 spond different social statuses. Some are classed as *Marabtin bil baraka*, 'client tribes with the blessing' or *Marabtin al-Fatha*,
619 'client tribes of the prayer', and they often claim to be Sharifs.
778 These 'sacred' tribes, such as the Aulad al-Shaikh and most of

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
TUNISIA
Tarabulis
Masallata
Misurata
Al-Rujban
Al-Qal'a
AL-AMAMRA
Al-Haraba
Bani Walid
AL-HARABA
AL-RUJBAN
AL-MASHASHA
Mizda
URFALLA
AULAD BUSAIF
Sirt
AL-QADHADHFA
Al-Naufiliya
Sinawin
Ghadamis
Darj
Al-Tabaqa
AL-ZINTAN
SULIMAN
AL-MAGHARBA
AL ZAWIYA
AL-HARABA
AL-MAQARHA
RIYAH
AL-JAMA'AT
Saukna
Hun
Waddan
Zalla
AULAD
Al-Fuqha
Birqin
AL-HUTMAN
AL-HASAUNA
Sabha
Tamassa
Ghudwa
Umm Al-Aranab
Zuwila
Murzuq
Draim
Taghaghan
Wau Al-Kabir
Wau Al-Namus
Ghath
Al-Qatrun
AL-HARABA → Names of Tribes
Al-Haraba → Sanusiya Zawiyas
Boundary Lines
Scale
0 50 100 150 200 400 kms.

The Chief Sanusi Bedouin Tribes of Tripolitania.

619 the Masamir and Farjan, live among the *Sa'adi* as equals in
778 virtue of the prestige they derive from their descent, or supposed descent, from saints, though the free tribes do not regard
[173] them as quite like themselves. Their ancestors are almost invariably believed to have come from the west, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, or Tripolitania. This move of pious men to

the east began in the middle of the thirteenth century and has 619
lasted to the present day. It is intimately bound up with the 778
pilgrimage to the sacred towns of Islam. Round these pious [173]
men and round their tombs gathered for sanctuary the simple [788]
and oppressed, and from these and from the children of the
holy men have sprung the *Marabtin bil baraka* tribes. The other 619
client tribes have no sacred associations and are known as 651
Marabtin al-sadqan because they pay *sadaqa*, a fee, to a free
tribe for protection and for the privilege of using the earth and
water. Some small broken-up fragments of this category on the
plateau, such as the 'Awwama, Alauna, Hasanna, and some of
the Qat'an and Sa'it, even to-day have a very inferior social
position and are forced to make payments to, and to perform
services for, the free tribes among whom they live. Other 619
tribes of this second category live, as already mentioned, on
territory which is to all intents and purposes their own and have
long since ceased to pay a fee. This is especially the case to the
east, in 'Abaidat tribal territory, where such client tribes as the
Minifa, Qat'an, Taraki, and Huta live with independent status.
In the west also the Fawakhir and Zuwaya are too powerful and
warlike to accept overlordship. Also, the more nomadic groups
in Cyrenaica are mostly client tribes and, like all nomads, resent
any control or authority. Whatever the free tribes may say
about them, they regard themselves as independent.

The provenance of the *Sa'adi* tribes and of some of the 619
Marabtin tribes is shown together with the distribution of the 162
Sanusiya lodges on the map facing page 35, and the approximate
numbers of these tribes, and of a few others not shown on the
map, are listed below.

Sa'adi	
al-'Abaidat	30,450
al-'Awaqir	27,500
al-Bara'asa	21,000
al-Darsa	18,850
al-Magharba	13,000
al-'Arafa	9,300
al-'Abid	6,850
al-Hasa	6,500
'*Ailat* Fayid	100
Marabtin	
al-Qat'an	5,850
al-'Awwama	3,800
al-Zuwaya	3,700
al-Shwa'ir	3,400
al-Fawakhir	3,300
al-Sa'it	2,900
al-Majabra	2,500
al-Minifa	2,500
al-Masamir	2,400
al-Awajila	2,300
Aulad al-Shaikh	1,650
al-'Aqail	1,400
al-Shahaibat	1,350
al-Sarahna	1,250
al-Qabail	1,150
al-Huta	1,150

619 The figures for the free tribes include attached client groups,
162 for the principal of which estimates are also given separately.
[127] The figures are taken from Col. De Agostini's monograph. The
provenance of the chief Bedouin tribes of Tripolitania and of
the fringes of Fazzan who are Sanusi, or sympathetic to the
Sanusiya, is shown, likewise in relation to the distribution of
Sanusiya lodges, on the map on page 52.

VI

619 Although there were in the past intertribal wars and feuds
[671] which have lasted into the present time, and in spite of the
[574] difference in status between free and client tribes, there were
laws of the tents which gave every Bedouin the freedom of the
whole country, and there was much coming and going between
the tribes and exchange of hospitality, especially in the grazing
grounds where sections with distinct territories on the plateau
shared common pasturage to the south of it, and where the
necessities of Bedouin life, watering at wells in transit, the crossing
of another tribe's territory on the way to markets, the
pursuit of straying camels, and the need to sow where rain fell,
imposed a recognition of individual rights without regard to
tribal affiliations or social status. Had it not been so, the Grand
[793] Sanusi could not have built on the tribal system his inclusive
organization, for there would have been no foundations in
*[795] culture, social structure, and sentiment, on which to build.

128 My inclinations as an anthropologist are to discuss at some
length the tribal and kinship systems and the life of the tents,
619 but I refrain from giving more than a bare outline of the tribal
system, and I neglect altogether kinship and the life of the tents,
because, however interesting detail about these matters might
be to the ethnologist, a knowledge of them is, I think, unnecessary
for an understanding of the development of the
Sanusiya Order in Cyrenaica. I discuss the structure of the
Cyrenaican tribe therefore only in so far as it is relevant to this
general theme.[1]

619 Use of the term 'tribe' in Cyrenaica, even if it be restricted to the big free tribes, is always to some extent arbitrary for the political structure is highly segmentary. Nevertheless, though

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[1] For a more general account see Savarese, op. cit., Pt. II, *passim*.

sections of a tribe may be opposed to one another they regard 619
themselves as an undivided group in opposition to neighbouring
tribes, and are so regarded by their neighbours. Thus a Qalbati
is only a Qalbati in Hasa country. In 'Abaidat or Bara'asa
country he is a Hasi. Likewise a Darsi or an 'Abidi in contrast
to members of other tribes regards the whole of the Darsa or the
'Abid as his people, his tribal brothers.

Each tribe in this commonly accepted sense has its *watan*, its 619
homeland, its soil, its arable, its pastures, and its wells; and 421
each has its camel-brand which is also carved on the tombstones [764]
of its dead. The tribal lands are vested in the tribe, which
has residual rights in them. They cannot, therefore, be alienated
to other tribes without the consent of the whole tribe. A tribe 619
is conceived of as a huge family descended from a common 614
ancestor, from whom the tribe generally takes its name. Hence
its segments can be figured either as a series of political sections
or as genealogical branches of a clan.

A tribe is divided into several, generally two or three, 619
primary divisions, or sub-tribes, which own well-defined portions 613
of the tribal territory, in most cases running in strips unbroken
by intrusive elements. These primary divisions are of the same
pattern as the tribe of which they form part. Each division has
its *watan*, which its members own and defend collectively. They
believe that they are descended from a common ancestor, who
is generally a son of the ancestor of the tribe. Primary tribal
divisions split into secondary divisions, and secondary divisions
into tertiary divisions, and so on. Each of the smaller divisions is
a replica of the larger ones and has the same preferential and
exclusive rights in its lands, an encroachment on which by
another division will lead to fighting. Each has within the
tribal brand its special lineage markings. The members of each
division also consider that they are descended from a common
ancestor who, in his turn, is descended from the ancestor of the
larger division of which they form a section. The further the
sub-division the more the resultant groups take on the complexion of kinship aggregates, rather than of political aggregates.

These kinship aggregates or extended family groups are the
basic units of tribal life. They are called *biyut* (sing. *bait*). The [423]
tribe may be the residual owner of land and water but the
biyut are the owners in use. Their members live in the same

619 stretch of tribal territory, move during the rains to the same
613 grazing grounds, use the same wells during the dry season, and
cultivate adjacent strips of arable. The members of a *bait* have
a lively sense of solidarity, and this is most evident in fighting
and feuds. It is their common duty to avenge a slain kinsman
and they share the *diya*, indemnity, should they accept it in
[672] the place of a life. They are jointly responsible for a wrong any
one of them may commit. The smaller *biyut* are often identical
[621] with camps, usually from five to ten tents, in grazing grounds,
and several closely related *biyut* camp near together in the
vicinity of springs and wells in the summer, their combined
camps then amounting sometimes to over a hundred tents.

619 What has been said above about tribal structure applies only
to the free tribes and the larger client tribes living on their own
land. The client tribes which are split up and scattered throughout
Cyrenaica are not tribes in a political, but only in an ethnic,
619 sense. It will be found that in any of the main tribes stranger
614 groups, sometimes of client origin, have attached themselves
608 to the clan dominant in the tribal area and through some fiction,
myth, or fraud, have grafted their branch of descent on to the
genealogical tree of this clan. The Bedouin use the word *laf* to
describe this process and they say that kinship established in this
way may become as strong as kinship of blood.

619 The structure of a tribe is expressed in terms of the lineage
system of the clan dominant in its territory, the tribal segments
614 being associated with branches of descent from the ancestor of
613 this clan. The primary tribal sections are identified with lineages
descended from some of this ancestor's descendants in the male
line; the secondary tribal sections are identified with lineages
descended from more of his descendants farther down the line
of descent; and so on till the smallest territorial segments and
the smallest lineages are reached. Thus a lineage considered as
a branch of a clan consists of all those persons who trace their
descent through the male line to a common ancestor, but it can
also be, and in speech often is, conceived of politically as an
agnatic group of this kind together with stranger and *Marabtin*
accretions which occupy its territory and make common cause
with it in disputes with other tribes or segments of the same
tribe.

A simple example is given in illustration of tribal segmentation

and of the consistency between lineages of a clan and segments 619
of a tribe. In explanation of it a few words must first be said 614
about the terms *qabila*, *'aila*, and *bait*. *Qabila* is the word 613
generally used to denote a tribe or primary tribal division.


MASAMIR
MARABTIN
AL-DARSA
AL-SHABA
AL-QALABTA
Balrabat
Al-Shaliah
Al-Mahafada
'Ait Brahim
'At al-Mzatal
AL-MUASA
Al-Aqta'
AL-BAKHAYIT
BARQA
AL-BARA'ASA
AL 'ABAIDAT
'AILAT FAYID
Tribal Boundaries
1st. Subdivision
2nd. Subdivision
3rd. Subdivision
Al-Aqta' 4th. Subdivision
Sanusiya Zawiya:—
Built
Not completed
Marabout Tomb
Scale
0 1 2 3 4 kms.

102
131
619
778
795*
613

The Divisions of the Hasa Tribe.

'Ailat are the lineages into which a clan is divided and hence 619
the sections of a tribe of various sizes in which these lineages are 614
found and after which they take their names. *Biyut* are small 613
lineages, or extended families, with a depth of five or six generations from the present day to their founders. It must be noted, however, that all these terms are relative and are used in a more or less comprehensive sense according to the context.

601
619
613


AL-HASA
Hawass
AL-QALABTA
Qalbat
Qassam
AL-MUASA
Musa
AL-MAHAMDA
Muhammad
AL-SHABARQA
Shibriq
AL-BAKHAYIT
Bakhit
'At BRAHIM
Brahim
'At AL-MZATAL
Mzatal
'At AL-SHAUQI
Ma'afi
'At AL-SLAILIKH
Zaidan
Mansur
'At ALRABA'I
Muhammad
'At AL-AQTA'
Tahir
Bt Bu SHNAINIFA
Bu Shnainifa
Sultan
Jibrin
Bt BU HAUDHANA
Sultan
Sa'ad
'Umar
Bt WA'AIRA
Wa'aira
Balal
Bt MUHAMMAD
Bt QASHAISH
Bt 'ALI
Muhammad
Qashaish
'Ali
Bu Halaiqa
Salih
Bt BU HALAIQA
Bt GHAIZAN
Bt BRAHIM
Bt MUSTAFA
Bt AL-HABAL
Bu Halaiqa
Ghaizan
Brahim
Mustafa
Husain
'Aqila
Mehemmed
Muhammad
Jibrin
Mustafa
'Abd al-Khaliq
Hamad
Mahmud
Sa'ad
'Abd al-'Azim
'Abd al-Salam
'Abd al-Razaq
'Abdalla
Salih
Mahmud
Mustafa
Ramadan

Names of tribal sections are printed in capital letters.
'At = *'Ailat.*
Bt = *Bait.*

619
613 If reference be made to the accompanying map and genealogical chart it will be seen that the Hasa tribe is made up of three primary sections, the Qalabta, the Shabarqa, and the Bakhayit, distributed in strips running from north to south, which are very typical and give to each section equal condi-

3:Evans-Pritchard E-4, 5 (1942-1944) 1949 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9
(1837-1942) Sanusi

tions of soil, water, and grazing. We trace the segmentation of the Qalabta alone and see that it has two divisions, the Muasa and the Mahamda. We follow the line of Muhammad alone and note that it splits into three lineages, *'Ailat* Brahim, *'Ailat* al-Mzatal, and *'Ailat* al-Shauqi (there is dispute, arising from quarrels over land, about the legitimacy of this branch). From Mzatal descend the three minor *'ailat*, al-Slailikh, al-Aqta', and Balraba'i. Following only the first line we note that *'Ailat* al-Shlailikh then divides into the various *biyut* shown on the chart, al-Habal, Mustafa, Brahim, &c., the male membership of only one of which, *bait* al-Habal, is presented in the genealogy. Where the name of an *'aila* or *bait* is different from that of its founder, it almost invariably means that the founder's nick-name has been used, the Cyrenaican Bedouin having a partiality for nicknames. 619 613

Each section of a tribe, from the smallest to the largest, has its Shaikh or Shaikhs. The tribal system, typical of segmentary structures everywhere, is a system of balanced opposition between tribes and tribal sections from the largest to the smallest divisions, and there cannot therefore be any single authority in a tribe. Authority is distributed at every point of the tribal structure and political leadership is limited to situations in which a tribe or a segment of it acts corporately. With a tribe this only happens in war or in dealings with an outside authority which for its own purposes recognizes the tribe as an administrative unit. There cannot, obviously, be any absolute authority vested in a single Shaikh of a tribe when the fundamental principle of tribal structure is opposition between its segments, and in such segmentary systems there is no state and no government as we understand these institutions; and criminal law is absent and civil law exists only in a very rudimentary form. Consequently the exact status of a Shaikh can only be defined in terms of a complicated network of kinship ties and structural relations. It is only necessary here to emphasize that his social position is unformalized and that he must in no sense be regarded as a ruler or administrator. Bedouin respect their Shaikhs, but they do not regard them as superiors. Rather their influence and wealth are considered as capital to be drawn on for the benefit of whoever is in need of them. So long as a Shaikhly family can keep their prestige, 619 554 [643] [671] 554

554 derived from the strength of their section, their wealth, their traditional place in Bedouin society, and the character of their leading members, so long only are they regarded as Shaikhs of whatever the grade may be.

554 In recording his impressions of the Aulad 'Ali tribe the generous and unfortunate Pacho gives an excellent picture of 619 the Bedouin Shaikh's position in tribal society. He says that it [642] is difficult to discover any government in their society, which might be called aristocratic, though it is such in form rather than in substance. The precarious authority of the Shaikhs rests not on force but on the renown and esteem they enjoy in 554 619 *648 the tribe. He adds that at the time of his visit it had become customary, after Muhammad 'Ali Pasha had broken the tribe, for the Shaikhs to get their titles confirmed by the Pasha of Egypt but that when they returned to their camps with the robes of honour bestowed on them by the Pasha of Egypt, these garments, far from adding to their prestige and making them objects of regard, excited derision and aversion unless the backing of the tribe had preceded the approval of the Pasha.[1]

554 613 The Italian lawyer Savarese has also written an illuminating description of the status of a Cyrenaican Bedouin Shaikh. Each *bait* and each *'aila* has its Shaikh, chosen for his age and wisdom or for his prowess, though the Shaikhship is generally [556] hereditary in certain families. A Shaikh receives obedience and respect from his dependants but ought to be rich because the demands of hospitality are considerable. He takes a leading part in the settlement of disputes and must have the tact necessary to maintain the unity of the group in opposition to other groups of the same order. He represents his group in relations with these other groups and in the larger group of which it forms part. In matters in which his group as a whole is concerned he takes the advice of the Shaikhs of its divisions. He commands the men of the group in war and he collects the tribute due from 554 the group to the Government. Nevertheless, a Bedouin Shaikh, however large the group he represents, lives and dresses like his fellow Bedouin, though, being rich, his tent may be larger than most and he has more horses and they are more richly appointed.

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[1] J. R. Pacho, *Relation d'un Voyage dans la Marmarique, la Cyrénaïque et les Oasis d'Audjelah et de Maradèh*, 1827, p. 67.

He also has more wives than other Bedouin and is usually more cultured and intelligent.[1] 554 [595]

The most important of the Shaikhly families of the country, those which represented large tribal divisions vis-à-vis the Turkish Government, the Sanusiya, others sections of their tribe, adjacent tribes, and attached client groups, lost much of their influence with the loss of their stock and the exile of some of their more prominent members during the second Italo-Sanusi war. The authority of these traditional Shaikhly lineages was also undermined by Italian policies, first of recognizing and paying salaries to so many Shaikhs, some of whom were persons of little importance, that the office of Shaikh lost much of its virtue in the eyes of the people, and afterwards of ignoring the Shaikhs altogether. The better known of these Shaikhly families are the house of Bu Bakr bu Hadduth among the Bara'asa, the house of Lataiwish among the Magharba; the house of 'Abdalla among the 'Abaidat, the houses of Kizzih and 'Abbar among the 'Awaqir, the house of Asbali among the 'Arafa, the houses of Suwaikir and 'Ilwani among the 'Abid, the house of Bu Khatara bu Halaiqa among the Hasa, and, in the Sirtica, the most famous house of all, that of Saif al-Nasir among the highly nomadic Aulad Suliman. 554 558 648*

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[1] Op. cit., Pt. II, pp. 39–40.

[P.62]

CHAPTER III

THE SANUSIYA AND THE TRIBES

I

793 When the Grand Sanusi came to preach in Cyrenaica he found
619 the kind of society I have outlined: a congeries of tribes without
law or effective government, for the Turks had little control
over the interior, but with like values and habits and a community
of life which crossed tribal boundaries. The Bedouin to
[181] whom he preached were simple people living the austere and
monotonous life of the tents, with that savage character which
has been so often portrayed, but also with those noble qualities
which have seldom failed to evoke admiration from those who
[177] have lived among them. They were profoundly ignorant about
the outside world and also—which is what touched the heart of
[797] the Grand Sanusi—about the faith of their fathers, and to this
matter I must now return, since the Sanusiya was a missionary
Order and can only be understood as such.

771 Though the Bedouin professed Islam before the Grand Sanusi
[797] influenced them by his teaching, they were almost totally
ignorant of its doctrinal content, rites, or ritual and moral
duties, and it is safe to assume that they did not obey its precepts.
It is safe to assume this because even to-day, after a
century of Sanusiya instruction, the Bedouin perform their
religious duties in a very perfunctory way, if at all, and when
Muslim law is at variance with tribal custom they follow tribal
custom. In saying that they are lax, I do not suggest that they
[186] are not very sincere, Muslims. They are proud of being Muslims
and consider themselves greatly superior to Christians, while
they are contemptuous of Jews. Nevertheless, though they
would not belittle, the Cyrenaican Bedouin feel no embarrassment
at neglecting, the duties obligatory on every Muslim.
The Confession of Faith is known to all and implicitly accepted
by all. It imposes no irksome restrictions or tiresome duties.
But they almost completely neglect—I speak of the more
[782] nomadic sections whom I know best, but it is probably true of
most Cyrenaican Bedouin—their daily prayers, a duty which is

absolutely obligatory and sinful to omit. I very much doubt 771 whether many of the Bedouin know how to pray in the pre- [782] scribed manner. As I have mentioned earlier, the Bedouin used [794] to give alms to their zawiyas and in doing so they carried out [735] one of the five major duties of a Muslim, but they regarded these [431] alms as charity rather than legal dues. I have never met an ordinary Bedouin who had been to Mecca, or who even contemplated going there. Nevertheless, however lax they may [785] be in other things, all Cyrenaican Bedouin keep the fast of Ramadan, and in this annual fast is summed up for them, more than in anything else, the obligations and privileges of Islam and its unity and strength. Moreover, although they are [829] negligent Muslims themselves they respect piety in others. Brothers of the Sanusiya Order and religious men in general ought to pray regularly. That is their business and it is very necessary for the well-being of the community and worthy of liberal support, but the Bedouin is an unlettered man, a shepherd, and a warrior, and he has his own affairs to see to. Perhaps the Bedouin make up for their shortcomings by their enthusiasm for the *jihad*, holy war against unbelievers. They [798] consider that they have fulfilled their obligation under this [648]* head in ample measure by their long and courageous fight, formally declared a holy war by the Caliph of Islam, against the Italians, the French, and the British. A Bedouin once said to me when I remarked how rarely I had seen Bedouin at prayer: '*nasum wa najhad*', '(but) we fast and we wage holy war'.

It must also be said that it would be an error to suppose that Islam had not, long before the time of the Grand Sanusi, strongly affected the character and custom of the Sulaimid Bedouin. This question, which is far from simple, need not be discussed in the present account and it is only necessary to note that the Bedouin assume that their customs are Muslim customs. It would also be a questionable judgement to assert that the Bedouin of Cyrenaica are not religious because they do not pay the same attention to outward ritual as do townspeople and peasants, for piety and holiness, as we have often been admonished, are not the same. The Bedouin certainly have a profound faith in God and trust in the destiny He has prepared for them and this faith and trust enhance that superb dignity

771 which often contrasts so strikingly with their poverty and rags and what Paolo Della Cella describes as their 'excessive and habitual filth'.[1]

771 It is important that it should be understood that the Bedouin
797 of Cyrenaica were Muslim, at any rate by allegiance if not by
793 instruction, before the Grand Sanusi propagated the faith among
*795 them, because otherwise it would be difficult to account for their ready acceptance of his guidance. He was not appealing to a pagan people to embrace Islam, but to a Muslim people to show in their lives the faith they professed. It was his achievement to have given their religion organized form and direction, and by so doing to have exercised a persistent and transformative influence on their morals; for if the Bedouin neglect religious duties to-day and are by peasant and urban standards ignorant, loud, and lawless, it can be imagined that they were troublesome indeed before the Grand Sanusi and Sayyid al-Mahdi had taught them something of the duties of their faith and had softened the harshness of their customs. That the Sanusiya made a big difference to their way of life cannot be doubted. Shaikh Muhammad 'Uthman tells us of the Bedouin of Cyrenaica that 'They are very good-natured and of a cheerful disposition. They have a profound reverence for the Shaikh Sidi al-Mahdi, and they fear God and His Prophet. One is in perfect security among them; a stranger, an explorer, has he even loads of gold or silver, has nothing to fear from them.' He also says, and for the same reason, that there were peace and security for caravans in the Wadai and in those parts of the Sahara where the Sanusiya was established; and he adds that Sayyid al-Mahdi had achieved these remarkable results by the exercise of spiritual authority only, and not by force, 'as an Amir or Sultan would have done'. As for the citizens of Banghazi, of whom the Tunisian traveller had a very poor opinion, he says that they were proud, inhospitable, and lazy, and would still have been plunged in ignorance and without a vestige of civilization or of religious education 'if the goodness of God had not sent them the Sanusiya fraternity, which contributed much to their moral regeneration'.[2] Even Italian authors have to admit that the Sanusiya did much for the people

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[1] Op. cit., p. 109.

[2] Op. cit., pp. 52, 59, 62, and 116-17.

of Cyrenaica.[1] The Bedouin remember with gratitude, as I have 771
often heard them declare, the moral and cultural benefits 797
brought to them by the Order. If they have fallen from the low 793
religious and literary standards to which the Sanusiya raised a 795*
fraction of them it is due to the virtual extinction of its teaching office during their long struggle with the Italians.

II

The Bedouin the Grand Sanusi found in Cyrenaica were not 771
only Muslims but also inveterate devotees of saints, the 792
Marabtin (sing. *Marabat*) or Marabouts, as they are called in 793
European accounts of North Africa, and the Grand Sanusi was 776
in the long tradition of these holy men. Therefore, although I 778
have touched on the matter in Chapter I, I need not excuse myself for treating it again in its Cyrenaican context, for Bedouin attachment to the Sanusiya springs from their personal devotion to the Grand Sanusi and his family, and not the other way round, and the Grand Sanusi derived his sanctity, and thereby his power, from the fact that he was a Marabout. The Bedouin are familiar with saints and ignorant of Orders. To them the Grand Sanusi was a saint and wonderworker, and a man with *baraka*, an ample measure of God's grace which flowed through him to ordinary folk; but there was nothing extraordinary about him. They knew his kind of old. When he died his tomb became a shrine, the largest and richest in Cyrenaica it is true, but only one among very many, dating from the Companions of the Prophet Muhammad, through the Martyrs who were killed fighting for the faith in Cyrenaica, to the pious and learned
men of yesterday and the day before. His successors, by their [613]
kinship with him, and in virtue of their spiritual legacy from
him, became heirs to his *baraka*; and so, to a lesser degree, have the heirs of the other religious teachers who came to Cyrenaica from the west, who died and were buried there, and whose descendants are the *Marabtin bil baraka* lineages of to-day. The authority the Grand Sanusi had over the Bedouin of Arabia and North Africa can be parallelled by the careers of many holy

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[1] Giuseppe Macaluso, *Turchi, Senussi e Italiani in Libia*, 1930, p. 32; Giglio, op. cit., p. 22; and Arcangelo Ghisleri (quoting Andrea Pedretti), *Tripolitania e Cirenaica dal Mediterraneo al Sahara*, 1912, p. 132. [113]

771 men in North Africa whose families still retain much wealth and
792 influence. It was this Marabout status of the Grand Sanusi in
793 the eyes of the Bedouin which won him their respect: it was the
776 organization of the Sanusiya Order, an organization the earlier
778 Marabouts did not have, which enabled him to turn this respect
into a theocracy.

*175 There is more than one explanation of the origin of the word
792 '*Marabat*'. That generally accepted is that it derives from the
root RBT, to bind, and hence from '*ribat*', a fortified convent,
619 inhabited by warrior-monks, found on the marches of Islam in
[192] its early days of expansion by arms. The word later became
attached to the tribes which settled in Andalousia under the leadership of the Saharan tribe of the Sanhaja and was corrupted into the European 'Almoravides'. After the fall of the Sanhaja dynasty in the twelfth century part of the *Marabtin* tribes fell back into central and southern Morocco, whence many individuals moved eastwards. Some settled in Cyrenaica, generally on their return from the pilgrimage to Mecca, and their fanaticism, asceticism, ability to read and write, and thaumaturgic powers, impressed the simple Bedouin, who accepted them as holy men and magicians and used them to write charms, to perform religious rites, and to act as mediators in inter-
[613] tribal disputes. Sometimes, as we have seen, these men
founded lineages which, dwelling under the shadow of their saintly forbears, became nuclei of social agglomerations which have developed in course of time into tribal groups, thus taking the shape of the tribal society in which they lived. The word
[192] '*Marabtin*' thus came to mean holy men (and their tombs) and
then, in addition, tribes tracing their descent, or supposed descent, from these holy men and also, finally, in Cyrenaica, tribes who are clients of the great *Sa'adi* tribes which own the earth and water.

778 Some of the better known of the Cyrenaican saints, but by
776 no means all, have gleaming white cupolas, supported by four
792 walls, erected over their tombs, and inside the walls is a *tub*, a
wooden box, over the grave, and this is covered with coloured cloth on which are inscribed passages from the Koran. Inside also are often a few pages from sacred books, occasionally a few small coins given by the local Bedouin, and any property, such as tents or ploughs, the Bedouin have wished to deposit in a

safe place when on seasonal moves. Often a shrine, sometimes 778
the shrine of a very famous saint, is no more than a wall of 776
stones, with perhaps a stick, with pieces of cloth tied to it, 792
erected over the grave, and this is the usual form in the steppe
grazing-grounds. There are generally cemeteries around the [764]
tombs.

All these shrines are visited by the Bedouin from time to time,
when they are passing by or when they have some request to
make of the holy man. Many of them are cult centres, an annual [796]
ceremony, one of the chief events of the Bedouin year, being [619]
held at them; and when they are near the border between tribes,
or between tribal sections, this is an occasion for intertribal, or
intersectional, gatherings. There is no saint whose tomb is much [789]
visited by the Bedouin who has not performed miracles, some [755]
of them very remarkable miracles, and there is probably none
who has not at some time or other cured the sick or given an heir.

The tombs of these holy men, Sidi this, Sidi that, and Sidi
the other, are found in profusion over the whole of inhabited
Cyrenaica. The historically best known are those of Sidi Rafa',
one of the Companions of the Prophet, near al-Zawiya al-Baida
on the plateau, of Sidi 'Abdalla, one of the Prophet's standard-bearers,
in the oasis of Aujila, and of the founder of the Sanusiya
Order, Sidi Muhammad bin 'Ali al-Sanusi, at Jaghbub oasis.
The shrines belong to the tribes and tribal sections in whose [619]
earth the Marabouts are buried and the Marabouts are looked [423]
upon as tribal and sub-tribal patrons. Like the Sanusiya Order,
they have become part of tribal life.

I have earlier reproduced Col. De Agostini's map of the Hasa 778
tribe to serve as an example of the territorial distribution of 619
lineages. The same map serves to illustrate the distribution of 792
shrines in a tribal territory. It can be seen from this map, which 776
shows only the best-known Marabout tombs, that all the different
sections of the tribe have their shrines, and I would draw
attention to an interesting feature of the distribution which I
have also noted in other tribal areas: how often these sacred
spots are near a tribal boundary, or near the boundary between
one tribal section and another. This may not be pure chance,
for the Marabouts in their lifetimes were regarded as standing
outside the tribal system, to which indeed, being foreigners from
the west, they did not belong, and their chief political role was

778 to act as mediators between tribes and between one tribal
619 section and another. Even to-day their tombs are regarded as
792 neutral points, as it were, and are often the place chosen for a
776 meeting between the Shaikhs of one tribe, or tribal section, and
those of an adjacent tribe, or section, when some matter has to be settled between them. It has sometimes happened also that when two tribes have disputed the ownership of territory, they have settled the dispute by allotting it to a Marabout, which means to his descendants, so that one then finds a *Marabtin* strip between two *Sa'adi* tribes or tribal sections. One of the best examples of this is the strip of country owned by the Aulad al-Shaikh tribe between the 'Awaqir and the 'Abid and 'Arafa tribal domains. In the same way tribes made gifts of disputed wells to dead saints. Where a *Marabtin* tribe has grown out of a Marabout family they will be found living in the area around their tombs. Thus the Aulad al-Shaikh territory spreads out from Sidi Mahiyus, part of the Masamir live near Sidi Nuh, the Mshaitat live around Sidi al-Mshaiti, and the Qat'an live near Sidi Hashim and Sidi Suliman al-Tair.

792 So, long centuries before the Grand Sanusi began his mission
776 in Cyrenaica, the Bedouin were used to the sight of an *'alim*, a
212 learned man—for anyone who can read and write is a learned
554 man to the Bedouin—coming from the west to heal their
children and beasts, break droughts, write talismans, and teach them the beliefs and law of Islam. Such a man was also a *muhakkam*, one who arbitrated in their disputes and said the *fatiha* at their settlements and undertakings to make them binding. He could arbitrate among them because he was not of them. He was not like them a tented son of the steppe, though his descendants may have learned to live as such, but a *Marabat*, a man who follows religion and not the rains. The Bedouin of Cyrenaica owe much to these holy men, for, ignorant and superstitious though they may have been, they taught the tribesmen to respect learning and religion and kept those twin lights burning, even if dimly, through centuries. The Bedouin do not forget them, or to say a prayer for them, when they pass their tombs; and they have given the freedom of their earth and water to their descendants. Without these forerunners the
[182] Grand Sanusi could not have planted his Order in the country.
*[795] It is planted in their bones.

Marabouts of the kind I have described were still coming to 792
Cyrenaica from the west up to the time when the Grand Sanusi 793
began his preaching in the country. Two of them whom he 795*
found there, already living among the Bedouin, the one on the
western and the other on the eastern part of the plateau, teaching them and settling their disputes, became his followers: Sidi
Ahmad bin 'Abdalla al-Sakkuri, a late arrival from the west,
whose descendants became Shaikhs of the zawiya of al-Marj,
and Sidi al-Martadi Farkash, of an old *Marabtin* family of
Cyrenaica, whose descendants became Shaikhs of the lodges at
Umm al-Razam, Bishara, and Martuba. But the great majority
of the Grand Sanusi's helpers were men who had come with him
from the west, chiefly from Algeria. Other *Ikhwan* families, [613]
mostly of the Khattabi lineage, of which the Sanusi family are
a branch, came later, also from Algeria, in the time of Sayyid
al-Mahdi. To the Bedouin they were all Marabouts and when [778]
they had in their lifetimes a reputation for piety or learning
their tombs in the Sanusiya lodges in which they resided became
places of cult like those of their forerunners all over Cyrenaica.
But unlike the earlier Marabouts these Sanusiya Brothers were
not only holy men. They were also members of a fraternity, of
an organization. The Sanusiya Order was thus not only heir 795*
to the accumulated capital of the Marabouts, but was able to 182
exploit it as a corporation. It incorporated a number of isolated
cults into a single wider cult, fractionized, it is true, by tribal
particularisms, but, all the same, brought under a common
organization. Each lodge of the Order was a cult centre, but it
was something more: it was part of a general cult directed
through the lodges towards the Head of the Order. The tribes 619
of Cyrenaica became through the Order linked from above in a 182
common, if loose, organization under a single, sacred, Head. 795*
This was possible only because a tribal system already existed
uniting the different tribes, in spite of their feuds and enmities, 793
into a society which, though lacking political unity, rested on
common sentiments, a common way of life, and a common
lineage structure.

What gave stability to this new relationship between the [648]*
Bedouin tribes and the Sanusiya Order, turning the sacred Head
into a secular leader and the religious organization into a
government, and changed a loose federation of tribes into a

3:Evans-Pritchard E-4, 5 (1942-1944) 1949 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9
(1837-1942) Sanusi

619

182 nation, was common hostility to outside interference, an ingre-
*795 dient supplied in measured quantities by the Turks and copiously
793 by the Italians.

*[648]

III

The rudiments of Islam which the Grand Sanusi found in
Cyrenaica made his teachings acceptable, delivered as they were
without embellishments, to the Bedouin of the country, and
the Marabout tradition which he also found there made him
[578] personally acceptable to them. His chief difficulty must have
been the rivalries between tribe and tribe and between tribal
section and tribal section down to the smallest sections. This
[361] difficulty was overcome by transferring the centre of the Order
to desert oases, where it could not become identified with any
particular tribe, and by distributing its lodges impartially
throughout the tribal territories.

*795 Of the forty-five zawiyas belonging to the tribes of Cyrenaica
793 proper (including al-Naufiliya and excluding the Kufra lodges)
*175 probably twenty-one were founded before 1860 or during the
lifetime of the Grand Sanusi, twenty-two during the lifetime of
Sayyid al-Mahdi, and two when Sayyid Ahmad al-Sharif was
Head of the Order.

*795 A high proportion of the lodges of the Order in the time of the
361 Grand Sanusi were along the line of oases on the 29th parallel,
[175] for to the lodges of the Cyrenaican oases on that line must be
added those in the oases of the Sirtica, Zalla, Saukna, Hun, and
Waddan, all founded round about 1855, and probably that in
al-Fuqha also. Lodges were early planted in the oases partly on
account of their importance as caravanserai and trading centres,
partly because the oases-folk were more tractable than the
Bedouin, and partly because the stability of these centres gave
greater opportunity for corporate religious life. The Sanusiya
certainly made a deeper religious impression on the peoples of
the oases than on the Bedouin.

*795 It will have been noticed also how few of the Sanusiya lodges
632 were founded in the towns of North Africa. There are no lodges
361 in the towns of Egypt and though the Order counts many
[175] followers in the towns of Cyrenaica and is politically dominant
in them it has only one zawiya in each, Banghazi, Darna, and
al-Marj; and that at Banghazi, the capital of the country, was

only founded about 1870. The Sanusiya lodge in Tripoli town 795*
was not built till 1882. It must, however, be remembered that in 361
Turkish times Banghazi and Darna were little more than villages 632
and al-Marj only a military post and that, as already explained, [175]*
their inhabitants were foreigners, either Jews or immigrants
from Tripolitanian towns who were generally affiliated already to
other Orders. Moreover, the Turkish administration functioned 795*
from these centres, and that alone would have prevented the 361
Grand Sanusi from making them the headquarters of his 632
mission. There could not be two governments in one large 648*
village, especially as the Grand Sanusi disapproved of the
Turks and they were suspicious of him. Also the presence of the
Turkish Government in the towns ensured order and some, even
if very small, opportunities for education and religious instruction
and services, and Sayyid Muhammad bin 'Ali al-Sanusi had
settled in Cyrenaica with the express purpose of reviving the
faith and raising the culture of the totally illiterate and almost
heathen Bedouin, whose contact with the towns was negligible.
The social functions carried out by the Sanusiya lodges in 795*
Cyrenaica were more consistent with settlement among wild
tribesmen than among peaceful citizens. Propaganda of the
faith, educational work, cultivation of gardens, settlement of
disputes, provision of shelter, hospitality, and security to
travellers, and of refuge for the pursued, the weak, and the
oppressed are all functions especially appropriate to tribal and
barbarous conditions of life

The Order was based on the tribes and not on the towns. The 795*
lodges were founded by tribes or tribal sections and the tribes 619
or their sections regarded them as tribal institutions. Al-Qasur
zawiya was not just a lodge of the Order in 'Abid tribal territory.
It was the 'Abid zawiya; just as al-Marj was the 'Arafa
zawiya, Shahhat the Hasa zawiya, and so on. The tribal system
and the Sanusiya organization interpenetrated. The Sanusiya
gave to the tribes a national symbol and the tribes participated
in it through their lodges. It was the combination of a common [182]
organization with representation that allowed for tribal allegiances
and rivalries which provided the Order with sure
foundations.

So much was the Sanusiya organization based on the tribal
system that the distribution of the lodges may be said to

*795 619 have reflected tribal segmentation, mirroring lines of cleavage between tribes and between tribal sections. The Sanusiya organization was fractionized along these fissures. The distribution of lodges among the 8 *Sa'adi* tribes was Hasa, 1; 'Ailat Fayid, 1; Bara'asa, 1 (a second lodge, al-Nayyan, was little more than a grain store attached to al-Zawiya al-Baida); 'Abid, 1; 'Arafa, 1; Magharba, 2; 'Awaqir, 6; Darsa, 9; and 'Abaidat, 14. There were 17 lodges among the Aulad 'Ali tribe in Egypt and for the Aulad Suliman with their attached tribes in the Sirtica only one, Sirt, if we exclude the lodges in the Sirtican oases. This uneven distribution may be related in part to the location of trade routes, harbours, springs, concentration of summer wells, and so forth, but it was undoubtedly due chiefly to variations in tribal cohesion. The more cohesive tribes had a single lodge, or, in the case of the Magharba, 2 lodges. The very cantonized Darsa tribe, whose lack of solidarity was largely due to their very broken country and the oecological self-sufficiency of their sections, each of which was more or less stable in its own territory, had no less than 9 lodges. The ethnically heterogeneous, widely dispersed, and structurally confused 'Awaqir tribe had 6 lodges, and the 'Abaidat tribe, which showed even less unity of sentiment and action, had 9 lodges. The most broken up tribe of all, the tribe in which the sections were most intermixed, and the tribe which displayed the minimum of political cohesion, was the Aulad 'Ali of Egypt, which had 17 lodges.

[578] Among the Hasa, who possessed only the Shahhat lodge, in the territory of the Shabarqa section, though on the edge of the territory of the Qalabta section, rivalry between these two sections led to the foundation of a lodge at Marsa Susa, where the Order still claims the endowments, but a sense of tribal unity in the end prevailed and the project was abandoned. Likewise in the leading Tamia section of the Bara'asa tribe the rivalry between its two principal sub-sections, the Hadduth, in whose territory was the al-Baida lodge, and the Jilghaf, led to the Jilghaf marking out with a low wall the site of a new zawiya in the *silk* al-Hamama in the southern steppe country; but, here again, the lodge was never built. The location of al-Qatafiya and al-Naufiliya corresponded to a traditional jealousy between the Shamakh and the Ra'idat sections of the Magharba

tribe. In the oasis of Jalu, where there was not the same tribal 795*
solidarity as in the neighbouring oases of Aujila and al-Jikharra, 619
the two lodges were almost next door to each other. This was because the oasis was split into two opposed villages, each occupying about half of it with a strip of waste ground in between. A similar lack of unity in the Egyptian oasis of Siwa accounts for the building of several Sanusiya lodges there.

IV

Starting from the foundation of al-Zawiya al-Baida in 1843 [175]*
the Order spread itself throughout Cyrenaica until it embraced in its network of lodges the entire tribal system of the country. It seeded itself, as it were, in the crevasses between tribes and between tribal sections, and its points of growth were thus also the points of convergence in tribal and lineage structure.

A tribal zawiya seems generally to have been founded in the 795*
following manner. A tribe or tribal section saw with envy that 793
a neighbouring tribe or section had a zawiya. They sent a 619
deputation to the Head of the Order and asked him for a Shaikh to teach their children, cater for their religious needs, settle their disputes, and so forth. The Head of the Order granted them their request and sent them a Shaikh chosen from among the learned and pious men who surrounded him at Jaghbub. The Shaikh probably took with him one or two companions, *Ikhwan*, Brothers of the Order, to help him start the new lodge which the tribesmen built in the most favoured spot in their territory. Simple structures though these zawiyas were, they took many years to complete, being added to when further accommodation was required, in the leisurely Arab way. Most [172]
of them were built on Graeco-Roman foundations so that the tribesmen who constructed them found stone ready to hand.

Through the kindness of Shaikh Muhammad al-Tayyib al- 175*
Ashhab I have seen the letter sent in 1855 by al-Sayyid Muham- 795*
mad Ibn 'Ali al-Sanusi al-Khattabi al-Hasani al-Idrisi to his 793
virtuous sons, some of the Shaikhs of the Sdaidi section of the 'Awaqir tribe, about the building of the zawiya of Msus. He says that he is sending to them Brothers to construct the buildings and that he has instructed them to build an annex which he can use as a resthouse when he visits the zawiya, though this

*175 is not to be built till the zawiya is completed. There will be
*795 builders and carpenters among the Brothers and all that is
793 required of the tribal Shaikhs is selection of the site and supervision of the work. He points out to them that the work is for their benefit, in that they and their sons will receive in the zawiya an education, especially in the Koran and in the laws of Islam, and will be able to worship there. The Grand Sanusi then cites passages from the Koran and the *Hadith* commending religious benefactions. Finally he prays God to assist those engaged in the building and those who have made themselves responsible for the upkeep of the zawiya. God helps those who help others. A man reaps what he sows.

*795 Some of the Cyrenaican lodges were larger than others but
they all had the same features, a straggling warren of stone
346 buildings comprising a mosque, schoolrooms, guest-rooms,
apartments for the Shaikh of the zawiya and his family, rooms
for teachers and pupils, and houses for the Brothers, clients,
[241] and servants, and their families. Many had small gardens near-
by and the local cemetery was usually adjacent to a lodge.
[764] Jaghbub, where several hundred persons lived, was the largest
of such communities. The ruins of Dariyana and al-'Azziyyat
[792] are also extensive and must have housed several hundred
persons, but the average lodge probably housed only some fifty to a hundred persons, including wives and children, though there were often *Marabtin* families attached to the zawiya living nearby, sometimes in caves dating from classical times. The importance of a lodge was not to be estimated so much by the number of its occupants as by its tribal position and the number of its Bedouin adherents.

*795 The Shaikh of a new zawiya would point out to the local
tribesmen that he and his companions had no means of support-
793 ing themselves or of maintaining the zawiya. The various
425 sections nearby then gave to the lodge the lands adjoining it,
this estate surrounding a lodge being known as its *haram*. On the plateau the lodges were generously endowed with arable, in the steppe with wells, and in the oases with date-palms and springs. Later, further gifts of arable, wells, springs, and date-palms, or part use of these, would sometimes be made, especially when there was a dispute between two sections about ownership of property and neither would give way to the other,

for they might then settle the matter by surrendering their 795*
claims to the zawiya.[1] Another way in which a lodge obtained 793
rights in land was by asking permission of its owners to sow it. 425
Constant repetition of this favour eventually gave the zawiya
rights of use in it in perpetuity.



Sanusiya Estates of the Zawiyas of Shahhat, Tart, al-Fayidiya, and al-Zawiya al-Baida.

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795*
491
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423

The tribesmen also assisted the Shaikh of the lodge in the 795*
cultivation of the lands, though most of the work was done by 793
241
476
the zawiya community itself. At sowing time the Shaikh would 795*
pitch his tent near the area to be cultivated and prepare a com- 793
munal meal, taking with him some sacks of rice for the purpose. 241
The local Bedouin then came with their draught animals and 476
sowed and ploughed for a couple of days on behalf of the
zawiya. The same procedure took place at harvest time.
Besides gifts of land and voluntary service in cultivating, the [794]
Bedouin were expected to pay a tithe to the lodge at harvest
time and after lambing. No doubt many of them paid annual
dues but it is unlikely that any strict record was kept or that
payment could have been enforced had they been averse to
making it.

That it was expected that the Bedouin might promise services 175*
more readily than perform them is suggested by an interesting 795*
document, dated 1307 A.H., found by the Italians at the 794

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[1] Savarese, op. cit., p. 193.

*175 Taukra zawiya and given in an Italian translation by Judge *795 Colucci.[1] In it the tribal sections of the Baraghtha, Tursh, 794 Dinai, and Shilmani place themselves under obligation, through the signatories to the deed, to pay the zawiya of Taukra alms on flocks and crops, to supply camels to carry supplies to Jaghbub, and to help the zawiya in sowing, building, excavations, and other works. Subject to the penalty of paying double alms they will not, without the permission of the Shaikh of the zawiya, render like services to other zawiyas. They promise also to defend the zawiya and to respect those who live in it, or who are its guests, and agree that those who fail to do so may be punished in body or in estate. Each will be for the zawiya and the zawiya for each. God is greater than any man. Those who are obedient will be recompensed by Him. Peace be to those who follow the right path.

*795 The estates of the Sanusiya Order were *waqf* (called in 423 Cyrenaica *habus*), inalienable endowments made in love of God by tribal sections and sometimes by individuals. They belonged to the various lodges to which they were donated, with the Order as a whole as residuary, and not to the family of the Grand Sanusi or to the Shaikhs of the lodges.[2] It was understood that when Bedouin donated tracts of country round a lodge they could continue to pasture and sow on any land not being used by the resident Brothers and to use the wells when there was sufficient water in them. The Shaikh of a zawiya was [793] the legal administrator of its properties. The Head of the Order had no direct say in the administration of the estates, and in all probability only knew roughly of their extent. The revenues of [434] one lodge could not be used for the upkeep of another, but any surplus over the expenses of a lodge were paid into a central *795 pool. The members of the Sanusi family and the teachers and 794 administrative officials of the Order lived in the distant oases of Jaghbub and Kufra, which produced little but dates, and had to be supplied from the lodges of the coastal region. Supplies were sent by caravan partly in local produce, such as skins, wool, grain, butter, honey, and meat, and partly in money or [431] imported goods: rice, tea, sugar, and cloth. These gifts were

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[1] Op. cit., pp. 434-5.

[2] Fernando Valenzi, 'La Senussia in Cirenaica ed il suo Patrimonio', *Rivista delle Colonie Italiane*, 1932, pp. 432-3.

sadaqa, freewill gifts, though if a lodge did not send them its 795*
Shaikh was reminded of his obligations. The lodges dealt with 794
certain trading houses at Banghazi, giving them import orders [431]
against future sales of local produce. [439]

This practice worked well enough during the lifetime of the founder and his sons but, as so often happens in Islamic Orders, later descendants began to demand individual shares in the
wealth of the Order. While Sayyid Ahmad al-Sharif was its 795*
third Head it began to be the custom, a few years before the 794
Italian invasion, to earmark the surplus revenues of particular 602
lodges for particular members of the Sanusi family, and these [434]
members became regarded as patrons of the lodges which supplied them and responsible for their supervision. The territories in which the Order was dominant began to fall into spheres of influence controlled by individual members of the family, the allocation of spheres tending to be determined by the maternal kinship of various members with *Ikhwan* families occupying lodges in them. Sayyid Muhammad 'Abid and his brother Sayyid 'Ali al-Khattab had a lien on the *barqa al-baida* and Fazzan, where their maternal relatives the Ashhab family were influential Shaikhs of lodges; Sayyid Safi al-Din on the *barqa al-hamra*, where his maternal kinsmen the Mahajib family were predominant; Sayyid Muhammad Hilal on the Marmarica where his maternal kinsmen of the Sharifian Tursh lineage had considerable influence; and Sayyid Idris and his brother Sayyid al-Rida on the Cyrenaican plateau, where they had maternal ties with the important Bu Saif and Ghumari families. Sayyid Ahmad al-Sharif had a lien on Tripolitania, where lived his maternal kinsmen the powerful Fawatir tribe of Zlitin territory.

The endowments of the Order in Cyrenaica ran into thousands 795*
of hectares.[1] Several lodges had each more than 1,000 hectares 423
attached to them. The fourteen lodges whose lands were technically registered in 1919 by a mixed Italo-Sanusi commission possessed more than 50,000 hectares. The total lands of the Order may well have been more than 200,000 hectares,
or somewhere in the neighbourhood of 500,000 acres. Much of [311]
the land was of use only for grazing, but much was valuable agricultural country on the plateau. Wherever there were

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[1] An *Ettaro* is 10,000 sq. metres or 2·471 acres.

*795 423 springs and gardens there were properties of the Order, for such sites were particularly suitable for settlements of its Brothers since, unlike the Bedouin, they were sedentary and house-dwellers. In the semi-desert the Order owned, or part-owned, many of the best wells. In the oases of the 29th parallel and in the Archipelago of Kufra it owned extensive gardens and shares in springs and many thousands of date-palms. As it was a country and Bedouin Order its urban properties were inconsiderable: a few houses, mostly used as shops, in Banghazi, Darna, and al-Marj.

*795 361 Anyone who studies the distribution of the Sanusiya lodges in Cyrenaica will observe that they were placed where he might expect them to have been placed on a politico-economic plan. A very large number were, as I have mentioned, built on Graeco-Roman foundations, and they were constructed on important caravan routes, on small inlets in the coast to command schooner trade, and in strong defensive positions. They were distributed to cover all the more important tribal aggregates, and the principal lodges were built at the centres of tribal life, as is especially evident among the southern nomads, who concentrate in summer time at such points as al-'Azziyat, al-Makhili, al-Nayyan, al-Qatafiya, and al-Naufiliya. In other words, where the Greeks and Romans and Turks found it convenient or essential to build villages and posts was where the Sanusiya established its lodges. Later the Italians used many of the same sites for their administrative and colonist settlements.

*795 434 On assessments made by the Italians in the early days of their occupation, in 1913 and in 1919, for twenty Cyrenaican lodges of the Order it can be reckoned that their total annual revenues were about 150,000 Lire. On this basis, as those assessed were representative, a rough estimate of the total revenue of all the lodges in Cyrenaica would be about L. 400,000 or 10,000 Pounds Sterling at the 1919 rate of exchange. Of the lodges for which assessments were made, those with the largest revenues were al-'Azziyyat, al-Qasur (L. 15,000), Msus (L. 20,000), and al-Tailimum (L. 20,000). The surpluses sent to the Headquarters of the Order were estimated for only eight of the zawiyas, and in these eight cases the surplus amounted to rather under a third of the total revenues. Gen. Rodolfo Graziani

states that the total annual revenue of the lodges of the Order, 795*
excluding those at Jaghbub and Kufra, was calculated at more 434
than 200,000 Lire.[1]

The Italian figures appear to include all sources of revenue, agricultural produce, increase in stock, and the gifts received in beasts, cereals, honey, skins, mats, carpets, and butter. At the time there could have been no adequate assessment and an estimate of revenue in money is an inappropriate measure in what was for the most part a subsistence economy. The zawiya community lived partly by its own labour, largely that of servants and slaves, assisted, as explained, by the Bedouin of the vicinity at seed-time and harvest. The produce of its cultiva- 795*
tions and gardens and of its flocks and herds was supplemented 794
by contributions in kind from the Bedouin. In theory such contributions were an annual tithe, but in practice it is more likely that the Bedouin brought presents of beasts, butter, honey, &c., to the zawiya when they happened to visit it, or when its Shaikh let it be known that he was in need of something; and that now and again there was a general whip-round for a caravan to Jaghbub or Kufra. That is the Bedouin way of doing things.

Bedouin are hard-headed people and they expect a return for 795*
their labour and gifts. The neighbouring tribesmen considered 794
that they were adequately rewarded for their support of their 182
zawiya by the services it rendered, for, like the Christian [157]
monasteries of Europe in the Dark Ages, Sanusiya lodges served many purposes besides catering for religious needs. They were schools, caravanserai, commercial centres, social centres, forts, courts of law, banks, store houses, poor houses, sanctuary, and burial grounds, besides being channels through which ran a generous stream of God's blessing. They were centres of culture and security in a wild country and amid a fierce people, and they were stable points in a country where all else was constantly on the move. A Bedouin camp might be anywhere. A zawiya was fixed to the earth and its community with it. But the chief benefits the lodges conferred on the Bedouin were, as the Grand Sanusi told them in the letter quoted earlier, that they and their children might learn from scholarly and pious men the faith and precepts of Islam, that they might have the

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[1] *Cirenaica Pacificata*, 1932, p. 125.

*795 opportunity to worship in a mosque, and that by charity to their
794 lodges they might earn recompense hereafter.

182 Each lodge had its Shaikh, who represented the Head of the
*795 Order. He arbitrated between the Bedouin, led the tribesmen
793 to holy war, acted as intermediary between the tribe or section
and the Turkish administration, dispensed hospitality to
travellers, supervised the collection of tithe, directed cultivation
of grain and care of stock, dispatched surplus revenues to
the Headquarters of the Order, acted as prayer-leader on
Fridays, and assisted in preaching and teaching. There were
(794) besides a number of other functionaries among the Brothers:
the Shaikh's deputy, the *imam* to lead the daily prayers and to
teach the Koran and canon law, the *mu'allim* to teach reading,
writing, and arithmetic in the zawiya school, and perhaps a
special *muadhdhin* to call the faithful to prayer, though any of
the Brothers could do that.

V

*795 In principle, as we have noted, the lands attached to lodges
793 belonged, like the lodges themselves, to the Order, and more
423 particularly to the lodge to which they were donated, and not
to any particular individual or family. In practice certain
*795 Shaikhly families tended to gain an hereditary interest in them.
793 What happened in the early days of the Order was that a Shaikh
was sent by its Head to found a lodge and when it was established
423 he was translated to a fresh missionary field. Shaikhs
428 of lodges were in this way moved fairly frequently at first, but
602 it later became the practice to leave a Shaikh in charge till his
death and then to nominate his successor from among his kinsmen,
with the approval of the tribe and on the advice of Shaikhs
of neighbouring lodges. What mostly seems to have happened
was that the tribal sections concerned asked for a son or brother
of the last Shaikh to be appointed director of their lodge and the
Head of the Order confirmed their choice. As one Darsi tribesman
put it: 'The Shaikh of our zawiya must be a man favoured
by the hearts of the people.' In course of time the tendency for
the Shaikhship of a lodge to be regarded as hereditary became
very marked, it being understood that if there was a suitable
candidate from the family already established in the lodge he
would be appointed, a view with which the later Heads of the

Order concurred. Thus we find charge of a zawiya continuing 795*
in the hands of a single family to the point at which Muhammad 793
Yahiya bin al-Sanusi bin 'Umar al-Ashhab was appointed by 423
Sayyid Ahmad al-Sharif to succeed his father as Shaikh of Msus 428
at the age of sixteen. Some of these families sent their roots so 602
deep that not only did they obtain what amounted to hereditary rights to a particular lodge, but controlled several lodges. Such were the influential families of Ghumari, Kalili, Farkash, and Ashhab, and the Khattabi families.

Hence we find to-day that many of the lodges are in hereditary charge of a family of Shaikhs who consider that they have a pre-emptive claim to its directorship and to enjoyment of its revenues, a claim backed by tribal opinion and by the acquiescence of the present Head of the Order. Thus the Dardafi family may be said to own the Shahhat lodge, the Isma'ili family to own the Fayidiya lodge, the 'Ammur family to own the Qafanta lodge, and so on. So much is this the case that [578]
disputes now sometimes arise, as in 1942 at Qafanta and Mirad Mas'ud, between members of a family about which of its members should succeed to the directorship of a lodge and control of its revenues.

This development is not surprising. Poor communications 795*
and the troubled times since 1911 have encouraged local auto- 793
nomy in the Sanusiya organization. The Shaikh of a lodge 428
brought up his family in it and his sons had no other home than the lodge and no other friends than the Bedouin around it and the families of Shaikhs in nearby lodges. Tribesmen dislike [178]
change and prefer to have for the Shaikhs of their lodges members of families they know and who share their local interests. But the tendency towards hereditary succession is 795*
also related to the fundamental lineage structure of the tribes 793
among whom the lodges are distributed, for it is noticeable that
whereas hereditary succession became customary in the Bedouin, 613
or tribal, lodges, it has been by comparison lacking in the urban 428
lodges of Banghazi and Darna and in those oases where tribal [369]
structure has become obscured by village life. This would seem to suggest that *Ikhwan* families tend the more easily to become stabilized as lines of hereditary Shaikhs the more closely they are associated with tribal structure. It is precisely in the most powerful, numerous, and integrated tribal sections that we

*795 find hereditary transmission of Shaikhship of lodges most
793 accentuated, such as the Bara‘asa-Tamia section (al-Zawiya
613 al-Baida), the ‘Awaqir-Sdaidi section (Msus zawiya), and the
428 ‘Abaidat-Ghaith section (Tart zawiya). In the same way the
[792] earlier Marabouts became, as has been noted, founders of
lineages which were on the pattern of the branches of the Bedouin clans among whom they lived, and attached to them.

*795 Also it must be remembered that the lodges were tribal
institutions built by the local Bedouin so that they might
778 participate in the *baraka* of Sayyid Muhammad bin ‘Ali al-
793 Sanusi. They participated in it through the Shaikhs of their
619 zawiyas who received their *baraka* direct from the hands of the
182 Grand Sanusi himself, or from the hands of son Sayyid al-Mahdi, and passed it on to their sons. This *baraka* belonged to the tribe, or tribal section, which built a lodge just as the *shaukha*, the secular Shaikhship of the tribe, or tribal section, belonged to it and had to be kept in it. In both the continuity of family succession had to be maintained, unless there were good reasons for acting otherwise. Thus each tribal section emphasized its autonomy in its hereditary line of religious Shaikhs, through whom the *baraka* of the founder of the Order was transmitted to them, whilst proclaiming its membership of a tribal federation with common allegiance to the Head of the Order.

*795 As I have pointed out when speaking of the sacred *Marabtin*
793 tribes of Cyrenaica, it was customary for the descendants of a
778 Marabout to reside near his tomb. I have further mentioned
that the Shaikh of a Sanusiya lodge, who is also called a *Mara-*
[776] *bat* by the Bedouin, might, if he had during life a reputation for piety, rather easily gained in Islam, be venerated as a saint when he was dead and his tomb become a shrine. This is another reason why Shaikhly families have tended to become hereditary directors of lodges.

*795 Just as almost all the Marabouts of Cyrenaica were foreigners
793 from the west, so were almost all the Shaikhs of the Sanusiya
554 lodges. The Dardafi and Isma‘ili families came from Tripoli-
tania, the Ghumari family from Morocco, the ‘Ammur, Bu
[167] Jibali, and Khattab families came from Algeria, and so on. As a class they enjoyed, and still enjoy, a reputation for sanctity among the Bedouin on account of their knowledge of the Koran

and of reading and writing, and of their strict performance of 795* religious duties. This reputation was doubtless enhanced by 793 their foreign origin, for the Bedouin of Cyrenaica were accustomed 554 to look to the west for piety.

At one time many, perhaps all, the Shaikhs of lodges were fairly well educated in such subjects as theology, canon law, [212] and commentaries on sacred texts. To-day most of these alumni of Jaghbub University are dead and their successors, brought up in the bitter years since 1911, are for the most part very ignorant, some being almost as illiterate as the Bedouin themselves. The Bedouin regard them with a curious mixture of respect and condescension. They look up to them as learned and pious men who possess *baraka*, they kiss their hands, they call them '*Sidi*', and they listen respectfully to their admonishments and arbitraments. At the same time they look down on them for not being tribesmen and Bedouin, children of the tents. The Bedouin harmonize these conflicting attitudes by saying that a *Marabat* is a different kind of person from a Bedouin and cannot be expected to behave in the same way or to have the same outlook. He has been brought up to read books, pray, wash, and to do other things the Bedouin finds unnecessary in his own life. He has not been reared in the roving life of the tents nor learned the shepherd's art. Since [582] they regard the *Ikhwan* as a different kind of people, the Bedouin do not intermarry with them nor with the Sanusi family, who belong to the same category. The *Ikhwan* families 795* marry among themselves. The Sanusi family marry the 582 daughters of *Ikhwan*, but do not give their daughters to persons outside their own kin.

The importance of the *Ikhwan* families in the history of the 795* development of the Sanusiya is evidently very great. From the 554 foundation of al-Zawiya al-Baida in 1843 to the appearance of Sayyid Ahmad al-Sharif in Cyrenaica in 1912 the Heads of the Order were absent from the country, either in Arabia or in distant oases, and its direct influence on the tribes was exercised by the Shaikhs of its lodges in their midst. Their ritual position within the tribal system combined with their structural position outside it enabled them to settle disputes and to unite and lead the various sections which had sponsored their lodges when the Order required their support. It was they who roused the [648]*

*795 Sudanese against the French in 1902 and, as we will see, it was
554 they who roused the Bedouin of Cyrenaica and of large parts of
*648 Tripolitania and Fazzan against the Italians in 1911; and it was they who attempted, unsuccessfully, to rouse the Bedouin of Egypt against the British in 1915. It was, above all, their propaganda and personal example in the field which made the struggle against Italy a national war and a religious crusade.
[178] To-day they have been broken by death, exile, and expropriation, and are poor and ignorant, but in the heyday of their power the Turks rightly estimated their influence and were careful not to encroach on their prerogatives.

VI

*795 The thesis I have maintained in the foregoing pages, that the
121 Sanusiya kept its cohesion and developed into a political
182 organization largely because it was identified with the tribal system of the Bedouin, is supported by the lack of cohesion, common direction, and political influence of the other Islamic Orders in Libya, which won adherents only in the towns of Cyrenaica and among the citizens and peasants of Tripolitania, and in neither country found support among the Bedouin. I mention these other Orders for this reason, and also because a reference to them, however brief, places the Sanusiya in a more general setting as only one among many Darwish Orders. These other Orders are, however, described barely, since the part they have played in the political history of Cyrenaica is negligible.

*795 The following Orders besides the Sanusiya are represented in Cyrenaica: Qadiriya, Rifa'iya, 'Arusiya, 'Isawiya, Tayyibiya, 'Azuziya, Madaniya, and Sa'adiya. The Qadiriya and the Rifa'iya are the only two classical Orders with lodges in the country, though the others eventually trace their descent from classical sources by those tortuous ramifications so confusing to the student of Islamic fraternities.

The distribution of the lodges of these Orders in Cyrenaica at the present time is shown in the table opposite. A knowledge of the history of the Orders is not necessary for an understanding of the history of the Sanusiya in Cyrenaica and is therefore omitted. It is necessary only to know that they all entered Cyrenaica from the west, both those, the majority,

[TEXT CONTINUED ON PAGE 86]

3:Evans-Pritchard E-4, 5 (1942-1944) 1949 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9
(1837-1942)
Sanusi

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632

LODGES OF ORDERS OTHER THAN THE SANUSIYA IN CYRENAICA IN 1942

Townships	*'Arusiya*	*'Isawiya*	*Rifa'iya*	*Qadiriya*	*Madaniya*	*Sa'adiya*	*Tayyibiya*	*'Azuziya*	*Total*
Banghazi	11	5	2	2	—	1	—	1	22
Darna	4	5	1	1	1	—	2	—	14
Al-Marj	1	1	—	—	—	1	—	—	3
Ajadabiya	1	1	—	—	1	—	—	—	3
Marsa Susa	1	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	2
Tubruq	1	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	2
Talmaitha	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	1
Taukra	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1
Burdi Suliman	1	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	2
Suluq	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1
Bedouin									
Aulad al-Shaikh	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1
TOTALS	23	16	3	3	2	2	2	1	52

(The lodge at Marsa Susa listed as 'Isawiya is shared by this Order and the Rifa'iya. Under *Bedouin* is listed the only lodge outside towns at the present time. The lodgeless 'Azuziya community at Banghazi is included.)

*795 which have a Maghribi origin and those which were founded in Iraq. Egyptian Orders are not represented in Cyrenaica. These facts are explained when it is pointed out that the Orders found in Cyrenaica to-day were introduced by urban immigrants from the west who settled in Banghazi and Darna as traders and
[369] artisans. Whence follows the most important feature of the non-Sanusiya Orders, their urban character. With the exception of the Madaniya and a single lodge of the 'Arusiya, these Orders are represented only in the towns. Occasionally one of their lodges was built with aid from local tribesmen, as the 'Arusiya lodges at al-Marj and Tubruq, but such examples are rare and in no way invalidate the statement that the Sanusiya alone has considerable following among the Bedouin. The adherents of the single 'Arusiya lodge at Bu Zaid are Bedouin of the Aulad al-Shaikh, immigrants from Tripolitania who regard themselves as direct descendants of Sidi 'Abd al-Salam, the founder of the Order whose rite they follow. The only competitor of the Sanusiya among the Bedouin was the Madaniya, which still retains its hold on the Fawakhir of the *barqa*, a tribe ill disposed towards any authority, and a few *Marabtin* fragments elsewhere, though these Bedouin now follow Sanusiya leadership in other than purely religious matters.
[798] There was at one time tension between the two Orders, complicated by tribal rivalries in the *barqa*, but it has now been for the greater part resolved. Apart from the opposition of the Sanusiya, the loss of influence of the Madaniya was hastened by its too close attachment to the fortunes of the declining Ottoman Caliphate, dissensions between the descendants of its founder, and a split in the Order itself.

*795 The Sanusiya has always shown marked tolerance towards
798 other Orders and it must, moreover, be noted that there are no doctrinal differences between the Orders, that members of different Orders worship together in the same mosques, and that sometimes a man is a member of several orders at the same
[793] time. We have seen that the Grand Sanusi in his early period joined a number of different Orders and our Tunisian friend Shaikh Muhammad 'Uthman seems to have made a hobby of joining them.[1] Furthermore, the founders of all the Orders are revered as saints by the common people everywhere, regardless

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[1] Op. cit., pp. 64-6 and 251.

of their affiliations. Hence the Sanusiya does not oppose the 795*
other Orders in the towns on a religious plane, although it does 798
not approve of those which are convulsionary, and they do not
compete with it politically. It is only in the interior that the
Order will not permit a rival, because competition for the
allegiance of the Bedouin must be political. Italian efforts to [648]*
play off these Orders against the Sanusiya were founded on
ignorance of the nature of an Islamic *tariqa* and seem to have
been ineffectual.

Since almost all the non-Sanusiya lodges are urban it follows 795*
that the history of the growth and spread of the Orders is 369
part of the general history of the growth and spread of the
urban centres of Cyrenaica. Some of the older lodges in
Benghazi and Darna are over 150 years old, but most of them
and all those in the smaller administrative centres date from
late Turkish times or were built during the Italian occupation.
An urban lodge is generally a small, very simple, structure and
its members seldom total more than 50 to 100. It may be [575]
regarded as a kind of club, founded for religious exercises, for
the performance of good works, and for social insurance. It [485]
also serves as a resthouse for travelling members of the Order
and as a *malja*, a place of refuge for the poor and the sick. Few
of the lodges are endowed, and most are very poor.

I do not wish to underestimate the social and, in the broadest 795*
sense, political importance of the urban Orders in Cyrenaica. 182
They provide the only spontaneous and co-operative associations in the towns and thus fill a gap for ordinary people both in the town society and in a religion which pays little attention either to corporeal works or, outside the mosques, to corporate worship. Outside the lodges of the Orders there were in Turkish times no associations dispensing charity or giving education, and worship in the mosques within the wide society of Islam does not provide the intimacy and colour men need in acts of common devotion. The lodges give to their members a double attachment and a double security, membership of a welfare association, which gives them a feeling of material security, and membership of a devotional group, which gives them a feeling of spiritual security. Also, in spite of their lack of numbers and organization, the urban lodges are links in chains which, running through Islamic countries and cutting across natural

*795 182 and political boundaries, help to keep the Islamic world together against the impact of western civilization and imperialism. A member of the Qadiriya or Rifa'iya Orders can wander from lodge to lodge from China to the Atlantic. A member of the Madaniya is received as a brother if he goes to Maknas, Istanbul, or Mecca. An 'Isawi or 'Arusi finds lodges of his Order all over North Africa, obeying the same rules, bearing the same banner, using the same books of devotion, performing the same ritual, and bound by a common brotherhood. These Orders, therefore, are not unimportant in shaping and propagating a common opinion and feeling among Muslims about any question of the day which affects Islam.

*795 369 182 [668] But in a narrower political sense they have little importance, even in the urban centres. They are too weak and poor to act as cells in a movement of a political kind, for they show, as René Brunel says of the 'Isawiya, 'lack of unity of direction' and 'absolute lack of cohesion'[1] In Cyrenaica the Sanusiya alone has been capable of becoming a political movement and hence of all the Orders alone aroused the suspicion of Istanbul and the hostility of Rome. We may inquire, therefore, what it is which has distinguished the Sanusiya from the other Orders in [186] the country. As we have noted earlier, the fakiristic exhibitions of some of the Orders, so dear to the common man in the towns, were uncongenial, even repellent, to the Bedouin, who, in any case, had no affection for the townsmen and for things emanating from the towns. Also the Bedouin, socially and morally secure in their tribal and kinship systems, felt no need for further associations. Their need was for some authority lying outside their segmentary tribal system which could compose intertribal and intersectional disputes and bind the tribes and tribal sections together within an organization and under a common [579] symbol. Hence, while the urban lodges were clubs—and this was the status of the Sanusiya lodges in the towns as much as it was that of the lodges of the other Orders—the Sanusiya lodges in the country-side were political, administrative, and economic, as well as religious and educational, centres. The urban lodges followed the social pattern in urban communities generally. Corporate life was narrowed to small quarters, single streets, a few houses, outside which people belonged, it is true, to a

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[1] *Essai sur la Confrérie religieuse des 'Aîssâoua au Maroc*, 1926, p. 53.

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residential community but felt no strong obligation to one another nor the need for common action. Religious Orders in such communities tend to become fractionized along the lines of social cleavage into sub-urban and sub-sub-urban lodges, each serving a few families in its vicinity and leading its own life with its own following and resources independently of the others. Social life in the towns is amorphous. There is no structure corresponding to the tribal system. The Sanusiya became dominant because it shunned the towns and sought its converts among the Bedouin and built its centres within the tribes. The Sanusiya Brotherhood was founded on a Bedouin brotherhood.

It is of great interest to note that the Sanusiya held a place in relation to other Orders in western Arabia like to that which it held in Cyrenaica. The learned Dutch Arabist, Snouck Hurgronje, who spent a year in western Arabia in 1884 and 1885, states that in the towns the Order 'has remained to this day highly honoured, but by no means overtopping its sister orders. For the districts of the Hejaz, inhabited by Harbis and other Beduins, it possesses however the highest significance, for its practical mission has succeeded in bringing to a great extent under its leadership the sons of the desert who are refractory to all authority and are far removed from the official Islam.'[1]

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[1] C. Snouck Hurgronje, *Mekka in the latter Part of the 19th Century*, 1931, pp. 55–6. (First published in 1888–9.)

[113]

[P.90]

CHAPTER IV

THE TURKISH ADMINISTRATION

I

*795 *648 UNTIL 1912, when Turkey surrendered Libya to Italy, Tripolitania and Cyrenaica were part of the Ottoman Empire and it was under Turkish hegemony that the Sanusiya Order was born and grew to maturity. [177] The Turkish administration was an important influence in its development and must be reviewed.

*648 I have seen the relics of the Ottoman Empire, men and places, in most lands of the Levant and North Africa and have admired the economy with which it bestowed peace upon the Arab world for close on 400 years. The Turks well understood that the successful practice of the art of administration depends not only on attention to some things but no less on inattention to others. They did not confuse government with bureaucratic interference in the name of moral regeneration. A general condemnation of Turkish rule has, however, been so long fashionable that I can scarcely hope to alter so widely accepted a judgement. I can do no more than make a passing gesture of respect to one of the characters in this Cyrenaican story, the Turk.

*175 *648 We have only such bare hints of what happened in Cyrenaica after the Hilalian invasion as Arab historians give us. At the downfall of the Mamluk dynasty in Egypt in 1517 Cyrenaica went with that country to the Turks, and its history under Ottoman rule from the sixteenth to the nineteenth century is almost entirely a blank. One may say with some confidence, however, that the Bedouin were little affected by Turkish rule. Those nearest to the coastal towns were doubtless compelled to pay taxes from time to time, but the tribes as a whole must have continued to lead their ancient way of life and to settle their own affairs among themselves. In 1711 a rebellion at Tripoli against the Sultan's authority led to the emergence of a local Janissary dynasty, the Caramanlis, who for a time exercised control over Cyrenaica also. It was during the period of their rule that Paolo Della Cella accompanied a military expedition sent by the Pasha of Tripoli to Darna. He records how the Bedouin whose country was traversed by the expedi-

tion were compelled to pay taxes and furnish supplies, and how 175*
forty-five of the Shaikhs of the Jawazi tribe were treacherously 648*
murdered and many of their followers massacred.[1] Generally,
however, it may be said that Cyrenaica has no history, other
than Bedouin traditions of inter-tribal wars, from 1051 to 1835,
in which year the Turks regained control of Libya from the
Caramanlis. On their return they instituted a more systematic
administration than had been exercised during their earlier
occupation.

The Turks returned to Cyrenaica about the time the Grand 175*
Sanusi first visited the country and eight years after their 648*
reoccupation he founded his first zawiya on the plateau. As 795*
the Sanusiya Order gained the confidence of the Bedouin and
became accepted as their spokesmen, it was necessary for the [793]
Ottoman authorities to take it into consideration in their dealings
with the tribes of the interior. The Order made it possible 175*
for the different tribes to express themselves politically as a 648*
unit for the first time in their relations with the outside world. 182
The tribes provided the Order with a social system, and the 795*
Order gave to that system a political organization at a time
when it was beginning to be brought into more direct contact
with political forces outside tribal society.

The Sanusiya is known to have been given a Charter about 175*
1856 by Sultan 'Abd al-Majid I. His firman was brought from 648*
Istanbul by Sidi 'Abd al-Rahim al-Maghbub, later Shaikh of 795*
the Sanusiya zawiya at Banghazi, who had been sent to Istanbul
for the purpose and had the utmost difficulty, as was often the [793]
case with visitors to the Ottoman capital, in obtaining an
audience with the Sultan. Whatever other privileges the firman
conferred on the Order—I have not seen the document—it [794]
certainly exempted its properties from taxation and permitted [651]
it to collect a religious tithe from its followers. A second firman
was issued later by Sultan 'Abd al-Majid's brother, Sultan 'Abd
al-'Aziz, and was brought from Istanbul to the Governor of
Tripoli by Sidi Abu al-Qasim al-'Isawi, 'Abd al-Rahim's successor
in the Banghazi lodge. There is in the Land Registry at
Banghazi a letter from the Governor of Tripoli to the Governor
of Banghazi giving the essence of this firman. It confirms the
privileges granted by the earlier firman and adds to them that [778]

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[1] Op. cit., *passim* and p. 220 seq.

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of the right of sanctuary within the precincts of the lodges of the Order. It is complimentary and written in the fulsome language of such documents.[1]

Nevertheless, the Turks were under no illusion. They did not believe that the Sanusi loved them, but they knew that if it came to a decision the Order and the Bedouin would support them against any of the Christian Powers of Europe. This is evident from the correspondence found in the archives of Tripoli by the Italians when they captured the town in 1911.[2] Shaikh Muhammad 'Uthman, writing in 1896, says frankly that the Turks were ill disposed towards the Sanusiya and would have liked to have taken Sayyid al-Mahdi to Istanbul and there given him a palace, the Turkish equivalent for *résidence forcée*, as they had done with Abu al-Huda, the Head of the Rifa'iya Order, and Shaikh Dafir, the Head of the Madaniya Order; and he adds that the Sayyid, on his side, had no liking for the Turks. When the Shaikh was in Banghazi the Shaikh of the Sanusiya lodge there was dismissed from his post by the Sayyid because he had allowed himself to be corrupted by the Turkish Authorities.[3]

The Ottoman Government was not much concerned about the exact juridical status of the Sanusiya Order, a question which greatly exercised Italian writers at a later date when this had become an important issue in their dealings with the Order. There were hundreds of Bedouin tribes and dozens of religious Orders in the Ottoman Empire and the Turks were matter-of-fact people who wisely left such questions alone. In the mosques under the Order's control the name of the Sultan was proclaimed at Friday prayers, but this means very little. Doubtless the Grand Sanusi and his successors took the view that the Caliphate had been usurped by the Ottoman Sultans—they could hardly have taken any other view—but it had long been in Ottoman hands and Turkey was the only independent Muslim Power capable of protecting Muslim interests. In practice also they accepted the secular authority of the Sultan as ruler of the Ottoman Empire.

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[1] Salim bin 'Amir, op. cit., May 1944.

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[2] Published in 1912 with the title *Relazione fra Turchi e Senussi. Documenti rinvenuti nell' Archivio di Tripoli* (Ufficio Politico Militare). Quoted by Macaluso, op. cit.

[3] Op. cit., pp. 65–6 and 106.

The local Turkish officials were content for the most part to 175*
sit in the towns, many of them no doubt regretting that they 648*
had ever been sent to Cyrenaica, where their salaries were low 795*
and often in arrears, and to let the Sanusiya control the interior
so long as taxes were paid and no overt act was committed
against the Sultan's authority which might bring them to the
notice of the Court; and the Central Government for its part
was quite prepared to forget that Cyrenaica formed part of the
Sultan's dominions so long as there was peace there and it sent
annual tribute to Istanbul. The Turks were indifferent otherwise
to what happened in Libya, which was a poor province,
particularly the Cyrenaican part of it, where their administration
was even less efficient than in Tripolitania, where it was
happy-go-lucky enough. They had quite enough troubles elsewhere
without alienating to no purpose a powerful Islamic Order
and the warlike Bedouin who supported it. They therefore left
the Sanusiya to perform many of the functions of government [651]
in the interior—education, justice, the maintenance of security, [794]
and even to some extent the collection of taxes, though in the
matter of tribute there were difficulties, for Bedouin do not
willingly pay taxes to anyone, and since they already paid a
tithe to the Sanusiya, with a grace which contrasted with their
reluctance to pay taxes to the Turkish Administration, they
were disinclined to pay twice. When any question arose which 175*
required direct contact between the Head of the Order and the 648*
local Governor it was established through the Shaikh of the 793
lodge at Banghazi, or a special messenger was sent from Jaghbub 795*
or Kufra to the Turkish Governor at Banghazi, or he sent a
messenger to the Head of the Order in his oasis seat. From time
to time the Central Government sent an envoy to the Head of
the Order with gifts and instructions to report on what was
going on in the Sahara, and on such occasions he was received
handsomely and returned with the blessings of the *Shaikh al-Tariqa*
on the Sultan. Sometimes, as we have seen, the Head
of the Order sent a deputation to Istanbul.

The payment of taxes and the maintenance of peace and communications, 175*
the only two functions of government the Turkish 648*
officials bothered their heads about, were intimately connected. 651
Minor quarrels among the Bedouin themselves little interested
them, but armed resistance to taxation was certain to earn

*175 them a reprimand on the double count of decrease in revenue
*648 and lack of security. It was essential, therefore, to get the
651 Bedouin to pay their taxes without making too much trouble
about doing so. To this end the Turkish administrative organiza-
*175 tion was largely directed. In 1879 the *Vilayet* of Banghazi was,
*648 in matters of civil administration, finally separated from that of
Tripoli and in 1888 became an autonomous *sanjaq* directly
631 dependent on Istanbul. It was governed by a *mutasarrif*
nominated by, and directly responsible to, the Central Govern-
ment. On him depended all the officials of the Administration,
though the chief among them were appointed by the Imperial
Government. The senior officials were usually Turks. The
*175 country was divided for administrative purposes into a number
*648 of districts, each under a *qaimaqam*, except that of Banghazi,
634 which came directly under the Governor himself; and all except
the Aujila-Jalu and Kufra districts were further divided into
*175 sub-districts under mudirs. These districts and sub-districts
*648 followed tribal divisions and subdivisions as any administra-
tion in Cyrenaica must do, since the tribes and their sections
634 are the fundamental social departments of the country. Hence
619 sections of a nomadic tribe might be residing at any time in a
sub-district different to that to which they were administra-
tively attached, and even in a different district.

*175 In his direction of the affairs of the administration, finances,
*648 and police, the Governor was assisted by an administrative
council composed of the chief accountant, the secretary, the
631 qadi, the mufti, and four elected members from the local popula-
tion. Each *qaimaqam*, nominated by the Imperial Government,
had an administrative council similarly composed. The mudirs,
nominated by the Imperial Government on the proposal of the
Governor, had no council established by statute but co-opted
tribal Shaikhs when they wanted their advice or co-operation.
In the towns there was a representative, called *mukhtar*,
elected by the property-owning citizens for each ward, and at
Banghazi and Darna there were urban councils of a simple
kind.

*175 It was the mudir in charge of a sub-district who had direct
*648 dealings with the Bedouin tribes and the lodges of the Sanusiya
Order. In 1911, just before the Italian invasion, there were six
634 districts including Kufra, which came nominally under the

Turkish administration in 1910, and the Banghazi district, 175*
which came directly under the Governor of Cyrenaica for 648*
administration. Attached to each district were the sub-districts 634
shown in the list below,[1] in which the tribes attached to each sub-district are also given. The Bara'asa came under Banghazi, although they lived well to the east, for political reasons, the tribe being exceptionally rebellious.[2]

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648*
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Districts	*Sub-districts*	*Tribes*
Banghazi (directly dependent on the Governor)	Suluq Qaminis Barsis Sidi Khalifa	'Awaqir
	Slanta	Bara'asa
al-Marj	al-Marj	'Arafa and 'Abid
	al-Ḥaniya	Darsa
Darna	al-Sallum Tubruq al-Banba al-Qubba	'Abaidat
	Shahhat	Hasa
Ajadabiya	Marsa Braiqa	Magharba
Aujila and Jalu	—	Awajila and Majabra
Kufra	—	—

The administration was very slapdash by European standards. 175*
Indeed, Shaikh Muhammad 'Uthman says darkly: 'There is at 648*
Banghazi no organization, political, administrative, or financial. 631
I say no more about this matter: it will be understood why.'[3] This was, of course, an exaggeration, for however simple the administration may have been, and perhaps for that reason, it worked—with a good deal of grumbling it is true, but without undue conflict. Revenue was collected and would have exceeded 175*
the cost of the very cheap administration of the country if the 648*
proceeds of some taxes had not been sent to Istanbul. Much of 651
this revenue came from import and export duties, but the bulk 634
of it was derived from taxes on herds and a tenth of the harvest in kind, the collection of which was in the hands of the mudirs. It was the task of these mudirs, who were generally literate

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[1] *Notizie relative al Sangiacato della Cirenaica e alle Mudirie dipendenti dal Mutassarifato di Bengasi* (Ufficio Politico Militare), 1913. [113]

[2] Fabrizio Serra, *Italia e Senussia*, 1933, p. 17; idem in *La Cirenaica*, 1922–3, p. 182.

[3] Op. cit., pp. 59–60.

*648 Arabs, to assess and collect taxes, to maintain security, and to
651 control the few police allotted to them. In this task they
634 expected co-operation from the local Shaikhs of the tribal
[619] sections and the Shaikhs of the Sanusiya lodges.

[793] It is remarkable that the Bedouin paid any taxes at all, for
the mudirs had not sufficient force at their command, nor had
the Governor at Banghazi, to compel the Bedouin to pay if they
were determined not to do so. The mudir of Slanta had only 50
[701] to 60 soldiers in his sub-district and the Bara'asa whom he
[625] administered could have annihilated this force with ease, as
could the 'Awaqir the 50 soldiers and the handful of police
*175 stationed at Suluq. That taxes were collected at all, and all the
*648 more that they were collected without constant disturbance, is
to be accounted for partly by the recognition by the Shaikhs of
651 the tribal sections, with whom the mudirs were careful to keep
634 on good personal terms, that there was a moral obligation to
619 pay them; but there were also sanctions if they were not paid.
If the Shaikh of a tribal section did not collect the taxes due from that section, he was held responsible and action could be taken against him personally. The mudir, accompanied by a small armed force, went a round of the tribal sections attached to his sub-district each year, generally in springtime, and sent out other tax-collecting parties in other directions. Sometimes special tax commissions appointed by the Governor also toured the country. A favourite device was for such parties to quarter themselves in the camp of a recalcitrant Shaikh and to reside there as his guests, for the soldiers and police carried few provisions, till the tax was paid. The Shaikhs, on the other hand, were made partners in the undertaking by, besides investment with an official robe and status, receiving a percentage of the taxes collected, the mudir himself also taking a percentage. Moreover, each Shaikh whose section paid the tax was determined that the other sections should not escape paying as well. A Shaikh was able to divide up the assessment on his section among the minor Shaikhs, and the minor Shaikhs among yet smaller ones. It was in the interest of each Shaikh to see that the smaller ones did not escape their share and leave him with the responsibility for a deficit. Responsibility was in this way
*175 passed down the tribal structure. On the whole the system
*648 worked well and the Turkish officials and the Bedouin did not
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get on badly together. Each understood the other. Also there 175*
was much elasticity in the taxes which appealed to the Bedouin, 648*
who prefer to pay a heavy tax one year and lightly or not at all 651
another year, rather than to pay a regular and inevitable tax.
The assessments were seldom revised and often had little relation to the capacity of a tribal section to pay. The result was that taxes were always in arrears and in some years, or for some sections, remitted altogether. Those sections nearest the Turkish posts paid the more easily because they were the more vulnerable. Some of the more nomadic Bedouin escaped payment altogether, or at any rate for years at a stretch. It is, I think, safe to assume that the taxes actually collected over a number of years were light. Otherwise the Bedouin would not have paid them.

Perhaps the chief reason why taxes were collected without 175*
constant rebellion was the support given to the administration 648*
in this matter by the Sanusiya. The Turks held the coastal 651
towns and a few inland posts outside which their direct control 795*
of the country was restricted to those Bedouin who lived a fairly stable life in the immediate vicinity of these centres. The rest of the country was left to the Sanusiya and its own devices, though, as we have seen, the Turks sent occasional patrols into the interior. Sporadically, without much enthusiasm or per-
severance, the Administration at one time tried to extend its 175*
effective control into the hinterland by nominating to official 648*
posts, and giving arms and money to, selected tribal chiefs, such 651
as the Shaikhly families of Hadduth, Lataiwish, and Saif al- 795*
Nasir. Bu Bakr bin Hadduth of the Bara'asa was made 793
qaimaqam of al-Qaiqab, where he had a castle; 'Ali Lataiwish 619
of the Magharba was made *qaimaqam* of Sirt, where he, also, 634
had a castle; and the fierce old warrior chieftain of the Aulad Suliman, Saif al-Nasir, was made mudir of Bu Njaim. This procedure resulted in brigandage rather than in good administration and was in the main discarded. Instead the mudirs worked directly through the Shaikhs of the tribal sections and, especially when dealing with intertribal and intersectional affairs, through the Shaikhs of the Sanusiya zawiyas. Some of the older notables of Banghazi have told me that the Pasha, as the Governor was often called, would never have succeeded in collecting taxes among the Bedouin had it not been for the co-operation of the

*175 *648 651 *795 793 [619] [634]

Heads of the Sanusiya lodges, who often accompanied the mudirs and tax commissions to the Shaikhs of the tribal sections attached to their lodges. It was to the common interest of the Turkish Administration and of the Sanusiya that there should be order, security, justice, and trade in the country, and they co-operated to maintain them.

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The Turkish officials did their utmost to remain on good terms with the Sanusiya Shaikhs and to this end, and doubtless also because they found no difficulty in accepting, as educated men, its exalted teachings, some of them affiliated themselves to the Order. Membership of it gave them prestige in the eyes of the Bedouin as great, if not greater, than their official status gave them. Likewise the more prosperous merchants who had dealings with the Bedouin tribes or sent caravans to the Sahara and Sudan found it advisable to be received into the Order. It is for this reason that in all the towns of Libya we find a small body of the richer and more cultured citizens ascribed to the Order, while the common people belong to other or no Orders.[1]

*175 *648 651 *795

But though the administration of Cyrenaica might be called at this period a Turco-Sanusi condominium there was an undercurrent of jealousy on both sides which occasionally gave rise to open conflict. A sure occasion was any effort on the part of the Administration to tax the Sanusiya estates. Although these had been exempted from taxation by the Sultan's firman, the local administration made rare and unsuccessful efforts to exact taxation on them. When in 1908 they tried to tax the crops of the Sanusiya holdings a tribal meeting, attended by 150 Shaikhs headed by 'Umar bu Rqaia of the Darsa tribe, met at the zawiya of al-Haniya and decided not to pay any more tribute to the Turkish Government till it revoked the tax. The Government then dropped the matter, though the trouble continued till 1910. Earlier, the Governor Ahmad Pasha Zuhadi (1904–5), acting on instructions from Istanbul, had tried to impose a tax on the crops of tribesmen and zawiyas alike. The Bedouin round al-Marj had thereupon attacked a Turkish detachment charged with collecting the tax and sent them back to Banghazi stripped of everything they possessed. The outcome was that the Governor was relieved of his office.

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[1] Capt. Emilio Canevari, *Zauie ed Ichuan Senussiti della Tripolitania*, 1917, *passim*.

The Sanusiya thus used the Turks to buttress its position in 175*
its dealings with the tribes, and combined with the tribes to 648*
resist any encroachments on its prerogatives by the Turkish 795*
Government. It was in the interests of both Administration 619
and Order that the tribes should not get out of hand, and it was in the interests of tribes and Order that the Administration should not become too powerful. The Sanusiya acquired from its central position between the other two parties a pre-eminence in the interior which led to the tribal system becoming already in Turkish times a proto-state with an embryonic government of its own. The tribes first began to see themselves as a nation through the Sanusiya's relations with the Turkish Administration. They were all 'Sanusi' *vis-à-vis* the Administration.

Ultimately it was the tribes who called the tune to both the Turkish Government and the Sanusiya Order. It would have taken a well-equipped army to have subdued them had they made a united revolt, and the Governor had only a meagre force at his disposal and could have had little hope of receiving much assistance from Istanbul. The Order had only moral weapons and though the tribal Shaikhs received its instructions with respect and every sign of acquiescence they did not necessarily act on them. Both Administration and Order were therefore compelled to compromise in their dealings with the tribes, who were, as Bedouin always are, at heart opposed to any interference and restriction. A typical situation of the latter days of Turkish rule was that described to me by the Banghazi notable 'Umar al-Kakhiya, at one time a member of the Ottoman House of Representatives. He was sent by the Governor of Cyrenaica to make agreements with the tribes in the eastern and western wings of the country by which they should refrain from cutting the Government's telegraph wires, a Bedouin habit which was later to irritate the Italian authorities and during the late war British Signals. I mention two further incidents in illustration of Turco-Bedouin relations. About 175*
1895 forty members of the Tamiya section of the Bara'asa tribe 648*
jointly killed a tax-collector, a certain 'Abd al-Rahman al- 651
Katib, for, among other affronts, having taxed the client tribes 795*
directly instead of through their *Sa'adi* overlords. They then 682
fled to the Marmarica, from where they treated with the Turkish 619
Authorities for a settlement by payment of 13,000 Riyal, or thirteen times the usual blood money, to the dead man's son.

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thirteen times the usual blood money, to the dead man's son. In 1898 the Darsa and Bara'asa threatened to prevent the Turkish Government from cutting cypress trees on their tribal lands for telegraph poles, although the trees were in law State property, and the matter had to be settled by negotiation, the Turks agreeing to pay for the trees on condition that the Bedouin helped in the cutting of them.[1] Turks and Bedouin managed in this kind of way to accept the presence of the other in a spirit of mutual tolerance. Just as the Sanusiya did not ask the Bedouin to change their way of life, but only to lead better lives, so the Turkish officials did not ask them to change their way of life, but only to pay taxes and, within reason, to keep the peace. In general we can agree with Professor Gregory's summary of the position when he wrote in 1909: 'The Turks apparently know how far they can go in interference with the Arabs, and during recent years have on more than one occasion altered their policy to avoid conflict with the natives.'[2]

II

The momentous events which took place in Turkey in 1908 made little difference to the political situation in Cyrenaica. In that year the 'Young Turks' gained control in Turkey and in the following year deposed the Sultan 'Abd al-Hamid II, who was succeeded by Muhammad the Fifth. The declaration of 'Liberty, Equality, Fraternity, and Justice' was coldly received by the Arab population of Banghazi, and the attempt by a section of the Turkish officials to create in the town a local branch of the Committee of 'Union and Progress' met with the strongest opposition. The two Cyrenaican delegates elected to the Parliament at Istanbul in the elections which followed the new constitution were both candidates of the party opposed to 'Young Turk' policy. Both in Tripolitania and in Cyrenaica the Arabs, citizens and Bedouin, were outraged by the revolutionary and rationalist leanings of the 'Young Turks', who aimed at the destruction of the Caliphate and of the religious Orders which

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[1] Savarese, op. cit., pp. 162–3.

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[2] J. W. Gregory (and others), *Report on the Work of the Commission sent out by the Jewish Territorial Organization under the Auspices of the Governor-General of Tripoli to examine the Territory proposed for the Purpose of a Jewish Settlement in Cyrenaica*, 1909, p. 13. See also Coro, op. cit., p. 19; Giglio, op. cit., p. 36; and Ismail Chemali, *Gli Abitanti della Tripolitania*, 1916, p. 39.

3:Evans-Pritchard E-4, 5 (1942-1944) 1949 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9
(1837-1942) Sanusi

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were one of its main supports. In the place of the cosmopolitan empire of the Ottoman Caliphs they wished to substitute a pan-Ottoman empire under the leadership of Turkey and to the cultural, religious, and political disadvantage of the Arab peoples. The Arabs everywhere reacted against these fanatics.

These events are interesting in that they show that the Arabs were not only conservative but also had a strong affection for the old Caliphate Order. They are of further importance in this account in that they were partly responsible for misleading Italian observers about the true state of affairs in Cyrenaica. Some members of what may be called the Arab party, as opposed to the committee of 'Union and Progress' which took on the complexion of a Turkish party opposed to Arab interests, approached the Italian Consul at Banghazi for diplomatic support. The Consul used the circumstances to make pro-Italian propaganda in the town and to extend it to the country-side by distributing gifts among some of the Bedouin Shaikhs. These urban quarrels and the precise form they took on this occasion, by seeming to drive a deeper wedge between Turk and Arab, combined with the usual Bedouin grumblings which had so recently led to unrest to mislead the Italians into believing that they would receive urban Arab, and even Sanusi Bedouin, support when they launched the attack they were preparing, or that these elements would at least remain neutral. They made errors both of judgement and of policy. They failed to allow for the quarrels endemic to any urban Arab society and for the fact that Bedouin are everywhere and at all times against government. They accepted at their face value the exaggerated and distorted reports of unrest in the interior by informants who seem to have been the corrupt riff-raff commonly employed by intelligence services. At the same time they failed to take advantage of what cleavages there were before the Turks, faced with a desperate hazard, closed them, for, as we will see in later chapters, Italian propaganda that they were entering Cyrenaica to free the Arabs from the Turkish yoke in the event convinced no one. The Arabs did not feel themselves to be under a yoke. Urban Arab and Sanusi Bedouin might view the Turkish Administration with irritation and suspicion, but before the storm wider loyalties to Islam and the Sultan held them. The urban Arabs sided with the

*175 Turks and as soon as news of hostilities reached the interior the
*648 Shaikhs of the Sanusiya lodges and the Shaikhs of the tribes
flocked amid general enthusiasm to the Turkish standard.

*175 It was evident to both Turks and Arabs what was afoot, and
*648 the threat of Italian invasion, coming on top of the French
*795 advance in the Sahara, brought the Ottoman Government and
the Sanusiya Order closer together in common adversity. The Ottoman Empire was threatened with the loss of its African possessions and the Sanusiya with the loss of independence and the rule of infidels. Istanbul and Kufra began to send out feelers towards each other. The Sanusiya had till this time refused to allow the Turkish flag to fly over Jaghbub and Kufra, or to permit a Turkish representative to reside in those oases, though efforts had been made to persuade them to do so, a flag even being dispatched to Kufra for the purpose by the hands of 'Umar al-Kakhiya in 1908. Sayyid Ahmad al-Sharif and his advisers were now anxious to proclaim Ottoman sovereignty in the Sahara, so long as they were not directly interfered with, because the Turkish flag might be expected to protect Kufra against French attack. Also, having no diplomatic status in world affairs, they were not able to make official representations against French aggression in the Chancelleries of Europe except through the Ottoman Court. In 1910, therefore, Sayyid Ahmad al-Sharif agreed to receive a Turkish *qaimaqam* at Kufra, on condition that he was a Sanusi, and to fly the Turkish flag there. Murad Fuad Bey, the Governor at Banghazi, sent him Kailani Lataiwish, a member of the leading family of the Sanusi tribe of the Magharba. The Banghazi notable Husain Pasha Bsaikri told me that later, in 1911, after the Italians had landed in Cyrenaica, the Turkish administration sent their first, and only, mudir to Jaghbub. He was also a leading Sanusi tribal Shaikh, al-Husain bin Abu Bakr bu Hadduth al-Bara'asi. He raised in the sacred village for the first, and last, time the Turkish flag and posted a few police there. He remained at his post till Enver Pasha's visit to the oasis in 1912 when, on account of the agreement reached between Enver and Sayyid Ahmad al-Sharif, he was withdrawn.

In return for these concessions the Turks sent troops, though little more than a token force, to Tibesti in 1910 and to Borku in the following year. In 1912 they were mostly withdrawn on

account of the Italian invasion of Tripolitania. Realizing that 175*
they were helpless without Sanusiya support not only in the 648*
Sahara but also in Libya, since they would not be able without 795*
command of the sea to reinforce their garrisons there, the Turks
showed themselves anxious to win over Sayyid Ahmad al-
Sharif by also conferring on him new privileges. In 1910 the
Governor of Banghazi proposed to make him a monthly grant of
4,000 Piastres, and the Governor of Tripoli sent a telegram
in cipher to his representatives in various parts of Tripolitania
asking them whether they thought the Sanusiya Order powerful
enough to warrant additional privileges, which was apparently
the view of Istanbul. His representatives, judging by its lesser
influence in Tripolitania, where it never gained the unanimous
support it received in Cyrenaica, reported that in their opinion
the political importance of the Order had been exaggerated.[1]

Such of these events as were known to Italian observers
shortly before and in the early stages of their war with Turkey 175*
led them to false conclusions because the complexity of Arab 648*
sentiments was not appreciated. The structure of Bedouin 181
society is such that whatever the size of the group a man con- 186
siders himself to belong to in any situation, he is in virtue of his 619
loyalty to it opposed to other groups of like order in the tribal
structure. He is loyal to his *bait* against other *biyut*, to his *'aila* [613]
against other *'ailat*, and to his *qabila* against other *qabail*.
Nevertheless, he has a strong feeling of communion with all the
Bedouin of his country, regardless of their tribal affiliations, in
common opposition to the towns. But Bedouin and citizen are
both Arab and they made common cause against the Turks,
especially when the activities of the 'Young Turks' forced
Turk and Arab into rival camps. But even Arab and Turk
shared wider loyalties in their regard—unequal, it is true, but
still shared—for the Sultanate and for Islam and they reacted
in spontaneous accord against threats from Christian Powers,
the French advance in the Sahara and the Italian invasion of
Libya. Against Christians and Europeans Arabs and Turks
were no longer Arabs and Turks but Muslims, just as against
the Turks Bedouin and citizens were no longer Bedouin and
citizens but Arabs, and against the towns tribesmen were no
longer members of different tribes but a Bedouin community.

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[1] Macaluso, op. cit., pp. 88–90, and Serra, op. cit., p. 37.

[P.104]

CHAPTER V

THE FIRST ITALO-SANUSI WAR (1911–17)

I

128 I HAVE given an account of the conditions in which the Sanusiya
*795 took root in Cyrenaica and of the circumstances which favoured
*648 its growth. I now describe how its Bedouin followers, under
*175 its leadership, resisted Italian aggression during two wars, from
1911 to 1917 and from 1923 to 1932, and finally lost their independence and suffered Italian domination until relieved by British arms in 1942. It will be seen how the long struggle accentuated the political functions of the Sanusiya in a manner I indicate forthwith.

121 For segmentary structures of the kind we find among the
Bedouin of Cyrenaica to develop rudimentary governmental,
182 or statal, organs it would seem necessary that for a long period
*648 of time all the segments of the society should find themselves
in common opposition to some outside force. It is not merely that such opposition fuses the segments in corporate action. A new form of political structure which includes the enemy comes into existence and necessitates a new orientation of political values. In a segmentary system each segment sees itself as a unity in opposition to an opposed segment of the same size and kind; so when all the segments come into a corporate relation of opposition to some political group outside them which has a different kind of political structure and belongs to a different political system they tend to see themselves as a unity *vis-à-vis* this group and as a unity on the same structural model as itself.
[177] The small Bedouin society of Cyrenaica in this way slowly took
on the political form of the European countries into the orbit of which it was drawn. It could only enter into structural relations with the states of Europe on the model of the European state.

*175 When the Italians invaded the country and the Turks made
*648 peace the tribes continued their resistance in the name of the
Sanusiya. In their social system tribe was balanced against
*795 tribe and tribal section against tribal section. It was the
619 Sanusiya which gave to all the tribes and their sections a com-

mon symbol which stood for their common interests. Faced 175*
with amorphous, but seemingly ineradicable, opposition from 648*
the Bedouin the Italians more and more directed their hostility 795*
to the Sanusiya Order as a tangible head to the resistance which 619
could be destroyed. Failing to crush opposition they were forced
to come to terms with it, but they could not come to terms with [793]
a tribal system—only with an organization and through a
person, the Head of the Order, who could speak for that
organization and for the tribes which it represented. Both in
fighting the tribes and in trying to come to terms with them,
the Italians thus threw the Sanusiya organization into political
relief, and the *tariqa*, the religious Order, began to speak of
itself as a *hakuma*, government. The peace negotiations, therefore,
centred round a contradiction. The Italians attempted to 175*
exact recognition of sovereignty and this implied recognition of 648*
the right of the Head of the Order to surrender sovereignty,
which he could do only if he were in a position analogous to 728
that of the Head of the Italian State, a status the Italians would 795*
not concede. Nevertheless they were compelled, in order to 793
establish relations with the tribes, to grant the Head of the 554
Order the title of Amír, and implicitly to recognize him as not
only the Shaikh of a religious Order, but the Head of a political
organization. As will be seen, the dilemma led to much equivocation
and finally to a second Italo-Sanusi war. In this
second war the Sanusiya was entirely destroyed as an organization,
political, economic, and religious. It persisted nevertheless
as a sentiment, and the Head of the Order in exile in Egypt still
retained the allegiance of the Bedouin, who saw in his freedom
the hope of their own.

When the last European war broke out and Cyrenaica became 175*
a battlefield of first importance it was in the interests of each 648*
side to ensure that the local population would be favourable 795*
to it. The Italians, having destroyed the Order, the one
organization through which they might have made effective
propaganda among the Bedouin, were confronted in the country
with an unimpressionable mass of sullen resentment which
could in no way be influenced to their advantage. The British,
on the other hand, who sought to rouse the Bedouin to renewed [793]
rebellion, at any rate up to the point at which they gave what [554]
assistance to British arms they were capable of, had a ready

*175 means of influencing them to this end in the exiled Head of the
*648 Order and many influential Shaikhs of tribes who recognized his
*795 authority. But the British Government, which in the past had
793 consistently refused to admit that Sayyid Muhammad Idris was
554 more than the Head of a religious Order, were in the new
circumstances compelled to accept his offer of help as coming from a person who could act in a political sense and for the whole population of Cyrenaica. The Sayyid had, therefore, to be recognized as an Amir and to be permitted to recruit his own army under the Sanusiya flag. The Bedouin of Cyrenaica could only take part in a world struggle between states as a unit within their structure, as a political unit of the same order as the other allied countries, which were autonomous states acting through their own governments in their relations with the British Government and Armed Forces. The recognition of Sayyid Muhammad Idris as a political leader was easier for the British in that in war national sentiment is at a high pitch and those engaged in the struggle are particularly sensitive to national aspirations and sympathetic towards them. They are then anxious to placate national movements in their own empires and to encourage those in the empires of their oppo-
*175 nents. To the British all the people of Cyrenaica were Sanusi
*648 and they so spoke of themselves in their dealings with British
*795 troops, and not as members of particular tribes or as citizens of
particular towns. Through the long years of struggle Bedouin and townsmen alike had come to identify their interests with those of the Sanusiya Order, and to see in the Order the symbol of their particularist aspirations. 'Sanusi' had become a word which could be translated 'Cyrenaican'. It had ceased to have a religious content and had acquired a purely political one.

II

*175 This is a history of the Sanusi of Cyrenaica and not of Italy
*648 so that there is no need to record the domestic and international
circumstances in which Italy went to war with Turkey. Nor is it necessary to narrate the reasons the Italians gave for their declaration of war. Italy had certain historic claims to a sphere of influence in Libya and her strategic interests in the coast of Africa opposite her shores are obvious. It is easy to understand

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Italian feelings about Libya. They 'knew it was no Eden' and they occupied it 'simply in order to be able to breathe freely in the Mediterranean—to avoid being stifled amidst the possessions and naval bases of France and Great Britain'.[1]

Although the Italians declared war with the minimum of both provocation and warning it was generally known to the Turkish Authorities at Istanbul, Tripoli, and Banghazi, as well as to the Arabs of Libya, that an invasion was being prepared and could not for long be deferred. The Italians had for some years pressed for facilities and concessions in Libya and it became increasingly clear that their importunities must eventually furnish an occasion of war. The Ottoman Government resisted them as far as it could. Where it could not directly refuse them it temporized and, when forced by diplomatic pressure to give way, sought by subterfuges to nullify any concessions it had granted. The Italians had been particularly anxious to acquire land in Libya, both for individuals and for the *Banca di Roma* and other corporations. When compelled to allow Italians to buy land the Turks used their influence with the Arabs to encourage them to refuse to sell.

But although war was known to be inevitable, and even imminent, the Turkish Authorities, in their happy-go-lucky way, did little to prepare for it. At the last moment, indeed, they made some small efforts to send reinforcements in men and arms to their Libyan garrisons, efforts the Italians made the occasion of their ultimatum of 26 September 1911; but this was offset by the earlier dispatch of the bulk of the Tripolitanian forces to deal with a revolt in the Yaman and by the transfer of the Governor of Tripolitania, Ibrahim Pasha, who was a good military leader. The Turks were also at the time engaged in suppressing an insurrection in Albania, and the Balkans were in a ferment which was to lead in the following year to the first Balkan War. Apart from these troubles, once war had been declared the Turks were able only meagrely to supply or reinforce their garrisons because from the beginning the Italians had an overwhelming superiority at sea.

When war broke out the Turks had an establishment of about 5,000 men in Tripolitania and about 2,000 men in Cyrenaica, but the garrisons were well below strength and badly

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[1] Ambrosini, *I problemi del Mediterraneo*, 1937, p. 23.

*175 *648 equipped. Coro says that at the end of May 1911 they had, not counting officers, 3,010 men in Tripolitania and 1,200 men in Cyrenaica.[1] The Italian expeditionary force consisted of 34,000 men, 6,300 horses, 1,050 wagons (*carri*), 48 field guns, and 24 mountain guns; and the Italians counted on being able to ship to Africa all the reserves and modern equipment that might be required were resistance to prove stronger than was expected. At the height of the campaign, when Italy entered the Great War, she had about 60,000 troops in Libya. It looked therefore as though the Turks had no chance of putting up more than a token resistance, and the Italians certainly expected a walk-over and were surprised, then alarmed, at the resistance they had to overcome. They were dilatory and over-cautious after their main landing at Tripoli, hanging about in the town instead of pushing on into the interior before the Turks had time to organize resistance and attract Arab volunteers. In Cyrenaica also they delayed too long their advance into the interior and gave the Bedouin time to come to the assistance of the Turks and for some adventurous young Turkish officers, among them men who were later to make names for themselves in world history, to reach the field from Turkey. The Italians also underestimated the skill and pluck of the Turkish soldiers and they misjudged—the worst of their miscalculations—the attitude of the Arab population of Libya to the war. They believed that the Arabs were so irate with the Turks that they would not assist them and might even turn against them. Indeed, so confident were the Italians of Bedouin support that, according to local statements, they were themselves supplying them with arms in Cyrenaica for some months before the outbreak of war.

*175 *648 *795 793 Looking back it is easy to see that another blunder was made in taking it for granted that the Sanusiya Order was hostile to the Turks to the point of being willing to remain outside the dispute or even to co-operate with a Christian Power to be rid of them. If the Head of the Order—'*Il famoso papa nero*', as the Italian press, most inappropriately, used to call him—wanted to create for himself an independent kingdom in North Africa, as it was supposed that he did, it seemed likely that he would have been glad to see the Turks driven out of Libya. But, apart from the fact that the Sanusiya and the Ottoman

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[1] Coro, op. cit., p. 121.

Governors had generally, in spite of occasional disagreements, 175*
managed to rub along together in a spirit of live and let 648*
live, it is difficult to understand how the Italians could have 795*
imagined that the Sanusiya Shaikhs would have preferred them [793]
to the Turks who, after all, were Muslims, if not very good ones, and sometimes personal friends as well; especially in view of the low opinion the Arabs of the Near East generally had formed of Italians in comparison with other Europeans. Also, if they had hoped for help or neutrality from the tribes and the Sanusiya, and they undoubtedly did hope for it, one might have expected that they would have prepared for it by making direct contact earlier with the persons of chief influence among the parties. That they did not do so may be attributed in part to over-confidence and in part to over-estimation of the assurances of such crafty citizens of Banghazi as 'Uthman al-'Anaizi and 'Umar al-Kakhiya. Mansur al-Kakhiya was indeed sent in 1912 to Kufra to bribe Sayyid Ahmad, without result, and there were some further vague semi-official efforts made in 1913 and 1914 to get into touch with the head of the Order, but they also came to nothing.

III

War was declared on Turkey on 29 September 1911 and 175*
opened with the bombardment of Darna town on the following 648*
day and of Tripoli town a few days later. During October the Italians occupied Tripoli, Tubruq, Darna, Banghazi, and Khums. The disembarkation at Banghazi was against a rough sea and stiff opposition. After this initial resistance the Turkish garrison withdrew to the interior, as did their garrisons in the other coastal towns of Libya, since they could be shelled from Italian warships without being able to reply, their few coastal guns having a very restricted range. The garrison made Banina, about 12 km. to the east of Banghazi, their headquarters and here they were quickly joined by contingents of all the Bedouin tribes of western Cyrenaica with the Shaikhs of the Sanusiya lodges at their head. The Turkish garrison had from the begin-
ning been in consultation with Shaikh Ahmad al-'Isawi, the [795]*
Sanusiya representative at Banghazi and the Head of its zawiya [793]
there; and he wrote to all the Shaikhs of the tribal lodges in the

*175 *648 *795 [793] neighbourhood asking them to recruit volunteers for war.[1] In doing so he was, according to local information, acting on instructions received from Sayyid Ahmad al-Sharif who, though he was in distant Kufra, seems to have been well aware, as indeed was everyone concerned, of Italian intentions. The tribal bands, following the Sanusiya Shaikhs, poured into Banina and put heart into the small Turkish garrison. Strengthened daily by tribal reinforcements the Turco-Arab force on the Banghazi front was able to contain the Italians in the town till 'Aziz Bey al-Masri (later Inspector-General of the Egyptian Army) arrived to direct operations. The Turkish garrison at Darna, which had also retired behind the town, was reinforced in the same way by the tribes of eastern Cyrenaica, roused and led by the Shaikhs of the tribal lodges of the Sanusiya in that part of the country. When Enver Bey (later Turkish Minister for War) arrived by camel from Egypt he took charge of the Darna sector, where he was assisted by Mustafa Kamal (Ata Turk, later the first President of the Turkish Republic). A third camp was established in the Marmarica near Tubruq under command of another young Turkish officer, Adham Pasha al-Halabi. Here [793] also the Turkish garrison was joined by the local tribes and the Shaikhs of their lodges. The Turkish Commanders always took the Shaikhs of the tribes and lodges into consultation.

Without these tribal reinforcements the Turks certainly could not have continued for long to resist. As it was, resistance not only became possible, but the whole character of the war changed, both in Cyrenaica and in Tripolitania, where the Bedouin also flocked to the Turkish standards. It ceased to be a war in which a foreign power was trying to seize its colonies from a tired empire, and became a colonial war in the traditional sense of a European power attempting to deprive a native people of their liberty and their land. In Cyrenaica it became, in fact, more and more an Italo-Sanusi, rather than an Italo-Turkish, war and ended as a simple struggle of the Bedouin of Cyrenaica under Sanusiya leadership for freedom from a foreign yoke.

*175 *648 Enthusiastic though they were, the Bedouin who poured into the Turkish camps were in no sense soldiers. Full of spirit, courageous to the point of recklessness, their one aim was to

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[1] Muhammad al-Akhdar al-'Isawi, *Rafu' al-Sitar*, pp. 13-18.

charge the enemy, who was armed with the most modern 175*
equipment and generally entrenched. They charged on horse- 648*
back, firing wildly, wherever they might come across him, with-
out any regard to danger, terrain, or odds. The Turkish officers
had great difficulty in the early days of the campaign in restrain-
ing these impetuous cavaliers, but Turkish tact, the example of
the disciplined Turkish troops, and the disastrous results of
their own impetuosity soon taught them to act with greater
caution, though not the patience necessary in the professional
soldier. Realizing that the war might be protracted, Enver 175*
tried to make the Bedouin volunteers feel that they were as 648*
much part of the army of resistance as the Turkish regulars 702
and to give them some military training, in however random a
fashion. He chose 300 young Bedouin of the principal families
of tribal Shaikhs from among the volunteers and gave them
training at his camp at al-Zahir al-Ahmar, some 20 km. to the
south-west of Darna. They were given arms and uniforms sent
from Turkey, were housed in Turkish army tents, and received
Turkish pay. This small Bedouin contingent, trained under
Turkish regular officers and N.C.O.'s, took part in the fighting
in 1912 and proved to be a valuable adjunct to the slender
Turkish forces. When trained some of them were put in charge of
the training of the *Mahafiziya*, the Bedouin irregulars, of whom
there were about 2,000 at Enver's camp. Besides the irregulars, 175*
who resided on and off at the Turkish camp, all the Bedouin 648*
for many miles round could be relied on to join in the fray
whenever the Italians ventured to move from entrenched and
fortified positions. Most of the Bedouin were armed, but their [411]
rifles were of a very old make, mostly old one-round Greek
pieces. When Enver received his irregular and scanty supplies
from Turkey he distributed a small number of Turkish rifles
among them. Later they equipped themselves with Italian
rifles taken in fights, and they had a ready source of ammuni-
tion in every Italian column. The irregulars occasionally
received largesse from Enver but for the most part paid them-
selves in loot.

Enver looked yet farther ahead. In June 1912 he selected 175*
365 boys, mostly from among the sons of the Bedouin Shaikhs, 648*
and sent them to Istanbul to be educated for posts in the 702
Cyrenaican army and administration. The first thirty to be

3:Evans-Pritchard E-4, 5 (1942-1944) 1949 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9
(1837-1942) Sanusi

*175 commissioned were later sent to al-Sallum to join Sayyid
*648 Ahmad al-Sharif before the outbreak of war in Europe in 1914.
702 Six months later another seven were sent to Cyrenaica but were captured *en route* by a French warship. Many of these lads later distinguished themselves in Asia Minor in the wars there which followed the 1914–1918 war in Europe, and remained in Turkey for good.

IV

*175 The Italian plan in Cyrenaica was to advance simultaneously
*648 from Banghazi in the west and Darna in the east, gripping the central plateau between pincer columns and bringing the enemy to decisive engagements. In the Banghazi zone a column advanced on 28 November 1911 on the suburbs of Sidi Khalifa and al-Kwaifiya. But the Italian forces in and around Banghazi still only had superiority within the range of their naval guns. They were on the defensive and the Turco-Arab force at Banina had the initiative. On 12 March 1912 the Turco-Arabs made a big general attack on Banghazi. This was a blunder which cost them dear. The official Italian account says that they left about 1,000 corpses on the field; but it must be said here, and in reference to all reports of enemy forces and casualties quoted elsewhere in this book, that Italian figures must be treated with reserve. The occupation of Banghazi was now extended to about 8 km. around the town and fortified on that arc. While the Italians sat behind these fortifications at Banghazi with the Turco-Arab force besieging them from Banina, the progress made in the Darna sector was even more disappointing. The town is backed almost immediately by the plateau to which access is difficult owing to the steepness of the incline. Finding the terrain too difficult for an offensive, the Italians remained in the town, with the country around it in undisputed control of their enemies. The fighting which took place on the periphery of the Italian defences was a struggle for control of the Wadi Darna, which supplies the town with most of its water. On the night of 11 to 12 February, Enver Bey launched an attack on the town, but failed to take it, and by July a new girdle of defensive works had been thrown around it, within which the Italians continued to be besieged by the Turco-Arabs, estimated at 8,000 to 12,000 armed men. On 17 September took place a

severe fight at Ras al-Laban in which the Italians lost 10 officers 175* and 174 men dead and wounded and their enemy 1,135 dead. 648* Further fights, more in the nature of skirmishes than battles, took place from time to time as the Italians tried to occupy various strong-points to protect the town and control the wadi. In the Tubruq sector fighting was limited to occasional Turco-Arab demonstrations in small numbers against the Italian working parties engaged in fortifying points outside the port to protect it against attack from the land side.

In the first days of September 1912 Gen. Caneva, who had hitherto commanded operations in the whole of Libya, was replaced and the command was divided, Gen. Ragni taking over in Tripolitania and Gen. Briccola in Cyrenaica. To these two Generals was entrusted the advance into the interior, but before they were able to put their plans into operation, Turkey made peace with Italy on 17 October 1912.

The Turks were about to become involved in the first Balkan war, and also were well aware that the Powers of Europe would not interfere on their behalf, but regarded the Italian invasion of Libya with sour benevolence. Had they been able to reinforce their garrisons in Libya, they might have continued the war, but without command of the sea this could only have been done through Egypt, and it was so well understood that England would not permit transit of troops through Egypt that the Turks did not embarrass the Khedive by asking for the favour. In these circumstances Turkey entered into negotiations. A *modus procedendi* was established between Italy and Turkey on 15 October 1912 by which it was agreed that the Sultan should give with his firman full and entire autonomy to Cyrenaica and Tripolitania, entrusting the protection of Ottoman interests in the two provinces to his representative, the *naib al-sultan*, and that the King of Italy should afterwards by Royal Decree regulate the conditions of the new autonomy on the basis of Italian sovereignty and define the status of the Sultan's representative. This preliminary understanding formed part of the formal Treaty of Losanna (Ouchy) of 17 October 1912. By it Turkey promised to withdraw all armed forces from Libya, in return for which undertaking, and when it had been accomplished, the Italians agreed to hand back to Turkey the Dodecanese Islands they had occupied during the war. The

*175 Sultan duly issued his firman while the Italians published a *648 Royal Decree reaffirming their sovereignty over Libya, already declared annexed by a Royal Decree in November 1911.

The treaty appears to have been carelessly drafted. What it amounted to was this: the Italians wanted the Turks to withdraw their meagre forces and equipment from Libya, when it was hoped that the Arab population would at once submit, and in return for this they were prepared to make what they thought would be a purely nominal concession by permitting the Arabs to continue to recognize the Sultan as their Caliph and to have relations with him as such through his representative at Tripoli; while the Turks wanted to escape from the predicament of having to defend a part of their empire they could not reach, without the inevitable loss of prestige the Sultan would suffer were he formally to surrender part of the *Dar al-Islam* to a Christian Power. The Italian politicians had promised their people a quick victory without much expenditure in lives and money and were prepared to sign any agreement which could be presented as such, without giving much consideration to the implications of what they were signing. Turkish diplomacy was true to form. The Sultan hoped that if he inserted some dubious clauses in the agreement, the situation in Europe might, before they could be clarified, deteriorate to the point at which the Italians would find themselves involved elsewhere than in Libya, and he would find himself with allies; as indeed it happened. In the meanwhile, till such a desirable event were to take place, the Arabs might, with some unofficial encouragement, be prepared to carry on resistance in Libya by themselves; as indeed they were.

The terms of the treaty contained a fundamental ambiguity. The Sultan's representative was to combine the functions of a kind of consul in charge of Ottoman affairs with those of a liaison between the Caliph and his Libyan followers. His precise status and powers were never determined, but it was evident that the Sultan had gone out by the front door only to return by the back. Moreover, under the treaty he had the right to nominate the Grand Qadi of Tripoli and hence to maintain control over the whole religious organization of the provinces in which the Italians claimed sovereignty, and with religious control went political authority, for Muslim qadis are political

as well as religious functionaries. The Italians seem to have 175*
been under the impression that they could exclude the Sultan's 648*
secular authority while admitting the Caliph's spiritual authority in Libya. This was a singular error, because the functions of the Caliph of Islam were not of a sacerdotal order at all, but entirely political. Hence, as Macaluso justly observes, by the Treaty of Losanna 'sovereignty in Libya was divided for some years between Italy and Turkey'.[1]

The Turks withdrew their forces from Tripolitania under the 175*
terms of the treaty and opposition in that country was soon 648*
overcome, except for sporadic resistance in the *qibla*, the Sirtica, 795*
and Fazzan, in which parts Sanusiya influence was strong. The
peace made very little difference to the military situation in [619]
Cyrenaica, partly because the Turkish garrisons remained behind to provide a disciplined core to the tribal resistance, and partly because the Bedouin tribes, who gave bulk to the resistance, had in the Sanusiya Order a common organization and leadership lacking in Tripolitania, where every tribe and every prominent tribal Shaikh acted independently and internal dissensions showed themselves as soon as the integrating presence of the Turkish army was withdrawn.

The Turkish soldiers who remained in Cyrenaica were drawn 175*
from every part of the Ottoman Empire—Albanians, Kurds, 648*
Syrians, Iraqis, Circassians, Anatolians, Macedonians, and Thracians—and were practically mercenaries who lived by the sword. Slovenly though they were, they were fine fighters and frugal as well, being content to campaign on rice, potatoes, bread, and an occasional helping of meat; and in Enver Bey they had an inspiring leader. Enver, being a regular soldier, was, however, anxious to return to Turkey to take part in the fighting in the Balkans. Before departing for the Bulgarian front and handing over his command in Cyrenaica to 'Aziz al-Masri he paid a visit to Sayyid Ahmad al-Sharif at Jaghbub, making a remarkable trip to the oasis in the only motor-car the Turco-Arab forces possessed. According to local statements the Sayyid, who had arrived at Jaghbub from Kufra in September 1912, had already declared that he would not be partner to a peace, so he required no persuading when Enver asked him in the name of the Sultan Muhammad V to carry on the struggle

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[1] Giuseppe Macaluso, *Fascismo e Colonie*, 1930, p. 7.

*175 as the Sultan's representative. If the Head of the Sanusiya
*648 Order could have been mistaken in the early stages of the war
*175 for no more than a benevolent spectator whose real attitude
*648 was unknown, the illusion was now dispelled. After Enver's
*795 visit to Jaghbub all official correspondence and documents from
the Headquarters of the Order were stamped '*al-Hakuma al-*
793 *Sanusiya*', the Sanusiya Government. The Order now claimed the status of a government of a semi-autonomous State and as such it led the resistance to Italian arms.

*175 The small Turkish garrisons thus had behind them all the
Bedouin of the country—the townsmen were sympathetic, but
*648 soft and of little account one way or the other—and behind the
*[795] Bedouin the Sanusiya Order. They were fortified also by the knowledge that behind the Sanusiya was the moral backing of the whole Arab and Muslim world, and even of peoples who were neither Arab nor Muslim. Throughout the Near East in particular, but also everywhere in the world where coloured peoples were articulate, the struggle was seen to have a deeper significance than a mere transfer of territories from Turkey to Italy, or the mere acquisition of another bit, one of the few remaining bits, of Africa by a European Power. Like a great octopus, Europe had stretched out its tentacles to seize and exploit the whole of Africa and Asia. The tentacle which now held Tripolitania and Cyrenaica in its grip belonged to the same beast which held half the world in its clutches. It was not the future of a handful of Bedouin which was being decided, but the future of Europe.

The Muslim world could do little to help their fellow Muslims, but they showed their indignation. The Arab and Muslim press railed against the Italians. The Bedouin boys sent by Enver from Cyrenaica to be educated in Turkey were everywhere on their journey received with acclamation as the sons of the brave Libyan *mujahidin*, the fighters for the faith. A Sanusi mission to Istanbul to do homage to the Caliph, though not received by him for diplomatic reasons, found plenty of support, especially in 'Young Turk' circles. Committees to collect funds for the war were formed in Egypt, Turkey, Syria, the Hijaz, and other parts of the Near East. An Egyptian Red Crescent Society was formed to look after the Libyan sick and wounded. A British Red Crescent Society was also founded in

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1912 for the same purpose by British sympathizers with the Arab cause and Indian Muslims.

V

On 13 April 1913 Gen. d'Alessandro attacked the Turco-Arab camp at Banina and after 10 hours' heavy fighting took it by assault, killing 200 men and capturing about 50 prisoners and much equipment. The Turco-Arabs from this time onwards abandoned any further attempt to hold a line and organized resistance gave way to the kind of guerrilla warfare the country, inferiority in numbers and arms, and lack of military training of the Arabs indicated as the most appropriate tactics. The Italians were therefore able to advance rapidly in column in the grand style and to defeat Arab bands wherever they met them by superiority in numbers and fire power. They occupied Bu Mariyam, al-Abyar, Taukra, al-Baniya, and Jardis al-'Abid. While this column, the 2nd Division under Gen. d'Alessandro, was advancing on Jardis al-'Abid a second column, the 4th Division under Gen. Tassoni, disembarked at Talmaitha after a sharp engagement, and from there advanced on al-Marj and took the village. The two Divisions then met at Jardis al-'Abid. From there the 4th Division moved eastwards and in mid-May took without much opposition Marawa, Slanta, Shahhat, Marsa Susa, and other points. The ease with which they were able to march through the country and the way in which the Bedouin bands nine times out of ten gave way to them on the field, made the Italians take too optimistic a view of the campaign. They had yet to learn that marching from point to point and occupying the points does not make any great impression on an enemy for whom places have little significance, and that it is one thing to force Bedouin bands to give ground and quite a different thing to conquer a hardy and elusive people scattered over a wild and rugged country. The whole country was up in arms and the general will to resistance was now strengthened by the arrival on the field of Sayyid Ahmad al-Sharif from Jaghbub and a Turco-Arab victory shortly afterwards, an event the Bedouin naturally attributed to the Sayyid's *baraka*. This victory was in the Darna sector.

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After the fighting in the autumn on the periphery of the town

*175 there had been little activity on this front till late in the spring
*648 of 1913. The Turco-Arab camp was at Sidi 'Aziz, where they
had some thousands of men, mostly tribal volunteers, and a few
cannon and machine-guns. The Darna command decided to
destroy this force in order to link up with the Tassoni column
driving towards the town from the west. On 16 May 1913 the
Italians launched an attack with some 5,000 men, three batteries
of field guns, and a machine-gun section, under Gen. Mambretti.
The fighting went against the Italians who lost their nerve and
fled in disorder, losing 10 officers and 60 men besides 400
wounded, missing, or taken prisoner. They also lost a battery
of guns and much equipment. The battle of Sidi al-Qarba', or
of the *yaum al-juma'*, the Friday, as the Bedouin generally
speak of it, prevented the further advance eastwards of the
Tassoni column and the planned pincer movement between this
column and the Darna force. It also threw Sayyid Ahmad into
[793] relief as the head of the resistance. At this point the Turks
began to fade into the background and the Sanusiya Order and
*[795] its Head to take responsibility for the direction of resistance.
The defeat of Friday also involved the Tassoni column in a
series of indecisive actions conducted from their forts during the
summer months, in which the Turco-Arabs had the initiative,
though they usually suffered heavier casualties than the Italians
through inferior fire power and drill. Nevertheless, Italian losses
were not negligible, their heaviest casualties in a single engagement
being 100 dead, including 6 officers, when one of their units
was surprised at Safsaf. Meanwhile in western Cyrenaica Suluq
and Qaminis were occupied. On the whole plateau what for a
colonial war may be regarded as heavy fighting and large-scale
engagements continued to take place throughout the late
summer and the autumn of 1913: the Turco-Arab force in a
fight at 'Ain bu Shimal, 10 km. to the south-west of 'Ain Mara,
on 6 October, was said to have numbered as many as 3,000 men.
The Italian success at 'Ain bu Shimal enabled them to effect a
junction between their forces in the Shahhat and Darna zones.
*[795] Under this pressure Sayyid Ahmad al-Sharif withdrew to the
west, where he made Msus and its neighbourhood his head-
[793] quarters from October 1913 till he moved to the Marmarica to
take part in the closing scenes of the first Italo-Sanusi war.

By the end of 1913 the campaign had broken up into a series of guerrilla fights and skirmishes, making it very difficult to 175* describe its development. Some observations on the general 648* nature of such fighting are made later in recounting the events of the second Italo-Sanusi war. The camps of the Turco-Arab forces at Banina, al-Tanji, Bu Shimal, and al-Madawar had been broken up and concerted resistance on the part of the Turkish regular forces had mostly ended, leaving the conduct of operations in the hands of the Bedouin, though the tattered Ottoman condottieri still took part in the fragmentary resistance. The war had become a true *guerra di partigiani* and in answer to its new pattern costly Italian columns began to give way to small mobile units, mostly composed of native troops, wandering through the country in all directions to destroy guerrilla bands, to punish the *tribù ribelli*, and to escort caravans. At the end of the year Gen. Ameglio became Governor of Cyrenaica and, as organized resistance was considered to have ceased, set about pacifying the country. For military purposes it was divided into three sections: an eastern sector, in which action was to be directed towards preventing contraband entering Cyrenaica from Egypt and to strike at the large enemy camp being formed in the Marmarica; a central sector in which the objective was to destroy the enemy camps at al-'Arqub and Slanta and to attempt a thrust beyond these to the Sanusi depot at al-Makhili, supply base for all the Turco-Arab camps in Cyrenaica; and a western sector, in which a drive was planned against the 'Awaqir and Magharba tribes, who kept up hostile activities from Ajadabiya and Msus. It was decided to begin these threefold operations at the end of February 1914, acting simultaneously in the three sectors, offensively in the zones of Banghazi, Shahhat, and Tubruq, and defensively in the zones of al-Marj and Darna.

During February there were many fights in the Shahhat zone. There was also fighting in the Banghazi zone, including two big battles, at Umm Shakhanab (Sanusi, 179 dead: Italians, 21 dead) and at al-Shlaidima (Sanusi, about 200 dead: Italians, 14 dead). Al-Zuwaitina was occupied and from there the village of Ajadabiya was entered without resistance and razed to the ground on 16 March 1914. The Italian force then retired to al-Zuwaitina and Ajadabiya was reoccupied by the Arabs and had to be retaken, this time by fighting (Sanusi, 130 dead). In the

3:Evans-Pritchard E-4, 5 (1942-1944) 1949 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9
(1837-1942) Sanusi

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zone of al-Marj there was also heavy fighting. Here the Italians were on the defensive and the Arabs attacking in a way very costly to themselves. There was also fighting in the Darna zone.

The total result of these operations in all parts of the country was that by mid-July all the principal Turco-Arab camps in central and western Cyrenaica had been occupied: al-'Arqub, Marawa, Taknis, al-Shlaidima, and Ajadabiya. The Bedouin forces had been compelled to withdraw to south of the Wadi al-Farigh, to the southern slopes of the plateau, and to the Marmarica. They continued, nevertheless, especially from the southern slopes of the plateau, to conduct improvised attacks on caravans and advanced posts. It was therefore decided to expel them from their new refuges on these slopes, and with this end in view Italian columns penetrated into the desert-scrub country to the south of the plateau in pursuit of the enemy. The Bedouin bands withdrew eastwards under the pressure of these attacks and formed concentrations at Khawalan and in the Marmarica. They were being hard pressed and had to face at the same time enemies more lethal and demoralizing than Italian arms: plague, smallpox, typhus, and drought and locusts [731] bringing famine in their train. The crops had failed for two years in succession in Cyrenaica and Tripolitania; and local markets were in the hands of the Italians. The only source of [439] supplies open to the Bedouin were the Egyptian ports, chiefly al-Sallum, and the markets of the Delta, and from these points large, but insufficient, quantities of food, particularly flour, poured in a steady stream across the frontier.

Bedouin mortality was certainly high. Lo Bello reckoned that by the end of 1914 nearly two-thirds of the population of Cyrenaica had died, 300,000 in 1911 being reduced to 120,000 in 1915.[1] One must agree, however, with Mondaini,[2] that Lo Bello's figure is exaggerated, for the casualties were almost entirely among the Bedouin and had they been as high as he puts them the long resistance of the Bedouin against the Italians in the second Italo-Sanusi war would have been impossible. In spite of their heavy losses and the great hardships they had to endure they kept up the struggle in a succession of guerrilla encounters, especially on the central plateau—in the month of August alone Italian historians consider ten such encounters worth recording. 175* 648*

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[1] 'Le Vicende politico-militari dei primi dodici Anni di Occupazione Italiana in Cirenaica', *Rivista Coloniale*, 1925, p. 126.

[2] Op. cit., p. 374.

To crown their difficulties the Turkish Commander, 'Aziz Bey al-Masri, with most of his officers deserted them late in 1913 or very early in 1914. Sayyid Ahmad was a proud and headstrong man with whom it was not easy to co-operate and disagreements between him and 'Aziz Bey had increased to the point at which 'Aziz Bey felt it necessary to withdraw to Egypt, as indeed he was supposed to have done in 1912 under the Treaty of Losanna. 'Aziz Bey left without Sayyid Ahmad's knowledge or consent, taking with him most of the artillery. An attempt to intercept him on his way to Egypt by a party of the Minifa tribe was unsuccessful and costly to the Minifa.

This incident might have caused a final rupture between Arab and Turk, the Sanusiya and the Ottoman Government, if it had not been for the outbreak of the Great War in Europe. When Italy entered the war on the side of the Allies in May 1915, the British felt obliged to institute on behalf of their ally a blockade of the coast, and Sayyid Ahmad and his followers found themselves in a precarious position, and more than ever dependent on Turkish supplies. The Turks, having entered the war on the side of the Central Powers in November 1914, found themselves once again officially at war with Italy in July 1915 and no longer had to be circumspect in supplying the Sayyid with munitions, and their powerful German ally was now able to supply the means of transport by submarine. The Sayyid thus found himself in a dilemma. He had no wish to become embroiled in a world war, but he was not in the position to refuse the help Turkey and Germany were able to give him against the Italians at a time when it was increasingly difficult for him to obtain supplies from any other quarter, and when with a little extra help he had every chance of driving the intruder out of his country altogether. For the Italians were in a poor plight in both Tripolitania and Cyrenaica even before their entry into the European war increased their responsibilities.

After the Peace of Losanna and the withdrawal of the Turkish forces from Tripolitania the country, always disunited at the best of times, was easily overrun by Italian columns to its

3:Evans-Pritchard E-4, 5 (1942-1944) 1949 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9
(1837-1942) Sanusi

*175 farthest confines. Col. Antonio Miani was able to march in
*648 triumph to Murzuq. It was a march through water, yielding to the weight of his column but closing behind it. The tide turned and the Italians were overwhelmed. The signal for a general rising was the massacre of an Italian caravan going from Mizda to Brak on 26 August 1914. Sayyid Muhammad
*175 'Abid, the member of the Sanusi family in charge of the affairs
*648 of the Order in Fazzan, who had made tentative overtures to
*795 Col. Miani when he seemed to be carrying everything before him, now raised the tribes of Fazzan and southern Tripolitania behind him. Col. Miani had incautiously recruited Bedouin friendlies to accompany his expedition and these, as might have been expected, revolted at the same time. Meanwhile in the Sirtica the Sanusi tribes led by the Aulad Suliman and the Magharba were still undefeated and in arms, and had been joined by some of the more obstinate Sanusi and Bedouin elements from Tripolitania, including a considerable part of the Aulad bu Saif tribe. Here, in the summer of 1914, the genial Sayyid Safi al-Din, Sayyid Ahmad al-Sharif's youngest brother, had taken command of the resistance in the name of the Sanusiya. The Sirtica offered excellent opportunities for keeping it going: inhospitable, without ports but allowing the disembarkation of supplies and reinforcements by Turco-German submarines, far alike from the centres of Tripolitania and Cyrenaica, and inhabited by tribes with a tradition of turbulent independence and devotion to the Sanusiya Order. Col. Miani, made over-confident by the ease with which he had marched through southern Tripolitania and Fazzan, advanced incautiously from Misurata into this barren land and was decisively defeated at Qasr bu Hadi on 29 April 1915. The treachery of his Misuratan friendlies under Ramadan al-Shtaiwi turned the defeat into a rout. The Italians lost, besides the rifles and ammunition with which the native and Italian units were armed, a reserve of 5,000 rifles, some millions of rounds of ammunition, several machine-guns, artillery with plenty of shells, the entire convoy of food supplies, and even the bank. After this victory Sayyid Safi al-Din marched into Old Tripolitania to put himself, in the name of the Sanusiya, at the head of the Arab resistance. He just failed to bring the whole country under the Sanusiya flag, not on account of Italian opposition, which was negligible, nor

entirely on account of his own shortcomings, which were considerable, but chiefly because of the ancient feud between the Bedouin and interior party of Tripolitania to which most of the Sanusiya supporters belonged, and the urban and coastal party represented by Ramadan al-Shtaiwi, the self-made lord of Misurata. Ramadan defeated the Sayyid in an encounter near Bani Walid early in 1916 and, to avoid further bloodshed between the Arabs themselves, Sayyid Safi al-Din was ordered by his cousin Sayyid Muhammad Idris, by that time in charge of the affairs of the Order, to withdraw to the east. This defeat set the limit to Sanusiya political influence in Old Tripolitania at the Wadi Zamzam. 175* 648* 795*

If in Tripolitania Italy had swallowed more than she could digest and was violently sick, in Cyrenaica what she had swallowed stuck in her throat. Although at the end of 1914 the Italians were on paper in control of the country as far as the Wadi al-Farigh and, on the plateau, the watershed, in fact they merely held posts in it and had very little authority outside these posts, which they supplied with difficulty and by an extravagant and cumbrous convoy system. Opposite the posts, harassing communications and keeping the garrisons on the alert day and night, were still unbeaten the Bedouin bands along what they called their *khatt al-nar*, their line of fire, a barrier which prevented any Italian contact with the tribes other than those few sections in the immediate vicinity of their forts. The Bedouin who had submitted, at any rate nominally, were the Baraghtha and a few other ʻAwaqir between Banghazi and Suluq, the *Marabtin* Fawakhir and some of the Magharba near Ajadabiya, most of the Hasa tribe, a few Baraʻasa sections near Shahhat, and the Darsa sections near al-Haniya. The rest of the country was unreservedly hostile. 175* 648*

While the Bedouin kept up ceaseless guerrilla activity around the Italian forts Italian difficulties were mounting as a by-product of the European war, although Italy had not yet entered it, and she found herself unable to give full attention to her Libyan venture. There was restlessness in the hinterland of Eritrea and it was thought that an incursion from Abyssinia was not impossible, so that Eritrean units intended for Cyrenaica had to be kept at home, and the Cyrenaican command was thus deprived of its best troops on whom, rather than on its national

3:Evans-Pritchard E-4, 5 (1942-1944) 1949 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9
(1837-1942) Sanusi

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troops, it had come to rely more and more to do most of the fighting. In 1914 there were eight battalions of Eritreans in Libya. The collapse in Tripolitania coming on top of their other troubles caused a panic in Cyrenaica and the garrisons of the interior were hastily withdrawn between January and October 1915. Thus even before Italy, after much hesitation and bargaining, entered the European maelstrom her North African empire was already in collapse.

Giolitti, who had stood for non-intervention, lost office amid general execration in May 1915 and Italy declared war on Austria. In August 1916 she also, under pressure from her allies, declared war on Germany. The war was not a happy one for Italy. There was strong opposition to it in the country, opportunism in the ministries, military incompetence, desertion from the armed forces, and all-round defeatism and selfishness which led, after repeated military failure, to the disaster of Caporetto in October 1917. In the midst of these troubles Giolitti's successors were anxious to end the expensive and unsuccessful diversion in Libya, a desire which led, as will be seen in the next chapter, to the truce with the Sanusi of April 1917 known as the *modus vivendi* of 'Akrama (Acroma). The outbreak of the second Turco-Italian war (1915–18) had some advantages from Italy's point of view. It enabled her to retain the Dodecanese Islands (Rhodes and eleven other small islands) and she had an excuse for rescinding the privileges the Sultan enjoyed in Libya under the Treaty of Losanna. Also, the British might be expected to be less tolerant of supplies reaching the Bedouin of Cyrenaica across the Egyptian frontier and through Egyptian ports, and by German and Turkish submarines. Nevertheless, its immediate result was an almost total evacuation of Tripolitania, where the Italians were able to hold only Tripoli town, a strip of coast to the west of it and Khums, and of Cyrenaica, where they held only the towns and villages near the coast and a few inland posts with which communication from the coast was maintained precariously. Everywhere the Bedouin had the initiative and the Italian garrisons were demoralized and besieged. If Sayyid Ahmad al-Sharif had not now decided to launch an attack on the British outposts in the Western Desert of Egypt the final outcome might have been very different from what it was.

VI

Italian pressure on the Turco-Arab forces during 1914 had 175* the effect of pushing the main concentration of their troops 648* eastwards where they were farther from the Italian bases and gained additional protection from the proximity of the Egyptian frontier. The Italians wished to avoid complications with Egypt and England in which they might find themselves involved were they to operate along an ill-defined frontier, and it was partly for this reason that the large-scale operations planned for the Marmarica by Gen. Ameglio were not put into effect. By the end of 1915 there were concentrated at Masa'ad (Amseat), about 3 km. from al-Sallum, some 2,000 armed men in Sayyid Ahmad's camp. This concentration did not cause much uneasiness in British circles at Cairo, for the Sanusi had no quarrel with the British and in the past Sayyid Ahmad had expressed himself well disposed towards them and had compared them favourably to the French and Italians. In two interviews on the frontier with Bimbashi Royle of the Frontiers Administration in November 1914 he had given assurances, the honesty of which there was no reason to doubt, that the concentration was not aimed at disturbing the frontier but was solely directed against the Italians. Nevertheless, the British reinforced their troops in the Western Desert of Egypt.

During 1915 Turkish and German officers landed from submarines on the Marmarican coast, bringing with them arms and money and other supplies to Sayyid Ahmad's camp. Among the arrivals were the Turkish officers Nuri Bey, Enver Bey's brother, and Ja'afir Bey al-'Askari (later Prime Minister of Iraq) and the Tripolitanian Berber leader Suliman al-Baruni, a tempestuous person. Sayyid Ahmad came more under the influence of these men the more he found himself compelled to rely on them for supplies for his famished people and for direction of his motley army of Bedouin seasoned with the remnants of the Ottoman forces of 1911. It is proof of the sincerity of his assurances to the British that he resisted for so long the pressure they exerted on him to attack British advanced positions in the Western Desert and that when in the summer of 1915 he discovered a plot, on behalf of Turco-German interests, to force the issue by involving his forces in conflict

*175 *648 with British frontier posts he arrested the ringleaders and sent them under guard to Jaghbub. Among the plotters were Suliman al-Baruni and the Sayyid's own brother Hilal, a miserable creature who had, as early as May 1913, approached the Italians in a letter denouncing Sayyid Ahmad and Mansur al-Kakhiya.[1]

*175 *648 *795 Sayyid Ahmad's cousin, Sayyid Muhammad Idris, always spoken of by the Bedouin as Sayyid Idris (by which term I refer to him in future) or by the more intimate title of Sidi Idris, was strongly against any action which might bring the Sanusi into conflict with the British, and his counsels were a restraining influence on his impetuous kinsman. Sayyid Idris had in May 1914 gone on pilgrimage—his habit in moments of crisis—and had contacted the British political authorities in Cairo on his way to Mecca. On his return in February 1915 he had been received in a friendly manner by Lord Kitchener and the Residency staff in Cairo and had visited the British General Officer Commanding in Egypt. He seems to have made it clear to the British Authorities that his view of the situation did not entirely agree with that of his cousin, and from this time the British favoured his pretensions to the leadership of the Bedouin of Cyrenaica. At the end of the month he had left for al-Sallum in a coastguard steamer and had joined Sayyid Ahmad at Masa'ad.

In the end Sayyid Ahmad's heart had the better of his judgement. He was an old-fashioned Muslim and a very headstrong one. He had in July 1915, after the declaration of the second Turco-Italian war, been nominated, by a firman of the Sultan, Governor of Tripolitania and of the dependent regions, and he had promulgated locally the Caliph's *jihad* against infidels in general, into which category the British clearly came. He found it difficult, therefore, to refuse the Sultan's instructions to attack in the Western Desert to ease British pressure on the Turkish forces operating in Palestine to cut the Suez Canal. With all his courage and piety Sayyid Ahmad was vain, and doubtless wished to see himself in the heroic role flatterers depicted to his imagination. He may have been misled by them into supposing that the Aulad 'Ali tribe of Egypt would rise to support him. In the event the Aulad 'Ali who, though pre-

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[1] Serra, op. cit., pp. 13 and 156 seq.

dominantly Sanusi, were an unwarlike people, were prevailed 175*
on by British representatives to remain quiet. Presumably also 648*
he was impressed by the stories interested persons told him of 795*
Germany's might and of her military successes. Many able politicians, diplomats, and generals in Europe, who had far better opportunity and far greater knowledge for judging the outcome than the Sayyid, were at this time convinced that the Central Powers would win the war. He was doubtless also misled by the little he had so far seen of European armies, small French Colonial columns of native troops and the dilatory and incompetent Italian military machine, into believing that war with the British in the Western Desert would be on the same scale.

These considerations apart, it may be doubted whether the Sayyid had any choice. The Turkish officers in his camp were his military advisers and the only persons who could supply and direct his forces. They persistently pressed him to action and urged the tribal and Sanusiya Shaikhs, over whom they had won much influence by their fighting qualities, their superior training and equipment, and the authority of their rank, to the same end. Those in favour of an attack on the British were supported by the strongest advocate, hunger. The Bedouin were reduced to desperation by famine, and an advance into Egypt seemed to offer an immediate satisfaction of their needs. In these circumstances they were likely to act as they thought fit, without waiting for instructions or paying much attention to any that might be given. A Bedouin horde is not a disciplined army and a leader of irregulars has often to be led by them. Whether, in the event, Sayyid Ahmad gave the order to attack the British posts or they were attacked without waiting for his direction is not entirely certain, but it is most likely that the attack was his responsibility. Already engaged in a desultory war with France in the Sudan and in a life and death struggle with Italy in Cyrenaica, he now, with quixotic abandon, attacked Great Britain in Egypt: a handful of Bedouin against three European Powers.

The campaign was short and decisive. In November 1915 Nuri Bey took al-Sallum by surprise, the small British garrison escaping by sea and three-quarters of the Egyptian troops going over to the enemy. He then advanced on Sidi al-Barrani and

3:Evans-Pritchard E-4, 5 (1942-1944) 1949 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9
(1837-1942) Sanusi

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THE SAYYID AHMAD AL-SHARIF (MACALUSO)

[facing P. 128]

*175 afterwards Marsa Matruh. The British made a counter-offensive
*648 in January 1916. Consistently beaten in a series of encounters,
*795 the forces of Sayyid Ahmad and Nuri Bey were finally routed at al-'Aqqaqir, to the west of Marsa Matruh, on 26 February 1916, by Gen. Peyton, an engagement in which Ja'afir Bey and his staff were captured. On 24 March al-Sallum was reoccupied. British armoured cars did great damage among the scattered Bedouin, 'shooting all loaded camels and men within reach'.[1] Seeing his men hopelessly routed and confused Sayyid Ahmad retired with a small bodyguard to Siwa oasis, then to al-Bahariya, Farafra, and finally al-Dakhla, in all of which oases in the Western Desert of Egypt there was a large Sanusi element. It is often said by writers, and the view seems to have been held by British Intelligence, though I do not know on what evidence, that he intended to link up with a revolt (November 1915) of 'Ali Dinar, the Sultan of Darfur in the Egyptian Sudan, though the Sultan had never been friendly towards the Sanusiya. It is quite possible that the Turks or the Sayyid, or both, had some such crazy plan. Anyhow, 'Ali Dinar's rising was crushed without difficulty and he was killed in the autumn of 1916.

After his defeat at the hands of the British, Sayyid Ahmad had at least the good sense to realize that his people were too exhausted to continue the struggle, that negotiations would have to be entered into, and that overtures from him were not likely to be acceptable to either the British or the Italians. He therefore, in the interests of his country and of his Order, handed over political and military control in Cyrenaica to Sayyid Idris. Sayyid Idris's brother, Sayyid al-Rida, was to assist him on the plateau and Sayyid Hilal in the Marmarica. Sayyid Safi al-Din was placed in charge of Sanusiya interests in the Sirtica, Sayyid Muhammad 'Abid in Fazzan and the *qibla*, and Sayyid 'Ali al-Khattab in the oases of Kufra. Sayyid Ahmad remained religious head of the Sanusiya *tariqa*.

It was, therefore, with Sayyid Ahmad's consent, indeed approval, that Sayyid Idris entered into negotiations with the British from Ajadabiya, whither he had repaired in the winter of 1915, before the attack in the Western Desert, to avoid being implicated in an action he could neither countenance nor stop.

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[1] W. T. Massey, *The Desert Campaigns*, 1918, p. 150.

Nuri Bey visited him at Ajadabiya and tried to win him back to 175*
the Turkish allegiance but failed to change his opinion. Such 648*
being the case, Nuri knew that resistance could no longer be 795*
kept up in Cyrenaica and set off for Tripolitania to try his luck there. Other Turkish officers and pro-Turkish elements, the irreconcilables, joined him, their departure being hastened by a new treachery on the part of Sayyid Hilal. This dissolute young man presented himself to the Italian authorities at Tubruq in March 1916, shortly before negotiations began between Sayyid Idris and the Anglo-Italian mission at al-Zuwaitina. He stated that he had come to ask for provisions for the starving Bedouin of the Marmarica, but he was also, as Canevari puts it, 'desirous of a life more in accordance with his aspirations'.[1] This was the first member of the Sanusi family the Italians had bagged and they were delighted to see him. At their suggestion he used his influence, both as a grandson of the Grand Sanusi and as a grandson of the Shaikh of an important Marmarican zawiya, to pacify the 'Abaidat tribe, who surrendered, largely as a result of his efforts and in return for food for their starving families, over 1,000 rifles to the Italians. The Italians also made use of his services to effect an uncontested entry into the port of al-Burdi Sulaiman in May 1916 and afterwards into Masa'ad, Sayyid Ahmad's old camp. His activities did Sayyid Idris a twofold harm, politically by weakening his military position and therefore his bargaining power while negotiations for peace were taking place, and morally by lowering the prestige of the Sanusi family in the eyes of the Bedouin by drunkenness and debauchery, for he led openly a scandalous life in the company of Italian officers.

The negotiations at al-Zuwaitina between the Anglo-Italian mission and Sayyid Idris broke down, partly because Sayyid Idris did not feel secure enough of his own position to agree to terms without first gaining the consent of Sayyid Ahmad. For this reason, and because they were anxious to end their military commitments in the Western Desert and could no longer countenance the occupation of Egyptian oases by enemy forces, the British dispatched a force from al-Kharja oasis to occupy al-Dakhla oasis on 17 October 1916. Sayyid Ahmad fled to al-Bahariya and thence to Siwa which, in its turn, was occupied

[1] Op. cit., p. 15.

*175 *648 *795 by a British motor column early in 1917, while resumed negotiations were taking place between Sayyid Idris and the Anglo-Italian Mission at 'Akrama. The occupation, sharply contested in a day's fighting, was possibly designed in part to cure Sayyid Idris of his lifelong malady of procrastination and to speed up the negotiations.

Sayyid Ahmad fled once more, this time for good. He went first to Jaghbub and thence through the oases of the 29th parallel to the Sirtica. His intention was to continue the war against Italy in Tripolitania, but Suliman al-Baruni and Nuri Bey, with whom he was by this time also on bad terms, had got there before him and linked up with Ramadan al-Shtaiwi, the old enemy of the Sanusiya in Misurata. Warned off Tripolitanian ground by these men, Sayyid Ahmad came down from the interior of the Sirtica to al-'Aqaila and from there took passage in a submarine for Turkey in September 1918. The Sayyid's departure was good-bye to many things: to British arms, to Ottoman rule, to the Sanusiya empire, and to Sayyid Ahmad al-Sharif al-Sanusi.

VII

The mechanized raid on Siwa oasis was the last action between the British and the Sanusi. From the British point of view the Sanusi war was a small incident in a great war. The Sanusi also, curiously, regarded it as no more than an incident in their war with Italy, though it proved for them to be a disastrous one. But although it was of minor importance and was wholly successful, the British were glad to see the campaign brought to a close. Casualties on their side had been negligible, but 35,000 Imperial troops—British, Australians, New Zealanders, Sikhs, and South Africans—had been tied down to the Western Desert of Egypt for many months when they were needed, and badly needed, elsewhere; and the expense had been prodigious. *175 *648 All the British wanted now was as quickly as possible to patch up a truce which would make any further trouble along the frontier unlikely and free their troops for other duties. All the troops wanted was to get away from the scorching, freezing, dust-blown desert of the Marmarica. I suppose that there was not one among them who foresaw that 24 years later their sons would be back—British, Australians, New Zealanders, Sikhs, and South Africans, as before—in the land of asphodels; this time with the Sanusi as their friends. 175* 648*

But if the British were to return, the Turks departed once and for all. When Sayyid Ahmad left Cyrenaica for Tripolitania there were still in the former country the remnants of its original Turkish army, and though most of these made their way westwards some remained to continue Turco-German propaganda, and occasional submarines made their appearance on the coast to the same end. The Turkish cause still found much sympathy among the Arab population and might have persuaded the Bedouin to follow Sayyid Ahmad and the sinking star of the Ottoman Caliphate, rather than Sayyid Idris and their own interests, had not exhaustion reduced them to that point at which men think only of peace. As it was, Turkish interests were in no way considered, at Sayyid Idris's own request, in the discussions which led to a truce, and when, under the terms of the truce, the Sayyid was compelled to arrest Turkish officers and agents still in the country, the Bedouin for the most part readily accepted his action. It is to his credit that he did not hand over any of these persons to the British or Italians.

The ambivalent attitude of the Sanusiya Order to the Ottoman Sultanate was at last resolved by splitting the Headship of the Order between two individuals. In the person of Sayyid Ahmad the *Tariqa al-Sanusiya* still followed the Sultanate, but only as a religious order and without territorial attachments, while in the person of Sayyid Idris it put on pace in its development into an Arab Amirate of Cyrenaica. The elimination of Turkey from Cyrenaican affairs was a vital step in its transformation. European powers with interests in the country were forced now to deal with the only person capable of speaking for its Bedouin tribes collectively, Sayyid Muhammad Idris. The Order had achieved diplomatic status. 175* 648* 795*

Sayyid Ahmad's departure marks the end of the Sanusiya empire as well as the end of the Ottoman Empire in North Africa. The Sanusiya reached the peak of its political expansion in 1902, the year in which Sayyid al-Mahdi died, and Sayyid Ahmad was heir to its declining fortunes. All his efforts to hold up the advance of the French were without avail and he saw one by one its Saharan provinces fall to them. By 1918 all that

*175 was left to it in these regions was the isolated oasis of Kufra.
*648 He had by his foolish attack on the British brought about the
*795 destruction of the lodges of the Order and of its political
influence in the Western Desert of Egypt. Tripolitania had also been lost to the Sanusiya, though it was by this time almost entirely free from Italian domination. Ramadan al-Shtaiwi of Misurata barred its way into Old Tripolitania. Fazzan was in a state of anarchy. All that remained to the Order was its original North African core—the tribes of Cyrenaica and its Cyrenaican lodges—for in spite of all their defeats and miseries the Bedouin of the country still remained loyal to the Order whose interests were their own. The Italians were very far from having conquered these Bedouin and the history of the Order from the time of Sayyid Ahmad's departure is identical with the history of their continued resistance to the Italians under its leadership, first by diplomacy, then again by arms. With its empire and its dependence on the Sultanate the Order lost also its religious character and became, through its exclusive identification with the interests of the people of Cyrenaica, an almost purely political movement.

*175 Although there were for many years rumours, greeted with
*648 great enthusiasm by the Bedouin and with nervous appre-
hension by the Italians, of Sayyid Ahmad's impending return
793 to Cyrenaica he never again set foot on the African continent.
159 Born in 1873, Sayyid Ahmad al-Sharif was still in the early
forties when he left for Turkey. He was described at this time
[142] as a man of medium height, stout, for an Arab on the dark side,
with a firm and determined face adorned with a small moustache, close-cut whiskers on the upper jaw, and close-cut beard.[1] The Sayyid was obstinate, impulsive in his judgements and impetuous in his actions, and he seems to have been proud, quarrelsome, and fanatical. He was not prepared to compromise, and the British and Italians were in entire agreement that no understanding could be reached with him. But he was a pious Muslim and a brave and loyal man, tenacious of his beliefs, stubborn in his upholding of them against overwhelming odds, and dignified in their defeat. There was a certain wildness in his schemes and recklessness in his execution of them which compel admiration.

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[1] Admiralty War Staff, Intelligence Division, 26 May 1915.

After his departure from North Africa, Sayyid Ahmad continued to lead an adventurous life. His wars against France, Italy, and Great Britain had made him a world figure, and in the eyes of Muslims one of the foremost fighters for Islam of his time. He was much sought after by the pan-Islamists of Istanbul, who wished to use his name in their propaganda directed to bringing Turks and Arabs more closely together. In April 1921 he was designated King of Iraq at the Assembly of Angora, but Faisal, backed by the British, had the advantage of him in this project. He and his name played a big part in persuading the Muslim minorities of Turkey to throw in their lot with Mustafa Kamal. After Mustafa Kamal's victories Sayyid Ahmad returned to Istanbul, where he tried to re-establish the Caliphate, a project for which Mustafa Kamal showed less enthusiasm. Early in 1922 we find him at Urfa making peace between the great Bedouin tribes of Shammar and 'Anaza. We then find him at Marsina trying to reunite Syria to Turkey. From there he went to live at Damascus. The French found his presence in Syria embarrassing and expelled him from the country in December 1924. Thence he went to the Hijaz, where he remained till his death at al-Madina on 10 March 1933. During the last years of his life he took less interest in politics. He seems to have won the personal respect of King Ibn Sa'ud, and he was called upon to settle local disputes, the most notable of his achievements as peacemaker being a settlement of the quarrel between the Amir Idris of 'Asir, the descendant of the Grand Sanusi's teacher at Mecca, and the Imam Yahiya of the Yaman, but he mainly lived in retirement among his books. He lived just long enough to see the Sanusi cause to all appearances as finally extinguished in Cyrenaica as it had been elsewhere.

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CHAPTER VI

THE PERIOD OF THE ACCORDS (1917–23)

I

*175 Sayyid Idris's approaches to the allied powers eventually led
*648 to the British High Commissioner in Egypt, Sir Henry McMahon, sending Col. Milo Talbot, a man of integrity and with a considerable knowledge of North African affairs, to represent his country in the negotiations. Col. Talbot, accompanied by his Egyptian secretary Ahmad Muhammad Hasanain (later the famous explorer of the Libyan Desert), left Alexandria on 25 May 1916 and after preliminary discussions at Rome joined the Italian delegates, Col. Villa and Com. Piacentini, at al-Zuwaitina; and there also awaited him the Idrisis of Luxor, descendants of that Sayyid Ahmad bin Idris al-Fasi who had been the Grand Sanusi's teacher at Mecca. They had been sent to Cyrenaica at Sayyid Idris's request to assist him in the negotiations. Sayyid Idris himself was camped some miles away in the interior with his counsellors and supporters.

*175 Discussions between Italy and England about the Sanusi had
*648 begun in February 1915 and an understanding had been reached
*795 on 31 July 1916, adhered to by France in March 1917, by which
each undertook not to sign an agreement with the Sanusi with-
793 out the consent of the other and to recognize Sayyid Idris as Head of the Sanusiya Order. It was clearly stipulated that the Sayyid should not be afforded recognition as an autonomous ruler, though the possibility of allowing him, under the sovereignty of the occupying State, administrative autonomy of some of the oases might be examined. On this point the Italians had earlier shown themselves to be very sensitive and the British Government had felt it expedient to assure them that it did not favour Sayyid Ahmad's claims to independence, pointing out to them that the recognition of Sayyid Ahmad as a secular ruler would be harmful to England as well as to Italy since it would involve the British Government in awkward frontier questions in the Marmarica.[1] Col. Talbot's instructions

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[1] Bruno Aglietti, 'La Confraternita Senussita', *Oriente Moderne*, Jan.–June, 1946, pp. 6–9.

in the negotiations state explicitly that Sayyid Idris was to be 175*
regarded as a spiritual leader and not as a temporal leader. 648*

Sayyid Idris had his first meeting with the Allied Mission on 795*
25 July 1916 and the three-cornered discussions were spread 793
out over the months of August and September. Between the Sanusi and the British there were easy relations from the beginning. Sayyid Idris had made friends with the British in Cairo, trusted them, and desired that the trust might be mutual. The British, for their part, were far from unsympathetic towards the Sanusi, and those who had met him respected the sincerity of their leader. Col. Talbot, while remaining on excellent terms with the Italian delegates, kept the confidence of the Sayyid, although he had sometimes, on behalf of the Italians, to press him to accept demands of which he personally disapproved and which could in no way serve British interests. He found little difficulty in obtaining the release of the British crew of the *Coquet*, who had for some time been prisoners in Sanusi hands.

Italo-Sanusi relations were very different. Sayyid Idris disliked the Italians and he thoroughly distrusted their intentions. The Italians suspected that Sayyid Ahmad and Sayyid Idris were in collusion, though pretending to be at variance, and aimed only at obtaining a temporary truce which would ensure entry into the country of supplies destined for a renewal of the struggle later; and they were resentful of the British, who, they thought, intended to relieve themselves of an embarrassment at the expense of Italy. It was soon evident that there was little hope of a permanent settlement, so a *modus vivendi* was sought which would at least give both sides a chance to recuperate.

At the beginning of the discussions the Italians said that they could only continue them if their prisoners were released, but the Sayyid had no intention of giving them up without a *quid pro quo* and adopted his usual delaying tactics when faced with demands of this kind, pleading that he would first have to ask permission of Sayyid Ahmad who had taken the prisoners, since he could not give one set of instructions and his cousin contrary
ones. As Sayyid Ahmad was still at al-Kharja oasis, consulta- [205]
tion by camel-mail could be relied on to delay the issue for some weeks. However, largely owing to Col. Talbot, agreement on this point was achieved, only to be overruled by the Italian Government at Rome, which considered its terms humiliating,

*175 on the grounds that its delegates had not been empowered to
*648 sign it. They were recalled and replaced by Maj. Riccardi and
793 Gen. Ameglio, who were to continue the negotiations from
*795 Banghazi. Sayyid Idris thought that he had been deliberately tricked and wanted to know whether any future engagements entered into with the Italians might be revoked in the same way. Col. Talbot was also irritated at Rome's action, since it was he who had persuaded the Sayyid to sign the agreement. Negotiations were thereupon broken off for some months and Col. Talbot and his staff returned in October to Cairo to report to the High Commissioner.

Interference of this kind from Rome and Banghazi was one of the difficulties which beset the negotiations. Another difficulty was Sayyid Idris's diplomatic technique, simple and effective, but none the less fatiguing. When faced with a demand he did not wish to accept but was unable to refuse outright he pleaded, often justly, that it would be useless for him to agree to terms his followers would reject. If this plea failed he raised all sorts of difficulties and delays on one pretext or another, and if hard pressed, pleaded ill health, or lapsed into phlegmatic indifference. This technique of attrition—what one Italian writer called his '*esasperante tattica temporeggiatrice*'[1]—was perhaps the best the Sayyid could have employed in the circumstances.

The discussions at al-Zuwaitina had not, however, been wasted. They had enabled Col. Talbot to know the Sayyid and, by a survey of the military situation at first hand and an initial assessment of the major problems, better to advise his Government. The discussions had made it clear that the Sayyid would agree neither to the release of the Italian prisoners nor to any further proposal unless the Allied Mission met him on the question of al-Sallum. The Sanusi received most of their supplies through this port, and if the British continued their blockade of it they would starve. Col. Talbot knew he could exact compliance in other matters in return for this concession, but he also knew that if the Sayyid did not obtain it for his people they might follow the intransigent Sayyid Ahmad, and the whole point of the negotiations was to prevent this. He felt, therefore, that he should urge the Italian delegates to meet

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[1] Serra, op. cit., p. 93.

the Sayyid's wishes in this matter, both to uphold the Sayyid's 175*
prestige among his own people and to make him keep to his 648*
promises, particularly about the Allied prisoners and the 795*
Turkish officers, under threat of closing the port should he 793
recant. There were in Cyrenaica still many Turkish officers urging the Bedouin to continue the struggle and Sayyid Idris had promised to round them up should al-Sallum be opened to trade. The question of the Turks was bound up with the al-Sallum issue because, as the Sayyid pointed out, Turkey had kept his people supplied by submarine, and while the Allies continued their blockade he could not afford to break with her.

Another problem was the immediate dispersal of the Sanusi 175*
fighting bands, or 'dors' (*adwar*), on which the Italian delegates 648*
insisted. It would have been foolish for the Sayyid to have 701
disbanded his forces while discussions were proceeding, since it 795*
was their presence in the field which compelled the Allies to negotiate. He urged that it would be useless for him to agree to the dispersal of the bands, because they had no intention of dispersing and he had no means of forcing them to do so. The only result would be the loss of his prestige among his followers, who would say that he had become 'Italianized'. These bands continued to be a bone of contention between the Sanusi and the Italians for the next six years, and the issue was only settled by the military subjugation of the whole of Cyrenaica in 1932.

It was a question of importance to the Italians, because the 175*
answer to it was also the answer to what they regarded as the 648*
fundamental question of sovereignty. On this point the Sayyid 795*
was unyielding. He argued that his family, like the Arab princes of Arabia, had never accepted such demands as the Italians made, even from the Turks, fellow Muslims ruled by the Caliph of Islam; and he insisted that the British, who had everywhere shown themselves to be friends to the Arabs, should not press those of Cyrenaica to accept Italian sovereignty, which was the issue of the war and could only be imposed on a defeated people. The British regarded the question of sovereignty as a theoretical one and could not understand why the Italians attached so much importance to it.

Col. Talbot thought they should be content with the occupation of the ports and other centres, as the British were in Egypt,

*175 *648 *795 without claiming sovereignty over a country their arms had failed to conquer. After they had spent, it was believed, £80 million Sterling on the war in Libya up to 1916,[1] they were still everywhere on the defensive, more or less besieged in their forts, which they could only victual and relieve by cumbrous convoys. Moreover, the Sayyid's Bedouin followers would have deserted his personal leadership had he compromised on the question of sovereignty, and there was no one else with whom the Allies could treat save Sayyid Ahmad, for only these two men could speak for the whole of Cyrenaica. If the Bedouin lost faith in Sayyid Idris, peace, the one essential for all parties, would be lost.

The British view was common sense and true to British traditions of diplomacy. It appeared to the British that the Italians, unable to conduct a colonial war successfully, wanted to gain their prize by British arms. Otherwise there was no point in pressing the Sayyid to recognize Italian sovereignty when this sovereignty had been recognized explicitly or implicitly by all the Powers of Europe. To the Italians it appeared that the British intended to secure their position in Egypt by making such terms with the Sanusi as would enable the Sanusi later to continue the struggle against Italy. There was some truth in both views. Divergence of policy arose from different aims. *175 *648 All the British wanted was to end the Sanusi affair quickly. They regarded it as an unfortunate incident in their war against Germany and one from which they neither expected, nor wished, profit. It was an embarrassment, freezing, at a time men and supplies were short, forces badly needed elsewhere. They demanded, therefore, besides the return of their few shipwrecked prisoners, only evacuation of the Egyptian oases, cessation of all propaganda in Egypt, and the extradition of all Turkish agents from Cyrenaica. Once the threat to their positions in Egypt and on the Canal, threatened at the same time by the Turks from Palestine, had been removed and steps had been taken to make its recurrence unlikely, the British had no further interest in Cyrenaican affairs and certainly had no intention of conquering the country for themselves or for the Italians. They considered moreover that their obligation to their Italian allies went no farther than a truce which would

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[1] Colonel Talbot's Reports (unpublished).

enable the Italians to win over the Bedouin by trade, good 175*
administration, and fair dealing. Peace would doubtless break 648*
up the cohesion of the Bedouin tribes brought about by their war with Italy and wise politics could make use of the resultant cleavages. If Italy did not succeed in pacifying the country that was her affair and not England's, for she had invaded Cyrenaica on her own responsibility long before the outbreak of war in Europe. Furthermore, the British had defeated Sayyid Ahmad without receiving, or asking for, Italian support. Italian aims were more comprehensive. They not only wanted to straighten out their battered prestige but also to conquer and colonize Cyrenaica. British aims were strategic; Italian aims were political.

Thus the British were strong, but wanted no more than military security, which they could have obtained by military means, whereas the Italians were weak, but wanted complete administrative control over a country in which, after five years of military effort, they barely retained a foothold. It was clear, therefore, that the Italians would in the end have to accom- [795]*
modate themselves to the British view, and though the British were prepared to force Sayyid Idris to conclude an accord with the Italians, as the price of signing one themselves, they would not press him much beyond the point at which their own interests were safeguarded.

Of the two Allied partners, the British held the stronger cards 175*
and could call the play. Sayyid Idris could not hope to win the 648*
game on his hand, but he held a few good cards and might 795*
expect, if he played them well, to win some tricks. His military position was hopeless. He might have continued fighting the Italians alone, even after the Sanusi defeat in the Western Desert, but he stood no chance against the British, and he soon found that he could not separate them from their Allies. His people were weary, famished, and despondent, and wanted peace. On the other hand he was aware that the Allies were anxious to reach an agreement with him as quickly as possible. Delays which cost the Bedouin hardships to which they were accustomed cost the Allies divisions needed in their life and death struggle with the Central Powers. Also, it was as obvious to him as it was to the Allied Mission that he was the only man in Cyrenaica with whom they could treat, since the only other man who had

3:Evans-Pritchard E-4, 5 (1942-1944) 1949 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9
(1837-1942) Sanusi

*175 the backing of the Bedouin, Sayyid Ahmad, despised the Italians
*648 and refused to have anything to do with them. Were Sayyid
*795 Idris to accept the full Italian demands, he would, as he said, be pulling down his position with his own hands, and he was the keystone of the whole negotiations.

The Sayyid held two other good cards at the conference table. The Bedouin of Cyrenaica did not stand entirely alone. They were still supported by the Turks, who managed to get some supplies to them by submarine in spite of the blockade, and the presence of Turkish officers in the Sanusi forces gave the struggle a wider significance than it would otherwise have had. The Arabs of Tripolitania were also, though indirectly, involved. Were negotiations to break down between Sayyid Idris and the Allies, it was probable that those Cyrenaicans who wished to continue the war would receive assistance from their western brothers, or would retire to the west to continue resistance there. If, however, the Sayyid's prestige could be enhanced among the Bedouin of Cyrenaica by an agreement which gave them supplies and left them their independence, it might be hoped that he would in his own interest oppose, and be strong enough to stop, Turkish agents and their sympathizers from involving the Arabs of Tripolitania directly in the Cyrenaican issue. England wanted to spare her troops the conquest of Cyrenaica. She wanted all the more to spare them the further conquest of Tripolitania. Sayyid Idris also held the pan-Arab card. The British had encouraged the Arabs of Arabia to revolt against Turkish rule and to gain their freedom. It seemed hardly consistent for them to bully the same Arab people in Cyrenaica into accepting Italian rule, a thing far more odious to them than Turkish rule. The successful rebellion of the Sharif of Mecca had stimulated Sayyid Idris to confirm the temporal, as well as the spiritual, power of his family in Cyrenaica and to hope for an independent Amirate, such as the Idrisis had set up in the 'Asir in 1909. It was difficult for the British to encourage Arab aspirations on one side of Egypt and to crush them on the other.

Thus Col. Talbot's diplomatic strength lay in the fact that the British could, if the Sayyid proved obdurate, starve his people by blockade and, if he proved more than obdurate, follow up their military successes in the Western Desert into

Cyrenaica itself; while if the Italians were too greedy, they could break off negotiations and limit their further participation in the Sanusi war to defensive action along the Egyptian frontier, leaving the Italians to validate their claim to sovereignty by force of arms. Italian diplomatic strength lay in the agreement by which England had bound herself that she would not conclude a separate peace with the Sanusi. They knew that the British were eager—Col. Talbot was always trying to expedite the discussions—to end their military commitments in this theatre and they were, therefore, able to bring pressure on Sayyid Idris through them. The Sayyid's strength lay in his weakness. To obtain an effective truce, the Allies would have to back him personally, and they could only do this by making concessions. 175* 648* 795*

Dummy, Sayyid Idris's absent partner in this game, was his cousin Sayyid Ahmad. Till recently Sayyid Ahmad had been undisputed leader of the Sanusi, and were he to appear on the scene again, the Bedouin would probably follow him. As neither he nor the Italians were prepared to negotiate with one another, and as the British also had no wish to negotiate with him, his reappearance would mean renewal of the fighting. The only way in which it could be prevented was by making a success of the discussions with Sayyid Idris. The Allied Mission felt the presence of this uncompromising man at the conference of al-Zuwaitina, although he was far away in the oasis of al-Kharja. [793]

II

Peace was so clearly in the interests of all that the temporary breakdown of the talks at al-Zuwaitina did not lead to further hostilities on either side, and was regarded by both as an interlude between two phases in the negotiations. The talks were resumed in the Marmarica in January 1917. The Allied Mission lived at Tubruq and the Sayyid at 'Akrama, about 40 km. distant. The Idrisis of Luxor, father and son, were again present and, as before, flitted between the two parties. The Italians were represented by Col. De Vita and Com. Pintor. Sayyid Ahmad was at Siwa. 175* 648* 795* 728

The talks began well and by 27 March the exchange of Italian and Sanusi prisoners was at last effected. In return for the

*175 Sayyid's goodwill in this matter the Allies conceded in principle
*648 the reopening of the markets to the famished Bedouin. The
*795 programme of al-Zuwaitina then began to repeat itself. The
728 Italians pressed for the acceptance of terms substantially the
same as those they put forward the year before and which became known as *modus vivendi* No. 1. They were unacceptable to the Sayyid, whose position had not deteriorated to any extent in the interval, and he replied with what became known as *modus vivendi* No. 2, in which he asked the Italians to make all the concessions he desired while deferring for future discussion the points in which they were chiefly interested. On the basis of the Sayyid's counter-proposals the Italians produced a *modus vivendi* No. 3 which gave the Sayyid almost all he had asked for, being in fact No. 2 with slight alterations and additions. To this the Sayyid replied with a *modus vivendi* No. 4, which altered or omitted several of the clauses in No. 3. Col. Talbot now felt that the ball had been patted backwards and forwards long enough, that the Sayyid's last effort was unnecessary, as the terms of the latest Italian proposals were practically the same as those put forward by the Sayyid himself, and that therefore No. 3 should be accepted as it stood without modifications. The Sayyid accepted it on the promise that when he did so the markets would forthwith be reopened.

At this point the Italian delegates, who were only empowered to negotiate *ad referendum*, declared, to Col. Talbot's consternation, that the Sayyid's acceptance of *modus vivendi* No. 3 was inadequate and that he must also accept No. 1 'on general lines'. It could hardly have seemed otherwise to the Sayyid than that the Italians were increasing their demands. However, he once again took Col. Talbot's advice and agreed to accept No. 1 'on general lines' on the Colonel's assurance that an acceptance of so general a nature would not fetter his future action; although the Italian interpretation of 'on general lines' was that it referred to the time and manner of implementation and not to the substance of the agreement. In the end, therefore, the Sayyid accepted No. 3 for immediate application and No. 1 on the understanding that it was to be put into force later, gradually, and subject to agreement between the parties. In reality he committed himself to very little. He had already consented to sign the terms placed before him by the British.

He signed the agreements with both Powers, with England on 175*
14 April and with Italy on 17 April; and Col. Talbot returned 648*
to Cairo to report to Sir Reginald Wingate. 795*

The main clauses in *modus vivendi* No. 3, for immediate 728
application, were: hostilities were to cease at once; social intercourse and commerce were to be free between the parts of Cyrenaica occupied by Italy and those held by the Sanusiya; each party was to be responsible for security in its own territory; and neither was to create new military posts or to encroach on the territory of the other. The population was to be disarmed at a later date, it being impossible to effect this at the time; and fomentors of disorder were to be removed. Further clauses stipulated that the lodges of the Sanusiya Order occupied by the Italians were to be restored to the Order, though the Italians were to remain in those being used by them for military purposes till peace was established; that the properties of the Order were to be free from taxation as in Turkish times; that the Italians were to pay salaries to Shaikhs of the lodges, nominated by the Sayyid with Italian approval, within their zone; and that in the interior Shaikhs of lodges were to act as intermediaries should it be necessary for the Italians to have dealings with the tribes. Muslim personal law and koranic teaching were safeguarded in the courts and schools in the area under Italian control.

Modus vivendi No. 1, accepted by the parties in principle and for future application, differed from No. 3 in three particulars: the Sanusi armed camps were to be broken up and their garrisons dispersed; the tribes were to be progressively disarmed within a year; and the Italian Government was to nominate, on the Sayyid's presentation of three names, Shaikhs of lodges in their zone.

By the British-Sanusi (Talbot-Idris) agreement, to the general terms of which Sayyid Idris had assented at al-Zuwaitina, all British, Allied, and Egyptian subjects were to be handed over; all Turkish and other enemy officers and agents were to be either handed over or sent out of Africa; and no armed Sanusi were to remain in Egyptian territory, or armed gatherings to be held near the frontier. Al-Sallum was to be opened for trade, but Alexandria–al-Sallum was to be the only route by which goods, in limited quantities, might enter Cyrenaica from Egypt, and

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THE SAYYID MUHAMMAD IDRIS

[facing p. 144]

*175 only on condition that nothing reached Turco-German hands.
*648 No Sanusiya lodges were to exist on Egyptian soil (they had
*795 already been razed to the ground in the Marmarica), though
728 alms might be collected from Egyptian adherents to the Order. Sayyid Idris's property in Egypt was to be respected. Jaghbub oasis, though in Egypt, was to be administered by the Sayyid.

The agreement signed at 'Akrama settled affairs between the Sanusi and the British. The British got the military security

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

The disposition of Italian and Sanusi positions in October 1916.

*175 they needed. The terms were very favourable to the Sanusi.
*648 The *status quo* was preserved, the Italians being left in control
*795 of those parts of Cyrenaica in which they had established them-
728 selves—the coastal towns and a few inland posts—and the Sanusiya Order retaining the rest of the country. The Sayyid
[793] had saved the organization of the Order his grandfather had founded in Cyrenaica, and though he was not formally recognized as more than the Head of a religious Order he was, in fact and of necessity, treated as though he were, as indeed he was, also the secular ruler of an independent people. The accords were signed without consultation with the Turks and without their consent, so whereas Sayyid Ahmad had fought the Italians and British as representative of the Sultan, his cousin made peace with them in his own right.

The least satisfied party were the Italians. They had embarked on a colonial war and had not been successful in waging

it. The Sanusi attack on the British was a godsend to them, 175*
since it not only diverted Sanusi forces but brought to their 648*
side a powerful ally who, they hoped, would win their colonial 795*
war for them or, at any rate, exact from the enemy the fruits 728
of a successful campaign. All they got from the truce was what their arms were able to maintain. Nothing in the agreements was said about their claim to sovereignty, round which there had been so much discussion during the negotiations. Some Fascist writers later blamed the Government of the day for signing 'the *modus vivendi* of Acroma', but it could not have wrung more from the Sayyid than verbal concessions, because it had not the military power to exact more. Nevertheless, the best Italian commentators have pointed out that the accord at least gave peace to Cyrenaica in the troubled years of European war and was the basis of those later accords which were to preserve it during the dangerous years of civil discord in Italy. It also gave the Italians the opportunity to spread their influence among the tribes through propaganda, subsidies, and trade. More immediate fruits were the rounding up of the Turkish and pro-Turkish elements and the widening of the breach between the Arabs of Tripolitania and those of Cyrenaica.

In the end, however, there cannot be two competing political sovereignties in the same country. The accord was a truce of convenience, on the basis, as Mondaini says,[1] of the *uti possidetis*, entered into by Italians and Sanusi because both were exhausted by the ordeal. It was 'the product of a situation particularly delicate for both',[2] and a situation which could not last.

III

The *modus vivendi* of Acroma was, as the title implies, a truce rather than a treaty. It brought military action to a close, but left political questions for future settlement. The accord embodied a fundamental ambiguity: Italy did not renounce her claim to sovereignty and the Sanusiya did not concede it to her or renounce, either explicitly or implicitly, 'the dominion which in plain fact it exercised, not only over the oases of the interior, but even over the Cyrenaican plateau

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[1] Op. cit., p. 386.

[2] Serra, op. cit., pp. 103–4.

*175 itself, excepting the parts of it occupied by the Italians'.[1] In
*648 some respects the Sayyid found himself in much the same posi-
*795 tion *vis-à-vis* the Italian Government as previous heads of
728 the Order had been *vis-à-vis* the Turkish Government. The authority of the Italians was limited, as that of the Turks had been, to the coastal towns and a few inland posts, and the rest of the country came under Sanusiya administration. The Order recognized their *de facto* control of the towns and they recognized the *de facto* rule of the Order in the country.

It must again be emphasized that the Sayyid signed a truce with the British and Italians without consulting the Turks and that he signed a truce with the British in his own right and not as under Italian suzerainty. Furthermore, he was defending the western frontier of Cyrenaica on behalf of the Allies, and with his own army, against possible incursions from Tripolitania. To prevent Ramadan al-Shtaiwi and his supporters making a drive into Cyrenaica, Sayyid Idris recruited a new army from the Bedouin and established a *khatt al-nar*, a line of fire, as the Arabs called it, across the Sirtica. To aid him to maintain these frontier defences the Italians had provided him with 2,000 rifles, a battery of mountain artillery, and funds. They deeply resented that later the force armed by themselves, the '*armati idrisiti*', was turned against Italy. In these circumstances it was clear that the Accord of 'Akrama would have to be supplemented by further agreements.

*175 Domestic confusion made the task of the local Italian com-
manders and administrative officers very difficult. Those who
*648 had hoped that when the European war ended they would be able to give greater attention to their Libyan colonies had underestimated the moral deterioration in Italy, where disunity in the years of war was nothing to the chaos of the years which followed it. An attempt to renew the colonial war in Libya during these troubled years of 1918–22 would have created such an outcry in Italy that none of the post-war Administrations, which were always up to their ears in difficulties, could have faced the extra embarrassment. Had the Italians been able to act with promptness and decision in Libya when the war in Europe ended they would probably have met with little resistance. They had at hand men and material in plenty to

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[1] Mondaini, op. cit., p. 388.

reconquer Tripolitania and Cyrenaica, but they lacked the will 175*
to action. Instead, they vacillated between threats of force on 648*
the one side and appeasements and diplomatic surrenders on
the other.

Considerable reinforcements were indeed sent to Tripolitania, [728]
but when there were assembled there 80,000 men ready for the
reconquest of the country, the Government signed with the
Arab leaders the humiliating pourparlers of Kallet al-Zaituna
in the spring of 1919. The agreement was supplemented on 175*
1 June 1919 by a constitution giving to the Arabs a parliament, 648*
Italian citizenship, exemption from taxation, &c. The Arabs 642
were more than ever convinced of Italian impotence. In theory,
an Arab republic, the *Jumhuriya al-Trabulsiya*, founded in the
previous year under Turco-Germanic influence, now ruled the
country through its Committee of Reform at Misurata under
the leadership of Ramadan al-Shtaiwi. In fact, there was little
order of any kind. Quarrels broke out between tribes and [578]
between tribal leaders, anyone powerful enough set himself up
as overlord of his district, the Arabs raided the Berbers, outside the narrow coastal region held by their troops Italian
officials were little more than consular agents, and when Italian
forces took part in Arab disputes they did so rather as mercenaries or allies than as rulers of a colony responsible for peace
and security in it. Meanwhile the Committee of Reform made 175*
preparations to achieve the complete independence of Tripolitania from Italian rule by securing agreement in principle to a 648*
Tripolitanian Amirate from an assembly of notables at Ghariyan
in November 1921. The deputation which carried this resolution to Rome, though it received no official encouragement,
found much support among Communists, Socialists, and troublemakers of all kinds. Its leader, Muhammad Khalid al-Qarqani,
went on to attend the Muslim Revolutionary Congress in
Moscow. Such a state of affairs could not last, and in the midst
of it Count Giuseppe Volpi was nominated Governor of Tripolitania. He was an energetic man prepared to act on his own
responsibility, and by March 1922 he had recaptured Misurata
and the whole coastal region between that town and Tunisia
and had commenced operations in the Sirtica.

During this period there was peace in Cyrenaica, the fruit of
the Accord of 'Akrama. At first the Italians did no more than

*175 hold their posts. In 1919 they began to establish civil government
*648 in the territory under their control and to extend their
influence farther afield. On 31 October of that year Cyrenaica
*175 was given a constitution similar to that given to Tripolitania,
*648 and its parliament first met in April 1921 under the unlikely
642 presidency of Sayyid Safi al-Din, the old enemy of the Italians
[646] in the Sirtica. The tribesmen, of course, elected their own
Shaikhs. It held altogether five sessions up to March 1923,
when it was closed down. From the Italian point of view the
best that could be said for the constitution was that it implied
a tacit acceptance of sovereignty and that a parliament brought
their officials into personal touch with tribal leaders. Writers
of the Fascist period, when the Wilsonian sentiments which
inspired the Libyan constitutions were regarded with disfavour,
strongly criticized the Government of the day for granting them.
Thus Gaibi says that they were bound to bear evil fruit and that
'the Government thought to present itself as a magnanimous
conqueror, and the Libyans thought it a beaten coward'.[1] The
Bedouin certainly distrusted and despised the Italians and cared
as little for their authority in Cyrenaica as their brothers cared
for it in Tripolitania. About 100 of their Shaikhs met at
Ajadabiya, where they issued a manifesto declaring that, constitution
or no constitution, they would not tolerate the Italians
outside the coastal towns, and there only as traders. To
this insult the Government lamely responded by opening new
*175 conversations. After long discussions between the Colonial
*648 Governor, Giacomo de Martino, and 'Umar Pasha al-Kakhiya,
*795 representing Sayyid Idris, and an exploratory visit by Sayyid
al-Rida to Rome, it was agreed that the *modus vivendi* of
'Akrama should be superseded by a new pact, the Accord of
al-Rajma of 25 October 1920.

*175 By this new agreement Sayyid Idris was given the hereditary
*648 title of 'Sanusi Amir' with the honorific address of Highness
*795 and was created Head of the autonomous administration of the
631 oases of Jaghbub, Aujila, Jalu, and Kufra, with the right of
using Ajadabiya as the seat of his administration. He was
793 granted a personal monthly allowance of L. 63,000 (on the day
[434] of the signing of the accord the Lira was 92 to the Pound

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[1] Agostino Gaibi, *Manuale di Storia politico-militare delle Colonie Italiane*, 1928, p. 531.

Sterling) and was allowed his own flag, the first place of honour 175*
after the Governor on official occasions, a salute of guns on 648*
official visits, and the use of an official steamer. Sums of money 795*
amounting to L. 93,000 were to be paid in monthly allowances 631
to members of his family. In addition the Government under- 793
took to pay the police and military necessary to maintain order [434]
within the area under the Amir's administrative control, and a further L. 2,600,000 to meet the Amir's general expenses, of which L. 300,000 was to be in gold, and half this sum, including the gold portion, was to be paid on the signing of the accord and the other half on the suppression of the armed Sanusi camps. The Italians also subsidized tribal Shaikhs and zawiya Shaikhs and they paid stipends to the Members of Parliament. Notables, zawiya officials, qadis, scribes, chiefs of irregular bands, political counsellors, and informers, were all on the Italian pay-roll. The Italians were, in fact, bribing the whole country to keep quiet. The Italian Government further undertook to act in agreement with the Amir in making appointments to posts within the territory entrusted to his administration; recognized his right to move about freely; permitted the oases to send representatives to the local parliament; allowed the population to keep their arms; and guaranteed exemption of the Sanusiya lands from taxation. It specifically and solemnly declared that it had no intention of expropriating Arab lands, privately or collectively owned, or endowments of the Order, in favour of colonists. On his side the Sayyid promised to aid the Government in the application of the new constitution; to suppress within eight months the camps and posts and other Sanusi organizations of a political, administrative, or military character in the territory not entrusted to his administration; to keep his army to 1,000 men, subject to increase by mutual agreement; to encourage trade and communications; and not to tax the population other than by collection of religious tithes without coercion.

It was felt by the Italian Government that though in this new pact it had to make considerable concessions it had gained in return a more definite acceptance of its claim to sovereignty over the whole of Cyrenaica, which was henceforth divided into two zones, Cyrenaica proper under direct Italian administration and the oases under Sanusiya administration. The Sanusiya,

*175 as well as Italy, had been forced to compromise. Critics of the
*648 Fascist period were later to complain that the pact was a blow
631 to Italian prestige in that it virtually recognized 'the existence
*795 of two distinct Governments',[1] and Macaluso goes so far as to
793 say that the making of the Sayyid into an Amir 'was the ratification of the undisputed sovereignty of the Sanusiya in Cyrenaica'.[2] Even those who defended the agreement had to admit that the Order was not being treated as a purely religious body, but as a politico-religious fraternity and that there was, therefore, doubt about what its relations with the Italian Government were supposed to be. 'Amir' to the Italians meant Honorary Prince but it had a very different sense to the Arabs. It was, moreover, uncertain whether a seat at Ajadabiya implied that the warlike Magharba tribe of the *barqa* and the Sirtica came within the Sayyid's political orbit or not. On the whole one can say that the Sayyid, or rather the Amir, as we can now call him, bargained autonomy of the oases and the hinterland for his armed camps and administrative posts on the plateau. As he did not, in fact, disband these he may be said to have had the better of the bargain. After the Accord of al-Rajma was signed the Amir visited Rome.

The accord was supplemented by a further agreement known as *Sistemazione definitiva delle zauie* of 16 August 1921 by which nomination, suspension, and transfer of Shaikhs of Sanusiya lodges were to be in the hands of the Amir, but he had to give notice of these acts to the Government, and he promised to remove Shaikhs who embittered relations between the Government and the people. The Government undertook to pay the
[434] Shaikhs of lodges (in two categories of L. 900 and L. 600 a
[728] month), to hand back to the Order all lodges in its occupation, except those being used as forts, and to pay the sum of L. 500,000 as indemnity for lodges destroyed during the war.[3]

IV

The Italians pretended afterwards that 'Umar al-Kakhiya, who closely followed political events in Italy, had in bad faith, believing that the Socialists were in the ascendant and that

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[1] Agostino Gaibi, op. cit., p. 463.

[2] Macaluso, op. cit., p. 102.

[3] *L'Occupazione di Cufra*, 1931, pp. 62–3. On 16 August 1921 the Lira was 84 to the Pound Sterling.

Italy would therefore withdraw from her colonial adventure, 175*
advised the Amir to sign the Accord of al-Rajma in the hope 648*
that he would not have to carry out its terms. He was later to 631
spend over 16 years in exile in Italy for his alleged duplicity. 795*
The Italians did not at this time charge the Amir with more 793
than weakness when, after the stipulated eight months had [712]
passed, he had failed to carry out the terms of the accord, especially
in the matter of the armed Sanusi camps.

These camps were supply points garrisoned by the remnants 175*
of the Sanusi army of 1917. Through them and from them the 648*
Sanusiya was exercising political control over the country and 712
administering the tribes. The chief camps in 1917 were Ajada- 631
biya, al-Shlaidima, Marawa, Khawalan, al-Abyar, Taknis, and 795*
'Akrama. Each was under a *qaimaqam* and had its com- 701
mandant of troops, its qadi for judicial proceedings, and its
tithe collectors who collected from the Bedouin a tax on crops
and flocks. With the development of the political functions of
the Order alms had been transformed into taxes. Ajadabiya and
al-Shlaidima had as their *nazir*, inspector, 'Ali Pasha al-'Abdiya.
Al-Abyar and Taknis came under Sidi 'Umar al-Mukhtar, and
Marawa, Khawalan, and 'Akrama came under Sayyid Safi
al-Din.

When asked why these camps had not been broken up the 175*
Amir said that the accord had been very badly received by the 648*
Bedouin and that were it to be enforced hastily serious dis- 712
turbances might ensue. He counselled caution. In addition to 701
the continuance of the armed camps in defiance of the accord, 795*
the Italians also complained of concerted passive resistance, 793
on the part of the Shaikhs of Sanusiya lodges and the Shaikhs 631
of tribes, to collaboration with their officials; but either because [668]
they were not yet ready to use force or because they were con-
vinced that the Amir was unable to dictate to his followers,
and probably for both reasons, they continued to temporize.

By the further Accord of Bu Mariyam of 11 November 1921 175*
the dissolution of the armed camps was confirmed, but it was 648*
agreed that until the Italians had strengthened their admini- 712
strative control and political influence in the country the still- 701
existing Sanusi camps should be held jointly. There were to 631
be four so-called '*Campi Misti*', at al-Abyar, Taknis, Slanta, 795*
and 'Akrama, manned by Italian and Sanusi troops in the

*175 proportion of 5 to 4, each controlled by its own representa-
*648 tive. To these four was later added a fifth camp, al-Makhili,
712 so that the Italians might establish themselves at an important
701 watering-place of the southern nomads.

631 The new arrangement was fantastic. Two forces, each under
*795 its own officers and flag, each opposed to the other in every
particular, were jointly responsible for the security and welfare of the country. What made it even more absurd in the eyes of later Fascist critics was the fact that the Sanusi soldiers in these camps received their rations and pay from the Italian Government they did everything to flout. It was, moreover, an admission on the part of the Italians that they were unable to enforce the accords they signed with the Amir if the Bedouin did not intend to carry out their terms, and that they could not establish themselves in the country unless the Sanusiya was ready
*175 to allow them to do so. All that apologists for this new accord
*648 have been able to say in defence of it was that the Italian
631 Government had by this time realized that nothing was in any
*795 case likely to come of all these agreements and in the end only
signed it in order that, while formally respecting it, they might have time and opportunity to establish their authority among the tribes, particularly among the 'Awaqir, the western Darsa, the Bara'asa, and the 'Abaidat. The Rome Government, not wanting to increase its troubles by starting a new war in Cyrenaica, imposed a policy of appeasement on its restless Colonial Government. It was bad enough to have to face the anarchy in Tripolitania, and there was always a danger that if the situation in Cyrenaica deteriorated Sayyid Ahmad might return to raise again the standard of revolt. Sayyid Idris might be weak and at times difficult, but he was at least pacific. The harassed Governor was therefore instructed that he would have to continue the battle of words till it became feasible to open real hostilities. However, the Italian Government were mistaken in believing that the new accord would allow them to increase their influence in the country, for the Sanusiya, through its representatives in the 'Mixed Camps', came between the tribes and the Italians. It is generally admitted by Italian commentators that after Bu Mariyam the Government was only apparently in the ascendancy politically, while in fact the administration of the whole country outside the towns continued

3:Evans-Pritchard E-4, 5 (1942-1944) 1949 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9
(1837-1942) Sanusi

in the hands of the Order. Nevertheless, the Rome Government 175*
at the time thought, or pretended to think, that the development 648*
of events was in their favour and that their propaganda 795*
was rapidly costing the Amir and his family their popularity 631
in the country. They constantly, as the Bedouin say when speaking of this period, pushed a stick under the pot to keep it hot till they wanted it to boil over.

The situation at this time in Cyrenaica could not, in any case, 175*
have lasted for long. It became clear to all, even before the 648*
Fascists gained control in October 1922, that hostilities would 793
sooner or later break out again and matters were being brought 795*
to a head by the Amir's attitude on the Tripolitanian issue. The Arabs of Tripolitania, finding themselves in difficulties, sought to extend their front against the Italians by reaching an agreement with the Sanusi, with whom in the past their relations, as we have seen, had not always been cordial. Their leaders held a meeting, at which Sanusi representatives from Cyrenaica were present, at Sirt at the end of 1921 which carried the decisions of the Assembly of Ghariyan a step farther by sending a deputation to Sayyid Idris at Ajadabiya in April 1922 to offer him the Amirate of all Libya. The Sayyid refused to commit himself one way or the other, for he was aware that the Tripolitanian notables who made him the offer had for the most part little regard for his person or for his Order and were merely trying to create a diversion which might draw off some of the Italian forces operating against them. To have replied 'Yes' would have brought him into conflict with Italy. To have replied 'No' would have alienated from him those Tripolitanian Arabs who genuinely sympathized with the Sanusiya. Faced with this dilemma he pleaded ill health early in 1922 and requested the Italian Government to permit him to visit Egypt for two years for rest and treatment. He also, according to Giglio,[1] made the strange request that Sayyid Ahmad be allowed to return to Cyrenaica. Both requests were refused. So was his offer, repeatedly made, to mediate between Italy and the Arabs of Tripolitania, and he was informed, in more forcible terms than he had been accustomed to expect from the Colonial Government, that any interference on his part in the affairs of Tripolitania would be considered a breach of the

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[1] Giglio, op. cit., p. 98.

*175 Accord of al-Rajma. But the Italians were not yet ready to
*648 break with him finally, not wishing to compromise the opera-
*795 tions they were carrying out in Tripolitania. They therefore
793 started new discussions, conducted in person by Amendola, the Minister for the Colonies, who, on his return to Italy, expressed satisfaction with the talks and confidence in the Amir, neither of which he could have felt. In Mondaini's opinion the Government's policy of continuing to treat with the Sanusiya at so late a stage was consistent and, in the circumstances, wise, for it was believed that the greed for lucre and honours so unashamedly displayed by members of the Amir's family would bring them into disrepute among the Arabs, while the Government would be able to organize under its administration the zone of the plateau nearest its coastal bases and thus prepare for its penetration into the interior. In defence of Amendola's policy, later subjected to much criticism,[1] Mondaini further observes that the Fascist Government itself delayed action till the spring of 1923 when the Tripolitanian rebellion had been crushed.[2]

Concessions certainly did not lessen tension. The Italians
712 felt that the Sanusiya was using the 'Mixed Camps' as a medium
701 for anti-Italian propaganda, as indeed they were, not only
182 through their official representatives in the camps but also through persons not officially recognized, such as the Sanusiya Shaikhs 'Umar al-Mukhtar, Salih al-'Awwami, and Khalid al-Humri; and they suspected that Shaikh 'Abd al-Aziz al-'Isawi had been sent by the Amir into the Misurata region to act as his liaison with the insurgents there. The Amir had selected for his personal advisers the most recalcitrant of the zawiya Shaikhs. They further accused the Order of responsibility for certain incidents which happened in the late summer of 1922: an attack on an Italian postal car near al-Zawiya al-Baida and the firing of some Italian property at al-Zuwaitina. Rome, said to have been misled by 'Umar Pasha al-Kakhiya, blamed the local government for these incidents and appointed a new Governor who made a further, and as it turned out final, gesture of conciliation by paying to the Amir the remainder of the money owing to him under the Accord of al-Rajma. But nothing could brake the wheels now. Already in August the Committee elected

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[1] Giglio, op. cit., p. 99.

[2] Mondaini, op. cit., p. 475.

by the Assembly of Sirt had forwarded to Sayyid Idris the 175*
madbata, dated 28 July 1922, formally investing him with the 648*
Amirate of Tripolitania. 795*

Sayyid Idris still hesitated. Before giving a reply he wished 793
to consult Bedouin opinion, for it was on the Bedouin he would have to count were hostilities to break out. To this purpose he called, in October 1922, a large tribal gathering at Jardis al-'Abid. In the following month, under great pressure from his advisers, and still hesitating in his own mind, he accepted the Amirate. It must by this time have been apparent to him that the Italians intended to make war whatever course he took and that he might, in that case, just as well have the Tripolitanian Arabs as allies. In his reply to the Committee he entrusted Tripolitanian affairs to them, under their President Ahmad al-Marayid, until such time as a National Assembly could meet to draw up a constitution. Then, realizing that the fable of the wolf and the lamb was about to be enacted, he fled by caravan to Jaghbub in December 1922 and thence to Egypt, where he had long made financial preparation for this eventuality out of the Italian subsidies. He may also have felt that he had compromised himself so deeply with the Italians over a number of years that his presence in the country could only be an embarrassment to the Bedouin whose martial spirit he could understand but not emulate. He left his brother Sayyid Muhammad al-Rida and his cousin Sayyid Safi al-Din to represent him in Cyrenaica.

Sayyid Idris did not return to Cyrenaica till the third British 175*
occupation of the country during the late war (1943), though 648*
he continued in Egypt to represent the forces of resistance and, 795*
in so far as he could do so without compromising his position as 793
a guest of a country whose Royal House was so intimately bound 159
to the Royal House of Italy, to direct them. At the time of his flight he was 33 years of age. He gave the impression of being tall and rather portly, very unlike the slight and delicate figure he presents to-day. Nurtured, as were all the Sanusi family, in piety and learning in oasis retreats and accustomed to a refined and sedentary life, he has never been a man of action or of a hardy constitution. Though he assisted Sayyid Ahmad in organizing the Sanusi bands at Ajadabiya after the Treaty of Losanna in the first Italo-Sanusi war, he early showed that his

*175 talents lay in diplomacy rather than in the field. It is evident
*648 from the part he played in the events leading up to the truce
793 and during the period of the truce that he is astute and a man
*795 of sound political judgement. That he is often vacillating and
159 evasive cannot be denied, and though these characteristics may sometimes have been a wise response of the weak negotiating with the strong, and may often have served him well in the difficult circumstances in which he took over direction of the Sanusiya Order from Sayyid Ahmad, they seem to be weaknesses to which he is temperamentally prone and to have become an aversion to directness in either thought or action. Italian writers, who are, with some justification, scathing in their comments on most members of the Sanusi family, speak of Sayyid Idris with respect. They admit that he is intelligent, religious, and gifted with a profound moral sense and political intuition. He is firm in decisions once he has taken them and keeps his promises.

*175 At the end of 1922 the Fascist revolution culminated in the
*648 march on Rome and the new Government at once made up its mind to reconquer by arms Tripolitania and Cyrenaica. It continued to temporize in Cyrenaica, partly because its position at home was not yet secure, and partly because it intended to finish operations in Tripolitania first. The Fascists felt that their prestige was at stake. The days of *socialdemocrazia* were over and military conquest, domination, and colonization were the order of the day. The ancient Roman provinces were once again to be peopled by the sons and daughters of Rome.

On 6 March 1923 the Italians, without delivering an ultimatum or declaration of war, carried out their secret and long-prepared plan to seize the 'Mixed Camps' and the Sanusi camp of Khawalan, taking about half the Sanusi soldiers prisoners. By this surprise they put out of action a considerable part of the Amir's regular forces. In a proclamation of 1 May 1923 the new Governor of the Colony, Gen. Luigi Bongiovanni—soldiers had replaced civil administrators—declared null and void all accords and conventions made between the Government and the Sanusiya. On the following day the Amir was informed of the step taken by a letter from the Italian Minister in Cairo. War had broken out again in Cyrenaica.

CHAPTER VII

THE SECOND ITALO-SANUSI WAR (1923-32)

I

THE second Italo-Sanusi war differed in some respects from the first, though the character of the fighting was alike in both. 175* 648* There was now, if not a new Italy, a new élite in Italy, which was eager to justify itself in the eyes of its own people and to win the respect of the Powers of Europe. Clearly, if the Fascists wanted to have the influence they thought was their due in the councils of Europe and to embark on an expansionist policy in the Mediterranean and North Africa, they would first have to show that they were capable of defeating the Bedouin of Libya. They had inherited from their predecessors in office a situation which gave them the limited choice of either full conquest at the cost of further sacrifices in life and gold or a withdrawal which might leave the half-won prize to some rival Power; for the years of compromise had shown that the Bedouin would never accept their rule, far less their colonization, until they had first been subjugated by arms. Where, in choosing the alternative of war, the Fascist Government differed from its predecessors was not in its desire to conquer and colonize Arab lands, but in its greater determination to satisfy the desire, in its vigour, and in its faith. Behind Italian arms in their second Libyan war was a will that had been lacking in the first.

The complexion of the Sanusiya had also changed. In 1911 175* the Order and its adherents had fought not only as allies of the 648* Turks but also, without putting too fine a point on it, as sub- 795* jects of the Ottoman Sultan. Even after Turkey had made peace with Italy Turkish officers continued to exercise command, but during the next three years the Turks slowly lost influence and the Sanusiya took over control. The resistance, with its mounting toll of Turkish casualties, became more and more a purely Arab and Bedouin struggle for freedom under the Sanusi flag. As the Sanusiya emerged as an autonomous government with direction of its own armed forces, its own finances, and its own diplomacy, the old breach between Turk and Arab gradually widened till, at the end of the war, the

*175 Turkish Government had been eliminated militarily and politi-
*648 cally from Cyrenaica. In its place was the Order, recognized
*795 by all as the one body which could speak for the Bedouin of the
? country, on whose behalf it treated with the Italian Government in the years between the two wars. Thus the first war had begun as a war against Turkey and became slowly transformed into a war against the Sanusiya. The second war was against the Sanusiya.

*175 At first sight the Italians might seem to have been in 1923
*648 in a more advantageous position than in 1911 to 1917, for
*795 they were united at home, at peace with the world, had established bases in Cyrenaica, and were opposed only by untrained Bedouin tribesmen instead of by Turkish soldiers who, however few and badly equipped, had nevertheless been disciplined, experienced in modern warfare, and under regular officers of
*175 distinction. But these advantages were offset by the loss of
*648 prestige the Italians had suffered in the eyes of the Bedouin
186 since 1911. Both in Cyrenaica and in Tripolitania the Italians,
if they had not been defeated, had certainly not been victorious.
*795 The Bedouin had seen them in both provinces of Libya advance in heavy columns across the country, occupy all the important centres, and then retreat in panic to the coast; and they had judged by the measure of their experience that the Italian is not a soldier. Then, in both countries, they had seen successive Italian Governors giving way to threats and trying to attain by diplomacy and bribery the ends brave men pursue by arms. Moreover, the Bedouin were far better equipped than they had been in 1911, for they had replaced their old weapons with modern rifles captured from the Italians. Col. Talbot reported in 1916 that they looked on every Italian troop movement as a gift from God. Hence energy and initiative which might have broken Bedouin morale had they been applied after the Sanusi defeat by the British in 1915–16, when expended in the opening stages of the second war did not effect the speedy crumbling of resistance hoped for. Indeed what happened in the first war was repeated in the second.

*175 The Italians had in 1923 the same overwhelming superiority
*648 in men and equipment they enjoyed in 1911, perhaps an even
*795 greater superiority in that they could use the knowledge acquired in the European war, particularly in the use of

mechanized surface vehicles and aeroplanes unknown in 1911. 175*
By the end of 1926 they had some 20,000 men in the field, 648*
mostly native troops, while after the opening round of the 795*
campaign the Sanusi probably seldom had more than 1,000 men on operational service at any one time. It was estimated that in 1923 they could put into the field 2,000 men armed with modern rifles and a few machine-guns and artillery pieces, and that in addition there were some 3,000 to 4,000 rifles among the tribes. With this superiority in mobility, fire, and numbers, the Italians were able, as in the first war, to push heavy columns in any direction they chose and to seize and fortify any point they pleased. Therefore, what is often called 'organized resistance' [726] broke down very early in the campaign, if there can be said to have been such at any time, and gave way to guerrilla warfare in which sentries, advanced posts, supply convoys, and communications were subjected to sniping, raids, ambushes, and sabotage. Consequently the war was made up of a succession of small, and often unrelated, incidents in different parts of the country. Italian operational and intelligence reports and Bedouin stories about these hundreds of fights and skirmishes are not easily arranged into a coherent picture. The hundreds of bits and pieces are all very much alike in size and shape and colour, and the guide of any clear pattern is lacking. To attempt, therefore, to construct from them a complete mosaic of events would be a task alike arduous for the writer and confusing and unprofitable for the reader; and I shall not endeavour to do more than sketch the development of the campaign. It would, I think, be of assistance to the reader were I first to mention some very general features of the fighting, which are, indeed, features of guerrilla warfare always and everywhere.

II

The war, which was waged with increasing bitterness as the [632]
years went by, was not against all the Arabs of Cyrenaica, but only against the Bedouin, for the townsmen played no active part in the resistance, though they sympathized with it. Also, [619]
among the Bedouin, whilst there was no one who could be fairly labelled pro-Italian there were many persons, and even whole tribal sections, who remained passive, chiefly because of their

3:Evans-Pritchard E-4, 5 (1942-1944) 1949 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9
(1837-1942) Sanusi

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vulnerability: the Baraghtha and other northern 'Awaqir sections, the 'Arafa, the Hasa, some of the Darsa, and a large part of the 'Abaidat. Most of these pacific sections, the least nomadic of the Bedouin, had a long history of intercourse with the urban population and the Turkish administration, and when Italian officials took the place of Turkish officials contact was early resumed. They tended to look northwards to the coast. The other sections, more nomadic, warlike, and powerful, and further removed from settled centres, looked southwards to the desert: the Aulad Suliman, the Magharba, the southern 'Awaqir, the Bara'asa, most of the 'Abid, the *'Ailat* Fayid, and the southern and eastern 'Abaidat. Beyond striking distance by horse patrols, these hardy wanderers of the steppe, whose history was nothing more than a long record of tribal wars, had paid scant attention to the Turks, had refused in the first Italian war to make terms, had disdainfully turned their backs on the intruder during the ensuing years of peace, and were now to offer a stubborn resistance to renewed aggression. The structural polarity exemplified in the tendency of some tribal sections to be drawn into the political orbit of the Administration while others remained politically aloof from it was earlier referred to. It corresponded to the well-known division between the *saf al-bahr*, the coastal party, and the *saf al-fauqi*, the interior party, of Tripolitania and to a political dichotomy found in some form in all countries where nomads are the social hinterland of peasants or citizens. In Cyrenaica it took the form of a pull in opposite directions by the Turkish (and afterwards Italian) Administration with its centre of attraction at Banghazi and the Sanusiya with its centre of attraction in the desert.

The more peaceful and sedentary sections early ceased to fight the Italians in the first war, and in the period between the two wars put up little outward resistance to Italian penetration. In appearance, at any rate, they had accepted Italian supervision. This was, in fact, the issue during those years: the Italians seeking to draw these sections deeper into their sphere of influence through trade and administrative liaison, and the Sanusiya seeking in its own interests to pull them back from the Government and to eliminate Italian propaganda among them. When war broke out again the Italians had the advantage, denied to them in 1911, of being in occupation of all the principal

centres of the country. They believed that they had the further 175*
advantage of having, by incessant propaganda and subsidies, 648*
weakened Sanusiya influence among the Bedouin around the 795*
towns and posts. Consequently, with optimism scarcely sus-
tained by the facts, they regarded these sections as allies against 619
those which openly supported the Sanusiya. The coastal sections did, as the Italians expected, remain outside the war or, as the Italians called it, the rebellion, and they were, therefore, known as the *sottomessi* in contrast to the *ribelli*, the sections which resisted, and whom I shall speak of by the fitter term 'Patriots', having an objection to the language of colonial imperialism by which an honourable attempt to defend home and property against foreign aggression is labelled rebellion. They called themselves the *muhafiziya*.

It was Italian policy to deal with the collaborationist, or supposedly collaborationist, Bedouin as friends and to create between them and the Patriots a state of permanent feud. The Patriots expected the submitted sections to give them asylum when hard pressed, and to supply them with food and other requirements, and if they did not receive what they wanted, they took it by force. The Italians could not allow the Patriots to use the submitted districts as bases of operation and supply and had, therefore, for both prestige and security, either by constant patrolling to protect the submitted population from reprisals or to supply them with arms for their own protection. Both were perilous expedients. The patrols to be effective had to be highly mobile and therefore small and vulnerable to guerrilla tactics. The arms might, and did, find their way to the Patriots, the Italians becoming themselves one of the main sources of supply to their enemies. They hoped, however, that if they armed the submitted population they might, since they were Bedouin, be expected to defend their own stock against Patriot requisitioning, which the Italians called brigandage and the Patriots called payment of religious dues. It was believed that a state of civil war would necessarily result from the manifold feuds which would have to be prosecuted by bereaved families on both sides in accordance with the Bedouin law of vengeance. It was proposed to make 'furrows of blood' ('*solci di sangue*') between tribe and tribe, and between tribal section and tribal section, across which the Bedouin might exterminate each other and

*175 save the Italians much labour and danger. The policy had very
*648 limited success, for in practice the Patriots recruited from every
*795 tribe and every section. Bedouin sentiments about kinship and
619 its obligations worked both ways. If it was a duty to avenge a
[602] slain kinsman it was no less a duty to protect and aid a living
kinsman, and the sense of kin and its compelling influence in
[183] conduct, all that is meant by *'asabiya* in Bedouin values, are the
life and the soul of the Romany world.

It took the Italians a long time to realize that the Bedouin mind was not all of one piece but a Joseph's coat of conflicting interests. These interests excluded each other as the social situation evoked one loyalty to the detriment of another and it was, therefore, only in terms of their social structure that the apparent inconsistencies of Bedouin behaviour could be understood. Consequently the Italians were for ever suffering disappointments and accused the Bedouin, with increasing resentment and bitterness as the struggle continued, of disloyalty and treachery. Among the collaborationists, the *mtalyanin*, the Italianized, as the Patriots called them, there was every degree of participation from passivity, the refraining from taking an active part in the resistance, to full co-operation with the Italian army as spies, guides, informers, and administrative officials; but even those guilty of the worst complicity could, especially when some personal tie was involved, do the guerrillas a good turn. Many poor Bedouin near the towns joined the Italian forces as one kind or other of irregulars, police, and friendlies, and as labourers and camelmen, and it was found that these, while drawing Italian pay and rations, did not hesitate to assist the Patriots when an opportunity offered itself. Desertions to the enemy with full equipment were frequent. Italian rifles and ammunition and even pay were often handed over to the guerrillas. After an engagement the ground was left strewn with live ammunition for the guerrillas to glean. Many reported fights between the Patriots and the submitted population were undoubtedly inventions to cover gifts of ammunition, supplied by the Italians, from the Italian-sponsored irregulars to the Patriot bands. These native battalions constituted, in fact, 'a sort of supply depot of men, arms, and ammunition for the Sanusi formations'.[1] Information about Italian troop move-

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[113] [1] 'La pulizia del Gehel Cirenaico', by 'Gadria', *L'Oltremare*, Dec. 1930. 7

ments and plans was soon passed on to the guerrilla bands, for 175*
Sidi 'Umar al-Mukhtar had agents in every Italian post. Those 648*
sottomessi who were armed and paid by the Italians to protect 795*
their territories against Patriot foraging expeditions would be 619
found among the Patriot casualties after skirmishes with Italian patrols. The submitted population, it was discovered, allowed their horses to graze far from their camps so that the Patriots could borrow them for operational purposes. The Patriots sold their animals in Italian and Egyptian markets through their submitted kinsmen, and Italian efforts to keep track of such transactions through tribal markings were, as might be supposed, unavailing. So useful, indeed, was a submitted population to the Patriots that the tribal Shaikhs sometimes arranged among themselves who among them should submit and who take the field. Even most of the Cyrenaican officials in the Italian administration did what was consistent with their safety to help their own people against their employers. Their faith unfaithful kept them falsely true. In the end the Italians came to the conclusion that they could trust no Cyrenaican, least of all a Cyrenaican Bedouin. The hearts of all were with their fighting fellow countrymen and fellow Muslims. The *sottomessi* and *ribelli* alike were all Bedouin, jealous of each other and hostile to tribes other than their own, but united by blood and a common way of life—one faith, one speech, one law. All regarded the Italians as foreigners whom one may serve but not love. 'The entire population thus took part directly or indirectly in the rebellion', wrote Graziani.[1]

The lot of the submitted sections was unenviable. They were compelled to live near Italian posts and their areas of sowing and pasturing were severely restricted. Their camps were subjected to constant inspections. Hostages were taken. Horses were confiscated. If it was discovered that they had dealings of any kind with their kinsmen in the Patriot bands they were heavily fined in animals and cereals, their camps were burnt, they were imprisoned, and sometimes shot. On the other hand,
if they did not supply the Patriots with victuals or if they [651]
refused to pay taxes in support of the resistance they were subjected to punitive operations by the guerrillas. Suffering from Italian interference and Patriot levies and from punitive action

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[1] Op. cit., p. 60.

*175 *648 *795 by both sides, many came to the conclusion that they were better off fighting in the Patriot bands than living under Italian protection.

619 That all Cyrenaica was hard hostile rock beneath the shallowest covering of local collaboration is shown by the fact that the guerrillas kept up their numbers till the end of the war in spite of the slaughter of many times the number of men engaged at any one time in operations. Whenever a man fell there was another to take his place. Apart from the connivance of the whole Bedouin population at Patriot activities it was not easy for the Italians to tell the difference between a Bedouin who was a guerrilla and a Bedouin who belonged to one of the submitted sections. The guerrillas had no uniforms and when defeated had only to disperse and hide their rifles to become harmless shepherds. The Italians found that killed and captured guerrillas all possessed Italian identity cards issued to them when in camps in the guise of *sottomessi*. The Italians were thus victualling directly the forces opposed to them, for any holder of one of their cards could draw Italian rations. I have myself met Bedouin ex-guerrillas who, wounded in a fight, went to Italian hospitals for treatment, pretending to have been shot by the guerrillas while defending their flocks.

Italian writers who themselves experienced at first hand the sense of insecurity and the feeling, slowly mounting to a conviction, that their efforts to win over the Bedouin by bribes were as vain as their hopes of a speedy conquest, have described the situation of disillusionment in which their despondency was born. Biagio Pace writes that there did not exist, in reality, submitted and rebels, the entire population of Cyrenaica being under the control of the leaders of the rebellion, thus constituting a demographic, political, and financial whole, which maintained a force in the field. The *sottomessi* were regularly [651] taxed to provide the guerrilla bands with food, arms, ammunition, clothes, money, and all the other requirements of war and life, and no-one escaped this levy. Pastoral nomads, urban merchants, agriculturists, even the police irregulars, made their contributions to maintain the rebellion. Even the tribal Shaikhs who received subsidies from the Government gave a tithe to 'Umar al-Mukhtar. The entire country was a capillary system of roots which fed from their hidden depths the visible foliage

3:Evans-Pritchard E-4,5 (1942-1944) 1949 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9
(1837-1942) Sanusi

of resistance. It was useless to try to destroy this plant of the 175* resistance by striking at its visible foliage, for when the fighting 648* bands were hard pressed, they dispersed and resided among 795* the *sottomessi* for repose, recuperation, and refitting.[1] Serra, 619 looking back across the years of struggle, with their mixture of compromise and ruthlessness, optimism and disillusionment, tells the same sombre story. The implacable hostility of the Arabs to their Christian conquerors was as formless as it was ineradicable. Everybody and everything were against the invaders, but in a flaccid and crumbling opposition which inhibited a precise reaction. The enemy, he complains, habitually withdrew from the struggle. The environment offered nothing to the Italians and everything to the Bedouin, whose culture was unexacting and unpretentious. The Shaikhs had authority only so long as they opposed the Italians, and if they co-operated with them they lost it and could only regain it at Italian expense. The population was unstable, adventurous, and accustomed to such privations that they did not recognize the limits of resistance to the hardships of war. In one thing alone there was constancy and reality, the hatred they had for their Christian conquerors, which persisted in spite of all appearances and all protestations of friendship.[2] When Graziani took charge of the operations in 1930 he likened the Cyrenaican situation to 'a poisoned organism which sets up, on one point of the body, a purulent bube. The bube in this case was the fighting band of 'Umar al-Mukhtar, resulting from an entire infected situation.'[3]

In this semi-darkness of suspicion and uncertainty, this twilight of confidence, when every human being was a foe, the friend behind no less than the enemy in front, every thicket an ambush, and every crag and boss a sniper's nest, the campaign became distorted to unreality. It was a fantastic shadow-show in which dozens of unrelated episodes were thrown at the same time on to a gigantic screen.

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[1] 'La pacificazione della Cirenaica', *Rivista delle Colonie Italiane*, 1932, p. 330. [113]

[2] Op. cit., pp. 152–3. See also 'Che cosa è il Gebel Cirenaico', by the same writer, in *L'Oltremare*, May 1928.

[3] Op. cit., p. 64.

III

*175 What gave the Bedouin the courage to endure the hardships
*648 and bereavements of the struggle? Certainly those two great
*795 sentiments, patriotism and religion. I have said that the first
Italo-Sanusi war began as a war against Turkey and slowly became transformed into a war against the Sanusiya. The war against the Sanusiya also became transformed slowly into a simple struggle of the Bedouin for survival, for their lands and their freedom to live their ancient way of life; and in this struggle they felt themselves, in spite of all their cleavages and feuds, to be at one against the intruder. Beneath the surface of political expressions the issue was the same in both wars: whether the Italians could deprive the Bedouin of their lands and colonize them. Whether the Bedouin fought in the name of the Sultan or of the Sanusiya, or just fought, they always realized, from the first days of the struggle, that the issue was their right to live by their own laws in their own land. In the first war the outer bark of Turkish administration was stripped.
[619] In the second war the inner bark of Sanusiya organization was
ripped off, leaving bare beneath it the hard wood of the tribal system.

*175 The war also, as wars have a way of doing, bared the religious
*648 content in the struggle. The Caliph had declared a religious war,
*795 but when the Caliphate no longer counted in Cyrenaica, or
721 indeed anywhere else, the war continued to be fought in the
798 name of a religious Order. With the destruction of the Sanusiya
619 it still went on in the name of religion. It then became simply
a war of Muslims to defend their faith against a Christian Power. Deep love of home and deep love of God nourished each other. In fighting for their lands and herds the Bedouin were fortified by the knowledge that they fought also for their faith. Without due appreciation of the religious feelings involved in the resistance it would, I think, be impossible to understand how it went on for so long against such overwhelming odds or how the tribes, with a long history of feuds dividing them, co-operated as much as they did under Sanusiya guidance.

*175 From their experiences in the first war the Italians had learned
*648 to expect that they would be more strongly resisted in Cyrenaica
*795
619

than in Tripolitania, and they had learned the reason for this: 'Inasmuch as in Cyrenaica the opposition to our rule was not fractionized and enfeebled by the personal ambitions and rivalries of numerous chiefs, but was retrenched and assembled around a single will, the Sanusiya, which manipulated it as it pleased.'[1] They started the war afresh in 1923 with this conclusion firmly fixed in their minds: *delenda est Sanusiya*. But they still believed, not understanding the place of the Order in tribal life, that the attachment of the Bedouin to it was superficial, that it was some kind of parasitic growth which could be cut out of the tribal system. They further believed that their incessant propaganda had already undermined the hold of the Order on the Bedouin. 175* 648* 795* 619

The Sanusi family, as will be seen, played an inconspicuous and inglorious part in the resistance. Italian writers confess surprise that the Bedouin should have continued to show devotion to persons whose character displayed so few of those qualities Bedouin admire. The Bedouin may indeed have expected a higher standard of conduct than some members of the family lived up to, but they did not suppose that they would distinguish themselves as military leaders. They knew that the descendants of the Grand Sanusi had been brought up in the oases to a sedentary and bookish life and not in the hard way of their own children and that they were unsuited to the frugal and exhausting life of a guerrilla. Their duty, in most cases little in evidence in fulfilment, was to pursue holiness and learning that their presence among the people might bring down on them God's blessing. In the eyes of the Bedouin they lacked in full measure the manly qualities of courage and endurance that Bedouin demand in their own folk, but they were credited with the scholarship and sanctity of the religious, which Bedouin admire in their spiritual guides rather than seek to emulate in their own lives. Italian writers sometimes refer to a member of the family accompanying the guerrilla bands, as did Sayyid al-Hasan and Sayyid Saddiq, as having the role of a standard (*insegna*), a word which well describes their peculiar position in the resistance. Where in a man the qualities of *marabat*, holy man, and of *mujahid*, fighter for the faith, were combined, as in Sayyid Ahmad al-Sharif and Sidi 'Umar al-Mukhtar, the 175* 648* 795* 793 554

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[1] Agostino Gaibi, *Storia delle Colonie Italiane*, 1934, p. 344.

3:Evans-Pritchard E-4, 5 (1942-1944) 1949 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9
(1837-1942) Sanusi



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SIDI 'UMAR AL-MUKHTAR (GRAZIANI)

[facing p. 168]

*175 Bedouin followed them at great sacrifice. They were combined
*648 in many of the Sanusiya Brothers.

*795 The Shaikhs and Brothers of the Order, with few exceptions,
793 played a prominent part in the war, both in the field and by
554 keeping the Bedouin, submitted and unsubmitted alike, in a
ferment. The Italian soldiers and administrators constantly
*175 complained that whenever the Bedouin were tiring of the
*648 struggle the Brothers of the Order urged them to continue it.
619 It was their example and exhortations which made it something
793 more than the usual piecemeal resistance of a barbarous people
794 to colonial conquest or more than a succession of raids of the
kind Bedouin have enjoyed for so many centuries. Their parti-
*795 cipation made it both a national and a religious movement. It did much also to establish the Sanusiya in the hearts of the Bedouin. Some of the best-known names of the resistance, like Salih Lataiwish, 'Abd al-Hamid al-'Abbar, Saifat and Muhammad bu Farwa, Husain al-Juwaifi, Brahim al-Fallah, Fadil al-Mahashash, and Qtait bu Musa, were those of Bedouin Shaikhs, but most of the leading figures were Sanusiya *Ikhwan*, men like 'Umar al-Mukhtar, Yusif bu Rahil, Khalid al-Humri, Sharif al-Mailud, 'Abd al-Qadir Farkash, Fadil bu 'Umar, Salih al-'Awwami, and Muhammad bu Najwa al-Masmari.

*175 The indomitable Sidi 'Umar al-Mukhtar was the soul of the
*648 resistance and the struggle is always associated with his name
as similar struggles against French aggression in Algeria and
*795 Morocco are associated with the names of 'Abd al-Qadir and
793 'Abd al-Karim. Sidi 'Umar, 'our irreducible enemy, the faith-
159 ful and able servant of Idris, the heart and soul of the Cyrenaican rebellion', as Graziani called him,[1] was that rare combination of Bedouin and Sanusiya Shaikh. He was born about 1862 of the '*Ailat* Farhan of the Braidan section of the Minifa tribe of the Marmarica and was educated first at the Sanusiya school at Janzur and afterwards at Jaghbub. He was nominated by Sayyid Ahmad al-Sharif Shaikh of al-Qasur lodge among the stubborn 'Abid tribe but only performed his duties there for two years before being summoned to Kufra to serve against the French in the Wadai. He returned to al-Qasur about 1906 and later took a prominent part in the first Italo-Sanusi war and in obstructing Italian penetration in the years of peace which

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[1] Op. cit., p. 235.

followed it. In 1923, when he was called to take the foremost 175*
part in the struggle, he was already over sixty years of age. 648*
He was a simple man, religious, courageous, contemptuous of 795*
worldly honours and success, and with singular tenacity and 793
powers of physical endurance. It may well be true that, as is 159
reported, Sayyid al-Mahdi said 'If we had ten men like 'Umar we would not need any more'.

IV

All the *adwar*, or guerrilla bands, on the plateau came under 175*
Sidi 'Umar's command and he signed himself *al-Naib al-'Amm*, 648*
the Representative-General (of the Sanusiya). Each Bedouin 795*
tribe, as in Enver's day, maintained its own guerrilla band, some 793
100 to 300 men strong. Towards the end of the war the guerrillas 701
never numbered, all told, more than 600 to 700. Only a certain 619
number of men could maintain themselves on the country and move through it with speed and secrecy. As in other guerrilla wars, the actual fighting was done by small bands of enthusiasts, whose success nevertheless depended on the goodwill of the whole population. The bands suffered very heavy casualties, but were maintained at strength by a constant stream of adventurous spirits from submitted and unsubmitted sections alike. Though each band was named after a tribe and its members were chiefly recruited from that tribe and fought in its territory, they were not entirely recruited from it and they might fight anywhere. In each tribal band there were a good number of volunteers from other tribes and a sprinkling of *Ikhwan*, Sudanese, and Tripolitanians. The 'Awaqir and Magharba had separate bands while the other tribal bands usually fought in pairs, Hasa–'Abaidat, Bara'asa–Darsa, and 'Abid–'Arafa. A Misuratan contingent formed a small band of its own which greatly distinguished itself in the fighting. Each band had a simple organization: a commander, a *qaimaqam* for civil affairs, a qadi for religious and legal purposes, a commissariat agent, and a number of officers, some of whom had been trained
in Turkish regular units. Sidi 'Umar maintained discipline in [703]
the bands, and acts of pillage or personal vendetta were severely punished. Those of the guerrillas who possessed horses rode
them. The rest went on foot. Each band had its Sanusi flag. [186]

*175 When things were quiet members of a band would have their
*648 families and herds with them and live in their own tents, but
*795 when pressed they left their women and children and beasts in
701 the tents of the submitted population and the only non-
619 combatants in their camps would then be a few female cooks.
[722] Before the end of the war many of the Patriots, including Sidi
'Umar, had sent their families to Egypt so that they could act
more freely.

*175 There was also a general administration for all the bands and
*648 this came directly under Sidi 'Umar. They maintained inter-
*795 communication and worked to a common strategy. Guerrilla
793 headquarters had also to arrange for the collection of a tithe
701 from the entire population to help pay for the expenses of the
619 campaign. Throughout the war Sidi 'Umar's tax-collectors were
[651] taking tithes from the submitted population, not always with-
out trouble, and were giving written receipts for the payments.
The tithe paid by each tribe went to support its own band. Sidi
[705] 'Umar had also to arrange for caravans to bring supplies from
Egypt, and to supervise their distribution to the armed forces
and the payment of customs dues on what went to the civilian
population. Sidi 'Umar also kept up correspondence with
Sayyid Idris and Sanusi elements and sympathizers in Egypt.

*175 The guerrilla bands were in constant contact with the enemy.
*648 One of the most striking features of the campaign was the
*795 frequency of the fighting. At some point or other on the plateau
a skirmish or larger engagement took place every few days for nearly nine years during the spring and summer months. In the account of the campaign which follows I mention but few of these fights, those which had exceptional importance for the campaign as a whole or as examples of the scale of the fighting. The few mentioned are therefore no indication of the amount of fighting. Its frequency may be judged by Gen. Graziani's statement that in the final year of the war, when resistance, compared with earlier years, was feeble and sporadic, there took place 53 engagements (*combattimenti*) and 210 skirmishes (*conflitti*).[1]

This incessant fighting cannot, as I have already said, be described in the language of text-book logistics in terms of manœuvring, objectives, and battles. Indeed, the Italians had

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[1] *Rivista delle Colonie Italiane*, vol. vi (I), 1932, pp. 52–3.

to adapt themselves to the kind of fighting which seldom fails 175*
to upset the orthodox military mind. Text-book strategy does 648*
not apply to an enemy who wanders at will over a country with 795*
which he is familiar from birth, among a friendly people ready
to provide him with exact intelligence, and in small mobile
bands; and whose strategy is little more than the guerrilla
imperatives—strike suddenly, strike incessantly, strike hard,
get out quick. An army can only be manœuvred to inflict
defeats on the enemy and to destroy his armed forces when he
has an opposing army which can be brought to decisive engage-
ments. The Italians were fighting a people, not an army, and a
people can only be defeated by total imprisonment or exter-
mination.

If the Bedouin had had anything which could clearly have
been isolated as 'armed forces', these could easily have been
destroyed by Italian superiority in men and machines. But [701]
they had nothing which could, properly speaking, be called an
army, and they had no lines which could be pierced or turned
and no strongholds which could be taken or in which troops
could be contained. Against Bedouin it was of little profit to
occupy towns and villages, for they retired to less accessible
regions or circulated gaily between the Italian garrisons. Con-
trol of the roads and ports was also of little benefit. Roads were [439]
meaningless to the Bedouin and they were independent of over-
seas trade since they could live on the country for immediate [705]
necessities and obtain from Egypt what few additional supplies
they required to carry on the war. To ease the supply problem, [701]
as well as to be of maximum nuisance to the Italian garrisons
and convoys, the guerrilla bands were kept as small and mobile
as possible. Their smallness and mobility confused the slow and
unwieldy Italian columns. If the columns split up they were
liable to be surrounded by concerted action of the bands and
annihilated, whereas if they kept together, the cost of forma-
tion was the loss of speed and surprise. There seemed to be no
enemy forces to fight, yet attack was incessant. There were no
fixed points of opposition. It was indefinite and disseminated.

Even when contact could be established with the guerrilla bands and they could be defeated, as they often were, their defeat could not be turned into more than a temporary rout, for there was no highly organized tactical system to be upset,

*175 no large-scale operational plan to be thrown out of gear. The *648 defeated band just dispersed and faded into the background of *795 the *sottomessi* where their Bedouin garb was an effective camouflage. Italian bewilderment was further increased by the fact we have already noted, that when they claimed to have pacified a district and to have received the submission of its tribal Shaikhs it often meant no more than that the Bedouin of the district had made formal submission while their sons and food continued to go to the support of the guerrillas, thus confusing the issue and making even the field of operations wholly theoretical, besides adding heavy police duties to the already crushing burden of the campaign. The blows the Italians struck at Sidi 'Umar's bands were like the batterings Brer Rabbit gave the Tar Baby: they sank into a solid sticky mass of formless opposition.

The patternless pattern of the war is well summed up by Teruzzi, one of the Governors of Cyrenaica during the campaign, in a passage in which, scarcely attempting to conceal his irritation at the parsimony of the home government, he concludes his apology for his stewardship. He says that Italian superiority in men and arms was a vain illusion, because the struggle was not against an organized enemy who resisted, but against an enemy who had no consistency of form. It was equally an illusion that it was possible to maintain, in the struggle against the rebellion, the initiative of action. For the most part the Italians had to remain on the defensive. The rebellion was like a fire creeping deceitfully over the whole of the vast territory of the Colony. One might have wished to make it blaze into a single point to limit and subdue it, but this could not always be done. 'Thus, against 200, 500, 1,000, 2,000 rebels, dressed in picturesque rags and badly armed, often 5,000 or 10,000 of our soldiers are not sufficient, because the rebels are not tied down to anything, are not bound to any impediment, have nothing to defend or to protect, and can show themselves to-day in one place, tomorrow 50 km. away, and the following day 100 km. away, to reappear a week later, to vanish for a month, to disperse to fire from afar on an unarmed shepherd, on a patrol of inspection, or on a column which files along the edge of a wood, or at the foot of a hill.' An overwhelming superiority in numbers was required to act on the offensive against so fractionized and elusive an enemy.[1] Corrado Zoli (later Governor of Eritrea) tells the same story, how after 1923 began a long cycle of exhausting '*campagne di grande polizia*', repeated every year, and frequently two or three times in the same year, against an elusive enemy who kept the Italian forces in constant movement and alarms by endless surprises, incursions, raids, and ambushes; making use of his great mobility, powers of dispersal, tactical independence, and perfect knowledge of the insidious terrain, to avoid decisive encounters.[2] And in *Cirenaica Pacificata* Graziani tells us how the Arabs spoke during the long campaign, right up to its conclusion, of the two Governments of Cyrenaica, Italian and Sanusi, as 'the Government of the Day and the Government of the Night'. 175* 648* 795*

V

In January 1923 the position was as follows: Italian posts to the south of Banghazi were up to some 50 km. from the Capital on the line Qaminis–al-Tailimun–Suluq; in the region between Banghazi and Talmaitha on the line al-Rajma–al-Marj–Qasr Libiya, running to a mean distance of 25 km. from the coast; and in the Shahhat area on the line al-Fayidiya–al-Qubba up to some 40 km. from the coast. In the region of Darna and between Tubruq and the Egyptian frontier the country was tranquil and was, in appearance at any rate, controlled by the Italian civil and military authorities as far as the southernmost encampments of the 'Abaidat. The Italians considered that the northern 'Awaqir, the 'Arafa, the Darsa, the Hasa, the northern Bara'asa, and the 'Abaidat were organized on the basis of the constitution of 1919.[3] In fact, however, their authority was negligible beyond the immediate vicinity of the towns and military posts. To the south of the Italian posts were the 'Mixed Camps' of al-Abyar, Taknis, Slanta, al-Makhili, and al-'Akrama, in each of which there were between about 100 and 300 Sanusi troops and rather more Italian troops, though the Italian garrisons were at the mercy of the Sanusi, since they were isolated in unfriendly country. The Sanusi had also estab-

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[1] Attilio Teruzzi, *Cirenaica Verde*, 1931, pp. 338–9.

[2] 'La completa Conquista e l'Occupazione definitiva della Libia', *Rivista delle Colonie Italiane*, 1932, p. 169.

[3] Mondaini, op. cit., pp. 480–1.

*175 *648 *795 lished on their own account, and the Italians considered illegally, a camp at Khawalan of about 100 men and a number of small posts, shown on the map, with about 15 to 30 men in each. Their headquarters force was at Ajadabiya.

As stated at the end of the last chapter, Gen. Bongiovanni seized the 'Mixed Camps' on 6 March 1923. Though this day may be regarded as the date of the recommencement of hostilities in Cyrenaica, the first operational phase proper was a drive to the south of Banghazi. The country there offered fewer difficulties to mechanized movement in the grand style than the plateau country, and it was near the main Italian base. The objective was the little village of Ajadabiya, the Sanusi seat of government and military headquarters, called grandiloquently by Bongiovanni after its capture the '*Roccaforte della Senussia*'.[1] The Italians seem to have believed that they had only to take it for resistance to collapse everywhere, much as it had collapsed in Old Tripolitania after the chief centres had been occupied. [701] The Sanusi forces, under their Commander, Qajja bin 'Abdalla, a Qur'ani of Tibesti, were unable to defend the village against so large and well-equipped a column, and after they had been worsted in several fights they retired, leaving the jubilant

[702] [712] [701]



Distribution of Sanusi forces in March 1923.

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[1] *Proclama alle popolazioni*, 1923, p. 5.

Italians to occupy it on 21 April, the Birthday of Rome. This 175*
proved to be less favourable an augury than was hoped, for 648*
early in June two of their columns advancing from Ajadabiya 795*
on Marsa al-Braiqa were almost annihilated by Magharba [701]
tribesmen.

Their experience in the *barqa* taught the Italians afresh the lesson of 1911 to 1915, that against Bedouin unwieldy columns advancing without concealment in a direct line on definite and fixed objectives could lead to little more than skirmishes, for the enemy was too wise to become involved in decisive action and mobile enough to avoid it; so they adopted the new tactics of making surprise raids by mechanized units on the Bedouin encampments, slaughtering man and beast indiscriminately, and destroying the grain stores. In these raids, on what in a non-colonial war would be regarded as the civilian population, the purpose was to kill as many of the Bedouin as possible, striking terror into the hearts of the shepherd folk of Cyrenaica. When the rains came and mechanized transport could no longer be used, the camps were bombed and machine-gunned from the air. The Bedouin suffered greatly from this persistent strafing, the
Italian estimate of their losses—I must repeat that Italian [727]
figures are highly suspect—from 6 March to 3 September 1923
being 800 killed, 230 captured, and 1,000 wounded, besides about 700 camels and 22,000 sheep killed or confiscated. These losses were incurred only in the western part of Cyrenaica, for during the opening phase the rest of the country was quiet, except for minor skirmishes between Sidi 'Umar and the
Italians in the Marmarica. At the end of the year the Sanusi [701]
forces had retired to country where they were less vulnerable, roughly to south and east of the line al-Braiqa–al-Qatafiya–Msus, with infiltrations everywhere along it towards the Italian posts.

The ease with which they had entered Ajadabiya and had 175*
raided and overcome resistance in the *barqa* generally had misled 648*
the Italians into believing that they would encounter little 795*
resistance elsewhere. They were further misled by the number 619
of submissions they received at the commencement of the campaign: by the end of May 1923, 10,380 in the Ajadabiya zone, 3,417 in the Banghazi zone, and 7,000 in the zone of al-Marj; a total of 20,797 with 6,028 tents and more than 10,000

*175 head of livestock, on which fines were levied for having taken
*648 part in the resistance. These submissions were from the less
*795 warlike Bedouin, those within easy reach of administrative
619 centres, who had been taken by surprise and overwhelmed by
the size of the Italian forces and their mechanized equipment, especially their planes, against the indiscriminate bombing and machine-gunning of which they had neither protection nor reply. They lacked the forest covering of the plateau tribes and the desert wastes into which the tribes of the Sirtica could retire. Moreover, the Italians had not yet realized that submission to protect families and herds did not exclude help in men, supplies, and intelligence to the fighting bands which continued resistance in country better suited to guerrilla warfare. The quietness of the plateau also deceived them. The Bedouin, unlike themselves, did not have an army ready to hand which could be sent into action at a moment's notice. It took the plateau tribes time to grasp what was happening and to form guerrilla groups. It also took the leaders of the Bedouin, both tribal Shaikhs and zawiya Shaikhs, time to accommodate themselves to Sayyid Idris's defection and vacillation, which seriously affected morale in Cyrenaica and Tripolitania and caused much coming and going between Cairo and the battlefields.

As the war entered its second phase in 1924–5 it soon became evident that neither the ponderous spectacular movements nor the mechanized raids on the camps which had been used in the flat *barqa* country were suited to the rugged and wooded plateau. The campaign rapidly assumed the character of guerrilla warfare, some of the features of which I have already outlined, with its tedious record of countless skirmishes and surprises. When the operational season opened in March 1924 the advanced Italian dispositions were on the west–east line al-Shlaidima–al-Abyar–
Sidi Salim–Taknis–Marawa–Slanta–al-Fayidiya–Khawalan–al-
[901] Makhili. The Sanusi 'regular army', mixed with tribal volunteers from the Magharba and southern 'Awaqir, was still unbeaten under al-Qazza in the eastern Sirtica between Ajadabiya and the Wadi al-Farigh. The tribal guerrilla bands under Sidi 'Umar were mostly on the southern slopes of the central plateau. They were chiefly recruited from the Bara'asa, 'Abid, and 'Awaqir tribes which had from the earliest days of the Italian occupation of Cyrenaica shown themselves most hostile to

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penetration, though they were assisted by contingents from the 648*
Darsa, Hasa, and 'Abaidat. 795*

In the fighting between March and June of 1924 the Italians 619
reckoned that about 600 men of the 'Abid, Bara'asa, and [701]
northern 'Awaqir had been killed and 25,000 head of their live- [727]
stock had been captured. In the summer and autumn at least another 250 were killed and about 1,500 camels and 17,000 sheep and goats captured. In spite of these, what were to them very heavy, casualties, the Bedouin continued to harass Italian posts and communications. Salih Lataiwish with his Magharba tribesmen menaced Ajadabiya; Abu al-Qasim al-Zintani with an 'Awaqir band threatened the advanced Italian bases at al-Abyar, al-Rajma, and Banina; Sidi 'Umar with the 'Abid tribal band contained the posts in the al-Marj sector, and detachments under his lieutenant 'Ali bu Rahayyim operated against communications between al-Marj and Talmaitha; Husain Juwaifi's Bara'asa band worried the garrisons at al-Zawiya al-Baida, al-Fayidiya, and Slanta; and Qtait bu Musa with his Hasa and 'Abaidat volunteers was camped opposite Khawalan. Behind these detachments were the camps of the Bedouin who had not submitted, even in appearance, in the *sirwal*, the *barqa al-baida*, and along the southern slopes of the plateau everywhere. The Italians found it necessary to pause to consolidate gains of territory and to carry out a reorganization of their operational units.

Sidi 'Umar's strategy at the time, both as Commander of the 175*
'Abid band and as Commander-in-Chief of all the guerrilla forces 648*
on the plateau, was to hold its southern slopes. Their rugged 795*
desolation prevented the use of mechanized forces against him 701
and gave him tactical superiority over foot and horse patrols. From the slopes he was able both to menace the Italian posts and communications on the plateau and to cover the families of his fighting men in their camps to the south of it. The Italian answer to these tactics was obvious. They could not prevent guerrilla bands from circulating on the plateau in the cover of forest and deep ravines, but they had by this time established themselves in sufficient strength on the margin of the plateau, and had gained sufficient experience in the handling of mechanized patrols to attack the camps of non-combatants in the flat steppe country to the south. These camps were easily

*175 *648 spotted by planes and either bombed or machine-gunned from the air or destroyed by armoured cars.

*795 701 As a result of the operations in 1924 and the spring of 1925 the Bedouin bands were pressed eastwards away from the main Italian bases at Banghazi and al-Marj. However, Italian control of much of the country from which they claimed to have driven the Patriots was less secure than the disposition of their advance posts suggests, for the guerrilla bands continued to operate in it. Nevertheless they were now able to mass men in these posts in such numbers, and to equip and supply them so well, that a Patriot attack on them had small chance of success. Sidi 'Umar had therefore to fall back on such operations as could be conducted by his small guerrilla bands, now deprived of any secure bases, mostly in and from the thick forest country to the south of the watershed between Marawa and al-Qaiqab and in the broken country of the Wadi al-Kuf area, where they had protection from air-reconnaissance and mechanized patrols and the advantage of superior intelligence and knowledge of the terrain.

*175 *648 *795 The Italians had to adapt their tactics anew to the kind of warfare most favourable to the enemy. Gen. Mombelli's new operational plan was to establish a line of forts to act as *perni di manovra* from which the whole country could be ceaselessly patrolled to prevent the Patriot bands from massing against any point, to destroy their herds and crops, and to keep them constantly on the run. The main concentrations for these operations were al-Abyar, al-Marj, and Shahhat. The plan at first appeared to give the desired results but as time went on it gave less satisfaction. It was found that while it allowed the troops greater freedom of movement it was they, and not the Patriots, whose strength was worn out and finally exhausted. The Bedouin countered the new measures by attacking the smaller Italian patrols and dispersing before the larger. They solved [705] the supply problem by living on the country, exacting food from the submitted sections, in whose country they also quartered their families, sowed their crops, and pastured their herds, so that the Italian patrols did not know what belonged to the *sottomessi* and what to the *ribelli* and they could only destroy the crops and beasts of the Patriots if they destroyed at the same time the crops and beasts of the quiescent part of

the population, thereby irritating them into renewed rebellion. 175*
The net result was that while the Italians could prevent the 648*
Bedouin bands from massing, the Bedouin could make them pay 795*
too high a price for dispersing, and without dispersing they could not ensure mobility. Mombelli's plan was found to be too costly and fatiguing for the rather meagre results obtained.

Early in 1926 occurred a spectacular interlude which focused attention away from the plateau. The Italians sent an imposing column to take the little oasis of Jaghbub, the historic seat of the Sanusiya Order and the burial-place of its founder. The column met with no opposition and the oasis was surrendered by the Shaikh of the zawiya there, Husain al-Susi, on 7 February. Once again the Italians were jubilant and hoped that their troubles had ended, believing that the capture of the sacred city of the Sanusiya would so adversely affect Sidi 'Umar's prestige that his followers would forthwith desert him. These hopes showed great lack of understanding of the Bedouin mind. In fact, the expedition to Jaghbub, though it showed technical ability, had no strategic significance and was politically a disappointment.

So convinced had the Italians been that Sidi 'Umar would attempt to save Jaghbub that they conducted at the same time a vigorous offensive on the plateau intended as a diversion to prevent him using part of his meagre forces for the purpose. The beasts and crops of the Patriots were systematically destroyed where they were found in the area of guerrilla operations. Italian figures for Patriot losses in the ensuing engagements were 303 killed and 100 horses, 2,300 camels, and more [927]
than 30,000 sheep and goats either killed or captured. Their own losses were 3 officers, 25 Italian O.R.s and 24 native troops. In spite of Patriot losses, doubtless magnified by those who reported them, Rome was not satisfied with the achievements of the Military Governor Mombelli and he was replaced at the end of 1926 by Gen. Teruzzi, a good Fascist who had earlier seen service in Tripolitania. Indeed, some indication of the dissatisfaction felt by the Fascist hierarchy at the inability of their Governors to break the resistance of a few Bedouin may be judged by the fact that there was a succession of no less than five of these between 1923 and 1933: Bongiovanni, Mombelli, Teruzzi, Siciliani, and Graziani.

*175 *648 *795 Teruzzi soon discovered that matters appeared in a different light to those in charge of the operations in Cyrenaica from that in which they appeared to those sitting on committees at Rome. In spite of all their successes, their occupation of the main strongholds of the country, and the submission of the greater number of the tribal sections, the Italians of all ranks were far from happy. The enemy was still protean and ubiquitous. It was like fighting mosquitoes. They have to be killed one by one and there are always a few left. Next sunset they are back again in the same numbers as before. Italian difficulties were increased by the absence of any single policy towards the tribal sections taking no open part in the struggle. Teruzzi found in the five Commissariats five different formulas of political action.[1] In the Banghazi district the submitted Bedouin were placed under strict surveillance, being organized into armed groups to defend their property against guerrilla raids. This separated them from the Patriots but meant entrusting to the Bedouin a function rightly belonging to the Government. In the Barce (al-Marj) district, on the other hand, relations between the submitted and the guerrillas were tolerated. This enabled the Italians to make propaganda in the Patriot camps, but it still more effectively allowed the Patriots to incite the submitted to further resistance or to exact from them tribute as the price of tranquillity. In the Cirene (Shahhat) district the Hasa tribe had submitted and was concentrated in the cages (*reticolati*) of Marsa Susa and Shahhat. In the Darna and Marmarica districts the 'Abaidat tribesmen, who had submitted as early as 1915-16 and had remained peaceful since the renewal of hostilities in 1923, thereby relieving the Italians of the necessity of sending a large body of troops to eastern Cyrenaica, were becoming restless and were purchasing quiet by payment of tribute in money, provisions, and volunteers to Sidi 'Umar. Taking all in all, there was lacking in the submitted districts good administration, effective propaganda, and adequate force to back decisions.

*195 *648 *795 619

*175 *648 *795 Teruzzi also found that, although almost unbroken success had been reported month by month in every part of the country ever since the war began, even as late as the middle of 1927 the Italians had little real control beyond the immediate vicinity

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[1] Op. cit., p. 37.

of their forts. In the bend of the Sirtica they occupied only 175*
Ajadabiya, joined by a corridor to the little port of al-Zuwaitina. 648*
Farther to the north they held a territory running from the 795*
coast to the line Qaminis–Suluq–al-Shlaidima–al-Rajma–al-Abyar–Jardis al-'Abid–Taknis–al-Gharib–Talmaitha. There was a gap between this territory and the tract of country held farther to the east, running from the coast at Marsa Susa to the line al-Zawiya al-Baida–Slanta–Jardis al-Jarrari–al-Fayidiya–Bilqis–Khawalan–al-Qaiqab. This gap, the Wadi al-Kuf area, was entirely in guerrilla hands and necessitated communication by sea between Banghazi and Darna. In the Darna and Tubruq districts Italian control was uncertain, and political rather than military.[1] The people there were quiet only because the Italians left them alone. Moreover, in the spring of 1927, when Teruzzi's first campaigning season began, the Patriots still had, according to Italian records, some 1,000 men in the eastern Sirtica, some 1,600, about a quarter of whom were horsed, on the plateau, and about 100 in the Marmarica. However, these estimates were almost certainly magnified to excuse failure, and although the war dragged on for many more months the issue, if ever in doubt, was decided during Teruzzi's term of office in 1927 and 1928. His plan to hasten the end of the war was twofold: to clear the Wadi al-Kuf area of guerrillas and to clean up the Sirtica.

Local actions began their usual seasonal run in the spring of 1927 and included one of the rare Italian defeats in a hard fight at al-Rahaiba, to the south of al-Marj, on 28 March, in which they lost 6 officers and 306 native troops. Otherwise Sidi 'Umar's men suffered heavily, especially in two encounters with the Italian forces in the middle of July, and their consequent dispersal enabled Teruzzi to carry out his plan of combing the Wadi al-Kuf area, where deep ravines and dense undergrowth had always given the guerrillas a refuge when hard pressed, and by so doing to link up the western (Banghazi and al-Marj) and eastern (Shahhat and Darna) sectors. This was accomplished during the summer and considerably eased Italian communications. During an 80 days' campaign the Patriots lost, according (727)
to Teruzzi, 1,296 dead, 2,844 camels and 5,000 sheep slaughtered, and 842 camels, 18,000 sheep, 172 head of cattle, and 26 horses

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[1] Op. cit., pp. 43 seq.

*175 captured, against 2 Italian officers, 5 airmen, and 61 native
*648 troops dead. The 'Abid and Bara'asa, the two tribes which
*795 from the beginning were the most tenacious supporters of Sidi
[727] 'Umar, were the most severely hit. The 1927 summer campaign
left the Patriots dispersed and they had now clearly lost the
initiative in the more open country. They still held out, however,
in the more broken and wooded area of the *jashsha* in the
neighbourhood of Bir Qandula, Shnaishan, and the Wadi
Mahajja, and to the south of Jardis al-'Abid, where they could
more easily escape detection from the air and disperse before
superior forces. Here Sidi 'Umar reorganized his guerrilla bands.
His difficulties and casualties were becoming formidable. Indeed,
in the summer of 1928 Teruzzi could speak with some justice of
the war on the plateau as large-scale police action. In evidence
of his success in the work of pacification he cites that between
May 1927 and February 1929 he recovered 3,755 rifles from the
Bedouin. Fighting still went on, it is true, and raids against the
submitted sections, particularly against the Hasa tribe, even
became fiercer, but the area of guerrilla activities was more
restricted. On the last day of March 1928 the Patriots suffered
[727] an unusually severe defeat in the southern steppe country, in
which they lost 200 dead, 70 prisoners, and 1,500 camels and
[728] 20 horses killed. Sidi 'Umar was forced, for the first time, to
make contact with the Italians and treat with them for a truce.

*175 The development of operations in Tripolitania had pointed
to greater co-ordination between the forces attempting to crush
*648 Arab resistance in that country and those attempting the same
*795 in Cyrenaica, so at the end of 1928 the two colonies were placed
728 under the single direction of Badoglio, and early in 1929 Teruzzi
was replaced in Cyrenaica by Siciliani with the rank of Vice-Governor.
Badoglio marked his appointment with a flamboyant
proclamation offering the Arabs the choice between unconditional
surrender and extermination. Its tone defeated its end,
if peace was its end, though Italian writers assume that it
influenced Sidi 'Umar in making his approach to the Italians in
June 1929, together with the noted guerrilla leader Sidi Fadil
bu 'Umar and Sayyid al-Hasan al-Rida, a boy of the Sanusi
family who accompanied the guerrilla forces on the plateau. A
truce was agreed to by both sides and continued for five months
while negotiations for peace dragged on. The Arab and Italian

accounts of these negotiations are very different and in many 175*
particulars contradictory. Graziani's account is certainly 648*
tendentious and I see no reason to doubt the Arab statements 795*
that Sidi 'Umar would not sign terms unless they were witnessed 728
by observers from Egypt and Tunisia and agreed to by Sayyid Idris. As he was thus claiming to be the representative of the Head of a sovereign State the Italians would not agree to these conditions and discussions broke down. The Italians, however, prevailed on the boy al-Hasan to sign an agreement in their favour, and greatly to his own personal advantage, at Banghazi. This agreement was at once repudiated by Sidi 'Umar, and Sayyid al-Hasan deserted him, followed by most of the Bara'asa-Darsa band, which Sidi 'Umar's followers nicknamed 'The Army of Flour', chiding them for selling themselves for rations. Fight- 175*
ing broke out again in November and on 8 January 1930 Sayyid 648*
al-Hasan's followers, who had been kept under supervision, 795*
resisted the Italian attempt to disarm them and 80 of them were killed while another 100, including the Sayyid, surrendered. Ten days later Sidi 'Umar's own force was beaten on the Wadi Mahajja, he himself being wounded and barely escaping with his life. From February 1929 the Patriots had lost another 800 [727]
men killed, 2,000 camels, and a vast number of sheep and goats. About 2,000 Bedouin had fled with their animals and goods into Egypt. Against these losses the Italians had lost only 6 officers, 6 other nationals, and 102 native troops.

VI

It is here necessary to leave Sidi 'Umar fighting his desperate guerrilla fight on the plateau to note developments in the Sirtica, which Teruzzi had decided to clean up in 1927. After their drive on Ajadabiya at the commencement of hostilities in 1923 the Italians had been content to sit in the village, leaving the Bedouin in control of the country around it. But operations in Tripolitania had drawn Italian forces slowly farther away from their coastal bases towards the south and east and were now being held up because the Tripolitanian elements which still resisted were able to retire into the Sirtica and its hinterland, where they were difficult to contact and could rely on recruits and supplies from their Cyrenaican kinsmen. The

*175 *648 *795 situation which had developed there in 1915 seemed likely to develop again. Concerted operations from Cyrenaica and Tripolitania were, therefore, planned. To facilitate them from the Cyrenaican side the Italian line was advanced in March 1927 from Qaminis–Tailimun–Suluq–al-Shlaidima to Ajadabiya–Sawunnu–Msus; and Teruzzi, always an advocate of combining political with military action, decided to try what diplomacy could do to ease the task of the soldiers. He had some success, with the aid of the treacherous Sanusiya Shaikh Sharif al-Ghariyani, in that he was able to arrange a meeting in June in the *barqa al-baida* with a number of tribal Shaikhs and to persuade 13 of those belonging to the Magharba Shammakh to make submission. This pacification of the Magharba near Ajadabiya, indispensable to operations in the Sirtica, had an immediate result in the uncontested occupation of al-Qatafiya towards the end of September and of al-'Aqaila a few days later. Sayyid Saddiq al-Rida collected a small force to the south of the Wadi al-Farigh to prevent a further advance but neither he nor his father, a man lacking both vigour and spirit, had the character of the Bedouin and both were wavering. The son entered into correspondence with the Italians and the father

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

The Italian conquest of Cyrenaica.

[793] [619]

left his camp near Jalu oasis and surrendered himself to them at 175*
Ajadabiya at the beginning of 1928 when he knew that they 648*
intended to strike southwards. He was sent to Sicily. Had the 795*
Italians kept their word and allowed him to reside at Banghazi his sons al-Saddiq and al-Hasan would probably have surrendered also.

The long-planned operation followed. In February and March 1928 the oases of the 29th Parallel, the Saukna group, Zalla, Marada, and the Jalu group, along which is an important caravan route to Egypt, were occupied by either the Tripolitanian or the Cyrenaican army; the powerful Sirtican tribe of the Aulad Suliman was heavily defeated; and the greater part of the Magharba tribe was disarmed. However, small Bedouin bands still remained at large and from time to time raided towards the coast from the interior. The most active of these were under Salim bu Krayyim of the Zuwaya tribe, a man of over eighty years of age, and Salih Lataiwish, the leader of the Magharba tribe. The Italians were able to bring overwhelming force against these small bands. In the open country in which they had to operate they were easily located by planes and run to earth by armoured cars and troop-carrying vehicles. Their bases, the oases of Tazirabu and Kufra, were defenceless against the bombs rained on them.

The combined operational programme for 1929 was to disarm the tribes of southern Tripolitania, to reoccupy Fazzan, and to capture the distant oasis of Kufra. It has not been thought necessary to describe the development of the war in Tripolitania which pursued its course parallel to, but for the most part independently of, the war in Cyrenaica. Accompanying sketch-maps show the advance year by year in the two countries. The Cyrenaican part of the 1929 programme, the occupation of Kufra, began, as described, by driving the Sanusi bands from the hinterland of the *barqa al-baida* and the Sirtica, and while this was happening the whole of Fazzan was conquered. It remained only to undertake the arduous journey across a vast expanse of desert to Kufra and to destroy the last Bedouin bands from the *barqa* and the Sirtica which still offered in the oasis archipelago a stubborn and forlorn resistance under Salih Lataiwish, 'Abd al-Salam al-Kizzih, 'Abd al-Jalil Saif al-Nasir, and 'Abd al-Hamid bu Matari. There was no more strategic

*175 *648 *795 advantage to be gained by the capture of Kufra than there had been by the capture of Jaghbub, but the magnitude of the undertaking, in both preparation and execution, and the opportunity it gave to inflict a last humiliation on the Sanusi family by planting the Italian flag in '*la Mecca della Senussia*', as Graziani

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
TUNISIA
Tarabulis
Misurata
Sirt
Ghadamis
Al-Aqaila
Zalla
CYRENAICA
Ghath
1921
1922
1923
1924
1928
1929
1930
Boundary lines
Scale
0 50 100 200 400 kms

The Italian conquest of Tripolitania.

*175 *648 *795 in a characteristic phrase calls the oasis, made an irresistible appeal to the Fascist politicians and generals. The operation again showed Italian skill in large-scale technical undertakings in which fighting is not required. Serious opposition could not have been expected, for there were at most only 600 armed men to defend the archipelago against over 1,000 native troops led by 100 Italian officers and N.C.O.s. The Italian force advanced in three columns, largely mechanized: the main column from Jalu and the subsidiary columns from Zalla and Wau al-Kabir.

On 19 January 1931 the combined columns defeated the Sanusi 175*
garrison at the oasis of al-Hawari and on the following day the 648*
Italian flag flew over al-Taj, the shrine of Sayyid al-Mahdi al- 795*
Sanusi. There was no alternative to flight for the remaining heroes of the *barqa* and the Sirtica. Four possible routes of escape were open to these Bedouin and the civil population of Kufra, all hazardous enough in time of peace: straight across the desert to the Egyptian oases, to the oasis of Siwa, to al-'Awainat and the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, and to Tibesti. With sickening cruelty Badoglio ordered Graziani, who had replaced Siciliani as Vice-Governor of Cyrenaica from 13 March 1930, to follow the caravans without quarter, and they were systematically bombed and machine-gunned to make them abandon food and water.

The Sanusi family had, as usual, deserted their comrades and followers. The sensual Sayyid Muhammad 'Abid had represented Sanusi interests in Kufra since 1917, when he was driven from Fazzan by a group of pro-Turkish adventurers. From Kufra he had from time to time made advances to the Italians, but his emissaries had either been captured by Patriot forces or, having reached Banghazi, received little encouragement from the Italians. The Zuwaya of the oasis finally tired of his treachery and compelled him to flee to the Borku in January 1929. His place at Kufra was taken by Sayyid Shams al-Din bin Sayyid 'Ali al-Khattab, who, after a vain effort to negotiate with the Italians in October 1929, fled to Egypt, leaving his younger brother Hasan the sole representative of the Sanusi family in the seat of the Order. Sayyid Saddiq al-Rida had already, early in 1929, given up resistance and fled to Egypt.

VII

We can now return to the plateau where Sidi 'Umar and his gallant men faced inevitable defeat and almost certain death. By 1930 all their bases had gone and they lived like hunted beasts in the juniper forest between the Italian posts of Jardis Jarrari, Slanta, al-Fayidiya, and Khawalan. Sidi 'Umar's losses had been, for so small a population, enormous, and the destruction of the livestock on which his men relied for sustenance had been staggering. Nevertheless, till Graziani arrived in Cyrenaica

*175 *648 *795 to take over the command, Sidi 'Umar had, in spite of almost invariable defeats, kept the initiative. Mobility, knowledge of the country, and daring still enabled his men, worn out though they were by long years of hardship and hunger, to strike where they would, keeping Italian posts, patrols, and convoys always on the alert. Graziani now closed on them from both the plateau and the steppe country to the south. All the earths were stopped. The view-halloo was given wherever they broke. Flight to Egypt alone could save them, and this they would not take.

Graziani was determined to wrest the initiative from the guerrillas. He reorganized his forces for the last round in the *'guerra senza quartiere'* into small mobile patrols to keep the whole of the forest country under surveillance and to attack the enemy wherever they met him, giving him no rest. To prevent the guerrillas from obtaining supplies and reinforcements from the civilian population he disarmed the tribesmen, confiscating from them thousands of rifles and millions of rounds of ammunition, and made possession of arms a capital offence. He instituted the *'tribunale volante'*, a military court flown from point to point to try, and execute, all who had dealings of any kind with the guerrillas. He reduced the Libyan units by more than two-thirds, with the intention of disbanding them altogether later. In the meanwhile he distributed among the 750 Libyans retained in service rifles of a different calibre from rifles in Patriot hands to prevent leakage of ammunition. At the same time he closed the Sanusiya lodges, confiscated their estates, and exiled their Shaikhs to the Island of Ustica. He also much improved the communications of the colony, thereby easing his supply problem and economizing man-power.

*175 *648 *795 727 [705] It may be doubted whether all these measures would have been effective if he had not also started his immense concentration camps for the entire tribal population of Cyrenaica, about whose feelings the General had no illusions. In taking this step the Italians were doing no more than others had done before them and have done after them, for an army fighting guerrillas is fighting an entire population. The first concentrations of January 1930 were found to be too near the area of military operations, for the prisoners, in spite of close surveillance, still managed to supply the guerrillas with some of their requirements;

so most of the Bedouin were removed to the *barqa al-baida* and 175*
the Sirtica. In this bleak country were herded in the smallest 648*
camps possible 80,000 men, women, and children, and 600,000 795*
beasts, in the summer of 1930. Hunger, disease, and broken 727
hearts took a heavy toll of the imprisoned population. Bedouin [705]
die in a cage. Loss of livestock was also great, for the beasts had insufficient grazing near the camps on which to support life, and the herds, already decimated in the fighting, were almost wiped out by the camps.

The guerrillas thus found themselves cut off from local sources 175*
of supply and forced more and more to rely on Egypt for the 648*
bare necessities of life and of war. For years a considerable part 795*
of their supplies had come from there, paid for by Bedouin 705
produce, money raised by customs charges, and funds collected throughout the Arab and Muslim world. Supplies came through the port of al-Sallum, and the Egyptian Frontiers Administration must have closed its eyes to supplies going into Cyrenaica as tightly as to refugees going out of it. The Marmarica had been declared by the Italians a military zone, its people being removed to concentration camps, and the closed frontier was patrolled by armoured cars and planes with instructions to destroy any caravans they spotted, but, in spite of these precautions, supplies continued to reach the Patriots. Graziani therefore decided to run a line of barbed-wire entanglement from the sea to Jaghbub and into the dunes to the south of it, a distance of over 300 km. The work was completed early in September 1931 and control along the wire was operated through
fortified posts, a telephone system, and aviation camps. Perhaps 175*
nothing shows more clearly the slow imprisonment of the people 648*
of Cyrenaica than the use of barbed wire on an ever-increasing 795*
scale to imprison them in concentration camps within their [727]
country and to shut them off from the outside world: in 1922–3 the Italians spent only 27,000 Lire on barbed wire in Cyrenaica but by 1930–1 they could boast of spending 14,111,000 Lire.[1]

In spite of all Graziani's energy and threats Sidi 'Umar and his men would neither surrender nor flee the country. In 1930 the bands of the Bara'asa, 'Abid, and Hasa-'Abaidat were still harassing Italian detachments and raiding the herds of those who had submitted. Nevertheless, Italian activities had now

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[1] *La Nuova Italia d'Oltremare*, 1933–4, vol. i, p. 239.

*175 the character of mopping-up operations and there is little to
*648 record beyond a succession of isolated skirmishes in which the
*795 guerrillas lost several of their most experienced leaders. In mid-September 1930 Fadil bu 'Umar had been killed in one such encounter and on 11 September 1931 Sidi 'Umar himself was wounded near the tomb of Sidi Rafa', pinned down by his horse, and captured. He was taken to Suluq where on 16 September, still suffering from his wound, he was hanged before 20,000 Bedouin and the urban notables of Cyrenaica, brought there from confinement to witness his end. The Italians were exultant. They believed, this time rightly, that the rebellion had been stamped out.

The resistance died with Sidi 'Umar al-Mukhtar. The remaining fights were twitches of an already lifeless body. There were still about 700 guerrillas on the plateau but there was no one of Sidi 'Umar's prestige to lead them. Three of his faithful lieutenants tried with about 100 of their men to break through Graziani's wire into Egypt. Of the three only 'Abd al-Hamid al-'Abbar succeeded. 'Uthman Shami then surrendered himself and on 19 December 1931 Yusif bu Rahil was killed, fighting with great gallantry, in an engagement in the Marmarica. This seems to have been the last fight of the war, which Badoglio declared in an Order of the Day to have been brought to a successful conclusion on 24 January 1932. Except for the five months' truce in 1929 there had been just under nine years of constant fighting. In those nine years '*Cirenaica verde di piante*' had, as Mussolini wrote, become '*rossa di sangue*'.[1]

[1] Introduction to *Cirenaica Verde*, p. 11.

[P.191]

CHAPTER VIII

ITALIAN RULE AND COLONIZATION (1932–42)

I

THE two Italo-Sanusi wars had broken the Bedouin and 175*
desolated their country. It is not easy to estimate from Italian 648*
figures Sanusi casualties, nor to assess their reliability. The 795*
Bedouin population was probably reduced by half to two-thirds by death and emigration between 1911 and 1932. Losses of livestock are even more difficult to estimate but they were certainly enormous. The herds seem to have been slaughtered indiscriminately by the Italians.

The Italians had suffered too. It is true their casualties were not nearly as high as those suffered by the Bedouin and were mostly among their native troops, but the cost of the war imposed a grave burden on the Italian people. Loss of prestige in the eyes of the world for failure to break the resistance of a few Bedouin within weeks and for their cruel conduct of the war must also be taken into account if we are to appreciate fully the determination of the Italian leaders that there should be no third Italo-Sanusi war. To ensure that the dying embers of resistance should not again be fanned into flame it seemed necessary as the most immediate measure to prevent the Sanusiya Order reconstituting itself. The Order appeared to be destroyed but the Italians were never quite certain what was happening under the surface and watched ceaselessly for any sign of its rehabilitation.

By the end of the second Italo-Sanusi war the Sanusi family were, with the exception of those few members who had fallen into Italian hands and were considered by their captors too lacking in character to be a danger, scattered in exile. Nevertheless the Italians never felt entirely secure while Sayyid Muhammad Idris was in Egypt. It is true that he had promised the Egyptian Government not to engage in politics and was closely watched by the Italian Embassy, but while he was alive and free the Sanusiya Order might be said still to exist in his person. He and his cousin Sayyid Safi al-Din were potential trouble-makers who would certainly try to stir up a rebellion in Cyrenaica

*175 *648 *795 should the Italians find themselves at war with a European power. Efforts to obtain the extradition of the Sanusi leaders in Egypt were unsuccessful.[1]

The organization of the Order within Cyrenaica had been entirely disrupted during the years of war. The zawiyas had been destroyed by gun-fire, had fallen into ruin through neglect, or were being used as military posts by the Italians. Their Shaikhs had been scattered by the years of war and in 1930 had been rounded up and exiled at the same time as the properties of the Order had been confiscated on the grounds that while the Sanusiya existed as a corporation it would continue from its lodges to spread disaffection. The confiscation of the estates of the Order was viewed as the final act in its extirpation.[2]

When the Italians invaded Cyrenaica in 1911 they hoped that the Bedouin might remain neutral. They therefore declared repeatedly during the early stages of the war that the privileges of the Order and the customs of the people would be respected.[3] It can hardly be doubted that they did so in bad faith, for Giolitti had won support for the war among the peasants of southern Italy by promising them the exploitation of an Eldorado in Libya. Certainly, as the Italians themselves had to confess, they were not believed.[4] In retaliation for the support the Order gave the Turkish cause the Italians began to sequestrate its estates in those parts of the country where they had obtained a footing. At the end of 1913, Gen. Ottavio Briccola, the first Governor of Cyrenaica, ordered sequestration of its lodges and in the following year further instructions provided for seizure of the properties of the twelve lodges at that time in Italian hands. It is doubtful, however, whether these measures were intended to constitute complete and final confiscation. It is more likely that, as the Italians themselves say, they were temporary war measures to prevent the resources of the Order being used to support Sanusi forces operating all over the country against them, as a retaliation, and to provide a pawn with which to bargain when the Sanusiya decided to come to terms.

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[1] Giglio, op. cit., p. 110.

[113] [2] 'Italia e Senussia', *L'Oltremare*, Aug. 1930.

[3] Bourbon del Monte Santa Maria, *L'Islamismo e la Confraternità dei Senussi*, 1912, p. 240.

[4] *Norme Sommaire* for Political Officials, Aug. 1912, pp. 5-6.

The *modus vivendi* of 'Akrama of 1917 declared that the 175*
Sanusiya lodges occupied by the Italians were to be restored to 648*
the Order, together with their properties, which would be exempt 795*
from taxation. The Italians were also to pay salaries to the 728
Shaikhs of the lodges. On 29 July 1919 the Governor of Cyrenaica, Giacomo De Martino, issued a proclamation in which he spoke of the '*Venerabile Confraternità dei Senussi*' from which the Government sought co-operation for the moral and economic advancement of the country and for the maintenance of security, and of the '*Venerabili Zauie e i loro Capi*' to whom were confirmed their traditional privileges and full freedom to exercise their beneficial functions.[1] The Accord of al-Rajma, which replaced the truce of 'Akrama in 1920, re-affirmed the right of the Order to its endowments. On 16 August 1921 a further agreement, the *Sistemazione definitiva delle zauie*, again reaffirmed it, and the Italians promised to pay an indemnity for lodges destroyed by their action during the war and again undertook to pay the salaries of the Shaikhs of the lodges.

In 1919 the Government of Cyrenaica, in order to put into execution Article 5 of the *modus vivendi* of 'Akrama, had nominated a Mixed Commission presided over by the Head of the Land Registry at Banghazi, Judge Colucci. Sayyid Idris appointed a representative on this Commission, and the Shaikhs of the lodges were co-opted when the lands of their lodges were being registered. The terms of reference limited the duties of this Commission to registration of lands indicated by the Shaikhs as belonging to their lodges, examination of documents relating to these properties, and interrogation of tribal Shaikhs representing those sections which had made the endowments. Moreover, the Commission was to register the immobile properties of only fourteen of the Sanusiya lodges, those which the *modus vivendi* recognized as being in the Italian area of occupation.

In 1922 the new Fascist Government at Rome decided to crush the Sanusiya Order once and for all and to seize its lands and colonize them with its own nationals. Gen. Bongiovanni's declaration of 1 May 1933, rendering invalid all accords and conventions entered into with the Sanusiya, revoked by implication the guarantees of inviolability of the estates of the Order. Even

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[1] *Bolletino Ufficiale*, Bengasi, Jan.–Feb. 1919.

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so, to avoid offence to Muslim opinion outside the Order, he was careful to announce in the same proclamation that the Sanusiya Order would be free to function as an Islamic fraternity.[1]

When Bedouin resistance had been overcome, except for its final guerrilla spasms in the more inaccessible parts of the plateau, the Italians no longer hesitated to grasp the prize they had aimed at for so long. By the Royal Decree of 22 December 1930 the articles of the various pacts between the Italians and the Sanusi which recognized the property rights of the Order were formally revoked and the closure of its lodges and sequestration of their goods were ordered. The Head of the Cyrenaican Land Registry was instructed to register without delay the properties of the Order in the name of the Colony. This Royal Decree set out to destroy the economic foundations of the Order as completely as military operations had destroyed its political foundations.

In execution of the decree Judge Valenzi was instructed in 1931 to complete the registration of as many of the Sanusiya lodges as political circumstances permitted and to inscribe their properties as patrimony of the colony. A technical survey and, therefore, final registration, were completed for only eighteen of the lodges. The disturbed state of the country, in which guerrilla bands were still operating, forced the Government to be content with compiling inventories of the properties of the remaining lodges from depositions made by tribal Shaikhs in concentration camps. It was intended to make a technical survey of these when circumstances allowed, but the work does not seem to have been done. During Italo Balbo's Governorship of Libya, from 1 January 1934, the Italians took what they wanted of the Sanusiya estates for their colonists and for other purposes, and the Shaikhs of the lodges on their return from captivity, or anyone else who wished to do so, cultivated on what was not immediately required by the State, though all the land belonged to the Colony and would eventually have been taken over by the Government without compensation whenever it suited its purpose.

The confiscated lands of the Order were given, when suitably placed, to Italian colonists under the *Ente* scheme of demo-

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[1] Op. cit., pp. 7–8; also the Governor's speech on 6 Mar. 1923 at the opening of the spring session of the Cyrenaican Parliament.

3:Evans-Pritchard E-4, 5 (1942-1944) 1949 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9
(1837-1942) Sanusi

graphic settlement. Some of the richest arable lands in Cyrenaica, forming part of the endowments of the plateau lodges, were used for this purpose, and the lands of a number of other lodges came within the area marked out for future metropolitan colonization. The lands of yet other lodges lying outside this area were earmarked for Arab agricultural settlement schemes. The only Sanusiya lands which were not to be colonized were those in the less-favoured parts of the country. The date-palms and gardens of the Order in the oases were also confiscated. 175* 648* 795* 728

As soon as the Italians had been powerful enough to seize the endowments of the Order they had seized them. Their action can only be called theft. It was a violation of the Shari'a law, repeatedly proclaimed inviolable by the Italians, and of the constitution they drew up for Cyrenaica in 1919. Their plea that the Order had opposed them in both political and military fields and had fomented rebellion in the Colony would have carried more weight if they had not seized the lands for their own nationals, for they could quite as effectively have broken the Order by using its revenues for general religious and charitable purposes. Some Italians were, indeed, troubled about such barefaced robbery, but their lawyers were able to fall back on the specious argument, so often used before to excuse similar expropriations, that the State has unlimited powers and must use them for its own safety and the welfare of the community regardless of the traditional rights of individuals and associations, and of God.

II

The elimination of the Sanusiya deprived the Bedouin of the leaders they had learned to follow but it did not make them any more favourably disposed towards the Italians. The efforts of the Administration to overcome this dull hostile turning away from their conquerors, to their acceptance of them only in resignation to the will of God, had only from 1932 to 1940 to become effective, and it was so little successful that I do not consider a detailed account of Italian native policy and measures to be required. I shall endeavour nevertheless to indicate briefly in the present section the general lines of their policy from 1911 to the entry of Italy into the last war and to illustrate its development by describing briefly in the following sections 175* 648* [795]* [128]

*175 *648 [128] the changes in the legal status of the Arabs of Cyrenaica during those years and how the lands of the Bedouin were confiscated to provide farms for Italian colonists. In the final section of the book I give a résumé of events leading up to what is, I hope, the threshold of Cyrenaican independence.

The Italians detested the Bedouin. Long years of campaigning against guerrilla bands had irritated them more than governments are usually irritated by Bedouin and made them increasingly flamboyant and brutal. In the whole Italian literature on Cyrenaica I have not read a sentence of understanding of Romany values. Because they lived in tents without most of the goods the peasant, and even more the townsman, regard as signs of civilization the Italians spoke of them as barbarians, little better than beasts, and treated them accordingly. The arguments they used to justify their treatment of them have a familiar ring.

[181] Graziani has described the Bedouin in his usual uncompromising language and his opinions were doubtless shared by most army officers and government officials:

> 'Anarchist, lover of the most complete liberty and independence, intolerant of any restraint, headstrong, ignorant, unconquerable and boastful (*bluffista*) hero, it is sufficient that he possesses a rifle and a horse: he often masks, under the pretence of the necessity of moving his tent, the desire of gaining the end of withdrawing himself from every governmental contact and control.'

And again:

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> 'Rebellious against every tie of discipline, used to wandering in territories often immense and solitary, bold in mobility and ease of movement, bemused by the fascination of independence, always ready for war and raiding, the nomads have always resisted every governmental restraint.'[1]

Graziani was a plain-spoken soldier. When the conquest phase of colonization had passed and it was no longer fashionable to believe in naked *refoulement*, administrators found it expedient to express themselves more temperately. The soldier-politician Badoglio, in his directive to subordinates in Libya for the year 1933, forbade further talk of '*ribelli*'. The war, the rebellion as it had been called, was over and the past must be forgotten in a

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[1] Op. cit., pp. 119–20.

common effort to reconstruct the life of the country. The first 175*
object of the Government was now to increase the Bedouin 648*
population, not to destroy it, for the country could never be
prosperous in its present depopulated state. At least 20,000 [722]
refugees had taken refuge during the war in Egypt and elsewhere [727]
and they could not be expected to return unless a more conciliatory policy were pursued.

Selected Arab officials were attached to the Italian Consulates 175*
in Egypt to do propaganda among the refugees, and those who 648*
returned were given food, clothing, and beasts. This policy met 727
with some success. In Egypt, where most of the refugees lived, the Bedouin were faced with the choice between becoming wage-earners or leading a gipsy life on the edge of the cultivations. The temptation to return to their country, where they were used to a life of freedom and plenty, was too great for many of them, in spite of Italian occupation. It was, as they say, *yakhtar akhaf al-dararain*, the choice of the lighter of two evils. Between 5,000
and 10,000 must have returned by the middle of 1940. Besides [728]
a general amnesty to induce the refugees to return, pardon was granted to almost all political prisoners, and by 1939 only a very few remained in jail or enforced exile. Instructions were given for this fact to be made widely known to neutralize anti-Italian propaganda in Arab countries.

It was possible to adopt a milder policy because the Bedouin 175*
had been disarmed and were unable to cause further trouble. 648*
It had long been recognized that while they possessed arms 728
they would use them against the Italians if given an opportunity. As early as August 1912, in the very premature *Norme Sommarie* for Political Officers, it was stressed that the Bedouin regard rifles as essential as horses and that no amount of persuasion would make them part with either, especially as 'there is not an Arab in the country who, in asking himself why we have come, does not reply to himself and to others, "To take our lands, our beasts, our women" '. Because of the strong feelings of the Bedouin on an issue which touched their manhood no very determined attempt was made to disarm those tribal sections which submitted to the Italians till the second Italo-Sanusi war was well advanced, and it was not till Graziani was made Vice-Governor in March 1930 that total disarmament of the civilian population was aimed at.

*175 *648 727 In 1932 the Bedouin were released from the concentration camps into which they had been herded in 1930 and were allowed to return to their tribal territories. In spite of their losses in manpower, stock, and arms, it was felt that the closest watch must still be kept on them. Local officials were, therefore, instructed to keep detailed lists of distribution of tents, and soldiers were posted to picket the camps and prevent any movement without a permit from an Italian official. Any breach of the regulation, which was in force till 1938, was punished with imprisonment. This supervision by what amounted to a strict pass system was finally given up by Balbo, as it was found that it irritated the Bedouin without serving any useful purpose.

*175 *648 Like other governments that have had dealings with nomads, the Italian bureaucrats in charge of the administration could not abide that they should live free from their interference. It was held that it was wicked to be a nomad and that it was the duty of an administration to compel them to settle. Graziani declared that the nomads are 'enemies, and destroyers, of agriculture. Everywhere, in fact, the nomad has passed he has destroyed woods, trees and fields.' Therefore, 'the nomads have no justification and no right to claim to stay in areas of assured development, such as those of the Cyrenaican plateau, rich in promise of tree and cereal culture, but ought to be excluded from it for ever, leaving room for thousands and thousands of Italian arms which are stretched out there, anxious to begin again to till and make fruitful this ancient Roman earth'. Graziani held, furthermore, that not only must the Bedouin be kept off the fertile plateau, but must be stabilized in the country on the edge of the steppe where, in his opinion, they had sufficient and suitable land for pasturing and sowing. They would there find themselves in an environment perfectly responding '*alla loro natura di rapsodi del deserto*'. Here their every move, every halt, every camp ought to be under rigid supervision by government officials. Braida adds that by 1935 Graziani's plan had been put into operation in its main proposals.[1] The plateau was reserved for metropolitan colonization and the steppe for the Bedouin, who were subject to such rigorous control that it might be regarded as a prelude to

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[1] Graziani, op. cit., p. 123; Vittorino Braida, *Memoria per l'Ufficiale dei Reparti indigeni della Cirenaica*, 1935, pp. 61–3.

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stabilization in native reserves. Zones of pasturing were fixed, it was forbidden to camp in places other than those laid down by the political authority and, as mentioned above, no move might be made without written authorization. The Italian aim was in the end to abolish the traditional Bedouin way of life altogether and to make them peasant-tenants of the State and wage-labourers. 'It is necessary', said Graziani in his address to the Fascist Institute of Culture at Banghazi on 23 November 1931, 'to compel them to build houses, abandoning the tents.' Balbo later held the same view and it was shared by some writers of the liberal period.

In any case, the Italians intended to take the best arable of the country for themselves and I describe later in this chapter how they planted by mass emigration colonies of metropolitans on extensive stretches of the best tribal lands, excluding the Bedouin from the whole tableland, both for pasturing and for sowing, section by section as it was taken over for exploitation. The inevitable prosecutions for trespass of stock on the expropriated lands followed. Since it was recognized that the Bedouin must move north–south to pasture their flocks and sow, passages for transport of stock across the reserved area were marked out, as shown in the map on p. 224, and the staging points fixed. All that was left to them in northern Cyrenaica were the narrow coastal belt, the more rugged parts of the first terrace which would not yield to Italian methods of cultivation, and the bleak southern slopes of the plateau. Under Balbo's scheme of development, which aimed at destroying the Bedouin way of life, they were to be settled as far as possible in village communities in these areas, where they would live and cultivate under the same rigid State control to which the Italian nationals were subjected. The whole of northern Cyrenaica was thus expropriated for State purposes, the more fertile areas for metropolitan colonists, and the less fertile for urbanized and semi-urbanized Arabs or such Bedouin as could be induced to submit to State direction and forsake their traditions. It was originally intended to establish sheep farms in those parts of the country more suitable for pastoral than agricultural exploitation, but experience showed that the Italian settlers did not make successful shepherds and, in any case, the development in this direction was in opposition to a colonization of people

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*175 *648 rather than of capital. For these and for political reasons the plan was abandoned and Balbo decreed in 1939 that only the Bedouin might own herds for nomadic pastoralism. This excluded both Italian colonists and urban merchants and left most of the southern slopes of the plateau, the steppe at their termination and on the *barqa*, and Cyrenaica's two arid wings, the Marmarica and the Sirtica, to those Bedouin who preferred to continue their ancient shepherds' way of life.

*175 *648 619 The loss of their best land could not by itself disrupt the social life of the Bedouin. It was necessary at the same time to destroy their social organization. As a first step in this direction an attempt was made to undermine the influence of the tribal Shaikhs. In the early days of their partial occupation of Cyrenaica the Italians continued, because they had no choice, the Turkish administrative divisions and their policy of consultation with the Shaikhs, confining the duties of Italian officials to inspection and advice, though native participation was illusory.[1] This policy was carried to excess in the Basic Law of 1919 which gave extensive powers to a local Parliament of representatives elected from the tribes and urban centres with ex-officio and nominated members who were not to exceed in number a sixth of the elected members. For administrative purposes the Shaikhs of each sub-tribe and the Shaikh al-Mashayakh of each tribe were recognized as such by decree. By official recognition as tribal Shaikhs of large numbers of men of no great importance in tribal life the status of Shaikh was lowered in the eyes of the Bedouin, and official subsidies to these Shaikhs occasioned much rancour between individuals and sections.

The Fascists revoked the Law of 1919 and reversed the tribal policy of the liberal period. Administration was in future to be as direct as could be—straightforward military rule of a beaten people without use of intermediaries and without tribal co-operation through their leaders. Graziani told his audience at the Fascist Institute of Culture: 'Direct rule will not be an empty phrase, because chiefs and sub-chiefs are going to be abolished; I have withdrawn them from circulation.' He went on to say: 'They will be replaced by old battalion N.C.O.s (*graduati*) made worthy of such employment by services

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[1] Mondaini, op. cit., p. 327.

rendered in fighting faithfully for Italy.' On this point Balbo, 175*
who replaced Graziani, was equally emphatic: 'Chiefs do not 648*
exist any more—there are only citizens with equality of duties 619
and rights.'[1] Tribal Shaikhs, therefore, were not asked to advise the Government or to co-operate with it in any official capacity and the subsidies they had received in the pre-Fascist and early Fascist periods were withdrawn. Cyrenaica under the Fascists was administered by decrees issued by a Governor directly
responsible to the Minister for the Colonies at Rome. Under the [646]
Organic Law of 1927 a General Council with very limited advisory functions was allowed for, and Arabs chosen from the notables of the sedentary population and Shaikhs of the Bedouin tribes could be nominated to sit on it by the Minister for the Colonies on the recommendation of the Governor. Its constitutional importance was nil, because it never came into opera-
tion. It was replaced by the Law-Decree of 1934, by which 175*
Tripolitania and Cyrenaica became a single colony with the 648*
seat of its administration at Tripoli. The new colony was divided 631
into four commissariats (Tripoli, Misurata, Bengasi, and Derna) 619
and a military territory of the Sahara. Each commissariat came under a Prefect and was divided into administrative sections: departments, residencies, and districts, all under Italian officials. It was recognized that the Bedouin were divided into tribes and sub-tribes. At the head of each was a Shaikh chosen in accordance with tribal custom and nominated by the Head of a commissariat. The Shaikh of a tribe was personally responsible to the competent Italian authority for order and security within the tribal territory. His functions and powers were those accorded him by tribal custom. The Shaikhs of the sub-tribes came under his control and had within their sub-tribal areas functions analogous to his. All that this meant was that certain tribal Shaikhs were recognized as such in so far as they were held responsible for any shortcomings of the Bedouin, but were accorded no privileges and had no representation. Consultative councils, where allowed for, were composed of administrative
officials. So long as the Bedouin obeyed the Government and 175*
submitted to whatever curtailments of their freedom and rights 648*
it chose to enact, they could stew in their own juice until the 619

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[1] Italo Balbo, *La Politica Sociale Fascista verso gli Arabi della Libia*, 1938. [113]

*175 *648 Italians had more leisure to devote to breaking up tribal life altogether.

[619] The final decree of the Fascists affecting Arab status was issued in 1939. It incorporated Tripolitania and Cyrenaica within the Kingdom of Italy, and to quiet any dismay this might cause among the Effendiya of the towns it offered them certain privileges, mostly nominal. The decree in no way affected the Bedouin. Indeed very little of the unceasing flow of legislation which poured from the Italian bureaucrats and lawyers in the form of Laws, Royal-Decrees, Royal-Law-Decrees, Ministerial Decrees, and Governatorial Decrees affected the Bedouin. The vast majority of these rules and regulations in no way touched their lives and they remained in blissful ignorance of their content. They had little or no money, they settled their own cases with the aid of their Shaikhs and religious teachers, they made their own trading arrangements, they provided their own labour, and so on. Where a law affected them it could often be eluded or circumvented. As the Bedouin [181] themselves say, '*Sama' min gher ta'a*', 'To hear without obeying', is one of their chief characteristics. The Italians in any case, sitting comfortably in their offices and entirely out of touch with the people, relied on their Cyrenaican police and minor officials to report breaches of regulations, and if they did not choose to do so, the law became a dead letter. Also it cannot be assumed that because there were regulations great efforts were always made to enforce them. 'The gap between the letter of the law and daily practice, wide in all countries, becomes an abyss in Italy.'[1]

With all their regulations and petty interference the Italians were most careful not to offend Arab opinion in religious matters. From the moment of their invasion of Libya they vociferated their respect for Arab custom, culture, and religion. Thus the Minister Bertolini said to the Arabs in a discourse at Tripoli in 1914: 'We will respect your religion and your customs; we know the splendour with which your civilization has already illumined the world and we do not intend in any way to threaten it. . . .'[2] The Italians prided themselves on their Islamic policy and claimed that as a result of it and of their justice and of their

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[1] James Meenan, *The Italian Corporative System*, 1944, p. 340.

[2] Mondaini, op. cit., pp. 327–8.

care for the material welfare of their Muslim subjects their 175*
colonies were the only ones in which the Muslim subjects of 648*
European powers were not in a state of suppressed revolt.[1] Balbo said:

> 'The Government has never favoured in Libya any form of religious proselytism directed to the conversion of Muslims to another faith. On the contrary it has shown its interest in favour of Islamic cult by making important donations for the restoration of old mosques and for the construction of new ones, even in the desert territories where the nomads have never till now been able to kneel to the Almighty in sacred precincts.'[2]

They built mosques, restored the tombs of well-known saints, including that of the most famous of Cyrenaican saints, Sidi Rafa', which their troops had destroyed in the fighting, and celebrated zawiyas (other than those of the Sanusiya Order). They respected Islamic law and custom. While the civil, commercial, and penal codes and their rules of procedure were as in Italy, the personal status and law of inheritance of Muslims were guaranteed in all laws and decrees from the beginning of their occupation, and nothing might be taught in the schools contrary to Islamic principles. They issued ordinances defining the status and duties of the mufti and of qadis and to ensure the proper functioning of the Shari'a Courts and the *auqaf* (religious endowments) administration. They founded a religious training college at Tripoli to serve the two Libyan countries and make it unnecessary for students to go to al-Azhar in Egypt or al-Zaituna in Tunisia for koranic instruction, for in those places they were subject to anti-Italian propaganda. Their prefects attended Islamic ceremonies on important feast-days, especially on the Birthday of the Prophet, and distributed alms on these occasions. The Prefect of Darna even re-established the *zarda*, a festal excursion at the beginning of spring, for the students of the town, though this was hardly an Islamic function. They went further. They built mosques in their concentration camps. They permitted the kuttabs (local koranic schools) to remain open although they disapproved of them. They gave special facilities for the pilgrimage to Mecca and established an Italo-

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[1] R. d. C., 'L'Italia per i suoi sudditi musulmani', *Riv. delle Col. It.*, 1938, pp. 1177-91. [113]

[2] Op. cit., p. 9.

*175 *648 Muslim hospice at al-Madina for the pilgrims. They ensured that the meat of their Muslim troops was prepared in the prescribed manner. In 1937 Balbo, at the request of some of the Muslim notables, forbade the sale of alcoholic drinks in the month of Ramadan. Exhibitions of fakirism by the ecstatic religious Orders were prohibited in 1935 to please the *'Ulama* who regarded them as an undesirable innovation. Mussolini thought, like Napoleon, that it was good policy to build up for himself a reputation of being the defender of Islam. The supreme moment of this burlesque was when the notables of Tripoli presented him on his visit to Libya with 'The Sword of Islam', an event commemorated by a huge equestrian statue in the middle of the town.

*175 *648 829 The Bedouin was not impressed with this Islamic propaganda, which even the more impressionable townsman thought highly ridiculous, especially the building of mosques by Christians. Those the Italians built outside the towns were neglected, for the Bedouin preferred to use his own prayer-places or the mosques of the Sanusiya lodges, where these had not been destroyed, when he felt the need to pray at all. Government qadis were of little interest to him, for in law and custom he followed tribal tradition, and such priestly services as he required were performed by his faqihs and zawiya Shaikhs. If the Italians liked to restore the tombs of his saints he was unconcerned. If they liked to encourage the pilgrimage, so much the better for those who felt the need, unfelt by himself, to make it. *[795] The Bedouin was a Sanusi and the Italians had driven the revered Heads of his Order into exile and had plundered and abolished the Order itself. He could hardly be expected to feel, and certainly did not feel, that the Italians were sincere in their professed respect for Islam.

*175 *648 The Italians based their claim to Arab regard on two considerations, their respect for Islam and their social services. I shall not describe in detail Italian measures designed to raise the standard of culture and living among the Bedouin, for their efforts in this direction were little advanced by 1940, but it is necessary to refer briefly to their educational policy. The Turks had provided instruction only in the towns, only during the last *[795] [794] years of their rule, and only on a very modest scale. The only schools in the Bedouin districts were those of the Sanusiya lodges.

3:Evans-Pritchard E-4, 5 (1942-1944) 1949 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9
(1837-1942) Sanusi

lodges. The Italians, who had some small schools in Libya even before 1911, gave considerable attention to educational matters from the earliest days of their occupation. The first educational programme for Libya, drawn up by the Arabist C. A. Nallino, was not accepted by the Central Government because it was felt that the proposals did not give the Administration effective control over the schools and that consequently education could not be sufficiently directed to political ends. Military conquest must be consolidated by moral conquest. This feeling hardened under the Fascists into an educational policy designed to meet the new programme of colonization. Mixed schools and classes were abolished in favour of schools for Italian boys and schools for Arab boys or, where they had to be taught in the same building, separate classes for each. Teaching, except of the Koran to the most junior pupils, was entirely in the hands of Italians. In the curriculum Italian took precedence over Arabic and it was intended that it should become eventually the sole medium of instruction. Arab boys learnt under the system to write Italian with greater facility than their own language. The aims of this education were to satisfy the cultural ambitions of the Arabs, while keeping them under control and preventing them from reaching a level of cultural equality with the Italians, and to provide minor government officials and a means of intercommunication by which the Arabs could more easily be employed in menial work.[1] It seems that by 1940 there were twenty-three schools for Arabs in Cyrenaica. Some of these were in centres within reach of Bedouin and a number of medical clinics were also opened in Bedouin areas. Less use was made of the schools than of the clinics. 175* 648*

Thus in every department of public life power and authority were retained by the Italians in their own hands and the people of the country had no representation in the Government and were not consulted about plans for their future. It was, however, necessary for the Italians to employ a number of Arabs in minor administrative posts, because they could not themselves make contact with the people, and in the Islamic courts, where they could not themselves function. After 1935, when Italy 175* 648* 563

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[1] Dr. R. Micacchi, 'L'Instruction publique en Libye de 1912 à 1924', *Institut Colonial International*, 1926, and 'L'Enseignement aux indigènes dans les colonies italiennes dépendant directement de la Couronne', ibid. 1931. [113]

*175 *648 563 found herself in none too friendly a world with the added cares of an imperial power, efforts were made to identify more closely with Italian interests those of the better-educated section of the Arab population through this bureaucratic *élite*. If it was to be an asset in the future it would have to be given a larger stake in the administration of the country. Balbo emphasized this requirement in his plan of development. He said in 1938 that he wished to raise the cultural and social level of the Arabs by allowing them to collaborate in greater numbers and more positively in public offices and duties. If such collaboration was still limited and the participation of Arabs in posts of responsibility was still rare it was due 'to the poverty of capable and reliable elements, and certainly not to an obstinate prejudice on the part of the Government'.[1]

This *élite* had to be very small to begin with, for suitable material was, as Balbo wrote in the passage quoted above, hard to find in Cyrenaica. Excluding persons employed in such menial offices as sweepers, door-keepers, and office messengers, and the large numbers of Cyrenaicans in the army and police under Italian officers and N.C.O.s, there were in 1940 only about 150 Arabs employed in the Civil Service. About 100 of these were administrative officials, advisers, mudirs, and sub-mudirs, and the rest were religious functionaries, qadis and officials of the religious courts. The administrative officials had no real authority, their duties being limited to collecting information about the Arab population and circulating among it the instructions of the Government. They were treated as servants in the domestic rather than in the public sense and they were ill-paid. Nevertheless, through their many social contacts with their fellow countrymen they exercised more influence than the Italians would have wished, and the Italians were, owing to their ignorance of Arabic and of Arab ways of life and thought, very largely in their hands. They undoubtedly deceived their masters to their own advantage and in the interests of their fellow countrymen. These Arab bureaucrats were townsmen, mostly from Banghazi and Darna. Some were members of respectable urban families of Turkish days, such as the Banghazi families of Bin 'Amir, Bsaikri, Biju, and 'Anaisi, and the Darna families of Bannani, Darbi, Dillal, and

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[1] Italo Balbo, op. cit., p. 15.

Jarbi, and had been educated in Turco-Arab schools in the 175*
country, and a few at Istanbul. Most, however, were less 648*
reputable and had a record of close and active collaboration
with the Italians as informers, spies, guides, interpreters, leaders 563
of 'friendlies', and overseers in concentration camps. When the fighting was over the Italians felt under an obligation to these men, their only friends in the country, and rewarded them with administrative posts for which they had few qualifications. It is not surprising that later they often found them an embarrassment and had to admit that the Bedouin for preference avoided their company. Before the last European war they were being slowly replaced by a new class of officials brought up in the towns under Italian rule and educated in Italo-Arab schools. These *évolués* showed a marked preoccupation with their own affairs and little inclination to use their superior education for the benefit of their own people in the towns, while their repugnance to the Bedouin made them regard a posting to one of the country districts as a punishment. But if they had no strong sense of loyalty to their own people they likewise had none to their masters. They might join Fascist clubs and syndics and apply for special Italian citizenship but they did so passively, without conviction that these things would mean more to them than payment of subscriptions. They knew moreover that the [167]
swarms of Italian immigrants settling like locusts on Cyrenaica would spell disaster to them no less than to the rest of the Arab population. It is not surprising, therefore, to find that during the late war the Italians watched them closely for *disfattismo politico*, and not without cause, for they showed themselves very ready to co-operate with the British during their first two occupations of Cyrenaica, and some, including ten senior officials, showed themselves so openly anti-Italian during these periods that they thought it wise to retire with the British forces in their second retreat to Egypt.

The Bedouin accepted all these Italian measures, good and 175*
bad, with resignation and indifference. They were powerless 648*
to oppose them, but as far as possible they ignored them. Plagued with concentration camps, loss of stock, confiscation of arms, rape of sowing and pasture grounds, the pass system, corrupt officials, and neglect of their Shaikhs, they found the odd mosque, school, and clinic poor consolation and retired

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into the strongholds of their tribal and kinship systems. Two exclusive societies, the colonial and bureaucratic Italian community and the Bedouin tribal community, lived side by side with the most slight and occasional contact between them. For the most part Italian and Bedouin lived as though the other did not exist. Brought up against a tribal solidarity which excluded them and ignored them, the Italians began to realize that they would not make any impression on the Bedouin without totally destroying their tribal and kinship institutions. This Balbo set about doing. 'Patriarchal agriculture' was to be broken down and replaced by individual ownership within Fascist corporations. Tribal and lineage ownership of wells was abolished. 'The epoch of the clan is about to pass for ever in these provinces.' A new type of Italo-Libyan citizen was to be created who would fit into the structure of the corporate Fascist state.

> 'The participation of the Libyan Arab in our social life begins at the tenderest age, whether in the company of scholars at our schools established at every centre or with the enrolment of the boys in the formations of the G.A.L.;[1] becomes perfected by military service; will continue afterwards, whatever may be the occupation of the individual in the following years, assiduous and uninterrupted, so that the personality of each emerges from the traditional and primitive ethnic group to integrate itself within the ambit of the Municipalities, of the Residencies, of the Departments, of the Prefectures, and of the Colony.'[2]

The stress placed on the building up of an Arab personality based on participation in various State organizations in place of the traditional Bedouin personality moulded in tribal and kinship groups was, of course, particularly Fascist. 'Therefore, for the Fascist', wrote Mussolini in the *Enciclopedia Italiana*, 'everything is in the State, and nothing human or spiritual exists, much less has value, outside the State.'[3] In the midst of their conceit and ignorance the Fascists had at least this grain of virtue: they said that they were trying to do what they were trying to do. Aiming in their native policy at a combination of political domination with social justice, they repudiated what they regarded as the British system of a small ruling class of

[1] The Arab Fascist Youth organization.

[2] Ibid., pp. 21-2.

[3] 'The Doctrine of Fascism', 1932.

Weisse Götter, who avoided all contact with the natives that was 175* not unavoidable, and they rejected also the French policy of 648* cultural assimilation and social and political equality with the *évolués*.[1] In 1938 the Under-Secretary for Italian Africa, Teruzzi, the ex-Governor of Cyrenaica, described the fundamental principle of Fascist native policy as a steering between the Anglo-Saxon colour bar and the French policy of assimilation which was not merely a middle course but an entirely new direction. At the same time he rejected the concept of indirect rule 'which leaves to the native chiefs very wide autonomy, not only administrative but also political, and which leads therefore inevitably to a slow detachment of the colony from the mother country'. The Italian policy was to regard their colonies as extensions of Italy beyond the seas.[2]

Had the Italians been content, as in the first years of their 175* occupation, to restrict their immigration to the towns, where 648* there was scope for a new element as traders, artisans, officials, 167 and professional men, a symbiosis might have developed, for the Arabs were at that time incapable of these functions on an adequate scale, and the problem of adjustment might never have become acute; but when they began to organize mass colonization of the country-side, questions of status and racial interrelations appeared to present no other solution than that proposed. Even had racial miscegenation not been prohibited it could hardly have taken place between Catholic Italians and Muslim Arabs. Cultural assimilation was also unlikely because both Italians and Arabs were civilized peoples with a long cultural history behind them and it was most improbable that the Arabs would give up their religion, law, and language. No other solution seemed feasible, therefore, than that advocated by Balbo, the policy of parallel development in cultural matters and structural co-ordination within the framework of the Fascist State. The Arabs were to remain Arabs in speech, religion, personal law, customs, and manners, but their tribal structure was to disappear and its place was to be taken by political and economic institutions similar to those of their Italian fellow Libyans. 'We shall have in Libya not rulers and ruled, but

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[1] Oskar Schmieder and Herbert Wilhelmy, *Die faschistische Kolonisation in Nordafrika*, 1939, pp. 79–80. [113]

[2] Italo Neri, 'Politica Indigena', *Riv. delle Col. It.*, 1938, pp. 1391–2. [113]

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Catholic Italians and Muslim Italians, the one and the other united in the enviable fortune of being the constructive elements in a great and mighty organism, the Fascist Empire. Rome will thus show herself to be once again and always the grand and fruitful Mother of peoples.'[1] Arabs and Italians would share like institutions in the same corporate State, though remaining culturally and racially distinct, it being understood, however, that the institutions would be like, not common, and that the Italian colonists and officials would always occupy a superior position politically and economically.

It was hoped that when the Bedouin tribal and kinship structure had been broken down and their social life had been remodelled on Fascist corporative lines, both Arabs and colonists would accept a situation they could not alter and tolerate each other in the realization that, though their immediate interests might sometimes clash, co-operation was to the final advantage of both. It was believed also that any jealousy the Arabs might feel about the disparity between the political status and economic privileges of the two peoples would be overcome by the natural aptitude of all Italians for meeting other peoples as social equals. In the end the two races would feel themselves bound together by a community of economic interests in loyalty to a common *Patria* and a common *Duce*. Clearly such rugged individualists as the Bedouin were did not fit into this picture. The Bedouin would, therefore, have to go.

In pursuance of this policy of parallel development the Italians under Balbo's direction made serious efforts to improve the material condition of the Arabs. New wells were dug, stock was improved, zootechnical stations were started, and educational and medical services were expanded. An effort was made to persuade the Arabs that they would receive consideration commensurate with that accorded by a paternal administration to its own nationals. Arab agricultural villages were built as well as metropolitan agricultural villages, metropolitan schools were balanced by Arab schools, the hospitals had Arab wards as well as Italian wards, there were Colonial battalions and Libyan battalions, there were Colonial Fascist organizations and Arab Fascist organizations, and the Government built mosques as well as churches. It may be doubted whether these

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[1] Op. cit., p. 22.

3:Evans-Pritchard E-4, 5 (1942-1944) 1949 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9
(1837-1942) Sanusi

measures would have convinced the Bedouin that they were compensated for the loss of their kinsmen, their lands, and their independence. In the event they were inadequate and they came too late. 175* 648* [167]

Italian policy in Cyrenaica, like the colonial policies of other European powers, was full of contradictions. It is not within the scope of this book to discuss them, but I would draw the reader's attention to the changes this policy underwent during the thirty years between their occupation of the country and their embroilment in the late war. They were tactical changes demanded by the development of local, domestic, and international situations. There was no fundamental difference between the aims of the Fascist Government and the aims of pre-Fascist Governments. All intended to wrest Cyrenaica from its inhabitants by force of arms and by peopling it with Italians to exploit it for Italian economic, political, and above all strategic, purposes. [167] They were attempting no more than other Colonial Powers had done before them, but they had waited too long, till the tide of colonial expansion was turning and the right of Europeans to rob native peoples of their lands was beginning to be challenged. Even so, it was not of their choosing or out of deference to humane considerations, but on account of military weakness and incompetence, that they made a truce with the Sanusi in 1917, and on account of domestic difficulties that they prolonged this truce to 1923. As soon as Mussolini had restored order in Italy he resumed the war Giolitti had begun, although he had been one of the most hostile critics of it at the time. When Graziani had crushed resistance the original plan of colonization was acted on. The migratory swarms from Italy of peasants, officials, traders, and hangers-on of all kinds, threatened the very existence of the Bedouin, who saw themselves being forced either to eke out their lives in the desert as a scarcely tolerated class of shepherds or to sink to the level of landless wage-earners in the country districts and of unskilled labourers in the towns. 175* 648* 167 The Italians intended this to be their fate,[1] and it might well have been if events in Europe had not

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[1] Giuseppe Daodiace, 'Latinità e colonizzazione nell' Africa del nord', *Riv. delle Col. e d'Oriente*, Feb. 1927, pp. 13–14; Filippo Lo Bello, *Rivista Coloniale*, 1925, p. 38; and Paolo D'Agostini Orsini di Camerota, *L'Italia nella politica africana*, 1926, p. 132. [113]

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first caused misgivings in Rome and afterwards led to the destruction of the Italian armies in North Africa and their ejection from the continent. A sullen Arab population in Cyrenaica and Tripolitania and a hostile Arab and Muslim world were, in view of the coming storm, so clearly contrary to Italian interests that a more conciliatory policy, at any rate in words, was adopted and Balbo was entrusted with the difficult task of putting it in effect against a background of slaughter and repression. Once again the Italians had waited too long.

III

The ups and downs of Italian fortunes in Cyrenaica and in the world are reflected in the various decrees which defined the juridical status of the Arabs. In giving a brief account of these decrees it must be kept in mind that whilst they referred to the whole Arab population they really affected only the Arabs of the towns, and even in the towns only those few persons, mostly officials, who actively collaborated with the Italians; and that till 1932 the Italians had no certain or complete control outside the towns.

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At the beginning of the first Italo-Sanusi war the Arabs were in law Turkish subjects. By a Royal Decree of 5 November 1911, Tripolitania and Cyrenaica were declared to be under the full sovereignty of the Kingdom of Italy. The status of the Cyrenaican Arabs was fixed by the Royal Decree of 6 April 1913, which declared all born in the country, wherever resident, to be *sudditi italiani*, provided they were not Italian citizens or foreign citizens or subjects. They retained their Muslim personal law, but were subject in other respects to whatever regulations the Italians saw fit to impose on them. They were permitted to hold posts in the armed forces and administration of the colony, and persons desirous of acquiring Italian citizenship might apply for it if they possessed residential qualifications, though by taking it they became subject to Italian personal law. These early decrees were more in the nature of administrative than constitutional law. A constitution, in the continental sense, was promulgated in 1919 after the Italians had signed a truce with the Sanusi.

The agreements entered into with the Sanusi between 1917

and 1922 and the efforts made by the Italians during those years to build up a democratic system of government in Cyrenaica were, as we have seen, largely due to defeatism and political unrest at home, but they sprang also from a genuine belief in peace and Wilsonian principles among the men at that time in power in Italy. It is possible that the local Governor, Giacomo de Martino, also believed in them. Early in his term of office the Royal Decree of 31 October 1919, called the *Legge Fondamentale per la Cirenaica*, was promulgated. The natives of the country who were not *cittadini italiani metropolitani* were defined as *cittadini italiani* and thus received status equal to that of Italians, but not identical with it, because the Arabs kept their Muslim personal law. They also enjoyed guarantees of personal liberty, inviolability of domicile and property, the right to compete in military and civil careers and professions, even in the Kingdom of Italy, electoral rights (a local Parliament was set up at Banghazi), the right of petition to the National Parliament, and rights of sojourn and emigration. Respect of religion and local custom was guaranteed, liberty of the press and right of meeting were recognized, citizens could not be conscripted for military service, no fiscal tribute could be imposed which was not the same for all or without consent of the local Parliament, revenue from taxes was to be used for Cyrenaican purposes exclusively, the Arabic language was compulsory in the teaching of certain subjects in the schools and in certain official publications, and no precepts contrary to Islam were to be taught. In general, all the inhabitants of Cyrenaica, whether Arab or Italian, were equal before the law. An adult Arab could acquire metropolitan citizenship if he fulfilled certain conditions. The decree revoked the earlier one of 6 April 1913 relating to Italian subjects, and other decrees and laws, though not formally abrogated, seem to have lapsed by substitution save in so far as some of the administrative machinery created by them remained of necessity in operation.

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This basic law of 1919 was as unwise as it was generous. The Bedouin may have enjoyed the elections, but to have formally handed over the country to the Arabs was detrimental to Italian prestige, for it was a confession that the Italians were unable to control it themselves. Moreover, the Chamber of Deputies, which was to the Bedouin a glorified *mi'ad*, or Shaikhs' gathering, *175 *648 641 was expected to run the country with machinery with which they were totally unacquainted. Arabs being what they are, and circumstances being what they were in 1919, the constitution could hardly have been other than a failure. Indeed it is not surprising that Fascist writers later poured scorn on these well-meant efforts of pluto-democracy.[1] They were particularly shocked by the grant of Italian citizenship to the Arabs, especially as these same Arabs were exempted from compulsory military service. Under Federzoni, the first Fascist Minister for the Colonies, policy was in this matter, as in others, completely reversed. All agreements with the Sanusi were, as has been noted, torn up, and into the waste-paper basket with them went the local Parliament and the constitution of 1919. In its place was issued by the Royal Decree of 26 June 1927 the *Legge Organica per l'Amministrazione della Tripolitania e della Cirenaica*. In a sense this was a new, and Fascist, constitution though its constitutional content was subordinated to its administrative and judicial content. By it the Arabs ceased to be *cittadini italiani* and became *cittadini italiani libici*, they lost the right to free exercise of military and civil careers outside the colonies, electoral rights (parliament had in any case been abolished), the right to petition to the National Parliament, &c., and there was no mention of the liberty of the press, of the right of meeting, of freedom from military conscription, and of the protection of the Arabic language in public instruction. In general, the Arabs were no longer equal with the Italians before the law. Metropolitan citizenship might still be asked for under certain conditions. Application of this decree was several times postponed and it appears never to have come into operation.

*175 *648 Bedouin resistance in both Tripolitania and Cyrenaica still caused the Italians much trouble even as late as 1929 and on both military and political grounds it was deemed advisable to place the two countries under single direction. This was done by the Royal Decree of 24 January 1929 which placed the two colonies under Pietro Badoglio and by the Royal Decree of 3 December 1934, *Ordinamento Organico per l'Amministrazione della Libia*, which, as described in the last section, divided the single colony into four provincial commissariats and a mili-

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[1] Alberto Stern, 'Il nuovo Ordinamento Fondamentale della Tripolitania e della Cirenaica', *Rivista delle Colonie Italiane*, 1934, p. 1027.

tary command of the Sahara. The other Articles of the 1934 175*
decree were designed chiefly to meet the new conditions arising, 648*
or likely to arise, from colonization by nationals. In no important respect did it alter the status of the Arab population or what rights it still possessed. In the first enthusiasm of turning Libya into a metropolitan colony the Arabs were of secondary interest to those who made the laws.

In view of the coming struggle between the powers of Europe, 175*
already seen by Mussolini to be inevitable, the Italian Govern-
ment considered it advisable to pay more attention to the feel- 648*
ings of its colonists and native peoples. To encourage the 167
colonists already in the country and those about to join them from Italy a Royal Decree was promulgated on 9 January 1939 declaring Libya to be an integral part of the Kingdom of Italy, its four provinces becoming the ninety-seventh, ninety-eighth, ninety-ninth, and hundredth provinces of the Kingdom. The military status of the Libyan Sahara remained unchanged. The colonists no longer had to feel that they had left their fatherland for inhospitable shores. The *Colonia* had become *Terra Italiana*. The *Quarta Sponda*, Italy's Fourth Shore, had
become a political fact. At the same time, to quiet any uneasi- 175*
ness which the incorporation of their country in the Kingdom of 648*
Italy might create among those educated Arabs whose services 641
the Italians needed, and to implement the promise Mussolini 563
had made during his tour of Libya in 1937 that he would remember the part played by Libyan volunteers in the Ethiopian campaign, the Decree offered the Arabs a new special citizenship which took the place of the right of acquiring metropolitan citizenship allowed in the earlier decrees and now abrogated. That the Italians had attached importance to the partial assimilation of a small *élite* of natives is shown by the retention of the right of acquiring metropolitan citizenship through all the decrees and laws, from the invasion of Libya in 1911 till the present decree, in both pre-Fascist and Fascist times. It had been found, however, that the Arabs had not availed themselves of the privilege. Employees of the administration could not feel that any advantages they might derive from it could compensate them for loss of status before the religious courts in matters of personal law, a loss considered shameful even by whole-hearted collaborators. Also, the new special citizenship,

*175 *cittadinanza italiana speciale*, was more in accordance with
*648 Balbo's policy of parallel development than acquisition of
641 metropolitan citizenship.

563 The new special citizenship could be acquired, without prejudice to Muslim personal law, by persons who had reached the age of eighteen, provided they had a good record and had in some way or other served the State or could read and write Italian. The status carried with it certain privileges: the right to bear arms, the right to be inscribed in the Arab Blackshirt Organization, the right to a military career in Libyan units (now withdrawn from other Libyans), the right to become mayor in Arab communities and adviser in mixed Italo-Arab communities, and the right to come under the *Ordinamento sindacale-corporativo*, an ordinance by which the Fascist guild system had been adapted to suit colonial conditions, and to take some part in the activities of these guilds. These rights could be exercised only in Italian African territories and no Arab could, in any case, occupy posts or practise professions which would necessitate Italians serving under him.

The reception of the new decree by the colonists and by Arab employees of the Administration was enthusiastic. It may be doubted, however, whether the sentiments expressed by the mudirs, the qadis, and some of the richer merchants, in the telegrams of thanks they sent to Mussolini and Balbo were felt. It was tacitly assumed to be a condition of continued employment that special citizenship should be applied for. The first batch of diplomas included ninety Cyrenaican names, almost all of native officials and government pensioners of the urban centres: the decree could not have been of the slightest interest to the Bedouin. Conscription for military service followed shortly afterwards. Of their bounty the Italians had given to the Arabs of Cyrenaica a *Patria, l'Italia Fascista*, and they were expected to show their gratitude by fighting for it. On 10 June 1940 Italy entered the war on the side of Germany.

Thus in 1911 the Arabs of Cyrenaica became enemy subjects and were afterwards declared to be Italian subjects. In 1919 they became Italian citizens. When the Italians renewed operations against them in 1923 those who resisted were declared to be *ribelli*. Under the Fascists they lost the Italian citizenship they had been granted under the democratic régime of 1919 and

became instead Italian-Libyan citizens. In 1939 they were 175*
granted the privilege of applying, if they had the necessary 648*
qualifications, for a special Italian citizenship, a status half-way 641
between that of the ordinary Arab of the country and that of 563
the Italian colonists. There were, therefore, in Cyrenaica in 1940 three categories of citizenship, that of the *cittadini metropolitani*, Italian settlers and officials, that of the *cittadini italiani speciali*, a small intermediate urban class of educated Arab officials, and that of the *cittadini italiani libici* (*musulmani*), which comprised almost the entire native population of the country. These changes in the civil status of the Arabs were to a considerable extent a response to the development of the
political situation in Cyrenaica itself. The Royal Decree of 175*
1913 was an optimistic anticipation of easy victory; the Royal 648*
Decree of 1919 was an acknowledgement of political and 641
military failure; the Royal Decree of 1927 was a sign that apathy and compromise had given way to determination to fight the Bedouin if necessary, and even by preference, to the point of extermination; the Royal Decree of 1934 marked the end of all resistance and envisaged the settlement of Italian colonists on the best lands of the country; and the Royal Decree of 1939 signalled the realization of this programme and at the same time made a bid for co-operation of the Arab intelligentsia. But to an equal extent the changes in civil status were determined by political events in Italy and in Europe. The Royal Decree of 1913 was a plain colonial declaration such as any European Power would have made in similar circumstances. In 1919 Italian politics were defeatist, demagogic, socialist, and internationalist, and the Royal Decree of that year was a stew of these ingredients. The Royal Decrees of 1927 and 1934 were typical Fascist pieces of legislation with emphasis on State requirements rather than on citizenship and the rights of the individual, and showed a strong bias towards bureaucratic centralization and hypertrophy. The Royal Decree of 1939 bore the stamp of empire.

IV

The Bedouin were altogether unimpressed either by Italian 175*
propaganda or by their social services, and they did not believe 648*
in their promises of future benefits. *'Bukra al-'id'*, 'The feast

*175 *648 day is always just ahead', as they say. Nothing could compensate them for the loss of their lands taken from them to make farms for Italian immigrants.

*175 *648 167 When the Italians invaded Libya in 1911 they did so not only to keep other European powers out of it but also to provide an outlet for their surplus population.[1] Sentiment also played a great part in their plans, especially under the Fascists. In classical times and for over a thousand years Europeans had flourished in Cyrenaica, and the country had once been part of the Roman Empire. To sentiment were added plausible arguments of an economic kind. Italy imported some of her elementary requirements, such as grain and oil, from countries controlled by other European powers and it was hoped that her Libyan colonies might supply part of these and so, through colonization, make a contribution to the autarchy its rulers aimed at. But sentiment and demographic and economic aims weighed less in the calculations of Italy's leaders than the political and strategic advantages likely to accrue from the adventure, both of which would be served by colonization.

It was, of course, well known to the Italians that only a small portion of Cyrenaica, part of the plateau, was suitable for European colonization. The findings of the Anglo-Jewish commission of 1908 had been far from encouraging, for they expressed the opinion that Cyrenaica could not take more than about three hundred thousand colonists in addition to the existing population, even when the maximum point of exploitation had been reached.[2] Many Italians also were sceptical about the advantages of the country for colonial settlement, but most took the more optimistic view and believed, or affected to believe, that an America lay opposite their shores. Indeed, as Despois observes, many Italian books and articles on colonization of Libya 'lack the most elementary competence or the least critical sense.'[3] But though there was much disagreement about the saturation point most Italian writers accepted that political control and colonization must go hand in hand.

In the first years of Italian occupation political conditions did not permit colonization on any scale. It was restricted to cereal culture in comparatively safe areas near Banghazi and

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[1] Mondaini, op. cit., p. 257, seq.

[2] Gregory, op. cit., pp. 12–14.

[3] Op. cit., p. 137.

behind barbed wire in the vicinity of al-Marj and al-Abyar, and 175*
up to the end of 1926 there were only 13 colonists, possessing 648*
630 hectares. Even by the end of 1932, in spite of Teruzzi's 167
fervent efforts and the personal interest of Mussolini, there were still only about 90 Italian farms in the whole country and the farming, mostly by concessions and private company settling, was often uneconomic and incompetent. Exploitation of this kind clearly did nothing to relieve over-population in Italy and was certainly not at all what had been advertised as '*colonizzazione di popolamento*', so in 1932 there was formed by the State, and coming as time went on more and more under State control and supported by public funds, a parastatal corporation called the *Ente per la colonizzazione della Cirenaica* and, after its extension to operate also in Tripolitania, the *Ente per la colonizzazione della Libia*. The *Ente* began in a small way in Cyrenaica in 1933. The lands immediately allotted to it were 30,000 hectares in the black soil country of Shahhat-Safsaf, 4,000 hectares near al-Zawiya al-Baida, and 5,500 hectares in the neighbourhood of al-Marj. The first experimental operations were begun in the Shahhat and al-Zawiya al-Baida areas, a fertile region with a climate like that with which the colonists were familiar in their homeland. In this smiling country of the juniper, the lentisk, and the cypress began to spring up the little white Italian farms: in 1933 at Beda Littoria and Luigi di Savoia, in 1934 at Luigi Razza and Giovanni Berta, and in 1936 at Maddalena. But the progress of colonization was not quick enough for the Fascist junta—only some 300 families had been settled—and it was decided to quicken the pace, especially in view of the rapidly deteriorating situation in Europe. By the spring of 1937 there were over 700 colonist families in Cyrenaica. The pace was forced in 1938 by State-directed immigration in mass. The unit of this demographic immigration was the family, so that each farm would be a self-contained economic unit run on its own labour. The farms had been prepared and the houses built in advance and furnished down to the last pot and pan. Each farm was part of a village and attached to a centre comprising all that a paternal State considered necessary for the bodies, minds, and souls of its citizens: a clinic, a granary, a school, a Fascist club, administrative offices, and a church and priest's house.

*175 *648 167 The first 20,000 new colonists for Libya were given a tremendous send-off in March 1938 and their settlement was completed during the following eight months. Those who came to Cyrenaica, probably more than half of the 20,000, partly went to complete the villages already in existence and partly to occupy the new holdings prepared for them at Baracca, Oberdan, D'Annunzio, and Battisti. The Cyrenaican quota of another 20,000 immigrants, the second wave of demographic colonization, was supposed to have followed in October 1939 to constitute the population of the newly constructed villages of Mameli, Sauro, and Filzi, but not all of them appear to have arrived. These two waves of mass immigration brought the number of farms to over 2,000 and the number of agricultural colonists to over 15,000 persons, making round about 50,000 Italian colonists of all kinds. Northern Cyrenaica had become in population and in appearance, as well as in law, part of Italy. Banghazi and Darna had become modern Italian towns which might well have been on the shores of Sicily or southern Italy. Modern roads cut through the plateau and for mile after mile were lined with Italian farmhouses and every few miles bisected Italian village centres. A railway ran from Banghazi to Suluq and from Banghazi to al-Marj and was in process of extension to Darna. An aqueduct was being built to carry water from Mara, near Darna, to the colonial villages as far to the west as those on the farther edge of the plain of al-Marj. Banghazi had been made into a modern port. Airlines to Banghazi ran from Rome, Tripoli, and Tubruq.

I have given a short sketch of Italian colonization of Cyrenaica only in order that the effect it had on the Bedouin may be better understood, for what concerns us is the fate of Muhammad, Mehemmed, Ahmad, and Abu Bakr, who with their flocks and herds were driven from the more fertile parts of the plateau to make way for Michele, Antonio, Italo, and Cesare. For over twenty years the Italians had been unable to colonize Cyrenaica for, as Graziani bluntly observed, 'It is plain that when one is making war one cannot plant trees, neither can one sow corn.'[1] Once resistance had been overcome it was merely a question of finding a legal formula for depriving the owners of the land of

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[113] [1] 'Panorama economico della Cirenaica', *Rivista delle Colonie Italiane*, 1933, p. 295.

their rights in it, and this presented no more difficulty to the 175*
lawyers than the discovery of a formula to cover confiscation of 648*
the Sanusiya properties had done. 167

Ancient rights in the lands of Cyrenaica rested with the 175*
Sa'adi tribes and whatever tribal fragments they permitted to 648*
reside there by grace. Disputes about ownership had been 423
settled either by war or through discussion between the groups 619
concerned in them, sometimes with the aid of Turkish officials [795]
or Marabouts, particularly of the Shaikhs of Sanusiya lodges [578]
after the Order had become established in the country. In 1858 the Ottoman Government, under pressure of Western ideas, promulgated a land code in all parts of the empire, and to put it into effect in Cyrenaica the Governor, Khalil Sami Pasha (1863–8), appointed a committee which declared the lands round Banghazi and Darna to be for the use of these towns and the rest of the country for the use of the tribes in occupation of it, except for barren hills and deserts which, like woods and roads, were regarded as the natural demesne of the State. The tribal boundaries of to-day were finally fixed by this committee, though the fixing of them was less an adjudication than a recording of existing conditions.

The new Turkish land code operated in the towns and just outside them and was not applied to tribal lands and grazing grounds, and the tribes were not asked to acquire a title to their lands by registration of them. This would have been an impossible task, and the Turks were in any case too wise to meddle with Bedouin lands, knowing that the Bedouin would not have consented to change or interference of any kind. Nevertheless the State claimed all tribal lands not bearing buildings or plantations as *miri*, public demesne, and from a legal point of view it was in virtue of this absolute and residuary ownership that it taxed the tribal occupiers and users of the land. This was a legal formalism which made no difference to anyone since the Government had neither the wish nor the power to exploit the lands and accepted that the tribes had rights of use, the *tassaruf*, in them in perpetuity. The Italian Land Registry, created in 1913 on the basis of the Turkish registers, followed Turkish practice in this matter, classing tribal lands as State demesne in which the occupiers had rights of use, and also in allowing tribal disputes to be settled by tribal custom, which

*175 the Italians called *Sa'adi* law. In 1923 the Land Registry, which
*648 had hitherto restricted its attention to urban properties, took
423 the first steps towards an assessment of tribal lands and by the
619 end of 1932 had registered in the name of the Colony 120,790
hectares, a large part of which was already marked for colonial settlement. The lands were acquired by 'natural right' (9,124 Ha.), by purchase, expropriation, and renunciation (43,441 Ha.), and by confiscation of Sanusiya estates (62,225 Ha.) and of properties of persons fighting in patriot bands and classed as rebels against the State (6,000 Ha.). However, expropriation for purposes of public utility and purchase were found to be slow, expensive, inadequate, and, in the political circumstances, inopportune methods of acquiring land for colonial settlement. Both also led to most complicated disputes about the distribution of the compensation in a country where every member of a tribe had preemptive rights of some degree in all its lands. In 1928 a new system was therefore adopted. The State in virtue of its supreme authority asked the owners of the lands considered useful to the State to renounce their rights in them. Compensation was to be divided equally among the various participants in the *tassaruf*.

*175 No action of the kind allowed for in the new decrees was, or
*648 could be, taken till the Bedouin had been subdued. It would
have been useless to attempt to register the lands of the Bedouin
423 in the name of the State on those parts of the plateau in
which the guerrillas still operated freely, and to have attempted to register them in the submitted areas would merely have driven the population to renewed revolt. Action does not seem to have been taken till 1935–6 and it was then taken in a form which is said to have disgusted even some of the lawyers. Proclamations covering the lands required for colonial settlement were drawn up and it was stated in them that the particular lands to which each referred were State property and that if no objection were raised by a certain date they would be registered in the name of the State. The proclamations were published by being fixed to official notice-boards in the Land Department and municipalities, but they were not published on the lands concerned, or anywhere near them, so that the Bedouin, even had they any idea of what the procedure was, and even could they have read the proclamations, did not in

any case see them. Consequently no objections were raised— 175*
had they been raised no attention would have been paid to 648*
them—and there was legal presumption of State ownership in 423
the fullest sense. The judges, therefore, ordered registration of
the new lands in the name of the Colony. They comprised [167]
about 450,000 hectares, about a quarter of which were immediately
allotted to the *Ente* for colonization. It will be noted
that the State had already, before this action was taken, been
bare owner of the lands as heir to the Turkish *miri* property.
What it now gained in addition was, in the opinion of its lawyers,
the *possesso utile*. They held further that compensation of those
deprived of the use of the lands, while perhaps unnecessary,
added to the juridical rigour of the proceeding. In other words,
in order to make it look a little less like common robbery it was
decided to make a parade of indemnification. The areas to be
taken over were estimated in a non-technical way by a surveyor
and a clerk of the Land Registry, and the supposed owners were
summoned, told that their lands were worth so much, and that
this sum would be handed over to them by the Government.
Tables of succession showing the share in the land of the various
members of the local group who owned it had already been
prepared, and if the representatives of this tribal section agreed
to the proposal the money could then be paid over on demand.

Whether the Bedouin took the money offered in compensation
or not they still lost their lands. For this reason most of them
took it. Though compensation was in this way offered, the
document to which the recipients of it had to affix their seals
or thumb-prints was not a contractual agreement for sale and
purchase nor an edict of expropriation for public utility purposes,
but it was a simple declaration by the owner that he
renounced all his rights in the land and transferred them to the
State. The Italians had now got all the lands in Cyrenaica
which were of any immediate use to them. They had only to [167]
allot them to colonists and register them technically as they
were required for settlement. The target figure for the zone of
colonization was 900,000 hectares.[1]

There remained the question of the Bedouin who had been 175*
driven off the lands of their fathers. Clearly they could not be 648*
allowed to lead their nomadic life amid the Italian cultiva- 423
233

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[1] *La Nuova Italia d'Oltremare*, vol. i, p. 552.

[TEXT CONTINUED ON PAGE 225]


Apollonia
Luigi Razza
CIRENE
Giovanni Berta
DERNA
Tolmeta
Beda Littoria
Luigi di Savoia
Oberdan
Maddalena
Tocra
BARCE
Baracca
Tecnis
Maraua
Slonta
Driana
el Abiar
BENGASI
Boundary of area to be colonised
Boundary of area for Organised Government Settlement
Narrow gauge railway
Main roads
Tracks for passage of Arab Flocks
Provincial boundary (Bengasi Province)
Scale
0
25
50
75
100 kms.

The Italian plan for the colonization of northern Cyrenaica.

*175 [P. 224]
*648
102
167
487
233
131

3:Evans-Pritchard E-4,5 (1942-1944) 1949 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9
(1837-1942)
Sanusi

tions and gardens. On the other hand, it was recognized that if 175*
they were to be able to lead a nomadic life at all, and they 648*
had to do so if they were to rear their animals, they must have 423
access to water-supplies and grazing-grounds, and that this 233
would sometimes mean their crossing the plateau through the
area of Italian colonization. To solve this problem corridors [487]
running north and south across the plateau were, as explained
in an earlier section, marked out for the transit of Bedouin
flocks and herds.

It was envisaged that the Bedouin would continue to lead
a predominantly pastoral life on the more rugged parts of
the first terrace of the plateau, on its southern slopes, and in the
steppe country of the *sirwal*, the *barqa*, the Marmarica, and the
Sirtica. It was thought that they had in these areas all the land
they needed for grazing and catch-crop cultivation, though it
was evident that in years of drought they could not have
managed to survive without summer grazing on the plateau.
Nevertheless, efforts were made to raise the economic level of 175*
the Bedouin by improving their methods of cultivation and 648*
stock-raising so that, as both producers and labourers, they [511]
might be more valuable an adjunct to Italian husbandry, and
might become more dependent on the State and more closely
linked with metropolitan activities. It was intended that they [464]
should constitute a cheap reserve of labour for general unskilled
work and for seasonal labour on the farms of the colonists. By
using them in this way it was hoped that it would be possible
to avoid the growth of a metropolitan proletariat.[1] These efforts 175*
included, largely for political reasons, the creation of Arab 648*
colonization centres. Agricultural villages and farms were to 167
be built by the *Ente* similar to, but smaller than, those built for 563
the Italian immigrants. The first two such villages, Fiorita and
Alba, were built in 1939. Each Arab farming family was provided with a house, a well, a camel, a cow, and farm implements.
Like the Italian, the Arab colonist was to be first salaried
labourer, then partner with the State, then mortgagor, and
finally owner. As only thirty-two holdings were prepared at
Fiorita and Alba the contribution to native agriculture cannot
be regarded as more than a token one. Moreover, the Italians
experienced difficulty in finding Arab colonists for even these

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[1] Ibid., p. 622.

3:Evans-Pritchard E-4, 5 (1942-1944) 1949 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9
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*175 thirty-two holdings, for the Bedouin showed no inclination to
*648 work as serfs the lands they had worked as freemen: 'In their
[167 daily attitude coldness and scepticism were apparent so that
563] the part they took in collaborating was purely formal.'[1] A
pastoral village, furnished with veterinary and stud services and offices for the collection, classification, and weighing of wool, was built at Nahiba (Jardis al-'Abid) and another was planned to be built at Verde (Jardis al-Jarrari). Some may consider that these measures are evidence of Balbo's sincerity. The Bedouin believed that he intended to destroy them by guile as surely as Graziani had destroyed them with machine-gun and bomb.

V

When Giolitti landed troops in Cyrenaica and Tripolitania in 1911 he started his country on the road to ruin. The first Libyan war was from 1911 to 1917. In the midst of it Italy was involved, from 1915 to 1918, in the first Great War. From 1921 to 1932 she was again engaged in prosecuting her colonial war in Libya, first in Tripolitania, then in Cyrenaica also. From 1934 to 1936 she participated in the Spanish civil war. In 1935 and 1936 she conquered Ethiopia. In 1939 she seized Albania. From 1940 to 1944 she was engaged in the second Great War. It was appropriate that disaster should overcome the Italians in Cyrenaica, that the Bedouin of that country who had suffered so much at their hands should witness their humiliation, and that it should fall on the head of Graziani, who became Governor of Libya when Balbo was killed at Tubruq on 28 June 1940.

As the day of retribution drew near the Italians showed some uneasiness about the situation in Cyrenaica and, as I have recorded, they made belated attempts to conciliate the Arabs.
*175 Their uneasiness was partly due to the presence of the Sanusi
*648 leader Sayyid Idris and of a number of notable Cyrenaican and
*795 Tripolitanian Shaikhs in exile in Egypt. It could hardly be
793 doubted that they would approach the British with offers of
assistance should Italy enter the war on the side of Germany. This is what happened. In October 1939, when Italy's participation seemed imminent, the Cyrenaican and Tripolitanian

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[113] [1] Giuseppe Palloni, *The Action of the Italian Government in Favour of the Lybian Agriculture*, 1945, p. 31.

Shaikhs met at Alexandria and informed the British Ambassador 175*
in Cairo that they recognized Sayyid Idris as their Amir and that 648*
he could speak on their behalf. At a second meeting of these 795*
Shaikhs in Cairo on 9 August 1940, after Italy had declared war, [793]
it was decided to form a Libyan force to co-operate with the British army in the Western Desert. Though some of the Tripolitanian notables refused to associate themselves with this offer, wishing to make a separate offer on their own account, it was gladly accepted by the British authorities, and the British-Arab Force, later known as the Libyan Arab Force, was recruited from among the Sanusi exiles in Egypt and later also from Sanusi prisoners of war, who had taken the first opportunity of surrendering to the British. It was officered by British and Arabs, including some of the veterans of the Italo-Sanusi wars, and at its maximum strength consisted of five battalions and a depot. The force was not trained and equipped for the kind of fighting which took place in the Western Desert, but it performed useful ancillary duties to which Mr. Eden paid a tribute in the House of Commons on 8 January 1942, when he declared that His Majesty's Government was determined that the Sanusi should not come again under Italian domination. It took part in the first and subsequent occupations of Cyrenaica by British troops, and two battalions served in the defence of Tubruq in 1941. The little Sanusi army fought under its own flag and Arab [701]
commissions in it were in the name of the Amir. The Bedouin of Cyrenaica also rendered services to the British army as guides and agents and in assisting escaped prisoners of war and men detached from their units during our two withdrawals to Egypt. They gave further assistance by their eager co-operation with the three British Military Administrations of their country, although those who were known to have rendered the British special assistance were shot by the Italians on our withdrawals.

When in 1943 Sayyid Idris visited Cyrenaica for the first time 175*
since his hurried departure from it in 1922 and was received 648*
with wild enthusiasm by the whole country, it was just a century 795*
after his grandfather had founded his first zawiya in it. During 793
that century the Sanusiya Order had seen many changes and had itself changed. Even in the Grand Sanusi's time it had some political functions. The best Italian historian of the Order, Carlo Giglio, could write that at the death of its founder the

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*795
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Order was 'not a true and proper State but something very similar'.[1] We have seen how these political functions were further developed under the rule of Sayyid al-Mahdi and how under the rule of Sayyid Ahmad al-Sharif what may justly be called an embryonic State came into being. The Head of the Order was by this time less the religious Head of an Islamic fraternity than the leading representative of a nascent nationalism which became increasingly conscious of itself in the long struggle against the Italians under Sanusiya leadership. In this struggle the Order became more and more a political organization which directed, administratively, economically, and militarily, the entire Bedouin population, and morally the entire population of Cyrenaica, Bedouin and townsmen alike, against the common enemy. When truce was made in 1917, whatever the Italians and British may have asserted to the contrary, they had, in fact, to treat with Sayyid Idris not only as the Head of a religious Order, but also as the Head of a political organization which represented, and alone represented, the political aspirations of a people. As events turned out, the Italians, by destroying the Sanusiya organization, cut out the intervening structure of lodges and Shaikhs and made more evident the political status of the Head of the Order.

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*175
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*795
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What has happened during the century which has passed since the first Brothers of the Order began to build the lodge and till the soil at what is now al-Zawiya al-Baida must be viewed in relation to Bedouin tribal structure. A man coming from outside and with religious authority established himself as Head of the acephalous Bedouin society of Cyrenaica, and circumstances in which that whole society was forced to act for a long period of time against external enemies transformed his religious fraternity into a political organization. The Sanusiya Order from the first identified itself with the Bedouin and laboured to bring about tribal unity under its aegis. Under Turkish rule nationalist tendencies, as distinct from, and overriding, tribal loyalties, were latent, and the role of the Sanusiya within the frame of the Ottoman Empire was still predominantly religious rather than political; but when the Italians sought to subjugate the Bedouin their resistance, in the very clear moral issue presented to them, manifested itself

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[1] Op. cit., p. 11.

105
as a nationalist movement, with a corresponding effect on the 175*
character of the Sanusiya Order and on the status of its Head. 648*
The final stage in the transformation of a religious revival into 795*
a political movement was brought about by the clash of European 793
arms. Amid the roar of planes and guns the Bedouin learnt [668]
to see themselves more clearly as a single people, the Sanusi of
Cyrenaica, in a wider world, and came to be regarded as such by
those engaged in the struggle.

3:Evans-Pritchard E-4, 5 (1942-1944) 1949 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9
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APPENDIX I

CYRENAICAN PLACE-NAMES FREQUENTLY MENTIONED IN THE TEXT

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Spelling in the text	*Italian spelling*
al-Abyar	el-Abiar
Ajadabiya	Agedabia
‘Akrama	Acroma
al-‘Aqaila	el-Agheila
al-‘Arqub	el-Argub
Aujila	Augila
al-‘Azziyyat	el-Ezzeiat
(al-Zawiya) al-Baida	Zauia el-Beda (Beda Littoria)
al-Banba	Bomba
Banghazi	Bengasi
Banina	Benina
al-Burdi Sulaiman	Bardia
Dariyana	Driana
Darna	Derna
al-Fayidiya	el-Faidia (De Martino)
(Bir) Hakaim	(Bir) Hacheim
al-Haniya	el-Hania
Jaghbub	Giarabub
Jalu	Gialo
Janzur	Gianzur
Jardis al-‘Abid	Gerdes el-Abid
al-Jikharra	Gicherra
Khawalan	Chaulan
al-Makhili	el-Mechili
Marawa	Maraua
al-Marj	el-Merg (Barce)
Massa	Messa (Luigi Razza)
Msus	Msus
al-Naufiliya	en-Nofilia
al-Qaiqab	el-Ghegab
al-Qasur	el-Gsur
al-Qatafiya	el-Gtafia
al-Qubba	el-Gubba (Giovanni Berta)
al-Sallum	es-Sollum
Shahhat	Sciahhat (Cirene)

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APPENDIX I

Spelling in the text	*Italian spelling*
al-Shlaidima	esc-Sceleidima
Slanta	Slonta
Suluq	Soluch
Susa (Marsa)	Susa (Marsa) (Apollonia)
al-Tailimun	Tilimun
Taknis	Tecnis
Talmaitha	Tolmeta
Tart	Tert
Taukra	Tocra
Tubruq	Tobruch
al-Zuwaitina	ez-Zuetina

APPENDIX II

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[For information on the cultural history of the Sanusi Order, see Category 116, pp. 2, 11-23, 26-28, 39, 41-43, 48-50, 66, 70-71, 73-76, and 90-229.]

[For information on the relationship of the Sanusi Order with other foreign powers, notably the Turkish and Italian governments, see Category 116, pp. 14-15, 22-23, 26-28, 37, 43-46, 50, 60-61, 63, 69-71, 83-84, 87, and 90-229.]

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[For information on the origin, development and expansion of the Sanusi Order and its relationship to various foreign powers, notably the Italians and Turks, see Category 116, pp. 1-28, 45-46, 54, 57, 64-65, 68-93, 97-99, 102-110, 115-118, 122-123, 126-195, 204, and 226-229.]

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[P.363]

EMRYS PETERS

18. *The Proliferation of Segments in the Lineage of the Bedouin of Cyrenaica [Libya]*[1]

121 128 In this article I do not propose to discuss the genealogies of the Cyrenaican Bedouin in full, but only such aspects of them as are strictly relevant to an understanding of their process of growth. Many other aspects of these genealogies will be referred to, and indeed, some of the arguments put forward will presume an acceptance of views which cannot be developed adequately in this article. A fuller and more general account of Cyrenaican genealogies is in preparation, and, until this is published, there is no alternative to the somewhat dogmatic statements about them which appear in the introductory part of this article.

174 613 551 562 [173] The Bedouin of Cyrenaica claim that they are all descendants of a unique ancestress, Sa'ada. Writers in the past (e.g. Robertson-Smith 1903) have considered the occurrence of female names in patrilineal genealogies as evidence of an earlier and matrilineal mode of descent. A more satisfactory explanation of the occurrence of female names is to be found in the combination of two facts: descent in the patriline, whether or

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[1] 122 My field work among the Cyrenaican Bedouin was made possible by an award from the Emslie Horniman Fund and a later award from the Treasury Committee for Studentships in Oriental Languages and Cultures. I wish here 121 to express my indebtedness to both committees for their generosity. Much of the work I have done on genealogies was included in a thesis presented for 128 the degree of D.Phil. at Oxford University in 1951. The ideas included in this thesis I developed more systematically in a course of lectures on the Bedouin which I gave at Manchester University during the session 1953–54. I subsequently read papers around the problems discussed in this paper at 128 Oxford and Cambridge Universities. I am grateful to Professor Gluckman for reading this article in manuscript, and for the numerous discussions I have had with him on problems relating to lineage organization.

174 not male names are used, is assumed; and secondly that the
613 Bedouin are polygamous. If, then, half-brother differentiation
551 or full sibling unity is to be shown genealogically, the obvious
562 way in which this can be done is to use a maternal name in the
genealogy. Thus, in the Cyrenaican genealogy, a number of
tribal groups will be shown as sons of a particular father. If dif-
182 ferentiation of these groups needs to be shown, this can be ef-
613 fected by clustering the groups round, say, two female names
551 (the names of the respective mothers) thereby making the two
562 clusters of groups stand in the relationship of paternal half
brothers. The concept of the 'one womb', of maternal origin, is a critical one in the context of social cohesion, but it does not deny patriliny; on the contrary, it serves in a sense to reinforce it. Female names can be used to show a greater notion of cohesion than the mere use of male names, and the significance of a female name placed at the apex of the Cyrenaican genealogy is that it is the symbol of full brother unity at the highest political level.

173 The founding ancestress Sa'ada is credited with two sons, who
613 in turn are considered to be the founding ancestors of the two
largest groups of tribes in Cyrenaica. Each of these sons is said
619 to have begottten two sons, as shown on the accompanying
genealogy. The next generation shows a total of nine names, and these nine ancestors are considered to be the founding ancestors of the nine noble tribes of Cyrenaica.[2] Continuing the line of descent of one of these tribes—the Magharba—the same pattern of segmentation repeats itself: the tribe is divided into two primary sections having ar-Ra'aid and ash-Shamakh as the respective founding ancestors. Ash-Shamakh is said to have had four sons, and these are the founding ancestors of four secondary sections. These latter four are credited with a varying number of sons, as shown in the genealogy (Fig. 18-1).

One feature of the Cyrenaican genealogy immediately stands out from this brief description: the uniformity in the number of segments at the various levels of segmentation. Along the line of descent from Sa'ada to Nasr, the number of sons shown in the

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[162] [2] One of these, the 'Ailat Fayid, now only numbers about 150 souls, and although it is given the structural position of a tribe in the genealogy, it scarcely merits this distinction in practice.

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619


SA'ADA
(1)
BARAGHITH
'AQQARA
(2)
BARAGHUTH AL-SGHAIR
JIBARNA
HARABI
'ALI
(In Egypt)
TRIBES
(3)
'ABID
'ARIF
'AWAQIR
MAGHARBA
DARSA
HASA
BARA'ASA
'AILAT FAYID
ABAIDAT
(4) PRIMARY
AL-RA'AIDAT
AULAD AL-SHAMAIGH
(5) SECONDARY
'ALI
MANSUR
NASR
SUBH
(6) TERTIARY
13
6
4
4
MADHKUR
HAIBA
AL-DAWWAS
UMBARAKA

FIG. 18-1 GENEALOGY 1. The names given in this genealogy are the tribal names in use. All are derivatives of personal names of ancestors, like all tribal names, except for some nicknames (e.g. Baraghith means 'the fleas') and a few which refer to a general location (e.g. the Magharba means the 'Westerners'). [551]

first four descending generations is two. At the fifth level the 173
number increases to four and finally, at the sixth level there 613
characteristically occurs a marked irregularity in the number of 619
descendants forming the founding ancestors of the tertiary sections.

Another feature of the Cyrenaican genealogy is that its 613
branches show an intimate relationship with ecological areas. 619
Thus, the major division into two branches stemming from 13
Sa'ada represents the eastern and western halves of the country 182
with associated and clear differences in ecology. Continuing the line of descent, the Jibarna and Baraghith groups of tribes occupy plain and mountain foot-hills respectively. The two Jibarna tribes in turn occupy two distinct kinds of plain. Following now the division of the Magharba tribe, its two primary sections are divided by a very conspicuous dry valley. The four secondary divisions of the Aulad ash-Shamakh primary section likewise show a relation to ecological boundaries, albeit on a smaller scale than those previously referred to, but none the less important in this more local context. Finally, the unevenly numbered tertiary sections which are derived from these four

613
619
13
182

secondary sections, in their very unevenness, show a more sensitive relation to more detailed ecological differences.

At all levels of segmentation, therefore, a high degree of consistency between the ecological divisions of the country and the genealogical divisions can be shown. Indeed the relationship is so close that it is tempting to consider the contemporary pattern of things as the only one possible. What historical evidence exists is against such a view being taken. [167] It is known that tribes have been displaced in the past, some of them or sections of them having been pushed out into Egypt, and others having altered their position. This being so, there obviously cannot be any finality about the present distribution of tribes in relation to the ecological divisions of the country. Rather, the existing pattern is one of a number of possible permutations. Again, as the relation between groups of people to their environment becomes progressively sensitive with the decrease in the size and order of the group, then the more unstable will be the relationship between the two. Conversely the greater the size and order of the group the more persistent will be its relationship to the ecology. In other words, the major ecological divisions are more fundamental in their effect on the way of life and the economy of people, whereas the more detailed ecological differences between, say, tertiary sections have a relatively minor effect. The [233] [433] ecological differences between the wooded plateau area with its cow and goat herding economy, and the arid semi-desert area with its camel and sheep herding economy has a much more profound effect on the general way of life, and is a more persistent division, than that which exists between two tertiary sections where the differences may only be in topographical details.

While therefore, the division of people into groups of various sorts is not permanently fixed in relation to ecological divisions, there is always an intimate relationship between the two which is progressively more enduring as the order of the structural segment increases. Yet even this statement of the relationship, guarded as it is, does not suffice, for the pattern and distribution of tribes and their sections at any given moment are not only a function of ecology, but they are also the result of a number of other complex factors which may be operating to reinforce or to

613

complicate the more direct relationship of the distribution of 619 groups of people to the ecology.[3] [13] [182]

The Cyrenaican genealogy, then, is a conceptualization of a hierarchy[4] of ordered territorial segments. The groups stemming from the ancestor at the third order of segmentation are referred to as tribes, and each tribe is the apex of a three-tiered order of segments, which, following customary practice, are referred to as primary, secondary, and tertiary. The latter, the tertiary segment, 621 represents the group of people who, for a period of six to eight 613 months, gather together and live in what, for all intents and purposes, is a single discrete residential group.[5] This tertiary group is also the smallest political group. It has its own homeland, with its [423] water supplies, pastures, and ploughland. In this homeland live most of its members. It is a lineage segment, and most of the agnates of this segment live on their own homeland.[6] It is also the [682] vengeance group, which means that any one of its members can [628] be killed in vengeance for a homicide committed by any other, and that the obligation to exact vengeance falls on all members alike, regardless of relationship to the victim. Likewise, its members pay blood money as a group, and although when they receive it, a bigger portion goes to the nearest agnate of the victim, the remainder is distributed equally among all its members. The number of generations which supervene between the founding ancestor of a tertiary segment and the living is usually four or five, but there is little consistency in this number. Some tertiary

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[3] This part of the discussion is necessarily brief, but further amplification will appear in two subsequent articles now in preparation, one of which is concerned with a general treatment of Cyrenaican genealogies, and the other with a discussion of the effects of ecology on the social organization of the Bedouin. [114]

[4] I use the word hierarchy here since, although segments of any order display many like features, the orders represent distinct and progressively more embracing interests, and these differences are of such consequence that to consider one order of groups as a facsimile of a superior or inferior order can only lead to confusion. A tertiary group, that is to say, may possess many of the characteristics of a secondary group, but the one is a fundamentally different sort of group from the other, as I shall show in my forthcoming article on the feud. (cf. Smith, M. G. 1956.) [128]

[5] This statement does not apply to the Darsa and the Hasa tribes, two of the plateau tribes in Cyrenaica. The statements in this article are confined almost exclusively to the camel herders of the semi-desert. [619] [128]

[6] This, admittedly, is too general a statement to make about such an important issue, but I would prefer to leave its documentation and precision for an article on the analysis of the composition of Bedouin camps.

613 segments show a lineage depth of three generations, while others
621 show as many as six. No special importance is attached by the
Bedouin to this number, although some writers claim that a depth
of five generations is of particular significance among other Arab
621 tribes.[7] Normally, in speaking of the vengeance group, the
628 Bedouin refer to the name of the ancestor of a tertiary tribal section.
613 Any one claiming membership of this group, regardless of his
682 precise generational relation to the offender or the victim is
immediately and equally involved with its other members. When
speaking of the group as such, the Bedouin refer to it as 'those
who have agreed on the blood', and use the phrase *'amara dam*
to refer to it. Blood money does not pass between its members,
and political division does not occur within it.

621 These small tertiary sections of tribes, then, are small
613 residential groups. Their population varies from one group to another,
[162] but most of them have a total population of 150 to 200 souls.
Successive generations—at least according to the Bedouin view
—add to these numbers, and also increase progressively the
number of generations in their genealogies. Substantial increases
of population would, of course, constitute a pressure on local
resources, on the water available in the particular well of a
group, on the amount of land available for ploughing, and on
the pastures for animals at the end of the rainy season. Again,
if each generation is to be added to the existing genealogy, this
would necessitate a realignment of structural relationships with
each succeeding generation. The discussion that follows is an
128 examination of the ways in which adjustments are made to
621 maintain an equilibrium between the population of a group and
613 the carrying capacity of the land on which its members live, and
of the ways in which the genealogical structure is able to persist
in the face of various contingencies which threaten it.

A beginning might be made by indicating the processes at work to keep the form of the genealogy fairly fixed when there is an absence of population pressure on resources. The first problem is the simple one of describing the mechanics of manipula-

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[171] [7] e.g. Burkhardt (1831), speaks of the *Khomse*, the five generation group, as very widespread among Arabs. G. W. Murray also reports the use of the word *Khomsa* among the Arabs of the Sinai desert to designate the blood-vengeance group, but the term used by the Aulad 'Ali tribe, the cousins and Egyptian neighbours of the Cyrenaican Bedouin, he gives as *Awlia'-ed-dam* (which simply means 'blood kindred').

621

tion which enable the genealogy to remain constant in length 613
and fixed in form despite its dynamic content. 128

One of the main processes at work in foreshortening genealogies 173
is that referred to by Evans-Pritchard as telescoping.[8] 178
This process is also a characteristic feature of the Cyrenaican 613
genealogy, although its effects, to be discussed presently, differ 551
conspicuously. The way in which telescoping works in the Cyrenaican genealogy is that several male names come to be omitted in the genealogy below the name of the founding ancestor of the tertiary group. Usually, the form in which this occurs it that the name of a famous tribesman, and particularly his nickname if he has one, is retained along with the personal names of his lineal descendants in successive generations. The example given below is taken from the genealogy of the Haiba tertiary section of the Magharba tribe:



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[8] 'It is evident, moreover, that since the minimal lineage consists of four or five actual steps in ascent, there has been telescoping of the agnatic line from the founder of the minimal lineage further up the line of ascent to the founder of the clan, for the founder of the minimal lineage was himself the extremity of another minimal lineage which has, by increase in generations,
become the minor lineage, and so on' (Fortes & Evans-Pritchard 1940, p. (171)
199). Since Evans-Pritchard first wrote on the telescoping of genealogies among the Nuer, other anthropologists have discussed the process in various systems. Fortes, Richards, Laura Bohannan, Cunnison, and Mitchell in their writings on the Tallensi, Bemba, the Tiv, the Luapula people, and the Yao respectively are notable examples . . . As the mode of manipulation of Bedouin genealogies is marginal to my present problem, the main comparison is not with these works but with Evans-Pritchard's earlier work on the Nuer, because the Bedouin and Nuer lineage system have more in common than either have with the other systems, excepting possibly the Tiv.

173 The line shows five male names in all. The eldest surviving mem-
178 bers of this line is Sa'aid, who almost invariably is referred to,
613 not by his personal name, but as Bu Shliby,[9] and on the infre-
551 quent occasions when his personal name is used it is followed by
Bu Shliby and not by his father's name, which is the more common practice. Again, Abdul Qadar, when his father is not about, is called Bu Shliby, and when it is necessary to give him his personal name Bu Shliby is added, except among his more intimate family kindred, when only his personal name would be used. Likewise, his son Yunis carries Bu Shliby in addition to his personal name and is sometimes even referred to as Bu Shliby only. Abdul Qadar had never known his grandfather, was aware however of his existence in the past, but did not feel it necessary to use his name, and whatever obligation he might have felt to keep the memory of his grandfather alive, he fulfilled it when he named his son after him. Many of the older members of the group are also aware of the lineal connexions between Bu Shliby and Yunis, even though they use this knowledge in a genealogical context only, but many of the younger men of the group do not know these details. It is clear that when the boy Yunis grows to old age, three names in this line will have ceased to be used.

This practice of adding to a personal name the name of a deceased ancestor making one the son of the other, is pushed to the extent of carrying forward through the generations a nickname which referred to some peculiar characteristic of the ancestor, but which has little relation to the present bearer. Thus the ancestor whose name has been retained might have been nicknamed 'The Lame One' or 'The Squint-Eyed One' because he suffered either of these personal defects; or he might have been nicknamed 'The Old One' because he lived to a ripe old age. Such nicknames might later be carried by men who are not lame, nor squint-eyed, nor old, while the names of the intervening ancestors are dropped in normal use.

Another process is at work, which needs to be distinguished from telescoping, for although the results in genealogical terms are similar, Bedouin view it in quite a different light. This is the
[553] process of fusing names. It is common practice among the Bed-

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[193] [9] The prefix *Bu* is used by the Bedouin to mean 'son of.'

ouin—and, for that matter, Arabs in other lands—to name a boy 173
after a deceased relative. Rarely is a boy named after his father, 178
unless the father's death occurs before the boy is born, in which 613
circumstance, the new-born boy would certainly take his father's 551
name. A much more common form of this practice is to name a [553]
boy after his grandfather, assuming the latter to be dead. The eldest son usually accepts this responsibility, but it by no means falls invariably to him. There is a number of reasons for this, but they need not concern us here, since they are of no relevance to the general argument. What is of concern at present is that one name in the genealogy might represent the fusion of several other similar names. When circumstances permit, an individual's line might run as follows: Muhammad—'Ali—Muhammad—'Ali—Muhammad. It is true that the man himself and those closely related to him might know full well that there are three men named Muhammad and two named 'Ali, but it would not be considered irregular if only one Muhammad and one 'Ali were given in the genealogy. A mature man, giving his genealogy, omitted his father's name, Ibrahim. When asked about the omission, he insisted that he had given it, and when he was told that the name Ibrahim given by him was intended to refer to his young son, he impatiently dismissed the matter with the observation that having given the name Ibrahim once, it mattered little whether it had been put in the position of his son or father. Pointing to his son he added, 'There is my father, Ibrahim. He has taken my father's position, has he not?'

By the fusion of names, several persons drop out of the genealogy, and by and by, the line comes to be shortened. It also has the effect of giving a person's name a weighting which otherwise it would not possess. In a sense, a young son named after a father is not merely a son but a father and possibly a great-grandfather also. The young boy becomes the contemporary carrier of the personalities of those of similar name who have preceded him, while the behaviour of the living towards him is, in virtue of this, affected in a number of details. A man who had named his son in this way, explained the matter thus: 'He is my son, but also my father because he has his name. I cannot beat him for it would be like beating my father. When he grows up and I grow old, he will look after me as if I were his son.'

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173 Fusion of names appears in another context and for similar
178 reasons. Not only are lineal descendants given the name of deceased
551 ancestors, but a man may be given the name of any deceased
613 agnate of his tertiary section. Usually, this is only done
428 when a man passes on property to another who is not his direct
[553] heir. Commonly, this occurs when an agnate is also a mother's
brother, as often happens as a result of parallel cousin marriage,
and this mother's brother has no sons of his own. If he has a
sister's son, who is also his paternal nephew, he is likely to pass
on his wealth to this nephew. A father, the Bedouin insist, ought
[183] to perform three duties for his sons: attend to their circumcision,
[593] and their education in the Koran, and provide bride-wealth when
[852] they marry. All fathers attend to the circumcision of all their sons;
few provide for the Koranic education of any of their sons; most
871 bear the burden of marrying off at least one of their sons. The
[583] performance of the latter duty is what makes the continuance
of the deceased's name an obligation, and whoever performs this duty must have his name perpetuated in one male offspring of the union which was brought about with his wealth. Wealth need not take the form of bride-wealth; it can be a legacy willed by a father, maternal uncle of the kind described above, or any other agnate who has died without male issue. Conversely, if a man dies without leaving any property, even his sons might not perpetuate his name, and eventually it will drop out of the genealogy.[10] There are instances of men inheriting the wealth of a number of agnates, using each parcel of wealth to make a new marriage and naming the sons of the various unions after the several dead who had left wealth. The example given below is taken from the genealogy of the Dawwas section of the Magharba tribe. What happened here was that the two lines stemming from Faraj and Sha'aban, after proliferating normally, became extinct. As this happened, Ibrahim, the son of Miftah, began to inherit wealth to which he was not a direct heir; and

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[588] [10] To avoid confusion, it ought to be made clear that this is not ghost marriage. As I understand ghost marriages from Evans-Pritchard's (1951) account, two main conditions must be satisfied: (i) that there should be inherited wealth to make a marriage, and (ii) that the wealth remaining after the ghost marriage has been made is inherited by the ghost children only. In Cyrenaica, wealth thus inherited becomes part of a man's total wealth and is not reserved for a ghost marriage and its issue.

as he did so, he entered into a plurality of marriages, begat sons, 173
and replaced those men in the genealogy who had died without 178
heirs. In the following generation the twin process of death and 551
replacement continued. Death removed all the male descendants 613
of Sha'aban and Faraj, and of Ibrahim Bu Miftah's many sons 428
only two, Sharif and Abdallah, were of age to marry at the time of my visits to their camp. Both had enjoyed a plurality of wives, although still young to have done so, and each marriage they contracted took place after the death of one of their kinsmen. The full and intricate details of this interesting genealogy are irrelevant here, since all the example is intended to show is how nine of eleven male names were perpetuated in the genealogy by repeating five of them twice and four of them three times, accounting in all for twenty-two names; and to do this, three men (one of them had died, but the other two were both under forty years of age) married eight wives. All the names in the two lines which have died out have not yet been brought back into the genealogy, but 'Abdallah, the son of Ibrahim, who had already done extremely well in this respect, was confident that soon the obligations towards Musa, Abd al-Rahim, and Sa'ad would be redeemed.

Thus the fusion of names not only ensures that names threatened with extinction are perpetuated, but that one person, in the name he bears, can carry the genealogical burden of several other men of that name.

[601]


SA'AID
MIFTAH
SHA'ABAN
FARAJ
IBRAHIM
IBRAHIM
SALIM
SA'AID
BU GHAWIYA
SHA'ABAN
'ABD AL RAHIM
MIFTAH
MUSA
SA'AD
FATALLAH
SHARIF
'ABDALLAH
MIFTAH
SALIM
ZAIDAN
SA'AD
SALAH
SHA'ABAN
SULAIMAN
MUHAMMAD
IBRAHIM
HAMAD
SA'AID
BU GHAWIYA
FARAJ
GHAITH
SALAH

FIG. 18-2 GENEALOGY 2. The names of dead men are underlined.

173 Telescoping of names, and fusion of names, taken together,
178 can account for the fixity of the genealogy to a large extent. In
551 addition, lines which showed every sign of normal development
613 at one time, have petered out completely, even after they have
sometimes assumed the status of tertiary segments. Conditions
173 under which this is likely to happen are not difficult to envisage.
178 If hearsay evidence is correct, disease, when it strikes in the
551 desert, might rage in a camp like wild fire, bringing death to
613 many, but not spreading to other camps, because the camps are
731 so far apart. Even in springtime when men and beasts are together
361 in the pastures, and the larger summer camp has split into
four or five smaller ones, the distance between camps may still be
[221] a few miles. In summer, when camps are concentrated on the
large watering points, the distances between them are considerably
more. Disease, therefore, does not spread from camp to camp
as rapidly as one might expect in such primitive conditions of
living. In 1949 a number of men of a small camp died within a
[761] few days of each other. Bedouin opinion attributed these deaths
to an allegedly false oath sworn by the deceased a year earlier.
[784] Medical opinion ascribed them to filth in a well which the deceased
had been cleaning before their illness. In any event, a
thriving line of a lineage was wiped off the genealogy. The portion
173 of the Dawwas genealogy shown on this page shows a
178 similar process at work. Again, to give another example, the Nasr
613 section of the Magharba tribe once included six tertiary sections,
not four as are now given. Two of these six sections are now
represented by only four men of whom two are too old and decrepit
to have heirs any longer, and are unmarried in any case;
a third, whose wife has long passed child-bearing age, had two
sons, but both died before marriage; and the fourth, a very poor
and old man, has only one daughter, and is a widower. Three
of the four now live with their collateral tribal section, Madhkur,
and count themselves members of this group. That they once belonged
to two different groups might have passed unnoticed were
it not that two elders of the Madhkur section insisted that they
should be correctly placed and their entire genealogies be recorded.
The younger men argued that although they were aware
that the two groups named Farjiani and al-Khadhar at one time

existed, it was pointless giving them separate status any longer; 173
they were content to give the three men separate lines of a few 178
613



generations, and then to tag them on to Madhkur, the founding ancestor of the segment.

Telescoping, fusion of names, and the extinction of lines are three ways in which the general fixed shape of the genealogy is retained. These three processes are only sufficient, however, in special circumstances, but before discussing these circumstances one further general condition relating to these processes must be made explicit. All three affect the genealogy within the tertiary 173
segments only, and do not affect it at any of the more superior 178
orders of segmentation. There is not a shred of evidence from 613
contemporary Cyrenaican genealogies to show that telescoping or 621
fusion occurs except within the tertiary segment, within that group, in other words, where precise genealogical links are known and can be specified, and within that small group which for most part of the year constitutes a single settlement. It is possible that groups of structurally superior levels to the tertiary have become extinct, in the way that tertiary lines have petered out. There is no definite evidence to support this, and from the analysis of Cyrenaican genealogies in general it seems that when any group is threatened with extinction—and this in turn means that fewer and fewer people will be using the same land and water facilities—there is a definite tendency for the lineage rump to fuse with a collateral lineage (and in so doing fuse their resources with those of the adopting lineage), or for a numerically more powerful lineage group to take it over by force. The number of tertiary segments spanned by a secondary segment, therefore, increases or decreases according to the circumstances; so that a secondary segment, numerically strong in its tertiary segments to-day, may become considerably weaker in future, and the numerically weak secondary section of to-day may proliferate its segments substantially in the future. Short of a significant de-

173 cline in the total population of a tribe, then, the extinction of
178 lines does not affect any order of segmentation superior to the
613 tertiary. In this respect, the Cyrenaican genealogy differs funda-
621 mentally from those collected from the Nuer by Evans-Pritchard.
In the quotation from his work on Nuer genealogies (1951), he
[171] asserts that telescoping occurs 'from the founder of the minimal
lineage further up the line of ascent to the founder of the clan'.
This major difference has serious implications for any discussion of lineage proliferation, but these must be left until the conditions under which proliferation is likely to occur have been analysed.

178 While it is true that the processes discussed are of importance
in retaining the general shape of the genealogy, what is assumed
613 so far is that the Cyrenaican population has been stable over long
621 periods. Stability of population is not an unreasonable assump-
161 tion to make for a people who live on the margin of subsistence
182 in a country where extended periods of drought are not infre-
[173] quent, though seldom leading, it is true, to actual famine condi-
[731] tions, but producing periodic and local food and water shortages.
Disease, following quickly in the trail of shortage, it can be assumed, kept the relationship of total population to the natural resources fairly constant. What evidence there is does not support
[726] even this very general assumption, since it is known that there
have been large-scale tribal wars in the past, and a certain
[167] amount of movement of tribes, some being displaced and others
pushed eastwards into Egypt. Unless these shifts were caused by increases in the aggregate population and the consequent pressure on land and water, it is difficult to account for them. This consideration of possible overall increases in population in the past poses interesting problems related to lineage structure which cannot be adequately treated here. For the moment it is proposed to neglect possible increases in the total population during past periods in the history of Cyrenaica. The historical depth of the view now to be discussed is about seventy years, and for this period I have no evidence of any large-scale increases in population. It is reasonable, therefore, to assume a general stability of
[132] population for this period. But the vagaries of the Cyrenaican
climate are such that, in a given year, one area might be well drenched with rain, giving excellent pastures for animals and good crops, while a nearby territorial strip might suffer a partial

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drought giving insufficient pastures and poor crops. Good or bad 613
crops, poor or abundant pasture, in turn mean a higher or lower 621
milk yield from the animals and better or worse living conditions 161
for human beings. Such factors as these may well, over a number 182
of years, lead to unevenness in the distribution of population [132]
throughout the tertiary sections. Whatever the cause, the genealogies
show that the population of the numerous tertiary sections [173]
is unequal. Some are numerically so weak that they have to
join a collateral section. Others are numerically so strong that
their natural resources are insufficient to meet the needs of all
their members. It was these latter segments which were in the
process of splitting, and which in some cases have already done
so. The next task, then, is to demonstrate where, on the genealogy, [128]
proliferation is effected.

We have seen that in Nuer genealogies segments proliferate at 173
all orders of segmentation. Here, the process is a continuous one, 171
beginning at any point in time within the minimal lineage and 613
progressing upwards to the apex of lineage bifurcation. As particular 551
names become significant within the minimal segment,
they are retained and become a permanent addition to the genealogy.
In order to include these successively additional names,
names of ascending ancestors are shunted further and further
into the genealogical past, until presumably the effect is felt at
the topmost limit of the genealogy, when the names here are
pushed out of the genealogical framework altogether, and forgotten
for ever. More than this, the upward shift in names at
each and every point in the genealogical line means also a consequent
re-ordering of structural relationships, at all levels in the
system. One vital difference between Nuer and Bedouin societies 173
which may partly, at least, account for the different genealogical 178
processes at work among them is that the Nuer, when they were 613
studied by Evans-Pritchard, were expanding territorially, and [171]
that continuous proliferation of segments throughout the structure
was the mode of dealing with a situation of expansion. The [648]
Bedouin, on the other hand, had suffered twenty years of terrible
privation at the hands of the Italians, during which period thousands
of them died in battle and in concentration camps, were
shot up in their camps from the air, or died from want, before I
went to live among them. Although I must confess that I now

173 178 613 551 114

Although I must confess that I now find it difficult to accept Evans-Pritchard's view of genealogical growth and development as stated for the Nuer, it was the view I originally held with regard to Bedouin genealogies. Indeed, thinking in genealogical terms only, it appears inevitable that the addition of successive generations can only mean the lengthening of the genealogy, or, if the length is to remain constant, extrusion of ancestral names must take place at the apex of the genealogy. If this view is to be accepted, several other conclusions must be accepted with it. The genealogy, as far as it goes at least, is an accurate record of descent—some names may have been lopped off at the top, but otherwise the genealogy represents a faithful statement of succession. Again, if successive generations are to be added to the genealogy, then its base must continually expand laterally. From what is known of contemporary Bedouin genealogies, there is no evidence which leads to the supposition that their base is progressively widening. With regard to the authenticity of the names in the genealogy, above the point of tertiary segmentation, I hope to show in a subsequent article on Bedouin genealogies in general, that names above the tertiary point of segmentation have remained fixed for very long periods of time, and that they bear slight relation to the passage of generations over the last century at least; moreover, in this article I hope to demonstrate that what manipulation of the genealogy takes place does not affect more than about four or five ascending generations from the living.

121 173 613

Part of the difficulty in a study of this sort lies in the strong temptation to think of the genealogy *per se*, even though it is readily admitted that it has a value in itself for the Bedouin. Yet even in these terms the genealogy must always represent an ordered grouping of people, and these people live on strips of territory. The starting point of the analysis then ought to begin with the territorial ordering of groups of people. The relation of groups of people to land, moreover, is determined by the carrying capacity of that land, and it is this prerequisite which is the main variable in discussing genealogical manipulation, and not the [182] other way about. The main landmarks of the Cyrenaican ecology are fixed points which cannot be manipulated to fit in with the genealogy; it is the genealogy which must be altered to comprehend the distribution of people in their ecological setting.

121 173 613 619 178 [162]

If, moreover, the view of a genealogy as a continually expanding line of descent is to be accepted, it must be accepted also that large structural units, even in conditions of population stability, are to experience a continuous re-ordering of their structural relationships. In practice, what this means is that a tribe of, say 20,000 souls cease to be tribesmen of a named tribe and instead all become members of an almost identical group but with a different name. To take an example from the genealogy given on page 365: the Magharba tribe shown there has a total population of some 13,000 souls. If proliferation affected the topmost limits of this tribe, the apical name disappears and presumably the name of one of the primary sections is to be substituted. That is, half the tribe would have to take on the lineage name of their opposed primary section. The only alternative to the use of the name of a primary segment as a substitute for the abandoned tribal name is the acceptance by 13,000 people of a totally new name, which is most unlikely.

It is reasonable to assume therefore, that the genealogy, in its general form, is fixed for long periods of time at least. This still leaves the problem of how and where adjustments are made to face the contingencies of birth and death, of the succession of generations, and of the irregular increases and decreases of population among the tertiary segments. An important clue lies in the number of segments which appear at the various orders of segmentation. From Sa'ada, the founding ancestress, in the line which runs to Nasr, each ancestor is shown as having a pair of sons for four orders of segmentation. At the fifth generation from Sa'ada—this is now the secondary order of segmentation within the tribe—the number of sons increases to four. Not all tribes will show the same number of sons at each generation as the Magharba—some, for example, might show three instead of two at the primary order—but what is true of all tribes is that there is evident consistency in the number down to and including the fifth generation from Sa'ada; if, that is to say, one of a tribe's primary segments is divided into three secondary sections, the other one or two, as the case may be, will be divided likewise. Throughout the tribes in Cyrenaica, then, segmentation of orders superior to the tertiary segments shows a pronounced consistency in their numbers.

613 619 621 At the next level of segmentation (this now being the tertiary order in any given tribe) the number of segments which appear is conspicuously irregular. For the Magharba tribe, the four secondary segments, 'Ali, Mansur, Subh and Nasr are divided into thirteen, six, four, and four segments respectively. Similar irregularity appears in other tribes.[11] The pattern of the genealogy is always one of regularity in the number of segments at all points in it except for the point of tertiary segmentation where conspicuous irregularity becomes immediately evident. Since these
613 619 621 182 131 segments constitute the summer camps of the Bedouin, this is not surprising, for these small groups will show greater susceptibility to details of local water supplies, pasturing facilities, ploughland areas, and topographical features than would the numerically larger and structurally superior groups occupying larger areas of territories of greater ecological importance. If we follow the line from Sa'ada to Nasr again, the bifurcation at the first order of segmentation is consistent with the division of the country into the permanently green high altitudes of the plateau, and the extended low-lying plain area of the western half of the country.
[134] Between the territory of the Magharba tribe ('The White Plain') and that of its neighbour tribe, the 'Awaqir ('The Red Plain'), there is a major soil difference, which is such a conspicuous feature of the landscape, and so sharply defined, that one is almost aware when one has crossed the tribal boundary. Within the Magharba tribe, a prominent dry river valley cuts the territory in two, the landscape to the west of it being characteristically serrated, making travel in an east-west direction difficult, while to the east the landscape is much more docile and undulating. The four sections of the ash-Shamakh branch again represent four quite distinct areas. The territory of one section is almost conterminious with the narrow belt of sand dunes along the coast; the territory of another is a block of rough and tumbled land in the west; the territory of a third, in the centre, is made up of a few low-lying shallow valleys; and the territory of the fourth,

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[114] [11] It is necessary here to warn the reader that, brilliant an ethnographer as Agostini undoubtedly was, his grouping of tribal sections is not always correct. I had his book (Agostini 1922–23) with me in the field and checked his tribal survey. I found that at several important points his ordering of the segments was incorrect. I should add that the differences between Agostini and myself are not due to the kind of changes discussed in this article.

stretching across to the village of Ajadabiya in the east, topples 613
in undulations away into the flat expanses of the desert to the 619
south. At all these points of segmentation, the territories occupied 621
by the various sections are large and roughly defined, and 133
the population aggregates supported on these territories run from 182
over a thousand at one end to tens of thousands at the upper 131
limits. The tertiary sections are numerically much smaller, some of them numbering as few as a hundred souls in all, and the territories to which they are attached are correspondingly smaller. The relationship between the numbers in this order of section, and the precise amount of water available in the local wells is an intimate one. If the population of one of these groups increases, or if the number of animals rises, or if the springs show a decline in the volume of water they give forth, or if the winter rainfall has allowed the storage in wells of only a small quantity of water, a rearrangement of the group must be effected. A significant alteration of any one of these components must mean that the local group must split to enable a new adjustment to be made in the relationship of man and animals to water.

Whatever changes occur within groups of any size, since the 173
genealogy embraces the entire population, these must appear on 178
the genealogy in some way or other. Now a genealogy is as rigid 829
a framework, as fixed and final a pattern of grouping, as can be 613
imagined. The impression that they are thus rigid and fixed, except 551
for the addition of successive generations, is strengthened by the way in which the Bedouin use them. From their young boys to their old men, the Bedouin are expert genealogists, and the names of ancestors, for one reason or another, are never far
from their lips. Names are kept alive by constant use, since all [571]
references to inter-group relationships must be in terms of these
names. More than this, the Bedouin were proud to the point of 173
boastfulness of their genealogical knowledge, and, wherever I 829
travelled, the first request I had to comply with was to take down 613
a large portion of a tribal genealogy. In recording their endless 551
genealogies, one feature about them came to assume increasing 123
interest; while there was remarkable unanimity with regard to 126
most of the names given, there was one point of marked ambiguity—at the tertiary level of segmentation. I recorded genealogies in four tribes on an extensive scale, and in each tribe

173 829 613 551 123 126 ambiguity surrounding the actual names and their correct position occurred at about the fifth ascending generation. Whenever this point was reached in the recordings, arguments would flare up over the names to be included or excluded and over the relation of these names to those above and below, with the result that for several people of the same segment there would be several versions of a genealogy which differed only at this one point. An example of this sort is given below from the genealogy of the Nasr section, which shows seven different versions of the arrangement of ancestors round about the fifth ascending generation from the living.

173 829 613 551 The confusion at and around the fifth ascending generation appeared with such regularity in the genealogies that I feel justified in referring to it as 'the area of ambiguity'. It seems likely, moreover, that in any society where the lineage structure is closely tied to the territorial disposition of groups, since the genealogy is so rigid, there needs to be in it somewhere an area of ambiguity if it is to be related to reality. Without this ambiguity, the form of the genealogy is too rigid to comprehend changes which occur. This point in the genealogy came to assume critical significance as the point where adjustments in it are made. Other kinds of evidence point to the same conclusion.

[601]


(1)
NASR*
UMBARAKA
HAIBA
MADHKUR
MUMEN
BIN NASR
MADHKUR
HAIBA
UMBARAKA
(3)
SA'AD
HASAIN
MADHKUR
HAIBA
(4)
SA'AD
(5)
HASAN
MADHKUR
HAIBA
SA'AD
MUMAN
(7)
HAIBA
MADHKUR
UMBARAKA
SA'AD
(2)
MUMEN
UMBARAKA
MADHKUR
HAIBA

FIG. 18-3 GENEALOGY 3. *There is another section, al-Dawwas, which belongs to this group, but to include this as well would greatly complicate the issue without giving any additional information.

There are, in Cyrenaica, three major status groups among the 619
tribes: the noble or free-born tribesmen (*al-Hurr*), those who 554
have been adopted or grafted on to a tribe (the *Laff*), and the 608
clients (*Marabtin*).

Those who claim to be free-born also claim ownership of the 619
natural resources. The *Laff* do not own these. They are people 608
thought not to have originally been of the lineage of the tribe 621
with which they are resident. They are found sometimes in ones 613
and twos in the camps of the free-born, but sometimes constituting [423]
tertiary groups themselves. Now when such people have resided 619
with their free-born hosts for several years and one of them 608
has married one of the host's daughters, they are grafted to the 613
genealogy at the point of tertiary segmentation, that is, where 621
ambiguity occurs in the genealogy. Obviously, persons thus 173
grafted to the lineage cannot be shown as descendants of one of the living or of the recently dead, remembered perhaps by some of the elders still living. It is equally true to say that they cannot be grafted to the lineage at a point superior to that of the tertiary segments, since this would involve recognition by a number of tertiary groups whose members may know little or nothing about them. When a person enters a new tribe, the only way in which he can do so is to go to live in a camp, and it is the concern of the people of that particular camp whether or not they accept him, since it is they who have to decide whether their resources are sufficient to support a newcomer. Once a man has been accepted as a full member of a tertiary section, membership of superior tribal sections is automatic, although to enter into tribal membership he requires the permission of members of a tertiary section only. To graft at a point superior to the tertiary would be the same as giving a man superior structural status, but without a camp in which to dwell. There is only one place for his incorporation, and that is where the ambiguity in the genealogy permits manipulation to include new lines. In this way the [597]
adoption of a person into a lineage does not offend the sense of kinship of the receiving group since the point of inclusion is an ancestor about whom little or nothing is known and whose authenticity is frequently doubted by some. What has been referred to as an area of ambiguity is, moreover, something of a jumble of names, and it is not a difficult matter, if a new line has to be

619 608 613 621 173 [182] attached somewhere along the line, to attach it to one of these names. Bedouin welcome, as members of their camps, practically anyone who wishes to join, even, in the case of one group, an Italian. The limit to this acceptance of members is, of course, the number of people who can be supported by the local resources. If people are being admitted freely to membership of a particular camp, this means that there is a local surplus of land and water, so that the number of grafts being supported by any particular section is a useful index of the extent to which the resources are being used. Conversely, as sometimes happens when grafted elements become numerous, or when the water supply, for various reasons, dwindles, it may be necessary to detach a grafted group. [578] Such action is always the occasion of a violent dispute, usually over watering rights, and not infrequently fights break out. Whether or not the grafted group wins, from then onwards it will be forced to exist as an independent group, and a new tertiary section will have been born. No matter which of the processes involving grafts is considered—incorporation or detachment—both are contained within the framework of the tertiary section, without any effect on the rest of the structure.

619 [423] The position of the clients, in the context of this discussion, is not unlike that of the grafts. Briefly, clients are men who are considered to have originated from a country other than Cyrenaica, and who for this reason cannot claim rights to land and water—at least this is the theory, although in some circumstances they are able to do so successfully. They are of various kinds, but they are not included in the genealogies given by the free-born. Clients are found grouped in two main ways. There are some large groups which constitute tribes in the sense that they display a genealogical and territorial organization like those of the free-born, and are usually to be found flanking the main tribes of the country on their borders. Some of these are powerful groups and enjoy considerable independence of action, but whatever their characteristics they none the less speak of themselves as 'for' or tied to the noble tribe whose territory includes theirs. Further, 619 571 621 613 the sections of these client tribes have their special ties with tertiary sections of the noble tribes, which are not merely ties of sentiment, but which take the form of valuable mutual help in a number of situations. A whole client tribe, in the sense that it is

occupying territory which cannot be said to belong to any particular 619
section of their noble patron tribe, is tied to the patron 571
tribe as such. Yet it is through the small tertiary segments that 621
these ties are made effective. In this sense, a client tribe is a combination 613
of small groups of people each group having specific
relationships with defined tertiary sections, and participating in
the tribe of their patrons through these relationships.

Secondly, clients are found distributed in small groups, sometimes 619
no more than one or two men, but often in clusters large 621
enough to compose a small camp. Practically all tertiary sections 613
of the noble tribes have some clients either living with them or
sharing their resources. While clients continue to reside with a 619
particular tertiary section, it is the members of the latter who are 621
responsible for them and vice versa. If, for example, one of the 613
clients commits a homicide, the gathering of blood-money is the 672
responsibility of the noble tertiary section to which he is attached, [682]
and vengeance can be exacted on any member of the
noble section. In other circumstances, when the offender is a
nobleman, then the clients of his group are the first to be approached 619
for blood-money. Tied in this way to a particular
tertiary section, they are not, however, compelled to reside with 621
its members permanently. On the contrary, they may be forced 182
to move. If, for example, there is a pressure on local water supplies, 166
the first to feel it are the clients. Annually, they supplicate 613
for the use of water, and if their patrons decide that there is insufficient
to meet all needs, the request is refused, albeit reluctantly. Clients constitute a socially mobile group; they are the pawns in the annual readjustment of men to their resources. Whenever they move, they pass on to another tertiary section, which may be a collateral section of the one they have left or structurally far removed from it, but as soon as they leave one, their duties and obligations cease and are taken up anew with another structurally like group. It is because their attachment is to a tertiary section, and not to one of superior order, that they can be as socially mobile as they are, which in turn facilitates a more efficient adjustment to the ecological situation from year to year.

Small groups of clients move frequently, groups of adopted people less frequently, and groups composed of the free-born

619 change their structural position only rarely. The latter change
621 sometimes does, however, occur, and there is evidence to show
182 that it does. For example, Agostini (1922–23, p. 323) in his tribal
166 survey, records a section named Barsha as one of the groups stem-
613 ming from Nasr.[12] In the genealogies I was given, the name did
not appear, and even after some questioning, what information
was known about it was concealed. Some time later the name
[578] cropped up accidentally in conversation, and I was then told that
at one time it had been one of the Nasr groups, but that after a
quarrel during a year of water shortage, the Barsha folk went
to live with people with whom they had maternal connexions,
and in whose territory there was ample water that year, and
never returned. The group, a tertiary one, was detached from the
tertiary point of segmentation in the genealogies, and tied on to
a tertiary group of another tribe in its new homeland.

To summarize briefly the argument thus far, the mechanical
178 devices of telescoping, fusion of names, the ejection of those
173 names which cease to be of any social consequence, and the
619 elision of names at or around the fifth ascending generation,
621 taken together point to the importance of the tertiary order of
613 segmentation in discussing the problem of maintaining the form
of the genealogy constant in face of its natural tendency to alter;
further, evidence of changes (adoption into a lineage, detachment from it, the inclusion and exclusion of clients) was presented, and this again led to the conclusion that the tertiary point
of segmentation is critical in this respect. This being so, the man-
[128] ner in which change actually occurs, still remains to be shown,
and this is best done, perhaps, by discussing the mode of proliferation of tertiary segments. In order to do this adequately, it
is necessary to say something briefly about certain features of
Bedouin marriage.

582 Among the Bedouin there exists a preferential form of marriage
605 between a man and his father's brother's daughter. Parallel
cousin marriage of this sort carries with it the exclusive right of
a man to this cousin. Without his consent no one else can marry
her, and to attempt to do so would be to risk the marriage arrangements being nullified after negotiations had almost been

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[114] [12] Barsha's position is incorrectly given as a sub-group of Haiba; it should be shown as structurally equivalent to Haiba. See also note 11.

concluded. I have been present on occasions when, after both 582 parties have agreed to a marriage and the groom has collected 605 most of the things necessary to present to the bride at the wedding celebrations, the girl's father's brother's son appears and demands the discontinuance of the arrangements; on one occasion, he did not appear until the actual day of the wedding, but was bought off with a cap, a cloak, and the promise of two sheep. The highest incidence for any form of marriage, moreover, is with the patrilineal parallel cousin, although not necessarily with the first cousin.

Parallel cousin marriage of this sort is not, however, the only 582 form practised among the Bedouin. Much of the writing on Bedouin marriage leaves the impression that a solution of the problem of parallel cousin marriage (Murphy & Kasdal 1959) solves all the problems involved in their system of marriage. In addition to this form, there is a number of others; indeed there is another form of preferential marriage among them, which, although it does not have the compulsive character of parallel cousin marriage, is of major importance. I refer to cross-cousin marriage with the mother's brother's daughter. Such a cousin may be, of course, as a result of patrilineal parallel cousin marriage, a patrilineal parallel cousin as well. Such a cousin may be, on the other hand, a woman of another tribal section or of a different tribe altogether. A characteristic form of this marriage is that once it has been initiated, it is perpetuated in successive generations. Members of one line in a tertiary segment will, 582 therefore, be building up kinship ties through marriage in one 613 particular direction. At the same time, another line, by practising the same form of marriage will be weaving ties in a quite different direction. One direction these marriages could take might be to a tertiary segment of a collateral secondary segment; another might be to a primary segment of the same tribe, and yet another to people living in a date oasis. Only occasionally do marriages occur between collateral tertiary segments, and then there is usually some specific reason. In other words, when men marry outside the limits of their own tertiary segment, they leap-frog adjacent segments and marry into structurally more remote groups.

The result of these two marriage patterns is that the people of [621]

582 any summer camp will have descent lines cross linked by the
613 bonds of marriage with parallel cousins, and at the same time
[621] cleaved by the maternal links established by repetitive cross-cousin
marriage to different groups outside the segment. Thus,
in one of its aspects, marriage makes of an agnatic group a group
582 of cognates as well. 'Marry your paternal cousins and both your
613 paternal and maternal relatives will be one,' to quote Bedouin
602 sentiment on the matter. Within this agnatic group, nevertheless,
two other clusters of kin exist—those with maternal connexions
outside. In all, three areas of kinship can be defined,[13] although
all the members of the segment will have the lineage bond of
agnation in common. In normal circumstances, when split does
not threaten the group, the bond of agnation, strengthened by
parallel cousin marriage, takes precedence, although behaviour
is significantly affected by maternal links at any time. There is,
152 in the first instance, great jealousy between co-wives, which is
595 passed on to their children. Each wife has her separate tent, and
593 each is entitled to a strictly equal share of the husband's time
they have in common. This applies similarly to favours he may
grant his wives, and the distribution of his wealth among them.
If, for example, the husband is the owner of a horse, he is required
to tether it outside the tents of his wives in strict rotation;
if he retires for the night with one wife, the following night
he must favour the other; if he buys dress material for the one
he must buy a length of identical material for the other; if he
bestows favours on the children of one the children of the other
must be given equal consideration. Many such details are
meticulously observed; but while many are observed most of the
time, it is difficult to observe them all, the whole time. Any
breach of the rules is quickly taken up by the wives, and quarrels
ensue, leading not only to bitterness among the co-wives, but between
the offended wife and her husband, between the children
of both wives, and between the children and their father. Often,
595 when a man has co-wives, there is a marked discrepancy in age
593 between them, for, when an elderly Bedouin marries a second
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[13] The situation is not always as simple as this. Cross-cousin marriage may take more than two directions, and marriage within the segment might bring about great complexity, but the argument put forward above is not seriously affected by neglecting these details here.

wife he usually chooses a young girl of about twenty years. Children 595
of the elder wife might be adult, therefore, when the children 593
of the junior wife are infants. Great emphasis is placed on 561
seniority, particularly among males, but strong emphasis is also
placed on the equality of siblings and their equal legal status.
Between brothers of widely differing ages, there is, then, this
field of potential conflict. From an early date competitive, if not
hostile, relationships develop between the sons of co-wives. Competition 593
between half-brothers results not only from their 586
mothers being co-wives: one group might be the sons of a divorced 587
wife. The latter situation is often much worse, for the sons
born of the divorced wife are now being fostered by a woman
who is not their mother. A similar condition of things is brought
about when a widower with sons remarries. Yet again, when a
wife grows old and her sons have reached maturity, her husband
may not divorce her formally, but merely 'throw her off his
back'; she will then go to live with her grown sons, while her
husband, in turn, takes a new wife, usually taking up residence
in another camp for a time at least. It would be too much of a
digression here to discuss the inheritance disputes, and the disputes
over marriage and bride-wealth, which arise out of these
various circumstances. Suffice it to note that such disputes are [613]
common and affect the alignment of people within a tertiary
segment.

As half-brothers grow to maturity some of them will marry 613
their maternal cross-cousins, and in succeeding generations some 621
of their descendants will do likewise. In this way, a tertiary segment [582]
united by the bond of agnation, will also have within it
smaller groups of kin having different sets of cognatic links. This
group, as a residential unit, shows a very high concentration of
agnates, and the Bedouin say with pride that members of the
camps are always 'one' because of this agnatic bond, and indeed,
the corporate identity of this group is strikingly displayed in
many circumstances. It does not take precedence in all circumstances, 613
for, built into agnation, with the heavy burden of duties 578
which go with it, are serious stresses and strains which in some 602
circumstances regularly come out into the open. In yet other
circumstances cognatic kinship affiliations appear to be dominant,
causing friction among agnates. A man, for example, may permit

613 his maternal kinsmen to use the land and water facilities of
578 his lineage; his agnates may give ready consent or bicker about
602 it, but when it becomes necessary to clean a well, disputes are
almost certain to break out in the camp between those who argue
that their maternal relatives should not be expected to assist in
its cleaning and those who insist they should as an acknowledgement
of the use they have made of it. In these circumstances
613 maternal links divide agnates. Conversely, if it becomes necessary
602 for some of the same men to use the water and ploughland
of their maternal kin, their agnates are only too pleased that
they are able to do so, because the pressure on their own resources
is relieved. In these circumstances, the maternal link
strengthens the agnatic group. When, to give another instance,
613 blood-money has to be gathered, it is the duty of all agnates to
682 contribute equally, and no member of the group, rich or poor,
can contract out of this obligation without sacrificing his membership
of the group. Payments of blood-money are witness of
the strength of the notion of 'oneness' among agnates, in one
sense, but in so far as they are compulsory, they point also to the
weakness in the relationship. Maternal kin are not directly concerned
in this, but they can and do make contributions. In this
context two aspects of agnation appear, and the value of the
602 maternal link is emphasized. Again, maternal kinsmen are not
428 directly concerned in inheritance disputes, but they are expected
578 to intercede for their sister's sons, who often use their mother's
brother's tribal brand on their own animals. During disputes of
this kind, blame is thrown on to the maternal kinsmen for their
interference in matters which, properly speaking, are not their
613 business. In marriage, however, events take quite a different
582 turn. The responsibility for providing a man with a wife is first
that of the father, and secondly of the members of the tertiary
section; the father takes the initiative, and his agnates assist, not
only in the negotiations, but also in defraying the heavy costs of
the wedding festivities, the various gifts that precede it, and the
604 bride-wealth which follows. The mother's brother is also a key
613 person in all these arrangements. He enters into the negotiations,
585 assists with the entertainment on the wedding day, and makes a
substantial contribution to the bride-wealth. On the wedding day,
[583] there is no kinsman to compare with the mother's brother; a few

weeks later, he is reviled for demanding a long overdue installment 604
of his daughter's bride-wealth. He is the person who can be 613
approached freely, to whom love tales can be told, from whom [585]
help can be expected, who gives support in disputes, and who also [583]
upbraids, who punishes, who withholds, who acts as a pull-away
from the agnatic group. An agnate demands help, and also compels 613
the fulfilment of obligations. An agnate is a man with whom 602
relationships are formal, particularly if he is a senior. He is, too,
the person who unfailingly, though perhaps grudgingly, gives
help when it is most required; who, regardless of the merits of the
case, defends one against external opposition; and who is always
available at each life crisis. A kinship link is not to be defined by
any one particular mode of behaviour. Each is a cluster of different
sorts of behaviour, one form taking precedence in these circumstances,
another in other circumstances, and so forth.

The little clusters of kindred can be defined clearly in any of 613
the camps. It is customary among the Bedouin for those who are 602
most closely linked as kindred to pitch their tents close to each 621
other. For example, if a man has two recently married sons, their
tents are pitched on either side of his, with the ropes of their
tents crossing the ropes of their father's tent. More distantly related
kin will be more distantly placed, and here and there,
breaks in the continuity of the lines of tents are to be observed,
corresponding as a rule to breaks in kinship. Each large camp in
this way can be viewed as two or more nuclei of kindred. The
camp as a whole is dominantly composed of agnates, but they
are disposed in such a way as to show clusterings of varying kinship
composition. Characteristically each cluster has a separate
name, often a female name which refers to a common mother of
the cluster, or of the head of the leading family in it. When these [221]
relatively large camps break up with the onset of the rains and
disperse to form small camps of five to seven tents for winter
pasturing, they will be seen to correspond almost identically with
the kin clusters of the larger summer camp. Again, a tertiary segment [312]
may have two wells for its own use. In a particular year
there may be sufficient water in one of them to meet the needs
of the whole group, and its members then live together in one
camp; the following year both wells may have to be used, and
the camp of the previous summer will split up, roughly half going

613 to one well, and the remainder to the other. It is usually an easy
621 matter to predict, at least in a general fashion, how the group
602 will divide, as long as the details of kinship are known; the camps
will be composed of members of two sets of patri-lines in the
[312) tertiary segment, who will also represent two discrete clusters of cognatic kindred. If, therefore, a tertiary group increases in numbers to the point where a split in the lineage is inevitable, here then is the line of split, along a line, that is, of kinship cleavage and lineage differentiation. 'Men make the tribe; women divide it,' is an oft-quoted saying among the Bedouin, but this, like most sayings, tells only part of the truth, as we shall see.

613 It is possible to show where on the genealogy change takes
621 place, and it is possible to indicate the lines cleavages will follow, but the proliferation of a lineage does not occur merely because the possibility exists for it to do so. A group must, clearly, break up if the number of its members significantly exceeds that which can be supported by the available natural resources; water is the prime cause of the proliferation of lineages. Granting this, a group remains an undifferentiated corporation until occasion arises when its members, or some of them, can demonstrate unequivocally that they are no longer bound by its conditions of membership. There is a number of occasions when this can be done, some of which are discussed below.

The test, *par excellence*, of corporate affiliation is the accept-
613 ance of the responsibility to pay blood-money. Refusal to accept
621 this is the same as renouncing membership of the group. Individ-
672 uals are sometimes excluded from membership in this way. There
682 are occasions too, when the payment of blood-money involves renunciation by more than one or two individuals. If membership of a section has increased to the point of splitting, and should a homicide occur within it, one of the kin clusters within the group might demand blood-money from the other. Nothing could make the statement of split clearer than this. The most impelling condition of membership of the tertiary group is that 'we pay as one and receive as one', a condition which, of course, excludes payment within the group. Any two groups between which the demand for blood-money has been made are, therefore, by definition, separate tertiary groups.

613 When a member of a group or his wife dies, there are specific
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days on which kin of various sorts should attend the mourning 613
ceremonies, which extend over a period of a week. Allowance is 621
made for those who may be away temporarily, although they are 765
expected to hasten to the mourning camp as quickly as possible.
Agnatic kin are expected not only to be present on the appro- 613
priate day, but are required to offer gifts consistent with their 621
relationship to the bereaved; agnates of the tertiary segment are 765
expected to offer a sheep, while some cognates ought to bring a 431
goat and others a quantity of sugar and tea. At one funeral in a camp where I was resident, soon after the death occurred, the main concern of its inhabitants was whether or not certain men of their section would attend the mourning rites and bring appropriate gifts with them. These men lived at the time in another camp a few miles away, as they had been doing for several years past. They did not come when they were expected, and when they finally arrived at the end of the week they brought with them gifts of sugar and tea only—gifts which were totally inappropriate for agnates of the group. They were, in fact, now no longer members of it, and my neighbours were able to tell me, 'They have branched off from us. We will never live together again.' The lineage had proliferated and this was the first occasion for showing it.

Wide-spread in Cyrenaica is a cult of saints. The number of 794
saints' tombs varies from tribe to tribe, there being fewer among 776
the camel herders of the semi-desert than among the cow- 778
herding, almost sedentary, folk of the plateau area. Whatever [788]
the number, the members of the group that venerates a particular
saint make an annual pilgrimage to his tomb, and sometimes
more frequent pilgrimages are made. In one area there were two 794
men, accepted by their respective kin groups as leaders, who vied 554
against each other for the leadership of their section. One of them [648]
had been a famous warrior during the Italian wars and, after being injured, fled to Egypt where he lived for seventeen years, until he returned to his homeland in 1947. The other had also fought against the Italians, failed to win renown, was a captive for a time, later released, and subsequently appointed leader of his section by the Italian authorities. The first, during his period of exile, had become impoverished. The second during his years of freedom had prospered. As far as their personalities

794 were concerned, there was little doubt who was leader—the
554 name of the former was known throughout the land. Now when
the warrior returned from his Egyptian exile, his rival offered
794 him a sheep as a gift. This act was wholly appropriate. Subsequently
554 they continued to compete fiercely, but it soon became
578 clear that the returned warrior was winning the greater support.
In the face of this, the rival, in 1948, decided to break with tradition
[788] by staying away from the annual pilgrimage to the tomb of
[175] the local saint. Instead, he and his followers made their pilgrimage
to a different tomb in the vicinity of their camp, and later
built a low wall round the tomb, whitewashed it, and made it
known that henceforward they would regularly use it for pilgrimages.
[613] The two kinship groups of a tertiary section now had their
[778] separate saint's tomb. Some months later, the rival decided to
move with his small group to an area in which they had not previously
794 resided. It is the custom among the Bedouin when they
554 pitch their tents in a place for the first time, that the people of
578 the neighbourhood should bring them gifts to mark the event.
431 The returned warrior, who had now become a close neighbour
[166] of his rival was obliged, like others, to offer the latter a gift; he
was also obliged to return the gift of a sheep that he had been
given on rejoining his section in 1947. He brought a gift within a
few hours of his rival's arrival, but it was a goat.[14] The rival and
his followers were furious, and the argument that the warrior was
too poor to give more was dismissed summarily. This was the
final insult. The donor, in return, had been given less than he had
presented. The reciprocity of gift exchanges had not only been
arrested, it had been reversed. From then onwards the two groups
made no attempt to conceal their hostility and went their separate
ways.

613 Disputes stemming from circumstances such as these are the
578 occasions which mark the proliferation of groups, although in
all three cases cited, difficulties over water supplies had preceded
the outbreaks of quarrelling.

613 In this discussion of the ways in which proliferation of segments
602 takes place, the emphasis had been put on the tug of war
121 between the interests of people in their agnatic connexions and

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[14] A goat is inferior to a sheep in gift exchanges.

the interests they have in their maternal relatives. Stated thus 613
sharply, this is a distortion of the process. To speak of the prin- 602
ciple of agnation conflicting with the principle of cognation or 121
maternal origin is nonsense, as the facts included in the discussion show. Agnation is not one thing, but many. Within its scope are included such aspects of social organization as succession, status, inheritance, bride-wealth, blood-money, modes of domestic and political behaviour, and so forth; and each of these aspects, the closer we stick to reality, can be broken up into a number of components. The same can be said of cognation and maternal origin. All these principles, so called, are clusters of numerous component parts, which combine, in reality, in a kaleidoscopic number of ways. In one situation a component of one combines with that of another to strengthen it; in a different situation the one component may repel the other; in a third situation, a number of the components in one will combine to exclude those of the other, and so on. If, therefore, an understanding of the way in which lineage proliferation occurs is sought, a view of the process as a conflict between the principle of agnation and the opposing pull of maternal origin is quite erroneous. It is of use in predicting the direction of cleavage to know that within a tertiary group there are also clusters of kin which are defined roughly by maternal links, and this knowledge serves as a rough and ready guide in predicting what the composition of groups, after they have split away from the parent group, will be. If a more precise picture of this composition is desired, other and more complex kinship links and the behaviour which accompanies them must be taken into account. If a still more accurate picture is desired, details of inheritance disputes, debts of bride-wealth, the size of flocks and herds, and the like, must also be taken into consideration. If, finally, one has the opportunity to study groups after they have proliferated, the presence or absence of this or that man can often be explained only in terms of his eye for a pretty girl or a personal preference for neighbours.

The kind of change which has been discussed in this essay is [178]
not difficult to negotiate in genealogical terms. Earlier it was [621]
stressed that within the tertiary tribal sections, although they [173]
are always predominantly agnatic groups, clusters of cognatic [551]

613 kin also exist. Two ways of naming these clusters are adopted—
602 all groups, whether they are elementary families, an odd assort-
121 ment of kindred sharing a common tent for reasons of expedi-
178 ency, or tribal groups, have a name. Sometimes these clusters are
621 named after a prominent living male, or a deceased kinsman of
173 the same kind. Sometimes these little groups are named after a
551 woman, perhaps the grandmother of the group.[15] Thus a small
group of two or three tents will be distinguished from another similar cluster within the camp, and so on for a number of groups, depending on the size of the camp. Most camps, however many tents they contain, have names for progressively inclusive clusters of tents until a twofold named division is reached. Tertiary segments that are forced to split contain therefore two groups with names already attached to them. When a split occurs, the name of the tertiary segment is pushed into the area of ambiguity and the names of what were previously two clusters become the names of two new tertiary segments, with a minimum adjustment in usage and a minor re-shuffle at the tertiary level of segmentation. Names cannot continue to be pushed into this area of the genealogy interminably, otherwise it would gradually expand into a vast pool of names. For a few generations the name dispensed with in this way becomes one of those ancestors about whom there is argument when genealogies are given. In the course of time, name after name is subjected to the process of elision and eventually will cease to be of concern to anyone.

105 I now summarize the main points of the discussion. The evi-
613 dence that has been examined suggests that the mechanical de-
173 vices of telescoping, fusion of names, and extinction of lines do
178 not affect orders of segmentation superior to that of the tertiary
[551] order, and that in conditions of a completely stable population,
these devices alone would suffice to retain the form of the genealogical structure. But, it was argued, conditions of complete stability cannot be assumed; the evidence of the present distribution of population among the numerous tertiary groups clearly points to marked fluctuations occurring within these small groups. This being so, proliferation of these groups in some areas at some

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[15] The naming of groups within a tertiary segment is an interesting study in itself, but it would be outside the limits of this discussion to make more than a brief mention of it.

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times, must follow, and conversely, while proliferation takes place here, combination will be taking place elsewhere as the population of groups decreases. The condition which compels proliferation is the alteration in the relationship of man and animals to the natural resources; and when this alteration builds up to an acute pressure on water and land, one group of a divided segment must move off to seek water elsewhere.

The next task was to demonstrate where this kind of change occurred on the genealogy. The sudden irregularity in the number of segments at the tertiary order, compared with the uniformity at others, provided a clue. Other evidence also pointed to this as a significant order in this context: there is ambiguity displayed with regard to the identity and positioning of ancestors here; members adopted into a lineage are grafted on to it here; clients are attached to tertiary sections; groups of noblemen, when they are detached and move off to another tribe, break away at this point. This is where change occurs, but, it was agreed, in understanding the way in which it takes place, certain forms of marriage have to be taken into account. Particular emphasis was placed on cross-cousin marriage with the mother's brother's daughter, and to women outside the tertiary segment, since the effect of these forms of marriage is to produce two or more clusters of cognatic kindred in camps largely composed of agnates, and to emphasize the line of cleavage in a lineage segment. So that when, therefore, a split occurs, the line it takes is predetermined. Proliferation, even when necessary, does not finally come about, however, until an occasion permits the separation of groups to be demonstrated by a violation of the conditions of membership of a group. Details of three such occasions were offered: the demand for blood-money between agnates who previously had constituted a politically undivided section; behaviour contrary to the demands of agnatic kinship in attendance and gift-giving at funerals; and failure to participate in a pilgrimage to the saint's tomb of a particular section. But another query remained: how are the newly formed groups named? It was seen that names already in daily use by the small group of people concerned came to assume a new significance, while the name which had previously spanned them all is disregarded and pushed into the area of ambiguity whence later it is elided altogether. [551]

4: Peters E-5 (1948-1950) 1970 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9
Cyrenaica

105 613 173 178 Change due to the normal and inevitable process of proliferation is thus managed within the structural limits of the tertiary section without disturbing any of the superior orders in the system. The latter remain fixed over long periods, but the tertiary sections of a particular secondary action may be reduced in number over a few generations while another secondary section may show a corresponding increase in the number of its segments.

121 178 613 161 By combining the various factors involved in change, it is possible to understand the details of lineage proliferation, or at least to travel along a well signposted road. In the light of this analysis, moreover, it is unnecessary to assume a stable population in each and every segment over long periods; the mechanisms of readjustment allow for substantial irregularities and fluctuations in population. It is possible that they are also sufficient to contain significant increases in the aggregate population. They could almost certainly control minor fluctuations, but it is seriously doubted whether a population increase sufficient to produce a country-wide and acute water shortage could be met merely by the proliferation of tertiary lineage segments. But to deal with this problem other aspects of the Bedouin genealogy and details of Cyrenaican history, which have necessarily been omitted from this discussion, would have to be taken into account, and this is best left for another article.

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SOME STRUCTURAL ASPECTS OF THE FEUD AMONG THE CAMEL-HERDING BEDOUIN OF CYRENAICA[1]

E. L. PETERS

WHEN a Bedouin kills another in Cyrenaica, one of a number of consequences 682
ensues. According to the Bedouin, the particular consequence is determined by 571
the genealogical positions of the persons or groups concerned. In the first part of 829
this article an analysis of the disturbances in social relationships precipitated by 128
homicide is made, using a lineage model as a framework. In this part of the discussion
the arrangement of the information corresponds closely to the view the
Bedouin give of their relationships. Additional information is then presented to show [613]
that this lineage model neither covers several important areas of social relationships
nor enables an accurate prediction of events to be made. This raises the issue: can the 121
comprehensive power of the model be increased by complicating it, or does complexity 613
destroy its utility? The argument advanced is that the lineage model is not a 571
sociological one, but that it is a frame of reference used by a particular people to
give them a common-sense kind of understanding of their social relationships. For
sociological purposes this means that the lineage model, with its supporting theoretical [128]
presuppositions, must perforce be abandoned. In the latter part of this article
some of the implications of adopting this position are discussed. Particular stress is [578]

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[1] This study is based on field-work in Cyrenaica carried out over a period of twenty-seven months from January 1948 to December 1950. The field-work was made possible by the award of a Horniman Studentship and of a Treasury Senior Studentship in Oriental Languages and Cultures. I wish to express my thanks to both awarding bodies. The paper was presented in its first form to a seminar at Manchester University. Modified versions were read at Oxford and Cambridge and at University College London in 1963. In a Manchester seminar, Professor W. J. M. Mackenzie raised issues which led me to reconsider my mode of analysis. Professor Ely Devons read a draft of the article, and offered valuable suggestions.
I also wish to thank Professor Gluckman for the 12
many profitable discussions we have had on the
institution of the feud. My interest in the feud stems [114]
directly from Evans-Pritchard's work on the institution
among the Nuer. I am most grateful to him ←
for his help and encouragement while I was pursuing my researches. Finally, anyone writing on the feud must acknowledge the contribution made to its understanding by Dr. Elizabeth Colson.

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121 given to the feud, for this is one of the few societies in which it occurs.[1] What is
613 meant here by a state of feud is a set of relationships between two tribal groups which
578 are characterized by hostility whenever two or more of their members meet. These
591 hostilities are of a sort which cannot be terminated; feud is not a matter of a group
121 indulging in hostilities here at one moment and there the next, but a sequence of
619 hostilities which, as far as the contemporary Bedouin are concerned at least, know
578 no beginning and are insoluble. Feud and the other forms of relationships to be
[591] discussed presently are to be understood, in part, by reference to the ordered divisions
of the tribes. It is necessary at the outset, therefore, to give a brief statement about
the tribal organization; other details will be included as they become relevant.

619 There are nine noble tribes in Cyrenaica whose members are referred to as freemen.
621 These tribes see themselves as divided into three genealogical orders of sections:
primary, secondary, and tertiary. The tertiary tribal sections correspond to the camps
613 which cluster around the larger watering points during the drought season, May to
[132] November. Such camps consist of clusters of smaller camps in which the concentration
of agnatically related males is over 80 per cent. Within the latter kinship links
are known, so that these agnates are consanguinely related as well as politically
[162] united. The populations of most tertiary groups vary from about 200 to 700 or so,
but a group ceases to be viable if the number of male adults drops much below fifty.
Political division is absent from these tertiary groups, regardless of their precise
size, for, whatever may be the condition of developing local lineages, the acceptance
of a common name carries with it full political responsibility incumbent equally on
[423] all their members. Each of these tertiary sections, moreover, has its own watering
point, ploughland, and pastures; each has its own *watan* or homeland. This statement
is true of all tribal sections of whatever order of segmentation. In other words, the
tribes and their sections correspond to an ordered division of the territory.

619 Names of tribal sections are the same as those given in the genealogies. Both tribe
613 and lineage are identically ordered. Lineages develop, and split at the tertiary order
of segmentation,[2] and, *a fortiori*, the process is the same for the tertiary tribal sections.
Split, in other words, occurs where relationships are most intense.

621 The summer community which constitutes a tertiary section, breaks up once the
221 rains begin in November or December. At this time of the year water is readily
available in the numerous small cisterns, there is pasture in plenty, and the animals
are giving milk. These combined reasons lead the larger summer camp to divide
into smaller camps of some five to ten tents. The latter are separated one from the
other by short distances—a mile or so—but together form a cluster in that they are
621 territorially distinguishable from a neighbouring and similar group of camps. Tertiary
311 sections are discrete also in the sense that all the major necessities of daily living
are available within their several territories. Each controls its own natural resources,
and these resources are the same for all the camel-herding groups—in any given year
one may have more of a particular commodity than another, but the difference is in

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[171] [1] Evans-Pritchard, 1940. The feud might have been present among the Nuer. Exogamy and the other rules of marriage which obtain among them create a dispersion of ties, which superficially appears to militate against a condition of feud. But a dispersal of ties does not mean that they necessarily act as a pressure for peace. Moreover, the exogamous links may link limited numbers of groups only, leaving others with sufficient discreteness to pursue feuding relationships as they are described in this paper.

[2] See Peters, 1959.

degree and is ephemeral, so that the opportunity for the development of trade rela- 621
tions is absent.[1] Save for straying animals, a section has no urgent need to seek 311
relationships with others, as long as the rainfall is sufficient to permit the exploitation [619]
of local resources.

The tertiary section is also regarded as the corporate group *par excellence*, in which 621
'the one word does for all'. Corporate identity is conceptualized as 'one bone' 613
or 'one body'. An offence against one of its members is held to be an offence
against all; if one of its members is killed 'we all lose blood'. When one of its mem- [682]
bers commits homicide the responsibility falls on all equally. Blood money, when
received, is shared by all save for a special portion reserved for the 'owner of the [272]
blood', the nearest agnate of the victim. In opposite circumstances, all adult males
accept the responsibility of contributing an equal share to the blood money. Rules
of membership, simple in their brevity, express graphically this corporate identity:
'You must strike with us and be struck with us; you must pay with us and receive
with us.' The group also bears a name, and there is never any doubt about the
affiliation of any tribesman. That group of men—known as the *'amarā dam*—who are
agreed on the obligation to exact vengeance, to pay blood money when necessary,
to engage in common defence, and to accept the possibility of death in vengeance,
is a fixed and clear-cut group, not one whose membership has to be calculated by
reference to degrees of kinship in regard to a specific situation, as appears to be the
case among other peoples.

Homicide within the *'amarā dam* brings about an impasse in relationships. A blood- 621
money payment is out of the question since the acceptance of blood money by one 613
part of a tertiary section from another of its parts is tantamount to a statement of 682
split. Only in conditions where relationships within the lineage have developed to the
point of political severance is it anticipated that a blood-money payment may be 627
demanded; but this problem is not the same as that at present under discussion.
Bedouin say that blood money cannot pass within the *'amarā dam* for those making [829]
the payment would be the persons receiving it. This is spurious reasoning, since the
'owner of the blood' is awarded more than any other members of the group as it is,
and arrangements could obviously be made to pay him separately. Blood money is
out of the question because it distinguishes relationships between people as belonging
to two distinct political communities, and not because of any difficulty of distribution.
In Bedouin thinking, an injury to 'the one body' is an injury to all its parts. Blood- [829]
money payments by members of a corporation to one or more of its members is a
contradiction in terms. In the same way vengeance is also excluded, for this merely
doubles the original loss. A reprisal exacted in hot blood is always a possibility, but
this is not referred to as *thār*, vengeance. Even if, at a later date, the closest kinsman
of the victim should slay the offender, the act would not be referred to as *thār* and any
connexion with earlier homicides would be denied.

Stultified in the field of political action, there is little else that can be done. Expul- 682
sion is a possible course of action—and expulsion has occurred. Records show,
however, that exile is almost invariably voluntary.[2] Moreover, exile is terminated as

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[1] Many sections trade fleeces for dates with the folk of distant oases, but the sections do not trade among themselves.

[2] I recorded one case of a man who was expelled from his group and the tribes around were warned that the rules of sanctuary were not to apply to him. [438] He is said to have died from grief and hunger. The reason given for such drastic action is that he killed

682 a rule by the return of the offender to his camp after the lapse of a number of years.
A man who had already killed six people killed a seventh, his first paternal cousin.
He and his brothers fled the tribe; he died in exile and it was not until some thirty
[123] years later that his brother and nephew returned. Another man, who had killed his
first paternal cousin, used my entry into a camp as the occasion for his re-entry,
pitching his tent rope on rope with mine, and mine in turn was rope on rope with
the tent of the camp's shaikh.[1]

621 An effort is always made to hush up the matter when a homicide occurs within a
682 tertiary section. It is for this reason that the name of the victim is not perpetuated.
613 Normally it is an obligation to perpetuate the names of the deceased, especially when
they have been killed in homicide, but in the circumstances now being discussed the
[551] name is suppressed. As one man expressed the general sentiments, stretching out his toga in front of him: 'Look at the hole in my toga; it would be better without it, but what can I do? Make it bigger? It is better to cover it up.' Any penal action taken against the offender could only enlarge the wound he had already opened. The notion of corporate identity is so strong that it eliminates the use of penal action against one of its members for the greatest offence of all. While overtly every effort is made to expunge the memory of a homicide of the sort described above, the Bedouin are most articulate in their views about the offender. He is referred to as one who 'defecates in the tent' thus likening him to an animal, for no human being would do this. Other expletives used in reference to him are: one who 'destroys the lineage', who 'corrupts the family'; he is one who 'brings confusion', who 'provokes God' and causes 'the evil of leprosy to eat into relationships'. Their feelings about the offender, who 'commits robbery internally', are summed up in the word *fitna*. This, in its Cyrenaican use, corresponds closely to the notion of sin as it is used in the Old Testament; in the sense, that is to say, of an act which causes an impasse in relationships, which creates chaos among a small group of related people, and produces internal calamity. And this is indeed the situation brought about by such homicide among the Bedouin. Flowing blood, they are wont to say, can only be staunched by blood (i.e. a vengeance killing), but if a man kills within a close agnatic range the corporate body continues to bleed. Nothing can be done. The group is left helpless, and this is sin.

The first step in this exposition, therefore, is to attach to homicide within a tertiary section the notion of its being *fitna*, carrying with it voluntary and temporary expulsion.

682 A homicide which involves two collateral tertiary sections is a different matter
628 altogether, for now the parties constitute two discrete political groups. Political
machinery can be set in motion to deal with the breach in relationships, and conse-
621 quently a homicide of this sort does not pose the dilemma which is created when it
613 occurs within a politically undivided group. Not only do agnates of two collateral tertiary sections behave towards each other as two groups of people, but the nature of their relationships is fundamentally different from those obtaining between mem-

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682 a first cousin in cold blood because of a dispute between them over the ownership of a new-born kid. Although this was the only reason given by the Bedouin other considerations were involved—the victim was said to have been a fine person, and his killer a constant trouble maker, and so on.

[1] See for comparison Robertson Smith, 1903. The tent is an area of sanctuary, and this extends to include the ropes also.

bers of an undivided group. It is erroneous to suppose that because the different 621
orders of sections are homologous in their structural aspects they do not differ; they 613
do, because the interests associated with the various orders are different.[1] 628
[682]

Collateral tertiary segments are associated with different tracts of territory. Each has its own watering rights as a group, and although groups may share a grain store, [423] it is divided on group lines. Members of these different groups do not gather together in summer to form a single community, though at some of the very big watering points they are near each other. Social relationships between them are, however, intense. Visits are frequent. They meet to exchange news, or to inquire after the [574] sick. They exchange greetings during the major festivals, and members of one group attend the funerals and weddings of the others, taking gifts. They also meet at the grain stores. Herdsmen, as they pursue straying animals, wander freely in their neighbours' territory. Relationships of this sort, some of them urgently necessary for survival, do not permit the feuding relationships to be described presently. Permanent hostility which characterizes the feud would seriously disrupt everyday economic activities, limit the pastoral movements of the Bedouin beyond endurance, and sever lines of communication which they always strive to keep open.

A homicide, when it involves two collateral tertiary groups must, therefore, be 621
resolved quickly. This can be effected in two ways. Vengeance may be exacted im- 613
mediately. This is always referred to as a vengeance killing or *thār*, and is to be dis- 628
tinguished from a superficially similar act within a tertiary group, since *thār* carries 682
with it the implication that it is premeditated. A *thār* between two tertiary sections is considered to be the best way of settling the affair and, after an appropriate lapse of time, a peace meeting is held at which it is accepted that the killings have cancelled each other out. The deliberations at this meeting are followed by a meal at which all present 'eat around the one bowl'; the meal over, they all pray together. A life had been taken for a life and the way is now open for the restoration of normal peaceful relationships. Vengeance needs to be distinguished from feud, for while retaliatory killings provide the propulsive force in the feud a vengeance killing may be the means whereby a settlement of hostilities is made possible.

An end to hostilities may also be brought about by a promise to pay blood money 621
or *diya*, and its acceptance by the victim's group. Arrangements for blood-money 613
discussions are made by a category of persons known as *marabtin bi'l baraka*, or 628
' clients of the goodness ', men who, by virtue of descent and origin, stand outside 682
the descent lines of the noble tribes, and who are accredited with divine goodness. 792
They tend the sick, write amulets, and are always present at a peace meeting to give it the weight of their baraka. Soon after the homicide has occurred they act as intermediaries to bring the hostile groups together at a peace meeting.[2] Ostensibly, the 621
first part of the proceedings at these meetings is to settle the amount of the blood 613
money, and how and when it is to be paid. Agreement on these counts will have been 628
reached, however, before the large peace gathering is assembled, for there is a gener- 682

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[1] This statement requires more documentation than I am able to give to it in this paper, but the descriptive details given hereafter give it some substance. See also Smith, 1936.

[2] It is necessary to add here that these clients do not assume coercive powers. They are granted the power to curse, but the curse that is feared is the curse of their dead when an oath is given at a saint's tomb. When they know that groups wish to make peace they assist as messengers in bringing people together, but they do not use their power to curse as a pressure.

621 613 628 682 ally recognized amount of blood money to compensate a homicide. The wrangling that goes on at the meeting is of a conventional kind, and it is known in advance that several distinguished guests present will supplicate for a reduction of the amount demanded by the victim's group, until the amount generally accepted as appropriate is reached. Such haggling makes it possible for the victim's surviving agnates to maintain the fiction that they yielded only under the strongest pressure from the desert [264] leaders and holy men. The main importance of the meeting is that the two hostile groups are brought together again for the first time, that the cleavage between them has been narrowed sufficiently to permit them to eat round one bowl, and that, by virtue of this commensal meal, the way is now open for the restoration of normal relationships. Subsequently there may be another killing, which, in the mind of the perpetrator, is connected with the earlier death of a kinsman, but it is not publicly recognized as one in a series of killings, or even as a vengeance killing; it is regarded as unique, and the method of dealing with it is on the basis of this fiction. Feud is not permitted between two collateral tertiary sections, for although the pattern of homicide may be similar to that of a feud, the two are never equated. There is good reason for this, since, whatever the similarity in pattern, the social relationships between the groups involved are radically different; each homicide involving tertiary sections is regarded as a unique event, and the relationships between times are friendly, whereas in feud relationships are permanently hostile and need not be otherwise for social, economic, or religious purposes.

Blood money when it brings peace brings it because payment is made only in part. It is never regarded as a payment for the life of a man, to be dissipated wantonly. ' The owner of the blood ' should marry a wife with it to beget children (one son to be named after the victim) or to buy camels to provide for a future marriage, or to buy a horse to be used to ride in bringing vengeance. Sufficient is paid to cover either of the first two alternatives; as far as my records go the third alternative is romanticism. At the peace meeting the offender's group does not promise to pay the total amount in one sum. An initial instalment is promised after the next lambing season or barley harvest. When the time comes it can be argued that the sheep dropped a disappointingly small number of lambs, or that the barley harvest did not fulfil expectations. If there is room for negotiation over the initial payment, the permitted manœuvring over subsequent payments is much greater. Promises made at the peace meeting relating to these subsequent payments do not specify the exact amount of each; the statement is no more definite than that the remainder should be paid over the following three to five years. Consequently when the second payment falls due, the offender's group can argue more cogently that their circumstances do not permit even a reduced payment, for the payment of the previous year was substantial and they have not yet recovered from this outlay. ' The owner of the blood ' is pressed to consider this, and to accept only a fraction of the wealth he had come to collect. The argument is cumulative, and can be used to excuse the rapidly decreasing payments of each successive year, until there comes a time when attempts to collect payments are discontinued. The arguments about the payments bear no relationship to the wealth possessed by a group. During the annual hagglings, and while members of the offender's group are declaring their straitened circumstances as an excuse for the small amount offered, the ' owner of the blood ' knows full well that two or three

621 hundred of their sheep are grazing in the neighbourhood. This is beside the point.
613 What is important is that the offender's group is showing a desire to remain on
628 friendly terms, and members of the victim's group are doing likewise by accepting
682 reduced amounts. Compared with what the payments should be, after four years they
are trivial and soon cease altogether. Blood money, if it is to achieve the purpose of
621 restoring peaceful relationships, must work in this way among the Bedouin, for, as
613 they view the matter, a single payment of the full amount would only terminate
628 relationships. There would be no further obligations to hold them together. The
682 payment of a debt in full means only one thing—hostility. Where there is no debt,
571 there are no relationships. Debt must be allowed to run between groups, for it is this
182 which creates obligations and perpetuates social relationships.[1] As the debt of blood
money mounts, the social relationships between the groups improve. The cessation of payments and the absence of further demands is final earnest that the relationships are again normal.

613 The second step in this exposition, therefore, is to attach to homicide between
628 tertiary sections the penalty of vengeance or the payment of blood money, both
621 achieving the same end of bringing about a restoration of peaceful relationships.

682 Between secondary sections, relationships are again different. Ecologically, the
619 areas are distinct. The topography may be dissimilar—sand dunes in one area and
613 low valleys in another; secondly, the soils may differ—sandy soil here and firm valley
[133] bottom soil there; thirdly, while the climatic régime of the two areas may be broadly
similar, since there is marked variability in the aggregate annual rainfall which is
[132] coupled with a high variability from place to place, each secondary section has its
own micro-climate, sufficiently well defined for one area to be well watered in any given year while a neighbouring area suffers partial drought. These differences affect
[221] productive activities. Seasonal movements are also affected: some secondary sections
move annually over considerable distances and in fixed directions, while members of a collateral section may move only a few miles and these short moves may vary in direction from year to year. It is true that minor ecological differences exist between collateral tertiary sections, but these do not affect the economy and the way of life in the manner described for secondary sections. Partly because of their territorial extent, partly because of the larger aggregate population, the secondary sections are more self-contained, not only ecologically and economically but also in terms of social relationship. More of the requirements of everyday living can be met within the territory and span of a secondary section than within those of a tertiary section. Secondary sections develop a kind of specialization to the extent that in any year some of them will have more usable natural resources than others, but because these differences are ephemeral they do not lead to the development of permanent trade relations. Add to all this the fact that agnates are concentrated in camps on the territory which belongs to their lineage, and the discreteness of secondary sections is
[582] immediately apparent. Marriage rules make this discreteness potentially, at least, even
more sharply defined, for unlike other 'lineage societies' where exogamy, coupled with other marriage regulations, compels the dispersion of kin links among lineage

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[1] This point becomes clearer when considered in the general context of debt relationship among the Bedouin. Marriage payments, gift exchanges, hospitality, various forms of help, and so on are all aspects, with blood money, of an intricate and fascinating web of debt relationships.

619 segments, the Bedouin are free to marry within as close a range as the first cousin on
613 either side. Preferential marriage with the father's brother's daughter exists, not
582 merely as a sentiment, but with the legal force of permitting a man this choice against all other men. Before a father arranges the marriage of his daughter he first must seek the permission of his brother's son. Moreover, if a first-parallel cousin is not available, a Bedouin is free to take as a wife any parallel cousin within the minimal lineage. Much weight has been given to the value of exogamy as a device for the definition of groups; parallel-cousin marriage is equally suitable for the purpose—indeed it is better for it has the effect of knitting the members of a local group together as cognates, thereby throwing the group into isolated relief.

613 Consequently, when a homicide occurs between two secondary sections, there is
628 no urgent necessity to make peace, the relationship between them being of a kind
682 that can be controlled and altered to suit the circumstances. It is between these groups that the argument—if the argument is taken up at all—centres on the circumstances of the killing, every effort being made to show that insult was deliberately added to homicide, that one homicide is to be distinguished from another because a man of great renown was singled out as the avenger's victim, or that in a vengeance killing there was a breach of taboo as well. A debt is always left over, and it is an impelling obligation for the Bedouin to redeem it. They frequently speak of vengeance in this context as 'redeeming the debt'. Again, any homicide between two secondary sections is regarded as one in a series, whether the details or even the name of the victim of the previous homicide is known or not. I recall discussing a double homicide with a close kinsman of the slayer, and the only way he could account for it was by telling me that his kinsman had to kill because his victims were of such and such a group. The feud knows no beginning, and it has no end. It is a form of behaviour associated with a specific structural order, and it is as persistent as the structural order itself; in this sense it is eternal. It was most difficult to get the Bedouin to give accounts of homicides other than those which had occurred over the past fifty years or so, but they invariably claimed that the origin was earlier than this, although they were wholly unaware of the identity of the earlier victims. In any event, their only historical frame of reference is the genealogy; and history, as a chronological sequence of events, has no meaning beyond the founding ancestor of a minimal segment. When they refer events to points on the genealogy superior to this, they are no longer thinking in terms of the temporal order of events, but in terms of what they know to be the contemporary relationships between groups, for the names on the genealogy are names of groups and do not bear a relation to a time scale in any sense. Put in another way, for them a homicide which involves two secondary sections must be a feud, because this is the nature of the relationships between the groups, and there must have been previous killings, otherwise the people involved would not belong to two separate secondary groups.

The relationships which are referred to as feud are of a kind which requires at least a show of hostility whenever the parties happen to meet. Even if they do not actually meet, but are in the vicinity, some sort of demonstration is likely. Thus, several shots were fired at a man riding some distance away from a camp, and although positive identification was difficult at this range, the men of the camp argued it must have been a member of a group with which they were at feud otherwise the passer-by

would have dropped in on the camp. In another situation, two men entered a shop 613
in a market-place; inside sat two men of a feuding group who, instead of retreating 628
hastily, greeted those who had just entered, and the latter returned the greeting with 682
blows on the head from the butts of their rifles. Markets in Cyrenaica are recognized [443]
to be places of peace. In their actions the two offenders not only injured two others
but also broke a taboo in a public place. The victim's group now had to avenge not [683]
only the injury but the insult that the breach of taboo carried with it, as well. In most feud relationships this is characteristic. It is never a matter of a simple homicide, but of killing a man at the entrance to his tent, between the centre poles of his tent, or taking the life of a minor, or an elder too old to carry arms and so on. Each successive killing ensures that the hostile relationships will be perpetuated.

The third step in this exposition, therefore, is the association of a state of feud with the secondary order of segmentation.

When the relationships between the structurally superior primary tribal sections 619
are examined, the arguments against the necessity for peace are stronger than in the case of secondary sections. Relationships between them are few and irregular. Only occasionally do members of these groups meet, and then often accidentally; very many men of collateral primary sections are complete strangers one to the other.
If a homicide occurs between two primary sections it is unlikely that any attempt to 619
open negotiations will be made. The offender's camp may be raided by a *ghazi* 682
recruited from the victim's kinsmen. There would be no question of these primary [721]
sections going to war. On a raid firearms may be used, but the action is limited to a
strike-and-run affair. If the issue is joined and members of both sides are ranged [726]
against each other they fight with sticks to avoid large-scale slaughter: warfare must
not be allowed within the tribe. Wars belong to intertribal relationships. For one of 175
these wars, apart from hearsay evidence, some records exist. These tell of a war 619
which took place during the period 1860 to 1865, in which there were planned cam- 726
paigns, the organization of fighters into groups, and provisions for a labour force in the home territory, large enough to produce sufficient food to maintain an army in the field. During this war several hundred people were killed.

At this point, it is possible to summarize the stages in this exposition of the 619
Bedouin view in diagrammatic form. 726

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

682 To complete this general statement, two further circumstances are cited by the
602 Bedouin. If a man kills a related person who is not an agnate (it is expressed as killing
the mother's brother) the breach in relationships must be healed as quickly as possible. The convention for dealing with this is that the offender, bound hand and foot, mounted on a horse, is sent to the camp of 'the owner of the blood', in the company of a holy man, there to make an offer of his life, saying: 'Here is my knife, my life is yours; here is my shroud, my life is yours.' No Bedouin would agree for a moment to undertake this journey if he thought the offer might be accepted. In Bedouin sentiments a life offered in this way cannot be taken. It is the convention which precedes a peace meeting and blood money. Any other way of dealing with the confusion, which spreads as a result of a homicide between cognates, is excluded.

682 Secondly, if a woman is killed, whatever the intersegmentary distance, the homicide
is said to be accidental, because a man never 'intends' to kill a woman. Blood-money
562 arrangements are made as soon as possible, and the wealth—half that of a
613 man—passes to the deceased's father, not to her husband, for a woman's 'bone'
always belongs to her father. Obviously women cannot be allowed to enter into
582 feud; since it is demographically compelling (apart from other reasons) for some of
591 them to marry outside their natal groups, then they might well find themselves residents
in the enemy's camps, if they were to become involved in feuds.

121 This statement of the different means available for the regulation of homicide at
the several orders of tribal segmentation is the view the Bedouin themselves hold of
682 their relationships. An analysis of the facts presented thus far could bring out a
613 number of interesting points with regard to the relativity of morals, the typification
829 of acts by their social context, the significance of the orders of segmentation, and so
619 on. Rather than proceed along these lines, however, it is more urgently necessary
to reflect on the significance of the fact that the arrangement of the material in terms of what is usually called the lineage structure coincides with the Bedouin ordering of the same details. It is, of course, important to note that the account is not based on mere hearsay evidence. Each statement made can be documented from known homicides, and to this extent the model that has been used is consistent with reality. The model, nevertheless, can only be a representation of what a particular people, the Bedouin, conceive their social reality to be; it is a kind of ideology which enables them, without making absurd demands on their credulity, to understand their field of social relationships, and to give particular relationships their *raison d'être*. But, as will be shown, it would be a serious error to mistake such a folk model for sociological analysis. Such an error is difficult to avoid because the Bedouin, when defending their view, are able to cite enough bits and pieces of reality to make their argument convincing.
121 The flaw in the reasoning is seen when it can be shown that its consequences
are absurd. As an example of what is meant, the statement that feud is attached to
114 groups at the secondary order of segmentation may be considered. If the statement
613 were true, if each and every secondary section were at feud one with the other (and
619 in a structural sense this ought to be so), then each tribe would be divided into small
829 mutually hostile groups, which completely lacked any possibility of movement, even
578 for pasturing purposes. Presented with this, the Bedouin would argue that this is not
in fact so, because secondary and primary sections are interlinked in many ways. That is, they evoke what to them are contingencies to explain why they are at feud with one

121 part of a secondary section but not with another. Once contingencies are permitted
613 to enter in, the lineage model ceases to be of use, for what is implied is that at all
114 times some parts of sections structurally situated for feuding do not in fact feud.
[619] Other facts can be adduced to show that the structural view is inadequate but, before
[621] proceeding to examine these, some general objections to the lineage theory need to
[578] be raised. In the first instance, the corner stone in the theory of lineage systems is that
they consist of parts which are in balanced opposition. It is no accident that the idiom generally used in discussing the segmentation of a lineage system is that segments bifurcate. Indeed bifurcation is necessary if lineage theory is to make sense, because if at any order there are more than two segments, then combinations can occur which are not comprehended by the theory. In the Cyrenaican lineage the number of segments at the tertiary order is haphazard, in some cases as few as two but in others as many as a dozen or so. Where there are many segments at this order it is rather pointless to speak in terms of balanced opposition. Moreover, at the secondary order of segmentation the number of segments are fairly consistent throughout the tribes, but they number more than two in all of them. It is also a fact that combinations occur and, moreover, these may be between the tertiary segments of two 'opposed' secondary segments.

121 Secondly, in lineage theory groups come together to constitute larger segments in
613 opposition to like segments. Yet in lineage societies there is a lack of instituted
613 authority, there are no chiefs distributed throughout the land as heads of segments
571 of the hierarchical orders. This being so, then it is not possible for all the sections of,
622 say, a secondary section to come together; there is no one to command the action.
114 In fact, sections combine in Cyrenaica, but not in the way they should according to the
lineage structure. In order to discuss this adequately, a lengthy diversion into an analysis of the distribution of power would be necessary. The matter must rest here with the admittedly somewhat dogmatic assertion that there are men who wield power over groups of varying populations, and that the extent of their domains cannot be understood by reference to orders in the lineage. Perhaps it is for this reason—because, that is to say, lineage theory effectively blocks the exercise—that relatively little has been written about the problem of leadership in these societies.

121 Thirdly, all segments should be fairly equal in numbers of people and economic
613 resources, if the theory of lineage were to have substance in reality. In Cyrenaica
114 the population of one tertiary segment may be three times or more that of another.
[621] Both may be structurally equal in the sense that they are named groups segmenting
as a pair of brothers from a common father. As political groups, however, this equality has little meaning. Further, with regard to economic resources, some sections possess several wells and a territory of such extent that it straddles two or even more of what might be called micro-ecological areas. With marked preponderance in numbers and superiority of resources, some groups have grown into dominance, and the evidence points to the existence of this dominance in the past also. However, 'like' sections may appear on a lineage chart, in political action there is conspicuous
[619] disparity. Each tribe possesses one tertiary section or more with a claim to be the
owners of the 'Golden Stirrup'; these are large tertiary groups with relatively plenti-
[621] ful resources, with allies in other groups, and, in sum, with the power to terrorise
other tribal groups.

121 These three objections to the lineage theory as a useful model for examining the
613 consequences of homicide are serious enough in themselves, but another objection
562 renders it still less satisfactory. This fourth objection relates to the implication that
114 lineage theory cannot take account of women. Indeed, in some of the accounts of the
political organization of lineage societies, the impression is given that they are all-male
societies: women belong only to the domestic and kinship realms. In terms of
the theory, this must be so. Women, the marriage links they create, the forms of
relationships that derive from marriage, the right of men to joke with others by
virtue of a link through women, their rights to demand favours of men who are not
their agnates, their right to expect contributions to bridewealth or blood money
from maternal relatives—all these, and other forms of behaviour, have been dealt
with as patterns of behaviour which interfere with or disturb agnation, or that cut
121 across lineage affiliations. Such metaphors can only be justified if it is accepted that
613 precedence must be given to agnation, to what people say they think their lineage
relationships to be, and that there is some kind of primacy about what have frequently
been called jural rules which constitute the structure, while behaviour which is not
governed by these rules is to be relegated to the position of secondary forms having
the effect of intruding only. But these secondary forms of behaviour are as impelling,
as persisting, and are as much a part of social life as any of the so-called jural rules.
[582] It is possible to go further than this, and state that in societies where there is a high
incidence of marriage among agnates of the local group, as occurs among the Bedouin,
jural rules rarely appear in their 'pure' form in behaviour, since, in groups of this
sort, each and every person constitutes a bundle of roles by virtue of the fact that he
is one of a very complex cognatic group; a particular role, it is true, may take precedence
in a particular situation, but all roles are present in each situation and affect
behaviour. Precedence can only be given to specific forms of behaviour in relation
to situations. There is no such thing as a general primacy with regard to any form.
The concept of agnation as the centre of all political problems, disturbed or disrupted
by, say, matrilaterality, is as inadequate as saying that the nucleus which pulls all other
components into position is matrilaterality with agnation as a disturbing element. In
reality there are numerous components present in all situations, which should not
be lumped together under such categorizing terms as agnation and matrilaterality,
but which combine as separate components in a kaleidoscopic range of clusters.

121 Some of the components of behaviour subsumed under the notion of matrilaterality
613 are briefly given here in order to appreciate more fully the consequence of inter-group
marriage. Of paramount importance is the fact that, in Bedouin sentiment, to kill
682 a relative is as sinful an act as the killing of a close agnate. When such a homicide
674 did occur, during my period of residence among them, the Bedouin response was to
829 assert that the offender was out of his mind—it was inconceivable that he could have
[602] committed the offence otherwise. Their attitude was reminiscent of the horror they
display when a man kills his father or a full brother, and represents a much stronger
reaction than is manifested when a man kills an agnate of, say, the third or fourth
degree. They have every reason to be disturbed by the killing of a mother's brother,
[604] for, whatever personal affections may be involved, a crucial link is threatened. Their
reasoning, however, is that relationships with the mother's brother are characteristically
easy, that they are not demanding, that there is much joking in them, and that to

121 kill within this range is, in terms of the general pattern of behaviour, stupid. What is of
613 interest is that such killings do occur. I recorded three instances of men killing the
682 mother's brother in the contemporary population, not to mention many others
based on hearsay evidence only. Clearly, the relationship is more than a merely per-
674 missive one. The mother's brother may well be the only person who can help in
829 certain crises, and if he withholds his assistance the sister's son is left in a dilemma.
604 The form of behaviour in which demands are made is, as the Bedouin rightly say,
121 that of asking a favour, but this does not mean that it is any the less urgent than a
613 demand made against agnates. The range of favours is large, and only a few can be
detailed here. If a group has insufficient water to meet its needs a man first seeks help
604 from his mother's brother. The request has a number of aspects to it: it is a test of
[554 the relationship itself; it is a matter of pride and status that a man can 'call' on
another to help his group out of difficulties, it is an assurance that resources other than
those jealously guarded by his agnates are available to him, and if a man is seeking
to increase his power he must have available more than an agnate's share of local
[682] water resources to supply his flocks and herds. When a blood-money payment has to
be made, the mother's brother is expected to come forward—it is his right to give
without being asked. If a man wants a wife, he is not permitted to approach his father
[584] directly, but his mother's brother can put pressure on the father instead. If a man dies
[429] while his eldest son is still a minor, his brother may be required to act as guardian,
and in this role he controls the son's property; disputes frequently break out as a
result, with the son at a considerable disadvantage, for he cannot engage his father's
brother in hostilities—but his mother's brother can do so for him. Whenever men
[422] come to possess animals before the demise of their fathers or when the father's
brother is acting as guardian they mark them with the tribal and personal signs of their
mothers' brothers. Men have the right to demand contributions for bridewealth
[583] from their agnates if they lack wealth; in practice it comes not from them, but from
the mother's brother. Finally, in certain circumstances, if a man does not have male
heirs, his sister's son might inherit all his wealth.

121 Affinity also carries with it a large number of rights. A poor man may take up
613 residence in the camp of his father-in-law, and be kept by him. The latter may come
to his son-in-law's aid in many of his dealings with his father. Like the mother's
606 brother, the affine is a potential source of water-supply when rain has been insufficient
on the homeland. He also helps with blood money and bridewealth, and he is expected
to aid his daughter and her husband with gifts of food and wool.

121 The details given above by no means exhaust the list of rights a man possesses in
his matrilateral and affinal relatives. Obviously, these are not the only forms of
613 relationship either, and the other forms carry with them yet other claims of various
sorts. Enough detail has been given, however, to make clear the point that local
agnatic groups are so differentiated, and inter-group relationships are so important,
that each aspect of homicide settlement previously described will require further
examination, not in the sense that additional complications must be introduced, but
with the question in mind, is not the structural presentation false? Before beginning
this stage of the argument it is necessary to establish the fact that the links of affinity
and matrilaterality which a group has with another are of a kind which necessitate
their inclusion in an analysis of the arrangements for settling homicides.

613 Among the Bedouin, men are permitted to marry their father's brother's daughter
582 and any other cousin of similar type within the local agnatic group. This means that
121 most agnates will be related in other ways as well. Parallel-cousin marriage has the
effect of diversifying the agnatic group, and creates small nuclei within it, each having its own characteristics and patterns of behaviour with others. Diversification of this kind leads to a differentiation between homicides within the tertiary group.

The Bedouin say that they always marry their parallel cousins, and do not give their daughters to others if they can help it. Census data does not support this view. Nearly as many men find wives outside their agnatic group as within it. Of importance in the present context is the direction taken by these external marriages. Perhaps
121 the most striking feature is that the number of marriages with men of a collateral
582 tertiary group is low, so low that they can be explained by special circumstances.
628 Now collateral tertiary groups whose territories are adjacent experience intense day-
613 to-day relationships. In the context of descent these are the most closely linked
[621] lineages—among older men there may be the recollection of the time when the two
constituted a single community, and when they all lived together in the same summer camp. Common sentiment between them is very strong. The strips of territory they inhabit may be almost identical. Their discreteness lies almost entirely in the possession of separate natural resources, although in some cases pastures are shared. But their social boundaries are nevertheless sharply drawn, for the high incidence of parallel-cousin marriage within them, and the tendency for external links to leap-frog collateral segments, gives them a definition which could not be bettered by exogamy.
121 The basis of their discreteness lies, of course, in the competition that exists between
628 them for natural resources; however much the Bedouin protest that their real enemies
are the secondary or primary groups lying some thirty to fifty miles away, when they
613 wish to enlarge their resources there is little point in attempting to capture a well a
578 long distance away, which cannot be defended, and might be located alongside an
enemy group. They do, it is true, engage in competitive hostilities over land and water situated some distance from their homeland, but when they engage in these activities they do so on behalf of a linked group, albeit with their own interests uppermost. The capture of natural resources for use by a tertiary group can only be achieved by an enlargement of its homeland, and this is only possible by expanding into a neighbour's territory.

121 Another feature of external marriages is that they are not spread among as many
613 groups as in societies where there are exogamous clans, and where other rules of
marriage appear to compel the maximum amount of dispersal. Instead, the external
582 links created through marriage are highly selective, and are thrown out into ecologi-
cally differentiated areas, giving added economic security, or, in the case of date oases, an additional item to the diet at a time of the year when it is sorely needed. Once established these external links are perpetuated through cross-cousin marriages in successive generations. If the link is considered valuable, and relationships develop satisfactorily, other marriage connexions will be woven around the first. Multiplicity gives added strength and durability, not in the mechanical sense of duplication, but of creating a more diverse kin structure, with its greater range of rights and claims, in which links can flourish. While the number of groups linked in marriage are few, the geographical spread is great. Marriage links exist with tertiary sections of colla-

121 teral secondary sections, with collateral primary sections, and long distances away
613 into other tribes. This spread can be interpreted as giving each tertiary group access
582 to resources [illegible] ide ecological diversity. What is of interest in the present context
[illegible] not the interpretation of the links but the effect they have on behaviour. Spread
means that a group can call for help from a number of differently situated groups.
121 Each one of these links not merely modifies the structural means for settling homi-
613 cide, but converts the homicide into a sociologically quite different sort of act. It can,
as the Bedouin like to think, be an act of merit for a man to kill another from a feud-
582 ing secondary section, but there is no merit whatsoever in it if the tertiary section of
578 that secondary section happens to contain affines or maternal relatives; this is a sinful
682 act. The Bedouin themselves recognize this when they add to their structural
explanation the rider that they do not feud with cognatic relatives. The difference
between their position and a sociological one is that they see this as a contingency not
as a persistent necessity; they are able to maintain their position because they see their
behaviour as explicable in terms of the simple ossified structure of their genealogical
relationships. What they fail to appreciate is that these 'contingencies' are ecologi-
cally, economically, demographically, and politically essential. They are able to main-
tain their position also, because the model of a lineage structure they use, along with
the two riders previously mentioned (see p. 270) affords them a kind of explanation
for most occurrences. The argument is attractive both to Bedouin and to anthro-
pologists because it is comprehensive and neat in its logicality. The next stage in the
argument is to show that there is a far greater range of possible consequences to a
homicide than those summarized in the diagram (see p. 269) and that the additional
consequences are related, not to the lineage structure, but to the linkages which have
been discussed above.

121 I begin with a review of a homicide which involves two men of the same tertiary
613 section. Bedouin classify all homicides within this range—as they do for any of the
682 structural orders—as undifferentiated, but in each case, different sorts of relatives
are concerned in the ensuing hostilities, and the consequences are, therefore, different
829 also. Bedouin say that a man never kills his father or full brother. In the event of a
man killing another man acknowledged to be his father, the act itself proves that he
cannot possibly be his son. He is said to be illegitimate, thus making his mother an
adultress and relieving the males of the agnatic line of the responsibility and the
121 odium. If a maternal uncle of the agnatic group is killed, the offence is almost on a
par with that of patricide or fratricide. When, however, the homicide is between two
613 men who are agnatically distant, and not closely related cognatically either, but both
682 are members of the same local agnatic group, what follows will depend largely on the
size and stage of development of the group; if it is small, the homicide threatens to
wreck it, but if it is large and on the verge of splitting the homicide may be the
occasion for split taking place and being recognized publicly by a demand for blood
money. Threatened with wreckage, a small group meets a homicide by closing its
ranks for self preservation; a large group splits. The same event within the same
kind of structural unit results in two quite dissimilar consequences. The reason is
clear enough—the two groups are similar only in a general structural way, but
sociologically they are not comparable.

When a homicide occurs between tertiary segments the solution, it was said earlier,

121 is found in either a vengeance killing or a blood-money agreement which later becomes
613 caught up in a wider set of debt relationships. Records show that this is true in some
682 cases, but in others the blood money is paid in one instalment and immediately. The recognition of a debt and its liquidation among the Bedouin is tantamount to a declaration of hostility, since without a debt the means for smooth-running relationships is lacking. Such a blood-money payment was made between two tertiary groups in the absence of the 'owner of the blood'; when he returned he sought out his brother's killer, and took two lives for one. Subsequently, there was a further blood-money settlement but there remained 'a man left over'. In other circumstances an annual payment, called *sana'*, is demanded in addition to the prompt and full payment of the blood money. The attachment of the *sana'* to a settlement is an invidious condition since it is regarded as a fee by those who have to pay it, it is said to lower the status of a group and ' one day, it must be repudiated '.[1] It may, circumstances permitting, serve to cast off all pretence of friendly relationships. It is more likely that it will lead to a further outbreak of hostilities. When I witnessed the payment of the *sana'* the terms in which it was demanded were: ' You have a man on your back. Are you going to repudiate this or are you going to give me *sana'*? If you repudiate, we must seek vengeance.' The payment, one in a long series, was made on that occasion but there were loud grumblings among the men of the camp against their leader for his acquiescence and one suggested that they terminate the payments forthwith by shooting the claimant. Of the three forms of blood money cited, this latter is the extreme to which groups can go short of open feud. Its opposite is a blood-money payment which is mainly left as a debt, and which is accompanied by the ' gift ' of a wife to the victim's group.[2] The wife is ' given ' as an earnest that the offender's group wishes the full restoration of relationships ruptured by the homicide. There are, therefore, four forms of blood-money payment. The Bedouin view of these is that they are variants of what is, in principle, the same thing. Their view cannot be accepted. Each of the four payments points to diverse kinds of social relationships between groups, and their consequences are wholly disparate. These various kinds of relationships between the tertiary sections of the same secondary section exist because the relationships between all sections cannot possibly be the same if they are more than a pair in number. A secondary section which spans ten tertiary sections is not the same type of unit as one which spans only three. The greater the number of tertiary sections the greater the possible permutations in their relationships. What the Bedouin think of as variations in the form of blood-money
[829] payment is related to the complexities that lie behind their simple lineage model. Bedouin can comprehend this complexity only by thinking in terms of a kind of average behaviour, regarding deviations from the average as fortuitous and explicable by the faulty reasoning that ' in this particular case, it just so happened ' that this, that, and the other were part of the situation, failing to appreciate that apparent aberrations are constants to the extent that some sort of specifics occur in all cases. There is no reason why Bedouin reasoning should be followed in sociological analysis.

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[1] See Peters, 1966.

[581] [585] [2] A marriage is not legal unless at least a promise to hand over wealth has been made beforehand. In the case cited the amount promised would be no more than a token—a sheep or a goat.

The consequences of homicides in which secondary groups are concerned present 121
an even greater variety, for now the span has expanded to include many more groups, 613
with a total population of several thousand people. Groups of this order are spread 682
over a much wider territorial range; some structurally distant groups are neighbours
by virtue of their propinquity, while some structurally proximate groups are far
removed territorially. Some feuds lie dormant for long periods. Others erupt [578]
frequently. Some homicides between these groups are followed by the 'laying down
of the denial'—the feud situation with most acrimony built into it, for one denial,
followed by a vengeance killing, is met by a second denial and so on, excluding thereby
any chance of a settlement. In other circumstances the offender's group boast that
they are responsible for a homicide, thus challenging the victim's group to a show
of force. Only the more powerful tertiary groups would venture to do this, and it is
only they who could meet a homicide against them with a spectacular show of force,
compelling a weaker tertiary group (according to hearsay evidence) to break up and
leave its homeland. The modes of killing in homicide differ in character. Some killings
have been heinous and offensive in terms of general morality; their purpose is to
sting the victim's kin to retaliate or to cause them to suffer general discredit and loss
of status. While some parts of secondary segments are at feud, others are not.
A homicide between affinally or matrilaterally linked groups, whether they are
secondary or primary groups, is settled as quickly and as amicably as possible to
prevent turmoil in their relationships. Feud concerns two tertiary sections, not the [578]
opposed secondary sections of which they are parts. Blood money and vengeance is [628]
not the responsibility of secondary sections, but of their respective tertiary sections.

At this point, a further statement concerning the external marriage links of tertiary 121
segments throws further light on the feud. Previously it was stated that the competi- 613
tion between collateral tertiary groups for natural resources is indicated by a low 582
rate of marriage between them. Their external marriage links reinforce the separation. 578
One tertiary section, A, takes some of its spouses from section X of a collateral
secondary section; A's collateral, B, takes some of its spouses from X's collateral, Y.
A may be at feud with Y and B with X. The agnatic links between A and B, and X
and Y do not mitigate the severity of the hostility in the two feuds, they exacerbate
it. It would be erroneous to think of them as cross-cutting ties which promote peace.
Stultified in the development of their hostilities by virtue of their territorial proximity
and the sentiment associated with putatively close agnatic connexion, A and B are
able to express hostilities indirectly through their linked groups X and Y respectively.
During discussions of disputes, homicides, or rival claims to water, whether the disputants
meet in the camps or in administrative offices in the villages, men from the
matrilateral and affinal groups of the parties directly concerned are also present to do
most of the shouting. In some cases I recorded a maternal relative was killed on
behalf of an agnatic group to which he did not belong, although the latter accepted
the responsibility. In the light of facts of this sort the lineage model obstructs analysis.

I now wish to make a few brief remarks about the relationships between collateral 121
primary sections and paired tribes. Homicide, it was asserted earlier, results in raids 619
and war between groups of these orders of segmentation respectively. Evidence 682
can be adduced to show that both consequences have followed. The case usually 726
cited to demonstrate that a single killing precipitates war between tribes is the

121 celebrated war between the 'Abaidat and the Bara 'asa tribes occupying a large part
619 of central and eastern Cyrenaica. This war took place a hundred years ago, so that the
682 evidence is mainly hearsay, but it is significant that when asked for details of the
726 groups taking part the Bedouin make it clear that the entire tribes were not at war—
[173] some sections on both sides are said to have remained on friendly terms. Yet when
121 wars are discussed in a general fashion, the Bedouin insist that tribes confront each
619 other as such. If it is pointed out to them that men might be ranged against their
maternal relatives the Bedouin mumble apologetically that they would not kill their
726 maternal relatives—a lame argument since in the heat of battle men cannot make this
602 kind of discrimination. Details of other wars also illustrate the point that only parts
of tribes face each other in strife, for though the stories of past events may be inaccurate there is genealogical evidence to substantiate their claims that certain groups
were linked in the past, and in any case their statements assert that where these links
exist they are not prepared to engage in hostilities. The several parts of each tribe,
121 like the parts of primary and secondary sections, have as many different sorts of
619 relationships as there are groups, and the general statement that tribes are warring
571 units merely obscures the interest there is in their relationships. Tribes, further, lack
the leadership to make war. I repeat that leadership does exist, but not even the
121 greatest leaders, past or present, can rightly be described as leaders of their tribes,
619 using the term in its structural connotation. Literature on the subject gives the
613 impression that there are tribal leaders, because successive administrations have used
554 the tribes and their divisions as a framework for attempting to rule the Bedouin, but
the details of the power domains of individual leaders make it clear that they have
little to do with the ordered divisions of tribes. A leader within part of one tribe may
carry with him tertiary sections of another tribe, and if major hostilities break out
between parts of these tribes, the sections of both which are joined as allies and
related as kinsfolk will not fight against each other, for sections so linked enjoy
stronger connexions than the structurally linked tertiary sections of a very large
[682] secondary section. Consequently the statement that homicide results in tribal war
[114] when the offender and his victim are members of two separate tribes is not merely
incomplete, not merely a simplification, it is wrong.

121 A point which has been implicit throughout the second part of this paper needs
now to be made quite explicit: groups do not come together in their respective
613 structural genealogical orders. During my entire residence in Cyrenaica I did not
571 see a group of agnates larger than a tertiary tribal section assemble for any purpose.
[114] It is true that the occasions when large groups are required to assemble are infrequent.
[648] It is also true that although the British Administration was serving a caretaker role
only, it may have had an affect on the nature of tribal gatherings. Despite this qualification, there were several occasions when I expected tribal groups to assemble in
lineage order if the fusion of sections in relation to like sections has any meaning in
practice. Large groups of men did gather to dispute claims to wells, to argue about
rights to ploughland, and to make peace. In every case that I recorded the agnatically
closest groups of the main participants were absent, while members of genealogically more remote groups were present in strength. This statement applies to gatherings in the camps and in the administrative centres. One of the biggest gatherings I
[628] witnessed assembled in an administrative office in a village near the coast in the

south-west of the country. Most members of the two tertiary groups directly con- 121
cerned in the dispute were present. The agnates of the collaterally linked groups of 613
the principals were unrepresented; indeed collaterals of one of the principals made 571
it quite explicit that they were opposed to their genealogical allies and considered 628
their perusal of the matter tiresome. The bulk of the crowd present was made up
of men linked to the principals in a variety of different and non-agnatic ways, and it
was they who provided most of the argument once the issue had been opened. It 121
follows, therefore, that an analysis of political organization and behaviour in Cyrena- 613
ica which is based on lineage theory leads to a gross misrepresentation. For, what 114
I am arguing is not that the lineage model in its rarefied state is too simple, not that
additional facts must be injected into it to complicate it, but that it does not provide
an admissible basis for analysis.[1] The complication of something that is founded in
error can only lead to complicated error, however many facts of real life are intro-
duced in an attempt to give it substance. The Bedouin conception of their social [829]
relationships in terms of a genealogical ordering of groups is a fact of their social
life, and in relation to some problems it is an important fact. My objection to the use
which has been made of a people's ideology of their relationships is that it has been
elevated from its status as a component of social life to such a position of universal
dominance in all sets of social relationships that 'every sociological problem', as
Fortes writes of the Tallensi, 'hinges on the lineage system'.[2]

If the ordering of groups within the frame of the Bedouin genealogy is abandoned 121
as a basis for analysis, it does not follow that the only remaining view is that of small 613
groups of people distributed throughout the country enjoying relationships merely 571
as units. Regularity in relationships does exist, it is urgently necessary, and it per- 578
sists; but this regularity is not consistent with a lineage model. Ultimately, feud is a
violent form of hostility between corporations which has its source in the competition
for proprietory rights in land and water. This competition makes it necessary for
groups to combine to prevent the encroachments of others in similar combinations
and also to expand their resources whenever the opportunity arises. The significant
groups in a discussion of the feud are these power groups, and it is their composition,
the shifting alliances within them, the growth and diminution in the power of tertiary

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[1] Dr. Paul Bohannan has distinguished in his writings between what he calls folk systems and analytical systems. The distinction, as he sees it, is set out clearly in the statement 'a certain field of Nuer relationships is explained by Nuer in terms of an agnatic genealogy. This is the folk system. The same field is explained, in English, by Professor Evans-Pritchard, as a lineage system based on the principle of segmental opposition. This is an analytical system' (Bohannan, 1957, p. 5). What is the difference? Is it only a difference of language? Bohannan's analytical statement is little more than a generalisation of what is in the folk system. An analytical system, in his hands, is a sophistication of a folk system, for it is the latter which provides him with his analytical framework. The act of creativity on the part of the social anthropologist about which he writes (Bohannan, 1963, p. 14) is the revealing of a folk system through analysis. But he does not
depart from the framework set by informants—the 121
agnatic genealogy is the lineage, and the fission and
fusion of parts, the opposition of like segments and 613
so on is explained by informants in different lan- 114
guages as adequately as it is explained by social 171
anthropologists in English. Bohannan's viewpoint
is made clearer, perhaps, in his discussion on the arrangement of facts relating to Tiv law. Here he considers what he should do once he has elicited all the facts, and he argues against setting them out as an arrangement of the procedural law of Tiv courts because, 'The error would be that the arrangement is not part of *the Tiv way of looking at it*, and hence would be false' (Bohannan, 1957, p. 69. Italics mine). Why? The Tiv are not the social anthropologists. Is the test of an analytical model its consistency with a folk comprehension?

[2] Fortes, 1945, p. 30.

121 sections constituting the combinations which makes the facts of feud intelligible.
613 Furthermore, several different types of power structures exist which serve the different
[577] interests of the people composing them, and these are interlinked in combinations
[578] of superior span. But the formation of these structures and the modes in which they
combine are quite unlike the articulations in a lineage system. Characteristically, the
segments in a lineage system are conceived of as building up hierarchically to span
what is spoken of as a total society, the apex of the system affording a spectacular and
fixed definition of its boundaries. Had I been using this concept in this paper the
[173] founding ancestress of the nine Cyrenaican tribes, Sa'ada as named by the Bedouin,
would have served this purpose and would have been given inappropriate prominence.
121 The views presented here have the consequences of retreating from a concept
184 of a total society. The people to whom the facts given are related are the camel-herding
tribes only. Some of them have relations of many kinds with the cow-herding
233 folk who inhabit the northern plateau area, and these relations are also significant
619 for the analysis of a wide range of problems; genealogically both cow and camel
herders are seen as part of a single structure, but the differences between them with
regard to their economy, the size, composition, and distribution of their residential
units, their political and ritual life is so great that to conceive of them as a single social
121 structure is not useful. Moreover, the far western tribal sections have relationships
619 of such urgency with their neighbours in Tripolitania (who are excluded from Cyrenaican
genealogies) that to cut off these relationships as lying outside Cyrenaican society
would be quite unwarranted. The same can be said of the relationships of the tribal
sections in the eastern part of Cyrenaica with their genealogical cousins, the Aulad
'Ali of Egypt, who, although residing across a national border, are closely linked to
some of the Cyrenaican Bedouin. Some tribes also have to rely on the people of the
southern oases for an item of diet and an outlet for surplus wool, and the net of kinship
is spread out to include them. In these cases they come into contact with other
[179] ethnic groups such as Berbers and Tibu, and through the oases they extend their lines
of communication southwards to Wadai, Chad, and Bornu. As an indication of the
effectiveness of these links, it is only necessary to add that people inhabiting Cyrenaica
make periodic and regular visits to these far southern places, and that in 1948 a
shaikh, living near Ajadabiya in south-western Cyrenaica, collected blood-money
contributions from kinsmen in Wadai. A single structure cannot possibly include,
for analytical purposes, these sorts of relationships.

121 Finally, it must be stressed that the facts given here refer to the period 1948 to
114 1950. Since then oil has been discovered in large quantities near the territory of a
[315] tribe where I spent most of my time while resident in the country, and where there
was one tin shack in 1950 there is now a modern port with roads extending southwards
from it into the wilderness. I see no reason to assume that social relations as
I observed them are present today or that they were the same at any time in the past
175 either. Before the advent of the Sanusi Order in the early eighteen-forties, it is known
795 that one lineage at least was dominantly powerful and that its leader tyrannized a
613 large part of Central Cyrenaica.[1] His descendants constituted a powerful group in

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[1] Smith and Porcher, 1864. These two archaeologists met this leader and continued their archaeological researches around Cirene only with his goodwill, although the site is not on the territory of his tribe as I knew it in 1950. They also speak of him as inhabiting a castle which also lies outside the

1950, but his kind of tyranny was absent from the Cyrenaica of that period. From the 795
mid-nineteenth century until the Italian invasion of 1911, the Sanusi Order estab- 175
lished itself, spread its lodges throughout the tribes and in other more remote lands [613]
until it became what Evans-Pritchard speaks of as a theocratic empire.[1] The lodges [778]
served as areas of sanctuary and their staffs adjudicated disputes. Leaders of the [793]
Order had the power to coerce and the Bedouin obeyed. They obeyed out of personal
regard for some of them in 1950, but the religious authority previously used by the
leaders had given way to the political power they now exercised as functionaries in
a state system. In the meantime, the country had been ravaged by the long Italo- [648]
Sanusi wars. Throughout the nineteen-thirties after suffering terrible privations and reduction in numbers through slaughter in war, death in concentration camps, and exile, the Bedouin were ruled by the Italians. During the Second World War the armies of three major contestants fought their battles where the Bedouin now tend their flocks and herds. After the war they were left to fend for themselves, with a minimum of administrative interference.

In the light of all this the conception of an equilibrium system is of little heuristic 121
value, still less its derivative concept of a repetitive system. This does not mean, however, that an account of part of the social life of the Bedouin as it existed in 1950 must be nothing more than a disconnected piece of history, unrelated to a prior state of things and wholly useless for the understanding of the contemporary oil-producing cum mixed pastoral–agricultural economy. It would be little more than a piece of social historiography if the analysis was based on the concept of a total social structure of functionally interconnected parts, forming what Leach describes as 'a delicately balanced mechanism rather like the various parts of a wrist watch'.[2] Such a viewpoint would effectively exclude any possible comprehension of changes save those present as part of the dynamics of a system; its only answer to change is an account of a different system. If, instead, attention is focused on the analysis of a field of components arranged in a specific fashion to meet the interests of men at a particular time, it then becomes possible to see how a shift in their positions, the addition of new components, or the elimination of others produces this or that effect. It can make intelligible what has gone before, and if the future cannot be anticipated it can be demarcated within rough limits.

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modern territory of his tribe. See also Hamilton, 1856.

[1] Evans-Pritchard, 1949. In this book a brilliant account is given of the development of the Order, and how it came to unify and provide centralized political leadership for the tribes. [795] [195] [613]

[2] Leach, 1961, p. 6.

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Résumé

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ASPECTS STRUCTURELS DE L'HOSTILITÉ CHEZ LES BÉDOUINS DE CYRÉNAÏQUE

Le propos essentiel de cet article est d'examiner l'utilité du lignage pris comme modèle pour l'analyse d'une institution sociale particulière. On considère généralement que les Bédouins de Cyrénaïque fournissent un exemple d'un système basé sur le lignage, *par excellence*, et si le lignage en tant que modèle a le potentiel analytique qu'on lui accorde en général, on pourrait alors comprendre, grâce à cela, les composantes d'une institution de la société Bédouine. Les faits choisis pour l'analyse sont ceux qui sont liés aux réajustements des rapports sociaux, nécessités par une rupture des accords pacifiques normaux provoquée par des homicides sous leurs différentes formes.

Dans la première partie de l'article, l'auteur donne un aperçu de la généalogie des groupes de populations concernées. Il analyse en détail les différents modes de conduite en relation avec les différents types d'homicides, en terme de structure de lignage. Il en tire la conclusion que chaque mode de conduite spécifique vis à vis de l'homicide peut être relié aux différents stades de la stratification sociale. Mais pour démontrer ce processus général, certains homicides, qui sont considérés par les Bédouins comme des cas spéciaux, doivent être exclus.

Dans la seconde partie de l'article, l'auteur tente de prouver que ces ' cas spéciaux ' sont aussi fréquents et institutionnalisés que ceux examinés dans l'analyse structurale, et, par conséquent, doivent être compris de la même façon. Si, cependant, les faits se rapportant à ces 'cas spéciaux ' sont considérés avec tout leur poids dans l'analyse, le lignage en tant que modèle, se trouve inadéquat. La conclusion que l'on en tire, est que la structure du lignage n'est pas un modèle sociologique, mais une conceptualisation que se font les Bédouins de leurs rapports sociaux. Ils se trouvent dans l'obligation d'utiliser ce concept car il est, en certains points, en accord avec la réalité et fournit une solution complète, si on met à part certains cas spéciaux. Sous l'angle sociologique, cela implique que l'on considère certains faits comme marginaux, ou en opposition avec l'ordre habituel des choses. L'auteur émet l'hypothèse qu'il n'y a aucune raison de les envisager ainsi. Par conséquent, le lignage en tant que modèle, considéré comme une référence de base pour l'analyse, doit être abandonné et l'on doit adopter une autre référence de base qui permette d'inclure les ' cas spéciaux '. De plus, ce point de vue s'applique non seulement à l'analyse des homicides, mais aussi à l'analyse d'autres problèmes (par exemple, la distribution du pouvoir) et fait apparaître l'inanité de la théorie du lignage. Mais si le lignage d'une population est relégué au rôle d'un fait, ou d'une série de faits, parmi d'autres, l'analyse qu'apporte cet article permet non seulement d'envisager un plus grand nombre de problèmes, mais permet aussi une approche plus directe de l'étude des changements sociaux sur le plan théorique.

6: Peters E-5 (1948-1950) 1965 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9
Cyrenaica

COMPARATIVE
FAMILY
SYSTEMS

EDITOR

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6: Peters E-5 (1948-1950) 1965 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9
Cyrenaica

Chapter
7

*Aspects of the Family Among the Bedouin of Cyrenaica**

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Marriage and the Father-Son Relationship

When a marriage takes place among the Bedouin of Cyrenaica, a nuptial 585
tent is set up some distance away from that of the groom's father. There is 593
no particular significance about the nuptial tent itself, but it must be pitched at a distance so that the father "will not see it" — although, obviously, in a country of large level plains, it stands out conspicuously. This pretence that the tent remains unseen by the father is pushed to the point of his denying any knowledge of what is afoot. A middle-aged or elderly man with a family adopts a similar attitude to any marriage in which his son participates, as groom or as guest. An elder, the father of three unmarried sons (one of [535]
whom, in his late twenties, was known to be getting impatient about mar- [831]
riage), when I asked after his eldest son, insisted that he was away with the camels, although the son was conspicuous in a semicircle of young men encouraging a blindfolded maiden in the movements of her seductive dance outside a wedding tent in his full view. Prior to the wedding festivities, the

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* I wish to express my gratitude to Mr. R. Werbner for reading this essay in manuscript. 128

The information presented is based on 27 months fieldwork carried out during 114
1948 to 1950, among the Cyrenaica Bedouin. I am indebted to the Trustees of the 122
Horniman Studentship Fund, and the Committee for Treasury Studentships in Oriental Languages and Cultures, for making the research financially possible.

Cases

584 593 Prior to the wedding festivities, the father will have participated in negotiations, although even in these he will have remained silent, leaving an affine, as a rule, to arrange the details with the girl's father and his kinsmen. The father feigns aloofness from the start of negotiations until after the wedding celebrations have ended. Before inquiring into this seemingly odd behaviour, a few further details of marriage ceremonies need to be mentioned briefly.

585 342 [492] [788] The bride is carried to the nuptial tent on a camel, seated in a cagelike structure placed on the camel's back, this canopy covered over with carpets and at least one long blanket — later to be used to divide her tent into male and female quarters — which constitute part of the goods given to a woman on marriage. On her arrival, while she is still seated in her canopy, the camel is led round the tent seven times by a small boy. She then descends and is hustled into the tent by a number of women who make a show of their attempts to conceal her from view. Inside the tent the bride is enclosed in one corner in a kind of cubicle partitioned off by a length of blanket.

585 [533] [831] In the meantime, the groom has affected to escape, but is "caught," while running away, by his fellows, who "compel" him to return to the nuptial tent, to the accompaniment of their lewd songs telling of the sexual pleasures awaiting him. Much of this is horseplay, but the young men carry it out brazenly and the groom is required to show reluctance to continue with the ceremonies. His entry into the nuptial tent is marked by an expectant hush that falls over the crowd of men gathered, as they await the result of the virginity test the groom is about to perform, which he does by wrapping part of his toga round one of his fingers to pierce the hymen. Sharp shrieks from [262] the bride give the signal that the test has been undertaken; not a stir moves the crowd until evidence of its success has been publicly displayed, which is given by the groom hoisting the blood-stained portion of the toga through the corner of the tent on a pole, followed by firing three shots from his rifle. Jubilantly, the men gathered fire volley after volley from their rifles just over the nuptial tent, and the seven-day celebrations begin.

585 589 [593] [561] [535] [533] A full descriptive account of a marriage, or many of the ritual details woven into it need not be given here. What is included is intended to illustrate certain relationships between father and son, and between one generation and another. In this connection two further points are appropriate. First, during the week of festival, young men gather outside the nuptial tent each night to encourage a maiden in her dancing, clapping their hands to the point of injury "so that we will have a wife soon." The celebrations belong to the bachelors, and they are the only ones to engage in the singing and hand clapping. It is they too who stop [538] [831] the bridal camel on its way to the nuptial tent to recite obscene rhymes to the bride, and they also shout their rather dubious consolations to the bride who, during the virginity test, crying out for her mother, is assured by them that the night holds promise 585 602 521 for her which her mother could never extend. The married men, particularly the close senior agnates of the groom, stay away from it all, discussing matters unconnected with the affair.

Second, the fiction that nothing has happened, which characterises the 585
father's behavior, does not cease with the termination of the celebrations. 593
Each morning, soon after daybreak and before the camp is astir, the groom must leave his bride and repair to his father's tent to lie at his father's side "as he always had done in the past, as if he had not left him." This conventional ruse is followed, not just for the seven days of wedding festivities, but is continued after the groom has moved back into the camp proper, and pitched his tent alongside his father's, with the ropes of the two tents crossing.

In matters other than sleeping arrangements, this fiction that "nothing
has happened" is maintained. Marriage does not mean the immediate crea- [592]
tion of a wholly separate domestic unit. Save for the appearance of an ad-
ditional tent, the ordinary run of daytime activities is scarcely altered. To 593
mention perhaps the most important feature of the relationships between 264
father and son, the groom continues to eat with his father. As yet, the son 571
does not use his own bowl,[1] and may not, indeed, do so for several years. 182
The important symbolism of "eating together" or "eating out of the one bowl," the act of commensality creating a bond of fellowship about which Robertson Smith[2] wrote so eloquently can only be referred to here in one of its many aspects. Bedouin themselves stress that eating together is a strong bond, and the communal meal is always used for this purpose after the settlement of a dispute, or at the conclusion of a blood-money agreement,
and so on. It is significant also in the sense that those who partake of a [574]
meal accept the authority of the host; he becomes their protector, and a blow against one of them is struck at him also. Even if the guest is an enemy,[3] as long as he has eaten from another's bowl his life is safe.

The slaughter of an animal for another person creates a bond which has its 571
roots in the intimate connection between man and his animals. In a very 231
vivid way, the Bedouin view their animals as part of themselves, as part of 264
their *Risiq*, their general wealth, in which their sons are included. It is this 182
mystical association between a man and his animals which distinguishes a
meal consisting of the meat of an animal slaughtered from ones' own flock [574]
or herd from a meal consisting of meat bought from a butcher's shop — often [186]
given by the plateau peoples of Northern Cyrenaica to their guests, but which the camel-herding Bedouin of the south regard as despicable hospitality. A slaughtered animal is the food, *par excellence*, which establishes this bond

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[1] When Bedouin take their meals, they eat from large wooden bowls imported from [415]
south of the Sahara. It is a matter of custom that a man does not eat alone unless it is [439]
unavoidable, a custom of such strength, that, when, one day, only an elder, occupying
a tent the ropes of which were crossed with mine, was left in camp, he brought his [123]
bowl into my tent "so that I will be eating with a man."

[2] William Robertson Smith. *The Religion of the Semites*. 3rd ed. London: Macmillan, 1927. [113]

[3] A stranger entering a camp is under no obligation to give his identity. Few do so
until they have partaken of a meal. In the past, the Bedouin claim, the period of [574]
anonymity could last for 40 days, but nowadays, they say they limit it to two only. I
have known strangers enter a camp, receive entertainment, and leave without offering [609]
any specific identity.

571 between man and man, although the various cereal dishes which constitute
231 their regular meals are said to have a similar effect.

264 The son who continues to eat with his father "as he always had been
182 doing," also continues to accept his authority. Indeed he could do little else
593 at this stage, for he lacks the economic means to cut away. Neither at mar-
585 riage nor after is there any transfer of wealth from father to son. The new
182 tent recently pitched is no more than a dormitory to which the young couple
[425] retire at night. During the daytime the son is still to be seen in his father's
[556] tent, and, in the male quarters, things appear to be much the same as before.
In the female quarters, the only superficial change is the more frequent appearance among the women of one who, before marriage, often sat among them if she had been a close neighbour or a close cousin previously; or of an additional helper if she had come from afar. On the surface things remain "as they always have been," although in fact, a whole set of changes have been initiated.

857 *Rites de passage* are few among the Bedouin. A man's progress in life is
881 ceremonially marked by only four events: his birth, circumcision, marriage
764 and burial. His development into manhood is not marked by clearly defined
stages. About the age of seven, the henna markings on the front of a boy's
858 shirt for protection from the evil eye are not renewed, the cowrie shell stitched
789 to the front of his cap as a kind of talisman against the evil eye is removed
and he is no longer permitted free access to the women's quarters. As he
857 grows older, he will be instructed in goat-herding, and later taught to follow
233 the sheep. In his late teens he will have to undertake the more arduous and
883 responsible task of herding the camels. Coincident with camel-herding, he
233 may be given a gun by his father. Shortly afterwards he must undertake the
[431] stringent test of manhood, a journey to a distant oasis for dates. These
[411] changes are not marked off by a *rite de passage*. The rites a man undergoes
[484] during the course of a lifetime are minimal, and in the sense that they are
[885] concerned with only the basic events in a man's life anywhere (save for
852 circumcision, which is a minor celebration anyway), they are irreducible.
88 Moreover, the rituals which exist do not comprehend the same multiplicity of
796 relationships as rituals which occur in many other African societies.[4] It is
[771] true that the ceremonies referred to in this chapter by no means include
all the Bedouin rituals. It is also true that the events mentioned vary in
[554] elaboration, and in the number of symbols present in them, but they are
not multiplied or reduced for different people.

In this context it is important to stress that we are here dealing with a
[613] lineage society where social differentiation is not built up into differences
[554] of rank, where the roles to which a man succeeds are almost wholly cap-
[602] tured by his kinship relationships with other men and which are sociologically
to be distinguished from the roles a man enters into by acquisition of office,

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[4] See, for example, the elaboration of rituals discussed in M. Gluckman (Ed.), *Essays on the Ritual of Social Relations.* Manchester: University of Manchester Press, 1962.

membership of associations and so on. The statuses a Bedouin achieves de- 796
pend not on an ordered acquisition through the inheritance of roles or elec- 852
tion to them, but on his personal manipulation of linkages in his jockeying 88
with others. Rites are minimal because there are few defined statuses an 554
individual can predictably acquire. The equalitarianism of the desert denudes 602
the Bedouin of ritual riches. Complimentarily, rites which do occur are 613
thrown into exaggerated relief by the absence of others, and in their isolation, [557]
become not merely a "passage" but a cataclysmic change. Marriage and 585
burial both comprehend limited fields of relations, but accompanying cere- 764
monies may bring several hundred people together, people who otherwise 796
rarely gather in these numbers to meet one another as kinsmen and neigh- 602
bours, and it is suggested that the emphasis given to the events dramatises the 182
significance of the changes they produce. In the discussion of the changes brought about by marriage, the Bedouin view of what is entailed will be considered first.

The Bedouin View of Marriage

After marriage, the Bedouin argue, a son has a tent of his own, a woman 585
over whom he has authority and soon children to make him a father. Mar- 581
riage causes split, branching. A new family is created, holding the poten- [613]
tial of a new lineage. The separation is so painful a matter for the father
that he cannot contemplate it, hence his pretence that he has no knowledge of [593]
wedding festivities, and his subsequent attitude that nothing has happened.

Interestingly, there are two other occasions when this attitude is to be 682
observed. When a man kills within his corporate group,[8] he may flee his 613
tribe or he may be compelled to leave; later he is likely to return and, when 621
he does, he is received with a minimum of show. Every attempt is made to suppress knowledge of the event.

Again, if incest occurs, the memory of it must somehow be suppressed, and 835
it is an ever-present danger. Men, permitted four wives simultaneously and 561
also able to engage in a plurality of marriages through divorce or death of [595]
spouses, may have children showing an age difference of two or three generations. Thus it comes about that a man may be of an age in relation to his father's sister which permits them as children to behave as if they were
first paternal cousins. As an adult, the preferred spouse for a man is a [582]
father's brother's daughter. In terms of relationships between adolescents the situation in which a man is of the same age generation as his father's
sister is fraught with danger. In one such case, between a man and his [684]
father's sister, the male child of the union was put out in the desert to be

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[8] Bedouin are disposed in groups which, in summer, usually constitute a single community, around or near a watering point. The men of this group are interlinked by reference to an ancestor four or five ascending generations, reckoning from the generation of men of about 20 years. When, elsewhere in this chapter reference is made to corporations, it will be to groups of this kind.

835 devoured by wild animals, the girl was "given"[*] to a close cousin who had
561 shot his sister. Both now reside with an enemy tribal section. The two acts
684 were equated. They were similar to the extent that both created a situation
which defied institutional resolution. The culprits were exorcised. The
girl's lover remains with his group — the odium for the male is incomparably
less than for the female, since, while maternity is easy to establish, paternity
is frequently shrouded in doubt — and during the months I lived with this
particular group, there was never a mention of the affair. It was as if "nothing had happened."

829 If asked why these two events cause such profound distress, the answers
the Bedouin give are twofold: they can do nothing about them, and they
578 cause split. By split in this context they mean split in the lineage; split in
613 the case of homicide because it may lead to a demand for blood-money which
[682] is payable only between corporations, and split in the case of incest because
[684] it causes chaos in relationships. Marriage, in one sense, their reasoning
581 runs, is similar, for it too causes split. Whatever may be the analytic strength
of the arguments that homicide and incest precipitate splitting, the argu-
829 ment that marriage does so is spurious. In what sense can marriage mean
613 split? Bedouin men marry "so that we may beget many sons, to make a
big lineage later on." The worst fate that can befall a man as a result of his
son's marriage is that he, in later generations, will become the focal point in
a series of branching descent lines. The alternative — that his sons remain
unmarried — can only mean that his name would disappear through want of
successors to carry it on, which is one of the greatest evils which can befall
a man, according to Bedouin sentiment: better split than oblivion. If the
key to the interpretation of the father's attitude to his son's marriage is not
581 that it causes split, it must lie elsewhere in their relationship. What mar-
585 riage does is alter the distribution of authority between father and son. In
593 order to pursue this, it is necessary first to clarify the types of authority in-
volved, and then assess them in a post-marital situation.

The Division of Authority Between the Family and the Corporation

554
851 Politically, a person's status is determined for him at birth. At this time
a man has the right to accept or deny paternity. Denial is tantamount to an
accusation of adultery by his wife. In practice, once a wife has given birth
to a male child, whatever doubts people may harbour regarding paternity,
the husband accepts the child as his. "The boy for the bed," is a saying often
heard among the Bedouin; but it remains the husband's prerogative to invest
the child with legitimacy, hence, political status. Only if a husband becomes
[837] aware that he is publicly considered a cuckold, or if he catches his wife and a
lover *in flagrante delicto*, is he at all likely to take action. Otherwise he may

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[585] [*] A marriage is illegal unless it is accompanied by an agreement to transfer wealth
[581] to the girl's father.

indeed welcome unfaithfulness on his wife's part. If a man is very old, and 554
his wife very young, it is likely that she will entertain lovers; if a man leaves 851
camp for a long absence his wife may not remain chaste. In both cases, if 837
the liaisons lead to the birth of a child, particularly a male, the husband
greets the news with unrestrained enthusiasm — "praise be to God," as their
saying goes. Incapacity[7] to produce offspring, if a husband is convinced of
it, may lead him to delegate a kinsman to serve his wife for procreative pur-
poses: he has the legal authority, as husband, to do so, and to require his
wife to submit, for the only alternative, if he is not to die without "issue,"
is to "take" a son from his brother and fulfill the obligations towards this
boy required of a pater, namely, attend to his circumcision, provide him with
teaching in the Koran (a duty neglected by most) and give him the wealth
with which to marry.

Granting the acceptance of paternity, whatever the circumstances of con- 593
ception, a male child, *ipso facto*, accedes to membership of a corporation, and 554
is subject to the authority of that group in a number of matters. In many [851]
situations it would appear that a son is under the father's political control. [613]
At a moot, the son, if he speaks at all, will do so only to corroborate his
father. Discussions among men in a small camp evoke a similar pattern of
behaviour. Until the father becomes senile or dies, a son cannot publicly
pursue an independent course, but he desists by virtue of his relationships
with his father *qua* pater, not because of his father's political power to
coerce. All men of a corporation, in any event, "speak with one word" at [613]
a moot, and a son, by his assent to the common view, also supports his
father; in so doing he yields to the political authority of his corporation, and
not that of his father.

Membership in the corporation invests a man with other privileges and 593
duties. Protection against external enemies comes within the corporation's 613
jurisdiction, although in a particular situation, the father may well be the
person who dispenses it. Complimentarily, if a man commits an offense [681]
against a person not of his group, whatever private thoughts his father may
have about the act, the responsibility lies not on his shoulders but on the
group, and he is compelled to share this responsibility equally with all other
members. For example, if a son commits a homicide the father bears the [682]
same legal responsibility for the act, and is under obligation to contribute the
same share of blood-money as he would be if the act had been perpetrated
by any male of the group other than his son. Even in a narrower field of
relations between father and son the group exercises its authority. Acting
as pater, a man may punish his son, physically or otherwise; he may not
do so to the point of injury, for personal injury comes within the legitimate
sphere of the corporation. A man's "bone" belongs to his group; he is an in-

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[7] Impotency is a special case, because it is dishonourable for a woman to remain [833]
wife to an impotent man. She cannot divorce him, but her father can insist on a
witnessed test of impotency and, if it is proven, the husband is compelled to divorce [586]
her. Barrenness, obviously, is a different matter.

593 tegral part of "the one body"; events which affect a man in this context lie
613 outside a father's field of jurisdiction. The political authority vested in a
corporation acts to circumscribe the authority of persons in other fields.

Other rights stem from political membership. As a person with a defined
position in a lineage corporation, a man has the right to use the
natural resources of its territory. His father, although he instructs his son
where to plough and when to water the animals, cannot deny him access
to wells, pastures and ploughland. Economically, a son is independent to this
extent, although his ability to exploit his right to the natural resources is
restricted by his father's control of animals. Ultimately, however, this restriction
cannot amount to stultification, because a man has the right to
613 demand food. In practice, a poor man staves off hunger with donations from
422 this or that individual, and superficially it appears that he is dependent on
735 the personal charity of his fellowmen. This is not so, for what is implicit is
that the parcels of wealth controlled by individuals are the possessions of
the corporation. It is not accidental that poor people do not go hungry.
During my entire stay among the Bedouin I never saw one of them beg or
[556] suffer hunger, however marginal the diet of many. Clearly, those with a
surplus can and do use it for personal advantage, but the extent to which
they can do so is circumscribed by the legal claims which members of a
corporation have on the parcels of moveable property held by each of them.

613 Control over the wealth, whether it be animals or the procreative functions
421 of women, rests, in the final analysis, in a corporation. Inheritance laws
428 specify that women are not legal heirs,[8] and that all male children are
[562] equal heirs. Women do, in fact, come to control property, and it is rare that
wealth is equally divided among male heirs. The precise details of inheritance
[593] may partly be decided by a father, but he is limited in his actions. Most
of the time inheritance disputes are not of the kind which require action by
the corporate group; a case which occured while I was resident with the
Bedouin did, however, invoke immediate action. A man, who had left the
desert to live in a village on the plateau, had only one daughter. He made
it known that he intended to will his entire property to his daughter. When
the news was brought to the camps of his fellow agnates, there was great
consternation, because, as became clear in their lengthy discussions, the
threat now existed that a substantial parcel of property would be removed
from the group, a threat made real by the proposed marriage of the daughter
[584] to a man of another tribe. The court would have to recognise the daughter's
right to some of the property, and the members of the group reluctantly had
to concede that there was little they could do about this, but they had one
[593] action left to them — they decided that her nearest agnate should demand
[584] her in marriage. Usually, the choice of husband for a daughter is a decision

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[771] [8] The Bedouin are Sunni Muslims, and, as Samusi, belong to the Maliki school in
[795] legal matters. According to court law, women are heirs. However, actual Bedouin
[671] practice is contrary to law. For, if women were permitted to inherit, since many marry
outside the corporation into which they were born, they could alienate its resources.

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her father takes, but in certain critical situations he can be relieved of choice 593
if the interests of the group as a whole are at stake. [421]

Political authority is the preserve of a corporation, and its exercise leads [428]
to invasion of a man's authority in the field of domestic relations. This [584]
does not mean, however, that discrete areas of authority do not remain with
the father. In the tent his authority over his son is so overwhelming as to
keep the son in almost complete subordination. The son is referred to as a
slave, and in daily life he has to behave as one. He must obey every command,
for, were he to rebel, he would find little or no support among his
agnates, whatever the extent of the provocation. Retreat from his father is [422]
hardly an alternative, since, while his father is alive, he has no animals of
his own, and to leave camp would only mean that he would have to move
outside his group to seek employment elsewhere as a shepherd. If he did [558]
this he would forfeit status, and almost certainly cut himself off from property [428]
which would fall to him after his father's death. A man who "denies"
his father looses too many privileges for the practice to become widespread.

Caught in this dilemma, a son's predicament is worsened by the fact that 593
he cannot initiate marriage negotiations — to be able to do so requires some 584
animals to offer a girl's father. Through his mother's brother he has the [431]
means of bringing pressure to bear on his father, but the latter can resist for [604]
years. Finally, a marriage is arranged for him. It is difficult to convey the 581
yearning of young Bedouin for marriage. They discuss it among themselves 521
ad nauseam. For the most part their talk is about the sexual aspect of marriage. 831
Premarital sex relations are strictly controlled, and the movements
of each young girl are carefully guarded because, if on the day of her marriage 836
the test shows that she is not a virgin, she not only brings disgrace to [585]
her family, but the marriage may be revoked and her worth as a bride for
another man seriously diminished. Nevertheless premarital relations do [837]
occur, if not between youths and maidens to any extent, between young
men and married women.

The question still remains: why is marriage the occasion of such ebullient 581
celebration? The formal authority a father exercises over his son 593
changes little on marriage. Economically the son is still harnessed to the
father. The latter still shouts his orders at him, and obedience remains
unaltered. Any sign of an independent view on a matter is met with a gruff
rebuff. If the marriage turns out to be disagreeable to the father, he has
the authority — if not always the power — to break it. Marriage does not
mean a change in the general mode of behaviour between the two; the legal
relations remain unaltered, albeit modified in practice, as the married son
matures in age. But marriage does mean the acquisition of rights and status
previously denied a son. Henceforward, he has a domain of his own. This
is high drama, indeed, for although every effort is made to give substance to [554]
the expressed view that "nothing has happened," for the first time in his
life the son has seized publicly, amid the jubilations of his fellows, a status
which hitherto was the possession of the father.

Cases

The Meaning of Marriage

581 Until marriage the changes in a man's life have been in the nature of
585 an ordered sequence of development from a child to be cared for — the only
342 time in his life when a father, without inhibition, showers on him his love
[593] and affection — to one who, by degrees, makes an increasing contribution to
a production unit. Marriage necessitates that a man pitch a tent for himself.
With a tent he becomes a potential host and protector of others. The local
idiom for marriage is "to set up a tent." It would be quite improper to use
[196] the verb "to marry" when inquiring whether a marriage has taken place
since this verb also has the meaning of "to have sexual intercourse." In-
[195] stead the euphemism, "Have you pitched a tent?" is used. The Arabic word
for a tent in this context is *Bait*. It is not used to refer to a military tent, nor
to the small tent which shelters only a widow. It is reserved for the Bedouin
tent, which usually has a wool top, and, most importantly, holds the promise
of the continuation of life, whether it shelters a newly married couple, a
mature family or young unmarried people. (The word *Bait* represents a
complex concept, and it would be too much of a diversion here to discuss
the various points of its significance. It is essential to understand that its
[778] meaning is not confined to a tent in the physical sense.) Its top has *Baraka*
(divine goodness) in it; the quality of *Haram*, which makes it possible for the
tent to be used as a sanctuary, is associated with it and this quality of *Haram*
extends, moreover, to the ropes of the tent, so that anyone who clutches them
comes under the protection of the owner. In it, the wife must permanently
reside and her husband has the legal right to insist on this. In it too, he
has the legal right of sexual access to a woman, his wife. Any children
born in it he can claim as his own. With the erection of a tent the son
[885] reaches adulthood, and it is in this sense that he can be said to have acquired
a domain of his own.

581 Marriage gives a son greater freedom and less dependence on his father
585 in another sense. A second euphemism used for marriage is "making a
[593] relationship," specifically an affinal one. Relationships between a man and
his father-in-law are diverse and are used in various ways in different situa-
[195] tions. Here, the particular aspect which needs to be stressed is that a man
606 can cajole his father-in-law, and (through his wife) wealth, in the form
425 of animals, may pass from the former to the latter. Reciprocal gifts are passed
556 between affines on certain occasions, but in addition small amounts may
pass which are not connected with the formal occasions of exchanges. Debt
583 lies between them. It begins with the initiation of marriage negotiations,
584 when the suitor's kinsmen take a prescribed number of sheep to present to
606 the girl's father if negotiations are successful. They promise to transfer
bride-wealth[*] to the girl's father. A few weeks after the marriage, the hus-

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[171] [*] I use the word "bride-wealth" because it has become so familiar in the literature,
but the only similarity between the *Sahiba* of the Bedouin and the bride-wealth of

band is required to take gifts to his mother-in-law in recognition of the fact 583
that she nourished his wife as an infant (the literal meaning of the word 584
used for this gift is "milk"). A return visit is made and gifts are given to 606
the daughter. When the first child is born an animal is presented by the 851
affines, and if the child is a male, the gift may be several sheep, or even a 425
few camels if the father-in-law is very wealthy. Formal exchange of gifts 606
continue, but, in addition, informal transfers are made. Moreover, if re-
lations between a man and his father-in-law develop favourably, it is not un- 606
common for a young husband, during the early years of marriage, to move 591
away from his father and pitch his tent alongside that of his father-in-law. 593
Marriage gives a son affinal relations of his own. Affinity can alleviate the
dead weight of paternal authority.

It is suggested that the crisis the marriage of a son assumes for a father 585
is the shift it entails in the distribution of authority. This is borne out by 561
other details in the marriage ceremony referred to earlier. Ordinarily, young 602
men dare not sing within earshot of their senior agnates. Far from allowing 533
obscenities, agnates of the ascending generation would not allow even a
mention of women to be made by young men, in their presence. In a group [593]
consisting of young men and an agnate, I chanced to use the noun for [123]
woman and immediately my tent was cleared of all but the senior agnate.
At a wedding the young men revel in their lewd songs and shout their [831]
obscenities for all to hear. The senior agnates stand aside and make a show of ignoring the proceedings. And well they may, for each marriage is a challenge to the exclusive authority they have enjoyed; each nuptial tent is an invasion of the domain of which they have been undisputed masters. Marriage is the only occasion when the men of one generation can clap and sing their defiance of an older one, and give warning of the changes which must be accommodated however great the pretence that nothing has happened.

Marriage ceremonies dramatise the clash between adjacent generations 561
over the distribution of certain forms of authority. If this authority is as 602
overwhelming as has been suggested, and if it is so deeply resented, how is it that life is endurable for juniors? Relationships between junior and senior agnates are so restrictive that they almost amount to what Professor Fortes has suggested I view as a form of avoidance relationships. Juniors must always defer, they must obey commands promptly, they serve their seniors, they must accept a lead when it is given and the restrictions on conversations exclude all reference to women, marriage or sex. These are not simply a set of general guides for behaviour, they are rigidly applied rules, deviation from which is countered with rebuke or greater severity. It would appear from this

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many African societies is that wealth is transferred. Obviously, in societies where the 583
rules of exogamy compel a dispersion of links outside a man's own clan, what is in- 584
volved in this transfer of wealth cannot be sociologically similar to one in which mar- 606
riage to the first cousin on either side is permitted. 171

561 that young men spend their premarital lives in an environment of unmiti-
602 gated agnatic hostility. Greater substance is given to this view when it is
realised that agnates live together. The residential concentration of agnates
561 in Cyrenaica exceeds 80 per cent. I wish to stress that this figure is based
602 on the universe of the small camp, and the only males included as agnates are
621 those who are consanguinely related. Over 50 such camps were used in
arriving at the figure. Obviously, the figure of agnatic concentration will
vary depending on the universe. If all men who claim to belong to a tribe
of, say, 15,000 souls, who claim that they are agnates in a political sense are
included, then the figure will not be the same as that derived from a small
group where the criterion for inclusion is consanguinity, not mere political
affiliation. It is necessary to make this clear to emphasise that the Cyrenaican
figure is unusually high, and also because the modes of behaviour between
consanguineal and political agnates differ critically. Granted the hostility
[578] built into agnation, and recognising in addition the significance of the high
degree of agnatic concentration, unless there are other factors present in the
situation, life would be intolerably burdensome. Parallel-cousin marriage
comes to the rescue.

Parallel-Cousin Marriage

582

Among the Bedouin the prohibited degrees of marriage are few. A man
may not marry within a closer range than first paternal or maternal cousin;
he cannot marry a woman of a senior generation, nor a woman known to
be older. He cannot marry the daughters of a woman who has acted as wet
nurse to him or to any of his brothers and sisters. Otherwise he is permitted
to marry any other woman. Marriage with the first paternal cousin is pre-
ferred, and is more than a sentiment. A man has a right to his father's
582 brother's daughter, and before a marriage is arranged with anyone else, the
585 girl's father seeks the opinion of his brother's son. If he neglects to do this,
578 or if he flouts the opinion offered him, he runs the risk of the marriage
being brought to a halt on the very wedding day. I have witnessed this. In
most of the records I possess, it usually happens that the brother's son is
bought off with a few sheep (about five) and some articles of clothing.
Here the brother's son was seizing the occasion to extort from a farmer's
brother wealth which he considered was due him from an earlier inheritance
[589] dispute. Occasionally the intervention is genuinely designed to prevent a
marriage; if the girl refuses to marry her father's brother's son, he can force
582 her into spinsterhood. Men exercise their right to marry their first parallel
cousins. They also marry other parallel cousins. The significance of parallel-
cousin marriage varies with the exact degree of the relationship. First- and,
say, third-parallel cousins are sociologically different in a number of respects,
and in relation to specific problems these differences may assume major
[602] importance. In the present discussion the various degrees have this in
common: that whatever the precise relationship, all parallel cousins are the

daughters of agnates and, in view of the high agnatic concentration, the daughters of agnates who are co-residents as well. Parallel-cousin marriage therefore creates affinity between co-resident agnates. 582 602

The rate of parallel-cousin marriage is high, producing such a density of kinship relationships as to afford a reliable index for defining the agnatic corporation. As a form of marriage it persists; genealogical records clearly demonstrate this. Frequency of parallel-cousin marriage taken together with its persistency, means, above all else, that it makes an agnatic group a cognatic group as well. The matter is put in this way to suit the general development of the argument, but it would be a serious error to think that this means I am giving priority to agnation and that I am considering cognation as intrusive, or that, in this society, agnation can stand on its own because it has a kind of absolute significance other forms of relationship do not possess. Both forms exist in reality.

The great Bu Bakr of Cyrenaica's most celebrated lineage is alleged to have [613] exhorted his fellow tribesmen to "marry your father's brother's daughters and then your paternal relatives and your maternal relatives will become one." Whether he had given the advice or not, the Bedouin, as their society is constituted, would marry them anyway. The Bedouin form of agnation without its accompanying parallel-cousin marriage would impose impossible restrictions, if indeed there is any point in attempting to conceive of a situation so remote from reality. With parallel-cousin marriage present in the [613] corporate group, men referred to as agnates are not agnates only; each and every one of them is the centre of a bundle of roles, each role potentially [554] as important as the other. It would be false to argue, moreover, that complexities of relationships can be unravelled by analytically separating them, giving precedence to the agnatic role in an "agnatic" situation, the mother's brother's role in a domestic situation and so on. An agnate who is also a mother's brother is never the same, in any situation, as an agnate to whom one is not otherwise related. The prime significance of parallel-cousin marriage is that it creates a complexity of linkages which almost amount to confusion, thereby maximising the choice available to individuals to meet whatever contingencies befall them. [182]

The only area of relationships left relatively undisturbed by parallel-cousin marriage is the son, father and father's brother triangle. Freed of the complications stemming from parallel-cousin marriage, agnation can here approximate its true form. Other complications arise out of marriage. A 582 few are listed here: father and son marry a mother and her daughter; a 583 form of exchange marriage between first parallel-cousins occur; two brothers marry two sisters; the marriage of two brothers to two sisters is followed, in the succeeding generation, by the son of one union marrying the daughter of the other, making this latter a double first parallel-cousin marriage — both a father's brother's daughter's and a mother's sister's daughter's marriage. These forms can all occur within a corporate group. No citadel of agnation [613] can withstand this attack. All forms of marriage combine to break the grip [602]

582 of agnation on the members of a corporate group and give it a taproot of
583 diversity whence it derives its strength, and which makes of it "the one body,"
613 conspicuous, in comparison with other societies, as the corporate group
602 *par excellence*.

The Sister's Son-Mother's Brother Relationship

128 Previously the mode of relationships associated with agnation and affinity
have been briefly discussed. In order to appreciate the effects of parallel-
cousin marriage, some remarks concerning the sister's son-mother's brother
604 set of relationships must be included here. Bedouin contrast the mother's
[174] brother with the father's brother; their sayings and proverbs afford a
wealth of verbal documentation on the contrast. With the mother's brother
a man enjoys all the freedoms he is denied in his relationships with his father
[831] and father's brother. He is permitted to joke with him; they indulge in
exchanges of obscenities. When the sister's son wishes to marry, he is
permitted to discuss the matter with his mother's brother and can urge him
to intercede with his father on his behalf. Two men thus related are readily
recognised in the camps, because in their acts they are required to show
affection by displays of innocent horseplay, pranks or mild practical jokes.
Small boys pursue their mother's brother, feign to kick or strike him, and he
takes it all in good part.

The external aspects of this behaviour is deceptive. Joking of this sort
creates the image in which the relationships are conceived; what is equally
striking in it is its compulsiveness. Obviously, mature men are not always
in the mood to be teased, but if they are, they must respond appropriately.
Their relationships are unmistakably onerous. This remark applies not only
to the external forms of their behaviour, but also to the favours a man is
[602] permitted to ask of his mother's brother. A brief amplification will make
the point clear. Demands can be made of agnates, but only in situations of
serious contingency. Day-to-day needs are met, not by appeals to the rights of
agnation, but from the expectations linked to the mother's brother. If these
expectations are withheld, the sister's son may be left in a quandary. In-
604 terestingly, in the records of homicides I gathered, three (in the con-
682 temporary population) were concerned with the killings of mother's broth-
ers by sister's sons. Homicide within this field of relationship is difficult
to comprehend unless it is appreciated that expectations are as compulsive
in the daily life and the general well-being of people as are the rights and
duties associated with agnation.

604 These general remarks apply to the relationships irrespective of the lineage
613 origin of the mother's brother. The similarity ends there, since the nature
of the expectations, their urgency at any given moment and the kind of
favours which are granted vary with the group identity of the mother's
[428] brother. A mother's brother who is a member of ego's corporate group may be
expected to give the sister's son small quantities of flour, favour him in all

sorts of petty ways, listen to his grumbles about his agnates, interfere on his 604
behalf in petty camp quarrels, shield him from the disciplinarian father and 613
guard his property interests against the predatory father's brother; if the 428
mother's brother dies without heirs, the sister's son can reasonably expect at least a share of his wealth. When the mother's brother is a member of a different corporate group, a sister's son cannot possibly expect to inherit from him in any circumstance.

The mother's brother may reside in a camp too distant to be much effective 604
direct help in day-to-day living. His relative remoteness gives the relation- 591
ship other possible opportunities, however. Rainfall in the semi-desert area 312
of Cyrenaica is highly variable, both from year to year, and from place to 233
place in any given year. As a result this shallow saucer of a depression may 241
have sufficient rain to supply both the water needs of animals and crops, while an area a few miles distant will have inadequate water supplies for either. The mother's brother-sister's son link can mean water for animals and a crop of barley for both when, in successive years, the resources of one area or the other are inadequate.

The differences in the relations between men and their mother's brother 604
do not end with a characterisation of their antipodal forms. The demographic structure of a group may be such that one man may have a number of mother's brothers, another only one; one man may have to share with
several brothers, another may be an only son. Complications of this sort de- [613]
termine the precise relationships between men, but however intricate these may be, each corporate group has its matrilateral links with a group occupying a slightly different ecological area, and it also has a plurality of matri-
lateral connections within it. Further, if a direct connection is not available [603]
to any particular individual he can use an indirect link (e.g. father's mother's brother or mother's mother's brother) to satisfy his needs.

The Preference for Males

Thus far, the family and the social matrix in which it is embedded has 128
been discussed in general terms, most particularly in reference to several selected sets of relationships. I wish now to place these relationships in a more specific setting with a brief discussion of the composition of a small
camp of a group inhabiting the arid areas of central Cyrenaica. When the 829
Bedouin give their views on the structure of the family in Cyrenaica they 594
speak of it as consisting of a pair of spouses and about ten children, mainly 562
males. The emphasis on males is not mere sentiment, overwhelmingly though
it favours them against females. Additional males in a family increase the 858
productive possibilities of a family in the sense that more herdsmen become available and larger ploughing commitments can be undertaken; an increase in the number of females has small effect on production since they are precluded from any direct participation in these activities. Both sexes, ranging in age from about seven years to mature adulthood, are necessary if a family

829 is to constitute a viable economic unit; and if it is to expand, the number
594 of males must be increased disproportionately compared with females. Since
562 the structure of this "ideal family" (which in the sentiments of the Bedouin
858 is the only family) is based on the division of labour, some details of the
tasks and their allocation among members of a family are included to estimate
the importance of this notional "ideal family."

The Division of Labour, by Sex

462 The tasks women perform are almost entirely associated with the tent.
286 They make the tent top, and the gaily coloured carpets which cover the
sandy ground in the men's quarters. They also weave the material for making
sacks, and nose bags for horses and camels. Throughout the year a
piece of weaving is always on the loom waiting, and while any women of
the tent may take a turn at weaving, the mother decides what is to be made,
462 its pattern and colours and in general directs operations. Women also pitch
the tent when the camp is moved; they do so unaided by the men. It is a
342 task which requires considerable strength and only grown girls and mature
women can assist in this; younger girls scour the vicinity in search of
stones to hold the sides of the tent on the ground after it has been erected.
[356] As soon as pitching is complete, the floor of the tent is brushed clean before
carpets are spread and the few articles of personal belongings placed in
their proper position.

462 Next, brushwood must be fetched in large quantities for fires. Apart
313 from cooking needs and winter warmth, the fire of each tent is in constant
use for preparing the sickly sweet tea, almost the consistency of syrup,
which is drunk several times a day regularly and which is made again for
even the casual visitor. The task of fetching brushwood is performed daily,
and each load takes a few hours of a woman's time to gather and bring back
[412] to the tent. Bushes are uprooted with the aid of a long-handled adze and
piled together, to be carried on her back for the homeward journey. The
load is cumbersome and heavy; only girls in their late teens and mature
women can cope with it.

462 All cooking is done by the women. Most meals consist of cereal dishes of
252 various sorts, so that grinding, using heavy millstones, is a perpetual activity
to satisfy the demands for large quantities of flour. Millstones are
412 bought in the villages. In most small camps there only one or two sets,
so they are passed round from one woman to another. The stones are very
heavy but when they are carried from tent to tent men offer no assistance.

462 Each tent also requires large quantities of water for human consumption.
If the camp is located near a well, water is drawn in small quantities, fre-
312 quently. Young girls and boys take a donkey to the well, fill a couple of
[492] jerry cans with water, wait for an older sister to load them on the donkey
and then drive the beast back to camp. After a fall of rain, while puddles
of water remain on the ground, mature women make haste to gather the

surface water in jerry cans, bringing them back to the tents, one at a time, 462
on their backs. Clothes are kept clean in the desert, and the women do the [312]
washing. [296]

The care of children from birth until they are a few years old is the re- 462
sponsibility of the woman. Childbirth causes a minimum interruption in the 854
daily sequence of a mother's activities. The child is breastfed if the mother [844]
has milk; if not, a wet nurse is sought or goat milk is substituted. Other [853]
than the time given to feeding it, the infant does not take up much of the
mother's time. It is placed in a hammock slung between the centre poles
of the tent and rocked by the mother as she passes to and fro. If nursing in
illness is required, the mother devotes herself to it; her other tasks must
then be performed by another woman.

As children acquire mobility, and at a time when, perhaps, the mother 855
is pregnant again, they become so fractious one with the other that if help 462
was unavailable the nervous strain could seriously disrupt the normal routine
of work. During the early years of marriage, when daughters are still too 855
young to look after their small brothers and sisters, the grandmother's help 462
in child-rearing is invaluable. Too old for the arduous tasks of the daily 603
routine, she may assist in teasing and spinning the raw wool, but it is in her
role as nursemaid that she assumes importance. Children of both sexes
are given the comfort of suckling at her breast, receiving attention and care
for which the young mother could not possibly afford the time.

Caring for children takes up little of a man's time, and is mostly in- 462
cidental. The woman, on the other hand, devotes relatively little of her 233
time to the animals. She does the milking in spring — of camels, sheep and [234]
goats — but herding is not her responsibility, save for partly tending goats.
Goats, when they are in the vicinity of the camp, are looked after by boys and [857]
girls of about eight to ten years of age. In springtime when they have
dropped their young, or if some of them have to be retained in the camp at
night for various reasons, the woman makes a brushwood enclosure at the
side of the tent and sees the goats safely inside before nightfall.

A catalogue of the tasks for which women are responsible may not seem 462
very impressive; the number of tasks is not excessive, but the persistence of
the routine bends the backs of most women. Paradoxically, any suggestion
that men should take over female tasks would strike them as absurd. Assist-
ance from one of the same sex is always a welcome relief, but the abrogation
of a particular task by men would be interpreted by women as the loss of a
right. For, in the division of labour, it is not merely that tasks are allocated
between the sexes for expedient reasons, or in consideration of the labour
involved or because tasks which can be performed in the vicinity of the
camp are left to women; division of labour would not make sense on these
grounds, however strong they may be in Bedouin sentiments. Each task which [424]
falls to the lot of woman constitutes a right exclusive to her. Fetching fire-
wood is not only a chore; it is a woman's prerogative. The insistence that
only a woman can undertake certain tasks has nothing to do with her liking

462 them or any innate aptitude for them; this insistence is an index of the
424 jealousy with which she is prepared to guard her rights. Each right derived
from this or that small task is an extension of her control over the male.

462 The force and significance of this control is, perhaps, best seen in a
woman's right to cook. At marriage a woman must have at least the minimum
424 of cooking utensils, and one of the rights a man acquires in a woman is
252 that she cooks for him. This is something a man cannot do for himself.
Therefore, when a man ill-treats his wife or threatens her with divorce, she
[593] can retaliate by refusing to cook, or leave the tent altogether to return to her
father. A man bereft of this service is in a very sorry plight indeed. The
legal dominance of the male, seemingly autocratic, is reduced at every
point by the control a woman exercises through her exclusive right to perform
tasks. The limits to the area of her coercive powers are significant.
They are confined almost wholly to domestic relationships. Legally, women
562 suffer such disabilities that they are almost of the status of minors; in
reality, their day-to-day living is far from intolerable because they are able
to control males over a wide field of relationships.

462 Men, excluded in the main from domestic duties around the tent, perform
424 form tasks to which their legal rights are tied. While women have access
231 to wells for water used by human beings, the transport of larger quantities
of water over longer distances, requiring the use of camels, is a task which
falls to the men. Watering of animals is done by men. Only they can
slaughter the animals for food. The meat of an animal slaughtered by a
woman is not "free," in a ritual sense, for human consumption. In an
extremity only, a woman can, in effect, kill an animal, but the knife which
cuts its throat must be held in a male hand, even if it is the hand of a very
462 small boy. The exploitation of the land is also the male prerogative. They
[424] plough and sow the grain; incidental help may be provided by wives working
[241] alongside their husbands during the early part of reaping, but the main
reaping is done entirely by men. Transportation of grain to the mounds is
also carried out by men, and it is they only who have access to the grain
stores when quantities are withdrawn for family use. Sheep-shearing is
[236] carried out entirely by males,[10] the fleeces are stacked by them and the
[432] distribution and sales of these is directed by the male head of the tent.

Additional to these major tasks which males undertake are a number of
minor ones. Men sew strips of cotton together to make clothes for both
sexes. They also make rope of grass, albeit in a desultory sort of way, by
twisting together the strands between the palms of the hands. A number of
[334] other tasks fall to the men by virtue of the fact that the sexes are separated
[342] in the tent by a divider of blanket material, which may be taken down
when only members of the elementary family are about, but which is put

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[461]
[533]
[538]
[831]

[10] This work is reserved for the younger men and takes the form of a festival during which lewd songs are sung and poems with obscene themes or references are recited loudly and within the hearing of elders, in a manner not dissimilar to the behaviour of bachelors at a wedding.

462
[834]

in position immediately anyone else appears at the entrance to the tent.[11] [342]
Women cook, but they do not serve the meal to males, nor are they re- [264]
sponsible for the distribution of meat among them. Parts of an animal are 264
carefully specified, and the various portions distributed at a meal carry 574
with them a great deal of significance. A host can honour, flatter, disap- 571
point or even insult his guest, depending on the precise distribution of meat
he adopts. Designated portions should go to certain kinsmen if they are [602]
present, but this still leaves a wide margin of choice, and a host can use
this choice as part of the many means at his disposal for directing his re-
lationships with other men. A political link can be forged or another
snapped by the distribution of portions of meat at the commensal meal.

The Bedouin Ideal Type of Family as a Unit of Production

This account of the division of labour is far from inclusive of all the tasks 594
carried out. The details given are only barely sufficient to provide some 183
indication of the necessary composition of a family. Referring again to the [462]
Bedouin sentiments about the matter, it is now possible to give it some
numerical precision. The number of females should be a minimum of
about three, including a mother, a teen-age daughter and a child of about
eight years. Males should number about six: a father, relieved of most [857]
chores to act as director; a son in his middle to late twenties, to plough; a [883]
second son, in his early to middle twenties, to herd the camels; a third, in [462]
his late teens to early twenties, to shepherd the sheep; a fourth, middle to [561]
late teens, to look after the goats; and a younger son to fetch, carry and
run errands about the camp. The family of the ordinary Bedouin, they say, [554]
shows this sex and age distribution, although they recognise that a politically
ambitious man with the wealth to match his aspirations would require more [556]
of both sexes — particularly women, since the burden of entertainment in-
creases rapidly with a man's climb to power and fame.

Clearly, the basis of Bedouin sentiment concerning family structure is its 121
approximation to an ideal production unit. Some families display the features
of this ideal, but even they enjoy the productive benefits of this composition 183
for a very limited period only. The family, as described above, can only be an 594
ephemeral unit, since the age structure constantly changes, women are re-
moved by marriage, men move away and death affects it at any point at any
time. The Bedouin family is a fiction in the sense that it can be said to have a
characteristic composition. The mistake they make is to conceive of it as a
particular kinship structure related to production. The substance of what
has been referred to as a fiction is that, if viewed as a productive unit, it
bears close consistency with reality. Freed of the need to examine it in terms [621]
of specifically limited kinship relationships, and no longer anchored to the
inhabitants of a single tent, the distribution of people according to sex and

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[11] This is the general rule. In practice, the use of the divider can indicate an intimacy or distance in relationships, most subtly.

121 age depicted in their notion of a family is meaningful. It follows that, since
183 this unit will not be clustered in one tent, but distributed over several, each
594 small community must be so constituted that links people can use to claim
621 the services of others must exist, and that, since claims can be made against
various sorts of kinship relationships, each small camp will have predictable kin links. It follows, further, that since age, sex and number of people are significant, a small camp will have a characteristic demographic structure; each tent in a camp will display developmental changes, and particular tents may be shifted from one camp to another, but if a livelihood is to be gained in this semi-desert environment supporting its mixed pastoral-cum-agricultural economy, then at any given time the small camp must have certain fixed features in its composition. The elementary family is subject to far too many vicissitudes to exist on its own. It now remains to demonstrate this general argument by examining the details of one of these small camps.

A Particular Camp Viewed in Detail

621 The camp was one of 12 which constitute a minimal tribal section. In
613 genealogical terms its male members were linked through an ancestor five
ascending generations from living males of about 20 years of age. Usually,
[221] in summer, camps of this sort move to the vicinity of a large watering point;
in winter, this larger community breaks up into a number of smaller ones
as man and animals move off further south to the pastures. The total living
[162] population of the tribal section to which this particular camp belonged was
524.

621 Linked patrilineally, its male members were also linked in a plurality of
other consanguineal ways. Primarily, this plurality was brought about by
613 parallel-cousin marriage. The incidence of this form of marriage for
582 males of this group was 48 per cent[12] of the gross total of 234, derived
182 from their marriages over three generations; that is, the generation of males
entering into marriage, and the generation which has begun to die out are included with the generation of middle-aged males. This means that practically every male is related to others in a number of ways, and it is necessary to point this out now because the details to be given presently will show only the more immediate, but not all, existing connections. Plurality of links, moreover, is not the only consequence. Parallel-cousin marriage is a transmuting agent, creating a diversity of links. Each and every link carries with it specific modes of behaviour, which in turn means that each individual has a wide variety of different claims he can press on his coresidents. Marriage connections also exist with other sections of the same tribe. Their proportion is 28 per cent of the total. Demographically, it

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[12] As a matter of interest, the figure for marriage to the father's brother's daughter is 50 per cent of the figure for parallel-cousin marriage in general, but the consequences of these are beyond the scope of the present discussion.

would be impossible to satisfy all marriage expectations of men within the 621
universe of the minimal tribal section. For this reason alone external links 613
are inevitable and persistent. Also, the small territorial strip such a group 582
claims as a homeland produces an economy which, in this environment, 182
is unstable. Additional security is gained by making connections with other [423]
tribal sections, each with its specific ecological character. Men also marry [433]
into their client groups. The proportion of these for this camp was 9 per cent [619]
of the total. From these links they gain economic advantages, they can
claim services and a client-following is politically significant. Finally, 7
per cent of the total[13] are marriages with women of other tribes, which
again not only reduces the instability of the economy (in that a large tribal
area suffering near-famine conditions has access to areas of markedly different
ecology), but also provides political connections for men whose power
ambitions have passed the point of leadership limited to their own tribes. In
one way or another all these interests are manifest in the small camp and
attention is now directed to the latter.

The disposition of people in the camp is represented diagrammatically 621
on the page following. 592

The nucleus of the camp is Tent A. Its owner (1) was a powerful *Shaikh,* [554]
the son of a famous father. His marriage represents a political link with a [619]
group of one of the primary sections of his own tribe. His father died only a [428]
few years before I recorded my census, and the large amount of moveable
property he left had still not been divided among the sons; the owner of the
tent, as eldest brother, still controlled the flocks and herds. Most of his time
he spent away from the camp engaging in political intrigue. His two younger
brothers lived in his tent, but the second (5) would not remain there long
because negotiations for his marriage had been started. His father (2) married [582]
a parallel cousin; she died and shortly afterwards he took her sister (3) [587]
in sororal union. When this occurred an amount of bride-wealth was
agreed, but instead of giving any of it to her father, the entire amount was [583]
"put in front of her" (that is, the animals were allowed to remain with her
husband's flock), and these animals she had marked with her brother's
tribal sign to distinguish them from those of her husband. It was widely [428]
known that she was going to leave these animals to her husband's second [562]
son, for although she could not transfer them to a male outside her husband's
corporate group, she could decide who, among his heirs, should inherit.

During my stay in this camp, her brother's son (4) came to it as a 621
temporary resident for a month. Since he was poor, the purpose of his visit 592
was to capture some of his aunt's wealth while she was still alive and the 574
possibility still existed. During his stay he was fed well but did no work. [604]
His kinsmen found his company tiresome, so, to cut short his stay, and after [431]
consulting her nominated heir (5), she gave him three grown goats. Also
when an occasion arose for an animal slaughter, she provided the sheep, and, [231]

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[13] The remainder is made up of marriages to the daughters of men incorporated into the lineages.

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

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231 since meat is shared by all the people of the camp, her wealth was partly
dispersed among her poorer kinsfolk.

621 The location of Tent B was determined by the fact that the wife (6) was
592 the sister of (3) of Tent A. Her husband (7) had moved into the camp a
571 few years earlier as a result of an inheritance quarrel with his elder who
[578] robbed him of his fair share. This husband (7) gained in two ways from
[233] the move. Although poor, he had a small flock of his own, too small to
justify its own shepherd, but which he was permitted to include with his
sister-in-law's (3) flock for shepherding. If the flock had been larger he
would still have had difficulties, because, at some times of the year, save for
short occasional visits to camp, the shepherd is with his sheep for several
weeks, day and night. He (7) had three sons, still far too young to follow
the sheep, but when they become of age to do so, his dependence on Tent
A will cease, for then he can begin to gather the small flocks of other kinsmen around his own, his sons can shepherd them all and he can begin to
[574] enjoy the benefits to be derived from dependents. In addition, he enjoyed

the lavish generosity dispensed by the members of Tent A, and fed far better 621 592
than would have been possible otherwise. 571

The location of Tent C was also determined by a link through women. [574]
The only female (8) living in this tent, a middle-aged widow, was the
sister of (3) and (6) of Tents A and B respectively. Her teenage son lived
with her. They possessed only a few sheep, which were put with the flock of
Tent A for shepherding. The son (9) spent some of his time herding for
Tent A. With the mother and her son in Tent C were two other kinsmen.
One, a poor man (10), was this son's first patrilateral cousin, and they both
were the only surviving sons of their respective fathers. He (10) was the
main shepherd of Tent A. The third male (11), also poor and nearly
blind, was a second patrilateral cousin of both, but his sister was also 11's
mother. All occupants of Tent C were almost entirely supported by Tent A.
Relieved of the necessity to live off their own resources, the two young men
(9 and 10) were afforded the opportunity of building up their flocks for the
day when they would be able to negotiate their delayed marriages.

Tents A, B and C sheltered men who were agnatically closely linked. More 621
important, their grandfathers, three sons in a family of 19 children, were 613
full brothers. The latter's mother's name was used when referring to these 592
three tents as a group. During the past few years, many changes have 571
occurred within it, and the death of the pivotal woman (3) of Tent A might
well disperse this small cluster. Further, the nuptials of her heir (5) were
anticipated, and this event, itself likely to precipitate division of his father's
(2) wealth, might also lead to further residential rearrangements.

The owner of Tent D, (12), a man in his late thirties, son of a slave 621
mother, was at loggerheads with his father's brother, much more senior in age. 592
The owner's father, one of a family of 24 children, had been a wealthy man 604
and died leaving a substantial herd and a large flock, but he (12) was bereft 578
of most of this wealth by the father's brother. His first successful strike
against his uncle was the demand he made for his daughter as a wife. [582]
Earlier, when (12) had demanded his father's wealth, his father's brother, [428]
who had for years acted as his guardian, replied, "It is in your stomach,"
(meaning that it had been expended on his upbringing). Later, after the [583]
marriage had taken place, when the uncle demanded payment of the bride-wealth
his own words were thrown back at him, but this time with the
meaning that the bride-wealth had already been paid. While I was resident
in this area, the two men met occasionally: each meeting was hostile, for
(12) was encouraging his half-brother (13) (also the son of a slave mother)
to demand a second daughter as a wife. Included in this tent is a third adult
male (14), virtually a pauper, reduced to this state by the same grasping
father's brother. His link with (12) was their closeness of relationship (first [571]
paternal cousin), together with the fact that all three males (12, 13 and
14) had suffered privations and were allies against the common enemy, their
father's brother.

Associated with them for the same reason, was the owner of Tent E (15).

Cases

621 Genealogically he was their father's brother, but he was of their same age
592 generation, and behaved as if he was their agnatic equal. Towards his own
578 brother (16), he behaved as if the latter was his uncle, for he was much his
[604] junior in age and his uncle had virtually brought him up from boyhood.
They had quarrelled bitterly because his brother (16) had given him only
[428] a fraction of his inheritance, which he himself, in turn, should have
[593] shared with his young full brother (not shown on the diagram) but he did
not do so. This youngest brother left (15) for this reason and now resides
621 with (16), his full brother's enemy. Two of the men (14 and 13) of this
592 group of four were the chief herdsmen of the camp, although they were
[233] assisted for short periods by (12) and (15), who also helped tend the
camels in other ways. Their connection with the group centered on Tent
[571] A was a mutual close link to a politically powerful person (not shown on the
genealogies) to whom they are deeply loyal and who, while I was among
them, was actively opposed to the common political enemy of them all (16),
and who in earlier years had challenged the leadership of (2) of Tent A.
There is also the fact that they were all linked within a close range of
[613] agnation. This linkage included, too, the owner of Tent F (17), not in
[602] fact the descendant of the man shown in the diagram — he was the son of
a slave wife; his genitor was a slave, but his mother's master reared him,
freed him and he is now given as his son in the genealogy. He lives with his
wife, of client origin, together with her children from a previous husband,
(18), who divorced her, and his own children. Aging, he no longer acted
as a regular herdsmen, but relieved other men in the camp, and also spent
some time shepherding.

621 The details given of the strands which run through the camp to tie these
571 particular people together are so few that, like the Bedouin plough, they do
no more than scratch the surface, but they are sufficient to permit a few
general statements. The camp, and particularly the precise disposition of
621 its tents, shows a group of males clustered together to share two of the main
571 economic tasks: shepherding and herding. The physically strong adult males
233 of Tents D and E shoulder the burden of herding all the camels of the camp,
462 and the men of Tents B, A and C shepherd all the sheep, with (17) of
Tent F serving both purposes. This number of men allows some to remain
in the camp at all times, to free one of them for a journey to the distant
market when supplies of sugar and tea are necessary, and to enable one or
two men, at short notice, to hurry away on horse or camel to search for
lost animals.[14]

621 Economic Determinants of the General Structure of the Camp

574 It is also clear from these details that, given the disparities in wealth
231 (although all men have some wealth), the diet of most is considerably
262

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43 [14] There is little point in seeking the lost animals themselves in the first instance.
A man travels from camp to camp asking for information, and when he has gathered
[556] his clues, he searches a neighbourhood.

ameliorated in its protein content, particularly by the generosity of the oc- 621
cupants of the nucleating Tent A. Not that they are the only ones who ever 574
slaughter their animals for food. Others do so, albeit much less frequently. 231
Whoever kills an animal, everyone present in the camp is given a share, and 262
the men always eat in the tent of the donor, sitting around one bowl. Thus, 431
the surplus that builds up at one point is redistributed among those suffering [556]
a shortage, and meat, in a society where the climate and way of life militate against its storage for more than a few days, is more efficiently used. Many other general economic points could be deduced. These general statements could, however, be made of practically any camp, whatever the specific differences.

Affinity and Matrilaterality in the Structure of the Camp

Economic considerations determine the general structure of these small 621
camps, but do not account for the particular people gathered in them. Per- 613
haps one of the most striking features of these camps, which comes out 602
clearly in the one discussed here, is the confined agnatic span which links the males. Lest it be underestimated, I wish to stress the profound significance of this fact. While granting its importance it is equally necessary to stress that the span, potentially, could be considerably reduced; in some camps it is. Many of the closer agnates of the men of this camp are not shown on the genealogy included with the diagram; (7), (15) and (16), for example, all have brothers, (12) has a large number of first paternal cousins and so on. Therefore, this particular cluster of agnates formed for reasons other than agnatic ties. The most direct single thread connecting Tents A, B and C is that which runs through women. Men of many other camps are all linked in this way, directly. Five tents of this camp are connected through a female link to a common ancestress, whose name still defines the group, two ascending generations for one adult male, three from others and four from others. If greater elaboration could have been shown on the genealogy without confusion, additional links through women could have been demonstrated. Affinity and matrilaterality are the prime movers in bringing agnates together as neighbours.

Other Factors Affecting the Structure of the Camp

Other considerations narrow the area in choice of residence. The quest 621
for power where every man entertains hope of achievement where ambitions 571
are not stifled by the rigour of rank and a small amount of wealth provides 554
a basis for a beginning is also a significant factor in considering the composition of camps. The generosity of the people in Tent A was not entirely altruistic. Justly, it had won them repute, but the repute itself was an important aspect of the political power they enjoyed. They also acquired the services of several men to manage their animals, an impossible strain for them alone. And with their shepherds and herdsmen they secured devoted followers. It was hinted in discussing the structure of the camp that changes

621 were imminent, because the marriages of two of the men were anticipated,
571 two others harboured more distant hopes and boys in all the tents would soon
[554] be youths. The composition of this camp, caught at a moment in time, was
a function of the age and sex distribution of its inhabitants. All camps
show regularities in their structure, but their content is dynamic. Certain
general features persist, but the alignments of people undergo change with
[128 equal persistency. What priority is given to each of these considerations,
which component occupies the nucleating centre for others, will depend on
the problem under analysis, for while I have stressed that this or that is
important, I do not wish to suggest that any single factor has an absolute
importance compared with others, except in relation to a specific problem.

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THE SEDENTARIZATION OF NOMADS IN THE WESTERN DESERT OF EGYPT

A. M. Abou-Zeid

178 659 Much attention has been paid in the last few years, in both Egyptian and international circles, to the question of settling the nomads of the Western Desert of Egypt. A number of institutions (e.g. the Cairo Institute for Desert Research and the Departments of Sociology and Social Anthropology in the Egyptian universities) and some government departments (e.g. the Department of Desert Irrigation, of the Ministry of Public Works) have combined their efforts to study the economic and social situation of the semi-nomadic clans and the possibility of creating new sedentary agricultural communities to replace the present nomadic and semi-nomadic groups whose economy is based on the rearing of livestock in general, and of sheep in particular. It is the purpose of this paper to give a brief account of the main projects of sedentarization suggested by the authorities concerned in Egypt, and to outline their expected effects upon the economic system and modes of living, and also to indicate the repercussions they may eventually have on the whole social structure of the semi-nomadic clans. Apart from the planned projects, there is a marked and growing tendency among these people, especially the younger
178 generation, to abandon the traditional way of life and to settle down. This
166 tendency is generally stimulated by the changing social conditions. The tremendous hardships and the insecurity of the nomadic life, which is entirely dependent on rains, and the increasing social and cultural contacts with the urban communities in the Delta are the main factors influencing this change of social conditions, thus accentuating what may be described as a spontaneous and natural drift to settled life. Thus, an acute decline in the amount of rainfall, which is a frequent phenomenon in the Western Desert, and the consequent drought, famine and death of large numbers of animals will drive men to search for a more stable means of living in which they can find the security that is lacking in the nomadic way of life. The introduction of modern education and the establishment of schools in the larger villages have played a great role in changing the outlook of the people and in discrediting the traditional nomadic values. The advent of the railway and the improvement of other means of transport and communication have encouraged contacts with the Delta, and more particularly with Alexandria. As a result, an increasing number of young men migrate every year to Alexandria and get themselves paid jobs there. Trade and commercial transactions have also been increased with the Delta. New trade centres (e.g. El-Hammam, El-Dab'aa and Mersa Matrouh) have grown up along the railway line at the key stations. The most important of these centres is perhaps El-Hammam, which is the largest cattle market in the Western Desert. Small food stores and cafés and restaurants owned by 'native' people have been opened at these centres and in the larger

villages and towns, especially at Mersa Matrouh which is the seat of the local 178
government. The second world war was also influential in changing attitude
and social values. Men who were employed as unskilled labourers during the 166
war by the different combating armies became accustomed to paid jobs and
to cash remuneration, which had previously been practically unknown to
them. When the war ended, it was not easy for those workers to go back to the
old nomadic life with all its hardships and insecurity. Some of them preferred
to migrate to the Delta, while the others decided to settle down to work in the
desert villages and towns as servants or as unskilled labour in the local government departments, schools, hospitals, etc. Most of the younger men now prefer
to follow their example; the settled sedentary life is thus gaining ground all
the time at the expense of livestock husbandry.

But important as they may be in accelerating the drift from nomadism to 000
sedentary life, these factors fall beyond the scope of this paper and need not
be discussed further in this context. We shall be concerned with the plans and
schemes which are deliberately designed to deal with the settlement of the
nomadic and semi-nomadic clans. But before going on to consider this problem
we should like to give a brief outline of the area itself so as to establish a clear
idea about the general setting, and to see the projects themselves against a
background of the whole social life. This should help us to understand more
clearly the motives underlying the projects and to discern the effects they may
have on the social situation.

Geographers generally divide the Western Desert into three main divisions, 133
each of which has its outstanding characteristics. 105

1. The northern strip which extends some 500 kilometres along the coast from the west of Alexandria to the Egyptian-Libyan border. This strip, known as the *Dera'a Bahari*, consists mainly of fertile cultivated land which extends some 20 to 30 kilometres to the south, tending generally to become narrower to the west till it almost vanishes at Sollum near the frontiers.
2. To the south of this green coastal zone lies a high plateau in which are a number of depressions, the most important being the Qattara Depression.
3. The rest of the area; i.e. the extreme southern region, is real arid desert.

The coastal zone is the only really inhabited and cultivated part of the desert; beyond it there is hardly any prospect for cultivation. It is also a vital centre to which the scattered clans and groups of herders come to gather round the water points and the artesian wells during the dry season when the water becomes scarce in the southern parts.

The climate of the desert varies between the Mediterranean climate to the 132
north and along the coast, and the sub-tropical dry climate in the southern 105
parts. The dry season is usually very warm, tending to grow hotter southwards;
while the wet season, usually extending from November to March, is generally
mild especially in the north. Rainfall is very erratic and varies greatly from
year to year and from one place to another. But on the whole, there is more
rain in the north than in the south, and in most years rain falls in the southern
parts only on very rare occasions. Rain may come quite suddenly and cause
torrential floods which sweep away dwellings, crops and animals alike. This
is typical of the Sallum area.

According to the 1947 census, the Bedouins of the Western Desert number 162
68,161. Only 29,444, i.e. less than the half of the population, are engaged in 105

105 162 livestock husbandry as their main occupation while the rest earn their living by such other means as agriculture, fishing, stone-cutting, trade, etc. But whatever his main job may be, a man is likely to possess a number of sheep which he usually entrusts to a professional herdsman if he cannot look after them himself. This means that all sectors of the population have an active interest in livestock. Livestock, or rather sheep, are the most important and most esteemed item of wealth, and pastoral values still rank very high in spite of the obvious attraction of other types of work. On the other hand, pure nomadism is not practised, except perhaps by some small groups of camel-herders living in the far south of the area. The tremendous majority of the herdsmen are sheep-herders, whose movements are much more restricted than the movements of the real nomads. They have permanent settlements to which they retire when the grazing season is over, and there they practise agriculture, which they consider a secondary and supplementary occupation.

Most of the inhabitants of the Western Desert belong to the Awlad Ali clans who originally came from Libya. Some less important and less numerous clans, the Morabiteen clans, also live there as 'clients' of the more powerful Awlad Ali. A certain degree of correspondence exists between clan segmentation and the distribution of lands, both pasture-land and the fertile arable areas of the northern strip being distributed among clans and lineages in a clearly defined manner. A man cannot make use of the grazing ground, much less of the cultivation ground, known to belong to a different clan or lineage except under certain conditions and only obtaining the owners' permission. This does not mean, however, that clans and lineages are localized. For in spite of the natural tendency of kinsmen to cluster together and to live near to each other, the members of the same clan-segment may be widely dispersed, and the inhabitants of any specific locality, especially near the coast, usually belong to different clans. Nevertheless, a certain clan may be more strongly represented in a particular locality than all the other clans.

105 312 The problem of water supply is, naturally, the most crucial problem with which the people have to cope. The absence of surface water, the shortness of the wet season, the low rainfall and the meagreness of the subterranean resources in most parts of the desert, especially inland, impose drastic limitations upon their activities. Apart from the few artesian wells found in the northern coastal zone, rain is the main source of water supply. It is, however, a very unreliable source because of its irregularity. Moreover, a considerable amount of rain-water is lost by seepage through the sand and by evaporation. The situation is further aggravated by the fact that not all the functioning wells yield potable water or even water suitable for the irrigation of fields. The water of a large number of these artesian wells is charged with a high percentage of dissolved salts. This water can only be used for domestic purposes. Certain experiments are now being carried out at Ras-el-Hikma and Fuka to see whether such saline water could be used for irrigating the pasture-lands.

105 243 311 The two main complementary occupations, i.e. livestock husbandry and the cultivation of barley, are seriously affected by the water situation. The strip of arable land which extends along the sea coast varies in breadth from place to place and from year to year according to the rainfall. In good years it may stretch some 10 to 20 kilometres southwards, but in bad years the cultivation becomes rather patchy and is confined to a very narrow strip only a few kilometres wide. The people are never sure of their crops, and in really

bad years the returns may be so poor that grain and flour have to be sent from 105
the Delta to avert famine. The failure of the crop may also compel whole 243
clan-segments to migrate with their animals to the Delta. In this respect, 311
the semi-nomadic clans of the Western Desert represent a real burden on
the national economy of Egypt.

Livestock husbandry, which is by far the most important and highly valued 105
occupation, is itself subject to the variability and the erratic nature of rainfall, 231
since it is the rain which determines the abundance of herbage and, consequently, the number of animals reared. Pasture land is found mainly to the south of the cultivated land. Sometimes, the fallow patches among the barley fields are also covered with grass and other pasture plants suitable for grazing. Pasture plants usually persist between December and May; during the summer, the land becomes arid hard desert with only few dispersed patches of dry grass. The grazing season *par excellence* is from November to April, during which period barley stands in the fields. After the first showers of November, barley is sown and the young men soon move with their flocks to the pastures, leaving the older people to look after the fields. As the dry season advances, the flocks are moved northwards to the cultivated lands so as to be nearer to fodder and to water-holes. Thus, the movements of the herders are rhythmic and regulated by the division of the year into two major seasons: the wet season and the dry season. The wet season is the period of plenty during which the animals are well fed; the dry season is the period of starvation for the flocks which must then rely on such fodder as barley straw and on the drying grass. Any movements of animals that may take place during that season are carried out on a very limited scale. In exceptionally bad years the people are compelled to dispose of their animals, or at least of a large part of the flocks, or they may send them away to their friends and relatives who may be living near vegetation. Sometimes, the herdsmen find themselves compelled to cross the frontiers to Cyrenaica for pasture.

We can see then from this brief account to what extent the water situation 105
is responsible for determining the modes of living in the desert and for channelling human activities and imposing certain limitations on these activities. Development projects and sedentarization schemes planned for the Western Desert and its inhabitants must, therefore, give a great deal of importance to the question of water and its availability. In fact, most of the contemplated projects envisage the possibility of better exploitation of the existing water supplies as well as the tapping of potential resources.

Rightly or wrongly, it is generally assumed in Egypt that nomadism and 178
semi-nomadism represent a phase of deterioration which is no longer compa-
tible with the actualities of modern life and therefore should be abolished. 312
For, apart from the fact that it is responsible for the hardships and insecurity 657
suffered by the desert dwellers and the consequent ill effects on the national economy, especially in bad years, nomadism as practised in the Western Desert and under the prevailing circumstances is wasteful and destructive. Vast stretches of land which could be reclaimed at little cost and cultivated intensively are simply left for grazing without any serious endeavour to make better use of them. Under the contemplated sedentarization projects it is intended to increase the cultivated area, to improve the pastures by introducing new pasture plants of higher nutritive value in areas where agriculture is not

178 312 657 practicable, to tap unused resources, to develop the existing primitive crafts and to establish new industries. The question of water is the corner-stone of all these projects. Subterranean water has been tapped from the ancient Roman wells, and about 120 artesian wells have been sunk lately along the coast. A number of water cisterns have been constructed, and others are under construction, to preserve the rain-water for irrigation. Special attention has been paid in this regard to the western part of the coastal zone where the amount of rainfall exceeds that falling in the eastern parts. An example is the Wadi-el-Kharrouba cistern near Mersa Matrouh which will prevent large amounts of rain-water from being lost in the sands or in the sea, and store it for use during the dry season. All the water thus obtained will certainly help to extend the area sown with barley, especially in the El-Dab'aa zone; besides providing the more settled people with what they require to keep their fig trees and olive groves. The abundance of water may also encourage the introduction of new plants and trees which need a more stable and constant supply of water.

178 657 A few examples may serve to illustrate further the general policy adopted with regard to the problem of sedentarization of the Bedouin clans, and the steps taken to put the policy into effect.

The first example we shall consider is the Wadi-el-Natrun project which concerns the exploitation of the natural resources of the area so as to allow the establishement of new industries and the extension of the cultivated area, which in turn may eventually encourage the people to change to agriculture or industry, i.e. to a sedentary life. The *wadi* is an extended depression which lies some 22 metres below sea-level. The south-eastern end of the depression is 80 kilometres from Cairo, while the northern end is about 85 kilometres from Alexandria. A number of shallow salt lakes cover about half its total area, and some of these lakes become dry during the summer. The *wadi* is known as a rich source of salt and natron (sodium carbonate). Also a certain reed called *halfa* grows there and is used by the inhabitants of the area for the making of rough mats. The depression has always been regarded as a grazing ground for sheep and goats, so that only 25 *feddans*[1] were cultivated in 1952. According to the project, the extraction of salt and soda was put under government supervision. Subterranean water was tapped in a number of places and by the end of 1957 more than one thousand *feddans* were brought under the plough. Serious efforts were also made to introduce the cultivation of fruit, olives and dates as well as vegetables. Much attention was also given to the question of improving the production of animals by introducing different methods of breeding, and encouraging the inhabitants of the area to change over to the improved breeds which are superior to the local animals. This was met at first with much reluctance and resistance, but there are signs that the people are beginning to appreciate the benefit of owning the improved breeds. A factory for the manufacture of carpets and rugs has also been established by the government. A considerable proportion of the raw wool required for the industry is obtained from local sources, and the relatively small production finds a ready market in the larger cities of the Delta. The point of particular interest for us here is that all the unskilled labour employed in this industry as well as in the extraction of salt and sodium is recruited from the local population. Those workers have become accustomed to a settled life, so that when the season of extraction is over and work is temporarily suspended they do not take up herding animals but rather prefer to engage in agriculture, either as paid workers at the government research farm where fruit and vegetables are grown, or cultivating small patches of barley for their own consumption. Paid jobs in the factory or in the extraction industry and on the farm are very attractive to the young men. Fruit and vegetables are grown, for research purposes, in a large area of the reclaimed land. It is understood, however, that this land will be sold to the people to be exploited by them; and it is hoped that development of such farms will lead to the introduction of a canned food industry. Thus, the ultimate aim of the project is to encourage people to adopt a settled sedentary life by setting up new industries which depend mainly on the agricultural products of the area. The distribution of the arable lands will serve as an additional means of attaining this objective. All the lands of the desert are considered the exclusive property of the State, with only the right of usufruct conceded to the people. The people themselves know this only too well, although they may speak about 'their' fields and 'their' grazing-grounds and they are quite willing to settle down and to practise intensive agriculture if they are given the right to possess the land.

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[1] A *feddan* = 1.038 acres.

The main features of the Wadi-el-Natrun project repeat themselves in the Qattara Depression project which, besides its other objectives, is designed to bring about the sedentarization of the nomads by industrialization as well as by the enlarging of the cultivated area. The project is still under consideration; but from what is already known about it, it seems that the starting-point will be the digging of a long canal connecting the Mediterranean at the village of El-Alamein with the depression which lies 10 kilometres to the south of the coast. This step will be taken with the purpose of transforming a part of the depression into a large lake covering an area of about 14,000 square kilometres. The lowest point in the depression is 134 metres below sea-level; thus, it is expected that the sea water will rush towards the depression at some 600 cubic feet per second. The force of the rushing water could be used as motive power for factories in the area and as a means of generating the electric power necessary for industries to be established. As in the case of the Wadi-el-Natrun project, all the labour needed for these industries will be recruited locally. In addition, the creation of this vast artificial lake will temper the heat of the area and it is expected that as a result of the perpetual evaporation from the lake large amounts of rain will fall there, thus making possible the cultivation of vast stretches of land. It will certainly take a very long time for the lake to be completely filled up with sea-water. Experts estimate, for example, that it will need about 40 years for the water-level to reach 70 metres below sea-level, and about 150 years for it to reach 50 metres below sea-level. Some 1,300 years should pass before the depression itself is entirely filled up with salt deposits as a result of evaporation.

Lastly, the Ras-el-Hikma project endeavours to deal with the same problem but from a different angle. Unlike the Wadi-el-Natrun and the Qattara Depression projects which are concerned with industrialization and increasing the cultivated lands as means of encouraging sedentarization, the Ras-el-Hikma project is designed, to achieve that end by improving the grazing potentialities of the Western Desert in general and the Fuka-Ras-el-Hikma region in particular; and also by rationalizing the use of pasture-grounds. The logic that lies behind the project is as follows: The excessive misuse of the pasture plants and uncontrolled grazing in the desert have caused aridity and consequently obliged the people to adopt a nomadic life in search of

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pasture. Therefore, if pasture grasses could be developed and grazing practices could be organized, it would then be easy to bring the herders to a form of sedentary life in which they could practise animal husbandry in certain specific areas all the year round, without any need for transhumance or for seasonal migrations or movements. It is thought that the long-term results of the project will be both an increase in livestock production and a greater interest in the land and in intensive agriculture—a feature which hardly exists among the nomads. Ras-el-Hikma, a small village on the coast mid-way between Alexandria and Sollum, has been chosen as a suitable place for a pilot project. A research station has been established there and the whole project has been placed under the sponsorship of the Desert Institute of Cairo.

An area of about 7500 *feddans* was selected and fenced round for the pilot project. Intensive research has been carried out to develop species of palatable pasture grass which can stand the drought and summer heat and other local conditions. Considerable areas have been resown and kept under close observation. Selected breeds of animals have been imported and placed under observation both for the study of grazing management and in order to determine to what extent these breeds can be used in improving the local breeds. Much attention has been given to the problem of developing the underground water supplies; a number of wells have been sunk and wind-pumps have been erected on some of them. Efforts have also been made to introduce the cultivation of fruits and vegetables and to encourage the local inhabitants to adopt them as part of their normal diet.

So much for the development of the natural resources and grazing management in the area. But if the Bedouins are to settle down and make best use of these improved conditions, they should also be provided with suitable housing for new type of existence. A section of the land put aside for the pilot project was divided into plots on each of which was built a 'model' house designed to meet all the requirements of the Bedouin in his new life. Each dwelling has its own small garden where vegetables and fruit can be grown for private consumption, and its own animal byre. Wells provided with wind-pumps have also been constructed to provide the settlers with water for daily use and for the irrigation of their gardens.

From the purely technical point of view, the pilot project has shown good and encouraging results; and there is every reason to believe that the main project will be equally successful if it is handled with the same determination and seriousness. But it may be too early to give any definite opinion about the sociological results that can be expected. The people have not yet shown any real interest in what is going on around them, in spite of the laborious and continuous efforts made by the staff of the research station to stimulate this interest.

From these examples, two main points may be singled out for special notice:

1. Most of the projects tend to encourage sedentarization at the expense of animal husbandry; or at least they do not give enough consideration to this vital question. The only exception to this is, perhaps the Ras-el-Hikma project. This policy may prove, in the end, to be harmful to livestock production and may have the effect of depleting the animal wealth of the region. Industrialization and the agricultural development of the arable areas in the desert, important as they may be as means of bringing about sedentarization, should not divert interest from long-range development schemes.

2. It may prove impossible for all the claims put forward for the sedentarization projects to be be fulfilled unless the people are entitled to own the lands they cultivate. Besides giving the inhabitants a new feeling of security, this would attach them permanently to their fields, and thus incite them to give due attention to cultivation. Land-holding is considered to be the determining factor in the process of establishing sedentary life in the desert. 178 657

Reactions to the proposed sedentarization projects vary widely, from indifference, reluctance and resentment to the absolute acceptance of them together with the changes which they may be expected to bring about. The kind of reaction depends mainly on the benefits that may be gained, or the losses that may be suffered, as a result of the realization of these projects. Thus, the semi-nomads who usually spend a considerable part of the year near towns and the larger villages such as Mersa Matrouh and El-Dab'aa and who thus have some idea of the significance and the privileges of settled life react favourably in general and welcome the sedentarization projects. Similar reactions may be found among the groups who have been accustomed to wage labour and who have thus tasted the advantages which money can offer. On the other hand, the more nomadic clans, especially those inhabiting the southern and the western parts of the desert, are forthright in expressing their deep resentment and indignation concerning the new projects. This is more obvious among the nomadic groups which live near the Egyptian-Libyan borders and who thus have grazing interests in Cyrenaica as well. For them sedentarization means the loss of these interests. Tribal chiefs also express dismay at the projects and the impending changes. Their doubts and resentment spring from their fear of losing their authority over the tribesmen, if the clans and the nomadic groups are sedentarizated and thus brought under the control of the local administration. 178

There is no doubt that the realization of these projects will cut deep into the structure of the traditional Bedouin community. The creation of new industrial and trade centres, the drift to agriculture and industry and to paid jobs, the increase in contacts with the Delta and especially with Alexandria, the greater amounts of cash in the hands of the people as a result of all these developments, and lastly the emergence of individual or private ownership of land as a result of new land legislation will lead to a growing sense of individuality and of economic independence among the younger generation. These individualistic tendencies may have some disruptive effects on both the traditional patterns of social relationships and the total social structure. Being economically independent of the lineage or the larger kin-groups, the young men will be able to free themselves from the authority of their elders, which may lead in the end to the breaking down of the whole traditional structure.

Perhaps the system which will be affected more deeply by these new trends is the kinship system, around which revolves all social and political life in the desert. The core of this system is the co-operation of a large number of agnatic kin constituting one corporate economic unit in which the personality of the individual is entirely submerged by group interests. The economic independence of the individual members and the consequent trend towards separation will lead to the shrinkage of this kin-group and to the disappearance of lineages and larger lineage-segments. Thus, the corporate units based on kinship relations will be limited in size and most of them will take the form of the

7:Abou-Zeid E-5 (no date) 1959 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9
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178 elementary family which prevails in the larger cities and the urban communities in general. In fact this type of family is already beginning to dominate the scene in the larger villages of the desert, such as Mersa Matrouh, which offer opportunities for trade and paid employment.

The traditional political system will also suffer badly, and it seems that the fears of the tribal chiefs are fully justified. Besides being affected by subjection to the local administrative authorities after sedentarization, the prestige of the chiefs will be equally depreciated by the antipathy of the people themselves to their intervention in their affairs. This antipathy can be noted among the more settled groups (in Mersa Matrouh, El-Dab'aa, El-Amriya, etc.) who tend to ignore the authority of the chiefs. Thus, it should be expected that the absolute coercive powers enjoyed by the chiefs of the more nomadic groups will be largely diminished by sedentarization and reduced to ineffectiveness. Yet the curb which will be imposed on the authority of the chiefs will provide, on the other hand, an effective means for social control in the desert. Under the present tribal organization, chiefs are liable to misuse their authority and can be a real source of unrest and trouble, by organizing raids against rival and hostile clans, smuggling goods across the Egyptian-Libyan frontiers, giving refuge and protection to criminals and helping them to cross the borders and escape punishment, etc. Sedentarization will put an end to these illegal activities.

In fact, the social achievements of the projects will be by no means less important than the economic results, although they were not envisaged at first by the authorities or, at least, were not given explicit consideration in the original plans. The importance of the sociological aspects of the projects can be judged from the fact that their effects will not be confined to the local Bedouin communities, but will rather influence Egyptian society at large. The emergence of the new mode of life depending mainly on intensive agriculture and on industry will encourage immigration from the Nile Valley. Some of the proposed projects do actually consider the possibility of moving 'active' and more trained peasantry elements from the Delta to rehabilitate the desert and more particularly the coastal zone and to cultivate the reclaimed lands. There is no doubt, also, that all the skilled labour needed for the new industries will be brought from Alexandria and other cities of the Nile Valley. Thus, the creation of new industrial and commercial centres in the desert will absorb a certain proportion of the inhabitants of the Delta. This can be regarded as a good contribution towards solving the problem of the increasing population of Egypt. But the crowning achievement of these projects will be the reduction of the cultural and social contrast which exists at present between the Western Desert, with its nomadic and semi-nomadic inhabitants, and the rest of the country. This contrast is manifested in the different patterns of social relationships, the different values and modes of thought, and the different structure prevailing in the desert and the Nile Valley. The creation of settled agricultural and industrial communities in the desert, the increase of contacts between the desert and the Delta, mass immigration into the desert and the breaking down of the traditional tribal organization will all help to bridge the existing social gulf. In other words, the realization of the sedentarization projects will lead in the end to a fuller social cohesion not only among the different Bedouin groups but also between the desert as a whole and the rest of the country.

8: Kennett G-5 (ca. 1921) 1925 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9

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BEDOUIN JUSTICE

LAWS & CUSTOMS AMONG THE EGYPTIAN BEDOUIN

by

AUSTIN KENNETT

SOMETIME ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER
IN THE LIBYAN DESERT
AND IN SINAI

/title page/

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CHAPTER VII

BLOODMONEY—WESTERN DESERT

000 Payment in Cash—Agreements to pay—Reprisals discouraged—Patricide—Detective Work—Death from Fright—Public Aversion—The twelve-year-old Bill—Informers—Ali Abu Bukr's Cistern—The Broken Rope—Found Drowned—Three Months' Hard Labour—Whose Rope?—Payment—The Old Man who fell off the Wall—The Clutches of the Police—A Well-conceived Lie—Ibrahim's Broken Leg—Ali's Cunning—The Fiasco at the Tomb—Reductions in Payment—The Dead Baby—Amateur Lawyers—The Two Shepherds and the Trespasser—Stick or Stone?—Legal Arguments—Travelling Allowance—Misappropriation—Chaos—Mirtah buys Sheep, while the Sayed buy Dates—The Clash—£300—Abdel Kerim and his Cousin—The Boys Fight—Result of pointing a Gun—Dirty Fingers—Serve him Right—The Two Married Sisters—A Gun Accident—Poor Towida—Successful Bluffing.

682 In the Western Desert the laws of bloodmoney differ
[171] considerably from those of Sinai, the former being of
African origin and the latter of Arabian. The Western
[435] Bedouin regard the price of a man as £300, irrespective of
[562] the market price of a camel; and the value of a woman's
life as normally £150, or half that of a man.

682 In the absence of satisfactory evidence in a case of
695 murder, if the oath be employed to decide the issue, fifty
men will swear for a man's life, and twenty-five in a case
562 involving the life of a woman. (Note. In some tribes
these numbers are increased to fifty-five and twenty-seven
respectively.)

682 As regards the payment and acceptance of bloodmoney,
621 this is almost invariably by agreement between the families,
and it is often difficult for an outsider to see any rhyme or

reason in three families of one tribe paying together, while 682
the fourth is independent. Sometimes this is caused by 621
geographical separation, at other times by personal animosity or jealousy.

The main difference between the rules of the Western 682
Desert and Sinai is that in the West reprisals taken at the 171
discretion of an aggrieved individual are not recognised as [679]
lawful, and are distinctly discouraged. Generally speaking, [181]
the Western Bedou is a very much more prosperous and
law-abiding person than the Sinai Arab, although at the
same time he retains his charm as a primitive and independent being. Occasionally a dastardly murder takes 682
place, but public opinion is very strong not only against the 674
murderer personally, but against all the members of his [626]
family, who automatically share his unpopularity.

In the spring of 1920 an old man, reputed to possess considerable wealth, both in camels and sheep and also in gold buried in the ground, was returning about mid-day from market riding his donkey, and one of his numerous grown-up sons was walking on foot beside him. After going four or five miles in the open desert, the old man got off his donkey, and told his son to ride for a little way while he walked. The son suddenly attacked his old father and hit him with the heavy stick he was carrying; and the poor old man died almost at once with a broken skull. There was nobody about, and the son dragged his father's body about a hundred yards, and threw it down an old dried-up cistern; then, mounting his donkey, he rode home to dinner.

That afternoon the local sheikh was told of the old man's disappearance, and as he had seen father and son leaving the market together, he had his suspicions. He traced their footsteps, picking up the tracks of a heavily laden donkey and one man walking, from near the entrance to the market place. Then, following along carefully on these tracks, he saw where the old man had dismounted. Then he saw a spot of blood and the place where the

682 body had been dragged. He followed the footsteps of the
674 son as far as the cistern, where he again saw a tiny spot of
fresh blood on one of the stones. From that point donkey-tracks led straight to the son's tent.

By nightfall the son was securely lodged in the police post; and local public opinion was seething with fury, firstly at such a dastardly deed committed presumably for the sake of the old man's money, and secondly because it reflected untold discredit on the rest of the tribe. The murderer, who was a big powerful man of about thirty standing nearly six feet in height, lay in prison awaiting trial. After a few days he was admitted to hospital, where he completely collapsed and died of fright a fortnight later.

[203] Rumours then began to spread that possibly the murderer had only acted in accordance with the wishes of his brothers, who were all conspiring to get rid of the old man, in order that they might share out his possessions. This could not be proved, and appeared unlikely from the
[626] evidence. However, public feeling against the whole family ran so high that it was feared that more horrors might follow; but although no open action was taken against the family, no opportunity was missed of having a dig at them in some way or another.

682 A very wealthy sheep merchant, who was a distant
674 connection of the family, and heartily ashamed of them,
brought an action for debt against one of the murderer's
691 brothers. He produced an I.O.U. for £2 dated twelve
626 years before and signed by the murdered man, claiming
(according to custom) that the son now in court as de-
686 fendant had inherited his father's liabilities together with
[672] his assets.

This sheep merchant was known personally to the writer, who was also aware that a month previously he had made a profit of £900 on a very clever bit of dealing in the West. The collection, after an interval of twelve years, of this paltry debt of £2, owing from the deceased father

of the present defendant seemed—for a really wealthy 682
man—to be pointless and futile. The merchant anticipated 674
this objection by hastening to add that the receipt of the 691
actual cash did not interest him in the least; but that he 626
had been wondering how he could shew his disapproval of 686
the defendant's family in some way, and had gone carefully through all his old papers and receipts with this end in view, and had triumphantly discovered the bill of debt now produced in court.

Bedouin Law and custom sometimes accept right to 671
bloodmoney in all sorts of circumstances, when other law 672
would recognise no claim. For example, the principle is 682
accepted that a life lost in prison must be paid for by the informers whose information resulted in the imprisonment of the deceased. It is entirely immaterial whether the information so given to the police was wilfully false or intentionally misleading, or whether it was merely subsequently found to be incorrect. Even if the information had been true and correct in every detail, the informer is still blood-guilty from the Ourfi standpoint, although in actual practice any such claims for bloodmoney would probably be considerably modified.

Other claims for bloodmoney are also recognised occasionally, in cases of obvious accidental death, or death by misadventure or Act of God, when the interpreters of Bedouin Law cannot get away from the main principle that a life lost must be paid for. The difficulty in these
cases is to determine who shall pay for it; and the lawsuits [695]
usually end in a clever compromise, in which their essential principles are duly observed, but their judgments are mitigated and modified by leniency and commonsense. The following example, which occurred recently in Mariut, will illustrate this.

A certain Arab called Ali Abu Bukr had inherited from 671
his father large cultivation rights in the desert; and in the 672
middle of this land was an old cistern for the collection of 682
rain water. It had not been used for years, and was silted 312

671 up with drift sand; and as it was some miles from the
672 nearest permanent water supply, the owner of the cistern
682 decided that it was well worth clearing out, with a view
to catching and conserving the next rainfall.

312 Accordingly he summoned all his kinsfolk, and propounded his proposition, to which they agreed. Other Arabs occupying neighbouring rights suggested that it was a very good idea, probably with a view to a simplified water supply for themselves.

An Arab from the neighbouring tribe called Ahmed
671 had frequently acted as shepherd and odd-job man for
672 Ali; and it happened that, when Ali and all his kinsfolk
682 were assembled at the cistern, Ahmed chanced to be
passing. Ali hailed him, and asked him to come and lend a hand. So Ahmed joined the crowd at the well, and assisted in getting ready the ropes and other tackle to be used.

[312] The cistern, constructed after the usual Roman pattern, was about forty feet deep, fifteen feet in diameter for the first twenty feet or so, and from there narrowed down to six or seven feet, with footholes cut in the side for the last half. One of Ali's relatives had agreed to be let down with ropes and to start cleaning out the mud and sand from the bottom. However, when the rope had been tied round his middle, and he was just going to be swung in mid-air and lowered to the ledge at half-way, his nerve suddenly failed him, and he refused to start.

Subsequent evidence was confused at this point as to exactly what happened; but it seems that one of the crowd noticed Ahmed standing with the rest, and remarked that he had had considerable experience in well digging, and suggested that he should go down. Accordingly Ahmed flung a stone down the well, and a faint splash at the bottom indicated that there were a few inches of water in it. He then organised a sort of tug-of-war among the men standing by, to test the strength of the rope. Satisfied on this point, he had the rope tied round him, and he was

lowered very slowly and carefully by the crowd at the top. 671
Here again it is difficult to ascertain exactly what happened, 672
as the evidence was again contradictory. Apparently, when
Ahmed reached the ledge at half-way, he fumbled about 682
in the dim light for the foot holes; and just at this psychological moment the rope broke.

The ten men holding the rope at the top collapsed one on the top of another; but when they had recovered their presence of mind, they shouted down to Ahmed, to ask if he were all right. A faint voice from the bowels of the earth replied that he had fallen heavily on a stone and had had a nasty knock, but that he would be all right in a few minutes.

They then produced a spare rope for another man to go down and get Ahmed up; but they discovered that the only one they had to hand was too short by several feet. A man was sent post-haste on a pony to get another rope from the encampment a mile or so away, and when he returned after a quarter of an hour, volunteers were quickly forthcoming to go down and retrieve Ahmed. On reaching the bottom they found that the unfortunate man, either stunned by the fall or overcome by foul air, had collapsed flat on the bottom of the well, and had been drowned in six inches of water. They hauled his body up to the surface, and Ali, terrified that he might be held in some way responsible, counselled all present to bury the dead
man then and there, and to say nothing about it. However, [123]
news quickly spreads; and the same day an informer came to the police post and reported the matter, and Ali was arrested and subsequently sentenced to three months' imprisonment with labour by the present writer, for failure
to notify a death under unusual circumstances. (Inci- [177]
dentally this did not constitute an offence under Bedouin Law, but was a contravention of the Police Code and was punished as such. Hence the apparent interference in a purely Bedouin concern.)

While Ali was still serving his sentence, Ahmed's rela- [694]

671 tives lost no time in taking legal proceedings at the Ourfi
672 court to claim bloodmoney from the owner of the cistern;
682 and on Ali's release from prison a very long and excessively
694 tedious lawsuit began.

The principle that a life had been lost and must be paid for was accepted without question by the court from the outset, in spite of the police enquiry, which is the local equivalent of a coroner's inquest. The enquiry had established beyond any shadow of doubt that death had been caused by misadventure, and that Ali was absolutely innocent, not only of any intent to kill, but also of any negligence whatsoever. Any other coroner's jury in the world would have returned a verdict of accidental death, expressed sympathy with the relatives, and absolved all concerned from blame; and there the matter would have ended.

671 Ali, who had already undergone three months in durance
672 vile—which, to a wandering child of the desert, must be particularly galling—so far forgot any tribal instruction he
682 might have had as to repudiate vigorously any responsibility either for the accident or for the restitution of the death in the form of bloodmoney. His family also, who would naturally have to share the payment, did their best to confound the issue by lodging a counter claim. They protested that the actual rope that broke was not theirs, but belonged to a third party, and that neighbouring tribes, who had approved of the project and who stood to benefit by the cistern when it was cleaned out, were conjointly responsible with themselves for any payment due.

The case dragged on unsatisfactorily for some months; the neighbouring tribes swore that no agreement existed whereby they should benefit by the cistern when completed; the question of the ownership of the rope was dropped; and eventually Ali and his family were ordered to pay a reduced scale of bloodmoney to the family of the deceased.

683 Sometimes these bloodmoney cases, so far from being
672 dramatic or nauseating, are actually rather amusing.

672

The plaintiff was an Arab called Salem Ibrahim, who 683
brought an action against a man of another family of his [694]
tribe called Ali. The plaint was as follows. Seven years
ago Salem's father Ibrahim, a man then about sixty years
old, was sitting on a wall near a patch of cultivation belonging to Ali, and watching Ali working on his land.
Some dispute arose between them; and, angered at something that Ibrahim had said, Ali picked up a large stone
and flung it at Ibrahim. The impact broke the old man's 683
leg; the case was reported to the police; Ali was arrested 682
and imprisoned; and Ibrahim was taken to hospital, where 672
he shortly afterwards died. Ali was thus left in prison,
and the case could not be proceeded with from the Ourfi
standpoint until he came out. On his release, therefore, 683
the case was to be brought up for settlement, and the 682
plaintiff to claim bloodmoney for his father's death.

Meanwhile, however, plaintiff related how his own 694
family had wanted to get the case cleared up and how Ali's 672
family had also approached them with the idea of extracting Ali from the clutches of the police, so that the case could be tried by an Ourfi court, and a judgment which would be intelligible and acceptable to both parties could be given by their own sheikhs.

Accordingly they agreed together that the plaintiff's family should go to the police, declare that the whole case was a mistake from beginning to end, and that the old man Ibrahim had fallen off the wall, and that nobody had thrown a stone at him. A document to this effect was drawn up, signed and sealed by the notables of Ibrahim's family, and solemnly presented to the police. The evidence seemed so genuine that Ali was released from prison, with implied apologies for wrongful arrest. On his release from prison Ali saw his opportunity, and by some means obtained possession of this document signed by Ibrahim's family.

When the case first came up for trial by Ourfi court, Ali denied throwing the stone, repudiated all responsibility

672
683 in the case, and produced this document signed by Ibrahim's
682 family to the effect that Ibrahim *fell* off the wall and broke his leg. How then could he possibly be implicated in the
694 case?

The assessors of the court went carefully into all the
683 evidence and eventually agreed that the matter should be
682 decided by the oath. They demanded that Ali, backed by
672 twenty-five men of his own tribe, chosen by Ibrahim's family as men of their word, should swear on the tomb
695 of Sidi Shar el Ruh the following oath: "By Allah the Great and by the Truth of this Holy Sheikh, I swear that I neither threw a stone at Ibrahim, nor broke his leg." They further decreed that if Ali himself, or any one of the twenty-five men chosen to back him in his oath, failed or refused to swear as required, the case for the defence would be null and void, and that bloodmoney would be required in full from Ali's family.

On the date appointed two or three sheikhs of the court were detailed to go to the tomb, to meet the defendant with his twenty-five backers, and to supervise the taking of the oath. The parties duly arrived; but when the oath was just about to be taken, three men of Ali's backers refused to swear, declaring that on the contrary they were ready to swear, if required, that Ali *had* thrown the stone, and was responsible for Ibrahim's death. The case for the defence thus fell to the ground, and the parties were warned to appear at a future date, when the case would be completed. At the next meeting of the court, Ali's liability to pay bloodmoney was accepted in principle, but there were divergencies of opinion as to the amount to be paid. Then followed a delightful example of casuistry typical of the Bedou mind.

The assessors of the court felt that, in the first instance, Ali had never intended to kill poor old Ibrahim, and that his crime fell very far short of intentional homicide. Also, it had happened seven years before, and, all said and done, time had healed most of whatever ill-feeling there ever

had been. Besides, Ibrahim was an old man when it 683
happened, and he would have to have died before very 682
long in any case. Moreover, the sheikhs in their heart of 672
hearts considerably admired the acumen displayed by Ali
in getting hold of that document. So they decided privately 695
among themselves that on the whole half the full bloodmoney, or £150, would meet the case. On no account, however, could they give in open court the above reasons for lessening the sum to be paid. They proceeded to listen patiently to more evidence, and eventually gave their considered judgment as follows:

"Defendant Ali is required to pay the full bloodmoney of £300. *But* in view of the fact that, when the police came to Ali's tent to arrest him seven years ago, in the excitement and commotion caused by the police patrol, Ali's wife gave birth to a premature boy child, and that this boy subsequently died, therefore the sum of £100 will be deducted from the total to be paid, for the sake of the dead baby. Also, as it cannot be proved conclusively that Ibrahim died simply and solely as the result of the stone thrown at his leg, and as it may be conceivably possible that other external causes contributed to his death, for this reason, therefore, another sum of £50 will be deducted. Hence the amount to be paid is £150, of which £50 must be paid after this coming barley harvest, with a similar sum after the two following harvests."

Amateur lawyers are not popular, and more often than 682
not darken counsel without understanding.

An Arab called Salem had some land, and he employed 672
two men of the Hawita tribe as shepherds and harvesters. [693]
One of these men was from the Nefoofa family of the Hawita, and the other was from a family called the Magai. These two shepherds worked peacefully together, and their respective families were friendly, until one day an Arab of the Gottaan tribe called Yadam Saadi drove his flocks and his animals on to Salem's land, and began to pitch his tents. These two shepherds saw this going on from afar, and

682 672 came up to drive him and his animals away. Yadam refused to move, and threatened violence if they attempted to eject him forcibly. So the two shepherds, who were responsible to their employer for the land, went for him simultaneously—the Nefoofa shepherd with a thick stick, which he brought down with all his force on Yadam's head, and the Magai with a large stone, which he hurled as hard as he could, and which caught Yadam in the chest over the heart. Yadam received both these blows simultaneously, collapsed on to the ground in a crumpled heap, and died soon afterwards.

682 672 693 695 Yadam's family then brought an action against the Nefoofa and Magai families conjointly, claiming bloodmoney. The Nefoofa produced an amateur barrister of their own family called Abd el Gelil, who proved (entirely to his own satisfaction) that many minor assaults were continually taking place, when people were hit on the head without death following immediately as the result of the blow. He therefore contended that it must have been the blow from the stone thrown by the Magai which had really killed him. The Magai adopted a similar line of argument, and the case remained at a standstill for nearly two years.

Eventually the court effected a compromise, and awarded the bloodmoney, to be paid equally by the Nefoofa and the Magai in three yearly instalments of £50 each. The Magai paid up their £50, and the Nefoofa barrister—a particularly bumptious individual from the Nile Valley—lodged a protest against the decision, claiming that the court was not properly constituted and was not competent, that the sheikhs were biassed, and a hundred and one reasons why the Nefoofa should not contribute their share.

He was eventually made to understand that the Nefoofa would have to pay, and that if there were any more trouble from him, his own property would be seized as part-payment. Accordingly Abd el Gelil travelled round the Nefoofa encampments, ostensibly to collect sums due from

the different families. A year later the Gottaan brought 682
up the case again, acknowledging the receipt of £50 from 672
the Magai, but protesting that they had still not received 693
anything from the Nefoofa. On an enquiry being held, 695
a representative collection of infuriated members of the Nefoofa family came to court, protesting that Abd el Gelil had already collected their payments, and that if he had not handed over the money, their responsibility at any rate had ended for the moment.

It subsequently transpired, when Abd el Gelil was with difficulty got hold of and brought to court, that he had collected about £50, but claimed this sum as his own personal travelling expenses for collection. Then followed [685]
another lawsuit, in which the Nefoofa family sued their self-appointed lawyer for mis-appropriation of tribal funds. The details of this new case, and those of the original suit, were then re-capitulated and muddled up together, to the complete bewilderment of the writer and the entire satisfaction of the Bedouin assessors.

Mention has been made of the extra £100 (£400 instead 682
of £300) usually paid among the Gawabees tribe as the 672
price of a life. It seems, however, as though there are exceptions to this rule; and the following case seems to shew [435]
that the payment of "Sanaa" depends on a variety of circumstances.

A family called Sirdani had had a bloodfeud with another 682
family of the Gawabees called Sayed, one of the former 628
having killed one of the latter some fifty years ago. The 672
two families had been living in totally different districts, and for years had not come into contact with each other, and so the feud had been allowed to continue.

In the spring of 1921 a man of the first family, about forty-five years old, called Mirtah el Sirdani, left the Wadi Natrun for the Nile Valley to buy some sheep from the Fellaheen, taking with him his old mother and a small boy, to help him bring them back across the desert to the luscious grazing in the wadi swamps. He arrived at the

8: Kennett G-5 (ca. 1921) 1925 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9

682 Cultivation, bought his sheep, and started off westwards
628 to the wadi.

672 By a sheer coincidence, four men of the other family
had left their camping ground a fortnight before, and had gone south on their yearly pilgrimage to Baharia Oasis to bring back dates. On leaving the oasis, they had later arrived at the wadi, watered their camels, and pushed on northwards to their camping ground. About one and a half days' trek north of the wadi, about half an hour before sunset, they saw in the distance a cloud of dust advancing towards them, out of which gradually emerged a flock of sheep, an old woman, a man, and a small boy.

According to the subsequent evidence of the mother, her son Mirtah drove his sheep unconcernedly, not noticing with the rays of the setting sun in his eyes who was with the approaching camels. When they drew near he called out the usual greeting, "Peace be upon you"; but instead of the stereotyped reply, two of the camelmen suddenly leapt from their camels with heavy sticks in their hands, and rushed at Mirtah. The old mother and the small boy began to run away, while the frightened sheep scattered in all directions. Mirtah was entirely unprepared for any assault, and before he realised what was happening, he had received two thundering blows on his skull from the two men, who immediately afterwards remounted, and rode away.

Mirtah fell stunned; and as soon as his assailants had gone, his mother and the boy ran to his assistance. After a few minutes Mirtah staggered to his feet in a dazed sort of way, cursed his aggressors, whom he had recognised as belonging to the Sayed family, and said that he would be able to continue slowly. He managed with the help of his mother and the boy to cover two or three miles, but was overcome by pain and loss of blood, and again collapsed. His mother with the sheep remained by his side, and sent off the boy to the Wadi to get assistance to bring him in. Fortunately, after running a few miles, the boy came across some

members of a neutral family with grazing camels, and with 682
their help Mirtah was fetched in to the Wadi unconscious. 628

The case was reported to the police, but a few hours 672
after his arrival in the Wadi Mirtah quietly died. The post-mortem examination revealed a skull cracked right across, with severe cerebral haemorrhage. In due course the Sirdani family claimed £400 bloodmoney from the Sayed family, according to the custom among the Gawabees tribe. This time, however, an exception was made. The sheikhs decided that the ordinary bloodmoney of £300 only should be paid by the Sayed to the Sirdani family, £100 in money and £200 in kind, divided into six yearly instalments of £50 each.

They also added a rider to the effect that they were not awarding Sanaa under the circumstances, as there was no proof of intent to kill, and that weapons such as guns or knives (which would imply premeditation) were not used. The presumption was that the Sayed family, though obviously intending to cause grievous bodily harm, did not intend to kill Mirtah. The fact that he died of his wounds automatically warranted the award of £300 as bloodmoney, but did not constitute sufficient justification for the imposition of the extra £100 as Sanaa.

In Common Law it is not always easy for the uninitiated 671
to understand the legal value of a threat, or what proportion 683
of the punishment for the completed action is due for a mere threat. It was singularly pleasing, therefore, to find a striking instance of a threat to shoot, and to see the attitude of the Bedouin court towards this particular offence.

An Arab called Abd el Kerim was tolerably well-to-do, 233
and owned several camels, a mare, fair-sized flocks of 685
sheep and goats, and certain cultivation rights; and he had two sons aged about sixteen and eighteen respectively. His cousin, Abd el Salam, who lived half a mile away, had four sons of ages ranging from fifteen to twenty, but he was considerably poorer in this world's goods. Abd el Kerim's sons took their camels out to graze, and inadvertently

233 685 [578] wandered over the boundary of Abd el Salam's grazing rights. The juvenile members of Abd el Salam's family came out from their tents in a body, to drive off their intruding second cousins with their camels. An altercation ensued, and the excitement grew; and eventually a pitched battle with sticks and stones began among the lads.

683 One of Abd el Kerim's sons, leaving his brother to hold on for a moment, ran back the half mile to call his father, who returned with him to the scene of the fight carrying his gun. On arrival at the camels, Abd el Salam's sons set on him in a body. Abd el Kerim pointed his gun at one of them and took aim; whereupon one of the other family from behind laid him low with a blow on the top of his head, sufficient to fell an ox.

[114] Abd el Kerim was carried back to his tent, where the writer witnessed the horrible sight of sympathetic but homicidal relatives pawing his open wound with their filthy fingers. A large hole had been knocked in the side of his head, and portions of brain were visible. After some months of surgical treatment Abd el Kerim came out of [694] hospital; and, as the blow was reported to have affected his reason, a case was brought on his behalf by some of his relatives, claiming damages from the family of Abd el Salam. However, before the case was fully completed, [682] Abd el Kerim was taken ill, was re-admitted to hospital, and died. The case therefore became one of bloodmoney, and was dealt with in the usual way.

683 682 695 672 The interesting point about the case, however, lies in the decision of the court, when the first claim for damages was brought up. A very strong line was adopted by the sheikhs, and in the opinion of the court the wounds received by Abd el Kerim were only what he might reasonably expect. They maintained that, after the way in which he had behaved, he was lucky to have got off as lightly as he did. The sheikhs protested that he ought never to have gone out from his tent, and mixed himself up in a fight between a lot of boys. If he had any authority at all, he

should have called a meeting with Abd el Salam, discussed 683
the position sensibly with him, and then the two of them 682
should have beaten all the boys soundly. Secondly, he ought 695
never to have taken his gun with him, which was as stupid 672
as it was dangerous. The fact that Abd el Kerim himself knew that it was not loaded made not the slightest difference to the case, as the boys did not, and could not, know whether it was loaded or not. As one of the sheikhs expressed it, "If you point a gun at me, loaded or unloaded, I'm not going to risk it. So if I retaliate by braining you, then that's your fault—not mine!"

As compared with some of the customs obtaining among 682
the Sinai Arabs, the following case among the Aulad Ali 171
in the Western Desert is illuminating, and will be quoted in full. The question of who is "chief mourner" of the deceased, and who draws the largest share in a bloodmoney case varies considerably between the tribes of Arab and
Berber origin. Among the Aulad Ali a woman killed is [562]
automatically half the value of a man, whereas among the [435]
Arabs the value of a woman depends on a variety of conditions.

A man called Idris had two daughters, Towida and 682
Beida. Beida married a man called Korayem Shushan of 672
the Gereidat tribe, and Towida married Farag Gueida of the Mowalik tribe. A son had been born to Towida and Farag called Lataif Farag; and when Lataif was about four years old, his parents quarrelled about some trifling matter, and Farag divorced Towida. Two months after this, Towida went to spend a day or two with her sister Beida and Korayem, and it was while sitting alone in their tent that the accident happened which was the cause of this lawsuit. It seems that Korayem had left a loaded gun tied up with cord to the roof of the tent, suspended from the poles. While Towida was sitting there, a sudden gust of wind got up, and shook the tent violently. As the tent rocked in the wind, the gun came tumbling down on to a wooden chest between the poles; the impact fired the

682 charge, which hit Towida at a range of only a few feet,
672 with fatal results.

Farag, who had divorced her two months before,
682 brought a claim for bloodmoney from Korayem; but when
672 the case was heard, Korayem denied that the accident had
695 happened in his tent. The assessors of this first court,
which was held soon after the accident, demanded that
Korayem should swear, backed by twenty-five men (i.e.
half the full number of fifty, as Towida was a woman),
that the accident did not take place in his tent. Then
[671 followed an example of one of the very unsatisfactory
points in Bedouin Law.

Korayem, who was a powerful man belonging to the Gereidat, who were in turn a powerful family, managed to persuade the court to cancel their judgment requiring the oath from himself and his twenty-five backers, and to agree to a settlement whereby he should pay £10 and be absolved from the necessity of taking the oath. The court accepted this agreement, and proceeded to examine the claims to the bloodmoney.

The Moslem Law of Divorce provides that when a man
682 divorces his wife, the decree does not become absolute for
672 three months, in order that it may be ascertained whether
695 the woman be pregnant by her lately divorced husband.
Towida had only been divorced two months before the
671 accident; so the question had to be decided whether Farag
586 were legally her husband or not at the time of her death,
for purposes of receiving a share of the bloodmoney. If so,
he should receive one quarter; but there seems to have
been some difference of opinion on this point among the
assessors of the court, and the whole matter was shelved.

682 Seventeen years afterwards, Lataif Farag—then a man
of twenty-one—re-opened the case, claiming his mother's
672 bloodmoney. In support of his claim he produced three
695 witnesses. The first was Farag himself, who was prepared
to swear that he had seen Towida lying dead in the tent of
694 Korayem. The second was Towida's brother, who was

prepared to swear that he had been called in; and had seen 682
his sister dying in a pool of blood in Korayem's tent. The 672
third was a stranger who had been passing at the time of
the accident, had heard the shot, had gone into Korayem's 695
tent, and had seen Towida lying on the floor in a dying 694
condition. The newly-constituted court probed this evidence, without actually demanding the oath from these three witnesses, and arrived at the following conclusions:

1. That the facts of the case were common knowledge, and were as Lataif claimed.
2. That Korayem never really intended to swear that the accident did *not* happen in his tent, but had succeeded in bluffing the previous Court. This was made possible by the fact that Korayem's family were strong, and Farag's were weak.
3. That half the price of a man—i.e. £150—should be the bloodmoney in this case, provided that Farag could produce satisfactory evidence on oath that:
    (*a*) the gun belonged to Korayem,
    (*b*) the accident took place in Korayem's tent.
4. In the event of these conditions being met, Lataif Farag should receive five-sixths of the £150; and, provided that they swore the above oath backed by four others, Towida's father and mother (if alive) should receive the remaining one-sixth.

Generally speaking, this judgment appeals to an outside observer as eminently sensible and just; and if only the matter had been left at that, and the judgment had been enforced, all would have been well. Unfortunately, however, various influences again crept in to interfere with the decision of this second court. The accident had then happened about eighteen years before; the first court had been bluffed by Korayem; after an interval of seventeen years the second court gave their very reasonable judgment; and then for some reason unexplained the case was again shelved, and the judgment not executed. For the third

682 time the case was re-opened, after a further interval of some
672 years since the second judgment. By this time nearly all
695 the assessors and witnesses of the first Court were dead,
694 rumours had been spread that the gun belonged to a stranger
who had left his gun in Korayem's tent, and should therefore pay his share of the bloodmoney, and so on.

The Gereidat family again succeeded in confusing the case, and in prejudicing the issue in their favour; and the third court gave the following decision, to the disgust of interested followers of this rather remarkable lawsuit. They decided that no evidence existed to shew what happened in Korayem's tent, and that no oath was necessary, maintaining that in the absence of any proof whatsoever Farag had no claim. They further ordered a new distribution of the reduced scale of bloodmoney proposed, whereupon the proceedings became completely involved and absolutely unintelligible.

682 The above events point out unmistakably the weak
672 spots in the Ourfi system. Korayem's family were strong,
and on two occasions were successful in evading just de-
695 cisions against them; while the weak family with a strong case had to see justice perverted.

695 When the considered judgment of an Ourfi Court
182 receives authority for prompt and immediate execution
from the Government and the police, the Ourfi system is
648 probably the nearest possible approach to the ideal, consistent with the conditions prevailing. But it is an undeniable fact, which must be faced, that without the moral backing of the Civil Power behind the judgments of the Bedouin Courts, miscarriages of justice are possible, and do actually take place.

8: Kennett

MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9

578

[For information on internal antagonisms within the society which have led to bloodshed and death, see Categories 682 and 683.]

SONS OF ISHMAEL

A STUDY OF THE EGYPTIAN BEDOUIN

By

G. W. MURRAY

> "And God was with the lad; and he grew, and dwelt in the wilderness, and became an archer. And he dwelt in the wilderness of Paran, and his mother took him a wife out of the land of Egypt."
>
> *Genesis* xxi, 20–21.

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9: Murray E. K-3, 4 (ca. 1910-1935) 1935 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9
Egypt

PLATE XXVIII

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

ARAB OF THE RASHAIDA (HITEIM)

/facing p. 270/

CHAPTER XVI

THE WESTERN BEDOUIN (EL MUGHARBA)[1]

" *The Moor is of a free and open nature.*"—Othello.

General Remarks—The Arab and the Libyan—The Sa'adi Tribes and the Murabitin—Bedouins of the Northern Littoral—Awlad 'Ali—Jawabis—Jumei'at—Samalus—Shiheibat. 000

Sinai has been called an " epitome of Arabia ", and the pilgrim certainly feels well on the way to Mecca as soon as he crosses the Suez Canal, but it is equally true that Algiers is not so very far west of the " Arab's Gate " at Alexandria. The skies of Mariut are coloured with much the same blue as those of Andalusia, and, though the Sierras are lacking, the historian instinctively begins to look for the Alhambra as soon as he crosses the causeway to Amriya. The reason [167] is not so very far to seek, there is more of the Libyan than the Arab in the tribes that hardly a century ago flooded back into Egypt from Cyrenaica. Yet in spite of numerous resemblances, [771] these two races are divided as the goats from the sheep by this essential difference that while the " Berbers "[2] are religious and often superstitious (traits of a converted race), his religion sits so lightly on the Arab that he has almost reverted to his early paganism. But though this is true, it is far from obvious, and a traveller will not find anyone in the Western Desert to admit that he is not of pure Arab descent.

This snobbishness was evident so long ago as the time of Ibn Khaldun (1332–1406), who found it advisable to represent the Tuareg, as descended from a respectable but mythical Arab conqueror, Ifrikias ibn Sufi. Ibn Khaldun asserts that when Ifrikias himself returned to Arabia, the Ketama and Sanhaja tribes remained behind and became absorbed in the people of the country. All this is pure

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[1] Mugharba means literally " westerners ", and is used in Egypt to denote generally all the Bedouin west of the Nile. But there is a tribe in Cyrenaica who content themselves with this simple title, and so confuse the issue. [101]

[2] All the indigenous races of North Africa are lumped together under this barbarian title by the Arab historians.

000 fiction, but it is interesting to read that, even in Ibn Khaldun's day, these Tuareg were known as "The Veiled Ones".

175 The first Arab expedition to North Africa began in 643, two years after the conquest of Egypt, when 'Amr ibn el-'Asi invaded Cyrenaica and received the submission of the Luwata Berbers, whom he found in occupation of that country. Forty years later the conquerors had reached the Atlantic, but these early Moslem invaders mostly settled in the towns and left the open country to the Berbers. Their influence on the nomadic population was therefore trifling, and to-day need not be taken into account.

175 619 The eleventh century irruption from the east of the wild Bedouin tribes of Beni Hilal and Beni Suleim, who continued their nomadic existence after their conquest of the country, was one of the decisive factors in moulding the character of the present-day population ; a religious upheaval among the Berbers of Senegal the other. The Beni Hilal have indeed disappeared, but to-day all the independent tribes of Western Egypt, the Sa'adi, claim descent from the Beni Suleim, while their vassals all have the same title, Murabitin, as the adherents of the religious movement referred to above. Some historical explanation now becomes necessary and, since the vassals probably represent the aboriginal population more closely, we will first consider the Murabitin.

In the early days of Islam, volunteers constantly thronged to all the fighting fronts where the faith was being spread by the sword among the heathen. These were nicknamed *El-Murabitin*, which meant "pickets", from the *ribat* or outposts (lit. "horse-lines") in which they lived.

But in the eleventh century a violent religious movement among the Messufa and Lamtuna sections of the Sanhaja Tuareg appropriated the name to its followers, just as eight hundred year later the fanatics of the Eastern Sudan were known as *the* Dervishes of their time. Both upheavals began with a prophet on an island, and both spread northwards with terrifying rapidity. Yet the *Murabitin* of the Senegal were far more successful than their rivals on the Nile, and their title reached the height of its fame when a line of their kings, whose name the Spaniards corrupted to "Almoravides", ruled over Andalusia till 1156.

Yet just as the original *Murabitin* were gaining their

first successes in Senegal, the Beni Hilal and the Beni Suleim were being despatched by the Caliph Mustansir billah against Mu'izz ibn Badis, his rebellious viceroy in Tripoli. They sang of their conquest : {175 619 [539]

> " Great was the king, son of Badis, a mighty man of war !
> Yet we routed his thirty thousand men !
> We were but three thousand, yet the victory was ours, and ours the spoil !
> Their hearts were as water, not a man was in their ranks !
> We routed them and they fled far and wide ! "

These Beni Hilal, now extinct, are famous wherever Arabic is spoken for the exploits of their legendary hero Abu Zeid, while the Beni Suleim had helped the Prophet at the battle of Hunein, and are said by Hogarth to be the ancestors of the great modern tribe of Harb.[1]

The confusion of these two invasions caused the races of North Africa to become inextricably mixed. Both Arabs and Berbers spent their lives in the desert herding their flocks, and both were warlike. So it is natural that the intermarriages of a few generations should have made one people of them, and it is also natural that the conquered should claim relationship with the conquerors and not vice versa. But this aspiration of the Berbers has flooded their genealogies with so many lies that it is difficult to disentangle the truth.

The descendants of the original colonists, much mixed with Berber blood, still preserve their title of Murabitin, [792] though no longer living in *ribat*, which soon lost their military character and were turned into *Zawia* " monasteries ", where the more peacefully inclined of the sect retired for religious teaching and contemplation. Later, when the *ribat* came to be deserted, the peaceful Murabitin, ill-fitted by their monastic habits for the resumption of an active nomadic life, sank into dependence on their warlike brethren the Sa'adi, and, among a primitive race, dependence means inferiority. Thus in Arabia any tribe that pays tribute to another [186] is despised as Hiteim. And so the once proud title of " Murabitin " has simply come to mean " vassal " and nothing more.

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[1] *History of Arabia*, 38.

619 The independent Sa'adi tribes fall into four groups :

1. The Jawazi, Fawayid, and Rammah, all of common origin with the 'Awaqir of Cyrenaica.
2. The Harabi and Bar'asa, both of common origin with the 'Ibeidat of Cyrenaica.
3. The Hanadi, and
4. The Awlad 'Ali

[173] The original ancestor whom these Sa'adi all claim is one Abu Dib, said to be of Suleim descent.

175 554 619 This sheikh was a real personage and a contemporary of Ibn Khaldun (who died in A.D. 1406). He was sheikh of the Beni Ja'afir, and a man of great importance in Barka, the very place that the four tribes inhabited for centuries before they came to Egypt. Also the period of fifteen or sixteen generations, which the modern Bedouin assert to separate them from Abu Dib, agrees with this chronology well enough.[1]

619 [173] Some are found to assert that their title of Sa'adi "helping" is derived from an ancestress called Sa'ada, the wife of Abu Dib, or, according to a hostile account, of a Jew called Yana. But the real explanation of the term has already been given above.

619 651 At the present day a sort of feudal system prevails both in Egypt and Cyrenaica, by which families are *mrabit*,[2] or vassal families, not tribes to tribes ; thus the Qat'an tribe of Murabitin is divided, one part vassal to a family of Awlad 'Ali el-Ahmar, another to the Sinaqra, and a third to the Sinana. For a tribute called "alms", which by hereditary obligation each Mrabit family must pay, the Sa'adi family to which it is attached is bound to afford the Mrabit family protection in all minor difficulties of life, such as robbery by another family of Sa'adi, etc.

Thus a "Mrabit" family by paying tribute can herd its flocks in peace, calling upon the Sa'adi to see that justice is done them, but they are bound to join the Sa'adi to fight with them in any serious conflict with other tribes.

Among the "Mrabit" tribes of the present day are the Jumei'at, Qat'an, and Awlad Suleiman, all claiming as common ancestor one Ka'b, and feudal relations are maintained to this day in the desert between the last two 619 651 and the Sa'adi, though they are relaxed in the cultivation.

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[1] The pedigrees of which these Western Bedouin are so proud can only be trusted so far back as the individual whose name a subdivision has adopted, such as Kharûf in the Awlad Kharûf pedigree. Taking them separately, the pedigrees will be found to dovetail into each other up to that point, but beyond it things become problematical.

[2] Sing. of "Murabitin".

The Jumei'at, who used to be "Murabitin" to the Beni 'Una, are now nominally so to the Awlad 'Ali, but are not required to pay tribute. Other tribes, such as the 619 Jawabis and 'Awarma, are in an intermediate stage between the Sa'adi and the Murabitin. The Awlad 'Abd es-Sallam, [778] the Samalus ed-Diminat, and perhaps the Fawakhir, call themselves "Murabitin bil Baraka", a priestly caste which, in Tripoli, used to receive special privileges from the Turkish Government.

Though the Sa'adi tribes despise the Murabitin as serfs, [186] they respect them for their piety and resort to them for the writing of charms.

While the Murabitin tribes generally may be suspected to contain more Libyan blood than the Sa'adi, there are other tribes such as the 'Amayim, the Jahama, and the Tarhuna, who have come to Egypt from further west than any of the above, and who seem to be quite definitely "Berber", though, of course, none of them will admit it. These are known euphemistically as 'Arab el-Gharb.

Even some of the Juheina, settled east of the Nile in Sharqiya, are scorned by Klippel as "d'origine berbère, se pretendant section d'une tribu d'Arabie".[1]

Awlad 'Ali.—This tribe, by far the most important of [131] the Western Bedouin, occupies with its vassals the whole north coast of Egypt from Salum to Alexandria. Like the 619 others, they claim descent from the Beni Suleim, alleging 173 their ancestor 'Ali, son of 'Aqar, to be a grandson of that Dib, or Abu Dib, mentioned by Ibn Khaldun. Their enemies, however, allege that he was a Jew. "When the Arabs occupied the north coast of Africa, there was a notable, a Jew, who owned property at Saqiet el-Hamra in Morocco. This man welcomed and entertained the Arab sheikh Ez-Zanati. He became very popular with the sheikh, who gave him his daughter named Sa'ada, on condition that he embraced Islam before the marriage contract was made out."[2] Another version calls the Jew Yana, and says that he had two daughters. Of these Sa'ada was the

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[1] E. Klippel, "Etudes sur le folklore Bédouin de l'Egypte," *Bull. Soc. Khédiv. de Géogr.*, vii, 10, Cairo, 1911. [113]

[2] From information collected by Muhammad Bey Wasfi.

619 173 ancestress of the Awlad 'Ali and Hind of the Hanadi. (The Hanadi call their ancestress Hind, the daughter of Sallam.) These obvious fabrications only mean that their conventional genealogy is not believed outside the tribe. But the Awlad 'Ali themselves all agree that 'Ali was the son of 'Aqar bin Dib.

175 619 They are now a composite tribe made up of the descendants of 'Ali's three sons, and various fragments of broken tribes. The Awlad 'Ali lived for a long time in the "Green Mountain" of Cyrenaica, and about 150 years ago began to drift eastwards, called into Egypt by the Jumei'at to aid them against the Hanadi, who, with their subtribes, were then in possession not only of the north coast but were also settled all over the Beheira.

175 619 648 After the departure of the French in 1801, a firman was addressed to the sheikhs of the Hanadi, Afrad (a division of the Awlad 'Ali), Jumei'at, Beni 'Una, and other Arabs resident in Beheira, confirming them in their territories, but threatening them with expulsion and fine if they misbehaved themselves.[1]

By 1808, the Hanadi seem to have been quite driven out by the Awlad 'Ali, for in that year they bought their peace with Muhammad 'Ali and asked for the restitution of their lands in Beheira. The Pasha agreed to this and sent troops under Shahin Bey to chase the Awlad 'Ali out again. The Awlad 'Ali responded by offering 100,000 "tallaris" to be allowed to remain in the lands of the Hanadi—an offer which Muhammad 'Ali accepted. When they failed to pay up, troops were again sent to aid the Hanadi against them, but this combined force was completely defeated by the Awlad 'Ali near Hosh 'Isa.[2]

Of the events of 1810, Jabarti says:

> "During his stay at Alexandria, he (Muhammad Ali) gave safe conduct to the chiefs of the Bedouins of the tribe of Awlad Ali who lived in the province of Beheira, and by this ruse enticed them to him; but hardly had they arrived than he had them arrested, claimed large sums from them, and sent his soldiers to carry off their cattle; their wives and their children were dishonoured. He then gave them robes of honour."[3]

Finally he exiled the Hanadi to Sharqiya, then a desert, and gave the Awlad 'Ali their lands on the coast and in Beheira.

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[1] Jabarti, vii, 78–80.

[2] Jabarti, viii, 171 and 179–180.

[3] Jabarti, viii, 300.

Had the Senussi been successful in the last war, they 175
would no doubt have brought in the 'Ibeidat or the 'Awaqir 619
from Cyrenaica to replace the Awlad 'Ali in Egypt.

At the present day the Awlad 'Ali, especially the eastern 619
sections near the Nile Valley, have almost ceased to be nomadic, 178
and only the old men have memories of their former warlike habits. They suffered considerably during the Great War, but are again becoming prosperous. They now own large comfortable tents, are beginning to build houses and clear out cisterns, and are also said to be increasing in numbers.[1] So civilized have they grown that my guides, one a Sinai Arab and the other an 'Abadi, concurred in calling them "green"—not real desert-worthy Bedouins.

Perhaps as a result of Libyan influence, or more probably 142
the better nurture and climate, they are taller, heavier, stronger, and lighter-complexioned than the lightly built Arabs of
Sinai and Hijaz. Also they are much franker and more 157
straightforward than their shifty and suspicious eastern cousins, 181
and altogether more trustworthy. Their women only veil 562
themselves to strangers, and talk quite naturally and cheerfully 834
to the men of their own tribe. 609

They cultivate as much barley as they can, using a 243
primitive plough drawn by camels, in the clayey hollows [492]
scattered over their very stony limestone desert, but, as the [132]
rainfall is very uncertain, a good crop only occurs every five
or six years. After harvest, they exchange some of their [437]
barley for maize, which the women grind to make bread
as required, and some for dried dates. The seed for next [251]
year is buried in a hole lined with straw and covered with
clay, and a year's forage for the animals is set aside. The [432]
rest of the crop goes to market, and for a short time the [426]
Arab has money to buy clothes for himself and his family
and at utmost need to pay off some of the numerous debts he has inherited from his forefathers. Soon he is reduced again to the clothes he wears, the tent he sleeps in, and his animals grazing in the desert.

They are great breeders of camels and sheep, and a busy 436
traffic in these goes on weekly in the markets of Hammam, 178
'Amriya, and the Beheira. So they have got into the habit [illegible]

---

[1] At the 1927 census, the Western Desert Arabs, Awlad 'Ali, Jawabis, etc., numbered 38,928 souls exclusive of those settled in Beheira. But Pacho, 100 years ago, estimated them at 38,000 souls. [161]

436 of thinking in money, and they reckon blood-money in cash
178 (£300) and not in camels, as Bedouin should.

The more adventurous make, annually, long and waterless
484 journeys to the oases of Siwa and Bahariya to remove the date
245 crop, and, after their own wants are provided for, a good profit
usually results from the sale of the remainder.

181 An Egyptian critic, who should know them only too
well,[1] calls them "haughty, independent, and untrustworthy
in character. They are dull and so abnormally lazy that
they have no desire whatever to do more than they learnt
(when young)". But he puts this down to the nature of the
country; less generous critics ascribe the nature of the
country to them!

173 Besides the descendants from 'Ali's three sons, 'Ali el-
619 Abyad, 'Ali el-Ahmar, and Sineina, a large section called Sinaqra
reckons its descent from Sinqir, a mysterious white man who
was wrecked and washed up on the coast near Salum some
time in the seventeenth century.[2] These are the true Awlad
'Ali, whose sections live mingled together in the most intricate
fashion. Among them live also the Jumei'at, who invited
them into the country, and various families of other *murabitin*,
such as Qat'an, Awlad Suleiman, Hawara, Habun, etc.
619 To distinguish themselves from their vassals, the Awlad 'Ali
call themselves *hurr* free, and the *murabitin* are divided into
various grades, according as they pay tribute or not.

The Awlad 'Ali are divided into three main divisions, with section (*badanat*) and subsections (*'eilat*) as follows. Some of these are so numerous that they practically constitute fresh tribes of their own.

I. AWLAD KHARUF

[173] These are the descendants of 'Ali el-Abyad ("The White"), the eldest son of 'Ali bin 'Aqar bin Dib, and are subdivided again into:

	Section.	*Subsections.*
(1)	'Eilet Bu Hindi	'Eilet Bu Zayyana, 'Eilet Bahiya, 'Eilet Da'ud
(2)	'Eilet Bu Diya	'Eilet Ibrahim, 'Eilet Jereisat
(3)	Awlad Mansur	El-Afrad, El-Tawa'il, 'Eilet 'Abd Allah

---

[1] Muhammad Bey Wasfi, for many years Inspector at Borg el-'Arab.

[2] Their sheikh told Hamilton in 1853, there were seven generations between him and Sinqir.

(SINAQRA)

The Sinaqra, or descendants of Sinqir, are also reckoned among the descendants of Ali the White, "because Sinqir married his daughter Khadija." They include:— 619 173

(4)	Afrad	Maghawra
(5)	Azayim	'Eilet el-Abdi, Muwamna
(6)	'Eilet Eleura	'Eilet Jeballa, 'Eilet Omar, 'Eilet Harun, 'Eilet Ajarma, 'Eilet Tahir.

II.

The descendants of 'Ali bin 'Aqar's second son, 'Ali el-Ahmar (" The Red ") are:—

(1)	'Esheibat	'Eilet ed-Dawi, 'Eilet el-Azraq, El-Wassafa, 'El-Lazumi
(2)	Kimeilat	'Eilet el-Hajj Muhammad, El-Maharsa, 'El-Khadayij
(3)	Jineishat [1]	'Eilet el-Majduba, Es-Samayil, Tabak

III. SINANA

The Sinana are the descendants of Sineina, the third son of Ali bin 'Aqar bin Dib. They include:—

(1)	Mahafid	'Eilet Etman, 'Eilet el-Hammama, 'Eilet esh-Shimla
(2)	Arawa	'Eilet ez-Zireiriya, 'Eilet el-Ghazulat
(3)	Qatifa	'Eilet Nasralla, 'Eilet-Omar, Esh-Shawalha.
(4)	Ijna	

Jawabis.—The nomadic Jawabis (sing. Jibusi) are for 619
the most part still settled in and around the Wadi Natrun, 175
where General Andreossy found them in Napoleon's time. [131]
He calls them :

> "A hospitable tribe who lead a shepherd's life and encamp there every winter with their flocks. They are employed during this time carrying Natrun and prickly reeds ; they also have some traffic in dates, which they fetch in caravans from Sioua in the Ammonian Oasis ; it is a journey of twelve to fifteen days. These Arabs are *marabouths*, or peaceful people."[2]

He goes on to say they never make war, and only take up [162]
arms to defend themselves. In his time the tribe was com- [231]
posed of about 2,000 men, and possessed 60 horses. A little [162]

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[1] Kennett gives the three subdivisions of the Jineishat as Madi, Samayil, and Jabr.

[2] *Memoirs Relative to Egypt*, 288.

142
291

PLATE XXIX

/facing p. 280/



'Ilwani



"Wania"

JUMEI'AT TYPES

[face p. 280

619 [175] later Wilkinson estimated them at about 400 men near El
[162] Terrana and the Wadi Natrun.

At the present day they are still reckoned *Murabitin*, but, like the Jumei‘at, are sufficiently independent not to have to
[439] pay tribute. They share with the Awlad ‘Ali in the date
traffic with Bahariya Oasis, where the produce of the village of Mandisha is reserved for them, and that from Bawitti for the Awlad ‘Ali.

619 Kennett notes (p. 54) that they demand £400 for blood-
682 money instead of £300, the usual price in the Western
181 Desert, and alludes (p. 67) to :

> "The free and easy way in which the Gawabees tribe near the Wadi Natrun pack up their summer tents and leave them in situ while they themselves trek off with their winter tents into the open desert for the winter grazing is indicative of this code of honesty prevailing among them."

142 On page 101, he calls them "nearly all very small men,
619 with strangely similar features and characteristics running through all the families of the tribe".

619 Bramly has collected three pedigrees of the tribe all
173 going back to Sheikh ‘Abd el-Jawad el-Kassar. They state
that they are an offshoot from the Qadadfa, and about 500 years ago left Saqiet el-Hamra in Morocco to settle in Egypt.

As a reward for "settling some affairs in the Wadi Natrun", Muhammad ‘Ali Pasha granted them the usual Bedouin privilege of exemption from military service. There are small colonies of them elsewhere among the Awlad Ali, while others are settled in the cultivated provinces of Giza, Beheira, Menufiya, and Gharbiya.

Jumei‘at.—This tribe, possibly a remnant of the original Libyan inhabitants of Mariut, is of quite respectable antiquity, for Ibn Khaldun includes the Jumei‘at as a subtribe of "Beni ‘Ali", themselves an offshoot from Beni Suleim. Whether his "Beni ‘Ali" are the same as the modern Awlad ‘Ali may be questioned, yet it is a reasonable assumption, for the exchange of the words "Beni" and "Awlad" in tribal names can be paralleled elsewhere.

The Jumei‘at all agree that their remote ancestor, whom they share with the Awlad Suleiman and the Qat‘an, was called Ka‘b, and a Ka‘b indeed appears in the pedigree ascribed

to Dib by Ibn Khaldun, who calls Dib a descendant of 619
Ka'b, the great-grandson of Suleim.[1] If this be true, the 173
Jumei'at must be an elder branch than any of the Sa'adi tribes, among whom the Awlad 'Ali are included. But in actual fact, the Awlad 'Ali do not consider the Jumei'at as of Sa'adi origin, that is, descendants of Abu Dib and his wife Sa'ada, but despise them as Murabitin or vassals, though they pay no tribute.

All this may be interpreted to mean that they are among the oldest inhabitants of Western Egypt. They have been in Egypt "seven hundred years" according to one of their sheikhs, Sa'ad Bey el-Masri, and a pedigree given me by another, Sheikh 'Ilwani Suleiman, who lives near Sidi 'Abd el-Rahman, runs :



The Jumei'at of Mariut are all descended from El-Ashtar, while the offspring of the other five sons are settled in Beheira, Gharbiya, and at Ramla near Alexandria.

It is, of course, possible that their eponymous ancestor, 619
Jumei'a, was an Arab of Beni Suleim descent, who returned to 173
Egypt from the "Green Mountain", soon after the Beni Suleim 174
invasion, and whose descendants became Murabitin by forming themselves into a religious community. But such religious fervour is not a Bedouin characteristic, but smacks rather of the fanaticism of the recently-converted, so I suspect the Jumei'at, in spite of their descent from Ka'b, to be mainly a remnant of the earlier Libyan population of the coast.

Prior to the arrival of the Awlad 'Ali, they were "Mrabit" 619
to the Beni 'Una, and engaged in constant conflict with the 175
Hanadi. Upon the rout and annihilation of the Beni 'Una, 726
the Jumei'at were stirred up to revolt against the Hanadi 792
by one of their holy men called Baqush. Outraged by their

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[1] The more ignorant Awlad Suleiman have forgotten Ka'b's paternity, and confused him with the famous Arab poet Ka'b ibn Zuheir. See p. 287 for their version. And yet another Jumei'at version gives as their ancestor the Saint Ka'b el Ahbar.

[2] The "Friends" of the Prophet.

619 oppression, he gathered his people and delivered a fiery
175 denunciation of his religion, during which he smashed his
726 rosary into pieces and mixed it with his horse's fodder;
792 Baqush then invited their kinsmen (?) the Awlad 'Ali, to
come over from the "Green Mountain" and help them.
To entice the Awlad 'Ali, he is said to have sent them samples
of salt desert water and Nile water sweetened with sugar to
illustrate the difference between the hardships of the desert
and the comforts of the Rif.[1]

619 As recounted earlier, the Awlad 'Ali completely routed the
175 Hanadi and their allies, and drove them from the desert.
726 In the division of the conquered territory, the Jumei'at
received a third, and, although they were still considered
Murabitin, were released from the payment of tribute. They
[131] now live intermingled with the free sections of the Awlad
'Ali, all along the north coast of Egypt, and are numerous in
Beheira, especially near Abu Hummus.

619 *Samalus.*—The Samalus are found scattered among the
[131] Awlad 'Ali on the northern coast and stranded among many
of the Egyptian provinces. They once possessed a head
sheikh Abu Sala at Minya, and colonies are recorded from
Faiyum, Beheira, Menufiya, Gharbiya, and Sharqiya. An
[175] old paper from the Recruiting Department gives from
[162] seventeen villages in the Faiyum 775 mounted Samalus
[231] and 1,400 on foot, possessing 1,760 camels and 11,400
sheep. Two important groups of wells, both called "Sawani
[312] es-Samalus" exist on the north coast, one about 50 kilometres
east of Salum, and the other 20 kilometres south
of Dhab'a.

[173] They say they came to Egypt, 400 strong, about 200
years ago, from the Wadi Samalus in the Jebel Akhdar, and
their ancestor twelve generations ago was Nasr el-Hasani, of
course an "Arab from Beni Suleim".

[175] In the *Description de l'Egypte*, P. D. Martin relates how
[726] in 1800 the Samalus of Faiyum were raided by a party of
Ferjan, 200 strong, from Beheira.

619 *Shiheibat.*—These are a "Mrabit" tribe from the west with
186 an unenviable reputation, living near the Wadi Natrun.
Sayed Idris, the former Senussi leader, says of them: "Most

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[1] Dumreicher, 16. This is probably the "Sheik Abdall Gawyal Bagooshi" who wrote to Sir Sydney Smith in March, 1801, warning him of the approach of the French from Damanhur. Wilson, *History of the British Expedition in Egypt*, 371. (Rif = cultivated area.)

619

herds have a black goat or two—such are the Shiheibat." [186] They are families of shepherds scattered amongst the Sa'adi families, and must not be confused with the 'Esheibat section of the Awlad 'Ali.

Dumreicher (pp. 52–7) gives a lively account of a [175] quarrel between the Jawabis and the Shiheibat. [578]

586 851 *613 Naturally, according to the rule of patriliny, all children from a marriage belong to the husband and become members of his lineage. Should divorce occur while a woman is nursing, she will take the child with her and it will be returned after weaning. Sometimes the husband will permit the wife to keep one child--always a girl--in order "to keep her company."

587 The practice of the sororate has been noted. The Bedouins also believe that "a man should marry his brother's widow so that she will have someone to help her with the children." But I have no data on the frequencies of these •12 58 practices. When I gathered my data on marriage, my informants would give me only the name of the tribe or lineage into which a man married, and never did I get the name of a man's wife. [829] (One lineage in al-Qasr, entirely refused to give me data on genealogy or marriage because, as one leader said, "it is not decent to speak of these things with people.") 595 Sororal polygny is forbidden (Quran IV:23), and the Bedouins say that a man cannot marry more than one bint 'amm. 182 [587] Marriage practices, such as sororate and levirate, I interpret as patterns which maintain structural continuity and political advantage. [582] The custom of permitting a man to marry only one of his father's brother's daughters may be seen as a precaution against intensifying authority relations and the degree of segmentation.

I managed, however, during my stay to be closely in touch with one 12[illegible]
of the major cases and with almost all the parties involved. This case
was used as the basis for the "social drama" analyzed in chapter three
of the present study.

In addition to the social drama, I have used the case study method 121
to analyze aspects of the substantive law of the group especially with 127
regard to concepts such as that of criminal responsibility and the nature
of the contractual relations as exemplified by the marriage contract.
Cases utilized in the study include ones that I observed myself as well [124]
as cases taken from texts and some which were told to me by informants.

Most of the data was collected through the time-honored technique 123
of participant observation which was facilitated by the fact that the 122
group spoke the native language of the researcher (or vice versa). Formal 124
interviewing was conducted on a very limited scale, thirty-five extensive 125
questionnaires in all. These questionnaires were originally designed and
administered to supplement the life history material and to assess the
attitudes of the particular people involved with regard to particular
issues. Some of the results of these questionnaires are used in the
chapter. Due to the non-representation of the sample interviewed, these
results are used merely as illustration and not as representing any kind
of statistical frequency.

ENTRY TO THE FIELD

It is common among anthropologists to talk with nostalgia about their 114
field experience and about the group they studied. This usually gives the
impression that field work is always an enjoyable experience. Although my
field work seems at the present time to have been a pleasant experience,
especially when comparing it to the pressures of everyday living in a

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SOME STRUCTURAL ASPECTS OF THE FEUD AMONG THE CAMEL-HERDING BEDOUIN OF CYRENAICA[1]

E. L. PETERS

WHEN a Bedouin kills another in Cyrenaica, one of a number of consequences 682
ensues. According to the Bedouin, the particular consequence is determined by 571
the genealogical positions of the persons or groups concerned. In the first part of 829
this article an analysis of the disturbances in social relationships precipitated by 128
homicide is made, using a lineage model as a framework. In this part of the dis-
cussion the arrangement of the information corresponds closely to the view the
Bedouin give of their relationships. Additional information is then presented to show [613]
that this lineage model neither covers several important areas of social relationships
nor enables an accurate prediction of events to be made. This raises the issue: can the 121
comprehensive power of the model be increased by complicating it, or does com- 613
plexity destroy its utility? The argument advanced is that the lineage model is not a 571
sociological one, but that it is a frame of reference used by a particular people to
give them a common-sense kind of understanding of their social relationships. For
sociological purposes this means that the lineage model, with its supporting theoreti- [128]
cal presuppositions, must perforce be abandoned. In the latter part of this article
some of the implications of adopting this position are discussed. Particular stress is [578]

12●

[114]

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[1] This study is based on field-work in Cyrenaica carried out over a period of twenty-seven months from January 1948 to December 1950. The field-work was made possible by the award of a Horniman Studentship and of a Treasury Senior Studentship in Oriental Languages and Cultures. I wish to express my thanks to both awarding bodies. The paper was presented in its first form to a seminar at Manchester University. Modified versions were read at Oxford and Cambridge and at University College London in 1963. In a Manchester seminar, Professor W. J. M. Mackenzie raised issues which led me to reconsider my mode of analysis. Professor Ely Devons read a draft of the article, and offered valuable suggestions. I also wish to thank Professor Gluckman for the many profitable discussions we have had on the institution of the feud. My interest in the feud stems directly from Evans-Pritchard's work on the institution among the Nuer. I am most grateful to him for his help and encouragement while I was pursuing my researches. Finally, anyone writing on the feud must acknowledge the contribution made to its understanding by Dr. Elizabeth Colson.

Thanks are due to the Association of Social Anthropologists for a grant from the Radcliffe-Brown Memorial Fund towards the publication of this paper.

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PREFACE

101 This study is based on data collected during the
•121 period of June of 1964 to May of 1965. The focus of the research was a permanent Bedouin community, the 'Aishaibat tribe of al-Qasr near the town of Marsa Matruh in the Western Desert of Egypt. Al-Qasr was selected for study because of its sedentary and relatively nucleated settlement pattern which rendered it accessible and manageable in the time allotted for research; also, because this community had been designated by the government as one undergoing rapid social change. The Marsa Matruh area, as a focus for anthropological research, was first suggested to me by Professor Ahmad Abou-Zeid, an Egyptian anthropologist who has written on the problems of social change in the Western Desert.

My original research plan was designed as an ethnographic survey of Bedouin society in the al-Qasr area, and a concentration on the specific problems related to the government's policy of integrating the Bedouins, socially and politically, into the national society. I was interested in the various ways in which the Bedouins of the Marsa Matruh area conceptualized the aims of the government, and in the structural reorganization, if any, of Bedouin politics and political thought under the impetus of social change programs.

121 However, the political climate of Egypt at the time of my research made such a study impracticable. In reorienting my research, I decided to confine my study to al-Qasr and an analysis of "micropolitics" at the local community level.

The aim of the present study is, then, an understanding of the political structure of al-Qasr. Also, since no group exists in isolation and relations with others are mainly a matter of politics, I have tried to present here the structural and ideological bases of politics in al-Qasr. This study is concerned with politics in the traditional sense and in the modern sense. An analysis of the traditional meaning of politics necessitates a discussion and understanding of the structural principles of Bedouin society and the manner in which they function in defining the rights and obligations contained in social relationships. Such an analysis also seeks to establish a base level from which we can perceive and understand the political process in al-Qasr and the modern context of Bedouin politics. The main focus of the political analysis in this study is upon authority and leadership roles, as they were in the past and as they are in the present.

121
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*613 I should hasten to make one thing clear at this time, for it directly affected the way I went about my research and the type of data which I collected. In al-Qasr, there exists communication boundaries, and even barriers, corresponding to the structural and territorial lines of the lineage system.
[178] The 'Aishaibat tribe of al-Qasr, once a nomadic tribe, is now

121 sedentary, but the semi-autonomous nature of the lineage segments
114 is maintained to a large extent. The result of this is a de-
*613 [178] emphasis of the "we-feeling" among the population of al-Qasr
[186] and an absence of "sense of community" (Easton 1965:332). By
[571] "community," I refer to a pattern of relatively intensive,
face-to-face social relationships, and the values of solidarity
and common goals to which these give rise. The relationship
121 between lineage structure and territoriality was such that
*613 kinship segments within the same lineage unit might go days,
571 and even weeks, with no inter-communication, and the degree
of communication between separate lineage units of the tribe
was less intensive than this. Such a communication pattern
made observation difficult. The fact that Bedouin tribal
society relatively lacks the group ceremonial aspect compounded
the difficulty of gaining an overall perspective of structural
relations, and of witnessing the bases and nature of social
interaction outside the lineage structure. All of this
emerges from a communication structure and kinship structure
differentiated into corporate groups which "discourage close
participation of members in the social relations of the larger
society" (Wolf 1957:7).

121 The structural arrangement of al-Qasr was such that,
in plain language, not a great deal was happening in the
sociological sense. I say this about al-Qasr in comparison
[123] with, for instance, a full-blown village community. Conse-
quently, I observed from day to day that which I could,

●121 123 recorded that which people said in formal and informal interviews, and hoped that events would materialize to corroborate, in one way or another, that which I heard or suspected.

123 Since al-Qasr lacked the "space-time component of communal living together" (Firth 1961:27), I was not able to select a central vantage point from which I could view the everyday life of the Bedouins. More importantly, since the Bedouins interpret social structure in terms of a close relationship between residence and group membership, by the very fact that I chose to live in al-Qasr, and so had to live in the territory of some one lineage, I threatened my own objectivity and that of the Bedouins toward me.

123 *613 In consideration of the time element, I made the decision to live with the most prestigious lineage in al-Qasr. I felt that this association would give me more freedom of movement in the field, and would provide me with access to more data in a shorter time. What I did not know at the time of my entry into the field was that the Bedouins prize neutrality and objectivity just as much as the anthropologist. [829] As the Bedouins often said: "A man should only speak about the things he knows."

121 This is a study of the Bedouins of al-Qasr. They are not nomads nor are they even primarily pastoralists. Various degrees of nomadism and pastoralism exist in the Western Desert of Egypt among the different units of the Awlad 'Ali tribe. Therefore, while the Bedouins of al-Qasr may represent a case

121 for comparative study, they do not represent the ethnological entity known as the Awlad 'Ali. However, one might heuristically think of al-Qasr as a post-tribal or pre-peasant stage of social change, and on this basis generate some hypotheses about the sedentarization process or other specific cultural processes.

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104 The translation of the Arabic documents presented here were made in the field. In most of the cases, translating took place on the spot and this may account for some of the awkward phraseology. Arabic terms and names have been transliterated according to the system used by Cowan in An Introduction to Modern Literary Arabic (1958) with certain exceptions: long vowels are shown by a double vowel; the guttural stop is indicated by an apostrophe; and the glottal stop is indicated by the use of a short "e," such as in 'aiela ("family").

000 I owe a great deal of gratitude to my former teachers who have given freely of their time and knowledge and have shown an interest in my training in anthropology and Middle
122 Eastern studies. I would like to thank in particular Dr. William Sanders, of Pennsylvania State University, who introduced me to anthropology; Dr. David Bidney, of Indiana University, and Dr. P. J. Vatikiotis, now of the London School of Oriental and African Studies, who were my advisers in anthropology and Middle Eastern studies during my graduate training; Dr. Irfan Shahid, now of Georgetown University, who instructed me in the Arabic language; Dr. Vincent Cantarino, of Indiana University, who instructed me in Arabic literature

CHAPTER I

THE BEDOUINS OF AL-QASR: PAST AND PRESENT

General Historical Background

121 No full historical account of events leading up to the present study is intended here. Only a fragment of history, a backdrop to the discussion of al-Qasr Bedouin society is offered. The account is an effort to trace, historically, the arrival of the Bedouin into the Egyptian Western Desert.

175 167 During the Arab conquest of Egypt in 639 A.D., tribesmen made only a few forays into Upper Egypt. But these sojourns represent the first intrusion of the Bedouin strain into this part of the world and were the vanguard of a force which would conquer all of North Africa. The Bedouin tribesmen of the Arab army found the pastures of Upper Egypt similar to their traditional habitat in Arabia, and certain trible segments settled in the area.

175 In 647 A.D., Muslim troops under the command of Ibn abu-Sarh pushed across the Western Desert as far as Tripoli in present-day Libya. This was an expeditionary force, and not until about 670 did permanent Arab occupation come to Libya. Historical sources are vague about the nature of the relationship between the Arabs and the Berbers of the newly

131 view it, the Western Desert is the *watan*
619 ("homeland") of the Awlad 'Ali tribe, and is subdivided into
631 tribal zones each referred to as a *mintaqa*. *Mintaqit al-Qasr*
is part of *mintaqit qabilit 'Aishaibat* (i.e. "the area of
al-Qasr" is part of "the territory of the 'Aishaibat tribe").
131 Each tribal *mintaqa* is further broken down into contiguous
619 parcels of land belonging to lineages, and these are also
*613 referred to as *mintaqa*; for instance, there is *mintaqa*
631 [423] *'ailit Ma'fas*, i.e. "the territory of the Ma'fas family."
In the al-Qasr segmentary lineage society, genealogical
ties and local ties are coincidental. The boundaries of
al-Qasr are defined by the agnatic lines of the 'Aishaibat
tribe and include the *sahil* and *sha'ir wi mar'a* zones.

361 To the Egyptians, a *qarya* ("village") is a nucleated
631 cluster of permanent dwellings with some degree of social
integration: al-Qasr is a *qarya* for administrative matters.
The Bedouins, who think in terms of kin-based residence groups,
tribal boundaries, and political and economic symbiotic relations, see the Egyptian *qarya* as only a sector of al-Qasr.
They refer to this sector as the *'izba*, i.e., "farm" or "rural
settlement." The *'izba* is land fertile enough to support a
secure and sedentary life. "The *'izba*," the Bedouins say,
"is the seed of the *madiina*" (city).

● [[21]] For my own purposes, the Bedouin sense of al-Qasr is
the more useful concept. Al-Qasr is all of the territory of
[[131]] the 'Aishaibat tribe. Situated at 31°N and 27°E, al-Qasr is

*613 the result of the patrilineal principle even though it is
571 by far the most ideologically significant. Other principles lend structure to associative relationships which may or may not complement those established by the unilinear rule. It is the operation of these other principles which give complexity to the social and political organization of al-Qasr. They may be identified in terms of residence, cognation and social compacts, or the establishment of contractual relations above and beyond those defined by patrilineality. The force of these four structural principles constitute the range or the structural constraints within which individuals and groups in al-Qasr conduct their social relations. Specifically, we
*613 are not interested in all social relations. The main interest
571 here is in those relationships in which individuals or groups
●121 struggle for control, or attempt to exercise power. Our interest is, then, the political aspect of social relations or, what Max Weber discussed in terms of, power and established authority (Bendix 1962:290-297).

*613 It is necessary to discuss the lineage system in al-
[121] Qasr because in a segmentary society, kinship and politics are analytical aspects of the same process. In the political structure of al-Qasr, we note first of all that the tertiary and secondary segments (see Figure 7 below) are the functionally significant units. Bait 'Umar, the tertiary segment diagramed in Figure 8 below, is typical: it is an autonomous political unit with a discernible authority structure and

*613 formal leadership. Ideologically, group solidarity at this
level is explained solely in terms of patrilineality; in
fact, local contiguity and explicit contractual ties are
*613 just as important. When we add to this the principle of
582 cognation in the form of the Bedouin preferred form of
marriage, parallel-cousin marriage, the resulting structure
is what Emrys Peters (1965) has called "the corporate group
[183] *par excellence*." But, as we shall see later, father's
brother's daughter-marriage is more of a cultural ideal than
it is a social reality in al-'Asr.

*613 The interplay of kinship, residence and contract ties
554 defines a corporate structure of authority and also informs
571 an external system of authority relations including all who
claim descent from 'Ali 'Aqar, son of the mythological Sa'ada.
The feeling of "corporateness," and the concomitant structural
demands upon the individual changes as the scope of political
action widens. This degree of corporate feeling is related
to the structural differentiation between what has been interpreted
as "domestic relations based on kinship and descent"
and "the field of political relations" (Fortes 1953:26). In
•121 this study, I maintain that both the internal and the external
*613
554 systems of relations are "political" since power and legitimate
571 authority are exercized in both. Therefore, rather than use
the terms "domestic" and "political," I shall refer to the
internal system of political relations and the external system

● 121 *613 554 57 of political relations. The structural differentiation between them relates to certain specifics of role differentiation and articulation, and corporate goals. Different roles function differently in different spheres of politics. This is clear when we consider that the two structural aspects of corporate group politics serve the double purpose of insuring local autonomy while promoting integration into the larger lineage segments. This I will cover more thoroughly in the next chapter. Most of the discussion here deals with social structure and, in particular, the internal elements of the corporate group.

*613 619 In the total societal context, the tertiary segment is pivotal for the conceptualization of two models: the Bedouin's model of his tribal system, and the observer's model of a segmentary lineage system. Both of these constructs are shown in Figure 7.[1] Both genealogical models can be completed by the addition of Figures 2, 3, and 8, extending the systems both horizontally and vertically.

Theoretically, all of the levels of the Awlad 'Ali tribal system constitute a political community, i.e., the various segments shown in Figure 3 regulate and maintain relations with each other through complementary opposition (Fallers 1963). But in fact, political action of any functional significance rarely occurs beyond the secondary lineage level. In terms of the structural principles, agnation, real or

[1], [See p. 77--Analyst]

*613 fictive, has practical political consequences only at the
619 tertiary and secondary levels of segmentation. Most political
activity in al-Qasr is the result of either cooperation
or conflict between corporate groups the size of Bait 'Umar
or 'Ailit Ma'fas. 'Ailit Ma'fas is made up of five structurally
replicated political groups such as Bait 'Umar. Toward outsiders,
[609] these five groups act as one; they represent a corporate
entity before the rest of the tribe. As a member of 'Ailit
*613 Ma'fas, an individual has jural status in the whole tribe.
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554 He also has the means and the moral obligation to articulate
his interests and to settle his arguments with other members
of the tribe. When an individual is involved in an activity
which relates to matters of power and authority, he is playing
a political role in the political process. The units which
make up the internal and external political systems of the
*121 'Aishaibat tribe of al-Qasr are roles. Roles then are the
*613 analytical focus of this study. Of course, I realize that
619 the concrete entities present in al-Qasr are human beings.
554 I only use roles as methodological constructs in order to
abstract from, and to understand, Bedouin behavior. By
conceptualizing sets of roles as structures, we will be able
to understand the internal and external political structures
as well as the traditional and modern political structures
of Bedouin society. In al-Qasr, these political roles and
structures emerge from the more generalized kinship structure

[TEXT CONTINUED ON PAGE 79]

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619 and are related to the organizational principles mentioned
554 above.

619 The Awlad 'Ali represent a cultural entity whose membership is defined in patrilineal terms. Cutlurally, and genealogically, they are related to the Cyrenaican Bedouin but distinct from the Egyptians of the Nile Valley. The
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177 political system of the Awlad 'Ali can be extended to include Cyrenaicans "as Bedouins" but it can only interact with the Egyptians "as foreigners." This means that the Awlad 'Ali possess common roles, structures, and cultural institutions which can articulate with those of the Cyrenaican Bedouin. In the case of the Egyptians, however, social interaction calls forth new cultural categories and new structural elements in Bedouin society. This is the basis of political change in al-Qasr. Role differentiation and ideological replacement are taking place vis a vis the nation-state: the traditional political structure of the Bedouins is adapting to the Egyptian political environment. In the language of the "politics of modernization," this process is referred to as "politicization" or "political socialization." We shall deal with this process in later chapters.

The principles which relate the Bedouins of al-Qasr to other Bedouins of the Western Desert and Libya are the organizational principles of kinship, residence, and contract; but the principle which relates them to the Egyptian state is

619 the bureaucratic principle. Here we are concerned with the
177 traditional situation.
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The 'Aishaibi Bedouins of al-Qasr are a residence
619 group. Each sub-group of the tribe, i.e., the secondary and
*613 tertiary units, is assigned their own territory (mintaqa).
571 Kinship and residence are the primary determinants of group
differentiation; agnates who dwell together represent
concrete authority structures, or political groups. This
follows from the fact that patterns of political action, or
what we call political structures, most often deal with the
exercise of legitimate authority--as opposed to power. Power
relations do occur and when present complicate the situation.
In al-Qasr, power relations and structures emerge when the
principle of cognation or contracted alliance form groups
which crosscut the effectiveness of local, agnatic political
structures. But, in al-Qasr, as in most societies, political
action usually takes the form of the exercise of authority
(Southall 1965:120).

173 The genealogical map as an idological charter argues
114 against the formation of power relations. Genealogical re-
*613 lations represent a set of social relations each replete with
571 definite rights and obligations. Fallers (1956) has noted
the tendency in segmentary lineage societies to cast all
authority relations in a unilinear genealogical mould. The
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829 Bedouin visualize their world, extending from Alexandria to
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*613 Libya, as a territorially segmented one corresponding to the
829 lineage divisions of the tribe. They say that every Bedouin
173 knows the owner of each centimeter of this world. Not only
571 does the genealogy represent a set of property relations, it
also represents and upholds a set of authority relations. In
*613 Cyrenaica also (Peters 1960), the Bedouin genealogical map
173 corresponds to the distribution of groups on the ground.
571 Kinship relations as social relations in Bedouin society may
be properly interpreted as property relations between groups.
Property relations as part of the Bedouin world view are an
essential premise upon which the social and political order
rests, although it is not the only premise.

619 The 'Aishaibat are identified with the al-Qasr portion
*613 of the Awlad 'Ali homeland. The 'Aishaibi segments are
separate and contiguous on the ground. Figure 3a[1] shows the
correspondence between the 'Aishaibi genealogical and territorial divisions at the secondary lineage level of segmentation.

●121 That kinship as an organizing principle in segmentary
*613 societies cannot be considered apart from local contiguity
is an old and well-known fact. Sir Henry Maine (1917:76-79)
in analyzing the evolution of "political ideas" noted the
interrelationship between "the principle of local contiguity"
and the central principle of the "connexion in blood," how
they combine to become "the condition of community in political

[1] [See p. 66--Analyst]

121 functions." The political system as a structure with reference
*613 to the territorial principle and descent system is the unit which the political analyst seeks to understand. To do so, he must concentrate his attention upon the local descent group, the corporate group (Fortes and Evans-Pritchard 1940:11; Leach 1954:128). Structural analysis in terms of functional group differentiation is preliminary to political content and political role analysis (Smith 1966:113-129). The objective
121 of this chapter is to define the basic political unit in Bedouin society and the set of authority relations which characterize it. We are looking for, what Maine referred to as, the "Corporation" and its "Public Officer" or "Corporation sole."

[128] The rest of this chapter is a discussion of the internal domestic structure of authority and the complex of values and beliefs which the Bedouins of al-Qasr express about a desired social order in terms of their principles of organization. Associative relationships based on kinship, residence and contract are morally supportive and hence authoritative; they structure as well as reflect a world order. Such relationships validate traditional authority and contribute to a system of social control.

619 Lineage Structure and Formal Categories

Not all residents of al-Qasr are members of the Awlad

*613 situation or another (Middleton and Tait 1958:11). The most
571 effective approach to understanding the segmentary society,
•121 in view of this dynamic situation, is to isolate the function-
*613 571 ally significant unit and to analyze its social and political
relations (Fortes 1945). This is what I attempted to do in
my study of the 'Aishaibat of al-Qasr.

*613 In al-Qasr, the secondary segment, i.e., 'Ailit Ma'fas, is the basic unit of the social structure. This statement must be qualified seeing that this unit consists of a balanced opposition of smaller tertiary segments, and action at the secondary level is a resultant of political consensus at the tertiary level. However, the ties which emerge from descent, residence, marriage, and contract are highly moral and utilitarian ones; with reference to tribal politics, we can state that corporate action is consensual and most functional at the secondary segment level. We may consider this group, in terms of two levels of corporateness, the basic unit of 'Aishaibat political structure.

*613 All of the segmentary groups of the 'Aishaibat are
619 bound together by the same patrilineal principle; they all
trace descent to 'Ali the son of Sa'ada. This principle also links them to the "noble tribes" of Cyrenaica who claim descent from this same ancestress. This principle is the genealogical and ideological basis of a man's claiming to be "Sa'adi," or "Awlad 'Ali," or "Aishaibi," etc. In theory,

196 only from area to area but also from person to person.

•121 *613 571 In terms of the Bedouin social structure, it is useful to discuss politics as a set of authority relations operating in a problem-solving situation. This operation takes place at all levels of the lineage system with the exception of the sub-tertiary group; below the tertiary group level authority is purely a function of certain kinship roles. Since we cannot analytically separate the political aspect of the role "family head" from the moral aspect of the role "father," it seems best to designate this type of authority as being something distinct from political authority. We will call this type of authority either "familial" or "domestic," and "political authority" will be considered to exist in cases where there is some degree of role specialization and role differentiation with respect to decision-making and problem-solving. As I conceptualize it, then, the tertiary group is a political group because it is structurally identified with a corporate office, or institutionalized role of leadership. At the end [128] of this chapter, and in the next chapter, I will elaborate on this because it is a focal point of the study.

121 571 181 Structural principles designed to promote integration in a society also shed light on the degree of coercion and conflict in social "organization." Individuals and groups in society have interests and values which they seek to maximize in the face of competition and opposition from other individ-

121 uals and groups. Radcliffe-Brown (1952:199) spoke of social
571 relations existing where there was "some adjustment of
181 respective interests, by convergence of interest, or by limitation
of conflicts that might arise from divergence of interests."
When a person or group has an interest in an object, material
or immaterial, that object has a certain value for the person
or group. Thus does the study of social structure become,
for Radcliffe-Brown, "the study of interests and values as
the determinants of social relations." Convergence of interests
side by side with a divergence of interests characterizes
any society, and all societies are segmented on one basis or
121 another. I have found it enlightening to consider the segments
571 of al-Qasr Bedouin society as "interest groups." Interest
groups are the real groups which one can observe in
either integration or conflict. They are real in the sense
that their behavior can be observed. They are real in that
they can be defined by a stable pattern of authority relations
whereas other groups are non-existent in this sense. The
tertiary group and the secondary group, in so far as it is a
coordination of replicate corporate groups, are real groups
in al-Qasr whereas the primary and tribal levels are theoretical
or quasi-groups. That is, they are only potentially
interest groups, seeing that, for the time being, they lack
the common interests and coordinated activity to be classified
as an authority, or political, or interest group.

Familial Authority and Rights and Duties in Kin Relations

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The analysis of authority structure, whether it has reference to a group as small as the family or as large as the nation, assumes as its unit of study the social position or the role. The role is the organized complex of rights and duties by which individuals, or categories of individuals, participate in an interactive process. Roles are linked together into a set, or a structure, by the rights which incumbents claim and the duties they fulfill (Linton 1936:113; Parsons and Shils 1951:23; Gluckman 1963:185). The heuristic value of role analysis is well established. Role theory has been referred to as "the highest level of generalization about social phenomena that has yet become in any sense operational (Southall 1959:17).

Since all social roles possess rights and duties just because they are defined with respect to other roles, we may assume that each and every social role has an authoritative aspect to it. The authoritative aspect of roles refers to the way in which authority positions relate in order to give form to an authority structure. We want to know how the authority positions at all levels of the authority structure function, but for the time being we are concerned with familial authority relations. Until we understand the operation of authority at the familial level, which is the source of legitimate political authority in a kin-based

121 moral community, we cannot proceed to a discussion of the
57 internal and external systems of political relations.
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577 As a result of the socialization process, and through
181 relations with other members of the family, an individual
[867] comes to recognize that his conduct is measurable by certain
standards of, what is considered by the group to be, good and
bad, right and wrong. In al-Qasr, such standards are in-
trinsically correct, or "decent" as the Bedouins say; obedience
to the authority representing these standards is interpreted
as a "duty." The authoritative aspect of the role of household
[596] head (shaib al-bait), and the moral obligations which it repre-
sents, emerge from and reinforce values and structural arrange-
ments central to Bedouin social order, namely, respect for
authority and devotion to social groups, the two basic elements
of morality defined by Durkheim (Parsons 1937:382-385).

577 The value placed upon social order, and the structural
571 mechanisms for insuring its realization and extension--kinship,
181 residence and contract--inform an authority structure which
182 ranges between filial piety at the family level and a set of
legal norms at the level of the external political system.
The fact that the Bedouins of al-Qasr are interested in
integrating a larger population into their authority structure
means that a common value is operative in the range of it;
also that one sphere of authority will tend to merge into another.
[593] Hence the father-son authority relation has importance for
[691] the strength of Bedouin customary law in the desert. The

The Corporate Group

•121 Two key concepts have derived from Radcliffe-Brown's
602 (1952:32-49) notion of kinship as a reflection of juridicial
*613 relations. Fallers (1956:14), discussing the expression of these concepts in segmentary societies, refers to them as "the lineage principle and its corollary, the corporate lineage group." For Radcliffe-Brown, kinship organization represented social order and this was the basis of societal survival; a social system in order to survive must conform
121 to certain conditions. Adaptive mechanisms, expressed through
602 the institutions of a society, consist of a "network of re-
571 lations between individuals and groups" (1952:43). These social relations represent a collection of rights and implied duties which reside either with an individual or a group. Though reference is made to the place of the individual in society, the idea of the group is central in the theory of Radcliffe-Brown.

121 Most important is the group referred to as "corporation:"
602 a collectivity of individuals "who jointly exercise some right
571 or rights," and who share common interests deriving from resi-
621 dence and kinship (1952:45). The corporation has rights in rem over its members; thus, the group imposes certain duties and obligations on other persons with respect to the rights of a particular person who is a member of the corporation. The law of blood-revenge is seen by Radcliffe-Brown to bring out

121 602 571 621 this aspect of the corporation clearly.

The concept of the corporation as a sociological construct was first used by Maine (1904). The concept was a central one in the work of Max Weber (1947; 1954). As it was used by Maine, and later by Radcliffe-Brown, the corporation as a collection of rights and duties functioned primarily to maintain structural continuity in society. Weber was concerned mainly with the political aspects of the corporation; this follows from his theoretical and empirical focus on political action and the exercise of authority. The two main elements of the corporate group as a social relationship according to Weber are that it is limited and defined by rules of admission, and that the administration of the group is carried out by functionaries, incumbents of political roles. An explicit structure of authority is the key to Weber's concept of corporate group: "Whether or not a corporate group exists is entirely a matter of the presence of a person in authority, with or without an administration staff" (1947: 145-146). Weber did differentiate analytically the corporate group from the other concept, first defined by Maine (1907: 108-110), the "Corporation sole" or "Public officer." However, he insisted that one could not exist without the other. Any analysis of the structure of authority in society must focus on both of these concepts.

The conditions for the formation of a corporate group

121 are, as Radcliffe-Brown correctly stated, the existence of
602 kinship ties and common residence. But, as Weber noted, the
571 expression of corporation is absent without a structure of
621 authority. The corporate authority structure functions to allot group membership and political status; to formulate and enforce a rule of succession governing the transmission of property and roles; and to define and assign rights and duties of group members toward others. Group rights over members, as rights _in rem_, produce mutual rights for members which entitle them to protection against external enemies. Hence the corporate group is characterized by internal functions which define and control relationships between members, and external functions which identify the group within a given structural context where it has jurisdiction and governs its relations with other elements in this environment. Within this context, the corporate group is representative of any individual member. Both the internal and external functional aspects of the corporate group operate through the office of a specialized role whose incumbent has authoritative and representative powers. This is the role, or office, which Maine referred to as the "Corporation sole," and which Weber later called the _Leiter_ ("chief").

*613 In al-Qasr, the corporate lineage group is composed
621 of agnates who reside together in a _mintaqa_, and who accept
571 as legitimate and morally binding an explicit process of

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571 decision-making which allocates values in society. This process orders the internal and external political relations of corporation members. The corporate office which acts to regulate internal affairs, and to represent the group in external affairs is a unique status in al-Qasr having only one incumbent at a time. In Bedouin society, then, the corporation is to be considered distinct from the corporate sole (Smith 1966).

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[183] The corporate group, although based on common interests and values, is not an integrated body simply in terms of consensus. Coercion also maintains corporate relationships. Consensus derives from the code of the group (Nadel 1951: 161), a set of common ideals. But in practice, the group must exert coercive pressures, sanctions, against individual behavior which threatens the welfare of the collectivity. Coercion may be seen as a necessary condition for what Durkheim called "mechanical solidarity." In al-Qasr, as in most societies, the desire for conformity to norms predicates coercive measures; coercion and consensus derive from the same cause, i.e., the requirement of some degree of integration. The corporate group and its authority structure is the mechanism which insures, through political means, the necessary degree of integration for the survival of al-Qasr society. In order to understand the phenomenon of social change occurring in al-Qasr, politics as an aspect of culture

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621 should be thought of as an adaptive mechanism. This will help
571 us to understand two structural features of the Bedouin politi-
182 cal system: the establishment of cognatic alliances and the
•121 differentiation of political roles. In tradition and modernity, the integration and the survival of the Bedouin social system have depended upon the proliferation of these features.

121 It is quite obvious that "a corporation can only form
621 itself on the basis of a common interest" (Radcliffe-Brown
571 1952:45); that any social relationship, or political group
[626] is characterized by both "pragmatic contents" and "moral aspects;" and that "political sentiments" as part of the group's moral and legal norms are enforcible by secular sanctions brought to bear on individuals or groups (Fortes
121 and Evans-Pritchard 1940:20). But the discovery of what underlies a "common interest," "moral aspect," and "political sentiment" is a subtle problem which varies from culture to culture. It deals with what Weber referred to as "problems of meaning," and ultimately, the legitimation of the normative system. What makes morality and sentiments meaningful and sanctions legitimate is a value, a connecting element between the social and cultural systems, "the constitutive symbolism which grounds the identity and solidarity of the community" (Parsons 1966:17). It is unlikely that such a value will ever be obvious, no matter how essential it is, because

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> a tradition is not a mere observed fact like an existing custom . . .; it is an idea which expresses a value judgment. A certain way of acting is regarded as right; a certain order or arrangement is held desirable. The maintenance of the tradition is the assertion of this judgment (Radin 1935:63).

121 For al-Qasr, I have traced social ideas, social action,
181 and social order to a central traditional value which promotes
621 group consciousness, solidarity, and corporateness. Such a
571 value does not derive from Islam, for Bedouin tradition
171 preceded Islamic tradition, and much of the latter derives
from the former. According to Robertson Smith (1903:26-62), the structurally significant unit in pre-Islamic Arabia was the hayy: "a collection of people of the same blood" who lived together and fought together. But, that which actually bound the members with a sense of corporateness to the hayy was the law of blood-revenge. For Smith, the key element in the Bedouin corporate group was the existence of a covenant of blood responsibility. The group was bound by a compact of mutual responsibility, the group had rights in rem over its members, and within the group there could be no blood-feud. Around this idea of mutual responsibility revolve the traditional values which are the basis of corporate grouping in Bedouin society: "The greater part of the traditions of the Arabs turns on blood-revenge and war . . . " (Smith 1903:26).

Smith developed his analysis of Arabian society in terms of certain structural principles: patrilineal ideology,

121 residence, cognatic ties, and contractual relations are all
181 seen to be structurally important in early Arabian society.
621 Structural differentiation into groups is based on the
571 lineage principle and sustained through "the law of blood-
171 revenge." And it is important to note that the *hayy* was
characterized by a structure of authority, it was "guided
in war and on the march by one chief" (Smith 1903:44). The
121 law of blood-revenge as an expression of group rights *in rem*
621 and a system of mutual protection point up the importance of
571 contractual relations in Bedouin society. Whether or not
675 real blood ties are involved, a contract must be present or
there can be no corporate group. Contract legitimizes authority
and provides the basis for the lateral extension of the group;
it is primary though it functions coordinately with a principle
of cognation, residence, adoption, etc. Contractual ties
121 operate outside of kinship at times but will always be validated
621 by it eventually, "for a legal fiction is always adopted to
571 reconcile an act with a principle too firmly established to
675 be simply ignored" (Smith 1903:62). "Blood brothers," in
608 al-Qasr, are defined both biologically and ideologically. As
597 [602] noted in the case of al-Qasr, there were at least three cases
of contractual adoption in which one individual and two whole
corporate groups "wrote their names into the books of the
'Aishaibat tribe" (*katab jinnsiyya 'Aishaibiyya*). The integration or adoption of elements in al-Qasr takes place on the

•121 621 basis of an agreement "to share the good and the bad" by
571 all parties concerned. Once the integration is effected,
675 patrilineal ideology and legal fiction succeed in concealing
608 597 the jointure.

The concept which derives from ancient Arabia, and
621 571 which expresses fully the structural principles of Bedouin
*613 society is that of _'agila_. The _'agila_, in al-Qasr, is the
head of the corporate group, the tertiary unit or _bait_. A
[884) person becomes part of the Bedouin jural body when he reaches
the age of 15, begins to keep the Ramadan fast, and is expected
to pay his share of the blood-money. At this time, a man
621 571 acquires rights over his corporate lineage-mates and they
*613 over him: they claim a share in the indemnity ("blood-
672 money" - _diiya_) of each other, and are under obligation to
[682] contribute equal shares to any _diiya_ which becomes due from
the group as a whole. Further, each corporate member is
morally bound to support his lineage-mates by swearing the
oath (_yamiin_) on the behalf of any who are accused of false-
hoods in the course of litigation. All of these rights and
obligations are guaranteed by the presence of an _'agila_.

*613 The tertiary _bait_ is the minimal corporate group.
It usually includes three to five generations of members.
Tertiary units which are descended from a common ancestor
combine through contractual relations into the maximal corporate
group, the secondary unit or _'aiela_. Beyond the secondary level

*613 554 571 or whole tertiary group may be expelled from the lineage group, or if they so desire, they may resign their status in the group. In either case, and both cases rarely occur, the permission and approval of the _'aqila_ are required. Or, I should say, the approval of the _'awaaqil_ is required, for both cases represent structural changes which affect the juristic personality and constitution of the maximal corporation. The legitimacy of the _'aqila_ and the whole political structure are tied up together. Social structure and authority roles are both objects of legitimacy, as Easton (1965:278-301) says, and hence the legitimacy of the _'aqila_ in al-Qasr flows from the structural legitimacy of a segmentary political system. Thus in al-Qasr, politics operates through authority groups in opposition to one another, each represented by an authority role. An _'aqila_ once told me that "the tribe of the _'aqila_ gives him the authority to judge between its members." Another _'aqila_ said that "the _'awaaqil_ are bound [675] by a contract (_rawaabit_) to perform their duty on behalf of their _bait_." The _rawaabit_ ("bonds") we will discuss in the next section.

Spheres and Focus of Authority

•121 Authority, as it is used in this study, refers to the Weberian notion of "imperative control" (_Herrschaft_); that is, "the probability that a command with a given specific

•121 content will be obeyed by a given group of persons" (Weber 1947:152). In the next chapter, it will be useful to distinguish between the concept of authority and that of "power." Mainly, we are concerned here with the legitimate exercise of authority in the regulation of conflict involving members of an "imperatively coordinated group" (1947:153), or corporation, at both the internal and external levels of the Bedouin political system.

121 114 *613 571 It has already been stated in the last chapter that political action occurs at all levels of the social structure; it is not peculiar to the external relational system. The tendency to differentiate structurally between "domestic relations" and "political relations" began with Evans-Pritchard (1940:148) who analyzed the Nuer political system as "an expanding series of opposed segments from the relations within the smallest tribal section to intertribal and foreign relations." This definition could serve as a description of the political system of the Bedouins of al-Qasr, or of any other segmentary society. Fortes (1949; 1953:26) first used the terms "domestic relations" and "political relations." He arbitrarily limited political action to the lineage structure, and assigned "person-to-person relations" to the sphere of kinship or domestic organization. Southall (1953), who applied the ideas of Max Weber, isolated what he referred to as two different types of authority: the "familial" and

●121 114 *613 571 the "political." Previous studies, then, indicate that a conceptualization of a division between spheres or foci of authority relations is fundamental to an understanding of the political aspect of segmentary societies. There is no need, however, to relegate the political to any particular social area if "we generally mean by 'political,' things that have to do with relations of authority . . ." (Weber 1947:155). Conflict, and the need for it to be regulated, occur at all levels of the lineage system, from the family to the tribal level. Authority must be exercised if the system is to persist. [554] The legitimate exercise of authority in al-Qasr is expressed through two structures: an authority role and authority groups, the 'aqila and the tertiary segments, the corporate sole and corporate groups.

121 554 The analysis which follows considers society as a composite of authority groups and authority roles. Roles are the basic elements of social structures which "order the human beings who make up the society" (Nadel 1957:11). The authority role is a focus for the study of politics at all levels of the social structure, and, also, the basis for extending role analysis. For the most part, political action in al-Qasr, from the family to the tribal levels, takes the form of the exercise of legitimate authority. Power, as illegitimate control, exists in the form of extra-processual authority roles which we will discuss in the next chapter.

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554 Here we are interested in the way in which roles and groups, and a whole structure of authority, operate over a wide area.

In the previous section, I presented the 'aqila as a specialized political role in Bedouin political organization. As Radcliffe-Brown (1940:xviii-xxi) has pointed out, in the political analysis of segmentary societies it is necessary to isolate incipient authority roles which function to make decisions concerning rightness and wrongness in disputes and which represent the community, giving voice to public sentiment. The notion of society as a functional system of authority roles and authority groups is clear in Radcliffe-Brown's treatment of politics.

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*[613] Local groups of political significance, i.e., authority groups, are identified by the status position, or office, referred to as 'aqila. The political relations within a local tertiary group, and between it and similar groups of a lineage and tribe, must be seen as relationships between authority roles.

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*613 In the domestic field of political relations, the authority of the Bedouin 'aqila shades into the familial authority sphere of the household head (shaib). The shaib, as senior agnate of his naja', is dominant over the other males of his tertiary sub-unit, but not to the extent that he can pre-empt any of their rights as members of the tertiary corporate group. A shaib, by virtue of his age, is supposed

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[578] to possess the wisdom which it takes to regulate conflict.

685 I was in al-Qasr, and each party to the conflict hired
578 Egyptian lawyers in Marsa Matruh to represent them. As one
648 litigant in this case told me: "The Bedouins prefer to settle
their own land disputes because the government's way of
handling these things costs money and long periods of waiting."

69 The notion of jurisprudence in tribal cultures, in
•121 general, seems to be one which concentrates on the restoration
578 of a disturbed balance rather than one concerned with formality
and procedure. To a great extent, this is true in the Bedouin
case also. However, the absence of institutionalized ways of
dealing with conflict is more characteristic of the internal
*613 system of political relations. Conflict within the secondary
578 segment, we have noticed, may be regulated at the familial
[593] level of authority by the shaib, or one acting in his place:
[596] it is hoped by the Bedouins that quarrels never become serious
enough to prompt intervention by the 'aqila. On the other
hand, the 'aqila, as a legitimate representative of his
authority group, will almost always become involved in conflict
regulation falling within the sphere of external political
relations, i.e., conflict between secondary, primary, or tribal
segments.

The 'aqila as the most effective mechanism of social
*613 control has become institutionalized through time in Bedouin
578 society. At the interactional level of secondary lineage
182 group relations, conflict may easily expand into feuding or,

577 According to this *'aqila*, the "good man" is the "good Muslim"
771 who observes the pillars of Islam (fasting, praying, making
183 the pilgrimage, and alms-giving). Also, the "good man" does not steal or lie, and this leads, importantly enough, to social accord.

●121 In light of the preceding discussion of authority and
681 law, we can now offer a description of the Bedouin judicial process in action. Southall (1956:121-151) has drawn the
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681 distinction between internal and external delicts on the
114 bases of kinds of sanctions rendered, and whether or not chiefly authority mediates conflict. Such a distinction can be only partially applied in the case of the Bedouins of the Western Desert. The kind of sanctions operating in the internal political system do differ from those applied in the external political system, though not to the same degree which is true
121 of Southall's Alurland. On the other hand, since Bedouin
681 society, lacking political centralization, cannot be character-
692 ized as a segmentary state with distinct spheres of authority
642] at successive levels of the lineage structure, the intervention or non-intervention of chiefly adjudication and decision-making cannot serve as a basis for differentiating political
* [613] action. Rather, the lone political office of the *'aqila*
[627] involves itself in all arbitration which cannot be successfully concluded by the mechanism of familial authority. There are
[648] just two exceptions which apply to this latter statement:

121 first, the government may enter into conflict cases which
681 are judged to be out of control and involving the larger tribal
692 units; secondly, litigants, whether exercising internal or
648 external political relations, have the right to take their
case to a rajal khair. Both exceptions represent informal
[626] processes of social control in al-Qasr; the first case rarely
happens, and the second case seems to occur quite frequently
but no recordings of the settlement are made.

681 Sanctions in the Bedouin legal system conform to what
121 Radcliffe-Brown referred to as secondary sanctions: "These
are concerned with the actions of persons or groups in their
effects upon other persons or groups" (1952:209). Also, it
[671] would seem that Bedouin law is one of private delicts as
opposed to a law of public delicts:

[692]

> In the procedure of a law of private delicts a person or a body of persons that has suffered some injury, loss or damage by infringement of recognized rights appeals to a constituted judicial authority, who declares some other person or body of persons within the community to be responsible and rules that the defendant shall give satisfaction to the plaintiff, such satisfaction frequently taking the form of the payment of an indemnity or damages. A private delict is thus an action which is subject to what may be called a restitutive sanction (Radcliffe-Brown 1952:213).

681 In Bedouin society, delicts are private since they involve
675 individuals or lineage groups, but the restitutive sanctions
671 to which they give rise are backed by communal consensus expressed through public approval in general, and by the twin

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675 charters of Bedouin society, the *rawaabit al-'awaaqil* and
671 the *'awaiyid Awlad 'Ali*. Again, following Radcliffe-Brown
●121 (1952:212-219), sanctions expressed in al-Qasr may be con-
681 sidered civil as opposed to criminal sanctions since, even in
682 the case of intentional homicide, the emphasis is upon resti-
182 tution and the restoration of the "good society" rather than
[671] upon punishment. The Bedouin legal system is one which deals
with private delicts, and which depends upon secondary social
sanctions and ritual sanctions for the arbitration and settle-
ment of disputes.

121 Since neither a dichotamy between private and public
681 delicts nor a differential distribution of authority at the
various levels of the lineage structure obtain in the uncentral-
ized political system of the Bedouins, political action and
type of sanction will be described in terms of whether or not
they occur in the internal political system of the secondary
or domestic group, or in the external system where interaction
between secondary, primary, or tribal segments takes place.

The most striking difference between the two systems
of political action rests with the fact that the *lex talionis*,
retaliation regulated by custom, does not operate within the
121 secondary group. In the two cases of killing between tertiary
681 groups of 'Ailit Ma'fas and 'Ailit Lazumi already given, com-
682 pensation was immediately paid: the incidents were both
* [613] settled and "forgotten." In conflict situations arising in the

• 121 external system, however, the law recognizes retaliation, a
681 life for a life. Still, even in this case, Bedouin values
682 [182] expressed through the *'awaiyid* try to avert bloodshed and
[671] feuding by showing "the good path" and providing the means
for settlement through compensation.

681 Just as the Bedouin accepts the *'awaiyid* as a set of
682 of ideals calculated to regulate conflict, he paradoxically
182 claims the right to impose retaliatory sanctions as a just
[671] conclusion to conflict. One Bedouin said that the greatest
[673] sin which a man or group can commit is to accept the *diiya*
and then take his blood-revenge and return the money. Pre-
sumably, a person or group commits no outrage if they refuse
the *diiya* with the understanding that blood-revenge will be
[626] taken. In al-Qasr, retaliation and the *'awaiyid* are mechanisms
[671] of social control and dispute settlement. A political office
* [613] exists, i.e. the *'aqila* which functions over the total range
[692] of political action, and the process of adjudication and
compensation in the form of indemnity payment represents an
institutionalized alternative to retaliation. In all cases
of dispute, ritual or religious sanctions back up social
[776] sanctions. God is a third party to all conflict, and this is
[695] made manifest in the reading of the *Fatiha* or the oath-taking
128 ceremony. In order to describe how authority and sanctions
68 operate in Bedouin society, a number of examples are presented
[124] below. Some of the cases are the statements of informants about
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CHAPTER V

STRUCTURAL DIFFERENTIATION AND AUTHORITY

121 554 Political Role Analysis: Theoretical Framework

There is current confusion over the definition and use of concepts in political analysis. Ideas concerning power, influence, authority, and the general notion of leadership itself, are variously treated and dealt with equally well. But in every case, a necessary and common aspect of political studies is that of role analysis.

121 554 571 "Role" is that part of the actor's behavior which constitutes and defines his participation in the social interactive process (Parsons and Shils 1951:23). Political roles define who does what with respect to the political aspect of the social interactive process, i.e. in the system of authority relations. In a most general sense, political role structure may be divided into the two categories of "followers" and "leaders" (Leach 1954:8-10; Easton 1965:205). From the level of the family to the largest social grouping, persons are assigned by the group, or take it upon themselves, to make and help execute decisions. This is to say, that some degree of leadership exists in all social groupings. Whether or not such leadership is institutionalized is another question with which we shall

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deal in the course of this discussion.

No political system can persist without a separation of duties between decision-makers and others. The specialized function of decision-making in the political sphere helps "to bring about some adjustment or accommodation in conflicting demands and to implement any settlement where necessary" (Easton 1965:206). It follows then that there is no society without some type of authority role, however simple, and, we assume, that this role can be defined.

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I do not consider this point a debatable one, though writings on the subject of political organization in primitive society seem to indicate that I should consider it debatable. For example, Steward (1938:247) reports on small bands of American Indians in the Basin-Plateau region who are without chiefs (leaders?). Sharp (1958:5) states that the Yir Yoront cannot tolerate even "mild chiefs"; Schapera (1956:93) notes that "chiefs everywhere in South Africa" are only part-time specialists, and this is taken to mean that the Bushman and Bergdama are without political roles. Service (1966:51) defines "leadership" as "administration" and finds that it is unstructured, which moves from one person to another, and, above all, cannot be associated with the word "chief."

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All of these discussions consider specialization to mean full-time spent in role-playing and the singularity of role assignment. On these bases conclusions are reached as to the presence

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554 or absence of political roles in primitive societies. It is obvious that in no society does an individual play one, and only one, role. Every social role is, in some degree, a part-time role. Even at the apex of role specialization and structural complexity (the presidency of the United States, for instance), an individual plays his political role along with others. Also, in trying to determine the presence or absence of roles in a society, it should be kept in mind that the notion of institutionalization refers to a process and not a state of being. Therefore, in any one society at any one point in time, there may be a number of roles "happening." This, it seems, will especially be the case in the dynamic field of politics.

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571 In political analysis, influential and leadership roles may be viewed in terms of differential responsibility. Authority is the institutionalization of a responsible relationship between the leader and other members of the collectivity wherein the former has the right to expect support from the latter in given situations (Parsons 1960:183-186). A role which is imbued with power, but not authority in the analytical sense which I wish to bring out here, lacks this institutionalized right to expect support. M.G. Smith (1966:127) makes this analytical distinction most clearly:

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> As a regulatory capacity, authority is legitimated and identified by the rules, traditions, and precedents which embody it and which govern its exercise and objects. Power is also regulatory, but is neither fully prescribed nor governed by norms and rules.

Authority is always attached to specific roles while power is a generalized control over others. For instance, power may be based on religious or economic grounds and operate with equal influence in the political sphere. The basis of the legitimacy of authority is the backing which it receives from the legal system. Power, however, is the probability that one actor within a social relationship will be able to carry out his will regardless of the basis on which this probability rests (Weber 1947:152). Power over others is a type of influence which may operate without their consent, their "will," or even their awareness and understanding. For instance, when one party controls property or other values essential to person's existence, he has power over those others (Goldhamer and Shils 1939).

Influence of the authority type is explicit and institutionalized control of certain symbols which emphasizes group goals. Power-type influence is the control of goods and symbols, often the inexplicit manipulation of these things, which emphasizes particularistic goals usually with a private individual referent. Power and authority are two types of influence. For analytical purposes, they may be considered at opposite ends of a scale of institutionalization. In this

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way, each may be considered as having aspects of the other attached to it: a power role may at times take on an authoritative aspect, and an authority role, when its incumbent "pulls rank," may be said to be exerting power rather than authority.

I have found it necessary to utilize the concepts and ideas discussed here in order to understand the distribution of power in al-Qasr. The range of authoritative action is wide in Bedouin society, and no simple dichotamy between power and authority will suffice to explain it. However, authority does crystallize at certain points in the al-Qasr social structure, and political rights and duties at these reference points become relatively formal and well-defined. When we speak of the crystallization of authority roles, we refer to a tendency toward legitimacy as a process of institutionalization taking place in society. Authority among the 'Aishaibat tribe is legitimate, public, and representative because it is distributed and exercised with reference to imperatively coordinated associations, or corporate groups.
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Furthermore, the manner in which authority is segmented and distributed informs and legitimates the Bedouin lineage structure. On the other hand, power and power roles possessing no legitimate or representative influence with reference to the lineage structure, may actually inform "structures" and "modes" which combine and "are quite unlike the articulations

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in a lineage system" (Peters 1967:280).

My own study indicates that authority roles are more easily studied since they are more easily observable. Power roles are subtle simply because they are less institutionalized; closer field work is required if we are to understand their structure and function. Al-Qasr is characterized by segmentation in communication structure which follows the lines of lineage segmentation. As a consequence of this, social intercourse is of a restricted nature wherein each lineage group tends to be its own audience. In cases such as these, where social interaction is anything but intense, the character of political relations between groups is difficult to perceive. Thus the operation of influence at the informal level, i.e. power, is difficult to comprehend. But it seems absolutely necessary that politics per se be studied in the tribal situation, and the only way that I can handle it in the al-Qasr case is to consider leadership in the context of an institutionalization process.

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There are precedents for this approach, and these also serve to point up the importance of leadership studies in primitive societies. Radcliffe-Brown (1940:xi-xxiii), referring to decision-making processes in tribal societies, was convinced that even in cases of contingencies, and seemingly "spur of the moment" group activities, careful observation would show that "they were directed by leaders who had some

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measure of recognized authority" (p. xv). Radcliffe-Brown conceived of politics as a process, and actually worked with concepts of increasing specialization in decision-making and role differentiation to bring this out (p. xxi). The structural focus of political analysis is the role: he reminds us that analytical concepts such as the "State" do not exist in the phenomenal world, that there exists only individuals who play roles and interrelate as possessors and non-possessors of authority (p. xxiii).

More recently, Pospisil (1968:201-222) has claimed that all societies necessarily possess authority roles by virtue of the fact that justice and its administration is "vested in the decision-making activity, irrespective of its informality or subtlety, of an individual or group of individuals of influence." According to Pospisil, law and conflict regulation upon which political order rests cannot be divorced from "the decision-making process of authority or group leaders" (1968:206). In his study of the Kapauku Papuans, Pospisil (1963:52-55) describes the basis of a "power" struggle between different "authorities."

In this study, I have tried to use the concepts of decision-making process, power-authority continuum, and role-structure for an analysis of Bedouin leadership. Such an approach may be better suited for a study of peasant or modern-complex societies where roles are more differentiated

121 554 571 and better defined, but I feel that the area of leadership in tribal society is more complex and less well studied than we are led to believe. Both the decision-making process and some kind of authority are present in all societies, but we know less about such universals in tribal society. It is as Easton (1965:205) has said: "Even in the smallest group, we can expect to find that the power and responsibility of caring for recurring matters as well as crises tend to reside in the hands of the few."

Status and Role Differentiation

554 565 Although structural differentiation along class lines does not exist in al-Qasr, status differential does exist and a discussion of it is essential for an understanding of Bedouin authority structure. Classes exist only where individuals at a specific socio-economic level "become conscious of their common interests and organize themselves"(Linton 1936:110). Status stratification in and of itself is not indicative of a class structure, for "a size beyond the possibility of facial recognition" is an additional prerequisite (Bierstedt 1957:404).

554 571 Authority structure in al-Qasr, like any of the other structures of society, constitites a system of roles. The actors who act out the roles in this particular system occupy a special status, or position, in the Bedouin social system

554 the disputants. As noted, the rajal saalih shares this right
792 with the 'aqila. The rajal khair does not have recourse
627 to this mechanism which amounts to divine approval of the
*613 binding decision of the "third party." 'Amm Salih in his
779 discussion of the Bedouin moral code corroborated this point: "Any 'aqila can read the Fatiha. In this way, he and the two parties involved terminate the quarrel. This is a way to show that all agree on the settlement. Originally, only the rajal saalih did this, but now the 'awaaqil do it in all cases." It would be interesting to know if in Cyrenaica both roles perform this function or if it belongs only to the role of rajal salih.

554 I cannot generalize concerning this role for the whole
184 of the Western Desert. Sayyid al-Sanusi and 'Amm Salih seem
627 to be special men. On the other hand, the 'aqila and the
792 rajal khair are roles which we would expect to find all over
*613 the desert, and in Libya also. The 'aqila is the focus of institutionalized traditional authority structure, and the rajal khair and "status group" represent the power structure.
554 This attempt to differentiate between authority and power
●121 is essentially one which deals with the more general problem of leadership. Any study of the structure of authority must have reference to the notion of leadership. Role analysis seems the best method of dealing with leaders and their functions. Role analysis together with the conceptualization of institution as a process is an adequate way of dealing with the tendency

554 toward legitimacy and the phenomenon of change in the
•121 political structure. Peters (1967:271-279), in a long awaited discussion of the political aspect of Cyrenaican Bedouin society, adumbrates this problem of differentiating between instituted authority and the distribution of power:

> In order to discuss this adequately, a lengthy diversion into an analysis of the distribution of power would be necessary . . . there are men who wield power over groups of varying populations, and the extent of their domains cannot be understood by reference to orders in the lineage. Perhaps it is for this reason--because, that is to say, lineage theory effectively blocks the exercise--that relatively little has been written about the problem of leadership in these societies (i.e. lineage societies).

554 Foci of power and authority change and at times
178 irrespectively of the lineage structure. The role of the
792 rajal saalih was more influential during the days of the
571 [795] Sanusiiya movement than it is today. At that time, "holy men" controlled economic, and thus political, relations through the zawiya system: they were in a position to command respect and obedience and could be considered a "status group" in their own right. Today, "holy men" are rarely found among the members of the "status group." As one informant phrased it: "They used to solve problems more in the past than now. People in the old days were not educated as they are today:
554 the mind of the son is larger than that of the father. In
178 the past, the "holy man" was so important that were he to ask
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> 124 If the office left the family,
> *613 all of the lineages would be fighting over it . . . The
> 634 job should stay in Bait Bu Taram; if this is impossible,
> 571 then it should stay in 'Ailit Lazumi. In any case, the
> 'awaaqil will decide.

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578 A change in the present locus of legal authority in
634 the Bedouin-Egyptian government structural relationship
178 would amount to a re-structuring process, and could lead to
•121 serious conflict. In the very least, it would call for a
clear explanation and new statement of social reality since
it would challenge what is, and "has always been," a legitimate
distribution of power and political order.

634 The office of the shaikh is not a potential power-
554 base by comparison with the office of 'umda. The shaikh,
rather than being in direct communication with the Governor, executes the official orders made known to the 'umda. As an administrator, he takes care of issuing drivers' licenses, notifies men of their military draft status, etc. The government sees this as a necessary post because of the difficulty of contacting Bedouins deep in the desert. In one sense, the shaikh's office is becoming less functional as the Bedouin move in from the desert and begin to take part in the national society, but in another sense it is becoming more functional as bureaucracy and red tape become increasingly complex. But the shaikh remains in the shadow of the 'umda. He never substitutes for the 'umda, for this would infringe on the rightful power of the 'umda's family; when the 'umda is absent,

CHAPTER VI

AUTHORITY AND CHANGE: A CASE STUDY

Theoretical Orientation

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Eric Wolf (1956) was one of the first political analysts to perceive the importance of "the nation-oriented person," the nexus between the local community and the nation state, for a theory of culture change. He described the Mexican "broker" as a power-seeker:

> An individual who seeks power and recognition outside his local community must shape his behavior to fit these new expectations . . . he must learn to function in terms which characterize any complex stratified society in which individuals can improve their status through the judicious manipulation of social ties . . . Individuals who are able to operate both in terms of community-oriented and nation-oriented expectations then tend to be selected out for mobility. They become the economic and political "brokers" of nation-community relations, a function which carries its own rewards (pp. 1071-1072).

Wolf felt that the "brokers" provided the anthropologist with a key concept for the analysis of leadership in situations of change where local communities are being integrated into larger systems. The basic function of the "broker" is to relate community-oriented persons, "who wish to stabilize or improve their life chances, but who lack economic security

121 and political connections," with nation-oriented persons who operate at a national socio-cultural level of integration (1956:1075-1076).

Clifford Geertz (1960) has also examined the rôle of a "cultural broker" in Indonesia as an instance of "a vigorous, imaginative regional leadership, able to play a cultural middleman role between peasant and metropolitan life, and so create an effective juncture between traditional cultural patterns and modern ones" (1960:229). In the case of the Mexican "broker" described by Wolf, the major means of consolidating and obtaining power both at the regional and the national levels were through political channels. In the case of the Indonesian "broker," both religious and political channels are the means by which the local Muslim teacher, or kijaji, has obtained power: traditionally, he was a specialist in communication of Islam to the countryside, and today he has taken on the role of local party leader (Geertz 1960:230).

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In al-Qasr, the rajal khair seems to be the Bedouin counterpart of the Mexican and Indonesian "broker." With a firm economic base in the local community, and with his ability to adopt new patterns of public behavior, i.e., "he knows how to speak to the Governor and public officials," the role of rajal khair provides the means for one to move upwards through political channels (Wolf 1956:1071). Within the context of a newly emerging authority system based upon the

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557 structural principle of bureaucracy, the rajal khair lacking legitimacy in the traditional lineage-based system may envisage an authoritative role and increased chances to "improve his status through the judicious manipulation of social ties."

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178 Leadership studies in the context of cultural change, such as those which deal with "broker" types, have important implications for a more general and fundamental theoretical problem: the role of the individual in culture and society. Radin, as early as 1927, Redfield (1960), Geertz (1960), Fallers (1964), and Mead (1964) have spoken of "primitive philosophers," "the hinge group," "the cultural brokers," "the new men," and "the evolutionary clusters." All terms have direct reference to role types constructed from the observation of individuals possessed of the ability and creativity to offer new ideas and methods of dealing with the pressing cultural problems of their times. The unitary goal of all these researchers was to understand culture change through a focus on the way in which the individual manipulates his cultural resources.

121 I would maintain that, especially in political analysis, the approach and focus of the researcher is directly related to his ontologic position concerning the concepts of culture and human nature. That is to say, whether or not the researcher believes that "man has no choice in life, that culture determines his behavior," then he will or will not find it relevant

to his problem to investigate something other than the structural categories of society; something such as ideas and other creative acts of leaders. It has been noted that leadership studies are lacking in the analyses of tribal societies. I find it no mere coincidence that this is also the area of research in which kinship, for the sake of kinship, has been studied and restudied. This is also the area of research in which, as Easton (1959) rightly notes, kinship analysis is erroneously identified with political analysis; in which social structures are elevated to the ontological level.

David Bidney (1953) has articulated the basic issue of the debate between "the superorganic evolutionists" and the "humanistic school," the former defending a theory of cultural determinism and the latter insisting upon freedom of thought and action for man. Since 1953, data have tended to support Bidney's claim in favor of cultural freedom, that culture may be investigated at different levels, and that, in fact, freedom of scientific thought is a prerequisite of any science of culture (1953:179). Other scientists concerned with both particular cultural problems and a general scientific theory of culture are increasingly in agreement with this position (see Geertz 1962 and 1964; Cohen 1962; Mackenzie 1967).

Leadership studies, it would seem, and the creative cultural dynamics of the "Third World" (Worsley 1964) certainly

121 bolster empirically Bidney's contention that

> The traditional ... societies have suddenly awakened to a consciousness of their underdeveloped condition and have demanded and been granted, often reluctantly, the rights to control their own cultural destinies. The new watchword is Freedom--freedom from alien control and freedom to rule themselves and to participate more fully in the cultural achievements of mankind (1967).

The Era of the New Nations, more than any other period in history, supports the methodological imperative of "a culture" and "Culture" toward which the anthropologist must orient himself if he is ever to arrive at a valid conception of man, society, and cultural evolution. In the New Nations, cultural innovations have most certainly been introduced by individuals which "deliberately promote and encourage cultural progress" (Bidney 1967:xxvii).

I have suggested in another place (Obermeyer 1967:6) that a Weberian model of society, which takes cognizance of both objective and subjective reality, approaches the methodological needs which Bidney insists upon for a scientific theory of culture. Furthermore, Weber's model is directly related to his view of political action "which seeks to encompass both the very great limitations that every social situation imposes upon the individual and the great opportunities for action that are inherent in the instability of social

121 structures (Bendix 1962:261).[1] Structural analysis, to be sure, is essential but it is also important that we have an understanding of the process by which individuals strive for and achieve certain roles, and the various ways in which they "manipulate, and even create, elements of the culture that evaluates them" (Fallers 1963:163). The very antithesis of this approach is represented in a leadership study by Marshall Sahlins (1963) who, in view of his cultural deterministic ontologic position and his stress on purely structural features, comes to a predictable conclusion: "Perhaps we have been too long accustomed to perceive rank and rule from the standpoint of the individuals involved, rather than from the perspective of the total society" (p. 300). It seems hardly realistic to accuse anthropologists of ignoring social structure in pursuit of the creativity of the individual.

Both Wolf (1966) and Geertz (1960) have acknowledged the primary place of Robert Redfield's work in their conceptualization of culture change. Redfield (1953;1960; 1962) explained culture change by reference to a process involving the divergence and convergence of two ideal types, "the great

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[1] In connection with a considered synthesis of the theories of David Bidney and Max Weber, I have also suggested that the approach of the symbolic interactionist school of sociology may be useful. This school emphasizes that the individual reacts to social constraints not by *conforming* but by *confirming* the social structure. Interestingly enough, there are indications that Durkheim's thought was developing in the direction of symbolic interaction (see Stone and Farberman 1967).

121 tradition" and "the little tradition." The "little tradition" refers to peasant or folk culture, and the "great tradition" to a specialized and systematized body of thought which is, in most cases, esoteric, written, related to religion, and the property of an intellectual group (1960:40-59; 1962:302). Of course, Redfield's notion of a "literati" does not apply in the Bedouin case. But in an earlier work (1953:44) Redfield drew attention to the more general concept of "intelligentsia" which further refines the scope and types of leadership. Redfield refers to "the member of the intelligentsia . . . (who) belongs to two worlds, not one; he is a marginal man." He then goes on to differentiate between the "literati" type and the "intelligentsia" type, stating that the former type uses literacy to carry on the sacred tradition while the member of the "intelligentsia" may use literacy "to admit
121 the ways of the world outside." While the rajal khair does
554 not become the representative of the great and sacred tradition
627 of Islam, he does utilize the bureaucratic means at hand to
177 admit the outside world into al-Qasr. The rajal khair may be
[571] considered a member of an "intelligentsia."

121 Gustave von Grunebaum (1962) has used Redfield's model of cultural dynamics to understand change and social mobility in the Arab World with special reference to Egypt. The author, an Islamicist, states that the "great tradition" of orthodox Islam in contrast to popular Islam is recognized as "the more

•121 advanced" and is assumed "to have authority"; that the "great tradition" is represented in the writings and public actions of the political elite; and that "social prestige is dependent on its adoption (or at least on its profession)" (1962:69). Implicit in von Grunebaum's analysis, and also contained in Redfield's model, is the employment of reference group theory to understand human behavior in society. In
121 the al-Qasr case, I have tried to show that "status group"
177 members repudiate many of the traditional ways of life while
571 at the same time identifying more and more with the Egyptian
181 "status group," the bureaucrats of Marsa Matruh. The implication here is that the Bedouin "status group" is in the process of taking on the values of a new reference group to which they do not yet belong but to which they seek admission.

The bureaucrats of Marsa Matruh, like those of Cairo and Alexandria described by von Grunebaum, represent the "great tradition." The "status group" of al-Qasr while aspiring to the "great tradition" emulate certain of the behavioral traits and expectations of the elite group. For
[771] instance, they are conspicuous for their regular attendance at Friday mosque services in Matruh. Merton, who has developed reference group theory, points out that "men frequently orient themselves to groups other than their own in shaping their behavior and evaluations" (1957:234). This type of behavior, or "anticipatory socialization," is the process of taking on

•121 the values of a non-membership group in order to "find readier
177 acceptance by that group and make an earlier adjustment to
571 it" (Merton 1957:265). In a relatively closed society such as
181 al-Qasr, when those who qualify for membership in other
reference groups are able to do more than merely aspire, when
they actually anticipate and adjust their behavior to a type
of status consciously desired, the local authority and social
structures are likely to be transformed.

121 We can generalize from the literature on social
571 stratification that the hierarchial structure characteristic
554 of traditional societies carries with it a relationship of
mutual obligation. The "inferior" owes rent, respect, loyalty,
obedience, etc., while the "superior" owes, in return, protection, advice, help in emergency, action in conflict regulation, representation in extralocal matters, etc. (Hagen 1962:
121 55-86; Parsons 1953: 108). In al-Qasr, the 'aqila fulfills
554 only one of the functions of the "superior," that which deals
*[613] with conflict regulation. The rajal khair role, as I have
[627] developed it, may function in full capacity as a "superior."
121 The rajal khair dominates the internal system through power
554 derived from rank on the prestige scale: he is prominent in
627 the external system as member and representative of a new
power structure based on national and political consciousness.
Traditionally, rajal khair-dominance was not by force but
through influence and prestige: in the new situation, with a

121 554 627 [634] *[613] [178] fully organized government behind the role, the element of force may enter into the *rajal khair* style of domination. Thus far, the *'umda* and the *shaikh* roles have functioned through the traditional roles of the *'aqila* and the *rajal khair*, that is, the "status group." In the future, this pattern may change. It is also possible that new roles will emerge. This is what I wish to explore.

121 571 554 [177] The "status group" of al-Qasr operating with a sense of identity with a modern reference group deem themselves responsible for making decisions on the behalf of "the people" or "the Bedouin." Members of the "status group" would occasionally dress in Western clothes; they would hunt gazelle for sport; they owned the few autos there were in the area; and a few partook of alcoholic beverages. Their rights and obligations in social relations are still relatively stable and depend on the ascribed values of al-Qasr Bedouin society, but one can detect the start of a power struggle within the group. It is a competitive desire for social mobility and is stated in terms of the achieved attributes considered important by the reference group to which they aspire, the Egyptian society. For example, one sometimes heard the complaint from various members of the "status group" that the Governor was not giving proper recognition to those "who understood the ways of the Bedouin," and "those who could speak for the Bedouin."

121 My approach here is to state the problem of authority
554 and change using a case study of one man whom I consider the
571 most prestigious member of the "status group" of al-Qasr. He
156 is a member of the "status group" by virtue of his wealth and
family connections; he has reinforced and enhanced his "status
honor" by the practice of intervening into various conflict
situations and mustering support, favors, and loyalty as he
goes; and he has proved his "superiority" by excelling in the
outside business world. All this he has done while remaining
a "good Bedouin."

124 The name of Hajj 'Ali appeared time and time again as
554 my research progressed and increasingly concentrated on the
156 authority structure.[2] I asked questions which required the
informants to name a person in al-Qasr to whom he would go
if he needed help, money or advice. I asked: "Who is the
leader of the Bedouin?";"Who knows the wants and needs of the
Bedouin most intimately?" On the basis of the data collected
[571] in this manner, I was able to perceive a "status group" and
gain an idea of the real leaders of al-Qasr. It also gave
me a working knowledge of the local role structure. Hajj
'Ali's name came up with the highest frequency in the
questionnaires, and my observations and interviews with
him corroborated his central place in the authority structure.
[126] I also recorded the life history of Hajj 'Ali's son, and gained
valuable insights from this data.

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[2] The name, Hajj 'Ali, is of course a pseudonym.

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I know that Hajj 'Ali consciously and actively seeks to be a leader among the Bedouin, that he seeks a place in the new governmental structure in Marsa Matruh, and hence that he desires power, however benevolent his intentions may be. In what follows, I hope to bring this out by presenting Hajj 'Ali as himself and as a "cultural broker."

When I say that Hajj 'Ali desires power I mean nothing derogatory. Power-seeking is a kind of social phenomenon which characterizes man-in-society around the world: the quest occurs in primitive and modern groups, and university structures alike (Moore 1958:1-30). Hajj 'Ali's desire for power, and also authority, has not wrought change in the whole structure of the al-Qasr social system. As we shall see, Hajj 'Ali is discontent with the present structure of al-Qasr and feels that the Bedouins must accept change. His discontent is related to the changing conditions in and about al-Qasr; the chance to express it or re-channel it, at this time, derives from his ascribed place in the al-Qasr system. Whether his desire for power is a result or a cause of his discontent I cannot tell. Only a personality study in depth could answer this question.

In terms of this study, one way to look at Hajj 'Ali's case is to view it as his attempt to convert power in the internal system into authority in the external system. But in this context "external" refers to the national level rather

156 than the Awlad 'Ali societal level. In the traditional
554 system, his influence and power have been informal, and,
121 although this has been advantageous over against the formal
role of _'aqila_, his political activity was ultimately limited
by this structural differentiation and definition of authority.
[177] In gaining access to the bureaucratic structure of Egyptian
officialdom with its firm allocation of rights and duties,
Hajj 'Ali could operate as an authority within the total authority
structure which has reference to both the internal and external
political relational systems of al-Qasr.

Practical Application

*613 In al-Qasr, the two most influential and powerful
lineages, 'Ailit Lazumi and 'Ailit Ma'fas, each have a
[634] "most powerful _bait_." We have noted that in 'Ailit Lazumi
it is Bait Bu Taram which controls the office of _'umda_: in
*613 'Ailit Ma'fas it is Bait 'Umar which has Hajj 'Ali. Hajj 'Ali
159 is fifty three years old. He has married five times, divorced
581 one wife, and at present has four wives. Whatever his motives
156 for these marriages, at least some of them have obviously
[595] been made as economic and political moves. A check on his
wives' tribal origins will show this. In each case, Hajj
'Ali's wife is from a lineage which holds land contiguous to
his own property in the _'izba_ sector of al-Qasr. The one
exception to this is a marriage contracted to establish ties

156 administrative business took up most of the time at the
159 meeting, and only the Governor and the Egyptians took part
554 in the discussion. At the conclusion of the meeting, the
635 Governor asked if any present had comments to make. Hajj
648 [871] 'Ali rose, and delivered a formal and well-prepared speech
[537] on the inadequacies of the educational facilities in Matruh. He noted that the Governor had promised the Bedouins that if they sent their sons in from the desert for secondary schooling, their material needs would be taken care of, but that in fact the Governor had not kept his promise for there was not enough space and beds for the boys. The Governor apologized for this condition and said he was trying to correct it. I noted that a few Egyptians found something amusing about this incident, but that all of the Bedouins present were serious and nodded in agreement with the points made by Hajj 'Ali.

156 We should note that Hajj 'Ali was the only Bedouin to
159 speak up at the meeting, that he spoke in the formal, tradi-
554 tional manner, and that he showed concern for the real problems
635 of the Bedouins. Hajj 'Ali is careful to protect his identity as a Bedouin, and in this he differs from the 'umda and most of the "status group."

•121 In situations of induced change, the cultural problems
156 involved differ in their conception and immediacy as defined
159 554 by the agents and the recipients of change. Hajj 'Ali, who
177 is both an agent and a recipient of change, is intimate with
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121 the problems of the Bedouins of al-Qasr. He knows how to
156 phrase them, and his place on the Majlis al-Muhafza gives
159 him the right and the opportunity to air them. This is the
554 role of the "cultural broker." Before the meeting of the
635 council, Hajj 'Ali had gathered a group of the men from al-
177 Qasr and they had talked about which demands should be presented to the Governor. This is purely a political process which Hajj 'Ali manipulates. The formulation and presentation
[E48] of demands became, in the hands of Hajj 'Ali, "inputs" into the Egyptian political system with the hope that they will materialize as "outputs" and the satisfaction of needs - to use the terminology of David Easton's "systems analysis" (1965b).

156 On another occasion, Hajj 'Ali demonstrated his
159 status and political leadership and the fact that he has
554 assumed the position of spokesman for the Bedouin of al-Qasr
635 during this period of change. Once each year the Governor
177 makes a tour of al-Qasr to inspect the school, the cooperative building, the government experimental farm, and the area in general. After the inspection tour, he holds a reception in a ceremonial tent set up for the occasion. At this time, he states his evaluations and opinions, distributes some clothing material to the poorer families of the area, and asks for suggestions from the Bedouins who sit on the ground before the tent. The only suggestion forthcoming from the Bedouins was

156 159 and they sat on chairs inside the tent. I returned to
554 Marsa Matruh in the *'umda's* car (1964 Ford, highly polished)
635 537 with the *'umda* and the *shaikh*. They openly joked about Hajj
[634] 'Ali and his manner of presentation; they repeated some of
[122] [522] his "stilted" phrases and laughed. Hajj 'Ali gave last year's
reception speech also. This is because, his son says, Hajj
'Ali is considered a fine speaker by the Bedouins of al-Qasr.

121 We can see how these details carry larger implications
177 within the context of political and social structures under-
178 going change. It is the stuff which the anthropologist finds
important for an understanding of the process of change.

156 If I have established thus far that Hajj 'Ali is
159 politically active and representative in both the traditional
554 and the modern systems, then the attempt is now to prove that
177 178 he consciously seeks to change the traditional in the direction
of the modern for political and moral reasons, and for social
and personal reasons.

156 Hajj 'Ali, when he spoke with me, inevitably came
159 around to the subject of international politics, whether this
554 was the question of Israel or the image which America's racial
177 problems presented. Hajj 'Ali was the only man from the whole
178 124 Marsa Matruh area who was neither *shaikh* nor *'umda* to attend
829 the nomination of Jamal Abd al-Nasser in January of 1965. In
[577] all of this, I detect a move on the part of Hajj 'Ali to
identify himself with an Egyptian reference group and to

CHAPTER VII

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

121 In this study I have attempted to understand and
128 to describe the structure and process of Bedouin society
105 in al-Qasr by utilizing the data of politics. The primary assumption of the study has been that political analysis must proceed along lines which give recognition to, and focus upon, the centrality of the concept and structure of authority and the way in which it contributes to an orderly social process. This study has dealt with the structure and function of authority and, as much as possible, its theory and practice in both contemporary and historical Bedouin society. Authority in al-Qasr is intimately tied up with the system of rights and obligations obtaining between individuals which is expressed through a structure of social roles. At another level of social organization, the rights and obligations inherent in a structure of authority inform a segmentary lineage system. Part of this study aims to understand and to underline the organizational principles from which the Bedouins of al-Qasr derive their meaning of authority, social roles, and social interaction.

In the first part of the study some of the general

128 historical aspects and specific economic facts of the Bedouin
105 social process were made explicit. The intention of the first
121 two chapters was to indicate the scope and dynamics of culture change now occurring through the growth of a market economy and the expansion of political awareness in al-Qasr. The economic transformation of Bedouin society and the move towards political integration into the larger Egyptian society are, more and more, reflected in a shift from dependence upon communal-based social ties to associative relationships based upon private landholding, individual competitive participation in the national economy and profit-keeping, and new rights and obligations brought on by the activities of national and provincial level politics.

The first part of this study also sought to understand the meaning of social change in al-Qasr. Due to historical experiences and ecological factors, social structure and social change carry different meanings for the Bedouin recipients and the Egyptian agents of change. In some cases, it was seen, it is even dubious that Egyptian officials are responding to the felt needs of the Bedouins. As background to a later discussion of authority and change, we tried to understand what the felt needs of the Bedouins are at this time. One aspect of this problem was to define the traditional units of Bedouin society as opposed to the modern administrative units, and to consider change in light of this contrast. My

128 105 •121 concern with the nature of al-Qasr's past not only helps us to understand the Bedouin present but should also help us to conceive of the Bedouin future. What data I was able to collect concerning the historical development of the Bedouin authority structure and its place in the economic transformation of Bedouin society relate to the later discussion of the ascribed nature of leadership roles and the probability that, in the future, access to political roles will become a matter of individual achievement and a heightened awareness of things political. In connection with this we saw that the Governor of Marsa Matruh through the institution of new bureaucratic structures, such as the Governor's Council and new electoral guidelines, is fostering political change in this direction.

Although the largest part of this study dealt with the political aspect of traditional roles and structures, the contention was that traditional complexes are increasingly unable to deal with the cultural problems of the day. This applies to economic as well as political structures, as the first part of this study is intended to show. But among the New Nations and, in particular, whenever we are dealing with tribal and peasant communities, "the most striking changes have been the decline in the authority of the elders in terms of both community and family organization . . . (because) the life experience of the elders . . . is at best only partially relevant to the current needs) (Halpern 1967:123).

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Authority represents and maintains a legitimate political order and an allotment of power. Without a system of authoritative norms, conflict could not be restrained and no social system could survive (Parsons 1960:183). As the concept of authority and its meaning undergo change so also do the appropriate structures and the power distribution between persons and groups change. The structure and dynamics of authority in al-Qasr were investigated through an analysis of the categories and interrelations of the Bedouin segmentary lineage system. This analysis was based primarily upon a definition of the organizational concepts and principles of Bedouin society such as unilineal rule of descent, residence, cognation, and contractual agreement and alliance.

While knowledge of these structural principles is fundamental to an understanding of Bedouin society, it was noted that a strict reliance on them would tend to limit one's understanding of politics in al-Qasr since they in fact conceal the nature of power and the functioning of semi-institutionalized roles. Nevertheless, these structural principles are informed by a set of key beliefs and values which are inculcated during the socialization process, and in a complementary way all of these concepts lend support to a corporate structure of authority. This corporate structure of authority which was discussed in terms of the concept and leadership role, or office, of _'aqila_ was claimed to be the

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basis of social control in traditional Bedouin society. To a large extent the corporate authority structure in al-Qasr is still intact but is undergoing change at this time. Change of the rule of consensus and the way in which it has reference to traditional principles of organization for the regulation of politics is the subject of the final two chapters in this study.

The unilinear principle and its corollary, the corporate group, were defined as the basis for the structural division of Bedouin society into groups. Within the context of a traditional struggle for ecological advantage and a growing participation in the modern political process of interest group conflict, the lineage groups of al-Qasr were considered as political, or authority, groups. The membership and boundaries of these political groups parallel those of structures formed through an alliance of tertiary segments of the lineage system which is itself sanctioned by the rules of unilineality, marriage, residence, and adherence to a legal and moral code known as the rawaabit al-'awaaqil ("the bonds of the wise men"). The central political notion of Bedouin society, and the one which converts a kinship group into a political group, is that of 'aqila. The 'aqila principle, which is manifest in the role of the corporate leader, refers to both the idea of collective responsibility and to a politically instituted office. The concept of 'aqila is essential to an understanding

128 of internal social control and political group interaction
105 in Bedouin society. In order to grasp the meaning of _'aqila_
• 121 in Bedouin society it was necessary to explore something of the history of the concept.

Max Weber (1947:143-145) has drawn attention to the political significance of collective responsibility and the way in which it is related to the concepts of corporate leadership and self-help (blood-revenge) in traditional societies such as the Bedouins of al-Qasr represent: "All are held responsible for the action of any one . . . (and) the action of certain members, the 'representatives,' may be binding upon the others." Blood-revenge, or the law of self-help, is an instance of regulation through convention, and this practice, Weber claims, leads to "solidarity." Weber further claims, and is supported by the evidence which I present here concerning the concept of _'aqila_, that we are likely to find a representative office especially where money must be collected and administered in the interest of the group (p. 145).

In modern political anthropology, Evans-Pritchard was the first to clearly equate kinship relations with political relations: he conceived of kinship groups as political conflict groups within the framework of a balanced opposition between structurally and ideologically similar units (1940:190). I have obviously found this conceptualization of tribal

128 politics very helpful, but the major emphasis of my study was
121 the authority structure rather than the kinship structure.
105 Authority was considered in terms of two aspects, both of which tell us something about kinship structure: in one way authority is the property of relations which obtain between persons and roles of a group, and it acts to define the structural boundaries and to secure the structural continuity of the group; in another way, authority is the property of a tertiary group expressed at the secondary level of the lineage structure and represented by the office of *'aqila*. In this last sense, authority defines the group vis a vis other groups and acts to promote political order in society. Authority, in view of these two aspects, was described as operating at the various levels of the lineage structure, i.e., the familial, the internal and external levels. I sought to clarify the discussion by defining concepts and roles which characterize authority and political action at these various levels. One role, the *shaib,* which functions solely at the familial level of the authority structure was described; the fully institutionalized authority role of *'aqila* was analyzed as were a number of only partly institutionalized roles, or power roles. The most important of these power roles was seen to be that of the *rajal khair*. The institutionalized roles, and this includes the *shaib* or head of the household, were described as functioning

128 according to public expectational patterns while the non-
121 institutionalized roles, being by definition less impinged
105 upon by structural norms, could function outside these
patterns. This distinction between types of roles was seen to be the basis of the rajal khair's ability to manipulate persons and events in a play for power. These three levels of authority were factored out from one another solely for analytical reasons. In reality, the one shades into the other: the authority of the shaib at times overlaps with that of the 'aqila, and the power of the rajal khair and rajal salih at time impinge upon, and detract from, the rightful influence of both the shaib and the 'aqila. Role analysis, as it is used in this study, I consider one of the most important methods available for an investigation of a political problem.

Through political role analysis it was shown that the role of 'aqila is the most important for an understanding of the structure and functioning of Bedouin society. Political, or authority, groups are defined in terms of the presence or absence of this role; hence the whole political structure proceeds from this concept. The legitimacy of the 'aqila, and therefore the legitimacy of the political order which obtains, stems from an explicit legal agreement among members of the tertiary and secondary groups known as the rawaabit al-'awaaqil. These bonds are a contract between the 'aqila and the other members of the corporate group, a mutual pact which

128 sets forth the rights and duties of the political office and
●121 the corporate members. The duplication and reciprocal honor-
105 ing of this contract by tertiary groups related, in fact or fiction, according to the unilineal principle gives rise to a political alliance of groups who are viewed as "one corporate body" at the secondary level of the lineage structure by all outsiders. Structural relations between secondary groups in Bedouin society are chartered in accordance with the several principles of social organization, such as marriage, contract, residence, and also according to the process of conflict control.

Actual conflict in al-Qasr usually takes place between secondary groups even though it is sometimes expressed as conflict between primary or tribal groupings. Coalition for the attainment of political goals and the process of conflict control at the supra-tertiary levels of the lineage hierarchy depend upon the recognition of mutual usefulness and a common means for settling disputes and re-establishing social harmony. The problem-solving device which assures the conditions of an orderly social process is the system of Bedouin customary law, a set of legal and moral norms (Fortes and Evans-Pritchard 1940:20), known as the _'awaiyid Awlad 'Ali_ ("the customs of the sons of 'Ali").

The customary law of the Bedouins of al-Qasr was described and a number of case studies occurring at the various levels of the lineage and authority structure was

128 121 105 presented. According to the moral and legal norms of the Bedouins, conflict control is effected formally and informally. A primary value of Bedouin society instructs all men to mediate conflict whenever possible lest quarrels spread to involve more people and a wider loss of rights. Redress of wrongs takes place through the intervention of, what were defined as, either a mediator at the informal level or an arbiter at the formal level of conflict control. If neither of these peace-making mechanisms is invoked, or should both fail in their attempt to restore social harmony, then the law of self-help, or blood-revenge, may operate. This method of controlling conflict is, according to most of the Bedouins, to be avoided at all costs.

The notion of the "third party" to conflict was developed in this study. It was pointed out that in the case of the triadic relationship in conflict control it is the rajal khair or the rajal salih who usually becomes involved, and that this role has the right to mediate but not to judge. This is in fact the distinction which the Bedouins themselves make between the roles of arbiter-'aqila and mediator-"third party." This differentiation between political roles is equivalent to a distinction between formal authority and informal power.

In order to further explicate the political role-set in Bedouin society a classificatory distinction was made

128 between traditional roles and modern legal roles; the former
121 category included the *'aqila*, the *rajal khair*, and *rajal salih*,
105 while the latter was made up of the *'umda* and the *shaikh.* The roles of *'umda* and *shaikh* have been historically imposed upon the Bedouins from without and thus were not viewed as indigenous to the al-Qasr political system. The role classification used here, which is borrowed from the work of Max Weber, is purely analytical for in reality both of the modern legal roles figure importantly in any complete treatment of Bedouin authority and its structure. All of the role-players who make up the internal and external authority structures of al-Qasr were considered to be members of a "status group" who possess high "status-honor" which is based upon family and wealth and, to a lesser extent in modern times, age.

Finally, the concept of the "cultural broker" was introduced in an attempt to delineate the nature of political change in al-Qasr. In the last chapter of the study the case study of Hajj 'Ali was used to develop the idea of "cultural broker." In some ways, the first five chapters of this study serve as a background to the discussion of Hajj 'Ali as a "cultural broker." The dynamics of the historical, economic, and political situations, the changing meanings of kinship concepts and other structures, and the growing tendency to trust secular as opposed to sacred and traditional authority, all of these factors converge to attach importance and immediacy

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128 to an understanding of the role of "cultural broker" in the
121 present and future of al-Qasr.
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Hajj 'Ali provided us with an example of the secularization of traditional society. This process has been described as one "whereby men become increasingly rational, analytical, and empirical in their political action (Almond and Powell 1966:24). A number of the critical attitudes held by Hajj 'Ali had to do with the Bedouin conception of marriage, law, and authority; in each case it was seen that he questioned the legitimacy of Bedouin tradition and, eventually, would like to steer the Bedouins of al-Qasr away from this world view into the larger Egyptian political community. Besides Hajj 'Ali's discontent with the 'awaiyid Awlad 'Ali and other Bedouin customs, it was suggested that he desired change in al-Qasr's traditional structures and ideas because of his own design upon higher status and authority in the Egyptian bureaucracy of Marsa Matruh, a reference group with which all members of the "status group" identify.

What is happening in the case of Hajj 'Ali and al-Qasr is a sign of the times as far as the New Nations are concerned. The growing need for centralization in order to compete on the international market transforms the traditional structures of the New Nations whenever and wherever it must. But this process is not just a matter of induced change; it is not a one-sided affair. Inherently, any social structure,

128 including "traditional" ones, is a dynamic mechanism for the
121 solution of cultural problems. Related to this is the fact
105 that the individuals who manipulate these mechanisms are creative and responsive agents of change themselves. The need for central coordination and cooperation with national governments sets the stage and provides the stimuli for new cultural responses and devices which result in novel and creative internal reorganization and reintegration around new cultural patterns (Moore 1958:1-28). The case of Hajj 'Ali illustrates the beginnings of such a reorganizational process in al-Qasr.

The main objective striven for in this study deals with only one aspect of the problem of change in the New Nations, but it is an important aspect: all politically-oriented researchers should try to explain the legitimacy and the dynamics of authority and structure in society. In my particular case, discussion centered on lineage theory and its corollary the corporate group, and authority was treated in terms of political role analysis and local leadership patterns. Change was viewed almost wholly as an endogenous process, but the importance of exogenous forces was not played down. It was claimed that an essential part of the "cultural broker" role was to legitimate the authority of the nation-state in order to effect change and legitimate his own authority role.

Conflict control was seen as a life-long process. As

128 culture change takes place, new bases for conflict arise and
121 new devices for control come into being. Politics was viewed
105 as the process of problem solution by the group, from the family level to the total societal level. Politics involves the struggle for, and the legitimation of, power, and functions to bring about some kind of an ideological adjustment between political groups: "Systems of beliefs are made in the image of an idealized home, and there one loves and obeys one's parents, loves the remaining members of the family, and treats all other persons as outsiders" (De Grazia 1948:49).

A struggle for power characterizes Bedouin society as it does any other human society. Equality in al-Qasr, as in all human societies, is an ideal and only an ideal. Inequality, in reality, persists and structures the patterns and issues of conflict in Bedouin society. There are possessors and non-possessors of property and wealth: there are possessors and non-possessors of "status honor." Consequently, there are possessors and non-possessors of authority, for authority derives from property and "status honor." But in al-Qasr, and in every human society, property is not the singular prerequisite of "status honor" and authority. (In this sense, one fundamental aspect of Marxian theory is totally incorrect.) We saw in the cases of 'Amm Salih the "holy man" and the prospective _'aqila_ of Bait Braik, that authority is determined in terms of a complex of structural and ideational

128 •121 105 factors. Nevertheless, in al-Qasr inequality does exist and is related to an unequal distribution of authority between individuals and groups, and the important point is that this is the basis of conflict. As culture change proceeds along with al-Qasr's need to be integrated into the national society, the threat to the traditional distribution of power and authority will foster new patterns of conflict; new means for dealing with conflict will also have to be found. Creative individuals such as Hajj 'Ali will have a hand in the new processes of conflict control and cultural invention. Traditional patterns of conflict and political structures provide meaning and a semblance of stability to al-Qasr society, but when conformity to political values becomes relative to motives of expediency, when politics become secularized, then instability and change in structures follow. And traditional concepts must be redefined and reevaluated to cope with the new conditions.

121 In the case of the New Nations, political change seems to be reflected in a shift from traditional organizational principles to a modern bureaucratic principle which entails a higher differentiation in the political structure. And, as Fortes (1953:24) has noted, unilinear descent groups such as the Bedouins of al-Qasr, tend to break down when specialization sets in.

The notion of viewing social change in terms of a shift to the bureaucratic structural principle is not, of

121 course, original with this study. It was the basis of Weber's (1947) treatment of social change and was one of the conceptual points of his secularizational process. Firth (1961:50) spoke of this bureaucratization process as involving the recognition of new problems and the need for "extra-organizational" roles and decision-makers to deal with them. Gluckman (1963:78) noted that in the future social ties and cleavages, fission and fusion processes, will be studied in the context of modern bureaucratic politics.

The problem of social and political transformation is what I consider the most important province of the modern anthropologist. It is a problem which demands investigation at the local community level, in both the real and the ideal, the scientific and the native, sense of the term. Such investigations should aim at answering the questions so well stated by May Edel in the case of Uganda (1965:358):

> To what degree are the boundaries of the moral community--the group within which common moral fellowship is acknowledged--changing, becoming wider and more inclusive . . . To what extent are (new factions) a tribal legacy deeply rooted in the divergent loyalties and institutions of the past, and destined to be a genuine source of long-range difficulty in Africa?

2: Mohsen E.O-5 (1958-1966) 1971 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9
Awlad Ali

ABSTRACT

THE QUEST FOR ORDER AMONG AWLAD ALI OF THE WESTERN DESERT OF EGYPT

By

Safia K. Mohsen

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The study deals with the ways in which disputes are settled within a tribal society with no contralized authority. One way these disputes are settled is through the application of a set of formal rules known as "the daraieb" or the tribal ways. These rules are kept in force through an elaborate, yet informal, judicial process in which the local political leaders play a key role.

The main focus of the study is not the rules themselves, but rather the ways they are implemented. More specifically, the study examines the ways in which judicial reasoning is related to certain realities of the social and political life of the group. Using mainly the case-study method, this relationship is examined.

The first part of the thesis provides an account of the historical and ecological features of the groups total context of action. This is followed by a rather detailed analysis of the tribal organization of the group. In dealing with the tribal organization two modes of analysis are employed. A structural form of analysis which focuses on the hierarchy of groups and subgroups by which the tribal members order themselves; and a description of these groups in terms of the processes through which they are maintained. In this context, special

[Introductory, P. V]

121 128 attention is paid to the nature of political leadership; the domains within which the leaders function, the bases of their political support and how all these are related to their role in dispute settlement.

Through the analysis of cases some of the salient features of the process of judicial reasoning are examined in the remaining part of the thesis. Distinction is made here between cases involving personal injuries and those arising from contractual relationships.

Finally, a concluding chapter summarizes the main findings of the study.

[Introductory, P. vi]
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2: Mohsen E.O-5 (1958-1966) 1971 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9
Awlad Ali

Chapter I

THEORETICAL BACKGROUND

The Comparative Studies of Law

This study is based on field work carried out among Awlad Ali, of the 121 [114]
Western Desert of Egypt, between August 1965 and August 1966. The study deals with the processes by which order is maintained within a tribal society with no centralized authority. One way that order is maintained is through 121 671
the application of a set of formal rules known to the people of the area as "the daraieb" or the tribal ways. These rules are kept in force by an elaborate, yet informal, judicial process in which the tribal political leaders play the most important part.

The main focus of the study is not the rules themselves but rather the ways in which they are implemented, or the judicial process. More specifically, the study deals with the ways in which the process of dispute settlement is related to certain realities of the social and political life of the group.

Concern with the legal systems of non-literate societies has been an 121 114 671
interest of anthropologists since the classical monographs of the nineteenth century (Maine 1861, 1871; and Fustel de Coulanges 1864), directed the attention of anthropologists to the laws of ancient civilizations. Those monographs were followed at a later date by the work of anthropologists such as Malinowski (1926), Hogbin (1934), and Schapera (1938). In more recent years most anthropological work on legal systems has been done in Africa. Most notable among these are Gluckman's treatise on the Barotse of Northern Rhodesia (1955, 1963), Bohannan's account of the Tiv of Nigeria (1957), and Howell on the Nuer Law (1954). Other studies of primitive law

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in other parts of the world include Llewellyn and Hoebel on the Cheyenne (1941), Pospisil's analysis of the Kapauku Papuan la (Pospisil 1958), Smith and Roberts' description of the Zuni law (1954) and Laura Nader's work on Zapotec law.

Despite this interest in the comparative study of legal institution among anthropologists, yet the fields of legal anthropology still lacks a coherent body of theory to bear upon the analysis of the institutions described. The theoretical questions represented in most of these writings seem to center around two main problems: the problem of definition, and that of methodology. With regard to the problem of definitions the various writers seem to be influenced by one or the other of two main schools of jurisprudence: the analytical school and the sociological school. The analytical school flourished in the late nineteenth century following the writings of its leader, John Austin, the British jurist. According to the analytical school law is a set of rules imposed upon society by a sovereign will. The picture is that of a supreme authority standing high above society and issuing its command downwards. This supreme authority is the creator and the ultimate source of law. These views are exemplified in Austin's famous definition of law as "a rule laid down for the guidance of an intelligent being by an intelligent being having the power over him" (1885: 316-7). Since the will of that political superior has to be exact, the only way to express it, according to Austin, is by means of legislation. According to the views of this school, the existence of a supreme authority is a prerequisite to the existence of law. Any social rules of observances existing before or without the issuing authority are not considered law. This excludes from being law rules which were not enacted such as the British common law, as well as all forms of primitive customary law.

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Later, members of the analytical school shifted the emphasis of their definition of law from its enactment by a supreme authority to its enforcement by that authority. Salmond defined law by reference to a court. Law, according to him, is "the body of principles recognized and applied by the state in the administration of justice" (1946:41). Gray, another member, went even further to deny the name, law, to a statute until it has been used as a basis of decision by the court (1921:82). Similarly, Diamond, who has contributed to the study and appreciation of 'primitive' law, hardly goes beyond arguing that societies without courts have no laws (Diamond 1935).

The influence of the analytical school on the anthropological writings on law is reflected in two ways. In the first place, it led some writers to maintain that since primitive societies lacked a supreme authority in the Austinian sense, they had no rules that may be called 'legal' and that among these societies "custom is the King" (Seagel 1941:iii). In the second place, the concept of the court as stated by members of the analytical school seems to influence to a greater or lesser degree the definition of law by many anthropologists, a point which will be discussed later in the chapter.

The sociological school of jurisprudence came as a reaction against limitations inherent in the analytical school with its glorification of the supreme will. According to the views of this school, law develops within society of its own vitality. It is not an artificial creation of a supreme will but is spontaneous and independent of any formal authority. These views do not exclude the notion of enforcement of law by a supreme authority which becomes necessary as the society reaches a certain level of complexity, but unlike the analytical school, the supreme authority in the latter case is not the creator of law but a creation of it.

The movement was led by Von Saveigny, the French jurist who viewed law as a rule existing for the purpose of regulating the actions of the

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individual in the interest of the whole community (1937). He regarded law as one of the many factors of the morphology of society. Roscoe Pound continued that tradition in his famous article, "The Scope and Purpose of Sociological Jurisprudence" (1910-11), in which he viewed law as "one side of the process of social control...a task or great series of tasks of social engineering." The purpose of law, according to Pound, is to eliminate friction and waste in the satisfaction of the human needs (1910-11;591-619).

To turn from jurists to anthropologists, we find the list of those who subscribe to the sociological view quite extensive. To try to enumerate them would be a very lengthy endeavor. Malinowski states that law and order arise out of the very process which they govern. He sees laws as existing in all human societies and attributes the failure of the analytical jurists to perceive the existence of legal systems among primitive societies to the faulty habit of identifying the legal system with the person or organ possessing the power to make laws and enforce them. He defined law as a body of binding obligations, regarded as a right by one party and acknowledged as a duty by the other, kept in force by a special mechanism of reciprocity and publicity inherent in the structure of their society" (1926:58). Radcliffe-Brown (1933), Lewellyn and Hoebel (1941), Hoebel (1961), Bohannan (1957) and Gluckman (1955, 1965) to give examples, all view law as an aspect of the society independent of any sovereign in the Austinian sense. This does not mean that they all agree in their definition of law. For they exhibit a considerable difference in their views. The difference, however, does not stem from their view of the sociological rather than the formal nature of law, but in their attempt to separate law from other aspects of social life of the group.

The main difficulty with the sociological view of law is that it does not provide a reliable criteria by which one can differentiate between that

aspect of the social life that one may call law and other aspects. This does not pose any problem for those who use the concept of law in a very wide and general sense to man "the totality of people's culture" (Hartland 1924:191). But for later writers, who tend to take a more or less restricted view of law, the problem was there. Malinowski states that the rules of law in primitive society stand out from other social norms in that they are felt and regarded as "obligation of one party and the rightful claim of another." This, of course, gives law a very broad definition and does not really help in distinguishing law from non-law. 121 114 671

One of the most commonly used criterion is that of a "sanction" behind the legal norms. But the mere fact that legal norms have sanctions behind them does not help in drawing the line between them and other norms since all norms are backed by sanctions of some kind or another. It is the kind of sanction, then, not just any sanction, that differentiates law from non-law. In other words, there are classes of sanctions that may be called "legal sanctions." For Malinowski, the loss of reciprocal relations in primitive society constituted the sufficient basis for the legal sanctions (1934). Allen (1958) maintained that legal sanctions are "completely compulsory." "No one is under an absolute compulsion to visit the barber or to wear garments " (1958:59), while, on the other hand, members of the society are under an absolute compulsion not to steal or take the life of another person. Like Malinowski's notion of the loss of reciprocal relations, Allen's concept of "absoluteness" as the basis of legal sanctions is not adequate. For even under the modern legal system, were the penalty for stealing or murder specific and clear, the individual is not under an "absolute" compulsion not to steal or kill. He still can, and the mere existence of the penal institution in modern societies is a living proof that many do violate the legal norms if they are willing to take the risk of such violation, the same risk the person takes who violates the norm 121 114 671 681

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of modesty and walks naked in the streets. Some may even find it easier to accept the risk of penalty for stealing than the social sanctions for violating the norms of modesty.

But although the notion of absolute vs. relative compulsion is arbitrary and artificial as a criterion for defining legal rules, yet Allen is close to another related and widespread criterion of legal sanctions, that is, the idea of the "use of force." Hoebel maintains that "the really fundamental sine qua non of law in any society - primitive or civilized - is the legitimate use of physical coercion.... The law has teeth, teeth that can bite if need be..." (1961a:26) Pound defines law as "social control through the systematic application of the forces of a politically organized society" (1910-11:591). This definition has later been adopted by Radcliffe-Brown (1940) who considers the obligations imposed upon the individual but for which there is no sanction backed by the use or the possibility of use of physical force as merely a matter of social conventions or custom but not law.

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It is evident, then, that those who used the concept of "coercion" as the basis for their distinction of law needed a further specification of the concept. For, as Hoebel has noticed, "There are as many forms of coercion as there are forms of power...and only certain methods and forms are legal" (1961:26). He states that coercion by gangsters is not legal coercion; neither is the parents' physical coercion if it is extreme in form. The essential element in legal coercion according to Hoebel, is "the general social acceptance of the application of physical power, threat or, in fact, by a privileged party, for a legitimate cause, in a legitimate way, and at a legitimate time." The privilege of applying physical force constitutes, according to Hoebel, the official element in law. The person who is recognized as having the right to exercise force is the symbol of authority. This does not mean that he has to be an official or a holder

of any permanent office; it is any person who is exercising the legiti- 121
mate use of force. Simple as the above argument might seem, it really 114
offers very little in refining our conception of legal sanctions. For we 671
are still left with the question of how a person acquires the right to 681
exercise the physical force. What gives his action the legitimacy that 625
is otherwise lacking in other forms of coercion? In trying to deal with 121
this problem anthropologists resorted to a concept that is used by the 114
analytical jurists, that is, the court. There is a basic difference, how- 671
ever, between the anthropologists' view of the court and that of the ana- 692
lytical jurists. The latter see the court as the ultimate source of law:
court creates the law. Anthropologists, on the other hand, tend to use the
court as the source of law but as a criterion of its existence. An example
of such views is Max Radin who maintained that the infallible test "for
recognizing whether an imagined course of conduct is lawful or unlawful...
is to submit the question to the judgment of a court" (1938:1145).

Anthropologists differed among themselves, however, on what constitutes 121
a court. While Radcliffe-Brown (1940) insists that it must be a body of 114
people acting on behalf of the community as a whole and therefore does not 671
exist in all societies, Hoebel (1961), on the other hand, extends the con- 692
cept to include the diffused public opinion or sentiment of the people in 626
a given society as a kind of court that gives legitimation to the use of 625
force by individuals or groups in the absence of a recognized body acting
on behalf of the community. He sees a court in cases of self-help where
the aggrieved party or his kinsmen carry on the procedures of redress
without the intervention of a third party. He maintained that if the pro-
cedures are right, there will be "at least the compulsion of recognized
'legal' procedure, though the ultimate court may be the 'bar of public
opinion'" (1961:25).

The concept of the court has been prominent in the writings of several 121
other anthropologists besides Radcliffe-Brown and Hoebel. Bohannan 114
(1957, 1964, 1965), Redfield (1964) and Pospisil (1958) all imply the 671
existence of a court of some kind or another as the identifying mark of 692
the existence of legal rules. In his attempt to distinguish between law and custom, Gluckman thought of law to exist "as a series of acceptable judgments of rightdoing and wrongdoing in particular cases" (1955:262). Custom and other social observances function as corpus juris and as such a basis for the judgment of where the behavior of one of the litigants in a case is reasonable or unreasonable, lawful or unlawful. As such, custom is a source of law, but not law itself. It becomes law when drawn upon in
passing judgment in a given case. In commenting on a passage on the Nuer 121
by Evans-Pritchard, Gluckman made it clear what he meant by the court. 114
"This passage shows that even in a society where 'self-help' is the en- 671
forcing sanction, people judge situations of dispute in terms of rights 626 692
and duties, and wrongs....Therefore, it seems fair to say that among the 171
Nuer, though they have no courts, there is a process of judgment by mediators and ordinary people in which custom and morality as part of the corpus juris constitute 'sources of law' for particular decisions" (1955a:263).

The importance of the above passage from Gluckman is his distinction 121
between the concept of the court and the judicial process, a distinction 114
lacking in the writing of most other anthropologists dealing with the 671
study of law. Failure to distinguish the two aspects of the legal system resulted in confusing a basic societal process with one of the mechanisms through which the goals of that process achieved in certain societies.
In its broadest sense, the judicial process refers to the ways disputes [692]
are settled within society. Since didsputes arise out of the very nature [626]
of social interaction, some form of dispute settlement is found in all [627]
societies.

The form which the process of dispute settlement takes differs from 121 ●
one society to another. In certain societies disputes are settled through 627
a process of informal mediation undertaken by go-betweens; in others it 692
is by means of self-help; still in others, it is by way of court. In societies 695
with courts the process of dispute settlements is undertaken by
judges who "take and assess the evidence, examine what they regard as the
facts, and come to a decision in favor of one party rather than another"
(Gluckman 1965:183).

Within a given society, disputes are settled in accordance with a set 121
of principles that reflect the basic goals and values of that society. As 627
long as the settlement of a particular dispute proceeds according to these 626
principles, the settlement is supported by the public opinion of that society. 671 692
This is true whether the process is carried on by means of informal 182
mediations or through a court system. It is this public opinion as the expression
of the basic societal values and not the court as a special mechanism
that gives legitimation to the judicial decisions. To equate opinion [114]
with the court as Hoebel (1961) did, or to look at the court as the ultimate
source of legitimation as did Radcliffe-Brown (1940) and others (Redfield
1964, Bohannan 1965), is to create an unnecessary confusion which tends to
undermine meaningful cross-cultural comparisons. Whatever the differences 121
among anthropologists with regard to the definition of the court, their 127
main interest in the concept so far has been as a tool for the definition 671
of law. The interest in the concept gave rise to a methodological approach 114
which came to characterize the literature in legal anthropology, namely,
the case-study approach, cases having been utilized in a number of ways
by legal anthropologists. In their book on the Cheyenne, Llewellyn and
Hoebel (1941) introduced the analysis of "the trouble case." This was
followed by a number of studies utilizing the case study method either to

document statements concerning the substantive law of the society studied, 121
or to abstract and elucidate that law. An example of the first technique 127
is Howell's analysis of the Nuer court decisions (1954) where he collected 671
a large number of court cases, classified them and abstracted the substan- 114
tive aspect of the native law. Gluckman's study of the Lozi (1955) represents the second technique. Smith and Roberts used the same method of case analysis to abstract certain principles of the Zuni law (1954), and Nader utilized it in her study of the Zapotecan law (1964). The list of those who utilized the case-study approach is quite extensive, and the range of the societies they studied is quite varied. But most of them share the interest in the substantive rather than in the procedural aspect of the law.

When referring to the procedural aspect of the law one should keep 121
in mind the difference between the technical and the abstract components 671
of procedural law. The first refers to the activities and steps involved [627]
in the settlement of disputes in the society as well as the person or body [692]
undertaking the responsibility of such settlement. The second involves a 121
number of abstract principles reflecting the values of the society with re- 181
gard to the goals of the judicial process, and which the judicial persons 671
use as a guide in achieving a settlement or in passing a judgment of one 114
kind or another. These are the bases of judicial reasoning. Although judicial reasoning represents one of the most interesting and important aspects of the judicial process, it attracted very little attention among legal anthropologists. With the exception of Gluckman and his analysis of the concept of "reasonable man" among the Lozi (1955a), no significant work has been done in this area. In dealing with the concept of the reasonable man, Gluckman was more interested in discovering universals in laws than in the process of judicial reasoning as such. He implied that an

element of reasonableness is a universal principle in any judicial logic. 121 Nadel reacts to Gluckman's implication of the universality of the concept 181 suggesting that it is valid only in certain contexts, and that the cases 671 reported by Gluckman from which he abstracted that concept are minor ones. 114 Nadel maintained that the principle seems inadequate in major crimes such as homicide, witchcraft or assault. "If I am right, the Lozi would, in these situations, discard their guiding fiction of 'reasonable man' for the sharper dichotomy of things simply lawful and unlawful, permitted and forbidden" (1956:162).

METHODOLOGY

One of the characteristics of legal anthropology is the absence of a 121 coherent body of theory that could be utilized in the analysis and inter- 124 pretation of the ethnographic data. What do exist, however, in the area of the ethnography of law are a variety of what may be called "tools of analysis." These are mainly methods and orientations which help to direct the researcher's attention to a certain area of behavior which describes best the phenomenon under study. Their main purpose is to help the researcher isolate particular portions of the phenomenon he is studying and as such enables him to conceptualize the problem. A number of these tools have been employed in the present study. One of these tools is Turner's "social drama" which was employed in the analysis of the political leadership and the judicial process. Since this approach depends upon the intimate knowledge of the sequential development of a given case, or cases, over a period of time, it was quite difficult to employ it in more than that particular context. As will be apparent in the later chapters, the judicial process among the group is highly informal. Most of the disputes are settled [627] by means of mediation which is done behind the scene and with a great deal of secrecy.

I managed, however, during my stay to be closely in touch with one 12
of the major cases and with almost all the parties involved. This case
was used as the basis for the "social drama" analyzed in chapter three
of the present study.

In addition to the social drama, I have used the case study method 121
to analyze aspects of the substantive law of the group especially with 127
regard to concepts such as that of criminal responsibility and the nature
of the contractual relations as exemplified by the marriage contract.
Cases utilized in the study include ones that I observed myself as well [124]
as cases taken from texts and some which were told to me by informants.

Most of the data was collected through the time-honored technique 123
of participant observation which was facilitated by the fact that the 122
group spoke the native language of the researcher (or vice versa). Formal 124
interviewing was conducted on a very limited scale, thirty-five extensive 125
questionnaires in all. These questionnaires were originally designed and
administered to supplement the life history material and to assess the
attitudes of the particular people involved with regard to particular
issues. Some of the results of these questionnaires are used in the
chapter. Due to the non-representation of the sample interviewed, these
results are used merely as illustration and not as representing any kind
of statistical frequency.

ENTRY TO THE FIELD

It is common among anthropologists to talk with nostalgia about their 114
field experience and about the group they studied. This usually gives the
impression that field work is always an enjoyable experience. Although my
field work seems at the present time to have been a pleasant experience,
especially when comparing it to the pressures of everyday living in a

CHAPTER III

TRIBAL ORGANIZATION

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In discussing the tribal organization of Awlad Ali two modes of analysis are employed. One is a structural form of analysis in which emphasis is on the hierarchy of groups and subgroups by which the tribesmen order themselves. This view of the system is an outside one regarding all smaller units as parts of a delimited whole: Awlad Ali. The other mode of analysis involves the description of some of these groups in terms of the processes by which they emerge and maintain themselves.

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The first problem one encounters in pursuing the first kind of analysis is that of definition of the tribal boundaries. It has been mentioned earlier that the name Awlad Ali includes a number of groups of different ethnic backgrounds. Some of these have been incorporated into the tribe by the system of tribal adoption known as "Iktitab." Such groups consider themselves as Awlad Ali and are considered as such by Awlad Ali proper as well as by outsiders. Other groups such

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as the Murabiteen are not thus incorporated into the tribe; and although they consider themselves to be Awlad Ali, they are not viewed as such by Awlad Ali themselves who prefer to keep the position of the Murabiteen distinct as an inferior group. On the other hand, many

[167]
Awlad Ali have moved outside the area of the Western Desert and have become settled cultivators on the banks of the Nile. These retain a vague and remote genetic connection to the name Awlad Ali.

To avoid this problem, it is best to define the tribe by political rather than by ethnic criterion. There is no paramount chief of the

121 619 671 [643] There is no paramount chief of the tribe at the present time; yet, the unifying force is the recognition by the group of the tribal law, the Daraieb, as a binding set of rules and as the regulator of behavior within the area. In these terms, Awlad Ali are a clearly delimited group, and it is in terms of the jurisdiction of these rules that Awlad Ali are treated as a unit for administrative purposes by the Egyptian government. Viewed this way, Awlad Ali will be defined as those who recognize and abide by the Daraieb or the customary law. This includes the Murabiteen tribes [563] as well as all those who became part of the tribal organization of Awlad Ali by means of Iktitab. Since the territorial jurisdiction of the Daraieb is limited to the Western Desert of Egypt, those groups and individuals of Awlad Ali origin who have moved on a permanent basis from the area will be excluded from the group. Groups and individuals who live in the area but are not part of the tribal organization of Awlad Ali are not subject to the Daraieb.

619 173 Awlad Ali of the Western Desert of Egypt are an offshoot of the Cyrenaica tribes who in turn believe themselves to be the descendants of a unique ancestress Sa'ada.


Syrenaica tribes
Sa'ad
Baraghuth
'Aggar
El-Saghir
Jibran
Harb
Ali
Tribe
Abiad
Ahmar
Senenah
Tribe
Awlad Kharouf
Awlad Mansur
El-Sanagrah
'Eila
El-'aggary
Gedeidah
Bu-Mutair
Bait ('Eila)
El-Asabei
Yousef
'afash
Helleis
Daghash
Bait
Semeida
Yunis
Makhum
Hussein

628 the settlement achieved. In many such interest is best served by taking
613 into consideration the welfare of the other party to the dispute as well.

613 Reasonableness is an important prerequisite for the success of the
554 Aqila in performing this functions in dispute settlement. This is true
157 whether the Aqila is dealing with disputes between members of his own
bait or between members of his bait and outsiders. But while reasonableness and the personal qualities constitute important assets for the Aqila,
they are not the basis of his political authority. Proven abilities are
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554 admired but they are, or had been until very recently, irrelevant to the
178 question of succession to the position of Aqila. The structurally significant source of the Aqila's authority is patrilineal succession. This principle has recently been challenged under the impact of social and economic changes that are taking place in the area. To analyze the role
● 121 of the Aqila and the source of his authority, I shall utilize, to some
613 extent, Turner's concept of "social drama" by presenting and analyzing a
128 case of dispute whose developmental stages happened over a period of more than eleven years. The major part of these developments occurred at the time of the field work and I had a chance to observe at lease part of it. The case in all its phases offers a rare example of a disturbance that happened in the social life of a particular tribal segment. It offers what Turner called "... a limited area of transparency in the otherwise opaque surface of regular, uneventful social life" (p. 93). The political unit involved is that of bait Asabe'i, the largest in size of all baits in the Aggary Eila. As events of the case unfolded themselves, some of the important principles of social structure, at least as they operate at a given point, were revealed.

*795 Bilma and in the following year occupied 'Ain Kalak, killing
*175 Sidi Muḥammad al-Barrani, the Shaikh of the Sanusiya lodge
*648 there and the foremost of al-Sayyid al-Mahdi's missionaries in
the Sahara. In 1909 they occupied Abaish in Wadai and sent an expedition against Masalit. As they advanced they everywhere destroyed or suppressed the lodges of the Order. In 1913 and 1914 they occupied Tibesti, Borku, Wajanqa, and Ennedi, at the same time as the Italians occupied Fazzan from Tripolitania. Though the Sanusiya had minor military successes and temporarily regained some of its territory, it had lost all political control in what is now known as the French Sudan. While the Franco-Sanusi war was in progress in the Sudan Italy, in 1911, declared war on Turkey and landed troops at various points on the Libyan coast, the conquest of Tripolitania being the primary objective. From the first the Sanusiya entered the fray and when Turkey abandoned the contest in 1912 the Order continued the struggle in its own name.

128 At this point I must break off my account of the history of the
*795 Order to show how it achieved its paramountcy in Cyrenaica,
because the development of the Order is tied up with a certain
● 121 set of social relations in Cyrenaica and has been circumscribed
by them. Only in Cyrenaica did the Sanusiya in the end establish itself firmly because only there existed conditions which permitted its taking root strongly.

*795 Sudanese against the French in 1902 and, as we will see, it was
554 they who roused the Bedouin of Cyrenaica and of large parts of
*648 Tripolitania and Fazzan against the Italians in 1911; and it was they who attempted, unsuccessfully, to rouse the Bedouin of Egypt against the British in 1915. It was, above all, their propaganda and personal example in the field which made the struggle against Italy a national war and a religious crusade.
[178] To-day they have been broken by death, exile, and expropriation, and are poor and ignorant, but in the heyday of their power the Turks rightly estimated their influence and were careful not to encroach on their prerogatives.

VI

*795 The thesis I have maintained in the foregoing pages, that the
• 121 Sanusiya kept its cohesion and developed into a political
182 organization largely because it was identified with the tribal system of the Bedouin, is supported by the lack of cohesion, common direction, and political influence of the other Islamic Orders in Libya, which won adherents only in the towns of Cyrenaica and among the citizens and peasants of Tripolitania, and in neither country found support among the Bedouin. I mention these other Orders for this reason, and also because a reference to them, however brief, places the Sanusiya in a more general setting as only one among many Darwish Orders. These other Orders are, however, described barely, since the part they have played in the political history of Cyrenaica is negligible.

*795 The following Orders besides the Sanusiya are represented in Cyrenaica: Qadiriya, Rifa'iya, 'Arusiya, 'Isawiya, Tayyibiya, 'Azuziya, Madaniya, and Sa'adiya. The Qadiriya and the Rifa'iya are the only two classical Orders with lodges in the country, though the others eventually trace their descent from classical sources by those tortuous ramifications so confusing to the student of Islamic fraternities.

The distribution of the lodges of these Orders in Cyrenaica at the present time is shown in the table opposite. A knowledge of the history of the Orders is not necessary for an understanding of the history of the Sanusiya in Cyrenaica and is therefore omitted. It is necessary only to know that they all entered Cyrenaica from the west, both those, the majority,

[TEXT CONTINUED ON PAGE 86]

3:Evans-Pritchard E-4, 5 (1942-1944) 1949 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9
(1837-1942) Sanusi

[P.104]

CHAPTER V

THE FIRST ITALO-SANUSI WAR (1911-17)

I

128 *795 *648 *175 I HAVE given an account of the conditions in which the Sanusiya took root in Cyrenaica and of the circumstances which favoured its growth. I now describe how its Bedouin followers, under its leadership, resisted Italian aggression during two wars, from 1911 to 1917 and from 1923 to 1932, and finally lost their independence and suffered Italian domination until relieved by British arms in 1942. It will be seen how the long struggle accentuated the political functions of the Sanusiya in a manner I indicate forthwith.

121 182 *648 For segmentary structures of the kind we find among the Bedouin of Cyrenaica to develop rudimentary governmental, or statal, organs it would seem necessary that for a long period of time all the segments of the society should find themselves in common opposition to some outside force. It is not merely that such opposition fuses the segments in corporate action. A new form of political structure which includes the enemy comes into existence and necessitates a new orientation of political values. In a segmentary system each segment sees itself as a unity in opposition to an opposed segment of the same size and kind ; so when all the segments come into a corporate relation of opposition to some political group outside them which has a different kind of political structure and belongs to a different political system they tend to see themselves as a unity *vis-à-vis* this group and as a unity on the same structural model as itself. [179] The small Bedouin society of Cyrenaica in this way slowly took on the political form of the European countries into the orbit of which it was drawn. It could only enter into structural relations with the states of Europe on the model of the European state.

*175 *648 *795 619 When the Italians invaded the country and the Turks made peace the tribes continued their resistance in the name of the Sanusiya. In their social system tribe was balanced against tribe and tribal section against tribal section. It was the Sanusiya which gave to all the tribes and their sections a com-

[P.363]

EMRYS PETERS

18. *The Proliferation of Segments in the Lineage of the Bedouin of Cyrenaica* [*Libya*][1]

121 128 In this article I do not propose to discuss the genealogies of the Cyrenaican Bedouin in full, but only such aspects of them as are strictly relevant to an understanding of their process of growth. Many other aspects of these genealogies will be referred to, and indeed, some of the arguments put forward will presume an acceptance of views which cannot be developed adequately in this article. A fuller and more general account of Cyrenaican genealogies is in preparation, and, until this is published, there is no alternative to the somewhat dogmatic statements about them which appear in the introductory part of this article.

174 613 551 562 [173] The Bedouin of Cyrenaica claim that they are all descendants of a unique ancestress, Sa'ada. Writers in the past (e.g. Robertson-Smith 1903) have considered the occurrence of female names in patrilineal genealogies as evidence of an earlier and matrilineal mode of descent. A more satisfactory explanation of the occurrence of female names is to be found in the combination of two facts: descent in the patriline, whether or

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[1] 122 My field work among the Cyrenaican Bedouin was made possible by an award from the Emslie Horniman Fund and a later award from the Treasury Committee for Studentships in Oriental Languages and Cultures. I wish here to express my indebtedness to both committees for their generosity. 121 128 Much of the work I have done on genealogies was included in a thesis presented for the degree of D.Phil. at Oxford University in 1951. The ideas included in this thesis I developed more systematically in a course of lectures on the Bedouin which I gave at Manchester University during the session 1953–54. I subsequently read papers around the problems discussed in this paper at 128 Oxford and Cambridge Universities. I am grateful to Professor Gluckman for reading this article in manuscript, and for the numerous discussions I have had with him on problems relating to lineage organization.

173 178 613 551 114 Although I must confess that I now find it difficult to accept Evans-Pritchard's view of genealogical growth and development as stated for the Nuer, it was the view I originally held with regard to Bedouin genealogies. Indeed, thinking in genealogical terms only, it appears inevitable that the addition of successive generations can only mean the lengthening of the genealogy, or, if the length is to remain constant, extrusion of ancestral names must take place at the apex of the genealogy. If this view is to be accepted, several other conclusions must be accepted with it. The genealogy, as far as it goes at least, is an accurate record of descent—some names may have been lopped off at the top, but otherwise the genealogy represents a faithful statement of succession. Again, if successive generations are to be added to the genealogy, then its base must continually expand laterally. From what is known of contemporary Bedouin genealogies, there is no evidence which leads to the supposition that their base is progressively widening. With regard to the authenticity of the names in the genealogy, above the point of tertiary segmentation, I hope to show in a subsequent article on Bedouin genealogies in general, that names above the tertiary point of segmentation have remained fixed for very long periods of time, and that they bear slight relation to the passage of generations over the last century at least; moreover, in this article I hope to demonstrate that what manipulation of the genealogy takes place does not affect more than about four or five ascending generations from the living.

● 121 173 613 Part of the difficulty in a study of this sort lies in the strong temptation to think of the genealogy *per se*, even though it is readily admitted that it has a value in itself for the Bedouin. Yet even in these terms the genealogy must always represent an ordered grouping of people, and these people live on strips of territory. The starting point of the analysis then ought to begin with the territorial ordering of groups of people. The relation of groups of people to land, moreover, is determined by the carrying capacity of that land, and it is this prerequisite which is the main variable in discussing genealogical manipulation, and not the [182] other way about. The main landmarks of the Cyrenaican ecology are fixed points which cannot be manipulated to fit in with the genealogy; it is the genealogy which must be altered to comprehend the distribution of people in their ecological setting.

• 121 173 613 619 178 If, moreover, the view of a genealogy as a continually expanding line of descent is to be accepted, it must be accepted also that large structural units, even in conditions of population stability, are to experience a continuous re-ordering of their structural relationships. In practice, what this means is that a tribe of, say 20,000 souls cease to be tribesmen of a named tribe and instead all become members of an almost identical group but with a different name. To take an example from the genealogy given [162] on page 365: the Magharba tribe shown there has a total population of some 13,000 souls. If proliferation affected the topmost limits of this tribe, the apical name disappears and presumably the name of one of the primary sections is to be substituted. That is, half the tribe would have to take on the lineage name of their opposed primary section. The only alternative to the use of the name of a primary segment as a substitute for the abandoned tribal name is the acceptance by 13,000 people of a totally new name, which is most unlikely.

It is reasonable to assume therefore, that the genealogy, in its general form, is fixed for long periods of time at least. This still leaves the problem of how and where adjustments are made to face the contingencies of birth and death, of the succession of generations, and of the irregular increases and decreases of population among the tertiary segments. An important clue lies in the number of segments which appear at the various orders of segmentation. From Sa'ada, the founding ancestress, in the line which runs to Nasr, each ancestor is shown as having a pair of sons for four orders of segmentation. At the fifth generation from Sa'ada—this is now the secondary order of segmentation within the tribe—the number of sons increases to four. Not all tribes will show the same number of sons at each generation as the Magharba—some, for example, might show three instead of two at the primary order—but what is true of all tribes is that there is evident consistency in the number down to and including the fifth generation from Sa'ada; if, that is to say, one of a tribe's primary segments is divided into three secondary sections, the other one or two, as the case may be, will be divided likewise. Throughout the tribes in Cyrenaica, then, segmentation of orders superior to the tertiary segments shows a pronounced consistency in their numbers.

794 were concerned, there was little doubt who was leader—the
554 name of the former was known throughout the land. Now when
the warrior returned from his Egyptian exile, his rival offered
794 him a sheep as a gift. This act was wholly appropriate. Subsequently
554 they continued to compete fiercely, but it soon became
578 clear that the returned warrior was winning the greater support.
[788] In the face of this, the rival, in 1948, decided to break with tradition
by staying away from the annual pilgrimage to the tomb of
[175] the local saint. Instead, he and his followers made their pilgrimage
to a different tomb in the vicinity of their camp, and later
built a low wall round the tomb, whitewashed it, and made it
known that henceforward they would regularly use it for pilgrimages.
[613] The two kinship groups of a tertiary section now had their
[778] separate saint's tomb. Some months later, the rival decided to
move with his small group to an area in which they had not previously
794 resided. It is the custom among the Bedouin when they
554 pitch their tents in a place for the first time, that the people of
578 the neighbourhood should bring them gifts to mark the event.
431 The returned warrior, who had now become a close neighbour
[166] of his rival was obliged, like others, to offer the latter a gift; he
was also obliged to return the gift of a sheep that he had been
given on rejoining his section in 1947. He brought a gift within a
few hours of his rival's arrival, but it was a goat.[14] The rival and
his followers were furious, and the argument that the warrior was
too poor to give more was dismissed summarily. This was the
final insult. The donor, in return, had been given less than he had
presented. The reciprocity of gift exchanges had not only been
arrested, it had been reversed. From then onwards the two groups
made no attempt to conceal their hostility and went their separate
ways.

613 Disputes stemming from circumstances such as these are the
578 occasions which mark the proliferation of groups, although in
all three cases cited, difficulties over water supplies had preceded
the outbreaks of quarrelling.

613 In this discussion of the ways in which proliferation of segments
602 takes place, the emphasis had been put on the tug of war
121 between the interests of people in their agnatic connexions and

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[14] A goat is inferior to a sheep in gift exchanges.

the interests they have in their maternal relatives. Stated thus 613
sharply, this is a distortion of the process. To speak of the prin- 602
ciple of agnation conflicting with the principle of cognation or 121
maternal origin is nonsense, as the facts included in the discussion show. Agnation is not one thing, but many. Within its scope are included such aspects of social organization as succession, status, inheritance, bride-wealth, blood-money, modes of domestic and political behaviour, and so forth; and each of these aspects, the closer we stick to reality, can be broken up into a number of components. The same can be said of cognation and maternal origin. All these principles, so called, are clusters of numerous component parts, which combine, in reality, in a kaleidoscopic number of ways. In one situation a component of one combines with that of another to strengthen it; in a different situation the one component may repel the other; in a third situation, a number of the components in one will combine to exclude those of the other, and so on. If, therefore, an understanding of the way in which lineage proliferation occurs is sought, a view of the process as a conflict between the principle of agnation and the opposing pull of maternal origin is quite erroneous. It is of use in predicting the direction of cleavage to know that within a tertiary group there are also clusters of kin which are defined roughly by maternal links, and this knowledge serves as a rough and ready guide in predicting what the composition of groups, after they have split away from the parent group, will be. If a more precise picture of this composition is desired, other and more complex kinship links and the behaviour which accompanies them must be taken into account. If a still more accurate picture is desired, details of inheritance disputes, debts of bride-wealth, the size of flocks and herds, and the like, must also be taken into consideration. If, finally, one has the opportunity to study groups after they have proliferated, the presence or absence of this or that man can often be explained only in terms of his eye for a pretty girl or a personal preference for neighbours.

The kind of change which has been discussed in this essay is [178]
not difficult to negotiate in genealogical terms. Earlier it was [621]
stressed that within the tertiary tribal sections, although they [173]
are always predominantly agnatic groups, clusters of cognatic [551]

613 602 121 178 621 173 551

kin also exist. Two ways of naming these clusters are adopted—all groups, whether they are elementary families, an odd assortment of kindred sharing a common tent for reasons of expediency, or tribal groups, have a name. Sometimes these clusters are named after a prominent living male, or a deceased kinsman of the same kind. Sometimes these little groups are named after a woman, perhaps the grandmother of the group.[15] Thus a small group of two or three tents will be distinguished from another similar cluster within the camp, and so on for a number of groups, depending on the size of the camp. Most camps, however many tents they contain, have names for progressively inclusive clusters of tents until a twofold named division is reached. Tertiary segments that are forced to split contain therefore two groups with names already attached to them. When a split occurs, the name of the tertiary segment is pushed into the area of ambiguity and the names of what were previously two clusters become the names of two new tertiary segments, with a minimum adjustment in usage and a minor re-shuffle at the tertiary level of segmentation. Names cannot continue to be pushed into this area of the genealogy interminably, otherwise it would gradually expand into a vast pool of names. For a few generations the name dispensed with in this way becomes one of those ancestors about whom there is argument when genealogies are given. In the course of time, name after name is subjected to the process of elision and eventually will cease to be of concern to anyone.

105 613 173 178 [551]

I now summarize the main points of the discussion. The evidence that has been examined suggests that the mechanical devices of telescoping, fusion of names, and extinction of lines do not affect orders of segmentation superior to that of the tertiary order, and that in conditions of a completely stable population, these devices alone would suffice to retain the form of the genealogical structure. But, it was argued, conditions of complete stability cannot be assumed; the evidence of the present distribution of population among the numerous tertiary groups clearly points to marked fluctuations occurring within these small groups. This being so, proliferation of these groups in some areas at some

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[15] The naming of groups within a tertiary segment is an interesting study in itself, but it would be outside the limits of this discussion to make more than a brief mention of it.

4: Peters E-5 (1948-1950) 1970. MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9
Cyrenaica

105 613 173 178 Change due to the normal and inevitable process of proliferation is thus managed within the structural limits of the tertiary section without disturbing any of the superior orders in the system. The latter remain fixed over long periods, but the tertiary sections of a particular secondary action may be reduced in number over a few generations while another secondary section may show a corresponding increase in the number of its segments.

● 121 178 613 161 By combining the various factors involved in change, it is possible to understand the details of lineage proliferation, or at least to travel along a well signposted road. In the light of this analysis, moreover, it is unnecessary to assume a stable population in each and every segment over long periods; the mechanisms of readjustment allow for substantial irregularities and fluctuations in population. It is possible that they are also sufficient to contain significant increases in the aggregate population. They could almost certainly control minor fluctuations, but it is seriously doubted whether a population increase sufficient to produce a country-wide and acute water shortage could be met merely by the proliferation of tertiary lineage segments. But to deal with this problem other aspects of the Bedouin genealogy and details of Cyrenaican history, which have necessarily been omitted from this discussion, would have to be taken into account, and this is best left for another article.

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SOME STRUCTURAL ASPECTS OF THE FEUD AMONG THE CAMEL-HERDING BEDOUIN OF CYRENAICA[1]

E. L. PETERS

WHEN a Bedouin kills another in Cyrenaica, one of a number of consequences 682
ensues. According to the Bedouin, the particular consequence is determined by 571
the genealogical positions of the persons or groups concerned. In the first part of 829
this article an analysis of the disturbances in social relationships precipitated by 128
homicide is made, using a lineage model as a framework. In this part of the
discussion the arrangement of the information corresponds closely to the view the
Bedouin give of their relationships. Additional information is then presented to show [613]
that this lineage model neither covers several important areas of social relationships
nor enables an accurate prediction of events to be made. This raises the issue: can the 121 ●
comprehensive power of the model be increased by complicating it, or does 613
complexity destroy its utility? The argument advanced is that the lineage model is not a 571
sociological one, but that it is a frame of reference used by a particular people to
give them a common-sense kind of understanding of their social relationships. For
sociological purposes this means that the lineage model, with its supporting theoretical [128]
presuppositions, must perforce be abandoned. In the latter part of this article
some of the implications of adopting this position are discussed. Particular stress is [578]

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[1] This study is based on field-work in Cyrenaica carried out over a period of twenty-seven months from January 1948 to December 1950. The field-work was made possible by the award of a Horniman Studentship and of a Treasury Senior Studentship in Oriental Languages and Cultures. I wish to express my thanks to both awarding bodies. The paper was presented in its first form to a seminar at Manchester University. Modified versions were read at Oxford and Cambridge and at University College London in 1963. In a Manchester seminar, Professor W. J. M. Mackenzie raised issues which led me to reconsider my mode of analysis. Professor Ely Devons read a draft of the article, and offered valuable suggestions.
I also wish to thank Professor Gluckman for the 12
many profitable discussions we have had on the
institution of the feud. My interest in the feud stems [114] ←
directly from Evans-Pritchard's work on the institution among the Nuer. I am most grateful to him for his help and encouragement while I was pursuing my researches. Finally, anyone writing on the feud must acknowledge the contribution made to its understanding by Dr. Elizabeth Colson.

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●121 given to the feud, for this is one of the few societies in which it occurs.[1] What is
613 meant here by a state of feud is a set of relationships between two tribal groups which
578 are characterized by hostility whenever two or more of their members meet. These
571 hostilities are of a sort which cannot be terminated; feud is not a matter of a group
121 indulging in hostilities here at one moment and there the next, but a sequence of
619 hostilities which, as far as the contemporary Bedouin are concerned at least, know
578 no beginning and are insoluble. Feud and the other forms of relationships to be
[571] discussed presently are to be understood, in part, by reference to the ordered divisions
of the tribes. It is necessary at the outset, therefore, to give a brief statement about
the tribal organization; other details will be included as they become relevant.

619 There are nine noble tribes in Cyrenaica whose members are referred to as freemen.
621 These tribes see themselves as divided into three genealogical orders of sections:
primary, secondary, and tertiary. The tertiary tribal sections correspond to the camps
613 which cluster around the larger watering points during the drought season, May to
[132] November. Such camps consist of clusters of smaller camps in which the concentration
of agnatically related males is over 80 per cent. Within the latter kinship links
are known, so that these agnates are consanguinely related as well as politically
[162] united. The populations of most tertiary groups vary from about 200 to 700 or so,
but a group ceases to be viable if the number of male adults drops much below fifty.
Political division is absent from these tertiary groups, regardless of their precise
size, for, whatever may be the condition of developing local lineages, the acceptance
of a common name carries with it full political responsibility incumbent equally on
[423] all their members. Each of these tertiary sections, moreover, has its own watering
point, ploughland, and pastures; each has its own *watan* or homeland. This statement
is true of all tribal sections of whatever order of segmentation. In other words, the
tribes and their sections correspond to an ordered division of the territory.

619 Names of tribal sections are the same as those given in the genealogies. Both tribe
613 and lineage are identically ordered. Lineages develop, and split at the tertiary order
of segmentation,[2] and, *a fortiori*, the process is the same for the tertiary tribal sections.
Split, in other words, occurs where relationships are most intense.

621 The summer community which constitutes a tertiary section, breaks up once the
221 rains begin in November or December. At this time of the year water is readily
available in the numerous small cisterns, there is pasture in plenty, and the animals
are giving milk. These combined reasons lead the larger summer camp to divide
into smaller camps of some five to ten tents. The latter are separated one from the
other by short distances—a mile or so—but together form a cluster in that they are
621 territorially distinguishable from a neighbouring and similar group of camps. Ter-
311 tiary sections are discrete also in the sense that all the major necessities of daily living
are available within their several territories. Each controls its own natural resources,
and these resources are the same for all the camel-herding groups—in any given year
one may have more of a particular commodity than another, but the difference is in

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[171] [1] Evans-Pritchard, 1940. The feud might have been present among the Nuer. Exogamy and the other rules of marriage which obtain among them create a dispersion of ties, which superficially appears to militate against a condition of feud. But a dispersal of ties does not mean that they necessarily act as a pressure for peace. Moreover, the exogamous links may link limited numbers of groups only, leaving others with sufficient discreteness to pursue feuding relationships as they are described in this paper.

[2] See Peters, 1959.

682 To complete this general statement, two further circumstances are cited by the
602 Bedouin. If a man kills a related person who is not an agnate (it is expressed as killing
the mother's brother) the breach in relationships must be healed as quickly as possible.
The convention for dealing with this is that the offender, bound hand and foot,
mounted on a horse, is sent to the camp of ' the owner of the blood ', in the company
of a holy man, there to make an offer of his life, saying: ' Here is my knife, my life
is yours; here is my shroud, my life is yours.' No Bedouin would agree for a moment
to undertake this journey if he thought the offer might be accepted. In Bedouin
sentiments a life offered in this way cannot be taken. It is the convention which precedes
a peace meeting and blood money. Any other way of dealing with the confusion,
which spreads as a result of a homicide between cognates, is excluded.

682 Secondly, if a woman is killed, whatever the intersegmentary distance, the homicide
562 is said to be accidental, because a man never ' intends ' to kill a woman. Blood-money
arrangements are made as soon as possible, and the wealth—half that of a
613 man—passes to the deceased's father, not to her husband, for a woman's ' bone '
always belongs to her father. Obviously women cannot be allowed to enter into
[582 feud; since it is demographically compelling (apart from other reasons) for some of
[591 them to marry outside their natal groups, then they might well find themselves residents
in the enemy's camps, if they were to become involved in feuds.

•121 This statement of the different means available for the regulation of homicide at
682 the several orders of tribal segmentation is the view the Bedouin themselves hold of
their relationships. An analysis of the facts presented thus far could bring out a
613 number of interesting points with regard to the relativity of morals, the typification
829 of acts by their social context, the significance of the orders of segmentation, and so
619 on. Rather than proceed along these lines, however, it is more urgently necessary
to reflect on the significance of the fact that the arrangement of the material in terms
of what is usually called the lineage structure coincides with the Bedouin ordering
of the same details. It is, of course, important to note that the account is not based
on mere hearsay evidence. Each statement made can be documented from known
homicides, and to this extent the model that has been used is consistent with reality.
The model, nevertheless, can only be a representation of what a particular people,
the Bedouin, conceive their social reality to be; it is a kind of ideology which enables
them, without making absurd demands on their credulity, to understand their field
of social relationships, and to give particular relationships their *raison d'être*. But, as
will be shown, it would be a serious error to mistake such a folk model for sociological
analysis. Such an error is difficult to avoid because the Bedouin, when defending their
view, are able to cite enough bits and pieces of reality to make their argument con-
121 vincing. The flaw in the reasoning is seen when it can be shown that its consequences
114 are absurd. As an example of what is meant, the statement that feud is attached to
groups at the secondary order of segmentation may be considered. If the statement
613 were true, if each and every secondary section were at feud one with the other (and
619 in a structural sense this ought to be so), then each tribe would be divided into small
829 mutually hostile groups, which completely lacked any possibility of movement, even
578 for pasturing purposes. Presented with this, the Bedouin would argue that this is not
in fact so, because secondary and primary sections are interlinked in many ways. That
is, they evoke what to them are contingencies to explain why they are at feud with one

121 part of a secondary section but not with another. Once contingencies are permitted
613 to enter in, the lineage model ceases to be of use, for what is implied is that at all
114 times some parts of sections structurally situated for feuding do not in fact feud.
[619] Other facts can be adduced to show that the structural view is inadequate but, before
[829] proceeding to examine these, some general objections to the lineage theory need to
[518] be raised. In the first instance, the corner stone in the theory of lineage systems is that
they consist of parts which are in balanced opposition. It is no accident that the idiom
generally used in discussing the segmentation of a lineage system is that segments
bifurcate. Indeed bifurcation is necessary if lineage theory is to make sense, because
if at any order there are more than two segments, then combinations can occur which
are not comprehended by the theory. In the Cyrenaican lineage the number of segments
at the tertiary order is haphazard, in some cases as few as two but in others as
many as a dozen or so. Where there are many segments at this order it is rather
pointless to speak in terms of balanced opposition. Moreover, at the secondary order
of segmentation the number of segments are fairly consistent throughout the tribes,
but they number more than two in all of them. It is also a fact that combinations
occur and, moreover, these may be between the tertiary segments of two ' opposed '
secondary segments.

121 Secondly, in lineage theory groups come together to constitute larger segments in
613 opposition to like segments. Yet in lineage societies there is a lack of instituted
571 authority, there are no chiefs distributed throughout the land as heads of segments
622 of the hierarchical orders. This being so, then it is not possible for all the sections of,
114 say, a secondary section to come together; there is no one to command the action.
In fact, sections combine in Cyrenaica, but not in the way they should according to the
lineage structure. In order to discuss this adequately, a lengthy diversion into an
analysis of the distribution of power would be necessary. The matter must rest here
with the admittedly somewhat dogmatic assertion that there are men who wield
power over groups of varying populations, and that the extent of their domains
cannot be understood by reference to orders in the lineage. Perhaps it is for this
reason—because, that is to say, lineage theory effectively blocks the exercise—that
relatively little has been written about the problem of leadership in these societies.

121 Thirdly, all segments should be fairly equal in numbers of people and economic
613 resources, if the theory of lineage were to have substance in reality. In Cyrenaica
114 the population of one tertiary segment may be three times or more that of another.
[621] Both may be structurally equal in the sense that they are named groups segmenting
as a pair of brothers from a common father. As political groups, however, this
equality has little meaning. Further, with regard to economic resources, some sections
possess several wells and a territory of such extent that it straddles two or even
more of what might be called micro-ecological areas. With marked preponderance in
numbers and superiority of resources, some groups have grown into dominance, and
the evidence points to the existence of this dominance in the past also. However,
' like ' sections may appear on a lineage chart, in political action there is conspicuous
[619] disparity. Each tribe possesses one tertiary section or more with a claim to be the
[621] owners of the ' Golden Stirrup '; these are large tertiary groups with relatively plentiful
resources, with allies in other groups, and, in sum, with the power to terrorize
other tribal groups.

5: Peters E-5 (1948-1950) 1967 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9
Cyrenaica

● 121 613 562 114 These three objections to the lineage theory as a useful model for examining the consequences of homicide are serious enough in themselves, but another objection renders it still less satisfactory. This fourth objection relates to the implication that lineage theory cannot take account of women. Indeed, in some of the accounts of the political organization of lineage societies, the impression is given that they are all-male societies: women belong only to the domestic and kinship realms. In terms of the theory, this must be so. Women, the marriage links they create, the forms of relationships that derive from marriage, the right of men to joke with others by virtue of a link through women, their rights to demand favours of men who are not their agnates, their right to expect contributions to bridewealth or blood money from maternal relatives—all these, and other forms of behaviour, have been dealt with as patterns of behaviour which interfere with or disturb agnation, or that cut
121 613 across lineage affiliations. Such metaphors can only be justified if it is accepted that precedence must be given to agnation, to what people say they think their lineage relationships to be, and that there is some kind of primacy about what have frequently been called jural rules which constitute the structure, while behaviour which is not governed by these rules is to be relegated to the position of secondary forms having the effect of intruding only. But these secondary forms of behaviour are as impelling, as persisting, and are as much a part of social life as any of the so-called jural rules.
[582] It is possible to go further than this, and state that in societies where there is a high incidence of marriage among agnates of the local group, as occurs among the Bedouin, jural rules rarely appear in their ' pure ' form in behaviour, since, in groups of this sort, each and every person constitutes a bundle of roles by virtue of the fact that he is one of a very complex cognatic group; a particular role, it is true, may take precedence in a particular situation, but all roles are present in each situation and affect behaviour. Precedence can only be given to specific forms of behaviour in relation to situations. There is no such thing as a general primacy with regard to any form. The concept of agnation as the centre of all political problems, disturbed or disrupted by, say, matrilaterality, is as inadequate as saying that the nucleus which pulls all other components into position is matrilaterality with agnation as a disturbing element. In reality there are numerous components present in all situations, which should not be lumped together under such categorizing terms as agnation and matrilaterality, but which combine as separate components in a kaleidoscopic range of clusters.

121 613 682 674 829 Some of the components of behaviour subsumed under the notion of matrilaterality are briefly given here in order to appreciate more fully the consequence of inter-group marriage. Of paramount importance is the fact that, in Bedouin sentiment, to kill a relative is as sinful an act as the killing of a close agnate. When such a homicide did occur, during my period of residence among them, the Bedouin response was to assert that the offender was out of his mind—it was inconceivable that he could have
[602] committed the offence otherwise. Their attitude was reminiscent of the horror they display when a man kills his father or a full brother, and represents a much stronger reaction than is manifested when a man kills an agnate of, say, the third or fourth degree. They have every reason to be disturbed by the killing of a mother's brother,
[604] for, whatever personal affections may be involved, a crucial link is threatened. Their reasoning, however, is that relationships with the mother's brother are characteristically easy, that they are not demanding, that there is much joking in them, and that to

121 kill within this range is, in terms of the general pattern of behaviour, stupid. What is of
613 interest is that such killings do occur. I recorded three instances of men killing the
682 mother's brother in the contemporary population, not to mention many others
674 based on hearsay evidence only. Clearly, the relationship is more than a merely per-
829 missive one. The mother's brother may well be the only person who can help in
certain crises, and if he withholds his assistance the sister's son is left in a dilemma.
604 The form of behaviour in which demands are made is, as the Bedouin rightly say,
121 that of asking a favour, but this does not mean that it is any the less urgent than a
613 demand made against agnates. The range of favours is large, and only a few can be
detailed here. If a group has insufficient water to meet its needs a man first seeks help
604 from his mother's brother. The request has a number of aspects to it: it is a test of
[554] the relationship itself; it is a matter of pride and status that a man can 'call' on
another to help his group out of difficulties, it is an assurance that resources other than
those jealously guarded by his agnates are available to him, and if a man is seeking
to increase his power he must have available more than an agnate's share of local
[682] water resources to supply his flocks and herds. When a blood-money payment has to
be made, the mother's brother is expected to come forward—it is his right to give
[584] without being asked. If a man wants a wife, he is not permitted to approach his father
directly, but his mother's brother can put pressure on the father instead. If a man dies
[429] while his eldest son is still a minor, his brother may be required to act as guardian,
and in this role he controls the son's property; disputes frequently break out as a
result, with the son at a considerable disadvantage, for he cannot engage his father's
brother in hostilities—but his mother's brother can do so for him. Whenever men
[422] come to possess animals before the demise of their fathers or when the father's
brother is acting as guardian they mark them with the tribal and personal signs of their
[583] mothers' brothers. Men have the right to demand contributions for bridewealth
from their agnates if they lack wealth; in practice it comes not from them, but from
the mother's brother. Finally, in certain circumstances, if a man does not have male
heirs, his sister's son might inherit all his wealth.

121 Affinity also carries with it a large number of rights. A poor man may take up
613 residence in the camp of his father-in-law, and be kept by him. The latter may come
to his son-in-law's aid in many of his dealings with his father. Like the mother's
606 brother, the affine is a potential source of water-supply when rain has been insufficient
on the homeland. He also helps with blood money and bridewealth, and he is expected
to aid his daughter and her husband with gifts of food and wool.

121 The details given above by no means exhaust the list of rights a man possesses in
his matrilateral and affinal relatives. Obviously, these are not the only forms of
613 relationship either, and the other forms carry with them yet other claims of various
sorts. Enough detail has been given, however, to make clear the point that local
agnatic groups are so differentiated, and inter-group relationships are so important,
that each aspect of homicide settlement previously described will require further
examination, not in the sense that additional complications must be introduced, but
with the question in mind, is not the structural presentation false? Before beginning
this stage of the argument it is necessary to establish the fact that the links of affinity
and matrilaterality which a group has with another are of a kind which necessitate
their inclusion in an analysis of the arrangements for settling homicides.

613 Among the Bedouin, men are permitted to marry their father's brother's daughter
582 and any other cousin of similar type within the local agnatic group. This means that
• 121 most agnates will be related in other ways as well. Parallel-cousin marriage has the
effect of diversifying the agnatic group, and creates small nuclei within it, each having
its own characteristics and patterns of behaviour with others. Diversification of this
kind leads to a differentiation between homicides within the tertiary group.

The Bedouin say that they always marry their parallel cousins, and do not give their
daughters to others if they can help it. Census data does not support this view. Nearly
as many men find wives outside their agnatic group as within it. Of importance
in the present context is the direction taken by these external marriages. Perhaps
121 the most striking feature is that the number of marriages with men of a collateral
582 tertiary group is low, so low that they can be explained by special circumstances.
628 Now collateral tertiary groups whose territories are adjacent experience intense day-
613 to-day relationships. In the context of descent these are the most closely linked
[621] lineages—among older men there may be the recollection of the time when the two
constituted a single community, and when they all lived together in the same summer
camp. Common sentiment between them is very strong. The strips of territory they
inhabit may be almost identical. Their discreteness lies almost entirely in the possession of separate natural resources, although in some cases pastures are shared.
But their social boundaries are nevertheless sharply drawn, for the high incidence of
parallel-cousin marriage within them, and the tendency for external links to leap-frog
collateral segments, gives them a definition which could not be bettered by exogamy.
121 The basis of their discreteness lies, of course, in the competition that exists between
628 them for natural resources; however much the Bedouin protest that their real enemies
613 are the secondary or primary groups lying some thirty to fifty miles away, when they
578 wish to enlarge their resources there is little point in attempting to capture a well a
long distance away, which cannot be defended, and might be located alongside an
enemy group. They do, it is true, engage in competitive hostilities over land and
water situated some distance from their homeland, but when they engage in these
activities they do so on behalf of a linked group, albeit with their own interests
uppermost. The capture of natural resources for use by a tertiary group can only be
achieved by an enlargement of its homeland, and this is only possible by expanding
into a neighbour's territory.

121 Another feature of external marriages is that they are not spread among as many
613 groups as in societies where there are exogamous clans, and where other rules of
marriage appear to compel the maximum amount of dispersal. Instead, the external
582 links created through marriage are highly selective, and are thrown out into ecologically differentiated areas, giving added economic security, or, in the case of date oases,
an additional item to the diet at a time of the year when it is sorely needed. Once
established these external links are perpetuated through cross-cousin marriages in
successive generations. If the link is considered valuable, and relationships develop
satisfactorily, other marriage connexions will be woven around the first. Multiplicity
gives added strength and durability, not in the mechanical sense of duplication, but of
creating a more diverse kin structure, with its greater range of rights and claims, in
which links can flourish. While the number of groups linked in marriage are few,
the geographical spread is great. Marriage links exist with tertiary sections of colla-

121 teral secondary sections, with collateral primary sections, and long distances away
613 into other tribes. This spread can be interpreted as giving each tertiary group access
582 to resources of wide ecological diversity. What is of interest in the present context
is not the interpretation of the links but the effect they have on behaviour. Spread
means that a group can call for help from a number of differently situated groups.
121 Each one of these links not merely modifies the structural means for settling homi-
613 cide, but converts the homicide into a sociologically quite different sort of act. It can,
as the Bedouin like to think, be an act of merit for a man to kill another from a feud-
582 ing secondary section, but there is no merit whatsoever in it if the tertiary section of
578 that secondary section happens to contain affines or maternal relatives; this is a sinful
682 act. The Bedouin themselves recognize this when they add to their structural
explanation the rider that they do not feud with cognatic relatives. The difference
between their position and a sociological one is that they see this as a contingency not
as a persistent necessity; they are able to maintain their position because they see their
behaviour as explicable in terms of the simple ossified structure of their genealogical
relationships. What they fail to appreciate is that these ' contingencies ' are ecologi-
cally, economically, demographically, and politically essential. They are able to main-
tain their position also, because the model of a lineage structure they use, along with
the two riders previously mentioned (see p. 270) affords them a kind of explanation
for most occurrences. The argument is attractive both to Bedouin and to anthro-
pologists because it is comprehensive and neat in its logicality. The next stage in the
argument is to show that there is a far greater range of possible consequences to a
homicide than those summarized in the diagram (see p. 269) and that the additional
consequences are related, not to the lineage structure, but to the linkages which have
been discussed above.

121 I begin with a review of a homicide which involves two men of the same tertiary
613 section. Bedouin classify all homicides within this range—as they do for any of the
682 structural orders—as undifferentiated, but in each case, different sorts of relatives
are concerned in the ensuing hostilities, and the consequences are, therefore, different
829 also. Bedouin say that a man never kills his father or full brother. In the event of a
man killing another man acknowledged to be his father, the act itself proves that he
cannot possibly be his son. He is said to be illegitimate, thus making his mother an
adultress and relieving the males of the agnatic line of the responsibility and the
121 odium. If a maternal uncle of the agnatic group is killed, the offence is almost on a
par with that of patricide or fratricide. When, however, the homicide is between two
613 men who are agnatically distant, and not closely related cognatically either, but both
682 are members of the same local agnatic group, what follows will depend largely on the
size and stage of development of the group; if it is small, the homicide threatens to
wreck it, but if it is large and on the verge of splitting the homicide may be the
occasion for split taking place and being recognized publicly by a demand for blood
money. Threatened with wreckage, a small group meets a homicide by closing its
ranks for self preservation; a large group splits. The same event within the same
kind of structural unit results in two quite dissimilar consequences. The reason is
clear enough—the two groups are similar only in a general structural way, but
sociologically they are not comparable.

When a homicide occurs between tertiary segments the solution, it was said earlier,

● 121 613 682 is found in either a vengeance killing or a blood-money agreement which later becomes caught up in a wider set of debt relationships. Records show that this is true in some cases, but in others the blood money is paid in one instalment and immediately. The recognition of a debt and its liquidation among the Bedouin is tantamount to a declaration of hostility, since without a debt the means for smooth-running relationships is lacking. Such a blood-money payment was made between two tertiary groups in the absence of the 'owner of the blood'; when he returned he sought out his brother's killer, and took two lives for one. Subsequently, there was a further blood-money settlement but there remained 'a man left over'. In other circumstances an annual payment, called *sana'*, is demanded in addition to the prompt and full payment of the blood money. The attachment of the *sana'* to a settlement is an invidious condition since it is regarded as a fee by those who have to pay it, it is said to lower the status of a group and 'one day, it must be repudiated'.[1] It may, circumstances permitting, serve to cast off all pretence of friendly relationships. It is more likely that it will lead to a further outbreak of hostilities. When I witnessed the payment of the *sana'* the terms in which it was demanded were: 'You have a man on your backs. Are you going to repudiate this or are you going to give me *sana'*? If you repudiate, we must seek vengeance.' The payment, one in a long series, was made on that occasion but there were loud grumblings among the men of the camp against their leader for his acquiescence and one suggested that they terminate the payments forthwith by shooting the claimant. Of the three forms of blood money cited, this latter is the extreme to which groups can go short of open feud. Its opposite is a blood-money payment which is mainly left as a debt, and which is accompanied by the 'gift' of a wife to the victim's group.[2] The wife is 'given' as an earnest that the offender's group wishes the full restoration of relationships ruptured by the homicide. There are, therefore, four forms of blood-money payment. The Bedouin view of these is that they are variants of what is, in principle, the same thing. Their view cannot be accepted. Each of the four payments points to diverse kinds of social relationships between groups, and their consequences are wholly disparate. These various kinds of relationships between the tertiary sections of the same secondary section exist because the relationships between all sections cannot possibly be the same if they are more than a pair in number. A secondary section which spans ten tertiary sections is not the same type of unit as one which spans only three. The greater the number of tertiary sections the greater the possible permutations in their relationships. What the Bedouin think of as variations in the form of blood-money
[829] payment is related to the complexities that lie behind their simple lineage model. Bedouin can comprehend this complexity only by thinking in terms of a kind of average behaviour, regarding deviations from the average as fortuitous and explicable by the faulty reasoning that 'in this particular case, it just so happened' that this, that, and the other were part of the situation, failing to appreciate that apparent aberrations are constants to the extent that some sort of specifics occur in all cases. There is no reason why Bedouin reasoning should be followed in sociological analysis.

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[1] See Peters, 1966.

[581] [585] [2] A marriage is not legal unless at least a promise to hand over wealth has been made beforehand. In the case cited the amount promised would be no more than a token—a sheep or a goat.

121 613 682

The consequences of homicides in which secondary groups are concerned present an even greater variety, for now the span has expanded to include many more groups, with a total population of several thousand people. Groups of this order are spread over a much wider territorial range; some structurally distant groups are neighbours by virtue of their propinquity, while some structurally proximate groups are far removed territorially. Some feuds lie dormant for long periods. Others erupt [578] frequently. Some homicides between these groups are followed by the 'laying down of the denial'—the feud situation with most acrimony built into it, for one denial, followed by a vengeance killing, is met by a second denial and so on, excluding thereby any chance of a settlement. In other circumstances the offender's group boast that they are responsible for a homicide, thus challenging the victim's group to a show of force. Only the more powerful tertiary groups would venture to do this, and it is only they who could meet a homicide against them with a spectacular show of force, compelling a weaker tertiary group (according to hearsay evidence) to break up and leave its homeland. The modes of killing in homicide differ in character. Some killings have been heinous and offensive in terms of general morality; their purpose is to sting the victim's kin to retaliate or to cause them to suffer general discredit and loss of status. While some parts of secondary segments are at feud, others are not. A homicide between affinally or matrilaterally linked groups, whether they are secondary or primary groups, is settled as quickly and as amicably as possible to prevent turmoil in their relationships. Feud concerns two tertiary sections, not the [578] opposed secondary sections of which they are parts. Blood money and vengeance is [628] not the responsibility of secondary sections, but of their respective tertiary sections.

121 613 582 578

At this point, a further statement concerning the external marriage links of tertiary segments throws further light on the feud. Previously it was stated that the competition between collateral tertiary groups for natural resources is indicated by a low rate of marriage between them. Their external marriage links reinforce the separation. One tertiary section, A, takes some of its spouses from section X of a collateral secondary section; A's collateral, B, takes some of its spouses from X's collateral, Y. A may be at feud with Y and B with X. The agnatic links between A and B, and X and Y do not mitigate the severity of the hostility in the two feuds, they exacerbate it. It would be erroneous to think of them as cross-cutting ties which promote peace. Stultified in the development of their hostilities by virtue of their territorial proximity and the sentiment associated with putatively close agnatic connexion, A and B are able to express hostilities indirectly through their linked groups X and Y respectively. During discussions of disputes, homicides, or rival claims to water, whether the disputants meet in the camps or in administrative offices in the villages, men from the matrilateral and affinal groups of the parties directly concerned are also present to do most of the shouting. In some cases I recorded a maternal relative was killed on behalf of an agnatic group to which he did not belong, although the latter accepted the responsibility. In the light of facts of this sort the lineage model obstructs analysis.

121 619 682 726

I now wish to make a few brief remarks about the relationships between collateral primary sections and paired tribes. Homicide, it was asserted earlier, results in raids and war between groups of these orders of segmentation respectively. Evidence can be adduced to show that both consequences have followed. The case usually cited to demonstrate that a single killing precipitates war between tribes is the

121 celebrated war between the 'Abaidat and the Bara 'asa tribes occupying a large part
619 of central and eastern Cyrenaica. This war took place a hundred years ago, so that the
682 evidence is mainly hearsay, but it is significant that when asked for details of the
726 groups taking part the Bedouin make it clear that the entire tribes were not at war—
[173] some sections on both sides are said to have remained on friendly terms. Yet when
121 wars are discussed in a general fashion, the Bedouin insist that tribes confront each
619 other as such. If it is pointed out to them that men might be ranged against their
maternal relatives the Bedouin mumble apologetically that they would not kill their
726 maternal relatives—a lame argument since in the heat of battle men cannot make this
602 kind of discrimination. Details of other wars also illustrate the point that only parts
of tribes face each other in strife, for though the stories of past events may be inaccurate
there is genealogical evidence to substantiate their claims that certain groups
were linked in the past, and in any case their statements assert that where these links
exist they are not prepared to engage in hostilities. The several parts of each tribe,
121 like the parts of primary and secondary sections, have as many different sorts of
619 relationships as there are groups, and the general statement that tribes are warring
571 units merely obscures the interest there is in their relationships. Tribes, further, lack
the leadership to make war. I repeat that leadership does exist, but not even the
121 greatest leaders, past or present, can rightly be described as leaders of their tribes,
619 using the term in its structural connotation. Literature on the subject gives the
613 impression that there are tribal leaders, because successive administrations have used
554 the tribes and their divisions as a framework for attempting to rule the Bedouin, but
the details of the power domains of individual leaders make it clear that they have
little to do with the ordered divisions of tribes. A leader within part of one tribe may
carry with him tertiary sections of another tribe, and if major hostilities break out
between parts of these tribes, the sections of both which are joined as allies and
related as kinsfolk will not fight against each other, for sections so linked enjoy
stronger connexions than the structurally linked tertiary sections of a very large
[682] secondary section. Consequently the statement that homicide results in tribal war
[114] when the offender and his victim are members of two separate tribes is not merely
incomplete, not merely a simplification, it is wrong.

121 A point which has been implicit throughout the second part of this paper needs
now to be made quite explicit: groups do not come together in their respective
613 structural genealogical orders. During my entire residence in Cyrenaica I did not
571 see a group of agnates larger than a tertiary tribal section assemble for any purpose.
[114] It is true that the occasions when large groups are required to assemble are infrequent.
[648] It is also true that although the British Administration was serving a caretaker role
only, it may have had an affect on the nature of tribal gatherings. Despite this qualification,
there were several occasions when I expected tribal groups to assemble in
lineage order if the fusion of sections in relation to like sections has any meaning in
practice. Large groups of men did gather to dispute claims to wells, to argue about
rights to ploughland, and to make peace. In every case that I recorded the agnatically
closest groups of the main participants were absent, while members of genealogically
more remote groups were present in strength. This statement applies to gatherings
[628] in the camps and in the administrative centres. One of the biggest gatherings I
witnessed assembled in an administrative office in a village near the coast in the

south-west of the country. Most members of the two tertiary groups directly concerned 121
in the dispute were present. The agnates of the collaterally linked groups of 613
the principals were unrepresented; indeed collaterals of one of the principals made 571
it quite explicit that they were opposed to their genealogical allies and considered 628
their perusal of the matter tiresome. The bulk of the crowd present was made up
of men linked to the principals in a variety of different and non-agnatic ways, and it
was they who provided most of the argument once the issue had been opened. It 121
follows, therefore, that an analysis of political organization and behaviour in Cyrenaica 613
which is based on lineage theory leads to a gross misrepresentation. For, what 114
I am arguing is not that the lineage model in its rarefied state is too simple, not that
additional facts must be injected into it to complicate it, but that it does not provide
an admissible basis for analysis.[1] The complication of something that is founded in
error can only lead to complicated error, however many facts of real life are introduced
in an attempt to give it substance. The Bedouin conception of their social
relationships in terms of a genealogical ordering of groups is a fact of their social [829]
life, and in relation to some problems it is an important fact. My objection to the use
which has been made of a people's ideology of their relationships is that it has been
elevated from its status as a component of social life to such a position of universal
dominance in all sets of social relationships that 'every sociological problem', as
Fortes writes of the Tallensi, 'hinges on the lineage system'.[2]

If the ordering of groups within the frame of the Bedouin genealogy is abandoned 121
as a basis for analysis, it does not follow that the only remaining view is that of small 613
groups of people distributed throughout the country enjoying relationships merely 571
as units. Regularity in relationships does exist, it is urgently necessary, and it persists; 578
but this regularity is not consistent with a lineage model. Ultimately, feud is a
violent form of hostility between corporations which has its source in the competition
for proprietory rights in land and water. This competition makes it necessary for
groups to combine to prevent the encroachments of others in similar combinations
and also to expand their resources whenever the opportunity arises. The significant
groups in a discussion of the feud are these power groups, and it is their composition,
the shifting alliances within them, the growth and diminution in the power of tertiary

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[1] Dr. Paul Bohannan has distinguished in his writings between what he calls folk systems and analytical systems. The distinction, as he sees it, is set out clearly in the statement 'a certain field of Nuer relationships is explained by Nuer in terms of an agnatic genealogy. This is the folk system. The same field is explained, in English, by Professor Evans-Pritchard, as a lineage system based on the principle of segmental opposition. This is an analytical system' (Bohannan, 1957, p. 5). What is the difference? Is it only a difference of language? Bohannan's analytical statement is little more than a generalisation of what is in the folk system. An analytical system, in his hands, is a sophistication of a folk system, for it is the latter which provides him with his analytical framework. The act of creativity on the part of the social anthropologist about which he writes (Bohannan, 1963, p. 14) is the revealing of a folk system through analysis. But he does not
depart from the framework set by informants—the 121
agnatic genealogy is the lineage, and the fission and
fusion of parts, the opposition of like segments and 613
so on is explained by informants in different languages 114
as adequately as it is explained by social
anthropologists in English. Bohannan's viewpoint 171
is made clearer, perhaps, in his discussion on the arrangement of facts relating to Tiv law. Here he considers what he should do once he has elicited all the facts, and he argues against setting them out as an arrangement of the procedural law of Tiv courts because, 'The error would be that the arrangement is not part of *the Tiv way of looking at it*, and hence would be false' (Bohannan, 1957, p. 69. Italics mine). Why? The Tiv are not the social anthropologists. Is the test of an analytical model its consistency with a folk comprehension?

[2] Fortes, 1945, p. 30.

121 sections constituting the combinations which makes the facts of feud intelligible.
613 Furthermore, several different types of power structures exist which serve the different
[571] interests of the people composing them, and these are interlinked in combinations
[578] of superior span. But the formation of these structures and the modes in which they
combine are quite unlike the articulations in a lineage system. Characteristically, the
segments in a lineage system are conceived of as building up hierarchically to span
what is spoken of as a total society, the apex of the system affording a spectacular and
fixed definition of its boundaries. Had I been using this concept in this paper the
[173] founding ancestress of the nine Cyrenaican tribes, Sa'ada as named by the Bedouin,
would have served this purpose and would have been given inappropriate prominence.
121 The views presented here have the consequences of retreating from a concept
of a total society. The people to whom the facts given are related are the camel-
184 herding tribes only. Some of them have relations of many kinds with the cow-herding
233 folk who inhabit the northern plateau area, and these relations are also significant
619 for the analysis of a wide range of problems; genealogically both cow and camel
herders are seen as part of a single structure, but the differences between them with
regard to their economy, the size, composition, and distribution of their residential
units, their political and ritual life is so great that to conceive of them as a single social
121 structure is not useful. Moreover, the far western tribal sections have relationships
619 of such urgency with their neighbours in Tripolitania (who are excluded from Cyrenaican
genealogies) that to cut off these relationships as lying outside Cyrenaican society
would be quite unwarranted. The same can be said of the relationships of the tribal
sections in the eastern part of Cyrenaica with their genealogical cousins, the Aulad
'Ali of Egypt, who, although residing across a national border, are closely linked to
some of the Cyrenaican Bedouin. Some tribes also have to rely on the people of the
southern oases for an item of diet and an outlet for surplus wool, and the net of kinship
is spread out to include them. In these cases they come into contact with other
[177] ethnic groups such as Berbers and Tibu, and through the oases they extend their lines
of communication southwards to Wadai, Chad, and Bornu. As an indication of the
effectiveness of these links, it is only necessary to add that people inhabiting Cyrenaica
make periodic and regular visits to these far southern places, and that in 1948 a
shaikh, living near Ajadabiya in south-western Cyrenaica, collected blood-money
contributions from kinsmen in Wadai. A single structure cannot possibly include,
for analytical purposes, these sorts of relationships.

121 Finally, it must be stressed that the facts given here refer to the period 1948 to
114 1950. Since then oil has been discovered in large quantities near the territory of a
tribe where I spent most of my time while resident in the country, and where there
[315] was one tin shack in 1950 there is now a modern port with roads extending southwards
from it into the wilderness. I see no reason to assume that social relations as
I observed them are present today or that they were the same at any time in the past
175 either. Before the advent of the Sanusi Order in the early eighteen-forties, it is known
795 that one lineage at least was dominantly powerful and that its leader tyrannized a
613 large part of Central Cyrenaica.[1] His descendants constituted a powerful group in

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[1] Smith and Porcher, 1864. These two archaeologists met this leader and continued their archaeological researches around Cirene only with his goodwill, although the site is not on the territory of his tribe as I knew it in 1950. They also speak of him as inhabiting a castle which also lies outside the

1950, but his kind of tyranny was absent from the Cyrenaica of that period. From the 795
mid-nineteenth century until the Italian invasion of 1911, the Sanusi Order estab- 175
lished itself, spread its lodges throughout the tribes and in other more remote lands [613]
until it became what Evans-Pritchard speaks of as a theocratic empire.[1] The lodges [778]
served as areas of sanctuary and their staffs adjudicated disputes. Leaders of the [793]
Order had the power to coerce and the Bedouin obeyed. They obeyed out of personal
regard for some of them in 1950, but the religious authority previously used by the
leaders had given way to the political power they now exercised as functionaries in
a state system. In the meantime, the country had been ravaged by the long Italo- [648]
Sanusi wars. Throughout the nineteen-thirties after suffering terrible privations and reduction in numbers through slaughter in war, death in concentration camps, and exile, the Bedouin were ruled by the Italians. During the Second World War the armies of three major contestants fought their battles where the Bedouin now tend their flocks and herds. After the war they were left to fend for themselves, with a minimum of administrative interference.

In the light of all this the conception of an equilibrium system is of little heuristic 121●
value, still less its derivative concept of a repetitive system. This does not mean, however, that an account of part of the social life of the Bedouin as it existed in 1950 must be nothing more than a disconnected piece of history, unrelated to a prior state of things and wholly useless for the understanding of the contemporary oil-producing cum mixed pastoral–agricultural economy. It would be little more than a piece of social historiography if the analysis was based on the concept of a total social structure of functionally interconnected parts, forming what Leach describes as 'a delicately balanced mechanism rather like the various parts of a wrist watch'.[2] Such a viewpoint would effectively exclude any possible comprehension of changes save those present as part of the dynamics of a system; its only answer to change is an account of a different system. If, instead, attention is focused on the analysis of a field of components arranged in a specific fashion to meet the interests of men at a particular time, it then becomes possible to see how a shift in their positions, the addition of new components, or the elimination of others produces this or that effect. It can make intelligible what has gone before, and if the future cannot be anticipated it can be demarcated within rough limits.

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modern territory of his tribe. See also Hamilton, 1856.

[1] Evans-Pritchard, 1949. In this book a brilliant account is given of the development of the Order, and how it came to unify and provide centralized political leadership for the tribes.

[2] Leach, 1961, p. 6.

[175] [795] [613]

462

in position immediately anyone else appears at the entrance to the tent.[11] [834 [342]
Women cook, but they do not serve the meal to males, nor are they re- [264]
sponsible for the distribution of meat among them. Parts of an animal are 264
carefully specified, and the various portions distributed at a meal carry 574
with them a great deal of significance. A host can honour, flatter, disap- 571
point or even insult his guest, depending on the precise distribution of meat
he adopts. Designated portions should go to certain kinsmen if they are [602]
present, but this still leaves a wide margin of choice, and a host can use
this choice as part of the many means at his disposal for directing his re-
lationships with other men. A political link can be forged or another
snapped by the distribution of portions of meat at the commensal meal.

The Bedouin Ideal Type of Family as a Unit of Production

This account of the division of labour is far from inclusive of all the tasks 594
carried out. The details given are only barely sufficient to provide some 183
indication of the necessary composition of a family. Referring again to the [462]
Bedouin sentiments about the matter, it is now possible to give it some
numerical precision. The number of females should be a minimum of
about three, including a mother, a teen-age daughter and a child of about
eight years. Males should number about six: a father, relieved of most [857]
chores to act as director; a son in his middle to late twenties, to plough; a [883]
second son, in his early to middle twenties, to herd the camels; a third, in [462]
his late teens to early twenties, to shepherd the sheep; a fourth, middle to [561]
late teens, to look after the goats; and a younger son to fetch, carry and
run errands about the camp. The family of the ordinary Bedouin, they say, [554]
shows this sex and age distribution, although they recognise that a politically
ambitious man with the wealth to match his aspirations would require more [556]
of both sexes — particularly women, since the burden of entertainment in-
creases rapidly with a man's climb to power and fame.

Clearly, the basis of Bedouin sentiment concerning family structure is its 121
approximation to an ideal production unit. Some families display the features 183
of this ideal, but even they enjoy the productive benefits of this composition
for a very limited period only. The family, as described above, can only be an 594
ephemeral unit, since the age structure constantly changes, women are re-
moved by marriage, men move away and death affects it at any point at any
time. The Bedouin family is a fiction in the sense that it can be said to have a
characteristic composition. The mistake they make is to conceive of it as a
particular kinship structure related to production. The substance of what
has been referred to as a fiction is that, if viewed as a productive unit, it
bears close consistency with reality. Freed of the need to examine it in terms [621]
of specifically limited kinship relationships, and no longer anchored to the
inhabitants of a single tent, the distribution of people according to sex and

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[11] This is the general rule. In practice, the use of the divider can indicate an intimacy or distance in relationships, most subtly.

Cases

121 183 594 621 age depicted in their notion of a family is meaningful. It follows that, since this unit will not be clustered in one tent, but distributed over several, each small community must be so constituted that links people can use to claim the services of others must exist, and that, since claims can be made against various sorts of kinship relationships, each small camp will have predictable kin links. It follows, further, that since age, sex and number of people are significant, a small camp will have a characteristic demographic structure; each tent in a camp will display developmental changes, and particular tents may be shifted from one camp to another, but if a livelihood is to be gained in this semi-desert environment supporting its mixed pastoral-cum-agricultural economy, then at any given time the small camp must have certain fixed features in its composition. The elementary family is subject to far too many vicissitudes to exist on its own. It now remains to demonstrate this general argument by examining the details of one of these small camps.

A Particular Camp Viewed in Detail

621 613 [221] [162] The camp was one of 12 which constitute a minimal tribal section. In genealogical terms its male members were linked through an ancestor five ascending generations from living males of about 20 years of age. Usually, in summer, camps of this sort move to the vicinity of a large watering point; in winter, this larger community breaks up into a number of smaller ones as man and animals move off further south to the pastures. The total living population of the tribal section to which this particular camp belonged was 524.

621 613 582 182 Linked patrilineally, its male members were also linked in a plurality of other consanguineal ways. Primarily, this plurality was brought about by parallel-cousin marriage. The incidence of this form of marriage for males of this group was 48 per cent[12] of the gross total of 234, derived from their marriages over three generations; that is, the generation of males entering into marriage, and the generation which has begun to die out are included with the generation of middle-aged males. This means that practically every male is related to others in a number of ways, and it is necessary to point this out now because the details to be given presently will show only the more immediate, but not all, existing connections. Plurality of links, moreover, is not the only consequence. Parallel-cousin marriage is a transmuting agent, creating a diversity of links. Each and every link carries with it specific modes of behaviour, which in turn means that each individual has a wide variety of different claims he can press on his co-residents. Marriage connections also exist with other sections of the same tribe. Their proportion is 28 per cent of the total. Demographically, it

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[12] As a matter of interest, the figure for marriage to the father's brother's daughter is 50 per cent of the figure for parallel-cousin marriage in general, but the consequences of these are beyond the scope of the present discussion.

121 for comparative study, they do not represent the ethnological entity known as the Awlad 'Ali. However, one might heuristically think of al-Qasr as a post-tribal or pre-peasant stage of social change, and on this basis generate some hypotheses about the sedentarization process or other specific cultural processes.

126
104 The translation of the Arabic documents presented here were made in the field. In most of the cases, translating took place on the spot and this may account for some of the awkward phraseology. Arabic terms and names have been transliterated according to the system used by Cowan in An Introduction to Modern Literary Arabic (1958) with certain exceptions: long vowels are shown by a double vowel; the guttural stop is indicated by an apostrophe; and the glottal stop is indicated by the use of a short "e," such as in 'aiela ("family").

000 I owe a great deal of gratitude to my former teachers who have given freely of their time and knowledge and have shown an interest in my training in anthropology and Middle
122 Eastern studies. I would like to thank in particular Dr. William Sanders, of Pennsylvania State University, who introduced me to anthropology; Dr. David Bidney, of Indiana University, and Dr. P. J. Vatikiotis, now of the London School of Oriental and African Studies, who were my advisers in anthropology and Middle Eastern studies during my graduate training; Dr. Irfan Shahid, now of Georgetown University, who instructed me in the Arabic language; Dr. Vincent Cantarino, of Indiana University, who instructed me in Arabic literature

122 and took the time to serve on my dissertation committee; Dr. Alan Merriam, of Indiana University, who taught me anthropology, served on my dissertation committee, and showed a sincere interest in my future; Dr. Harold Driver and Dr. John Messenger, both of Indiana University, who taught me anthropology.

128 I would also like to thank Dr. Richard Antoun, of Indiana University, who took the time and interest to serve on my dissertation committee and who offered valuable suggestions which have vastly improved the study offered here.

000 I owe a great and special debt of gratitude to Dr. John Kennedy, of the Neuro-Psychiatric Institute of U.C.L.A., who served as my adviser during a two-year stay in Egypt. He, more than any other, has influenced by own approach to anthropology. I am glad to have this opportunity to thank him for being a good friend and a brilliant teacher.

I must thank Dr. David Bidney a second time for serving as chairman of my dissertation committee and for being a good friend and guide throughout my graduate training period.

Finally, to my wife Judith Criste Obermeyer, I owe the greatest debt which words cannot express. Without her constant support and encouragement this study would never have been 128 written. I am grateful for her aid in preparing this manuscript, but this is only an insignificant part of her contribution to the total effort.

122 During the course of my graduate training, my fieldwork

122 and the writing-up stage, I have received financial support and assistance from a number of sources which I would like to recognize and thank at this time. The United States Office of Education supported me over a two-year period at Indiana University through a National Defense Title VI Fellowship for the study of Arabic. The Carnegie Seminar in Political and Administrative Development of Indiana University, under the direction of Professor Fred Riggs and Professor William Siffin, provided me with a summer's employment and a small research grant prior to my leaving for the field. The American University in Cairo supported me over a two-year period, the first year with a research fellowship at the Center for Arabic Studies, and the second year with a research grant to carry out the field study which is presented here. I would like to thank, in particular, Dr. Laila Shukry el-Hamamsy, the Director of the Social Research Center of the university, who helped me a great deal and took an interest in my work.

Finally, the University of Chicago awarded me a Carnegie Fellowship for the Comparative Study of New Nations which permitted me the time to prepare the greatest part of
000 this dissertation. I am especially grateful to the members of the Committee for the Comparative Study of New Nations who make it their practice to give the graduate student a unique experience in intellectual fellowship. During my stay at Chicago, I gained intellectual insight and stimulation in particular from the ideas and work of Professor Leonard Binder, Professor

156 159 and they sat on chairs inside the tent. I returned to
554 635 Marsa Matruh in the *'umda's* car (1964 Ford, highly polished)
537 with the *'umda* and the *shaikh*. They openly joked about Hajj
[634] 'Ali and his manner of presentation; they repeated some of
[122] his "stilted" phrases and laughed. Hajj 'Ali gave last year's
[522] reception speech also. This is because, his son says, Hajj
'Ali is considered a fine speaker by the Bedouins of al-Qasr.

121 We can see how these details carry larger implications
177 within the context of political and social structures under-
178 going change. It is the stuff which the anthropologist finds
important for an understanding of the process of change.

156 If I have established thus far that Hajj 'Ali is
159 politically active and representative in both the traditional
554 and the modern systems, then the attempt is now to prove that
177 he consciously seeks to change the traditional in the direction
178 of the modern for political and moral reasons, and for social
and personal reasons.

156 Hajj 'Ali, when he spoke with me, inevitably came
159 around to the subject of international politics, whether this
554 was the question of Israel or the image which America's racial
177 problems presented. Hajj 'Ali was the only man from the whole
178 124 Marsa Matruh area who was neither *shaikh* nor *'umda* to attend
829 the nomination of Jamal Abd al-Nasser in January of 1965. In
[571] all of this, I detect a move on the part of Hajj 'Ali to
identify himself with an Egyptian reference group and to

I managed, however, during my stay to be closely in touch with one 12
of the major cases and with almost all the parties involved. This case
was used as the basis for the "social drama" analyzed in chapter three
of the present study.

In addition to the social drama, I have used the case study method 121
to analyze aspects of the substantive law of the group especially with 127
regard to concepts such as that of criminal responsibility and the nature
of the contractual relations as exemplified by the marriage contract.
Cases utilized in the study include ones that I observed myself as well [124]
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Most of the data was collected through the time-honored technique 123
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interviewing was conducted on a very limited scale, thirty-five extensive 125
questionnaires in all. These questionnaires were originally designed and administered to supplement the life history material and to assess the attitudes of the particular people involved with regard to particular issues. Some of the results of these questionnaires are used in the chapter. Due to the non-representation of the sample interviewed, these results are used merely as illustration and not as representing any kind of statistical frequency.

ENTRY TO THE FIELD

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field experience and about the group they studied. This usually gives the impression that field work is always an enjoyable experience. Although my field work seems at the present time to have been a pleasant experience, especially when comparing it to the pressures of everyday living in a

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the field, I then sought out these old friends who introduced me to other
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At the beginning, I made a deliberate effort to avoid associating 114
with the government officials who worked in the area, even though they were 123
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would put me in a suspicious situation as far as the tribal groups were
concerned, and thus prevent me from having good rapport with them. Later, however, [657]
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the area and the tribal population was extremely good, and they always looked
to the government as a source of aid and support to them. There was no
conflict of interest between the state administration and the tribal groups. In
fact, people accepted me more readily whenever they knew that I had worked
for the Egyptian government. This later developed into a time-consuming and
disappointing experience when many of the tribal members came to me asking
for help getting employment in the government projects in the area, or to
have their sons accepted in certain government schools, or to get some
favored treatment from the government relief organizations.

The difficulty I encountered in my field work stemmed from the interplay 114
of three major factors: the reliance on the case study method which 123
necessitates the intimate knowledge of the events, facts, and parties
involved in each case; being a female anthropologist in a society where
women by definition are barred from public participation and particularly

[P. iii]

PREFACE

THIS account of the Sanusi of Cyrenaica would not have been 114
written if a number of accidents had not led me to their country during the late war, but the seed of it was planted long before the war. I had acquired during three years' residence in Egypt [122]
and through travels in other Arab lands some knowledge of Arab history and culture, a little experience of Bedouin, and proficiency in spoken Arabic. During the war a year spent as Political Officer in the Alawite Territory of Syria added to both knowledge and enthusiasm. I had been acquainted with some of the Sanusi exiles in Egypt as far back as 1932 and had visited Darna and Banghazi by sea; and it had long been my hope that I might some day, when the Italians had ceased to rule the country, have a chance to visit the interior. This wish came true when in November 1942 I was posted as Political Officer to the (third) British Military Administration of Cyrenaica. I spent over two years in the country, the greater part of them among the Bedouin, particularly the more nomadic sections. Inhabited Cyrenaica is a small country and as in the course of my wanderings, mostly in its southern steppes and the desert beyond them, I covered more than two thousand miles by horse and camel I came to know something of its Bedouin tribes. My duties, it is true, prevented me from carrying out any systematic inquiries of a sociological kind, but the contact with the Bedouin they entailed enabled me to read the literature which forms the basis of this study in the light of my own experience. My labours have been but a small return for the hospitality of the tents and the many kindnesses of my Bedouin hosts.

I have not attempted to write a history of Cyrenaica, but 128
only of the development of the Sanusiya Order among the Bedouin tribes of the country. I have, therefore, said nothing of the centuries of Greek colonization and Roman and Byzantine rule, nor of the little known centuries of Arab and Turkish rule until 1843, when the Grand Sanusi founded his first zawiya, or religious lodge, on the Cyrenaican plateau. Also, I have not aimed at giving a comprehensive account either of the Sanusiya Order or of the Bedouin tribes, but I have described both only in so far as seemed necessary to an understanding of the political

EMRYS PETERS

18. *The Proliferation of Segments in the Lineage of the Bedouin of Cyrenaica [Libya]*[1]

121 In this article I do not propose to discuss the genealogies of the
128 Cyrenaican Bedouin in full, but only such aspects of them as are
strictly relevant to an understanding of their process of growth. Many other aspects of these genealogies will be referred to, and indeed, some of the arguments put forward will presume an acceptance of views which cannot be developed adequately in this article. A fuller and more general account of Cyrenaican genealogies is in preparation, and, until this is published, there is no alternative to the somewhat dogmatic statements about them which appear in the introductory part of this article.

174 The Bedouin of Cyrenaica claim that they are all descendants
613 of a unique ancestress, Sa'ada. Writers in the past (e.g.
551 Robertson-Smith 1903) have considered the occurrence of fe-
562 male names in patrilineal genealogies as evidence of an earlier
[173] and matrilineal mode of descent. A more satisfactory explanation of the occurrence of female names is to be found in the combination of two facts: descent in the patriline, whether or

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128 Reprinted by permission of the author and the Council from the *Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute,* Vol. 90, pp. 29–53, 1960.

[1] My field work among the Cyrenaican Bedouin was made possible by an
122 award from the Emslie Horniman Fund and a later award from the Treasury Committee for Studentships in Oriental Languages and Cultures. I wish here
121 to express my indebtedness to both committees for their generosity. Much of the work I have done on genealogies was included in a thesis presented for
128 the degree of D.Phil. at Oxford University in 1951. The ideas included in this thesis I developed more systematically in a course of lectures on the Bedouin which I gave at Manchester University during the session 1953–54. I subsequently read papers around the problems discussed in this paper at
128 Oxford and Cambridge Universities. I am grateful to Professor Gluckman for reading this article in manuscript, and for the numerous discussions I have had with him on problems relating to lineage organization.

Chapter

7

*Aspects of the Family Among the Bedouin of Cyrenaica**

E. L. Peters
University of Manchester

Marriage and the Father-Son Relationship

When a marriage takes place among the Bedouin of Cyrenaica, a nuptial 585
tent is set up some distance away from that of the groom's father. There is 593
no particular significance about the nuptial tent itself, but it must be pitched at a distance so that the father "will not see it" — although, obviously, in a country of large level plains, it stands out conspicuously. This pretence that the tent remains unseen by the father is pushed to the point of his denying any knowledge of what is afoot. A middle-aged or elderly man with a family adopts a similar attitude to any marriage in which his son participates, as groom or as guest. An elder, the father of three unmarried sons (one of [535]
whom, in his late twenties, was known to be getting impatient about marriage), when I asked after his eldest son, insisted that he was away with the [831]
camels, although the son was conspicuous in a semicircle of young men encouraging a blindfolded maiden in the movements of her seductive dance outside a wedding tent in his full view. Prior to the wedding festivities, the

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* I wish to express my gratitude to Mr. R. Werbner for reading this essay in manuscript. 128

The information presented is based on 27 months fieldwork carried out during 1948 to 1950, among the Cyrenaica Bedouin. I am indebted to the Trustees of the Horniman Studentship Fund, and the Committee for Treasury Studentships in Oriental Languages and Cultures, for making the research financially possible. 114 122

121 sedentary, but the semi-autonomous nature of the lineage segments
114 is maintained to a large extent. The result of this is a de-
*613 [178] emphasis of the "we-feeling" among the population of al-Qasr
[186] and an absence of "sense of community" (Easton 1965:332). By
[571] "community," I refer to a pattern of relatively intensive,
face-to-face social relationships, and the values of solidarity
121 and common goals to which these give rise. The relationship
*613 between lineage structure and territoriality was such that
571 kinship segments within the same lineage unit might go days,
and even weeks, with no inter-communication, and the degree
of communication between separate lineage units of the tribe
was less intensive than this. Such a communication pattern
made observation difficult. The fact that Bedouin tribal
society relatively lacks the group ceremonial aspect compounded
the difficulty of gaining an overall perspective of structural
relations, and of witnessing the bases and nature of social
interaction outside the lineage structure. All of this
emerges from a communication structure and kinship structure
differentiated into corporate groups which "discourage close
participation of members in the social relations of the larger
society" (Wolf 1957:7).

121 The structural arrangement of al-Qasr was such that,
in plain language, not a great deal was happening in the
sociological sense. I say this about al-Qasr in comparison
● [123] with, for instance, a full-blown village community. Conse-
quently, I observed from day to day that which I could,

121 recorded that which people said in formal and informal inter-
●123 views, and hoped that events would materialize to corroborate, in one way or another, that which I heard or suspected.

123 Since al-Qasr lacked the "space-time component of communal living together" (Firth 1961:27), I was not able to select a central vantage point from which I could view the everyday life of the Bedouins. More importantly, since the Bedouins interpret social structure in terms of a close relationship between residence and group membership, by the very fact that I chose to live in al-Qasr, and so had to live in the territory of some one lineage, I threatened my own objectivity and that of the Bedouins toward me.

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*613 In consideration of the time element, I made the decision to live with the most prestigious lineage in al-Qasr. I felt that this association would give me more freedom of movement in the field, and would provide me with access to more data in a shorter time. What I did not know at the time of my entry into the field was that the Bedouins prize neutrality and objectivity just as much as the anthropologist.
[829] As the Bedouins often said: "A man should only speak about the things he knows."

121 This is a study of the Bedouins of al-Qasr. They are not nomads nor are they even primarily pastoralists. Various degrees of nomadism and pastoralism exist in the Western Desert of Egypt among the different units of the Awlad 'Ali tribe. Therefore, while the Bedouins of al-Qasr may represent a case

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judicious. Another issue which enters here is the desire on the part of the individual to maintain his privacy--especially where an infringement of it could result in a change of his tax status. The Bedouins think that it is wise to keep the government uninformed about the exact size of their family.

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●123
When I first asked a question concerning divorce, I was politely taken aside and told that I do not speak about divorce to a man, and especially when his sons are present.

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Two cases of divorce took place while I was in the field. In the one, the wife claimed that her husband was impotent. She took this complaint to her father who then confronted the husband with it; the result was a divorce. Although the man denied that he was sterile, this was his second childless marriage and he felt it wise not to contest the case. It becomes very important to know, in the case of Bedouin divorce, which partner cannot meet the requirements of the marriage. If it is the woman, she will return to her father's house and the father must then return the price of _mahr_ (brideprice). If it is the husband, when his wife returns to her father's house he must pay her (not her father, in this case) a sum, called _mu'akhkhir al-sadaaq_ ("the balance of the marriage contract"), which is equal to that of the original _mahr_. Actually, there are three times when a _mahr_

[583]
[768]
[595]
price may be paid in al-Qasr: the original _mahr_ is paid at the time of the marriage; the _mu'akhkhir al-sadaaq_ is paid

156 159 554 177 178 124 829 [571] draw al-Qasr into the Egyptian political community. He has committed himself to work hand-in-hand with the Governor of Marsa Matruh in introducing changes connected with economics and education into al-Qasr. He does not conceal this fact. When I spoke with him about helping me with my study of changing attitudes in al-Qasr, he said: "I might have the time to do this, but before I decide you will have to bring me a letter from the Governor stating that he wishes me to cooperate with you." The identity and responsibility which Hajj 'Ali feels for his role of agent of change is indicated in his remark to me that he had heard "there were others in the desert who feel and think the way I myself do."

156 159 554 571 574 796 123 Hajj 'Ali is discretely aware of the status difference between himself, as a member of the "status group," and the others of al-Qasr. As Weber would say, he perceives the difference in "style of life." I was invited to Hajj 'Ali's house for 'iid al-fitr, the feast marking the end of Ramadan. I thought that this would be a good opportunity to observe the "leaders" of al-Qasr together. I was very much surprised to find present no members of the "status group" but only [556] [735] their exact opposites. On the occasion of this feast it is the custom that the rich treat the poor. As an additional surprise, we had a very simple meal of bread, dates, peanuts, and tea. Hajj 'Ali explained to me: "My neighbors do not have my economic advantages, and I do not think it is proper

156 to serve other than what they eat." Hajj 'Ali is not only
159 conscious of social stratification in his society, but he also
554 571 has a great deal of empathy with the less endowed, a pre-
574 requisite of a traditional Bedouin leader and an advantageous
796 one for a modern leader.
• 123

He is aware of most traditional institutions and how
156 they relate to conditions of modernity. Hajj 'Ali, whose own
159 marriages speak for his political acumen, sees only disadvantages
554 829 in the cousin-right marriage custom of the Bedouins. His
582 interest in getting on with the business of change, so to
speak, has led him to question a basic right contained in the
Bedouin principle of lineage structure and corporate membership.

> A thing which I do not like about our customs is the idea that a man has a right to his uncle's daughter. The man binds his cousin and in the end he might not marry her and will be the cause of her never marrying. He gives himself the authority to decide whom she may or may not marry. If he knows she desires to marry a certain man, he says: "She can marry anyone but not that one."

[562] Here he challenges the traditional right of the individual
male in Bedouin society, favoring the rights of the female.
[177] The emancipation of the female, especially in rights and
[178] duties concerned with the marriage contract, is an element
[562] of the modernization process in Egyptian society and the
Middle East in general.

* 613 The bait, as a political group, is in part structurally
602 defined by the corporate principle which states that blood-kin
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play of three major factors: the reliance on the case study method which 123
necessitates the intimate knowledge of the events, facts, and parties involved in each case; being a female anthropologist in a society where
women by definition are barred from public participation and particularly

114 123 from the process of dispute settlement; and the semi-nomadic nature of the population in the area.

114 123 124 627 578 The reliance on the case-study method and especially that of Turner's "social drama" which requires extensive and detailed knowledge of the sequential development of a number of cases over a long period of time proved to be a major task in a society where disputes are settled not in formal hearings, but by means of informal mediation and behind the scene negotiations. These activities covered a large area, and were shrouded in a great deal of secrecy. The assumption is that the parties involved in the dispute should be given the privacy and chance to arrive at an acceptable settlement without being conscious of or influenced by the opinion of non-interested parties. The public hearing, or the *mi'ad*, loves the announcement of the agreement arrived at in private. As will be seen later, very little factual information about the dispute is discussed in the *mi'ad*. No record is kept of either the discussion in the *mi'ad* or the preceding negotiations. The process of dispute settlement is, then, highly decentralized. To be able to follow one particular dispute involves the constant reliance on informants not only to acquaint the anthropologist with the places of negotiations, but also to fill the gaps in the information about the process of negotiation itself.

114 123 562 As a woman anthropologist, I found myself at a disadvantage in a society where women were excluded from public participation. It is true that from the very beginning of the field work I was never cast into the role of the native woman, yet, my position as a woman posed a certain number of problems. When I first arrived in the area, I made a deliberate effort not to identify with the native women. When it was suggested to me that the relatively short skirts I wore were not practical for riding donkeys

or walking in the strong winds characteristic of the area, and that the 114
floor-length native dress would be more appropriate, I refused the advice 123
for fear of being identified in the minds of the people with the natives, 562
and thus being treated in the same way. The possibility of being identi-
fied with native women was not very strong, because from the very beginning
I did not act like one. I did things and talked about things that native
women had never done or talked about. I drove a car, read, and wrote, and
talked about national and local politics. More important than that though,
to the tribal population, was that I was a member of the bar association of
Egypt, and that I had practiced law for a year in Cairo. Every time I was
introduced, the fact that I was an attorney was made evident. This gave
legitimacy to my interest in studying the tribal legal system, and in many
ways they were flattered than an attorney, especially a woman city attorney,
would be interested in their law. Yet, in native clothes or not, in the
native female role or not, I was still a woman, and as such I was not part
of any serious activity, especially those of dispute settlement. My mere 114
presence in any part of the dispute settlement made the gathering seem some- 123
how less serious. At the beginning of the field work a deliberate effort 562 627
was made to keep me from knowing anything about the whereabouts of the nego-
tiations or what was going on. I had to bribe men, women and children to [124]
tell me where the negotiations were taking place and who they involved, and
then appear on the scene uninvited. This condition lasted for about two
months. At that time the news of my presence in the area spread around,
and I had attended many of the negotiations that men became less conscious
of my presence. In fact, some even asked me to attend the meetings where
some parts of the negotiations were conducted and give them my opinion as
to the fairness of the settlement.

Yet, even when the problem of role definition was solved, it was 114
still difficult to follow closely all aspects and phases of any particu- 123
lar dispute. This was mainly the result of the semi-nomadic nature of 361
the population. In settled communities, the anthropologist usually finds [627]
himself in the midst of the social life of the community. He might not
be a part of it, but at least a major portion of it is happening around
him. In the case of nomadic or semi-nomadic populations, the situation is
different. There were no large tribal concentrations in the area. The [621]
largest residential unit was the camp, and it consisted of no more than
thirteen tents which changed in composition quite rapidly. In one camp,
out of the thirteen tents which were there when I joined, only six re-
mained unchanged by the time I left three months later. Originally I had
planned to stay in the small village of El-Hammam, which was believed to
be in the tribal route of the major tribal segment in the area. It took [487]
me only a few weeks to realize that the tribal segments did not follow
any definite migratory route, and for more than four weeks I saw nothing
of the life of the group more than the few individuals who came occasion-
ally to the small settlement to buy tea or sugar, or to catch the train
to Alexandria. It was then that I decided to leave the settlement and
live with the camp. My stay in the camp was very insightful as far as
information about the daily activities of the camp members and the rela-
tionship between the camp and other tribal segments in the area. But the
camp was a very small group and fairly isolated. Besides, there was no
way of knowing how typical that camp was to the other camps in the area.
I finally decided that the best strategy was to live with a number of camps
in the surrounding area for relatively short periods of time, making my base
of operation a relatively settled camp in close proximity to a number of
other camps.

627 628 [123] agreement is reached. In fact, later one of the people attending said that my presence made everything run smoothly in that particular Mi'ad because they felt that they should show me how peaceful Awlad Ali were. This was mainly supported by my own observation of other Mi'ads, some of which are described later, where parties were less understanding of one another and where no forfeiting of any part of the compensation occurs. This is particularly true when the Mi'ad is held to acknowledge the failure of the negotiators to reach an acceptable agreement among the parties. [681] This is also true when one of the parties to a dispute denies the charge and insists on not paying any kind of compensation. In such cases the Mi'ad is held to decide upon a different course of action, usually the administration of the oath, as will be discussed later in the chapter. [182] Despite its typical nature, the Mi'ad described above exemplifies the nature of the Mi'ad and its purpose as a process of making public what has been achieved in private negotiations. No evidence is presented and evaluated in the Mi'ad, no hearing of witnesses, no passing of judgment based on the evaluation of the facts of the case. Actually, the facts of the case are never presented and a person who is not acquainted with them before hand has no way of learning what the dispute is all about by merely listening to the discussions of the Mi'ad.

628 613 The key role in the process of mediation in dispute settlements is done by the Aqila or the leader of the bait. When a dispute occurs between members of different baits, each party goes to the Aqila of his bait who takes immediate steps tomeet with the Aqila of the other party and discuss the matter with him in an attempt to reach a settlement. He acts as a representative of members of his bait and defends their interests in

stretching across to the village of Ajadabiya in the east, topples 613
in undulations away into the flat expanses of the desert to the 619
south. At all these points of segmentation, the territories occu- 621
pied by the various sections are large and roughly defined, and 133
the population aggregates supported on these territories run from 182
over a thousand at one end to tens of thousands at the upper 131
limits. The tertiary sections are numerically much smaller, some
of them numbering as few as a hundred souls in all, and the
territories to which they are attached are correspondingly
smaller. The relationship between the numbers in this order of
section, and the precise amount of water available in the local
wells is an intimate one. If the population of one of these groups
increases, or if the number of animals rises, or if the springs show
a decline in the volume of water they give forth, or if the winter
rainfall has allowed the storage in wells of only a small quantity
of water, a rearrangement of the group must be effected. A sig-
nificant alteration of any one of these components must mean
that the local group must split to enable a new adjustment to be
made in the relationship of man and animals to water.

Whatever changes occur within groups of any size, since the 173
genealogy embraces the entire population, these must appear on 178
the genealogy in some way or other. Now a genealogy is as rigid 829
a framework, as fixed and final a pattern of grouping, as can be 613
imagined. The impression that they are thus rigid and fixed, ex- 551
cept for the addition of successive generations, is strengthened
by the way in which the Bedouin use them. From their young
boys to their old men, the Bedouin are expert genealogists, and
the names of ancestors, for one reason or another, are never far
from their lips. Names are kept alive by constant use, since all [571]
references to inter-group relationships must be in terms of these
names. More than this, the Bedouin were proud to the point of 173
boastfulness of their genealogical knowledge, and, wherever I 829
travelled, the first request I had to comply with was to take down 613
a large portion of a tribal genealogy. In recording their endless 551
genealogies, one feature about them came to assume increasing 123 •
interest; while there was remarkable unanimity with regard to 126
most of the names given, there was one point of marked am-
biguity—at the tertiary level of segmentation. I recorded geneal-
ogies in four tribes on an extensive scale, and in each tribe

173 ambiguity surrounding the actual names and their correct posi-
829 tion occurred at about the fifth ascending generation. Whenever
613 this point was reached in the recordings, arguments would flare
551 up over the names to be included or excluded and over the rela-
123 tion of these names to those above and below, with the result
126 that for several people of the same segment there would be several versions of a genealogy which differed only at this one point. An example of this sort is given below from the genealogy of the Nasr section, which shows seven different versions of the arrangement of ancestors round about the fifth ascending generation from the living.

173 The confusion at and around the fifth ascending generation
829 appeared with such regularity in the genealogies that I feel justi-
613 fied in referring to it as 'the area of ambiguity'. It seems likely,
551 moreover, that in any society where the lineage structure is closely tied to the territorial disposition of groups, since the genealogy is so rigid, there needs to be in it somewhere an area of ambiguity if it is to be related to reality. Without this ambiguity, the form of the genealogy is too rigid to comprehend changes which occur. This point in the genealogy came to assume critical significance as the point where adjustments in it are made. Other kinds of evidence point to the same conclusion.

[601]


(1)
NASR*
UMBARAKA
HAIBA
MADHKUR
MUMEN
BIN NASR
MADHKUR
HAIBA
UMBARAKA
(3)
SA'AID
HASAIN
MADHKUR
HAIBA
(4)
SA'AID
(5)
HASAN
MADHKUR
HAIBA
SA'AD
MUMAN
(7)
HAIBA
MADHKUR
UMBARAKA
SA'AD
(2)
MUMEN
UMBARAKA
MADHKUR
HAIBA

FIG. 18-3 GENEALOGY 3. *There is another section, al-Dawwas, which belongs to this group, but to include this as well would greatly complicate the issue without giving any additional information.

682 a rule by the return of the offender to his camp after the lapse of a number of years.
A man who had already killed six people killed a seventh, his first paternal cousin.
He and his brothers fled the tribe; he died in exile and it was not until some thirty
years later that his brother and nephew returned. Another man, who had killed his
● [123] first paternal cousin, used my entry into a camp as the occasion for his re-entry,
pitching his tent rope on rope with mine, and mine in turn was rope on rope with
the tent of the camp's shaikh.[1]

621 An effort is always made to hush up the matter when a homicide occurs within a
682 tertiary section. It is for this reason that the name of the victim is not perpetuated.
613 Normally it is an obligation to perpetuate the names of the deceased, especially when
they have been killed in homicide, but in the circumstances now being discussed the
[551] name is suppressed. As one man expressed the general sentiments, stretching out his toga in front of him: 'Look at the hole in my toga; it would be better without it, but what can I do? Make it bigger? It is better to cover it up.' Any penal action taken against the offender could only enlarge the wound he had already opened. The notion of corporate identity is so strong that it eliminates the use of penal action against one of its members for the greatest offence of all. While overtly every effort is made to expunge the memory of a homicide of the sort described above, the Bedouin are most articulate in their views about the offender. He is referred to as one who 'defecates in the tent' thus likening him to an animal, for no human being would do this. Other expletives used in reference to him are: one who 'destroys the lineage', who 'corrupts the family'; he is one who 'brings confusion', who 'provokes God' and causes 'the evil of leprosy to eat into relationships'. Their feelings about the offender, who 'commits robbery internally', are summed up in the word *fitna*. This, in its Cyrenaican use, corresponds closely to the notion of sin as it is used in the Old Testament; in the sense, that is to say, of an act which causes an impasse in relationships, which creates chaos among a small group of related people, and produces internal calamity. And this is indeed the situation brought about by such homicide among the Bedouin. Flowing blood, they are wont to say, can only be staunched by blood (i.e. a vengeance killing), but if a man kills within a close agnatic range the corporate body continues to bleed. Nothing can be done. The group is left helpless, and this is sin.

The first step in this exposition, therefore, is to attach to homicide within a tertiary section the notion of its being *fitna*, carrying with it voluntary and temporary expulsion.

682 A homicide which involves two collateral tertiary sections is a different matter
628 altogether, for now the parties constitute two discrete political groups. Political
machinery can be set in motion to deal with the breach in relationships, and conse-
621 quently a homicide of this sort does not pose the dilemma which is created when it
613 occurs within a politically undivided group. Not only do agnates of two collateral tertiary sections behave towards each other as two groups of people, but the nature of their relationships is fundamentally different from those obtaining between mem-

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682 a first cousin in cold blood because of a dispute between them over the ownership of a new-born kid. Although this was the only reason given by the Bedouin other considerations were involved—the victim was said to have been a fine person, and his killer a constant trouble maker, and so on.

[1] See for comparison Robertson Smith, 1903. The tent is an area of sanctuary, and this extends to include the ropes also.

Second, the fiction that nothing has happened, which characterises the 585
father's behavior, does not cease with the termination of the celebrations. 593
Each morning, soon after daybreak and before the camp is astir, the groom
must leave his bride and repair to his father's tent to lie at his father's side
"as he always had done in the past, as if he had not left him." This conventional
ruse is followed, not just for the seven days of wedding festivities,
but is continued after the groom has moved back into the camp proper, and
pitched his tent alongside his father's, with the ropes of the two tents crossing.

In matters other than sleeping arrangements, this fiction that "nothing
has happened" is maintained. Marriage does not mean the immediate creation [592]
of a wholly separate domestic unit. Save for the appearance of an additional
tent, the ordinary run of daytime activities is scarcely altered. To 593
mention perhaps the most important feature of the relationships between 264
father and son, the groom continues to eat with his father. As yet, the son 571
does not use his own bowl,[1] and may not, indeed, do so for several years. 182
The important symbolism of "eating together" or "eating out of the one
bowl," the act of commensality creating a bond of fellowship about which
Robertson Smith[2] wrote so eloquently can only be referred to here in one of
its many aspects. Bedouin themselves stress that eating together is a strong
bond, and the communal meal is always used for this purpose after the
settlement of a dispute, or at the conclusion of a blood-money agreement,
and so on. It is significant also in the sense that those who partake of a
meal accept the authority of the host; he becomes their protector, and a blow [574]
against one of them is struck at him also. Even if the guest is an enemy,[3]
as long as he has eaten from another's bowl his life is safe.

The slaughter of an animal for another person creates a bond which has its 571
roots in the intimate connection between man and his animals. In a very 231
vivid way, the Bedouin view their animals as part of themselves, as part of 264
their *Risiq*, their general wealth, in which their sons are included. It is this 182
mystical association between a man and his animals which distinguishes a
meal consisting of the meat of an animal slaughtered from ones' own flock [574]
or herd from a meal consisting of meat bought from a butcher's shop — often [186]
given by the plateau peoples of Northern Cyrenaica to their guests, but which
the camel-herding Bedouin of the south regard as despicable hospitality. A
slaughtered animal is the food, *par excellence*, which establishes this bond

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[1] When Bedouin take their meals, they eat from large wooden bowls imported from [415]
south of the Sahara. It is a matter of custom that a man does not eat alone unless it is [439]
unavoidable, a custom of such strength, that, when, one day, only an elder, occupying
a tent the ropes of which were crossed with mine, was left in camp, he brought his [123]
bowl into my tent "so that I will be eating with a man."

[2] William Robertson Smith. *The Religion of the Semites*. 3rd ed. London: Macmillan, 1927. [113]

[3] A stranger entering a camp is under no obligation to give his identity. Few do so
until they have partaken of a meal. In the past, the Bedouin claim, the period of [574]
anonymity could last for 40 days, but nowadays, they say they limit it to two only. I [609]
have known strangers enter a camp, receive entertainment, and leave without offering
any specific identity.

band is required to take gifts to his mother-in-law in recognition of the fact 583
that she nourished his wife as an infant (the literal meaning of the word 584
used for this gift is "milk"). A return visit is made and gifts are given to 606
the daughter. When the first child is born an animal is presented by the 851
affines, and if the child is a male, the gift may be several sheep, or even a 425
few camels if the father-in-law is very wealthy. Formal exchange of gifts 606
continue, but, in addition, informal transfers are made. Moreover, if re-
lations between a man and his father-in-law develop favourably, it is not un- 606
common for a young husband, during the early years of marriage, to move 591
away from his father and pitch his tent alongside that of his father-in-law. 593
Marriage gives a son affinal relations of his own. Affinity can alleviate the
dead weight of paternal authority.

It is suggested that the crisis the marriage of a son assumes for a father 585
is the shift it entails in the distribution of authority. This is borne out by 561
other details in the marriage ceremony referred to earlier. Ordinarily, young 602
men dare not sing within earshot of their senior agnates. Far from allowing 533
obscenities, agnates of the ascending generation would not allow even a
mention of women to be made by young men, in their presence. In a group [593]
consisting of young men and an agnate, I chanced to use the noun for [123]•
woman and immediately my tent was cleared of all but the senior agnate.
At a wedding the young men revel in their lewd songs and shout their [831]
obscenities for all to hear. The senior agnates stand aside and make a show of ignoring the proceedings. And well they may, for each marriage is a challenge to the exclusive authority they have enjoyed; each nuptial tent is an invasion of the domain of which they have been undisputed masters. Marriage is the only occasion when the men of one generation can clap and sing their defiance of an older one, and give warning of the changes which must be accommodated however great the pretence that nothing has happened.

Marriage ceremonies dramatise the clash between adjacent generations 561
over the distribution of certain forms of authority. If this authority is as 602
overwhelming as has been suggested, and if it is so deeply resented, how is it that life is endurable for juniors? Relationships between junior and senior agnates are so restrictive that they almost amount to what Professor Fortes has suggested I view as a form of avoidance relationships. Juniors must always defer, they must obey commands promptly, they serve their seniors, they must accept a lead when it is given and the restrictions on conversations exclude all reference to women, marriage or sex. These are not simply a set of general guides for behaviour, they are rigidly applied rules, deviation from which is countered with rebuke or greater severity. It would appear from this

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many African societies is that wealth is transferred. Obviously, in societies where the 583
rules of exogamy compel a dispersion of links outside a man's own clan, what is in- 584
volved in this transfer of wealth cannot be sociologically similar to one in which mar- 606
riage to the first cousin on either side is permitted. 171

lowered very slowly and carefully by the crowd at the top. 671
Here again it is difficult to ascertain exactly what happened, 672
as the evidence was again contradictory. Apparently, when
Ahmed reached the ledge at half-way, he fumbled about 682
in the dim light for the foot holes; and just at this psychological moment the rope broke.

The ten men holding the rope at the top collapsed one on the top of another; but when they had recovered their presence of mind, they shouted down to Ahmed, to ask if he were all right. A faint voice from the bowels of the earth replied that he had fallen heavily on a stone and had had a nasty knock, but that he would be all right in a few minutes.

They then produced a spare rope for another man to go down and get Ahmed up; but they discovered that the only one they had to hand was too short by several feet. A man was sent post-haste on a pony to get another rope from the encampment a mile or so away, and when he returned after a quarter of an hour, volunteers were quickly forthcoming to go down and retrieve Ahmed. On reaching the bottom they found that the unfortunate man, either stunned by the fall or overcome by foul air, had collapsed flat on the bottom of the well, and had been drowned in six inches of water. They hauled his body up to the surface, and Ali, terrified that he might be held in some way responsible, counselled all present to bury the dead
man then and there, and to say nothing about it. However, [123]
news quickly spreads; and the same day an informer came
to the police post and reported the matter, and Ali was arrested and subsequently sentenced to three months' imprisonment with labour by the present writer, for failure
to notify a death under unusual circumstances. (Inci- [177]
dentally this did not constitute an offence under Bedouin Law, but was a contravention of the Police Code and was punished as such. Hence the apparent interference in a purely Bedouin concern.)

While Ali was still serving his sentence, Ahmed's rela- [694]

175 648 According to Murray, on July fourth "thirty Sheikhs of the Hanadi, the Awlad 'Ali, and the Beni'Una made their peace with the new power" (1935:30).

175 186 ●124 (648) The version of history provided by my informants is no radical departure from these facts. But there are a few differing aspects which represent ethnocentric highlights on history. For instance, the Bedouins of al-Qasr have a few stories which exaggerate the fact that the Harabi needed the cooperation of the Turkish rulers to defeat the Awlad 'Ali and to force them out of Cyrenaica. Also, the Bedouins point out, the Jumi'at tribe begged the Awlad 'Ali to come and rescue them from the oppression of the Hanadi.

175 619 648 Shortly after 1800, Muhammad 'Ali, the Ottoman viceroy, drove the French from Egypt and supported the Hanadi against the Awlad 'Ali. The Egytian ruler felt that political control over the Awlad 'Ali would insure the security of the whole desert, and especially Egypt's western frontier with Libya. Despite the alliance between the Hanadi and Muhammed 'Ali's forces, the outcome was a temporary victory for the Awlad 'Ali. This event actually set the stage for a transformation of Bedouin tribal society.

175 648 After the defeat of the Hanadi and the Pasha's troops, the Awlad 'Ali were given preferential treatment by Muhammed 'Ali. He wisely secured the Hanadi tribe in Sharqiyya Province. Then he granted the Awlad 'Ali, by right of usufruct, the

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posts were established there, and Marsa Matruh became the capital town. The Western Desert was administered by British officers who had under their command a garrison of Egyptian soldiers. Their assignment was to secure the colonial borders. This task included keeping the Awlad 'Ali within the boundaries of Egypt. The policy of the British provincial government was to avoid interfering with the Bedouin process of law and conflict regulation unless it threatened the peace and security [124] of the desert. My informants said that the British interfered with Bedouin justice only under the threat of large-scale tribal warfare.

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795
[619]
The political relationship which the Bedouins of the Awlad 'Ali tribe had with the Sanusi Order of Islam in Libya was historically not so important compared to that of the other Cyrenaican tribes. The Sanusi Order, classified as a Sufi _tariiqa_ ("mystic order"), was actually quite orthodox in its attitudes and practices. This is a function of the socio-religious conditions of its origin during the 18th-19th century revival of orthodoxy in Islamic Arabia (Gibb 1955: [793] 127-145). Muhammad bin 'Ali al-Sanusi founded his order, al-Sanusiyya, near Mecca around the year 1837. The Sanusi doctrine may be considered orthodox, or secularly oriented, in that it rejects the fundamental goal of Sufism, mystical union with God.

The Sanusi Order, from the very beginning, strove for a return to pure Islam. It made its greatest headway among

175 795 648 bat from al-Qasr joined the Sanusi army. The importance of their contribution to the Sanusi effort is vague, even though most of my informants claimed that their fathers "fought the British." Some of the al-Qasr activity was on a part-time basis. [124] One informant, whose father was the paramount leader of the 'Aishaibat tribe in 1916, told me that his father "used to take his rifle and ride out every morning to join the troops of Sayyid Ahmad al-Sharif (the grandson of al-Sanusi al-kabiir), and there he would kill many British soldiers. Then he would come home again at night." There was at least one group of al-Qasr Bedouins who joined the Sanusi in Libya before the start of the war. After the end of the fighting, this group returned to Egypt and asked to be pardoned by the British. They appealed to the Governor of Marsa Matruh that there should be no reprisals taken against them since the Turks had actually forced them to fight for the Sanusi. The British Governor, who was fluent in the Bedouin dialect and considered a great man by the Bedouins, replied to them in the form of a famous Bedouin proverb: "The ropes can be stretched far enough for forgiveness."

175 177 554 631 648 Traditionally, the Bedouins of the Marsa Matruh area were held in check by an officially created political structure which dated from the time of Muhammad 'Ali. This structure depended upon two political roles for the control of the Awlad 'Ali, the 'umda and the shaikh, neither of which had previously existed in the Bedouin authority system.

428 562 [422] inherited by a woman's daughters. The carpets and the tent, which are woven by women, are not their property to pass on for they belong to the head of the household, the shaib.

596 177 178 ● [124] Economic change in al-Qasr has had its impact at the level of production mode, and, also, it has affected the composition of the basic family structure. One informant, who is now nineteen years old, remembers growing up in a household composed of his grandfather, father, father's brothers and their families. Since that time, his father has built another house away from the family home; one uncle has moved to Marsa Matruh and opened a shop there; his youngest uncle has built a house not far from the family home; and one uncle remains with his three wives in the original house. 182 177 *613 433 434 This fission-type process is not uncommon in a segmentary society, although as a traditional process, it represented a mechanism for dealing with ecological pressures. In the modern case, in al-Qasr, the process of fission in the Bedouin social structure proves to be an adaptive mechanism also: the fragmentation of lineage property and relations is a positive condition for the transition to a cash and market economy. Among most of the families of al-Qasr, as market orientation increases brothers begin to economically differentiate their tasks and interests with an eye to individual profits.

619 the segmentary system is considered by the Bedouins to be a
*613 monolithic unit: "The Awlad 'Ali are one." But, as with all other segmentary lineage systems, in al-Qasr levels of segmentation reflect degrees of corporateness.

*613 Furthermore, the ideology of structural unity dissolves
178 before the empirical evidence of fission and fusion, processes
619 characteristic of the segmentary society in general. These processes are not common in al-Qasr during the present time. But they must have been in the past, because the segments which Murray (1935) names as making up the Ali Ahmar include only one of those which currently comprise the tribe. The
[578] only admission of fission which I could obtain from my informants was that, at one time, 'Ailit Ma'fas was a tertiary
● [124] segment of 'Ailit Lazumi (see Figure 3). I received this information from a number of my key informants so that it can be accepted despite a denial to the contrary by some of my other informants. There is no empirical link below the secondary level to be discovered in the genealogical maps of these two groups; kinship ties have been manipulated to coincide with ideological claims. The fact that these two lineages are now the wealthiest and most powerful in the al-Qasr area may be an indication that economic and political motivations undermined the unity of 'Ailit Lazumi in the
*613 past. We shall have occasion to return to this opposition
178 between the Lazumi and the Ma'fas when we discuss political
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One of my in-

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•124 formants, a wealthy man and a poet, said that since he could not love two women equally he would never take a second wife. He also said that he was unwilling to give his daughter to a man who refused to promise him that she would be his only wife.

593 Throughout his life, the father is dominant and his washuun is subjective. He is the master of his naja' and the [596] social behavior of his wife and offspring toward him has both a moral and a pragmatic aspect. They show respect and obed- [768] ience because "it is the decent thing to do;" further, just as he provides for their material needs while he is alive, so the property which he leaves them will sustain them after 428 his death. As we have already noted, in theory, the daughters [562] inherit one-half of the shares which the sons receive; in fact, females inherit only if they are the sole survivors of the male. But the surviving wife, or wives, will take a cash amount equal to their brideprice from the husband's estate. The Bedouins say that this price will be paid before any other inheritance shares are distributed. 768 In addition, the wife has the right to remain in her husband's house or tent, and it is the duty of the eldest son to look after her. She may remain at home until death, provided she never brings a man who may be considered a prospective husband into the house.

593 The rights and duties involved in the father-washuun relationship show that the ideal authority structure of the

582 114 196 "parallel cousin" (i.e. bint 'amm) is perfectly interchangeable with the term "parallel-cousin once removed" (i.e. bint ibn 'amm, "daughter of the father's brother's son"). After I [124] had familiarized myself with the genealogies of al-Qasr, I began to realize that many of my informants were using the term bint 'amm to refer to the parallel-cousin once, twice, or even thrice removed. When I pointed this out to one of the Bedouins, he replied: "So what, there is nothing forbidden about this type of marriage." Table 5 shows that this is indeed the case. 582 183 182 There are a number of cultural ideals which influence the practice of marriage in al-Qasr: endogamy is encouraged because it cements and intensifies corporate ties; exogamy is desired because it widens the web of kinship; men prefer younger women to older women and may utilize their cousin-right privilege to realize this preference.

582 829 The Bedouins of al-Qasr define the bint 'amm over a wide range. One informant said that "all of the girls of the Awlad 'Ali tribe are my bint 'amm, we are all one." Another said to me, that "any girl of the 'Ali Ahmar is a man's bint 'amm." And yet another informed me that "a man of the Qinaishat tribe will reserve his daughter for me before he will give her to an outsider." Ideologically, a bint 'amm seemed to be anything except the father's brother's daughter. This is quite convenient for the Bedouins because an ideological concept can be placed anywhere along the scale of actuality

554 1952:165), and the role rajal khair along with the other roles
627 concerned with political action, the 'aqila, shaikh, and 'umda,
692 represent political organization in al-Qasr. Although the role of rajal khair is not institutionalized to the same degree that the others are, we shall see in the next chapter that it is an important one for an understanding of power relations in al-Qasr. All of these roles carry with them some type of right to make binding decisions in matters regarding conflict regulation. That is, an individual should take his
*[613] claims to the 'aqila, but may take them to any of the other political specialists. In any of the cases, the litigants concerned become bound by the decision of the third party.
*[613] But only at the hand of the 'aqila can a decision be made
[695] which will effect a whole group, i.e., only an 'aqila can
[682] give judgment against a corporation for the blood-money in a case of homicide (Schacht 1953:328).

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692 If, however, blood-money is not an immediate concern, the litigants may utilize any and all of the political roles
*613 available in the judicial system. A statement from one of my
554 informants, an 'aqila, is useful here.
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●[124]

> The bait is made up of thirty or fourty men, and there is one most important man (rajal kabiir), the 'aqila. The 'aqila puts an end to problems, he sees who deserves this and who deserves that. Problems must be settled. It happened five or six years ago that I and my paternal cousins quarreled over land at Wadi Raml. I went to the police station and complained to the shaikh of the 'Aishaibat. I asked him to choose a person to judge

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672 other than those dealing with blood-revenge too. For instance,
*613 in matters concerning personal debts incurred, the group is
571 not responsible for the individual. The Bedouins say that if
672 a man has the money he must repay his debts: if he does not
*613
426 have the money, then he must ask a rich relative to pay his
debts for him. He is then in debt to his relative and, out
of respect for him, should not borrow money or go into debt
[558] again. If he does, he will bring dishonor ('ar) to his
[681] family and they will, ultimately, banish him. There was disagreement
682 among my informants as to whether or not they
*613 should contribute to a diiya which was compensation for an
829 intentional slaying. Some said that they would not question
•124 the motives of their kinsman who has killed because "we are
together in the good and the bad, and I must pay for him
just as he must pay for me." But others held the opinion,
which I feel was a prevailing one, that one must take into
account the justifiability of the killing. This seems to
have been the case in the past, for the Bedouins say that
traditionally the bait of the killer had to pay one-half
of the diiya.

*613 All things political somehow relate to the payment
682 of blood-money. We have seen that the essential function
681 of the 'aqila, and even the condition of his taking office,
182 refers to the responsibility of collecting the diiya from
571 the members of his group. The criterion of being a member

671 I checked the contents of this document with
[124] my own informants who agreed that it was authentic and
represented the _'awaiyid_ as it should be practiced. Almost
[682] the whole of the _'awaiyid_ refers to the circumstances surrounding the occurrence of killing and the payment of the
[128] _diiya_. The case studies which I present below reflect the
'awaiyid as it was practiced in 1935.

682 Blood-money is calculated relative to three things: whether or not a killing was premeditated or accidental; the sex of the victim; and whether or not the victim was a freeman or a slave. The full _diiya_ is paid in the case of intentional killing, and three-fourths of this amount is due in the case
[562] of accidental killing. The _diiya_ for a woman is one-half that for a man whether or not the killing is intentional.
[567] There are no slaves in al-Qasr, only their descendents who are now freemen. In the case where a pregnant woman is killed, the foetus will be examined and should it prove to be a male then the full _diiya_ will be due.

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An important mechanism for conflict regulation in the Western Desert is the _nazaala_, i.e., "the act of taking refuge." If a killing is committed, the killer immediately seeks protection by going to the residence of a neutral third party. The third party, who may or may not be an _'aqila_, and his lineage give protection to the whole tertiary segment of the killer. This may involve the actual relocation of the killer's _bait_ to the residence of the protecting group for

682 Since Bedouin law, and not Egyptian law, still prevails
683 in al-Qasr, personal injury cases must be expedited
671 according to the 'awaiyid lest the greater sanctions embodied
in the principle of self-help follow. Sanctioned fines for
death and bodily injury are standardized in al-Qasr and in the
[124] whole Western Desert. One informant, a rajal khair ("good
[627] man") who sometimes adjudicated quarrels, possessed an
authoritative paper which listed the injury and ensuing fine
prevailing in al-Qasr when I was in the field. Below are the
contents of this paper. The comments in parentheses were
made by the man as I translated the paper: they were offered
as the rationale behind Bedouin law.

L.E. 400 - for inflicting an injury upon a person which renders him sterile.
400 - for the intentional death of a man with a gun or knife.
400 - for causing the loss of a man's nose, ("Because to cut up a man's nose is to make him ugly.")
400 - for causing the loss of a man's eyes, 200 L.E. for each eye, ("Because without eyes a man can do nothing.")
400 - for causing the loss of a man's ears, 200 L.E. for each ear, ("Because a deaf man cannot work.")
300 - for the death of a man if caused by beating with sticks or stones, ("This is unintentional, for if you really wanted to kill the man you would use a better weapon.")
200 - for the intentional death of a woman with a gun or knife.
150 - for the loss of a hand.
150 - for the loss of a leg.
10 - for the loss of a front tooth, ("Because it is bad for a man's appearange.")
5 - for the loss of a rear tooth.

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•124 The following excerpt from my field notes concerning Bedouin law will show the earnestness with which informants upheld the function of the oath as a legal sanction.

> I know that you want to find out whether or not the oath will prove the guilt or innocence of a person. Well, it will. First of all, if a man is known to be a liar, those of his relatives who are supposed to support him will refuse to swear the oath. And, if they do take the oath and know that the person is lying, then definitely something bad will happen to both him and them. I will give you a case which will prove what I say. Years ago, there was a quarrel between an _'aiela_ of Awlad Kharuf ('Ali Abyad) and 'Ailit Abu Qarasa of the 'Aishaibat over the rightful ownership of a Roman well in the desert. The well originally belonged to our family (i.e. 'Ailit Abu Qarasa). The Abu Qarasa requested that the oath be used to settle the matter, and that twenty-five of the Awlad Kharuf swear that the well belonged to them. They swore the oath and the case was finished: the well went to the Awlad Kharuf. The Abu Qarasa could say nothing more since the oath had been taken. But listen to this: within one month's time of taking the oath, seven of the twenty-five Awlad Kharuf swearers were buried. At the present time, only three of the original swearers are still living. One of these three begot only girls, and when these girls married all of their marriages ended in divorce. Another of the three survivors has a son who lost an eye and an arm in an accident. And the third man, he has not married yet. Some of these men who died were very young at the age of death. You see, if I steal 10 L.E. and swear that I did not, then God will punish me ten-fold. God's punishment may strike my animals, my family, or my money; God will take his vengeance through these three means. You should always remember that the life of one man is worth one-hundred wells.

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*[613] The man who swears the oath places himself and his group in ritual danger. The above description of the oath and its possible consequences show that the Bedouins believe divine punishment can work indirectly. One case-study presented

121 external system, however, the law recognizes retaliation, a
681 life for a life. Still, even in this case, Bedouin values
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[182] expressed through the _'awaiyid_ try to avert bloodshed and
[671] feuding by showing "the good path" and providing the means
for settlement through compensation.

681 Just as the Bedouin accepts the _'awaiyid_ as a set of
682 of ideals calculated to regulate conflict, he paradoxically
182 claims the right to impose retaliatory sanctions as a just
[671] conclusion to conflict. One Bedouin said that the greatest
[673] sin which a man or group can commit is to accept the _diiya_
and then take his blood-revenge and return the money. Presumably,
a person or group commits no outrage if they refuse
the _diiya_ with the understanding that blood-revenge will be
[626] taken. In al-Qasr, retaliation and the _'awaiyid_ are mechanisms
[671] of social control and dispute settlement. A political office
*[613] exists, i.e. the _'aqila_ which functions over the total range
[692] of political action, and the process of adjudication and
compensation in the form of indemnity payment represents an
institutionalized alternative to retaliation. In all cases
of dispute, ritual or religious sanctions back up social
[776] sanctions. God is a third party to all conflict, and this is
[695] made manifest in the reading of the _Fatiha_ or the oath-taking
128 ceremony. In order to describe how authority and sanctions
68 operate in Bedouin society, a number of examples are presented
•[124] below. Some of the cases are the statements of informants about
[114]

128 68 what happened; some of them are my translations of legal docu-
[124] ments which informants permitted me to see; a few of the cases
[114] happened while I was in the field and represent my reporting
of what happened. I have arbitrarily divided the cases into
those involving personal injury and those concerning property
rights. In each case, I indicate at which level of the authority
structure the conflict and settlement has taken place.

Legal Cases Pertaining to Personal Injury

578 681 Two cases of killing have been discussed previously.
Below are a number of cases dealing with personal injury which
occurred in the external political system at the various levels
of segmentation. The first three cases involve conflict
* [613] [619] between secondary lineage segments of the 'Aishaibat tribe;
[648] the next two cases take place at the primary and sub-tribal
levels, but note that secondary segments are the actual function-
ing units involved; the final case, an unusual one, deals with
conflict with "foreigners" at the tribal level. Note that the
* [613] 'aqila as a corporate representative is active in these cases.
[182] The third case presented below is a translation of an actual
[778] document showing how the nazaala (discussed above) functions
as a formal mechanism of conflict regulation.

554 It would be considered "wrong" for the members of
571 this group to present themselves at an al-Qasr wedding party,
[577] or the annual celebration held in honor of a local saint of
[585] [796] the area. When I inquired about the conspicuous absence of
[124] some of my chief informants from such gatherings, I was told
[431] that "they will send their gifts," or that "it is not decent
554 that they come to something such as this." In terms of
571 Bedouin social structure, there are a number of plausible
182 explanations for this "status separation." Fathers should
561 [593] not attend public affairs at which their sons may be "performing," i.e., young men should be allowed to play a public role outside the confines of the father-son authority structure. By virtue of the extension of the father role, and its corresponding authoritarian attitude, every member of the elder age-set commands certain rights and obligations which would prevent the free expression that is the hallmark of Bedouin parties. Conversely, and at the more general level, members of the "status group" who wish to remain members of this circle accept certain restrictions on social
[114] intercourse. At the five different Bedouin "parties" which
I attended, there were "elders" present, but none of them could be classified as members of the "status group." Bedouins plainly state that elders should not attend parties, but, on the other hand, they show much more concern and emotion when they say that a member of the "status group" should not "be

554 hence the rajal khair represents a face-saving mechanicsm
571 and an alternative which is needed. The rajal khair may even
627 [829] violate group norms in acting to restore the balance of
*[613] honor: he may lie with intent to deceive, behavior which at
[577] any other time would be considered "wrong" by the Bedouin.
An informant said that

> [539] the real rajal khair is a man who goes to men in a quarrel and asks them to be on good terms and to avoid the devil. He uses good judgement in quarrels. In this case, he may even have to lie. He goes to both parties and listens to them insult each other, but when he returns he tells each that the other is a good man and wishes to settle the quarrel. He tells them: 'Do not let the devil interfere.' He tells each that the other wants his friendship.

554 I pursued the detail that a rajal khair may lie to restore
571 peace, since other informants had made a point of this. My
577 informant then explained:
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> • 124 [539] I don't want to commit myself because no one knows if the rajal khair is really lying; the men at the time of the quarrel do not know that he is lying. Not all men are rajal khair: there are only a few. The rajal khair puts himself in trouble to help others, therefore, the people do not want to harm him (by thinking ill of him). The rajal khair must be a good man and help others, and he always speaks the truth. He lies but he is doing good, and the people do not want to harm him. When the rajal khair lies, a man does not lose his rights. A man tells the rajal khair this; he tells him that he does not want to lose his rights, and he does not care what he says as long as he does not lose his rights.

554 of the Bedouin attitude, or lack of it, toward religion.
792 771 Since the time of Muhammad, the Bedouins have been considered
notoriously bad Muslims. Today, the Bedouins tend to joke
about their lack of zeal, and often point out that "holy
619 men" are not to be trusted.[2] This is seen in Sa'adi behavior
771 toward the Marabtin tribes who are their vassals. Theoretically,
792 the Marabtin who trace descent to the Prophet and might be
554 [778] considered "sacred Tribes" should be respected by the "secular"
Sa'adi tribes. But the Sa'adi of al-Qasr tend to deride the
554 Marabit. For instance, the "holy man" of al-Qasr, 'Amm Salih,
792 is a Marabit and well-known for his ability to successfully
627 mediate in conflict situations. But one informant, pointing
619 out this gift which 'Amm Salih possesses, said: "Amm Salih
is a good man, he is not a Marabit." But 'Amm Salih identifies
himself as a "rajal saalih" and a "Marabit"; he sees no role
conflict here.

771 The Bedouins also joke about the manner in which they
[522] practice the "pillars of Islam." Especially, they make light
of the fact that they are irregular in mosque attendance.
They say, with a slight smile, "we pray in the desert." A
● [124] common way for an interview to end was by an informant rising
and saying: "Now I must wash for prayers." This happened

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[184] [2] Professor Abou-Zeid also notes this trait in his study of the Bedouin near Sallum, on the Libyan border (1966:248).

771 at any time of the day! As one Bedouin put it: "According to the idea of goodness (salih), we are not good. This is because we do not pray, we are part-timers in prayer."

554 792 778 A good rajal saalih is considered by the Bedouin to have a special "blessing" (baraka), a concept somewhat equivalent to that of mana. Someone such as 'Amm Salih is thought to have baraka, and this type of power naturally increases his influence and enhances his status. The following [124] informant's account brings this out and shows something of the magico-religious element at work in Bedouin power relations.

> [539] Hajj 'Ali does not believe in magic but he respects the "holy man" like anyone else. He owns a field from which are taken stones for building houses. One day he saw some men taking stones from this field. They were digging near a well so that the well would not be able to hold water after they had finished. Hajj 'Ali told the men to stop digging. One man answered: "I am cutting these stones for the Jaraira family (the family of 'Amm Salih), and only a few more and we will be finished." Hajj 'Ali replied: "For the Jaraira as for anyone else, we don't favor anyone, so stop the work now." Then Hajj 'Ali went home, never thinking that they would cause any trouble for him, and he was afraid of no harm. [787] He slept and he had a dream. In the dream he saw three of the Jaraira family, all of whom were dead and whom he had known in life. In the dream they only watched him and spoke no words. In the morning Hajj 'Ali went to the co-operative society's office and there he met 'Amm Salih. He said to him: "'Amm Salih, I want to tell you something." Then he related the whole story to him, and said: "I had no fear that you would do me any harm. But last night I saw your relatives in my dream; I had not even thought of them yesterday, so they are not the cause of the dream. [828] (The Bedouins believe that dreams reflect, and are connected with, what you saw or did during the day). So come and take all of the stones that you want, even if you are going to build a palace."

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his role.

The people of al-Qasr identify 'Amm Salih as the "holy man" in the area. In my interviews, when I asked for the name of a party, besides the 'aqila, who solves the Bedouins' problems, the answer was either Hajj 'Ali, the rajal khair, or "the Jaraira family." (This refers to 'Amm Salih and his brother.) When I asked for the name of a man who could tell me "how the Bedouin should act," the only name mentioned was that of 'Amm Salih.
[124]
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'Amm Salih says that he solves many problems, not all of which deal with marriage and divorce. He claimed that he could settle conflicts over land and water. Just as a man may choose to go to the rajal khair, so also might he go to the rajal salih. Often enough, the selection of a "third party" will be determined by his propinquity. One 'aqila told me: "Salih Jaraira is a good man . . . If two men wish to accept Jaraira's decision, and if he lives near them, it is all right. If Jaraira cannot solve the problem, then they will return to the 'aqila. The 'aqila can solve it or he can call in other 'awaqil who can solve it."
* [613]
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[114]
When I asked 'Amm Salih for case studies of problems which he has handled, he said that he would not reveal them because they are private affairs. He was willing, however, to describe the method in which he solves a problem.

114 until sometime after my departure from the field.[5] Never-
634 666 theless, before I left the field I discussed the pending
114 election with some of my informants and members of the
634 "status group." The interviews reveal that the "status
666 group" still intends to dominate the area of power relations
•124 829 with the government. As one informant said: "The present
*[613] *'umda* and the one before him were from Bait Bu Taram of
'Ailit Lazumi, and the next one will be from Bu Taram also."

634 The tenacity of traditional politics and the influence
571 of the "status group" are reflected in the affairs surrounding
666 the election of a new incumbent to the office of *'umda*. In
this situation, all Bedouins become concerned more with the
distribution of power than with the actual person who will
124 fill the authority role. One informant, an *'aqila*, gave
*613 indication that formal authorities support the "status group"
634 and the distribution of power which they represent and maintain.

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> Mustafa, the brother of the *'umda*, takes his place while he is in Cairo attending Parliament. The *'umda* told me that he was going to ask the *'awaaqil to* sacrifice (i.e. slaughter a lamb) and write a paper making Mustafa the new *'umda*. (Here I told the informant that I had spoken with Mustafa about this, and he told me that he did not want to be the *'umda*).
> Even if Mustafa does not want to be the *'umda*, the *'awaaqil* will force him to accept . . . . It should remain in the same family, it would be a shame if the office went to another family. Mustafa's father and brother were *'umdas* before him. If the office left the family,

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[5] Technically, the 'Aishaibat were without an *'umda* while [redacted] was in the field. However, he spent enough time in Matruh that he was able to carry on his duties until his successor could be named.

●124 If the office left the family,

> *613 all of the lineages would be fighting over it . . . The
> 634 job should stay in Bait Bu Taram; if this is impossible,
> 571 then it should stay in 'Ailit Lazumi. In any case, the
> 666 _'awaaqil_ will decide.

578 A change in the present locus of legal authority in
634 the Bedouin-Egyptian government structural relationship
178 would amount to a re-structuring process, and could lead to
121 serious conflict. In the very least, it would call for a clear explanation and new statement of social reality since it would challenge what is, and "has always been," a legitimate distribution of power and political order.

634 The office of the _shaikh_ is not a potential power-
554 base by comparison with the office of _'umda_. The _shaikh_, rather than being in direct communication with the Governor, executes the official orders made known to the _'umda._ As an administrator, he takes care of issuing drivers' licenses, notifies men of their military draft status, etc. The government sees this as a necessary post because of the difficulty of contacting Bedouins deep in the desert. In one sense, the _shaikh's_ office is becoming less functional as the Bedouin move in from the desert and begin to take part in the national society, but in another sense it is becoming more functional as bureaucracy and red tape become increasingly complex. But the _shaikh_ remains in the shadow of the _'umda_. He never substitutes for the _'umda_, for this would infringe on the rightful power of the _'umda's_ family; when the _'umda_ is absent,

121 My approach here is to state the problem of authority
554 and change using a case study of one man whom I consider the
571 most prestigious member of the "status group" of al-Qasr. He
156 is a member of the "status group" by virtue of his wealth and
family connections; he has reinforced and enhanced his "status
honor" by the practice of intervening into various conflict
situations and mustering support, favors, and loyalty as he
goes; and he has proved his "superiority" by excelling in the
outside business world. All this he has done while remaining
a "good Bedouin."

•124 The name of Hajj 'Ali appeared time and time again as
554 my research progressed and increasingly concentrated on the
156 authority structure.[2] I asked questions which required the
informants to name a person in al-Qasr to whom he would go
if he needed help, money or advice. I asked: "Who is the
leader of the Bedouin?";"Who knows the wants and needs of the
Bedouin most intimately?" On the basis of the data collected
[571] in this manner, I was able to perceive a "status group" and
gain an idea of the real leaders of al-Qasr. It also gave
me a working knowledge of the local role structure. Hajj
'Ali's name came up with the highest frequency in the
questionnaires, and my observations and interviews with
him corroborated his central place in the authority structure.
[126] I also recorded the life history of Hajj 'Ali's son, and gained
valuable insights from this data.

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[2] The name, Hajj 'Ali, is of course a pseudonym.

156 with four wives. It is not hard to understand why the people
159 of al-Qasr consider Hajj 'Ali a *rajal khair* *par excellence*.
554 627 For instance, when I asked one man if he could give me some
•124 examples of court cases, he replied: "The one who is not an
'aqila pays no attention to anything save getting food for
his children. The *rajal khair* has money and men (a reference
to the "old days" when a person needed cohorts for battle),
and so he always pays instead of us. He lends us money and
helps us in doing anything, like Hajj 'Ali does." In another
124 interview, one man showed great respect for Hajj 'Ali's tradi-
156 159 tional status and modern ability to deal with the outside
554 world by giving him the honorific title of "*shaikh*," and
439 showing that the Bedouins of al-Qasr put their trust in him:
472 "When the olive merchants come from Alexandria, they go to
245 Shaikh 'Ali, someone who knows about olives. They ask him
what kind of olives al-Qasr has. He shows the merchants, and
they say: 'I will give you so much for them.' They make an
agreement, and Hajj 'Ali collects the olives and gets the
price for them."

156 In terms of local politics, I would guess, but do
159 not have data to prove, that Hajj 'Ali was the third party
554 [627] most frequently referred to in seeking a termination of
[114] conflict. He was commonly asked to participate in these
matters not only by the disputants themselves but also by
the *'aqila* or other third party presiding. He was sometimes

156 159 554 675 He was sometimes asked to sit-in as a witness for important contractual matters. Note that in the rawaabit al-'awaaqil of Bait Shafaila of 'Ailit Lazumi (presented in Chapter Four), Hajj 'Ali who is neither from 'Ailit Lazumi nor an 'aqila was present to sign and validate this document.

156 159 554 Hajj 'Ali, then, operates in the micropolitical system and the traditional authority structure of al-Qasr. But what is just as important, he has secured a firm foothold in the modern bureaucratic structure of the near-by town. He straddles both camps. 635 634 156 159 554 •124 [648] The Governor of Marsa Matruh was an important aid to my understanding of Hajj 'Ali's role as "broker." The Governor claimed that the British first introduced the roles of 'umda and shaikh; they did this to "control the Bedouin" and to"get the men out of the tents." He explained in his own way what he considered to be the structural differentiation of political roles in al-Qasr.

> *[613] Let me tell you, these fellows are very clever. They have an 'umda . . . he comes to my office and says: "I want this and this." I say, "No." Then he goes back to the 'awaqil and tells them that, and then these fellows begin to think in what way they can get what they want. But the 'umda is nothing; it is the 'aqila whom the Bedouins listen to and love . . . The 'umda is elected (at this time) by the Bedouins. They put forward a man who hesitates, one who can say yes or no . . . But there is a real leader for the people, this is a man such as Hajj 'Ali, here is a man the Bedouins love.

124 635 156 159 554 *[613] The Governor said that Hajj 'Ali speaks well and thinks well. Twice in the interview the Governor said that

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635 156 Hajj 'Ali "became an _'aqila_ by his way of life." Of course,
159 the fact is that Hajj 'Ali is not an _'aqila_ at all. Although
554 I feel that the Governor should understand the Bedouin authority
*[613] structure, he is not alone in his misconceptions. The chief
156 agricultural engineer for the G.D.D.O., who works very closely
159 with the Bedouins of al-Qasr, also thought that Hajj 'Ali
554 was the _'aqila_ of Bait 'Umar in 'Ailit Ma'fas. Furthermore,
*613 and most impressive of all, one _'aqila_ in 'Ailit Dawlat and
his four sons all thought that Hajj 'Ali was the _'aqila_ of
Bait 'Umar. There is more here than just ignorance of
Bedouin society on the part of officials, and disinterest
on the part of the Dawlat _'aqila_. There is good reason for
these different parties to mistake Hajj 'Ali as a key
traditional "authority," or spokesman for his corporate group.
It seems clear that in their respective dealings they must
have encountered Hajj 'Ali in some kind of representative
capacity. The _'aqila_ who insisted that Hajj 'Ali was an
'aqila, even after I pointed out that he was not, lived
outside the _'izba_ sector and hence mistook an important
rajal khair for an _'aqila_. The Governor understandably
mistook the most influential man in al-Qasr as an _'aqila_.

635 There are other traits which qualify Hajj 'Ali as
648 the singular leader of the Bedouins. A few years back, the
[554] Governor of Marsa Matruh formed a Governor's Council
[156] [159] (_Majlis al-Muhafza_) made up of representatives of the Bedouin

635 population of the whole Western Desert, and representatives
[648] of the Egyptian government employees working in the province.
[634] The Bedouin representatives appointed to this council need
not be an *'umda* or a *shaikh*, although they may be. The
oldest Bedouin member of the council, who happens to be an
'umda, told me that "the Governor picks the men who he feels
understand the problems of the people."

635 The Governor himself thinks that every Bedouin on
•124 his council is an *'aqila*. He replied to my question about
*613 the criteria for membership on the *Majlis al-Muhafza*: "I
am using a new selection system. Rather than choose the
'umda or *shaikh*, I choose the *'aqila*. Every man on the
council is an *'aqila*, and the number is determined by the
population of the area . . . But I appoint more men from the
[619] 'Ali Ahmar (see Figures 3 and 7)[1] than from other tribes.
This is because they are more numerous, and they are near
Matruh where I am able to contact them immediately. The
'Ali Ahmar are represented by six men and the other tribes
by just three men."

156 Hajj 'Ali is one of these six men and the only member
159 of the Council who resides in al-Qasr. I attended and ob-
554 served the December meeting of the Council. The Governor
635 sat at the head of a long table with the Egyptian representa-
648 tives on either side of him. At the other end of the table
[114] sat the Bedouin representatives, Hajj 'Ali among them. Purely

[1] [See pp. 65 & 77 respectively--Analyst]

156 159 and they sat on chairs inside the tent. I returned to
554 Marsa Matruh in the 'umda's car (1964 Ford, highly polished)
635 537 with the 'umda and the shaikh. They openly joked about Hajj
[634] 'Ali and his manner of presentation; they repeated some of
[122] his "stilted" phrases and laughed. Hajj 'Ali gave last year's
[522] reception speech also. This is because, his son says, Hajj
'Ali is considered a fine speaker by the Bedouins of al-Qasr.

121 We can see how these details carry larger implications
177 within the context of political and social structures under-
178 going change. It is the stuff which the anthropologist finds
important for an understanding of the process of change.

156 If I have established thus far that Hajj 'Ali is
159 politically active and representative in both the traditional
554 and the modern systems, then the attempt is now to prove that
177 he consciously seeks to change the traditional in the direction
178 of the modern for political and moral reasons, and for social
and personal reasons.

156 Hajj 'Ali, when he spoke with me, inevitably came
159 around to the subject of international politics, whether this
554 was the question of Israel or the image which America's racial
177 problems presented. Hajj 'Ali was the only man from the whole
178 124 Marsa Matruh area who was neither shaikh nor 'umda to attend
829 the nomination of Jamal Abd al-Nasser in January of 1965. In
[571] all of this, I detect a move on the part of Hajj 'Ali to
identify himself with an Egyptian reference group and to

156 draw al-Qasr into the Egyptian political community. He has
159 committed himself to work hand-in-hand with the Governor of
554 Marsa Matruh in introducing changes connected with economics
177 and education into al-Qasr. He does not conceal this fact.
178 When I spoke with him about helping me with my study of
124 changing attitudes in al-Qasr, he said: "I might have the
829 time to do this, but before I decide you will have to bring
[571] me a letter from the Governor stating that he wishes me to
cooperate with you." The identity and responsibility which
Hajj 'Ali feels for his role of agent of change is indicated
in his remark to me that he had heard "there were others in
the desert who feel and think the way I myself do."

156 Hajj 'Ali is discretely aware of the status difference
159 between himself, as a member of the "status group," and the
554 others of al-Qasr. As Weber would say, he perceives the
571 difference in "style of life." I was invited to Hajj 'Ali's
574 house for 'iid al-fitr, the feast marking the end of Ramadan.
796 I thought that this would be a good opportunity to observe
123 the "leaders" of al-Qasr together. I was very much surprised
to find present no members of the "status group" but only
[656] their exact opposites. On the occasion of this feast it is
[735] the custom that the rich treat the poor. As an additional
surprise, we had a very simple meal of bread, dates, peanuts,
and tea. Hajj 'Ali explained to me: "My neighbors do not
have my economic advantages, and I do not think it is proper

*613 at this lineage level must bear collective responsibility in
602 matters of compensation and blood-revenge. This principle,
571 682 as we have seen, is extended until the whole *'aiela* is in-
cluded in a symbolic expression of corporate group solidarity.
In order for this expression to persist, of course, the
mechanism, or ideology, of blood-revenge must be maintained.
•[124] All of my informants, though they disagreed over the details
of revenge, insisted that it was the inviolable right of the
156 Arabs. But Hajj 'Ali took exception to the practice of blood-
159 554 revenge for a number of reasons. He said:

> 829 The world changes. Before it was only the *'awaiyid*
> 682 *Awlad 'Ali* and the Border Guards which kept order.
> The government now enters into the matter of killings.
> Personally, I do not agree with the custom and the
> way it operates. In the case of killing, for instance,
> someone who is not worth anything, and has no brains,
> kills one from another tribe. Then the tribe of the
> [778] killer asks for the *nazaala*, and a third party becomes
> involved. The third party agrees to guard the killer's
> *bait* for twelve months and the business of all those
> involved must stop. A member of the third party's
> family must accompany each member of the killer's tribe.
> But even after the twelve months one must live in fear
> at his own home, for after the twelve months the tribe
> of the deceased will try to kill the best man in the
> killer's tribe. How many good ones do we have in one
> tribe? I have heard that in Algeria, Morocco, and
> Tunisia the deceased man's family has the right to kill
> the killer only . . . (I then commented that perhaps
> blood-revenge functions to discourage killing in the
> desert.) But there are unbalanced people who actually
> commit murder just to tease their tribe: they have
> nothing to fear because no one is interested in killing
> them in retaliation.

In challenging the Arabs' traditional right to blood-revenge, Hajj 'Ali--besides questioning a structural basis of

156 159 554 829 574 648 tional style of Bedouin hospitality--"as we used to do in Cyrenaica"--and spent a total of 50 L.E. for the welcoming ceremony. "This money was from his own pocket," as the Bedouins of al-Qasr complained after it was learned that the vice-President would not visit Matruh after all. As a matter of fact, all of the Bedouin leaders who had been invited to the reception by Hajj 'Ali refused to eat the food, for they said that it had not been prepared for them. [576] This act was taken as a show of respect for Hajj 'Ali and anger with bureaucrats.

156 159 554 648 668 Hajj 'Ali is the representative of al-Qasr to the Arab Socialist Union which meets in Marsa Matruh and has cell meetings in al-Qasr. The socialist cell in al-Qasr meets about three times a month. When I asked why Hajj 'Ali ● [124] was the man chosen to represent all of al-Qasr at section [635] meetings of the Union, the reply was: "Because he is a member of the Majlis al-Muhafza." There was one section meeting of the Union in Matruh while I was in the field. The theme of the meeting was "The Meaning of Socialism." Hajj 'Ali attended this meeting.

156 159 554 In sum, it seems not too far afield to say that Hajj 'Ali is prepared to take over the leadership of the Bedouins in a much more sophisticated manner than one could possibly expect from the traditional style of politics. Hajj 'Ali's [634] comments about the _'umda_ and the _'umda's_ probable successor

element of reasonableness is a universal principle in any judicial logic. 121
Nadel reacts to Gluckman's implication of the universality of the concept 181
suggesting that it is valid only in certain contexts, and that the cases 671
reported by Gluckman from which he abstracted that concept are minor ones. 114
Nadel maintained that the principle seems inadequate in major crimes such as homicide, witchcraft or assault. "If I am right, the Lozi would, in these situations, discard their guiding fiction of 'reasonable man' for the sharper dichotomy of things simply lawful and unlawful, permitted and forbidden" (1956:162).

METHODOLOGY

One of the characteristics of legal anthropology is the absence of a 121
coherent body of theory that could be utilized in the analysis and interpretation of the ethnographic data. 124
What do exist, however, in the area of the ethnography of law are a variety of what may be called "tools of analysis." These are mainly methods and orientations which help to direct the researcher's attention to a certain area of behavior which describes best the phenomenon under study. Their main purpose is to help the researcher isolate particular portions of the phenomenon he is studying and as such enables him to conceptualize the problem. A number of these tools have been employed in the present study. One of these tools is Turner's "social drama" which was employed in the analysis of the political leadership and the judicial process. Since this approach depends upon the intimate knowledge of the sequential development of a given case, or cases, over a period of time, it was quite difficult to employ it in more than that particular context. As will be apparent in the later chapters, the judicial process among the group is highly informal. Most of the disputes are settled [627]
by means of mediation which is done behind the scene and with a great deal of secrecy.

I managed, however, during my stay to be closely in touch with one 12
of the major cases and with almost all the parties involved. This case was used as the basis for the "social drama" analyzed in chapter three of the present study.

In addition to the social drama, I have used the case study method 121
to analyze aspects of the substantive law of the group especially with 127
regard to concepts such as that of criminal responsibility and the nature of the contractual relations as exemplified by the marriage contract.
Cases utilized in the study include ones that I observed myself as well [124]●
as cases taken from texts and some which were told to me by informants.

Most of the data was collected through the time-honored technique 123
of participant observation which was facilitated by the fact that the 122
group spoke the native language of the researcher (or vice versa). Formal 124
interviewing was conducted on a very limited scale, thirty-five extensive 125
questionnaires in all. These questionnaires were originally designed and administered to supplement the life history material and to assess the attitudes of the particular people involved with regard to particular issues. Some of the results of these questionnaires are used in the chapter. Due to the non-representation of the sample interviewed, these results are used merely as illustration and not as representing any kind of statistical frequency.

ENTRY TO THE FIELD

It is common among anthropologists to talk with nostalgia about their 114
field experience and about the group they studied. This usually gives the impression that field work is always an enjoyable experience. Although my field work seems at the present time to have been a pleasant experience, especially when comparing it to the pressures of everyday living in a

114 123

from the process of dispute settlement; and the semi-nomadic nature of the population in the area.

114 123 124 627 578

The reliance on the case-study method and especially that of Turner's "social drama" which requires extensive and detailed knowledge of the sequential development of a number of cases over a long period of time proved to be a major task in a society where disputes are settled not in formal hearings, but by means of informal mediation and behind the scene negotiations. These activities covered a large area, and were shrouded in a great deal of secrecy. The assumption is that the parties involved in the dispute should be given the privacy and chance to arrive at an acceptable settlement without being conscious of or influenced by the opinion of non-interested parties. The public hearing, or the mi'ad, loves the announcement of the agreement arrived at in private. As will be seen later, very little factual information about the dispute is discussed in the mi'ad. No record is kept of either the discussion in the mi'ad or the preceding negotiations. The process of dispute settlement is, then, highly decentralized. To be able to follow one particular dispute involves the constant reliance on informants not only to acquaint the anthropologist with the places of negotiations, but also to fill the gaps in the information about the process of negotiation itself.

114 123 562

As a woman anthropologist, I found myself at a disadvantage in a society where women were excluded from public participation. It is true that from the very beginning of the field work I was never cast into the role of the native woman, yet, my position as a woman posed a certain number of problems. When I first arrived in the area, I made a deliberate effort not to identify with the native women. When it was suggested to me that the relatively short skirts I wore were not practical for riding donkeys or walking in the strong winds characteristic of the area, and that the floor-length native dress would be more appropriate, I refused the advice for fear of being identified in the minds of the people with the natives, and thus being treated in the same way. The possibility of being identified with native women was not very strong, because from the very beginning I did not act like one. I did things and talked about things that native women had never done or talked about. I drove a car, read, and wrote, and talked about national and local politics. More important than that though, to the tribal population, was that I was a member of the bar association of Egypt, and that I had practiced law for a year in Cairo. Every time I was introduced, the fact that I was an attorney was made evident. This gave legitimacy to my interest in studying the tribal legal system, and in many ways they were flattered than an attorney, especially a woman city attorney, would be interested in their law. Yet, in native clothes or not, in the native female role or not, I was still a woman, and as such I was not part of any serious activity, especially those of dispute settlement. My mere presence in any part of the dispute settlement made the gathering seem somehow less serious. At the beginning of the field work a deliberate effort was made to keep me from knowing anything about the whereabouts of the negotiations or what was going on. I had to bribe men, women and children to tell me where the negotiations were taking place and who they involved, and then appear on the scene uninvited. This condition lasted for about two months. At that time the news of my presence in the area spread around, and I had attended many of the negotiations that men became less conscious of my presence. In fact, some even asked me to attend the meetings where some parts of the negotiations were conducted and give them my opinion as to the fairness of the settlement.

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613 682 683 672 558 [115] the victims' families sent their representatives to demand that the money be paid. To face the situation, a meeting of all the Awaqil of Eilat Aggary was called and Sheikh Selouma, the Aqila of bait Eweidha, took the responsibility of notifying the other Awaqil. The meeting was held in the tent of Hemeida (my driver and informant) from the Sanagrah tribe. Each bait was represented by its Aqila with the exception of bait Asabei', from which both Shei'eb and Hakim were present. Since bait Asabei' was the only bait which did not submit to its share of the bloodmoney, the discussion centered around the inability of Shei'eb to collect it. In a gesture which he meant to appear as helping out Shei'eb, Hakim offered to pay not only his share but that of all members of bait Asabei', and followed his offer by handing the money to Sheikh Selouma. After this act which was a complete surprise to Shei'eb, Sheikh Slouma, the Aqila of bait Eweidha, suggested that Hakim should be considered as the Aqila of bait Asabei' instead of Shei'eb, who had demonstrated his inability to collect from members of his own bait. He emphasized the fact that he had nothing against Shei'eb who had legitimately acquired his position as Aqila by means of succession. But he insisted that the survival of the Amar depended upon the fulfullment of its financial obligations to outsiders and that Hakim was wealthy and could pay. Shei'eb did not comment and the rest of the Awaqil nodded indicating their agreement with Sheikh Selouma.

[124] The above is the summary of events that happened before I came to the area, and which were told to me by informants including the parties involved. Since most of these events occurred more than ten years ago,

613 682 it was impossible to verify the actual facts or to know what exactly
683 happened. But since the parties involved are still alive and since these
672 events are closely related to present-day happenings, the case is still
558 alive in the minds of the parties involved as well as those of outsiders-
● (124) Naturlaly, each party tries to present the facts in such a way as to
613 682 support his own claims. Shei'eb, for example, insists that Hakim had
683 bribed members of bait Asabei' to refuse to pay their share in order to
156 embarrass him and make him appear as unable to perform his duties as
558 Aqila. "Hakim always had his eyes on becoming the Aqila of bait Asabei'," said Shei'eb, "but he had no business becoming the Aqila, so he had to make me look bad to the other Awaqil.... He likes to be looked up to as a big man, but it wouldn't work." While other members of bait Asabei' deny that Hakim had bribed them, they agree with Shei'eb that Hakim is a
156 dishonest man. In fact, Hakim's reputation is so widespread in the area
551 that it has earned him the nickname of "the thief". The nickname was
788 given to him a few years ago when he went to Mecca for a pilgrimage with
685 another fellow tribesman. The latter told the story that while in Mecca Hakim had found a purse with two hundred pounds in it. He was supposed to return the purse to the authorities or it would be considered as stealing if he kept it. Stealing in Mecca is not only a crime but also a great sin which makes the holy trip void for the offender. Hakim told his companion that he had given the purse to the authorities. But later, on their way back from Mecca, the friend found the purse hidden in Hakim's luggage. When the story was known in the area, he was referred to as
156 "the thief". Other accounts of Hakim's dishonesty are told throughout
685 439 the area, including stories of how he acquired his wealth through stealing

613 156 was set for a meeting in which Quadra was to announce his decision.
554 Meanwhile, Qudura stopped attacking Hakim and directed his attack to-
578 ward the inadequacy of Shei'eb as the Aqila.

The meeting was held two weeks later and all the important people in the area were invited. After dinner was served Qudura announced his agreement with Hakim to become the Aqila of bait Asabei' replacing Shei'eb. Everybody expected Hakim to support Qudura in his claim, but instead Hakim directed his comment to Qudura telling him that there had been a misunderstanding on Qudura's part and that all his message to Qudura was to acknowledge the latter as the Aqila for his own camp alone not for bait Asabei' as a whole as Qudura claimed. This announcement was a surprise to everyone in the meeting since this meant recognizing the camp of Qudura as a separate bait, a result which nobody, including Qudura, had ever anticipated. Qudura was very angry and dissolved the meeting immediately. Ever since that incident, the relationship between
578 Qudura and Hakim has been very unfriendly. Almost all of my informants
156 explained Qudura's failure to show up at the oath as a means of revenge
695 685 against Hakim who had embarrassed him among the people who attended the
627 meeting. Qudura himself had told me later that the reason for his not
[124] coming to the oath was that he was not sure that Rabbu was innocent:

> Rabbu has been known to do these thins (inform the police) and I cannot trust him. I cannot take a false oath and endanger myself for someone like Rabbuh. Besides, Hakim never came to me to discuss the oath like he did with all the others who were to swear with them. If he had brought his son and come to me before I would have been able to tell whether they were lying or not, and If not, I would have sworn with a clear conscience and without fear. The oath is something that one does not take lightly. It involves the supernatural.

613 627 When Qudura refused to see Hakim and Shei'eb, Hakim asked Sheikh
156 196 Saleh, the Aqila of one of the most powerful baits in the area, to talk

613 681 a request and examine the reasons behind it in an attempt to remedy them if possible. They have to be sure first of all that by his request the person is not avoiding the paymnet of his share in a particular case. [695] If this is proven to be the case, then no barawa is granted unless the person pays all his debts to the amar. This, like the amar's barawa of the individual, has to be put in writing.

613 578 [114] I left the area a month after the meeting held at Qudura's camp. By the time I left, bait Asabei' was almost in a chaotic situation. Many thought that the outcome would be in favor of Qudura, who would emerge from all the happenings as the leader of bait Asabei' as a whole. Others thought that the only possible outcome was for bait Asabei' to be divided into two or even three separate units with their own respective leaders.

Analysis

114 627 All events of the second phase occurred while I was in the area. Nonetheless I was not able to observe directly all of these events, due to the nature of the judicial process among Awlad Ali which relies, as has been mentioned earlier, on informal mediation and influence, rather than on formal court hearings. Most of the above events happened behind [124] closed doors and with a great amount of secrecy. For this reason I had to rely partly on informants' accounts of what exactly had happened between the parties involved.

613 627 182 The dispute in its two phases revealed a major weakness in the social structure of the major bait of the Aggary family. As the events of the case unfolded, they shed light on some of the important principles

582 some reason or other cannot marry his cousin, he still has that legal claim on his cousin. She cannot marry another man without the consent
582 of her cousin. He has the right to forcibly take her away and even
682 kill her or her husband in protection of his right. Although in the few cases where this had happened in the past, the groom had to pay full blood money. Such killing, however, was considered as justified and never resulted in retaliation or feuds among the tribal segments involved.

582 However, it is difficult to call cousin marriage among the group
124 "preferential" marriage. In a limited quantitative study I asked 35 tribal members who have unmarried daughters over the age of 12 the following question: "If you had your choice, to whom would you give your daughter in marriage: your brother's son or another man who is wealthier or more respected?" Twenty-six said they would rather have their daughters married to someone other than their nephews. The reasons given were that their nephews did not make enough money to either pay her a good mahr or to support her without outside help. The nine who preferred to marry their daughters to their nephews emphasized the fact that the girl's cousin is likely to look after her interests and take care of her more than the outsider "who may not fear God in his treatment of my daughter," as one of the respondents to the questionnaire expressed it. They also said that their nephew is more under their control than the outsider. They further maintained that a person is likely to know his nephew more than he knows an outsider or a more distant relative. One of the informants put it, "Even if my nephew is a cheat, at least I know that this is all that is wrong with him." All thirty-five informants felt that they were obliged to give their daughters in marriage

582 124 to their nephews if the latter demanded "because it is the right of the girl's cousin." And all but two said they would ask the permission of the girl's cousin before marrying her to an outsider, even if they knew that the nephew had no intention of marrying her himself, "to prevent the development of difficulties in the future."

On the other hand, when the same group was asked, "If you had your choice, would you rather marry your cousin or another woman who was wealthier or more beautiful," they answered as follows:

Marry their cousin	11
Marry someone else	24
Total	35

Two reasons were given by the eleven who chose to marry their cousins. The first is that they knew more about the temperament and the moral character of their cousin than about the other woman no matter how beautiful or wealthy she might be. Four of the eleven respondents said they would like to marry their cousin because they could not afford to pay the high bridewealth for a distant relative or an outsider. Although the sample I selected was by no means representative of the total tribal population in the area, yet, it points at least to the fact that parallel cousin marriage is considered by the father of the girl more as a duty or obligation than a choice, while from the standpoint of the suitor, it is viewed as a right which he can invoke at will.

582 557 It seems that many invoke such a right even when they have no serious intention of marrying their bint'amm. The purpose apparent in the numerous cases where this happened was to obtain money from the prospective groom who has to get the approval of the cousin to prevent trouble. In some cases the man invokes his right to force his uncle or the groom to concede to some demands, such as the sale of the right to use a piece

684 of drastic actions taken in cases of adultery. Of the fourteen cases
613 562 of adultery that I examined furing my field work, none resulted in the
593 killing of the adulteress, and only three resulted in the murder of her
[114] partner. In all three cases where the adulterer was killed, the avenger
684 682 was the husband; and in all three cases, the husband had to pay the
613 bloodmoney to the murdered man's kin group. His payment of the blood-
money, among other things, may indicate that the right of the husband
to kill the adulterer is not completely accepted among Awlad Ali. All
[628] agree, however, that such killings never result in blood feuds because
of the shameful circumstances in which the victim dies.

684 It was very difficult to obtain any detailed or reliable information
126 about adultery cases. All the above mentioned fourteen cases were gath-
[124] ered from the informants, twelve of which were cases which had already
been solved. For the two cases which were still open at the time of
the study, information was quite vague. Usually such cases are conducted
with a great amount of secrecy, with the involved parties referring to
them as cases of theft, or merely by saying that the cases involve
women. Only when the adultery leads to the killing of the adulteress
or the adulterer are more details publicly known about the case.

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adulterous wife is vague and diffused, the right of the husband for com-
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sepct, adultery is treated very much like theft; the adulterer has stolen
the husband's exclusive right to his wife's sexual activities. The com-
[583] pensation for this offense is estimated at L.E. 20, in addition to the
[586] mahr, if the husband decides to divorce his wife as a result of her
adultery.

124 One informant once told me,
576 "If you don't greet me, this means that you hate me, and if you
829 hate me, there is no limit to the kind of harm you can do me and
my family. One who hates you can kill you, and none can walk
safely anywhere if he fears that he will be killed."

682 As Sheikh Suliman and Mahdi reached the general store, every-
689 one was gathering there as usual, including the two awaqil who
672 were involved in the original settlement. Sheikh Suliman told
695 554 Mahdi not to dismount his donkey and not to say the customary
792 greeting as they passed by the gathering. When they passed the
576 gathering, everyone stood to greet Sheikh Suliman who ignored them
and left with Mahdi. No one believed that Sheikh Suliman, who
should be the guard of the tribal tradition, should commit such an
unforgivable violation of the norms of the people. The next morn-
682 ing the whole area was talking about a big Mi'ad to "take the right"
689 from Sheikh Suliman and Mahdi, who had insulted the gathering. The
672 Mi'ad was held a week after the incident. During the Mi'ad, Sheikh
695 554 Suliman was asked to explain his behavior, and his answer was, "How
792 do you want me to greet all those people who were sitting in front
576 of the store? There were more than thirty men in that gathering,
627 and I was afraid that if I said the customary greeting, I might
have startled some of them causing them to harm themselves, leaving
me with the payment of so many bloodmoneys." Immediately, the
attendants of the Mi'ad knew what Sheikh Suliman was referring to,
and that his action was to prove that the settlement reached in
the case of Mahdi was wrong and that it set a very dangerous prece-
dent which would cause people to avoid greeting one another, "and
hatred will prevail among brothers and nobody will be safe in his
own home."

I managed, however, during my stay to be closely in touch with one 12
of the major cases and with almost all the parties involved. This case was used as the basis for the "social drama" analyzed in chapter three of the present study.

In addition to the social drama, I have used the case study method 121
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Most of the data was collected through the time-honored technique 123
of participant observation which was facilitated by the fact that the 122
group spoke the native language of the researcher (or vice versa). Formal 124
interviewing was conducted on a very limited scale, thirty-five extensive 125
questionnaires in all. These questionnaires were originally designed and administered to supplement the life history material and to assess the attitudes of the particular people involved with regard to particular issues. Some of the results of these questionnaires are used in the chapter. Due to the non-representation of the sample interviewed, these results are used merely as illustration and not as representing any kind of statistical frequency.

ENTRY TO THE FIELD

It is common among anthropologists to talk with nostalgia about their 114
field experience and about the group they studied. This usually gives the impression that field work is always an enjoyable experience. Although my field work seems at the present time to have been a pleasant experience, especially when comparing it to the pressures of everyday living in a

121 for comparative study, they do not represent the ethnological entity known as the Awlad 'Ali. However, one might heuristically think of al-Qasr as a post-tribal or pre-peasant stage of social change, and on this basis generate some hypotheses about the sedentarization process or other specific cultural processes.

126
104 The translation of the Arabic documents presented here were made in the field. In most of the cases, translating took place on the spot and this may account for some of the awkward phraseology. Arabic terms and names have been transliterated according to the system used by Cowan in *An Introduction to Modern Literary Arabic* (1958) with certain exceptions: long vowels are shown by a double vowel; the guttural stop is indicated by an apostrophe; and the glottal stop is indicated by the use of a short "e," such as in 'aiela ("family").

000 I owe a great deal of gratitude to my former teachers
who have given freely of their time and knowledge and have
shown an interest in my training in anthropology and Middle
122 Eastern studies. I would like to thank in particular Dr.
William Sanders, of Pennsylvania State University, who introduced me to anthropology; Dr. David Bidney, of Indiana University, and Dr. P. J. Vatikiotis, now of the London School of Oriental and African Studies, who were my advisers in anthropology and Middle Eastern studies during my graduate training; Dr. Irfan Shahid, now of Georgetown University, who instructed me in the Arabic language; Dr. Vincent Cantarino, of Indiana University, who instructed me in Arabic literature

121 554 571 156 My approach here is to state the problem of authority and change using a case study of one man whom I consider the most prestigious member of the "status group" of al-Qasr. He is a member of the "status group" by virtue of his wealth and family connections; he has reinforced and enhanced his "status honor" by the practice of intervening into various conflict situations and mustering support, favors, and loyalty as he goes; and he has proved his "superiority" by excelling in the outside business world. All this he has done while remaining a "good Bedouin."

124 554 156 The name of Hajj 'Ali appeared time and time again as my research progressed and increasingly concentrated on the authority structure.[2] I asked questions which required the informants to name a person in al-Qasr to whom he would go if he needed help, money or advice. I asked: "Who is the leader of the Bedouin?";"Who knows the wants and needs of the Bedouin most intimately?" On the basis of the data collected [571] in this manner, I was able to perceive a "status group" and gain an idea of the real leaders of al-Qasr. It also gave me a working knowledge of the local role structure. Hajj 'Ali's name came up with the highest frequency in the questionnaires, and my observations and interviews with him corroborated his central place in the authority structure. ● [126] I also recorded the life history of Hajj 'Ali's son, and gained valuable insights from this data.

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[2] The name, Hajj 'Ali, is of course a pseudonym.

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stretching across to the village of Ajadabiya in the east, topples 613
in undulations away into the flat expanses of the desert to the 619
south. At all these points of segmentation, the territories occupied 621
by the various sections are large and roughly defined, and 133
the population aggregates supported on these territories run from 182
over a thousand at one end to tens of thousands at the upper 131
limits. The tertiary sections are numerically much smaller, some
of them numbering as few as a hundred souls in all, and the
territories to which they are attached are correspondingly
smaller. The relationship between the numbers in this order of
section, and the precise amount of water available in the local
wells is an intimate one. If the population of one of these groups
increases, or if the number of animals rises, or if the springs show
a decline in the volume of water they give forth, or if the winter
rainfall has allowed the storage in wells of only a small quantity
of water, a rearrangement of the group must be effected. A significant
alteration of any one of these components must mean
that the local group must split to enable a new adjustment to be
made in the relationship of man and animals to water.

Whatever changes occur within groups of any size, since the 173
genealogy embraces the entire population, these must appear on 178
the genealogy in some way or other. Now a genealogy is as rigid 829
a framework, as fixed and final a pattern of grouping, as can be 613
imagined. The impression that they are thus rigid and fixed, except 551
for the addition of successive generations, is strengthened
by the way in which the Bedouin use them. From their young
boys to their old men, the Bedouin are expert genealogists, and
the names of ancestors, for one reason or another, are never far
from their lips. Names are kept alive by constant use, since all [571]
references to inter-group relationships must be in terms of these
names. More than this, the Bedouin were proud to the point of 173
boastfulness of their genealogical knowledge, and, wherever I 829
travelled, the first request I had to comply with was to take down 613
a large portion of a tribal genealogy. In recording their endless 551
genealogies, one feature about them came to assume increasing 123
interest; while there was remarkable unanimity with regard to 126
most of the names given, there was one point of marked ambiguity—at
the tertiary level of segmentation. I recorded genealogies
in four tribes on an extensive scale, and in each tribe

173 ambiguity surrounding the actual names and their correct position
829 occurred at about the fifth ascending generation. Whenever
613 this point was reached in the recordings, arguments would flare
551 up over the names to be included or excluded and over the relation
123 of these names to those above and below, with the result
that for several people of the same segment there would be several
126 versions of a genealogy which differed only at this one point.
An example of this sort is given below from the genealogy of the Nasr section, which shows seven different versions of the arrangement of ancestors round about the fifth ascending generation from the living.

173 The confusion at and around the fifth ascending generation
829 appeared with such regularity in the genealogies that I feel justified
613 in referring to it as 'the area of ambiguity'. It seems likely,
moreover, that in any society where the lineage structure is
551 closely tied to the territorial disposition of groups, since the genealogy is so rigid, there needs to be in it somewhere an area of ambiguity if it is to be related to reality. Without this ambiguity, the form of the genealogy is too rigid to comprehend changes which occur. This point in the genealogy came to assume critical significance as the point where adjustments in it are made. Other kinds of evidence point to the same conclusion.

[601]


(1)
NASR*
UMBARAKA
HAIBA
MADHKUR
MUMEN
BIN NASR
MADHKUR
HAIBA
UMBARAKA
(3)
SA'AID
HASAIN
MADHKUR
HAIBA
(4)
SA'AID
(5)
HASAN
MADHKUR
HAIBA
SA'AD
MUMAN
(7)
HAIBA
MADHKUR
UMBARAKA
SAAD
(2)
MUMEN
UMBARAKA
MADHKUR
HAIBA

FIG. 18-3 GENEALOGY 3. *There is another section, al-Dawwas, which belongs to this group, but to include this as well would greatly complicate the issue without giving any additional information.

The form which the process of dispute settlement takes differs from 121
one society to another. In certain societies disputes are settled through 627
a process of informal mediation undertaken by go-betweens; in others it 692 695
is by means of self-help; still in others, it is by way of court. In societies with courts the process of dispute settlements is undertaken by judges who "take and assess the evidence, examine what they regard as the facts, and come to a decision in favor of one party rather than another" (Gluckman 1965:183).

Within a given society, disputes are settled in accordance with a set 121
of principles that reflect the basic goals and values of that society. As 627
long as the settlement of a particular dispute proceeds according to these 626
principles, the settlement is supported by the public opinion of that so- 671 692
ciety. This is true whether the process is carried on b y means of informal 182
mediations or through a court system. It is this public opinion as the expression of the basic societal values and not the court as a special mechan-
ism that gives legitimation to the judicial decisions. To equate opinion [114]
with the court as Hoebel (1961) did, or to look at the court as the ultimate source of legitimation as did Radcliffe-Brown (1940) and others (Redfield 1964, Bohannan 1965), is to create an unnecessary confusion which tends to
undermine meaningful cross-cultural comparisons. Whatever the differences 121
among anthropologists with regard to the definition of the court, their 127
main interest in the concept so far has been as a tool for the definition 671
of law. The interest in the concept gave rise to a methodological approach 114
which came to characterize the literature in legal anthropology, namely, the case-study approach, cases having been utilized in a number of ways by legal anthropologists. In their book on the Cheyenne, Llewellyn and Hoebel (1941) introduced the analysis of "the trouble case." This was followed by a number of studies utilizing the case study method either to

document statements concerning the substantive law of the society studied, 121
or to abstract and elucidate that law. An example of the first technique 127
is Howell's analysis of the Nuer court decisions (1954) where he collected 671
a large number of court cases, classified them and abstracted the substantive 114
aspect of the native law. Gluckman's study of the Lozi (1955) represents the second technique. Smith and Roberts used the same method of case analysis to abstract certain principles of the Zuni law (1954), and Nader utilized it in her study of the Zapotecan law (1964). The list of those who utilized the case-study approach is quite extensive, and the range of the societies they studied is quite varied. But most of them share the interest in the substantive rather than in the procedural aspect of the law.

When referring to the procedural aspect of the law one should keep 121
in mind the difference between the technical and the abstract components 671
of procedural law. The first refers to the activities and steps involved [627]
in the settlement of disputes in the society as well as the person or body [692]
undertaking the responsibility of such settlement. The second involves a 121
number of abstract principles reflecting the values of the society with regard 181
to the goals of the judicial process, and which the judicial persons 671
use as a guide in achieving a settlement or in passing a judgment of one 114
kind or another. These are the bases of judicial reasoning. Although judicial reasoning represents one of the most interesting and important aspects of the judicial process, it attracted very little attention among legal anthropologists. With the exception of Gluckman and his analysis of the concept of "reasonable man" among the Lozi (1955a), no significant work has been done in this area. In dealing with the concept of the reasonable man, Gluckman was more interested in discovering universals in laws than in the process of judicial reasoning as such. He implied that an

I managed, however, during my stay to be closely in touch with one 12
of the major cases and with almost all the parties involved. This case was used as the basis for the "social drama" analyzed in chapter three of the present study.

In addition to the social drama, I have used the case study method 121
to analyze aspects of the substantive law of the group especially with 127
regard to concepts such as that of criminal responsibility and the nature of the contractual relations as exemplified by the marriage contract. Cases utilized in the study include ones that I observed myself as well [124]
as cases taken from texts and some which were told to me by informants.

Most of the data was collected through the time-honored technique 123
of participant observation which was facilitated by the fact that the 122
group spoke the native language of the researcher (or vice versa). Formal 124
interviewing was conducted on a very limited scale, thirty-five extensive 125
questionnaires in all. These questionnaires were originally designed and administered to supplement the life history material and to assess the attitudes of the particular people involved with regard to particular issues. Some of the results of these questionnaires are used in the chapter. Due to the non-representation of the sample interviewed, these results are used merely as illustration and not as representing any kind of statistical frequency.

ENTRY TO THE FIELD

It is common among anthropologists to talk with nostalgia about their 114
field experience and about the group they studied. This usually gives the impression that field work is always an enjoyable experience. Although my field work seems at the present time to have been a pleasant experience, especially when comparing it to the pressures of everyday living in a

619 The figures for the free tribes include attached client groups,
162 for the principal of which estimates are also given separately.
• [127] The figures are taken from Col. De Agostini's monograph. The
provenance of the chief Bedouin tribes of Tripolitania and of
the fringes of Fazzan who are Sanusi, or sympathetic to the
Sanusiya, is shown, likewise in relation to the distribution of
Sanusiya lodges, on the map on page 52.

VI

619 Although there were in the past intertribal wars and feuds
[671] which have lasted into the present time, and in spite of the
[574] difference in status between free and client tribes, there were
laws of the tents which gave every Bedouin the freedom of the
whole country, and there was much coming and going between
the tribes and exchange of hospitality, especially in the grazing
grounds where sections with distinct territories on the plateau
shared common pasturage to the south of it, and where the
necessities of Bedouin life, watering at wells in transit, the crossing
of another tribe's territory on the way to markets, the
pursuit of straying camels, and the need to sow where rain fell,
imposed a recognition of individual rights without regard to
tribal affiliations or social status. Had it not been so, the Grand
[793] Sanusi could not have built on the tribal system his inclusive
organization, for there would have been no foundations in
* [795] culture, social structure, and sentiment, on which to build.

128 My inclinations as an anthropologist are to discuss at some
length the tribal and kinship systems and the life of the tents,
619 but I refrain from giving more than a bare outline of the tribal
system, and I neglect altogether kinship and the life of the tents,
because, however interesting detail about these matters might
be to the ethnologist, a knowledge of them is, I think, unnecessary for an understanding of the development of the
Sanusiya Order in Cyrenaica. I discuss the structure of the
Cyrenaican tribe therefore only in so far as it is relevant to this
general theme.[1]

619 Use of the term 'tribe' in Cyrenaica, even if it be restricted
to the big free tribes, is always to some extent arbitrary for the
political structure is highly segmentary. Nevertheless, though

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[1] For a more general account see Savarese, op. cit., Pt. II, *passim*.

122 and took the time to serve on my dissertation committee; Dr. Alan Merriam, of Indiana University, who taught me anthropology, served on my dissertation committee, and showed a sincere interest in my future; Dr. Harold Driver and Dr. John Messenger, both of Indiana University, who taught me anthropology.

128 I would also like to thank Dr. Richard Antoun, of Indiana University, who took the time and interest to serve on my dissertation committee and who offered valuable suggestions which have vastly improved the study offered here.

000 I owe a great and special debt of gratitude to Dr. John Kennedy, of the Neuro-Psychiatric Institute of U.C.L.A., who served as my adviser during a two-year stay in Egypt. He, more than any other, has influenced by own approach to anthropology. I am glad to have this opportunity to thank him for being a good friend and a brilliant teacher.

I must thank Dr. David Bidney a second time for serving as chairman of my dissertation committee and for being a good friend and guide throughout my graduate training period.

Finally, to my wife Judith Criste Obermeyer, I owe the greatest debt which words cannot express. Without her constant support and encouragement this study would never have been written. 128 I am grateful for her aid in preparing this manuscript, but this is only an insignificant part of her contribution to the total effort.

122 During the course of my graduate training, my fieldwork

*121 *613 functions." The political system as a structure with reference to the territorial principle and descent system is the unit which the political analyst seeks to understand. To do so, he must concentrate his attention upon the local descent group, the corporate group (Fortes and Evans-Pritchard 1940:11; Leach 1954:128). Structural analysis in terms of functional group differentiation is preliminary to political content and political role analysis (Smith 1966:113-129). The objective 121 of this chapter is to define the basic political unit in Bedouin society and the set of authority relations which characterize it. We are looking for, what Maine referred to as, the "Corporation" and its "Public Officer" or "Corporation sole."

[128] The rest of this chapter is a discussion of the internal domestic structure of authority and the complex of values and beliefs which the Bedouins of al-Qasr express about a desired social order in terms of their principles of organization. Associative relationships based on kinship, residence and contract are morally supportive and hence authoritative; they structure as well as reflect a world order. Such relationships validate traditional authority and contribute to a system of social control.

619 Lineage Structure and Formal Categories

Not all residents of al-Qasr are members of the Awlad

196 only from area to area but also from person to person.

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*613
571 In terms of the Bedouin social structure, it is useful to discuss politics as a set of authority relations operating in a problem-solving situation. This operation takes place at all levels of the lineage system with the exception of the sub-tertiary group; below the tertiary group level authority is purely a function of certain kinship roles. Since we cannot analytically separate the political aspect of the role "family head" from the moral aspect of the role "father," it seems best to designate this type of authority as being something distinct from political authority. We will call this type of authority either "familial" or "domestic," and "political authority" will be considered to exist in cases where there is some degree of role specialization and role differentiation with respect to decision-making and problem-solving. As I conceptualize it, then, the tertiary group is a political group because it is structurally identified with a corporate office, or institutionalized role of leadership. At the end [128] of this chapter, and in the next chapter, I will elaborate on this because it is a focal point of the study.

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181 Structural principles designed to promote integration in a society also shed light on the degree of coercion and conflict in social "organization." Individuals and groups in society have interests and values which they seek to maximize in the face of competition and opposition from other individ-

*613 571 182 the central value and traditional institution of _'aqila_ which
has always existed and is still binding. All authority is
referable in some way and in varying degrees to the office of
'aqila which alone represents "the legitimate exercise of
imperative control" (Weber 1947:153). Because private interests
clash with the duties and obligations of social roles and corporate
interests, political action, or the exercise of authority
and the regulation of conflict, may be assigned to levels of
• 128 the social structure and analyzed in this way. In this chapter
we have discussed the social structure of al-Qasr, and have
touched on what gives structure and meaning to political
action. We have seen that the structure of authority operating
through the office of _'aqila_ deals with both an internal and
an external system of political relations, a corporate group
and a societal unit. The purpose of the following discussion
will be to make clear some of the abstractions and concepts
used here in outlinging structure and authority in Bedouin
society.

CHAPTER IV

THE STRUCTURE OF AUTHORITY

The 'Aqila as a Political Role

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[596] The role of 'aqila is the single specialized role in Bedouin political organization. Although it is possible to differentiate another authority role, that of the shaib (elder), this role is primarily a kinship role and in this sense is not an institutionalized political complex of rights and obligations. The 'aqila represents a unique political status in al-Qasr having one incumbent at a time: "The present incumbent is merely a link in a chain of indefinite extent, the temporary custodian of all the properties, powers and privileges which constitute the office" (Smith 1966;117).

*613
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571 The role of 'aqila is instituted at the tertiary structural level of the lineage system. In theory, each tertiary bait has its own 'aqila. But, in fact, not every tertiary segment is large enough and, therefore, powerful enough to constitute an authority group in the political structure of the lineage. ● [128] In the next section, we will draw a distinction between authority groups and tertiary groups. The 'aqila acts alone in juridical matters concerning his own

*613
571 peace and security in the desert they are discouraged by
681 means of the moral and legal norms expressed in the _'awaiyid_,
628 626 or law of the Bedouins.

671 Conflict regulation between secondary groups is the
*613 function of the _'awaaqil_ who act as legitimate representatives
571 in terms of the _rawaabit_, and as legitimate judges and decision-
578 makers in terms of the _'awaiyid_. Not all conflict in the
external political system is, in terms of our structural
levels, between secondary authority groups, but seldom is
any group larger than the secondary unit mobilized for political
619 action. In other words, even where we note that conflict is
*613 between two primary units, i.e., the 'Aishaibat and the
571 Kumailat, there is probably, in fact, political action taking
578 place between two secondary groups within the respective primary groups. However, there always exists the very real possibility that greater conflict will be generated involving primary and even tribal units.

•128 In the next section of this chapter, I will discuss Bedouin law and sanctions within the framework of the lineage structure and the authority levels at which they operate. The following section will further illustrate the legitimacy and dynamics of authority and structure in Bedouin society.

671 [124] I checked the contents of this document with my own informants who agreed that it was authentic and represented the _'awaiyid_ as it should be practiced. Almost [682] the whole of the _'awaiyid_ refers to the circumstances surrounding the occurrence of killing and the payment of the • [128] _diiya_. The case studies which I present below reflect the _'awaiyid_ as it was practiced in 1935.

682 Blood-money is calculated relative to three things: whether or not a killing was premeditated or accidental; the sex of the victim; and whether or not the victim was a freeman or a slave. The full _diiya_ is paid in the case of intentional killing, and three-fourths of this amount is due in the case [562] of accidental killing. The _diiya_ for a woman is one-half that for a man whether or not the killing is intentional. [567] There are no slaves in al-Qasr, only their descendents who are now freemen. In the case where a pregnant woman is killed, the foetus will be examined and should it prove to be a male then the full _diiya_ will be due.

578 682 *613 778 An important mechanism for conflict regulation in the Western Desert is the _nazaala_, i.e., "the act of taking refuge." If a killing is committed, the killer immediately seeks protection by going to the residence of a neutral third party. The third party, who may or may not be an _'aqila_, and his lineage give protection to the whole tertiary segment of the killer. This may involve the actual relocation of the killer's _bait_ to the residence of the protecting group for

121 external system, however, the law recognizes retaliation, a
681 life for a life. Still, even in this case, Bedouin values
682 [182] expressed through the _'awaiyid_ try to avert bloodshed and
[671] feuding by showing "the good path" and providing the means
for settlement through compensation.

681 Just as the Bedouin accepts the _'awaiyid_ as a set of
682 of ideals calculated to regulate conflict, he paradoxically
182 claims the right to impose retaliatory sanctions as a just
[671] conclusion to conflict. One Bedouin said that the greatest
[673] sin which a man or group can commit is to accept the _diiya_
and then take his blood-revenge and return the money. Presumably, a person or group commits no outrage if they refuse
the _diiya_ with the understanding that blood-revenge will be
[626] taken. In al-Qasr, retaliation and the _'awaiyid_ are mechanisms
[671] of social control and dispute settlement. A political office
* [613] exists, i.e. the _'aqila_ which functions over the total range
[692] of political action, and the process of adjudication and
compensation in the form of indemnity payment represents an
institutionalized alternative to retaliation. In all cases
of dispute, ritual or religious sanctions back up social
[776] sanctions. God is a third party to all conflict, and this is
[695] made manifest in the reading of the _Fatiha_ or the oath-taking
• 128 ceremony. In order to describe how authority and sanctions
68[operate in Bedouin society, a number of examples are presented
[124] below. Some of the cases are the statements of informants about
[114]

128 68 what happened; some of them are my translations of legal docu-
[124] ments which informants permitted me to see; a few of the cases
[114] happened while I was in the field and represent my reporting
of what happened. I have arbitrarily divided the cases into
those involving personal injury and those concerning property
rights. In each case, I indicate at which level of the authority
structure the conflict and settlement has taken place.

Legal Cases Pertaining to Personal Injury

578 Two cases of killing have been discussed previously.
681 Below are a number of cases dealing with personal injury which
occurred in the external political system at the various levels
of segmentation. The first three cases involve conflict
* [613] between secondary lineage segments of the 'Aishaibat tribe;
[619] the next two cases take place at the primary and sub-tribal
[648] levels, but note that secondary segments are the actual function-
ing units involved; the final case, an unusual one, deals with
conflict with "foreigners" at the tribal level. Note that the
* [613] 'aqila as a corporate representative is active in these cases.
[182] The third case presented below is a translation of an actual
[778] document showing how the nazaala (discussed above) functions
as a formal mechanism of conflict regulation.

554 tional symbol of wealth. A comparison of wealth between
571 the "status group" and "other members" of al-Qasr, and the
556 picture of stratification which emerges, are shown on Table 6.

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422
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TABLE 6

COMPARATIVE DATA ON SOCIO-ECONOMIC STRATIFICATION IN AL-QASR[1]

Average Per Person	Status Group	Others
OLIVE - trees	661	86
SHEEP - head	402	30
LAND - acres	91	5

554 One most important way of accruing "status honor"
571 in al-Qasr is by acting the part of the third party in conflict
627 situations. The role of the third party represents an effective
*613 and acceptable way of bypassing formal litigation through the
[778] office of 'aqila. For instance, by mediating through the process of nazaala, the third party prevents feuds.

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[114]
[128]

[1] This data is both approximate and partial. Some data are excellent and completely reliable, others are not so dependable. Factors which could conceivably change the picture here presented would be a count of land and animals outside al-Qasr which would be extremely difficult to obtain. Also, some land is not in the name of the owner but in the names of relatives. Of all the data, land data is the most unreliable. Nevertheless, the addition of new data, I feel, would only serve to substantiate the picture of socio-economic stratification shown here.

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[182]
politics, and the fact that it is differentiated from the role of _'aqila_, are the bases for conceptualizing a structural division of political duties and authority distribution.

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Role differentiation in the authority structure may be discussed from two points of view: the degree of difference between authoritative decision-making roles and the other roles, and, the way in which one authoritative role differs from another. These refer to the different degrees of specialization characterized by any one role as compared to another. I have already discussed the way in which the role of _'aqila_ differs from other social roles (such as the kinship roles) in the authority structure of al-Qasr. In the following
● [128]
discussion, I focus on role differentiation in the non-institutionalized aspect of the authority structure, on power and influence.

Societies differ from culture to culture in the complexity of role differentiation. Within any one culture it
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*[613]
may differ from social domain to social domain. The political system in al-Qasr is from this point of view structurally simple, the assignment of duties in the traditional authority structure being divided between the _'aqila_ and the third party. What legitimate influence is possessed by the third party is derivative from the "status honor" of its members. The
[792]
exception to this is the _rajal saalih_ who derives his power or influence as a result of his special relationship with God.

554 571 182 *[613] When power is institutionalized, such as it is in the role of 'aqila, it becomes authority. This is the Weberian notion of power and authority which has been used by Bohannan (1958) for an analysis of, what he refers to as, "extra-processual events." "Extra-processual events" refers to the operation of power in everyday social relationships, whenever some people make others do what they want them to do. In other words, possessors of "status honor" are also possessors of power, and, I would claim, by virtue of this, such people are recruited into decision-making roles. Not only do members of the "status group" manipulate others in everyday dyadic social relationships, but, more importantly, in the context of conflict control they are able to dominate in political triadic relationships. Furthermore, since they are not structurally bound in their decision-making role, i.e., they operate across group and lineage lines, they accrue even more power and widen their power-base or support structure. What is highlighted in this kind of political role analysis is the fact that different individuals play the game of power politcs in various ways, and with varying degrees of success. In the next chapter, I will bring out this very point by presenting a case study of one such role-player. ● (128)

554 571 *613 627 When we contrast the roles of 'aqila and rajal khair, we are defining a political role-set. In an attempt to differentiate between the two roles further than we already have,

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571
and operate as a rajal khair.

There are two primary types of political roles in al-Qasr, the traditional and the modern legal. Modern legal political roles have been decreed from above by the government. The traditional roles of 'aqila and "third party" represent autochthonous roles emerging from Bedouin social and cultural structures. Bedouin traditional roles correspond to Weber's ideal-type "traditional authority" which is based upon "piety for what actually, allegedly, or presumably has always existed" (Gerth and Mills 1946:296). The role of 'aqila is "traditional" rather than "legal" despite its fully institutionalized status. The relatively modern roles of 'umda and shaikh are what I term here "legal"; these offices are not, nor did any of my informants consider them to be, roles natural in the Bedouin political system. The legitimacy of these roles stems from, what Weber called, "legal authority" in which "submission . . . is based upon an impersonal bond to the generally defined and functional duty of office" (1946:299). In this case, the norms to which conformity is demanded are not those espoused by the 'aqila or the "third party," but are established by national governmental decrees and regulations.

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In the remaining part of this chapter, the attempt is to show two things which I consider essential to an understanding of Bedouin political structure and a perspective of

128 Bedouin culture change: how the Bedouins perceive their authority structure, and how political authorities relate to members of the political system.

Traditional Roles

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627 The authority and role of the 'aqila has been discussed so that I can devote attention to the "third party" roles in this section. No formalized document exists to stipulate the rights and duties of the "third party," such as exists for the 'aqila in the form of the rawaabit al-'awaaqil. Nevertheless, Bedouin litigants have certain expectations of a rajal khair when he mediates in a case of conflict. Before a rajal khair agrees to take part in the judicial process, the disputants make it explicit that they will accept his decision as final and binding. Such an agreement is not put into writing. On the other hand, a rajal khair can intervene into a dispute on his own. In so doing, he may gain in prestige relative to the manner and degree of success with which he handles the problem. By saving face for both parties in the quarrel, by cajoling an ingratiating attitude from both parties, the rajal khair may reinforce or augment his "status honor" and his local following.

*[613] A person occupying the office of 'aqila can participate in the process of conflict regulation as a rajal khair. We noted that this is a case of role-switching. It is conceivable

554 178 [792] you for your cloak, you would have immediately given it to him. God was pleased with them at that time."

This notion of changing foci of authority and power cannot be divorced from the related political phenomena of the tendency toward legitimacy and the role institutionalization
128 process. In the next chapter, I will attempt to show how such a conceptual framework can be utilized in an analysis of culture and political change.

Modern Legal Roles

634 554 [648] [177] The roles of _'umda_ and _shaikh_ were created and imposed upon the Bedouins by Muhammad 'Ali sometime during the early part of the nineteenth century in order to facilitate administration, maintain security in the desert, and protect the Western frontier.

[619] Both of these roles are representative offices at the primary level of the tribal structure. The 'Aishaibat have an _'umda_ and a _shaikh_ who reside in Marsa Matruh and work in close relation with the Governor. In terms of a chain of command, these offices receive demands which may originate either with the Governor in Matruh or with Bedouins in al-Qasr. But these offices are subservient to both the Governor and the Bedouins since no decision-making powers of any consequence
[571] [635] resides with them. With reference to the two authority structures, the Egyptian and the Bedouin, the _'umda_ and the

1: Obermeyer E-5 (1964-1965) 1969 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9
'Aishaibat

CHAPTER VII

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

121 In this study I have attempted to understand and
● 128 to describe the structure and process of Bedouin society
105 in al-Qasr by utilizing the data of politics. The primary assumption of the study has been that political analysis must proceed along lines which give recognition to, and focus upon, the centrality of the concept and structure of authority and the way in which it contributes to an orderly social process. This study has dealt with the structure and function of authority and, as much as possible, its theory and practice in both contemporary and historical Bedouin society. Authority in al-Qasr is intimately tied up with the system of rights and obligations obtaining between individuals which is expressed through a structure of social roles. At another level of social organization, the rights and obligations inherent in a structure of authority inform a segmentary lineage system. Part of this study aims to understand and to underline the organizational principles from which the Bedouins of al-Qasr derive their meaning of authority, social roles, and social interaction.

In the first part of the study some of the general

128 historical aspects and specific economic facts of the Bedouin
105 social process were made explicit. The intention of the first
121 two chapters was to indicate the scope and dynamics of culture change now occurring through the growth of a market economy and the expansion of political awareness in al-Qasr. The economic transformation of Bedouin society and the move towards political integration into the larger Egyptian society are, more and more, reflected in a shift from dependence upon communal-based social ties to associative relationships based upon private landholding, individual competitive participation in the national economy and profit-keeping, and new rights and obligations brought on by the activities of national and provincial level politics.

The first part of this study also sought to understand the meaning of social change in al-Qasr. Due to historical experiences and ecological factors, social structure and social change carry different meanings for the Bedouin recipients and the Egyptian agents of change. In some cases, it was seen, it is even dubious that Egyptian officials are responding to the felt needs of the Bedouins. As background to a later discussion of authority and change, we tried to understand what the felt needs of the Bedouins are at this time. One aspect of this problem was to define the traditional units of Bedouin society as opposed to the modern administrative units, and to consider change in light of this contrast. My

128 105 121 concern with the nature of al-Qasr's past not only helps us to understand the Bedouin present but should also help us to conceive of the Bedouin future. What data I was able to collect concerning the historical development of the Bedouin authority structure and its place in the economic transformation of Bedouin society relate to the later discussion of the ascribed nature of leadership roles and the probability that, in the future, access to political roles will become a matter of individual achievement and a heightened awareness of things political. In connection with this we saw that the Governor of Marsa Matruh through the institution of new bureaucratic structures, such as the Governor's Council and new electoral guidelines, is fostering political change in this direction.

Although the largest part of this study dealt with the political aspect of traditional roles and structures, the contention was that traditional complexes are increasingly unable to deal with the cultural problems of the day. This applies to economic as well as political structures, as the first part of this study is intended to show. But among the New Nations and, in particular, whenever we are dealing with tribal and peasant communities, "the most striking changes have been the decline in the authority of the elders in terms of both community and family organization . . . (because) the life experience of the elders . . . is at best only partially relevant to the current needs) (Halpern 1967:123).

128 Authority represents and maintains a legitimate
105 political order and an allotment of power. Without a system
121 of authoritative norms, conflict could not be restrained and no social system could survive (Parsons 1960:183). As the concept of authority and its meaning undergo change so also do the appropriate structures and the power distribution between persons and groups change. The structure and dynamics of authority in al-Qasr were investigated through an analysis of the categories and interrelations of the Bedouin segmentary lineage system. This analysis was based primarily upon a definition of the organizational concepts and principles of Bedouin society such as unilineal rule of descent, residence, cognation, and contractual agreement and alliance.

While knowledge of these structural principles is fundamental to an understanding of Bedouin society, it was noted that a strict reliance on them would tend to limit one's understanding of politics in al-Qasr since they in fact conceal the nature of power and the functioning of semi-institutionalized roles. Nevertheless, these structural principles are informed by a set of key beliefs and values which are inculcated during the socialization process, and in a complementary way all of these concepts lend support to a corporate structure of authority. This corporate structure of authority which was discussed in terms of the concept and leadership role, or office, of _'aqila_ was claimed to be the

•128 105 121 basis of social control in traditional Bedouin society. To a large extent the corporate authority structure in al-Qasr is still intact but is undergoing change at this time. Change of the rule of consensus and the way in which it has reference to traditional principles of organization for the regulation of politics is the subject of the final two chapters in this study.

The unilinear principle and its corollary, the corporate group, were defined as the basis for the structural division of Bedouin society into groups. Within the context of a traditional struggle for ecological advantage and a growing participation in the modern political process of interest group conflict, the lineage groups of al-Qasr were considered as political, or authority, groups. The membership and boundaries of these political groups parallel those of structures formed through an alliance of tertiary segments of the lineage system which is itself sanctioned by the rules of unilineality, marriage, residence, and adherence to a legal and moral code known as the rawaabit al-'awaaqil ("the bonds of the wise men"). The central political notion of Bedouin society, and the one which converts a kinship group into a political group, is that of 'aqila. The 'aqila principle, which is manifest in the role of the corporate leader, refers to both the idea of collective responsibility and to a politically instituted office. The concept of 'aqila is essential to an understanding

128 of internal social control and political group interaction
105 in Bedouin society. In order to grasp the meaning of 'aqila
121 in Bedouin society it was necessary to explore something of
the history of the concept.

Max Weber (1947:143-145) has drawn attention to the political significance of collective responsibility and the way in which it is related to the concepts of corporate leadership and self-help (blood-revenge) in traditional societies such as the Bedouins of al-Qasr represent: "All are held responsible for the action of any one . . . (and) the action of certain members, the 'representatives,' may be binding upon the others." Blood-revenge, or the law of self-help, is an instance of regulation through convention, and this practice, Weber claims, leads to "solidarity." Weber further claims, and is supported by the evidence which I present here concerning the concept of 'aqila, that we are likely to find a representative office especially where money must be collected and administered in the interest of the group (p. 145).

In modern political anthropology, Evans-Pritchard was the first to clearly equate kinship relations with political relations: he conceived of kinship groups as political conflict groups within the framework of a balanced opposition between structurally and ideologically similar units (1940:190). I have obviously found this conceptualization of tribal

128 politics very helpful, but the major emphasis of my study was
121 the authority structure rather than the kinship structure.
105 Authority was considered in terms of two aspects, both of which tell us something about kinship structure: in one way authority is the property of relations which obtain between persons and roles of a group, and it acts to define the structural boundaries and to secure the structural continuity of the group; in another way, authority is the property of a tertiary group expressed at the secondary level of the lineage structure and represented by the office of *'aqila*. In this last sense, authority defines the group vis a vis other groups and acts to promote political order in society. Authority, in view of these two aspects, was described as operating at the various levels of the lineage structure, i.e., the familial, the internal and external levels. I sought to clarify the discussion by defining concepts and roles which characterize authority and political action at these various levels. One role, the *shaib,* which functions solely at the familial level of the authority structure was described; the fully institutionalized authority role of *'aqila* was analyzed as were a number of only partly institutionalized roles, or power roles. The most important of these power roles was seen to be that of the *rajal khair*. The institutionalized roles, and this includes the *shaib* or head of the household, were described as functioning

128 121 105 according to public expectational patterns while the non-institutionalized roles, being by definition less impinged upon by structural norms, could function outside these patterns. This distinction between types of roles was seen to be the basis of the rajal khair's ability to manipulate persons and events in a play for power. These three levels of authority were factored out from one another solely for analytical reasons. In reality, the one shades into the other: the authority of the shaib at times overlaps with that of the 'aqila, and the power of the rajal khair and rajal salih at time impinge upon, and detract from, the rightful influence of both the shaib and the 'aqila. Role analysis, as it is used in this study, I consider one of the most important methods available for an investigation of a political problem.

Through political role analysis it was shown that the role of 'aqila is the most important for an understanding of the structure and functioning of Bedouin society. Political, or authority, groups are defined in terms of the presence or absence of this role; hence the whole political structure proceeds from this concept. The legitimacy of the 'aqila, and therefore the legitimacy of the political order which obtains, stems from an explicit legal agreement among members of the tertiary and secondary groups known as the rawaabit al-'awaaqil. These bonds are a contract between the 'aqila and the other members of the corporate group, a mutual pact which

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sets forth the rights and duties of the political office and the corporate members. The duplication and reciprocal honoring of this contract by tertiary groups related, in fact or fiction, according to the unilineal principle gives rise to a political alliance of groups who are viewed as "one corporate body" at the secondary level of the lineage structure by all outsiders. Structural relations between secondary groups in Bedouin society are chartered in accordance with the several principles of social organization, such as marriage, contract, residence, and also according to the process of conflict control.

Actual conflict in al-Qasr usually takes place between secondary groups even though it is sometimes expressed as conflict between primary or tribal groupings. Coalition for the attainment of political goals and the process of conflict control at the supra-tertiary levels of the lineage hierarchy depend upon the recognition of mutual usefulness and a common means for settling disputes and re-establishing social harmony. The problem-solving device which assures the conditions of an orderly social process is the system of Bedouin customary law, a set of legal and moral norms (Fortes and Evans-Pritchard 1940:20), known as the 'awaiyid Awlad 'Ali ("the customs of the sons of 'Ali").

The customary law of the Bedouins of al-Qasr was described and a number of case studies occurring at the various levels of the lineage and authority structure was

128 presented. According to the moral and legal norms of the
121 Bedouins, conflict control is effected formally and informally.
105 A primary value of Bedouin society instructs all men to mediate conflict whenever possible lest quarrels spread to involve more people and a wider loss of rights. Redress of wrongs takes place through the intervention of, what were defined as, either a mediator at the informal level or an arbiter at the formal level of conflict control. If neither of these peace-making mechanisms is invoked, or should both fail in their attempt to restore social harmony, then the law of self-help, or blood-revenge, may operate. This method of controlling conflict is, according to most of the Bedouins, to be avoided at all costs.

The notion of the "third party" to conflict was developed in this study. It was pointed out that in the case of the triadic relationship in conflict control it is the _rajal khair_ or the _rajal salih_ who usually becomes involved, and that this role has the right to mediate but not to judge. This is in fact the distinction which the Bedouins themselves make between the roles of arbiter-_'aqila_ and mediator-"third party." This differentiation between political roles is equivalent to a distinction between formal authority and informal power.

In order to further explicate the political role-set in Bedouin society a classificatory distinction was made

128 121 105 between traditional roles and modern legal roles; the former category included the *'aqila*, the *rajal khair*, and *rajal salih*, while the latter was made up of the *'umda* and the *shaikh.* The roles of *'umda* and *shaikh* have been historically imposed upon the Bedouins from without and thus were not viewed as indigenous to the al-Qasr political system. The role classification used here, which is borrowed from the work of Max Weber, is purely analytical for in reality both of the modern legal roles figure importantly in any complete treatment of Bedouin authority and its structure. All of the role-players who make up the internal and external authority structures of al-Qasr were considered to be members of a "status group" who possess high "status-honor" which is based upon family and wealth and, to a lesser extent in modern times, age.

Finally, the concept of the "cultural broker" was introduced in an attempt to delineate the nature of political change in al-Qasr. In the last chapter of the study the case study of Hajj 'Ali was used to develop the idea of "cultural broker." In some ways, the first five chapters of this study serve as a background to the discussion of Hajj 'Ali as a "cultural broker." The dynamics of the historical, economic, and political situations, the changing meanings of kinship concepts and other structures, and the growing tendency to trust secular as opposed to sacred and traditional authority, all of these factors converge to attach importance and immediacy

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to an understanding of the role of "cultural broker" in the present and future of al-Qasr.

Hajj 'Ali provided us with an example of the secularization of traditional society. This process has been described as one "whereby men become increasingly rational, analytical, and empirical in their political action (Almond and Powell 1966:24). A number of the critical attitudes held by Hajj 'Ali had to do with the Bedouin conception of marriage, law, and authority; in each case it was seen that he questioned the legitimacy of Bedouin tradition and, eventually, would like to steer the Bedouins of al-Qasr away from this world view into the larger Egyptian political community. Besides Hajj 'Ali's discontent with the 'awaiyid Awlad 'Ali and other Bedouin customs, it was suggested that he desired change in al-Qasr's traditional structures and ideas because of his own design upon higher status and authority in the Egyptian bureaucracy of Marsa Matruh, a reference group with which all members of the "status group" identify.

What is happening in the case of Hajj 'Ali and al-Qasr is a sign of the times as far as the New Nations are concerned. The growing need for centralization in order to compete on the international market transforms the traditional structures of the New Nations whenever and wherever it must. But this process is not just a matter of induced change; it is not a one-sided affair. Inherently, any social structure,

128 121 105 including "traditional" ones, is a dynamic mechanism for the solution of cultural problems. Related to this is the fact that the individuals who manipulate these mechanisms are creative and responsive agents of change themselves. The need for central coordination and cooperation with national governments sets the stage and provides the stimuli for new cultural responses and devices which result in novel and creative internal reorganization and reintegration around new cultural patterns (Moore 1958:1-28). The case of Hajj 'Ali illustrates the beginnings of such a reorganizational process in al-Qasr.

The main objective striven for in this study deals with only one aspect of the problem of change in the New Nations, but it is an important aspect: all politically-oriented researchers should try to explain the legitimacy and the dynamics of authority and structure in society. In my particular case, discussion centered on lineage theory and its corollary the corporate group, and authority was treated in terms of political role analysis and local leadership patterns. Change was viewed almost wholly as an endogenous process, but the importance of exogenous forces was not played down. It was claimed that an essential part of the "cultural broker" role was to legitimate the authority of the nation-state in order to effect change and legitimate his own authority role.

Conflict control was seen as a life-long process. As

128 culture change takes place, new bases for conflict arise and
121 new devices for control come into being. Politics was viewed
105 as the process of problem solution by the group, from the family level to the total societal level. Politics involves the struggle for, and the legitimation of, power, and functions to bring about some kind of an ideological adjustment between political groups: "Systems of beliefs are made in the image of an idealized home, and there one loves and obeys one's parents, loves the remaining members of the family, and treats all other persons as outsiders" (De Grazia 1948:49).

A struggle for power characterizes Bedouin society as it does any other human society. Equality in al-Qasr, as in all human societies, is an ideal and only an ideal. Inequality, in reality, persists and structures the patterns and issues of conflict in Bedouin society. There are possessors and non-possessors of property and wealth: there are possessors and non-possessors of "status honor." Consequently, there are possessors and non-possessors of authority, for authority derives from property and "status honor." But in al-Qasr, and in every human society, property is not the singular prerequisite of "status honor" and authority. (In this sense, one fundamental aspect of Marxian theory is totally incorrect.) We saw in the cases of 'Amm Salih the "holy man" and the prospective _'aqila_ of Bait Braik, that authority is determined in terms of a complex of structural and ideational

128 121 105 factors. Nevertheless, in al-Qasr inequality does exist and is related to an unequal distribution of authority between individuals and groups, and the important point is that this is the basis of conflict. As culture change proceeds along with al-Qasr's need to be integrated into the national society, the threat to the traditional distribution of power and authority will foster new patterns of conflict; new means for dealing with conflict will also have to be found. Creative individuals such as Hajj 'Ali will have a hand in the new processes of conflict control and cultural invention. Traditional patterns of conflict and political structures provide meaning and a semblance of stability to al-Qasr society, but when conformity to political values becomes relative to motives of expediency, when politics become secularized, then instability and change in structures follow. And traditional concepts must be redefined and reevaluated to cope with the new conditions.

121 In the case of the New Nations, political change seems to be reflected in a shift from traditional organizational principles to a modern bureaucratic principle which entails a higher differentiation in the political structure. And, as Fortes (1953:24) has noted, unilinear descent groups, such as the Bedouins of al-Qasr, tend to break down when specialization sets in.

The notion of viewing social change in terms of a shift to the bureaucratic structural principle is not, of

2: Mohsen E.O-5 (1958-1966) 1971 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9
Awlad Ali

ABSTRACT

THE QUEST FOR ORDER AMONG AWLAD ALI OF THE WESTERN DESERT OF EGYPT

By

Safia K. Mohsen

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The study deals with the ways in which disputes are settled within a tribal society with no contralized authority. One way these disputes are settled is through the application of a set of formal rules known as "the daraieb" or the tribal ways. These rules are kept in force through an elaborate, yet informal, judicial process in which the local political leaders play a key role.

The main focus of the study is not the rules themselves, but rather the ways they are implemented. More specifically, the study examines the ways in which judicial reasoning is related to certain realities of the social and political life of the group. Using mainly the case-study method, this relationship is examined.

The first part of the thesis provides an account of the historical and ecological features of the groups total context of action. This is followed by a rather detailed analysis of the tribal organization of the group. In dealing with the tribal organization two modes of analysis are employed. A structural form of analysis which focuses on the hierarchy of groups and subgroups by which the tribal members order themselves; and a description of these groups in terms of the processes through which they are maintained. In this context, special

[Introductory, P. V]

121 attention is paid to the nature of political leadership; the domains
128 within which the leaders function, the bases of their political support and how all these are related to their role in dispute settlement.

Through the analysis of cases some of the salient features of the process of judicial reasoning are examined in the remaining part of the thesis. Distinction is made here between cases involving personal injuries and those arising from contractual relationships.

Finally, a concluding chapter summarizes the main findings of the study.

[Introductory, P. Vi]
[P. i is blank]

613 individuals. He settles disputes among them and represents them in their
[627] disputes with outsiders. He is also the spokesman of his Bait in all
matters involving the relationship of the Bait with the other tribal segments.
[682] He is responsible for the collection of the bloodmoney from members
of his Bait and has the authority to confiscate property of individual
members who refuse to pay their share. When a member is financially unable
to pay his share, the Aqila is expected to pay for him and collect at a
later time when the member is in a position to make such payment.

613 Originally the position of the Aqila was a hereditary one with the
428 position passing from father to son. However, in recent years the rigidity
178 of the patrilineal descent as the basis of succession to the position
of the Aqila has been modified radically and other principles of selection
613 have been introduced. The working of the principles underlying the
128 selection of the Aqila will be analyzed in detail in the following chapter
through the close examination of one of the major legal cases which occurred
during my stay in the area.

613 Thus each Bait is a division of one of the Eilas and this has its
[423] place in the formal tribal system. It constitutes a group with definite
usufruct rights to land and a formally recognized leadership.

621 But the actual residential units in which Awlad Ali live are not
[613] baits but parts of them in the form of separate camps or "nagei". The
camps constitute the primary communities of Awlad Ali. A camp consists
[594] of a number of tents ranging from four to twelve. Each tent is usually
occupied by one nuclear family of a husband, his wife and children. In
[595] cases of polygynous marriages, each wife usually occupies one tent with
[361] her children. Each camp is separated from the next one by a distance
which ranges from two to ten kilometers.

628 the settlement achieved. In many such interest is best served by taking
613 into consideration the welfare of the other party to the dispute as well.

613 Reasonableness is an important prerequisite for the success of the
554 Aqila in performing this functions in dispute settlement. This is true
157 whether the Aqila is dealing with disputes between members of his own
bait or between members of his bait and outsiders. But while reasonableness and the personal qualities constitute important assets for the Aqila,
613 they are not the basis of his political authority. Proven abilities are
554 admired but they are, or had been until very recently, irrelevant to the
178 question of succession to the position of Aqila. The structurally significant source of the Aqila's authority is patrilineal succession. This principle has recently been challenged under the impact of social and economic changes that are taking place in the area. To analyze the role
121 of the Aqila and the source of his authority, I shall utilize, to some
613 extent, Turner's concept of "social drama" by presenting and analyzing a
128 case of dispute whose developmental stages happened over a period of more than eleven years. The major part of these developments occurred at the time of the field work and I had a chance to observe at lease part of it. The case in all its phases offers a rare example of a disturbance that happened in the social life of a particular tribal segment. It offers what Turner called "... a limited area of transparency in the otherwise opaque surface of regular, uneventful social life" (p. 93). The political unit involved is that of bait Asabe'i, the largest in size of all baits in the Aggary Eila. As events of the case unfolded themselves, some of the important principles of social structure, at least as they operate at a given point, were revealed.

[P. iii]

PREFACE

THIS account of the Sanusi of Cyrenaica would not have been 114 written if a number of accidents had not led me to their country during the late war, but the seed of it was planted long before the war. I had acquired during three years' residence in Egypt and through travels in other Arab lands some knowledge of [122] Arab history and culture, a little experience of Bedouin, and proficiency in spoken Arabic. During the war a year spent as Political Officer in the Alawite Territory of Syria added to both knowledge and enthusiasm. I had been acquainted with some of the Sanusi exiles in Egypt as far back as 1932 and had visited Darna and Banghazi by sea; and it had long been my hope that I might some day, when the Italians had ceased to rule the country, have a chance to visit the interior. This wish came true when in November 1942 I was posted as Political Officer to the (third) British Military Administration of Cyrenaica. I spent over two years in the country, the greater part of them among the Bedouin, particularly the more nomadic sections. Inhabited Cyrenaica is a small country and as in the course of my wanderings, mostly in its southern steppes and the desert beyond them, I covered more than two thousand miles by horse and camel I came to know something of its Bedouin tribes. My duties, it is true, prevented me from carrying out any systematic inquiries of a sociological kind, but the contact with the Bedouin they entailed enabled me to read the literature which forms the basis of this study in the light of my own experience. My labours have been but a small return for the hospitality of the tents and the many kindnesses of my Bedouin hosts.

I have not attempted to write a history of Cyrenaica, but 128 only of the development of the Sanusiya Order among the Bedouin tribes of the country. I have, therefore, said nothing of the centuries of Greek colonization and Roman and Byzantine rule, nor of the little known centuries of Arab and Turkish rule until 1843, when the Grand Sanusi founded his first zawiya, or religious lodge, on the Cyrenaican plateau. Also, I have not aimed at giving a comprehensive account either of the Sanusiya Order or of the Bedouin tribes, but I have described both only in so far as seemed necessary to an understanding of the political

3:Evans-Pritchard E-4, 5 (1942-1944) 1949 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9
(1837-1942) Sanusi

128 development of the Order which sprang from their association. The Sanusi of Cyrenaica, and elsewhere, are so called because they adhere to the Islamic Order of the Sanusiya which takes its name from its founder al-Sayyid Muhammad bin 'Ali al-Sanusi and has been directed by his descendants. I have, therefore, described briefly the nature of an Islamic Order and how this particular Order became established and spread. The Sanusiya differs from most other Orders not so much in its teachings and rites as in its political and economic organization, a development arising from its absorption into the Bedouin tribal structure, but owing much also to opposition from the outside, particularly to the Italo-Sanusi wars. For this reason I have described in the latter part of the book Italo-Sanusi relations at some length. If in doing so I have sometimes expressed indignation, I do not wish it to be thought that I have any but friendly feelings for Italy and her people, or that I believe the Italian colonial record to be very different from the records of other Colonial Powers.

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I have transliterated Arabic words in the simplest way. The Arabist will know, or can easily discover, how they are written in Arabic, and those who do not know the language would be little the wiser had I transliterated them differently. For the uninitiated it need only be said that the letter 'q', which stands for the Arabic letter *qaf*, has in Cyrenaica the value of a hard 'g' as in the English word 'goat', that 'gh', which stands for the Arabic letter *ghain*, has the value the Parisian gives to the 'r' in 'Paris', and that ', which stands for the Arabic letter *'ain* is a guttural sound peculiar to Arabic. I have not been entirely consistent in the spelling of Arabic words in that I have retained the usual English spelling of such words as Cairo, Mecca, Kufra, Caramanli, and Koran, and that I have treated some Arabic words as though they were English words and have, therefore, not italicized them and have given them the common English plural form, e.g. Shaikhs, qadis, Sharifs, mudirs, and zawiyas. I have used the Arabic names of places instead of classical or Italian names: Shahhat, Marsa Susa, and al-Marj instead of Cirene, Apollonia, and Barce. If I need to excuse myself for this on the grounds that Cyrenaica is to-day an Arab country, no apology is needed for using the Arab names for the sites of recently built Italian colonial settlements, in naming

which the Italians commemorated persons who for the most part 104
might well be forgotten. To aid the reader I have listed at the 128 ●
end of the book the chief place-names mentioned in the text
with their Italian equivalents. It will be observed that the
Italian way of writing Arabic words is different from our way:
where we write Suluq, Tubruq, Banghazi, and Jaghbub, they
write Soluch, Tobruch, Bengasi, and Giarabub.

I have cut the book to half its original size and have con- 128
sequently been compelled to omit a mass of detail. I have also
restricted references to quotations and to statements which seem
particularly to require the citation of an authority. Much of the
omitted detail and many of the deleted references will be found
in various articles and papers I have published on the Sanusi
elsewhere. In a few instances I have not been able to check
references because the books cited are unobtainable in England.

I acknowledge the generous help of many British and Arab 000
friends, especially of Major-General D. C. Cumming, Muhammad
Shafiq Effendi Hamza, and the warm-hearted companion of my
travels Salih bu 'Abd al-Salam.

I thank Mr. E. L. Peters and Miss Sonya Gregory for help 128
in preparation of the maps.

E. E. E.-P.

OXFORD
April 1948

[P. vi is blank]

the lodges were largely autonomous, or came under the control 795*
of a local Mother Lodge, such as Mizda in Tripolitania and Abu 175*
Qubais in Arabia. After the death of Sayyid al-Mahdi, a member of the Sanusi family sometimes installed himself as local director of the affairs of the Order, as Sayyid Muhammad 'Abid did in Fazzan. Without going into further detail it may be said that though central control existed it was cumbersome and that though there was an organization it was inadequate to deal with situations such as that which faced the Order on the death of Sayyid al-Mahdi, which demanded a rapid marshalling of its dispersed resources.

V

The dynastic situation which had formed after the death of 795*
the Grand Sanusi formed again after the death of Sayyid al- 793
Mahdi: his surviving sons, Sayyid Muhammad Idris and Sayyid 175*
Muhammad al-Rida, were minors. The leadership of the Order therefore passed to Sayyid Ahmad al-Sharif, son of Sayyid Muhammad al-Sharif, Sayyid al-Mahdi's younger brother; though for the first few years its political direction seems to have been largely in the hands of the experienced old Shaikh Ahmad al-Rifi, the last of the intimates of the Grand Sanusi and the principal adviser of Sayyid al-Mahdi.

Sayyid Ahmad al-Sharif's leadership of the Order falls into 795*
three periods, from 1902 to 1912 when he was resisting the 793
French in the Sahara, from 1912 to 1918 when he was in 175*
Cyrenaica directing the Bedouin against the Italians and the 159
British, and from 1918, when he went into exile, to 1933, the 648*
year of his death at al-Madina in Arabia. It is only the second
period with which this book is directly concerned and I will [128] ●
therefore summarize very briefly the events in the Sahara, leaving to a future chapter a more detailed account of the events in Libya which led to the Sayyid's appearance in Cyrenaica at the head of the Sanusiya Militant.

The French advance continued. After the loss of Bir Alali in 795*
1902 Sayyid Ahmad moved his headquarters from Qiru back 175*
to Kufra, where he was protected by an immense desert and 648*
diplomatic immunity, since the British took the view that the [159]
oasis belonged to Turkey. In 1906 the French took Kawar and [793]

*795 Bilma and in the following year occupied 'Ain Kalak, killing
*175 Sidi Muhammad al-Barrani, the Shaikh of the Sanusiya lodge
*648 there and the foremost of al-Sayyid al-Mahdi's missionaries in
the Sahara. In 1909 they occupied Abaish in Wadai and sent an expedition against Masalit. As they advanced they everywhere destroyed or suppressed the lodges of the Order. In 1913 and 1914 they occupied Tibesti, Borku, Wajanqa, and Ennedi, at the same time as the Italians occupied Fazzan from Tripolitania. Though the Sanusiya had minor military successes and temporarily regained some of its territory, it had lost all political control in what is now known as the French Sudan. While the Franco-Sanusi war was in progress in the Sudan Italy, in 1911, declared war on Turkey and landed troops at various points on the Libyan coast, the conquest of Tripolitania being the primary objective. From the first the Sanusiya entered the fray and when Turkey abandoned the contest in 1912 the Order continued the struggle in its own name.

● 128 At this point I must break off my account of the history of the
Order to show how it achieved its paramountcy in Cyrenaica,
*795 because the development of the Order is tied up with a certain
121 set of social relations in Cyrenaica and has been circumscribed
by them. Only in Cyrenaica did the Sanusiya in the end establish itself firmly because only there existed conditions which permitted its taking root strongly.

CHAPTER II

THE BEDOUIN OF CYRENAICA

I

In the last chapter I recorded the development of the Sanusiya. 128
In this chapter I give a brief description of Cyrenaica and of the
way of life of the Bedouin who live there and an equally brief
account of the history of these Bedouin and of their tribal
system.

The geographical isolation of Cyrenaica proper, the large 13
peninsula which juts into the Mediterranean from the Bay of
al-Sallum to the eastern Sirtica, has greatly affected its history.
It is cut off from the Nile Delta by 700 km. of semi-desert and
from Tripolitania by 650 km. of the Sahara round the shores
of the Sirtica, while to the south of it stretch endless desert
wastes, for Cyrenaica proper is only just over 200,000 sq. km.
with a Saharan hinterland of over 500,000 sq. km. On the other
hand the coast of Cyrenaica lies only 300 km. from Crete and
400 km. from the Greek mainland, and it belongs by climate
and vegetation to Europe.

The physiographic features of the country which influence 133
to any extent the life of its people can rapidly be summarized. 137
Northern Cyrenaica is a calcareous mountain rising to a tableland, *al-Jabal al-Akhdar*, the Green Mountain, so called from
its evergreen forests. To the north its slopes rise steeply from
the sea or its littoral, while to the south it billows gently
towards the great Saharan desert. The two major divisions of
the country are known as *al-jabal*, the mountain—or *al-ghaba*,
the forest, since its northern part is covered with bush—and
al-barr, the steppe. The mountain and the steppe alike fall into 133
a number of zones, the principal of which are shown in the
accompanying sketch-map. There is a narrow strip of coastal
plain which broadens towards Banghazi and then spreads southwestwards into the great *barqa* plain. Animal transport can [492]
only mount the plateau from the coast by steep and infrequent
paths which lead up deep ravines to the first terrace, the so-called *arqub* country, a succession of thickly wooded ridges
broken into myriad bosses and cut deep by many wide wadis,

[TEXT CONTINUED ON PAGE 31]

619 The figures for the free tribes include attached client groups,
162 for the principal of which estimates are also given separately.
[127] The figures are taken from Col. De Agostini's monograph. The provenance of the chief Bedouin tribes of Tripolitania and of the fringes of Fazzan who are Sanusi, or sympathetic to the Sanusiya, is shown, likewise in relation to the distribution of Sanusiya lodges, on the map on page 52.

VI

619 Although there were in the past intertribal wars and feuds
[671] which have lasted into the present time, and in spite of the
[574] difference in status between free and client tribes, there were
laws of the tents which gave every Bedouin the freedom of the
whole country, and there was much coming and going between
the tribes and exchange of hospitality, especially in the grazing
grounds where sections with distinct territories on the plateau
shared common pasturage to the south of it, and where the
necessities of Bedouin life, watering at wells in transit, the crossing of another tribe's territory on the way to markets, the
pursuit of straying camels, and the need to sow where rain fell,
imposed a recognition of individual rights without regard to
tribal affiliations or social status. Had it not been so, the Grand
[793] Sanusi could not have built on the tribal system his inclusive
organization, for there would have been no foundations in
*[795] culture, social structure, and sentiment, on which to build.

128 My inclinations as an anthropologist are to discuss at some length the tribal and kinship systems and the life of the tents,
619 but I refrain from giving more than a bare outline of the tribal system, and I neglect altogether kinship and the life of the tents, because, however interesting detail about these matters might be to the ethnologist, a knowledge of them is, I think, unnecessary for an understanding of the development of the Sanusiya Order in Cyrenaica. I discuss the structure of the Cyrenaican tribe therefore only in so far as it is relevant to this general theme.[1]

619 Use of the term 'tribe' in Cyrenaica, even if it be restricted to the big free tribes, is always to some extent arbitrary for the political structure is highly segmentary. Nevertheless, though

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[1] For a more general account see Savarese, op. cit., Pt. II, *passim*.

3:Evans-Pritchard E-4, 5 (1942-1944) 1949 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9
(1837-1942) Sanusi

[P.104]

CHAPTER V

THE FIRST ITALO-SANUSI WAR (1911–17)

I

● 128 I HAVE given an account of the conditions in which the Sanusiya
*795 took root in Cyrenaica and of the circumstances which favoured its growth. I now describe how its Bedouin followers, under
*648 its leadership, resisted Italian aggression during two wars, from
*175 1911 to 1917 and from 1923 to 1932, and finally lost their independence and suffered Italian domination until relieved by British arms in 1942. It will be seen how the long struggle accentuated the political functions of the Sanusiya in a manner I indicate forthwith.

121 For segmentary structures of the kind we find among the
182 Bedouin of Cyrenaica to develop rudimentary governmental, or statal, organs it would seem necessary that for a long period
*648 of time all the segments of the society should find themselves in common opposition to some outside force. It is not merely that such opposition fuses the segments in corporate action. A new form of political structure which includes the enemy comes into existence and necessitates a new orientation of political values. In a segmentary system each segment sees itself as a unity in opposition to an opposed segment of the same size and kind; so when all the segments come into a corporate relation of opposition to some political group outside them which has a different kind of political structure and belongs to a different political system they tend to see themselves as a unity *vis-à-vis* this group and as a unity on the same structural model as itself.
[177] The small Bedouin society of Cyrenaica in this way slowly took on the political form of the European countries into the orbit of which it was drawn. It could only enter into structural relations with the states of Europe on the model of the European state.

*175 When the Italians invaded the country and the Turks made
*648 peace the tribes continued their resistance in the name of the
*795 Sanusiya. In their social system tribe was balanced against
619 tribe and tribal section against tribal section. It was the Sanusiya which gave to all the tribes and their sections a com-

graphic settlement. Some of the richest arable lands in Cyrenaica, forming part of the endowments of the plateau lodges, were used for this purpose, and the lands of a number of other lodges came within the area marked out for future metropolitan colonization. The lands of yet other lodges lying outside this area were earmarked for Arab agricultural settlement schemes. The only Sanusiya lands which were not to be colonized were those in the less-favoured parts of the country. The date-palms and gardens of the Order in the oases were also confiscated. 175* 648* 795* 728

As soon as the Italians had been powerful enough to seize the endowments of the Order they had seized them. Their action can only be called theft. It was a violation of the Shari'a law, repeatedly proclaimed inviolable by the Italians, and of the constitution they drew up for Cyrenaica in 1919. Their plea that the Order had opposed them in both political and military fields and had fomented rebellion in the Colony would have carried more weight if they had not seized the lands for their own nationals, for they could quite as effectively have broken the Order by using its revenues for general religious and charitable purposes. Some Italians were, indeed, troubled about such barefaced robbery, but their lawyers were able to fall back on the specious argument, so often used before to excuse similar expropriations, that the State has unlimited powers and must use them for its own safety and the welfare of the community regardless of the traditional rights of individuals and associations, and of God.

II

The elimination of the Sanusiya deprived the Bedouin of the leaders they had learned to follow but it did not make them any more favourably disposed towards the Italians. The efforts of the Administration to overcome this dull hostile turning away from their conquerors, to their acceptance of them only in resignation to the will of God, had only from 1932 to 1940 to become effective, and it was so little successful that I do not consider a detailed account of Italian native policy and measures to be required. I shall endeavour nevertheless to indicate briefly in the present section the general lines of their policy from 1911 to the entry of Italy into the last war and to illustrate its development by describing briefly in the following sections 175* 648* [795]* [728]

*175 the changes in the legal status of the Arabs of Cyrenaica during
*648 those years and how the lands of the Bedouin were confiscated
• [128] to provide farms for Italian colonists. In the final section of the book I give a résumé of events leading up to what is, I hope, the threshold of Cyrenaican independence.

The Italians detested the Bedouin. Long years of campaigning against guerrilla bands had irritated them more than governments are usually irritated by Bedouin and made them increasingly flamboyant and brutal. In the whole Italian literature on Cyrenaica I have not read a sentence of understanding of Romany values. Because they lived in tents without most of the goods the peasant, and even more the townsman, regard as signs of civilization the Italians spoke of them as barbarians, little better than beasts, and treated them accordingly. The arguments they used to justify their treatment of them have a familiar ring.

[181] Graziani has described the Bedouin in his usual uncompromising language and his opinions were doubtless shared by most army officers and government officials:

> 'Anarchist, lover of the most complete liberty and independence, intolerant of any restraint, headstrong, ignorant, unconquerable and boastful (*bluffista*) hero, it is sufficient that he possesses a rifle and a horse; he often masks, under the pretence of the necessity of moving his tent, the desire of gaining the end of withdrawing himself from every governmental contact and control.'

And again:

[181]

> 'Rebellious against every tie of discipline, used to wandering in territories often immense and solitary, bold in mobility and ease of movement, bemused by the fascination of independence, always ready for war and raiding, the nomads have always resisted every governmental restraint.'[1]

Graziani was a plain-spoken soldier. When the conquest phase of colonization had passed and it was no longer fashionable to believe in naked *refoulement*, administrators found it expedient to express themselves more temperately. The soldier-politician Badoglio, in his directive to subordinates in Libya for the year 1933, forbade further talk of '*ribelli*'. The war, the rebellion as it had been called, was over and the past must be forgotten in a

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[1] Op. cit., pp. 119–20.

EMRYS PETERS

18. *The Proliferation of Segments in the Lineage of the Bedouin of Cyrenaica* [*Libya*][1]

121 In this article I do not propose to discuss the genealogies of the
128 Cyrenaican Bedouin in full, but only such aspects of them as are strictly relevant to an understanding of their process of growth. Many other aspects of these genealogies will be referred to, and indeed, some of the arguments put forward will presume an acceptance of views which cannot be developed adequately in this article. A fuller and more general account of Cyrenaican genealogies is in preparation, and, until this is published, there is no alternative to the somewhat dogmatic statements about them which appear in the introductory part of this article.

174 The Bedouin of Cyrenaica claim that they are all descendants
613 of a unique ancestress, Sa'ada. Writers in the past (e.g.
551 Robertson-Smith 1903) have considered the occurrence of fe-
562 male names in patrilineal genealogies as evidence of an earlier
[173] and matrilineal mode of descent. A more satisfactory explanation of the occurrence of female names is to be found in the combination of two facts: descent in the patriline, whether or

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128 Reprinted by permission of the author and the Council from the *Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute*, Vol. 90, pp. 29-53, 1960.

122 [1] My field work among the Cyrenaican Bedouin was made possible by an award from the Emslie Horniman Fund and a later award from the Treasury Committee for Studentships in Oriental Languages and Cultures. I wish here
121 to express my indebtedness to both committees for their generosity. Much of
128 the work I have done on genealogies was included in a thesis presented for the degree of D.Phil. at Oxford University in 1951. The ideas included in this thesis I developed more systematically in a course of lectures on the Bedouin which I gave at Manchester University during the session 1953-54. I subsequently read papers around the problems discussed in this paper at
128 Oxford and Cambridge Universities. I am grateful to Professor Gluckman for reading this article in manuscript, and for the numerous discussions I have had with him on problems relating to lineage organization.

613

complicate the more direct relationship of the distribution of groups of people to the ecology.[3] 619 [13] [182]

The Cyrenaican genealogy, then, is a conceptualization of a hierarchy[4] of ordered territorial segments. The groups stemming from the ancestor at the third order of segmentation are referred to as tribes, and each tribe is the apex of a three-tiered order of segments, which, following customary practice, are referred to as primary, secondary, and tertiary. The latter, the tertiary segment, 621 represents the group of people who, for a period of six to eight 613 months, gather together and live in what, for all intents and purposes, is a single discrete residential group.[5] This tertiary group is also the smallest political group. It has its own homeland, with its [423] water supplies, pastures, and ploughland. In this homeland live most of its members. It is a lineage segment, and most of the agnates of this segment live on their own homeland.[6] It is also the [682] vengeance group, which means that any one of its members can [628] be killed in vengeance for a homicide committed by any other, and that the obligation to exact vengeance falls on all members alike, regardless of relationship to the victim. Likewise, its members pay blood money as a group, and although when they receive it, a bigger portion goes to the nearest agnate of the victim, the remainder is distributed equally among all its members. The number of generations which supervene between the founding ancestor of a tertiary segment and the living is usually four or five, but there is little consistency in this number. Some tertiary

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[3] This part of the discussion is necessarily brief, but further amplification will appear in two subsequent articles now in preparation, one of which is concerned with a general treatment of Cyrenaican genealogies, and the other with a discussion of the effects of ecology on the social organization of the Bedouin. [114]

[4] I use the word hierarchy here since, although segments of any order display many like features, the orders represent distinct and progressively more embracing interests, and these differences are of such consequence that to consider one order of groups as a facsimile of a superior or inferior order can only lead to confusion. A tertiary group, that is to say, may possess many of the characteristics of a secondary group, but the one is a fundamentally different sort of group from the other, as I shall show in my forthcoming article on the feud. (cf. Smith, M. G. 1956.) [128]

[5] This statement does not apply to the Darsa and the Hasa tribes, two of the plateau tribes in Cyrenaica. The statements in this article are confined almost exclusively to the camel herders of the semi-desert. [619] [128]

[6] This, admittedly, is too general a statement to make about such an important issue, but I would prefer to leave its documentation and precision for an article on the analysis of the composition of Bedouin camps.

613 segments show a lineage depth of three generations, while others
621 show as many as six. No special importance is attached by the
Bedouin to this number, although some writers claim that a depth
of five generations is of particular significance among other Arab
621 tribes.[7] Normally, in speaking of the vengeance group, the Bed-
628 ouin refer to the name of the ancestor of a tertiary tribal section.
613 Any one claiming membership of this group, regardless of his
682 precise generational relation to the offender or the victim is im-
mediately and equally involved with its other members. When
speaking of the group as such, the Bedouin refer to it as 'those
who have agreed on the blood', and use the phrase *'amara dam*
to refer to it. Blood money does not pass between its members,
and political division does not occur within it.

621 These small tertiary sections of tribes, then, are small residen-
613 tial groups. Their population varies from one group to another,
[162] but most of them have a total population of 150 to 200 souls.
Successive generations—at least according to the Bedouin view
—add to these numbers, and also increase progressively the
number of generations in their genealogies. Substantial increases
of population would, of course, constitute a pressure on local
resources, on the water available in the particular well of a
group, on the amount of land available for ploughing, and on
the pastures for animals at the end of the rainy season. Again,
if each generation is to be added to the existing genealogy, this
would necessitate a realignment of structural relationships with
each succeeding generation. The discussion that follows is an
128 examination of the ways in which adjustments are made to
621 maintain an equilibrium between the population of a group and
613 the carrying capacity of the land on which its members live, and
of the ways in which the genealogical structure is able to persist
in the face of various contingencies which threaten it.

A beginning might be made by indicating the processes at work to keep the form of the genealogy fairly fixed when there is an absence of population pressure on resources. The first problem is the simple one of describing the mechanics of manipula-

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[171] [7] e.g. Burkhardt (1831) speaks of the *Khomse*, the five generation group, as very widespread among Arabs. G. W. Murray also reports the use of the word *Khomsa* among the Arabs of the Sinai desert to designate the blood-vengeance group, but the term used by the Aulad 'Ali tribe, the cousins and Egyptian neighbours of the Cyrenaican Bedouin, he gives as *Awlia'-ed-dam* (which simply means 'blood kindred').

621
tion which enable the genealogy to remain constant in length 613
and fixed in form despite its dynamic content. 128 •

One of the main processes at work in foreshortening gene- 173
alogies is that referred to by Evans-Pritchard as telescoping.[8] 178
This process is also a characteristic feature of the Cyrenaican 613
genealogy, although its effects, to be discussed presently, differ 551
conspicuously. The way in which telescoping works in the Cyrenaican genealogy is that several male names come to be omitted in the genealogy below the name of the founding ancestor of the tertiary group. Usually, the form in which this occurs it that the name of a famous tribesman, and particularly his nickname if he has one, is retained along with the personal names of his lineal descendants in successive generations. The example given below is taken from the genealogy of the Haiba tertiary section of the Magharba tribe:



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[8] 'It is evident, moreover, that since the minimal lineage consists of four or five actual steps in ascent, there has been telescoping of the agnatic line from the founder of the minimal lineage further up the line of ascent to the founder of the clan, for the founder of the minimal lineage was himself the extremity of another minimal lineage which has, by increase in generations, become the minor lineage, and so on' (Fortes & Evans-Pritchard 1940, p.
199). Since Evans-Pritchard first wrote on the telescoping of genealogies [171]
among the Nuer, other anthropologists have discussed the process in various systems. Fortes, Richards, Laura Bohannan, Cunnison, and Mitchell in their writings on the Tallensi, Bemba, the Tiv, the Luapula people, and the Yao respectively are notable examples . . . As the mode of manipulation of Bedouin genealogies is marginal to my present problem, the main comparison is not with these works but with Evans-Pritchard's earlier work on the Nuer, because the Bedouin and Nuer lineage system have more in common than either have with the other systems, excepting possibly the Tiv.

drought giving insufficient pastures and poor crops. Good or bad 178 613
crops, poor or abundant pasture, in turn mean a higher or lower 621
milk yield from the animals and better or worse living conditions 161
for human beings. Such factors as these may well, over a number 182
of years, lead to unevenness in the distribution of population [132]
throughout the tertiary sections. Whatever the cause, the genealogies
show that the population of the numerous tertiary sections [173]
is unequal. Some are numerically so weak that they have to
join a collateral section. Others are numerically so strong that
their natural resources are insufficient to meet the needs of all
their members. It was these latter segments which were in the
process of splitting, and which in some cases have already done
so. The next task, then, is to demonstrate where, on the genealogy, [128] •
proliferation is effected.

We have seen that in Nuer genealogies segments proliferate at 173
all orders of segmentation. Here, the process is a continuous one, 171
beginning at any point in time within the minimal lineage and 613
progressing upwards to the apex of lineage bifurcation. As particular 551
names become significant within the minimal segment,
they are retained and become a permanent addition to the genealogy.
In order to include these successively additional names,
names of ascending ancestors are shunted further and further
into the genealogical past, until presumably the effect is felt at
the topmost limit of the genealogy, when the names here are
pushed out of the genealogical framework altogether, and forgotten
for ever. More than this, the upward shift in names at
each and every point in the genealogical line means also a consequent
re-ordering of structural relationships, at all levels in the
system. One vital difference between Nuer and Bedouin societies 173
which may partly, at least, account for the different genealogical 178
processes at work among them is that the Nuer, when they were 613
studied by Evans-Pritchard, were expanding territorially, and [171]
that continuous proliferation of segments throughout the structure
was the mode of dealing with a situation of expansion. The [648]
Bedouin, on the other hand, had suffered twenty years of terrible
privation at the hands of the Italians, during which period thousands
of them died in battle and in concentration camps, were
shot up in their camps from the air, or died from want, before I
went to live among them. Although I must confess that I now

619 change their structural position only rarely. The latter change
621 sometimes does, however, occur, and there is evidence to show
182 that it does. For example, Agostini (1922–23, p. 323) in his tribal
166 survey, records a section named Barsha as one of the groups stemming
613 from Nasr.[12] In the genealogies I was given, the name did
not appear, and even after some questioning, what information
was known about it was concealed. Some time later the name
[578] cropped up accidentally in conversation, and I was then told that
at one time it had been one of the Nasr groups, but that after a
quarrel during a year of water shortage, the Barsha folk went
to live with people with whom they had maternal connexions,
and in whose territory there was ample water that year, and
never returned. The group, a tertiary one, was detached from the
tertiary point of segmentation in the genealogies, and tied on to
a tertiary group of another tribe in its new homeland.

178 To summarize briefly the argument thus far, the mechanical
173 devices of telescoping, fusion of names, the ejection of those
619 names which cease to be of any social consequence, and the
621 elision of names at or around the fifth ascending generation,
613 taken together point to the importance of the tertiary order of
segmentation in discussing the problem of maintaining the form
of the genealogy constant in face of its natural tendency to alter;
further, evidence of changes (adoption into a lineage, detachment
from it, the inclusion and exclusion of clients) was presented,
and this again led to the conclusion that the tertiary point
of segmentation is critical in this respect. This being so, the manner
[128] in which change actually occurs, still remains to be shown,
and this is best done, perhaps, by discussing the mode of proliferation
of tertiary segments. In order to do this adequately, it
is necessary to say something briefly about certain features of
Bedouin marriage.

582 Among the Bedouin there exists a preferential form of marriage
605 between a man and his father's brother's daughter. Parallel
cousin marriage of this sort carries with it the exclusive right of
a man to this cousin. Without his consent no one else can marry
her, and to attempt to do so would be to risk the marriage arrangements
being nullified after negotiations had almost been

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[114] [12] Barsha's position is incorrectly given as a sub-group of Haiba; it should be shown as structurally equivalent to Haiba. See also note 11.

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SOME STRUCTURAL ASPECTS OF THE FEUD AMONG THE CAMEL-HERDING BEDOUIN OF CYRENAICA[1]

E. L. PETERS

WHEN a Bedouin kills another in Cyrenaica, one of a number of consequences 682 571
ensues. According to the Bedouin, the particular consequence is determined by 829
the genealogical positions of the persons or groups concerned. In the first part of 128
this article an analysis of the disturbances in social relationships precipitated by
homicide is made, using a lineage model as a framework. In this part of the dis-
cussion the arrangement of the information corresponds closely to the view the
Bedouin give of their relationships. Additional information is then presented to show [613]
that this lineage model neither covers several important areas of social relationships
nor enables an accurate prediction of events to be made. This raises the issue: can the 121
comprehensive power of the model be increased by complicating it, or does com- 613
plexity destroy its utility? The argument advanced is that the lineage model is not a 571
sociological one, but that it is a frame of reference used by a particular people to
give them a common-sense kind of understanding of their social relationships. For
sociological purposes this means that the lineage model, with its supporting theoreti- [128]
cal presuppositions, must perforce be abandoned. In the latter part of this article
some of the implications of adopting this position are discussed. Particular stress is [578]

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[1] This study is based on field-work in Cyrenaica carried out over a period of twenty-seven months from January 1948 to December 1950. The field-work was made possible by the award of a Horniman Studentship and of a Treasury Senior Studentship in Oriental Languages and Cultures. I wish to express my thanks to both awarding bodies. The paper was presented in its first form to a seminar at Manchester University. Modified versions were read at Oxford and Cambridge and at University College London in 1963. In a Manchester seminar, Professor W. J. M. Mackenzie raised issues which led me to reconsider my mode of analysis. Professor Ely Devons read a draft of the article, and offered valuable suggestions. I also wish to thank Professor Gluckman for the many profitable discussions we have had on the institution of the feud. My interest in the feud stems directly from Evans-Pritchard's work on the institution among the Nuer. I am most grateful to him for his help and encouragement while I was pursuing my researches. Finally, anyone writing on the feud must acknowledge the contribution made to its understanding by Dr. Elizabeth Colson. 12 [114]

Thanks are due to the Association of Social Anthropologists for a grant from the Radcliffe-Brown Memorial Fund towards the publication of this paper.

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6: Peters E-5 (1948-1950) 1965 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9
Cyrenaica

Chapter

7

Aspects of the Family Among the Bedouin of Cyrenaica*

E. L. PETERS
University of Manchester

Marriage and the Father-Son Relationship

When a marriage takes place among the Bedouin of Cyrenaica, a nuptial 585
tent is set up some distance away from that of the groom's father. There is 593
no particular significance about the nuptial tent itself, but it must be pitched at a distance so that the father "will not see it" — although, obviously, in a country of large level plains, it stands out conspicuously. This pretence that the tent remains unseen by the father is pushed to the point of his denying any knowledge of what is afoot. A middle-aged or elderly man with a family adopts a similar attitude to any marriage in which his son participates, as groom or as guest. An elder, the father of three unmarried sons (one of [535]
whom, in his late twenties, was known to be getting impatient about marriage), when I asked after his eldest son, insisted that he was away with the [831]
camels, although the son was conspicuous in a semicircle of young men encouraging a blindfolded maiden in the movements of her seductive dance outside a wedding tent in his full view. Prior to the wedding festivities, the

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* I wish to express my gratitude to Mr. R. Werbner for reading this essay in manuscript. 128

The information presented is based on 27 months fieldwork carried out during 114
1948 to 1950, among the Cyrenaica Bedouin. I am indebted to the Trustees of the 122
Horniman Studentship Fund, and the Committee for Treasury Studentships in Oriental Languages and Cultures, for making the research financially possible.

582 of agnation on the members of a corporate group and give it a taproot of
583 diversity whence it derives its strength, and which makes of it "the one body,"
613 conspicuous, in comparison with other societies, as the corporate group
602 *par excellence*.

The Sister's Son-Mother's Brother Relationship

•128 Previously the mode of relationships associated with agnation and affinity
have been briefly discussed. In order to appreciate the effects of parallel-
cousin marriage, some remarks concerning the sister's son-mother's brother
604 set of relationships must be included here. Bedouin contrast the mother's
[174] brother with the father's brother; their sayings and proverbs afford a
wealth of verbal documentation on the contrast. With the mother's brother
a man enjoys all the freedoms he is denied in his relationships with his father
[831] and father's brother. He is permitted to joke with him; they indulge in
exchanges of obscenities. When the sister's son wishes to marry, he is permitted to discuss the matter with his mother's brother and can urge him to intercede with his father on his behalf. Two men thus related are readily recognised in the camps, because in their acts they are required to show affection by displays of innocent horseplay, pranks or mild practical jokes. Small boys pursue their mother's brother, feign to kick or strike him, and he takes it all in good part.

The external aspects of this behaviour is deceptive. Joking of this sort creates the image in which the relationships are conceived; what is equally striking in it is its compulsiveness. Obviously, mature men are not always in the mood to be teased, but if they are, they must respond appropriately. Their relationships are unmistakably onerous. This remark applies not only to the external forms of their behaviour, but also to the favours a man is
[602] permitted to ask of his mother's brother. A brief amplification will make
the point clear. Demands can be made of agnates, but only in situations of serious contingency. Day-to-day needs are met, not by appeals to the rights of agnation, but from the expectations linked to the mother's brother. If these expectations are withheld, the sister's son may be left in a quandary. In-
604 terestingly, in the records of homicides I gathered, three (in the con-
682 temporary population) were concerned with the killings of mother's brothers by sister's sons. Homicide within this field of relationship is difficult to comprehend unless it is appreciated that expectations are as compulsive in the daily life and the general well-being of people as are the rights and duties associated with agnation.

604 These general remarks apply to the relationships irrespective of the lineage
613 origin of the mother's brother. The similarity ends there, since the nature
of the expectations, their urgency at any given moment and the kind of favours which are granted vary with the group identity of the mother's
[428] brother. A mother's brother who is a member of ego's corporate group may be
expected to give the sister's son small quantities of flour, favour him in all

sorts of petty ways, listen to his grumbles about his agnates, interfere on his 604
behalf in petty camp quarrels, shield him from the disciplinarian father and 613
guard his property interests against the predatory father's brother; if the 428
mother's brother dies without heirs, the sister's son can reasonably expect at
least a share of his wealth. When the mother's brother is a member of a
different corporate group, a sister's son cannot possibly expect to inherit
from him in any circumstance.

The mother's brother may reside in a camp too distant to be much effective 604
direct help in day-to-day living. His relative remoteness gives the relation- 591
ship other possible opportunities, however. Rainfall in the semi-desert area 312
of Cyrenaica is highly variable, both from year to year, and from place to 233
place in any given year. As a result this shallow saucer of a depression may 241
have sufficient rain to supply both the water needs of animals and crops,
while an area a few miles distant will have inadequate water supplies for
either. The mother's brother-sister's son link can mean water for animals and
a crop of barley for both when, in successive years, the resources of one area
or the other are inadequate.

The differences in the relations between men and their mother's brother 604
do not end with a characterisation of their antipodal forms. The demo-
graphic structure of a group may be such that one man may have a number
of mother's brothers, another only one; one man may have to share with
several brothers, another may be an only son. Complications of this sort de- [613]
termine the precise relationships between men, but however intricate these
may be, each corporate group has its matrilateral links with a group occupy-
ing a slightly different ecological area, and it also has a plurality of matri-
lateral connections within it. Further, if a direct connection is not available [603]
to any particular individual he can use an indirect link (e.g. father's mother's
brother or mother's mother's brother) to satisfy his needs.

The Preference for Males

Thus far, the family and the social matrix in which it is embedded has 128
been discussed in general terms, most particularly in reference to several
selected sets of relationships. I wish now to place these relationships in a
more specific setting with a brief discussion of the composition of a small
camp of a group inhabiting the arid areas of central Cyrenaica. When the 829
Bedouin give their views on the structure of the family in Cyrenaica they 594
speak of it as consisting of a pair of spouses and about ten children, mainly
males. The emphasis on males is not mere sentiment, overwhelmingly though 562
it favours them against females. Additional males in a family increase the 858
productive possibilities of a family in the sense that more herdsmen become
available and larger ploughing commitments can be undertaken; an increase
in the number of females has small effect on production since they are pre-
cluded from any direct participation in these activities. Both sexes, ranging
in age from about seven years to mature adulthood, are necessary if a family

621 were imminent, because the marriages of two of the men were anticipated,
571 two others harboured more distant hopes and boys in all the tents would soon
[554] be youths. The composition of this camp, caught at a moment in time, was a function of the age and sex distribution of its inhabitants. All camps show regularities in their structure, but their content is dynamic. Certain general features persist, but the alignments of people undergo change with
[128] equal persistency. What priority is given to each of these considerations, which component occupies the nucleating centre for others, will depend on the problem under analysis, for while I have stressed that this or that is important, I do not wish to suggest that any single factor has an absolute importance compared with others, except in relation to a specific problem.

113

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[P.29]

CHAPTER II

THE BEDOUIN OF CYRENAICA

I

In the last chapter I recorded the development of the Sanusiya. 128 In this chapter I give a brief description of Cyrenaica and of the way of life of the Bedouin who live there and an equally brief account of the history of these Bedouin and of their tribal system.

The geographical isolation of Cyrenaica proper, the large 13 peninsula which juts into the Mediterranean from the Bay of al-Sallum to the eastern Sirtica, has greatly affected its history. It is cut off from the Nile Delta by 700 km. of semi-desert and from Tripolitania by 650 km. of the Sahara round the shores of the Sirtica, while to the south of it stretch endless desert wastes, for Cyrenaica proper is only just over 200,000 sq. km. with a Saharan hinterland of over 500,000 sq. km. On the other hand the coast of Cyrenaica lies only 300 km. from Crete and 400 km. from the Greek mainland, and it belongs by climate and vegetation to Europe.

The physiographic features of the country which influence 133 to any extent the life of its people can rapidly be summarized. 137 Northern Cyrenaica is a calcareous mountain rising to a tableland, *al-Jabal al-Akhdar*, the Green Mountain, so called from its evergreen forests. To the north its slopes rise steeply from the sea or its littoral, while to the south it billows gently towards the great Saharan desert. The two major divisions of the country are known as *al-jabal*, the mountain—or *al-ghaba*, the forest, since its northern part is covered with bush—and *al-barr*, the steppe. The mountain and the steppe alike fall into 133 a number of zones, the principal of which are shown in the accompanying sketch-map. There is a narrow strip of coastal plain which broadens towards Banghazi and then spreads southwestwards into the great *barqa* plain. Animal transport can [492] only mount the plateau from the coast by steep and infrequent paths which lead up deep ravines to the first terrace, the so-called *arqub* country, a succession of thickly wooded ridges broken into myriad bosses and cut deep by many wide wadis,

[TEXT CONTINUED ON PAGE 31]

[P.30]

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
Shahhat
Darna
Taukra
Al-Marj
Banghazi
Tubruq
500
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400
300
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100
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Over 500 metres
200-500 metres
Under 200 metres
Isohyets showing mean annual aggregates in mms.

Rainfall and the Plateau Area.

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
Steppe
Semi-Desert
Desert
Mediterranean Maritime
Mediterranean Plateau
Scale
0 25 50 75 100 kms.

Climatic Zones.

137 [134] of country. The whitish soils of the steppe support worts and other scrub bushes and some drought-resisting trees in the beds of wadis and they are well covered with annual and perennial grasses and other plants which yield excellent pasturage in the [233] springtime. However, except in the Wadi al-Mra, where camels can be kept the year round, there is little grazing beyond the line Msus–Bir Tinjidhir–Bir Hakaim.

233 137 The Bedouin of the forest area are essentially a goat people, though they also keep many sheep and cattle, and it is mostly through the medium of the goat that the vast natural wealth of the forests of Cyrenaica is transformed into human wealth. The animal is hardy and frugal, and has the great merit of preferring tree and shrub to grass and of being a catholic feeder. Just as the forest would be useless to the Bedouin without the goat so the much vaster stretches of steppe would be useless to them without the sheep and camel which turn its grasses and 233 scrub into food. Thus Cyrenaica is fundamentally a pastoral [181] country, primarily a country of sheep farming, and its people, as they say themselves, have the hearts of shepherds and not of peasants. While agriculture and pastoralism are both practised, the bias of nature and tradition is towards animal husbandry, by which the rich vegetation of the country is turned into milk, butter, meat, wool, hides, and draught and transport.

II

13 221 233 In Cyrenaica stand always contrasted the mountain and the plain, the forest and the steppe, the red soils and the white, the region of goats and cows and the region of sheep and camels, settled life and nomadism.

221 233 True nomadism is very rare. A few Fawakhir, Minifa, Huta, and other tribal fragments herd only camels, or if they possess other animals keep them with kinsmen near the plateau, and can therefore wander pretty well where they please. They may be found anywhere between the Nile, Fazzan, and the Sudan. Their spirit is that of an Aulad 'Ali tribesman who said to me: 'We call no place our home. It is wherever there is grass and water.' Semi-nomads are numerous. Those with land on the [241] plateau cultivate there, then graze southwards, and return again to the plateau in the dry season to water their flocks.

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
SA'ADA
(1)
BARAGHITH
'AQQARA
(2)
BARAGHUTH AL-SGHAIR
JIBARNA
HARABI
'ALI (In Egypt)
TRIBES
(3)
'ABID
'ARIF
'AWAQIR
MAGHARBA
DARSA
HASA
BARA'ASA
'AILAT FAYID
ABAIDAT
(4) PRIMARY
AL-RA'AIDAT
AULAD AL-SHAMAKH
(5) SECONDARY
'ALI
MANSUR
NASR
SUBH
(6) TERTIARY
13
6
4
4
MADHKUR
HAIBA
AL-DAWWAS
UMBARAKA

FIG. 18-1 GENEALOGY 1. The names given in this genealogy are the tribal names in use. All are derivatives of personal names of ancestors, like all tribal names, except for some nicknames (e.g. Baraghith means 'the fleas') and a few which refer to a general location (e.g. the Magharba means the 'Westerners'). [551]

first four descending generations is two. At the fifth level the 173
number increases to four and finally, at the sixth level there 613
characteristically occurs a marked irregularity in the number of 619
descendants forming the founding ancestors of the tertiary sections.

Another feature of the Cyrenaican genealogy is that its 613
branches show an intimate relationship with ecological areas. 619
Thus, the major division into two branches stemming from 13
Sa'ada represents the eastern and western halves of the country 182
with associated and clear differences in ecology. Continuing the line of descent, the Jibarna and Baraghith groups of tribes occupy plain and mountain foot-hills respectively. The two Jibarna tribes in turn occupy two distinct kinds of plain. Following now the division of the Magharba tribe, its two primary sections are divided by a very conspicuous dry valley. The four secondary divisions of the Aulad ash-Shamakh primary section likewise show a relation to ecological boundaries, albeit on a smaller scale than those previously referred to, but none the less important in this more local context. Finally, the unevenly numbered tertiary sections which are derived from these four

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619
• 13
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secondary sections, in their very unevenness, show a more sensitive relation to more detailed ecological differences.

At all levels of segmentation, therefore, a high degree of consistency between the ecological divisions of the country and the genealogical divisions can be shown. Indeed the relationship is so close that it is tempting to consider the contemporary pattern of things as the only one possible. What historical evidence [167] exists is against such a view being taken. It is known that tribes have been displaced in the past, some of them or sections of them having been pushed out into Egypt, and others having altered their position. This being so, there obviously cannot be any finality about the present distribution of tribes in relation to the ecological divisions of the country. Rather, the existing pattern is one of a number of possible permutations. Again, as the relation between groups of people to their environment becomes progressively sensitive with the decrease in the size and order of the group, then the more unstable will be the relationship between the two. Conversely the greater the size and order of the group the more persistent will be its relationship to the ecology. In other words, the major ecological divisions are more fundamental in their effect on the way of life and the economy of people, whereas the more detailed ecological differences between, say, tertiary sections have a relatively minor effect. The [233] [433] ecological differences between the wooded plateau area with its cow and goat herding economy, and the arid semi-desert area with its camel and sheep herding economy has a much more profound effect on the general way of life, and is a more persistent division, than that which exists between two tertiary sections where the differences may only be in topographical details.

While therefore, the division of people into groups of various sorts is not permanently fixed in relation to ecological divisions, there is always an intimate relationship between the two which is progressively more enduring as the order of the structural segment increases. Yet even this statement of the relationship, guarded as it is, does not suffice, for the pattern and distribution of tribes and their sections at any given moment are not only a function of ecology, but they are also the result of a number of other complex factors which may be operating to reinforce or to

613

complicate the more direct relationship of the distribution of groups of people to the ecology.[3] 619 [13] [182]

The Cyrenaican genealogy, then, is a conceptualization of a hierarchy[4] of ordered territorial segments. The groups stemming from the ancestor at the third order of segmentation are referred to as tribes, and each tribe is the apex of a three-tiered order of segments, which, following customary practice, are referred to as primary, secondary, and tertiary. The latter, the tertiary segment, 621 represents the group of people who, for a period of six to eight 613 months, gather together and live in what, for all intents and purposes, is a single discrete residential group.[5] This tertiary group is also the smallest political group. It has its own homeland, with its [423] water supplies, pastures, and ploughland. In this homeland live most of its members. It is a lineage segment, and most of the agnates of this segment live on their own homeland.[6] It is also the [682] vengeance group, which means that any one of its members can [628] be killed in vengeance for a homicide committed by any other, and that the obligation to exact vengeance falls on all members alike, regardless of relationship to the victim. Likewise, its members pay blood money as a group, and although when they receive it, a bigger portion goes to the nearest agnate of the victim, the remainder is distributed equally among all its members. The number of generations which supervene between the founding ancestor of a tertiary segment and the living is usually four or five, but there is little consistency in this number. Some tertiary

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[3] This part of the discussion is necessarily brief, but further amplification will appear in two subsequent articles now in preparation, one of which is concerned with a general treatment of Cyrenaican genealogies, and the other with a discussion of the effects of ecology on the social organization of the Bedouin. [114]

[4] I use the word hierarchy here since, although segments of any order display many like features, the orders represent distinct and progressively more embracing interests, and these differences are of such consequence that to consider one order of groups as a facsimile of a superior or inferior order can only lead to confusion. A tertiary group, that is to say, may possess many of the characteristics of a secondary group, but the one is a fundamentally different sort of group from the other, as I shall show in my forthcoming article on the feud. (cf. Smith, M. G. 1956.) [128]

[5] This statement does not apply to the Darsa and the Hasa tribes, two of the plateau tribes in Cyrenaica. The statements in this article are confined almost exclusively to the camel herders of the semi-desert. [619] [128]

[6] This, admittedly, is too general a statement to make about such an important issue, but I would prefer to leave its documentation and precision for an article on the analysis of the composition of Bedouin camps.

175 then came the Awlad 'Ali.

619 Around the year 1800, the Awlad 'Ali were able to
726 defeat the Hanadi with the help of another Cyrenaican tribe
167 dwelling in the area, the Jumi'at. The Jumi'at were a vassal
tribe who changed their allegiance from the Hanadi to the
Awlad 'Ali after this war. The Hanadi, as the Banu'Una
before them, were forced into the Nile Valley. Today, they
•[131] live in Sharqiyya Province and are no longer distinguishable
from the peasant population.

175 According to Evans-Pritchard, the Awlad 'Ali were still
619 in possession of eastern Cyrenaica in 1800. Then there occurred
726 "long and savagely fought" wars ending with the expulsion of
114 the Awlad 'Ali. But this time schedule seems unlikely since
the Awlad 'Ali were already at war with the Hanadi when
175 Napoleon landed near Alexandria in 1798. The Bedouin war has
648 been amusingly described by the French historian Lacroix (in
181 Murray 1935:30) who accompanied the Napoleonic expedition:

> At five o'clock, the first Bedouin were seen on the flank of the army, and shortly afterwards one saw four or five hundred; it was the tribe of Henady, the fiercest Arabs of these deserts. They were almost naked, swarthy, and lean; their horses seemed wornout hacks; save for the helmet, it was Don Quixote as represented in the engravings ...if these five hundred Arabs had been Mamelukes, they would have been able to obtain a great success at this first moment, when the soldiers' imaginations were alert and ready to receive any impression, but these Arabs were as cowardly as the Mamelukes, who had charged an hour before, were brave.

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
JABAL
AL-AKHDAR
SALLUM
AL-QASR
MARSA MATRUH
ALEXANDRIA
Libyan
Plateau
CYRENAICA
CAIRO
SIWA
WESTERN
DESERT
LIBYA
U. A. R.
SCALE APPROX. :
1 INCH = 176 MILES

EGYPT AND CYRENAICA

FIGURE I

CHAPTER II

THE ECOLOGY AND ECONOMY OF THE AL-QASR AREA

Changing Patterns of Land Use

131 Al-Qasr is located in the Northwestern Coastal Zone, a relatively fertile littoral region forming the northern edge of the Egyptian Western Desert. Extending from Alexandria to Sallum on the Libyan border, the Zone is some 500 kilometers in length and reaches south into the desert some 20 to 50
134 kilometers. A deep soil deposit and a relatively high average
132 rainfall of about 15 centimeters (20 centimeters of rain would
241 be considered "high") permit limited agriculture in this region.

133 Due to the drainage pattern of the coastal area there is a fair supply of underground water. The rain percolates
[172] down through coastal sand dunes and is trapped in man-made underground galleries dating from Roman times. Farther into
312 the desert, cisterns, which also date from Roman times, catch the rains draining off the Libyan plateau to the south. This plateau and the catchment area form the southern boundary of the greater al-Qasr settlement area (see Figure 4). The General Desert Development Authority, an agency of the government, estimates that there are about 3,000 of these

312 cisterns spread throughout the Western Desert. Many of them are still used by the Bedouins for watering their liyestock. The southernmost part of the catchment area provides grazing for sheep. Northward near the coast, where the soil deposit permits, barley is cultivated.

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[103] The Bedouins divide al-Qasr into "the good life" (ma'isha simha) on the coast, and "the bad life" (ma'isha wihsha) in the desert. Ma'isha simha consists of two zones: the shatt or sahil (i.e. "the coast," "as far as one can still see the sea"), and the area of sha'ir wi mar'a ("the barley and pasture area"). Ma'isha wihsha is the zone beyond the plateau where nothing grows, the daf'a or sibta ("uncultivable land which is sandy and stoney"). 361 All of the Bedouins of al-Qasr are settled permanently either on the coast or just south in the barley and pasture area. Nomadic and semi-nomadic activity disappeared generations ago in this part of the desert.

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131 When the Bedouins speak of al-Qasr, they are referring to an area which is traditionally defined. When the Egyptians speak of al-Qasr, they are referring to a "village" only recently incorporated. The difference is a substantial one and not merely a difference in dialect. The Bedouins use the term mintaqit al-Qasr ("the area, or territory, of al-Qasr"): the Egyptians say qaryit al-Qasr ("the village of al-Qasr"). 000 As the Bedouins view it, the Western Desert is the watan

131 view it, the Western Desert is the watan
619 ("homeland") of the Awlad 'Ali tribe, and is subdivided into
631 tribal zones each referred to as a mintaqa. Mintaqit al-Qasr
is part of mintaqit qabilit 'Aishaibat (i.e. "the area of
al-Qasr" is part of "the territory of the 'Aishaibat tribe").
131 Each tribal mintaqa is further broken down into contiguous
619 parcels of land belonging to lineages, and these are also
*613 referred to as mintaqa; for instance, there is mintaqa
631
[423] 'ailit Ma'fas, i.e. "the territory of the Ma'fas family."
In the al-Qasr segmentary lineage society, genealogical
ties and local ties are coincidental. The boundaries of
al-Qasr are defined by the agnatic lines of the 'Aishaibat
tribe and include the sahil and sha'ir wi mar'a zones.

361 To the Egyptians, a qarya ("village") is a nucleated
631 cluster of permanent dwellings with some degree of social
integration: al-Qasr is a qarya for administrative matters.
The Bedouins, who think in terms of kin-based residence groups,
tribal boundaries, and political and economic symbiotic relations, see the Egyptian qarya as only a sector of al-Qasr.
They refer to this sector as the 'izba, i.e., "farm" or "rural
settlement." The 'izba is land fertile enough to support a
secure and sedentary life. "The 'izba," the Bedouins say,
"is the seed of the madiina" (city).

[[121]] For my own purposes, the Bedouin sense of al-Qasr is
the more useful concept. Al-Qasr is all of the territory of
[[131]] the 'Aishaibat tribe. Situated at 31°N and 27°E, al-Qasr is

361 directly on the Mediterranean coast. The '*izba* sector is
631 just 14 kilometers due west of Marsa Matruh, and about 300
131 kilometers due west of the coastal city of Alexandria.

161 In 1960, the population of the whole Western Desert
162 was 98,000, the majority being of Bedouin stock. Considering that Egypt is a country with a 2 - 1/2 per cent rise in birth rate per year, the desert population would have been about 127,000 in 1965 when I was in the field. The town of Marsa Matruh, which is the capital of the Province of Matruh (formerly the Western Desert Province) has a population of about 7,000. With increasing economic and political concern for the desert provinces and the oases, this number should continue to rise.

131 *Mintaqit al-Qasr* (see Figure 4)[1] is an area which measures about six kilometers from east to west along the sea, and about ten to fifteen kilometers on a north-south line extending into the desert as far as the Libyan plateau. The
162 population of al-Qasr is less easy to determine. In 1960, al-Qasr, by official count, consisted of 225 families, 595 males and 749 females, or a total of 1344 souls. Al-Qasr, as
[631] the Bedouins define it, includes the *garya* and six other demographic sections separately defined by the Egyptian government. The population of this al-Qasr is 2,996, 1,287 males and 1,709
[114] females. There is reason to doubt any census figures of the al-Qasr area because the Bedouins are reluctant to reveal their

[1] [See p. 67--Analyst]

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

FIGURE 4

LAND FORM MAP OF AL-QASR SHOWING DRAINAGE PATTERN

SCALE = 1:250,000

MEDITERRANEAN
AL-QASR
MARSA MATRUH
LIBYAN PLATEAU
DESERT
▨ 'IZBA SECTOR
▒ SHA'IR WI MAR'A SECTOR

CHAPTER II

ECOLOGY AND HISTORY

619 Awlad Ali are a number of Arabic-speaking semi-nomadic tribes of
101 sheep and goat herders who inhabit the northern part of the Western
162 Desert of Egypt. The total population of Awlad Ali, according to the
1965 preliminary census, was about 100,000 inhabitants. This estimate is, however, very tentative and fluctuates from one year to the
next, depending on the circumstances of the pasture in the area. The
131 area they occupy consists of the narrow strip of fertile land which extends along the Mediterranean coast from near Alexandria in the east
some 350 miles westward to the UAR-Libyan border town of Sallum, and
132 varying in width from ten to thirty miles. Vegetation in the area de-
133 pends on rainfall, supplemented by a number of artesian wells. The
rainy season extends from November to March, but the rain is extremely
erratic in nature, varying from one year to another and from one place
to the next. Draught has been experienced every three to four years,
one of them being experienced at the time of the study. The water situ-
312 ation is further aggravated by the low technological level of the people
[181] which prevents them from making the best use of the available rain water.
There have been some attempts made to store as much of the rain water
as possible, but these attempts are usually made by individuals and in
too crude and primitive a way to prevent most of the water from being
lost by seepage or by evaporation. The most commonly used method of
water preservation in the area is digging cisterns in the ground. But
most of these cisterns are too shallow to keep large amounts of water.
Some deeper wells are found in the area and are called "beer sama"

613 619 551 597 554 definite political advantage. In the second case in which the female name was used, the husband was a member of the Bara'asa tribe of Libya. Although this tribe is one the powerful tribes of Libya, it has no political influence in the Egyptian Western Desert. Changing affiliation carried with it the strong political support of the mother's tribal segment.

619 131 In general the Reds occupy the western half of the coastal area of the Western Desert from the town of Matruh westward to the Libyan border, while the Whites occupy the eastern part which stretches to Alexandria. The Senenah are fairly scattered although their largest concentration is located in the extreme western part overlapping that of the Reds. The territorial division of the area among the three major sections of Awlad Ali is not a strict one. Historical evidence shows that there has been [194] a considerable tribal displacement throughout the area. This displacement occurred mainly during the intratribal war era and during the Second World War when the area was a main battlefield. In general, however, there is a significant relationship between territorial distribution and tribal segmentation, and this is especially true on the higher levels of segmentation than on the lower ones.

619 613 Each of the three sections of the apex of a three-tiered order of segments which, following the native usage, will be called Kabila (tribe), Eila (family), and Bait (house).

619 173 The first order referred to as tribes are structurally equivalent units but of highly variable size. Each of them has its traditional history. Some of these histories are important to the tribe as a whole.

613
671 first appeared, the rule has become a practice so common that other Amars
675 find it unnecessary to specify it in their own papers.

682 Another new rule which is in the process of acquiring a great amount
613 of consensus among the tribal population of Awlad Ali is that of the re-
672
675 sponsibility of the Amar for the payment of the lawyer's fees for members
[693] of the Amar who are tried by the government (Article 13 of the Aggary
[695] papers). Another less agreed upon rule is that of the responsibility of
613 the Amar for the financial losses caused by the confiscation of smuggled
672 goods or the payment of money for the destruction of government property
675
439 by a member of the Amar. Where smuggling is an important source of in-
[434] come for the group, Amar papers usually include rules making it a corporate responsibility; other Amar papers, especially those of tribal segments not deeply involved in smuggling, make it an individual responsibility, while still others leave it intentionally with no specific rule, as in the case of the Aggary Amar paper.

613 The Aggary document is a relatively elaborate one. Not all Amar
[675] papers, or at least the ones I had a chance to examine, are as detailed.
● [131] Eilat Aggary is the largest Amar in the area of Dera'el Bahari, which extends from Alexandria 60 miles westward to the town of Alamein. The
613 distinctive characteristics of the Aggary Eila is that it is composed
563 mainly of peasant groups who joined the Aggary by means of tribal adop-
619 tion. Of the 16 Baits constituting the Aggary Amar, only three are believed to be Awlad Ali proper. The attractiveness of the Aggary for the peasant groups seeking to be adopted by the tribal population of the area may be partly explained in terms of the location of Eilat Aggary in an area relatively close to the Delta from where these groups usually migrate.

APPENDEX II


MEDITERRANEAN SEA
البحر الأبيض المتوسط
الإسكندرية
ALEXANDRIA
LIBYA
ليبيا
SENENAH
HAHA
GNA
KATJA
YARAW
GENEISHA
AWLAD KHARRUF
اولاد خروف
ETE
جميعات
اولاد خروف
AWLAD KHARRUF
GEMEIAT
SANAGRA
سنافرة
KATAIFA
قطايفة
جميعات
GEMEIAT
SAMALOUS
سمالوس
AGGARY
SHEAEIBAT
شهيبات
AGGAR
ASHBET
GWABIS
جوابيس
أولاد علي
A W L A D A L I
SEREIHAT
صريحات
QATTARA DEPRESSION
القطارة
SIWA OASIS
قبائل البدو
وخريطة طرق الساحل الشمالي
BEDUIN TRIBES
ROAD MAP OF NORTH COAST
REFERENCE
علامات
PRINCIPAL ROADS
TOWNS
102
131
619
491
361
133

795*

touch with the lodges of his Order in Cyrenaica, Tripolitania, 793
the Western Desert of Egypt, and the Sudan. 159
175*

In moving the seat of his Order to Jaghbub, the Grand
Sanusi was probably most influenced by his decision to direct 795*
his missionary propaganda southwards. It is understandable 797
that he should have made this decision. His was a missionary 793
159
175*

795*
648*
175*
131 ●
102


Scale
0
500
1,000
1,500 kms.
Italian expansion into Tripolitania and Cyrenaica
1911 – 1932
MOROCCO
ALGERIA
TUNISIA
TRIPOLITANIA
CYRENAICA
Al-Baida (1843)
Mizda
Al-Tabaqa
Saukna
Jaghbub (1856)
Jalu
British line of defence 1914-1917
French expansion into the Sahara
1902 – 1914
Wau-al-Kabir
Kufra (1895)
FEZZAN
EGYPT
Kawar
TIBESTI
Qiru (1899)
BORKU
ENNEDI
KANEM
ANGLO EGYPTIAN SUDAN
FRENCH SAHARA
CHAD
WADAI
DARFUR
Thin arrows indicate Sanusiya expansion
Thick arrows indicate movements of European Powers

The Spread of the Sanusiya in North Africa.

mind and the Order he had founded a missionary Order, and 795*
the pagan and semi-pagan countries of the Sahara and the 793
Sudan, and of Equatorial Africa beyond them, offered endless 797
scope for conversion to the faith. Moreover, his Order was 159
already reaching the limits of its expansion in North Africa. 175*
It had won over the nomad and semi-nomad Bedouin tribes of Cyrenaica, Tripolitania, and Egypt, and the oases folk under their influence, but was not making, and was not even in its heyday to make, much impression on the peasants and townsmen up against whom it now found itself in Northern Tripolitania and the Nile Valley. Dammed to west and east the Order

KEY

102 1. al-'Arq
133 2. al-'Arqub
3. Asqafa
131 4. Aujila
361 5. al-'Azziyyat
619 6. Banghazi
7. Bishara
8. Dariyana
9. Darna
10. al-Fayidiya
11. al-Hamama
12. al-Haniya
13. al-Huwaiz
14. Jaghbub
15. Janzur
16. al-Jarfan
17. al-Jikharra
18. Khashm Rzaiq
19. al-Libba
20. al-Makhili
21. Mara
22. Marada
23. al-Marassas
24. Maraziq
25. al-Marj
26. Martuba
27. Mirad Mas'ud
28. Msus
29. al-Naufiliya
30. al-Nayyan
31. Qafanta
32. Qarabarbi
33. al-Qasrain
34. al-Qasur
35. al-Qatafiya
36. Shahhat
37. al-Tailimun
38. Talmaitha
39. Tart
40. Taukra
41. Umm Hafain
42. Umm al-Razam
43. Umm Rukba
44. Umm al-Shakhanab
45. al-Zawiya al-Baida


18°
19°
20°
32°
31°
30°
29°
Banghazi
Barce
Suluq
Al Sl
Al-Zuwaitina
Ajdabiya
Al-Naufiliya
Al-Agheila
A L M A G H A R B A
WADI AL-FARIGH
Marada

THE CHI

[facing p. 34, A]

3: Evans-Pritchard E-4, 5 (1942-1944) (1837-1942) 1949 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9 Sanusi

102
133
131
361
619


21°
22°
23°
24°
25°
32°
31°
30°
29°
Marsa Susa
Darna
Al Qubba
Al-Qaiqab
Khawalan
Marawa
Taknis
Jardas Al 'Abid
Abyar
Al-Bomba
Tobruk
'Akrama
Al-Burdi Sulaiman
Al-Sallum
Bir Hakaim
Jaghbub
DARSA
AL-'ABID
AL-BARA'ASA
HASSA
AILAT FAYID
FAYID
'ABAIDAT
FAWAKHIR
WADI AL-MRA
ZUWAYA
AWAJILA
Al-Jakharra
Aujila
Jalu
AL-MAJABRA
Contours in metres
Tribal boundaries
Towns
Place names
Zawiyas
Scale
0
10
20
50
80
110 kms

EF TRIBES OF CYRENAICA (after De Agostini)

[facing P. 34, B]

two main branches, the Jibarna and the Harabi. The Jibarna 619 tribes are 'Awaqir, Magharba (some list the 'Araibat section of this tribe separately), 'Abid, and 'Arafa. The Harabi tribes are 'Abaidat, Hasa, *'Ailat* Fayid, Bara'asa, and Darsa. These tribes are shown on the diagram below, which presents them as tribes and not in the genealogical fiction of proper names. Strictly speaking, the Bara'asa should not appear on this chart since it is only one section of this tribe, the Aulad Hamad, who are true Harabi. However, it has become customary to class them as Harabi.



Attention is drawn to other names on this chart. The Aulad 619 'Ali, who have a fraternal relationship to the Harabi, about a 167 century and a half ago lived in eastern Cyrenaica, but were 131 compelled to migrate to Egypt by pressure from the Harabi, 175* who received support from the Caramanli rulers of Tripoli. To-day they occupy the Mediterranean littoral from al-Sallum to Alexandria. Another branch of the Aqaqra, the Sharai', who migrated to Egypt, have become *fallahin* and are now found only as scattered families. When the Aulad 'Ali entered Egypt they found the Hanadi in possession of part of their present-day territory and drove them out of it. These Hanadi are now settled in the Sharqiya Province of Egypt. As will be noted from the chart, they belong to the Bani Sallam branch of the *Sa'adi* family of tribes. The Hanadi had previously dispossessed their brothers the Bani 'Una and this tribe is now completely absorbed in the *fallahin* population of Lower Egypt. A third fraternal branch of the Bani Sallam, the Bahaja, were also expelled from the Bahaira and are now settled in the Sharqiya and Gharbiya Provinces of Egypt. Of the Jibarna group, the Fawayid used to occupy the part of the plateau and plain now occupied by the Hasa, the Bara'asa, and the 'Abid. They were driven out of their country early in the nineteenth century, at the

3:Evans-Pritchard E-4, 5 (1942-1944) 1949 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9
(1837-1942) Sanusi

619 same time as the Jawazi, by a combination of the 'Awaqir, the
167 Magharba, and the Bara'asa, assisted by the Caramanli rulers of
Tripoli, and are now settled in the provinces of Fayum, Bani Suef,
● 131 Bahaira, and Minya in Egypt. The Jawazi used to live in the
*175 country now occupied by the 'Awaqir, and they now mostly live
in Minya Province of Egypt and in the Fayum. Another struggle
which greatly altered the tribal distribution in Cyrenaica was
*[648] two wars, the last about 1832, of the Magharba and 'Awaqir,
aided by their Jibarna kinsmen the 'Abid and 'Arafa, against
the tribes which occupied the *barqa* and the remnants of which
now range the littoral of the western Sirtica. These tribes are
known as *al-'Arab al-Gharb*, the Western Arabs.

*175 So, in 1800 the Harabi and Jibarna tribes, which are now in
undisputed control of all Cyrenaica outside the towns, occupied
131 only part of the country, mostly the central, and the most
619 northerly reaches of the western plateau. The Jibarna were
cut off from the southern steppe by the Fawayid and Jawazi,
the whole of the *barqa* was occupied by *al-'Arab al-Gharb*, and
the eastern part of the plateau by the Aulad 'Ali. The wars by
[726] which they drove out their rivals were long and savagely fought
and many incidents in them still form part of Bedouin tradition.

As a result of these tribal wars the descendants of the Bani
*175 Sulaim invaders of Cyrenaica and the Maghrib thus began to
131 return eastwards with a quota of Berber blood about the end of
167 the seventeenth century and pushed out the tribes they found
619 dwelling in the Western Desert of Egypt and pressed them into
the Delta, where they were absorbed by the *fallahin*. The first
intruders from the west were pushed to the Nile by stronger
tribes coming behind them and these by yet stronger. They
pushed one another like trucks on a siding. The Hanadi pushed
out the Bani 'Una and the Aulad 'Ali pushed out the Hanadi,
being themselves pushed on from behind by the 'Abaidat and
other Harabi tribes. Besides the migration of whole tribes from
Cyrenaica into Egypt there has taken place an exodus of many
tribal sections and fragments, owing to intertribal fighting, until
to-day there is not a Cyrenaican tribe, or even large section,
which has not some of its members in Egypt, often whole
619 lineages. The Bedouin of Cyrenaica know their kinsmen in
167 Egypt and sometimes when the price of sheep is low in the
602 Egyptian markets they leave their animals with them to sell on
439 their behalf when prices rise.

619 spond different social statuses. Some are classed as *Marabtin*
bil baraka, 'client tribes with the blessing' or *Marabtin al-Fatha*,
619 'client tribes of the prayer', and they often claim to be Sharifs.
778 These 'sacred' tribes, such as the Aulad al-Shaikh and most of

102
619
361
● 131


TUNISIA
Tarabulis
Masallata
Al-Rujban
Al-Qal'a
AL-AMAMRA
Misurata
Al-Haraba
AL-MASHASHA
Bani Walid
AL-HARABA
AL-RUJBAN
Mizda
URFALLA
Sirt
AL-QADHADHFA
Al-Naufiliya
Sinawin
AULAD BUSAIF
Ghadamis
Al-Tabaqa
AL-ZINTAN
SULIMAN
AL-MAGHARBA
Darj
AL-ZAWIYA
AL-HARABA
AL-MAQARHA
RIYAH
AL-JAMA'AT
Waddan
Sukna
Hun
Zalla
AULAD
Al-Fuqha
Birqin
AL-HUTMAN
AL-HASAUNA
Sabha
Tamassa
Ghudwa
Umm Al-Aranab
Zuwila
Murzuq
Taghaghan
Draim
Wau Al-Kabir
Ghath
Wau Al-Namus
Al-Qatrun
AL-HARABA → Names of Tribes
Al-Haraba → Sanusiya Zawiyas
Boundary Lines
Scale
0 50 100 150 200 400 kms.

The Chief Sanusi Bedouin Tribes of Tripolitania.

619 the Masamir and Farjan, live among the *Sa'adi* as equals in
778 virtue of the prestige they derive from their descent, or sup-
posed descent, from saints, though the free tribes do not regard
[173] them as quite like themselves. Their ancestors are almost
invariably believed to have come from the west, Morocco,
Algeria, Tunisia, or Tripolitania. This move of pious men to

and of the consistency between lineages of a clan and segments 619
of a tribe. In explanation of it a few words must first be said 614
about the terms *qabila, 'aila,* and *bait*. *Qabila* is the word 613
generally used to denote a tribe or primary tribal division.


AL-DARSA
MASAMIR
MARABTIN
AL-SHABARQA
AL-QALABTA
Al-Mahamda
Balrabat
Al-Shulah
At Ibrahim
At al-Mzatal
AL-MUASA
Al-Aqta'
AL-BAKHAYIT
AL-BARA'ASA
AL 'ABAIDAT
'AILAT FAYID
Tribal Boundaries
1st. Subdivision
2nd. Subdivision
3rd. Subdivision
Al-Aqta' 4th. Subdivision
Sanusiya Zawiya:-
Built
Not completed
Marabout Tomb
Scale
0 1 2 3 4 kms.

102
131 •
619
778
795*
613

The Divisions of the Hasa Tribe.

'*Ailat* are the lineages into which a clan is divided and hence 619
the sections of a tribe of various sizes in which these lineages are 614
found and after which they take their names. *Biyut* are small 613
lineages, or extended families, with a depth of five or six generations from the present day to their founders. It must be noted, however, that all these terms are relative and are used in a more or less comprehensive sense according to the context.

3:Evans-Pritchard E-4,5 (1942-1944) 1949 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9
(1837-1942)
Sanusi

*175 [P. 224]
*648
102
167
487
233
131


Apollonia
CIRENE
Giovanni Berta
DERNA
Luigi Razza
Beda Littoria
Luigi di Savoia
Tolmeta
Oberdan
Maddalena
BARCE
Tocra
Baracca
Tecnis
Marava
Slonta
Driana
el Abiar
BENGASI
Boundary of area to be colonised
Boundary of area for Organised Government Settlement
Narrow gauge railway
Main roads
Tracks for passage of Arab flocks
Provincial boundary (Bengasi Province)
Scale
0
25
50
75
100 kms.

The Italian plan for the colonization of northern Cyrenaica.

613 At the next level of segmentation (this now being the tertiary
619 order in any given tribe) the number of segments which appear
621 is conspicuously irregular. For the Magharba tribe, the four secondary segments, 'Ali, Mansur, Subh and Nasr are divided into
thirteen, six, four, and four segments respectively. Similar irregularity appears in other tribes.[11] The pattern of the genealogy
is always one of regularity in the number of segments at all points
in it except for the point of tertiary segmentation where conspicuous irregularity becomes immediately evident. Since these
613 segments constitute the summer camps of the Bedouin, this is not
619 surprising, for these small groups will show greater susceptibility
621 to details of local water supplies, pasturing facilities, ploughland
133 areas, and topographical features than would the numerically
larger and structurally superior groups occupying larger areas of
182 territories of greater ecological importance. If we follow the line
● 131 from Sa'ada to Nasr again, the bifurcation at the first order of
segmentation is consistent with the division of the country into
the permanently green high altitudes of the plateau, and the extended low-lying plain area of the western half of the country.
[134] Between the territory of the Magharba tribe ('The White Plain')
and that of its neighbour tribe, the 'Awaqir ('The Red Plain'),
there is a major soil difference, which is such a conspicuous feature of the landscape, and so sharply defined, that one is almost
aware when one has crossed the tribal boundary. Within the
Magharba tribe, a prominent dry river valley cuts the territory
in two, the landscape to the west of it being characteristically
serrated, making travel in an east-west direction difficult, while
to the east the landscape is much more docile and undulating.
The four sections of the ash-Shamakh branch again represent
four quite distinct areas. The territory of one section is almost
conterminous with the narrow belt of sand dunes along the coast;
the territory of another is a block of rough and tumbled land in
the west; the territory of a third, in the centre, is made up of a
few low-lying shallow valleys; and the territory of the fourth,

---

[114] [11] It is necessary here to warn the reader that, brilliant an ethnographer as Agostini undoubtedly was, his grouping of tribal sections is not always correct. I had his book (Agostini 1922–23) with me in the field and checked his tribal survey. I found that at several important points his ordering of the segments was incorrect. I should add that the differences between Agostini and myself are not due to the kind of changes discussed in this article.

stretching across to the village of Ajadabiya in the east, topples 613
in undulations away into the flat expanses of the desert to the 619
south. At all these points of segmentation, the territories occu- 621
pied by the various sections are large and roughly defined, and 133
the population aggregates supported on these territories run from 182
over a thousand at one end to tens of thousands at the upper 131
limits. The tertiary sections are numerically much smaller, some of them numbering as few as a hundred souls in all, and the territories to which they are attached are correspondingly smaller. The relationship between the numbers in this order of section, and the precise amount of water available in the local wells is an intimate one. If the population of one of these groups increases, or if the number of animals rises, or if the springs show a decline in the volume of water they give forth, or if the winter rainfall has allowed the storage in wells of only a small quantity of water, a rearrangement of the group must be effected. A significant alteration of any one of these components must mean that the local group must split to enable a new adjustment to be made in the relationship of man and animals to water.

Whatever changes occur within groups of any size, since the 173
genealogy embraces the entire population, these must appear on 178
the genealogy in some way or other. Now a genealogy is as rigid 829
a framework, as fixed and final a pattern of grouping, as can be 613
imagined. The impression that they are thus rigid and fixed, ex- 551
cept for the addition of successive generations, is strengthened by the way in which the Bedouin use them. From their young boys to their old men, the Bedouin are expert genealogists, and the names of ancestors, for one reason or another, are never far
from their lips. Names are kept alive by constant use, since all [571]
references to inter-group relationships must be in terms of these
names. More than this, the Bedouin were proud to the point of 173
boastfulness of their genealogical knowledge, and, wherever I
travelled, the first request I had to comply with was to take down 829
a large portion of a tribal genealogy. In recording their endless 613
genealogies, one feature about them came to assume increasing 551
interest; while there was remarkable unanimity with regard to 123
most of the names given, there was one point of marked am- 126
biguity—at the tertiary level of segmentation. I recorded genealogies in four tribes on an extensive scale, and in each tribe

maintained to this day in the desert between the last two 619
and the Sa'adi, though they are relaxed in the cultivation. 651

The Jumei'at, who used to be "Murabitin" to the
Beni 'Una, are now nominally so to the Awlad 'Ali, but are
not required to pay tribute. Other tribes, such as the 619
Jawabis and 'Awarma, are in an intermediate stage between
the Sa'adi and the Murabitin. The Awlad 'Abd es-Sallam,
the Samalus ed-Diminat, and perhaps the Fawakhir, call [778]
themselves "Murabitin bil Baraka", a priestly caste which,
in Tripoli, used to receive special privileges from the
Turkish Government.

Though the Sa'adi tribes despise the Murabitin as serfs, [186]
they respect them for their piety and resort to them for
the writing of charms.

While the Murabitin tribes generally may be suspected to contain more Libyan blood than the Sa'adi, there are other tribes such as the 'Amayim, the Jahama, and the Tarhuna, who have come to Egypt from further west than any of the above, and who seem to be quite definitely "Berber", though, of course, none of them will admit it. These are known euphemistically as 'Arab el-Gharb.

Even some of the Juheina, settled east of the Nile in Sharqiya, are scorned by Klippel as "d'origine berbère, se pretendant section d'une tribu d'Arabie".[1]

Awlad 'Ali.—This tribe, by far the most important of [131]●
the Western Bedouin, occupies with its vassals the whole
north coast of Egypt from Salum to Alexandria. Like the 619
others, they claim descent from the Beni Suleim, alleging 173
their ancestor 'Ali, son of 'Aqar, to be a grandson of that
Dib, or Abu Dib, mentioned by Ibn Khaldun. Their enemies,
however, allege that he was a Jew. "When the Arabs
occupied the north coast of Africa, there was a notable, a
Jew, who owned property at Saqiet el-Hamra in
Morocco. This man welcomed and entertained the Arab
sheikh Ez-Zanati. He became very popular with the
sheikh, who gave him his daughter named Sa'ada, on condition
that he embraced Islam before the marriage contract was
made out."[2] Another version calls the Jew Yana, and says
that he had two daughters. Of these Sa'ada was the

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[1] E. Klippel, "Etudes sur le folklore Bédouin de l'Egypte," *Bull. Soc. Khédiv. de Géogr.*, vii, 10, Cairo, 1911. [113]

[2] From information collected by Muhammad Bey Wasfi.

(Sinaqra)

The Sinaqra, or descendants of Sinqir, are also reckoned among the descendants of Ali the White, " because Sinqir married his daughter Khadija." They include :— 619 173

(4)	Afrad	Maghawra
(5)	Azayim	'Eilet el-Abdi, Muwamna
(6)	'Eilet Eleura	'Eilet Jeballa, 'Eilet Omar, 'Eilet Harun, 'Eilet Ajarma, 'Eilet Tahir.

II.

The descendants of 'Ali bin 'Aqar's second son, 'Ali el-Ahmar (" The Red ") are:—

(1)	'Esheibat	'Eilet ed-Dawi, 'Eilet el-Azraq, El-Wassafa, 'El-Lazumi
(2)	Kimeilat	'Eilet el-Hajj Muhammad, El-Maharsa, 'El-Khadayij
(3)	Jineishat[1]	'Eilet el-Majduba, Es-Samayil, Tabak

III. Sinana

The Sinana are the descendants of Sineina, the third son of Ali bin 'Aqar bin Dib. They include:—

(1)	Mahafid	'Eilet Etman, 'Eilet el-Hammama, 'Eilet esh-Shimla
(2)	Arawa	'Eilet ez-Zireiriya, 'Eilet el-Ghazulat
(3)	Qatifa	'Eilet Nasralla, 'Eilet-Omar, Esh-Shawalha.
(4)	Ijna	

Jawabis.—The nomadic Jawabis (sing. Jibusi) are for the most part still settled in and around the Wadi Natrun, where General Andreossy found them in Napoleon's time. He calls them : 619 175 [131]

> " A hospitable tribe who lead a shepherd's life and encamp there every winter with their flocks. They are employed during this time carrying Natrun and prickly reeds ; they also have some traffic in dates, which they fetch in caravans from Sioua in the Ammonian Oasis ; it is a journey of twelve to fifteen days. These Arabs are *marabouths*, or peaceful people."[2]

He goes on to say they never make war, and only take up arms to defend themselves. In his time the tribe was composed of about 2,000 men, and possessed 60 horses. A little [162] [231] [162]

---

[1] Kennett gives the three subdivisions of the Jineishat as Madi, Samayil, and Jabr.

[2] *Memoirs Relative to Egypt*, 288.

619 oppression, he gathered his people and delivered a fiery
175 denunciation of his religion, during which he smashed his
726 rosary into pieces and mixed it with his horse's fodder;
792 Baqush then invited their kinsmen (?) the Awlad 'Ali, to
come over from the "Green Mountain" and help them. To entice the Awlad 'Ali, he is said to have sent them samples of salt desert water and Nile water sweetened with sugar to illustrate the difference between the hardships of the desert and the comforts of the Rif.[1]

619 As recounted earlier, the Awlad 'Ali completely routed the
175 Hanadi and their allies, and drove them from the desert.
726 In the division of the conquered territory, the Jumei'at
received a third, and, although they were still considered Murabitin, were released from the payment of tribute. They
[131] now live intermingled with the free sections of the Awlad
'Ali, all along the north coast of Egypt, and are numerous in Beheira, especially near Abu Hummus.

619 *Samalus.*—The Samalus are found scattered among the
[131] Awlad 'Ali on the northern coast and stranded among many
of the Egyptian provinces. They once possessed a head sheikh Abu Sala at Minya, and colonies are recorded from Faiyum, Beheira, Menufiya, Gharbiya, and Sharqiya. An
[175] old paper from the Recruiting Department gives from
[162] seventeen villages in the Faiyum 775 mounted Samalus
[231] and 1,400 on foot, possessing 1,760 camels and 11,400 sheep. Two important groups of wells, both called "Sawani
[312] es-Samalus" exist on the north coast, one about 50 kilometres east of Salum, and the other 20 kilometres south of Dhab'a.

[173] They say they came to Egypt, 400 strong, about 200
years ago, from the Wadi Samalus in the Jebel Akhdar, and their ancestor twelve generations ago was Nasr el-Hasani, of course an "Arab from Beni Suleim".

[175] In the *Description de l'Egypte*, P. D. Martin relates how
[726] in 1800 the Samalus of Faiyum were raided by a party of
Ferjan, 200 strong, from Beheira.

619 *Shiheibat.*—These are a "Mrabit" tribe from the west with
186 an unenviable reputation, living near the Wadi Natrun.
Sayed Idris, the former Senussi leader, says of them: "Most

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[1] Dumreicher, 16. This is probably the "Sheik Abdall Gawyal Bagooshi" who wrote to Sir Sydney Smith in March, 1801, warning him of the approach of the French from Damanhur. Wilson, *History of the British Expedition in Egypt*, 371. (Rif = cultivated area.)

CHAPTER II

THE ECOLOGY AND ECONOMY OF THE AL-QASR AREA

Changing Patterns of Land Use

131 Al-Qasr is located in the Northwestern Coastal Zone, a relatively fertile littoral region forming the northern edge of the Egyptian Western Desert. Extending from Alexandria to Sallum on the Libyan border, the Zone is some 500 kilometers in length and reaches south into the desert some 20 to 50
134 kilometers. A deep soil deposit and a relatively high average
•132 rainfall of about 15 centimeters (20 centimeters of rain would
241 be considered "high") permit limited agriculture in this region.

133 Due to the drainage pattern of the coastal area there is a fair supply of underground water. The rain percolates
[172] down through coastal sand dunes and is trapped in man-made underground galleries dating from Roman times. Farther into
312 the desert, cisterns, which also date from Roman times, catch the rains draining off the Libyan plateau to the south. This plateau and the catchment area form the southern boundary of the greater al-Qasr settlement area (see Figure 4). The General Desert Development Authority, an agency of the government, estimates that there are about 3,000 of these

244 all times of the day in the desert. The Bedouins had most of these crops before the government came to al-Qasr. Since
[177] 1960, however, the Bedouins have been planting new crops such as okra, squash, cucumber, tomato, spinach and melon. All of
244 these are plants adopted from the Nile Valley. Vegetables
312 are grown by means of irrigation or dry-farming. Where there is no well water, an individual will cultivate without irrigation. In this case, crops are planted in the spring after the rains. This method is called ba'ali. Irrigation makes it possible for a man to obtain four crops during the year, but usually, the Bedouin is more concerned with security than with profit. Therefore, most Bedouins try for one good crop
244 and allow a portion of the land to remain fallow. Land which has been planted all year around needs at least one year's rest before it can be replanted. The vegetable harvest usually takes place in July or August.

241 The government has attempted to introduce other crops
177 into al-Qasr which have failed. Failure is related to two
312 main problems in al-Qasr: salination arising from the short supply of fresh water, and the Bedouin's misunderstanding of
245 the techniques of successful irrigation farming. Figs have
177 not been successful in al-Qasr due to the nature of the soil itself. The almond tree has succumbed to the climate of al-
[132] Qasr. This tree blooms in April during the khamsin season, fifty days of hot, dry winds blowing in from the Sahara. The

407 the lack of spare parts. Three of the tractors were Russian-
built, and two were Egyptian made. The Bedouins say that the
Russian tractors are the better.

407 In 1964, the Western Desert received its heaviest
241 rainfall since 1947. To take advantage of this, local govern-
654 ment officials of the reclamation project requested an additional
[132] fifty tractors for plowing on the coastal zone. They received
only six additional tractors. In that year, the thirty-nine
tractors used in the entire Western Desert were able to plow
15,240 acres of land. During this period of economic change,
731 a bad barley crop causes a fodder shortage for the animals,
233 and seldom is the aid program able to compensate for this.
[654] Consequently, there is a need to ship sheep to the Nile Valley,
[166] or to seek permission to take them to the pastures of Cyrenaica.
Both situations create tremendous difficulties for both the
Bedouins and the government. A third alternative for the
[432] Bedouin is to buy barley on the black-market. In doing this,
[435] he must pay six times the normal cost of grain, and risk
reprisals.

177 Prior to 1960, change in al-Qasr might be characterized
657 as a steady and endogenous process of sedentarization. It had
been taking place for about a century and a half. Exogenous
change, social and economic, may be identified with the desire
of the government to reclaim land in al-Qasr for agricultural
use, and to integrate the Bedouin into the national economy.

2: Mohsen E,O-5 (1958-1966) 1971 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9
Awlad Ali

CHAPTER II

ECOLOGY AND HISTORY

619 101 Awlad Ali are a number of Arabic-speaking semi-nomadic tribes of sheep and goat herders who inhabit the northern part of the Western 162 Desert of Egypt. The total population of Awlad Ali, according to the 1965 preliminary census, was about 100,000 inhabitants. This estimate is, however, very tentative and fluctuates from one year to the next, depending on the circumstances of the pasture in the area. The 131 area they occupy consists of the narrow strip of fertile land which extends along the Mediterranean coast from near Alexandria in the east some 350 miles westward to the UAR-Libyan border town of Sallum, and varying in width from ten to thirty miles. 132 133 Vegetation in the area depends on rainfall, supplemented by a number of artesian wells. The rainy season extends from November to March, but the rain is extremely erratic in nature, varying from one year to another and from one place to the next. Draught has been experienced every three to four years, one of them being experienced at the time of the study. The water situ- 312 [181] ation is further aggravated by the low technological level of the people which prevents them from making the best use of the available rain water. There have been some attempts made to store as much of the rain water as possible, but these attempts are usually made by individuals and in too crude and primitive a way to prevent most of the water from being lost by seepage or by evaporation. The most commonly used method of water preservation in the area is digging cisterns in the ground. But most of these cisterns are too shallow to keep large amounts of water. Some deeper wells are found in the area and are called "beer sama"

236 Wool is also very important to the economy of Awlad Ali. Lamb's
286 wool is either sold or spun and woven into rugs. Goat's wool is spun and woven to provide the cover for the tents.

231 Sheep and goats are rarely slaughtered for meat except on special
[262] occasions. Most male and many female lambs and kids are sold in the
[432] market and the money is used to buy the necessary supply of food (like
[438] tea, sugar, salt, etc.), clothes, and other household items. Most of
438 these items are obtained from the shops in the settled communities in
439
443 the area, although some of the major items can be obtained only from large urban centers like Alexandria.

231 The other domesticated animals that Awlad Ali keep are the donkey
492 for transport and riding, a few camels for heavy transport and also for
[236] wool, very few horses for riding on special occasions (they are con-
[554] sidered as a status symbol for those who own them), and the dog to guard the camp and to protect the herds from wolves and other predators.
235 Poultry are usually kept for meat and eggs which are sometimes sold by
432 the women in the nearby markets.

233 The main occupation in the area is stock raising. Grazing lands
137 extend generally south of the cultivated land in the northern strip.
[132] The growth of pasture plants is affected by the amount of rainfall in a particular year. Low rainfall causes acute shortages of pasture and herbage, and leads to the death of animals by both starvation and thirst. Pasture plants comprise a wide variety of bushes, scrub, and many other species of grasses, most of which have a very short life span. These plants normally persist from December to May; then the land is turned into arid, hard desert with only a few dispersed patches of dry grass.

233
221 The grazing season extends between November and April. As the dry season advances, the flocks are moved northward to the cultivated lands so as to be nearer to fodder and to the waterholes which stand usually very close to the coastal zone. During the dry season, animals live mainly on barley straw and very little dry grass. In exceptionally bad years, the people are compelled to dispose of their animals or to sell some of them in order to be able to maintain the rest. In such years the shepherds find it necessary to cross the border to the permanent pasture of Cyrenaica in northeastern Libya, or to move to the Delta where they may purchase the right to graze in wheat fields after reaping the crop.

243 Grain crops, mainly barley, are also grown in the area. Depending on the rainfall, pockets of land characterized by deep alluvial soil and underground water at various depths are cultivated with barley and other grain crops. [246] Barley cultivation is preferred by the people because it grows quickly and matures faster than wheat; also, it can be cultivated in a range of soils and climates; it is mostly used as animal feed. Barley straw is also used as fodder for animals. [132] Because of the erratic nature of rainfall, barley production is hazardous in most of the region. [233] [433] For this reason, pastoralism remains the most important mode of subsistence, and cultivation becomes secondary. Cultivation is done on the basis of shifting cultivation, which means that the areas cultivated vary from one year to the next following the rainfall.

Land Tenure

423
311 Most of the cultivable lands, as well as the grazing lands, are under tribal occupation. Awlad Ali have, by custom and usage, had for

683 was to be paid unconditionally and consequently would cost all
682 members of the amar; but all these attempts failed. At this point,
672 there was no doubt on the part of the attending crowd about Muftah's
695 613 responsibility for the death of Selouma. The question was, how much
had he to pay. The amount requested by Selouma's son was that for "intentional" killing on the basis that Muftah had willfully thrown the rock knowing that it might harm Selouma, especially considering his age.

683 After long and intensive negotiations with the interested
682 parties, a Mi'ad was set in which it was announced that Muftah had
672 to pay the amount of L.E. 200. In his reasoning, he stipulated
627 that the wound which had caused the death of Selouma, although it
was intentional on the part of Muftah, was inflicted by a stone which in itself is not a lethal weapon, and therefore the death was an unintentional one for which the bloodmoney is customarily estimated at L.E. 300. He also stated that in the excitement that
[845] followed the death of Selouma, Muftah's pregnant wife had lost the
child. The bloodmoney for the still-born infant was estimated at L.E. 100, which was deducted from the amount of bloodmoney that Muftah had to pay.

CASE #3: The Case of the Trespasser

311 This case occurred during the year of the fieldwork which was
423 the second dry year the area experienced. Rain had not fallen ex-
613 ● [132] cept in a very few places. One of these places was near the small
town of Sidi Barrani in which the land belonging to Yadem and his Bait was found. Yadem had sown his barley which at that time had grown to about five feet high. Surrounding the cultivated land

[P.30]

102
132
133


Shahhat
Darna
Taukra
Al-Marj
Banghazi
Tubruq
500
600
400
300
200
150
100
50
Over 500 metres
200-500 metres
Under 200 metres
Isohyets showing mean annual aggregates in mms.

Rainfall and the Plateau Area.

102
13


Steppe
Semi-Desert
Desert
Mediterranean Maritime
Mediterranean Plateau
Scale
0 25 50 75 100 kms.

Climatic Zones.

the steep sides of which make east–west journeys slow and 133
arduous. To the west this broken country levels down, and in a
bay in the hills lies the extensive treeless, but very fertile, basin
of al-Marj, known to Europeans as the Barce Plain. It was [167]
colonized in classical times and again recently by the Italians.
The Arabs call this first terrace *lusaita* (*al-wasaita*), the middle
part, because it lies between the coastal plain and the plateau
tableland formed by *al-zahir*, the second terrace. This tableland [172]
is famous for its Graeco-Roman ruins and is dotted also
with the deserted farms of Italian colonists. It mounts to a
narrow third terrace, at about 875 metres above sea level, from
the top of which one can look down on these settlements.

The plateau slopes southwards through a juniper belt. There 133
forest ends and it continues to roll to the southern steppe in 137
stony undulations dissected by many wadis. In the plain at its
foot there is plenty of grass and low scrub, and vegetation is
thick in depressions, but the country becomes increasingly
desolate the farther to the south one journeys towards the lifeless
wastes of the Sahara. The eastern part of Cyrenaica is more [132]
arid than the west or centre. The Marmarica, the *batnan* of the
Arabs, is characterized by low hills rising from the coastal belt
and prolonged towards the south to create a succession of crests
of several kilometres in depth. The mean annual rainfall is low [132]
and wells are restricted to the coastal belt. However, there is, [312]
probably in most years, a certain amount of grazing to some
fifty miles from the coast during the rains. The Sirtica, the
extension of Cyrenaica to the west, is a vast rolling treeless
plain traversed by a series of wadis running north–south which
in their spread provide most of the summer grazing. Wells are [312]
found only near the coast but pasturage is plentiful till the [233]
Wadi al-Farigh is reached.

The rainfall very exactly determines the vegetation belts and 132
thereby limits human distribution and imposes a certain way
of life. The amount of precipitation depends on a number of
circumstances. Mean annual rainfall decreases from west to
east. Altitude also affects it. More significant, however, are
the variation with latitude, the seasonal rhythm, and annual
irregularities. The accompanying map shows how rainfall
decreases rapidly from the coast, how only the very limited
plateau area is subject to heavy precipitations (400–550 mms.),

[TEXT CONTINUED ON PAGE 33]

and the insufficiency of the fall elsewhere. It follows that only 132
on the plateau can there be forest, and only there is a settled [137]
and purely agricultural way of life possible; and it was there [241]
and on the coastal fringe that in ancient and modern times [167]
European colonists settled.

The rains in Cyrenaica fall only in winter, from October to 132
April. In the absence of irrigation the planting season is thus 241
clearly delimited. So is the grazing season to the south of the 233
plateau, for in summer the grasses wither and the wells dry up, [221]
compelling shepherds to drive their flocks northwards to the plateau, thus producing the kind of seasonal nomadism known as transhumance. The variation in total rainfall from year to year and the distribution of its fall over the winter months are of the utmost importance for agriculturalists in Cyrenaica. There is still some obscurity, but it is an observed fact that every few years in Cyrenaica there is a year in which the fall of rain is insufficient, or too badly distributed, to raise an adequate crop. In a mixed economy this fact must have given an overwhelming bias towards pastoralism.

The water supplies of the plateau, which depend entirely on 132
rainfall, are sufficient for the needs of the Bedouin and their 312
flocks. The clayey soils are, however, very exacting and running spring water is rare, being for the most part restricted to the triangle Darna–Slanta–al-Haniya. On the western part of the plateau water is conserved in cisterns and wells and on the maritime and *barqa* plains, in the Sirtica and Marmarica, and generally to the south of the plateau, in wells.

The distribution of vegetation in Cyrenaica follows variation 132
in degree of precipitation. Where there is much rain there is 137
forest. Where there is little rain there is steppe. Where there
is no rain there is desert. The forest is thick but mainly squat 137
and of very limited extension. An Italian estimate[1] of its distribution is shown on the accompanying map. It is predominantly Mediterranean in type, the juniper and the lentisk being the two commonest trees of the country. Forest ceases a few miles to the south of the high watershed of the plateau and gives way to steppe. The well-known route Tariq 'Aziza is generally regarded as the dividing line between the two kinds

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[1] Dott. Giovanni Manzoni, 'Memorie sui boschi della Cirenaica', *Notiziario Economico della Cirenaica*, 1929. [113]

173 cline in the total population of a tribe, then, the extinction of
178 lines does not affect any order of segmentation superior to the
613 tertiary. In this respect, the Cyrenaican genealogy differs funda-
621 mentally from those collected from the Nuer by Evans-Pritchard.
In the quotation from his work on Nuer genealogies (1951), he
[171] asserts that telescoping occurs 'from the founder of the minimal
lineage further up the line of ascent to the founder of the clan'.
This major difference has serious implications for any discussion
of lineage proliferation, but these must be left until the conditions
under which proliferation is likely to occur have been analysed.

178 While it is true that the processes discussed are of importance
613 in retaining the general shape of the genealogy, what is assumed
621 so far is that the Cyrenaican population has been stable over long
161 periods. Stability of population is not an unreasonable assump-
182 tion to make for a people who live on the margin of subsistence
in a country where extended periods of drought are not infre-
[173] quent, though seldom leading, it is true, to actual famine condi-
[731] tions, but producing periodic and local food and water shortages.
Disease, following quickly in the trail of shortage, it can be assumed, kept the relationship of total population to the natural
resources fairly constant. What evidence there is does not support
[726] even this very general assumption, since it is known that there
have been large-scale tribal wars in the past, and a certain
[167] amount of movement of tribes, some being displaced and others
pushed eastwards into Egypt. Unless these shifts were caused by
increases in the aggregate population and the consequent pressure on land and water, it is difficult to account for them. This
consideration of possible overall increases in population in the
past poses interesting problems related to lineage structure which
cannot be adequately treated here. For the moment it is proposed
to neglect possible increases in the total population during past
periods in the history of Cyrenaica. The historical depth of the
view now to be discussed is about seventy years, and for this
period I have no evidence of any large-scale increases in population. It is reasonable, therefore, to assume a general stability of
[132] population for this period. But the vagaries of the Cyrenaican
climate are such that, in a given year, one area might be well
drenched with rain, giving excellent pastures for animals and
good crops, while a nearby territorial strip might suffer a partial

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drought giving insufficient pastures and poor crops. Good or bad 613
crops, poor or abundant pasture, in turn mean a higher or lower 621
milk yield from the animals and better or worse living conditions 161
for human beings. Such factors as these may well, over a number 182
of years, lead to unevenness in the distribution of population [132]
throughout the tertiary sections. Whatever the cause, the gene-
alogies show that the population of the numerous tertiary sec- [173]
tions is unequal. Some are numerically so weak that they have to join a collateral section. Others are numerically so strong that their natural resources are insufficient to meet the needs of all their members. It was these latter segments which were in the
process of splitting, and which in some cases have already done
so. The next task, then, is to demonstrate where, on the geneal- [128]
ogy, proliferation is effected.

We have seen that in Nuer genealogies segments proliferate at 173
all orders of segmentation. Here, the process is a continuous one, 171
beginning at any point in time within the minimal lineage and 613
progressing upwards to the apex of lineage bifurcation. As par- 551
ticular names become significant within the minimal segment, they are retained and become a permanent addition to the genealogy. In order to include these successively additional names, names of ascending ancestors are shunted further and further into the genealogical past, until presumably the effect is felt at the topmost limit of the genealogy, when the names here are pushed out of the genealogical framework altogether, and forgotten for ever. More than this, the upward shift in names at each and every point in the genealogical line means also a consequent re-ordering of structural relationships, at all levels in the
system. One vital difference between Nuer and Bedouin societies 173
which may partly, at least, account for the different genealogical 178
processes at work among them is that the Nuer, when they were 613
studied by Evans-Pritchard, were expanding territorially, and [171]
that continuous proliferation of segments throughout the struc-
ture was the mode of dealing with a situation of expansion. The [648]
Bedouin, on the other hand, had suffered twenty years of terrible privation at the hands of the Italians, during which period thousands of them died in battle and in concentration camps, were shot up in their camps from the air, or died from want, before I went to live among them. Although I must confess that I now

121 given to the feud, for this is one of the few societies in which it occurs.[1] What is
613 meant here by a state of feud is a set of relationships between two tribal groups which
578 are characterized by hostility whenever two or more of their members meet. These
571 hostilities are of a sort which cannot be terminated; feud is not a matter of a group
121 indulging in hostilities here at one moment and there the next, but a sequence of
619 hostilities which, as far as the contemporary Bedouin are concerned at least, know
578 no beginning and are insoluble. Feud and the other forms of relationships to be
[571] discussed presently are to be understood, in part, by reference to the ordered divisions
of the tribes. It is necessary at the outset, therefore, to give a brief statement about
the tribal organization; other details will be included as they become relevant.

619 There are nine noble tribes in Cyrenaica whose members are referred to as freemen.
621 These tribes see themselves as divided into three genealogical orders of sections:
primary, secondary, and tertiary. The tertiary tribal sections correspond to the camps
613 which cluster around the larger watering points during the drought season, May to
● [132] November. Such camps consist of clusters of smaller camps in which the concentration of agnatically related males is over 80 per cent. Within the latter kinship links
are known, so that these agnates are consanguinely related as well as politically
[162] united. The populations of most tertiary groups vary from about 200 to 700 or so,
but a group ceases to be viable if the number of male adults drops much below fifty.
Political division is absent from these tertiary groups, regardless of their precise
size, for, whatever may be the condition of developing local lineages, the acceptance
of a common name carries with it full political responsibility incumbent equally on
[423] all their members. Each of these tertiary sections, moreover, has its own watering
point, ploughland, and pastures; each has its own *watan* or homeland. This statement
is true of all tribal sections of whatever order of segmentation. In other words, the
tribes and their sections correspond to an ordered division of the territory.

619 Names of tribal sections are the same as those given in the genealogies. Both tribe
613 and lineage are identically ordered. Lineages develop, and split at the tertiary order
of segmentation,[2] and, *a fortiori*, the process is the same for the tertiary tribal sections.
Split, in other words, occurs where relationships are most intense.

621 The summer community which constitutes a tertiary section, breaks up once the
221 rains begin in November or December. At this time of the year water is readily
available in the numerous small cisterns, there is pasture in plenty, and the animals
are giving milk. These combined reasons lead the larger summer camp to divide
into smaller camps of some five to ten tents. The latter are separated one from the
other by short distances—a mile or so—but together form a cluster in that they are
621 territorially distinguishable from a neighbouring and similar group of camps. Ter-
311 tiary sections are discrete also in the sense that all the major necessities of daily living
are available within their several territories. Each controls its own natural resources,
and these resources are the same for all the camel-herding groups—in any given year
one may have more of a particular commodity than another, but the difference is in

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[171] [1] Evans-Pritchard, 1940. The feud might have been present among the Nuer. Exogamy and the other rules of marriage which obtain among them create a dispersion of ties, which superficially appears to militate against a condition of feud. But a dispersal of ties does not mean that they necessarily act as a pressure for peace. Moreover, the exogamous links may link limited numbers of groups only, leaving others with sufficient discreteness to pursue feuding relationships as they are described in this paper.

[2] See Peters, 1959.

621 hundred of their sheep are grazing in the neighbourhood. This is beside the point.
613 What is important is that the offender's group is showing a desire to remain on
628 friendly terms, and members of the victim's group are doing likewise by accepting
682 reduced amounts. Compared with what the payments should be, after four years they
are trivial and soon cease altogether. Blood money, if it is to achieve the purpose of
621 restoring peaceful relationships, must work in this way among the Bedouin, for, as
613 they view the matter, a single payment of the full amount would only terminate
628 relationships. There would be no further obligations to hold them together. The
682 payment of a debt in full means only one thing—hostility. Where there is no debt,
571 there are no relationships. Debt must be allowed to run between groups, for it is this
182 which creates obligations and perpetuates social relationships.[1] As the debt of blood
money mounts, the social relationships between the groups improve. The cessation
of payments and the absence of further demands is final earnest that the relationships
are again normal.

613 The second step in this exposition, therefore, is to attach to homicide between
628 tertiary sections the penalty of vengeance or the payment of blood money, both
621 achieving the same end of bringing about a restoration of peaceful relationships.
682 Between secondary sections, relationships are again different. Ecologically, the
619 areas are distinct. The topography may be dissimilar—sand dunes in one area and
613 low valleys in another; secondly, the soils may differ—sandy soil here and firm valley
[133] bottom soil there; thirdly, while the climatic régime of the two areas may be broadly
similar, since there is marked variability in the aggregate annual rainfall which is
[132] coupled with a high variability from place to place, each secondary section has its
own micro-climate, sufficiently well defined for one area to be well watered in any
given year while a neighbouring area suffers partial drought. These differences affect
[221] productive activities. Seasonal movements are also affected: some secondary sections
move annually over considerable distances and in fixed directions, while members of
a collateral section may move only a few miles and these short moves may vary in direction from year to year. It is true that minor ecological differences exist between collateral tertiary sections, but these do not affect the economy and the way of life in the manner described for secondary sections. Partly because of their territorial extent, partly because of the larger aggregate population, the secondary sections are more self-contained, not only ecologically and economically but also in terms of social relationship. More of the requirements of everyday living can be met within the territory and span of a secondary section than within those of a tertiary section. Secondary sections develop a kind of specialization to the extent that in any year some of them will have more usable natural resources than others, but because these differences are ephemeral they do not lead to the development of permanent trade relations. Add to all this the fact that agnates are concentrated in camps on the territory which belongs to their lineage, and the discreteness of secondary sections is
[582] immediately apparent. Marriage rules make this discreteness potentially, at least, even
more sharply defined, for unlike other ' lineage societies ' where exogamy, coupled
with other marriage regulations, compels the dispersion of kin links among lineage

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[1] This point becomes clearer when considered in the general context of debt relationship among the Bedouin. Marriage payments, gift exchanges, hospitality, various forms of help, and so on are all aspects, with blood money, of an intricate and fascinating web of debt relationships.

villages and towns, especially at Mersa Matrouh which is the seat of the local 178
government. The second world war was also influential in changing attitude
and social values. Men who were employed as unskilled labourers during the 166
war by the different combating armies became accustomed to paid jobs and to cash remuneration, which had previously been practically unknown to them. When the war ended, it was not easy for those workers to go back to the old nomadic life with all its hardships and insecurity. Some of them preferred to migrate to the Delta, while the others decided to settle down to work in the desert villages and towns as servants or as unskilled labour in the local government departments, schools, hospitals, etc. Most of the younger men now prefer to follow their example; the settled sedentary life is thus gaining ground all the time at the expense of livestock husbandry.

But important as they may be in accelerating the drift from nomadism to 000
sedentary life, these factors fall beyond the scope of this paper and need not be discussed further in this context. We shall be concerned with the plans and schemes which are deliberately designed to deal with the settlement of the nomadic and semi-nomadic clans. But before going on to consider this problem we should like to give a brief outline of the area itself so as to establish a clear idea about the general setting, and to see the projects themselves against a background of the whole social life. This should help us to understand more clearly the motives underlying the projects and to discern the effects they may have on the social situation.

Geographers generally divide the Western Desert into three main divisions, 133
each of which has its outstanding characteristics. 105

1. The northern strip which extends some 500 kilometres along the coast from the west of Alexandria to the Egyptian-Libyan border. This strip, known as the *Dera'a Bahari*, consists mainly of fertile cultivated land which extends some 20 to 30 kilometres to the south, tending generally to become narrower to the west till it almost vanishes at Sollum near the frontiers.
2. To the south of this green coastal zone lies a high plateau in which are a number of depressions, the most important being the Qattara Depression.
3. The rest of the area; i.e. the extreme southern region, is real arid desert.

The coastal zone is the only really inhabited and cultivated part of the desert; beyond it there is hardly any prospect for cultivation. It is also a vital centre to which the scattered clans and groups of herders come to gather round the water points and the artesian wells during the dry season when the water becomes scarce in the southern parts.

The climate of the desert varies between the Mediterranean climate to the 132
north and along the coast, and the sub-tropical dry climate in the southern 105
parts. The dry season is usually very warm, tending to grow hotter southwards; while the wet season, usually extending from November to March, is generally mild especially in the north. Rainfall is very erratic and varies greatly from year to year and from one place to another. But on the whole, there is more rain in the north than in the south, and in most years rain falls in the southern parts only on very rare occasions. Rain may come quite suddenly and cause torrential floods which sweep away dwellings, crops and animals alike. This is typical of the Sallum area.

According to the 1947 census, the Bedouins of the Western Desert number 162
68,161. Only 23,444, i.e. less than the half of the population, are engaged in 105

Had the Senussi been successful in the last war, they 175
would no doubt have brought in the 'Ibeidat or the 'Awaqir 619
from Cyrenaica to replace the Awlad 'Ali in Egypt.

At the present day the Awlad 'Ali, especially the eastern 619
sections near the Nile Valley, have almost ceased to be nomadic, 178
and only the old men have memories of their former warlike habits. They suffered considerably during the Great War, but are again becoming prosperous. They now own large comfortable tents, are beginning to build houses and clear out cisterns, and are also said to be increasing in numbers.[1] So civilized have they grown that my guides, one a Sinai Arab and the other an 'Abadi, concurred in calling them "green"—not real desert-worthy Bedouins.

Perhaps as a result of Libyan influence, or more probably 142
the better nurture and climate, they are taller, heavier, stronger, and lighter-complexioned than the lightly built Arabs of
Sinai and Hijaz. Also they are much franker and more 157
straightforward than their shifty and suspicious eastern cousins, 181
and altogether more trustworthy. Their women only veil 562
themselves to strangers, and talk quite naturally and cheerfully 834
to the men of their own tribe. 609

They cultivate as much barley as they can, using a 243
primitive plough drawn by camels, in the clayey hollows [492]
scattered over their very stony limestone desert, but, as the [132]
rainfall is very uncertain, a good crop only occurs every five
or six years. After harvest, they exchange some of their [437]
barley for maize, which the women grind to make bread
as required, and some for dried dates. The seed for next [251]
year is buried in a hole lined with straw and covered with clay, and a year's forage for the animals is set aside. The [432]
rest of the crop goes to market, and for a short time the [426]
Arab has money to buy clothes for himself and his family and at utmost need to pay off some of the numerous debts he has inherited from his forefathers. Soon he is reduced again to the clothes he wears, the tent he sleeps in, and his animals grazing in the desert.

They are great breeders of camels and sheep, and a busy 436
traffic in these goes on weekly in the markets of Hammam, 178
'Amriya, and the Beheira. So they have got into the habit [438] [443] [233]

---

[1] At the 1927 census, the Western Desert Arabs, Awlad 'Ali, Jawabis, etc., numbered 38,928 souls exclusive of those settled in Beheira. But Pacho, 100 years ago, estimated them at 38,000 souls. [161]

CHAPTER II

THE ECOLOGY AND ECONOMY OF THE AL-QASR AREA

Changing Patterns of Land Use

131 Al-Qasr is located in the Northwestern Coastal Zone, a relatively fertile littoral region forming the northern edge of the Egyptian Western Desert. Extending from Alexandria to Sallum on the Libyan border, the Zone is some 500 kilometers in length and reaches south into the desert some 20 to 50
134 kilometers. A deep soil deposit and a relatively high average
132 rainfall of about 15 centimeters (20 centimeters of rain would
241 be considered "high") permit limited agriculture in this region.

•133 Due to the drainage pattern of the coastal area there is a fair supply of underground water. The rain percolates
[172] down through coastal sand dunes and is trapped in man-made underground galleries dating from Roman times. Farther into
312 the desert, cisterns, which also date from Roman times, catch the rains draining off the Libyan plateau to the south. This plateau and the catchment area form the southern boundary of the greater al-Qasr settlement area (see Figure 4). The General Desert Development Authority, an agency of the government, estimates that there are about 3,000 of these

*613 423 311 241 491 •133 102


SEA
N
OLIVES AND VEGETABLES
ROAD TO MARSA MATRUH
('AILIT SHRAIF)
('AILIT ADU. QAR ASA)
('AILIT DAVLATI)
('AILIT SULVATIYYA)
('AILIT ZALLAT)
('AILIT ZAGHARAT)
('AILIT MA'FAS)
('AILIT LAZUMI)
PLATEAU
BARLEY
ROAD TO AL-SALLUM
(KAMAILAT TRIBE)
WADI
PASTURE
DESERT

FIGURE 3a. LINEAGE TERRITORIES OF AL-QASR.

102
133
131



FIGURE 4

LAND FORM MAP OF AL-QASR SHOWING DRAINAGE PATTERN

SCALE = 1:250,000

MEDITERRANEAN
LIBYAN PLATEAU
DESERT
AL-QASR
MARSA MATRUH
'IZBA SECTOR
SHA'IR WI MAR'A SECTOR

1: Obermeyer E-5 (1964-1965) 1969 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9 'Aishaibat

102
312
361
423
311
133



FIGURE 5
SAMPLE OF LAND TEN
IN IZBA SECTOR

WHITE SAND DUNES
N
UNCULTIVABLE STONEY HILL
SCALE = 1:4,000 (APPROX.)
○ = WELLS
□ = PERMANENT DWELLINGS

CHAPTER II

ECOLOGY AND HISTORY

619 Awlad Ali are a number of Arabic-speaking semi-nomadic tribes of
101 sheep and goat herders who inhabit the northern part of the Western
162 Desert of Egypt. The total population of Awlad Ali, according to the
1965 preliminary census, was about 100,000 inhabitants. This estimate
is, however, very tentative and fluctuates from one year to the
next, depending on the circumstances of the pasture in the area. The
131 area they occupy consists of the narrow strip of fertile land which extends
along the Mediterranean coast from near Alexandria in the east
some 350 miles westward to the UAR-Libyan border town of Sallum, and
132 varying in width from ten to thirty miles. Vegetation in the area depends
133 on rainfall, supplemented by a number of artesian wells. The
rainy season extends from November to March, but the rain is extremely
erratic in nature, varying from one year to another and from one place
to the next. Draught has been experienced every three to four years,
one of them being experienced at the time of the study. The water situation
312 is further aggravated by the low technological level of the people
[181] which prevents them from making the best use of the available rain water.
There have been some attempts made to store as much of the rain water
as possible, but these attempts are usually made by individuals and in
too crude and primitive a way to prevent most of the water from being
lost by seepage or by evaporation. The most commonly used method of
water preservation in the area is digging cisterns in the ground. But
most of these cisterns are too shallow to keep large amounts of water.
Some deeper wells are found in the area and are called "beer sama"

2: Mohsen E.O-5 (1958-1966) 1971 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9
Awlad Ali

APPENDEX II


MEDITERRANEAN SEA
البحر الأبيض المتوسط
الاسكندرية
ALEXANDRIA
LIBYA
ليبيا
SENENAH
MAHAF
AGNA
KATAF
YERAH
GEMEISAT
AWLAD KHAROUF
'EITAYEL
AWLAD KHAROUF
أولاد خروف
GEMEIAT
جميعات
SANAGRA
سنافرة
HATAIFA
قطايفة
GEMEIAT
جميعات
SARALOUS
AGGARY
SHEHEIBAT
شهيبات
AGGAR
ASAREI
GWABIS
جوابيس
SEREIHAT
صريحات
AWLAD ALI
أولاد علي
DEPRESSION
QATTARA
القطارة
SIWA OASIS
قبائل البدو
وخريطة طرق الساحل الشمالي
BEDWIN TRIBES
ROAD MAP OF NORTH COAST
REFERENCE
علامات

102
131
619
491
361
133

[P.29]

CHAPTER II

THE BEDOUIN OF CYRENAICA

I

In the last chapter I recorded the development of the Sanusiya. 128 In this chapter I give a brief description of Cyrenaica and of the way of life of the Bedouin who live there and an equally brief account of the history of these Bedouin and of their tribal system.

The geographical isolation of Cyrenaica proper, the large 13 peninsula which juts into the Mediterranean from the Bay of al-Sallum to the eastern Sirtica, has greatly affected its history. It is cut off from the Nile Delta by 700 km. of semi-desert and from Tripolitania by 650 km. of the Sahara round the shores of the Sirtica, while to the south of it stretch endless desert wastes, for Cyrenaica proper is only just over 200,000 sq. km. with a Saharan hinterland of over 500,000 sq. km. On the other hand the coast of Cyrenaica lies only 300 km. from Crete and 400 km. from the Greek mainland, and it belongs by climate and vegetation to Europe.

The physiographic features of the country which influence 133 to any extent the life of its people can rapidly be summarized. 137 Northern Cyrenaica is a calcareous mountain rising to a tableland, *al-Jabal al-Akhdar*, the Green Mountain, so called from its evergreen forests. To the north its slopes rise steeply from the sea or its littoral, while to the south it billows gently towards the great Saharan desert. The two major divisions of the country are known as *al-jabal*, the mountain—or *al-ghaba*, the forest, since its northern part is covered with bush—and *al-barr*, the steppe. The mountain and the steppe alike fall into 133 a number of zones, the principal of which are shown in the accompanying sketch-map. There is a narrow strip of coastal plain which broadens towards Banghazi and then spreads southwestwards into the great *barqa* plain. Animal transport can [492] only mount the plateau from the coast by steep and infrequent paths which lead up deep ravines to the first terrace, the so-called *arqub* country, a succession of thickly wooded ridges broken into myriad bosses and cut deep by many wide wadis,

[TEXT CONTINUED ON PAGE 31]

3:Evans-Pritchard E-4, 5 (1942-1944) 1949 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9
(1837-1942) Sanusi

[P.30]

102
132
● 133


Shahhat
Darna
Taukra
Al-Marj
Banghazi
Tubruq
500
500
400
300
200
150
100
50
Over 500 metres
200-500 metres
Under 200 metres
Isohyets showing mean annual aggregates in mms.

Rainfall and the Plateau Area.

102
13


Steppe
Semi-Desert
Desert
Mediterranean Maritime
Mediterranean Plateau
Scale
0 25 50 75 100 kms.

Climatic Zones.

the steep sides of which make east–west journeys slow and 133
arduous. To the west this broken country levels down, and in a
bay in the hills lies the extensive treeless, but very fertile, basin
of al-Marj, known to Europeans as the Barce Plain. It was [167]
colonized in classical times and again recently by the Italians.
The Arabs call this first terrace *lusaita* (*al-wasaita*), the middle
part, because it lies between the coastal plain and the plateau
tableland formed by *al-zahir*, the second terrace. This table- [172]
land is famous for its Graeco-Roman ruins and is dotted also
with the deserted farms of Italian colonists. It mounts to a
narrow third terrace, at about 875 metres above sea level, from
the top of which one can look down on these settlements.

The plateau slopes southwards through a juniper belt. There 133
forest ends and it continues to roll to the southern steppe in 137
stony undulations dissected by many wadis. In the plain at its
foot there is plenty of grass and low scrub, and vegetation is
thick in depressions, but the country becomes increasingly
desolate the farther to the south one journeys towards the life-
less wastes of the Sahara. The eastern part of Cyrenaica is more [132]
arid than the west or centre. The Marmarica, the *batnan* of the
Arabs, is characterized by low hills rising from the coastal belt
and prolonged towards the south to create a succession of crests
of several kilometres in depth. The mean annual rainfall is low [132]
and wells are restricted to the coastal belt. However, there is, [312]
probably in most years, a certain amount of grazing to some
fifty miles from the coast during the rains. The Sirtica, the
extension of Cyrenaica to the west, is a vast rolling treeless
plain traversed by a series of wadis running north–south which
in their spread provide most of the summer grazing. Wells are [312]
found only near the coast but pasturage is plentiful till the [233]
Wadi al-Farigh is reached.

The rainfall very exactly determines the vegetation belts and 132
thereby limits human distribution and imposes a certain way
of life. The amount of precipitation depends on a number of
circumstances. Mean annual rainfall decreases from west to
east. Altitude also affects it. More significant, however, are
the variation with latitude, the seasonal rhythm, and annual
irregularities. The accompanying map shows how rainfall
decreases rapidly from the coast, how only the very limited
plateau area is subject to heavy precipitations (400–550 mms.),

[TEXT CONTINUED ON PAGE 33]

3: Evans-Pritchard E-4.5 (1942-1944) 1949 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9
(1837-1942) Sanusi

KEY

102 1. al-'Arq
● 133 2. al-'Arqub
131 3. Asqafa
361 4. Aujila
619 5. al-'Azziyyat
6. Banghazi
7. Bishara
8. Dariyana
9. Darna
10. al-Fayidiya
11. al-Hamama
12. al-Haniya
13. al-Huwaiz
14. Jaghbub
15. Janzur
16. al-Jarfan
17. al-Jikharra
18. Khashm Rzaiq
19. al-Libba
20. al-Makhili
21. Mara
22. Marada
23. al-Marassas
24. Maraziq
25. al-Marj
26. Martuba
27. Mirad Mas'ud
28. Msus
29. al-Naufiliya
30. al-Nayyan
31. Qafanta
32. Qarabarbi
33. al-Qasrain
34. al-Qasur
35. al-Qatafiya
36. Shahhat
37. al-Tailimun
38. Talmaitha
39. Tart
40. Taukra
41. Umm Hafain
42. Umm al-Razam
43. Umm Rukba
44. Umm al-Shakhanab
45. al-Zawiya al-Baida


18°
19°
20°
32°
31°
30°
29°
Banghazi
Suluq
Al-Zuwaitina
Ajdabiya
Al-Naufiliya
Al-Aqaila
A L D M A G H A R B A
WADI AL-FARIGH
A L - A W A Q I R
Marada

THE CHI

[facing p. 34, A]

102
133
131
361
619


21°
22°
23°
24°
25°
33°
32°
31°
30°
29°
Marsa Susa
Darna
Al Qubba
Al-Gubba
Khawalan
Slanta
Marawa
Tokara
Jardas al 'Abid
Abyar
Tobruk
Al-Adam
Bardia
'Akrama
Bir Hakaim
Al Burdi Sulaiman
Al-Sallum
Jaghbub
AL-HASA
DARSA
AL-BARASA
FAYID
HASA
AL-'ABID
'ABAIDAT
FAWAKHIR
WADI AL-MRA
AWAJILA
MAJABRA
Al-Jakharra
Aujila
Jalo
Contours in metres
Tribal boundaries
Towns
Place names
Zawiyas
Scale
0 10 20 50 80 110 kms

EF TRIBES OF CYRENAICA (after De Agostini)

[facing P. 34, B]

day, but even ethnically the Bedouin are more Arabian than 619
the people of Egypt, the Sudan, and Tripolitania, while 101
culturally they are as completely Arab as any people in the [144]
world, proud Tamim and Quraish not excepted. In essentials
their language is that of the Hilalian invasion of the eleventh 197
century and no foreign language competes with it. The Berber- [191]
speakers are a handful in the distant oasis of Aujila, and even
there they are bilingual, and the insignificant fractions of Jews
and Cretans in the towns speak Arabic, the Cretans being
Muslims as well. The Italian immigrants left the country of 619
their own accord during the late war. Thus the obstacles to [167]
complete Arabization in the Maghrib (Tripolitania, Tunisia,
Algeria, and Morocco), a Berber culture, large Jewish colonies,
and European colonization are to-day all absent in Cyrenaica.
In all essential matters also the Bedouin of Cyrenaica [184]
are like Bedouin tribesmen elsewhere in the Arab world: they
have the same tented, pastoral, way of life, the same social
organization, the same laws and customs and manners, and the
same values.

The people of Cyrenaica are linked to the classical Arab 177
world of the east, to Egypt and the Jazirat al-'Arab (Arabia,
Palestine, Iraq, and Syria) rather than to the Maghrib; to the
sacred towns of Islam and to Umayyad Damascus, 'Abbasid
Baghdad, and Fatimid Cairo. More particularly they are linked
to Egypt, with which their country has had political ties from
the earliest times, and which is their natural market. The [133]
desert comes down to the sea at the Gulf of Sirte and separates
Cyrenaica from Tripolitania and these two countries have
always gone each its own way. Cyrenaica was linked to Graeco-Egypt,
Tripolitania to Phoenician Carthage. Cyrenaica went
with Byzantium, Tripolitania with Rome. Indeed, as Despois
says: 'The Greater Syrtis is without dispute one of the most
decided frontiers, natural and human, to be found anywhere in
the world.'[1]

During the last few decades this separation has been brought [195]
into relief again by the rise of the Sanusiya Order, for whereas
almost to a man the Cyrenaicans follow the Order politically,
the Tripolitanians, except for the Bedouin tribes, have shown a
lively animosity towards it. Moreover tribal ties between the 619

---

[1] Op. cit., p. 45.

613 At the next level of segmentation (this now being the tertiary
619 order in any given tribe) the number of segments which appear
621 is conspicuously irregular. For the Magharba tribe, the four sec-
ondary segments, 'Ali, Mansur, Subh and Nasr are divided into
thirteen, six, four, and four segments respectively. Similar irregu-
larity appears in other tribes.[11] The pattern of the genealogy
is always one of regularity in the number of segments at all points
in it except for the point of tertiary segmentation where con-
spicuous irregularity becomes immediately evident. Since these
613 segments constitute the summer camps of the Bedouin, this is not
619 surprising, for these small groups will show greater susceptibility
621 to details of local water supplies, pasturing facilities, ploughland
133 areas, and topographical features than would the numerically
182 larger and structurally superior groups occupying larger areas of
territories of greater ecological importance. If we follow the line
131 from Sa'ada to Nasr again, the bifurcation at the first order of
segmentation is consistent with the division of the country into
the permanently green high altitudes of the plateau, and the ex-
tended low-lying plain area of the western half of the country.
[134] Between the territory of the Magharba tribe ('The White Plain')
and that of its neighbour tribe, the 'Awaqir ('The Red Plain'),
there is a major soil difference, which is such a conspicuous fea-
ture of the landscape, and so sharply defined, that one is almost
aware when one has crossed the tribal boundary. Within the
Magharba tribe, a prominent dry river valley cuts the territory
in two, the landscape to the west of it being characteristically
serrated, making travel in an east-west direction difficult, while
to the east the landscape is much more docile and undulating.
The four sections of the ash-Shamakh branch again represent
four quite distinct areas. The territory of one section is almost
conterminous with the narrow belt of sand dunes along the coast;
the territory of another is a block of rough and tumbled land in
the west; the territory of a third, in the centre, is made up of a
few low-lying shallow valleys; and the territory of the fourth,

---

[114] [11] It is necessary here to warn the reader that, brilliant an ethnographer as Agostini undoubtedly was, his grouping of tribal sections is not always correct. I had his book (Agostini 1922–23) with me in the field and checked his tribal survey. I found that at several important points his ordering of the segments was incorrect. I should add that the differences between Agostini and myself are not due to the kind of changes discussed in this article.

stretching across to the village of Ajadabiya in the east, topples 613
in undulations away into the flat expanses of the desert to the 619
south. At all these points of segmentation, the territories occupied 621
by the various sections are large and roughly defined, and 133
the population aggregates supported on these territories run from 182
over a thousand at one end to tens of thousands at the upper 131
limits. The tertiary sections are numerically much smaller, some of them numbering as few as a hundred souls in all, and the territories to which they are attached are correspondingly smaller. The relationship between the numbers in this order of section, and the precise amount of water available in the local wells is an intimate one. If the population of one of these groups increases, or if the number of animals rises, or if the springs show a decline in the volume of water they give forth, or if the winter rainfall has allowed the storage in wells of only a small quantity of water, a rearrangement of the group must be effected. A significant alteration of any one of these components must mean that the local group must split to enable a new adjustment to be made in the relationship of man and animals to water.

Whatever changes occur within groups of any size, since the 173
genealogy embraces the entire population, these must appear on 178
the genealogy in some way or other. Now a genealogy is as rigid 829
a framework, as fixed and final a pattern of grouping, as can be 613
imagined. The impression that they are thus rigid and fixed, except 551
for the addition of successive generations, is strengthened by the way in which the Bedouin use them. From their young boys to their old men, the Bedouin are expert genealogists, and the names of ancestors, for one reason or another, are never far
from their lips. Names are kept alive by constant use, since all [571]
references to inter-group relationships must be in terms of these
names. More than this, the Bedouin were proud to the point of 173
boastfulness of their genealogical knowledge, and, wherever I 829
travelled, the first request I had to comply with was to take down 613
a large portion of a tribal genealogy. In recording their endless 551
genealogies, one feature about them came to assume increasing 123
interest; while there was remarkable unanimity with regard to 126
most of the names given, there was one point of marked ambiguity—at the tertiary level of segmentation. I recorded genealogies in four tribes on an extensive scale, and in each tribe

621 hundred of their sheep are grazing in the neighbourhood. This is beside the point.
613 What is important is that the offender's group is showing a desire to remain on
628 friendly terms, and members of the victim's group are doing likewise by accepting
682 reduced amounts. Compared with what the payments should be, after four years they
are trivial and soon cease altogether. Blood money, if it is to achieve the purpose of
621 restoring peaceful relationships, must work in this way among the Bedouin, for, as
613 they view the matter, a single payment of the full amount would only terminate
628 relationships. There would be no further obligations to hold them together. The
682 payment of a debt in full means only one thing—hostility. Where there is no debt,
571 there are no relationships. Debt must be allowed to run between groups, for it is this
182 which creates obligations and perpetuates social relationships.[1] As the debt of blood
money mounts, the social relationships between the groups improve. The cessation of payments and the absence of further demands is final earnest that the relationships are again normal.

613 The second step in this exposition, therefore, is to attach to homicide between
628 tertiary sections the penalty of vengeance or the payment of blood money, both
621 achieving the same end of bringing about a restoration of peaceful relationships.

682 Between secondary sections, relationships are again different. Ecologically, the
619 areas are distinct. The topography may be dissimilar—sand dunes in one area and
613 low valleys in another; secondly, the soils may differ—sandy soil here and firm valley
[133] bottom soil there; thirdly, while the climatic régime of the two areas may be broadly
similar, since there is marked variability in the aggregate annual rainfall which is
[132] coupled with a high variability from place to place, each secondary section has its
own micro-climate, sufficiently well defined for one area to be well watered in any
given year while a neighbouring area suffers partial drought. These differences affect
[221] productive activities. Seasonal movements are also affected: some secondary sections
move annually over considerable distances and in fixed directions, while members of a collateral section may move only a few miles and these short moves may vary in direction from year to year. It is true that minor ecological differences exist between collateral tertiary sections, but these do not affect the economy and the way of life in the manner described for secondary sections. Partly because of their territorial extent, partly because of the larger aggregate population, the secondary sections are more self-contained, not only ecologically and economically but also in terms of social relationship. More of the requirements of everyday living can be met within the territory and span of a secondary section than within those of a tertiary section. Secondary sections develop a kind of specialization to the extent that in any year some of them will have more usable natural resources than others, but because these differences are ephemeral they do not lead to the development of permanent trade relations. Add to all this the fact that agnates are concentrated in camps on the territory which belongs to their lineage, and the discreteness of secondary sections is
[582] immediately apparent. Marriage rules make this discreteness potentially, at least, even
more sharply defined, for unlike other ' lineage societies ' where exogamy, coupled with other marriage regulations, compels the dispersion of kin links among lineage

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[1] This point becomes clearer when considered in the general context of debt relationship among the Bedouin. Marriage payments, gift exchanges, hospitality, various forms of help, and so on are all aspects, with blood money, of an intricate and fascinating web of debt relationships.

7:Abou-Zeid E-5 (no date) 1959 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9
Egypt

villages and towns, especially at Mersa Matrouh which is the seat of the local 178
government. The second world war was also influential in changing attitude 166
and social values. Men who were employed as unskilled labourers during the war by the different combating armies became accustomed to paid jobs and to cash remuneration, which had previously been practically unknown to them. When the war ended, it was not easy for those workers to go back to the old nomadic life with all its hardships and insecurity. Some of them preferred to migrate to the Delta, while the others decided to settle down to work in the desert villages and towns as servants or as unskilled labour in the local government departments, schools, hospitals, etc. Most of the younger men now prefer to follow their example; the settled sedentary life is thus gaining ground all the time at the expense of livestock husbandry.

But important as they may be in accelerating the drift from nomadism to 000
sedentary life, these factors fall beyond the scope of this paper and need not be discussed further in this context. We shall be concerned with the plans and schemes which are deliberately designed to deal with the settlement of the nomadic and semi-nomadic clans. But before going on to consider this problem we should like to give a brief outline of the area itself so as to establish a clear idea about the general setting, and to see the projects themselves against a background of the whole social life. This should help us to understand more clearly the motives underlying the projects and to discern the effects they may have on the social situation.

Geographers generally divide the Western Desert into three main divisions, 133
each of which has its outstanding characteristics. 105

1. The northern strip which extends some 500 kilometres along the coast from the west of Alexandria to the Egyptian-Libyan border. This strip, known as the *Dera'a Bahari*, consists mainly of fertile cultivated land which extends some 20 to 30 kilometres to the south, tending generally to become narrower to the west till it almost vanishes at Sollum near the frontiers.
2. To the south of this green coastal zone lies a high plateau in which are a number of depressions, the most important being the Qattara Depression.
3. The rest of the area; i.e. the extreme southern region, is real arid desert.

The coastal zone is the only really inhabited and cultivated part of the desert; beyond it there is hardly any prospect for cultivation. It is also a vital centre to which the scattered clans and groups of herders come to gather round the water points and the artesian wells during the dry season when the water becomes scarce in the southern parts.

The climate of the desert varies between the Mediterranean climate to the 132
north and along the coast, and the sub-tropical dry climate in the southern 105
parts. The dry season is usually very warm, tending to grow hotter southwards; while the wet season, usually extending from November to March, is generally mild especially in the north. Rainfall is very erratic and varies greatly from year to year and from one place to another. But on the whole, there is more rain in the north than in the south, and in most years rain falls in the southern parts only on very rare occasions. Rain may come quite suddenly and cause torrential floods which sweep away dwellings, crops and animals alike. This is typical of the Sallum area.

According to the 1947 census, the Bedouins of the Western Desert number 162
68,161. Only 23,444, i.e. less than the half of the population, are engaged in 105

CHAPTER II

THE ECOLOGY AND ECONOMY OF THE AL-QASR AREA

Changing Patterns of Land Use

131 Al-Qasr is located in the Northwestern Coastal Zone,
a relatively fertile littoral region forming the northern
edge of the Egyptian Western Desert. Extending from Alexandria
to Sallum on the Libyan border, the Zone is some 500 kilometers
in length and reaches south into the desert some 20 to 50
134 kilometers. A deep soil deposit and a relatively high average
132 rainfall of about 15 centimeters (20 centimeters of rain would
241 be considered "high") permit limited agriculture in this
region.

133 Due to the drainage pattern of the coastal area there
is a fair supply of underground water. The rain percolates
[172] down through coastal sand dunes and is trapped in man-made
underground galleries dating from Roman times. Farther into
312 the desert, cisterns, which also date from Roman times, catch
the rains draining off the Libyan plateau to the south. This
plateau and the catchment area form the southern boundary of
the greater al-Qasr settlement area (see Figure 4). The
General Desert Development Authority, an agency of the government, estimates that there are about 3,000 of these

137 of country. The whitish soils of the steppe support worts and
[134] other scrub bushes and some drought-resisting trees in the beds
of wadis and they are well covered with annual and perennial
grasses and other plants which yield excellent pasturage in the
[233] springtime. However, except in the Wadi al-Mra, where camels
can be kept the year round, there is little grazing beyond the
line Msus–Bir Tinjidhir–Bir Hakaim.

233 The Bedouin of the forest area are essentially a goat people,
137 though they also keep many sheep and cattle, and it is mostly
through the medium of the goat that the vast natural wealth
of the forests of Cyrenaica is transformed into human wealth.
The animal is hardy and frugal, and has the great merit of
preferring tree and shrub to grass and of being a catholic feeder.
Just as the forest would be useless to the Bedouin without the
goat so the much vaster stretches of steppe would be useless to
them without the sheep and camel which turn its grasses and
233 scrub into food. Thus Cyrenaica is fundamentally a pastoral
[181] country, primarily a country of sheep farming, and its people,
as they say themselves, have the hearts of shepherds and not of
peasants. While agriculture and pastoralism are both practised,
the bias of nature and tradition is towards animal husbandry,
by which the rich vegetation of the country is turned into milk,
butter, meat, wool, hides, and draught and transport.

II

13
221 In Cyrenaica stand always contrasted the mountain and the
plain, the forest and the steppe, the red soils and the white, the
233 region of goats and cows and the region of sheep and camels,
settled life and nomadism.

221 True nomadism is very rare. A few Fawakhir, Minifa, Huta,
233 and other tribal fragments herd only camels, or if they possess
other animals keep them with kinsmen near the plateau, and
can therefore wander pretty well where they please. They may
be found anywhere between the Nile, Fazzan, and the Sudan.
Their spirit is that of an Aulad 'Ali tribesman who said to me:
'We call no place our home. It is wherever there is grass and
water.' Semi-nomads are numerous. Those with land on the
[241] plateau cultivate there, then graze southwards, and return
again to the plateau in the dry season to water their flocks.

613 At the next level of segmentation (this now being the tertiary
619 order in any given tribe) the number of segments which appear
621 is conspicuously irregular. For the Magharba tribe, the four sec-
ondary segments, 'Ali, Mansur, Subh and Nasr are divided into
thirteen, six, four, and four segments respectively. Similar irregu-
larity appears in other tribes.[11] The pattern of the genealogy
is always one of regularity in the number of segments at all points
in it except for the point of tertiary segmentation where con-
spicuous irregularity becomes immediately evident. Since these
613 segments constitute the summer camps of the Bedouin, this is not
619 surprising, for these small groups will show greater susceptibility
621 to details of local water supplies, pasturing facilities, ploughland
133 areas, and topographical features than would the numerically
larger and structurally superior groups occupying larger areas of
182 territories of greater ecological importance. If we follow the line
131 from Sa'ada to Nasr again, the bifurcation at the first order of
segmentation is consistent with the division of the country into
the permanently green high altitudes of the plateau, and the ex-
tended low-lying plain area of the western half of the country.
[134] Between the territory of the Magharba tribe ('The White Plain')
and that of its neighbour tribe, the 'Awaqir ('The Red Plain'),
there is a major soil difference, which is such a conspicuous feature of the landscape, and so sharply defined, that one is almost aware when one has crossed the tribal boundary. Within the Magharba tribe, a prominent dry river valley cuts the territory in two, the landscape to the west of it being characteristically serrated, making travel in an east-west direction difficult, while to the east the landscape is much more docile and undulating. The four sections of the ash-Shamakh branch again represent four quite distinct areas. The territory of one section is almost conterminous with the narrow belt of sand dunes along the coast; the territory of another is a block of rough and tumbled land in the west; the territory of a third, in the centre, is made up of a few low-lying shallow valleys; and the territory of the fourth,

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[114] [11] It is necessary here to warn the reader that, brilliant an ethnographer as Agostini undoubtedly was, his grouping of tribal sections is not always correct. I had his book (Agostini 1922–23) with me in the field and checked his tribal survey. I found that at several important points his ordering of the segments was incorrect. I should add that the differences between Agostini and myself are not due to the kind of changes discussed in this article.

236 Wool is also very important to the economy of Awlad Ali. Lamb's
286 wool is either sold or spun and woven into rugs. Goat's wool is spun
and woven to provide the cover for the tents.

231 Sheep and goats are rarely slaughtered for meat except on special
[262] occasions. Most male and many female lambs and kids are sold in the
[432] market and the money is used to buy the necessary supply of food (like
[438] tea, sugar, salt, etc.), clothes, and other household items. Most of
438 these items are obtained from the shops in the settled communities in
439 443 the area, although some of the major items can be obtained only from
large urban centers like Alexandria.

231 The other domesticated animals that Awlad Ali keep are the donkey
492 for transport and riding, a few camels for heavy transport and also for
[234] wool, very few horses for riding on special occasions (they are con-
[554] sidered as a status symbol for those who own them), and the dog to
guard the camp and to protect the herds from wolves and other predators.
235 Poultry are usually kept for meat and eggs which are sometimes sold by
432 the women in the nearby markets.

233 The main occupation in the area is stock raising. Grazing lands
● 137 extend generally south of the cultivated land in the northern strip.
[132] The growth of pasture plants is affected by the amount of rainfall in
a particular year. Low rainfall causes acute shortages of pasture and
herbage, and leads to the death of animals by both starvation and thirst.
Pasture plants comprise a wide variety of bushes, scrub, and many other
species of grasses, most of which have a very short life span. These
plants normally persist from December to May; then the land is turned
into arid, hard desert with only a few dispersed patches of dry grass.

439 market with more than one-third of its lamb meat. The other two-
[315] thirds of the lamb market was supplied from the Sudan, the Delta, and
[315] from Libya. Oil industry in Libya attracted a large number of the young
[178] tribal members in Libya, who had originally undertaken the main task of
[464] sheep pastoralism. As a result, the population of shcep and goats in
Libya dropped sharply. Not only did the Libyan market become unable
to supply the Egyptian market, but it was also unable to support itself
and was forced to pay high prices for the Western Desert sheep and goats.
[457] The price became even more attractive after the devaluation of the
Egyptian pound which gave higher value to the Libyan currency, and
hence, the price of sheep. In the last decade, the number of smuggled
sheep reached a point where it created a great shortage of lamb meat in
Egypt. All government attempts to stop smuggling activities in either
direction have failed.

657 All these factors attracted the attention of the government to the
area and its people. The need to control the tribal population became
evident. But since it is difficult, if not impossible, to control a
population which is constantly on the move, the first step the govern-
ment took to control the tribal population was to settle them in perman-
ent villages. A number of projects are underway. The aims of these
[654] projects are to increase the cultivated land and to improve the pastures
[137] by introducing new and highly nutritive pasture plants in areas where
agriculture is not feasible. Attempts have also been made to promote
local crafts and industries. The intentional efforts of the government
[178] to settle the tribal population is supplemented by the gradual drift of
[464] many tribesmen, especially the younger generation, to seek part-time or

[P.29]

CHAPTER II

THE BEDOUIN OF CYRENAICA

I

In the last chapter I recorded the development of the Sanusiya. 128 In this chapter I give a brief description of Cyrenaica and of the way of life of the Bedouin who live there and an equally brief account of the history of these Bedouin and of their tribal system.

The geographical isolation of Cyrenaica proper, the large 13 peninsula which juts into the Mediterranean from the Bay of al-Sallum to the eastern Sirtica, has greatly affected its history. It is cut off from the Nile Delta by 700 km. of semi-desert and from Tripolitania by 650 km. of the Sahara round the shores of the Sirtica, while to the south of it stretch endless desert wastes, for Cyrenaica proper is only just over 200,000 sq. km. with a Saharan hinterland of over 500,000 sq. km. On the other hand the coast of Cyrenaica lies only 300 km. from Crete and 400 km. from the Greek mainland, and it belongs by climate and vegetation to Europe.

The physiographic features of the country which influence 133 to any extent the life of its people can rapidly be summarized. 137 Northern Cyrenaica is a calcareous mountain rising to a tableland, *al-Jabal al-Akhdar*, the Green Mountain, so called from its evergreen forests. To the north its slopes rise steeply from the sea or its littoral, while to the south it billows gently towards the great Saharan desert. The two major divisions of the country are known as *al-jabal*, the mountain—or *al-ghaba*, the forest, since its northern part is covered with bush—and *al-barr*, the steppe. The mountain and the steppe alike fall into 133 a number of zones, the principal of which are shown in the accompanying sketch-map. There is a narrow strip of coastal plain which broadens towards Banghazi and then spreads southwestwards into the great *barqa* plain. Animal transport can [492] only mount the plateau from the coast by steep and infrequent paths which lead up deep ravines to the first terrace, the so-called *arqub* country, a succession of thickly wooded ridges broken into myriad bosses and cut deep by many wide wadis,

[TEXT CONTINUED ON PAGE 31]

the steep sides of which make east–west journeys slow and 133 arduous. To the west this broken country levels down, and in a bay in the hills lies the extensive treeless, but very fertile, basin of al-Marj, known to Europeans as the Barce Plain. It was [167] colonized in classical times and again recently by the Italians. The Arabs call this first terrace *lusaita* (*al-wasaita*), the middle part, because it lies between the coastal plain and the plateau tableland formed by *al-zahir*, the second terrace. This tableland [172] is famous for its Graeco-Roman ruins and is dotted also with the deserted farms of Italian colonists. It mounts to a narrow third terrace, at about 875 metres above sea level, from the top of which one can look down on these settlements.

The plateau slopes southwards through a juniper belt. There 133 forest ends and it continues to roll to the southern steppe in 137 stony undulations dissected by many wadis. In the plain at its foot there is plenty of grass and low scrub, and vegetation is thick in depressions, but the country becomes increasingly desolate the farther to the south one journeys towards the lifeless wastes of the Sahara. The eastern part of Cyrenaica is more [132] arid than the west or centre. The Marmarica, the *batnan* of the Arabs, is characterized by low hills rising from the coastal belt and prolonged towards the south to create a succession of crests of several kilometres in depth. The mean annual rainfall is low [132] and wells are restricted to the coastal belt. However, there is, [312] probably in most years, a certain amount of grazing to some fifty miles from the coast during the rains. The Sirtica, the extension of Cyrenaica to the west, is a vast rolling treeless plain traversed by a series of wadis running north–south which in their spread provide most of the summer grazing. Wells are [312] found only near the coast but pasturage is plentiful till the [233] Wadi al-Farigh is reached.

The rainfall very exactly determines the vegetation belts and 132 thereby limits human distribution and imposes a certain way of life. The amount of precipitation depends on a number of circumstances. Mean annual rainfall decreases from west to east. Altitude also affects it. More significant, however, are the variation with latitude, the seasonal rhythm, and annual irregularities. The accompanying map shows how rainfall decreases rapidly from the coast, how only the very limited plateau area is subject to heavy precipitations (400–550 mms.),

[TEXT CONTINUED ON PAGE 33]

[P. 32]

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• 137


Al-Jashsha
Al-Batnan
Al-Barqe
Al-Hamra
Al-Sirwal
Al-Baida
WADI AL-MRA
WADI AL-FARIGH
Al-Barqa
Al-Daffa
Al-Qardaba
Scale
0
50
100
25
75
kms.
Forest

Distribution of Forest.

102
312
233


Shahhat
Darna
Al-Marj
GOATS AND CATTLE
Banghazi
SHEEP AND CAMELS
Zt. Msus
Bir Tinjidhir
Bir Hakaim
MOSTLY STONY
ARID COUNTRY
Ajadabiya
CAMELS
Approx. Line of springs
" Southern limit of well water in summer
" Southern limit of grazing in spring

Pastoral Zones.

and the insufficiency of the fall elsewhere. It follows that only 132
on the plateau can there be forest, and only there is a settled [137]
and purely agricultural way of life possible; and it was there [241]
and on the coastal fringe that in ancient and modern times [167]
European colonists settled.

The rains in Cyrenaica fall only in winter, from October to 132
April. In the absence of irrigation the planting season is thus 241
clearly delimited. So is the grazing season to the south of the 233
plateau, for in summer the grasses wither and the wells dry up, [221]
compelling shepherds to drive their flocks northwards to the plateau, thus producing the kind of seasonal nomadism known as transhumance. The variation in total rainfall from year to year and the distribution of its fall over the winter months are of the utmost importance for agriculturalists in Cyrenaica. There is still some obscurity, but it is an observed fact that every few years in Cyrenaica there is a year in which the fall of rain is insufficient, or too badly distributed, to raise an adequate crop. In a mixed economy this fact must have given an overwhelming bias towards pastoralism.

The water supplies of the plateau, which depend entirely on 132
rainfall, are sufficient for the needs of the Bedouin and their 312
flocks. The clayey soils are, however, very exacting and running spring water is rare, being for the most part restricted to the triangle Darna–Slanta–al-Haniya. On the western part of the plateau water is conserved in cisterns and wells and on the maritime and *barqa* plains, in the Sirtica and Marmarica, and generally to the south of the plateau, in wells.

The distribution of vegetation in Cyrenaica follows variation 132
in degree of precipitation. Where there is much rain there is 137
forest. Where there is little rain there is steppe. Where there
is no rain there is desert. The forest is thick but mainly squat 137
and of very limited extension. An Italian estimate[1] of its distribution is shown on the accompanying map. It is predominantly Mediterranean in type, the juniper and the lentisk being the two commonest trees of the country. Forest ceases a few miles to the south of the high watershed of the plateau and gives way to steppe. The well-known route Tariq 'Aziza is generally regarded as the dividing line between the two kinds

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[1] Dott. Giovanni Manzoni, 'Memorie sui boschi della Cirenaica', *Notiziario Economico della Cirenaica*, 1929. [113]

137 [134] of country. The whitish soils of the steppe support worts and other scrub bushes and some drought-resisting trees in the beds of wadis and they are well covered with annual and perennial grasses and other plants which yield excellent pasturage in the [233] springtime. However, except in the Wadi al-Mra, where camels can be kept the year round, there is little grazing beyond the line Msus–Bir Tinjidhir–Bir Hakaim.

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II

13 221 233 In Cyrenaica stand always contrasted the mountain and the plain, the forest and the steppe, the red soils and the white, the region of goats and cows and the region of sheep and camels, settled life and nomadism.

221 233 True nomadism is very rare. A few Fawakhir, Minifa, Huta, and other tribal fragments herd only camels, or if they possess other animals keep them with kinsmen near the plateau, and can therefore wander pretty well where they please. They may be found anywhere between the Nile, Fazzan, and the Sudan. Their spirit is that of an Aulad 'Ali tribesman who said to me: 'We call no place our home. It is wherever there is grass and water.' Semi-nomads are numerous. Those with land on the [241] plateau cultivate there, then graze southwards, and return again to the plateau in the dry season to water their flocks.

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THE SAYYID AHMAD AL-SHARIF (MACALUSO)

[facing P. 128]

*175 was left to it in these regions was the isolated oasis of Kufra.
*649 He had by his foolish attack on the British brought about the
*795 destruction of the lodges of the Order and of its political
influence in the Western Desert of Egypt. Tripolitania had also been lost to the Sanusiya, though it was by this time almost entirely free from Italian domination. Ramadan al-Shtaiwi of Misurata barred its way into Old Tripolitania. Fazzan was in a state of anarchy. All that remained to the Order was its original North African core—the tribes of Cyrenaica and its Cyrenaican lodges—for in spite of all their defeats and miseries the Bedouin of the country still remained loyal to the Order whose interests were their own. The Italians were very far from having conquered these Bedouin and the history of the Order from the time of Sayyid Ahmad's departure is identical with the history of their continued resistance to the Italians under its leadership, first by diplomacy, then again by arms. With its empire and its dependence on the Sultanate the Order lost also its religious character and became, through its exclusive identification with the interests of the people of Cyrenaica, an almost purely political movement.

*175 Although there were for many years rumours, greeted with
great enthusiasm by the Bedouin and with nervous appre-
*648 hension by the Italians, of Sayyid Ahmad's impending return
793 to Cyrenaica he never again set foot on the African continent.
159 Born in 1873, Sayyid Ahmad al-Sharif was still in the early
forties when he left for Turkey. He was described at this time
● [142] as a man of medium height, stout, for an Arab on the dark side,
with a firm and determined face adorned with a small moustache, close-cut whiskers on the upper jaw, and close-cut beard.[1] The Sayyid was obstinate, impulsive in his judgements and impetuous in his actions, and he seems to have been proud, quarrelsome, and fanatical. He was not prepared to compromise, and the British and Italians were in entire agreement that no understanding could be reached with him. But he was a pious Muslim and a brave and loyal man, tenacious of his beliefs, stubborn in his upholding of them against overwhelming odds, and dignified in their defeat. There was a certain wildness in his schemes and recklessness in his execution of them which compel admiration.

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[1] Admiralty War Staff, Intelligence Division, 26 May 1915.

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THE SAYYID MUHAMMAD IDRIS

[facing p. 144]

3:Evans-Pritchard E-4, 5 (1942-1944) 1949 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9
(1837-1942) Sanusi

142
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SIDI 'UMAR AL-MUKHTAR (GRAZIANI)

[facing p. 168]

PLATE XXVIII

●142
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

ARAB OF THE RASHAIDA (HITEIM)

/facing p. 270/

Had the Senussi been successful in the last war, they 175
would no doubt have brought in the 'Ibeidat or the 'Awaqir 619
from Cyrenaica to replace the Awlad 'Ali in Egypt.

At the present day the Awlad 'Ali, especially the eastern 619
sections near the Nile Valley, have almost ceased to be nomadic, 178
and only the old men have memories of their former warlike
habits. They suffered considerably during the Great War,
but are again becoming prosperous. They now own large
comfortable tents, are beginning to build houses and clear
out cisterns, and are also said to be increasing in numbers.[1]
So civilized have they grown that my guides, one a Sinai
Arab and the other an 'Abadi, concurred in calling them
"green"—not real desert-worthy Bedouins.

Perhaps as a result of Libyan influence, or more probably 142
the better nurture and climate, they are taller, heavier, stronger,
and lighter-complexioned than the lightly built Arabs of
Sinai and Hijaz. Also they are much franker and more 157
straightforward than their shifty and suspicious eastern cousins, 181
and altogether more trustworthy. Their women only veil 562
themselves to strangers, and talk quite naturally and cheerfully 834
to the men of their own tribe. 609

They cultivate as much barley as they can, using a 243
primitive plough drawn by camels, in the clayey hollows [492]
scattered over their very stony limestone desert, but, as the [132]
rainfall is very uncertain, a good crop only occurs every five
or six years. After harvest, they exchange some of their [437]
barley for maize, which the women grind to make bread
as required, and some for dried dates. The seed for next [251]
year is buried in a hole lined with straw and covered with
clay, and a year's forage for the animals is set aside. The [432]
rest of the crop goes to market, and for a short time the [426]
Arab has money to buy clothes for himself and his family
and at utmost need to pay off some of the numerous debts he
has inherited from his forefathers. Soon he is reduced again
to the clothes he wears, the tent he sleeps in, and his animals
grazing in the desert.

They are great breeders of camels and sheep, and a busy 436
traffic in these goes on weekly in the markets of Hammam, 178
'Amriya, and the Beheira. So they have got into the habit [438] [443] [233]

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[1] At the 1927 census, the Western Desert Arabs, Awlad 'Ali, Jawabis, etc., numbered
38,928 souls exclusive of those settled in Beheira. But Pacho, 100 years ago, estimated them
at 38,000 souls. [161]

9: Murray E.K-3,4 (ca. 1910-1935) 1935 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9
Egypt

PLATE XXIX

/facing p. 280/



'Ilwani

"Wanis"

JUMEI'AT TYPES

[*face p.* 280

619 [175] [162] later Wilkinson estimated them at about 400 men near El Terrana and the Wadi Natrun.

At the present day they are still reckoned *Murabitin*, but, like the Jumei'at, are sufficiently independent not to have to [437] pay tribute. They share with the Awlad 'Ali in the date traffic with Bahariya Oasis, where the produce of the village of Mandisha is reserved for them, and that from Bawitti for the Awlad 'Ali.

619 682 181 Kennett notes (p. 54) that they demand £400 for blood-money instead of £300, the usual price in the Western Desert, and alludes (p. 67) to :

> "The free and easy way in which the Gawabees tribe near the Wadi Natrun pack up their summer tents and leave them in situ while they themselves trek off with their winter tents into the open desert for the winter grazing is indicative of this code of honesty prevailing among them."

● 142 619 On page 101, he calls them "nearly all very small men, with strangely similar features and characteristics running through all the families of the tribe".

619 173 Bramly has collected three pedigrees of the tribe all going back to Sheikh 'Abd el-Jawad el-Kassar. They state that they are an offshoot from the Qadadfa, and about 500 years ago left Saqiet el-Hamra in Morocco to settle in Egypt.

As a reward for "settling some affairs in the Wadi Natrun", Muhammad 'Ali Pasha granted them the usual Bedouin privilege of exemption from military service. There are small colonies of them elsewhere among the Awlad Ali, while others are settled in the cultivated provinces of Giza, Beheira, Menufiya, and Gharbiya.

Jumei'at.—This tribe, possibly a remnant of the original Libyan inhabitants of Mariut, is of quite respectable antiquity, for Ibn Khaldun includes the Jumei'at as a subtribe of "Beni 'Ali", themselves an offshoot from Beni Suleim. Whether his "Beni 'Ali" are the same as the modern Awlad 'Ali may be questioned, yet it is a reasonable assumption, for the exchange of the words "Beni" and "Awlad" in tribal names can be paralleled elsewhere.

The Jumei'at all agree that their remote ancestor, whom they share with the Awlad Suleiman and the Qat'an, was called Ka'b, and a Ka'b indeed appears in the pedigree ascribed

619 [563] The name also includes various peasant groups and individuals who migrated from the Nile valley and who were incorporated into the tribal organization by a system of tribal adoption called "Iktitab." Most of these peasant groups came to the desert [701] to avoid military drafting by becoming part of Awlad Ali, who, until [554] 1947, were exempted from serving in the Egyptian army. Although groups and individuals thus adopted become part of the pedigrees of the adopting tribal segments and are supposed to enjoy equal status, yet, insofar as their origin is still remembered, they are looked down upon by the Sa'adi and occupy a position somewhere between that of Awlad Ali Sa'adi and that of the Murabiteen.

619 173 The Sa'adi tribes consider themselves to be the descendants of a certain Aqqar Ben Sa'ada or Aqqar El-Sherif, a descendant of Bani Suleim, who settled in Cyrenaica in the Fifth Century. Although they claim to [144] be of pure Arab ancestory, all sources agree that a considerable amount of mixture between Arab and indigenous Berber populations took place during the period they have been in North Africa.



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Fig. 1. The Sa'adi Tribes

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* The exact relationship of the Gemeiat tribe to the Sa'adi tribes is not exactly known. Many informants, as well as accounts of earlier travelers in the area, assert that descent from Hkadiga, a sister of Ali and Harb, and therefore are cousins of Awlad Ali. Others, especially members of Sa'adi tribes, themselves, deny any genealogical

565 Arabian ways. In Egypt necessity has slowly subjugated the
167 exiles to the peasant yoke. They long resisted but, like the
Bedouin nomads coming from the Sinai Peninsula, had in the
end to submit or perish. The absence of a substantial peasantry
in Cyrenaica is one of the characteristics which most distinguish
it from the Arab societies of Palestine, Syria, Iraq, Egypt, and
565 the Maghrib. The peasant can be dominated. He is fixed to the
earth and can be made to surrender it and till it for others. The
Cyrenaican Bedouin is fixed to no place and cannot be forced to
565 sell his birthright by bad seasons or intimidation. This has
632 meant that there have not been in Cyrenaica any social enclaves
attached to the towns through which the towns and administrative
centres could lord it over the Bedouin. Outside the towns
*[648] all is Bedouin and the Turkish Administration, and afterwards
[619] the Italian Administration, found that they could not get a
grip on the Bedouin of Cyrenaica as they could on the peasantry
of Tripolitania.

632 Nevertheless the towns and the Turkish, and later the Italian,
*648 Administration in them affected the tribal system by acting as
619 a pull on those tribal segments which lived nearest to them, so
that the tribes which lay between the towns and the steppe
were attracted towards one or other of these poles. The political
structure of Cyrenaica as a whole exercised in this way a significant
influence on the segmentary tribal system.

IV

619 The Bedouin who became followers of the Sanusiya Order
178 and whose country and way of life I have described are divided
into tribes and tribal sections owning different tracts of the
[793] country. This tribal system existed in Cyrenaica long before
the Grand Sanusi preached there and it continued to exist after
*[795] his grandson Sayyid Muhammad Idris had fled the country
and the Sanusiya Order had been abolished and its lodges
destroyed by the Italians. It is the fundamental structure of
Bedouin society which the Sulaimid tribes brought with them
from Arabia.

619 The Bedouin of Cyrenaica are Arabs. The Arabian tribes
101 who conquered the country and settled in it mixed with the
144 indigenous Berbers, as is evident in their physical features to-

day, but even ethnically the Bedouin are more Arabian than 619
the people of Egypt, the Sudan, and Tripolitania, while 101
culturally they are as completely Arab as any people in the [144]
world, proud Tamim and Quraish not excepted. In essentials 197
their language is that of the Hilalian invasion of the eleventh
century and no foreign language competes with it. The Berber- [191]
speakers are a handful in the distant oasis of Aujila, and even
there they are bilingual, and the insignificant fractions of Jews
and Cretans in the towns speak Arabic, the Cretans being
Muslims as well. The Italian immigrants left the country of 619
their own accord during the late war. Thus the obstacles to [167]
complete Arabization in the Maghrib (Tripolitania, Tunisia,
Algeria, and Morocco), a Berber culture, large Jewish colonies,
and European colonization are to-day all absent in Cyrenaica.
In all essential matters also the Bedouin of Cyrenaica [184]
are like Bedouin tribesmen elsewhere in the Arab world: they
have the same tented, pastoral, way of life, the same social
organization, the same laws and customs and manners, and the
same values.

The people of Cyrenaica are linked to the classical Arab 177
world of the east, to Egypt and the Jazirat al-'Arab (Arabia,
Palestine, Iraq, and Syria) rather than to the Maghrib; to the
sacred towns of Islam and to Umayyad Damascus, 'Abbasid
Baghdad, and Fatimid Cairo. More particularly they are linked
to Egypt, with which their country has had political ties from
the earliest times, and which is their natural market. The [133]
desert comes down to the sea at the Gulf of Sirte and separates
Cyrenaica from Tripolitania and these two countries have
always gone each its own way. Cyrenaica was linked to Graeco-Egypt,
Tripolitania to Phoenician Carthage. Cyrenaica went
with Byzantium, Tripolitania with Rome. Indeed, as Despois
says: 'The Greater Syrtis is without dispute one of the most
decided frontiers, natural and human, to be found anywhere in
the world.'[1]

During the last few decades this separation has been brought [195]
into relief again by the rise of the Sanusiya Order, for whereas
almost to a man the Cyrenaicans follow the Order politically,
the Tripolitanians, except for the Bedouin tribes, have shown a
lively animosity towards it. Moreover tribal ties between the 619

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[1] Op. cit., p. 45.

582 any summer camp will have descent lines cross linked by the
613 bonds of marriage with parallel cousins, and at the same time
[621] cleaved by the maternal links established by repetitive cross-cousin
marriage to different groups outside the segment. Thus,
in one of its aspects, marriage makes of an agnatic group a group
582 of cognates as well. 'Marry your paternal cousins and both your
613 paternal and maternal relatives will be one,' to quote Bedouin
602 sentiment on the matter. Within this agnatic group, nevertheless,
two other clusters of kin exist—those with maternal connexions
outside. In all, three areas of kinship can be defined,[13] although
all the members of the segment will have the lineage bond of
agnation in common. In normal circumstances, when split does
not threaten the group, the bond of agnation, strengthened by
parallel cousin marriage, takes precedence, although behaviour
is significantly affected by maternal links at any time. There is,
152 in the first instance, great jealousy between co-wives, which is
595 passed on to their children. Each wife has her separate tent, and
593 each is entitled to a strictly equal share of the husband's time
they have in common. This applies similarly to favours he may
grant his wives, and the distribution of his wealth among them.
If, for example, the husband is the owner of a horse, he is required
to tether it outside the tents of his wives in strict rotation;
if he retires for the night with one wife, the following night
he must favour the other; if he buys dress material for the one
he must buy a length of identical material for the other; if he
bestows favours on the children of one the children of the other
must be given equal consideration. Many such details are
meticulously observed; but while many are observed most of the
time, it is difficult to observe them all, the whole time. Any
breach of the rules is quickly taken up by the wives, and quarrels
ensue, leading not only to bitterness among the co-wives, but between
the offended wife and her husband, between the children
of both wives, and between the children and their father. Often,
595 when a man has co-wives, there is a marked discrepancy in age
593 between them, for, when an elderly Bedouin marries a second
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[13] The situation is not always as simple as this. Cross-cousin marriage may take more than two directions, and marriage within the segment might bring about great complexity, but the argument put forward above is not seriously affected by neglecting these details here.

554 seen" at any such function. It would appear that the mechanism
571 at work here is not simply a device to provide the younger
182 generation with a tension-release situation, but also a
561 symbolic expression of the difference between the possessors
● [154] and the non-possessors of authority, a confirmation of the political order.

[578] The avoidance practice, or separation, between the old and the young in the "party" situation is a structural fact of Bedouin society, and, though it may ultimately be defined as a conflict control or legitimating mechanism, in the context of culture change new aspects and meanings attach
554 to the phenomenon. The "status group" is an agent of change
571 in al-Qasr; its members can afford to gamble in the market
178 economy of Marsa Matruh since they possess the reserve capital
[471] (in the form of sheep) and the social prestige which permits
[439] this. The "status group," with business and social relations
[177] in Marsa Matruh, enjoys both the benefits of associational ties with the Egyptians and the communal ties with their fellow Bedouins. They see themselves as being different from their fellow tribesmen, and they tend to face more towards Marsa Matruh than al-Qasr. In short, they are the "cultural brokers" who support an ideology of change, they extol the benefits of a new way of life over and against the old.

[789] One repudiation of tradition which constitutes an
[796] attempt to define the style of life of the "status group"

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156 My approach here is to state the problem of authority and change using a case study of one man whom I consider the most prestigious member of the "status group" of al-Qasr. He is a member of the "status group" by virtue of his wealth and family connections; he has reinforced and enhanced his "status honor" by the practice of intervening into various conflict situations and mustering support, favors, and loyalty as he goes; and he has proved his "superiority" by excelling in the outside business world. All this he has done while remaining a "good Bedouin."

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156 The name of Hajj 'Ali appeared time and time again as my research progressed and increasingly concentrated on the authority structure.[2] I asked questions which required the informants to name a person in al-Qasr to whom he would go if he needed help, money or advice. I asked: "Who is the leader of the Bedouin?";"Who knows the wants and needs of the Bedouin most intimately?" [571] On the basis of the data collected in this manner, I was able to perceive a "status group" and gain an idea of the real leaders of al-Qasr. It also gave me a working knowledge of the local role structure. Hajj 'Ali's name came up with the highest frequency in the questionnaires, and my observations and interviews with him corroborated his central place in the authority structure. [126] I also recorded the life history of Hajj 'Ali's son, and gained valuable insights from this data.

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[2] The name, Hajj 'Ali, is of course a pseudonym.

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I know that Hajj 'Ali consciously and actively seeks to be a leader among the Bedouin, that he seeks a place in the new governmental structure in Marsa Matruh, and hence that he desires power, however benevolent his intentions may be. In what follows, I hope to bring this out by presenting Hajj 'Ali as himself and as a "cultural broker."

When I say that Hajj 'Ali desires power I mean nothing derogatory. Power-seeking is a kind of social phenomenon which characterizes man-in-society around the world: the quest occurs in primitive and modern groups, and university structures alike (Moore 1958:1-30). Hajj 'Ali's desire for power, and also authority, has not wrought change in the whole structure of the al-Qasr social system. As we shall see, Hajj 'Ali is discontent with the present structure of al-Qasr and feels that the Bedouins must accept change. His discontent is related to the changing conditions in and about al-Qasr; the chance to express it or re-channel it, at this time, derives from his ascribed place in the al-Qasr system. Whether his desire for power is a result or a cause of his discontent I cannot tell. Only a personality study in depth could answer this question.

In terms of this study, one way to look at Hajj 'Ali's case is to view it as his attempt to convert power in the internal system into authority in the external system. But in this context "external" refers to the national level rather

156 than the Awlad 'Ali societal level. In the traditional
554 system, his influence and power have been informal, and,
121 although this has been advantageous over against the formal role of 'aqila, his political activity was ultimately limited by this structural differentiation and definition of authority.
[177] In gaining access to the bureaucratic structure of Egyptian officialdom with its firm allocation of rights and duties, Hajj 'Ali could operate as an authority within the total authority structure which has reference to both the internal and external political relational systems of al-Qasr.

Practical Application

*613 In al-Qasr, the two most influential and powerful lineages, 'Ailit Lazumi and 'Ailit Ma'fas, each have a
[634] "most powerful bait." We have noted that in 'Ailit Lazumi it is Bait Bu Taram which controls the office of 'umda: in
*613 'Ailit Ma'fas it is Bait 'Umar which has Hajj 'Ali. Hajj 'Ali
159 is fifty three years old. He has married five times, divorced
581 one wife, and at present has four wives. Whatever his motives
156 for these marriages, at least some of them have obviously
[595] been made as economic and political moves. A check on his wives' tribal origins will show this. In each case, Hajj 'Ali's wife is from a lineage which holds land contiguous to his own property in the 'izba sector of al-Qasr. The one exception to this is a marriage contracted to establish ties

*613 with Bait Bu Taram of 'Ailit Lazumi. These marriages and
159 their resultant alliances enhance the political power and
581 social status of Hajj 'Ali within and without al-Qasr.
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Although he has no education himself, and neither reads
159 nor writes, Hajj 'Ali has sent his son to the University of
156 Alexandria. Hajj 'Ali's son is the only boy from al-Qasr
873 [212] ever to attend the university. Hajj 'Ali desired that his
son study law at the university or enter the military academy
"and become an officer." But his son objected to this, saying:
"Either way I will be employed by the government and will not
be permitted to travel and see other countries." Hajj 'Ali did
not argue with this: he said that his son should study what
he wished. The son is now studying in the Faculty of Commerce
156 at Alexandria. Hajj 'Ali is also sending his daughters to
159 the primary school in al-Qasr. Not all of the Bedouins believe
872 562 that girls should receive an education.

156 Hajj 'Ali places among the "status group" in terms
159 of wealth. Although he has now committed himself to olive-
554 farming as a way of life, he remains one of the biggest sheep
472 owners in al-Qasr. Therefore, he is identified with both tra-
ditional and modern symbols of status. Hajj 'Ali differs in
156 one important way from other members of the "status group"
159 554 in that he owns three small general stores, two in al-Qasr
443 and one far to the west in Sallum. This fact has several
423 472 significant implications. Shops in al-Qasr (there are five
*[613]

156 of them) cater largely to the needs of the lineage in whose
159 554 territory they are located. They are operated mostly on a
*443 credit basis. Lineage members, as debtors, feel gratitude
423 472 but also, and more importantly, loyalty toward their kinsman
*[613] and creditor. Hajj 'Ali is the only member of al-Qasr who
[452] owns two shops, and the only Bedouin in the whole Western Desert
who owns three shops. His brother owns a shop in Matruh.
156 Furthermore, the shop in Sallum is in a strategic position on
159 the Libyan border which, coincidentally or not, is a point
554 443 for importing, and also smuggling, foreign goods into Egypt.
439 The possession and utilization of foreign products is definitely
472 a status symbol all over Egypt. Hence, the person in this
area who can control, however slightly, the distribution of
such goods has a lever with which to exact prestige and
favors from the "status group" in al-Qasr who now welcome
these symbols (tobacco, pistols, rifles, radios) and the
bureaucrats of Marsa Matruh who crave them (food goods,
clothing materials, car parts).

156 Besides all this, Hajj 'Ali is involved in a small
159 stone-cutting operation which supplies stones for house
554 [316] building, he cooperates with his three brothers in a well-
[312] cleaning concern, and contracts government heavy equipment
[427] to build earth dams. The material evidence of his status
[342] is that he is the only man in al-Qasr with two compound-type
[595] houses (one he built thirteen years ago), and the only man
with four wives.

156 with four wives. It is not hard to understand why the people
159 of al-Qasr consider Hajj 'Ali a *rajal khair* *par excellence*.
554 627 For instance, when I asked one man if he could give me some
124 examples of court cases, he replied: "The one who is not an
'aqila pays no attention to anything save getting food for
his children. The *rajal khair* has money and men (a reference
to the "old days" when a person needed cohorts for battle),
and so he always pays instead of us. He lends us money and
helps us in doing anything, like Hajj 'Ali does." In another
124 interview, one man showed great respect for Hajj 'Ali's tradi-
156 159 tional status and modern ability to deal with the outside
554 world by giving him the honorific title of "*shaikh*," and
439 showing that the Bedouins of al-Qasr put their trust in him:
472 245 "When the olive merchants come from Alexandria, they go to
Shaikh 'Ali, someone who knows about olives. They ask him
what kind of olives al-Qasr has. He shows the merchants, and
they say: 'I will give you so much for them.' They make an
agreement, and Hajj 'Ali collects the olives and gets the
price for them."

156 In terms of local politics, I would guess, but do
159 554 not have data to prove, that Hajj 'Ali was the third party
[627] most frequently referred to in seeking a termination of
[114] conflict. He was commonly asked to participate in these
matters not only by the disputants themselves but also by
the *'aqila* or other third party presiding. He was sometimes

156 159 554 675 He was sometimes asked to sit-in as a witness for important contractual matters. Note that in the rawaabit al-'awaaqil of Bait Shafaila of 'Ailit Lazumi (presented in Chapter Four), Hajj 'Ali who is neither from 'Ailit Lazumi nor an 'aqila was present to sign and validate this document.

156 159 554 Hajj 'Ali, then, operates in the micropolitical system and the traditional authority structure of al-Qasr. But what is just as important, he has secured a firm foothold in the modern bureaucratic structure of the near-by town. He straddles both camps. 635 634 156 159 554 124 [648] The Governor of Marsa Matruh was an important aid to my understanding of Hajj 'Ali's role as "broker." The Governor claimed that the British first introduced the roles of 'umda and shaikh; they did this to "control the Bedouin" and to "get the men out of the tents." He explained in his own way what he considered to be the structural differentiation of political roles in al-Qasr.

> *[613] Let me tell you, these fellows are very clever. They have an 'umda . . . he comes to my office and says: "I want this and this." I say, "No." Then he goes back to the 'awaqil and tells them that, and then these fellows begin to think in what way they can get what they want. But the 'umda is nothing; it is the 'aqila whom the Bedouins listen to and love . . . The 'umda is elected (at this time) by the Bedouins. They put forward a man who hesitates, one who can say yes or no . . . But there is a real leader for the people, this is a man such as Hajj 'Ali, here is a man the Bedouins love.

124 635 156 159 554 *[613] The Governor said that Hajj 'Ali speaks well and thinks well. Twice in the interview the Governor said that

124 635 Hajj 'Ali "became an *'aqila* by his way of life." Of course,
•156 159 the fact is that Hajj 'Ali is not an *'aqila* at all. Although
554 I feel that the Governor should understand the Bedouin authority
*[613] structure, he is not alone in his misconceptions. The chief
156 agricultural engineer for the G.D.D.O., who works very closely
159 with the Bedouins of al-Qasr, also thought that Hajj 'Ali
554 was the *'aqila* of Bait 'Umar in 'Ailit Ma'fas. Furthermore,
*613 and most impressive of all, one *'aqila* in 'Ailit Dawlat and
his four sons all thought that Hajj 'Ali was the *'aqila* of
Bait 'Umar. There is more here than just ignorance of
Bedouin society on the part of officials, and disinterest
on the part of the Dawlat *'aqila*. There is good reason for
these different parties to mistake Hajj 'Ali as a key
traditional "authority," or spokesman for his corporate group.
It seems clear that in their respective dealings they must
have encountered Hajj 'Ali in some kind of representative
capacity. The *'aqila* who insisted that Hajj 'Ali was an
'aqila, even after I pointed out that he was not, lived
outside the *'izba* sector and hence mistook an important
rajal khair for an *'aqila*. The Governor understandably
mistook the most influential man in al-Qasr as an *'aqila*.

635 There are other traits which qualify Hajj 'Ali as
648 [554] the singular leader of the Bedouins. A few years back, the
[156] Governor of Marsa Matruh formed a Governor's Council
[159] (*Majlis al-Muhafza*) made up of representatives of the Bedouin

635 population of the whole Western Desert, and representatives
[648] of the Egyptian government employees working in the province.
[634] The Bedouin representatives appointed to this council need
not be an *'umda* or a *shaikh*, although they may be. The
oldest Bedouin member of the council, who happens to be an
'umda, told me that "the Governor picks the men who he feels
understand the problems of the people."

635 The Governor himself thinks that every Bedouin on
124 his council is an *'aqila*. He replied to my question about
*613 the criteria for membership on the *Majlis al-Muhafza*: "I
am using a new selection system. Rather than choose the
'umda or *shaikh*, I choose the *'aqila*. Every man on the
council is an *'aqila*, and the number is determined by the
population of the area . . . But I appoint more men from the
[619] 'Ali Ahmar (see Figures 3 and 7)[1] than from other tribes.
This is because they are more numerous, and they are near
Matruh where I am able to contact them immediately. The
'Ali Ahmar are represented by six men and the other tribes
by just three men."

•156 Hajj 'Ali is one of these six men and the only member
159 of the Council who resides in al-Qasr. I attended and ob-
554 served the December meeting of the Council. The Governor
635 sat at the head of a long table with the Egyptian representa-
648 tives on either side of him. At the other end of the table
[114] sat the Bedouin representatives, Hajj 'Ali among them. Purely

[1] [See pp. 65 & 77 respectively--Analyst]

156 administrative business took up most of the time at the
159 meeting, and only the Governor and the Egyptians took part
554 in the discussion. At the conclusion of the meeting, the
635 Governor asked if any present had comments to make. Hajj
648 'Ali rose, and delivered a formal and well-prepared speech
[871] on the inadequacies of the educational facilities in Matruh.
[537] He noted that the Governor had promised the Bedouins that if they sent their sons in from the desert for secondary schooling, their material needs would be taken care of, but that in fact the Governor had not kept his promise for there was not enough space and beds for the boys. The Governor apologized for this condition and said he was trying to correct it. I noted that a few Egyptians found something amusing about this incident, but that all of the Bedouins present were serious and nodded in agreement with the points made by Hajj 'Ali.

156 We should note that Hajj 'Ali was the only Bedouin to
159 speak up at the meeting, that he spoke in the formal, tradi-
554 tional manner, and that he showed concern for the real problems
635 of the Bedouins. Hajj 'Ali is careful to protect his identity as a Bedouin, and in this he differs from the 'umda and most of the "status group."

121 In situations of induced change, the cultural problems
156 involved differ in their conception and immediacy as defined
159 by the agents and the recipients of change. Hajj 'Ali, who
554 is both an agent and a recipient of change, is intimate with
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121 156 159 554 635 177 the problems of the Bedouins of al-Qasr. He knows how to phrase them, and his place on the Majlis al-Muhafza gives him the right and the opportunity to air them. This is the role of the "cultural broker." Before the meeting of the council, Hajj 'Ali had gathered a group of the men from al-Qasr and they had talked about which demands should be presented to the Governor. This is purely a political process which Hajj 'Ali manipulates. The formulation and presentation [48] of demands became, in the hands of Hajj 'Ali, "inputs" into the Egyptian political system with the hope that they will materialize as "outputs" and the satisfaction of needs - to use the terminology of David Easton's "systems analysis" (1965b).

156 159 554 635 177 On another occasion, Hajj 'Ali demonstrated his status and political leadership and the fact that he has assumed the position of spokesman for the Bedouin of al-Qasr during this period of change. Once each year the Governor makes a tour of al-Qasr to inspect the school, the cooperative building, the government experimental farm, and the area in general. After the inspection tour, he holds a reception in a ceremonial tent set up for the occasion. At this time, he states his evaluations and opinions, distributes some clothing material to the poorer families of the area, and asks for suggestions from the Bedouins who sit on the ground before the tent. The only suggestion forthcoming from the Bedouins was

156 159 554 635 177 by the secretary of the cooperative society who requested that the government furnish bus service between Matruh and al-Qasr. The Governor thought this a good idea and said he would inquire into the matter.

156 159 554 635 177 537 As the Governor suggested that the meeting be adjourned, Hajj 'Ali stood up, faced the Governor and began another of his formal speeches in the rich tradition of Arabic; it was the best Arabic I had heard spoken in the desert. This speech was for the benefit of all present, Bedouins and officials alike. Hajj 'Ali made no requests but simply thanked the Governor for honoring al-Qasr with his presence. In this short well-prepared tribute, he said:

> We feel the efforts of the government and we can scarcely imagine or dream of this development. For instance, we were living in tents and now only five per cent remain in tents while the remainder are in houses. We were dressed simply, but now we are dressed in poplin material. Those who could afford one set of clothes now can afford two. Thanks be to God, all this is due to Jamal Abd al-Nasser.

156 159 554 635 537 It is significant, of course, that smiles once again played on the faces of the Governor's entourage and nothing but admiration on the faces of the Bedouins. As Hajj 'Ali spoke he did not face the Governor directly but turned aside, speaking both to him and the Bedouins--Hajj 'Ali, the Bedouin, had been sitting on the ground before the Governor. The [634] _'umda_ and _shaikh_ had accompanied the Governor on his tour

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159 and they sat on chairs inside the tent. I returned to
554 Marsa Matruh in the _'umda's_ car (1964 Ford, highly polished)
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537 with the _'umda_ and the _shaikh_. They openly joked about Hajj
[634] 'Ali and his manner of presentation; they repeated some of
□122 his "stilted" phrases and laughed. Hajj 'Ali gave last year's
[522] reception speech also. This is because, his son says, Hajj
'Ali is considered a fine speaker by the Bedouins of al-Qasr.

121 We can see how these details carry larger implications
177 within the context of political and social structures under-
178 going change. It is the stuff which the anthropologist finds
important for an understanding of the process of change.

156 If I have established thus far that Hajj 'Ali is
159 politically active and representative in both the traditional
554 and the modern systems, then the attempt is now to prove that
177 he consciously seeks to change the traditional in the direction
178 of the modern for political and moral reasons, and for social
and personal reasons.]

156 Hajj 'Ali, when he spoke with me, inevitably came
159 around to the subject of international politics, whether this
554 was the question of Israel or the image which America's racial
177 problems presented. Hajj 'Ali was the only man from the whole
178 Marsa Matruh area who was neither _shaikh_ nor _'umda_ to attend
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829 the nomination of Jamal Abd al-Nasser in January of 1965. In
[57[] all of this, I detect a move on the part of Hajj 'Ali to
identify himself with an Egyptian reference group and to

•156 to serve other than what they eat." Hajj 'Ali is not only
159 554 conscious of social stratification in his society, but he also
571 has a great deal of empathy with the less endowed, a pre-
574 requisite of a traditional Bedouin leader and an advantageous
796 one for a modern leader.
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He is aware of most traditional institutions and how
156 they relate to conditions of modernity. Hajj 'Ali, whose own
159 554 marriages speak for his political acumen, sees only disadvantages
829 in the cousin-right marriage custom of the Bedouins. His
582 interest in getting on with the business of change, so to
speak, has led him to question a basic right contained in the
Bedouin principle of lineage structure and corporate membership.

> A thing which I do not like about our customs is the idea that a man has a right to his uncle's daughter. The man binds his cousin and in the end he might not marry her and will be the cause of her never marrying. He gives himself the authority to decide whom she may or may not marry. If he knows she desires to marry a certain man, he says: "She can marry anyone but not that one."

[562] Here he challenges the traditional right of the individual
male in Bedouin society, favoring the rights of the female.
[177] The emancipation of the female, especially in rights and
[178] duties concerned with the marriage contract, is an element
[562] of the modernization process in Egyptian society and the
Middle East in general.

*613 The bait, as a political group, is in part structurally
602 defined by the corporate principle which states that blood-kin
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*613 602 571 682 at this lineage level must bear collective responsibility in matters of compensation and blood-revenge. This principle, as we have seen, is extended until the whole _'aiela_ is included in a symbolic expression of corporate group solidarity. In order for this expression to persist, of course, the mechanism, or ideology, of blood-revenge must be maintained. [124] All of my informants, though they disagreed over the details of revenge, insisted that it was the inviolable right of the Arabs. •156 159 554 829 682 But Hajj 'Ali took exception to the practice of blood-revenge for a number of reasons. He said:

> The world changes. Before it was only the _'awaiyid Awlad 'Ali_ and the Border Guards which kept order. The government now enters into the matter of killings. Personally, I do not agree with the custom and the way it operates. In the case of killing, for instance, someone who is not worth anything, and has no brains, kills one from another tribe. [978] Then the tribe of the killer asks for the _nazaala_, and a third party becomes involved. The third party agrees to guard the killer's _bait_ for twelve months and the business of all those involved must stop. A member of the third party's family must accompany each member of the killer's tribe. But even after the twelve months one must live in fear at his own home, for after the twelve months the tribe of the deceased will try to kill the best man in the killer's tribe. How many good ones do we have in one tribe? I have heard that in Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia the deceased man's family has the right to kill the killer only . . . (I then commented that perhaps blood-revenge functions to discourage killing in the desert.) But there are unbalanced people who actually commit murder just to tease their tribe: they have nothing to fear because no one is interested in killing them in retaliation.

In challenging the Arabs' traditional right to blood-revenge, Hajj 'Ali--besides questioning a structural basis of

• 156 the group--in effect questions a great deal about the whole
159 traditional authority structure. Blood-revenge functions as
554 829 a deterrent to social disorder in that it represents an
682 automatic mechanism for restoring a balance of good relations
[182] in the society. Actually, Hajj 'Ali exaggerated to make a
point when he spoke of the existence of "unbalanced people."
682 A person would indeed be "unbalanced" who did not take into
672 consideration the repercussions of his acts with respect to
*613 the personal danger and the dishonor and shame it would bring
to his _'aiela_ and _bait_. Although the _'aiela_ members are
willing to share in the blood money for accidental or unpremeditated
killings, it is wrong to suppose that the Bedouins
do not attempt to weigh the justifiability and culpability
[671] in matters of killing. The very existence of the _'awaiyid
Awlad 'Ali_ argues against this. Obviously, the dichotomy made
between killing in the _'awaiyid_, i.e., intentional and accidental,
and the concomitant gradation in compensation points to some
kind of reasonable consideration in cases of killing.

156 Hajj 'Ali is discontent with yet another aspect of
159 the traditional authority structure. He questions the logic
554 and authority represented in the oath as a sacred sanction.
695 This says something about the degree of secularization which
829 Hajj 'Ali has undergone. Although he does not say so, he
apparently favors a more secular and logical procedure for
determining a man's guilt or innocence.

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> Another thing which I do not like about our old ways is the idea of swearing the oath. For instance, if I steal 1,000 L.E. from you, then you will accuse me. The 'aqila will then come to me and say: "If you did not steal the money, swear the oath." Some of my family will support me in this, swearing that I did not steal the money. The swearing of the oath will take place at a tomb, in the presence of the Quran. This tomb belongs to a dead man, and they tell you that he is a saint. First of all, the thief will swear the oath and then they will believe him; and, secondly, what is the sense of swearing in front of a dead body?

[784] Hajj 'Ali made no mention of God or of the Bedouin belief that misfortune will be visited upon the one who swears the oath in bad faith. There is an Arabic proverb which Hajj 'Ali repeated here which says in effect that "the thief will always swear."

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Hajj 'Ali actively challenges the traditional basis of the Bedouin moral and political community. Striving to do away with prescribed cousin-right in marriage and the mechanisms of blood-revenge and the oath as means of supporting law and order in al-Qasr is a course which we might expect from an Egyptian official who seeks to integrate the Bedouins into national society. And, in fact, these are all customs which the Governor believes must eventually be eradicated. It is not surprising that Hajj 'Ali's son believes that "it is not civilized" to lay claim to his cousin for, like his father, he also is redefining morality vis a vis "civilization."

It appears obvious in all that he says, including his comments at the Governor's reception, that Hajj 'Ali has

156 undertaken to transform his rajal khair role into an authority
159 which transcends the bounds of the local community. During
554 my talks with him, he never once insinuated that the people
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178 of al-Qasr, nor even the 'Aishaibat or 'Ali Ahmar (terms
he rarely ever used), owe anything to a larger entity or
community known as "the Bedouin" or "the Awlad 'Ali."
If Hajj 'Ali is to legitimate his own authority in a new
political system, he must, at the same time, show the Bedouins
829 the legitimacy of the new political community. The Bedouins
178 must feel a moral commitment toward the new national political
177 community or else it has no meaning or authority. Most of the
Bedouins of al-Qasr still take it for granted that the allocation
of political values and distribution of power in terms of
traditional and modern legal roles will be carried over into
the modern community and its politics. Hence, if anyone should
[634] go on to Cairo to represent the Bedouin of the Western Desert,
[648] naturally it should be the 'umda or the shaikh "who knew how
to deal with the Egyptians." The majority of the people of
the al-Qasr area see change coming but do not conceptualize
it as any threat to the traditional authority structure.

156 Hajj 'Ali anticipates the change as fundamental
159 enough to require a new sense of identity. I think this is
554 evident in the following statement in which he takes issue
829 with the traditional way of doing things and appears to be
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177 preparing himself for a role in the readjustment process.

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> There is another objection which I have concerning our customs. I mean the case of elections. For instance, one from the 'Aishaibat and one from the Sanagra, of the 'Ali Abyad, are nominated. Then, each man must vote for the one from his own tribe. He must vote for the 'Aishaibi even if the other is the better man. But, we should consider that the best man is the man with the best qualifications. 'Umda Ibrahim, for instance, knows how to greet an official or a minister, but he does not know the 'awaiyid nor the problems of the Bedouins. His brother (who will probably be the next 'umda) is a good man and is educated, but he does not know the 'awaiyid either.

829 666 This view contrasts sharply with the traditional stand of most Bedouins in al-Qasr, including the members of the "status group." For instance, one 'aqila voiced what is a prevalent opinion when he said:

[619] [186]

> If a man chooses to become a political candidate against a Bedouin, he must understand that the members of the tribe should and would vote for their 'umda because he is a member of their own tribe. Even if a man is crazy and his opponent has the highest college degree, the Bedouins must vote for the man from their own tribe.

156 159 554 178 177 829 [671] Hajj 'Ali is modern in his evaluation of the political situation here: a politician should know the problems of his constituents rather than follow principles based on traditional relationships. His motive is not to promote the 'awaiyid as a good way of life, for we know he does not think this to be the case. Instead, Hajj 'Ali believes that in order to help the Bedouins through a period of change one must know what they are changing from. Through his negative appraisal of

156 159 554 178 177 829 the 'umda, Hajj 'Ali seems to imply that he himself is capable of understanding and leading the Bedouins during this period.

Hajj 'Ali has formulated some positive and constructive ideas relating to the period of transition which now faces al-Qasr, and they are related to his analysis of the pressing needs of the day.

> The Bedouins need many things: they need factories as there are in the Nile Valley. For the desert, here in particular, we need olive presses. This will raise the profits of the farmer . . . We need [244] [489] a factory for canning tomatoes, for the whole desert plants them and the transportation is such that we cannot get them to the market . . . The biggest change in the desert results from the presence of 12,000 government workers; there were only 20 or [871] 30 before the World War. There were no schools, now there a few. You cannot find a six year-old boy who does not go to school; about thirty per cent of the girls in al-Qasr go to school also . . . Another cause of change is due to the fact that everyone now watches his neighbor, he sees what he does and he imitates him. Today, I listen to the [207] radio and tomorrow my neighbor buys one. Evolution (tatawwar) is taking place, and the people here are [212] realistic about it. For instance, I do not know reading and writing, and sometimes I must dictate a letter to my son . . . My son knows better than I, and I know better than my father did, who lived in al-Qasr for thirty five years without knowing anything about the streets of Marsa Matruh.

156 159 554 178 177 Hajj 'Ali is both subjective and objective about change, as we can note from the comment about the radio. In a non-doctrinaire fashion, Hajj 'Ali stresses the great value of education while being aware of his own deficiencies in this area. However, as a counterbalance, he seems to

156 imply that one cannot be educated and know the 'awaiyid at
159 the same time--the attitude of a self-made man. Hajj 'Ali
554 178 realizes his marginal position between the new and the old,
177 and his attitude concerning change through education seems
to be that of an unselfish leader. Elaborating further on
156 the role of education, Hajj 'Ali showed insight into some of
159 the psychological aspects underlying social change:

> 554 178 As I said before, the people here are realistic about
> 177 change. There are now only about three or four of
> 829 us who send our sons to study at the university, the
> rest of the people are waiting to see what these boys
> 871 will amount to. The other day, one of our educated
> boys, an officer in the army, came to visit al-Qasr.
> All of the women are now hoping to see their sons
> become as successful as this. This is exactly like
> the first time we cultivated olives in the desert:
> the Bedouins mocked those who planted the olive.
> After the olive began to show profits, everyone regretted that they did not cultivate it. Time is
> changing, and the people are changing. Education is
> the basis of everything in any nation. Now the
> agricultural engineer directs me, telling me what to
> do and how to do it . . . and before 1952 (pre-Nassar
> regime) they knew nothing about us and we had nothing.

156 As culture and social change proceeds in al-Qasr, it
159 is evident that Hajj 'Ali and the national political community
554 are becoming legitimate authorities in the eyes of the Bedouins.
829 This is indicated by the following event. One month before
574 I left the field, the first vice-President of the Republic was
648 expected to visit the province of Marsa Matruh, and al-Qasr
was named as one of the places which he would tour. Hajj
'Ali took it upon himself to set up three tents in the tradi-

156 tional style of Bedouin hospitality--"as we used to do in
159 Cyrenaica"--and spent a total of 50 L.E. for the welcoming
554 ceremony. "This money was from his own pocket," as the
829 Bedouins of al-Qasr complained after it was learned that
574 the vice-President would not visit Matruh after all. As
648 a matter of fact, all of the Bedouin leaders who had been
invited to the reception by Hajj 'Ali refused to eat the
food, for they said that it had not been prepared for them.
[576] This act was taken as a show of respect for Hajj 'Ali and
anger with bureaucrats.

156 Hajj 'Ali is the representative of al-Qasr to the
159 Arab Socialist Union which meets in Marsa Matruh and has
554 cell meetings in al-Qasr. The socialist cell in al-Qasr
648 meets about three times a month. When I asked why Hajj 'Ali
668 [124] was the man chosen to represent all of al-Qasr at section
meetings of the Union, the reply was: "Because he is a member
[635] of the Majlis al-Muhafza." There was one section meeting
of the Union in Matruh while I was in the field. The theme
of the meeting was "The Meaning of Socialism." Hajj 'Ali
attended this meeting.

156 In sum, it seems not too far afield to say that Hajj
159 'Ali is prepared to take over the leadership of the Bedouins
554 in a much more sophisticated manner than one could possibly
expect from the traditional style of politics. Hajj 'Ali's
[634] comments about the 'umda and the 'umda's probable successor

156 159 554 634 imply that he feels they are not really equipped to represent their traditional constituency. Hajj 'Ali, as everyone in al-Qasr knows, is traditional and modern at the same time. It seems that he has only alienated those whom he threatens and those who are a threat to him, i.e., the _'umda_ and the _shaikh_.

156 159 554 212 He may not be educated, but he knows the _'awaiyid_; at the same time he stresses the fact that his son will have the education which he never had. Empathy is a primary trait of the charismatic leader and the "cultural broker" who seeks to manipulate social relations. No one could explain to me why Hajj 'Ali did not have an education while his brother (who is only three years younger) and other members of the "status group" do read and write. He perhaps only became concerned in the period of change. Hajj 'Ali, the "cultural broker," is more politically conscious and creative within the context of two worlds in change.

613 682 it was impossible to verify the actual facts or to know what exactly
683 happened. But since the parties involved are still alive and since these
672 events are closely related to present-day happenings, the case is still
558 alive in the minds of the parties involved as well as those of outsiders-
(124) Naturlaly, each party tries to present the facts in such a way as to
613 682 support his own claims. Shei'eb, for example, insists that Hakim had
683 bribed members of bait Asabei' to refuse to pay their share in order to
156 embarrass him and make him appear as unable to perform his duties as
558 Aqila. "Hakim always had his eyes on becoming the Aqila of bait Asabei',"
said Shei'eb, "but he had no business becoming the Aqila, so he had to
make me look bad to the other Awaqil.... He likes to be looked up to as
a big man, but it wouldn't work." While other members of bait Asabei'
deny that Hakim had bribed them, they agree with Shei'eb that Hakim is a
156 dishonest man. In fact, Hakim's reputation is so widespread in the area
551 that it has earned him the nickname of "the thief". The nickname was
788 given to him a few years ago when he went to Mecca for a pilgrimage with
685 another fellow tribesman. The latter told the story that while in Mecca
Hakim had found a purse with two hundred pounds in it. He was supposed
to return the purse to the authorities or it would be considered as
stealing if he kept it. Stealing in Mecca is not only a crime but also
a great sin which makes the holy trip void for the offender. Hakim told
his companion that he had given the purse to the authorities. But later,
on their way back from Mecca, the friend found the purse hidden in Hakim's
luggage. When the story was known in the area, he was referred to as
156 "the thief". Other accounts of Hakim's dishonesty are told throughout
685 439 the area, including stories of how he acquired his wealth through stealing

156 [685 439] equipment from the government projects and from smuggling sheep and mer-
chandise across the Libyan border. Although some of these stories might
be exaggerated, they all point to the fact that Hakim, despite his wealth,
is not the most popular or reputable individual in bait Asabei', and that
although Shei'eb is not a popular individual either, he definitely comes
up the winner in any popularity contest between the two. The question is
156 why Hakim was selected by the Awaqil to replace Shei'eb. The case in-
613 volved more than Shei'eb's inability to collect the money from members of
558 his bait. Shei'eb's ineffectiveness seemed to have been taken as an ex-
682 683 cuse rather than as the direct cause. Many Aqaqil, before Shei'eb, had
failed in collecting money from their own bait without being subject to
direct challenge. What seems to be involved is more than a challenge to
a particular member, Shei'eb. It is a challenge to the whole principle
by which Shei'eb acquired his position as Aqila of bait Asabei': patrilineal succession.

156 159 613 463 683 554 Shei'eb is the youngest of four sons of the former Aqila of bait Asabei', Sheikh Elewa. For more than fifty years Sheikh Elewa was the undisputed Aqila of bait Asabei'. He also had considerable influence among other tribal segments throughout the whole of the Western Desert by virtue of his position as "nazzar", that is, the expert who assesses the amount of compensation for wound inflicted in a liable case. The
[428] position of nazzar is a hereditary one and had been handed down from
[779] father to son. The basis for his assessment of wounds are a number of
old books believed to be obtained from Mecca and contain all the judgments of famous Islamic leaders in their assessments of wounds.

[428] Eleven years ago when Sheikh Elewa became blind and too old to

156 exercise his functions, he invited all the important people in the area
159 into a large gathering during which he announced that he was handing the
613 sacred books to Shei'eb, who was to become the nazzar and also to succeed
463 683 him as the Aqila of bait Asabei'. Although at that time Shei'eb was
554 fairly young, twenty-six, nobody questioned Sheikh Elewa's decision.
428 [579] "He is the Aqila," said one informant, "and he has the right to decide
which of his sons is to succeed him. After all, he knows his sons better
than anybody else and knows which one is best for the job." Most people
156 thought that Sheikh Elewa, being still alive and with clear thinking,
159 would help Shei'eb in performing his duties as Aqila. A few months after
613 554 Shei'eb took over his father's position, it became apparent that he was
578 too immature for the job. He tried to use his position to take money
[661] from members of his bait and when they refused to give him any money, he
entered into fights with a number of them. Rumors spread that he took
bribes from the disputing parties who came to him for him to assess the
legal compensation for wounds to raise or lower his estimate. But still
people within bait Asabei' as well as outside it respected Sheikh Elewa's
decision and did not challenge Shei'eb openly. But as time passed the
dissatisfaction with Shei'eb grew. This dissatisfaction came mainly from
members of the Amar who were affected directly by Shei'eb's actions, especially those actions which resulted in the payment of compensation for
wounds inflicted in fights.

PHASE II

439 On the evening of May 16, 1966, two members of the Geneishat tribe of Matruh area came to Burg-el-Arab with a large shipment of smuggled cigarettes to leave with their partner in the area, Hadi, from the

685 refused to see them. Later Hakim had Shei'eb spread the rumor that Qudura
627 had taken a bribe from the Geneishat to refuse to take the oath, and the
578 [521] story of an old dispute between Qudura, on the one hand, and both Hakim
613 and Shei'eb, on the other. This dispute dates back to the time when the
156 Awaqil of the Aggary Amar decided to replace Shei'eb with Hakim as the
554 Aqila of bait Asabei'. Shortly after the decision of the Aggary Awaqil
578 was publicly known, Qudura was very unhappy and refused to recognize it.
His reaction was not out of loyalty to Shei'eb whom he thought was a very unfit person for the position, but it stemmed rather, from a deep resentment of Hakim. According to my information, Qudura's position was met with sympathy by the majority of the people outside the Aggary Amar who share with him the belief that Hakim was a dishonest person who could not be trusted as a representative of bait Asabei'. It was at that time that the stories of Hakim's dishonest dealings were being discussed publicly, mainly by Qudura and members of his camp. At that time many believed that Qudura was the best man for the position of Aqila of bait Asabei' and that he was the only qualified member of that bait. He was the oldest able man in the bait, and although he was poor, yet he was known throughout the area for his honesty and sound decision. In fact many people in the area told me that they believe Qudura to be the only honest member of bait Asabei'. Realizing that Qudura was getting all the attention, Hakim sent his son Rabbu to Qudura with a message that Hakim acknowledged Qudura as the Aqila and that he (Hakim) had neither the time nor the interest in taking the position himself. Hakim also conveyed the view that he would support Qudura if the latter denounced Shei'eb and appointed himself in his place. Qudura agreed and a date

613 was set for a meeting in which Quadra was to announce his decision.
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554 Meanwhile, Qudura stopped attacking Hakim and directed his attack to-
578 ward the inadequacy of Shei'eb as the Aqila.

The meeting was held two weeks later and all the important people in the area were invited. After dinner was served Qudura announced his agreement with Hakim to become the Aqila of bait Asabei' replacing Shei'eb. Everybody expected Hakim to support Qudura in his claim, but instead Hakim directed his comment to Qudura telling him that there had been a misunderstanding on Qudura's part and that all his message to Qudura was to acknowledge the latter as the Aqila for his own camp alone not for bait Asabei' as a whole as Qudura claimed. This announcement was a surprise to everyone in the meeting since this meant recognizing the camp of Qudura as a separate bait, a result which nobody, including Qudura, had ever anticipated. Qudura was very angry and dissolved the meeting immediately. Ever since that incident, the relationship between
578 Qudura and Hakim has been very unfriendly. Almost all of my informants
156 explained Qudura's failure to show up at the oath as a means of revenge
695 against Hakim who had embarrassed him among the people who attended the
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627 meeting. Qudura himself had told me later that the reason for his not
[124] coming to the oath was that he was not sure that Rabbu was innocent:

> Rabbu has been known to do these thins (inform the police) and I cannot trust him. I cannot take a false oath and endanger myself for someone like Rabbuh. Besides, Hakim never came to me to discuss the oath like he did with all the others who were to swear with them. If he had brought his son and come to me before I would have been able to tell whether they were lying or not, and If not, I would have sworn with a clear conscience and without fear. The oath is something that one does not take lightly. It involves the supernatural.

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156 When Qudura refused to see Hakim and Shei'eb, Hakim asked Sheikh
196 Saleh, the Aqila of one of the most powerful baits in the area, to talk

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627 to Qudura and to tell him that Hakim wanted to show his respect. This
156 means in everyday parlance that Hakim was willing to pay him money.
[196] Qudura agreed to meet Hakim the following day.

[114] On the day of the meeting, to which I was invited, Hakim arrived
[431] with his son and gifts of three goats, tea and sugar. One of the goats
[594] was slaughtered and supper was prepared for the guests. While the guests were eating, Hakim and Qudura disappeared inside one of the tents for more than an hour. When they finally joined the gathering, Hakim announced that he and Qudura were now brothers and that it was his fault that Qudura was angry because he had accused him of being stupid and misunderstanding the content of the message sent to him after the meeting of the Aggary awawil. "I admit," said Hakim, "that I might have meant at one time and probably said it to sheikh Qudura that I wanted him to be the Aqila of bait Asabei'. Now that I have admitted this, Sheikh Qudura should not have any grudges against me or my son." Then Qudura addressed the gathering and said, in a very cold and dry manner, "I am glad that Hakim has come to this senses and admitted his mistake." The gathering lasted for most of the evening, spent mostly in behind-the-scenes meetings involving Hakim, Qudura and different guests. Then as the last guest left, Shei'eb, who had been inside the tent throughtout the evening came out and said that Hakim was a fool and that Qudura had tricked him into admitting publicly that he had lied and that Qudura still refused to take the oath.

613 Qudura's stand created a strong reaction which affected almost all
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578 the tribal segments in the area. The case overshadowed any other event
[521] and was the main topic of discussion. The reaction was mixed, however.

613 619 578 156 Other tribal segments outside the Aggary amar supported the position of
Qudura, and most took his position to prove their notion about his hon-
esty and the fact that despite his poverty, he could not be bribed. They
were also pleased with Qudura's trick which demonstrated Hakim's dishonest
613 578 156 techniques. Within the Aggary amar, the general sentiment was still with
Hakim although his confession of cheating Qudura made it difficult to
support him openly. They directed their attack against Qudura who in
their view violated the solidarity of the amar and even of his bait and
showed it as divided and noncohesive. They were also fearful that Qudura's
[685] refusal to pay would cause the amar to pay the Geneishat the full compen-
sation for the action of Rabbuh, a sum which, as one said, would put the
amar in debt for generations to come. The strongest impact of the events
affected bait Asabei'itself and left it one step from complete fission
into three distinct groups. Shei'eb, finding the tide turning against
Hakim, found a chance to assert his claim to the position of the Aqila,
stating openly that he would never forfeit his hereditary right. On the
other hand, finding the popularity of Qudura increasing rapidly, he
started attacking him verbally and even threatened to beat him. He in-
[681] sisted that Qudura and his sons should be excluded from the amar and
given the barawa.

613 681 [192] The word "barawa" is derived from the Arabic verb "bara" which means to
cure one's self of an illness. It also means to sever social ties with
undesirable persons. The term is used among Awlad Ali in a much restrited
sense to refer to the process by which a tribal segment detaches itself
from any responsibility for the actions of a particular member. It is

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156 This apparently is not a typical case, nor is Fatma by any means
562 representative of a typical tribal women. It is a case of a marginal
woman who had revolted against the tribal definition of a female role.
[428] She violated the customary ways of her society and claimed her share of
[593] her father's inheritance; and by doing this, she forfeited her right to
[183] protection by her brothers. She was able to do this because of her mar-
[625] ginality which enabled her to draw upon sources of protection outside
the tribal pattern, the police. It is interesting to note here that by
doing so, she was not totally eliminated or ostracized from her society;
rather, her role was redefined as that of a man, and she was treated
as such.

628 the settlement achieved. In many such interest is best served by taking
613 into consideration the welfare of the other party to the dispute as well.

613 Reasonableness is an important prerequisite for the success of the
554 Aqila in performing this functions in dispute settlement. This is true
157 whether the Aqila is dealing with disputes between members of his own
bait or between members of his bait and outsiders. But while reasonable-
ness and the personal qualities constitute important assets for the Aqila,
613 they are not the basis of his political authority. Proven abilities are
554 admired but they are, or had been until very recently, irrelevant to the
178 question of succession to the position of Aqila. The structurally signi-
ficant source of the Aqila's authority is patrilineal succession. This
principle has recently been challenged under the impact of social and
economic changes that are taking place in the area. To analyze the role
121 of the Aqila and the source of his authority, I shall utilize, to some
613 extent, Turner's concept of "social drama" by presenting and analyzing a
128 case of dispute whose developmental stages happened over a period of more
than eleven years. The major part of these developments occurred at the
time of the field work and I had a chance to observe at lease part of it.
The case in all its phases offers a rare example of a disturbance that
happened in the social life of a particular tribal segment. It offers
what Turner called "... a limited area of transparency in the otherwise
opaque surface of regular, uneventful social life" (p. 93). The politi-
cal unit involved is that of bait Asabe'i, the largest in size of all
baits in the Aggary Eila. As events of the case unfolded themselves,
some of the important principles of social structure, at least as they
operate at a given point, were revealed.

613 554 In performing his functions within the bait, personal qualities such as
[157] wisdom, soundness of ideas, personal persuasiveness are of importance.
[428] But the main basis of his authority is patrilineal succession. The Aqila
[556] has no economic power to speak of. Although many aqila are among the
wealthiest members of their baits, many more are among its poorest. The
nature of the economic process and the pastoral life of Awald Ali is
such that the economic position of the individual is always flucuating.
Nor does the Aqila have any military power at his disposal, or any command of the use of force to back his decisions or to make them binding
[428] upon members of his bait. The main source of compliance to the Aqila's
decisions comes from the knowledge that the Aqila has the authority to
make such decisions and that he has acquired this authority through the
legitimate channel of patrilineal succession.

613 Where membership in formal groups is transmitted by descent, Awlad
428 Ali always choose the patriline. The son of Awlad Ali is regarded as
562 [619] Awlad Ali even though his mother might not be from the tribe, while a
woman who marries outside the tribe transmits no rights in the tribe to
her children. The importance of agnatic kin is reinforced by an solidary of brothers which is extended laterally to patrilateral cousins. It
is also shown in the fact that sons are favored in inheritance usually
to the exclusion of daughters. The male line is viewed by Awlad Ali as
the natural principle when it comes to anything which is inheritable,
whether property or position. In an attempt to defend Shei'eb's position and his right to be the Aqila, one informant told me: "The main purpose that a man has in life is to have sons because it is the son who
makes the man live forever. Daughters don't count. A man gives his son

*795 which the soul experiences God. It is suffused with knowledge:
786 not with *‘ilm*, intellectual and traditional knowledge, but with
ma‘rifa, gnosis, wisdom. The Grand Sanusi and his successors
[785] very strongly disapproved of external aids to this end, such as
processions, music, movements of the body inducing convulsions,
piercing the flesh with sharp implements, and such other
means as are used by some Orders, and steered a middle course
between the illuminative, or intuitive, school of Sufi writers and
*795 the rational, or intellectual, school. Thus Sayyid Ahmad al-Sharif,
his grandson, has in his writings, as Moreno points out,[1]
exhorted followers of the Order not to depart from the rational,
the chief aim of the Sanusiya being to make a man a good
Muslim rather than a good mystic. Mysticism is something
added to orthodox faith and morals, not a substitute for them.

*795 It is for this reason that, as Sayyid Ahmad insists, perfection
787 is to be sought through spiritual identification with the Prophet
Muhammad rather than with God, at any rate for ordinary
people. This is to be attained by contemplation of the essence
of the Prophet and by an inner knowledge of him through
constant imitation of his actions, attention to his words, and
blessing him. The contemplation should be so intense that
veneration of the Prophet pervades the adept till at last he hears
only his name and has only his form before the eyes of the intellect.
Then the Prophet becomes his sole guide and counsellor.

*795 As this is not a treatise on Sufism there is no need to give
further details about the mystical content of the Sanusiya. It
should, however, be stressed that the rigorous orthodoxy of the
Order, and especially its insistence on conformity to the original
teachings of the Prophet, meant that the faith and morals which
the Prophet preached to the Bedouin of his day, and which they
accepted, were equally suited to the Bedouin of Cyrenaica, who
in all essentials were leading, and still lead, a life like to that of
the Bedouin in Arabia in the seventh century. In particular,
[793] the refusal of the Grand Sanusi to allow the more demonstrative
forms of ecstasy, which, together with lack of organization and
[786] direction, characterize so many of the Sufi Orders of North
[157] Africa, enabled the Bedouin to adopt his teachings and ritual,
for Bedouin are an undemonstrative people and it is difficult to
imagine them piercing their cheeks with skewers, eating glass,

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[1] M. M. Moreno, *Brevi Nozioni d'Islām*, 1927, p. 58.

or swaying into convulsions. Indeed, it is noticeable that the 795*
Orders which permit such practices, notably the 'Arusiya, [793]
'Isawiya, Rifa'iya, and Sa'adiya, so popular in the towns of [786]
Libya, have made no converts among the true Bedouin. [157]

It is unnecessary to discuss further the mystical side to the 795*
Sanusiya for another reason. The Bedouin of Cyrenaica with 771
whom this book is concerned have only the slightest knowledge
of either the religious teachings or the ritual of the Order, and
are interested in neither. They belong to the illiterate class of
the *Muntasabin*, the simple adherents of the Order who follow
its Shaikh personally and politically. It is very seldom, if ever,
that the Bedouin know the special prayers and litanies of the [789]
Order, and their use of them, if any, is restricted to getting a [212]
scribe to write them on paper so that they can sew them up in
leather and tie them to their bodies. It is only a tiny educated
minority who regularly recite the prayer formulas and litanies.
These are the *Ikhwan*, the Brothers of the Order. They live in 795*
the lodges of the Order and hold prayer-meetings there. Among
the Brothers are some who have been raised to the position of
Shaikhs of lodges, generally, in past times, after special training
at the University of the Order at Jaghbub oasis, where they have
received a diploma from the Head of the Order or from one of
his family or inner circle. This inner circle, the *Khawass*, consists vaguely to-day of a few senior members of the Sanusi
family and two or three learned Brothers and does not function
as a Body, but in the past it was, according to Sayyid Muhammad Idris, an official Council controlling the affairs of the Order
and was composed of four Shaikhs of the Order, who were not
of the Sanusi family, under the presidency of the Head of the
Order, who had to be a member of the founder's family. As
Dr. Adams points out,[1] the fact that this inner circle is no longer [178]
a determinate Body indicates a change in the character of
the Order, a development of its political, to the detriment
of its religious, functions. This development has favoured the
interests of the Sanusi family to the disadvantage of the Order
as a whole.

The *Shaikh al-Tariqa*, Head of the Order, advised in past 795*
times by his Council, appoints the Shaikhs of the lodges and 793
these Shaikhs can ordain Brothers and the Brothers can receive

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[1] C. C. Adams, 'The Sanusiya Order', *Handbook on Cyrenaica*, 1944, p. 31. [113]

795*

praise of which many poems have been written by Brothers of 793
the Order. The Grand Sanusi forbad music, dancing, and sing- 784
ing in the recitations of the Order, but in this he was at one with 114
all the official spokesmen of Islam. Most reformist movements [272]
in Islam tend towards asceticism. [533]

Far from being extreme ascetics, however, the Sanusi [536]
Brothers eat and dress well, even using scent, and are amiable 795*
and merry companions. The Tunisian scholar and traveller 157
Muhammad 'Uthman al-Hashaishi, who travelled in 1896 via [785]
Malta, Tripoli, and Banghazi to Kufra to visit al-Sayyid al-Mahdi and met the leading Brothers of the time, remarks that 'they are fond of diversions, honest jesting. I have visited many of their zawiyas and I have made the acquaintance of many of their notables: I have seen only cheerful and smiling faces, welcoming me with benevolence and kindness. May God reward them!'[1]

The Grand Sanusi discouraged the trappings of poverty by 795*
his example, his exhortations, and his insistence on the Brothers 793
being self-supporting. Although the Heads of the Sanusiya 735
Order, like the Wahhabi leaders, encouraged settlement on the land, they can hardly have hoped to have greatly influenced the Bedouin to this end; but they insisted on the lodges of the Order supporting themselves by agriculture supplemented by stock-raising, and thereby took a stand against *ittikal*, the dependence for livelihood on alms and not on labour which some mendicant Orders have advocated.

The Order has always been, in fact, conventional as well as 795*
orthodox. In its early period it was essentially a missionary 797
Order with the limited aim of bringing by peaceful persuasion the Bedouin Arabs and the peoples of the Sahara and the Sudan to a fuller understanding of the beliefs and morals of Islam, while giving them at the same time the blessings of civilization: justice, peace, trade, and education. Its principles were, as Shaikh Muhammad 'Uthman says, simply 'to do good and avoid evil'.[2]

The accusation of fanaticism is not borne out by either the 795*
character of the Bedouin adherents of the Order or by its actions.

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[1] Mohammed ben Otsmane el-Hachaichi, *Voyage au Pays des Senoussia à travers La Tripolitaine et les Pays Touareg*, 1912, p. 128 (1st ed., 1903). [113]

[2] Ibid., p. 86.

states that the total annual revenue of the lodges of the Order, 795*
excluding those at Jaghbub and Kufra, was calculated at more 434
than 200,000 Lire.[1]

The Italian figures appear to include all sources of revenue, agricultural produce, increase in stock, and the gifts received in beasts, cereals, honey, skins, mats, carpets, and butter. At the time there could have been no adequate assessment and an estimate of revenue in money is an inappropriate measure in what was for the most part a subsistence economy. The zawiya community lived partly by its own labour, largely that of servants and slaves, assisted, as explained, by the Bedouin of
the vicinity at seed-time and harvest. The produce of its cultiva- 795*
tions and gardens and of its flocks and herds was supplemented 794
by contributions in kind from the Bedouin. In theory such contributions were an annual tithe, but in practice it is more likely that the Bedouin brought presents of beasts, butter, honey, &c., to the zawiya when they happened to visit it, or when its Shaikh let it be known that he was in need of something; and that now and again there was a general whip-round for a caravan to Jaghbub or Kufra. That is the Bedouin way of doing things.

Bedouin are hard-headed people and they expect a return for 795*
their labour and gifts. The neighbouring tribesmen considered 794
that they were adequately rewarded for their support of their 182
zawiya by the services it rendered, for, like the Christian [157]
monasteries of Europe in the Dark Ages, Sanusiya lodges served many purposes besides catering for religious needs. They were schools, caravanserai, commercial centres, social centres, forts, courts of law, banks, store houses, poor houses, sanctuary, and burial grounds, besides being channels through which ran a generous stream of God's blessing. They were centres of culture and security in a wild country and amid a fierce people, and they were stable points in a country where all else was constantly on the move. A Bedouin camp might be anywhere. A zawiya was fixed to the earth and its community with it. But the chief benefits the lodges conferred on the Bedouin were, as the Grand Sanusi told them in the letter quoted earlier, that they and their children might learn from scholarly and pious men the faith and precepts of Islam, that they might have the

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[1] *Cirenaica Pacificata*, 1932, p. 125.

Had the Senussi been successful in the last war, they 175
would no doubt have brought in the 'Ibeidat or the 'Awaqir 619
from Cyrenaica to replace the Awlad 'Ali in Egypt.

At the present day the Awlad 'Ali, especially the eastern 619
sections near the Nile Valley, have almost ceased to be nomadic, 178
and only the old men have memories of their former warlike
habits. They suffered considerably during the Great War,
but are again becoming prosperous. They now own large
comfortable tents, are beginning to build houses and clear
out cisterns, and are also said to be increasing in numbers.[1]
So civilized have they grown that my guides, one a Sinai
Arab and the other an 'Abadi, concurred in calling them
"green"—not real desert-worthy Bedouins.

Perhaps as a result of Libyan influence, or more probably 142
the better nurture and climate, they are taller, heavier, stronger,
and lighter-complexioned than the lightly built Arabs of
Sinai and Hijaz. Also they are much franker and more 157
straightforward than their shifty and suspicious eastern cousins, 181
and altogether more trustworthy. Their women only veil 562
themselves to strangers, and talk quite naturally and cheerfully 834
to the men of their own tribe. 609

They cultivate as much barley as they can, using a
primitive plough drawn by camels, in the clayey hollows 243
scattered over their very stony limestone desert, but, as the [492]
rainfall is very uncertain, a good crop only occurs every five [132]
or six years. After harvest, they exchange some of their [437]
barley for maize, which the women grind to make bread
as required, and some for dried dates. The seed for next
year is buried in a hole lined with straw and covered with [251]
clay, and a year's forage for the animals is set aside. The [432]
rest of the crop goes to market, and for a short time the [426]
Arab has money to buy clothes for himself and his family
and at utmost need to pay off some of the numerous debts he
has inherited from his forefathers. Soon he is reduced again
to the clothes he wears, the tent he sleeps in, and his animals
grazing in the desert.

They are great breeders of camels and sheep, and a busy 436
traffic in these goes on weekly in the markets of Hammam, 178
'Amriya, and the Beheira. So they have got into the habit [438] [433] [233]

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[1] At the 1927 census, the Western Desert Arabs, Awlad 'Ali, Jawabis, etc., numbered
38,928 souls exclusive of those settled in Beheira. But Pacho, 100 years ago, estimated them [161]
at 38,000 souls.

586 at the time of divorce (if the husband is in fault), and also
[583] at the time of the husband's death; and, sadaaq al-musaama
[768] ("price of friendship") is paid to the wife when her husband
[595] takes a second, third or fourth wife.

586 The second divorce case which happened while I was
●158 in al-Qasr involved, what seems to be, an instance of psychotic
behavior. A girl, who had married shortly before I arrived
in the field, would fall into a deep sleep every time she
entered her husband's house. Each time her father would come
for her and take her home until she had recovered. But upon
her return, three different times, she became ill again.
Finally, her father and the husband agreed that this marriage
would not work, and the father returned the mahr to the man.
This case lasted over the period of almost a year while I
lived in al-Qasr. I suggested to the father that perhaps his
daughter did not wish to be married to this man but he assured
me that "she loved him very much."

586 If the girl's father is dead, so that she cannot
return to his house at the time of divorce, she will go to
live with the brother who needs her services. It then be-
586 587 comes the duty of the brother to make another marriage for
[593] his sister, and in the case that he does it becomes his right
[583] to claim the mahr for himself. The Bedouins say that virginity,
or the lack of it, in the case of the divorced woman is no
issue; just so a man knows "she is from a good family."

The Bedouins of al-Qasr claim that they
428 follow the Islamic laws of inheritance, in which case, a
562 surviving daughter is entitled to one-half the share of a surviving son (Quran IV: 177). But, in only two cases did
[423] women own land in al-Qasr: one woman was the only close survivor of her father, and, the other woman was a widow without sons. In fact, my informant even admitted that these cases were exceptional, that the women were permitted to keep the land only because the brothers of the deceased men, who are the "rightful heirs" after the sons, did not want the land. The Bedouins insist, on the other hand, that a girl can claim her share of the inheritance: "It is her right." But she will never do such a thing "because she respects her brothers too much to accept the land which is offered to her."

428 When the father's estate is large, certain measures are taken to divide it between his sons. In some cases, the division may be somewhat complex and determined over a period of time. One example of this in al-Qasr involved a wealthy man whose own property was divisible into parts roughly corresponding to ecological subdivisions. The subdivisions of the estate became the shares of the sons, and could then be separated but remain symbiotically dependent. Ecological relationships affirm social relations. The following is an
[159] account of inheritance rules in al-Qasr:

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> I am 45 years old and my eldest brother is 53 years old. I have two younger brothers. When my father died, we four sons inherited the property of our father jointly. I told my older brother to divide the land the way in which he wanted . . . My father had divided his land into four parts before he died. Each part was a separate "farm" so that a son could raise barley or olives, as he liked . . . But my brother told me to make the decision. As it turned out, my youngest brother was the first to make his choice of the four parts. He took his land but we still kept all of our sheep together. One year later, my older brother took his share of the land, but Jabril (the next to the youngest brother) and I remained together, and still remain together. Some men want to be on their own and others do not. Our eldest brother was the first to separate his animals from the collective herd . . . When the decisions were made to divide the land between us, we got the local "holy man" to go around the area with us and to witness the boundaries. This is done so that later if a brother changes his mind, or wants to take different land, the true borders will be known. We recorded them on paper and the "holy man" knows them . . . In matters of inheritance, all sons get equal shares, but in a case where there are ten camels and three sons, then, each gets three camels and the tenth goes to the eldest brother.

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562 [431] Any property which a female may own, if it is land or livestock, will go to her sons upon her death. In al-Qasr, such property will usually be sheep which a woman may accumulate through gift-giving. In one case, which is unique in al-Qasr, a woman received thirteen camels from her husband [583] at the time of her wedding. (This was not the brideprice, for that goes to the bride's father.) At the time of her death her camels numbered seventy, and they were divided equally among her five sons. Concerning lesser items, such as clothing and jewelry, and also chickens, these are

582 [584] she could marry no man.

Most of the older Bedouins say that bint 'amm marriage
582 578 as it is practiced in the desert is an evil, that it causes
nothing but trouble. They say that if there are bad feelings
between two men they will place claims upon each other's
sister with the intention of preventing the girls from ever
marrying. The younger Bedouins say that "it is better to
marry the bint 'amm than to let a stranger take her." The
[182] claim on the bint 'amm, of course, should be seen as a basis
[571] for social relationships between groups, regardless of any
[586] conflict it may or may not lead to. This is why the Bedouins
say that a man "will never divorce his bint 'amm, because if
he does that means that she is no good." It follows, then,
that if "she is no good" none of her other paternal cousins
will marry her. Implicit here is the reference to the making
[182] and breaking of group ties. Similarly, to regulate and to
maximize kinship ties, a man can claim only one of his
father's brother's daughters. In the case where there is
only one bint 'amm, her eldest cousin has first claim to her.
582 This sometimes causes conflict between brothers as the fol-
578 lowing informant's story indicates.
•159

> The father of Salih and Aziz was dead which meant that Aziz, being the elder, would have to furnish the brideprice if Salih were to marry first. In fact, Salih wanted to marry his bint 'amm. Aziz refused him permission to do so: Aziz had first claim to the bint 'amm, and, also, he thought that the brideprice which

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> her father was asking was too high. Salih was angry, so angry that he swore to kill any man who tried to take his bint 'amm. He went away to the Nile Valley to earn enough money to pay the high brideprice. In the meantime, the cousin of the brothers came and paid Aziz for the permission to marry the girl. Salih returned, but, of course, he could not kill his own paternal cousin. He became ill and went into a sleep which lasted for three days. Salih had always been known for his powerful voice but when he awoke he had a very weak voice. Salih never spoke to his brother again. He died seven years ago without every marrying.

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[182]

This story has aprocryphal aspects which announce this to be an important issue in Bedouin culture. The subject of parallel-cousin marriage is a complex one surrounded by controversy and contradiction. The older Bedouins say that the practice is a source of conflict, but they will usually insist that at least one of their sons marry his bint 'amm to insure the corporate link with the brother. In support of their complaints, they say that bint 'amm marriage is not morally sanctioned: "We do not like it and it is not right. But if we try to stop our sons from taking their cousins they will put a gun on their shoulder and go after her." On the other hand, this is contrasted with the complaints of the elders that their sons no longer respect their marriage habits, that they are marrying anyone these days: "Our sons resent the bint 'amm marriage because it is an agreement between fathers."

582 While I was in the field, three marriages took place; one was with the bint 'amm, and the other two were outside the secondary group but within the primary group, i.e., inter-lineage.

156 than the Awlad 'Ali societal level. In the traditional
554 system, his influence and power have been informal, and,
121 although this has been advantageous over against the formal
role of _'aqila_, his political activity was ultimately limited
by this structural differentiation and definition of authority.
[177] In gaining access to the bureaucratic structure of Egyptian
officialdom with its firm allocation of rights and duties,
Hajj 'Ali could operate as an authority within the total authority
structure which has reference to both the internal and external
political relational systems of al-Qasr.

Practical Application

*613 In al-Qasr, the two most influential and powerful
lineages, 'Ailit Lazumi and 'Ailit Ma'fas, each have a
[634] "most powerful _bait_." We have noted that in 'Ailit Lazumi
it is Bait Bu Taram which controls the office of _'umda_: in
*613 'Ailit Ma'fas it is Bait 'Umar which has Hajj 'Ali. Hajj 'Ali
•159 is fifty three years old. He has married five times, divorced
581 one wife, and at present has four wives. Whatever his motives
156 for these marriages, at least some of them have obviously
[595] been made as economic and political moves. A check on his
wives' tribal origins will show this. In each case, Hajj
'Ali's wife is from a lineage which holds land contiguous to
his own property in the _'izba_ sector of al-Qasr. The one
exception to this is a marriage contracted to establish ties

*613 with Bait Bu Taram of 'Ailit Lazumi. These marriages and
•159 their resultant alliances enhance the political power and
581
156 social status of Hajj 'Ali within and without al-Qasr.

Although he has no education himself, and neither reads
159 nor writes, Hajj 'Ali has sent his son to the University of
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873 Alexandria. Hajj 'Ali's son is the only boy from al-Qasr
[212] ever to attend the university. Hajj 'Ali desired that his
son study law at the university or enter the military academy
"and become an officer." But his son objected to this, saying:
"Either way I will be employed by the government and will not
be permitted to travel and see other countries." Hajj 'Ali did
not argue with this: he said that his son should study what
he wished. The son is now studying in the Faculty of Commerce
156 at Alexandria. Hajj 'Ali is also sending his daughters to
159 the primary school in al-Qasr. Not all of the Bedouins believe
872
562 that girls should receive an education.

156 Hajj 'Ali places among the "status group" in terms
159 of wealth. Although he has now committed himself to olive-
554 farming as a way of life, he remains one of the biggest sheep
472 owners in al-Qasr. Therefore, he is identified with both traditional and modern symbols of status. Hajj 'Ali differs in
156 one important way from other members of the "status group"
159
554 in that he owns three small general stores, two in al-Qasr
443 and one far to the west in Sallum. This fact has several
423 significant implications. Shops in al-Qasr (there are five
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*[613]

156 of them) cater largely to the needs of the lineage in whose
159 554 territory they are located. They are operated mostly on a
443 credit basis. Lineage members, as debtors, feel gratitude
423 472 but also, and more importantly, loyalty toward their kinsman
*[613] and creditor. Hajj 'Ali is the only member of al-Qasr who
[452] owns two shops, and the only Bedouin in the whole Western Desert
who owns three shops. His brother owns a shop in Matruh.
156 Furthermore, the shop in Sallum is in a strategic position on
159 the Libyan border which, coincidentally or not, is a point
554 443 for importing, and also smuggling, foreign goods into Egypt.
439 The possession and utilization of foreign products is definitely
472 a status symbol all over Egypt. Hence, the person in this
area who can control, however slightly, the distribution of
such goods has a lever with which to exact prestige and
favors from the "status group" in al-Qasr who now welcome
these symbols (tobacco, pistols, rifles, radios) and the
bureaucrats of Marsa Matruh who crave them (food goods,
clothing materials, car parts).

156 Besides all this, Hajj 'Ali is involved in a small
159 stone-cutting operation which supplies stones for house
554 [316] building, he cooperates with his three brothers in a well-
[312] cleaning concern, and contracts government heavy equipment
[427] to build earth dams. The material evidence of his status
[342] is that he is the only man in al-Qasr with two compound-type
[595] houses (one he built thirteen years ago), and the only man
with four wives.

156 with four wives. It is not hard to understand why the people
•159 of al-Qasr consider Hajj 'Ali a rajal khair par excellence.
554 627 For instance, when I asked one man it he could give me some
124 examples of court cases, he replied: "The one who is not an
'aqila pays no attention to anything save getting food for
his children. The rajal khair has money and men (a reference
to the "old days" when a person needed cohorts for battle),
and so he always pays instead of us. He lends us money and
helps us in doing anything, like Hajj 'Ali does." In another
124 interview, one man showed great respect for Hajj 'Ali's tradi-
156 159 tional status and modern ability to deal with the outside
554 world by giving him the honorific title of "shaikh," and
439 showing that the Bedouins of al-Qasr put their trust in him:
472 "When the olive merchants come from Alexandria, they go to
245 Shaikh 'Ali, someone who knows about olives. They ask him
what kind of olives al-Qasr has. He shows the merchants, and
they say: 'I will give you so much for them.' They make an
agreement, and Hajj 'Ali collects the olives and gets the
price for them."

156 In terms of local politics, I would guess, but do
159 not have data to prove, that Hajj 'Ali was the third party
554 [627] most frequently referred to in seeking a termination of
[114] conflict. He was commonly asked to participate in these
matters not only by the disputants themselves but also by
the 'aqila or other third party presiding. He was sometimes

156 He was sometimes
159 asked to sit-in as a witness for important contractual
554 matters. Note that in the *rawaabit al-'awaaqil* of Bait
675 Shafaila of 'Ailit Lazumi (presented in Chapter Four),
Hajj 'Ali who is neither from 'Ailit Lazumi nor an *'aqila*
was present to sign and validate this document.

156 Hajj 'Ali, then, operates in the micropolitical
159 system and the traditional authority structure of al-Qasr.
554 But what is just as important, he has secured a firm foothold in the modern bureaucratic structure of the near-by
town. He straddles both camps. The Governor of Marsa Matruh
635 was an important aid to my understanding of Hajj 'Ali's
634 role as "broker." The Governor claimed that the British
156
159 first introduced the roles of *'umda* and *shaikh*; they did this
554 to "control the Bedouin" and to "get the men out of the tents."
124 He explained in his own way what he considered to be the
[648] structural differentiation of political roles in al-Qasr.

> Let me tell you, these fellows are very clever. They
> have an *'umda* . . . he comes to my office and says:
> "I want this and this." I say, "No." Then he goes
> back to the *'awaqil* and tells them that, and then
> these fellows begin to think in what way they can get
> what they want. But the *'umda* is nothing; it is the
> *[613] *'aqila* whom the Bedouins listen to and love . . . The
> *'umda* is elected (at this time) by the Bedouins. They
> put forward a man who hesitates, one who can say yes
> or no . . . But there is a real leader for the people,
> this is a man such as Hajj 'Ali, here is a man the
> Bedouins love.

124
635 The Governor said that Hajj 'Ali speaks well and
156
159 thinks well. Twice in the interview the Governor said that
554
*[613]

124

635 Hajj 'Ali "became an _'aqila_ by his way of life." Of course,
156 ●159 the fact is that Hajj 'Ali is not an _'aqila_ at all. Although
554 I feel that the Governor should understand the Bedouin authority
*[613] structure, he is not alone in his misconceptions. The chief
156 agricultural engineer for the G.D.D.O., who works very closely
159 with the Bedouins of al-Qasr, also thought that Hajj 'Ali
554 was the _'aqila_ of Bait 'Umar in 'Ailit Ma'fas. Furthermore,
*613 and most impressive of all, one _'aqila_ in 'Ailit Dawlat and
his four sons all thought that Hajj 'Ali was the _'aqila_ of
Bait 'Umar. There is more here than just ignorance of
Bedouin society on the part of officials, and disinterest
on the part of the Dawlat _'aqila_. There is good reason for
these different parties to mistake Hajj 'Ali as a key
traditional "authority," or spokesman for his corporate group.
It seems clear that in their respective dealings they must
have encountered Hajj 'Ali in some kind of representative
capacity. The _'aqila_ who insisted that Hajj 'Ali was an
'aqila, even after I pointed out that he was not, lived
outside the _'izba_ sector and hence mistook an important
rajal khair for an _'aqila_. The Governor understandably
mistook the most influential man in al-Qasr as an _'aqila_.

635 There are other traits which qualify Hajj 'Ali as
648 the singular leader of the Bedouins. A few years back, the
[554] [156] Governor of Marsa Matruh formed a Governor's Council
[159] (_Majlis al-Muhafza_) made up of representatives of the Bedouin

635 population of the whole Western Desert, and representatives
[648] of the Egyptian government employees working in the province.
[634] The Bedouin representatives appointed to this council need
not be an _'umda_ or a _shaikh_, although they may be. The
oldest Bedouin member of the council, who happens to be an
'umda, told me that "the Governor picks the men who he feels
understand the problems of the people."

635 The Governor himself thinks that every Bedouin on
124 his council is an _'aqila_. He replied to my question about
*613 the criteria for membership on the _Majlis al-Muhafza_: "I
am using a new selection system. Rather than choose the
'umda or _shaikh_, I choose the _'aqila_. Every man on the
council is an _'aqila_, and the number is determined by the
population of the area . . . But I appoint more men from the
[619] 'Ali Ahmar (see Figures 3 and 7)[1] than from other tribes.
This is because they are more numerous, and they are near
Matruh where I am able to contact them immediately. The
'Ali Ahmar are represented by six men and the other tribes
by just three men."

156 Hajj 'Ali is one of these six men and the only member
•159 of the Council who resides in al-Qasr. I attended and ob-
554 served the December meeting of the Council. The Governor
635 sat at the head of a long table with the Egyptian representa-
648 tives on either side of him. At the other end of the table
[114] sat the Bedouin representatives, Hajj 'Ali among them. Purely

[1] [See pp. 65 & 77 respectively--Analyst]

156 administrative business took up most of the time at the
•159 meeting, and only the Governor and the Egyptians took part
554 635 in the discussion. At the conclusion of the meeting, the
648 Governor asked if any present had comments to make. Hajj
[871] 'Ali rose, and delivered a formal and well-prepared speech
[537] on the inadequacies of the educational facilities in Matruh. He noted that the Governor had promised the Bedouins that if they sent their sons in from the desert for secondary schooling, their material needs would be taken care of, but that in fact the Governor had not kept his promise for there was not enough space and beds for the boys. The Governor apologized for this condition and said he was trying to correct it. I noted that a few Egyptians found something amusing about this incident, but that all of the Bedouins present were serious and nodded in agreement with the points made by Hajj 'Ali.

156 We should note that Hajj 'Ali was the only Bedouin to
159 speak up at the meeting, that he spoke in the formal, tradi-
554 635 tional manner, and that he showed concern for the real problems of the Bedouins. Hajj 'Ali is careful to protect his identity as a Bedouin, and in this he differs from the _'umda_ and most of the "status group."

121 In situations of induced change, the cultural problems
156 involved differ in their conception and immediacy as defined
159 554 by the agents and the recipients of change. Hajj 'Ali, who
177 635 is both an agent and a recipient of change, is intimate with

121 the problems of the Bedouins of al-Qasr. He knows how to
156
159 phrase them, and his place on the Majlis al-Muhafza gives
554 him the right and the opportunity to air them. This is the
635 role of the "cultural broker." Before the meeting of the
177 council, Hajj 'Ali had gathered a group of the men from al-
Qasr and they had talked about which demands should be pre-
sented to the Governor. This is purely a political process
which Hajj 'Ali manipulates. The formulation and presentation
E48 of demands became, in the hands of Hajj 'Ali, "inputs" into
the Egyptian political system with the hope that they will
materialize as "outputs" and the satisfaction of needs -
to use the terminology of David Easton's "systems analysis"
(1965b).

156 On another occasion, Hajj 'Ali demonstrated his
159 status and political leadership and the fact that he has
554 assumed the position of spokesman for the Bedouin of al-Qasr
635 during this period of change. Once each year the Governor
177 makes a tour of al-Qasr to inspect the school, the cooperative
building, the government experimental farm, and the area in
general. After the inspection tour, he holds a reception in
a ceremonial tent set up for the occasion. At this time, he
states his evaluations and opinions, distributes some clothing
material to the poorer families of the area, and asks for
suggestions from the Bedouins who sit on the ground before the
tent. The only suggestion forthcoming from the Bedouins was

156 159 554 635 177 by the secretary of the cooperative society who requested that the government furnish bus service between Matruh and al-Qasr. The Governor thought this a good idea and said he would inquire into the matter.

156 159 554 635 177 537 As the Governor suggested that the meeting be adjourned, Hajj 'Ali stood up, faced the Governor and began another of his formal speeches in the rich tradition of Arabic; it was the best Arabic I had heard spoken in the desert. This speech was for the benefit of all present, Bedouins and officials alike. Hajj 'Ali made no requests but simply thanked the Governor for honoring al-Qasr with his presence. In this short well-prepared tribute, he said:

> We feel the efforts of the government and we can scarcely imagine or dream of this development. For instance, we were living in tents and now only five per cent remain in tents while the remainder are in houses. We were dressed simply, but now we are dressed in poplin material. Those who could afford one set of clothes now can afford two. Thanks be to God, all this is due to Jamal 'Abd al-Nasser.

156 159 554 635 537 It is significant, of course, that smiles once again played on the faces of the Governor's entourage and nothing but admiration on the faces of the Bedouins. As Hajj 'Ali spoke he did not face the Governor directly but turned aside, speaking both to him and the Bedouins--Hajj 'Ali, the Bedouin, had been sitting on the ground before the Governor. The [634] 'umda and shaikh had accompanied the Governor on his tour

156
159 and they sat on chairs inside the tent. I returned to
554 Marsa Matruh in the *'umda's* car (1964 Ford, highly polished)
635 537 with the *'umda* and the *shaikh*. They openly joked about Hajj
[634] 'Ali and his manner of presentation; they repeated some of
[122] [522] his "stilted" phrases and laughed. Hajj 'Ali gave last year's
reception speech also. This is because, his son says, Hajj
'Ali is considered a fine speaker by the Bedouins of al-Qasr.

121 We can see how these details carry larger implications
177 within the context of political and social structures under-
178 going change. It is the stuff which the anthropologist finds
important for an understanding of the process of change.

156 If I have established thus far that Hajj 'Ali is
159 politically active and representative in both the traditional
554 and the modern systems, then the attempt is now to prove that
177 he consciously seeks to change the traditional in the direction
178 of the modern for political and moral reasons, and for social
and personal reasons.

156 Hajj 'Ali, when he spoke with me, inevitably came
159 around to the subject of international politics, whether this
554 was the question of Israel or the image which America's racial
177 problems presented. Hajj 'Ali was the only man from the whole
178 124 Marsa Matruh area who was neither *shaikh* nor *'umda* to attend
829 the nomination of Jamal Abd al-Nasser in January of 1965. In
[571] all of this, I detect a move on the part of Hajj 'Ali to
identify himself with an Egyptian reference group and to

156 159 554 177 178 124 829 [571] draw al-Qasr into the Egyptian political community. He has committed himself to work hand-in-hand with the Governor of Marsa Matruh in introducing changes connected with economics and education into al-Qasr. He does not conceal this fact. When I spoke with him about helping me with my study of changing attitudes in al-Qasr, he said: "I might have the time to do this, but before I decide you will have to bring me a letter from the Governor stating that he wishes me to cooperate with you." The identity and responsibility which Hajj 'Ali feels for his role of agent of change is indicated in his remark to me that he had heard "there were others in the desert who feel and think the way I myself do."

156 159 554 571 574 796 123 Hajj 'Ali is discretely aware of the status difference between himself, as a member of the "status group," and the others of al-Qasr. As Weber would say, he perceives the difference in "style of life." I was invited to Hajj 'Ali's house for 'iid al-fitr, the feast marking the end of Ramadan. I thought that this would be a good opportunity to observe the "leaders" of al-Qasr together. I was very much surprised to find present no members of the "status group" but only [556] [735] their exact opposites. On the occasion of this feast it is the custom that the rich treat the poor. As an additional surprise, we had a very simple meal of bread, dates, peanuts, and tea. Hajj 'Ali explained to me: "My neighbors do not have my economic advantages, and I do not think it is proper

156 159 554 571 574 796 123 to serve other than what they eat." Hajj 'Ali is not only conscious of social stratification in his society, but he also has a great deal of empathy with the less endowed, a prerequisite of a traditional Bedouin leader and an advantageous one for a modern leader.

156 159 554 829 582 He is aware of most traditional institutions and how they relate to conditions of modernity. Hajj 'Ali, whose own marriages speak for his political acumen, sees only disadvantages in the cousin-right marriage custom of the Bedouins. His interest in getting on with the business of change, so to speak, has led him to question a basic right contained in the Bedouin principle of lineage structure and corporate membership.

> A thing which I do not like about our customs is the idea that a man has a right to his uncle's daughter. The man binds his cousin and in the end he might not marry her and will be the cause of her never marrying. He gives himself the authority to decide whom she may or may not marry. If he knows she desires to marry a certain man, he says: "She can marry anyone but not that one."

[562] Here he challenges the traditional right of the individual male in Bedouin society, favoring the rights of the female. [177] [178] [562] The emancipation of the female, especially in rights and duties concerned with the marriage contract, is an element of the modernization process in Egyptian society and the Middle East in general.

*613 602 571 682 The bait, as a political group, is in part structurally defined by the corporate principle which states that blood-kin

*613 602 571 682 at this lineage level must bear collective responsibility in matters of compensation and blood-revenge. This principle, as we have seen, is extended until the whole 'aiela is included in a symbolic expression of corporate group solidarity. In order for this expression to persist, of course, the mechanism, or ideology, of blood-revenge must be maintained. [124] All of my informants, though they disagreed over the details of revenge, insisted that it was the inviolable right of the 156 •159 554 829 682 Arabs. But Hajj 'Ali took exception to the practice of blood-revenge for a number of reasons. He said:

> [778] The world changes. Before it was only the 'awaiyid Awlad 'Ali and the Border Guards which kept order. The government now enters into the matter of killings. Personally, I do not agree with the custom and the way it operates. In the case of killing, for instance, someone who is not worth anything, and has no brains, kills one from another tribe. Then the tribe of the killer asks for the nazaala, and a third party becomes involved. The third party agrees to guard the killer's bait for twelve months and the business of all those involved must stop. A member of the third party's family must accompany each member of the killer's tribe. But even after the twelve months one must live in fear at his own home, for after the twelve months the tribe of the deceased will try to kill the best man in the killer's tribe. How many good ones do we have in one tribe? I have heard that in Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia the deceased man's family has the right to kill the killer only . . . (I then commented that perhaps blood-revenge functions to discourage killing in the desert.) But there are unbalanced people who actually commit murder just to tease their tribe: they have nothing to fear because no one is interested in killing them in retaliation.

In challenging the Arabs' traditional right to blood-revenge, Hajj 'Ali--besides questioning a structural basis of

156 the group--in effect questions a great deal about the whole
•159 traditional authority structure. Blood-revenge functions as
554 a deterrent to social disorder in that it represents an
829 automatic mechanism for restoring a balance of good relations
682 [182] in the society. Actually, Hajj 'Ali exaggerated to make a
point when he spoke of the existence of "unbalanced people."
682 A person would indeed be "unbalanced" who did not take into
672 consideration the repercussions of his acts with respect to
*613 the personal danger and the dishonor and shame it would bring
to his _'aiela_ and _bait_. Although the _'aiela_ members are
willing to share in the blood money for accidental or unpremeditated killings, it is wrong to suppose that the Bedouins
do not attempt to weigh the justifiability and culpability
[671] in matters of killing. The very existence of the _'awaiyid
Awlad 'Ali_ argues against this. Obviously, the dichotomy made between killing in the _'awaiyid_, i.e., intentional and accidental, and the concomitant gradation in compensation points to some kind of reasonable consideration in cases of killing.

156 Hajj 'Ali is discontent with yet another aspect of
159 the traditional authority structure. He questions the logic
554 and authority represented in the oath as a sacred sanction.
695 This says something about the degree of secularization which
829 Hajj 'Ali has undergone. Although he does not say so, he
apparently favors a more secular and logical procedure for determining a man's guilt or innocence.

156 159 554 695 829

> Another thing which I do not like about our old ways is the idea of swearing the oath. For instance, if I steal 1,000 L.E. from you, then you will accuse me. The 'aqila will then come to me and say: "If you did not steal the money, swear the oath." Some of my family will support me in this, swearing that I did not steal the money. The swearing of the oath will take place at a tomb, in the presence of the Quran. This tomb belongs to a dead man, and they tell you that he is a saint. First of all, the thief will swear the oath and then they will believe him; and, secondly, what is the sense of swearing in front of a dead body?

[784] Hajj 'Ali made no mention of God or of the Bedouin belief that misfortune will be visited upon the one who swears the oath in bad faith. There is an Arabic proverb which Hajj 'Ali repeated here which says in effect that "the thief will always swear."

156 159 554 829 178 Hajj 'Ali actively challenges the traditional basis of the Bedouin moral and political community. Striving to do away with prescribed cousin-right in marriage and the mechanisms of blood-revenge and the oath as means of supporting law and order in al-Qasr is a course which we might expect from an Egyptian official who seeks to integrate the Bedouins into national society. And, in fact, these are all customs which the Governor believes must eventually be eradicated. It is not surprising that Hajj 'Ali's son believes that "it is not civilized" to lay claim to his cousin for, like his father, he also is redefining morality vis a vis "civilization."

It appears obvious in all that he says, including his comments at the Governor's reception, that Hajj 'Ali has

156 undertaken to transform his rajal khair role into an authority
159 which transcends the bounds of the local community. During
554 my talks with him, he never once insinuated that the people
829 of al-Qasr, nor even the 'Aishaibat or 'Ali Ahmar (terms
178 he rarely ever used), owe anything to a larger entity or
community known as "the Bedouin" or "the Awlad 'Ali."
If Hajj 'Ali is to legitimate his own authority in a new
political system, he must, at the same time, show the Bedouins
829 the legitimacy of the new political community. The Bedouins
178 must feel a moral commitment toward the new national political
177 community or else it has no meaning or authority. Most of the
Bedouins of al-Qasr still take it for granted that the allocation of political values and distribution of power in terms of
traditional and modern legal roles will be carried over into
the modern community and its politics. Hence, if anyone should
634 go on to Cairo to represent the Bedouin of the Western Desert,
648 naturally it should be the 'umda or the shaikh "who knew how
to deal with the Egyptians." The majority of the people of
the al-Qasr area see change coming but do not conceptualize
it as any threat to the traditional authority structure.

156 Hajj 'Ali anticipates the change as fundamental
159 enough to require a new sense of identity. I think this is
554 evident in the following statement in which he takes issue
829 with the traditional way of doing things and appears to be
178 preparing himself for a role in the readjustment process.
177

> 156 There is another objection which I have concerning
> 159 our customs. I mean the case of elections. For
> 554 instance, one from the 'Aishaibat and one from the
> 829 Sanagra, of the 'Ali Abyad, are nominated. Then,
> 666 each man must vote for the one from his own tribe.
> He must vote for the 'Aishaibi even if the other is
> the better man. But, we should consider that the
> best man is the man with the best qualifications.
> 'Umda Ibrahim, for instance, knows how to greet an
> official or a minister, but he does not know the
> 'awaiyid nor the problems of the Bedouins. His
> brother (who will probably be the next 'umda) is a
> good man and is educated, but he does not know
> the 'awaiyid either.

829 This view contrasts sharply with the traditional stand
666 of most Bedouins in al-Qasr, including the members of the
"status group." For instance, one 'aqila voiced what is a
prevalent opinion when he said:

> [619] If a man chooses to become a political candidate
> [186] against a Bedouin, he must understand that the
> members of the tribe should and would vote for
> their 'umda because he is a member of their own
> tribe. Even if a man is crazy and his opponent
> has the highest college degree, the Bedouins must
> vote for the man from their own tribe.

156 Hajj 'Ali is modern in his evaluation of the political
159 situation here: a politician should know the problems of his
554 constituents rather than follow principles based on traditional
178 relationships. His motive is not to promote the 'awaiyid as
177 a good way of life, for we know he does not think this to be
829 the case. Instead, Hajj 'Ali believes that in order to help
[671] the Bedouins through a period of change one must know what
they are changing from. Through his negative appraisal of

156 the _'umda_, Hajj 'Ali seems to imply that he himself is capable
159 554 of understanding and leading the Bedouins during this period.
178 Hajj 'Ali has formulated some positive and constructive
177 ideas relating to the period of transition which now faces
829 al-Qasr, and they are related to his analysis of the pressing
needs of the day.

> The Bedouins need many things: they need factories
> as there are in the Nile Valley. For the desert,
> here in particular, we need olive presses. This
> will raise the profits of the farmer . . . We need
> [244] a factory for canning tomatoes, for the whole desert
> [489] plants them and the transportation is such that we
> cannot get them to the market . . . The biggest
> change in the desert results from the presence of
> 12,000 government workers; there were only 20 or
> [871] 30 before the World War. There were no schools,
> now there a few. You cannot find a six year-old
> boy who does not go to school; about thirty per cent
> of the girls in al-Qasr go to school also . . .
> Another cause of change is due to the fact that
> everyone now watches his neighbor, he sees what he
> does and he imitates him. Today, I listen to the
> [207] radio and tomorrow my neighbor buys one. Evolution
> (_tatawwar_) is taking place, and the people here are
> [212] realistic about it. For instance, I do not know
> reading and writing, and sometimes I must dictate a
> letter to my son . . . My son knows better than I,
> and I know better than my father did, who lived in
> al-Qasr for thirty five years without knowing anything about the streets of Marsa Matruh.

156 Hajj 'Ali is both subjective and objective about
159 change, as we can note from the comment about the radio.
554 178 In a non-doctrinaire fashion, Hajj 'Ali stresses the great
177 value of education while being aware of his own deficiencies
in this area. However, as a counterbalance, he seems to

156 159 554 178 177 imply that one cannot be educated and know the 'awaiyid at the same time--the attitude of a self-made man. Hajj 'Ali realizes his marginal position between the new and the old, and his attitude concerning change through education seems to be that of an unselfish leader. Elaborating further on

156 159 554 178 177 829 871 the role of education, Hajj 'Ali showed insight into some of the psychological aspects underlying social change:

> As I said before, the people here are realistic about change. There are now only about three or four of us who send our sons to study at the university, the rest of the people are waiting to see what these boys will amount to. The other day, one of our educated boys, an officer in the army, came to visit al-Qasr. All of the women are now hoping to see their sons become as successful as this. This is exactly like the first time we cultivated olives in the desert: the Bedouins mocked those who planted the olive. After the olive began to show profits, everyone regretted that they did not cultivate it. Time is changing, and the people are changing. Education is the basis of everything in any nation. Now the agricultural engineer directs me, telling me what to do and how to do it . . . and before 1952 (pre-Nassar regime) they knew nothing about us and we had nothing.

156 159 554 829 574 648 As culture and social change proceeds in al-Qasr, it is evident that Hajj 'Ali and the national political community are becoming legitimate authorities in the eyes of the Bedouins. This is indicated by the following event. One month before I left the field, the first vice-President of the Republic was expected to visit the province of Marsa Matruh, and al-Qasr was named as one of the places which he would tour. Hajj 'Ali took it upon himself to set up three tents in the tradi-

156 tional style of Bedouin hospitality--"as we used to do in
159 Cyrenaica"--and spent a total of 50 L.E. for the welcoming
554 ceremony. "This money was from his own pocket," as the
829 Bedouins of al-Qasr complained after it was learned that
574 the vice-President would not visit Matruh after all. As
648 a matter of fact, all of the Bedouin leaders who had been
invited to the reception by Hajj 'Ali refused to eat the
food, for they said that it had not been prepared for them.
[576] This act was taken as a show of respect for Hajj 'Ali and
anger with bureaucrats.

156 Hajj 'Ali is the representative of al-Qasr to the
159 Arab Socialist Union which meets in Marsa Matruh and has
554 cell meetings in al-Qasr. The socialist cell in al-Qasr
648 meets about three times a month. When I asked why Hajj 'Ali
668 was the man chosen to represent all of al-Qasr at section
[124] meetings of the Union, the reply was: "Because he is a member
[635] of the Majlis al-Muhafza." There was one section meeting
of the Union in Matruh while I was in the field. The theme
of the meeting was "The Meaning of Socialism." Hajj 'Ali
attended this meeting.

156 In sum, it seems not too far afield to say that Hajj
159 'Ali is prepared to take over the leadership of the Bedouins
554 in a much more sophisticated manner than one could possibly
expect from the traditional style of politics. Hajj 'Ali's
[634] comments about the 'umda and the 'umda's probable successor

156 imply that he feels they are not really equipped to represent
159 their traditional constituency. Hajj 'Ali, as everyone in
554 al-Qasr knows, is traditional and modern at the same time.
634 It seems that he has only alienated those whom he threatens
and those who are a threat to him, i.e., the *'umda* and the
shaikh.

156 He may not be educated, but he knows the *'awaiyid*;
159 at the same time he stresses the fact that his son will have
554 the education which he never had. Empathy is a primary trait
212 of the charismatic leader and the "cultural broker" who seeks
to manipulate social relations. No one could explain to me
why Hajj 'Ali did not have an education while his brother
(who is only three years younger) and other members of the
"status group" do read and write. He perhaps only became
concerned in the period of change. Hajj 'Ali, the "cultural
broker," is more politically conscious and creative within
the context of two worlds in change.

156 equipment from the government projects and from smuggling sheep and mer-
[685] [439] chandise across the Libyan border. Although some of these stories might
be exaggerated, they all point to the fact that Hakim, despite his wealth,
is not the most popular or reputable individual in bait Asabei', and that
although Shei'eb is not a popular individual either, he definitely comes
up the winner in any popularity contest between the two. The question is
156 why Hakim was selected by the Awaqil to replace Shei'eb. The case in-
613 volved more than Shei'eb's inability to collect the money from members of
558 682 his bait. Shei'eb's ineffectiveness seemed to have been taken as an ex-
683 cuse rather than as the direct cause. Many Aqaqil, before Shei'eb, had
failed in collecting money from their own bait without being subject to
direct challenge. What seems to be involved is more than a challenge to
a particular member, Shei'eb. It is a challenge to the whole principle
by which Shei'eb acquired his position as Aqila of bait Asabei': pat-
rilineal succession.

156 Shei'eb is the youngest of four sons of the former Aqila of bait
159 Asabei', Sheikh Elewa. For more than fifty years Sheikh Elewa was the
613 undisputed Aqila of bait Asabei'. He also had considerable influence
463 683 among other tribal segments throughout the whole of the Western Desert
554 by virtue of his position as "nazzar", that is, the expert who assesses
the amount of compensation for wound inflicted in a liable case. The
[428] position of nazzar is a hereditary one and had been handed down from
[779] father to son. The basis for his assessment of wounds are a number of
old books believed to be obtained from Mecca and contain all the judg-
ments of famous Islamic leaders in their assessments of wounds.

[428] Eleven years ago when Sheikh Elewa became blind and too old to

156 exercise his functions, he invited all the important people in the area
159 into a large gathering during which he announced that he was handing the
613 sacred books to Shei'eb, who was to become the nazzar and also to succeed
463 him as the Aqila of bait Asabei'. Although at that time Shei'eb was
683 fairly young, twenty-six, nobody questioned Sheikh Elewa's decision.
554 "He is the Aqila," said one informant, "and he has the right to decide
428 which of his sons is to succeed him. After all, he knows his sons better
(079) than anybody else and knows which one is best for the job." Most people
156 thought that Sheikh Elewa, being still alive and with clear thinking,
159 would help Shei'eb in performing his duties as Aqila. A few months after
613 Shei'eb took over his father's position, it became apparent that he was
554 too immature for the job. He tried to use his position to take money
578 from members of his bait and when they refused to give him any money, he
[661] entered into fights with a number of them. Rumors spread that he took
bribes from the disputing parties who came to him for him to assess the
legal compensation for wounds to raise or lower his estimate. But still
people within bait Asabei' as well as outside it respected Sheikh Elewa's
decision and did not challenge Shei'eb openly. But as time passed the
dissatisfaction with Shei'eb grew. This dissatisfaction came mainly from
members of the Amar who were affected directly by Shei'eb's actions, especially those actions which resulted in the payment of compensation for
wounds inflicted in fights.

PHASE II

439 On the evening of May 16, 1966, two members of the Geneishat tribe of Matruh area came to Burg-el-Arab with a large shipment of smuggled cigarettes to leave with their partner in the area, Hadi, from the

634 government." But due to the nature of the representation and the specific
554 relation of the government to the area, the position of the omda
657
[578] does not pose serious demands upon the loyalty of the omda to his tribal
group.

634 Because of the omda's ability to bring benefits to his tribal segment
554 from the government, the ability to manipulate the administrative
657
666 officials is the most important basis for the nomination of a given
individual for the position of the omda. "The omda is one who can speak city talk and knows how to deal with the government officials." Age is not important; young people know more about city ways than old people. "A man may be a cheat, but as long as he can get our things done, he is the best man for the job...of course, we don't want to nominate someone with a bad reputation who may blacken our face in front of everybody. However, if he has a bad reputation the council would not approve his appointment...he just has to be someone who can get things done..."

● 159 Muftah Mughaieb, the sheikh of the Sanagrah tribal segment in the
634 district of Haman, described the circumstances of his nomination as
554 follows:

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> Before the former sheikh of that tribal segment died (he was Muftah's uncle), one member of the group got into an argument with the police officer in charge of the police station in the district. The tribesman insulted the police officer who insisted on arresting him. Rumors also had it that the police officer was using his authority to reduce the share of the tribal segment in the government aid which was badly needed during that particular year. Sheikh Muftah, whose father is the Aqila of

159 bait Mughaieb of the Sanagrah tribe, went to the officer and apologized
634 to him on behalf of the whole group and invited him to a
554 lavish dinner party. The charges against the tribesman were soon
657 dropped, and it was concluded that it was because of the way Muftah
666 had handled the situation. Since that incident, Muftah has been
[578] known as an expert in handling the government officials. One year
[625] later, the sheikh of the tribal segment died, and a meeting was held during which the important members of the Sanagrah tribal segment in the district decided to nominate Muftah for the position of the sheikh, vacant by the death of his uncle. Muftah, who was attending the meeting, was asked to accept the nomination, and he agreed. "...I accepted the nomination reluctantly." Muftah later told me, "I did not really want to become the sheikh. The
159 position does not bring any personal benefit, and it involves a
634 lot of responsibility. The sheikh has to act as an attorney for
554 his tribe, represent it to the government and competes with other
657 sheikhs to bring his people things that the other sheikhs cannot get for theirs, like more membership in the cooperative units or in the socialist union. And what does he get in return? Nothing... not even the gratitude of his people. To them, he is a servant of the tribe, and his duty is to look after its interest. If he doesn't, then everybody is quick to criticize him. I had to accept the nomination because I felt it was my duty to do so and not to embarrass the awaqil and the important people of the tribe who
[465] put their confidence in me. As far as the government, all I get is six pounds a month."

562 such compensation. In forfeiting her rights of inheritance, a woman
428 secures for herself and her children the continuous support of her
593 kin-group and the protection of her rights. This support was denied in the few cases I was able to collect in which the woman demanded her share of inheritance. The following is one of these cases. The material
159 presented is a summary of the life history of Fatma, who at the time of
562 the study, was a shopkeeper managing the small general store she owned
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593 near the railroad station of Burg el-Arab, some fifty miles west of
[444] Alexandria. She also practiced healing and midwifery on a part-time
[759] basis.

Fatma was the only daughter with four sons of sheikh El-Asi, who at one time was the aqila of bait Hussein of the Sanagrah tribal segment
[627] in the area. He was also known as a mardi and was frequently sought in
[755] mediation of disputes. He was believed to have supernatural power which he used to cure people for a certain amount of money. During his life-
[454] time, he had acquired a sizable sum of money which he invested in live-
[233] stock. At the time of his death his herd, which numbered more than 900
[422] sheep and goats, was considered the finest in the area. He had no barley
[423] lands because his camp was deep in the desert, but he had fine grazing land.

Throughout the area the four sons were known for being arrogant and irresponsible. Three of them were employed by one of the irrigation projects carried on by the government in the area as construction workers; the fourth looked after the herd of his father. All four were known as chasers of women, and they frequently went to Alexandria to visit prostitutes and drink liquor.

[444] Fatma was first married when she was eighteen to a man from Alexandria who had opened a general store in the area where her father

159 562 428 593 444 lived. Five years ago the husband died in a mining accident leaving Fatma with a ten-month-old boy. By that time, her father had been disabled, and her brothers wanted to manage her husband's store on her behalf. Knowing that her brothers were greedy, she refused and insisted that she take care of the store herself. The brothers objected on the grounds that it was not customary for a decent woman to be exposed to the customers in the store. When she insisted, the brothers threatened her. When the threats did not work, they beat her. After that, she [625] went to the police station in the area, filed a complaint against her brothers, and asked for police protection. The police officer in charge brought the brothers in and warned them that if they interfered with the store, not only would he arrest them, but he would also use his influence to get them forced from the irrigation projects where three of them worked. The threat worked, and they became friendly with their sister, buying things for the store whenever they went to Alexandria and sometimes helping in the store with her consent when she was on housecalls as a midwife. 159 562 428 593 233 [587] A year later Fatma was married for the second time to a distant cousin; a few months later her father died. In a family meeting that followed the funeral, Fatma made her announcement that she was claiming her share of her father's herd. The brothers were angry and tried to beat her. But the older members of the bait who were present at the meeting stopped them and told them that Fatma had all the right to claim her share of the inheritance according to Awlad Ali ways and that there was [578] nothing that they could do about it. She was characterized in that meeting as "bint haram" (illegitimate child), an insult used to refer to those who show selfishness in their kinship obligations. When she left the camp with her share of the herd, this seemed to have severed

159 562 the relationship between her and her brothers.

428 Following her action and until the time of the study, they had
593 never visited her and she had never visited them. Her husband took
[232] care of the herd; and the arrangement worked out all right until the
159 562 husband told Fatma one day that he was going to marry a second wife.
593 She refused, but he went ahead with the marriage without her consent.
595 He brought the new wife to live with Fatma in the same tin hut in which
they were living. He started to pay more attention to the new wife and
to neglect Fatma; whenever the latter complained, he beat her. Then,
before one of the religious feasts, he sold two of Fatma's sheep and
bought his new wife a dress and a silver bracelet. When Fatma objected
[164] and they argued, he hit her with a stick on the head; she was hospitalized for a week with a serious head wound. While in the hospital, she
went to her brothers who lived only two miles away, but they refused to
159 come to her assistance. She then went to sheikh Elewa (the aqila of
562 Bait Asabei) and threw herself on him. He met with the husband and con-
594 vinced him to divorce Fatma. He kept forty sheep of Fatma's herd as com-
593 595 pensation for the mahr he had paid her and the marriage expenses, then
586 took his new wife and moved from Fatma's hut. Fatma then returned and
159 managed her financial affairs successfully herself. She managed the
562 444 store and hired a shepherd to take care of the sheep. At the time of
[233] the present study she was respected by almost everybody in the area, including members of the local administration. She is known to be reason-
[629] able and of sound opinion, and her store functions as the meeting place
[521] for many of the tribal mi'ads and for casual conversations. She is also
considered as a liason between the tribal population in the area and the
local government administration, and is respected by both sides.

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562 This apparently is not a typical case, nor is Fatma by any means representative of a typical tribal women. It is a case of a marginal woman who had revolted against the tribal definition of a female role. [428] She violated the customary ways of her society and claimed her share of [593] her father's inheritance; and by doing this, she forfeited her right to [183] protection by her brothers. She was able to do this because of her mar- [625] ginality which enabled her to draw upon sources of protection outside the tribal pattern, the police. It is interesting to note here that by doing so, she was not totally eliminated or ostracized from her society; rather, her role was redefined as that of a man, and she was treated as such.

ment to which his teachings led, it may be said that the great 795*
difference between the Grand Sanusi and the earlier holy men 793
whose tombs are homely landmarks all over Cyrenaica was that, 182
while they were, all of them, in the eyes of the Bedouin, Mara- [792]
bouts, the Grand Sanusi was also the head of an Order which [778]
gave to him and his successors an organization. Moreover, unlike the Heads of most Islamic Orders, which have rapidly disintegrated into autonomous segments without contact and common direction, they have been able to maintain this organization intact and keep control of it. This they were able to do by co-ordinating the lodges of the Order to the tribal structure.

III

The more recent Islamic Orders are to be found principally 795*
in North and West Africa. The Sanusiya is one of the most 793
recent of them. Its founder was an Algerian scholar, al-Sayyid 159●
Muhammad bin 'Ali al-Sanusi al-Khattabi al-Idrisi al-Hasani,
a very remarkable man, mystic, missionary, and Marabout. 175*
The Sayyid Muhammad bin 'Ali al-Sanusi is usually spoken of in Cyrenaica as *al-Sanusi al-Kabir*, the Grand Sanusi, and I generally refer to him thus in this book.

The Grand Sanusi was born of a distinguished family of Sharifs at a village near Mustaghanim in Algeria about 1787. Early in life he became noted for his intelligence, piety, and profound learning, considered fitting ornaments to his noble birth. He studied first at Mustaghanim, then at Mazun, and later at the famous mosque school at Fez in Morocco, where he learnt theology, jurisprudence, exegesis of the Koran, and the other usual subjects of a Muslim student of the time. There he seems to have developed an interest in mysticism, having come under the influence of the Moroccan Order of the Tijaniya Darwishes. He left Fez when in the early thirties in order to make the pilgrimage to Mecca, though a Turkish biographer says that one of his reasons for leaving Morocco was to avoid possible unpleasantness with the authorities, who were alarmed lest his propaganda for the greater unity of Islam, his life's aim, might have political consequences.[1] They had small cause for alarm as his efforts seem to have made little impression on the

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[1] Salim bin 'Amir, *Majallat 'Umar al-Mukhtar*, No. II, 1943–4, p. 2.

*795 people of Fez, but, if the story is true, the suspicion of those in
793 authority would have been his first experience of the kind of
● 159 opposition he was later to encounter in Cairo and Mecca.

*175 He went from Fez to southern Algeria and thence to Qabis, Tripoli, Misurata, and Banghazi, preaching everywhere on his way. He had already gathered around him his first disciples (*Ikhwan*), mostly Algerians, and in their company he made his way to Egypt by the coastal route from Banghazi and stayed there a few weeks. He had intended to study at al-Azhar, but he seems to have aroused the jealousy of the Shaikhs of the University and to have irritated them by his reforming zeal and his speculations, and so departed for Mecca. Short though his stay in Cairo had been it is probable that the independence of the Khedive Muhammad 'Ali and the cultural and intellectual revival going on there left their mark on his mind.[1]

He remained in the Hijaz for about six years, studying under a number of Shaikhs at Mecca and al-Madina. He is said to have returned to Mustaghanim in about 1829 and not to have visited the Hijaz again till 1833. On this second visit, which lasted for eight years, he was accompanied by a considerable number of disciples from the west. He continued his reformist agitation and his studies under learned Shaikhs at Mecca. The man who influenced him most, and whose favourite pupil he became, was Sayyid Ahmad bin Idris al-Fasi, the fourth Head of the Moroccan Order of the Khadiriya or Khidriya Darwishes, a branch of the Shadhiliya Order, and later the founder of a new sub-Order of his own, the Idrisiya or Khadiriya-Idrisiya. Sayyid Ahmad Idris had aroused the hostility of the doctors of the Maliki rite at Mecca, by whom he was regarded as unorthodox, and went into exile into the Yaman, where he was accompanied for two years by the Grand Sanusi. On Sayyid Ahmad Idris's death in the Yaman, his two chief disciples organized his followers into two new sub-Orders, the Mirghaniya and the Sanusiya, the latter being organized and led by the Grand Sanusi, who established its headquarters at Mt. Abu Qubais, near Mecca, in 1837. This year is regarded as the official date of the foundation of the Order.

It will have been noted that the Grand Sanusi was influenced by a wide range of Sufi tradition and had affiliated himself to a

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[1] Salim bin 'Amir, *Majallat 'Umar al-Mukhtar*, No. I, p. 12.

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number of Orders before he founded his own. It has been recorded that he was influenced by the Moroccan Tijaniya Order and that at Mecca he became the favourite pupil of the founder of the Idrisiya Order, which derived its tenets from the basic Shadhiliya Order. In his student days he became a member of other Orders: Shadhiliya, Nasiriya, Qadariya, and perhaps others.[1] His catholicism was not peculiar among the Sufis, and in his case he seems to have joined a large variety of Orders with the deliberate intention of learning their rites and doctrines at first hand so that he could combine all that was best in each of them in a new Order which would be the crown of Sufi thought and practice. It must not be supposed that on this account his teaching was a mere amalgam of the tenets of earlier Orders. Original it was not, but it was a consistent and carefully thought out way of life.[2]

[798]

The new Sanusiya Order made such rapid progress, especially among the Bedouin of the Hijaz,[3] that it excited the jealousy and fear of the various authorities in Mecca, the *'Ulama*, the Sharifs, and the Turkish Administration. There can be little doubt that the real objections to the Order were that it threatened the prestige and privileges of these authorities, but they were framed in less revealing language. It seems to have been held against the Order that it lowered Sufi standards to accommodate itself to Bedouin laxity in religious matters, and that it verged on heresy.

Faced with serious opposition the Grand Sanusi did what his teacher Sayyid Ahmad Idris had done in similar circumstances: he left the Hijaz, in about 1841, accompanied by many of his disciples, to return to his native land. After spending some months in Cairo, he continued his journey westwards to Siwa oasis, where he was taken sick and spent several weeks recuperating and instructing the people of the oasis in the faith. In the following year he reached Tripoli by the desert route. On his way to Qabis from that town he heard of the new French advances in his homeland and decided in view of them to return to Tripoli and thence to Banghazi. It would appear therefore

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[1] Ibid., p. 6; Adams, op. cit., p. 22.

[2] Carlo Giglio, *La Confraternità Senussita dalle sue Origini ad Oggi*, 1932, p. 17.

[3] A. Le Chatelier, *Les Confréries Musulmanes du Hedjaz*, 1887, *passim*.

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*795 that he did not choose Cyrenaica as his field of labour but was
793 compelled to settle in Libya for a time because the road to the
159 west was closed by the French and the road to the east by the
*175 authorities in Cairo and Mecca. The Grand Sanusi was a
cosmopolitan, a townsman, and more at home in the schools and libraries of Fez, Cairo, and Mecca than amid the lentisk and juniper of the Cyrenaican plateau or the thyme and wormwood of its rolling plains. Even after founding in 1843 what has become the Mother Lodge of the Order, al-Zawiya al-Baida, on the central Cyrenaican plateau, not far from the ancient city of Cyrene, and while the Sanusi movement was still young in the country, he returned in 1846 to Mecca and stayed there till 1853. Altogether he spent only about ten years of his teaching life in Cyrenaica, whereas he spent some twenty years in the Hijaz.

On his return to Cyrenaica he seems to have felt the need for greater solitude. He was then nearing seventy years of age and doubtless felt that what was left to him of life should be given
*[648] to contemplation, prayer, and study. It may be true also, as is
commonly stated in books written by Europeans, that he desired to place a wide stretch of desert between himself and the Turkish authorities who, as the Sanusiya movement grew, began to take greater interest in it. He therefore first went to live for a short while at al-'Azziyyat on the southern edge of the plateau, where he built a zawiya, and afterwards at Jaghbub, about 160 km. from the sea.

[873] Jaghbub, now to become the centre of the Order and the seat of an Islamic University second only in Africa to al-Azhar, was till 1856, when the Grand Sanusi made it his seat, an uninhabited oasis, in which the water was brackish, highly sulphurous, and insufficient to irrigate more than a small area of gardens. It was not a place for luxurious living, though it seems to have been healthy and, unlike Siwa, free from malaria; but it had certain political advantages. It was out of reach of
*[648] the Turkish, French, or Egyptian governments, it was on the
main pilgrimage route from North-west Africa through Egypt
[487] to Mecca, and this pilgrimage route bisected at the oasis one
of the trade routes from the coast to the Sahara and the Sudan. Moreover, since Cyrenaica is a peninsula, it was the most central point he could have chosen at that time to be in equal

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touch with the lodges of his Order in Cyrenaica, Tripolitania, the Western Desert of Egypt, and the Sudan.

In moving the seat of his Order to Jaghbub, the Grand Sanusi was probably most influenced by his decision to direct his missionary propaganda southwards. It is understandable that he should have made this decision. His was a missionary mind and the Order he had founded a missionary Order, and the pagan and semi-pagan countries of the Sahara and the Sudan, and of Equatorial Africa beyond them, offered endless scope for conversion to the faith. Moreover, his Order was already reaching the limits of its expansion in North Africa. It had won over the nomad and semi-nomad Bedouin tribes of Cyrenaica, Tripolitania, and Egypt, and the oases folk under their influence, but was not making, and was not even in its heyday to make, much impression on the peasants and townsmen up against whom it now found itself in Northern Tripolitania and the Nile Valley. Dammed to west and east the Order

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
Scale
0
500
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1,500 kms.
Italian expansion into Tripolitania and Cyrenaica
1911 – 1932
MOROCCO
ALGERIA
TUNISIA
TRIPOLITANIA
CYRENAICA
Al-Baida (1843)
Mizda
Al-Tabaqa
Saukna
Jalu
Jaghbub (1856)
British line of defence 1914-1917
Wau-al-Kabir
Kufra (1895)
FEZZAN
EGYPT
French expansion into the Sahara
1902 – 1914
Kawar
TIBESTI
Qiru (1899)
BORKU
ENNEDI
KANEM
ANGLO EGYPTIAN SUDAN
FRENCH SAHARA
CHAD
WADAI
DARFUR
Thin arrows indicate Sanusiya expansion
Thick arrows indicate movements of European Powers

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The Spread of the Sanusiya in North Africa.

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*795 poured its vitality southwards along the trade routes to the
793 interior of Africa, into Fazzan and the various regions that are
797 to-day called the French Sahara and French Equatorial Africa.
• 159 Until France opened up the Atlantic seaboard, much of the
Central African trade found its way along the oases-routes to
*175 the ports of Cyrenaica and Tripolitania and there were, therefore, well-established social connexions running from the Bedouin tribes of Cyrenaica and southern Tripolitania through the oases-dwellers to the tribes of the interior, for the nomads of Libya controlled the routes and to a large extent supplied the transport for the caravans. These connexions allowed an easy ingress to the Sanusiya. The two Cyrenaican tribes who chiefly traded with the Sahara, the Majabra and the Zuwaya of the oases of Jalu and al-Jikharra, had already been won over to the Order. The Zuwaya, who had date groves in the distant oasis archipelago of Kufra, over 700 km. to the south of Jaghbub, had already promised the Grand Sanusi a liberal donation of palms and water if he would build a zawiya there, and he had sent one of his followers to supervise the erection at al-Jauf of a lodge which became known as Zawiyat al-Ustad. Also, the Order had gained a foothold in the Wadai. While still a student at Mecca the Grand Sanusi had made friends with Muhammad Sharif, a prince of the Wadai, who in 1838 became Sultan of that country and furthered the interests of the Order there. It is said also that the Grand Sanusi bought a caravan of slaves on its way from the Wadai through Jaghbub to the coast and, having freed and educated them, sent them back to the Wadai as his missionaries.[1] The Order was also infiltrating from Mizda in southern Tripolitania, where a lodge was founded in 1845, and from the lodges in the oases of the Sirtican hinterland into Fazzan.

*795 In Jaghbub oasis the Grand Sanusi set about the construc-
793 tion of his headquarters, a large mass of stone buildings, some
of them two-storied, enclosing a mosque and school which were,
159 for Cyrenaica, on an imposing scale. Around these central
*175 buildings and courts were the houses of the *Ikhwan*, many of
346 them teachers in the school, of the students, of whom Shaikh Muhammad 'Uthman says that there were over 300,[2] and of the Sayyid's family. There were also guest-rooms, quarters for the

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[1] Duveyrier, op. cit., pp. 18–19.

[2] Op. cit., p. 88.

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slaves, kitchens, and wells. The oasis depression was studded 793
with date palms and just outside the main entrance to the village 159 •
were small irrigated gardens and wind-mills. The people had 175*
to use the brackish water for ordinary purposes, but sufficient [346]
fresh water for tea was obtained from infrequent showers by [241]
hollowing out cisterns in the rocks at the top of the western [379]
escarpment of the oasis. [312]

The Grand Sanusi was not only a very learned man and a writer of distinction but also a bibliophile with a fine library of [217] some 8,000 volumes,[1] mostly works on Islamic law and jurisprudence, mysticism, philosophy, history, koranic exegesis, poetry, and astronomy and astrology. Round him were many men capable of making good use of this substantial library. Indeed, it would have been difficult to have found anywhere in the Islamic world at that time, outside Cairo, a circle of better scholars. Poetry was one of the arts most cultivated at the oasis and I have been told by Arabs that it reached a high level of excellence. Shaikh Muhammad 'Uthman, himself a poet, wrote that at Jaghbub one meets 'literary men of distinction, whose writings eclipse those of the poets of Iraq and of Andalousia'.[2]

The whole community at Jaghbub may have numbered round about 1,000, but it is not possible to make more than a guess at the figure. As the oasis produces little except dates, the supply problem must have been considerable, and we know that the Grand Sanusi kept herds of camels to the west of the oasis, where there is scrub grazing, and at al-'Azziyyat, to transport supplies from the coast. The community lived very largely on the surplus revenues, mostly goods in kind, sent annually by all the zawiyas of Cyrenaica.

The community was centred round the University. It was, [873] in fact, almost purely a University society, and its importance as such in the history of the Sanusiya Order is very considerable. Here, under his personal supervision and the supervision of his disciples, far from worldly distractions, the Grand Sanusi was able to train the future leaders of the Order. The Shaikhs of the lodges of the Order were appointed by him from among his intimate circle of disciples, many of whom had followed him

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[1] Duveyrier, op. cit., p. 24; Muhammad bin 'Uthman, op. cit., p. 88; Sir Richard Burton, *Personal Narrative of a Pilgrimage to al-Madinah and Meccah* (Memorial Edition), 1893, vol. ii, pp. 24-5.

[2] Op. cit., p. 88.

*795 from Algeria and the other countries of the Maghrib on his
793 travels backwards and forwards to Arabia. He found in
● 159 Cyrenaica a tribal structure of a simple kind on which it was
*175 possible to build a missionary organization, but not out of
which it could be built. He brought this organization with him
to Cyrenaica, a band of devoted followers whose allegiance had
been tried by many vicissitudes. It must be remembered also
that these intimates of the Grand Sanusi were foreigners to the
Bedouin of Cyrenaica, with whom they had no ties of kinship,
so that they stood always outside the tribal system and were
not involved in the ancient loyalties and feuds inherent in
Bedouin society. The missionary organization, the Sanusiya
*795 Order, was separate from the tribal system, and by centring
793 it in the distant oasis of Jaghbub the Grand Sanusi prevented it
797 from becoming identified with any one tribe or section of the
159 country, as it might have become had it been centred in Cyrenaica
*175 proper. As we will see, it was the local attachment of the tribes
to the zawiyas in their territories, and the attachment of the
Shaikhs of these zawiyas to the Head of the Order, which made
the Order so effective a missionary Body, and eventually
enabled it to become a political force.

The Grand Sanusi died at Jaghbub on 7 September 1859 and
*795 was buried there. Later a magnificent shrine, furnished with
793 ornate trappings, was erected over his bones and was sur-
159 mounted with a white cupola, which gleams several miles away
*175 as one approaches the oasis. The shrine is of Egyptian craft-
764 manship and seems incongruous in its desert surroundings and
[177] unfamiliar among a simple people.

There can be no gainsaying that al-Sayyid Muhammad bin
*795 'Ali al-Sanusi was a great man and his life's work a great
793 achievement. He is said to have been tall and of a distinguished
159 appearance, an eloquent speaker, and a wise teacher.[1] His
religious personality may be estimated by the fact that many
Algerians, Tunisians, and Moroccans were so inspired by his
teaching and example that they left their homes and followed
him on his travels and at his orders went as missionaries into
new lands, and by the fact that the Bedouin of Arabia and
Libya, who are a reserved and unheeding people, accepted him
as their guide in things both spiritual and temporal.

[1] Adams, op. cit., p. 10.

The mere physical achievement of the man was remarkable. 795*
He had studied assiduously since he was a small boy in the 793
Koranic school of his home and in other schools of North Africa 159 •
and Arabia, and was still acquiring and sifting knowledge in his 175*
library at Jaghbub up to his death. He had taught in the schools
in Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Tripolitania, Cyrenaica, Egypt,
the Hijaz, and the Yaman. Months of his life had been spent
in travelling by the slow camel caravans of those days. He had [788]
thrice made the pilgrimage to Mecca. In spite of these activities
he had found time to write a number of treatises. He had
started his career as the head of a new missionary Order late in
life—he was about 50 years of age when he founded his first
zawiya in Arabia, and in the next twenty years he had made the
Sanusiya the dominant Order in western Arabia and in North
Africa from the Nile Valley to the borders of Tunisia and from
the Mediterranean to the Sahara. When he died it was still
intensifying its activities in the areas where it was already
dominant, building everywhere new lodges, and was still
expanding, mainly into the Sahara and the Sudan.

IV

When the Grand Sanusi died his two surviving sons, al-Sayyid Muhammad al-Mahdi and al-Sayyid Muhammad al-Sharif, were minors, so a regency of ten Shaikhs was appointed to control the affairs of the Order till the elder, Muhammad al-Mahdi, was old enough to take over their direction. When he did so he dealt primarily with the general affairs of the Order, leaving religious instruction in the hands of his brother.

The Grand Sanusi had been typical of the great itinerant teachers of his day: international in outlook and intent on the pursuit of holiness and learning rather than guided by secular distractions and ambitions. Mecca was the centre of his world and to it he tended always to gravitate. The Sayyid al-Mahdi was more definitely a Cyrenaican. Born in 1844 in a cave at Massa, near the Cyrenaican Mother Lodge of al-Baida, he was brought up among the religious families of the country and among the Bedouin. He studied under his father, the erudite Moroccan Sidi Ahmad al-Rifi, Sidi 'Ali bin 'abd al-Maula, Sidi 'Umran bin Baraka, and others of his father's circle of pupil-

[TEXT CONTINUED ON PAGE 21]

savants, and later at Mecca. He is said to have been an eloquent 795*
and inspiring leader and he was evidently an able organizer. 793
Unlike his father the Grand Sanusi and his nephew Sayyid 159 ●
Ahmad al-Sharif he has left no writings behind and he seems 175*
to have had less interest than they in literature and speculation.
He lived an austere life and was considered by his followers to
have been a saint and worker of miracles as great, or greater,
than his father.

The Order expanded considerably under Sayyid al-Mahdi's
leadership, particularly into the Sahara and the Sudan, and its
greatly extended missionary enterprises demanded his personal
attention. The conversion of the heathen and semi-heathen [797]
tribes of these regions created political problems and the trading
activities of the Order required organization. The trade routes [487]
through the Libyan oases to the coast had increased in importance
since the rise of the Sudanese Mahdi in 1881 had closed
the Nile route. Personal direction was difficult from Jaghbub,
so in 1895 Sayyid al-Mahdi moved the seat of the Order to
Kufra, a more central position than Jaghbub in the theocratic
empire being slowly built up. He first went to live at the
zawiya of al-Ustad but shortly afterwards built a new zawiya,
in which he resided, on a site which became known as al-Taj.
He departed from Jaghbub amid the lamentations of his
followers, only some of whom he was able to take with him to
Kufra, leaving the rest behind at Jaghbub, with his nephew al-Sayyid
Muhammad 'Abid as his titular representative there. 175*

There are few places in the world so remote as Kufra oasis, 795*
but it was at the centre of the Sanusi empire and the meeting-place 793
of a number of important desert routes. Before Sayyid 159
al-Mahdi made it the seat of his Order, Kufra had been little 487
more than a watering place for caravans and the centre for the 437
wandering Tibbu tribes of the region, though the Zuwaya of [361]
al-Jikharra went there each year to collect dates. It now became
an emporium through which caravans were constantly passing
and exchange was carried on. The Sanusiya profited both
by directly engaging in trade and transport and through
customs dues.

The little village of mud and palmwood houses at al-Taj also 795*
became a centre of religious life and propaganda. The missionary 793
efforts of the Order intensified all over Fazzan and into 159
175*
[797]

*795 the territories of Kawar, Tibesti, Borku, Ennedi, Darfur,
793 Wadai, Kanem, Chad, the Azger, the Air, and Baghirmi. Its
797 teachings were spread as far as Senegal. The work of organizing
• 159 this propaganda fell largely to Sayyid al-Mahdi's two principal
*175 lieutenants. Sidi Muhammad al-Barrani operated in Kanem,
where he founded a lodge at Bir Alali on the route to Chad and
*795 organized bands among the Aulad Suliman, Zuwaya, Majabra,
793 Tibbu, and especially the Tuwariq, to oppose the advance of
159 the French into Central Africa; and afterwards in the Borku.
Muhammad al-Sunni, and his son al-Mahdi, operated in Bornu
*175 and Baghirmi, where he entered into relations, politically unfruitful,
*648 with the Sultans of those countries, and in the Wadai,
where he strengthened the good relations existing between the Sultan of that country and Sayyid al-Mahdi. In 1899 Sayyid al-Mahdi transferred the seat of his Order to Qiru (or Quru) oasis, between Borku and Tibesti, to direct better its propaganda, to administer the extensive regions won to it, and to organize resistance to the French.

It is sometimes said in European books that one reason why
[114] Sayyid al-Mahdi went from Jaghbub to Kufra was his desire
to increase the distance between himself and the Turkish Administration of Cyrenaica, but I have not found any evidence to support this view. On the other hand there can be no doubt that he was alarmed by the military and political activities of the French, about which he seems to have been well informed. The French were hastening to reach the limits of the sphere allotted to them by the agreements with England of 1898 and 1899 about the partition of Central Africa. In January 1902 they seized Bir Alali (Kanem) and destroyed the Sanusiya zawiya there. At the end of May, or at the beginning of June, in the same year Sayyid al-Mahdi died. His brother, Sayyid Muhammad al-Sharif, had predeceased him at Jaghbub in 1896.

*795 In general the energies of the Sayyid al-Mahdi had been
793 directed to the Sahara and the Sudan and the main events during
159 his headship of the Order took place off the Cyrenaican stage.
I have not thought it necessary, therefore, to give more than a
*175 brief summary of his career and of the political history of the
Order in Central Africa. He saw the Order his father had founded rise under his direction to the height of its expansion

3:Evans-Pritchard E-4, 5 (1942-1944) 1949 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9
(1837-1942) Sanusi

and political importance. Except for two or three lodges 795*
founded after his death the distribution of the lodges shown on 793
the map—two in Algeria, and some elsewhere which were not 159 •
completed, are not marked—is that of 1902. All the Bedouin 175*
of Cyrenaica and of the Sirtica, and most of those in the Western Desert of Egypt, followed the Order and there was no part of these regions which had not established in it a Sanusiya lodge; and even in the towns of Cyrenaica it had an influential following in the more cultured administrative and commercial circles. In southern Tripolitania the Order had slowly increased its authority and advanced it to the west, while it was the dominant power in Fazzan and in the central Sahara. It had retained a powerful following among the Bedouin of the Hijaz.

After Sayyid al-Mahdi's death the fortunes of the Order 795*
declined. This was chiefly due to the attack on it by the powers 793
of Europe whose greed for possessions in Africa and Asia was 159
bringing them rapidly to disaster. For his part Sayyid al-Mahdi 175*
showed himself anxious to avoid any action which might enable
these powers to accuse him of political designs. He wished only 648*
to be left alone to worship God according to the teachings of his Prophet, and when in the end he fought the French it was in defence of the religious life as he understood it. In its remarkable diffusion in North and Central Africa the Order never once resorted to force to back its missionary labours. Shaikh Muhammad 'Uthman says of Sayyid al-Mahdi that the only orders he gave his followers were to pray and to obey God and His Prophet, that he avoided making any show of his power, considerable though it was, and that he held himself apart from political questions, fleeing from all considerations of that kind.[1] The Sanusiya Order co-operated with the Turks in the administration of Cyrenaica, although the Sanusi family and the Brothers of the Order disapproved of their way of life, but it resisted Turkish demands for assistance in their war of 1876–8 against the Russians. It refused the aid asked for by 'Arabi Pasha in Egypt in 1882, and by the Sudanese Mahdi in 1883, against the British. Sayyid al-Mahdi likewise rejected diplomatic overtures by the Italians and Germans. But when the French invaded its Saharan territories and destroyed its religious houses, and when later the Italians, also without

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[1] Op. cit., pp. 118–19.

[TEXT CONTINUED ON PAGE 26]

*795

*175 provocation, did the same in Cyrenaica, the Order had no ● [159] choice but to resist.

[793] But though it was attacks from the outside which destroyed *[648] the theocratic empire of the Sanusiya, it may be considered doubtful whether in any case such extensive territories could have been maintained under single direction. The economic and political organization of the Order was crude, even when elaborated in the days of Sayyid al-Mahdi in response to increased trading activities and to the need of maintaining peace in the petty and barbarous states that had come under its influence. Its administrative machinery was at no time adequate for effective control over such wide domains, with their poor communications and their manifold tribal, racial, [578] and cultural divergencies. To these weaknesses must be added, after Sayyid al-Mahdi's death, personal rivalries within the Sanusi family on the lines of which cracks began to appear in the loose empire, and it is probable that even if it had not been attacked by the Powers of Europe it would have broken up into a number of principalities, or spheres of religious influence, ruled by various members of the family. It might indeed be *[648] possible to sustain the thesis that it was the Italian occupation [182] of Libya which prevented the complete break-up of the Order by rallying the outraged sentiment of the Bedouin to its side as the symbol of their common resistance to conquest and alien rule.

The administrative organization of the Order in the time of Sayyid al-Mahdi was simple indeed. Each lodge of the Order [794] lived on its own revenues, derived from endowments, tithes, contributions of money, goods, transport, and labour, and sent its surplus to Jaghbub and Kufra for the maintenance of the University and of the Sanusi family and for the general purposes [628] of the Order. The Shaikh of each lodge arbitrated in disputes in the district in which it was situated and could generally wield spiritual sanctions sufficiently weighty to compel acceptance of his awards. The Shaikh of a lodge was appointed by the head of the Order and was responsible to him. There was, however, so little centralized planning that new lodges seem occasionally to have been founded by the initiative of influential families without the head of the Order hearing of the new foundation till its completion. In the more distant parts

the lodges were largely autonomous, or came under the control 795*
of a local Mother Lodge, such as Mizda in Tripolitania and Abu 175*
Qubais in Arabia. After the death of Sayyid al-Mahdi, a member of the Sanusi family sometimes installed himself as local director of the affairs of the Order, as Sayyid Muhammad 'Abid did in Fazzan. Without going into further detail it may be said that though central control existed it was cumbersome and that though there was an organization it was inadequate to deal with situations such as that which faced the Order on the death of Sayyid al-Mahdi, which demanded a rapid marshalling of its dispersed resources.

V

The dynastic situation which had formed after the death of 795*
the Grand Sanusi formed again after the death of Sayyid al- 793
Mahdi: his surviving sons, Sayyid Muhammad Idris and Sayyid 175*
Muhammad al-Rida, were minors. The leadership of the Order therefore passed to Sayyid Ahmad al-Sharif, son of Sayyid Muhammad al-Sharif, Sayyid al-Mahdi's younger brother; though for the first few years its political direction seems to have been largely in the hands of the experienced old Shaikh Ahmad al-Rifi, the last of the intimates of the Grand Sanusi and the principal adviser of Sayyid al-Mahdi.

Sayyid Ahmad al-Sharif's leadership of the Order falls into 795*
three periods, from 1902 to 1912 when he was resisting the 793
French in the Sahara, from 1912 to 1918 when he was in 175*
Cyrenaica directing the Bedouin against the Italians and the 159 •
British, and from 1918, when he went into exile, to 1933, the 648*
year of his death at al-Madina in Arabia. It is only the second
period with which this book is directly concerned and I will [128]
therefore summarize very briefly the events in the Sahara, leaving to a future chapter a more detailed account of the events in Libya which led to the Sayyid's appearance in Cyrenaica at the head of the Sanusiya Militant.

The French advance continued. After the loss of Bir Alali in 795*
1902 Sayyid Ahmad moved his headquarters from Qiru back 175*
to Kufra, where he was protected by an immense desert and 648*
diplomatic immunity, since the British took the view that the [159]
oasis belonged to Turkey. In 1906 the French took Kawar and [793]

*175 was left to it in these regions was the isolated oasis of Kufra.
*648 He had by his foolish attack on the British brought about the
*795 destruction of the lodges of the Order and of its political
influence in the Western Desert of Egypt. Tripolitania had also been lost to the Sanusiya, though it was by this time almost entirely free from Italian domination. Ramadan al-Shtaiwi of Misurata barred its way into Old Tripolitania. Fazzan was in a state of anarchy. All that remained to the Order was its original North African core—the tribes of Cyrenaica and its Cyrenaican lodges—for in spite of all their defeats and miseries the Bedouin of the country still remained loyal to the Order whose interests were their own. The Italians were very far from having conquered these Bedouin and the history of the Order from the time of Sayyid Ahmad's departure is identical with the history of their continued resistance to the Italians under its leadership, first by diplomacy, then again by arms. With its empire and its dependence on the Sultanate the Order lost also its religious character and became, through its exclusive identification with the interests of the people of Cyrenaica, an almost purely political movement.

*175 Although there were for many years rumours, greeted with
great enthusiasm by the Bedouin and with nervous appre-
*648 hension by the Italians, of Sayyid Ahmad's impending return
793 to Cyrenaica he never again set foot on the African continent.
• 159 Born in 1873, Sayyid Ahmad al-Sharif was still in the early
forties when he left for Turkey. He was described at this time
[142] as a man of medium height, stout, for an Arab on the dark side,
with a firm and determined face adorned with a small moustache, close-cut whiskers on the upper jaw, and close-cut beard.[1] The Sayyid was obstinate, impulsive in his judgements and impetuous in his actions, and he seems to have been proud, quarrelsome, and fanatical. He was not prepared to compromise, and the British and Italians were in entire agreement that no understanding could be reached with him. But he was a pious Muslim and a brave and loyal man, tenacious of his beliefs, stubborn in his upholding of them against overwhelming odds, and dignified in their defeat. There was a certain wildness in his schemes and recklessness in his execution of them which compel admiration.

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[1] Admiralty War Staff, Intelligence Division, 26 May 1915.

After his departure from North Africa, Sayyid Ahmad con- 175*
tinued to lead an adventurous life. His wars against France, 159 ●
Italy, and Great Britain had made him a world figure, and in 793
the eyes of Muslims one of the foremost fighters for Islam of his
time. He was much sought after by the pan-Islamists of
Istanbul, who wished to use his name in their propaganda
directed to bringing Turks and Arabs more closely together. In
April 1921 he was designated King of Iraq at the Assembly of
Angora, but Faisal, backed by the British, had the advantage
of him in this project. He and his name played a big part in
persuading the Muslim minorities of Turkey to throw in their
lot with Mustafa Kamal. After Mustafa Kamal's victories
Sayyid Ahmad returned to Istanbul, where he tried to re-
establish the Caliphate, a project for which Mustafa Kamal
showed less enthusiasm. Early in 1922 we find him at Urfa
making peace between the great Bedouin tribes of Shammar and
'Anaza. We then find him at Marsina trying to reunite Syria to
Turkey. From there he went to live at Damascus. The French
found his presence in Syria embarrassing and expelled him from
the country in December 1924. Thence he went to the Hijaz,
where he remained till his death at al-Madina on 10 March 1933.
During the last years of his life he took less interest in politics.
He seems to have won the personal respect of King Ibn Sa'ud,
and he was called upon to settle local disputes, the most notable
of his achievements as peacemaker being a settlement of the
quarrel between the Amir Idris of 'Asir, the descendant of the
Grand Sanusi's teacher at Mecca, and the Imam Yahiya of
the Yaman, but he mainly lived in retirement among his books.
He lived just long enough to see the Sanusi cause to all [795]*
appearances as finally extinguished in Cyrenaica as it had been
elsewhere.

by the Assembly of Sirt had forwarded to Sayyid Idris the 175*
madbata, dated 28 July 1922, formally investing him with the 648*
Amirate of Tripolitania. 795*

Sayyid Idris still hesitated. Before giving a reply he wished 793
to consult Bedouin opinion, for it was on the Bedouin he would have to count were hostilities to break out. To this purpose he called, in October 1922, a large tribal gathering at Jardis al-'Abid. In the following month, under great pressure from his advisers, and still hesitating in his own mind, he accepted the Amirate. It must by this time have been apparent to him that the Italians intended to make war whatever course he took and that he might, in that case, just as well have the Tripolitanian Arabs as allies. In his reply to the Committee he entrusted Tripolitanian affairs to them, under their President Ahmad al-Marayid, until such time as a National Assembly could meet to draw up a constitution. Then, realizing that the fable of the wolf and the lamb was about to be enacted, he fled by caravan to Jaghbub in December 1922 and thence to Egypt, where he had long made financial preparation for this eventuality out of the Italian subsidies. He may also have felt that he had compromised himself so deeply with the Italians over a number of years that his presence in the country could only be an embarrassment to the Bedouin whose martial spirit he could understand but not emulate. He left his brother Sayyid Muhammad al-Rida and his cousin Sayyid Safi al-Din to represent him in Cyrenaica.

Sayyid Idris did not return to Cyrenaica till the third British 175*
occupation of the country during the late war (1943), though 648*
he continued in Egypt to represent the forces of resistance and, 795*
in so far as he could do so without compromising his position as 793
a guest of a country whose Royal House was so intimately bound 159
to the Royal House of Italy, to direct them. At the time of his flight he was 33 years of age. He gave the impression of being tall and rather portly, very unlike the slight and delicate figure he presents to-day. Nurtured, as were all the Sanusi family, in piety and learning in oasis retreats and accustomed to a refined and sedentary life, he has never been a man of action or of a hardy constitution. Though he assisted Sayyid Ahmad in organizing the Sanusi bands at Ajadabiya after the Treaty of Losanna in the first Italo-Sanusi war, he early showed that his

3:Evans-Pritchard E-4, 5 (1942-1944) 1949 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9
(1837-1942) , Sanusi

*175 talents lay in diplomacy rather than in the field. It is evident
*648 from the part he played in the events leading up to the truce
793 and during the period of the truce that he is astute and a man
*795 of sound political judgement. That he is often vacillating and
159 evasive cannot be denied, and though these characteristics may
sometimes have been a wise response of the weak negotiating with the strong, and may often have served him well in the difficult circumstances in which he took over direction of the Sanusiya Order from Sayyid Ahmad, they seem to be weaknesses to which he is temperamentally prone and to have become an aversion to directness in either thought or action. Italian writers, who are, with some justification, scathing in their comments on most members of the Sanusi family, speak of Sayyid Idris with respect. They admit that he is intelligent, religious, and gifted with a profound moral sense and political intuition. He is firm in decisions once he has taken them and keeps his promises.

*175 At the end of 1922 the Fascist revolution culminated in the
*648 march on Rome and the new Government at once made up its
mind to reconquer by arms Tripolitania and Cyrenaica. It continued to temporize in Cyrenaica, partly because its position at home was not yet secure, and partly because it intended to finish operations in Tripolitania first. The Fascists felt that their prestige was at stake. The days of *socialdemocrazia* were over and military conquest, domination, and colonization were the order of the day. The ancient Roman provinces were once again to be peopled by the sons and daughters of Rome.

On 6 March 1923 the Italians, without delivering an ultimatum or declaration of war, carried out their secret and long-prepared plan to seize the 'Mixed Camps' and the Sanusi camp of Khawalan, taking about half the Sanusi soldiers prisoners. By this surprise they put out of action a considerable part of the Amir's regular forces. In a proclamation of 1 May 1923 the new Governor of the Colony, Gen. Luigi Bongiovanni—soldiers had replaced civil administrators—declared null and void all accords and conventions made between the Government and the Sanusiya. On the following day the Amir was informed of the step taken by a letter from the Italian Minister in Cairo. War had broken out again in Cyrenaica.

*175 Bedouin followed them at great sacrifice. They were combined
*648 in many of the Sanusiya Brothers.

*795 The Shaikhs and Brothers of the Order, with few exceptions,
793 played a prominent part in the war, both in the field and by
554 keeping the Bedouin, submitted and unsubmitted alike, in a
ferment. The Italian soldiers and administrators constantly
*175 complained that whenever the Bedouin were tiring of the
*648 struggle the Brothers of the Order urged them to continue it.
619 It was their example and exhortations which made it something
793 more than the usual piecemeal resistance of a barbarous people
794 to colonial conquest or more than a succession of raids of the
kind Bedouin have enjoyed for so many centuries. Their parti-
*795 cipation made it both a national and a religious movement. It did much also to establish the Sanusiya in the hearts of the Bedouin. Some of the best-known names of the resistance, like Salih Lataiwish, 'Abd al-Hamid al-'Abbar, Saifat and Muhammad bu Farwa, Husain al-Juwaifi, Brahim al-Fallah, Fadil al-Mahashash, and Qtait bu Musa, were those of Bedouin Shaikhs, but most of the leading figures were Sanusiya *Ikhwan*, men like 'Umar al-Mukhtar, Yusif bu Rahil, Khalid al-Humri, Sharif al-Mailud, 'Abd al-Qadir Farkash, Fadil bu 'Umar, Salih al-'Awwami, and Muhammad bu Najwa al-Masmari.

*175 The indomitable Sidi 'Umar al-Mukhtar was the soul of the
*648 resistance and the struggle is always associated with his name
as similar struggles against French aggression in Algeria and
*795 Morocco are associated with the names of 'Abd al-Qadir and
793 'Abd al-Karim. Sidi 'Umar, 'our irreducible enemy, the faith-
159 ful and able servant of Idris, the heart and soul of the Cyrenaican rebellion', as Graziani called him,[1] was that rare combination of Bedouin and Sanusiya Shaikh. He was born about 1862 of the *'Ailat* Farhan of the Braidan section of the Minifa tribe of the Marmarica and was educated first at the Sanusiya school at Janzur and afterwards at Jaghbub. He was nominated by Sayyid Ahmad al-Sharif Shaikh of al-Qasur lodge among the stubborn 'Abid tribe but only performed his duties there for two years before being summoned to Kufra to serve against the French in the Wadai. He returned to al-Qasur about 1906 and later took a prominent part in the first Italo-Sanusi war and in obstructing Italian penetration in the years of peace which

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[1] Op. cit., p. 235.

followed it. In 1923, when he was called to take the foremost 175*
part in the struggle, he was already over sixty years of age. 648*
He was a simple man, religious, courageous, contemptuous of 795*
worldly honours and success, and with singular tenacity and 793
powers of physical endurance. It may well be true that, as is 159
reported, Sayyid al-Mahdi said 'If we had ten men like 'Umar
we would not need any more'.

IV

All the *adwar*, or guerrilla bands, on the plateau came under 175*
Sidi 'Umar's command and he signed himself *al-Naib al-'Amm*, 648*
the Representative-General (of the Sanusiya). Each Bedouin 795*
tribe, as in Enver's day, maintained its own guerrilla band, some 793
100 to 300 men strong. Towards the end of the war the guerrillas 701
never numbered, all told, more than 600 to 700. Only a certain 619
number of men could maintain themselves on the country and move through it with speed and secrecy. As in other guerrilla wars, the actual fighting was done by small bands of enthusiasts, whose success nevertheless depended on the goodwill of the whole population. The bands suffered very heavy casualties, but were maintained at strength by a constant stream of adventurous spirits from submitted and unsubmitted sections alike. Though each band was named after a tribe and its members were chiefly recruited from that tribe and fought in its territory, they were not entirely recruited from it and they might fight anywhere. In each tribal band there were a good number of volunteers from other tribes and a sprinkling of *Ikhwan*, Sudanese, and Tripolitanians. The 'Awaqir and Magharba had separate bands while the other tribal bands usually fought in pairs, Hasa–'Abaidat, Bara'asa–Darsa, and 'Abid–'Arafa. A Misuratan contingent formed a small band of its own which greatly distinguished itself in the fighting. Each band had a simple organization: a commander, a *qaimaqam* for civil affairs, a qadi for religious and legal purposes, a commissariat agent, and a number of officers, some of whom had been trained
in Turkish regular units. Sidi 'Umar maintained discipline in [703]
the bands, and acts of pillage or personal vendetta were severely
punished. Those of the guerrillas who possessed horses rode
them. The rest went on foot. Each band had its Sanusi flag. [186]

361 631 131 directly on the Mediterranean coast. The 'izba sector is just 14 kilometers due west of Marsa Matruh, and about 300 kilometers due west of the coastal city of Alexandria.

161 162 In 1960, the population of the whole Western Desert was 98,000, the majority being of Bedouin stock. Considering that Egypt is a country with a 2 - 1/2 per cent rise in birth rate per year, the desert population would have been about 127,000 in 1965 when I was in the field. The town of Marsa Matruh, which is the capital of the Province of Matruh (formerly the Western Desert Province) has a population of about 7,000. With increasing economic and political concern for the desert provinces and the oases, this number should continue to rise.

131 Mintaqit al-Qasr (see Figure 4)[1] is an area which measures about six kilometers from east to west along the sea, and about ten to fifteen kilometers on a north-south line extending into the desert as far as the Libyan plateau. The 162 population of al-Qasr is less easy to determine. In 1960, al-Qasr, by official count, consisted of 225 families, 595 males and 749 females, or a total of 1344 souls. Al-Qasr, as [631] the Bedouins define it, includes the qarya and six other demographic cections separately defined by the Egyptian government. The population of this al-Qasr is 2,996, 1,287 males and 1,709 [114] females. There is reason to doubt any census figures of the al-Qasr area because the Bedouins are reluctant to reveal their

[1] [See p. 67--Analyst]

162 true numbers. As recipients of aid programs, their rations
114 are based upon the number of members per family. For these
[657] purposes, they are anxious to present as high a population
figure as possible. They exaggerate their livestock count in
order to receive more fodder, and, at other times, underestimate
their numbers to escape taxes.

162 For purposes of this study, the Bedouin population of
•161 al-Qasr is about 1,500 to 3,000. Most of this population lives
361 on the coastal area and in the cultivable wadi areas. The
remainder is scattered south of the plateau region, near the
621 desert proper. The 'izba sector of al-Qasr may be described
*613 as a nucleated cluster or settlement, but due to the nature
of the Bedouin segmentary lineage system, with its relatively
autonomous kin-based residence groups, this sector lacks the
usual degree of social interaction and integration associated
621 with the village or hamlet. The 'izba might be described as a
*613 multi-nucleated settlement or cluster. Each lineage has its
423 own mintaqa. Each mintaqa usually has a small dry-goods store
631 owned and operated by a lineage member and catering chiefly
443 to his own lineage-mates. Water and land in the 'izba sector
423 are individually owned. In the barley-pasture area, rights
*613 and privileges of ownership are vested in the corporate group,
621 even though the Bedouins and the government claim that tribally
423 owned land is illegal. All land boundaries, whether a min[illegible]a
or an individual's plot, are well-marked and well-known. The

Europeans consider to be a low level of civilization. They do 433
not feel the need for expensive roads and ports, electric light, 511
wireless sets, telephones, schools, churches, newspapers, and 182
so forth; and clearly their economy could not support them.
Time and again colonists, tempted from their homes by the 182
short sea routes and the wooded plateau, have settled in the 167
country and dispossessed the Bedouin, but in the end it is the
Bedouin, and not the colonists, who have survived. When one
looks at the massive Phoenician, Greek, Egyptian, and Roman
ruins and the already half-ruined Italian towns, villages, and
farms, and then on the flimsy tents of the Arabs, one cannot
but reflect that the race is not always to the swift nor the battle
to the strong.

III

Even in the steppe country it is difficult to find a Bedouin 361
naja', camp, for the camps are pitched in hollows and on the
slopes of wadis and their feeders for shelter from rain and wind
and too many visitors. On the plateau they are hidden in the
forest. One cannot, therefore, make more than a very approxi- 161
mate estimate of the population of any part of the country, or 162
of its distribution, by bare observation. It can, however, be
said that at present the country is underpopulated and that the
population is badly distributed between town and country, the
urban part of it, which is almost entirely unproductive, being
too large in relation to the whole.

There have been a number of estimates of the population by 161
early travellers who visited the country in Turkish times. They 175
had to make a guess at the population figure, aided by Turkish
censuses. It has been suggested on the basis of their reports
that the country then supported round about 250,000 souls.[1]
The Turkish census of 1911 gave the population as 198,345,
excluding Kufra.[2] Taking into account the various estimates
which were made during the Italo-Sanusi wars, in the interval
between them, and since, it may be said that to-day the total
population of Cyrenaica is probably round about 200,000, of
whom about a quarter live in the towns, the remainder being
tented Bedouin and a few thousand oasis dwellers.

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[1] Dr. Gotthold Hildebrandt, *Cyrenaïka als Gebiet künftiger Besiedelung*, 1904, p. 317.

[2] Coro, op. cit., p. 20.

161 162 114 If the Bedouin of the country number no more than 150,000 it is evident that density of population outside the towns must be very low indeed. Ricci's map, based on Col. De Agostini's census, shows a density of 0 to 5 per sq. km. for all the tribes of Cyrenaica except the 'Arafa, the Darsa, and the Hasa, all plateau tribes, for which he gives a density of 5 to 10.[1] Col. De Agostini, in his exhaustive monograph,[2] written before the worst Italian excesses, reckoned the native population of Cyrenaica at 185,400, of whom 181,750 were Arabs and 3,650 Jews. Of the Arabs about 25,000—I give round figures—were living in urban centres, about 7,000 in the oases, and about 150,000 were tented Bedouin. Of the Bedouin he classed only 16,000 as nomads, 35,000 as semi-nomads, and 99,000 as stable. His classification into nomads, semi-nomads, and stable was, as he recognized, arbitrary, since there is no reliable criterion of stability among a tented people, but it gives a useful indication of relative mobility. By 'stable' Col. De Agostini meant normal residence in a determined area within which the tents are pitched here and there for watering or other reasons and with periodic movements for sowing and pasturing, even though some days away from their usual seat, as we find among the 'Arafa tribe and a considerable part of the Hasa, the Darsa, and the 'Abaidat tribes. By 'semi-nomads' he meant those Bedouin who spread with greater frequency and more widely either in their own territory or towards zones of sowing or pasturing where they remain for a long time on account of less prosperous conditions in their own territory, such as we find in the Magharba tribe and parts of the 'Awaqir, the Bara'asa, and the 'Abaidat tribes and in many of the more important client groups. By 'nomads' he meant Bedouin who, although they possess their own territory or recognized centre, emigrate for long periods to distant, and not always the same, objectives, and are almost always fractionized into small groups for reasons of watering and pasturing; or Bedouin who normally wander in desert territories, giving themselves exclusively to rearing camels. As examples of nomads in this sense he mentions the Aulad Shahin section of the 'Abaidat tribe and many units

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(113) [1] *La Cirenaica—Geografica-Economica-Politica*, edited by Olinto Marinelli, 1922–3.

[2] *Le Popolazioni della Cirenaica*, 1922–3, p. 444.

of the more independent client tribes. In other words, all the 161
Bedouin of Cyrenaica are nomadic in some degree, some more 162
and some less, and Col. De Agostini rightly stresses that 114
whether they move much or little they all have the same characteristics when compared to peasants and townsmen.[1] They are all *bwadi*, as the Cyrenaican dialect has it, people of the tents, and they see themselves as a single people against the *hadur*, the citizens.

I have so far said nothing of the towns of Cyrenaica or of 632
their inhabitants. They play a minor part in this story, which is about the Bedouin, but they cannot be entirely left out of it on account of their economic and political relations with the Bedouin, so I take this opportunity to give a brief account of them.[2]

Banghazi, which is supposed to be called after the saint Sidi 175
Ghazi, buried in the town, is on the site of the classical Berenice. 632
It is believed that after the disappearance of the Graeco-Roman community the site was unoccupied till the fifteenth century, when it was reoccupied by immigrants from the mercantile communities of the Tripolitanian coast, among whom Misuratans, both Muslims and Jews, preponderated in numbers and wealth. The Genoese Della Cella, who passed [162]
through the fly-infested town in 1817–18, in the time of the Caramanlis, says that it then contained about 5,000 inhabitants, [441]
at least half of whom were Jews.[3] Shaikh Muhammad 'Uthman al-Hashaishi, who was in the town in 1896, says that the [167]
greater part of the traders were immigrants from Sfax and the [114]
Island of Jerba—he was himself a Tunisian and often tended to exaggerate Tunisian influence—with some Greeks and a few Italians. 'As to the Turks, they do not give themselves to trade.' At this time Banghazi was a very simple, mostly mud-and-rubble, town, and the learned Shaikh makes a point of telling us that there were no posts or telegraphs, nor even a railway, save a line of three kilometres joining the official

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[1] Ibid., pp. 32–3.

[2] The historical information is chiefly derived from Agostini, ibid., pp. 413–43.

[3] Paolo Della Cella, *Narrative of an Expedition from Tripoli in Barbary to the Western Frontier of Egypt in 1817*, 1822, pp. 194–5. (First published in 1819.) F. W. and H. W. Beechey (*Proceedings of the Expedition to explore the Northern Coast of Africa from Tripoly Eastward in 1821 and 1822*, 1828, p. 299) [113]
consider Della Cella's estimate too high. Theirs is 2,000.

173 cline in the total population of a tribe, then, the extinction of
178 lines does not affect any order of segmentation superior to the
613 tertiary. In this respect, the Cyrenaican genealogy differs fundamentally
621 from those collected from the Nuer by Evans-Pritchard.
In the quotation from his work on Nuer genealogies (1951), he
[171] asserts that telescoping occurs 'from the founder of the minimal
lineage further up the line of ascent to the founder of the clan'.
This major difference has serious implications for any discussion
of lineage proliferation, but these must be left until the conditions
under which proliferation is likely to occur have been analysed.

178 While it is true that the processes discussed are of importance
613 in retaining the general shape of the genealogy, what is assumed
621 so far is that the Cyrenaican population has been stable over long
periods. Stability of population is not an unreasonable assumption
● 161 to make for a people who live on the margin of subsistence
182 in a country where extended periods of drought are not infrequent,
[173] though seldom leading, it is true, to actual famine conditions,
[731] but producing periodic and local food and water shortages.
Disease, following quickly in the trail of shortage, it can be assumed,
kept the relationship of total population to the natural
resources fairly constant. What evidence there is does not support
[726] even this very general assumption, since it is known that there
have been large-scale tribal wars in the past, and a certain
[167] amount of movement of tribes, some being displaced and others
pushed eastwards into Egypt. Unless these shifts were caused by
increases in the aggregate population and the consequent pressure
on land and water, it is difficult to account for them. This
consideration of possible overall increases in population in the
past poses interesting problems related to lineage structure which
cannot be adequately treated here. For the moment it is proposed
to neglect possible increases in the total population during past
periods in the history of Cyrenaica. The historical depth of the
view now to be discussed is about seventy years, and for this
period I have no evidence of any large-scale increases in population.
It is reasonable, therefore, to assume a general stability of
[132] population for this period. But the vagaries of the Cyrenaican
climate are such that, in a given year, one area might be well
drenched with rain, giving excellent pastures for animals and
good crops, while a nearby territorial strip might suffer a partial

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drought giving insufficient pastures and poor crops. Good or bad 613
crops, poor or abundant pasture, in turn mean a higher or lower 621
milk yield from the animals and better or worse living conditions 161
for human beings. Such factors as these may well, over a number 182
of years, lead to unevenness in the distribution of population [132]
throughout the tertiary sections. Whatever the cause, the genealogies
show that the population of the numerous tertiary sections [173]
is unequal. Some are numerically so weak that they have to join a collateral section. Others are numerically so strong that their natural resources are insufficient to meet the needs of all their members. It was these latter segments which were in the process of splitting, and which in some cases have already done
so. The next task, then, is to demonstrate where, on the genealogy, [128]
proliferation is effected.

We have seen that in Nuer genealogies segments proliferate at 173
all orders of segmentation. Here, the process is a continuous one, 171
beginning at any point in time within the minimal lineage and 613
progressing upwards to the apex of lineage bifurcation. As particular 551
names become significant within the minimal segment, they are retained and become a permanent addition to the genealogy. In order to include these successively additional names, names of ascending ancestors are shunted further and further into the genealogical past, until presumably the effect is felt at the topmost limit of the genealogy, when the names here are pushed out of the genealogical framework altogether, and forgotten for ever. More than this, the upward shift in names at each and every point in the genealogical line means also a consequent re-ordering of structural relationships, at all levels in the
system. One vital difference between Nuer and Bedouin societies 173
which may partly, at least, account for the different genealogical 178
processes at work among them is that the Nuer, when they were 613
studied by Evans-Pritchard, were expanding territorially, and [171]
that continuous proliferation of segments throughout the structure
was the mode of dealing with a situation of expansion. The [648]
Bedouin, on the other hand, had suffered twenty years of terrible privation at the hands of the Italians, during which period thousands of them died in battle and in concentration camps, were shot up in their camps from the air, or died from want, before I went to live among them. Although I must confess that I now

105 Change due to the normal and inevitable process of proliferation
613 is thus managed within the structural limits of the tertiary section
173 without disturbing any of the superior orders in the system. The
178 latter remain fixed over long periods, but the tertiary sections of
a particular secondary action may be reduced in number over a few generations while another secondary section may show a corresponding increase in the number of its segments.

121 By combining the various factors involved in change, it is possible to understand the details of lineage proliferation, or at least
178 to travel along a well signposted road. In the light of this analy-
613 sis, moreover, it is unnecessary to assume a stable population in
161 each and every segment over long periods; the mechanisms of
readjustment allow for substantial irregularities and fluctuations in population. It is possible that they are also sufficient to contain significant increases in the aggregate population. They could almost certainly control minor fluctuations, but it is seriously doubted whether a population increase sufficient to produce a country-wide and acute water shortage could be met merely by the proliferation of tertiary lineage segments. But to deal with this problem other aspects of the Bedouin genealogy and details of Cyrenaican history, which have necessarily been omitted from this discussion, would have to be taken into account, and this is best left for another article.

Had the Senussi been successful in the last war, they 175
would no doubt have brought in the 'Ibeidat or the 'Awaqir 619
from Cyrenaica to replace the Awlad 'Ali in Egypt.

At the present day the Awlad 'Ali, especially the eastern 619
sections near the Nile Valley, have almost ceased to be nomadic, 178
and only the old men have memories of their former warlike habits. They suffered considerably during the Great War, but are again becoming prosperous. They now own large comfortable tents, are beginning to build houses and clear out cisterns, and are also said to be increasing in numbers.[1] So civilized have they grown that my guides, one a Sinai Arab and the other an 'Abadi, concurred in calling them "green"—not real desert-worthy Bedouins.

Perhaps as a result of Libyan influence, or more probably 142
the better nurture and climate, they are taller, heavier, stronger, and lighter-complexioned than the lightly built Arabs of
Sinai and Hijaz. Also they are much franker and more 157
straightforward than their shifty and suspicious eastern cousins, 181
and altogether more trustworthy. Their women only veil 562
themselves to strangers, and talk quite naturally and cheerfully 834
to the men of their own tribe. 609

They cultivate as much barley as they can, using a 243
primitive plough drawn by camels, in the clayey hollows [492]
scattered over their very stony limestone desert, but, as the [132]
rainfall is very uncertain, a good crop only occurs every five
or six years. After harvest, they exchange some of their [437]
barley for maize, which the women grind to make bread
as required, and some for dried dates. The seed for next [251]
year is buried in a hole lined with straw and covered with
clay, and a year's forage for the animals is set aside. The [432]
rest of the crop goes to market, and for a short time the [426]
Arab has money to buy clothes for himself and his family and at utmost need to pay off some of the numerous debts he has inherited from his forefathers. Soon he is reduced again to the clothes he wears, the tent he sleeps in, and his animals grazing in the desert.

They are great breeders of camels and sheep, and a busy 436
traffic in these goes on weekly in the markets of Hammam, 178
'Amriya, and the Beheira. So they have got into the habit [438 443 233]

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[1] At the 1927 census, the Western Desert Arabs, Awlad 'Ali, Jawabis, etc., numbered 38,928 souls exclusive of those settled in Beheira. But Pacho, 100 years ago, estimated them at 38,000 souls. [161]

175 Nile dikes and military conscription. The term "Bedouin"
648 came to mean, as it was defined by the government of Egypt,
651 one who did not legally own land and hence was not subject to
423 forced labor or military service. On this basis, the Director
● [162] of Recruiting Office in a 1904 census distinguished three kinds
of Bedouin (Murray 1935:31):

290,095	- settled and living in their own farm colonies
240,880	- living among the fallahin
70,472	- real Bedouin or nomads
601,447	

175 By the end of the 19th century, Bedouin society had
177 undergone a great deal of change. Politically, the Bedouins
648 were subordinates in a dominant-subjective authority relationship with the central regime of the Nile Valley. As a result of external political control, nomadism was curtailed and the Bedouins were forced to settle on the land to raise what few crops they could. These new political and economic conditions are the major aspects of the sedentarization process. Bedouin dependence on the central authority of Egypt and their reliance on horticulture increased with time. Nor did the entry of Britain into Egypt in 1882 change the material and social condition of the Bedouin.

175 The British, in the style of the politics of colonial-
648 ism, reorganized the administrative structure of Egypt. The Western Desert was given the status of a province; command

175 These were the wealthy group who had large numbers of sheep
648 and camels. In fact, most of the animals taken east to
722 Amriyya died on the way or were expropriated by the British.
556
166 'Umran Kailani, "who owned one thousand camels" and was the
shaikh of the 'Ali Ahmar section of the Awlad 'Ali at the time, refused to go to Amriyya. The Bedouins say that he was treated very well by the Germans who asked him to form a local government and promised him all the help and supplies that he needed. It is difficult to obtain figures on how many Bedouins made the migration to the Nile Valley and how many remained
• [162] behind in the Al-Qasr area. One informant told me that before the war there were about 80,000 members of the Awlad 'Ali in the Western Desert and that out of this number, about 30,000 remained behind.

175 Those who sought refuge at Amriyya returned to the
648 al-Qasr area at the end of 1942 after the defeat of the Germans
727 at al-Alamain. They found things greatly changed. Before the war, there had been about twenty buildings in the al-Qasr area and most of these were bombed out by the air war. The loss of animals and the damage to the land made the resumption of normal life quite difficult for the Bedouins. Underneath, the land was literally a bed of anti-tank and anti-personnel mines left by the advance and retreat of three different armies. This restricted Bedouin travel and everyday food-
648
727 getting activities. This condition, which still exists, has

361 directly on the Mediterranean coast. The _'izba_ sector is
631 just 14 kilometers due west of Marsa Matruh, and about 300
131 kilometers due west of the coastal city of Alexandria.

161 In 1960, the population of the whole Western Desert
162 was 98,000, the majority being of Bedouin stock. Considering
that Egypt is a country with a 2 - 1/2 per cent rise in birth
rate per year, the desert population would have been about
127,000 in 1965 when I was in the field. The town of Marsa
Matruh, which is the capital of the Province of Matruh
(formerly the Western Desert Province) has a population of
about 7,000. With increasing economic and political concern
for the desert provinces and the oases, this number should
continue to rise.

131 _Mintaqit al-Qasr_ (see Figure 4)[1] is an area which
measures about six kilometers from east to west along the sea,
and about ten to fifteen kilometers on a north-south line
extending into the desert as far as the Libyan plateau. The
162 population of al-Qasr is less easy to determine. In 1960,
al-Qasr, by official count, consisted of 225 families, 595
males and 749 females, or a total of 1344 souls. Al-Qasr, as
[631] the Bedouins define it, includes the _qarya_ and six other demographic sections separately defined by the Egyptian government.
The population of this al-Qasr is 2,996, 1,287 males and 1,709
[114] females. There is reason to doubt any census figures of the
al-Qasr area because the Bedouins are reluctant to reveal their

[1] [See p. 67--Analyst]

•162 true numbers. As recipients of aid programs, their rations
114 are based upon the number of members per family. For these
[657] purposes, they are anxious to present as high a population
figure as possible. They exaggerate their livestock count in
order to receive more fodder, and, at other times, underestimate
their numbers to escape taxes.

162 For purposes of this study, the Bedouin population of
161 al-Qasr is about 1,500 to 3,000. Most of this population lives
361 on the coastal area and in the cultivable *wadi* areas. The
remainder is scattered south of the plateau region, near the
621 desert proper. The *'izba* sector of al-Qasr may be described
*613 as a nucleated cluster or settlement, but due to the nature
of the Bedouin segmentary lineage system, with its relatively
autonomous kin-based residence groups, this sector lacks the
usual degree of social interaction and integration associated
621 with the village or hamlet. The *'izba* might be described as a
*613 multi-nucleated settlement or cluster. Each lineage has its
423 own *mintaqa*. Each *mintaqa* usually has a small dry-goods store
631 owned and operated by a lineage member and catering chiefly
443 to his own lineage-mates. Water and land in the *'izba* sector
423 are individually owned. In the barley-pasture area, rights
*613 and privileges of ownership are vested in the corporate group,
621 even though the Bedouins and the government claim that tribally
423 owned land is illegal. All land boundaries, whether a *mintaqa*
or an individual's plot, are well-marked and well-known. The

(Patai 1962:Ch. 6).

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The point of this is that most of the Middle East's inhabitants are villagers dependent upon agriculture. The dominant form of marriage is not parallel-cousin marriage. As a matter of fact, marriage may or may not be considered exogamous depending upon the level of segmentation at which one wishes to draw the line for his definition of endogamy. Ayoub (1959) suggests that parallel-cousin marriage be considered only as an extreme expression of an overall preference for endogamy. She found in a sample of 514 marriages from a Syrian village that 9.1 per cent of them were with the parallel-cousin while 63.4 per cent were within the secondary group. She concludes from this that intra-lineage marriage is frequent enough that it cannot be accounted for by random mate selection.

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*[613]
[595]
In 'Ailit Ma'fas of al-Qasr, out of 197 recorded marriages over a period of five generations the frequency of parallel-cousin marriage was 11.1 per cent and marriage within the lineage was 41.6 per cent of the total. Of these 197 marriages, only 39 were cases of polygny and most of these involved a man taking two wives (see Table 5 below).

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The confusion over the presence or absence of parallel-cousin marriage in the Middle East is related to the question of whether or not the researcher and the native are talking about the same thing. In Qasr, for instance, the term

[TEXT CONTINUED ON PAGE 116]

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	GENERATIONS					
	5th	4th	3rd	2nd	1st	Total
EXOGAMY						
Extra-Awlad 'Ali	3	11	20	24	3	61
Extra-'Ali Ahmar	1	2	2	1	0	6
Extra-'Aishaibat	1	3	6	4	1	15
Extra-'Ailit Ma'fas	0	1	15	12	5	33
	5	17	43	41	9	115 (58.4%)
ENDOGAMY (within 'Ailit Ma'fas)						
FaBrDa	1	2	8	10	1	22
FaBrSoDa	1	3	3	2	0	9
FaFaBrSoDa	0	0	3	10	5	18
FaFaBrSoSoDa	0	3	1	7	0	11
FaFaFaBrSoDa	0	0	0	0	3	3
FaFaFaBrSoSoDa	0	0	3	4	3	10
FaFaFaBrSoSoSoDa	0	0	1	2	0	3
FaFaFaFaBrSoSoDa	0	0	0	3	0	3
FaFaFaFaFaBrSoSoDa	0	0	0	0	3	3
	2	8	19	38	15	82 (41.6%)
Total	7	25	62	79	24	197

TABLE 5

HISTORY OF EXOGAMY AND ENDOGAMY FOR 'AILIT MA'FAS

*613
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Authority Group		Components	No. of Persons	Total Persons
I.	Bait 'Umar	Bait 'Umar	73	73
II.	Bait Kailani	Bait Kailani	67	67
III.	Bait Firjani	Bait Firjani	31	43
		Bait Salih	12	
IV.	Bait Muhammad	Bait Muhammad	27	30
		Bait Yunis	3	
V.	Bait Braik	Bait Braik	6	32
		Bait Abd al-Hadi	6	
		Bait Fadl	3	
		Bait Mahaishi	8	
		Bait Maraja	9	
			245	245

*613
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These five groups represent the political structure of 'Ailit Ma'fas. Authority relations between the 245 members, and between the five groups, proceed with reference to the five 'awaaqil of the secondary group. External relations of 'Ailit Ma'fas, either in the form of demanding rights from other secondary segments, or of meeting obligations toward these groups, proceed through the five 'awaaqil "speaking with one voice." One group in 'Ailit Ma'fas, Bait Musa, migrated to the Nile Valley sometime during the 1930's. Bait Musa no longer possesses jural rights or obligations in the lineage. But jural relations are not always severed as a result of moving. 'Ailit Shraif, another secondary group in al-Qasr, has one bait in the Nile Valley which maintains its

2: Mohsen E,O-5 (1958-1966) 1971 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9
Awlad Ali

CHAPTER II

ECOLOGY AND HISTORY

619 Awlad Ali are a number of Arabic-speaking semi-nomadic tribes of
101 sheep and goat herders who inhabit the northern part of the Western
162 Desert of Egypt. The total population of Awlad Ali, according to the 1965 preliminary census, was about 100,000 inhabitants. This estimate is, however, very tentative and fluctuates from one year to the next, depending on the circumstances of the pasture in the area. The
131 area they occupy consists of the narrow strip of fertile land which extends along the Mediterranean coast from near Alexandria in the east some 350 miles westward to the UAR-Libyan border town of Sallum, and
132 varying in width from ten to thirty miles. Vegetation in the area de-
133 pends on rainfall, supplemented by a number of artesian wells. The rainy season extends from November to March, but the rain is extremely erratic in nature, varying from one year to another and from one place to the next. Draught has been experienced every three to four years, one of them being experienced at the time of the study. The water situ-
312 ation is further aggravated by the low technological level of the people
[181] which prevents them from making the best use of the available rain water. There have been some attempts made to store as much of the rain water as possible, but these attempts are usually made by individuals and in too crude and primitive a way to prevent most of the water from being lost by seepage or by evaporation. The most commonly used method of water preservation in the area is digging cisterns in the ground. But most of these cisterns are too shallow to keep large amounts of water. Some deeper wells are found in the area and are called "beer sama"

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EILAT ACGARY AND ITS CONSTIUENT BAITS

BAIT	NUMBER OF ADULT MALES (Sayems)[1]	AQILA
Eweidha (El-Burg)*	28	Ta'eb
Eweidha (El-Alamein)*	31	Selouma
Yusef**	30	Suliman
Helleis	22	Hussein
El-Asabei'	56	Shei'eb
Abdel Hamid*	20	Haj Musa
Risq**	30	Yadem
Afash	25	Nayer
Daghas**	25	Daghash
Bul-Yazid*	21	Haj Shousha
Makhyum**	23	Abdel fattah
Hussein**	17	Masri
El-Ramly**	25	Salem
Rashwan**	30	Rashwan
Attya*	31	Masu'd
Abdella*	22	Abdel Galil

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[1] Numbers are taken from the Amar list which is used to distribute the amount of bloodmoney on the various baits. An adult male or "sayem" is anyone 15 years of age or older. The word "sayem" means fasting individual and the age of 15 is when a child is forced to observe the duties of fasting.

[885]
[785]
[619]

** Refers to adopted tribal segments (Muktatibeen).

* Baits of doubted origin. Some claim these baits are adopted, while others insist that they are Awlad Ali proper.

Europeans consider to be a low level of civilization. They do 433
not feel the need for expensive roads and ports, electric light, 511
wireless sets, telephones, schools, churches, newspapers, and 182
so forth; and clearly their economy could not support them.
Time and again colonists, tempted from their homes by the 182
short sea routes and the wooded plateau, have settled in the 167
country and dispossessed the Bedouin, but in the end it is the
Bedouin, and not the colonists, who have survived. When one
looks at the massive Phoenician, Greek, Egyptian, and Roman
ruins and the already half-ruined Italian towns, villages, and
farms, and then on the flimsy tents of the Arabs, one cannot
but reflect that the race is not always to the swift nor the battle
to the strong.

III

Even in the steppe country it is difficult to find a Bedouin 361
naja', camp, for the camps are pitched in hollows and on the
slopes of wadis and their feeders for shelter from rain and wind
and too many visitors. On the plateau they are hidden in the
forest. One cannot, therefore, make more than a very approxi- 161
mate estimate of the population of any part of the country, or 162
of its distribution, by bare observation. It can, however, be
said that at present the country is underpopulated and that the
population is badly distributed between town and country, the
urban part of it, which is almost entirely unproductive, being
too large in relation to the whole.

There have been a number of estimates of the population by 161
early travellers who visited the country in Turkish times. They 175
had to make a guess at the population figure, aided by Turkish
censuses. It has been suggested on the basis of their reports
that the country then supported round about 250,000 souls.[1]
The Turkish census of 1911 gave the population as 198,345,
excluding Kufra.[2] Taking into account the various estimates
which were made during the Italo-Sanusi wars, in the interval
between them, and since, it may be said that to-day the total
population of Cyrenaica is probably round about 200,000, of
whom about a quarter live in the towns, the remainder being
tented Bedouin and a few thousand oasis dwellers.

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[1] Dr. Gotthold Hildebrandt, *Cyrenaika als Gebiet künftiger Besiedelung*, 1904, p. 317.

[2] Coro, op. cit., p. 20.

161 162 114 If the Bedouin of the country number no more than 150,000 it is evident that density of population outside the towns must be very low indeed. Ricci's map, based on Col. De Agostini's census, shows a density of 0 to 5 per sq. km. for all the tribes of Cyrenaica except the 'Arafa, the Darsa, and the Hasa, all plateau tribes, for which he gives a density of 5 to 10.[1] Col. De Agostini, in his exhaustive monograph,[2] written before the worst Italian excesses, reckoned the native population of Cyrenaica at 185,400, of whom 181,750 were Arabs and 3,650 Jews. Of the Arabs about 25,000—I give round figures—were living in urban centres, about 7,000 in the oases, and about 150,000 were tented Bedouin. Of the Bedouin he classed only 16,000 as nomads, 35,000 as semi-nomads, and 99,000 as stable. His classification into nomads, semi-nomads, and stable was, as he recognized, arbitrary, since there is no reliable criterion of stability among a tented people, but it gives a useful indication of relative mobility. By 'stable' Col. De Agostini meant normal residence in a determined area within which the tents are pitched here and there for watering or other reasons and with periodic movements for sowing and pasturing, even though some days away from their usual seat, as we find among the 'Arafa tribe and a considerable part of the Hasa, the Darsa, and the 'Abaidat tribes. By 'semi-nomads' he meant those Bedouin who spread with greater frequency and more widely either in their own territory or towards zones of sowing or pasturing where they remain for a long time on account of less prosperous conditions in their own territory, such as we find in the Magharba tribe and parts of the 'Awaqir, the Bara'asa, and the 'Abaidat tribes and in many of the more important client groups. By 'nomads' he meant Bedouin who, although they possess their own territory or recognized centre, emigrate for long periods to distant, and not always the same, objectives, and are almost always fractionized into small groups for reasons of watering and pasturing; or Bedouin who normally wander in desert territories, giving themselves exclusively to rearing camels. As examples of nomads in this sense he mentions the Aulad Shahin section of the 'Abaidat tribe and many units

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(113) [1] *La Cirenaica—Geografica-Economica-Politica*, edited by Olinto Marinelli, 1922–3.

[2] *Le Popolazioni della Cirenaica*, 1922–3, p. 444.

of the more independent client tribes. In other words, all the 161
Bedouin of Cyrenaica are nomadic in some degree, some more 162
and some less, and Col. De Agostini rightly stresses that 114
whether they move much or little they all have the same
characteristics when compared to peasants and townsmen.[1]
They are all *bwadi*, as the Cyrenaican dialect has it, people of
the tents, and they see themselves as a single people against
the *hadur*, the citizens.

I have so far said nothing of the towns of Cyrenaica or of 632
their inhabitants. They play a minor part in this story, which
is about the Bedouin, but they cannot be entirely left out of it
on account of their economic and political relations with the
Bedouin, so I take this opportunity to give a brief account of
them.[2]

Banghazi, which is supposed to be called after the saint Sidi 175
Ghazi, buried in the town, is on the site of the classical Berenice. 632
It is believed that after the disappearance of the Graeco-
Roman community the site was unoccupied till the fifteenth
century, when it was reoccupied by immigrants from the
mercantile communities of the Tripolitanian coast, among
whom Misuratans, both Muslims and Jews, preponderated in
numbers and wealth. The Genoese Della Cella, who passed [162]
through the fly-infested town in 1817–18, in the time of the
Caramanlis, says that it then contained about 5,000 inhabitants,
at least half of whom were Jews.[3] Shaikh Muhammad 'Uthman [941]
al-Hashaishi, who was in the town in 1896, says that the [167]
greater part of the traders were immigrants from Sfax and the [114]
Island of Jerba—he was himself a Tunisian and often tended
to exaggerate Tunisian influence—with some Greeks and a few
Italians. 'As to the Turks, they do not give themselves to
trade.' At this time Banghazi was a very simple, mostly mud-and-rubble,
town, and the learned Shaikh makes a point of
telling us that there were no posts or telegraphs, nor even a
railway, save a line of three kilometres joining the official

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[1] Ibid., pp. 32–3.

[2] The historical information is chiefly derived from Agostini, ibid., pp. 413–43.

[3] Paolo Della Cella, *Narrative of an Expedition from Tripoli in Barbary to the Western Frontier of Egypt in 1817*, 1822, pp. 194–5. (First published in 1819.) F. W. and H. W. Beechey (*Proceedings of the Expedition to explore the Northern Coast of Africa from Tripoly Eastward in 1821 and 1822*, 1828, p. 299) consider Della Cella's estimate too high. Theirs is 2,000. [113]

175 residence of the Pasha to a garden; and that the town possessed
632 only one machine for grinding corn.[1] The population increased
considerably in the last decades of Turkish rule, reaching the
175 figure of 16,500 in 1911.[2] In 1922 the population was 22,740,
● 162 the great majority of whom were Arabs from the Maghrib,
632 though some were immigrants into the town from the more
sedentary Bedouin of the neighbourhood. It included also over
2,000 *qulaughla*, descendants of Turkish officials and troops and
Arab women, and a large number of *shawashna*, descendants of
Arab men and Negresses, with a sprinkling of *'abid*, full-
blooded Negroes. There were also about 3,000 Jews and about
3,600 Europeans, almost all Italians. These elements, except
for the Italians who left during the late war, are found in all
the towns of Cyrenaica. There are also a few Cretans, the
remnant of a small community exiled by the Italians.

Darna stands on the site of the Greek town of Darnis, from
which the Arab name is presumably derived. It seems that it
continued to be occupied throughout the Arab period, but was
given new life through the settlement there of Muslim refugees
from Spain at the end of the fifteenth century. According to
tradition, towards the end of the seventeenth century the town
was developed by a certain Muhammad Bey who organized
irrigation and other public works there. The population was
much increased by the settlement of merchants from the coastal
towns of Tripolitania and of other countries of the Maghrib,
either by direct migration or from Banghazi. When Della Cella
[731] visited the town in 1816 the population had been reduced by
pestilence from 7,000 to 500.[3] In 1911 it was about 9,500[4] and
in 1922 it was about 9,700 (not counting Italians) of whom 250
were Jews and the rest Muslims.

Al-Marj, the Italian Barce, was the site of the ancient city of
Barke, famous in Greek times and to Arab historians of the
first centuries after the Arab conquest of Cyrenaica. It fell into
decay after the Hilalian invasion and was only a heap of ruins
till 1842, when the Turkish administration built a fort there, a
Sanusiya zawiya being constructed shortly afterwards. In 1922
175 the population, of very mixed origins, was 1,540. The other
632 centres in Cyrenaica are no more than villages around admini-
621

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[1] Op. cit., pp. 52 and 59.

[2] Coro, op. cit., p. 99.

[3] Op. cit., p. 177.

[4] Coro, op. cit., p. 102.

strative posts and contain not more than a few hundred persons. 175
Shahhat and Tubruq had been Turkish posts before the Italians 632
made them administrative centres. Taukra and Talmaitha had 621
been Sanusiya lodges. Suluq and Qaminis were Italian creations. Marsa Susa (Apollonia) was first occupied by Cretan refugees during the Turco-Greek war of 1897: Ajadabiya, the town of which the Arab historian al-Bakri of the eleventh century spoke in such glowing terms, had ceased to be a settled centre until the Turks made it an administrative post. During [648]*
the period of truce between the Sanusi and the Italians from 1917 to 1922 it became the seat of the Sanusi Amir, Sayyid Mahammad Idris, and afterwards an Italian administrative and commercial centre.

It has been noted that almost all the townsmen of Cyrenaica 632
are immigrants from the west, from Morocco to Tripolitania, 162 •
and the Bedouin regard them as foreigners and often with some 369
distaste, especially the Tripolitanian immigrants. It is true [186]
that there is a small element of Bedouin origin in the towns, for the more stable and poorer Bedouin living near towns sometimes drift into them; but when they do so their descendants soon lose their links with the tents and their tribal status. The road to town life is a way along which there is no return, for the townsmen are not only foreigners, but their food, their speech, their dress, their manners, their interests, their loyalties, and in general their way of life and their sentiments, are different. The Bedouin visit the towns from time to time, but they do not feel at home in them, and they do not look at home in them either. In a town one can spot a Bedouin at a glance by his appearance, his step, his dignity, his naivety, and his loud voice, which sometimes startles the shopkeeper with whom he disputes a price.

The road to the towns is not only a way along which there is 632
no return, but is a one-way track. A Bedouin can become a 369
citizen, but a citizen can never become a Bedouin. He cannot 641
live the life of the tents. Hence the Bedouin say that while it is always bad for a Bedouin girl to marry a townsman, it is possible for her to adapt herself to urban life, but it is out of the question for a Bedouin to marry a townsman's daughter, for it is impossible for her to become a daughter of the tents.

The *bwadi*, Bedouin, and the *hadur*, citizens, are separate

their behalf when prices rise. There are said to be 30,000 619
'Harabi' alone, excluding the Bara'asa, in Egypt, most of them 167
in the Fayum, while the Aulad 'Ali and their client aggregates 162
number nearly 40,000.[1]

V

The Arabs of Cyrenaica distinguish between those tribes which 619 are *Sa'adi* and those which are *Marabtin*. The *Sa'adi* tribes are so called after Sa'ada of the Bani Sulaim, their ancestress. They are those nine tribes who hold the country by right of conquest: the 'Abaidat, the Hasa, the *'Ailat* Fayid, the Aulad Hamad (Bara'asa), the Darsa, the 'Abid, the 'Arafa, the 'Awaqir, and the Magharba. The *Marabtin* tribes use the earth and water by grace of the *Sa'adi* tribes of whom they are to a greater or lesser degree clients. Savarese says that their status in Turkish times lay between that of clients of ancient Roman law and that of serfs of the glebe in western Europe in the Middle Ages.[2] The Sanusiya did much to lessen the difference in status between free and client tribes in Cyrenaica and to-day the larger groups of *Marabtin*, although they may in theory live on *Sa'adi* land, do in fact live independently and pay no fees to the owners of the land. Sometimes violent disputes, and even wars, have broken out between free tribes and their clients, such as the famous battles between the 'Awaqir and the Shahaibat. Moreover, one has only to note that the predominance of the leading sections of some free tribes is due to the support of powerful client fractions to realize that, though the clients may be considered not to have the full status of a noble Arab tribe, the relationship between them and the owners of the country is often one of mutual dependence. Thus the leading section of the [162] powerful Bara'asa tribe is the *'Ailat* Hadduth which in De Agostini's lists numbers 2,520 persons, of whom only 630 are true Bara'asa, the remainder being clients; and the leading section of the 'Awaqir, the *'Ailat* Suliman, counts 1,200 clients out of a total of 1,940. Where the relationship is one of mutual dependence the two tribes are expected to help each other in the payment of blood-money.

The client tribes are of different categories to which corre-

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[1] G. W. Murray, *Sons of Ishmael*, 1935, pp. 277 and 296.

[2] Op. cit., p. 56.

the east began in the middle of the thirteenth century and has 619
lasted to the present day. It is intimately bound up with the 778
pilgrimage to the sacred towns of Islam. Round these pious [173]
men and round their tombs gathered for sanctuary the simple [788]
and oppressed, and from these and from the children of the
holy men have sprung the *Marabtin bil baraka* tribes. The other 619
client tribes have no sacred associations and are known as 651
Marabtin al-sadqan because they pay *sadaqa*, a fee, to a free
tribe for protection and for the privilege of using the earth and
water. Some small broken-up fragments of this category on the
plateau, such as the 'Awwama, Alauna, Hasanna, and some of
the Qat'an and Sa'it, even to-day have a very inferior social
position and are forced to make payments to, and to perform
services for, the free tribes among whom they live. Other 619
tribes of this second category live, as already mentioned, on
territory which is to all intents and purposes their own and have
long since ceased to pay a fee. This is especially the case to the
east, in 'Abaidat tribal territory, where such client tribes as the
Minifa, Qat'an, Taraki, and Huta live with independent status.
In the west also the Fawakhir and Zuwaya are too powerful and
warlike to accept overlordship. Also, the more nomadic groups
in Cyrenaica are mostly client tribes and, like all nomads, resent
any control or authority. Whatever the free tribes may say
about them, they regard themselves as independent.

The provenance of the *Sa'adi* tribes and of some of the 619
Marabtin tribes is shown together with the distribution of the 162
Sanusiya lodges on the map facing page 35, and the approximate
numbers of these tribes, and of a few others not shown on the
map, are listed below.

Sa'adi	
al-'Abaidat	30,450
al-'Awaqir	27,500
al-Bara'asa	21,000
al-Darsa	18,850
al-Magharba	13,000
al-'Arafa	9,300
al-'Abid	6,850
al-Hasa	6,500
'Ailat Fayid	100
Marabtin	
al-Qat'an	5,850
al-'Awwama	3,800
al-Zuwaya	3,700
al-Shwa'ir	3,400
al-Fawakhir	3,300
al-Sa'it	2,900
al-Majabra	2,500
al-Minifa	2,500
al-Masamir	2,400
al-Awajila	2,300
Aulad al-Shaikh	1,650
al-'Aqail	1,400
al-Shahaibat	1,350
al-Sarahna	1,250
al-Qabail	1,150
al-Huta	1,150

619 The figures for the free tribes include attached client groups,
162 for the principal of which estimates are also given separately.
[127] The figures are taken from Col. De Agostini's monograph. The
provenance of the chief Bedouin tribes of Tripolitania and of
the fringes of Fazzan who are Sanusi, or sympathetic to the
Sanusiya, is shown, likewise in relation to the distribution of
Sanusiya lodges, on the map on page 52.

VI

619 Although there were in the past intertribal wars and feuds
[671] which have lasted into the present time, and in spite of the
[574] difference in status between free and client tribes, there were
laws of the tents which gave every Bedouin the freedom of the
whole country, and there was much coming and going between
the tribes and exchange of hospitality, especially in the grazing
grounds where sections with distinct territories on the plateau
shared common pasturage to the south of it, and where the
necessities of Bedouin life, watering at wells in transit, the crossing
of another tribe's territory on the way to markets, the
pursuit of straying camels, and the need to sow where rain fell,
imposed a recognition of individual rights without regard to
tribal affiliations or social status. Had it not been so, the Grand
[793] Sanusi could not have built on the tribal system his inclusive
organization, for there would have been no foundations in
*[795] culture, social structure, and sentiment, on which to build.

128 My inclinations as an anthropologist are to discuss at some
length the tribal and kinship systems and the life of the tents,
619 but I refrain from giving more than a bare outline of the tribal
system, and I neglect altogether kinship and the life of the tents,
because, however interesting detail about these matters might
be to the ethnologist, a knowledge of them is, I think, unnecessary
for an understanding of the development of the
Sanusiya Order in Cyrenaica. I discuss the structure of the
Cyrenaican tribe therefore only in so far as it is relevant to this
general theme.[1]

619 Use of the term 'tribe' in Cyrenaica, even if it be restricted
to the big free tribes, is always to some extent arbitrary for the
political structure is highly segmentary. Nevertheless, though

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[1] For a more general account see Savarese, op. cit., Pt. II, *passim*.

174 not male names are used, is assumed; and secondly that the
613 Bedouin are polygamous. If, then, half-brother differentiation
551 or full sibling unity is to be shown genealogically, the obvious
562 way in which this can be done is to use a maternal name in the genealogy. Thus, in the Cyrenaican genealogy, a number of tribal groups will be shown as sons of a particular father. If dif-
182 ferentiation of these groups needs to be shown, this can be ef-
613 fected by clustering the groups round, say, two female names
551 (the names of the respective mothers) thereby making the two
562 clusters of groups stand in the relationship of paternal half brothers. The concept of the 'one womb', of maternal origin, is a critical one in the context of social cohesion, but it does not deny patriliny; on the contrary, it serves in a sense to reinforce it. Female names can be used to show a greater notion of cohesion than the mere use of male names, and the significance of a female name placed at the apex of the Cyrenaican genealogy is that it is the symbol of full brother unity at the highest political level.

173 The founding ancestress Sa'ada is credited with two sons, who
613 in turn are considered to be the founding ancestors of the two largest groups of tribes in Cyrenaica. Each of these sons is said
619 to have begottten two sons, as shown on the accompanying genealogy. The next generation shows a total of nine names, and these nine ancestors are considered to be the founding ancestors of the nine noble tribes of Cyrenaica.[2] Continuing the line of descent of one of these tribes—the Magharba—the same pattern of segmentation repeats itself: the tribe is divided into two primary sections having ar-Ra'aid and ash-Shamakh as the respective founding ancestors. Ash-Shamakh is said to have had four sons, and these are the founding ancestors of four secondary sections. These latter four are credited with a varying number of sons, as shown in the genealogy (Fig. 18-1).

One feature of the Cyrenaican genealogy immediately stands out from this brief description: the uniformity in the number of segments at the various levels of segmentation. Along the line of descent from Sa'ada to Nasr, the number of sons shown in the

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[162] [2] One of these, the 'Ailat Fayid, now only numbers about 150 souls, and although it is given the structural position of a tribe in the genealogy, it scarcely merits this distinction in practice.

613 segments show a lineage depth of three generations, while others
621 show as many as six. No special importance is attached by the
Bedouin to this number, although some writers claim that a depth
of five generations is of particular significance among other Arab
621 tribes.[7] Normally, in speaking of the vengeance group, the Bed-
628 ouin refer to the name of the ancestor of a tertiary tribal section.
613 Any one claiming membership of this group, regardless of his
682 precise generational relation to the offender or the victim is immediately and equally involved with its other members. When speaking of the group as such, the Bedouin refer to it as 'those who have agreed on the blood', and use the phrase *'amara dam* to refer to it. Blood money does not pass between its members, and political division does not occur within it.

621 These small tertiary sections of tribes, then, are small residen-
613 tial groups. Their population varies from one group to another,
[162] but most of them have a total population of 150 to 200 souls.
Successive generations—at least according to the Bedouin view—add to these numbers, and also increase progressively the number of generations in their genealogies. Substantial increases of population would, of course, constitute a pressure on local resources, on the water available in the particular well of a group, on the amount of land available for ploughing, and on the pastures for animals at the end of the rainy season. Again, if each generation is to be added to the existing genealogy, this would necessitate a realignment of structural relationships with each succeeding generation. The discussion that follows is an
128 examination of the ways in which adjustments are made to
621 maintain an equilibrium between the population of a group and
613 the carrying capacity of the land on which its members live, and
of the ways in which the genealogical structure is able to persist in the face of various contingencies which threaten it.

A beginning might be made by indicating the processes at work to keep the form of the genealogy fairly fixed when there is an absence of population pressure on resources. The first problem is the simple one of describing the mechanics of manipula-

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[171] [7] e.g. Burkhardt (1831), speaks of the *Khomse*, the five generation group, as very widespread among Arabs. G. W. Murray also reports the use of the word *Khomsa* among the Arabs of the Sinai desert to designate the blood-vengeance group, but the term used by the Aulad 'Ali tribe, the cousins and Egyptian neighbours of the Cyrenaican Bedouin, he gives as *Awlia'-ed-dam* (which simply means 'blood kindred').

121 173 613 619 178 If, moreover, the view of a genealogy as a continually expanding line of descent is to be accepted, it must be accepted also that large structural units, even in conditions of population stability, are to experience a continuous re-ordering of their structural relationships. In practice, what this means is that a tribe of, say 20,000 souls cease to be tribesmen of a named tribe and instead all become members of an almost identical group but with a different name. To take an example from the genealogy given [162] on page 365: the Magharba tribe shown there has a total population of some 13,000 souls. If proliferation affected the topmost limits of this tribe, the apical name disappears and presumably the name of one of the primary sections is to be substituted. That is, half the tribe would have to take on the lineage name of their opposed primary section. The only alternative to the use of the name of a primary segment as a substitute for the abandoned tribal name is the acceptance by 13,000 people of a totally new name, which is most unlikely.

It is reasonable to assume therefore, that the genealogy, in its general form, is fixed for long periods of time at least. This still leaves the problem of how and where adjustments are made to face the contingencies of birth and death, of the succession of generations, and of the irregular increases and decreases of population among the tertiary segments. An important clue lies in the number of segments which appear at the various orders of segmentation. From Sa'ada, the founding ancestress, in the line which runs to Nasr, each ancestor is shown as having a pair of sons for four orders of segmentation. At the fifth generation from Sa'ada—this is now the secondary order of segmentation within the tribe—the number of sons increases to four. Not all tribes will show the same number of sons at each generation as the Magharba—some, for example, might show three instead of two at the primary order—but what is true of all tribes is that there is evident consistency in the number down to and including the fifth generation from Sa'ada; if, that is to say, one of a tribe's primary segments is divided into three secondary sections, the other one or two, as the case may be, will be divided likewise. Throughout the tribes in Cyrenaica, then, segmentation of orders superior to the tertiary segments shows a pronounced consistency in their numbers.

121 given to the feud, for this is one of the few societies in which it occurs.[1] What is
613 meant here by a state of feud is a set of relationships between two tribal groups which
578 are characterized by hostility whenever two or more of their members meet. These
591 hostilities are of a sort which cannot be terminated; feud is not a matter of a group
121 indulging in hostilities here at one moment and there the next, but a sequence of
619 hostilities which, as far as the contemporary Bedouin are concerned at least, know
578 no beginning and are insoluble. Feud and the other forms of relationships to be
[591] discussed presently are to be understood, in part, by reference to the ordered divisions
of the tribes. It is necessary at the outset, therefore, to give a brief statement about
the tribal organization; other details will be included as they become relevant.

619 There are nine noble tribes in Cyrenaica whose members are referred to as freemen.
621 These tribes see themselves as divided into three genealogical orders of sections:
primary, secondary, and tertiary. The tertiary tribal sections correspond to the camps
613 which cluster around the larger watering points during the drought season, May to
[132] November. Such camps consist of clusters of smaller camps in which the concentration of agnatically related males is over 80 per cent. Within the latter kinship links are known, so that these agnates are consanguinely related as well as politically
[162] united. The populations of most tertiary groups vary from about 200 to 700 or so, but a group ceases to be viable if the number of male adults drops much below fifty. Political division is absent from these tertiary groups, regardless of their precise size, for, whatever may be the condition of developing local lineages, the acceptance of a common name carries with it full political responsibility incumbent equally on
[423] all their members. Each of these tertiary sections, moreover, has its own watering point, ploughland, and pastures; each has its own *watan* or homeland. This statement is true of all tribal sections of whatever order of segmentation. In other words, the tribes and their sections correspond to an ordered division of the territory.

619 Names of tribal sections are the same as those given in the genealogies. Both tribe
613 and lineage are identically ordered. Lineages develop, and split at the tertiary order of segmentation,[2] and, *a fortiori*, the process is the same for the tertiary tribal sections. Split, in other words, occurs where relationships are most intense.

621 The summer community which constitutes a tertiary section, breaks up once the rains begin in November or December. At this time of the year water is readily
221 available in the numerous small cisterns, there is pasture in plenty, and the animals are giving milk. These combined reasons lead the larger summer camp to divide into smaller camps of some five to ten tents. The latter are separated one from the other by short distances—a mile or so—but together form a cluster in that they are
621 territorially distinguishable from a neighbouring and similar group of camps. Tertiary
311 sections are discrete also in the sense that all the major necessities of daily living are available within their several territories. Each controls its own natural resources, and these resources are the same for all the camel-herding groups—in any given year one may have more of a particular commodity than another, but the difference is in

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[171] [1] Evans-Pritchard, 1940. The feud might have been present among the Nuer. Exogamy and the other rules of marriage which obtain among them create a dispersion of ties, which superficially appears to militate against a condition of feud. But a dispersal of ties does not mean that they necessarily act as a pressure for peace. Moreover, the exogamous links may link limited numbers of groups only, leaving others with sufficient discreteness to pursue feuding relationships as they are described in this paper.

[2] See Peters, 1959.

121 age depicted in their notion of a family is meaningful. It follows that, since
183 this unit will not be clustered in one tent, but distributed over several, each
594 small community must be so constituted that links people can use to claim
621 the services of others must exist, and that, since claims can be made against various sorts of kinship relationships, each small camp will have predictable kin links. It follows, further, that since age, sex and number of people are significant, a small camp will have a characteristic demographic structure; each tent in a camp will display developmental changes, and particular tents may be shifted from one camp to another, but if a livelihood is to be gained in this semi-desert environment supporting its mixed pastoral-cum-agricultural economy, then at any given time the small camp must have certain fixed features in its composition. The elementary family is subject to far too many vicissitudes to exist on its own. It now remains to demonstrate this general argument by examining the details of one of these small camps.

A Particular Camp Viewed in Detail

621 The camp was one of 12 which constitute a minimal tribal section. In
613 genealogical terms its male members were linked through an ancestor five ascending generations from living males of about 20 years of age. Usually,
[221] in summer, camps of this sort move to the vicinity of a large watering point; in winter, this larger community breaks up into a number of smaller ones as man and animals move off further south to the pastures. The total living
• [162] population of the tribal section to which this particular camp belonged was 524.

621 Linked patrilineally, its male members were also linked in a plurality of other consanguineal ways. Primarily, this plurality was brought about by
613 parallel-cousin marriage. The incidence of this form of marriage for
582 males of this group was 48 per cent[12] of the gross total of 234, derived
182 from their marriages over three generations; that is, the generation of males entering into marriage, and the generation which has begun to die out are included with the generation of middle-aged males. This means that practically every male is related to others in a number of ways, and it is necessary to point this out now because the details to be given presently will show only the more immediate, but not all, existing connections. Plurality of links, moreover, is not the only consequence. Parallel-cousin marriage is a transmuting agent, creating a diversity of links. Each and every link carries with it specific modes of behaviour, which in turn means that each individual has a wide variety of different claims he can press on his coresidents. Marriage connections also exist with other sections of the same tribe. Their proportion is 28 per cent of the total. Demographically, it

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[12] As a matter of interest, the figure for marriage to the father's brother's daughter is 50 per cent of the figure for parallel-cousin marriage in general, but the consequences of these are beyond the scope of the present discussion.

villages and towns, especially at Mersa Matrouh which is the seat of the local 178
government. The second world war was also influential in changing attitude
and social values. Men who were employed as unskilled labourers during the 166
war by the different combating armies became accustomed to paid jobs and to cash remuneration, which had previously been practically unknown to them. When the war ended, it was not easy for those workers to go back to the old nomadic life with all its hardships and insecurity. Some of them preferred to migrate to the Delta, while the others decided to settle down to work in the desert villages and towns as servants or as unskilled labour in the local government departments, schools, hospitals, etc. Most of the younger men now prefer to follow their example; the settled sedentary life is thus gaining ground all the time at the expense of livestock husbandry.

But important as they may be in accelerating the drift from nomadism to 000
sedentary life, these factors fall beyond the scope of this paper and need not be discussed further in this context. We shall be concerned with the plans and schemes which are deliberately designed to deal with the settlement of the nomadic and semi-nomadic clans. But before going on to consider this problem we should like to give a brief outline of the area itself so as to establish a clear idea about the general setting, and to see the projects themselves against a background of the whole social life. This should help us to understand more clearly the motives underlying the projects and to discern the effects they may have on the social situation.

Geographers generally divide the Western Desert into three main divisions, 133
each of which has its outstanding characteristics.

1. The northern strip which extends some 500 kilometres along the coast 105
from the west of Alexandria to the Egyptian-Libyan border. This strip, known as the *Dera'a Bahari*, consists mainly of fertile cultivated land which extends some 20 to 30 kilometres to the south, tending generally to become narrower to the west till it almost vanishes at Sollum near the frontiers.
2. To the south of this green coastal zone lies a high plateau in which are a number of depressions, the most important being the Qattara Depression.
3. The rest of the area; i.e. the extreme southern region, is real arid desert.

The coastal zone is the only really inhabited and cultivated part of the desert; beyond it there is hardly any prospect for cultivation. It is also a vital centre to which the scattered clans and groups of herders come to gather round the water points and the artesian wells during the dry season when the water becomes scarce in the southern parts.

The climate of the desert varies between the Mediterranean climate to the 132
north and along the coast, and the sub-tropical dry climate in the southern 105
parts. The dry season is usually very warm, tending to grow hotter southwards; while the wet season, usually extending from November to March, is generally mild especially in the north. Rainfall is very erratic and varies greatly from year to year and from one place to another. But on the whole, there is more rain in the north than in the south, and in most years rain falls in the southern parts only on very rare occasions. Rain may come quite suddenly and cause torrential floods which sweep away dwellings, crops and animals alike. This is typical of the Sallum area.

According to the 1947 census, the Bedouins of the Western Desert number 162
68,161. Only 23,444, i.e. less than the half of the population, are engaged in 105

105 162 livestock husbandry as their main occupation while the rest earn their living by such other means as agriculture, fishing, stone-cutting, trade, etc. But whatever his main job may be, a man is likely to possess a number of sheep which he usually entrusts to a professional herdsman if he cannot look after them himself. This means that all sectors of the population have an active interest in livestock. Livestock, or rather sheep, are the most important and most esteemed item of wealth, and pastoral values still rank very high in spite of the obvious attraction of other types of work. On the other hand, pure nomadism is not practised, except perhaps by some small groups of camel-herders living in the far south of the area. The tremendous majority of the herdsmen are sheep-herders, whose movements are much more restricted than the movements of the real nomads. They have permanent settlements to which they retire when the grazing season is over, and there they practise agriculture, which they consider a secondary and supplementary occupation.

Most of the inhabitants of the Western Desert belong to the Awlad Ali clans who originally came from Libya. Some less important and less numerous clans, the Morabiteen clans, also live there as 'clients' of the more powerful Awlad Ali. A certain degree of correspondence exists between clan segmentation and the distribution of lands, both pasture-land and the fertile arable areas of the northern strip being distributed among clans and lineages in a clearly defined manner. A man cannot make use of the grazing ground, much less of the cultivation ground, known to belong to a different clan or lineage except under certain conditions and only obtaining the owners' permission. This does not mean, however, that clans and lineages are localized. For in spite of the natural tendency of kinsmen to cluster together and to live near to each other, the members of the same clan-segment may be widely dispersed, and the inhabitants of any specific locality, especially near the coast, usually belong to different clans. Nevertheless, a certain clan may be more strongly represented in a particular locality than all the other clans.

105 312 The problem of water supply is, naturally, the most crucial problem with which the people have to cope. The absence of surface water, the shortness of the wet season, the low rainfall and the meagreness of the subterranean resources in most parts of the desert, especially inland, impose drastic limitations upon their activities. Apart from the few artesian wells found in the northern coastal zone, rain is the main source of water supply. It is, however, a very unreliable source because of its irregularity. Moreover, a considerable amount of rain-water is lost by seepage through the sand and by evaporation. The situation is further aggravated by the fact that not all the functioning wells yield potable water or even water suitable for the irrigation of fields. The water of a large number of these artesian wells is charged with a high percentage of dissolved salts. This water can only be used for domestic purposes. Certain experiments are now being carried out at Ras-el-Hikma and Fuka to see whether such saline water could be used for irrigating the pasture-lands.

105 243 311 The two main complementary occupations, i.e. livestock husbandry and the cultivation of barley, are seriously affected by the water situation. The strip of arable land which extends along the sea coast varies in breadth from place to place and from year to year according to the rainfall. In good years it may stretch some 10 to 20 kilometres southwards, but in bad years the cultivation becomes rather patchy and is confined to a very narrow strip only a few kilometres wide. The people are never sure of their crops, and in really

(Sinaqra)

The Sinaqra, or descendants of Sinqir, are also reckoned among the descendants of Ali the White, "because Sinqir married his daughter Khadija." They include :— 619 173

(4)	Afrad	Maghawra
(5)	Azayim	'Eilet el-Abdi, Muwamna
(6)	'Eilet Eleura	'Eilet Jeballa, 'Eilet Omar, 'Eilet Harun, 'Eilet Ajarma, 'Eilet Tahir.

II.

The descendants of 'Ali bin 'Aqar's second son, 'Ali el-Ahmar (" The Red ") are:—

(1)	'Esheibat	'Eilet ed-Dawi, 'Eilet el-Azraq, El-Wassafa, 'El-Lazumi
(2)	Kimeilat	'Eilet el-Hajj Muhammad, El-Maharsa, 'El-Khadayij
(3)	Jineishat[1]	'Eilet el-Majduba, Es-Samayil, Tabak

III. Sinana

The Sinana are the descendants of Sineina, the third son of Ali bin 'Aqar bin Dib. They include:—

(1)	Mahafid	'Eilet Etman, 'Eilet el-Hammama, 'Eilet esh-Shimla
(2)	Arawa	'Eilet ez-Zireiriya, 'Eilet el-Ghazulat
(3)	Qatifa	'Eilet Nasralla, 'Eilet-Omar, Esh-Shawalha.
(4)	Ijna	

Jawabis.—The nomadic Jawabis (sing. Jibusi) are for the most part still settled in and around the Wadi Natrun, where General Andreossy found them in Napoleon's time. He calls them : 619 175 [131]

> " A hospitable tribe who lead a shepherd's life and encamp there every winter with their flocks. They are employed during this time carrying Natrun and prickly reeds ; they also have some traffic in dates, which they fetch in caravans from Sioua in the Ammonian Oasis ; it is a journey of twelve to fifteen days. These Arabs are *marabouths*, or peaceful people."[2]

He goes on to say they never make war, and only take up arms to defend themselves. In his time the tribe was composed of about 2,000 men, and possessed 60 horses. A little [162] [231] [162]

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[1] Kennett gives the three subdivisions of the Jineishat as Madi, Samayil, and Jabr.

[2] *Memoirs Relative to Egypt*, 288.

619
[175] later Wilkinson estimated them at about 400 men near El
[162] Terrana and the Wadi Natrun.

At the present day they are still reckoned *Murabitin*, but, like the Jumei'at, are sufficiently independent not to have to
[437] pay tribute. They share with the Awlad 'Ali in the date
traffic with Bahariya Oasis, where the produce of the village of Mandisha is reserved for them, and that from Bawitti for the Awlad 'Ali.

619 Kennett notes (p. 54) that they demand £400 for blood-
682 money instead of £300, the usual price in the Western
181 Desert, and alludes (p. 67) to:

> "The free and easy way in which the Gawabees tribe near the Wadi Natrun pack up their summer tents and leave them in situ while they themselves trek off with their winter tents into the open desert for the winter grazing is indicative of this code of honesty prevailing among them."

142 On page 101, he calls them "nearly all very small men,
619 with strangely similar features and characteristics running through all the families of the tribe".

619 Bramly has collected three pedigrees of the tribe all
173 going back to Sheikh 'Abd el-Jawad el-Kassar. They state that they are an offshoot from the Qadadfa, and about 500 years ago left Saqiet el-Hamra in Morocco to settle in Egypt.

As a reward for "settling some affairs in the Wadi Natrun", Muhammad 'Ali Pasha granted them the usual Bedouin privilege of exemption from military service. There are small colonies of them elsewhere among the Awlad Ali, while others are settled in the cultivated provinces of Giza, Beheira, Menufiya, and Gharbiya.

Jumei'at.—This tribe, possibly a remnant of the original Libyan inhabitants of Mariut, is of quite respectable antiquity, for Ibn Khaldun includes the Jumei'at as a subtribe of "Beni 'Ali", themselves an offshoot from Beni Suleim. Whether his "Beni 'Ali" are the same as the modern Awlad 'Ali may be questioned, yet it is a reasonable assumption, for the exchange of the words "Beni" and "Awlad" in tribal names can be paralleled elsewhere.

The Jumei'at all agree that their remote ancestor, whom they share with the Awlad Suleiman and the Qat'an, was called Ka'b, and a Ka'b indeed appears in the pedigree ascribed

619 oppression, he gathered his people and delivered a fiery
175 denunciation of his religion, during which he smashed his
726 rosary into pieces and mixed it with his horse's fodder;
792 Baqush then invited their kinsmen (?) the Awlad 'Ali, to
come over from the "Green Mountain" and help them.
To entice the Awlad 'Ali, he is said to have sent them samples
of salt desert water and Nile water sweetened with sugar to
illustrate the difference between the hardships of the desert
and the comforts of the Rif.[1]

619 As recounted earlier, the Awlad 'Ali completely routed the
175 Hanadi and their allies, and drove them from the desert.
726 In the division of the conquered territory, the Jumei'at
received a third, and, although they were still considered
Murabitin, were released from the payment of tribute. They
[131] now live intermingled with the free sections of the Awlad
'Ali, all along the north coast of Egypt, and are numerous in
Beheira, especially near Abu Hummus.

619 *Samalus.*—The Samalus are found scattered among the
[131] Awlad 'Ali on the northern coast and stranded among many
of the Egyptian provinces. They once possessed a head
sheikh Abu Sala at Minya, and colonies are recorded from
Faiyum, Beheira, Menufiya, Gharbiya, and Sharqiya. An
[175] old paper from the Recruiting Department gives from
● [162] seventeen villages in the Faiyum 775 mounted Samalus
[231] and 1,400 on foot, possessing 1,760 camels and 11,400
sheep. Two important groups of wells, both called "Sawani
[312] es-Samalus" exist on the north coast, one about 50 kilometres
east of Salum, and the other 20 kilometres south
of Dhab'a.

[173] They say they came to Egypt, 400 strong, about 200
years ago, from the Wadi Samalus in the Jebel Akhdar, and
their ancestor twelve generations ago was Nasr el-Hasani, of
course an "Arab from Beni Suleim".

[175] In the *Description de l'Egypte*, P. D. Martin relates how
[726] in 1800 the Samalus of Faiyum were raided by a party of
Ferjan, 200 strong, from Beheira.

619 *Shiheibat.*—These are a "Mrabit" tribe from the west with
186 an unenviable reputation, living near the Wadi Natrun.
Sayed Idris, the former Senussi leader, says of them: "Most

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[1] Dumreicher, 16. This is probably the "Sheik Abdall Gawyal Bagooshi" who wrote to Sir Sydney Smith in March, 1801, warning him of the approach of the French from Damanhur. Wilson, *History of the British Expedition in Egypt*, 371. (Rif = cultivated area.)

648 727 important effects on contemporary al-Qasr. There remain about
11 million land mines in the ground between Marsa Matruh and
648 727 165 •164 Sallum. Accidents connected with these mines take one thousand Bedouin lives every year, and cause about 10,000 injuries annually. (Reported in al-Ahram, January, 1965). This danger limits the areas in which the Bedouins can use the tractor, and, as a result, a great deal of the coastal land must be plowed by hand. In al-Qasr, physical disfigurements resulting from mine mishaps were quite common, and most families have had members killed in this way. In one al-Qasr lineage, 'Ailit Ma'fas, there have been sixteen men killed by mines since 1943.

Change and Present Attitudes

648 177 Political and economic changes, begun at the turn of the century, have continued into the present. The Bedouins of al-Qasr have been increasingly drawn into the political and economic life of the Egyptian national community. They have come to depend upon the national market for their products and upon governmental agricultural subsidies for their security. The net result of this process has been a sedentary Bedouin society which is not quite tribal and not quite peasant. Al-Qasr has this in-between quality--what Fallers (1961) has called the *tertium quid* quality.

[829] It is difficult to gauge the feelings of the Bedouins of al-Qasr about the social changes taking place. They complain

159 the relationship between her and her brothers.

562
428 Following her action and until the time of the study, they had
593 never visited her and she had never visited them. Her husband took
[232] care of the herd; and the arrangement worked out all right until the
159 husband told Fatma one day that he was going to marry a second wife.
562
593 She refused, but he went ahead with the marriage without her consent.
595 He brought the new wife to live with Fatma in the same tin hut in which
they were living. He started to pay more attention to the new wife and
to neglect Fatma; whenever the latter complained, he beat her. Then,
before one of the religious feasts, he sold two of Fatma's sheep and
bought his new wife a dress and a silver bracelet. When Fatma objected
[164] and they argued, he hit her with a stick on the head; she was hospitalized for a week with a serious head wound. While in the hospital, she
went to her brothers who lived only two miles away, but they refused to
159 come to her assistance. She then went to sheikh Elewa (the aqila of
562 Bait Asabei) and threw herself on him. He met with the husband and con-
574 vinced him to divorce Fatma. He kept forty sheep of Fatma's herd as com-
593
595 pensation for the mahr he had paid her and the marriage expenses, then
586 took his new wife and moved from Fatma's hut. Fatma then returned and
159 managed her financial affairs successfully herself. She managed the
562 store and hired a shepherd to take care of the sheep. At the time of
444
[233] the present study she was respected by almost everybody in the area, including members of the local administration. She is known to be reason-
[629] able and of sound opinion, and her store functions as the meeting place
[521] for many of the tribal mi'ads and for casual conversations. She is also
considered as a liason between the tribal population in the area and the
local government administration, and is respected by both sides.

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233 animals to drink, sat on the edge of the well with his feet in the
cool water of the pool completely absorbed in his thoughts amidst
the quiet surroundings. Passing by the pool at that time was Mahdi
233 576 from a neighboring tribal segment. Seeing Idris (whom he had not
● 165 known), he shouted the customary greeting, "Peace on you." Startled
by the voice of Mahdi, Idris lost his balance and fell in the deep
water of the pool. Mahdi rushed to help him, but the water was too
deep, and Idris drowned. Feeling sorry for Idris, Mahdi took the
flock and went back to the camp of Idris where he informed the
682 latter's wife of what had happened. A few days later, Mahdi was
627 paid a visit by Sheikh Elewa, the aqila of Bait Asabei' and known
[613] mardi in the area who informed Mahdi that the family of Idris was
demanding the payment of the sum of L.E. 300 for the death of their
682 relative. A Mi'ad was set for the following week. In that Mi'ad,
627 and after Mahdi admitted that it was his greeting that had startled
672 Idris and caused him to fall in the well, the two Mardis represent-
613 ing the two parties agreed that the payment of the sum of three
hundred pounds was in order and that Mahdi and his amar must pay it
to the victim's family as soon as possible. At first, Mahdi seemed
to accept the judgment of the two Mardis, especially when both were
prominant members of some of the influential tribal segments in the
area. But Mahdi was a poor man, and his amar was very small in num-
ber, which made the payment of the bloodmoney almost impossible.
682 Although appeal in the ordinary legal sense does not exist in such
627 a system like that of Awlad Ali, where no judgment is forced upon
672 any of the disputing parties, and where the pronouncement of the
695

175 648 554 631 Sanusi against the Italians in Cyrenaica. "When the British reached Matruh, they jailed all of the 'umdas and shaikhs (two 'umdas and five shaikhs, at that time). Then they chose new leaders, from the families of the old leaders, to work with them." But, "these men did not fight with the British, they only acted as their guides in dealing with the Bedouins of the desert. When the old leaders were released from jail, they returned to their positions of political office. While they were in jail, their replacements had only helped the [178] British with supplies." Apparently, the British saw the need of maintaining the continuity of the Bedouin authority structure.

175 648 Data on the condition of the Bedouins of the Western Desert between the two world wars are absent. The Bedouins say that they lived with no trouble, or any help, from the Egyptians. The Bedouins have no fond memories of their experiences during World War II. They first heard of the war in 1940 when the Italians marched into Western Desert from Libya. The Germans occupied al-Qasr from May to October of 1942, when the famous General Rommel had his headquarters at Marsa Matruh. The British had told the Bedouins, in 1940, that they should flee the Italians, and that unless they did they would be held responsible for their actions. Most of the 175 648 722 people of al-Qasr agreed to go to refugee camps at Amriyya near Alexandria for the duration of the war.

•166 [556] Some of the Bedouins refused to leave for Amriyya.

175 These were the wealthy group who had large numbers of sheep
648 and camels. In fact, most of the animals taken east to
722 Amriyya died on the way or were expropriated by the British.
556 'Umran Kailani, "who owned one thousand camels" and was the
•166 shaikh of the 'Ali Ahmar section of the Awlad 'Ali at the time,
refused to go to Amriyya. The Bedouins say that he was treated
very well by the Germans who asked him to form a local government
and promised him all the help and supplies that he
needed. It is difficult to obtain figures on how many Bedouins
made the migration to the Nile Valley and how many remained
[162] behind in the Al-Qasr area. One informant told me that before
the war there were about 80,000 members of the Awlad 'Ali in
the Western Desert and that out of this number, about 30,000
remained behind.

175 Those who sought refuge at Amriyya returned to the
648 al-Qasr area at the end of 1942 after the defeat of the Germans
727 at al-Alamain. They found things greatly changed. Before the
war, there had been about twenty buildings in the al-Qasr area
and most of these were bombed out by the air war. The loss of
animals and the damage to the land made the resumption of
normal life quite difficult for the Bedouins. Underneath,
the land was literally a bed of anti-tank and anti-personnel
mines left by the advance and retreat of three different
armies. This restricted Bedouin travel and everyday food-
648 getting activities. This condition, which still exists, has
727

History of Settlement in al-Qasr

173 The settlement of al-Qasr took place about 200 years
•[166] ago when the Awlad 'Ali first came to the area from Cyrenaica.
[175] No historical documentation for this period exists. The
173 various versions which the Bedouins offer are both vague and
*613 ethnocentric with reference to lineage. A point of consensus
[712] is that the zone was first claimed by Abu Mahjuba who built
a large fort (qasr = "fort" or "castle") near the coast. The Bedouins say that Abu Mahjuba settled in the area of al-Qasr because "he knew good land when he saw it." He belonged to no one lineage, "he was 'Aishaibi only." All of the lineages of al-Qasr claim that their ancestors came with Abu Mahjuba and settled on the land at that time. Abu Mahjuba has been mythologized: he belongs to all of al-Qasr, a symbol of local group solidarity and fraternal equality.

173 Al-Qasr represents the end of nomadic life for the
361 'Aishaibat tribe. According to the Bedouins, each tribe and
[198] lineage took that part of al-Qasr which it preferred. If the
members of the segment wanted to grow vegetables, they took land on the coast; if they preferred the "old way of life," they set up their tents in the sha'ir wi mar'a area and raised sheep. "Everything was fine," they say, "there were no land registration laws--a man was free." Al-Qasr was settled
[619] "after the wars" (with the Hanadi), and it was only then that
the Awlad 'Ali broke up into tribes. The 'Aishaibat took the

245 blossoms of the tree are stripped away by these winds before
177 the fruit can mature.

178 Traditional values affect the Bedouins' perception of
517 their new life. Men are fond of gathering for their ritual
272 three cups of mint tea and recalling "the good old days." In
[829] those days, they say, men only had to ride, shoot, and drink
233 tea. In the past, there was a great deal of security in
178 owning animals which are not as dependent on the rains as
422 is agriculture. During a year of bad rains, a Bedouin could
233 always move his flock to Libya or to the Nile Valley: "When
731 we have a bad year, we take our animals to the grass of our
• 166 relatives. When they have a bad year, they come here." In
167 the drought year of 1960, 20,000 Egyptian Bedouins migrated
to Libya in search of pasturage. This caused an international
[648] conflict and King Idris of Libya, for a short time, closed the
border to Bedouins. The conflict was finally resolved, and
the Bedouins were given permission to use the pastures of
Cyrenaica. None of the Bedouins of al-Qasr were involved in
this movement.

233 The Bedouins who have settled in the _'izba_ sector of
al-Qasr also prefer to keep some sheep. The security which
they represent is worth the time and expense of maintaining
233 them and paying a shepherd to look after them. The Bedouins,
178 in the past, paid their shepherds one sheep for every ten
465 sheep that he tended. Payment was made twice a year. Today,

407 the lack of spare parts. Three of the tractors were Russian-built, and two were Egyptian made. The Bedouins say that the Russian tractors are the better.

407 241 654 [132] In 1964, the Western Desert received its heaviest rainfall since 1947. To take advantage of this, local government officials of the reclamation project requested an additional fifty tractors for plowing on the coastal zone. They received only six additional tractors. In that year, the thirty-nine tractors used in the entire Western Desert were able to plow 15,240 acres of land. During this period of economic change, 731 233 [654] [166] a bad barley crop causes a fodder shortage for the animals, and seldom is the aid program able to compensate for this. Consequently, there is a need to ship sheep to the Nile Valley, or to seek permission to take them to the pastures of Cyrenaica. Both situations create tremendous difficulties for both the [432] [435] Bedouins and the government. A third alternative for the Bedouin is to buy barley on the black-market. In doing this, he must pay six times the normal cost of grain, and risk reprisals.

177 657 Prior to 1960, change in al-Qasr might be characterized as a steady and endogenous process of sedentarization. It had been taking place for about a century and a half. Exogenous change, social and economic, may be identified with the desire of the government to reclaim land in al-Qasr for agricultural use, and to integrate the Bedouin into the national economy.

619
675
and the Marabit.

The Qit'an tribe, based partly in Libya and partly *[613] in Egypt, is a tribe in the same sense that the Awlad 'Ali is one, i.e., at the secondary level of the lineage system. [166] [175] This tribe moved into Egypt sometime around 1900. The Bedouins of al-Qasr estimate that "50% of the Qit'an are with Ali Ahmar,.30% with Sinaina, and 20% with Ali Abyad." 619 675 578 In 1956, certain events occurred in Libya which brought about a declaration of independence from Sa'adi domination by the Qit'an in that country. The Qit'an felt that their numbers were sufficiently large enough that they should represent themselves in the Libyan parliament. In other words, the Marabtiin were no longer willing to settle for the traditional social categories and role structures allotted to them. After these events in Libya, some members of the Qit'an came to Egypt and informed their brothers about the formation of the tribe as a separate entity, and convinced the Egyptian Qit'an to do the same--which they did.

The Bedouins say that the Governor of Marsa Matruh encouraged the Qit'an tribe to increase their numbers in the area after he learned of their desire to be free from Sa'adi domination. There had been a small number of Qit'an in the town of Marsa Matruh. This number quickly grew in size and political strength so that it could challenge the power of the 'Ali Ahmar who are considered the dominant tribe in this

613 Written agreements such as the above are becoming more common in
675 the area. The need to have the responsibility of the vengeance group
[178] or the Amar recorded and the names of its members listed stems from the
[361] increase in the geographical mobility of individuals and separate house-
[464] holds seeking jobs with the government organizations in the area or with
the various industries in the towns and cities outside the Western Desert.
233 The uncertainty of pastoral nomadism and the delicate balance which exists
178 between pastures, animal population, and human population is pushing an
182 ever-increasing number of people to abandon the way of life which they
had lived for generations. Animals are extremely important to sustain
233 the pastoral life of Awlad Ali. Once the balance between the pasture and
182 the animal population is upset by a draught, a segment of the human popu-
731 lation has to make new adjustments. This adjustment is first made by
● 166 moving with one's flocks to areas in the Delta or in the Cyrenaica region
of Libya. This is a short-term adjustment, however, and cannot be con-
tinued for long periods of time. Pastures in the Delta have to be pur-
chased, and in most cases the owner of the herd has to sell part of his
[619] herd to feed the rest. The Cyrenaica pasture is very limited and re-
stricted by the strong tribal control of the Cyrenaica Bedouins, who in
general are not friendly with many of the tribal segments living in the
233 Egyptian Western Desert. If the draught continues beyond a certain time,
731 the individual owner of a herd may find himself forced to sell the herd
464 434 and seek other modes of subsistence in the form of part-time or full-time
182 employment as a semi-skilled or unskilled worker with the government or
industrial organizations. Such jobs are usually viewed as a temporary
source of income to help the individual and his immediate family live

613 usually has no difficulty collecting the individual shares. His own
682 [554] financial ability is rarely called upon. When a member is unable to
[178] pay for any reason, his share is divided among the able members. However,
in recent years this seems to be changing, especially among the baits
closely located to the settled communities or the urban centers. Among
'613 these baits individual mobility has increased significantly with a large
178 166 number of younger members either leaving the area for the urban centers
464 or accepting salaried jobs with the government organizations. Among
369 certain baits in the area of Burg el-Arab, for example, the percentage
of adult males engaged in such jobs sometimes reaches sixty percent.
More than thirty-five out of fifty-six males constituting bait Asabei'
have a full-time or part-time job.

613 The individualistic attitudes accompanying the dependency on sal-
178 aries and living in towns and cities have their effects on the kinship
166 464 ties among members of these baits. With the prevalence of the individ-
682 ualistic attitudes among members of a certain bait, they become more
369 reluctant to pay their financial obligations and the Aqila finds it more
and more difficult to rely, for the fulfillment of the bait's financial
obligations, on the willingness of members to pay. His success within
613 554 the domain of the amar becomes more determined by his ability to pay
556 from his own money for those members of his bait who refuse or are un-
682 able to pay. Wealth becomes an important asset for the Aqila's per-
formance of his duties within the amar. When this happens, there seems
to be a certain shift in the source of political support for the Aqila.
613 In a well-integrated bait the popularity (or unopopularity) of the Aqila
554 among the other Awaqil of the amar had very little influence on his

613 position as the leader of the bait. The principle of patrilineal suc-
554 cession is so respected in such baits that it overshadows any other con-
613 554 sideration. This continues to be the case as long as the kinship ties
428 within the bait remain strong. When the kinship ties in a given bait
178 weaken, the principle of patrilineal succession also weakens. This is
●[166] more likely to occur in baits where a relatively large number of the
[464] members leave the area permanently or for a more or less prolonged period
613 of time, seeking jobs on a part or a full-time basis. Many of these
178 members maintain only a minimal contact with their respective baits.
166 464 They become more reluctant to fulfill their kinship obligations, es-
561 pecially when they entail any financial liability. The older members
369 complain about how younger persons are less loyal to their elders and
how selfish they have become. "All they care about is their jobs and
the pleasure they get from the city; they are becoming city people."
Younger members, on the other hand, maintain that their reluctance to
fulfill their kinship obligations stems from their feeling that they
do not get anything in return. "Life is expensive and money is hard to
obtain. I cannot make enough money to support myself and my wife and
children and at the same time pay my cousin's financial debts," said a
member of eilat Asabei', who works as a driver with the Desert Organi-
zation in Alexandria.

613 When this happens, there seems to be a tendency toward shifting the
554 emphasis from the bait to the eila or the amar as the source of the po-
[556] litical support of the Aqila. This is turn makes wealth an important
basis of the Aqila's power. No more can the bait impose an ineffective
Aqila on the amar unless it is ready to back him by their own share of
money. If this is lacking as was the case with Shei'eb, there is nothing

occupying territory which cannot be said to belong to any particular 619
section of their noble patron tribe, is tied to the patron 571
tribe as such. Yet it is through the small tertiary segments that 621
these ties are made effective. In this sense, a client tribe is a combination 613
of small groups of people each group having specific
relationships with defined tertiary sections, and participating in
the tribe of their patrons through these relationships.

Secondly, clients are found distributed in small groups, sometimes 619
no more than one or two men, but often in clusters large 621
enough to compose a small camp. Practically all tertiary sections 613
of the noble tribes have some clients either living with them or
sharing their resources. While clients continue to reside with a 619
particular tertiary section, it is the members of the latter who are 621
responsible for them and vice versa. If, for example, one of the 613
clients commits a homicide, the gathering of blood-money is the 672
responsibility of the noble tertiary section to which he is attached, [682]
and vengeance can be exacted on any member of the
noble section. In other circumstances, when the offender is a
nobleman, then the clients of his group are the first to be approached
for blood-money. Tied in this way to a particular 619
tertiary section, they are not, however, compelled to reside with 621
its members permanently. On the contrary, they may be forced 182
to move. If, for example, there is a pressure on local water supplies, 166
the first to feel it are the clients. Annually, they supplicate 613
for the use of water, and if their patrons decide that there is insufficient to meet all needs, the request is refused, albeit reluctantly. Clients constitute a socially mobile group; they are the pawns in the annual readjustment of men to their resources. Whenever they move, they pass on to another tertiary section, which may be a collateral section of the one they have left or structurally far removed from it, but as soon as they leave one, their duties and obligations cease and are taken up anew with another structurally like group. It is because their attachment is to a tertiary section, and not to one of superior order, that they can be as socially mobile as they are, which in turn facilitates a more efficient adjustment to the ecological situation from year to year.

Small groups of clients move frequently, groups of adopted people less frequently, and groups composed of the free-born

619 change their structural position only rarely. The latter change
621 sometimes does, however, occur, and there is evidence to show
182 that it does. For example, Agostini (1922–23, p. 323) in his tribal
166 survey, records a section named Barsha as one of the groups stemming
613 from Nasr.[12] In the genealogies I was given, the name did
not appear, and even after some questioning, what information
was known about it was concealed. Some time later the name
[578] cropped up accidentally in conversation, and I was then told that
at one time it had been one of the Nasr groups, but that after a
quarrel during a year of water shortage, the Barsha folk went
to live with people with whom they had maternal connexions,
and in whose territory there was ample water that year, and
never returned. The group, a tertiary one, was detached from the
tertiary point of segmentation in the genealogies, and tied on to
a tertiary group of another tribe in its new homeland.

178 To summarize briefly the argument thus far, the mechanical
173 devices of telescoping, fusion of names, the ejection of those
619 names which cease to be of any social consequence, and the
elision of names at or around the fifth ascending generation,
621 taken together point to the importance of the tertiary order of
613 segmentation in discussing the problem of maintaining the form
of the genealogy constant in face of its natural tendency to alter;
further, evidence of changes (adoption into a lineage, detachment
from it, the inclusion and exclusion of clients) was presented,
and this again led to the conclusion that the tertiary point
of segmentation is critical in this respect. This being so, the manner
[128] in which change actually occurs, still remains to be shown,
and this is best done, perhaps, by discussing the mode of proliferation
of tertiary segments. In order to do this adequately, it
is necessary to say something briefly about certain features of
Bedouin marriage.

582 Among the Bedouin there exists a preferential form of marriage
between a man and his father's brother's daughter. Parallel
605 cousin marriage of this sort carries with it the exclusive right of
a man to this cousin. Without his consent no one else can marry
her, and to attempt to do so would be to risk the marriage arrangements
being nullified after negotiations had almost been

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[114] [12] Barsha's position is incorrectly given as a sub-group of Haiba; it should be shown as structurally equivalent to Haiba. See also note 11.

794 were concerned, there was little doubt who was leader—the
554 name of the former was known throughout the land. Now when
794 the warrior returned from his Egyptian exile, his rival offered
him a sheep as a gift. This act was wholly appropriate. Subse-
554 quently they continued to compete fiercely, but it soon became
578 clear that the returned warrior was winning the greater support.
[788] In the face of this, the rival, in 1948, decided to break with tradi-
tion by staying away from the annual pilgrimage to the tomb of
[175] the local saint. Instead, he and his followers made their pilgrim-
age to a different tomb in the vicinity of their camp, and later
built a low wall round the tomb, whitewashed it, and made it
known that henceforward they would regularly use it for pilgrim-
[613] ages. The two kinship groups of a tertiary section now had their
[778] separate saint's tomb. Some months later, the rival decided to
794 move with his small group to an area in which they had not pre-
viously resided. It is the custom among the Bedouin when they
554 pitch their tents in a place for the first time, that the people of
578 the neighbourhood should bring them gifts to mark the event.
431 The returned warrior, who had now become a close neighbour
[166] of his rival was obliged, like others, to offer the latter a gift; he
was also obliged to return the gift of a sheep that he had been
given on rejoining his section in 1947. He brought a gift within a
few hours of his rival's arrival, but it was a goat.[14] The rival and
his followers were furious, and the argument that the warrior was
too poor to give more was dismissed summarily. This was the
final insult. The donor, in return, had been given less than he had
presented. The reciprocity of gift exchanges had not only been
arrested, it had been reversed. From then onwards the two groups
made no attempt to conceal their hostility and went their sepa-
rate ways.

613 Disputes stemming from circumstances such as these are the
578 occasions which mark the proliferation of groups, although in
all three cases cited, difficulties over water supplies had pre-
ceded the outbreaks of quarrelling.

613 In this discussion of the ways in which proliferation of seg-
602 ments takes place, the emphasis had been put on the tug of war
121 between the interests of people in their agnatic connexions and

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[14] A goat is inferior to a sheep in gift exchanges.

7:Abou-Zeid E-5 (no date) 1959 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9
Egypt

THE SEDENTARIZATION OF NOMADS IN THE WESTERN DESERT OF EGYPT

A. M. Abou-Zeid

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178 Much attention has been paid in the last few years, in both Egyptian and international circles, to the question of settling the nomads of the Western 657 Desert of Egypt. A number of institutions (e.g. the Cairo Institute for Desert Research and the Departments of Sociology and Social Anthropology in the Egyptian universities) and some government departments (e.g. the Department of Desert Irrigation, of the Ministry of Public Works) have combined their efforts to study the economic and social situation of the semi-nomadic clans and the possibility of creating new sedentary agricultural communities to replace the present nomadic and semi-nomadic groups whose economy is based on the rearing of livestock in general, and of sheep in particular. It is the purpose of this paper to give a brief account of the main projects of sedentarization suggested by the authorities concerned in Egypt, and to outline their expected effects upon the economic system and modes of living, and also to indicate the repercussions they may eventually have on the whole social structure of the semi-nomadic clans. Apart from the planned projects, there is a marked and growing tendency among these people, especially the younger 178 generation, to abandon the traditional way of life and to settle down. This 166 tendency is generally stimulated by the changing social conditions. The tremendous hardships and the insecurity of the nomadic life, which is entirely dependent on rains, and the increasing social and cultural contacts with the urban communities in the Delta are the main factors influencing this change of social conditions, thus accentuating what may be described as a spontaneous and natural drift to settled life. Thus, an acute decline in the amount of rainfall, which is a frequent phenomenon in the Western Desert, and the consequent drought, famine and death of large numbers of animals will drive men to search for a more stable means of living in which they can find the security that is lacking in the nomadic way of life. The introduction of modern education and the establishment of schools in the larger villages have played a great role in changing the outlook of the people and in discrediting the traditional nomadic values. The advent of the railway and the improvement of other means of transport and communication have encouraged contacts with the Delta, and more particularly with Alexandria. As a result, an increasing number of young men migrate every year to Alexandria and get themselves paid jobs there. Trade and commercial transactions have also been increased with the Delta. New trade centres (e.g. El-Hammam, El-Dab'aa and Mersa Matrouh) have grown up along the railway line at the key stations. The most important of these centres is perhaps El-Hammam, which is the largest cattle market in the Western Desert. Small food stores and cafés and restaurants owned by 'native' people have been opened at these centres and in the larger

7:Abou-Zeid E-5 (no date) 1959 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9
Egypt

villages and towns, especially at Mersa Matrouh which is the seat of the local 178
government. The second world war was also influential in changing attitude
and social values. Men who were employed as unskilled labourers during the 166
war by the different combating armies became accustomed to paid jobs and to cash remuneration, which had previously been practically unknown to them. When the war ended, it was not easy for those workers to go back to the old nomadic life with all its hardships and insecurity. Some of them preferred to migrate to the Delta, while the others decided to settle down to work in the desert villages and towns as servants or as unskilled labour in the local government departments, schools, hospitals, etc. Most of the younger men now prefer to follow their example; the settled sedentary life is thus gaining ground all the time at the expense of livestock husbandry.

But important as they may be in accelerating the drift from nomadism to 000
sedentary life, these factors fall beyond the scope of this paper and need not be discussed further in this context. We shall be concerned with the plans and schemes which are deliberately designed to deal with the settlement of the nomadic and semi-nomadic clans. But before going on to consider this problem we should like to give a brief outline of the area itself so as to establish a clear idea about the general setting, and to see the projects themselves against a background of the whole social life. This should help us to understand more clearly the motives underlying the projects and to discern the effects they may have on the social situation.

Geographers generally divide the Western Desert into three main divisions, 133
each of which has its outstanding characteristics. 105

1. The northern strip which extends some 500 kilometres along the coast from the west of Alexandria to the Egyptian-Libyan border. This strip, known as the *Dera'a Bahari*, consists mainly of fertile cultivated land which extends some 20 to 30 kilometres to the south, tending generally to become narrower to the west till it almost vanishes at Sollum near the frontiers.
2. To the south of this green coastal zone lies a high plateau in which are a number of depressions, the most important being the Qattara Depression.
3. The rest of the area; i.e. the extreme southern region, is real arid desert.

The coastal zone is the only really inhabited and cultivated part of the desert; beyond it there is hardly any prospect for cultivation. It is also a vital centre to which the scattered clans and groups of herders come to gather round the water points and the artesian wells during the dry season when the water becomes scarce in the southern parts.

The climate of the desert varies between the Mediterranean climate to the 132
north and along the coast, and the sub-tropical dry climate in the southern 105
parts. The dry season is usually very warm, tending to grow hotter southwards; while the wet season, usually extending from November to March, is generally mild especially in the north. Rainfall is very erratic and varies greatly from year to year and from one place to another. But on the whole, there is more rain in the north than in the south, and in most years rain falls in the southern parts only on very rare occasions. Rain may come quite suddenly and cause torrential floods which sweep away dwellings, crops and animals alike. This is typical of the Sallum area.

According to the 1947 census, the Bedouins of the Western Desert number 162
68,161. Only 23,444, i.e. less than the half of the population, are engaged in 105

1: Obermeyer E-5 (1964-1965) 1969 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9
'Aishaibat

CHAPTER I

THE BEDOUINS OF AL-QASR: PAST AND PRESENT

General Historical Background

121 No full historical account of events leading up to the present study is intended here. Only a fragment of history, a backdrop to the discussion of al-Qasr Bedouin society is offered. The account is an effort to trace, historically, the arrival of the Bedouin into the Egyptian Western Desert.

175 ●167 During the Arab conquest of Egypt in 639 A.D., tribesmen made only a few forays into Upper Egypt. But these sojourns represent the first intrusion of the Bedouin strain into this part of the world and were the vanguard of a force which would conquer all of North Africa. The Bedouin tribesmen of the Arab army found the pastures of Upper Egypt similar to their traditional habitat in Arabia, and certain trible segments settled in the area.

175 In 647 A.D., Muslim troops under the command of Ibn abu-Sarh pushed across the Western Desert as far as Tripoli in present-day Libya. This was an expeditionary force, and not until about 670 did permanent Arab occupation come to Libya. Historical sources are vague about the nature of the relationship between the Arabs and the Berbers of the newly

175 conquered lands. Generally, the Berbers fought assimilation and change when and where they could, just as they had in their confrontations with the Greeks and Romans. But as the Arabs took more and more of the "sown" lands of North Africa, Berber resistance decreased. Only in mountainous areas, such as the Kabyle region (from the Arabic qabaa'il, i.e., "tribes"), were the Berbers successful against the Arabization process.

Around the time of 908 A.D., the Ismaili Shi'a sect, based in the Yemen, established a western mission in Tunisia. This outpost grew into the Fatimid Dynasty, and in 969 the Fatimids were able to capture Egypt from the central Islamic empire. By the 11th century they had reached their zenith as a religious and political power. At this time, their rule was threatened internally by two Bedouin tribes, the Bedouin element in Egypt, the Banu Hilal and Banu Sulaim.

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167 In his Histoire des Berberes (trans. 1925), Ibn Khaldun states that the original homeland of these two tribes was the Najd area of Arabia. They were dangerous predators who spent their summers raiding along the frontiers of Syria and Iraq: the Banu Sulaim even attacked pilgrims traveling to and from Mecca (1925:28-166). Some segments of these tribes found their way into the delta region of Egypt where they became troublesome to the Fatimid Caliph, and were promptly exiled into Upper
175 Egypt. Apparently, they were responsible for discord among the other tribes there, for in an attempt to solve two problems

175 114 619 between the Bedouin and the Berbers (1954:46-47). G. W. Murray informs us that the Bedouins of the Egyptian Western Desert themselves believe this to be the case (1935:33, 247). I agree that the Cyrenaican Bedouin are the descendants of the Banu Sulaim; nevertheless, and despite what Murray says, my informants (when they knew) claimed to be descendants of the Banu Hilal. They refer to their ancestress, Sa'ada, as al-Hilaliyya, "she of the Banu Hilal."

175 167 Data concerning the Awlad 'Ali migratory history are insufficient for a satisfactory reconstruction of the process. As we have noted, there were two invasions of North Africa by the Arabs. The first, about 643 A.D., was a shock wave from the Arab conquest of Egypt in which the Arabs defeated the Luwata Berbers who were living in eastern Libya. The second invasion, in the 11th century, took place at the hands of the Banu Hilal and Banu Sulaim and penetrated into the North African countryside. As a result, the Banu Salaim tribe settled in Cyrenaica where they intermingled with the Luwata Berbers. That part of Cyrenaica which they claimed as their [103] territory they called the Jabal Akhdar (i.e. "Green Mountain"), a plateau region set back from the coast. The Bedouins of al-Qasr refer to the Jabal Akhdar as their original homeland (see Figure 1).

We hear nothing more of the Banu Salaim until the 17th century. At this time, segments of the tribe began drifting

175 eastward toward the Nile Valley. It is not possible to
167 determine the exact conditions associated with this migration, but they probably parallel later movements which are connected with tribal conflicts over land and water rights. In 1689, Bedouins from Libya raided Egyptian oases in the Western Desert (Murray 1935:29). From this date on, for a period of some forty years, records show a continual movement of Bedouins out of Libya into Egypt. Some groups went as far as the Nile Valley and were eventually assimilated into the peasant population there. Tribal movements at the end of the 17th century involved whole tribes and also tribal sections and fragments. Thus in some cases, authority relations arising from territorial bonds were dissipated; but in other cases, political ties were strung across the Libyan Desert from Cyrenaica to the Nile Valley. "Today there is not a Cyrenaican tribe, or even large section, which has not some of its members in Egypt, often whole lineages" (Evans-Pritchard 1954:49-50).

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[648]
Evans-Pritchard's study of the Sanusi, valuable for its analysis of Italian colonial records, shows that the Awlad 'Ali were driven from Cyrenaica by its sister tribe, the Harabi, with the help of the Turkish rulers of Libya. This took place, he says, about 150 years ago. When the Awlad 'Ali arrived in Egypt, they found the Hanadi tribe already there. In a chain of conflicts, the Hanadi had displaced the Banu'Una, forcing them into the Nile Valley:

175 then came the Awlad 'Ali.

619 Around the year 1800, the Awlad 'Ali were able to
726 defeat the Hanadi with the help of another Cyrenaican tribe
•167 dwelling in the area, the Jumi'at. The Jumi'at were a vassal
tribe who changed their allegiance from the Hanadi to the
Awlad 'Ali after this war. The Hanadi, as the Banu'Una
before them, were forced into the Nile Valley. Today, they
[131] live in Sharqiyya Province and are no longer distinguishable
from the peasant population.

175 According to Evans-Pritchard, the Awlad 'Ali were still
619 in possession of eastern Cyrenaica in 1800. Then there occurred
726 "long and savagely fought" wars ending with the expulsion of
114 the Awlad 'Ali. But this time schedule seems unlikely since
the Awlad 'Ali were already at war with the Hanadi when
175 Napoleon landed near Alexandria in 1798. The Bedouin war has
648 been amusingly described by the French historian Lacroix (in
181 Murray 1935:30) who accompanied the Napoleonic expedition:

> At five o'clock, the first Bedouin were seen on the flank of the army, and shortly afterwards one saw four or five hundred; it was the tribe of Henady, the fiercest Arabs of these deserts.. They were almost naked, swarthy, and lean; their horses seemed wornout hacks; save for the helmet, it was Don Quixote as represented in the engravings ...if these five hundred Arabs had been Mamelukes, they would have been able to obtain a great success at this first moment, when the soldiers' imaginations were alert and ready to receive any impression, but these Arabs were as cowardly as the Mamelukes, who had charged an hour before, were brave.

245 177 blossoms of the tree are stripped away by these winds before the fruit can mature.

178 517 272 [829] 233 178 422 233 731 166 167 Traditional values affect the Bedouins' perception of their new life. Men are fond of gathering for their ritual three cups of mint tea and recalling "the good old days." In those days, they say, men only had to ride, shoot, and drink tea. In the past, there was a great deal of security in owning animals which are not as dependent on the rains as is agriculture. During a year of bad rains, a Bedouin could always move his flock to Libya or to the Nile Valley: "When we have a bad year, we take our animals to the grass of our relatives. When they have a bad year, they come here." In the drought year of 1960, 20,000 Egyptian Bedouins migrated to Libya in search of pasturage. This caused an international [648] conflict and King Idris of Libya, for a short time, closed the border to Bedouins. The conflict was finally resolved, and the Bedouins were given permission to use the pastures of Cyrenaica. None of the Bedouins of al-Qasr were involved in this movement.

233 The Bedouins who have settled in the _'izba_ sector of al-Qasr also prefer to keep some sheep. The security which they represent is worth the time and expense of maintaining 233 them and paying a shepherd to look after them. The Bedouins, 178 in the past, paid their shepherds one sheep for every ten 465 sheep that he tended. Payment was made twice a year. Today,

CHAPTER III

TRIBAL ORGANIZATION

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In discussing the tribal organization of Awlad Ali two modes of analysis are employed. One is a structural form of analysis in which emphasis is on the hierarchy of groups and subgroups by which the tribesmen order themselves. This view of the system is an outside one regarding all smaller units as parts of a delimited whole: Awlad Ali. The other mode of analysis involves the description of some of these groups in terms of the processes by which they emerge and maintain themselves.

The first problem one encounters in pursuing the first kind of
121 analysis is that of definition of the tribal boundaries. It has been
619 mentioned earlier that the name Awlad Ali includes a number of groups
563 of different ethnic backgrounds. Some of these have been incorporated into the tribe by the system of tribal adoption known as "Iktitab." Such groups consider themselves as Awlad Ali and are considered as such by Awlad Ali proper as well as by outsiders. Other groups such
121 as the Murabiteen are not thus incorporated into the tribe; and although
619 they consider themselves to be Awlad Ali, they are not viewed as such by Awlad Ali themselves who prefer to keep the position of the Murabiteen distinct as an inferior group. On the other hand, many
● [167] Awlad Ali have moved outside the area of the Western Desert and have become settled cultivators on the banks of the Nile. These retain a vague and remote genetic connection to the name Awlad Ali.

To avoid this problem, it is best to define the tribe by political rather than by ethnic criterion. There is no paramount chief of the

the steep sides of which make east–west journeys slow and 133
arduous. To the west this broken country levels down, and in a
bay in the hills lies the extensive treeless, but very fertile, basin
of al-Marj, known to Europeans as the Barce Plain. It was [167]
colonized in classical times and again recently by the Italians.
The Arabs call this first terrace *lusaita* (*al-wasaita*), the middle
part, because it lies between the coastal plain and the plateau
tableland formed by *al-zahir*, the second terrace. This table- [172]
land is famous for its Graeco-Roman ruins and is dotted also
with the deserted farms of Italian colonists. It mounts to a
narrow third terrace, at about 875 metres above sea level, from
the top of which one can look down on these settlements.

The plateau slopes southwards through a juniper belt. There 133
forest ends and it continues to roll to the southern steppe in 137
stony undulations dissected by many wadis. In the plain at its
foot there is plenty of grass and low scrub, and vegetation is
thick in depressions, but the country becomes increasingly
desolate the farther to the south one journeys towards the life-
less wastes of the Sahara. The eastern part of Cyrenaica is more [132]
arid than the west or centre. The Marmarica, the *batnan* of the
Arabs, is characterized by low hills rising from the coastal belt
and prolonged towards the south to create a succession of crests
of several kilometres in depth. The mean annual rainfall is low [132]
and wells are restricted to the coastal belt. However, there is, [312]
probably in most years, a certain amount of grazing to some
fifty miles from the coast during the rains. The Sirtica, the
extension of Cyrenaica to the west, is a vast rolling treeless
plain traversed by a series of wadis running north–south which
in their spread provide most of the summer grazing. Wells are [312]
found only near the coast but pasturage is plentiful till the [233]
Wadi al-Farigh is reached.

The rainfall very exactly determines the vegetation belts and 132
thereby limits human distribution and imposes a certain way
of life. The amount of precipitation depends on a number of
circumstances. Mean annual rainfall decreases from west to
east. Altitude also affects it. More significant, however, are
the variation with latitude, the seasonal rhythm, and annual
irregularities. The accompanying map shows how rainfall
decreases rapidly from the coast, how only the very limited
plateau area is subject to heavy precipitations (400–550 mms.),

[TEXT CONTINUED ON PAGE 33]

and the insufficiency of the fall elsewhere. It follows that only 132
on the plateau can there be forest, and only there is a settled [137]
and purely agricultural way of life possible; and it was there [241]
and on the coastal fringe that in ancient and modern times [169]
European colonists settled.

The rains in Cyrenaica fall only in winter, from October to 132
April. In the absence of irrigation the planting season is thus 241
clearly delimited. So is the grazing season to the south of the 233
plateau, for in summer the grasses wither and the wells dry up, [221]
compelling shepherds to drive their flocks northwards to the
plateau, thus producing the kind of seasonal nomadism known as transhumance. The variation in total rainfall from year to year and the distribution of its fall over the winter months are of the utmost importance for agriculturalists in Cyrenaica. There is still some obscurity, but it is an observed fact that every few years in Cyrenaica there is a year in which the fall of rain is insufficient, or too badly distributed, to raise an adequate crop. In a mixed economy this fact must have given an overwhelming bias towards pastoralism.

The water supplies of the plateau, which depend entirely on 132
rainfall, are sufficient for the needs of the Bedouin and their 312
flocks. The clayey soils are, however, very exacting and running spring water is rare, being for the most part restricted to the triangle Darna–Slanta–al-Haniya. On the western part of the plateau water is conserved in cisterns and wells and on the maritime and *barqa* plains, in the Sirtica and Marmarica, and generally to the south of the plateau, in wells.

The distribution of vegetation in Cyrenaica follows variation 132
in degree of precipitation. Where there is much rain there is 137
forest. Where there is little rain there is steppe. Where there
is no rain there is desert. The forest is thick but mainly squat 137
and of very limited extension. An Italian estimate[1] of its distribution is shown on the accompanying map. It is predominantly Mediterranean in type, the juniper and the lentisk being the two commonest trees of the country. Forest ceases a few miles to the south of the high watershed of the plateau and gives way to steppe. The well-known route Tariq 'Aziza is generally regarded as the dividing line between the two kinds

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[1] Dott. Giovanni Manzoni, 'Memorie sui boschi della Cirenaica', *Notiziario Economico della Cirenaica*, 1929. [113]

Europeans consider to be a low level of civilization. They do 433
not feel the need for expensive roads and ports, electric light, 511
wireless sets, telephones, schools, churches, newspapers, and 182
so forth; and clearly their economy could not support them.
Time and again colonists, tempted from their homes by the 182
short sea routes and the wooded plateau, have settled in the 167
country and dispossessed the Bedouin, but in the end it is the
Bedouin, and not the colonists, who have survived. When one
looks at the massive Phoenician, Greek, Egyptian, and Roman
ruins and the already half-ruined Italian towns, villages, and
farms, and then on the flimsy tents of the Arabs, one cannot
but reflect that the race is not always to the swift nor the battle
to the strong.

III

Even in the steppe country it is difficult to find a Bedouin 361
naja', camp, for the camps are pitched in hollows and on the
slopes of wadis and their feeders for shelter from rain and wind
and too many visitors. On the plateau they are hidden in the
forest. One cannot, therefore, make more than a very approxi- 161
mate estimate of the population of any part of the country, or 162
of its distribution, by bare observation. It can, however, be
said that at present the country is underpopulated and that the
population is badly distributed between town and country, the
urban part of it, which is almost entirely unproductive, being
too large in relation to the whole.

There have been a number of estimates of the population by 161
early travellers who visited the country in Turkish times. They 175
had to make a guess at the population figure, aided by Turkish
censuses. It has been suggested on the basis of their reports
that the country then supported round about 250,000 souls.[1]
The Turkish census of 1911 gave the population as 198,345,
excluding Kufra.[2] Taking into account the various estimates
which were made during the Italo-Sanusi wars, in the interval
between them, and since, it may be said that to-day the total
population of Cyrenaica is probably round about 200,000, of
whom about a quarter live in the towns, the remainder being
tented Bedouin and a few thousand oasis dwellers.

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[1] Dr. Gotthold Hildebrandt, *Cyrenaïka als Gebiet künftiger Besiedelung*, 1904, p. 317.

[2] Coro, op. cit., p. 20.

[113]

of the more independent client tribes. In other words, all the 161
Bedouin of Cyrenaica are nomadic in some degree, some more 162
and some less, and Col. De Agostini rightly stresses that 114
whether they move much or little they all have the same
characteristics when compared to peasants and townsmen.[1]
They are all *bwadi*, as the Cyrenaican dialect has it, people of
the tents, and they see themselves as a single people against
the *hadur*, the citizens.

I have so far said nothing of the towns of Cyrenaica or of 632
their inhabitants. They play a minor part in this story, which
is about the Bedouin, but they cannot be entirely left out of it
on account of their economic and political relations with the
Bedouin, so I take this opportunity to give a brief account of
them.[2]

Banghazi, which is supposed to be called after the saint Sidi 175
Ghazi, buried in the town, is on the site of the classical Berenice. 632
It is believed that after the disappearance of the Graeco-
Roman community the site was unoccupied till the fifteenth
century, when it was reoccupied by immigrants from the
mercantile communities of the Tripolitanian coast, among
whom Misuratans, both Muslims and Jews, preponderated in
numbers and wealth. The Genoese Della Cella, who passed [162]
through the fly-infested town in 1817–18, in the time of the
Caramanlis, says that it then contained about 5,000 inhabitants, [441]
at least half of whom were Jews.[3] Shaikh Muhammad 'Uthman
al-Hashaishi, who was in the town in 1896, says that the [167]
greater part of the traders were immigrants from Sfax and the [114]
Island of Jerba—he was himself a Tunisian and often tended
to exaggerate Tunisian influence—with some Greeks and a few
Italians. 'As to the Turks, they do not give themselves to
trade.' At this time Banghazi was a very simple, mostly mud-
and-rubble, town, and the learned Shaikh makes a point of
telling us that there were no posts or telegraphs, nor even a
railway, save a line of three kilometres joining the official

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[1] Ibid., pp. 32–3.

[2] The historical information is chiefly derived from Agostini, ibid., pp. 413–43.

[3] Paolo Della Cella, *Narrative of an Expedition from Tripoli in Barbary to the Western Frontier of Egypt in 1817*, 1822, pp. 194–5. (First published in
1819.) F. W. and H. W. Beechey (*Proceedings of the Expedition to explore the Northern Coast of Africa from Tripoly Eastward in 1821 and 1822*, 1828, p. 299) [113]
consider Della Cella's estimate too high. Theirs is 2,000.

The Turkish Administration was centred in the towns but operated, 632
as will be explained later, through the contacts of its local 648*
officials, who were generally Arabs of the country, with the leading 571
tribal Shaikhs, with whom they made friends. These officials 369
were townsmen or sons of Bedouin who had received an urban
education and they acted as links between the citizen communities
and the Bedouin. Through Bedouin relations with
town merchants and officials what was happening in the world
outside Cyrenaica percolated to the most distant tents. Another 795*
channel of political and cultural infiltration was the network of 571
Sanusiya lodges. The Shaikh of the Sanusiya lodge at Banghazi 648*
was regarded as the ambassador of the head of the Order to the 177
Governor of Cyrenaica and he was chosen for qualities which 632
fitted him for this role. He was consulted by the Governor on 793
matters in which the tribes were involved, and through him 369
and the Brothers of the lodges of the towns news of the outside
world reached the Head of the Order in the distant oasis of
Kufra and the Heads of the local lodges, whose relations with
the Bedouin in their localities were intimate. Thus, as will be
seen, the Bedouin had a general idea of what the revolution of
the 'Young Turks' meant and were aware of the impending crisis
long before the Italian attack on their country was delivered.
But though maintaining communications with the towns, 632
neither the tribal Shaikhs nor the Sanusiya allowed themselves 571
to be subordinated to them or identified themselves with urban 795
interests. The Bedouin Shaikh did not, like the Syrian landowner, 369
feel any need to have a town house, and the Sanusiya
ever remained a country and Bedouin Order and directed its
affairs from the desert.

Town and country kept apart, with the towns dependent on 632
the country and not the country on the towns, because there 369
was in Cyrenaica no client peasantry bound by debt, need of 565
protection, and trade monopoly to the towns. The Bedouin
did not settle on the land where they would be an easy prey to
the usurer, overseer, and tax collector. Those who were defeated [167]
in the great tribal wars of the past and in the inter-tribal and
inter-sectional fighting of more recent times migrated to Egypt
and settled there as *fallahin*, and not in Cyrenaica. In Cyrenaica 565
there is not the spur of adverse climatic conditions or the lash 167
of land shortage to drive them to depart from their ancient

565 Arabian ways. In Egypt necessity has slowly subjugated the
167 exiles to the peasant yoke. They long resisted but, like the
Bedouin nomads coming from the Sinai Peninsula, had in the
end to submit or perish. The absence of a substantial peasantry
in Cyrenaica is one of the characteristics which most distinguish
it from the Arab societies of Palestine, Syria, Iraq, Egypt, and
565 the Maghrib. The peasant can be dominated. He is fixed to the
earth and can be made to surrender it and till it for others. The
Cyrenaican Bedouin is fixed to no place and cannot be forced to
sell his birthright by bad seasons or intimidation. This has
565 meant that there have not been in Cyrenaica any social enclaves
632 attached to the towns through which the towns and administrative
centres could lord it over the Bedouin. Outside the towns
*[648] all is Bedouin and the Turkish Administration, and afterwards
[619] the Italian Administration, found that they could not get a
grip on the Bedouin of Cyrenaica as they could on the peasantry
of Tripolitania.

632 Nevertheless the towns and the Turkish, and later the Italian,
*648 Administration in them affected the tribal system by acting as
619 a pull on those tribal segments which lived nearest to them, so
that the tribes which lay between the towns and the steppe
were attracted towards one or other of these poles. The political
structure of Cyrenaica as a whole exercised in this way a significant
influence on the segmentary tribal system.

IV

619 The Bedouin who became followers of the Sanusiya Order
178 and whose country and way of life I have described are divided
into tribes and tribal sections owning different tracts of the
[793] country. This tribal system existed in Cyrenaica long before
the Grand Sanusi preached there and it continued to exist after
*[795] his grandson Sayyid Muhammad Idris had fled the country
and the Sanusiya Order had been abolished and its lodges
destroyed by the Italians. It is the fundamental structure of
Bedouin society which the Sulaimid tribes brought with them
from Arabia.

619 The Bedouin of Cyrenaica are Arabs. The Arabian tribes
101 who conquered the country and settled in it mixed with the
144 indigenous Berbers, as is evident in their physical features to-

day, but even ethnically the Bedouin are more Arabian than 619
the people of Egypt, the Sudan, and Tripolitania, while 101
culturally they are as completely Arab as any people in the [144]
world, proud Tamim and Quraish not excepted. In essentials
their language is that of the Hilalian invasion of the eleventh 197
century and no foreign language competes with it. The Berber- [191]
speakers are a handful in the distant oasis of Aujila, and even
there they are bilingual, and the insignificant fractions of Jews
and Cretans in the towns speak Arabic, the Cretans being
Muslims as well. The Italian immigrants left the country of 619
their own accord during the late war. Thus the obstacles to [167]
complete Arabization in the Maghrib (Tripolitania, Tunisia,
Algeria, and Morocco), a Berber culture, large Jewish colonies,
and European colonization are to-day all absent in Cyren-
aica. In all essential matters also the Bedouin of Cyrenaica [184]
are like Bedouin tribesmen elsewhere in the Arab world: they
have the same tented, pastoral, way of life, the same social
organization, the same laws and customs and manners, and the
same values.

The people of Cyrenaica are linked to the classical Arab 177
world of the east, to Egypt and the Jazirat al-'Arab (Arabia,
Palestine, Iraq, and Syria) rather than to the Maghrib; to the
sacred towns of Islam and to Umayyad Damascus, 'Abbasid
Baghdad, and Fatimid Cairo. More particularly they are linked
to Egypt, with which their country has had political ties from
the earliest times, and which is their natural market. The [133]
desert comes down to the sea at the Gulf of Sirte and separates
Cyrenaica from Tripolitania and these two countries have
always gone each its own way. Cyrenaica was linked to Graeco-
Egypt, Tripolitania to Phoenician Carthage. Cyrenaica went
with Byzantium, Tripolitania with Rome. Indeed, as Despois
says: 'The Greater Syrtis is without dispute one of the most
decided frontiers, natural and human, to be found anywhere in
the world.'[1]

During the last few decades this separation has been brought [195]
into relief again by the rise of the Sanusiya Order, for whereas
almost to a man the Cyrenaicans follow the Order politically,
the Tripolitanians, except for the Bedouin tribes, have shown a
lively animosity towards it. Moreover tribal ties between the 619

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[1] Op. cit., p. 45.

619 two countries are weak. On the other hand, Cyrenaican tribes and tribal sections, notably the Aulad 'Ali tribe, speaking the same dialect and with the same customs as their cousins still in Cyrenaica, stretch unbroken from al-Sallum to Alexandria, and are also numerous in the Bahaira province of Egypt and in the Fayum. The Cyrenaican Arabs form to-day numerically by far the most important Bedouin element in Egypt, and apart from those who have remained tented there, there are many who have settled on the land.

*175 619 In its general outline the history of the Arab conquest of Cyrenaica is well known. 'Amr ibn al-'As, during the Caliphate of 'Umar, conquered Syria and Egypt and in 643 overran Cyrenaica, then occupied by Berber tribes and under the nominal rule of Byzantium. He met with little resistance, and within seventy years the whole of North Africa, from Sinai to the Atlantic, was in Muslim hands. It seems, however, that the original conquerors only settled as garrisons in the coastal towns, and neither controlled the hinterland nor had any considerable ethnic influence on its Berber peoples. Bedouin settlement on a big scale and the complete Arabization of the indigenous Berber population took place from 1050 or 1051 in the famous Hilalian migration.

*175 • 167 619 The Bani Sulaim and the Bani Hilal came originally from Nadj. They are of Mudarid stock, the Bani Sulaim being the senior branch. They passed into Upper Egypt as a result of the check to the Carmathian movement in Arabia, in which they were involved, and settled there; but they were inclined to be troublesome in a country little suited to their traditional way of life, so during the reign of the Fatimid Caliph al-Mustansir, his Vizier encouraged them to reconquer Tripoli and Tunis from the Berbers, who had again asserted their independence. Arab historians have compared their migration to that of locusts or wolves. The Bani Hilal passed westwards into Tripolitania and Tunisia, where many Bedouin tribes claim descent from them to-day. The Bani Sulaim mostly settled in Cyrenaica. It must be added that the nobility and the historical exploits of their forbears are for the most part unknown to the Bedouin of Cyrenaica.

619 The present-day descendants of the Bani Sulaim are spread from Egypt to Tunisia. Those of Cyrenaica are divided into

two main branches, the Jibarna and the Harabi. The Jibarna 619
tribes are 'Awaqir, Magharba (some list the 'Araibat section of this tribe separately), 'Abid, and 'Arafa. The Harabi tribes are 'Abaidat, Hasa, *'Ailat* Fayid, Bara'asa, and Darsa. These tribes are shown on the diagram below, which presents them as tribes and not in the genealogical fiction of proper names. Strictly speaking, the Bara'asa should not appear on this chart since it is only one section of this tribe, the Aulad Hamad, who are true Harabi. However, it has become customary to class them as Harabi.



Attention is drawn to other names on this chart. The Aulad 619
'Ali, who have a fraternal relationship to the Harabi, about a 167
century and a half ago lived in eastern Cyrenaica, but were 131
compelled to migrate to Egypt by pressure from the Harabi, 175*
who received support from the Caramanli rulers of Tripoli. To-day they occupy the Mediterranean littoral from al-Sallum to Alexandria. Another branch of the Aqaqra, the Sharai', who migrated to Egypt, have become *fallahin* and are now found only as scattered families. When the Aulad 'Ali entered Egypt they found the Hanadi in possession of part of their present-day territory and drove them out of it. These Hanadi are now settled in the Sharqiya Province of Egypt. As will be noted from the chart, they belong to the Bani Sallam branch of the *Sa'adi* family of tribes. The Hanadi had previously dispossessed their brothers the Bani 'Una and this tribe is now completely absorbed in the *fallahin* population of Lower Egypt. A third fraternal branch of the Bani Sallam, the Bahaja, were also expelled from the Bahaira and are now settled in the Sharqiya and Gharbiya Provinces of Egypt. Of the Jibarna group, the Fawayid used to occupy the part of the plateau and plain now occupied by the Hasa, the Bara'asa, and the 'Abid. They were driven out of their country early in the nineteenth century, at the

619 same time as the Jawazi, by a combination of the 'Awaqir, the
167 Magharba, and the Bara'asa, assisted by the Caramanli rulers of
131 Tripoli, and are now settled in the provinces of Fayum, Bani Suef,
Bahaira, and Minya in Egypt. The Jawazi used to live in the
*175 country now occupied by the 'Awaqir, and they now mostly live
in Minya Province of Egypt and in the Fayum. Another struggle
which greatly altered the tribal distribution in Cyrenaica was
*[648] two wars, the last about 1832, of the Magharba and 'Awaqir,
aided by their Jibarna kinsmen the 'Abid and 'Arafa, against
the tribes which occupied the *barqa* and the remnants of which
now range the littoral of the western Sirtica. These tribes are
known as *al-'Arab al-Gharb*, the Western Arabs.

*175 So, in 1800 the Harabi and Jibarna tribes, which are now in
131 undisputed control of all Cyrenaica outside the towns, occupied
only part of the country, mostly the central, and the most
619 northerly reaches of the western, plateau. The Jibarna were
cut off from the southern steppe by the Fawayid and Jawazi,
the whole of the *barqa* was occupied by *al-'Arab al-Gharb*, and
the eastern part of the plateau by the Aulad 'Ali. The wars by
[726] which they drove out their rivals were long and savagely fought
and many incidents in them still form part of Bedouin tradition.

As a result of these tribal wars the descendants of the Bani
*175 Sulaim invaders of Cyrenaica and the Maghrib thus began to
131 return eastwards with a quota of Berber blood about the end of
167 the seventeenth century and pushed out the tribes they found
619 dwelling in the Western Desert of Egypt and pressed them into
the Delta, where they were absorbed by the *fallahin*. The first
intruders from the west were pushed to the Nile by stronger
tribes coming behind them and these by yet stronger. They
pushed one another like trucks on a siding. The Hanadi pushed
out the Bani 'Una and the Aulad 'Ali pushed out the Hanadi,
being themselves pushed on from behind by the 'Abaidat and
other Harabi tribes. Besides the migration of whole tribes from
Cyrenaica into Egypt there has taken place an exodus of many
tribal sections and fragments, owing to intertribal fighting, until
to-day there is not a Cyrenaican tribe, or even large section,
which has not some of its members in Egypt, often whole
619 lineages. The Bedouin of Cyrenaica know their kinsmen in
167 Egypt and sometimes when the price of sheep is low in the
602 Egyptian markets they leave their animals with them to sell on
439 their behalf when prices rise.

their behalf when prices rise. There are said to be 30,000 619
'Harabi' alone, excluding the Bara'asa, in Egypt, most of them 167
in the Fayum, while the Aulad 'Ali and their client aggregates 162
number nearly 40,000.[1]

V

The Arabs of Cyrenaica distinguish between those tribes which 619
are *Sa'adi* and those which are *Marabtin*. The *Sa'adi* tribes are so called after Sa'ada of the Bani Sulaim, their ancestress. They are those nine tribes who hold the country by right of conquest: the 'Abaidat, the Hasa, the *'Ailat* Fayid, the Aulad Hamad (Bara'asa), the Darsa, the 'Abid, the 'Arafa, the 'Awaqir, and the Magharba. The *Marabtin* tribes use the earth and water by grace of the *Sa'adi* tribes of whom they are to a greater or lesser degree clients. Savarese says that their status in Turkish times lay between that of clients of ancient Roman law and that of serfs of the glebe in western Europe in the Middle Ages.[2] The Sanusiya did much to lessen the difference in status between free and client tribes in Cyrenaica and to-day the larger groups of *Marabtin*, although they may in theory live on *Sa'adi* land, do in fact live independently and pay no fees to the owners of the land. Sometimes violent disputes, and even wars, have broken out between free tribes and their clients, such as the famous battles between the 'Awaqir and the Shahaibat. Moreover, one has only to note that the predominance of the leading sections of some free tribes is due to the support of powerful client fractions to realize that, though the clients may be considered not to have the full status of a noble Arab tribe, the relationship between them and the owners of the country is often
one of mutual dependence. Thus the leading section of the [162]
powerful Bara'asa tribe is the *'Ailat* Hadduth which in De Agostini's lists numbers 2,520 persons, of whom only 630 are true Bara'asa, the remainder being clients; and the leading section of the 'Awaqir, the *'Ailat* Suliman, counts 1,200 clients out of a total of 1,940. Where the relationship is one of mutual dependence the two tribes are expected to help each other in the payment of blood-money.

The client tribes are of different categories to which corre-

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[1] G. W. Murray, *Sons of Ishmael*, 1935, pp. 277 and 296.

[2] Op. cit., p. 56.

*795 find hereditary transmission of Shaikhship of lodges most
793 accentuated, such as the Bara'asa-Tamia section (al-Zawiya
613 al-Baida), the 'Awaqir-Sdaidi section (Msus zawiya), and the
428 'Abaidat-Ghaith section (Tart zawiya). In the same way the
[792] earlier Marabouts became, as has been noted, founders of
lineages which were on the pattern of the branches of the Bedouin clans among whom they lived, and attached to them.

*795 Also it must be remembered that the lodges were tribal
institutions built by the local Bedouin so that they might
778 participate in the *baraka* of Sayyid Muhammad bin 'Ali al-
793 Sanusi. They participated in it through the Shaikhs of their
619 zawiyas who received their *baraka* direct from the hands of the
182 Grand Sanusi himself, or from the hands of son Sayyid al-Mahdi, and passed it on to their sons. This *baraka* belonged to the tribe, or tribal section, which built a lodge just as the *shaukha*, the secular Shaikhship of the tribe, or tribal section, belonged to it and had to be kept in it. In both the continuity of family succession had to be maintained, unless there were good reasons for acting otherwise. Thus each tribal section emphasized its autonomy in its hereditary line of religious Shaikhs, through whom the *baraka* of the founder of the Order was transmitted to them, whilst proclaiming its membership of a tribal federation with common allegiance to the Head of the Order.

*795 As I have pointed out when speaking of the sacred *Marabtin*
793 tribes of Cyrenaica, it was customary for the descendants of a
778 Marabout to reside near his tomb. I have further mentioned
[776] that the Shaikh of a Sanusiya lodge, who is also called a *Marabat* by the Bedouin, might, if he had during life a reputation for piety, rather easily gained in Islam, be venerated as a saint when he was dead and his tomb become a shrine. This is another reason why Shaikhly families have tended to become hereditary directors of lodges.

*795 Just as almost all the Marabouts of Cyrenaica were foreigners
793 from the west, so were almost all the Shaikhs of the Sanusiya
554 lodges. The Dardafi and Isma'ili families came from Tripoli-
[167] tania, the Ghumari family from Morocco, the 'Ammur, Bu Jibali, and Khattab families came from Algeria, and so on. As a class they enjoyed, and still enjoy, a reputation for sanctity among the Bedouin on account of their knowledge of the Koran

Jarbi, and had been educated in Turco-Arab schools in the 175*
country, and a few at Istanbul. Most, however, were less 648*
reputable and had a record of close and active collaboration 563
with the Italians as informers, spies, guides, interpreters, leaders of 'friendlies', and overseers in concentration camps. When the fighting was over the Italians felt under an obligation to these men, their only friends in the country, and rewarded them with administrative posts for which they had few qualifications. It is not surprising that later they often found them an embarrassment and had to admit that the Bedouin for preference avoided their company. Before the last European war they were being slowly replaced by a new class of officials brought up in the towns under Italian rule and educated in Italo-Arab schools. These *évolués* showed a marked preoccupation with their own affairs and little inclination to use their superior education for the benefit of their own people in the towns, while their repugnance to the Bedouin made them regard a posting to one of the country districts as a punishment. But if they had no strong sense of loyalty to their own people they likewise had none to their masters. They might join Fascist clubs and syndics and apply for special Italian citizenship but they did so passively, without conviction that these things would mean more to them than payment of subscriptions. They knew moreover that the [167]
swarms of Italian immigrants settling like locusts on Cyrenaica would spell disaster to them no less than to the rest of the Arab population. It is not surprising, therefore, to find that during the late war the Italians watched them closely for *disfattismo politico*, and not without cause, for they showed themselves very ready to co-operate with the British during their first two occupations of Cyrenaica, and some, including ten senior officials, showed themselves so openly anti-Italian during these periods that they thought it wise to retire with the British forces in their second retreat to Egypt.

The Bedouin accepted all these Italian measures, good and 175*
bad, with resignation and indifference. They were powerless 648*
to oppose them, but as far as possible they ignored them. Plagued with concentration camps, loss of stock, confiscation of arms, rape of sowing and pasture grounds, the pass system, corrupt officials, and neglect of their Shaikhs, they found the odd mosque, school, and clinic poor consolation and retired

Weisse Götter, who avoided all contact with the natives that was not unavoidable, and they rejected also the French policy of cultural assimilation and social and political equality with the *évolués*.[1] In 1938 the Under-Secretary for Italian Africa, Teruzzi, the ex-Governor of Cyrenaica, described the fundamental principle of Fascist native policy as a steering between the Anglo-Saxon colour bar and the French policy of assimilation which was not merely a middle course but an entirely new direction. At the same time he rejected the concept of indirect rule 'which leaves to the native chiefs very wide autonomy, not only administrative but also political, and which leads therefore inevitably to a slow detachment of the colony from the mother country'. The Italian policy was to regard their colonies as extensions of Italy beyond the seas.[2] 175* 648*

Had the Italians been content, as in the first years of their occupation, to restrict their immigration to the towns, where there was scope for a new element as traders, artisans, officials, and professional men, a symbiosis might have developed, for the Arabs were at that time incapable of these functions on an adequate scale, and the problem of adjustment might never have become acute; but when they began to organize mass colonization of the country-side, questions of status and racial interrelations appeared to present no other solution than that proposed. Even had racial miscegenation not been prohibited it could hardly have taken place between Catholic Italians and Muslim Arabs. Cultural assimilation was also unlikely because both Italians and Arabs were civilized peoples with a long cultural history behind them and it was most improbable that the Arabs would give up their religion, law, and language. No other solution seemed feasible, therefore, than that advocated by Balbo, the policy of parallel development in cultural matters and structural co-ordination within the framework of the Fascist State. The Arabs were to remain Arabs in speech, religion, personal law, customs, and manners, but their tribal structure was to disappear and its place was to be taken by political and economic institutions similar to those of their Italian fellow Libyans. 'We shall have in Libya not rulers and ruled, but 175* 648* 167 •

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[1] Oskar Schmieder and Herbert Wilhelmy, *Die faschistische Kolonisation in Nordafrika*, 1939, pp. 79–80. [113]

[2] Italo Neri, 'Politica Indigena', *Riv. delle Col. It.*, 1938, pp. 1391–2. [113]

*175
*648
• 167

Catholic Italians and Muslim Italians, the one and the other united in the enviable fortune of being the constructive elements in a great and mighty organism, the Fascist Empire. Rome will thus show herself to be once again and always the grand and fruitful Mother of peoples.'[1] Arabs and Italians would share like institutions in the same corporate State, though remaining culturally and racially distinct, it being understood, however, that the institutions would be like, not common, and that the Italian colonists and officials would always occupy a superior position politically and economically.

It was hoped that when the Bedouin tribal and kinship structure had been broken down and their social life had been remodelled on Fascist corporative lines, both Arabs and colonists would accept a situation they could not alter and tolerate each other in the realization that, though their immediate interests might sometimes clash, co-operation was to the final advantage of both. It was believed also that any jealousy the Arabs might feel about the disparity between the political status and economic privileges of the two peoples would be overcome by the natural aptitude of all Italians for meeting other peoples as social equals. In the end the two races would feel themselves bound together by a community of economic interests in loyalty to a common *Patria* and a common *Duce*. Clearly such rugged individualists as the Bedouin were did not fit into this picture. The Bedouin would, therefore, have to go.

In pursuance of this policy of parallel development the Italians under Balbo's direction made serious efforts to improve the material condition of the Arabs. New wells were dug, stock was improved, zootechnical stations were started, and educational and medical services were expanded. An effort was made to persuade the Arabs that they would receive consideration commensurate with that accorded by a paternal administration to its own nationals. Arab agricultural villages were built as well as metropolitan agricultural villages, metropolitan schools were balanced by Arab schools, the hospitals had Arab wards as well as Italian wards, there were Colonial battalions and Libyan battalions, there were Colonial Fascist organizations and Arab Fascist organizations, and the Government built mosques as well as churches. It may be doubted whether these

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[1] Op. cit., p. 22.

measures would have convinced the Bedouin that they were 175*
compensated for the loss of their kinsmen, their lands, and their 648*
independence. In the event they were inadequate and they [167]
came too late.

Italian policy in Cyrenaica, like the colonial policies of other European powers, was full of contradictions. It is not within the scope of this book to discuss them, but I would draw the reader's attention to the changes this policy underwent during the thirty years between their occupation of the country and their embroilment in the late war. They were tactical changes demanded by the development of local, domestic, and international situations. There was no fundamental difference between the aims of the Fascist Government and the aims of pre-Fascist Governments. All intended to wrest Cyrenaica from [[167]]
its inhabitants by force of arms and by peopling it with Italians to exploit it for Italian economic, political, and above all strategic, purposes. They were attempting no more than other Colonial Powers had done before them, but they had waited too long, till the tide of colonial expansion was turning and the right of Europeans to rob native peoples of their lands was beginning to be challenged. Even so, it was not of their choosing or out of deference to humane considerations, but on account of military weakness and incompetence, that they made a truce with the Sanusi in 1917, and on account of domestic difficulties that they prolonged this truce to 1923. As soon as Mussolini had restored order in Italy he resumed the war Giolitti had begun, although he had been one of the most hostile critics of it at the time. When Graziani had crushed resistance the original plan of 175*
colonization was acted on. The migratory swarms from Italy 648*
of peasants, officials, traders, and hangers-on of all kinds, 167
threatened the very existence of the Bedouin, who saw themselves being forced either to eke out their lives in the desert as a scarcely tolerated class of shepherds or to sink to the level of landless wage-earners in the country districts and of unskilled labourers in the towns. The Italians intended this to be their fate,[1] and it might well have been if events in Europe had not

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[1] Giuseppe Daodiace, 'Latinità e colonizzazione nell' Africa del nord', *Riv. delle Col. e d'Oriente*, Feb. 1927, pp. 13–14; Filippo Lo Bello, *Rivista Coloniale*, 1925, p. 38; and Paolo D'Agostini Orsini di Camerota, *L'Italia nella politica africana*, 1926, p. 132. [113]

175 648 [167] first caused misgivings in Rome and afterwards led to the destruction of the Italian armies in North Africa and their ejection from the continent. A sullen Arab population in Cyrenaica and Tripolitania and a hostile Arab and Muslim world were, in view of the coming storm, so clearly contrary to Italian interests that a more conciliatory policy, at any rate in words, was adopted and Balbo was entrusted with the difficult task of putting it in effect against a background of slaughter and repression. Once again the Italians had waited too long.

III

The ups and downs of Italian fortunes in Cyrenaica and in the world are reflected in the various decrees which defined the juridical status of the Arabs. In giving a brief account of these decrees it must be kept in mind that whilst they referred to the whole Arab population they really affected only the Arabs of the towns, and even in the towns only those few persons, mostly officials, who actively collaborated with the Italians; and that till 1932 the Italians had no certain or complete control outside the towns.

175 648 641 At the beginning of the first Italo-Sanusi war the Arabs were in law Turkish subjects. By a Royal Decree of 5 November 1911, Tripolitania and Cyrenaica were declared to be under the full sovereignty of the Kingdom of Italy. The status of the Cyrenaican Arabs was fixed by the Royal Decree of 6 April 1913, which declared all born in the country, wherever resident, to be *sudditi italiani*, provided they were not Italian citizens or foreign citizens or subjects. They retained their Muslim personal law, but were subject in other respects to whatever regulations the Italians saw fit to impose on them. They were permitted to hold posts in the armed forces and administration of the colony, and persons desirous of acquiring Italian citizenship might apply for it if they possessed residential qualifications, though by taking it they became subject to Italian personal law. These early decrees were more in the nature of administrative than constitutional law. A constitution, in the continental sense, was promulgated in 1919 after the Italians had signed a truce with the Sanusi.

The agreements entered into with the Sanusi between 1917

tary command of the Sahara. The other Articles of the 1934 175*
decree were designed chiefly to meet the new conditions arising, 648*
or likely to arise, from colonization by nationals. In no important respect did it alter the status of the Arab population or what rights it still possessed. In the first enthusiasm of turning Libya into a metropolitan colony the Arabs were of secondary interest to those who made the laws.

In view of the coming struggle between the powers of Europe, 175*
already seen by Mussolini to be inevitable, the Italian Govern- 648*
ment considered it advisable to pay more attention to the feel- 167
ings of its colonists and native peoples. To encourage the colonists already in the country and those about to join them from Italy a Royal Decree was promulgated on 9 January 1939 declaring Libya to be an integral part of the Kingdom of Italy, its four provinces becoming the ninety-seventh, ninety-eighth, ninety-ninth, and hundredth provinces of the Kingdom. The military status of the Libyan Sahara remained unchanged. The colonists no longer had to feel that they had left their fatherland for inhospitable shores. The *Colonia* had become *Terra Italiana*. The *Quarta Sponda*, Italy's Fourth Shore, had
become a political fact. At the same time, to quiet any uneasi- 175*
ness which the incorporation of their country in the Kingdom of 648*
Italy might create among those educated Arabs whose services 641
the Italians needed, and to implement the promise Mussolini 563
had made during his tour of Libya in 1937 that he would remember the part played by Libyan volunteers in the Ethiopian campaign, the Decree offered the Arabs a new special citizenship which took the place of the right of acquiring metropolitan citizenship allowed in the earlier decrees and now abrogated. That the Italians had attached importance to the partial assimilation of a small *élite* of natives is shown by the retention of the right of acquiring metropolitan citizenship through all the decrees and laws, from the invasion of Libya in 1911 till the present decree, in both pre-Fascist and Fascist times. It had been found, however, that the Arabs had not availed themselves of the privilege. Employees of the administration could not feel that any advantages they might derive from it could compensate them for loss of status before the religious courts in matters of personal law, a loss considered shameful even by whole-hearted collaborators. Also, the new special citizenship,

*175 *648 day is always just ahead', as they say. Nothing could compensate them for the loss of their lands taken from them to make farms for Italian immigrants.

*175 *648 ● 167 When the Italians invaded Libya in 1911 they did so not only to keep other European powers out of it but also to provide an outlet for their surplus population.[1] Sentiment also played a great part in their plans, especially under the Fascists. In classical times and for over a thousand years Europeans had flourished in Cyrenaica, and the country had once been part of the Roman Empire. To sentiment were added plausible arguments of an economic kind. Italy imported some of her elementary requirements, such as grain and oil, from countries controlled by other European powers and it was hoped that her Libyan colonies might supply part of these and so, through colonization, make a contribution to the autarchy its rulers aimed at. But sentiment and demographic and economic aims weighed less in the calculations of Italy's leaders than the political and strategic advantages likely to accrue from the adventure, both of which would be served by colonization.

It was, of course, well known to the Italians that only a small portion of Cyrenaica, part of the plateau, was suitable for European colonization. The findings of the Anglo-Jewish commission of 1908 had been far from encouraging, for they expressed the opinion that Cyrenaica could not take more than about three hundred thousand colonists in addition to the existing population, even when the maximum point of exploitation had been reached.[2] Many Italians also were sceptical about the advantages of the country for colonial settlement, but most took the more optimistic view and believed, or affected to believe, that an America lay opposite their shores. Indeed, as Despois observes, many Italian books and articles on colonization of Libya 'lack the most elementary competence or the least critical sense.'[3] But though there was much disagreement about the saturation point most Italian writers accepted that political control and colonization must go hand in hand.

In the first years of Italian occupation political conditions did not permit colonization on any scale. It was restricted to cereal culture in comparatively safe areas near Banghazi and

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[1] Mondaini, op. cit., p. 257, seq.

[2] Gregory, op. cit., pp. 12–14.

[3] Op. cit., p. 137.

behind barbed wire in the vicinity of al-Marj and al-Abyar, and 175*
up to the end of 1926 there were only 13 colonists, possessing 648*
630 hectares. Even by the end of 1932, in spite of Teruzzi's 167
fervent efforts and the personal interest of Mussolini, there were still only about 90 Italian farms in the whole country and the farming, mostly by concessions and private company settling, was often uneconomic and incompetent. Exploitation of this kind clearly did nothing to relieve over-population in Italy and was certainly not at all what had been advertised as '*colonizzazione di popolamento*', so in 1932 there was formed by the State, and coming as time went on more and more under State control and supported by public funds, a parastatal corporation called the *Ente per la colonizzazione della Cirenaica* and, after its extension to operate also in Tripolitania, the *Ente per la colonizzazione della Libia*. The *Ente* began in a small way in Cyrenaica in 1933. The lands immediately allotted to it were 30,000 hectares in the black soil country of Shahhat-Safsaf, 4,000 hectares near al-Zawiya al-Baida, and 5,500 hectares in the neighbourhood of al-Marj. The first experimental operations were begun in the Shahhat and al-Zawiya al-Baida areas, a fertile region with a climate like that with which the colonists were familiar in their homeland. In this smiling country of the juniper, the lentisk, and the cypress began to spring up the little white Italian farms: in 1933 at Beda Littoria and Luigi di Savoia, in 1934 at Luigi Razza and Giovanni Berta, and in 1936 at Maddalena. But the progress of colonization was not quick enough for the Fascist junta—only some 300 families had been settled—and it was decided to quicken the pace, especially in view of the rapidly deteriorating situation in Europe. By the spring of 1937 there were over 700 colonist families in Cyrenaica. The pace was forced in 1938 by State-directed immigration in mass. The unit of this demographic immigration was the family, so that each farm would be a self-contained economic unit run on its own labour. The farms had been prepared and the houses built in advance and furnished down to the last pot and pan. Each farm was part of a village and attached to a centre comprising all that a paternal State considered necessary for the bodies, minds, and souls of its citizens: a clinic, a granary, a school, a Fascist club, administrative offices, and a church and priest's house.

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The first 20,000 new colonists for Libya were given a tremendous send-off in March 1938 and their settlement was completed during the following eight months. Those who came to Cyrenaica, probably more than half of the 20,000, partly went to complete the villages already in existence and partly to occupy the new holdings prepared for them at Baracca, Oberdan, D'Annunzio, and Battisti. The Cyrenaican quota of another 20,000 immigrants, the second wave of demographic colonization, was supposed to have followed in October 1939 to constitute the population of the newly constructed villages of Mameli, Sauro, and Filzi, but not all of them appear to have arrived. These two waves of mass immigration brought the number of farms to over 2,000 and the number of agricultural colonists to over 15,000 persons, making round about 50,000 Italian colonists of all kinds. Northern Cyrenaica had become in population and in appearance, as well as in law, part of Italy. Banghazi and Darna had become modern Italian towns which might well have been on the shores of Sicily or southern Italy. Modern roads cut through the plateau and for mile after mile were lined with Italian farmhouses and every few miles bisected Italian village centres. A railway ran from Banghazi to Suluq and from Banghazi to al-Marj and was in process of extension to Darna. An aqueduct was being built to carry water from Mara, near Darna, to the colonial villages as far to the west as those on the farther edge of the plain of al-Marj. Banghazi had been made into a modern port. Airlines to Banghazi ran from Rome, Tripoli, and Tubruq.

I have given a short sketch of Italian colonization of Cyrenaica only in order that the effect it had on the Bedouin may be better understood, for what concerns us is the fate of Muhammad, Mehemmed, Ahmad, and Abu Bakr, who with their flocks and herds were driven from the more fertile parts of the plateau to make way for Michele, Antonio, Italo, and Cesare. For over twenty years the Italians had been unable to colonize Cyrenaica for, as Graziani bluntly observed, 'It is plain that when one is making war one cannot plant trees, neither can one sow corn.'[1] Once resistance had been overcome it was merely a question of finding a legal formula for depriving the owners of the land of

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[1] 'Panorama economico della Cirenaica', *Rivista delle Colonie Italiane*, 1933, p. 295.

their rights in it, and this presented no more difficulty to the 175*
lawyers than the discovery of a formula to cover confiscation of 648*
the Sanusiya properties had done. 167 •

Ancient rights in the lands of Cyrenaica rested with the
Sa'adi tribes and whatever tribal fragments they permitted to 175*
reside there by grace. Disputes about ownership had been 648*
settled either by war or through discussion between the groups 423
concerned in them, sometimes with the aid of Turkish officials 619
or Marabouts, particularly of the Shaikhs of Sanusiya lodges [795]
after the Order had become established in the country. In 1858 [578]
the Ottoman Government, under pressure of Western ideas, promulgated a land code in all parts of the empire, and to put it into effect in Cyrenaica the Governor, Khalil Sami Pasha (1863–8), appointed a committee which declared the lands round Banghazi and Darna to be for the use of these towns and the rest of the country for the use of the tribes in occupation of it, except for barren hills and deserts which, like woods and roads, were regarded as the natural demesne of the State. The tribal boundaries of to-day were finally fixed by this committee, though the fixing of them was less an adjudication than a recording of existing conditions.

The new Turkish land code operated in the towns and just outside them and was not applied to tribal lands and grazing grounds, and the tribes were not asked to acquire a title to their lands by registration of them. This would have been an impossible task, and the Turks were in any case too wise to meddle with Bedouin lands, knowing that the Bedouin would not have consented to change or interference of any kind. Nevertheless the State claimed all tribal lands not bearing buildings or plantations as *miri*, public demesne, and from a legal point of view it was in virtue of this absolute and residuary ownership that it taxed the tribal occupiers and users of the land. This was a legal formalism which made no difference to anyone since the Government had neither the wish nor the power to exploit the lands and accepted that the tribes had rights of use, the *tassaruf*, in them in perpetuity. The Italian Land Registry, created in 1913 on the basis of the Turkish registers, followed Turkish practice in this matter, classing tribal lands as State demesne in which the occupiers had rights of use, and also in allowing tribal disputes to be settled by tribal custom, which

any case see them. Consequently no objections were raised— 175* had they been raised no attention would have been paid to 648* them—and there was legal presumption of State ownership in 423 the fullest sense. The judges, therefore, ordered registration of the new lands in the name of the Colony. They comprised [167] about 450,000 hectares, about a quarter of which were immediately allotted to the *Ente* for colonization. It will be noted that the State had already, before this action was taken, been bare owner of the lands as heir to the Turkish *miri* property. What it now gained in addition was, in the opinion of its lawyers, the *possesso utile*. They held further that compensation of those deprived of the use of the lands, while perhaps unnecessary, added to the juridical rigour of the proceeding. In other words, in order to make it look a little less like common robbery it was decided to make a parade of indemnification. The areas to be taken over were estimated in a non-technical way by a surveyor and a clerk of the Land Registry, and the supposed owners were summoned, told that their lands were worth so much, and that this sum would be handed over to them by the Government. Tables of succession showing the share in the land of the various members of the local group who owned it had already been prepared, and if the representatives of this tribal section agreed to the proposal the money could then be paid over on demand.

Whether the Bedouin took the money offered in compensation or not they still lost their lands. For this reason most of them took it. Though compensation was in this way offered, the document to which the recipients of it had to affix their seals or thumb-prints was not a contractual agreement for sale and purchase nor an edict of expropriation for public utility purposes, but it was a simple declaration by the owner that he renounced all his rights in the land and transferred them to the State. The Italians had now got all the lands in Cyrenaica which were of any immediate use to them. They had only to [167] allot them to colonists and register them technically as they were required for settlement. The target figure for the zone of colonization was 900,000 hectares.[1]

There remained the question of the Bedouin who had been 175* driven off the lands of their fathers. Clearly they could not be 648* allowed to lead their nomadic life amid the Italian cultiva- 423 233

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[1] *La Nuova Italia d'Oltremare*, vol. i, p. 552.

[TEXT CONTINUED ON PAGE 225]


Apollonia
CIRENE
Luigi Razza
Giovanni Berta
DERNA
Beda Littoria
Luigi-di-Savoia
Tolmeta
Oberdan
Maddalena
BARCE
Tocra
Baracca
Tecnis
Maraua
Slonta
Driana
el Abiar
BENGASI
Boundary of area to be colonised
Boundary of area for Organised Government Settlement
Narrow gauge railway
Main roads
Tracks for passage of Arab flocks
Provincial boundary (Bengasi Province)
Scale
0
25
50
75
100 kms.

The Italian plan for the colonization of northern Cyrenaica.

tions and gardens. On the other hand, it was recognized that if 175*
they were to be able to lead a nomadic life at all, and they 648*
had to do so if they were to rear their animals, they must have 423
access to water-supplies and grazing-grounds, and that this 233
would sometimes mean their crossing the plateau through the
area of Italian colonization. To solve this problem corridors [487]
running north and south across the plateau were, as explained
in an earlier section, marked out for the transit of Bedouin
flocks and herds.

It was envisaged that the Bedouin would continue to lead
a predominantly pastoral life on the more rugged parts of
the first terrace of the plateau, on its southern slopes, and in the
steppe country of the *sirwal*, the *barqa*, the Marmarica, and the
Sirtica. It was thought that they had in these areas all the land
they needed for grazing and catch-crop cultivation, though it
was evident that in years of drought they could not have
managed to survive without summer grazing on the plateau.
Nevertheless, efforts were made to raise the economic level of 175*
the Bedouin by improving their methods of cultivation and 648*
stock-raising so that, as both producers and labourers, they [511]
might be more valuable an adjunct to Italian husbandry, and
might become more dependent on the State and more closely
linked with metropolitan activities. It was intended that they [464]
should constitute a cheap reserve of labour for general unskilled
work and for seasonal labour on the farms of the colonists. By
using them in this way it was hoped that it would be possible
to avoid the growth of a metropolitan proletariat.[1] These efforts 175*
included, largely for political reasons, the creation of Arab 648*
colonization centres. Agricultural villages and farms were to 167
be built by the *Ente* similar to, but smaller than, those built for 563
the Italian immigrants. The first two such villages, Fiorita and
Alba, were built in 1939. Each Arab farming family was provided with a house, a well, a camel, a cow, and farm implements.
Like the Italian, the Arab colonist was to be first salaried
labourer, then partner with the State, then mortgagor, and
finally owner. As only thirty-two holdings were prepared at
Fiorita and Alba the contribution to native agriculture cannot
be regarded as more than a token one. Moreover, the Italians
experienced difficulty in finding Arab colonists for even these

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[1] Ibid., p. 622.

*175 thirty-two holdings, for the Bedouin showed no inclination to
*648 work as serfs the lands they had worked as freemen: 'In their
[167 daily attitude coldness and scepticism were apparent so that
563] the part they took in collaborating was purely formal.'[1] A
pastoral village, furnished with veterinary and stud services and offices for the collection, classification, and weighing of wool, was built at Nahiba (Jardis al-ʿAbid) and another was planned to be built at Verde (Jardis al-Jarrari). Some may consider that these measures are evidence of Balbo's sincerity. The Bedouin believed that he intended to destroy them by guile as surely as Graziani had destroyed them with machine-gun and bomb.

V

When Giolitti landed troops in Cyrenaica and Tripolitania in 1911 he started his country on the road to ruin. The first Libyan war was from 1911 to 1917. In the midst of it Italy was involved, from 1915 to 1918, in the first Great War. From 1921 to 1932 she was again engaged in prosecuting her colonial war in Libya, first in Tripolitania, then in Cyrenaica also. From 1934 to 1936 she participated in the Spanish civil war. In 1935 and 1936 she conquered Ethiopia. In 1939 she seized Albania. From 1940 to 1944 she was engaged in the second Great War. It was appropriate that disaster should overcome the Italians in Cyrenaica, that the Bedouin of that country who had suffered so much at their hands should witness their humiliation, and that it should fall on the head of Graziani, who became Governor of Libya when Balbo was killed at Tubruq on 28 June 1940.

As the day of retribution drew near the Italians showed some uneasiness about the situation in Cyrenaica and, as I have recorded, they made belated attempts to conciliate the Arabs.
*175 Their uneasiness was partly due to the presence of the Sanusi
*648 leader Sayyid Idris and of a number of notable Cyrenaican and
*795 Tripolitanian Shaikhs in exile in Egypt. It could hardly be
793 doubted that they would approach the British with offers of
assistance should Italy enter the war on the side of Germany. This is what happened. In October 1939, when Italy's participation seemed imminent, the Cyrenaican and Tripolitanian

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[113] [1] Giuseppe Palloni, *The Action of the Italian Government in Favour of the Lybian Agriculture*, 1945, p. 31.

613 619 13 secondary sections, in their very unevenness, show a more sensitive relation to more detailed ecological differences.

182 At all levels of segmentation, therefore, a high degree of consistency between the ecological divisions of the country and the genealogical divisions can be shown. Indeed the relationship is so close that it is tempting to consider the contemporary pattern of things as the only one possible. What historical evidence
[167] exists is against such a view being taken. It is known that tribes have been displaced in the past, some of them or sections of them having been pushed out into Egypt, and others having altered their position. This being so, there obviously cannot be any finality about the present distribution of tribes in relation to the ecological divisions of the country. Rather, the existing pattern is one of a number of possible permutations. Again, as the relation between groups of people to their environment becomes progressively sensitive with the decrease in the size and order of the group, then the more unstable will be the relationship between the two. Conversely the greater the size and order of the group the more persistent will be its relationship to the ecology. In other words, the major ecological divisions are more fundamental in their effect on the way of life and the economy of people, whereas the more detailed ecological differences between, say, tertiary sections have a relatively minor effect. The
[233] [433] ecological differences between the wooded plateau area with its cow and goat herding economy, and the arid semi-desert area with its camel and sheep herding economy has a much more profound effect on the general way of life, and is a more persistent division, than that which exists between two tertiary sections where the differences may only be in topographical details.

While therefore, the division of people into groups of various sorts is not permanently fixed in relation to ecological divisions, there is always an intimate relationship between the two which is progressively more enduring as the order of the structural segment increases. Yet even this statement of the relationship, guarded as it is, does not suffice, for the pattern and distribution of tribes and their sections at any given moment are not only a function of ecology, but they are also the result of a number of other complex factors which may be operating to reinforce or to

173 cline in the total population of a tribe, then, the extinction of
178 lines does not affect any order of segmentation superior to the
613 tertiary. In this respect, the Cyrenaican genealogy differs fundamentally
621 from those collected from the Nuer by Evans-Pritchard.
In the quotation from his work on Nuer genealogies (1951), he
[171] asserts that telescoping occurs 'from the founder of the minimal
lineage further up the line of ascent to the founder of the clan'.
This major difference has serious implications for any discussion
of lineage proliferation, but these must be left until the conditions
under which proliferation is likely to occur have been analysed.

178 While it is true that the processes discussed are of importance
613 in retaining the general shape of the genealogy, what is assumed
621 so far is that the Cyrenaican population has been stable over long
periods. Stability of population is not an unreasonable assumption
161 to make for a people who live on the margin of subsistence
182 in a country where extended periods of drought are not infrequent,
[173] though seldom leading, it is true, to actual famine conditions,
[731] but producing periodic and local food and water shortages.
Disease, following quickly in the trail of shortage, it can be assumed,
kept the relationship of total population to the natural
resources fairly constant. What evidence there is does not support
[726] even this very general assumption, since it is known that there
have been large-scale tribal wars in the past, and a certain
[167] amount of movement of tribes, some being displaced and others
pushed eastwards into Egypt. Unless these shifts were caused by
increases in the aggregate population and the consequent pressure
on land and water, it is difficult to account for them. This
consideration of possible overall increases in population in the
past poses interesting problems related to lineage structure which
cannot be adequately treated here. For the moment it is proposed
to neglect possible increases in the total population during past
periods in the history of Cyrenaica. The historical depth of the
view now to be discussed is about seventy years, and for this
period I have no evidence of any large-scale increases in population.
It is reasonable, therefore, to assume a general stability of
[132] population for this period. But the vagaries of the Cyrenaican
climate are such that, in a given year, one area might be well
drenched with rain, giving excellent pastures for animals and
good crops, while a nearby territorial strip might suffer a partial

Chapter XVI

THE WESTERN BEDOUIN (EL MUGHARBA)[1]

"*The Moor is of a free and open nature.*"—Othello.

General Remarks—The Arab and the Libyan—The Sa'adi Tribes and the Murabitin—Bedouins of the Northern Littoral—Awlad 'Ali—Jawabis—Jumei'at—Samalus—Shiheibat. 000

Sinai has been called an "epitome of Arabia", and the pilgrim certainly feels well on the way to Mecca as soon as he crosses the Suez Canal, but it is equally true that Algiers is not so very far west of the "Arab's Gate" at Alexandria. The skies of Mariut are coloured with much the same blue as those of Andalusia, and, though the Sierras are lacking, the historian instinctively begins to look for the Alhambra as soon as he crosses the causeway to Amriya. The reason [167] is not so very far to seek, there is more of the Libyan than the Arab in the tribes that hardly a century ago flooded back into Egypt from Cyrenaica. Yet in spite of numerous resemblances, [771] these two races are divided as the goats from the sheep by this essential difference that while the "Berbers"[2] are religious and often superstitious (traits of a converted race), his religion sits so lightly on the Arab that he has almost reverted to his early paganism. But though this is true, it is far from obvious, and a traveller will not find anyone in the Western Desert to admit that he is not of pure Arab descent.

This snobbishness was evident so long ago as the time of Ibn Khaldun (1332–1406), who found it advisable to represent the Tuareg, as descended from a respectable but mythical Arab conqueror, Ifrikias ibn Sufi. Ibn Khaldun asserts that when Ifrikias himself returned to Arabia, the Ketama and Sanhaja tribes remained behind and became absorbed in the people of the country. All this is pure

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[1] Mugharba means literally "westerners", and is used in Egypt to denote generally all the Bedouin west of the Nile. But there is a tribe in Cyrenaica who content themselves with this simple title, and so confuse the issue. [101]

[2] All the indigenous races of North Africa are lumped together under this barbarian title by the Arab historians.

173 that in those days it was important "to have men to go to
*613 war; Hajj 'Ali came from the Sinai with many men and wrote
619 597 his name into the books of Lazumi." Today, in the Lazumi
genealogy Hajj 'Ali's name appears as the brother of Taram,
[114] both are claimed as sons of Mighawsiz. This kind of data is
difficult to uncover and I may have missed gathering other
cases of ideological kinship ties.

*613 The specific unilinear principle which operates in
•[171] al-Qasr is partrilineality, common to the Middle Eastern
culture area. A corollary principle is the corporate group.
*613 Together, these two rules structure the social world of the
571 individual and effectively define a range of social choices
for him. The individual's social relations and social roles
are relative to the rights and obligations of the people
related to him through his father. In a sense, the social
world for the individual in al-Qasr is his father's group
and its network of relationships with other similar groups;
he would not think of leaving this group of his own free
will though, in reality, he could. The Bedouins believe
[181] that a man cannot be happy if he lives with strangers, i.e.,
[829] outside his corporate group. This value holds up today to
the extent that a man will expect his son to return to the
desert even after his education as a merchant, a government
clerk, or an army officer.

Structural differentiation in al-Qasr is not solely

619 'Ali tribe. There is one lineage, the Sulwatiyya shown in *[613] Figure 7a, which does not claim descent from Sa'ada and hence are no relations of the Awlad 'Ali Bedouin. Nor are any serious ideological claims for tribal membership provided by them or their Awlad 'Ali neighbors. The first social differentiation found in al-Qasr, then, is between those who belong to the Sa'adi tribes and those of the Marabit tribes. In terms of Bedouin social ideal types, the Sa'adi tribesmen are warriors, known for their courage and generosity; the Marabit tribesmen are weak and dependent on the protection [792] which the Sa'adi offers them. The Marabit tends to specialize in the role of "holy man." The dichotamy here is a reflection •[171] of the structural differentiation, common to North Africa, between sacred and secular tribes, or client and protector tribes.

619 193 539 The Sa'adi-Marabit division in al-Qasr is defined geographically, in name, and in Bedouin tradition and myth. Here is the way in which the Marabit "holy man" of al-Qasr conceives of the difference between the two types and its origin:

> They are brothers and there is no difference. The Sa'adi is always one step in front of the Marabit, he handles things for the Marabit and helps him. In political matters the Sa'adi is more advanced . . . When the Marabit is in trouble, the Sa'adi will defend him. They are two different groups because the Sa'adi are from one mother. Once Sa'ada was riding in a caravan through the desert.

619
*613 study of the whole Western Desert, or in an analysis of contemporary politics in Marsa Matruh.

The Bedouins of al-Qasr are, in this study, the 'Aishaibat of the 'Ali Ahmar of the Awlad 'Ali tribe. The [191] Bedouin tribal unit throughout the Middle East is described as a segmentary lineage system. Something of the meaning of this concept has already been made clear in our discussion of the structural principles of Bedouin society. This type [114] of society has been adequately analyzed by Evans-Pritchard (1940), Fortes (1945 and 1949), Smith (1956), Middleton and Tait (1958), and Peters (1960). My own ideas about the segmentary lineage society as it functions in al-Qasr derive from these sources.

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[642] Politically, the 'Aishaibat of al-Qasr are a stateless society; they have no centralized political institution. The lineage system is the structural framework for social and political relations. The basis of government, i.e., the regulation of authority relations, is the balanced protraction of corporate groups which support institutional uniformities in the form of similar organization, ideology and procedure (Smith 1956). Although the various groupings of the segmentary system can be analytically identified, and each grouping thinks of itself as a distinct group, in actuality, it is difficult to define the groups because of the way in which each fuses into lesser or greater differentiated units in one

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ing to harden social barriers" (Fortes 1953:29).

Wood (1959:74) notes that only 13.3 per cent of the marriages in a Palestinian Arab village, and 9.1 per cent of the marriages in a Syrian Druze village were parallel-cousin marriages. But although parallel-cousin marriage was infrequent, marriage within the secondary group was consistently high. This is true in general for the Middle East. Baer (1964:64) reports that 62.2 per cent of all the marriages in a southern Iraqi village were between members of the secondary group. Rosenfeld (1957), in a comparative study of three Palestinian villages, found the frequency of parallel-cousin marriage to be less than 13.0 per cent in all three villages while the frequencies for intra-secondary group marriage were 33.7 per cent, 31.5 per cent, and 55.8 per cent.

The function of parallel-cousin marriage has been variously explained. The early Orientalists claimed that this form of marriage "strengthened kin ties and kept property in the family" (Westermarck 1925:151). It was noted that the ties between cousins are stronger than those between spouses, that "blood ties are indissoluble but that of matrimony is very precarious" (Lane 1908:161). Patai (1962:170-173) seems to make parallel-cousin marriage a condition for society in the Middle East: this type of marriage functions to keep property in the family; it assures continuation of group harmony in that it presents no new adaptive social situations;

593 family is a dominant-subjective one. But the rights and
duties of the father have no legal sanctions. His authority
grows out of the moral and mutual dependence, the common
interests and value, which hold the family together. The
593 authority relations learned in the family become the norms
183 of behavior to be applied by the individual in a wider-scale
867 network of social relations. The son learns the discipline-respect relationship which is the model of behavior between
generations. The subjective role which the daughter plays
in the father-daughter relationship prepares her for the
role of wife.

Marriage and Kinship Relations

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The parallel-cousin, the father's brother's daughter,
is the preferred mate in Bedouin marriage. Parallel-cousin
marriage in al-Qasr is more of an ideal than a practice. In
fact, parallel-cousin marriage is not practical in the case
where social order depends upon the integration of a larger
and clearly segmented population. Endogamy of this kind in
this type of society works against survival in a double-edged way: economic security through cooperation with a
larger group is discouraged, and political security through
●171 coalition is undermined. In the Middle East, as elsewhere,
582 cross-cousin marriage is the normative practice which functions
"as a counterweight to the tendency of unilineal descent group-

582 and, the individual has been socially conditioned to prefer
●171 his father's brother's daughter.

582 All of these explanations are as plausible as they
183 are obvious. They are, in fact, the same explanations which the Bedouins themselves offer for their marriage ideal. But one cannot help noticing that the explanations offered actually concern an ideal, in Bedouin social behavior, and not a practice. Theories showing the logic of parallel-cousin marriage are placed along side the fact that this type of marriage is statistically atypical.

582 If, as Islamic Law decrees, the daughter did inherit
428 some share of her father's property, then parallel-cousin
[671] marriage as an attempt to keep land in the tertiary group would be logical. But we know that usually the sons inherit all of the father's property, Islamic Law to the contrary (Levy 1957:245-246). In this case, parallel-cousin marriage can only be seen as an ideal which functions side by side with the other ideal of a girl's right to inherit.

582 Barth (1954), and Murphy and Kasdan (1959) have
171 stressed the political advantages which attach to parallel-cousin marriage in the context of factional struggle. The general idea is that political differentiation between collateral branches of the lineage structure is intensified and political autonomy enhanced by the practice of turning affinal bonds inward. Parallel-cousin marriage then has the opposite

582 171 effect of cross-cousin marriage which is a way for kinship groupings to interrelate and to increase the integration of a larger population.

582 171 114 Such an explanation of parallel-cousin marriage may suffice for an analysis of politics in the tribal mountain villages of Kurdistan. Because Barth (1954:68) found that 48.0 per cent of the Kurd marriages were with the father's brother's daughter, we must assume that this type of relationship is politically significant. But we must question the fact that Murphy and Kasdan arrive at the same conclusion when dealing with parallel-cousin marriage as an abstract concept. If this type of marriage is really politically rational behavior, then it should be the normative practice in the Middle East. In other words, Murphy and Kasdan are explaining a phenomenon which exists only as a cultural ideal, and one which may have never really been a general practice at all--except in those few cases of adaptation to ecological extremes, such as pure nomadism and mountain tribalism. The few records which we have on the marriage practices of pre-Islamic and early Islamic Arabia indicate that parallel-cousin marriage was highly atypical in the Mecca and Hijaz areas. For instance, of the 71 marriages recorded for the Quraish only 9 were with father's brother's daughter and 32 of them were within the secondary group. In the Hijaz, only 15 of 113 marriages, or 3.3 per cent, were with the parallel-cousin (Patai 1962: Ch.6).

(Patai 1962:Ch. 6).

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•171 The point of this is that most of the Middle East's inhabitants are villagers dependent upon agriculture. The dominant form of marriage is not parallel-cousin marriage. As a matter of fact, marriage may or may not be considered exogamous depending upon the level of segmentation at which one wishes to draw the line for his definition of endogamy. Ayoub (1959) suggests that parallel-cousin marriage be considered only as an extreme expression of an overall preference for endogamy. She found in a sample of 514 marriages from a Syrian village that 9.1 per cent of them were with the parallel-cousin while 63.4 per cent were within the secondary group. She concludes from this that intra-lineage marriage is frequent enough that it cannot be accounted for by random mate selection.

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*[613]
[595] In 'Ailit Ma'fas of al-Qasr, out of 197 recorded marriages over a period of five generations the frequency of parallel-cousin marriage was 11.1 per cent and marriage within the lineage was 41.6 per cent of the total. Of these 197 marriages, only 39 were cases of polygny and most of these involved a man taking two wives (see Table 5 below).

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196 The confusion over the presence or absence of parallel-cousin marriage in the Middle East is related to the question of whether or not the researcher and the native are talking about the same thing. In Qasr, for instance, the term

[TEXT CONTINUED ON PAGE 116]

> 121 a tradition is not a mere observed fact like an existing custom . . .; it is an idea which expresses a value judgment. A certain way of acting is regarded as right; a certain order or arrangement is held desirable. The maintenance of the tradition is the assertion of this judgment (Radin 1935:63).

121 For al-Qasr, I have traced social ideas, social action,
181 and social order to a central traditional value which promotes
621 group consciousness, solidarity, and corporateness. Such a
571 value does not derive from Islam, for Bedouin tradition
•171 preceded Islamic tradition, and much of the latter derives
from the former. According to Robertson Smith (1903:26-62), the structurally significant unit in pre-Islamic Arabia was the hayy: "a collection of people of the same blood" who lived together and fought together. But, that which actually bound the members with a sense of corporateness to the hayy was the law of blood-revenge. For Smith, the key element in the Bedouin corporate group was the existence of a covenant of blood responsibility. The group was bound by a compact of mutual responsibility, the group had rights in rem over its members, and within the group there could be no blood-feud. Around this idea of mutual responsibility revolve the traditional values which are the basis of corporate grouping in Bedouin society: "The greater part of the traditions of the Arabs turns on blood-revenge and war . . . " (Smith 1903:26).

Smith developed his analysis of Arabian society in terms of certain structural principles: patrilineal ideology,

121 residence, cognatic ties, and contractual relations are all
181 seen to be structurally important in early Arabian society.
621 Structural differentiation into groups is based on the
571 lineage principle and sustained through "the law of blood-
●171 revenge." And it is important to note that the *hayy* was
characterized by a structure of authority, it was "guided
in war and on the march by one chief" (Smith 1903:44). The
121 law of blood-revenge as an expression of group rights *in rem*
621 and a system of mutual protection point up the importance of
571 contractual relations in Bedouin society. Whether or not
675 real blood ties are involved, a contract must be present or
there can be no corporate group. Contract legitimizes authority
and provides the basis for the lateral extension of the group;
it is primary though it functions coordinately with a principle
of cognation, residence, adoption, etc. Contractual ties
121 operate outside of kinship at times but will always be validated
621 by it eventually, "for a legal fiction is always adopted to
571 reconcile an act with a principle too firmly established to
675 be simply ignored" (Smith 1903:62). "Blood brothers," in
608 al-Qasr, are defined both biologically and ideologically. As
597 noted in the case of al-Qasr, there were at least three cases
[602] of contractual adoption in which one individual and two whole
corporate groups "wrote their names into the books of the
'Aishaibat tribe" (*katab jinnsiyya 'Aishaibiyya*). The integration or adoption of elements in al-Qasr takes place on the

600 to possess the wisdom which it takes to regulate conflict.
*613 Theoretically, as one *'aqila* said, conflict should be stopped
578 at the familial level, either by the father or the paternal
593 [604] uncle, and should never reach the level of the *'aqila*. Once
before the *'aqila*, conflict assumes new structural poses, or
different orientation in authority relations. Authority here
is differentiated in terms of the context: the father's authority relates to the familial structural level, and beyond this
level the father *per se* cannot exercise legitimate authority.
*613 The *'aqila*, who is responsible for internal order and external
578 relations exercises legitimate authority at each level of the
182 political structure. The authority of the *'aqila* is checked
and prevented from growing into naked power in that any single
'aqila must consult with the other *'awaaqil* of the secondary
segment concerning matters which may concern the structural
nature and continuity of the group.

*613 In many respects, the authority structure in al-Qasr
559 corresponds to that defined for the Lugbara of Uganda
571 (Middleton 1960). The structural levels (see Figure 7 above)
•171 of 'Ailit Ma'fas (secondary), Bait 'Umar (tertiary), and 'Ait
Abd al-Malik (sub-tertiary) are approximately equivalent to
Middleton's major, minor, and minimal lineages (1960:7-9). But
[596] whereas among the Lugbara authority roles are purely kinship
roles, i.e., genealogically senior heads are responsible for
internal control and representation, among the Bedouins of

*613 554 571 •171 596 al-Qasr there is definite role differentiation between the shaib and the 'aqila. The incumbents of the two roles may have exactly the same genealogical position in the tertiary segment, but they will never have the same social status. There are as many elders as there are households, but there is only one 'aqila for each group. Another difference between the Bedouins and the Lugbara is that in the latter society a kinship role which doubles as an authority role does not occur above the familial (i.e. shaib) level.

*613 554 596 The difference between the shaib and the 'aqila is the distinguishing factor between informal and formal social control. The shaib acts in accordance with the values implied by Bedouin authority structure: the action of the 'aqila is legitimate in the explicit terms of the Bedouin authority structure. These two spheres of political action represent familial and internal (or domestic) levels of authority and authority relations. Legal matters which affect the whole tertiary segment are dealt with at the internal level.
627 596 685 Affairs of a purely personal nature and of lesser importance are dealt with at the familial level of authority. For instance, it happened that the dog of one man killed a neighbor's chicken. No one sent for the 'aqila. They sent for the shaib of the woman who owned the chicken, i.e., they sent for her husband. He spoke to the woman, his wife, to determine the value of the chicken and this price he demanded as compensation

Law and Political Order: 'Awaiyid Awlad 'Ali

671 [792] A "holy man" in al-Qasr, who has intimate knowledge of both the Quran and Bedouin law, has this to say on the subject of the *'awaiyid Awlad 'Ali*:

> 671 ●171 The *Sharii'a* (Islamic Law) was given by God, and it guides man concerning what is good and what is bad: it is for all Muslims. The 'awaiyid was made by man for the Bedouins: it is for settling problems and evaluating damages. The *'awaiyid* is natural, made by man and the Awlad 'Ali for settling the problems of the Bedouins. It is different from the *Sharii'a*. The Awlad 'Ali made the *'awaiyid*, not the *ashraaf* ("holy men"); but the "holy men" approved it. The *'awaiyid* agrees with the *Sharii'a*, but not in everything for it is not from the *Sharii'a*. *Shari'it Muhammad* ("the law of the Prophet") is one thing and the *'awaiyid* is another. The *Sharii'a* says an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth, and a life for a life: the *'awaiyid* also says an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth, and a life for a life, but in a different way: the *'awaiyid* involves money. The *'awaiyid* judges a situation; the *dhabiiha* ("blood sacrifice," usually a lamb as an expiatory fee) and the fine are paid and the problem is solved . . . The *'aqila* is better than the government for settling [672] problems in the desert. The government may put a man in prison, and if he dies there you will be responsible to his father and brothers. There is a more liberal judgment here in al-Qasr, and God prefers that we [673] settle our problems through peace . . . If a man dies in prison, it is no sin before God but the Bedouins consider it a sin.

671 At the present time, the customary law of the Awlad 'Ali prevails in al-Qasr, and, I suspect, this body of legal and moral norms will be the basis for Bedouin social and political action for some time in the future. In any case, it furnishes us with a base-line from which any future studies of social

*613 682 681 182 571 of the group, of joining a new group, or of becoming a man, all refer to the notion of sharing in the payment of the diiya. All obligations and sanctions which carry the force of law in Bedouin society also are directly related to compensation and retaliation. Weber (1954:110) has stated the general case: "The wergilt debt as set by the judge was the most ancient debt and all forms of obligation have derived from it." ●[171] Evans-Pritchard (1940:171) has stated the particular case: " . . . Nuer law, in so far as it applies to a study of political relations, must be treated in connexion with the blood-feud." The blood-feud and the diiya are institutions by which authority groups interact and political order is maintained. 681 578 682 Blood-revenge, or the threat that it may take place and spread, is a most serious sanction in the Bedouin political system. Of the twenty-two cases of conflict in al-Qasr about which I have good details, nine of these deal with homicide or attempted homicide, and thirteen involve quarrels over rights to land, water, and women which could have led to violence had not arbitration succeeded. In fact, seven of the nine cases of personal injury began over property rights.

*613 682 Rules regarding the diiya in Bedouin society apply at all levels of the lineage structure. This seems important to note for it points up an unusual degree of autonomous authority at the tertiary level. Research on segmentary societies has often stressed the fact that compensation is

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deal in the course of this discussion.

No political system can persist without a separation of duties between decision-makers and others. The specialized function of decision-making in the political sphere helps "to bring about some adjustment or accommodation in conflicting demands and to implement any settlement where necessary" (Easton 1965:206). It follows then that there is no society without some type of authority role, however simple, and, we assume, that this role can be defined.

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I do not consider this point a debatable one, though writings on the subject of political organization in primitive society seem to indicate that I should consider it debatable. For example, Steward (1938:247) reports on small bands of American Indians in the Basin-Plateau region who are without chiefs (leaders?). Sharp (1958:5) states that the Yir Yoront cannot tolerate even "mild chiefs"; Schapera (1956:93) notes that "chiefs everywhere in South Africa" are only part-time specialists, and this is taken to mean that the Bushman and Bergdama are without political roles. Service (1966:51) defines "leadership" as "administration" and finds that it is unstructured, which moves from one person to another, and, above all, cannot be associated with the word "chief." All

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of these discussions consider specialization to mean full-time spent in role-playing and the singularity of role assignment. On these bases conclusions are reached as to the presence

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> A tut in this rather wide sense of 'man of good standing,' or 'social leader' is usually a scion of an important lineage, the head of his own family, and master of his homestead and herd . . . (His) authority is never formalized. He has no defined status (i.e. specifically delimited position), powers, or sphere of leadership . . . Beyond his domestic groups a tut has authority in his village only in the sense that he takes a prominent part in questions of procedure and other discussions.

The non-institutionalized third party role in al-Qasr has power and influence in political affairs, and this condition arises from certain structural features and economic facts about Bedouin society. In a word, outside the lone formal role of 'aqila, a person's political influence is directly related to the traditional influence which attaches to his family, or to his economic status. In all cases, the person of "good" family and sufficient wealth has a high status on the social prestige scale of al-Qasr. The people who have high esteem do not have prescribed roles to play in al-Qasr, but their roles are indeed important. Furthermore, the rajal khair role can be just as important as any political role which is prescribed, and it may even become more important.

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Besides the 'aqila and the third party, there exists two external but related roles which form part of the total system of Bedouin authority. The roles of 'umda and shaikh represent institutionalized offices. They function, however, more as structural aspects of the Egyptian governmental authority structure. Of course, no complete separation between the two structures can be claimed. It is recognized

The concept of the court has been prominent in the writings of sev- 121
eral other anthropologists besides Radcliffe-Brown and Hoebel. Bohannan 114
(1957, 1964, 1965), Redfield (1964) and Pospisil (1958) all imply the 671
existence of a court of some kind or another as the identifying mark of 692
the existence of legal rules. In his attempt to distinguish between law
and custom, Gluckman thought of law to exist "as a series of acceptable
judgments of rightdoing and wrongdoing in particular cases" (1955:262).
Custom and other social observances function as corpus juris and as such
a basis for the judgment of where the behavior of one of the litigants in
a case is reasonable or unreasonable, lawful or unlawful. As such, custom
is a source of law, but not law itself. It becomes law when drawn upon in
passing judgment in a given case. In commenting on a passage on the Nuer 121
by Evans-Pritchard, Gluckman made it clear what he meant by the court. 114
"This passage shows that even in a society where 'self-help' is the en- 671
forcing sanction, people judge situations of dispute in terms of rights 626
and duties, and wrongs....Therefore, it seems fair to say that among the 692
Nuer, though they have no courts, there is a process of judgment by media- 171
tors and ordinary people in which custom and morality as part of the corpus
juris constitute 'sources of law' for particular decisions" (1955a:263).

The importance of the above passage from Gluckman is his distinction 121
between the concept of the court and the judicial process, a distinction 114
lacking in the writing of most other anthropologists dealing with the 671
study of law. Failure to distinguish the two aspects of the legal system
resulted in confusing a basic societal process with one of the mechanisms
through which the goals of that process achieved in certain societies.
In its broadest sense, the judicial process refers to the ways disputes [692]
are settled within society. Since didsputes arise out of the very nature [626]
of social interaction, some form of dispute settlement is found in all [627]
societies.

585 legal guardian and considered a bride price to compensate the father or
583 the legal guardian of the bride. In earlier times the bride received
779 none of the mahr, although she usually got a sadaq or bridal gift for
431 [178] herself. In Islamic Arabia, the mahr and the sadaq became indistinguishable
[171] and were given to the woman and took the form of a legal gift
for affecting the marriage. The Koraan no longer contains the concept
[178] of the purchase of the wife, and the mahr becomes a compensation which
the woman has to claim in all cases. The Koraan demands a bridal gift
for a legal marriage: "And give them whom ye have enjoyed their reward
as a wedding gift" (Sura, iv. 24), and again, "And give the women their
[586] dowries voluntarily" (Sura, iv. 3). According to the Koraan, the mahr
remains the property of the wife and remains her own even if the marriage
is dissolved by divorce. But although it took the form of a gift, the
mahr remained in Islamic law a prerequisite for the legalization of the
marriage. It is only upon the giving of the mahr that the marriage is
considered valid. No marriage is legal, according to the Islamic law,
unless that transfer of the mahr is affected. Mutual consent of the
two parties to forfeit the mahr does not change that rule, and the marriage
58 is considered void. According to Muslim jurisprudence, marriage
675 is a contract ('acd) made betweeen the bridegroom and the bride or her
184 wali or guardian. An essential element in that contract is the mahr.
The jurists themselves are not sure about the nature of the mahr. Some
regard it as practically a purchase money or as an equivalent ('iwad)
for the possession of the woman and the rights over her, so it is like
a price paid in a contract of sale; while other jurists see in the mahr
a legal symbol, a mark of honor and a proper legal security of property
for the woman.

684 682 the husband, who reached for his gun and fired at Goma'h. Three days later the latter died in the hospital from the gun wound.

684 682 672 The case was investigated by the police and brought to trial, but the case was dismissed as justifiable homocide by reason of self defense. The tribal proceedings, however, required Ghenewa to pay the bloodmoney for intentional homocide, since the weapon used was a gun. Out of the L. 400 bloodmoney, the sum of L. 20 kabara for committing adultery with the wife was deducted. None had questioned the right of Ghenewa to kill Goma'h in the process of defending himself.

671 In his essay on "The Early History of Malice Aforethought" in
672 English law, Maitland discussed the "utter incompetence of ancient law to take note of the mental elements of a crime" (1911:327). This statement seems to apply to certain aspects of the tribal law of Awlad Ali. If one causes the death of another, even accidentally, he is liable to
671 compensation. This attribute is not restricted to Awlad Ali law, for
672 it has been documented by a number of other studies. Peristiany found
171 this to be the case among the Potok (1954), and Dundas documented it among the Kikuyu (1921). In his analysis of injury and liability among the Barotse, Gluckman maintained that "whatever the motivation of the killer or the circumstances surrounding the deed, bloodmoney has to be paid if a member of one grouping of kinsmen was killed by a member of some other group. The mental element seems to be irrelevant. What is important is that "murder" is committed within social relationships where blood compensation is due (1963:205). Similarly, Howell gives us one of the most comprehensive accounts of the Nuer "rule of law" and

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672 the irrelevance of intention in establishing liabilities for homocide
● 171 or injuries (1954).

672 The neglect of intention in assessing liability in cases of homo-
682 cide is evident in the cases presented above (Cases 1,2,4,5 and 6),
where compensation was paid although there was no intention established
on the part of the offender.

Awlad Ali use the Arabic word "katl" to refer to any killing. This
[192] is different from the word "mut" which means death by natural causes.
They further differentiate between "katl 'amd," or intentional killing
682 and "katl khata," or unintentional killing. Although reference here is
672 made to "intention," yet, from the above cases it is evident that the
673 basis of establishing that intention is from the type of weapon used in
effecting the death of the victim. Intentional killings are those caused
[411] by a lethal weapon. Lethal weapons are defined as guns or knives.
Death caused by a non-lethal weapon, no matter what the intentions of
the offender, is defined as non-intentional, even when the circumstances
of the act indicates the actual existence of an intention on the part
of the offender to cause the death of the victim (as in Case #3 above).
The assumption is that the use of lethal weapons, such as daggers or
guns, implies intention and possibly a certain degree of premeditation,
since these weapons have no other important use. Moreover, the probability of death by a lethal weapon is much greater than from other non-lethal weapons. These give the victim a chance to defend himself, a chance which he does not have in the cases of killing with a gun or dagger. In other words, Awlad Ali, in assessing responsibility for homocide, "operate with a legalistic psychology in which intention is is presumed from action" (Gluckman, 1963:207).

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divine blessing, since it was because the Bedouin believed the [792]
Sanusi family had the same virtue that they accepted their [798]
leadership. [776]

The resemblance often alleged between the Sanusi and the [778]
Wahhabi movements, on the grounds of like puritanism, 795*
literalism, and fanaticism, cannot be substantiated. It is 171 ●
obvious that there must be resemblances between new religious [114)
movements: they usually claim to be a return to primitive faith and morals and they are generally missionary and enthusiastic. There is no great significance in such common characteristics of the two movements. Nor is there any reason to suppose that the Grand Sanusi was directly influenced by Wahhabi propaganda. A more significant comparison between the two might be made by tracing their developments from religious into political movements. Both started as religious revivals among backward peoples, chiefly Bedouin, the Wahhabi movement in the Nadj in the eighteenth century and the Sanusi movement first in the Hijaz and then in Cyrenaica in the middle of the nineteenth century; the *Ikhwan* organizations of the two movements have much in common; and both ended in the formation of Amirates, or small Islamic States.

Both movements have created States, the Wahhabi in Arabia and the Sanusi in Cyrenaica, based explicitly on religious particularism. In doing so they have only done what any movement of the kind is bound to do in a barbarous country if it is to continue to exist, namely, to create an administrative system which would ensure a measure of peace, security, justice, and economic stability. A religious organization cannot exist apart from a polity of a wider kind. But they did not create the sentiment of community which made the growth of governmental functions and the emergence of a State possible.

Religious divisions in Islam have commonly been the expres- 795*
sion of a sense of social and cultural exclusiveness. The support 182
given to the 'Alids in Persia and Arabia, to the Umayyads in 177
Africa and Spain, to the Fatimids in Egypt, to the Kharijites 171
by the Berbers in North Africa, and the adoption of extreme Shi'ite doctrines by the mountaineers of Syria and by the Kurds, and of Isma'ili teachings in parts of India, were all reactions against foreign domination as much as revolts against orthodoxy. The religious deviation was the expression of the intense desire

*795 of a people to live according to their own traditions and institu-
182 tions. To-day this desire is expressed in the political language
177 of nationalism. In the past it was expressed in religious move-
• 171 ments. Arab nationalism is not a new phenomenon. Only its
[668] dress is new.

*795 As will be seen in the chapters which follow, conditions in
Cyrenaica were particularly favourable to the growth of a
182 politico-religious movement such as the Sanusiya became. It was cut off by deserts from neighbouring countries, it had a homogeneous population, it had a tribal system which embraced common traditions and a strong feeling of community of blood, the country was not dominated by the towns, and the Turkish administration exercised very little control over the interior. It was, as will be seen, the tribal system of the Bedouin which furnished the Order with its political foundations just as it was the tribesmen of the country whose hardiness and courage enabled it to stand up to the succession of defeats it had to endure.

*795 The reasons for the political success of the Sanusiya Order in
793 Cyrenaica will appear in the course of this account, and here I
wish to draw attention to one of them only. It has been said
182 that its rites and teachings were, like the Bedouin character,
[792] austere without being fanatical, and that it tolerated the cult
[798] of saints to which the Bedouin were accustomed, the Grand
Sanusi becoming, in fact, a kind of national saint; but it must be added that the acceptability of its teachings and the fact that the Grand Sanusi could at once be placed by the Bedouin in the familiar category of *Marabtin*, holy men coming to preach and settle in Cyrenaica from the west, cannot alone account for the remarkable success of the Sanusiya movement. The Bedouin of Cyrenaica had heard similar teachings before from similar teachers and had paid them the same degree of attention as they paid to the Grand Sanusi, but these earlier missionaries won only a personal and local following for themselves and their descendants, whereas the Grand Sanusi established himself and his family as leaders of a national movement, a position they have now held for three generations.
Leaving aside the remarkable personality of the Grand Sanusi
[792] and without here discussing whether the time at which he
[798] taught was particularly favourable to the growth of the move-

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[P.24]

3:Evans-Pritchard E-4,5 (1942-1944) 1949 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9
(1837-1942)
Sanusi


ALGERIA
TUNISIA
TRIPOLITANIA
FAZZAN
CYRENAICA
see inset
WESTERN DESERT OF EGYPT
AL-KAFARA
ARABIA
SUDAN
WEST AFRICA
Scale
0 250 500 750 1,000 kms
CYRENAICA
Scale
kms. 0 50 100

Distribution of Sanusiya Lodges in North Africa and Arabia.

CYRENAICA

1 al-Jarfan
2 Umm Rukba
3 Janzur
4 al-Marassas
5 Umm al-Razam
6 Umm Hafain
7 Martuba
8 Darna
9 al-'Azziyyat
10 Mara
11 Khashm Rzaiq
12 Maraziq
13 Bishara
14 Tart
15 Shahhat
16 al-Fayidiya
17 al-Makhili
18 al-Nayyan
19 al-Hamama
20 al-Haniya
21 al-Zawiya al-Baida
22 Qafanta
23 al-'Arqub
24 al-Qasrain
25 Talmaitha
26 Anbalu al-Huwaiz
27 Mirad Mas'ud
28 Qarabarbi
29 al-Marj
30 al-Qasur
31 Taukra
32 Dariyana
33 Asqafa
34 Banghazi
35 Umm al-Shakhanab
36 al-Tallimun
37 Msus
38 al-Qatafiya
39 Aujila
40 al-'Arq
41 al-Libba
42 al-Jikharra
43 al-Khatt
44 Marada
45 Jaghbub

EGYPT

46 al-Akhsab
47 al-Shih (Barrani)
48 al-Mithnan
49 Shammas
50 Najaila
51 Umm al-Rakham
52 Baqush (Sidi Harun)
53 '*Ailat* Bin Musa
54 Fuka
55 al-'Awama
56 al-Jamaima (al-Dhaba)
57 Abu-Shinaina
58 al-Hammam
59 Sidi Musa
60 Yadim al-Abairish
61 al-Ghait
62 Haush 'Isa
63 al-Qara
64 Gharmi
65 al-Zaitun
66 al-Sabukha
67 al-Gharbiya
68 Taba'
69 al-Bawiti
70 Mandisha
71 Farafra
72 al-Qasr
73 al-Rashda
74 Balat
75 Ismant
76 al-Qalamun

ARABIA

77 al-Wajh
78 al-Ais
79 al-Madina
80 al-Haura
81 Yanbu' al-Nakhl
82 Yanbu' al-Bahr
83 al-Khaif
84 al-Safra
85 Subh
86 Badr
87 Ziba
88 Rabigh
89 Jidda
90 Abu Qubais (Makka)
91 al-Tayif
92 Muna
93 al-Husainiya

TRIPOLITANIA

94 Ghadamis
95 Darj
96 Sinawin
97 al-Haraba
98 al-Rujban
99 al-Qal'a
100 Mizda
101 Tarabulis
102 Masallata
103 Bani Walid
104 Misurata (2)
105 Sirt
106 al-Naufiliya
107 al-Tabaqa
108 Hun
109 Saukna
110 Waddan
111 Zalla

FAZZAN

112 al-Fuqha
113 Birqin
114 Sabha
115 Ghudwa
116 Dlaim
117 Murzuq
118 Taghaghan
119 Umm al-Aranab
120 Zuwila
121 Tamassa
122 al-Qatrun
123 Wau al-Kabir
124 Wau al-Namus
125 Ghath
126 Qanit

AL KAFARA

127 Tazirabu
128 Bazima
129 Ribiyana
130 al-Hawari
131 al-Taj
132 al-Jauf

SUDAN

133 Bardai
134 Quru
135 Wajanqa al-Kabira
136 Wajanqa al-Saghaira
137 Yarda
138 'Ain Kalak
139 Faya
140 al-Fashir
141 Jabal Murrah
142 Abaish
143 Bir Alali
144 Jajiduna
145 Zinder
146 Kano

[P. 25]

102
795*
171

3:Evans-Pritchard E-4, 5 (1942-1944) 1949 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9
(1837-1942)
Sanusi

613 segments show a lineage depth of three generations, while others
621 show as many as six. No special importance is attached by the
Bedouin to this number, although some writers claim that a depth
of five generations is of particular significance among other Arab
621 tribes.[7] Normally, in speaking of the vengeance group, the Bed-
628 ouin refer to the name of the ancestor of a tertiary tribal section.
613 Any one claiming membership of this group, regardless of his
682 precise generational relation to the offender or the victim is immediately and equally involved with its other members. When speaking of the group as such, the Bedouin refer to it as 'those who have agreed on the blood', and use the phrase *'amara dam* to refer to it. Blood money does not pass between its members, and political division does not occur within it.

621 These small tertiary sections of tribes, then, are small residen-
613 tial groups. Their population varies from one group to another,
[162] but most of them have a total population of 150 to 200 souls.
Successive generations—at least according to the Bedouin view—add to these numbers, and also increase progressively the number of generations in their genealogies. Substantial increases of population would, of course, constitute a pressure on local resources, on the water available in the particular well of a group, on the amount of land available for ploughing, and on the pastures for animals at the end of the rainy season. Again, if each generation is to be added to the existing genealogy, this would necessitate a realignment of structural relationships with each succeeding generation. The discussion that follows is an
128 examination of the ways in which adjustments are made to
621 maintain an equilibrium between the population of a group and
613 the carrying capacity of the land on which its members live, and
of the ways in which the genealogical structure is able to persist in the face of various contingencies which threaten it.

A beginning might be made by indicating the processes at work to keep the form of the genealogy fairly fixed when there is an absence of population pressure on resources. The first problem is the simple one of describing the mechanics of manipula-

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[171] [7] e.g. Burkhardt (1831), speaks of the *Khomse,* the five generation group, as very widespread among Arabs. G. W. Murray also reports the use of the word *Khomsa* among the Arabs of the Sinai desert to designate the blood-vengeance group, but the term used by the Aulad 'Ali tribe, the cousins and Egyptian neighbours of the Cyrenaican Bedouin, he gives as *Awlia'-ed-dam* (which simply means 'blood kindred').

621

tion which enable the genealogy to remain constant in length 613
and fixed in form despite its dynamic content. 128

One of the main processes at work in foreshortening genealogies 173
is that referred to by Evans-Pritchard as telescoping.[8] 178
This process is also a characteristic feature of the Cyrenaican 613
genealogy, although its effects, to be discussed presently, differ 551
conspicuously. The way in which telescoping works in the Cyrenaican genealogy is that several male names come to be omitted in the genealogy below the name of the founding ancestor of the tertiary group. Usually, the form in which this occurs it that the name of a famous tribesman, and particularly his nickname if he has one, is retained along with the personal names of his lineal descendants in successive generations. The example given below is taken from the genealogy of the Haiba tertiary section of the Magharba tribe:



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[8] 'It is evident, moreover, that since the minimal lineage consists of four or five actual steps in ascent, there has been telescoping of the agnatic line from the founder of the minimal lineage further up the line of ascent to the founder of the clan, for the founder of the minimal lineage was himself the extremity of another minimal lineage which has, by increase in generations, become the minor lineage, and so on' (Fortes & Evans-Pritchard 1940, p. 199). Since Evans-Pritchard first wrote on the telescoping of genealogies (171) among the Nuer, other anthropologists have discussed the process in various systems. Fortes, Richards, Laura Bohannan, Cunnison, and Mitchell in their writings on the Tallensi, Bemba, the Tiv, the Luapula people, and the Yao respectively are notable examples . . . As the mode of manipulation of Bedouin genealogies is marginal to my present problem, the main comparison is not with these works but with Evans-Pritchard's earlier work on the Nuer, because the Bedouin and Nuer lineage system have more in common than either have with the other systems, excepting possibly the Tiv.

173 cline in the total population of a tribe, then, the extinction of
178 lines does not affect any order of segmentation superior to the
613 tertiary. In this respect, the Cyrenaican genealogy differs fundamentally
621 from those collected from the Nuer by Evans-Pritchard.
In the quotation from his work on Nuer genealogies (1951), he
[171] asserts that telescoping occurs 'from the founder of the minimal
lineage further up the line of ascent to the founder of the clan'.
This major difference has serious implications for any discussion
of lineage proliferation, but these must be left until the conditions
under which proliferation is likely to occur have been analysed.

178 While it is true that the processes discussed are of importance
613 in retaining the general shape of the genealogy, what is assumed
so far is that the Cyrenaican population has been stable over long
621 periods. Stability of population is not an unreasonable assumption
161 to make for a people who live on the margin of subsistence
182 in a country where extended periods of drought are not infrequent,
[173] though seldom leading, it is true, to actual famine conditions,
[731] but producing periodic and local food and water shortages.
Disease, following quickly in the trail of shortage, it can be assumed,
kept the relationship of total population to the natural
resources fairly constant. What evidence there is does not support
[726] even this very general assumption, since it is known that there
have been large-scale tribal wars in the past, and a certain
[167] amount of movement of tribes, some being displaced and others
pushed eastwards into Egypt. Unless these shifts were caused by
increases in the aggregate population and the consequent pressure
on land and water, it is difficult to account for them. This
consideration of possible overall increases in population in the
past poses interesting problems related to lineage structure which
cannot be adequately treated here. For the moment it is proposed
to neglect possible increases in the total population during past
periods in the history of Cyrenaica. The historical depth of the
view now to be discussed is about seventy years, and for this
period I have no evidence of any large-scale increases in population.
It is reasonable, therefore, to assume a general stability of
[132] population for this period. But the vagaries of the Cyrenaican
climate are such that, in a given year, one area might be well
drenched with rain, giving excellent pastures for animals and
good crops, while a nearby territorial strip might suffer a partial

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drought giving insufficient pastures and poor crops. Good or bad 613
crops, poor or abundant pasture, in turn mean a higher or lower 621
milk yield from the animals and better or worse living conditions 161
for human beings. Such factors as these may well, over a number 182
of years, lead to unevenness in the distribution of population [132]
throughout the tertiary sections. Whatever the cause, the genealogies
show that the population of the numerous tertiary sections [173]
is unequal. Some are numerically so weak that they have to
join a collateral section. Others are numerically so strong that
their natural resources are insufficient to meet the needs of all
their members. It was these latter segments which were in the
process of splitting, and which in some cases have already done
so. The next task, then, is to demonstrate where, on the genealogy, [128]
proliferation is effected.

We have seen that in Nuer genealogies segments proliferate at 173
all orders of segmentation. Here, the process is a continuous one, 171 ●
beginning at any point in time within the minimal lineage and 613
progressing upwards to the apex of lineage bifurcation. As particular 551
names become significant within the minimal segment,
they are retained and become a permanent addition to the genealogy.
In order to include these successively additional names,
names of ascending ancestors are shunted further and further
into the genealogical past, until presumably the effect is felt at
the topmost limit of the genealogy, when the names here are
pushed out of the genealogical framework altogether, and forgotten
for ever. More than this, the upward shift in names at
each and every point in the genealogical line means also a consequent
re-ordering of structural relationships, at all levels in the
system. One vital difference between Nuer and Bedouin societies 173
which may partly, at least, account for the different genealogical 178
processes at work among them is that the Nuer, when they were 613
studied by Evans-Pritchard, were expanding territorially, and [171]
that continuous proliferation of segments throughout the structure
was the mode of dealing with a situation of expansion. The [648]
Bedouin, on the other hand, had suffered twenty years of terrible
privation at the hands of the Italians, during which period thousands
of them died in battle and in concentration camps, were
shot up in their camps from the air, or died from want, before I
went to live among them. Although I must confess that I now

121 given to the feud, for this is one of the few societies in which it occurs.[1] What is
613 meant here by a state of feud is a set of relationships between two tribal groups which
578 are characterized by hostility whenever two or more of their members meet. These
591 hostilities are of a sort which cannot be terminated; feud is not a matter of a group
121 indulging in hostilities here at one moment and there the next, but a sequence of
619 hostilities which, as far as the contemporary Bedouin are concerned at least, know
578 no beginning and are insoluble. Feud and the other forms of relationships to be
[591] discussed presently are to be understood, in part, by reference to the ordered divisions
of the tribes. It is necessary at the outset, therefore, to give a brief statement about
the tribal organization; other details will be included as they become relevant.

619 There are nine noble tribes in Cyrenaica whose members are referred to as freemen.
621 These tribes see themselves as divided into three genealogical orders of sections:
primary, secondary, and tertiary. The tertiary tribal sections correspond to the camps
613 which cluster around the larger watering points during the drought season, May to
[132] November. Such camps consist of clusters of smaller camps in which the concentration of agnatically related males is over 80 per cent. Within the latter kinship links
are known, so that these agnates are consanguinely related as well as politically
[162] united. The populations of most tertiary groups vary from about 200 to 700 or so,
but a group ceases to be viable if the number of male adults drops much below fifty.
Political division is absent from these tertiary groups, regardless of their precise
size, for, whatever may be the condition of developing local lineages, the acceptance
of a common name carries with it full political responsibility incumbent equally on
[423] all their members. Each of these tertiary sections, moreover, has its own watering
point, ploughland, and pastures; each has its own *watan* or homeland. This statement
is true of all tribal sections of whatever order of segmentation. In other words, the
tribes and their sections correspond to an ordered division of the territory.

619 Names of tribal sections are the same as those given in the genealogies. Both tribe
613 and lineage are identically ordered. Lineages develop, and split at the tertiary order
of segmentation,[2] and, *a fortiori*, the process is the same for the tertiary tribal sections.
Split, in other words, occurs where relationships are most intense.

621 The summer community which constitutes a tertiary section, breaks up once the
221 rains begin in November or December. At this time of the year water is readily
available in the numerous small cisterns, there is pasture in plenty, and the animals
are giving milk. These combined reasons lead the larger summer camp to divide
into smaller camps of some five to ten tents. The latter are separated one from the
other by short distances—a mile or so—but together form a cluster in that they are
621 territorially distinguishable from a neighbouring and similar group of camps. Ter-
311 tiary sections are discrete also in the sense that all the major necessities of daily living
are available within their several territories. Each controls its own natural resources,
and these resources are the same for all the camel-herding groups—in any given year
one may have more of a particular commodity than another, but the difference is in

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[171] [1] Evans-Pritchard, 1940. The feud might have been present among the Nuer. Exogamy and the other rules of marriage which obtain among them create a dispersion of ties, which superficially appears to militate against a condition of feud. But a dispersal of ties does not mean that they necessarily act as a pressure for peace. Moreover, the exogamous links may link limited numbers of groups only, leaving others with sufficient discreteness to pursue feuding relationships as they are described in this paper.

[2] See Peters, 1959.

south-west of the country. Most members of the two tertiary groups directly con- 121
cerned in the dispute were present. The agnates of the collaterally linked groups of 613
the principals were unrepresented; indeed collaterals of one of the principals made 571
it quite explicit that they were opposed to their genealogical allies and considered 628
their perusal of the matter tiresome. The bulk of the crowd present was made up
of men linked to the principals in a variety of different and non-agnatic ways, and it
was they who provided most of the argument once the issue had been opened. It 121
follows, therefore, that an analysis of political organization and behaviour in Cyrena- 613
ica which is based on lineage theory leads to a gross misrepresentation. For, what 114
I am arguing is not that the lineage model in its rarefied state is too simple, not that
additional facts must be injected into it to complicate it, but that it does not provide
an admissible basis for analysis.[1] The complication of something that is founded in
error can only lead to complicated error, however many facts of real life are intro-
duced in an attempt to give it substance. The Bedouin conception of their social [829]
relationships in terms of a genealogical ordering of groups is a fact of their social
life, and in relation to some problems it is an important fact. My objection to the use
which has been made of a people's ideology of their relationships is that it has been
elevated from its status as a component of social life to such a position of universal
dominance in all sets of social relationships that 'every sociological problem', as
Fortes writes of the Tallensi, 'hinges on the lineage system'.[2]

If the ordering of groups within the frame of the Bedouin genealogy is abandoned 121
as a basis for analysis, it does not follow that the only remaining view is that of small 613
groups of people distributed throughout the country enjoying relationships merely 571
as units. Regularity in relationships does exist, it is urgently necessary, and it per- 578
sists; but this regularity is not consistent with a lineage model. Ultimately, feud is a
violent form of hostility between corporations which has its source in the competition
for proprietory rights in land and water. This competition makes it necessary for
groups to combine to prevent the encroachments of others in similar combinations
and also to expand their resources whenever the opportunity arises. The significant
groups in a discussion of the feud are these power groups, and it is their composition,
the shifting alliances within them, the growth and diminution in the power of tertiary

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[1] Dr. Paul Bohannan has distinguished in his writings between what he calls folk systems and analytical systems. The distinction, as he sees it, is set out clearly in the statement 'a certain field of Nuer relationships is explained by Nuer in terms of an agnatic genealogy. This is the folk system. The same field is explained, in English, by Professor Evans-Pritchard, as a lineage system based on the principle of segmental opposition. This is an analytical system' (Bohannan, 1957, p. 5). What is the difference? Is it only a difference of language? Bohannan's analytical statement is little more than a generalisation of what is in the folk system. An analytical system, in his hands, is a sophistication of a folk system, for it is the latter which provides him with his analytical framework. The act of creativity on the part of the social anthropologist about which he writes (Bohannan, 1963, p. 14) is the revealing of a folk system through analysis. But he does not
depart from the framework set by informants—the 121
agnatic genealogy is the lineage, and the fission and 613
fusion of parts, the opposition of like segments and 114
so on is explained by informants in different lan- 171
guages as adequately as it is explained by social anthropologists in English. Bohannan's viewpoint is made clearer, perhaps, in his discussion on the arrangement of facts relating to Tiv law. Here he considers what he should do once he has elicited all the facts, and he argues against setting them out as an arrangement of the procedural law of Tiv courts because, 'The error would be that the arrangement is not part of *the Tiv way of looking at it*, and hence would be false' (Bohannan, 1957, p. 69. Italics mine). Why? The Tiv are not the social anthropologists. Is the test of an analytical model its consistency with a folk comprehension?

[2] Fortes, 1945, p. 30.

571 231 between man and man, although the various cereal dishes which constitute
their regular meals are said to have a similar effect.
264 The son who continues to eat with his father "as he always had been
182 doing," also continues to accept his authority. Indeed he could do little else
593 at this stage, for he lacks the economic means to cut away. Neither at mar-
585 riage nor after is there any transfer of wealth from father to son. The new
182 tent recently pitched is no more than a dormitory to which the young couple
[425] retire at night. During the daytime the son is still to be seen in his father's
[556] tent, and, in the male quarters, things appear to be much the same as before.
In the female quarters, the only superficial change is the more frequent appearance among the women of one who, before marriage, often sat among them if she had been a close neighbour or a close cousin previously; or of an additional helper if she had come from afar. On the surface things remain "as they always have been," although in fact, a whole set of changes have been initiated.

852 *Rites de passage* are few among the Bedouin. A man's progress in life is
881 ceremonially marked by only four events: his birth, circumcision, marriage
764 and burial. His development into manhood is not marked by clearly defined
stages. About the age of seven, the henna markings on the front of a boy's
858 shirt for protection from the evil eye are not renewed, the cowrie shell stitched
789 to the front of his cap as a kind of talisman against the evil eye is removed
and he is no longer permitted free access to the women's quarters. As he
857 grows older, he will be instructed in goat-herding, and later taught to follow
233 the sheep. In his late teens he will have to undertake the more arduous and
883 responsible task of herding the camels. Coincident with camel-herding, he
233 may be given a gun by his father. Shortly afterwards he must undertake the
[431] stringent test of manhood, a journey to a distant oasis for dates. These
[411] changes are not marked off by a *rite de passage*. The rites a man undergoes
[484] during the course of a lifetime are minimal, and in the sense that they are
[885] concerned with only the basic events in a man's life anywhere (save for
852 circumcision, which is a minor celebration anyway), they are irreducible.
88 Moreover, the rituals which exist do not comprehend the same multiplicity of
796 relationships as rituals which occur in many other African societies.[4] It is
[771] true that the ceremonies referred to in this chapter by no means include
all the Bedouin rituals. It is also true that the events mentioned vary in
[554] elaboration, and in the number of symbols present in them, but they are
not multiplied or reduced for different people.

In this context it is important to stress that we are here dealing with a
[613] lineage society where social differentiation is not built up into differences
[554] of rank, where the roles to which a man succeeds are almost wholly cap-
[602] tured by his kinship relationships with other men and which are sociologically
to be distinguished from the roles a man enters into by acquisition of office,

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[4] See, for example, the elaboration of rituals discussed in M. Gluckman (Ed.), *Essays on the Ritual of Social Relations.* Manchester: University of Manchester Press, 1962.

Cases

The Meaning of Marriage

581 Until marriage the changes in a man's life have been in the nature of
585 an ordered sequence of development from a child to be cared for — the only
342 time in his life when a father, without inhibition, showers on him his love
[593] and affection — to one who, by degrees, makes an increasing contribution to
a production unit. Marriage necessitates that a man pitch a tent for himself.
With a tent he becomes a potential host and protector of others. The local
idiom for marriage is "to set up a tent." It would be quite improper to use
[196] the verb "to marry" when inquiring whether a marriage has taken place
since this verb also has the meaning of "to have sexual intercourse." In-
[195] stead the euphemism, "Have you pitched a tent?" is used. The Arabic word
for a tent in this context is *Bait*. It is not used to refer to a military tent, nor
to the small tent which shelters only a widow. It is reserved for the Bedouin
tent, which usually has a wool top, and, most importantly, holds the promise
of the continuation of life, whether it shelters a newly married couple, a
mature family or young unmarried people. (The word *Bait* represents a
complex concept, and it would be too much of a diversion here to discuss
the various points of its significance. It is essential to understand that its
[778] meaning is not confined to a tent in the physical sense.) Its top has *Baraka*
(divine goodness) in it; the quality of *Haram*, which makes it possible for the
tent to be used as a sanctuary, is associated with it and this quality of *Haram*
extends, moreover, to the ropes of the tent, so that anyone who clutches them
comes under the protection of the owner. In it, the wife must permanently
reside and her husband has the legal right to insist on this. In it too, he
has the legal right of sexual access to a woman, his wife. Any children
[885] born in it he can claim as his own. With the erection of a tent the son
reaches adulthood, and it is in this sense that he can be said to have acquired
a domain of his own.

581 Marriage gives a son greater freedom and less dependence on his father
585 in another sense. A second euphemism used for marriage is "making a
[593] relationship," specifically an affinal one. Relationships between a man and
[195] his father-in-law are diverse and are used in various ways in different situa-
tions. Here, the particular aspect which needs to be stressed is that a man
606 can cajole his father-in-law, and (through his wife) wealth, in the form
425 of animals, may pass from the former to the latter. Reciprocal gifts are passed
556 between affines on certain occasions, but in addition small amounts may
pass which are not connected with the formal occasions of exchanges. Debt
583 lies between them. It begins with the initiation of marriage negotiations,
584 when the suitor's kinsmen take a prescribed number of sheep to present to
606 the girl's father if negotiations are successful. They promise to transfer
bride-wealth[9] to the girl's father. A few weeks after the marriage, the hus-

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[191] [9] I use the word "bride-wealth" because it has become so familiar in the literature,
but the only similarity between the *Sahiba* of the Bedouin and the bride-wealth of

band is required to take gifts to his mother-in-law in recognition of the fact 583
that she nourished his wife as an infant (the literal meaning of the word 584
used for this gift is "milk"). A return visit is made and gifts are given to 606
the daughter. When the first child is born an animal is presented by the 851
affines, and if the child is a male, the gift may be several sheep, or even a 425
few camels if the father-in-law is very wealthy. Formal exchange of gifts 606
continue, but, in addition, informal transfers are made. Moreover, if re-
lations between a man and his father-in-law develop favourably, it is not un- 606
common for a young husband, during the early years of marriage, to move 591
away from his father and pitch his tent alongside that of his father-in-law. 593
Marriage gives a son affinal relations of his own. Affinity can alleviate the
dead weight of paternal authority.

It is suggested that the crisis the marriage of a son assumes for a father 585
is the shift it entails in the distribution of authority. This is borne out by 561
other details in the marriage ceremony referred to earlier. Ordinarily, young 602
men dare not sing within earshot of their senior agnates. Far from allowing
obscenities, agnates of the ascending generation would not allow even a 533
mention of women to be made by young men, in their presence. In a group [593]
consisting of young men and an agnate, I chanced to use the noun for [123]
woman and immediately my tent was cleared of all but the senior agnate.
At a wedding the young men revel in their lewd songs and shout their [831]
obscenities for all to hear. The senior agnates stand aside and make a show of ignoring the proceedings. And well they may, for each marriage is a challenge to the exclusive authority they have enjoyed; each nuptial tent is an invasion of the domain of which they have been undisputed masters. Marriage is the only occasion when the men of one generation can clap and sing their defiance of an older one, and give warning of the changes which must be accommodated however great the pretence that nothing has happened.

Marriage ceremonies dramatise the clash between adjacent generations 561
over the distribution of certain forms of authority. If this authority is as 602
overwhelming as has been suggested, and if it is so deeply resented, how is it that life is endurable for juniors? Relationships between junior and senior agnates are so restrictive that they almost amount to what Professor Fortes has suggested I view as a form of avoidance relationships. Juniors must always defer, they must obey commands promptly, they serve their seniors, they must accept a lead when it is given and the restrictions on conversations exclude all reference to women, marriage or sex. These are not simply a set of general guides for behaviour, they are rigidly applied rules, deviation from which is countered with rebuke or greater severity. It would appear from this

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many African societies is that wealth is transferred. Obviously, in societies where the 583
rules of exogamy compel a dispersion of links outside a man's own clan, what is in- 584
volved in this transfer of wealth cannot be sociologically similar to one in which mar- 606
riage to the first cousin on either side is permitted.
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CHAPTER VII

BLOODMONEY—WESTERN DESERT

000 Payment in Cash—Agreements to pay—Reprisals discouraged—Patricide—Detective Work—Death from Fright—Public Aversion—The twelve-year-old Bill—Informers—Ali Abu Bukr's Cistern—The Broken Rope—Found Drowned—Three Months' Hard Labour—Whose Rope?—Payment—The Old Man who fell off the Wall—The Clutches of the Police—A Well-conceived Lie—Ibrahim's Broken Leg—Ali's Cunning—The Fiasco at the Tomb—Reductions in Payment—The Dead Baby—Amateur Lawyers—The Two Shepherds and the Trespasser—Stick or Stone?—Legal Arguments—Travelling Allowance—Misappropriation—Chaos—Mirtah buys Sheep, while the Sayed buy Dates—The Clash—£300—Abdel Kerim and his Cousin—The Boys Fight—Result of pointing a Gun—Dirty Fingers—Serve him Right—The Two Married Sisters—A Gun Accident—Poor Towida—Successful Bluffing.

682 In the Western Desert the laws of bloodmoney differ
● [171] considerably from those of Sinai, the former being of
African origin and the latter of Arabian. The Western
[435] Bedouin regard the price of a man as £300, irrespective of
[562] the market price of a camel; and the value of a woman's
life as normally £150, or half that of a man.

682 In the absence of satisfactory evidence in a case of
695 murder, if the oath be employed to decide the issue, fifty
men will swear for a man's life, and twenty-five in a case
562 involving the life of a woman. (Note. In some tribes
these numbers are increased to fifty-five and twenty-seven
respectively.)

682 As regards the payment and acceptance of bloodmoney,
621 this is almost invariably by agreement between the families,
and it is often difficult for an outsider to see any rhyme or

reason in three families of one tribe paying together, while 682
the fourth is independent. Sometimes this is caused by 621
geographical separation, at other times by personal animosity or jealousy.

The main difference between the rules of the Western 682
Desert and Sinai is that in the West reprisals taken at the 171•
discretion of an aggrieved individual are not recognised as [670]
lawful, and are distinctly discouraged. Generally speaking, [181]
the Western Bedou is a very much more prosperous and law-abiding person than the Sinai Arab, although at the same time he retains his charm as a primitive and independent being. Occasionally a dastardly murder takes 682
place, but public opinion is very strong not only against the 674
murderer personally, but against all the members of his [626]
family, who automatically share his unpopularity.

In the spring of 1920 an old man, reputed to possess considerable wealth, both in camels and sheep and also in gold buried in the ground, was returning about mid-day from market riding his donkey, and one of his numerous grown-up sons was walking on foot beside him. After going four or five miles in the open desert, the old man got off his donkey, and told his son to ride for a little way while he walked. The son suddenly attacked his old father and hit him with the heavy stick he was carrying; and the poor old man died almost at once with a broken skull. There was nobody about, and the son dragged his father's body about a hundred yards, and threw it down an old dried-up cistern; then, mounting his donkey, he rode home to dinner.

That afternoon the local sheikh was told of the old man's disappearance, and as he had seen father and son leaving the market together, he had his suspicions. He traced their footsteps, picking up the tracks of a heavily laden donkey and one man walking, from near the entrance to the market place. Then, following along carefully on these tracks, he saw where the old man had dismounted. Then he saw a spot of blood and the place where the

8: Kennett G-5 (ca. 1921) 1925 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9

should have called a meeting with Abd el Salam, discussed 683
the position sensibly with him, and then the two of them 682
should have beaten all the boys soundly. Secondly, he ought 695
never to have taken his gun with him, which was as stupid 672
as it was dangerous. The fact that Abd el Kerim himself knew that it was not loaded made not the slightest difference to the case, as the boys did not, and could not, know whether it was loaded or not. As one of the sheikhs expressed it, "If you point a gun at me, loaded or unloaded, I'm not going to risk it. So if I retaliate by braining you, then that's your fault—not mine!"

As compared with some of the customs obtaining among 682
the Sinai Arabs, the following case among the Aulad Ali 171
in the Western Desert is illuminating, and will be quoted in full. The question of who is "chief mourner" of the deceased, and who draws the largest share in a bloodmoney case varies considerably between the tribes of Arab and Berber origin. Among the Aulad Ali a woman killed is [562]
automatically half the value of a man, whereas among the [435]
Arabs the value of a woman depends on a variety of conditions.

A man called Idris had two daughters, Towida and 682
Beida. Beida married a man called Korayem Shushan of 672
the Gereidat tribe, and Towida married Farag Gueida of the Mowalik tribe. A son had been born to Towida and Farag called Lataif Farag; and when Lataif was about four years old, his parents quarrelled about some trifling matter, and Farag divorced Towida. Two months after this, Towida went to spend a day or two with her sister Beida and Korayem, and it was while sitting alone in their tent that the accident happened which was the cause of this lawsuit. It seems that Korayem had left a loaded gun tied up with cord to the roof of the tent, suspended from the poles. While Towida was sitting there, a sudden gust of wind got up, and shook the tent violently. As the tent rocked in the wind, the gun came tumbling down on to a wooden chest between the poles; the impact fired the

CHAPTER II

THE ECOLOGY AND ECONOMY OF THE AL-QASR AREA

Changing Patterns of Land Use

131 Al-Qasr is located in the Northwestern Coastal Zone,
a relatively fertile littoral region forming the northern
edge of the Egyptian Western Desert. Extending from Alexandria
to Sallum on the Libyan border, the Zone is some 500 kilometers
in length and reaches south into the desert some 20 to 50
134 kilometers. A deep soil deposit and a relatively high average
132 rainfall of about 15 centimeters (20 centimeters of rain would
241 be considered "high") permit limited agriculture in this
region.

133 Due to the drainage pattern of the coastal area there
is a fair supply of underground water. The rain percolates
•[172] down through coastal sand dunes and is trapped in man-made
underground galleries dating from Roman times. Farther into
312 the desert, cisterns, which also date from Roman times, catch
the rains draining off the Libyan plateau to the south. This
plateau and the catchment area form the southern boundary of
the greater al-Qasr settlement area (see Figure 4). The
General Desert Development Authority, an agency of the government, estimates that there are about 3,000 of these

312 (literally, sky-wells, to indicate that they are dug to receive and
[172] preserve rain water). Most of these are ancient Roman pools which were
claimed either by the government or by individuals, and are put into
[653] use again to store rain water. Recently, the government has erected a
number of dams to preserve the rain water in exceptionally good years
from flowing into the sea. All this, however, is not enough to provide
the tribal population in the area with a permanent supply of water because
of the limited capacity of the cisterns and the pools and the
scarcity of rain and its erratic nature. Recent attempts have been
made to tap the underground water in some parts of the area. A large
number of wells were sunk, especially along the coast.

433 The economy of Awlad Ali is based on livestock husbandry, supplemented
221 by occasional cultivation of barley. Owing largely to the variation
in the amount of rainfall, the sources of food in the area have the
important characteristic that the place and amount of their occurrence
vary from one year to the next. Throughout most of the area, the tribal
populations are concerned predominantly with warding off shortages in
the food supply by moving with their flocks to areas where grazing lands
are available.

233 Awlad Ali keep a variety of domestic animals, the most important
of which, from the economic point of view, are sheep and goats. The
[433] economy of Awlad Ali is based on the utilization of the products of
[237] these two animals. These products are milk, meat, wool, and hides.
[262] Milk and its products constitute the basic element of the people's
[272] diet. Milk is never consumed fresh. It is always made into sour milk
272
252 (maleh), kishk (dried milk), or butter.

the steep sides of which make east–west journeys slow and 133
arduous. To the west this broken country levels down, and in a
bay in the hills lies the extensive treeless, but very fertile, basin
of al-Marj, known to Europeans as the Barce Plain. It was [167]
colonized in classical times and again recently by the Italians.
The Arabs call this first terrace *lusaita* (*al-wasaita*), the middle
part, because it lies between the coastal plain and the plateau
tableland formed by *al-zahir*, the second terrace. This tableland [172] ●
is famous for its Graeco-Roman ruins and is dotted also
with the deserted farms of Italian colonists. It mounts to a
narrow third terrace, at about 875 metres above sea level, from
the top of which one can look down on these settlements.

The plateau slopes southwards through a juniper belt. There 133
forest ends and it continues to roll to the southern steppe in 137
stony undulations dissected by many wadis. In the plain at its
foot there is plenty of grass and low scrub, and vegetation is
thick in depressions, but the country becomes increasingly
desolate the farther to the south one journeys towards the lifeless
wastes of the Sahara. The eastern part of Cyrenaica is more [132]
arid than the west or centre. The Marmarica, the *batnan* of the
Arabs, is characterized by low hills rising from the coastal belt
and prolonged towards the south to create a succession of crests
of several kilometres in depth. The mean annual rainfall is low [132]
and wells are restricted to the coastal belt. However, there is, [312]
probably in most years, a certain amount of grazing to some
fifty miles from the coast during the rains. The Sirtica, the
extension of Cyrenaica to the west, is a vast rolling treeless
plain traversed by a series of wadis running north–south which
in their spread provide most of the summer grazing. Wells are [312]
found only near the coast but pasturage is plentiful till the [233]
Wadi al-Farigh is reached.

The rainfall very exactly determines the vegetation belts and 132
thereby limits human distribution and imposes a certain way
of life. The amount of precipitation depends on a number of
circumstances. Mean annual rainfall decreases from west to
east. Altitude also affects it. More significant, however, are
the variation with latitude, the seasonal rhythm, and annual
irregularities. The accompanying map shows how rainfall
decreases rapidly from the coast, how only the very limited
plateau area is subject to heavy precipitations (400–550 mms.),

[TEXT CONTINUED ON PAGE 33]

tribe. In the oasis of Jalu, where there was not the same tribal 795*
solidarity as in the neighbouring oases of Aujila and al-Jikharra, 619
the two lodges were almost next door to each other. This was because the oasis was split into two opposed villages, each occupying about half of it with a strip of waste ground in between. A similar lack of unity in the Egyptian oasis of Siwa accounts for the building of several Sanusiya lodges there.

IV

Starting from the foundation of al-Zawiya al-Baida in 1843 [175]*
the Order spread itself throughout Cyrenaica until it embraced in its network of lodges the entire tribal system of the country. It seeded itself, as it were, in the crevasses between tribes and between tribal sections, and its points of growth were thus also the points of convergence in tribal and lineage structure.

A tribal zawiya seems generally to have been founded in the 795*
following manner. A tribe or tribal section saw with envy that 793
a neighbouring tribe or section had a zawiya. They sent a 619
deputation to the Head of the Order and asked him for a Shaikh to teach their children, cater for their religious needs, settle their disputes, and so forth. The Head of the Order granted them their request and sent them a Shaikh chosen from among the learned and pious men who surrounded him at Jaghbub. The Shaikh probably took with him one or two companions, *Ikhwan*, Brothers of the Order, to help him start the new lodge which the tribesmen built in the most favoured spot in their territory. Simple structures though these zawiyas were, they took many years to complete, being added to when further
accommodation was required, in the leisurely Arab way. Most [172] •
of them were built on Graeco-Roman foundations so that the tribesmen who constructed them found stone ready to hand.

Through the kindness of Shaikh Muhammad al-Tayyib al- 175*
Ashhab I have seen the letter sent in 1855 by al-Sayyid Muham- 795*
mad Ibn 'Ali al-Sanusi al-Khattabi al-Hasani al-Idrisi to his 793
virtuous sons, some of the Shaikhs of the Sdaidi section of the 'Awaqir tribe, about the building of the zawiya of Msus. He says that he is sending to them Brothers to construct the buildings and that he has instructed them to build an annex which he can use as a resthouse when he visits the zawiya, though this

173
619


SA'ADA
JIBARNA
AQAQRA
BANI SALLAM
BARAGHUTH
'AWAQIR
'ARAIBAT
MAGHARBA
JAWAZI
FAWAYID
HARABI
AWLAD 'ALI
SHARAI'
HANADI
BAHAJA
BANI 'UNA

THE GENEALOGY OF THE CYRENAICAN BEDOUIN

FIGURE 2

History of Settlement in al-Qasr

•173 [166] [175] 173 *613 [912] The settlement of al-Qasr took place about 200 years ago when the Awlad 'Ali first came to the area from Cyrenaica. No historical documentation for this period exists. The various versions which the Bedouins offer are both vague and ethnocentric with reference to lineage. A point of consensus is that the zone was first claimed by Abu Mahjuba who built a large fort (qasr = "fort" or "castle") near the coast. The Bedouins say that Abu Mahjuba settled in the area of al-Qasr because "he knew good land when he saw it." He belonged to no one lineage, "he was 'Aishaibi only." All of the lineages of al-Qasr claim that their ancestors came with Abu Mahjuba and settled on the land at that time. Abu Mahjuba has been mythologized: he belongs to all of al-Qasr, a symbol of local group solidarity and fraternal equality.

173 361 [198] Al-Qasr represents the end of nomadic life for the 'Aishaibat tribe. According to the Bedouins, each tribe and lineage took that part of al-Qasr which it preferred. If the members of the segment wanted to grow vegetables, they took land on the coast; if they preferred the "old way of life," they set up their tents in the sha'ir wi mar'a area and raised sheep. "Everything was fine," they say, "there were no land registration laws--a man was free." Al-Qasr was settled [619] "after the wars" (with the Hanadi), and it was only then that the Awlad 'Ali broke up into tribes. The 'Aishaibat took the

• 173 land along the coast: "This land was free, and the man who
[361] planted on it owned it. We call this (method of claiming land)
[425] *wad'a-l-id* ("laying on of the hand," i.e. seizure). There was
[423] plenty of freedom in those days. A man could farm or keep
animals." Planting and caring for the land is not novel to
the Bedouins of al-Qasr.

423 The Bedouins claim that the pattern of land distribution
425 established during the time of Abu Mahjuba prevails today.
656 Further, they say that these rules will never change, no matter
[178] what laws come out of Cairo: "Land registration can mean nothing
where the tribes are concerned, for no Bedouin would be willing
to take the land of another Bedouin. The government forces us
to register our land so that it can be stated in the news-
paper that they are giving the Bedouins land."

*613 The relationship between ecology and lineage territory
423 is not striking, such as in the case of the Cyrenaican Bedouins
182 of Libya (Peters 1960). In most cases, lineage territories run
on a north-south line cross-cutting the coastal garden and
southern pastoral zones. Hence, lineage territories are, gen-
erally, ecologically similar rather than contrasted. However,
*613 there are exceptions. 'Ailit Shraif lineage (see Figure 3a
423 below), at the western end of al-Qasr's *'izba* sector, settled
182 there "because of the abundance of underground water in this
241
[312] area: the ground is rocky here and the water comes out fresh
[361] like the Nile." Their founder, Sayyid Shraif, "specialized"

CHAPTER III

KINSHIP AND POLITICAL ORGANIZATION

Principles of Social Structure

*613 The division of Bedouin society into groups is
explained in terms of certain principles of organization, the
most pervasive of these being unilineality or the lineage
*613 principle. According to this structural rule, an individual
619 born into a tertiary lineage segment (see Figure 7)[1] automatically becomes a member of each successive and more inclusive
group represented by the higher levels of segmentation. The
status, rights, and obligations of the individual with respect
to other members of the tribe are in this way determined on
the basis of kinship. An individual gains political status
in the tribe, as a societal unit, only through membership in
a tertiary group. Theoretically, group membership is based
on birth, but there are certain "legal fictions" which
represent exceptions to this rule. In al-Qasr exceptions are
rare, but a few do exist. For instance, there is one case of
[597] individual adoption, and in another case, a whole tertiary
•173 segment was grafted on to a lineage stem. The latter case
*613 happened four generations ago when Taram Mighaiwiz of 'Ailit
619 Lazumi adopted Hajj 'Ali "as his brother." The Bedouins say
597

[1] [See p.77--Analyst]

1

173 *613 619 597 that in those days it was important "to have men to go to war; Hajj 'Ali came from the Sinai with many men and wrote his name into the books of Lazumi." Today, in the Lazumi genealogy Hajj 'Ali's name appears as the brother of Taram, [114] both are claimed as sons of Mighawsiz. This kind of data is difficult to uncover and I may have missed gathering other cases of ideological kinship ties.

*613 [171] The specific unilinear principle which operates in al-Qasr is partrilineality, common to the Middle Eastern culture area. A corollary principle is the corporate group. *613 571 Together, these two rules structure the social world of the individual and effectively define a range of social choices for him. The individual's social relations and social roles are relative to the rights and obligations of the people related to him through his father. In a sense, the social world for the individual in al-Qasr is his father's group and its network of relationships with other similar groups; he would not think of leaving this group of his own free will though, in reality, he could. The Bedouins believe [181] [829] that a man cannot be happy if he lives with strangers, i.e., outside his corporate group. This value holds up today to the extent that a man will expect his son to return to the desert even after his education as a merchant, a government clerk, or an army officer.

Structural differentiation in al-Qasr is not solely

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619


SA'ADA
(1) 'AQAR
TRIBE (2) AWLAD 'ALI
TRIBE (3) 'ALI AHMAR
PRIMARY (4) 'AISHAIBAT
SECONDARY (5) 'AILIT MA'FAS
TERTIARY (6) BAIT 'UMAR
(7) BAIT ('AIT) ABD AL-MALIK

FIGURE 7

GENERATIONS AND TERMINOLOGY OF TRIBAL STRUCTURE

1: Obermeyer E-5 (1964-1965) 1969 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9
'Aishaibat

● 173
*613
601



BRAIK
(BAIT) KAILANI
(BAIT) YUNIS
(BAIT) MUHAMMAD
ABD AL-MALIK
YUNIS
JIBRIL
ABD AL-LATIF
YA'QUB
ABD AL-RAHMAN
ABD AL-HALIM
ABD AL-SALAM
FARAJ
ABD AL-RAHMAN
'ALI
ABD AL-HAMID
ABD AL-'AZIZ
'UMAR
ABD AL-'AL
QASSIM
ABD AL-MALIK
JAD AL-MULA
ABD AL-MUNSIF
NAJI
SALIH AL-DIN
ABD AL-NASSIR
KAMAL AL-DIN

[P.78-A]

1: Obermeyer E-5 (1964-1965) 1969 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9
'Aishaibat

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*613
601


MA'FAS
HASSAN
QASSIM
BAIT 'UMAR
(BAIT) 'UMAR
HANAISH
ABD AL-QADAR
IBRAHIM
MUHAMMAD
'ALI
ABD AL-KHALIQ
SALIH
YUNIS
ABD AL-RAHIM
MUHAMMAD
'ALI
IBRAHIM
SA'AD
'ATIYA
'UMAR
TAHIR
FARAJ
QASSIM
RIZQ
SAFI
ABD ALLAH
NUWAIJI
HAMAD
MAUHI AL-DIN
SA'ID
IBRAHIM
ABD ALLAH
JIBRIL
RIYID
'ISLAIB
ABD AL-KARIM
BAGHI
JAB ALLAH
HIMAIDA
MAS'UD
HASSAN
MUHAMMAD
ABD AL-NASSIF
RAMADAN
FATH ALLAH

[P.78-B]

1: Obermeyer E-5 (1964-1965) 1969 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9
'Aishaibat

● 173
#613
601

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
MUSA
HAMAD
(BAIT) FIRJANI
(BAIT) SALAH
HUSSAIN
MAHMUD
ABD AL-RAWAF
MUSA'ID
NASIF
SALIH
ABD AL-KARIM
MANSUR
ABD AL-RAWAF
ABD ALLAH
'ISA
GHAITH
▲ = 'AQILA

FIGURE 8

GENEALOGY OF BAIT 'UMAR

[P. 78-C]

619 177 [121] the bureaucratic principle. Here we are concerned with the traditional situation.

The 'Aishaibi Bedouins of al-Qasr are a residence group. Each sub-group of the tribe, i.e., the secondary and tertiary units, is assigned their own territory (mintaqa). Kinship and residence are the primary determinants of group differentiation; agnates who dwell together represent concrete authority structures, or political groups. This follows from the fact that patterns of political action, or what we call political structures, most often deal with the exercise of legitimate authority--as opposed to power. Power relations do occur and when present complicate the situation. In al-Qasr, power relations and structures emerge when the principle of cognation or contracted alliance form groups which crosscut the effectiveness of local, agnatic political structures. But, in al-Qasr, as in most societies, political action usually takes the form of the exercise of authority (Southall 1965:120). 619 *613 571

*173 114 *613 571 The genealogical map as an idological charter argues against the formation of power relations. Genealogical relations represent a set of social relations each replete with definite rights and obligations. Fallers (1956) has noted the tendency in segmentary lineage societies to cast all authority relations in a unilinear genealogical mould. The Bedouin visualize their world, extending from Alexandria to *613 829 173 571

*613 Libya, as a territorially segmented one corresponding to the
829 lineage divisions of the tribe. They say that every Bedouin
•173 knows the owner of each centimeter of this world. Not only
571 does the genealogy represent a set of property relations, it
also represents and upholds a set of authority relations. In
*613 Cyrenaica also (Peters 1960), the Bedouin genealogical map
173 corresponds to the distribution of groups on the ground.
571 Kinship relations as social relations in Bedouin society may
be properly interpreted as property relations between groups.
Property relations as part of the Bedouin world view are an
essential premise upon which the social and political order
rests, although it is not the only premise.

619 The 'Aishaibat are identified with the al-Qasr portion
*613 of the Awlad 'Ali homeland. The 'Aishaibi segments are
separate and contiguous on the ground. Figure 3a[1] shows the
correspondence between the 'Aishaibi genealogical and territorial divisions at the secondary lineage level of segmentation.

121 That kinship as an organizing principle in segmentary
*613 societies cannot be considered apart from local contiguity
is an old and well-known fact. Sir Henry Maine (1917:76-79) in analyzing the evolution of "political ideas" noted the interrelationship between "the principle of local contiguity" and the central principle of the "connexion in blood," how they combine to become "the condition of community in political

[1] [See p. 66--Analyst]

619 'Ali tribe. There is one lineage, the Sulwatiyya shown in
*[613] Figure 7a, which does not claim descent from Sa'ada and hence
are no relations of the Awlad 'Ali Bedouin. Nor are any
serious ideological claims for tribal membership provided
by them or their Awlad 'Ali neighbors. The first social
differentiation found in al-Qasr, then, is between those who
belong to the Sa'adi tribes and those of the Marabit tribes.
In terms of Bedouin social ideal types, the Sa'adi tribesmen
are warriors, known for their courage and generosity; the
Marabit tribesmen are weak and dependent on the protection
[992] which the Sa'adi offers them. The Marabit tends to specialize
in the role of "holy man." The dichotomy here is a reflection
[171] of the structural differentiation, common to North Africa,
between sacred and secular tribes, or client and protector
tribes.

619 The Sa'adi-Marabit division in al-Qasr is defined
● 173 geographically, in name, and in Bedouin tradition and myth.
539 Here is the way in which the Marabit "holy man" of al-Qasr
conceives of the difference between the two types and its
origin:

> They are brothers and there is no difference. The Sa'adi is always one step in front of the Marabit, he handles things for the Marabit and helps him. In political matters the Sa'adi is more advanced . . . When the Marabit is in trouble, the Sa'adi will defend him. They are two different groups because the Sa'adi are from one mother. Once Sa'ada was riding in a caravan through the desert.

619
173
539 Her riding booth struck a tree and she found herself stranded there in the tree; her camel had gone and the rest of the caravan noticed nothing and continued on. Then a Marabit passed by and saw her there. He helped her down and they later married. She already had three sons to a former husband: Ali Ahmar, Ali Abyad and Sinaina. The Marabit also had children from another marriage. He was very rich and they could afford to live together. One day thieves began to harrass the man, but when the three Sa'adi sons offered him their help he told them not to bother with the thieves, that they would go away. But they did not, and they continued to harrass the man for a long time. The three sons were still very young at this time. When they grew up they asked the Marabit for arms and horses with which to fight off the thieves. They received them and succeeded in driving off the thieves. The Marabit was very happy and offered the three sons one-half of his wealth, and he was very rich. The sons refused this generous offer saying to the Marabit that they were no different from his other sons and would take only one-tenth of his wealth.

619 The differentiation between the Sa'adi and Marabit has structural consequences only in that it defines psychological types and tends to assign them to certain roles in society. By his [181] psychological make-up, the Marabit, who is weak and retiring, is unfit for the tasks which the Sa'adi undertakes, i.e., war, trade, and politics. It is, nevertheless, expected that the Marabit will act as a support mechanism for the secular operations of the Sa'adi. Usually, this support takes the form of financial contributions.

619
675 Each Marabit group is related through contractual agreement to a Sa'adi group. For instance, the Sulwatiyya lineage of al-Qasr are members of the Jumi'at tribe, a Marabit tribe; when identifying themselves they will say

*613 •173 That the secondary segment is as significant as the tertiary group seems to be indicated by the Bedouin tendency to mythologize the founder of the secondary group. For instance, Ma'fas is a nickname literally meaning "the big-footed one;" the Zagharat take their name from a man who used the zaghaariid ("shrill cry of joy" used by women) as his battle-cry; Abu Qarasa means "father of bread-loaf;" Sayyid Shraif was a very "noble" (shraif - "high-bred, noble") man. Along with each name there are a number of different myths to explain it: hence Ma'fas was a cattle thief who left large footprints in the mud so that all would know of his daring exploits; Abu Qarasa baked hugh loaves of bread to honor his in-laws when they visited him. On the other hand, there are no myths about
*613 178 founders of tertiary segments. Tertiary segments might, in the future, disappear from the Bedouins' genealogy, either because of death, barawwa, or secession, but the secondary group survives these events. It is the secondary segment, as we shall see in our discussion of law and sanctions, which is structurally important for the political community of the Awlad 'Ali.

*613 571 Because the secondary level is the more structurally important, seeing that the greater benefits of collective responsibility derive from it, the tertiary group surrenders part of its autonomy to it. The tertiary group does so in just the way that the individual member of any polity allows

619 [563] The name also includes various peasant groups and individuals who migrated from the Nile valley and who were incorporated into the tribal organization by a system of tribal adoption called "Iktitab." Most of these peasant groups came to the desert [701] to avoid military drafting by becoming part of Awlad Ali, who, until [554] 1947, were exempted from serving in the Egyptian army. Although groups and individuals thus adopted become part of the pedigrees of the adopting tribal segments and are supposed to enjoy equal status, yet, insofar as their origin is still remembered, they are looked down upon by the Sa'adi and occupy a position somewhere between that of Awlad Ali Sa'adi and that of the Murabiteen.

619 ●173 The Sa'adi tribes consider themselves to be the descendants of a certain Aqqar Ben Sa'ada or Aqqar El-Sherif, a descendant of Bani Suleim, who settled in Cyrenaica in the Fifth Century. Although they claim to [144] be of pure Arab ancestory, all sources agree that a considerable amount of mixture between Arab and indigenous Berber populations took place during the period they have been in North Africa.

[missing in copy provided --Analyst]



Fig. 1. The Sa'adi Tribes

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* The exact relationship of the Gemeiat tribe to the Sa'adi tribes is not exactly known. Many informants, as well as accounts of earlier travelers in the area, assert that descent from Hkadiga, a sister of Ali and Harb, and therefore are cousins of Awlad Ali. Others, especially members of Sa'adi tribes, themselves, deny any genealogical

619 Until two centuries ago Awlad Ali lived in eastern Cyrenaica.
173 After the death of Aqqar, his two sons, Ali (founder of Awlad Ali) and
Harb (founder of Harabi tribe on chart), competed for the leadership of
619 the tribe. This competition involved their respective tribes in a
173 bitter war which existed for more than fifty years. In one of the major
726 battles between the two tribal segments, the Harabi segment with help
[648] from the Caramanli rules of Tripoli were able to defeat Awlad Ali and
to drive them eastward across the Libyan-Egyptian borders into the
Egyptian Western Desert. This happened about 150 years ago. At that
time, the area was occupied by the Hanadi, a warlike cousin of Awlad
Ali, who had established a system of dominance over the Murabiteen
tribes who are believed to be the original inhabitants of the desert.
The area also was inhabited by the Gemeiat tribe, which, although believed to have Murabiteen status, yet were not treated as clients of
the powerful Hanadi, as were the other Murabiteen tribes in the area.
With the help from the Murabiteen, Awlad Ali were able to defeat the
Hanadi and to drive them eastward into the Nile Delta, where they
settle now as cultivators.

619 During the rule of Muhammad Ali (1815-1848), the warlike Awlad
175 Ali were frequently used by the government to subdue the tribal uprisings in the Delta and other parts of Egypt, and to hold the Mamlukes
648 in check. There was no organized army in Egypt at that time except for
a few remnants of the Turkish soldiers. The tribal population of
Awlad Ali agreed to supply Muhammad Ali with fighting men on the condition that they would be provided with food and arms and also exempted

---

[619] [173] connection to Gemeiat and insist that they are a Murabiteen tribe who acquired their relatively higher status through their assistance to Awlad Ali during their fight with the Harabi.

There is no paramount chief of the
121 tribe at the present time; yet, the unifying force is the recognition
619 by the group of the tribal law, the Daraieb, as a binding set of rules
671 [643] and as the regulator of behavior within the area. In these terms,
Awlad Ali are a clearly delimited group, and it is in terms of the
jurisdiction of these rules that Awlad Ali are treated as a unit for
administrative purposes by the Egyptian government. Viewed this
way, Awlad Ali will be defined as those who recognize and abide by
the Daraieb or the customary law. This includes the Murabiteen tribes
[563] as well as all those who became part of the tribal organization of
Awlad Ali by means of Iktitab. Since the territorial jurisdiction of
the Daraieb is limited to the Western Desert of Egypt, those groups
and individuals of Awlad Ali origin who have moved on a permanent basis
from the area will be excluded from the group. Groups and individuals
who live in the area but are not part of the tribal organization of
Awlad Ali are not subject to the Daraieb.

619 Awlad Ali of the Western Desert of Egypt are an offshoot of the
173 Cyrenaica tribes who in turn believe themselves to be the descendants
of a unique ancestress Sa'ada.


Syrenaica tribes
Sa'ad
Baraghuth
'Aggar
El-Saghir
Jibran
Harb
Ali
Tribe
Abiad
Ahmar
Senenah
Tribe
Awlad Kharouf
Awlad Mansur
El-Sanagrah
'Eila
El-'aggary
Gedeidah
Bu-Mutair
Bait ('Eila)
El-Asabei
Yousef
'afash
Helleis
Daghash
Bait
Semeida
Yunis
Makhum
Hussein

619 Awlad Ali themselves are divided into three major sections: Ahmar
● 173 (the Reds); Abiad (the Whites); and Senenah. Each of these sections is referred to as "tribe" and sometimes "tribes." The first two major sections, those of Ahmar or the Reds and Abiad (Whites), are named after their mothers, the wives of Ali (founder of Awlad Ali). The Whites are named after their white mother, and the Reds after their Sudanese mother who, owing to her dark complexion, was known as El-Hamra (the red one).

613 In the past, writers such as Robertson-Smith (1903) have inter-
114 preted the reference to female names in patrilineal genealogies as in-
551 dicating an earlier matrilineal descent. I tend to agree with a more
[595] recent writer, E. Peters (1959), who explains the reference to female ancestors by two factors: patrilineal descent and polygyny. According to him, it is a way of distinguishing full brothers from half brothers and a means to show this genealogically. "The concept of the 'one womb', of maternal origin, is a critical one in the context of social cohesion, but it does not deny patriliny; on the contrary, it serves a sense to enforce it. Female names can be used to show a greater notion of cohesion than the mere use of male names, and the significance of a female name . . . is that it is symbol of full brother unity at the highest political level." (p.29).

613 This can be further supported by evidence from my own data which
551 show that reference to female names occur more frequently in charts
173 where tribal names rather than proper names are used. In genealogies
619 using proper names, informants rarely, if ever, trace their descent to an ancestress. But when charts of tribal names are used, it is not

613 uncommon to find reference to female names. This indicates that it is
551 only when the unity of the full brothers becomes politically signifi-
173 cant that the name of the mother rather than the name of the father is
619 used. This may explain why the occurrence of female names in Awlad Ali
[595] genealogies is not as common as one might expect judging from the frequency of polygynous marriages among the group.


Awlad Mansur
Mutair
'aggary
Gedaidah
Bu-Zewah
El-Hafian
El-Marries
Suliman

Fig. 3. Recognized tribal segments of Awlad Mansur (a segment of Awlad Ali)


Mansur
Bu-Asabei
Bu-Mutair
'aggar
Muhammed
Bu-Zewah
Abdellah
Hussein (Hafian)
Muhammed
Suliman
Muhammed
Suliman

613 The two charts show the same unit of Awlad Mansour. The first of
619 the two charts shows the tribal segments in which Eilat Gedaida (a fe-
● 173
551 male name) appears as one of the segments. When the actual genealogical chart of one of the living members of that segment was drawn, descent was traced to Mohammed, the husband of Gedaida, as shown on the second chart. In this case Gedaida is not a member of Awald Mansour segment. The unity of the full brothers is emphasized without changing the affiliation of the segment. It is simply a means of carrying on the patriline using the mother's name. This is not always the case, however. Examination of other cases in which the female name was used reveals the fact that in certain instances using the female name is a means of carrying on the line of descent through a daughter. This meant incorporating within the tribal segment a whole group of individuals who otherwise
613 would have belonged to a different patriline. Carrying the line through
619 the daughter in this manner has the same result as adopting her husband
551 unto the tribe. The question then is why wasn't adoption used. Examin-
597 ation of the two cases in which this happened indicates that a possible explanation may be that this occurs whenever the husband is unadoptable. Adoption is possible whenever a man does not have any tribal affiliation.
613 In one of the two cases the husband belonged to the Gemei'at tribe, a
619 Murabiteen tribe which enjoys a relatively higher status than the
551 other Murabiteen tribes by virtue of their being the original settlers
597
554 of the area and helping the Awald Ali in their fight with the Hanadi, yet compared to Awlad Ali proper occupies an inferior position. In this case, relating to the patriline of the mother carried with it a

613 definite political advantage. In the second case in which the female
619 name was used, the husband was a member of the Bara'asa tribe of Libya.
551 Although this tribe is one the powerful tribes of Libya, it has no
597
554 political influence in the Egyptian Western Desert. Changing affiliation carried with it the strong political support of the mother's tribal segment.

619
131 In general the Reds occupy the western half of the coastal area of the Western Desert from the town of Matruh westward to the Libyan border, while the Whites occupy the eastern part which stretches to Alexandria. The Senenah are fairly scattered although their largest concentration is located in the extreme western part overlapping that of the Reds. The territorial division of the area among the three major sections of Awlad Ali is not a strict one. Historical evidence shows that there has been
[194] a considerable tribal displacement throughout the area. This displacement occurred mainly during the intratribal war era and during the Second World War when the area was a main battlefield. In general, however, there is a significant relationship between territorial distribution and tribal segmentation, and this is especially true on the higher levels of segmentation than on the lower ones.

619
613 Each of the three sections of the apex of a three-tiered order of segments which, following the native usage, will be called Kab[illegible]a (tribe), Eila (family), and Bait (house).

619
173 The first order referred to as tribes are structurally equivalent units but of highly variable size. Each of them has its traditional history. Some of these histories are important to the tribe as a whole.

619 Such traditions differentiate between these segments which otherwise
• [173] occupy an equivalent position in the formal system.

This level of segmentation has no particular political significance except that it is at this level that the client tribes of Murabiteen are attached. People in the area differentiate between Awlad Ali proper, who are called the Sa'adi, and the Murabiteen tribes. Murabiteen tribes occupy a special position which tends to complicate the formal analysis of the tribal organization of the Awlad Ali. The Murabiteen are a number of tribes of varying sizes and origin which are attached to the Sa'adi tribes as their vassals or clients. They exhibit the same principles of tribal organization as the Sa'adi tribes escept that they have no common origin similar to that of the latter groups.

619 The original division of the Murabiteen tribes among the Sa'adi was
173 made in the famous meeting at El-Haqfa in which the division of land was
also made and the Awlad Ali law was first enacted. The number of client
groups attached to each Sa'adi tribe reflects the relative prestige and
619 power of thatparticular tribe at the time of the meeting. Having a
173 relatively large number of client tribes meant, in addition to prestige of
651 the patron tribe, large financial support. Until half a century ago
this financial support was in the form of an obligatory tribute or
"sadaqa" which the client tribes had to pay. This tribute is no longer
[178] mandatory, but the client groups are still expected to present members
[431] of their patron tribes with gifts on occasions such as weddings, funerals
619 or feasts of the tribal saint. Large vassal groups also meant support in
fights. Although the client groups did not constitute part of the
vengeance group of their Sa'adi, when the Sa'adi tribe fought, their client

619 184 178 582 In recent years this has changed, however. The increased importance of wealth in the recently introduced money economy relaxed the endogamous tendency that was characteristic of the Sa'adi tribes.

619 184 In discussing the position of the Murabiteen tribes it is worth noting that not all the Murabiteen tribes in the area occupy the same position. Some enjoy relatively higher positions than the others. Actually, there are two kinds of Murabiteen in the area: Mustaqillen (independent Murabiteen); and the dependent Murabiteen. The latter are further subdivided into Murabiteen bil-baraka (with the blessing); and Murabiteen bil-sadaqa (with the tribute). The only independent Murabiteen in the area is the Gemei'at tribe. These are the original settlers
[173] of the area. Because of their help to Awlad Ali against the Hanadi, the latter were defeated and Awlad Ali were able to occupy the Western Desert. For their part the Gemei'at tribe was granted its independence by Awlad Ali and were given one-third of the total area as their homeland (watan).
619 184 778 682 In theory, the Gemei'at tribe occupies the same position and has the same rights as the Sa'adi tribes, including the right to offer their protection which is denied to all other client groups. In practice, however, this seems to be of no practical value. None of my informants could remember a single case in which a murderer has taken refuge at a segment
619 778 184 682 629 628 of the Gemei'at tribe. The importance of the nazala is not merely to be safe from the pursuit of the victim's group but rather to provide the mediators who undertake the crucial task of negotiation on behalf of the murderer and his gorup. It is the ability to settle the dispute on a permanent basis that offers the actual long-lasting protection, even after the time of the nazala expires. To be successful in his pursuit,

619 spond different social statuses. Some are classed as *Marabtin bil baraka*, 'client tribes with the blessing' or *Marabtin al-Fatha*, 619 'client tribes of the prayer', and they often claim to be Sharifs. 778 These 'sacred' tribes, such as the Aulad al-Shaikh and most of

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
TUNISIA
Tarabulis
Masallata
Al-Qal'a
AL-AMAMRA
Misurata
Al-Rujban
Al-Haraba
AL-HARABA
AL-RUJBAN
AL-MASHASHA
Mizda
Bani Walid
URFALLA
AULAD BUSAIF
Sirt
AL-QADHADHFA
Al-Naufiliya
Sinawin
Ghadamis
Darj
AL-ZINTAN
Al-Tabaqa
SULIMAN
AL-MAGHARBA
AL-ZAWIYA
AL-HARABA
AL-MAQARHA
RIYAH
AL-JAMAAT
Saukna
Hun
Waddan
Zalla
AULAD
Al-Fuqha
Birqin
AL-HUTMAN
AL-HASAUNA
Sabha
Tamassa
Ghudwa
Umm Al-Aranab
Zuwila
Murzuq
Taghaghan
Dlaim
Wau Al-Kabir
Wau Al-Namus
Ghath
Al-Qatrun
AL-HARABA → Names of Tribes
Al-Haraba → Sanusiya Zawiyas
Boundary Lines
Scale
0 50 100 150 200 400 kms.

The Chief Sanusi Bedouin Tribes of Tripolitania.

619 the Masamir and Farjan, live among the *Sa'adi* as equals in 778 virtue of the prestige they derive from their descent, or supposed descent, from saints, though the free tribes do not regard [173] them as quite like themselves. Their ancestors are almost invariably believed to have come from the west, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, or Tripolitania. This move of pious men to

the east began in the middle of the thirteenth century and has 619
lasted to the present day. It is intimately bound up with the 778
pilgrimage to the sacred towns of Islam. Round these pious [173] ●
men and round their tombs gathered for sanctuary the simple [788]
and oppressed, and from these and from the children of the
holy men have sprung the ***Marabtin bil baraka*** tribes. The other 619
client tribes have no sacred associations and are known as 651
Marabtin al-sadqan because they pay *sadaqa*, a fee, to a free
tribe for protection and for the privilege of using the earth and
water. Some small broken-up fragments of this category on the
plateau, such as the 'Awwama, Alauna, Hasanna, and some of
the Qat'an and Sa'it, even to-day have a very inferior social
position and are forced to make payments to, and to perform
services for, the free tribes among whom they live. Other 619
tribes of this second category live, as already mentioned, on
territory which is to all intents and purposes their own and have
long since ceased to pay a fee. This is especially the case to the
east, in 'Abaidat tribal territory, where such client tribes as the
Minifa, Qat'an, Taraki, and Huta live with independent status.
In the west also the Fawakhir and Zuwaya are too powerful and
warlike to accept overlordship. Also, the more nomadic groups
in Cyrenaica are mostly client tribes and, like all nomads, resent
any control or authority. Whatever the free tribes may say
about them, they regard themselves as independent.

The provenance of the *Sa'adi* tribes and of some of the 619
Marabtin tribes is shown together with the distribution of the 162
Sanusiya lodges on the map facing page 35, and the approximate
numbers of these tribes, and of a few others not shown on the
map, are listed below.

Sa'adi			
al-'Abaidat	30,450	al-Zuwaya	3,700
al-'Awaqir	27,500	al-Shwa'ir	3,400
al-Bara'asa	21,000	al-Fawakhir	3,300
al-Darsa	18,850	al-Sa'it	2,900
al-Magharba	13,000	al-Majabra	2,500
al-'Arafa	9,300	al-Minifa	2,500
al-'Abid	6,850	al-Masamir	2,400
al-Hasa	6,500	al-Awajila	2,300
'Ailat Fayid	100	Aulad al-Shaikh	1,650
		al-'Aqail	1,400
Marabtin		al-Shahaibat	1,350
		al-Sarahna	1,250
al-Qat'an	5,850	al-Qabail	1,150
al-'Awwama	3,800	al-Huta	1,150

[P.363]

EMRYS PETERS

18. *The Proliferation of Segments in the Lineage of the Bedouin of Cyrenaica [Libya]*[1]

121 In this article I do not propose to discuss the genealogies of the
128 Cyrenaican Bedouin in full, but only such aspects of them as are
strictly relevant to an understanding of their process of growth.
Many other aspects of these genealogies will be referred to, and
indeed, some of the arguments put forward will presume an acceptance of views which cannot be developed adequately in
this article. A fuller and more general account of Cyrenaican
genealogies is in preparation, and, until this is published, there
is no alternative to the somewhat dogmatic statements about
them which appear in the introductory part of this article.

174 The Bedouin of Cyrenaica claim that they are all descendants
613 of a unique ancestress, Sa'ada. Writers in the past (e.g.
551 Robertson-Smith 1903) have considered the occurrence of fe-
562 male names in patrilineal genealogies as evidence of an earlier
[173] and matrilineal mode of descent. A more satisfactory explanation of the occurrence of female names is to be found in the
combination of two facts: descent in the patriline, whether or

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128 Reprinted by permission of the author and the Council from the *Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute*, Vol. 90, pp. 29–53, 1960.

122 [1] My field work among the Cyrenaican Bedouin was made possible by an
award from the Emslie Horniman Fund and a later award from the Treasury
Committee for Studentships in Oriental Languages and Cultures. I wish here
121 to express my indebtedness to both committees for their generosity. Much of
the work I have done on genealogies was included in a thesis presented for
128 the degree of D.Phil. at Oxford University in 1951. The ideas included in
this thesis I developed more systematically in a course of lectures on the
Bedouin which I gave at Manchester University during the session 1953–54.
I subsequently read papers around the problems discussed in this paper at
128 Oxford and Cambridge Universities. I am grateful to Professor Gluckman for
reading this article in manuscript, and for the numerous discussions I have
had with him on problems relating to lineage organization.

174 not male names are used, is assumed; and secondly that the
613 Bedouin are polygamous. If, then, half-brother differentiation
551 or full sibling unity is to be shown genealogically, the obvious
562 way in which this can be done is to use a maternal name in the
genealogy. Thus, in the Cyrenaican genealogy, a number of
tribal groups will be shown as sons of a particular father. If dif-
182 ferentiation of these groups needs to be shown, this can be ef-
613 fected by clustering the groups round, say, two female names
551 (the names of the respective mothers) thereby making the two
562 clusters of groups stand in the relationship of paternal half
brothers. The concept of the 'one womb', of maternal origin, is a critical one in the context of social cohesion, but it does not deny patriliny; on the contrary, it serves in a sense to reinforce it. Female names can be used to show a greater notion of cohesion than the mere use of male names, and the significance of a female name placed at the apex of the Cyrenaican genealogy is that it is the symbol of full brother unity at the highest political level.

173 The founding ancestress Sa'ada is credited with two sons, who
613 in turn are considered to be the founding ancestors of the two
largest groups of tribes in Cyrenaica. Each of these sons is said
619 to have begottten two sons, as shown on the accompanying
genealogy. The next generation shows a total of nine names, and these nine ancestors are considered to be the founding ancestors of the nine noble tribes of Cyrenaica.[2] Continuing the line of descent of one of these tribes—the Magharba—the same pattern of segmentation repeats itself: the tribe is divided into two primary sections having ar-Ra'aid and ash-Shamakh as the respective founding ancestors. Ash-Shamakh is said to have had four sons, and these are the founding ancestors of four secondary sections. These latter four are credited with a varying number of sons, as shown in the genealogy (Fig. 18-1).

One feature of the Cyrenaican genealogy immediately stands out from this brief description: the uniformity in the number of segments at the various levels of segmentation. Along the line of descent from Sa'ada to Nasr, the number of sons shown in the

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[162] [2] One of these, the 'Ailat Fayid, now only numbers about 150 souls, and although it is given the structural position of a tribe in the genealogy, it scarcely merits this distinction in practice.

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
SA'ADA
(1)
BARAGHITH
'AQQARA
(2)
BARAGHUTH AL-SGHAIR
JIBARNA
HARABI
'ALI (In Egypt)
TRIBES
(3)
'ABID
'ARIF
'AWAQIR
MAGHARBA
DARSA
HASA
BARA'ASA
'AILAT FAYID
ABAIDAT
(4) PRIMARY
AL-RA'AIDAT
AULAD AL-SHAMAKH
(5) SECONDARY
'ALI
MANSUR
NASR
SUBH
(6) TERTIARY
13
8
4
4
MADHKUR
HAIBA
AL-DAWWAS
UMBARAKA

FIG. 18-1 GENEALOGY 1. The names given in this genealogy are the tribal names in use. All are derivatives of personal names of ancestors, like all tribal names, except for some nicknames (e.g. Baraghith means 'the fleas') and a few which refer to a general location (e.g. the Magharba means the 'Westerners'). [551]

first four descending generations is two. At the fifth level the 173
number increases to four and finally, at the sixth level there 613
characteristically occurs a marked irregularity in the number of 619
descendants forming the founding ancestors of the tertiary sections.

Another feature of the Cyrenaican genealogy is that its 613
branches show an intimate relationship with ecological areas. 619
Thus, the major division into two branches stemming from 13
Sa'ada represents the eastern and western halves of the country 182
with associated and clear differences in ecology. Continuing the line of descent, the Jibarna and Baraghith groups of tribes occupy plain and mountain foot-hills respectively. The two Jibarna tribes in turn occupy two distinct kinds of plain. Following now the division of the Magharba tribe, its two primary sections are divided by a very conspicuous dry valley. The four secondary divisions of the Aulad ash-Shamakh primary section likewise show a relation to ecological boundaries, albeit on a smaller scale than those previously referred to, but none the less important in this more local context. Finally, the unevenly numbered tertiary sections which are derived from these four

tion which enable the genealogy to remain constant in length 621 613
and fixed in form despite its dynamic content. 128

One of the main processes at work in foreshortening gene- 173
alogies is that referred to by Evans-Pritchard as telescoping.[8] 178
This process is also a characteristic feature of the Cyrenaican 613
genealogy, although its effects, to be discussed presently, differ 551
conspicuously. The way in which telescoping works in the Cyrenaican genealogy is that several male names come to be omitted in the genealogy below the name of the founding ancestor of the tertiary group. Usually, the form in which this occurs it that the name of a famous tribesman, and particularly his nickname if he has one, is retained along with the personal names of his lineal descendants in successive generations. The example given below is taken from the genealogy of the Haiba tertiary section of the Magharba tribe:



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[8] 'It is evident, moreover, that since the minimal lineage consists of four or five actual steps in ascent, there has been telescoping of the agnatic line from the founder of the minimal lineage further up the line of ascent to the founder of the clan, for the founder of the minimal lineage was himself the extremity of another minimal lineage which has, by increase in generations, become the minor lineage, and so on' (Fortes & Evans-Pritchard 1940, p.
199). Since Evans-Pritchard first wrote on the telescoping of genealogies [171]
among the Nuer, other anthropologists have discussed the process in various systems. Fortes, Richards, Laura Bohannan, Cunnison, and Mitchell in their writings on the Tallensi, Bemba, the Tiv, the Luapula people, and the Yao respectively are notable examples . . . As the mode of manipulation of Bedouin genealogies is marginal to my present problem, the main comparison is not with these works but with Evans-Pritchard's earlier work on the Nuer, because the Bedouin and Nuer lineage system have more in common than either have with the other systems, excepting possibly the Tiv.

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551
The line shows five male names in all. The eldest surviving members of this line is Sa'aid, who almost invariably is referred to, not by his personal name, but as Bu Shliby,[9] and on the infrequent occasions when his personal name is used it is followed by Bu Shliby and not by his father's name, which is the more common practice. Again, Abdul Qadar, when his father is not about, is called Bu Shliby, and when it is necessary to give him his personal name Bu Shliby is added, except among his more intimate family kindred, when only his personal name would be used. Likewise, his son Yunis carries Bu Shliby in addition to his personal name and is sometimes even referred to as Bu Shliby only. Abdul Qadar had never known his grandfather, was aware however of his existence in the past, but did not feel it necessary to use his name, and whatever obligation he might have felt to keep the memory of his grandfather alive, he fulfilled it when he named his son after him. Many of the older members of the group are also aware of the lineal connexions between Bu Shliby and Yunis, even though they use this knowledge in a genealogical context only, but many of the younger men of the group do not know these details. It is clear that when the boy Yunis grows to old age, three names in this line will have ceased to be used.

This practice of adding to a personal name the name of a deceased ancestor making one the son of the other, is pushed to the extent of carrying forward through the generations a nickname which referred to some peculiar characteristic of the ancestor, but which has little relation to the present bearer. Thus the ancestor whose name has been retained might have been nicknamed 'The Lame One' or 'The Squint-Eyed One' because he suffered either of these personal defects; or he might have been nicknamed 'The Old One' because he lived to a ripe old age. Such nicknames might later be carried by men who are not lame, nor squint-eyed, nor old, while the names of the intervening ancestors are dropped in normal use.

Another process is at work, which needs to be distinguished from telescoping, for although the results in genealogical terms are similar, Bedouin view it in quite a different light. This is the [553] process of fusing names. It is common practice among the Bed-

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[193]

[9] The prefix *Bu* is used by the Bedouin to mean 'son of.'

ouin—and, for that matter, Arabs in other lands—to name a boy 173
after a deceased relative. Rarely is a boy named after his father, 178
unless the father's death occurs before the boy is born, in which 613
circumstance, the new-born boy would certainly take his father's 551
name. A much more common form of this practice is to name a [553]
boy after his grandfather, assuming the latter to be dead. The eldest son usually accepts this responsibility, but it by no means falls invariably to him. There is a number of reasons for this, but they need not concern us here, since they are of no relevance to the general argument. What is of concern at present is that one name in the genealogy might represent the fusion of several other similar names. When circumstances permit, an individual's line might run as follows: Muhammad—'Ali—Muhammad—'Ali—Muhammad. It is true that the man himself and those closely related to him might know full well that there are three men named Muhammad and two named 'Ali, but it would not be considered irregular if only one Muhammad and one 'Ali were given in the genealogy. A mature man, giving his genealogy, omitted his father's name, Ibrahim. When asked about the omission, he insisted that he had given it, and when he was told that the name Ibrahim given by him was intended to refer to his young son, he impatiently dismissed the matter with the observation that having given the name Ibrahim once, it mattered little whether it had been put in the position of his son or father. Pointing to his son he added, 'There is my father, Ibrahim. He has taken my father's position, has he not?'

By the fusion of names, several persons drop out of the genealogy, and by and by, the line comes to be shortened. It also has the effect of giving a person's name a weighting which otherwise it would not possess. In a sense, a young son named after a father is not merely a son but a father and possibly a great-grandfather also. The young boy becomes the contemporary carrier of the personalities of those of similar name who have preceded him, while the behaviour of the living towards him is, in virtue of this, affected in a number of details. A man who had named his son in this way, explained the matter thus: 'He is my son, but also my father because he has his name. I cannot beat him for it would be like beating my father. When he grows up and I grow old, he will look after me as if I were his son.'

● 173 Fusion of names appears in another context and for similar
178 reasons. Not only are lineal descendants given the name of deceased
551 ancestors, but a man may be given the name of any deceased
613 agnate of his tertiary section. Usually, this is only done
428 when a man passes on property to another who is not his direct
[553] heir. Commonly, this occurs when an agnate is also a mother's
brother, as often happens as a result of parallel cousin marriage,
and this mother's brother has no sons of his own. If he has a
sister's son, who is also his paternal nephew, he is likely to pass
on his wealth to this nephew. A father, the Bedouin insist, ought
[183] to perform three duties for his sons: attend to their circumcision,
[593] and their education in the Koran, and provide bride-wealth when
[852] they marry. All fathers attend to the circumcision of all their sons;
[871] few provide for the Koranic education of any of their sons; most
bear the burden of marrying off at least one of their sons. The
[583] performance of the latter duty is what makes the continuance of the deceased's name an obligation, and whoever performs this duty must have his name perpetuated in one male offspring of the union which was brought about with his wealth. Wealth need not take the form of bride-wealth; it can be a legacy willed by a father, maternal uncle of the kind described above, or any other agnate who has died without male issue. Conversely, if a man dies without leaving any property, even his sons might not perpetuate his name, and eventually it will drop out of the genealogy.[10] There are instances of men inheriting the wealth of a number of agnates, using each parcel of wealth to make a new marriage and naming the sons of the various unions after the several dead who had left wealth. The example given below is taken from the genealogy of the Dawwas section of the Magharba tribe. What happened here was that the two lines stemming from Faraj and Sha'aban, after proliferating normally, became extinct. As this happened, Ibrahim, the son of Miftah, began to inherit wealth to which he was not a direct heir; and

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[588] [10] To avoid confusion, it ought to be made clear that this is not ghost marriage. As I understand ghost marriages from Evans-Pritchard's (1951) account, two main conditions must be satisfied: (i) that there should be inherited wealth to make a marriage, and (ii) that the wealth remaining after the ghost marriage has been made is inherited by the ghost children only. In Cyrenaica, wealth thus inherited becomes part of a man's total wealth and is not reserved for a ghost marriage and its issue.

as he did so, he entered into a plurality of marriages, begat sons, 173
and replaced those men in the genealogy who had died without 178
heirs. In the following generation the twin process of death and 551
replacement continued. Death removed all the male descendants 613
of Sha'aban and Faraj, and of Ibrahim Bu Miftah's many sons 428
only two, Sharif and Abdallah, were of age to marry at the time of my visits to their camp. Both had enjoyed a plurality of wives, although still young to have done so, and each marriage they contracted took place after the death of one of their kinsmen. The full and intricate details of this interesting genealogy are irrelevant here, since all the example is intended to show is how nine of eleven male names were perpetuated in the genealogy by repeating five of them twice and four of them three times, accounting in all for twenty-two names; and to do this, three men (one of them had died, but the other two were both under forty years of age) married eight wives. All the names in the two lines which have died out have not yet been brought back into the genealogy, but 'Abdallah, the son of Ibrahim, who had already done extremely well in this respect, was confident that soon the obligations towards Musa, Abd al-Rahim, and Sa'ad would be redeemed.

Thus the fusion of names not only ensures that names threatened with extinction are perpetuated, but that one person, in the name he bears, can carry the genealogical burden of several other men of that name.


SA'AID
MIFTAH
SHA'ABAN
FARAJ
IBRAHIM
IBRAHIM
SALIM
SA'AID
BU GHAWIYA
SHA'ABAN
'ABD AL RAHIM
MIFTAH
MUSA
SA'AD
FATALLAH
SHARIF
'ABDALLAH
MIFTAH
SALIM
ZAIDAN
SA'AD
SALAH
SHA'ABAN
SULAIMAN
MUHAMMAD
IBRAHIM
HAMAD
SA'AID
BU GHAWIYA
FARAJ
GHAITH
SALAH

[601]

FIG. 18-2 GENEALOGY 2. The names of dead men are underlined.

173 Telescoping of names, and fusion of names, taken together,
178 can account for the fixity of the genealogy to a large extent. In
551 addition, lines which showed every sign of normal development
613 at one time, have petered out completely, even after they have
sometimes assumed the status of tertiary segments. Conditions
173 under which this is likely to happen are not difficult to envisage.
178 If hearsay evidence is correct, disease, when it strikes in the
551 desert, might rage in a camp like wild fire, bringing death to
613 many, but not spreading to other camps, because the camps are
731 so far apart. Even in springtime when men and beasts are to-
361 gether in the pastures, and the larger summer camp has split into
four or five smaller ones, the distance between camps may still be
[221] a few miles. In summer, when camps are concentrated on the
large watering points, the distances between them are considera-
bly more. Disease, therefore, does not spread from camp to camp
as rapidly as one might expect in such primitive conditions of
living. In 1949 a number of men of a small camp died within a
[761] few days of each other. Bedouin opinion attributed these deaths
to an allegedly false oath sworn by the deceased a year earlier.
[784] Medical opinion ascribed them to filth in a well which the de-
ceased had been cleaning before their illness. In any event, a
173 thriving line of a lineage was wiped off the genealogy. The por-
tion of the Dawwas genealogy shown on this page shows a
178 similar process at work. Again, to give another example, the Nasr
613 section of the Magharba tribe once included six tertiary sections,
not four as are now given. Two of these six sections are now
represented by only four men of whom two are too old and decrepit to have heirs any longer, and are unmarried in any case; a third, whose wife has long passed child-bearing age, had two sons, but both died before marriage; and the fourth, a very poor and old man, has only one daughter, and is a widower. Three of the four now live with their collateral tribal section, Madhkur, and count themselves members of this group. That they once belonged to two different groups might have passed unnoticed were it not that two elders of the Madhkur section insisted that they should be correctly placed and their entire genealogies be recorded. The younger men argued that although they were aware that the two groups named Farjiani and al-Khadhar at one time

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existed, it was pointless giving them separate status any longer; they were content to give the three men separate lines of a few generations, and then to tag them on to Madhkur, the founding ancestor of the segment.



Telescoping, fusion of names, and the extinction of lines are three ways in which the general fixed shape of the genealogy is retained. These three processes are only sufficient, however, in special circumstances, but before discussing these circumstances one further general condition relating to these processes must be made explicit. All three affect the genealogy within the tertiary segments only, and do not affect it at any of the more superior orders of segmentation. There is not a shred of evidence from contemporary Cyrenaican genealogies to show that telescoping or fusion occurs except within the tertiary segment, within that group, in other words, where precise genealogical links are known and can be specified, and within that small group which for most part of the year constitutes a single settlement. It is possible that groups of structurally superior levels to the tertiary have become extinct, in the way that tertiary lines have petered out. There is no definite evidence to support this, and from the analysis of Cyrenaican genealogies in general it seems that when any group is threatened with extinction—and this in turn means that fewer and fewer people will be using the same land and water facilities—there is a definite tendency for the lineage rump to fuse with a collateral lineage (and in so doing fuse their resources with those of the adopting lineage), or for a numerically more powerful lineage group to take it over by force. The number of tertiary segments spanned by a secondary segment, therefore, increases or decreases according to the circumstances; so that a secondary segment, numerically strong in its tertiary segments to-day, may become considerably weaker in future, and the numerically weak secondary section of to-day may proliferate its segments substantially in the future. Short of a significant de-

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173 cline in the total population of a tribe, then, the extinction of
178 lines does not affect any order of segmentation superior to the
613 tertiary. In this respect, the Cyrenaican genealogy differs fundamentally
621 from those collected from the Nuer by Evans-Pritchard.
In the quotation from his work on Nuer genealogies (1951), he
[171] asserts that telescoping occurs 'from the founder of the minimal
lineage further up the line of ascent to the founder of the clan'.
This major difference has serious implications for any discussion
of lineage proliferation, but these must be left until the conditions
under which proliferation is likely to occur have been analysed.

178 While it is true that the processes discussed are of importance
613 in retaining the general shape of the genealogy, what is assumed
621 so far is that the Cyrenaican population has been stable over long
161 periods. Stability of population is not an unreasonable assumption
182 to make for a people who live on the margin of subsistence
[173] in a country where extended periods of drought are not infrequent,
[731] though seldom leading, it is true, to actual famine conditions,
but producing periodic and local food and water shortages.
Disease, following quickly in the trail of shortage, it can be assumed,
kept the relationship of total population to the natural
resources fairly constant. What evidence there is does not support
[726] even this very general assumption, since it is known that there
have been large-scale tribal wars in the past, and a certain
[167] amount of movement of tribes, some being displaced and others
pushed eastwards into Egypt. Unless these shifts were caused by
increases in the aggregate population and the consequent pressure
on land and water, it is difficult to account for them. This
consideration of possible overall increases in population in the
past poses interesting problems related to lineage structure which
cannot be adequately treated here. For the moment it is proposed
to neglect possible increases in the total population during past
periods in the history of Cyrenaica. The historical depth of the
view now to be discussed is about seventy years, and for this
period I have no evidence of any large-scale increases in population.
It is reasonable, therefore, to assume a general stability of
[132] population for this period. But the vagaries of the Cyrenaican
climate are such that, in a given year, one area might be well
drenched with rain, giving excellent pastures for animals and
good crops, while a nearby territorial strip might suffer a partial

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drought giving insufficient pastures and poor crops. Good or bad 613
crops, poor or abundant pasture, in turn mean a higher or lower 621
milk yield from the animals and better or worse living conditions 161
for human beings. Such factors as these may well, over a number 182
of years, lead to unevenness in the distribution of population [132]
throughout the tertiary sections. Whatever the cause, the genealogies
show that the population of the numerous tertiary sections [173]
is unequal. Some are numerically so weak that they have to
join a collateral section. Others are numerically so strong that
their natural resources are insufficient to meet the needs of all
their members. It was these latter segments which were in the
process of splitting, and which in some cases have already done [128]
so. The next task, then, is to demonstrate where, on the genealogy,
proliferation is effected.

We have seen that in Nuer genealogies segments proliferate at 173
all orders of segmentation. Here, the process is a continuous one, 171
beginning at any point in time within the minimal lineage and 613
progressing upwards to the apex of lineage bifurcation. As particular 551
names become significant within the minimal segment,
they are retained and become a permanent addition to the genealogy.
In order to include these successively additional names,
names of ascending ancestors are shunted further and further
into the genealogical past, until presumably the effect is felt at
the topmost limit of the genealogy, when the names here are
pushed out of the genealogical framework altogether, and forgotten
for ever. More than this, the upward shift in names at
each and every point in the genealogical line means also a consequent
re-ordering of structural relationships, at all levels in the
system. One vital difference between Nuer and Bedouin societies 173
which may partly, at least, account for the different genealogical 178
processes at work among them is that the Nuer, when they were 613
studied by Evans-Pritchard, were expanding territorially, and [171]
that continuous proliferation of segments throughout the structure
was the mode of dealing with a situation of expansion. The [648]
Bedouin, on the other hand, had suffered twenty years of terrible
privation at the hands of the Italians, during which period thousands
of them died in battle and in concentration camps, were
shot up in their camps from the air, or died from want, before I
went to live among them. Although I must confess that I now

173 178 613 551 114 Although I must confess that I now find it difficult to accept Evans-Pritchard's view of genealogical growth and development as stated for the Nuer, it was the view I originally held with regard to Bedouin genealogies. Indeed, thinking in genealogical terms only, it appears inevitable that the addition of successive generations can only mean the lengthening of the genealogy, or, if the length is to remain constant, extrusion of ancestral names must take place at the apex of the genealogy. If this view is to be accepted, several other conclusions must be accepted with it. The genealogy, as far as it goes at least, is an accurate record of descent–some names may have been lopped off at the top, but otherwise the genealogy represents a faithful statement of succession. Again, if successive generations are to be added to the genealogy, then its base must continually expand laterally. From what is known of contemporary Bedouin genealogies, there is no evidence which leads to the supposition that their base is progressively widening. With regard to the authenticity of the names in the genealogy, above the point of tertiary segmentation, I hope to show in a subsequent article on Bedouin genealogies in general, that names above the tertiary point of segmentation have remained fixed for very long periods of time, and that they bear slight relation to the passage of generations over the last century at least; moreover, in this article I hope to demonstrate that what manipulation of the genealogy takes place does not affect more than about four or five ascending generations from the living.

121 173 613 Part of the difficulty in a study of this sort lies in the strong temptation to think of the genealogy *per se*, even though it is readily admitted that it has a value in itself for the Bedouin. Yet even in these terms the genealogy must always represent an ordered grouping of people, and these people live on strips of territory. The starting point of the analysis then ought to begin with the territorial ordering of groups of people. The relation of groups of people to land, moreover, is determined by the carrying capacity of that land, and it is this prerequisite which is the main variable in discussing genealogical manipulation, and not the other way about. The main landmarks of the Cyrenaican ecology are fixed points which cannot be manipulated to fit in with the genealogy; it is the genealogy which must be altered to comprehend the distribution of people in their ecological setting. [182]

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If, moreover, the view of a genealogy as a continually expanding line of descent is to be accepted, it must be accepted also that large structural units, even in conditions of population stability, are to experience a continuous re-ordering of their structural relationships. In practice, what this means is that a tribe of, say 20,000 souls cease to be tribesmen of a named tribe and instead all become members of an almost identical group but with a different name. To take an example from the genealogy given [162] on page 365: the Magharba tribe shown there has a total population of some 13,000 souls. If proliferation affected the topmost limits of this tribe, the apical name disappears and presumably the name of one of the primary sections is to be substituted. That is, half the tribe would have to take on the lineage name of their opposed primary section. The only alternative to the use of the name of a primary segment as a substitute for the abandoned tribal name is the acceptance by 13,000 people of a totally new name, which is most unlikely.

It is reasonable to assume therefore, that the genealogy, in its general form, is fixed for long periods of time at least. This still leaves the problem of how and where adjustments are made to face the contingencies of birth and death, of the succession of generations, and of the irregular increases and decreases of population among the tertiary segments. An important clue lies in the number of segments which appear at the various orders of segmentation. From Sa'ada, the founding ancestress, in the line which runs to Nasr, each ancestor is shown as having a pair of sons for four orders of segmentation. At the fifth generation from Sa'ada—this is now the secondary order of segmentation within the tribe—the number of sons increases to four. Not all tribes will show the same number of sons at each generation as the Magharba—some, for example, might show three instead of two at the primary order—but what is true of all tribes is that there is evident consistency in the number down to and including the fifth generation from Sa'ada; if, that is to say, one of a tribe's primary segments is divided into three secondary sections, the other one or two, as the case may be, will be divided likewise. Throughout the tribes in Cyrenaica, then, segmentation of orders superior to the tertiary segments shows a pronounced consistency in their numbers.

stretching across to the village of Ajadabiya in the east, topples 613
in undulations away into the flat expanses of the desert to the 619
south. At all these points of segmentation, the territories occupied 621
by the various sections are large and roughly defined, and 133
the population aggregates supported on these territories run from 182
over a thousand at one end to tens of thousands at the upper 131
limits. The tertiary sections are numerically much smaller, some of them numbering as few as a hundred souls in all, and the territories to which they are attached are correspondingly smaller. The relationship between the numbers in this order of section, and the precise amount of water available in the local wells is an intimate one. If the population of one of these groups increases, or if the number of animals rises, or if the springs show a decline in the volume of water they give forth, or if the winter rainfall has allowed the storage in wells of only a small quantity of water, a rearrangement of the group must be effected. A significant alteration of any one of these components must mean that the local group must split to enable a new adjustment to be made in the relationship of man and animals to water.

Whatever changes occur within groups of any size, since the 173
genealogy embraces the entire population, these must appear on 178
the genealogy in some way or other. Now a genealogy is as rigid 829
a framework, as fixed and final a pattern of grouping, as can be 613
imagined. The impression that they are thus rigid and fixed, except 551
for the addition of successive generations, is strengthened by the way in which the Bedouin use them. From their young boys to their old men, the Bedouin are expert genealogists, and the names of ancestors, for one reason or another, are never far
from their lips. Names are kept alive by constant use, since all [571]
references to inter-group relationships must be in terms of these
names. More than this, the Bedouin were proud to the point of 173
boastfulness of their genealogical knowledge, and, wherever I 829
travelled, the first request I had to comply with was to take down 613
a large portion of a tribal genealogy. In recording their endless 551
genealogies, one feature about them came to assume increasing 123
interest; while there was remarkable unanimity with regard to 126
most of the names given, there was one point of marked ambiguity—at the tertiary level of segmentation. I recorded genealogies in four tribes on an extensive scale, and in each tribe

•173 829 613 551 123 126 ambiguity surrounding the actual names and their correct position occurred at about the fifth ascending generation. Whenever this point was reached in the recordings, arguments would flare up over the names to be included or excluded and over the relation of these names to those above and below, with the result that for several people of the same segment there would be several versions of a genealogy which differed only at this one point. An example of this sort is given below from the genealogy of the Nasr section, which shows seven different versions of the arrangement of ancestors round about the fifth ascending generation from the living.

173 829 613 551 The confusion at and around the fifth ascending generation appeared with such regularity in the genealogies that I feel justified in referring to it as 'the area of ambiguity'. It seems likely, moreover, that in any society where the lineage structure is closely tied to the territorial disposition of groups, since the genealogy is so rigid, there needs to be in it somewhere an area of ambiguity if it is to be related to reality. Without this ambiguity, the form of the genealogy is too rigid to comprehend changes which occur. This point in the genealogy came to assume critical significance as the point where adjustments in it are made. Other kinds of evidence point to the same conclusion.

[601]


(1)
NASR*
UMBARAKA
MADHKUR
HAIBA
UMBARAKA
SA'AID
SA'AID
SA'AD
(3)
(6)
HAIBA
MADHKUR
MUMEN
HASAIN
HASAN
MUMAN
BIN NASR
MADHKUR
HAIBA
MADHKUR
HAIBA
(4)
(7)
HAIBA
MADHKUR
UMBARAKA
SA'AD
(2)
MUMEN
UMBARAKA
MADHKUR
HAIBA

FIG. 18-3 GENEALOGY 3. *There is another section, al-Dawwas, which belongs to this group, but to include this as well would greatly complicate the issue without giving any additional information.

There are, in Cyrenaica, three major status groups among the 619
tribes: the noble or free-born tribesmen (*al-Hurr*), those who 554
have been adopted or grafted on to a tribe (the *Laff*), and the 608
clients (*Marabtin*).

Those who claim to be free-born also claim ownership of the 619
natural resources. The *Laff* do not own these. They are people 608
thought not to have originally been of the lineage of the tribe 621
with which they are resident. They are found sometimes in ones 613
and twos in the camps of the free-born, but sometimes constitut- [423]
ing tertiary groups themselves. Now when such people have re-
sided with their free-born hosts for several years and one of them 619
has married one of the host's daughters, they are grafted to the 608
genealogy at the point of tertiary segmentation, that is, where 613
ambiguity occurs in the genealogy. Obviously, persons thus 621
grafted to the lineage cannot be shown as descendants of one 173
of the living or of the recently dead, remembered perhaps by
some of the elders still living. It is equally true to say that they
cannot be grafted to the lineage at a point superior to that of
the tertiary segments, since this would involve recognition by a
number of tertiary groups whose members may know little or
nothing about them. When a person enters a new tribe, the only
way in which he can do so is to go to live in a camp, and it is the
concern of the people of that particular camp whether or not they
accept him, since it is they who have to decide whether their
resources are sufficient to support a newcomer. Once a man has
been accepted as a full member of a tertiary section, membership
of superior tribal sections is automatic, although to enter into
tribal membership he requires the permission of members of a
tertiary section only. To graft at a point superior to the tertiary
would be the same as giving a man superior structural status, but
without a camp in which to dwell. There is only one place for
his incorporation, and that is where the ambiguity in the gene-
alogy permits manipulation to include new lines. In this way the [597]
adoption of a person into a lineage does not offend the sense of
kinship of the receiving group since the point of inclusion is an
ancestor about whom little or nothing is known and whose au-
thenticity is frequently doubted by some. What has been referred
to as an area of ambiguity is, moreover, something of a jumble of
names, and it is not a difficult matter, if a new line has to be

619 attached somewhere along the line, to attach it to one of these
608 names. Bedouin welcome, as members of their camps, practically
613 anyone who wishes to join, even, in the case of one group, an
621 Italian. The limit to this acceptance of members is, of course, the
173 number of people who can be supported by the local resources.
If people are being admitted freely to membership of a particular
[182] camp, this means that there is a local surplus of land and water,
so that the number of grafts being supported by any particular
section is a useful index of the extent to which the resources are
being used. Conversely, as sometimes happens when grafted elements become numerous, or when the water supply, for various
reasons, dwindles, it may be necessary to detach a grafted group.
[578] Such action is always the occasion of a violent dispute, usually
over watering rights, and not infrequently fights break out.
Whether or not the grafted group wins, from then onwards it will
be forced to exist as an independent group, and a new tertiary
section will have been born. No matter which of the processes
involving grafts is considered—incorporation or detachment—both are contained within the framework of the tertiary section,
without any effect on the rest of the structure.

619 The position of the clients, in the context of this discussion, is
not unlike that of the grafts. Briefly, clients are men who are con-
[423] sidered to have originated from a country other than Cyrenaica,
and who for this reason cannot claim rights to land and water—at least this is the theory, although in some circumstances they
are able to do so successfully. They are of various kinds, but they
are not included in the genealogies given by the free-born. [illegible]ents are found grouped in two main ways. There are some large
groups which constitute tribes in the sense that they display a
genealogical and territorial organization like those of the free-born, and are usually to be found flanking the main tribes of the
country on their borders. Some of these are powerful groups and
enjoy considerable independence of action, but whatever their
characteristics they none the less speak of themselves as 'for' or
tied to the noble tribe whose territory includes theirs. Further,
619 the sections of these client tribes have their special ties with
571 tertiary sections of the noble tribes, which are not merely ties of
621 sentiment, but which take the form of valuable mutual help in a
613 number of situations. A whole client tribe, in the sense that it is

619 change their structural position only rarely. The latter change
621 sometimes does, however, occur, and there is evidence to show
182 that it does. For example, Agostini (1922–23, p. 323) in his tribal
166 survey, records a section named Barsha as one of the groups stem-
613 ming from Nasr.[12] In the genealogies I was given, the name did
not appear, and even after some questioning, what information
was known about it was concealed. Some time later the name
[578] cropped up accidentally in conversation, and I was then told that
at one time it had been one of the Nasr groups, but that after a
quarrel during a year of water shortage, the Barsha folk went
to live with people with whom they had maternal connexions,
and in whose territory there was ample water that year, and
never returned. The group, a tertiary one, was detached from the
tertiary point of segmentation in the genealogies, and tied on to
a tertiary group of another tribe in its new homeland.

178 To summarize briefly the argument thus far, the mechanical
173 devices of telescoping, fusion of names, the ejection of those
619 names which cease to be of any social consequence, and the
621 elision of names at or around the fifth ascending generation,
613 taken together point to the importance of the tertiary order of
segmentation in discussing the problem of maintaining the form
of the genealogy constant in face of its natural tendency to alter;
further, evidence of changes (adoption into a lineage, detachment from it, the inclusion and exclusion of clients) was presented, and this again led to the conclusion that the tertiary point
of segmentation is critical in this respect. This being so, the man-
[128] ner in which change actually occurs, still remains to be shown,
and this is best done, perhaps, by discussing the mode of proliferation of tertiary segments. In order to do this adequately, it
is necessary to say something briefly about certain features of
Bedouin marriage.

582 Among the Bedouin there exists a preferential form of marriage
605 between a man and his father's brother's daughter. Parallel
cousin marriage of this sort carries with it the exclusive right of
a man to this cousin. Without his consent no one else can marry
her, and to attempt to do so would be to risk the marriage arrangements being nullified after negotiations had almost been

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[114] [12] Barsha's position is incorrectly given as a sub-group of Haiba; it should be shown as structurally equivalent to Haiba. See also note 11.

the interests they have in their maternal relatives. Stated thus 613
sharply, this is a distortion of the process. To speak of the prin- 602
ciple of agnation conflicting with the principle of cognation or 121
maternal origin is nonsense, as the facts included in the discussion show. Agnation is not one thing, but many. Within its scope are included such aspects of social organization as succession, status, inheritance, bride-wealth, blood-money, modes of domestic and political behaviour, and so forth; and each of these aspects, the closer we stick to reality, can be broken up into a number of components. The same can be said of cognation and maternal origin. All these principles, so called, are clusters of numerous component parts, which combine, in reality, in a kaleidoscopic number of ways. In one situation a component of one combines with that of another to strengthen it; in a different situation the one component may repel the other; in a third situation, a number of the components in one will combine to exclude those of the other, and so on. If, therefore, an understanding of the way in which lineage proliferation occurs is sought, a view of the process as a conflict between the principle of agnation and the opposing pull of maternal origin is quite erroneous. It is of use in predicting the direction of cleavage to know that within a tertiary group there are also clusters of kin which are defined roughly by maternal links, and this knowledge serves as a rough and ready guide in predicting what the composition of groups, after they have split away from the parent group, will be. If a more precise picture of this composition is desired, other and more complex kinship links and the behaviour which accompanies them must be taken into account. If a still more accurate picture is desired, details of inheritance disputes, debts of bride-wealth, the size of flocks and herds, and the like, must also be taken into consideration. If, finally, one has the opportunity to study groups after they have proliferated, the presence or absence of this or that man can often be explained only in terms of his eye for a pretty girl or a personal preference for neighbours.

The kind of change which has been discussed in this essay is [178]
not difficult to negotiate in genealogical terms. Earlier it was
stressed that within the tertiary tribal sections, although they [621]
are always predominantly agnatic groups, clusters of cognatic [173]
[551]

613 kin also exist. Two ways of naming these clusters are adopted—
602 all groups, whether they are elementary families, an odd assort-
121 ment of kindred sharing a common tent for reasons of expedi-
178 ency, or tribal groups, have a name. Sometimes these clusters are
621 named after a prominent living male, or a deceased kinsman of
173 the same kind. Sometimes these little groups are named after a
woman, perhaps the grandmother of the group.[15] Thus a small
551 group of two or three tents will be distinguished from another similar cluster within the camp, and so on for a number of groups, depending on the size of the camp. Most camps, however many tents they contain, have names for progressively inclusive clusters of tents until a twofold named division is reached. Tertiary segments that are forced to split contain therefore two groups with names already attached to them. When a split occurs, the name of the tertiary segment is pushed into the area of ambiguity and the names of what were previously two clusters become the names of two new tertiary segments, with a minimum adjustment in usage and a minor re-shuffle at the tertiary level of segmentation. Names cannot continue to be pushed into this area of the genealogy interminably, otherwise it would gradually expand into a vast pool of names. For a few generations the name dispensed with in this way becomes one of those ancestors about whom there is argument when genealogies are given. In the course of time, name after name is subjected to the process of elision and eventually will cease to be of concern to anyone.

105 I now summarize the main points of the discussion. The evi-
613 dence that has been examined suggests that the mechanical de-
vices of telescoping, fusion of names, and extinction of lines do
173 not affect orders of segmentation superior to that of the tertiary
178 order, and that in conditions of a completely stable population,
[551] these devices alone would suffice to retain the form of the genealogical structure. But, it was argued, conditions of complete stability cannot be assumed; the evidence of the present distribution of population among the numerous tertiary groups clearly points to marked fluctuations occurring within these small groups. This being so, proliferation of these groups in some areas at some

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[15] The naming of groups within a tertiary segment is an interesting study in itself, but it would be outside the limits of this discussion to make more than a brief mention of it.

times, must follow, and conversely, while proliferation takes 105
place here, combination will be taking place elsewhere as the 613
population of groups decreases. The condition which compels 173
proliferation is the alteration in the relationship of man and animals to the natural resources; and when this alteration builds up to an acute pressure on water and land, one group of a divided segment must move off to seek water elsewhere. 178

The next task was to demonstrate where this kind of change occurred on the genealogy. The sudden irregularity in the number of segments at the tertiary order, compared with the uniformity at others, provided a clue. Other evidence also pointed to this as a significant order in this context: there is ambiguity displayed with regard to the identity and positioning of ancestors here; members adopted into a lineage are grafted on to it here; clients are attached to tertiary sections; groups of noblemen, when they are detached and move off to another tribe, break away at this point. This is where change occurs, but, it was agreed, in understanding the way in which it takes place, certain forms of marriage have to be taken into account. Particular emphasis was placed on cross-cousin marriage with the mother's brother's daughter, and to women outside the tertiary segment, since the effect of these forms of marriage is to produce two or more clusters of cognatic kindred in camps largely composed of agnates, and to emphasize the line of cleavage in a lineage segment. So that when, therefore, a split occurs, the line it takes is predetermined. Proliferation, even when necessary, does not finally come about, however, until an occasion permits the separation of groups to be demonstrated by a violation of the conditions of membership of a group. Details of three such occasions were offered: the demand for blood-money between agnates who previously had constituted a politically undivided section; behaviour contrary to the demands of agnatic kinship in attendance and gift-giving at funerals; and failure to participate in a pilgrimage to the saint's tomb of a particular section. But another query [551)
remained: how are the newly formed groups named? It was seen that names already in daily use by the small group of people concerned came to assume a new significance, while the name which had previously spanned them all is disregarded and pushed into the area of ambiguity whence later it is elided altogether.

105 Change due to the normal and inevitable process of proliferation
613 is thus managed within the structural limits of the tertiary section
173 without disturbing any of the superior orders in the system. The
178 latter remain fixed over long periods, but the tertiary sections of
a particular secondary action may be reduced in number over a few generations while another secondary section may show a corresponding increase in the number of its segments.

121 By combining the various factors involved in change, it is pos-
178 sible to understand the details of lineage proliferation, or at least
to travel along a well signposted road. In the light of this analy-
613 sis, moreover, it is unnecessary to assume a stable population in
161 each and every segment over long periods; the mechanisms of
readjustment allow for substantial irregularities and fluctuations in population. It is possible that they are also sufficient to contain significant increases in the aggregate population. They could almost certainly control minor fluctuations, but it is seriously doubted whether a population increase sufficient to produce a country-wide and acute water shortage could be met merely by the proliferation of tertiary lineage segments. But to deal with this problem other aspects of the Bedouin genealogy and details of Cyrenaican history, which have necessarily been omitted from this discussion, would have to be taken into account, and this is best left for another article.

121 celebrated war between the 'Abaidat and the Bara 'asa tribes occupying a large part
619 of central and eastern Cyrenaica. This war took place a hundred years ago, so that the
682 evidence is mainly hearsay, but it is significant that when asked for details of the
726 groups taking part the Bedouin make it clear that the entire tribes were not at war—
● [173] some sections on both sides are said to have remained on friendly terms. Yet when
121 wars are discussed in a general fashion, the Bedouin insist that tribes confront each
619 other as such. If it is pointed out to them that men might be ranged against their
726 maternal relatives the Bedouin mumble apologetically that they would not kill their
maternal relatives—a lame argument since in the heat of battle men cannot make this
602 kind of discrimination. Details of other wars also illustrate the point that only parts
of tribes face each other in strife, for though the stories of past events may be inaccurate
there is genealogical evidence to substantiate their claims that certain groups
were linked in the past, and in any case their statements assert that where these links
exist they are not prepared to engage in hostilities. The several parts of each tribe,
121 like the parts of primary and secondary sections, have as many different sorts of
619 relationships as there are groups, and the general statement that tribes are warring
571 units merely obscures the interest there is in their relationships. Tribes, further, lack
the leadership to make war. I repeat that leadership does exist, but not even the
121 greatest leaders, past or present, can rightly be described as leaders of their tribes,
619 using the term in its structural connotation. Literature on the subject gives the
613 impression that there are tribal leaders, because successive administrations have used
554 the tribes and their divisions as a framework for attempting to rule the Bedouin, but
the details of the power domains of individual leaders make it clear that they have
little to do with the ordered divisions of tribes. A leader within part of one tribe may
carry with him tertiary sections of another tribe, and if major hostilities break out
between parts of these tribes, the sections of both which are joined as allies and
related as kinsfolk will not fight against each other, for sections so linked enjoy
stronger connexions than the structurally linked tertiary sections of a very large
[682] secondary section. Consequently the statement that homicide results in tribal war
[114] when the offender and his victim are members of two separate tribes is not merely
incomplete, not merely a simplification, it is wrong.

121 A point which has been implicit throughout the second part of this paper needs
613 now to be made quite explicit: groups do not come together in their respective
structural genealogical orders. During my entire residence in Cyrenaica I did not
571 see a group of agnates larger than a tertiary tribal section assemble for any purpose.
[114] It is true that the occasions when large groups are required to assemble are infrequent.
[648] It is also true that although the British Administration was serving a caretaker role
only, it may have had an affect on the nature of tribal gatherings. Despite this qualification,
there were several occasions when I expected tribal groups to assemble in
lineage order if the fusion of sections in relation to like sections has any meaning in
practice. Large groups of men did gather to dispute claims to wells, to argue about
rights to ploughland, and to make peace. In every case that I recorded the agnatically
closest groups of the main participants were absent, while members of genealogically
more remote groups were present in strength. This statement applies to gatherings
[628] in the camps and in the administrative centres. One of the biggest gatherings I
witnessed assembled in an administrative office in a village near the coast in the

121 sections constituting the combinations which makes the facts of feud intelligible. 613 Furthermore, several different types of power structures exist which serve the different [571] interests of the people composing them, and these are interlinked in combinations [578] of superior span. But the formation of these structures and the modes in which they combine are quite unlike the articulations in a lineage system. Characteristically, the segments in a lineage system are conceived of as building up hierarchically to span what is spoken of as a total society, the apex of the system affording a spectacular and fixed definition of its boundaries. Had I been using this concept in this paper the [173] founding ancestress of the nine Cyrenaican tribes, Sa'ada as named by the Bedouin, would have served this purpose and would have been given inappropriate prominence. 121 The views presented here have the consequences of retreating from a concept 184 of a total society. The people to whom the facts given are related are the camel-herding tribes only. 233 Some of them have relations of many kinds with the cow-herding folk who inhabit the northern plateau area, and these relations are also significant 619 for the analysis of a wide range of problems; genealogically both cow and camel herders are seen as part of a single structure, but the differences between them with regard to their economy, the size, composition, and distribution of their residential units, their political and ritual life is so great that to conceive of them as a single social 121 structure is not useful. Moreover, the far western tribal sections have relationships 619 of such urgency with their neighbours in Tripolitania (who are excluded from Cyrenaican genealogies) that to cut off these relationships as lying outside Cyrenaican society would be quite unwarranted. The same can be said of the relationships of the tribal sections in the eastern part of Cyrenaica with their genealogical cousins, the Aulad 'Ali of Egypt, who, although residing across a national border, are closely linked to some of the Cyrenaican Bedouin. Some tribes also have to rely on the people of the southern oases for an item of diet and an outlet for surplus wool, and the net of kinship is spread out to include them. [177] In these cases they come into contact with other ethnic groups such as Berbers and Tibu, and through the oases they extend their lines of communication southwards to Wadai, Chad, and Bornu. As an indication of the effectiveness of these links, it is only necessary to add that people inhabiting Cyrenaica make periodic and regular visits to these far southern places, and that in 1948 a shaikh, living near Ajadabiya in south-western Cyrenaica, collected blood-money contributions from kinsmen in Wadai. A single structure cannot possibly include, for analytical purposes, these sorts of relationships.

121 Finally, it must be stressed that the facts given here refer to the period 1948 to 114 1950. Since then oil has been discovered in large quantities near the territory of a [315] tribe where I spent most of my time while resident in the country, and where there was one tin shack in 1950 there is now a modern port with roads extending southwards from it into the wilderness. I see no reason to assume that social relations as I observed them are present today or that they were the same at any time in the past 175 either. Before the advent of the Sanusi Order in the early eighteen-forties, it is known 795 that one lineage at least was dominantly powerful and that its leader tyrannized a 613 large part of Central Cyrenaica.[1] His descendants constituted a powerful group in

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[1] Smith and Porcher, 1864. These two archaeologists met this leader and continued their archaeological researches around Cirene only with his goodwill, although the site is not on the territory of his tribe as I knew it in 1950. They also speak of him as inhabiting a castle which also lies outside the

619 The independent Sa'adi tribes fall into four groups :

1. The Jawazi, Fawayid, and Rammah, all of common origin with the 'Awaqir of Cyrenaica.
2. The Harabi and Bar'asa, both of common origin with the 'Ibeidat of Cyrenaica.
3. The Hanadi, and
4. The Awlad 'Ali

[173] The original ancestor whom these Sa'adi all claim is one Abu Dib, said to be of Suleim descent.

175 554 619 This sheikh was a real personage and a contemporary of Ibn Khaldun (who died in A.D. 1406). He was sheikh of the Beni Ja'afir, and a man of great importance in Barka, the very place that the four tribes inhabited for centuries before they came to Egypt. Also the period of fifteen or sixteen generations, which the modern Bedouin assert to separate them from Abu Dib, agrees with this chronology well enough.[1]

619. [173] Some are found to assert that their title of Sa'adi "helping" is derived from an ancestress called Sa'ada, the wife of Abu Dib, or, according to a hostile account, of a Jew called Yana. But the real explanation of the term has already been given above.

619. 651 At the present day a sort of feudal system prevails both in Egypt and Cyrenaica, by which families are *mrabit*,[2] or vassal families, not tribes to tribes ; thus the Qat'an tribe of Murabitin is divided, one part vassal to a family of Awlad 'Ali el-Ahmar, another to the Sinaqra, and a third to the Sinana. For a tribute called "alms", which by hereditary obligation each Mrabit family must pay, the Sa'adi family to which it is attached is bound to afford the Mrabit family protection in all minor difficulties of life, such as robbery by another family of Sa'adi, etc.

Thus a "Mrabit" family by paying tribute can herd its flocks in peace, calling upon the Sa'adi to see that justice is done them, but they are bound to join the Sa'adi to fight with them in any serious conflict with other tribes.

Among the "Mrabit" tribes of the present day are the Jumei'at, Qat'an, and Awlad Suleiman, all claiming as common ancestor one Ka'b, and feudal relations are

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[1] The pedigrees of which these Western Bedouin are so proud can only be trusted so far back as the individual whose name a subdivision has adopted, such as Kharûf in the Awlad Kharûf pedigree. Taking them separately, the pedigrees will be found to dovetail into each other up to that point, but beyond it things become problematical.

[2] Sing. of "Murabitin".

maintained to this day in the desert between the last two 619
and the Sa'adi, though they are relaxed in the cultivation. 651

The Jumei'at, who used to be "Murabitin" to the
Beni 'Una, are now nominally so to the Awlad 'Ali, but are
not required to pay tribute. Other tribes, such as the 619
Jawabis and 'Awarma, are in an intermediate stage between
the Sa'adi and the Murabitin. The Awlad 'Abd es-Sallam,
the Samalus ed-Diminat, and perhaps the Fawakhir, call [778]
themselves "Murabitin bil Baraka", a priestly caste which,
in Tripoli, used to receive special privileges from the
Turkish Government.

Though the Sa'adi tribes despise the Murabitin as serfs, [186]
they respect them for their piety and resort to them for
the writing of charms.

While the Murabitin tribes generally may be suspected to contain more Libyan blood than the Sa'adi, there are other tribes such as the 'Amayim, the Jahama, and the Tarhuna, who have come to Egypt from further west than any of the above, and who seem to be quite definitely "Berber", though, of course, none of them will admit it. These are known euphemistically as 'Arab el-Gharb.

Even some of the Juheina, settled east of the Nile in Sharqiya, are scorned by Klippel as "d'origine berbère, se pretendant section d'une tribu d'Arabie".[1]

Awlad 'Ali.—This tribe, by far the most important of [131]
the Western Bedouin, occupies with its vassals the whole
north coast of Egypt from Salum to Alexandria. Like the 619
others, they claim descent from the Beni Suleim, alleging
their ancestor 'Ali, son of 'Aqar, to be a grandson of that 173
Dib, or Abu Dib, mentioned by Ibn Khaldun. Their enemies, however, allege that he was a Jew. "When the 'Arabs occupied the north coast of Africa, there was a notable, a Jew, who owned property at Saqiet el-Hamra in Morocco. This man welcomed and entertained the Arab sheikh Ez-Zanati. He became very popular with the sheikh, who gave him his daughter named Sa'ada, on condition that he embraced Islam before the marriage contract was made out."[2] Another version calls the Jew Yana, and says that he had two daughters. Of these Sa'ada was the

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[1] E. Klippel, "Etudes sur le folklore Bédouin de l'Egypte," *Bull. Soc. Khédiv. de Géogr.*, vii, 10, Cairo, 1911. [113]

[2] From information collected by Muhammad Bey Wasfi.

619 ancestress of the Awlad ‘Ali and Hind of the Hanadi. (The
173 Hanadi call their ancestress Hind, the daughter of Sallam.)
These obvious fabrications only mean that their conventional genealogy is not believed outside the tribe. But the Awlad ‘Ali themselves all agree that ‘Ali was the son of ‘Aqar bin Dib.

175 They are now a composite tribe made up of the descendants
of ‘Ali's three sons, and various fragments of broken tribes.
619 The Awlad ‘Ali lived for a long time in the "Green Mountain"
of Cyrenaica, and about 150 years ago began to drift eastwards, called into Egypt by the Jumei‘at to aid them against the Hanadi, who, with their subtribes, were then in possession not only of the north coast but were also settled all over the Beheira.

175 After the departure of the French in 1801, a firman was
619 addressed to the sheikhs of the Hanadi, Afrad (a division
of the Awlad ‘Ali), Jumei‘at, Beni ‘Una, and other Arabs
648 resident in Beheira, confirming them in their territories, but
threatening them with expulsion and fine if they misbehaved themselves.[1]

By 1808, the Hanadi seem to have been quite driven out by the Awlad ‘Ali, for in that year they bought their peace with Muhammad ‘Ali and asked for the restitution of their lands in Beheira. The Pasha agreed to this and sent troops under Shahin Bey to chase the Awlad ‘Ali out again. The Awlad ‘Ali responded by offering 100,000 "tallaris" to be allowed to remain in the lands of the Hanadi—an offer which Muhammad ‘Ali accepted. When they failed to pay up, troops were again sent to aid the Hanadi against them, but this combined force was completely defeated by the Awlad ‘Ali near Hosh ‘Isa.[2]

Of the events of 1810, Jabarti says:

> "During his stay at Alexandria, he (Muhammad Ali) gave safe conduct to the chiefs of the Bedouins of the tribe of Awlad Ali who lived in the province of Beheira, and by this ruse enticed them to him; but hardly had they arrived than he had them arrested, claimed large sums from them, and sent his soldiers to carry off their cattle; their wives and their children were dishonoured. He then gave them robes of honour."[3]

Finally he exiled the Hanadi to Sharqiya, then a desert, and gave the Awlad ‘Ali their lands on the coast and in Beheira.

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[1] Jabarti, vii, 78–80.

[2] Jabarti, viii, 171 and 179–180.

[3] Jabarti, viii, 300.

436 of thinking in money, and they reckon blood-money in cash
178 (£300) and not in camels, as Bedouin should.

484 The more adventurous make, annually, long and waterless
245 journeys to the oases of Siwa and Bahariya to remove the date crop, and, after their own wants are provided for, a good profit usually results from the sale of the remainder.

181 An Egyptian critic, who should know them only too well,[1] calls them "haughty, independent, and untrustworthy in character. They are dull and so abnormally lazy that they have no desire whatever to do more than they learnt (when young)". But he puts this down to the nature of the country; less generous critics ascribe the nature of the country to them!

● 173 Besides the descendants from 'Ali's three sons, 'Ali el-
619 Abyad, 'Ali el-Ahmar, and Sineina, a large section called Sinaqra reckons its descent from Sinqir, a mysterious white man who was wrecked and washed up on the coast near Salum some time in the seventeenth century.[2] These are the true Awlad 'Ali, whose sections live mingled together in the most intricate fashion. Among them live also the Jumei'at, who invited them into the country, and various families of other *murabitin*, such as Qat'an, Awlad Suleiman, Hawara, Habun, etc.
619 To distinguish themselves from their vassals, the Awlad 'Ali call themselves *hurr* free, and the *murabitin* are divided into various grades, according as they pay tribute or not.

The Awlad 'Ali are divided into three main divisions, with section (*badanat*) and subsections (*'eilat*) as follows. Some of these are so numerous that they practically constitute fresh tribes of their own.

I. AWLAD KHARUF

[173] These are the descendants of 'Ali el-Abyad ("The White"), the eldest son of 'Ali bin 'Aqar bin Dib, and are subdivided again into:

	Section.	*Subsections.*
(1)	'Eilet Bu Hindi	'Eilet Bu Zayyana, 'Eilet Bahiya, 'Eilet Da'ud
(2)	'Eilet Bu Diya	'Eilet Ibrahim, 'Eilet Jereisat
(3)	Awlad Mansur	El-Afrad, El-Tawa'il, 'Eilet 'Abd Allah

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[1] Muhammad Bey Wasfi, for many years Inspector at Borg el-'Arab.

[2] Their sheikh told Hamilton in 1853, there were seven generations between him and Sinqir.

(Sinaqra)

The Sinaqra, or descendants of Sinqir, are also reckoned among the descendants of Ali the White, "because Sinqir married his daughter Khadija." They include :— 619 173●

(4)	Afrad	Maghawra
(5)	Azayim	'Eilet el-Abdi, Muwamna
(6)	'Eilet Eleura	'Eilet Jeballa, 'Eilet Omar, 'Eilet Harun, 'Eilet Ajarma, 'Eilet Tahir.

II.

The descendants of 'Ali bin 'Aqar's second son, 'Ali el-Ahmar (" The Red ") are:—

(1)	'Esheibat	'Eilet ed-Dawi, 'Eilet el-Azraq, El-Wassafa, 'El-Lazumi
(2)	Kimeilat	'Eilet el-Hajj Muhammad, El-Maharsa, 'El-Khadayij
(3)	Jineishat[1]	'Eilet el-Majduba, Es-Samayil, Tabak

III. Sinana

The Sinana are the descendants of Sineina, the third son of Ali bin 'Aqar bin Dib. They include:—

(1)	Mahafid	'Eilet Etman, 'Eilet el-Hammama, 'Eilet esh-Shimla
(2)	Arawa	'Eilet ez-Zireiriya, 'Eilet el-Ghazulat
(3)	Qatifa	'Eilet Nasralla, 'Eilet-Omar, Esh-Shawalha.
(4)	Ijna	

Jawabis.—The nomadic Jawabis (sing. Jibusi) are for the most part still settled in and around the Wadi Natrun, where General Andreossy found them in Napoleon's time. He calls them : 619 175 [131]

> " A hospitable tribe who lead a shepherd's life and encamp there every winter with their flocks. They are employed during this time carrying Natrun and prickly reeds ; they also have some traffic in dates, which they fetch in caravans from Sioua in the Ammonian Oasis ; it is a journey of twelve to fifteen days. These Arabs are *marabouths*, or peaceful people."[2]

He goes on to say they never make war, and only take up arms to defend themselves. In his time the tribe was composed of about 2,000 men, and possessed 60 horses. A little [162] [231] [162]

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[1] Kennett gives the three subdivisions of the Jineishat as Madi, Samayil, and Jabr.

[2] *Memoirs Relative to Egypt*, 288.

619 [175] later Wilkinson estimated them at about 400 men near El
[162] Terrana and the Wadi Natrun.

At the present day they are still reckoned *Murabitin*, but,
like the Jumei'at, are sufficiently independent not to have to
[439] pay tribute. They share with the Awlad 'Ali in the date
traffic with Bahariya Oasis, where the produce of the village
of Mandisha is reserved for them, and that from Bawitti
for the Awlad 'Ali.

619 Kennett notes (p. 54) that they demand £400 for blood-
682 money instead of £300, the usual price in the Western
181 Desert, and alludes (p. 67) to :

> "The free and easy way in which the Gawabees tribe near the Wadi Natrun pack up their summer tents and leave them in situ while they themselves trek off with their winter tents into the open desert for the winter grazing is indicative of this code of honesty prevailing among them."

142 On page 101, he calls them "nearly all very small men,
619 with strangely similar features and characteristics running
through all the families of the tribe".

619 Bramly has collected three pedigrees of the tribe all
173 going back to Sheikh 'Abd el-Jawad el-Kassar. They state
that they are an offshoot from the Qadadfa, and about
500 years ago left Saqiet el-Hamra in Morocco to settle
in Egypt.

As a reward for "settling some affairs in the Wadi Natrun", Muhammad 'Ali Pasha granted them the usual Bedouin privilege of exemption from military service. There are small colonies of them elsewhere among the Awlad Ali, while others are settled in the cultivated provinces of Giza, Beheira, Menufiya, and Gharbiya.

Jumei'at.—This tribe, possibly a remnant of the original Libyan inhabitants of Mariut, is of quite respectable antiquity, for Ibn Khaldun includes the Jumei'at as a subtribe of "Beni 'Ali", themselves an offshoot from Beni Suleim. Whether his "Beni 'Ali" are the same as the modern Awlad 'Ali may be questioned, yet it is a reasonable assumption, for the exchange of the words "Beni" and "Awlad" in tribal names can be paralleled elsewhere.

The Jumei'at all agree that their remote ancestor, whom they share with the Awlad Suleiman and the Qat'an, was called Ka'b, and a Ka'b indeed appears in the pedigree ascribed

to Dib by Ibn Khaldun, who calls Dib a descendant of 619
Ka'b, the great-grandson of Suleim.[1] If this be true, the 173
Jumei'at must be an elder branch than any of the Sa'adi tribes, among whom the Awlad 'Ali are included. But in actual fact, the Awlad 'Ali do not consider the Jumei'at as of Sa'adi origin, that is, descendants of Abu Dib and his wife Sa'ada, but despise them as Murabitin or vassals, though they pay no tribute.

All this may be interpreted to mean that they are among the oldest inhabitants of Western Egypt. They have been in Egypt "seven hundred years" according to one of their sheikhs, Sa'ad Bey el-Masri, and a pedigree given me by another, Sheikh 'Ilwani Suleiman, who lives near Sidi 'Abd el-Rahman, runs :



The Jumei'at of Mariut are all descended from El-Ashtar, while the offspring of the other five sons are settled in Beheira, Gharbiya, and at Ramla near Alexandria.

It is, of course, possible that their eponymous ancestor, 619
Jumei'a, was an Arab of Beni Suleim descent, who returned to 173
Egypt from the "Green Mountain", soon after the Beni Suleim 174
invasion, and whose descendants became Murabitin by forming themselves into a religious community. But such religious fervour is not a Bedouin characteristic, but smacks rather of the fanaticism of the recently-converted, so I suspect the Jumei'at, in spite of their descent from Ka'b, to be mainly a remnant of the earlier Libyan population of the coast.

Prior to the arrival of the Awlad 'Ali, they were "Mrabit" 619
to the Beni 'Una, and engaged in constant conflict with the 175
Hanadi. Upon the rout and annihilation of the Beni 'Una, 726
the Jumei'at were stirred up to revolt against the Hanadi 792
by one of their holy men called Baqush. Outraged by their

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[1] The more ignorant Awlad Suleiman have forgotten Ka'b's paternity, and confused him with the famous Arab poet Ka'b ibn Zuheir. See p. 287 for their version. And yet another Jumei'i version gives as their ancestor the Saint Ka'b el Ahbar.

[2] The "Friends" of the Prophet.

619 oppression, he gathered his people and delivered a fiery
175 denunciation of his religion, during which he smashed his
726 rosary into pieces and mixed it with his horse's fodder;
792 Baqush then invited their kinsmen (?) the Awlad 'Ali, to come over from the "Green Mountain" and help them. To entice the Awlad 'Ali, he is said to have sent them samples of salt desert water and Nile water sweetened with sugar to illustrate the difference between the hardships of the desert and the comforts of the Rif.[1]

619 As recounted earlier, the Awlad 'Ali completely routed the
175 Hanadi and their allies, and drove them from the desert.
726 In the division of the conquered territory, the Jumei'at received a third, and, although they were still considered Murabitin, were released from the payment of tribute. They
[131] now live intermingled with the free sections of the Awlad 'Ali, all along the north coast of Egypt, and are numerous in Beheira, especially near Abu Hummus.

619 *Samalus.*—The Samalus are found scattered among the
[131] Awlad 'Ali on the northern coast and stranded among many of the Egyptian provinces. They once possessed a head sheikh Abu Sala at Minya, and colonies are recorded from Faiyum, Beheira, Menufiya, Gharbiya, and Sharqiya. An
[175] old paper from the Recruiting Department gives from
[162] seventeen villages in the Faiyum 775 mounted Samalus
[231] and 1,400 on foot, possessing 1,760 camels and 11,400 sheep. Two important groups of wells, both called "Sawani
[312] es-Samalus" exist on the north coast, one about 50 kilometres east of Salum, and the other 20 kilometres south of Dhab'a.

• [173] They say they came to Egypt, 400 strong, about 200 years ago, from the Wadi Samalus in the Jebel Akhdar, and their ancestor twelve generations ago was Nasr el-Hasani, of course an "Arab from Beni Suleim".

[175] In the *Description de l'Egypte*, P. D. Martin relates how
[726] in 1800 the Samalus of Faiyum were raided by a party of Ferjan, 200 strong, from Beheira.

619 *Shiheibat.*—These are a "Mrabit" tribe from the west with
186 an unenviable reputation, living near the Wadi Natrun. Sayed Idris, the former Senussi leader, says of them: "Most

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[1] Dumreicher, 16. This is probably the "Sheik Abdall Gawyal Bagooshi" who wrote to Sir Sydney Smith in March, 1801, warning him of the approach of the French from Damanhur. Wilson, *History of the British Expedition in Egypt*, 371. (Rif = cultivated area.)

*613 178 578 •[194] office in modern Bedouin society. Also, we will return to the processes of fission and fusion when we discuss Bedouin law. I will be able to show through the use of legal documents how one tertiary unit went through a process of fission, fusion and re-fusion with its secondary unit.

The capacity for fusion and fission is a result of a number of structural situations. First of all, it is the exercise of choice on the part of the tertiary segment members who have contracted alliance in the form of collective responsibility with other tertiary segments of the lineage. The choice to break off from the major group may be of two kinds: a severence of political ties with one group in favor of a new group or the natural process of segmentation as a response to ecological conditions. In the latter case, no new political alliances are formed, and it usually involves a married son going off to begin his own camp. It is only an expansion of the major or secondary group. But the former case is one of decimation: the secondary group contracts. In both cases, authority is exercised, either between father and son, or, between heads of corporate groups. *613 578 177 178 In al-Qasr, the capacity for either type of fission is limited by the political environment of the Egyptian nation-state, the highest level of authority which the Bedouin encounters. The classic functioning of the segmentary lineage system is, in the case of al-Qasr, being changed by extra-system factors. The

*613 of lineage segmentation, ties based upon any of the structural principles may obtain, but they are not ritually legitimated by the principle of blood responsibility. A functional corporate group cannot be defined beyond the secondary level. The Bedouins of al-Qasr make an explicit distinction between a group which is _'asaba_ and one which is not. The term _'asaba_ derives from the verb, "to bind," and is translated as "paternal relations" or "agnates." The tertiary and secondary segments are considered to be _'asaba_. Only these segments can be represented by an _'aqila_.

[666] *613 196 •174 682 The _'aqila_, the focus of authority in the corporate tertiary group, is an elected head. The concept of _'aqila_ is itself an expression which entails mutual support and collective responsibility: the concept of _'aqila_ is equivalent to that of corporate group. Wehr (1961) translates the word _'aqila_ as "a clan committed by unwritten law of the Bedouins to pay bloodwite for each of its members." In pre-Islamic Arabia, the _'aqila_ must have been "the juristic personality" (Weber 1954:157). In early Islamic Arabia, we know the penal codes of the ancient schools of law came to differentiate between the offender (i.e. the individual) and the _'aqila_ (i.e. the group) concerning the payment of blood-money. During Umayyad times, the _'aqila_ was the group listed on the _diwaan_ (account books), and was considered a tribal grouping of some order which was responsible for paying the _diiya_

*613 (Schacht 1953:207).

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•174
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So, in pre-Islamic Arabia and later, the _'aqila_ and not the culprit was responsible for payment of the _diya_ or for retaliation. And the _'aqila_, which means every single corporate member, risked its life in the face of retaliation from without. According to Islamic law, only the killer may be retaliated upon. But in pre-Islamic Arabia and in al-Qasr, any member of the killer's corporate group may be revenged upon. The Bedouins say that revenge should be taken upon the best man of the family, for this will cause the most damage. Both the legal schools of Madina (Maliki) and Kufa recognized the principle of self-help, or collective responsibility, for payment or retaliation in cases of homicide and wounding. And, according to Coulson (1964:49), "they both called the group which shoulders the burden the _'aqila_."

*613

The _'aqila_ in al-Qasr, which is an uncentralized system, is a corporate sole and a political office. It functions both in internal domestic (i.e. within the tertiary segment) authority relations, and at the level of external authority relations. The _'aqila_ is a symbol of his corporation and, as such, speaks for its members in matters of social regulation and the enforcement of political decisions growing out of conflict situations. [591] Political order in al-Qasr depends upon the values inculcated and the type of authority exercised within the corporate group (Southall 1956:27). The model of

613 definite political advantage. In the second case in which the female
619 name was used, the husband was a member of the Bara'asa tribe of Libya.
551 Although this tribe is one the powerful tribes of Libya, it has no
597 554 political influence in the Egyptian Western Desert. Changing affiliation carried with it the strong political support of the mother's tribal segment.

619 In general the Reds occupy the western half of the coastal area of
131 the Western Desert from the town of Matruh westward to the Libyan border, while the Whites occupy the eastern part which stretches to Alexandria. The Senenah are fairly scattered although their largest concentration is located in the extreme western part overlapping that of the Reds. The territorial division of the area among the three major sections of Awlad Ali is not a strict one. Historical evidence shows that there has been
● [174] a considerable tribal displacement throughout the area. This displacement occurred mainly during the intratribal war era and during the Second World War when the area was a main battlefield. In general, however, there is a significant relationship between territorial distribution and tribal segmentation, and this is especially true on the higher levels of segmentation than on the lower ones.

619 Each of the three sections of the apex of a three-tiered order of
613 segments which, following the native usage, will be called Kabila (tribe), Eila (family), and Bait (house).

619 The first order referred to as tribes are structurally equivalent
173 units but of highly variable size. Each of them has its traditional history. Some of these histories are important to the tribe as a whole.

619 the negotiator has to have behind him the full weight of his tribal se-
778 gment. Since the origin of the Gemei'at tribe as a Murabiteen tribe is
184 well known, any negotiator has to rely almost entirely upon his own skill
682 to affect any settlement; even if he is able to affect such a settlement,
627 there is no guarantee that it will be permanent.
628

619 The Murabiteen bil-baraka and Murabiteen bil-sadaqa occupy the same
792 position as vassal groups. The only difference between the two is that the first, the religious men, are much more respected than the latter. They are feared by the other tribes because of the belief that they have direct contact with the religious and spiritual world and can harm those who dare to offend them in one way or another. Because of this factor
[627] and of their neutral position with regard to the rest of the tribes, they
[628] play an important role in mediation and dispute settlement.

619 The origin of inferiority of the Murabiteen tribes in general is
184 hard to account for. Kenneth (1925) believes that hundreds of years ago
● 174 the Murabiteen were essentially the holymen. They learned to read and
792 write the Qoraan and grouped themselves around the "zawias' which were the centers of learning and religion. While indulging in their religious practices their flocks ere grazed miles away in the open desert under the charge of the Sa'adi shepherds, who originally were the poor paid workers of the Murabiteen. These shepherds, living out in the open, were busy fighting away the raiders attempting to steal their flocks. As time passed the Sa'adi shepherds became not only tough fighters but also wealthy. This latter end was achieved partly as a result of successful raids on neighboring tribes. Later when the Sa'adi planned a large raid, they entrusted their flocks to the Murabiteen, who by that time had become dependent upon the Sa'adi for their protection from the raids of other tribes.

619 The picture was reversed then with the poor Sa'adi shepherds becoming
184 the masters, acquiring great wealth and prestige because of their fight-
174 792 ing ability, and the holymen becoming the shepherds and clients of the
[651] Sa'adi fighters. In the old inter-tribal wars, the Murabiteen stood a
very limited chance so the Sa'adi tribes adopted them and in return for a yearly tribure guaranteed theprotection of the Murabiteen from external aggression.

As time passed, the main difference between the Sa'adi and Murabiteen tended to diminish. One or two outstanding Murabiteen tribes fought their own battles without seeking the protection of the Sa'adi and remained independent, while a few others rose up and fought on with the protector against a common foe (the case of the Gemei'at tribe is an example) and in return were emancipated from the stigma of serfdom and accepted by the Sa'adi as almost equals. Other Murabiteen tribes remained attached to their Sa'adi protector as client groups.

Ibn Khaldoun also saw the inferiority of the Murabiteen tribes as stemming from a mode of tribal relations adapted to inter-tribal warfare (1845).

613 The Eila

The Eila represents the next level of tribal segmentation among the Awlad Ali. The Eila is the most important political unit. Although the Eila lacks any formally recognized leadership, its importance stems from the fact that it constitutes the vengeance group or Ámar El-Dam (unity of
613 the blood). This means that it bears a corporate responsibility for the
672 actions of its members. Anyone of its members can be killed in vengence
682 for a homocide committed by any other, and the duty of revenge for any

[P.363]

EMRYS PETERS

18. *The Proliferation of Segments in the Lineage of the Bedouin of Cyrenaica* [*Libya*][1]

121 In this article I do not propose to discuss the genealogies of the
128 Cyrenaican Bedouin in full, but only such aspects of them as are strictly relevant to an understanding of their process of growth. Many other aspects of these genealogies will be referred to, and indeed, some of the arguments put forward will presume an acceptance of views which cannot be developed adequately in this article. A fuller and more general account of Cyrenaican genealogies is in preparation, and, until this is published, there is no alternative to the somewhat dogmatic statements about them which appear in the introductory part of this article.

174 The Bedouin of Cyrenaica claim that they are all descendants
613 of a unique ancestress, Sa'ada. Writers in the past (e.g.
551 Robertson-Smith 1903) have considered the occurrence of fe-
562 male names in patrilineal genealogies as evidence of an earlier
[173] and matrilineal mode of descent. A more satisfactory explanation of the occurrence of female names is to be found in the combination of two facts: descent in the patriline, whether or

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[1] My field work among the Cyrenaican Bedouin was made possible by an
122 award from the Emslie Horniman Fund and a later award from the Treasury Committee for Studentships in Oriental Languages and Cultures. I wish here
121 to express my indebtedness to both committees for their generosity. Much of the work I have done on genealogies was included in a thesis presented for
128 the degree of D.Phil. at Oxford University in 1951. The ideas included in this thesis I developed more systematically in a course of lectures on the Bedouin which I gave at Manchester University during the session 1953–54. I subsequently read papers around the problems discussed in this paper at
128 Oxford and Cambridge Universities. I am grateful to Professor Gluckman for reading this article in manuscript, and for the numerous discussions I have had with him on problems relating to lineage organization.

174 not male names are used, is assumed; and secondly that the
613 Bedouin are polygamous. If, then, half-brother differentiation
551 or full sibling unity is to be shown genealogically, the obvious
562 way in which this can be done is to use a maternal name in the genealogy. Thus, in the Cyrenaican genealogy, a number of tribal groups will be shown as sons of a particular father. If dif-
182 ferentiation of these groups needs to be shown, this can be ef-
613 fected by clustering the groups round, say, two female names
551 (the names of the respective mothers) thereby making the two
562 clusters of groups stand in the relationship of paternal half brothers. The concept of the 'one womb', of maternal origin, is a critical one in the context of social cohesion, but it does not deny patriliny; on the contrary, it serves in a sense to reinforce it. Female names can be used to show a greater notion of cohesion than the mere use of male names, and the significance of a female name placed at the apex of the Cyrenaican genealogy is that it is the symbol of full brother unity at the highest political level.

173 The founding ancestress Sa'ada is credited with two sons, who
613 in turn are considered to be the founding ancestors of the two
619 largest groups of tribes in Cyrenaica. Each of these sons is said to have begottten two sons, as shown on the accompanying genealogy. The next generation shows a total of nine names, and these nine ancestors are considered to be the founding ancestors of the nine noble tribes of Cyrenaica.[2] Continuing the line of descent of one of these tribes—the Magharba—the same pattern of segmentation repeats itself: the tribe is divided into two primary sections having ar-Ra'aid and ash-Shamakh as the respective founding ancestors. Ash-Shamakh is said to have had four sons, and these are the founding ancestors of four secondary sections. These latter four are credited with a varying number of sons, as shown in the genealogy (Fig. 18-1).

One feature of the Cyrenaican genealogy immediately stands out from this brief description: the uniformity in the number of segments at the various levels of segmentation. Along the line of descent from Sa'ada to Nasr, the number of sons shown in the

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[162] [2] One of these, the 'Ailat Fayid, now only numbers about 150 souls, and although it is given the structural position of a tribe in the genealogy, it scarcely merits this distinction in practice.

582 of agnation on the members of a corporate group and give it a taproot of
583 diversity whence it derives its strength, and which makes of it "the one body,"
613 conspicuous, in comparison with other societies, as the corporate group
602 *par excellence*.

The Sister's Son-Mother's Brother Relationship

128 Previously the mode of relationships associated with agnation and affinity have been briefly discussed. In order to appreciate the effects of parallel-cousin marriage, some remarks concerning the sister's son-mother's brother
604 set of relationships must be included here. Bedouin contrast the mother's
[174] brother with the father's brother; their sayings and proverbs afford a wealth of verbal documentation on the contrast. With the mother's brother a man enjoys all the freedoms he is denied in his relationships with his father
[831] and father's brother. He is permitted to joke with him; they indulge in exchanges of obscenities. When the sister's son wishes to marry, he is permitted to discuss the matter with his mother's brother and can urge him to intercede with his father on his behalf. Two men thus related are readily recognised in the camps, because in their acts they are required to show affection by displays of innocent horseplay, pranks or mild practical jokes. Small boys pursue their mother's brother, feign to kick or strike him, and he takes it all in good part.

The external aspects of this behaviour is deceptive. Joking of this sort creates the image in which the relationships are conceived; what is equally striking in it is its compulsiveness. Obviously, mature men are not always in the mood to be teased, but if they are, they must respond appropriately. Their relationships are unmistakably onerous. This remark applies not only to the external forms of their behaviour, but also to the favours a man is
[602] permitted to ask of his mother's brother. A brief amplification will make the point clear. Demands can be made of agnates, but only in situations of serious contingency. Day-to-day needs are met, not by appeals to the rights of agnation, but from the expectations linked to the mother's brother. If these expectations are withheld, the sister's son may be left in a quandary. In-
604 terestingly, in the records of homicides I gathered, three (in the con-
682 temporary population) were concerned with the killings of mother's brothers by sister's sons. Homicide within this field of relationship is difficult to comprehend unless it is appreciated that expectations are as compulsive in the daily life and the general well-being of people as are the rights and duties associated with agnation.

604 These general remarks apply to the relationships irrespective of the lineage
613 origin of the mother's brother. The similarity ends there, since the nature of the expectations, their urgency at any given moment and the kind of favours which are granted vary with the group identity of the mother's
[428] brother. A mother's brother who is a member of ego's corporate group may be expected to give the sister's son small quantities of flour, favour him in all

to Dib by Ibn Khaldun, who calls Dib a descendant of 619
Ka'b, the great-grandson of Suleim.[1] If this be true, the 173
Jumei'at must be an elder branch than any of the Sa'adi tribes,
among whom the Awlad 'Ali are included. But in actual
fact, the Awlad 'Ali do not consider the Jumei'at as of Sa'adi
origin, that is, descendants of Abu Dib and his wife Sa'ada,
but despise them as Murabitin or vassals, though they pay
no tribute.

All this may be interpreted to mean that they are among the oldest inhabitants of Western Egypt. They have been in Egypt "seven hundred years" according to one of their sheikhs, Sa'ad Bey el-Masri, and a pedigree given me by another, Sheikh 'Ilwani Suleiman, who lives near Sidi 'Abd el-Rahman, runs :



The Jumei'at of Mariut are all descended from El-Ashtar, while the offspring of the other five sons are settled in Beheira, Gharbiya, and at Ramla near Alexandria.

It is, of course, possible that their eponymous ancestor, 619
Jumei'a, was an Arab of Beni Suleim descent, who returned to 173
Egypt from the "Green Mountain", soon after the Beni Suleim 174 •
invasion, and whose descendants became Murabitin by forming
themselves into a religious community. But such religious
fervour is not a Bedouin characteristic, but smacks rather of
the fanaticism of the recently-converted, so I suspect the
Jumei'at, in spite of their descent from Ka'b, to be mainly a
remnant of the earlier Libyan population of the coast.

Prior to the arrival of the Awlad 'Ali, they were "Mrabit" 619
to the Beni 'Una, and engaged in constant conflict with the 175
Hanadi. Upon the rout and annihilation of the Beni 'Una, 726
the Jumei'at were stirred up to revolt against the Hanadi 792
by one of their holy men called Baqush. Outraged by their

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[1] The more ignorant Awlad Suleiman have forgotten Ka'b's paternity, and confused him with the famous Arab poet Ka'b ibn Zuheir. See p. 287 for their version. And yet another Jumei'i version gives as their ancestor the Saint Ka'b el Ahbar.

[2] The "Friends" of the Prophet.

CHAPTER I

THE BEDOUINS OF AL-QASR: PAST AND PRESENT

General Historical Background

121 No full historical account of events leading up to the present study is intended here. Only a fragment of history, a backdrop to the discussion of al-Qasr Bedouin society is offered. The account is an effort to trace, historically, the arrival of the Bedouin into the Egyptian Western Desert.

175 167 During the Arab conquest of Egypt in 639 A.D., tribesmen made only a few forays into Upper Egypt. But these sojourns represent the first intrusion of the Bedouin strain into this part of the world and were the vanguard of a force which would conquer all of North Africa. The Bedouin tribesmen of the Arab army found the pastures of Upper Egypt similar to their traditional habitat in Arabia, and certain trible segments settled in the area.

175 In 647 A.D., Muslim troops under the command of Ibn abu-Sarh pushed across the Western Desert as far as Tripoli in present-day Libya. This was an expeditionary force, and not until about 670 did permanent Arab occupation come to Libya. Historical sources are vague about the nature of the relationship between the Arabs and the Berbers of the newly

175 conquered lands. Generally, the Berbers fought assimilation and change when and where they could, just as they had in their confrontations with the Greeks and Romans. But as the Arabs took more and more of the "sown" lands of North Africa, Berber resistance decreased. Only in mountainous areas, such as the Kabyle region (from the Arabic qabaa'il, i.e., "tribes"), were the Berbers successful against the Arabization process.

Around the time of 908 A.D., the Ismaili Shi'a sect, based in the Yemen, established a western mission in Tunisia. This outpost grew into the Fatimid Dynasty, and in 969 the Fatimids were able to capture Egypt from the central Islamic empire. By the 11th century they had reached their zenith as a religious and political power. At this time, their rule was threatened internally by two Bedouin tribes, the Bedouin element in Egypt, the Banu Hilal and Banu Sulaim.

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167 In his Histoire des Berberes (trans. 1925), Ibn Khaldun states that the original homeland of these two tribes was the Najd area of Arabia. They were dangerous predators who spent their summers raiding along the frontiers of Syria and Iraq: the Banu Sulaim even attacked pilgrims traveling to and from Mecca (1925:28-166). Some segments of these tribes found their way into the delta region of Egypt where they became troublesome to the Fatimid Caliph, and were promptly exiled into Upper

175 Egypt. Apparently, they were responsible for discord among the other tribes there, for in an attempt to solve two problems

175 with one move, the Caliph sent these Bedouins into battle in order to enforce authority in his western Berber provinces. This order set in motion the great "Hilali invasion." The tribesmen of Banu Hilal and Banu Sulaim literally slashed their way across eastern North Africa laying waste to towns and fields as they went (Ibn Khaldun 1925:29; Brockelmann 1939: 204).

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648 The Arab Bedouins recruited Berbers as they went, especially in Libya. Between the years 1052 and 1054, these marauding nomads sacked the rich agricultural lands of Tripolitania and Tunisia, lands which had been in production since the time of the Romans (Mahdi 1964:21). The Banu Sulaim, according to Ibn Khaldun (1925:136), concentrated their action in an area from Alexandria to Tripolitania. It was over this region, which includes Cyrenaica in eastern Libya, that they established their rule. Ibn Khaldun states that the two tribes agreed to divide the conquered territory between them, the eastern lands going to the Banu Sulaim and the western lands to the Banu
175 Hilal (1925:33-34). Such a division of territorial rights in
571 Arab Bedouin society is representative of a set of authority
182 relationships. Differentiation in the locus of authority,
*[613] whether it be horizontal or hierarchical, is a method of maintaining political order among segments of the lineage structure.

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619 Evans-Pritchard states that the Cyrenaican Bedouins are descendants of the Banu Sulaim and represent an admixture

175 114 619 between the Bedouin and the Berbers (1954:46-47). G. W. Murray informs us that the Bedouins of the Egyptian Western Desert themselves believe this to be the case (1935:33, 247). I agree that the Cyrenaican Bedouin are the descendants of the Banu Sulaim; nevertheless, and despite what Murray says, my informants (when they knew) claimed to be descendants of the Banu Hilal. They refer to their ancestress, Sa'ada, as al-Hilaliyya, "she of the Banu Hilal."

175 167 Data concerning the Awlad 'Ali migratory history are insufficient for a satisfactory reconstruction of the process. As we have noted, there were two invasions of North Africa by the Arabs. The first, about 643 A.D., was a shock wave from the Arab conquest of Egypt in which the Arabs defeated the Luwata Berbers who were living in eastern Libya. The second invasion, in the 11th century, took place at the hands of the Banu Hilal and Banu Sulaim and penetrated into the North African countryside. As a result, the Banu Salaim tribe settled in Cyrenaica where they intermingled with the Luwata Berbers. That part of Cyrenaica which they claimed as their [103] territory they called the Jabal Akhdar (i.e. "Green Mountain"), a plateau region set back from the coast. The Bedouins of al-Qasr refer to the Jabal Akhdar as their original homeland (see Figure 1).

We hear nothing more of the Banu Salaim until the 17th century. At this time, segments of the tribe began drifting

175 eastward toward the Nile Valley. It is not possible to
167 determine the exact conditions associated with this migration,
but they probably parallel later movements which are connected with tribal conflicts over land and water rights. In 1689, Bedouins from Libya raided Egyptian oases in the Western Desert (Murray 1935:29). From this date on, for a period of some forty years, records show a continual movement of Bedouins out of Libya into Egypt. Some groups went as far as the Nile Valley and were eventually assimilated into the peasant population there. Tribal movements at the end of the 17th century involved whole tribes and also tribal sections and fragments. Thus in some cases, authority relations arising from territorial bonds were dissipated; but in other cases, political ties were strung across the Libyan Desert from Cyrenaica to the Nile Valley. "Today there is not a Cyrenaican tribe, or even large section, which has not some of its members in Egypt, often whole lineages" (Evans-Pritchard 1954:49-50).

175 Evans-Pritchard's study of the Sanusi, valuable for
619 its analysis of Italian colonial records, shows that the
726 Awlad 'Ali were driven from Cyrenaica by its sister tribe,
167 [648] the Harabi, with the help of the Turkish rulers of Libya.
This took place, he says, about 150 years ago. When the Awlad 'Ali arrived in Egypt, they found the Hanadi tribe already there. In a chain of conflicts, the Hanadi had displaced the Banu'Una, forcing them into the Nile Valley:

175 then came the Awlad 'Ali.

619 Around the year 1800, the Awlad 'Ali were able to
726 defeat the Hanadi with the help of another Cyrenaican tribe
167 dwelling in the area, the Jumi'at. The Jumi'at were a vassal
tribe who changed their allegiance from the Hanadi to the
Awlad 'Ali after this war. The Hanadi, as the Banu'Una
before them, were forced into the Nile Valley. Today, they
[131] live in Sharqiyya Province and are no longer distinguishable
from the peasant population.

175 According to Evans-Pritchard, the Awlad 'Ali were still
619 in possession of eastern Cyrenaica in 1800. Then there occurred
726 "long and savagely fought" wars ending with the expulsion of
114 the Awlad 'Ali. But this time schedule seems unlikely since
the Awlad 'Ali were already at war with the Hanadi when
175 Napoleon landed near Alexandria in 1798. The Bedouin war has
648 been amusingly described by the French historian Lacroix (in
181 Murray 1935:30) who accompanied the Napoleonic expedition:

> At five o'clock, the first Bedouin were seen on the flank of the army, and shortly afterwards one saw four or five hundred; it was the tribe of Henady, the fiercest Arabs of these deserts. They were almost naked, swarthy, and lean; their horses seemed wornout hacks; save for the helmet, it was Don Quixote as represented in the engravings ...if these five hundred Arabs had been Mamelukes, they would have been able to obtain a great success at this first moment, when the soldiers' imaginations were alert and ready to receive any impression, but these Arabs were as cowardly as the Mamelukes, who had charged an hour before, were brave.

175 648 According to Murray, on July fourth "thirty Sheikhs of the Hanadi, the Awlad 'Ali, and the Beni'Una made their peace with the new power" (1935:30).

175 186 124 (648) The version of history provided by my informants is no radical departure from these facts. But there are a few differing aspects which represent ethnocentric highlights on history. For instance, the Bedouins of al-Qasr have a few stories which exaggerate the fact that the Harabi needed the cooperation of the Turkish rulers to defeat the Awlad 'Ali and to force them out of Cyrenaica. Also, the Bedouins point out, the Jumi'at tribe begged the Awlad 'Ali to come and rescue them from the oppression of the Hanadi.

175 619 648 Shortly after 1800, Muhammad 'Ali, the Ottoman viceroy, drove the French from Egypt and supported the Hanadi against the Awlad 'Ali. The Egytian ruler felt that political control over the Awlad 'Ali would insure the security of the whole desert, and especially Egypt's western frontier with Libya. Despite the alliance between the Hanadi and Muhammed 'Ali's forces, the outcome was a temporary victory for the Awlad 'Ali. This event actually set the stage for a transformation of Bedouin tribal society.

175 648 After the defeat of the Hanadi and the Pasha's troops, the Awlad 'Ali were given preferential treatment by Muhammed 'Ali. He wisely secured the Hanadi tribe in Sharqiyya Province. Then he granted the Awlad 'Ali, by right of usufruct, the

175 648 [651] territory of the whole Western Desert. They were also exempted from land taxes, military duty, and forced labor on the irrigation projects of the Nile River. In return for these privileges, the Bedouins were expected to guard the frontiers of Egypt and to furnish warriors for the expeditionary forces of Muhammed 'Ali. The Pasha, who was in the process of carving out his own empire independent of the Ottomans, needed warriors, a role which traditionally excluded the fallahin of the Nile Valley. Bedouin horsemen from the Western Desert fought with Muhammad 'Ali in his Wahhabi campaign of 1815 in Arabia. They also aided the Pasha's son, Ismail, in the conquest of the Sudan.

Muhammad 'Ali instituted the practice of granting to the Bedouin leaders land in the rich Nile Valley. He made it explicit that the leaders were to dwell upon this land: their role, as it was officially stated, was to provide a liaison between the Pasha and the tribes. In fact, the leaders were hostages. By controlling them, Muhammad 'Ali was able to exert proper pressure on the Bedouins when and where it was needed (Baer 1957:84-98).

175 648 651 423 Bedouins did not pay land taxes, but neither did they "own" the land; they simply had the right of usufruct. The law stated that only those who paid land taxes had the right to purchase and own their land. But along with ownership of land came the onerous responsibilities of corvée labor on the

175 Nile dikes and military conscription. The term "Bedouin"
648 came to mean, as it was defined by the government of Egypt,
651 one who did not legally own land and hence was not subject to
423 forced labor or military service. On this basis, the Director
[162] of Recruiting Office in a 1904 census distinguished three kinds
of Bedouin (Murray 1935:31):

290,095 - settled and living in their own farm colonies
240,880 - living among the fallahin
70,472 - real Bedouin or nomads

601,447

175 By the end of the 19th century, Bedouin society had
177 undergone a great deal of change. Politically, the Bedouins
648 were subordinates in a dominant-subjective authority relationship with the central regime of the Nile Valley. As a result of external political control, nomadism was curtailed and the Bedouins were forced to settle on the land to raise what few crops they could. These new political and economic conditions are the major aspects of the sedentarization process. Bedouin dependence on the central authority of Egypt and their reliance on horticulture increased with time. Nor did the entry of Britain into Egypt in 1882 change the material and social condition of the Bedouin.

175 The British, in the style of the politics of colonial-
648 ism, reorganized the administrative structure of Egypt. The Western Desert was given the status of a province; command

175 posts were established there, and Marsa Matruh became the
648 capital town. The Western Desert was administered by British
officers who had under their command a garrison of Egyptian
soldiers. Their assignment was to secure the colonial borders.
This task included keeping the Awlad 'Ali within the boundaries
of Egypt. The policy of the British provincial government was
to avoid interfering with the Bedouin process of law and conflict regulation unless it threatened the peace and security
[124] of the desert. My informants said that the British interfered
with Bedouin justice only under the threat of large-scale
tribal warfare.

175 The political relationship which the Bedouins of the
795 Awlad 'Ali tribe had with the Sanusi Order of Islam in Libya
[619] was historically not so important compared to that of the
other Cyrenaican tribes. The Sanusi Order, classified as a
Sufi *tariiqa* ("mystic order"), was actually quite orthodox in
its attitudes and practices. This is a function of the
socio-religious conditions of its origin during the 18th-19th
century revival of orthodoxy in Islamic Arabia (Gibb 1955:
[793] 127-145). Muhammad bin 'Ali al-Ṣanusi founded his order,
al-Sanusiyya, near Mecca around the year 1837. The Sanusi
doctrine may be considered orthodox, or secularly oriented,
in that it rejects the fundamental goal of Sufism, mystical
union with God.

The Sanusi Order, from the very beginning, strove for a return to pure Islam. It made its greatest headway among

175 the Bedouins of the Hijaz area. This Sanusi success aroused
795 the jealousy and animosities of the orthodox *'ulama* ("clergy")
[798] of the Mecca area. Al-Sanusi was forced to flee the Arabian
[793] peninsula, and in 1843 he founded his first *zawiya* ("lodge"),
[346] *al-zawiya al-baida*, in Cyrenaica. The Sanusi doctrine was as
acceptable to the Bedouins of Cyrenaica as it had been to the
[793] tribes of the Hijaz. The person and teachings of *al-Sanusi
al-kabir* ("the grand Sanusi"), as he came to be known, fit
into the "holy man" religious tradition of Cyrenaica and even
spread beyond into the Sudan and Lake Chad area. The Order
[793] showed primary concern for the people of the desert: the
[346] Sanusi *shaikh* ("holy man") cared for the poor, and the *zawiya*
[485] became rest stops, storehouses, and religious centers where
[794] Bedouin children were taught their Quranic lessons. Through
175 the *zawiya*, the Sanusiyya became a political and economic
795 integrating factor in the desert, and al-Sanusi became the
346 182 legitimate authority of the Bedouins. The *zawiya* became a
[793] very important part of the traditional desert economic system.
Today one *zawiya* remains near al-Qasr but it is scarcely used.
The Bedouins say: "Before, when Alexandria was far away by
camel, we could get what we wanted at the *zawiya*. Now that we
have trucks and trains no one goes to the *zawiya*."

175 The fortunes of the Bedouin became linked with those
795 of the Order. When the Sanusi became involved in full-scale
648 conflict with the Italian colonial power, the Bedouins bore

175 795 648 the brunt of the war. With Bedouin warriors, the Sanusiyya religious order became a political force for the Italians to reckon with.

From 1911 until the start of the world war in 1914, the Sanusi Bedouin army fought the Italians in the desert and harrassed them in the coastal area. In November, 1914, the Turks entered the war on the side of the Germans, and in May, 1915, Italy joined the Allies. As a result of the declaration of alliances and the expansion of the war, the Sanusi army was sent into Egypt against the British. This move brought the Awlad 'Ali into contact with the Sanusi army. Before this, they had had little involvement in the war. This relative inactivity of the Awlad 'Ali can hardly be explained by the notion that they were "an unwarlike peoples," as Evans-Pritchard (1954:127) has characterized them. The Awlad 'Ali were not in the mainstream of Sanusi war activities in Libya. Also, the British exerted a great deal of control over them in contrast to that which the Italians were able to gain over the Cyrenaican Bedouin.

In 1915, the Sanusi army captured the British Libyan outpost at Sallum, and in January of 1916 they were threatening the town of Marsa Matruh. But within a month's time, by the end of February 1916, the British had routed the Sanusi army, and the following month had retaken Sallum.

During the Marsa Matruh campaign, some of the 'Aishai-

175 795 648 bat from al-Qasr joined the Sanusi army. The importance of their contribution to the Sanusi effort is vague, even though most of my informants claimed that their fathers "fought the British." Some of the al-Qasr activity was on a part-time [124] basis. One informant, whose father was the paramount leader of the 'Aishaibat tribe in 1916, told me that his father "used to take his rifle and ride out every morning to join the troops of Sayyid Ahmad al-Sharif (the grandson of al-Sanusi al-kabiir), and there he would kill many British soldiers. Then he would come home again at night." There was at least one group of al-Qasr Bedouins who joined the Sanusi in Libya before the start of the war. After the end of the fighting, this group returned to Egypt and asked to be pardoned by the British. They appealed to the Governor of Marsa Matruh that there should be no reprisals taken against them since the Turks had actually forced them to fight for the Sanusi. The British Governor, who was fluent in the Bedouin dialect and considered a great man by the Bedouins, replied to them in the form of a famous Bedouin proverb: "The ropes can be stretched far enough for forgiveness."

175 177 554 631 648 Traditionally, the Bedouins of the Marsa Matruh area were held in check by an officially created political structure which dated from the time of Muhammad 'Ali. This structure depended upon two political roles for the control of the Awlad 'Ali, the 'umda and the shaikh, neither of which had previously existed in the Bedouin authority system.

175 177 554 631 648 Historically, the modern aspect of role differentiation and political specialization began with the appointment of Mitkhatri 'Adam at Sidi Barrani, west of Marsa Matruh. This was under Muhammad 'Ali Pasha. The new role was that of _'umda_, the same term used for the village leader in the Valley of the Nile. The first Bedouin _'umda_ died in 1909. At this time, under the British, another political role was instituted. This new role, that of _shaikh_, was a kind of vice-_'umda_ position. The son of the first _shaikh_ is now about 80 years old [115] and still lives in Marsa Matruh. (He was my chief informant for Bedouin history.) During this early period, there were few government officials in the desert, and, according to my informant, "there was need for only a few _'umdas_ and _shaikhs_. But later there was a need for more and more. The job of these men in those times was to work for the Egyptians in their dealings with the Bedouins of the desert." The number of incumbents in the offices of _'umda_ and _shaikh_ increased as the political needs of the British grew.

175 648 According to the Bedouins, the British administration did not arrive in the desert until about 1914. Up until that time, matters were in the hands of the Egyptians who governed the desert province for the colonial government. When the British arrived in Marsa Matruh, the opening of World War I was at hand. The Bedouins say, quite proudly, that the British knew of their sympathy for, and cooperation with, the Sanusi against the Italians in Cyrenaica.

175 648 554 631 Sanusi against the Italians in Cyrenaica. "When the British reached Matruh, they jailed all of the 'umdas and shaikhs (two 'umdas and five shaikhs, at that time). Then they chose new leaders, from the families of the old leaders, to work with them." But, "these men did not fight with the British, they only acted as their guides in dealing with the Bedouins of the desert. When the old leaders were released from jail, they returned to their positions of political office. While they were in jail, their replacements had only helped the [178] British with supplies." Apparently, the British saw the need of maintaining the continuity of the Bedouin authority structure.

175 648 Data on the condition of the Bedouins of the Western Desert between the two world wars are absent. The Bedouins say that they lived with no trouble, or any help, from the Egyptians. The Bedouins have no fond memories of their experiences during World War II. They first heard of the war in 1940 when the Italians marched into Western Desert from Libya. The Germans occupied al-Qasr from May to October of 1942, when the famous General Rommel had his headquarters at Marsa Matruh. The British had told the Bedouins, in 1940, that they should flee the Italians, and that unless they did they would be held responsible for their actions. Most of the 175 648 722 166 people of al-Qasr agreed to go to refugee camps at Amriyya near Alexandria for the duration of the war.

[556] Some of the Bedouins refused to leave for Amriyya.

175 These were the wealthy group who had large numbers of sheep
648 and camels. In fact, most of the animals taken east to
722 Amriyya died on the way or were expropriated by the British.
556 'Umran Kailani, "who owned one thousand camels" and was the
166 shaikh of the 'Ali Ahmar section of the Awlad 'Ali at the time,
refused to go to Amriyya. The Bedouins say that he was treated
very well by the Germans who asked him to form a local government
and promised him all the help and supplies that he
needed. It is difficult to obtain figures on how many Bedouins
made the migration to the Nile Valley and how many remained
[162] behind in the Al-Qasr area. One informant told me that before
the war there were about 80,000 members of the Awlad 'Ali in
the Western Desert and that out of this number, about 30,000
remained behind.

175 Those who sought refuge at Amriyya returned to the
648 al-Qasr area at the end of 1942 after the defeat of the Germans
727 at al-Alamain. They found things greatly changed. Before the
war, there had been about twenty buildings in the al-Qasr area
and most of these were bombed out by the air war. The loss of
animals and the damage to the land made the resumption of
normal life quite difficult for the Bedouins. Underneath,
the land was literally a bed of anti-tank and anti-personnel
mines left by the advance and retreat of three different
armies. This restricted Bedouin travel and everyday food-
648 getting activities. This condition, which still exists, has
727

History of Settlement in al-Qasr

173 The settlement of al-Qasr took place about 200 years
[166] ago when the Awlad 'Ali first came to the area from Cyrenaica.
• [175] No historical documentation for this period exists. The
173 various versions which the Bedouins offer are both vague and
*613 ethnocentric with reference to lineage. A point of consensus
[712] is that the zone was first claimed by Abu Mahjuba who built
a large fort (qasr = "fort" or "castle") near the coast. The
Bedouins say that Abu Mahjuba settled in the area of al-Qasr
because "he knew good land when he saw it." He belonged to
no one lineage, "he was 'Aishaibi only." All of the lineages
of al-Qasr claim that their ancestors came with Abu Mahjuba
and settled on the land at that time. Abu Mahjuba has been
mythologized: he belongs to all of al-Qasr, a symbol of
local group solidarity and fraternal equality.

173 Al-Qasr represents the end of nomadic life for the
361 'Aishaibat tribe. According to the Bedouins, each tribe and
[198] lineage took that part of al-Qasr which it preferred. If the
members of the segment wanted to grow vegetables, they took
land on the coast; if they preferred the "old way of life,"
they set up their tents in the sha'ir wi mar'a area and raised
sheep. "Everything was fine," they say, "there were no land
registration laws--a man was free." Al-Qasr was settled
[619] "after the wars" (with the Hanadi), and it was only then that
the Awlad 'Ali broke up into tribes. The 'Aishaibat took the

361 1925 and 1930 because, as they point out, the British
648 administration provided employment for "the poor Bedouin."
361 The wealthier Bedouins who owned camels and large numbers of
556 sheep remained in the desert. Just the reverse is happening
178 at the present time. The rich men who see the advantages in business, and the comforts which Matruh offers, can also afford the change of residence or the maintenance of two residences.

•175 In 1922, the Egyptian government first registered land
423 in al-Qasr. At this time, they sanctioned the tribal division
657 of territory which existed. There was no attempt to force political integration upon the Bedouins. Egypt has never had a nomad problem as have other Middle Eastern countries. The history of Egypt is essentially the history of the Nile Valley. Consequently, it is not odd that we find no mention of the Awlad 'Ali in the historical record. The Bedouins of the Western Desert were resigned to their place in the desert, and the central government saw no particular advantage or disadvantage in this.

423 Concern for the Bedouin minority in Egypt emerged only
648 with nationalistic programs of modernization. In 1954, the Fourth United Nations Social Welfare Seminar for Arab States in the Middle East convened in Baghdad. From this meeting came some general recommendations for dealing with the problems of the Bedouin. The major proposal was calculated to transform

619 675 and the Marabit.

The Qit'an tribe, based partly in Libya and partly
*[613] in Egypt, is a tribe in the same sense that the Awlad 'Ali
is one, i.e., at the secondary level of the lineage system.
[166] This tribe moved into Egypt sometime around 1900. The
●[175] Bedouins of al-Qasr estimate that "50% of the Qit'an are
with Ali Ahmar, 30% with Sinaina, and 20% with Ali Abyad."
619 In 1956, certain events occurred in Libya which brought about
675 a declaration of independence from Sa'adi domination by the
578 Qit'an in that country. The Qit'an felt that their numbers were sufficiently large enough that they should represent themselves in the Libyan parliament. In other words, the Marabtiin were no longer willing to settle for the traditional social categories and role structures allotted to them. After these events in Libya, some members of the Qit'an came to Egypt and informed their brothers about the formation of the tribe as a separate entity, and convinced the Egyptian Qit'an to do the same--which they did.

The Bedouins say that the Governor of Marsa Matruh encouraged the Qit'an tribe to increase their numbers in the area after he learned of their desire to be free from Sa'adi domination. There had been a small number of Qit'an in the town of Marsa Matruh. This number quickly grew in size and political strength so that it could challenge the power of the 'Ali Ahmar who are considered the dominant tribe in this

671 change in al-Qasr must proceed.

671 Bedouin law should be considered within its historical
177 context, especially as it has reference to the Maliki school
of Islamic Law. The Maliki school, or "rite," (madhhab) of
law is considered to be the most conservative interpretation
of the doctrine of the Prophet Muhammad. Therefore, the
Maliki school is thought to reflect the society and tribal
traditions of pre-Islamic Arabia more dependably than any of
the other three schools of law. For instance, the Maliki
671 school, in the domain of family law, stresses the importance
177 and the primacy of agnate rights and claims. This is es-
428 pecially so in matters of inheritance: the law states that
in the absence of agnate heirs the property of the deceased
passes, not to female survivors but, to the central treasury
of the State. This single legal aspect helps us to under-
[562] stand the Bedouin practice of disallowing the female to
inherit and should be a consideration in any study of Bedouin
succession rules.

175 Maliki Law was introduced into North Africa during
671 the ninth century, and became the official legal doctrine of
177 the Berber dynasties. It was first taught in this part of
the world, probably, by Yahya ibn Yahya, a student of Malik
ibn Anas, the founder of the school. Murray (1935:313)
presents a valuable legal document from the Western Desert
in which the name "Yahya" is frequently cited as the authority

175 for legal interpretation. For instance: "We are also told
671 by Yahya that (the Caliph) Mu'awiya ibn Sufian said that a
177 wound on the body should be assessed at half the value of
that wound on the head or face" (1935:324). Maliki law,
671 derived in large part from the Bedouin traditions of Arabia,
177 may be seen to characterize the legal norms of the tribal-based
social structure in the Western Desert. The Bedouins of al-
[428] Qasr themselves claim that they are within the bounds of
[562] Islamic Law when they deny the female the right to inherit,
though they do have other, and more secular, justifications
for the practice.

As we have already noted, in the above quote from the
671 "holy man" of al-Qasr, the Bedouins feel that the 'awaiyid
182 can succeed where governmental law will fail. They say that
648 "the government does not understand the problems of the
Bedouins," that "government troops cannot function in the
desert." They feel that they need the 'awaiyid for the sake
of political order itself: "If the Bedouins did not have
the 'awaiyid, they would eat each other. The 'awaiyid is so
important that a man who commits a wrong in town will lie
to the government, and then dutifully return to the tribe for
Bedouin justice."

[656] In 1933, the government "abolished" the 'awaiyid
and insisted that the Bedouins settle their difference in
the civil courts in accord with Egyptian law. According to

619 173 Until two centuries ago Awlad Ali lived in eastern Cyrenaica. After the death of Aqqar, his two sons, Ali (founder of Awlad Ali) and Harb (founder of Harabi tribe on chart), competed for the leadership of 619 173 726 [648] the tribe. This competition involved their respective tribes in a bitter war which existed for more than fifty years. In one of the major battles between the two tribal segments, the Harabi segment with help from the Caramanli rules of Tripoli were able to defeat Awlad Ali and to drive them eastward across the Libyan-Egyptian borders into the Egyptian Western Desert. This happened about 150 years ago. At that time, the area was occupied by the Hanadi, a warlike cousin of Awlad Ali, who had established a system of dominance over the Murabiteen tribes who are believed to be the original inhabitants of the desert. The area also was inhabited by the Gemeiat tribe, which, although believed to have Murabiteen status, yet were not treated as clients of the powerful Hanadi, as were the other Murabiteen tribes in the area. With the help from the Murabiteen, Awlad Ali were able to defeat the Hanadi and to drive them eastward into the Nile Delta, where they settle now as cultivators.

619 175 648 During the rule of Muhammad Ali (1815-1848), the warlike Awlad Ali were frequently used by the government to subdue the tribal uprisings in the Delta and other parts of Egypt, and to hold the Mamlukes in check. There was no organized army in Egypt at that time except for a few remnants of the Turkish soldiers. The tribal population of Awlad Ali agreed to supply Muhammad Ali with fighting men on the condition that they would be provided with food and arms and also exempted

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[619] [173] connection to Gemeiat and insist that they are a Murabiteen tribe who acquired their relatively higher status through their assistance to Awlad Ali during their fight with the Harabi.

619 175 648 from forced labor in government projects and released from the payment of taxes. The government agreed to these demands, and on their part, Awlad Ali helped Muhammad Ali extensively in his military expedition in Syria and Arabia and were a major factor in the battle of 1815 at Bissel where he succeeded in breaking Wahabi power. They also helped his son, Ismeal, in his expedition to the Sudan.

[701] Later, when the Egyptian army was organized, the government exempted Awlad Ali and other tribal groups which helped in the military conquests from military service, but required them to undertake the guarding of the desert roads and the frontiers of Egypt. Also, in [423] exchange for their previous services, they were given the right to use the land of the Western Desert and left the question of its distribution among the various tribal segments to the native tribal leaders. 619 175 648 642 Finally, in 1832, Awlad Ali were granted a form of legal and political autonomy whereby the government acknowledged the tribal legal and judicial system as the means to settle disputes between members of the tribe. The government also recognized the authority of the native tribal leaders and allowed the tribal populations to be governed by their own native system of leadership.

This political autonomy of Awlad Ali existed until 1947. Although their usefulness to the government had long ceased to exist, they had continued to enjoy the privileges they had obtained earlier. This was partly due to the fact that the various governments that came after Muhammad Ali showed no interest in the area occupied by Awlad Ali. There were no taxable lands in the area, no natural resources of any promise, and the tribal population did not present any particular problem to attract the attention of the government. There was some smuggling 000

622 His main function is to manage the affairs of the village, apprehend
554 crininals, report and register births and deaths, collect taxes and
represent the government in all matters involving the relationship be-
tween the government and his village. Because of his position as the
[661] representative of the govrernment, he usually enjoys a considerable
amount of power which, over the years, many omdas have used it to obtain
personal benefits.

361 In 1958 the committee appointed for the examination of the possi-
631 bility of applying the system to Awlad Ali noticed that villages in the
sense of a compact settlement similar to that existing in the rural area
simply do not exist in the Western Desert region. There are a few
settled communities in the area but they are scattered homes or a few
stores. These communities have no identifiable boundaries or adminis-
631 trative existence. The area as a whole is divided into ten adminis-
634 trative districts, each having a police station. These districts cor-
[625] respond to the old Senusia Zawyas which played an important role in
[795] maintaining order in the era until the First World War. Until that time
[175] the area was divided into fourteen zones each of which was under the
795 jurisdiction of one of the zawyas. The zawyas were mainly religious
175 centers, or shrines, inhabited and directed by a member of the Senusi
[793] order of Cyrenaica. The role of the head of the zawya was to teach the
Qoraan and spread the teachings of the Senusi order. One of the ways
[794] the zawyas attracted followers was through distribution of food and
clothing to those who joined it. The zawyas also provided places of
[778] refuge for those who needed protection since no one could force his way
into the sacred zawyas. Because of their religious position which put

795 Because of their religious position which put
175 them outside the tribal structure, the leaders of the zawyas played a
627 significant role in mediation and settling disputes between various tribal
793 segments. At their disposal was their ability to ostracize anyone
[626] who did not abide by their decision from the zawyas, which meant depriving
him from all the benefits, social as well as religious, that membership
in the zawyas offered.

795 After the First World War when the British replaced the Turks as
175 governors of the area, the zawyas were closed and the religious leaders
177 ordered to leave. The zoning established by the zawyas existed, however,
[648] and was used as the basis for the redistricting of the area. Police
[631] stations replaced the religious centers. From the standpoint of the tribal
[625] population itself, the districts have no psychological or political
619 reality. The zawyas were originally established in the areas of tribal
634 concentrations. But the area itself did not have any political identity.
[795] The only reality from the standpoint of the inhabitants was the tribal
[361] reality and affiliation which cut across many of these districts. Many
of the tribal segments inhabiting one district were and still are hostile
177 to one another. To transform the zones into administrative districts and
634 to establish one office of leadership for the whole district was to impose
619 a political unity nonexistent among the tribal segments inhabiting
[622] the district. To avoid this difficulty, the government supplemented the
territorial principle of the omda system in the rural area with the principle
of tribal representation and came up with a system which seems to
suite the situation in the Western Desert. For each of the districts,
a list of all tribal segments which habitually occupy the area and whose
tribal land is located within the district, is made. The most powerful

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[For information on the cultural history of the Sanusi Order, see Category 116, pp. 2, 11-23, 26-28, 39, 41-43, 48-50, 66, 70-71, 73-76, and 90-229.]

Europeans consider to be a low level of civilization. They do 433
not feel the need for expensive roads and ports, electric light, 511
wireless sets, telephones, schools, churches, newspapers, and 182
so forth; and clearly their economy could not support them.
Time and again colonists, tempted from their homes by the 182
short sea routes and the wooded plateau, have settled in the 167
country and dispossessed the Bedouin, but in the end it is the Bedouin, and not the colonists, who have survived. When one looks at the massive Phoenician, Greek, Egyptian, and Roman ruins and the already half-ruined Italian towns, villages, and farms, and then on the flimsy tents of the Arabs, one cannot but reflect that the race is not always to the swift nor the battle to the strong.

III

Even in the steppe country it is difficult to find a Bedouin 361
naja', camp, for the camps are pitched in hollows and on the slopes of wadis and their feeders for shelter from rain and wind and too many visitors. On the plateau they are hidden in the forest. One cannot, therefore, make more than a very approxi- 161
mate estimate of the population of any part of the country, or 162
of its distribution, by bare observation. It can, however, be said that at present the country is underpopulated and that the population is badly distributed between town and country, the urban part of it, which is almost entirely unproductive, being too large in relation to the whole.

There have been a number of estimates of the population by 161
early travellers who visited the country in Turkish times. They 175 ●
had to make a guess at the population figure, aided by Turkish censuses. It has been suggested on the basis of their reports that the country then supported round about 250,000 souls.[1] The Turkish census of 1911 gave the population as 198,345, excluding Kufra.[2] Taking into account the various estimates which were made during the Italo-Sanusi wars, in the interval between them, and since, it may be said that to-day the total population of Cyrenaica is probably round about 200,000, of whom about a quarter live in the towns, the remainder being tented Bedouin and a few thousand oasis dwellers.

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[1] Dr. Gotthold Hildebrandt, *Cyrenaïka als Gebiet künftiger Besiedelung*, 1904, p. 317. [113]

[2] Coro, op. cit., p. 20.

of the more independent client tribes. In other words, all the 161
Bedouin of Cyrenaica are nomadic in some degree, some more 162
and some less, and Col. De Agostini rightly stresses that 114
whether they move much or little they all have the same characteristics when compared to peasants and townsmen.[1] They are all *bwadi*, as the Cyrenaican dialect has it, people of the tents, and they see themselves as a single people against the *hadur*, the citizens.

I have so far said nothing of the towns of Cyrenaica or of 632
their inhabitants. They play a minor part in this story, which is about the Bedouin, but they cannot be entirely left out of it on account of their economic and political relations with the Bedouin, so I take this opportunity to give a brief account of them.[2]

Banghazi, which is supposed to be called after the saint Sidi 175
Ghazi, buried in the town, is on the site of the classical Berenice. 632
It is believed that after the disappearance of the Graeco-Roman community the site was unoccupied till the fifteenth century, when it was reoccupied by immigrants from the mercantile communities of the Tripolitanian coast, among whom Misuratans, both Muslims and Jews, preponderated in
numbers and wealth. The Genoese Della Cella, who passed [162]
through the fly-infested town in 1817–18, in the time of the
Caramanlis, says that it then contained about 5,000 inhabitants,
at least half of whom were Jews.[3] Shaikh Muhammad 'Uthman [441]
al-Hashaishi, who was in the town in 1896, says that the [167]
greater part of the traders were immigrants from Sfax and the [114]
Island of Jerba—he was himself a Tunisian and often tended to exaggerate Tunisian influence—with some Greeks and a few Italians. 'As to the Turks, they do not give themselves to trade.' At this time Banghazi was a very simple, mostly mud-and-rubble, town, and the learned Shaikh makes a point of telling us that there were no posts or telegraphs, nor even a railway, save a line of three kilometres joining the official

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[1] Ibid., pp. 32–3.

[2] The historical information is chiefly derived from Agostini, ibid., pp. 413–43.

[3] Paolo Della Cella, *Narrative of an Expedition from Tripoli in Barbary to the Western Frontier of Egypt in 1817*, 1822, pp. 194–5. (First published in 1819.) F. W. and H. W. Beechey (*Proceedings of the Expedition to explore the Northern Coast of Africa from Tripoly Eastward in 1821 and 1822*, 1828, p. 299) consider Della Cella's estimate too high. Theirs is 2,000. [113]

175 residence of the Pasha to a garden ; and that the town possessed
632 only one machine for grinding corn.[1] The population increased
considerably in the last decades of Turkish rule, reaching the
175 figure of 16,500 in 1911.[2] In 1922 the population was 22,740,
162 the great majority of whom were Arabs from the Maghrib,
632 though some were immigrants into the town from the more
sedentary Bedouin of the neighbourhood. It included also over
2,000 *qulaughla*, descendants of Turkish officials and troops and
Arab women, and a large number of *shawashna*, descendants of
Arab men and Negresses, with a sprinkling of *'abid*, full-
blooded Negroes. There were also about 3,000 Jews and about
3,600 Europeans, almost all Italians. These elements, except
for the Italians who left during the late war, are found in all
the towns of Cyrenaica. There are also a few Cretans, the
remnant of a small community exiled by the Italians.

Darna stands on the site of the Greek town of Darnis, from
which the Arab name is presumably derived. It seems that it
continued to be occupied throughout the Arab period, but was
given new life through the settlement there of Muslim refugees
from Spain at the end of the fifteenth century. According to
tradition, towards the end of the seventeenth century the town
was developed by a certain Muhammad Bey who organized
irrigation and other public works there. The population was
much increased by the settlement of merchants from the coastal
towns of Tripolitania and of other countries of the Maghrib,
either by direct migration or from Banghazi. When Della Cella
[731] visited the town in 1816 the population had been reduced by
pestilence from 7,000 to 500.[3] In 1911 it was about 9,500[4] and
in 1922 it was about 9,700 (not counting Italians) of whom 250
were Jews and the rest Muslims.

Al-Marj, the Italian Barce, was the site of the ancient city of
Barke, famous in Greek times and to Arab historians of the
first centuries after the Arab conquest of Cyrenaica. It fell into
decay after the Hilalian invasion and was only a heap of ruins
till 1842, when the Turkish administration built a fort there, a
Sanusiya zawiya being constructed shortly afterwards. In 1922
175 the population, of very mixed origins, was 1,540. The other
632 centres in Cyrenaica are no more than villages around admini-

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621 [1] Op. cit., pp. 52 and 59.

[2] Coro, op. cit., p. 99.

[3] Op. cit., p. 177.

[4] Coro, op. cit., p. 102.

strative posts and contain not more than a few hundred persons. 175
Shahhat and Tubruq had been Turkish posts before the Italians 632
made them administrative centres. Taukra and Talmaitha had 621
been Sanusiya lodges. Suluq and Qaminis were Italian
creations. Marsa Susa (Apollonia) was first occupied by Cretan
refugees during the Turco-Greek war of 1897. Ajadabiya, the
town of which the Arab historian al-Bakri of the eleventh
century spoke in such glowing terms, had ceased to be a settled
centre until the Turks made it an administrative post. During [648]*
the period of truce between the Sanusi and the Italians from
1917 to 1922 it became the seat of the Sanusi Amir, Sayyid
Mahammad Idris, and afterwards an Italian administrative and
commercial centre.

It has been noted that almost all the townsmen of Cyrenaica 632
are immigrants from the west, from Morocco to Tripolitania, 162
and the Bedouin regard them as foreigners and often with some 369
distaste, especially the Tripolitanian immigrants. It is true [186]
that there is a small element of Bedouin origin in the towns, for the more stable and poorer Bedouin living near towns sometimes drift into them; but when they do so their descendants soon lose their links with the tents and their tribal status. The road to town life is a way along which there is no return, for the townsmen are not only foreigners, but their food, their speech, their dress, their manners, their interests, their loyalties, and in general their way of life and their sentiments, are different. The Bedouin visit the towns from time to time, but they do not feel at home in them, and they do not look at home in them either. In a town one can spot a Bedouin at a glance by his appearance, his step, his dignity, his naivety, and his loud voice, which sometimes startles the shopkeeper with whom he disputes a price.

The road to the towns is not only a way along which there is 632
no return, but is a one-way track. A Bedouin can become a 369
citizen, but a citizen can never become a Bedouin. He cannot 641
live the life of the tents. Hence the Bedouin say that while it is always bad for a Bedouin girl to marry a townsman, it is possible for her to adapt herself to urban life, but it is out of the question for a Bedouin to marry a townsman's daughter, for it is impossible for her to become a daughter of the tents.

The *bwadi*, Bedouin, and the *hadur*, citizens, are separate

619

182 nation, was common hostility to outside interference, an ingre-
*795 dient supplied in measured quantities by the Turks and copiously
793 by the Italians.

*[648] III

The rudiments of Islam which the Grand Sanusi found in Cyrenaica made his teachings acceptable, delivered as they were without embellishments, to the Bedouin of the country, and the Marabout tradition which he also found there made him
[578] personally acceptable to them. His chief difficulty must have
been the rivalries between tribe and tribe and between tribal
section and tribal section down to the smallest sections. This
[361] difficulty was overcome by transferring the centre of the Order
to desert oases, where it could not become identified with any particular tribe, and by distributing its lodges impartially throughout the tribal territories.

*795 Of the forty-five zawiyas belonging to the tribes of Cyrenaica
793 proper (including al-Naufiliya and excluding the Kufra lodges)
*175 probably twenty-one were founded before 1860 or during the
lifetime of the Grand Sanusi, twenty-two during the lifetime of Sayyid al-Mahdi, and two when Sayyid Ahmad al-Sharif was Head of the Order.

*795 A high proportion of the lodges of the Order in the time of the
361 Grand Sanusi were along the line of oases on the 29th parallel,
[175] for to the lodges of the Cyrenaican oases on that line must be
added those in the oases of the Sirtica, Zalla, Saukna, Hun, and Waddan, all founded round about 1855, and probably that in al-Fuqha also. Lodges were early planted in the oases partly on account of their importance as caravanserai and trading centres, partly because the oases-folk were more tractable than the Bedouin, and partly because the stability of these centres gave greater opportunity for corporate religious life. The Sanusiya certainly made a deeper religious impression on the peoples of the oases than on the Bedouin.

*795 It will have been noticed also how few of the Sanusiya lodges
632 were founded in the towns of North Africa. There are no lodges
361 in the towns of Egypt and though the Order counts many
[175] followers in the towns of Cyrenaica and is politically dominant
in them it has only one zawiya in each, Banghazi, Darna, and al-Marj; and that at Banghazi, the capital of the country, was

175 648 [167] first caused misgivings in Rome and afterwards led to the destruction of the Italian armies in North Africa and their ejection from the continent. A sullen Arab population in Cyrenaica and Tripolitania and a hostile Arab and Muslim world were, in view of the coming storm, so clearly contrary to Italian interests that a more conciliatory policy, at any rate in words, was adopted and Balbo was entrusted with the difficult task of putting it in effect against a background of slaughter and repression. Once again the Italians had waited too long.

III

The ups and downs of Italian fortunes in Cyrenaica and in the world are reflected in the various decrees which defined the juridical status of the Arabs. In giving a brief account of these decrees it must be kept in mind that whilst they referred to the whole Arab population they really affected only the Arabs of the towns, and even in the towns only those few persons, mostly officials, who actively collaborated with the Italians; and that till 1932 the Italians had no certain or complete control outside the towns.

175 648 641 At the beginning of the first Italo-Sanusi war the Arabs were in law Turkish subjects. By a Royal Decree of 5 November 1911, Tripolitania and Cyrenaica were declared to be under the full sovereignty of the Kingdom of Italy. The status of the Cyrenaican Arabs was fixed by the Royal Decree of 6 April 1913, which declared all born in the country, wherever resident, to be *sudditi italiani*, provided they were not Italian citizens or foreign citizens or subjects. They retained their Muslim personal law, but were subject in other respects to whatever regulations the Italians saw fit to impose on them. They were permitted to hold posts in the armed forces and administration of the colony, and persons desirous of acquiring Italian citizenship might apply for it if they possessed residential qualifications, though by taking it they became subject to Italian personal law. These early decrees were more in the nature of administrative than constitutional law. A constitution, in the continental sense, was promulgated in 1919 after the Italians had signed a truce with the Sanusi.

The agreements entered into with the Sanusi between 1917

794 were concerned, there was little doubt who was leader—the
554 name of the former was known throughout the land. Now when
the warrior returned from his Egyptian exile, his rival offered
794 him a sheep as a gift. This act was wholly appropriate. Subsequently
554 they continued to compete fiercely, but it soon became
578 clear that the returned warrior was winning the greater support.
In the face of this, the rival, in 1948, decided to break with tradition
[788] by staying away from the annual pilgrimage to the tomb of
[175] the local saint. Instead, he and his followers made their pilgrimage
to a different tomb in the vicinity of their camp, and later
built a low wall round the tomb, whitewashed it, and made it
known that henceforward they would regularly use it for pilgrimages.
[613] The two kinship groups of a tertiary section now had their
[778] separate saint's tomb. Some months later, the rival decided to
move with his small group to an area in which they had not previously
794 resided. It is the custom among the Bedouin when they
554 pitch their tents in a place for the first time, that the people of
578 the neighbourhood should bring them gifts to mark the event.
431 The returned warrior, who had now become a close neighbour
[166] of his rival was obliged, like others, to offer the latter a gift; he
was also obliged to return the gift of a sheep that he had been
given on rejoining his section in 1947. He brought a gift within a
few hours of his rival's arrival, but it was a goat.[14] The rival and
his followers were furious, and the argument that the warrior was
too poor to give more was dismissed summarily. This was the
final insult. The donor, in return, had been given less than he had
presented. The reciprocity of gift exchanges had not only been
arrested, it had been reversed. From then onwards the two groups
made no attempt to conceal their hostility and went their separate
ways.

613 Disputes stemming from circumstances such as these are the
578 occasions which mark the proliferation of groups, although in
all three cases cited, difficulties over water supplies had preceded
the outbreaks of quarrelling.

613 In this discussion of the ways in which proliferation of segments
602 takes place, the emphasis had been put on the tug of war
between the interests of people in their agnatic connexions and
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[14] A goat is inferior to a sheep in gift exchanges.

5: Peters E-5 (1948-1950) 1967 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9
Cyrenaica

would have dropped in on the camp. In another situation, two men entered a shop 613
in a market-place; inside sat two men of a feuding group who, instead of retreating 628
hastily, greeted those who had just entered, and the latter returned the greeting with 682
blows on the head from the butts of their rifles. Markets in Cyrenaica are recognized [443]
to be places of peace. In their actions the two offenders not only injured two others
but also broke a taboo in a public place. The victim's group now had to avenge not [683]
only the injury but the insult that the breach of taboo carried with it, as well. In most feud relationships this is characteristic. It is never a matter of a simple homicide, but of killing a man at the entrance to his tent, between the centre poles of his tent, or taking the life of a minor, or an elder too old to carry arms and so on. Each successive killing ensures that the hostile relationships will be perpetuated.

The third step in this exposition, therefore, is the association of a state of feud with the secondary order of segmentation.

When the relationships between the structurally superior primary tribal sections 619
are examined, the arguments against the necessity for peace are stronger than in the case of secondary sections. Relationships between them are few and irregular. Only occasionally do members of these groups meet, and then often accidentally; very many men of collateral primary sections are complete strangers one to the other.
If a homicide occurs between two primary sections it is unlikely that any attempt to 619
open negotiations will be made. The offender's camp may be raided by a *ghazi* 682
recruited from the victim's kinsmen. There would be no question of these primary [721]
sections going to war. On a raid firearms may be used, but the action is limited to a
strike-and-run affair. If the issue is joined and members of both sides are ranged [726]
against each other they fight with sticks to avoid large-scale slaughter: warfare must
not be allowed within the tribe. Wars belong to intertribal relationships. For one of 175
these wars, apart from hearsay evidence, some records exist. These tell of a war 619
which took place during the period 1860 to 1865, in which there were planned cam- 726
paigns, the organization of fighters into groups, and provisions for a labour force in the home territory, large enough to produce sufficient food to maintain an army in the field. During this war several hundred people were killed.

At this point, it is possible to summarize the stages in this exposition of the 619
Bedouin view in diagrammatic form. 726

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

121 sections constituting the combinations which makes the facts of feud intelligible.
613 Furthermore, several different types of power structures exist which serve the different
[571] interests of the people composing them, and these are interlinked in combinations
[578] of superior span. But the formation of these structures and the modes in which they
combine are quite unlike the articulations in a lineage system. Characteristically, the
segments in a lineage system are conceived of as building up hierarchically to span
what is spoken of as a total society, the apex of the system affording a spectacular and
fixed definition of its boundaries. Had I been using this concept in this paper the
[173] founding ancestress of the nine Cyrenaican tribes, Sa'ada as named by the Bedouin,
would have served this purpose and would have been given inappropriate prominence.
121 The views presented here have the consequences of retreating from a concept
184 of a total society. The people to whom the facts given are related are the camel-herding
tribes only. Some of them have relations of many kinds with the cow-herding
233 folk who inhabit the northern plateau area, and these relations are also significant
619 for the analysis of a wide range of problems; genealogically both cow and camel
herders are seen as part of a single structure, but the differences between them with
regard to their economy, the size, composition, and distribution of their residential
units, their political and ritual life is so great that to conceive of them as a single social
121 structure is not useful. Moreover, the far western tribal sections have relationships
619 of such urgency with their neighbours in Tripolitania (who are excluded from Cyrenaican
genealogies) that to cut off these relationships as lying outside Cyrenaican society
would be quite unwarranted. The same can be said of the relationships of the tribal
sections in the eastern part of Cyrenaica with their genealogical cousins, the Aulad
'Ali of Egypt, who, although residing across a national border, are closely linked to
some of the Cyrenaican Bedouin. Some tribes also have to rely on the people of the
southern oases for an item of diet and an outlet for surplus wool, and the net of kinship
is spread out to include them. In these cases they come into contact with other
[177] ethnic groups such as Berbers and Tibu, and through the oases they extend their lines
of communication southwards to Wadai, Chad, and Bornu. As an indication of the
effectiveness of these links, it is only necessary to add that people inhabiting Cyrenaica
make periodic and regular visits to these far southern places, and that in 1948 a
shaikh, living near Ajadabiya in south-western Cyrenaica, collected blood-money
contributions from kinsmen in Wadai. A single structure cannot possibly include,
for analytical purposes, these sorts of relationships.

121 Finally, it must be stressed that the facts given here refer to the period 1948 to
114 1950. Since then oil has been discovered in large quantities near the territory of a
tribe where I spent most of my time while resident in the country, and where there
(315) was one tin shack in 1950 there is now a modern port with roads extending southwards
from it into the wilderness. I see no reason to assume that social relations as
I observed them are present today or that they were the same at any time in the past
● 175 either. Before the advent of the Sanusi Order in the early eighteen-forties, it is known
795 that one lineage at least was dominantly powerful and that its leader tyrannized a
613 large part of Central Cyrenaica.[1] His descendants constituted a powerful group in

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[1] Smith and Porcher, 1864. These two archaeologists met this leader and continued their archaeological researches around Cirene only with his goodwill, although the site is not on the territory of his tribe as I knew it in 1950. They also speak of him as inhabiting a castle which also lies outside the

1950, but his kind of tyranny was absent from the Cyrenaica of that period. From the 795
mid-nineteenth century until the Italian invasion of 1911, the Sanusi Order estab- 175
lished itself, spread its lodges throughout the tribes and in other more remote lands [613]
until it became what Evans-Pritchard speaks of as a theocratic empire.[1] The lodges [778]
served as areas of sanctuary and their staffs adjudicated disputes. Leaders of the
Order had the power to coerce and the Bedouin obeyed. They obeyed out of personal [793]
regard for some of them in 1950, but the religious authority previously used by the
leaders had given way to the political power they now exercised as functionaries in
a state system. In the meantime, the country had been ravaged by the long Italo- [648]
Sanusi wars. Throughout the nineteen-thirties after suffering terrible privations and
reduction in numbers through slaughter in war, death in concentration camps, and
exile, the Bedouin were ruled by the Italians. During the Second World War the
armies of three major contestants fought their battles where the Bedouin now tend
their flocks and herds. After the war they were left to fend for themselves, with a
minimum of administrative interference.

121 In the light of all this the conception of an equilibrium system is of little heuristic value, still less its derivative concept of a repetitive system. This does not mean, however, that an account of part of the social life of the Bedouin as it existed in 1950 must be nothing more than a disconnected piece of history, unrelated to a prior state of things and wholly useless for the understanding of the contemporary oil-producing cum mixed pastoral–agricultural economy. It would be little more than a piece of social historiography if the analysis was based on the concept of a total social structure of functionally interconnected parts, forming what Leach describes as ' a delicately balanced mechanism rather like the various parts of a wrist watch '.[2] Such a viewpoint would effectively exclude any possible comprehension of changes save those present as part of the dynamics of a system; its only answer to change is an account of a different system. If, instead, attention is focused on the analysis of a field of components arranged in a specific fashion to meet the interests of men at a particular time, it then becomes possible to see how a shift in their positions, the addition of new components, or the elimination of others produces this or that effect. It can make intelligible what has gone before, and if the future cannot be anticipated it can be demarcated within rough limits.

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modern territory of his tribe. See also Hamilton, 1856.

[1] Evans-Pritchard, 1949. In this book a brilliant account is given of the development of the Order, and how it came to unify and provide centralized political leadership for the tribes. [175] [795] [613]

[2] Leach, 1961, p. 6.

000 fiction, but it is interesting to read that, even in Ibn Khaldun's day, these Tuareg were known as "The Veiled Ones".

● 175 The first Arab expedition to North Africa began in 643, two years after the conquest of Egypt, when 'Amr ibn el-'Asi invaded Cyrenaica and received the submission of the Luwata Berbers, whom he found in occupation of that country. Forty years later the conquerors had reached the Atlantic, but these early Moslem invaders mostly settled in the towns and left the open country to the Berbers. Their influence on the nomadic population was therefore trifling, and to-day need not be taken into account.

175 619 The eleventh century irruption from the east of the wild Bedouin tribes of Beni Hilal and Beni Suleim, who continued their nomadic existence after their conquest of the country, was one of the decisive factors in moulding the character of the present-day population; a religious upheaval among the Berbers of Senegal the other. The Beni Hilal have indeed disappeared, but to-day all the independent tribes of Western Egypt, the Sa'adi, claim descent from the Beni Suleim, while their vassals all have the same title, Murabitin, as the adherents of the religious movement referred to above. Some historical explanation now becomes necessary and, since the vassals probably represent the aboriginal population more closely, we will first consider the Murabitin.

In the early days of Islam, volunteers constantly thronged to all the fighting fronts where the faith was being spread by the sword among the heathen. These were nicknamed *El-Murabitin*, which meant "pickets", from the *ribat* or outposts (lit. "horse-lines") in which they lived.

But in the eleventh century a violent religious movement among the Messufa and Lamtuna sections of the Sanhaja Tuareg appropriated the name to its followers, just as eight hundred year later the fanatics of the Eastern Sudan were known as *the* Dervishes of their time. Both upheavals began with a prophet on an island, and both spread northwards with terrifying rapidity. Yet the *Murabitin* of the Senegal were far more successful than their rivals on the Nile, and their title reached the height of its fame when a line of their kings, whose name the Spaniards corrupted to "Almoravides", ruled over Andalusia till 1156.

Yet just as the original *Murabitin* were gaining their

first successes in Senegal, the Beni Hilal and the Beni Suleim 175
were being despatched by the Caliph Mustansir billah against 619
Mu'izz ibn Badis, his rebellious viceroy in Tripoli. They
sang of their conquest : [539]

> " Great was the king, son of Badis, a mighty man of war !
> Yet we routed his thirty thousand men !
> We were but three thousand, yet the victory was ours, and ours the spoil !
> Their hearts were as water, not a man was in their ranks !
> We routed them and they fled far and wide ! "

These Beni Hilal, now extinct, are famous wherever Arabic is spoken for the exploits of their legendary hero Abu Zeid, while the Beni Suleim had helped the Prophet at the battle of Hunein, and are said by Hogarth to be the ancestors of the great modern tribe of Harb.[1]

The confusion of these two invasions caused the races of North Africa to become inextricably mixed. Both Arabs and Berbers spent their lives in the desert herding their flocks, and both were warlike. So it is natural that the intermarriages of a few generations should have made one people of them, and it is also natural that the conquered should claim relationship with the conquerors and not vice versa. But this aspiration of the Berbers has flooded their genealogies with so many lies that it is difficult to disentangle the truth.

The descendants of the original colonists, much mixed [792]
with Berber blood, still preserve their title of Murabitin, though no longer living in *ribat*, which soon lost their military character and were turned into *Zawia* " monasteries ", where the more peacefully inclined of the sect retired for religious teaching and contemplation. Later, when the *ribat* came to be deserted, the peaceful Murabitin, ill-fitted by their monastic habits for the resumption of an active nomadic life, sank into dependence on their warlike brethren the Sa'adi, and, among a primitive race, dependence means inferiority. Thus in Arabia any tribe that pays tribute to another [186]
is despised as Hiteim. And so the once proud title of " Murabitin " has simply come to mean " vassal " and nothing more.

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[1] *History of Arabia*, 38.

619 The independent Sa'adi tribes fall into four groups :

1. The Jawazi, Fawayid, and Rammah, all of common origin with the 'Awaqir of Cyrenaica.
2. The Harabi and Bar'asa, both of common origin with the 'Ibeidat of Cyrenaica.
3. The Hanadi, and
4. The Awlad 'Ali

[173] The original ancestor whom these Sa'adi all claim is one Abu Dib, said to be of Suleim descent.

175 554 619 This sheikh was a real personage and a contemporary of Ibn Khaldun (who died in A.D. 1406). He was sheikh of the Beni Ja'afir, and a man of great importance in Barka, the very place that the four tribes inhabited for centuries before they came to Egypt. Also the period of fifteen or sixteen generations, which the modern Bedouin assert to separate them from Abu Dib, agrees with this chronology well enough.[1]

619 [173] Some are found to assert that their title of Sa'adi "helping" is derived from an ancestress called Sa'ada, the wife of Abu Dib, or, according to a hostile account, of a Jew called Yana. But the real explanation of the term has already been given above.

619 651 At the present day a sort of feudal system prevails both in Egypt and Cyrenaica, by which families are *mrabit*,[2] or vassal families, not tribes to tribes ; thus the Qat'an tribe of Murabitin is divided, one part vassal to a family of Awlad 'Ali el-Ahmar, another to the Sinaqra, and a third to the Sinana. For a tribute called "alms", which by hereditary obligation each Mrabit family must pay, the Sa'adi family to which it is attached is bound to afford the Mrabit family protection in all minor difficulties of life, such as robbery by another family of Sa'adi, etc.

Thus a "Mrabit" family by paying tribute can herd its flocks in peace, calling upon the Sa'adi to see that justice is done them, but they are bound to join the Sa'adi to fight with them in any serious conflict with other tribes.

Among the "Mrabit" tribes of the present day are the Jumei'at, Qat'an, and Awlad Suleiman, all claiming as common ancestor one Ka'b, and feudal relations are

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[1] The pedigrees of which these Western Bedouin are so proud can only be trusted so far back as the individual whose name a subdivision has adopted, such as Kharûf in the Awlad Kharûf pedigree. Taking them separately, the pedigrees will be found to dovetail into each other up to that point, but beyond it things become problematical.

[2] Sing. of "Murabitin".

619 ancestress of the Awlad 'Ali and Hind of the Hanadi. (The
173 Hanadi call their ancestress Hind, the daughter of Sallam.)
These obvious fabrications only mean that their conventional genealogy is not believed outside the tribe. But the Awlad 'Ali themselves all agree that 'Ali was the son of 'Aqar bin Dib.

175 They are now a composite tribe made up of the descendants
619 of 'Ali's three sons, and various fragments of broken tribes.
The Awlad 'Ali lived for a long time in the "Green Mountain" of Cyrenaica, and about 150 years ago began to drift eastwards, called into Egypt by the Jumei'at to aid them against the Hanadi, who, with their subtribes, were then in possession not only of the north coast but were also settled all over the Beheira.

175 After the departure of the French in 1801, a firman was
619 addressed to the sheikhs of the Hanadi, Afrad (a division
of the Awlad 'Ali), Jumei'at, Beni 'Una, and other Arabs
648 resident in Beheira, confirming them in their territories, but threatening them with expulsion and fine if they misbehaved themselves.[1]

By 1808, the Hanadi seem to have been quite driven out by the Awlad 'Ali, for in that year they bought their peace with Muhammad 'Ali and asked for the restitution of their lands in Beheira. The Pasha agreed to this and sent troops under Shahin Bey to chase the Awlad 'Ali out again. The Awlad 'Ali responded by offering 100,000 "tallaris" to be allowed to remain in the lands of the Hanadi—an offer which Muhammad ,Ali accepted. When they failed to pay up, troops were again sent to aid the Hanadi against them, but this combined force was completely defeated by the Awlad 'Ali near Hosh 'Isa.[2]

Of the events of 1810, Jabarti says:

> "During his stay at Alexandria, he (Muhammad Ali) gave safe conduct to the chiefs of the Bedouins of the tribe of Awlad Ali who lived in the province of Beheira, and by this ruse enticed them to him; but hardly had they arrived than he had them arrested, claimed large sums from them, and sent his soldiers to carry off their cattle; their wives and their children were dishonoured. He then gave them robes of honour."[3]

Finally he exiled the Hanadi to Sharqiya, then a desert, and gave the Awlad 'Ali their lands on the coast and in Beheira.

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[1] Jabarti, vii, 78–80.

[2] Jabarti, viii, 171 and 179–180.

[3] Jabarti, viii, 300.

Had the Senussi been successful in the last war, they 175 •
would no doubt have brought in the 'Ibeidat or the 'Awaqir 619
from Cyrenaica to replace the Awlad 'Ali in Egypt.

At the present day the Awlad 'Ali, especially the eastern 619
sections near the Nile Valley, have almost ceased to be nomadic, 178
and only the old men have memories of their former warlike habits. They suffered considerably during the Great War, but are again becoming prosperous. They now own large comfortable tents, are beginning to build houses and clear out cisterns, and are also said to be increasing in numbers.[1] So civilized have they grown that my guides, one a Sinai Arab and the other an 'Abadi, concurred in calling them "green"—not real desert-worthy Bedouins.

Perhaps as a result of Libyan influence, or more probably 142
the better nurture and climate, they are taller, heavier, stronger, and lighter-complexioned than the lightly built Arabs of
Sinai and Hijaz. Also they are much franker and more 157
straightforward than their shifty and suspicious eastern cousins, 181
and altogether more trustworthy. Their women only veil 562
themselves to strangers, and talk quite naturally and cheerfully 834
to the men of their own tribe. 609

They cultivate as much barley as they can, using a 243
primitive plough drawn by camels, in the clayey hollows [492]
scattered over their very stony limestone desert, but, as the [132]
rainfall is very uncertain, a good crop only occurs every five
or six years. After harvest, they exchange some of their [437]
barley for maize, which the women grind to make bread
as required, and some for dried dates. The seed for next [251]
year is buried in a hole lined with straw and covered with
clay, and a year's forage for the animals is set aside. The [432]
rest of the crop goes to market, and for a short time the
Arab has money to buy clothes for himself and his family [426]
and at utmost need to pay off some of the numerous debts he has inherited from his forefathers. Soon he is reduced again to the clothes he wears, the tent he sleeps in, and his animals grazing in the desert.

They are great breeders of camels and sheep, and a busy 436
traffic in these goes on weekly in the markets of Hammam, 178
'Amriya, and the Beheira. So they have got into the habit [438]
[442]
[433]

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[1] At the 1927 census, the Western Desert Arabs, Awlad 'Ali, Jawabis, etc., numbered 38,928 souls exclusive of those settled in Beheira. But Pacho, 100 years ago, estimated them at 38,000 souls. [161]

(Sinaqra)

The Sinaqra, or descendants of Sinqir, are also reckoned among the descendants of Ali the White, "because Sinqir married his daughter Khadija." They include :— 619 173

(4)	Afrad	Maghawra
(5)	Azayim	'Eilet el-Abdi, Muwamna
(6)	'Eilet Eleura	'Eilet Jeballa, 'Eilet Qmar, 'Eilet Harun, 'Eilet Ajarma, 'Eilet Tahir.

II.

The descendants of 'Ali bin 'Aqar's second son, 'Ali el-Ahmar ("The Red") are:—

(1)	'Esheibat	'Eilet ed-Dawi, 'Eilet el-Azraq, El-Wassafa, 'El-Lazumi
(2)	Kimeilat	'Eilet el-Hajj Muhammad, El-Maharsa, 'El-Khadayij
(3)	Jineishat[1]	'Eilet el-Majduba, Es-Samayil, Tabak

III. SINANA

The Sinana are the descendants of Sineina, the third son of Ali bin 'Aqar bin Dib. They include:—

(1)	Mahafid	'Eilet Etman, 'Eilet el-Hammama, 'Eilet esh-Shimla
(2)	Arawa	'Eilet ez-Zireiriya, 'Eilet el-Ghazulat
(3)	Qatifa	'Eilet Nasralla, 'Eilet-Omar, Esh-Shawalha.
(4)	Ijna	

Jawabis.—The nomadic Jawabis (sing. Jibusi) are for 619
the most part still settled in and around the Wadi Natrun, 175
where General Andreossy found them in Napoleon's time. [131]
He calls them :

> "A hospitable tribe who lead a shepherd's life and encamp there every winter with their flocks. They are employed during this time carrying Natrun and prickly reeds ; they also have some traffic in dates, which they fetch in caravans from Sioua in the Ammonian Oasis ; it is a journey of twelve to fifteen days. These Arabs are *marabouths*, or peaceful people."[2]

He goes on to say they never make war, and only take up
arms to defend themselves. In his time the tribe was com- [162]
posed of about 2,000 men, and possessed 60 horses. A little [231]
[162]

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[1] Kennett gives the three subdivisions of the Jineishat as Madi, Samayil, and Jabr.

[2] *Memoirs Relative to Egypt*, 288.

619
[175] later Wilkinson estimated them at about 400 men near El
[162] Terrana and the Wadi Natrun.

At the present day they are still reckoned *Murabitin*, but,
like the Jumei'at, are sufficiently independent not to have to
[439] pay tribute. They share with the Awlad 'Ali in the date
traffic with Bahariya Oasis, where the produce of the village
of Mandisha is reserved for them, and that from Bawitti
for the Awlad 'Ali.

619 Kennett notes (p. 54) that they demand £400 for blood-
682 money instead of £300, the usual price in the Western
181 Desert, and alludes (p. 67) to :

> "The free and easy way in which the Gawabees tribe near the Wadi Natrun pack up their summer tents and leave them in situ while they themselves trek off with their winter tents into the open desert for the winter grazing is indicative of this code of honesty prevailing among them."

142 On page 101, he calls them "nearly all very small men,
619 with strangely similar features and characteristics running
through all the families of the tribe".

619 Bramly has collected three pedigrees of the tribe all
173 going back to Sheikh 'Abd el-Jawad el-Kassar. They state
that they are an offshoot from the Qadadfa, and about
500 years ago left Saqiet el-Hamra in Morocco to settle
in Egypt.

As a reward for "settling some affairs in the Wadi Natrun", Muhammad 'Ali Pasha granted them the usual Bedouin privilege of exemption from military service. There are small colonies of them elsewhere among the Awlad Ali, while others are settled in the cultivated provinces of Giza, Beheira, Menufiya, and Gharbiya.

Jumei'at.—This tribe, possibly a remnant of the original Libyan inhabitants of Mariut, is of quite respectable antiquity, for Ibn Khaldun includes the Jumei'at as a subtribe of "Beni 'Ali", themselves an offshoot from Beni Suleim. Whether his "Beni 'Ali" are the same as the modern Awlad 'Ali may be questioned, yet it is a reasonable assumption, for the exchange of the words "Beni" and "Awlad" in tribal names can be paralleled elsewhere.

The Jumei'at all agree that their remote ancestor, whom they share with the Awlad Suleiman and the Qat'an, was called Ka'b, and a Ka'b indeed appears in the pedigree ascribed

to Dib by Ibn Khaldun, who calls Dib a descendant of 619
Ka'b, the great-grandson of Suleim.[1] If this be true, the 173
Jumei'at must be an elder branch than any of the Sa'adi tribes, among whom the Awlad 'Ali are included. But in actual fact, the Awlad 'Ali do not consider the Jumei'at as of Sa'adi origin, that is, descendants of Abu Dib and his wife Sa'ada, but despise them as Murabitin or vassals, though they pay no tribute.

All this may be interpreted to mean that they are among the oldest inhabitants of Western Egypt. They have been in Egypt "seven hundred years" according to one of their sheikhs, Sa'ad Bey el-Masri, and a pedigree given me by another, Sheikh 'Ilwani Suleiman, who lives near Sidi 'Abd el-Rahman, runs :



The Jumei'at of Mariut are all descended from El-Ashtar, while the offspring of the other five sons are settled in Beheira, Gharbiya, and at Ramla near Alexandria.

It is, of course, possible that their eponymous ancestor, 619
Jumei'a, was an Arab of Beni Suleim descent, who returned to 173
Egypt from the "Green Mountain", soon after the Beni Suleim 174
invasion, and whose descendants became Murabitin by forming themselves into a religious community. But such religious fervour is not a Bedouin characteristic, but smacks rather of the fanaticism of the recently-converted, so I suspect the Jumei'at, in spite of their descent from Ka'b, to be mainly a remnant of the earlier Libyan population of the coast.

Prior to the arrival of the Awlad 'Ali, they were "Mrabit" 619
to the Beni 'Una, and engaged in constant conflict with the 175 •
Hanadi. Upon the rout and annihilation of the Beni 'Una, 726
the Jumei'at were stirred up to revolt against the Hanadi 792
by one of their holy men called Baqush. Outraged by their

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[1] The more ignorant Awlad Suleiman have forgotten Ka'b's paternity, and confused him with the famous Arab poet Ka'b ibn Zuheir. See p. 287 for their version. And yet another Jumei'i version gives as their ancestor the Saint Ka'b el Ahbar.

[2] The "Friends" of the Prophet.

619 oppression, he gathered his people and delivered a fiery
175 denunciation of his religion, during which he smashed his
726 rosary into pieces and mixed it with his horse's fodder;
792 Baqush then invited their kinsmen (?) the Awlad 'Ali, to
come over from the "Green Mountain" and help them.
To entice the Awlad 'Ali, he is said to have sent them samples
of salt desert water and Nile water sweetened with sugar to
illustrate the difference between the hardships of the desert
and the comforts of the Rif.[1]

619 As recounted earlier, the Awlad 'Ali completely routed the
175 Hanadi and their allies, and drove them from the desert.
726 In the division of the conquered territory, the Jumei'at
received a third, and, although they were still considered
Murabitin, were released from the payment of tribute. They
[131] now live intermingled with the free sections of the Awlad
'Ali, all along the north coast of Egypt, and are numerous in
Beheira, especially near Abu Hummus.

619 *Ṣamalus.*—The Samalus are found scattered among the
[131] Awlad 'Ali on the northern coast and stranded among many
of the Egyptian provinces. They once possessed a head
sheikh Abu Sala at Minya, and colonies are recorded from
Faiyum, Beheira, Menufiya, Gharbiya, and Sharqiya. An
[175] old paper from the Recruiting Department gives from
[162] seventeen villages in the Faiyum 775 mounted Samalus
[231] and 1,400 on foot, possessing 1,760 camels and 11,400
sheep. Two important groups of wells, both called "Sawani
[312] es-Samalus" exist on the north coast, one about 50 kilometres
east of Salum, and the other 20 kilometres south
of Dhab'a.

[173] They say they came to Egypt, 400 strong, about 200
years ago, from the Wadi Samalus in the Jebel Akhdar, and
their ancestor twelve generations ago was Nasr el-Hasani, of
course an "Arab from Beni Suleim".

[175] In the *Description de l'Egypte*, P. D. Martin relates how
[726] in 1800 the Samalus of Faiyum were raided by a party of
Ferjan, 200 strong, from Beheira.

619 *Shiheibat.*—These are a "Mrabit" tribe from the west with
186 an unenviable reputation, living near the Wadi Natrun.
Sayed Idris, the former Senussi leader, says of them: "Most

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[1] Dumreicher, 16. This is probably the "Sheik Abdall Gawyal Bagooshi" who wrote to Sir Sydney Smith in March, 1801, warning him of the approach of the French from Damanhur. Wilson, *History of the British Expedition in Egypt*, 371. (Rif = cultivated area.)

9: Murray E. K-3, 4 (ca. 1910-1935) 1935 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9
Egypt

herds have a black goat or two—such are the Shiheibat." 619 [186] They are families of shepherds scattered amongst the Sa'adi families, and must not be confused with the 'Esheibat section of the Awlad 'Ali.

Dumreicher (pp. 52–7) gives a lively account of a [175] quarrel between the Jawabis and the Shiheibat. [578]

175 Nile dikes and military conscription. The term "Bedouin"
648 came to mean, as it was defined by the government of Egypt,
651 one who did not legally own land and hence was not subject to
423 forced labor or military service. On this basis, the Director
[162] of Recruiting Office in a 1904 census distinguished three kinds
of Bedouin (Murray 1935:31):

290,095 - settled and living in their own farm colonies
240,880 - living among the fallahin
70,472 - real Bedouin or nomads

601,447

175 By the end of the 19th century, Bedouin society had
● 177 undergone a great deal of change. Politically, the Bedouins
648 were subordinates in a dominant-subjective authority relationship with the central regime of the Nile Valley. As a result of external political control, nomadism was curtailed and the Bedouins were forced to settle on the land to raise what few crops they could. These new political and economic conditions are the major aspects of the sedentarization process. Bedouin dependence on the central authority of Egypt and their reliance on horticulture increased with time. Nor did the entry of Britain into Egypt in 1882 change the material and social condition of the Bedouin.

175 The British, in the style of the politics of colonial-
648 ism, reorganized the administrative structure of Egypt. The Western Desert was given the status of a province; command

175 795 648 bat from al-Qasr joined the Sanusi army. The importance of their contribution to the Sanusi effort is vague, even though most of my informants claimed that their fathers "fought the British." Some of the al-Qasr activity was on a part-time basis. [124] One informant, whose father was the paramount leader of the 'Aishaibat tribe in 1916, told me that his father "used to take his rifle and ride out every morning to join the troops of Sayyid Ahmad al-Sharif (the grandson of *al-Sanusi al-kabiir*), and there he would kill many British soldiers. Then he would come home again at night." There was at least one group of al-Qasr Bedouins who joined the Sanusi in Libya before the start of the war. After the end of the fighting, this group returned to Egypt and asked to be pardoned by the British. They appealed to the Governor of Marsa Matruh that there should be no reprisals taken against them since the Turks had actually forced them to fight for the Sanusi. The British Governor, who was fluent in the Bedouin dialect and considered a great man by the Bedouins, replied to them in the form of a famous Bedouin proverb: "The ropes can be stretched far enough for forgiveness."

175 177 554 631 648 Traditionally, the Bedouins of the Marsa Matruh area were held in check by an officially created political structure which dated from the time of Muhammad 'Ali. This structure depended upon two political roles for the control of the Awlad 'Ali, the *'umda* and the *shaikh*, neither of which had previously existed in the Bedouin authority system.

175 177 554 631 648 Historically, the modern aspect of role differentiation and political specialization began with the appointment of Mitkhatri 'Adam at Sidi Barrani, west of Marsa Matruh. This was under Muhammad 'Ali Pasha. The new role was that of _'umda_, the same term used for the village leader in the Valley of the Nile. The first Bedouin _'umda_ died in 1909. At this time, under the British, another political role was instituted. This new role, that of _shaikh_, was a kind of vice-_'umda_ position. The son of the first _shaikh_ is now about 80 years old [115] and still lives in Marsa Matruh. (He was my chief informant for Bedouin history.) During this early period, there were few government officials in the desert, and, according to my informant, "there was need for only a few _'umdas_ and _shaikhs_. But later there was a need for more and more. The job of these men in those times was to work for the Egyptians in their dealings with the Bedouins of the desert." The number of incumbents in the offices of _'umda_ and _shaikh_ increased as the political needs of the British grew.

175 648 According to the Bedouins, the British administration did not arrive in the desert until about 1914. Up until that time, matters were in the hands of the Egyptians who governed the desert province for the colonial government. When the British arrived in Marsa Matruh, the opening of World War I was at hand. The Bedouins say, quite proudly, that the British knew of their sympathy for, and cooperation with, the Sanusi against the Italians in Cyrenaica.

648 727 important effects on contemporary al-Qasr. There remain about 11 million land mines in the ground between Marsa Matruh and Sallum. 648 727 165 164 Accidents connected with these mines take one thousand Bedouin lives every year, and cause about 10,000 injuries annually. (Reported in al-Ahram, January, 1965). This danger limits the areas in which the Bedouins can use the tractor, and, as a result, a great deal of the coastal land must be plowed by hand. In al-Qasr, physical disfigurements resulting from mine mishaps were quite common, and most families have had members killed in this way. In one al-Qasr lineage, 'Ailit Ma'fas, there have been sixteen men killed by mines since 1943.

Change and Present Attitudes

648 177 Political and economic changes, begun at the turn of the century, have continued into the present. The Bedouins of al-Qasr have been increasingly drawn into the political and economic life of the Egyptian national community. They have come to depend upon the national market for their products and upon governmental agricultural subsidies for their security. The net result of this process has been a sedentary Bedouin society which is not quite tribal and not quite peasant. Al-Qasr has this in-between quality--what Fallers (1961) has called the tertium quid quality.

[829] It is difficult to gauge the feelings of the Bedouins of al-Qasr about the social changes taking place. They complain

648 about the lack of concern shown toward the Bedouins throughout
•177 the history of their relations with the Nile Valley: they
829 complain that the Egyptians have no right to take over the desert and order their lives for them. They say that "the Egyptians know nothing about the desert"; that "they do not know how to live in the desert and should take our advice on these things." "They (the Egyptians) have given us nothing, we had all of this before they came. Jamal Abd al-Nasser did not invent socialism (*ishtarikiyya*): the Bedouins have always had it. We have always shared and taken care of one another." The Egyptians are still "outsiders" to the Bedouins. They are referred to as "*fallahin*" or "peasants."

Interestingly enough, the Bedouins include President Nasser in their own in-group. They insist, in a half-serious way, that he is of the Awlad 'Ali because he is originally from Upper Egypt. One can compare the roles of Nasser and the Grand Sanusi in some ways. Both leaders made special
[778] efforts to bring the Bedouins into a new community, to share their "good fortune" with them; also, both leaders are considered to be possessors of charisma, or *baraka* ("blessing") by the Bedouins. One may hear unkind remarks about "holy men" or "government officials," but never about Nasser or the al-Sanusi family. One Bedouin said: "Jamal Abd al-Nasser works hard and tries to do good for the people, but his officials are
000 very lazy and do not care about us." While the Bedouins

While the Bedouins
795 771 respect the Sanusi family they, nevertheless, wear their
829 religion lightly. An informant, speaking of the merits and demerits of the conservative Muslim Brethern Association, said that "you should never listen to a holy man, for he will lead
[576] you straight to hell!" But upon meeting any member of the
[778] Sanusi family, all Bedouins greet him by kissing his hand. Besides a show of deference, this ritual act, in theory, transfers baraka from al-Sanusi to the layman.

648 The citizenship exemptions granted the Bedouins by
641 Muhammad 'Ali have been rescinded by Abd al-Nasser. This has been one aspect of his program to imbue the Bedouin with political consciousness and promote participation in the nation-state. The Bedouins say that this is the way it should be: they want the right to own land and to accept the responsibility of defending the homeland. But they still do
[651] not pay land taxes, and they feel justified in this because the desert "is very poor soil, and not like that of the Nile." Nor do they always heed the call to military duty, though they insist that they do.

648 Egyptian land reform laws would be impractical, or
● 177 impossible to apply, in al-Qasr. In the Nile Valley, such
423 laws were necessary. The majority of the Egyptian peasants can survive on less than one acre of land, and farms of under five acres comprise 44 per cent of the agricultural land area in the Nile Valley (Warriner 1962:204). Plots this

648 177 423 size in the barley and pasture area of al-Qasr would not permit a subsistence level economy. Just as important is the political implication of any attempt at large-scale land reform in al-Qasr. The pattern of land distribution in al-Qasr reflects an intimate relationship between the structural principles of Bedouin society, especially the lineage system and territoriality. (In a later chapter we will discuss this relationship.) The ramifications of land reform would amount to a structural rearrangement of al-Qasr society and would make redistribution of land difficult to administer, or even to imagine. A reorganization of property relations is, in effect, a basic change in the authority structure. Therefore, the Bedouins want no part of land reform. There is a law which forbids the ownership of "more than 100 feddans (one feddan=one acre) of agricultural land. This shall also apply to barren and desert land."[1] [115] One of my informants, a large landowner, claims that this "law only applies to the Nile Valley where there is plenty of water. If the government wants the Bedouins to abide by that law then they must take care of us. I would gladly trade this land (which was considerably more than 100 feddans) for 100 feddans in the Nile Valley." The traditional tribal structure of Bedouin society

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[1] "Decree for the Amendment of the Agrarian Reform Law in the Southern Region," Department of Information, Cairo, July 25, 1961.

648 • 177 [423] makes the welfare aspects of "Arab Socialism" meaningful, but the Bedouins of al-Qasr feel that they are already practicing "Socialists."

The Bedouins feel that the programs of the government are insufficient: the desert is extra harsh and aid should compensate for this. On the other hand, the Egyptians who administer the aid programs claim that the Bedouins do not differentiate between "giving cooperation" and "receiving aid." [181] Agricultural advisers complain that the Bedouins are lazy. One agronomist whose job it was to teach the Bedouins how to cultivate the olive tree said that they did not want to learn: "They want us to plant the trees, water them and care for them, harvest the olives, and then they will take them to the market and sell them!" This statement is typical. The [186] Bedouins reply: "The Egyptians did not teach us how to grow the olive. Our fathers planted the olive here long before they came into the desert." The Bedouins feel that the Egyptians should follow their advice concerning the use and control of water in the desert; that if they did the olive [186] would flourish and life would be easier. "The Egyptians," they say, "are lazy and cannot keep up with our requests for more seedlings. They cannot furnish us with what we need to improve our lives. All we hear is: 'tomorrow, tomorrow'!"

[241] The Bedouins do not understand the methods of modern hydrology and agronomy. They see no reason for the experimenta-

648 tions and innovations in agriculture which the Egyptians bring
•177 to the desert. On the other hand, the Bedouins do not get
241 the modern materials which they need to increase the production
of their land. This is most serious when it comes to heavy
farm machinery, such as tractors, and the spare parts to keep
it functioning. Furthermore, seldom did a man in al-Qasr
receive the number of olive seedlings that he requested. This
invariably led to bitterness between Bedouins and Egyptians.
648 Most of the Bedouins believe that the desert is a difficult
177 (wihsha) life, and they favor change. They want to know, for
instance, why an American would leave home to live such a life.
[114] At a Governor's Council meeting which I attended, the Bedouin
representative from al-Qasr did not protest government interference. He complained that the Governor was not furnishing the materials and facilities which the Bedouin needed if he was to become "modern" and "educated." The Bedouins' major complaint about the Egyptians is not that they are trying to change the desert, but that they are not changing it fast enough!

423 cost payable over a period of thirty years. As pointed out
657 by Professor Abu-Zeid (n.d.), this law is welcomed in part
656 because the garden area to which it really applies (the garden
area in al-Qasr would be the _'izba_ sector) is not considered
"tribal territory" or lineage-owned as are the barley and
pasture regions.

653 Governmental activity growing out of the "Desert Law"
•177 has been an important catalyst for social, economic and
*613 political change. All of these aspects of change had repur-
cussions on the lineage system and the authority structure of the Bedouins. In 1959, the government entered al-Qasr with the goal of revitalizing and reorganizing the hydraulic system of the area. The revival of the Roman water system, especially the network of cisterns covering the southern region of al-Qasr, and, on the coast, the restoration of the well system and underground galleries, the drilling of new wells and the intensification of olive farming have all led to a levelling of economic differentiation between lineages and between individuals.

657 In 1956, the Egyptian government passed the Cooperative
177 Law (U.A.R. Law Number 217) establishing agricultural cooperative
474 societies throughout the country. But not until 1959 did this
law have any impact on the tribes of the Western Desert.
[433] Generally, the cooperative society has served as a primary
and successful agent of social change in the desert. It has

657 sanctioned the direction of economic development from a
•177 pastoral to a market-oriented, agricultural mode of production.
474 Land reclamation and development projects administered by the
433 cooperatives encourage the Bedouins to produce cash crops.
In this way, Al-Qasr is being drawn into the national economy.
Price changes and seasonal commodity preferences in the Nile
Valley now affect the economy of al-Qasr. The generation of a
[181] cash economy has created a competitive spirit and a degree of
individual independence which cuts across tribal loyalty and
affiliations. The cooperative society, in this manner, tends
to be a "social equalizer."

657 But economic transformation as the intended goal of the
177 Cooperative Law is far from being an accomplished fact. Al-
178 Qasr is still a traditional Bedouin society in the sense that
474 the lineage structure is the framework in which economic and
*613 social relations take place. Because the cooperative society,
as a new basis for association, threatens the dominance of the
lineage principle, it has become the focal point for a struggle
between the old and new.

657 The major problem encountered by the government officials
177 in this program is that the cooperative society, as a central
474 agent for the dispensation of aid products, becomes a pawn in
661 tribal power politics. The government, forced to rely upon the
435 prestigious and wealthy men for the initiation of an innovative
program, found itself unable to prevent profiteering and the

657 sale of goods on the black-market. Tribal leaders, or members
177 of a "status group," in whose hands the operation of the
474 cooperative society had been placed, confiscated more than
661 [435] their share of food and fodder and resold it either in the Nile Valley or to their own tribesmen for whom it had originally been intended. The government could not really prosecute the guilty parties for fear of jeopardizing the entire program. Nor could they convince the cheated tribesmen that they had been treated unfairly by their leaders. For one thing, the
[673] Bedouins did not consider that their leaders were committing a wrong; furthermore, any Bedouin who would go to the government to inform on another Bedouin would be subjected to a
[577] trial by Bedouin justice. It is still the traditional codes of Bedouin law and honor, and not the modern judiciary system, which prevail in al-Qasr.

474 The cooperative society in al-Qasr is one of thirteen in the general area of Marsa Matruh. It began with a membership of twenty-five, twenty-two of these were from the 'Aishaibat tribe. Today, the enrollment is 139 official, and another 195 "unofficial" members. The unofficial members represent unregistered branches of the al-Qasr cooperative. The Bedouins
[735] explain that they cannot allow any members of the tribe to go hungry, and, therefore, they will distribute food to all those
[661] who need it (Zein, n.d.). This, of course, shows that those cooperative officers who do profiteer are not entirely oblivious

474 of the needs of their tribesmen; that, in fact, the patronage
661 system is relative to the traditional situation. Unavoidably,
474 the al-Qasr cooperative society is dominated by one tribe:
619 107 of its members are from the 'Aishaibat, while only 32 are from other tribes. This relationship between traditional and modern structures is common throughout the Western Desert. When a new cooperative is organized within the boundaries of a certain tribal mintaqa, members of the local tribe will resign from other cooperatives to join "their own." Thus, when a new cooperative was founded in Marsa Matruh, twenty members of the Jum'iat tribe left the al-Qasr branch to join the new chapter which catered largely to the needs of the Jum'iat in the town.

474 The World Food Program of the Food and Agriculture
747 Organization (F.A.O.) of the United Nations operates through
433 the cooperative society. It has had an impact on the economy
177 of the Bedouins of al-Qasr. In 1963, this organization, with the cooperation of the U.A.R. government, proposed to stabilize economic conditions in the Western Desert by providing 4,000 Bedouin families (20,000 persons) with enough food and fodder to help them through the three dry summer months. The program was designed to encourage mixed and settled farming through the reclamation of 20,000 acres of arid desert land, while its range improvement project was to furnish pasturage for 500,000 sheep throughout the Northwestern Coastal Zone. In al-Qasr,

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this number included pasturage for 11,000 sheep (Abu-Zeid n.d.: 19-27).

[474] F.A.O. has encountered a number of serious problems and the program has received setbacks. The program, as an agent of social change, failed to take proper measure of the structural and ideological aspects of the Bedouin traditional system. Range improvement projects were carried out with disregard for existing tribal boundaries (the mintaqa) in the desert. In one case, the Bedouins removed fences on their property, and allowed sheep to destroy an entire experimental range area. Food distribution has fallen short because polygyny as a structural feature of marriage and the Bedouin family was not taken into account. The government estimated five persons per family, and planned to distribute food to 4,000 families. They were only able to subsidize 3,281 families. Aid officials failed to consider the strength of Bedouin values. To qualify
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for government aid, a Bedouin must belong to his local cooperative society. Some Bedouins wish to remain independent of government business, and others cannot afford the 50 piasters membership dues. A man may borrow money from another, of course, but in al-Qasr a "debt" is actually a particular kind of social relation which, like all others, carries with it a set of specific rights and obligations. A debt among Bedouins is a [571] complex relationship: it may draw two parties together, or it may be, as it is with the Kachins of Burma (Leach 1954:153),

747 the basis of conflict. Bedouins may be unwilling to contract
•177 such a potentially significant relationship for the 50 piasters
474 426 it takes to join the cooperative society. In yet another area,
571 program administrators concerned with nutritional improvement
747 have ignored the culturally important areas of food preferences
177 and, more seriously, food prohibitions. The Bedouins, who
262 subsist mainly on their own animal products, barley bread, and
a few fresh vegetables, are extremely hesitant to accept what
they consider ritually "unclean meat from foreigners," powdered
747 milk, dried fish, and Kraft cheese. They are willing to
177 accept grain, flour, and the cottonseed cakes which are used
as fodder. In other words, the Bedouins seem to be presented
[178] with poor alternatives which may tend to reinforce choices
[433] related to the traditional productive organization, i.e.,
pastoralism. The exogenous stimuli to change are so culturally
objectionable that they actually generate conflict situations
and misunderstanding between agents and recipients of change.

747 Government programs have aimed at one aspect of
177 Bedouin society, the economic structure. They have ignored
433 the cultural underpinning of social organization, the system
of meanings in terms of which social action takes place
(Geertz 1957:32-54). The relationship between social and
economic behavior is, of course, an extremely important one.
But the economic structure cannot be transformed independently
of a specific cultural structure.

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233 The Bedouin of al-Qasr idealize the life of the pastor-
183 alist. It is a dominant theme in their culture. Gardening
241 and arboriculture are perceived by the Bedouins as involving
[461] long hours of work, anxiety over waiting for profits, and
complex market operations. They understand the logic and
[556] operation of the sheep market. Sheep are a store of value, a
source of security, and a medium of exchange. In a good year
of rain, a man can reap a good crop of barley, and buy more
sheep against the inevitable bad year to come. While most
472 Bedouins are, in one way or another, involved with the modern
433 cash economy which ties al-Qasr to Marsa Matruh, the Bedouins
241 who go into the production of cash crops on a large scale are
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177 those who can afford the risk of failure and who can survive
the meager profits of the initial stage. These are the men who
can adjust their world view from that of the pastoralist to
that of the entrepreneur. There are only a few of these men
in al-Qasr but they dominate the economy. Through them, most
of the Bedouins of al-Qasr are linked to the national economy.

Land and Economy

433 The period between 1960 and 1964 was one of significant
177 economic change in al-Qasr. Dependence upon farming increased
178 while pastoralist activities became less important. In the
past, none of the Bedouins now living in al-Qasr were "nomads;"
even my oldest informants had moved only once or twice to

433 plant a small crop or graze their animals on the land of
177 relatives. In terms of economic specialty, the economy of
178 al-Qasr has for some time been a mixed one. Traditionally,
433 dependence was upon animal products with relatively few
177 vegetables being grown in the *'izba* sector of the coast and
178 the barley sector to the south. Now, over one-half of the
241 registered land in al-Qasr is aboricultural land, and much
311 more land is given over to the growing of vegetables than in
the past. Correspondingly, the barley land has decreased.
The Bedouins still use barley primarily for fodder but much
of this comes from the government. With the shift to olive
arboriculture and government aid in the form of flour and
grain, naturally the barley crop has become less crucial.
But it remains indispensable for many Bedouins during this
transitional period. All Bedouins of al-Qasr are concerned
with securing a good livlihood. They express this idea in
the term *ma'isha simha*, and, as I have noted, they identify
it with the garden coastal sector of al-Qasr. The security
of a cash economy and participation in the national economy
433 have been realized by the Bedouins. I have no figures on the
241 amount of land registered prior to 1960, but, as of 1964,
311 al-Qasr consisted of 2,000 registered acres. Over one-half
434 of this land is in the garden area of al-Qasr, and is planted
with orchards. All of this land represents cash crops. Planted
in between the orchards are vegetable gardens. These gardens

These gardens
433 furnish staples for local consumption and more cash crops for
241 the Marsa Matruh market. Matruh is dependent upon these
311 vegetable goods from al-Qasr, to the extent that the Governor
434 has forbidden the Bedouins to truck their goods to the higher
443 [656] priced market in Alexandria.

654 The success of arboriculture in al-Qasr has been the
245 result of a well-organized reclamation program in this area
177 by the government. The relatively good supply of fresh water
433 and the proximity of a large market town has made al-Qasr an
atypical case in the government's attempt to transform the desert pastoral economy. Since 1960, the government's program has met with a great deal of success. Such results have, of course, induced the Bedouins of al-Qasr to accept change, and have further enhanced the future of the program. The figures below show, as of 1964, the plant distribution of orchards in the _'izba_ of al-Qasr, and indicate the measure of success attained by the governmental reclamation program.

The environmental conditions of al-Qasr are particularly well-suited for the olive tree: the olive has been the basis of the economic transformation of al-Qasr. The Bedouins tend to play down the government's role in developing olive arboriculture in the al-Qasr area. But before 1960, only the very
[556] wealthy men could afford to deal in the olive market, since it
involves a great initial financial risk. Hence, prior to the entry of the government's program, there were 2,743 olive trees

TABLE 1

ARBORICULTURE IN AL-QASR, 1964

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Plant	Acres	Plants Distributed	Successful Plants
Olive	947	40,399	32,488 (80%)
Almond	57	2,570	1,752 (67%)
Fig	66	10,537	(experimental stage)
Grape	.5	512	512 (100%)
Peach	2.5	804	200 (20%)

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in al-Qasr, and these were distributed among only 27 men. Most of these men also owned large numbers of sheep.

In 1960, the government began planting olive trees on the registered land of individuals living in the 'izba sector. This plan also involved instructing the Bedouins in the care of the tree: an individual who had traditionally depended on the rains now had to learn irrigation farming. This aspect of the program, learning modern "water discipline," was a source of conflict for the Bedouin with his pastoralist outlook on life. The olive tree must be watered twice weekly. The Bedouins say that this made them feel like "peasants." The Bedouins were also apprehensive over the fact that the olive tree did not bear its first fruit, i.e., the first cash

654 245 •177 433 [747] crop, until five to seven years after planting. To alleviate the difficulties of this period of apprehension, which the Governor of the desert province refers to as "the dangerous period," the United Nations F.A.O. aid program was designed and put into operation in al-Qasr.

654 245 177 433 435 A Bedouin may purchase an olive seedling from the government for the price of two piasters (about six cents). This same seedling costs the government 26 piasters. Once through "the dangerous period," a Bedouin can expect a yield of 120 to 150 kilos of olives from one tree. Olives sell for about 15 piasters per kilo. Or, at a cost of 5 piasters per kilo, the olives can be converted into oil. One ton of olives will render about 23 per cent oil. Olive oil is now considered a luxury item in Egypt, and the market price is very high. But only the Bedouin with a large harvest of olives finds it profitable to sell his product on the oil market. These conditions have made many Bedouins willing to convert from horticulture and sedentary pastoralism to arboriculture.

654 245 177 Between 1960 and 1964, the government reclamation program has planted a total of 9,514 olive trees on land registered to 124 individuals. The average distribution of trees, about seventy-six per man, is indicative of one of the problems related to change in al-Qasr and about which we have spoken earlier. Most of the trees have gone to men who, before

654 245 147 1960, were olive tree owners. One individual, who owned 400 trees before the reclamation program, now owns 1,400 trees. His increase has not all been at government expense, but a large share of it has been. Of the 9,514 trees planted by the government, 4,666 of them have been planted in the barley and wadi area to the south; 4,848 in the garden area on the coast. [312] In the southern sector, a Bedouin who owns at least ten acres of land may have the government drill a well and erect a windmill pump on his property. For this, he pays [452] 350 Egyptian pounds (approximately $1,000.00) over a thirty-year period. The Bedouin is willing to undertake this contract, and also to take land out of barley production, because he sees the future security of the olive market. Because of this, also, he is willing to agree on land boundaries and to register his land with the government.

657 Economic transition would not be possible, nor could the Bedouins afford to hazard it, were it not for government welfare payments in the form of staple products. These rations stabilize the mixed economy of the al-Qasr while promoting a shift to a fuller dependence on agriculture. 657 474 Of the thirteen cooperative societies in the Matruh area, al-Qasr is the largest and has been designated as a pilot project for the whole Western Desert. Al-Qasr garners the largest share of government aid, and, consequently, is heavily dependent upon it. The table below shows the amount of aid given monthly to

244 all times of the day in the desert. The Bedouins had most
of these crops before the government came to al-Qasr. Since
? [177] 1960, however, the Bedouins have been planting new crops such
as okra, squash, cucumber, tomato, spinach and melon. All of
244 these are plants adopted from the Nile Valley. Vegetables
312 are grown by means of irrigation or dry-farming. Where there
is no well water, an individual will cultivate without irrigation. In this case, crops are planted in the spring after the
rains. This method is called ba'ali. Irrigation makes it
possible for a man to obtain four crops during the year, but
usually, the Bedouin is more concerned with security than
with profit. Therefore, most Bedouins try for one good crop
244 and allow a portion of the land to remain fallow. Land which
has been planted all year around needs at least one year's
rest before it can be replanted. The vegetable harvest
usually takes place in July or August.

241 The government has attempted to introduce other crops
177 into al-Qasr which have failed. Failure is related to two
312 main problems in al-Qasr: salination arising from the short
supply of fresh water, and the Bedouin's misunderstanding of
245 the techniques of successful irrigation farming. Figs have
177 not been successful in al-Qasr due to the nature of the soil
itself. The almond tree has succumbed to the climate of al-
[132] Qasr. This tree blooms in April during the khamsin season,
fifty days of hot, dry winds blowing in from the Sahara. The

245 blossoms of the tree are stripped away by these winds before
177 the fruit can mature.

178 Traditional values affect the Bedouins' perception of
517 their new life. Men are fond of gathering for their ritual
272 three cups of mint tea and recalling "the good old days." In
[829] those days, they say, men only had to ride, shoot, and drink
233 tea. In the past, there was a great deal of security in
178 owning animals which are not as dependent on the rains as
422 is agriculture. During a year of bad rains, a Bedouin could
233 always move his flock to Libya or to the Nile Valley: "When
731 we have a bad year, we take our animals to the grass of our
166 relatives. When they have a bad year, they come here." In
167 the drought year of 1960, 20,000 Egyptian Bedouins migrated
to Libya in search of pasturage. This caused an international
[648] conflict and King Idris of Libya, for a short time, closed the
border to Bedouins. The conflict was finally resolved, and
the Bedouins were given permission to use the pastures of
Cyrenaica. None of the Bedouins of al-Qasr were involved in
this movement.

233 The Bedouins who have settled in the _'izba_ sector of
al-Qasr also prefer to keep some sheep. The security which
they represent is worth the time and expense of maintaining
233 them and paying a shepherd to look after them. The Bedouins,
178 in the past, paid their shepherds one sheep for every ten
465 sheep that he tended. Payment was made twice a year. Today,

407 the lack of spare parts. Three of the tractors were Russian-built, and two were Egyptian made. The Bedouins say that the Russian tractors are the better.

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In 1964, the Western Desert received its heaviest rainfall since 1947. To take advantage of this, local government officials of the reclamation project requested an additional fifty tractors for plowing on the coastal zone. They received only six additional tractors. In that year, the thirty-nine tractors used in the entire Western Desert were able to plow 15,240 acres of land. During this period of economic change,

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a bad barley crop causes a fodder shortage for the animals, and seldom is the aid program able to compensate for this. Consequently, there is a need to ship sheep to the Nile Valley, or to seek permission to take them to the pastures of Cyrenaica. Both situations create tremendous difficulties for both the

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Bedouins and the government. A third alternative for the Bedouin is to buy barley on the black-market. In doing this, he must pay six times the normal cost of grain, and risk reprisals.

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Prior to 1960, change in al-Qasr might be characterized as a steady and endogenous process of sedentarization. It had been taking place for about a century and a half. Exogenous change, social and economic, may be identified with the desire of the government to reclaim land in al-Qasr for agricultural use, and to integrate the Bedouin into the national economy.

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This program cannot be divorced from the fundamental political aim of the government which is to make the Bedouins politically-conscious participants in the Egyptian political community. The reform program, which has been only outlined here, has had ramifying effects on the Bedouin traditional systems, especially the political, and that is a major concern of this study. Changes in one structure of society are apt to have repercussions in other structures. This seems particularly the case where the economic and political structures are concerned. Economic change has been a background to political structural change in al-Qasr. Political change is historical in al-Qasr, but it has been accelerated in the period starting with 1960. For these reasons, we are interested in both the traditional and the modern systems.

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Change will continue to occur in al-Qasr. This is because the advantages of cash crops and a market economy are obvious to the Bedouin. He can even have more of what has been traditionally valued if he is successful in the modern market system. He can buy a sheep for 10 L.E.; a goat for [435] 8 L.E.; a horse for 90 L.E.; a camel for 150 L.E.; and a fine spring tent for 125 L.E.. A Bedouin knows that he must, as an individual, register his land, build a stone house on it (which costs about 100 L.E.), and learn the technique of irrigation farming. All of the Bedouins of al-Qasr are to some degree willing to do this for the ma'isha simha which it

177 433 434 brings. The future of the olive tree on the coast, and the growing importance of the melon crop in the southern sector will be the bases of a modern al-Qasr. The table below gives 177 434 435 some indication of what the Bedouins of al-Qasr can hope for, in terms of material profits, by a shift to a cash economy. Prices are approximate, and as of 1964.

TABLE 4

PRICES OF KEY PRODUCTS IN AL-QASR, 1964

Crop	Price Per Unit	Possible Profit
Barley	3 L.E. per ardab (120 kg.)	20 L.E. per acre
Melon	6-12 piasters each	70-100 L.E. per acre
Mint	Few piaster per bunch	150 L.E. per acre
Olive	15 piasters per kg. of olives	1 tree=150 kg. of olives =22.5 L.E.
	40 piasters per kg. of oil	1 tree=30 kg. of olive oil =12.5 L.E.

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Land Tenure and Rights of Ownership

Traditionally, an individual's rights in the land were of usufruct and tenancy. Sovereignty over the land was vested in the corporate secondary lineage group (see Figure 7). The territory of al-Qasr is a division of lineage zones, and more will be said about this in the next chapter since it relates directly to the structural organization of Bedouin

428 562 inherited by a woman's daughters. The carpets and the tent,
[422] which are woven by women, are not their property to pass on
for they belong to the head of the household, the shaib.

596 Economic change in al-Qasr has had its impact at the
• 177 level of production mode, and, also, it has affected the
178 composition of the basic family structure. One informant,
[124] who is now nineteen years old, remembers growing up in a
household composed of his grandfather, father, father's
brothers and their families. Since that time, his father
has built another house away from the family home; one uncle
has moved to Marsa Matruh and opened a shop there; his
youngest uncle has built a house not far from the family home;
and one uncle remains with his three wives in the original
182 house. This fission-type process is not uncommon in a seg-
177 mentary society, although as a traditional process, it
*613 represented a mechanism for dealing with ecological pressures.
433 In the modern case, in al-Qasr, the process of fission in the
434 Bedouin social structure proves to be an adaptive mechanism
also: the fragmentation of lineage property and relations is
a positive condition for the transition to a cash and market
economy. Among most of the families of al-Qasr, as market
orientation increases brothers begin to economically differentiate their tasks and interests with an eye to individual
profits.

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554 and are related to the organizational principles mentioned above.

619 The Awlad 'Ali represent a cultural entity whose membership is defined in patrilineal terms. Cutlurally, and genealogically, they are related to the Cyrenaican Bedouin but distinct from the Egyptians of the Nile Valley. The 619 •177 political system of the Awlad 'Ali can be extended to include Cyrenaicans "as Bedouins" but it can only interact with the Egyptians "as foreigners." This means that the Awlad 'Ali possess common roles, structures, and cultural institutions which can articulate with those of the Cyrenaican Bedouin. In the case of the Egyptians, however, social interaction calls forth new cultural categories and new structural elements in Bedouin society. This is the basis of political change in al-Qasr. Role differentiation and ideological replacement are taking place vis a vis the nation-state: the traditional political structure of the Bedouins is adapting to the Egyptian political environment. In the language of the "politics of modernization," this process is referred to as "politicization" or "political socialization." We shall deal with this process in later chapters.

The principles which relate the Bedouins of al-Qasr to other Bedouins of the Western Desert and Libya are the organizational principles of kinship, residence, and contract; but the principle which relates them to the Egyptian state is

619 •177 [121] the bureaucratic principle. Here we are concerned with the traditional situation.

619 *613 571 The 'Aishaibi Bedouins of al-Qasr are a residence group. Each sub-group of the tribe, i.e., the secondary and tertiary units, is assigned their own territory (mintaqa). Kinship and residence are the primary determinants of group differentiation; agnates who dwell together represent concrete authority structures, or political groups. This follows from the fact that patterns of political action, or what we call political structures, most often deal with the exercise of legitimate authority--as opposed to power. Power relations do occur and when present complicate the situation. In al-Qasr, power relations and structures emerge when the principle of cognation or contracted alliance form groups which crosscut the effectiveness of local, agnatic political structures. But, in al-Qasr, as in most societies, political action usually takes the form of the exercise of authority (Southall 1965:120).

173 114 *613 571 The genealogical map as an idological charter argues against the formation of power relations. Genealogical relations represent a set of social relations each replete with definite rights and obligations. Fallers (1956) has noted the tendency in segmentary lineage societies to cast all authority relations in a unilinear genealogical mould. The

*613 829 173 571 Bedouin visualize their world, extending from Alexandria to

*613 178 578 [194] office in modern Bedouin society. Also, we will return to the processes of fission and fusion when we discuss Bedouin law. I will be able to show through the use of legal documents how one tertiary unit went through a process of fission, fusion and re-fusion with its secondary unit.

The capacity for fusion and fission is a result of a number of structural situations. First of all, it is the exercise of choice on the part of the tertiary segment members who have contracted alliance in the form of collective responsibility with other tertiary segments of the lineage. The choice to break off from the major group may be of two kinds: a severence of political ties with one group in favor of a new group or the natural process of segmentation as a response to ecological conditions. In the latter case, no new political alliances are formed, and it usually involves a married son going off to begin his own camp. It is only an expansion of the major or secondary group. But the former case is one of decimation: the secondary group contracts. In both cases, authority is exercised, either between father and son, or, *613 578 177 178 between heads of corporate groups. In al-Qasr, the capacity for either type of fission is limited by the political environment of the Egyptian nation-state, the highest level of authority which the Bedouin encounters. The classic functioning of the segmentary lineage system is, in the case of al-Qasr, being changed by extra-system factors. The

*613 178 177 578 Bedouins, always a minority in Egypt, have been undergoing a transition to peasantry since about 1800. Probably since that time, Bedouin society has been, to use Easton's (1959) emphasis, a "segmentary society" rather than a "segmenting society."

196 Formal Bedouin categories of kinship are confusing; depending upon the situation they use the concepts of bait, 'ait, 'aiela and gabiila interchangeably. The term bait literally means "house," the term bait al-'Arab may mean "the tent" or "the people of the tent." "People of the tent" [594] may refer to either the nuclear family of one man, or the nuclear families of a man, his brothers and his sons, and [596] [621] their spouses and offspring. In the latter case, the extended family is referred to as the naja'. A naja', or camp, usually consists of three or four tents. The word bait may 196 *613 refer to the tertiary and the sub-tertiary groups, and occasionally one might even refer to the secondary group as a bait when he wishes to emphasize the quality of corporateness. The term 'aiela, literally "family," is the word used most often to designate the secondary lineage segment. The diminutive of this word, i.e. 'ait, usually refers to the sub-tertiary group but it commonly designates the secondary group [619] also. The term gabiila, "tribe," is the only word used for the primary and supra-primary lineage groupings. These are 196 the general Bedouin usages and their frequency will vary not

593 In al-Qasr it is a rare sight to see a father and his young
son together, and it is only slightly more common to see the
father with the grown son. The second case may simply be a
reflection of the division of labor since the son, once
grown, takes over the economic tasks of his father.

593 The most important duties of a father toward his
867 son are three: he must teach him generosity, courage and
584 courtesy; he must see that the boy learns the Quran; and he
872 must arrange a good marriage for his son. According to
593 Peters (1960:34), the Cyrenaican Bedouin father must attend
852 [872] to three things for his son, namely: his circumcision, his
[583] education in the Quran, and his bridewealth when he marries.
In al-Qasr, the Egyptian school teachers have succeeded in
[179] showing the Bedouin that circumcision is a private family
593 affair and not a public ritual. Although all fathers still
852 see to it that their sons are circumcised, the father is no
178 longer responsible for "making a circumcision party." In
[626] fact, the father who does insist on following the old ways
[431] by hiring a dancer and publicly marking his son's rite de
passage, will be ridiculed as one "who only wants to make
money from the ritual gift (naquut) given the boy."

593 The son recognizes the rights which the father has
over him through a show of respect and obedience. A boy
shows deference toward his father by not smoking, singing,
or reciting poetry of any kind in his presence. During the

During the
593 [207] [177] present time when most of the Bedouins own a transistor radio, a son will not even listen to songs or poetry broadcast over the air if his father is within hearing distance. I once witnessed a well-meaning father try unsuccessfully to get his ten year old son to sit down and listen with him to the news on the radio. 593 561 This automatic deference paid to the father is extended to all male elders: the father-son relationship is the model for authority relations between generations. [276] But there are degrees in which the model is applied to behavior; for instance, a boy will not smoke in front of his older brother, his uncles and grandfather, but will feel no uneasiness about smoking in the company of an elder with whom he has no immediate authority relationship.

593 The filial piety which marks the father-son authority relationship is owed to the father until his death. As the son grows older, he may show a little less constraint but he still plays the role of the subordinate. For example, I never saw a son argue with his father over anything during my stay in the field, with one serious exception. One man who had broken off friendly relations with his brother objected to the presence of his brother's sons at the wedding of his own daughter. When he threatened to cause a public scene to embarrass his nephews before the other guests, his own sons defended the right of their cousins to be at their sister's wedding. They told their father that his quarrel

671 change in al-Qasr must proceed.

671 Bedouin law should be considered within its historical
177 context, especially as it has reference to the Maliki school
of Islamic Law. The Maliki school, or "rite," (madhhab) of
law is considered to be the most conservative interpretation
of the doctrine of the Prophet Muhammad. Therefore, the
Maliki school is thought to reflect the society and tribal
traditions of pre-Islamic Arabia more dependably than any of
671 the other three schools of law. For instance, the Maliki
177 school, in the domain of family law, stresses the importance
428 and the primacy of agnate rights and claims. This is especially so in matters of inheritance: the law states that
in the absence of agnate heirs the property of the deceased
passes, not to female survivors but, to the central treasury
[562] of the State. This single legal aspect helps us to understand the Bedouin practice of disallowing the female to
inherit and should be a consideration in any study of Bedouin
succession rules.

175 Maliki Law was introduced into North Africa during
671 the ninth century, and became the official legal doctrine of
177 the Berber dynasties. It was first taught in this part of
the world, probably, by Yahya ibn Yahya, a student of Malik
ibn Anas, the founder of the school. Murray (1935:313)
presents a valuable legal document from the Western Desert
in which the name "Yahya" is frequently cited as the authority

175 for legal interpretation. For instance: "We are also told
671 by Yahya that (the Caliph) Mu'awiya ibn Sufian said that a
177 wound on the body should be assessed at half the value of
671 that wound on the head or face" (1935:324). Maliki law,
177 derived in large part from the Bedouin traditions of Arabia,
may be seen to characterize the legal norms of the tribal-based
social structure in the Western Desert. The Bedouins of al-
[428] Qasr themselves claim that they are within the bounds of
[562] Islamic Law when they deny the female the right to inherit,
though they do have other, and more secular, justifications
for the practice.

671 As we have already noted, in the above quote from the
182 "holy man" of al-Qasr, the Bedouins feel that the 'awaiyid
648 can succeed where governmental law will fail. They say that
"the government does not understand the problems of the
Bedouins," that "government troops cannot function in the
desert." They feel that they need the 'awaiyid for the sake
of political order itself: "If the Bedouins did not have
the 'awaiyid, they would eat each other. The 'awaiyid is so
important that a man who commits a wrong in town will lie
to the government, and then dutifully return to the tribe for
Bedouin justice."

[656] In 1933, the government "abolished" the 'awaiyid
and insisted that the Bedouins settle their difference in
the civil courts in accord with Egyptian law. According to

683
578 that they had received their rights in this case. And
*613 the two parties are satisfied by this according to the
692 witnesses present.

539 Signatures or seals of four witnesses.
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578 The next case represents the only time in the memory
682 of informants that all of the 'awaaqil of the 'Ali Ahmar met
*613 to intervene in a case of conflict. This case is extremely
692 unusual because it may be the only time in Awlad 'Ali history
571 that political mobilization of this scale has taken place. As
619 noted, political action, in war or peace, usually involves
[177] only secondary segments. In view of this, the case probably
[648] reflects an instance of social change: the Egyptian government,
anxious to maintain good relations with Libya, encouraged and
facilitated the settlement of this dispute by furnishing
transportation and cutting administrative red tape so that
the 'awaaqil of the 'Ali Ahmar could handle this case in a
most expeditious way. Here is a case where Bedouin traditional
[182] political structures function adequately in the modern situation.
Note here also that, in certain circumstances, the diiya payment
can be divided symbolically and specifically to place guilt and
to indicate the seriousness of a crime.

619 Date: 1963. Case: Quarrel between the tribe of 'Ali Ahmar
682 (Egypt) and the Harabi (Libya) concerning murder. A young
578
*613 boy of 'Ailit X was visiting his sister in Libya. He learned
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554 seen" at any such function. It would appear that the mechanism
571 at work here is not simply a device to provide the younger
182 generation with a tension-release situation, but also a
561 symbolic expression of the difference between the possessors
[154] and the non-possessors of authority, a confirmation of the
political order.

[578] The avoidance practice, or separation, between the
old and the young in the "party" situation is a structural
fact of Bedouin society, and, though it may ultimately be
defined as a conflict control or legitimating mechanism, in
the context of culture change new aspects and meanings attach
554 to the phenomenon. The "status group" is an agent of change
571 in al-Qasr; its members can afford to gamble in the market
178 economy of Marsa Matruh since they possess the reserve capital
[471] (in the form of sheep) and the social prestige which permits
[439] this. The "status group," with business and social relations
[177] in Marsa Matruh, enjoys both the benefits of associational
ties with the Egyptians and the communal ties with their
fellow Bedouins. They see themselves as being different from
their fellow tribesmen, and they tend to face more towards
Marsa Matruh than al-Qasr. In short, they are the "cultural
brokers" who support an ideology of change, they extol the
benefits of a new way of life over and against the old.

[789] One repudiation of tradition which constitutes an
[796] attempt to define the style of life of the "status group"

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> A tut in this rather wide sense of 'man of good standing,' or 'social leader' is usually a scion of an important lineage, the head of his own family, and master of his homestead and herd . . . (His) authority is never formalized. He has no defined status (i.e. specifically delimited position), powers, or sphere of leadership . . . Beyond his domestic groups a tut has authority in his village only in the sense that he takes a prominent part in questions of procedure and other discussions.

The non-institutionalized third party role in al-Qasr has power and influence in political affairs, and this condition arises from certain structural features and economic facts about Bedouin society. In a word, outside the lone formal role of 'aqila, a person's political influence is directly related to the traditional influence which attaches to his family, or to his economic status. In all cases, the person of "good" family and sufficient wealth has a high status on the social prestige scale of al-Qasr. The people who have high esteem do not have prescribed roles to play in al-Qasr, but their roles are indeed important. Furthermore, the rajal khair role can be just as important as any political role which is prescribed, and it may even become more important.

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Besides the 'aqila and the third party, there exists two external but related roles which form part of the total system of Bedouin authority. The roles of 'umda and shaikh represent institutionalized offices. They function, however, more as structural aspects of the Egyptian governmental authority structure. Of course, no complete separation between the two structures can be claimed. It is recognized

554 that these officers, as representatives of the Bedouin, must
571 figure in both structures. Therefore, we must understand
•177 and explain the relationship between the two sets of roles extant in the Bedouin total political structure, one set pertaining to the traditional authority structure and the other to the relatively new legal authority structure of the nation state.

554 The one factor common to all Bedouins in politically
571 influential roles is that they possess a high degree of "status honor," and thus belong to the "status group" of al-Qasr. The "status group" is responsible for political order in al-Qasr and the political links which it maintains with other systems, Bedouin and Egyptian. Bedouins say that responsible action in conflict control belongs to one who knows how to give a man his rights while maintaining the honor of both parties; at the ideal level, it is the duty of all to do this. The fact that the power group and "the rich" comprise two coterminous groups is accidental and even incidental to the Bedouins. In theory, there could be a person of low economic status but who would belong to the "status group" simply as a result of his ability to mediate.
*[613] The authority of the 'aqila and the governmental offices of
[177] 'umda and shaikh are legitimate only where formal litigation
[627] is concerned. Beyond this, they may have influence, not legitimate authority, and in this case, they switch roles and operate as a rajal khair.

554 571 and operate as a *rajal khair*.

There are two primary types of political roles in al-
554 571 Qasr, the traditional and the modern legal. Modern legal
•177 political rolés have been decreed from above by the government.
*613 The traditional roles of *'aqila* and "third party" represent
[627] autochthonous roles emerging from Bedouin social and cultural
structures. Bedouin traditional roles correspond to Weber's ideal-type "traditional authority" which is based upon "piety for what actually, allegedly, or presumably has always existed" (Gerth and Mills 1946:296). The role of *'aqila* is "traditional" rather than "legal" despite its fully institutionalized status. The relatively modern roles of *'umda* and *shaikh* are what I term here "legal"; these offices are not, nor did any of my informants consider them to be, roles natural in the Bedouin political system. The legitimacy of these roles stems from, what Weber called, "legal authority" in which "submission . . . is based upon an impersonal bond to the generally defined and functional duty of office"
[627] (1946:299). In this case, the norms to which conformity is demanded are not those espoused by the *'aqila* or the "third party," but are established by national governmental decrees and regulations.

128 In the remaining part of this chapter, the attempt is to show two things which I consider essential to an understanding of Bedouin political structure and a perspective of

554 178 [792] you for your cloak, you would have immediately given it to him. God was pleased with them at that time."

This notion of changing foci of authority and power cannot be divorced from the related political phenomena of the tendency toward legitimacy and the role institutionalization process. In the next chapter, I will attempt to show how such a conceptual framework can be utilized in an analysis of culture and political change. 128

Modern Legal Roles

634 554 [648] [177] The roles of 'umda and shaikh were created and imposed upon the Bedouins by Muhammad 'Ali sometime during the early part of the nineteenth century in order to facilitate administration, maintain security in the desert, and protect the Western frontier.

[619] Both of these roles are representative offices at the primary level of the tribal structure. The 'Aishaibat have an 'umda and a shaikh who reside in Marsa Matruh and work in close relation with the Governor. In terms of a chain of command, these offices receive demands which may originate either with the Governor in Matruh or with Bedouins in al-Qasr. But these offices are subservient to both the Governor and the Bedouins since no decision-making powers of any consequence resides with them. [591] [635] With reference to the two authority structures, the Egyptian and the Bedouin, the 'umda and the

634 554 to the 'umda. Both offices are for a life-term, only being terminated by bad behavior or senility. At the expiration 634 571 635 666 of an incumbent's term, the "status group" meets in al-Qasr to decide upon his replacement. The name of a "nominee" is passed on to the Governor who is expected to approve the Bedouins' selection of a representative to the government. [178] •[177] It is this "status group"-controlled process which the Governor seeks to change. Since these are officially held offices in the U.A.R. governmental structure, he feels that elections to fill their vacancies should be a public affair. Naturally, he will exercise more influence over the naming of candidates in this way, and the Bedouins perceive this as a challenge to the traditional structure of leadership and control of external relations.

634 *613 666 [428] The offices of 'umda and shaikh are even more hereditary than that of 'aqila, which theoretically should not be the case. By definition, the role of 'aqila is functional at the bait level, and so the recruitment pool of candidates for this office is inherently limited. By comparison, the offices of 'umda and shaikh should go to the "best men" in the tribe, and, therefore, the recruitment pool should be 634 *613 666 428 [571] tribal-wide. But, in fact, these two offices are considered "the property" of the wealthiest lineages in the al-Qasr area. There is a traditional rationale behind this fact: there is the structural necessity for, and conscious practice of, an

121 tradition" and "the little tradition." The "little tradition" refers to peasant or folk culture, and the "great tradition" to a specialized and systematized body of thought which is, in most cases, esoteric, written, related to religion, and the property of an intellectual group (1960:40-59; 1962:302). Of course, Redfield's notion of a "literati" does not apply in the Bedouin case. But in an earlier work (1953:44) Redfield drew attention to the more general concept of "intelligentsia" which further refines the scope and types of leadership. Redfield refers to "the member of the intelligentsia . . . (who) belongs to two worlds, not one; he is a marginal man." He then goes on to differentiate between the "literati" type and the "intelligentsia" type, stating that the former type uses literacy to carry on the sacred tradition while the member of the "intelligentsia" may use literacy "to admit
121 the ways of the world outside." While the rajal khair does
554 not become the representative of the great and sacred tradition
627 of Islam, he does utilize the bureaucratic means at hand to
•177 admit the outside world into al-Qasr. The rajal khair may be
[571] considered a member of an "intelligentsia."

121 Gustave von Grunebaum (1962) has used Redfield's model of cultural dynamics to understand change and social mobility in the Arab World with special reference to Egypt. The author, an Islamicist, states that the "great tradition" of orthodox Islam in contrast to popular Islam is recognized as "the more

121 advanced" and is assumed "to have authority"; that the
"great tradition" is represented in the writings and public
actions of the political elite; and that "social prestige is
dependent on its adoption (or at least on its profession)"
(1962:69). Implicit in von Grunebaum's analysis, and also
contained in Redfield's model, is the employment of reference
group theory to understand human behavior in society. In
121 177 the al-Qasr case, I have tried to show that "status group"
571 members repudiate many of the traditional ways of life while
181 at the same time identifying more and more with the Egyptian
"status group," the bureaucrats of Marsa Matruh. The implication here is that the Bedouin "status group" is in the
process of taking on the values of a new reference group to
which they do not yet belong but to which they seek admission.

The bureaucrats of Marsa Matruh, like those of Cairo
and Alexandria described by von Grunebaum, represent the
"great tradition." The "status group" of al-Qasr while
aspiring to the "great tradition" emulate certain of the
behavioral traits and expectations of the elite group. For
[771] instance, they are conspicuous for their regular attendance
at Friday mosque services in Matruh. Merton, who has developed
reference group theory, points out that "men frequently orient
themselves to groups other than their own in shaping their
behavior and evaluations" (1957:234). This type of behavior,
or "anticipatory socialization," is the process of taking on

121 the values of a non-membership group in order to "find readier
177 acceptance by that group and make an earlier adjustment to
571 it" (Merton 1957:265). In a relatively closed society such as
181 al-Qasr, when those who qualify for membership in other reference groups are able to do more than merely aspire, when they actually anticipate and adjust their behavior to a type of status consciously desired, the local authority and social structures are likely to be transformed.

121 We can generalize from the literature on social
571 stratification that the hierarchial structure characteristic
554 of traditional societies carries with it a relationship of mutual obligation. The "inferior" owes rent, respect, loyalty, obedience, etc., while the "superior" owes, in return, protection, advice, help in emergency, action in conflict regulation, representation in extralocal matters, etc. (Hagen 1962:
121 55-86; Parsons 1953: 108). In al-Qasr, the *'aqila* fulfills
554 only one of the functions of the "superior," that which deals
*[613] with conflict regulation. The *rajal Khair* role, as I have
[627] developed it, may function in full capacity as a "superior."
121 The *rajal khair* dominates the internal system through power
554 derived from rank on the prestige scale: he is prominent in
627 the external system as member and representative of a new power structure based on national and political consciousness. Traditionally, *rajal khair*-dominance was not by force but through influence and prestige: in the new situation, with a

121 fully organized government behind the role, the element of
554 force may enter into the rajal khair style of domination.
627 Thus far, the 'umda and the shaikh roles have functioned
[634] through the traditional roles of the 'aqila and the rajal
*[613] khair, that is, the "status group." In the future, this pattern
[178] may change. It is also possible that new roles will emerge. This is what I wish to explore.

121 The "status group" of al-Qasr operating with a sense
571 of identity with a modern reference group deem themselves
554 responsible for making decisions on the behalf of "the people"
●[177] or "the Bedouin." Members of the "status group" would occasionally dress in Western clothes; they would hunt gazelle for sport; they owned the few autos there were in the area; and a few partook of alcoholic beverages. Their rights and obligations in social relations are still relatively stable and depend on the ascribed values of al-Qasr Bedouin society, but one can detect the start of a power struggle within the group. It is a competitive desire for social mobility and is stated in terms of the achieved attributes considered important by the reference group to which they aspire, the Egyptian society. For example, one sometimes heard the complaint from various members of the "status group" that the Governor was not giving proper recognition to those "who understood the ways of the Bedouin," and "those who could speak for the Bedouin."

156 than the Awlad 'Ali societal level. In the traditional
554 system, his influence and power have been informal, and,
121 although this has been advantageous over against the formal
role of _'aqila_, his political activity was ultimately limited
by this structural differentiation and definition of authority.
•[177] In gaining access to the bureaucratic structure of Egyptian
officialdom with its firm allocation of rights and duties,
Hajj 'Ali could operate as an authority within the total authority
structure which has reference to both the internal and external
political relational systems of al-Qasr.

Practical Application

*613 In al-Qasr, the two most influential and powerful
lineages, 'Ailit Lazumi and 'Ailit Ma'fas, each have a
[634] "most powerful _bait_." We have noted that in 'Ailit Lazumi
it is Bait Bu Taram which controls the office of _'umda_: in
*613 'Ailit Ma'fas it is Bait 'Umar which has Hajj 'Ali. Hajj 'Ali
159 is fifty three years old. He has married five times, divorced
581 one wife, and at present has four wives. Whatever his motives
156 for these marriages, at least some of them have obviously
[595] been made as economic and political moves. A check on his
wives' tribal origins will show this. In each case, Hajj
'Ali's wife is from a lineage which holds land contiguous to
his own property in the _'izba_ sector of al-Qasr. The one
exception to this is a marriage contracted to establish ties

156 administrative business took up most of the time at the
159 meeting, and only the Governor and the Egyptians took part
554 in the discussion. At the conclusion of the meeting, the
635
648 Governor asked if any present had comments to make. Hajj
[871] 'Ali rose, and delivered a formal and well-prepared speech
[537] on the inadequacies of the educational facilities in Matruh.
He noted that the Governor had promised the Bedouins that if
they sent their sons in from the desert for secondary schooling,
their material needs would be taken care of, but that in fact
the Governor had not kept his promise for there was not enough
space and beds for the boys. The Governor apologized for this
condition and said he was trying to correct it. I noted that
a few Egyptians found something amusing about this incident,
but that all of the Bedouins present were serious and nodded
in agreement with the points made by Hajj 'Ali.

156 We should note that Hajj 'Ali was the only Bedouin to
159 speak up at the meeting, that he spoke in the formal, tradi-
554 tional manner, and that he showed concern for the real problems
635 of the Bedouins. Hajj 'Ali is careful to protect his identity
as a Bedouin, and in this he differs from the _'umda_ and
most of the "status group."

121 In situations of induced change, the cultural problems
156 involved differ in their conception and immediacy as defined
159 by the agents and the recipients of change. Hajj 'Ali, who
554
177 is both an agent and a recipient of change, is intimate with
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121 the problems of the Bedouins of al-Qasr. He knows how to
156 phrase them, and his place on the Majlis al-Muhafza gives
159 him the right and the opportunity to air them. This is the
554 role of the "cultural broker." Before the meeting of the
635 council, Hajj 'Ali had gathered a group of the men from al-
•177 Qasr and they had talked about which demands should be presented to the Governor. This is purely a political process which Hajj 'Ali manipulates. The formulation and presentation
[648] of demands became, in the hands of Hajj 'Ali, "inputs" into the Egyptian political system with the hope that they will materialize as "outputs" and the satisfaction of needs - to use the terminology of David Easton's "systems analysis" (1965b).

156 On another occasion, Hajj 'Ali demonstrated his
159 status and political leadership and the fact that he has
554 assumed the position of spokesman for the Bedouin of al-Qasr
635 during this period of change. Once each year the Governor
177 makes a tour of al-Qasr to inspect the school, the cooperative building, the government experimental farm, and the area in general. After the inspection tour, he holds a reception in a ceremonial tent set up for the occasion. At this time, he states his evaluations and opinions, distributes some clothing material to the poorer families of the area, and asks for suggestions from the Bedouins who sit on the ground before the tent. The only suggestion forthcoming from the Bedouins was

156 by the secretary of the cooperative society who requested
159 that the government furnish bus service between Matruh and
554 al-Qasr. The Governor thought this a good idea and said he
635 ● 177 would inquire into the matter.

156 As the Governor suggested that the meeting be adjourned,
159 Hajj 'Ali stood up, faced the Governor and began another of
554 his formal speeches in the rich tradition of Arabic; it was
635 the best Arabic I had heard spoken in the desert. This speech
177 537 was for the benefit of all present, Bedouins and officials
alike. Hajj 'Ali made no requests but simply thanked the
Governor for honoring al-Qasr with his presence. In this
short well-prepared tribute, he said:

> We feel the efforts of the government and we can scarcely imagine or dream of this development. For instance, we were living in tents and now only five per cent remain in tents while the remainder are in houses. We were dressed simply, but now we are dressed in poplin material. Those who could afford one set of clothes now can afford two. Thanks be to God, all this is due to Jamal Abd al-Nasser.

156 It is significant, of course, that smiles once again
159 played on the faces of the Governor's entourage and nothing
554 but admiration on the faces of the Bedouins. As Hajj 'Ali
635 537 spoke he did not face the Governor directly but turned aside,
speaking both to him and the Bedouins--Hajj 'Ali, the Bedouin,
had been sitting on the ground before the Governor. The
[634] 'umda and shaikh had accompanied the Governor on his tour

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159 and they sat on chairs inside the tent. I returned to
554 Marsa Matruh in the _'umda's_ car (1964 Ford, highly polished)
635 537 with the _'umda_ and the _shaikh_. They openly joked about Hajj
[634] 'Ali and his manner of presentation; they repeated some of
[122] his "stilted" phrases and laughed. Hajj 'Ali gave last year's
[522] reception speech also. This is because, his son says, Hajj
'Ali is considered a fine speaker by the Bedouins of al-Qasr.

121 We can see how these details carry larger implications
177 within the context of political and social structures under-
178 going change. It is the stuff which the anthropologist finds
important for an understanding of the process of change.

156 If I have established thus far that Hajj 'Ali is
159 politically active and representative in both the traditional
554 and the modern systems, then the attempt is now to prove that
177 he consciously seeks to change the traditional in the direction
178 of the modern for political and moral reasons, and for social
and personal reasons.

156 Hajj 'Ali, when he spoke with me, inevitably came
159 around to the subject of international politics, whether this
554 was the question of Israel or the image which America's racial
177 problems presented. Hajj 'Ali was the only man from the whole
178 124 Marsa Matruh area who was neither _shaikh_ nor _'umda_ to attend
829 the nomination of Jamal Abd al-Nasser in January of 1965. In
[571] all of this, I detect a move on the part of Hajj 'Ali to
identify himself with an Egyptian reference group and to

156 draw al-Qasr into the Egyptian political community. He has
159 committed himself to work hand-in-hand with the Governor of
554 Marsa Matruh in introducing changes connected with economics
177 and education into al-Qasr. He does not conceal this fact.
178 When I spoke with him about helping me with my study of
124 changing attitudes in al-Qasr, he said: "I might have the
829 time to do this, but before I decide you will have to bring
[571] me a letter from the Governor stating that he wishes m[illegible]
cooperate with you." The identity and responsibility which
Hajj 'Ali feels for his role of agent of change is indicated
in his remark to me that he had heard "there were others in
the desert who feel and think the way I myself do."

156 Hajj 'Ali is discretely aware of the status difference
159 between himself, as a member of the "status group," and the
554 others of al-Qasr. As Weber would say, he perceives the
571 difference in "style of life." I was invited to Hajj 'Ali's
574 house for _'iid al-fitr_, the feast marking the end of Ramadan.
796 I thought that this would be a good opportunity to observe
123 the "leaders" of al-Qasr together. I was very much surprised
to find present no members of the "status group" but only
[556] their exact opposites. On the occasion of this feast it is
[735] the custom that the rich treat the poor. As an additional
surprise, we had a very simple meal of bread, dates, peanuts,
and tea. Hajj 'Ali explained to me: "My neighbors do not
have my economic advantages, and I do not think it is proper

156 to serve other than what they eat." Hajj 'Ali is not only
159 conscious of social stratification in his society, but he also
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571 has a great deal of empathy with the less endowed, a pre-
574 requisite of a traditional Bedouin leader and an advantageous
796 one for a modern leader.
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He is aware of most traditional institutions and how
156 they relate to conditions of modernity. Hajj 'Ali, whose own
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554 marriages speak for his political acumen, sees only disadvantages
829 in the cousin-right marriage custom of the Bedouins. His
582 interest in getting on with the business of change, so to
speak, has led him to question a basic right contained in the
Bedouin principle of lineage structure and corporate membership.

> A thing which I do not like about our customs is the idea that a man has a right to his uncle's daughter. The man binds his cousin and in the end he might not marry her and will be the cause of her never marrying. He gives himself the authority to decide whom she may or may not marry. If he knows she desires to marry a certain man, he says: "She can marry anyone but not that one."

[562] Here he challenges the traditional right of the individual
male in Bedouin society, favoring the rights of the female.
[177] The emancipation of the female, especially in rights and
[178] duties concerned with the marriage contract, is an element
[562] of the modernization process in Egyptian society and the
Middle East in general.

*613 The bait, as a political group, is in part structurally
602 defined by the corporate principle which states that blood-kin
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156 undertaken to transform his rajal khair role into an authority
159 which transcends the bounds of the local community. During
554 my talks with him, he never once insinuated that the people
829 of al-Qasr, nor even the 'Aishaibat or 'Ali Ahmar (terms
178 he rarely ever used), owe anything to a larger entity or
community known as "the Bedouin" or "the Awlad 'Ali."
If Hajj 'Ali is to legitimate his own authority in a new
political system, he must, at the same time, show the Bedouins
829 the legitimacy of the new political community. The Bedouins
178 must feel a moral commitment toward the new national political
177 community or else it has no meaning or authority. Most of the
Bedouins of al-Qasr still take it for granted that the alloca-
tion of political values and distribution of power in terms of
traditional and modern legal roles will be carried over into
the modern community and its politics. Hence, if anyone should
[634] go on to Cairo to represent the Bedouin of the Western Desert,
[648] naturally it should be the 'umda or the shaikh "who knew how
to deal with the Egyptians." The majority of the people of
the al-Qasr area see change coming but do not conceptualize
it as any threat to the traditional authority structure.

156 Hajj 'Ali anticipates the change as fundamental
159 enough to require a new sense of identity. I think this is
554 evident in the following statement in which he takes issue
829 178 with the traditional way of doing things and appears to be
177 preparing himself for a role in the readjustment process.

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> There is another objection which I have concerning our customs. I mean the case of elections. For instance, one from the 'Aishaibat and one from the Sanagra, of the 'Ali Abyad, are nominated. Then, each man must vote for the one from his own tribe. He must vote for the 'Aishaibi even if the other is the better man. But, we should consider that the best man is the man with the best qualifications. 'Umda Ibrahim, for instance, knows how to greet an official or a minister, but he does not know the _'awaiyid_ nor the problems of the Bedouins. His brother (who will probably be the next _'umda_) is a good man and is educated, but he does not know the _'awaiyid_ either.

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This view contrasts sharply with the traditional stand of most Bedouins in al-Qasr, including the members of the "status group." For instance, one _'aqila_ voiced what is a prevalent opinion when he said:

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> If a man chooses to become a political candidate against a Bedouin, he must understand that the members of the tribe should and would vote for their _'umda_ because he is a member of their own tribe. Even if a man is crazy and his opponent has the highest college degree, the Bedouins must vote for the man from their own tribe.

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Hajj 'Ali is modern in his evaluation of the political situation here: a politician should know the problems of his constituents rather than follow principles based on traditional relationships. His motive is not to promote the _'awaiyid_ as a good way of life, for we know he does not think this to be the case. Instead, Hajj 'Ali believes that in order to help the Bedouins through a period of change one must know what they are changing from. Through his negative appraisal of

156 the _'umda_, Hajj 'Ali seems to imply that he himself is capable
159 of understanding and leading the Bedouins during this period.
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178 Hajj 'Ali has formulated some positive and constructive
177 ideas relating to the period of transition which now faces
829 al-Qasr, and they are related to his analysis of the pressing
needs of the day.

> The Bedouins need many things: they need factories
> as there are in the Nile Valley. For the desert,
> here in particular, we need olive presses. This
> will raise the profits of the farmer . . . We need
> [244] a factory for canning tomatoes, for the whole desert
> plants them and the transportation is such that we
> [489] cannot get them to the market . . . The biggest
> change in the desert results from the presence of
> 12,000 government workers; there were only 20 or
> [871] 30 before the World War. There were no schools,
> now there a few. You cannot find a six year-old
> boy who does not go to school; about thirty per cent
> of the girls in al-Qasr go to school also . . .
> Another cause of change is due to the fact that
> everyone now watches his neighbor, he sees what he
> does and he imitates him. Today, I listen to the
> [207] radio and tomorrow my neighbor buys one. Evolution
> (_tatawwar_) is taking place, and the people here are
> [212] realistic about it. For instance, I do not know
> reading and writing, and sometimes I must dictate a
> letter to my son . . . My son knows better than I,
> and I know better than my father did, who lived in
> al-Qasr for thirty five years without knowing anything about the streets of Marsa Matruh.

156 Hajj 'Ali is both subjective and objective about
159 change, as we can note from the comment about the radio.
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178 In a non-doctrinaire fashion, Hajj 'Ali stresses the great
177 value of education while being aware of his own deficiencies
in this area. However, as a counterbalance, he seems to

156 imply that one cannot be educated and know the 'awaiyid at
159 the same time--the attitude of a self-made man. Hajj 'Ali
554
178 realizes his marginal position between the new and the old,
177 and his attitude concerning change through education seems
to be that of an unselfish leader. Elaborating further on
156 the role of education, Hajj 'Ali showed insight into some of
159 the psychological aspects underlying social change:
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> 177 As I said before, the people here are realistic about change. There are now only about three or four of
> 829 us who send our sons to study at the university, the rest of the people are waiting to see what these boys
> 871 will amount to. The other day, one of our educated boys, an officer in the army, came to visit al-Qasr. All of the women are now hoping to see their sons become as successful as this. This is exactly like the first time we cultivated olives in the desert: the Bedouins mocked those who planted the olive. After the olive began to show profits, everyone regretted that they did not cultivate it. Time is changing, and the people are changing. Education is the basis of everything in any nation. Now the agricultural engineer directs me, telling me what to do and how to do it . . . and before 1952 (pre-Nassar regime) they knew nothing about us and we had nothing.

156 As culture and social change proceeds in al-Qasr, it
159 is evident that Hajj 'Ali and the national political community
554 are becoming legitimate authorities in the eyes of the Bedouins.
829 This is indicated by the following event. One month before
574 I left the field, the first vice-President of the Republic was
648 expected to visit the province of Marsa Matruh, and al-Qasr
was named as one of the places which he would tour. Hajj
'Ali took it upon himself to set up three tents in the tradi-

"modern industrial society," it was not easy work. This, despite the 114
fact that there was no language barrier, seeing that I spoke the same 114
language of the group, or rather they spoke my native language; I had 122
no problems of introduction because I had worked in the area and become 123
acquainted with a number of the tribal members in 1958. When I went to
the field, I then sought out these old friends who introduced me to other
members of the group.

At the beginning, I made a deliberate effort to avoid associating 114
with the government officials who worked in the area, even though they were 123
quite willing to help and seemed to have an intimate knowledge of the people 177
in the area. I had thought that any identification with the government
would put me in a suspicious situation as far as the tribal groups were
concerned, and thus prevent me from having good rapport with them. Later, [657]
however, I realized that the relationship between the government officials in
the area and the tribal population was extremely good, and they always looked
to the government as a source of aid and support to them. There was no
conflict of interest between the state administration and the tribal groups. In
fact, people accepted me more readily whenever they knew that I had worked
for the Egyptian government. This later developed into a time-consuming and
disappointing experience when many of the tribal members came to me asking
for help getting employment in the government projects in the area, or to
have their sons accepted in certain government schools, or to get some
favored treatment from the government relief organizations.

The difficulty I encountered in my field work stemmed from the 114
interplay of three major factors: the reliance on the case study method which 123
necessitates the intimate knowledge of the events, facts, and parties
involved in each case; being a female anthropologist in a society where
women by definition are barred from public participation and particularly

657 full-time employment with the government projects in the area and
[178] settle in fairly permanent houses near the place of work.
[464]

657 With the movement toward settling down, the relative legal and
701 political autonomy which Awlad Ali once enjoyed is breaking down. This
642 was reflected first in the loss of military exemption. In 1947, the
draft law was applied to all tribal populations in Egypt, including
Awlad Ali. The application is not seriously enforced, however, due
to the fact that births are still not recorded in the area. In 1954,
657 the "omda" or mayorship system practiced in the rural areas of Egypt
634 was extended to the Western Desert with certain modifications to fit
177 the tribal organization of populations in the area. This put a strain
on the native system of leadership, a point which will be covered in
657 later chapters. Finally, and along with the extension of the omda system,
692 the jurisdiction of the legal system of the state was extended
177 over the area. This resulted in a duality in the judicial process.
178 The tribal law, with its traditional tribal mediators, is still functioning
side by side with the modern court system of the state law. In many cases, especially in criminal cases, the individual is tried under both systems, and sometimes receives two different judgments for the same offense. Various efforts are being made to minimize the effects of this duality. In civil cases, the problem does not seem serious, since it is the parties themselves, or one of them, who voluntarily bring the case to the attention of the legal authorities. Therefore, they can choose between the traditional legal system and the modern courts of law. So far, civil cases are brought to the modern court system only when the native procedures fail to achieve a settlement. As such, the

657 modern court system may be viewed as a form of appeal to the tribal
692
177 justice. One has to be careful, however, in calling such a procedure
178 an appeal, since the tribal proceedings have no relevance in the court
proceedings.

69 The duality is more serious in criminal cases. When an act is de-
681 fined as illegal by both the tribal and modern law, persons committing
177 it come automatically under the jurisdiction of both laws. As long as such acts remain unknown to the police, the duality of procedures is not undertaken. This is possible in minor cases of assault or theft or adultery. But in major cases, such as homocide or serious assault resulting in the serious injury of a tribal member, it is difficult to keep the news a secret from the authorities. The funeral proceedings in the former cases and the medical attention needed in the latter cases
[627] are hard to conceal. Besides, serious cases start a whole series of
[521] mediations and go-betweens which always become the general knowledge
in the entire area and the subject of conversation among the people. When the authorities know about such cases, they have to take immediate action to bring the offender to trial, even when the government authorities know that the tribal proceedings are being conducted in the case. Some attempts are made by both the tribal law and the modern law to minimize the effect of that duality. It is common that when the district attorney knows that a certain criminal case has been successfully solved according to the tribal proceedings, to ask for the minimum penalty for the offense. On the side of the tribal proceedings, once the case has been solved, the witnesses needed to testify for the prosecutor are instructed by their fellow tribesmen to refrain from giving the information

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required for the indictment of the offender according to the modern legal system. If this is not possible and the offender is sentenced by the government court, only half the tribal settlement is paid, and the rest is postponed pending the release of the offender. If the offender is executed or he dies in prison, then the unpaid part of the settlement is dropped.

613 628 554 [428] His success in solving disputes between members of his baits and outsiders might enhance his prestige within the bait, but it is not a substitute for patrilineal succession as the basis of the Aqila's authority. But in less integrated baits the situation is different. [627] The ineffectiveness of the Aqila in solving disputes may lead members of his bait to seek another man as their representative who would act as a mediator in their behalf. If this continues for a long time the Aqila might find himself with no functions and the new person would become a de facto Aqila.

613 554 622 The Aqila represents the only effective indigenous form of leadership among Awlad Ali at the present time. The camp headman provides another form of leadership on the camp level, but, as mentioned before, the leadership of the headman is very limited and involves minimal authority. 634 622 656 177 In addition to the indigenous leadership represented by the Aqila, there is the superimposed administrative structure of the government representative in the form of the "omda" system introduced into the area by the government decree no. 1187 of 1958. The system of omda or mayorship is essentially that applied to the rural areas of Egypt with certain modifications to fit the tribal organization and the semi-nomadic existence of the populations of the Western Desert. In rural areas, the 622 omda is the administrative head of the village. He is appointed by the [554] [212] [556] government from among the village inhabitants who have certain qualifications with regard to education (must be able at least to read and write), wealth (own at least 5 feddans of land in the area), and sound reputation. As such, the omda system in the rural areas is a territorial system. The omda's authority covers the territory of the village and all individuals living in it regardless of their kinship affiliation.

795 Because of their religious position which put
175 them outside the tribal structure, the leaders of the zawyas played a
627 significant role in mediation and settling disputes between various tribal
793 segments. At their disposal was their ability to ostracize anyone
[626] who did not abide by their decision from the zawyas, which meant depriving
him from all the benefits, social as well as religious, that membership
in the zawyas offered.

795 After the First World War when the British replaced the Turks as
175 governors of the area, the zawyas were closed and the religious leaders
● 177 ordered to leave. The zoning established by the zawyas existed, however,
[648] [631] and was used as the basis for the redistricting of the area. Police
[625] stations replaced the religious centers. From the standpoint of the tribal
619 634 population itself, the districts have no psychological or political
[795] reality. The zawyas were originally established in the areas of tribal
[361] concentrations. But the area itself did not have any political identity.
The only reality from the standpoint of the inhabitants was the tribal
reality and affiliation which cut across many of these districts. Many
of the tribal segments inhabiting one district were and still are hostile
177 to one another. To transform the zones into administrative districts and
634 to establish one office of leadership for the whole district was to impose
619 a political unity nonexistent among the tribal segments inhabiting
[622] the district. To avoid this difficulty, the government supplemented the
territorial principle of the omda system in the rural area with the principle
of tribal representation and came up with a system which seems to
suite the situation in the Western Desert. For each of the districts,
a list of all tribal segments which habitually occupy the area and whose
tribal land is located within the district, is made. The most powerful

554 The most powerful
177 and numerous segments are then represented by the omda, and the lesser
634 ones are represented by a sheikh. Unlike the system in the rural areas
619 where the sheikh is a subordinate to the omda, the sheikh in the Western
[622] Desert does not occupy the same position. Instead he has the same functions and occupies, with regard to his tribal segment, the same position the omda occupies with regard to his. He does not take orders from the omda and has direct relations with the administration. Sheikhs and omdas from one district are supposed to meet periodically in the police station and discuss with the police officer in charge of the station matters concerning the district and their own tribal groups. The only difference between the omda and the sheikh in the Western Desert seems to be the label of the office. The label itself carries a certain amount of prestige to the tribal segment represented by the omda, since it is an acknowledgement by the government of its importance. This is why many of the tribal segments try to be represented by an omda rather than by a sheikh. In certain districts where two or more strong tribal segments compete for the honor of being represented by an omda, the district may have two or more omdas representing the strong tribal segments and a number of sheikhs representing the lesser tribal groups in the district. Not every tribal segment in a district is represented by an omda or even a sheikh, however. Very small tribal segments may join together and have one sheikh, while others may agree to be represented by one of the larger segment's sheikh or omda.

634 Obviously, the number of omdas and sheikhs differ from one district
554 to another depending on the number of important tribal segments in each.
619
657 There is no specific rule whereby a certain tribal segment is considered

581 are necessary for the validation of the marriage contract. Modern
585 671 legal systems which took as their basis the Islamic law of marriage
675 and the family further required the registration of the marriage contract for the marriage to be legal.

584 The request and necessary response forming the marriage are sup-
585 posed to be carried on by the parties involved. However, if either the
429 593 groom or the bride is not of age, or is mentally unqualified, the transaction is carried on by his or her guardian, or "wakil." The wakil is the father, unless he is dead or an invalid, in which case the brothers
[604] become the wakils. If the person has no brothers, then the uncles be-
[184] come the wakil in the order stated. According to certain Sunni sects in Islam, a woman marrying for the first time is always represented by her wakil, even if she is of age. The assumption is that a woman who has never been married does not have the experience that enables her to enter into any kind of legally binding relationship such as marriage.

585 Following the original Islamic idea, marriage among Awlad Ali is
675 593 an oral agreement between the groom or his father and the guardian
429 (wakil) of the bride-to-be (her father, if alive, or her closest male
[604] kin in the following order: her brothers, her uncles, her grandfather).
585 A religious man is sometimes asked to perform the marriage, although it
792 is not required. Some persons might invite a member of the Murabiteen
[619] tribe or holy men to witness the marriage on the basis that his presence
[778] gives "baraka," or blessing, to the marriage. Before the application of
585 656 the State legal system to the area, marriage contracts were not regis-
177 tered. In recent years, however, and with the increased mobility of
[675] the tribal populations, more and more marriages are being registered in
[634] the administrative districts. Still, according to the unofficial estimates,

Still, according to the unofficial estimates,
585 only about ten per cent of all marriages are registered, and these are
656 177 mainly mixed marriages involving a tribal person and a non-tribal one
582 or a tribal member who is not living in the area anymore. The reason
619 is that such a spouse, especially when he is the husband, is not under
the control of the tribal customs and therefore cannot be forced to fulfill
his obligations if he fails to do so. Most of the tribal population
[581] still feel that marriage is a personal and family affair that
should be kept away from the State legal system.

584 Marriage among Awlad Ali is a relatively informal procedure. When
593 a man decides to marry a certain girl, he informs his mother who, in
turn, informs his father. The father may have objections to his son's
choice of the bride. Such objections may be based on already strained
relations between the two families or the questionable reputation of
the girl or any member of her family. In such cases, the father tries
to dissuade his son from going ahead with the marriage. The father is
[583] usually successful in controlling his son's choice when the latter is
dependent on his father for the payment of the bridewealth called "mahr"
and for the support of his new household. This is usually the case in
the man's first marriage. In subsequent marriages and in the cases
where the son has independent means of support for himself and his
bride, the father's control of the son's choice is minimal, and asking
593 the father's approval is a matter of formality. In second and subsequent
595 marriages, the approval of the older wives is essential. The
584 older wives have no right to object to the husband taking an additional
wife, but they have the right to object to the choice on the basis that
the new bride is hard to get along with or that there is animosity between
her family and the families of the other wives which makes

CHAPTER VI

HOMICIDE AND BODILY INJURIES

Part 1: Homicide

579 Fighting is quite common among Awlad Ali. Many of these fights
involve a large number of individuals and result in many casualties
579 and sometimes even deaths. Fighting is considered "shar," or evil,
673 for according to Awlad Ali, it threatens the social cohesion which is
182 highly valued in the area. Yet, although undesirable, fighting and
[682] even homicide are not considered a crime against society and sometimes
are viewed as necessary to safeguard individual and collective rights
in the absence of an established authority which could protect these
[177] rights. Although this absence of an authority is remedied now by the
[692] introduction of state administrative justice, this has not yet achieved
enough efficiency and recognition to replace the old tribal system.

619 In the tribal system, there is no concept of individual punishment
681 inflicted upon the suspect. There is no recognized authority to inflict
692 it. The mardi or the 'aqila who performs the function of dispute settlement
[627] in the case of homicide has no power to pass or inflict any punishment.
His role is restricted to mediation between the two parties involved
682 as was earlier mentioned. Homicide, like all other wrongs among Awlad Ali,
673 are private wrongs affecting the individual or a group of individuals.
[182] The main purpose of the tribal proceedings in the case of homicide is to
restore some form of harmony and order among the group. This harmony is
sometimes restored by killing the murderer or any member of his vengeance
682 group, or amar. Feuds may result from such killing, and a few instances
628 of feuds have, in fact, been recorded in the area (although not in the

*795 The desire to establish in North Africa conditions in which
793 Muslims might live by their own laws and under their own
798 government, as they did in Arabia under the first four Caliphs,
led the Grand Sanusi and his successors to oppose the Turkish
177 way of life and the influences and innovations of Western Christendom, but their intransigence in these matters did not imply intolerance, far less aggressiveness. Though some writers have made assertions to the contrary, the Sanusi have never shown themselves more hostile than other Muslims to Christians and Jews, and the Grand Sanusi and Sayyid al-Mahdi scrupulously avoided all political entanglements which might bring them into unfriendly relations with neighbouring States and the European Powers. The Brothers of the Order
*795 were discouraged from discussing political questions. Nor were
793 the Sanusi intolerant towards fellow Muslims who differed from
798 them. Shaikh Muhammed 'Uthman records of Sayyid al-Mahdi that 'the persons he dislikes the most are those who speak ill of Muslims'.[1] The leaders of the Sanusiya have always tolerated other and rival Orders, even when they have disapproved of their rites. The Grand Sanusi had himself been a member of a succession of Orders before he started his own and he allowed, as his successors have done, members of other Orders to belong to the Sanusiya at the same time.

*795 The leaders of the Order have also been tolerant towards the
792 cult of saints, unlike the iconoclastic Wahhabi, who have
destroyed even the tombs of those nearest to the Prophet him-
798 self. The view held by the doctors of orthodox Islam is that,
776 though intercession through a saint is unlawful and the only
798 mention of him during prayers at his tomb should be to ask the mercy of God on his soul, it is permissible to show respect to his tomb and his memory. The heads of the Sanusiya have, however, always tolerated among their Bedouin followers a regard for holy men and their tombs which goes beyond mere respect. It is unlikely that they felt any repugnance to the cult, because they counted among their forbears several saints and were themselves brought up in North Africa where the cult of saints is widespread and very near to the hearts of the common people; and they could not have remonstrated with the Bedouin for believing that holy men and their tombs are sources of *baraka*,

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[1] Op. cit., p. 121.

795*

divine blessing, since it was because the Bedouin believed the [792]
Sanusi family had the same virtue that they accepted their [798]
leadership. [776]

The resemblance often alleged between the Sanusi and the [778]
Wahhabi movements, on the grounds of like puritanism, 795*
literalism, and fanaticism, cannot be substantiated. It is 171
obvious that there must be resemblances between new religious [114]
movements: they usually claim to be a return to primitive faith and morals and they are generally missionary and enthusiastic. There is no great significance in such common characteristics of the two movements. Nor is there any reason to suppose that the Grand Sanusi was directly influenced by Wahhabi propaganda. A more significant comparison between the two might be made by tracing their developments from religious into political movements. Both started as religious revivals among backward peoples, chiefly Bedouin, the Wahhabi movement in the Nadj in the eighteenth century and the Sanusi movement first in the Hijaz and then in Cyrenaica in the middle of the nineteenth century; the *Ikhwan* organizations of the two movements have much in common; and both ended in the formation of Amirates, or small Islamic States.

Both movements have created States, the Wahhabi in Arabia and the Sanusi in Cyrenaica, based explicitly on religious particularism. In doing so they have only done what any movement of the kind is bound to do in a barbarous country if it is to continue to exist, namely, to create an administrative system which would ensure a measure of peace, security, justice, and economic stability. A religious organization cannot exist apart from a polity of a wider kind. But they did not create the sentiment of community which made the growth of governmental functions and the emergence of a State possible.

Religious divisions in Islam have commonly been the expres- 795*
sion of a sense of social and cultural exclusiveness. The support 182
given to the 'Alids in Persia and Arabia, to the Umayyads in 177 ●
Africa and Spain, to the Fatimids in Egypt, to the Kharijites 171
by the Berbers in North Africa, and the adoption of extreme Shi'ite doctrines by the mountaineers of Syria and by the Kurds, and of Isma'ili teachings in parts of India, were all reactions against foreign domination as much as revolts against orthodoxy. The religious deviation was the expression of the intense desire

*795 of a people to live according to their own traditions and institutions.
182 To-day this desire is expressed in the political language
• 177 of nationalism. In the past it was expressed in religious movements.
171 Arab nationalism is not a new phenomenon. Only its
[668] dress is new.

*795 As will be seen in the chapters which follow, conditions in
Cyrenaica were particularly favourable to the growth of a
182 politico-religious movement such as the Sanusiya became. It was cut off by deserts from neighbouring countries, it had a homogeneous population, it had a tribal system which embraced common traditions and a strong feeling of community of blood, the country was not dominated by the towns, and the Turkish administration exercised very little control over the interior. It was, as will be seen, the tribal system of the Bedouin which furnished the Order with its political foundations just as it was the tribesmen of the country whose hardiness and courage enabled it to stand up to the succession of defeats it had to endure.

*795 The reasons for the political success of the Sanusiya Order in
793 Cyrenaica will appear in the course of this account, and here I
wish to draw attention to one of them only. It has been said
182 that its rites and teachings were, like the Bedouin character,
[792] austere without being fanatical, and that it tolerated the cult
of saints to which the Bedouin were accustomed, the Grand
[798] Sanusi becoming, in fact, a kind of national saint; but it must be added that the acceptability of its teachings and the fact that the Grand Sanusi could at once be placed by the Bedouin in the familiar category of *Marabtin*, holy men coming to preach and settle in Cyrenaica from the west, cannot alone account for the remarkable success of the Sanusiya movement. The Bedouin of Cyrenaica had heard similar teachings before from similar teachers and had paid them the same degree of attention as they paid to the Grand Sanusi, but these earlier missionaries won only a personal and local following for themselves and their descendants, whereas the Grand Sanusi established himself and his family as leaders of a national movement, a position they have now held for three generations.
Leaving aside the remarkable personality of the Grand Sanusi
[792] and without here discussing whether the time at which he
[798] taught was particularly favourable to the growth of the move-

*795 from Algeria and the other countries of the Maghrib on his
793 travels backwards and forwards to Arabia. He found in
159 Cyrenaica a tribal structure of a simple kind on which it was
*175 possible to build a missionary organization, but not out of
which it could be built. He brought this organization with him
to Cyrenaica, a band of devoted followers whose allegiance had
been tried by many vicissitudes. It must be remembered also
that these intimates of the Grand Sanusi were foreigners to the
Bedouin of Cyrenaica, with whom they had no ties of kinship,
so that they stood always outside the tribal system and were
not involved in the ancient loyalties and feuds inherent in
Bedouin society. The missionary organization, the Sanusiya
*795 Order, was separate from the tribal system, and by centring
793 it in the distant oasis of Jaghbub the Grand Sanusi prevented it
797 from becoming identified with any one tribe or section of the
159 country, as it might have become had it been centred in Cyrenaica
*175 proper. As we will see, it was the local attachment of the tribes
to the zawiyas in their territories, and the attachment of the
Shaikhs of these zawiyas to the Head of the Order, which made
the Order so effective a missionary Body, and eventually
enabled it to become a political force.

The Grand Sanusi died at Jaghbub on 7 September 1859 and
*795 was buried there. Later a magnificent shrine, furnished with
793 ornate trappings, was erected over his bones and was sur-
159 mounted with a white cupola, which gleams several miles away
*175 as one approaches the oasis. The shrine is of Egyptian craft-
764 manship and seems incongruous in its desert surroundings and
● [177] unfamiliar among a simple people.

There can be no gainsaying that al-Sayyid Muhammad bin
*795 'Ali al-Sanusi was a great man and his life's work a great
793 achievement. He is said to have been tall and of a distinguished
159 appearance, an eloquent speaker, and a wise teacher.[1] His
religious personality may be estimated by the fact that many
Algerians, Tunisians, and Moroccans were so inspired by his
teaching and example that they left their homes and followed
him on his travels and at his orders went as missionaries into
new lands, and by the fact that the Bedouin of Arabia and
Libya, who are a reserved and unheeding people, accepted him
as their guide in things both spiritual and temporal.

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[1] Adams, op. cit., p. 10.

The
Turkish Administration was centred in the towns but operated, 632
as will be explained later, through the contacts of its local 648*
officials, who were generally Arabs of the country, with the leading 571
tribal Shaikhs, with whom they made friends. These officials 369
were townsmen or sons of Bedouin who had received an urban
education and they acted as links between the citizen communities
and the Bedouin. Through Bedouin relations with
town merchants and officials what was happening in the world
outside Cyrenaica percolated to the most distant tents. Another 795*
channel of political and cultural infiltration was the network of 571
Sanusiya lodges. The Shaikh of the Sanusiya lodge at Banghazi, 648*
was regarded as the ambassador of the head of the Order to the 177
Governor of Cyrenaica and he was chosen for qualities which 632
fitted him for this role. He was consulted by the Governor on 793
matters in which the tribes were involved, and through him 369
and the Brothers of the lodges of the towns news of the outside
world reached the Head of the Order in the distant oasis of
Kufra and the Heads of the local lodges, whose relations with
the Bedouin in their localities were intimate. Thus, as will be
seen, the Bedouin had a general idea of what the revolution of
the 'Young Turks' meant and were aware of the impending crisis
long before the Italian attack on their country was delivered.
But though maintaining communications with the towns, 632
neither the tribal Shaikhs nor the Sanusiya allowed themselves 571
to be subordinated to them or identified themselves with urban 795
interests. The Bedouin Shaikh did not, like the Syrian landowner, 369
feel any need to have a town house, and the Sanusiya
ever remained a country and Bedouin Order and directed its
affairs from the desert.

Town and country kept apart, with the towns dependent on 632
the country and not the country on the towns, because there 369
was in Cyrenaica no client peasantry bound by debt, need of 565
protection, and trade monopoly to the towns. The Bedouin
did not settle on the land where they would be an easy prey to
the usurer, overseer, and tax collector. Those who were defeated [167]
in the great tribal wars of the past and in the inter-tribal and
inter-sectional fighting of more recent times migrated to Egypt
and settled there as *fallahin*, and not in Cyrenaica. In Cyrenaica 565
there is not the spur of adverse climatic conditions or the lash 167
of land shortage to drive them to depart from their ancient

day, but even ethnically the Bedouin are more Arabian than 619
the people of Egypt, the Sudan, and Tripolitania, while 101
culturally they are as completely Arab as any people in the [144]
world, proud Tamim and Quraish not excepted. In essentials
their language is that of the Hilalian invasion of the eleventh 197
century and no foreign language competes with it. The Berber- [191]
speakers are a handful in the distant oasis of Aujila, and even
there they are bilingual, and the insignificant fractions of Jews
and Cretans in the towns speak Arabic, the Cretans being
Muslims as well. The Italian immigrants left the country of 619
their own accord during the late war. Thus the obstacles to [167]
complete Arabization in the Maghrib (Tripolitania, Tunisia,
Algeria, and Morocco), a Berber culture, large Jewish colonies,
and European colonization are to-day all absent in Cyren-
aica. In all essential matters also the Bedouin of Cyrenaica
are like Bedouin tribesmen elsewhere in the Arab world: they [184]
have the same tented, pastoral, way of life, the same social
organization, the same laws and customs and manners, and the
same values.

The people of Cyrenaica are linked to the classical Arab 177
world of the east, to Egypt and the Jazirat al-'Arab (Arabia,
Palestine, Iraq, and Syria) rather than to the Maghrib; to the
sacred towns of Islam and to Umayyad Damascus, 'Abbasid
Baghdad, and Fatimid Cairo. More particularly they are linked
to Egypt, with which their country has had political ties from
the earliest times, and which is their natural market. The [133]
desert comes down to the sea at the Gulf of Sirte and separates
Cyrenaica from Tripolitania and these two countries have
always gone each its own way. Cyrenaica was linked to Graeco-
Egypt, Tripolitania to Phoenician Carthage. Cyrenaica went
with Byzantium, Tripolitania with Rome. Indeed, as Despois
says: 'The Greater Syrtis is without dispute one of the most
decided frontiers, natural and human, to be found anywhere in
the world.'[1]

During the last few decades this separation has been brought [195]
into relief again by the rise of the Sanusiya Order, for whereas
almost to a man the Cyrenaicans follow the Order politically,
the Tripolitanians, except for the Bedouin tribes, have shown a
lively animosity towards it. Moreover tribal ties between the 619

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[1] Op. cit., p. 45.

CHAPTER III

THE SANUSIYA AND THE TRIBES

I

793 WHEN the Grand Sanusi came to preach in Cyrenaica he found
619 the kind of society I have outlined: a congeries of tribes without
law or effective government, for the Turks had little control
over the interior, but with like values and habits and a community
of life which crossed tribal boundaries. The Bedouin to
[181] whom he preached were simple people living the austere and
monotonous life of the tents, with that savage character which
has been so often portrayed, but also with those noble qualities
which have seldom failed to evoke admiration from those who
have lived among them. They were profoundly ignorant about
[177] the outside world and also—which is what touched the heart of
[797] the Grand Sanusi—about the faith of their fathers, and to this
matter I must now return, since the Sanusiya was a missionary
Order and can only be understood as such.

771 Though the Bedouin professed Islam before the Grand Sanusi
influenced them by his teaching, they were almost totally
[797] ignorant of its doctrinal content, rites, or ritual and moral
duties, and it is safe to assume that they did not obey its precepts.
It is safe to assume this because even to-day, after a
century of Sanusiya instruction, the Bedouin perform their
religious duties in a very perfunctory way, if at all, and when
Muslim law is at variance with tribal custom they follow tribal
custom. In saying that they are lax, I do not suggest that they
are not very sincere, Muslims. They are proud of being Muslims
[186] and consider themselves greatly superior to Christians, while
they are contemptuous of Jews. Nevertheless, though they
would not belittle, the Cyrenaican Bedouin feel no embarrassment
at neglecting, the duties obligatory on every Muslim.
The Confession of Faith is known to all and implicitly accepted
by all. It imposes no irksome restrictions or tiresome duties.
But they almost completely neglect—I speak of the more
[782] nomadic sections whom I know best, but it is probably true of
most Cyrenaican Bedouin—their daily prayers, a duty which is

CHAPTER IV

THE TURKISH ADMINISTRATION

I

*795 UNTIL 1912, when Turkey surrendered Libya to Italy, Tripoli-
*648 tania and Cyrenaica were part of the Ottoman Empire and it
was under Turkish hegemony that the Sanusiya Order was born
and grew to maturity. The Turkish administration was an
• [177] important influence in its development and must be reviewed.

*648 I have seen the relics of the Ottoman Empire, men and places, in most lands of the Levant and North Africa and have admired the economy with which it bestowed peace upon the Arab world for close on 400 years. The Turks well understood that the successful practice of the art of administration depends not only on attention to some things but no less on inattention to others. They did not confuse government with bureaucratic interference in the name of moral regeneration. A general condemnation of Turkish rule has, however, been so long fashionable that I can scarcely hope to alter so widely accepted a judgement. I can do no more than make a passing gesture of respect to one of the characters in this Cyrenaican story, the Turk.

We have only such bare hints of what happened in Cyrenaica
*175 after the Hilalian invasion as Arab historians give us. At the
*648 downfall of the Mamluk dynasty in Egypt in 1517 Cyrenaica went with that country to the Turks, and its history under Ottoman rule from the sixteenth to the nineteenth century is almost entirely a blank. One may say with some confidence, however, that the Bedouin were little affected by Turkish rule. Those nearest to the coastal towns were doubtless compelled to pay taxes from time to time, but the tribes as a whole must have continued to lead their ancient way of life and to settle their own affairs among themselves. In 1711 a rebellion at Tripoli against the Sultan's authority led to the emergence of a local Janissary dynasty, the Caramanlis, who for a time exercised control over Cyrenaica also. It was during the period of their rule that Paolo Della Cella accompanied a military expedition sent by the Pasha of Tripoli to Darna. He records how the Bedouin whose country was traversed by the expedi-

3:Evans-Pritchard E-4, 5 (1942-1944) 1949 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9
(1837-1942) Sanusi

[P.104]

CHAPTER V

THE FIRST ITALO-SANUSI WAR (1911–17)

I

128 I HAVE given an account of the conditions in which the Sanusiya
*795 took root in Cyrenaica and of the circumstances which favoured
its growth. I now describe how its Bedouin followers, under
*648 its leadership, resisted Italian aggression during two wars, from
*175 1911 to 1917 and from 1923 to 1932, and finally lost their
independence and suffered Italian domination until relieved by
British arms in 1942. It will be seen how the long struggle
accentuated the political functions of the Sanusiya in a manner
I indicate forthwith.

121 For segmentary structures of the kind we find among the
182 Bedouin of Cyrenaica to develop rudimentary governmental,
or statal, organs it would seem necessary that for a long period
*648 of time all the segments of the society should find themselves
in common opposition to some outside force. It is not merely
that such opposition fuses the segments in corporate action. A
new form of political structure which includes the enemy comes
into existence and necessitates a new orientation of political
values. In a segmentary system each segment sees itself as a
unity in opposition to an opposed segment of the same size and
kind; so when all the segments come into a corporate relation of
opposition to some political group outside them which has a
different kind of political structure and belongs to a different
political system they tend to see themselves as a unity *vis-à-vis*
this group and as a unity on the same structural model as itself.
The small Bedouin society of Cyrenaica in this way slowly took
[177] on the political form of the European countries into the orbit
of which it was drawn. It could only enter into structural relations with the states of Europe on the model of the European
state.

*175 When the Italians invaded the country and the Turks made
*648 peace the tribes continued their resistanee in the name of the
Sanusiya. In their social system tribe was balanced against
*795 tribe and tribal section against tribal section. It was the
619 Sanusiya which gave to all the tribes and their sections a com-

121 sections constituting the combinations which makes the facts of feud intelligible.
613 Furthermore, several different types of power structures exist which serve the differ-
[571] ent interests of the people composing them, and these are interlinked in combinations
[578] of superior span. But the formation of these structures and the modes in which they
combine are quite unlike the articulations in a lineage system. Characteristically, the
segments in a lineage system are conceived of as building up hierarchically to span
what is spoken of as a total society, the apex of the system affording a spectacular and
fixed definition of its boundaries. Had I been using this concept in this paper the
[173] founding ancestress of the nine Cyrenaican tribes, Sa'ada as named by the Bedouin,
would have served this purpose and would have been given inappropriate promi-
121 nence. The views presented here have the consequences of retreating from a concept
184 of a total society. The people to whom the facts given are related are the camel-
herding tribes only. Some of them have relations of many kinds with the cow-herding
233 folk who inhabit the northern plateau area, and these relations are also significant
619 for the analysis of a wide range of problems; genealogically both cow and camel
herders are seen as part of a single structure, but the differences between them with
regard to their economy, the size, composition, and distribution of their residential
units, their political and ritual life is so great that to conceive of them as a single social
121 structure is not useful. Moreover, the far western tribal sections have relationships
619 of such urgency with their neighbours in Tripolitania (who are excluded from Cyrena-
ican genealogies) that to cut off these relationships as lying outside Cyrenaican society
would be quite unwarranted. The same can be said of the relationships of the tribal
sections in the eastern part of Cyrenaica with their genealogical cousins, the Aulad
'Ali of Egypt, who, although residing across a national border, are closely linked to
some of the Cyrenaican Bedouin. Some tribes also have to rely on the people of the
southern oases for an item of diet and an outlet for surplus wool, and the net of kin-
ship is spread out to include them. In these cases they come into contact with other
[177] ethnic groups such as Berbers and Tibu, and through the oases they extend their lines
of communication southwards to Wadai, Chad, and Bornu. As an indication of the
effectiveness of these links, it is only necessary to add that people inhabiting Cyrenaica
make periodic and regular visits to these far southern places, and that in 1948 a
shaikh, living near Ajadabiya in south-western Cyrenaica, collected blood-money
contributions from kinsmen in Wadai. A single structure cannot possibly include,
for analytical purposes, these sorts of relationships.

121 Finally, it must be stressed that the facts given here refer to the period 1948 to
114 1950. Since then oil has been discovered in large quantities near the territory of a
[315] tribe where I spent most of my time while resident in the country, and where there
was one tin shack in 1950 there is now a modern port with roads extending south-
wards from it into the wilderness. I see no reason to assume that social relations as
I observed them are present today or that they were the same at any time in the past
175 either. Before the advent of the Sanusi Order in the early eighteen-forties, it is known
795 that one lineage at least was dominantly powerful and that its leader tyrannized a
613 large part of Central Cyrenaica.[1] His descendants constituted a powerful group in

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[1] Smith and Porcher, 1864. These two archaeologists met this leader and continued their archaeological researches around Cirene only with his goodwill, although the site is not on the territory of his tribe as I knew it in 1950. They also speak of him as inhabiting a castle which also lies outside the

lowered very slowly and carefully by the crowd at the top. 671
Here again it is difficult to ascertain exactly what happened, 672
as the evidence was again contradictory. Apparently, when
Ahmed reached the ledge at half-way, he fumbled about 682
in the dim light for the foot holes; and just at this psychological
moment the rope broke.

The ten men holding the rope at the top collapsed one on the top of another; but when they had recovered their presence of mind, they shouted down to Ahmed, to ask if he were all right. A faint voice from the bowels of the earth replied that he had fallen heavily on a stone and had had a nasty knock, but that he would be all right in a few minutes.

They then produced a spare rope for another man to
go down and get Ahmed up; but they discovered that the
only one they had to hand was too short by several feet.
A man was sent post-haste on a pony to get another rope
from the encampment a mile or so away, and when he
returned after a quarter of an hour, volunteers were quickly
forthcoming to go down and retrieve Ahmed. On reaching
the bottom they found that the unfortunate man, either
stunned by the fall or overcome by foul air, had collapsed
flat on the bottom of the well, and had been drowned in
six inches of water. They hauled his body up to the
surface, and Ali, terrified that he might be held in some
way responsible, counselled all present to bury the dead
man then and there, and to say nothing about it. However, [123]
news quickly spreads; and the same day an informer came
to the police post and reported the matter, and Ali was
arrested and subsequently sentenced to three months' imprisonment
with labour by the present writer, for failure
to notify a death under unusual circumstances. (Incidentally [177]
this did not constitute an offence under Bedouin
Law, but was a contravention of the Police Code and was
punished as such. Hence the apparent interference in a
purely Bedouin concern.)

While Ali was still serving his sentence, Ahmed's rela- [694]

121 However, the political climate of Egypt at the time of my research made such a study impracticable. In reorienting my research, I decided to confine my study to al-Qasr and an analysis of "micropolitics" at the local community level.

The aim of the present study is, then, an understanding of the political structure of al-Qasr. Also, since no group exists in isolation and relations with others are mainly a matter of politics, I have tried to present here the structural and ideological bases of politics in al-Qasr. This study is concerned with politics in the traditional sense and in the modern sense. An analysis of the traditional meaning of politics necessitates a discussion and understanding of the structural principles of Bedouin society and the manner in which they function in defining the rights and obligations contained in social relationships. Such an analysis also seeks to establish a base level from which we can perceive and understand the political process in al-Qasr and the modern context of Bedouin politics. The main focus of the political analysis in this study is upon authority and leadership roles, as they were in the past and as they are in the present.

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*613 I should hasten to make one thing clear at this time, for it directly affected the way I went about my research and the type of data which I collected. In al-Qasr, there exists communication boundaries, and even barriers, corresponding to the structural and territorial lines of the lineage system. [178] The 'Aishaibat tribe of al-Qasr, once a nomadic tribe, is now

121 sedentary, but the semi-autonomous nature of the lineage segments
114 is maintained to a large extent. The result of this is a de-
*613 •[178] emphasis of the "we-feeling" among the population of al-Qasr
[186] and an absence of "sense of community" (Easton 1965:332). By
[571] "community," I refer to a pattern of relatively intensive,
face-to-face social relationships, and the values of solidarity
and common goals to which these give rise. The relationship
121 between lineage structure and territoriality was such that
*613 571 kinship segments within the same lineage unit might go days,
and even weeks, with no inter-communication, and the degree
of communication between separate lineage units of the tribe
was less intensive than this. Such a communication pattern
made observation difficult. The fact that Bedouin tribal
society relatively lacks the group ceremonial aspect compounded
the difficulty of gaining an overall perspective of structural
relations, and of witnessing the bases and nature of social
interaction outside the lineage structure. All of this
emerges from a communication structure and kinship structure
differentiated into corporate groups which "discourage close
participation of members in the social relations of the larger
society" (Wolf 1957:7).

121 The structural arrangement of al-Qasr was such that,
in plain language, not a great deal was happening in the
sociological sense. I say this about al-Qasr in comparison
[123] with, for instance, a full-blown village community. Conse-
quently, I observed from day to day that which I could,

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631 Sanusi against the Italians in Cyrenaica. "When the British reached Matruh, they jailed all of the *'umdas* and *shaikhs* (two *'umdas* and five *shaikhs*, at that time). Then they chose new leaders, from the families of the old leaders, to work with them." But, "these men did not fight with the British, they only acted as their guides in dealing with the Bedouins of the desert. When the old leaders were released from jail, they returned to their positions of political office. While they were in jail, their replacements had only helped the

•[178] British with supplies." Apparently, the British saw the need of maintaining the continuity of the Bedouin authority structure.

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648 Data on the condition of the Bedouins of the Western Desert between the two world wars are absent. The Bedouins say that they lived with no trouble, or any help, from the Egyptians. The Bedouins have no fond memories of their experiences during World War II. They first heard of the war in 1940 when the Italians marched into Western Desert from Libya. The Germans occupied al-Qasr from May to October of 1942, when the famous General Rommel had his headquarters at Marsa Matruh. The British had told the Bedouins, in 1940, that they should flee the Italians, and that unless they did

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166 they would be held responsible for their actions. Most of the people of al-Qasr agreed to go to refugee camps at Amriyya near Alexandria for the duration of the war.

[556] Some of the Bedouins refused to leave for Amriyya.

History of Settlement in al-Qasr

173 The settlement of al-Qasr took place about 200 years
[166] ago when the Awlad 'Ali first came to the area from Cyrenaica.
[175] No historical documentation for this period exists. The
173 various versions which the Bedouins offer are both vague and
*613 ethnocentric with reference to lineage. A point of consensus
[912] is that the zone was first claimed by Abu Mahjuba who built
a large fort (qasr = "fort" or "castle") near the coast. The Bedouins say that Abu Mahjuba settled in the area of al-Qasr because "he knew good land when he saw it." He belonged to no one lineage, "he was 'Aishaibi only." All of the lineages of al-Qasr claim that their ancestors came with Abu Mahjuba and settled on the land at that time. Abu Mahjuba has been mythologized: he belongs to all of al-Qasr, a symbol of local group solidarity and fraternal equality.

173 Al-Qasr represents the end of nomadic life for the
361 'Aishaibat tribe. According to the Bedouins, each tribe and
•[198] lineage took that part of al-Qasr which it preferred. If the
members of the segment wanted to grow vegetables, they took land on the coast; if they preferred the "old way of life," they set up their tents in the sha'ir wi mar'a area and raised sheep. "Everything was fine," they say, "there were no land registration laws--a man was free." Al-Qasr was settled
[619] "after the wars" (with the Hanadi), and it was only then that
the Awlad 'Ali broke up into tribes. The 'Aishaibat took the

173 land along the coast: "This land was free, and the man who
[361] planted on it owned it. We call this (method of claiming land)
[425] wad'a-l-id ("laying on of the hand," i.e. seizure). There was
[423] plenty of freedom in those days. A man could farm or keep
animals." Planting and caring for the land is not novel to
the Bedouins of al-Qasr.

423 The Bedouins claim that the pattern of land distribution
425 established during the time of Abu Mahjuba prevails today.
656 Further, they say that these rules will never change, no matter
•[178] what laws come out of Cairo: "Land registration can mean nothing
where the tribes are concerned, for no Bedouin would be willing
to take the land of another Bedouin. The government forces us
to register our land so that it can be stated in the newspaper that they are giving the Bedouins land."

*613 The relationship between ecology and lineage territory
423 is not striking, such as in the case of the Cyrenaican Bedouins
182 of Libya (Peters 1960). In most cases, lineage territories run
on a north-south line cross-cutting the coastal garden and
southern pastoral zones. Hence, lineage territories are, generally, ecologically similar rather than contrasted. However,
*613 there are exceptions. 'Ailit Shraif lineage (see Figure 3a
423 below), at the western end of al-Qasr's 'izba sector, settled
182 there "because of the abundance of underground water in this
241
[312] area: the ground is rocky here and the water comes out fresh
[361] like the Nile." Their founder, Sayyid Shraif, "specialized"

*613 in farming, and he found this land "good for raising mint and
423 182 vegetables." To the southeast of the 'izba, the lineages of
241 Lazumi and Ma'fas found the land suitable for barley and
[312] grazing. This area is rain-fed. There are no wells and so
vegetable crops are not possible here. The members of these
lineages say that their ancestors were "real" Bedouins in
Cyrenaica, and did not wish to become farmers in Egypt. It
*613 is interesting to note that the Lazumi and Ma'fas are the
182 richest lineages in all of al-Qasr. They were, perhaps, better
184 241 able to maintain the traditional style of life which all of
the Bedouins claim is "the best." But all Bedouins of al-Qasr
depend to some degree upon horticulture or arboriculture.
[231] And most families own a few sheep or goats. Both Lazumi and
Ma'fas garden in their coastal sections, and Shraif members own
sheep.

656 Land registration has a history in the Western Desert.
423 The government attempted it a number of times, but with little
success until 1959 when the General Desert Development Organization
(GDDO) undertook its program of land reclamation. But the
361 Bedouins were settled long before this. In al-Qasr, the Bedouins
342 began to erect permanent stone dwellings on the land about the
•178 time of the First World War. In the Matruh area, elder informants
agree that before 1914 the Bedouins lived in tents outside the
361 town area. When the British came, they began to move into town.
648 Many of the Bedouins built houses in Matruh between the years

361 648 1925 and 1930 because, as they point out, the British administration provided employment for "the poor Bedouin." 361 556 178 The wealthier Bedouins who owned camels and large numbers of sheep remained in the desert. Just the reverse is happening at the present time. The rich men who see the advantages in business, and the comforts which Matruh offers, can also afford the change of residence or the maintenance of two residences.

175 423 657 In 1922, the Egyptian government first registered land in al-Qasr. At this time, they sanctioned the tribal division of territory which existed. There was no attempt to force political integration upon the Bedouins. Egypt has never had a nomad problem as have other Middle Eastern countries. The history of Egypt is essentially the history of the Nile Valley. Consequently, it is not odd that we find no mention of the Awlad 'Ali in the historical record. The Bedouins of the Western Desert were resigned to their place in the desert, and the central government saw no particular advantage or disadvantage in this.

423 648 Concern for the Bedouin minority in Egypt emerged only with nationalistic programs of modernization. In 1954, the Fourth United Nations Social Welfare Seminar for Arab States in the Middle East convened in Baghdad. From this meeting came some general recommendations for dealing with the problems of the Bedouin. The major proposal was calculated to transform

657 177 474 433 sanctioned the direction of economic development from a pastoral to a market-oriented, agricultural mode of production. Land reclamation and development projects administered by the cooperatives encourage the Bedouins to produce cash crops. In this way, Al-Qasr is being drawn into the national economy. Price changes and seasonal commodity preferences in the Nile Valley now affect the economy of al-Qasr. The generation of a [181] cash economy has created a competitive spirit and a degree of individual independence which cuts across tribal loyalty and affiliations. The cooperative society, in this manner, tends to be a "social equalizer."

657 177 •178 474 *613 But economic transformation as the intended goal of the Cooperative Law is far from being an accomplished fact. Al-Qasr is still a traditional Bedouin society in the sense that the lineage structure is the framework in which economic and social relations take place. Because the cooperative society, as a new basis for association, threatens the dominance of the lineage principle, it has become the focal point for a struggle between the old and new.

657 177 474 661 435 The major problem encountered by the government officials in this program is that the cooperative society, as a central agent for the dispensation of aid products, becomes a pawn in tribal power politics. The government, forced to rely upon the prestigious and wealthy men for the initiation of an innovative program, found itself unable to prevent profiteering and the

747 the basis of conflict. Bedouins may be unwilling to contract
177 such a potentially significant relationship for the 50 piasters
474 426 it takes to join the cooperative society. In yet another area,
571 program administrators concerned with nutritional improvement
747 have ignored the culturally important areas of food preferences
177 and, more seriously, food prohibitions. The Bedouins, who
262 subsist mainly on their own animal products, barley bread, and
a few fresh vegetables, are extremely hesitant to accept what
they consider ritually "unclean meat from foreigners," powdered
milk, dried fish, and Kraft cheese. They are willing to
747 177 accept grain, flour, and the cottonseed cakes which are used
as fodder. In other words, the Bedouins seem to be presented
[178] with poor alternatives which may tend to reinforce choices
[433] related to the traditional productive organization, i.e.,
pastoralism. The exogenous stimuli to change are so culturally
objectionable that they actually generate conflict situations
and misunderstanding between agents and recipients of change.

747 Government programs have aimed at one aspect of
177 Bedouin society, the economic structure. They have ignored
433 the cultural underpinning of social organization, the system
of meanings in terms of which social action takes place
(Geertz 1957:32-54). The relationship between social and
economic behavior is, of course, an extremely important one.
But the economic structure cannot be transformed independently
of a specific cultural structure.

433
233 The Bedouin of al-Qasr idealize the life of the pastor-
183 alist. It is a dominant theme in their culture. Gardening
241 and arboriculture are perceived by the Bedouins as involving
[461] long hours of work, anxiety over waiting for profits, and
complex market operations. They understand the logic and
[556] operation of the sheep market. Sheep are a store of value, a
source of security, and a medium of exchange. In a good year
of rain, a man can reap a good crop of barley, and buy more
sheep against the inevitable bad year to come. While most
472 Bedouins are, in one way or another, involved with the modern
433 cash economy which ties al-Qasr to Marsa Matruh, the Bedouins
241 who go into the production of cash crops on a large scale are
434
177 those who can afford the risk of failure and who can survive
the meager profits of the initial stage. These are the men who
can adjust their world view from that of the pastoralist to
that of the entrepreneur. There are only a few of these men
in al-Qasr but they dominate the economy. Through them, most
of the Bedouins of al-Qasr are linked to the national economy.

Land and Economy

433 The period between 1960 and 1964 was one of significant
177 economic change in al-Qasr. Dependence upon farming increased
178 while pastoralist activities became less important. In the
past, none of the Bedouins now living in al-Qasr were "nomads;"
even my oldest informants had moved only once or twice to

433 plant a small crop or graze their animals on the land of
177 relatives. In terms of economic specialty, the economy of
178 al-Qasr has for some time been a mixed one. Traditionally,
433 dependence was upon animal products with relatively few
177 vegetables being grown in the *'izba* sector of the coast and
178 the barley sector to the south. Now, over one-half of the
241 registered land in al-Qasr is aboricultural land, and much
311 more land is given over to the growing of vegetables than in
the past. Correspondingly, the barley land has decreased.
The Bedouins still use barley primarily for fodder but much
of this comes from the government. With the shift to olive
arboriculture and government aid in the form of flour and
grain, naturally the barley crop has become less crucial.
But it remains indispensable for many Bedouins during this
transitional period. All Bedouins of al-Qasr are concerned
with securing a good livlihood. They express this idea in
the term *ma'isha simha*, and, as I have noted, they identify
it with the garden coastal sector of al-Qasr. The security
of a cash economy and participation in the national economy
433 have been realized by the Bedouins. I have no figures on the
241 amount of land registered prior to 1960, but, as of 1964,
311 al-Qasr consisted of 2,000 registered acres. Over one-half
434 of this land is in the garden area of al-Qasr, and is planted
with orchards. All of this land represents cash crops. Planted
in between the orchards are vegetable gardens. These gardens

245 blossoms of the tree are stripped away by these winds before
177 the fruit can mature.

• 178 Traditional values affect the Bedouins' perception of
517 their new life. Men are fond of gathering for their ritual
272 three cups of mint tea and recalling "the good old days." In
[829] those days, they say, men only had to ride, shoot, and drink
233 tea. In the past, there was a great deal of security in
178 owning animals which are not as dependent on the rains as
422 is agriculture. During a year of bad rains, a Bedouin could
233 always move his flock to Libya or to the Nile Valley: "When
731 we have a bad year, we take our animals to the grass of our
166 relatives. When they have a bad year, they come here." In
167 the drought year of 1960, 20,000 Egyptian Bedouins migrated
to Libya in search of pasturage. This caused an international
[648] conflict and King Idris of Libya, for a short time, closed the
border to Bedouins. The conflict was finally resolved, and
the Bedouins were given permission to use the pastures of
Cyrenaica. None of the Bedouins of al-Qasr were involved in
this movement.

233 The Bedouins who have settled in the _'izba_ sector of
al-Qasr also prefer to keep some sheep. The security which
they represent is worth the time and expense of maintaining
233 them and paying a shepherd to look after them. The Bedouins,
178 in the past, paid their shepherds one sheep for every ten
465 sheep that he tended. Payment was made twice a year. Today,

233
178 with the movement toward a cash economy, this has changed.
[465] The shepherd receives 8 to 10 piasters for each head of sheep
which he tends. The Bedouins who have taken up farming can
spare none of their family for sheep-herding chores. If he
[497] can afford it, during the dry season, a Bedouin may ship his
sheep to the Nile Valley by train at 12 piasters per head.
But the government will not accept sheep for shipment unless
they are accompanied by a shepherd. The role of shepherd
has become a very specialized one in the al-Qasr area. Few
[554] of the al-Qasr Bedouins are shepherds, and the role is
reserved for the poorer men without land.

241 Plowing in the garden area is done by hand. Usually,
407 the plow is pulled by a donkey but occasionally, if one can
492 afford it, a camel or a horse will be used. A man and his
[462] sons handle all of the agricultural chores with the exception
178 of the winnowing process which the women do. Traditionally,
241 barley was threshed by camels plodding on it. The Bedouins say
492 that this is the best way because the soft feet of the camel
do not crush the kernel. Now, however, very few men can afford
[409] a camel. Threshing is done with a heavy wooden sled pulled by
241 a donkey or a horse. Tractors, when available, are used for
407 agricultural plowing in the southern barley zone. This zone,
434 during the year 1963, also became important for raising water-
433 melons (batiikh), and this product figures to be an excellent
cash crop for al-Qasr. Melons and barley can bring high profits

423 society. Private ownership of land with sovereign rights
*[613] over it is now the normal practice in al-Qasr. Rights are
●[178] held by the family head, the shaib. If the family head is
[596] deceased, land tenure rights are held jointly by the sons.

In the area beyond the plateau, in the extreme
[184] south of al-Qasr, land rights to grazing and water still are
*[613] associated with lineages. But here agriculture is impossible.
[241] The type of rights over the land varies with the method by
which it is exploited. The southern and coastal sections of
[433] al-Qasr represent the old and the new, the pastoral traditional
mode of production and the modern agricultural cash economy.
[233] But, as noted, of the total population only a few Bedouins
are actually engaged in pastoralist activities. Hence, tribal
tenure rights, in general, are not overly important at this
time. Not too long ago they were, and many cases in the recent
[671] history of Bedouin customary law relate to conflicts over land
and water in the southern region. The Bedouins say that
[178] traditionally no lineage could use the pasturage or water of
*[613] another without some agreement, usually of long standing,
[233] made beforehand. Now, they say, permission is not needed.
[675] In the old days, these agreements were made between lineage
representatives, not individuals per se. Today, the grass
178 and water in the southern zone are claimed, though not in a
423 legal sense, by the families using them: the rights of
usufruct over the land are closer to rights of sovereignty

178 than they were in the past. These conditions reflect a change
423 in social and authority relations.

423 In the *'izba* sector of al-Qasr, as of 1964, there were
432 two cases of land purchase. In one case, land was sold to an
Egyptian, "an outsider" from the Nile Valley. This, of course,
could only occur where such a transaction would be upheld by
423 the Egyptian government. Land ownership, when it involves
registered land, is absolute. This, to a great extent, works
*[613] to lessen the influence of the lineage structure on property
423 relations. The law governing property, whether in traditional
178 or modern al-Qasr, reflects a set of social relationships.
571 When an individual can own property in the absolute sense,
rather than with respect to his being a member of a group
which enjoys sovereign rights of ownership, then, there has
been a change in traditional corporate relations (Herskovits
[184] 1952:260). This has definitely been the case for most of
al-Qasr, and it is adumbrated in the southern sector where
a person's rights over land are nearly absolute. A comparison
423 of land tenure patterns on the coast and in the southern
184 region reflect not only the contrast between methods of land
use, but, also the fact that as land becomes valuable it
becomes scarce and land holdings become fragmented (compare
Figures 5 and 6).

428 When the head of a household dies, his eldest son
596 inherits his authority, but all of the sons share equally in

428 inherited by a woman's daughters. The carpets and the tent,
562 [422] which are woven by women, are not their property to pass on
for they belong to the head of the household, the shaib.

596 Economic change in al-Qasr has had its impact at the
177 level of production mode, and, also, it has affected the
•178 composition of the basic family structure. One informant,
[124] who is now nineteen years old, remembers growing up in a
household composed of his grandfather, father, father's brothers and their families. Since that time, his father has built another house away from the family home; one uncle has moved to Marsa Matruh and opened a shop there; his youngest uncle has built a house not far from the family home; and one uncle remains with his three wives in the original
182 house. This fission-type process is not uncommon in a segmentary
177 society, although as a traditional process, it
*613 represented a mechanism for dealing with ecological pressures.
433 In the modern case, in al-Qasr, the process of fission in the
434 Bedouin social structure proves to be an adaptive mechanism
also: the fragmentation of lineage property and relations is a positive condition for the transition to a cash and market economy. Among most of the families of al-Qasr, as market orientation increases brothers begin to economically differentiate their tasks and interests with an eye to individual profits.

*613 •178 578 [194] office in modern Bedouin society. Also, we will return to the processes of fission and fusion when we discuss Bedouin law. I will be able to show through the use of legal documents how one tertiary unit went through a process of fission, fusion and re-fusion with its secondary unit.

The capacity for fusion and fission is a result of a number of structural situations. First of all, it is the exercise of choice on the part of the tertiary segment members who have contracted alliance in the form of collective responsibility with other tertiary segments of the lineage. The choice to break off from the major group may be of two kinds: a severence of political ties with one group in favor of a new group or the natural process of segmentation as a response to ecological conditions. In the latter case, no new political alliances are formed, and it usually involves a married son going off to begin his own camp. It is only an expansion of the major or secondary group. But the former case is one of decimation: the secondary group contracts. In both cases, authority is exercised, either between father and son, or, *613 578 177 178 between heads of corporate groups. In al-Qasr, the capacity for either type of fission is limited by the political environment of the Egyptian nation-state, the highest level of authority which the Bedouin encounters. The classic functioning of the segmentary lineage system is, in the case of al-Qasr, being changed by extra-system factors. The

*613 Bedouins, always a minority in Egypt, have been undergoing
•178 a transition to peasantry since about 1800. Probably since
177 that time, Bedouin society has been, to use Easton's (1959)
578 emphasis, a "segmentary society" rather than a "segmenting
society."

196 Formal Bedouin categories of kinship are confusing;
depending upon the situation they use the concepts of bait,
'ait, 'aiela and qabiila interchangeably. The term bait
literally means "house," the term bait al-'Arab may mean
"the tent" or "the people of the tent." "People of the tent"
[594] may refer to either the nuclear family of one man, or the
nuclear families of a man, his brothers and his sons, and
[596] their spouses and offspring. In the latter case, the ex-
[621] tended family is referred to as the naja'. A naja', or camp,
usually consists of three or four tents. The word bait may
196 refer to the tertiary and the sub-tertiary groups, and oc-
*613 casionally one might even refer to the secondary group as a
bait when he wishes to emphasize the quality of corporateness.
The term 'aiela, literally "family," is the word used most
often to designate the secondary lineage segment. The dim-
inutive of this word, i.e. 'ait, usually refers to the sub-
tertiary group but it commonly designates the secondary group
[619] also. The term qabiila, "tribe," is the only word used for
the primary and supra-primary lineage groupings. These are
196 the general Bedouin usages and their frequency will vary not

593 In al-Qasr it is a rare sight to see a father and his young son together, and it is only slightly more common to see the father with the grown son. The second case may simply be a reflection of the division of labor since the son, once grown, takes over the economic tasks of his father.

593 The most important duties of a father toward his
867 son are three:. he must teach him generosity, courage and
584 courtesy; he must see that the boy learns the Quran; and he
872 must arrange a good marriage for his son. According to
593 Peters (1960:34), the Cyrenaican Bedouin father must attend
852 to three things for his son, namely: his circumcision, his
[872]
[583] education in the Quran, and his bridewealth when he marries.
In al-Qasr, the Egyptian school teachers have succeeded in
[177] showing the Bedouin that circumcision is a private family
593 affair and not a public ritual. Although all fathers still
852 see to it that their sons are circumcised, the father is no
•178 longer responsible for "making a circumcision party." In
[626] fact, the father who does insist on following the old ways
[431] by hiring a dancer and publicly marking his son's *rite de passage*, will be ridiculed as one "who only wants to make money from the ritual gift (*naquut*) given the boy."

593 The son recognizes the rights which the father has over him through a show of respect and obedience. A boy shows deference toward his father by not smoking, singing, or reciting poetry of any kind in his presence. During the

585 Only one of the three weddings was conducted in the
● 178 traditional way with three nights of dancing previous to the wedding and a large feast on the wedding day. The Bedouin say that a man can no longer afford to do things the old way.
584 The procedure of the marriage arrangement begins when the boy informs his uncle that he wishes to marry. Then the uncle,
[583] the father and other males of the group meet with the father of the prospective bride to arrange the marriage, an important part of which is the establishment of the brideprice (hulwaan
584 or mahr). Before going to see the girl's father, the boy's
*613 father consults with his secondary lineage group, as I have already mentioned. Then he should wait for a period of seven days, for the girl's father, "who has heard about the marriage," must consult with his group and wait for a period of one week during which time any member of the girl's
584 lineage may claim her. After this time, the ties proposed
[675] by the marriage are ritualized by two preliminary acts: the writing of the contract (ma'azuum) between the fathers, and the offering of a lamb by the groom which solemnizes his intentions and the marriage (dabah fi-l-williyya). After
[431] another waiting period of about two weeks, during which time the boy buys gifts of clothing and jewelry and presents them to the girl at her home, the wedding celebration begins.
585 On the day of the wedding, the girl is delivered to the groom's residence. The girl remains in the groom's tent, or

*613 682 435 436 •178 [571] Each member of the corporate group contributes an equal share to the blood-money due in a compensation case. The blood-price for intentional killing is presently set at 400 L.E. In the olden days, the blood-price was 100 camels. If a man had no camels, he was expected to contribute his share in cash, the value to be assessed at current market prices. Eventually, cash came to replace camels altogether in [231] the exchange of blood-money. This reflects the growing unimportance of the camel in the Western Desert. Today, there [556] is only one man in al-Qasr who may be considered a "camel owner," and he is the richest man in the area. Since at least 1935 the blood-price has been met with cash.

*613 682 554 571 When it has been decided that the right of blood-revenge as a retaliatory measure is to be waived, the *'aqila* must go to each member of the group for his share of the blood-money. Each *'aqila* of the secondary group does this, and together their collections make up the 400 L.E. blood price. For instance, if there happens to be 400 men in a secondary lineage group, then the share which each contributes will be 1 L.E. The *'aqila* must account for his own group's share even if this means making up deficiencies from his own pocket. It is for this reason that the *'aqila* "should be rich." Though the *'awaaqil* of al-Qasr are generally members of the "status group," this is not always the case. Hussain, the man destined to become the *'aqila* of Bait Braik, was comparatively poor. He admitted to this fact, and said that for this reason he was reluctant to become an *'aqila*: "The *'aqila* is responsible for his *bait*.

*613 He must pay the _diiya_ with the shares which he collects from
682 the others. It makes no difference if the _'aqila_ must pay
554 with his own money. He is responsible for this matter before
571 the whole tribe."

*613 The collection of the _diiya_ is only one aspect of the
554 process of conflict regulation, but it stands out as the funda-
682 mental manifestation of the office of _'aqila_. In the course
[692] of office, an _'aqila_ will spend much more time arbitrating
disputes, but it is his responsibility concerning blood-money
which defines his position and his jurisdiction as corporate
682 ones. During the present period in al-Qasr, the practice of
●178 blood-revenge has all but disappeared as a mechanism of social
[626] control. Nevertheless, the possibility of its happening is
not too remote. The payment of blood-money is the alternative
[619] to blood-revenge, and blood-revenge is a condition for all-out
[721] tribal warfare--something which the Bedouins look upon with
[829] horror. One informant once likened a primary-level war between
the 'Aishaibat and the Kamailat (should it ever occur) to
*613 "the end of the world." The _'aqila_ as a representative of a
682 group can prevent war by preventing reciprocal homicides: by
554 presenting his share of the blood-money he regulates conflict
578 and promotes integration. The blood-money is usually paid
over a period of from one to two years. In this case, the
[571] notion of "debt" represents a contingent, institutionalized
social relationship for the purpose of maintaining political
order.

*613 554 578 692 Conflict regulation, in the formal sense, is the province of the _'aqila_. All complaints should be taken before the _'aqila_. In al-Qasr, every individual has certain rights, and when any of these rights are infringed upon he may demand a redress of wrongs: he demands his rights, or exercises _haqq al-'Arab_ ("the right of the Arabs"). The _haqq al-'Arab_ is opposed to the _haqq Allah_, "the right of God," which concerns crimes against religion (i.e., wine-drinking, apostasy). The dichotamy represents private claims over against the claims of a religious state which is characteristic of Islamic society. [688] In al-Qasr, crimes against religion have never occurred, and if they did they would be handled in Marsa Matruh by the local _shaikh_ ("holy man").

*613 554 69 The litigation process is initiated when an individual appears before his _'aqila_ with a claim, and the statement: "I do not wish so-and-so to take any of my rights." The _'aqila_ first attempts to persuade each party "to return to the path of the good," to come together and to cease quarreling. This type of moral persuasion is preliminary to a full court-hearing in which both parties will appear with witnesses before their respective _'awaaqil_, and other "third parties" who aid the _'awaaqil_ in their decision. The decision reached by the court is morally binding upon both parties. [671] •[178] According to recent innovation in Bedouin customary law, the details of the litigation and the decision reached by the court are to be recorded

*613
554 on paper in triplicate, one copy going to each litigant and
69 a third copy to the chief of police of the Marsa Matruh sector.
[671] In practice, though, a copy usually goes to the litigants, but
[178] not to the chief of police (who had not a single Bedouin court
case in his files).

*613 As is not the case in Islamic law, in Bedouin customary
695 law the decision of the judge may be appealed. The system of
692 appeals may even function at the level of familial authority,
[671] i.e., the son may, in theory, appeal a ruling by his own
father. The Bedouins insist that this is an important right
of every man. In the situation where a man wishes to appeal
a decision of his own _'aqila_, he will generally take his claim
to another _'aqila_ of his secondary group. When an appeal is
to be made, it is done with the permission of the _'aqila_ who
rendered the original decision. The one who appeals his case
does so with the understanding that the decision returned by
the court of appeal will be final and binding. Further, if
[681] the court of appeal concurs with the findings of the original
court, the plaintiff pays a double fine (twice the original
fine), and also pays his own _'aqila_ an expiation fee (_kubaara_).

69 The Egyptians have preferred to leave the Bedouins of
648 al-Qasr to settle their own disputes except in the more serious
[682] criminal matters. Police from Matruh will enter homicide cases
[685] and those conflicts over property rights which threaten to
explode into tribal warfare. But these types of conflict have

*613 571 jural status in the lineage by contributing its share of the blood-money.

*613 571 178 The consolidation of tertiary groups into authority groups may shed some light on the dual process of fission and fusion common in segmentary societies. The structure of authority groups which make up a secondary group is a reflection of the way in which tertiary segments grow and segment, or decline and fuse, into other groups. In the process, one group, or many small groups of agnates, are incorporated under a name other than that of their genealogical ancestor. Through time, and in the interest of group solidarity and political order, real biological ties may be obscured: the regulation of political relations favors ideological jural ties over genealogical ties which indicate lineal differences. With reference to 'Ailit Ma'fas, perhaps in the future, Bait Yunis, with only three members, will be totally submerged into the authority group, Bait Muhammad, so that the individual, Yunis, will be dropped from the genealogy of 'Ailit Ma'fas. Then the descendents of Yunis will be linked to Muhammad, the founder of Bait Muhammad, by an artificial link, though the patrilineal ideology will define it as a descent link. During the period of solidification, there is apt to be confusion concerning the exact nature of kinship ties. For instance, in al-Qasr, there was a great deal of argument about whether or not 'Ailit Ma'fas was once a segment of 'Ailit Lazumi. As I

*613 571 •178 have noted previously, informants very definitely disagreed over the matter; by looking at the two genealogies one is unable to say one way or the other. The process of fission and fusion in the form of secession and adoption is another instance of genealogical manipulation through patrilineal ideology. In this case, patrilineal ideology also may succeed in concealing real biological links in favor of political relations. We shall see below how secession and adoption actually function in Bedouin society.

*613 675 554 571 We have said that the authority of the _'aqila_ is legitimate at each structural level. The Bedouins of al-Qasr often legitimate the authority of the _'aqila_ in writing, and, at the same time, make an explicit statement of social compact which outlines the pragmatic and moral values of the corporate group. The corporate charter in al-Qasr is a document of self-interest which defines expectations and consequences for corporate members: it governs the conduct of members in situations relevant to internal order, and gives the _'aqila_ powers of representation in external affairs. The charter is a [181] reflection of the high value the Bedouins place upon security and order, and is a condition for a legal system of wider *613 675 571 scope. Max Weber (1947:120) has expressed the idea of social relationship as contract so well that it is worthwhile to quote him extensively here.

*613 That the
173 secondary segment is as significant as the tertiary group
seems to be indicated by the Bedouin tendency to mythologize
the founder of the secondary group. For instance, Ma'fas is
a nickname literally meaning "the big-footed one;" the
Zagharat take their name from a man who used the zaghaariid
("shrill cry of joy" used by women) as his battle-cry; Abu
Qarasa means "father of bread-loaf;" Sayyid Shraif was a
very "noble" (shraif - "high-bred, noble") man. Along with
each name there are a number of different myths to explain it:
hence Ma'fas was a cattle thief who left large footprints in
the mud so that all would know of his daring exploits; Abu
Qarasa baked hugh loaves of bread to honor his in-laws when
they visited him. On the other hand, there are no myths about
*613 founders of tertiary segments. Tertiary segments might, in
•178 the future, disappear from the Bedouins' genealogy, either
because of death, barawwa, or secession, but the secondary
group survives these events. It is the secondary segment,
as we shall see in our discussion of law and sanctions, which
is structurally important for the political community of the
Awlad 'Ali.

*613 Because the secondary level is the more structurally
571 important, seeing that the greater benefits of collective
responsibility derive from it, the tertiary group surrenders
part of its autonomy to it. The tertiary group does so in
just the way that the individual member of any polity allows

*613 778 182 682 The nazaala as a regulatory mechanism functions only between secondary segments. This indicates that blood-revenge as a negative sanction is operative only in the external system of political relations. Political relations at this level, where the feeling of corporateness is relatively lacking, are in delicate balance. Therefore, once conflict is successfully mediated and the injury redressed, it is best forgotten, for it is unlikely that either party feels their rights have been completely restored.

683 Sanctions against personal injury, besides killing, are dealt out in terms of fines, the fines being figured as proportions of the diiya. Every part of the body has a price on it: the Bedouins say, "Banu Adam kill-i-filuus" ("The sons of Adam are all money"). A proportion of the diiya is due for injury to any of the following parts of the body: the beard, hair on the head and the nape of the neck, and eyelashes; wounds to any part of the body; fractures and dislocations of bones; the tongue and the teeth; the testicles and the breasts; and the loss of mind. Bodily injuries are [463] evaluated by a considered expert, the nathaara ("the keen-eyed one"). [305] If the services of a nathaara become necessary in al-Qasr, the barber in Marsa Matruh (the same person who performs most of the Bedouins' circumcisions) fills the role. [178] But the Bedouins say, "Now that we are educated we are able to make our own evaluations."

554 seen" at any such function. It would appear that the mechanism
571 at work here is not simply a device to provide the younger
182 generation with a tension-release situation, but also a
561 symbolic expression of the difference between the possessors
[154] and the non-possessors of authority, a confirmation of the
political order.

[578] The avoidance practice, or separation, between the
old and the young in the "party" situation is a structural
fact of Bedouin society, and, though it may ultimately be
defined as a conflict control or legitimating mechanism, in
the context of culture change new aspects and meanings attach
554 to the phenomenon. The "status group" is an agent of change
571 in al-Qasr; its members can afford to gamble in the market
178 economy of Marsa Matruh since they possess the reserve capital
[471] (in the form of sheep) and the social prestige which permits
[439] this. The "status group," with business and social relations
[177] in Marsa Matruh, enjoys both the benefits of associational
ties with the Egyptians and the communal ties with their
fellow Bedouins. They see themselves as being different from
their fellow tribesmen, and they tend to face more towards
Marsa Matruh than al-Qasr. In short, they are the "cultural
brokers" who support an ideology of change, they extol the
benefits of a new way of life over and against the old.

[789] One repudiation of tradition which constitutes an
[796] attempt to define the style of life of the "status group"

554 concerns magic. Each August there is a celebration in honor
571 of al-Qasr's local saint. At these celebrations, the darwish
• 178
789 performs his special skills such as putting a red-hot iron
796 to his tongue, or standing on a skin drum held high by his
two assistants. No member of the "status group" attends these
affairs because the darwish and his magic "belong totally to
the old way of life." This is a restriction on social intercourse. It may also be a rejection of the saint's sacred
power, or reluctance on the part of the "status group" to
554 share authority. The ideology which the "status group" in
571 al-Qasr has developed embodies attitudes of cooperation and
183 patience with induced programs of change. These attitudes
are invoked in varying degrees corresponding to motives of
economic gain, desire for power, and altruistic concern. But
the result is a "status group" mood which may be described
as one of disdain for the old way of life. Ideology and
discontent in al-Qasr are mainly evident among the members of
the "status group."

554 The pool from which the members of the "status group"
556 are recruited consists of the "status honor" possessors of
571 three lineages (two Sa'adi and one Marabit). These have been,
* [613] traditionally and presently, the wealthiest and most influential
in al-Qasr. Wealth in al-Qasr is defined in terms of three
things: sheep, land, and olives. Olives are becoming the
measure of wealth in the modern al-Qasr: sheep are the tradi-

554 571 627 182 [181] [556] turns in times of need dealing with financial and personal problems. In view of the value stress which the Bedouins place upon generosity, manifest in the redistributive system of the lineage, the wealth of the rajal khair is the wealth of the community. Wealth divides, not only possessors from non-possessors, but also, seekers after security from power seekers. It is as Peters (1965:145) has noted in Cyrenaica: generosity, not being entirely altruistic, wins repute and repute is an important aspect of political power.

554 682 627 *613 829 In an interview concerning the justice of blood-revenge, there was general agreement that if a man kills intentionally, then blood-revenge must be taken by the murdered man's bait against someone in the murderer's aiela. But one prominent man (a rajal khair) protested that "the best man in the killer's family must not be harmed." This statement generated a rather heated debate. One man said: "The best man should be killed for this is right in the Bedouin type of justice." (This comment was made by a man who is the 'aqila of a low-status lineage in al-Qasr.) The first speaker's reply to the protest was this:

> Nevertheless, it all depends upon the character of the best man . . . if he is evil and on bad terms with your family, then he will be the first one to be killed. But if he is a good man, then you kill the murderer himself . . . You must never kill a rajal khair because he may do good in the future. In the old days, the killing started right away, and all problems were big ones: today there is negotiation--people are improving. • [178]

554 The *rajal khair*, then, is a broker in social relation-
571 ships, a manipulator of loyalties. As a member of the "status
627 group," he can afford to spend time and money in courting his
fellow tribesmen, and, as a result, can accrue prestige and
loyalty. This role, like that of the *'aqila*, is a secular
[681] one. The sanctions which it controls are as economical as
those of the *'aqila's* are political. In this sense, they
are differentiated from the role of *rajal saalih* whose
sanctions are sacred in nature.

554 The traditional role which we define as that of the
792 *rajal saalih*, "the holy man," was probably much more important
[178] in the past than it is today. In al-Qasr, there are only two
rajal saalih who share in traditional power: the one is a
resident of al-Qasr proper, and the other, a member of the
prestigious Sanusi family, lives near Marsa Matruh.

The *rajal saalih* of al-Qasr, i.e. the local "holy
man," is assured of status because he is an *ashraf*, one who
claims descent from the family of the Prophet. He is also a
[561] member of the elder age-set, and while he is not rich, he
cannot be considered poor. Though the "holy man" al-Sanusi
[793] lives near Matruh, he participates in the authority structure
of al-Qasr and is a member of the "status group." He is
sometimes referred to as *rajal saalih kabir*, "a great holy
man," by virtue of his Sanusi heritage.

[771] The relative unimportance of this role as compared
to that of the *rajal khair* in conflict regulation is a function

554 [571] ● [178] It is interesting to note that Hajj 'Ali is one of the most powerful members of the "status group" in al-Qasr. He is also a leading proponent of social change and a critic of the old way of life which includes belief in magic. One can [792] see how 'Amm Salih's influence and status might work in other areas of social action.

554 792 627 [695] [691] * [613] [829] Although it is conceivable that a rajal salih can be asked to intervene in any type of conflict, it is more likely that he will preside at cases involving marriage and divorce. The rajal saalih may also be asked to serve as a witness or consultant in litigation cases. The Bedouins point out that the "holy man," like the rajal khair, is apt to be more trustworthy than the formal authority, the 'aqila.

> Sanusi is a good man and the people should listen to him. He is a rajal khair, a rajal saalih, not an 'aqila. He is better than an 'aqila--he is our brother. He is much better than the 'umda because he never changes the truth. The 'umda may go and accuse me wrongly to the government but Sanusi would never do this.

554 792 It is, of course, difficult to decide whether Sanusi's charisma stems from the fact that he is a rajal salih, or the facts of his wealth and family. Most probably it is a little of both, the sacred as well as the secular. 'Amm Salih, on the other hand, is neither wealthy nor from a particularly prestigious family by economic standards of al-Qasr: he derives his influence and status from the sacred aspects of

554 121 toward legitimacy and the phenomenon of change in the political structure. Peters (1967:271-279), in a long awaited discussion of the political aspect of Cyrenaican Bedouin society, adumbrates this problem of differentiating between instituted authority and the distribution of power:

> In order to discuss this adequately, a lengthy diversion into an analysis of the distribution of power would be necessary . . . there are men who wield power over groups of varying populations, and the extent of their domains cannot be understood by reference to orders in the lineage. Perhaps it is for this reason--because, that is to say, lineage theory effectively blocks the exercise--that relatively little has been written about the problem of leadership in these societies (i.e. lineage societies).

554 178 792 571 [795] Foci of power and authority change and at times irrespectively of the lineage structure. The role of the rajal saalih was more influential during the days of the Sanusiiya movement than it is today. At that time, "holy men" controlled economic, and thus political, relations through the zawiya system: they were in a position to command respect and obedience and could be considered a "status group" in their own right. Today, "holy men" are rarely found among the members of the "status group." As one informant phrased it: "They used to solve problems more in the past than now. People in the old days were not educated as they are today: the mind of the son is larger than that of the father. 554 178 792 In the past, the "holy man" was so important that were he to ask

554 •178 [792] you for your cloak, you would have immediately given it to him. God was pleased with them at that time."

This notion of changing foci of authority and power cannot be divorced from the related political phenomena of the tendency toward legitimacy and the role institutionalization
128 process. In the next chapter, I will attempt to show how such a conceptual framework can be utilized in an analysis of culture and political change.

Modern Legal Roles

·634 554 [648] [177] The roles of 'umda and shaikh were created and imposed upon the Bedouins by Muhammad 'Ali sometime during the early part of the nineteenth century in order to facilitate administration, maintain security in the desert, and protect the Western frontier.

[619] Both of these roles are representative offices at the primary level of the tribal structure. The 'Aishaibat have an 'umda and a shaikh who reside in Marsa Matruh and work in close relation with the Governor. In terms of a chain of command, these offices receive demands which may originate either with the Governor in Matruh or with Bedouins in al-Qasr. But these offices are subservient to both the Governor and the Bedouins since no decision-making powers of any consequence
[571] [635] resides with them. With reference to the two authority structures, the Egyptian and the Bedouin, the 'umda and the

634 to the *'umda*. Both offices are for a life-term, only being
554 terminated by bad behavior or senility. At the expiration
634 of an incumbent's term, the "status group" meets in al-Qasr
571 to decide upon his replacement. The name of a "nominee"
635 is passed on to the Governor who is expected to approve the
666 Bedouins' selection of a representative to the government.
• [178] It is this "status group"-controlled process which the
[177] Governor seeks to change. Since these are officially held
offices in the U.A.R. governmental structure, he feels that
elections to fill their vacancies should be a public affair.
Naturally, he will exercise more influence over the naming
of candidates in this way, and the Bedouins perceive this as
a challenge to the traditional structure of leadership and
control of external relations.

634 The offices of *'umda* and *shaikh* are even more heredi-
*613 tary than that of *'aqila*, which theoretically should not be
666 the case. By definition, the role of *'aqila* is functional at
[428] the *bait* level, and so the recruitment pool of candidates
for this office is inherently limited. By comparison, the
offices of *'umda* and *shaikh* should go to the "best men" in
the tribe, and, therefore, the recruitment pool should be
634 tribal-wide. But, in fact, these two offices are considered
*613 "the property" of the wealthiest lineages in the al-Qasr area.
666 There is a traditional rationale behind this fact: there is
428 the structural necessity for, and conscious practice of, an
[571]

634 *613 666 428 [578] no coincidence, then, that the present 'umda and shaikh are the sons of the former 'umda and shaikh. This reveals not only the structural rules of succession, but also indicates that "social honor," and thus power, still resides with these families.

[178] It is important to note that since the time of their inception, these roles have not changed 'aiela or even bait in al-Qasr. When the former 'umda from 'Ailit Lazumi died, 634 *613 666 428 571 his eldest son petitioned to the 'awaaqil of the 'Aishaibat that he be approved to succeed to his father's position. The 'awaaqil met and made their decision. One 'aqila who was present at the election said: "The office of 'umda should stay in the Lazumi family since the father was 'umda. The 'awaaqil agreed on the son. But the son will be accepted to follow his father only if he is good. If he is not good, the 'awaaqil will find a new bait." Although the Bedouins speak of "the 'awaaqil" electing the 'umda, it must be remembered that it is the "status group" which makes the decision, and that the 'awaaqil are only part of this group. [627] The names of the men who elected the present 'umda include less 'awaaqil and more rajal khair.

114 634 666 Before I arrived in the field, the present acting 'umda of the 'Aishaibat tribe was elected to the national parliament to represent the province of Marsa Matruh. The election of his replacement was not scheduled to take place

124 If the office left the family,

> *613 all of the lineages would be fighting over it . . . The
> 634 job should stay in Bait Bu Taram; if this is impossible,
> 571 then it should stay in 'Ailit Lazumi. In any case, the
> 666 _'awaaqil_ will decide.

578 A change in the present locus of legal authority in
634 the Bedouin-Egyptian government structural relationship
•178 would amount to a re-structuring process, and could lead to
121 serious conflict. In the very least, it would call for a clear explanation and new statement of social reality since it would challenge what is, and "has always been," a legitimate distribution of power and political order.

634 The office of the _shaikh_ is not a potential power-
554 base by comparison with the office of _'umda_. The _shaikh_, rather than being in direct communication with the Governor, executes the official orders made known to the _'umda._ As an administrator, he takes care of issuing drivers' licenses, notifies men of their military draft status, etc. The government sees this as a necessary post because of the difficulty of contacting Bedouins deep in the desert. In one sense, the _shaikh's_ office is becoming less functional as the Bedouin move in from the desert and begin to take part in the national society, but in another sense it is becoming more functional as bureaucracy and red tape become increasingly complex. But the _shaikh_ remains in the shadow of the _'umda_. He never substitutes for the _'umda,_ for this would infringe on the rightful power of the _'umda's_ family; when the _'umda_ is absent,

634 of little significance in the authority structure. Very few
554 people of the al-Qasr area have had any contact with these
634 officers, and very few want any contact. On the other hand,
554 the direction of change in al-Qasr and the bureaucratic growth
178 of the government in the Western Desert makes it likely that
all Bedouins will be drawn into the total authority structure,
and that the roles of *'umda* and *shaikh* will expand. These
roles will not increase in terms of traditional prestige and
status, but they may gain the authority which they do not possess
now. This is in view of the fact that the traditional authority
structure remains relatively intact. The *'umda* and the
shaikh have no traditional basis of authority, so they cannot
make decisions which are morally binding for Bedouins of al-
634 Qasr at this time. It is obvious, of course, that the *'umda*
635 may refer to the Governor, and even the use of governmental
554 force, as the basis of his legitimacy. But this has never
178 happened. The incumbent *'umda* is still a Bedouin, and this
prevents him from challenging the traditional ways. Also,
the Governor is concerned with restricting the *'umda's*
influence not increasing it.

634 I do not mean to imply that there is, or will be, a
613 struggle for power between traditional authority represented
178 by the *'aqila* and modern legal authority represented by the
578 *'umda*. Such a struggle could not actually occur since when,
and if, the *'umda* came to represent authority in a newly

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structured situation the traditional authority structure would have disappeared from the scene.

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But, there is a struggle for authority recognition going on in al-Qasr. It is related to the change from the old basis of traditional authority to a new basis of legal authority. At the heart of this struggle is the role of the *rajal khair*. The *rajal khair* has a firm public basis for establishing himself in an authoritative and representative role. Traditionally, the *rajal khair* has faced inward and outward: he has used his ascribed position on the al-Qasr prestige scale to augment his status and influence, and, at the same time, his economic rationality has oriented him

[648] toward Marsa Matruh. In the present stage of culture change, the *rajal khair* is in a position to combine his ascribed and achieved attributes to gain entrance to a new reference group, the Egyptian bureaucracy. This offers him a new kind of prestige as well as affording him new opportunities for power, and even authority, over his fellow Bedouins.

The *rajal khair*, in view of his movement between the old and new in Egypt, maintains a *tertium quid* status in two camps. While he has one foot in the traditional community because of his role in conflict regulation and the manipulation of traditional values, the *rajal khair* also has a foot in the

178 554 627 modern camp. He has been able to enter into dialogue with modernizing agents because his intra-tribal "status honor" renders him public recognition at the institutional level, and because his worldly style of life allows him to, in part, identify with a modern reference group.

554 178 634 *613 The _'aqila_ and the _'umda_ might be seen as the two extremes of a temporary and emerging authority structure for the Bedouin of al-Qasr: the traditional authority bound to the old moral order, and the modern legal authority identified wholly with an, as of yet, outside political and moral order. [627] Ideally, it seems that only the _rajal khair_, who is neither an _'aqila_ nor an _'umda_, is in the structural and ideological position to assume leadership and to guide the Bedouins during this period of culture change.

121 structural principle of bureaucracy, the rajal khair lacking
554 legitimacy in the traditional lineage-based system may en-
627 visage an authoritative role and increased chances to "improve
557 his status through the judicious manipulation of social ties."

121 Leadership studies in the context of cultural change,
554 such as those which deal with "broker" types, have important
● 178 implications for a more general and fundamental theoretical
problem: the role of the individual in culture and society. Radin, as early as 1927, Redfield (1960), Geertz (1960), Fallers (1964), and Mead (1964) have spoken of "primitive philosophers," "the hinge group," "the cultural brokers," "the new men," and "the evolutionary clusters." All terms have direct reference to role types constructed from the observation of individuals possessed of the ability and creativity to offer new ideas and methods of dealing with the pressing cultural problems of their times. The unitary goal of all these researchers was to understand culture change through a focus on the way in which the individual manipulates his cultural resources.

121 I would maintain that, especially in political analysis, the approach and focus of the researcher is directly related to his ontologic position concerning the concepts of culture and human nature. That is to say, whether or not the researcher believes that "man has no choice in life, that culture determines his behavior," then he will or will not find it relevant

121 fully organized government behind the role, the element of
554 force may enter into the rajal khair style of domination.
627 Thus far, the 'umda and the shaikh roles have functioned
[634] through the traditional roles of the 'aqila and the rajal
*[613] khair, that is, the "status group." In the future, this pattern
●[178] may change. It is also possible that new roles will emerge.
This is what I wish to explore.

121 The "status group" of al-Qasr operating with a sense
571 of identity with a modern reference group deem themselves
554 responsible for making decisions on the behalf of "the people"
or "the Bedouin." Members of the "status group" would
[177] occasionally dress in Western clothes; they would hunt gazelle
for sport; they owned the few autos there were in the area; and a few partook of alcoholic beverages. Their rights and obligations in social relations are still relatively stable and depend on the ascribed values of al-Qasr Bedouin society, but one can detect the start of a power struggle within the group. It is a competitive desire for social mobility and is stated in terms of the achieved attributes considered important by the reference group to which they aspire, the Egyptian society. For example, one sometimes heard the complaint from various members of the "status group" that the Governor was not giving proper recognition to those "who understood the ways of the Bedouin," and "those who could speak for the Bedouin."

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159 and they sat on chairs inside the tent. I returned to
554 Marsa Matruh in the *'umda's* car (1964 Ford, highly polished)
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537 with the *'umda* and the *shaikh*. They openly joked about Hajj
[634] 'Ali and his manner of presentation; they repeated some of
[122] his "stilted" phrases and laughed. Hajj 'Ali gave last year's
[522] reception speech also. This is because, his son says, Hajj
'Ali is considered a fine speaker by the Bedouins of al-Qasr.

121 We can see how these details carry larger implications
177 within the context of political and social structures under-
178 going change. It is the stuff which the anthropologist finds
important for an understanding of the process of change.

156 If I have established thus far that Hajj 'Ali is
159 politically active and representative in both the traditional
554 and the modern systems, then the attempt is now to prove that
177 he consciously seeks to change the traditional in the direction
178 of the modern for political and moral reasons, and for social
and personal reasons.

156 Hajj 'Ali, when he spoke with me, inevitably came
159 around to the subject of international politics, whether this
554 was the question of Israel or the image which America's racial
177 problems presented. Hajj 'Ali was the only man from the whole
178 Marsa Matruh area who was neither *shaikh* nor *'umda* to attend
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829 the nomination of Jamal Abd al-Nasser in January of 1965. In
[577] all of this, I detect a move on the part of Hajj 'Ali to
identify himself with an Egyptian reference group and to

156 159 draw al-Qasr into the Egyptian political community. He has
554 committed himself to work hand-in-hand with the Governor of
177 Marsa Matruh in introducing changes connected with economics
178 and education into al-Qasr. He does not conceal this fact.
124 829 When I spoke with him about helping me with my study of
[571] changing attitudes in al-Qasr, he said: "I might have the
time to do this, but before I decide you will have to bring me a letter from the Governor stating that he wishes me to cooperate with you." The identity and responsibility which Hajj 'Ali feels for his role of agent of change is indicated in his remark to me that he had heard "there were others in the desert who feel and think the way I myself do."

156 Hajj 'Ali is discretely aware of the status difference
159 between himself, as a member of the "status group," and the
554 others of al-Qasr. As Weber would say, he perceives the
571 difference in "style of life." I was invited to Hajj 'Ali's
574 796 house for *'iid al-fitr*, the feast marking the end of Ramadan.
123 I thought that this would be a good opportunity to observe
the "leaders" of al-Qasr together. I was very much surprised to find present no members of the "status group" but only
[556] their exact opposites. On the occasion of this feast it is
[735] the custom that the rich treat the poor. As an additional
surprise, we had a very simple meal of bread, dates, peanuts, and tea. Hajj 'Ali explained to me: "My neighbors do not have my economic advantages, and I do not think it is proper

156 to serve other than what they eat." Hajj 'Ali is not only
159 554 conscious of social stratification in his society, but he also
571 has a great deal of empathy with the less endowed, a pre-
574 requisite of a traditional Bedouin leader and an advantageous
796 one for a modern leader.
123

He is aware of most traditional institutions and how
156 they relate to conditions of modernity. Hajj 'Ali, whose own
159 marriages speak for his political acumen, sees only disadvantages
554 829 in the cousin-right marriage custom of the Bedouins. His
582 interest in getting on with the business of change, so to
speak, has led him to question a basic right contained in the
Bedouin principle of lineage structure and corporate membership.

> A thing which I do not like about our customs is the idea that a man has a right to his uncle's daughter. The man binds his cousin and in the end he might not marry her and will be the cause of her never marrying. He gives himself the authority to decide whom she may or may not marry. If he knows she desires to marry a certain man, he says: "She can marry anyone but not that one."

[562] Here he challenges the traditional right of the individual
male in Bedouin society, favoring the rights of the female.
[177] The emancipation of the female, especially in rights and
[178] duties concerned with the marriage contract, is an element
[562] of the modernization process in Egyptian society and the
Middle East in general.

*613 The bait, as a political group, is in part structurally
602 defined by the corporate principle which states that blood-kin
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> 156 159 554 695 829 Another thing which I do not like about our old ways is the idea of swearing the oath. For instance, if I steal 1,000 L.E. from you, then you will accuse me. The *'aqila* will then come to me and say: "If you did not steal the money, swear the oath." Some of my family will support me in this, swearing that I did not steal the money. The swearing of the oath will take place at a tomb, in the presence of the Quran. This tomb belongs to a dead man, and they tell you that he is a saint. First of all, the thief will swear the oath and then they will believe him; and, secondly, what is the sense of swearing in front of a dead body?

[784] Hajj 'Ali made no mention of God or of the Bedouin belief that misfortune will be visited upon the one who swears the oath in bad faith. There is an Arabic proverb which Hajj 'Ali repeated here which says in effect that "the thief will always swear."

156 159 554 829 178 Hajj 'Ali actively challenges the traditional basis of the Bedouin moral and political community. Striving to do away with prescribed cousin-right in marriage and the mechanisms of blood-revenge and the oath as means of supporting law and order in al-Qasr is a course which we might expect from an Egyptian official who seeks to integrate the Bedouins into national society. And, in fact, these are all customs which the Governor believes must eventually be eradicated. It is not surprising that Hajj 'Ali's son believes that "it is not civilized" to lay claim to his cousin for, like his father, he also is redefining morality vis a vis "civilization."

It appears obvious in all that he says, including his comments at the Governor's reception, that Hajj 'Ali has

156 undertaken to transform his rajal khair role into an authority
159 which transcends the bounds of the local community. During
554 my talks with him, he never once insinuated that the people
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•178 of al-Qasr, nor even the 'Aishaibat or 'Ali Ahmar (terms
he rarely ever used), owe anything to a larger entity or
community known as "the Bedouin" or "the Awlad 'Ali."
If Hajj 'Ali is to legitimate his own authority in a new
political system, he must, at the same time, show the Bedouins
the legitimacy of the new political community. The Bedouins
829 must feel a moral commitment toward the new national political
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177 community or else it has no meaning or authority. Most of the
Bedouins of al-Qasr still take it for granted that the allocation of political values and distribution of power in terms of
traditional and modern legal roles will be carried over into
the modern community and its politics. Hence, if anyone should
[634] go on to Cairo to represent the Bedouin of the Western Desert,
[648] naturally it should be the 'umda or the shaikh "who knows how
to deal with the Egyptians." The majority of the people of
the al-Qasr area see change coming but do not conceptualize
it as any threat to the traditional authority structure.

156 Hajj 'Ali anticipates the change as fundamental
159 enough to require a new sense of identity. I think this is
554 evident in the following statement in which he takes issue
829 with the traditional way of doing things and appears to be
178
177 preparing himself for a role in the readjustment process.

> 156 There is another objection which I have concerning
> 159 our customs. I mean the case of elections. For
> 554 instance, one from the 'Aishaibat and one from the
> 829 Sanagra, of the 'Ali Abyed, are nominated. Then,
> 666 each man must vote for the one from his own tribe.
> He must vote for the 'Aishaibi even if the other is
> the better man. But, we should consider that the
> best man is the man with the best qualifications.
> 'Umda Ibrahim, for instance, knows how to greet an
> official or a minister, but he does not know the
> *'awaiyid* nor the problems of the Bedouins. His
> brother (who will probably be the next *'umda*) is a
> good man and is educated, but he does not know
> the *'awaiyid* either.

829 This view contrasts sharply with the traditional stand
666 of most Bedouins in al-Qasr, including the members of the
"status group." For instance, one *'aqila* voiced what is a
prevalent opinion when he said:

> [619] If a man chooses to become a political candidate
> [186] against a Bedouin, he must understand that the
> members of the tribe should and would vote for
> their *'umda* because he is a member of their own
> tribe. Even if a man is crazy and his opponent
> has the highest college degree, the Bedouins must
> vote for the man from their own tribe.

156 Hajj 'Ali is modern in his evaluation of the political
159 situation here: a politician should know the problems of his
554 constituents rather than follow principles based on traditional
178 relationships. His motive is not to promote the *'awaiyid* as
177 a good way of life, for we know he does not think this to be
829 the case. Instead, Hajj 'Ali believes that in order to help
[671] the Bedouins through a period of change one must know what
they are changing from. Through his negative appraisal of

156 the 'umda, Hajj 'Ali seems to imply that he himself is capable
159 of understanding and leading the Bedouins during this period.

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178 Hajj 'Ali has formulated some positive and constructive
177 ideas relating to the period of transition which now faces
829 al-Qasr, and they are related to his analysis of the pressing
needs of the day.

> The Bedouins need many things: they need factories
> as there are in the Nile Valley. For the desert,
> here in particular, we need olive presses. This
> will raise the profits of the farmer . . . We need
> [244] a factory for canning tomatoes, for the whole desert
> plants them and the transportation is such that we
> [489] cannot get them to the market . . . The biggest
> change in the desert results from the presence of
> 12,000 government workers; there were only 20 or
> [871] 30 before the World War. There were no schools,
> now there a few. You cannot find a six year-old
> boy who does not go to school; about thirty per cent
> of the girls in al-Qasr go to school also . . .
> Another cause of change is due to the fact that
> everyone now watches his neighbor, he sees what he
> does and he imitates him. Today, I listen to the
> [207] radio and tomorrow my neighbor buys one. Evolution
> (tatawwar) is taking place, and the people here are
> [212] realistic about it. For instance, I do not know
> reading and writing, and sometimes I must dictate a
> letter to my son . . . My son knows better than I,
> and I know better than my father did, who lived in
> al-Qasr for thirty five years without knowing anything about the streets of Marsa Matruh.

156 Hajj 'Ali is both subjective and objective about
159 change, as we can note from the comment about the radio.
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178 In a non-doctrinaire fashion, Hajj 'Ali stresses the great
177 value of education while being aware of his own deficiencies
in this area. However, as a counterbalance, he seems to

156 imply that one cannot be educated and know the 'awaiyid at
159 the same time--the attitude of a self-made man. Hajj 'Ali
554 178 realizes his marginal position between the new and the old,
177 and his attitude concerning change through education seems
to be that of an unselfish leader. Elaborating further on
156 the role of education, Hajj 'Ali showed insight into some of
159 the psychological aspects underlying social change:

> 554 178 177 829 871
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> As I said before, the people here are realistic about change. There are now only about three or four of us who send our sons to study at the university, the rest of the people are waiting to see what these boys will amount to. The other day, one of our educated boys, an officer in the army, came to visit al-Qasr. All of the women are now hoping to see their sons become as successful as this. This is exactly like the first time we cultivated olives in the desert: the Bedouins mocked those who planted the olive. After the olive began to show profits, everyone regretted that they did not cultivate it. Time is changing, and the people are changing. Education is the basis of everything in any nation. Now the agricultural engineer directs me, telling me what to do and how to do it . . . and before 1952 (pre-Nassar regime) they knew nothing about us and we had nothing.

156 As culture and social change proceeds in al-Qasr, it
159 is evident that Hajj 'Ali and the national political community
554 are becoming legitimate authorities in the eyes of the Bedouins.
829 This is indicated by the following event. One month before
574 I left the field, the first vice-President of the Republic was
648 expected to visit the province of Marsa Matruh, and al-Qasr
was named as one of the places which he would tour. Hajj
'Ali took it upon himself to set up three tents in the tradi-

439 market with more than one-third of its lamb meat. The other two-
[315] thirds of the lamb market was supplied from the Sudan, the Delta, and
[315] from Libya. Oil industry in Libya attracted a large number of the young
[178] tribal members in Libya, who had originally undertaken the main task of
[464] sheep pastoralism. As a result, the population of sheep and goats in
Libya dropped sharply. Not only did the Libyan market become unable
to supply the Egyptian market, but it was also unable to support itself
and was forced to pay high prices for the Western Desert sheep and goats.
[457] The price became even more attractive after the devaluation of the
Egyptian pound which gave higher value to the Libyan currency, and
hence, the price of sheep. In the last decade, the number of smuggled
sheep reached a point where it created a great shortage of lamb meat in
Egypt. All government attempts to stop smuggling activities in either
direction have failed.

657 All these factors attracted the attention of the government to the
area and its people. The need to control the tribal population became
evident. But since it is difficult, if not impossible, to control a
population which is constantly on the move, the first step the govern-
ment took to control the tribal population was to settle them in perman-
ent villages. A number of projects are underway. The aims of these
[654] projects are to increase the cultivated land and to improve the pastures
[137] by introducing new and highly nutritive pasture plants in areas where
agriculture is not feasible. Attempts have also been made to promote
local crafts and industries. The intentional efforts of the government
[178] to settle the tribal population is supplemented by the gradual drift of
[464] many tribesmen, especially the younger generation, to seek part-time or

657 full-time employment with the government projects in the area and
[178] settle in fairly permanent houses near the place of work.
[464]

657 With the movement toward settling down, the relative legal and
701 political autonomy which Awlad Ali once enjoyed is breaking down. This
642 was reflected first in the loss of military exemption. In 1947, the
draft law was applied to all tribal populations in Egypt, including
Awlad Ali. The application is not seriously enforced, however, due
to the fact that births are still not recorded in the area. In 1954,
657 the "omda" or mayorship system practiced in the rural areas of Egypt
634 was extended to the Western Desert with certain modifications to fit
177 the tribal organization of populations in the area. This put a strain
on the native system of leadership, a point which will be covered in
657 later chapters. Finally, and along with the extension of the omda system,
692 the jurisdiction of the legal system of the state was extended
177 over the area. This resulted in a duality in the judicial process.
178 The tribal law, with its traditional tribal mediators, is still functioning side by side with the modern court system of the state law. In many cases, especially in criminal cases, the individual is tried under both systems, and sometimes receives two different judgments for the same offense. Various efforts are being made to minimize the effects of this duality. In civil cases, the problem does not seem serious, since it is the parties themselves, or one of them, who voluntarily bring the case to the attention of the legal authorities. Therefore, they can choose between the traditional legal system and the modern courts of law. So far, civil cases are brought to the modern court system only when the native procedures fail to achieve a settlement. As such, the

657 692 177 178 modern court system may be viewed as a form of appeal to the tribal justice. One has to be careful, however, in calling such a procedure an appeal, since the tribal proceedings have no relevance in the court proceedings.

69 681 177 The duality is more serious in criminal cases. When an act is defined as illegal by both the tribal and modern law, persons committing it come automatically under the jurisdiction of both laws. As long as such acts remain unknown to the police, the duality of procedures is not undertaken. This is possible in minor cases of assault or theft or adultery. But in major cases, such as homocide or serious assault resulting in the serious injury of a tribal member, it is difficult to keep the news a secret from the authorities. The funeral proceedings in the former cases and the medical attention needed in the latter cases are hard to conceal. [627] [521] Besides, serious cases start a whole series of mediations and go-betweens which always become the general knowledge in the entire area and the subject of conversation among the people. When the authorities know about such cases, they have to take immediate action to bring the offender to trial, even when the government authorities know that the tribal proceedings are being conducted in the case. Some attempts are made by both the tribal law and the modern law to minimize the effect of that duality. It is common that when the district attorney knows that a certain criminal case has been successfully solved according to the tribal proceedings, to ask for the minimum penalty for the offense. On the side of the tribal proceedings, once the case has been solved, the witnesses needed to testify for the prosecutor are instructed by their fellow tribesmen to refrain from giving the information

619 Such traditions differentiate between these segments which otherwise
[173] occupy an equivalent position in the formal system.

This level of segmentation has no particular political significance
except that it is at this level that the client tribes of Murabiteen are
attached. People in the area differentiate between Awlad Ali proper,
who are called the Sa'adi, and the Murabiteen tribes. Murabiteen tribes
occupy a special position which tends to complicate the formal analysis
of the tribal organization of the Awlad Ali. The Murabiteen are a number
of tribes of varying sizes and origin which are attached to the Sa'adi
tribes as their vassals or clients. They exhibit the same principles of
tribal organization as the Sa'adi tribes escept that they have no common
origin similar to that of the latter groups.

619 The original division of the Murabiteen tribes among the Sa'adi was
173 made in the famous meeting at El-Haqfa in which the division of land was
also made and the Awlad Ali law was first enacted. The number of client
groups attached to each Sa'adi tribe reflects the relative prestige and
power of thatparticular tribe at the time of the meeting. Having a re-
619 latively large number of client tribes meant, in addition to prestige of
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651 the patron tribe, large financial support. Until half a century ago
this financial support was in the form of an obligatory tribute or
"sadaqa" which the client tribes had to pay. This tribute is no longer
● [178] mandatory, but the client groups are still expected to present members
[431] of their patron tribes with gifts on occasions such as weddings, funerals
619 or feasts of the tribal saint. Large vassal groups also meant support in
fights. Although the client groups did not constitute part of the ven-
geance group of their Sa'adi, when the Sa'adi tribe fought, their client

619 184 178 582 In recent years this has changed, however. The increased importance of wealth in the recently introduced money economy relaxed the endogamous tendency that was characteristic of the Sa'adi tribes.

619 184 In discussing the position of the Murabiteen tribes it is worth noting that not all the Murabiteen tribes in the area occupy the same position. Some enjoy relatively higher positions than the others. Actually, there are two kinds of Murabiteen in the area: Mustaqillen (independent Murabiteen); and the dependent Murabiteen. The latter are further subdivided into Murabiteen bil-baraka (with the blessing); and Murabiteen bil-sadaqa (with the tribute). The only independent Murabiteen in the area is the Gemei'at tribe. These are the original settlers [173] of the area. Because of their help to Awlad Ali against the Hanadi, the latter were defeated and Awlad Ali were able to occupy the Western Desert. For their part the Gemei'at tribe was granted its independence by Awlad Ali and were given one-third of the total area as their homeland (watan). 619 184 778 682 In theory, the Gemei'at tribe occupies the same position and has the same rights as the Sa'adi tribes, including the right to offer their protection which is denied to all other client groups. In practice, however, this seems to be of no practical value. None of my informants could remember a single case in which a murderer has taken refuge at a segment 619 778 184 682 627 628 of the Gemei'at tribe. The importance of the nazala is not merely to be safe from the pursuit of the victim's group but rather to provide the mediators who undertake the crucial task of negotiation on behalf of the murderer and his gorup. It is the ability to settle the dispute on a permanent basis that offers the actual long-lasting protection, even after the time of the nazala expires. To be successful in his pursuit,

613 Written agreements such as the above are becoming more common in
675 the area. The need to have the responsibility of the vengeance group
[178] or the Amar recorded and the names of its members listed stems from the
[361] increase in the geographical mobility of individuals and separate households
[464] seeking jobs with the government organizations in the area or with
the various industries in the towns and cities outside the Western Desert.
233 The uncertainty of pastoral nomadism and the delicate balance which exists
178 between pastures, animal population, and human population is pushing an
182 ever-increasing number of people to abandon the way of life which they
had lived for generations. Animals are extremely important to sustain
233 the pastoral life of Awlad Ali. Once the balance between the pasture and
182 the animal population is upset by a draught, a segment of the human population
731 has to make new adjustments. This adjustment is first made by
166 moving with one's flocks to areas in the Delta or in the Cyrenaica region
of Libya. This is a short-term adjustment, however, and cannot be continued
for long periods of time. Pastures in the Delta have to be purchased,
and in most cases the owner of the herd has to sell part of his
[619] herd to feed the rest. The Cyrenaica pasture is very limited and restricted
by the strong tribal control of the Cyrenaica Bedouins, who in
general are not friendly with many of the tribal segments living in the
233 Egyptian Western Desert. If the draught continues beyond a certain time,
731 the individual owner of a herd may find himself forced to sell the herd
464 and seek other modes of subsistence in the form of part-time or full-time
434 182 employment as a semi-skilled or unskilled worker with the government or
industrial organizations. Such jobs are usually viewed as a temporary
source of income to help the individual and his immediate family live

613 If any disagreement between the
578 responsibility of the majority of the awaqil to persuade the minority to
571 conform to the majority's decision. This is usually done by simple personal
613 persuasion. In certain instances, however, when a particular aqila
554 is known for being troublesome to the Amar, refusing to abide by the majority
571 decisions, an attempt may be made by the others to build up popular
578 support around another person in the Bait which the aqila represents.
If this strategy is successful, it might lead to replacing the aqila by
another who is more abiding to the Amar's decisions. This approach is
more likely to succeed if the aqila is not a popular person in his own
Bait, for if he is popular, any attempt by the other Baits to disqualify
the aqila would be viewed by the members of his Bait as interference in
their own affairs and might lead them to rally even more strongly around
their leader.

613 The other tendency occurring when the size of the Eilat increases
is toward the separation of one or more of its constiuent Baits. Originally
613 this was done by merely refusing to share in the payment of bloodmoney.
682 If this refusal continued, it was considered as a sign of
[178] separation of the Bait. In recent years this created problems with an
increasing number of individuals claiming separation from the Amar to
avoid the payment of the bloodmoney, while claiming membership when distribution
613 is done. This led many tribal segments to require that the
675 "barawa" or separation of individuals or tribal units from any particular
Amar should be put in writing, after getting the approval of the Amar to
which he belonged. When the approval is given and the separation in put
in writing, it is announced to all other tribal segments. If this is
[672] done, members of the separated tribal segment are not held responsible

613 individuals. He settles disputes among them and represents them in their
[627] disputes with outsiders. He is also the spokesman of his Bait in all
matters involving the relationship of the Bait with the other tribal segments.
[682] He is responsible for the collection of the bloodmoney from members
of his Bait and has the authority to confiscate property of individual
members who refuse to pay their share. When a member is financially unable
to pay his share, the Aqila is expected to pay for him and collect at a
later time when the member is in a position to make such payment.

613 Originally the position of the Aqila was a hereditary one with the
428 position passing from father to son. However, in recent years the rigidity
178 of the patrilineal descent as the basis of succession to the position
of the Aqila has been modified radically and other principles of selection
613 have been introduced. The working of the principles underlying the
128 selection of the Aqila will be analyzed in detail in the following chapter
through the close examination of one of the major legal cases which occurred
during my stay in the area.

613 Thus each Bait is a division of one of the Eilas and this has its
[423] place in the formal tribal system. It constitutes a group with definite
usufruct rights to land and a formally recognized leadership.

621 But the actual residential units in which Awlad Ali live are not
[613] baits but parts of them in the form of separate camps or "nagei". The
camps constitute the primary communities of Awlad Ali. A camp consists
[594] of a number of tents ranging from four to twelve. Each tent is usually
occupied by one nuclear family of a husband, his wife and children. In
[595] cases of polygynous marriages, each wife usually occupies one tent with
[361] her children. Each camp is separated from the next one by a distance
which ranges from two to ten kilometers.

621 which ranges from two to ten kilometers. The camp coincides with the
233 herding unit. The herd of the camp is usually grazed as a unit, often
621 by a paid shepherd hired by the members of the camp as a whole. Originally
233 the camp moved as a unit for grazing. This was essential in the
621 era of the tribal warfare and raiding where the security of the herd
361
178 and that of the people depended on such collective movement. In a type
of organization adapted to periodical movement, the camp offered the
optimum sized community: small enough to permit easy movement and large
enough to offer the kind of protection which individual families could
621 not have offered. In this era the camp seemed to have been a closely
178 knit group. Many of the informants still remember the time when the
622 camp was under the strong control of the headman who made the major decisions
361
233 of where and when the camp should move. It was those decisions
that determined the safety and the security of the group. The headman
had strong authority over members of his camp. Such authority was based
mainly on his ability to exercise valid judgments as to whether or not
the group should move and the route that it had to take if movement was
decided upon. At the present time, and with the diminishing of raiding
and tribal warfare in the area, the authority of the headman seems to
have diminished along with it. The camp appears at the present time to
be mostly a residential unit with minimal leadership and with a rapidly
changing composition. Different families join the camp at different
times during the year.

621 Although the membership of the camps is drawn from the bait, a camp
613 does not, in terms of its genealogical composition, make up a descent
segment of that Bait. The membership of a camp is based on a completely

628 the settlement achieved. In many such interest is best served by taking
613 into consideration the welfare of the other party to the dispute as well.

613 Reasonableness is an important prerequisite for the success of the
554 Aqila in performing this functions in dispute settlement. This is true
157 whether the Aqila is dealing with disputes between members of his own
bait or between members of his bait and outsiders. But while reasonableness
and the personal qualities constitute important assets for the Aqila,
613 they are not the basis of his political authority. Proven abilities are
554 admired but they are, or had been until very recently, irrelevant to the
178 question of succession to the position of Aqila. The structurally significant
source of the Aqila's authority is patrilineal succession. This
principle has recently been challenged under the impact of social and
economic changes that are taking place in the area. To analyze the role
121 of the Aqila and the source of his authority, I shall utilize, to some
613 extent, Turner's concept of "social drama" by presenting and analyzing a
128 case of dispute whose developmental stages happened over a period of more
than eleven years. The major part of these developments occurred at the
time of the field work and I had a chance to observe at lease part of it.
The case in all its phases offers a rare example of a disturbance that
happened in the social life of a particular tribal segment. It offers
what Turner called "... a limited area of transparency in the otherwise
opaque surface of regular, uneventful social life" (p. 93). The political
unit involved is that of bait Asabe'i, the largest in size of all
baits in the Aggary Eila. As events of the case unfolded themselves,
some of the important principles of social structure, at least as they
operate at a given point, were revealed.

613 usually has no difficulty collecting the individual shares. His own
682 [554] financial ability is rarely called upon. When a member is unable to
pay for any reason, his share is divided among the able members. However,
● [178] in recent years this seems to be changing, especially among the baits
closely located to the settled communities or the urban centers. Among
613 these baits individual mobility has increased significantly with a large
178 166 number of younger members either leaving the area for the urban centers
464 or accepting salaried jobs with the government organizations. Among
369 certain baits in the area of Burg el-Arab, for example, the percentage
of adult males engaged in such jobs sometimes reaches sixty percent.
More than thirty-five out of fifty-six males constituting bait Asabei'
have a full-time or part-time job.

613 178 The individualistic attitudes accompanying the dependency on sal-
aries and living in towns and cities have their effects on the kinship
166 464 ties among members of these baits. With the prevalence of the individ-
682 ualistic attitudes among members of a certain bait, they become more
369 reluctant to pay their financial obligations and the Aqila finds it more
and more difficult to rely, for the fulfillment of the bait's financial
obligations, on the willingness of members to pay. His success within
613 554 the domain of the amar becomes more determined by his ability to pay
556 from his own money for those members of his bait who refuse or are un-
682 able to pay. Wealth becomes an important asset for the Aqila's per-
formance of his duties within the amar. When this happens, there seems
to be a certain shift in the source of political support for the Aqila.
613 In a well-integrated bait the popularity (or unopopularity) of the Aqila
554 among the other Awaqil of the amar had very little influence on his

613 position as the leader of the bait. The principle of patrilineal suc-
554 cession is so respected in such baits that it overshadows any other con-
613 sideration. This continues to be the case as long as the kinship ties
554 within the bait remain strong. When the kinship ties in a given bait
428 weaken, the principle of patrilineal succession also weakens. This is
●178 more likely to occur in baits where a relatively large number of the
[166] members leave the area permanently or for a more or less prolonged period
[464] of time, seeking jobs on a part or a full-time basis. Many of these
613 members maintain only a minimal contact with their respective baits.
178 They become more reluctant to fulfill their kinship obligations, es-
166 pecially when they entail any financial liability. The older members
464
561
369 complain about how younger persons are less loyal to their elders and
how selfish they have become. "All they care about is their jobs and
the pleasure they get from the city; they are becoming city people."
Younger members, on the other hand, maintain that their reluctance to
fulfill their kinship obligations stems from their feeling that they
do not get anything in return. "Life is expensive and money is hard to
obtain. I cannot make enough money to support myself and my wife and
children and at the same time pay my cousin's financial debts," said a
member of eilat Asabei', who works as a driver with the Desert Organi-
zation in Alexandria.

613 When this happens, there seems to be a tendency toward shifting the
554 emphasis from the bait to the eila or the amar as the source of the po-
[556] litical support of the Aqila. This is turn makes wealth an important
basis of the Aqila's power. No more can the bait impose an ineffective
Aqila on the amar unless it is ready to back him by their own share of
money. If this is lacking as was the case with Shei'eb, there is nothing

613 554 that prevents the Awaqil of the amar from rallying support around another person.

613 178 554 In the case of the Aggary amar Hakim was their choice as the man to replace the original Aqila. What happened in the Aggary amar could never have happened if bait Asabei' were more cohesive than it was or if the kinship ties "were still strong and durable" as one important member of the Sanagrah tribe commented. "If there was any respect to the fore-fathers left, Hakim could never have agreed to replace Shei'eb....Nobody would dare take a position from someone who inherited it from his father.... but bait Asabei' is not as it used to be."

613 628 554 The third domain within which the Aqila normally pursues his activities is that of the wide scope of tribal society in the area. The Aqila represents his bait in all matters involving the bait either as a unit or any particular member of it with other tribal segments. When an individual from the bait is involved in a dispute with a member of another tribal segment, the Aqila acts as the legal representative and the attorney of that member trying to achieve a settlement which is not fair for his client but also fair for the other party. To be successful in this area, the Aqila relies on his own personal qualities and persuasive abilities. If the Aqila is known to be fair and honest, a quick and permanent settlement is usually achieved since he is trusted also by the other party. If, on the other hand, he has the reputation of using dishonest techniques, mistrust prevails and achieving a settlement is usually delayed.

Like the domain of the amar, the present field of activities is no major source for the Aqila's political support in the baits where kinship solidarity is strong. His success in solving disputes between members

634 who reach the age of military service. He is also supposed to report
554 the presence of any fugitive or crininal in his district and report
657 crimes accurring in that district and which involve members of the tribal
segment he represents.

634 The first two duties of the omda to the government do not involve
554 any conflict of interest. Unlike the rural areas where sons are con-
657 sidered a very important economic asset to their parents, and therefore,
562 there is a general resentment of military service which takes the sons
701 away and deprives the parents of their important work around the fields,
178 Awlad Ali look at military service as
an opportunity to have their sons go to the city, obtain guaranteed pay-
ment, and escape the hardship of nomadic existence. Economic activities
[233] in the area do not require the cooperation of a large number of individ-
uals, and most of the grazing of animals is done either by a paid shep-
herd or by one of the grown-up sons. Although there still exists an
[183] ideology which values having many sons, yet with the cessation of hostil-
ities between the tribal segments, their presence in the area has lost its
[464] value. Many of the younger generation are seeking jobs with the govern-
ment projects in the area or in the city. Neither one is easy to find.
Joining the army is increasingly considered as an easy alternative.

634 The omda's function which seems to involve some conflicting loyalties
554 is that of reporting crimes involving members of his tribal segment. But
657 even this does not pose a serious problem as it might seem. Almost all
674 minor crimes committed against property or persons as well as all civil
disputes are left to be handled by the tribal proceedings. The duties of
the omda are limited to reporting the cases of murder and serious assault

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[1] On the basis of one percent of the yearly yield.

582 of parley land or a well or to make him a partner in a business or smuggling
557 activities or even as revenge on his uncle by keeping his daughters
582 unmarried. In 1961 the heads of 25 prominant baits of various tribes
557 in the area of Matruh met and decided that the right of ibn 'amm had
● 178 become a major problem, and that invoking that right when the man had
613 no intention of marrying the girl had resulted in a number of disputes
that became serious over a period of time. They felt that the time was
suitable to revise that right and make it subject to the concept of fair
behavior applicable to other rights. They wrote a new rule which specifies
582 557 that the man has the right to prevent his cousin from marrying an
178 outsider or a more distant relative only if he himself intends to marry
613 675 her either in the present or in the reasonable future. If the circumstances
show that he cannot do so, then he forfeits the right.

[558] To prevent his cousin from marrying another man without a proven
[681] intention on the part of the man to marry her himself in the foreseeable
future, is considered as an unreasonable behavior for which
ibn 'amm could be liable to pay kabara to his uncle as well as to the
prospective groom. It also denies him the right of taking her away from
[683] her marital residence by force. If he does this, he would be liable to
the compensation for assault. The agreement was signed by the omeqil
and is considered binding as far as the baits they represented are concerned.
Other tribal segments in the area refuse to abide by the agreement
and consider it as a pretentious departure from the ways of Awlad Ali
which should not be encouraged. Even within the tribal segments involved
in the agreement, there have been reports of individuals who refused to
[629] abide by the agreement. In certain of these latter cases, the ibn 'amm
selected as his mardi a member of a tribal segment not involved in the
agreement and therefore not morally bound to abide by
its contents.

585 legal guardian and considered a bride price to compensate the father as
583 the legal guardian of the bride. In earlier times the bride received
779 none of the mahr, although she usually got a sadaq or bridal gift for
431 [178] herself. In Islamic Arabia, the mahr and the sadaq became indistin-
[171] guishable and were given to the woman and took the form of a legal gift
[178] for affecting the marriage. The Koraan no longer contains the concept
of the purchase of the wife, and the mahr becomes a compensation which
the woman has to claim in all cases. The Koraan demands a bridal gift
for a legal marriage: "And give them whom ye have enjoyed their reward
as a wedding gift" (Sura, iv. 24), and again, "And give the women their
[586] dowries voluntarily" (Sura, iv. 3). According to the Koraan, the mahr
remains the property of the wife and remains her own even if the marriage
is dissolved by divorce. But although it took the form of a gift, the
mahr remained in Islamic law a prerequisite for the legalisation of the
marriage. It is only upon the giving of the mahr that the marriage is
considered valid. No marriage is legal, according to the Islamic law,
unless that transfer of the mahr is affected. Mutual consent of the
two parties to forfeit the mahr does not change that rule, and the mar-
58 riage is considered void. According to Muslim jurisprudence, marriage
675 is a contract ('acd) made betweeen the bridegroom and the bride or her
184 wali or guardian. An essential element in that contract is the mahr.
The jurists themselves are not sure about the nature of the mahr. Some
regard it as practically a purchase money or as an equivalent ('iwad)
for the possession of the woman and the rights over her, so it is like
a price paid in a contract of sale; while other jurists see in the mahr
a legal symbol, a mark of honor and a proper legal security of property
for the woman.

583 Among Awlad Ali the payment of the bridewealth signifies the com-
[584] pletion of the marriage contract. The mahr is not paid to the woman but
583 to her father or closest male kin. Usually the mahr is paid in money.
178 This, however, seems to be a recent phenomenon. Until the turn of the
century, according to informants, the mahr was paid only in sheep and
583 goats. The practice is still followed by a number of tribal segments
178 of Ali Ahmar who occupy the western most part of the area where pasture
184 is more abundant and reliable and where the permanent pasture of the
green mountains of Cyrenaica is close by. Other tribal segments still
insist that at least one-fourth of the mahr should be paid in livestock,
583 but the majority of the people accept money. The main purpose of the
[584] mahr among Awlad Ali is to legalize the marriage contract and to put
[182] emphasis on the reciprocal oblications that the marriage created between
the two families of the bride and the groom. It also works as an in-
surance for good behavior on the part of both the husband and the wife.
583 If the husband mistreats his wife or fails to give her the rights legally
593 hers by marriage, he risks the chance of losing the mahr and being forced
586 to divorce her. On the other hand, if the wife fails to behave in the
customary way expected from a wife, the husband could divorce her and
have the right to get back his mahr. This is particularly inconvenient
in cases where all or part of the mahr is paid in livestock, in which
case it becomes part of the father's herd and hard to take away in case
of divorce. It is therefore in the interest of her family to keep the
marriage. In this way their interference in the marriage is checked.
[591] This is especially important among Awlad Ali where, although the mar-
[592] riage is usually patrilocal, the woman retains membership in her father's
household even after marriage.

581 Marriage does not deprive the woman of some rights of her own.
585 The customary law gives the wife three basic rights corresponding to
562
671 those of the husband's sexual services, domestic work, and obedience.
Corresponding to the first of these, the wife has the right to have a
normal sexual life with her husband. This right, however, is not an ex-
clusive one, since the husband can marry more than one wife. A woman
585 can be divorced from her husband without having to return the mahr if
586 she claims that the husband is unable to perform his sexual duties. In
593 such cases, the marriage is usually dissolved quietly. In certain rare
instances, the husband may deny his wife's accusations. If both insist
585
586 on their stand, one or both may ask to be submitted to "bait el-shana'a,"
593 or house of the dreadful deeds. Reports are extremely vague about the
627 exact procedures involved in this case. Some informants stated that the
married couple would live in a tent without sidewalls so that everybody
could see what goes on inside. Most informants, however, insist that it
merely means that the couple move their tent near that of a respectable
man whose word is believed and honored. This man is supposed to keep a
close watch on the couple's activities, by listening or looking through
holes in the tent. His verdict determines the future of the marriage.
[588] If the wife is justified in her claim, the husband is forced to divorce
her and to forfeit his mahr. If, on the other hand, the verdict is for
[681]
[558] the husband, he not only can divorce her and get back the mahr, but is
also entitled to kabara, or compensation, for his injured pride. There
[114] is no case of bait el-shana'a in the area during the time of the field
[178] work, and most people insist that this practice is something of the past
[583] when the mahr was relatively high and was paid in livestock, in which

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593 case its return to the husband would have caused great financial in-
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[114] convenience for the wife's family.

[778]
(583) Corresponding to the second right, the husband's right to his wife's domestic work, is the wife's right to maintenance. The husband

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585 has to support his wife. This includes providing her and her children
562 with adequate food and proper clothing. If the husband fails to do so
593 because of poverty, sickness, crop failure or unexpected disasters, the wife's brother or father provides her and her children with the necessary food and clothing.

[586] If the husband's failure to fulfill his duties is due to neglect, the wife can leave him and go to her father or brother who talks the matter over with the husband who, in turn, either agrees to their demands or has to divorce his wife and forfeit his mahr.

593 Finally, corresponding to the husband's right to his wife's obedi-
562 ence is the wife's right to fair treatment by her husband. There are a number of ways in which the wife is mistreated.

[779] One is excessive punishment; although the right of the husband to punish his wife is provided in the Koraan, the punishment must be excessive or severe. Awlad Ali draws a line between acceptable and severe punishment. A punishment is severe if it results in something that other people can see or hear. If the husband insults his wife or her family and others hear the action, or if he beats her and this results in visible traces, then the punishment is severe.

593 A wife considers herself mistreated if the husband, when married
595 to more than one, treats any of the other wives better than he treats
562 her. Although the wife cannot deny her husband the right to have additional wives, he must give them all equal treatment. This includes

682 last two decades). But a feud in the form of extensive, long-term
628 killing between two groups is very rare among Awlad Ali. The principle of
life for life upon which a feud operates would rarely lead to a permanent
settlement or peace, even when the sense of revenge is satisfied for the
682 moment. Among the group, this form of permanent settlement is more likely
to be achieved through the payment of bloodmoney, or "diyya." The payment
of the diyya is based on the assumption that the group has lost,
in the deceased, an economic asset. It has been deprived of his services,
both in supporting his immediate family and in the collective
activities of his amar. This is illustrated in the distribution of the
bloodmoney. Only half of the bloodmoney is paid to the immediate family
of the victim, the other half being divided equally among adult
males of his amar or vengeance group. This is intended not only to
satisfy their sense of indignation and curb their desire for revenge,
but also to insure that when the time comes to share in the payment of
the bloodmoney, they will pay.

628 The cessation of feuds in the area seems to coincide with the cessation
619 of inter-tribal and intra-tribal warfare. During the era of tribal
726 warfare, the killing of a tribesman meant the loss in the fighting power
● 178 of his tribal segment, and feuding, with its emphasis on life for life,
had the purpose of restoring the balance in fighting power among the
[682] groups involved. Monetary compensations were not known in the area during
that time, according to the informants' accounts, but they were usually
restricted to cases where either the victim or the killer was a
178 non-tribal person. With the cessation of tribal warfare, the death of
682 a tribal member became more an economic, rather than a political, loss,
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178 682 and compensation became more and more accepted in settling murder cases
[619] among the tribal population. Bloodmoney, or diyya," was established
[729] among compensations for injury in general. This scale of compensation
682 is based on the amount of loss of normal activities the injury caused
the victim with death being the total loss of such activities. The
compensation for homocide is estimated at L.E.400 for intentional kill-
682 ing, and L.E. 300, for unintentional killing. Although reference here
673 is made to "intention," the assessment of that intention and its defini-
672 tion are quite different from the general usage of that term among modern jurists. Among modern jurists, the term refers to a state of mind which implies that the offender willfully and knowingly committed the prohibited act. This means, first, that the person is able to recognize the nature of his act and to distinguish between right and wrong. Secondly, it means that the person was in a position to choose between committing the act and not committing it and took the former path. According to this view, individuals under temporary or permanent insanity, children under the legal age (the definition of which varies from one legal system to another), non-human beings and objects are not capable of having criminal intent, since they are incapable of having a will of their own. Similarly, individuals who are capable of having a will but, because of certain circumstances their freedom of choice was impaired, cannot also have intentions. Intention, then, in the modern legal conception is a psychological quality that connects the offender with the prohibited result or results. It is this psychological connection that differentiates in modern legal systems between murder and manslaughter, between attempted murder and simple assault, between first and second degree murder, and between justifiable

or swaying into convulsions. Indeed, it is noticeable that the 795* [793]
Orders which permit such practices, notably the 'Arusiya, [786]
'Isawiya, Rifa'iya, and Sa'adiya, so popular in the towns of [157]
Libya, have made no converts among the true Bedouin.

It is unnecessary to discuss further the mystical side to the 795*
Sanusiya for another reason. The Bedouin of Cyrenaica with 771
whom this book is concerned have only the slightest knowledge
of either the religious teachings or the ritual of the Order, and
are interested in neither. They belong to the illiterate class of
the *Muntasabin*, the simple adherents of the Order who follow
its Shaikh personally and politically. It is very seldom, if ever,
that the Bedouin know the special prayers and litanies of the [789]
Order, and their use of them, if any, is restricted to getting a [212]
scribe to write them on paper so that they can sew them up in
leather and tie them to their bodies. It is only a tiny educated
minority who regularly recite the prayer formulas and litanies.
These are the *Ikhwan*, the Brothers of the Order. They live in 795*
the lodges of the Order and hold prayer-meetings there. Among
the Brothers are some who have been raised to the position of
Shaikhs of lodges, generally, in past times, after special training
at the University of the Order at Jaghbub oasis, where they have
received a diploma from the Head of the Order or from one of
his family or inner circle. This inner circle, the *Khawass*, consists
vaguely to-day of a few senior members of the Sanusi
family and two or three learned Brothers and does not function
as a Body, but in the past it was, according to Sayyid Muhammad
Idris, an official Council controlling the affairs of the Order
and was composed of four Shaikhs of the Order, who were not
of the Sanusi family, under the presidency of the Head of the
Order, who had to be a member of the founder's family. As [178] ●
Dr. Adams points out,[1] the fact that this inner circle is no longer
a determinate Body indicates a change in the character of
the Order, a development of its political, to the detriment
of its religious, functions. This development has favoured the
interests of the Sanusi family to the disadvantage of the Order
as a whole.

The *Shaikh al-Tariqa*, Head of the Order, advised in past 795*
times by his Council, appoints the Shaikhs of the lodges and 793
these Shaikhs can ordain Brothers and the Brothers can receive

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[1] C. C. Adams, 'The Sanusiya Order', *Handbook on Cyrenaica*, 1944, p. 31. [113]

565 Arabian ways. In Egypt necessity has slowly subjugated the
167 exiles to the peasant yoke. They long resisted but, like the
Bedouin nomads coming from the Sinai Peninsula, had in the
end to submit or perish. The absence of a substantial peasantry
in Cyrenaica is one of the characteristics which most distinguish
it from the Arab societies of Palestine, Syria, Iraq, Egypt, and
565 the Maghrib. The peasant can be dominated. He is fixed to the
earth and can be made to surrender it and till it for others. The
Cyrenaican Bedouin is fixed to no place and cannot be forced to
sell his birthright by bad seasons or intimidation. This has
565 meant that there have not been in Cyrenaica any social enclaves
632 attached to the towns through which the towns and administrative
centres could lord it over the Bedouin. Outside the towns
*[648] all is Bedouin and the Turkish Administration, and afterwards
[619] the Italian Administration, found that they could not get a
grip on the Bedouin of Cyrenaica as they could on the peasantry
of Tripolitania.

632 Nevertheless the towns and the Turkish, and later the Italian,
*648 Administration in them affected the tribal system by acting as
619 a pull on those tribal segments which lived nearest to them, so
that the tribes which lay between the towns and the steppe
were attracted towards one or other of these poles. The political
structure of Cyrenaica as a whole exercised in this way a significant
influence on the segmentary tribal system.

IV

619 The Bedouin who became followers of the Sanusiya Order
178 and whose country and way of life I have described are divided
into tribes and tribal sections owning different tracts of the
country. This tribal system existed in Cyrenaica long before
[793] the Grand Sanusi preached there and it continued to exist after
*[795] his grandson Sayyid Muhammad Idris had fled the country
and the Sanusiya Order had been abolished and its lodges
destroyed by the Italians. It is the fundamental structure of
Bedouin society which the Sulaimid tribes brought with them
from Arabia.

619 The Bedouin of Cyrenaica are Arabs. The Arabian tribes
101 who conquered the country and settled in it mixed with the
144 indigenous Berbers, as is evident in their physical features to-

Order concurred. Thus we find charge of a zawiya continuing 795*
in the hands of a single family to the point at which Muhammad 793
Yahiya bin al-Sanusi bin 'Umar al-Ashhab was appointed by 423
Sayyid Ahmad al-Sharif to succeed his father as Shaikh of Msus 428
at the age of sixteen. Some of these families sent their roots so 602
deep that not only did they obtain what amounted to hereditary rights to a particular lodge, but controlled several lodges. Such were the influential families of Ghumari, Kalili, Farkash, and Ashhab, and the Khattabi families.

Hence we find to-day that many of the lodges are in hereditary charge of a family of Shaikhs who consider that they have a pre-emptive claim to its directorship and to enjoyment of its revenues, a claim backed by tribal opinion and by the acquiescence of the present Head of the Order. Thus the Dardafi family may be said to own the Shahhat lodge, the Isma'ili family to own the Fayidiya lodge, the 'Ammur family to own
the Qafanta lodge, and so on. So much is this the case that [578]
disputes now sometimes arise, as in 1942 at Qafanta and Mirad Mas'ud, between members of a family about which of its members should succeed to the directorship of a lodge and control of its revenues.

This development is not surprising. Poor communications 795*
and the troubled times since 1911 have encouraged local auto- 793
nomy in the Sanusiya organization. The Shaikh of a lodge 428
brought up his family in it and his sons had no other home than
the lodge and no other friends than the Bedouin around it and
the families of Shaikhs in nearby lodges. Tribesmen dislike [178]
change and prefer to have for the Shaikhs of their lodges
members of families they know and who share their local
interests. But the tendency towards hereditary succession is 795*
also related to the fundamental lineage structure of the tribes 793
among whom the lodges are distributed, for it is noticeable that
whereas hereditary succession became customary in the Bedouin, 613
or tribal, lodges, it has been by comparison lacking in the urban 428
lodges of Banghazi and Darna and in those oases where tribal [369]
structure has become obscured by village life. This would seem to suggest that *Ikhwan* families tend the more easily to become stabilized as lines of hereditary Shaikhs the more closely they are associated with tribal structure. It is precisely in the most powerful, numerous, and integrated tribal sections that we

*795 554 *648 Sudanese against the French in 1902 and, as we will see, it was they who roused the Bedouin of Cyrenaica and of large parts of Tripolitania and Fazzan against the Italians in 1911; and it was they who attempted, unsuccessfully, to rouse the Bedouin of Egypt against the British in 1915. It was, above all, their propaganda and personal example in the field which made the struggle against Italy a national war and a religious crusade. [178] To-day they have been broken by death, exile, and expropriation, and are poor and ignorant, but in the heyday of their power the Turks rightly estimated their influence and were careful not to encroach on their prerogatives.

VI

*795 121 182 The thesis I have maintained in the foregoing pages, that the Sanusiya kept its cohesion and developed into a political organization largely because it was identified with the tribal system of the Bedouin, is supported by the lack of cohesion, common direction, and political influence of the other Islamic Orders in Libya, which won adherents only in the towns of Cyrenaica and among the citizens and peasants of Tripolitania, and in neither country found support among the Bedouin. I mention these other Orders for this reason, and also because a reference to them, however brief, places the Sanusiya in a more general setting as only one among many Darwish Orders. These other Orders are, however, described barely, since the part they have played in the political history of Cyrenaica is negligible.

*795 The following Orders besides the Sanusiya are represented in Cyrenaica: Qadiriya, Rifa'iya, 'Arusiya, 'Isawiya, Tayyibiya, 'Azuziya, Madaniya, and Sa'adiya. The Qadiriya and the Rifa'iya are the only two classical Orders with lodges in the country, though the others eventually trace their descent from classical sources by those tortuous ramifications so confusing to the student of Islamic fraternities.

The distribution of the lodges of these Orders in Cyrenaica at the present time is shown in the table opposite. A knowledge of the history of the Orders is not necessary for an understanding of the history of the Sanusiya in Cyrenaica and is therefore omitted. It is necessary only to know that they all entered Cyrenaica from the west, both those, the majority,

[TEXT CONTINUED ON PAGE 86]

621

tion which enable the genealogy to remain constant in length 613
and fixed in form despite its dynamic content. 128

One of the main processes at work in foreshortening genealogies is that referred to by Evans-Pritchard as telescoping.[8] This process is also a characteristic feature of the Cyrenaican genealogy, although its effects, to be discussed presently, differ conspicuously. The way in which telescoping works in the Cyrenaican genealogy is that several male names come to be omitted in the genealogy below the name of the founding ancestor of the tertiary group. Usually, the form in which this occurs it that the name of a famous tribesman, and particularly his nickname if he has one, is retained along with the personal names of his lineal descendants in successive generations. The example given below is taken from the genealogy of the Haiba tertiary section of the Magharba tribe:

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

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[8] 'It is evident, moreover, that since the minimal lineage consists of four or five actual steps in ascent, there has been telescoping of the agnatic line from the founder of the minimal lineage further up the line of ascent to the founder of the clan, for the founder of the minimal lineage was himself the extremity of another minimal lineage which has, by increase in generations, become the minor lineage, and so on' (Fortes & Evans-Pritchard 1940, p. 199). Since Evans-Pritchard first wrote on the telescoping of genealogies among the Nuer, other anthropologists have discussed the process in various systems. Fortes, Richards, Laura Bohannan, Cunnison, and Mitchell in their writings on the Tallensi, Bemba, the Tiv, the Luapula people, and the Yao respectively are notable examples . . . As the mode of manipulation of Bedouin genealogies is marginal to my present problem, the main comparison is not with these works but with Evans-Pritchard's earlier work on the Nuer, because the Bedouin and Nuer lineage system have more in common than either have with the other systems, excepting possibly the Tiv. (171)

173 178 613 551 The line shows five male names in all. The eldest surviving members of this line is Sa'aid, who almost invariably is referred to, not by his personal name, but as Bu Shliby,[9] and on the infrequent occasions when his personal name is used it is followed by Bu Shliby and not by his father's name, which is the more common practice. Again, Abdul Qadar, when his father is not about, is called Bu Shliby, and when it is necessary to give him his personal name Bu Shliby is added, except among his more intimate family kindred, when only his personal name would be used. Likewise, his son Yunis carries Bu Shliby in addition to his personal name and is sometimes even referred to as Bu Shliby only. Abdul Qadar had never known his grandfather, was aware however of his existence in the past, but did not feel it necessary to use his name, and whatever obligation he might have felt to keep the memory of his grandfather alive, he fulfilled it when he named his son after him. Many of the older members of the group are also aware of the lineal connexions between Bu Shliby and Yunis, even though they use this knowledge in a genealogical context only, but many of the younger men of the group do not know these details. It is clear that when the boy Yunis grows to old age, three names in this line will have ceased to be used.

This practice of adding to a personal name the name of a deceased ancestor making one the son of the other, is pushed to the extent of carrying forward through the generations a nickname which referred to some peculiar characteristic of the ancestor, but which has little relation to the present bearer. Thus the ancestor whose name has been retained might have been nicknamed 'The Lame One' or 'The Squint-Eyed One' because he suffered either of these personal defects; or he might have been nicknamed 'The Old One' because he lived to a ripe old age. Such nicknames might later be carried by men who are not lame, nor squint-eyed, nor old, while the names of the intervening ancestors are dropped in normal use.

Another process is at work, which needs to be distinguished from telescoping, for although the results in genealogical terms are similar, Bedouin view it in quite a different light. This is the [553] process of fusing names. It is common practice among the Bed-

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[9] The prefix *Bu* is used by the Bedouin to mean 'son of.'

ouin—and, for that matter, Arabs in other lands—to name a boy 173
after a deceased relative. Rarely is a boy named after his father, 178
unless the father's death occurs before the boy is born, in which 613
circumstance, the new-born boy would certainly take his father's 551
name. A much more common form of this practice is to name a [553]
boy after his grandfather, assuming the latter to be dead. The eldest son usually accepts this responsibility, but it by no means falls invariably to him. There is a number of reasons for this, but they need not concern us here, since they are of no relevance to the general argument. What is of concern at present is that one name in the genealogy might represent the fusion of several other similar names. When circumstances permit, an individual's line might run as follows: Muhammad—'Ali—Muhammad—'Ali—Muhammad. It is true that the man himself and those closely related to him might know full well that there are three men named Muhammad and two named 'Ali, but it would not be considered irregular if only one Muhammad and one 'Ali were given in the genealogy. A mature man, giving his genealogy, omitted his father's name, Ibrahim. When asked about the omission, he insisted that he had given it, and when he was told that the name Ibrahim given by him was intended to refer to his young son, he impatiently dismissed the matter with the observation that having given the name Ibrahim once, it mattered little whether it had been put in the position of his son or father. Pointing to his son he added, 'There is my father, Ibrahim. He has taken my father's position, has he not?'

By the fusion of names, several persons drop out of the genealogy, and by and by, the line comes to be shortened. It also has the effect of giving a person's name a weighting which otherwise it would not possess. In a sense, a young son named after a father is not merely a son but a father and possibly a great-grandfather also. The young boy becomes the contemporary carrier of the personalities of those of similar name who have preceded him, while the behaviour of the living towards him is, in virtue of this, affected in a number of details. A man who had named his son in this way, explained the matter thus: 'He is my son, but also my father because he has his name. I cannot beat him for it would be like beating my father. When he grows up and I grow old, he will look after me as if I were his son.'

173 178 551 613 428 [553] Fusion of names appears in another context and for similar reasons. Not only are lineal descendants given the name of deceased ancestors, but a man may be given the name of any deceased agnate of his tertiary section. Usually, this is only done when a man passes on property to another who is not his direct heir. Commonly, this occurs when an agnate is also a mother's brother, as often happens as a result of parallel cousin marriage, and this mother's brother has no sons of his own. If he has a sister's son, who is also his paternal nephew, he is likely to pass on his wealth to this nephew. [183] [593] [852] [871] [583] A father, the Bedouin insist, ought to perform three duties for his sons: attend to their circumcision, and their education in the Koran, and provide bride-wealth when they marry. All fathers attend to the circumcision of all their sons; few provide for the Koranic education of any of their sons; most bear the burden of marrying off at least one of their sons. The performance of the latter duty is what makes the continuance of the deceased's name an obligation, and whoever performs this duty must have his name perpetuated in one male offspring of the union which was brought about with his wealth. Wealth need not take the form of bride-wealth; it can be a legacy willed by a father, maternal uncle of the kind described above, or any other agnate who has died without male issue. Conversely, if a man dies without leaving any property, even his sons might not perpetuate his name, and eventually it will drop out of the genealogy.[10] There are instances of men inheriting the wealth of a number of agnates, using each parcel of wealth to make a new marriage and naming the sons of the various unions after the several dead who had left wealth. The example given below is taken from the genealogy of the Dawwas section of the Magharba tribe. What happened here was that the two lines stemming from Faraj and Sha'aban, after proliferating normally, became extinct. As this happened, Ibrahim, the son of Miftah, began to inherit wealth to which he was not a direct heir; and

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[588] [10] To avoid confusion, it ought to be made clear that this is not ghost marriage. As I understand ghost marriages from Evans-Pritchard's (1951) account, two main conditions must be satisfied: (i) that there should be inherited wealth to make a marriage, and (ii) that the wealth remaining after the ghost marriage has been made is inherited by the ghost children only. In Cyrenaica, wealth thus inherited becomes part of a man's total wealth and is not reserved for a ghost marriage and its issue.

as he did so, he entered into a plurality of marriages, begat sons, 173
and replaced those men in the genealogy who had died without 178
heirs. In the following generation the twin process of death and 551
replacement continued. Death removed all the male descendants 613
of Sha'aban and Faraj, and of Ibrahim Bu Miftah's many sons 428
only two, Sharif and Abdallah, were of age to marry at the time of my visits to their camp. Both had enjoyed a plurality of wives, although still young to have done so, and each marriage they contracted took place after the death of one of their kinsmen. The full and intricate details of this interesting genealogy are irrelevant here, since all the example is intended to show is how nine of eleven male names were perpetuated in the genealogy by repeating five of them twice and four of them three times, accounting in all for twenty-two names; and to do this, three men (one of them had died, but the other two were both under forty years of age) married eight wives. All the names in the two lines which have died out have not yet been brought back into the genealogy, but 'Abdallah, the son of Ibrahim, who had already done extremely well in this respect, was confident that soon the obligations towards Musa, Abd al-Rahim, and Sa'ad would be redeemed.

Thus the fusion of names not only ensures that names threatened with extinction are perpetuated, but that one person, in the name he bears, can carry the genealogical burden of several other men of that name.


SA'AID
MIFTAH
SHA'ABAN
FARAJ
IBRAHIM
IBRAHIM
SALIM
SA'AID
BU GHAWIYA
SHA'ABAN
'ABD AL RAHIM
MIFTAH
MUSA
SA'AD
FATALLAH
SHARIF
'ABDALLAH
MIFTAH
SALIM
ZAIDAN
SA'AD
SALAH
SHA'ABAN
SULAIMAN
MUHAMMAD
IBRAHIM
HAMAD
SA'AID
BU GHAWIYA
FARAJ
GHAITH
SALAH

[601]

FIG. 18-2 GENEALOGY 2. The names of dead men are underlined.

173 Telescoping of names, and fusion of names, taken together,
178 can account for the fixity of the genealogy to a large extent. In
551 addition, lines which showed every sign of normal development
613 at one time, have petered out completely, even after they have
sometimes assumed the status of tertiary segments. Conditions
173 under which this is likely to happen are not difficult to envisage.
178 If hearsay evidence is correct, disease, when it strikes in the
551 desert, might rage in a camp like wild fire, bringing death to
613 many, but not spreading to other camps, because the camps are
731 so far apart. Even in springtime when men and beasts are to-
361 gether in the pastures, and the larger summer camp has split into
four or five smaller ones, the distance between camps may still be
[221] a few miles. In summer, when camps are concentrated on the
large watering points, the distances between them are considerably more. Disease, therefore, does not spread from camp to camp as rapidly as one might expect in such primitive conditions of living. In 1949 a number of men of a small camp died within a
[761] few days of each other. Bedouin opinion attributed these deaths
[784] to an allegedly false oath sworn by the deceased a year earlier.
Medical opinion ascribed them to filth in a well which the deceased had been cleaning before their illness. In any event, a
173 thriving line of a lineage was wiped off the genealogy. The por-
178 tion of the Dawwas genealogy shown on this page shows a
613 similar process at work. Again, to give another example, the Nasr
section of the Magharba tribe once included six tertiary sections, not four as are now given. Two of these six sections are now represented by only four men of whom two are too old and decrepit to have heirs any longer, and are unmarried in any case; a third, whose wife has long passed child-bearing age, had two sons, but both died before marriage; and the fourth, a very poor and old man, has only one daughter, and is a widower. Three of the four now live with their collateral tribal section, Madhkur, and count themselves members of this group. That they once belonged to two different groups might have passed unnoticed were it not that two elders of the Madhkur section insisted that they should be correctly placed and their entire genealogies be recorded. The younger men argued that although they were aware that the two groups named Farjiani and al-Khadhar at one time

existed, it was pointless giving them separate status any longer; 173
they were content to give the three men separate lines of a few 178
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

generations, and then to tag them on to Madhkur, the founding ancestor of the segment.

Telescoping, fusion of names, and the extinction of lines are three ways in which the general fixed shape of the genealogy is retained. These three processes are only sufficient, however, in special circumstances, but before discussing these circumstances one further general condition relating to these processes must be made explicit. All three affect the genealogy within the tertiary 173
segments only, and do not affect it at any of the more superior 178
orders of segmentation. There is not a shred of evidence from 613
contemporary Cyrenaican genealogies to show that telescoping or 621
fusion occurs except within the tertiary segment, within that group, in other words, where precise genealogical links are known and can be specified, and within that small group which for most part of the year constitutes a single settlement. It is possible that groups of structurally superior levels to the tertiary have become extinct, in the way that tertiary lines have petered out. There is no definite evidence to support this, and from the analysis of Cyrenaican genealogies in general it seems that when any group is threatened with extinction—and this in turn means that fewer and fewer people will be using the same land and water facilities—there is a definite tendency for the lineage rump to fuse with a collateral lineage (and in so doing fuse their resources with those of the adopting lineage), or for a numerically more powerful lineage group to take it over by force. The number of tertiary segments spanned by a secondary segment, therefore, increases or decreases according to the circumstances; so that a secondary segment, numerically strong in its tertiary segments to-day, may become considerably weaker in future, and the numerically weak secondary section of to-day may proliferate its segments substantially in the future. Short of a significant de-

173 cline in the total population of a tribe, then, the extinction of
•178 lines does not affect any order of segmentation superior to the
613 tertiary. In this respect, the Cyrenaican genealogy differs funda-
621 mentally from those collected from the Nuer by Evans-Pritchard.
In the quotation from his work on Nuer genealogies (1951), he
[171] asserts that telescoping occurs 'from the founder of the minimal
lineage further up the line of ascent to the founder of the clan'.
This major difference has serious implications for any discussion
of lineage proliferation, but these must be left until the conditions
under which proliferation is likely to occur have been analysed.

While it is true that the processes discussed are of importance
178 in retaining the general shape of the genealogy, what is assumed
613 so far is that the Cyrenaican population has been stable over long
621 periods. Stability of population is not an unreasonable assump-
161 tion to make for a people who live on the margin of subsistence
182 in a country where extended periods of drought are not infre-
[173] quent, though seldom leading, it is true, to actual famine condi-
[731] tions, but producing periodic and local food and water shortages.
Disease, following quickly in the trail of shortage, it can be as-
sumed, kept the relationship of total population to the natural
resources fairly constant. What evidence there is does not support
even this very general assumption, since it is known that there
[726] have been large-scale tribal wars in the past, and a certain
[167] amount of movement of tribes, some being displaced and others
pushed eastwards into Egypt. Unless these shifts were caused by
increases in the aggregate population and the consequent pres-
sure on land and water, it is difficult to account for them. This
consideration of possible overall increases in population in the
past poses interesting problems related to lineage structure which
cannot be adequately treated here. For the moment it is proposed
to neglect possible increases in the total population during past
periods in the history of Cyrenaica. The historical depth of the
view now to be discussed is about seventy years, and for this
period I have no evidence of any large-scale increases in popula-
tion. It is reasonable, therefore, to assume a general stability of
population for this period. But the vagaries of the Cyrenaican
[132] climate are such that, in a given year, one area might be well
drenched with rain, giving excellent pastures for animals and
good crops, while a nearby territorial strip might suffer a partial

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drought giving insufficient pastures and poor crops. Good or bad 613
crops, poor or abundant pasture, in turn mean a higher or lower 621
milk yield from the animals and better or worse living conditions 161
for human beings. Such factors as these may well, over a number 182
of years, lead to unevenness in the distribution of population [032]
throughout the tertiary sections. Whatever the cause, the gene-
alogies show that the population of the numerous tertiary sec- [173]
tions is unequal. Some are numerically so weak that they have to
join a collateral section. Others are numerically so strong that
their natural resources are insufficient to meet the needs of all
their members. It was these latter segments which were in the
process of splitting, and which in some cases have already done
so. The next task, then, is to demonstrate where, on the geneal- [128]
ogy, proliferation is effected.

We have seen that in Nuer genealogies segments proliferate at 173
all orders of segmentation. Here, the process is a continuous one, 171
beginning at any point in time within the minimal lineage and 613
progressing upwards to the apex of lineage bifurcation. As par- 551
ticular names become significant within the minimal segment,
they are retained and become a permanent addition to the gene-
alogy. In order to include these successively additional names,
names of ascending ancestors are shunted further and further
into the genealogical past, until presumably the effect is felt at
the topmost limit of the genealogy, when the names here are
pushed out of the genealogical framework altogether, and for-
gotten for ever. More than this, the upward shift in names at
each and every point in the genealogical line means also a con-
sequent re-ordering of structural relationships, at all levels in the
system. One vital difference between Nuer and Bedouin societies 173
which may partly, at least, account for the different genealogical 178
processes at work among them is that the Nuer, when they were 613
studied by Evans-Pritchard, were expanding territorially, and [171]
that continuous proliferation of segments throughout the struc-
ture was the mode of dealing with a situation of expansion. The [648]
Bedouin, on the other hand, had suffered twenty years of terrible
privation at the hands of the Italians, during which period thou-
sands of them died in battle and in concentration camps, were
shot up in their camps from the air, or died from want, before I
went to live among them. Although I must confess that I now

173 178 613 551 114 Although I must confess that I now find it difficult to accept Evans-Pritchard's view of genealogical growth and development as stated for the Nuer, it was the view I originally held with regard to Bedouin genealogies. Indeed, thinking in genealogical terms only, it appears inevitable that the addition of successive generations can only mean the lengthening of the genealogy, or, if the length is to remain constant, extrusion of ancestral names must take place at the apex of the genealogy. If this view is to be accepted, several other conclusions must be accepted with it. The genealogy, as far as it goes at least, is an accurate record of descent—some names may have been lopped off at the top, but otherwise the genealogy represents a faithful statement of succession. Again, if successive generations are to be added to the genealogy, then its base must continually expand laterally. From what is known of contemporary Bedouin genealogies, there is no evidence which leads to the supposition that their base is progressively widening. With regard to the authenticity of the names in the genealogy, above the point of tertiary segmentation, I hope to show in a subsequent article on Bedouin genealogies in general, that names above the tertiary point of segmentation have remained fixed for very long periods of time, and that they bear slight relation to the passage of generations over the last century at least; moreover, in this article I hope to demonstrate that what manipulation of the genealogy takes place does not affect more than about four or five ascending generations from the living.

121 173 613 Part of the difficulty in a study of this sort lies in the strong temptation to think of the genealogy *per se*, even though it is readily admitted that it has a value in itself for the Bedouin. Yet even in these terms the genealogy must always represent an ordered grouping of people, and these people live on strips of territory. The starting point of the analysis then ought to begin with the territorial ordering of groups of people. The relation of groups of people to land, moreover, is determined by the carrying capacity of that land, and it is this prerequisite which is the main variable in discussing genealogical manipulation, and not the [182] other way about. The main landmarks of the Cyrenaican ecology are fixed points which cannot be manipulated to fit in with the genealogy; it is the genealogy which must be altered to comprehend the distribution of people in their ecological setting.

121 173 613 619 178 If, moreover, the view of a genealogy as a continually expanding line of descent is to be accepted, it must be accepted also that large structural units, even in conditions of population stability, are to experience a continuous re-ordering of their structural relationships. In practice, what this means is that a tribe of, say 20,000 souls cease to be tribesmen of a named tribe and instead all become members of an almost identical group but with a different name. To take an example from the genealogy given [162] on page 365: the Magharba tribe shown there has a total population of some 13,000 souls. If proliferation affected the topmost limits of this tribe, the apical name disappears and presumably the name of one of the primary sections is to be substituted. That is, half the tribe would have to take on the lineage name of their opposed primary section. The only alternative to the use of the name of a primary segment as a substitute for the abandoned tribal name is the acceptance by 13,000 people of a totally new name, which is most unlikely.

It is reasonable to assume therefore, that the genealogy, in its general form, is fixed for long periods of time at least. This still leaves the problem of how and where adjustments are made to face the contingencies of birth and death, of the succession of generations, and of the irregular increases and decreases of population among the tertiary segments. An important clue lies in the number of segments which appear at the various orders of segmentation. From Sa'ada, the founding ancestress, in the line which runs to Nasr, each ancestor is shown as having a pair of sons for four orders of segmentation. At the fifth generation from Sa'ada—this is now the secondary order of segmentation within the tribe—the number of sons increases to four. Not all tribes will show the same number of sons at each generation as the Magharba—some, for example, might show three instead of two at the primary order—but what is true of all tribes is that there is evident consistency in the number down to and including the fifth generation from Sa'ada; if, that is to say, one of a tribe's primary segments is divided into three secondary sections, the other one or two, as the case may be, will be divided likewise. Throughout the tribes in Cyrenaica, then, segmentation of orders superior to the tertiary segments shows a pronounced consistency in their numbers.

stretching across to the village of Ajadabiya in the east, topples 613
in undulations away into the flat expanses of the desert to the 619
south. At all these points of segmentation, the territories occupied 621
by the various sections are large and roughly defined, and 133
the population aggregates supported on these territories run from 182
over a thousand at one end to tens of thousands at the upper 131
limits. The tertiary sections are numerically much smaller, some
of them numbering as few as a hundred souls in all, and the
territories to which they are attached are correspondingly
smaller. The relationship between the numbers in this order of
section, and the precise amount of water available in the local
wells is an intimate one. If the population of one of these groups
increases, or if the number of animals rises, or if the springs show
a decline in the volume of water they give forth, or if the winter
rainfall has allowed the storage in wells of only a small quantity
of water, a rearrangement of the group must be effected. A significant
alteration of any one of these components must mean
that the local group must split to enable a new adjustment to be
made in the relationship of man and animals to water.

Whatever changes occur within groups of any size, since the 173
genealogy embraces the entire population, these must appear on 178 •
the genealogy in some way or other. Now a genealogy is as rigid 829
a framework, as fixed and final a pattern of grouping, as can be 613
imagined. The impression that they are thus rigid and fixed, except 551
for the addition of successive generations, is strengthened
by the way in which the Bedouin use them. From their young
boys to their old men, the Bedouin are expert genealogists, and
the names of ancestors, for one reason or another, are never far
from their lips. Names are kept alive by constant use, since all [571]
references to inter-group relationships must be in terms of these
names. More than this, the Bedouin were proud to the point of 173
boastfulness of their genealogical knowledge, and, wherever I 829
travelled, the first request I had to comply with was to take down 613
a large portion of a tribal genealogy. In recording their endless 551
genealogies, one feature about them came to assume increasing 123
interest; while there was remarkable unanimity with regard to 126
most of the names given, there was one point of marked ambiguity—at
the tertiary level of segmentation. I recorded genealogies
in four tribes on an extensive scale, and in each tribe

619 change their structural position only rarely. The latter change
621 sometimes does, however, occur, and there is evidence to show
182 that it does. For example, Agostini (1922–23, p. 323) in his tribal
166 survey, records a section named Barsha as one of the groups stem-
613 ming from Nasr.[12] In the genealogies I was given, the name did
not appear, and even after some questioning, what information
was known about it was concealed. Some time later the name
[578] cropped up accidentally in conversation, and I was then told that
at one time it had been one of the Nasr groups, but that after a
quarrel during a year of water shortage, the Barsha folk went
to live with people with whom they had maternal connexions,
and in whose territory there was ample water that year, and
never returned. The group, a tertiary one, was detached from the
tertiary point of segmentation in the genealogies, and tied on to
a tertiary group of another tribe in its new homeland.

178 To summarize briefly the argument thus far, the mechanical
173 devices of telescoping, fusion of names, the ejection of those
619 names which cease to be of any social consequence, and the
621 elision of names at or around the fifth ascending generation,
613 taken together point to the importance of the tertiary order of
segmentation in discussing the problem of maintaining the form
of the genealogy constant in face of its natural tendency to alter;
further, evidence of changes (adoption into a lineage, detachment from it, the inclusion and exclusion of clients) was presented, and this again led to the conclusion that the tertiary point
of segmentation is critical in this respect. This being so, the man-
[128] ner in which change actually occurs, still remains to be shown,
and this is best done, perhaps, by discussing the mode of proliferation of tertiary segments. In order to do this adequately, it
is necessary to say something briefly about certain features of
Bedouin marriage.

582 Among the Bedouin there exists a preferential form of marriage
605 between a man and his father's brother's daughter. Parallel
cousin marriage of this sort carries with it the exclusive right of
a man to this cousin. Without his consent no one else can marry
her, and to attempt to do so would be to risk the marriage arrangements being nullified after negotiations had almost been

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[114] [12] Barsha's position is incorrectly given as a sub-group of Haiba; it should be shown as structurally equivalent to Haiba. See also note 11.

the interests they have in their maternal relatives. Stated thus 613 sharply, this is a distortion of the process. To speak of the prin- 602 ciple of agnation conflicting with the principle of cognation or 121 maternal origin is nonsense, as the facts included in the discussion show. Agnation is not one thing, but many. Within its scope are included such aspects of social organization as succession, status, inheritance, bride-wealth, blood-money, modes of domestic and political behaviour, and so forth; and each of these aspects, the closer we stick to reality, can be broken up into a number of components. The same can be said of cognation and maternal origin. All these principles, so called, are clusters of numerous component parts, which combine, in reality, in a kaleidoscopic number of ways. In one situation a component of one combines with that of another to strengthen it; in a different situation the one component may repel the other; in a third situation, a number of the components in one will combine to exclude those of the other, and so on. If, therefore, an understanding of the way in which lineage proliferation occurs is sought, a view of the process as a conflict between the principle of agnation and the opposing pull of maternal origin is quite erroneous. It is of use in predicting the direction of cleavage to know that within a tertiary group there are also clusters of kin which are defined roughly by maternal links, and this knowledge serves as a rough and ready guide in predicting what the composition of groups, after they have split away from the parent group, will be. If a more precise picture of this composition is desired, other and more complex kinship links and the behaviour which accompanies them must be taken into account. If a still more accurate picture is desired, details of inheritance disputes, debts of bridewealth, the size of flocks and herds, and the like, must also be taken into consideration. If, finally, one has the opportunity to study groups after they have proliferated, the presence or absence of this or that man can often be explained only in terms of his eye for a pretty girl or a personal preference for neighbours.

The kind of change which has been discussed in this essay is [178] not difficult to negotiate in genealogical terms. Earlier it was [621] stressed that within the tertiary tribal sections, although they [173] are always predominantly agnatic groups, clusters of cognatic [551]

613 kin also exist. Two ways of naming these clusters are adopted—
602 all groups, whether they are elementary families, an odd assort-
121 ment of kindred sharing a common tent for reasons of expedi-
● 178 ency, or tribal groups, have a name. Sometimes these clusters are
621 named after a prominent living male, or a deceased kinsman of
173 the same kind. Sometimes these little groups are named after a
woman, perhaps the grandmother of the group.[15] Thus a small
551 group of two or three tents will be distinguished from another
similar cluster within the camp, and so on for a number of groups, depending on the size of the camp. Most camps, however many tents they contain, have names for progressively inclusive clusters of tents until a twofold named division is reached. Tertiary segments that are forced to split contain therefore two groups with names already attached to them. When a split occurs, the name of the tertiary segment is pushed into the area of ambiguity and the names of what were previously two clusters become the names of two new tertiary segments, with a minimum adjustment in usage and a minor re-shuffle at the tertiary level of segmentation. Names cannot continue to be pushed into this area of the genealogy interminably, otherwise it would gradually expand into a vast pool of names. For a few generations the name dispensed with in this way becomes one of those ancestors about whom there is argument when genealogies are given. In the course of time, name after name is subjected to the process of elision and eventually will cease to be of concern to anyone.

105 I now summarize the main points of the discussion. The evi-
613 dence that has been examined suggests that the mechanical de-
vices of telescoping, fusion of names, and extinction of lines do
173 not affect orders of segmentation superior to that of the tertiary
178 order, and that in conditions of a completely stable population,
[551] these devices alone would suffice to retain the form of the genea-
logical structure. But, it was argued, conditions of complete stability cannot be assumed; the evidence of the present distribution of population among the numerous tertiary groups clearly points to marked fluctuations occurring within these small groups. This being so, proliferation of these groups in some areas at some

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[15] The naming of groups within a tertiary segment is an interesting study in itself, but it would be outside the limits of this discussion to make more than a brief mention of it.

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times, must follow, and conversely, while proliferation takes place here, combination will be taking place elsewhere as the population of groups decreases. The condition which compels proliferation is the alteration in the relationship of man and animals to the natural resources; and when this alteration builds up to an acute pressure on water and land, one group of a divided segment must move off to seek water elsewhere.

The next task was to demonstrate where this kind of change occurred on the genealogy. The sudden irregularity in the number of segments at the tertiary order, compared with the uniformity at others, provided a clue. Other evidence also pointed to this as a significant order in this context: there is ambiguity displayed with regard to the identity and positioning of ancestors here; members adopted into a lineage are grafted on to it here; clients are attached to tertiary sections; groups of noblemen, when they are detached and move off to another tribe, break away at this point. This is where change occurs, but, it was agreed, in understanding the way in which it takes place, certain forms of marriage have to be taken into account. Particular emphasis was placed on cross-cousin marriage with the mother's brother's daughter, and to women outside the tertiary segment, since the effect of these forms of marriage is to produce two or more clusters of cognatic kindred in camps largely composed of agnates, and to emphasize the line of cleavage in a lineage segment. So that when, therefore, a split occurs, the line it takes is predetermined. Proliferation, even when necessary, does not finally come about, however, until an occasion permits the separation of groups to be demonstrated by a violation of the conditions of membership of a group. Details of three such occasions were offered: the demand for blood-money between agnates who previously had constituted a politically undivided section; behaviour contrary to the demands of agnatic kinship in attendance and gift-giving at funerals; and failure to participate in a pilgrimage to the saint's tomb of a particular section. But another query remained: how are the newly formed groups named? It was seen that names already in daily use by the small group of people concerned came to assume a new significance, while the name which had previously spanned them all is disregarded and pushed into the area of ambiguity whence later it is elided altogether. [551]

105 613 173 178 ● Change due to the normal and inevitable process of proliferation is thus managed within the structural limits of the tertiary section without disturbing any of the superior orders in the system. The latter remain fixed over long periods, but the tertiary sections of a particular secondary action may be reduced in number over a few generations while another secondary section may show a corresponding increase in the number of its segments.

121 178 613 161 By combining the various factors involved in change, it is possible to understand the details of lineage proliferation, or at least to travel along a well signposted road. In the light of this analysis, moreover, it is unnecessary to assume a stable population in each and every segment over long periods; the mechanisms of readjustment allow for substantial irregularities and fluctuations in population. It is possible that they are also sufficient to contain significant increases in the aggregate population. They could almost certainly control minor fluctuations, but it is seriously doubted whether a population increase sufficient to produce a country-wide and acute water shortage could be met merely by the proliferation of tertiary lineage segments. But to deal with this problem other aspects of the Bedouin genealogy and details of Cyrenaican history, which have necessarily been omitted from this discussion, would have to be taken into account, and this is best left for another article.

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THE SEDENTARIZATION OF NOMADS IN THE WESTERN DESERT OF EGYPT

A. M. Abou-Zeid

•178 Much attention has been paid in the last few years, in both Egyptian and
657 international circles, to the question of settling the nomads of the Western Desert of Egypt. A number of institutions (e.g. the Cairo Institute for Desert Research and the Departments of Sociology and Social Anthropology in the Egyptian universities) and some government departments (e.g. the Department of Desert Irrigation, of the Ministry of Public Works) have combined their efforts to study the economic and social situation of the semi-nomadic clans and the possibility of creating new sedentary agricultural communities to replace the present nomadic and semi-nomadic groups whose economy is based on the rearing of livestock in general, and of sheep in particular. It is the purpose of this paper to give a brief account of the main projects of sedentarization suggested by the authorities concerned in Egypt, and to outline their expected effects upon the economic system and modes of living, and also to indicate the repercussions they may eventually have on the whole social structure of the semi-nomadic clans. Apart from the planned projects, there is a marked and growing tendency among these people, especially the younger
178 generation, to abandon the traditional way of life and to settle down. This
166 tendency is generally stimulated by the changing social conditions. The tremendous hardships and the insecurity of the nomadic life, which is entirely dependent on rains, and the increasing social and cultural contacts with the urban communities in the Delta are the main factors influencing this change of social conditions, thus accentuating what may be described as a spontaneous and natural drift to settled life. Thus, an acute decline in the amount of rainfall, which is a frequent phenomenon in the Western Desert, and the consequent drought, famine and death of large numbers of animals will drive men to search for a more stable means of living in which they can find the security that is lacking in the nomadic way of life. The introduction of modern education and the establishment of schools in the larger villages have played a great role in changing the outlook of the people and in discrediting the traditional nomadic values. The advent of the railway and the improvement of other means of transport and communication have encouraged contacts with the Delta, and more particularly with Alexandria. As a result, an increasing number of young men migrate every year to Alexandria and get themselves paid jobs there. Trade and commercial transactions have also been increased with the Delta. New trade centres (e.g. El-Hammam, El-Dab'aa and Mersa Matrouh) have grown up along the railway line at the key stations. The most important of these centres is perhaps El-Hammam, which is the largest cattle market in the Western Desert. Small food stores and cafés and restaurants owned by 'native' people have been opened at these centres and in the larger

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villages and towns, especially at Mersa Matrouh which is the seat of the local 178
government. The second world war was also influential in changing attitude
and social values. Men who were employed as unskilled labourers during the 166
war by the different combating armies became accustomed to paid jobs and to cash remuneration, which had previously been practically unknown to them. When the war ended, it was not easy for those workers to go back to the old nomadic life with all its hardships and insecurity. Some of them preferred to migrate to the Delta, while the others decided to settle down to work in the desert villages and towns as servants or as unskilled labour in the local government departments, schools, hospitals, etc. Most of the younger men now prefer to follow their example; the settled sedentary life is thus gaining ground all the time at the expense of livestock husbandry.

But important as they may be in accelerating the drift from nomadism to 000
sedentary life, these factors fall beyond the scope of this paper and need not be discussed further in this context. We shall be concerned with the plans and schemes which are deliberately designed to deal with the settlement of the nomadic and semi-nomadic clans. But before going on to consider this problem we should like to give a brief outline of the area itself so as to establish a clear idea about the general setting, and to see the projects themselves against a background of the whole social life. This should help us to understand more clearly the motives underlying the projects and to discern the effects they may have on the social situation.

Geographers generally divide the Western Desert into three main divisions, 133
each of which has its outstanding characteristics. 105

1. The northern strip which extends some 500 kilometres along the coast from the west of Alexandria to the Egyptian-Libyan border. This strip, known as the *Dera'a Bahari*, consists mainly of fertile cultivated land which extends some 20 to 30 kilometres to the south, tending generally to become narrower to the west till it almost vanishes at Sollum near the frontiers.
2. To the south of this green coastal zone lies a high plateau in which are a number of depressions, the most important being the Qattara Depression.
3. The rest of the area; i.e. the extreme southern region, is real arid desert.

The coastal zone is the only really inhabited and cultivated part of the desert; beyond it there is hardly any prospect for cultivation. It is also a vital centre to which the scattered clans and groups of herders come to gather round the water points and the artesian wells during the dry season when the water becomes scarce in the southern parts.

The climate of the desert varies between the Mediterranean climate to the 132
north and along the coast, and the sub-tropical dry climate in the southern 105
parts. The dry season is usually very warm, tending to grow hotter southwards; while the wet season, usually extending from November to March, is generally mild especially in the north. Rainfall is very erratic and varies greatly from year to year and from one place to another. But on the whole, there is more rain in the north than in the south, and in most years rain falls in the southern parts only on very rare occasions. Rain may come quite suddenly and cause torrential floods which sweep away dwellings, crops and animals alike. This is typical of the Sallum area.

According to the 1947 census, the Bedouins of the Western Desert number 162
68,161. Only 23,444, i.e. less than the half of the population, are engaged in 105

bad years the returns may be so poor that grain and flour have to be sent from 105
the Delta to avert famine. The failure of the crop may also compel whole 243
clan-segments to migrate with their animals to the Delta. In this respect, 311
the semi-nomadic clans of the Western Desert represent a real burden on the national economy of Egypt.

Livestock husbandry, which is by far the most important and highly valued 105
occupation, is itself subject to the variability and the erratic nature of rainfall, 231
since it is the rain which determines the abundance of herbage and, consequently, the number of animals reared. Pasture land is found mainly to the south of the cultivated land. Sometimes, the fallow patches among the barley fields are also covered with grass and other pasture plants suitable for grazing. Pasture plants usually persist between December and May; during the summer, the land becomes arid hard desert with only few dispersed patches of dry grass. The grazing season *par excellence* is from November to April, during which period barley stands in the fields. After the first showers of November, barley is sown and the young men soon move with their flocks to the pastures, leaving the older people to look after the fields. As the dry season advances, the flocks are moved northwards to the cultivated lands so as to be nearer to fodder and to water-holes. Thus, the movements of the herders are rhythmic and regulated by the division of the year into two major seasons: the wet season and the dry season. The wet season is the period of plenty during which the animals are well fed; the dry season is the period of starvation for the flocks which must then rely on such fodder as barley straw and on the drying grass. Any movements of animals that may take place during that season are carried out on a very limited scale. In exceptionally bad years the people are compelled to dispose of their animals, or at least of a large part of the flocks, or they may send them away to their friends and relatives who may be living near vegetation. Sometimes, the herdsmen find themselves compelled to cross the frontiers to Cyrenaica for pasture.

We can see then from this brief account to what extent the water situation 105
is responsible for determining the modes of living in the desert and for channelling human activities and imposing certain limitations on these activities. Development projects and sedentarization schemes planned for the Western Desert and its inhabitants must, therefore, give a great deal of importance to the question of water and its availability. In fact, most of the contemplated projects envisage the possibility of better exploitation of the existing water supplies as well as the tapping of potential resources.

Rightly or wrongly, it is generally assumed in Egypt that nomadism and 178
semi-nomadism represent a phase of deterioration which is no longer compatible with the actualities of modern life and therefore should be abolished. 312
For, apart from the fact that it is responsible for the hardships and insecurity 657
suffered by the desert dwellers and the consequent ill effects on the national economy, especially in bad years, nomadism as practised in the Western Desert and under the prevailing circumstances is wasteful and destructive. Vast stretches of land which could be reclaimed at little cost and cultivated intensively are simply left for grazing without any serious endeavour to make better use of them. Under the contemplated sedentarization projects it is intended to increase the cultivated area, to improve the pastures by introducing new pasture plants of higher nutritive value in areas where agriculture is not

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178 practicable, to tap unused resources, to develop the existing primitive crafts and to establish new industries. The question of water is the corner-stone of
312 all these projects. Subterranean water has been tapped from the ancient Roman
657 wells, and about 120 artesian wells have been sunk lately along the coast. A number of water cisterns have been constructed, and others are under construction, to preserve the rain-water for irrigation. Special attention has been paid in this regard to the western part of the coastal zone where the amount of rainfall exceeds that falling in the eastern parts. An example is the Wadi-el-Kharrouba cistern near Mersa Matrouh which will prevent large amounts of rain-water from being lost in the sands or in the sea, and store it for use during the dry season. All the water thus obtained will certainly help to extend the area sown with barley, especially in the El-Dab'aa zone; besides providing the more settled people with what they require to keep their fig trees and olive groves. The abundance of water may also encourage the introduction of new plants and trees which need a more stable and constant supply of water.

178 A few examples may serve to illustrate further the general policy adopted with regard to the problem of sedentarization of the Bedouin clans, and the
657 steps taken to put the policy into effect.

The first example we shall consider is the Wadi-el-Natrun project which concerns the exploitation of the natural resources of the area so as to allow the establishement of new industries and the extension of the cultivated area, which in turn may eventually encourage the people to change to agriculture or industry, i.e. to a sedentary life. The *wadi* is an extended depression which lies some 22 metres below sea-level. The south-eastern end of the depression is 80 kilometres from Cairo, while the northern end is about 85 kilometres from Alexandria. A number of shallow salt lakes cover about half its total area, and some of these lakes become dry during the summer. The *wadi* is known as a rich source of salt and natron (sodium carbonate). Also a certain reed called *halfa* grows there and is used by the inhabitants of the area for the making of rough mats. The depression has always been regarded as a grazing ground for sheep and goats, so that only 25 *feddans*[1] were cultivated in 1952. According to the project, the extraction of salt and soda was put under government supervision. Subterranean water was tapped in a number of places and by the end of 1957 more than one thousand *feddans* were brought under the plough. Serious efforts were also made to introduce the cultivation of fruit, olives and dates as well as vegetables. Much attention was also given to the question of improving the production of animals by introducing different methods of breeding, and encouraging the inhabitants of the area to change over to the improved breeds which are superior to the local animals. This was met at first with much reluctance and resistance, but there are signs that the people are beginning to appreciate the benefit of owning the improved breeds. A factory for the manufacture of carpets and rugs has also been established by the government. A considerable proportion of the raw wool required for the industry is obtained from local sources, and the relatively small production finds a ready market in the larger cities of the Delta. The point of particular interest for us here is that all the unskilled labour employed in this industry as well as in the extraction of salt and sodium is recruited from the local population. Those workers have become accustomed to a settled life, so that when the season of extraction is over and work is temporarily suspended they do

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[1] A *feddan* = 1.038 acres.

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not take up herding animals but rather prefer to engage in agriculture, either as paid workers at the government research farm where fruit and vegetables are grown, or cultivating small patches of barley for their own consumption. Paid jobs in the factory or in the extraction industry and on the farm are very attractive to the young men. Fruit and vegetables are grown, for research purposes, in a large area of the reclaimed land. It is understood, however, that this land will be sold to the people to be exploited by them; and it is hoped that development of such farms will lead to the introduction of a canned food industry. Thus, the ultimate aim of the project is to encourage people to adopt a settled sedentary life by setting up new industries which depend mainly on the agricultural products of the area. The distribution of the arable lands will serve as an additional means of attaining this objective. All the lands of the desert are considered the exclusive property of the State, with only the right of usufruct conceded to the people. The people themselves know this only too well, although they may speak about 'their' fields and 'their' grazing-grounds and they are quite willing to settle down and to practise intensive agriculture if they are given the right to possess the land.

The main features of the Wadi-el-Natrun project repeat themselves in the Qattara Depression project which, besides its other objectives, is designed to bring about the sedentarization of the nomads by industrialization as well as by the enlarging of the cultivated area. The project is still under consideration; but from what is already known about it, it seems that the starting-point will be the digging of a long canal connecting the Mediterranean at the village of El-Alamein with the depression which lies 10 kilometres to the south of the coast. This step will be taken with the purpose of transforming a part of the depression into a large lake covering an area of about 14,000 square kilometres. The lowest point in the depression is 134 metres below sea-level; thus, it is expected that the sea water will rush towards the depression at some 600 cubic feet per second. The force of the rushing water could be used as motive power for factories in the area and as a means of generating the electric power necessary for industries to be established. As in the case of the Wadi-el-Natrun project, all the labour needed for these industries will be recruited locally. In addition, the creation of this vast artificial lake will temper the heat of the area and it is expected that as a result of the perpetual evaporation from the lake large amounts of rain will fall there, thus making possible the cultivation of vast stretches of land. It will certainly take a very long time for the lake to be completely filled up with sea-water. Experts estimate, for example, that it will need about 40 years for the water-level to reach 70 metres below sea-level, and about 150 years for it to reach 50 metres below sea-level. Some 1,300 years should pass before the depression itself is entirely filled up with salt deposits as a result of evaporation.

Lastly, the Ras-el-Hikma project endeavours to deal with the same problem but from a different angle. Unlike the Wadi-el-Natrun and the Qattara Depression projects which are concerned with industrialization and increasing the cultivated lands as means of encouraging sedentarization, the Ras-el-Hikma project is designed, to achieve that end by improving the grazing potentialities of the Western Desert in general and the Fuka-Ras-el-Hikma region in particular; and also by rationalizing the use of pasture-grounds. The logic that lies behind the project is as follows: The excessive misuse of the pasture plants and uncontrolled grazing in the desert have caused aridity and consequently obliged the people to adopt a nomadic life in search of

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pasture. Therefore, if pasture grasses could be developed and grazing practices could be organized, it would then be easy to bring the herders to a form of sedentary life in which they could practise animal husbandry in certain specific areas all the year round, without any need for transhumance or for seasonal migrations or movements. It is thought that the long-term results of the project will be both an increase in livestock production and a greater interest in the land and in intensive agriculture—a feature which hardly exists among the nomads. Ras-el-Hikma, a small village on the coast mid-way between Alexandria and Sollum, has been chosen as a suitable place for a pilot project. A research station has been established there and the whole project has been placed under the sponsorship of the Desert Institute of Cairo.

An area of about 7500 *feddans* was selected and fenced round for the pilot project. Intensive research has been carried out to develop species of palatable pasture grass which can stand the drought and summer heat and other local conditions. Considerable areas have been resown and kept under close observation. Selected breeds of animals have been imported and placed under observation both for the study of grazing management and in order to determine to what extent these breeds can be used in improving the local breeds. Much attention has been given to the problem of developing the underground water supplies; a number of wells have been sunk and wind-pumps have been erected on some of them. Efforts have also been made to introduce the cultivation of fruits and vegetables and to encourage the local inhabitants to adopt them as part of their normal diet.

So much for the development of the natural resources and grazing management in the area. But if the Bedouins are to settle down and make best use of these improved conditions, they should also be provided with suitable housing for new type of existence. A section of the land put aside for the pilot project was divided into plots on each of which was built a 'model' house designed to meet all the requirements of the Bedouin in his new life. Each dwelling has its own small garden where vegetables and fruit can be grown for private consumption, and its own animal byre. Wells provided with wind-pumps have also been constructed to provide the settlers with water for daily use and for the irrigation of their gardens.

From the purely technical point of view, the pilot project has shown good and encouraging results; and there is every reason to believe that the main project will be equally successful if it is handled with the same determination and seriousness. But it may be too early to give any definite opinion about the sociological results that can be expected. The people have not yet shown any real interest in what is going on around them, in spite of the laborious and continuous efforts made by the staff of the research station to stimulate this interest.

From these examples, two main points may be singled out for special notice:

1. Most of the projects tend to encourage sedentarization at the expense of animal husbandry; or at least they do not give enough consideration to this vital question. The only exception to this is, perhaps the Ras-el-Hikma project. This policy may prove, in the end, to be harmful to livestock production and may have the effect of depleting the animal wealth of the region. Industrialization and the agricultural development of the arable areas in the desert, important as they may be as means of bringing about sedentarization, should not divert interest from long-range development schemes.

7:Abou-Zeid E-5 (no date) 1959 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9
Egypt

2. It may prove impossible for all the claims put forward for the sedentarization projects to be be fulfilled unless the people are entitled to own the lands they cultivate. Besides giving the inhabitants a new feeling of security, this would attach them permanently to their fields, and thus incite them to give due attention to cultivation. Land-holding is considered to be the determining factor in the process of establishing sedentary life in the desert. 178• 657

Reactions to the proposed sedentarization projects vary widely, from indifference, reluctance and resentment to the absolute acceptance of them together with the changes which they may be expected to bring about. The kind of reaction depends mainly on the benefits that may be gained, or the losses that may be suffered, as a result of the realization of these projects. Thus, the semi-nomads who usually spend a considerable part of the year near towns and the larger villages such as Mersa Matrouh and El-Dab'aa and who thus have some idea of the significance and the privileges of settled life react favourably in general and welcome the sedentarization projects. Similar reactions may be found among the groups who have been accustomed to wage labour and who have thus tasted the advantages which money can offer. On the other hand, the more nomadic clans, especially those inhabiting the southern and the western parts of the desert, are forthright in expressing their deep resentment and indignation concerning the new projects. This is more obvious among the nomadic groups which live near the Egyptian-Libyan borders and who thus have grazing interests in Cyrenaica as well. For them sedentarization means the loss of these interests. Tribal chiefs also express dismay at the projects and the impending changes. Their doubts and resentment spring from their fear of losing their authority over the tribesmen, if the clans and the nomadic groups are sedentarizated and thus brought under the control of the local administration. 178

There is no doubt that the realization of these projects will cut deep into the structure of the traditional Bedouin community. The creation of new industrial and trade centres, the drift to agriculture and industry and to paid jobs, the increase in contacts with the Delta and especially with Alexandria, the greater amounts of cash in the hands of the people as a result of all these developments, and lastly the emergence of individual or private ownership of land as a result of new land legislation will lead to a growing sense of individuality and of economic independence among the younger generation. These individualistic tendencies may have some disruptive effects on both the traditional patterns of social relationships and the total social structure. Being economically independent of the lineage or the larger kin-groups, the young men will be able to free themselves from the authority of their elders, which may lead in the end to the breaking down of the whole traditional structure.

Perhaps the system which will be affected more deeply by these new trends is the kinship system, around which revolves all social and political life in the desert. The core of this system is the co-operation of a large number of agnatic kin constituting one corporate economic unit in which the personality of the individual is entirely submerged by group interests. The economic independence of the individual members and the consequent trend towards separation will lead to the shrinkage of this kin-group and to the disappearance of lineages and larger lineage-segments. Thus, the corporate units based on kinship relations will be limited in size and most of them will take the form of the

178 elementary family which prevails in the larger cities and the urban communities in general. In fact this type of family is already beginning to dominate the scene in the larger villages of the desert, such as Mersa Matrouh, which offer opportunities for trade and paid employment.

The traditional political system will also suffer badly, and it seems that the fears of the tribal chiefs are fully justified. Besides being affected by subjection to the local administrative authorities after sedentarization, the prestige of the chiefs will be equally depreciated by the antipathy of the people themselves to their intervention in their affairs. This antipathy can be noted among the more settled groups (in Mersa Matrouh, El-Dab'aa, El-Amriya, etc.) who tend to ignore the authority of the chiefs. Thus, it should be expected that the absolute coercive powers enjoyed by the chiefs of the more nomadic groups will be largely diminished by sedentarization and reduced to ineffectiveness. Yet the curb which will be imposed on the authority of the chiefs will provide, on the other hand, an effective means for social control in the desert. Under the present tribal organization, chiefs are liable to misuse their authority and can be a real source of unrest and trouble, by organizing raids against rival and hostile clans, smuggling goods across the Egyptian-Libyan frontiers, giving refuge and protection to criminals and helping them to cross the borders and escape punishment, etc. Sedentarization will put an end to these illegal activities.

In fact, the social achievements of the projects will be by no means less important than the economic results, although they were not envisaged at first by the authorities or, at least, were not given explicit consideration in the original plans. The importance of the sociological aspects of the projects can be judged from the fact that their effects will not be confined to the local Bedouin communities, but will rather influence Egyptian society at large. The emergence of the new mode of life depending mainly on intensive agriculture and on industry will encourage immigration from the Nile Valley. Some of the proposed projects do actually consider the possibility of moving 'active' and more trained peasantry elements from the Delta to rehabilitate the desert and more particularly the coastal zone and to cultivate the reclaimed lands. There is no doubt, also, that all the skilled labour needed for the new industries will be brought from Alexandria and other cities of the Nile Valley. Thus, the creation of new industrial and commercial centres in the desert will absorb a certain proportion of the inhabitants of the Delta. This can be regarded as a good contribution towards solving the problem of the increasing population of Egypt. But the crowning achievement of these projects will be the reduction of the cultural and social contrast which exists at present between the Western Desert, with its nomadic and semi-nomadic inhabitants, and the rest of the country. This contrast is manifested in the different patterns of social relationships, the different values and modes of thought, and the different structure prevailing in the desert and the Nile Valley. The creation of settled agricultural and industrial communities in the desert, the increase of contacts between the desert and the Delta, mass immigration into the desert and the breaking down of the traditional tribal organization will all help to bridge the existing social gulf. In other words, the realization of the sedentarization projects will lead in the end to a fuller social cohesion not only among the different Bedouin groups but also between the desert as a whole and the rest of the country.

Had the Senussi been successful in the last war, they 175
would no doubt have brought in the 'Ibeidat or the 'Awaqir 619
from Cyrenaica to replace the Awlad 'Ali in Egypt.

At the present day the Awlad 'Ali, especially the eastern 619
sections near the Nile Valley, have almost ceased to be nomadic, 178
and only the old men have memories of their former warlike
habits. They suffered considerably during the Great War,
but are again becoming prosperous. They now own large
comfortable tents, are beginning to build houses and clear
out cisterns, and are also said to be increasing in numbers.[1]
So civilized have they grown that my guides, one a Sinai
Arab and the other an 'Abadi, concurred in calling them
"green"—not real desert-worthy Bedouins.

Perhaps as a result of Libyan influence, or more probably 142
the better nurture and climate, they are taller, heavier, stronger,
and lighter-complexioned than the lightly built Arabs of
Sinai and Hijaz. Also they are much franker and more 157
straightforward than their shifty and suspicious eastern cousins, 181
and altogether more trustworthy. Their women only veil 562
themselves to strangers, and talk quite naturally and cheerfully 834
to the men of their own tribe. 609

They cultivate as much barley as they can, using a 243
primitive plough drawn by camels, in the clayey hollows [492]
scattered over their very stony limestone desert, but, as the [132]
rainfall is very uncertain, a good crop only occurs every five
or six years. After harvest, they exchange some of their [437]
barley for maize, which the women grind to make bread
as required, and some for dried dates. The seed for next [251]
year is buried in a hole lined with straw and covered with
clay, and a year's forage for the animals is set aside. The [432]
rest of the crop goes to market, and for a short time the [426]
Arab has money to buy clothes for himself and his family
and at utmost need to pay off some of the numerous debts he
has inherited from his forefathers. Soon he is reduced again
to the clothes he wears, the tent he sleeps in, and his animals
grazing in the desert.

They are great breeders of camels and sheep, and a busy 436
traffic in these goes on weekly in the markets of Hammam, 178
'Amriya, and the Beheira. So they have got into the habit [illegible]

---

[1] At the 1927 census, the Western Desert Arabs, Awlad 'Ali, Jawabis, etc., numbered 38,928 souls exclusive of those settled in Beheira. But Pacho, 100 years ago, estimated them at 38,000 souls. [161]

436 of thinking in money, and they reckon blood-money in cash
178 (£300) and not in camels, as Bedouin should.

484 The more adventurous make, annually, long and waterless journeys to the oases of Siwa and Bahariya to remove the date
245 crop, and, after their own wants are provided for, a good profit usually results from the sale of the remainder.

181 An Egyptian critic, who should know them only too well,[1] calls them "haughty, independent, and untrustworthy in character. They are dull and so abnormally lazy that they have no desire whatever to do more than they learnt (when young)". But he puts this down to the nature of the country; less generous critics ascribe the nature of the country to them!

173 Besides the descendants from 'Ali's three sons, 'Ali el-
619 Abyad, 'Ali el-Ahmar, and Sineina, a large section called Sinaqra reckons its descent from Sinqir, a mysterious white man who was wrecked and washed up on the coast near Salum some time in the seventeenth century.[2] These are the true Awlad 'Ali, whose sections live mingled together in the most intricate fashion. Among them live also the Jumei'at, who invited them into the country, and various families of other *murabitin*, such as Qat'an, Awlad Suleiman, Hawara, Habun, etc.
619 To distinguish themselves from their vassals, the Awlad 'Ali call themselves *hurr* free, and the *murabitin* are divided into various grades, according as they pay tribute or not.

The Awlad 'Ali are divided into three main divisions, with section (*badanat*) and subsections (*'eilat*) as follows. Some of these are so numerous that they practically constitute fresh tribes of their own.

I. Awlad Kharuf

[173] These are the descendants of 'Ali el-Abyad ("The White"), the eldest son of 'Ali bin 'Aqar bin Dib, and are subdivided again into:

	Section.	*Subsections.*
(1)	'Eilet Bu Hindi	'Eilet Bu Zayyana, 'Eilet Bahiya, 'Eilet Da'ud
(2)	'Eilet Bu Diya	'Eilet Ibrahim, 'Eilet Jereisat
(3)	Awlad Mansur	El-Afrad, El-Tawa'il, 'Eilet 'Abd Allah

---

[1] Muhammad Bey Wasfi, for many years Inspector at Borg el-'Arab.

[2] Their sheikh told Hamilton in 1853, there were seven generations between him and Sinqir.

175 then came the Awlad 'Ali.

619 Around the year 1800, the Awlad 'Ali were able to
726 defeat the Hanadi with the help of another Cyrenaican tribe
167 dwelling in the area, the Jumi'at. The Jumi'at were a vassal
tribe who changed their allegiance from the Hanadi to the
Awlad 'Ali after this war. The Hanadi, as the Banu'Una
before them, were forced into the Nile Valley. Today, they
[131] live in Sharqiyya Province and are no longer distinguishable
from the peasant population.

175 According to Evans-Pritchard, the Awlad 'Ali were still
619 in possession of eastern Cyrenaica in 1800. Then there occurred
726 "long and savagely fought" wars ending with the expulsion of
114 the Awlad 'Ali. But this time schedule seems unlikely since
the Awlad 'Ali were already at war with the Hanadi when
175 Napoleon landed near Alexandria in 1798. The Bedouin war has
648 been amusingly described by the French historian Lacroix (in
•181 Murray 1935:30) who accompanied the Napoleonic expedition:

> At five o'clock, the first Bedouin were seen on the flank of the army, and shortly afterwards one saw four or five hundred; it was the tribe of Henady, the fiercest Arabs of these deserts. They were almost naked, swarthy, and lean; their horses seemed wornout hacks; save for the helmet, it was Don Quixote as represented in the engravings ...if these five hundred Arabs had been Mamelukes, they would have been able to obtain a great success at this first moment, when the soldiers' imaginations were alert and ready to receive any impression, but these Arabs were as cowardly as the Mamelukes, who had charged an hour before, were brave.

648 makes the welfare aspects of "Arab Socialism" meaningful,
177 but the Bedouins of al-Qasr feel that they are already
[[illegible]23] practicing "Socialists."

The Bedouins feel that the programs of the government
are insufficient: the desert is extra harsh and aid should
compensate for this. On the other hand, the Egyptians who
administer the aid programs claim that the Bedouins do not
differentiate between "giving cooperation" and "receiving aid."
[181] Agricultural advisers complain that the Bedouins are lazy. One
agronomist whose job it was to teach the Bedouins how to
cultivate the olive tree said that they did not want to learn:
"They want us to plant the trees, water them and care for
them, harvest the olives, and then they will take them to the
market and sell them!" This statement is typical. The
[186] Bedouins reply: "The Egyptians did not teach us how to grow
the olive. Our fathers planted the olive here long before
they came into the desert." The Bedouins feel that the
Egyptians should follow their advice concerning the use and
control of water in the desert; that if they did the olive
[186] would flourish and life would be easier. "The Egyptians,"
they say, "are lazy and cannot keep up with our requests for
more seedlings. They cannot furnish us with what we need to
improve our lives. All we hear is: 'tomorrow, tomorrow'!"

[241] The Bedouins do not understand the methods of modern
hydrology and agronomy. They see no reason for the experimenta-

657 sanctioned the direction of economic development from a
177 pastoral to a market-oriented, agricultural mode of production.
474 Land reclamation and development projects administered by the
433 cooperatives encourage the Bedouins to produce cash crops.
In this way, Al-Qasr is being drawn into the national economy.
Price changes and seasonal commodity preferences in the Nile
Valley now affect the economy of al-Qasr. The generation of a
•[181] cash economy has created a competitive spirit and a degree of
individual independence which cuts across tribal loyalty and
affiliations. The cooperative society, in this manner, tends
to be a "social equalizer."

657 But economic transformation as the intended goal of the
177 Cooperative Law is far from being an accomplished fact. Al-
178 Qasr is still a traditional Bedouin society in the sense that
474 the lineage structure is the framework in which economic and
*613 social relations take place. Because the cooperative society,
as a new basis for association, threatens the dominance of the
lineage principle, it has become the focal point for a struggle
between the old and new.

The major problem encountered by the government officials
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177 in this program is that the cooperative society, as a central
474 agent for the dispensation of aid products, becomes a pawn in
661 tribal power politics. The government, forced to rely upon the
435 prestigious and wealthy men for the initiation of an innovative
program, found itself unable to prevent profiteering and the

173 that in those days it was important "to have men to go to
*613 war; Hajj 'Ali came from the Sinai with many men and wrote
619
597 his name into the books of Lazumi." Today, in the Lazumi
genealogy Hajj 'Ali's name appears as the brother of Taram,
[114] both are claimed as sons of Mighawsiz. This kind of data is
difficult to uncover and I may have missed gathering other
cases of ideological kinship ties.

*613 The specific unilinear principle which operates in
[171] al-Qasr is partrilineality, common to the Middle Eastern
culture area. A corollary principle is the corporate group.
*613 Together, these two rules structure the social world of the
571 individual and effectively define a range of social choices
for him. The individual's social relations and social roles
are relative to the rights and obligations of the people
related to him through his father. In a sense, the social
world for the individual in al-Qasr is his father's group
and its network of relationships with other similar groups;
he would not think of leaving this group of his own free
will though, in reality, he could. The Bedouins believe
● [181] that a man cannot be happy if he lives with strangers, i.e.,
[829] outside his corporate group. This value holds up today to
the extent that a man will expect his son to return to the
desert even after his education as a merchant, a government
clerk, or an army officer.

Structural differentiation in al-Qasr is not solely

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Her riding booth struck a tree and she found herself stranded there in the tree; her camel had gone and the rest of the caravan noticed nothing and continued on. Then a Marabit passed by and saw her there. He helped her down and they later married. She already had three sons to a former husband: Ali Ahmar, Ali Abyad and Sinaina. The Marabit also had children from another marriage. He was very rich and they could afford to live together. One day thieves began to harrass the man, but when the three Sa'adi sons offered him their help he told them not to bother with the thieves, that they would go away. But they did not, and they continued to harrass the man for a long time. The three sons were still very young at this time. When they grew up they asked the Marabit for arms and horses with which to fight off the thieves. They received them and succeeded in driving off the thieves. The Marabit was very happy and offered the three sons one-half of his wealth, and he was very rich. The sons refused this generous offer saying to the Marabit that they were no different from his other sons and would take only one-tenth of his wealth.

619 The differentiation between the Sa'adi and Marabit has structural consequences only in that it defines psychological types and tends to assign them to certain roles in society. By his [181] psychological make-up, the Marabit, who is weak and retiring, is unfit for the tasks which the Sa'adi undertakes, i.e., war, trade, and politics. It is, nevertheless, expected that the Marabit will act as a support mechanism for the secular operations of the Sa'adi. Usually, this support takes the form of financial contributions.

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675 Each Marabit group is related through contractual agreement to a Sa'adi group. For instance, the Sulwatiyya lineage of al-Qasr are members of the Jumi'at tribe, a Marabit tribe; when identifying themselves they will say

196 only from area to area but also from person to person.

121 In terms of the Bedouin social structure, it is useful
*613 to discuss politics as a set of authority relations operating
571 in a problem-solving situation. This operation takes place
at all levels of the lineage system with the exception of the
sub-tertiary group; below the tertiary group level authority is
purely a function of certain kinship roles. Since we cannot
analytically separate the political aspect of the role "family
head" from the moral aspect of the role "father," it seems
best to designate this type of authority as being something
distinct from political authority. We will call this type
of authority either "familial" or "domestic," and "political
authority" will be considered to exist in cases where there
is some degree of role specialization and role differentiation
with respect to decision-making and problem-solving. As I
conceptualize it, then, the tertiary group is a political
group because it is structurally identified with a corporate
office, or institutionalized role of leadership. At the end
[128] of this chapter, and in the next chapter, I will elaborate
on this because it is a focal point of the study.

121 Structural principles designed to promote integration
571 in a society also shed light on the degree of coercion and
•181 conflict in social "organization." Individuals and groups in
society have interests and values which they seek to maximize
in the face of competition and opposition from other individ-

121 571 181 uals and groups. Radcliffe-Brown (1952:199) spoke of social relations existing where there was "some adjustment of respective interests, by convergence of interest, or by limitation of conflicts that might arise from divergence of interests." When a person or group has an interest in an object, material or immaterial, that object has a certain value for the person or group. Thus does the study of social structure become, for Radcliffe-Brown, "the study of interests and values as the determinants of social relations." Convergence of interests side by side with a divergence of interests characterizes any society, and all societies are segmented on one basis or another. 121 571 I have found it enlightening to consider the segments of al-Qasr Bedouin society as "interest groups." Interest groups are the real groups which one can observe in either integration or conflict. They are real in the sense that their behavior can be observed. They are real in that they can be defined by a stable pattern of authority relations whereas other groups are non-existent in this sense. The tertiary group and the secondary group, in so far as it is a coordination of replicate corporate groups, are real groups in al-Qasr whereas the primary and tribal levels are theoretical or quasi-groups. That is, they are only potentially interest groups, seeing that, for the time being, they lack the common interests and coordinated activity to be classified as an authority, or political, or interest group.

121 moral community, we cannot proceed to a discussion of the
571
554 internal and external systems of political relations.

577 As a result of the socialization process, and through
181 relations with other members of the family, an individual
[867] comes to recognize that his conduct is measurable by certain
standards of, what is considered by the group to be, good and
bad, right and wrong. In al-Qasr, such standards are in-
trinsically correct, or "decent" as the Bedouins say; obedience
to the authority representing these standards is interpreted
as a "duty." The authoritative aspect of the role of household
[596] head (shaib al-bait), and the moral obligations which it repre-
sents, emerge from and reinforce values and structural arrange-
ments central to Bedouin social order, namely, respect for
authority and devotion to social groups, the two basic elements
of morality defined by Durkheim (Parsons 1937:382-385).

577 The value placed upon social order, and the structural
571 mechanisms for insuring its realization and extension--kinship,
181 residence and contract--inform an authority structure which
182 ranges between filial piety at the family level and a set of
legal norms at the level of the external political system.
The fact that the Bedouins of al-Qasr are interested in
integrating a larger population into their authority structure
means that a common value is operative in the range of it;
also that one sphere of authority will tend to merge into another.
[593] Hence the father-son authority relation has importance for
[671] the strength of Bedouin customary law in the desert. The

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182 high value placed upon conformity to rules governing authority relations makes Bedouin society of al-Qasr less individualistic than, for instance, the Iatmul of New Guinea who "set no exaggerated value upon extremely orderly behavior" (Bateson 1958:31). Social cohesion in al-Qasr is sustained through what Durkheim called "mechanical solidarity."

593 The Bedouin father is in a disciplinary position over his washuun, his wife (wives) and his children. (The word, washuun, must be of Berber origin for I am unable to trace it in Arabic.) Although the father has the right to beat his washuun, the Bedouins say that he does so "only in rare cases, when it is necessary." During my time in the field I heard of no physical punishment being dealt out by a father.

The dyadic relationship of father and son roles is the focal field of authority in the family. The pattern of behavior in this relationship is marked typically by restraint on the part of the son. The father orders and the son obeys unquestioningly. If the father accidentally uses a taboo [192] word, such as 'ammar which in standard Arabic means "to fill" but in the Bedouin dialect means "to have sexual intercourse," the son will immediately depart the scene in a high state of embarrassment. In this way, the boy is not only excluded [561] from gatherings and activities in which his father participates, but he is also made to maintain a respectable social distance from his father's age-set. There are other ways of

FIGURE 9 - USE OF MATERNAL APPENDAGE OR SUFFIX

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
WIFE FROM
KAMAILAT
TRIBE
ABD
AL-MALIK
WIFE FROM
QINAISHAT
TRIBE
YUNIS
ABD AL-MALIK
AL-KAMAILIYYA
JABRIL
ABD AL-MALIK
AL-QINAISHIYYA

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The sister's son-mother's brother relationship receives a high degree of attention in al-Qasr. No other kinship relationship except for that between the father and the son is better defined. Peters (1965:135) sees the importance of the sister's son-mother's brother relationship to be based on the need for economic symbiosis. This factor, but also the necessity for political cooperation, probably account for the central significance of this relationship. One chief political value, i.e., one type of behavior valued by the group and relevant to the political process (see LeVine 1960), which Bedouin children learn relates to the desire to avoid conflict, especially if it concerns their mothers' tribes. Children are taught that any quarrel, however slight at first, could conceivably grow to become a large-scale tribal war.

[181]
[867]
[865]

604 182 war.

604 602 182 The Bedouins of al-Qasr are conscious of the practicality of external kinship ties. The role of mother's brother becomes a significant symbol for the maintenance of these ties. Boys are supposed to respect their khal ("mother's brother") in order "to avoid wars which could end the world." The Bedouins claim vehemently that "no quarrel can happen between me and a member of that tribe because my brother has married into that tribe." They make the value ● [181] of the mother's brother link very explicit: "Marriage into other tribes makes quarrels impossible."

604 538 There are many Bedouin proverbs pointing to the place of the mother's brother in the social structure. Proverbs, in any culture, trace out areas of behavior which have become important. Kenneth Burke (1957:256) says of proverbs, that they are "strategies for dealing with situations. In so far as situations are typical and recurrent in a given social structure, people develop names for them and strategies for handling them. Another name for strategies might be attitudes." [829] The Bedouins likewise look upon proverbs as templates for behavior. They say that "we should heed proverbs because they are the words of the elders; they are like a white flag which marks the way, and people should not go beyond these flags."

A most common proverb which elevates the mother's

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> a tradition is not a mere observed fact like an existing custom . . .; it is an idea which expresses a value judgment. A certain way of acting is regarded as right; a certain order or arrangement is held desirable. The maintenance of the tradition is the assertion of this judgment (Radin 1935:63).

121 181 621 571 171

For al-Qasr, I have traced social ideas, social action, and social order to a central traditional value which promotes group consciousness, solidarity, and corporateness. Such a value does not derive from Islam, for Bedouin tradition preceded Islamic tradition, and much of the latter derives from the former. According to Robertson Smith (1903:26-62), the structurally significant unit in pre-Islamic Arabia was the hayy: "a collection of people of the same blood" who lived together and fought together. But, that which actually bound the members with a sense of corporateness to the hayy was the law of blood-revenge. For Smith, the key element in the Bedouin corporate group was the existence of a covenant of blood responsibility. The group was bound by a compact of mutual responsibility, the group had rights in rem over its members, and within the group there could be no blood-feud. Around this idea of mutual responsibility revolve the traditional values which are the basis of corporate grouping in Bedouin society: "The greater part of the traditions of the Arabs turns on blood-revenge and war . . . " (Smith 1903:26).

Smith developed his analysis of Arabian society in terms of certain structural principles: patrilineal ideology,

121 residence, cognatic ties, and contractual relations are all
•181 seen to be structurally important in early Arabian society.
621
571 Structural differentiation into groups is based on the
171 lineage principle and sustained through "the law of blood-revenge." And it is important to note that the *hayy* was characterized by a structure of authority, it was "guided in war and on the march by one chief" (Smith 1903:44). The
121 law of blood-revenge as an expression of group rights *in rem*
621 and a system of mutual protection point up the importance of
571 contractual relations in Bedouin society. Whether or not
675 real blood ties are involved, a contract must be present or there can be no corporate group. Contract legitimizes authority and provides the basis for the lateral extension of the group; it is primary though it functions coordinately with a principle of cognation, residence, adoption, etc. Contractual ties
121 operate outside of kinship at times but will always be validated
621 by it eventually, "for a legal fiction is always adopted to
571
675 reconcile an act with a principle too firmly established to
608 be simply ignored" (Smith 1903:62). "Blood brothers," in
599 al-Qasr, are defined both biologically and ideologically. As
[602] noted in the case of al-Qasr, there were at least three cases of contractual adoption in which one individual and two whole corporate groups "wrote their names into the books of the 'Aishaibat tribe" (*katab jinnsiyya 'Aishaibiyya*). The integration or adoption of elements in al-Qasr takes place on the

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concepts of what is desirable and undesirable. "Every structural arrangement," Raymond Firth has said, "has its moral attributes of obligation" (1961:212). This is most essential in an uncentralized system, such as that of al-Qasr, where no institutions exist outside of the corporate group for the introduction of new principles of organization and association.

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*[613]
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[554]
Among the Bedouins, the conceptualization of an authority structure in the role of 'aqila relates to the high value which they place upon a peaceful and orderly world. Children in al-Qasr are taught that one of their serious duties in life is to mediate conflicts, especially, when they are potentially situations which may lead to protracted conflict. And, in a segmentary society where a member's status links him to many different groups in differing degrees of importance, all quarrels are potential group wars. The Bedouin child knows that his elders, and God, want him to follow "the path of the good" (tariiq al-khair). Mainly, this involves helping others to follow "the path of the good" by "bringing them back together" when they are in conflict. When two individuals quarrel and refuse to return to "the path of the good," this brings 'aib ("shame") to each of the persons. When two individuals quarrel, setting off a group conflict, this brings 'ar ("shame") to the respective corporate groups of the individuals (Abou-Zeid 1966). Against individuals who persist in the ways which cause 'aib to himself, or 'ar to his group,

*[613]
[626]
[784]

181 578 certain sanctions of both a secular and sacred nature may be
577 imposed: expulsion from the group and the curse of God are
626 ultimate coercive interventions in the process of conflict
784 regulation.

*613 The role of _'aqila_ presents the corporate group as
181 "one person" in opposition to other similarly defined groups.
182 Thus, Fortes says (1953:25), "the way a lineage system works
571 depends on the kind of legal institutions found in the society,"
and this is a function of its political organization. The Bedouin political organization is characterized by two aspects: the internal political system, and the external political system. Both systems are regulated by the same values and norms. Authority relations within the corporate level are founded on values inculcated in the socialization process, and prescribe political behavior for all who come under the jurisdiction of the respective _'aqila_. Authority relations outside the corporate level are conducted through the _'aqila_. This political role as a functional part of the lineage structure operates in terms of kinship values; politics at the external level are characterized by no new principles.

*613 Politics in al-Qasr, and elsewhere for that matter, is
571 a process of problem-solving and conflict regulation between
182 individuals and groups. Political action occurs at different
levels of the lineage structure, and each is demarcated as a focus or sphere of authority. But all authority stems from

*613 segment. He acts in concert with other 'awaaqil (plural of
554 'aqila) of the tertiary segments of his secondary group when
571 lineage matters call for decision-making at this level.
*613 Tertiary segments are replicate groups descended from one
571 ancestor, they operate with a common ideology pursuant of
183 common interests and goals. As we shall see, this common
675 ideology is expressed in a kind of code, or contract, which
all members of the group swear to uphold and abide by according
to the principle of blood responsibility. Tertiary codes in
[181] al-Qasr are a reflection and an affirmation of a wider system
of values and norms which bind the Bedouins of the Western
Desert together into a political system. This wider normative
[671] system is expressed in the customary legal system of the
Bedouins known as 'awaiyid Awlad 'Ali ("the customs of the
Awlad 'Ali tribe").

*613 The primary duty attached to the office of 'aqila is
578 the regulation of conflict. It is worth noting here that
571 conflict regulation is not equivalent to conflict resolution.
554 The latter process carries with it the intimation that the
causes of conflict have been treated and resolved, that conflict
has been eliminated. Nothing could be further from the truth
in a segmentary society where the various segments actually
constitute conflict groups; consequently, conflict between
groups or individuals who represent groups may be contained
but never forgotten. Conflict is an ongoing process among

*613
578 the Bedouins. Conflict regulation treats the expressions of
571 social conflict and not its causes.

554 The 'aqila regulates conflict between the members of
his tertiary segment, between this group and the other groups
of the secondary unit, and between secondary units of the
tribe. He operates in both the internal and external systems
*613 of authority relations. The 'aqila may pre-empt the authority
578 of the shaib in the sphere of familial authority, though, the
593 Bedouins say, this seldom happens because the son is willing
554
[596] to obey his father. Having been reared in the culture, and
as a future father himself, the son supports the respect-
*613 discipline principle of Bedouin society. But in extreme cases,
578 such as the threat of a father to disown his son, the explicit
593 approval of the 'aqila, and of all the 'awaaqil of the secondary
428 corporate group, is necessary. This is the procedure in all
554 cases of banishment. In one case (which I document below), a
man disinherited his younger brother with the formal approval
of his 'awaaqil.

*613 The tertiary group in Bedouin society is by definition
682 the blood-vengence group. However, in view of the common
578 values and pragmatic interests of its members, the secondary
•[181] group fulfills this function. Traditionally, when revenge
[681] killings were carried out according to the *lex talionis*, it
was usually at the hand of some member of the victim's tertiary
group. In the case of protracted conflict, such as extended

*613 have noted previously, informants very definitely disagreed
571 over the matter; by looking at the two genealogies one is
178 unable to say one way or the other. The process of fission and fusion in the form of secession and adoption is another instance of genealogical manipulation through patrilineal ideology. In this case, patrilineal ideology also may succeed in concealing real biological links in favor of political relations. We shall see below how secession and adoption actually function in Bedouin society.

*613 We have said that the authority of the _'aqila_ is
675 legitimate at each structural level. The Bedouins of al-Qasr
554 often legitimate the authority of the _'aqila_ in writing, and,
571 at the same time, make an explicit statement of social compact which outlines the pragmatic and moral values of the corporate group. The corporate charter in al-Qasr is a document of self-interest which defines expectations and consequences for corporate members: it governs the conduct of members in situations relevant to internal order, and gives the _'aqila_ powers of representation in external affairs. The charter is a
● [181] reflection of the high value the Bedouins place upon security and order, and is a condition for a legal system of wider
*613 scope. Max Weber (1947:120) has expressed the idea of social
675 relationship as contract so well that it is worthwhile to
571 quote him extensively here.

671 182 648 the Bedouins, the government soon discovered their own error, for they were unable to effectively manage group and tribal political relations: "They (the government) found out that they could not solve murders in the desert. They would arrest the killer but the trouble continued between families (i.e. feuding went on). There were more killings instead of less, and, finally, the government asked us to return to the 'awaiyid because it alone can solve murders in the desert." I was unable to document the claim that the government had "abolished" the 'awaiyid in 1933, but a number of officials who worked at the Governor's Office in Marsa Matruh said that it was true.

671 641 577 571 554 In al-Qasr, and in the Western Desert in general, adherence to law and political order rests upon the conviction that each individual and territorial group have guaranteed rights which are related to honor and property. A violation of any single man's honor or property may easily be interpreted, according to the principle of collective responsibility, as an offense against the rights of a group. And in this sense, legal and moral violations in Bedouin society are relative to the structure of interrelations, and they must be regulated with reference to the various levels of the authority structure.

•181 641 578 571 Bedouins place a high value on political order, but also on the idea that political order can only be guaranteed through a man's willingness "not to allow another to take any

181 of his rights;" a man should be courageous enough to fight
641 for what belongs to him and his family. These values, which
578 become political values in a tribal context, coupled with the
571 idea of self-help make for a political order which is ultimately
based upon the law of blood-revenge and feud. At least this
is the case where the external system of authority relations
578 is concerned. But force as the ultimate mechanism for the
571 establishment of political order is better considered an
182 extreme, and only one of the mechanisms used by the Bedouins
in the process of conflict regulation. The attempt is to
establish a balance of rights, concerning honor and property,
and not to go beyond another's boundaries lest he retaliate.
Force, as a coercive institution, can never be the sole basis
of political structure, as Schapera has shown in the case of
the Bergdama and Bushmen (1956:211-221). Thus the Bedouins
[681] say blood-revenge would be impossible within the secondary
* [613] corporate group; relations this important cannot be based
[682] upon force. In the case of homicide within this group compensation is immediately forthcoming.

571 Also, it has been pointed out that self-help and
672 collective responsibility do not operate indiscriminately.
*613 That is, an individual cannot depend upon the backing of
[578] his group irrespective of his own motivations in a particular
situation which calls for retaliation or threatened the group
with retaliation. Individual responsibility figures in cases

554 571 627 182 ●[181] [556] turns in times of need dealing with financial and personal problems. In view of the value stress which the Bedouins place upon generosity, manifest in the redistributive system of the lineage, the wealth of the rajal khair is the wealth of the community. Wealth divides, not only possessors from non-possessors, but also, seekers after security from power seekers. It is as Peters (1965:145) has noted in Cyrenaica: generosity, not being entirely altruistic, wins repute and repute is an important aspect of political power.

554 682 627 *613 829 In an interview concerning the justice of blood-revenge, there was general agreement that if a man kills intentionally, then blood-revenge must be taken by the murdered man's bait against someone in the murderer's aiela. But one prominent man (a rajal khair) protested that "the best man in the killer's family must not be harmed." This statement generated a rather heated debate. One man said: "The best man should be killed for this is right in the Bedouin type of justice." (This comment was made by a man who is the 'aqila of a low-status lineage in al-Qasr.) The first speaker's reply to the protest was this:

> [178] Nevertheless, it all depends upon the character of the best man . . . if he is evil and on bad terms with your family, then he will be the first one to be killed. But if he is a good man, then you kill the murderer himself . . . You must never kill a rajal khair because he may do good in the future. In the old days, the killing started right away, and all problems were big ones: today there is negotiation--people are improving.

121 advanced" and is assumed "to have authority"; that the "great tradition" is represented in the writings and public actions of the political elite; and that "social prestige is dependent on its adoption (or at least on its profession)" (1962:69). Implicit in von Grunebaum's analysis, and also contained in Redfield's model, is the employment of reference group theory to understand human behavior in society. In
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the al-Qasr case, I have tried to show that "status group" members repudiate many of the traditional ways of life while at the same time identifying more and more with the Egyptian "status group," the bureaucrats of Marsa Matruh. The implication here is that the Bedouin "status group" is in the process of taking on the values of a new reference group to which they do not yet belong but to which they seek admission.

The bureaucrats of Marsa Matruh, like those of Cairo and Alexandria described by von Grunebaum, represent the "great tradition." The "status group" of al-Qasr while aspiring to the "great tradition" emulate certain of the behavioral traits and expectations of the elite group. For [971] instance, they are conspicuous for their regular attendance at Friday mosque services in Matruh. Merton, who has developed reference group theory, points out that "men frequently orient themselves to groups other than their own in shaping their behavior and evaluations" (1957:234). This type of behavior, or "anticipatory socialization," is the process of taking on

121 the values of a non-membership group in order to "find readier
177 acceptance by that group and make an earlier adjustment to
571 it" (Merton 1957:265). In a relatively closed society such as
•181 al-Qasr, when those who qualify for membership in other
reference groups are able to do more than merely aspire, when
they actually anticipate and adjust their behavior to a type
of status consciously desired, the local authority and social
structures are likely to be transformed.

121 We can generalize from the literature on social
571 stratification that the hierarchial structure characteristic
554 of traditional societies carries with it a relationship of
mutual obligation. The "inferior" owes rent, respect, loyalty,
obedience, etc., while the "superior" owes, in return, protection, advice, help in emergency, action in conflict regulation, representation in extralocal matters, etc. (Hagen 1962:
.121 55-86; Parsons 1953: 108). In al-Qasr, the *'aqila* fulfills
554 only one of the functions of the "superior," that which deals
*[613] with conflict regulation. The *rajal khair* role, as I have
[627] developed it, may function in full capacity as a "superior."
121 The *rajal khair* dominates the internal system through power
554 derived from rank on the prestige scale: he is prominent in
627 the external system as member and representative of a new
power structure based on national and political consciousness.
Traditionally, *rajal khair*-dominance was not by force but
through influence and prestige: in the new situation, with a

document statements concerning the substantive law of the society studied, 121
or to abstract and elucidate that law. An example of the first technique 127
is Howell's analysis of the Nuer court decisions (1954) where he collected 671
a large number of court cases, classified them and abstracted the substan- 114
tive aspect of the native law. Gluckman's study of the Lozi (1955) repre-
sents the second technique. Smith and Roberts used the same method of
case analysis to abstract certain principles of the Zuni law (1954), and
Nader utilized it in her study of the Zapotecan law (1964). The list of
those who utilized the case-study approach is quite extensive, and the
range of the societies they studied is quite varied. But most of them
share the interest in the substantive rather than in the procedural aspect
of the law.

When referring to the procedural aspect of the law one should keep 121
in mind the difference between the technical and the abstract components 671
of procedural law. The first refers to the activities and steps involved [627]
in the settlement of disputes in the society as well as the person or body [692]
undertaking the responsibility of such settlement. The second involves a 121
number of abstract principles reflecting the values of the society with re- 181
gard to the goals of the judicial process, and which the judicial persons 671
use as a guide in achieving a settlement or in passing a judgment of one 114
kind or another. These are the bases of judicial reasoning. Although
judicial reasoning represents one of the most interesting and important
aspects of the judicial process, it attracted very little attention among
legal anthropologists. With the exception of Gluckman and his analysis
of the concept of "reasonable man" among the Lozi (1955a), no significant
work has been done in this area. In dealing with the concept of the reason-
able man, Gluckman was more interested in discovering universals in laws
than in the process of judicial reasoning as such. He implied that an

element of reasonableness is a universal principle in any judicial logic. 121
Nadel reacts to Gluckman's implication of the universality of the concept 181
suggesting that it is valid only in certain contexts, and that the cases 671
reported by Gluckman from which he abstracted that concept are minor ones. 114
Nadel maintained that the principle seems inadequate in major crimes such as homicide, witchcraft or assault. "If I am right, the Lozi would, in these situations, discard their guiding fiction of 'reasonable man' for the sharper dichotomy of things simply lawful and unlawful, permitted and forbidden" (1956:162).

METHODOLOGY

One of the characteristics of legal anthropology is the absence of a 121
coherent body of theory that could be utilized in the analysis and inter- 124
pretation of the ethnographic data. What do exist, however, in the area of the ethnography of law are a variety of what may be called "tools of analysis." These are mainly methods and orientations which help to direct the researcher's attention to a certain area of behavior which describes best the phenomenon under study. Their main purpose is to help the researcher isolate particular portions of the phenomenon he is studying and as such enables him to conceptualize the problem. A number of these tools have been employed in the present study. One of these tools is Turner's "social drama" which was employed in the analysis of the political leadership and the judicial process. Since this approach depends upon the intimate knowledge of the sequential development of a given case, or cases, over a period of time, it was quite difficult to employ it in more than that particular context. As will be apparent in the later chapters, the judicial
process among the group is highly informal. Most of the disputes are settled [627]
by means of mediation which is done behind the scene and with a great deal of secrecy.

CHAPTER II

ECOLOGY AND HISTORY

619 Awlad Ali are a number of Arabic-speaking semi-nomadic tribes of
101 sheep and goat herders who inhabit the northern part of the Western
162 Desert of Egypt. The total population of Awlad Ali, according to the
1965 preliminary census, was about 100,000 inhabitants. This estimate is, however, very tentative and fluctuates from one year to the
next, depending on the circumstances of the pasture in the area. The
131 area they occupy consists of the narrow strip of fertile land which extends along the Mediterranean coast from near Alexandria in the east
some 350 miles westward to the U.A.R-Libyan border town of Sallum, and
132 varying in width from ten to thirty miles. Vegetation in the area de-
133 pends on rainfall, supplemented by a number of artesian wells. The
rainy season extends from November to March, but the rain is extremely
erratic in nature, varying from one year to another and from one place
to the next. Draught has been experienced every three to four years,
one of them being experienced at the time of the study. The water situ-
312 ation is further aggravated by the low technological level of the people
● [181] which prevents them from making the best use of the available rain water.
There have been some attempts made to store as much of the rain water
as possible, but these attempts are usually made by individuals and in
too crude and primitive a way to prevent most of the water from being
lost by seepage or by evaporation. The most commonly used method of
water preservation in the area is digging cisterns in the ground. But
most of these cisterns are too shallow to keep large amounts of water.
Some deeper wells are found in the area and are called "beer sama"

137 of country. The whitish soils of the steppe support worts and
[134] other scrub bushes and some drought-resisting trees in the beds
of wadis and they are well covered with annual and perennial
grasses and other plants which yield excellent pasturage in the
[233] springtime. However, except in the Wadi al-Mra, where camels
can be kept the year round, there is little grazing beyond the
line Msus–Bir Tinjidhir–Bir Hakaim.

233 The Bedouin of the forest area are essentially a goat people,
137 though they also keep many sheep and cattle, and it is mostly
through the medium of the goat that the vast natural wealth
of the forests of Cyrenaica is transformed into human wealth.
The animal is hardy and frugal, and has the great merit of
preferring tree and shrub to grass and of being a catholic feeder.
Just as the forest would be useless to the Bedouin without the
goat so the much vaster stretches of steppe would be useless to
them without the sheep and camel which turn its grasses and
233 scrub into food. Thus Cyrenaica is fundamentally a pastoral
[181] country, primarily a country of sheep farming, and its people,
as they say themselves, have the hearts of shepherds and not of
peasants. While agriculture and pastoralism are both practised,
the bias of nature and tradition is towards animal husbandry,
by which the rich vegetation of the country is turned into milk,
butter, meat, wool, hides, and draught and transport.

II

13 In Cyrenaica stand always contrasted the mountain and the
221 plain, the forest and the steppe, the red soils and the white, the
233 region of goats and cows and the region of sheep and camels,
settled life and nomadism.

221 True nomadism is very rare. A few Fawakhir, Minifa, Huta,
233 and other tribal fragments herd only camels, or if they possess
other animals keep them with kinsmen near the plateau, and
can therefore wander pretty well where they please. They may
be found anywhere between the Nile, Fazzan, and the Sudan.
Their spirit is that of an Aulad 'Ali tribesman who said to me:
'We call no place our home. It is wherever there is grass and
water.' Semi-nomads are numerous. Those with land on the
[241] plateau cultivate there, then graze southwards, and return
again to the plateau in the dry season to water their flocks.

3:Evans-Pritchard E-4, 5 (1942-1944) 1949 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9
(1837-1942) Sanusi

[p.62]

CHAPTER III

THE SANUSIYA AND THE TRIBES

I

793 WHEN the Grand Sanusi came to preach in Cyrenaica he found
619 the kind of society I have outlined: a congeries of tribes without law or effective government, for the Turks had little control
over the interior, but with like values and habits and a community of life which crossed tribal boundaries. The Bedouin to
[181] whom he preached were simple people living the austere and
monotonous life of the tents, with that savage character which
has been so often portrayed, but also with those noble qualities
which have seldom failed to evoke admiration from those who
[177] have lived among them. They were profoundly ignorant about
the outside world and also—which is what touched the heart of
[797] the Grand Sanusi—about the faith of their fathers, and to this
matter I must now return, since the Sanusiya was a missionary
Order and can only be understood as such.

771 Though the Bedouin professed Islam before the Grand Sanusi
influenced them by his teaching, they were almost totally
[797] ignorant of its doctrinal content, rites, or ritual and moral
duties, and it is safe to assume that they did not obey its precepts. It is safe to assume this because even to-day, after a
century of Sanusiya instruction, the Bedouin perform their
religious duties in a very perfunctory way, if at all, and when
Muslim law is at variance with tribal custom they follow tribal
custom. In saying that they are lax, I do not suggest that they
[186] are not very sincere, Muslims. They are proud of being Muslims
and consider themselves greatly superior to Christians, while
they are contemptuous of Jews. Nevertheless, though they
would not belittle, the Cyrenaican Bedouin feel no embarrassment at neglecting, the duties obligatory on every Muslim.
The Confession of Faith is known to all and implicitly accepted
by all. It imposes no irksome restrictions or tiresome duties.
But they almost completely neglect—I speak of the more
[782] nomadic sections whom I know best, but it is probably true of
most Cyrenaican Bedouin—their daily prayers, a duty which is

account of the Italian invasion of Tripolitania. Realizing that 195*
they were helpless without Sanusiya support not only in the 648*
Sahara but also in Libya, since they would not be able without 795*
command of the sea to reinforce their garrisons there, the Turks showed themselves anxious to win over Sayyid Ahmad al-Sharif by also conferring on him new privileges. In 1910 the Governor of Banghazi proposed to make him a monthly grant of 4,000 Piastres, and the Governor of Tripoli sent a telegram in cipher to his representatives in various parts of Tripolitania asking them whether they thought the Sanusiya Order powerful enough to warrant additional privileges, which was apparently the view of Istanbul. His representatives, judging by its lesser influence in Tripolitania, where it never gained the unanimous support it received in Cyrenaica, reported that in their opinion the political importance of the Order had been exaggerated.[1]

Such of these events as were known to Italian observers 175*
shortly before and in the early stages of their war with Turkey 648*
led them to false conclusions because the complexity of Arab 181 •
sentiments was not appreciated. The structure of Bedouin 186
society is such that whatever the size of the group a man con- 619
siders himself to belong to in any situation, he is in virtue of his
loyalty to it opposed to other groups of like order in the tribal [613]
structure. He is loyal to his *bait* against other *biyut*, to his *'aila* against other *'ailat*, and to his *qabila* against other *qabail*. Nevertheless, he has a strong feeling of communion with all the Bedouin of his country, regardless of their tribal affiliations, in common opposition to the towns. But Bedouin and citizen are both Arab and they made common cause against the Turks, especially when the activities of the 'Young Turks' forced Turk and Arab into rival camps. But even Arab and Turk shared wider loyalties in their regard—unequal, it is true, but still shared—for the Sultanate and for Islam and they reacted in spontaneous accord against threats from Christian Powers, the French advance in the Sahara and the Italian invasion of Libya. Against Christians and Europeans Arabs and Turks were no longer Arabs and Turks but Muslims, just as against the Turks Bedouin and citizens were no longer Bedouin and citizens but Arabs, and against the towns tribesmen were no longer members of different tribes but a Bedouin community.

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[1] Macaluso, op. cit., pp. 88–90, and Serra, op. cit., p. 37.

+175 *648 [128] the changes in the legal status of the Arabs of Cyrenaica during those years and how the lands of the Bedouin were confiscated to provide farms for Italian colonists. In the final section of the book I give a résumé of events leading up to what is, I hope, the threshold of Cyrenaican independence.

The Italians detested the Bedouin. Long years of campaigning against guerrilla bands had irritated them more than governments are usually irritated by Bedouin and made them increasingly flamboyant and brutal. In the whole Italian literature on Cyrenaica I have not read a sentence of understanding of Romany values. Because they lived in tents without most of the goods the peasant, and even more the townsman, regard as signs of civilization the Italians spoke of them as barbarians, little better than beasts, and treated them accordingly. The arguments they used to justify their treatment of them have a familiar ring.

[181] Graziani has described the Bedouin in his usual uncompromising language and his opinions were doubtless shared by most army officers and government officials:

> 'Anarchist, lover of the most complete liberty and independence, intolerant of any restraint, headstrong, ignorant, unconquerable and boastful (*bluffista*) hero, it is sufficient that he possesses a rifle and a horse; he often masks, under the pretence of the necessity of moving his tent, the desire of gaining the end of withdrawing himself from every governmental contact and control.'

And again:

[181]

> 'Rebellious against every tie of discipline, used to wandering in territories often immense and solitary, bold in mobility and ease of movement, bemused by the fascination of independence, always ready for war and raiding, the nomads have always resisted every governmental restraint.'[1]

Graziani was a plain-spoken soldier. When the conquest phase of colonization had passed and it was no longer fashionable to believe in naked *refoulement*, administrators found it expedient to express themselves more temperately. The soldier-politician Badoglio, in his directive to subordinates in Libya for the year 1933, forbade further talk of '*ribelli*'. The war, the rebellion as it had been called, was over and the past must be forgotten in a

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[1] Op. cit., pp. 119–20.

*175 *648 Italians had more leisure to devote to breaking up tribal life altogether.

[619] The final decree of the Fascists affecting Arab status was issued in 1939. It incorporated Tripolitania and Cyrenaica within the Kingdom of Italy, and to quiet any dismay this might cause among the Effendiya of the towns it offered them certain privileges, mostly nominal. The decree in no way affected the Bedouin. Indeed very little of the unceasing flow of legislation which poured from the Italian bureaucrats and lawyers in the form of Laws, Royal-Decrees, Royal-Law-Decrees, Ministerial Decrees, and Governatorial Decrees affected the Bedouin. The vast majority of these rules and regulations in no way touched their lives and they remained in blissful ignorance of their content. They had little or no money, they settled their own cases with the aid of their Shaikhs and religious teachers, they made their own trading arrangements, they provided their own labour, and so on. Where a law affected them it could often be eluded or circumvented. As the Bedouin [181] themselves say, '*Sama' min gher ta'a*', 'To hear without obeying', is one of their chief characteristics. The Italians in any case, sitting comfortably in their offices and entirely out of touch with the people, relied on their Cyrenaican police and minor officials to report breaches of regulations, and if they did not choose to do so, the law became a dead letter. Also it cannot be assumed that because there were regulations great efforts were always made to enforce them. 'The gap between the letter of the law and daily practice, wide in all countries, becomes an abyss in Italy.'[1]

With all their regulations and petty interference the Italians were most careful not to offend Arab opinion in religious matters. From the moment of their invasion of Libya they vociferated their respect for Arab custom, culture, and religion. Thus the Minister Bertolini said to the Arabs in a discourse at Tripoli in 1914: 'We will respect your religion and your customs; we know the splendour with which your civilization has already illumined the world and we do not intend in any way to threaten it. . . .'[2] The Italians prided themselves on their Islamic policy and claimed that as a result of it and of their justice and of their

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[1] James Meenan, *The Italian Corporative System*, 1944, p. 340.

[2] Mondaini, op. cit., pp. 327–8.

reason in three families of one tribe paying together, while 682
the fourth is independent. Sometimes this is caused by 621
geographical separation, at other times by personal animosity or jealousy.

The main difference between the rules of the Western 682
Desert and Sinai is that in the West reprisals taken at the 171
discretion of an aggrieved individual are not recognised as [670]
lawful, and are distinctly discouraged. Generally speaking, [181]
the Western Bedou is a very much more prosperous and
law-abiding person than the Sinai Arab, although at the
same time he retains his charm as a primitive and independent being. Occasionally a dastardly murder takes 682
place, but public opinion is very strong not only against the 674
murderer personally, but against all the members of his [626]
family, who automatically share his unpopularity.

In the spring of 1920 an old man, reputed to possess considerable wealth, both in camels and sheep and also in gold buried in the ground, was returning about mid-day from market riding his donkey, and one of his numerous grown-up sons was walking on foot beside him. After going four or five miles in the open desert, the old man got off his donkey, and told his son to ride for a little way while he walked. The son suddenly attacked his old father and hit him with the heavy stick he was carrying; and the poor old man died almost at once with a broken skull. There was nobody about, and the son dragged his father's body about a hundred yards, and threw it down an old dried-up cistern; then, mounting his donkey, he rode home to dinner.

That afternoon the local sheikh was told of the old man's disappearance, and as he had seen father and son leaving the market together, he had his suspicions. He traced their footsteps, picking up the tracks of a heavily laden donkey and one man walking, from near the entrance to the market place. Then, following along carefully on these tracks, he saw where the old man had dismounted. Then he saw a spot of blood and the place where the

Had the Senussi been successful in the last war, they 175
would no doubt have brought in the 'Ibeidat or the 'Awaqir 619
from Cyrenaica to replace the Awlad 'Ali in Egypt.

At the present day the Awlad 'Ali, especially the eastern 619
sections near the Nile Valley, have almost ceased to be nomadic, 178
and only the old men have memories of their former warlike
habits. They suffered considerably during the Great War,
but are again becoming prosperous. They now own large
comfortable tents, are beginning to build houses and clear
out cisterns, and are also said to be increasing in numbers.[1]
So civilized have they grown that my guides, one a Sinai
Arab and the other an 'Abadi, concurred in calling them
"green"—not real desert-worthy Bedouins.

Perhaps as a result of Libyan influence, or more probably 142
the better nurture and climate, they are taller, heavier, stronger,
and lighter-complexioned than the lightly built Arabs of
Sinai and Hijaz. Also they are much franker and more 157
straightforward than their shifty and suspicious eastern cousins, 181
and altogether more trustworthy. Their women only veil 562
themselves to strangers, and talk quite naturally and cheerfully 834
to the men of their own tribe. 609

They cultivate as much barley as they can, using a 243
primitive plough drawn by camels, in the clayey hollows [492]
scattered over their very stony limestone desert, but, as the [132]
rainfall is very uncertain, a good crop only occurs every five
or six years. After harvest, they exchange some of their [437]
barley for maize, which the women grind to make bread
as required, and some for dried dates. The seed for next [251]
year is buried in a hole lined with straw and covered with
clay, and a year's forage for the animals is set aside. The [432]
rest of the crop goes to market, and for a short time the
Arab has money to buy clothes for himself and his family [426]
and at utmost need to pay off some of the numerous debts he
has inherited from his forefathers. Soon he is reduced again
to the clothes he wears, the tent he sleeps in, and his animals
grazing in the desert.

They are great breeders of camels and sheep, and a busy 436
traffic in these goes on weekly in the markets of Hammam, 178
'Amriya, and the Beheira. So they have got into the habit [illegible]

---

[1] At the 1927 census, the Western Desert Arabs, Awlad 'Ali, Jawabis, etc., numbered
38,928 souls exclusive of those settled in Beheira. But Pacho, 100 years ago, estimated them
at 38,000 souls. [161]

436 178 of thinking in money, and they reckon blood-money in cash (£300) and not in camels, as Bedouin should.

484 245 The more adventurous make, annually, long and waterless journeys to the oases of Siwa and Bahariya to remove the date crop, and, after their own wants are provided for, a good profit usually results from the sale of the remainder.

● 181 An Egyptian critic, who should know them only too well,[1] calls them "haughty, independent, and untrustworthy in character. They are dull and so abnormally lazy that they have no desire whatever to do more than they learnt (when young)". But he puts this down to the nature of the country; less generous critics ascribe the nature of the country to them!

173 619 Besides the descendants from 'Ali's three sons, 'Ali el-Abyad, 'Ali el-Ahmar, and Sineina, a large section called Sinaqra reckons its descent from Sinqir, a mysterious white man who was wrecked and washed up on the coast near Salum some time in the seventeenth century.[2] These are the true Awlad 'Ali, whose sections live mingled together in the most intricate fashion. Among them live also the Jumei'at, who invited them into the country, and various families of other *murabitin*, such as Qat'an, Awlad Suleiman, Hawara, Habun, etc. 619 To distinguish themselves from their vassals, the Awlad 'Ali call themselves *hurr* free, and the *murabitin* are divided into various grades, according as they pay tribute or not.

The Awlad 'Ali are divided into three main divisions, with section (*badanat*) and subsections (*'eilat*) as follows. Some of these are so numerous that they practically constitute fresh tribes of their own.

I. Awlad Kharuf

[173] These are the descendants of 'Ali el-Abyad ("The White"), the eldest son of 'Ali bin 'Aqar bin Dib, and are subdivided again into:

	Section.	*Subsections.*
(1)	'Eilet Bu Hindi	'Eilet Bu Zayyana, 'Eilet Bahiya, 'Eilet Da'ud
(2)	'Eilet Bu Diya	'Eilet Ibrahim, 'Eilet Jereisat
(3)	Awlad Mansur	El-Afrad, El-Tawa'il, 'Eilet 'Abd Allah

---

[1] Muhammad Bey Wasfi, for many years Inspector at Borg el-'Arab.

[2] Their sheikh told Hamilton in 1853, there were seven generations between him and Sinqir.

619 [175] [162] later Wilkinson estimated them at about 400 men near El Terrana and the Wadi Natrun.

At the present day they are still reckoned *Murabitin*, but, like the Jumei'at, are sufficiently independent not to have to [439] pay tribute. They share with the Awlad 'Ali in the date traffic with Bahariya Oasis, where the produce of the village of Mandisha is reserved for them, and that from Bawitti for the Awlad 'Ali.

619 682 181 Kennett notes (p. 54) that they demand £400 for blood-money instead of £300, the usual price in the Western Desert, and alludes (p. 67) to :

> "The free and easy way in which the Gawabees tribe near the Wadi Natrun pack up their summer tents and leave them in situ while they themselves trek off with their winter tents into the open desert for the winter grazing is indicative of this code of honesty prevailing among them."

142 619 On page 101, he calls them "nearly all very small men, with strangely similar features and characteristics running through all the families of the tribe".

619 173 Bramly has collected three pedigrees of the tribe all going back to Sheikh 'Abd el-Jawad el-Kassar. They state that they are an offshoot from the Qadadfa, and about 500 years ago left Saqiet el-Hamra in Morocco to settle in Egypt.

As a reward for "settling some affairs in the Wadi Natrun", Muhammad 'Ali Pasha granted them the usual Bedouin privilege of exemption from military service. There are small colonies of them elsewhere among the Awlad Ali, while others are settled in the cultivated provinces of Giza, Beheira, Menufiya, and Gharbiya.

Jumei'at.—This tribe, possibly a remnant of the original Libyan inhabitants of Mariut, is of quite respectable antiquity, for Ibn Khaldun includes the Jumei'at as a subtribe of "Beni 'Ali", themselves an offshoot from Beni Suleim. Whether his "Beni 'Ali" are the same as the modern Awlad 'Ali may be questioned, yet it is a reasonable assumption, for the exchange of the words "Beni" and "Awlad" in tribal names can be paralleled elsewhere.

The Jumei'at all agree that their remote ancestor, whom they share with the Awlad Suleiman and the Qat'an, was called Ka'b, and a Ka'b indeed appears in the pedigree ascribed

175 with one move, the Caliph sent these Bedouins into battle in order to enforce authority in his western Berber provinces. This order set in motion the great "Hilali invasion." The tribesmen of Banu Hilal and Banu Sulaim literally slashed their way across eastern North Africa laying waste to towns and fields as they went (Ibn Khaldun 1925:29; Brockelmann 1939: 204).

175
648 especially in Libya. Between the years 1052 and 1054, these maraudin nomads sacked the rich agricultural lands of Tripolitania and Tunisia, lands which had been in production since the time of the Romans (Mahdi 1964:21). The Banu Sulaim, according to Ibn Khaldun (1925:136), concentrated their action in an area from Alexandria to Tripolitania. It was over this region, which includes Cyrenaica in eastern Libya, that they established their rule. Ibn Khaldun states that the two tribes agreed to divide the conquered territory between them, the eastern lands going to the Banu Sulaim and the western lands to the Banu

175 Hilal (1925:33-34). Such a division of territorial rights in
571 Arab Bedouin society is representative of a set of authority
182 relationships. Differentiation in the locus of authority,
*[613] whether it be horizontal or hierarchical, is a method of
maintaining political order among segments of the lineage
structure.

175 Evans-Pritchard states that the Cyrenaican Bedouins
114 are descendants of the Banu Sulaim and represent an admixture
619

175 the Bedouins of the Hijaz area. This Sanusi success aroused
795 the jealousy and animosities of the orthodox *'ulama* ("clergy")
[798] of the Mecca area. Al-Sanusi was forced to flee the Arabian
[793] peninsula, and in 1843 he founded his first *zawiya* ("lodge"),
[346] *al-zawiya al-baida*, in Cyrenaica. The Sanusi doctrine was as
acceptable to the Bedouins of Cyrenaica as it had been to the
[793] tribes of the Hijaz. The person and teachings of *al-Sanusi
al-kabir* ("the grand Sanusi"), as he came to be known, fit
into the "holy man" religious tradition of Cyrenaica and even
spread beyond into the Sudan and Lake Chad area. The Order
showed primary concern for the people of the desert: the
[793] Sanusi *shaikh* ("holy man") cared for the poor, and the *zawiya*
[346] became rest stops, storehouses, and religious centers where
[485] Bedouin children were taught their Quranic lessons. Through
[794] the *zawiya*, the Sanusiyya became a political and economic
175 integrating factor in the desert, and al-Sanusi became the
795 legitimate authority of the Bedouins. The *zawiya* became a
346 very important part of the traditional desert economic system.
•182
[793]
Today one *zawiya* remains near al-Qasr but it is scarcely used. The Bedouins say: "Before, when Alexandria was far away by camel, we could get what we wanted at the *zawiya*. Now that we have trucks and trains no one goes to the *zawiya*."

175 The fortunes of the Bedouin became linked with those
795 of the Order. When the Sanusi became involved in full-scale
648 conflict with the Italian colonial power, the Bedouins bore

173 land along the coast: "This land was free, and the man who
[361] planted on it owned it. We call this (method of claiming land)
[425] *wad'a-l-id* ("laying on of the hand," i.e. seizure). There was
[423] plenty of freedom in those days. A man could farm or keep
animals." Planting and caring for the land is not novel to
the Bedouins of al-Qasr.

423 The Bedouins claim that the pattern of land distribution
425 established during the time of Abu Mahjuba prevails today.
656 Further, they say that these rules will never change, no matter
[178] what laws come out of Cairo: "Land registration can mean nothing
where the tribes are concerned, for no Bedouin would be willing
to take the land of another Bedouin. The government forces us
to register our land so that it can be stated in the news-
paper that they are giving the Bedouins land."

*613 The relationship between ecology and lineage territory
423 is not striking, such as in the case of the Cyrenaican Bedouins
•182 of Libya (Peters 1960). In most cases, lineage territories run
on a north-south line cross-cutting the coastal garden and
southern pastoral zones. Hence, lineage territories are, generally, ecologically similar rather than contrasted. However,
*613 there are exceptions. 'Ailit Shraif lineage (see Figure 3a
423 below), at the western end of al-Qasr's *'izba* sector, settled
182 there "because of the abundance of underground water in this
241
[312] area: the ground is rocky here and the water comes out fresh
[361] like the Nile." Their founder, Sayyid Shraif, "specialized"

*613 in farming, and he found this land "good for raising mint and
423 vegetables." To the southeast of the *'izba*, the lineages of
•182 Lazumi and Ma'fas found the land suitable for barley and
241
[312] grazing. This area is rain-fed. There are no wells and so
vegetable crops are not possible here. The members of these
lineages say that their ancestors were "real" Bedouins in
Cyrenaica, and did not wish to become farmers in Egypt. It
*613 is interesting to note that the Lazumi and Ma'fas are the
182 richest lineages in all of al-Qasr. They were, perhaps, better
184
241 able to maintain the traditional style of life which all of
the Bedouins claim is "the best." But all Bedouins of al-Qasr
depend to some degree upon horticulture or arboriculture.
[231] And most families own a few sheep or goats. Both Lazumi and
Ma'fas garden in their coastal sections, and Shraif members own
sheep.

656 Land registration has a history in the Western Desert.
423 The government attempted it a number of times, but with little
success until 1959 when the General Desert Development Organization (GDDO) undertook its program of land reclamation. But the
361 Bedouins were settled long before this. In al-Qasr, the Bedouins
342
178 began to erect permanent stone dwellings on the land about the
time of the First World War. In the Matruh area, elder informants
agree that before 1914 the Bedouins lived in tents outside the
361 town area. When the British came, they began to move into town.
648 Many of the Bedouins built houses in Matruh between the years

428 562 inherited by a woman's daughters. The carpets and the tent,
[422] which are woven by women, are not their property to pass on
for they belong to the head of the household, the shaib.

596 Economic change in al-Qasr has had its impact at the
177 level of production mode, and, also, it has affected the
178 composition of the basic family structure. One informant,
[124] who is now nineteen years old, remembers growing up in a
household composed of his grandfather, father, father's
brothers and their families. Since that time, his father
has built another house away from the family home; one uncle
has moved to Marsa Matruh and opened a shop there; his
youngest uncle has built a house not far from the family home;
and one uncle remains with his three wives in the original
•182 house. This fission-type process is not uncommon in a seg-
177 mentary society, although as a traditional process, it
*613 represented a mechanism for dealing with ecological pressures.
433 In the modern case, in al-Qasr, the process of fission in the
434 Bedouin social structure proves to be an adaptive mechanism
also: the fragmentation of lineage property and relations is
a positive condition for the transition to a cash and market
economy. Among most of the families of al-Qasr, as market
orientation increases brothers begin to economically differ-
entiate their tasks and interests with an eye to individual
profits.

121 571 554 moral community, we cannot proceed to a discussion of the internal and external systems of political relations.

577 181 [867] As a result of the socialization process, and through relations with other members of the family, an individual comes to recognize that his conduct is measurable by certain standards of, what is considered by the group to be, good and bad, right and wrong. In al-Qasr, such standards are intrinsically correct, or "decent" as the Bedouins say; obedience to the authority representing these standards is interpreted as a "duty." [596] The authoritative aspect of the role of household head (shaib al-bait), and the moral obligations which it represents, emerge from and reinforce values and structural arrangements central to Bedouin social order, namely, respect for authority and devotion to social groups, the two basic elements of morality defined by Durkheim (Parsons 1937:382-385).

577 571 181 182 The value placed upon social order, and the structural mechanisms for insuring its realization and extension--kinship, residence and contract--inform an authority structure which ranges between filial piety at the family level and a set of legal norms at the level of the external political system. The fact that the Bedouins of al-Qasr are interested in integrating a larger population into their authority structure means that a common value is operative in the range of it; also that one sphere of authority will tend to merge into another. [593] [671] Hence the father-son authority relation has importance for the strength of Bedouin customary law in the desert. The

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181
182 high value placed upon conformity to rules governing authority relations makes Bedouin society of al-Qasr less individualistic than, for instance, the Iatmul of New Guinea who "set no exaggerated value upon extremely orderly behavior" (Bateson 1958:31). Social cohesion in al-Qasr is sustained through what Durkheim called "mechanical solidarity."

593 The Bedouin father is in a disciplinary position over his *washuun*, his wife (wives) and his children. (The word, *washuun*, must be of Berber origin for I am unable to trace it in Arabic.) Although the father has the right to beat his *washuun*, the Bedouins say that he does so "only in rare cases, when it is necessary." During my time in the field I heard of no physical punishment being dealt out by a father.

The dyadic relationship of father and son roles is the focal field of authority in the family. The pattern of behavior in this relationship is marked typically by restraint on the part of the son. The father orders and the son obeys unquestioningly. If the father accidentally uses a taboo [192] word, such as *'ammar* which in standard Arabic means "to fill" but in the Bedouin dialect means "to have sexual intercourse," the son will immediately depart the scene in a high state of embarrassment. In this way, the boy is not only excluded [561] from gatherings and activities in which his father participates, but he is also made to maintain a respectable social distance from his father's age-set. There are other ways of

582 "parallel cousin" (i.e. bint 'amm) is perfectly interchangeable
114 with the term "parallel-cousin once removed" (i.e. bint ibn
196 'amm, "daughter of the father's brother's son"). After I
[124] had familiarized myself with the genealogies of al-Qasr, I
began to realize that many of my informants were using the
term bint 'amm to refer to the parallel-cousin once, twice,
or even thrice removed. When I pointed this out to one of the
Bedouins, he replied: "So what, there is nothing forbidden
about this type of marriage." Table 5 shows that this is
582 indeed the case. There are a number of cultural ideals
183 which influence the practice of marriage in al-Qasr: endo-
182 gamy is encouraged because it cements and intensifies corpor-
ate ties; exogamy is desired because it widens the web of
kinship; men prefer younger women to older women and may
utilize their cousin-right privilege to realize this preference.

582 The Bedouins of al-Qasr define the bint 'amm over a
829 wide range. One informant said that "all of the girls of the
Awlad 'Ali tribe are my bint 'amm, we are all one." Another
said to me, that "any girl of the 'Ali Ahmar is a man's bint
'amm." And yet another informed me that "a man of the
Qinaishat tribe will reserve his daughter for me before he
will give her to an outsider." Ideologically, a bint 'amm
seemed to be anything except the father's brother's daughter.
This is quite convenient for the Bedouins because an ideological
concept can be placed anywhere along the scale of actuality

582 depending upon the needs of the situation.

829 But one is able to differentiate between the various 582 meanings of bint 'amm in al-Qasr. First of all, the Bedouins 196 make an initial dichotomy between the bint 'amm daira (daira = *613 "homeland") and the bint 'amm shaqiiqa (shaqiiqa = "full sister"). The first term refers to any girl within the primary level of segmentation, i.e., the 'Aishaibat, and the latter term refers to the actual father's brother's daughter. Any marriage within the secondary group, i.e., 'Ailit Ma'fas, is referred to simply as a bint 'amm marriage--even if it is really a bint ibn 'amm marriage. A man has an actual moral claim upon his bint 'amm shaqiiqa: such a marriage is an agreement between their fathers who are brothers. A man cannot claim his bint 'amm daira but he might assume that if she is not claimed by her father's brother's son (ibn 'amm), his claim will be favored over that of an outsider.

582 The differentiation between these two types of cousin role is made in terms of rights and obligations which define social relations in al-Qasr. Social action is based upon these expectations of behavior. In al-Qasr, a man really does claim his bint 'amm shaqiiqa. If his claim is thwarted, he will attempt to do something about it, and whatever the consequences, his group is committed to back him in this [182] matter. Parallel-cousin marriage may be an important basis [578] for integration, or it may be the cause of bitter conflict.

582 [584] she could marry no man.

582 Most of the older Bedouins say that bint 'amm marriage
578 as it is practiced in the desert is an evil, that it causes
nothing but trouble. They say that if there are bad feelings
between two men they will place claims upon each other's
sister with the intention of preventing the girls from ever
marrying. The younger Bedouins say that "it is better to
marry the bint 'amm than to let a stranger take her." The
● [182] claim on the bint 'amm, of course, should be seen as a basis
[571] for social relationships between groups, regardless of any
[586] conflict it may or may not lead to. This is why the Bedouins
say that a man "will never divorce his bint 'amm, because if
he does that means that she is no good." It follows, then,
that if "she is no good" none of her other paternal cousins
will marry her. Implicit here is the reference to the making
[182] and breaking of group ties. Similarly, to regulate and to
maximize kinship ties, a man can claim only one of his
father's brother's daughters. In the case where there is
only one bint 'amm, her eldest cousin has first claim to her.
582 This sometimes causes conflict between brothers as the fol-
578 lowing informant's story indicates.
159

> The father of Salih and Aziz was dead which meant that Aziz, being the elder, would have to furnish the brideprice if Salih were to marry first. In fact, Salih wanted to marry his bint 'amm. Aziz refused him permission to do so: Aziz had first claim to the bint 'amm, and, also, he thought that the brideprice which

582 578 159 her father was asking was too high. Salih was angry, so angry that he swore to kill any man who tried to take his bint 'amm. He went away to the Nile Valley to earn enough money to pay the high brideprice. In the meantime, the cousin of the brothers came and paid Aziz for the permission to marry the girl. Salih returned, but, of course, he could not kill his own paternal cousin. He became ill and went into a sleep which lasted for three days. Salih had always been known for his powerful voice but when he awoke he had a very weak voice. Salih never spoke to his brother again. He died seven years ago without every marrying.

582 578 829 [182] This story has aprocryphal aspects which announce this to be an important issue in Bedouin culture. The subject of parallel-cousin marriage is a complex one surrounded by controversy and contradiction. The older Bedouins say that the practice is a source of conflict, but they will usually insist that at least one of their sons marry his bint 'amm to insure the corporate link with the brother. In support of their complaints, they say that bint 'amm marriage is not morally sanctioned: "We do not like it and it is not right. But if we try to stop our sons from taking their cousins they will put a gun on their shoulder and go after her." On the other hand, this is contrasted with the complaints of the elders that their sons no longer respect their marriage habits, that they are marrying anyone these days: "Our sons resent the bint 'amm marriage because it is an agreement between fathers." 582 While I was in the field, three marriages took place; one was with the bint 'amm, and the other two were outside the secondary group but within the primary group, i.e., inter-lineage.

585 [684] probably by pricking himself, and will wipe it on the toga.

585 606 [574] About two weeks after the wedding, the bride and groom take a lamb or a goat and go to spend a few days with the bride's parents. The Bedouin say that the relationship between the groom and his in-laws is extremely important. The man should treat his wife's mother and father as if they were his own. "When a man's father-in-law and mother-in-law come to visit him, he must slaughter a lamb for them. He must respect both of them. Remember, this man and woman are the grandparents of his children."

585 571 182 [574] [431] [782] *[613] The marriage, then, is only the first step in the ritualization of new group bonds established between the families of the bride and groom. Bonds are subsequently intensified through a process of visitation, gift-exchange and sacrifice. The most important factor linking the two groups is the actual presence of the bride in the midst of her husband's group, for she remains, in terms of the patrilineal principle, a member of her father's lineage. 585 *613 551 571 182 [193] This is made perfectly clear by the fact that she is referred to, never by her name but, by the name of her tribal grouping if she is other than 'Aishaibi. If she is of the 'Aishaibat tribe, she will be referred to as bint of so-and-so. Hence the Bedouins stress the importance of extra-group bonds by referring to the women in their residence group as al-Qinaishiyya or al-Kamailiyya, for instance (-iyya is the Arabic feminine marker).

182 marker).

*613
551
571
[585] In al-Qasr, if a man's mother is 'Aishaibiiya, he will refer to her as ummi ("my mother"): if she is otherwise, he will refer to her by the tribal tag, i.e. al-Qinaishiyya. A man will also add the name of his mother's tribe, to identify himself with the tribe and to symbolize tribal links, as an appendage to his own full name. The use of the maternal appendage by an individual links him to his mother's tribe through the idea of what Peters (1960:29) has called "the concept of the one womb of maternal origin."

In the case of al-Qasr, this maternal appendage refers to links with the mother's tribe at the primary level (see Figure 9). For instance, two brothers of the Bait Abd al-Malik might wish to differentiate between their maternal origins for some reason or other; one would refer to himself as Yunis Abd al-Malik al-Kamailiyya and, the other as Jabril Abd al-Malik al-Qinaishiyya. This is shown in Figure 9, page 125.

*613
604
[182] Although a person is obviously related to the mother's tribe through the mother, this matrilateral structural relationship is expressed as one between the individual and his mother's brother's tribe. The set of relationships surrounding the sister's son-mother's brother dyad is central to Bedouin political organization; it is the basis for the formation of relations of alliance along cognatic lines.

● 182
*613
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FIGURE 9 - USE OF MATERNAL APPENDAGE OR SUFFIX


WIFE FROM KAMAILAT TRIBE
ABD AL-MALIK
WIFE FROM QINAISHAT TRIBE
YUNIS ABD AL-MALIK AL-KAMAILIYYA
JABRIL ABD AL-MALIK AL-QINAISHIYYA

604
182 The sister's son-mother's brother relationship receives a high degree of attention in al-Qasr. No other kinship relationship except for that between the father and the son is better defined. Peters (1965:135) sees the importance of the sister's son-mother's brother relationship to be based on the need for economic symbiosis. This factor, but also the necessity for political cooperation, probably account for the central significance of this relationship. One chief political value, i.e., one type of behavior valued by the group and relevant to the political process (see LeVine 1960), which Bedouin children learn relates to the desire to avoid conflict, especially if it concerns their mothers' tribes. Children are taught that any quarrel, however slight at first, could conceivably grow to become a large-scale tribal war.

[181]
[867]
[865]

604
•182 war.

The Bedouins of al-Qasr are conscious of the practicality of external kinship ties. The role of mother's brother becomes a significant symbol for the maintenance of these ties. Boys are supposed to respect their khal ("mother's brother") in order "to avoid wars which could end the world." The Bedouins claim vehemently that "no quarrel can happen between me and a member of that tribe because my brother has married into that tribe." They make the value of the mother's brother link very explicit: "Marriage into other tribes makes quarrels impossible."

604 602 182 [181]

There are many Bedouin proverbs pointing to the place of the mother's brother in the social structure. Proverbs, in any culture, trace out areas of behavior which have become important. Kenneth Burke (1957:256) says of proverbs, that they are "strategies for dealing with situations. In so far as situations are typical and recurrent in a given social structure, people develop names for them and strategies for handling them. Another name for strategies might be attitudes." The Bedouins likewise look upon proverbs as templates for behavior. They say that "we should heed proverbs because they are the words of the elders; they are like a white flag which marks the way, and people should not go beyond these flags."

604 538 [829]

A most common proverb which elevates the mother's

5

604
538 brother to special place in the social structure states that
[539] "Two-thirds of the boy belongs to the khal, and he is like the
father: the remaining one-third is divided equally between
the father and the khal." The Bedouins are always quick to
point out to the stranger, such as I was, that this means
there is only one-sixth of the boy which belongs to the
father. A clearer case of the ideology of kinship versus
[539] descent could not be had. Another proverb has it that "the
good which you see in a boy comes from khal khalu ("the
maternal uncle of his maternal uncle"). Any kinship relation
may be the basis for a new network of social relations by
making use of the classificatory principle. The Bedouins
[539] exaggerate the status and role of the mother's brother by
saying that "when a boy does good or bad, one wants to know
the name of his khal not the name of his father." This
statement, which favors cognatic links over patrilineal ties,
is not true but such an attempt at emphasis indicates that
this relationship is something of value in the Bedouin society.

604 In the case of any conflict "between his tribes," the
578 Bedouins say, "the boy must support the tribe of his khal."
This, of course, does not mean that the individual should
take up arms against his patrilineal corporate group, but
562 that he should seek to mediate the conflict. The political
593 value of conflict avoidance and conflict control is also
554 conspicuous in the dual role which the mature female plays
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562 593 in Bedouin society, that is, the role of wife-daughter. The
554 principles of patrilineality and cognation do not work against
182 each other when the girl marries outside her corporate group,
578 nor does her new dual role present a case of role conflict.
562 593 On the contrary, the wife-daughter role functions to bind together
554 182 two groups which are structurally differentiated by
578 the rule of patrilineality. During time of peace, the wife-daughter
*613 acts as a bond-maker by carrying gifts back and
[431] forth between the two groups, often bringing some of her
[628] [574] younger patrilineal relatives back to her husband's house or
562 tent for short visits. During a time of conflict or war, the
593 Bedouins point out, she is the only person who can cross the
554 battle lines unharmed. She is a match-maker as well as a
[726] peace-maker. Often she influences the selection of mates by
[584] individuals in both her husband's group and her father's
562 group. The Bedouins say that "after the bint 'amm, a man
593 should marry his bint khal ("mother's brother's daughter")
554 because she is like his bint 'amm." Usually, over a period
582 of a few generations, a given direction in marriage is sustained
(see Figure 10), and it is one function of this wife-daughter
role to accomplish this important political action.

562 The role of wife-daughter, then, may be seen as one
593 554 important aspect of what Fortes (1953:33) calls, "complementary
*613 filiation," the essential mechanism which provides the
182 link between the corporate groups of al-Qasr society and the
kin groups of the parent who does not determine descent.

000 kin groups of the parent who does not determine descent. A
182 corollary aspect of the filiation principle in al-Qasr is the
601 practice of collaterally extending the term, khal, to include
602 many others besides the real mother's brother. This usage
604 [114] of classificatory terminology, like that in the case of bint
'amm, leads to confusion for the fieldworker. When an in-
601 dividual marries into an outside group, or even within the
604 secondary group, the wife's brother becomes khal not only to
561 182 the offspring of the marriage, but to all the children (awlad)
at the same generation level as the offspring. All boys of
the age of sister's son will refer to his mother's brother
as khali ("my mother's brother"). Besides extending the web
of kinship, this practice also has the function of uniting
age-mates of the local descent group.

604 582 [829] Throughout this discussion of mother's brother, I have been stressing the fact that the sentiment which a Bedouin develops toward this person is to be construed as a political value, i.e., a behavioral disposition relevant to the political process. It is patent then that the sister's son-mother's brother relationship should be more crucial in exogamous marriages, for in these cases cognation becomes the principal mechanism for establishing authority relations and effecting political alliance. In endogamous marriages, cognation complements the other structural principles which define the corporate group, and makes it the corporate group par excellence.

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*613 Naturally, according to the rule of patriliny, all children from a marriage belong to the husband and become members of his lineage. Should divorce occur while a woman is nursing, she will take the child with her and it will be returned after weaning. Sometimes the husband will permit the wife to keep one child--always a girl--in order "to keep her company."

587 The practice of the sororate has been noted. The Bedouins also believe that "a man should marry his brother's widow so that she will have someone to help her with the children." But I have no data on the frequencies of these
12 practices. When I gathered my data on marriage, my informants
58 would give me only the name of the tribe or lineage into which a man married, and never did I get the name of a man's wife.
[829] (One lineage in al-Qasr, entirely refused to give me data on genealogy or marriage because, as one leader said, "it is not decent to speak of these things with people.") Sororal
595 polygny is forbidden (Quran IV:23), and the Bedouins say that a man cannot marry more than one bint 'amm. Marriage
•182 practices, such as sororate and levirate, I interpret as
[587] patterns which maintain structural continuity and political advantage.
[582] The custom of permitting a man to marry only one of his father's brother's daughters may be seen as a precaution against intensifying authority relations and the degree of segmentation.

*613 decision-making which allocates values in society. This
621 process orders the internal and external political relations
571 of corporation members. The corporate office which acts to
regulate internal affairs, and to represent the group in
external affairs is a unique status in al-Qasr having only
one incumbent at a time. In Bedouin society, then, the
corporation is to be considered distinct from the corporate
sole (Smith 1966).

621 The corporate group, although based on common interests
626 and values, is not an integrated body simply in terms of
571 consensus. Coercion also maintains corporate relationships.
[183] Consensus derives from the code of the group (Nadel 1951:
161), a set of common ideals. But in practice, the group
must exert coercive pressures, sanctions, against individual
behavior which threatens the welfare of the collectivity.
Coercion may be seen as a necessary condition for what Durk-
heim called "mechanical solidarity." In al-Qasr, as in most
societies, the desire for conformity to norms predicates
coercive measures; coercion and consensus derive from the
same cause, i.e., the requirement of some degree of integra-
621 tion. The corporate group and its authority structure is the
571 mechanism which insures, through political means, the neces-
•182 sary degree of integration for the survival of al-Qasr
(121) society. In order to understand the phenomenon of social
change occurring in al-Qasr, politics as an aspect of culture

621 571 ●182 121 should be thought of as an adaptive mechanism. This will help us to understand two structural features of the Bedouin political system: the establishment of cognatic alliances and the differentiation of political roles. In tradition and modernity, the integration and the survival of the Bedouin social system have depended upon the proliferation of these features.

121 621 571 [626] It is quite obvious that "a corporation can only form itself on the basis of a common interest" (Radcliffe-Brown 1952:45); that any social relationship, or political group is characterized by both "pragmatic contents" and "moral aspects;" and that "political sentiments" as part of the group's moral and legal norms are enforcible by secular sanctions brought to bear on individuals or groups (Fortes
121 and Evans-Pritchard 1940:20). But the discovery of what underlies a "common interest," "moral aspect," and "political sentiment" is a subtle problem which varies from culture to culture. It deals with what Weber referred to as "problems of meaning," and ultimately, the legitimation of the normative system. What makes morality and sentiments meaningful and sanctions legitimate is a value, a connecting element between the social and cultural systems, "the constitutive symbolism which grounds the identity and solidarity of the community" (Parsons 1966:17). It is unlikely that such a value will ever be obvious, no matter how essential it is, because

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578 certain sanctions of both a secular and sacred nature may be
577 imposed: expulsion from the group and the curse of God are
626 ultimate coercive interventions in the process of conflict
784 regulation.

*613 The role of 'aqila presents the corporate group as
181 "one person" in opposition to other similarly defined groups.
182 Thus, Fortes says (1953:25), "the way a lineage system works
571 depends on the kind of legal institutions found in the society," and this is a function of its political organization. The Bedouin political organization is characterized by two aspects: the internal political system, and the external political system. Both systems are regulated by the same values and norms. Authority relations within the corporate level are founded on values inculcated in the socialization process, and prescribe political behavior for all who come under the jurisdiction of the respective 'aqila. Authority relations outside the corporate level are conducted through the 'aqila. This political role as a functional part of the lineage structure operates in terms of kinship values; politics at the external level are characterized by no new principles.

*613 Politics in al-Qasr, and elsewhere for that matter, is
571 a process of problem-solving and conflict regulation between
182 individuals and groups. Political action occurs at different levels of the lineage structure, and each is demarcated as a focus or sphere of authority. But all authority stems from

*613 571 •182 the central value and traditional institution of _'aqila_ which has always existed and is still binding. All authority is referable in some way and in varying degrees to the office of _'aqila_ which alone represents "the legitimate exercise of imperative control" (Weber 1947:153). Because private interests clash with the duties and obligations of social roles and corporate interests, political action, or the exercise of authority and the regulation of conflict, may be assigned to levels of
128 the social structure and analyzed in this way. In this chapter we have discussed the social structure of al-Qasr, and have touched on what gives structure and meaning to political action. We have seen that the structure of authority operating through the office of _'aqila_ deals with both an internal and an external system of political relations, a corporate group and a societal unit. The purpose of the following discussion will be to make clear some of the abstractions and concepts used here in outlinging structure and authority in Bedouin society.

69 been infrequent in al-Qasr. The *'awaaqil* of al-Qasr and the
648 police of al-Qasr have an agreement that Bedouin problems are
the jurisdiction of the desert leaders, and that the police
will intervene only when their help is requested. The
Bedouins claim that in the 1930's, the Egyptians tried to do
away with Bedouin law but soon discovered their own penal code
to be inoperative in the desert. Against "outsiders," the
609 69 Bedouin is duty bound to protect his kinsmen, and hence justice
could not be satisfied. One *'aqila* said that "only the *'awaiyid*
*613 *Awlad 'Ali* can maintain order because it stops wars through
682 •182 payment of blood-money." If a Bedouin, for some reason or
692 other, takes his case to the police in Matruh, he will be
648 returned to his *'aqila*; he will be told that they can do
*613 nothing for him without the permission of his *'aqila*. There
are exceptions to this rule which complicate modern Bedouin
692 judicial procedure. For instance, in cases which involve
685 government property, such as olive trees and government-
648 operated water systems, a man may legitimately deal with the
*613 police. In one case in al-Qasr, a man's goats destroyed a
number of his neighbor's olive trees. The police decided that
the owner of the goats should pay the value of the trees. In
another case, a man who had constructed small earth dikes in
such a way that rain water was prevented from flowing onto
his neighbor's land was forced against his will to remove the
obstruction. His neighbor had taken his complaint to the

600 to possess the wisdom which it takes to regulate conflict.
*613 Theoretically, as one _'aqila_ said, conflict should be stopped
578 at the familial level, either by the father or the paternal
593 uncle, and should never reach the level of the _'aqila_. Once
[604] before the _'aqila_, conflict assumes new structural poses, or
different orientation in authority relations. Authority here
is differentiated in terms of the context: the father's authority
relates to the familial structural level, and beyond this
level the father _per se_ cannot exercise legitimate authority.
*613 The _'aqila_, who is responsible for internal order and external
578 relations exercises legitimate authority at each level of the
•182 political structure. The authority of the _'aqila_ is checked
and prevented from growing into naked power in that any single
'aqila must consult with the other _'awaaqil_ of the secondary
segment concerning matters which may concern the structural
nature and continuity of the group.

*613 In many respects, the authority structure in al-Qasr
559 corresponds to that defined for the Lugbara of Uganda
571 (Middleton 1960). The structural levels (see Figure 7 above)
171 of 'Ailit Ma'fas (secondary), Bait 'Umar (tertiary), and 'Ait
Abd al-Malik (sub-tertiary) are approximately equivalent to
Middleton's major, minor, and minimal lineages (1960:7-9). But
[596] whereas among the Lugbara authority roles are purely kinship
roles, i.e., genealogically senior heads are responsible for
internal control and representation, among the Bedouins of

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the conversion of small authority groups into larger ones. Political order depends upon this convergence of principles and the affirmation of the values and institutions which the principles imply. [182] In turn, the resulting political organization helps to maintain the "body of interconnected moral and legal norms" (Fortes and Evans-Pritchard 1940:20).

When blood-money is paid out, all of the tertiary groups contribute an equal share. When blood-money is received, the group of the killed man receives one-half of the diiya and the remainder is divided equally among the members of the secondary group. The distribution of blood-money was explained as follows:

> The one-half of the diiya which goes to the murdered man's bait belongs to his sons. If the man was not married and had no sons, then the money goes to his brothers or those closely related to him (bi-dam), like his uncles or paternal cousins. If the man was married and had only daughters, and they had no brothers, these females can claim the diiya only if they are married to someone in the tribe. (Here the word tribe refers to the secondary lineage group.) If they are married to someone from outside the tribe, the female will take no money because her husband will not contribute to the next diiya in the tribe.

This is the ideal situation. But blood-money distribution is relative to the level at which conflict takes place, i.e., depending upon the nature of the relationship between the authority groups concerned. For instance, it means a great deal if the groups concerned are of the same secondary segment.

175 671 177 for legal interpretation. For instance: "We are also told by Yahya that (the Caliph) Mu'awiya ibn Sufian said that a wound on the body should be assessed at half the value of that wound on the head or face" (1935:324). 671 177 Maliki law, derived in large part from the Bedouin traditions of Arabia, may be seen to characterize the legal norms of the tribal-based social structure in the Western Desert. [428] [562] The Bedouins of al-Qasr themselves claim that they are within the bounds of Islamic Law when they deny the female the right to inherit, though they do have other, and more secular, justifications for the practice.

671 •182 648 As we have already noted, in the above quote from the "holy man" of al-Qasr, the Bedouins feel that the 'awaiyid can succeed where governmental law will fail. They say that "the government does not understand the problems of the Bedouins," that "government troops cannot function in the desert." They feel that they need the 'awaiyid for the sake of political order itself: "If the Bedouins did not have the 'awaiyid, they would eat each other. The 'awaiyid is so important that a man who commits a wrong in town will lie to the government, and then dutifully return to the tribe for Bedouin justice."

[656] In 1933, the government "abolished" the 'awaiyid and insisted that the Bedouins settle their difference in the civil courts in accord with Egyptian law. According to

671 182 648 the Bedouins, the government soon discovered their own error, for they were unable to effectively manage group and tribal political relations: "They (the government) found out that they could not solve murders in the desert. They would arrest the killer but the trouble continued between families (i.e. feuding went on). There were more killings instead of less, and, finally, the government asked us to return to the 'awaiyid because it alone can solve murders in the desert." I was unable to document the claim that the government had "abolished" the 'awaiyid in 1933, but a number of officials who worked at the Governor's Office in Marsa Matruh said that it was true.

671 641 577 571 554 In al-Qasr, and in the Western Desert in general, adherence to law and political order rests upon the conviction that each individual and territorial group have guaranteed rights which are related to honor and property. A violation of any single man's honor or property may easily be interpreted, according to the principle of collective responsibility, as an offense against the rights of a group. And in this sense, legal and moral violations in Bedouin society are relative to the structure of interrelations, and they must be regulated with reference to the various levels of the authority structure.

181 641 578 571 Bedouins place a high value on political order, but also on the idea that political order can only be guaranteed through a man's willingness "not to allow another to take any

181 of his rights;" a man should be courageous enough to fight
641 for what belongs to him and his family. These values, which
578
571 become political values in a tribal context, coupled with the
idea of self-help make for a political order which is ultimately
based upon the law of blood-revenge and feud. At least this
is the case where the external system of authority relations
578 is concerned. But force as the ultimate mechanism for the
571 establishment of political order is better considered an
• 182 extreme, and only one of the mechanisms used by the Bedouins
in the process of conflict regulation. The attempt is to
establish a balance of rights, concerning honor and property,
and not to go beyond another's boundaries lest he retaliate.
Force, as a coercive institution, can never be the sole basis
of political structure, as Schapera has shown in the case of
the Bergdama and Bushmen (1956:211-221). Thus the Bedouins
[681] say blood-revenge would be impossible within the secondary
* [613] corporate group; relations this important cannot be based
[682] upon force. In the case of homicide within this group compensation is immediately forthcoming.

571 Also, it has been pointed out that self-help and
672 collective responsibility do not operate indiscriminately.
* 613 That is, an individual cannot depend upon the backing of
[578] his group irrespective of his own motivations in a particular
situation which calls for retaliation or threatened the group
with retaliation. Individual responsibility figures in cases

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672 other than those dealing with blood-revenge too. For instance,
*613 in matters concerning personal debts incurred, the group is
571 not responsible for the individual. The Bedouins say that if
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*613 a man has the money he must repay his debts: if he does not
426 have the money, then he must ask a rich relative to pay his
debts for him. He is then in debt to his relative and, out
of respect for him, should not borrow money or go into debt
[558] again. If he does, he will bring dishonor ('ar) to his
[681] family and they will, ultimately, banish him. There was dis-
682 agreement among my informants as to whether or not they
*613 should contribute to a diiya which was compensation for an
829 intentional slaying. Some said that they would not question
124 the motives of their kinsman who has killed because "we are
together in the good and the bad, and I must pay for him
just as he must pay for me." But others held the opinion,
which I feel was a prevailing one, that one must take into
account the justifiability of the killing. This seems to
have been the case in the past, for the Bedouins say that
traditionally the bait of the killer had to pay one-half
of the diiya.

*613 All things political somehow relate to the payment
682 of blood-money. We have seen that the essential function
681 of the 'aqila, and even the condition of his taking office,
•182
571 refers to the responsibility of collecting the diiya from
the members of his group. The criterion of being a member

*613 of the group, of joining a new group, or of becoming a man,
682 all refer to the notion of sharing in the payment of the *diiya*.
681 All obligations and sanctions which carry the force of law in
•182 Bedouin society also are directly related to compensation and
571 retaliation. Weber (1954:110) has stated the general case:
"The *wergilt* debt as set by the judge was the most ancient
debt and all forms of obligation have derived from it."
[171] Evans-Pritchard (1940:171) has stated the particular case:
" . . . Nuer law, in so far as it applies to a study of
political relations, must be treated in connexion with the
blood-feud." The blood-feud and the *diiya* are institutions by
which authority groups interact and political order is main-
681 tained. Blood-revenge, or the threat that it may take place
578 and spread, is a most serious sanction in the Bedouin political
682 system. Of the twenty-two cases of conflict in al-Qasr about
which I have good details, nine of these deal with homicide
or attempted homicide, and thirteen involve quarrels over
rights to land, water, and women which could have led to
violence had not arbitration succeeded. In fact, seven of
the nine cases of personal injury began over property rights.

*613 Rules regarding the *diiya* in Bedouin society apply
682 at all levels of the lineage structure. This seems important
to note for it points up an unusual degree of autonomous
authority at the tertiary level. Research on segmentary
societies has often stressed the fact that compensation is

*613 778 •182 682 The nazaala as a regulatory mechanism functions only between secondary segments. This indicates that blood-revenge as a negative sanction is operative only in the external system of political relations. Political relations at this level, where the feeling of corporateness is relatively lacking, are in delicate balance. Therefore, once conflict is successfully mediated and the injury redressed, it is best forgotten, for it is unlikely that either party feels their rights have been completely restored.

683 Sanctions against personal injury, besides killing, are dealt out in terms of fines, the fines being figured as proportions of the diiya. Every part of the body has a price on it: the Bedouins say, "Banu Adam kill-i-filuus" ("The sons of Adam are all money"). A proportion of the diiya is due for injury to any of the following parts of the body: the beard, hair on the head and the nape of the neck, and eyelashes; wounds to any part of the body; fractures and dislocations of bones; the tongue and the teeth; the testicles and the breasts; and the loss of mind. Bodily injuries are [463] evaluated by a considered expert, the nathaara ("the keen-eyed one"). [305] If the services of a nathaara become necessary in al-Qasr, the barber in Marsa Matruh (the same person who performs most of the Bedouins' circumcisions) fills the role. [178] But the Bedouins say, "Now that we are educated we are able to make our own evaluations."

685 I was in al-Qasr, and each party to the conflict hired
578 Egyptian lawyers in Marsa Matruh to represent them. As one
648 litigant in this case told me: "The Bedouins prefer to settle
their own land disputes because the government's way of
handling these things costs money and long periods of waiting."

69 The notion of jurisprudence in tribal cultures, in
121 general, seems to be one which concentrates on the restoration
578 of a disturbed balance rather than one concerned with formality
and procedure. To a great extent, this is true in the Bedouin
case also. However, the absence of institutionalized ways of
dealing with conflict is more characteristic of the internal
*613 system of political relations. Conflict within the secondary
578 segment, we have noticed, may be regulated at the familial
[593] level of authority by the shaib, or one acting in his place:
[596] it is hoped by the Bedouins that quarrels never become serious
enough to prompt intervention by the 'aqila. On the other
hand, the 'aqila, as a legitimate representative of his
authority group, will almost always become involved in conflict
regulation falling within the sphere of external political
relations, i.e., conflict between secondary, primary, or tribal
segments.

The 'aqila as the most effective mechanism of social
*613 control has become institutionalized through time in Bedouin
578
•182 society. At the interactional level of secondary lineage
group relations, conflict may easily expand into feuding or,

*613 ultimately, all-out warfare: the role of _'aqila_ is most
578 critical at this level. Abou-Zeid (1966:259) has suggested
•182 an explanation for the delicate balance of political relations which exists between secondary lineage groups. He thinks that

[577]
> . . . in the segmentary society of the Bedouin of the Western Desert . . . honour has played, and still plays, a most vital role in the field of social control, besides providing an effective code of morality . . . A slight offence inflicted against a lineage . . . is taken as an unfavorable humiliation requiring immediate retaliation to wipe out the shame, regain honour, and restore the same relations as formerly between the groups.

682 Homicide and wounding cases, which usually develop over con-
683 flicting claims to land or water rights, are most prone to
578 lead to grand-scale conflict. Thus the _'aqila_ will always
*613 mediate and adjudicate these cases whereas he will not necessarily intervene in those cases involving tertiary groups where appeals to moral solidarity and kinship unity may succeed in restoring relations. It is difficult to muster evidence for this contention since conflict between tertiary groups is more of a private matter than it is public, and, once settled, such conflict is not likely to be discussed, or even admitted.

*613 Most of my details on conflict regulation and the
578 judicial process in al-Qasr involve political action between
619 secondary or primary groups, eighteen of the twenty-two cases
681 in fact. Of the nine cases dealing with personal injury (eight

695 below will show how a "bad oath" can work directly on the
784 false witness.

784 Divine sanctions enter into other aspects of the
626 Bedouin judicial process and function to maintain social
626 control in al-Qasr. If we can speak of a standard, or
681 minimal sanction, in Bedouin law it would be the dhabiiha
and 10 L.E. In any case, however small the offence might
be, the litigant found to be in the wrong will have this
judgment made against him. But in almost every case "the
[788] party who takes his rights" will refuse the dhabiiha and
[292] 10 L.E. and insist instead upon a ritual three cups of tea.
An individual refuses the dhabiiha as an act of brotherhood
and thanksgiving that the quarrel has been settled. The
Bedouins point out the practical factor that very few men
in al-Qasr can afford to part with even one lamb. On the
626 other hand, in more serious cases, such as homicide, which
681 occur in the external sphere of political relations and
682 threaten to disintegrate the political community, the parties
264 involved will actually eat a whole meal together. In this
case, the dhabiiha is accepted, for the act of commensality
is deemed necessary for reconciliation.

626 But whether or not conflict is concluded by a simple
182 ritual or a large feast, the prevailing mood is one of
771 gratitude that the secular bonds of brotherhood and a pre-
ordained sacred order have been maintained. The Bedouin

626 process of conflict regulation is ritually sanctioned and
182 the political order sacralized in a public way at the conclusion
771 of litigation when the parties involved and the
'aqila read the *Fatiha* (the first *sura* of the Quran). For
671 the Bedouins, the *'awaiyid* is the enactment of the word of
771 God, and the man who follows the *'awaiyid* follows the commandments
771 of God. One *'aqila* speaking of the final authority which
776 directs Bedouin society said this:
577

> God knows all things. God made the world and gave man a brain with which to think. Therefore, he gave man two choices: the good, and the bad. If a man follows the good, he does not steal, kill, or lie. God gave us Muhammad the Messenger, and he taught the ignorant to follow the word of God. You are an educated man, and so you must choose the good path and follow it. I do not read but I follow the Quran.

577 It follows, then, that "the good man" represents an
183 important Bedouin cultural ideal which is legitimated by
771 reference to the sacred. The practice of this ideal leads
[829] to "the good society." Another *'aqila*, in reply to my
question concerning the definition of a "good man," answered:

> A good man should follow God, and through this he will be a perfect man because such a man could make no mistakes. You could find no better person than this. The good man fasts, prays, makes the pilgrimage, and helps the poor. He avoids stealing and lying; these are the most important things to avoid . . . All men aim to do good. Some men think that they are doing good, but they cannot tell good from bad: this is the origin of badness . . . A man aims to do good so that the Arabs will thank him for it. The Arabs (i.e. the man's fellow Bedouins) will say that he is doing good and that he is following the good path.

681 675 charters of Bedouin society, the rawaabit al-'awaaqil and
671 the 'awaiyid Awlad 'Ali. Again, following Radcliffe-Brown
121 (1952:212-219), sanctions expressed in al-Qasr may be con-
681 sidered civil as opposed to criminal sanctions since, even in
682 the case of intentional homicide, the emphasis is upon resti-
•182 tution and the restoration of the "good society" rather than
[671] upon punishment. The Bedouin legal system is one which deals
with private delicts, and which depends upon secondary social
sanctions and ritual sanctions for the arbitration and settle-
ment of disputes.

121 Since neither a dichotamy between private and public
681 delicts nor a differential distribution of authority at the
various levels of the lineage structure obtain in the uncentralized political system of the Bedouins, political action and type of sanction will be described in terms of whether or not they occur in the internal political system of the secondary or domestic group, or in the external system where interaction between secondary, primary, or tribal segments takes place.

The most striking difference between the two systems of political action rests with the fact that the lex talionis, retaliation regulated by custom, does not operate within the
121 secondary group. In the two cases of killing between tertiary
681 groups of 'Ailit Ma'fas and 'Ailit Lazumi already given, com-
682 pensation was immediately paid: the incidents were both
* [613] settled and "forgotten." In conflict situations arising in the

121 external system, however, the law recognizes retaliation, a
681 life for a life. Still, even in this case, Bedouin values
682 [182] expressed through the 'awaiyid try to avert bloodshed and
[671] feuding by showing "the good path" and providing the means
for settlement through compensation.

Just as the Bedouin accepts the 'awaiyid as a set of
681 682 of ideals calculated to regulate conflict, he paradoxically
182 claims the right to impose retaliatory sanctions as a just
[671] conclusion to conflict. One Bedouin said that the greatest
[673] sin which a man or group can commit is to accept the diiya
and then take his blood-revenge and return the money. Presumably, a person or group commits no outrage if they refuse
the diiya with the understanding that blood-revenge will be
[626] taken. In al-Qasr, retaliation and the 'awaiyid are mechanisms
[671] of social control and dispute settlement. A political office
* [613] exists, i.e. the 'aqila which functions over the total range
[692] of political action, and the process of adjudication and
compensation in the form of indemnity payment represents an
institutionalized alternative to retaliation. In all cases
of dispute, ritual or religious sanctions back up social
[776] sanctions. God is a third party to all conflict, and this is
[695] made manifest in the reading of the Fatiha or the oath-taking
128 ceremony. In order to describe how authority and sanctions
68 operate in Bedouin society, a number of examples are presented
[124] below. Some of the cases are the statements of informants about
[114]

128 68 what happened; some of them are my translations of legal documents
[124] which informants permitted me to see; a few of the cases
[114] happened while I was in the field and represent my reporting
of what happened. I have arbitrarily divided the cases into
those involving personal injury and those concerning property
rights. In each case, I indicate at which level of the authority
structure the conflict and settlement has taken place.

Legal Cases Pertaining to Personal Injury

578 Two cases of killing have been discussed previously.
681 Below are a number of cases dealing with personal injury which
occurred in the external political system at the various levels
of segmentation. The first three cases involve conflict
* [613] between secondary lineage segments of the 'Aishaibat tribe;
[619] the next two cases take place at the primary and sub-tribal
[648] levels, but note that secondary segments are the actual functioning
units involved; the final case, an unusual one, deals with
conflict with "foreigners" at the tribal level. Note that the
* [613] '_aqila_ as a corporate representative is active in these cases.
• [182] The third case presented below is a translation of an actual
[778] document showing how the _nazaala_ (discussed above) functions
as a formal mechanism of conflict regulation.

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that they had received their rights in this case. And the two parties are satisfied by this according to the witnesses present.

Signatures or seals of four witnesses.

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The next case represents the only time in the memory of informants that all of the _'awaaqil_ of the 'Ali Ahmar met to intervene in a case of conflict. This case is extremely unusual because it may be the only time in Awlad 'Ali history that political mobilization of this scale has taken place. As noted, political action, in war or peace, usually involves only secondary segments. In view of this, the case probably reflects an instance of social change: the Egyptian government, anxious to maintain good relations with Libya, encouraged and facilitated the settlement of this dispute by furnishing transportation and cutting administrative red tape so that the _'awaaqil_ of the 'Ali Ahmar could handle this case in a most expeditious way. Here is a case where Bedouin traditional political structures function adequately in the modern situation. Note here also that, in certain circumstances, the _diiya_ payment can be divided symbolically and specifically to place guilt and to indicate the seriousness of a crime.

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Date: 1963. Case: Quarrel between the tribe of 'Ali Ahmar (Egypt) and the Harabi (Libya) concerning murder. A young boy of 'Ailit X was visiting his sister in Libya. He learned

682 the *diiya*: the Qinaishat paid 50 L.E., the Kamailat paid
578 50 L.E., but the 'Aishaibat, the tribe of the killer paid
619 600 L.E. Of the 600 L.E. paid by the 'Aishaibat it was
*613 distributed as follows: 'Ailit Lazumi and "Ailit Ma'fas each
paid 100 L.E. because they are rich; 'Ailit Dawlat paid only
30 L.E. because they are poor, and each pays according to their
means. The *'aiela* of the killer, although they are poor, had
to pay 70 L.E., and the *bait* of the killer had to pay 300 L.E.
All paid according to their means, except the killer's *bait*.
This was a special case, it never happened before and will
never happen again and this is why the killer's *bait* had to
pay more. The killer's *bait* was very poor, so what they did
not have they had to beg from the richer families of the tribe.

Legal Cases Pertaining to Property Rights

423 *613 In general, property in al-Qasr is owned either by an
individual or by a tertiary group; seldom, in these days, is
423 property held by the secondary lineage group. If we followed
*613 classic segmentary lineage theory, seeing that the tribal
•182 political structure and the *'awaiyid* are still functionally
[671] intact, we might suppose that land and water possession are
rights in usufruct and not of ownership. The Bedouins themselves insist that the rights to land and water are rights of
ownership. They state that all of the lineage-owned land,
with few exceptions, was parcelled out to tertiary groups a

423 long time ago. This seems to be supported by the evidence
*613 shown below, for often conflict over land and water rights is
• 182 represented by litigation between individuals and not groups.
(691)

422 I have arbitrarily assigned to the classification of
562 property rights the rights over women. I have done this
*613 because a man acquires such rights as a member of a lineage
jural group and secures them with the backing of public opinion
and the _'awaiyid_. Also, though a man in al-Qasr does not
"own" his wife, he does have the legal rights to certain things
related to her: he has the right to her sexual favors, and the
right to claim her offspring for his own lineage.

685 Settlement in cases dealing with the infringement of
695 property rights, if they do not lead to personal injury cases,
will usually be concluded by arbitration or oath-taking, either
of which brings the two parties into agreement.

691 _Date: 1964_. Case: Quarrel between Bait 'Umran and Bait Idris
685 of 'Ailit Ma'fas over the ownership of a well. The _'awaaqil_
*613 sent for the two parties involved, and they met on Wednesday,
578 market day. And the _'awaaqil_ told the two parties: "This is
692 a shame (_'aib_), you must be friends because you are from the
same tribe." The _'awaaqil_ knew "from past history and from
truthful elders" that the well belonged to 'Ait Idris. The
'awaaqil made 'Ait 'Umran change their minds about their claim
(695) to the well. Before the litigation 'Ait 'Umran had insisted

554 It would be considered "wrong" for the members of
571 [577] this group to present themselves at an al-Qasr wedding party,
[585] or the annual celebration held in honor of a local saint of
[796] the area. When I inquired about the conspicuous absence of
[124] some of my chief informants from such gatherings, I was told
[431] that "they will send their gifts," or that "it is not decent
554 that they come to something such as this." In terms of
571 Bedouin social structure, there are a number of plausible
•182 explanations for this "status separation." Fathers should
561 [593] not attend public affairs at which their sons may be "performing,"
i.e., young men should be allowed to play a public
role outside the confines of the father-son authority
structure. By virtue of the extension of the father role,
and its corresponding authoritarian attitude, every member
of the elder age-set commands certain rights and obligations
which would prevent the free expression that is the hallmark
of Bedouin parties. Conversely, and at the more general
level, members of the "status group" who wish to remain
members of this circle accept certain restrictions on social
[114] intercourse. At the five different Bedouin "parties" which
I attended, there were "elders" present, but none of them
could be classified as members of the "status group." Bedouins
plainly state that elders should not attend parties, but, on
the other hand, they show much more concern and emotion when
they say that a member of the "status group" should not "be

554 seen" at any such function. It would appear that the mechanism
571 at work here is not simply a device to provide the younger
182 generation with a tension-release situation, but also a
561 symbolic expression of the difference between the possessors
[154] and the non-possessors of authority, a confirmation of the
political order.

[578] The avoidance practice, or separation, between the
old and the young in the "party" situation is a structural
fact of Bedouin society, and, though it may ultimately be
defined as a conflict control or legitimating mechanism, in
the context of culture change new aspects and meanings attach
554 to the phenomenon. The "status group" is an agent of change
571 in al-Qasr; its members can afford to gamble in the market
178 economy of Marsa Matruh since they possess the reserve capital
[471] (in the form of sheep) and the social prestige which permits
[439] this. The "status group," with business and social relations
[177] in Marsa Matruh, enjoys both the benefits of associational
ties with the Egyptians and the communal ties with their
fellow Bedouins. They see themselves as being different from
their fellow tribesmen, and they tend to face more towards
Marsa Matruh than al-Qasr. In short, they are the "cultural
brokers" who support an ideology of change, they extol the
benefits of a new way of life over and against the old.

[789] One repudiation of tradition which constitutes an
[796] attempt to define the style of life of the "status group"

554 process of nazaala, the third party prevents feuds. In this
571) sense, the third party is a legitimate moral and political
627 influence, but not formalized to the degree as that of the
*[613] 'aqila. A discussion of the authority structure in al-Qasr, then, requires that the allocation of authoritative action in terms of the loci, or roles, of political influence be designated.

[792] The central place of the third party role in the Bedouin political structure is manifested in the many laudable terms which refer to it: rajal khair ("good man") is the most general and often used referent; rajal saalih ("pious man") refers almost always to a "holy man," a specialized role in al-Qasr; quwaal al-khair ("the speaker of good"); and fa'aal al-khair or 'amaal al-khair ("the doer of good"). The latter three roles are approximately equivalent to that of rajal khair, though some informants argued that rajal khair is especially designated because he mediates quarrels while the fa'aal al-khair or 'amaal al-khair help a man when he is in financial difficulties.

554 The functioning of the third party in conflict media-
571 tion is formal to the degree that two parties agree on his
627 intervention and to abide by his decision; but the structuring
*613 of the third party is informal by comparison with the in-
•182 stitutionalized role of 'aqila. However, the existence of the third party role, and its various expressions in al-Qasr

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politics, and the fact that it is differentiated from the role of *'aqila*, are the bases for conceptualizing a structural division of political duties and authority distribution.

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Role differentiation in the authority structure may be discussed from two points of view: the degree of difference between authoritative decision-making roles and the other roles, and, the way in which one authoritative role differs from another. These refer to the different degrees of specialization characterized by any one role as compared to another. I have already discussed the way in which the role of *'aqila* differs from other social roles (such as the kinship roles) in the authority structure of al-Qasr. In the following [128] discussion, I focus on role differentiation in the non-institutionalized aspect of the authority structure, on power and influence.

Societies differ from culture to culture in the complexity of role differentiation. Within any one culture it
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may differ from social domain to social domain. The political system in al-Qasr is from this point of view structurally simple, the assignment of duties in the traditional authority structure being divided between the *'aqila* and the third party. What legitimate influence is possessed by the third party is derivative from the "status honor" of its members. The [792] exception to this is the *rajal saalih* who derives his power or influence as a result of his special relationship with God.

554 Thus within the "status group" a difference exists between
571 those members whose power might be considered "secular" (i.e.
627 the rajal khair), and those whose power might be considered "sacred" (i.e. the rajal saalih). Their right to mediate and to overseer the execution of decisions binding on parties to conflict derives from this status. In a way, authority role patterns may be seen to overlap, and the "status group" impinges on the legitimate authority of the 'aqila by virtue of the fact that they are, for one reason or another, his status equals inside and outside the political structure.

554 This structural division of political duties for
571 dealing with conflict corresponds to Eisenstadt's (1965:30)
•182 differentiation of roles in terms of degrees of instituional-
*613 ization. The role of 'aqila is present and enduring in each tertiary authority group. There is an incumbent who can be pointed out. His rights and privileges are circumscribed, and his duties and obligations are well defined: the power of the 'aqila role is limited by the very fact that it is
554 institutionalized. The role of the third party, or the
571 mediator in Bedouin society, is less institutionalized, and
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627 therefore, less structured and less confining with respect to the kind and amount of influence which the role-player might exert.

The role of the rajal khair, and this implies reference to all third parties, carries with it power. When power is

554 571 •182 *[613] When power is institutionalized, such as it is in the role of _'aqila_, it becomes authority. This is the Weberian notion of power and authority which has been used by Bohannan (1958) for an analysis of, what he refers to as, "extra-processual events." "Extra-processual events" refers to the operation of power in everyday social relationships, whenever some people make others do what they want them to do. In other words, possessors of "status honor" are also possessors of power, and, I would claim, by virtue of this, such people are recruited into decision-making roles. Not only do members of the "status group" manipulate others in everyday dyadic social relationships, but, more importantly, in the context of conflict control they are able to dominate in political triadic relationships. Furthermore, since they are not structurally bound in their decision-making role, i.e., they operate across group and lineage lines, they accrue even more power and widen their power-base or support structure. What is highlighted in this kind of political role analysis is the fact that different individuals play the game of power politcs in various ways, (128) and with varying degrees of success. In the next chapter, I will bring out this very point by presenting a case study of one such role-player.

554 571 *613 627 When we contrast the roles of _'aqila_ and _rajal khair_, we are defining a political role-set. In an attempt to differentiate between the two roles further than we already have,

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One 'aqila, who is famous for the sharpness of his tongue in dealing with litigants, was explicit about the authority of the rajal khair as compared to his own in matters of conflict regulation:

> Both are one (i.e. the 'aqila and the rajal khair), for the rajal khair can also finish a problem. The rajal khair tries to solve the problem, but only the 'aqila judges (yahkum). The rajal khair worries about the feelings of the two men involved, but the 'aqila cares only about justice and what is right . . . The rajal khair does not want the two men to lose one another. It is a friendly way to solve problems.

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Bedouins of low status in al-Qasr who are economically linked to the rajal khair in what resembles a patron-client relationship permit this fact to influence their own interpretation of the authority structure. A common view of the 'aqila's formal authority indicates that the Bedouins themselves are conscious of a structural comparison of political roles, but not of the underlying economic conditioners at work.

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> There are good men and there are bad men: the rajal khair is the opposite of a bad man. The rajal khair is not responsible for his group, but the 'aqila is. The 'aqila is chosen from among the elders of the bait so that he is not always a good man. But when they want a man to solve problems, they get him from among the rajal khair. The 'aqila is responsible before the 'umda and shaikh, and he is responsible for collecting and receiving the diya.

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The rajal khair represents a vital element in Bedouin society. He is a symbol of security, the man to whom one

554 571 627 •182 [181] [556] turns in times of need dealing with financial and personal problems. In view of the value stress which the Bedouins place upon generosity, manifest in the redistributive system of the lineage, the wealth of the rajal khair is the wealth of the community. Wealth divides, not only possessors from non-possessors, but also, seekers after security from power seekers. It is as Peters (1965:145) has noted in Cyrenaica: generosity, not being entirely altruistic, wins repute and repute is an important aspect of political power.

554 682 627 *613 829 In an interview concerning the justice of blood-revenge, there was general agreement that if a man kills intentionally, then blood-revenge must be taken by the murdered man's bait against someone in the murderer's aiela. But one prominent man (a rajal khair) protested that "the best man in the killer's family must not be harmed." This statement generated a rather heated debate. One man said: "The best man should be killed for this is right in the Bedouin type of justice." (This comment was made by a man who is the 'aqila of a low-status lineage in al-Qasr.) The first speaker's reply to the protest was this:

> Nevertheless, it all depends upon the character of the best man . . . if he is evil and on bad terms with your family, then he will be the first one to be killed. But if he is a good man, then you kill the murderer himself . . . You must never kill a rajal khair because he may do good in the future. [178] In the old days, the killing started right away, and all problems were big ones: today there is negotiation--people are improving.

554 One _'aqila_ claimed that the _rajal khair_ is a person
627 who shares in his own authority and presides when he is
*613 away, but he separated the "rights" of the two roles. The
[779] _'aqila_ is able to force two parties in conflict to read the
[578] _Fatiha,_ the first _sura_ of the Quran, in order to terminate
the problem; this is beyond the rights of the _rajal khair_ whose
influence is not directly supported by sacred sanctions. But
[784] the role of _rajal khair_ does have its "sacred" aspects, for
all Bedouins know that "you should never harm a _rajal khair_
or God will punish you for this." I never heard this same
thing said about the _'aqila_.

554 Historically, it was perhaps the case that the _rajal_
627 _khair_ was the person of high status who represented the authority
*613 of an absent _'aqila_. The role never became institutionalized
•182 but functioned as a support and substitute role in a structure
dominated by that of the _'aqila_. In a segmentary society
627 where the various structures exist in opposition to one
628 another, it is important that an institution, such as a third
182 non-partisan element, exists to facilitate communication
578 between parties for the purposes of conflict regulation.
Besides the _rajal khair_, an example of this would be the
traditional case of the wife from an outside tribe who alone
was permitted freedom of passage between the two warring
parties. Her purpose, it was assumed, was that of peace-making.

156 the group--in effect questions a great deal about the whole
159 traditional authority structure. Blood-revenge functions as
554 a deterrent to social disorder in that it represents an
829 automatic mechanism for restoring a balance of good relations
682 [182] in the society. Actually, Hajj 'Ali exaggerated to make a
point when he spoke of the existence of "unbalanced people."
682 A person would indeed be "unbalanced" who did not take into
672 consideration the repercussions of his acts with respect to
*613 the personal danger and the dishonor and shame it would bring
to his _'aiela_ and _bait_. Although the _'aiela_ members are
willing to share in the blood money for accidental or unpremeditated
killings, it is wrong to suppose that the Bedouins
do not attempt to weigh the justifiability and culpability
[671] in matters of killing. The very existence of the _'awaiyid
Awlad 'Ali_ argues against this. Obviously, the dichotomy made
between killing in the _'awaiyid_, i.e., intentional and accidental,
and the concomitant gradation in compensation points to some
kind of reasonable consideration in cases of killing.

156 Hajj 'Ali is discontent with yet another aspect of
159 the traditional authority structure. He questions the logic
554 and authority represented in the oath as a sacred sanction.
695 This says something about the degree of secularization which
829 Hajj 'Ali has undergone. Although he does not say so, he
apparently favors a more secular and logical procedure for
determining a man's guilt or innocence.

The form which the process of dispute settlement takes differs from one society to another. In certain societies disputes are settled through a process of informal mediation undertaken by go-betweens; in others it is by means of self-help; still in others, it is by way of court. In societies with courts the process of dispute settlements is undertaken by judges who "take and assess the evidence, examine what they regard as the facts, and come to a decision in favor of one party rather than another" (Gluckman 1965:183).

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Within a given society, disputes are settled in accordance with a set of principles that reflect the basic goals and values of that society. As long as the settlement of a particular dispute proceeds according to these principles, the settlement is supported by the public opinion of that society. This is true whether the process is carried on b y means of informal mediations or through a court system. It is this public opinion as the expression of the basic societal values and not the court as a special mechanism that gives legitimation to the judicial decisions. To equate opinion with the court as Hoebel (1961) did, or to look at the court as the ultimate source of legitimation as did Radcliffe-Brown (1940) and others (Redfield 1964, Bohannan 1965), is to create an unnecessary confusion which tends to undermine meaningful cross-cultural comparisons. Whatever the differences among anthropologists with regard to the definition of the court, their main interest in the concept so far has been as a tool for the definition of law. The interest in the concept gave rise to a methodological approach which came to characterize the literature in legal anthropology, namely, the case-study approach, cases having been utilized in a number of ways by legal anthropologists. In their book on the Cheyenne, Llewellyn and Hoebel (1941) introduced the analysis of "the trouble case." This was followed by a number of studies utilizing the case study method either to

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613 Written agreements such as the above are becoming more common in
675 the area. The need to have the responsibility of the vengeance group
[178] or the Amar recorded and the names of its members listed stems from the
[361] increase in the geographical mobility of individuals and separate households
[464] seeking jobs with the government organizations in the area or with
the various industries in the towns and cities outside the Western Desert.
233 The uncertainty of pastoral nomadism and the delicate balance which exists
178 between pastures, animal population, and human population is pushing an
182 ever-increasing number of people to abandon the way of life which they
had lived for generations. Animals are extremely important to sustain
233 the pastoral life of Awlad Ali. Once the balance between the pasture and
182 the animal population is upset by a draught, a segment of the human population
731 has to make new adjustments. This adjustment is first made by
166 moving with one's flocks to areas in the Delta or in the Cyrenaica region
of Libya. This is a short-term adjustment, however, and cannot be continued
for long periods of time. Pastures in the Delta have to be purchased,
and in most cases the owner of the herd has to sell part of his
[619] herd to feed the rest. The Cyrenaica pasture is very limited and restricted
by the strong tribal control of the Cyrenaica Bedouins, who in
general are not friendly with many of the tribal segments living in the
233 Egyptian Western Desert. If the draught continues beyond a certain time,
731 the individual owner of a herd may find himself forced to sell the herd
464 434 and seek other modes of subsistence in the form of part-time or full-time
182 employment as a semi-skilled or unskilled worker with the government or
industrial organizations. Such jobs are usually viewed as a temporary
source of income to help the individual and his immediate family live

233 through a hard year and to help him replace the herd he has lost. In
731 many cases a dry year is followed by another and many of these employed
464 find themselves depending more and more on their income from the jobs.
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● 182 The security of the employment is often compared favorably with the uncertainty of nomadic existence, and many decide to abandon the pastoral life on a more or less permanent basis. But even when one makes such a decision, he usually retains a strong affiliation with his original way
613 of life. He retains an active interest in the affairs of his Amar, es-
182 pecially those from which he can benefit in one way or another. One im-
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portant gain he might get is through sharing in the receipt of bloodmoney for the killing of any member of the Amar, and having the Amar paid in his behalf. But while asserting their membership in the Amar at the time of such distribution, very few, if any, would show themselves when the membership of the Amar is called upon for the collection of bloodmoney which the Amar has to pay for a murder committed by one of its members.
613 It is known in the area that members of one bait of the Aggary Amar (Bait
682 Ahmad) have never paid their share of the bloodmoney of the last twenty
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years, but always claim their share in the distribution of bloodmoney. Many members of that Bait claim that the Bait has long been separated from the Aggary Amar, although this claim is denied by the rest of the Amar as well as by those members of Bait Ahmad who claim their share in the receipt of bloodmoney.

613 Disputes such as these, which are not limited to the Aggarty, led
675 many Amars to attempt to make comprehensive lists of all members of the
578 Amar and to require a written agreement in case of separation of a given Bait from the Amar.

His Bait is the wealthiest in the
613 554 Aggary and he himself has recently acquired a great amount of wealth,
627 mostly from smuggling goods across the Libyan borders. Because of his
[556] position as a Government Sheihk, he is believed to have influencial con-
nections in the government. He is the only member of the Aggary Amar
who has a car. He considers himself to be the spokesman of the Aggary
Family, and he is known to be able to persuade the reluctant awaqil to
conform to decisions made by the rest of the awaqil. In a number of in-
[682] stances he was able to collect bloodmoney from members of the Amar who
had previously refused to pay. Some people in the area believe that had
it not been for the persuasive abilities of Sheihk Selouma, the Aggary
Amar could never have persisted, and it would have long ago been divided
into smaller units due to the lack of agreement among its members. The
613 lack of formalized leadership of the Amar or the Eila makes consensus of
extreme importance for the Amar. The emphasis on the unity of the Amar
[675] is stated in Article 2 and is implied in a number of other articles in
[578] the Amar paper of Aggary. Disagreement among the awaqil is very rare al-
613 though not unknown in the area. The relative consensus among the awaqil
682 stems from the fact that the Amar as a group has a fairly limited function.
[182] Until very recently the only practical function of the Amar was the collec-
tion of money to pay for a murder committed by one of its members. Since
establishing the innocence or guilt of the accused is not the duty of the
Amar, once his guilt has been established, there is no question about
613 the payment. Disagreements are likely to occur in the case of new circum-
682 stances where money has to be paid, since payment in such cases are not
578 yet institutionalized, even when specified in a given Amar paper. This
000 has not yet become a major problem. If any disagreement between the

627 agreement is reached. In fact, later one of the people attending said
628 that my presence made everything run smoothly in that particular Mi'ad
[123] because they felt that they should show me how peaceful Awlad Ali were.
This was mainly supported by my own observation of other Mi'ads, some of
which are described later, where parties were less understanding of one
another and where no forfeiting of any part of the compensation occurs.
This is particularly true when the Mi'ad is held to acknowledge the fail-
ure of the negotiators to reach an acceptable agreement among the parties.
[681] This is also true when one of the parties to a dispute denies the charge
and insists on not paying any kind of compensation. In such cases the
Mi'ad is held to decide upon a different course of action, usually the
administration of the oath, as will be discussed later in the chapter.
[182] Despite its typical nature, the Mi'ad described above exemplifies the
nature of the Mi'ad and its purpose as a process of making public what
has been achieved in private negotiations. No evidence is presented and
evaluated in the Mi'ad, no hearing of witnesses, no passing of judgment
based on the evaluation of the facts of the case. Actually, the facts of
the case are never presented and a person who is not acquainted with them
before hand has no way of learning what the dispute is all about by merely
listening to the discussions of the Mi'ad.

628 The key role in the process of mediation in dispute settlements is
613 done by the Aqila or the leader of the bait. When a dispute occurs between members of different baits, each party goes to the Aqila of his bait who takes immediate steps tomeet with the Aqila of the other party and discuss the matter with him in an attempt to reach a settlement. He acts as a representative of members of his bait and defends their interests in

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681 a request and examine the reasons behind it in an attempt to remedy them if possible. They have to be sure first of all that by his request the person is not avoiding the paymnet of his share in a particular case. [695] If this is proven to be the case, then no barawa is granted unless the person pays all his debts to the amar. This, like the amar's barawa of the individual, has to be put in writing.

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[114] I left the area a month after the meeting held at Qudura's camp. By the time I left, bait Asabei' was almost in a chaotic situation. Many thought that the outcome would be in favor of Qudura, who would emerge from all the happenings as the leader of bait Asabei' as a whole. Others thought that the only possible outcome was for bait Asabei' to be divided into two or even three separate units with their own respective leaders.

Analysis

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627 All events of the second phase occurred while I was in the area. Nonetheless I was not able to observe directly all of these events, due to the nature of the judicial process among Awlad Ali which relies, as has been mentioned earlier, on informal mediation and influence, rather than on formal court hearings. Most of the above events happened behind closed doors and with a great amount of secrecy. [124] For this reason I had to rely partly on informants' accounts of what exactly had happened between the parties involved.

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182 The dispute in its two phases revealed a major weakness in the social structure of the major bait of the Aggary family. As the events of the case unfolded, they shed light on some of the important principles

613 627 182 underlying the authority of the Aqila and the source of his political support. Three such principles were evident in the above case: patrilineal succession, wealth, and social and personal renown.


Ability to deal fairly with disputes involving members of his bait and outsiders
(wisdom and social renown)
Ability to fulfil financial obligations of the bait (wealth)
Patrilineal succession
other tribal groups
'Eila
Bait

613 554 To better understand the importance of the three principles to the authority of the Aqila, it is important to examine the domains within the Aqila normally functions. First, the Aqila is the leader of a certain kinship unit: the bait. Historically, the bait has been the main field of action for the Aqila and from it he draws his main political support. 613 627 554 As the leader of his bait, the Aqila settles disputes among members of his bait and represents the group for political and administrative purposes. His function is to hold the bait together by preventing major disputes between members from leading to the fission of the group into smaller, separate units. He performs his function by exercising authority and/or personal influence to establish long-lasting agreements.

613 627 554 [192] The word mardi is derived from the Arabic verb "yardi" which means to accept or agree upon. The mardi therefore is the person who is accepted by one or both parties to a dispute as a mediator. If he is accepted by only one of the parties, his work is more that of a legal representative of that party. He makes all efforts, using all powers of persuasion to get the other party to concede to the demands of the party he represents. If, on the other hand, he is chosed by both parties to a dispute, he acts as an impartial judge and avoids taking sides in the case. His fame is determined by his ability to achieve permanent, long-lasting settlements. His success in this area depends, in addition to personal qualities, upon the respect he has within his own tribal segment and the weight that tribal segment has among other tribal segments. Similarly, his success and the fame he gets as a mardi may give him considerable influence within the bait. But this influence does not develop into authority because the mardi in this case does not have an established basis for the effective maintenance of that authority, in this case, patrilineal succession. [182] [428]

613 554 682 The other domain within which the Aqila performs his duties is that of the Eila or the amar. His main function within this area is to represent his bait in matters involving the collection or the distribution of bloodmoney within the vengeance group. Within the amar, the aqila is considered successful insofar as he is able to fulfill his bait's financial obligations to the amar. This ability is in turn determined by his success in collecting money from individual members of his bait and/or his willingness to pay from his own money for those members who are unable or unwilling to pay their share. Where kinship ties are strong, the Aqila

634 "The omda or sheikh is both a blessing and a curse to his tribe,"
554 said one member of the Aggary 'eila. "He can bring benefits to his
619 tribe, but at the same time, he has to report his own people if one of
them breaks the city laws... His position is like that of a double-edged razor."

Most of the people in the area, however, tolerate the negative aspects of the omda's functions as a moderate price for the possible benefits they may get through his position. This is why each tribal segment does its best to be represented by an omda, or at least by a sheikh.

Within his tribal segment he enjoys a great deal of respect. He does not, by means of position alone, command any power over members of his group similar to the power the omda of the village has over his
[613] people. It seems, however, that although the position itself does not
carry with it any power, yet, when the holder of that position is at the same time a native tribal leader or aqila, it tends to enhance his position as a tribal leader and to give him more respect among members of his tribal unit as well as among the rest of the tribal groupings.
634 This may be explained by the fact that the establishment of the omda
554 system in that area did not involve direct interference with the native
619 political system except in a minimal way, mainly to keep the tribal
182 657 populations in the area from interfering in the progress of various
613 government projects in the area. As such, the system did not impose
too many demands upon the tribal loyalties of the omdas or sheikhs. In the relationship between the government and the tribal population, the balance so far has been in favor of the latter, who, by means of

634 omda representation, are taking from the government much more than
554
619 they are giving in return. Being the link between his people and
182 the government in such a system gives the aqila a new basis of
657 political support.
613

583 Among Awlad Ali the payment of the bridewealth signifies the com-
[584] pletion of the marriage contract. The mahr is not paid to the woman but
583 to her father or closest male kin. Usually the mahr is paid in money.
178 This, however, seems to be a recent phenomenon. Until the turn of the
century, according to informants, the mahr was paid only in sheep and
583 goats. The practice is still followed by a number of tribal segments
178 of Ali Ahmar who occupy the western most part of the area where pasture
184 is more abundant and reliable and where the permanent pasture of the
green mountains of Cyrenaica is close by. Other tribal segments still
insist that at least one-fourth of the mahr should be paid in livestock,
583 but the majority of the people accept money. The main purpose of the
[584] mahr among Awlad Ali is to legalize the marriage contract and to put
[182] emphasis on the reciprocal oblications that the marriage created between
the two families of the bride and the groom. It also works as an in-
surance for good behavior on the part of both the husband and the wife.
583 If the husband mistreats his wife or fails to give her the rights legally
593 hers by marriage, he risks the chance of losing the mahr and being forced
586 to divorce her. On the other hand, if the wife fails to behave in the
customary way expected from a wife, the husband could divorce her and
have the right to get back his mahr. This is particularly inconvenient
in cases where all or part of the mahr is paid in livestock, in which
case it becomes part of the father's herd and hard to take away in case
of divorce. It is therefore in the interest of her family to keep the
marriage. In this way their interference in the marriage is checked.
[591] This is especially important among Awlad Ali where, although the mar-
[592] riage is usually patrilocal, the woman retains membership in her father's
household even after marriage.

CHAPTER VI

HOMICIDE AND BODILY INJURIES

Part 1: Homicide

579 Fighting is quite common among Awlad Ali. Many of these fights
involve a large number of individuals and result in many casualties
579 and sometimes even deaths. Fighting is considered "shar," or evil,
673 for according to Awlad Ali, it threatens the social cohesion which is
182 highly valued in the area. Yet, although undesirable, fighting and
[682] even homicide are not considered a crime against society and sometimes
are viewed as necessary to safeguard individual and collective rights
in the absence of an established authority which could protect these
[177] rights. Although this absence of an authority is remedied now by the
[692] introduction of state administrative justice, this has not yet achieved
enough efficiency and recognition to replace the old tribal system.

619 In the tribal system, there is no concept of individual punishment
681 inflicted upon the suspect. There is no recognized authority to inflict
692 it. The mardi or the 'aqila who performs the function of dispute settle-
[629] ment in the case of homicide has no power to pass or inflict any punishment.
His role is restricted to mediation between the two parties involved
682 as was earlier mentioned. Homicide, like all other wrongs among Awlad Ali,
673 are private wrongs affecting the individual or a group of individuals.
[182] The main purpose of the tribal proceedings in the case of homicide is to
restore some form of harmony and order among the group. This harmony is
sometimes restored by killing the murderer or any member of his vengeance
682 group, or amar. Feuds may result from such killing, and a few instances
628 of feuds have, in fact, been recorded in the area (although not in the

105 The judicial process among Awlad Ali of the Western Desert of
Egypt has been dealt with in the context of political organization of
105 the group. The main feature of the political organization of Awlad Ali
613 is the absence of centralized leadership. The only formally recognized
leadership is that of the aqila, the leader of the bait tribal segment.
105 The sources of the aqila's authority derive from a number of sources,
613 one of which is his judicial role. It is through him that disputes in-
627 volving members of his bait are solved. The process by which he per-
forms this crucial function is that of informal mediation in which both
the personal qualities of the aqila, as well as the weight of his tribal
[592] segment, play an important role. This is especially important in a so-
ciety with no court system or formal hearing and where durability of any
settlement depends on its being accepted by the parties involved.

105 The main aim of the judicial process is to affect reconciliation of
182 the parties and to restore a certain degree of social order and cohesion
627 that was disrupted by the dispute. The need to restore the social order
[619] and to maintain friendly relations between tribal members is a response
to certain aspects of the natural and social environment in which the
105 group finds itself. Natural resources in the area are very meager, and
182 subsistence activities require that the tribesmen constantly move with
619 233 their herds for pasture throughout an area already divided among the
various tribal segments. Since the place and nature of pasture differ
from one year to the next, the identity of the specific tribal unit which
would be sought for help varies correspondingly. This creates a general
feeling of dependency that characterizes the social relations in the area.

105 On the other hand, there is always a feeling of rivalry and hostility
578 between the different tribal segments which goes back to the era of
571 tribal warfare. Thus, the social relations among the tribal population
are characterized by a certain amount of ambivalence which is hidden be-
hind a facade of formality in the way tribal members treat one another
105 in day-to-day activities. There are certain rules of etiquette describ-
571 ing the way members of the same tribal segment should behave toward one
576 another and toward other tribesmen and outsiders. Failure to abide by
[689] these rules may subject the violator to a symbolic fine of a goat or a
[574] sheep slaughtered for a feast to which everyone is invited. These feasts,
[182] or dinners as they are called, have various functions, the most important
of which is the integrative one. In an area where the population is usu-
105
571 ally dispersed, these dinners offer an opportunity to the tribesmen who
574 happen to be in the area at the time of the feast to attend, where they
182 eat, meet other tribesmen, and exchange information about what is happen-
ing in other parts of the area. It is from such dinners that the tribes-
men get to know about the available pastures, about the prices of sheep
and goats in different markets, and about who is doing what and where.
The occasion also signifies the restoration of the violator of the rules
to the social life of the group and the reinforcement of those rules.
105 This is also true with the tribal meetings, or mi'ad, which are held to
627 announce settlements in more serious cases. It is on this basis that
182 the mi'ad should not be considered as a tribal court. It is more of a
689
574 social occasion where food and drinks are served and where parties in-
volved and all those invited by them talk about everything except the
[689] dispute itself. In certain instances, the financial settlement agreed
upon in the informal mediation is exaggerated when announced in the mi'ad

105 so that part of it may be reduced in honor of some prominent members
627 who are attending the meeting. When part of the financial agreement is
● 182 reduced in honor of a person, this creates an obligation on the part of
681 that person to reciprocate in a similar situation when one arises. This
554 creates an active interest in the settlement on the part of individuals who otherwise are not involved, and insures the durability of the settlement. The social cohesion is maintained.

105 The need to keep friendly relations with all tribesmen is reflected
571 in the judicial process in its procedural aspect, as well as in judicial
578 reasoning, that is, the logic according to which facts in certain cases
627 are assessed. With regard to procedures, there is an emphasis on avoid-
182 ing face-to-face confrontations between the disputing parties until an agreement has been reached by means of the mediators. Only then is it that the parties see and talk to one another. This is especially true in serious cases such as homicide or serious assault where face-to-face confrontation is likely to lead to more hostilities.

105 The emphasis on reconciliation may explain, at least in part, the in-
571 formality of the judicial process. Leaving the process of dispute settle-
627 ment informal gives it a measure of flexibility which permits the treatment
182 of each case as unique without being tied down by rigid formal rules. This does not mean, however, that there are no rules to be followed, or that there is no place for legal precedents. It simply means that the rules are very general and that the legal precedents are used merely as a guide in solving similar cases. The main guide remains, however, the desire to achieve a successful settlement that satisfies all parties. It is only through achieving such successful settlements that the social order is maintained and the tribal cohesion is secured.

795*

divine blessing, since it was because the Bedouin believed the [792]
Sanusi family had the same virtue that they accepted their [798]
leadership. [776]

The resemblance often alleged between the Sanusi and the [778]
Wahhabi movements, on the grounds of like puritanism, 795*
literalism, and fanaticism, cannot be substantiated. It is 171
obvious that there must be resemblances between new religious [114]
movements: they usually claim to be a return to primitive faith and morals and they are generally missionary and enthusiastic. There is no great significance in such common characteristics of the two movements. Nor is there any reason to suppose that the Grand Sanusi was directly influenced by Wahhabi propaganda. A more significant comparison between the two might be made by tracing their developments from religious into political movements. Both started as religious revivals among backward peoples, chiefly Bedouin, the Wahhabi movement in the Nadj in the eighteenth century and the Sanusi movement first in the Hijaz and then in Cyrenaica in the middle of the nineteenth century; the *Ikhwan* organizations of the two movements have much in common; and both ended in the formation of Amirates, or small Islamic States.

Both movements have created States, the Wahhabi in Arabia and the Sanusi in Cyrenaica, based explicitly on religious particularism. In doing so they have only done what any movement of the kind is bound to do in a barbarous country if it is to continue to exist, namely, to create an administrative system which would ensure a measure of peace, security, justice, and economic stability. A religious organization cannot exist apart from a polity of a wider kind. But they did not create the sentiment of community which made the growth of governmental functions and the emergence of a State possible.

Religious divisions in Islam have commonly been the expres- 795*
sion of a sense of social and cultural exclusiveness. The support 182
given to the 'Alids in Persia and Arabia, to the Umayyads in 177
Africa and Spain, to the Fatimids in Egypt, to the Kharijites 171
by the Berbers in North Africa, and the adoption of extreme Shi'ite doctrines by the mountaineers of Syria and by the Kurds, and of Isma'ili teachings in parts of India, were all reactions against foreign domination as much as revolts against orthodoxy. The religious deviation was the expression of the intense desire

*795 of a people to live according to their own traditions and institu-
● 182 tions. To-day this desire is expressed in the political language
177 of nationalism. In the past it was expressed in religious move-
177 ments. Arab nationalism is not a new phenomenon. Only its
[668] dress is new.

*795 As will be seen in the chapters which follow, conditions in Cyrenaica were particularly favourable to the growth of a
182 politico-religious movement such as the Sanusiya became. It was cut off by deserts from neighbouring countries, it had a homogeneous population, it had a tribal system which embraced common traditions and a strong feeling of community of blood, the country was not dominated by the towns, and the Turkish administration exercised very little control over the interior. It was, as will be seen, the tribal system of the Bedouin which furnished the Order with its political foundations just as it was the tribesmen of the country whose hardiness and courage enabled it to stand up to the succession of defeats it had to endure.

*795 The reasons for the political success of the Sanusiya Order in
793 Cyrenaica will appear in the course of this account, and here I wish to draw attention to one of them only. It has been said
182 that its rites and teachings were, like the Bedouin character,
[792] austere without being fanatical, and that it tolerated the cult of saints to which the Bedouin were accustomed, the Grand
[798] Sanusi becoming, in fact, a kind of national saint; but it must be added that the acceptability of its teachings and the fact that the Grand Sanusi could at once be placed by the Bedouin in the familiar category of *Marabtin*, holy men coming to preach and settle in Cyrenaica from the west, cannot alone account for the remarkable success of the Sanusiya movement. The Bedouin of Cyrenaica had heard similar teachings before from similar teachers and had paid them the same degree of attention as they paid to the Grand Sanusi, but these earlier missionaries won only a personal and local following for themselves and their descendants, whereas the Grand Sanusi established himself and his family as leaders of a national movement, a position they have now held for three generations.
Leaving aside the remarkable personality of the Grand Sanusi
[792] and without here discussing whether the time at which he
[798] taught was particularly favourable to the growth of the move-

ment to which his teachings led, it may be said that the great 795*
difference between the Grand Sanusi and the earlier holy men 793
whose tombs are homely landmarks all over Cyrenaica was that, 182
while they were, all of them, in the eyes of the Bedouin, Marabouts, [792]
the Grand Sanusi was also the head of an Order which [778]
gave to him and his successors an organization. Moreover, unlike the Heads of most Islamic Orders, which have rapidly disintegrated into autonomous segments without contact and common direction, they have been able to maintain this organization intact and keep control of it. This they were able to do by co-ordinating the lodges of the Order to the tribal structure.

III

The more recent Islamic Orders are to be found principally 795*
in North and West Africa. The Sanusiya is one of the most 793
recent of them. Its founder was an Algerian scholar, al-Sayyid
Muhammad bin 'Ali al-Sanusi al-Khattabi al-Idrisi al-Hasani, 159
a very remarkable man, mystic, missionary, and Marabout. 175*
The Sayyid Muhammad bin 'Ali al-Sanusi is usually spoken of in Cyrenaica as *al-Sanusi al-Kabir*, the Grand Sanusi, and I generally refer to him thus in this book.

The Grand Sanusi was born of a distinguished family of Sharifs at a village near Mustaghanim in Algeria about 1787. Early in life he became noted for his intelligence, piety, and profound learning, considered fitting ornaments to his noble birth. He studied first at Mustaghanim, then at Mazun, and later at the famous mosque school at Fez in Morocco, where he learnt theology, jurisprudence, exegesis of the Koran, and the other usual subjects of a Muslim student of the time. There he seems to have developed an interest in mysticism, having come under the influence of the Moroccan Order of the Tijaniya Darwishes. He left Fez when in the early thirties in order to make the pilgrimage to Mecca, though a Turkish biographer says that one of his reasons for leaving Morocco was to avoid possible unpleasantness with the authorities, who were alarmed lest his propaganda for the greater unity of Islam, his life's aim, might have political consequences.[1] They had small cause for alarm as his efforts seem to have made little impression on the

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[1] Salim bin 'Amir, *Majallat 'Umar al-Mukhtar*, No. II, 1943-4, p. 2.

*795

*175 provocation, did the same in Cyrenaica, the Order had no
[159] choice but to resist.

[793] But though it was attacks from the outside which destroyed
*[648] the theocratic empire of the Sanusiya, it may be considered
doubtful whether in any case such extensive territories could
have been maintained under single direction. The economic
and political organization of the Order was crude, even when
elaborated in the days of Sayyid al-Mahdi in response to
increased trading activities and to the need of maintaining
peace in the petty and barbarous states that had come under
its influence. Its administrative machinery was at no time
adequate for effective control over such wide domains, with
their poor communications and their manifold tribal, racial,
[578] and cultural divergencies. To these weaknesses must be added,
after Sayyid al-Mahdi's death, personal rivalries within the
Sanusi family on the lines of which cracks began to appear in
the loose empire, and it is probable that even if it had not been
attacked by the Powers of Europe it would have broken up
into a number of principalities, or spheres of religious influence,
ruled by various members of the family. It might indeed be
*[648] possible to sustain the thesis that it was the Italian occupation
[182] of Libya which prevented the complete break-up of the Order
by rallying the outraged sentiment of the Bedouin to its side as
the symbol of their common resistance to conquest and alien
rule.

The administrative organization of the Order in the time of
Sayyid al-Mahdi was simple indeed. Each lodge of the Order
[794] lived on its own revenues, derived from endowments, tithes,
contributions of money, goods, transport, and labour, and sent
its surplus to Jaghbub and Kufra for the maintenance of the
University and of the Sanusi family and for the general purposes
[628] of the Order. The Shaikh of each lodge arbitrated in disputes
in the district in which it was situated and could generally
wield spiritual sanctions sufficiently weighty to compel
acceptance of his awards. The Shaikh of a lodge was appointed
by the head of the Order and was responsible to him. There
was, however, so little centralized planning that new lodges
seem occasionally to have been founded by the initiative of
influential families without the head of the Order hearing of the
new foundation till its completion. In the more distant parts

243 They could not sow a better crop. There are wild varieties of
barley in Cyrenaica and the country is in every way suited to
its culture. It is very hardy, stands up to drought, and easily
holds its own against the grasses, which are ploughed in with
[251] the seed on the plateau. When the barley and wheat have
been reaped, the grain is stored in *kuf*. On the plateau these
are ancient tomb-caves; elsewhere they are holes dug in the
ground.

[131] In a bad year, and even more in a succession of bad years,
the Bedouin have experienced famine, but in most years the
barley, and to a lesser extent the wheat, give an abundant
[433] yield. Bedouin have told me that they expect from sowing in
the beds of wadis up to a hundredfold of barley and in the
barqa up to fiftyfold. On the plateau the yield is smaller and
in the Marmarica and Sirtica much smaller. In Turkish times
[439] there was a large export of grain from Cyrenaica. Mondaini says
that it was to the mean annual value of 40,000 Lire Sterling
for the years 1885 to 1900.[1] Much of this surplus was bought
by English brewers.

433 The Bedouin way of life is well adapted to their environment.
182 Given the inconstancy of the rainfall and the distribution of
water supplies they would be foolish indeed were they not, at
any rate in part, shepherds. They are not, of course, in all
433 respects self-supporting. They make their winter tents and a
439 good part of their equipment, carpets, sacks, and so forth, from
182 the wool of their beasts, but some things the Bedouin regard as
[237] necessities have to be imported, notably tea, sugar, some rice,
and cloth, especially the *jird*, the woollen cloak of the country.
They trade these with surplus stock on the hoof, skins, wool,
clarified butter, surplus barley, and honey and wax, so that
they are in an economic sense self-supporting.

433 Cyrenaica is a rich country for Bedouin, a poor country for
182 Europeans. Bedouin generally have no overhead expenses in
[556] production. I say generally, because rich men sometimes
[233] employ shepherds, though this is usually the practice of urban
[464] merchants engaged in the sheep trade. Bedouin use their own
labour and that of their families and animals. What is perhaps
[511] more important is that they are prepared to live on what

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[1] G. Mondaini, *Manuale di Storia e Legislazione Coloniale del Regno d'Italia*. 1927, p. 308.

Europeans consider to be a low level of civilization. They do 433
not feel the need for expensive roads and ports, electric light, 511
wireless sets, telephones, schools, churches, newspapers, and 182
so forth; and clearly their economy could not support them.
Time and again colonists, tempted from their homes by the 182
short sea routes and the wooded plateau, have settled in the 167
country and dispossessed the Bedouin, but in the end it is the
Bedouin, and not the colonists, who have survived. When one
looks at the massive Phoenician, Greek, Egyptian, and Roman
ruins and the already half-ruined Italian towns, villages, and
farms, and then on the flimsy tents of the Arabs, one cannot
but reflect that the race is not always to the swift nor the battle
to the strong.

III

Even in the steppe country it is difficult to find a Bedouin 361
naja', camp, for the camps are pitched in hollows and on the
slopes of wadis and their feeders for shelter from rain and wind
and too many visitors. On the plateau they are hidden in the
forest. One cannot, therefore, make more than a very approxi- 161
mate estimate of the population of any part of the country, or 162
of its distribution, by bare observation. It can, however, be
said that at present the country is underpopulated and that the
population is badly distributed between town and country, the
urban part of it, which is almost entirely unproductive, being
too large in relation to the whole.

There have been a number of estimates of the population by 161
early travellers who visited the country in Turkish times. They 175
had to make a guess at the population figure, aided by Turkish
censuses. It has been suggested on the basis of their reports
that the country then supported round about 250,000 souls.[1]
The Turkish census of 1911 gave the population as 198,345,
excluding Kufra.[2] Taking into account the various estimates
which were made during the Italo-Sanusi wars, in the interval
between them, and since, it may be said that to-day the total
population of Cyrenaica is probably round about 200,000, of
whom about a quarter live in the towns, the remainder being
tented Bedouin and a few thousand oasis dwellers.

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[1] Dr. Gotthold Hildebrandt, *Cyrenaika als Gebiet künftiger Besiedelung*, 1904, p. 317. [113]

[2] Coro, op. cit., p. 20.

778 to act as mediators between tribes and between one tribal
619 section and another. Even to-day their tombs are regarded as
792 neutral points, as it were, and are often the place chosen for a
776 meeting between the Shaikhs of one tribe, or tribal section, and
those of an adjacent tribe, or section, when some matter has to be settled between them. It has sometimes happened also that when two tribes have disputed the ownership of territory, they have settled the dispute by allotting it to a Marabout, which means to his descendants, so that one then finds a *Marabtin* strip between two *Sa'adi* tribes or tribal sections. One of the best examples of this is the strip of country owned by the Aulad al-Shaikh tribe between the 'Awaqir and the 'Abid and 'Arafa tribal domains. In the same way tribes made gifts of disputed wells to dead saints. Where a *Marabtin* tribe has grown out of a Marabout family they will be found living in the area around their tombs. Thus the Aulad al-Shaikh territory spreads out from Sidi Mahiyus, part of the Masamir live near Sidi Nuh, the Mshaitat live around Sidi al-Mshaiti, and the Qat'an live near Sidi Hashim and Sidi Suliman al-Tair.

792 So, long centuries before the Grand Sanusi began his mission
776 in Cyrenaica, the Bedouin were used to the sight of an *'alim*, a
212 learned man—for anyone who can read and write is a learned
554 man to the Bedouin—coming from the west to heal their
children and beasts, break droughts, write talismans, and teach them the beliefs and law of Islam. Such a man was also a *muhakkam*, one who arbitrated in their disputes and said the *fatiha* at their settlements and undertakings to make them binding. He could arbitrate among them because he was not of them. He was not like them a tented son of the steppe, though his descendants may have learned to live as such, but a *Marabat*, a man who follows religion and not the rains. The Bedouin of Cyrenaica owe much to these holy men, for, ignorant and superstitious though they may have been, they taught the tribesmen to respect learning and religion and kept those twin lights burning, even if dimly, through centuries. The Bedouin do not forget them, or to say a prayer for them, when they pass their tombs; and they have given the freedom of their earth and water to their descendants. Without these forerunners the
● [182] Grand Sanusi could not have planted his Order in the country.
* [795] It is planted in their bones.

Marabouts of the kind I have described were still coming to 792
Cyrenaica from the west up to the time when the Grand Sanusi 793
began his preaching in the country. Two of them whom he 795*
found there, already living among the Bedouin, the one on the
western and the other on the eastern part of the plateau, teaching
them and settling their disputes, became his followers: Sidi
Ahmad bin 'Abdalla al-Sakkuri, a late arrival from the west
whose descendants became Shaikhs of the zawiya of al-Marj,
and Sidi al-Martadi Farkash, of an old *Marabtin* family of
Cyrenaica, whose descendants became Shaikhs of the lodges at
Umm al-Razam, Bishara, and Martuba. But the great majority
of the Grand Sanusi's helpers were men who had come with him
from the west, chiefly from Algeria. Other *Ikhwan* families, [613]
mostly of the Khattabi lineage, of which the Sanusi family are
a branch, came later, also from Algeria, in the time of Sayyid
al-Mahdi. To the Bedouin they were all Marabouts and when [778]
they had in their lifetimes a reputation for piety or learning
their tombs in the Sanusiya lodges in which they resided became
places of cult like those of their forerunners all over Cyrenaica.
But unlike the earlier Marabouts these Sanusiya Brothers were
not only holy men. They were also members of a fraternity, of
an organization. The Sanusiya Order was thus not only heir 795*
to the accumulated capital of the Marabouts, but was able to 182
exploit it as a corporation. It incorporated a number of isolated
cults into a single wider cult, fractionized, it is true, by tribal
particularisms, but, all the same, brought under a common
organization. Each lodge of the Order was a cult centre, but it
was something more: it was part of a general cult directed
through the lodges towards the Head of the Order. The tribes 619
of Cyrenaica became through the Order linked from above in a 182
common, if loose, organization under a single, sacred, Head. 795*
This was possible only because a tribal system already existed
uniting the different tribes, in spite of their feuds and enmities, 793
into a society which, though lacking political unity, rested on
common sentiments, a common way of life, and a common
lineage structure.

What gave stability to this new relationship between the [648]*
Bedouin tribes and the Sanusiya Order, turning the sacred Head
into a secular leader and the religious organization into a
government, and changed a loose federation of tribes into a

619

182 nation, was common hostility to outside interference, an ingre-
*795 dient supplied in measured quantities by the Turks and copiously
793 by the Italians.

*[648]

III

The rudiments of Islam which the Grand Sanusi found in Cyrenaica made his teachings acceptable, delivered as they were without embellishments, to the Bedouin of the country, and the Marabout tradition which he also found there made him
[578] personally acceptable to them. His chief difficulty must have been the rivalries between tribe and tribe and between tribal section and tribal section down to the smallest sections. This
[361] difficulty was overcome by transferring the centre of the Order to desert oases, where it could not become identified with any particular tribe, and by distributing its lodges impartially throughout the tribal territories.

*795 Of the forty-five zawiyas belonging to the tribes of Cyrenaica
793 proper (including al-Naufiliya and excluding the Kufra lodges)
*175 probably twenty-one were founded before 1860 or during the lifetime of the Grand Sanusi, twenty-two during the lifetime of Sayyid al-Mahdi, and two when Sayyid Ahmad al-Sharif was Head of the Order.

*795 A high proportion of the lodges of the Order in the time of the
361 Grand Sanusi were along the line of oases on the 29th parallel,
[175] for to the lodges of the Cyrenaican oases on that line must be added those in the oases of the Sirtica, Zalla, Saukna, Hun, and Waddan, all founded round about 1855, and probably that in al-Fuqha also. Lodges were early planted in the oases partly on account of their importance as caravanserai and trading centres, partly because the oases-folk were more tractable than the Bedouin, and partly because the stability of these centres gave greater opportunity for corporate religious life. The Sanusiya certainly made a deeper religious impression on the peoples of the oases than on the Bedouin.

*795 It will have been noticed also how few of the Sanusiya lodges
632 were founded in the towns of North Africa. There are no lodges
361 in the towns of Egypt and though the Order counts many
[175] followers in the towns of Cyrenaica and is politically dominant in them it has only one zawiya in each, Banghazi, Darna, and al-Marj; and that at Banghazi, the capital of the country, was

only founded about 1870. The Sanusiya lodge in Tripoli town 795*
was not built till 1882. It must, however, be remembered that in 361
Turkish times Banghazi and Darna were little more than villages 632
and al-Marj only a military post and that, as already explained, [175]*
their inhabitants were foreigners, either Jews or immigrants
from Tripolitanian towns who were generally affiliated already to
other Orders. Moreover, the Turkish administration functioned 795*
from these centres, and that alone would have prevented the 361
Grand Sanusi from making them the headquarters of his 632
mission. There could not be two governments in one large 648*
village, especially as the Grand Sanusi disapproved of the
Turks and they were suspicious of him. Also the presence of the
Turkish Government in the towns ensured order and some, even
if very small, opportunities for education and religious instruction and services, and Sayyid Muhammad bin 'Ali al-Sanusi had
settled in Cyrenaica with the express purpose of reviving the
faith and raising the culture of the totally illiterate and almost
heathen Bedouin, whose contact with the towns was negligible.
The social functions carried out by the Sanusiya lodges in 795*
Cyrenaica were more consistent with settlement among wild
tribesmen than among peaceful citizens. Propaganda of the
faith, educational work, cultivation of gardens, settlement of
disputes, provision of shelter, hospitality, and security to
travellers, and of refuge for the pursued, the weak, and the
oppressed are all functions especially appropriate to tribal and
barbarous conditions of life

The Order was based on the tribes and not on the towns. The 795*
lodges were founded by tribes or tribal sections and the tribes 619
or their sections regarded them as tribal institutions. Al-Qasur
zawiya was not just a lodge of the Order in 'Abid tribal territory. It was the 'Abid zawiya; just as al-Marj was the 'Arafa
zawiya, Shahhat the Hasa zawiya, and so on. The tribal system
and the Sanusiya organization interpenetrated. The Sanusiya
gave to the tribes a national symbol and the tribes participated
in it through their lodges. It was the combination of a common [182]
organization with representation that allowed for tribal allegiances and rivalries which provided the Order with sure
foundations.

So much was the Sanusiya organization based on the tribal
system that the distribution of the lodges may be said to

states that the total annual revenue of the lodges of the Order, 795*
excluding those at Jaghbub and Kufra, was calculated at more 434
than 200,000 Lire.[1]

The Italian figures appear to include all sources of revenue, agricultural produce, increase in stock, and the gifts received in beasts, cereals, honey, skins, mats, carpets, and butter. At the time there could have been no adequate assessment and an estimate of revenue in money is an inappropriate measure in what was for the most part a subsistence economy. The zawiya community lived partly by its own labour, largely that of servants and slaves, assisted, as explained, by the Bedouin of the vicinity at seed-time and harvest. The produce of its cultiva- 795*
tions and gardens and of its flocks and herds was supplemented 794
by contributions in kind from the Bedouin. In theory such contributions were an annual tithe, but in practice it is more likely that the Bedouin brought presents of beasts, butter, honey, &c., to the zawiya when they happened to visit it, or when its Shaikh let it be known that he was in need of something; and that now and again there was a general whip-round for a caravan to Jaghbub or Kufra. That is the Bedouin way of doing things.

Bedouin are hard-headed people and they expect a return for 795*
their labour and gifts. The neighbouring tribesmen considered 794
that they were adequately rewarded for their support of their 182
zawiya by the services it rendered, for, like the Christian [157]
monasteries of Europe in the Dark Ages, Sanusiya lodges served many purposes besides catering for religious needs. They were schools, caravanserai, commercial centres, social centres, forts, courts of law, banks, store houses, poor houses, sanctuary, and burial grounds, besides being channels through which ran a generous stream of God's blessing. They were centres of culture and security in a wild country and amid a fierce people, and they were stable points in a country where all else was constantly on the move. A Bedouin camp might be anywhere. A zawiya was fixed to the earth and its community with it. But the chief benefits the lodges conferred on the Bedouin were, as the Grand Sanusi told them in the letter quoted earlier, that they and their children might learn from scholarly and pious men the faith and precepts of Islam, that they might have the

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[1] *Cirenaica Pacificata*, 1932, p. 125.

*795 opportunity to worship in a mosque, and that by charity to their
794 lodges they might earn recompense hereafter.

• 182 Each lodge had its Shaikh, who represented the Head of the
Order. He arbitrated between the Bedouin, led the tribesmen
*795 to holy war, acted as intermediary between the tribe or section
793 and the Turkish administration, dispensed hospitality to travellers, supervised the collection of tithe, directed cultivation of grain and care of stock, dispatched surplus revenues to the Headquarters of the Order, acted as prayer-leader on Fridays, and assisted in preaching and teaching. There were besides a number of other functionaries among the Brothers:
[794] the Shaikh's deputy, the *imam* to lead the daily prayers and to teach the Koran and canon law, the *mu'allim* to teach reading, writing, and arithmetic in the zawiya school, and perhaps a special *muadhdhin* to call the faithful to prayer, though any of the Brothers could do that.

V

*795 In principle, as we have noted, the lands attached to lodges
793 belonged, like the lodges themselves, to the Order, and more
particularly to the lodge to which they were donated, and not
423 to any particular individual or family. In practice certain
Shaikhly families tended to gain an hereditary interest in them.
*795 What happened in the early days of the Order was that a Shaikh
793 was sent by its Head to found a lodge and when it was estab-
423 lished he was translated to a fresh missionary field. Shaikhs
428 of lodges were in this way moved fairly frequently at first, but
602 it later became the practice to leave a Shaikh in charge till his death and then to nominate his successor from among his kinsmen, with the approval of the tribe and on the advice of Shaikhs of neighbouring lodges. What mostly seems to have happened was that the tribal sections concerned asked for a son or brother of the last Shaikh to be appointed director of their lodge and the Head of the Order confirmed their choice. As one Darsi tribesman put it: 'The Shaikh of our zawiya must be a man favoured by the hearts of the people.' In course of time the tendency for the Shaikhship of a lodge to be regarded as hereditary became very marked, it being understood that if there was a suitable candidate from the family already established in the lodge he would be appointed, a view with which the later Heads of the

*795 find hereditary transmission of Shaikhship of lodges most
793 accentuated, such as the Bara'asa-Tamia section (al-Zawiya
613 al-Baida), the 'Awaqir-Sdaidi section (Msus zawiya), and the
428 'Abaidat-Ghaith section (Tart zawiya). In the same way the
[792] earlier Marabouts became, as has been noted, founders of
lineages which were on the pattern of the branches of the Bedouin clans among whom they lived, and attached to them.

*795 Also it must be remembered that the lodges were tribal
778 institutions built by the local Bedouin so that they might
participate in the *baraka* of Sayyid Muhammad bin 'Ali al-
793 Sanusi. They participated in it through the Shaikhs of their
619 zawiyas who received their *baraka* direct from the hands of the
● 182 Grand Sanusi himself, or from the hands of son Sayyid al-
Mahdi, and passed it on to their sons. This *baraka* belonged to the tribe, or tribal section, which built a lodge just as the *shaukha*, the secular Shaikhship of the tribe, or tribal section, belonged to it and had to be kept in it. In both the continuity of family succession had to be maintained, unless there were good reasons for acting otherwise. Thus each tribal section emphasized its autonomy in its hereditary line of religious Shaikhs, through whom the *baraka* of the founder of the Order was transmitted to them, whilst proclaiming its membership of a tribal federation with common allegiance to the Head of the Order.

*795 As I have pointed out when speaking of the sacred *Marabtin*
793 tribes of Cyrenaica, it was customary for the descendants of a
778 Marabout to reside near his tomb. I have further mentioned
[776] that the Shaikh of a Sanusiya lodge, who is also called a *Marabat*
by the Bedouin, might, if he had during life a reputation for piety, rather easily gained in Islam, be venerated as a saint when he was dead and his tomb become a shrine. This is another reason why Shaikhly families have tended to become hereditary directors of lodges.

*795 Just as almost all the Marabouts of Cyrenaica were foreigners
793 from the west, so were almost all the Shaikhs of the Sanusiya
554 lodges. The Dardafi and Isma'ili families came from Tripoli-
[167] tania, the Ghumari family from Morocco, the 'Ammur, Bu
Jibali, and Khattab families came from Algeria, and so on. As a class they enjoyed, and still enjoy, a reputation for sanctity among the Bedouin on account of their knowledge of the Koran

*795 Sudanese against the French in 1902 and, as we will see, it was
554 they who roused the Bedouin of Cyrenaica and of large parts of
*648 Tripolitania and Fazzan against the Italians in 1911; and it was
they who attempted, unsuccessfully, to rouse the Bedouin of
Egypt against the British in 1915. It was, above all, their
propaganda and personal example in the field which made the
struggle against Italy a national war and a religious crusade.
[178] To-day they have been broken by death, exile, and expropriation, and are poor and ignorant, but in the heyday of their
power the Turks rightly estimated their influence and were careful not to encroach on their prerogatives.

VI

*795 The thesis I have maintained in the foregoing pages, that the
121 Sanusiya kept its cohesion and developed into a political
• 182 organization largely because it was identified with the tribal
system of the Bedouin, is supported by the lack of cohesion, common direction, and political influence of the other Islamic Orders in Libya, which won adherents only in the towns of Cyrenaica and among the citizens and peasants of Tripolitania, and in neither country found support among the Bedouin. I mention these other Orders for this reason, and also because a reference to them, however brief, places the Sanusiya in a more general setting as only one among many Darwish Orders. These other Orders are, however, described barely, since the part they have played in the political history of Cyrenaica is negligible.

*795 The following Orders besides the Sanusiya are represented in Cyrenaica: Qadiriya, Rifa'iya, 'Arusiya, 'Isawiya, Tayyibiya, 'Azuziya, Madaniya, and Sa'adiya. The Qadiriya and the Rifa'iya are the only two classical Orders with lodges in the country, though the others eventually trace their descent from classical sources by those tortuous ramifications so confusing to the student of Islamic fraternities.

The distribution of the lodges of these Orders in Cyrenaica at the present time is shown in the table opposite. A knowledge of the history of the Orders is not necessary for an understanding of the history of the Sanusiya in Cyrenaica and is therefore omitted. It is necessary only to know that they all entered Cyrenaica from the west, both those, the majority,

[TEXT CONTINUED ON PAGE 86]

of their affiliations. Hence the Sanusiya does not oppose the 795*
other Orders in the towns on a religious plane, although it does 798
not approve of those which are convulsionary, and they do not
compete with it politically. It is only in the interior that the
Order will not permit a rival, because competition for the
allegiance of the Bedouin must be political. Italian efforts to [648]*
play off these Orders against the Sanusiya were founded on
ignorance of the nature of an Islamic *tariqa* and seem to have
been ineffectual.

Since almost all the non-Sanusiya lodges are urban it follows 795*
that the history of the growth and spread of the Orders is 369
part of the general history of the growth and spread of the
urban centres of Cyrenaica. Some of the older lodges in
Benghazi and Darna are over 150 years old, but most of them
and all those in the smaller administrative centres date from
late Turkish times or were built during the Italian occupation.
An urban lodge is generally a small, very simple, structure and
its members seldom total more than 50 to 100. It may be [575]
regarded as a kind of club, founded for religious exercises, for
the performance of good works, and for social insurance. It [485]
also serves as a resthouse for travelling members of the Order
and as a *malja*, a place of refuge for the poor and the sick. Few
of the lodges are endowed, and most are very poor.

I do not wish to underestimate the social and, in the broadest 795*
sense, political importance of the urban Orders in Cyrenaica. 182 ●
They provide the only spontaneous and co-operative associations in the towns and thus fill a gap for ordinary people both in the town society and in a religion which pays little attention either to corporeal works or, outside the mosques, to corporate worship. Outside the lodges of the Orders there were in Turkish times no associations dispensing charity or giving education, and worship in the mosques within the wide society of Islam does not provide the intimacy and colour men need in acts of common devotion. The lodges give to their members a double attachment and a double security, membership of a welfare association, which gives them a feeling of material security, and membership of a devotional group, which gives them a feeling of spiritual security. Also, in spite of their lack of numbers and organization, the urban lodges are links in chains which, running through Islamic countries and cutting across natural

*795 182 and political boundaries, help to keep the Islamic world together against the impact of western civilization and imperialism. A member of the Qadiriya or Rifa'iya Orders can wander from lodge to lodge from China to the Atlantic. A member of the Madaniya is received as a brother if he goes to Maknas, Istanbul, or Mecca. An 'Isawi or 'Arusi finds lodges of his Order all over North Africa, obeying the same rules, bearing the same banner, using the same books of devotion, performing the same ritual, and bound by a common brotherhood. These Orders, therefore, are not unimportant in shaping and propagating a common opinion and feeling among Muslims about any question of the day which affects Islam.

795 369 182 [668] But in a narrower political sense they have little importance, even in the urban centres. They are too weak and poor to act as cells in a movement of a political kind, for they show, as René Brunel says of the 'Isawiya, 'lack of unity of direction' and 'absolute lack of cohesion'[1] In Cyrenaica the Sanusiya alone has been capable of becoming a political movement and hence of all the Orders alone aroused the suspicion of Istanbul and the hostility of Rome. We may inquire, therefore, what it is which has distinguished the Sanusiya from the other Orders in the country. [186] As we have noted earlier, the fakiristic exhibitions of some of the Orders, so dear to the common man in the towns, were uncongenial, even repellent, to the Bedouin, who, in any case, had no affection for the townsmen and for things emanating from the towns. Also the Bedouin, socially and morally secure in their tribal and kinship systems, felt no need for further associations. Their need was for some authority lying outside their segmentary tribal system which could compose intertribal and intersectional disputes and bind the tribes and tribal sections together within an organization and under a common symbol. [575] Hence, while the urban lodges were clubs—and this was the status of the Sanusiya lodges in the towns as much as it was that of the lodges of the other Orders—the Sanusiya lodges in the country-side were political, administrative, and economic, as well as religious and educational, centres. The urban lodges followed the social pattern in urban communities generally. Corporate life was narrowed to small quarters, single streets, a few houses, outside which people belonged, it is true, to a residential community but felt no strong obligation to one another nor the need for common action. Religious Orders in such communities tend to become fractionized along the lines of social cleavage into sub-urban and sub-sub-urban lodges, each serving a few families in its vicinity and leading its own life with its own following and resources independently of the others. Social life in the towns is amorphous. There is no structure corresponding to the tribal system. The Sanusiya became dominant because it shunned the towns and sought its converts among the Bedouin and built its centres within the tribes. The Sanusiya Brotherhood was founded on a Bedouin brotherhood. 795 369 182

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[1] *Essai sur la Confrérie religieuse des 'Aîssâoua au Maroc*, 1926, p. 53.

It is of great interest to note that the Sanusiya held a place in relation to other Orders in western Arabia like to that which it held in Cyrenaica. The learned Dutch Arabist, Snouck Hurgronje, who spent a year in western Arabia in 1884 and 1885, states that in the towns the Order 'has remained to this day highly honoured, but by no means overtopping its sister orders. For the districts of the Hejaz, inhabited by Harbis and other Beduins, it possesses however the highest significance, for its practical mission has succeeded in bringing to a great extent under its leadership the sons of the desert who are refractory to all authority and are far removed from the official Islam.'[1]

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[1] C. Snouck Hurgronje, *Mekka in the latter Part of the 19th Century*, 1931, pp. 55–6. (First published in 1888–9.) [113]

tion were compelled to pay taxes and furnish supplies, and how 175*
forty-five of the Shaikhs of the Jawazi tribe were treacherously 648*
murdered and many of their followers massacred.[1] Generally, however, it may be said that Cyrenaica has no history, other than Bedouin traditions of inter-tribal wars, from 1051 to 1835, in which year the Turks regained control of Libya from the Caramanlis. On their return they instituted a more systematic administration than had been exercised during their earlier occupation.

The Turks returned to Cyrenaica about the time the Grand 175*
Sanusi first visited the country and eight years after their 648*
reoccupation he founded his first zawiya on the plateau. As 795*
the Sanusiya Order gained the confidence of the Bedouin and [793]
became accepted as their spokesmen, it was necessary for the
Ottoman authorities to take it into consideration in their dealings with the tribes of the interior. The Order made it possible 175*
for the different tribes to express themselves politically as a 648*
unit for the first time in their relations with the outside world. 182 •
The tribes provided the Order with a social system, and the 795*
Order gave to that system a political organization at a time when it was beginning to be brought into more direct contact with political forces outside tribal society.

The Sanusiya is known to have been given a Charter about 175*
1856 by Sultan 'Abd al-Majid I. His firman was brought from 648*
Istanbul by Sidi 'Abd al-Rahim al-Maghbub, later Shaikh of 795*
the Sanusiya zawiya at Banghazi, who had been sent to Istanbul [793]
for the purpose and had the utmost difficulty, as was often the case with visitors to the Ottoman capital, in obtaining an
audience with the Sultan. Whatever other privileges the firman [794]
conferred on the Order—I have not seen the document—it
certainly exempted its properties from taxation and permitted [651]
it to collect a religious tithe from its followers. A second firman was issued later by Sultan 'Abd al-Majid's brother, Sultan 'Abd al-'Aziz, and was brought from Istanbul to the Governor of Tripoli by Sidi Abu al-Qasim al-'Isawi, 'Abd al-Rahim's successor in the Banghazi lodge. There is in the Land Registry at Banghazi a letter from the Governor of Tripoli to the Governor
of Banghazi giving the essence of this firman. It confirms the [778]
privileges granted by the earlier firman and adds to them that

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[1] Op. cit., *passim* and p. 220 seq.

CHAPTER V

THE FIRST ITALO-SANUSI WAR (1911–17)

I

128 I HAVE given an account of the conditions in which the Sanusiya
*795 took root in Cyrenaica and of the circumstances which favoured
its growth. I now describe how its Bedouin followers, under
*648 its leadership, resisted Italian aggression during two wars, from
*175 1911 to 1917 and from 1923 to 1932, and finally lost their
independence and suffered Italian domination until relieved by
British arms in 1942. It will be seen how the long struggle
accentuated the political functions of the Sanusiya in a manner
I indicate forthwith.

121 For segmentary structures of the kind we find among the
● 182 Bedouin of Cyrenaica to develop rudimentary governmental,
or statal, organs it would seem necessary that for a long period
*648 of time all the segments of the society should find themselves
in common opposition to some outside force. It is not merely
that such opposition fuses the segments in corporate action. A
new form of political structure which includes the enemy comes
into existence and necessitates a new orientation of political
values. In a segmentary system each segment sees itself as a
unity in opposition to an opposed segment of the same size and
kind; so when all the segments come into a corporate relation of
opposition to some political group outside them which has a
different kind of political structure and belongs to a different
political system they tend to see themselves as a unity *vis-à-vis*
this group and as a unity on the same structural model as itself.
[177] The small Bedouin society of Cyrenaica in this way slowly took
on the political form of the European countries into the orbit
of which it was drawn. It could only enter into structural relations with the states of Europe on the model of the European
state.

*175 When the Italians invaded the country and the Turks made
*648 peace the tribes continued their resistance in the name of the
Sanusiya. In their social system tribe was balanced against
*795 tribe and tribal section against tribal section. It was the
619 Sanusiya which gave to all the tribes and their sections a com-

*175 *648 *795 793 Accord of al-Rajma. But the Italians were not yet ready to break with him finally, not wishing to compromise the operations they were carrying out in Tripolitania. They therefore started new discussions, conducted in person by Amendola, the Minister for the Colonies, who, on his return to Italy, expressed satisfaction with the talks and confidence in the Amir, neither of which he could have felt. In Mondaini's opinion the Government's policy of continuing to treat with the Sanusiya at so late a stage was consistent and, in the circumstances, wise, for it was believed that the greed for lucre and honours so unashamedly displayed by members of the Amir's family would bring them into disrepute among the Arabs, while the Government would be able to organize under its administration the zone of the plateau nearest its coastal bases and thus prepare for its penetration into the interior. In defence of Amendola's policy, later subjected to much criticism,[1] Mondaini further observes that the Fascist Government itself delayed action till the spring of 1923 when the Tripolitanian rebellion had been crushed.[2]

Concessions certainly did not lessen tension. The Italians [712] [701] [182] felt that the Sanusiya was using the 'Mixed Camps' as a medium for anti-Italian propaganda, as indeed they were, not only through their official representatives in the camps but also through persons not officially recognized, such as the Sanusiya Shaikhs 'Umar al-Mukhtar, Salih al-'Awwami, and Khalid al-Humri; and they suspected that Shaikh 'Abd al-Aziz al-'Isawi had been sent by the Amir into the Misurata region to act as his liaison with the insurgents there. The Amir had selected for his personal advisers the most recalcitrant of the zawiya Shaikhs. They further accused the Order of responsibility for certain incidents which happened in the late summer of 1922: an attack on an Italian postal car near al-Zawiya al-Baida and the firing of some Italian property at al-Zuwaitina. Rome, said to have been misled by 'Umar Pasha al-Kakhiya, blamed the local government for these incidents and appointed a new Governor who made a further, and as it turned out final, gesture of conciliation by paying to the Amir the remainder of the money owing to him under the Accord of al-Rajma. But nothing could brake the wheels now. Already in August the Committee elected

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[1] Giglio, op. cit., p. 99.

[2] Mondaini, op. cit., p. 475.

174 not male names are used, is assumed; and secondly that the
613 Bedouin are polygamous. If, then, half-brother differentiation
551 or full sibling unity is to be shown genealogically, the obvious
562 way in which this can be done is to use a maternal name in the
genealogy. Thus, in the Cyrenaican genealogy, a number of
tribal groups will be shown as sons of a particular father. If dif-
182 ferentiation of these groups needs to be shown, this can be ef-
613 fected by clustering the groups round, say, two female names
551 (the names of the respective mothers) thereby making the two
562 clusters of groups stand in the relationship of paternal half
brothers. The concept of the 'one womb', of maternal origin, is a critical one in the context of social cohesion, but it does not deny patriliny; on the contrary, it serves in a sense to reinforce it. Female names can be used to show a greater notion of cohesion than the mere use of male names, and the significance of a female name placed at the apex of the Cyrenaican genealogy is that it is the symbol of full brother unity at the highest political level.

173 The founding ancestress Sa'ada is credited with two sons, who
613 in turn are considered to be the founding ancestors of the two
largest groups of tribes in Cyrenaica. Each of these sons is said
619 to have begottten two sons, as shown on the accompanying
genealogy. The next generation shows a total of nine names, and these nine ancestors are considered to be the founding ancestors of the nine noble tribes of Cyrenaica.[2] Continuing the line of descent of one of these tribes—the Magharba—the same pattern of segmentation repeats itself: the tribe is divided into two primary sections having ar-Ra'aid and ash-Shamakh as the respective founding ancestors. Ash-Shamakh is said to have had four sons, and these are the founding ancestors of four secondary sections. These latter four are credited with a varying number of sons, as shown in the genealogy (Fig. 18-1).

One feature of the Cyrenaican genealogy immediately stands out from this brief description: the uniformity in the number of segments at the various levels of segmentation. Along the line of descent from Sa'ada to Nasr, the number of sons shown in the

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[162] [2] One of these, the 'Ailat Fayid, now only numbers about 150 souls, and although it is given the structural position of a tribe in the genealogy, it scarcely merits this distinction in practice.

601
173
613
619


SA'ADA
(1)
BARAGHITH
'AQQARA
(2)
BARAGHUTH AL-SGHAIR
JIBARNA
HARABI
'ALI (In Egypt)
TRIBES
(3)
'ABID
'ARIF
'AWAQIR
MAGHARBA
DARSA
HASA
BARA'ASA
'AILAT FAYID
ABAIDAT
(4) PRIMARY
AL-RA'AIDAT
AULAD AL-SHAMAKH
(5) SECONDARY
'ALI
MANSUR
NASR
SUBH
(6) TERTIARY
13
6
4
4
MADHKUR
HAIBA
AL-DAWWAS
UMBARAKA

FIG. 18-1 GENEALOGY 1. The names given in this genealogy are the tribal names in use. All are derivatives of personal names of ancestors, like all tribal names, except for some nicknames (e.g. Baraghith means 'the fleas') and a few which refer to a general location (e.g. the Magharba means the 'Westerners'). [551]

first four descending generations is two. At the fifth level the 173
number increases to four and finally, at the sixth level there 613
characteristically occurs a marked irregularity in the number of 619
descendants forming the founding ancestors of the tertiary sections.

Another feature of the Cyrenaican genealogy is that its 613
branches show an intimate relationship with ecological areas. 619
Thus, the major division into two branches stemming from 13
Sa'ada represents the eastern and western halves of the country 182 ●
with associated and clear differences in ecology. Continuing the line of descent, the Jibarna and Baraghith groups of tribes occupy plain and mountain foot-hills respectively. The two Jibarna tribes in turn occupy two distinct kinds of plain. Following now the division of the Magharba tribe, its two primary sections are divided by a very conspicuous dry valley. The four secondary divisions of the Aulad ash-Shamakh primary section likewise show a relation to ecological boundaries, albeit on a smaller scale than those previously referred to, but none the less important in this more local context. Finally, the unevenly numbered tertiary sections which are derived from these four

613 619 13 secondary sections, in their very unevenness, show a more sensitive relation to more detailed ecological differences.

182 At all levels of segmentation, therefore, a high degree of consistency between the ecological divisions of the country and the genealogical divisions can be shown. Indeed the relationship is so close that it is tempting to consider the contemporary pattern of things as the only one possible. What historical evidence [167] exists is against such a view being taken. It is known that tribes have been displaced in the past, some of them or sections of them having been pushed out into Egypt, and others having altered their position. This being so, there obviously cannot be any finality about the present distribution of tribes in relation to the ecological divisions of the country. Rather, the existing pattern is one of a number of possible permutations. Again, as the relation between groups of people to their environment becomes progressively sensitive with the decrease in the size and order of the group, then the more unstable will be the relationship between the two. Conversely the greater the size and order of the group the more persistent will be its relationship to the ecology. In other words, the major ecological divisions are more fundamental in their effect on the way of life and the economy of people, whereas the more detailed ecological differences between, say, tertiary sections have a relatively minor effect. The [233] [433] ecological differences between the wooded plateau area with its cow and goat herding economy, and the arid semi-desert area with its camel and sheep herding economy has a much more profound effect on the general way of life, and is a more persistent division, than that which exists between two tertiary sections where the differences may only be in topographical details.

While therefore, the division of people into groups of various sorts is not permanently fixed in relation to ecological divisions, there is always an intimate relationship between the two which is progressively more enduring as the order of the structural segment increases. Yet even this statement of the relationship, guarded as it is, does not suffice, for the pattern and distribution of tribes and their sections at any given moment are not only a function of ecology, but they are also the result of a number of other complex factors which may be operating to reinforce or to

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complicate the more direct relationship of the distribution of 619
groups of people to the ecology.[3] [13]

The Cyrenaican genealogy, then, is a conceptualization of a [182]
hierarchy[4] of ordered territorial segments. The groups stemming from the ancestor at the third order of segmentation are referred to as tribes, and each tribe is the apex of a three-tiered order of segments, which, following customary practice, are referred to as primary, secondary, and tertiary. The latter, the tertiary segment, 621
represents the group of people who, for a period of six to eight 613
months, gather together and live in what, for all intents and purposes, is a single discrete residential group.[5] This tertiary group is also the smallest political group. It has its own homeland, with its [423]
water supplies, pastures, and ploughland. In this homeland live most of its members. It is a lineage segment, and most of the agnates of this segment live on their own homeland.[6] It is also the [682]
vengeance group, which means that any one of its members can be killed in vengeance for a homicide committed by any other, [628]
and that the obligation to exact vengeance falls on all members alike, regardless of relationship to the victim. Likewise, its members pay blood money as a group, and although when they receive it, a bigger portion goes to the nearest agnate of the victim, the remainder is distributed equally among all its members. The number of generations which supervene between the founding ancestor of a tertiary segment and the living is usually four or five, but there is little consistency in this number. Some tertiary

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[3] This part of the discussion is necessarily brief, but further amplification will appear in two subsequent articles now in preparation, one of which is concerned with a general treatment of Cyrenaican genealogies, and the other with a discussion of the effects of ecology on the social organization of the Bedouin. [114]

[4] I use the word hierarchy here since, although segments of any order display many like features, the orders represent distinct and progressively more embracing interests, and these differences are of such consequence that to consider one order of groups as a facsimile of a superior or inferior order can only lead to confusion. A tertiary group, that is to say, may possess many of the characteristics of a secondary group, but the one is a fundamentally different sort of group from the other, as I shall show in my forthcoming article on the feud. (cf. Smith, M. G. 1956.) [128]

[5] This statement does not apply to the Darsa and the Hasa tribes, two of the plateau tribes in Cyrenaica. The statements in this article are confined almost exclusively to the camel herders of the semi-desert. [619] [28]

[6] This, admittedly, is too general a statement to make about such an important issue, but I would prefer to leave its documentation and precision for an article on the analysis of the composition of Bedouin camps.

173 cline in the total population of a tribe, then, the extinction of
178 lines does not affect any order of segmentation superior to the
613 tertiary. In this respect, the Cyrenaican genealogy differs fundamentally
621 from those collected from the Nuer by Evans-Pritchard.
In the quotation from his work on Nuer genealogies (1951), he
[171] asserts that telescoping occurs 'from the founder of the minimal
lineage further up the line of ascent to the founder of the clan'.
This major difference has serious implications for any discussion
of lineage proliferation, but these must be left until the conditions
under which proliferation is likely to occur have been analysed.

178 While it is true that the processes discussed are of importance
613 in retaining the general shape of the genealogy, what is assumed
621 so far is that the Cyrenaican population has been stable over long
161 periods. Stability of population is not an unreasonable assumption
182 to make for a people who live on the margin of subsistence
in a country where extended periods of drought are not infrequent,
[173] though seldom leading, it is true, to actual famine conditions,
[731] but producing periodic and local food and water shortages.
Disease, following quickly in the trail of shortage, it can be assumed,
kept the relationship of total population to the natural
resources fairly constant. What evidence there is does not support
[726] even this very general assumption, since it is known that there
have been large-scale tribal wars in the past, and a certain
[167] amount of movement of tribes, some being displaced and others
pushed eastwards into Egypt. Unless these shifts were caused by
increases in the aggregate population and the consequent pressure on land and water, it is difficult to account for them. This consideration of possible overall increases in population in the past poses interesting problems related to lineage structure which cannot be adequately treated here. For the moment it is proposed to neglect possible increases in the total population during past periods in the history of Cyrenaica. The historical depth of the view now to be discussed is about seventy years, and for this period I have no evidence of any large-scale increases in population. It is reasonable, therefore, to assume a general stability of
[132] population for this period. But the vagaries of the Cyrenaican
climate are such that, in a given year, one area might be well
drenched with rain, giving excellent pastures for animals and
good crops, while a nearby territorial strip might suffer a partial

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drought giving insufficient pastures and poor crops. Good or bad 613
crops, poor or abundant pasture, in turn mean a higher or lower 621
milk yield from the animals and better or worse living conditions 161
for human beings. Such factors as these may well, over a number 182
of years, lead to unevenness in the distribution of population [132]
throughout the tertiary sections. Whatever the cause, the genealogies
show that the population of the numerous tertiary sections [173]
is unequal. Some are numerically so weak that they have to
join a collateral section. Others are numerically so strong that
their natural resources are insufficient to meet the needs of all
their members. It was these latter segments which were in the
process of splitting, and which in some cases have already done
so. The next task, then, is to demonstrate where, on the genealogy, [128]
proliferation is effected.

We have seen that in Nuer genealogies segments proliferate at 173
all orders of segmentation. Here, the process is a continuous one, 177
beginning at any point in time within the minimal lineage and 613
progressing upwards to the apex of lineage bifurcation. As particular 551
names become significant within the minimal segment, they are retained and become a permanent addition to the genealogy. In order to include these successively additional names, names of ascending ancestors are shunted further and further into the genealogical past, until presumably the effect is felt at the topmost limit of the genealogy, when the names here are pushed out of the genealogical framework altogether, and forgotten for ever. More than this, the upward shift in names at each and every point in the genealogical line means also a consequent re-ordering of structural relationships, at all levels in the
system. One vital difference between Nuer and Bedouin societies 173
which may partly, at least, account for the different genealogical 178
processes at work among them is that the Nuer, when they were 613
studied by Evans-Pritchard, were expanding territorially, and [171]
that continuous proliferation of segments throughout the structure
was the mode of dealing with a situation of expansion. The [648]
Bedouin, on the other hand, had suffered twenty years of terrible privation at the hands of the Italians, during which period thousands of them died in battle and in concentration camps, were shot up in their camps from the air, or died from want, before I went to live among them. Although I must confess that I now

Although I must confess that I now
173 find it difficult to accept Evans-Pritchard's view of genealogical
178 growth and development as stated for the Nuer, it was the view
613 I originally held with regard to Bedouin genealogies. Indeed,
551 thinking in genealogical terms only, it appears inevitable that the
114 addition of successive generations can only mean the lengthening
of the genealogy, or, if the length is to remain constant, extrusion of ancestral names must take place at the apex of the genealogy. If this view is to be accepted, several other conclusions must be accepted with it. The genealogy, as far as it goes at least, is an accurate record of descent—some names may have been lopped off at the top, but otherwise the genealogy represents a faithful statement of succession. Again, if successive generations are to be added to the genealogy, then its base must continually expand laterally. From what is known of contemporary Bedouin genealogies, there is no evidence which leads to the supposition that their base is progressively widening. With regard to the authenticity of the names in the genealogy, above the point of tertiary segmentation, I hope to show in a subsequent article on Bedouin genealogies in general, that names above the tertiary point of segmentation have remained fixed for very long periods of time, and that they bear slight relation to the passage of generations over the last century at least; moreover, in this article I hope to demonstrate that what manipulation of the genealogy takes place does not affect more than about four or five ascending generations from the living.

121 Part of the difficulty in a study of this sort lies in the strong
173 temptation to think of the genealogy *per se*, even though it is
613 readily admitted that it has a value in itself for the Bedouin. Yet
even in these terms the genealogy must always represent an ordered grouping of people, and these people live on strips of territory. The starting point of the analysis then ought to begin with the territorial ordering of groups of people. The relation of groups of people to land, moreover, is determined by the carrying capacity of that land, and it is this prerequisite which is the main variable in discussing genealogical manipulation, and not the
● [182] other way about. The main landmarks of the Cyrenaican ecology
are fixed points which cannot be manipulated to fit in with the genealogy; it is the genealogy which must be altered to comprehend the distribution of people in their ecological setting.

613 At the next level of segmentation (this now being the tertiary
619 order in any given tribe) the number of segments which appear
621 is conspicuously irregular. For the Magharba tribe, the four secondary
segments, 'Ali, Mansur, Subh and Nasr are divided into
thirteen, six, four, and four segments respectively. Similar irregularity
appears in other tribes.[11] The pattern of the genealogy
is always one of regularity in the number of segments at all points
in it except for the point of tertiary segmentation where conspicuous
irregularity becomes immediately evident. Since these
613 segments constitute the summer camps of the Bedouin, this is not
619 surprising, for these small groups will show greater susceptibility
621 to details of local water supplies, pasturing facilities, ploughland
133 areas, and topographical features than would the numerically
larger and structurally superior groups occupying larger areas of
182 territories of greater ecological importance. If we follow the line
131 from Sa'ada to Nasr again, the bifurcation at the first order of
segmentation is consistent with the division of the country into
the permanently green high altitudes of the plateau, and the extended
low-lying plain area of the western half of the country.
[134] Between the territory of the Magharba tribe ('The White Plain')
and that of its neighbour tribe, the 'Awaqir ('The Red Plain'),
there is a major soil difference, which is such a conspicuous feature
of the landscape, and so sharply defined, that one is almost
aware when one has crossed the tribal boundary. Within the
Magharba tribe, a prominent dry river valley cuts the territory
in two, the landscape to the west of it being characteristically
serrated, making travel in an east-west direction difficult, while
to the east the landscape is much more docile and undulating.
The four sections of the ash-Shamakh branch again represent
four quite distinct areas. The territory of one section is almost
conterminous with the narrow belt of sand dunes along the coast;
the territory of another is a block of rough and tumbled land in
the west; the territory of a third, in the centre, is made up of a
few low-lying shallow valleys; and the territory of the fourth,

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[114] [11] It is necessary here to warn the reader that, brilliant an ethnographer as Agostini undoubtedly was, his grouping of tribal sections is not always correct. I had his book (Agostini 1922–23) with me in the field and checked his tribal survey. I found that at several important points his ordering of the segments was incorrect. I should add that the differences between Agostini and myself are not due to the kind of changes discussed in this article.

stretching across to the village of Ajadabiya in the east, topples 613
in undulations away into the flat expanses of the desert to the 619
south. At all these points of segmentation, the territories occu- 621
pied by the various sections are large and roughly defined, and 133
the population aggregates supported on these territories run from 182 •
over a thousand at one end to tens of thousands at the upper 131
limits. The tertiary sections are numerically much smaller, some of them numbering as few as a hundred souls in all, and the territories to which they are attached are correspondingly smaller. The relationship between the numbers in this order of section, and the precise amount of water available in the local wells is an intimate one. If the population of one of these groups increases, or if the number of animals rises, or if the springs show a decline in the volume of water they give forth, or if the winter rainfall has allowed the storage in wells of only a small quantity of water, a rearrangement of the group must be effected. A significant alteration of any one of these components must mean that the local group must split to enable a new adjustment to be made in the relationship of man and animals to water.

Whatever changes occur within groups of any size, since the 173
genealogy embraces the entire population, these must appear on 178
the genealogy in some way or other. Now a genealogy is as rigid 829
a framework, as fixed and final a pattern of grouping, as can be 613
imagined. The impression that they are thus rigid and fixed, ex- 551
cept for the addition of successive generations, is strengthened by the way in which the Bedouin use them. From their young boys to their old men, the Bedouin are expert genealogists, and the names of ancestors, for one reason or another, are never far
from their lips. Names are kept alive by constant use, since all [571]
references to inter-group relationships must be in terms of these
names. More than this, the Bedouin were proud to the point of 173
boastfulness of their genealogical knowledge, and, wherever I 829
travelled, the first request I had to comply with was to take down
a large portion of a tribal genealogy. In recording their endless 613
genealogies, one feature about them came to assume increasing 551
interest; while there was remarkable unanimity with regard to 123
most of the names given, there was one point of marked am- 126
biguity—at the tertiary level of segmentation. I recorded genealogies in four tribes on an extensive scale, and in each tribe

619 attached somewhere along the line, to attach it to one of these
608 names. Bedouin welcome, as members of their camps, practically
613 anyone who wishes to join, even, in the case of one group, an
621 Italian. The limit to this acceptance of members is, of course, the
173 number of people who can be supported by the local resources.
If people are being admitted freely to membership of a particular
[182] camp, this means that there is a local surplus of land and water,
so that the number of grafts being supported by any particular section is a useful index of the extent to which the resources are being used. Conversely, as sometimes happens when grafted elements become numerous, or when the water supply, for various reasons, dwindles, it may be necessary to detach a grafted group.
[578] Such action is always the occasion of a violent dispute, usually
over watering rights, and not infrequently fights break out. Whether or not the grafted group wins, from then onwards it will be forced to exist as an independent group, and a new tertiary section will have been born. No matter which of the processes involving grafts is considered–incorporation or detachment–both are contained within the framework of the tertiary section, without any effect on the rest of the structure.

619 The position of the clients, in the context of this discussion, is
not unlike that of the grafts. Briefly, clients are men who are con-
[423] sidered to have originated from a country other than Cyrenaica,
and who for this reason cannot claim rights to land and water–at least this is the theory, although in some circumstances they are able to do so successfully. They are of various kinds, but they are not included in the genealogies given by the free-born. Clients are found grouped in two main ways. There are some large groups which constitute tribes in the sense that they display a genealogical and territorial organization like those of the free-born, and are usually to be found flanking the main tribes of the country on their borders. Some of these are powerful groups and enjoy considerable independence of action, but whatever their characteristics they none the less speak of themselves as 'for' or
619 tied to the noble tribe whose territory includes theirs. Further,
571 the sections of these client tribes have their special ties with
621 tertiary sections of the noble tribes, which are not merely ties of
sentiment, but which take the form of valuable mutual help in a
613 number of situations. A whole client tribe, in the sense that it is

occupying territory which cannot be said to belong to any particular 619
section of their noble patron tribe, is tied to the patron 571
tribe as such. Yet it is through the small tertiary segments that 621
these ties are made effective. In this sense, a client tribe is a combination 613
of small groups of people each group having specific relationships with defined tertiary sections, and participating in the tribe of their patrons through these relationships.

Secondly, clients are found distributed in small groups, sometimes 619
no more than one or two men, but often in clusters large 621
enough to compose a small camp. Practically all tertiary sections 613
of the noble tribes have some clients either living with them or
sharing their resources. While clients continue to reside with a 619
particular tertiary section, it is the members of the latter who are 621
responsible for them and vice versa. If, for example, one of the 613
clients commits a homicide, the gathering of blood-money is the 672
responsibility of the noble tertiary section to which he is attached, [682]
and vengeance can be exacted on any member of the
noble section. In other circumstances, when the offender is a
nobleman, then the clients of his group are the first to be approached
for blood-money. Tied in this way to a particular 619
tertiary section, they are not, however, compelled to reside with 621
its members permanently. On the contrary, they may be forced 182
to move. If, for example, there is a pressure on local water supplies, 166
the first to feel it are the clients. Annually, they supplicate 613
for the use of water, and if their patrons decide that there is insufficient to meet all needs, the request is refused, albeit reluctantly. Clients constitute a socially mobile group; they are the pawns in the annual readjustment of men to their resources. Whenever they move, they pass on to another tertiary section, which may be a collateral section of the one they have left or structurally far removed from it, but as soon as they leave one, their duties and obligations cease and are taken up anew with another structurally like group. It is because their attachment is to a tertiary section, and not to one of superior order, that they can be as socially mobile as they are, which in turn facilitates a more efficient adjustment to the ecological situation from year to year.

Small groups of clients move frequently, groups of adopted people less frequently, and groups composed of the free-born

619 621 182 166 613 change their structural position only rarely. The latter change sometimes does, however, occur, and there is evidence to show that it does. For example, Agostini (1922–23, p. 323) in his tribal survey, records a section named Barsha as one of the groups stemming from Nasr.[12] In the genealogies I was given, the name did not appear, and even after some questioning, what information was known about it was concealed. Some time later the name [578] cropped up accidentally in conversation, and I was then told that at one time it had been one of the Nasr groups, but that after a quarrel during a year of water shortage, the Barsha folk went to live with people with whom they had maternal connexions, and in whose territory there was ample water that year, and never returned. The group, a tertiary one, was detached from the tertiary point of segmentation in the genealogies, and tied on to a tertiary group of another tribe in its new homeland.

178 173 619 621 613 To summarize briefly the argument thus far, the mechanical devices of telescoping, fusion of names, the ejection of those names which cease to be of any social consequence, and the elision of names at or around the fifth ascending generation, taken together point to the importance of the tertiary order of segmentation in discussing the problem of maintaining the form of the genealogy constant in face of its natural tendency to alter; further, evidence of changes (adoption into a lineage, detachment from it, the inclusion and exclusion of clients) was presented, and this again led to the conclusion that the tertiary point of segmentation is critical in this respect. This being so, the man- [128] ner in which change actually occurs, still remains to be shown, and this is best done, perhaps, by discussing the mode of proliferation of tertiary segments. In order to do this adequately, it is necessary to say something briefly about certain features of Bedouin marriage.

582 605 Among the Bedouin there exists a preferential form of marriage between a man and his father's brother's daughter. Parallel cousin marriage of this sort carries with it the exclusive right of a man to this cousin. Without his consent no one else can marry her, and to attempt to do so would be to risk the marriage arrangements being nullified after negotiations had almost been

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[114] [12] Barsha's position is incorrectly given as a sub-group of Haiba; it should be shown as structurally equivalent to Haiba. See also note 11.

621 hundred of their sheep are grazing in the neighbourhood. This is beside the point.
613 What is important is that the offender's group is showing a desire to remain on
628 friendly terms, and members of the victim's group are doing likewise by accepting
682 reduced amounts. Compared with what the payments should be, after four years they
are trivial and soon cease altogether. Blood money, if it is to achieve the purpose of
621 restoring peaceful relationships, must work in this way among the Bedouin, for, as
613 they view the matter, a single payment of the full amount would only terminate
628 relationships. There would be no further obligations to hold them together. The
682 payment of a debt in full means only one thing—hostility. Where there is no debt,
571 there are no relationships. Debt must be allowed to run between groups, for it is this
182 which creates obligations and perpetuates social relationships.[1] As the debt of blood
money mounts, the social relationships between the groups improve. The cessation
of payments and the absence of further demands is final earnest that the relationships
are again normal.

613 The second step in this exposition, therefore, is to attach to homicide between
628 tertiary sections the penalty of vengeance or the payment of blood money, both
621 achieving the same end of bringing about a restoration of peaceful relationships.

682 Between secondary sections, relationships are again different. Ecologically, the
619 areas are distinct. The topography may be dissimilar—sand dunes in one area and
613 low valleys in another; secondly, the soils may differ—sandy soil here and firm valley
[133] bottom soil there; thirdly, while the climatic régime of the two areas may be broadly
similar, since there is marked variability in the aggregate annual rainfall which is
[132] coupled with a high variability from place to place, each secondary section has its
own micro-climate, sufficiently well defined for one area to be well watered in any
given year while a neighbouring area suffers partial drought. These differences affect
[221] productive activities. Seasonal movements are also affected: some secondary sections
move annually over considerable distances and in fixed directions, while members of
a collateral section may move only a few miles and these short moves may vary in
direction from year to year. It is true that minor ecological differences exist between
collateral tertiary sections, but these do not affect the economy and the way of life in
the manner described for secondary sections. Partly because of their territorial extent,
partly because of the larger aggregate population, the secondary sections are more
self-contained, not only ecologically and economically but also in terms of social
relationship. More of the requirements of everyday living can be met within the
territory and span of a secondary section than within those of a tertiary section.
Secondary sections develop a kind of specialization to the extent that in any year
some of them will have more usable natural resources than others, but because these
differences are ephemeral they do not lead to the development of permanent trade
relations. Add to all this the fact that agnates are concentrated in camps on the territory which belongs to their lineage, and the discreteness of secondary sections is
[582] immediately apparent. Marriage rules make this discreteness potentially, at least, even
more sharply defined, for unlike other 'lineage societies' where exogamy, coupled
with other marriage regulations, compels the dispersion of kin links among lineage

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[1] This point becomes clearer when considered in the general context of debt relationship among the Bedouin. Marriage payments, gift exchanges, hospitality, various forms of help, and so on are all aspects, with blood money, of an intricate and fascinating web of debt relationships.

Second, the fiction that nothing has happened, which characterises the 585 father's behavior, does not cease with the termination of the celebrations. 593 Each morning, soon after daybreak and before the camp is astir, the groom must leave his bride and repair to his father's tent to lie at his father's side "as he always had done in the past, as if he had not left him." This conventional ruse is followed, not just for the seven days of wedding festivities, but is continued after the groom has moved back into the camp proper, and pitched his tent alongside his father's, with the ropes of the two tents crossing.

In matters other than sleeping arrangements, this fiction that "nothing has happened" is maintained. Marriage does not mean the immediate crea- [592] tion of a wholly separate domestic unit. Save for the appearance of an additional tent, the ordinary run of daytime activities is scarcely altered. To 593 mention perhaps the most important feature of the relationships between 264 father and son, the groom continues to eat with his father. As yet, the son 571 does not use his own bowl,[1] and may not, indeed, do so for several years. 182 The important symbolism of "eating together" or "eating out of the one bowl," the act of commensality creating a bond of fellowship about which Robertson Smith[2] wrote so eloquently can only be referred to here in one of its many aspects. Bedouin themselves stress that eating together is a strong bond, and the communal meal is always used for this purpose after the settlement of a dispute, or at the conclusion of a blood-money agreement, and so on. It is significant also in the sense that those who partake of a [574] meal accept the authority of the host; he becomes their protector, and a blow against one of them is struck at him also. Even if the guest is an enemy,[3] as long as he has eaten from another's bowl his life is safe.

The slaughter of an animal for another person creates a bond which has its 571 roots in the intimate connection between man and his animals. In a very 231 vivid way, the Bedouin view their animals as part of themselves, as part of 264 their *Risiq*, their general wealth, in which their sons are included. It is this 182 mystical association between a man and his animals which distinguishes a meal consisting of the meat of an animal slaughtered from ones' own flock [574] or herd from a meal consisting of meat bought from a butcher's shop — often [186] given by the plateau peoples of Northern Cyrenaica to their guests, but which the camel-herding Bedouin of the south regard as despicable hospitality. A slaughtered animal is the food, *par excellence*, which establishes this bond

[1] When Bedouin take their meals, they eat from large wooden bowls imported from [415] south of the Sahara. It is a matter of custom that a man does not eat alone unless it is unavoidable, a custom of such strength, that, when, one day, only an elder, occupying [439] a tent the ropes of which were crossed with mine, was left in camp, he brought his [123] bowl into my tent "so that I will be eating with a man."

[2] William Robertson Smith. *The Religion of the Semites*. 3rd ed. London: Macmillan, 1927. [113]

[3] A stranger entering a camp is under no obligation to give his identity. Few do so until they have partaken of a meal. In the past, the Bedouin claim, the period of [574] anonymity could last for 40 days, but nowadays, they say they limit it to two only. I [609] have known strangers enter a camp, receive entertainment, and leave without offering any specific identity.

571 231 between man and man, although the various cereal dishes which constitute
their regular meals are said to have a similar effect.

264 The son who continues to eat with his father "as he always had been
182 doing," also continues to accept his authority. Indeed he could do little else
593 at this stage, for he lacks the economic means to cut away. Neither at mar-
585 riage nor after is there any transfer of wealth from father to son. The new
182 tent recently pitched is no more than a dormitory to which the young couple
[425] retire at night. During the daytime the son is still to be seen in his father's
[556] tent, and, in the male quarters, things appear to be much the same as before.
In the female quarters, the only superficial change is the more frequent ap-
pearance among the women of one who, before marriage, often sat among
them if she had been a close neighbour or a close cousin previously; or of
an additional helper if she had come from afar. On the surface things re-
main "as they always have been," although in fact, a whole set of changes
have been initiated.

852 *Rites de passage* are few among the Bedouin. A man's progress in life is
881 ceremonially marked by only four events: his birth, circumcision, marriage
764 and burial. His development into manhood is not marked by clearly defined
stages. About the age of seven, the henna markings on the front of a boy's
858 shirt for protection from the evil eye are not renewed, the cowrie shell stitched
789 to the front of his cap as a kind of talisman against the evil eye is removed
and he is no longer permitted free access to the women's quarters. As he
857 grows older, he will be instructed in goat-herding, and later taught to follow
233 the sheep. In his late teens he will have to undertake the more arduous and
883 responsible task of herding the camels. Coincident with camel-herding, he
233 may be given a gun by his father. Shortly afterwards he must undertake the
[431] stringent test of manhood, a journey to a distant oasis for dates. These
[411] changes are not marked off by a *rite de passage*. The rites a man undergoes
[484] during the course of a lifetime are minimal, and in the sense that they are
[885] concerned with only the basic events in a man's life anywhere (save for
852 circumcision, which is a minor celebration anyway), they are irreducible.
88 Moreover, the rituals which exist do not comprehend the same multiplicity of
796 relationships as rituals which occur in many other African societies.[4] It is
[771] true that the ceremonies referred to in this chapter by no means include
all the Bedouin rituals. It is also true that the events mentioned vary in
[554] elaboration, and in the number of symbols present in them, but they are
not multiplied or reduced for different people.

In this context it is important to stress that we are here dealing with a
[613] lineage society where social differentiation is not built up into differences
[554] of rank, where the roles to which a man succeeds are almost wholly cap-
[602] tured by his kinship relationships with other men and which are sociologically
to be distinguished from the roles a man enters into by acquisition of office,

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[4] See, for example, the elaboration of rituals discussed in M. Gluckman (Ed.), *Essays on the Ritual of Social Relations*. Manchester: University of Manchester Press, 1962.

membership of associations and so on. The statuses a Bedouin achieves de- 796
pend not on an ordered acquisition through the inheritance of roles or elec- 852
tion to them, but on his personal manipulation of linkages in his jockeying 88
with others. Rites are minimal because there are few defined statuses an 554
individual can predictably acquire. The equalitarianism of the desert denudes 602
the Bedouin of ritual riches. Complimentarily, rites which do occur are 613
thrown into exaggerated relief by the absence of others, and in their isolation, [557]
become not merely a "passage" but a cataclysmic change. Marriage and 585
burial both comprehend limited fields of relations, but accompanying cere- 764
monies may bring several hundred people together, people who otherwise 796
rarely gather in these numbers to meet one another as kinsmen and neigh- 602
bours, and it is suggested that the emphasis given to the events dramatises the 182
significance of the changes they produce. In the discussion of the changes
brought about by marriage, the Bedouin view of what is entailed will be
considered first.

The Bedouin View of Marriage

After marriage, the Bedouin argue, a son has a tent of his own, a woman 585
over whom he has authority and soon children to make him a father. Mar- 581
riage causes split, branching. A new family is created, holding the poten- [613]
tial of a new lineage. The separation is so painful a matter for the father
that he cannot contemplate it, hence his pretence that he has no knowledge of [593]
wedding festivities, and his subsequent attitude that nothing has happened.

Interestingly, there are two other occasions when this attitude is to be 682
observed. When a man kills within his corporate group,[5] he may flee his 613
tribe or he may be compelled to leave; later he is likely to return and, when 621
he does, he is received with a minimum of show. Every attempt is made to
suppress knowledge of the event.

Again, if incest occurs, the memory of it must somehow be suppressed, and 835
it is an ever-present danger. Men, permitted four wives simultaneously and 561
also able to engage in a plurality of marriages through divorce or death of [595]
spouses, may have children showing an age difference of two or three generations. Thus it comes about that a man may be of an age in relation to his father's sister which permits them as children to behave as if they were
first paternal cousins. As an adult, the preferred spouse for a man is a [582]
father's brother's daughter. In terms of relationships between adolescents the situation in which a man is of the same age generation as his father's
sister is fraught with danger. In one such case, between a man and his [684]
father's sister, the male child of the union was put out in the desert to be

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[5] Bedouin are disposed in groups which, in summer, usually constitute a single community, around or near a watering point. The men of this group are interlinked by reference to an ancestor four or five ascending generations, reckoning from the generation of men of about 20 years. When, elsewhere in this chapter reference is made to corporations, it will be to groups of this kind.

daughters of agnates and, in view of the high agnatic concentration, the 582
daughters of agnates who are co-residents as well. Parallel-cousin marriage 602
therefore creates affinity between co-resident agnates.

The rate of parallel-cousin marriage is high, producing such a density of
kinship relationships as to afford a reliable index for defining the agnatic
corporation. As a form of marriage it persists; genealogical records clearly
demonstrate this. Frequency of parallel-cousin marriage taken together
with its persistency, means, above all else, that it makes an agnatic group
a cognatic group as well. The matter is put in this way to suit the general
development of the argument, but it would be a serious error to think that
this means I am giving priority to agnation and that I am considering cognation
as intrusive, or that, in this society, agnation can stand on its own because
it has a kind of absolute significance other forms of relationship do
not possess. Both forms exist in reality.

The great Bu Bakr of Cyrenaica's most celebrated lineage is alleged to have [613]
exhorted his fellow tribesmen to "marry your father's brother's daughters
and then your paternal relatives and your maternal relatives will become
one." Whether he had given the advice or not, the Bedouin, as their society
is constituted, would marry them anyway. The Bedouin form of agnation
without its accompanying parallel-cousin marriage would impose impossible
restrictions, if indeed there is any point in attempting to conceive of a
situation so remote from reality. With parallel-cousin marriage present in the
corporate group, men referred to as agnates are not agnates only; each and [613]
every one of them is the centre of a bundle of roles, each role potentially [554]
as important as the other. It would be false to argue, moreover, that complexities
of relationships can be unravelled by analytically separating them,
giving precedence to the agnatic role in an "agnatic" situation, the mother's
brother's role in a domestic situation and so on. An agnate who is also a
mother's brother is never the same, in any situation, as an agnate to whom
one is not otherwise related. The prime significance of parallel-cousin marriage
is that it creates a complexity of linkages which almost amount to confusion, [182]
thereby maximising the choice available to individuals to meet whatever
contingencies befall them.

The only area of relationships left relatively undisturbed by parallel-cousin
marriage is the son, father and father's brother triangle. Freed of
the complications stemming from parallel-cousin marriage, agnation can
here approximate its true form. Other complications arise out of marriage. A 582
few are listed here: father and son marry a mother and her daughter; a 583
form of exchange marriage between first parallel-cousins occur; two brothers
marry two sisters; the marriage of two brothers to two sisters is followed, in
the succeeding generation, by the son of one union marrying the daughter
of the other, making this latter a double first parallel-cousin marriage —
both a father's brother's daughter's and a mother's sister's daughter's marriage.
These forms can all occur within a corporate group. No citadel of agnation [613]
can withstand this attack. All forms of marriage combine to break the grip [602]

121 183 594 621 age depicted in their notion of a family is meaningful. It follows that, since this unit will not be clustered in one tent, but distributed over several, each small community must be so constituted that links people can use to claim the services of others must exist, and that, since claims can be made against various sorts of kinship relationships, each small camp will have predictable kin links. It follows, further, that since age, sex and number of people are significant, a small camp will have a characteristic demographic structure; each tent in a camp will display developmental changes, and particular tents may be shifted from one camp to another, but if a livelihood is to be gained in this semi-desert environment supporting its mixed pastoral-cum-agricultural economy, then at any given time the small camp must have certain fixed features in its composition. The elementary family is subject to far too many vicissitudes to exist on its own. It now remains to demonstrate this general argument by examining the details of one of these small camps.

A Particular Camp Viewed in Detail

621 613 [221] [162] The camp was one of 12 which constitute a minimal tribal section. In genealogical terms its male members were linked through an ancestor five ascending generations from living males of about 20 years of age. Usually, in summer, camps of this sort move to the vicinity of a large watering point; in winter, this larger community breaks up into a number of smaller ones as man and animals move off further south to the pastures. The total living population of the tribal section to which this particular camp belonged was 524.

621 613 582 • 182 Linked patrilineally, its male members were also linked in a plurality of other consanguineal ways. Primarily, this plurality was brought about by parallel-cousin marriage. The incidence of this form of marriage for males of this group was 48 per cent[12] of the gross total of 234, derived from their marriages over three generations; that is, the generation of males entering into marriage, and the generation which has begun to die out are included with the generation of middle-aged males. This means that practically every male is related to others in a number of ways, and it is necessary to point this out now because the details to be given presently will show only the more immediate, but not all, existing connections. Plurality of links, moreover, is not the only consequence. Parallel-cousin marriage is a transmuting agent, creating a diversity of links. Each and every link carries with it specific modes of behaviour, which in turn means that each individual has a wide variety of different claims he can press on his coresidents. Marriage connections also exist with other sections of the same tribe. Their proportion is 28 per cent of the total. Demographically, it

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[12] As a matter of interest, the figure for marriage to the father's brother's daughter is 50 per cent of the figure for parallel-cousin marriage in general, but the consequences of these are beyond the scope of the present discussion.

would be impossible to satisfy all marriage expectations of men within the 621
universe of the minimal tribal section. For this reason alone external links 613
are inevitable and persistent. Also, the small territorial strip such a group 582
claims as a homeland produces an economy which, in this environment, 182 •
is unstable. Additional security is gained by making connections with other [423]
tribal sections, each with its specific ecological character. Men also marry [433]
into their client groups. The proportion of these for this camp was 9 per cent [619]
of the total. From these links they gain economic advantages, they can claim services and a client-following is politically significant. Finally, 7 per cent of the total[13] are marriages with women of other tribes, which again not only reduces the instability of the economy (in that a large tribal area suffering near-famine conditions has access to areas of markedly different ecology), but also provides political connections for men whose power ambitions have passed the point of leadership limited to their own tribes. In one way or another all these interests are manifest in the small camp and attention is now directed to the latter.

The disposition of people in the camp is represented diagrammatically 621
on the page following. 592

The nucleus of the camp is Tent A. Its owner (1) was a powerful *Shaikh,* [554]
the son of a famous father. His marriage represents a political link with a [619]
group of one of the primary sections of his own tribe. His father died only a [428]
few years before I recorded my census, and the large amount of moveable property he left had still not been divided among the sons; the owner of the tent, as eldest brother, still controlled the flocks and herds. Most of his time he spent away from the camp engaging in political intrigue. His two younger brothers lived in his tent, but the second (5) would not remain there long
because negotiations for his marriage had been started. His father (2) mar- [582]
ried a parallel cousin; she died and shortly afterwards he took her sister (3) [587]
in sororal union. When this occurred an amount of bride-wealth was
agreed, but instead of giving any of it to her father, the entire amount was [583]
"put in front of her" (that is, the animals were allowed to remain with her husband's flock), and these animals she had marked with her brother's
tribal sign to distinguish them from those of her husband. It was widely [428]
known that she was going to leave these animals to her husband's second [562]
son, for although she could not transfer them to a male outside her husband's corporate group, she could decide who, among his heirs, should inherit.

During my stay in this camp, her brother's son (4) came to it as a 621
temporary resident for a month. Since he was poor, the purpose of his visit 592
was to capture some of his aunt's wealth while she was still alive and the 574
possibility still existed. During his stay he was fed well but did no work. [604]
His kinsmen found his company tiresome, so, to cut short his stay, and after [431]
consulting her nominated heir (5), she gave him three grown goats. Also
when an occasion arose for an animal slaughter, she provided the sheep, and, [231]

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[13] The remainder is made up of marriages to the daughters of men incorporated into the lineages.

682 time the case was re-opened, after a further interval of some
672 years since the second judgment. By this time nearly all
695 the assessors and witnesses of the first Court were dead,
rumours had been spread that the gun belonged to a stranger
694 who had left his gun in Korayem's tent, and should therefore pay his share of the bloodmoney, and so on.

The Gereidat family again succeeded in confusing the case, and in prejudicing the issue in their favour; and the third court gave the following decision, to the disgust of interested followers of this rather remarkable lawsuit. They decided that no evidence existed to shew what happened in Korayem's tent, and that no oath was necessary, maintaining that in the absence of any proof whatsoever Farag had no claim. They further ordered a new distribution of the reduced scale of bloodmoney proposed, whereupon the proceedings became completely involved and absolutely unintelligible.

682 The above events point out unmistakably the weak
672 spots in the Ourfi system. Korayem's family were strong, and on two occasions were successful in evading just de-
695 cisions against them; while the weak family with a strong case had to see justice perverted.

695 When the considered judgment of an Ourfi Court
• 182 receives authority for prompt and immediate execution from the Government and the police, the Ourfi system is
648 probably the nearest possible approach to the ideal, consistent with the conditions prevailing. But it is an undeniable fact, which must be faced, that without the moral backing of the Civil Power behind the judgments of the Bedouin Courts, miscarriages of justice are possible, and do actually take place.

433
233 The Bedouin of al-Qasr idealize the life of the pastor-
183 alist. It is a dominant theme in their culture. Gardening
241 and arboriculture are perceived by the Bedouins as involving
[461] long hours of work, anxiety over waiting for profits, and
complex market operations. They understand the logic and
[556] operation of the sheep market. Sheep are a store of value, a
source of security, and a medium of exchange. In a good year
of rain, a man can reap a good crop of barley, and buy more
sheep against the inevitable bad year to come. While most
472 Bedouins are, in one way or another, involved with the modern
433 cash economy which ties al-Qasr to Marsa Matruh, the Bedouins
241 who go into the production of cash crops on a large scale are
434
177 those who can afford the risk of failure and who can survive
the meager profits of the initial stage. These are the men who
can adjust their world view from that of the pastoralist to
that of the entrepreneur. There are only a few of these men
in al-Qasr but they dominate the economy. Through them, most
of the Bedouins of al-Qasr are linked to the national economy.

Land and Economy

433 The period between 1960 and 1964 was one of significant
177 economic change in al-Qasr. Dependence upon farming increased
178 while pastoralist activities became less important. In the
past, none of the Bedouins now living in al-Qasr were "nomads;"
even my oldest informants had moved only once or twice to

428 the father's property. The egalitarian spirit of the Bedouin
596 inheritance rule functions to maintain the unity of the family,
and, at another level of social complexity, the structural
continuity of the corporate group. Ideally, the surviving
sons will keep intact their father's estate, his land and
animals, and will work it as a unit. And this is generally
596 the case in al-Qasr. On the other hand, there is also the
594 implicit assumption in the structural principle of the
*613 Bedouin segmentary lineage system that each individual will
•183 eventually establish a unit of his own, separate from but
interrelated with, the main household. As a result, there
596 usually develops some division of property and labor among
593 surviving brothers. Whether or not this division is formally
agreed upon, and, whether or not it is assigned by the father
or the eldest son is largely arbitrary. In some cases, the
father makes such a decision before his death and prepares
his sons for it. The father's concern is that good relations
be maintained between his sons after his death. Just as the
father mediates conflict between his sons during his life,
so he hopes to maintain peace between them after his death.
The Bedouins say that a father should be fair when dealing
with his sons, and that he should never favor one over the
other.

428 Inheritance is determined through the patrilineal
*[613] lineage principle. The Bedouins of al-Qasr claim that they

*613 formal leadership. Ideologically, group solidarity at this level is explained solely in terms of patrilineality; in fact, local contiguity and explicit contractual ties are
*613 just as important. When we add to this the principle of
582 cognation in the form of the Bedouin preferred form of marriage, parallel-cousin marriage, the resulting structure is what Emrys Peters (1965) has called "the corporate group
●[183] *par excellence*." But, as we shall see later, father's brother's daughter-marriage is more of a cultural ideal than it is a social reality in al-Qasr.

*613
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571 The interplay of kinship, residence and contract ties defines a corporate structure of authority and also informs an external system of authority relations including all who claim descent from 'Ali 'Aqar, son of the mythological Sa'ada. The feeling of "corporateness," and the concomitant structural demands upon the individual changes as the scope of political action widens. This degree of corporate feeling is related to the structural differentiation between what has been interpreted as "domestic relations based on kinship and descent" and "the field of political relations" (Fortes 1953:26). In
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*613
554
571 this study, I maintain that both the internal and the external systems of relations are "political" since power and legitimate authority are exercized in both. Therefore, rather than use the terms "domestic" and "political," I shall refer to the internal system of political relations and the external system

593 family is a dominant-subjective one. But the rights and duties of the father have no legal sanctions. His authority grows out of the moral and mutual dependence, the common interests and value, which hold the family together. The
593 authority relations learned in the family become the norms
•183 of behavior to be applied by the individual in a wider-scale
867 network of social relations. The son learns the discipline-respect relationship which is the model of behavior between generations. The subjective role which the daughter plays in the father-daughter relationship prepares her for the role of wife.

Marriage and Kinship Relations

582

The parallel-cousin, the father's brother's daughter, is the preferred mate in Bedouin marriage. Parallel-cousin marriage in al-Qasr is more of an ideal than a practice. In fact, parallel-cousin marriage is not practical in the case where social order depends upon the integration of a larger and clearly segmented population. Endogamy of this kind in this type of society works against survival in a double-edged way: economic security through cooperation with a larger group is discouraged, and political security through
171 coalition is undermined. In the Middle East, as elsewhere,
582 cross-cousin marriage is the normative practice which functions "as a counterweight to the tendency of unilineal descent group-

582 171 and, the individual has been socially conditioned to prefer his father's brother's daughter.

582 183 All of these explanations are as plausible as they are obvious. They are, in fact, the same explanations which the Bedouins themselves offer for their marriage ideal. But one cannot help noticing that the explanations offered actually concern an ideal in Bedouin social behavior, and not a practice. Theories showing the logic of parallel-cousin marriage are placed along side the fact that this type of marriage is statistically atypical.

582 428 [671] If, as Islamic Law decrees, the daughter did inherit some share of her father's property, then parallel-cousin marriage as an attempt to keep land in the tertiary group would be logical. But we know that usually the sons inherit all of the father's property, Islamic Law to the contrary (Levy 1957:245-246). In this case, parallel-cousin marriage can only be seen as an ideal which functions side by side with the other ideal of a girl's right to inherit.

582 171 Barth (1954), and Murphy and Kasdan (1959) have stressed the political advantages which attach to parallel-cousin marriage in the context of factional struggle. The general idea is that political differentiation between collateral branches of the lineage structure is intensified and political autonomy enhanced by the practice of turning affinal bonds inward. Parallel-cousin marriage then has the opposite

582 "parallel cousin" (i.e. bint 'amm) is perfectly interchangeable
114 with the term "parallel-cousin once removed" (i.e. bint ibn
196 'amm, "daughter of the father's brother's son"). After I
[124] had familiarized myself with the genealogies of al-Qasr, I
began to realize that many of my informants were using the
term bint 'amm to refer to the parallel-cousin once, twice,
or even thrice removed. When I pointed this out to one of the
Bedouins, he replied: "So what, there is nothing forbidden
about this type of marriage." Table 5 shows that this is
582 indeed the case. There are a number of cultural ideals
183 which influence the practice of marriage in al-Qasr: endo-
182 gamy is encouraged because it cements and intensifies corporate ties; exogamy is desired because it widens the web of kinship; men prefer younger women to older women and may utilize their cousin-right privilege to realize this preference.

582 The Bedouins of al-Qasr define the bint 'amm over a
829 wide range. One informant said that "all of the girls of the Awlad 'Ali tribe are my bint 'amm, we are all one." Another said to me, that "any girl of the 'Ali Ahmar is a man's bint 'amm." And yet another informed me that "a man of the Qinaishat tribe will reserve his daughter for me before he will give her to an outsider." Ideologically, a bint 'amm seemed to be anything except the father's brother's daughter. This is quite convenient for the Bedouins because an ideological concept can be placed anywhere along the scale of actuality

*613 decision-making which allocates values in society. This
621 process orders the internal and external political relations
571 of corporation members. The corporate office which acts to
regulate internal affairs, and to represent the group in
external affairs is a unique status in al-Qasr having only
one incumbent at a time. In Bedouin society, then, the
corporation is to be considered distinct from the corporate
sole (Smith 1966).

621 The corporate group, although based on common interests
626 and values, is not an integrated body simply in terms of
571 consensus. Coercion also maintains corporate relationships.
● [183] Consensus derives from the code of the group (Nadel 1951:
161), a set of common ideals. But in practice, the group
must exert coercive pressures, sanctions, against individual
behavior which threatens the welfare of the collectivity.
Coercion may be seen as a necessary condition for what Durkheim called "mechanical solidarity." In al-Qasr, as in most
societies, the desire for conformity to norms predicates
coercive measures; coercion and consensus derive from the
same cause, i.e., the requirement of some degree of integration. The corporate group and its authority structure is the
621
571 mechanism which insures, through political means, the neces-
182 sary degree of integration for the survival of al-Qasr
(121) society. In order to understand the phenomenon of social
change occurring in al-Qasr, politics as an aspect of culture

*613 segment. He acts in concert with other 'awaaqil (plural of
554 'aqila) of the tertiary segments of his secondary group when
571 lineage matters call for decision-making at this level.
*613 Tertiary segments are replicate groups descended from one
571 ancestor, they operate with a common ideology pursuant of
●183 common interests and goals. As we shall see, this common
675 ideology is expressed in a kind of code, or contract, which
all members of the group swear to uphold and abide by according
to the principle of blood responsibility. Tertiary codes in
[181] al-Qasr are a reflection and an affirmation of a wider system
of values and norms which bind the Bedouins of the Western
Desert together into a political system. This wider normative
[671] system is expressed in the customary legal system of the
Bedouins known as 'awaiyid Awlad 'Ali ("the customs of the
Awlad 'Ali tribe").

*613 The primary duty attached to the office of 'aqila is
578 the regulation of conflict. It is worth noting here that
571 conflict regulation is not equivalent to conflict resolution.
554 The latter process carries with it the intimation that the
causes of conflict have been treated and resolved, that conflict
has been eliminated. Nothing could be further from the truth
in a segmentary society where the various segments actually
constitute conflict groups; consequently, conflict between
groups or individuals who represent groups may be contained
but never forgotten. Conflict is an ongoing process among

*613 6. every member of the tribe who submits a complaint
675 without first consulting his 'aqila, (i.e. who
571 goes to the government before the 'aqila),

539 7. every member of the tribe shall back the members of his bait against an opponent without right,

8. every member of the tribe who has proved against him the showing of sympathy toward another tribe knowing that this tribe is antagonistic to his own tribe,

9. every member of the tribe who has proved against him that he helped a relative in payment or in a quarrel against his brother.

we signed this document and declare that these customs are valid from the date of today and everyone who disobeys them pays a dhabiiha ("lamb") and 10 L.E. without any objection if any of the items of the above items is proven against him.

Date: August 8, 1953
The 'awaaqil (signatures or stamps):
Abd al-Ruwaf (Bait Firjani)
Hussain 'Umar (Bait 'Umar)
Shi'ath Abd al-Hadi (deceased, Bait Braik)
'Atiya 'Umran (Bait Kailani)
Khalid Idris (Bait Muhammad)

114 In the rawaabit, or contract, just noted the term
619 "tribe" refers to the secondary segment ('aiela). Murray
675 (1935:315n) has also pointed to an instance of the Bedouins'
*613 use, in a formal document, of the word qabiila ("tribe") when
reference to "some smaller division, such as 'eila is clearly
meant."

675 Through the rawaabit norms are expressed and action
681 is oriented with respect to them. If it is otherwise, sanctions
● [183] may be brought to bear to insure conformity to norms. The
*[613] minimal sanction which the 'aqila may impose is the dhabiiha

626 process of conflict regulation is ritually sanctioned and
182 the political order sacralized in a public way at the con-
771 clusion of litigation when the parties involved and the
'aqila read the Fatiha (the first sura of the Quran). For
671 the Bedouins, the 'awaiyid is the enactment of the word of
771 God, and the man who follows the 'awaiyid follows the command-
771 ments of God. One 'aqila speaking of the final authority which
776 directs Bedouin society said this:
577

> God knows all things. God made the world and gave man a brain with which to think. Therefore, he gave man two choices: the good, and the bad. If a man follows the good, he does not steal, kill, or lie. God gave us Muhammad the Messenger, and he taught the ignorant to follow the word of God. You are an educated man, and so you must choose the good path and follow it. I do not read but I follow the Quran.

577 It follows, then, that "the good man" represents an
•183 important Bedouin cultural ideal which is legitimated by
771 reference to the sacred. The practice of this ideal leads
[829] to "the good society." Another 'aqila, in reply to my
question concerning the definition of a "good man," answered:

> A good man should follow God, and through this he will be a perfect man because such a man could make no mistakes. You could find no better person than this. The good man fasts, prays, takes the pilgrimage, and helps the poor. He avoids stealing and lying; these are the most important things to avoid . . . All men aim to do good. Some men think that they are doing good, but they cannot tell good from bad: this is the origin of badness . . . A man aims to do good so that the Arabs will thank him for it. The Arabs (i.e. the man's fellow Bedouins) will say that he is doing good and that he is following the good path.

577 According to this _'aqila_, the "good man" is the "good Muslim"
771 who observes the pillars of Islam (fasting, praying, making
• 183 the pilgrimage, and alms-giving). Also, the "good man" does
not steal or lie, and this leads, importantly enough, to social
accord.

121 In light of the preceding discussion of authority and
681 law, we can now offer a description of the Bedouin judicial
process in action. Southall (1956:121-151) has drawn the
121 distinction between internal and external delicts on the
681 bases of kinds of sanctions rendered, and whether or not
114 chiefly authority mediates conflict. Such a distinction can
be only partially applied in the case of the Bedouins of the
Western Desert. The kind of sanctions operating in the internal
political system do differ from those applied in the external
political system, though not to the same degree which is true
121 of Southall's Alurland. On the other hand, since Bedouin
681 society, lacking political centralization, cannot be character-
692 ized as a segmentary state with distinct spheres of authority
[642] at successive levels of the lineage structure, the intervention
or non-intervention of chiefly adjudication and decision-
making cannot serve as a basis for differentiating political
* [613] action. Rather, the lone political office of the _'aqila_
[627] involves itself in all arbitration which cannot be successfully
concluded by the mechanism of familial authority. There are
[648] just two exceptions which apply to this latter statement:

554 concerns magic. Each August there is a celebration in honor
571 of al-Qasr's local saint. At these celebrations, the darwish
178
789 performs his special skills such as putting a red-hot iron
796 to his tongue, or standing on a skin drum held high by his
two assistants. No member of the "status group" attends these affairs because the darwish and his magic "belong totally to the old way of life." This is a restriction on social intercourse. It may also be a rejection of the saint's sacred power, or reluctance on the part of the "status group" to
554 share authority. The ideology which the "status group" in
571 al-Qasr has developed embodies attitudes of cooperation and
• 183 patience with induced programs of change. These attitudes
are invoked in varying degrees corresponding to motives of economic gain, desire for power, and altruistic concern. But the result is a "status group" mood which may be described as one of disdain for the old way of life. Ideology and discontent in al-Qasr are mainly evident among the members of the "status group."

554 The pool from which the members of the "status group"
556 are recruited consists of the "status honor" possessors of
571 three lineages (two Sa'adi and one Marabit). These have been,
* [613] traditionally and presently, the wealthiest and most influential
in al-Qasr. Wealth in al-Qasr is defined in terms of three things: sheep, land, and olives. Olives are becoming the measure of wealth in the modern al-Qasr: sheep are the tradi-

634 who reach the age of military service. He is also supposed to report
554 the presence of any fugitive or crininal in his district and report
657 crimes accurring in that district and which involve members of the tribal
segment he represents.

634 The first two duties of the omda to the government do not involve
554 any conflict of interest. Unlike the rural areas where sons are considered
657 a very important economic asset to their parents, and therefore,
562 there is a general resentment of military service which takes the sons
701 178 away and deprives the parents of their important work around the fields,
Awlad Ali look at military service as
an opportunity to have their sons go to the city, obtain guaranteed payment,
and escape the hardship of nomadic existence. Economic activities
[233] in the area do not require the cooperation of a large number of individuals,
and most of the grazing of animals is done either by a paid shepherd
or by one of the grown-up sons. Although there still exists an
[183] ideology which values having many sons, yet with the cessation of hostilities
between the tribal segments, their presence in the area has lost its
[464] value. Many of the younger generation are seeking jobs with the government
projects in the area or in the city. Neither one is easy to find.
Joining the army is increasingly considered as an easy alternative.

634 The omda's function which seems to involve some conflicting loyalties
554 is that of reporting crimes involving members of his tribal segment. But
657 even this does not pose a serious problem as it might seem. Almost all
674 minor crimes committed against property or persons as well as all civil
disputes are left to be handled by the tribal proceedings. The duties of
the omda are limited to reporting the cases of murder and serious assault

[1] On the basis of one percent of the yearly yield.

586 626 divorce only under specific circumstances in the absence of which the
593 husband can force her to live with him. Following the Koraanic rules,
[562] Awlad Ali give men the right to dissolve the marriage at will and without
[779] any necessary justification; however, they differentiate between
cases where divorce is justified and those in which it is not. In a
case of justifiable divorce, the husband can take back the mahr and possibly
all other marriage expenses. In the case of unjustifiable divorce,
the husband forfeits his right to regain the mahr. Divorce is justified
whenever one or more of the husband's rights are violated by the wife or
members of her family. Not all degrees of violation are considered as
justification for divorce, however. Only intolerable violations can be
considered as such. In deciding whether or not an act constitutes an
● [183] intolerable violation, Awlad Ali judge it against the standard of the
reasonable man, the customary man, and what he would have tolerated in
a similar situation.

586 What constitutes reasonable behavior does not only vary according
183 to the situation and the manner in which the actions are taken, but also
554 with the relative position in the social structure of the parties involved
and their initial relations to one another. In the case of divorce,
what constitutes grounds for justifiable divorce in one case may
not be sufficient grounds for justifiable divorce in another. In one of
586 183 the cases I witnessed during the year of study, a man who divorced his
554 wife because of her insistence that he buy her meat from the market
511 every day of the week, was forced to forfeit his right to redeem the
[114] mahr on the basis that the wife's actions had not established a basis
for justifiable divorce. In the negotiations that followed, the position
of the husband, as well as that of the family of the wife, were discussed.

586 The husband had a big herd by the standards of the tribe (600 sheep
183 and goats). In addition, he also cultivated a large stretch of the fig
554 land in the coastal area and was making good money. In other words, the
511 husband could afford the standard of living the wife demanded. The other
question that was discussed was the actions of the wife herself. She was
the daughter of one of the wealthiest members of the same tribe as her
husband; and according to the people who knew her, she was used to meat
every day of the week. In other cases, similar demands by the wife to
have a certain kind of food or to be clothed in certain kinds of material
were considered as an intolerable situation, and the husband was justified in his divorcing her and had the right to retrieve his mahr. This
was obvious in the case of one of my informants whose wife insisted that
every time he went to Alexandria, he bring her silk material for a dress.
Since the husband could not afford to meet her demands, her insistence
was considered as grounds for the husband. The assessment of reasonable-
586 ness on the part of the husband in his divorce action and therefore his
183 right to the mahr paid is frequently influenced by the relative position
554 of the husband and the wife's guardian in the social structure. An influential man who marries his daughter to a poor relative or nephew rarely
has to return the mahr.

586 Although women among Awlad Ali are not given the same legal right
562 of divorcing the husband by pronouncing the "dismissal formula," they are
given the right of certain customary procedures which in practice give
them equal facilities for dissolving the marriage. This is known as the
[594] right of the woman to "throw herself." This means that the woman takes
all her clothes and sometimes her children and goes to the dwelling of

159 This apparently is not a typical case, nor is Fatma by any means
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562 representative of a typical tribal women. It is a case of a marginal
woman who had revolted against the tribal definition of a female role.
[428] She violated the customary ways of her society and claimed her share of
[593] her father's inheritance; and by doing this, she forfeited her right to
● [183] protection by her brothers. She was able to do this because of her mar-
[625] ginality which enabled her to draw upon sources of protection outside
the tribal pattern, the police. It is interesting to note here that by
doing so, she was not totally eliminated or ostracized from her society;
rather, her role was redefined as that of a man, and she was treated
as such.

000 the role of the victim in initiating the act of the offender. In the
684 682 case of the adulterous wife (Case #7), the intention of the husband to
672 kill the wife's lover was clear from the evidence; yet, the husband's
kin group never attempted to take refuge, and the victim's group was
eager to settle the case with the least amount of publicity. On the
682 other hand, killing in circumstances that offend the tribal standards
672 183 of chivalry, like killing from ambush or during the night, are the most
difficult to solve and pose the greatest chance for retaliation.

682 Although the traditional amount of compensation is not determined
672 by the actual intentions of the killer, but rather by assumed intentions
[673] as deducted from the type of weapon used in causing death, yet, the final
amount paid is usually determined by such intention. The actual intention works as the basis for bargaining between the victim's kin and the kin of the killer. Kin of the victim of an intentional killing are less likely to agree to any reduction of the amount, and with the threat of retaliation or revenge present, the killer's kin are bargaining from a weaker point. This is not the case in unintentional killings or where the victim's behavior instigated the reaction of the killer. In such cases, the victim's group is more willing to accept a lesser amount of compensation, and the killer's group, while not in a good bargaining position, at least are not under the threat of revenge. And since they do not resort to the right of refuge, their daily activities are not disrupted. In this case, they could sustain the bargaining activities for a relatively longer period of time. Also, there is usually a strong
[626] pressure on the victim's group to accept reduced compensation in the
case of unintentional killing from the rest of the tribal members. If

*175 save the Italians much labour and danger. The policy had very
*648 limited success, for in practice the Patriots recruited from every
*795 tribe and every section. Bedouin sentiments about kinship and
619 its obligations worked both ways. If it was a duty to avenge a
slain kinsman it was no less a duty to protect and aid a living
[602] kinsman, and the sense of kin and its compelling influence in
[183] conduct, all that is meant by *'asabiya* in Bedouin values, are the
life and the soul of the Romany world.

It took the Italians a long time to realize that the Bedouin mind was not all of one piece but a Joseph's coat of conflicting interests. These interests excluded each other as the social situation evoked one loyalty to the detriment of another and it was, therefore, only in terms of their social structure that the apparent inconsistencies of Bedouin behaviour could be understood. Consequently the Italians were for ever suffering disappointments and accused the Bedouin, with increasing resentment and bitterness as the struggle continued, of disloyalty and treachery. Among the collaborationists, the *mtalyanin*, the Italianized, as the Patriots called them, there was every degree of participation from passivity, the refraining from taking an active part in the resistance, to full co-operation with the Italian army as spies, guides, informers, and administrative officials; but even those guilty of the worst complicity could, especially when some personal tie was involved, do the guerrillas a good turn. Many poor Bedouin near the towns joined the Italian forces as one kind or other of irregulars, police, and friendlies, and as labourers and camelmen, and it was found that these, while drawing Italian pay and rations, did not hesitate to assist the Patriots when an opportunity offered itself. Desertions to the enemy with full equipment were frequent. Itâlian rifles and ammunition and even pay were often handed over to the guerrillas. After an engagement the ground was left strewn with live ammunition for the guerrillas to glean. Many reported fights between the Patriots and the submitted population were undoubtedly inventions to cover gifts of ammunition, supplied by the Italians, from the Italian-sponsored irregulars to the Patriot bands. These native battalions constituted, in fact, 'a sort of supply depot of men, arms, and ammunition for the Sanusi formations'.[1] Information about Italian troop move-

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[113] [1] 'La pulizia del Gehel Cirenaico', by 'Gadria', *L'Oltremare*, Dec. 1930.

173 Fusion of names appears in another context and for similar
178 reasons. Not only are lineal descendants given the name of
551 deceased ancestors, but a man may be given the name of any
613 deceased agnate of his tertiary section. Usually, this is only done
428 when a man passes on property to another who is not his direct
[553] heir. Commonly, this occurs when an agnate is also a mother's
brother, as often happens as a result of parallel cousin marriage,
and this mother's brother has no sons of his own. If he has a
sister's son, who is also his paternal nephew, he is likely to pass
on his wealth to this nephew. A father, the Bedouin insist, ought
[183] to perform three duties for his sons: attend to their circumcision,
[593] and their education in the Koran, and provide bride-wealth when
[852] they marry. All fathers attend to the circumcision of all their sons;
[871] few provide for the Koranic education of any of their sons; most
bear the burden of marrying off at least one of their sons. The
[583] performance of the latter duty is what makes the continuance of the deceased's name an obligation, and whoever performs this duty must have his name perpetuated in one male offspring of the union which was brought about with his wealth. Wealth need not take the form of bride-wealth; it can be a legacy willed by a father, maternal uncle of the kind described above, or any other agnate who has died without male issue. Conversely, if a man dies without leaving any property, even his sons might not perpetuate his name, and eventually it will drop out of the genealogy.[10] There are instances of men inheriting the wealth of a number of agnates, using each parcel of wealth to make a new marriage and naming the sons of the various unions after the several dead who had left wealth. The example given below is taken from the genealogy of the Dawwas section of the Magharba tribe. What happened here was that the two lines stemming from Faraj and Sha'aban, after proliferating normally, became extinct. As this happened, Ibrahim, the son of Miftah, began to inherit wealth to which he was not a direct heir; and

[588] [10] To avoid confusion, it ought to be made clear that this is not ghost marriage. As I understand ghost marriages from Evans-Pritchard's (1951) account, two main conditions must be satisfied: (i) that there should be inherited wealth to make a marriage, and (ii) that the wealth remaining after the ghost marriage has been made is inherited by the ghost children only. In Cyrenaica, wealth thus inherited becomes part of a man's total wealth and is not reserved for a ghost marriage and its issue.

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in position immediately anyone else appears at the entrance to the tent.[11] [834]
Women cook, but they do not serve the meal to males, nor are they re- [342]
sponsible for the distribution of meat among them. Parts of an animal are [264]
carefully specified, and the various portions distributed at a meal carry 264
with them a great deal of significance. A host can honour, flatter, disap- 574
point or even insult his guest, depending on the precise distribution of meat 571
he adopts. Designated portions should go to certain kinsmen if they are [602]
present, but this still leaves a wide margin of choice, and a host can use this choice as part of the many means at his disposal for directing his relationships with other men. A political link can be forged or another snapped by the distribution of portions of meat at the commensal meal.

The Bedouin Ideal Type of Family as a Unit of Production

This account of the division of labour is far from inclusive of all the tasks 594
carried out. The details given are only barely sufficient to provide some 183
indication of the necessary composition of a family. Referring again to the [462]
Bedouin sentiments about the matter, it is now possible to give it some numerical precision. The number of females should be a minimum of about three, including a mother, a teen-age daughter and a child of about
eight years. Males should number about six: a father, relieved of most [857]
chores to act as director; a son in his middle to late twenties, to plough; a [883]
second son, in his early to middle twenties, to herd the camels; a third, in [462]
his late teens to early twenties, to shepherd the sheep; a fourth, middle to [561]
late teens, to look after the goats; and a younger son to fetch, carry and run errands about the camp. The family of the ordinary Bedouin, they say,
shows this sex and age distribution, although they recognise that a politically [554]
ambitious man with the wealth to match his aspirations would require more [556]
of both sexes — particularly women, since the burden of entertainment increases rapidly with a man's climb to power and fame.

Clearly, the basis of Bedouin sentiment concerning family structure is its 121
approximation to an ideal production unit. Some families display the features
of this ideal, but even they enjoy the productive benefits of this composition 183
for a very limited period only. The family, as described above, can only be an 594
ephemeral unit, since the age structure constantly changes, women are removed by marriage, men move away and death affects it at any point at any time. The Bedouin family is a fiction in the sense that it can be said to have a characteristic composition. The mistake they make is to conceive of it as a particular kinship structure related to production. The substance of what has been referred to as a fiction is that, if viewed as a productive unit, it bears close consistency with reality. Freed of the need to examine it in terms
of specifically limited kinship relationships, and no longer anchored to the [621]
inhabitants of a single tent, the distribution of people according to sex and

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[11] This is the general rule. In practice, the use of the divider can indicate an intimacy or distance in relationships, most subtly.

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age depicted in their notion of a family is meaningful. It follows that, since this unit will not be clustered in one tent, but distributed over several, each small community must be so constituted that links people can use to claim the services of others must exist, and that, since claims can be made against various sorts of kinship relationships, each small camp will have predictable kin links. It follows, further, that since age, sex and number of people are significant, a small camp will have a characteristic demographic structure; each tent in a camp will display developmental changes, and particular tents may be shifted from one camp to another, but if a livelihood is to be gained in this semi-desert environment supporting its mixed pastoral-cum-agricultural economy, then at any given time the small camp must have certain fixed features in its composition. The elementary family is subject to far too many vicissitudes to exist on its own. It now remains to demonstrate this general argument by examining the details of one of these small camps.

A Particular Camp Viewed in Detail

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[221]
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The camp was one of 12 which constitute a minimal tribal section. In genealogical terms its male members were linked through an ancestor five ascending generations from living males of about 20 years of age. Usually, in summer, camps of this sort move to the vicinity of a large watering point; in winter, this larger community breaks up into a number of smaller ones as man and animals move off further south to the pastures. The total living population of the tribal section to which this particular camp belonged was 524.

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Linked patrilineally, its male members were also linked in a plurality of other consanguineal ways. Primarily, this plurality was brought about by parallel-cousin marriage. The incidence of this form of marriage for males of this group was 48 per cent[12] of the gross total of 234, derived from their marriages over three generations; that is, the generation of males entering into marriage, and the generation which has begun to die out are included with the generation of middle-aged males. This means that practically every male is related to others in a number of ways, and it is necessary to point this out now because the details to be given presently will show only the more immediate, but not all, existing connections. Plurality of links, moreover, is not the only consequence. Parallel-cousin marriage is a transmuting agent, creating a diversity of links. Each and every link carries with it specific modes of behaviour, which in turn means that each individual has a wide variety of different claims he can press on his coresidents. Marriage connections also exist with other sections of the same tribe. Their proportion is 28 per cent of the total. Demographically, it

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[12] As a matter of interest, the figure for marriage to the father's brother's daughter is 50 per cent of the figure for parallel-cousin marriage in general, but the consequences of these are beyond the scope of the present discussion.

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Libyan Bedouin MT9

[For information on the omda, the administrative head of the rural village, see Category 622.]

342 costs to make or buy. In the 'izba sector, most of the Bedouin have a summer tent which they place next to their stone house for the hot months. According to the governmental community [657] development program, in order to own land and register it properly one must build at least one room upon it. The one- [735] room house (daar) is not common in al-Qasr: it is a symbol of poverty. The multi-roomed house (duwaar) is common. It is [333] built of large pieces of cut sandstone which are quarried in [316] al-Qasr. Those who can afford it build the duwaar and surround 342 it with a wall in compound fashion. Only one man in al-Qasr 556 is rich enough to afford two of these compound-type houses. The size and style of a house reflect status. Traditionally, [184] a man furnished a tent for each wife and for each married son. Although this is still the custom in parts of the desert, in al-Qasr the private room (daar) in a duwaar has replaced the private tent.

596 The basic residential unit is called naja' (literally, "hamlet"). It is composed of the father, his wife (wives), his unmarried children, and married sons and their families. The naja' takes the name of the father who is called the shaib ("elder," literally, "white-haired one") of the group. In the naja', the word of the shaib is law, and the members' chief duty is unquestionable obedience. The average naja' in al-Qasr consists of about three or four houses or tents.

*613 in farming, and he found this land "good for raising mint and
423 vegetables." To the southeast of the 'izba, the lineages of
182 Lazumi and Ma'fas found the land suitable for barley and
241 [312] grazing. This area is rain-fed. There are no wells and so
vegetable crops are not possible here. The members of these
lineages say that their ancestors were "real" Bedouins in
Cyrenaica, and did not wish to become farmers in Egypt. It
*613 is interesting to note that the Lazumi and Ma'fas are the
182 richest lineages in all of al-Qasr. They were, perhaps, better
•184 able to maintain the traditional style of life which all of
241 the Bedouins claim is "the best." But all Bedouins of al-Qasr
depend to some degree upon horticulture or arboriculture.
[231] And most families own a few sheep or goats. Both Lazumi and
Ma'fas garden in their coastal sections, and Shraif members own
sheep.

656 Land registration has a history in the Western Desert.
423 The government attempted it a number of times, but with little
success until 1959 when the General Desert Development Organization (GDDO) undertook its program of land reclamation. But the
361 Bedouins were settled long before this. In al-Qasr, the Bedouins
342 began to erect permanent stone dwellings on the land about the
178 time of the First World War. In the Matruh area, elder informants
agree that before 1914 the Bedouins lived in tents outside the
361 town area. When the British came, they began to move into town.
648 Many of the Bedouins built houses in Matruh between the years

423 society. Private ownership of land with sovereign rights
*[613] over it is now the normal practice in al-Qasr. Rights are
[178]
[596] held by the family head, the shaib. If the family head is
deceased, land tenure rights are held jointly by the sons.

In the area beyond the plateau, in the extreme
•[184] south of al-Qasr, land rights to grazing and water still are
*[613] associated with lineages. But here agriculture is impossible.
[241] The type of rights over the land varies with the method by
which it is exploited. The southern and coastal sections of
[433] al-Qasr represent the old and the new, the pastoral traditional
mode of production and the modern agricultural cash economy.
[233] But, as noted, of the total population only a few Bedouins
are actually engaged in pastoralist activities. Hence, tribal
tenure rights, in general, are not overly important at this
time. Not too long ago they were, and many cases in the recent
[671] history of Bedouin customary law relate to conflicts over land
and water in the southern region. The Bedouins say that
[178] traditionally no lineage could use the pasturage or water of
*[613] another without some agreement, usually of long standing,
[233] made beforehand. Now, they say, permission is not needed.
[675] In the old days, these agreements were made between lineage
representatives, not individuals per se. Today, the grass
178 and water in the southern zone are claimed, though not in a
423 legal sense, by the families using them: the rights of
usufruct over the land are closer to rights of sovereignty

178 than they were in the past. These conditions reflect a change
423 in social and authority relations.

423 In the 'izba sector of al-Qasr, as of 1964, there were
432 two cases of land purchase. In one case, land was sold to an
Egyptian, "an outsider" from the Nile Valley. This, of course,
could only occur where such a transaction would be upheld by
423 the Egyptian government. Land ownership, when it involves
registered land, is absolute. This, to a great extent, works
*[613] to lessen the influence of the lineage structure on property
423 relations. The law governing property, whether in traditional
178 or modern al-Qasr, reflects a set of social relationships.
571 When an individual can own property in the absolute sense,
rather than with respect to his being a member of a group
which enjoys sovereign rights of ownership, then, there has
been a change in traditional corporate relations (Herskovits
•[184] 1952:260). This has definitely been the case for most of
al-Qasr, and it is adumbrated in the southern sector where
a person's rights over land are nearly absolute. A compar-
423 ison of land tenure patterns on the coast and in the southern
184 region reflect not only the contrast between methods of land
use, but, also the fact that as land becomes valuable it
becomes scarce and land holdings become fragmented (compare
Figures 5 and 6).

428 When the head of a household dies, his eldest son
596 inherits his authority, but all of the sons share equally in

593 [591] be kept with the father's flock. Only in the case of a man's owning, or using, a large piece of land in the pasture area of al-Qasr will his son live away from the main part of the naja', i.e., away from his father's tent. The son then serves as his father's shepherd.

593 591 184 In the 'izba sector of al-Qasr, the pattern is generally the same except that the son will be given a room in the house rather than a tent when he marries. Since the land in this area is more scarce and a matter of official ownership, the son is not likely to have his own house during his father's lifetime.

593 584 When the son does marry, the marriage proceedings may be initiated by either the son or the father. But, under no circumstances that I heard of, would the son approach the father with the idea of his marriage; the son should communicate his desire to marry, first of all, to either his father's brother or his mother's brother. As the Bedouins say, "Marriage is an agreement between fathers." What they 593 584 *613 mean is that marriage is an agreement between tertiary groups. A father upon hearing of his son's wish to marry, for the boy's uncle will immediately tell the father, consults with the head of his tertiary group about such a proposed marriage. This is not a formal procedure but, certainly, the father would not go ahead with the marriage without making the matter public. In other words, marriage in al-Qasr is a

554 of the Bedouin attitude, or lack of it, toward religion.
792 Since the time of Muhammad, the Bedouins have been considered
771 notoriously bad Muslims. Today, the Bedouins tend to joke
about their lack of zeal, and often point out that "holy
619 men" are not to be trusted.[2] This is seen in Sa'adi behavior
771 toward the Marabtin tribes who are their vassals. Theoretically,
792 the Marabtin who trace descent to the Prophet and might be
554 considered "sacred Tribes" should be respected by the "secular"
[778] Sa'adi tribes. But the Sa'adi of al-Qasr tend to deride the
554 Marabit. For instance, the "holy man" of al-Qasr, 'Amm Salih,
792 is a Marabit and well-known for his ability to successfully
627 mediate in conflict situations. But one informant, pointing
619 out this gift which 'Amm Salih possesses, said: "Amm Salih
is a good man, he is not a Marabit." But 'Amm Salih identifies
himself as a "rajal saalih" and a "Marabit"; he sees no role
conflict here.

771 The Bedouins also joke about the manner in which they
[522] practice the "pillars of Islam." Especially, they make light
of the fact that they are irregular in mosque attendance.
They say, with a slight smile, "we pray in the desert." A
[124] common way for an interview to end was by an informant rising
and saying: "Now I must wash for prayers." This happened

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[184] [2] Professor Abou-Zeid also notes this trait in his study of the Bedouin near Sallum, on the Libyan border (1966:248).

554 the disputants. As noted, the *rajal saalih* shares this right
792 with the *'aqila.* The *rajal khair* does not have recourse
627 to this mechanism which amounts to divine approval of the
*613 binding decision of the "third party." 'Amm Salih in his
779 discussion of the Bedouin moral code corroborated this
point: "Any *'aqila* can read the *Fatiha*. In this way, he
and the two parties involved terminate the quarrel. This is
a way to show that all agree on the settlement. Originally,
only the *rajal saalih* did this, but now the *'awaaqil* do it
in all cases." It would be interesting to know if in Cyrenaica
both roles perform this function or if it belongs only to the
role of *rajal salih*.

554 I cannot generalize concerning this role for the whole
•,184 of the Western Desert. Sayyid al-Sanusi and 'Amm Salih seem
627 to be special men. On the other hand, the *'aqila* and the
792 *rajal khair* are roles which we would expect to find all over
*613 the desert, and in Libya also. The *'aqila* is the focus of
institutionalized traditional authority structure, and the
rajal khair and "status group" represent the power structure.
554 This attempt to differentiate between authority and power
121 is essentially one which deals with the more general problem
of leadership. Any study of the structure of authority must
have reference to the notion of leadership. Role analysis seems
the best method of dealing with leaders and their functions.
Role analysis together with the conceptualization of institution
as a process is an adequate way of dealing with the tendency

619 groups were expected to help. For these reasons the Sa'adi tribes com-
619 peted and even fought among themselves for the newcoming Murabiteen
721 groups which continued to migrate into the area, escaping the strong dominance of the Cyrenaica Bedouins..Many of the major tribal wars which occurred in the area before the turn of the century had as their major cause the competition over the Murabiteen.

619 As a vassal group the Murabiteen tribes are kept in an inferior
778 position. This inferiority has certain manifestation, the most obvious
184 of which is the deprivation of the Murabiteen of the right of "nazala"
682 or refuge. When a person is killed the killer and his kin unit seek re-
778 fuge at a neutral tribal segment, and for a period of twelve months they
613 are safe from the revenge of the victim's kin group. The victim's family
[671] cannot follow them to the refuge place, for to do this is to violate one of the basic principles of Awlad Ali law. The philosophy behind the rule of "nazala" is to give time for "the blood to cool off" as one of the informants described it. It also gives the host group a chance to start immediate negotiations with the victim's group to settle permanently the dispute. As soon as the murderer's group takes refuge, which is done either by moving along with their tents and flocks and settling in the locality of the host group or symbolically by having the head of the host group send one of his sons or male relatives to pitch his tent in the locality of the murderer's group, the head of the host group contacts the victim's group, informs them that he has been chosed by the murderer's group in accordance with the right of nazala, and asks for their permission to grant his protection to the murderer's group. To ask for the permission of the victim's group is a matter of formality since, by custom, they cannot refuse to grant this permission except on one single ground:

682 if the host group is genealogically close enough to the murderer's group
778 as to be themselves part of the vengeance group. As soon as the per-
613 mission is granted the head of the host group starts negotiations on behalf of the murderer. Since the basic reason for the nazala is to avoid the direct confrontation between the two opposing groups, the first task of the negotiations is to define which places and markets each group can go to during the year of the nazala. Once this has been agreed upon, the difficult task of settling the dispute begins. The success or failure of the negotiations depends on the skill of the negotiator and the weight his tribal segment has in the area. This makes it of extreme importance for the murderer to select the tribal segment which can affect such a settlement. In cases where the host group is not particularly powerful, the victim's group pretends to agree to a settlement in order to have the murderer and his group leave the locality of the host group and then takes revenge by killing the murderer. This cannot happen when the host group is powerful, since such an action would automatically make the host group enemies of the victim's group.

619 With very few exceptions which will be dealt with later, the right
184 to offer refuge is limited to the Sa'adi tribes. No Murabiteen tribe can
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682 grant refuge to a murderer, although they themselve can seek refuge at a Sa'adi tribal segment if one of them is involved in murder.

619 Another less conspicuous manifestation of the inferior position of
184 the Murabiteen relative to the Sa'adi is the fact that the bloodmoney
[682] for the Murabit is two-thirds that for the Sa'adi man. Also, until very
[582] recently, marriage of a Sa'adi to a member of the Murabiteen tribes was considered by the Sa'adi as a very poor choice and was discouraged.

619 184 In recent years this has changed, however. The increased importance
178 of wealth in the recently introduced money economy relaxed the en-
582 dogamous tendency that was characteristic of the Sa'adi tribes.

619 In discussing the position of the Murabiteen tribes it is worth
184 noting that not all the Murabiteen tribes in the area occupy the same
position. Some enjoy relatively higher positions than the others. Ac-
tually, there are two kinds of Murabiteen in the area: Mustaqillen (in-
dependent Murabiteen); and the dependent Murabiteen. The latter are
further subdivided into Murabiteen bil-baraka (with the blessing); and
Murabiteen bil-sadaqa (with the tribute). The only independent Murabi-
teen in the area is the Gemei'at tribe. These are the original settlers
[173] of the area. Because of their help to Awlad Ali against the Hanadi, the
latter were defeated and Awlad Ali were able to occupy the Western Desert.
For their part the Gemei'at tribe was granted its independence by Awlad
Ali and were given one-third of the total area as their homeland (watan).
619 In theory, the Gemei'at tribe occupies the same position and has the same
184 rights as the Sa'adi tribes, including the right to offer their protec-
778 682 tion which is denied to all other client groups. In practice, however,
this seems to be of no practical value. None of my informants could re-
member a single case in which a murderer has taken refuge at a segment
619 of the Gemei'at tribe. The importance of the nazala is not merely to be
778 safe from the pursuit of the victim's group but rather to provide the
184 mediators who undertake the crucial task of negotiation on behalf of the
682 627 murderer and his gorup. It is the ability to settle the dispute on a
628 permanent basis that offers the actual long-lasting protection, even
after the time of the nazala expires. To be successful in his pursuit,

619 778 184 682 627 628 the negotiator has to have behind him the full weight of his tribal segment. Since the origin of the Gemei'at tribe as a Murabiteen tribe is well known, any negotiator has to rely almost entirely upon his own skill to affect any settlement; even if he is able to affect such a settlement, there is no guarantee that it will be permanent.

619 792 The Murabiteen bil-baraka and Murabiteen bil-sadaqa occupy the same position as vassal groups. The only difference between the two is that the first, the religious men, are much more respected than the latter. They are feared by the other tribes because of the belief that they have direct contact with the religious and spiritual world and can harm those who dare to offend them in one way or another. Because of this factor [627] [628] and of their neutral position with regard to the rest of the tribes, they play an important role in mediation and dispute settlement.

619 184 174 792 The origin of inferiority of the Murabiteen tribes in general is hard to account for. Kenneth (1925) believes that hundreds of years ago the Murabiteen were essentially the holymen. They learned to read and write the Qoraan and grouped themselves around the "zawias' which were the centers of learning and religion. While indulging in their religious practices their flocks ere grazed miles away in the open desert under the charge of the Sa'adi shepherds, who originally were the poor paid workers of the Murabiteen. These shepherds, living out in the open, were busy fighting away the raiders attempting to steal their flocks. As time passed the Sa'adi shepherds became not only tough fighters but also wealthy. This latter end was achieved partly as a result of successful raids on neighboring tribes. Later when the Sa'adi planned a large raid, they entrusted their flocks to the Murabiteen, who by that time had become dependent upon the Sa'adi for their protection from the raids of other tribes.

619 184 174 792 [651] The picture was reversed then with the poor Sa'adi shepherds becoming the masters, acquiring great wealth and prestige because of their fighting ability, and the holymen becoming the shepherds and clients of the Sa'adi fighters. In the old inter-tribal wars, the Murabiteen stood a very limited chance so the Sa'adi tribes adopted them and in return for a yearly tribure guaranteed theprotection of the Murabiteen from external aggression.

As time passed, the main difference between the Sa'adi and Murabiteen tended to diminish. One or two outstanding Murabiteen tribes fought their own battles without seeking the protection of the Sa'adi and remained independent, while a few others rose up and fought on with the protector against a common foe (the case of the Gemei'at tribe is an example) and in return were emancipated from the stigma of serfdom and accepted by the Sa'adi as almost equals. Other Murabiteen tribes remained attached to their Sa'adi protector as client groups.

Ibn Khaldoun also saw the inferiority of the Murabiteen tribes as stemming from a mode of tribal relations adapted to inter-tribal warfare (1845).

613 The Eila

The Eila represents the next level of tribal segmentation among the Awlad Ali. The Eila is the most important political unit. Although the Eila lacks any formally recognized leadership, its importance stems from the fact that it constitutes the vengeance group or Amar El-Dam (unity of 613 672 682 the blood). This means that it bears a corporate responsibility for the actions of its members. Anyone of its members can be killed in vengence for a homocide committed by any other, and the duty of revenge for any

581 are necessary for the validation of the marriage contract. Modern
585 671 legal systems which took as their basis the Islamic law of marriage
675 and the family further required the registration of the marriage contract for the marriage to be legal.

584 The request and necessary response forming the marriage are sup-
585 posed to be carried on by the parties involved. However, if either the
429 groom or the bride is not of age, or is mentally unqualified, the trans-
593 action is carried on by his or her guardian, or "wakil." The wakil is
the father, unless he is dead or an invalid, in which case the brothers
[604] become the wakils. If the person has no brothers, then the uncles be-
● [184] come the wakil in the order stated. According to certain Sunni sects
in Islam, a woman marrying for the first time is always represented by
her wakil, even if she is of age. The assumption is that a woman who
has never been married does not have the experience that enables her to
enter into any kind of legally binding relationship such as marriage.

585 Following the original Islamic idea, marriage among Awlad Ali is
675 an oral agreement between the groom or his father and the guardian
593 429 (wakil) of the bride-to-be (her father, if alive, or her closest male
[604] kin in the following order: her brothers, her uncles, her grandfather).
585 A religious man is sometimes asked to perform the marriage, although it
792 is not required. Some persons might invite a member of the Murabiteen
[619] tribe or holy men to witness the marriage on the basis that his presence
[778] gives "baraka," or blessing, to the marriage. Before the application of
585 the State legal system to the area, marriage contracts were not regis-
656 177 tered. In recent years, however, and with the increased mobility of
[675] the tribal populations, more and more marriages are being registered in
[634] the administrative districts. Still, according to the unofficial estimates,

585 legal guardian and considered a bride price to compensate the father or
583 the legal guardian of the bride. In earlier times the bride received
779 none of the mahr, although she usually got a sadaq or bridal gift for
431 [178] herself. In Islamic Arabia, the mahr and the sadaq became indistin-
[171] guishable and were given to the woman and took the form of a legal gift
for affecting the marriage. The Koraan no longer contains the concept
[178] of the purchase of the wife, and the mahr becomes a compensation which
the woman has to claim in all cases. The Koraan demands a bridal gift
for a legal marriage: "And give them whom ye have enjoyed their reward
as a wedding gift" (Sura, iv. 24), and again, "And give the women their
[586] dowries voluntarily" (Sura, iv. 3). According to the Koraan, the mahr
remains the property of the wife and remains her own even if the marriage
is dissolved by divorce. But although it took the form of a gift, the
mahr remained in Islamic law a prerequisite for the legalization of the
marriage. It is only upon the giving of the mahr that the marriage is
considered valid. No marriage is legal, according to the Islamic law,
unless that transfer of the mahr is affected. Mutual consent of the
two parties to forfeit the mahr does not change that rule, and the mar-
58 riage is considered void. According to Muslim jurisprudence, marriage
675 is a contract ('acd) made between the bridegroom and the bride or her
184 wali or guardian. An essential element in that contract is the mahr.
The jurists themselves are not sure about the nature of the mahr. Some
regard it as practically a purchase money or as an equivalent ('iwad)
for the possession of the woman and the rights over her, so it is like
a price paid in a contract of sale; while other jurists see in the mahr
a legal symbol, a mark of honor and a proper legal security of property
for the woman.

583 Among Awlad Ali the payment of the bridewealth signifies the completion
[584] of the marriage contract. The mahr is not paid to the woman but
583 to her father or closest male kin. Usually the mahr is paid in money.
178 This, however, seems to be a recent phenomenon. Until the turn of the
century, according to informants, the mahr was paid only in sheep and
583 goats. The practice is still followed by a number of tribal segments
178 of Ali Ahmar who occupy the western most part of the area where pasture
● 184 is more abundant and reliable and where the permanent pasture of the
green mountains of Cyrenaica is close by. Other tribal segments still
insist that at least one-fourth of the mahr should be paid in livestock,
583 but the majority of the people accept money. The main purpose of the
[584] mahr among Awlad Ali is to legalize the marriage contract and to put
[182] emphasis on the reciprocal oblications that the marriage created between
the two families of the bride and the groom. It also works as an insurance
for good behavior on the part of both the husband and the wife.
583 If the husband mistreats his wife or fails to give her the rights legally
593 hers by marriage, he risks the chance of losing the mahr and being forced
586 to divorce her. On the other hand, if the wife fails to behave in the
customary way expected from a wife, the husband could divorce her and
have the right to get back his mahr. This is particularly inconvenient
in cases where all or part of the mahr is paid in livestock, in which
case it becomes part of the father's herd and hard to take away in case
of divorce. It is therefore in the interest of her family to keep the
marriage. In this way their interference in the marriage is checked.
[591] This is especially important among Awlad Ali where, although the marriage
[592] is usually patrilocal, the woman retains membership in her father's
household even after marriage.

682 672 673 and unjustifiable homicide. To examine responsibility in homicide among Awlad Ali and their definition of "intentional" and "non-intentional" killing, let us first present some of the cases collected from the area.

CASE #1: The Case of the Broken Rope

682 672 312 [184] [428] This is one of the classical cases which is told throughout the entire area. There is some slight variation in the way it is told, but all accounts refer to the fact that Hemeida from the 'Esheibat tribe inherited the right to use a large area of tribal land in which there was an old Roman well not used for a long period of time and which was full of sand. One day he invited the awaqil of his tribal segment, as well as his neighbors, to consult them on how to clear the well, since without it the land was almost useless. They all decided it was a good idea and offered their help. On the day the well was to be cleared, they all gathered around the well. Among those present was Do'ah, a poor member of the 'Esheibat tribe who worked as a paid shepherd for Hemeida. He was watching from a distance when Hemeida called upon him to give a hand. The well, like all Roman wells in the area, is about fifty feet deep and fifteen feet in diameter, and narrows as one goes down the well. To be cleared, someone has to be lowered by a rope to the bottom of the well to dig up the sand. Hemeida's cousin, Ali, agreed to go down, and the gathering looked for a sturdy rope which they found at one of Hemeida's neighbors. As the group was tying Ali to the rope, Hemeida suggested that Ali was too heavy for the rope and that it would be a good idea if a slimmer man did the job. At this point, everybody looked at Do'ah, since he was the thinnest

day, but even ethnically the Bedouin are more Arabian than 619
the people of Egypt, the Sudan, and Tripolitania, while 101
culturally they are as completely Arab as any people in the [144]
world, proud Tamim and Quraish not excepted. In essentials
their language is that of the Hilalian invasion of the eleventh 197
century and no foreign language competes with it. The Berber- [191]
speakers are a handful in the distant oasis of Aujila, and even
there they are bilingual, and the insignificant fractions of Jews
and Cretans in the towns speak Arabic, the Cretans being
Muslims as well. The Italian immigrants left the country of 619
their own accord during the late war. Thus the obstacles to [167]
complete Arabization in the Maghrib (Tripolitania, Tunisia,
Algeria, and Morocco), a Berber culture, large Jewish colonies,
and European colonization are to-day all absent in Cyrenaica.
In all essential matters also the Bedouin of Cyrenaica [184]
are like Bedouin tribesmen elsewhere in the Arab world: they
have the same tented, pastoral, way of life, the same social
organization, the same laws and customs and manners, and the
same values.

The people of Cyrenaica are linked to the classical Arab 177
world of the east, to Egypt and the Jazirat al-'Arab (Arabia,
Palestine, Iraq, and Syria) rather than to the Maghrib; to the
sacred towns of Islam and to Umayyad Damascus, 'Abbasid
Baghdad, and Fatimid Cairo. More particularly they are linked
to Egypt, with which their country has had political ties from
the earliest times, and which is their natural market. The [133]
desert comes down to the sea at the Gulf of Sirte and separates
Cyrenaica from Tripolitania and these two countries have
always gone each its own way. Cyrenaica was linked to Graeco-Egypt,
Tripolitania to Phoenician Carthage. Cyrenaica went
with Byzantium, Tripolitania with Rome. Indeed, as Despois
says: 'The Greater Syrtis is without dispute one of the most
decided frontiers, natural and human, to be found anywhere in
the world.'[1]

During the last few decades this separation has been brought [195]
into relief again by the rise of the Sanusiya Order, for whereas
almost to a man the Cyrenaicans follow the Order politically,
the Tripolitanians, except for the Bedouin tribes, have shown a
lively animosity towards it. Moreover tribal ties between the 619

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[1] Op. cit., p. 45.

121 sections constituting the combinations which makes the facts of feud intelligible.
613 Furthermore, several different types of power structures exist which serve the differ-
[571] ent interests of the people composing them, and these are interlinked in combinations
[578] of superior span. But the formation of these structures and the modes in which they combine are quite unlike the articulations in a lineage system. Characteristically, the segments in a lineage system are conceived of as building up hierarchically to span what is spoken of as a total society, the apex of the system affording a spectacular and fixed definition of its boundaries. Had I been using this concept in this paper the
[173] founding ancestress of the nine Cyrenaican tribes, Sa'ada as named by the Bedouin, would have served this purpose and would have been given inappropriate promi-
121 nence. The views presented here have the consequences of retreating from a concept
184 of a total society. The people to whom the facts given are related are the camel-
233 herding tribes only. Some of them have relations of many kinds with the cow-herding folk who inhabit the northern plateau area, and these relations are also significant
619 for the analysis of a wide range of problems; genealogically both cow and camel herders are seen as part of a single structure, but the differences between them with regard to their economy, the size, composition, and distribution of their residential units, their political and ritual life is so great that to conceive of them as a single social
121 structure is not useful. Moreover, the far western tribal sections have relationships
619 of such urgency with their neighbours in Tripolitania (who are excluded from Cyrenaican genealogies) that to cut off these relationships as lying outside Cyrenaican society would be quite unwarranted. The same can be said of the relationships of the tribal sections in the eastern part of Cyrenaica with their genealogical cousins, the Aulad 'Ali of Egypt, who, although residing across a national border, are closely linked to some of the Cyrenaican Bedouin. Some tribes also have to rely on the people of the southern oases for an item of diet and an outlet for surplus wool, and the net of kin-
[177] ship is spread out to include them. In these cases they come into contact with other ethnic groups such as Berbers and Tibu, and through the oases they extend their lines of communication southwards to Wadai, Chad, and Bornu. As an indication of the effectiveness of these links, it is only necessary to add that people inhabiting Cyrenaica make periodic and regular visits to these far southern places, and that in 1948 a shaikh, living near Ajadabiya in south-western Cyrenaica, collected blood-money contributions from kinsmen in Wadai. A single structure cannot possibly include, for analytical purposes, these sorts of relationships.

121 Finally, it must be stressed that the facts given here refer to the period 1948 to
114 1950. Since then oil has been discovered in large quantities near the territory of a
[315] tribe where I spent most of my time while resident in the country, and where there was one tin shack in 1950 there is now a modern port with roads extending southwards from it into the wilderness. I see no reason to assume that social relations as I observed them are present today or that they were the same at any time in the past
175 either. Before the advent of the Sanusi Order in the early eighteen-forties, it is known
795 that one lineage at least was dominantly powerful and that its leader tyrannized a
613 large part of Central Cyrenaica.[1] His descendants constituted a powerful group in

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[1] Smith and Porcher, 1864. These two archaeologists met this leader and continued their archaeological researches around Cirene only with his goodwill, although the site is not on the territory of his tribe as I knew it in 1950. They also speak of him as inhabiting a castle which also lies outside the

121 sedentary, but the semi-autonomous nature of the lineage segments
114 is maintained to a large extent. The result of this is a de-
*613
[178] emphasis of the "we-feeling" among the population of al-Qasr
• [186] and an absence of "sense of community" (Easton 1965:332). By
[571] "community," I refer to a pattern of relatively intensive, face-to-face social relationships, and the values of solidarity and common goals to which these give rise.
121 The relationship between lineage structure and territoriality was such that
*613
571 kinship segments within the same lineage unit might go days, and even weeks, with no inter-communication, and the degree of communication between separate lineage units of the tribe was less intensive than this. Such a communication pattern made observation difficult. The fact that Bedouin tribal society relatively lacks the group ceremonial aspect compounded the difficulty of gaining an overall perspective of structural relations, and of witnessing the bases and nature of social interaction outside the lineage structure. All of this emerges from a communication structure and kinship structure differentiated into corporate groups which "discourage close participation of members in the social relations of the larger society" (Wolf 1957:7).

121 The structural arrangement of al-Qasr was such that, in plain language, not a great deal was happening in the sociological sense. I say this about al-Qasr in comparison
[123] with, for instance, a full-blown village community. Consequently, I observed from day to day that which I could,

175 According to Murray, on July fourth "thirty Sheikhs of the
648 Hanadi, the Awlad 'Ali, and the Beni'Una made their peace with the new power" (1935:30).

175 The version of history provided by my informants is
186 no radical departure from these facts. But there are a few
124 differing aspects which represent ethnocentric highlights on
(648) history. For instance, the Bedouins of al-Qasr have a few stories which exaggerate the fact that the Harabi needed the cooperation of the Turkish rulers to defeat the Awlad 'Ali and to force them out of Cyrenaica. Also, the Bedouins point out, the Jumi'at tribe begged the Awlad 'Ali to come and rescue them from the oppression of the Hanadi.

175 Shortly after 1800, Muhammad 'Ali, the Ottoman
619 viceroy, drove the French from Egypt and supported the Hanadi
648 against the Awlad 'Ali. The Egytian ruler felt that political control over the Awlad 'Ali would insure the security of the whole desert, and especially Egypt's western frontier with Libya. Despite the alliance between the Hanadi and Muhammed 'Ali's forces, the outcome was a temporary victory for the Awlad 'Ali. This event actually set the stage for a transformation of Bedouin tribal society.

175 After the defeat of the Hanadi and the Pasha's troops,
648 the Awlad 'Ali were given preferential treatment by Muhammed 'Ali. He wisely secured the Hanadi tribe in Sharqiyya Province. Then he granted the Awlad 'Ali, by right of usufruct, the

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[423] makes the welfare aspects of "Arab Socialism" meaningful, but the Bedouins of al-Qasr feel that they are already practicing "Socialists."

The Bedouins feel that the programs of the government are insufficient: the desert is extra harsh and aid should compensate for this. On the other hand, the Egyptians who administer the aid programs claim that the Bedouins do not differentiate between "giving cooperation" and "receiving aid." [181] Agricultural advisers complain that the Bedouins are lazy. One agronomist whose job it was to teach the Bedouins how to cultivate the olive tree said that they did not want to learn: "They want us to plant the trees, water them and care for them, harvest the olives, and then they will take them to the market and sell them!" This statement is typical. The [186] Bedouins reply: "The Egyptians did not teach us how to grow the olive. Our fathers planted the olive here long before they came into the desert." The Bedouins feel that the Egyptians should follow their advice concerning the use and control of water in the desert; that if they did the olive [186] would flourish and life would be easier. "The Egyptians," they say, "are lazy and cannot keep up with our requests for more seedlings. They cannot furnish us with what we need to improve our lives. All we hear is: 'tomorrow, tomorrow'!"

[241] The Bedouins do not understand the methods of modern hydrology and agronomy. They see no reason for the experimenta-

> 156 159 554 829 666 There is another objection which I have concerning our customs. I mean the case of elections. For instance, one from the 'Aishaibat and one from the Sanagra, of the 'Ali Abyad, are nominated. Then, each man must vote for the one from his own tribe. He must vote for the 'Aishaibi even if the other is the better man. But, we should consider that the best man is the man with the best qualifications. 'Umda Ibrahim, for instance, knows how to greet an official or a minister, but he does not know the 'awaiyid nor the problems of the Bedouins. His brother (who will probably be the next 'umda) is a good man and is educated, but he does not know the 'awaiyid either.

829 666 This view contrasts sharply with the traditional stand of most Bedouins in al-Qasr, including the members of the "status group." For instance, one 'aqila voiced what is a prevalent opinion when he said:

> [619] [186] If a man chooses to become a political candidate against a Bedouin, he must understand that the members of the tribe should and would vote for their 'umda because he is a member of their own tribe. Even if a man is crazy and his opponent has the highest college degree, the Bedouins must vote for the man from their own tribe.

156 159 554 178 177 829 [671] Hajj 'Ali is modern in his evaluation of the political situation here: a politician should know the problems of his constituents rather than follow principles based on traditional relationships. His motive is not to promote the 'awaiyid as a good way of life, for we know he does not think this to be the case. Instead, Hajj 'Ali believes that in order to help the Bedouins through a period of change one must know what they are changing from. Through his negative appraisal of

strative posts and contain not more than a few hundred persons. 175
Shahhat and Tubruq had been Turkish posts before the Italians 632
made them administrative centres. Taukra and Talmaitha had 621
been Sanusiya lodges. Suluq and Qaminis were Italian
creations. Marsa Susa (Apollonia) was first occupied by Cretan
refugees during the Turco-Greek war of 1897. Ajadabiya, the
town of which the Arab historian al-Bakri of the eleventh
century spoke in such glowing terms, had ceased to be a settled
centre until the Turks made it an administrative post. During [648]*
the period of truce between the Sanusi and the Italians from
1917 to 1922 it became the seat of the Sanusi Amir, Sayyid
Mahammad Idris, and afterwards an Italian administrative and
commercial centre.

It has been noted that almost all the townsmen of Cyrenaica 632
are immigrants from the west, from Morocco to Tripolitania, 162
and the Bedouin regard them as foreigners and often with some 369
distaste, especially the Tripolitanian immigrants. It is true [186]
that there is a small element of Bedouin origin in the towns,
for the more stable and poorer Bedouin living near towns sometimes drift into them; but when they do so their descendants soon lose their links with the tents and their tribal status. The road to town life is a way along which there is no return, for the townsmen are not only foreigners, but their food, their speech, their dress, their manners, their interests, their loyalties, and in general their way of life and their sentiments, are different. The Bedouin visit the towns from time to time, but they do not feel at home in them, and they do not look at home in them either. In a town one can spot a Bedouin at a glance by his appearance, his step, his dignity, his naivety, and his loud voice, which sometimes startles the shopkeeper with whom he disputes a price.

The road to the towns is not only a way along which there is 632
no return, but is a one-way track. A Bedouin can become a 369
citizen, but a citizen can never become a Bedouin. He cannot 641
live the life of the tents. Hence the Bedouin say that while it is
always bad for a Bedouin girl to marry a townsman, it is possible for her to adapt herself to urban life, but it is out of the question for a Bedouin to marry a townsman's daughter, for it is impossible for her to become a daughter of the tents.

The *bwadi*, Bedouin, and the *hadur*, citizens, are separate

[P.62]

CHAPTER III

THE SANUSIYA AND THE TRIBES

I

793 WHEN the Grand Sanusi came to preach in Cyrenaica he found
619 the kind of society I have outlined: a congeries of tribes without
law or effective government, for the Turks had little control
over the interior, but with like values and habits and a community
of life which crossed tribal boundaries. The Bedouin to
[181] whom he preached were simple people living the austere and
monotonous life of the tents, with that savage character which
has been so often portrayed, but also with those noble qualities
which have seldom failed to evoke admiration from those who
[177] have lived among them. They were profoundly ignorant about
the outside world and also—which is what touched the heart of
[797] the Grand Sanusi—about the faith of their fathers, and to this
matter I must now return, since the Sanusiya was a missionary
Order and can only be understood as such.

771 Though the Bedouin professed Islam before the Grand Sanusi
influenced them by his teaching, they were almost totally
[797] ignorant of its doctrinal content, rites, or ritual and moral
duties, and it is safe to assume that they did not obey its precepts.
It is safe to assume this because even to-day, after a
century of Sanusiya instruction, the Bedouin perform their
religious duties in a very perfunctory way, if at all, and when
Muslim law is at variance with tribal custom they follow tribal
custom. In saying that they are lax, I do not suggest that they
are not very sincere, Muslims. They are proud of being Muslims
[186] and consider themselves greatly superior to Christians, while
they are contemptuous of Jews. Nevertheless, though they
would not belittle, the Cyrenaican Bedouin feel no embarrassment
at neglecting, the duties obligatory on every Muslim.
The Confession of Faith is known to all and implicitly accepted
by all. It imposes no irksome restrictions or tiresome duties.
But they almost completely neglect—I speak of the more
[782] nomadic sections whom I know best, but it is probably true of
most Cyrenaican Bedouin—their daily prayers, a duty which is

*795 182 and political boundaries, help to keep the Islamic world together against the impact of western civilization and imperialism. A member of the Qadiriya or Rifa'iya Orders can wander from lodge to lodge from China to the Atlantic. A member of the Madaniya is received as a brother if he goes to Maknas, Istanbul, or Mecca. An 'Isawi or 'Arusi finds lodges of his Order all over North Africa, obeying the same rules, bearing the same banner, using the same books of devotion, performing the same ritual, and bound by a common brotherhood. These Orders, therefore, are not unimportant in shaping and propagating a common opinion and feeling among Muslims about any question of the day which affects Islam.

*795 369 182 [668] But in a narrower political sense they have little importance, even in the urban centres. They are too weak and poor to act as cells in a movement of a political kind, for they show, as René Brunel says of the 'Isawiya, 'lack of unity of direction' and 'absolute lack of cohesion'[1] In Cyrenaica the Sanusiya alone has been capable of becoming a political movement and hence of all the Orders alone aroused the suspicion of Istanbul and the hostility of Rome. We may inquire, therefore, what it is which has distinguished the Sanusiya from the other Orders in the country. As we have noted earlier, the fakiristic exhibitions [186] of some of the Orders, so dear to the common man in the towns, were uncongenial, even repellent, to the Bedouin, who, in any case, had no affection for the townsmen and for things emanating from the towns. Also the Bedouin, socially and morally secure in their tribal and kinship systems, felt no need for further associations. Their need was for some authority lying outside their segmentary tribal system which could compose intertribal and intersectional disputes and bind the tribes and tribal sections together within an organization and under a common [579] symbol. Hence, while the urban lodges were clubs—and this was the status of the Sanusiya lodges in the towns as much as it was that of the lodges of the other Orders—the Sanusiya lodges in the country-side were political, administrative, and economic, as well as religious and educational, centres. The urban lodges followed the social pattern in urban communities generally. Corporate life was narrowed to small quarters, single streets, a few houses, outside which people belonged, it is true, to a

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[1] *Essai sur la Confrérie religieuse des 'Aîssâoua au Maroc*, 1926, p. 53.

account of the Italian invasion of Tripolitania. Realizing that 175*
they were helpless without Sanusiya support not only in the 648*
Sahara but also in Libya, since they would not be able without 795*
command of the sea to reinforce their garrisons there, the Turks showed themselves anxious to win over Sayyid Ahmad al-Sharif by also conferring on him new privileges. In 1910 the Governor of Banghazi proposed to make him a monthly grant of 4,000 Piastres, and the Governor of Tripoli sent a telegram in cipher to his representatives in various parts of Tripolitania asking them whether they thought the Sanusiya Order powerful enough to warrant additional privileges, which was apparently the view of Istanbul. His representatives, judging by its lesser influence in Tripolitania, where it never gained the unanimous support it received in Cyrenaica, reported that in their opinion the political importance of the Order had been exaggerated.[1]

Such of these events as were known to Italian observers
shortly before and in the early stages of their war with Turkey 175*
led them to false conclusions because the complexity of Arab 648*
sentiments was not appreciated. The structure of Bedouin 181
society is such that whatever the size of the group a man con- 186
siders himself to belong to in any situation, he is in virtue of his 619
loyalty to it opposed to other groups of like order in the tribal
structure. He is loyal to his *bait* against other *biyut*, to his *'aila* [613]
against other *'ailat*, and to his *qabila* against other *qabail*. Nevertheless, he has a strong feeling of communion with all the Bedouin of his country, regardless of their tribal affiliations, in common opposition to the towns. But Bedouin and citizen are both Arab and they made common cause against the Turks, especially when the activities of the 'Young Turks' forced Turk and Arab into rival camps. But even Arab and Turk shared wider loyalties in their regard—unequal, it is true, but still shared—for the Sultanate and for Islam and they reacted in spontaneous accord against threats from Christian Powers, the French advance in the Sahara and the Italian invasion of Libya. Against Christians and Europeans Arabs and Turks were no longer Arabs and Turks but Muslims, just as against the Turks Bedouin and citizens were no longer Bedouin and citizens but Arabs, and against the towns tribesmen were no longer members of different tribes but a Bedouin community.

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[1] Macaluso, op. cit., pp. 88–90, and Serra, op. cit., p. 37.

*175 Turkish Government had been eliminated militarily and politi-
*648 cally from Cyrenaica. In its place was the Order, recognized
*795 by all as the one body which could speak for the Bedouin of the
country, on whose behalf it treated with the Italian Govern-
ment in the years between the two wars. Thus the first war had
begun as a war against Turkey and became slowly transformed
into a war against the Sanusiya. The second war was against
the Sanusiya.

*175 At first sight the Italians might seem to have been in 1923
*648 in a more advantageous position than in 1911 to 1917, for
*795 they were united at home, at peace with the world, had estab-
lished bases in Cyrenaica, and were opposed only by untrained
Bedouin tribesmen instead of by Turkish soldiers who, however
few and badly equipped, had nevertheless been disciplined,
experienced in modern warfare, and under regular officers of
*175 distinction. But these advantages were offset by the loss of
*648 prestige the Italians had suffered in the eyes of the Bedouin
since 1911. Both in Cyrenaica and in Tripolitania the Italians,
• 186 if they had not been defeated, had certainly not been victorious.
*795 The Bedouin had seen them in both provinces of Libya advance
in heavy columns across the country, occupy all the important
centres, and then retreat in panic to the coast; and they had
judged by the measure of their experience that the Italian is not
a soldier. Then, in both countries, they had seen successive
Italian Governors giving way to threats and trying to attain by
diplomacy and bribery the ends brave men pursue by arms.
Moreover, the Bedouin were far better equipped than they had
been in 1911, for they had replaced their old weapons with
modern rifles captured from the Italians. Col. Talbot reported
in 1916 that they looked on every Italian troop movement as a
gift from God. Hence energy and initiative which might have
broken Bedouin morale had they been applied after the Sanusi
defeat by the British in 1915–16, when expended in the opening
stages of the second war did not effect the speedy crumbling
of resistance hoped for. Indeed what happened in the first war
was repeated in the second.

*175 The Italians had in 1923 the same overwhelming superiority
*648 in men and equipment they enjoyed in 1911, perhaps an even
*795 greater superiority in that they could use the knowledge
acquired in the European war, particularly in the use of

followed it. In 1923, when he was called to take the foremost 175*
part in the struggle, he was already over sixty years of age. 648*
He was a simple man, religious, courageous, contemptuous of 795*
worldly honours and success, and with singular tenacity and 793
powers of physical endurance. It may well be true that, as is 159
reported, Sayyid al-Mahdi said 'If we had ten men like 'Umar we would not need any more'.

IV

All the *adwar*, or guerrilla bands, on the plateau came under 175*
Sidi 'Umar's command and he signed himself *al-Naib al-'Amm*, 648*
the Representative-General (of the Sanusiya). Each Bedouin 795*
tribe, as in Enver's day, maintained its own guerrilla band, some 793
100 to 300 men strong. Towards the end of the war the guerrillas 701
never numbered, all told, more than 600 to 700. Only a certain 619
number of men could maintain themselves on the country and move through it with speed and secrecy. As in other guerrilla wars, the actual fighting was done by small bands of enthusiasts, whose success nevertheless depended on the goodwill of the whole population. The bands suffered very heavy casualties, but were maintained at strength by a constant stream of adventurous spirits from submitted and unsubmitted sections alike. Though each band was named after a tribe and its members were chiefly recruited from that tribe and fought in its territory, they were not entirely recruited from it and they might fight anywhere. In each tribal band there were a good number of volunteers from other tribes and a sprinkling of *Ikhwan*, Sudanese, and Tripolitanians. The 'Awaqir and Magharba had separate bands while the other tribal bands usually fought in pairs, Hasa–'Abaidat, Bara'asa–Darsa, and 'Abid–'Arafa. A Misuratan contingent formed a small band of its own which greatly distinguished itself in the fighting. Each band had a simple organization: a commander, a *qaimaqam* for civil affairs, a qadi for religious and legal purposes, a commissariat agent, and a number of officers, some of whom had been trained
in Turkish regular units. Sidi 'Umar maintained discipline in [703]
the bands, and acts of pillage or personal vendetta were severely punished. Those of the guerrillas who possessed horses rode
them. The rest went on foot. Each band had its Sanusi flag. [186]

Second, the fiction that nothing has happened, which characterises the 585
father's behavior, does not cease with the termination of the celebrations. 593
Each morning, soon after daybreak and before the camp is astir, the groom
must leave his bride and repair to his father's tent to lie at his father's side
"as he always had done in the past, as if he had not left him." This conventional
ruse is followed, not just for the seven days of wedding festivities,
but is continued after the groom has moved back into the camp proper, and
pitched his tent alongside his father's, with the ropes of the two tents crossing.

In matters other than sleeping arrangements, this fiction that "nothing
has happened" is maintained. Marriage does not mean the immediate creation [592]
of a wholly separate domestic unit. Save for the appearance of an additional
tent, the ordinary run of daytime activities is scarcely altered. To 593
mention perhaps the most important feature of the relationships between 264
father and son, the groom continues to eat with his father. [illegible] the son 571
does not use his own bowl,[1] and may not, indeed, do so for several years.
The important symbolism of "eating together" or "eating out of the one 182
bowl," the act of commensality creating a bond of fellowship about which
Robertson Smith[2] wrote so eloquently can only be referred to here in one of
its many aspects. Bedouin themselves stress that eating together is a strong
bond, and the communal meal is always used for this purpose after the
settlement of a dispute, or at the conclusion of a blood-money agreement,
and so on. It is significant also in the sense that those who partake of a
meal accept the authority of the host; he becomes their protector, and a blow [574]
against one of them is struck at him also. Even if the guest is an enemy,[3]
as long as he has eaten from another's bowl his life is safe.

The slaughter of an animal for another person creates a bond which has its 571
roots in the intimate connection between man and his animals. In a very 231
vivid way, the Bedouin view their animals as part of themselves, as part of 264
their *Risiq*, their general wealth, in which their sons are included. It is this 182
mystical association between a man and his animals which distinguishes a
meal consisting of the meat of an animal slaughtered from ones' own flock [574]
or herd from a meal consisting of meat bought from a butcher's shop — often [186]
given by the plateau peoples of Northern Cyrenaica to their guests, but which
the camel-herding Bedouin of the south regard as despicable hospitality. A
slaughtered animal is the food, *par excellence*, which establishes this bond

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[1] When Bedouin take their meals, they eat from large wooden bowls imported from [415]
south of the Sahara. It is a matter of custom that a man does not eat alone unless it is [439]
unavoidable, a custom of such strength, that, when, one day, only an elder, occupying
a tent the ropes of which were crossed with mine, was left in camp, he brought his [123]
bowl into my tent "so that I will be eating with a man."

[2] William Robertson Smith. *The Religion of the Semites*. 3rd ed. London: Macmillan, 1927. [113]

[3] A stranger entering a camp is under no obligation to give his identity. Few do so
until they have partaken of a meal. In the past, the Bedouin claim, the period of [574]
anonymity could last for 40 days, but nowadays, they say they limit it to two only. I [609]
have known strangers enter a camp, receive entertainment, and leave without offering
any specific identity.

first successes in Senegal, the Beni Hilal and the Beni Suleim 175
were being despatched by the Caliph Mustansir billah against 619
Mu‘izz ibn Badis, his rebellious viceroy in Tripoli. They
sang of their conquest : [539]

> "Great was the king, son of Badis, a mighty man of war !
> Yet we routed his thirty thousand men !
> We were but three thousand, yet the victory was ours, and ours
> the spoil !
> Their hearts were as water, not a man was in their ranks !
> We routed them and they fled far and wide !"

These Beni Hilal, now extinct, are famous wherever Arabic is spoken for the exploits of their legendary hero Abu Zeid, while the Beni Suleim had helped the Prophet at the battle of Hunein, and are said by Hogarth to be the ancestors of the great modern tribe of Harb.[1]

The confusion of these two invasions caused the races of North Africa to become inextricably mixed. Both Arabs and Berbers spent their lives in the desert herding their flocks, and both were warlike. So it is natural that the intermarriages of a few generations should have made one people of them, and it is also natural that the conquered should claim relationship with the conquerors and not vice versa. But this aspiration of the Berbers has flooded their genealogies with so many lies that it is difficult to disentangle the truth.

The descendants of the original colonists, much mixed [792]
with Berber blood, still preserve their title of Murabitin, though no longer living in *ribat*, which soon lost their military character and were turned into *Zawia* "monasteries", where the more peacefully inclined of the sect retired for religious teaching and contemplation. Later, when the *ribat* came to be deserted, the peaceful Murabitin, ill-fitted by their monastic habits for the resumption of an active nomadic life, sank into dependence on their warlike brethren the Sa‘adi, and, among a primitive race, dependence means inferiority. Thus in Arabia any tribe that pays tribute to another [186]
is despised as Hiteim. And so the once proud title of "Murabitin" has simply come to mean "vassal" and nothing more.

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[1] *History of Arabia*, 38.

maintained to this day in the desert between the last two 619
and the Sa'adi, though they are relaxed in the cultivation. 651

The Jumei'at, who used to be " Murabitin " to the Beni 'Una, are now nominally so to the Awlad 'Ali, but are
not required to pay tribute. Other tribes, such as the 619
Jawabis and 'Awarma, are in an intermediate stage between the Sa'adi and the Murabitin. The Awlad 'Abd es-Sallam,
the Samalus ed-Diminat, and perhaps the Fawakhir, call [778]
themselves " Murabitin bil Baraka ", a priestly caste which, in Tripoli, used to receive special privileges from the Turkish Government.

Though the Sa'adi tribes despise the Murabitin as serfs, [186]
they respect them for their piety and resort to them for the writing of charms.

While the Murabitin tribes generally may be suspected to contain more Libyan blood than the Sa'adi, there are other tribes such as the 'Amayim, the Jahama, and the Tarhuna, who have come to Egypt from further west than any of the above, and who seem to be quite definitely " Berber ", though, of course, none of them will admit it. These are known euphemistically as 'Arab el-Gharb.

Even some of the Juheina, settled east of the Nile in Sharqiya, are scorned by Klippel as " d'origine berbère, se pretendant section d'une tribu d'Arabie ".[1]

Awlad 'Ali.—This tribe, by far the most important of [131]
the Western Bedouin, occupies with its vassals the whole
north coast of Egypt from Salum to Alexandria. Like the 619
others, they claim descent from the Beni Suleim, alleging 173
their ancestor 'Ali, son of 'Aqar, to be a grandson of that Dib, or Abu Dib, mentioned by Ibn Khaldun. Their enemies, however, allege that he was a Jew. " When the Arabs occupied the north coast of Africa, there was a notable, a Jew, who owned property at Saqiet el-Hamra in Morocco. This man welcomed and entertained the Arab sheikh Ez-Zanati. He became very popular with the sheikh, who gave him his daughter named Sa'ada, on condition that he embraced Islam before the marriage contract was made out."[2] Another version calls the Jew Yana, and says that he had two daughters. Of these Sa'ada was the

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[1] E. Klippel, " Etudes sur le folklore Bédouin de l'Egypte," *Bull. Soc. Khédiv. de Géogr.*, vii, 10, Caire, 1911. [113]

[2] From information collected by Muhammad Bey Wasfi.

619 oppression, he gathered his people and delivered a fiery
175 denunciation of his religion, during which he smashed his
726 rosary into pieces and mixed it with his horse's fodder;
792 Baqush then invited their kinsmen (?) the Awlad 'Ali, to
come over from the "Green Mountain" and help them. To entice the Awlad 'Ali, he is said to have sent them samples of salt desert water and Nile water sweetened with sugar to illustrate the difference between the hardships of the desert and the comforts of the Rif.[1]

619 As recounted earlier, the Awlad 'Ali completely routed the
175 Hanadi and their allies, and drove them from the desert.
726 In the division of the conquered territory, the Jumei'at
received a third, and, although they were still considered Murabitin, were released from the payment of tribute. They
[131] now live intermingled with the free sections of the Awlad
'Ali, all along the north coast of Egypt, and are numerous in Beheira, especially near Abu Hummus.

619 *Samalus.*—The Samalus are found scattered among the
[131] Awlad 'Ali on the northern coast and stranded among many
of the Egyptian provinces. They once possessed a head sheikh Abu Sala at Minya, and colonies are recorded from Faiyum, Beheira, Menufiya, Gharbiya, and Sharqiya. An
[175] old paper from the Recruiting Department gives from
[162] seventeen villages in the Faiyum 775 mounted Samalus
[231] and 1,400 on foot, possessing 1,760 camels and 11,400
sheep. Two important groups of wells, both called "Sawani
[312] es-Samalus" exist on the north coast, one about 50 kilometres east of Salum, and the other 20 kilometres south of Dhab'a.

[173] They say they came to Egypt, 400 strong, about 200
years ago, from the Wadi Samalus in the Jebel Akhdar, and their ancestor twelve generations ago was Nasr el-Hasani, of course an "Arab from Beni Suleim".

[175] In the *Description de l'Egypte*, P. D. Martin relates how
[726] in 1800 the Samalus of Faiyum were raided by a party of
Ferjan, 200 strong, from Beheira.

619 *Shiheibat.*—These are a "Mrabit" tribe from the west with
186 an unenviable reputation, living near the Wadi Natrun.
Sayed Idris, the former Senussi leader, says of them: "Most

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[1] Dumreicher, 16. This is probably the "Sheik Abdall Gawyal Bagooshi" who wrote to Sir Sydney Smith in March, 1801, warning him of the approach of the French from Damanhur. Wilson, *History of the British Expedition in Egypt*, 371. (Rif = cultivated area.)

herds have a black goat or two—such are the Shiheibat." 619 [186] They are families of shepherds scattered amongst the Sa'adi families, and must not be confused with the 'Esheibat section of the Awlad 'Ali.

Dumreicher (pp. 52–7) gives a lively account of a quarrel between the Jawabis and the Shiheibat. [175] [578]

day, but even ethnically the Bedouin are more Arabian than 619
the people of Egypt, the Sudan, and Tripolitania, while 101
culturally they are as completely Arab as any people in the [144]
world, proud Tamim and Quraish not excepted. In essentials
their language is that of the Hilalian invasion of the eleventh 197
century and no foreign language competes with it. The Berber- [191]
speakers are a handful in the distant oasis of Aujila, and even
there they are bilingual, and the insignificant fractions of Jews
and Cretans in the towns speak Arabic, the Cretans being
Muslims as well. The Italian immigrants left the country of 619
their own accord during the late war. Thus the obstacles to [167]
complete Arabization in the Maghrib (Tripolitania, Tunisia,
Algeria, and Morocco), a Berber culture, large Jewish colonies,
and European colonization are to-day all absent in Cyrenaica.
In all essential matters also the Bedouin of Cyrenaica [184]
are like Bedouin tribesmen elsewhere in the Arab world: they
have the same tented, pastoral, way of life, the same social
organization, the same laws and customs and manners, and the
same values.

The people of Cyrenaica are linked to the classical Arab 177
world of the east, to Egypt and the Jazirat al-'Arab (Arabia,
Palestine, Iraq, and Syria) rather than to the Maghrib; to the
sacred towns of Islam and to Umayyad Damascus, 'Abbasid
Baghdad, and Fatimid Cairo. More particularly they are linked
to Egypt, with which their country has had political ties from
the earliest times, and which is their natural market. The [133]
desert comes down to the sea at the Gulf of Sirte and separates
Cyrenaica from Tripolitania and these two countries have
always gone each its own way. Cyrenaica was linked to Graeco-Egypt,
Tripolitania to Phoenician Carthage. Cyrenaica went
with Byzantium, Tripolitania with Rome. Indeed, as Despois
says: 'The Greater Syrtis is without dispute one of the most
decided frontiers, natural and human, to be found anywhere in
the world.'[1]

During the last few decades this separation has been brought [195]
into relief again by the rise of the Sanusiya Order, for whereas
almost to a man the Cyrenaicans follow the Order politically,
the Tripolitanians, except for the Bedouin tribes, have shown a
lively animosity towards it. Moreover tribal ties between the 619

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[1] Op. cit., p. 45.

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181 high value placed upon conformity to rules governing authority relations makes Bedouin society of al-Qasr less individualistic
182 than, for instance, the Iatmul of New Guinea who "set no exaggerated value upon extremely orderly behavior" (Bateson 1958:31). Social cohesion in al-Qasr is sustained through what Durkheim called "mechanical solidarity."

593 The Bedouin father is in a disciplinary position over his washuun, his wife (wives) and his children. (The word, washuun, must be of Berber origin for I am unable to trace it in Arabic.) Although the father has the right to beat his washuun, the Bedouins say that he does so "only in rare cases, when it is necessary." During my time in the field I heard of no physical punishment being dealt out by a father.

The dyadic relationship of father and son roles is the focal field of authority in the family. The pattern of behavior in this relationship is marked typically by restraint on the part of the son. The father orders and the son obeys unquestioningly. If the father accidentally uses a taboo
[192] word, such as 'ammar which in standard Arabic means "to fill" but in the Bedouin dialect means "to have sexual intercourse," the son will immediately depart the scene in a high state of embarrassment. In this way, the boy is not only excluded
[561] from gatherings and activities in which his father participates, but he is also made to maintain a respectable social distance from his father's age-set. There are other ways of

613 Other tribal segments outside the Aggary amar supported the position of
619 Qudura, and most took his position to prove their notion about his hon-
578 esty and the fact that despite his poverty, he could not be bribed. They
156 were also pleased with Qudura's trick which demonstrated Hakim's dishonest
613 techniques. Within the Aggary amar, the general sentiment was still with
578 Hakim although his confession of cheating Qudura made it difficult to
156 support him openly. They directed their attack against Qudura who in
their view violated the solidarity of the amar and even of his bait and
showed it as divided and noncohesive. They were also fearful that Qudura's
[685] refusal to pay would cause the amar to pay the Geneishat the full compen-
sation for the action of Rabbuh, a sum which, as one said, would put the
amar in debt for generations to come. The strongest impact of the events
affected bait Asabei'itself and left it one step from complete fission
into three distinct groups. Shei'eb, finding the tide turning against
Hakim, found a chance to assert his claim to the position of the Aqila,
stating openly that he would never forfeit his hereditary right. On the
other hand, finding the popularity of Qudura increasing rapidly, he
started attacking him verbally and even threatened to beat him. He in-
[681] sisted that Qudura and his sons should be excluded from the amar and
given the barawa.

613 The word "barawa" is derived from the Arabic verb "bara" which means to
681 cure one's self of an illness. It also means to sever social ties with
[192] undesirable persons. The term is used among Awlad Ali in a much restrited
sense to refer to the process by which a tribal segment detaches itself
from any responsibility for the actions of a particular member. It is

613 627 554 [192] The word mardi is derived from the Arabic verb "yardi" which means to accept or agree upon. The mardi therefore is the person who is accepted by one or both parties to a dispute as a mediator. If he is accepted by only one of the parties, his work is more that of a legal representative of that party. He makes all efforts, using all powers of persuasion to get the other party to concede to the demands of the party he represents. If, on the other hand, he is chosed by both parties to a dispute, he acts as an impartial judge and avoids taking sides in the case. His fame is determined by his ability to achieve permanent, long-lasting settlements. His success in this area depends, in addition to personal qualities, upon the respect he has within his own tribal segment and the weight that tribal segment has among other tribal segments. Similarly, his success and the fame he gets as a mardi may give him considerable influence within the bait. [182] [428] But this influence does not develop into authority because the mardi in this case does not have an established basis for the effective maintenance of that authority, in this case, patrilineal succession.

613 554 682 The other domain within which the Aqila performs his duties is that of the Eila or the amar. His main function within this area is to represent his bait in matters involving the collection or the distribution of bloodmoney within the vengeance group. Within the amar, the aqila is considered successful insofar as he is able to fulfill his bait's financial obligations to the amar. This ability is in turn determined by his success in collecting money from individual members of his bait and/or his willingness to pay from his own money for those members who are unable or unwilling to pay their share. Where kinship ties are strong, the Aqila

671 672 the irrelevance of intention in establishing liabilities for homocide
171 or injuries (1954).

672 The neglect of intention in assessing liability in cases of homo-
682 cide is evident in the cases presented above (Cases 1,2,4,5 and 6),
where compensation was paid although there was no intention established
on the part of the offender.

Awlad Ali use the Arabic word "katl" to refer to any killing. This
● [192] is different from the word "mut" which means death by natural causes.
They further differentiate between "katl 'amd," or intentional killing
682 and "katl khata," or unintentional killing. Although reference here is
672 made to "intention," yet, from the above cases it is evident that the
673 basis of establishing that intention is from the type of weapon used in
effecting the death of the victim. Intentional killings are those caused
[411] by a lethal weapon. Lethal weapons are defined as guns or knives.
Death caused by a non-lethal weapon, no matter what the intentions of
the offender, is defined as non-intentional, even when the circumstances
of the act indicates the actual existence of an intention on the part
of the offender to cause the death of the victim (as in Case #3 above).
The assumption is that the use of lethal weapons, such as daggers or
guns, implies intention and possibly a certain degree of premeditation,
since these weapons have no other important use. Moreover, the probability of death by a lethal weapon is much greater than from other non-lethal weapons. These give the victim a chance to defend himself, a chance which he does not have in the cases of killing with a gun or dagger. In other words, Awlad Ali, in assessing responsibility for homocide, "operate with a legalistic psychology in which intention is is presumed from action" (Gluckman, 1963:207).

771 men in North Africa whose families still retain much wealth and
792 influence. It was this Marabout status of the Grand Sanusi in
793 the eyes of the Bedouin which won him their respect: it was the
776 organization of the Sanusiya Order, an organization the earlier
778 Marabouts did not have, which enabled him to turn this respect into a theocracy.

*175. There is more than one explanation of the origin of the word
792 '*Marabat*'. That generally accepted is that it derives from the
792 root RBT, to bind, and hence from '*ribat*', a fortified convent,
619 inhabited by warrior-monks, found on the marches of Islam in
[192] its early days of expansion by arms. The word later became attached to the tribes which settled in Andalousia under the leadership of the Saharan tribe of the Sanhaja and was corrupted into the European 'Almoravides'. After the fall of the Sanhaja dynasty in the twelfth century part of the *Marabtin* tribes fell back into central and southern Morocco, whence many individuals moved eastwards. Some settled in Cyrenaica, generally on their return from the pilgrimage to Mecca, and their fanaticism, asceticism, ability to read and write, and thaumaturgic powers, impressed the simple Bedouin, who accepted them as holy men and magicians and used them to write charms, to perform religious rites, and to act as mediators in inter-
[613] tribal disputes. Sometimes, as we have seen, these men founded lineages which, dwelling under the shadow of their saintly forbears, became nuclei of social agglomerations which have developed in course of time into tribal groups, thus taking the shape of the tribal society in which they lived. The word
[192] '*Marabtin*' thus came to mean holy men (and their tombs) and then, in addition, tribes tracing their descent, or supposed descent, from these holy men and also, finally, in Cyrenaica, tribes who are clients of the great *Sa'adi* tribes which own the earth and water.

778 Some of the better known of the Cyrenaican saints, but by
776 no means all, have gleaming white cupolas, supported by four
792 walls, erected over their tombs, and inside the walls is a *tub*, a wooden box, over the grave, and this is covered with coloured cloth on which are inscribed passages from the Koran. Inside also are often a few pages from sacred books, occasionally a few small coins given by the local Bedouin, and any property, such as tents or ploughs, the Bedouin have wished to deposit in a

585 [684] probably by pricking himself, and will wipe it on the toga.

585 About two weeks after the wedding, the bride and
606 groom take a lamb or a goat and go to spend a few days with
[574] the bride's parents. The Bedouin say that the relationship
between the groom and his in-laws is extremely important.
The man should treat his wife's mother and father as if they
were his own. "When a man's father-in-law and mother-in-law
come to visit him, he must slaughter a lamb for them. He
must respect both of them. Remember, this man and woman are
the grandparents of his children."

585 The marriage, then, is only the first step in the
571 ritualization of new group bonds established between the
182 families of the bride and groom. Bonds are subsequently intensified
[574] through a process of visitation, gift-exchange and
[431] sacrifice. The most important factor linking the two groups
[782] is the actual presence of the bride in the midst of her husband's
*[613] group, for she remains, in terms of the patrilineal
585 principle, a member of her father's lineage. This is made
*613 perfectly clear by the fact that she is referred to, never
551 by her name but, by the name of her tribal grouping if she is
571 other than 'Aishaibi. If she is of the 'Aishaibat tribe,
182 she will be referred to as bint of so-and-so. Hence the
• [193] Bedouins stress the importance of extra-group bonds by referring
to the women in their residence group as al-Qinaishiyya
or al-Kamailiyya, for instance (-iyya is the Arabic feminine
marker).

173 178 613 551 The line shows five male names in all. The eldest surviving members of this line is Sa'aid, who almost invariably is referred to, not by his personal name, but as Bu Shliby,[9] and on the infrequent occasions when his personal name is used it is followed by Bu Shliby and not by his father's name, which is the more common practice. Again, Abdul Qadar, when his father is not about, is called Bu Shliby, and when it is necessary to give him his personal name Bu Shliby is added, except among his more intimate family kindred, when only his personal name would be used. Likewise, his son Yunis carries Bu Shliby in addition to his personal name and is sometimes even referred to as Bu Shliby only. Abdul Qadar had never known his grandfather, was aware however of his existence in the past, but did not feel it necessary to use his name, and whatever obligation he might have felt to keep the memory of his grandfather alive, he fulfilled it when he named his son after him. Many of the older members of the group are also aware of the lineal connexions between Bu Shliby and Yunis, even though they use this knowledge in a genealogical context only, but many of the younger men of the group do not know these details. It is clear that when the boy Yunis grows to old age, three names in this line will have ceased to be used.

This practice of adding to a personal name the name of a deceased ancestor making one the son of the other, is pushed to the extent of carrying forward through the generations a nickname which referred to some peculiar characteristic of the ancestor, but which has little relation to the present bearer. Thus the ancestor whose name has been retained might have been nicknamed 'The Lame One' or 'The Squint-Eyed One' because he suffered either of these personal defects, or he might have been nicknamed 'The Old One' because he lived to a ripe old age. Such nicknames might later be carried by men who are not lame, nor squint-eyed, nor old, while the names of the intervening ancestors are dropped in normal use.

Another process is at work, which needs to be distinguished from telescoping, for although the results in genealogical terms are similar, Bedouin view it in quite a different light. This is the
[553] process of fusing names. It is common practice among the Bed-

[193]

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[9] The prefix *Bu* is used by the Bedouin to mean 'son of.'

Cases

The Meaning of Marriage

581 Until marriage the changes in a man's life have been in the nature of
585 an ordered sequence of development from a child to be cared for — the only
342 time in his life when a father, without inhibition, showers on him his love
[593] and affection — to one who, by degrees, makes an increasing contribution to
a production unit. Marriage necessitates that a man pitch a tent for himself.
With a tent he becomes a potential host and protector of others. The local
idiom for marriage is "to set up a tent." It would be quite improper to use
[196] the verb "to marry" when inquiring whether a marriage has taken place
since this verb also has the meaning of "to have sexual intercourse."
[195] Instead the euphemism, "Have you pitched a tent?" is used. The Arabic word
for a tent in this context is *Bait*. It is not used to refer to a military tent, nor
to the small tent which shelters only a widow. It is reserved for the Bedouin
tent, which usually has a wool top, and, most importantly, holds the promise
of the continuation of life, whether it shelters a newly married couple, a
mature family or young unmarried people. (The word *Bait* represents a
complex concept, and it would be too much of a diversion here to discuss
the various points of its significance. It is essential to understand that its
[778] meaning is not confined to a tent in the physical sense.) Its top has *Baraka*
(divine goodness) in it; the quality of *Haram*, which makes it possible for the
tent to be used as a sanctuary, is associated with it and this quality of *Haram*
extends, moreover, to the ropes of the tent, so that anyone who clutches them
comes under the protection of the owner. In it, the wife must permanently
reside and her husband has the legal right to insist on this. In it too, he
has the legal right of sexual access to a woman, his wife. Any children
[885] born in it he can claim as his own. With the erection of a tent the son
reaches adulthood, and it is in this sense that he can be said to have acquired
a domain of his own.

581 Marriage gives a son greater freedom and less dependence on his father
585 in another sense. A second euphemism used for marriage is "making a
[593] relationship," specifically an affinal one. Relationships between a man and
[195] his father-in-law are diverse and are used in various ways in different situations.
Here, the particular aspect which needs to be stressed is that a man
606 can cajole his father-in-law, and (through his wife) wealth, in the form
425 of animals, may pass from the former to the latter. Reciprocal gifts are passed
556 between affines on certain occasions, but in addition small amounts may
pass which are not connected with the formal occasions of exchanges. Debt
583 lies between them. It begins with the initiation of marriage negotiations,
584 when the suitor's kinsmen take a prescribed number of sheep to present to
606 the girl's father if negotiations are successful. They promise to transfer
bride-wealth[9] to the girl's father. A few weeks after the marriage, the hus-

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[191] [9] I use the word "bride-wealth" because it has become so familiar in the literature,
but the only similarity between the *Sahiba* of the Bedouin and the bride-wealth of

*613 Bedouins, always a minority in Egypt, have been undergoing
178 a transition to peasantry since about 1800. Probably since
177
578 that time, Bedouin society has been, to use Easton's (1959)
emphasis, a "segmentary society" rather than a "segmenting
society."

•196 Formal Bedouin categories of kinship are confusing;
depending upon the situation they use the concepts of bait,
'ait, 'aiela and qabiila interchangeably. The term bait
literally means "house," the term bait al-'Arab may mean
"the tent" or "the people of the tent." "People of the tent"
[594] may refer to either the nuclear family of one man, or the
nuclear families of a man, his brothers and his sons, and
[596] their spouses and offspring. In the latter case, the ex-
[621] tended family is referred to as the naja'. A naja', or camp,
usually consists of three or four tents. The word bait may
196 refer to the tertiary and the sub-tertiary groups, and oc-
*613 casionally one might even refer to the secondary group as a
bait when he wishes to emphasize the quality of corporateness.
The term 'aiela, literally "family," is the word used most
often to designate the secondary lineage segment. The dim-
inutive of this word, i.e. 'ait, usually refers to the sub-
tertiary group but it commonly designates the secondary group
[619] also. The term qabiila, "tribe," is the only word used for
the primary and supra-primary lineage groupings. These are
196 the general Bedouin usages and their frequency will vary not

• 196 only from area to area but also from person to person.

121 In terms of the Bedouin social structure, it is useful
*613 to discuss politics as a set of authority relations operating
571 in a problem-solving situation. This operation takes place
at all levels of the lineage system with the exception of the
sub-tertiary group; below the tertiary group level authority is
purely a function of certain kinship roles. Since we cannot
analytically separate the political aspect of the role "family
head" from the moral aspect of the role "father," it seems
best to designate this type of authority as being something
distinct from political authority. We will call this type
of authority either "familial" or "domestic," and "political
authority" will be considered to exist in cases where there
is some degree of role specialization and role differentiation
with respect to decision-making and problem-solving. As I
conceptualize it, then, the tertiary group is a political
group because it is structurally identified with a corporate
office, or institutionalized role of leadership. At the end
[128] of this chapter, and in the next chapter, I will elaborate
on this because it is a focal point of the study.

121 Structural principles designed to promote integration
571 in a society also shed light on the degree of coercion and
181 conflict in social "organization." Individuals and groups in
society have interests and values which they seek to maximize
in the face of competition and opposition from other individ-

582 (Patai 1962:Ch. 6).

171 The point of this is that most of the Middle East's inhabitants are villagers dependent upon agriculture. The dominant form of marriage is not parallel-cousin marriage. As a matter of fact, marriage may or may not be considered exogamous depending upon the level of segmentation at which one wishes to draw the line for his definition of endogamy. Ayoub (1959) suggests that parallel-cousin marriage be considered only as an extreme expression of an overall preference for endogamy. She found in a sample of 514 marriages from a Syrian village that 9.1 per cent of them were with the parallel-cousin while 63.4 per cent were within the secondary group. She concludes from this that intra-lineage marriage is frequent enough that it cannot be accounted for by random mate selection.

582 In 'Ailit Ma'fas of al-Qasr, out of 197 recorded
162 marriages over a period of five generations the frequency of
*[613] parallel-cousin marriage was 11.1 per cent and marriage within
the lineage was 41.6 per cent of the total. Of these 197
[595] marriages, only 39 were cases of polygny and most of these
involved a man taking two wives (see Table 5 below).

582 The confusion over the presence or absence of parallel-
114 cousin marriage in the Middle East is related to the question
•196 of whether or not the researcher and the native are talking
about the same thing. In Qasr, for instance, the term

[TEXT CONTINUED ON PAGE 116]

582 114 196 [124] "parallel cousin" (i.e. *bint 'amm*) is perfectly interchangeable with the term "parallel-cousin once removed" (i.e. *bint ibn 'amm*, "daughter of the father's brother's son"). After I had familiarized myself with the genealogies of al-Qasr, I began to realize that many of my informants were using the term *bint 'amm* to refer to the parallel-cousin once, twice, or even thrice removed. When I pointed this out to one of the Bedouins, he replied: "So what, there is nothing forbidden about this type of marriage." Table 5 shows that this is indeed the case. 582 183 182 There are a number of cultural ideals which influence the practice of marriage in al-Qasr: endogamy is encouraged because it cements and intensifies corporate ties; exogamy is desired because it widens the web of kinship; men prefer younger women to older women and may utilize their cousin-right privilege to realize this preference.

582 829 The Bedouins of al-Qasr define the *bint 'amm* over a wide range. One informant said that "all of the girls of the Awlad 'Ali tribe are my *bint 'amm*, we are all one." Another said to me, that "any girl of the 'Ali Ahmar is a man's *bint 'amm*." And yet another informed me that "a man of the Qinaishat tribe will reserve his daughter for me before he will give her to an outsider." Ideologically, a *bint 'amm* seemed to be anything except the father's brother's daughter. This is quite convenient for the Bedouins because an ideological concept can be placed anywhere along the scale of actuality

582 depending upon the needs of the situation.

829 But one is able to differentiate between the various

582 meanings of bint 'amm in al-Qasr. First of all, the Bedouins
● 196 make an initial dichotamy between the bint 'amm daira (daira =
* 613 "homeland") and the bint 'amm shaqiiqa (shaqiiqa = "full sister"). The first term refers to any girl within the primary level of segmentation, i.e., the 'Aishaibat, and the latter term refers to the actual father's brother's daughter. Any marriage within the secondary group, i.e., 'Ailit Ma'fas, is referred to simply as a bint 'amm marriage--even if it is really a bint ibn 'amm marriage. A man has an actual moral claim upon his bint 'amm shaqiiqa: such a marriage is an agreement between their fathers who are brothers. A man cannot claim his bint 'amm daira but he might assume that if she is not claimed by her father's brother's son (ibn 'amm), his claim will be favored over that of an outsider.

582 The differentiation between these two types of cousin role is made in terms of rights and obligations which define social relations in al-Qasr. Social action is based upon these expectations of behavior. In al-Qasr, a man really does claim his bint 'amm shaqiiqa. If his claim is thwarted, he will attempt to do something about it, and whatever the consequences, his group is committed to back him in this
[182] matter. Parallel-cousin marriage may be an important basis
[578] for integration, or it may be the cause of bitter conflict.

*613 of lineage segmentation, ties based upon any of the structural principles may obtain, but they are not ritually legitimated by the principle of blood responsibility. A functional corporate group cannot be defined beyond the secondary level. The Bedouins of al-Qasr make an explicit distinction between a group which is *'asaba* and one which is not. The term *'asaba* derives from the verb, "to bind," and is translated as "paternal relations" or "agnates." The tertiary and secondary segments are considered to be *'asaba*. Only these segments can be represented by an *'aqila*.

[666] *613 •196 174 682 The *'aqila*, the focus of authority in the corporate tertiary group, is an elected head. The concept of *'aqila* is itself an expression which entails mutual support and collective responsibility: the concept of *'aqila* is equivalent to that of corporate group. Wehr (1961) translates the word *'aqila* as "a clan committed by unwritten law of the Bedouins to pay bloodwite for each of its members." In pre-Islamic Arabia, the *'aqila* must have been "the juristic personality" (Weber 1954:157). In early Islamic Arabia, we know the penal codes of the ancient schools of law came to differentiate between the offender (i.e. the individual) and the *'aqila* (i.e. the group) concerning the payment of blood-money. During Umayyad times, the *'aqila* was the group listed on the *diwaan* (account books), and was considered a tribal grouping of some order which was responsible for paying the *diiya*

*613 (Schacht 1953:207).

•196 So, in pre-Islamic Arabia and later, the 'aqila and
174 not the culprit was responsible for payment of the diya or
682 for retaliation. And the 'aqila, which means every single corporate member, risked its life in the face of retaliation from without. According to Islamic law, only the killer may be retaliated upon. But in pre-Islamic Arabia and in al-Qasr, any member of the killer's corporate group may be revenged upon. The Bedouins say that revenge should be taken upon the best man of the family, for this will cause the most damage. Both the legal schools of Madina (Maliki) and Kufa recognized the principle of self-help, or collective responsibility, for payment or retaliation in cases of homicide and wounding. And, according to Coulson (1964:49), "they both called the group which shoulders the burden the 'aqila."

*613 The 'aqila in al-Qasr, which is an uncentralized system, is a corporate sole and a political office. It functions both in internal domestic (i.e. within the tertiary segment) authority relations, and at the level of external authority relations. The 'aqila is a symbol of his corporation and, as such, speaks for its members in matters of social regulation and the enforcement of political decisions growing out of conflict situations. Political order in al-Qasr depends
[571] upon the values inculcated and the type of authority exercised within the corporate group (Southall 1956:27). The model of

613 was set for a meeting in which Quadra was to announce his decision.
156 Meanwhile, Qudura stopped attacking Hakim and directed his attack to-
554 578 ward the inadequacy of Shei'eb as the Aqila.

The meeting was held two weeks later and all the important people in the area were invited. After dinner was served Qudura announced his agreement with Hakim to become the Aqila of bait Asabei' replacing Shei'eb. Everybody expected Hakim to support Qudura in his claim, but instead Hakim directed his comment to Qudura telling him that there had been a misunderstanding on Qudura's part and that all his message to Qudura was to acknowledge the latter as the Aqila for his own camp alone not for bait Asabei' as a whole as Qudura claimed. This announcement was a surprise to everyone in the meeting since this meant recognizing the camp of Qudura as a separate bait, a result which nobody, including Qudura, had ever anticipated. Qudura was very angry and dissolved the meeting immediately. Ever since that incident, the relationship between
578 Qudura and Hakim has been very unfriendly. Almost all of my informants
156 explained Qudura's failure to show up at the oath as a means of revenge
695 against Hakim who had embarrassed him among the people who attended the
685 627 meeting. Qudura himself had told me later that the reason for his not
[124] coming to the oath was that he was not sure that Rabbu was innocent:

> Rabbu has been known to do these thins (inform the police) and I cannot trust him. I cannot take a false oath and endanger myself for someone like Rabbuh. Besides, Hakim never came to me to discuss the oath like he did with all the others who were to swear with them. If he had brought his son and come to me before I would have been able to tell whether they were lying or not, and If not, I would have sworn with a clear conscience and without fear. The oath is something that one does not take lightly. It involves the supernatural.

613 627 When Qudura refused to see Hakim and Shei'eb, Hakim asked Sheikh
156 196 Saleh, the Aqila of one of the most powerful baits in the area, to talk

613 627 156 [196] to Qudura and to tell him that Hakim wanted to show his respect. This means in everyday parlance that Hakim was willing to pay him money. Qudura agreed to meet Hakim the following day.

[114] [431] [574] On the day of the meeting, to which I was invited, Hakim arrived with his son and gifts of three goats, tea and sugar. One of the goats was slaughtered and supper was prepared for the guests. While the guests were eating, Hakim and Qudura disappeared inside one of the tents for more than an hour. When they finally joined the gathering, Hakim announced that he and Qudura were now brothers and that it was his fault that Qudura was angry because he had accused him of being stupid and misunderstanding the content of the message sent to him after the meeting of the Aggary awawil. "I admit," said Hakim, "that I might have meant at one time and probably said it to sheikh Qudura that I wanted him to be the Aqila of bait Asabei'. Now that I have admitted this, Sheikh Qudura should not have any grudges against me or my son." Then Qudura addressed the gathering and said, in a very cold and dry manner, "I am glad that Hakim has come to this senses and admitted his mistake." The gathering lasted for most of the evening, spent mostly in behind-the-scenes meetings involving Hakim, Qudura and different guests. Then as the last guest left, Shei'eb, who had been inside the tent throughtout the evening came out and said that Hakim was a fool and that Qudura had tricked him into admitting publicly that he had lied and that Qudura still refused to take the oath.

613 619 578 [521] Qudura's stand created a strong reaction which affected almost all the tribal segments in the area. The case overshadowed any other event and was the main topic of discussion. The reaction was mixed, however.

Cases

The Meaning of Marriage

581 Until marriage the changes in a man's life have been in the nature of
585 an ordered sequence of development from a child to be cared for — the only
342 time in his life when a father, without inhibition, showers on him his love
[593] and affection — to one who, by degrees, makes an increasing contribution to a production unit. Marriage necessitates that a man pitch a tent for himself. With a tent he becomes a potential host and protector of others. The local idiom for marriage is "to set up a tent." It would be quite improper to use
• [196] the verb "to marry" when inquiring whether a marriage has taken place since this verb also has the meaning of "to have sexual intercourse."
[195] Instead the euphemism, "Have you pitched a tent?" is used. The Arabic word for a tent in this context is *Bait*. It is not used to refer to a military tent, nor to the small tent which shelters only a widow. It is reserved for the Bedouin tent, which usually has a wool top, and, most importantly, holds the promise of the continuation of life, whether it shelters a newly married couple, a mature family or young unmarried people. (The word *Bait* represents a complex concept, and it would be too much of a diversion here to discuss the various points of its significance. It is essential to understand that its
[778] meaning is not confined to a tent in the physical sense.) Its top has *Baraka* (divine goodness) in it; the quality of *Haram*, which makes it possible for the tent to be used as a sanctuary, is associated with it and this quality of *Haram* extends, moreover, to the ropes of the tent, so that anyone who clutches them comes under the protection of the owner. In it, the wife must permanently reside and her husband has the legal right to insist on this. In it too, he has the legal right of sexual access to a woman, his wife. Any children
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581 Marriage gives a son greater freedom and less dependence on his father
585 in another sense. A second euphemism used for marriage is "making a
[593] relationship," specifically an affinal one. Relationships between a man and
[195] his father-in-law are diverse and are used in various ways in different situations. Here, the particular aspect which needs to be stressed is that a man
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556 between affines on certain occasions, but in addition small amounts may pass which are not connected with the formal occasions of exchanges. Debt
583 lies between them. It begins with the initiation of marriage negotiations,
584 when the suitor's kinsmen take a prescribed number of sheep to present to
606 the girl's father if negotiations are successful. They promise to transfer bride-wealth[*] to the girl's father. A few weeks after the marriage, the hus-

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[191] [*] I use the word "bride-wealth" because it has become so familiar in the literature, but the only similarity between the *Sahiba* of the Bedouin and the bride-wealth of

day, but even ethnically the Bedouin are more Arabian than 619
the people of Egypt, the Sudan, and Tripolitania, while 101
culturally they are as completely Arab as any people in the [144]
world, proud Tamim and Quraish not excepted. In essentials
their language is that of the Hilalian invasion of the eleventh 197
century and no foreign language competes with it. The Berber- [191]
speakers are a handful in the distant oasis of Aujila, and even
there they are bilingual, and the insignificant fractions of Jews
and Cretans in the towns speak Arabic, the Cretans being
Muslims as well. The Italian immigrants left the country of 619
their own accord during the late war. Thus the obstacles to [167]
complete Arabization in the Maghrib (Tripolitania, Tunisia,
Algeria, and Morocco), a Berber culture, large Jewish colonies,
and European colonization are to-day all absent in Cyren-
aica. In all essential matters also the Bedouin of Cyrenaica
are like Bedouin tribesmen elsewhere in the Arab world: they [184]
have the same tented, pastoral, way of life, the same social
organization, the same laws and customs and manners, and the
same values.

The people of Cyrenaica are linked to the classical Arab 177
world of the east, to Egypt and the Jazirat al-'Arab (Arabia,
Palestine, Iraq, and Syria) rather than to the Maghrib; to the
sacred towns of Islam and to Umayyad Damascus, 'Abbasid
Baghdad, and Fatimid Cairo. More particularly they are linked
to Egypt, with which their country has had political ties from
the earliest times, and which is their natural market. The [133]
desert comes down to the sea at the Gulf of Sirte and separates
Cyrenaica from Tripolitania and these two countries have
always gone each its own way. Cyrenaica was linked to Graeco-
Egypt, Tripolitania to Phoenician Carthage. Cyrenaica went
with Byzantium, Tripolitania with Rome. Indeed, as Despois
says: 'The Greater Syrtis is without dispute one of the most
decided frontiers, natural and human, to be found anywhere in
the world.'[1]

During the last few decades this separation has been brought [195]
into relief again by the rise of the Sanusiya Order, for whereas
almost to a man the Cyrenaicans follow the Order politically,
the Tripolitanians, except for the Bedouin tribes, have shown a
lively animosity towards it. Moreover tribal ties between the 619

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[1] Op. cit., p. 45.

Cases

584 Prior to the wedding festivities, the
593 father will have participated in negotiations, although even in these he will
have remained silent, leaving an affine, as a rule, to arrange the details with
the girl's father and his kinsmen. The father feigns aloofness from the start
of negotiations until after the wedding celebrations have ended. Before inquiring into this seemingly odd behaviour, a few further details of marriage
ceremonies need to be mentioned briefly.

585 The bride is carried to the nuptial tent on a camel, seated in a cagelike
342 structure placed on the camel's back, this canopy covered over with carpets
[492] and at least one long blanket — later to be used to divide her tent into male
and female quarters — which constitute part of the goods given to a woman
[788] on marriage. On her arrival, while she is still seated in her canopy, the
camel is led round the tent seven times by a small boy. She then descends
and is hustled into the tent by a number of women who make a show of their
attempts to conceal her from view. Inside the tent the bride is enclosed in
one corner in a kind of cubicle partitioned off by a length of blanket.

585 In the meantime, the groom has affected to escape, but is "caught," while
[533] running away, by his fellows, who "compel" him to return to the nuptial tent,
to the accompaniment of their lewd songs telling of the sexual pleasures
[831] awaiting him. Much of this is horseplay, but the young men carry it out
brazenly and the groom is required to show reluctance to continue with the
ceremonies. His entry into the nuptial tent is marked by an expectant hush
that falls over the crowd of men gathered, as they await the result of the
virginity test the groom is about to perform, which he does by wrapping part
of his toga round one of his fingers to pierce the hymen. Sharp shrieks from
• [202] the bride give the signal that the test has been undertaken; not a stir moves
the crowd until evidence of its success has been publicly displayed, which is
given by the groom hoisting the blood-stained portion of the toga through
the corner of the tent on a pole, followed by firing three shots from his rifle.
Jubilantly, the men gathered fire volley after volley from their rifles just over
the nuptial tent, and the seven-day celebrations begin.

585 A full descriptive account of a marriage, or many of the ritual details
589 woven into it need not be given here. What is included is intended to illus-
[593] trate certain relationships between father and son, and between one
[561] generation and another. In this connection two further points are appropri-
ate. First, during the week of festival, young men gather outside the nuptial
[535] tent each night to encourage a maiden in her dancing, clapping their hands
to the point of injury "so that we will have a wife soon." The celebrations
[533] belong to the bachelors, and they are the only ones to engage in the singing
and hand clapping. It is they too who stop the bridal camel on its way to
[538] the nuptial tent to recite obscene rhymes to the bride, and they also shout
[831] their rather dubious consolations to the bride who, during the virginity test,
crying out for her mother, is assured by them that the night holds promise
585 for her which her mother could never extend. The married men, particularly
602 the close senior agnates of the groom, stay away from it all, discussing mat-
521 ters unconnected with the affair.

682 674 body had been dragged. He followed the footsteps of the son as far as the cistern, where he again saw a tiny spot of fresh blood on one of the stones. From that point donkey-tracks led straight to the son's tent.

By nightfall the son was securely lodged in the police post; and local public opinion was seething with fury, firstly at such a dastardly deed committed presumably for the sake of the old man's money, and secondly because it reflected untold discredit on the rest of the tribe. The murderer, who was a big powerful man of about thirty standing nearly six feet in height, lay in prison awaiting trial. After a few days he was admitted to hospital, where he completely collapsed and died of fright a fortnight later.

● [203] Rumours then began to spread that possibly the murderer had only acted in accordance with the wishes of his brothers, who were all conspiring to get rid of the old man, in order that they might share out his possessions. This could not be proved, and appeared unlikely from the [626] evidence. However, public feeling against the whole family ran so high that it was feared that more horrors might follow; but although no open action was taken against the family, no opportunity was missed of having a dig at them in some way or another.

682 674 691 626 686 [672] A very wealthy sheep merchant, who was a distant connection of the family, and heartily ashamed of them, brought an action for debt against one of the murderer's brothers. He produced an I.O.U. for £2 dated twelve years before and signed by the murdered man, claiming (according to custom) that the son now in court as defendant had inherited his father's liabilities together with his assets.

This sheep merchant was known personally to the writer, who was also aware that a month previously he had made a profit of £900 on a very clever bit of dealing in the West. The collection, after an interval of twelve years, of this paltry debt of £2, owing from the deceased father

in the negotiations state explicitly that Sayyid Idris was to be 175*
regarded as a spiritual leader and not as a temporal leader. 648*

Sayyid Idris had his first meeting with the Allied Mission on 795*
25 July 1916 and the three-cornered discussions were spread 793
out over the months of August and September. Between the Sanusi and the British there were easy relations from the beginning. Sayyid Idris had made friends with the British in Cairo, trusted them, and desired that the trust might be mutual. The British, for their part, were far from unsympathetic towards the Sanusi, and those who had met him respected the sincerity of their leader. Col. Talbot, while remaining on excellent terms with the Italian delegates, kept the confidence of the Sayyid, although he had sometimes, on behalf of the Italians, to press him to accept demands of which he personally disapproved and which could in no way serve British interests. He found little difficulty in obtaining the release of the British crew of the *Coquet*, who had for some time been prisoners in Sanusi hands.

Italo-Sanusi relations were very different. Sayyid Idris disliked the Italians and he thoroughly distrusted their intentions. The Italians suspected that Sayyid Ahmad and Sayyid Idris were in collusion, though pretending to be at variance, and aimed only at obtaining a temporary truce which would ensure entry into the country of supplies destined for a renewal of the struggle later; and they were resentful of the British, who, they thought, intended to relieve themselves of an embarrassment at the expense of Italy. It was soon evident that there was little hope of a permanent settlement, so a *modus vivendi* was sought which would at least give both sides a chance to recuperate.

At the beginning of the discussions the Italians said that they could only continue them if their prisoners were released, but the Sayyid had no intention of giving them up without a *quid pro quo* and adopted his usual delaying tactics when faced with demands of this kind, pleading that he would first have to ask permission of Sayyid Ahmad who had taken the prisoners, since he could not give one set of instructions and his cousin contrary
ones. As Sayyid Ahmad was still at al-Kharja oasis, consulta- [205]
tion by camel-mail could be relied on to delay the issue for some weeks. However, largely owing to Col. Talbot, agreement on this point was achieved, only to be overruled by the Italian Government at Rome, which considered its terms humiliating,

During the

593 [207] [177] present time when most of the Bedouins own a transistor radio, a son will not even listen to songs or poetry broadcast over the air if his father is within hearing distance. I once witnessed a well-meaning father try unsuccessfully to get his ten year old son to sit down and listen with him to the news on the radio. 593 561 This automatic deference paid to the father is extended to all male elders: the father-son relationship is the model for authority relations between generations. [276] But there are degrees in which the model is applied to behavior; for instance, a boy will not smoke in front of his older brother, his uncles and grandfather, but will feel no uneasiness about smoking in the company of an elder with whom he has no immediate authority relationship.

593 The filial piety which marks the father-son authority relationship is owed to the father until his death. As the son grows older, he may show a little less constraint but he still plays the role of the subordinate. For example, I never saw a son argue with his father over anything during my stay in the field, with one serious exception. One man who had broken off friendly relations with his brother objected to the presence of his brother's sons at the wedding of his own daughter. When he threatened to cause a public scene to embarrass his nephews before the other guests, his own sons defended the right of their cousins to be at their sister's wedding. They told their father that his quarrel

156 the 'umda, Hajj 'Ali seems to imply that he himself is capable
159 of understanding and leading the Bedouins during this period.

554 178 Hajj 'Ali has formulated some positive and constructive
177 ideas relating to the period of transition which now faces
829 al-Qasr, and they are related to his analysis of the pressing
needs of the day.

> The Bedouins need many things: they need factories
> as there are in the Nile Valley. For the desert,
> here in particular, we need olive presses. This
> will raise the profits of the farmer . . . We need
> [244] a factory for canning tomatoes, for the whole desert
> plants them and the transportation is such that we
> [489] cannot get them to the market . . . The biggest
> change in the desert results from the presence of
> 12,000 government workers; there were only 20 or
> [871] 30 before the World War. There were no schools,
> now there a few. You cannot find a six year-old
> boy who does not go to school; about thirty per cent
> of the girls in al-Qasr go to school also . . .
> Another cause of change is due to the fact that
> everyone now watches his neighbor, he sees what he
> does and he imitates him. Today, I listen to the
> • [207] radio and tomorrow my neighbor buys one. Evolution
> (tatawwar) is taking place, and the people here are
> [212] realistic about it. For instance, I do not know
> reading and writing, and sometimes I must dictate a
> letter to my son . . . My son knows better than I,
> and I know better than my father did, who lived in
> al-Qasr for thirty five years without knowing any-
> thing about the streets of Marsa Matruh.

156 Hajj 'Ali is both subjective and objective about
159 change, as we can note from the comment about the radio.
554 178 In a non-doctrinaire fashion, Hajj 'Ali stresses the great
177 value of education while being aware of his own deficiencies
in this area. However, as a counterbalance, he seems to

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671

Libyan Bedouin MT9

[For information on the barawwa, the act of banishing from the group, as a form of legal document, see Categories 675 and 681.]

*613 with Bait Bu Taram of 'Ailit Lazumi. These marriages and
159 their resultant alliances enhance the political power and
581 social status of Hajj 'Ali within and without al-Qasr.
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159 Although he has no education himself, and neither reads
156 nor writes, Hajj 'Ali has sent his son to the University of
873 Alexandria. Hajj 'Ali's son is the only boy from al-Qasr
[212] ever to attend the university. Hajj 'Ali desired that his
son study law at the university or enter the military academy
"and become an officer." But his son objected to this, saying:
"Either way I will be employed by the government and will not
be permitted to travel and see other countries." Hajj 'Ali did
not argue with this: he said that his son should study what
he wished. The son is now studying in the Faculty of Commerce
156 at Alexandria. Hajj 'Ali is also sending his daughters to
159 the primary school in al-Qasr. Not all of the Bedouins believe
872
562 that girls should receive an education.

156 Hajj 'Ali places among the "status group" in terms
159 of wealth. Although he has now committed himself to olive-
554 farming as a way of life, he remains one of the biggest sheep
472 owners in al-Qasr. Therefore, he is identified with both tra-
ditional and modern symbols of status. Hajj 'Ali differs in
156 one important way from other members of the "status group"
159 in that he owns three small general stores, two in al-Qasr
554 and one far to the west in Sallum. This fact has several
443 significant implications. Shops in al-Qasr (there are five
423
472
*[613]

156 159 554 178 177 829 the 'umda, Hajj 'Ali seems to imply that he himself is capable of understanding and leading the Bedouins during this period.

Hajj 'Ali has formulated some positive and constructive ideas relating to the period of transition which now faces al-Qasr, and they are related to his analysis of the pressing needs of the day.

> [244] [489] The Bedouins need many things: they need factories as there are in the Nile Valley. For the desert, here in particular, we need olive presses. This will raise the profits of the farmer . . . We need a factory for canning tomatoes, for the whole desert plants them and the transportation is such that we cannot get them to the market . . . The biggest change in the desert results from the presence of 12,000 government workers; there were only 20 or 30 before the World War. [871] There were no schools, now there a few. You cannot find a six year-old boy who does not go to school; about thirty per cent of the girls in al-Qasr go to school also . . . Another cause of change is due to the fact that everyone now watches his neighbor, he sees what he does and he imitates him. [207] Today, I listen to the radio and tomorrow my neighbor buys one. Evolution (tatawwar) is taking place, and the people here are realistic about it. ● [212] For instance, I do not know reading and writing, and sometimes I must dictate a letter to my son . . . My son knows better than I, and I know better than my father did, who lived in al-Qasr for thirty five years without knowing anything about the streets of Marsa Matruh.

156 159 554 178 177 Hajj 'Ali is both subjective and objective about change, as we can note from the comment about the radio. In a non-doctrinaire fashion, Hajj 'Ali stresses the great value of education while being aware of his own deficiencies in this area. However, as a counterbalance, he seems to

156 159 554 634 imply that he feels they are not really equipped to represent their traditional constituency. Hajj 'Ali, as everyone in al-Qasr knows, is traditional and modern at the same time. It seems that he has only alienated those whom he threatens and those who are a threat to him, i.e., the _'umda_ and the _shaikh_.

156 159 554 •212 He may not be educated, but he knows the _'awaiyid_; at the same time he stresses the fact that his son will have the education which he never had. Empathy is a primary trait of the charismatic leader and the "cultural broker" who seeks to manipulate social relations. No one could explain to me why Hajj 'Ali did not have an education while his brother (who is only three years younger) and other members of the "status group" do read and write. He perhaps only became concerned in the period of change. Hajj 'Ali, the "cultural broker," is more politically conscious and creative within the context of two worlds in change.

685 such, deviates from the normal pattern of cases dealt with by the cus-
627 tomary law in the conventional way. The men selected by the Geneishat
695 included, in addition to Rabbu and his father Hakim, Shei'eb and his
613 three brothers, Hakim's cousin Samsoun and his four brothers and Hakim's
uncle Sheikh Qudura and his sons. The date of the oath was set for June
tenth. Two days before, the two parties involved in the dispute invited
a number of the important people of other tribal segments in the area to
[492] be witnesses to the oath. All involved started to travel to the tomb of
[494] Sidi Dmain, some on donkeys, others by bus or train. At six o'clock on
[497] the morning of the oath everybody gathered in the courtyard outside the
[778] tomb of the saint. The granddaughter of the saint works as a mediator
[787] between the spirit of her grandfather and his followers announced that
[776] the saint was ready for the oath and everybody went inside preparing for
the oath. Before the oath was taken the Geneishat asked Hakim if his son
and the fourteen men they had chosen were present and Hakim said they
were. Since the Geneishat were from a different tribal segment and
lived outside the area, they had no personal knowledge of most of the
men who were to take the oath. Knowing the reputation of Hakim they
• [212] asked the men to present their identification cards to check them against
[747] the list they had. At that time Hakim said that some of the men didn't
have identification cards because they had not applied for aid from the
World Food Program. Then the Geneishat demanded that those without cards
should be identified by members of other tribal segments who had come as
witnesses. Hakim refused and then admitted that one of the men was absent and that he had put another in place of him. But when the Geneishat
learned that the one to be absent was Sheikh Qudura, they insisted that

His success in solving disputes between members
613 of his baits and outsiders might enhance his prestige within the bait,
628 554 but it is not a substitute for patrilineal succession as the basis of
[428] the Aqila's authority. But in less integrated baits the situation is
[627] different. The ineffectiveness of the Aqila in solving disputes may
lead members of his bait to seek another man as their representative who
would act as a mediator in their behalf. If this continues for a long
time the Aqila might find himself with no functions and the new person
would become a de facto Aqila.

613 The Aqila represents the only effective indigenous form of leader-
554 ship among Awlad Ali at the present time. The camp headman provides
622 another form of leadership on the camp level, but, as mentioned before,
the leadership of the headman is very limited and involves minimal
634 authority. In addition to the indigenous leadership represented by the
622 Aqila, there is the superimposed administrative structure of the govern-
656 ment representative in the form of the "omda" system introduced into the
177 area by the government decree no. 1187 of 1958. The system of omda or
mayorship is essentially that applied to the rural areas of Egypt with
certain modifications to fit the tribal organization and the semi-nomadic
existence of the populations of the Western Desert. In rural areas, the
622 omda is the administrative head of the village. He is appointed by the
[554] government from among the village inhabitants who have certain qualifi-
● [212] cations with regard to education (must be able at least to read and
[556] write), wealth (own at least 5 feddans of land in the area), and sound
reputation. As such, the omda system in the rural areas is a territorial
system. The omda's authority covers the territory of the village and
all individuals living in it regardless of their kinship affiliation.

795*

or swaying into convulsions. Indeed, it is noticeable that the [793]
Orders which permit such practices, notably the 'Arusiya, [786]
'Isawiya, Rifa'iya, and Sa'adiya, so popular in the towns of [157]
Libya, have made no converts among the true Bedouin.

It is unnecessary to discuss further the mystical side to the 795*
Sanusiya for another reason. The Bedouin of Cyrenaica with 771
whom this book is concerned have only the slightest knowledge
of either the religious teachings or the ritual of the Order, and
are interested in neither. They belong to the illiterate class of
the *Muntasabin*, the simple adherents of the Order who follow
its Shaikh personally and politically. It is very seldom, if ever, [789]
that the Bedouin know the special prayers and litanies of the [212]
Order, and their use of them, if any, is restricted to getting a
scribe to write them on paper so that they can sew them up in
leather and tie them to their bodies. It is only a tiny educated
minority who regularly recite the prayer formulas and litanies.
These are the *Ikhwan*, the Brothers of the Order. They live in 795*
the lodges of the Order and hold prayer-meetings there. Among
the Brothers are some who have been raised to the position of
Shaikhs of lodges, generally, in past times, after special training
at the University of the Order at Jaghbub oasis, where they have
received a diploma from the Head of the Order or from one of
his family or inner circle. This inner circle, the *Khawass*, consists
vaguely to-day of a few senior members of the Sanusi
family and two or three learned Brothers and does not function
as a Body, but in the past it was, according to Sayyid Muhammad
Idris, an official Council controlling the affairs of the Order
and was composed of four Shaikhs of the Order, who were not
of the Sanusi family, under the presidency of the Head of the
Order, who had to be a member of the founder's family. As [178]
Dr. Adams points out,[1] the fact that this inner circle is no longer
a determinate Body indicates a change in the character of
the Order, a development of its political, to the detriment
of its religious, functions. This development has favoured the
interests of the Sanusi family to the disadvantage of the Order
as a whole.

The *Shaikh al-Tariqa*, Head of the Order, advised in past 795*
times by his Council, appoints the Shaikhs of the lodges and 793
these Shaikhs can ordain Brothers and the Brothers can receive

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[1] C. C. Adams, 'The Sanusiya Order', *Handbook on Cyrenaica*, 1944, p. 31. [113]

778 to act as mediators between tribes and between one tribal
619 section and another. Even to-day their tombs are regarded as
792 neutral points, as it were, and are often the place chosen for a
776 meeting between the Shaikhs of one tribe, or tribal section, and
those of an adjacent tribe, or section, when some matter has to be settled between them. It has sometimes happened also that when two tribes have disputed the ownership of territory, they have settled the dispute by allotting it to a Marabout, which means to his descendants, so that one then finds a *Marabtin* strip between two *Sa'adi* tribes or tribal sections. One of the best examples of this is the strip of country owned by the Aulad al-Shaikh tribe between the 'Awaqir and the 'Abid and 'Arafa tribal domains. In the same way tribes made gifts of disputed wells to dead saints. Where a *Marabtin* tribe has grown out of a Marabout family they will be found living in the area around their tombs. Thus the Aulad al-Shaikh territory spreads out from Sidi Mahiyus, part of the Masamir live near Sidi Nuh, the Mshaitat live around Sidi al-Mshaiti, and the Qat'an live near Sidi Hashim and Sidi Suliman al-Tair.

792 So, long centuries before the Grand Sanusi began his mission
776 in Cyrenaica, the Bedouin were used to the sight of an *'alim*, a
learned man—for anyone who can read and write is a learned
● 212 man to the Bedouin—coming from the west to heal their
554 children and beasts, break droughts, write talismans, and teach
them the beliefs and law of Islam. Such a man was also a *muhakkam*, one who arbitrated in their disputes and said the *fatiha* at their settlements and undertakings to make them binding. He could arbitrate among them because he was not of them. He was not like them a tented son of the steppe, though his descendants may have learned to live as such, but a *Marabat*, a man who follows religion and not the rains. The Bedouin of Cyrenaica owe much to these holy men, for, ignorant and superstitious though they may have been, they taught the tribesmen to respect learning and religion and kept those twin lights burning, even if dimly, through centuries. The Bedouin do not forget them, or to say a prayer for them, when they pass their tombs; and they have given the freedom of their earth
and water to their descendants. Without these forerunners the
[182] Grand Sanusi could not have planted his Order in the country.
*[795] It is planted in their bones.

and of reading and writing, and of their strict performance of 795*
religious duties. This reputation was doubtless enhanced by 793
their foreign origin, for the Bedouin of Cyrenaica were accustomed 554
to look to the west for piety.

At one time many, perhaps all, the Shaikhs of lodges were
fairly well educated in such subjects as theology, canon law, [212]
and commentaries on sacred texts. To-day most of these alumni
of Jaghbub University are dead and their successors, brought
up in the bitter years since 1911, are for the most part very
ignorant, some being almost as illiterate as the Bedouin themselves.
The Bedouin regard them with a curious mixture of
respect and condescension. They look up to them as learned
and pious men who possess *baraka*, they kiss their hands, they
call them '*Sidi*', and they listen respectfully to their admonishments
and arbitraments. At the same time they look down on
them for not being tribesmen and Bedouin, children of the
tents. The Bedouin harmonize these conflicting attitudes by
saying that a *Marabat* is a different kind of person from a
Bedouin and cannot be expected to behave in the same way or
to have the same outlook. He has been brought up to read
books, pray, wash, and to do other things the Bedouin finds
unnecessary in his own life. He has not been reared in the
roving life of the tents nor learned the shepherd's art. Since
they regard the *Ikhwan* as a different kind of people, the [582]
Bedouin do not intermarry with them nor with the Sanusi
family, who belong to the same category. The *Ikhwan* families 795*
marry among themselves. The Sanusi family marry the 582
daughters of *Ikhwan*, but do not give their daughters to persons
outside their own kin.

The importance of the *Ikhwan* families in the history of the 795*
development of the Sanusiya is evidently very great. From the 554
foundation of al-Zawiya al-Baida in 1843 to the appearance of
Sayyid Ahmad al-Sharif in Cyrenaica in 1912 the Heads of the
Order were absent from the country, either in Arabia or in
distant oases, and its direct influence on the tribes was exercised
by the Shaikhs of its lodges in their midst. Their ritual position
within the tribal system combined with their structural position
outside it enabled them to settle disputes and to unite and lead
the various sections which had sponsored their lodges when the
Order required their support. It was they who roused the [648]*

613 672 682 member falls on all members alike, regardless of the exact genealogical relationship to the victim. When bloodmoney is to be paid, its members pay it as a group, divided among all male adults; and although when they receive it, a bigger portion goes to the nearest agnates of the victim, the remainder is distributed equally among all its members.

613 The genealogical depth of the Eila is usually five generations. This is not always true, however, In certain instances the number of generations intervening between the founder of the Eila and its living members is nine or even ten. Naturally, the more generations the larger the size of the Eila. Sometimes the Eila becomes so numerous that it is [217] hard to keep records of all members who are supposed to share in the payment of the bloodmoney in a specific case. When the size of the Eila reaches this point, one of two things may happen. The first is an attempt to make lists of the members. Many of the Eilas have such lists. This 613 675 is usually accompanied by a tendency toward writing down the specific rules and regulations of the vengeance group. These lists are referred to as Amar papers. They constitute a formal statement of an otherwise informally recognized responsibility of the group for certain actions of its members. The other is a tendency toward the fission of one or more of its constiuent units which, after separation, establishes itself as an independent Amar. The factors underlying this process of fission are discussed in the next chapter.

[539] The following is an example of an Amar paper, that of the Eilat Aggary, which was put into effect in 1954.

795*

slaves, kitchens, and wells. The oasis depression was studded 793
with date palms and just outside the main entrance to the village 159
were small irrigated gardens and wind-mills. The people had 175*
to use the brackish water for ordinary purposes, but sufficient [346]
fresh water for tea was obtained from infrequent showers by [241]
hollowing out cisterns in the rocks at the top of the western [379]
escarpment of the oasis. [312]

The Grand Sanusi was not only a very learned man and a
writer of distinction but also a bibliophile with a fine library of [217]
some 8,000 volumes,[1] mostly works on Islamic law and jurisprudence, mysticism, philosophy, history, koranic exegesis, poetry, and astronomy and astrology. Round him were many men capable of making good use of this substantial library. Indeed, it would have been difficult to have found anywhere in the Islamic world at that time, outside Cairo, a circle of better scholars. Poetry was one of the arts most cultivated at the oasis and I have been told by Arabs that it reached a high level of excellence. Shaikh Muhammad 'Uthman, himself a poet, wrote that at Jaghbub one meets 'literary men of distinction, whose writings eclipse those of the poets of Iraq and of Andalousia'.[2]

The whole community at Jaghbub may have numbered round about 1,000, but it is not possible to make more than a guess at the figure. As the oasis produces little except dates, the supply problem must have been considerable, and we know that the Grand Sanusi kept herds of camels to the west of the oasis, where there is scrub grazing, and at al-'Azziyyat, to transport supplies from the coast. The community lived very largely on the surplus revenues, mostly goods in kind, sent annually by all the zawiyas of Cyrenaica.

The community was centred round the University. It was, [873]
in fact, almost purely a University society, and its importance
as such in the history of the Sanusiya Order is very considerable. Here, under his personal supervision and the supervision of his disciples, far from worldly distractions, the Grand Sanusi was able to train the future leaders of the Order. The Shaikhs of the lodges of the Order were appointed by him from among his intimate circle of disciples, many of whom had followed him

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[1] Duveyrier, op. cit., p. 24; Muhammad bin 'Uthman, op. cit., p. 88; Sir Richard Burton, *Personal Narrative of a Pilgrimage to al-Madinah and Meccah* (Memorial Edition), 1893, vol. ii, pp. 24–5.

[2] Op. cit., p. 88.

312 (literally, sky-wells, to indicate that they are dug to receive and [172] preserve rain water). Most of these are ancient Roman pools which were claimed either by the government or by individuals, and are put into [653] use again to store rain water. Recently, the government has erected a number of dams to preserve the rain water in exceptionally good years from flowing into the sea. All this, however, is not enough to provide the tribal population in the area with a permanent supply of water because of the limited capacity of the cisterns and the pools and the scarcity of rain and its erratic nature. Recent attempts have been made to tap the underground water in some parts of the area. A large number of wells were sunk, especially along the coast.

433 221 The economy of Awlad Ali is based on livestock husbandry, supplemented by occasional cultivation of barley. Owing largely to the variation in the amount of rainfall, the sources of food in the area have the important characteristic that the place and amount of their occurrence vary from one year to the next. Throughout most of the area, the tribal populations are concerned predominantly with warding off shortages in the food supply by moving with their flocks to areas where grazing lands are available.

233 Awlad Ali keep a variety of domestic animals, the most important of which, from the economic point of view, are sheep and goats. The [433] economy of Awlad Ali is based on the utilization of the products of [237] these two animals. These products are milk, meat, wool, and hides. [262] Milk and its products constitute the basic element of the people's [272] diet. Milk is never consumed fresh. It is always made into sour milk 272 252 (maleh), kishk (dried milk), or butter.

233 The grazing season extends between November and April. As the dry sea-
221 son advances, the flocks are moved northward to the cultivated lands so as to be nearer to fodder and to the waterholes which stand usually very close to the coastal zone. During the dry season, animals live mainly on barley straw and very little dry grass. In exceptionally bad years, the people are compelled to dispose of their animals or to sell some of them in order to be able to maintain the rest. In such years the shepherds find it necessary to cross the border to the permanent pasture of Cyrenaica in northeastern Libya, or to move to the Delta where they may purchase the right to graze in wheat fields after reaping the crop.

243 Grain crops, mainly barley, are also grown in the area. Depending on the rainfall, pockets of land characterized by deep alluvial soil and underground water at various depths are cultivated with barley and other grain crops.
[246] Barley cultivation is preferred by the people because it grows quickly and matures faster than wheat; also, it can be cultivated in a range of soils and climates; it is mostly used as animal feed.
[132] Barley straw is also used as fodder for animals. Because of the erratic nature of rainfall, barley production is hazardous in most of the region.
[233]
[433] For this reason, pastoralism remains the most important mode of subsistence, and cultivation becomes secondary. Cultivation is done on the basis of shifting cultivation, which means that the areas cultivated vary from one year to the next following the rainfall.

Land Tenure

423
311 Most of the cultivable lands, as well as the grazing lands, are under tribal occupation. Awlad Ali have, by custom and usage, had for

and the insufficiency of the fall elsewhere. It follows that only 132
on the plateau can there be forest, and only there is a settled [137]
and purely agricultural way of life possible; and it was there [241]
and on the coastal fringe that in ancient and modern times [167]
European colonists settled.

The rains in Cyrenaica fall only in winter, from October to 132
April. In the absence of irrigation the planting season is thus 241
clearly delimited. So is the grazing season to the south of the 233
plateau, for in summer the grasses wither and the wells dry up, [221]
compelling shepherds to drive their flocks northwards to the
plateau, thus producing the kind of seasonal nomadism known as transhumance. The variation in total rainfall from year to year and the distribution of its fall over the winter months are of the utmost importance for agriculturalists in Cyrenaica. There is still some obscurity, but it is an observed fact that every few years in Cyrenaica there is a year in which the fall of rain is insufficient, or too badly distributed, to raise an adequate crop. In a mixed economy this fact must have given an overwhelming bias towards pastoralism.

The water supplies of the plateau, which depend entirely on 132
rainfall, are sufficient for the needs of the Bedouin and their 312
flocks. The clayey soils are, however, very exacting and running spring water is rare, being for the most part restricted to the triangle Darna-Slanta-al-Haniya. On the western part of the plateau water is conserved in cisterns and wells and on the maritime and *barqa* plains, in the Sirtica and Marmarica, and generally to the south of the plateau, in wells.

The distribution of vegetation in Cyrenaica follows variation 132
in degree of precipitation. Where there is much rain there is 137
forest. Where there is little rain there is steppe. Where there
is no rain there is desert. The forest is thick but mainly squat 137
and of very limited extension. An Italian estimate[1] of its distribution is shown on the accompanying map. It is predominantly Mediterranean in type, the juniper and the lentisk being the two commonest trees of the country. Forest ceases a few miles to the south of the high watershed of the plateau and gives way to steppe. The well-known route Tariq 'Aziza is generally regarded as the dividing line between the two kinds

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[1] Dott. Giovanni Manzoni, 'Memorie sui boschi della Cirenaica', *Notiziario Economico della Cirenaica*, 1929 [113]

137 [134] of country. The whitish soils of the steppe support worts and other scrub bushes and some drought-resisting trees in the beds of wadis and they are well covered with annual and perennial grasses and other plants which yield excellent pasturage in the [233] springtime. However, except in the Wadi al-Mra, where camels can be kept the year round, there is little grazing beyond the line Msus–Bir Tinjidhir–Bir Hakaim.

233 137 The Bedouin of the forest area are essentially a goat people, though they also keep many sheep and cattle, and it is mostly through the medium of the goat that the vast natural wealth of the forests of Cyrenaica is transformed into human wealth. The animal is hardy and frugal, and has the great merit of preferring tree and shrub to grass and of being a catholic feeder. Just as the forest would be useless to the Bedouin without the goat so the much vaster stretches of steppe would be useless to them without the sheep and camel which turn its grasses and 233 scrub into food. Thus Cyrenaica is fundamentally a pastoral [181] country, primarily a country of sheep farming, and its people, as they say themselves, have the hearts of shepherds and not of peasants. While agriculture and pastoralism are both practised, the bias of nature and tradition is towards animal husbandry, by which the rich vegetation of the country is turned into milk, butter, meat, wool, hides, and draught and transport.

II

13 221 233 In Cyrenaica stand always contrasted the mountain and the plain, the forest and the steppe, the red soils and the white, the region of goats and cows and the region of sheep and camels, settled life and nomadism.

221 233 True nomadism is very rare. A few Fawakhir, Minifa, Huta, and other tribal fragments herd only camels, or if they possess other animals keep them with kinsmen near the plateau, and can therefore wander pretty well where they please. They may be found anywhere between the Nile, Fazzan, and the Sudan. Their spirit is that of an Aulad 'Ali tribesman who said to me: 'We call no place our home. It is wherever there is grass and water.' Semi-nomads are numerous. Those with land on the [241] plateau cultivate there, then graze southwards, and return again to the plateau in the dry season to water their flocks.

Those of the *barqa* plain may never camp on the plateau but 221
they move freely between grazing grounds, permanent water 233
supplies, and ploughland.

Of the plateau tribes, the Darsa, the 'Arafa, most of the Hasa, 221
and a number of 'Abaidat and 'Awaqir sections remain there 233
throughout the year. The Bedouin met with wandering about 619
in the southern grazing grounds after the rains are the 'Abaidat Ghaith, 'Awakla, and Shahin, some of the Hasa Shabarqa and Bakhayit, the whole of the small *'Ailat* Fayid tribe, large numbers of Bara'asa Husain, Tamiya, and Masa'id, 'Abid Mansur and Jabar, 'Awaqir Sdaidi and Brahim, and numerous small client groups more or less affiliated to these tribal sections. The nomadic sections are generally richer than the others in sheep and camels, and are also more vigorous, independent, and warlike. Politically, they are the leading sections of the tribes to which they belong. The foremost Shaikhs of the 'Abaidat, Hasa, Bara'asa, 'Abid, 'Awaqir, and Magharba are all to be found during the rains farther away in the steppe than most of their fellow-tribesmen.

The move southwards starts in December after the barley 221
has been sown, or part of a group may take the animals south 233
while the rest finish the ploughing. Most of these semi-nomads [243]
return to the plateau in May, when water becomes scarce, but some, including some of the most powerful elements, remain to the south of it permanently. There are many advantages in this annual move to the south. Rain falls and the grasses spring up in advance of the plateau, and grazing is more abundant and of a better quality. On the other hand, the grasses of the plateau and its southern slopes are still green when the desert grasses, except in specially favoured depressions, are withered. By their annual oscillation the Bedouin thus give their animals the best grazing at all seasons of the year. Sheep mostly lamb round about November, which is the month in which new grasses spring up in the *barr*, so that the move southwards gives the sheep the richest grazing at a time when they need it most; and the warmer conditions prevailing in the south suit the lambs. At the same time, the Bedouin in [262]
southern grazing grounds are compelled to live very largely on milk food, and the combination of rich pastures with the dropping of their young by sheep, goats, and camels, enables them to live on the country to a great extent.

221 them to live on the country to a great extent. In normal times
233 the Bedouin drive their animals on the hoof to Egyptian
[439] markets, slowly, along this rich southern pasture belt, grazing
as they go, so that they arrive in good condition. Finally, there
can be no doubt about the correctness of the Arab claim that a
few weeks residence in the open steppe is a tonic for man and
beast.

233 It must be remembered that there are no water problems at
312 this time of year. Sheep, goats, and camels do not have to be
423 watered from the time the first rains make grass till the end
of April or early in May: even horses do not drink until well
into April. This fact is important, because it means that the
prolific pastures can be grazed by all without dispute, since
the wells, which belong to tribal sections or families, are
not drawn on. While rain is still falling regularly human requirements
are met from pools. To the south of the Tariq
'Aziza, generally speaking, there is no ownership in land—
there are no *hudud*, boundaries, as the Arabs say—and anyone
may cultivate or graze where he pleases, but there is strict
ownership in wells; whereas to the north of the Tariq 'Aziza
there is less narrowly restricted ownership in water, which is
here spring water in abundance, but there are well-defined
rights in arable.[1] The water of the southern wells is essential
for the Bedouin who own the country and who live in it all the
year round, and their rights are respected by those who graze
233 there. Sheep and goats need only drink every second or third
312 day, even in the hottest weather, so that in the period of meagre
pasturage they have a wide range of grazing from the wells,
and the dry grasses, supplemented by evergreen shrubs of the
goosefoot family, are sufficient nourishment for them. Wells
are numerous in the steppe but few of them last out the summer.

233 The animals grazed in the southern steppe are mostly sheep
and camels. The Bedouin say 'Cattle and goats do not migrate;
[221] camels and sheep do'. Camels are essential to nomadic life as
it is impossible to move camp without them, and the richer
Bedouin are in camels the more frequently they move, seeking
231 richer pastures. Cyrenaican dromedaries are heavy beasts,

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[1] Enzo Savarese, *Le Terre della Cirenaica*, Pt. II, 1928, Chap. VII; Massimo Colucci, *Il Regime della Proprietà Fondiaria nell' Africa Italiana*, vol. i, 1942, pp. 210 seq. and 220 seq.

121 given to the feud, for this is one of the few societies in which it occurs.[1] What is
613 meant here by a state of feud is a set of relationships between two tribal groups which
578 are characterized by hostility whenever two or more of their members meet. These
591 hostilities are of a sort which cannot be terminated; feud is not a matter of a group
indulging in hostilities here at one moment and there the next, but a sequence of
121 hostilities which, as far as the contemporary Bedouin are concerned at least, know
619 no beginning and are insoluble. Feud and the other forms of relationships to be
578 discussed presently are to be understood, in part, by reference to the ordered divisions
[591] of the tribes. It is necessary at the outset, therefore, to give a brief statement about
the tribal organization; other details will be included as they become relevant.

619 There are nine noble tribes in Cyrenaica whose members are referred to as freemen.
621 These tribes see themselves as divided into three genealogical orders of sections:
primary, secondary, and tertiary. The tertiary tribal sections correspond to the camps
613 which cluster around the larger watering points during the drought season, May to
[132] November. Such camps consist of clusters of smaller camps in which the concentration
of agnatically related males is over 80 per cent. Within the latter kinship links
are known, so that these agnates are consanguinely related as well as politically
[162] united. The populations of most tertiary groups vary from about 200 to 700 or so,
but a group ceases to be viable if the number of male adults drops much below fifty.
Political division is absent from these tertiary groups, regardless of their precise
size, for, whatever may be the condition of developing local lineages, the acceptance
of a common name carries with it full political responsibility incumbent equally on
[423] all their members. Each of these tertiary sections, moreover, has its own watering
point, ploughland, and pastures; each has its own *watan* or homeland. This statement
is true of all tribal sections of whatever order of segmentation. In other words, the
tribes and their sections correspond to an ordered division of the territory.

619 Names of tribal sections are the same as those given in the genealogies. Both tribe
and lineage are identically ordered. Lineages develop, and split at the tertiary order
613 of segmentation,[2] and, *a fortiori*, the process is the same for the tertiary tribal sections.
Split, in other words, occurs where relationships are most intense.

621 The summer community which constitutes a tertiary section, breaks up once the
rains begin in November or December. At this time of the year water is readily
221 available in the numerous small cisterns, there is pasture in plenty, and the animals
are giving milk. These combined reasons lead the larger summer camp to divide
into smaller camps of some five to ten tents. The latter are separated one from the
other by short distances—a mile or so—but together form a cluster in that they are
621 territorially distinguishable from a neighbouring and similar group of camps. Tertiary
sections are discrete also in the sense that all the major necessities of daily living
311 are available within their several territories. Each controls its own natural resources,
and these resources are the same for all the camel-herding groups—in any given year
one may have more of a particular commodity than another, but the difference is in

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[171] [1] Evans-Pritchard, 1940. The feud might have been present among the Nuer. Exogamy and the other rules of marriage which obtain among them create a dispersion of ties, which superficially appears to militate against a condition of feud. But a dispersal of ties does not mean that they necessarily act as a pressure for peace. Moreover, the exogamous links may link limited numbers of groups only, leaving others with sufficient discreteness to pursue feuding relationships as they are described in this paper.

[2] See Peters, 1959.

621 613 628 682 hundred of their sheep are grazing in the neighbourhood. This is beside the point. What is important is that the offender's group is showing a desire to remain on friendly terms, and members of the victim's group are doing likewise by accepting reduced amounts. Compared with what the payments should be, after four years they are trivial and soon cease altogether. Blood money, if it is to achieve the purpose of 621 613 628 682 restoring peaceful relationships, must work in this way among the Bedouin, for, as they view the matter, a single payment of the full amount would only terminate relationships. There would be no further obligations to hold them together. The payment of a debt in full means only one thing—hostility. Where there is no debt, 571 182 there are no relationships. Debt must be allowed to run between groups, for it is this which creates obligations and perpetuates social relationships.[1] As the debt of blood money mounts, the social relationships between the groups improve. The cessation of payments and the absence of further demands is final earnest that the relationships are again normal.

613 628 621 682 The second step in this exposition, therefore, is to attach to homicide between tertiary sections the penalty of vengeance or the payment of blood money, both achieving the same end of bringing about a restoration of peaceful relationships.

Between secondary sections, relationships are again different. Ecologically, the 619 613 areas are distinct. The topography may be dissimilar—sand dunes in one area and low valleys in another; secondly, the soils may differ—sandy soil here and firm valley [133] [132] bottom soil there; thirdly, while the climatic régime of the two areas may be broadly similar, since there is marked variability in the aggregate annual rainfall which is coupled with a high variability from place to place, each secondary section has its own micro-climate, sufficiently well defined for one area to be well watered in any given year while a neighbouring area suffers partial drought. These differences affect [221] productive activities. Seasonal movements are also affected: some secondary sections move annually over considerable distances and in fixed directions, while members of a collateral section may move only a few miles and these short moves may vary in direction from year to year. It is true that minor ecological differences exist between collateral tertiary sections, but these do not affect the economy and the way of life in the manner described for secondary sections. Partly because of their territorial extent, partly because of the larger aggregate population, the secondary sections are more self-contained, not only ecologically and economically but also in terms of social relationship. More of the requirements of everyday living can be met within the territory and span of a secondary section than within those of a tertiary section. Secondary sections develop a kind of specialization to the extent that in any year some of them will have more usable natural resources than others, but because these differences are ephemeral they do not lead to the development of permanent trade relations. Add to all this the fact that agnates are concentrated in camps on the territory which belongs to their lineage, and the discreteness of secondary sections is [582] immediately apparent. Marriage rules make this discreteness potentially, at least, even more sharply defined, for unlike other ' lineage societies ' where exogamy, coupled with other marriage regulations, compels the dispersion of kin links among lineage

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[1] This point becomes clearer when considered in the general context of debt relationship among the Bedouin. Marriage payments, gift exchanges, hospitality, various forms of help, and so on are all aspects, with blood money, of an intricate and fascinating web of debt relationships.

121 183 594 621 age depicted in their notion of a family is meaningful. It follows that, since this unit will not be clustered in one tent, but distributed over several, each small community must be so constituted that links people can use to claim the services of others must exist, and that, since claims can be made against various sorts of kinship relationships, each small camp will have predictable kin links. It follows, further, that since age, sex and number of people are significant, a small camp will have a characteristic demographic structure; each tent in a camp will display developmental changes, and particular tents may be shifted from one camp to another, but if a livelihood is to be gained in this semi-desert environment supporting its mixed pastoral-cum-agricultural economy, then at any given time the small camp must have certain fixed features in its composition. The elementary family is subject to far too many vicissitudes to exist on its own. It now remains to demonstrate this general argument by examining the details of one of these small camps.

A Particular Camp Viewed in Detail

621 613 The camp was one of 12 which constitute a minimal tribal section. In genealogical terms its male members were linked through an ancestor five ascending generations from living males of about 20 years of age. Usually, • [221] in summer, camps of this sort move to the vicinity of a large watering point; in winter, this larger community breaks up into a number of smaller ones as man and animals move off further south to the pastures. [162] The total living population of the tribal section to which this particular camp belonged was 524.

621 613 582 182 Linked patrilineally, its male members were also linked in a plurality of other consanguineal ways. Primarily, this plurality was brought about by parallel-cousin marriage. The incidence of this form of marriage for males of this group was 48 per cent[12] of the gross total of 234, derived from their marriages over three generations; that is, the generation of males entering into marriage, and the generation which has begun to die out are included with the generation of middle-aged males. This means that practically every male is related to others in a number of ways, and it is necessary to point this out now because the details to be given presently will show only the more immediate, but not all, existing connections. Plurality of links, moreover, is not the only consequence. Parallel-cousin marriage is a transmuting agent, creating a diversity of links. Each and every link carries with it specific modes of behaviour, which in turn means that each individual has a wide variety of different claims he can press on his coresidents. Marriage connections also exist with other sections of the same tribe. Their proportion is 28 per cent of the total. Demographically, it

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[12] As a matter of interest, the figure for marriage to the father's brother's daughter is 50 per cent of the figure for parallel-cousin marriage in general, but the consequences of these are beyond the scope of the present discussion.

*613 in farming, and he found this land "good for raising mint and
423 vegetables." To the southeast of the _'izba_, the lineages of
182 Lazumi and Ma'fas found the land suitable for barley and
241 grazing. This area is rain-fed. There are no wells and so
[312] vegetable crops are not possible here. The members of these
lineages say that their ancestors were "real" Bedouins in
Cyrenaica, and did not wish to become farmers in Egypt. It
*613 is interesting to note that the Lazumi and Ma'fas are the
182 richest lineages in all of al-Qasr. They were, perhaps, better
184
241 able to maintain the traditional style of life which all of
the Bedouins claim is "the best." But all Bedouins of al-Qasr
depend to some degree upon horticulture or arboriculture.
• [231] And most families own a few sheep or goats. Both Lazumi and
Ma'fas garden in their coastal sections, and Shraif members own
sheep.

656 Land registration has a history in the Western Desert.
423 The government attempted it a number of times, but with little
success until 1959 when the General Desert Development Organization
(GDDO) undertook its program of land reclamation. But the
361 Bedouins were settled long before this. In al-Qasr, the Bedouins
342 began to erect permanent stone dwellings on the land about the
178 time of the First World War. In the Matruh area, elder informants
agree that before 1914 the Bedouins lived in tents outside the
361 town area. When the British came, they began to move into town.
648 Many of the Bedouins built houses in Matruh between the years

*613 682 435 436 178 [571] Each member of the corporate group contributes an equal share to the blood-money due in a compensation case. The blood-price for intentional killing is presently set at 400 L.E. In the olden days, the blood-price was 100 camels. If a man had no camels, he was expected to contribute his share in cash, the value to be assessed at current market prices. Eventually, cash came to replace camels altogether in ●[231] the exchange of blood-money. This reflects the growing unimportance of the camel in the Western Desert. Today, there [556] is only one man in al-Qasr who may be considered a "camel owner," and he is the richest man in the area. Since at least 1935 the blood-price has been met with cash.

*613 682 554 571 When it has been decided that the right of blood-revenge as a retaliatory measure is to be waived, the _'aqila_ must go to each member of the group for his share of the blood-money. Each _'aqila_ of the secondary group does this, and together their collections make up the 400 L.E. blood price. For instance, if there happens to be 400 men in a secondary lineage group, then the share which each contributes will be 1 L.E. The _'aqila_ must account for his own group's share even if this means making up deficiencies from his own pocket. It is for this reason that the _'aqila_ "should be rich." Though the _'awaagil_ of al-Qasr are generally members of the "status group," this is not always the case. Hussain, the man destined to become the _'aqila_ of Bait Braik, was comparatively poor. He admitted to this fact, and said that for this reason he was reluctant to become an _'aqila_: "The _'aqila_ is responsible for his _bait_.

236 Wool is also very important to the economy of Awlad Ali. Lamb's
286 wool is either sold or spun and woven into rugs. Goat's wool is spun
and woven to provide the cover for the tents.

● 231 Sheep and goats are rarely slaughtered for meat except on special
[262] occasions. Most male and many female lambs and kids are sold in the
[432] market and the money is used to buy the necessary supply of food (like
[438] tea, sugar, salt, etc.), clothes, and other household items. Most of
438 these items are obtained from the shops in the settled communities in
439
443 the area, although some of the major items can be obtained only from
large urban centers like Alexandria.

231 The other domesticated animals that Awlad Ali keep are the donkey
492 for transport and riding, a few camels for heavy transport and also for
[234] wool, very few horses for riding on special occasions (they are con-
[554] sidered as a status symbol for those who own them), and the dog to
guard the camp and to protect the herds from wolves and other predators.
235 Poultry are usually kept for meat and eggs which are sometimes sold by
432 the women in the nearby markets.

233 The main occupation in the area is stock raising. Grazing lands
137 extend generally south of the cultivated land in the northern strip.
[132] The growth of pasture plants is affected by the amount of rainfall in
a particular year. Low rainfall causes acute shortages of pasture and
herbage, and leads to the death of animals by both starvation and thirst.
Pasture plants comprise a wide variety of bushes, scrub, and many other
species of grasses, most of which have a very short life span. These
plants normally persist from December to May; then the land is turned
into arid, hard desert with only a few dispersed patches of dry grass.

682 as soon as he settles in the host's place, should unload the gun. In
672 411 addition to reducing the possibility of the gun being accidentally fired
671 and harming someone, this act expressed the trust of the guest in his
514 host and signifies the ability of the latter to protect his guest against
any harm. A person visiting another does not need his gun for protection
and therefore must unload it. If the owner of the gun fails to take this
682 672 customary precaution and leaves his gun loaded, and because of that fail-
411 ure the gun causes the death or injury of a person or even damage to property, the owner is held responsible for that result. The same rule applies
to other deadly weapons, such as knives or daggers, as well as to animals
683 which are dangerous by nature, such as dogs. Each tent in the area has a
672 dog. Starting the first weeks in the puppy's life, he is trained to
231 guard the tent and to bark at the approach of any stranger. It is also trained to attack any intruder who comes within fifty yards of the tent unless accompanied by a member of the tent. When one goes to visit another, he usually stays away from the tent until someone from the tent hears the dog barking and comes out to get the guest. Most dogs would not attack a person as long as he is the safe fifty yards away from the tent. Occasionally, a dog goes behond the safe distance and bites an individual passing by or a guest waiting to be let inside the tent. If the injured person is able to prove, usually by taking the oath, that he was more than fifty yards away from the tent at the time he was attacked by the dog, the dog's owner is liable to the victim for the injury inflicted by the dog. If, on the other hand, evidence shows that the victim was bitten by the dog while being less than fifty yards away from the tent, then there is no responsibility on the part of the dog's

683 owner. This means that an element of neglect has to be proven on the part
672 of the owner of either a lethal weapon or a dangerous animal before he
• 231 is held responsible for the fdamage they cause. But whether dangerous
or not, the role of such objects or animals, in causing the death or injury of the victim, is taken into consideration in assessing the exact amount to be paid as compensation.

682 In assessing the intention and consequently the amount of the tradi-
672 tional bloodmoney to be paid, the behavior of the offender is judged according to a traditional standard of reasonableness. In the case of the curious neighbor, Muftah, in his attempt to evade the payment of the full bloodmoney, presented an elaborate account of his neighbor's actions including the provocative statements that the latter had said, the jokes, and even the insults he had directed against Muftah. His attempt was to show that throwing a small rock at his neighbor was not an unreasonable behavior considering the provocations of that neighbor whose behavior was itself unreasonable. Although the victim's behavior was unreasonable, the response of Muftah to the provocations of his neighbor was also considered as unreasonable. He could have followed the traditional means of asking a third party to interfere and prevent the neighbor from continuing his insults. Instead, Muftah took the direct and unreasonable response which eventually led to the death of Selouma. It is that element of reasonableness that led to the reversal of the original settle-
682 ment in the case of the startled shepherd (Case #4). When considering
672 a certain behavior in the context of reasonableness, the mediators draw
627 not only upon the immediate facts of the case under consideration, but
also upon the careful inquiry into the long history of interrelations

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233 the Bedouin drive their animals on the hoof to Egyptian
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useful mostly for transport and ploughing, though they give a good milk yield and a fair harvest of wool. There are horses, of Berber rather than of Arab type, in every big camp. They are kept for the saddle alone, being much used in old days for hawking, and are a sign of wealth and social position. 231

The census figures for domesticated animals are probably highly inaccurate. The flocks and herds were certainly much greater, especially for camels and horses, before the Italians ravaged the country.. The Turkish figures for 1910 were 713,000 sheep, 546,300 goats, 83,300 camels, 23,600 cattle, and 27,000 horses, and it has been reckoned that by 1933 these had been reduced to 98,000 sheep, 25,000 goats, 2,600 camels, 8,700 cattle, and 1,000 horses.[1] Before the outbreak of the second Italo-Sanusi war in 1923 the normal export to the markets of Egypt was 80,000 sheep and goats a year, and it was reckoned that a settled Cyrenaica could produce annually for export at least 100,000 to 150,000 sheep and goats and 6,000 camels. The country used to satisfy a considerable portion of Egypt's meat requirements. It also exported clarified butter in big quantities, 91,835 kilograms being the figure for 1922 and 75,462 the figure for 1923.[2] [648]* [648]* [439] 234 439

Although the Bedouin are by practice and inclination shepherds first and cultivators afterwards, all plough. Barley and some wheat are a staple food. Indeed, in most years they cultivate a surplus of barley which they trade, and it may be said that for the most part they are self-supporting as far as their flour requirements go. On the southern slopes of the plateau and in the *barqa* plain ploughing begins from the middle of October to the middle of November, according to the rains. The coastal belt is sown a little later and the plateau in December and January when the grasses begin to sprout. By mid-April the first harvest, that of the *barqa* and the southern slopes of the plateau, is being reaped, and on the plateau reaping goes on from May to the end of August. Everywhere barley is sown greatly in excess of wheat, for wheaten bread is not considered a necessity and barley is required for horses as well as for men. 243 [262] [231]

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[1] Jean Despois, *La Colonisation Italienne en Libya: Problèmes et Méthodes*, 1935, p. 44; Hans w: son Ahlmann, *La Libia Settentrionale*, 1930, p. 78. (First published in 1928.) [113]

[2] *L'Oltremare*, Mar. 1930; *Rivista delle Colonie Italiane*, 1934, p. 885; Francesco Coro, *Settantasei Anni di Dominazione Turca in Libia*, 1937, p. 82. [113]

173 Telescoping of names, and fusion of names, taken together,
178 can account for the fixity of the genealogy to a large extent. In
551 addition, lines which showed every sign of normal development
613 at one time, have petered out completely, even after they have
sometimes assumed the status of tertiary segments. Conditions
173 under which this is likely to happen are not difficult to envisage.
178 If hearsay evidence is correct, disease, when it strikes in the
551 desert, might rage in a camp like wild fire, bringing death to
613 many, but not spreading to other camps, because the camps are
731 so far apart. Even in springtime when men and beasts are to-
361 gether in the pastures, and the larger summer camp has split into
four or five smaller ones, the distance between camps may still be
● [221] a few miles. In summer, when camps are concentrated on the
large watering points, the distances between them are considera-
bly more. Disease, therefore, does not spread from camp to camp
as rapidly as one might expect in such primitive conditions of
living. In 1949 a number of men of a small camp died within a
[761] few days of each other. Bedouin opinion attributed these deaths
to an allegedly false oath sworn by the deceased a year earlier.
[784] Medical opinion ascribed them to filth in a well which the de-
ceased had been cleaning before their illness. In any event, a
thriving line of a lineage was wiped off the genealogy. The por-
173 tion of the Dawwas genealogy shown on this page shows a
178 similar process at work. Again, to give another example, the Nasr
613 section of the Magharba tribe once included six tertiary sections,
not four as are now given. Two of these six sections are now
represented by only four men of whom two are too old and de-
crepit to have heirs any longer, and are unmarried in any case;
a third, whose wife has long passed child-bearing age, had two
sons, but both died before marriage; and the fourth, a very poor
and old man, has only one daughter, and is a widower. Three
of the four now live with their collateral tribal section, Madhkur,
and count themselves members of this group. That they once be-
longed to two different groups might have passed unnoticed were
it not that two elders of the Madhkur section insisted that they
should be correctly placed and their entire genealogies be re-
corded. The younger men argued that although they were aware
that the two groups named Farjiani and al-Khadhar at one time

weeks later, he is reviled for demanding a long overdue instalment of his daughter's bride-wealth. He is the person who can be approached freely, to whom love tales can be told, from whom help can be expected, who gives support in disputes, and who also upbraids, who punishes, who withholds, who acts as a pull-away from the agnatic group. An agnate demands help, and also compels the fulfilment of obligations. An agnate is a man with whom relationships are formal, particularly if he is a senior. He is, too, the person who unfailingly, though perhaps grudgingly, gives help when it is most required; who, regardless of the merits of the case, defends one against external opposition; and who is always available at each life crisis. A kinship link is not to be defined by any one particular mode of behaviour. Each is a cluster of different sorts of behaviour, one form taking precedence in these circumstances, another in other circumstances, and so forth. 604 613 [585] [583] 613 602

The little clusters of kindred can be defined clearly in any of the camps. It is customary among the Bedouin for those who are most closely linked as kindred to pitch their tents close to each other. For example, if a man has two recently married sons, their tents are pitched on either side of his, with the ropes of their tents crossing the ropes of their father's tent. More distantly related kin will be more distantly placed, and here and there, breaks in the continuity of the lines of tents are to be observed, corresponding as a rule to breaks in kinship. Each large camp in this way can be viewed as two or more nuclei of kindred. The camp as a whole is dominantly composed of agnates, but they are disposed in such a way as to show clusterings of varying kinship composition. Characteristically each cluster has a separate name, often a female name which refers to a common mother of the cluster, or of the head of the leading family in it. When these relatively large camps break up with the onset of the rains and disperse to form small camps of five to seven tents for winter pasturing, they will be seen to correspond almost identically with the kin clusters of the larger summer camp. Again, a tertiary segment may have two wells for its own use. In a particular year there may be sufficient water in one of them to meet the needs of the whole group, and its members then live together in one camp; the following year both wells may have to be used, and the camp of the previous summer will split up, roughly half going 613 602 621 [221] [312]

Second, the fiction that nothing has happened, which characterises the 585
father's behavior, does not cease with the termination of the celebrations. 593
Each morning, soon after daybreak and before the camp is astir, the groom
must leave his bride and repair to his father's tent to lie at his father's side
"as he always had done in the past, as if he had not left him." This conventional
ruse is followed, not just for the seven days of wedding festivities,
but is continued after the groom has moved back into the camp proper, and
pitched his tent alongside his father's, with the ropes of the two tents crossing.

In matters other than sleeping arrangements, this fiction that "nothing
has happened" is maintained. Marriage does not mean the immediate creation [592]
of a wholly separate domestic unit. Save for the appearance of an additional
tent, the ordinary run of daytime activities is scarcely altered. To 593
mention perhaps the most important feature of the relationships between 264
father and son, the groom continues to eat with his father. As yet, the son 571
does not use his own bowl,[1] and may not, indeed, do so for several years. 182
The important symbolism of "eating together" or "eating out of the one
bowl," the act of commensality creating a bond of fellowship about which
Robertson Smith[2] wrote so eloquently can only be referred to here in one of
its many aspects. Bedouin themselves stress that eating together is a strong
bond, and the communal meal is always used for this purpose after the
settlement of a dispute, or at the conclusion of a blood-money agreement,
and so on. It is significant also in the sense that those who partake of a [574]
meal accept the authority of the host; he becomes their protector, and a blow
against one of them is struck at him also. Even if the guest is an enemy,[3]
as long as he has eaten from another's bowl his life is safe.

The slaughter of an animal for another person creates a bond which has its 571
roots in the intimate connection between man and his animals. In a very 231
vivid way, the Bedouin view their animals as part of themselves, as part of 264
their *Risq*, their general wealth, in which their sons are included. It is this
mystical association between a man and his animals which distinguishes a 182
meal consisting of the meat of an animal slaughtered from ones' own flock [574]
or herd from a meal consisting of meat bought from a butcher's shop — often [186]
given by the plateau peoples of Northern Cyrenaica to their guests, but which
the camel-herding Bedouin of the south regard as despicable hospitality. A
slaughtered animal is the food, *par excellence*, which establishes this bond

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[1] When Bedouin take their meals, they eat from large wooden bowls imported from [415]
south of the Sahara. It is a matter of custom that a man does not eat alone unless it is [439]
unavoidable, a custom of such strength, that, when, one day, only an elder, occupying
a tent the ropes of which were crossed with mine, was left in camp, he brought his [123]
bowl into my tent "so that I will be eating with a man."

[2] William Robertson Smith. *The Religion of the Semites.* 3rd ed. London: Macmillan, 1927. [113]

[3] A stranger entering a camp is under no obligation to give his identity. Few do so
until they have partaken of a meal. In the past, the Bedouin claim, the period of [574]
anonymity could last for 40 days, but nowadays, they say they limit it to two only. I
have known strangers enter a camp, receive entertainment, and leave without offering [609]
any specific identity.

571 between man and man, although the various cereal dishes which constitute
231 their regular meals are said to have a similar effect.
264 The son who continues to eat with his father "as he always had been
182 doing," also continues to accept his authority. Indeed he could do little else
593 at this stage, for he lacks the economic means to cut away. Neither at marriage
585 nor after is there any transfer of wealth from father to son. The new
182 tent recently pitched is no more than a dormitory to which the young couple
[425] retire at night. During the daytime the son is still to be seen in his father's
tent, and, in the male quarters, things appear to be much the same as before.
[556] In the female quarters, the only superficial change is the more frequent appearance
among the women of one who, before marriage, often sat among
them if she had been a close neighbour or a close cousin previously; or of
an additional helper if she had come from afar. On the surface things remain
"as they always have been," although in fact, a whole set of changes
have been initiated.

852 *Rites de passage* are few among the Bedouin. A man's progress in life is
881 ceremonially marked by only four events: his birth, circumcision, marriage
764 and burial. His development into manhood is not marked by clearly defined
stages. About the age of seven, the henna markings on the front of a boy's
858 shirt for protection from the evil eye are not renewed, the cowrie shell stitched
789 to the front of his cap as a kind of talisman against the evil eye is removed
and he is no longer permitted free access to the women's quarters. As he
857 grows older, he will be instructed in goat-herding, and later taught to follow
233 the sheep. In his late teens he will have to undertake the more arduous and
883 responsible task of herding the camels. Coincident with camel-herding, he
233 may be given a gun by his father. Shortly afterwards he must undertake the
[431] stringent test of manhood, a journey to a distant oasis for dates. These
[411] changes are not marked off by a *rite de passage*. The rites a man undergoes
[484] during the course of a lifetime are minimal, and in the sense that they are
[885] concerned with only the basic events in a man's life anywhere (save for
852 circumcision, which is a minor celebration anyway), they are irreducible.
88 Moreover, the rituals which exist do not comprehend the same multiplicity of
776 relationships as rituals which occur in many other African societies.[4] It is
[771] true that the ceremonies referred to in this chapter by no means include
all the Bedouin rituals. It is also true that the events mentioned vary in
[554] elaboration, and in the number of symbols present in them, but they are
not multiplied or reduced for different people.

In this context it is important to stress that we are here dealing with a
[613] lineage society where social differentiation is not built up into differences
[554] of rank, where the roles to which a man succeeds are almost wholly captured
[602] by his kinship relationships with other men and which are sociologically
to be distinguished from the roles a man enters into by acquisition of office,

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[4] See, for example, the elaboration of rituals discussed in M. Gluckman (Ed.), *Essays on the Ritual of Social Relations*. Manchester: University of Manchester Press, 1962.

462 them or any innate aptitude for them; this insistence is an index of the
424 jealousy with which she is prepared to guard her rights. Each right derived
from this or that small task is an extension of her control over the male.

462 The force and significance of this control is, perhaps, best seen in a
woman's right to cook. At marriage a woman must have at least the minimum
424 of cooking utensils, and one of the rights a man acquires in a woman is
252 that she cooks for him. This is something a man cannot do for himself.
Therefore, when a man ill-treats his wife or threatens her with divorce, she
[593] can retaliate by refusing to cook, or leave the tent altogether to return to her
father. A man bereft of this service is in a very sorry plight indeed. The
legal dominance of the male, seemingly autocratic, is reduced at every
point by the control a woman exercises through her exclusive right to perform tasks. The limits to the area of her coercive powers are significant.
562 They are confined almost wholly to domestic relationships. Legally, women
suffer such disabilities that they are almost of the status of minors; in
reality, their day-to-day living is far from intolerable because they are able
to control males over a wide field of relationships.

462 Men, excluded in the main from domestic duties around the tent, per-
424 form tasks to which their legal rights are tied. While women have access
231 to wells for water used by human beings, the transport of larger quantities
of water over longer distances, requiring the use of camels, is a task which
falls to the men. Watering of animals is done by men. Only they can
slaughter the animals for food. The meat of an animal slaughtered by a
woman is not "free," in a ritual sense, for human consumption. In an
extremity only, a woman can, in effect, kill an animal, but the knife which
cuts its throat must be held in a male hand, even if it is the hand of a very
462 small boy. The exploitation of the land is also the male prerogative. They
[424] plough and sow the grain; incidental help may be provided by wives working
[241] alongside their husbands during the early part of reaping, but the main
reaping is done entirely by men. Transportation of grain to the mounds is
also carried out by men, and it is they only who have access to the grain
stores when quantities are withdrawn for family use. Sheep-shearing is
[236] carried out entirely by males,[10] the fleeces are stacked by them and the
[432] distribution and sales of these is directed by the male head of the tent.

Additional to these major tasks which males undertake are a number of
minor ones. Men sew strips of cotton together to make clothes for both
sexes. They also make rope of grass, albeit in a desultory sort of way, by
[834] twisting together the strands between the palms of the hands. A number of
[342] other tasks fall to the men by virtue of the fact that the sexes are separated
in the tent by a divider of blanket material, which may be taken down
when only members of the elementary family are about, but which is put

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[461] [10] This work is reserved for the younger men and takes the form of a festival during
which lewd songs are sung and poems with obscene themes or references are recited
[533] loudly and within the hearing of elders, in a manner not dissimilar to the behaviour
[538] of bachelors at a wedding.
[831]

would be impossible to satisfy all marriage expectations of men within the 621
universe of the minimal tribal section. For this reason alone external links 613
are inevitable and persistent. Also, the small territorial strip such a group 582
claims as a homeland produces an economy which, in this environment, 182
is unstable. Additional security is gained by making connections with other [423]
tribal sections, each with its specific ecological character. Men also marry [433]
into their client groups. The proportion of these for this camp was 9 per cent [619]
of the total. From these links they gain economic advantages, they can
claim services and a client-following is politically significant. Finally, 7
per cent of the total[18] are marriages with women of other tribes, which
again not only reduces the instability of the economy (in that a large tribal
area suffering near-famine conditions has access to areas of markedly different
ecology), but also provides political connections for men whose power
ambitions have passed the point of leadership limited to their own tribes. In
one way or another all these interests are manifest in the small camp and
attention is now directed to the latter.

The disposition of people in the camp is represented diagrammatically 621
on the page following. 592

The nucleus of the camp is Tent A. Its owner (1) was a powerful *Shaikh*, [554]
the son of a famous father. His marriage represents a political link with a [619]
group of one of the primary sections of his own tribe. His father died only a [428]
few years before I recorded my census, and the large amount of moveable
property he left had still not been divided among the sons; the owner of the
tent, as eldest brother, still controlled the flocks and herds. Most of his time
he spent away from the camp engaging in political intrigue. His two younger
brothers lived in his tent, but the second (5) would not remain there long
because negotiations for his marriage had been started. His father (2) married [582]
a parallel cousin; she died and shortly afterwards he took her sister (3) [587]
in sororal union. When this occurred an amount of bride-wealth was
agreed, but instead of giving any of it to her father, the entire amount was [583]
"put in front of her" (that is, the animals were allowed to remain with her
husband's flock), and these animals she had marked with her brother's
tribal sign to distinguish them from those of her husband. It was widely [428]
known that she was going to leave these animals to her husband's second [562]
son, for although she could not transfer them to a male outside her husband's
corporate group, she could decide who, among his heirs, should inherit.

During my stay in this camp, her brother's son (4) came to it as a 621
temporary resident for a month. Since he was poor, the purpose of his visit 592
was to capture some of his aunt's wealth while she was still alive and the 574
possibility still existed. During his stay he was fed well but did no work. [604]
His kinsmen found his company tiresome, so, to cut short his stay, and after [431]
consulting her nominated heir (5), she gave him three grown goats. Also
when an occasion arose for an animal slaughter, she provided the sheep, and, [231] •

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[18] The remainder is made up of marriages to the daughters of men incorporated into the lineages.

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621
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

621
592
574 since meat is shared by all the people of the camp, her wealth was partly
•231 dispersed among her poorer kinsfolk.

621 The location of Tent B was determined by the fact that the wife (6) was
592 the sister of (3) of Tent A. Her husband (7) had moved into the camp a
571 few years earlier as a result of an inheritance quarrel with his elder who
[578] robbed him of his fair share. This husband (7) gained in two ways from
[233] the move. Although poor, he had a small flock of his own, too small to
justify its own shepherd, but which he was permitted to include with his
sister-in-law's (3) flock for shepherding. If the flock had been larger he
would still have had difficulties, because, at some times of the year, save for
short occasional visits to camp, the shepherd is with his sheep for several
weeks, day and night. He (7) had three sons, still far too young to follow
the sheep, but when they become of age to do so, his dependence on Tent
A will cease, for then he can begin to gather the small flocks of other kinsmen
around his own; his sons can shepherd them all and he can begin to
[574] enjoy the benefits to be derived from dependents. In addition, he enjoyed

Cases

621 Genealogically he was their father's brother, but he was of their same age
592 generation, and behaved as if he was their agnatic equal. Towards his own
578 brother (16), he behaved as if the latter was his uncle, for he was much his
[604] junior in age and his uncle had virtually brought him up from boyhood.
They had quarrelled bitterly because his brother (16) had given him only
[428] a fraction of his inheritance, which he himself, in turn, should have
[593] shared with his young full brother (not shown on the diagram) but he did
not do so. This youngest brother left (15) for this reason and now resides
621 with (16), his full brother's enemy. Two of the men (14 and 13) of this
592 group of four were the chief herdsmen of the camp, although they were
[233] assisted for short periods by (12) and (15), who also helped tend the
camels in other ways. Their connection with the group centered on Tent
[571] A was a mutual close link to a politically powerful person (not shown on the
genealogies) to whom they are deeply loyal and who, while I was among
them, was actively opposed to the common political enemy of them all (16),
and who in earlier years had challenged the leadership of (2) of Tent A.
There is also the fact that they were all linked within a close range of
[613] agnation. This linkage included, too, the owner of Tent F (17), not in
[602] fact the descendant of the man shown in the diagram — he was the son of
a slave wife; his genitor was a slave, but his mother's master reared him,
freed him and he is now given as his son in the genealogy. He lives with his
wife, of client origin, together with her children from a previous husband,
(18), who divorced her, and his own children. Aging, he no longer acted
as a regular herdsmen, but relieved other men in the camp, and also spent
some time shepherding.

621 The details given of the strands which run through the camp to tie these
particular people together are so few that, like the Bedouin plough, they do
571 no more than scratch the surface, but they are sufficient to permit a few
general statements. The camp, and particularly the precise disposition of
621 its tents, shows a group of males clustered together to share two of the main
571 economic tasks: shepherding and herding. The physically strong adult males
233 of Tents D and E shoulder the burden of herding all the camels of the camp,
462 and the men of Tents B, A and C shepherd all the sheep, with (17) of
Tent F serving both purposes. This number of men allows some to remain
in the camp at all times, to free one of them for a journey to the distant
market when supplies of sugar and tea are necessary, and to enable one or
two men, at short notice, to hurry away on horse or camel to search for
lost animals.[14]

621
Economic Determinants of the General Structure of the Camp

574 It is also clear from these details that, given the disparities in wealth
•231 (although all men have some wealth), the diet of most is considerably
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43 [14] There is little point in seeking the lost animals themselves in the first instance.
A man travels from camp to camp asking for information, and when he has gathered
[556] his clues, he searches a neighbourhood.

ameliorated in its protein content, particularly by the generosity of the oc- 621
cupants of the nucleating Tent A. Not that they are the only ones who ever 574
slaughter their animals for food. Others do so, albeit much less frequently. 231●
Whoever kills an animal, everyone present in the camp is given a share, and 262
the men always eat in the tent of the donor, sitting around one bowl. Thus, 431
the surplus that builds up at one point is redistributed among those suffering [556]
a shortage, and meat, in a society where the climate and way of life militate against its storage for more than a few days, is more efficiently used. Many other general economic points could be deduced. These general statements could, however, be made of practically any camp, whatever the specific differences.

Affinity and Matrilaterality in the Structure of the Camp

Economic considerations determine the general structure of these small 621
camps, but do not account for the particular people gathered in them. Per- 613
haps one of the most striking features of these camps, which comes out 602
clearly in the one discussed here, is the confined agnatic span which links the males. Lest it be underestimated, I wish to stress the profound significance of this fact. While granting its importance it is equally necessary to stress that the span, potentially, could be considerably reduced; in some camps it is. Many of the closer agnates of the men of this camp are not shown on the genealogy included with the diagram; (7), (15) and (16), for example, all have brothers, (12) has a large number of first paternal cousins and so on. Therefore, this particular cluster of agnates formed for reasons other than agnatic ties. The most direct single thread connecting Tents A, B and C is that which runs through women. Men of many other camps are all linked in this way, directly. Five tents of this camp are connected through a female link to a common ancestress, whose name still defines the group, two ascending generations for one adult male, three from others and four from others. If greater elaboration could have been shown on the genealogy without confusion, additional links through women could have been demonstrated. Affinity and matrilaterality are the prime movers in bringing agnates together as neighbours.

Other Factors Affecting the Structure of the Camp

Other considerations narrow the area in choice of residence. The quest 621
for power where every man entertains hope of achievement where ambitions 571
are not stifled by the rigour of rank and a small amount of wealth provides 554
a basis for a beginning is also a significant factor in considering the composition of camps. The generosity of the people in Tent A was not entirely altruistic. Justly, it had won them repute, but the repute itself was an important aspect of the political power they enjoyed. They also acquired the services of several men to manage their animals, an impossible strain for them alone. And with their shepherds and herdsmen they secured devoted followers. It was hinted in discussing the structure of the camp that changes

7:Abou-Zeid E-5 (no date) 1959 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9
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bad years the returns may be so poor that grain and flour have to be sent from the Delta to avert famine. The failure of the crop may also compel whole clan-segments to migrate with their animals to the Delta. In this respect, the semi-nomadic clans of the Western Desert represent a real burden on the national economy of Egypt. 105 243 311

Livestock husbandry, which is by far the most important and highly valued occupation, is itself subject to the variability and the erratic nature of rainfall, since it is the rain which determines the abundance of herbage and, consequently, the number of animals reared. Pasture land is found mainly to the south of the cultivated land. Sometimes, the fallow patches among the barley fields are also covered with grass and other pasture plants suitable for grazing. Pasture plants usually persist between December and May; during the summer, the land becomes arid hard desert with only few dispersed patches of dry grass. The grazing season *par excellence* is from November to April, during which period barley stands in the fields. After the first showers of November, barley is sown and the young men soon move with their flocks to the pastures, leaving the older people to look after the fields. As the dry season advances, the flocks are moved northwards to the cultivated lands so as to be nearer to fodder and to water-holes. Thus, the movements of the herders are rhythmic and regulated by the division of the year into two major seasons: the wet season and the dry season. The wet season is the period of plenty during which the animals are well fed; the dry season is the period of starvation for the flocks which must then rely on such fodder as barley straw and on the drying grass. Any movements of animals that may take place during that season are carried out on a very limited scale. In exceptionally bad years the people are compelled to dispose of their animals, or at least of a large part of the flocks, or they may send them away to their friends and relatives who may be living near vegetation. Sometimes, the herdsmen find themselves compelled to cross the frontiers to Cyrenaica for pasture. 105 231

We can see then from this brief account to what extent the water situation is responsible for determining the modes of living in the desert and for channelling human activities and imposing certain limitations on these activities. Development projects and sedentarization schemes planned for the Western Desert and its inhabitants must, therefore, give a great deal of importance to the question of water and its availability. In fact, most of the contemplated projects envisage the possibility of better exploitation of the existing water supplies as well as the tapping of potential resources. 105

Rightly or wrongly, it is generally assumed in Egypt that nomadism and semi-nomadism represent a phase of deterioration which is no longer compatible with the actualities of modern life and therefore should be abolished. For, apart from the fact that it is responsible for the hardships and insecurity suffered by the desert dwellers and the consequent ill effects on the national economy, especially in bad years, nomadism as practised in the Western Desert and under the prevailing circumstances is wasteful and destructive. Vast stretches of land which could be reclaimed at little cost and cultivated intensively are simply left for grazing without any serious endeavour to make better use of them. Under the contemplated sedentarization projects it is intended to increase the cultivated area, to improve the pastures by introducing new pasture plants of higher nutritive value in areas where agriculture is not 178 312 657

(Sinaqra)

The Sinaqra, or descendants of Sinqir, are also reckoned among the descendants of Ali the White, "because Sinqir married his daughter Khadija." They include :— 619 173

(4)	Afrad	Maghawra
(5)	Azayim	'Eilet el-Abdi, Muwamna
(6)	'Eilet Eleura	'Eilet Jeballa, 'Eilet Omar, 'Eilet Harun, 'Eilet Ajarma, 'Eilet Tahir.

II.

The descendants of 'Ali bin 'Aqar's second son, 'Ali el-Ahmar (" The Red ") are:—

(1)	'Esheibat	'Eilet ed-Dawi, 'Eilet el-Azraq, El-Wassafa, 'El-Lazumi
(2)	Kimeilat	'Eilet el-Hajj, Muhammad, El-Maharsa, 'El-Khadayij
(3)	Jineishat[1]	'Eilet el-Majduba, Es-Samayil, Tabak

III. Sinana

The Sinana are the descendants of Sineina, the third son of Ali bin 'Aqar bin Dib. They include:—

(1)	Mahafid	'Eilet Etman, 'Eilet el-Hammama, 'Eilet esh-Shimla
(2)	Arawa	'Eilet ez-Zireiriya, 'Eilet el-Ghazulat
(3)	Qatifa	'Eilet Nasralla, 'Eilet-Omar, Esh-Shawalha.
(4)	Ijna	

Jawabis.—The nomadic Jawabis (sing. Jibusi) are for the most part still settled in and around the Wadi Natrun, where General Andreossy found them in Napoleon's time. He calls them : 619 175 [131]

> "A hospitable tribe who lead a shepherd's life and encamp there every winter with their flocks. They are employed during this time carrying Natrun and prickly reeds ; they also have some traffic in dates, which they fetch in caravans from Sioua in the Ammonian Oasis ; it is a journey of twelve to fifteen days. These Arabs are *marabouths*, or peaceful people."[2]

He goes on to say they never make war, and only take up arms to defend themselves. In his time the tribe was composed of about 2,000 men, and possessed 60 horses. A little [162] [231] [162]

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[1] Kennett gives the three subdivisions of the Jineishat as Madi, Samayil, and Jabr.

[2] *Memoirs Relative to Egypt*, 288.

619 oppression, he gathered his people and delivered a fiery
175 denunciation of his religion, during which he smashed his
726 rosary into pieces and mixed it with his horse's fodder;
792 Baqush then invited their kinsmen (?) the Awlad 'Ali, to come over from the "Green Mountain" and help them. To entice the Awlad 'Ali, he is said to have sent them samples of salt desert water and Nile water sweetened with sugar to illustrate the difference between the hardships of the desert and the comforts of the Rif.[1]

619 As recounted earlier, the Awlad 'Ali completely routed the
175 Hanadi and their allies, and drove them from the desert.
726 In the division of the conquered territory, the Jumei'at received a third, and, although they were still considered Murabitin, were released from the payment of tribute. They
[131] now live intermingled with the free sections of the Awlad 'Ali, all along the north coast of Egypt, and are numerous in Beheira, especially near Abu Hummus.

619 *Samalus.*—The Samalus are found scattered among the
[131] Awlad 'Ali on the northern coast and stranded among many of the Egyptian provinces. They once possessed a head sheikh Abu Sala at Minya, and colonies are recorded from Faiyum, Beheira, Menufiya, Gharbiya, and Sharqiya. An
[175] old paper from the Recruiting Department gives from
[162] seventeen villages in the Faiyum 775 mounted Samalus
[231] and 1,400 on foot, possessing 1,760 camels and 11,400 sheep. Two important groups of wells, both called "Sawani
[312] es-Samalus" exist on the north coast, one about 50 kilometres east of Salum, and the other [illegible]0 kilometres south of Dhab'a.

[173] They say they came to Egypt, 400 strong, about 200 years ago, from the Wadi Samalus in the Jebel Akhdar, and their ancestor twelve generations ago was Nasr el-Hasani, of course an "Arab from Beni Suleim".

[175] In the *Description de l'Egypte*, P. D. Martin relates how
[726] in 1800 the Samalus of Faiyum were raided by a party of Ferjan, 200 strong, from Beheira.

619 *Shiheibat.*—These are a "Mrabit" tribe from the west with
186 an unenviable reputation, living near the Wadi Natrun. Sayed Idris, the former Senussi leader, says of them: "Most

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[1] Dumreicher, 16. This is probably the "Sheik Abdall Gawyal Bagooshi" who wrote to Sir Sydney Smith in March, 1801, warning him of the approach of the French from Damanhur. Wilson, *History of the British Expedition in Egypt*, 371. (Rif = cultivated area.)

433
•233 The Bedouin of al-Qasr idealize the life of the pastoralist.
183 It is a dominant theme in their culture. Gardening
241 and arboriculture are perceived by the Bedouins as involving
[461] long hours of work, anxiety over waiting for profits, and
complex market operations. They understand the logic and
[556] operation of the sheep market. Sheep are a store of value, a
source of security, and a medium of exchange. In a good year
of rain, a man can reap a good crop of barley, and buy more
sheep against the inevitable bad year to come. While most
472 Bedouins are, in one way or another, involved with the modern
433 cash economy which ties al-Qasr to Marsa Matruh, the Bedouins
241 who go into the production of cash crops on a large scale are
434
177 those who can afford the risk of failure and who can survive
the meager profits of the initial stage. These are the men who
can adjust their world view from that of the pastoralist to
that of the entrepreneur. There are only a few of these men
in al-Qasr but they dominate the economy. Through them, most
of the Bedouins of al-Qasr are linked to the national economy.

Land and Economy

433 The period between 1960 and 1964 was one of significant
177 economic change in al-Qasr. Dependence upon farming increased
178 while pastoralist activities became less important. In the
past, none of the Bedouins now living in al-Qasr were "nomads;"
even my oldest informants had moved only once or twice to

TABLE 2

AID PER MONTH TO THIRTEEN COOPERATIVE SOCIETIES OF MATRUH AREA, 1963

657
474

	No. of Families	Beef	Fish	Oil	Cheese	Tea	Powdered Milk
al-Qasr Aid:	308 (1344)*	1008	604	604	1209	201	1209
Total Aid:	627 (3134)*	2350	1410	1410	2826	470	2820

*Number of Persons

al-Qasr during the year 1963. This amount is compared with the total amount of aid given to all thirteen cooperatives in the area.

654
233
During this period, 1960 to 1964, the government has succeeded in stabilizing the pastoral sector of the economy. The Bedouins are given barley and cottonseed-oil cakes as fodder for their animals. Consequently, they must depend upon their own barley crop only to a minimal degree. There are 144,804 sheep in the Marsa Matruh area, as of 1963. In al-Qasr, 332 men own 9,958 sheep, about 30 sheep per man. One sheep requires a kilogram of barley and six kilograms of cottonseed [474] cake per month. The table below shows the amount of fodder distributed to al-Qasr and the whole Matruh sector, in 1963, through the cooperative societies.

TABLE 3

FODDER DISTRIBUTED IN MATRUH SECTOR, 1963

654
233

	No. of Sheep	Kg. of Barley	Kg. of Cottonseed Cakes
al-Qasr	9,958	85,392	56,928
Total Distribution	144,804	1,303,236	868,824

the cooperative societies.

243 Barley is the important staple in al-Qasr: it is used for bread and fodder. About one-half of the Bedouins plant barley on a small scale. The wealthy individuals who own large flocks of sheep plant up to 100 acres of barley. Barley is planted in October and harvested at the end of April. Two methods of cultivation are used: plowing and seeding takes place either before the rains, i.e., the _'afiir_ system, or, after the rains, i.e., the _haraati_ system. After harvesting, [251] the grain is threshed and stored in two-meter deep pits (_matmuura_). Grain stored in this fashion can be preserved for three years.

244 The main vegetables raised in al-Qasr are onions, radishes, peppers, and mint. Mint is the only dependable [263] cash crop of those mentioned. It is used by the Bedouins [272] in tea, and tea drinking is a ceremony which takes place at all times of the day in the desert.

245 blossoms of the tree are stripped away by these winds before
177 the fruit can mature.

178 Traditional values affect the Bedouins' perception of
517 their new life. Men are fond of gathering for their ritual
272 three cups of mint tea and recalling "the good old days." In
[829] those days, they say, men only had to ride, shoot, and drink
233 tea. In the past, there was a great deal of security in
178 owning animals which are not as dependent on the rains as
422 is agriculture. During a year of bad rains, a Bedouin could
233 always move his flock to Libya or to the Nile Valley: "When
731 we have a bad year, we take our animals to the grass of our
166 relatives. When they have a bad year, they come here." In
167 the drought year of 1960, 20,000 Egyptian Bedouins migrated
to Libya in search of pasturage. This caused an international
[648] conflict and King Idris of Libya, for a short time, closed the
border to Bedouins. The conflict was finally resolved, and
the Bedouins were given permission to use the pastures of
Cyrenaica. None of the Bedouins of al-Qasr were involved in
this movement.

233 The Bedouins who have settled in the 'izba sector of
al-Qasr also prefer to keep some sheep. The security which
they represent is worth the time and expense of maintaining
233 them and paying a shepherd to look after them. The Bedouins,
178 in the past, paid their shepherds one sheep for every ten
465 sheep that he tended. Payment was made twice a year. Today,

• 233 178 with the movement toward a cash economy, this has changed.
[465] The shepherd receives 8 to 10 piasters for each head of sheep
which he tends. The Bedouins who have taken up farming can
spare none of their family for sheep-herding chores. If he
[497] can afford it, during the dry season, a Bedouin may ship his
sheep to the Nile Valley by train at 12 piasters per head.
But the government will not accept sheep for shipment unless
they are accompanied by a shepherd. The role of shepherd
has become a very specialized one in the al-Qasr area. Few
[554] of the al-Qasr Bedouins are shepherds, and the role is
reserved for the poorer men without land.

241 Plowing in the garden area is done by hand. Usually,
407 the plow is pulled by a donkey but occasionally, if one can
492 afford it, a camel or a horse will be used. A man and his
[462] sons handle all of the agricultural chores with the exception
178 of the winnowing process which the women do. Traditionally,
241 barley was threshed by camels plodding on it. The Bedouins say
492 that this is the best way because the soft feet of the camel
do not crush the kernel. Now, however, very few men can afford
[407] a camel. Threshing is done with a heavy wooden sled pulled by
241 a donkey or a horse. Tractors, when available, are used for
407 agricultural plowing in the southern barley zone. This zone,
434 during the year 1963, also became important for raising water-
433 melons (batiikh), and this product figures to be an excellent
cash crop for al-Qasr. Melons and barley can bring high profits

407 the lack of spare parts. Three of the tractors were Russian-
built, and two were Egyptian made. The Bedouins say that the
Russian tractors are the better.

407 In 1964, the Western Desert received its heaviest
241 rainfall since 1947. To take advantage of this, local govern-
654 ment officials of the reclamation project requested an additional
[132] fifty tractors for plowing on the coastal zone. They received
only six additional tractors. In that year, the thirty-nine
tractors used in the entire Western Desert were able to plow
15,240 acres of land. During this period of economic change,
731 a bad barley crop causes a fodder shortage for the animals,
233 [654] and seldom is the aid program able to compensate for this.
[166] Consequently, there is a need to ship sheep to the Nile Valley,
or to seek permission to take them to the pastures of Cyrenaica.
Both situations create tremendous difficulties for both the
Bedouins and the government. A third alternative for the
[432] Bedouin is to buy barley on the black-market. In doing this,
[435] he must pay six times the normal cost of grain, and risk
reprisals.

177 Prior to 1960, change in al-Qasr might be characterized
657 as a steady and endogenous process of sedentarization. It had
been taking place for about a century and a half. Exogenous
change, social and economic, may be identified with the desire
of the government to reclaim land in al-Qasr for agricultural
use, and to integrate the Bedouin into the national economy.

423 society. Private ownership of land with sovereign rights
*[613] over it is now the normal practice in al-Qasr. Rights are
[178] [596] held by the family head, the shaib. If the family head is deceased, land tenure rights are held jointly by the sons.

In the area beyond the plateau, in the extreme
[184] south of al-Qasr, land rights to grazing and water still are
*[613] associated with lineages. But here agriculture is impossible.
[241] The type of rights over the land varies with the method by which it is exploited. The southern and coastal sections of
[433] al-Qasr represent the old and the new, the pastoral traditional mode of production and the modern agricultural cash economy.
•[233] But, as noted, of the total population only a few Bedouins are actually engaged in pastoralist activities. Hence, tribal tenure rights, in general, are not overly important at this time. Not too long ago they were, and many cases in the recent
[671] history of Bedouin customary law relate to conflicts over land and water in the southern region. The Bedouins say that
[178] traditionally no lineage could use the pasturage or water of
*[613] another without some agreement, usually of long standing,
[233] made beforehand. Now, they say, permission is not needed.
[675] In the old days, these agreements were made between lineage representatives, not individuals per se. Today, the grass
178 and water in the southern zone are claimed, though not in a
423 legal sense, by the families using them: the rights of usufruct over the land are closer to rights of sovereignty

312 (literally, sky-wells, to indicate that they are dug to receive and
[172] preserve rain water). Most of these are ancient Roman pools which were
claimed either by the government or by individuals, and are put into
[653] use again to store rain water. Recently, the government has erected a
number of dams to preserve the rain water in exceptionally good years
from flowing into the sea. All this, however, is not enough to provide
the tribal population in the area with a permanent supply of water because of the limited capacity of the cisterns and the pools and the
scarcity of rain and its erratic nature. Recent attempts have been
made to tap the underground water in some parts of the area. A large
number of wells were sunk, especially along the coast.

433 The economy of Awlad Ali is based on livestock husbandry, supple-
221 mented by occasional cultivation of barley. Owing largely to the variation in the amount of rainfall, the sources of food in the area have the important characteristic that the place and amount of their occurrence vary from one year to the next. Throughout most of the area, the tribal populations are concerned predominantly with warding off shortages in the food supply by moving with their flocks to areas where grazing lands are available.

233 Awlad Ali keep a variety of domestic animals, the most important
of which, from the economic point of view, are sheep and goats. The
[433] economy of Awlad Ali is based on the utilization of the products of
[237] these two animals. These products are milk, meat, wool, and hides.
[262] Milk and its products constitute the basic element of the people's
[272] diet. Milk is never consumed fresh. It is always made into sour milk
272
252 (maleh), kishk (dried milk), or butter.

236 Wool is also very important to the economy of Awlad Ali. Lamb's
286 wool is either sold or spun and woven into rugs. Goat's wool is spun
and woven to provide the cover for the tents.

231 Sheep and goats are rarely slaughtered for meat except on special
[262] occasions. Most male and many female lambs and kids are sold in the
[432] market and the money is used to buy the necessary supply of food (like
[438] tea, sugar, salt, etc.), clothes, and other household items. Most of
438 these items are obtained from the shops in the settled communities in
439 the area, although some of the major items can be obtained only from
443 large urban centers like Alexandria.

231 The other domesticated animals that Awlad Ali keep are the donkey
492 for transport and riding, a few camels for heavy transport and also for
[236] wool, very few horses for riding on special occasions (they are con-
[554] sidered as a status symbol for those who own them), and the dog to
guard the camp and to protect the herds from wolves and other predators.
235 Poultry are usually kept for meat and eggs which are sometimes sold by
432 the women in the nearby markets.

233 The main occupation in the area is stock raising. Grazing lands
137 extend generally south of the cultivated land in the northern strip.
[132] The growth of pasture plants is affected by the amount of rainfall in
a particular year. Low rainfall causes acute shortages of pasture and
herbage, and leads to the death of animals by both starvation and thirst.
Pasture plants comprise a wide variety of bushes, scrub, and many other
species of grasses, most of which have a very short life span. These
plants normally persist from December to May; then the land is turned
into arid, hard desert with only a few dispersed patches of dry grass.

233 221 The grazing season extends between November and April. As the dry season advances, the flocks are moved northward to the cultivated lands so as to be nearer to fodder and to the waterholes which stand usually very close to the coastal zone. During the dry season, animals live mainly on barley straw and very little dry grass. In exceptionally bad years, the people are compelled to dispose of their animals or to sell some of them in order to be able to maintain the rest. In such years the shepherds find it necessary to cross the border to the permanent pasture of Cyrenaica in northeastern Libya, or to move to the Delta where they may purchase the right to graze in wheat fields after reaping the crop.

243 Grain crops, mainly barley, are also grown in the area. Depending
on the rainfall, pockets of land characterized by deep alluvial soil
and underground water at various depths are cultivated with barley and
other grain crops. Barley cultivation is preferred by the people be-
[246] cause it grows quickly and matures faster than wheat; also, it can be
cultivated in a range of soils and climates; it is mostly used as ani-
[132] mal feed. Barley straw is also used as fodder for animals. Because of
the erratic nature of rainfall, barley production is hazardous in most
[233] of the region. For this reason, pastoralism remains the most impor-
[433] tant mode of subsistence, and cultivation becomes secondary. Cultiva-
tion is done on the basis of shifting cultivation, which means that the
areas cultivated vary from one year to the next following the rainfall.

Land Tenure

423 311 Most of the cultivable lands, as well as the grazing lands, are under tribal occupation. Awlad Ali have, by custom and usage, had for

423 can he do this, but he can also sell that right. The right to sell the
311 share of the tribal land has recently become recognized in the Western
619 Desert, and the usufruct right is being treated in the same way as
ownership.

423 While the boundaries of the cultivable land belonging to the tribe
311 are guarded, when it comes to grazing land, the boundaries are not so
619 much enforced. The tribes of the Western Desert of Egypt are quite tol-
• 233 erant in allowing members of other tribal segments to graze their flocks
wherever grazing lands are available. Everyone from any tribe can graze
his flocks in areas that offer better pasture. But in doing so, he does
not have the right to use the wells and cisterns of the tribal segment.
[312] Water is scarce and valuable. Cisterns are owned by the tribal segments,
[432] and if an outsider wants to use the water, he has to buy it from the
owner for the whole season for a sum ranging between $100-$180.

423 In 1958, with the extension of the Mariut irrigation project, a
656 Desert Land Possession Law was enacted and came into force in 1960.
This law restates the right of the government to the ownership of the land, and therefore does not recognize the tribal possessions of the land, even when they have made certain improvements in it, such as planting trees or digging wells. However, it gave the right of the occupants of a certain area of land to request either the purchase of the land or its lease for a period not exceeding nine years, granted that such is made within one year of the passing of the law. Failing to do so within one year, the government will either remove the plants and buildings, or confiscate them without compensation.

423 656 The above law met with opposition from the tribal population in the area. As a result of this opposition, a new law was enacted in 1964 (Law #100). Although this later law eliminated some of the shortcomings of the previous one, it is not itself without disadvantages. The 1964 law recognizes the Bedouins' right of ownership only in areas where the fairly permanent trees were planted before 1958. Rain-fed areas cultivated from season to season are excluded. The new law also provides for the sale and transfer of land. Any person can purchase up to 50 feddans (acres) provided that he can develop it into an economic enterprise. The law also provides for the distribution of arable lands in such a way as to permit each head of household to own 10 feddans and to be provided with water possibilities. The price of this kind of land is to be paid over a period of 30 years. Settlers are encouraged and helped in planting trees and building dikes. So far, 8,600 feddans ir- [312] rigated by windmills have been psessed by members of Awlad Ali tribes, and titles to their holdings are being issued.

233 423 656 With regard to grazing lands, no legislation has yet been issued, and the government feels that at this stage of development, it is essential to start educating and inducing the tribal population of the Western Desert in initiating and implementing new programs for preventing overgrazing and controlling the number of flocks.

The Group

619 The name Awlad Ali covers a number of ethnically distinct groups. In addition to Awlad Ali proper (the descendents of Ali), referred to as the Sa'adi, it includes a number of Murabiteen (holy men) tribes who are attached to various segments of Awlad Ali and occupy an inferior political position. The name also includes various peasant

613 Written agreements such as the above are becoming more common in
675 the area. The need to have the responsibility of the vengeance group
[178] or the Amar recorded and the names of its members listed stems from the
[361] increase in the geographical mobility of individuals and separate households
[464] seeking jobs with the government organizations in the area or with
the various industries in the towns and cities outside the Western Desert.
233 The uncertainty of pastoral nomadism and the delicate balance which exists
178 between pastures, animal population, and human population is pushing an
182 ever-increasing number of people to abandon the way of life which they
had lived for generations. Animals are extremely important to sustain
233 the pastoral life of Awlad Ali. Once the balance between the pasture and
182 the animal population is upset by a draught, a segment of the human population
731 has to make new adjustments. This adjustment is first made by
166 moving with one's flocks to areas in the Delta or in the Cyrenaica region
of Libya. This is a short-term adjustment, however, and cannot be continued
for long periods of time. Pastures in the Delta have to be purchased,
and in most cases the owner of the herd has to sell part of his
[619] herd to feed the rest. The Cyrenaica pasture is very limited and restricted
by the strong tribal control of the Cyrenaica Bedouins, who in
general are not friendly with many of the tribal segments living in the
233 Egyptian Western Desert. If the draught continues beyond a certain time,
731 the individual owner of a herd may find himself forced to sell the herd
464
434 and seek other modes of subsistence in the form of part-time or full-time
182 employment as a semi-skilled or unskilled worker with the government or
industrial organizations. Such jobs are usually viewed as a temporary
source of income to help the individual and his immediate family live

233 through a hard year and to help him replace the herd he has lost. In
731 464 many cases a dry year is followed by another and many of these employed
434 find themselves depending more and more on their income from the jobs.
182 The security of the employment is often compared favorably with the uncertainty
of nomadic existence, and many decide to abandon the pastoral
life on a more or less permanent basis. But even when one makes such a
decision, he usually retains a strong affiliation with his original way
613 of life. He retains an active interest in the affairs of his Amar, especially
182 those from which he can benefit in one way or another. One important
682 gain he might get is through sharing in the receipt of bloodmoney
for the killing of any member of the Amar, and having the Amar paid in
his behalf. But while asserting their membership in the Amar at the time
of such distribution, very few, if any, would show themselves when the
membership of the Amar is called upon for the collection of bloodmoney
which the Amar has to pay for a murder committed by one of its members.
613 It is known in the area that members of one bait of the Aggary Amar (Bait
682 Ahmad) have never paid their share of the bloodmoney of the last twenty
578 years, but always claim their share in the distribution of bloodmoney.
Many members of that Bait claim that the Bait has long been separated from
the Aggary Amar, although this claim is denied by the rest of the Amar as
well as by those members of Bait Ahmad who claim their share in the receipt
of bloodmoney.

613 Disputes such as these, which are not limited to the Aggarty, led
675 many Amars to attempt to make comprehensive lists of all members of the
578 Amar and to require a written agreement in case of separation of a given
Bait from the Amar.

621 which ranges from two to ten kilometers. The camp coincides with the
233 herding unit. The herd of the camp is usually grazed as a unit, often
621 by a paid shepherd hired by the members of the camp as a whole. Origi-
233 nally the camp moved as a unit for grazing. This was essential in the
621 era of the tribal warfare and raiding where the security of the herd
361 and that of the people depended on such collective movement. In a type
178 of organization adapted to periodical movement, the camp offered the
optimum sized community: small enough to permit easy movement and large
enough to offer the kind of protection which individual families could
621 not have offered. In this era the camp seemed to have been a closely
178 knit group. Many of the informants still remember the time when the
622 361 camp was under the strong control of the headman who made the major de-
233 cisions of where and when the camp should move. It was those decisions
that determined the safety and the security of the group. The headman
had strong authority over members of his camp. Such authority was based
mainly on his ability to exercise valid judgments as to whether or not
the group should move, and the route that it had to take if movement was
decided upon. At the present time, and with the diminishing of raiding
and tribal warfare in the area, the authority of the headman seems to
have diminished along with it. The camp appears at the present time to
be mostly a residential unit with minimal leadership and with a rapidly
changing composition. Different families join the camp at different
times during the year.

621 Although the membership of the camps is drawn from the bait, a camp
613 does not, in terms of its genealogical composition, make up a descent
segment of that Bait. The membership of a camp is based on a completely

634 who reach the age of military service. He is also supposed to report
554 the presence of any fugitive or criminal in his district and report
657 crimes accurring in that district and which involve members of the tribal segment he represents.

634 The first two duties of the omda to the government do not involve
554 any conflict of interest. Unlike the rural areas where sons are considered
657 a very important economic asset to their parents, and therefore,
562 there is a general resentment of military service which takes the sons
701 away and deprives the parents of their important work around the fields,
178 Awlad Ali look at military service as an opportunity to have their sons go to the city, obtain guaranteed payment, and escape the hardship of nomadic existence. Economic activities
[233] in the area do not require the cooperation of a large number of individuals, and most of the grazing of animals is done either by a paid shepherd or by one of the grown-up sons. Although there still exists an
[183] ideology which values having many sons, yet with the cessation of hostilities between the tribal segments, their presence in the area has lost its
[464] value. Many of the younger generation are seeking jobs with the government projects in the area or in the city. Neither one is easy to find. Joining the army is increasingly considered as an easy alternative.

634 The omda's function which seems to involve some conflicting loyalties
554 is that of reporting crimes involving members of his tribal segment. But
657 even this does not pose a serious problem as it might seem. Almost all
674 minor crimes committed against property or persons as well as all civil disputes are left to be handled by the tribal proceedings. The duties of the omda are limited to reporting the cases of murder and serious assault

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1 On the basis of one percent of the yearly yield.

586 women in the Western Desert, and that the women usually have no difficulty
562 in finding another husband.

586 While the right of "throwing herself" offers the wife some guarantee
562 of her rights, her main guarantee is derived from the security
593 she gets from retaining membership in her father's family. After the
768 death of the father, the woman's claims extend to the households of her brothers. She acquires in them the same rights she had in her father's household, and the brothers take the responsibility of their father in
[428] protecting and defending their sister. The woman achieves this continuation of support partially through forfeiting her rights of inheritance to her brothers.

562 Awlad Ali recognize the right of the daughters to inherit in their
428 father's estate. They accept the system of inheritance specified in
[779] the Koraan which gives the woman half the share of her brother. In practice, this is usually side-stepped. Only sons inherit their father's
[238] property. The justification given for the non-inheritance of women is
[311] that the main items of inheritance in the Western Desert, livestock and the right of land use, require certain protection and care which are beyond
233 the culturally defined roles of women. Livestock require moving
562 from one grazing ground to another, almost always crossing tribal lands
428 belonging to various tribal segments, some of whom might be hostile. It also requires the ability to protect the herds from predators and from raids, especially in earlier times. Similarly, land requires preparation and protection against trespassers, especially when the barley is growing.

562 Women, however, are supposed to be compensated by their brothers
428 593 for their shares. But very few would actually ask their brothers for

562 such compensation. In forfeiting her rights of inheritance, a woman
428 secures for herself and her children the continuous support of her
593 kin-group and the protection of her rights. This support was denied
in the few cases I was able to collect in which the woman demanded her
share of inheritance. The following is one of these cases. The material
159 presented is a summary of the life history of Fatma, who at the time of
562 428 the study, was a shopkeeper managing the small general store she owned
593 near the railroad station of Burg el-Arab, some fifty miles west of
[444] Alexandria. She also practiced healing and midwifery on a part-time
[759] basis.

Fatma was the only daughter with four sons of sheikh El-Asi, who
at one time was the aqila of bait Hussein of the Sanagrah tribal segment
[627] in the area. He was also known as a mardi and was frequently sought in
[755] mediation of disputes. He was believed to have supernatural power which
he used to cure people for a certain amount of money. During his life-
[454] time, he had acquired a sizable sum of money which he invested in live-
[233] stock. At the time of his death his herd, which numbered more than 900
[422] sheep and goats, was considered the finest in the area. He had no barley
[423] lands because his camp was deep in the desert, but he had fine grazing
land.

Throughout the area the four sons were known for being arrogant and irresponsible. Three of them were employed by one of the irrigation projects carried on by the government in the area as construction workers; the fourth looked after the herd of his father. All four were known as chasers of women, and they frequently went to Alexandria to visit prostitutes and drink liquor.

[444) Fatma was first married when she was eighteen to a man from
Alexandria who had opened a general store in the area where her father

159 562 428 593 444 lived. Five years ago the husband died in a mining accident leaving Fatma with a ten-month-old boy. By that time, her father had been disabled, and her brothers wanted to manage her husband's store on her behalf. Knowing that her brothers were greedy, she refused and insisted that she take care of the store herself. The brothers objected on the grounds that it was not customary for a decent woman to be exposed to the customers in the store. When she insisted, the brothers threatened her. When the threats did not work, they beat her. After that, she [625] went to the police station in the area, filed a complaint against her brothers, and asked for police protection. The police officer in charge brought the brothers in and warned them that if they interfered with the store, not only would he arrest them, but he would also use his influence to get them forced from the irrigation projects where three of them worked. The threat worked, and they became friendly with their sister, buying things for the store whenever they went to Alexandria and sometimes helping in the store with her consent when she was on housecalls 159 562 428 593 233 [587] as a midwife. A year later Fatma was married for the second time to a distant cousin; a few months later her father died. In a family meeting that followed the funeral, Fatma made her announcement that she was claiming her share of her father's herd. The brothers were angry and tried to beat her. But the older members of the bait who were present at the meeting stopped them and told them that Fatma had all the right to claim her share of the inheritance according to Awlad Ali ways and that there was [578] nothing that they could do about it. She was characterized in that meeting as "bint haram" (illegitimate child), an insult used to refer to those who show selfishness in their kinship obligations. When she left the camp with her share of the herd, this seemed to have severed

159 the relationship between her and her brothers.

562 428 Following her action and until the time of the study, they had
593 never visited her and she had never visited them. Her husband took
● [237] care of the herd; and the arrangement worked out all right until the
159 husband told Fatma one day that he was going to marry a second wife.
562 593 She refused, but he went ahead with the marriage without her consent.
595 He brought the new wife to live with Fatma in the same tin hut in which
they were living. He started to pay more attention to the new wife and
to neglect Fatma; whenever the latter complained, he beat her. Then,
before one of the religious feasts, he sold two of Fatma's sheep and
bought his new wife a dress and a silver bracelet. When Fatma objected
[164] and they argued, he hit her with a stick on the head; she was hospitalized for a week with a serious head wound. While in the hospital, she
went to her brothers who lived only two miles away, but they refused to
159 come to her assistance. She then went to sheikh Elewa (the aqila of
562 Bait Asabei) and threw herself on him. He met with the husband and convinced him to divorce Fatma. He kept forty sheep of Fatma's herd as com- 594 593
595 pensation for the mahr he had paid her and the marriage expenses, then
586 took his new wife and moved from Fatma's hut. Fatma then returned and
159 managed her financial affairs successfully herself. She managed the
562 444 store and hired a shepherd to take care of the sheep. At the time of
[233] the present study she was respected by almost everybody in the area, including members of the local administration. She is known to be reason-
[629] able and of sound opinion, and her store functions as the meeting place
[521] for many of the tribal mi'ads and for casual conversations. She is also
considered as a liason between the tribal population in the area and the
local government administration, and is respected by both sides.

311 423 613 was a large area of grazing land which also belonged to the Bait of Yadem. The area attracted a large number of tribesmen who 233 311 619 613 brought their herds for grazing. One of these was Kuraiem from Awlad Kharouf tribal segment. He brought his wife and child and a herd of more than two hundred sheep and goats. Although it is not proper for one to cultivate the land belonging to another tribal segment, yet, when it comes to grazing land, no such restriction is imposed. Only the permission of the aqila of that tribal segment is required, and even that is granted so automatically that many tribesmen do not bother to ask for such permission. Kuraiem took this permission for granted and pitched his 233 311 578 tent in the grazing land of Yadem and his Bait. Yadem, however, was disturbed because he thought that Kuraiem grazed his flocks in an area very close to his cultivated barley, so close that he feared that the animals might eat the growing barley. When Yadem asked Kuraiem to move a little further and Kuraiem refused, they entered into an argument during which Yadem told him that if he did not move by the following day, he would break his neck. The following morning Yadem went with his brother to see if Kuraiem was still there. Both Yadem and his brother were armed with heavy sticks. As they reached Kuraiem's tent, they hit him with the sticks on [682] the head. Kuraiem fell on the ground, and they kept hitting him until he was dead.

682 672 In due course, Kuraiem's family claimed L.E. 400 bloodmoney for the intentional killing of Kuraiem. Yadem and his family rejec- [627] ted the claim and insisted that the killing was unintentional. The Mi'ad was held, and the two Mardis selected by the two parties

613 the tent and fearing that he might have been a member of the
628 feuding Bait intending to harm him or members of his family,
Galil took his gun and went outside to see who was there. He
called on the person to identify himself. When he got no answer,
he warned him that unless he identify himself, he (Galil) would
fire his gun in the air as a warning. After a short period of no
613 response, Galil fired his gun in the air. A moment later, Galil
628 heard a cry coming from the direction of a small hill at the side
682 of the tent. When Galil went there, he found Salem, a member of
a neighboring camp, lying on the ground with a bullet wound in his
stomach. He told Galil that his wife was sick and that he had
come to borrow Galil's donkey to take her to the doctor in the
nearby medical center. He had taken the short cut to Galil's tent
when he was hit by the bullet which Galil had fired in the air.
Galil took his wounded neighbor to the medical center, but Salem
died before they reached it.

682 The Mi'ad was held, and Galil and his family had to pay L.E. 400
672 to the victim's kin group. The amount was that specified for in-
627 tentional killing, since the wound that caused the death was in-
673 flicted by a lethal weapon.

CASE #5: The Case of the Startled Shepherd

● 233 This case involves Idris, a poor member of the Sheresat tribal
[464] segment. He earned his living by working as a hired shepherd for
[219] 'Awwad from Bait Ibrahim in the area of Gharbaniat. During the dry
[312] season, each shepherd takes his flocks to the water wells near the
coast and leaves them there for three or four hours to get their
fill of drinking water. That afternoon, Idris, waiting for the

● 233 animals to drink, sat on the edge of the well with his feet in the
cool water of the pool completely absorbed in his thoughts amidst
233 the quiet surroundings. Passing by the pool at that time was Mahdi
576 from a neighboring tribal segment. Seeing Idris (whom he had not
165 known), he shouted the customary greeting, "Peace on you." Startled
by the voice of Mahdi, Idris lost his balance and fell in the deep
water of the pool. Mahdi rushed to help him, but the water was too
deep, and Idris drowned. Feeling sorry for Idris, Mahdi took the
flock and went back to the camp of Idris where he informed the
682 latter's wife of what had happened. A few days later, Mahdi was
627 paid a visit by Sheikh Elewa, the aqila of Bait Asabei' and known
[613] mardi in the area who informed Mahdi that the family of Idris was
demanding the payment of the sum of L.E. 300 for the death of their
682 relative. A Mi'ad was set for the following week. In that Mi'ad,
627 and after Mahdi admitted that it was his greeting that had startled
672 Idris and caused him to fall in the well, the two Mardis represent-
613 ing the two parties agreed that the payment of the sum of three
hundred pounds was in order and that Mahdi and his amar must pay it
to the victim's family as soon as possible. At first, Mahdi seemed
to accept the judgment of the two Mardis, especially when both were
prominant members of some of the influential tribal segments in the
area. But Mahdi was a poor man, and his amar was very small in number, which made the payment of the bloodmoney almost impossible.
682 Although appeal in the ordinary legal sense does not exist in such
627 a system like that of Awlad Ali, where no judgment is forced upon
672
695 any of the disputing parties, and where the pronouncement of the

105 The judicial process among Awlad Ali of the Western Desert of
Egypt has been dealt with in the context of political organization of
105 the group. The main feature of the political organization of Awlad Ali
613 is the absence of centralized leadership. The only formally recognized
leadership is that of the aqila, the leader of the bait tribal segment.
105 The sources of the aqila's authority derive from a number of sources,
613 one of which is his judicial role. It is through him that disputes in-
627 volving members of his bait are solved. The process by which he per-
forms this crucial function is that of informal mediation in which both
the personal qualities of the aqila, as well as the weight of his tribal
[692] segment, play an important role. This is especially important in a so-
ciety with no court system or formal hearing and where durability of any
settlement depends on its being accepted by the parties involved.

105 The main aim of the judicial process is to affect reconciliation of
182 the parties and to restore a certain degree of social order and cohesion
627 that was disrupted by the dispute. The need to restore the social order
[619] and to maintain friendly relations between tribal members is a response
to certain aspects of the natural and social environment in which the
105 group finds itself. Natural resources in the area are very meager, and
182 subsistence activities require that the tribesmen constantly move with
619 their herds for pasture throughout an area already divided among the
233 various tribal segments. Since the place and nature of pasture differ
from one year to the next, the identity of the specific tribal unit which
would be sought for help varies correspondingly. This creates a general
feeling of dependency that characterizes the social relations in the area.

the steep sides of which make east–west journeys slow and 133
arduous. To the west this broken country levels down, and in a
bay in the hills lies the extensive treeless, but very fertile, basin
of al-Marj, known to Europeans as the Barce Plain. It was [167]
colonized in classical times and again recently by the Italians.
The Arabs call this first terrace *lusaita* (*al-wasaita*), the middle
part, because it lies between the coastal plain and the plateau
tableland formed by *al-zahir*, the second terrace. This tableland [172]
is famous for its Graeco-Roman ruins and is dotted also
with the deserted farms of Italian colonists. It mounts to a
narrow third terrace, at about 875 metres above sea level, from
the top of which one can look down on these settlements.

The plateau slopes southwards through a juniper belt. There 133
forest ends and it continues to roll to the southern steppe in 137
stony undulations dissected by many wadis. In the plain at its
foot there is plenty of grass and low scrub, and vegetation is
thick in depressions, but the country becomes increasingly
desolate the farther to the south one journeys towards the lifeless
wastes of the Sahara. The eastern part of Cyrenaica is more [132]
arid than the west or centre. The Marmarica, the *batnan* of the
Arabs, is characterized by low hills rising from the coastal belt
and prolonged towards the south to create a succession of crests
of several kilometres in depth. The mean annual rainfall is low [132]
and wells are restricted to the coastal belt. However, there is, [312]
probably in most years, a certain amount of grazing to some
fifty miles from the coast during the rains. The Sirtica, the
extension of Cyrenaica to the west, is a vast rolling treeless
plain traversed by a series of wadis running north–south which
in their spread provide most of the summer grazing. Wells are [312]
found only near the coast but pasturage is plentiful till the [233]
Wadi al-Farigh is reached.

The rainfall very exactly determines the vegetation belts and 132
thereby limits human distribution and imposes a certain way
of life. The amount of precipitation depends on a number of
circumstances. Mean annual rainfall decreases from west to
east. Altitude also affects it. More significant, however, are
the variation with latitude, the seasonal rhythm, and annual
irregularities. The accompanying map shows how rainfall
decreases rapidly from the coast, how only the very limited
plateau area is subject to heavy precipitations (400–550 mms.),

[TEXT CONTINUED ON PAGE 33]

[P. 32]

102
137


Al-Jashsha
Al-Batnan
Al-Barqe
Al-Sirwal
Al-Hamra
Al-Baida
WADI AL-MRA
WADI AL-FARIGH
Al-Daffa
Al-Barqa
Al-Qardaba
Scale
0
50
100
25
75
kms.
Forest

Distribution of Forest.

102
312
● 233


Shahhat
Darna
Al-Marj
GOATS AND CATTLE
Banghazi
Zt. Msus
SHEEP AND CAMELS
Bir Tinjidhir
Bir Hakaim
MOSTLY STONY
ARID COUNTRY
Ajadabiya
CAMELS
Approx. Line of springs
" Southern limit of well water in summer
" Southern limit of grazing in spring

Pastoral Zones.

and the insufficiency of the fall elsewhere. It follows that only 132
on the plateau can there be forest, and only there is a settled [137]
and purely agricultural way of life possible; and it was there [241]
and on the coastal fringe that in ancient and modern times [167]
European colonists settled.

The rains in Cyrenaica fall only in winter, from October to 132
April. In the absence of irrigation the planting season is thus 241
clearly delimited. So is the grazing season to the south of the 233
plateau, for in summer the grasses wither and the wells dry up, [221]
compelling shepherds to drive their flocks northwards to the plateau, thus producing the kind of seasonal nomadism known as transhumance. The variation in total rainfall from year to year and the distribution of its fall over the winter months are of the utmost importance for agriculturalists in Cyrenaica. There is still some obscurity, but it is an observed fact that every few years in Cyrenaica there is a year in which the fall of rain is insufficient, or too badly distributed, to raise an adequate crop. In a mixed economy this fact must have given an overwhelming bias towards pastoralism.

The water supplies of the plateau, which depend entirely on 132
rainfall, are sufficient for the needs of the Bedouin and their 312
flocks. The clayey soils are, however, very exacting and running spring water is rare, being for the most part restricted to the triangle Darna–Slanta–al-Haniya. On the western part of the plateau water is conserved in cisterns and wells and on the maritime and *barqa* plains, in the Sirtica and Marmarica, and generally to the south of the plateau, in wells.

The distribution of vegetation in Cyrenaica follows variation 132
in degree of precipitation. Where there is much rain there is 137
forest. Where there is little rain there is steppe. Where there
is no rain there is desert. The forest is thick but mainly squat 137
and of very limited extension. An Italian estimate[1] of its distribution is shown on the accompanying map. It is predominantly Mediterranean in type, the juniper and the lentisk being the two commonest trees of the country. Forest ceases a few miles to the south of the high watershed of the plateau and gives way to steppe. The well-known route Tariq 'Aziza is generally regarded as the dividing line between the two kinds

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[1] Dott. Giovanni Manzoni, 'Memorie sui boschi della Cirenaica', *Notiziario Economico della Cirenaica*, 1929. [113]

137 of country. The whitish soils of the steppe support worts and
[134] other scrub bushes and some drought-resisting trees in the beds
of wadis and they are well covered with annual and perennial
grasses and other plants which yield excellent pasturage in the
[233] springtime. However, except in the Wadi al-Mra, where camels
can be kept the year round, there is little grazing beyond the
line Msus–Bir Tinjidhir–Bir Hakaim.

233 The Bedouin of the forest area are essentially a goat people,
137 though they also keep many sheep and cattle, and it is mostly
through the medium of the goat that the vast natural wealth
of the forests of Cyrenaica is transformed into human wealth.
The animal is hardy and frugal, and has the great merit of
preferring tree and shrub to grass and of being a catholic feeder.
Just as the forest would be useless to the Bedouin without the
goat so the much vaster stretches of steppe would be useless to
them without the sheep and camel which turn its grasses and
233 scrub into food. Thus Cyrenaica is fundamentally a pastoral
[181] country, primarily a country of sheep farming, and its people,
as they say themselves, have the hearts of shepherds and not of
peasants. While agriculture and pastoralism are both practised,
the bias of nature and tradition is towards animal husbandry,
by which the rich vegetation of the country is turned into milk,
butter, meat, wool, hides, and draught and transport.

II

13
221 In Cyrenaica stand always contrasted the mountain and the
233 plain, the forest and the steppe, the red soils and the white, the
region of goats and cows and the region of sheep and camels,
settled life and nomadism.

221 True nomadism is very rare. A few Fawakhir, Minifa, Huta,
233 and other tribal fragments herd only camels, or if they possess
other animals keep them with kinsmen near the plateau, and
can therefore wander pretty well where they please. They may
be found anywhere between the Nile, Fazzan, and the Sudan.
Their spirit is that of an Aulad 'Ali tribesman who said to me:
'We call no place our home. It is wherever there is grass and
water.' Semi-nomads are numerous. Those with land on the
[241] plateau cultivate there, then graze southwards, and return
again to the plateau in the dry season to water their flocks.

Those of the *barqa* plain may never camp on the plateau but 221
they move freely between grazing grounds, permanent water 233
supplies, and ploughland.

Of the plateau tribes, the Darsa, the 'Arafa, most of the Hasa, 221
and a number of 'Abaidat and 'Awaqir sections remain there 233
throughout the year. The Bedouin met with wandering about 619
in the southern grazing grounds after the rains are the 'Abaidat Ghaith, 'Awakla, and Shahin, some of the Hasa Shabarqa and Bakhayit, the whole of the small *'Ailat* Fayid tribe, large numbers of Bara'asa Husain, Tamiya, and Masa'id, 'Abid Mansur and Jabar, 'Awaqir Sdaidi and Brahim, and numerous small client groups more or less affiliated to these tribal sections. The nomadic sections are generally richer than the others in sheep and camels, and are also more vigorous, independent, and warlike. Politically, they are the leading sections of the tribes to which they belong. The foremost Shaikhs of the 'Abaidat, Hasa, Bara'asa, 'Abid, 'Awaqir, and Magharba are all to be found during the rains farther away in the steppe than most of their fellow-tribesmen.

The move southwards starts in December after the barley 221
has been sown, or part of a group may take the animals south 233
while the rest finish the ploughing. Most of these semi-nomads [243]
return to the plateau in May, when water becomes scarce, but some, including some of the most powerful elements, remain to the south of it permanently. There are many advantages in this annual move to the south. Rain falls and the grasses spring up in advance of the plateau, and grazing is more abundant and of a better quality. On the other hand, the grasses of the plateau and its southern slopes are still green when the desert grasses, except in specially favoured depressions, are withered. By their annual oscillation the Bedouin thus give their animals the best grazing at all seasons of the year. Sheep mostly lamb round about November, which is the month in which new grasses spring up in the *barr*, so that the move southwards gives the sheep the richest grazing at a time when they need it most; and the warmer conditions prevailing
in the south suit the lambs. At the same time, the Bedouin in [262]
southern grazing grounds are compelled to live very largely on milk food, and the combination of rich pastures with the dropping of their young by sheep, goats, and camels, enables them to live on the country to a great extent.

221 them to live on the country to a great extent. In normal times
233 the Bedouin drive their animals on the hoof to Egyptian
[439] markets, slowly, along this rich southern pasture belt, grazing
as they go, so that they arrive in good condition. Finally, there
can be no doubt about the correctness of the Arab claim that a
few weeks residence in the open steppe is a tonic for man and
beast.

233 It must be remembered that there are no water problems at
this time of year. Sheep, goats, and camels do not have to be
312 watered from the time the first rains make grass till the end
423 of April or early in May: even horses do not drink until well
into April. This fact is important, because it means that the
prolific pastures can be grazed by all without dispute, since
the wells, which belong to tribal sections or families, are
not drawn on. While rain is still falling regularly human requirements are met from pools. To the south of the Tariq
'Aziza, generally speaking, there is no ownership in land—
there are no *hudud*, boundaries, as the Arabs say—and anyone
may cultivate or graze where he pleases, but there is strict
ownership in wells; whereas to the north of the Tariq 'Aziza
there is less narrowly restricted ownership in water, which is
here spring water in abundance, but there are well-defined
rights in arable.[1] The water of the southern wells is essential
for the Bedouin who own the country and who live in it all the
year round, and their rights are respected by those who graze
233 there. Sheep and goats need only drink every second or third
312 day, even in the hottest weather, so that in the period of meagre
pasturage they have a wide range of grazing from the wells,
and the dry grasses, supplemented by evergreen shrubs of the
goosefoot family, are sufficient nourishment for them. Wells
are numerous in the steppe but few of them last out the summer.

233 The animals grazed in the southern steppe are mostly sheep
and camels. The Bedouin say 'Cattle and goats do not migrate;
[221] camels and sheep do'. Camels are essential to nomadic life as
it is impossible to move camp without them, and the richer
Bedouin are in camels the more frequently they move, seeking
231 richer pastures. Cyrenaican dromedaries are heavy beasts,

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[1] Enzo Savarese, *Le Terre della Cirenaica*, Pt. II, 1928, Chap. VII; Massimo Colucci, *Il Regime della Proprietà Fondiaria nell' Africa Italiana*, vol. i, 1942, pp. 210 seq. and 220 seq.

243 They could not sow a better crop. There are wild varieties of
barley in Cyrenaica and the country is in every way suited to
its culture. It is very hardy, stands up to drought, and easily
holds its own against the grasses, which are ploughed in with
[251] the seed on the plateau. When the barley and wheat have
been reaped, the grain is stored in *kuf*. On the plateau these
are ancient tomb-caves; elsewhere they are holes dug in the
ground.

[731] In a bad year, and even more in a succession of bad years,
the Bedouin have experienced famine, but in most years the
barley, and to a lesser extent the wheat, give an abundant
[433] yield. Bedouin have told me that they expect from sowing in
the beds of wadis up to a hundredfold of barley and in the
barqa up to fiftyfold. On the plateau the yield is smaller and
in the Marmarica and Sirtica much smaller. In Turkish times
[439] there was a large export of grain from Cyrenaica. Mondaini says
that it was to the mean annual value of 40,000 Lire Sterling
for the years 1885 to 1900.[1] Much of this surplus was bought
by English brewers.

433 The Bedouin way of life is well adapted to their environment.
182 Given the inconstancy of the rainfall and the distribution of
water supplies they would be foolish indeed were they not, at
any rate in part, shepherds. They are not, of course, in all
433 respects self-supporting. They make their winter tents and a
439 good part of their equipment, carpets, sacks, and so forth, from
182 the wool of their beasts, but some things the Bedouin regard as
[237] necessities have to be imported, notably tea, sugar, some rice,
and cloth, especially the *jird*, the woollen cloak of the country.
They trade these with surplus stock on the hoof, skins, wool,
clarified butter, surplus barley, and honey and wax, so that
they are in an economic sense self-supporting.

433 Cyrenaica is a rich country for Bedouin, a poor country for
182 Europeans. Bedouin generally have no overhead expenses in
[556] production. I say generally, because rich men sometimes
[233] employ shepherds, though this is usually the practice of urban
[464] merchants engaged in the sheep trade. Bedouin use their own
labour and that of their families and animals. What is perhaps
[511] more important is that they are prepared to live on what

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[1] G. Mondaini, *Manuale di Storia e Legislazione Coloniale del Regno d'Italia*. 1927, p. 308.

any case see them. Consequently no objections were raised— 175*
had they been raised no attention would have been paid to 648*
them—and there was legal presumption of State ownership in 423
the fullest sense. The judges, therefore, ordered registration of the new lands in the name of the Colony. They comprised [167]
about 450,000 hectares, about a quarter of which were immediately allotted to the *Ente* for colonization. It will be noted that the State had already, before this action was taken, been bare owner of the lands as heir to the Turkish *miri* property. What it now gained in addition was, in the opinion of its lawyers, the *possesso utile*. They held further that compensation of those deprived of the use of the lands, while perhaps unnecessary, added to the juridical rigour of the proceeding. In other words, in order to make it look a little less like common robbery it was decided to make a parade of indemnification. The areas to be taken over were estimated in a non-technical way by a surveyor and a clerk of the Land Registry, and the supposed owners were summoned, told that their lands were worth so much, and that this sum would be handed over to them by the Government. Tables of succession showing the share in the land of the various members of the local group who owned it had already been prepared, and if the representatives of this tribal section agreed to the proposal the money could then be paid over on demand.

Whether the Bedouin took the money offered in compensation or not they still lost their lands. For this reason most of them took it. Though compensation was in this way offered, the document to which the recipients of it had to affix their seals or thumb-prints was not a contractual agreement for sale and purchase nor an edict of expropriation for public utility purposes, but it was a simple declaration by the owner that he renounced all his rights in the land and transferred them to the State. The Italians had now got all the lands in Cyrenaica which were of any immediate use to them. They had only to [167]
allot them to colonists and register them technically as they were required for settlement. The target figure for the zone of colonization was 900,000 hectares.[1]

There remained the question of the Bedouin who had been 175*
driven off the lands of their fathers. Clearly they could not be 648*
allowed to lead their nomadic life amid the Italian cultiva- 423
233

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[1] *La Nuova Italia d'Oltremare*, vol. i, p. 552.

[TEXT CONTINUED ON PAGE 225]

3:Evans-Pritchard E-4, 5 (1942-1944) 1949 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9 Sanusi
(1837-1942)

*175 [P. 224]
*648
102
167
487
233
131


Apollonia
CIRENE
Giovanni Berta
DERNA
Luigi Razza
Beda Littoria
Luigi di Savoia
Tolmeta
Oberdan
Maddalena
BARCE
Tocra
Baracca
Tecnis
Maraua
Slonta
Driana
el Abiar
BENGASI
Boundary of area to be colonised
Boundary of area for Organised Government Settlement
Narrow gauge railway
Main roads
Tracks for passage of Arab Flocks
Provincial boundary (Bengasi Province)
Scale
0
25
50
75
100 kms.

The Italian plan for the colonization of northern Cyrenaica.

tions and gardens. On the other hand, it was recognized that if 175*
they were to be able to lead a nomadic life at all, and they 648*
had to do so if they were to rear their animals, they must have 423
access to water-supplies and grazing-grounds, and that this 233
would sometimes mean their crossing the plateau through the
area of Italian colonization. To solve this problem corridors [487]
running north and south across the plateau were, as explained
in an earlier section, marked out for the transit of Bedouin
flocks and herds.

It was envisaged that the Bedouin would continue to lead
a predominantly pastoral life on the more rugged parts of
the first terrace of the plateau, on its southern slopes, and in the
steppe country of the *sirwal*, the *barqa*, the Marmarica, and the
Sirtica. It was thought that they had in these areas all the land
they needed for grazing and catch-crop cultivation, though it
was evident that in years of drought they could not have
managed to survive without summer grazing on the plateau.
Nevertheless, efforts were made to raise the economic level of 175*
the Bedouin by improving their methods of cultivation and 648*
stock-raising so that, as both producers and labourers, they [511]
might be more valuable an adjunct to Italian husbandry, and
might become more dependent on the State and more closely
linked with metropolitan activities. It was intended that they [464]
should constitute a cheap reserve of labour for general unskilled
work and for seasonal labour on the farms of the colonists. By
using them in this way it was hoped that it would be possible
to avoid the growth of a metropolitan proletariat.[1] These efforts 175*
included, largely for political reasons, the creation of Arab 648*
colonization centres. Agricultural villages and farms were to 167
be built by the *Ente* similar to, but smaller than, those built for
the Italian immigrants. The first two such villages, Fiorita and 563
Alba, were built in 1939. Each Arab farming family was provided
with a house, a well, a camel, a cow, and farm implements.
Like the Italian, the Arab colonist was to be first salaried
labourer, then partner with the State, then mortgagor, and
finally owner. As only thirty-two holdings were prepared at
Fiorita and Alba the contribution to native agriculture cannot
be regarded as more than a token one. Moreover, the Italians
experienced difficulty in finding Arab colonists for even these

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[1] Ibid., p. 622.

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secondary sections, in their very unevenness, show a more sensitive relation to more detailed ecological differences.

At all levels of segmentation, therefore, a high degree of consistency between the ecological divisions of the country and the genealogical divisions can be shown. Indeed the relationship is so close that it is tempting to consider the contemporary pattern of things as the only one possible. What historical evidence exists is against such a view being taken. [167] It is known that tribes have been displaced in the past, some of them or sections of them having been pushed out into Egypt, and others having altered their position. This being so, there obviously cannot be any finality about the present distribution of tribes in relation to the ecological divisions of the country. Rather, the existing pattern is one of a number of possible permutations. Again, as the relation between groups of people to their environment becomes progressively sensitive with the decrease in the size and order of the group, then the more unstable will be the relationship between the two. Conversely the greater the size and order of the group the more persistent will be its relationship to the ecology. In other words, the major ecological divisions are more fundamental in their effect on the way of life and the economy of people, whereas the more detailed ecological differences between, say, tertiary sections have a relatively minor effect. The [233] [433] ecological differences between the wooded plateau area with its cow and goat herding economy, and the arid semi-desert area with its camel and sheep herding economy has a much more profound effect on the general way of life, and is a more persistent division, than that which exists between two tertiary sections where the differences may only be in topographical details.

While therefore, the division of people into groups of various sorts is not permanently fixed in relation to ecological divisions, there is always an intimate relationship between the two which is progressively more enduring as the order of the structural segment increases. Yet even this statement of the relationship, guarded as it is, does not suffice, for the pattern and distribution of tribes and their sections at any given moment are not only a function of ecology, but they are also the result of a number of other complex factors which may be operating to reinforce or to

121 sections constituting the combinations which makes the facts of feud intelligible.
613 Furthermore, several different types of power structures exist which serve the different
[571 interests of the people composing them, and these are interlinked in combinations
578] of superior span. But the formation of these structures and the modes in which they
combine are quite unlike the articulations in a lineage system. Characteristically, the
segments in a lineage system are conceived of as building up hierarchically to span
what is spoken of as a total society, the apex of the system affording a spectacular and
fixed definition of its boundaries. Had I been using this concept in this paper the
[173] founding ancestress of the nine Cyrenaican tribes, Sa'ada as named by the Bedouin,
would have served this purpose and would have been given inappropriate prominence.
121 The views presented here have the consequences of retreating from a concept
184 of a total society. The people to whom the facts given are related are the camel-herding
tribes only. Some of them have relations of many kinds with the cow-herding
● 233 folk who inhabit the northern plateau area, and these relations are also significant
619 for the analysis of a wide range of problems; genealogically both cow and camel
herders are seen as part of a single structure, but the differences between them with
regard to their economy, the size, composition, and distribution of their residential
units, their political and ritual life is so great that to conceive of them as a single social
121 structure is not useful. Moreover, the far western tribal sections have relationships
619 of such urgency with their neighbours in Tripolitania (who are excluded from Cyrenaican
genealogies) that to cut off these relationships as lying outside Cyrenaican society
would be quite unwarranted. The same can be said of the relationships of the tribal
sections in the eastern part of Cyrenaica with their genealogical cousins, the Aulad
'Ali of Egypt, who, although residing across a national border, are closely linked to
some of the Cyrenaican Bedouin. Some tribes also have to rely on the people of the
southern oases for an item of diet and an outlet for surplus wool, and the net of kinship
is spread out to include them. In these cases they come into contact with other
[177] ethnic groups such as Berbers and Tibu, and through the oases they extend their lines
of communication southwards to Wadai, Chad, and Bornu. As an indication of the
effectiveness of these links, it is only necessary to add that people inhabiting Cyrenaica
make periodic and regular visits to these far southern places, and that in 1948 a
shaikh, living near Ajadabiya in south-western Cyrenaica, collected blood-money
contributions from kinsmen in Wadai. A single structure cannot possibly include,
for analytical purposes, these sorts of relationships.

121 Finally, it must be stressed that the facts given here refer to the period 1948 to
114 1950. Since then oil has been discovered in large quantities near the territory of a
[315] tribe where I spent most of my time while resident in the country, and where there
was one tin shack in 1950 there is now a modern port with roads extending southwards
from it into the wilderness. I see no reason to assume that social relations as
I observed them are present today or that they were the same at any time in the past
175 either. Before the advent of the Sanusi Order in the early eighteen-forties, it is known
795 that one lineage at least was dominantly powerful and that its leader tyrannized a
613 large part of Central Cyrenaica.[1] His descendants constituted a powerful group in

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[1] Smith and Porcher, 1864. These two archaeologists met this leader and continued their archaeological researches around Cirene only with his goodwill, although the site is not on the territory of his tribe as I knew it in 1950. They also speak of him as inhabiting a castle which also lies outside the

571 between man and man, although the various cereal dishes which constitute
231 their regular meals are said to have a similar effect.

264 The son who continues to eat with his father "as he always had been
182 doing," also continues to accept his authority. Indeed he could do little else
593 at this stage, for he lacks the economic means to cut away. Neither at mar-
585 riage nor after is there any transfer of wealth from father to son. The new
182 tent recently pitched is no more than a dormitory to which the young couple
[425] retire at night. During the daytime the son is still to be seen in his father's
[556] tent, and, in the male quarters, things appear to be much the same as before.
In the female quarters, the only superficial change is the more frequent ap-
pearance among the women of one who, before marriage, often sat among
them if she had been a close neighbour or a close cousin previously; or of
an additional helper if she had come from afar. On the surface things re-
main "as they always have been," although in fact, a whole set of changes
have been initiated.

852 *Rites de passage* are few among the Bedouin. A man's progress in life is
881 ceremonially marked by only four events: his birth, circumcision, marriage
764 and burial. His development into manhood is not marked by clearly defined
stages. About the age of seven, the henna markings on the front of a boy's
858 shirt for protection from the evil eye are not renewed, the cowrie shell stitched
789 to the front of his cap as a kind of talisman against the evil eye is removed
and he is no longer permitted free access to the women's quarters. As he
857 grows older, he will be instructed in goat-herding, and later taught to follow
233 the sheep. In his late teens he will have to undertake the more arduous and
883 responsible task of herding the camels. Coincident with camel-herding, he
233 may be given a gun by his father. Shortly afterwards he must undertake the
[431] stringent test of manhood, a journey to a distant oasis for dates. These
[411] changes are not marked off by a *rite de passage.* The rites a man undergoes
[484] during the course of a lifetime are minimal, and in the sense that they are
[885] concerned with only the basic events in a man's life anywhere (save for
852 circumcision, which is a minor celebration anyway), they are irreducible.
88 Moreover, the rituals which exist do not comprehend the same multiplicity of
796 relationships as rituals which occur in many other African societies.[4] It is
[771] true that the ceremonies referred to in this chapter by no means include
all the Bedouin rituals. It is also true that the events mentioned vary in
[554] elaboration, and in the number of symbols present in them, but they are
not multiplied or reduced for different people.

In this context it is important to stress that we are here dealing with a
[613] lineage society where social differentiation is not built up into differences
[554] of rank, where the roles to which a man succeeds are almost wholly cap-
[602] tured by his kinship relationships with other men and which are sociologically
to be distinguished from the roles a man enters into by acquisition of office,

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[4] See, for example, the elaboration of rituals discussed in M. Gluckman (Ed.), *Essays on the Ritual of Social Relations.* Manchester: University of Manchester Press, 1962.

sorts of petty ways, listen to his grumbles about his agnates, interfere on his 604
behalf in petty camp quarrels, shield him from the disciplinarian father and 613
guard his property interests against the predatory father's brother; if the 428
mother's brother dies without heirs, the sister's son can reasonably expect at least a share of his wealth. When the mother's brother is a member of a different corporate group, a sister's son cannot possibly expect to inherit from him in any circumstance.

The mother's brother may reside in a camp too distant to be much effective 604
direct help in day-to-day living. His relative remoteness gives the relation- 591
ship other possible opportunities, however. Rainfall in the semi-desert area 312
of Cyrenaica is highly variable, both from year to year, and from place to 233•
place in any given year. As a result this shallow saucer of a depression may 241
have sufficient rain to supply both the water needs of animals and crops, while an area a few miles distant will have inadequate water supplies for either. The mother's brother-sister's son link can mean water for animals and a crop of barley for both when, in successive years, the resources of one area or the other are inadequate.

The differences in the relations between men and their mother's brother 604
do not end with a characterisation of their antipodal forms. The demographic structure of a group may be such that one man may have a number of mother's brothers, another only one; one man may have to share with
several brothers, another may be an only son. Complications of this sort de- [613]
termine the precise relationships between men, but however intricate these may be, each corporate group has its matrilateral links with a group occupying a slightly different ecological area, and it also has a plurality of matri-
lateral connections within it. Further, if a direct connection is not available [603]
to any particular individual he can use an indirect link (e.g. father's mother's brother or mother's mother's brother) to satisfy his needs.

The Preference for Males

Thus far, the family and the social matrix in which it is embedded has 128
been discussed in general terms, most particularly in reference to several selected sets of relationships. I wish now to place these relationships in a more specific setting with a brief discussion of the composition of a small
camp of a group inhabiting the arid areas of central Cyrenaica. When the 829
Bedouin give their views on the structure of the family in Cyrenaica they 594
speak of it as consisting of a pair of spouses and about ten children, mainly 562
males. The emphasis on males is not mere sentiment, overwhelmingly though 858
it favours them against females. Additional males in a family increase the productive possibilities of a family in the sense that more herdsmen become available and larger ploughing commitments can be undertaken; an increase in the number of females has small effect on production since they are precluded from any direct participation in these activities. Both sexes, ranging in age from about seven years to mature adulthood, are necessary if a family

surface water in jerry cans, bringing them back to the tents, one at a time, 462
on their backs. Clothes are kept clean in the desert, and the women do the [312]
washing. [296]

The care of children from birth until they are a few years old is the re- 462
sponsibility of the woman. Childbirth causes a minimum interruption in the 854
daily sequence of a mother's activities. The child is breastfed if the mother [844]
has milk; if not, a wet nurse is sought or goat milk is substituted. Other [853]
than the time given to feeding it, the infant does not take up much of the mother's time. It is placed in a hammock slung between the centre poles of the tent and rocked by the mother as she passes to and fro. If nursing in illness is required, the mother devotes herself to it; her other tasks must then be performed by another woman.

As children acquire mobility, and at a time when, perhaps, the mother 855
is pregnant again, they become so fractious one with the other that if help 462
was unavailable the nervous strain could seriously disrupt the normal routine
of work. During the early years of marriage, when daughters are still too 855
young to look after their small brothers and sisters, the grandmother's help 462
in child-rearing is invaluable. Too old for the arduous tasks of the daily 603
routine, she may assist in teasing and spinning the raw wool, but it is in her role as nursemaid that she assumes importance. Children of both sexes are given the comfort of suckling at her breast, receiving attention and care for which the young mother could not possibly afford the time.

Caring for children takes up little of a man's time, and is mostly in- 462
cidental. The woman, on the other hand, devotes relatively little of her 233
time to the animals. She does the milking in spring — of camels, sheep and [234]
goats — but herding is not her responsibility, save for partly tending goats. [857]
Goats, when they are in the vicinity of the camp, are looked after by boys and girls of about eight to ten years of age. In springtime when they have dropped their young, or if some of them have to be retained in the camp at night for various reasons, the woman makes a brushwood enclosure at the side of the tent and sees the goats safely inside before nightfall.

A catalogue of the tasks for which women are responsible may not seem 462
very impressive; the number of tasks is not excessive, but the persistence of the routine bends the backs of most women. Paradoxically, any suggestion that men should take over female tasks would strike them as absurd. Assistance from one of the same sex is always a welcome relief, but the abrogation of a particular task by men would be interpreted by women as the loss of a right. For, in the division of labour, it is not merely that tasks are allocated between the sexes for expedient reasons, or in consideration of the labour involved or because tasks which can be performed in the vicinity of the camp are left to women; division of labour would not make sense on these
grounds, however strong they may be in Bedouin sentiments. Each task which [424]
falls to the lot of woman constitutes a right exclusive to her. Fetching firewood is not only a chore; it is a woman's prerogative. The insistence that only a woman can undertake certain tasks has nothing to do with her liking

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

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574 since meat is shared by all the people of the camp, her wealth was partly
231 dispersed among her poorer kinsfolk.

621 The location of Tent B was determined by the fact that the wife (6) was
592 the sister of (3) of Tent A. Her husband (7) had moved into the camp a
571 few years earlier as a result of an inheritance quarrel with his elder who
[578] robbed him of his fair share. This husband (7) gained in two ways from
[233] the move. Although poor, he had a small flock of his own, too small to
justify its own shepherd, but which he was permitted to include with his
sister-in-law's (3) flock for shepherding. If the flock had been larger he
would still have had difficulties, because, at some times of the year, save for
short occasional visits to camp, the shepherd is with his sheep for several
weeks, day and night. He (7) had three sons, still far too young to follow
the sheep, but when they become of age to do so, his dependence on Tent
A will cease, for then he can begin to gather the small flocks of other kinsmen
around his own, his sons can shepherd them all and he can begin to
[574] enjoy the benefits to be derived from dependents. In addition, he enjoyed

Cases

621 Genealogically he was their father's brother, but he was of their same age
592 generation, and behaved as if he was their agnatic equal. Towards his own
578 brother (16), he behaved as if the latter was his uncle, for he was much his
[604] junior in age and his uncle had virtually brought him up from boyhood.
They had quarrelled bitterly because his brother (16) had given him only
[428] a fraction of his inheritance, which he himself, in turn, should have
[593] shared with his young full brother (not shown on the diagram) but he did
not do so. This youngest brother left (15) for this reason and now resides
621 with (16), his full brother's enemy. Two of the men (14 and 13) of this
592 group of four were the chief herdsmen of the camp, although they were
● [233] assisted for short periods by (12) and (15), who also helped tend the
camels in other ways. Their connection with the group centered on Tent
[571] A was a mutual close link to a politically powerful person (not shown on the
genealogies) to whom they are deeply loyal and who, while I was among
them, was actively opposed to the common political enemy of them all (16),
and who in earlier years had challenged the leadership of (2) of Tent A.
There is also the fact that they were all linked within a close range of
[613] agnation. This linkage included, too, the owner of Tent F (17), not in
[602] fact the descendant of the man shown in the diagram — he was the son of
a slave wife; his genitor was a slave, but his mother's master reared him,
freed him and he is now given as his son in the genealogy. He lives with his
wife, of client origin, together with her children from a previous husband,
(18), who divorced her, and his own children. Aging, he no longer acted
as a regular herdsmen, but relieved other men in the camp, and also spent
some time shepherding.

621 The details given of the strands which run through the camp to tie these
571 particular people together are so few that, like the Bedouin plough, they do
no more than scratch the surface, but they are sufficient to permit a few
general statements. The camp, and particularly the precise disposition of
621 its tents, shows a group of males clustered together to share two of the main
571 economic tasks: shepherding and herding. The physically strong adult males
233 of Tents D and E shoulder the burden of herding all the camels of the camp,
462 and the men of Tents B, A and C shepherd all the sheep, with (17) of
Tent F serving both purposes. This number of men allows some to remain
in the camp at all times, to free one of them for a journey to the distant
market when supplies of sugar and tea are necessary, and to enable one or
two men, at short notice, to hurry away on horse or camel to search for
lost animals.[14]

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Economic Determinants of the General Structure of the Camp

231 It is also clear from these details that, given the disparities in wealth
262 (although all men have some wealth), the diet of most is considerably

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431 [14] There is little point in seeking the lost animals themselves in the first instance.
[556] A man travels from camp to camp asking for information, and when he has gathered
his clues, he searches a neighbourhood.

members of a neutral family with grazing camels, and with 682
their help Mirtah was fetched in to the Wadi unconscious. 628

The case was reported to the police, but a few hours
after his arrival in the Wadi Mirtah quietly died. The 672
post-mortem examination revealed a skull cracked right across, with severe cerebral haemorrhage. In due course the Sirdani family claimed £400 bloodmoney from the Sayed family, according to the custom among the Gawabees tribe. This time, however, an exception was made. The sheikhs decided that the ordinary bloodmoney of £300 only should be paid by the Sayed to the Sirdani family, £100 in money and £200 in kind, divided into six yearly instalments of £50 each.

They also added a rider to the effect that they were not awarding Sanaa under the circumstances, as there was no proof of intent to kill, and that weapons such as guns or knives (which would imply premeditation) were not used. The presumption was that the Sayed family, though obviously intending to cause grievous bodily harm, did not intend to kill Mirtah. The fact that he died of his wounds automatically warranted the award of £300 as bloodmoney, but did not constitute sufficient justification for the imposition of the extra £100 as Sanaa.

In Common Law it is not always easy for the uninitiated 671
to understand the legal value of a threat, or what proportion 683
of the punishment for the completed action is due for a mere threat. It was singularly pleasing, therefore, to find a striking instance of a threat to shoot, and to see the attitude of the Bedouin court towards this particular offence.

An Arab called Abd el Kerim was tolerably well-to-do, 233
and owned several camels, a mare, fair-sized flocks of
sheep and goats, and certain cultivation rights; and he had 685
two sons aged about sixteen and eighteen respectively. His cousin, Abd el Salam, who lived half a mile away, had four sons of ages ranging from fifteen to twenty, but he was considerably poorer in this world's goods. Abd el Kerim's sons took their camels out to graze, and inadvertently

233 wandered over the boundary of Abd el Salam's grazing
685 rights. The juvenile members of Abd el Salam's family
[578] came out from their tents in a body, to drive off their intruding second cousins with their camels. An altercation ensued, and the excitement grew; and eventually a pitched battle with sticks and stones began among the lads.

683 One of Abd el Kerim's sons, leaving his brother to hold on for a moment, ran back the half mile to call his father, who returned with him to the scene of the fight carrying his gun. On arrival at the camels, Abd el Salam's sons set on him in a body. Abd el Kerim pointed his gun at one of them and took aim; whereupon one of the other family from behind laid him low with a blow on the top of his head, sufficient to fell an ox.

[114] Abd el Kerim was carried back to his tent, where the writer witnessed the horrible sight of sympathetic but homicidal relatives pawing his open wound with their filthy fingers. A large hole had been knocked in the side of his head, and portions of brain were visible. After some
[694] months of surgical treatment Abd el Kerim came out of hospital; and, as the blow was reported to have affected his reason, a case was brought on his behalf by some of his relatives, claiming damages from the family of Abd el
[682] Salam. However, before the case was fully completed, Abd el Kerim was taken ill, was re-admitted to hospital, and died. The case therefore became one of bloodmoney, and was dealt with in the usual way.

683 The interesting point about the case, however, lies in
682 the decision of the court, when the first claim for damages
695 was brought up. A very strong line was adopted by the
672 sheikhs, and in the opinion of the court the wounds received by Abd el Kerim were only what he might reasonably expect. They maintained that, after the way in which he had behaved, he was lucky to have got off as lightly as he did. The sheikhs protested that he ought never to have gone out from his tent, and mixed himself up in a fight between a lot of boys. If he had any authority at all, he

Had the Senussi been successful in the last war, they 175
would no doubt have brought in the 'Ibeidat or the 'Awaqir 619
from Cyrenaica to replace the Awlad 'Ali in Egypt.

At the present day the Awlad 'Ali, especially the eastern 619
sections near the Nile Valley, have almost ceased to be nomadic, 178
and only the old men have memories of their former warlike
habits. They suffered considerably during the Great War,
but are again becoming prosperous. They now own large
comfortable tents, are beginning to build houses and clear
out cisterns, and are also said to be increasing in numbers.[1]
So civilized have they grown that my guides, one a Sinai
Arab and the other an 'Abadi, concurred in calling them
"green"—not real desert-worthy Bedouins.

Perhaps as a result of Libyan influence, or more probably 142
the better nurture and climate, they are taller, heavier, stronger,
and lighter-complexioned than the lightly built Arabs of
Sinai and Hijaz. Also they are much franker and more 157
straightforward than their shifty and suspicious eastern cousins, 181
and altogether more trustworthy. Their women only veil 562
themselves to strangers, and talk quite naturally and cheerfully 834
to the men of their own tribe. 609

They cultivate as much barley as they can, using a 243
primitive plough drawn by camels, in the clayey hollows [492]
scattered over their very stony limestone desert, but, as the [132]
rainfall is very uncertain, a good crop only occurs every five
or six years. After harvest, they exchange some of their [437]
barley for maize, which the women grind to make bread
as required, and some for dried dates. The seed for next [251]
year is buried in a hole lined with straw and covered with
clay, and a year's forage for the animals is set aside. The [432]
rest of the crop goes to market, and for a short time the
Arab has money to buy clothes for himself and his family [426]
and at utmost need to pay off some of the numerous debts he
has inherited from his forefathers. Soon he is reduced again
to the clothes he wears, the tent he sleeps in, and his animals
grazing in the desert.

They are great breeders of camels and sheep, and a busy 436
traffic in these goes on weekly in the markets of Hammam, 178
'Amriya, and the Beheira. So they have got into the habit [438] [493] [233]

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[1] At the 1927 census, the Western Desert Arabs, Awlad 'Ali, Jawabis, etc., numbered 38,928 souls exclusive of those settled in Beheira. But Pacho, 100 years ago, estimated them at 38,000 souls. [161]

useful mostly for transport and ploughing, though they give a 231
good milk yield and a fair harvest of wool. There are horses, of
Berber rather than of Arab type, in every big camp. They are
kept for the saddle alone, being much used in old days for
hawking, and are a sign of wealth and social position.

The census figures for domesticated animals are probably
highly inaccurate. The flocks and herds were certainly much [648]*
greater, especially for camels and horses, before the Italians
ravaged the country. The Turkish figures for 1910 were
713,000 sheep, 546,300 goats, 83,300 camels, 23,600 cattle, and
27,000 horses, and it has been reckoned that by 1933 these had
been reduced to 98,000 sheep, 25,000 goats, 2,600 camels,
8,700 cattle, and 1,000 horses.[1] Before the outbreak of the [648]*
second Italo-Sanusi war in 1923 the normal export to the [439]
markets of Egypt was 80,000 sheep and goats a year, and it was
reckoned that a settled Cyrenaica could produce annually for
export at least 100,000 to 150,000 sheep and goats and 6,000
camels. The country used to satisfy a considerable portion of
Egypt's meat requirements. It also exported clarified butter 234
in big quantities, 91,835 kilograms being the figure for 1922 and 439
75,462 the figure for 1923.[2]

Although the Bedouin are by practice and inclination 243
shepherds first and cultivators afterwards, all plough. Barley [262]
and some wheat are a staple food. Indeed, in most years they
cultivate a surplus of barley which they trade, and it may be
said that for the most part they are self-supporting as far as
their flour requirements go. On the southern slopes of the
plateau and in the *barqa* plain ploughing begins from the middle
of October to the middle of November, according to the rains.
The coastal belt is sown a little later and the plateau in December
and January when the grasses begin to sprout. By mid-April
the first harvest, that of the *barqa* and the southern slopes of
the plateau, is being reaped, and on the plateau reaping goes
on from May to the end of August. Everywhere barley is sown
greatly in excess of wheat, for wheaten bread is not considered [231]
a necessity and barley is required for horses as well as for men.

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[1] Jean Despois, *La Colonisation Italienne en Libya: Problèmes et Méthodes*, 1935, p. 44; Hans w:son Ahlmann, *La Libia Settentrionale*, 1930, p. 78. (First published in 1928.) [113]

[2] *L'Oltremare*, Mar. 1930; *Rivista delle Colonie Italiane*, 1934, p. 885; Francesco Coro, *Settantasei Anni di Dominazione Turca in Libia*, 1937, p. 82. [113]

surface water in jerry cans, bringing them back to the tents, one at a time, 462
on their backs. Clothes are kept clean in the desert, and the women do the [312]
washing. [296]

The care of children from birth until they are a few years old is the responsibility 462
of the woman. Childbirth causes a minimum interruption in the 854
daily sequence of a mother's activities. The child is breastfed if the mother [844]
has milk; if not, a wet nurse is sought or goat milk is substituted. Other [853]
than the time given to feeding it, the infant does not take up much of the
mother's time. It is placed in a hammock slung between the centre poles
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of work. During the early years of marriage, when daughters are still too 855
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in child-rearing is invaluable. Too old for the arduous tasks of the daily 603
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for which the young mother could not possibly afford the time.

Caring for children takes up little of a man's time, and is mostly incidental. 462
The woman, on the other hand, devotes relatively little of her 233
time to the animals. She does the milking in spring — of camels, sheep and [234]
goats — but herding is not her responsibility, save for partly tending goats.
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dropped their young, or if some of them have to be retained in the camp at
night for various reasons, the woman makes a brushwood enclosure at the
side of the tent and sees the goats safely inside before nightfall.

A catalogue of the tasks for which women are responsible may not seem 462
very impressive; the number of tasks is not excessive, but the persistence of
the routine bends the backs of most women. Paradoxically, any suggestion
that men should take over female tasks would strike them as absurd. Assistance
from one of the same sex is always a welcome relief, but the abrogation
of a particular task by men would be interpreted by women as the loss of a
right. For, in the division of labour, it is not merely that tasks are allocated
between the sexes for expedient reasons, or in consideration of the labour
involved or because tasks which can be performed in the vicinity of the
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falls to the lot of woman constitutes a right exclusive to her. Fetching firewood
is not only a chore; it is a woman's prerogative. The insistence that
only a woman can undertake certain tasks has nothing to do with her liking

236 Wool is also very important to the economy of Awlad Ali. Lamb's
286 wool is either sold or spun and woven into rugs. Goat's wool is spun
and woven to provide the cover for the tents.

231 Sheep and goats are rarely slaughtered for meat except on special
[262] occasions. Most male and many female lambs and kids are sold in the
[432] market and the money is used to buy the necessary supply of food (like
[438] tea, sugar, salt, etc.), clothes, and other household items. Most of
438 these items are obtained from the shops in the settled communities in
439
443 the area, although some of the major items can be obtained only from
large urban centers like Alexandria.

231 The other domesticated animals that Awlad Ali keep are the donkey
492 for transport and riding, a few camels for heavy transport and also for
[236] wool, very few horses for riding on special occasions (they are con-
[554] sidered as a status symbol for those who own them), and the dog to
guard the camp and to protect the herds from wolves and other predators.
235 Poultry are usually kept for meat and eggs which are sometimes sold by
432 the women in the nearby markets.

233 The main occupation in the area is stock raising. Grazing lands
137 extend generally south of the cultivated land in the northern strip.
[132] The growth of pasture plants is affected by the amount of rainfall in
a particular year. Low rainfall causes acute shortages of pasture and
herbage, and leads to the death of animals by both starvation and thirst.
Pasture plants comprise a wide variety of bushes, scrub, and many other
species of grasses, most of which have a very short life span. These
plants normally persist from December to May; then the land is turned
into arid, hard desert with only a few dispersed patches of dry grass.

236 286 Wool is also very important to the economy of Awlad Ali. Lamb's wool is either sold or spun and woven into rugs. Goat's wool is spun and woven to provide the cover for the tents.

231 [262] [432] [438] 438 439 443 Sheep and goats are rarely slaughtered for meat except on special occasions. Most male and many female lambs and kids are sold in the market and the money is used to buy the necessary supply of food (like tea, sugar, salt, etc.), clothes, and other household items. Most of these items are obtained from the shops in the settled communities in the area, although some of the major items can be obtained only from large urban centers like Alexandria.

231 492 [236] [554] The other domesticated animals that Awlad Ali keep are the donkey for transport and riding, a few camels for heavy transport and also for wool, very few horses for riding on special occasions (they are considered as a status symbol for those who own them), and the dog to guard the camp and to protect the herds from wolves and other predators. 235 432 Poultry are usually kept for meat and eggs which are sometimes sold by the women in the nearby markets.

233 137 [132] The main occupation in the area is stock raising. Grazing lands extend generally south of the cultivated land in the northern strip. The growth of pasture plants is affected by the amount of rainfall in a particular year. Low rainfall causes acute shortages of pasture and herbage, and leads to the death of animals by both starvation and thirst. Pasture plants comprise a wide variety of bushes, scrub, and many other species of grasses, most of which have a very short life span. These plants normally persist from December to May; then the land is turned into arid, hard desert with only a few dispersed patches of dry grass.

462 them or any innate aptitude for them; this insistence is an index of the
424 jealousy with which she is prepared to guard her rights. Each right derived
from this or that small task is an extension of her control over the male.

462 The force and significance of this control is, perhaps, best seen in a
woman's right to cook. At marriage a woman must have at least the minimum
424 of cooking utensils, and one of the rights a man acquires in a woman is
252 that she cooks for him. This is something a man cannot do for himself.
Therefore, when a man ill-treats his wife or threatens her with divorce, she
[593] can retaliate by refusing to cook, or leave the tent altogether to return to her
father. A man bereft of this service is in a very sorry plight indeed. The
legal dominance of the male, seemingly autocratic, is reduced at every
point by the control a woman exercises through her exclusive right to perform tasks. The limits to the area of her coercive powers are significant.
562 They are confined almost wholly to domestic relationships. Legally, women
suffer such disabilities that they are almost of the status of minors; in
reality, their day-to-day living is far from intolerable because they are able
to control males over a wide field of relationships.

462 Men, excluded in the main from domestic duties around the tent, perform tasks to which their legal rights are tied. While women have access
424 to wells for water used by human beings, the transport of larger quantities
231 of water over longer distances, requiring the use of camels, is a task which
falls to the men. Watering of animals is done by men. Only they can
slaughter the animals for food. The meat of an animal slaughtered by a
woman is not "free," in a ritual sense, for human consumption. In an
extremity only, a woman can, in effect, kill an animal, but the knife which
cuts its throat must be held in a male hand, even if it is the hand of a very
462 small boy. The exploitation of the land is also the male prerogative. They
[424] plough and sow the grain; incidental help may be provided by wives working
[241] alongside their husbands during the early part of reaping, but the main
reaping is done entirely by men. Transportation of grain to the mounds is
also carried out by men, and it is they only who have access to the grain
stores when quantities are withdrawn for family use. Sheep-shearing is
● [236] carried out entirely by males,[10] the fleeces are stacked by them and the
[432] distribution and sales of these is directed by the male head of the tent.

Additional to these major tasks which males undertake are a number of
minor ones. Men sew strips of cotton together to make clothes for both
sexes. They also make rope of grass, albeit in a desultory sort of way, by
twisting together the strands between the palms of the hands. A number of
[334] other tasks fall to the men by virtue of the fact that the sexes are separated
[342] in the tent by a divider of blanket material, which may be taken down
when only members of the elementary family are about, but which is put

[461] [10] This work is reserved for the younger men and takes the form of a festival during
[533] which lewd songs are sung and poems with obscene themes or references are recited
[538] loudly and within the hearing of elders, in a manner not dissimilar to the behaviour
[831] of bachelors at a wedding.

423 boundary marker is usually a pile of stones, a tree, a wadi,
or, a line recorded on paper by two parties and given to a
third to hold in case of future differences of opinion.

342 In the extreme southern pastoral zone, there were few
361 permanent houses but with new government land registration
[656] laws the number is increasing. The settlement pattern in this
area might be characterized as a scattered homestead type,
"homesteads" being defined as tents or houses whose location
is permanent. Tents are seldom, if ever, moved these days even
[657] during a heavy rainy season. This is because barley production
has increased, and, mainly because government aid programs
supply fodder for the sheep. Bedouin shepherds in the pasture
area change dwelling places, but only to move their tents from
their winter protective hiding places out into the open for the
springtime, or to move from their tent into the stone house
for the cold, rainy winter. In either case, no real change in
location is involved.

342 The tent is called bait al-'Arab ("house of the Arabs").
There are two types: the bait al-saif ("summer house"), and
the bait al-rabi'a ("spring house"). The summer tent, made of
"gunny" and flour sacks sewn together, is for protection from
the sun. The spring tent is the real Bedouin tent. It is
[286] woven from the wool of the sheep and camel hair, and is used
[237] during the winter. Most Bedouin now say that they cannot afford
[435] the 125 Egyptian pounds (1 pound = $2.80) which the bait al-rabi'a
costs to make or buy.

312 (literally, sky-wells, to indicate that they are dug to receive and
[112] preserve rain water). Most of these are ancient Roman pools which were claimed either by the government or by individuals, and are put into
[653] use again to store rain water. Recently, the government has erected a number of dams to preserve the rain water in exceptionally good years from flowing into the sea. All this, however, is not enough to provide the tribal population in the area with a permanent supply of water because of the limited capacity of the cisterns and the pools and the scarcity of rain and its erratic nature. Recent attempts have been made to tap the underground water in some parts of the area. A large number of wells were sunk, especially along the coast.

433 The economy of Awlad Ali is based on livestock husbandry, supple-
221 mented by occasional cultivation of barley. Owing largely to the variation in the amount of rainfall, the sources of food in the area have the important characteristic that the place and amount of their occurrence vary from one year to the next. Throughout most of the area, the tribal populations are concerned predominantly with warding off shortages in the food supply by moving with their flocks to areas where grazing lands are available.

233 Awlad Ali keep a variety of domestic animals, the most important of which, from the economic point of view, are sheep and goats. The
[433] economy of Awlad Ali is based on the utilization of the products of
[237] these two animals. These products are milk, meat, wool, and hides.
[262] Milk and its products constitute the basic element of the people's
[272] diet. Milk is never consumed fresh. It is always made into sour milk
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252 (maleh), kishk (dried milk), or butter.

243 They could not sow a better crop. There are wild varieties of
barley in Cyrenaica and the country is in every way suited to
its culture. It is very hardy, stands up to drought, and easily
holds its own against the grasses, which are ploughed in with
[251] the seed on the plateau. When the barley and wheat have
been reaped, the grain is stored in *kuf*. On the plateau these
are ancient tomb-caves; elsewhere they are holes dug in the
ground.

[731] In a bad year, and even more in a succession of bad years,
the Bedouin have experienced famine, but in most years the
barley, and to a lesser extent the wheat, give an abundant
[433] yield. Bedouin have told me that they expect from sowing in
the beds of wadis up to a hundredfold of barley and in the
barqa up to fiftyfold. On the plateau the yield is smaller and
in the Marmarica and Sirtica much smaller. In Turkish times
[439] there was a large export of grain from Cyrenaica. Mondaini says
that it was to the mean annual value of 40,000 Lire Sterling
for the years 1885 to 1900.[1] Much of this surplus was bought
by English brewers.

433 The Bedouin way of life is well adapted to their environment.
182 Given the inconstancy of the rainfall and the distribution of
water supplies they would be foolish indeed were they not, at
any rate in part, shepherds. They are not, of course, in all
respects self-supporting. They make their winter tents and a
433 good part of their equipment, carpets, sacks, and so forth, from
439 the wool of their beasts, but some things the Bedouin regard as
182 necessities have to be imported, notably tea, sugar, some rice,
[237] and cloth, especially the *jird*, the woollen cloak of the country.
They trade these with surplus stock on the hoof, skins, wool,
clarified butter, surplus barley, and honey and wax, so that
they are in an economic sense self-supporting.

433 Cyrenaica is a rich country for Bedouin, a poor country for
182 Europeans. Bedouin generally have no overhead expenses in
[556] production. I say generally, because rich men sometimes
[233] employ shepherds, though this is usually the practice of urban
[464] merchants engaged in the sheep trade. Bedouin use their own
labour and that of their families and animals. What is perhaps
[511] more important is that they are prepared to live on what

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[1] G. Mondaini, *Manuale di Storia e Legislazione Coloniale del Regno d'Italia.* 1927, p. 308.

648 makes the welfare aspects of "Arab Socialism" meaningful,
177 [423] but the Bedouins of al-Qasr feel that they are already
practicing "Socialists."

The Bedouins feel that the programs of the government
are insufficient: the desert is extra harsh and aid should
compensate for this. On the other hand, the Egyptians who
administer the aid programs claim that the Bedouins do not
differentiate between "giving cooperation" and "receiving aid."
[181] Agricultural advisers complain that the Bedouins are lazy. One
agronomist whose job it was to teach the Bedouins how to
cultivate the olive tree said that they did not want to learn:
"They want us to plant the trees, water them and care for
them, harvest the olives, and then they will take them to the
market and sell them!" This statement is typical. The
[186] Bedouins reply: "The Egyptians did not teach us how to grow
the olive. Our fathers planted the olive here long before
they came into the desert." The Bedouins feel that the
Egyptians should follow their advice concerning the use and
control of water in the desert; that if they did the olive
[186] would flourish and life would be easier. "The Egyptians,"
they say, "are lazy and cannot keep up with our requests for
more seedlings. They cannot furnish us with what we need to
improve our lives. All we hear is: 'tomorrow, tomorrow'!"

[241] The Bedouins do not understand the methods of modern
hydrology and agronomy. They see no reason for the experimenta-

648 177 •241 tions and innovations in agriculture which the Egyptians bring to the desert. On the other hand, the Bedouins do not get the modern materials which they need to increase the production of their land. This is most serious when it comes to heavy farm machinery, such as tractors, and the spare parts to keep it functioning. Furthermore, seldom did a man in al-Qasr receive the number of olive seedlings that he requested. This invariably led to bitterness between Bedouins and Egyptians.

648 177 Most of the Bedouins believe that the desert is a difficult (wihsha) life, and they favor change. They want to know, for instance, why an American would leave home to live such a life.

[114] At a Governor's Council meeting which I attended, the Bedouin representative from al-Qasr did not protest government interference. He complained that the Governor was not furnishing the materials and facilities which the Bedouin needed if he was to become "modern" and "educated." The Bedouins' major complaint about the Egyptians is not that they are trying to change the desert, but that they are not changing it fast enough!

CHAPTER II

THE ECOLOGY AND ECONOMY OF THE AL-QASR AREA

Changing Patterns of Land Use

131 Al-Qasr is located in the Northwestern Coastal Zone, a relatively fertile littoral region forming the northern edge of the Egyptian Western Desert. Extending from Alexandria to Sallum on the Libyan border, the Zone is some 500 kilometers in length and reaches south into the desert some 20 to 50 kilometers. A deep soil deposit and a relatively high average rainfall of about 15 centimeters (20 centimeters of rain would be considered "high") permit limited agriculture in this region.

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133 Due to the drainage pattern of the coastal area there is a fair supply of underground water. The rain percolates down through coastal sand dunes and is trapped in man-made underground galleries dating from Roman times. Farther into the desert, cisterns, which also date from Roman times, catch the rains draining off the Libyan plateau to the south. This plateau and the catchment area form the southern boundary of the greater al-Qasr settlement area (see Figure 4). The General Desert Development Authority, an agency of the government, estimates that there are about 3,000 of these

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173 land along the coast: "This land was free, and the man who
[361] planted on it owned it. We call this (method of claiming land)
[425] _wad'a-l-id_ ("laying on of the hand," i.e. seizure). There was
[423] plenty of freedom in those days. A man could farm or keep
animals." Planting and caring for the land is not novel to
the Bedouins of al-Qasr.

423 The Bedouins claim that the pattern of land distribution
425 established during the time of Abu Mahjuba prevails today.
656 Further, they say that these rules will never change, no matter
[178] what laws come out of Cairo: "Land registration can mean nothing
where the tribes are concerned, for no Bedouin would be willing
to take the land of another Bedouin. The government forces us
to register our land so that it can be stated in the newspaper that they are giving the Bedouins land."

*613 The relationship between ecology and lineage territory
423 is not striking, such as in the case of the Cyrenaican Bedouins
182 of Libya (Peters 1960). In most cases, lineage territories run
on a north-south line cross-cutting the coastal garden and
southern pastoral zones. Hence, lineage territories are, generally, ecologically similar rather than contrasted. However,
*613 there are exceptions. 'Ailit Shraif lineage (see Figure 3a
423 below), at the western end of al-Qasr's _'izba_ sector, settled
182 there "because of the abundance of underground water in this
•241 area: the ground is rocky here and the water comes out fresh
[312] like the Nile." Their founder, Sayyid Shraif, "specialized"
[361]

*613 in farming, and he found this land "good for raising mint and
423 182 vegetables." To the southeast of the _'izba_, the lineages of
•241 Lazumi and Ma'fas found the land suitable for barley and
[312] grazing. This area is rain-fed. There are no wells and so
vegetable crops are not possible here. The members of these
lineages say that their ancestors were "real" Bedouins in
Cyrenaica, and did not wish to become farmers in Egypt. It
*613 is interesting to note that the Lazumi and Ma'fas are the
182 184 richest lineages in all of al-Qasr. They were, perhaps, better
241 able to maintain the traditional style of life which all of
the Bedouins claim is "the best." But all Bedouins of al-Qasr
depend to some degree upon horticulture or arboriculture.
[231] And most families own a few sheep or goats. Both Lazumi and
Ma'fas garden in their coastal sections, and Shraif members own
sheep.

656 Land registration has a history in the Western Desert.
423 The government attempted it a number of times, but with little
success until 1959 when the General Desert Development Organization (GDDO) undertook its program of land reclamation. But the
361 Bedouins were settled long before this. In al-Qasr, the Bedouins
342 178 began to erect permanent stone dwellings on the land about the
time of the First World War. In the Matruh area, elder informants
agree that before 1914 the Bedouins lived in tents outside the
361 town area. When the British came, they began to move into town.
648 Many of the Bedouins built houses in Matruh between the years

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The Bedouin of al-Qasr idealize the life of the pastoralist. It is a dominant theme in their culture. Gardening and arboriculture are perceived by the Bedouins as involving long hours of work, anxiety over waiting for profits, and complex market operations. They understand the logic and operation of the sheep market. Sheep are a store of value, a source of security, and a medium of exchange. In a good year of rain, a man can reap a good crop of barley, and buy more sheep against the inevitable bad year to come. While most Bedouins are, in one way or another, involved with the modern cash economy which ties al-Qasr to Marsa Matruh, the Bedouins who go into the production of cash crops on a large scale are those who can afford the risk of failure and who can survive the meager profits of the initial stage. These are the men who can adjust their world view from that of the pastoralist to that of the entrepreneur. There are only a few of these men in al-Qasr but they dominate the economy. Through them, most of the Bedouins of al-Qasr are linked to the national economy.

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Land and Economy

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The period between 1960 and 1964 was one of significant economic change in al-Qasr. Dependence upon farming increased while pastoralist activities became less important. In the past, none of the Bedouins now living in al-Qasr were "nomads;" even my oldest informants had moved only once or twice to

433 plant a small crop or graze their animals on the land of
177 relatives. In terms of economic specialty, the economy of
178 al-Qasr has for some time been a mixed one. Traditionally,
433 dependence was upon animal products with relatively few
177 vegetables being grown in the _'izba_ sector of the coast and
178 the barley sector to the south. Now, over one-half of the
• 241 registered land in al-Qasr is aboricultural land, and much
311 more land is given over to the growing of vegetables than in
the past. Correspondingly, the barley land has decreased.
The Bedouins still use barley primarily for fodder but much
of this comes from the government. With the shift to olive
arboriculture and government aid in the form of flour and
grain, naturally the barley crop has become less crucial.
But it remains indispensable for many Bedouins during this
transitional period. All Bedouins of al-Qasr are concerned
with securing a good livlihood. They express this idea in
the term _ma'isha simha_, and, as I have noted, they identify
it with the garden coastal sector of al-Qasr. The security
of a cash economy and participation in the national economy
have been realized by the Bedouins. I have no figures on the
433 amount of land registered prior to 1960, but, as of 1964,
241 al-Qasr consisted of 2,000 registered acres. Over one-half
311 of this land is in the garden area of al-Qasr, and is planted
434 with orchards. All of this land represents cash crops. Planted
in between the orchards are vegetable gardens. These gardens

These gardens

433 furnish staples for local consumption and more cash crops for
241 the Marsa Matruh market. Matruh is dependent upon these
311 vegetable goods from al-Qasr, to the extent that the Governor
434 has forbidden the Bedouins to truck their goods to the higher
443 [656] priced market in Alexandria.

654 The success of arboriculture in al-Qasr has been the
245 result of a well-organized reclamation program in this area
177 by the government. The relatively good supply of fresh water
433 and the proximity of a large market town has made al-Qasr an
atypical case in the government's attempt to transform the
desert pastoral economy. Since 1960, the government's program
has met with a great deal of success. Such results have, of
course, induced the Bedouins of al-Qasr to accept change,
and have further enhanced the future of the program. The
figures below show, as of 1964, the plant distribution of
orchards in the _'izba_ of al-Qasr, and indicate the measure
of success attained by the governmental reclamation program.

The environmental conditions of al-Qasr are particularly
well-suited for the olive tree: the olive has been the basis
of the economic transformation of al-Qasr. The Bedouins tend
to play down the government's role in developing olive arboriculture in the al-Qasr area. But before 1960, only the very
[556] wealthy men could afford to deal in the olive market, since it
involves a great initial financial risk. Hence, prior to the
entry of the government's program, there were 2,743 olive trees

244 all times of the day in the desert. The Bedouins had most of these crops before the government came to al-Qasr. Since [177] 1960, however, the Bedouins have been planting new crops such as okra, squash, cucumber, tomato, spinach and melon. All of these are plants adopted from the Nile Valley. 244 312 Vegetables are grown by means of irrigation or dry-farming. Where there is no well water, an individual will cultivate without irrigation. In this case, crops are planted in the spring after the rains. This method is called ba'ali. Irrigation makes it possible for a man to obtain four crops during the year, but usually, the Bedouin is more concerned with security than with profit. Therefore, most Bedouins try for one good crop 244 and allow a portion of the land to remain fallow. Land which has been planted all year around needs at least one year's rest before it can be replanted. The vegetable harvest usually takes place in July or August.

241 177 312 The government has attempted to introduce other crops into al-Qasr which have failed. Failure is related to two main problems in al-Qasr: salination arising from the short supply of fresh water, and the Bedouin's misunderstanding of the techniques of successful irrigation farming. 245 177 Figs have not been successful in al-Qasr due to the nature of the soil itself. The almond tree has succumbed to the climate of al-[132] Qasr. This tree blooms in April during the khamsin season, fifty days of hot, dry winds blowing in from the Sahara. The

233 178 with the movement toward a cash economy, this has changed.
[465] The shepherd receives 8 to 10 piasters for each head of sheep which he tends. The Bedouins who have taken up farming can spare none of their family for sheep-herding chores. If he [497] can afford it, during the dry season, a Bedouin may ship his sheep to the Nile Valley by train at 12 piasters per head. But the government will not accept sheep for shipment unless they are accompanied by a shepherd. The role of shepherd has become a very specialized one in the al-Qasr area. Few [554] of the al-Qasr Bedouins are shepherds, and the role is reserved for the poorer men without land.

241 407 492 [462] Plowing in the garden area is done by hand. Usually, the plow is pulled by a donkey but occasionally, if one can afford it, a camel or a horse will be used. A man and his sons handle all of the agricultural chores with the exception 178 241 492 of the winnowing process which the women do. Traditionally, barley was threshed by camels plodding on it. The Bedouins say that this is the best way because the soft feet of the camel do not crush the kernel. Now, however, very few men can afford [407] a camel. Threshing is done with a heavy wooden sled pulled by 241 407 434 433 a donkey or a horse. Tractors, when available, are used for agricultural plowing in the southern barley zone. This zone, during the year 1963, also became important for raising watermelons (batiikh), and this product figures to be an excellent cash crop for al-Qasr. Melons and barley can bring high profits

241 407 434 433 when planted in large quantities. The southern zone of al-Qasr is best suited for these crops, and the tractor is necessary for a successful crop.

407 474 [427] [654] Tractors are rented through the cooperative society. Local cooperative officers are responsible for seeing that all members share in the use of the tractor. But, in fact, officers and their closer relatives monopolize the tractors. The government has allotted to the al-Qasr cooperative five tractors. They feel that it would jeopardize the whole program of economic reform if they were to dictate the way in which the tractors are to be used. 407 619 474 Consequently, the tractor, like the rations of foodstuffs, has become a pawn in tribal power plays. In one case, not in al-Qasr, a tractor-driver who was a member of the 'Ali Abyad tribe insisted that members of the 'Ali Ahmar tribe pay him a 50 piaster "tip" to have their fields plowed. Because of situations such as these, most Bedouins prefer that cooperative membership coincide with local group membership. It is better, they say, if the 'Aishaibat of al-Qasr have their own cooperative because they know how to handle problems among themselves. The government, during this transitional period, seems to agree.

407 One reason that tractors are monopolized by a small group is that there are not enough of the machines to handle the plowing. Of the five tractors in al-Qasr, seldom were more than two working simultaneously. Often, this was a result of

407 the lack of spare parts. Three of the tractors were Russian-built, and two were Egyptian made. The Bedouins say that the Russian tractors are the better.

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In 1964, the Western Desert received its heaviest rainfall since 1947. To take advantage of this, local government officials of the reclamation project requested an additional fifty tractors for plowing on the coastal zone. They received only six additional tractors. In that year, the thirty-nine tractors used in the entire Western Desert were able to plow 15,240 acres of land. During this period of economic change,
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a bad barley crop causes a fodder shortage for the animals, and seldom is the aid program able to compensate for this. Consequently, there is a need to ship sheep to the Nile Valley, or to seek permission to take them to the pastures of Cyrenaica. Both situations create tremendous difficulties for both the
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Bedouins and the government. A third alternative for the Bedouin is to buy barley on the black-market. In doing this, he must pay six times the normal cost of grain, and risk reprisals.

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Prior to 1960, change in al-Qasr might be characterized as a steady and endogenous process of sedentarization. It had been taking place for about a century and a half. Exogenous change, social and economic, may be identified with the desire of the government to reclaim land in al-Qasr for agricultural use, and to integrate the Bedouin into the national economy.

423 society. Private ownership of land with sovereign rights
*[613] over it is now the normal practice in al-Qasr. Rights are
[178] held by the family head, the shaib. If the family head is
[596] deceased, land tenure rights are held jointly by the sons.

In the area beyond the plateau, in the extreme
[184] south of al-Qasr, land rights to grazing and water still are
*[613] associated with lineages. But here agriculture is impossible.
• [241] The type of rights over the land varies with the method by
which it is exploited. The southern and coastal sections of
[433] al-Qasr represent the old and the new, the pastoral traditional
mode of production and the modern agricultural cash economy.
[233] But, as noted, of the total population only a few Bedouins
are actually engaged in pastoralist activities. Hence, tribal
tenure rights, in general, are not overly important at this
time. Not too long ago they were, and many cases in the recent
[671] history of Bedouin customary law relate to conflicts over land
and water in the southern region. The Bedouins say that
[178] traditionally no lineage could use the pasturage or water of
*[613] another without some agreement, usually of long standing,
[233] made beforehand. Now, they say, permission is not needed.
[675] In the old days, these agreements were made between lineage
representatives, not individuals per se. Today, the grass
178 and water in the southern zone are claimed, though not in a
423 legal sense, by the families using them: the rights of
usufruct over the land are closer to rights of sovereignty

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
SEA
N
OLIVES AND VEGETABLES
('AILIT ZALLAT)
('AILIT SULWATIYYA)
('AILIT DAWLAT)
('AILIT ABU QARBASA)
('AILIT SHRAIF)
ROAD TO MARSA MATRUH
('AILIT ZAGHARAT)
('AILIT MA'FAS)
('AILIT LAZUMI)
PLATEAU
BARLEY
ROAD TO AL-SALLUM
(KAMAILAT TRIBE)
WADI
PASTURE
DESERT

FIGURE 3a. LINEAGE TERRITORIES OF AL-QASR.

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slaves, kitchens, and wells. The oasis depression was studded 793
with date palms and just outside the main entrance to the village 159
were small irrigated gardens and wind-mills. The people had 175*
to use the brackish water for ordinary purposes, but sufficient [346]
fresh water for tea was obtained from infrequent showers by [241] •
hollowing out cisterns in the rocks at the top of the western [379]
escarpment of the oasis. [312]

The Grand Sanusi was not only a very learned man and a writer of distinction but also a bibliophile with a fine library of [217] some 8,000 volumes,[1] mostly works on Islamic law and jurisprudence, mysticism, philosophy, history, koranic exegesis, poetry, and astronomy and astrology. Round him were many men capable of making good use of this substantial library. Indeed, it would have been difficult to have found anywhere in the Islamic world at that time, outside Cairo, a circle of better scholars. Poetry was one of the arts most cultivated at the oasis and I have been told by Arabs that it reached a high level of excellence. Shaikh Muhammad 'Uthman, himself a poet, wrote that at Jaghbub one meets 'literary men of distinction, whose writings eclipse those of the poets of Iraq and of Andalousia'.[2]

The whole community at Jaghbub may have numbered round about 1,000, but it is not possible to make more than a guess at the figure. As the oasis produces little except dates, the supply problem must have been considerable, and we know that the Grand Sanusi kept herds of camels to the west of the oasis, where there is scrub grazing, and at al-'Azziyyat, to transport supplies from the coast. The community lived very largely on the surplus revenues, mostly goods in kind, sent annually by all the zawiyas of Cyrenaica.

The community was centred round the University. It was, in fact, almost purely a University society, and its importance [873] as such in the history of the Sanusiya Order is very considerable. Here, under his personal supervision and the supervision of his disciples, far from worldly distractions, the Grand Sanusi was able to train the future leaders of the Order. The Shaikhs of the lodges of the Order were appointed by him from among his intimate circle of disciples, many of whom had followed him

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[1] Duveyrier, op. cit., p. 24; Muhammad bin 'Uthman, op. cit., p. 88; Sir Richard Burton, *Personal Narrative of a Pilgrimage to al-Madinah and Meccah* (Memorial Edition), 1893, vol. ii, pp. 24–5.

[2] Op. cit., p. 88.

and the insufficiency of the fall elsewhere. It follows that only 132
on the plateau can there be forest, and only there is a settled [137]
and purely agricultural way of life possible; and it was there [241]
and on the coastal fringe that in ancient and modern times [167]
European colonists settled.

The rains in Cyrenaica fall only in winter, from October to 132
April. In the absence of irrigation the planting season is thus 241
clearly delimited. So is the grazing season to the south of the 233
plateau, for in summer the grasses wither and the wells dry up, [221]
compelling shepherds to drive their flocks northwards to the
plateau, thus producing the kind of seasonal nomadism known as transhumance. The variation in total rainfall from year to year and the distribution of its fall over the winter months are of the utmost importance for agriculturalists in Cyrenaica. There is still some obscurity, but it is an observed fact that every few years in Cyrenaica there is a year in which the fall of rain is insufficient, or too badly distributed, to raise an adequate crop. In a mixed economy this fact must have given an overwhelming bias towards pastoralism.

The water supplies of the plateau, which depend entirely on 132
rainfall, are sufficient for the needs of the Bedouin and their 312
flocks. The clayey soils are, however, very exacting and running spring water is rare, being for the most part restricted to the triangle Darna–Slanta–al-Haniya. On the western part of the plateau water is conserved in cisterns and wells and on the maritime and *barqa* plains, in the Sirtica and Marmarica, and generally to the south of the plateau, in wells.

The distribution of vegetation in Cyrenaica follows variation 132
in degree of precipitation. Where there is much rain there is 137
forest. Where there is little rain there is steppe. Where there
is no rain there is desert. The forest is thick but mainly squat 137
and of very limited extension. An Italian estimate[1] of its distribution is shown on the accompanying map. It is predominantly Mediterranean in type, the juniper and the lentisk being the two commonest trees of the country. Forest ceases a few miles to the south of the high watershed of the plateau and gives way to steppe. The well-known route Tariq 'Aziza is generally regarded as the dividing line between the two kinds

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[1] Dott. Giovanni Manzoni, 'Memorie sui boschi della Cirenaica', *Notiziario Economico della Cirenaica*, 1929. [113]

137 of country. The whitish soils of the steppe support worts and
[134] other scrub bushes and some drought-resisting trees in the beds
of wadis and they are well covered with annual and perennial
grasses and other plants which yield excellent pasturage in the
[233] springtime. However, except in the Wadi al-Mra, where camels
can be kept the year round, there is little grazing beyond the
line Msus–Bir Tinjidhir–Bir Hakaim.

233 The Bedouin of the forest area are essentially a goat people,
137 though they also keep many sheep and cattle, and it is mostly
through the medium of the goat that the vast natural wealth
of the forests of Cyrenaica is transformed into human wealth.
The animal is hardy and frugal, and has the great merit of
preferring tree and shrub to grass and of being a catholic feeder.
Just as the forest would be useless to the Bedouin without the
goat so the much vaster stretches of steppe would be useless to
them without the sheep and camel which turn its grasses and
233 scrub into food. Thus Cyrenaica is fundamentally a pastoral
[181] country, primarily a country of sheep farming, and its people,
as they say themselves, have the hearts of shepherds and not of
peasants. While agriculture and pastoralism are both practised,
the bias of nature and tradition is towards animal husbandry,
by which the rich vegetation of the country is turned into milk,
butter, meat, wool, hides, and draught and transport.

II

13
221 In Cyrenaica stand always contrasted the mountain and the
plain, the forest and the steppe, the red soils and the white, the
233 region of goats and cows and the region of sheep and camels,
settled life and nomadism.

221 True nomadism is very rare. A few Fawakhir, Minifa, Huta,
233 and other tribal fragments herd only camels, or if they possess
other animals keep them with kinsmen near the plateau, and
can therefore wander pretty well where they please. They may
be found anywhere between the Nile, Fazzan, and the Sudan.
Their spirit is that of an Aulad 'Ali tribesman who said to me:
'We call no place our home. It is wherever there is grass and
water.' Semi-nomads are numerous. Those with land on the
● [241] plateau cultivate there, then graze southwards, and return
again to the plateau in the dry season to water their flocks.

*175 is not to be built till the zawiya is completed. There will be
*795 builders and carpenters among the Brothers and all that is
required of the tribal Shaikhs is selection of the site and super-
793 vision of the work. He points out to them that the work is for
their benefit, in that they and their sons will receive in the zawiya an education, especially in the Koran and in the laws of Islam, and will be able to worship there. The Grand Sanusi then cites passages from the Koran and the *Hadith* commending religious benefactions. Finally he prays God to assist those engaged in the building and those who have made themselves responsible for the upkeep of the zawiya. God helps those who help others. A man reaps what he sows.

Some of the Cyrenaican lodges were larger than others but
*795 they all had the same features, a straggling warren of stone
346 buildings comprising a mosque, schoolrooms, guest-rooms,
apartments for the Shaikh of the zawiya and his family, rooms
for teachers and pupils, and houses for the Brothers, clients,
and servants, and their families. Many had small gardens near-
• [241] by and the local cemetery was usually adjacent to a lodge.
[764] Jaghbub, where several hundred persons lived, was the largest
of such communities. The ruins of Dariyana and al-'Azziyyat
[792] are also extensive and must have housed several hundred
persons, but the average lodge probably housed only some fifty to a hundred persons, including wives and children, though there were often *Marabtin* families attached to the zawiya living nearby, sometimes in caves dating from classical times. The importance of a lodge was not to be estimated so much by the number of its occupants as by its tribal position and the number of its Bedouin adherents.

The Shaikh of a new zawiya would point out to the local
*795 tribesmen that he and his companions had no means of support-
793 ing themselves or of maintaining the zawiya. The various
425 sections nearby then gave to the lodge the lands adjoining it,
this estate surrounding a lodge being known as its *haram*. On the plateau the lodges were generously endowed with arable, in the steppe with wells, and in the oases with date-palms and springs. Later, further gifts of arable, wells, springs, and date-palms, or part use of these, would sometimes be made, especially when there was a dispute between two sections about ownership of property and neither would give way to the other,

for they might then settle the matter by surrendering their 795*
claims to the zawiya.[1] Another way in which a lodge obtained 793
rights in land was by asking permission of its owners to sow it. 425
Constant repetition of this favour eventually gave the zawiya
rights of use in it in perpetuity.

The tribesmen also assisted the Shaikh of the lodge in the 795*
cultivation of the lands, though most of the work was done by 793
241
476
the zawiya community itself. At sowing time the Shaikh would 795*
pitch his tent near the area to be cultivated and prepare a com- 793
munal meal, taking with him some sacks of rice for the purpose. 241
The local Bedouin then came with their draught animals and 476
sowed and ploughed for a couple of days on behalf of the
zawiya. The same procedure took place at harvest time.
Besides gifts of land and voluntary service in cultivating, the [794]
Bedouin were expected to pay a tithe to the lodge at harvest
time and after lambing. No doubt many of them paid annual
dues but it is unlikely that any strict record was kept or that
payment could have been enforced had they been averse to
making it.

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795*
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

Sanusiya Estates of the Zawiyas of Shahhat, Tart, al-Fayidiya, and al-Zawiya al-Baida.

That it was expected that the Bedouin might promise services 175*
more readily than perform them is suggested by an interesting 795*
document, dated 1307 A.H., found by the Italians at the 794

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[1] Savarese, op. cit., p. 193.

sorts of petty ways, listen to his grumbles about his agnates, interfere on his 604
behalf in petty camp quarrels, shield him from the disciplinarian father and 613
guard his property interests against the predatory father's brother; if the 428
mother's brother dies without heirs, the sister's son can reasonably expect at least a share of his wealth. When the mother's brother is a member of a different corporate group, a sister's son cannot possibly expect to inherit from him in any circumstance.

The mother's brother may reside in a camp too distant to be much effective 604
direct help in day-to-day living. His relative remoteness gives the relation- 591
ship other possible opportunities, however. Rainfall in the semi-desert area 312
of Cyrenaica is highly variable, both from year to year, and from place to 233
place in any given year. As a result this shallow saucer of a depression may 241 •
have sufficient rain to supply both the water needs of animals and crops, while an area a few miles distant will have inadequate water supplies for either. The mother's brother-sister's son link can mean water for animals and a crop of barley for both when, in successive years, the resources of one area or the other are inadequate.

The differences in the relations between men and their mother's brother 604
do not end with a characterisation of their antipodal forms. The demographic structure of a group may be such that one man may have a number of mother's brothers, another only one; one man may have to share with several brothers, another may be an only son. Complications of this sort de- [613]
termine the precise relationships between men, but however intricate these may be, each corporate group has its matrilateral links with a group occupying a slightly different ecological area, and it also has a plurality of matrilateral connections within it. Further, if a direct connection is not available [603]
to any particular individual he can use an indirect link (e.g. father's mother's brother or mother's mother's brother) to satisfy his needs.

The Preference for Males

Thus far, the family and the social matrix in which it is embedded has 128
been discussed in general terms, most particularly in reference to several selected sets of relationships. I wish now to place these relationships in a more specific setting with a brief discussion of the composition of a small camp of a group inhabiting the arid areas of central Cyrenaica. When the 829
Bedouin give their views on the structure of the family in Cyrenaica they 594
speak of it as consisting of a pair of spouses and about ten children, mainly 594
males. The emphasis on males is not mere sentiment, overwhelmingly though 562
it favours them against females. Additional males in a family increase the 858
productive possibilities of a family in the sense that more herdsmen become available and larger ploughing commitments can be undertaken; an increase in the number of females has small effect on production since they are precluded from any direct participation in these activities. Both sexes, ranging in age from about seven years to mature adulthood, are necessary if a family

462 them or any innate aptitude for them; this insistence is an index of the 424 jealousy with which she is prepared to guard her rights. Each right derived from this or that small task is an extension of her control over the male.

462 The force and significance of this control is, perhaps, best seen in a woman's right to cook. At marriage a woman must have at least the minimum 424 of cooking utensils, and one of the rights a man acquires in a woman is 252 that she cooks for him. This is something a man cannot do for himself. Therefore, when a man ill-treats his wife or threatens her with divorce, she [593] can retaliate by refusing to cook, or leave the tent altogether to return to her father. A man bereft of this service is in a very sorry plight indeed. The legal dominance of the male, seemingly autocratic, is reduced at every point by the control a woman exercises through her exclusive right to perform tasks. The limits to the area of her coercive powers are significant. They are confined almost wholly to domestic relationships. Legally, women 562 suffer such disabilities that they are almost of the status of minors; in reality, their day-to-day living is far from intolerable b[illegible] they are able to control males over a wide field of relationships.

462 Men, excluded in the main from domestic duties around the tent, perform 424 tasks to which their legal rights are tied. While women have access 231 to wells for water used by human beings, the transport of larger quantities of water over longer distances, requiring the use of camels, is a task which falls to the men. Watering of animals is done by men. Only they can slaughter the animals for food. The meat of an animal slaughtered by a woman is not "free," in a ritual sense, for human consumption. In an extremity only, a woman can, in effect, kill an animal, but the knife which cuts its throat must be held in a male hand, even if it is the hand of a very 462 small boy. The exploitation of the land is also the male prerogative. They [424] plough and sow the grain; incidental help may be provided by wives working •[241] alongside their husbands during the early part of reaping, but the main reaping is done entirely by men. Transportation of grain to the mounds is also carried out by men, and it is they only who have access to the grain stores when quantities are withdrawn for family use. Sheep-shearing is [236] carried out entirely by males,[10] the fleeces are stacked by them and the [432] distribution and sales of these is directed by the male head of the tent.

Additional to these major tasks which males undertake are a number of minor ones. Men sew strips of cotton together to make clothes for both sexes. They also make rope of grass, albeit in a desultory sort of way, by twisting together the strands between the palms of the hands. A number of [834] other tasks fall to the men by virtue of the fact that the sexes are separated [342] in the tent by a divider of blanket material, which may be taken down when only members of the elementary family are about, but which is put

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[461] [533] [538] [831]

[10] This work is reserved for the younger men and takes the form of a festival during which lewd songs are sung and poems with obscene themes or references are recited loudly and within the hearing of elders, in a manner not dissimilar to the behaviour of bachelors at a wedding.

TABLE 3

FODDER DISTRIBUTED IN MATRUH SECTOR, 1963

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	No. of Sheep	Kg. of Barley	Kg. of Cottonseed Cakes
al-Qasr	9,958	85,392	56,928
Total Distribution	144,804	1,303,236	868,824

the cooperative societies.

● 243 Barley is the important staple in al-Qasr: it is used for bread and fodder. About one-half of the Bedouins plant barley on a small scale. The wealthy individuals who own large flocks of sheep plant up to 100 acres of barley. Barley is planted in October and harvested at the end of April. Two methods of cultivation are used: plowing and seeding takes place either before the rains, i.e., the _'afiir_ system, or, after the rains, i.e., the _haraati_ system. After harvesting, [251] the grain is threshed and stored in two-meter deep pits (_matmuura_). Grain stored in this fashion can be preserved for three years.

244 The main vegetables raised in al-Qasr are onions, radishes, peppers, and mint. Mint is the only dependable cash crop of those mentioned. It is used by the Bedouins [263] [272] in tea, and tea drinking is a ceremony which takes place at all times of the day in the desert.

Those of the *barqa* plain may never camp on the plateau but 221 they move freely between grazing grounds, permanent water 233 supplies, and ploughland.

Of the plateau tribes, the Darsa, the 'Arafa, most of the Hasa, 221 and a number of 'Abaidat and 'Awaqir sections remain there 233 throughout the year. The Bedouin met with wandering about 619 in the southern grazing grounds after the rains are the 'Abaidat Ghaith, 'Awakla, and Shahin, some of the Hasa Shabarqa and Bakhayit, the whole of the small *'Ailat* Fayid tribe, large numbers of Bara'asa Husain, Tamiya, and Masa'id, 'Abid Mansur and Jabar, 'Awaqir Sdaidi and Brahim, and numerous small client groups more or less affiliated to these tribal sections. The nomadic sections are generally richer than the others in sheep and camels, and are also more vigorous, independent, and warlike. Politically, they are the leading sections of the tribes to which they belong. The foremost Shaikhs of the 'Abaidat, Hasa, Bara'asa, 'Abid, 'Awaqir, and Magharba are all to be found during the rains farther away in the steppe than most of their fellow-tribesmen.

The move southwards starts in December after the barley 221 has been sown, or part of a group may take the animals south 233 while the rest finish the ploughing. Most of these semi-nomads [243] return to the plateau in May, when water becomes scarce, but some, including some of the most powerful elements, remain to the south of it permanently. There are many advantages in this annual move to the south. Rain falls and the grasses spring up in advance of the plateau, and grazing is more abundant and of a better quality. On the other hand, the grasses of the plateau and its southern slopes are still green when the desert grasses, except in specially favoured depressions, are withered. By their annual oscillation the Bedouin thus give their animals the best grazing at all seasons of the year. Sheep mostly lamb round about November, which is the month in which new grasses spring up in the *barr*, so that the move southwards gives the sheep the richest grazing at a time when they need it most; and the warmer conditions prevailing in the south suit the lambs. At the same time, the Bedouin in [262] southern grazing grounds are compelled to live very largely on milk food, and the combination of rich pastures with the dropping of their young by sheep, goats, and camels, enables them to live on the country to a great extent.

233
221 The grazing season extends between November and April. As the dry season advances, the flocks are moved northward to the cultivated lands so as to be nearer to fodder and to the waterholes which stand usually very close to the coastal zone. During the dry season, animals live mainly on barley straw and very little dry grass. In exceptionally bad years, the people are compelled to dispose of their animals or to sell some of them in order to be able to maintain the rest. In such years the shepherds find it necessary to cross the border to the permanent pasture of Cyrenaica in northeastern Libya, or to move to the Delta where they may purchase the right to graze in wheat fields after reaping the crop.

• 243 Grain crops, mainly barley, are also grown in the area. Depending on the rainfall, pockets of land characterized by deep alluvial soil and underground water at various depths are cultivated with barley and other grain crops. [246] Barley cultivation is preferred by the people because it grows quickly and matures faster than wheat; also, it can be cultivated in a range of soils and climates; it is mostly used as animal feed. Barley straw is also used as fodder for animals. [132] Because of the erratic nature of rainfall, barley production is hazardous in most of the region. [233] [433] For this reason, pastoralism remains the most important mode of subsistence, and cultivation becomes secondary. Cultivation is done on the basis of shifting cultivation, which means that the areas cultivated vary from one year to the next following the rainfall.

Land Tenure

423
311 Most of the cultivable lands, as well as the grazing lands, are under tribal occupation. Awlad Ali have, by custom and usage, had for

useful mostly for transport and ploughing, though they give a 231
good milk yield and a fair harvest of wool. There are horses, of
Berber rather than of Arab type, in every big camp. They are
kept for the saddle alone, being much used in old days for
hawking, and are a sign of wealth and social position.

The census figures for domesticated animals are probably
highly inaccurate. The flocks and herds were certainly much [648]*
greater, especially for camels and horses, before the Italians
ravaged the country. The Turkish figures for 1910 were
713,000 sheep, 546,300 goats, 83,300 camels, 23,600 cattle, and
27,000 horses, and it has been reckoned that by 1933 these had
been reduced to 98,000 sheep, 25,000 goats, 2,600 camels,
8,700 cattle, and 1,000 horses.[1] Before the outbreak of the [648]*
second Italo-Sanusi war in 1923 the normal export to the [439]
markets of Egypt was 80,000 sheep and goats a year, and it was
reckoned that a settled Cyrenaica could produce annually for
export at least 100,000 to 150,000 sheep and goats and 6,000
camels. The country used to satisfy a considerable portion of
Egypt's meat requirements. It also exported clarified butter 234
in big quantities, 91,835 kilograms being the figure for 1922 and 439
75,462 the figure for 1923.[2]

Although the Bedouin are by practice and inclination 243 •
shepherds first and cultivators afterwards, all plough. Barley [262]
and some wheat are a staple food. Indeed, in most years they
cultivate a surplus of barley which they trade, and it may be
said that for the most part they are self-supporting as far as
their flour requirements go. On the southern slopes of the
plateau and in the *barqa* plain ploughing begins from the middle
of October to the middle of November, according to the rains.
The coastal belt is sown a little later and the plateau in December
and January when the grasses begin to sprout. By mid-April
the first harvest, that of the *barqa* and the southern slopes of
the plateau, is being reaped, and on the plateau reaping goes
on from May to the end of August. Everywhere barley is sown
greatly in excess of wheat, for wheaten bread is not considered [231]
a necessity and barley is required for horses as well as for men.

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[1] Jean Despois, *La Colonisation Italienne en Libya: Problèmes et Méthodes*, 1935, p. 44; Hans w: son Ahlmann, *La Libia Settentrionale*, 1930, p. 78. (First published in 1928.) [113]

[2] *L'Oltremare*, Mar. 1930; *Rivista delle Colonie Italiane*, 1934, p. 885; Francesco Coro, *Settantasei Anni di Dominazione Turca in Libia*, 1937, p. 82. [113]

243 They could not sow a better crop. There are wild varieties of
barley in Cyrenaica and the country is in every way suited to
its culture. It is very hardy, stands up to drought, and easily
holds its own against the grasses, which are ploughed in with
[251] the seed on the plateau. When the barley and wheat have
been reaped, the grain is stored in *kuf*. On the plateau these
are ancient tomb-caves; elsewhere they are holes dug in the
ground.

[131] In a bad year, and even more in a succession of bad years,
the Bedouin have experienced famine, but in most years the
barley, and to a lesser extent the wheat, give an abundant
[433] yield. Bedouin have told me that they expect from sowing in
the beds of wadis up to a hundredfold of barley and in the
barqa up to fiftyfold. On the plateau the yield is smaller and
in the Marmarica and Sirtica much smaller. In Turkish times
[439] there was a large export of grain from Cyrenaica. Mondaini says
that it was to the mean annual value of 40,000 Lire Sterling
for the years 1885 to 1900.[1] Much of this surplus was bought
by English brewers.

433 The Bedouin way of life is well adapted to their environment.
182 Given the inconstancy of the rainfall and the distribution of
water supplies they would be foolish indeed were they not, at
any rate in part, shepherds. They are not, of course, in all
433 respects self-supporting. They make their winter tents and a
433 good part of their equipment, carpets, sacks, and so forth, from
439 the wool of their beasts, but some things the Bedouin regard as
182 necessities have to be imported, notably tea, sugar, some rice,
[237] and cloth, especially the *jird*, the woollen cloak of the country.
They trade these with surplus stock on the hoof, skins, wool,
clarified butter, surplus barley, and honey and wax, so that
they are in an economic sense self-supporting.

433 Cyrenaica is a rich country for Bedouin, a poor country for
182 Europeans. Bedouin generally have no overhead expenses in
[556] production. I say generally, because rich men sometimes
[233] employ shepherds, though this is usually the practice of urban
[464] merchants engaged in the sheep trade. Bedouin use their own
labour and that of their families and animals. What is perhaps
[511] more important is that they are prepared to live on what

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[1] G. Mondaini, *Manuale di Storia e Legislazione Coloniale del Regno d'Italia*. 1927, p. 308.

7:Abou-Zeid E-5 (no date) 1959 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9
Egypt

105 [162] livestock husbandry as their main occupation while the rest earn their living by such other means as agriculture, fishing, stone-cutting, trade, etc. But whatever his main job may be, a man is likely to possess a number of sheep which he usually entrusts to a professional herdsman if he cannot look after them himself. This means that all sectors of the population have an active interest in livestock. Livestock, or rather sheep, are the most important and most esteemed item of wealth, and pastoral values still rank very high in spite of the obvious attraction of other types of work. On the other hand, pure nomadism is not practised, except perhaps by some small groups of camel-herders living in the far south of the area. The tremendous majority of the herdsmen are sheep-herders, whose movements are much more restricted than the movements of the real nomads. They have permanent settlements to which they retire when the grazing season is over, and there they practise agriculture, which they consider a secondary and supplementary occupation.

Most of the inhabitants of the Western Desert belong to the Awlad Ali clans who originally came from Libya. Some less important and less numerous clans, the Morabiteen clans, also live there as 'clients' of the more powerful Awlad Ali. A certain degree of correspondence exists between clan segmentation and the distribution of lands, both pasture-land and the fertile arable areas of the northern strip being distributed among clans and lineages in a clearly defined manner. A man cannot make use of the grazing ground, much less of the cultivation ground, known to belong to a different clan or lineage except under certain conditions and only obtaining the owners' permission. This does not mean, however, that clans and lineages are localized. For in spite of the natural tendency of kinsmen to cluster together and to live near to each other, the members of the same clan-segment may be widely dispersed, and the inhabitants of any specific locality, especially near the coast, usually belong to different clans. Nevertheless, a certain clan may be more strongly represented in a particular locality than all the other clans.

105 312 The problem of water supply is, naturally, the most crucial problem with which the people have to cope. The absence of surface water, the shortness of the wet season, the low rainfall and the meagreness of the subterranean resources in most parts of the desert, especially inland, impose drastic limitations upon their activities. Apart from the few artesian wells found in the northern coastal zone, rain is the main source of water supply. It is, however, a very unreliable source because of its irregularity. Moreover, a considerable amount of rain-water is lost by seepage through the sand and by evaporation. The situation is further aggravated by the fact that not all the functioning wells yield potable water or even water suitable for the irrigation of fields. The water of a large number of these artesian wells is charged with a high percentage of dissolved salts. This water can only be used for domestic purposes. Certain experiments are now being carried out at Ras-el-Hikma and Fuka to see whether such saline water could be used for irrigating the pasture-lands.

105 243 311 The two main complementary occupations, i.e. livestock husbandry and the cultivation of barley, are seriously affected by the water situation. The strip of arable land which extends along the sea coast varies in breadth from place to place and from year to year according to the rainfall. In good years it may stretch some 10 to 20 kilometres southwards, but in bad years the cultivation becomes rather patchy and is confined to a very narrow strip only a few kilometres wide. The people are never sure of their crops, and in really

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bad years the returns may be so poor that grain and flour have to be sent from 105
the Delta to avert famine. The failure of the crop may also compel whole 243
clan-segments to migrate with their animals to the Delta. In this respect, 311
the semi-nomadic clans of the Western Desert represent a real burden on the national economy of Egypt.

Livestock husbandry, which is by far the most important and highly valued 105
occupation, is itself subject to the variability and the erratic nature of rainfall, 231
since it is the rain which determines the abundance of herbage and, consequently, the number of animals reared. Pasture land is found mainly to the south of the cultivated land. Sometimes, the fallow patches among the barley fields are also covered with grass and other pasture plants suitable for grazing. Pasture plants usually persist between December and May; during the summer, the land becomes arid hard desert with only few dispersed patches of dry grass. The grazing season *par excellence* is from November to April, during which period barley stands in the fields. After the first showers of November, barley is sown and the young men soon move with their flocks to the pastures, leaving the older people to look after the fields. As the dry season advances, the flocks are moved northwards to the cultivated lands so as to be nearer to fodder and to water-holes. Thus, the movements of the herders are rhythmic and regulated by the division of the year into two major seasons: the wet season and the dry season. The wet season is the period of plenty during which the animals are well fed; the dry season is the period of starvation for the flocks which must then rely on such fodder as barley straw and on the drying grass. Any movements of animals that may take place during that season are carried out on a very limited scale. In exceptionally bad years the people are compelled to dispose of their animals, or at least of a large part of the flocks, or they may send them away to their friends and relatives who may be living near vegetation. Sometimes, the herdsmen find themselves compelled to cross the frontiers to Cyrenaica for pasture.

We can see then from this brief account to what extent the water situation 105
is responsible for determining the modes of living in the desert and for channelling human activities and imposing certain limitations on these activities. Development projects and sedentarization schemes planned for the Western Desert and its inhabitants must, therefore, give a great deal of importance to the question of water and its availability. In fact, most of the contemplated projects envisage the possibility of better exploitation of the existing water supplies as well as the tapping of potential resources.

Rightly or wrongly, it is generally assumed in Egypt that nomadism and 178
semi-nomadism represent a phase of deterioration which is no longer compatible with the actualities of modern life and therefore should be abolished. 312
For, apart from the fact that it is responsible for the hardships and insecurity 657
suffered by the desert dwellers and the consequent ill effects on the national economy, especially in bad years, nomadism as practised in the Western Desert and under the prevailing circumstances is wasteful and destructive. Vast stretches of land which could be reclaimed at little cost and cultivated intensively are simply left for grazing without any serious endeavour to make better use of them. Under the contemplated sedentarization projects it is intended to increase the cultivated area, to improve the pastures by introducing new pasture plants of higher nutritive value in areas where agriculture is not

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would no doubt have brought in the 'Ibeidat or the 'Awaqir 619
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At the present day the Awlad 'Ali, especially the eastern 619
sections near the Nile Valley, have almost ceased to be nomadic, 178
and only the old men have memories of their former warlike
habits. They suffered considerably during the Great War,
but are again becoming prosperous. They now own large
comfortable tents, are beginning to build houses and clear
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Arab and the other an 'Abadi, concurred in calling them
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and lighter-complexioned than the lightly built Arabs of
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They are great breeders of camels and sheep, and a busy 436
traffic in these goes on weekly in the markets of Hammam, 178
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[1] At the 1927 census, the Western Desert Arabs, Awlad 'Ali, Jawabis, etc., numbered 38,928 souls exclusive of those settled in Beheira. But Pacho, 100 years ago, estimated them at 38,000 souls. [161]

TABLE 3

FODDER DISTRIBUTED IN MATRUH SECTOR, 1963

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	No. of Sheep	Kg. of Barley	Kg. of Cottonseed Cakes
al-Qasr	9,958	85,392	56,928
Total Distribution	144,804	1,303,236	868,824

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241 177 312 The government has attempted to introduce other crops into al-Qasr which have failed. Failure is related to two main problems in al-Qasr: salination arising from the short supply of fresh water, and the Bedouin's misunderstanding of 245 177 the techniques of successful irrigation farming. Figs have not been successful in al-Qasr due to the nature of the soil itself. The almond tree has succumbed to the climate of al- [132] Qasr. This tree blooms in April during the khamsin season, fifty days of hot, dry winds blowing in from the Sahara. The

156 159 554 178 177 829 the 'umda, Hajj 'Ali seems to imply that he himself is capable of understanding and leading the Bedouins during this period.

Hajj 'Ali has formulated some positive and constructive ideas relating to the period of transition which now faces al-Qasr, and they are related to his analysis of the pressing needs of the day.

> [244] [489] The Bedouins need many things: they need factories as there are in the Nile Valley. For the desert, here in particular, we need olive presses. This will raise the profits of the farmer . . . We need a factory for canning tomatoes, for the whole desert plants them and the transportation is such that we cannot get them to the market . . . The biggest change in the desert results from the presence of 12,000 government workers; there were only 20 or [871] 30 before the World War. There were no schools, now there a few. You cannot find a six year-old boy who does not go to school; about thirty per cent of the girls in al-Qasr go to school also . . . Another cause of change is due to the fact that everyone now watches his neighbor, he sees what he [207] does and he imitates him. Today, I listen to the radio and tomorrow my neighbor buys one. Evolution (tatawwar) is taking place, and the people here are [212] realistic about it. For instance, I do not know reading and writing, and sometimes I must dictate a letter to my son . . . My son knows better than I, and I know better than my father did, who lived in al-Qasr for thirty five years without knowing anything about the streets of Marsa Matruh.

156 159 554 178 177 Hajj 'Ali is both subjective and objective about change, as we can note from the comment about the radio. In a non-doctrinaire fashion, Hajj 'Ali stresses the great value of education while being aware of his own deficiencies in this area. However, as a counterbalance, he seems to

These gardens
433 furnish staples for local consumption and more cash crops for
241 the Marsa Matruh market. Matruh is dependent upon these
311 vegetable goods from al-Qasr, to the extent that the Governor
434 has forbidden the Bedouins to truck their goods to the higher
443
[656] priced market in Alexandria.

654 The success of arboriculture in al-Qasr has been the
245 result of a well-organized reclamation program in this area
177 by the government. The relatively good supply of fresh water
433 and the proximity of a large market town has made al-Qasr an
atypical case in the government's attempt to transform the desert pastoral economy. Since 1960, the government's program has met with a great deal of success. Such results have, of course, induced the Bedouins of al-Qasr to accept change, and have further enhanced the future of the program. The figures below show, as of 1964, the plant distribution of orchards in the 'izba of al-Qasr, and indicate the measure of success attained by the governmental reclamation program.

The environmental conditions of al-Qasr are particularly well-suited for the olive tree: the olive has been the basis of the economic transformation of al-Qasr. The Bedouins tend to play down the government's role in developing olive arboriculture in the al-Qasr area. But before 1960, only the very
[556] wealthy men could afford to deal in the olive market, since it
involves a great initial financial risk. Hence, prior to the entry of the government's program, there were 2,743 olive trees

TABLE 1

ARBORICULTURE IN AL-QASR, 1964

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Plant	Acres	Plants Distributed	Successful Plants
Olive	947	40,399	32,488 (80%)
Almond	57	2,570	1,752 (67%)
Fig	66	10,537	(experimental stage)
Grape	.5	512	512 (100%)
Peach	2.5	804	200 (20%)

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245
177
433
[556]

in al-Qasr, and these were distributed among only 27 men. Most of these men also owned large numbers of sheep.

In 1960, the government began planting olive trees on the registered land of individuals living in the _'izba_ sector. This plan also involved instructing the Bedouins in the care of the tree: an individual who had traditionally depended on the rains now had to learn irrigation farming. This aspect of the program, learning modern "water discipline," was a source of conflict for the Bedouin with his pastoralist outlook on life. The olive tree must be watered twice weekly. The Bedouins say that this made them feel like "peasants." The Bedouins were also apprehensive over the fact that the olive tree did not bear its first fruit, i.e., the first cash

654
245 crop, until five to seven years after planting. To alleviate
177 the difficulties of this period of apprehension, which the
433 Governor of the desert province refers to as "the dangerous
[747] period," the United Nations F.A.O. aid program was designed
and put into operation in al-Qasr.

654 A Bedouin may purchase an olive seedling from the
245 government for the price of two piasters (about six cents).
177 This same seedling costs the government 26 piasters. Once
433 through "the dangerous period," a Bedouin can expect a yield
435 of 120 to 150 kilos of olives from one tree. Olives sell for about 15 piasters per kilo. Or, at a cost of 5 piasters per kilo, the olives can be converted into oil. One ton of olives will render about 23 per cent oil. Olive oil is now considered a luxury item in Egypt, and the market price is very high. But only the Bedouin with a large harvest of olives finds it profitable to sell his product on the oil market. These conditions have made many Bedouins willing to convert from horticulture and sedentary pastoralism to arboriculture.

654 Between 1960 and 1964, the government reclamation
245 program has planted a total of 9,514 olive trees on land
177 registered to 124 individuals. The average distribution of trees, about seventy-six per man, is indicative of one of the problems related to change in al-Qasr and about which we have spoken earlier. Most of the trees have gone to men who, before

654 •245 177 1960, were olive tree owners. One individual, who owned 400 trees before the reclamation program, now owns 1,400 trees. His increase has not all been at government expense, but a large share of it has been. Of the 9,514 trees planted by the government, 4,666 of them have been planted in the barley and wadi area to the south; 4,848 in the garden area on the coast. [312] In the southern sector, a Bedouin who owns at least ten acres of land may have the government drill a well and erect a windmill pump on his property. For this, he pays [452] 350 Egyptian pounds (approximately $1,000.00) over a thirty-year period. The Bedouin is willing to undertake this contract, and also to take land out of barley production, because he sees the future security of the olive market. Because of this, also, he is willing to agree on land boundaries and to register his land with the government.

657 Economic transition would not be possible, nor could the Bedouins afford to hazard it, were it not for government welfare payments in the form of staple products. These rations stabilize the mixed economy of the al-Qasr while promoting a shift to a fuller dependence on agriculture. 657 474 Of the thirteen cooperative societies in the Matruh area, al-Qasr is the largest and has been designated as a pilot project for the whole Western Desert. Al-Qasr garners the largest share of government aid, and, consequently, is heavily dependent upon it. The table below shows the amount of aid given monthly to

244 all times of the day in the desert. The Bedouins had most
of these crops before the government came to al-Qasr. Since
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as okra, squash, cucumber, tomato, spinach and melon. All of
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[132] Qasr. This tree blooms in April during the khamsin season,
fifty days of hot, dry winds blowing in from the Sahara. The

245 blossoms of the tree are stripped away by these winds before
177 the fruit can mature.

178 Traditional values affect the Bedouins' perception of
517 their new life. Men are fond of gathering for their ritual
272 three cups of mint tea and recalling "the good old days." In
[829] those days, they say, men only had to ride, shoot, and drink
233 tea. In the past, there was a great deal of security in
178 owning animals which are not as dependent on the rains as
422 is agriculture. During a year of bad rains, a Bedouin could
233 always move his flock to Libya or to the Nile Valley: "When
731 we have a bad year, we take our animals to the grass of our
166 relatives. When they have a bad year, they come here." In
167 the drought year of 1960, 20,000 Egyptian Bedouins migrated
to Libya in search of pasturage. This caused an international
[648] conflict and King Idris of Libya, for a short time, closed the
border to Bedouins. The conflict was finally resolved, and
the Bedouins were given permission to use the pastures of
Cyrenaica. None of the Bedouins of al-Qasr were involved in
this movement.

233 The Bedouins who have settled in the _'izba_ sector of
al-Qasr also prefer to keep some sheep. The security which
they represent is worth the time and expense of maintaining
233 them and paying a shepherd to look after them. The Bedouins,
178 in the past, paid their shepherds one sheep for every ten
465 sheep that he tended. Payment was made twice a year. Today,

156 with four wives. It is not hard to understand why the people
159 of al-Qasr consider Hajj 'Ali a *rajal khair* *par excellence*.
554 627 For instance, when I asked one man it he could give me some
124 examples of court cases, he replied: "The one who is not an
'aqila pays no attention to anything save getting food for
his children. The *rajal khair* has money and men (a reference
to the "old days" when a person needed cohorts for battle),
and so he always pays instead of us. He lends us money and
helps us in doing anything, like Hajj 'Ali does." In another
124 interview, one man showed great respect for Hajj 'Ali's tradi-
156 159 tional status and modern ability to deal with the outside
554 world by giving him the honorific title of "*shaikh*," and
439 showing that the Bedouins of al-Qasr put their trust in him:
472 "When the olive merchants come from Alexandria, they go to
•245 Shaikh 'Ali, someone who knows about olives. They ask him
what kind of olives al-Qasr has. He shows the merchants, and
they say: 'I will give you so much for them.' They make an
agreement, and Hajj 'Ali collects the olives and gets the
price for them."

156 In terms of local politics, I would guess, but do
159 not have data to prove, that Hajj 'Ali was the third party
554 [627] most frequently referred to in seeking a termination of
[114] conflict. He was commonly asked to participate in these
matters not only by the disputants themselves but also by
the *'aqila* or other third party presiding. He was sometimes

436 of thinking in money, and they reckon blood-money in cash
178 (£300) and not in camels, as Bedouin should.

The more adventurous make, annually, long and waterless
484 journeys to the oases of Siwa and Bahariya to remove the date
245 crop, and, after their own wants are provided for, a good profit usually results from the sale of the remainder.

181 An Egyptian critic, who should know them only too well,[1] calls them "haughty, independent, and untrustworthy in character. They are dull and so abnormally lazy that they have no desire whatever to do more than they learnt (when young)". But he puts this down to the nature of the country; less generous critics ascribe the nature of the country to them!

173 Besides the descendants from 'Ali's three sons, 'Ali el-
619 Abyad, 'Ali el-Ahmar, and Sineina, a large section called Sinaqra reckons its descent from Sinqir, a mysterious white man who was wrecked and washed up on the coast near Salum some time in the seventeenth century.[2] These are the true Awlad 'Ali, whose sections live mingled together in the most intricate fashion. Among them live also the Jumei'at, who invited them into the country, and various families of other *murabitin*, such as Qat'an, Awlad Suleiman, Hawara, Habun, etc.
619 To distinguish themselves from their vassals, the Awlad 'Ali call themselves *hurr* free, and the *murabitin* are divided into various grades, according as they pay tribute or not.

The Awlad 'Ali are divided into three main divisions, with section (*badanat*) and subsections (*'eilat*) as follows. Some of these are so numerous that they practically constitute fresh tribes of their own.

I. AWLAD KHARUF

[173] These are the descendants of 'Ali el-Abyad ("The White"), the eldest son of 'Ali bin 'Aqar bin Dib, and are subdivided again into:

	Section.	*Subsections.*
(1)	'Eilet Bu Hindi	'Eilet Bu Zayyana, 'Eilet Bahiya, 'Eilet Da'ud
(2)	'Eilet Bu Diya	'Eilet Ibrahim, 'Eilet Jereiat
(3)	Awlad Mansur	El-Afrad, El-Tawa'il, 'Eilet 'Abd Allah

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[1] Muhammad Bey Wasfi, for many years Inspector at Borg el-'Arab.

[2] Their sheikh told Hamilton in 1853, there were seven generations between him and Sinqir.

233 221 The grazing season extends between November and April. As the dry season advances, the flocks are moved northward to the cultivated lands so as to be nearer to fodder and to the waterholes which stand usually very close to the coastal zone. During the dry season, animals live mainly on barley straw and very little dry grass. In exceptionally bad years, the people are compelled to dispose of their animals or to sell some of them in order to be able to maintain the rest. In such years the shepherds find it necessary to cross the border to the permanent pasture of Cyrenaica in northeastern Libya, or to move to the Delta where they may purchase the right to graze in wheat fields after reaping the crop.

243 Grain crops, mainly barley, are also grown in the area. Depending
on the rainfall, pockets of land characterized by deep alluvial soil
and underground water at various depths are cultivated with barley and
other grain crops. Barley cultivation is preferred by the people
• [246] because it grows quickly and matures faster than wheat; also, it can be
cultivated in a range of soils and climates; it is mostly used as
animal feed. Barley straw is also used as fodder for animals. Because of
[132] the erratic nature of rainfall, barley production is hazardous in most
[233] of the region. For this reason, pastoralism remains the most
[433] important mode of subsistence, and cultivation becomes secondary.
Cultivation is done on the basis of shifting cultivation, which means that the
areas cultivated vary from one year to the next following the rainfall.

Land Tenure

423 311 Most of the cultivable lands, as well as the grazing lands, are under tribal occupation. Awlad Ali have, by custom and usage, had for

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312 (literally, sky-wells, to indicate that they are dug to receive and
[172] preserve rain water). Most of these are ancient Roman pools which were
claimed either by the government or by individuals, and are put into
[653] use again to store rain water. Recently, the government has erected a
number of dams to preserve the rain water in exceptionally good years
from flowing into the sea. All this, however, is not enough to provide
the tribal population in the area with a permanent supply of water because
of the limited capacity of the cisterns and the pools and the
scarcity of rain and its erratic nature. Recent attempts have been
made to tap the underground water in some parts of the area. A large
number of wells were sunk, especially along the coast.

433 The economy of Awlad Ali is based on livestock husbandry, supplemented
221 by occasional cultivation of barley. Owing largely to the variation
in the amount of rainfall, the sources of food in the area have the
important characteristic that the place and amount of their occurrence
vary from one year to the next. Throughout most of the area, the tribal
populations are concerned predominantly with warding off shortages in
the food supply by moving with their flocks to areas where grazing lands
are available.

233 Awlad Ali keep a variety of domestic animals, the most important
of which, from the economic point of view, are sheep and goats. The
[433] economy of Awlad Ali is based on the utilization of the products of
[237] these two animals. These products are milk, meat, wool, and hides.
[262] Milk and its products constitute the basic element of the people's
[272] diet. Milk is never consumed fresh. It is always made into sour milk
272
252 (maleh), kishk (dried milk), or butter.

829 is to constitute a viable economic unit; and if it is to expand, the number
594 of males must be increased disproportionately compared with females. Since
562 the structure of this "ideal family" (which in the sentiments of the Bedouin
858 is the only family) is based on the division of labour, some details of the
tasks and their allocation among members of a family are included to estimate the importance of this notional "ideal family."

The Division of Labour, by Sex

462
286 The tasks women perform are almost entirely associated with the tent. They make the tent top, and the gaily coloured carpets which cover the sandy ground in the men's quarters. They also weave the material for making sacks, and nose bags for horses and camels. Throughout the year a piece of weaving is always on the loom waiting, and while any women of the tent may take a turn at weaving, the mother decides what is to be made,
462 its pattern and colours and in general directs operations. Women also pitch
342 the tent when the camp is moved; they do so unaided by the men. It is a
task which requires considerable strength and only grown girls and mature women can assist in this; younger girls scour the vicinity in search of stones to hold the sides of the tent on the ground after it has been erected.
[356] As soon as pitching is complete, the floor of the tent is brushed clean before
carpets are spread and the few articles of personal belongings placed in their proper position.

462 Next, brushwood must be fetched in large quantities for fires. Apart
313 from cooking needs and winter warmth, the fire of each tent is in constant
use for preparing the sickly sweet tea, almost the consistency of syrup, which is drunk several times a day regularly and which is made again for even the casual visitor. The task of fetching brushwood is performed daily, and each load takes a few hours of a woman's time to gather and bring back
[412] to the tent. Bushes are uprooted with the aid of a long-handled adze and
piled together, to be carried on her back for the homeward journey. The load is cumbersome and heavy; only girls in their late teens and mature women can cope with it.

462 All cooking is done by the women. Most meals consist of cereal dishes of
252 various sorts, so that grinding, using heavy millstones, is a perpetual activity to satisfy the demands for large quantities of flour. Millstones are
412 bought in the villages. In most small camps there only one or two sets,
so they are passed round from one woman to another. The stones are very heavy but when they are carried from tent to tent men offer no assistance.

Each tent also requires large quantities of water for human consumption.
462 If the camp is located near a well, water is drawn in small quantities, fre-
312 quently. Young girls and boys take a donkey to the well, fill a couple of
[492] jerry cans with water, wait for an older sister to load them on the donkey
and then drive the beast back to camp. After a fall of rain, while puddles of water remain on the ground, mature women make haste to gather the

462 them or any innate aptitude for them; this insistence is an index of the
424 jealousy with which she is prepared to guard her rights. Each right derived
from this or that small task is an extension of her control over the male.

462 The force and significance of this control is, perhaps, best seen in a
woman's right to cook. At marriage a woman must have at least the minimum
424 of cooking utensils, and one of the rights a man acquires in a woman is
• 252 that she cooks for him. This is something a man cannot do for himself.
Therefore, when a man ill-treats his wife or threatens her with divorce, she
[593] can retaliate by refusing to cook, or leave the tent altogether to return to her
father. A man bereft of this service is in a very sorry plight indeed. The
legal dominance of the male, seemingly autocratic, is reduced at every
point by the control a woman exercises through her exclusive right to perform tasks. The limits to the area of her coercive powers are significant.
They are confined almost wholly to domestic relationships. Legally, women
562 suffer such disabilities that they are almost of the status of minors; in
reality, their day-to-day living is far from intolerable because they are able
to control males over a wide field of relationships.

462 Men, excluded in the main from domestic duties around the tent, per-
424 form tasks to which their legal rights are tied. While women have access
to wells for water used by human beings, the transport of larger quantities
231 of water over longer distances, requiring the use of camels, is a task which
falls to the men. Watering of animals is done by men. Only they can
slaughter the animals for food. The meat of an animal slaughtered by a
woman is not "free," in a ritual sense, for human consumption. In an
extremity only, a woman can, in effect, kill an animal, but the knife which
cuts its throat must be held in a male hand, even if it is the hand of a very
462 small boy. The exploitation of the land is also the male prerogative. They
[424] plough and sow the grain; incidental help may be provided by wives working
[241] alongside their husbands during the early part of reaping, but the main
reaping is done entirely by men. Transportation of grain to the mounds is
also carried out by men, and it is they only who have access to the grain
stores when quantities are withdrawn for family use. Sheep-shearing is
[236] carried out entirely by males,[10] the fleeces are stacked by them and the
distribution and sales of these is directed by the male head of the tent.

[432] Additional to these major tasks which males undertake are a number of
minor ones. Men sew strips of cotton together to make clothes for both
sexes. They also make rope of grass, albeit in a desultory sort of way, by
twisting together the strands between the palms of the hands. A number of
[334] other tasks fall to the men by virtue of the fact that the sexes are separated
[342] in the tent by a divider of blanket material, which may be taken down
when only members of the elementary family are about, but which is put

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[461] [10] This work is reserved for the younger men and takes the form of a festival during
[533] which lewd songs are sung and poems with obscene themes or references are recited
[538] loudly and within the hearing of elders, in a manner not dissimilar to the behaviour
of bachelors at a wedding.
[831]

747 the basis of conflict. Bedouins may be unwilling to contract
177 such a potentially significant relationship for the 50 piasters
474 426 it takes to join the cooperative society. In yet another area,
571 program administrators concerned with nutritional improvement
747 have ignored the culturally important areas of food preferences
177 and, more seriously, food prohibitions. The Bedouins, who
•262 subsist mainly on their own animal products, barley bread, and
a few fresh vegetables, are extremely hesitant to accept what
they consider ritually "unclean meat from foreigners," powdered
milk, dried fish, and Kraft cheese. They are willing to
747 accept grain, flour, and the cottonseed cakes which are used
177 as fodder. In other words, the Bedouins seem to be presented
[178] with poor alternatives which may tend to reinforce choices
[433] related to the traditional productive organization, i.e.,
pastoralism. The exogenous stimuli to change are so culturally
objectionable that they actually generate conflict situations
and misunderstanding between agents and recipients of change.

747 Government programs have aimed at one aspect of
177 Bedouin society, the economic structure. They have ignored
433 the cultural underpinning of social organization, the system
of meanings in terms of which social action takes place
(Geertz 1957:32-54). The relationship between social and
economic behavior is, of course, an extremely important one.
But the economic structure cannot be transformed independently
of a specific cultural structure.

312 (literally, sky-wells, to indicate that they are dug to receive and
[172] preserve rain water). Most of these are ancient Roman pools which were
claimed either by the government or by individuals, and are put into
[653] use again to store rain water. Recently, the government has erected a
number of dams to preserve the rain water in exceptionally good years
from flowing into the sea. All this, however, is not enough to provide
the tribal population in the area with a permanent supply of water because
of the limited capacity of the cisterns and the pools and the
scarcity of rain and its erratic nature. Recent attempts have been
made to tap the underground water in some parts of the area. A large
number of wells were sunk, especially along the coast.

433 The economy of Awlad Ali is based on livestock husbandry, supplemented
221 by occasional cultivation of barley. Owing largely to the variation
in the amount of rainfall, the sources of food in the area have the
important characteristic that the place and amount of their occurrence
vary from one year to the next. Throughout most of the area, the tribal
populations are concerned predominantly with warding off shortages in
the food supply by moving with their flocks to areas where grazing lands
are available.

233 Awlad Ali keep a variety of domestic animals, the most important
of which, from the economic point of view, are sheep and goats. The
[433] economy of Awlad Ali is based on the utilization of the products of
[237] these two animals. These products are milk, meat, wool, and hides.
[262] Milk and its products constitute the basic element of the people's
[272] diet. Milk is never consumed fresh. It is always made into sour milk
272
252 (maleh), kishk (dried milk), or butter.

236 Wool is also very important to the economy of Awlad Ali. Lamb's
286 wool is either sold or spun and woven into rugs. Goat's wool is spun
and woven to provide the cover for the tents.

231 Sheep and goats are rarely slaughtered for meat except on special
[262] occasions. Most male and many female lambs and kids are sold in the
[432] market and the money is used to buy the necessary supply of food (like
[438] tea, sugar, salt, etc.), clothes, and other household items. Most of
438 these items are obtained from the shops in the settled communities in
439
443 the area, although some of the major items can be obtained only from
large urban centers like Alexandria.

231 The other domesticated animals that Awlad Ali keep are the donkey
492 for transport and riding, a few camels for heavy transport and also for
[234] wool, very few horses for riding on special occasions (they are con-
[554] sidered as a status symbol for those who own them), and the dog to
guard the camp and to protect the herds from wolves and other predators.
235 Poultry are usually kept for meat and eggs which are sometimes sold by
432 the women in the nearby markets.

233 The main occupation in the area is stock raising. Grazing lands
137 extend generally south of the cultivated land in the northern strip.
[132] The growth of pasture plants is affected by the amount of rainfall in
a particular year. Low rainfall causes acute shortages of pasture and
herbage, and leads to the death of animals by both starvation and thirst.
Pasture plants comprise a wide variety of bushes, scrub, and many other
species of grasses, most of which have a very short life span. These
plants normally persist from December to May; then the land is turned
into arid, hard desert with only a few dispersed patches of dry grass.

Those of the *barqa* plain may never camp on the plateau but 221
they move freely between grazing grounds, permanent water 233
supplies, and ploughland.

Of the plateau tribes, the Darsa, the 'Arafa, most of the Hasa, 221
and a number of 'Abaidat and 'Awaqir sections remain there 233
throughout the year. The Bedouin met with wandering about 619
in the southern grazing grounds after the rains are the 'Abaidat Ghaith, 'Awakla, and Shahin, some of the Hasa Shabarqa and Bakhayit, the whole of the small *'Ailat* Fayid tribe, large numbers of Bara'asa Husain, Tamiya, and Masa'id, 'Abid Mansur and Jabar, 'Awaqir Sdaidi and Brahim, and numerous small client groups more or less affiliated to these tribal sections. The nomadic sections are generally richer than the others in sheep and camels, and are also more vigorous, independent, and warlike. Politically, they are the leading sections of the tribes to which they belong. The foremost Shaikhs of the 'Abaidat, Hasa, Bara'asa, 'Abid, 'Awaqir, and Magharba are all to be found during the rains farther away in the steppe than most of their fellow-tribesmen.

The move southwards starts in December after the barley 221
has been sown, or part of a group may take the animals south 233
while the rest finish the ploughing. Most of these semi-nomads [243]
return to the plateau in May, when water becomes scarce, but some, including some of the most powerful elements, remain to the south of it permanently. There are many advantages in this annual move to the south. Rain falls and the grasses spring up in advance of the plateau, and grazing is more abundant and of a better quality. On the other hand, the grasses of the plateau and its southern slopes are still green when the desert grasses, except in specially favoured depressions, are withered. By their annual oscillation the Bedouin thus give their animals the best grazing at all seasons of the year. Sheep mostly lamb round about November, which is the month in which new grasses spring up in the *barr*, so that the move southwards gives the sheep the richest grazing at a time when they need it most; and the warmer conditions prevailing
in the south suit the lambs. At the same time, the Bedouin in [262]
southern grazing grounds are compelled to live very largely on
milk food, and the combination of rich pastures with the dropping of their young by sheep, goats, and camels, enables them to live on the country to a great extent.

useful mostly for transport and ploughing, though they give a 231
good milk yield and a fair harvest of wool. There are horses, of Berber rather than of Arab type, in every big camp. They are kept for the saddle alone, being much used in old days for hawking, and are a sign of wealth and social position.

The census figures for domesticated animals are probably highly inaccurate. The flocks and herds were certainly much [648]*
greater, especially for camels and horses, before the Italians ravaged the country. The Turkish figures for 1910 were 713,000 sheep, 546,300 goats, 83,300 camels, 23,600 cattle, and 27,000 horses, and it has been reckoned that by 1933 these had been reduced to 98,000 sheep, 25,000 goats, 2,600 camels, 8,700 cattle, and 1,000 horses.[1] Before the outbreak of the [648]*
second Italo-Sanusi war in 1923 the normal export to the [439]
markets of Egypt was 80,000 sheep and goats a year, and it was reckoned that a settled Cyrenaica could produce annually for export at least 100,000 to 150,000 sheep and goats and 6,000 camels. The country used to satisfy a considerable portion of Egypt's meat requirements. It also exported clarified butter 234
in big quantities, 91,835 kilograms being the figure for 1922 and 439
75,462 the figure for 1923.[2]

Although the Bedouin are by practice and inclination 243
shepherds first and cultivators afterwards, all plough. Barley [262]
and some wheat are a staple food. Indeed, in most years they cultivate a surplus of barley which they trade, and it may be said that for the most part they are self-supporting as far as their flour requirements go. On the southern slopes of the plateau and in the *barqa* plain ploughing begins from the middle of October to the middle of November, according to the rains. The coastal belt is sown a little later and the plateau in December and January when the grasses begin to sprout. By mid-April the first harvest, that of the *barqa* and the southern slopes of the plateau, is being reaped, and on the plateau reaping goes on from May to the end of August. Everywhere barley is sown
greatly in excess of wheat, for wheaten bread is not considered [231]
a necessity and barley is required for horses as well as for men.

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[1] Jean Despois, *La Colonisation Italienne en Libya: Problèmes et Méthodes*, 1935, p. 44; Hans w: son Ahlmann, *La Libia Settentrionale*, 1930, p. 78. (First published in 1928.) [113]

[2] *L'Oltremare*, Mar. 1930; *Rivista delle Colonie Italiane*, 1934, p. 885; Francesco Coro, *Settantasei Anni di Dominazione Turca in Libia*, 1937, p. 82. [113]

Cases

621 Genealogically he was their father's brother, but he was of their same age
592 generation, and behaved as if he was their agnatic equal. Towards his own
578 brother (16), he behaved as if the latter was his uncle, for he was much his
[604] junior in age and his uncle had virtually brought him up from boyhood.
They had quarrelled bitterly because his brother (16) had given him only
[428] a fraction of his inheritance, which he himself, in turn, should have
[593] shared with his young full brother (not shown on the diagram) but he did
not do so. This youngest brother left (15) for this reason and now resides
621 with (16), his full brother's enemy. Two of the men (14 and 13) of this
592 group of four were the chief herdsmen of the camp, although they were
[233] assisted for short periods by (12) and (15), who also helped tend the
camels in other ways. Their connection with the group centered on Tent
[571] A was a mutual close link to a politically powerful person (not shown on the
genealogies) to whom they are deeply loyal and who, while I was among
them, was actively opposed to the common political enemy of them all (16),
and who in earlier years had challenged the leadership of (2) of Tent A.
There is also the fact that they were all linked within a close range of
[613] agnation. This linkage included, too, the owner of Tent F (17), not in
[602] fact the descendant of the man shown in the diagram — he was the son of
a slave wife; his genitor was a slave, but his mother's master reared him,
freed him and he is now given as his son in the genealogy. He lives with his
wife, of client origin, together with her children from a previous husband,
(18), who divorced her, and his own children. Aging, he no longer acted
as a regular herdsmen, but relieved other men in the camp, and also spent
some time shepherding.

621 The details given of the strands which run through the camp to tie these
particular people together are so few that, like the Bedouin plough, they do
571 no more than scratch the surface, but they are sufficient to permit a few
general statements. The camp, and particularly the precise disposition of
621 its tents, shows a group of males clustered together to share two of the main
571 economic tasks: shepherding and herding. The physically strong adult males
233 of Tents D and E shoulder the burden of herding all the camels of the camp,
462 and the men of Tents B, A and C shepherd all the sheep, with (17) of
Tent F serving both purposes. This number of men allows some to remain
in the camp at all times, to free one of them for a journey to the distant
market when supplies of sugar and tea are necessary, and to enable one or
two men, at short notice, to hurry away on horse or camel to search for
lost animals.[14]

621 Economic Determinants of the General Structure of the Camp

574 It is also clear from these details that, given the disparities in wealth
231 (although all men have some wealth), the diet of most is considerably
•262

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431 [14] There is little point in seeking the lost animals themselves in the first instance.
[556] A man travels from camp to camp asking for information, and when he has gathered
his clues, he searches a neighbourhood.

ameliorated in its protein content, particularly by the generosity of the oc- 621
cupants of the nucleating Tent A. Not that they are the only ones who ever 574
slaughter their animals for food. Others do so, albeit much less frequently. 231
Whoever kills an animal, everyone present in the camp is given a share, and 262
the men always eat in the tent of the donor, sitting around one bowl. Thus, 431
the surplus that builds up at one point is redistributed among those suffering [556]
a shortage, and meat, in a society where the climate and way of life militate against its storage for more than a few days, is more efficiently used. Many other general economic points could be deduced. These general statements could, however, be made of practically any camp, whatever the specific differences.

Affinity and Matrilaterality in the Structure of the Camp

Economic considerations determine the general structure of these small 621
camps, but do not account for the particular people gathered in them. Per- 613
haps one of the most striking features of these camps, which comes out 602
clearly in the one discussed here, is the confined agnatic span which links the males. Lest it be underestimated, I wish to stress the profound significance of this fact. While granting its importance it is equally necessary to stress that the span, potentially, could be considerably reduced; in some camps it is. Many of the closer agnates of the men of this camp are not shown on the genealogy included with the diagram; (7), (15) and (16), for example, all have brothers, (12) has a large number of first paternal cousins and so on. Therefore, this particular cluster of agnates formed for reasons other than agnatic ties. The most direct single thread connecting Tents A, B and C is that which runs through women. Men of many other camps are all linked in this way, directly. Five tents of this camp are connected through a female link to a common ancestress, whose name still defines the group, two ascending generations for one adult male, three from others and four from others. If greater elaboration could have been shown on the genealogy without confusion, additional links through women could have been demonstrated. Affinity and matrilaterality are the prime movers in bringing agnates together as neighbours.

Other Factors Affecting the Structure of the Camp

Other considerations narrow the area in choice of residence. The quest 621
for power where every man entertains hope of achievement where ambitions 571
are not stifled by the rigour of rank and a small amount of wealth provides 554
a basis for a beginning is also a significant factor in considering the composition of camps. The generosity of the people in Tent A was not entirely altruistic. Justly, it had won them repute, but the repute itself was an important aspect of the political power they enjoyed. They also acquired the services of several men to manage their animals, an impossible strain for them alone. And with their shepherds and herdsmen they secured devoted followers. It was hinted in discussing the structure of the camp that changes

TABLE 3

FODDER DISTRIBUTED IN MATRUH SECTOR, 1963

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	No. of Sheep	Kg. of Barley	Kg. of Cottonseed Cakes
al-Qasr	9,958	85,392	56,928
Total Distribution	144,804	1,303,236	868,824

the cooperative societies.

243 Barley is the important staple in al-Qasr: it is used for bread and fodder. About one-half of the Bedouins plant barley on a small scale. The wealthy individuals who own large flocks of sheep plant up to 100 acres of barley. Barley is planted in October and harvested at the end of April. Two methods of cultivation are used: plowing and seeding takes place either before the rains, i.e., the _'afiir_ system, or, after the rains, i.e., the _haraati_ system. After harvesting, [251] the grain is threshed and stored in two-meter deep pits (_matmuura_). Grain stored in this fashion can be preserved for three years.

244 The main vegetables raised in al-Qasr are onions, radishes, peppers, and mint. Mint is the only dependable [263] cash crop of those mentioned. It is used by the Bedouins [272] in tea, and tea drinking is a ceremony which takes place at all times of the day in the desert.

695 below will show how a "bad oath" can work directly on the
784 false witness.

784 Divine sanctions enter into other aspects of the
626 Bedouin judicial process and function to maintain social
626 control in al-Qasr. If we can speak of a standard, or
681 minimal sanction, in Bedouin law it would be the dhabiiha
and 10 L.E. In any case, however small the offence might
be, the litigant found to be in the wrong will have this
judgment made against him. But in almost every case "the
[788] party who takes his rights" will refuse the dhabiiha and
[272] 10 L.E. and insist instead upon a ritual three cups of tea.
An individual refuses the dhabiiha as an act of brotherhood
and thanksgiving that the quarrel has been settled. The
Bedouins point out the practical factor that very few men
in al-Qasr can afford to part with even one lamb. On the
626 other hand, in more serious cases, such as homicide, which
681 occur in the external sphere of political relations and
682 threaten to disintegrate the political community, the parties
264 involved will actually eat a whole meal together. In this
case, the dhabiiha is accepted, for the act of commensality
is deemed necessary for reconciliation.

626 But whether or not conflict is concluded by a simple
182 ritual or a large feast, the prevailing mood is one of
771 gratitude that the secular bonds of brotherhood and a preordained sacred order have been maintained. The Bedouin

621 613 628 682 ally recognized amount of blood money to compensate a homicide. The wrangling that goes on at the meeting is of a conventional kind, and it is known in advance that several distinguished guests present will supplicate for a reduction of the amount demanded by the victim's group, until the amount generally accepted as appropriate is reached. Such haggling makes it possible for the victim's surviving agnates to maintain the fiction that they yielded only under the strongest pressure from the desert ● [264] leaders and holy men. The main importance of the meeting is that the two hostile groups are brought together again for the first time, that the cleavage between them has been narrowed sufficiently to permit them to eat round one bowl, and that, by virtue of this commensal meal, the way is now open for the restoration of normal relationships. Subsequently there may be another killing, which, in the mind of the perpetrator, is connected with the earlier death of a kinsman, but it is not publicly recognized as one in a series of killings, or even as a vengeance killing; it is regarded as unique, and the method of dealing with it is on the basis of this fiction. Feud is not permitted between two collateral tertiary sections, for although the pattern of homicide may be similar to that of a feud, the two are never equated. There is good reason for this, since, whatever the similarity in pattern, the social relationships between the groups involved are radically different; each homicide involving tertiary sections is regarded as a unique event, and the relationships between times are friendly, whereas in feud relationships are permanently hostile and need not be otherwise for social, economic, or religious purposes.

Blood money when it brings peace brings it because payment is made only in part. It is never regarded as a payment for the life of a man, to be dissipated wantonly. ' The owner of the blood ' should marry a wife with it to beget children (one son to be named after the victim) or to buy camels to provide for a future marriage, or to buy a horse to be used to ride in bringing vengeance. Sufficient is paid to cover either of the first two alternatives; as far as my records go the third alternative is romanticism. At the peace meeting the offender's group does not promise to pay the total amount in one sum. An initial instalment is promised after the next lambing season or barley harvest. When the time comes it can be argued that the sheep dropped a disappointingly small number of lambs, or that the barley harvest did not fulfil expectations. If there is room for negotiation over the initial payment, the permitted manœuvring over subsequent payments is much greater. Promises made at the peace meeting relating to these subsequent payments do not specify the exact amount of each; the statement is no more definite than that the remainder should be paid over the following three to five years. Consequently when the second payment falls due, the offender's group can argue more cogently that their circumstances do not permit even a reduced payment, for the payment of the previous year was substantial and they have not yet recovered from this outlay. ' The owner of the blood ' is pressed to consider this, and to accept only a fraction of the wealth he had come to collect. The argument is cumulative, and can be used to excuse the rapidly decreasing payments of each successive year, until there comes a time when attempts to collect payments are discontinued. The arguments about the payments bear no relationship to the wealth possessed by a group. During the annual hagglings, and while members of the offender's group are declaring their straitened circumstances as an excuse for the small amount offered, the ' owner of the blood ' knows full well that two or three

Second, the fiction that nothing has happened, which characterises the 585
father's behavior, does not cease with the termination of the celebrations. 593
Each morning, soon after daybreak and before the camp is astir, the groom must leave his bride and repair to his father's tent to lie at his father's side "as he always had done in the past, as if he had not left him." This conventional ruse is followed, not just for the seven days of wedding festivities, but is continued after the groom has moved back into the camp proper, and pitched his tent alongside his father's, with the ropes of the two tents crossing.

In matters other than sleeping arrangements, this fiction that "nothing
has happened" is maintained. Marriage does not mean the immediate crea- [592]
tion of a wholly separate domestic unit. Save for the appearance of an ad-
ditional tent, the ordinary run of daytime activities is scarcely altered. To 593
mention perhaps the most important feature of the relationships between 264
father and son, the groom continues to eat with his father. As yet, the son 571
does not use his own bowl,[1] and may not, indeed, do so for several years. 182
The important symbolism of "eating together" or "eating out of the one bowl," the act of commensality creating a bond of fellowship about which Robertson Smith[2] wrote so eloquently can only be referred to here in one of its many aspects. Bedouin themselves stress that eating together is a strong bond, and the communal meal is always used for this purpose after the settlement of a dispute, or at the conclusion of a blood-money agreement,
and so on. It is significant also in the sense that those who partake of a [574]
meal accept the authority of the host; he becomes their protector, and a blow against one of them is struck at him also. Even if the guest is an enemy,[3] as long as he has eaten from another's bowl his life is safe.

The slaughter of an animal for another person creates a bond which has its 571
roots in the intimate connection between man and his animals. In a very 231
vivid way, the Bedouin view their animals as part of themselves, as part of 264
their *Risiq,* their general wealth, in which their sons are included. It is this 182
mystical association between a man and his animals which distinguishes a
meal consisting of the meat of an animal slaughtered from ones' own flock [574]
or herd from a meal consisting of meat bought from a butcher's shop — often [186]
given by the plateau peoples of Northern Cyrenaica to their guests, but which the camel-herding Bedouin of the south regard as despicable hospitality. A slaughtered animal is the food, *par excellence,* which establishes this bond

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[1] When Bedouin take their meals, they eat from large wooden bowls imported from [415]
south of the Sahara. It is a matter of custom that a man does not eat alone unless it is [439]
unavoidable, a custom of such strength, that, when, one day, only an elder, occupying
a tent the ropes of which were crossed with mine, was left in camp, he brought his [123]
bowl into my tent "so that I will be eating with a man."

[2] William Robertson Smith. *The Religion of the Semites.* 3rd ed. London: Macmillan, 1927. [113]

[3] A stranger entering a camp is under no obligation to give his identity. Few do so
until they have partaken of a meal. In the past, the Bedouin claim, the period of [574]
anonymity could last for 40 days, but nowadays, they say they limit it to two only. I [609]
have known strangers enter a camp, receive entertainment, and leave without offering any specific identity.

571
231 between man and man, although the various cereal dishes which constitute
•264 their regular meals are said to have a similar effect.
The son who continues to eat with his father "as he always had been
182 doing," also continues to accept his authority. Indeed he could do little else
593 at this stage, for he lacks the economic means to cut away. Neither at marriage
585 nor after is there any transfer of wealth from father to son. The new
182 tent recently pitched is no more than a dormitory to which the young couple
[425] retire at night. During the daytime the son is still to be seen in his father's
tent, and, in the male quarters, things appear to be much the same as before.
[556] In the female quarters, the only superficial change is the more frequent appearance
among the women of one who, before marriage, often sat among
them if she had been a close neighbour or a close cousin previously; or of
an additional helper if she had come from afar. On the surface things remain
"as they always have been," although in fact, a whole set of changes
have been initiated.

852 *Rites de passage* are few among the Bedouin. A man's progress in life is
881 ceremonially marked by only four events: his birth, circumcision, marriage
764 and burial. His development into manhood is not marked by clearly defined
stages. About the age of seven, the henna markings on the front of a boy's
858 shirt for protection from the evil eye are not renewed, the cowrie shell stitched
789 to the front of his cap as a kind of talisman against the evil eye is removed
and he is no longer permitted free access to the women's quarters. As he
857 grows older, he will be instructed in goat-herding, and later taught to follow
233 the sheep. In his late teens he will have to undertake the more arduous and
883 responsible task of herding the camels. Coincident with camel-herding, he
233 may be given a gun by his father. Shortly afterwards he must undertake the
[431] stringent test of manhood, a journey to a distant oasis for dates. These
[411] changes are not marked off by a *rite de passage*. The rites a man undergoes
[484] during the course of a lifetime are minimal, and in the sense that they are
[885] concerned with only the basic events in a man's life anywhere (save for
852 circumcision, which is a minor celebration anyway), they are irreducible.
88 Moreover, the rituals which exist do not comprehend the same multiplicity of
776 relationships as rituals which occur in many other African societies.[4] It is
[771] true that the ceremonies referred to in this chapter by no means include
all the Bedouin rituals. It is also true that the events mentioned vary in
[554] elaboration, and in the number of symbols present in them, but they are
not multiplied or reduced for different people.

In this context it is important to stress that we are here dealing with a
[613] lineage society where social differentiation is not built up into differences
[554] of rank, where the roles to which a man succeeds are almost wholly cap-
[602] tured by his kinship relationships with other men and which are sociologically
to be distinguished from the roles a man enters into by acquisition of office,

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[4] See, for example, the elaboration of rituals discussed in M. Gluckman (Ed.), *Essays on the Ritual of Social Relations*. Manchester: University of Manchester Press, 1962.

462

in position immediately anyone else appears at the entrance to the tent.[11] [834 [342] Women cook, but they do not serve the meal to males, nor are they responsible [264] for the distribution of meat among them. Parts of an animal are 264 carefully specified, and the various portions distributed at a meal carry 574 with them a great deal of significance. A host can honour, flatter, disappoint 571 or even insult his guest, depending on the precise distribution of meat he adopts. Designated portions should go to certain kinsmen if they are [602] present, but this still leaves a wide margin of choice, and a host can use this choice as part of the many means at his disposal for directing his relationships with other men. A political link can be forged or another snapped by the distribution of portions of meat at the commensal meal.

The Bedouin Ideal Type of Family as a Unit of Production

This account of the division of labour is far from inclusive of all the tasks 594 carried out. The details given are only barely sufficient to provide some 183 indication of the necessary composition of a family. Referring again to the [462] Bedouin sentiments about the matter, it is now possible to give it some numerical precision. The number of females should be a minimum of about three, including a mother, a teen-age daughter and a child of about eight years. Males should number about six: a father, relieved of most [857] chores to act as director; a son in his middle to late twenties, to plough; a [883] second son, in his early to middle twenties, to herd the camels; a third, in [462] his late teens to early twenties, to shepherd the sheep; a fourth, middle to [561] late teens, to look after the goats; and a younger son to fetch, carry and run errands about the camp. The family of the ordinary Bedouin, they say, [554] shows this sex and age distribution, although they recognise that a politically ambitious man with the wealth to match his aspirations would require more [556] of both sexes — particularly women, since the burden of entertainment increases rapidly with a man's climb to power and fame.

Clearly, the basis of Bedouin sentiment concerning family structure is its 121 approximation to an ideal production unit. Some families display the features 183 of this ideal, but even they enjoy the productive benefits of this composition for a very limited period only. The family, as described above, can only be an 594 ephemeral unit, since the age structure constantly changes, women are removed by marriage, men move away and death affects it at any point at any time. The Bedouin family is a fiction in the sense that it can be said to have a characteristic composition. The mistake they make is to conceive of it as a particular kinship structure related to production. The substance of what has been referred to as a fiction is that, if viewed as a productive unit, it bears close consistency with reality. Freed of the need to examine it in terms [621] of specifically limited kinship relationships, and no longer anchored to the inhabitants of a single tent, the distribution of people according to sex and

---

[11] This is the general rule. In practice, the use of the divider can indicate an intimacy or distance in relationships, most subtly.

TABLE 3

FODDER DISTRIBUTED IN MATRUH SECTOR, 1963

654
233

	No. of Sheep	Kg. of Barley	Kg. of Cottonseed Cakes
al-Qasr	9,958	85,392	56,928
Total Distribution	144,804	1,303,236	868,824

the cooperative societies.

243 Barley is the important staple in al-Qasr: it is used for bread and fodder. About one-half of the Bedouins plant barley on a small scale. The wealthy individuals who own large flocks of sheep plant up to 100 acres of barley. Barley is planted in October and harvested at the end of April. Two methods of cultivation are used: plowing and seeding takes place either before the rains, i.e., the 'afiir system, or, after the rains, i.e., the haraati system. After harvesting, the grain is threshed and stored in two-meter deep pits (matmuura). Grain stored in this fashion can be preserved for three years. [251]

244 The main vegetables raised in al-Qasr are onions, radishes, peppers, and mint. Mint is the only dependable cash crop of those mentioned. It is used by the Bedouins in tea, and tea drinking is a ceremony which takes place at all times of the day in the desert. [263] [272]

245 blossoms of the tree are stripped away by these winds before
177 the fruit can mature.

178 Traditional values affect the Bedouins' perception of
517 their new life. Men are fond of gathering for their ritual
•272 three cups of mint tea and recalling "the good old days." In
[829] those days, they say, men only had to ride, shoot, and drink
233 tea. In the past, there was a great deal of security in
178 owning animals which are not as dependent on the rains as
422 is agriculture. During a year of bad rains, a Bedouin could
233 always move his flock to Libya or to the Nile Valley: "When
731 we have a bad year, we take our animals to the grass of our
166 relatives. When they have a bad year, they come here." In
167 the drought year of 1960, 20,000 Egyptian Bedouins migrated
to Libya in search of pasturage. This caused an international
[648] conflict and King Idris of Libya, for a short time, closed the
border to Bedouins. The conflict was finally resolved, and
the Bedouins were given permission to use the pastures of
Cyrenaica. None of the Bedouins of al-Qasr were involved in
this movement.

233 The Bedouins who have settled in the 'izba sector of
al-Qasr also prefer to keep some sheep. The security which
they represent is worth the time and expense of maintaining
233 them and paying a shepherd to look after them. The Bedouins,
178 in the past, paid their shepherds one sheep for every ten
465 sheep that he tended. Payment was made twice a year. Today,

695 below will show how a "bad oath" can work directly on the
784 false witness.

784 Divine sanctions enter into other aspects of the
626 Bedouin judicial process and function to maintain social
626 control in al-Qasr. If we can speak of a standard, or
681 minimal sanction, in Bedouin law it would be the dhabiiha
and 10 L.E. In any case, however small the offence might
be, the litigant found to be in the wrong will have this
judgment made against him. But in almost every case "the
[788] party who takes his rights" will refuse the dhabiiha and
[272] 10 L.E. and insist instead upon a ritual three cups of tea.
An individual refuses the dhabiiha as an act of brotherhood
and thanksgiving that the quarrel has been settled. The
Bedouins point out the practical factor that very few men
in al-Qasr can afford to part with even one lamb. On the
626 other hand, in more serious cases, such as homicide, which
681 occur in the external sphere of political relations and
682
264 threaten to disintegrate the political community, the parties
involved will actually eat a whole meal together. In this
case, the dhabiiha is accepted, for the act of commensality
is deemed necessary for reconciliation.

626 But whether or not conflict is concluded by a simple
182 ritual or a large feast, the prevailing mood is one of
771 gratitude that the secular bonds of brotherhood and a pre-
ordained sacred order have been maintained. The Bedouin

312 (literally, sky-wells, to indicate that they are dug to receive and
[172] preserve rain water). Most of these are ancient Roman pools which were
claimed either by the government or by individuals, and are put into
[653] use again to store rain water. Recently, the government has erected a
number of dams to preserve the rain water in exceptionally good years
from flowing into the sea. All this, however, is not enough to provide
the tribal population in the area with a permanent supply of water because of the limited capacity of the cisterns and the pools and the
scarcity of rain and its erratic nature. Recent attempts have been
made to tap the underground water in some parts of the area. A large
number of wells were sunk, especially along the coast.

433 The economy of Awlad Ali is based on livestock husbandry, supple-
221 mented by occasional cultivation of barley. Owing largely to the variation in the amount of rainfall, the sources of food in the area have the
important characteristic that the place and amount of their occurrence
vary from one year to the next. Throughout most of the area, the tribal
populations are concerned predominantly with warding off shortages in
the food supply by moving with their flocks to areas where grazing lands
are available.

233 Awlad Ali keep a variety of domestic animals, the most important
of which, from the economic point of view, are sheep and goats. The
[433] economy of Awlad Ali is based on the utilization of the products of
[237] these two animals. These products are milk, meat, wool, and hides.
[262] Milk and its products constitute the basic element of the people's
[272] diet. Milk is never consumed fresh. It is always made into sour milk
272
252 (maleh), kishk (dried milk), or butter.

*795 into the Order ordinary members. This is done simply by the
[793] two persons concerned shaking hands and reciting the *fatiha*,
the opening verse of the Koran, together. These categories can hardly be regarded as grades and I can cite the authority of Sayyid Muhammad Idris to support the opinion that they have never meant more than that some persons were recognized as more learned than others and therefore better qualified to recite the longer and more advanced religious exercises.

II

*795 The Grand Sanusi's desire to create around him a society
793 living the life of primitive Islam and his missionary zeal gave an
impression, enhanced by the austerity of his Bedouin followers and the remoteness of the Sahara, of excessive puritanism and fanaticism; and some writers have compared the Sanusi movement to the Wahhabi movement on account of these supposed
114 traits. Duveyrier's account,[1] used very uncritically by other
*795 writers, is largely to be blamed for the exaggerated stories of
648 the secrecy, puritanism, fanaticism, power, and numbers of
the Order that were current at the end of the last century and in the first decade of the present century and which much prejudiced it in the eyes of European Powers with interests in North Africa. With Duveyrier it was an axiom that any foolhardy European who got himself killed in North and Central Africa had been assassinated by Sanusi agents and that any setback to French interests was due to their propaganda.

*795 It is true that the Grand Sanusi, like the founder of the
793 Wahhabi movement, aimed at restoring what he conceived to
be the original society of the Prophet. Neither was peculiar in
784 doing so, for every Muslim preacher must have the same aim.
114 The Grand Sanusi forbad the drinking of alcohol and the taking
[273] of snuff and at first, though not absolutely, smoking. But all
[276] Muslims are forbidden alcohol and many who are neither
Sanusi nor Wahhabi think that smoking is best avoided. It is
[272] untrue, as has been asserted, that the Sanusi are forbidden
coffee. The Bedouin of Libya do not drink coffee, only tea, in

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[1] H. Duveyrier, *La Confrérie Musulmane de Sidi Mohammed ben 'Alî es Senoûsî et son Domaine géographique en l'Année 1300 de l'Hégire = 1883 de notre ère*, 1884.

795*

praise of which many poems have been written by Brothers of 793
the Order. The Grand Sanusi forbad music, dancing, and singing 784
in the recitations of the Order, but in this he was at one with 114
all the official spokesmen of Islam. Most reformist movements [272]
in Islam tend towards asceticism. [533]
[536]

Far from being extreme ascetics, however, the Sanusi
Brothers eat and dress well, even using scent, and are amiable 795*
and merry companions. The Tunisian scholar and traveller 157
Muhammad 'Uthman al-Hashaishi, who travelled in 1896 via [785]
Malta, Tripoli, and Banghazi to Kufra to visit al-Sayyid al-Mahdi and met the leading Brothers of the time, remarks that 'they are fond of diversions, honest jesting. I have visited many of their zawiyas and I have made the acquaintance of many of their notables: I have seen only cheerful and smiling faces, welcoming me with benevolence and kindness. May God reward them!'[1]

The Grand Sanusi discouraged the trappings of poverty by 795*
his example, his exhortations, and his insistence on the Brothers 793
being self-supporting. Although the Heads of the Sanusiya 735
Order, like the Wahhabi leaders, encouraged settlement on the land, they can hardly have hoped to have greatly influenced the Bedouin to this end; but they insisted on the lodges of the Order supporting themselves by agriculture supplemented by stock-raising, and thereby took a stand against *ittikal*, the dependence for livelihood on alms and not on labour which some mendicant Orders have advocated.

The Order has always been, in fact, conventional as well as 795*
orthodox. In its early period it was essentially a missionary 797
Order with the limited aim of bringing by peaceful persuasion the Bedouin Arabs and the peoples of the Sahara and the Sudan to a fuller understanding of the beliefs and morals of Islam, while giving them at the same time the blessings of civilization: justice, peace, trade, and education. Its principles were, as Shaikh Muhammad 'Uthman says, simply 'to do good and avoid evil'.[2]

The accusation of fanaticism is not borne out by either the 795*
character of the Bedouin adherents of the Order or by its actions.

---

[1] Mohammed ben Otsmane el-Hachaichi, *Voyage au Pays des Senoussia à travers La Tripolitaine et les Pays Touareg*, 1912, p. 128 (1st ed., 1903). [113]

[2] Ibid., p. 86.

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593 [207] [177] During the present time when most of the Bedouins own a transistor radio, a son will not even listen to songs or poetry broadcast over the air if his father is within hearing distance. I once witnessed a well-meaning father try unsuccessfully to get his ten year old son to sit down and listen with him to the news on the radio. 593 561 This automatic deference paid to the father is extended to all male elders: the father-son relationship is the model for authority relations between generations. [276] But there are degrees in which the model is applied to behavior; for instance, a boy will not smoke in front of his older brother, his uncles and grandfather, but will feel no uneasiness about smoking in the company of an elder with whom he has no immediate authority relationship.

593 The filial piety which marks the father-son authority relationship is owed to the father until his death. As the son grows older, he may show a little less constraint but he still plays the role of the subordinate. For example, I never saw a son argue with his father over anything during my stay in the field, with one serious exception. One man who had broken off friendly relations with his brother objected to the presence of his brother's sons at the wedding of his own daughter. When he threatened to cause a public scene to embarrass his nephews before the other guests, his own sons defended the right of their cousins to be at their sister's wedding. They told their father that his quarrel

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423 boundary marker is usually a pile of stones, a tree, a wadi, or, a line recorded on paper by two parties and given to a third to hold in case of future differences of opinion.

342 361 [656] In the extreme southern pastoral zone, there were few permanent houses but with new government land registration laws the number is increasing. The settlement pattern in this area might be characterized as a scattered homestead type, "homesteads" being defined as tents or houses whose location is permanent. Tents are seldom, if ever, moved these days even [657] during a heavy rainy season. This is because barley production has increased, and, mainly because government aid programs supply fodder for the sheep. Bedouin shepherds in the pasture area change dwelling places, but only to move their tents from their winter protective hiding places out into the open for the springtime, or to move from their tent into the stone house for the cold, rainy winter. In either case, no real change in location is involved.

342 The tent is called bait al-'Arab ("house of the Arabs"). There are two types: the bait al-saif ("summer house"), and the bait al-rabi'a ("spring house"). The summer tent, made of "gunny" and flour sacks sewn together, is for protection from the sun. The spring tent is the real Bedouin tent. It is [286] [237] [435] woven from the wool of the sheep and camel hair, and is used during the winter. Most Bedouin now say that they cannot afford the 125 Egyptian pounds (1 pound = $2.80) which the bait al-rabi'a costs to make or buy.

236 Wool is also very important to the economy of Awlad Ali. Lamb's
286 wool is either sold or spun and woven into rugs. Goat's wool is spun
and woven to provide the cover for the tents.

231 Sheep and goats are rarely slaughtered for meat except on special
[262] occasions. Most male and many female lambs and kids are sold in the
[432] market and the money is used to buy the necessary supply of food (like
[438] tea, sugar, salt, etc.), clothes, and other household items. Most of
438 these items are obtained from the shops in the settled communities in
439
443 the area, although some of the major items can be obtained only from
large urban centers like Alexandria.

231 The other domesticated animals that Awlad Ali keep are the donkey
492 for transport and riding, a few camels for heavy transport and also for
[234] wool, very few horses for riding on special occasions (they are con-
[554] sidered as a status symbol for those who own them), and the dog to
guard the camp and to protect the herds from wolves and other predators.
235 Poultry are usually kept for meat and eggs which are sometimes sold by
432 the women in the nearby markets.

233 The main occupation in the area is stock raising. Grazing lands
137 extend generally south of the cultivated land in the northern strip.
[132] The growth of pasture plants is affected by the amount of rainfall in
a particular year. Low rainfall causes acute shortages of pasture and
herbage, and leads to the death of animals by both starvation and thirst.
Pasture plants comprise a wide variety of bushes, scrub, and many other
species of grasses, most of which have a very short life span. These
plants normally persist from December to May; then the land is turned
into arid, hard desert with only a few dispersed patches of dry grass.

829 is to constitute a viable economic unit; and if it is to expand, the number
594 of males must be increased disproportionately compared with females. Since
562 the structure of this "ideal family" (which in the sentiments of the Bedouin
858 is the only family) is based on the division of labour, some details of the
tasks and their allocation among members of a family are included to estimate
the importance of this notional "ideal family."

The Division of Labour, by Sex

462
•286 The tasks women perform are almost entirely associated with the tent.
They make the tent top, and the gaily coloured carpets which cover the sandy ground in the men's quarters. They also weave the material for making sacks, and nose bags for horses and camels. Throughout the year a piece of weaving is always on the loom waiting, and while any women of the tent may take a turn at weaving, the mother decides what is to be made,
462 its pattern and colours and in general directs operations. Women also pitch
342 the tent when the camp is moved; they do so unaided by the men. It is a
task which requires considerable strength and only grown girls and mature women can assist in this; younger girls scour the vicinity in search of stones to hold the sides of the tent on the ground after it has been erected.
[356] As soon as pitching is complete, the floor of the tent is brushed clean before
carpets are spread and the few articles of personal belongings placed in their proper position.

462 Next, brushwood must be fetched in large quantities for fires. Apart
313 from cooking needs and winter warmth, the fire of each tent is in constant
use for preparing the sickly sweet tea, almost the consistency of syrup, which is drunk several times a day regularly and which is made again for even the casual visitor. The task of fetching brushwood is performed daily, and each load takes a few hours of a woman's time to gather and bring back
[412] to the tent. Bushes are uprooted with the aid of a long-handled adze and
piled together, to be carried on her back for the homeward journey. The load is cumbersome and heavy; only girls in their late teens and mature women can cope with it.

462 All cooking is done by the women. Most meals consist of cereal dishes of
252 various sorts, so that grinding, using heavy millstones, is a perpetual activity to satisfy the demands for large quantities of flour. Millstones are
412 bought in the villages. In most small camps there only one or two sets,
so they are passed round from one woman to another. The stones are very heavy but when they are carried from tent to tent men offer no assistance.

462 Each tent also requires large quantities of water for human consumption.
If the camp is located near a well, water is drawn in small quantities, fre-
312 quently. Young girls and boys take a donkey to the well, fill a couple of
[492] jerry cans with water, wait for an older sister to load them on the donkey
and then drive the beast back to camp. After a fall of rain, while puddles of water remain on the ground, mature women make haste to gather the

3:Evans-Pritchard E-4, 5 (1942-1944) 1949 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9
(1837-1942) Sanusi



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THE SAYYID AHMAD AL-SHARIF (MACALUSO)

[facing P. 128]

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THE SAYYID MUHAMMAD IDRIS

[facing p. 144]

3:Evans-Pritchard E-4, 5 (1942-1944) 1949 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9
(1837-1942) Sanusi

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SIDI 'UMAR AL-MUKHTAR (GRAZIANI)

[facing p. 168]

PLATE XXVIII

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

ARAB OF THE RASHAIDA (HITEIM)

/facing p. 270/

PLATE XXIX

/Facing p. 280/



'Ilwani

"Wanis"

JUMEI'AT TYPES

[face p. 280

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9: Murray E. K-3,4 (ca. 1910-1935) 1935, MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9
Egypt

surface water in jerry cans, bringing them back to the tents, one at a time, 462
on their backs. Clothes are kept clean in the desert, and the women do the [312]
washing. [296]

The care of children from birth until they are a few years old is the responsibility 462
of the woman. Childbirth causes a minimum interruption in the 854
daily sequence of a mother's activities. The child is breastfed if the mother [844]
has milk; if not, a wet nurse is sought or goat milk is substituted. Other [853]
than the time given to feeding it, the infant does not take up much of the mother's time. It is placed in a hammock slung between the centre poles of the tent and rocked by the mother as she passes to and fro. If nursing in illness is required, the mother devotes herself to it; her other tasks must then be performed by another woman.

As children acquire mobility, and at a time when, perhaps, the mother 855
is pregnant again, they become so fractious one with the other that if help 462
was unavailable the nervous strain could seriously disrupt the normal routine of work. During the early years of marriage, when daughters are still too 855
young to look after their small brothers and sisters, the grandmother's help 462
in child-rearing is invaluable. Too old for the arduous tasks of the daily 603
routine, she may assist in teasing and spinning the raw wool, but it is in her role as nursemaid that she assumes importance. Children of both sexes are given the comfort of suckling at her breast, receiving attention and care for which the young mother could not possibly afford the time.

Caring for children takes up little of a man's time, and is mostly incidental. 462
The woman, on the other hand, devotes relatively little of her 233
time to the animals. She does the milking in spring — of camels, sheep and [234]
goats — but herding is not her responsibility, save for partly tending goats. [857]
Goats, when they are in the vicinity of the camp, are looked after by boys and girls of about eight to ten years of age. In springtime when they have dropped their young, or if some of them have to be retained in the camp at night for various reasons, the woman makes a brushwood enclosure at the side of the tent and sees the goats safely inside before nightfall.

A catalogue of the tasks for which women are responsible may not seem 462
very impressive; the number of tasks is not excessive, but the persistence of the routine bends the backs of most women. Paradoxically, any suggestion that men should take over female tasks would strike them as absurd. Assistance from one of the same sex is always a welcome relief, but the abrogation of a particular task by men would be interpreted by women as the loss of a right. For, in the division of labour, it is not merely that tasks are allocated between the sexes for expedient reasons, or in consideration of the labour involved or because tasks which can be performed in the vicinity of the camp are left to women; division of labour would not make sense on these grounds, however strong they may be in Bedouin sentiments. Each task which [424]
falls to the lot of woman constitutes a right exclusive to her. Fetching firewood is not only a chore; it is a woman's prerogative. The insistence that only a woman can undertake certain tasks has nothing to do with her liking

3:Evans-Pritchard E-4, 5 (1942-1944) 1949 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9
(1837-1942) Sanusi



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THE SAYYID AHMAD AL-SHARIF (MACALUSO)

[facing P. 128]

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THE SAYYID MUHAMMAD IDRIS

[facing p. 144]

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

SIDI 'UMAR AL-MUKHTAR (GRAZIANI)

[facing p. 168]

*613 778 182 682 The nazaala as a regulatory mechanism functions only between secondary segments. This indicates that blood-revenge as a negative sanction is operative only in the external system of political relations. Political relations at this level, where the feeling of corporateness is relatively lacking, are in delicate balance. Therefore, once conflict is successfully mediated and the injury redressed, it is best forgotten, for it is unlikely that either party feels their rights have been completely restored.

683 Sanctions against personal injury, besides killing, are dealt out in terms of fines, the fines being figured as proportions of the diiya. Every part of the body has a price on it: the Bedouins say, "Banu Adam kill-i-filuus" ("The sons of Adam are all money"). A proportion of the diiya is due for injury to any of the following parts of the body: the beard, hair on the head and the nape of the neck, and eyelashes; wounds to any part of the body; fractures and dislocations of bones; the tongue and the teeth; the testicles and the breasts; and the loss of mind. Bodily injuries are [463] evaluated by a considered expert, the nathaara ("the keen-eyed one"). ●[305] If the services of a nathaara become necessary in al-Qasr, the barber in Marsa Matruh (the same person who performs most of the Bedouins' circumcisions) fills the role. [178] But the Bedouins say, "Now that we are educated we are able to make our own evaluations."

312 cisterns spread throughout the Western Desert. Many of them
are still used by the Bedouins for watering their livestock.
The southernmost part of the catchment area provides grazing
for sheep. Northward near the coast, where the soil deposit
permits, barley is cultivated.

•311 The Bedouins divide al-Qasr into "the good life"
823 (ma'isha simha) on the coast, and "the bad life" (ma'isha
[103] wihsha) in the desert. Ma'isha simha consists of two zones:
the shatt or sahil (i.e. "the coast," "as far as one can still
see the sea"), and the area of shair wi mar'a ("the barley
and pasture area"). Ma'isha wihsha is the zone beyond the
plateau where nothing grows, the daf'a or sibta ("uncultivable
land which is sandy and stoney"). All of the Bedouins of
361 al-Qasr are settled permanently either on the coast or just
south in the barley and pasture area. Nomadic and semi-
nomadic activity disappeared generations ago in this part of
the desert.

823 When the Bedouins speak of al-Qasr, they are referring
103 to an area which is traditionally defined. When the Egyptians
131 speak of al-Qasr, they are referring to a "village" only
recently incorporated. The difference is a substantial one
and not merely a difference in dialect. The Bedouins use the
term mintaqit al-Qasr ("the area, or territory, of al-Qasr"):
the Egyptians say qaryit al-Qasr ("the village of al-Qasr").
000 As the Bedouins view it, the Western Desert is the watan

433 plant a small crop or graze their animals on the land of
177 relatives. In terms of economic specialty, the economy of
178 al-Qasr has for some time been a mixed one. Traditionally,
433 dependence was upon animal products with relatively few
177 vegetables being grown in the _'izba_ sector of the coast and
178 the barley sector to the south. Now, over one-half of the
241 registered land in al-Qasr is aboricultural land, and much
311 more land is given over to the growing of vegetables than in
the past. Correspondingly, the barley land has decreased.
The Bedouins still use barley primarily for fodder but much
of this comes from the government. With the shift to olive
arboriculture and government aid in the form of flour and
grain, naturally the barley crop has become less crucial.
But it remains indispensable for many Bedouins during this
transitional period. All Bedouins of al-Qasr are concerned
with securing a good livlihood. They express this idea in
the term _ma'isha simha_, and, as I have noted, they identify
it with the garden coastal sector of al-Qasr. The security
of a cash economy and participation in the national economy
have been realized by the Bedouins. I have no figures on the
433 amount of land registered prior to 1960, but, as of 1964,
241 al-Qasr consisted of 2,000 registered acres. Over one-half
311 of this land is in the garden area of al-Qasr, and is planted
434 with orchards. All of this land represents cash crops. Planted
in between the orchards are vegetable gardens. These gardens

These gardens
433 furnish staples for local consumption and more cash crops for
241 the Marsa Matruh market. Matruh is dependent upon these
●311 vegetable goods from al-Qasr, to the extent that the Governor
434 has forbidden the Bedouins to truck their goods to the higher
443 priced market in Alexandria.
[656]

654 The success of arboriculture in al-Qasr has been the
245 result of a well-organized reclamation program in this area
177 by the government. The relatively good supply of fresh water
433 and the proximity of a large market town has made al-Qasr an
atypical case in the government's attempt to transform the desert pastoral economy. Since 1960, the government's program has met with a great deal of success. Such results have, of course, induced the Bedouins of al-Qasr to accept change, and have further enhanced the future of the program. The figures below show, as of 1964, the plant distribution of orchards in the *'izba* of al-Qasr, and indicate the measure of success attained by the governmental reclamation program.

The environmental conditions of al-Qasr are particularly well-suited for the olive tree: the olive has been the basis of the economic transformation of al-Qasr. The Bedouins tend to play down the government's role in developing olive arboriculture in the al-Qasr area. But before 1960, only the very
[556] wealthy men could afford to deal in the olive market, since it
involves a great initial financial risk. Hence, prior to the entry of the government's program, there were 2,743 olive trees

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
SEA
N
OLIVES AND VEGETABLES
('AILIT SHRAIF)
('AILIT ABU QAR ASA)
('AILIT DAWLAT)
('AILIT SULWATIYYA)
('AILIT ZALLAT)
ROAD TO MARSA MATRUH
('AILIT ZAGHARAT)
('AILIT MA'FAS)
('AILIT LAZUMI)
PLATEAU
BARLEY
ROAD TO AL-SALLUM
(KAMAILAT TRIBE)
WADI
PASTURE
DESERT

FIGURE 3a. LINEAGE TERRITORIES OF AL-QASR.

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
WHITE SAND DUNES
UNCULTIVABLE STONEY HILL
N
SCALE = 1:4,000 (APPROX.)
○ = WELLS
□ = PERMANENT DWELLINGS

FIGURE 5
SAMPLE OF LAND TENURE IN IZBA SECTOR

233 The grazing season extends between November and April. As the dry season
221 advances, the flocks are moved northward to the cultivated lands so
as to be nearer to fodder and to the waterholes which stand usually
very close to the coastal zone. During the dry season, animals live
mainly on barley straw and very little dry grass. In exceptionally bad
years, the people are compelled to dispose of their animals or to sell
some of them in order to be able to maintain the rest. In such years
the shepherds find it necessary to cross the border to the permanent
pasture of Cyrenaica in northeastern Libya, or to move to the Delta
where they may purchase the right to graze in wheat fields after reaping
the crop.

243 Grain crops, mainly barley, are also grown in the area. Depending
on the rainfall, pockets of land characterized by deep alluvial soil
and underground water at various depths are cultivated with barley and
other grain crops. Barley cultivation is preferred by the people because
[246] it grows quickly and matures faster than wheat; also, it can be
cultivated in a range of soils and climates; it is mostly used as animal
feed. Barley straw is also used as fodder for animals. Because of
[132] the erratic nature of rainfall, barley production is hazardous in most
[233] of the region. For this reason, pastoralism remains the most important
[433] mode of subsistence, and cultivation becomes secondary. Cultivation
is done on the basis of shifting cultivation, which means that the
areas cultivated vary from one year to the next following the rainfall.

Land Tenure

423 Most of the cultivable lands, as well as the grazing lands, are
● 311 under tribal occupation. Awlad Ali have, by custom and usage, had for

423 many generations a recognized right by the Egyptian government to use
311 the land for grazing and cultivation, and the tribal concept is that
the land belongs to the tribe.

The concept is true with regard to wells and cisterns. But
legally speaking, land belongs to the state, and the tribal populations
in the area have only the right of usufruct. This does not mean that
the land is exploited jointly by all members of one tribe or tribal
segment, or that a man can cultivate or graze his flocks in any part
he chooses, for there is a certain correlation between the right of
usufruct and the distribution of the tribes in the area on the one hand,
and the inner tribal segmentation on the other. Although land is not
[556] an object of ownership in itself, and wealth is not spoken of in terms
of land, yet, the distinction between ownership and usufruct in the
423 area is sometimes very hard to draw. Each tribal segment has its name
311 associated with a specific area of land which it regards as its own
619 and whose boundaries it defends against other tribal segments. The
tribal segment whose name is associated with a certain locality not only
has the right to use the land, but this right is also vested in it to
the exclusion of other segments. Within such an area, each subsegment
has the right to a portion of the land to the exclusion of the other
subsegments. While individual members of the tribal segments know the
land belonging to their tribal segments, their right is not associated
with a specific patch within the total area. Individuals usually cultivate
different patches within that total area as the need may arise;
but one cannot cultivate a patch in an area belonging to another tribal
segment except under certain conditions. This does not mean that the
individual cannot claim the right to a specific patch, for not only

423 can he do this, but he can also sell that right. The right to sell the
311 share of the tribal land has recently become recognized in the Western
619 Desert, and the usufruct right is being treated in the same way as ownership.

423 While the boundaries of the cultivable land belonging to the tribe
311 are guarded, when it comes to grazing land, the boundaries are not so
619 much enforced. The tribes of the Western Desert of Egypt are quite tol-
233 erant in allowing members of other tribal segments to graze their flocks wherever grazing lands are available. Everyone from any tribe can graze his flocks in areas that offer better pasture. But in doing so, he does not have the right to use the wells and cisterns of the tribal segment.
[312] Water is scarce and valuable. Cisterns are owned by the tribal segments,
[432] and if an outsider wants to use the water, he has to buy it from the owner for the whole season for a sum ranging between $100-$180.

423 In 1958, with the extension of the Mariut irrigation project, a
656 Desert Land Possession Law was enacted and came into force in 1960. This law restates the right of the government to the ownership of the land, and therefore does not recognize the tribal possessions of the land, even when they have made certain improvements in it, such as planting trees or digging wells. However, it gave the right of the occupants of a certain area of land to request either the purchase of the land or its lease for a period not exceeding nine years, granted that such is made within one year of the passing of the law. Failing to do so within one year, the government will either remove the plants and buildings, or confiscate them without compensation.

586 women in the Western Desert, and that the women usually have no diffi-
562 culty in finding another husband.

586 While the right of "throwing herself" offers the wife some guar-
562 antee of her rights, her main guarantee is derived from the security
593 she gets from retaining membership in her father's family. After the
768 death of the father, the woman's claims extend to the households of her
brothers. She acquires in them the same rights she had in her father's
household, and the brothers take the responsibility of their father in
[428] protecting and defending their sister. The woman achieves this continu-
ation of support partially through forfeiting her rights of inheritance
to her brothers.

562 Awlad Ali recognize the right of the daughters to inherit in their
428 father's estate. They accept the system of inheritance specified in
[779] the Koraan which gives the woman half the share of her brother. In prac-
tice, this is usually side-stepped. Only sons inherit their father's
[238] property. The justification given for the non-inheritance of women is
[311] that the main items of inheritance in the Western Desert, livestock and
the right of land use, require certain protection and care which are be-
233 yond the culturally defined roles of women. Livestock require moving
562 from one grazing ground to another, almost always crossing tribal lands
428 belonging to various tribal segments, some of whom might be hostile.
It also requires the ability to protect the herds from predators and
from raids, especially in earlier times. Similarly, land requires prep-
aration and protection against trespassers, especially when the barley
is growing.

562 Women, however, are supposed to be compensated by their brothers
428
593 for their shares. But very few would actually ask their brothers for

683 was to be paid unconditionally and consequently would cost all
682 members of the amar; but all these attempts failed. At this point,
672 there was no doubt on the part of the attending crowd about Muftah's
695
613 responsibility for the death of Selouma. The question was, how much
had he to pay. The amount requested by Selouma's son was that for "intentional" killing on the basis that Muftah had willfully thrown the rock knowing that it might harm Selouma, especially considering his age.

683 After long and intensive negotiations with the interested
682 parties, a Mi'ad was set in which it was announced that Muftah had
672 to pay the amount of L.E. 200. In his reasoning, he stipulated
629 that the wound which had caused the death of Selouma, although it
was intentional on the part of Muftah, was inflicted by a stone which in itself is not a lethal weapon, and therefore the death was an unintentional one for which the bloodmoney is customarily estimated at L.E. 300. He also stated that in the excitement that
[845] followed the death of Selouma, Muftah's pregnant wife had lost the
child. The bloodmoney for the still-born infant was estimated at L.E. 100, which was deducted from the amount of bloodmoney that Muftah had to pay.

CASE #3: The Case of the Trespasser

311 This case occurred during the year of the fieldwork which was
423 the second dry year the area experienced. Rain had not fallen ex-
613
[132] cept in a very few places. One of these places was near the small
town of Sidi Barrani in which the land belonging to Yadem and his Bait was found. Yadem had sown his barley which at that time had grown to about five feet high. Surrounding the cultivated land

311 423 was a large area of grazing land which also belonged to the Bait
613 of Yadem. The area attracted a large number of tribesmen who
233 brought their herds for grazing. One of these was Kuraiem from
311 619 Awlad Kharouf tribal segment. He brought his wife and child and
613 a herd of more than two hundred sheep and goats. Although it is
not proper for one to cultivate the land belonging to another
tribal segment, yet, when it comes to grazing land, no such restriction is imposed. Only the permission of the aqila of that
tribal segment is required, and even that is granted so automatically that many tribesmen do not bother to ask for such permission. Kuraiem took this permission for granted and pitched his
233 tent in the grazing land of Yadem and his Bait. Yadem, however,
311 was disturbed because he thought that Kuraiem grazed his flocks in
578 an area very close to his cultivated barley, so close that he feared
that the animals might eat the growing barley. When Yadem asked
Kuraiem to move a little further and Kuraiem refused, they entered
into an argument during which Yadem told him that if he did not
move by the following day, he would break his neck. The following
morning Yadem went with his brother to see if Kuraiem was still
there. Both Yadem and his brother were armed with heavy sticks.
As they reached Kuraiem's tent, they hit him with the sticks on
[682] the head. Kuraiem fell on the ground, and they kept hitting him
until he was dead.

682 In due course, Kuraiem's family claimed L.E. 400 bloodmoney
672 for the intentional killing of Kuraiem. Yadem and his family rejected the claim and insisted that the killing was unintentional. The
[627] Mi'ad was held, and the two Mardis selected by the two parties

sadaqa, freewill gifts, though if a lodge did not send them its 795*
Shaikh was reminded of his obligations. The lodges dealt with 794
certain trading houses at Banghazi, giving them import orders [431]
against future sales of local produce. [439]

This practice worked well enough during the lifetime of the founder and his sons but, as so often happens in Islamic Orders, later descendants began to demand individual shares in the
wealth of the Order. While Sayyid Ahmad al-Sharif was its 795*
third Head it began to be the custom, a few years before the 794
Italian invasion, to earmark the surplus revenues of particular 602
lodges for particular members of the Sanusi family, and these [434]
members became regarded as patrons of the lodges which supplied them and responsible for their supervision. The territories in which the Order was dominant began to fall into spheres of influence controlled by individual members of the family, the allocation of spheres tending to be determined by the maternal kinship of various members with *Ikhwan* families occupying lodges in them. Sayyid Muhammad 'Abid and his brother Sayyid 'Ali al-Khattab had a lien on the *barqa al-baida* and Fazzan, where their maternal relatives the Ashhab family were influential Shaikhs of lodges; Sayyid Safi al-Din on the *barqa al-hamra*, where his maternal kinsmen the Mahajib family were predominant; Sayyid Muhammad Hilal on the Marmarica where his maternal kinsmen of the Sharifian Tursh lineage had considerable influence; and Sayyid Idris and his brother Sayyid al-Rida on the Cyrenaican plateau, where they had maternal ties with the important Bu Saif and Ghumari families. Sayyid Ahmad al-Sharif had a lien on Tripolitania, where lived his maternal kinsmen the powerful Fawatir tribe of Zlitin territory.

The endowments of the Order in Cyrenaica ran into thousands 795*
of hectares.[1] Several lodges had each more than 1,000 hectares 423
attached to them. The fourteen lodges whose lands were technically registered in 1919 by a mixed Italo-Sanusi commission possessed more than 50,000 hectares. The total lands of the Order may well have been more than 200,000 hectares,
or somewhere in the neighbourhood of 500,000 acres. Much of [311] ●
the land was of use only for grazing, but much was valuable agricultural country on the plateau. Wherever there were

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[1] An *Ettaro* is 10,000 sq. metres or 2·471 acres.

121 given to the feud, for this is one of the few societies in which it occurs.[1] What is
613 meant here by a state of feud is a set of relationships between two tribal groups which
578 are characterized by hostility whenever two or more of their members meet. These
571 hostilities are of a sort which cannot be terminated; feud is not a matter of a group
121 indulging in hostilities here at one moment and there the next, but a sequence of
619 hostilities which, as far as the contemporary Bedouin are concerned at least, know
578 no beginning and are insoluble. Feud and the other forms of relationships to be
[571] discussed presently are to be understood, in part, by reference to the ordered divisions
of the tribes. It is necessary at the outset, therefore, to give a brief statement about
the tribal organization; other details will be included as they become relevant.

619 There are nine noble tribes in Cyrenaica whose members are referred to as freemen.
621 These tribes see themselves as divided into three genealogical orders of sections:
primary, secondary, and tertiary. The tertiary tribal sections correspond to the camps
613 which cluster around the larger watering points during the drought season, May to
[132] November. Such camps consist of clusters of smaller camps in which the concentration
of agnatically related males is over 80 per cent. Within the latter kinship links
are known, so that these agnates are consanguinely related as well as politically
[162] united. The populations of most tertiary groups vary from about 200 to 700 or so,
but a group ceases to be viable if the number of male adults drops much below fifty.
Political division is absent from these tertiary groups, regardless of their precise
size, for, whatever may be the condition of developing local lineages, the acceptance
of a common name carries with it full political responsibility incumbent equally on
[423] all their members. Each of these tertiary sections, moreover, has its own watering
point, ploughland, and pastures; each has its own *watan* or homeland. This statement
is true of all tribal sections of whatever order of segmentation. In other words, the
tribes and their sections correspond to an ordered division of the territory.

619 Names of tribal sections are the same as those given in the genealogies. Both tribe
613 and lineage are identically ordered. Lineages develop, and split at the tertiary order
of segmentation,[2] and, *a fortiori*, the process is the same for the tertiary tribal sections.
Split, in other words, occurs where relationships are most intense.

621 The summer community which constitutes a tertiary section, breaks up once the
221 rains begin in November or December. At this time of the year water is readily
available in the numerous small cisterns, there is pasture in plenty, and the animals
are giving milk. These combined reasons lead the larger summer camp to divide
into smaller camps of some five to ten tents. The latter are separated one from the
other by short distances—a mile or so—but together form a cluster in that they are
621 territorially distinguishable from a neighbouring and similar group of camps. Tertiary
311 sections are discrete also in the sense that all the major necessities of daily living
are available within their several territories. Each controls its own natural resources,
and these resources are the same for all the camel-herding groups—in any given year
one may have more of a particular commodity than another, but the difference is in

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[171] [1] Evans-Pritchard, 1940. The feud might have been present among the Nuer. Exogamy and the other rules of marriage which obtain among them create a dispersion of ties, which superficially appears to militate against a condition of feud. But a dispersal of ties does not mean that they necessarily act as a pressure for peace. Moreover, the exogamous links may link limited numbers of groups only, leaving others with sufficient discreteness to pursue feuding relationships as they are described in this paper.

[2] See Peters, 1959.

degree and is ephemeral, so that the opportunity for the development of trade relations is absent.[1] 621 311 Save for straying animals, a section has no urgent need to seek relationships with others, as long as the rainfall is sufficient to permit the exploitation [619] of local resources.

The tertiary section is also regarded as the corporate group *par excellence*, in which 621 'the one word does for all'. Corporate identity is conceptualized as 'one bone' 613 or 'one body'. An offence against one of its members is held to be an offence against all; if one of its members is killed 'we all lose blood'. When one of its members commits homicide the responsibility falls on all equally. [682] Blood money, when received, is shared by all save for a special portion reserved for the 'owner of the [672] blood', the nearest agnate of the victim. In opposite circumstances, all adult males accept the responsibility of contributing an equal share to the blood money. Rules of membership, simple in their brevity, express graphically this corporate identity: 'You must strike with us and be struck with us; you must pay with us and receive with us.' The group also bears a name, and there is never any doubt about the affiliation of any tribesman. That group of men—known as the *'amarā dam*—who are agreed on the obligation to exact vengeance, to pay blood money when necessary, to engage in common defence, and to accept the possibility of death in vengeance, is a fixed and clear-cut group, not one whose membership has to be calculated by reference to degrees of kinship in regard to a specific situation, as appears to be the case among other peoples.

Homicide within the *'amarā dam* brings about an impasse in relationships. A blood- 621 money payment is out of the question since the acceptance of blood money by one 613 part of a tertiary section from another of its parts is tantamount to a statement of 682 split. Only in conditions where relationships within the lineage have developed to the 627 point of political severance is it anticipated that a blood-money payment may be demanded; but this problem is not the same as that at present under discussion. Bedouin say that blood money cannot pass within the *'amarā dam* for those making [829] the payment would be the persons receiving it. This is spurious reasoning, since the 'owner of the blood' is awarded more than any other members of the group as it is, and arrangements could obviously be made to pay him separately. Blood money is out of the question because it distinguishes relationships between people as belonging to two distinct political communities, and not because of any difficulty of distribution. In Bedouin thinking, an injury to 'the one body' is an injury to all its parts. Blood- [829] money payments by members of a corporation to one or more of its members is a contradiction in terms. In the same way vengeance is also excluded, for this merely doubles the original loss. A reprisal exacted in hot blood is always a possibility, but this is not referred to as *thār*, vengeance. Even if, at a later date, the closest kinsman of the victim should slay the offender, the act would not be referred to as *thār* and any connexion with earlier homicides would be denied.

Stultified in the field of political action, there is little else that can be done. Expul- 682 sion is a possible course of action—and expulsion has occurred. Records show, however, that exile is almost invariably voluntary.[2] Moreover, exile is terminated as

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[1] Many sections trade fleeces for dates with the folk of distant oases, but the sections do not trade among themselves.

[2] I recorded one case of a man who was expelled from his group and the tribes around were warned [438] that the rules of sanctuary were not to apply to him. He is said to have died from grief and hunger. The reason given for such drastic action is that he killed

105 162 livestock husbandry as their main occupation while the rest earn their living by such other means as agriculture, fishing, stone-cutting, trade, etc. But whatever his main job may be, a man is likely to possess a number of sheep which he usually entrusts to a professional herdsman if he cannot look after them himself. This means that all sectors of the population have an active interest in livestock. Livestock, or rather sheep, are the most important and most esteemed item of wealth, and pastoral values still rank very high in spite of the obvious attraction of other types of work. On the other hand, pure nomadism is not practised, except perhaps by some small groups of camel-herders living in the far south of the area. The tremendous majority of the herdsmen are sheep-herders, whose movements are much more restricted than the movements of the real nomads. They have permanent settlements to which they retire when the grazing season is over, and there they practise agriculture, which they consider a secondary and supplementary occupation.

Most of the inhabitants of the Western Desert belong to the Awlad Ali clans who originally came from Libya. Some less important and less numerous clans, the Morabiteen clans, also live there as 'clients' of the more powerful Awlad Ali. A certain degree of correspondence exists between clan segmentation and the distribution of lands, both pasture-land and the fertile arable areas of the northern strip being distributed among clans and lineages in a clearly defined manner. A man cannot make use of the grazing ground, much less of the cultivation ground, known to belong to a different clan or lineage except under certain conditions and only obtaining the owners' permission. This does not mean, however, that clans and lineages are localized. For in spite of the natural tendency of kinsmen to cluster together and to live near to each other, the members of the same clan-segment may be widely dispersed, and the inhabitants of any specific locality, especially near the coast, usually belong to different clans. Nevertheless, a certain clan may be more strongly represented in a particular locality than all the other clans.

105 312 The problem of water supply is, naturally, the most crucial problem with which the people have to cope. The absence of surface water, the shortness of the wet season, the low rainfall and the meagreness of the subterranean resources in most parts of the desert, especially inland, impose drastic limitations upon their activities. Apart from the few artesian wells found in the northern coastal zone, rain is the main source of water supply. It is, however, a very unreliable source because of its irregularity. Moreover, a considerable amount of rain-water is lost by seepage through the sand and by evaporation. The situation is further aggravated by the fact that not all the functioning wells yield potable water or even water suitable for the irrigation of fields. The water of a large number of these artesian wells is charged with a high percentage of dissolved salts. This water can only be used for domestic purposes. Certain experiments are now being carried out at Ras-el-Hikma and Fuka to see whether such saline water could be used for irrigating the pasture-lands.

105 243 •311 The two main complementary occupations, i.e. livestock husbandry and the cultivation of barley, are seriously affected by the water situation. The strip of arable land which extends along the sea coast varies in breadth from place to place and from year to year according to the rainfall. In good years it may stretch some 10 to 20 kilometres southwards, but in bad years the cultivation becomes rather patchy and is confined to a very narrow strip only a few kilometres wide. The people are never sure of their crops, and in really

bad years the returns may be so poor that grain and flour have to be sent from 105
the Delta to avert famine. The failure of the crop may also compel whole 243
clan-segments to migrate with their animals to the Delta. In this respect, 311
the semi-nomadic clans of the Western Desert represent a real burden on the national economy of Egypt.

Livestock husbandry, which is by far the most important and highly valued 105
occupation, is itself subject to the variability and the erratic nature of rainfall, 231
since it is the rain which determines the abundance of herbage and, consequently, the number of animals reared. Pasture land is found mainly to the south of the cultivated land. Sometimes, the fallow patches among the barley fields are also covered with grass and other pasture plants suitable for grazing. Pasture plants usually persist between December and May; during the summer, the land becomes arid hard desert with only few dispersed patches of dry grass. The grazing season *par excellence* is from November to April, during which period barley stands in the fields. After the first showers of November, barley is sown and the young men soon move with their flocks to the pastures, leaving the older people to look after the fields. As the dry season advances, the flocks are moved northwards to the cultivated lands so as to be nearer to fodder and to water-holes. Thus, the movements of the herders are rhythmic and regulated by the division of the year into two major seasons: the wet season and the dry season. The wet season is the period of plenty during which the animals are well fed; the dry season is the period of starvation for the flocks which must then rely on such fodder as barley straw and on the drying grass. Any movements of animals that may take place during that season are carried out on a very limited scale. In exceptionally bad years the people are compelled to dispose of their animals, or at least of a large part of the flocks, or they may send them away to their friends and relatives who may be living near vegetation. Sometimes, the herdsmen find themselves compelled to cross the frontiers to Cyrenaica for pasture.

We can see then from this brief account to what extent the water situation 105
is responsible for determining the modes of living in the desert and for channelling human activities and imposing certain limitations on these activities. Development projects and sedentarization schemes planned for the Western Desert and its inhabitants must, therefore, give a great deal of importance to the question of water and its availability. In fact, most of the contemplated projects envisage the possibility of better exploitation of the existing water supplies as well as the tapping of potential resources.

Rightly or wrongly, it is generally assumed in Egypt that nomadism and 178
semi-nomadism represent a phase of deterioration which is no longer compatible with the actualities of modern life and therefore should be abolished. 312
For, apart from the fact that it is responsible for the hardships and insecurity 657
suffered by the desert dwellers and the consequent ill effects on the national economy, especially in bad years, nomadism as practised in the Western Desert and under the prevailing circumstances is wasteful and destructive. Vast stretches of land which could be reclaimed at little cost and cultivated intensively are simply left for grazing without any serious endeavour to make better use of them. Under the contemplated sedentarization projects it is intended to increase the cultivated area, to improve the pastures by introducing new pasture plants of higher nutritive value in areas where agriculture is not

CHAPTER II

THE ECOLOGY AND ECONOMY OF THE AL-QASR AREA

Changing Patterns of Land Use

131 Al-Qasr is located in the Northwestern Coastal Zone,
a relatively fertile littoral region forming the northern
edge of the Egyptian Western Desert. Extending from Alexandria
to Sallum on the Libyan border, the Zone is some 500 kilometers
in length and reaches south into the desert some 20 to 50
134 kilometers. A deep soil deposit and a relatively high average
132 rainfall of about 15 centimeters (20 centimeters of rain would
241 be considered "high") permit limited agriculture in this
region.

133 Due to the drainage pattern of the coastal area there
is a fair supply of underground water. The rain percolates
[172] down through coastal sand dunes and is trapped in man-made
underground galleries dating from Roman times. Farther into
•312 the desert, cisterns, which also date from Roman times, catch
the rains draining off the Libyan plateau to the south. This
plateau and the catchment area form the southern boundary of
the greater al-Qasr settlement area (see Figure 4). The
General Desert Development Authority, an agency of the government, estimates that there are about 3,000 of these

312 cisterns spread throughout the Western Desert. Many of them
are still used by the Bedouins for watering their livestock.
The southernmost part of the catchment area provides grazing
for sheep. Northward near the coast, where the soil deposit
permits, barley is cultivated.

311 The Bedouins divide al-Qasr into "the good life"
823 (*ma'isha simha*) on the coast, and "the bad life" (*ma'isha*
[103] *wihsha*) in the desert. *Ma'isha simha* consists of two zones:
the *shatt* or *sahil* (i.e. "the coast," "as far as one can still
see the sea"), and the area of *sha'ir wi mar'a* ("the barley
and pasture area"). *Ma'isha wihsha* is the zone beyond the
plateau where nothing grows, the *daf'a* or *sibta* ("uncultivable
land which is sandy and stoney"). All of the Bedouins of
361
al-Qasr are settled permanently either on the coast or just
south in the barley and pasture area. Nomadic and semi-
nomadic activity disappeared generations ago in this part of
the desert.

823 When the Bedouins speak of al-Qasr, they are referring
103 to an area which is traditionally defined. When the Egyptians
131 speak of al-Qasr, they are referring to a "village" only
recently incorporated. The difference is a substantial one
and not merely a difference in dialect. The Bedouins use the
term *mintaqit al-Qasr* ("the area, or territory, of al-Qasr"):
the Egyptians say *qaryit al-Qasr* ("the village of al-Qasr").
000 As the Bedouins view it, the Western Desert is the *watan*

173 land along the coast: "This land was free, and the man who
[361] planted on it owned it. We call this (method of claiming land)
[425] wad'a-l-id ("laying on of the hand," i.e. seizure). There was
[423] plenty of freedom in those days. A man could farm or keep
animals." Planting and caring for the land is not novel to
the Bedouins of al-Qasr.

423 The Bedouins claim that the pattern of land distribution
425 established during the time of Abu Mahjuba prevails today.
656 Further, they say that these rules will never change, no matter
[178] what laws come out of Cairo: "Land registration can mean nothing
where the tribes are concerned, for no Bedouin would be willing
to take the land of another Bedouin. The government forces us
to register our land so that it can be stated in the newspaper that they are giving the Bedouins land."

*613 The relationship between ecology and lineage territory
423 is not striking, such as in the case of the Cyrenaican Bedouins
182 of Libya (Peters 1960). In most cases, lineage territories run
on a north-south line cross-cutting the coastal garden and
southern pastoral zones. Hence, lineage territories are, generally, ecologically similar rather than contrasted. However,
*613 there are exceptions. 'Ailit Shraif lineage (see Figure 3a
423 below), at the western end of al-Qasr's 'izba sector, settled
182 there "because of the abundance of underground water in this
241
•[312] area: the ground is rocky here and the water comes out fresh
[361] like the Nile." Their founder, Sayyid Shraif, "specialized"

*613 in farming, and he found this land "good for raising mint and
423 182 vegetables." To the southeast of the *'izba*, the lineages of
241 Lazumi and Ma'fas found the land suitable for barley and
•[312] grazing. This area is rain-fed. There are no wells and so
vegetable crops are not possible here. The members of these
lineages say that their ancestors were "real" Bedouins in
Cyrenaica, and did not wish to become farmers in Egypt. It
*613 is interesting to note that the Lazumi and Ma'fas are the
182 184 richest lineages in all of al-Qasr. They were, perhaps, better
241 able to maintain the traditional style of life which all of
the Bedouins claim is "the best." But all Bedouins of al-Qasr
depend to some degree upon horticulture or arboriculture.
[231] And most families own a few sheep or goats. Both Lazumi and
Ma'fas garden in their coastal sections, and Shraif members own
sheep.

656 Land registration has a history in the Western Desert.
423 The government attempted it a number of times, but with little
success until 1959 when the General Desert Development Organization
(GDDO) undertook its program of land reclamation. But the
361 Bedouins were settled long before this. In al-Qasr, the Bedouins
342 178 began to erect permanent stone dwellings on the land about the
time of the First World War. In the Matruh area, elder informants
agree that before 1914 the Bedouins lived in tents outside the
361 town area. When the British came, they began to move into town.
648 Many of the Bedouins built houses in Matruh between the years

654 1960, were olive tree owners. One individual, who owned 400
245 trees before the reclamation program, now owns 1,400 trees.
177 His increase has not all been at government expense, but a
large share of it has been. Of the 9,514 trees planted by
the government, 4,666 of them have been planted in the
barley and wadi area to the south; 4,848 in the garden area
on the coast. In the southern sector, a Bedouin who owns at
•[312] least ten acres of land may have the government drill a well
and erect a windmill pump on his property. For this, he pays
[452] 350 Egyptian pounds (approximately $1,000.00) over a thirty-year
period. The Bedouin is willing to undertake this contract,
and also to take land out of barley production,
because he sees the future security of the olive market.
Because of this, also, he is willing to agree on land boundaries
and to register his land with the government.

657 Economic transition would not be possible, nor could
the Bedouins afford to hazard it, were it not for government
welfare payments in the form of staple products. These rations
stabilize the mixed economy of the al-Qasr while promoting a
shift to a fuller dependence on agriculture. Of the thirteen
657
474 cooperative societies in the Matruh area, al-Qasr is the
largest and has been designated as a pilot project for the
whole Western Desert. Al-Qasr garners the largest share of
government aid, and, consequently, is heavily dependent upon
it. The table below shows the amount of aid given monthly to

244 all times of the day in the desert. The Bedouins had most
of these crops before the government came to al-Qasr. Since
[177] 1960, however, the Bedouins have been planting new crops such
as okra, squash, cucumber, tomato, spinach and melon. All of
244 these are plants adopted from the Nile Valley. Vegetables
312 are grown by means of irrigation or dry-farming. Where there
is no well water, an individual will cultivate without irrigation.
In this case, crops are planted in the spring after the
rains. This method is called ba'ali. Irrigation makes it
possible for a man to obtain four crops during the year, but
usually, the Bedouin is more concerned with security than
with profit. Therefore, most Bedouins try for one good crop
244 and allow a portion of the land to remain fallow. Land which
has been planted all year around needs at least one year's
rest before it can be replanted. The vegetable harvest
usually takes place in July or August.

241 The government has attempted to introduce other crops
177 into al-Qasr which have failed. Failure is related to two
312 main problems in al-Qasr: salination arising from the short
supply of fresh water, and the Bedouin's misunderstanding of
245 the techniques of successful irrigation farming. Figs have
177 not been successful in al-Qasr due to the nature of the soil
itself. The almond tree has succumbed to the climate of al-
[132] Qasr. This tree blooms in April during the khamsin season,
fifty days of hot, dry winds blowing in from the Sahara. The

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

FIGURE 5
SAMPLE OF LAND TENURE IN IZBA SECTOR

WHITE SAND DUNES
N
UNCULTIVABLE STONEY HILL
SCALE = 1:4,000 (APPROX.)
○ = WELLS
□ = PERMANENT DWELLINGS

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

FIGURE 6
SAMPLE OF LAND TENURE IN SHA'IR WI MAR'A SECTOR

SCALE = 1:4,000 (APPROX.)
○ = WELLS
□ = PERMANENT DWELLINGS
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156 of them) cater largely to the needs of the lineage in whose
159 554 territory they are located. They are operated mostly on a
443 credit basis. Lineage members, as debtors, feel gratitude
423 but also, and more importantly, loyalty toward their kinsman
472 *[613] and creditor. Hajj 'Ali is the only member of al-Qasr who
[452] owns two shops, and the only Bedouin in the whole Western Desert
who owns three shops. His brother owns a shop in Matruh.
156 Furthermore, the shop in Sallum is in a strategic position on
159 the Libyan border which, coincidentally or not, is a point
554 443 for importing, and also smuggling, foreign goods into Egypt.
439 The possession and utilization of foreign products is definitely
472 a status symbol all over Egypt. Hence, the person in this
area who can control, however slightly, the distribution of
such goods has a lever with which to exact prestige and
favors from the "status group" in al-Qasr who now welcome
these symbols (tobacco, pistols, rifles, radios) and the
bureaucrats of Marsa Matruh who crave them (food goods,
clothing materials, car parts).

156 Besides all this, Hajj 'Ali is involved in a small
159 stone-cutting operation which supplies stones for house
554 [316] building, he cooperates with his three brothers in a well-
[312] cleaning concern, and contracts government heavy equipment
[427] to build earth dams. The material evidence of his status
[342] is that he is the only man in al-Qasr with two compound-type
[595] houses (one he built thirteen years ago), and the only man
with four wives.

CHAPTER II

ECOLOGY AND HISTORY

619 Awlad Ali are a number of Arabic-speaking semi-nomadic tribes of
101 sheep and goat herders who inhabit the northern part of the Western
162 Desert of Egypt. The total population of Awlad Ali, according to the
1965 preliminary census, was about 100,000 inhabitants. This estimate
is, however, very tentative and fluctuates from one year to the
next, depending on the circumstances of the pasture in the area. The
131 area they occupy consists of the narrow strip of fertile land which extends
along the Mediterranean coast from near Alexandria in the east
some 350 miles westward to the UAR-Libyan border town of Sallum, and
132 varying in width from ten to thirty miles. Vegetation in the area depends
133 on rainfall, supplemented by a number of artesian wells. The
rainy season extends from November to March, but the rain is extremely
erratic in nature, varying from one year to another and from one place
to the next. Draught has been experienced every three to four years,
one of them being experienced at the time of the study. The water situation
312 is further aggravated by the low technological level of the people
[181] which prevents them from making the best use of the available rain water.
There have been some attempts made to store as much of the rain water
as possible, but these attempts are usually made by individuals and in
too crude and primitive a way to prevent most of the water from being
lost by seepage or by evaporation. The most commonly used method of
water preservation in the area is digging cisterns in the ground. But
most of these cisterns are too shallow to keep large amounts of water.
Some deeper wells are found in the area and are called "beer sama"

312 (literally, sky-wells, to indicate that they are dug to receive and
[172] preserve rain water). Most of these are ancient Roman pools which were
claimed either by the government or by individuals, and are put into
[653] use again to store rain water. Recently, the government has erected a
number of dams to preserve the rain water in exceptionally good years from flowing into the sea. All this, however, is not enough to provide the tribal population in the area with a permanent supply of water because of the limited capacity of the cisterns and the pools and the scarcity of rain and its erratic nature. Recent attempts have been made to tap the underground water in some parts of the area. A large number of wells were sunk, especially along the coast.

433 The economy of Awlad Ali is based on livestock husbandry, supple-
221 mented by occasional cultivation of barley. Owing largely to the variation in the amount of rainfall, the sources of food in the area have the important characteristic that the place and amount of their occurrence vary from one year to the next. Throughout most of the area, the tribal populations are concerned predominantly with warding off shortages in the food supply by moving with their flocks to areas where grazing lands are available.

233 Awlad Ali keep a variety of domestic animals, the most important
of which, from the economic point of view, are sheep and goats. The
[433] economy of Awlad Ali is based on the utilization of the products of
[237] these two animals. These products are milk, meat, wool, and hides.
[262] Milk and its products constitute the basic element of the people's
[272] diet. Milk is never consumed fresh. It is always made into sour milk
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252 (maleh), kishk (dried milk), or butter.

423 can he do this, but he can also sell that right. The right to sell the
311 share of the tribal land has recently become recognized in the Western
619 Desert, and the usufruct right is being treated in the same way as ownership.

423 While the boundaries of the cultivable land belonging to the tribe
311 are guarded, when it comes to grazing land, the boundaries are not so
619 much enforced. The tribes of the Western Desert of Egypt are quite tolerant
233 in allowing members of other tribal segments to graze their flocks wherever grazing lands are available. Everyone from any tribe can graze his flocks in areas that offer better pasture. But in doing so, he does not have the right to use the wells and cisterns of the tribal segment.
● [312] Water is scarce and valuable. Cisterns are owned by the tribal segments,
[432] and if an outsider wants to use the water, he has to buy it from the owner for the whole season for a sum ranging between $100-$180.

423 In 1958, with the extension of the Mariut irrigation project, a
656 Desert Land Possession Law was enacted and came into force in 1960. This law restates the right of the government to the ownership of the land, and therefore does not recognize the tribal possessions of the land, even when they have made certain improvements in it, such as planting trees or digging wells. However, it gave the right of the occupants of a certain area of land to request either the purchase of the land or its lease for a period not exceeding nine years, granted that such is made within one year of the passing of the law. Failing to do so within one year, the government will either remove the plants and buildings, or confiscate them without compensation.

423 656 The above law met with opposition from the tribal population in the area. As a result of this opposition, a new law was enacted in 1964 (Law #100). Although this later law eliminated some of the shortcomings of the previous one, it is not itself without disadvantages. The 1964 law recognizes the Bedouins' right of ownership only in areas where the fairly permanent trees were planted before 1958. Rain-fed areas cultivated from season to season are excluded. The new law also provides for the sale and transfer of land. Any person can purchase up to 50 feddans (acres) provided that he can develop it into an economic enterprise. The law also provides for the distribution of arable lands in such a way as to permit each head of household to own 10 feddans and to be provided with water possibilities. The price of this kind of land is to be paid over a period of 30 years. Settlers are encouraged and helped in planting trees and building dikes. So far, 8,600 feddans ir-
[312] rigated by windmills have been passessed by members of Awlad Ali tribes, and titles to their holdings are being issued.

233 423 656 With regard to grazing lands, no legislation has yet been issued, and the government feels that at this stage of development, it is essential to start educating and inducing the tribal population of the Western Desert in initiating and implementing new programs for preventing overgrazing and controlling the number of flocks.

The Group

619 The name Awlad Ali covers a number of ethnically distinct groups. In addition to Awlad Ali proper (the descendents of Ali), referred to as the Sa'adi, it includes a number of Murabiteen (holy men) tribes who are attached to various segments of Awlad Ali and occupy an inferior political position. The name also includes various peasant

682 and unjustifiable homicide. To examine responsibility in homicide
672 among Awlad Ali and their definition of "intentional" and "non-
673 intentional" killing, let us first present some of the cases collected
from the area.

682 CASE #1: The Case of the Broken Rope

672 This is one of the classical cases which is told throughout
●312 the entire area. There is some slight variation in the way it is
[184] told, but all accounts refer to the fact that Hemeida from the
[428] 'Esheibat tribe inherited the right to use a large area of tribal land in which there was an old Roman well not used for a long period of time and which was full of sand. One day he invited the awaqil of his tribal segment, as well as his neighbors, to consult them on how to clear the well, since without it the land was almost useless. They all decided it was a good idea and offered their help. On the day the well was to be cleared, they all gathered around the well. Among those present was Do'ah, a poor member of the 'Esheibat tribe who worked as a paid shepherd for Hemeida. He was watching from a distance when Hemeida called upon him to give a hand. The well, like all Roman wells in the area, is about fifty feet deep and fifteen feet in diameter, and narrows as one goes down the well. To be cleared, someone has to be lowered by a rope to the bottom of the well to dig up the sand. Hemeida's cousin, Ali, agreed to go down, and the gathering looked for a sturdy rope which they found at one of Hemeida's neighbors. As the group was tying Ali to the rope, Hemeida suggested that Ali was too heavy for the rope and that it would be a good idea if a slimmer man did the job. At this point, everybody looked at Do'ah, since he was the thinnest

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person in the crowd. So, Do'ah volunteered to be lowered down to clear the well. He then proceeded to the well, glanced at the bottom of it, and threw a small stone to see if there was any water left in it. The stone made a faint splash indicating that there were a few inches of water. After that, he examined the rope and the equipment used. Satisfied with everything, he tied the rope around himself and was lowered very slowly and carefully by the crowd at the top of the well. As Do'ah was more than half-way down, the rope broke, and he fell. When the crowd called him, Do'ah answered in a faint voice telling them that he was hurt but that he would be all right. The crowd then looked for a spare rope to lower somebody to get Do'ah but could not find any in a nearby camp. They sent a man to get a rope from the next camp, but by the time a man was lowered to get Do'ah, he was dead; he had drowned in six inches of water.

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[613]
Since the place of the accident was close to the police station, word got to the officer who, after investigating the case, ruled it as accidental death. But while the government authorities were investigating the case, members of the Bait to which Do'ah belonged were proceeding with the customary ways of Awlad Ali to claim bloodmoney for their dead kinsman. The idea was that a life had been lost, and that regardless of the police investigation, someone must pay for it. The question was who. Since the well belonged to Hemeida, Do'ah's relatives insisted that he was the one to pay the bloodmoney. Not denying the fact that someone had to pay for the death of Do'ah, Hemeida insisted that the one to pay was the

613 the tent and fearing that he might have been a member of the
628 feuding Bait intending to harm him or members of his family,
Galil took his gun and went outside to see who was there. He
called on the person to identify himself. When he got no answer,
he warned him that unless he identify himself, he (Galil) would
fire his gun in the air as a warning. After a short period of no
613 response, Galil fired his gun in the air. A moment later, Galil
628 heard a cry coming from the direction of a small hill at the side
682 of the tent. When Galil went there, he found Salem, a member of
a neighboring camp, lying on the ground with a bullet wound in his
stomach. He told Galil that his wife was sick and that he had
come to borrow Galil's donkey to take her to the doctor in the
nearby medical center. He had taken the short cut to Galil's tent
when he was hit by the bullet which Galil had fired in the air.
Galil took his wounded neighbor to the medical center, but Salem
died before they reached it.

682 The Mi'ad was held, and Galil and his family had to pay L.E. 400
672 to the victim's kin group. The amount was that specified for intentional
627 killing, since the wound that caused the death was inflicted
673 by a lethal weapon.

CASE #5: The Case of the Startled Shepherd

233 This case involves Idris, a poor member of the Sheresat tribal
[464] segment. He earned his living by working as a hired shepherd for
[619] 'Awwad from Bait Ibrahim in the area of Gharbaniat. During the dry
[312] season, each shepherd takes his flocks to the water wells near the
coast and leaves them there for three or four hours to get their
fill of drinking water. That afternoon, Idris, waiting for the

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slaves, kitchens, and wells. The oasis depression was studded 793
with date palms and just outside the main entrance to the village 159
were small irrigated gardens and wind-mills. The people had 175*
to use the brackish water for ordinary purposes, but sufficient [346]
fresh water for tea was obtained from infrequent showers by [241]
hollowing out cisterns in the rocks at the top of the western [379]
escarpment of the oasis. [312] •

The Grand Sanusi was not only a very learned man and a writer of distinction but also a bibliophile with a fine library of [217] some 8,000 volumes,[1] mostly works on Islamic law and jurisprudence, mysticism, philosophy, history, koranic exegesis, poetry, and astronomy and astrology. Round him were many men capable of making good use of this substantial library. Indeed, it would have been difficult to have found anywhere in the Islamic world at that time, outside Cairo, a circle of better scholars. Poetry was one of the arts most cultivated at the oasis and I have been told by Arabs that it reached a high level of excellence. Shaikh Muhammad 'Uthman, himself a poet, wrote that at Jaghbub one meets 'literary men of distinction, whose writings eclipse those of the poets of Iraq and of Andalousia'.[2]

The whole community at Jaghbub may have numbered round about 1,000, but it is not possible to make more than a guess at the figure. As the oasis produces little except dates, the supply problem must have been considerable, and we know that the Grand Sanusi kept herds of camels to the west of the oasis, where there is scrub grazing, and at al-'Azziyyat, to transport supplies from the coast. The community lived very largely on the surplus revenues, mostly goods in kind, sent annually by all the zawiyas of Cyrenaica.

The community was centred round the University. It was, [873] in fact, almost purely a University society, and its importance as such in the history of the Sanusiya Order is very considerable. Here, under his personal supervision and the supervision of his disciples, far from worldly distractions, the Grand Sanusi was able to train the future leaders of the Order. The Shaikhs of the lodges of the Order were appointed by him from among his intimate circle of disciples, many of whom had followed him

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[1] Duveyrier, op. cit., p. 24; Muhammad bin 'Uthman, op. cit., p. 88; Sir Richard Burton, *Personal Narrative of a Pilgrimage to al-Madinah and Meccah* (Memorial Edition), 1893, vol. ii, pp. 24–5.

[2] Op. cit., p. 88.

the steep sides of which make east–west journeys slow and 133
arduous. To the west this broken country levels down, and in a
bay in the hills lies the extensive treeless, but very fertile, basin
of al-Marj, known to Europeans as the Barce Plain. It was [167]
colonized in classical times and again recently by the Italians.
The Arabs call this first terrace *lusaita* (*al-wasaita*), the middle
part, because it lies between the coastal plain and the plateau
tableland formed by *al-zahir*, the second terrace. This tableland [172]
is famous for its Graeco-Roman ruins and is dotted also
with the deserted farms of Italian colonists. It mounts to a
narrow third terrace, at about 875 metres above sea level, from
the top of which one can look down on these settlements.

The plateau slopes southwards through a juniper belt. There 133
forest ends and it continues to roll to the southern steppe in 137
stony undulations dissected by many wadis. In the plain at its
foot there is plenty of grass and low scrub, and vegetation is
thick in depressions, but the country becomes increasingly
desolate the farther to the south one journeys towards the lifeless
wastes of the Sahara. The eastern part of Cyrenaica is more [132]
arid than the west or centre. The Marmarica, the *batnan* of the
Arabs, is characterized by low hills rising from the coastal belt
~~and~~ prolonged towards the south to create a succession of crests
of several kilometres in depth. The mean annual rainfall is low [132]
and wells are restricted to the coastal belt. However, there is, [312]
probably in most years, a certain amount of grazing to some
fifty miles from the coast during the rains. The Sirtica, the
extension of Cyrenaica to the west, is a vast rolling treeless
plain traversed by a series of wadis running north–south which
in their spread provide most of the summer grazing. Wells are [312]
found only near the coast but pasturage is plentiful till the [233]
Wadi al-Farigh is reached.

The rainfall very exactly determines the vegetation belts and 132
thereby limits human distribution and imposes a certain way
of life. The amount of precipitation depends on a number of
circumstances. Mean annual rainfall decreases from west to
east. Altitude also affects it. More significant, however, are
the variation with latitude, the seasonal rhythm, and annual
irregularities. The accompanying map shows how rainfall
decreases rapidly from the coast, how only the very limited
plateau area is subject to heavy precipitations (400–550 mms.),

[TEXT CONTINUED ON PAGE 33]

[P. 32]

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
Al-Jashsha
Al-Batnan
Al-Barqe
Al-Sirwal
Al-Hamra
Al-Baida
WADI AL-MRA
Al-Barqa
WADI AL-FARIGH
Al-Daffa
Al-Qardaba
Scale
0 50 100
25 75 kms.
Forest

Distribution of Forest.

102
312
233


Shahhat
Darna
Al-Marj
GOATS AND CATTLE
Banghazi
SHEEP AND CAMELS
Zt. Msus
Bir Tinjidhir
Bir Hakaim
MOSTLY STONY ARID COUNTRY
Ajadabiya
CAMELS
Approx. Line of springs
" Southern limit of well water in summer
" Southern limit of grazing in spring

Pastoral Zones.

and the insufficiency of the fall elsewhere. It follows that only 132
on the plateau can there be forest, and only there is a settled [137]
and purely agricultural way of life possible; and it was there [241]
and on the coastal fringe that in ancient and modern times [167]
European colonists settled.

The rains in Cyrenaica fall only in winter, from October to 132
April. In the absence of irrigation the planting season is thus 241
clearly delimited. So is the grazing season to the south of the 233
plateau, for in summer the grasses wither and the wells dry up, [221]
compelling shepherds to drive their flocks northwards to the plateau, thus producing the kind of seasonal nomadism known as transhumance. The variation in total rainfall from year to year and the distribution of its fall over the winter months are of the utmost importance for agriculturalists in Cyrenaica. There is still some obscurity, but it is an observed fact that every few years in Cyrenaica there is a year in which the fall of rain is insufficient, or too badly distributed, to raise an adequate crop. In a mixed economy this fact must have given an overwhelming bias towards pastoralism.

The water supplies of the plateau, which depend entirely on 132
rainfall, are sufficient for the needs of the Bedouin and their 312 ●✓
flocks. The clayey soils are, however, very exacting and running spring water is rare, being for the most part restricted to the triangle Darna–Slanta–al-Haniya. On the western part of the plateau water is conserved in cisterns and wells and on the maritime and *barqa* plains, in the Sirtica and Marmarica, and generally to the south of the plateau, in wells.

The distribution of vegetation in Cyrenaica follows variation 132
in degree of precipitation. Where there is much rain there is 137
forest. Where there is little rain there is steppe. Where there
is no rain there is desert. The forest is thick but mainly squat 137
and of very limited extension. An Italian estimate[1] of its distribution is shown on the accompanying map. It is predominantly Mediterranean in type, the juniper and the lentisk being the two commonest trees of the country. Forest ceases a few miles to the south of the high watershed of the plateau and gives way to steppe. The well-known route Tariq 'Aziza is generally regarded as the dividing line between the two kinds

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[1] Dott. Giovanni Manzoni, 'Memorie sui boschi della Cirenaica', *Notiziario Economico della Cirenaica*, 1929. [113]

221 them to live on the country to a great extent. In normal times
233 the Bedouin drive their animals on the hoof to Egyptian
[439] markets, slowly, along this rich southern pasture belt, grazing
as they go, so that they arrive in good condition. Finally, there
can be no doubt about the correctness of the Arab claim that a
few weeks residence in the open steppe is a tonic for man and
beast.

233 It must be remembered that there are no water problems at
312 this time of year. Sheep, goats, and camels do not have to be
watered from the time the first rains make grass till the end
423 of April or early in May: even horses do not drink until well
into April. This fact is important, because it means that the prolific pastures can be grazed by all without dispute, since the wells, which belong to tribal sections or families, are not drawn on. While rain is still falling regularly human requirements are met from pools. To the south of the Tariq 'Aziza, generally speaking, there is no ownership in land—there are no *hudud*, boundaries, as the Arabs say—and anyone may cultivate or graze where he pleases, but there is strict ownership in wells; whereas to the north of the Tariq 'Aziza there is less narrowly restricted ownership in water, which is here spring water in abundance, but there are well-defined rights in arable.[1] The water of the southern wells is essential for the Bedouin who own the country and who live in it all the year round, and their rights are respected by those who graze
233 there. Sheep and goats need only drink every second or third
312 day, even in the hottest weather, so that in the period of meagre
pasturage they have a wide range of grazing from the wells, and the dry grasses, supplemented by evergreen shrubs of the goosefoot family, are sufficient nourishment for them. Wells are numerous in the steppe but few of them last out the summer.

233 The animals grazed in the southern steppe are mostly sheep
and camels. The Bedouin say 'Cattle and goats do not migrate;
[221] camels and sheep do'. Camels are essential to nomadic life as
it is impossible to move camp without them, and the richer
Bedouin are in camels the more frequently they move, seeking
231 richer pastures. Cyrenaican dromedaries are heavy beasts,

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[1] Enzo Savarese, *Le Terre della Cirenaica*, Pt. II, 1928, Chap. VII; Massimo Colucci, *Il Regime della Proprietà Fondiaria nell' Africa Italiana*, vol. i, 1942, pp. 210 seq. and 220 seq.

weeks later, he is reviled for demanding a long overdue instalment 604
of his daughter's bride-wealth. He is the person who can be 613
approached freely, to whom love tales can be told, from whom [585]
help can be expected, who gives support in disputes, and who also [583]
upbraids, who punishes, who withholds, who acts as a pull-away
from the agnatic group. An agnate demands help, and also compels 613
the fulfilment of obligations. An agnate is a man with whom 602
relationships are formal, particularly if he is a senior. He is, too,
the person who unfailingly, though perhaps grudgingly, gives
help when it is most required; who, regardless of the merits of the
case, defends one against external opposition; and who is always
available at each life crisis. A kinship link is not to be defined by
any one particular mode of behaviour. Each is a cluster of different
sorts of behaviour, one form taking precedence in these circumstances,
another in other circumstances, and so forth.

The little clusters of kindred can be defined clearly in any of 613
the camps. It is customary among the Bedouin for those who are 602
most closely linked as kindred to pitch their tents close to each 621
other. For example, if a man has two recently married sons, their
tents are pitched on either side of his, with the ropes of their
tents crossing the ropes of their father's tent. More distantly related
kin will be more distantly placed, and here and there,
breaks in the continuity of the lines of tents are to be observed,
corresponding as a rule to breaks in kinship. Each large camp in
this way can be viewed as two or more nuclei of kindred. The
camp as a whole is dominantly composed of agnates, but they
are disposed in such a way as to show clusterings of varying kinship
composition. Characteristically each cluster has a separate
name, often a female name which refers to a common mother of
the cluster, or of the head of the leading family in it. When these [221]
relatively large camps break up with the onset of the rains and
disperse to form small camps of five to seven tents for winter
pasturing, they will be seen to correspond almost identically with
the kin clusters of the larger summer camp. Again, a tertiary segment [312]
may have two wells for its own use. In a particular year
there may be sufficient water in one of them to meet the needs
of the whole group, and its members then live together in one
camp; the following year both wells may have to be used, and
the camp of the previous summer will split up, roughly half going

613 621 602 [312] to one well, and the remainder to the other. It is usually an easy matter to predict, at least in a general fashion, how the group will divide, as long as the details of kinship are known; the camps will be composed of members of two sets of patri-lines in the tertiary segment, who will also represent two discrete clusters of cognatic kindred. If, therefore, a tertiary group increases in numbers to the point where a split in the lineage is inevitable, here then is the line of split, along a line, that is, of kinship cleavage and lineage differentiation. 'Men make the tribe; women divide it,' is an oft-quoted saying among the Bedouin, but this, like most sayings, tells only part of the truth, as we shall see.

613 621 It is possible to show where on the genealogy change takes place, and it is possible to indicate the lines cleavages will follow, but the proliferation of a lineage does not occur merely because the possibility exists for it to do so. A group must, clearly, break up if the number of its members significantly exceeds that which can be supported by the available natural resources; water is the prime cause of the proliferation of lineages. Granting this, a group remains an undifferentiated corporation until occasion arises when its members, or some of them, can demonstrate unequivocally that they are no longer bound by its conditions of membership. There is a number of occasions when this can be done, some of which are discussed below.

613 621 672 682 The test, *par excellence,* of corporate affiliation is the acceptance of the responsibility to pay blood-money. Refusal to accept this is the same as renouncing membership of the group. Individuals are sometimes excluded from membership in this way. There are occasions too, when the payment of blood-money involves renunciation by more than one or two individuals. If membership of a section has increased to the point of splitting, and should a homicide occur within it, one of the kin clusters within the group might demand blood-money from the other. Nothing could make the statement of split clearer than this. The most impelling condition of membership of the tertiary group is that 'we pay as one and receive as one', a condition which, of course, excludes payment within the group. Any two groups between which the demand for blood-money has been made are, therefore, by definition, separate tertiary groups.

613 621 765 When a member of a group or his wife dies, there are specific

sorts of petty ways, listen to his grumbles about his agnates, interfere on his 604
behalf in petty camp quarrels, shield him from the disciplinarian father and 613
guard his property interests against the predatory father's brother; if the 428
mother's brother dies without heirs, the sister's son can reasonably expect at
least a share of his wealth. When the mother's brother is a member of a
different corporate group, a sister's son cannot possibly expect to inherit
from him in any circumstance.

The mother's brother may reside in a camp too distant to be much effective 604
direct help in day-to-day living. His relative remoteness gives the relationship 591
other possible opportunities, however. Rainfall in the semi-desert area 312
of Cyrenaica is highly variable, both from year to year, and from place to 233
place in any given year. As a result this shallow saucer of a depression may 241
have sufficient rain to supply both the water needs of animals and crops,
while an area a few miles distant will have inadequate water supplies for
either. The mother's brother-sister's son link can mean water for animals and
a crop of barley for both when, in successive years, the resources of one area
or the other are inadequate.

The differences in the relations between men and their mother's brother 604
do not end with a characterisation of their antipodal forms. The demographic
structure of a group may be such that one man may have a number
of mother's brothers, another only one; one man may have to share with
several brothers, another may be an only son. Complications of this sort determine [613]
the precise relationships between men, but however intricate these
may be, each corporate group has its matrilateral links with a group occupying
a slightly different ecological area, and it also has a plurality of matrilateral
connections within it. Further, if a direct connection is not available [603]
to any particular individual he can use an indirect link (e.g. father's mother's
brother or mother's mother's brother) to satisfy his needs.

The Preference for Males

Thus far, the family and the social matrix in which it is embedded has 128
been discussed in general terms, most particularly in reference to several
selected sets of relationships. I wish now to place these relationships in a
more specific setting with a brief discussion of the composition of a small
camp of a group inhabiting the arid areas of central Cyrenaica. When the 829
Bedouin give their views on the structure of the family in Cyrenaica they 594
speak of it as consisting of a pair of spouses and about ten children, mainly 562
males. The emphasis on males is not mere sentiment, overwhelmingly though 858
it favours them against females. Additional males in a family increase the
productive possibilities of a family in the sense that more herdsmen become
available and larger ploughing commitments can be undertaken; an increase
in the number of females has small effect on production since they are precluded
from any direct participation in these activities. Both sexes, ranging
in age from about seven years to mature adulthood, are necessary if a family

829 is to constitute a viable economic unit; and if it is to expand, the number
594 of males must be increased disproportionately compared with females. Since
562 the structure of this "ideal family" (which in the sentiments of the Bedouin
858 is the only family) is based on the division of labour, some details of the
tasks and their allocation among members of a family are included to estimate the importance of this notional "ideal family."

The Division of Labour, by Sex

462
286 The tasks women perform are almost entirely associated with the tent. They make the tent top, and the gaily coloured carpets which cover the sandy ground in the men's quarters. They also weave the material for making sacks, and nose bags for horses and camels. Throughout the year a piece of weaving is always on the loom waiting, and while any women of the tent may take a turn at weaving, the mother decides what is to be made,
462 its pattern and colours and in general directs operations. Women also pitch
342 the tent when the camp is moved; they do so unaided by the men. It is a task which requires considerable strength and only grown girls and mature women can assist in this; younger girls scour the vicinity in search of stones to hold the sides of the tent on the ground after it has been erected.
[356] As soon as pitching is complete, the floor of the tent is brushed clean before carpets are spread and the few articles of personal belongings placed in their proper position.

462 Next, brushwood must be fetched in large quantities for fires. Apart
313 from cooking needs and winter warmth, the fire of each tent is in constant use for preparing the sickly sweet tea, almost the consistency of syrup, which is drunk several times a day regularly and which is made again for even the casual visitor. The task of fetching brushwood is performed daily, and each load takes a few hours of a woman's time to gather and bring back
[412] to the tent. Bushes are uprooted with the aid of a long-handled adze and piled together, to be carried on her back for the homeward journey. The load is cumbersome and heavy; only girls in their late teens and mature women can cope with it.

462 All cooking is done by the women. Most meals consist of cereal dishes of
252 various sorts, so that grinding, using heavy millstones, is a perpetual activity to satisfy the demands for large quantities of flour. Millstones are
412 bought in the villages. In most small camps there only one or two sets, so they are passed round from one woman to another. The stones are very heavy but when they are carried from tent to tent men offer no assistance.

462 Each tent also requires large quantities of water for human consumption. If the camp is located near a well, water is drawn in small quantities, fre-
312 quently. Young girls and boys take a donkey to the well, fill a couple of
[492] jerry cans with water, wait for an older sister to load them on the donkey and then drive the beast back to camp. After a fall of rain, while puddles of water remain on the ground, mature women make haste to gather the

surface water in jerry cans, bringing them back to the tents, one at a time, 462
on their backs. Clothes are kept clean in the desert, and the women do the [312]
washing. [296]

The care of children from birth until they are a few years old is the re- 462
sponsibility of the woman. Childbirth causes a minimum interruption in the 854
daily sequence of a mother's activities. The child is breastfed if the mother [844]
has milk; if not, a wet nurse is sought or goat milk is substituted. Other [853]
than the time given to feeding it, the infant does not take up much of the mother's time. It is placed in a hammock slung between the centre poles of the tent and rocked by the mother as she passes to and fro. If nursing in illness is required, the mother devotes herself to it; her other tasks must then be performed by another woman.

As children acquire mobility, and at a time when, perhaps, the mother 855
is pregnant again, they become so fractious one with the other that if help 462
was unavailable the nervous strain could seriously disrupt the normal routine
of work. During the early years of marriage, when daughters are still too 855
young to look after their small brothers and sisters, the grandmother's help 462
in child-rearing is invaluable. Too old for the arduous tasks of the daily 603
routine, she may assist in teasing and spinning the raw wool, but it is in her role as nursemaid that she assumes importance. Children of both sexes are given the comfort of suckling at her breast, receiving attention and care for which the young mother could not possibly afford the time.

Caring for children takes up little of a man's time, and is mostly in- 462
cidental. The woman, on the other hand, devotes relatively little of her 233
time to the animals. She does the milking in spring — of camels, sheep and [234]
goats — but herding is not her responsibility, save for partly tending goats. [857]
Goats, when they are in the vicinity of the camp, are looked after by boys and girls of about eight to ten years of age. In springtime when they have dropped their young, or if some of them have to be retained in the camp at night for various reasons, the woman makes a brushwood enclosure at the side of the tent and sees the goats safely inside before nightfall.

A catalogue of the tasks for which women are responsible may not seem 462
very impressive; the number of tasks is not excessive, but the persistence of the routine bends the backs of most women. Paradoxically, any suggestion that men should take over female tasks would strike them as absurd. Assistance from one of the same sex is always a welcome relief, but the abrogation of a particular task by men would be interpreted by women as the loss of a right. For, in the division of labour, it is not merely that tasks are allocated between the sexes for expedient reasons, or in consideration of the labour involved or because tasks which can be performed in the vicinity of the camp are left to women; division of labour would not make sense on these
grounds, however strong they may be in Bedouin sentiments. Each task which [424]
falls to the lot of woman constitutes a right exclusive to her. Fetching firewood is not only a chore; it is a woman's prerogative. The insistence that only a woman can undertake certain tasks has nothing to do with her liking

105 162 livestock husbandry as their main occupation while the rest earn their living by such other means as agriculture, fishing, stone-cutting, trade, etc. But whatever his main job may be, a man is likely to possess a number of sheep which he usually entrusts to a professional herdsman if he cannot look after them himself. This means that all sectors of the population have an active interest in livestock. Livestock, or rather sheep, are the most important and most esteemed item of wealth, and pastoral values still rank very high in spite of the obvious attraction of other types of work. On the other hand, pure nomadism is not practised, except perhaps by some small groups of camel-herders living in the far south of the area. The tremendous majority of the herdsmen are sheep-herders, whose movements are much more restricted than the movements of the real nomads. They have permanent settlements to which they retire when the grazing season is over, and there they practise agriculture, which they consider a secondary and supplementary occupation.

Most of the inhabitants of the Western Desert belong to the Awlad Ali clans who originally came from Libya. Some less important and less numerous clans, the Morabiteen clans, also live there as 'clients' of the more powerful Awlad Ali. A certain degree of correspondence exists between clan segmentation and the distribution of lands, both pasture-land and the fertile arable areas of the northern strip being distributed among clans and lineages in a clearly defined manner. A man cannot make use of the grazing ground, much less of the cultivation ground, known to belong to a different clan or lineage except under certain conditions and only obtaining the owners' permission. This does not mean, however, that clans and lineages are localized. For in spite of the natural tendency of kinsmen to cluster together and to live near to each other, the members of the same clan-segment may be widely dispersed, and the inhabitants of any specific locality, especially near the coast, usually belong to different clans. Nevertheless, a certain clan may be more strongly represented in a particular locality than all the other clans.

105 312 The problem of water supply is, naturally, the most crucial problem with which the people have to cope. The absence of surface water, the shortness of the wet season, the low rainfall and the meagreness of the subterranean resources in most parts of the desert, especially inland, impose drastic limitations upon their activities. Apart from the few artesian wells found in the northern coastal zone, rain is the main source of water supply. It is, however, a very unreliable source because of its irregularity. Moreover, a considerable amount of rain-water is lost by seepage through the sand and by evaporation. The situation is further aggravated by the fact that not all the functioning wells yield potable water or even water suitable for the irrigation of fields. The water of a large number of these artesian wells is charged with a high percentage of dissolved salts. This water can only be used for domestic purposes. Certain experiments are now being carried out at Ras-el-Hikma and Fuka to see whether such saline water could be used for irrigating the pasture-lands.

105 243 311 The two main complementary occupations, i.e. livestock husbandry and the cultivation of barley, are seriously affected by the water situation. The strip of arable land which extends along the sea coast varies in breadth from place to place and from year to year according to the rainfall. In good years it may stretch some 10 to 20 kilometres southwards, but in bad years the cultivation becomes rather patchy and is confined to a very narrow strip only a few kilometres wide. The people are never sure of their crops, and in really

bad years the returns may be so poor that grain and flour have to be sent from 105
the Delta to avert famine. The failure of the crop may also compel whole 243
clan-segments to migrate with their animals to the Delta. In this respect, 311
the semi-nomadic clans of the Western Desert represent a real burden on the national economy of Egypt.

Livestock husbandry, which is by far the most important and highly valued 105
occupation, is itself subject to the variability and the erratic nature of rainfall, 231
since it is the rain which determines the abundance of herbage and, consequently, the number of animals reared. Pasture land is found mainly to the south of the cultivated land. Sometimes, the fallow patches among the barley fields are also covered with grass and other pasture plants suitable for grazing. Pasture plants usually persist between December and May; during the summer, the land becomes arid hard desert with only few dispersed patches of dry grass. The grazing season *par excellence* is from November to April, during which period barley stands in the fields. After the first showers of November, barley is sown and the young men soon move with their flocks to the pastures, leaving the older people to look after the fields. As the dry season advances, the flocks are moved northwards to the cultivated lands so as to be nearer to fodder and to water-holes. Thus, the movements of the herders are rhythmic and regulated by the division of the year into two major seasons: the wet season and the dry season. The wet season is the period of plenty during which the animals are well fed; the dry season is the period of starvation for the flocks which must then rely on such fodder as barley straw and on the drying grass. Any movements of animals that may take place during that season are carried out on a very limited scale. In exceptionally bad years the people are compelled to dispose of their animals, or at least of a large part of the flocks, or they may send them away to their friends and relatives who may be living near vegetation. Sometimes, the herdsmen find themselves compelled to cross the frontiers to Cyrenaica for pasture.

We can see then from this brief account to what extent the water situation 105
is responsible for determining the modes of living in the desert and for channelling human activities and imposing certain limitations on these activities. Development projects and sedentarization schemes planned for the Western Desert and its inhabitants must, therefore, give a great deal of importance to the question of water and its availability. In fact, most of the contemplated projects envisage the possibility of better exploitation of the existing water supplies as well as the tapping of potential resources.

Rightly or wrongly, it is generally assumed in Egypt that nomadism and 178
semi-nomadism represent a phase of deterioration which is no longer compa- 312
tible with the actualities of modern life and therefore should be abolished.
For, apart from the fact that it is responsible for the hardships and insecurity 657
suffered by the desert dwellers and the consequent ill effects on the national economy, especially in bad years, nomadism as practised in the Western Desert and under the prevailing circumstances is wasteful and destructive. Vast stretches of land which could be reclaimed at little cost and cultivated intensively are simply left for grazing without any serious endeavour to make better use of them. Under the contemplated sedentarization projects it is intended to increase the cultivated area, to improve the pastures by introducing new pasture plants of higher nutritive value in areas where agriculture is not

7:Abou-Zeid E-5 (no date) 1959 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9
Egypt

178 practicable, to tap unused resources, to develop the existing primitive crafts
and to establish new industries. The question of water is the corner-stone of
•312 all these projects. Subterranean water has been tapped from the ancient Roman
657 wells, and about 120 artesian wells have been sunk lately along the coast. A number of water cisterns have been constructed, and others are under construction, to preserve the rain-water for irrigation. Special attention has been paid in this regard to the western part of the coastal zone where the amount of rainfall exceeds that falling in the eastern parts. An example is the Wadi-el-Kharrouba cistern near Mersa Matrouh which will prevent large amounts of rain-water from being lost in the sands or in the sea, and store it for use during the dry season. All the water thus obtained will certainly help to extend the area sown with barley, especially in the El-Dab'aa zone; besides providing the more settled people with what they require to keep their fig trees and olive groves. The abundance of water may also encourage the introduction of new plants and trees which need a more stable and constant supply of water.

178 A few examples may serve to illustrate further the general policy adopted
with regard to the problem of sedentarization of the Bedouin clans, and the
657 steps taken to put the policy into effect.

The first example we shall consider is the Wadi-el-Natrun project which concerns the exploitation of the natural resources of the area so as to allow the establishement of new industries and the extension of the cultivated area, which in turn may eventually encourage the people to change to agriculture or industry, i.e. to a sedentary life. The *wadi* is an extended depression which lies some 22 metres below sea-level. The south-eastern end of the depression is 80 kilometres from Cairo, while the northern end is about 85 kilometres from Alexandria. A number of shallow salt lakes cover about half its total area, and some of these lakes become dry during the summer. The *wadi* is known as a rich source of salt and natron (sodium carbonate). Also a certain reed called *halfa* grows there and is used by the inhabitants of the area for the making of rough mats. The depression has always been regarded as a grazing ground for sheep and goats, so that only 25 *feddans*[1] were cultivated in 1952. According to the project, the extraction of salt and soda was put under government supervision. Subterranean water was tapped in a number of places and by the end of 1957 more than one thousand *feddans* were brought under the plough. Serious efforts were also made to introduce the cultivation of fruit, olives and dates as well as vegetables. Much attention was also given to the question of improving the production of animals by introducing different methods of breeding, and encouraging the inhabitants of the area to change over to the improved breeds which are superior to the local animals. This was met at first with much reluctance and resistance, but there are signs that the people are beginning to appreciate the benefit of owning the improved breeds. A factory for the manufacture of carpets and rugs has also been established by the government. A considerable proportion of the raw wool required for the industry is obtained from local sources, and the relatively small production finds a ready market in the larger cities of the Delta. The point of particular interest for us here is that all the unskilled labour employed in this industry as well as in the extraction of salt and sodium is recruited from the local population. Those workers have become accustomed to a settled life, so that when the season of extraction is over and work is temporarily suspended they do

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[1] A *feddan* = 1 038 acres.

of the present defendant seemed—for a really wealthy 682
man—to be pointless and futile. The merchant anticipated 674
this objection by hastening to add that the receipt of the 691
actual cash did not interest him in the least; but that he 626
had been wondering how he could shew his disapproval of 686
the defendant's family in some way, and had gone carefully
through all his old papers and receipts with this end in
view, and had triumphantly discovered the bill of debt
now produced in court.

Bedouin Law and custom sometimes accept right to 671
bloodmoney in all sorts of circumstances, when other law 672
would recognise no claim. For example, the principle is 682
accepted that a life lost in prison must be paid for by the
informers whose information resulted in the imprisonment
of the deceased. It is entirely immaterial whether the
information so given to the police was wilfully false or
intentionally misleading, or whether it was merely subsequently
found to be incorrect. Even if the information
had been true and correct in every detail, the informer is
still blood-guilty from the Ourfi standpoint, although in
actual practice any such claims for bloodmoney would
probably be considerably modified.

Other claims for bloodmoney are also recognised occasionally,
in cases of obvious accidental death, or death by
misadventure or Act of God, when the interpreters of
Bedouin Law cannot get away from the main principle
that a life lost must be paid for. The difficulty in these [695]
cases is to determine who shall pay for it; and the lawsuits
usually end in a clever compromise, in which their essential
principles are duly observed, but their judgments are mitigated
and modified by leniency and commonsense. The
following example, which occurred recently in Mariut,
will illustrate this.

A certain Arab called Ali Abu Bukr had inherited from 671
his father large cultivation rights in the desert; and in the 672
middle of this land was an old cistern for the collection of 682
rain water. It had not been used for years, and was silted 312

671 672 682 up with drift sand; and as it was some miles from the nearest permanent water supply, the owner of the cistern decided that it was well worth clearing out, with a view to catching and conserving the next rainfall.

•312 Accordingly he summoned all his kinsfolk, and propounded his proposition, to which they agreed. Other Arabs occupying neighbouring rights suggested that it was a very good idea, probably with a view to a simplified water supply for themselves.

671 672 682 An Arab from the neighbouring tribe called Ahmed had frequently acted as shepherd and odd-job man for Ali; and it happened that, when Ali and all his kinsfolk were assembled at the cistern, Ahmed chanced to be passing. Ali hailed him, and asked him to come and lend a hand. So Ahmed joined the crowd at the well, and assisted in getting ready the ropes and other tackle to be used.

[312] The cistern, constructed after the usual Roman pattern, was about forty feet deep, fifteen feet in diameter for the first twenty feet or so, and from there narrowed down to six or seven feet, with footholes cut in the side for the last half. One of Ali's relatives had agreed to be let down with ropes and to start cleaning out the mud and sand from the bottom. However, when the rope had been tied round his middle, and he was just going to be swung in mid-air and lowered to the ledge at half-way, his nerve suddenly failed him, and he refused to start.

Subsequent evidence was confused at this point as to exactly what happened; but it seems that one of the crowd noticed Ahmed standing with the rest, and remarked that he had had considerable experience in well digging, and suggested that he should go down. Accordingly Ahmed flung a stone down the well, and a faint splash at the bottom indicated that there were a few inches of water in it. He then organised a sort of tug-of-war among the men standing by, to test the strength of the rope. Satisfied on this point, he had the rope tied round him, and he was

619 oppression, he gathered his people and delivered a fiery
175 denunciation of his religion, during which he smashed his
726 rosary into pieces and mixed it with his horse's fodder ;
792 Baqush then invited their kinsmen (?) the Awlad 'Ali, to
come over from the "Green Mountain" and help them.
To entice the Awlad 'Ali, he is said to have sent them samples
of salt desert water and Nile water sweetened with sugar to
illustrate the difference between the hardships of the desert
and the comforts of the Rif.[1]

619 As recounted earlier, the Awlad 'Ali completely routed the
175 Hanadi and their allies, and drove them from the desert.
726 In the division of the conquered territory, the Jumei'at
received a third, and, although they were still considered
Murabitin, were released from the payment of tribute. They
[131] now live intermingled with the free sections of the Awlad
'Ali, all along the north coast of Egypt, and are numerous in
Beheira, especially near Abu Hummus.

619 *Samalus.*—The Samalus are found scattered among the
[131] Awlad 'Ali on the northern coast and stranded among many
of the Egyptian provinces. They once possessed a head
sheikh Abu Sala at Minya, and colonies are recorded from
Faiyum, Beheira, Menufiya, Gharbiya, and Sharqiya. An
[175] old paper from the Recruiting Department gives from
[162] seventeen villages in the Faiyum 775 mounted Samalus
[231] and 1,400 on foot, possessing 1,760 camels and 11,400
sheep. Two important groups of wells, both called "Sawani
[312] es-Samalus" exist on the north coast, one about 50 kilometres
east of Salum, and the other 20 kilometres south
of Dhab'a.

[173] They say they came to Egypt, 400 strong, about 200
years ago, from the Wadi Samalus in the Jebel Akhdar, and
their ancestor twelve generations ago was Nasr el-Hasani, of
course an "Arab from Beni Suleim".

[175] In the *Description de l'Egypte*, P. D. Martin relates how
[726] in 1800 the Samalus of Faiyum were raided by a party of
Ferjan, 200 strong, from Beheira.

619 *Shiheibat.*—These are a "Mrabit" tribe from the west with
186 an unenviable reputation, living near the Wadi Natrun.
Sayed Idris, the former Senussi leader, says of them : "Most

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[1] Dumreicher, 16. This is probably the "Sheik Abdall Gawyal Bagooshi" who wrote to Sir Sydney Smith in March, 1801, warning him of the approach of the French from Damanhur. Wilson, *History of the British Expedition in Egypt*, 371. (Rif = cultivated area.)

829 is to constitute a viable economic unit; and if it is to expand, the number
594 of males must be increased disproportionately compared with females. Since
562 the structure of this "ideal family" (which in the sentiments of the Bedouin
858 is the only family) is based on the division of labour, some details of the
tasks and their allocation among members of a family are included to estimate
the importance of this notional "ideal family."

The Division of Labour, by Sex

462 The tasks women perform are almost entirely associated with the tent.
286 They make the tent top, and the gaily coloured carpets which cover the
sandy ground in the men's quarters. They also weave the material for making
sacks, and nose bags for horses and camels. Throughout the year a
piece of weaving is always on the loom waiting, and while any women of
the tent may take a turn at weaving, the mother decides what is to be made,
462 its pattern and colours and in general directs operations. Women also pitch
342 the tent when the camp is moved; they do so unaided by the men. It is a
task which requires considerable strength and only grown girls and mature
women can assist in this; younger girls scour the vicinity in search of
stones to hold the sides of the tent on the ground after it has been erected.
[356] As soon as pitching is complete, the floor of the tent is brushed clean before
carpets are spread and the few articles of personal belongings placed in
their proper position.

462 Next, brushwood must be fetched in large quantities for fires. Apart
313 from cooking needs and winter warmth, the fire of each tent is in constant
use for preparing the sickly sweet tea, almost the consistency of syrup,
which is drunk several times a day regularly and which is made again for
even the casual visitor. The task of fetching brushwood is performed daily,
and each load takes a few hours of a woman's time to gather and bring back
[412] to the tent. Bushes are uprooted with the aid of a long-handled adze and
piled together, to be carried on her back for the homeward journey. The
load is cumbersome and heavy; only girls in their late teens and mature
women can cope with it.

462 All cooking is done by the women. Most meals consist of cereal dishes of
252 various sorts, so that grinding, using heavy millstones, is a perpetual activity
to satisfy the demands for large quantities of flour. Millstones are
412 bought in the villages. In most small camps there only one or two sets,
so they are passed round from one woman to another. The stones are very
heavy but when they are carried from tent to tent men offer no assistance.

462 Each tent also requires large quantities of water for human consumption.
If the camp is located near a well, water is drawn in small quantities, frequently.
312 Young girls and boys take a donkey to the well, fill a couple of
[492] jerry cans with water, wait for an older sister to load them on the donkey
and then drive the beast back to camp. After a fall of rain, while puddles
of water remain on the ground, mature women make haste to gather the

There was some smuggling
439 of goods across the Libyan border, but this smuggling was done on a
648 very small scale. Before the Egyptian government imposed restrictions
on imports, the prices of the goods in the Libyan market were close to
their prices on the Egyptian market. Except for a very few items which
were not found on the Egyptian market, smuggling goods from Libya offered
653 a very limited financial gain to the smugglers. In recent years, this
situation has changed, however. With population increase in Egypt
threatening disaster, and with the cultivable land in the valley reaching
its maximum productivity, the attention of the government was drawn to
the fertile yet dry land of the northern strip of the Western Desert as
a possible means of expanding the cultivated area. A number of projects
are taking place at the present time under the land reclamation act. The
most important of these projects is the Eastern Mariut project which is
directed toward the irrigation of the lands of the Western Desert
through the channelling of the flood waters of the Nile into a network
of canals covering an extensive area of the northern strip of the Western
315 Desert. Also, recently, oil has been discovered in the area, and since
457 the end of the Second World War, the area has been a major attraction
for tourists.

439 More important is the increase in traffic of smuggled goods from
[651] Libya. Custom restrictions on imported goods to Egypt have created a
[656] scarcity of American and British manufactured goods which raised their
price on the Egyptian market and made smuggling a profitable activity.
An opposite-direction smuggling of sheep and goats from Egypt to Libya
[315] created a great shortage in the Egyptian meat market. Before the discovery of oil in Libya, the Western Desert area supplied the Egyptian

439 market with more than one-third of its lamb meat. The other two-
[315] thirds of the lamb market was supplied from the Sudan, the Delta, and
[315] from Libya. Oil industry in Libya attracted a large number of the young
[178] tribal members in Libya, who had originally undertaken the main task of
[464] sheep pastoralism. As a result, the population of shcep and goats in
Libya dropped sharply. Not only did the Libyan market become unable
to supply the Egyptian market, but it was also unable to support itself
and was forced to pay high prices for the Western Desert sheep and goats.
[457] The price became even more attractive after the devaluation of the
Egyptian pound which gave higher value to the Libyan currency, and
hence, the price of sheep. In the last decade, the number of smuggled
sheep reached a point where it created a great shortage of lamb meat in
Egypt. All government attempts to stop smuggling activities in either
direction have failed.

657 All these factors attracted the attention of the government to the
area and its people. The need to control the tribal population became
evident. But since it is difficult, if not impossible, to control a
population which is constantly on the move, the first step the govern-
ment took to control the tribal population was to settle them in perman-
ent villages. A number of projects are underway. The aims of these
[654] projects are to increase the cultivated land and to improve the pastures
[137] by introducing new and highly nutritive pasture plants in areas where
agriculture is not feasible. Attempts have also been made to promote
local crafts and industries. The intentional efforts of the government
[178] to settle the tribal population is supplemented by the gradual drift of
[464] many tribesmen, especially the younger generation, to seek part-time or

121 sections constituting the combinations which makes the facts of feud intelligible.
613 Furthermore, several different types of power structures exist which serve the different
[571] interests of the people composing them, and these are interlinked in combinations
[578] of superior span. But the formation of these structures and the modes in which they
combine are quite unlike the articulations in a lineage system. Characteristically, the
segments in a lineage system are conceived of as building up hierarchically to span
what is spoken of as a total society, the apex of the system affording a spectacular and
fixed definition of its boundaries. Had I been using this concept in this paper the
[173] founding ancestress of the nine Cyrenaican tribes, Sa'ada as named by the Bedouin,
would have served this purpose and would have been given inappropriate prominence.
121 The views presented here have the consequences of retreating from a concept
184 of a total society. The people to whom the facts given are related are the camel-herding
tribes only. Some of them have relations of many kinds with the cow-herding
233 folk who inhabit the northern plateau area, and these relations are also significant
619 for the analysis of a wide range of problems; genealogically both cow and camel
herders are seen as part of a single structure, but the differences between them with
regard to their economy, the size, composition, and distribution of their residential
units, their political and ritual life is so great that to conceive of them as a single social
121 structure is not useful. Moreover, the far western tribal sections have relationships
619 of such urgency with their neighbours in Tripolitania (who are excluded from Cyrenaican
genealogies) that to cut off these relationships as lying outside Cyrenaican society
would be quite unwarranted. The same can be said of the relationships of the tribal
sections in the eastern part of Cyrenaica with their genealogical cousins, the Aulad
'Ali of Egypt, who, although residing across a national border, are closely linked to
some of the Cyrenaican Bedouin. Some tribes also have to rely on the people of the
southern oases for an item of diet and an outlet for surplus wool, and the net of kinship
is spread out to include them. In these cases they come into contact with other
[177] ethnic groups such as Berbers and Tibu, and through the oases they extend their lines
of communication southwards to Wadai, Chad, and Bornu. As an indication of the
effectiveness of these links, it is only necessary to add that people inhabiting Cyrenaica
make periodic and regular visits to these far southern places, and that in 1948 a
shaikh, living near Ajadabiya in south-western Cyrenaica, collected blood-money
contributions from kinsmen in Wadai. A single structure cannot possibly include,
for analytical purposes, these sorts of relationships.

121 Finally, it must be stressed that the facts given here refer to the period 1948 to
114 1950. Since then oil has been discovered in large quantities near the territory of a
(315) tribe where I spent most of my time while resident in the country, and where there
was one tin shack in 1950 there is now a modern port with roads extending southwards
from it into the wilderness. I see no reason to assume that social relations as
I observed them are present today or that they were the same at any time in the past
175 either. Before the advent of the Sanusi Order in the early eighteen-forties, it is known
795 that one lineage at least was dominantly powerful and that its leader tyrannized a
613 large part of Central Cyrenaica.[1] His descendants constituted a powerful group in

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[1] Smith and Porcher, 1864. These two archaeologists met this leader and continued their archaeological researches around Cirene only with his good-will, although the site is not on the territory of his tribe as I knew it in 1950. They also speak of him as inhabiting a castle which also lies outside the

342 costs to make or buy. In the _'izba_ sector, most of the Bedouin have a summer tent which they place next to their stone house for the hot months. According to the governmental community [657] development program, in order to own land and register it properly one must build at least one room upon it. The one-[735] room house (_daar_) is not common in al-Qasr: it is a symbol of poverty. The multi-roomed house (_duwaar_) is common. It is [333] built of large pieces of cut sandstone which are quarried in [316] al-Qasr. Those who can afford it build the _duwaar_ and surround 342 it with a wall in compound fashion. Only one man in al-Qasr 556 is rich enough to afford two of these compound-type houses. The size and style of a house reflect status. Traditionally, [184] a man furnished a tent for each wife and for each married son. Although this is still the custom in parts of the desert, in al-Qasr the private room (_daar_) in a _duwaar_ has replaced the private tent.

596 The basic residential unit is called _naja'_ (literally, "hamlet"). It is composed of the father, his wife (wives), his unmarried children, and married sons and their families. The _naja'_ takes the name of the father who is called the _shaib_ ("elder," literally, "white-haired one") of the group. In the _naja'_, the word of the _shaib_ is law, and the members' chief duty is unquestionable obedience. The average _naja'_ in al-Qasr consists of about three or four houses or tents.

156 159 of them) cater largely to the needs of the lineage in whose
554 territory they are located. They are operated mostly on a
443 credit basis. Lineage members, as debtors, feel gratitude
423 472 but also, and more importantly, loyalty toward their kinsman
*[613] and creditor. Hajj 'Ali is the only member of al-Qasr who
[452] owns two shops, and the only Bedouin in the whole Western Desert
who owns three shops. His brother owns a shop in Matruh.
156 Furthermore, the shop in Sallum is in a strategic position on
159 the Libyan border which, coincidentally or not, is a point
554 443 for importing, and also smuggling, foreign goods into Egypt.
439 The possession and utilization of foreign products is definitely
472 a status symbol all over Egypt. Hence, the person in this
area who can control, however slightly, the distribution of
such goods has a lever with which to exact prestige and
favors from the "status group" in al-Qasr who now welcome
these symbols (tobacco, pistols, rifles, radios) and the
bureaucrats of Marsa Matruh who crave them (food goods,
clothing materials, car parts).

156 Besides all this, Hajj 'Ali is involved in a small
159 stone-cutting operation which supplies stones for house
554 •[316] building, he cooperates with his three brothers in a well-
[312] cleaning concern, and contracts government heavy equipment
[427] to build earth dams. The material evidence of his status
[342] is that he is the only man in al-Qasr with two compound-type
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423 boundary marker is usually a pile of stones, a tree, a wadi,
or, a line recorded on paper by two parties and given to a
third to hold in case of future differences of opinion.

342 In the extreme southern pastoral zone, there were few
361 permanent houses but with new government land registration
[656] laws the number is increasing. The settlement pattern in this
area might be characterized as a scattered homestead type,
"homesteads" being defined as tents or houses whose location
is permanent. Tents are seldom, if ever, moved these days even
[657] during a heavy rainy season. This is because barley production
has increased, and, mainly because government aid programs
supply fodder for the sheep. Bedouin shepherds in the pasture
area change dwelling places, but only to move their tents from
their winter protective hiding places out into the open for the
springtime, or to move from their tent into the stone house
for the cold, rainy winter. In either case, no real change in
location is involved.

342 The tent is called bait al-'Arab ("house of the Arabs").
There are two types: the bait al-saif ("summer house"), and
the bait al-rabi'a ("spring house"). The summer tent, made of
"gunny" and flour sacks sewn together, is for protection from
the sun. The spring tent is the real Bedouin tent. It is
[286] woven from the wool of the sheep and camel hair, and is used
[237] during the winter. Most Bedouin now say that they cannot afford
[435] the 125 Egyptian pounds (1 pound = $2.80) which the bait al-rabi'a
costs to make or buy.

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*613 in farming, and he found this land "good for raising mint and
423 vegetables." To the southeast of the _'izba_, the lineages of
182
241 Lazumi and Ma'fas found the land suitable for barley and
[312] grazing. This area is rain-fed. There are no wells and so
vegetable crops are not possible here. The members of these
lineages say that their ancestors were "real" Bedouins in
Cyrenaica, and did not wish to become farmers in Egypt. It
*613 is interesting to note that the Lazumi and Ma'fas are the
182 richest lineages in all of al-Qasr. They were, perhaps, better
184
241 able to maintain the traditional style of life which all of
the Bedouins claim is "the best." But all Bedouins of al-Qasr
depend to some degree upon horticulture or arboriculture.
[231] And most families own a few sheep or goats. Both Lazumi and
Ma'fas garden in their coastal sections, and Shraif members own
sheep.

656 Land registration has a history in the Western Desert.
423 The government attempted it a number of times, but with little
success until 1959 when the General Desert Development Organization
(GDDO) undertook its program of land reclamation. But the
361 Bedouins were settled long before this. In al-Qasr, the Bedouins
•342 began to erect permanent stone dwellings on the land about the
178
time of the First World War. In the Matruh area, elder informants
agree that before 1914 the Bedouins lived in tents outside the
361 town area. When the British came, they began to move into town.
648 Many of the Bedouins built houses in Matruh between the years

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159 territory they are located. They are operated mostly on a
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with four wives.

Cases

584 Prior to the wedding festivities, the
father will have participated in negotiations, although even in these he will
593 have remained silent, leaving an affine, as a rule, to arrange the details with
the girl's father and his kinsmen. The father feigns aloofness from the start
of negotiations until after the wedding celebrations have ended. Before
inquiring into this seemingly odd behaviour, a few further details of marriage
ceremonies need to be mentioned briefly.

585 The bride is carried to the nuptial tent on a camel, seated in a cagelike
•342 structure placed on the camel's back, this canopy covered over with carpets
[492] and at least one long blanket — later to be used to divide her tent into male
and female quarters — which constitute part of the goods given to a woman
[788] on marriage. On her arrival, while she is still seated in her canopy, the
camel is led round the tent seven times by a small boy. She then descends
and is hustled into the tent by a number of women who make a show of their
attempts to conceal her from view. Inside the tent the bride is enclosed in
one corner in a kind of cubicle partitioned off by a length of blanket.

585 In the meantime, the groom has affected to escape, but is "caught," while
running away, by his fellows, who "compel" him to return to the nuptial tent,
[533] to the accompaniment of their lewd songs telling of the sexual pleasures
[831] awaiting him. Much of this is horseplay, but the young men carry it out
brazenly and the groom is required to show reluctance to continue with the
ceremonies. His entry into the nuptial tent is marked by an expectant hush
that falls over the crowd of men gathered, as they await the result of the
virginity test the groom is about to perform, which he does by wrapping part
of his toga round one of his fingers to pierce the hymen. Sharp shrieks from
[202] the bride give the signal that the test has been undertaken; not a stir moves
the crowd until evidence of its success has been publicly displayed, which is
given by the groom hoisting the blood-stained portion of the toga through
the corner of the tent on a pole, followed by firing three shots from his rifle.
Jubilantly, the men gathered fire volley after volley from their rifles just over
the nuptial tent, and the seven-day celebrations begin.

585 A full descriptive account of a marriage, or many of the ritual details
589 woven into it need not be given here. What is included is intended to
illustrate certain relationships between father and son, and between one
[593] generation and another. In this connection two further points are
[561] appropriate. First, during the week of festival, young men gather outside the nuptial
[535] tent each night to encourage a maiden in her dancing, clapping their hands
to the point of injury "so that we will have a wife soon." The celebrations
[533] belong to the bachelors, and they are the only ones to engage in the singing
and hand clapping. It is they too who stop the bridal camel on its way to
[538] the nuptial tent to recite obscene rhymes to the bride, and they also shout
[831] their rather dubious consolations to the bride who, during the virginity test,
crying out for her mother, is assured by them that the night holds promise
585 for her which her mother could never extend. The married men, particularly
602 the close senior agnates of the groom, stay away from it all, discussing
521 matters unconnected with the affair.

Cases

The Meaning of Marriage

581 Until marriage the changes in a man's life have been in the nature of
585 an ordered sequence of development from a child to be cared for — the only
• 342 time in his life when a father, without inhibition, showers on him his love
[593] and affection — to one who, by degrees, makes an increasing contribution to
a production unit. Marriage necessitates that a man pitch a tent for himself.
With a tent he becomes a potential host and protector of others. The local
idiom for marriage is "to set up a tent." It would be quite improper to use
[196] the verb "to marry" when inquiring whether a marriage has taken place
since this verb also has the meaning of "to have sexual intercourse." In-
[195] stead the euphemism, "Have you pitched a tent?" is used. The Arabic word
for a tent in this context is *Bait*. It is not used to refer to a military tent, nor
to the small tent which shelters only a widow. It is reserved for the Bedouin
tent, which usually has a wool top, and, most importantly, holds the promise
of the continuation of life, whether it shelters a newly married couple, a
mature family or young unmarried people. (The word *Bait* represents a
complex concept, and it would be too much of a diversion here to discuss
the various points of its significance. It is essential to understand that its
[778] meaning is not confined to a tent in the physical sense.) Its top has *Baraka*
(divine goodness) in it; the quality of *Haram*, which makes it possible for the
tent to be used as a sanctuary, is associated with it and this quality of *Haram*
extends, moreover, to the ropes of the tent, so that anyone who clutches them
comes under the protection of the owner. In it, the wife must permanently
reside and her husband has the legal right to insist on this. In it too, he
has the legal right of sexual access to a woman, his wife. Any children
[885] born in it he can claim as his own. With the erection of a tent the son
reaches adulthood, and it is in this sense that he can be said to have acquired
a domain of his own.

581 Marriage gives a son greater freedom and less dependence on his father
585 in another sense. A second euphemism used for marriage is "making a
[593] relationship," specifically an affinal one. Relationships between a man and
[195] his father-in-law are diverse and are used in various ways in different situa-
tions. Here, the particular aspect which needs to be stressed is that a man
606 can cajole his father-in-law, and (through his wife) wealth, in the form
425 of animals, may pass from the former to the latter. Reciprocal gifts are passed
556 between affines on certain occasions, but in addition small amounts may
pass which are not connected with the formal occasions of exchanges. Debt
583 lies between them. It begins with the initiation of marriage negotiations,
584 when the suitor's kinsmen take a prescribed number of sheep to present to
606 the girl's father if negotiations are successful. They promise to transfer
bride-wealth* to the girl's father. A few weeks after the marriage, the hus-

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[191] * I use the word "bride-wealth" because it has become so familiar in the literature, but the only similarity between the *Sahiba* of the Bedouin and the bride-wealth of

Cases

829 is to constitute a viable economic unit; and if it is to expand, the number
594 of males must be increased disproportionately compared with females. Since
562 the structure of this "ideal family" (which in the sentiments of the Bedouin
858 is the only family) is based on the division of labour, some details of the
tasks and their allocation among members of a family are included to estimate
the importance of this notional "ideal family."

The Division of Labour, by Sex

462
The tasks women perform are almost entirely associated with the tent.
286 They make the tent top, and the gaily coloured carpets which cover the
sandy ground in the men's quarters. They also weave the material for making
sacks, and nose bags for horses and camels. Throughout the year a
piece of weaving is always on the loom waiting, and while any women of
the tent may take a turn at weaving, the mother decides what is to be made,
462 its pattern and colours and in general directs operations. Women also pitch
342 the tent when the camp is moved; they do so unaided by the men. It is a
task which requires considerable strength and only grown girls and mature
women can assist in this; younger girls scour the vicinity in search of
stones to hold the sides of the tent on the ground after it has been erected.
[356] As soon as pitching is complete, the floor of the tent is brushed clean before
carpets are spread and the few articles of personal belongings placed in
their proper position.

462 Next, brushwood must be fetched in large quantities for fires. Apart
313 from cooking needs and winter warmth, the fire of each tent is in constant
use for preparing the sickly sweet tea, almost the consistency of syrup,
which is drunk several times a day regularly and which is made again for
even the casual visitor. The task of fetching brushwood is performed daily,
and each load takes a few hours of a woman's time to gather and bring back
[412] to the tent. Bushes are uprooted with the aid of a long-handled adze and
piled together, to be carried on her back for the homeward journey. The
load is cumbersome and heavy; only girls in their late teens and mature
women can cope with it.

462 All cooking is done by the women. Most meals consist of cereal dishes of
252 various sorts, so that grinding, using heavy millstones, is a perpetual activity
to satisfy the demands for large quantities of flour. Millstones are
412 bought in the villages. In most small camps there only one or two sets,
so they are passed round from one woman to another. The stones are very
heavy but when they are carried from tent to tent men offer no assistance.

Each tent also requires large quantities of water for human consumption.
462 If the camp is located near a well, water is drawn in small quantities, frequently.
312 Young girls and boys take a donkey to the well, fill a couple of
[492] jerry cans with water, wait for an older sister to load them on the donkey
and then drive the beast back to camp. After a fall of rain, while puddles
of water remain on the ground, mature women make haste to gather the

462 them or any innate aptitude for them; this insistence is an index of the
424 jealousy with which she is prepared to guard her rights. Each right derived
from this or that small task is an extension of her control over the male.

462 The force and significance of this control is, perhaps, best seen in a
woman's right to cook. At marriage a woman must have at least the minimum
424 of cooking utensils, and one of the rights a man acquires in a woman is
252 that she cooks for him. This is something a man cannot do for himself.
[593] Therefore, when a man ill-treats his wife or threatens her with divorce, she
can retaliate by refusing to cook, or leave the tent altogether to return to her
father. A man bereft of this service is in a very sorry plight indeed. The
legal dominance of the male, seemingly autocratic, is reduced at every
point by the control a woman exercises through her exclusive right to perform
tasks. The limits to the area of her coercive powers are significant.
562 They are confined almost wholly to domestic relationships. Legally, women
suffer such disabilities that they are almost of the status of minors; in
reality, their day-to-day living is far from intolerable because they are able
to control males over a wide field of relationships.

462 Men, excluded in the main from domestic duties around the tent, per-
424 form tasks to which their legal rights are tied. While women have access
231 to wells for water used by human beings, the transport of larger quantities
of water over longer distances, requiring the use of camels, is a task which
falls to the men. Watering of animals is done by men. Only they can
slaughter the animals for food. The meat of an animal slaughtered by a
woman is not "free," in a ritual sense, for human consumption. In an
extremity only, a woman can, in effect, kill an animal, but the knife which
cuts its throat must be held in a male hand, even if it is the hand of a very
462 small boy. The exploitation of the land is also the male prerogative. They
[424] plough and sow the grain; incidental help may be provided by wives working
[241] alongside their husbands during the early part of reaping, but the main
reaping is done entirely by men. Transportation of grain to the mounds is
also carried out by men, and it is they only who have access to the grain
stores when quantities are withdrawn for family use. Sheep-shearing is
[236] carried out entirely by males,[10] the fleeces are stacked by them and the
[432] distribution and sales of these is directed by the male head of the tent.

Additional to these major tasks which males undertake are a number of
minor ones. Men sew strips of cotton together to make clothes for both
sexes. They also make rope of grass, albeit in a desultory sort of way, by
[334] twisting together the strands between the palms of the hands. A number of
other tasks fall to the men by virtue of the fact that the sexes are separated
• [342] in the tent by a divider of blanket material, which may be taken down
when only members of the elementary family are about, but which is put

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[461] [10] This work is reserved for the younger men and takes the form of a festival during
[533] which lewd songs are sung and poems with obscene themes or references are recited
[538] loudly and within the hearing of elders, in a manner not dissimilar to the behaviour
of bachelors at a wedding.
[831]

462

in position immediately anyone else appears at the entrance to the tent.[11] [834]
Women cook, but they do not serve the meal to males, nor are they re- [342]
sponsible for the distribution of meat among them. Parts of an animal are [264]
carefully specified, and the various portions distributed at a meal carry 264
with them a great deal of significance. A host can honour, flatter, disap- 574
point or even insult his guest, depending on the precise distribution of meat 571
he adopts. Designated portions should go to certain kinsmen if they are [602]
present, but this still leaves a wide margin of choice, and a host can use
this choice as part of the many means at his disposal for directing his re-
lationships with other men. A political link can be forged or another
snapped by the distribution of portions of meat at the commensal meal.

The Bedouin Ideal Type of Family as a Unit of Production

This account of the division of labour is far from inclusive of all the tasks 594
carried out. The details given are only barely sufficient to provide some 183
indication of the necessary composition of a family. Referring again to the [462]
Bedouin sentiments about the matter, it is now possible to give it some
numerical precision. The number of females should be a minimum of
about three, including a mother, a teen-age daughter and a child of about
eight years. Males should number about six: a father, relieved of most
chores to act as director; a son in his middle to late twenties, to plough; a [857]
second son, in his early to middle twenties, to herd the camels; a third, in [883]
his late teens to early twenties, to shepherd the sheep; a fourth, middle to [462]
late teens, to look after the goats; and a younger son to fetch, carry and [561]
run errands about the camp. The family of the ordinary Bedouin, they say,
shows this sex and age distribution, although they recognise that a politically [554]
ambitious man with the wealth to match his aspirations would require more [556]
of both sexes — particularly women, since the burden of entertainment in-
creases rapidly with a man's climb to power and fame.

Clearly, the basis of Bedouin sentiment concerning family structure is its 121
approximation to an ideal production unit. Some families display the features
of this ideal, but even they enjoy the productive benefits of this composition 183
for a very limited period only. The family, as described above, can only be an 594
ephemeral unit, since the age structure constantly changes, women are re-
moved by marriage, men move away and death affects it at any point at any
time. The Bedouin family is a fiction in the sense that it can be said to have a
characteristic composition. The mistake they make is to conceive of it as a
particular kinship structure related to production. The substance of what
has been referred to as a fiction is that, if viewed as a productive unit, it
bears close consistency with reality. Freed of the need to examine it in terms
of specifically limited kinship relationships, and no longer anchored to the [621]
inhabitants of a single tent, the distribution of people according to sex and

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[11] This is the general rule. In practice, the use of the divider can indicate an intimacy or distance in relationships, most subtly.

175 the Bedouins of the Hijaz area. This Sanusi success aroused
795 the jealousy and animosities of the orthodox 'ulama ("clergy")
[798] of the Mecca area. Al-Sanusi was forced to flee the Arabian
[793] peninsula, and in 1843 he founded his first zawiya ("lodge"),
[346] al-zawiya al-baida, in Cyrenaica. The Sanusi doctrine was as
acceptable to the Bedouins of Cyrenaica as it had been to the
[793] tribes of the Hijaz. The person and teachings of al-Sanusi
al-kabir ("the grand Sanusi"), as he came to be known, fit
into the "holy man" religious tradition of Cyrenaica and even
spread beyond into the Sudan and Lake Chad area. The Order
[993] showed primary concern for the people of the desert: the
[346] Sanusi shaikh ("holy man") cared for the poor, and the zawiya
[485] became rest stops, storehouses, and religious centers where
[794] Bedouin children were taught their Quranic lessons. Through
175 the zawiya, the Sanusiyya became a political and economic
795 integrating factor in the desert, and al-Sanusi became the
346 182 legitimate authority of the Bedouins. The zawiya became a
[793] very important part of the traditional desert economic system.
Today one zawiya remains near al-Qasr but it is scarcely used.
The Bedouins say: "Before, when Alexandria was far away by
camel, we could get what we wanted at the zawiya. Now that we
have trucks and trains no one goes to the zawiya."

175 The fortunes of the Bedouin became linked with those
795 of the Order. When the Sanusi became involved in full-scale
648 conflict with the Italian colonial power, the Bedouins bore

*795 poured its vitality southwards along the trade routes to the
793 interior of Africa, into Fazzan and the various regions that are
797 to-day called the French Sahara and French Equatorial Africa.
159 Until France opened up the Atlantic seaboard, much of the
Central African trade found its way along the oases-routes to
*175 the ports of Cyrenaica and Tripolitania and there were, therefore, well-established social connexions running from the Bedouin tribes of Cyrenaica and southern Tripolitania through the oases-dwellers to the tribes of the interior, for the nomads of Libya controlled the routes and to a large extent supplied the transport for the caravans. These connexions allowed an easy ingress to the Sanusiya. The two Cyrenaican tribes who chiefly traded with the Sahara, the Majabra and the Zuwaya of the oases of Jalu and al-Jikharra, had already been won over to the Order. The Zuwaya, who had date groves in the distant oasis archipelago of Kufra, over 700 km. to the south of Jaghbub, had already promised the Grand Sanusi a liberal donation of palms and water if he would build a zawiya there, and he had sent one of his followers to supervise the erection at al-Jauf of a lodge which became known as Zawiyat al-Ustad. Also, the Order had gained a foothold in the Wadai. While still a student at Mecca the Grand Sanusi had made friends with Muhammad Sharif, a prince of the Wadai, who in 1838 became Sultan of that country and furthered the interests of the Order there. It is said also that the Grand Sanusi bought a caravan of slaves on its way from the Wadai through Jaghbub to the coast and, having freed and educated them, sent them back to the Wadai as his missionaries.[1] The Order was also infiltrating from Mizda in southern Tripolitania, where a lodge was founded in 1845, and from the lodges in the oases of the Sirtican hinterland into Fazzan.

*795 In Jaghbub oasis the Grand Sanusi set about the construc-
793 tion of his headquarters, a large mass of stone buildings, some
of them two-storied, enclosing a mosque and school which were,
159 for Cyrenaica, on an imposing scale. Around these central
*175 buildings and courts were the houses of the *Ikhwan*, many of
346 them teachers in the school, of the students, of whom Shaikh Muhammad 'Uthman says that there were over 300,[2] and of the Sayyid's family. There were also guest-rooms, quarters for the

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[1] Duveyrier, op. cit., pp. 18-19.

[2] Op. cit., p. 88.

795*

slaves, kitchens, and wells. The oasis depression was studded 793
with date palms and just outside the main entrance to the village 159
were small irrigated gardens and wind-mills. The people had 175*
to use the brackish water for ordinary purposes, but sufficient [346] •
fresh water for tea was obtained from infrequent showers by [241]
hollowing out cisterns in the rocks at the top of the western [379]
escarpment of the oasis. [312]

The Grand Sanusi was not only a very learned man and a [217]
writer of distinction but also a bibliophile with a fine library of some 8,000 volumes,[1] mostly works on Islamic law and jurisprudence, mysticism, philosophy, history, koranic exegesis, poetry, and astronomy and astrology. Round him were many men capable of making good use of this substantial library. Indeed, it would have been difficult to have found anywhere in the Islamic world at that time, outside Cairo, a circle of better scholars. Poetry was one of the arts most cultivated at the oasis and I have been told by Arabs that it reached a high level of excellence. Shaikh Muhammad 'Uthman, himself a poet, wrote that at Jaghbub one meets 'literary men of distinction, whose writings eclipse those of the poets of Iraq and of Andalousia'.[2]

The whole community at Jaghbub may have numbered round about 1,000, but it is not possible to make more than a guess at the figure. As the oasis produces little except dates, the supply problem must have been considerable, and we know that the Grand Sanusi kept herds of camels to the west of the oasis, where there is scrub grazing, and at al-'Azziyyat, to transport supplies from the coast. The community lived very largely on the surplus revenues, mostly goods in kind, sent annually by all the zawiyas of Cyrenaica.

The community was centred round the University. It was, [873]
in fact, almost purely a University society, and its importance as such in the history of the Sanusiya Order is very considerable. Here, under his personal supervision and the supervision of his disciples, far from worldly distractions, the Grand Sanusi was able to train the future leaders of the Order. The Shaikhs of the lodges of the Order were appointed by him from among his intimate circle of disciples, many of whom had followed him

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[1] Duveyrier, op. cit., p. 24; Muhammad bin 'Uthman, op. cit., p. 88; Sir Richard Burton, *Personal Narrative of a Pilgrimage to al-Madinah and Meccah* (Memorial Edition), 1893, vol. ii, pp. 24–5.

[2] Op. cit., p. 88.

*175 is not to be built till the zawiya is completed. There will be
*795 builders and carpenters among the Brothers and all that is
793 required of the tribal Shaikhs is selection of the site and supervision of the work. He points out to them that the work is for their benefit, in that they and their sons will receive in the zawiya an education, especially in the Koran and in the laws of Islam, and will be able to worship there. The Grand Sanusi then cites passages from the Koran and the *Hadith* commending religious benefactions. Finally he prays God to assist those engaged in the building and those who have made themselves responsible for the upkeep of the zawiya. God helps those who help others. A man reaps what he sows.

*795 Some of the Cyrenaican lodges were larger than others but they all had the same features, a straggling warren of stone
● 346 buildings comprising a mosque, schoolrooms, guest-rooms, apartments for the Shaikh of the zawiya and his family, rooms for teachers and pupils, and houses for the Brothers, clients,
[241] and servants, and their families. Many had small gardens nearby and the local cemetery was usually adjacent to a lodge.
[764] Jaghbub, where several hundred persons lived, was the largest of such communities. The ruins of Dariyana and al-'Azziyyat
[792] are also extensive and must have housed several hundred persons, but the average lodge probably housed only some fifty to a hundred persons, including wives and children, though there were often *Marabtin* families attached to the zawiya living nearby, sometimes in caves dating from classical times. The importance of a lodge was not to be estimated so much by the number of its occupants as by its tribal position and the number of its Bedouin adherents.

*795 The Shaikh of a new zawiya would point out to the local tribesmen that he and his companions had no means of support-
793 ing themselves or of maintaining the zawiya. The various
425 sections nearby then gave to the lodge the lands adjoining it, this estate surrounding a lodge being known as its *haram*. On the plateau the lodges were generously endowed with arable, in the steppe with wells, and in the oases with date-palms and springs. Later, further gifts of arable, wells, springs, and date-palms, or part use of these, would sometimes be made, especially when there was a dispute between two sections about ownership of property and neither would give way to the other,

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1: Obermeyer E-5 (1964-1965) 1969 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9
'Aishaibat

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●361
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
JABAL
AL-AKHDAR
SALLUM
AL-QASR
MARSA MATRUH
ALEXANDRIA
CAIRO
Libyan
Plateau
SIWA
CYRENAICA
WESTERN
DESERT
LIBYA
U. A. R.
SCALE APPROX. :
1 INCH = 176 MILES

EGYPT AND CYRENAICA

FIGURE I

312 cisterns spread throughout the Western Desert. Many of them are still used by the Bedouins for watering their livestock. The southernmost part of the catchment area provides grazing for sheep. Northward near the coast, where the soil deposit permits, barley is cultivated.

311 The Bedouins divide al-Qasr into "the good life"
823 (*ma'isha simha*) on the coast, and "the bad life" (*ma'isha*
[103] *wihsha*) in the desert. *Ma'isha simha* consists of two zones:
the *shatt* or *sahil* (i.e. "the coast," "as far as one can still
see the sea"), and the area of *sha'ir wi mar'a* ("the barley
and pasture area"). *Ma'isha wihsha* is the zone beyond the
plateau where nothing grows, the *daf'a* or *sibta* ("uncultivable
•361 land which is sandy and stoney"). All of the Bedouins of
al-Qasr are settled permanently either on the coast or just
south in the barley and pasture area. Nomadic and semi-nomadic activity disappeared generations ago in this part of
the desert.

823 When the Bedouins speak of al-Qasr, they are referring
103 to an area which is traditionally defined. When the Egyptians
131 speak of al-Qasr, they are referring to a "village" only
recently incorporated. The difference is a substantial one
and not merely a difference in dialect. The Bedouins use the
term *mintaqit al-Qasr* ("the area, or territory, of al-Qasr"):
the Egyptians say *qaryit al-Qasr* ("the village of al-Qasr").
000 As the Bedouins view it, the Western Desert is the *watan*

131 view it, the Western Desert is the *watan*
619 ("homeland") of the Awlad 'Ali tribe, and is subdivided into
631 tribal zones each referred to as a *mintaqa*. *Mintagit al-Qasr*
is part of *mintaqit qabilit 'Aishaibat* (i.e. "the area of
al-Qasr" is part of "the territory of the 'Aishaibat tribe").
131 Each tribal *mintaqa* is further broken down into contiguous
619 parcels of land belonging to lineages, and these are also
*613 referred to as *mintaqa*; for instance, there is *mintaqa*
631
[423] *'ailit Ma'fas*, i.e. "the territory of the Ma'fas family."
In the al-Qasr segmentary lineage society, genealogical ties and local ties are coincidental. The boundaries of al-Qasr are defined by the agnatic lines of the 'Aishaibat tribe and include the *sahil* and *sha'ir wi mar'a* zones.

•361 To the Egyptians, a *qarya* ("village") is a nucleated
631 cluster of permanent dwellings with some degree of social
integration: al-Qasr is a *qarya* for administrative matters. The Bedouins, who think in terms of kin-based residence groups, tribal boundaries, and political and economic symbiotic relations, see the Egyptian *qarya* as only a sector of al-Qasr. They refer to this sector as the *'izba*, i.e., "farm" or "rural settlement." The *'izba* is land fertile enough to support a secure and sedentary life. "The *'izba*," the Bedouins say, "is the seed of the *madiina*" (city).

[[121]] For my own purposes, the Bedouin sense of al-Qasr is
the more useful concept. Al-Qasr is all of the territory of
[[131]] the 'Aishaibat tribe. Situated at 31°N and 27°E, al-Qasr is

361 directly on the Mediterranean coast. The _'izba_ sector is
631 just 14 kilometers due west of Marsa Matruh, and about 300
131 kilometers due west of the coastal city of Alexandria.

161 In 1960, the population of the whole Western Desert
162 was 98,000, the majority being of Bedouin stock. Considering that Egypt is a country with a 2 - 1/2 per cent rise in birth rate per year, the desert population would have been about 127,000 in 1965 when I was in the field. The town of Marsa Matruh, which is the capital of the Province of Matruh (formerly the Western Desert Province) has a population of about 7,000. With increasing economic and political concern for the desert provinces and the oases, this number should continue to rise.

131 _Mintaqit al-Qasr_ (see Figure 4)[1] is an area which measures about six kilometers from east to west along the sea, and about ten to fifteen kilometers on a north-south line extending into the desert as far as the Libyan plateau. The
162 population of al-Qasr is less easy to determine. In 1960, al-Qasr, by official count, consisted of 225 families, 595 males and 749 females, or a total of 1344 souls. Al-Qasr, as
[631] the Bedouins define it, includes the _qarya_ and six other demographic cections separately defined by the Egyptian government. The population of this al-Qasr is 2,996, 1,287 males and 1,709
[114] females. There is reason to doubt any census figures of the al-Qasr area because the Bedouins are reluctant to reveal their

[1] [See p. 67--Analyst]

162 true numbers. As recipients of aid programs, their rations
114 are based upon the number of members per family. For these
[657] purposes, they are anxious to present as high a population
figure as possible. They exaggerate their livestock count in
order to receive more fodder, and, at other times, underestimate
their numbers to escape taxes.

162 For purposes of this study, the Bedouin population of
161 al-Qasr is about 1,500 to 3,000. Most of this population lives
•361 on the coastal area and in the cultivable wadi areas. The
remainder is scattered south of the plateau region, near the
621 desert proper. The 'izba sector of al-Qasr may be described
*613 as a nucleated cluster or settlement, but due to the nature
of the Bedouin segmentary lineage system, with its relatively
autonomous kin-based residence groups, this sector lacks the
usual degree of social interaction and integration associated
621 with the village or hamlet. The 'izba might be described as a
*613 multi-nucleated settlement or cluster. Each lineage has its
423 own mintaqa. Each mintaqa usually has a small dry-goods store
631 owned and operated by a lineage member and catering chiefly
443 to his own lineage-mates. Water and land in the 'izba sector
423 are individually owned. In the barley-pasture area, rights
*613 621 and privileges of ownership are vested in the corporate group,
even though the Bedouins and the government claim that tribally
423 owned land is illegal. All land boundaries, whether a mintaqa
or an individual's plot, are well-marked and well-known. The

423 boundary marker is usually a pile of stones, a tree, a wadi, or, a line recorded on paper by two parties and given to a third to hold in case of future differences of opinion.

342 In the extreme southern pastoral zone, there were few
361 permanent houses but with new government land registration
[656] laws the number is increasing. The settlement pattern in this area might be characterized as a scattered homestead type, "homesteads" being defined as tents or houses whose location is permanent. Tents are seldom, if ever, moved these days even
[657] during a heavy rainy season. This is because barley production has increased, and, mainly because government aid programs supply fodder for the sheep. Bedouin shepherds in the pasture area change dwelling places, but only to move their tents from their winter protective hiding places out into the open for the springtime, or to move from their tent into the stone house for the cold, rainy winter. In either case, no real change in location is involved.

342 The tent is called bait al-'Arab ("house of the Arabs"). There are two types: the bait al-saif ("summer house"), and the bait al-rabi'a ("spring house"). The summer tent, made of "gunny" and flour sacks sewn together, is for protection from the sun. The spring tent is the real Bedouin tent. It is
[286] woven from the wool of the sheep and camel hair, and is used
[237] during the winter. Most Bedouin now say that they cannot afford
[435] the 125 Egyptian pounds (1 pound = $2.80) which the bait al-rabi'a costs to make or buy.

History of Settlement in al-Qasr

173 [166] [175] 173 *613 [912] The settlement of al-Qasr took place about 200 years ago when the Awlad 'Ali first came to the area from Cyrenaica. No historical documentation for this period exists. The various versions which the Bedouins offer are both vague and ethnocentric with reference to lineage. A point of consensus is that the zone was first claimed by Abu Mahjuba who built a large fort (qasr = "fort" or "castle") near the coast. The Bedouins say that Abu Mahjuba settled in the area of al-Qasr because "he knew good land when he saw it." He belonged to no one lineage, "he was 'Aishaibi only." All of the lineages of al-Qasr claim that their ancestors came with Abu Mahjuba and settled on the land at that time. Abu Mahjuba has been mythologized: he belongs to all of al-Qasr, a symbol of local group solidarity and fraternal equality.

173 •361 [198] Al-Qasr represents the end of nomadic life for the 'Aishaibat tribe. According to the Bedouins, each tribe and lineage took that part of al-Qasr which it preferred. If the members of the segment wanted to grow vegetables, they took land on the coast; if they preferred the "old way of life," they set up their tents in the sha'ir wi mar'a area and raised sheep. "Everything was fine," they say, "there were no land registration laws--a man was free." Al-Qasr was settled [619] "after the wars" (with the Hanadi), and it was only then that the Awlad 'Ali broke up into tribes. The 'Aishaibat took the

173 land along the coast: "This land was free, and the man who
•[361] planted on it owned it. We call this (method of claiming land)
[425] wad'a-l-id ("laying on of the hand," i.e. seizure). There was
[423] plenty of freedom in those days. A man could farm or keep
animals." Planting and caring for the land is not novel to
the Bedouins of al-Qasr.

423 The Bedouins claim that the pattern of land distribution
425 established during the time of Abu Mahjuba prevails today.
656 Further, they say that these rules will never change, no matter
[178] what laws come out of Cairo: "Land registration can mean nothing
where the tribes are concerned, for no Bedouin would be willing
to take the land of another Bedouin. The government forces us
to register our land so that it can be stated in the newspaper that they are giving the Bedouins land."

*613 The relationship between ecology and lineage territory
423 is not striking, such as in the case of the Cyrenaican Bedouins
182 of Libya (Peters 1960). In most cases, lineage territories run
on a north-south line cross-cutting the coastal garden and
southern pastoral zones. Hence, lineage territories are, generally, ecologically similar rather than contrasted. However,
*613 there are exceptions. 'Ailit Shraif lineage (see Figure 3a
423 below), at the western end of al-Qasr's 'izba sector, settled
182 there "because of the abundance of underground water in this
241
[312] area: the ground is rocky here and the water comes out fresh
[361] like the Nile." Their founder, Sayyid Shraif, "specialized"

*613 in farming, and he found this land "good for raising mint and
423 vegetables." To the southeast of the *'izba*, the lineages of
182 Lazumi and Ma'fas found the land suitable for barley and
241 grazing. This area is rain-fed. There are no wells and so
[312] vegetable crops are not possible here. The members of these
lineages say that their ancestors were "real" Bedouins in
Cyrenaica, and did not wish to become farmers in Egypt. It
*613 is interesting to note that the Lazumi and Ma'fas are the
182 richest lineages in all of al-Qasr. They were, perhaps, better
184
241 able to maintain the traditional style of life which all of
the Bedouins claim is "the best." But all Bedouins of al-Qasr
depend to some degree upon horticulture or arboriculture.
[231] And most families own a few sheep or goats. Both Lazumi and
Ma'fas garden in their coastal sections, and Shraif members own
sheep.

656 Land registration has a history in the Western Desert.
423 The government attempted it a number of times, but with little
success until 1959 when the General Desert Development Organization
(GDDO) undertook its program of land reclamation. But the
•361 Bedouins were settled long before this. In al-Qasr, the Bedouins
342 began to erect permanent stone dwellings on the land about the
178 time of the First World War. In the Matruh area, elder informants
agree that before 1914 the Bedouins lived in tents outside the
361 town area. When the British came, they began to move into town.
648 Many of the Bedouins built houses in Matruh between the years

361 1925 and 1930 because, as they point out, the British
648 administration provided employment for "the poor Bedouin."
361 The wealthier Bedouins who owned camels and large numbers of
556 sheep remained in the desert. Just the reverse is happening
178 at the present time. The rich men who see the advantages in
business, and the comforts which Matruh offers, can also
afford the change of residence or the maintenance of two
residences.

175 In 1922, the Egyptian government first registered land
423 in al-Qasr. At this time, they sanctioned the tribal division
657 of territory which existed. There was no attempt to force
political integration upon the Bedouins. Egypt has never had
a nomad problem as have other Middle Eastern countries. The
history of Egypt is essentially the history of the Nile Valley.
Consequently, it is not odd that we find no mention of the
Awlad 'Ali in the historical record. The Bedouins of the
Western Desert were resigned to their place in the desert, and
the central government saw no particular advantage or disadvantage
in this.

423 Concern for the Bedouin minority in Egypt emerged only
648 with nationalistic programs of modernization. In 1954, the
Fourth United Nations Social Welfare Seminar for Arab States
in the Middle East convened in Baghdad. From this meeting
came some general recommendations for dealing with the problems
of the Bedouin. The major proposal was calculated to transform

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•361
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

FIGURE 5
SAMPLE OF LAND TENURE IN IZBA SECTOR

WHITE SAND DUNES
N
UNCULTIVABLE STONEY HILL
SCALE = 1:4,000 (APPROX.)
○ = WELLS
□ = PERMANENT DWELLINGS

102
423
312
● 361



FIGURE 6
SAMPLE OF LAND TENURE IN SHA'IR WI MAR'A SECTOR

SCALE = 1:4,000 (APPROX.)
O = WELLS
□ = PERMANENT DWELLINGS
N

Yet, even when the problem of role definition was solved, it was still difficult to follow closely all aspects and phases of any particular dispute. This was mainly the result of the semi-nomadic nature of the population. In settled communities, the anthropologist usually finds himself in the midst of the social life of the community. He might not be a part of it, but at least a major portion of it is happening around him. In the case of nomadic or semi-nomadic populations, the situation is different. There were no large tribal concentrations in the area. The largest residential unit was the camp, and it consisted of no more than thirteen tents which changed in composition quite rapidly. In one camp, out of the thirteen tents which were there when I joined, only six remained unchanged by the time I left three months later. Originally I had planned to stay in the small village of El-Hammam, which was believed to be in the tribal route of the major tribal segment in the area. It took me only a few weeks to realize that the tribal segments did not follow any definite migratory route, and for more than four weeks I saw nothing of the life of the group more than the few individuals who came occasionally to the small settlement to buy tea or sugar, or to catch the train to Alexandria. It was then that I decided to leave the settlement and live with the camp. My stay in the camp was very insightful as far as information about the daily activities of the camp members and the relationship between the camp and other tribal segments in the area. But the camp was a very small group and fairly isolated. Besides, there was no way of knowing how typical that camp was to the other camps in the area. I finally decided that the best strategy was to live with a number of camps in the surrounding area for relatively short periods of time, making my base of operation a relatively settled camp in close proximity to a number of other camps.

114
123
361
[627]

[621]

[487]

613 Written agreements such as the above are becoming more common in
625 the area. The need to have the responsibility of the vengeance group
[178] or the Amar recorded and the names of its members listed stems from the
[361] increase in the geographical mobility of individuals and separate households
[464] seeking jobs with the government organizations in the area or with
the various industries in the towns and cities outside the Western Desert.
233 The uncertainty of pastoral nomadism and the delicate balance which exists
178 between pastures, animal population, and human population is pushing an
182 ever-increasing number of people to abandon the way of life which they
had lived for generations. Animals are extremely important to sustain
233 the pastoral life of Awlad Ali. Once the balance between the pasture and
182 the animal population is upset by a draught, a segment of the human population
731 has to make new adjustments. This adjustment is first made by
166 moving with one's flocks to areas in the Delta or in the Cyrenaica region
of Libya. This is a short-term adjustment, however, and cannot be continued
for long periods of time. Pastures in the Delta have to be purchased,
and in most cases the owner of the herd has to sell part of his
[619] herd to feed the rest. The Cyrenaica pasture is very limited and restricted
by the strong tribal control of the Cyrenaica Bedouins, who in
general are not friendly with many of the tribal segments living in the
233 Egyptian Western Desert. If the draught continues beyond a certain time,
731 the individual owner of a herd may find himself forced to sell the herd
464 434 and seek other modes of subsistence in the form of part-time or full-time
182 employment as a semi-skilled or unskilled worker with the government or
industrial organizations. Such jobs are usually viewed as a temporary
source of income to help the individual and his immediate family live

613 individuals. He settles disputes among them and represents them in their
[627] disputes with outsiders. He is also the spokesman of his Bait in all
matters involving the relationship of the Bait with the other tribal seg-
[682] ments. He is responsible for the collection of the bloodmoney from mem-
bers of his Bait and has the authority to confiscate property of individual
members who refuse to pay their share. When a member is financially unable
to pay his share, the Aqila is expected to pay for him and collect at a
later time when the member is in a position to make such payment.

613 Originally the position of the Aqila was a hereditary one with the
428 position passing from father to son. However, in recent years the rigid-
178 ity of the patrilineal descent as the basis of succession to the position
of the Aqila has been modified radically and other principles of selec-
613 tion have been introduced. The working of the principles underlying the
128 selection of the Aqila will be analyzed in detail in the following chapter
through the close examination of one of the major legal cases which oc-
curred during my stay in the area.

613 Thus each Bait is a division of one of the Eilas and this has its
[423] place in the formal tribal system. It constitutes a group with definite
usufruct rights to land and a formally recognized leadership.

621 But the actual residential units in which Awlad Ali live are not
[613] baits but parts of them in the form of separate camps or "nagei". The
camps constitute the primary communities of Awlad Ali. A camp consists
[594] of a number of tents ranging from four to twelve. Each tent is usually
occupied by one nuclear family of a husband, his wife and children. In
[595] cases of polygynous marriages, each wife usually occupies one tent with
[361] her children. Each camp is separated from the next one by a distance
which ranges from two to ten kilometers.

621 which ranges from two to ten kilometers. The camp coincides with the
233 herding unit. The herd of the camp is usually grazed as a unit, often
621 by a paid shepherd hired by the members of the camp as a whole. Originally
233 the camp moved as a unit for grazing. This was essential in the
621 era of the tribal warfare and raiding where the security of the herd
● 361 and that of the people depended on such collective movement. In a type
178 of organization adapted to periodical movement, the camp offered the
optimum sized community: small enough to permit easy movement and large
enough to offer the kind of protection which individual families could
621 not have offered. In this era the camp seemed to have been a closely
178 knit group. Many of the informants still remember the time when the
622 camp was under the strong control of the headman who made the major decisions
361 of where and when the camp should move. It was those decisions
233 that determined the safety and the security of the group. The headman
had strong authority over members of his camp. Such authority was based
mainly on his ability to exercise valid judgments as to whether or not
the group should move and the route that it had to take if movement was
decided upon. At the present time, and with the diminishing of raiding
and tribal warfare in the area, the authority of the headman seems to
have diminished along with it. The camp appears at the present time to
be mostly a residential unit with minimal leadership and with a rapidly
changing composition. Different families join the camp at different
times during the year.

621 Although the membership of the camps is drawn from the bait, a camp
613 does not, in terms of its genealogical composition, make up a descent
segment of that Bait. The membership of a camp is based on a completely

622 His main function is to manage the affairs of the village, apprehend
554 criminals, report and register births and deaths, collect taxes and
represent the government in all matters involving the relationship between the government and his village. Because of his position as the
[661] representative of the govrernment, he usually enjoys a considerable
amount of power which, over the years, many omdas have used it to obtain personal benefits.

361 In 1958 the committee appointed for the examination of the possi-
631 bility of applying the system to Awlad Ali noticed that villages in the sense of a compact settlement similar to that existing in the rural area simply do not exist in the Western Desert region. There are a few settled communities in the area but they are scattered homes or a few stores. These communities have no identifiable boundaries or adminis-
631 trative existence. The area as a whole is divided into ten adminis-
634 trative districts, each having a police station. These districts cor-
[625] respond to the old Senusia Zawyas which played an important role in
[795] maintaining order in the era until the First World War. Until that time
[175] the area was divided into fourteen zones each of which was under the
795 jurisdiction of one of the zawyas. The zawyas were mainly religious
175 centers, or shrines, inhabited and directed by a member of the Senusi
[793] order of Cyrenaica. The role of the head of the zawya was to teach the
Qoraan and spread the teachings of the Senusi order. One of the ways
[794] the zawyas attracted followers was through distribution of food and
clothing to those who joined it. The zawyas also provided places of
[798] refuge for those who needed protection since no one could force his way
into the sacred zawyas. Because of their religious position which put

795 Because of their religious position which put
175 them outside the tribal structure, the leaders of the zawyas played a
627 significant role in mediation and settling disputes between various tri-
793 bal segments. At their disposal was their ability to ostracize anyone
[626] who did not abide by their decision from the zawyas, which meant depriv-
ing him from all the benefits, social as well as religious, that membership in the zawyas offered.

795 After the First World War when the British replaced the Turks as
175 governors of the area, the zawyas were closed and the religious leaders
177 ordered to leave. The zoning established by the zawyas existed, however,
[648]
[631] and was used as the basis for the redistricting of the area. Police
[625] stations replaced the religious centers. From the standpoint of the tri-
619
634 bal population itself, the districts have no psychological or political
[795] reality. The zawyas were originally established in the areas of tribal
[361] concentrations. But the area itself did not have any political identity.
The only reality from the standpoint of the inhabitants was the tribal reality and affiliation which cut across many of these districts. Many of the tribal segments inhabiting one district were and still are hostile
177 to one another. To transform the zones into administrative districts and
634 to establish one office of leadership for the whole district was to im-
619 pose a political unity nonexistent among the tribal segments inhabiting
[622] the district. To avoid this difficulty, the government supplemented the
territorial principle of the omda system in the rural area with the principle of tribal representation and came up with a system which seems to suite the situation in the Western Desert. For each of the districts, a list of all tribal segments which habitually occupy the area and whose tribal land is located within the district, is made. The most powerful

2: Mohsen E.O-5 (1958-1966) 1971 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9
Awlad Ali
184

APPENDEX II


MEDITERRANEAN SEA
البحر الأبيض المتوسط
الاسكندرية
ALEXANDRIA
LIBYA
SENENAH
MAHAF
EGNA
KATTA
VARAW
GENEISHAT
AWLAD KHANUF
AWLAD KHAROUF
GEMEI'AT
SANAGRA
KATALFA
GEMEI'AT
SAMALOUS
AGGAR
SHEHEIBAT
GWABY
ASHBET
A W L A
أولاد ع
SEKEIHAT
QATTARA
DEPRESSION
SIWA OASIS
قبائل البدو
وخريطة طرق الساحل الشمالي
BEDOUIN TRIBES
ROAD MAP OF NORTH COAST
REFERENCE
علامات
102
131
619
491
361
133

savants, and later at Mecca. He is said to have been an eloquent 795*
and inspiring leader and he was evidently an able organizer. 793
Unlike his father the Grand Sanusi and his nephew Sayyid 159
Ahmad al-Sharif he has left no writings behind and he seems 175*
to have had less interest than they in literature and speculation. He lived an austere life and was considered by his followers to have been a saint and worker of miracles as great, or greater, than his father.

The Order expanded considerably under Sayyid al-Mahdi's leadership, particularly into the Sahara and the Sudan, and its greatly extended missionary enterprises demanded his personal
attention. The conversion of the heathen and semi-heathen [797]
tribes of these regions created political problems and the trading
activities of the Order required organization. The trade routes [487]
through the Libyan oases to the coast had increased in importance since the rise of the Sudanese Mahdi in 1881 had closed the Nile route. Personal direction was difficult from Jaghbub, so in 1895 Sayyid al-Mahdi moved the seat of the Order to Kufra, a more central position than Jaghbub in the theocratic empire being slowly built up. He first went to live at the zawiya of al-Ustad but shortly afterwards built a new zawiya, in which he resided, on a site which became known as al-Taj. He departed from Jaghbub amid the lamentations of his followers, only some of whom he was able to take with him to Kufra, leaving the rest behind at Jaghbub, with his nephew al-
Sayyid Muhammad 'Abid as his titular representative there. 175*

There are few places in the world so remote as Kufra oasis, 795*
but it was at the centre of the Sanusi empire and the meeting- 793
place of a number of important desert routes. Before Sayyid 159
al-Mahdi made it the seat of his Order, Kufra had been little 487
more than a watering place for caravans and the centre for the 437
wandering Tibbu tribes of the region, though the Zuwaya of [361]
al-Jikharra went there each year to collect dates. It now became an emporium through which caravans were constantly passing and exchange was carried on. The Sanusiya profited both by directly engaging in trade and transport and through customs dues.

The little village of mud and palmwood houses at al-Taj also 795*
became a centre of religious life and propaganda. The mis- 793
sionary efforts of the Order intensified all over Fazzan and into 159
175*
[797]

KEY

102 1. al-'Arq
133 2. al-'Arqub
3. Asqafa
131 4. Aujila
● 361 5. al-'Azziyyat
619 6. Banghazi
7. Bishara
8. Dariyana
9. Darna
10. al-Fayidiya
11. al-Hamama
12. al-Haniya
13. al-Huwaiz
14. Jaghbub
15. Janzur
16. al-Jarfan
17. al-Jikharra
18. Khashm Rzaiq
19. al-Libba
20. al-Makhili
21. Mara
22. Marada
23. al-Marassas
24. Maraziq
25. al-Marj
26. Martuba
27. Mirad Mas'ud
28. Maus
29. al-Naufiliya
30. al-Nayyan
31. Qafanta
32. Qarabarbi
33. al-Qasrain
34. al-Qasur
35. al-Qatafiya
36. Shahhat
37. al-Tailimun
38. Talmaitha
39. Tart
40. Taukra
41. Umm Hafain
42. Umm al-Razam
43. Umm Rukba
44. Umm al-Shakhanab
45. al-Zawiya al-Baida


19°
20°
32°
31°
30°
29°
Banghazi
Barce
Suluq
Al Sl
Al-Zuwaitina
Ajdabiya
Al-Naufiliya
Al-Aqaila
Marada
AL MAGHARBA
WADI AL-FARIGH

THE CHI

[facing p. 34, A]

3: Evans-Pritchard E-4, 5 (1942-1944) (1837-1942) 1949 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9 Sanusi

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
21°
22°
23°
24°
25°
Marsa Susa
Darna
Al Qubba
Al Qaiqab
Khowalan
Al-Bomba
Tubruq
Akrama
Al Burdi Sulaiman
Bir Hakeim
Al-Sallum
31°
30°
29°
Jaghbub
AL-BARASA
AL-ABID
FAYID
ABAIDAT
FAWAKHIR
WADI AL-MRA
AL-ANAJILA
Al Jikharra
Aujila
Jalu
AL-MAJABRA
Contours in metres
Tribal boundaries
Towns
Place names
Zawiyas
Scale
0 10 20 50 80 110 kms

EF TRIBES OF CYRENAICA (after De Agostini)

[facing P. 34, B]

Europeans consider to be a low level of civilization. They do 433
not feel the need for expensive roads and ports, electric light, 511
wireless sets, telephones, schools, churches, newspapers, and 182
so forth; and clearly their economy could not support them.
Time and again colonists, tempted from their homes by the 182
short sea routes and the wooded plateau, have settled in the 167
country and dispossessed the Bedouin, but in the end it is the
Bedouin, and not the colonists, who have survived. When one
looks at the massive Phoenician, Greek, Egyptian, and Roman
ruins and the already half-ruined Italian towns, villages, and
farms, and then on the flimsy tents of the Arabs, one cannot
but reflect that the race is not always to the swift nor the battle
to the strong.

III

Even in the steppe country it is difficult to find a Bedouin 361
naja', camp, for the camps are pitched in hollows and on the
slopes of wadis and their feeders for shelter from rain and wind
and too many visitors. On the plateau they are hidden in the
forest. One cannot, therefore, make more than a very approximate 161
estimate of the population of any part of the country, or 162
of its distribution, by bare observation. It can, however, be
said that at present the country is underpopulated and that the
population is badly distributed between town and country, the
urban part of it, which is almost entirely unproductive, being
too large in relation to the whole.

There have been a number of estimates of the population by 161
early travellers who visited the country in Turkish times. They 175
had to make a guess at the population figure, aided by Turkish
censuses. It has been suggested on the basis of their reports
that the country then supported round about 250,000 souls.[1]
The Turkish census of 1911 gave the population as 198,345,
excluding Kufra.[2] Taking into account the various estimates
which were made during the Italo-Sanusi wars, in the interval
between them, and since, it may be said that to-day the total
population of Cyrenaica is probably round about 200,000, of
whom about a quarter live in the towns, the remainder being
tented Bedouin and a few thousand oasis dwellers.

---

[1] Dr. Gotthold Hildebrandt, *Cyrenaïka als Gebiet künftiger Besiedelung*, 1904, p. 317.

[2] Coro, op. cit., p. 20.

619 spond different social statuses. Some are classed as *Marabtin*
bil baraka, 'client tribes with the blessing' or *Marabtin al-Fatha*,
619 'client tribes of the prayer', and they often claim to be Sharifs.
778 These 'sacred' tribes, such as the Aulad al-Shaikh and most of

102
619
361
131


TUNISIA
Tarabulis
Masallata
Misurata
Al-Rujban
Al-Qal'a
AL-AMAMRA
Al-Haraba
Bani Walid
AL-HARABA
AL-RUJBAN
AL-MASHASHA
Mizda
URFALLA
AULAD BUSAIF
Sirt
Al-Naufiliya
Sinawin
AL-QADHADHFA
Ghadamis
AL-ZINTAN
Al-Tabaqa
Darj
AL-MAGHARBA
AL-ZAWIYA
AL-HARABA
AL-MAQARHA
RIYAH
AL-JAMA'AT
AULAD SULIMAN
Saukna
Hun
Waddan
Zalla
Al-Fuqha
Birqin
AL-HUTMAN
AL-HASAUNA
Sabha
Tamassa
Ghudwa
Umm Al-Aranab
Zuwila
Murzuq
Dlaim
Taghaghan
Wau Al-Kabir
Ghath
Wau Al-Namus
Al-Qatrun
AL-HARABA → Names of Tribes
Al-Haraba → Sanusiya Zawiyas
Boundary Lines
Scale
0 50 100 150 200 400 kms.

The Chief Sanusi Bedouin Tribes of Tripolitania.

619 the Masamir and Farjan, live among the *Sa'adi* as equals in
778 virtue of the prestige they derive from their descent, or supposed descent, from saints, though the free tribes do not regard
[173] them as quite like themselves. Their ancestors are almost
invariably believed to have come from the west, Morocco,
Algeria, Tunisia, or Tripolitania. This move of pious men to

619

182 *795 793 nation, was common hostility to outside interference, an ingredient supplied in measured quantities by the Turks and copiously by the Italians.

*[648]

III

[578] [361] The rudiments of Islam which the Grand Sanusi found in Cyrenaica made his teachings acceptable, delivered as they were without embellishments, to the Bedouin of the country, and the Marabout tradition which he also found there made him personally acceptable to them. His chief difficulty must have been the rivalries between tribe and tribe and between tribal section and tribal section down to the smallest sections. This difficulty was overcome by transferring the centre of the Order to desert oases, where it could not become identified with any particular tribe, and by distributing its lodges impartially throughout the tribal territories.

*795 793 *175 Of the forty-five zawiyas belonging to the tribes of Cyrenaica proper (including al-Naufiliya and excluding the Kufra lodges) probably twenty-one were founded before 1860 or during the lifetime of the Grand Sanusi, twenty-two during the lifetime of Sayyid al-Mahdi, and two when Sayyid Ahmad al-Sharif was Head of the Order.

*795 361 [175] A high proportion of the lodges of the Order in the time of the Grand Sanusi were along the line of oases on the 29th parallel, for to the lodges of the Cyrenaican oases on that line must be added those in the oases of the Sirtica, Zalla, Saukna, Hun, and Waddan, all founded round about 1855, and probably that in al-Fuqha also. Lodges were early planted in the oases partly on account of their importance as caravanserai and trading centres, partly because the oases-folk were more tractable than the Bedouin, and partly because the stability of these centres gave greater opportunity for corporate religious life. The Sanusiya certainly made a deeper religious impression on the peoples of the oases than on the Bedouin.

*795 632 361 [175] It will have been noticed also how few of the Sanusiya lodges were founded in the towns of North Africa. There are no lodges in the towns of Egypt and though the Order counts many followers in the towns of Cyrenaica and is politically dominant in them it has only one zawiya in each, Banghazi, Darna, and al-Marj; and that at Banghazi, the capital of the country, was

only founded about 1870. The Sanusiya lodge in Tripoli town 795*
was not built till 1882. It must, however, be remembered that in 361 •
Turkish times Banghazi and Darna were little more than villages 632
and al-Marj only a military post and that, as already explained, [175]*
their inhabitants were foreigners, either Jews or immigrants
from Tripolitanian towns who were generally affiliated already to
other Orders. Moreover, the Turkish administration functioned 795*
from these centres, and that alone would have prevented the 361
Grand Sanusi from making them the headquarters of his 632
mission. There could not be two governments in one large 648*
village, especially as the Grand Sanusi disapproved of the
Turks and they were suspicious of him. Also the presence of the
Turkish Government in the towns ensured order and some, even
if very small, opportunities for education and religious instruction and services, and Sayyid Muhammad bin 'Ali al-Sanusi had
settled in Cyrenaica with the express purpose of reviving the
faith and raising the culture of the totally illiterate and almost
heathen Bedouin, whose contact with the towns was negligible.
The social functions carried out by the Sanusiya lodges in 795*
Cyrenaica were more consistent with settlement among wild
tribesmen than among peaceful citizens. Propaganda of the
faith, educational work, cultivation of gardens, settlement of
disputes, provision of shelter, hospitality, and security to
travellers, and of refuge for the pursued, the weak, and the
oppressed are all functions especially appropriate to tribal and
barbarous conditions of life

The Order was based on the tribes and not on the towns. The 795*
lodges were founded by tribes or tribal sections and the tribes 619
or their sections regarded them as tribal institutions. Al-Qasur
zawiya was not just a lodge of the Order in 'Abid tribal territory. It was the 'Abid zawiya; just as al-Marj was the 'Arafa
zawiya, Shahhat the Hasa zawiya, and so on. The tribal system
and the Sanusiya organization interpenetrated. The Sanusiya
gave to the tribes a national symbol and the tribes participated
in it through their lodges. It was the combination of a common [182]
organization with representation that allowed for tribal allegiances and rivalries which provided the Order with sure
foundations.

So much was the Sanusiya organization based on the tribal
system that the distribution of the lodges may be said to

*795 423 springs and gardens there were properties of the Order, for such sites were particularly suitable for settlements of its Brothers since, unlike the Bedouin, they were sedentary and house-dwellers. In the semi-desert the Order owned, or part-owned, many of the best wells. In the oases of the 29th parallel and in the Archipelago of Kufra it owned extensive gardens and shares in springs and many thousands of date-palms. As it was a country and Bedouin Order its urban properties were inconsiderable: a few houses, mostly used as shops, in Banghazi, Darna, and al-Marj.

*795 ● 361 Anyone who studies the distribution of the Sanusiya lodges in Cyrenaica will observe that they were placed where he might expect them to have been placed on a politico-economic plan. A very large number were, as I have mentioned, built on Graeco-Roman foundations, and they were constructed on important caravan routes, on small inlets in the coast to command schooner trade, and in strong defensive positions. They were distributed to cover all the more important tribal aggregates, and the principal lodges were built at the centres of tribal life, as is especially evident among the southern nomads, who concentrate in summer time at such points as al-'Azziyat, al-Makhili, al-Nayyan, al-Qatafiya, and al-Naufiliya. In other words, where the Greeks and Romans and Turks found it convenient or essential to build villages and posts was where the Sanusiya established its lodges. Later the Italians used many of the same sites for their administrative and colonist settlements.

*795 434 On assessments made by the Italians in the early days of their occupation, in 1913 and in 1919, for twenty Cyrenaican lodges of the Order it can be reckoned that their total annual revenues were about 150,000 Lire. On this basis, as those assessed were representative, a rough estimate of the total revenue of all the lodges in Cyrenaica would be about L. 400,000 or 10,000 Pounds Sterling at the 1919 rate of exchange. Of the lodges for which assessments were made, those with the largest revenues were al-'Azziyyat, al-Qasur (L. 15,000), Msus (L. 20,000), and al-Tailimum (L. 20,000). The surpluses sent to the Headquarters of the Order were estimated for only eight of the zawiyas, and in these eight cases the surplus amounted to rather under a third of the total revenues. Gen. Rodolfo Graziani

173 Telescoping of names, and fusion of names, taken together,
178 can account for the fixity of the genealogy to a large extent. In
551 addition, lines which showed every sign of normal development
613 at one time, have petered out completely, even after they have
sometimes assumed the status of tertiary segments. Conditions
173 under which this is likely to happen are not difficult to envisage.
178 If hearsay evidence is correct, disease, when it strikes in the
551 desert, might rage in a camp like wild fire, bringing death to
613 many, but not spreading to other camps, because the camps are
731 so far apart. Even in springtime when men and beasts are together
361 in the pastures, and the larger summer camp has split into
four or five smaller ones, the distance between camps may still be
[221] a few miles. In summer, when camps are concentrated on the
large watering points, the distances between them are considerably
more. Disease, therefore, does not spread from camp to camp
as rapidly as one might expect in such primitive conditions of
living. In 1949 a number of men of a small camp died within a
[761] few days of each other. Bedouin opinion attributed these deaths
to an allegedly false oath sworn by the deceased a year earlier.
[784] Medical opinion ascribed them to filth in a well which the deceased
had been cleaning before their illness. In any event, a
173 thriving line of a lineage was wiped off the genealogy. The portion
of the Dawwas genealogy shown on this page shows a
178 similar process at work. Again, to give another example, the Nasr
613 section of the Magharba tribe once included six tertiary sections,
not four as are now given. Two of these six sections are now
represented by only four men of whom two are too old and decrepit
to have heirs any longer, and are unmarried in any case;
a third, whose wife has long passed child-bearing age, had two
sons, but both died before marriage; and the fourth, a very poor
and old man, has only one daughter, and is a widower. Three
of the four now live with their collateral tribal section, Madhkur,
and count themselves members of this group. That they once belonged
to two different groups might have passed unnoticed were
it not that two elders of the Madhkur section insisted that they
should be correctly placed and their entire genealogies be recorded.
The younger men argued that although they were aware
that the two groups named Farjiani and al-Khadhar at one time

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369

[For information on the omda, the administrative head of the rural village, see Category 622.]

613 usually has no difficulty collecting the individual shares. His own
682 [554] financial ability is rarely called upon. When a member is unable to
[178] pay for any reason, his share is divided among the able members. However,
in recent years this seems to be changing, especially among the baits
closely located to the settled communities or the urban centers. Among
613 these baits individual mobility has increased significantly with a large
178 number of younger members either leaving the area for the urban centers
166 464 or accepting salaried jobs with the government organizations. Among
369 certain baits in the area of Burg el-Arab, for example, the percentage
of adult males engaged in such jobs sometimes reaches sixty percent.
More than thirty-five out of fifty-six males constituting bait Asabei'
have a full-time or part-time job.

613 The individualistic attitudes accompanying the dependency on sal-
178 aries and living in towns and cities have their effects on the kinship
166 464 ties among members of these baits. With the prevalence of the individ-
682 ualistic attitudes among members of a certain bait, they become more
369 reluctant to pay their financial obligations and the Aqila finds it more
and more difficult to rely, for the fulfillment of the bait's financial
obligations, on the willingness of members to pay. His success within
613 554 the domain of the amar becomes more determined by his ability to pay
556 from his own money for those members of his bait who refuse or are un-
682 able to pay. Wealth becomes an important asset for the Aqila's per-
formance of his duties within the amar. When this happens, there seems
to be a certain shift in the source of political support for the Aqila.
613 In a well-integrated bait the popularity (or unopopularity) of the Aqila
554 among the other Awaqil of the amar had very little influence on his

613 position as the leader of the bait. The principle of patrilineal succession
554 is so respected in such baits that it overshadows any other consideration.
613 554 This continues to be the case as long as the kinship ties
428 within the bait remain strong. When the kinship ties in a given bait
178 weaken, the principle of patrilineal succession also weakens. This is
[166] more likely to occur in baits where a relatively large number of the
[464] members leave the area permanently or for a more or less prolonged period
613 of time, seeking jobs on a part or a full-time basis. Many of these
178 members maintain only a minimal contact with their respective baits.
166 464 They become more reluctant to fulfill their kinship obligations, especially
561 when they entail any financial liability. The older members
369 complain about how younger persons are less loyal to their elders and
how selfish they have become. "All they care about is their jobs and
the pleasure they get from the city; they are becoming city people."
Younger members, on the other hand, maintain that their reluctance to
fulfill their kinship obligations stems from their feeling that they
do not get anything in return. "Life is expensive and money is hard to
obtain. I cannot make enough money to support myself and my wife and
children and at the same time pay my cousin's financial debts," said a
member of eilat Asabei', who works as a driver with the Desert Organization
in Alexandria.

613 When this happens, there seems to be a tendency toward shifting the
554 emphasis from the bait to the eila or the amar as the source of the political
[556] support of the Aqila. This is turn makes wealth an important
basis of the Aqila's power. No more can the bait impose an ineffective
Aqila on the amar unless it is ready to back him by their own share of
money. If this is lacking as was the case with Shei'eb, there is nothing

strative posts and contain not more than a few hundred persons. 175
Shahhat and Tubruq had been Turkish posts before the Italians 632
made them administrative centres. Taukra and Talmaitha had 621
been Sanusiya lodges. Suluq and Qaminis were Italian
creations. Marsa Susa (Apollonia) was first occupied by Cretan
refugees during the Turco-Greek war of 1897. Ajadabiya, the
town of which the Arab historian al-Bakri of the eleventh
century spoke in such glowing terms, had ceased to be a settled
centre until the Turks made it an administrative post. During [648]*
the period of truce between the Sanusi and the Italians from
1917 to 1922 it became the seat of the Sanusi Amir, Sayyid
Mahammad Idris, and afterwards an Italian administrative and
commercial centre.

It has been noted that almost all the townsmen of Cyrenaica 632
are immigrants from the west, from Morocco to Tripolitania, 162
and the Bedouin regard them as foreigners and often with some 369
distaste, especially the Tripolitanian immigrants. It is true [186]
that there is a small element of Bedouin origin in the towns,
for the more stable and poorer Bedouin living near towns sometimes drift into them; but when they do so their descendants soon lose their links with the tents and their tribal status. The road to town life is a way along which there is no return, for the townsmen are not only foreigners, but their food, their speech, their dress, their manners, their interests, their loyalties, and in general their way of life and their sentiments, are different. The Bedouin visit the towns from time to time, but they do not feel at home in them, and they do not look at home in them either. In a town one can spot a Bedouin at a glance by his appearance, his step, his dignity, his naivety, and his loud voice, which sometimes startles the shopkeeper with whom he disputes a price.

The road to the towns is not only a way along which there is 632
no return, but is a one-way track. A Bedouin can become a 369
citizen, but a citizen can never become a Bedouin. He cannot 641
live the life of the tents. Hence the Bedouin say that while it is
always bad for a Bedouin girl to marry a townsman, it is possible for her to adapt herself to urban life, but it is out of the question for a Bedouin to marry a townsman's daughter, for it is impossible for her to become a daughter of the tents.

The *bwadi*, Bedouin, and the *hadur*, citizens, are separate

632 communities. They are strangers to each other who meet but
369 do not mix. There is a barrier between them and each distrusts
641 the other. Nevertheless there is a measure of economic interdependence between them, and the tribes and the towns affect
each other politically. In Turkish times the urban population,
632 which, as we have seen, was small and contained a high pro-
439 portion of Jews, was engaged in trade and domestic industries.
438 The townsmen bought from the Bedouin animals, hides, wool, clarified butter, honey, beeswax, and ostrich feathers (ostriches
369 were still hunted in the southern steppe in those days), and they supplied the Bedouin with those things he required but could not, or would not, make for himself: tea, sugar, rice, cloth, horseshoes, musket balls, flints, gunpowder, and earthenware. The urban craftsmen also made leather goods, manufactured salt from sea water, and conducted trade and exchange. Imports came by sea from Tripoli, Marseilles, London, Malta, Alexandria, and Crete, and overland from Alexandria.

But the townsmen of Cyrenaica never dominated the country as they dominate most of the Arab lands, where through usury, intimidation, monopoly of trade, and influence in the administration and the courts they have reduced the countryman to the position of landless labourer or *métayage* serf. There was nothing in the Bedouin way of life which gave an opening to the usurer. Moreover, the towns had no monopoly of trade for, if necessary, the Bedouin could, since they were self-supporting in necessities, either go without urban supplies or obtain them overland from Egypt, as they showed during their war with the
[565] Italians. Consequently there were no rich landowning families living in the towns at the expense of the country-side, no aghas, beys, and pashas; and an educated middle class hardly existed outside the small official circle and lacked both wealth and influence. In general it may be said that in Cyrenaica the towns were not parasites on the country, but had their proper functions as trading centres and suppliers of the needs of the Bedouin population. The markets were free, not tied to town societies.

632 Nor could the Bedouin be coerced by force or law. The tribes
*648 were largely inaccessible and they were stronger than the towns,
369 even with the administration behind them. The Bedouin were not afraid of the Turkish Administration, which sat very lightly on their shoulders, and they did not use the courts. The

The Turkish Administration was centred in the towns but operated, 632
as will be explained later, through the contacts of its local 648*
officials, who were generally Arabs of the country, with the leading 571
tribal Shaikhs, with whom they made friends. These officials 369
were townsmen or sons of Bedouin who had received an urban
education and they acted as links between the citizen communities
and the Bedouin. Through Bedouin relations with
town merchants and officials what was happening in the world
outside Cyrenaica percolated to the most distant tents. Another 795*
channel of political and cultural infiltration was the network of 571
Sanusiya lodges. The Shaikh of the Sanusiya lodge at Banghazi 648*
was regarded as the ambassador of the head of the Order to the 177
Governor of Cyrenaica and he was chosen for qualities which 632
fitted him for this role. He was consulted by the Governor on 793
matters in which the tribes were involved, and through him 369
and the Brothers of the lodges of the towns news of the outside
world reached the Head of the Order in the distant oasis of
Kufra and the Heads of the local lodges, whose relations with
the Bedouin in their localities were intimate. Thus, as will be
seen, the Bedouin had a general idea of what the revolution of
the 'Young Turks' meant and were aware of the impending crisis
long before the Italian attack on their country was delivered.
But though maintaining communications with the towns, 632
neither the tribal Shaikhs nor the Sanusiya allowed themselves 571
to be subordinated to them or identified themselves with urban 795
interests. The Bedouin Shaikh did not, like the Syrian landowner, 369
feel any need to have a town house, and the Sanusiya
ever remained a country and Bedouin Order and directed its
affairs from the desert.

Town and country kept apart, with the towns dependent on 632
the country and not the country on the towns, because there 369
was in Cyrenaica no client peasantry bound by debt, need of 565
protection, and trade monopoly to the towns. The Bedouin
did not settle on the land where they would be an easy prey to
the usurer, overseer, and tax collector. Those who were defeated [167]
in the great tribal wars of the past and in the inter-tribal and
inter-sectional fighting of more recent times migrated to Egypt
and settled there as *fallahin*, and not in Cyrenaica. In Cyrenaica 565
there is not the spur of adverse climatic conditions or the lash 167
of land shortage to drive them to depart from their ancient

Order concurred. Thus we find charge of a zawiya continuing 795*
in the hands of a single family to the point at which Muhammad 793
Yahiya bin al-Sanusi bin 'Umar al-Ashhab was appointed by 423
Sayyid Ahmad al-Sharif to succeed his father as Shaikh of Msus 428
at the age of sixteen. Some of these families sent their roots so 602
deep that not only did they obtain what amounted to hereditary rights to a particular lodge, but controlled several lodges. Such were the influential families of Ghumari, Kalili, Farkash, and Ashhab, and the Khattabi families.

Hence we find to-day that many of the lodges are in hereditary charge of a family of Shaikhs who consider that they have a pre-emptive claim to its directorship and to enjoyment of its revenues, a claim backed by tribal opinion and by the acquiescence of the present Head of the Order. Thus the Dardafi family may be said to own the Shahhat lodge, the Isma'ili family to own the Fayidiya lodge, the 'Ammur family to own
the Qafanta lodge, and so on. So much is this the case that [578]
disputes now sometimes arise, as in 1942 at Qafanta and Mirad
Mas'ud, between members of a family about which of its members should succeed to the directorship of a lodge and control of its revenues.

This development is not surprising. Poor communications 795*
and the troubled times since 1911 have encouraged local auto- 793
nomy in the Sanusiya organization. The Shaikh of a lodge 428
brought up his family in it and his sons had no other home than
the lodge and no other friends than the Bedouin around it and
the families of Shaikhs in nearby lodges. Tribesmen dislike [178]
change and prefer to have for the Shaikhs of their lodges
members of families they know and who share their local
interests. But the tendency towards hereditary succession is 795*
also related to the fundamental lineage structure of the tribes 793
among whom the lodges are distributed, for it is noticeable that
whereas hereditary succession became customary in the Bedouin, 613
or tribal, lodges, it has been by comparison lacking in the urban 428
lodges of Banghazi and Darna and in those oases where tribal [369]
structure has become obscured by village life. This would seem to suggest that *Ikhwan* families tend the more easily to become stabilized as lines of hereditary Shaikhs the more closely they are associated with tribal structure. It is precisely in the most powerful, numerous, and integrated tribal sections that we

*795 which have a Maghribi origin and those which were founded in Iraq. Egyptian Orders are not represented in Cyrenaica. These facts are explained when it is pointed out that the Orders found in Cyrenaica to-day were introduced by urban immigrants from the west who settled in Banghazi and Darna as traders and [369] artisans. Whence follows the most important feature of the non-Sanusiya Orders, their urban character. With the exception of the Madaniya and a single lodge of the 'Arusiya, these Orders are represented only in the towns. Occasionally one of their lodges was built with aid from local tribesmen, as the 'Arusiya lodges at al-Marj and Tubruq, but such examples are rare and in no way invalidate the statement that the Sanusiya alone has considerable following among the Bedouin. The adherents of the single 'Arusiya lodge at Bu Zaid are Bedouin of the Aulad al-Shaikh, immigrants from Tripolitania who regard themselves as direct descendants of Sidi 'Abd al-Salam, the founder of the Order whose rite they follow. The only competitor of the Sanusiya among the Bedouin was the Madaniya, which still retains its hold on the Fawakhir of the *barqa*, a tribe ill disposed towards any authority, and a few *Marabtin* fragments elsewhere, though these Bedouin now follow Sanusiya leadership in other than purely religious matters. [798] There was at one time tension between the two Orders, complicated by tribal rivalries in the *barqa*, but it has now been for the greater part resolved. Apart from the opposition of the Sanusiya, the loss of influence of the Madaniya was hastened by its too close attachment to the fortunes of the declining Ottoman Caliphate, dissensions between the descendants of its founder, and a split in the Order itself.

*795 798 The Sanusiya has always shown marked tolerance towards other Orders and it must, moreover, be noted that there are no doctrinal differences between the Orders, that members of different Orders worship together in the same mosques, and that sometimes a man is a member of several orders at the same [793] time. We have seen that the Grand Sanusi in his early period joined a number of different Orders and our Tunisian friend Shaikh Muhammad 'Uthman seems to have made a hobby of joining them.[1] Furthermore, the founders of all the Orders are revered as saints by the common people everywhere, regardless

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[1] Op. cit., pp. 64-6 and 251.

of their affiliations. Hence the Sanusiya does not oppose the 795*
other Orders in the towns on a religious plane, although it does 798
not approve of those which are convulsionary, and they do not
compete with it politically. It is only in the interior that the
Order will not permit a rival, because competition for the
allegiance of the Bedouin must be political. Italian efforts to [648]*
play off these Orders against the Sanusiya were founded on
ignorance of the nature of an Islamic *tariqa* and seem to have
been ineffectual.

Since almost all the non-Sanusiya lodges are urban it follows 795*
that the history of the growth and spread of the Orders is 369 •
part of the general history of the growth and spread of the
urban centres of Cyrenaica. Some of the older lodges in
Benghazi and Darna are over 150 years old, but most of them
and all those in the smaller administrative centres date from
late Turkish times or were built during the Italian occupation.
An urban lodge is generally a small, very simple, structure and
its members seldom total more than 50 to 100. It may be [575]
regarded as a kind of club, founded for religious exercises, for
the performance of good works, and for social insurance. It [485]
also serves as a resthouse for travelling members of the Order
and as a *malja*, a place of refuge for the poor and the sick. Few
of the lodges are endowed, and most are very poor.

I do not wish to underestimate the social and, in the broadest 795*
sense, political importance of the urban Orders in Cyrenaica. 182
They provide the only spontaneous and co-operative associations in the towns and thus fill a gap for ordinary people both in
the town society and in a religion which pays little attention
either to corporeal works or, outside the mosques, to corporate
worship. Outside the lodges of the Orders there were in Turkish
times no associations dispensing charity or giving education,
and worship in the mosques within the wide society of Islam
does not provide the intimacy and colour men need in acts of
common devotion. The lodges give to their members a double
attachment and a double security, membership of a welfare
association, which gives them a feeling of material security, and
membership of a devotional group, which gives them a feeling
of spiritual security. Also, in spite of their lack of numbers and
organization, the urban lodges are links in chains which,
running through Islamic countries and cutting across natural

*795 and political boundaries, help to keep the Islamic world 182 together against the impact of western civilization and imperialism. A member of the Qadiriya or Rifa'iya Orders can wander from lodge to lodge from China to the Atlantic. A member of the Madaniya is received as a brother if he goes to Maknas, Istanbul, or Mecca. An 'Isawi or 'Arusi finds lodges of his Order all over North Africa, obeying the same rules, bearing the same banner, using the same books of devotion, performing the same ritual, and bound by a common brotherhood. These Orders, therefore, are not unimportant in shaping and propagating a common opinion and feeling among Muslims about any question of the day which affects Islam.

*795 But in a narrower political sense they have little importance, ● 369 even in the urban centres. They are too weak and poor to act 182 as cells in a movement of a political kind, for they show, as [668] René Brunel says of the 'Isawiya, 'lack of unity of direction' and 'absolute lack of cohesion'[1] In Cyrenaica the Sanusiya alone has been capable of becoming a political movement and hence of all the Orders alone aroused the suspicion of Istanbul and the hostility of Rome. We may inquire, therefore, what it is which has distinguished the Sanusiya from the other Orders in [186] the country. As we have noted earlier, the fakiristic exhibitions of some of the Orders, so dear to the common man in the towns, were uncongenial, even repellent, to the Bedouin, who, in any case, had no affection for the townsmen and for things emanating from the towns. Also the Bedouin, socially and morally secure in their tribal and kinship systems, felt no need for further associations. Their need was for some authority lying outside their segmentary tribal system which could compose intertribal and intersectional disputes and bind the tribes and tribal sections together within an organization and under a common [575] symbol. Hence, while the urban lodges were clubs—and this was the status of the Sanusiya lodges in the towns as much as it was that of the lodges of the other Orders—the Sanusiya lodges in the country-side were political, administrative, and economic, as well as religious and educational, centres. The urban lodges followed the social pattern in urban communities generally. Corporate life was narrowed to small quarters, single streets, a few houses, outside which people belonged, it is true, to a

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[1] *Essai sur la Confrérie religieuse des 'Aïssâoua au Maroc*, 1926, p. 53.

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residential community but felt no strong obligation to one another nor the need for common action. Religious Orders in such communities tend to become fractionized along the lines of social cleavage into sub-urban and sub-sub-urban lodges, each serving a few families in its vicinity and leading its own life with its own following and resources independently of the others. Social life in the towns is amorphous. There is no structure corresponding to the tribal system. The Sanusiya became dominant because it shunned the towns and sought its converts among the Bedouin and built its centres within the tribes. The Sanusiya Brotherhood was founded on a Bedouin brotherhood.

It is of great interest to note that the Sanusiya held a place in relation to other Orders in western Arabia like to that which it held in Cyrenaica. The learned Dutch Arabist, Snouck Hurgronje, who spent a year in western Arabia in 1884 and 1885, states that in the towns the Order 'has remained to this day highly honoured, but by no means overtopping its sister orders. For the districts of the Hejaz, inhabited by Harbis and other Beduins, it possesses however the highest significance, for its practical mission has succeeded in bringing to a great extent under its leadership the sons of the desert who are refractory to all authority and are far removed from the official Islam.'[1]

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[1] C. Snouck Hurgronje, *Mekka in the latter Part of the 19th Century*, 1931, pp. 55–6. (First published in 1888–9.) [113]

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slaves, kitchens, and wells. The oasis depression was studded 793
with date palms and just outside the main entrance to the village 159
were small irrigated gardens and wind-mills. The people had 175*
to use the brackish water for ordinary purposes, but sufficient [346]
fresh water for tea was obtained from infrequent showers by [241]
hollowing out cisterns in the rocks at the top of the western [379]
escarpment of the oasis. [312]

The Grand Sanusi was not only a very learned man and a writer of distinction but also a bibliophile with a fine library of [217] some 8,000 volumes,[1] mostly works on Islamic law and jurisprudence, mysticism, philosophy, history, koranic exegesis, poetry, and astronomy and astrology. Round him were many men capable of making good use of this substantial library. Indeed, it would have been difficult to have found anywhere in the Islamic world at that time, outside Cairo, a circle of better scholars. Poetry was one of the arts most cultivated at the oasis and I have been told by Arabs that it reached a high level of excellence. Shaikh Muhammad 'Uthman, himself a poet, wrote that at Jaghbub one meets 'literary men of distinction, whose writings eclipse those of the poets of Iraq and of Andalousia'.[2]

The whole community at Jaghbub may have numbered round about 1,000, but it is not possible to make more than a guess at the figure. As the oasis produces little except dates, the supply problem must have been considerable, and we know that the Grand Sanusi kept herds of camels to the west of the oasis, where there is scrub grazing, and at al-'Azziyyat, to transport supplies from the coast. The community lived very largely on the surplus revenues, mostly goods in kind, sent annually by all the zawiyas of Cyrenaica.

The community was centred round the University. It was, [873] in fact, almost purely a University society, and its importance as such in the history of the Sanusiya Order is very considerable. Here, under his personal supervision and the supervision of his disciples, far from worldly distractions, the Grand Sanusi was able to train the future leaders of the Order. The Shaikhs of the lodges of the Order were appointed by him from among his intimate circle of disciples, many of whom had followed him

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[1] Duveyrier, op. cit., p. 24; Muhammad bin 'Uthman, op. cit., p. 88; Sir Richard Burton, *Personal Narrative of a Pilgrimage to al-Madinah and Meccah* (Memorial Edition), 1893, vol. ii, pp. 24-5.

[2] Op. cit., p. 88.

233 178 with the movement toward a cash economy, this has changed.
[465] The shepherd receives 8 to 10 piasters for each head of sheep
which he tends. The Bedouins who have taken up farming can
spare none of their family for sheep-herding chores. If he
[497] can afford it, during the dry season, a Bedouin may ship his
sheep to the Nile Valley by train at 12 piasters per head.
But the government will not accept sheep for shipment unless
they are accompanied by a shepherd. The role of shepherd
has become a very specialized one in the al-Qasr area. Few
[554] of the al-Qasr Bedouins are shepherds, and the role is
reserved for the poorer men without land.

241 Plowing in the garden area is done by hand. Usually,
407 the plow is pulled by a donkey but occasionally, if one can
492 afford it, a camel or a horse will be used. A man and his
[462] sons handle all of the agricultural chores with the exception
178 of the winnowing process which the women do. Traditionally,
241 barley was threshed by camels plodding on it. The Bedouins say
492 that this is the best way because the soft feet of the camel
do not crush the kernel. Now, however, very few men can afford
[407] a camel. Threshing is done with a heavy wooden sled pulled by
241 a donkey or a horse. Tractors, when available, are used for
407 agricultural plowing in the southern barley zone. This zone,
434 during the year 1963, also became important for raising water-
433 melons (batiikh), and this product figures to be an excellent
cash crop for al-Qasr. Melons and barley can bring high profits

241 when planted in large quantities. The southern zone of al-Qasr
•407 is best suited for these crops, and the tractor is necessary
434
433 for a successful crop.

407 Tractors are rented through the cooperative society.
474 Local cooperative officers are responsible for seeing that all
[427] members share in the use of the tractor. But, in fact, officers
and their closer relatives monopolize the tractors. The gov-
[654] ernment has allotted to the al-Qasr cooperative five tractors.
They feel that it would jeopardize the whole program of economic
reform if they were to dictate the way in which the tractors
407 are to be used. Consequently, the tractor, like the rations
619 of foodstuffs, has become a pawn in tribal power plays. In
474 one case, not in al-Qasr, a tractor-driver who was a member of
the 'Ali Abyad tribe insisted that members of the 'Ali Ahmar
tribe pay him a 50 piaster "tip" to have their fields plowed.
Because of situations such as these, most Bedouins prefer that
cooperative membership coincide with local group membership.
It is better, they say, if the 'Aishaibat of al-Qasr have
their own cooperative because they know how to handle problems
among themselves. The government, during this transitional
period, seems to agree.

407 One reason that tractors are monopolized by a small
group is that there are not enough of the machines to handle
the plowing. Of the five tractors in al-Qasr, seldom were more
than two working simultaneously. Often, this was a result of

• 407 the lack of spare parts. Three of the tractors were Russian-built, and two were Egyptian made. The Bedouins say that the Russian tractors are the better.

407 In 1964, the Western Desert received its heaviest
241 rainfall since 1947. To take advantage of this, local government
654 officials of the reclamation project requested an additional
[132] fifty tractors for plowing on the coastal zone. They received
only six additional tractors. In that year, the thirty-nine
tractors used in the entire Western Desert were able to plow
15,240 acres of land. During this period of economic change,
731 a bad barley crop causes a fodder shortage for the animals,
233 [654] and seldom is the aid program able to compensate for this.
[166] Consequently, there is a need to ship sheep to the Nile Valley,
or to seek permission to take them to the pastures of Cyrenaica.
Both situations create tremendous difficulties for both the
Bedouins and the government. A third alternative for the
[432] Bedouin is to buy barley on the black-market. In doing this,
[435] he must pay six times the normal cost of grain, and risk
reprisals.

177 Prior to 1960, change in al-Qasr might be characterized
657 as a steady and endogenous process of sedentarization. It had
been taking place for about a century and a half. Exogenous
change, social and economic, may be identified with the desire
of the government to reclaim land in al-Qasr for agricultural
use, and to integrate the Bedouin into the national economy.

682 agreed that the sticks were not by nature lethal weapons. The
672 latter, according to the tribal law, are only guns and knives,
627 since they give the victims no chance to defend himself. They ruled the case unintentional killing for which only L.E. 300 should be paid.

682 Since Yadem and his brother were arrested by the police for
625 their crime, the payment of the bloodmoney was postponed until
692 the case was settled according to the state legal system. Only half of the bloodmoney was paid and the rest was postponed until the case was decided upon by the legal system and Yadem released.
682 This is obviously a case in which the nature of the killing was
672 decided upon by drawing upon the material aspect of criminal
673 causation. The nature of the weapon used was the major determinant
● [411] of the crime. Only guns and knives are defined as lethal; all others are non-lethal by nature, although they might cause the death of the victim. Death caused by a non-lethal weapon is considered as unintentional regardless of whether or not the actor intended the results, while death by a lethal weapon, even without the intention of killing, is classified as intentional killing, as appears in the following case.

CASE #4: The Case of the Threatened Tribesman

613
628 For more than five years Bait El-Mawi from the Sheibat tribe had been in a continuous state of feud with Bait El-Asi from the Gemeiat tribe. One night, during a Khamasein sand storm when visability was extremely low, Abd-el-Galil from Bait El-Mawi heard a noise outside his tent, and the dogs were barking indicating that a stranger was there. Being sure that someone was approaching

671
672 the irrelevance of intention in establishing liabilities for homocide
171 or injuries (1954).

672 The neglect of intention in assessing liability in cases of homo-
682 cide is evident in the cases presented above (Cases 1,2,4,5 and 6),
where compensation was paid although there was no intention established
on the part of the offender.

Awlad Ali use the Arabic word "katl" to refer to any killing. This
[192] is different from the word "mut" which means death by natural causes.
They further differentiate between "katl 'amd," or intentional killing
682 and "katl khata," or unintentional killing. Although reference here is
672 made to "intention," yet, from the above cases it is evident that the
673 basis of establishing that intention is from the type of weapon used in
effecting the death of the victim. Intentional killings are those caused
● [411] by a lethal weapon. Lethal weapons are defined as guns or knives.
Death caused by a non-lethal weapon, no matter what the intentions of the offender, is defined as non-intentional, even when the circumstances of the act indicates the actual existence of an intention on the part of the offender to cause the death of the victim (as in Case #3 above). The assumption is that the use of lethal weapons, such as daggers or guns, implies intention and possibly a certain degree of premeditation, since these weapons have no other important use. Moreover, the probability of death by a lethal weapon is much greater than from other non-lethal weapons. These give the victim a chance to defend himself, a chance which he does not have in the cases of killing with a gun or dagger. In other words, Awlad Ali, in assessing responsibility for homocide, "operate with a legalistic psychology in which intention is is presumed from action" (Gluckman, 1963:207).

682 672 although the weapon used was not lethal and therefore was classified as an unintentional killing, yet the nature of the crime and the obvious intention on the part of the killers made reduced payment difficult to achieve.

Another way of reducing liability and the amount of money paid in cases of unintentional killing is by taking into consideration all the intervening variables that contributed to the death of the victim and asking them to share the blame. The working of this principle is illustrated in the case of the broken rope where the rope was assigned half the responsibility for the death of the victim. It is also present in the case of the careless guest where the responsibility was divided three ways with the host paying one third, the owner of the gun paying another third, and the goat sharing the responsibility for the rest of the bloodmoney. It is interesting to note the difference in the responsibility to the owner of the gun in the above case and the owner of the rope in the case of the broken rope. The owner of the rope was not held responsible for the death caused by his rope, the same way the owner of the goat in the case of the careless guest was not held responsible for the actions of the animal. Both the goat and the rope are not dangerous things by themselves for which a certain degree of care in handling is required. If such normally harmless things cause injury or death to a person, the owner is not held responsible.

682 672 41 67 [594] The situation is quite different in the case of the gun and the responsibility of its owner. By nature, the gun is a weapon of death, and for that reason the tribal law has required certain precautions in its use or handling. Among such precautions is the requirement that a guest,

682 as soon as he settles in the host's place, should unload the gun. In
672 411 addition to reducing the possibility of the gun being accidentally fired
671 and harming someone, this act expressed the trust of the guest in his
594 host and signifies the ability of the latter to protect his guest against
any harm. A person visiting another does not need his gun for protection
and therefore must unload it. If the owner of the gun fails to take this
682 672 customary precaution and leaves his gun loaded, and because of that fail-
411 ure the gun causes the death or injury of a person or even damage to property, the owner is held responsible for that result. The same rule applies to other deadly weapons, such as knives or daggers, as well as to animals
683 which are dangerous by nature, such as dogs. Each tent in the area has a
672 231 dog. Starting the first weeks in the puppy's life, he is trained to guard the tent and to bark at the approach of any stranger. It is also trained to attack any intruder who comes within fifty yards of the tent unless accompanied by a member of the tent. When one goes to visit another, he usually stays away from the tent until someone from the tent hears the dog barking and comes out to get the guest. Most dogs would not attack a person as long as he is the safe fifty yards away from the tent. Occasionally, a dog goes behond the safe distance and bites an individual passing by or a guest waiting to be let inside the tent. If the injured person is able to prove, usually by taking the oath, that he was more than fifty yards away from the tent at the time he was attacked by the dog, the dog's owner is liable to the victim for the injury inflicted by the dog. If, on the other hand, evidence shows that the victim was bitten by the dog while being less than fifty yards away from the tent, then there is no responsibility on the part of the dog's

charge the enemy, who was armed with the most modern 175*
equipment and generally entrenched. They charged on horse- 648*
back, firing wildly, wherever they might come across him, with-
out any regard to danger, terrain, or odds. The Turkish officers
had great difficulty in the early days of the campaign in restrain-
ing these impetuous cavaliers, but Turkish tact, the example of
the disciplined Turkish troops, and the disastrous results of
their own impetuosity soon taught them to act with greater
caution, though not the patience necessary in the professional
soldier. Realizing that the war might be protracted, Enver 175*
tried to make the Bedouin volunteers feel that they were as 648*
much part of the army of resistance as the Turkish regulars 702
and to give them some military training, in however random a
fashion. He chose 300 young Bedouin of the principal families
of tribal Shaikhs from among the volunteers and gave them
training at his camp at al-Zahir al-Ahmar, some 20 km. to the
south-west of Darna. They were given arms and uniforms sent
from Turkey, were housed in Turkish army tents, and received
Turkish pay. This small Bedouin contingent, trained under
Turkish regular officers and N.C.O.'s, took part in the fighting
in 1912 and proved to be a valuable adjunct to the slender
Turkish forces. When trained some of them were put in charge of
the training of the *Mahafiziya*, the Bedouin irregulars, of whom
there were about 2,000 at Enver's camp. Besides the irregulars, 175*
who resided on and off at the Turkish camp, all the Bedouin 648*
for many miles round could be relied on to join in the fray
whenever the Italians ventured to move from entrenched and
fortified positions. Most of the Bedouin were armed, but their [411] ●
rifles were of a very old make, mostly old one-round Greek
pieces. When Enver received his irregular and scanty supplies
from Turkey he distributed a small number of Turkish rifles
among them. Later they equipped themselves with Italian
rifles taken in fights, and they had a ready source of ammuni-
tion in every Italian column. The irregulars occasionally
received largesse from Enver but for the most part paid them-
selves in loot.

Enver looked yet farther ahead. In June 1912 he selected 175*
365 boys, mostly from among the sons of the Bedouin Shaikhs, 648*
and sent them to Istanbul to be educated for posts in the 702
Cyrenaican army and administration. The first thirty to be

571 between man and man, although the various cereal dishes which constitute
231 their regular meals are said to have a similar effect.

264 The son who continues to eat with his father "as he always had been
182 doing," also continues to accept his authority. Indeed he could do little else
593 at this stage, for he lacks the economic means to cut away. Neither at marriage
585 nor after is there any transfer of wealth from father to son. The new
tent recently pitched is no more than a dormitory to which the young couple
182 retire at night. During the daytime the son is still to be seen in his father's
[425] tent, and, in the male quarters, things appear to be much the same as before.
[556] In the female quarters, the only superficial change is the more frequent appearance
among the women of one who, before marriage, often sat among
them if she had been a close neighbour or a close cousin previously; or of
an additional helper if she had come from afar. On the surface things remain
"as they always have been," although in fact, a whole set of changes
have been initiated.

852 *Rites de passage* are few among the Bedouin. A man's progress in life is
881 ceremonially marked by only four events: his birth, circumcision, marriage
764 and burial. His development into manhood is not marked by clearly defined
stages. About the age of seven, the henna markings on the front of a boy's
858 shirt for protection from the evil eye are not renewed, the cowrie shell stitched
789 to the front of his cap as a kind of talisman against the evil eye is removed
and he is no longer permitted free access to the women's quarters. As he
857 grows older, he will be instructed in goat-herding, and later taught to follow
233 the sheep. In his late teens he will have to undertake the more arduous and
883 responsible task of herding the camels. Coincident with camel-herding, he
233 may be given a gun by his father. Shortly afterwards he must undertake the
[431] stringent test of manhood, a journey to a distant oasis for dates. These
[411] changes are not marked off by a *rite de passage*. The rites a man undergoes
[484] during the course of a lifetime are minimal, and in the sense that they are
[885] concerned with only the basic events in a man's life anywhere (save for
852 circumcision, which is a minor celebration anyway), they are irreducible.
88 Moreover, the rituals which exist do not comprehend the same multiplicity of
796 relationships as rituals which occur in many other African societies.[4] It is
[771] true that the ceremonies referred to in this chapter by no means include
all the Bedouin rituals. It is also true that the events mentioned vary in
[554] elaboration, and in the number of symbols present in them, but they are
not multiplied or reduced for different people.

In this context it is important to stress that we are here dealing with a
[613] lineage society where social differentiation is not built up into differences
[554] of rank, where the roles to which a man succeeds are almost wholly captured
[602] by his kinship relationships with other men and which are sociologically
to be distinguished from the roles a man enters into by acquisition of office,

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[4] See, for example, the elaboration of rituals discussed in M. Gluckman (Ed.), *Essays on the Ritual of Social Relations*. Manchester: University of Manchester Press, 1962.

829 is to constitute a viable economic unit; and if it is to expand, the number
594 of males must be increased disproportionately compared with females. Since
562 the structure of this "ideal family" (which in the sentiments of the Bedouin
858 is the only family) is based on the division of labour, some details of the
tasks and their allocation among members of a family are included to estimate the importance of this notional "ideal family."

The Division of Labour, by Sex

462
286 The tasks women perform are almost entirely associated with the tent.
They make the tent top, and the gaily coloured carpets which cover the sandy ground in the men's quarters. They also weave the material for making sacks, and nose bags for horses and camels. Throughout the year a piece of weaving is always on the loom waiting, and while any women of the tent may take a turn at weaving, the mother decides what is to be made,
462 its pattern and colours and in general directs operations. Women also pitch
342 the tent when the camp is moved; they do so unaided by the men. It is a
task which requires considerable strength and only grown girls and mature women can assist in this; younger girls scour the vicinity in search of stones to hold the sides of the tent on the ground after it has been erected.
[356] As soon as pitching is complete, the floor of the tent is brushed clean before
carpets are spread and the few articles of personal belongings placed in their proper position.

462 Next, brushwood must be fetched in large quantities for fires. Apart
313 from cooking needs and winter warmth, the fire of each tent is in constant
use for preparing the sickly sweet tea, almost the consistency of syrup, which is drunk several times a day regularly and which is made again for even the casual visitor. The task of fetching brushwood is performed daily, and each load takes a few hours of a woman's time to gather and bring back
[412] to the tent. Bushes are uprooted with the aid of a long-handled adze and
piled together, to be carried on her back for the homeward journey. The load is cumbersome and heavy; only girls in their late teens and mature women can cope with it.

462 All cooking is done by the women. Most meals consist of cereal dishes of
252 various sorts, so that grinding, using heavy millstones, is a perpetual ac-
tivity to satisfy the demands for large quantities of flour. Millstones are
412 bought in the villages. In most small camps there only one or two sets,
so they are passed round from one woman to another. The stones are very heavy but when they are carried from tent to tent men offer no assistance.

462 Each tent also requires large quantities of water for human consumption.
If the camp is located near a well, water is drawn in small quantities, fre-
312 quently. Young girls and boys take a donkey to the well, fill a couple of
[492] jerry cans with water, wait for an older sister to load them on the donkey
and then drive the beast back to camp. After a fall of rain, while puddles of water remain on the ground, mature women make haste to gather the

Second, the fiction that nothing has happened, which characterises the 585
father's behavior, does not cease with the termination of the celebrations. 593
Each morning, soon after daybreak and before the camp is astir, the groom must leave his bride and repair to his father's tent to lie at his father's side "as he always had done in the past, as if he had not left him." This conventional ruse is followed, not just for the seven days of wedding festivities, but is continued after the groom has moved back into the camp proper, and pitched his tent alongside his father's, with the ropes of the two tents crossing.

In matters other than sleeping arrangements, this fiction that "nothing
has happened" is maintained. Marriage does not mean the immediate crea- [592]
tion of a wholly separate domestic unit. Save for the appearance of an ad-
ditional tent, the ordinary run of daytime activities is scarcely altered. To 593
mention perhaps the most important feature of the relationships between 264
father and son, the groom continues to eat with his father. As yet, the son 571
does not use his own bowl,[1] and may not, indeed, do so for several years. 182
The important symbolism of "eating together" or "eating out of the one bowl," the act of commensality creating a bond of fellowship about which Robertson Smith[2] wrote so eloquently can only be referred to here in one of its many aspects. Bedouin themselves stress that eating together is a strong bond, and the communal meal is always used for this purpose after the settlement of a dispute, or at the conclusion of a blood-money agreement,
and so on. It is significant also in the sense that those who partake of a
meal accept the authority of the host; he becomes their protector, and a blow [574]
against one of them is struck at him also. Even if the guest is an enemy,[3] as long as he has eaten from another's bowl his life is safe.

The slaughter of an animal for another person creates a bond which has its 571
roots in the intimate connection between man and his animals. In a very 231
vivid way, the Bedouin view their animals as part of themselves, as part of 264
their *Risiq*, their general wealth, in which their sons are included. It is this 182
mystical association between a man and his animals which distinguishes a
meal consisting of the meat of an animal slaughtered from ones' own flock [574]
or herd from a meal consisting of meat bought from a butcher's shop — often [186]
given by the plateau peoples of Northern Cyrenaica to their guests, but which the camel-herding Bedouin of the south regard as despicable hospitality. A slaughtered animal is the food, *par excellence*, which establishes this bond

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[1] When Bedouin take their meals, they eat from large wooden bowls imported from [415]
south of the Sahara. It is a matter of custom that a man does not eat alone unless it is [439]
unavoidable, a custom of such strength, that, when, one day, only an elder, occupying
a tent the ropes of which were crossed with mine, was left in camp, he brought his [123]
bowl into my tent "so that I will be eating with a man."

[2] William Robertson Smith. *The Religion of the Semites*. 3rd ed. London: Macmillan, 1927. [113]

[3] A stranger entering a camp is under no obligation to give his identity. Few do so
until they have partaken of a meal. In the past, the Bedouin claim, the period of [574]
anonymity could last for 40 days, but nowadays, they say they limit it to two only. I [609]
have known strangers enter a camp, receive entertainment, and leave without offering
any specific identity.

593 was with his brother and not his brother's sons. When the father persisted with his intention to embarrass his nephews, his sons, as a last alternative, threatened to leave him. In the face of this threat, the father capitulated.

The rights and duties of the father-son relationship, although they do not change in sentiment, will change in content during the lifetime of the father. The main change
[421] in content will be a reflection of a change in property re-
593 lations. The Bedouin believe that this is the way it ought
577 to be; they say that

> A son must respect and obey his father. The son must do anything that he can to help and please his father. When the son grows up and begins to earn money, he must contribute generously to his father. A son pleases his father by giving him money and helping him to be comfortable.

593 In boyhood and manhood, the father has disposal over his son's
596 labor. As long as a son lives in his father's naja' this is
[464] so. One son, who worked for an American oil company in the desert, regularly turned over his pay check to his father. It is the father who decides where the son will live, and, whether or not he will have his own domicile away from the main naja'. When the son marries and brings his wife to the
[591] naja', he will usually set up his tent next to his father's tent. The tent is given to the boy by his father. During
593
431 the son's growing-up period, he will be given, as gifts on various occasions, a sheep or a number of sheep which will be kept with the father's flock.

*613 582 'Ailit Lazumi, the other lineage, along with 'Ailit Ma'fas, considered to be the most powerful in al-Qasr. In the fourth [423] case, Abd al-Latif's marriage into 'Ailit Dawlat, this individual owns an olive orchard in Dawlat territory, adjacent to that of Ma'fas, which he purchased from a member of his wife's lineage before their marriage. In every case, with *613 582 one exception, marriage ties are intimately related to property ●421 relations, cognation with local contiguity. The two groups become politically entwined, and property relations become a basis for authority relations.

*613 All things considered, complementary filiation is as important in Bedouin society as it is in other societies: "The bilateral family is the focal element in the web of [533] kinship" (Fortes 1953:33). As one Bedouin wedding song puts it: "The bride is the flower of the stem," the stem here symbolizing her tertiary group.

583 554 556 The amount of brideprice which a man is expected to pay will depend upon his status as an "outsider" or an "insider," and his position on the prestige scale which is figured largely in terms of wealth. A man adds to his prestige and reputation when he pays beyond the "going price" to obtain a bride for his son. On the other hand, if a man is an "outsider," he is expected to pay well beyond the normal brideprice for the privilege of marrying into the family, and he receives no additional prestige unless he goes even higher than what is

8

675 culprit, and are no longer responsible for his acts." The
681 barawwa is not only the imposition of a most severe sanction
675 by the group, but it is also the withdrawal of all positive
681 sanctions which would apply to an individual as a member of
571 the group. The withdrawal of sanctions means the withdrawal
of the right of reciprocity; consequently, the banished no
longer comes under the rule of succession, and he has no
[421] rights over either persons or things. The banished may claim
no property of the property of the group other than that which
he takes with him, and he may claim no women from the group.
675 The barawwa, naturally enough, is uncommon in al-Qasr. The
681 last occurred in 1957, the declaration of which is reproduced
below.

DECLARATION OF BARAWWA

Law Office of Abd al-Rahman
Marsa Matruh

50 milleme tax
stamp

On this date the following came: Kuraim Juhami of the 'Aishaibat on behalf of himself and his paternal uncle, and their 'umda, the first party. And there also came Sa'ad Uthman on behalf of himself and his children, the second party. The reason for the coming together of these two parties is in order to ask the barawwa from each other. Since they have all agreed by their own will without any force or ill feeling that the two parties shall not be responsible for each other's actions, it is a valid agreement that can never be rejected. No one from either of the parties is responsible to the other in supporting oaths, in paying for wounds, or in paying blood-revenge (diya), and no one from either party involved in barawwa will take girls from the other. This barawwa became a dividing line between the two parties, and if later there appears a fraternity paper, the barawwa will be cancelled and be to no avail. This paper is signed

sections of a tribe may be opposed to one another they regard 619
themselves as an undivided group in opposition to neighbouring
tribes, and are so regarded by their neighbours. Thus a Qalbati
is only a Qalbati in Hasa country. In 'Abaidat or Bara'asa
country he is a Hasi. Likewise a Darsi or an 'Abidi in contrast
to members of other tribes regards the whole of the Darsa or the
'Abid as his people, his tribal brothers.

Each tribe in this commonly accepted sense has its *watan*, its 619
homeland, its soil, its arable, its pastures, and its wells; and 421
each has its camel-brand which is also carved on the tomb- [764]
stones of its dead. The tribal lands are vested in the tribe, which
has residual rights in them. They cannot, therefore, be alienated
to other tribes without the consent of the whole tribe. A tribe 619
is conceived of as a huge family descended from a common 614
ancestor, from whom the tribe generally takes its name. Hence
its segments can be figured either as a series of political sections
or as genealogical branches of a clan.

A tribe is divided into several, generally two or three, 619
primary divisions, or sub-tribes, which own well-defined portions 613
of the tribal territory, in most cases running in strips unbroken
by intrusive elements. These primary divisions are of the same
pattern as the tribe of which they form part. Each division has
its *watan*, which its members own and defend collectively. They
believe that they are descended from a common ancestor, who
is generally a son of the ancestor of the tribe. Primary tribal
divisions split into secondary divisions, and secondary divisions
into tertiary divisions, and so on. Each of the smaller divisions is
a replica of the larger ones and has the same preferential and
exclusive rights in its lands, an encroachment on which by
another division will lead to fighting. Each has within the
tribal brand its special lineage markings. The members of each
division also consider that they are descended from a common
ancestor who, in his turn, is descended from the ancestor of the
larger division of which they form a section. The further the
sub-division the more the resultant groups take on the com-
plexion of kinship aggregates, rather than of political aggregates.

These kinship aggregates or extended family groups are the
basic units of tribal life. They are called *biyut* (sing. *bait*). The [423]
tribe may be the residual owner of land and water but the
biyut are the owners in use. Their members live in the same

593 tegral part of "the one body"; events which affect a man in this context lie
613 outside a father's field of jurisdiction. The political authority vested in a
corporation acts to circumscribe the authority of persons in other fields.

Other rights stem from political membership. As a person with a defined
position in a lineage corporation, a man has the right to use the
natural resources of its territory. His father, although he instructs his son
where to plough and when to water the animals, cannot deny him access
to wells, pastures and ploughland. Economically, a son is independent to this
extent, although his ability to exploit his right to the natural resources is
restricted by his father's control of animals. Ultimately, however, this restriction
cannot amount to stultification, because a man has the right to
613 demand food. In practice, a poor man staves off hunger with donations from
422 this or that individual, and superficially it appears that he is dependent on
735 the personal charity of his fellowmen. This is not so, for what is implicit is
that the parcels of wealth controlled by individuals are the possessions of
the corporation. It is not accidental that poor people do not go hungry.
During my entire stay among the Bedouin I never saw one of them beg or
[556] suffer hunger, however marginal the diet of many. Clearly, those with a
surplus can and do use it for personal advantage, but the extent to which
they can do so is circumscribed by the legal claims which members of a
corporation have on the parcels of moveable property held by each of them.

613 Control over the wealth, whether it be animals or the procreative functions
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428 specify that women are not legal heirs,[8] and that all male children are
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wealth is equally divided among male heirs. The precise details of inheritance
[593] may partly be decided by a father, but he is limited in his actions. Most
of the time inheritance disputes are not of the kind which require action by
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Bedouin did, however, invoke immediate action. A man, who had left the
desert to live in a village on the plateau, had only one daughter. He made
it known that he intended to will his entire property to his daughter. When
the news was brought to the camps of his fellow agnates, there was great
consternation, because, as became clear in their lengthy discussions, the
threat now existed that a substantial parcel of property would be removed
from the group, a threat made real by the proposed marriage of the daughter
[584] to a man of another tribe. The court would have to recognise the daughter's
right to some of the property, and the members of the group reluctantly had
to concede that there was little they could do about this, but they had one
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[771] [8] The Bedouin are Sunni Muslims, and, as Samusi, belong to the Maliki school in
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practice is contrary to law. For, if women were permitted to inherit, since many marry
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her father takes, but in certain critical situations he can be relieved of choice 593
if the interests of the group as a whole are at stake. [421]

Political authority is the preserve of a corporation, and its exercise leads [428]
to invasion of a man's authority in the field of domestic relations. This [584]
does not mean, however, that discrete areas of authority do not remain with
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keep the son in almost complete subordination. The son is referred to as a
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this he would forfeit status, and almost certainly cut himself off from prop- [428]
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Caught in this dilemma, a son's predicament is worsened by the fact that 593
he cannot initiate marriage negotiations — to be able to do so requires some 584
animals to offer a girl's father. Through his mother's brother he has the [431]
means of bringing pressure to bear on his father, but the latter can resist for [604]
years. Finally, a marriage is arranged for him. It is difficult to convey the 581
yearning of young Bedouin for marriage. They discuss it among themselves 521
ad nauseam. For the most part their talk is about the sexual aspect of mar- 831
riage. Premarital sex relations are strictly controlled, and the movements
of each young girl are carefully guarded because, if on the day of her mar- 836
riage the test shows that she is not a virgin, she not only brings disgrace to [585]
her family, but the marriage may be revoked and her worth as a bride for
another man seriously diminished. Nevertheless premarital relations do [837]
occur, if not between youths and maidens to any extent, between young
men and married women.

The question still remains: why is marriage the occasion of such ebul- 581
lient celebration? The formal authority a father exercises over his son 593
changes little on marriage. Economically the son is still harnessed to the
father. The latter still shouts his orders at him, and obedience remains
unaltered. Any sign of an independent view on a matter is met with a gruff
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the authority — if not always the power — to break it. Marriage does not
mean a change in the general mode of behaviour between the two; the legal
relations remain unaltered, albeit modified in practice, as the married son
matures in age. But marriage does mean the acquisition of rights and status
previously denied a son. Henceforward, he has a domain of his own. This
is high drama, indeed, for although every effort is made to give substance to [554]
the expressed view that "nothing has happened," for the first time in his
life the son has seized publicly, amid the jubilations of his fellows, a status
which hitherto was the possession of the father.

245 blossoms of the tree are stripped away by these winds before
177 the fruit can mature.

178 Traditional values affect the Bedouins' perception of
517 their new life. Men are fond of gathering for their ritual
272 three cups of mint tea and recalling "the good old days." In
[829] those days, they say, men only had to ride, shoot, and drink
233 tea. In the past, there was a great deal of security in
178 owning animals which are not as dependent on the rains as
422 is agriculture. During a year of bad rains, a Bedouin could
233 always move his flock to Libya or to the Nile Valley: "When
731 we have a bad year, we take our animals to the grass of our
166 relatives. When they have a bad year, they come here." In
167 the drought year of 1960, 20,000 Egyptian Bedouins migrated
to Libya in search of pasturage. This caused an international
[648] conflict and King Idris of Libya, for a short time, closed the
border to Bedouins. The conflict was finally resolved, and
the Bedouins were given permission to use the pastures of
Cyrenaica. None of the Bedouins of al-Qasr were involved in
this movement.

233 The Bedouins who have settled in the *'izba* sector of
al-Qasr also prefer to keep some sheep. The security which
they represent is worth the time and expense of maintaining
233 them and paying a shepherd to look after them. The Bedouins,
178 in the past, paid their shepherds one sheep for every ten
465 sheep that he tended. Payment was made twice a year. Today,

428 562 [422] inherited by a woman's daughters. The carpets and the tent, which are woven by women, are not their property to pass on for they belong to the head of the household, the shaib.

596 177 178 [124] Economic change in al-Qasr has had its impact at the level of production mode, and, also, it has affected the composition of the basic family structure. One informant, who is now nineteen years old, remembers growing up in a household composed of his grandfather, father, father's brothers and their families. Since that time, his father has built another house away from the family home; one uncle has moved to Marsa Matruh and opened a shop there; his youngest uncle has built a house not far from the family home; and one uncle remains with his three wives in the original house. 182 177 *613 433 434 This fission-type process is not uncommon in a segmentary society, although as a traditional process, it represented a mechanism for dealing with ecological pressures. In the modern case, in al-Qasr, the process of fission in the Bedouin social structure proves to be an adaptive mechanism also: the fragmentation of lineage property and relations is a positive condition for the transition to a cash and market economy. Among most of the families of al-Qasr, as market orientation increases brothers begin to economically differentiate their tasks and interests with an eye to individual profits.

423 long time ago. This seems to be supported by the evidence
*613 shown below, for often conflict over land and water rights is
182 [691] represented by litigation between individuals and not groups.

•422 I have arbitrarily assigned to the classification of
562 property rights the rights over women. I have done this
*613 because a man acquires such rights as a member of a lineage
jural group and secures them with the backing of public opinion
and the 'awaiyid. Also, though a man in al-Qasr does not
"own" his wife, he does have the legal rights to certain things
related to her: he has the right to her sexual favors, and the
right to claim her offspring for his own lineage.

685 Settlement in cases dealing with the infringement of
695 property rights, if they do not lead to personal injury cases,
will usually be concluded by arbitration or oath-taking, either
of which brings the two parties into agreement.

691 Date: 1964. Case: Quarrel between Bait 'Umran and Bait Idris
685 of 'Ailit Ma'fas over the ownership of a well. The 'awaaqil
*613 sent for the two parties involved, and they met on Wednesday,
578 market day. And the 'awaaqil told the two parties: "This is
692 a shame ('aib), you must be friends because you are from the
same tribe." The 'awaaqil knew "from past history and from
truthful elders" that the well belonged to 'Ait Idris. The
'awaaqil made 'Ait 'Umran change their minds about their claim
[695] to the well. Before the litigation 'Ait 'Umran had insisted

554 tional symbol of wealth. A comparison of wealth between
571 the "status group" and "other members" of al-Qasr, and the
556 picture of stratification which emerges, are shown on Table 6.

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•422
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TABLE 6

COMPARATIVE DATA ON SOCIO-ECONOMIC STRATIFICATION IN AL-QASR[1]

Average Per Person	Status Group	Others
OLIVE - trees	661	86
SHEEP - head	402	30
LAND - acres	91	5

554 One most important way of accruing "status honor"
571 in al-Qasr is by acting the part of the third party in conflict
627 situations. The role of the third party represents an effective
*613 and acceptable way of bypassing formal litigation through the
[778] office of 'aqila. For instance, by mediating through the
process of nazaala, the third party prevents feuds.

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[114] [128] [1] This data is both approximate and partial. Some data are excellent and completely reliable, others are not so dependable. Factors which could conceivably change the picture here presented would be a count of land and animals outside al-Qasr which would be extremely difficult to obtain. Also, some land is not in the name of the owner but in the names of relatives. Of all the data, land data is the most unreliable. Nevertheless, the addition of new data, I feel, would only serve to substantiate the picture of socio-economic stratification shown here.

584 husband or his father pays the woman's father the bridewealth, or mahr.
583 In exchange for the mahr, the husband expects his father-in-law to out-
fit his daughter with such items as rugs, blankets, and a few other house-
hold items, like cooking pots, serving dishes, and a metal or wooden chest
[422] to keep her clothes in. These items become the private property of the
wife, but the husband has the right to use them. In addition, the man
581 expects to gain certain rights to the woman. The customary law of Awlad
671
585 Ali gives the husband three basic rights over his wife: the right to her
sexual services (including the right to bear him children); the right to
her labor in domestic activities; and the right to her obedience. Of the
three rights, the first is the most exclusive. Not only doesthe husband
have a complete monopoly over his wife's present sexual services, but he
also has the right, if the girl has never been married before, to be the
[583] first to use such services. If he discovers that she is not a virgin, he
can send her back to her father and get back his mahr.

581 The other two rights are not as exclusive. The husband's right to
585 his wife's domestic labor does not prevent her from occasionally helping
593 out in her father's or brother's household, especially if they live nearby.
Finally, the husband's right to be obeyed by his wife is always subordin-
ated to that of her father, who retains the ultimate authority over his
daughter.

682 If the woman is killed or injured, the husband is deprived of all
683 or some of her services, depending on the seriousness and the permanence
581
585 of the injury, and therefore is entitled to compensation. The right of
593 avenging the woman's murder remains, however, that of her family, since
she is still a member of that family.

562 such compensation. In forfeiting her rights of inheritance, a woman
428 secures for herself and her children the continuous support of her
593 kin-group and the protection of her rights. This support was denied
in the few cases I was able to collect in which the woman demanded her
share of inheritance. The following is one of these cases. The material
159 presented is a summary of the life history of Fatma, who at the time of
562 the study, was a shopkeeper managing the small general store she owned
428 near the railroad station of Burg el-Arab, some fifty miles west of
593 [444] Alexandria. She also practiced healing and midwifery on a part-time
[759] basis.

Fatma was the only daughter with four sons of sheikh El-Asi, who at one time was the aqila of bait Hussein of the Sanagrah tribal segment
[627] in the area. He was also known as a mardi and was frequently sought in
[755] mediation of disputes. He was believed to have supernatural power which
he used to cure people for a certain amount of money. During his life-
[454] time, he had acquired a sizable sum of money which he invested in live-
[233] stock. At the time of his death his herd, which numbered more than 900
[422] sheep and goats, was considered the finest in the area. He had no barley
[423] lands because his camp was deep in the desert, but he had fine grazing land.

Throughout the area the four sons were known for being arrogant and irresponsible. Three of them were employed by one of the irrigation projects carried on by the government in the area as construction workers; the fourth looked after the herd of his father. All four were known as chasers of women, and they frequently went to Alexandria to visit prostitutes and drink liquor.

[444) Fatma was first married when she was eighteen to a man from Alexandria who had opened a general store in the area where her father

121 kill within this range is, in terms of the general pattern of behaviour, stupid. What is of
613 interest is that such killings do occur. I recorded three instances of men killing the
682 mother's brother in the contemporary population, not to mention many others
674 based on hearsay evidence only. Clearly, the relationship is more than a merely per-
829 missive one. The mother's brother may well be the only person who can help in
certain crises, and if he withholds his assistance the sister's son is left in a dilemma.
604 The form of behaviour in which demands are made is, as the Bedouin rightly say,
121 that of asking a favour, but this does not mean that it is any the less urgent than a
613 demand made against agnates. The range of favours is large, and only a few can be
604 detailed here. If a group has insufficient water to meet its needs a man first seeks help
from his mother's brother. The request has a number of aspects to it: it is a test of
[554] the relationship itself; it is a matter of pride and status that a man can 'call' on
another to help his group out of difficulties, it is an assurance that resources other than
those jealously guarded by his agnates are available to him, and if a man is seeking
to increase his power he must have available more than an agnate's share of local
[682] water resources to supply his flocks and herds. When a blood-money payment has to
be made, the mother's brother is expected to come forward—it is his right to give
[584] without being asked. If a man wants a wife, he is not permitted to approach his father
directly, but his mother's brother can put pressure on the father instead. If a man dies
[429] while his eldest son is still a minor, his brother may be required to act as guardian,
and in this role he controls the son's property; disputes frequently break out as a
result, with the son at a considerable disadvantage, for he cannot engage his father's
brother in hostilities—but his mother's brother can do so for him. Whenever men
● [422] come to possess animals before the demise of their fathers or when the father's
brother is acting as guardian they mark them with the tribal and personal signs of their
[583] mothers' brothers. Men have the right to demand contributions for bridewealth
from their agnates if they lack wealth; in practice it comes not from them, but from
the mother's brother. Finally, in certain circumstances, if a man does not have male
heirs, his sister's son might inherit all his wealth.

121 Affinity also carries with it a large number of rights. A poor man may take up
613 residence in the camp of his father-in-law, and be kept by him. The latter may come
to his son-in-law's aid in many of his dealings with his father. Like the mother's
606 brother, the affine is a potential source of water-supply when rain has been insufficient
on the homeland. He also helps with blood money and bridewealth, and he is expected
to aid his daughter and her husband with gifts of food and wool.

121 The details given above by no means exhaust the list of rights a man possesses in
613 his matrilateral and affinal relatives. Obviously, these are not the only forms of
relationship either, and the other forms carry with them yet other claims of various
sorts. Enough detail has been given, however, to make clear the point that local
agnatic groups are so differentiated, and inter-group relationships are so important,
that each aspect of homicide settlement previously described will require further
examination, not in the sense that additional complications must be introduced, but
with the question in mind, is not the structural presentation false? Before beginning
this stage of the argument it is necessary to establish the fact that the links of affinity
and matrilaterality which a group has with another are of a kind which necessitate
their inclusion in an analysis of the arrangements for settling homicides.

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613 outside a father's field of jurisdiction. The political authority vested in a
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Other rights stem from political membership. As a person with a defined position in a lineage corporation, a man has the right to use the natural resources of its territory. His father, although he instructs his son where to plough and when to water the animals, cannot deny him access to wells, pastures and ploughland. Economically, a son is independent to this extent, although his ability to exploit his right to the natural resources is restricted by his father's control of animals. Ultimately, however, this restriction cannot amount to stultification, because a man has the right to
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175 648 [651] territory of the whole Western Desert. They were also exempted from land taxes, military duty, and forced labor on the irrigation projects of the Nile River. In return for these privileges, the Bedouins were expected to guard the frontiers of Egypt and to furnish warriors for the expeditionary forces of Muhammed 'Ali. The Pasha, who was in the process of carving out his own empire independent of the Ottomans, needed warriors, a role which traditionally excluded the fallahin of the Nile Valley. Bedouin horsemen from the Western Desert fought with Muhammad 'Ali in his Wahhabi campaign of 1815 in Arabia. They also aided the Pasha's son, Ismail, in the conquest of the Sudan.

Muhammad 'Ali instituted the practice of granting to the Bedouin leaders land in the rich Nile Valley. He made it explicit that the leaders were to dwell upon this land: their role, as it was officially stated, was to provide a liaison between the Pasha and the tribes. In fact, the leaders were hostages. By controlling them, Muhammad 'Ali was able to exert proper pressure on the Bedouins when and where it was needed (Baer 1957:84-98).

175 648 651 423 Bedouins did not pay land taxes, but neither did they "own" the land; they simply had the right of usufruct. The law stated that only those who paid land taxes had the right to purchase and own their land. But along with ownership of land came the onerous responsibilities of corvée labor on the

175 Nile dikes and military conscription. The term "Bedouin"
648 came to mean, as it was defined by the government of Egypt,
651 one who did not legally own land and hence was not subject to
●423 forced labor or military service. [illegible] this basis, the Director
[162] of Recruiting Office in a 1904 census distinguished three kinds
of Bedouin (Murray 1935:31):

290,095 - settled and living in their own farm colonies
240,880 - living among the fallahin
70,472 - real Bedouin or nomads

601,447

175 By the end of the 19th century, Bedouin society had
177 undergone a great deal of change. Politically, the Bedouins
648 were subordinates in a dominant-subjective authority relationship with the central regime of the Nile Valley. As a result of external political control, nomadism was curtailed and the Bedouins were forced to settle on the land to raise what few crops they could. These new political and economic conditions are the major aspects of the sedentarization process. Bedouin dependence on the central authority of Egypt and their reliance on horticulture increased with time. Nor did the entry of Britain into Egypt in 1882 change the material and social condition of the Bedouin.

175 The British, in the style of the politics of colonial-
648 ism, reorganized the administrative structure of Egypt. The Western Desert was given the status of a province; command

While the Bedouins

795 771 respect the Sanusi family they, nevertheless, wear their
829 religion lightly. An informant, speaking of the merits and
demerits of the conservative Muslim Brethern Association, said
that "you should never listen to a holy man, for he will lead
[576] you straight to hell!" But upon meeting any member of the
[778] Sanusi family, all Bedouins greet him by kissing his hand.
Besides a show of deference, this ritual act, in theory,
transfers baraka from al-Sanusi to the layman.

648 The citizenship exemptions granted the Bedouins by
641 Muhammad 'Ali have been rescinded by Abd al-Nasser. This
has been one aspect of his program to imbue the Bedouin with
political consciousness and promote participation in the
nation-state. The Bedouins say that this is the way it should
be: they want the right to own land and to accept the
responsibility of defending the homeland. But they still do
[651] not pay land taxes, and they feel justified in this because
the desert "is very poor soil, and not like that of the Nile."
Nor do they always heed the call to military duty, though they
insist that they do.

648 Egyptian land reform laws would be impractical, or
177 impossible to apply, in al-Qasr. In the Nile Valley, such
423 laws were necessary. The majority of the Egyptian peasants
can survive on less than one acre of land, and farms of
under five acres comprise 44 per cent of the agricultural
land area in the Nile Valley (Warriner 1962:204). Plots this

648 177 423 size in the barley and pasture area of al-Qasr would not permit a subsistence level economy. Just as important is the political implication of any attempt at large-scale land reform in al-Qasr. The pattern of land distribution in al-Qasr reflects an intimate relationship between the structural principles of Bedouin society, especially the lineage system and territoriality. (In a later chapter we will discuss this relationship.) The ramifications of land reform would amount to a structural rearrangement of al-Qasr society and would make redistribution of land difficult to administer, or even to imagine. A reorganization of property relations is, in effect, a basic change in the authority structure. Therefore, the Bedouins want no part of land reform. There is a law which forbids the ownership of "more than 100 _feddans_ (one _feddan_=one acre) of agricultural land. This shall also apply to barren and desert land."[1] One of my informants, a [115] large landowner, claims that this "law only applies to the Nile Valley where there is plenty of water. If the government wants the Bedouins to abide by that law then they must take care of us. I would gladly trade this land (which was considerably more than 100 _feddans_) for 100 _feddans_ in the Nile Valley." The traditional tribal structure of Bedouin society

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[1] "Decree for the Amendment of the Agrarian Reform Law in the Southern Region," Department of Information, Cairo, July 25, 1961.

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177
[423] makes the welfare aspects of "Arab Socialism" meaningful, but the Bedouins of al-Qasr feel that they are already practicing "Socialists."

The Bedouins feel that the programs of the government are insufficient: the desert is extra harsh and aid should compensate for this. On the other hand, the Egyptians who administer the aid programs claim that the Bedouins do not differentiate between "giving cooperation" and "receiving aid." [181] Agricultural advisers complain that the Bedouins are lazy. One agronomist whose job it was to teach the Bedouins how to cultivate the olive tree said that they did not want to learn: "They want us to plant the trees, water them and care for them, harvest the olives, and then they will take them to the market and sell them!" This statement is typical. The [186] Bedouins reply: "The Egyptians did not teach us how to grow the olive. Our fathers planted the olive here long before they came into the desert." The Bedouins feel that the Egyptians should follow their advice concerning the use and control of water in the desert; that if they did the olive [186] would flourish and life would be easier. "The Egyptians," they say, "are lazy and cannot keep up with our requests for more seedlings. They cannot furnish us with what we need to improve our lives. All we hear is: 'tomorrow, tomorrow'!"

[241] The Bedouins do not understand the methods of modern hydrology and agronomy. They see no reason for the experimenta-

131 view it, the Western Desert is the *watan*
619 ("homeland") of the Awlad 'Ali tribe, and is subdivided into
631 tribal zones each referred to as a *mintaqa*. *Mintagit al-Qasr*
is part of *mintaqit qabilit 'Aishaibat* (i.e. "the area of
al-Qasr" is part of "the territory of the 'Aishaibat tribe").
131 Each tribal *mintaqa* is further broken down into contiguous
619 parcels of land belonging to lineages, and these are also
*613 referred to as *mintaqa*; for instance, there is *mintaqa*
631
•[423] *'ailit Ma'fas*, i.e. "the territory of the Ma'fas family."
In the al-Qasr segmentary lineage society, genealogical
ties and local ties are coincidental. The boundaries of
al-Qasr are defined by the agnatic lines of the 'Aishaibat
tribe and include the *sahil* and *sha'ir wi mar'a* zones.

361 To the Egyptians, a *qarya* ("village") is a nucleated
631 cluster of permanent dwellings with some degree of social
integration: al-Qasr is a *qarya* for administrative matters.
The Bedouins, who think in terms of kin-based residence groups,
tribal boundaries, and political and economic symbiotic relations, see the Egyptian *qarya* as only a sector of al-Qasr.
They refer to this sector as the *'izba*, i.e., "farm" or "rural
settlement." The *'izba* is land fertile enough to support a
secure and sedentary life. "The *'izba*," the Bedouins say,
"is the seed of the *madiina*" (city).

[121] For my own purposes, the Bedouin sense of al-Qasr is
the more useful concept. Al-Qasr is all of the territory of
[131] the 'Aishaibat tribe. Situated at 31°N and 27°E, al-Qasr is

162 true numbers. As recipients of aid programs, their rations
114 are based upon the number of members per family. For these
[657] purposes, they are anxious to present as high a population
figure as possible. They exaggerate their livestock count in
order to receive more fodder, and, at other times, underestimate
their numbers to escape taxes.

162 For purposes of this study, the Bedouin population of
161 al-Qasr is about 1,500 to 3,000. Most of this population lives
361 on the coastal area and in the cultivable *wadi* areas. The
remainder is scattered south of the plateau region, near the
621 desert proper. The *'izba* sector of al-Qasr may be described
*613 as a nucleated cluster or settlement, but due to the nature
of the Bedouin segmentary lineage system, with its relatively
autonomous kin-based residence groups, this sector lacks the
usual degree of social interaction and integration associated
621 with the village or hamlet. The *'izba* might be described as a
multi-nucleated settlement or cluster. Each lineage has its
*613
•423 own *mintaqa*. Each *mintaqa* usually has a small dry-goods store
631 owned and operated by a lineage member and catering chiefly
443 to his own lineage-mates. Water and land in the *'izba* sector
423 are individually owned. In the barley-pasture area, rights
*613 and privileges of ownership are vested in the corporate group,
621
even though the Bedouins and the government claim that tribally
423 owned land is illegal. All land boundaries, whether a *mintaqa*
or an individual's plot, are well-marked and well-known. The

423 boundary marker is usually a pile of stones, a tree, a wadi,
or, a line recorded on paper by two parties and given to a
third to hold in case of future differences of opinion.

In the extreme southern pastoral zone, there were few
342
361 permanent houses but with new government land registration
[656] laws the number is increasing. The settlement pattern in this
area might be characterized as a scattered homestead type,
"homesteads" being defined as tents or houses whose location
is permanent. Tents are seldom, if ever, moved these days even
[657] during a heavy rainy season. This is because barley production
has increased, and, mainly because government aid programs
supply fodder for the sheep. Bedouin shepherds in the pasture
area change dwelling places, but only to move their tents from
their winter protective hiding places out into the open for the
springtime, or to move from their tent into the stone house
for the cold, rainy winter. In either case, no real change in
location is involved.

342 The tent is called bait al-'Arab ("house of the Arabs").
There are two types: the bait al-saif ("summer house"), and
the bait al-rabi'a ("spring house"). The summer tent, made of
"gunny" and flour sacks sewn together, is for protection from
the sun. The spring tent is the real Bedouin tent. It is
[286] woven from the wool of the sheep and camel hair, and is used
[237] during the winter. Most Bedouin now say that they cannot afford
[435] the 125 Egyptian pounds (1 pound = $2.80) which the bait al-rabi'a
costs to make or buy.

173 land along the coast: "This land was free, and the man who
[361] planted on it owned it. We call this (method of claiming land)
[425] *wad'a-l-id* ("laying on of the hand," i.e. seizure). There was
[423] plenty of freedom in those days. A man could farm or keep
animals." Planting and caring for the land is not novel to
the Bedouins of al-Qasr.

423 The Bedouins claim that the pattern of land distribution
425 established during the time of Abu Mahjuba prevails today.
656 Further, they say that these rules will never change, no matter
[178] what laws come out of Cairo: "Land registration can mean nothing
where the tribes are concerned, for no Bedouin would be willing
to take the land of another Bedouin. The government forces us
to register our land so that it can be stated in the newspaper
that they are giving the Bedouins land."

*613 The relationship between ecology and lineage territory
423 is not striking, such as in the case of the Cyrenaican Bedouins
182 of Libya (Peters 1960). In most cases, lineage territories run
on a north-south line cross-cutting the coastal garden and
southern pastoral zones. Hence, lineage territories are, generally,
ecologically similar rather than contrasted. However,
*613 there are exceptions. 'Ailit Shraif lineage (see Figure 3a
423 below), at the western end of al-Qasr's *'izba* sector, settled
182 there "because of the abundance of underground water in this
241
[312] area: the ground is rocky here and the water comes out fresh
[361] like the Nile." Their founder, Sayyid Shraif, "specialized"

*613 in farming, and he found this land "good for raising mint and
423 vegetables." To the southeast of the 'izba, the lineages of
182
241 Lazumi and Ma'fas found the land suitable for barley and
[312] grazing. This area is rain-fed. There are no wells and so
vegetable crops are not possible here. The members of these
lineages say that their ancestors were "real" Bedouins in
Cyrenaica, and did not wish to become farmers in Egypt. It
*613 is interesting to note that the Lazumi and Ma'fas are the
182 richest lineages in all of al-Qasr. They were, perhaps, better
184
241 able to maintain the traditional style of life which all of
the Bedouins claim is "the best." But all Bedouins of al-Qasr
depend to some degree upon horticulture or arboriculture.
[231] And most families own a few sheep or goats. Both Lazumi and
Ma'fas garden in their coastal sections, and Shraif members own
sheep.

656 Land registration has a history in the Western Desert.
423 The government attempted it a number of times, but with little
success until 1959 when the General Desert Development Organization (GDDO) undertook its program of land reclamation. But the
361 Bedouins were settled long before this. In al-Qasr, the Bedouins
342 began to erect permanent stone dwellings on the land about the
178
time of the First World War. In the Matruh area, elder informants
agree that before 1914 the Bedouins lived in tents outside the
361 town area. When the British came, they began to move into town.
648 Many of the Bedouins built houses in Matruh between the years

361 1925 and 1930 because, as they point out, the British
648 administration provided employment for "the poor Bedouin."
361 The wealthier Bedouins who owned camels and large numbers of
556 sheep remained in the desert. Just the reverse is happening
178 at the present time. The rich men who see the advantages in
business, and the comforts which Matruh offers, can also
afford the change of residence or the maintenance of two
residences.

175 In 1922, the Egyptian government first registered land
423 in al-Qasr. At this time, they sanctioned the tribal division
657 of territory which existed. There was no attempt to force
political integration upon the Bedouins. Egypt has never had
a nomad problem as have other Middle Eastern countries. The
history of Egypt is essentially the history of the Nile Valley.
Consequently, it is not odd that we find no mention of the
Awlad 'Ali in the historical record. The Bedouins of the
Western Desert were resigned to their place in the desert, and
the central government saw no particular advantage or disadvantage
in this.

423 Concern for the Bedouin minority in Egypt emerged only
648 with nationalistic programs of modernization. In 1954, the
Fourth United Nations Social Welfare Seminar for Arab States
in the Middle East convened in Baghdad. From this meeting
came some general recommendations for dealing with the problems
of the Bedouin. The major proposal was calculated to transform

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648
the structure of both the nomadic and the sedentary tribe: "Settlement should take place on the basis of granting each individual capable of working in agriculture a piece of land, the area to be fixed by the state, calculated to ensure the raising of his living standard and to enable him to support himself and his legal dependents on condition that he start cultivation of the land. When distributing the land, care should be taken that a family be settled on a single piece of land composed of the total of the plots granted to its members, the family being composed of relatives to the first grandfather" (Abu-Zeid n.d.).

From this point, each Arab country dealt with the problem of the nomad in its own way, some effectively and others not so effectively. Not until 1958 did Egypt make a formal effort to integrate the Bedouins of the Western Desert into the national society. And it was not until 1960 that the so-called "Desert Law" of 1958 (U.A.R. Law Number 124) was activated and enforced. The most important provision of this law followed the plan formulated at the Baghdad conference: "There is no recognition of tribal possession of land which is considered as belonging to the State, and whenever a family develops and plants on a holding, this gives it the right, if approved, to the issue ot a title to it by the government." Law Number 124 also provided that land occupied by buildings or orchards before 1957 can be owned by the occupants at a low

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423 cost payable over a period of thirty years. As pointed out
657 by Professor Abu-Zeid (n.d.), this law is welcomed in part
656 because the garden area to which it really applies (the garden
area in al-Qasr would be the 'izba sector) is not considered
"tribal territory" or lineage-owned as are the barley and
pasture regions.

653 Governmental activity growing out of the "Desert Law"
177 has been an important catalyst for social, economic and
*613 political change. All of these aspects of change had repercussions on the lineage system and the authority structure of the Bedouins. In 1959, the government entered al-Qasr with the goal of revitalizing and reorganizing the hydraulic system of the area. The revival of the Roman water system, especially the network of cisterns covering the southern region of al-Qasr, and, on the coast, the restoration of the well system and underground galleries, the drilling of new wells and the intensification of olive farming have all led to a levelling of economic differentiation between lineages and between individuals.

657 In 1956, the Egyptian government passed the Cooperative
177 Law (U.A.R. Law Number 217) establishing agricultural cooperative
474 societies throughout the country. But not until 1959 did this
law have any impact on the tribes of the Western Desert.
[433] Generally, the cooperative society has served as a primary and successful agent of social change in the desert. It has

177 brings. The future of the olive tree on the coast, and the
433 growing importance of the melon crop in the southern sector
434 will be the bases of a modern al-Qasr. The table below gives
177 some indication of what the Bedouins of al-Qasr can hope for,
434 in terms of material profits, by a shift to a cash economy.
435 Prices are approximate, and as of 1964.

TABLE 4

PRICES OF KEY PRODUCTS IN AL-QASR, 1964

Crop	Price Per Unit	Possible Profit
Barley	3 L.E. per ardab (120 kg.)	20 L.E. per acre
Melon	6-12 piasters each	70-100 L.E. per acre
Mint	Few piaster per bunch	150 L.E. per acre
Olive	15 piasters per kg. of olives	1 tree=150 kg. of olives =22.5 L.E.
	40 piasters per kg. of oil	1 tree=30 kg. of olive oil =12.5 L.E.

•423 *613 Land Tenure and Rights of Ownership

Traditionally, an individual's rights in the land were of usufruct and tenancy. Sovereignty over the land was vested in the corporate secondary lineage group (see Figure 7). The territory of al-Qasr is a division of lineage zones, and more will be said about this in the next chapter since it relates directly to the structural organization of Bedouin

•423 society. Private ownership of land with sovereign rights
*[613] [178] over it is now the normal practice in al-Qasr. Rights are
[596] held by the family head, the shaib. If the family head is
deceased, land tenure rights are held jointly by the sons.

[184] In the area beyond the plateau, in the extreme
*[613] south of al-Qasr, land rights to grazing and water still are
[241] associated with lineages. But here agriculture is impossible. The type of rights over the land varies with the method by which it is exploited. The southern and coastal sections of
[433] al-Qasr represent the old and the new, the pastoral traditional mode of production and the modern agricultural cash economy.
[233] But, as noted, of the total population only a few Bedouins are actually engaged in pastoralist activities. Hence, tribal tenure rights, in general, are not overly important at this time. Not too long ago they were, and many cases in the recent
[671] history of Bedouin customary law relate to conflicts over land and water in the southern region. The Bedouins say that
[178] traditionally no lineage could use the pasturage or water of
*[613] another without some agreement, usually of long standing,
[233] made beforehand. Now, they say, permission is not needed.
[675] In the old days, these agreements were made between lineage representatives, not individuals per se. Today, the grass
178 and water in the southern zone are claimed, though not in a
423 legal sense, by the families using them: the rights of usufruct over the land are closer to rights of sovereignty

178 than they were in the past. These conditions reflect a change
●423 in social and authority relations.

423 In the 'izba sector of al-Qasr, as of 1964, there were
432 two cases of land purchase. In one case, land was sold to an
Egyptian, "an outsider" from the Nile Valley. This, of course,
could only occur where such a transaction would be upheld by
423 the Egyptian government. Land ownership, when it involves
registered land, is absolute. This, to a great extent, works
*[613] to lessen the influence of the lineage structure on property
423 relations. The law governing property, whether in traditional
178 or modern al-Qasr, reflects a set of social relationships.
571 When an individual can own property in the absolute sense,
rather than with respect to his being a member of a group
which enjoys sovereign rights of ownership, then, there has
been a change in traditional corporate relations (Herskovits
[184] 1952:260). This has definitely been the case for most of
al-Qasr, and it is adumbrated in the southern sector where
a person's rights over land are nearly absolute. A compar-
423 ison of land tenure patterns on the coast and in the southern
184 region reflect not only the contrast between methods of land
use, but, also the fact that as land becomes valuable it
becomes scarce and land holdings become fragmented (compare
Figures 5 and 6).

428 When the head of a household dies, his eldest son
596 inherits his authority, but all of the sons share equally in

The Bedouins of al-Qasr claim that they
428 follow the Islamic laws of inheritance, in which case, a 562 surviving daughter is entitled to one-half the share of a surviving son (Quran IV: 177). But, in only two cases did [423] women own land in al-Qasr: one woman was the only close survivor of her father, and, the other woman was a widow without sons. In fact, my informant even admitted that these cases were exceptional, that the women were permitted to keep the land only because the brothers of the deceased men, who are the "rightful heirs" after the sons, did not want the land. The Bedouins insist, on the other hand, that a girl can claim her share of the inheritance: "It is her right." But she will never do such a thing "because she respects her brothers too much to accept the land which is offered to her."

428 When the father's estate is large, certain measures are taken to divide it between his sons. In some cases, the division may be somewhat complex and determined over a period of time. One example of this in al-Qasr involved a wealthy man whose own property was divisible into parts roughly corresponding to ecological subdivisions. The subdivisions of the estate became the shares of the sons, and could then be separated but remain symbiotically dependent. Ecological relationships affirm social relations. The following is an [159] account of inheritance rules in al-Qasr:

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
SEA
N
OLIVES AND VEGETABLES
ROAD TO MARSA MATRUH
('AILIT SHRAIF)
('AILIT ABU QAR ASA)
('AILIT DAWLAT)
('AILIT SULWATIYYA)
('AILIT ZALLAT)
('AILIT ZAGHARAT)
('AILIT MA'FAS)
('AILIT LAZUMI)
PLATEAU
BARLEY
ROAD TO AL-SALLUM
(KAMAILAT TRIBE)
WADI
PASTURE
DESERT

FIGURE 3a. LINEAGE TERRITORIES OF AL-QASR.

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

FIGURE 5
SAMPLE OF LAND TENURE IN IZBA SECTOR

WHITE SAND DUNES
N
UNCULTIVABLE STONEY HILL
SCALE = 1:4,000 (APPROX.)
○ = WELLS
☐ = PERMANENT DWELLINGS

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●423
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

FIGURE 6
SAMPLE OF LAND TENURE IN SHA'IR WI MAR'A SECTOR

SCALE = 1:4,000 (APPROX.)
O = WELLS
□ = PERMANENT DWELLINGS
N

*613 582 'Ailit Lazumi, the other lineage, along with 'Ailit Ma'fas, considered to be the most powerful in al-Qasr. In the fourth ● [423] case, Abd al-Latif's marriage into 'Ailit Dawlat, this individual owns an olive orchard in Dawlat territory, adjacent to that of Ma'fas, which he purchased from a member of his wife's lineage before their marriage. *613 582 421 In every case, with one exception, marriage ties are intimately related to property relations, cognation with local contiguity. The two groups become politically entwined, and property relations become a basis for authority relations.

*613 All things considered, complementary filiation is as important in Bedouin society as it is in other societies: "The bilateral family is the focal element in the web of kinship" (Fortes 1953:33). [533] As one Bedouin wedding song puts it: "The bride is the flower of the stem," the stem here symbolizing her tertiary group.

583 554 556 The amount of brideprice which a man is expected to pay will depend upon his status as an "outsider" or an "insider," and his position on the prestige scale which is figured largely in terms of wealth. A man adds to his prestige and reputation when he pays beyond the "going price" to obtain a bride for his son. On the other hand, if a man is an "outsider," he is expected to pay well beyond the normal brideprice for the privilege of marrying into the family, and he receives no additional prestige unless he goes even higher than what is

682 578 619 *613 the diiya: the Qinaishat paid 50 L.E., the Kamailat paid 50 L.E., but the 'Aishaibat, the tribe of the killer paid 600 L.E. Of the 600 L.E. paid by the 'Aishaibat it was distributed as follows: 'Ailit Lazumi and "Ailit Ma'fas each paid 100 L.E. because they are rich; 'Ailit Dawlat paid only 30 L.E. because they are poor, and each pays according to their means. The 'aiela of the killer, although they are poor, had to pay 70 L.E., and the bait of the killer had to pay 300 L.E. All paid according to their means, except the killer's bait. This was a special case, it never happened before and will never happen again and this is why the killer's bait had to pay more. The killer's bait was very poor, so what they did not have they had to beg from the richer families of the tribe.

Legal Cases Pertaining to Property Rights

• 423 *613 In general, property in al-Qasr is owned either by an individual or by a tertiary group; seldom, in these days, is property held by the secondary lineage group. 423 *613 182 [671] If we followed classic segmentary lineage theory, seeing that the tribal political structure and the 'awaiyid are still functionally intact, we might suppose that land and water possession are rights in usufruct and not of ownership. The Bedouins themselves insist that the rights to land and water are rights of ownership. They state that all of the lineage-owned land, with few exceptions, was parcelled out to tertiary groups a

423 long time ago. This seems to be supported by the evidence
*613 shown below, for often conflict over land and water rights is
182
[691] represented by litigation between individuals and not groups.

422 I have arbitrarily assigned to the classification of
562 property rights the rights over women. I have done this
*613 because a man acquires such rights as a member of a lineage
jural group and secures them with the backing of public opinion
and the _'awaiyid_. Also, though a man in al-Qasr does not
"own" his wife, he does have the legal rights to certain things
related to her: he has the right to her sexual favors, and the
right to claim her offspring for his own lineage.

685 Settlement in cases dealing with the infringement of
695 property rights, if they do not lead to personal injury cases,
will usually be concluded by arbitration or oath-taking, either
of which brings the two parties into agreement.

691 Date: 1964. Case: Quarrel between Bait 'Umran and Bait Idris
685 of 'Ailit Ma'fas over the ownership of a well. The _'awaaqil_
*613 sent for the two parties involved, and they met on Wednesday,
578 market day. And the _'awaaqil_ told the two parties: "This is
692 a shame (_'aib_), you must be friends because you are from the
same tribe." The _'awaaqil_ knew "from past history and from
truthful elders" that the well belonged to 'Ait Idris. The
'awaaqil made 'Ait 'Umran change their minds about their claim
[695] to the well. Before the litigation 'Ait 'Umran had insisted

691 that 'Ait Idris take the oath as proof that the well was
685 owned by them. Upon the decision of the _'awaaqil_, however,
*613 'Ait 'Umran refused to allow 'Ait Idris to swear the oath
578 "because we are all one family." This means, as one _'aqila_
692 actually stated at the conclusion of the case, that " 'Ait
695 Idris is indebted to 'Ait 'Umran."

•423 The following two cases which occur in the external
675 system of political relations, one within the 'Aishaibat
*613 territory and the other dealing with land rights in the
territory between two primary authority groups, indicate the
formal aspect of Bedouin adjudication in establishing contracts.

[539] _Date: 12 August 1963_. _A Contract of Agreement on Land Rights_.
Agreement and satisfaction took place between Hussain Karim al-Dawlat of al-'Aishaibat and Khalid Idris al-Ma'fas of al-'Aishaibat, the first and second party. And the reason for this agreement is that each of the two parties own cultivable land at Ras Wadi Madwar. The two parties wish to make a dividing line between this linear piece of land and to declare the borders. The two parties agreed on the following: first, the beginning of the border extends from the eastern side at south Ras Raqabit al-Shumar to the western side at Hatiyid and is shown by stone markers; secondly, this line should be established from the east to the west, and this is a dividing line between the two parties and was executed by them and with their satisfaction; thirdly, whoever rejects or modifies this line will be responsible in front of law and the _'awaiyid Awlad 'Ali_; each party is responsible for his children and relatives as to their actions regarding this line which is the subject of the agreement; fifthly, this contract of agreement which defines the borders between the two parties was issued in two copies, a copy to each party to use when it is needed.

Signatures or seals of seven men.

●423 Date: 12 October 1954. There came to us (i.e. the 'awaqil)
691 on this day, Khalid Idris of al-'Aishaibat and Yunis Abd
578 al-Nabi of al-Kamailat. The reason for their coming is a
*613 quarrel over land rights at Wadi al-Hijnaiya. And we put
distinct markers between the land of the two parties, the
[539] first, Khalid Idris, and the second, Yunis Abd al-Nabi.
And the boundary passes by the distinct markers; the
first is the wadi marker, the second to the sea and beside
the tree, and the final marker we put east of Halima well.
This is a decision between the two parties in the presence
of the following witnesses:

Signatures or seals of five men.

619 The case given below indicates, by the use of two
578 documents, the process of conflict settlement involving two
secondary segments of al-Qasr, one Sa'adi and one Marabit.
[671] 'Ailit al-Sulwatiyya, though genealogically not members of the
Awlad 'Ali and holders of a client or vassal status in traditional times, are within the jurisdiction of the 'awaiyid
Awlad 'Ali. They claim their rights under it by virtue of the
fact of their residence in al-Qasr. The power of ritual
sanction is clearly illustrated by this case.

578 Date: 30 July 1964, Marsa Matruh. First Party: Shaikh
685 Khalid Za'aluk al-Sulwatiyya and four relatives. Second
691 Party: Khalid Idris of 'Ailit Ma'fas and three relatives.
619 They are present. The cause of these two parties coming together
423 is a quarrel over a well named Halima. Since the choice
[695] to swear the oath has been made by the two parties, Khalid
Idris, the second party, will swear the oath supported by
twenty-four members of his 'umraa al-dam ("blood group") to

423
578 be chosen by Shaikh Khalid Za'aluk, the first party. The text
685
691 of the oath which Khalid Idris will swear is: "By the truth
619 of the owner of this tomb (maqaam), and this book of God, I
695 swear that you (i.e. the 'Ailit Sulwatiyya represented by
[539] Shaikh Khalid Za'aluk) have neither work of hand nor a grandfather's stake in this well." If any of the oath-takers are missing on the day of the oath, the well will be owned Khalid Za'aluk. And if they swear the oath, the well will be owned by 'Ailit Ma'fas.

The date of the oath will be the first Friday of month nine,
[778] 1964. The oath will be taken at the shrine of Sidi 'Awam, and the swearing will deal with the well only. For the land which is west of the well belongs to Khalid Za'aluk and his family, and the land to the east of the well belongs to Khalid Idris and his family. And the water which is west of the well belongs to Khalid Za'aluk. The two parties agreed to this. (Each party, and five witnesses, i.e. rajal khair, for each party, signed the document.)

423 Date: 30 July 1964. I, Khalid Za'aluk, have decided to cancel
619 the oath which was supposed to have been sworn on 9 September
578 1964 at the shrine of Sidi Awam. Khalid Idris and the oath-
691
[695] takers were present and were stopped from taking the oath. And the well named al-Halima which was the cause of the quarrel

423 619 578 691 (nizaa'a) belongs to Khalid Idris and his brothers. This happened with the satisfaction of both tribes, and this renunciation of claim is valid from today. This paper concerning the ownership of land around the well is valid from today also. And this happened between the parties: (Signatures or stamps of both parties concerned.)

(There appeared the signatures of twenty-three of the twenty-four men who were to have sworn the oath.)
Only twenty-three oath-takers were present: 30 July 1964.
I, Shaikh Khalid Za'aluk, agree on the signatures of only twenty-three oath-takers. (Signature of Khalid Za'aluk.)

648 671 578 We have mentioned that the 'awaiyid prevails in al-Qasr, but have also noted that where the security of the desert is threatened the government is likely to intervene. The government enters tribal conflict in al-Qasr with the tacit approval of the Bedouins. As one informant remarked: "The 'awaiyid is the best way to handle problems, but the police will handle what the 'awaiyid cannot."

423 691 578 619 648 *[613] [634] Date: 1964. Case: Quarrel between al-Afrad ('Ali Abyad) and 'Aishaibat ('Ali Ahmar) over water rights. Many members of both tribes took part in this conflict. The government had to intervene: they formed a peace committee made up of all the 'awaaqil of both tribes and the 'umda and shaikh from each tribe.

•423 691 578 619 648 each tribe. It was decided that the water which flows through the wadi after the rains should be divided equally between the two tribes, and that no one should be stopped from using the water. Had not the government intervened in this conflict, and had not they collected all of the weapons from the Bedouins, this problem would have resulted in the death of many men and even greater problems.

674 685 Theft is condemned by the Bedouins: "Everything in the desert is loose. We must punish the thief quickly and severely." It is a fact that the man who goes to steal and [682] accidentally kills in the act will have judged against him [829] the full diiya, i.e., the amount for intentional killing. On the other hand, the people of al-Qasr insist that "Bedouins do [671] not steal." But legal norms exist to sanction violations against cultural ideals. The following case shows how social and ritual sanctions operate to enforce ideals.

619 578 685 *613 Date: 1964. Case: Quarrel between the tribe of Kamailat and the tribe of 'Aishaibat over the theft of 16 L.E. Muhammad of 'Ailit Ma'fas was accused of stealing 16 L.E. which belonged to Ahmad of 'Ailit Idris, Kamailat. The theft occurred while the two were residing at a hotel in Marsa Matruh. There were twenty other persons in the hotel that night. The accused said: "I did not take anything."

554 tional symbol of wealth. A comparison of wealth between
571 the "status group" and "other members" of al-Qasr, and the
556 picture of stratification which emerges, are shown on Table 6.

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TABLE 6

COMPARATIVE DATA ON SOCIO-ECONOMIC STRATIFICATION IN AL-QASR[1]

Average Per Person	Status Group	Others
OLIVE - trees	661	86
SHEEP - head	402	30
LAND - acres	91	5

554 One most important way of accruing "status honor"
571 in al-Qasr is by acting the part of the third party in conflict
627 situations. The role of the third party represents an effective
*613 and acceptable way of bypassing formal litigation through the
[778] office of 'aqila. For instance, by mediating through the
process of nazaala, the third party prevents feuds.

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[114] [1] This data is both approximate and partial. Some data
[128] are excellent and completely reliable, others are not so dependable. Factors which could conceivably change the picture here presented would be a count of land and animals outside al-Qasr which would be extremely difficult to obtain. Also, some land is not in the name of the owner but in the names of relatives. Of all the data, land data is the most unreliable. Nevertheless, the addition of new data, I feel, would only serve to substantiate the picture of socio-economic stratification shown here.

*613 with Bait Bu Taram of 'Ailit Lazumi. These marriages and
159 their resultant alliances enhance the political power and
581 social status of Hajj 'Ali within and without al-Qasr.
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Although he has no education himself, and neither reads
159 nor writes, Hajj 'Ali has sent his son to the University of
156
873 Alexandria. Hajj 'Ali's son is the only boy from al-Qasr
[212] ever to attend the university. Hajj 'Ali desired that his
son study law at the university or enter the military academy
"and become an officer." But his son objected to this, saying:
"Either way I will be employed by the government and will not
be permitted to travel and see other countries." Hajj 'Ali did
not argue with this: he said that his son should study what
he wished. The son is now studying in the Faculty of Commerce
156 at Alexandria. Hajj 'Ali is also sending his daughters to
159 the primary school in al-Qasr. Not all of the Bedouins believe
872
562 that girls should receive an education.

156
Hajj 'Ali places among the "status group" in terms
159 of wealth. Although he has now committed himself to olive-
554 farming as a way of life, he remains one of the biggest sheep
472 owners in al-Qasr. Therefore, he is identified with both traditional and modern symbols of status. Hajj 'Ali differs in
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one important way from other members of the "status group"
159
554 in that he owns three small general stores, two in al-Qasr
443 and one far to the west in Sallum. This fact has several
•423 significant implications. Shops in al-Qasr (there are five
472
*[613]

156 of them) cater largely to the needs of the lineage in whose
159 territory they are located. They are operated mostly on a
554 credit basis. Lineage members, as debtors, feel gratitude
443 ●423 but also, and more importantly, loyalty toward their kinsman
472 *[613] and creditor. Hajj 'Ali is the only member of al-Qasr who
[452] owns two shops, and the only Bedouin in the whole Western Desert
who owns three shops. His brother owns a shop in Matruh.
156 Furthermore, the shop in Sallum is in a strategic position on
159 the Libyan border which, coincidentally or not, is a point
554 for importing, and also smuggling, foreign goods into Egypt.
443 439 The possession and utilization of foreign products is definitely
472 a status symbol all over Egypt. Hence, the person in this
area who can control, however slightly, the distribution of
such goods has a lever with which to exact prestige and
favors from the "status group" in al-Qasr who now welcome
these symbols (tobacco, pistols, rifles, radios) and the
bureaucrats of Marsa Matruh who crave them (food goods,
clothing materials, car parts).

156 Besides all this, Hajj 'Ali is involved in a small
159 stone-cutting operation which supplies stones for house
554 building, he cooperates with his three brothers in a well-
[316] [312] cleaning concern, and contracts government heavy equipment
[427] to build earth dams. The material evidence of his status
[342] is that he is the only man in al-Qasr with two compound-type
[595] houses (one he built thirteen years ago), and the only man
with four wives.

233 The grazing season extends between November and April. As the dry sea-
221 son advances, the flocks are moved northward to the cultivated lands so as to be nearer to fodder and to the waterholes which stand usually very close to the coastal zone. During the dry season, animals live mainly on barley straw and very little dry grass. In exceptionally bad years, the people are compelled to dispose of their animals or to sell some of them in order to be able to maintain the rest. In such years the shepherds find it necessary to cross the border to the permanent pasture of Cyrenaica in northeastern Libya, or to move to the Delta where they may purchase the right to graze in wheat fields after reaping the crop.

243 Grain crops, mainly barley, are also grown in the area. Depending on the rainfall, pockets of land characterized by deep alluvial soil and underground water at various depths are cultivated with barley and
[246] other grain crops. Barley cultivation is preferred by the people because it grows quickly and matures faster than wheat; also, it can be cultivated in a range of soils and climates; it is mostly used as ani-
[132] mal feed. Barley straw is also used as fodder for animals. Because of the erratic nature of rainfall, barley production is hazardous in most
[233] of the region. For this reason, pastoralism remains the most impor-
[433] tant mode of subsistence,and cultivation becomes secondary. Cultivation is done on the basis of shifting cultivation, which means that the areas cultivated vary from one year to the next following the rainfall.

Land Tenure

• 423 Most of the cultivable lands, as well as the grazing lands, are
311 under tribal occupation. Awlad Ali have, by custom and usage, had for

423 311 many generations a recognized right by the Egyptian government to use the land for grazing and cultivation, and the tribal concept is that the land belongs to the tribe.

The concept is true with regard to wells and cisterns. But legally speaking, land belongs to the state, and the tribal populations in the area have only the right of usufruct. This does not mean that the land is exploited jointly by all members of one tribe or tribal segment, or that a man can cultivate or graze his flocks in any part he chooses, for there is a certain correlation between the right of usufruct and the distribution of the tribes in the area on the one hand, and the inner tribal segmentation on the other. Although land is not [556] an object of ownership in itself, and wealth is not spoken of in terms of land, yet, the distinction between ownership and usufruct in the 423 311 619 area is sometimes very hard to draw. Each tribal segment has its name associated with a specific area of land which it regards as its own and whose boundaries it defends against other tribal segments. The tribal segment whose name is associated with a certain locality not only has the right to use the land, but this right is also vested in it to the exclusion of other segments. Within such an area, each subsegment has the right to a portion of the land to the exclusion of the other subsegments. While individual members of the tribal segments know the land belonging to their tribal segments, their right is not associated with a specific patch within the total area. Individuals usually cultivate different patches within that total area as the need may arise; but one cannot cultivate a patch in an area belonging to another tribal segment except under certain conditions. This does not mean that the individual cannot claim the right to a specific patch, for not only

423 311 619 can he do this, but he can also sell that right. The right to sell the share of the tribal land has recently become recognized in the Western Desert, and the usufruct right is being treated in the same way as ownership.

423 311 619 233 While the boundaries of the cultivable land belonging to the tribe are guarded, when it comes to grazing land, the boundaries are not so much enforced. The tribes of the Western Desert of Egypt are quite tolerant in allowing members of other tribal segments to graze their flocks wherever grazing lands are available. Everyone from any tribe can graze his flocks in areas that offer better pasture. But in doing so, he does not have the right to use the wells and cisterns of the tribal segment. [312] [432] Water is scarce and valuable. Cisterns are owned by the tribal segments, and if an outsider wants to use the water, he has to buy it from the owner for the whole season for a sum ranging between $100-$180.

423 656 In 1958, with the extension of the Mariut irrigation project, a Desert Land Possession Law was enacted and came into force in 1960. This law restates the right of the government to the ownership of the land, and therefore does not recognize the tribal possessions of the land, even when they have made certain improvements in it, such as planting trees or digging wells. However, it gave the right of the occupants of a certain area of land to request either the purchase of the land or its lease for a period not exceeding nine years, granted that such is made within one year of the passing of the law. Failing to do so within one year, the government will either remove the plants and buildings, or confiscate them without compensation.

423
656 The above law met with opposition from the tribal population in the area. As a result of this opposition, a new law was enacted in 1964 (Law #100). Although this later law eliminated some of the shortcomings of the previous one, it is not itself without disadvantages. The 1964 law recognizes the Bedouins' right of ownership only in areas where the fairly permanent trees were planted before 1958. Rain-fed areas cultivated from season to season are excluded. The new law also provides for the sale and transfer of land. Any person can purchase up to 50 feddans (acres) provided that he can develop it into an economic enterprise. The law also provides for the distribution of arable lands in such a way as to permit each head of household to own 10 feddans and to be provided with water possibilities. The price of this kind of land is to be paid over a period of 30 years. Settlers are encouraged and helped in planting trees and building dikes. So far, 8,600 feddans irrigated by windmills have been pssessed by members of Awlad Ali tribes, [312] and titles to their holdings are being issued.

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423
656 With regard to grazing lands, no legislation has yet been issued, and the government feels that at this stage of development, it is essential to start educating and inducing the tribal population of the Western Desert in initiating and implementing new programs for preventing overgrazing and controlling the number of flocks.

The Group

619 The name Awlad Ali covers a number of ethnically distinct groups. In addition to Awlad Ali proper (the descendents of Ali), referred to as the Sa'adi, it includes a number of Murabiteen (holy men) tribes who are attached to various segments of Awlad Ali and occupy an inferior political position. The name also includes various peasant

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619 175 648 from forced labor in government projects and released from the payment of taxes. The government agreed to these demands, and on their part, Awlad Ali helped Muhammad Ali extensively in his military expedition in Syria and Arabia and were a major factor in the battle of 1815 at Bissel where he succeeded in breaking Wahabi power. They also helped his son, Ismeal, in his expedition to the Sudan.

[701] Later, when the Egyptian army was organized, the government exempted Awlad Ali and other tribal groups which helped in the military conquests from military service, but required them to undertake the guarding of the desert roads and the frontiers of Egypt. Also, in [423] exchange for their previous services, they were given the right to use the land of the Western Desert and left the question of its distribution among the various tribal segments to the native tribal leaders. 619 175 648 642 Finally, in 1832, Awlad Ali were granted a form of legal and political autonomy whereby the government acknowledged the tribal legal and judicial system as the means to settle disputes between members of the tribe. The government also recognized the authority of the native tribal leaders and allowed the tribal populations to be governed by their own native system of leadership.

This political autonomy of Awlad Ali existed until 1947. Although their usefulness to the government had long ceased to exist, they had continued to enjoy the privileges they had obtained earlier. This was partly due to the fact that the various governments that came after Muhammad Ali showed no interest in the area occupied by Awlad Ali. There were no taxable lands in the area, no natural resources of any promise, and the tribal population did not present any particular problem to attract the attention of the government. There was some smuggling 000

613 [675] [672] for the actions of the members of their former Amar, nor is the Amar responsible for theirs.

Units thus separated establish themselves as separate Amars. These units are commonly referred to as Eila, thus retaining the structural label of the higher order of segmentation. This is not always the case, however, and other segments may refer to them as Baits rather than as Eilat. This explains, at least in part, the tendency toward blurring the formal scheme on the next level of segmentation, that is, of the Bait, and may account for the variable meaning of the term Eilat itself.

The Bait

While the Eila or Amar-el-dam is the most important political unit by virtue of being the vengeance group and therefore, the individual's major support group, it is the Bait that constitutes the most visible political unit.

613 423 The Bait is the only corporate land-holding group. While the Eila is usually associated with a certain geographical locale which it considers as its homeland or "watan", it rarely, if ever, utilizes this land as a corporate unit. Instead, the land is divided among the various Baits constituting the Eila. The land of the Bait is not divided and each member of the Bait can, at least theoretically, cultivate or graze on any part of it.

613 But the one important characteristic of the Bait which distinguishes it as a political unit is the existence of a formally recognized leadership in the position of the Aqila (lit. wiseman). The Bait is the only structural unit with such formalized leadership. The Aqila is responsible for all members of his own Bait whose number varies from 20 to 60

613 individuals. He settles disputes among them and represents them in their
[627] disputes with outsiders. He is also the spokesman of his Bait in all
matters involving the relationship of the Bait with the other tribal segments.
[682] He is responsible for the collection of the bloodmoney from members
of his Bait and has the authority to confiscate property of individual
members who refuse to pay their share. When a member is financially unable
to pay his share, the Aqila is expected to pay for him and collect at a
later time when the member is in a position to make such payment.

613 Originally the position of the Aqila was a hereditary one with the
428 position passing from father to son. However, in recent years the rigidity
178 of the patrilineal descent as the basis of succession to the position
of the Aqila has been modified radically and other principles of selection
613 have been introduced. The working of the principles underlying the
128 selection of the Aqila will be analyzed in detail in the following chapter
through the close examination of one of the major legal cases which occurred
during my stay in the area.

613 Thus each Bait is a division of one of the Eilas and this has its
[423] place in the formal tribal system. It constitutes a group with definite
usufruct rights to land and a formally recognized leadership.

621 But the actual residential units in which Awlad Ali live are not
[613] baits but parts of them in the form of separate camps or "nagei". The
camps constitute the primary communities of Awlad Ali. A camp consists
[594] of a number of tents ranging from four to twelve. Each tent is usually
occupied by one nuclear family of a husband, his wife and children. In
[595] cases of polygynous marriages, each wife usually occupies one tent with
[361] her children. Each camp is separated from the next one by a distance
which ranges from two to ten kilometers.

562 such compensation. In forfeiting her rights of inheritance, a woman
428 secures for herself and her children the continuous support of her
593 kin-group and the protection of her rights. This support was denied
in the few cases I was able to collect in which the woman demanded her
share of inheritance. The following is one of these cases. The material
159 presented is a summary of the life history of Fatma, who at the time of
562 the study, was a shopkeeper managing the small general store she owned
428
593 near the railroad station of Burg el-Arab, some fifty miles west of
[444] Alexandria. She also practiced healing and midwifery on a part-time
[754] basis.

Fatma was the only daughter with four sons of sheikh El-Asi, who
at one time was the aqila of bait Hussein of the Sanagrah tribal segment
[627] in the area. He was also known as a mardi and was frequently sought in
[755] mediation of disputes. He was believed to have supernatural power which
he used to cure people for a certain amount of money. During his life-
[454] time, he had acquired a sizable sum of money which he invested in live-
[233] stock. At the time of his death his herd, which numbered more than 900
[422] sheep and goats, was considered the finest in the area. He had no barley
[423] lands because his camp was deep in the desert, but he had fine grazing
land.

Throughout the area the four sons were known for being arrogant and irresponsible. Three of them were employed by one of the irrigation projects carried on by the government in the area as construction workers; the fourth looked after the herd of his father. All four were known as chasers of women, and they frequently went to Alexandria to visit prostitutes and drink liquor.

[444] Fatma was first married when she was eighteen to a man from
Alexandria who had opened a general store in the area where her father

683 was to be paid unconditionally and consequently would cost all
682 members of the amar; but all these attempts failed. At this point,
672 there was no doubt on the part of the attending crowd about Muftah's
695
613 responsibility for the death of Selouma. The question was, how much
had he to pay. The amount requested by Selouma's son was that for
"intentional" killing on the basis that Muftah had willfully thrown
the rock knowing that it might harm Selouma, especially considering
his age.

683 After long and intensive negotiations with the interested
682 parties, a Mi'ad was set in which it was announced that Muftah had
672 to pay the amount of L.E. 200. In his reasoning, he stipulated
627 that the wound which had caused the death of Selouma, although it
was intentional on the part of Muftah, was inflicted by a stone
which in itself is not a lethal weapon, and therefore the death
was an unintentional one for which the bloodmoney is customarily
estimated at L.E. 300. He also stated that in the excitement that
[845] followed the death of Selouma, Muftah's pregnant wife had lost the
child. The bloodmoney for the still-born infant was estimated at
L.E. 100, which was deducted from the amount of bloodmoney that
Muftah had to pay.

CASE #3: The Case of the Trespasser

311 This case occurred during the year of the fieldwork which was
423 the second dry year the area experienced. Rain had not fallen ex-
613
[132] cept in a very few places. One of these places was near the small
town of Sidi Barrani in which the land belonging to Yadem and his
Bait was found. Yadem had sown his barley which at that time had
grown to about five feet high. Surrounding the cultivated land

311 423 was a large area of grazing land which also belonged to the Bait
613 of Yadem. The area attracted a large number of tribesmen who
233 brought their herds for grazing. One of these was Kuraiem from
311 Awlad Kharouf tribal segment. He brought his wife and child and
619 613 a herd of more than two hundred sheep and goats. Although it is
not proper for one to cultivate the land belonging to another
tribal segment, yet, when it comes to grazing land, no such restriction is imposed. Only the permission of the aqila of that
tribal segment is required, and even that is granted so automatically that many tribesmen do not bother to ask for such permission. Kuraiem took this permission for granted and pitched his
233 tent in the grazing land of Yadem and his Bait. Yadem, however,
311 was disturbed because he thought that Kuraiem grazed his flocks in
578 an area very close to his cultivated barley, so close that he feared
that the animals might eat the growing barley. When Yadem asked
Kuraiem to move a little further and Kuraiem refused, they entered
into an argument during which Yadem told him that if he did not
move by the following day, he would break his neck. The following
morning Yadem went with his brother to see if Kuraiem was still
there. Both Yadem and his brother were armed with heavy sticks.
As they reached Kuraiem's tent, they hit him with the sticks on
[682] the head. Kuraiem fell on the ground, and they kept hitting him
until he was dead.

682 In due course, Kuraiem's family claimed L.E. 400 bloodmoney
672 for the intentional killing of Kuraiem. Yadem and his family rejected the claim and insisted that the killing was unintentional. The
[627] Mi'ad was held, and the two Mardis selected by the two parties

221 them to live on the country to a great extent. In normal times
233 the Bedouin drive their animals on the hoof to Egyptian
[439] markets, slowly, along this rich southern pasture belt, grazing as they go, so that they arrive in good condition. Finally, there can be no doubt about the correctness of the Arab claim that a few weeks residence in the open steppe is a tonic for man and beast.

233 It must be remembered that there are no water problems at
312 this time of year. Sheep, goats, and camels do not have to be
423 watered from the time the first rains make grass till the end of April or early in May: even horses do not drink until well into April. This fact is important, because it means that the prolific pastures can be grazed by all without dispute, since the wells, which belong to tribal sections or families, are not drawn on. While rain is still falling regularly human requirements are met from pools. To the south of the Tariq 'Aziza, generally speaking, there is no ownership in land—there are no *hudud*, boundaries, as the Arabs say—and anyone may cultivate or graze where he pleases, but there is strict ownership in wells; whereas to the north of the Tariq 'Aziza there is less narrowly restricted ownership in water, which is here spring water in abundance, but there are well-defined rights in arable.[1] The water of the southern wells is essential for the Bedouin who own the country and who live in it all the year round, and their rights are respected by those who graze
233 there. Sheep and goats need only drink every second or third
312 day, even in the hottest weather, so that in the period of meagre pasturage they have a wide range of grazing from the wells, and the dry grasses, supplemented by evergreen shrubs of the goosefoot family, are sufficient nourishment for them. Wells are numerous in the steppe but few of them last out the summer.

233 The animals grazed in the southern steppe are mostly sheep and camels. The Bedouin say 'Cattle and goats do not migrate;
[221] camels and sheep do'. Camels are essential to nomadic life as it is impossible to move camp without them, and the richer Bedouin are in camels the more frequently they move, seeking
231 richer pastures. Cyrenaican dromedaries are heavy beasts,

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[1] Enzo Savarese, *Le Terre della Cirenaica*, Pt. II, 1928, Chap. VII; Massimo Colucci, *Il Regime della Proprietà Fondiaria nell' Africa Italiana*, vol. i, 1942, pp. 210 seq. and 220 seq.

sections of a tribe may be opposed to one another they regard 619
themselves as an undivided group in opposition to neighbouring
tribes, and are so regarded by their neighbours. Thus a Qalbati
is only a Qalbati in Hasa country. In 'Abaidat or Bara'asa
country he is a Hasi. Likewise a Darsi or an 'Abidi in contrast
to members of other tribes regards the whole of the Darsa or the
'Abid as his people, his tribal brothers.

Each tribe in this commonly accepted sense has its *watan*, its 619
homeland, its soil, its arable, its pastures, and its wells; and 421
each has its camel-brand which is also carved on the tomb- [764]
stones of its dead. The tribal lands are vested in the tribe, which
has residual rights in them. They cannot, therefore, be alienated
to other tribes without the consent of the whole tribe. A tribe 619
is conceived of as a huge family descended from a common 614
ancestor, from whom the tribe generally takes its name. Hence
its segments can be figured either as a series of political sections
or as genealogical branches of a clan.

A tribe is divided into several, generally two or three, 619
primary divisions, or sub-tribes, which own well-defined portions 613
of the tribal territory, in most cases running in strips unbroken by intrusive elements. These primary divisions are of the same pattern as the tribe of which they form part. Each division has its *watan*, which its members own and defend collectively. They believe that they are descended from a common ancestor, who is generally a son of the ancestor of the tribe. Primary tribal divisions split into secondary divisions, and secondary divisions into tertiary divisions, and so on. Each of the smaller divisions is a replica of the larger ones and has the same preferential and exclusive rights in its lands, an encroachment on which by another division will lead to fighting. Each has within the tribal brand its special lineage markings. The members of each division also consider that they are descended from a common ancestor who, in his turn, is descended from the ancestor of the larger division of which they form a section. The further the sub-division the more the resultant groups take on the complexion of kinship aggregates, rather than of political aggregates.

These kinship aggregates or extended family groups are the
basic units of tribal life. They are called *biyut* (sing. *bait*). The [423]
tribe may be the residual owner of land and water but the
biyut are the owners in use. Their members live in the same

safe place when on seasonal moves. Often a shrine, sometimes 778
the shrine of a very famous saint, is no more than a wall of 776
stones, with perhaps a stick, with pieces of cloth tied to it, 792
erected over the grave, and this is the usual form in the steppe
grazing-grounds. There are generally cemeteries around the [764]
tombs.

All these shrines are visited by the Bedouin from time to time,
when they are passing by or when they have some request to
make of the holy man. Many of them are cult centres, an annual [796]
ceremony, one of the chief events of the Bedouin year, being [619]
held at them; and when they are near the border between tribes,
or between tribal sections, this is an occasion for intertribal, or
intersectional, gatherings. There is no saint whose tomb is much [789]
visited by the Bedouin who has not performed miracles, some [755]
of them very remarkable miracles, and there is probably none
who has not at some time or other cured the sick or given an heir.

The tombs of these holy men, Sidi this, Sidi that, and Sidi
the other, are found in profusion over the whole of inhabited
Cyrenaica. The historically best known are those of Sidi Rafa',
one of the Companions of the Prophet, near al-Zawiya al-Baida
on the plateau, of Sidi 'Abdalla, one of the Prophet's standard-bearers,
in the oasis of Aujila, and of the founder of the Sanusiya
Order, Sidi Muhammad bin 'Ali al-Sanusi, at Jaghbub oasis.
The shrines belong to the tribes and tribal sections in whose [619]
earth the Marabouts are buried and the Marabouts are looked [423]
upon as tribal and sub-tribal patrons. Like the Sanusiya Order,
they have become part of tribal life.

I have earlier reproduced Col. De Agostini's map of the Hasa 778
tribe to serve as an example of the territorial distribution of 619
lineages. The same map serves to illustrate the distribution of 792
shrines in a tribal territory. It can be seen from this map, which 776
shows only the best-known Marabout tombs, that all the different
sections of the tribe have their shrines, and I would draw
attention to an interesting feature of the distribution which I
have also noted in other tribal areas: how often these sacred
spots are near a tribal boundary, or near the boundary between
one tribal section and another. This may not be pure chance,
for the Marabouts in their lifetimes were regarded as standing
outside the tribal system, to which indeed, being foreigners from
the west, they did not belong, and their chief political role was

for they might then settle the matter by surrendering their 795*
claims to the zawiya.[1] Another way in which a lodge obtained 793
rights in land was by asking permission of its owners to sow it. 425
Constant repetition of this favour eventually gave the zawiya
rights of use in it in perpetuity.

The tribesmen also assisted the Shaikh of the lodge in the 795*
cultivation of the lands, though most of the work was done by 793 241 476
the zawiya community itself. At sowing time the Shaikh would 795*
pitch his tent near the area to be cultivated and prepare a com- 793
munal meal, taking with him some sacks of rice for the purpose. 241
The local Bedouin then came with their draught animals and 476
sowed and ploughed for a couple of days on behalf of the
zawiya. The same procedure took place at harvest time.
Besides gifts of land and voluntary service in cultivating, the [794]
Bedouin were expected to pay a tithe to the lodge at harvest
time and after lambing. No doubt many of them paid annual
dues but it is unlikely that any strict record was kept or that
payment could have been enforced had they been averse to
making it.



Sanusiya Estates of the Zawiyas of Shahhat, Tart, al-Fayidiya, and al-Zawiya al-Baida.

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That it was expected that the Bedouin might promise services 175*
more readily than perform them is suggested by an interesting 795*
document, dated 1307 A.H., found by the Italians at the 794

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[1] Savarese, op. cit., p. 193.

*175 Taukra zawiya and given in an Italian translation by Judge *795 Colucci.[1] In it the tribal sections of the Baraghtha, Tursh, 794 Dinal, and Shilmani place themselves under obligation, through the signatories to the deed, to pay the zawiya of Taukra alms on flocks and crops, to supply camels to carry supplies to Jaghbub, and to help the zawiya in sowing, building, excavations, and other works. Subject to the penalty of paying double alms they will not, without the permission of the Shaikh of the zawiya, render like services to other zawiyas. They promise also to defend the zawiya and to respect those who live in it, or who are its guests, and agree that those who fail to do so may be punished in body or in estate. Each will be for the zawiya and the zawiya for each. God is greater than any man. Those who are obedient will be recompensed by Him. Peace be to those who follow the right path.

*795 The estates of the Sanusiya Order were *waqf* (called in ● 423 Cyrenaica *habus*), inalienable endowments made in love of God by tribal sections and sometimes by individuals. They belonged to the various lodges to which they were donated, with the Order as a whole as residuary, and not to the family of the Grand Sanusi or to the Shaikhs of the lodges.[2] It was understood that when Bedouin donated tracts of country round a lodge they could continue to pasture and sow on any land not being used by the resident Brothers and to use the wells when [793] there was sufficient water in them. The Shaikh of a zawiya was the legal administrator of its properties. The Head of the Order had no direct say in the administration of the estates, and in all probability only knew roughly of their extent. The revenues of [434] one lodge could not be used for the upkeep of another, but any surplus over the expenses of a lodge were paid into a central *795 pool. The members of the Sanusi family and the teachers and 794 administrative officials of the Order lived in the distant oases of Jaghbub and Kufra, which produced little but dates, and had to be supplied from the lodges of the coastal region. Supplies were sent by caravan partly in local produce, such as skins, wool, grain, butter, honey, and meat, and partly in money or [431] imported goods: rice, tea, sugar, and cloth. These gifts were

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[1] Op. cit., pp. 434-5.

[2] Fernando Valenzi, 'La Senussia in Cirenaica ed il suo Patrimonio', *Rivista delle Colonie Italiane*, 1932, pp. 432-3.

sadaqa, freewill gifts, though if a lodge did not send them its 795*
Shaikh was reminded of his obligations. The lodges dealt with 794
certain trading houses at Banghazi, giving them import orders [431]
against future sales of local produce. [439]

This practice worked well enough during the lifetime of the founder and his sons but, as so often happens in Islamic Orders, later descendants began to demand individual shares in the
wealth of the Order. While Sayyid Ahmad al-Sharif was its 795*
third Head it began to be the custom, a few years before the 794
Italian invasion, to earmark the surplus revenues of particular 602
lodges for particular members of the Sanusi family, and these [434]
members became regarded as patrons of the lodges which supplied them and responsible for their supervision. The territories in which the Order was dominant began to fall into spheres of influence controlled by individual members of the family, the allocation of spheres tending to be determined by the maternal kinship of various members with *Ikhwan* families occupying lodges in them. Sayyid Muhammad 'Abid and his brother Sayyid 'Ali al-Khattab had a lien on the *barqa al-baida* and Fazzan, where their maternal relatives the Ashhab family were influential Shaikhs of lodges; Sayyid Safi al-Din on the *barqa al-hamra*, where his maternal kinsmen the Mahajib family were predominant; Sayyid Muhammad Hilal on the Marmarica where his maternal kinsmen of the Sharifian Tursh lineage had considerable influence; and Sayyid Idris and his brother Sayyid al-Rida on the Cyrenaican plateau, where they had maternal ties with the important Bu Saif and Ghumari families. Sayyid Ahmad al-Sharif had a lien on Tripolitania, where lived his maternal kinsmen the powerful Fawatir tribe of Zlitin territory.

The endowments of the Order in Cyrenaica ran into thousands 795*
of hectares.[1] Several lodges had each more than 1,000 hectares 423 ●
attached to them. The fourteen lodges whose lands were technically registered in 1919 by a mixed Italo-Sanusi commission possessed more than 50,000 hectares. The total lands of the Order may well have been more than 200,000 hectares,
or somewhere in the neighbourhood of 500,000 acres. Much of [311]
the land was of use only for grazing, but much was valuable agricultural country on the plateau. Wherever there were

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[1] An *Ettaro* is 10,000 sq. metres or 2·471 acres.

*795 423 springs and gardens there were properties of the Order, for such sites were particularly suitable for settlements of its Brothers since, unlike the Bedouin, they were sedentary and house-dwellers. In the semi-desert the Order owned, or part-owned, many of the best wells. In the oases of the 29th parallel and in the Archipelago of Kufra it owned extensive gardens and shares in springs and many thousands of date-palms. As it was a country and Bedouin Order its urban properties were inconsiderable: a few houses, mostly used as shops, in Banghazi, Darna, and al-Marj.

*795 361 Anyone who studies the distribution of the Sanusiya lodges in Cyrenaica will observe that they were placed where he might expect them to have been placed on a politico-economic plan. A very large number were, as I have mentioned, built on Graeco-Roman foundations, and they were constructed on important caravan routes, on small inlets in the coast to command schooner trade, and in strong defensive positions. They were distributed to cover all the more important tribal aggregates, and the principal lodges were built at the centres of tribal life, as is especially evident among the southern nomads, who concentrate in summer time at such points as al-'Azziyat, al-Makhili, al-Nayyan, al-Qatafiya, and al-Naufiliya. In other words, where the Greeks and Romans and Turks found it convenient or essential to build villages and posts was where the Sanusiya established its lodges. Later the Italians used many of the same sites for their administrative and colonist settlements.

*795 434 On assessments made by the Italians in the early days of their occupation, in 1913 and in 1919, for twenty Cyrenaican lodges of the Order it can be reckoned that their total annual revenues were about 150,000 Lire. On this basis, as those assessed were representative, a rough estimate of the total revenue of all the lodges in Cyrenaica would be about L. 400,000 or 10,000 Pounds Sterling at the 1919 rate of exchange. Of the lodges for which assessments were made, those with the largest revenues were al-'Azziyyat, al-Qasur (L. 15,000), Msus (L. 20,000), and al-Tailimum (L. 20,000). The surpluses sent to the Headquarters of the Order were estimated for only eight of the zawiyas, and in these eight cases the surplus amounted to rather under a third of the total revenues. Gen. Rodolfo Graziani

*795 opportunity to worship in a mosque, and that by charity to their
794 lodges they might earn recompense hereafter.

182 Each lodge had its Shaikh, who represented the Head of the
*795 Order. He arbitrated between the Bedouin, led the tribesmen
793 to holy war, acted as intermediary between the tribe or section
and the Turkish administration, dispensed hospitality to travellers, supervised the collection of tithe, directed cultivation of grain and care of stock, dispatched surplus revenues to the Headquarters of the Order, acted as prayer-leader on Fridays, and assisted in preaching and teaching. There were
[794] besides a number of other functionaries among the Brothers:
the Shaikh's deputy, the *imam* to lead the daily prayers and to teach the Koran and canon law, the *mu'allim* to teach reading, writing, and arithmetic in the zawiya school, and perhaps a special *muadhdhin* to call the faithful to prayer, though any of the Brothers could do that.

V

*795 In principle, as we have noted, the lands attached to lodges
793 belonged, like the lodges themselves, to the Order, and more
● 423 particularly to the lodge to which they were donated, and not
to any particular individual or family. In practice certain
*795 Shaikhly families tended to gain an hereditary interest in them.
793 What happened in the early days of the Order was that a Shaikh
was sent by its Head to found a lodge and when it was established
423 he was translated to a fresh missionary field. Shaikhs
428 of lodges were in this way moved fairly frequently at first, but
602 it later became the practice to leave a Shaikh in charge till his
death and then to nominate his successor from among his kinsmen, with the approval of the tribe and on the advice of Shaikhs of neighbouring lodges. What mostly seems to have happened was that the tribal sections concerned asked for a son or brother of the last Shaikh to be appointed director of their lodge and the Head of the Order confirmed their choice. As one Darsi tribesman put it: 'The Shaikh of our zawiya must be a man favoured by the hearts of the people.' In course of time the tendency for the Shaikhship of a lodge to be regarded as hereditary became very marked, it being understood that if there was a suitable candidate from the family already established in the lodge he would be appointed, a view with which the later Heads of the

Order concurred. Thus we find charge of a zawiya continuing 795*
in the hands of a single family to the point at which Muhammad 793
Yahiya bin al-Sanusi bin 'Umar al-Ashhab was appointed by 423
Sayyid Ahmad al-Sharif to succeed his father as Shaikh of Msus 428
at the age of sixteen. Some of these families sent their roots so 602
deep that not only did they obtain what amounted to hereditary rights to a particular lodge, but controlled several lodges. Such were the influential families of Ghumari, Kalili, Farkash, and Ashhab, and the Khattabi families.

Hence we find to-day that many of the lodges are in hereditary charge of a family of Shaikhs who consider that they have a pre-emptive claim to its directorship and to enjoyment of its revenues, a claim backed by tribal opinion and by the acquiescence of the present Head of the Order. Thus the Dardafi family may be said to own the Shahhat lodge, the Isma'ili family to own the Fayidiya lodge, the 'Ammur family to own
the Qafanta lodge, and so on. So much is this the case that [578]
disputes now sometimes arise, as in 1942 at Qafanta and Mirad Mas'ud, between members of a family about which of its members should succeed to the directorship of a lodge and control of its revenues.

This development is not surprising. Poor communications 795*
and the troubled times since 1911 have encouraged local auto- 793
nomy in the Sanusiya organization. The Shaikh of a lodge 428
brought up his family in it and his sons had no other home than the lodge and no other friends than the Bedouin around it and
the families of Shaikhs in nearby lodges. Tribesmen dislike [178]
change and prefer to have for the Shaikhs of their lodges members of families they know and who share their local
interests. But the tendency towards hereditary succession is 795*
also related to the fundamental lineage structure of the tribes 793
among whom the lodges are distributed, for it is noticeable that
whereas hereditary succession became customary in the Bedouin, 613
or tribal, lodges, it has been by comparison lacking in the urban 428
lodges of Banghazi and Darna and in those oases where tribal [369]
structure has become obscured by village life. This would seem to suggest that *Ikhwan* families tend the more easily to become stabilized as lines of hereditary Shaikhs the more closely they are associated with tribal structure. It is precisely in the most powerful, numerous, and integrated tribal sections that we

their rights in it, and this presented no more difficulty to the 175*
lawyers than the discovery of a formula to cover confiscation of 648*
the Sanusiya properties had done. 167

Ancient rights in the lands of Cyrenaica rested with the 175*
Sa'adi tribes and whatever tribal fragments they permitted to 648*
reside there by grace. Disputes about ownership had been 423 ●
settled either by war or through discussion between the groups 619
concerned in them, sometimes with the aid of Turkish officials [795]
or Marabouts, particularly of the Shaikhs of Sanusiya lodges [578]
after the Order had become established in the country. In 1858 the Ottoman Government, under pressure of Western ideas, promulgated a land code in all parts of the empire, and to put it into effect in Cyrenaica the Governor, Khalil Sami Pasha (1863–8), appointed a committee which declared the lands round Banghazi and Darna to be for the use of these towns and the rest of the country for the use of the tribes in occupation of it, except for barren hills and deserts which, like woods and roads, were regarded as the natural demesne of the State. The tribal boundaries of to-day were finally fixed by this committee, though the fixing of them was less an adjudication than a recording of existing conditions.

The new Turkish land code operated in the towns and just outside them and was not applied to tribal lands and grazing grounds, and the tribes were not asked to acquire a title to their lands by registration of them. This would have been an impossible task, and the Turks were in any case too wise to meddle with Bedouin lands, knowing that the Bedouin would not have consented to change or interference of any kind. Nevertheless the State claimed all tribal lands not bearing buildings or plantations as *miri*, public demesne, and from a legal point of view it was in virtue of this absolute and residuary ownership that it taxed the tribal occupiers and users of the land. This was a legal formalism which made no difference to anyone since the Government had neither the wish nor the power to exploit the lands and accepted that the tribes had rights of use, the *tassaruf*, in them in perpetuity. The Italian Land Registry, created in 1913 on the basis of the Turkish registers, followed Turkish practice in this matter, classing tribal lands as State demesne in which the occupiers had rights of use, and also in allowing tribal disputes to be settled by tribal custom, which

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the Italians called *Sa'adi* law. In 1923 the Land Registry, which had hitherto restricted its attention to urban properties, took the first steps towards an assessment of tribal lands and by the end of 1932 had registered in the name of the Colony 120,790 hectares, a large part of which was already marked for colonial settlement. The lands were acquired by 'natural right' (9,124 Ha.), by purchase, expropriation, and renunciation (43,441 Ha.), and by confiscation of Sanusiya estates (62,225 Ha.) and of properties of persons fighting in patriot bands and classed as rebels against the State (6,000 Ha.). However, expropriation for purposes of public utility and purchase were found to be slow, expensive, inadequate, and, in the political circumstances, inopportune methods of acquiring land for colonial settlement. Both also led to most complicated disputes about the distribution of the compensation in a country where every member of a tribe had preemptive rights of some degree in all its lands. In 1928 a new system was therefore adopted. The State in virtue of its supreme authority asked the owners of the lands considered useful to the State to renounce their rights in them. Compensation was to be divided equally among the various participants in the *tassaruf*.

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No action of the kind allowed for in the new decrees was, or could be, taken till the Bedouin had been subdued. It would have been useless to attempt to register the lands of the Bedouin in the name of the State on those parts of the plateau in which the guerrillas still operated freely, and to have attempted to register them in the submitted areas would merely have driven the population to renewed revolt. Action does not seem to have been taken till 1935–6 and it was then taken in a form which is said to have disgusted even some of the lawyers. Proclamations covering the lands required for colonial settlement were drawn up and it was stated in them that the particular lands to which each referred were State property and that if no objection were raised by a certain date they would be registered in the name of the State. The proclamations were published by being fixed to official notice-boards in the Land Department and municipalities, but they were not published on the lands concerned, or anywhere near them, so that the Bedouin, even had they any idea of what the procedure was, and even could they have read the proclamations, did not in

any case see them. Consequently no objections were raised— 175*
had they been raised no attention would have been paid to 648*
them—and there was legal presumption of State ownership in 423 ●
the fullest sense. The judges, therefore, ordered registration of the new lands in the name of the Colony. They comprised [167]
about 450,000 hectares, about a quarter of which were immediately allotted to the *Ente* for colonization. It will be noted that the State had already, before this action was taken, been bare owner of the lands as heir to the Turkish *miri* property. What it now gained in addition was, in the opinion of its lawyers, the *possesso utile*. They held further that compensation of those deprived of the use of the lands, while perhaps unnecessary, added to the juridical rigour of the proceeding. In other words, in order to make it look a little less like common robbery it was decided to make a parade of indemnification. The areas to be taken over were estimated in a non-technical way by a surveyor and a clerk of the Land Registry, and the supposed owners were summoned, told that their lands were worth so much, and that this sum would be handed over to them by the Government. Tables of succession showing the share in the land of the various members of the local group who owned it had already been prepared, and if the representatives of this tribal section agreed to the proposal the money could then be paid over on demand.

Whether the Bedouin took the money offered in compensation or not they still lost their lands. For this reason most of them took it. Though compensation was in this way offered, the document to which the recipients of it had to affix their seals or thumb-prints was not a contractual agreement for sale and purchase nor an edict of expropriation for public utility purposes, but it was a simple declaration by the owner that he renounced all his rights in the land and transferred them to the State. The Italians had now got all the lands in Cyrenaica
which were of any immediate use to them. They had only to [167]
allot them to colonists and register them technically as they were required for settlement. The target figure for the zone of colonization was 900,000 hectares.[1]

There remained the question of the Bedouin who had been 175*
driven off the lands of their fathers. Clearly they could not be 648* 423
allowed to lead their nomadic life amid the Italian cultiva- 233

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[1] *La Nuova Italia d'Oltremare*, vol. i, p. 552.

[TEXT CONTINUED ON PAGE 225]

tions and gardens. On the other hand, it was recognized that if 175*
they were to be able to lead a nomadic life at all, and they 648*
had to do so if they were to rear their animals, they must have 423*
access to water-supplies and grazing-grounds, and that this 233
would sometimes mean their crossing the plateau through the
area of Italian colonization. To solve this problem corridors [487]
running north and south across the plateau were, as explained
in an earlier section, marked out for the transit of Bedouin
flocks and herds.

It was envisaged that the Bedouin would continue to lead
a predominantly pastoral life on the more rugged parts of
the first terrace of the plateau, on its southern slopes, and in the
steppe country of the *sirwal*, the *barqa*, the Marmarica, and the
Sirtica. It was thought that they had in these areas all the land
they needed for grazing and catch-crop cultivation, though it
was evident that in years of drought they could not have
managed to survive without summer grazing on the plateau.
Nevertheless, efforts were made to raise the economic level of 175*
the Bedouin by improving their methods of cultivation and 648*
stock-raising so that, as both producers and labourers, they [511]
might be more valuable an adjunct to Italian husbandry, and
might become more dependent on the State and more closely
linked with metropolitan activities. It was intended that they [464]
should constitute a cheap reserve of labour for general unskilled
work and for seasonal labour on the farms of the colonists. By
using them in this way it was hoped that it would be possible
to avoid the growth of a metropolitan proletariat.[1] These efforts 175*
included, largely for political reasons, the creation of Arab 648*
colonization centres. Agricultural villages and farms were to 167
be built by the *Ente* similar to, but smaller than, those built for 563
the Italian immigrants. The first two such villages, Fiorita and
Alba, were built in 1939. Each Arab farming family was provided
with a house, a well, a camel, a cow, and farm implements.
Like the Italian, the Arab colonist was to be first salaried
labourer, then partner with the State, then mortgagor, and
finally owner. As only thirty-two holdings were prepared at
Fiorita and Alba the contribution to native agriculture cannot
be regarded as more than a token one. Moreover, the Italians
experienced difficulty in finding Arab colonists for even these

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[1] Ibid., p. 622.

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complicate the more direct relationship of the distribution of 619 groups of people to the ecology.[3] [13 182]

The Cyrenaican genealogy, then, is a conceptualization of a hierarchy[4] of ordered territorial segments. The groups stemming from the ancestor at the third order of segmentation are referred to as tribes, and each tribe is the apex of a three-tiered order of segments, which, following customary practice, are referred to as primary, secondary, and tertiary. The latter, the tertiary segment, 621 represents the group of people who, for a period of six to eight 613 months, gather together and live in what, for all intents and purposes, is a single discrete residential group.[5] This tertiary group is also the smallest political group. It has its own homeland, with its [423] water supplies, pastures, and ploughland. In this homeland live most of its members. It is a lineage segment, and most of the agnates of this segment live on their own homeland.[6] It is also the [682) vengeance group, which means that any one of its members can [628) be killed in vengeance for a homicide committed by any other, and that the obligation to exact vengeance falls on all members alike, regardless of relationship to the victim. Likewise, its members pay blood money as a group, and although when they receive it, a bigger portion goes to the nearest agnate of the victim, the remainder is distributed equally among all its members. The number of generations which supervene between the founding ancestor of a tertiary segment and the living is usually four or five, but there is little consistency in this number. Some tertiary

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[3] This part of the discussion is necessarily brief, but further amplification will appear in two subsequent articles now in preparation, one of which is concerned with a general treatment of Cyrenaican genealogies, and the other with a discussion of the effects of ecology on the social organization of the Bedouin. [114)

[4] I use the word hierarchy here since, although segments of any order display many like features, the orders represent distinct and progressively more embracing interests, and these differences are of such consequence that to consider one order of groups as a facsimile of a superior or inferior order can only lead to confusion. A tertiary group, that is to say, may possess many of the characteristics of a secondary group, but the one is a fundamentally different sort of group from the other, as I shall show in my forthcoming article on the feud. (cf. Smith, M. G. 1956.) [128)

[5] This statement does not apply to the Darsa and the Hasa tribes, two of the plateau tribes in Cyrenaica. The statements in this article are confined almost exclusively to the camel herders of the semi-desert. [619] [128)

[6] This, admittedly, is too general a statement to make about such an important issue, but I would prefer to leave its documentation and precision for an article on the analysis of the composition of Bedouin camps.

There are, in Cyrenaica, three major status groups among the 619
tribes: the noble or free-born tribesmen (*al-Hurr*), those who 554
have been adopted or grafted on to a tribe (the *Laff*), and the 608
clients (*Marabtin*).

Those who claim to be free-born also claim ownership of the 619
natural resources. The *Laff* do not own these. They are people 608
thought not to have originally been of the lineage of the tribe 621
with which they are resident. They are found sometimes in ones 613
and twos in the camps of the free-born, but sometimes constituting [423] •
tertiary groups themselves. Now when such people have resided 619
with their free-born hosts for several years and one of them
has married one of the host's daughters, they are grafted to the 608
genealogy at the point of tertiary segmentation, that is, where 613
ambiguity occurs in the genealogy. Obviously, persons thus 621
grafted to the lineage cannot be shown as descendants of one 173
of the living or of the recently dead, remembered perhaps by some of the elders still living. It is equally true to say that they cannot be grafted to the lineage at a point superior to that of the tertiary segments, since this would involve recognition by a number of tertiary groups whose members may know little or nothing about them. When a person enters a new tribe, the only way in which he can do so is to go to live in a camp, and it is the concern of the people of that particular camp whether or not they accept him, since it is they who have to decide whether their resources are sufficient to support a newcomer. Once a man has been accepted as a full member of a tertiary section, membership of superior tribal sections is automatic, although to enter into tribal membership he requires the permission of members of a tertiary section only. To graft at a point superior to the tertiary would be the same as giving a man superior structural status, but without a camp in which to dwell. There is only one place for his incorporation, and that is where the ambiguity in the genealogy
permits manipulation to include new lines. In this way the [597]
adoption of a person into a lineage does not offend the sense of
kinship of the receiving group since the point of inclusion is an ancestor about whom little or nothing is known and whose authenticity is frequently doubted by some. What has been referred to as an area of ambiguity is, moreover, something of a jumble of names, and it is not a difficult matter, if a new line has to be

619 attached somewhere along the line, to attach it to one of these
608 names. Bedouin welcome, as members of their camps, practically
613 anyone who wishes to join, even, in the case of one group, an
621 Italian. The limit to this acceptance of members is, of course, the
173 number of people who can be supported by the local resources.
If people are being admitted freely to membership of a particular
[182] camp, this means that there is a local surplus of land and water,
so that the number of grafts being supported by any particular
section is a useful index of the extent to which the resources are
being used. Conversely, as sometimes happens when grafted elements
become numerous, or when the water supply, for various
reasons, dwindles, it may be necessary to detach a grafted group.
[578] Such action is always the occasion of a violent dispute, usually
over watering rights, and not infrequently fights break out.
Whether or not the grafted group wins, from then onwards it will
be forced to exist as an independent group, and a new tertiary
section will have been born. No matter which of the processes
involving grafts is considered—incorporation or detachment—
both are contained within the framework of the tertiary section,
without any effect on the rest of the structure.

619 The position of the clients, in the context of this discussion, is
not unlike that of the grafts. Briefly, clients are men who are considered
• [423] to have originated from a country other than Cyrenaica,
and who for this reason cannot claim rights to land and water—
at least this is the theory, although in some circumstances they
are able to do so successfully. They are of various kinds, but they
are not included in the genealogies given by the free-born. Clients
are found grouped in two main ways. There are some large
groups which constitute tribes in the sense that they display a
genealogical and territorial organization like those of the freeborn,
and are usually to be found flanking the main tribes of the
country on their borders. Some of these are powerful groups and
enjoy considerable independence of action, but whatever their
characteristics they none the less speak of themselves as 'for' or
619 tied to the noble tribe whose territory includes theirs. Further,
571 the sections of these client tribes have their special ties with
621 tertiary sections of the noble tribes, which are not merely ties of
613 sentiment, but which take the form of valuable mutual help in a
number of situations. A whole client tribe, in the sense that it is

121 given to the feud, for this is one of the few societies in which it occurs.[1] What is
613 meant here by a state of feud is a set of relationships between two tribal groups which
578 are characterized by hostility whenever two or more of their members meet. These
591 hostilities are of a sort which cannot be terminated; feud is not a matter of a group
121 indulging in hostilities here at one moment and there the next, but a sequence of
619 hostilities which, as far as the contemporary Bedouin are concerned at least, know
578 no beginning and are insoluble. Feud and the other forms of relationships to be
[591] discussed presently are to be understood, in part, by reference to the ordered divisions
of the tribes. It is necessary at the outset, therefore, to give a brief statement about
the tribal organization; other details will be included as they become relevant.

619 There are nine noble tribes in Cyrenaica whose members are referred to as freemen.
621 These tribes see themselves as divided into three genealogical orders of sections:
primary, secondary, and tertiary. The tertiary tribal sections correspond to the camps
613 which cluster around the larger watering points during the drought season, May to
[132] November. Such camps consist of clusters of smaller camps in which the concentration of agnatically related males is over 80 per cent. Within the latter kinship links
are known, so that these agnates are consanguinely related as well as politically
[162] united. The populations of most tertiary groups vary from about 200 to 700 or so,
but a group ceases to be viable if the number of male adults drops much below fifty.
Political division is absent from these tertiary groups, regardless of their precise
size, for, whatever may be the condition of developing local lineages, the acceptance
of a common name carries with it full political responsibility incumbent equally on
[423] all their members. Each of these tertiary sections, moreover, has its own watering
point, ploughland, and pastures; each has its own *watan* or homeland. This statement
is true of all tribal sections of whatever order of segmentation. In other words, the
tribes and their sections correspond to an ordered division of the territory.

619 Names of tribal sections are the same as those given in the genealogies. Both tribe
613 and lineage are identically ordered. Lineages develop, and split at the tertiary order
of segmentation,[2] and, *a fortiori*, the process is the same for the tertiary tribal sections.
Split, in other words, occurs where relationships are most intense.

621 The summer community which constitutes a tertiary section, breaks up once the
221 rains begin in November or December. At this time of the year water is readily
available in the numerous small cisterns, there is pasture in plenty, and the animals
are giving milk. These combined reasons lead the larger summer camp to divide
into smaller camps of some five to ten tents. The latter are separated one from the
other by short distances—a mile or so—but together form a cluster in that they are
621 territorially distinguishable from a neighbouring and similar group of camps. Ter-
311 tiary sections are discrete also in the sense that all the major necessities of daily living
are available within their several territories. Each controls its own natural resources,
and these resources are the same for all the camel-herding groups—in any given year
one may have more of a particular commodity than another, but the difference is in

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[171] [1] Evans-Pritchard, 1940. The feud might have been present among the Nuer. Exogamy and the other rules of marriage which obtain among them create a dispersion of ties, which superficially appears to militate against a condition of feud. But a dispersal of ties does not mean that they necessarily act as a pressure for peace. Moreover, the exogamous links may link limited numbers of groups only, leaving others with sufficient discreteness to pursue feuding relationships as they are described in this paper.

[2] See Peters, 1959.

bers of an undivided group. It is erroneous to suppose that because the different 621
orders of sections are homologous in their structural aspects they do not differ; they 613
do, because the interests associated with the various orders are different.[1] 628

Collateral tertiary segments are associated with different tracts of territory. Each [682]
has its own watering rights as a group, and although groups may share a grain store, [423]
it is divided on group lines. Members of these different groups do not gather together
in summer to form a single community, though at some of the very big watering
points they are near each other. Social relationships between them are, however,
intense. Visits are frequent. They meet to exchange news, or to inquire after the [574]
sick. They exchange greetings during the major festivals, and members of one group attend the funerals and weddings of the others, taking gifts. They also meet at the grain stores. Herdsmen, as they pursue straying animals, wander freely in their neighbours' territory. Relationships of this sort, some of them urgently necessary for survival, do not permit the feuding relationships to be described presently. Permanent hostility which characterizes the feud would seriously disrupt everyday economic activities, limit the pastoral movements of the Bedouin beyond endurance, and sever lines of communication which they always strive to keep open.

A homicide, when it involves two collateral tertiary groups must, therefore, be 621
resolved quickly. This can be effected in two ways. Vengeance may be exacted 613
immediately. This is always referred to as a vengeance killing or *thār*, and is to be 628
distinguished from a superficially similar act within a tertiary group, since *thār* carries 682
with it the implication that it is premeditated. A *thār* between two tertiary sections is considered to be the best way of settling the affair and, after an appropriate lapse of time, a peace meeting is held at which it is accepted that the killings have cancelled each other out. The deliberations at this meeting are followed by a meal at which all present 'eat around the one bowl'; the meal over, they all pray together. A life had been taken for a life and the way is now open for the restoration of normal peaceful relationships. Vengeance needs to be distinguished from feud, for while retaliatory killings provide the propulsive force in the feud a vengeance killing may be the means whereby a settlement of hostilities is made possible.

An end to hostilities may also be brought about by a promise to pay blood money 621
or *diya*, and its acceptance by the victim's group. Arrangements for blood-money 613
discussions are made by a category of persons known as *marabtin bi'l baraka*, or 628
' clients of the goodness ', men who, by virtue of descent and origin, stand outside 682
the descent lines of the noble tribes, and who are accredited with divine goodness. 792
They tend the sick, write amulets, and are always present at a peace meeting to give
it the weight of their baraka. Soon after the homicide has occurred they act as inter-
mediaries to bring the hostile groups together at a peace meeting.[2] Ostensibly, the 621
first part of the proceedings at these meetings is to settle the amount of the blood 613
money, and how and when it is to be paid. Agreement on these counts will have been 628
reached, however, before the large peace gathering is assembled, for there is a gener- 682

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[1] This statement requires more documentation than I am able to give to it in this paper, but the descriptive details given hereafter give it some substance. See also Smith, 1956.

[2] It is necessary to add here that these clients do not assume coercive powers. They are granted the power to curse, but the curse that is feared is the curse of their dead when an oath is given at a saint's tomb. When they know that groups wish to make peace they assist as messengers in bringing people together, but they do not use their power to curse as a pressure.

would be impossible to satisfy all marriage expectations of men within the 621
universe of the minimal tribal section. For this reason alone external links 613
are inevitable and persistent. Also, the small territorial strip such a group 582
claims as a homeland produces an economy which, in this environment, 182
is unstable. Additional security is gained by making connections with other [423]
tribal sections, each with its specific ecological character. Men also marry [433]
into their client groups. The proportion of these for this camp was 9 per cent [619]
of the total. From these links they gain economic advantages, they can claim services and a client-following is politically significant. Finally, 7 per cent of the total[13] are marriages with women of other tribes, which again not only reduces the instability of the economy (in that a large tribal area suffering near-famine conditions has access to areas of markedly different ecology), but also provides political connections for men whose power ambitions have passed the point of leadership limited to their own tribes. In one way or another all these interests are manifest in the small camp and attention is now directed to the latter.

The disposition of people in the camp is represented diagrammatically 621
on the page following. 592

The nucleus of the camp is Tent A. Its owner (1) was a powerful *Shaikh*, [554]
the son of a famous father. His marriage represents a political link with a [619]
group of one of the primary sections of his own tribe. His father died only a [428]
few years before I recorded my census, and the large amount of moveable property he left had still not been divided among the sons; the owner of the tent, as eldest brother, still controlled the flocks and herds. Most of his time he spent away from the camp engaging in political intrigue. His two younger brothers lived in his tent, but the second (5) would not remain there long
because negotiations for his marriage had been started. His father (2) mar- [582]
ried a parallel cousin; she died and shortly afterwards he took her sister (3) [587]
in sororal union. When this occurred an amount of bride-wealth was [583]
agreed, but instead of giving any of it to her father, the entire amount was "put in front of her" (that is, the animals were allowed to remain with her husband's flock), and these animals she had marked with her brother's
tribal sign to distinguish them from those of her husband. It was widely [428]
known that she was going to leave these animals to her husband's second [562]
son, for although she could not transfer them to a male outside her husband's corporate group, she could decide who, among his heirs, should inherit.

During my stay in this camp, her brother's son (4) came to it as a 621
temporary resident for a month. Since he was poor, the purpose of his visit 592
was to capture some of his aunt's wealth while she was still alive and the 574
possibility still existed. During his stay he was fed well but did no work. [604]
His kinsmen found his company tiresome, so, to cut short his stay, and after [431]
consulting her nominated heir (5), she gave him three grown goats. Also
when an occasion arose for an animal slaughter, she provided the sheep, and, [231]

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[13] The remainder is made up of marriages to the daughters of men incorporated into the lineages.

surface water in jerry cans, bringing them back to the tents, one at a time, 462
on their backs. Clothes are kept clean in the desert, and the women do the [312]
washing. [296]

The care of children from birth until they are a few years old is the re- 462
sponsibility of the woman. Childbirth causes a minimum interruption in the 854
daily sequence of a mother's activities. The child is breastfed if the mother [844]
has milk; if not, a wet nurse is sought or goat milk is substituted. Other [853]
than the time given to feeding it, the infant does not take up much of the mother's time. It is placed in a hammock slung between the centre poles of the tent and rocked by the mother as she passes to and fro. If nursing in illness is required, the mother devotes herself to it; her other tasks must then be performed by another woman.

As children acquire mobility, and at a time when, perhaps, the mother 855
is pregnant again, they become so fractious one with the other that if help 462
was unavailable the nervous strain could seriously disrupt the normal routine
of work. During the early years of marriage, when daughters are still too 855
young to look after their small brothers and sisters, the grandmother's help 462
in child-rearing is invaluable. Too old for the arduous tasks of the daily 603
routine, she may assist in teasing and spinning the raw wool, but it is in her role as nursemaid that she assumes importance. Children of both sexes are given the comfort of suckling at her breast, receiving attention and care for which the young mother could not possibly afford the time.

Caring for children takes up little of a man's time, and is mostly in- 462
cidental. The woman, on the other hand, devotes relatively little of her 233
time to the animals. She does the milking in spring — of camels, sheep and [234]
goats — but herding is not her responsibility, save for partly tending goats. [857]
Goats, when they are in the vicinity of the camp, are looked after by boys and girls of about eight to ten years of age. In springtime when they have dropped their young, or if some of them have to be retained in the camp at night for various reasons, the woman makes a brushwood enclosure at the side of the tent and sees the goats safely inside before nightfall.

A catalogue of the tasks for which women are responsible may not seem 462
very impressive; the number of tasks is not excessive, but the persistence of the routine bends the backs of most women. Paradoxically, any suggestion that men should take over female tasks would strike them as absurd. Assistance from one of the same sex is always a welcome relief, but the abrogation of a particular task by men would be interpreted by women as the loss of a right. For, in the division of labour, it is not merely that tasks are allocated between the sexes for expedient reasons, or in consideration of the labour involved or because tasks which can be performed in the vicinity of the camp are left to women; division of labour would not make sense on these
grounds, however strong they may be in Bedouin sentiments. Each task which [424]
falls to the lot of woman constitutes a right exclusive to her. Fetching firewood is not only a chore; it is a woman's prerogative. The insistence that only a woman can undertake certain tasks has nothing to do with her liking

462 them or any innate aptitude for them; this insistence is an index of the
•424 jealousy with which she is prepared to guard her rights. Each right derived
from this or that small task is an extension of her control over the male.

462 The force and significance of this control is, perhaps, best seen in a
woman's right to cook. At marriage a woman must have at least the minimum
424 of cooking utensils, and one of the rights a man acquires in a woman is
252 that she cooks for him. This is something a man cannot do for himself.
Therefore, when a man ill-treats his wife or threatens her with divorce, she
[593] can retaliate by refusing to cook, or leave the tent altogether to return to her
father. A man bereft of this service is in a very sorry plight indeed. The
legal dominance of the male, seemingly autocratic, is reduced at every
point by the control a woman exercises through her exclusive right to perform
tasks. The limits to the area of her coercive powers are significant.
562 They are confined almost wholly to domestic relationships. Legally, women
suffer such disabilities that they are almost of the status of minors; in
reality, their day-to-day living is far from intolerable because they are able
to control males over a wide field of relationships.

462 Men, excluded in the main from domestic duties around the tent, perform
424 tasks to which their legal rights are tied. While women have access
231 to wells for water used by human beings, the transport of larger quantities
of water over longer distances, requiring the use of camels, is a task which
falls to the men. Watering of animals is done by men. Only they can
slaughter the animals for food. The meat of an animal slaughtered by a
woman is not "free," in a ritual sense, for human consumption. In an
extremity only, a woman can, in effect, kill an animal, but the knife which
cuts its throat must be held in a male hand, even if it is the hand of a very
462 small boy. The exploitation of the land is also the male prerogative. They
[424] plough and sow the grain; incidental help may be provided by wives working
[241] alongside their husbands during the early part of reaping, but the main
reaping is done entirely by men. Transportation of grain to the mounds is
also carried out by men, and it is they only who have access to the grain
stores when quantities are withdrawn for family use. Sheep-shearing is
[236] carried out entirely by males,[10] the fleeces are stacked by them and the
[432] distribution and sales of these is directed by the male head of the tent.

Additional to these major tasks which males undertake are a number of
minor ones. Men sew strips of cotton together to make clothes for both
sexes. They also make rope of grass, albeit in a desultory sort of way, by
twisting together the strands between the palms of the hands. A number of
[834] other tasks fall to the men by virtue of the fact that the sexes are separated
[342] in the tent by a divider of blanket material, which may be taken down
when only members of the elementary family are about, but which is put

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[461] [10] This work is reserved for the younger men and takes the form of a festival during
[533] which lewd songs are sung and poems with obscene themes or references are recited
[538] loudly and within the hearing of elders, in a manner not dissimilar to the behaviour
[831] of bachelors at a wedding.

173 land along the coast: "This land was free, and the man who
[361] planted on it owned it. We call this (method of claiming land)
• [425] wad'a-l-id ("laying on of the hand," i.e. seizure). There was
[423] plenty of freedom in those days. A man could farm or keep
animals." Planting and caring for the land is not novel to
the Bedouins of al-Qasr.

423 The Bedouins claim that the pattern of land distribution
425 established during the time of Abu Mahjuba prevails today.
656 Further, they say that these rules will never change, no matter
[178] what laws come out of Cairo: "Land registration can mean nothing
where the tribes are concerned, for no Bedouin would be willing
to take the land of another Bedouin. The government forces us
to register our land so that it can be stated in the newspaper that they are giving the Bedouins land."

*613 The relationship between ecology and lineage territory
423 is not striking, such as in the case of the Cyrenaican Bedouins
182 of Libya (Peters 1960). In most cases, lineage territories run
on a north-south line cross-cutting the coastal garden and
southern pastoral zones. Hence, lineage territories are, generally, ecologically similar rather than contrasted. However,
*613 there are exceptions. 'Ailit Shraif lineage (see Figure 3a
423 below), at the western end of al-Qasr's 'izba sector, settled
182 there "because of the abundance of underground water in this
241
[312] area: the ground is rocky here and the water comes out fresh
[361] like the Nile." Their founder, Sayyid Shraif, "specialized"

*175 is not to be built till the zawiya is completed. There will be
*795 builders and carpenters among the Brothers and all that is
793 required of the tribal Shaikhs is selection of the site and supervision of the work. He points out to them that the work is for their benefit, in that they and their sons will receive in the zawiya an education, especially in the Koran and in the laws of Islam, and will be able to worship there. The Grand Sanusi then cites passages from the Koran and the *Hadith* commending religious benefactions. Finally he prays God to assist those engaged in the building and those who have made themselves responsible for the upkeep of the zawiya. God helps those who help others. A man reaps what he sows.

*795 Some of the Cyrenaican lodges were larger than others but they all had the same features, a straggling warren of stone
346 buildings comprising a mosque, schoolrooms, guest-rooms, apartments for the Shaikh of the zawiya and his family, rooms for teachers and pupils, and houses for the Brothers, clients,
[241] and servants, and their families. Many had small gardens nearby and the local cemetery was usually adjacent to a lodge.
[764] Jaghbub, where several hundred persons lived, was the largest of such communities. The ruins of Dariyana and al-'Azziyyat
[792] are also extensive and must have housed several hundred persons, but the average lodge probably housed only some fifty to a hundred persons, including wives and children, though there were often *Marabtin* families attached to the zawiya living nearby, sometimes in caves dating from classical times. The importance of a lodge was not to be estimated so much by the number of its occupants as by its tribal position and the number of its Bedouin adherents.

*795 The Shaikh of a new zawiya would point out to the local tribesmen that he and his companions had no means of support-
793 ing themselves or of maintaining the zawiya. The various
• 425 sections nearby then gave to the lodge the lands adjoining it, this estate surrounding a lodge being known as its *haram*. On the plateau the lodges were generously endowed with arable, in the steppe with wells, and in the oases with date-palms and springs. Later, further gifts of arable, wells, springs, and date-palms, or part use of these, would sometimes be made, especially when there was a dispute between two sections about ownership of property and neither would give way to the other,

for they might then settle the matter by surrendering their 795*
claims to the zawiya.[1] Another way in which a lodge obtained 793
rights in land was by asking permission of its owners to sow it. 425
Constant repetition of this favour eventually gave the zawiya
rights of use in it in perpetuity.

The tribesmen also assisted the Shaikh of the lodge in the 795*
cultivation of the lands, though most of the work was done by 793
241
476



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795*
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423

Sanusiya Estates of the Zawiyas of Shahhat, Tart, al-Fayidiya, and al-Zawiya al-Baida.

the zawiya community itself. At sowing time the Shaikh would 795*
pitch his tent near the area to be cultivated and prepare a communal 793
meal, taking with him some sacks of rice for the purpose. 241
The local Bedouin then came with their draught animals and 476
sowed and ploughed for a couple of days on behalf of the
zawiya. The same procedure took place at harvest time.
Besides gifts of land and voluntary service in cultivating, the [794]
Bedouin were expected to pay a tithe to the lodge at harvest
time and after lambing. No doubt many of them paid annual
dues but it is unlikely that any strict record was kept or that
payment could have been enforced had they been averse to
making it.

That it was expected that the Bedouin might promise services 175*
more readily than perform them is suggested by an interesting 795*
document, dated 1307 A.H., found by the Italians at the 794

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[1] Savarese, op. cit., p. 193.

Cases

571 between man and man, although the various cereal dishes which constitute
231 their regular meals are said to have a similar effect.

264 The son who continues to eat with his father "as he always had been
182 doing," also continues to accept his authority. Indeed he could do little else
593 at this stage, for he lacks the economic means to cut away. Neither at mar-
585 riage nor after is there any transfer of wealth from father to son. The new
182 tent recently pitched is no more than a dormitory to which the young couple
[425] retire at night. During the daytime the son is still to be seen in his father's
[556] tent, and, in the male quarters, things appear to be much the same as before.
In the female quarters, the only superficial change is the more frequent appearance among the women of one who, before marriage, often sat among them if she had been a close neighbour or a close cousin previously; or of an additional helper if she had come from afar. On the surface things remain "as they always have been," although in fact, a whole set of changes have been initiated.

852 *Rites de passage* are few among the Bedouin. A man's progress in life is
881 ceremonially marked by only four events: his birth, circumcision, marriage
764 and burial. His development into manhood is not marked by clearly defined
stages. About the age of seven, the henna markings on the front of a boy's
858 shirt for protection from the evil eye are not renewed, the cowrie shell stitched
789 to the front of his cap as a kind of talisman against the evil eye is removed
857 and he is no longer permitted free access to the women's quarters. As he
233 grows older, he will be instructed in goat-herding, and later taught to follow
the sheep. In his late teens he will have to undertake the more arduous and
883 responsible task of herding the camels. Coincident with camel-herding, he
233 may be given a gun by his father. Shortly afterwards he must undertake the
[431] stringent test of manhood, a journey to a distant oasis for dates. These
[411] changes are not marked off by a *rite de passage*. The rites a man undergoes
[484] during the course of a lifetime are minimal, and in the sense that they are
[885] concerned with only the basic events in a man's life anywhere (save for
852 circumcision, which is a minor celebration anyway), they are irreducible.
88 Moreover, the rituals which exist do not comprehend the same multiplicity of
796 relationships as rituals which occur in many other African societies.[4] It is
[771] true that the ceremonies referred to in this chapter by no means include
all the Bedouin rituals. It is also true that the events mentioned vary in
[554] elaboration, and in the number of symbols present in them, but they are
not multiplied or reduced for different people.

[613] In this context it is important to stress that we are here dealing with a
lineage society where social differentiation is not built up into differences
[554] of rank, where the roles to which a man succeeds are almost wholly cap-
[602] tured by his kinship relationships with other men and which are sociologically
to be distinguished from the roles a man enters into by acquisition of office,

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[4] See, for example, the elaboration of rituals discussed in M. Gluckman (Ed.), *Essays on the Ritual of Social Relations*. Manchester: University of Manchester Press, 1962.

Cases

The Meaning of Marriage

581 Until marriage the changes in a man's life have been in the nature of
585 an ordered sequence of development from a child to be cared for — the only
342 time in his life when a father, without inhibition, showers on him his love
[593] and affection — to one who, by degrees, makes an increasing contribution to
a production unit. Marriage necessitates that a man pitch a tent for himself.
With a tent he becomes a potential host and protector of others. The local
idiom for marriage is "to set up a tent." It would be quite improper to use
[196] the verb "to marry" when inquiring whether a marriage has taken place
since this verb also has the meaning of "to have sexual intercourse." In-
[195] stead the euphemism, "Have you pitched a tent?" is used. The Arabic word
for a tent in this context is *Bait*. It is not used to refer to a military tent, nor
to the small tent which shelters only a widow. It is reserved for the Bedouin
tent, which usually has a wool top, and, most importantly, holds the promise
of the continuation of life, whether it shelters a newly married couple, a
mature family or young unmarried people. (The word *Bait* represents a
complex concept, and it would be too much of a diversion here to discuss
the various points of its significance. It is essential to understand that its
[778] meaning is not confined to a tent in the physical sense.) Its top has *Baraka*
(divine goodness) in it; the quality of *Haram*, which makes it possible for the
tent to be used as a sanctuary, is associated with it and this quality of *Haram*
extends, moreover, to the ropes of the tent, so that anyone who clutches them
comes under the protection of the owner. In it, the wife must permanently
reside and her husband has the legal right to insist on this. In it too, he
has the legal right of sexual access to a woman, his wife. Any children
[885] born in it he can claim as his own. With the erection of a tent the son
reaches adulthood, and it is in this sense that he can be said to have acquired
a domain of his own.

581 Marriage gives a son greater freedom and less dependence on his father
585 in another sense. A second euphemism used for marriage is "making a
[593] relationship," specifically an affinal one. Relationships between a man and
[195] his father-in-law are diverse and are used in various ways in different situa-
tions. Here, the particular aspect which needs to be stressed is that a man
606 can cajole his father-in-law, and (through his wife) wealth, in the form
•425 of animals, may pass from the former to the latter. Reciprocal gifts are passed
556 between affines on certain occasions, but in addition small amounts may
pass which are not connected with the formal occasions of exchanges. Debt
583 lies between them. It begins with the initiation of marriage negotiations,
584 when the suitor's kinsmen take a prescribed number of sheep to present to
606 the girl's father if negotiations are successful. They promise to transfer
bride-wealth[9] to the girl's father. A few weeks after the marriage, the hus-

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[191] [9] I use the word "bride-wealth" because it has become so familiar in the literature, but the only similarity between the *Sahiba* of the Bedouin and the bride-wealth of

band is required to take gifts to his mother-in-law in recognition of the fact 583
that she nourished his wife as an infant (the literal meaning of the word 584
used for this gift is "milk"). A return visit is made and gifts are given to 606
the daughter. When the first child is born an animal is presented by the 851
affines, and if the child is a male, the gift may be several sheep, or even a 425
few camels if the father-in-law is very wealthy. Formal exchange of gifts 606
continue, but, in addition, informal transfers are made. Moreover, if relations between a man and his father-in-law develop favourably, it is not un- 606
common for a young husband, during the early years of marriage, to move 591
away from his father and pitch his tent alongside that of his father-in-law. 593
Marriage gives a son affinal relations of his own. Affinity can alleviate the dead weight of paternal authority.

It is suggested that the crisis the marriage of a son assumes for a father 585
is the shift it entails in the distribution of authority. This is borne out by 561
other details in the marriage ceremony referred to earlier. Ordinarily, young 602
men dare not sing within earshot of their senior agnates. Far from allowing
obscenities, agnates of the ascending generation would not allow even a 533
mention of women to be made by young men, in their presence. In a group [593]
consisting of young men and an agnate, I chanced to use the noun for [123]
woman and immediately my tent was cleared of all but the senior agnate.
At a wedding the young men revel in their lewd songs and shout their [831]
obscenities for all to hear. The senior agnates stand aside and make a show of ignoring the proceedings. And well they may, for each marriage is a challenge to the exclusive authority they have enjoyed; each nuptial tent is an invasion of the domain of which they have been undisputed masters. Marriage is the only occasion when the men of one generation can clap and sing their defiance of an older one, and give warning of the changes which must be accommodated however great the pretence that nothing has happened.

Marriage ceremonies dramatise the clash between adjacent generations 561
over the distribution of certain forms of authority. If this authority is as 602
overwhelming as has been suggested, and if it is so deeply resented, how is it that life is endurable for juniors? Relationships between junior and senior agnates are so restrictive that they almost amount to what Professor Fortes has suggested I view as a form of avoidance relationships. Juniors must always defer, they must obey commands promptly, they serve their seniors, they must accept a lead when it is given and the restrictions on conversations exclude all reference to women, marriage or sex. These are not simply a set of general guides for behaviour, they are rigidly applied rules, deviation from which is countered with rebuke or greater severity. It would appear from this

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many African societies is that wealth is transferred. Obviously, in societies where the 583
rules of exogamy compel a dispersion of links outside a man's own clan, what is in- 584
volved in this transfer of wealth cannot be sociologically similar to one in which mar- 606
riage to the first cousin on either side is permitted. 171

747 this number included pasturage for 11,000 sheep (Abu-Zeid
177 433 n.d.: 19-27).

[474] F.A.O. has encountered a number of serious problems
and the program has received setbacks. The program, as an
agent of social change, failed to take proper measure of the
structural and ideological aspects of the Bedouin traditional
system. Range improvement projects were carried out with
disregard for existing tribal boundaries (the mintaqa) in the
desert. In one case, the Bedouins removed fences on their
property, and allowed sheep to destroy an entire experimental
range area. Food distribution has fallen short because polygyny
as a structural feature of marriage and the Bedouin family was
not taken into account. The government estimated five persons
per family, and planned to distribute food to 4,000 families.
They were only able to subsidize 3,281 families. Aid officials
failed to consider the strength of Bedouin values. To qualify
747 for government aid, a Bedouin must belong to his local coopera-
177 tive society. Some Bedouins wish to remain independent of
474 •426 government business, and others cannot afford the 50 piasters
membership dues. A man may borrow money from another, of course,
but in al-Qasr a "debt" is actually a particular kind of social
relation which, like all others, carries with it a set of
specific rights and obligations. A debt among Bedouins is a
[571] complex relationship: it may draw two parties together, or it
may be, as it is with the Kachins of Burma (Leach 1954:153),

747 the basis of conflict. Bedouins may be unwilling to contract
177 such a potentially significant relationship for the 50 piasters
474 it takes to join the cooperative society. In yet another area,
426 program administrators concerned with nutritional improvement
571 have ignored the culturally important areas of food preferences
747 and, more seriously, food prohibitions. The Bedouins, who
177 subsist mainly on their own animal products, barley bread, and
262 a few fresh vegetables, are extremely hesitant to accept what
they consider ritually "unclean meat from foreigners," powdered
milk, dried fish, and Kraft cheese. They are willing to
747 accept grain, flour, and the cottonseed cakes which are used
177 as fodder. In other words, the Bedouins seem to be presented
[178] with poor alternatives which may tend to reinforce choices
[433] related to the traditional productive organization, i.e.,
pastoralism. The exogenous stimuli to change are so culturally
objectionable that they actually generate conflict situations
and misunderstanding between agents and recipients of change.

747 Government programs have aimed at one aspect of
177 Bedouin society, the economic structure. They have ignored
433 the cultural underpinning of social organization, the system
of meanings in terms of which social action takes place
(Geertz 1957:32-54). The relationship between social and
economic behavior is, of course, an extremely important one.
But the economic structure cannot be transformed independently
of a specific cultural structure.

571
672 other than those dealing with blood-revenge too. For instance,
*613 in matters concerning personal debts incurred, the group is
571 not responsible for the individual. The Bedouins say that if
672 *613 a man has the money he must repay his debts: if he does not
•426 have the money, then he must ask a rich relative to pay his
debts for him. He is then in debt to his relative and, out
of respect for him, should not borrow money or go into debt
[558] again. If he does, he will bring dishonor (*'ar*) to his
[681] family and they will, ultimately, banish him. There was dis-
682 agreement among my informants as to whether or not they
*613 should contribute to a *diiya* which was compensation for an
829 intentional slaying. Some said that they would not question
124 the motives of their kinsman who has killed because "we are
together in the good and the bad, and I must pay for him
just as he must pay for me." But others held the opinion,
which I feel was a prevailing one, that one must take into
account the justifiability of the killing. This seems to
have been the case in the past, for the Bedouins say that
traditionally the *bait* of the killer had to pay one-half
of the *diiya*.

*613 All things political somehow relate to the payment
682 of blood-money. We have seen that the essential function
681 of the *'aqila*, and even the condition of his taking office,
182 refers to the responsibility of collecting the *diiya* from
571 the members of his group. The criterion of being a member

681 this variation is that committing the adultery within the camp of the
558 684 husband constitutes a greater humiliation, since it affects his honor
among his neighbors. Also, adultery inside the tent of the couple carries
with it the possibility of rape, while adultery outside the tent
at least implies an element of consent on the part of the wife. The
[583] penalty in the case of adultery is the return by the wife's father of
the mahr and all other expenses of the marriage ceremony and the gifts
the husband had presented during the engagement period. This is a
further indication that the father of the wife is still responsible
for her behavior even after she is married. It is in this respect that
the crime of adultery differs from theft. In the case of theft, the
[685] thief has to return twice the amount stolen and in the case of repeated
offenders, four times the amount stolen. This is in addition to a certain
amount of money as kabara. Yet, in the latter case the kabara is
not specified and is subject to the proof by the victim that the theft
constituted an insult to him. This insult is assumed in the case of
adultery, which makes the kabara in the case of adultery part of the
punishment--an integral part of the punishment. The kabara is not among
[613] the collective responsibility of the amar and is paid only by the person
involved, unless he is totally unable to pay or refuses to pay. In such
• 426 593 cases, his closest male kin (his father, son, or brother) pays on his
681 behalf with the understanding that such payment constitutes a debt which
684 should be repaid. The person paying on his behalf in this case can go
558 to his tent and take by force anything of value, such as blankets, utensils,
or even sheep and goats, and keep them as pawns until the debt is
paid.

9: Murray E,K-3,4 (ca. 1910-1935) 1935 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9
Egypt

Had the Senussi been successful in the last war, they 175
would no doubt have brought in the ‘Ibeidat or the ‘Awaqir 619
from Cyrenaica to replace the Awlad ‘Ali in Egypt.

At the present day the Awlad ‘Ali, especially the eastern 619
sections near the Nile Valley, have almost ceased to be nomadic, 178
and only the old men have memories of their former warlike
habits. They suffered considerably during the Great War,
but are again becoming prosperous. They now own large
comfortable tents, are beginning to build houses and clear
out cisterns, and are also said to be increasing in numbers.[1]
So civilized have they grown that my guides, one a Sinai
Arab and the other an ‘Abadi, concurred in calling them
"green"—not real desert-worthy Bedouins.

Perhaps as a result of Libyan influence, or more probably 142
the better nurture and climate, they are taller, heavier, stronger,
and lighter-complexioned than the lightly built Arabs of
Sinai and Hijaz. Also they are much franker and more 157
straightforward than their shifty and suspicious eastern cousins, 181
and altogether more trustworthy. Their women only veil 562
themselves to strangers, and talk quite naturally and cheerfully 834
to the men of their own tribe. 609

They cultivate as much barley as they can, using a
primitive plough drawn by camels, in the clayey hollows 243
scattered over their very stony limestone desert, but, as the [492]
rainfall is very uncertain, a good crop only occurs every five [132]
or six years. After harvest, they exchange some of their [437]
barley for maize, which the women grind to make bread
as required, and some for dried dates. The seed for next [251]
year is buried in a hole lined with straw and covered with
clay, and a year's forage for the animals is set aside. The [432]
rest of the crop goes to market, and for a short time the [426]
Arab has money to buy clothes for himself and his family
and at utmost need to pay off some of the numerous debts he
has inherited from his forefathers. Soon he is reduced again
to the clothes he wears, the tent he sleeps in, and his animals
grazing in the desert.

They are great breeders of camels and sheep, and a busy 436
traffic in these goes on weekly in the markets of Hammam, 178
‘Amriya, and the Beheira. So they have got into the habit [438] [493] [233]

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[1] At the 1927 census, the Western Desert Arabs, Awlad ‘Ali, Jawabis, etc., numbered
38,928 souls exclusive of those settled in Beheira. But Pacho, 100 years ago, estimated them [161]
at 38,000 souls.

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433 when planted in large quantities. The southern zone of al-Qasr is best suited for these crops, and the tractor is necessary for a successful crop.

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●[427]
[654] Tractors are rented through the cooperative society. Local cooperative officers are responsible for seeing that all members share in the use of the tractor. But, in fact, officers and their closer relatives monopolize the tractors. The government has allotted to the al-Qasr cooperative five tractors. They feel that it would jeopardize the whole program of economic reform if they were to dictate the way in which the tractors are to be used. Consequently, the tractor, like the rations of foodstuffs, has become a pawn in tribal power plays. In one case, not in al-Qasr, a tractor-driver who was a member of the 'Ali Abyad tribe insisted that members of the 'Ali Ahmar tribe pay him a 50 piaster "tip" to have their fields plowed. Because of situations such as these, most Bedouins prefer that cooperative membership coincide with local group membership. It is better, they say, if the 'Aishaibat of al-Qasr have their own cooperative because they know how to handle problems among themselves. The government, during this transitional period, seems to agree.

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407 One reason that tractors are monopolized by a small group is that there are not enough of the machines to handle the plowing. Of the five tractors in al-Qasr, seldom were more than two working simultaneously. Often, this was a result of

156 of them) cater largely to the needs of the lineage in whose
159 554 territory they are located. They are operated mostly on a
443 credit basis. Lineage members, as debtors, feel gratitude
423 472 but also, and more importantly, loyalty toward their kinsman
* [613] and creditor. Hajj 'Ali is the only member of al-Qasr who
[452] owns two shops, and the only Bedouin in the whole Western Desert
who owns three shops. His brother owns a shop in Matruh.
156 Furthermore, the shop in Sallum is in a strategic position on
159 the Libyan border which, coincidentally or not, is a point
554 for importing, and also smuggling, foreign goods into Egypt.
443 439 The possession and utilization of foreign products is definitely
472 a status symbol all over Egypt. Hence, the person in this
area who can control, however slightly, the distribution of
such goods has a lever with which to exact prestige and
favors from the "status group" in al-Qasr who now welcome
these symbols (tobacco, pistols, rifles, radios) and the
bureaucrats of Marsa Matruh who crave them (food goods,
clothing materials, car parts).

156 Besides all this, Hajj 'Ali is involved in a small
159 stone-cutting operation which supplies stones for house
554 building, he cooperates with his three brothers in a well-
[316] [312] cleaning concern, and contracts government heavy equipment
● [427] to build earth dams. The material evidence of his status
[342] is that he is the only man in al-Qasr with two compound-type
[595] houses (one he built thirteen years ago), and the only man
with four wives.

178 423 than they were in the past. These conditions reflect a change in social and authority relations.

423 432 In the *'izba* sector of al-Qasr, as of 1964, there were two cases of land purchase. In one case, land was sold to an Egyptian, "an outsider" from the Nile Valley. This, of course, could only occur where such a transaction would be upheld by 423 the Egyptian government. Land ownership, when it involves registered land, is absolute. This, to a great extent, works *[613] to lessen the influence of the lineage structure on property 423 relations. The law governing property, whether in traditional 178 or modern al-Qasr, reflects a set of social relationships. 571 When an individual can own property in the absolute sense, rather than with respect to his being a member of a group which enjoys sovereign rights of ownership, then, there has been a change in traditional corporate relations (Herskovits [184] 1952:260). This has definitely been the case for most of al-Qasr, and it is adumbrated in the southern sector where a person's rights over land are nearly absolute. A compar- 423 184 ison of land tenure patterns on the coast and in the southern region reflect not only the contrast between methods of land use, but, also the fact that as land becomes valuable it becomes scarce and land holdings become fragmented (compare Figures 5 and 6).

•428 596 When the head of a household dies, his eldest son inherits his authority, but all of the sons share equally in

428 596 the father's property. The egalitarian spirit of the Bedouin inheritance rule functions to maintain the unity of the family, and, at another level of social complexity, the structural continuity of the corporate group. Ideally, the surviving sons will keep intact their father's estate, his land and animals, and will work it as a unit. And this is generally 596 594 *613 183 the case in al-Qasr. On the other hand, there is also the implicit assumption in the structural principle of the Bedouin segmentary lineage system that each individual will eventually establish a unit of his own, separate from but interrelated with, the main household. As a result, there 596 593 usually develops some division of property and labor among surviving brothers. Whether or not this division is formally agreed upon, and, whether or not it is assigned by the father or the eldest son is largely arbitrary. In some cases, the father makes such a decision before his death and prepares his sons for it. The father's concern is that good relations be maintained between his sons after his death. Just as the father mediates conflict between his sons during his life, so he hopes to maintain peace between them after his death. The Bedouins say that a father should be fair when dealing with his sons, and that he should never favor one over the other.

428 *[613] Inheritance is determined through the patrilineal lineage principle. The Bedouins of al-Qasr claim that they

The Bedouins of al-Qasr claim that they
428 follow the Islamic laws of inheritance, in which case, a
562 surviving daughter is entitled to one-half the share of a
surviving son (Quran IV: 177). But, in only two cases did
[423] women own land in al-Qasr: one woman was the only close
survivor of her father, and, the other woman was a widow
without sons. In fact, my informant even admitted that these
cases were exceptional, that the women were permitted to keep
the land only because the brothers of the deceased men, who
are the "rightful heirs" after the sons, did not want the
land. The Bedouins insist, on the other hand, that a girl
can claim her share of the inheritance: "It is her right."
But she will never do such a thing "because she respects
her brothers too much to accept the land which is offered to
her."

428 When the father's estate is large, certain measures
are taken to divide it between his sons. In some cases, the
division may be somewhat complex and determined over a period
of time. One example of this in al-Qasr involved a wealthy
man whose own property was divisible into parts roughly
corresponding to ecological subdivisions. The subdivisions
of the estate became the shares of the sons, and could then
be separated but remain symbiotically dependent. Ecological
relationships affirm social relations. The following is an
[159] account of inheritance rules in al-Qasr:

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I am 45 years old and my eldest brother is 53 years old. I have two younger brothers. When my father died, we four sons inherited the property of our father jointly. I told my older brother to divide the land the way in which he wanted . . . My father had divided his land into four parts before he died. Each part was a separate "farm" so that a son could raise barley or olives, as he liked . . . But my brother told me to make the decision. As it turned out, my youngest brother was the first to make his choice of the four parts. He took his land but we still kept all of our sheep together. One year later, my older brother took his share of the land, but Jabril (the next to the youngest brother) and I remained together, and still remain together. Some men want to be on their own and others do not. Our eldest brother was the first to separate his animals from the collective herd . . . When the decisions were made to divide the land between us, we got the local "holy man" to go around the area with us and to witness the boundaries. This is done so that later if a brother changes his mind, or wants to take different land, the true borders will be known. We recorded them on paper and the "holy man" knows them . . . In matters of inheritance, all sons get equal shares, but in a case where there are ten camels and three sons, then, each gets three camels and the tenth goes to the eldest brother.

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[583]

Any property which a female may own, if it is land or livestock, will go to her sons upon her death. In al-Qasr, such property will usually be sheep which a woman may accumulate through gift-giving. In one case, which is unique in al-Qasr, a woman received thirteen camels from her husband at the time of her wedding. (This was not the brideprice, for that goes to the bride's father.) At the time of her death her camels numbered seventy, and they were divided equally among her five sons. Concerning lesser items, such as clothing and jewelry, and also chickens, these are

● 428 562 [422] inherited by a woman's daughters. The carpets and the tent, which are woven by women, are not their property to pass on for they belong to the head of the household, the shaib.

596 177 178 [124] Economic change in al-Qasr has had its impact at the level of production mode, and, also, it has affected the composition of the basic family structure. One informant, who is now nineteen years old, remembers growing up in a household composed of his grandfather, father, father's brothers and their families. Since that time, his father has built another house away from the family home; one uncle has moved to Marsa Matrúh and opened a shop there; his youngest uncle has built a house not far from the family home; and one uncle remains with his three wives in the original house. 182 177 *613 433 434 This fission-type process is not uncommon in a segmentary society, although as a traditional process, it represented a mechanism for dealing with ecological pressures. In the modern case, in al-Qasr, the process of fission in the Bedouin social structure proves to be an adaptive mechanism also: the fragmentation of lineage property and relations is a positive condition for the transition to a cash and market economy. Among most of the families of al-Qasr, as market orientation increases brothers begin to economically differentiate their tasks and interests with an eye to individual profits.

One of my in-
595 124 formants, a wealthy man and a poet, said that since he could
not love two women equally he would never take a second wife.
He also said that he was unwilling to give his daughter to a
man who refused to promise him that she would be his only wife.

593 Throughout his life, the father is dominant and his
washuun is subjective. He is the master of his *naja'* and the
[596] social behavior of his wife and offspring toward him has both
a moral and a pragmatic aspect. They show respect and obed-
[768] ience because "it is the decent thing to do;" further, just
as he provides for their material needs while he is alive,
so the property which he leaves them will sustain them after
•428 his death. As we have already noted, in theory, the daughters
[562] inherit one-half of the shares which the sons receive; in
fact, females inherit only if they are the sole survivors of
the male. But the surviving wife, or wives, will take a cash
amount equal to their brideprice from the husband's estate.
The Bedouins say that this price will be paid before any
other inheritance shares are distributed. In addition, the
768 wife has the right to remain in her husband's house or tent,
and it is the duty of the eldest son to look after her. She
may remain at home until death, provided she never brings a
man who may be considered a prospective husband into the
house.

593 The rights and duties involved in the father-*washuun*
relationship show that the ideal authority structure of the

582 171 and, the individual has been socially conditioned to prefer his father's brother's daughter.

582 183 All of these explanations are as plausible as they are obvious. They are, in fact, the same explanations which the Bedouins themselves offer for their marriage ideal. But one cannot help noticing that the explanations offered actually concern an ideal in Bedouin social behavior, and not a practice. Theories showing the logic of parallel-cousin marriage are placed along side the fact that this type of marriage is statistically atypical.

582 428 [671] If, as Islamic Law decrees, the daughter did inherit some share of her father's property, then parallel-cousin marriage as an attempt to keep land in the tertiary group would be logical. But we know that usually the sons inherit all of the father's property, Islamic Law to the contrary (Levy 1957:245-246). In this case, parallel-cousin marriage can only be seen as an ideal which functions side by side with the other ideal of a girl's right to inherit.

582 171 Barth (1954), and Murphy and Kasdan (1959) have stressed the political advantages which attach to parallel-cousin marriage in the context of factional struggle. The general idea is that political differentiation between collateral branches of the lineage structure is intensified and political autonomy enhanced by the practice of turning affinal bonds inward. Parallel-cousin marriage then has the opposite

*613 578 the Bedouins. Conflict regulation treats the expressions of
571 social conflict and not its causes.

554 The _'aqila_ regulates conflict between the members of
his tertiary segment, between this group and the other groups
of the secondary unit, and between secondary units of the
tribe. He operates in both the internal and external systems
*613 of authority relations. The _'aqila_ may pre-empt the authority
578 of the _shaib_ in the sphere of familial authori[illegible]hough, the
593 Bedouins say, this seldom happens because the son is willing
554 [596] to obey his father. Having been reared in the culture, and
as a future father himself, the son supports the respect-
*613 discipline principle of Bedouin society. But in extreme cases,
578 such as the threat of a father to disown his son, the explicit
593 approval of the _'aqila_, and of all the _'awaaqil_ of the secondary
•428 corporate group, is necessary. This is the procedure in all
554 cases of banishment. In one case (which I document below), a
man disinherited his younger brother with the formal approval
of his _'awaaqil_.

*613 The tertiary group in Bedouin society is by definition
682 the blood-vengence group. However, in view of the common
578 values and pragmatic interests of its members, the secondary
[181] group fulfills this function. Traditionally, when revenge
[681] killings were carried out according to the _lex talionis_, it
was usually at the hand of some member of the victim's tertiary
group. In the case of protracted conflict, such as extended

000 order.

*613 The 'aqila is elected by the elders of the secondary
554 lineage group. The election usually takes place when these
666 men are gathered for some festive occasion, such as a wedding.
[578] The name of the man chosen to succeed to the political office
will not be made public until it is absolutely necessary, i.e.,
in the case of conflict within the man's bait, or more especially,
in the case where blood-money is due. According to the Bedouins,
the only qualification for the office of 'aqila is wisdom--
*613 the ability to arbitrate disputes. On the other hand, it is
554 implicit that the 'aqila be a member of the "status group."
556 Prestige commands respect and obedience, and prestige in
al-Qasr usually comes with wealth. In general, the 'aqila is
an elder, i.e., one with wisdom, and a member of a wealthy
and influential family.

*613 Technically, the 'aqila-ship is not inherited, but
554 succession tends in this direction. An 'aqila must "speak the
• [428] good and show men how to follow the path of the good." Not
all men have the ability to do this, and, the Bedouins say,
it is natural that such a great gift resides with a particular
family "because the son learns from the father." All of the
'awaaqil in al-Qasr claim that they knew how to settle disputes
before they became 'awaaqil. If they had not, they would not
[428] have been worthy of the office. Actually, the choice of an
'aqila is a restricted one: the office may pass, according to

*613 the unilineal rule, only to the son or the brother of the
554 former 'aqila. In Bait 'Umar, for instance, the office went
•428 from father to son to brother (see Figure 8). The election
[666] amounts to a choice between the son or the brother, and
partiality is usually shown towards the eldest of the two
candidates.

The 'aqila's term of office may be terminated by the
members of the bait. Such an action may be the result of
*613 ineffectiveness due to old age, or it may stem from a violation
554 of the norms of the office by the incumbent. Two cases of an
687 'aqila being impeached were reported to me. One, which did not
take place in al-Qasr, was brought about when the 'aqila was
accused of taking a bribe, and favoring one party to the
conflict over the other. The second case, which happened
about fifteen years ago in al-Qasr, involved an 'aqila from
'Ailit Ma'fas. This man informed Egyptian officials that his
fellow tribesmen were storing guns and ammunition beyond the
quantity permitted by national security laws. Not only was
this man removed from his 'aqila-ship, but he was also expelled
*613 from his tertiary segment, and hence the tribe. But, in most
554 cases, term of office is ended by death or senility. The
Bedouins say: "An 'aqila will be removed if he can no longer
solve problems; if he says bad things about his tribe; if he
is too old, or too lazy; in other terms, if he is not a good
man, he is removed."

671 change in al-Qasr must proceed.

671 Bedouin law should be considered within its historical
177 context, especially as it has reference to the Maliki school
of Islamic Law. The Maliki school, or "rite," (madhhab) of
law is considered to be the most conservative interpretation
of the doctrine of the Prophet Muhammad. Therefore, the
Maliki school is thought to reflect the society and tribal
traditions of pre-Islamic Arabia more dependably than any of
the other three schools of law. For instance, the Maliki
671 school, in the domain of family law, stresses the importance
177
428 and the primacy of agnate rights and claims. This is especially so in matters of inheritance: the law states that
in the absence of agnate heirs the property of the deceased
passes, not to female survivors but, to the central treasury
[562] of the State. This single legal aspect helps us to understand the Bedouin practice of disallowing the female to
inherit and should be a consideration in any study of Bedouin
succession rules.

175 Maliki Law was introduced into North Africa during
671 the ninth century, and became the official legal doctrine of
177 the Berber dynasties. It was first taught in this part of
the world, probably, by Yahya ibn Yahya, a student of Malik
ibn Anas, the founder of the school. Murray (1935:313)
presents a valuable legal document from the Western Desert
in which the name "Yahya" is frequently cited as the authority

175 for legal interpretation. For instance: "We are also told
671 by Yahya that (the Caliph) Mu'awiya ibn Sufian said that a
177 wound on the body should be assessed at half the value of
671 that wound on the head or face" (1935:324). Maliki law,
177 derived in large part from the Bedouin traditions of Arabia,
may be seen to characterize the legal norms of the tribal-based
social structure in the Western Desert. The Bedouins of al-
•[428] Qasr themselves claim that they are within the bounds of
[562] Islamic Law when they deny the female the right to inherit,
though they do have other, and more secular, justifications
for the practice.

671 As we have already noted, in the above quote from the
182 "holy man" of al-Qasr, the Bedouins feel that the *'awaiyid*
648 can succeed where governmental law will fail. They say that
"the government does not understand the problems of the
Bedouins," that "government troops cannot function in the
desert." They feel that they need the *'awaiyid* for the sake
of political order itself: "If the Bedouins did not have
the *'awaiyid*, they would eat each other. The *'awaiyid* is so
important that a man who commits a wrong in town will lie
to the government, and then dutifully return to the tribe for
Bedouin justice."

[656] In 1933, the government "abolished" the *'awaiyid*
and insisted that the Bedouins settle their difference in
the civil courts in accord with Egyptian law. According to

634 to the *'umda*. Both offices are for a life-term, only being
554 terminated by bad behavior or senility. At the expiration
634 of an incumbent's term, the "status group" meets in al-Qasr
571 to decide upon his replacement. The name of a "nominee"
635 is passed on to the Governor who is expected to approve the
666 Bedouins' selection of a representative to the government.
[178] It is this "status group"-controlled process which the
[177] Governor seeks to change. Since these are officially held
offices in the U.A.R. governmental structure, he feels that
elections to fill their vacancies should be a public affair.
Naturally, he will exercise more influence over the naming
of candidates in this way, and the Bedouins perceive this as
a challenge to the traditional structure of leadership and
control of external relations.

634 The offices of *'umda* and *shaikh* are even more hereditary
*613 than that of *'aqila*, which theoretically should not be
666 the case. By definition, the role of *'aqila* is functional at
● [428] the *bait* level, and so the recruitment pool of candidates
for this office is inherently limited. By comparison, the
offices of *'umda* and *shaikh* should go to the "best men" in
the tribe, and, therefore, the recruitment pool should be
634 tribal-wide. But, in fact, these two offices are considered
*613 "the property" of the wealthiest lineages in the al-Qasr area.
666 There is a traditional rationale behind this fact: there is
428 the structural necessity for, and conscious practice of, an
[571]

634 asymmetrical power relationship between commoners and "status
*613 group" which maintains political order. The Bedouins say of
666 the *'umda's* office, as they did of the *'aqila*, "if the son is
•428 worthy of the office, then he should take his father's place."
[571] Such a statement is usually qualified by noting that if the son does not possess the qualifications of the office, of course, he will not succeed. This is not simply a case of power politics, there is more to it. Behind the inheritance of the *'umda* and *shaikh* office is a logical concern and attempt to sustain a balance of political and social relations.

The "inheritance" of the *'aqila's* office is explained by showing that the candidates for the office are limited to the brothers and sons of the incumbent, the former *'aqila*. The offices of *'umda* and *shaikh*, in contrast, have a recruitment pool which includes, potentially, every man at the primary tribal level, the 'Aishaibat. The rule of succession, where the modern legal roles are concerned, is a mechanism for maintaining, what is considered by most Bedouins to be, the legitimate distribution of power in al-Qasr. Once the roles
634 of *'umda* and *shaikh* have been "captured" by a *bait*, for
*613 political power resides at the tertiary level of the lineage
666 structure, any attempt to change the distribution or locus
428 of power will be culturally transformed into a threat to the
578 honor, not of the individual, but of his *bait* and *'aiela*.
And this is a basis for conflict in Bedouin society. It is

634 no coincidence, then, that the present 'umda and shaikh are
*613 the sons of the former 'umda and shaikh. This reveals not
666 only the structural rules of succession, but also indicates
• 428 that "social honor," and thus power, still resides with these
[578] families.

It is important to note that since the time of their
[178] inception, these roles have not changed 'aiela or even bait
in al-Qasr. When the former 'umda from 'Ailit Lazumi died,
634 his eldest son petitioned to the 'awaaqil of the 'Aishaibat
*613 that he be approved to succeed to his father's position.
666 The 'awaaqil met and made their decision. One 'aqila who
428 was present at the election said: "The office of 'umda should
571 stay in the Lazumi family since the father was 'umda. The
'awaaqil agreed on the son. But the son will be accepted to
follow his father only if he is good. If he is not good, the
'awaaqil will find a new bait." Although the Bedouins speak
of "the 'awaaqil" electing the 'umda, it must be remembered
that it is the "status group" which makes the decision, and
that the 'awaaqil are only part of this group. The names of
[627] the men who elected the present 'umda include less 'awaaqil
and more rajal khair.

114 Before I arrived in the field, the present acting
634 'umda of the 'Aishaibat tribe was elected to the national
666 parliament to represent the province of Marsa Matruh. The
election of his replacement was not scheduled to take place

613 [627] individuals. He settles disputes among them and represents them in their disputes with outsiders. He is also the spokesman of his Bait in all matters involving the relationship of the Bait with the other tribal segments. [682] He is responsible for the collection of the bloodmoney from members of his Bait and has the authority to confiscate property of individual members who refuse to pay their share. When a member is financially unable to pay his share, the Aqila is expected to pay for him and collect at a later time when the member is in a position to make such payment.

613 428 178 Originally the position of the Aqila was a hereditary one with the position passing from father to son. However, in recent years the rigidity of the patrilineal descent as the basis of succession to the position of the Aqila has been modified radically and other principles of selection have been introduced. 613 128 The working of the principles underlying the selection of the Aqila will be analyzed in detail in the following chapter through the close examination of one of the major legal cases which occurred during my stay in the area.

613 [423] Thus each Bait is a division of one of the Eilas and this has its place in the formal tribal system. It constitutes a group with definite usufruct rights to land and a formally recognized leadership.

621 [613] But the actual residential units in which Awlad Ali live are not baits but parts of them in the form of separate camps or "nagei". The camps constitute the primary communities of Awlad Ali. A camp consists [594] of a number of tents ranging from four to twelve. Each tent is usually occupied by one nuclear family of a husband, his wife and children. [595] In cases of polygynous marriages, each wife usually occupies one tent with [361] her children. Each camp is separated from the next one by a distance which ranges from two to ten kilometers.

156 equipment from the government projects and from smuggling sheep and mer-
[685] [439] chandise across the Libyan border. Although some of these stories might
be exaggerated, they all point to the fact that Hakim, despite his wealth,
is not the most popular or reputable individual in bait Asabei', and that
although Shei'eb is not a popular individual either, he definitely comes
up the winner in any popularity contest between the two. The question is
156 why Hakim was selected by the Awaqil to replace Shei'eb. The case in-
613 volved more than Shei'eb's inability to collect the money from members of
558 682 his bait. Shei'eb's ineffectiveness seemed to have been taken as an ex-
683 cuse rather than as the direct cause. Many Aqaqil, before Shei'eb, had
failed in collecting money from their own bait without being subject to
direct challenge. What seems to be involved is more than a challenge to
a particular member, Shei'eb. It is a challenge to the whole principle
by which Shei'eb acquired his position as Aqila of bait Asabei': pat-
rilineal succession.

156 Shei'eb is the youngest of four sons of the former Aqila of bait
159 Asabei', Sheikh Elewa. For more than fifty years Sheikh Elewa was the
613 463 undisputed Aqila of bait Asabei'. He also had considerable influence
683 among other tribal segments throughout the whole of the Western Desert
554 by virtue of his position as "nazzar", that is, the expert who assesses
the amount of compensation for wound inflicted in a liable case. The
[428] position of nazzar is a hereditary one and had been handed down from
[779] father to son. The basis for his assessment of wounds are a number of
old books believed to be obtained from Mecca and contain all the judg-
ments of famous Islamic leaders in their assessments of wounds.

[428] Eleven years ago when Sheikh Elewa became blind and too old to

156 exercise his functions, he invited all the important people in the area
159 into a large gathering during which he announced that he was handing the
613 sacred books to Shei'eb, who was to become the nazzar and also to succeed
463 him as the Aqila of bait Asabei'. Although at that time Shei'eb was
683 fairly young, twenty-six, nobody questioned Sheikh Elewa's decision.
554 "He is the Aqila," said one informant, "and he has the right to decide
● 428 which of his sons is to succeed him. After all, he knows his sons better
[579] than anybody else and knows which one is best for the job." Most people
156 thought that Sheikh Elewa, being still alive and with clear thinking,
159 would help Shei'eb in performing his duties as Aqila. A few months after
613 Shei'eb took over his father's position, it became apparent that he was
554 too immature for the job. He tried to use his position to take money
578 from members of his bait and when they refused to give him any money, he
[661] entered into fights with a number of them. Rumors spread that he took bribes from the disputing parties who came to him for him to assess the legal compensation for wounds to raise or lower his estimate. But still people within bait Asabei' as well as outside it respected Sheikh Elewa's decision and did not challenge Shei'eb openly. But as time passed the dissatisfaction with Shei'eb grew. This dissatisfaction came mainly from members of the Amar who were affected directly by Shei'eb's actions, especially those actions which resulted in the payment of compensation for wounds inflicted in fights.

PHASE II

439 On the evening of May 16, 1966, two members of the Geneishat tribe of Matruh area came to Burg-el-Arab with a large shipment of smuggled cigarettes to leave with their partner in the area, Hadi, from the

613 In performing his functions within the bait, personal qualities such as
554 [157] wisdom, soundness of ideas, personal persuasiveness are of importance.
● [428] But the main basis of his authority is patrilineal succession. The Aqila
[556] has no economic power to speak of. Although many aqila are among the
wealthiest members of their baits, many more are among its poorest. The
nature of the economic process and the pastoral life of Awald Ali is
such that the economic position of the individual is always flucuating.
Nor does the Aqila have any military power at his disposal, or any command of the use of force to back his decisions or to make them binding
[428] upon members of his bait. The main source of compliance to the Aqila's
decisions comes from the knowledge that the Aqila has the authority to
make such decisions and that he has acquired this authority through the
legitimate channel of patrilineal succession.

613 Where membership in formal groups is transmitted by descent, Awlad
428 Ali always choose the patriline. The son of Awlad Ali is regarded as
562 [619] Awlad Ali even though his mother might not be from the tribe, while a
woman who marries outside the tribe transmits no rights in the tribe to
her children. The importance of agnatic kin is reinforced by an solidary of brothers which is extended laterally to patrilateral cousins. It
is also shown in the fact that sons are favored in inheritance usually
to the exclusion of daughters. The male line is viewed by Awlad Ali as
the natural principle when it comes to anything which is inheritable,
whether property or position. In an attempt to defend Shei'eb's position and his right to be the Aqila, one informant told me: "The main purpose that a man has in life is to have sons because it is the son who
makes the man live forever. Daughters don't count. A man gives his son

613 everything ... his property, his name, and anything he can give him, like
428 the position of the Aqila. This is only natural." While the office of
[562] the Aqila is inherited through the male line, there seems to be no special regard for seniority. Any son of the Aqila can succeed him in the position and it is usually left to the Aqila to select the son who is to
613 succeed him. This decision is not usually the subject matter of brotherly
428 rivalry since the position of Aqila is regarded more as a duty than
593 as a privilege. There has been only one case in the entire area of the Western Desert in which such a decision has lead to open fighting between brothers. "When my father became very old and his eyes bothered him, he told me that I should become the Aqila and could not say no to him," said Shei'eb. "I didn't want to become the Aqila but this was the choice of my father and I have to obey .... You owe it to your father and family to carry on his responsibilities the same way you carry his name." It was patrilineal succession upon which Shei'eb based his case. Most uninterested parties believe that he and he alone had the legitimate claim to the position.

613 The importance of patrilineal succession as the basis of the Aqila's
627 authority may be better understood by contrasting it to a closely related
554 position, that of the "mardi". A man within a bait may acquire, by virtue of personal qualities, a reputation for wisdom and soundness of opinion which may overshadow that of the Aqila. Such a person becomes known throughout a certain area as a successful mediator and go-between; and therefore is called upon to solve disputes not limited to members of his own bait. He thus acquires an informal position which cuts across a number of baits and sometimes larger political units.

613 627 554 [192] The word mardi is derived from the Arabic verb "yardi" which means to accept or agree upon. The mardi therefore is the person who is accepted by one or both parties to a dispute as a mediator. If he is accepted by only one of the parties, his work is more that of a legal representative of that party. He makes all efforts, using all powers of persuasion to get the other party to concede to the demands of the party he represents. If, on the other hand, he is chosed by both parties to a dispute, he acts as an impartial judge and avoids taking sides in the case. His fame is determined by his ability to achieve permanent, long-lasting settlements. His success in this area depends, in addition to personal qualities, upon the respect he has within his own tribal segment and the weight that tribal segment has among other tribal segments. Similarly, his success and the fame he gets as a mardi may give him considerable influence within the bait. But this influence does not develop [182] [428] into authority because the mardi in this case does not have an established basis for the effective maintenance of that authority, in this case, patrilineal succession.

613 554 682 The other domain within which the Aqila performs his duties is that of the Eila or the amar. His main function within this area is to represent his bait in matters involving the collection or the distribution of bloodmoney within the vengeance group. Within the amar, the aqila is considered successful insofar as he is able to fulfill his bait's financial obligations to the amar. This ability is in turn determined by his success in collecting money from individual members of his bait and/or his willingness to pay from his own money for those members who are unable or unwilling to pay their share. Where kinship ties are strong, the Aqila

613 position as the leader of the bait. The principle of patrilineal succession
554 is so respected in such baits that it overshadows any other consideration.
613 This continues to be the case as long as the kinship ties
554
428 within the bait remain strong. When the kinship ties in a given bait
178 weaken, the principle of patrilineal succession also weakens. This is
[166] more likely to occur in baits where a relatively large number of the
[464] members leave the area permanently or for a more or less prolonged period
of time, seeking jobs on a part or a full-time basis. Many of these
613
178 members maintain only a minimal contact with their respective baits.
166 They become more reluctant to fulfill their kinship obligations, especially
464
561 when they entail any financial liability. The older members
369 complain about how younger persons are less loyal to their elders and
how selfish they have become. "All they care about is their jobs and the pleasure they get from the city; they are becoming city people." Younger members, on the other hand, maintain that their reluctance to fulfill their kinship obligations stems from their feeling that they do not get anything in return. "Life is expensive and money is hard to obtain. I cannot make enough money to support myself and my wife and children and at the same time pay my cousin's financial debts," said a member of eilat Asabei', who works as a driver with the Desert Organization in Alexandria.

613 When this happens, there seems to be a tendency toward shifting the
554 emphasis from the bait to the eila or the amar as the source of the political
[556] support of the Aqila. This is turn makes wealth an important
basis of the Aqila's power. No more can the bait impose an ineffective Aqila on the amar unless it is ready to back him by their own share of money. If this is lacking as was the case with Shei'eb, there is nothing

His success in solving disputes between members
613 628 of his baits and outsiders might enhance his prestige within the bait,
554 but it is not a substitute for patrilineal succession as the basis of
[428] the Aqila's authority. But in less integrated baits the situation is
[627] different. The ineffectiveness of the Aqila in solving disputes may
lead members of his bait to seek another man as their representative who
would act as a mediator in their behalf. If this continues for a long
time the Aqila might find himself with no functions and the new person
would become a de facto Aqila.

613 The Aqila represents the only effective indigenous form of leader-
554 ship among Awlad Ali at the present time. The camp headman provides
622 another form of leadership on the camp level, but, as mentioned before,
the leadership of the headman is very limited and involves minimal
634 authority. In addition to the indigenous leadership represented by the
622 Aqila, there is the superimposed administrative structure of the govern-
656 ment representative in the form of the "omda" system introduced into the
177 area by the government decree no. 1187 of 1958. The system of omda or
mayorship is essentially that applied to the rural areas of Egypt with
certain modifications to fit the tribal organization and the semi-nomadic
existence of the populations of the Western Desert. In rural areas, the
622 omda is the administrative head of the village. He is appointed by the
[554] government from among the village inhabitants who have certain qualifi-
[212] cations with regard to education (must be able at least to read and
[556] write), wealth (own at least 5 feddans of land in the area), and sound
reputation. As such, the omda system in the rural areas is a territorial
system. The omda's authority covers the territory of the village and
all individuals living in it regardless of their kinship affiliation.

586 women in the Western Desert, and that the women usually have no diffi-
562 culty in finding another husband.

586 While the right of "throwing herself" offers the wife some guar-
562 antee of her rights, her main guarantee is derived from the security
593 she gets from retaining membership in her father's family. After the
768 death of the father, the woman's claims extend to the households of her
brothers. She acquires in them the same rights she had in her father's
household, and the brothers take the responsibility of their father in
[428] protecting and defending their sister. The woman achieves this continu-
ation of support partially through forfeiting her rights of inheritance
to her brothers.

562 Awlad Ali recognize the right of the daughters to inherit in their
428 father's estate. They accept the system of inheritance specified in
[779] the Koraan which gives the woman half the share of her brother. In prac-
tice, this is usually side-stepped. Only sons inherit their father's
[233] property. The justification given for the non-inheritance of women is
[311] that the main items of inheritance in the Western Desert, livestock and
the right of land use, require certain protection and care which are be-
233 yond the culturally defined roles of women. Livestock require moving
562 from one grazing ground to another, almost always crossing tribal lands
428 belonging to various tribal segments, some of whom might be hostile.
It also requires the ability to protect the herds from predators and
from raids, especially in earlier times. Similarly, land requires prep-
aration and protection against trespassers, especially when the barley
is growing.

562 Women, however, are supposed to be compensated by their brothers
428
593 for their shares. But very few would actually ask their brothers for

562 such compensation. In forfeiting her rights of inheritance, a woman
428 secures for herself and her children the continuous support of her
593 kin-group and the protection of her rights. This support was denied
in the few cases I was able to collect in which the woman demanded her
share of inheritance. The following is one of these cases. The material
159 presented is a summary of the life history of Fatma, who at the time of
562 the study, was a shopkeeper managing the small general store she owned
428 593 near the railroad station of Burg el-Arab, some fifty miles west of
[444] Alexandria. She also practiced healing and midwifery on a part-time
[754] basis.

Fatma was the only daughter with four sons of sheikh El-Asi, who
at one time was the aqila of bait Hussein of the Sanagrah tribal segment
[627] in the area. He was also known as a mardi and was frequently sought in
[755] mediation of disputes. He was believed to have supernatural power which
he used to cure people for a certain amount of money. During his lifetime,
[454] he had acquired a sizable sum of money which he invested in livestock.
[233] At the time of his death his herd, which numbered more than 900
[422] sheep and goats, was considered the finest in the area. He had no barley
[423] lands because his camp was deep in the desert, but he had fine grazing
land.

Throughout the area the four sons were known for being arrogant and
irresponsible. Three of them were employed by one of the irrigation
projects carried on by the government in the area as construction
workers; the fourth looked after the herd of his father. All four were
known as chasers of women, and they frequently went to Alexandria to
visit prostitutes and drink liquor.

[444] Fatma was first married when she was eighteen to a man from
Alexandria who had opened a general store in the area where her father

159 lived. Five years ago the husband died in a mining accident leaving
562 428 Fatma with a ten-month-old boy. By that time, her father had been disabled,
593 and her brothers wanted to manage her husband's store on her behalf.
444 Knowing that her brothers were greedy, she refused and insisted
that she take care of the store herself. The brothers objected on the
grounds that it was not customary for a decent woman to be exposed to
the customers in the store. When she insisted, the brothers threatened
her. When the threats did not work, they beat her. After that, she
[625] went to the police station in the area, filed a complaint against her
brothers, and asked for police protection. The police officer in charge
brought the brothers in and warned them that if they interfered with the
store, not only would he arrest them, but he would also use his influence
to get them forced from the irrigation projects where three of them
worked. The threat worked, and they became friendly with their sister,
buying things for the store whenever they went to Alexandria and sometimes
helping in the store with her consent when she was on housecalls
159 as a midwife. A year later Fatma was married for the second time to a
562 distant cousin; a few months later her father died. In a family meeting
428 593 that followed the funeral, Fatma made her announcement that she was claiming
233 her share of her father's herd. The brothers were angry and tried to
[587] beat her. But the older members of the bait who were present at the meeting
stopped them and told them that Fatma had all the right to claim her
share of the inheritance according to Awlad Ali ways and that there was
[578] nothing that they could do about it. She was characterized in that
meeting as "bint haram" (illegitimate child), an insult used to refer
to those who show selfishness in their kinship obligations. When she
left the camp with her share of the herd, this seemed to have severed

159 the relationship between her and her brothers.
562
●428 Following her action and until the time of the study, they had
593 never visited her and she had never visited them. Her husband took
[233] care of the herd; and the arrangement worked out all right until the
159 husband told Fatma one day that he was going to marry a second wife.
562
593 She refused, but he went ahead with the marriage without her consent.
595 He brought the new wife to live with Fatma in the same tin hut in which
they were living. He started to pay more attention to the new wife and
to neglect Fatma; whenever the latter complained, he beat her. Then,
before one of the religious feasts, he sold two of Fatma's sheep and
bought his new wife a dress and a silver bracelet. When Fatma objected
[164] and they argued, he hit her with a stick on the head; she was hospital-
ized for a week with a serious head wound. While in the hospital, she
went to her brothers who lived only two miles away, but they refused to
159 come to her assistance. She then went to sheikh Elewa (the aqila of
562 Bait Asabei) and threw herself on him. He met with the husband and con-
594 vinced him to divorce Fatma. He kept forty sheep of Fatma's herd as com-
593
595 pensation for the mahr he had paid her and the marriage expenses, then
586 took his new wife and moved from Fatma's hut. Fatma then returned and
159 managed her financial affairs successfully herself. She managed the
562
444 store and hired a shepherd to take care of the sheep. At the time of
[233] the present study she was respected by almost everybody in the area, in-
cluding members of the local administration. She is known to be reason-
[629] able and of sound opinion, and her store functions as the meeting place
[521] for many of the tribal mi'ads and for casual conversations. She is also
considered as a liason between the tribal population in the area and the
local government administration, and is respected by both sides.

159 This apparently is not a typical case, nor is Fatma by any means
156 562 representative of a typical tribal women. It is a case of a marginal
woman who had revolted against the tribal definition of a female role.
[428] She violated the customary ways of her society and claimed her share of
[593] her father's inheritance; and by doing this, she forfeited her right to
[183] protection by her brothers. She was able to do this because of her mar-
[625] ginality which enabled her to draw upon sources of protection outside
the tribal pattern, the police. It is interesting to note here that by
doing so, she was not totally eliminated or ostracized from her society;
rather, her role was redefined as that of a man, and she was treated
as such.

682 and unjustifiable homicide. To examine responsibility in homicide
672 among Awlad Ali and their definition of "intentional" and "non-
673 intentional" killing, let us first present some of the cases collected from the area.

CASE #1: The Case of the Broken Rope

682 This is one of the classical cases which is told throughout
672 the entire area. There is some slight variation in the way it is
312 told, but all accounts refer to the fact that Hemeida from the
[184] 'Esheibat tribe inherited the right to use a large area of tribal
[428] land in which there was an old Roman well not used for a long period of time and which was full of sand. One day he invited the awaqil of his tribal segment, as well as his neighbors, to consult them on how to clear the well, since without it the land was almost useless. They all decided it was a good idea and offered their help. On the day the well was to be cleared, they all gathered around the well. Among those present was Do'ah, a poor member of the 'Esheibat tribe who worked as a paid shepherd for Hemeida. He was watching from a distance when Hemeida called upon him to give a hand. The well, like all Roman wells in the area, is about fifty feet deep and fifteen feet in diameter, and narrows as one goes down the well. To be cleared, someone has to be lowered by a rope to the bottom of the well to dig up the sand. Hemeida's cousin, Ali, agreed to go down, and the gathering looked for a sturdy rope which they found at one of Hemeida's neighbors. As the group was tying Ali to the rope, Hemeida suggested that Ali was too heavy for the rope and that it would be a good idea if a slimmer man did the job. At this point, everybody looked at Do'ah, since he was the thinnest

*795 opportunity to worship in a mosque, and that by charity to their
794 lodges they might earn recompense hereafter.

182 Each lodge had its Shaikh, who represented the Head of the
*795 Order. He arbitrated between the Bedouin, led the tribesmen
to holy war, acted as intermediary between the tribe or section
793 and the Turkish administration, dispensed hospitality to
travellers, supervised the collection of tithe, directed cultivation of grain and care of stock, dispatched surplus revenues to the Headquarters of the Order, acted as prayer-leader on Fridays, and assisted in preaching and teaching. There were
besides a number of other functionaries among the Brothers:
[794] the Shaikh's deputy, the *imam* to lead the daily prayers and to
teach the Koran and canon law, the *mu'allim* to teach reading, writing, and arithmetic in the zawiya school, and perhaps a special *muadhdhin* to call the faithful to prayer, though any of the Brothers could do that.

V

*795 In principle, as we have noted, the lands attached to lodges
793 belonged, like the lodges themselves, to the Order, and more
423 particularly to the lodge to which they were donated, and not
to any particular individual or family. In practice certain
*795 Shaikhly families tended to gain an hereditary interest in them.
What happened in the early days of the Order was that a Shaikh
793 was sent by its Head to found a lodge and when it was estab-
423 lished he was translated to a fresh missionary field. Shaikhs
428 of lodges were in this way moved fairly frequently at first, but
602 it later became the practice to leave a Shaikh in charge till his
death and then to nominate his successor from among his kinsmen, with the approval of the tribe and on the advice of Shaikhs of neighbouring lodges. What mostly seems to have happened was that the tribal sections concerned asked for a son or brother of the last Shaikh to be appointed director of their lodge and the Head of the Order confirmed their choice. As one Darsi tribesman put it: 'The Shaikh of our zawiya must be a man favoured by the hearts of the people.' In course of time the tendency for the Shaikhship of a lodge to be regarded as hereditary became very marked, it being understood that if there was a suitable candidate from the family already established in the lodge he would be appointed, a view with which the later Heads of the

Order concurred. Thus we find charge of a zawiya continuing 795*
in the hands of a single family to the point at which Muhammad 793
Yahiya bin al-Sanusi bin 'Umar al-Ashhab was appointed by 423
Sayyid Ahmad al-Sharif to succeed his father as Shaikh of Msus 428 •
at the age of sixteen. Some of these families sent their roots so 602
deep that not only did they obtain what amounted to hereditary
rights to a particular lodge, but controlled several lodges.
Such were the influential families of Ghumari, Kalili, Farkash,
and Ashhab, and the Khattabi families.

Hence we find to-day that many of the lodges are in hereditary charge of a family of Shaikhs who consider that they have a pre-emptive claim to its directorship and to enjoyment of its revenues, a claim backed by tribal opinion and by the acquiescence of the present Head of the Order. Thus the Dardafi family may be said to own the Shahhat lodge, the Isma'ili family to own the Fayidiya lodge, the 'Ammur family to own
the Qafanta lodge, and so on. So much is this the case that [578]
disputes now sometimes arise, as in 1942 at Qafanta and Mirad
Mas'ud, between members of a family about which of its members should succeed to the directorship of a lodge and control of its revenues.

This development is not surprising. Poor communications 795*
and the troubled times since 1911 have encouraged local autonomy 793
in the Sanusiya organization. The Shaikh of a lodge 428
brought up his family in it and his sons had no other home than
the lodge and no other friends than the Bedouin around it and
the families of Shaikhs in nearby lodges. Tribesmen dislike [178]
change and prefer to have for the Shaikhs of their lodges
members of families they know and who share their local
interests. But the tendency towards hereditary succession is 795*
also related to the fundamental lineage structure of the tribes 793
among whom the lodges are distributed, for it is noticeable that
whereas hereditary succession became customary in the Bedouin, 613
or tribal, lodges, it has been by comparison lacking in the urban 428
lodges of Banghazi and Darna and in those oases where tribal [369]
structure has become obscured by village life. This would seem to suggest that *Ikhwan* families tend the more easily to become stabilized as lines of hereditary Shaikhs the more closely they are associated with tribal structure. It is precisely in the most powerful, numerous, and integrated tribal sections that we

*795 find hereditary transmission of Shaikhship of lodges most
793 accentuated, such as the Bara'asa-Tamia section (al-Zawiya
613 al-Baida), the 'Awaqir-Sdaidi section (Msus zawiya), and the
428 'Abaidat-Ghaith section (Tart zawiya). In the same way the
[792] earlier Marabouts became, as has been noted, founders of
lineages which were on the pattern of the branches of the Bedouin clans among whom they lived, and attached to them.

*795 Also it must be remembered that the lodges were tribal
institutions built by the local Bedouin so that they might
778 participate in the *baraka* of Sayyid Muhammad bin 'Ali al-
793 Sanusi. They participated in it through the Shaikhs of their
619 zawiyas who received their *baraka* direct from the hands of the
182 Grand Sanusi himself, or from the hands of son Sayyid al-Mahdi, and passed it on to their sons. This *baraka* belonged to the tribe, or tribal section, which built a lodge just as the *shaukha*, the secular Shaikhship of the tribe, or tribal section, belonged to it and had to be kept in it. In both the continuity of family succession had to be maintained, unless there were good reasons for acting otherwise. Thus each tribal section emphasized its autonomy in its hereditary line of religious Shaikhs, through whom the *baraka* of the founder of the Order was transmitted to them, whilst proclaiming its membership of a tribal federation with common allegiance to the Head of the Order.

*795 As I have pointed out when speaking of the sacred *Marabtin*
793 tribes of Cyrenaica, it was customary for the descendants of a
778 Marabout to reside near his tomb. I have further mentioned
that the Shaikh of a Sanusiya lodge, who is also called a *Mara-*
[776] *bat* by the Bedouin, might, if he had during life a reputation for piety, rather easily gained in Islam, be venerated as a saint when he was dead and his tomb become a shrine. This is another reason why Shaikhly families have tended to become hereditary directors of lodges.

*795 Just as almost all the Marabouts of Cyrenaica were foreigners
793 from the west, so were almost all the Shaikhs of the Sanusiya
554 lodges. The Dardafi and Isma'ili families came from Tripoli-
tania, the Ghumari family from Morocco, the 'Ammur, Bu
[167] Jibali, and Khattab families came from Algeria, and so on. As a class they enjoyed, and still enjoy, a reputation for sanctity among the Bedouin on account of their knowledge of the Koran

173 Fusion of names appears in another context and for similar
178 reasons. Not only are lineal descendants given the name of de-
551 ceased ancestors, but a man may be given the name of any de-
613 ceased agnate of his tertiary section. Usually, this is only done
428 when a man passes on property to another who is not his direct
[553] heir. Commonly, this occurs when an agnate is also a mother's
brother, as often happens as a result of parallel cousin marriage,
and this mother's brother has no sons of his own. If he has a
sister's son, who is also his paternal nephew, he is likely to pass
on his wealth to this nephew. A father, the Bedouin insist, ought
[183] to perform three duties for his sons: attend to their circumcision,
[593] and their education in the Koran, and provide bride-wealth when
[852] they marry. All fathers attend to the circumcision of all their sons;
[871] few provide for the Koranic education of any of their sons; most
bear the burden of marrying off at least one of their sons. The
[583] performance of the latter duty is what makes the continuance
of the deceased's name an obligation, and whoever performs this
duty must have his name perpetuated in one male offspring of
the union which was brought about with his wealth. Wealth need
not take the form of bride-wealth; it can be a legacy willed by a
father, maternal uncle of the kind described above, or any other
agnate who has died without male issue. Conversely, if a man
dies without leaving any property, even his sons might not per-
petuate his name, and eventually it will drop out of the geneal-
ogy.[10] There are instances of men inheriting the wealth of a
number of agnates, using each parcel of wealth to make a new
marriage and naming the sons of the various unions after the
several dead who had left wealth. The example given below is
taken from the genealogy of the Dawwas section of the Ma-
gharba tribe. What happened here was that the two lines stem-
ming from Faraj and Sha'aban, after proliferating normally,
became extinct. As this happened, Ibrahim, the son of Miftah,
began to inherit wealth to which he was not a direct heir; and

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[588] [10] To avoid confusion, it ought to be made clear that this is not ghost marriage. As I understand ghost marriages from Evans-Pritchard's (1951) account, two main conditions must be satisfied: (i) that there should be inherited wealth to make a marriage, and (ii) that the wealth remaining after the ghost marriage has been made is inherited by the ghost children only. In Cyrenaica, wealth thus inherited becomes part of a man's total wealth and is not reserved for a ghost marriage and its issue.

as he did so, he entered into a plurality of marriages, begat sons, 173
and replaced those men in the genealogy who had died without 178
heirs. In the following generation the twin process of death and 551
replacement continued. Death removed all the male descendants 613
of Sha'aban and Faraj, and of Ibrahim Bu Miftah's many sons 428 •
only two, Sharif and Abdallah, were of age to marry at the time of my visits to their camp. Both had enjoyed a plurality of wives, although still young to have done so, and each marriage they contracted took place after the death of one of their kinsmen. The full and intricate details of this interesting genealogy are irrelevant here, since all the example is intended to show is how nine of eleven male names were perpetuated in the genealogy by repeating five of them twice and four of them three times, accounting in all for twenty-two names; and to do this, three men (one of them had died, but the other two were both under forty years of age) married eight wives. All the names in the two lines which have died out have not yet been brought back into the genealogy, but 'Abdallah, the son of Ibrahim, who had already done extremely well in this respect, was confident that soon the obligations towards Musa, Abd al-Rahim, and Sa'ad would be redeemed.

Thus the fusion of names not only ensures that names threatened with extinction are perpetuated, but that one person, in the name he bears, can carry the genealogical burden of several other men of that name.

[601]


SA'AID
MIFTAH
SHA'ABAN
FARAJ
IBRAHIM
IBRAHIM
SALIM
SA'AID
BU GHAWIYA
SHA'ABAN
'ABD AL RAHIM
MIFTAH
MUSA
SA'AD
FATALLAH
SHARIF
'ABDALLAH
MIFTAH
SALIM
ZAIDAN
SA'AD
SALAH
SHA'ABAN
SULAIMAN
MUHAMMAD
IBRAHIM
HAMAD
SA'AID
BU GHAWIYA
FARAJ
GHAITH
SALAH

FIG. 18-2 GENEALOGY 2. The names of dead men are underlined.

613 his maternal kinsmen to use the land and water facilities of
578 his lineage; his agnates may give ready consent or bicker about
602 it, but when it becomes necessary to clean a well, disputes are
almost certain to break out in the camp between those who argue
that their maternal relatives should not be expected to assist in
its cleaning and those who insist they should as an acknowledgement
of the use they have made of it. In these circumstances
613 maternal links divide agnates. Conversely, if it becomes neces-
602 sary for some of the same men to use the water and ploughland
of their maternal kin, their agnates are only too pleased that
they are able to do so, because the pressure on their own resources
is relieved. In these circumstances, the maternal link
strengthens the agnatic group. When, to give another instance,
613 blood-money has to be gathered, it is the duty of all agnates to
682 contribute equally, and no member of the group, rich or poor,
can contract out of this obligation without sacrificing his membership
of the group. Payments of blood-money are witness of
the strength of the notion of 'oneness' among agnates, in one
sense, but in so far as they are compulsory, they point also to the
weakness in the relationship. Maternal kin are not directly concerned
in this, but they can and do make contributions. In this
context two aspects of agnation appear, and the value of the
602 maternal link is emphasized. Again, maternal kinsmen are not
428 directly concerned in inheritance disputes, but they are expected
578 to intercede for their sister's sons, who often use their mother's
brother's tribal brand on their own animals. During disputes of
this kind, blame is thrown on to the maternal kinsmen for their
interference in matters which, properly speaking, are not their
613 business. In marriage, however, events take quite a different
582 turn. The responsibility for providing a man with a wife is first
that of the father, and secondly of the members of the tertiary
section; the father takes the initiative, and his agnates assist, not
only in the negotiations, but also in defraying the heavy costs of
the wedding festivities, the various gifts that precede it, and the
604 bride-wealth which follows. The mother's brother is also a key
613 person in all these arrangements. He enters into the negotiations,
585 assists with the entertainment on the wedding day, and makes a
(583) substantial contribution to the bride-wealth. On the wedding day,
there is no kinsman to compare with the mother's brother; a few

593 tegral part of "the one body"; events which affect a man in this context lie
613 outside a father's field of jurisdiction. The political authority vested in a
corporation acts to circumscribe the authority of persons in other fields.

Other rights stem from political membership. As a person with a defined
position in a lineage corporation, a man has the right to use the
natural resources of its territory. His father, although he instructs his son
where to plough and when to water the animals, cannot deny him access
to wells, pastures and ploughland. Economically, a son is independent to this
extent, although his ability to exploit his right to the natural resources is
restricted by his father's control of animals. Ultimately, however, this restriction
cannot amount to stultification, because a man has the right to
613 demand food. In practice, a poor man staves off hunger with donations from
422 this or that individual, and superficially it appears that he is dependent on
735 the personal charity of his fellowmen. This is not so, for what is implicit is
that the parcels of wealth controlled by individuals are the possessions of
the corporation. It is not accidental that poor people do not go hungry.
During my entire stay among the Bedouin I never saw one of them beg or
[556] suffer hunger, however marginal the diet of many. Clearly, those with a
surplus can and do use it for personal advantage, but the extent to which
they can do so is circumscribed by the legal claims which members of a
corporation have on the parcels of moveable property held by each of them.

613 Control over the wealth, whether it be animals or the procreative functions
421 of women, rests, in the final analysis, in a corporation. Inheritance laws
428 specify that women are not legal heirs,[a] and that all male children are
[562] equal heirs. Women do, in fact, come to control property, and it is rare that
wealth is equally divided among male heirs. The precise details of inheritance
[593] may partly be decided by a father, but he is limited in his actions. Most
of the time inheritance disputes are not of the kind which require action by
the corporate group; a case which occured while I was resident with the
Bedouin did, however, invoke immediate action. A man, who had left the
desert to live in a village on the plateau, had only one daughter. He made
it known that he intended to will his entire property to his daughter. When
the news was brought to the camps of his fellow agnates, there was great
consternation, because, as became clear in their lengthy discussions, the
threat now existed that a substantial parcel of property would be removed
from the group, a threat made real by the proposed marriage of the daughter
[584] to a man of another tribe. The court would have to recognise the daughter's
right to some of the property, and the members of the group reluctantly had
to concede that there was little they could do about this, but they had one
[593] action left to them — they decided that her nearest agnate should demand
[584] her in marriage. Usually, the choice of husband for a daughter is a decision

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[771] [a] The Bedouin are Sunni Muslims, and, as Samusi, belong to the Maliki school in
[795] legal matters. According to court law, women are heirs. However, actual Bedouin
[671] practice is contrary to law. For, if women were permitted to inherit, since many marry
outside the corporation into which they were born, they could alienate its resources.

613

her father takes, but in certain critical situations he can be relieved of choice 593
if the interests of the group as a whole are at stake. [421]

Political authority is the preserve of a corporation, and its exercise leads [428]
to invasion of a man's authority in the field of domestic relations. This [584]
does not mean, however, that discrete areas of authority do not remain with
the father. In the tent his authority over his son is so overwhelming as to
keep the son in almost complete subordination. The son is referred to as a
slave, and in daily life he has to behave as one. He must obey every command,
for, were he to rebel, he would find little or no support among his
agnates, whatever the extent of the provocation. Retreat from his father is
hardly an alternative, since, while his father is alive, he has no animals of [422]
his own, and to leave camp would only mean that he would have to move
outside his group to seek employment elsewhere as a shepherd. If he did [558]
this he would forfeit status, and almost certainly cut himself off from property [428]
which would fall to him after his father's death. A man who "denies"
his father looses too many privileges for the practice to become widespread.

Caught in this dilemma, a son's predicament is worsened by the fact that 593
he cannot initiate marriage negotiations — to be able to do so requires some 584
animals to offer a girl's father. Through his mother's brother he has the [431]
means of bringing pressure to bear on his father, but the latter can resist for [604]
years. Finally, a marriage is arranged for him. It is difficult to convey the 581
yearning of young Bedouin for marriage. They discuss it among themselves 521
ad nauseam. For the most part their talk is about the sexual aspect of marriage. 831
Premarital sex relations are strictly controlled, and the movements 836
of each young girl are carefully guarded because, if on the day of her marriage
the test shows that she is not a virgin, she not only brings disgrace to [585]
her family, but the marriage may be revoked and her worth as a bride for
another man seriously diminished. Nevertheless premarital relations do [837]
occur, if not between youths and maidens to any extent, between young
men and married women.

The question still remains: why is marriage the occasion of such ebullient 581
celebration? The formal authority a father exercises over his son 593
changes little on marriage. Economically the son is still harnessed to the
father. The latter still shouts his orders at him, and obedience remains
unaltered. Any sign of an independent view on a matter is met with a gruff
rebuff. If the marriage turns out to be disagreeable to the father, he has
the authority — if not always the power — to break it. Marriage does not
mean a change in the general mode of behaviour between the two; the legal
relations remain unaltered, albeit modified in practice, as the married son
matures in age. But marriage does mean the acquisition of rights and status
previously denied a son. Henceforward, he has a domain of his own. This
is high drama, indeed, for although every effort is made to give substance to [554]
the expressed view that "nothing has happened," for the first time in his
life the son has seized publicly, amid the jubilations of his fellows, a status
which hitherto was the possession of the father.

582 of agnation on the members of a corporate group and give it a taproot of
583 diversity whence it derives its strength, and which makes of it "the one body,"
613 conspicuous, in comparison with other societies, as the corporate group
602 *par excellence*.

The Sister's Son-Mother's Brother Relationship

128 Previously the mode of relationships associated with agnation and affinity have been briefly discussed. In order to appreciate the effects of parallel-cousin marriage, some remarks concerning the sister's son-mother's brother
604 set of relationships must be included here. Bedouin contrast the mother's
[174] brother with the father's brother; their sayings and proverbs afford a
wealth of verbal documentation on the contrast. With the mother's brother a man enjoys all the freedoms he is denied in his relationships with his father
[831] and father's brother. He is permitted to joke with him; they indulge in
exchanges of obscenities. When the sister's son wishes to marry, he is permitted to discuss the matter with his mother's brother and can urge him to intercede with his father on his behalf. Two men thus related are readily recognised in the camps, because in their acts they are required to show affection by displays of innocent horseplay, pranks or mild practical jokes. Small boys pursue their mother's brother, feign to kick or strike him, and he takes it all in good part.

The external aspects of this behaviour is deceptive. Joking of this sort creates the image in which the relationships are conceived; what is equally striking in it is its compulsiveness. Obviously, mature men are not always in the mood to be teased, but if they are, they must respond appropriately. Their relationships are unmistakably onerous. This remark applies not only to the external forms of their behaviour, but also to the favours a man is
[602] permitted to ask of his mother's brother. A brief amplification will make
the point clear. Demands can be made of agnates, but only in situations of serious contingency. Day-to-day needs are met, not by appeals to the rights of agnation, but from the expectations linked to the mother's brother. If these expectations are withheld, the sister's son may be left in a quandary. In-
604 terestingly, in the records of homicides I gathered, three (in the con-
682 temporary population) were concerned with the killings of mother's brothers by sister's sons. Homicide within this field of relationship is difficult to comprehend unless it is appreciated that expectations are as compulsive in the daily life and the general well-being of people as are the rights and duties associated with agnation.

604 These general remarks apply to the relationships irrespective of the lineage
613 origin of the mother's brother. The similarity ends there, since the nature of the expectations, their urgency at any given moment and the kind of favours which are granted vary with the group identity of the mother's
• [428] brother. A mother's brother who is a member of ego's corporate group may be
expected to give the sister's son small quantities of flour, favour him in all

sorts of petty ways, listen to his grumbles about his agnates, interfere on his 604
behalf in petty camp quarrels, shield him from the disciplinarian father and 613
guard his property interests against the predatory father's brother; if the 428
mother's brother dies without heirs, the sister's son can reasonably expect at least a share of his wealth. When the mother's brother is a member of a different corporate group, a sister's son cannot possibly expect to inherit from him in any circumstance.

The mother's brother may reside in a camp too distant to be much effective 604
direct help in day-to-day living. His relative remoteness gives the relation- 591
ship other possible opportunities, however. Rainfall in the semi-desert area 312
of Cyrenaica is highly variable, both from year to year, and from place to 233
place in any given year. As a result this shallow saucer of a depression may 241
have sufficient rain to supply both the water needs of animals and crops, while an area a few miles distant will have inadequate water supplies for either. The mother's brother-sister's son link can mean water for animals and a crop of barley for both when, in successive years, the resources of one area or the other are inadequate.

The differences in the relations between men and their mother's brother 604
do not end with a characterisation of their antipodal forms. The demographic structure of a group may be such that one man may have a number of mother's brothers, another only one; one man may have to share with
several brothers, another may be an only son. Complications of this sort de- [613]
termine the precise relationships between men, but however intricate these may be, each corporate group has its matrilateral links with a group occupying a slightly different ecological area, and it also has a plurality of matri-
lateral connections within it. Further, if a direct connection is not available [603]
to any particular individual he can use an indirect link (e.g. father's mother's brother or mother's mother's brother) to satisfy his needs.

The Preference for Males

Thus far, the family and the social matrix in which it is embedded has 128
been discussed in general terms, most particularly in reference to several selected sets of relationships. I wish now to place these relationships in a more specific setting with a brief discussion of the composition of a small
camp of a group inhabiting the arid areas of central Cyrenaica. When the 829
Bedouin give their views on the structure of the family in Cyrenaica they
speak of it as consisting of a pair of spouses and about ten children, mainly 594
males. The emphasis on males is not mere sentiment, overwhelmingly though 562
it favours them against females. Additional males in a family increase the 858
productive possibilities of a family in the sense that more herdsmen become available and larger ploughing commitments can be undertaken; an increase in the number of females has small effect on production since they are precluded from any direct participation in these activities. Both sexes, ranging in age from about seven years to mature adulthood, are necessary if a family

would be impossible to satisfy all marriage expectations of men within the 621
universe of the minimal tribal section. For this reason alone external links 613
are inevitable and persistent. Also, the small territorial strip such a group 582
claims as a homeland produces an economy which, in this environment, 182
is unstable. Additional security is gained by making connections with other [423]
tribal sections, each with its specific ecological character. Men also marry [433]
into their client groups. The proportion of these for this camp was 9 per cent [619]
of the total. From these links they gain economic advantages, they can
claim services and a client-following is politically significant. Finally, 7
per cent of the total[13] are marriages with women of other tribes, which
again not only reduces the instability of the economy (in that a large tribal
area suffering near-famine conditions has access to areas of markedly different
ecology), but also provides political connections for men whose power
ambitions have passed the point of leadership limited to their own tribes. In
one way or another all these interests are manifest in the small camp and
attention is now directed to the latter.

The disposition of people in the camp is represented diagrammatically 621
on the page following. 592

The nucleus of the camp is Tent A. Its owner (1) was a powerful *Shaikh,* [554]
the son of a famous father. His marriage represents a political link with a [619]
group of one of the primary sections of his own tribe. His father died only a [428]
few years before I recorded my census, and the large amount of moveable
property he left had still not been divided among the sons; the owner of the
tent, as eldest brother, still controlled the flocks and herds. Most of his time
he spent away from the camp engaging in political intrigue. His two younger
brothers lived in his tent, but the second (5) would not remain there long
because negotiations for his marriage had been started. His father (2) married [582]
a parallel cousin; she died and shortly afterwards he took her sister (3) [587]
in sororal union. When this occurred an amount of bride-wealth was
agreed, but instead of giving any of it to her father, the entire amount was [583]
"put in front of her" (that is, the animals were allowed to remain with her
husband's flock), and these animals she had marked with her brother's
tribal sign to distinguish them from those of her husband. It was widely [428]
known that she was going to leave these animals to her husband's second [562]
son, for although she could not transfer them to a male outside her husband's
corporate group, she could decide who, among his heirs, should inherit.

During my stay in this camp, her brother's son (4) came to it as a 621
temporary resident for a month. Since he was poor, the purpose of his visit 592
was to capture some of his aunt's wealth while she was still alive and the 574
possibility still existed. During his stay he was fed well but did no work. [604]
His kinsmen found his company tiresome, so, to cut short his stay, and after [431]
consulting her nominated heir (5), she gave him three grown goats. Also
when an occasion arose for an animal slaughter, she provided the sheep, and, [231]

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[13] The remainder is made up of marriages to the daughters of men incorporated into the lineages.

the lavish generosity dispensed by the members of Tent A, and fed far better than would have been possible otherwise. 621 592 571

The location of Tent C was also determined by a link through women. [574] The only female (8) living in this tent, a middle-aged widow, was the sister of (3) and (6) of Tents A and B respectively. Her teenage son lived with her. They possessed only a few sheep, which were put with the flock of Tent A for shepherding. The son (9) spent some of his time herding for Tent A. With the mother and her son in Tent C were two other kinsmen. One, a poor man (10), was this son's first patrilateral cousin, and they both were the only surviving sons of their respective fathers. He (10) was the main shepherd of Tent A. The third male (11), also poor and nearly blind, was a second patrilateral cousin of both, but his sister was also 11's mother. All occupants of Tent C were almost entirely supported by Tent A. Relieved of the necessity to live off their own resources, the two young men (9 and 10) were afforded the opportunity of building up their flocks for the day when they would be able to negotiate their delayed marriages.

Tents A, B and C sheltered men who were agnatically closely linked. More important, their grandfathers, three sons in a family of 19 children, were full brothers. The latter's mother's name was used when referring to these three tents as a group. During the past few years, many changes have occurred within it, and the death of the pivotal woman (3) of Tent A might well disperse this small cluster. Further, the nuptials of her heir (5) were anticipated, and this event, itself likely to precipitate division of his father's (2) wealth, might also lead to further residential rearrangements. 621 613 592 571

The owner of Tent D, (12), a man in his late thirties, son of a slave mother, was at loggerheads with his father's brother, much more senior in age. The owner's father, one of a family of 24 children, had been a wealthy man and died leaving a substantial herd and a large flock, but he (12) was bereft of most of this wealth by the father's brother. His first successful strike against his uncle was the demand he made for his daughter as a wife. Earlier, when (12) had demanded his father's wealth, his father's brother, who had for years acted as his guardian, replied, "It is in your stomach," (meaning that it had been expended on his upbringing). Later, after the marriage had taken place, when the uncle demanded payment of the bride-wealth his own words were thrown back at him, but this time with the meaning that the bride-wealth had already been paid. While I was resident in this area, the two men met occasionally: each meeting was hostile, for (12) was encouraging his half-brother (13) (also the son of a slave mother) to demand a second daughter as a wife. Included in this tent is a third adult male (14), virtually a pauper, reduced to this state by the same grasping father's brother. His link with (12) was their closeness of relationship (first paternal cousin), together with the fact that all three males (12, 13 and 14) had suffered privations and were allies against the common enemy, their father's brother. 621 592 604 578 [582] [428] • [583] [571]

Associated with them for the same reason, was the owner of Tent E (15).

621 Genealogically he was their father's brother, but he was of their same age
592 generation, and behaved as if he was their agnatic equal. Towards his own
578 brother (16), he behaved as if the latter was his uncle, for he was much his
[604] junior in age and his uncle had virtually brought him up from boyhood.
• [428] They had quarrelled bitterly because his brother (16) had given him only
a fraction of his inheritance, which he himself, in turn, should have
[593] shared with his young full brother (not shown on the diagram) but he did
not do so. This youngest brother left (15) for this reason and now resides
621 with (16), his full brother's enemy. Two of the men (14 and 13) of this
592 group of four were the chief herdsmen of the camp, although they were
[233] assisted for short periods by (12) and (15), who also helped tend the
camels in other ways. Their connection with the group centered on Tent
[571] A was a mutual close link to a politically powerful person (not shown on the
genealogies) to whom they are deeply loyal and who, while I was among
them, was actively opposed to the common political enemy of them all (16),
and who in earlier years had challenged the leadership of (2) of Tent A.
[613] There is also the fact that they were all linked within a close range of
agnation. This linkage included, too, the owner of Tent F (17), not in
[602] fact the descendant of the man shown in the diagram — he was the son of
a slave wife; his genitor was a slave, but his mother's master reared him,
freed him and he is now given as his son in the genealogy. He lives with his
wife, of client origin, together with her children from a previous husband,
(18), who divorced her, and his own children. Aging, he no longer acted
as a regular herdsmen, but relieved other men in the camp, and also spent
some time shepherding.

621 The details given of the strands which run through the camp to tie these
571 particular people together are so few that, like the Bedouin plough, they do
no more than scratch the surface, but they are sufficient to permit a few
general statements. The camp, and particularly the precise disposition of
621 its tents, shows a group of males clustered together to share two of the main
571 economic tasks: shepherding and herding. The physically strong adult males
233 of Tents D and E shoulder the burden of herding all the camels of the camp,
462 and the men of Tents B, A and C shepherd all the sheep, with (17) of
Tent F serving both purposes. This number of men allows some to remain
in the camp at all times, to free one of them for a journey to the distant
market when supplies of sugar and tea are necessary, and to enable one or
two men, at short notice, to hurry away on horse or camel to search for
lost animals.[14]

621 Economic Determinants of the General Structure of the Camp

574 It is also clear from these details that, given the disparities in wealth
231 (although all men have some wealth), the diet of most is considerably
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433 [14] There is little point in seeking the lost animals themselves in the first instance.
A man travels from camp to camp asking for information, and when he has gathered
[556] his clues, he searches a neighbourhood.

581 are necessary for the validation of the marriage contract. Modern
585 671 legal systems which took as their basis the Islamic law of marriage
675 and the family further required the registration of the marriage con-
tract for the marriage to be legal.

584 The request and necessary response forming the marriage are sup-
585 posed to be carried on by the parties involved. However, if either the
429 groom or the bride is not of age, or is mentally unqualified, the trans-
593 action is carried on by his or her guardian, or "wakil." The wakil is
the father, unless he is dead or an invalid, in which case the brothers
[604] become the wakils. If the person has no brothers, then the uncles be-
[184] come the wakil in the order stated. According to certain Sunni sects
in Islam, a woman marrying for the first time is always represented by
her wakil, even if she is of age. The assumption is that a woman who
has never been married does not have the experience that enables her to
enter into any kind of legally binding relationship such as marriage.

585 Following the original Islamic idea, marriage among Awlad Ali is
675 an oral agreement between the groom or his father and the guardian
593 429 (wakil) of the bride-to-be (her father, if alive, or her closest male
[604] kin in the following order: her brothers, her uncles, her grandfather).
585 A religious man is sometimes asked to perform the marriage, although it
792 is not required. Some persons might invite a member of the Murabiteen
[619] tribe or holy men to witness the marriage on the basis that his presence
[778] gives "baraka," or blessing, to the marriage. Before the application of
585 the State legal system to the area, marriage contracts were not regis-
656 177 tered. In recent years, however, and with the increased mobility of
[675] the tribal populations, more and more marriages are being registered in
[634] the administrative districts. Still, according to the unofficial estimates,

593 595 cooperation between the wives in household activities difficult. The
584 wives have to have reasonable grounds for their objection to the new
[431] bride. But even then, the husband could still marry the woman of his
choice, although in this case he has to bring gifts to the other wives
as "nasafa," or making-up present.

584 If the family has no objections to the marriage, the proceedings
593 start. The initial proceedings are undertaken by the women on both
sides. The groom's mother or a female relative of his mother's generation
or older visits the mother of the prospective bride and tells her
of her son's intention to marry the latter's daughter. The bride's
mother then discusses the matter with the girl's father who has the
[429] final say in the matter. If the father is dead, then the authority on
giving the girl in marriage goes to her brother or closest male kin in
the order specified before. The girl has no say in the matter of marriage
and cannot refuse to complete the marriage, although after marriage
she can resort to a certain practice which helps her to terminate the
marriage without the consent of her guardian, as will be seen later in
584 the chapter. From this moment until the conclusion of the marriage
[583] negotiations are done by the men of both families. The first thing to
be discussed is the amount of bridewealth, a "mahr." If the two families
agree on the marriage, a small ceremony is held. This ceremony is called
[779] "el-fatha" in reference to reading the first "sura" of the Koraan known
as el-fatha, or "the beginning." The ceremony includes members of the
[675] two families and very few friends. After the fatha is read, the agreement
is achieved. This is considered as an engagement and means that the girl
is spoken for and therefore no other man can ask to marry her.

To break the fatha agreement, the father of the prospective bride

593 went to see Muftah and his company. Half an hour later the religious
574 man came and took Hemeida aside and talked to him in a very low voice,
606
586 then left the tent again. A few minutes more had passed; everyone re-
627 turned to the tent; Muftah was not angry anymore. The religious man
792 read the fatha, or the beginning sura of the Koraan, then said that the
[779] souls were now pure and that Hemeida was considered as a son of Muftah
and that disagreements such as this should not alter the good relations
between the two. He said that the devil had found his way into the souls
of the two people, but now, thanks to God and the good people present,
they both had come back to their senses. Hemeida then rose and went to
where his father-in-law was sitting and shook hands with him. Then he
[681] handed the religious man ten pounds which the latter passed to Muftah
and promised to send him a goat as a gift to his daughter. Muftah left
the tent and went to the tent of the women. When he came back he announced
that a goat had been slaughtered and that everyone was invited to eat.
Everybody then left and Muftah promised to return his daughter to her
husband the following day.

593 While the right of the father to take his daughter away from her
606 husband constitutes a check on the authority of the latter and insures
557 the wife good treatment by her husband and her in-laws, not infrequently
586 that right has been invoked for personal or individual interest on the
part of the woman's father or her closest male kin. Several cases have
[429] been cited in the area where the father or guardian had invoked the right
to force the husband to concede to certain demands of the wife's guardian,
even when the wife objected to those demands or disagreed with her guardian. One of these is the case of Mabroka who is married to a distant

586 562 who forced her to marry the husband, or if she was cut off from the
593 family for some reason or another.

From the frequency of women using this right in the area, it
586 562 seems that no social disapproval is associated with it, nor is there
574 a social stigma attached to women who throw themselves. They seem to
626 find it as easy to find a husband as those women divorced voluntarily
by their husbands or with the help of their fathers. In fact, as was
586 562 mentioned earlier, many of them marry the rich men over whom they
587 throw themselves. As to the amount of mahr paid for their subsequent
[583] marriages, the fact of throwing themselves does not seem to be a factor
[574] in determining the amount of mahr paid. In one of the cases, the woman
threw herself on an 'aqila of one of the Geneishat tribe after her
father refused to help her get a divorce from her husband who had married a second wife without first asking the first wife's permission.
[429] When the Geneishat member succeeded in convincing the husband to divorce his wife, the latter had no place to stay so remained in the
house of her protector who acted as her guardian in place of her father
[583] who had refused to take her back in his home. While staying in the
house of her protector, she got many marriage offers; one of the suitors
offered a mahr of L.E. 4,000 ($10,000), one of the highest mahrs reported in the area. She agreed, and the marriage was affected. This
mahr is about ten times the mahr she got for her first marriage. This
586 562 procedure offers the woman a considerable guarantee of her marital
rights. It also gives her, as far as the ability to dissolve the marriage, a status close to that of her husband. This relative equality
is reflected is reflected in the lack of stigma associated with divorced

121 kill within this range is, in terms of the general pattern of behaviour, stupid. What is of
613 interest is that such killings do occur. I recorded three instances of men killing the
682 mother's brother in the contemporary population, not to mention many others
674 based on hearsay evidence only. Clearly, the relationship is more than a merely per-
829 missive one. The mother's brother may well be the only person who can help in
certain crises, and if he withholds his assistance the sister's son is left in a dilemma.
604 The form of behaviour in which demands are made is, as the Bedouin rightly say,
121 that of asking a favour, but this does not mean that it is any the less urgent than a
613 demand made against agnates. The range of favours is large, and only a few can be
604 detailed here. If a group has insufficient water to meet its needs a man first seeks help
from his mother's brother. The request has a number of aspects to it: it is a test of
[554] the relationship itself; it is a matter of pride and status that a man can 'call' on
another to help his group out of difficulties, it is an assurance that resources other than
those jealously guarded by his agnates are available to him, and if a man is seeking
to increase his power he must have available more than an agnate's share of local
[682] water resources to supply his flocks and herds. When a blood-money payment has to
be made, the mother's brother is expected to come forward—it is his right to give
[584] without being asked. If a man wants a wife, he is not permitted to approach his father
directly, but his mother's brother can put pressure on the father instead. If a man dies
● [429] while his eldest son is still a minor, his brother may be required to act as guardian,
and in this role he controls the son's property; disputes frequently break out as a
result, with the son at a considerable disadvantage, for he cannot engage his father's
brother in hostilities—but his mother's brother can do so for him. Whenever men
[422] come to possess animals before the demise of their fathers or when the father's
brother is acting as guardian they mark them with the tribal and personal signs of their
[583] mothers' brothers. Men have the right to demand contributions for bridewealth
from their agnates if they lack wealth; in practice it comes not from them, but from
the mother's brother. Finally, in certain circumstances, if a man does not have male
heirs, his sister's son might inherit all his wealth.

121 Affinity also carries with it a large number of rights. A poor man may take up
613 residence in the camp of his father-in-law, and be kept by him. The latter may come
to his son-in-law's aid in many of his dealings with his father. Like the mother's
606 brother, the affine is a potential source of water-supply when rain has been insufficient
on the homeland. He also helps with blood money and bridewealth, and he is expected
to aid his daughter and her husband with gifts of food and wool.

121 The details given above by no means exhaust the list of rights a man possesses in
613 his matrilateral and affinal relatives. Obviously, these are not the only forms of
relationship either, and the other forms carry with them yet other claims of various
sorts. Enough detail has been given, however, to make clear the point that local
agnatic groups are so differentiated, and inter-group relationships are so important,
that each aspect of homicide settlement previously described will require further
examination, not in the sense that additional complications must be introduced, but
with the question in mind, is not the structural presentation false? Before beginning
this stage of the argument it is necessary to establish the fact that the links of affinity
and matrilaterality which a group has with another are of a kind which necessitate
their inclusion in an analysis of the arrangements for settling homicides.

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I am 45 years old and my eldest brother is 53 years old. I have two younger brothers. When my father died, we four sons inherited the property of our father jointly. I told my older brother to divide the land the way in which he wanted . . . My father had divided his land into four parts before he died. Each part was a separate "farm" so that a son could raise barley or olives, as he liked . . . But my brother told me to make the decision. As it turned out, my youngest brother was the first to make his choice of the four parts. He took his land but we still kept all of our sheep together. One year later, my older brother took his share of the land, but Jabril (the next to the youngest brother) and I remained together, and still remain together. Some men want to be on their own and others do not. Our eldest brother was the first to separate his animals from the collective herd . . . When the decisions were made to divide the land between us, we got the local "holy man" to go around the area with us and to witness the boundaries. This is done so that later if a brother changes his mind, or wants to take different land, the true borders will be known. We recorded them on paper and the "holy man" knows them . . . In matters of inheritance, all sons get equal shares, but in a case where there are ten camels and three sons, then, each gets three camels and the tenth goes to the eldest brother.

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[431]
[583]
Any property which a female may own, if it is land or livestock, will go to her sons upon her death. In al-Qasr, such property will usually be sheep which a woman may accumulate through gift-giving. In one case, which is unique in al-Qasr, a woman received thirteen camels from her husband at the time of her wedding. (This was not the brideprice, for that goes to the bride's father.) At the time of her death her camels numbered seventy, and they were divided equally among her five sons. Concerning lesser items, such as clothing and jewelry, and also chickens, these are

593 In al-Qasr it is a rare sight to see a father and his young son together, and it is only slightly more common to see the father with the grown son. The second case may simply be a reflection of the division of labor since the son, once grown, takes over the economic tasks of his father.

593 The most important duties of a father toward his
867 son are three: he must teach him generosity, courage and
584 courtesy; he must see that the boy learns the Quran; and he
872 must arrange a good marriage for his son. According to
593 Peters (1960:34), the Cyrenaican Bedouin father must attend
852 to three things for his son, namely: his circumcision, his
[872]
[583] education in the Quran, and his bridewealth when he marries.
In al-Qasr, the Egyptian school teachers have succeeded in
[177] showing the Bedouin that circumcision is a private family
593 affair and not a public ritual. Although all fathers still
852 see to it that their sons are circumcised, the father is no
178 longer responsible for "making a circumcision party." In
[626] fact, the father who does insist on following the old ways
[431] by hiring a dancer and publicly marking his son's rite de passage, will be ridiculed as one "who only wants to make money from the ritual gift (naquut) given the boy."

593 The son recognizes the rights which the father has over him through a show of respect and obedience. A boy shows deference toward his father by not smoking, singing, or reciting poetry of any kind in his presence. During the

593 was with his brother and not his brother's sons. When the
father persisted with his intention to embarrass his nephews,
his sons, as a last alternative, threatened to leave him.
In the face of this threat, the father capitulated.

The rights and duties of the father-son relationship,
although they do not change in sentiment, will change in
content during the lifetime of the father. The main change
[421] in content will be a reflection of a change in property re-
593 lations. The Bedouin believe that this is the way it ought
577 to be; they say that

> A son must respect and obey his father. The son must do anything that he can to help and please his father. When the son grows up and begins to earn money, he must contribute generously to his father. A son pleases his father by giving him money and helping him to be comfortable.

593 In boyhood and manhood, the father has disposal over his son's
596 labor. As long as a son lives in his father's naja' this is
[464] so. One son, who worked for an American oil company in the
desert, regularly turned over his pay check to his father.
It is the father who decides where the son will live, and,
whether or not he will have his own domicile away from the
main naja'. When the son marries and brings his wife to the
[591] naja', he will usually set up his tent next to his father's
tent. The tent is given to the boy by his father. During
593 431 the son's growing-up period, he will be given, as gifts on
various occasions, a sheep or a number of sheep which will
be kept with the father's flock.

593 not considered bad for a man to beat his wife." In the case
593 of ill-treatment by the husband, her father may take the
*613 matter to the corporate head. Traditionally, the corporate
[792] head would order the husband to move his tent next to the
tend of the "holy man" or some other third party, so that
he would be dissuaded against such behavior. Another reason
[586] for this is so that the girl might have witnesses to support
her petition for divorce should the husband continue to beat
her. I heard of no wife-beating while I was in al-Qasr.

595 The Quran states that a man may lawfully take four
[779] wives, but that if he feels he cannot treat each of them
equally, he should take only one (Sura IV:3 and 129). The
Bedouins are conscientious in practicing this rule, though
595 perhaps not for religious reasons. If a man has more than
593 one wife, he must spend an equal amount of time with each.
Conflict between co-wives is lessened by the fact that a man
will have separate tents, or rooms in the case of a house,
for each wife. A man will not buy a dress or a piece of jewelry
for one wife without buying a copy of it for all other wives.
595 On a trip to the Siwa Oasis, I was accompanied by a man who
593 had three wives and wished to bring them a gift of basketry
114 upon his return. He was successful in buying two baskets
which were similar but could not find a comparable third in
● [431] the oasis market. In dismay, he made a gift of the baskets
to me and returned with no souvenirs at all. One of my in-

585 178 Only one of the three weddings was conducted in the
traditional way with three nights of dancing previous to the
wedding and a large feast on the wedding day. The Bedouin
say that a man can no longer afford to do things the old way.
584 The procedure of the marriage arrangement begins when the boy
informs his uncle that he wishes to marry. Then the uncle,
[583] the father and other males of the group meet with the father
of the prospective bride to arrange the marriage, an important
part of which is the establishment of the brideprice (*hulwaan*
or *mahr*). Before going to see the girl's father, the boy's
584 *613 father consults with his secondary lineage group, as I have
already mentioned. Then he should wait for a period of
seven days, for the girl's father, "who has heard about the
marriage," must consult with his group and wait for a period
of one week during which time any member of the girl's
584 lineage may claim her. After this time, the ties proposed
[695] by the marriage are ritualized by two preliminary acts:
the writing of the contract (*ma'azuum*) between the fathers,
and the offering of a lamb by the groom which solemnizes his
intentions and the marriage (*dabah fi-l-williyya*). After
● [431] another waiting period of about two weeks, during which
time the boy buys gifts of clothing and jewelry and presents
them to the girl at her home, the wedding celebration begins.
585 On the day of the wedding, the girl is delivered to the
groom's residence. The girl remains in the groom's tent, or

585 [684] probably by pricking himself, and will wipe it on the toga.

About two weeks after the wedding, the bride and
585 606 groom take a lamb or a goat and go to spend a few days with
[574] the bride's parents. The Bedouin say that the relationship
between the groom and his in-laws is extremely important.
The man should treat his wife's mother and father as if they
were his own. "When a man's father-in-law and mother-in-law
come to visit him, he must slaughter a lamb for them. He
must respect both of them. Remember, this man and woman are
the grandparents of his children."

585 The marriage, then, is only the first step in the
571 ritualization of new group bonds established between the
182 families of the bride and groom. Bonds are subsequently in-
[574] tensified through a process of visitation, gift-exchange and
● [431] sacrifice. The most important factor linking the two groups
[782] is the actual presence of the bride in the midst of her hus-
*[613] band's group, for she remains, in terms of the patrilineal
principle, a member of her father's lineage. This is made
585 *613 perfectly clear by the fact that she is referred to, never
551 by her name but, by the name of her tribal grouping if she is
571 other than 'Aishaibi. If she is of the 'Aishaibat tribe,
182 she will be referred to as bint of so-and-so. Hence the
[193] Bedouins stress the importance of extra-group bonds by re-
ferring to the women in their residence group as al-Qinaishiyya
or al-Kamailiyya, for instance (-iyya is the Arabic feminine
marker).

562 in Bedouin society, that is, the role of wife-daughter. The
593 554 principles of patrilineality and cognation do not work against
182 each other when the girl marries outside her corporate group,
578 nor does her new dual role present a case of role conflict.
562 On the contrary, the wife-daughter role functions to bind to-
593 554 gether two groups which are structurally differentiated by
182 578 the rule of patrilineality. During time of peace, the wife-
*613 daughter acts as a bond-maker by carrying gifts back and
•[431] forth between the two groups, often bringing some of her
[628] [574] younger patrilineal relatives back to her husband's house or
562 tent for short visits. During a time of conflict or war, the
593 Bedouins point out, she is the only person who can cross the
554 battle lines unharmed. She is a match-maker as well as a
[726] peace-maker. Often she influences the selection of mates by
[584] individuals in both her husband's group and her father's
562 group. The Bedouins say that "after the *bint 'amm*, a man
593 should marry his *bint khal* ("mother's brother's daughter")
554 because she is like his *bint 'amm*." Usually, over a period
582 of a few generations, a given direction in marriage is sustained (see Figure 10), and it is one function of this wife-daughter role to accomplish this important political action.

562 The role of wife-daughter, then, may be seen as one
593 important aspect of what Fortes (1953:33) calls, "complemen-
554 tary filiation," the essential mechanism which provides the
*613 182 link between the corporate groups of al-Qasr society and the kin groups of the parent who does not determine descent.

554 It would be considered "wrong" for the members of
571 this group to present themselves at an al-Qasr wedding party,
[577] or the annual celebration held in honor of a local saint of
[585] [796] the area. When I inquired about the conspicuous absence of
[124] some of my chief informants from such gatherings, I was told
[431] that "they will send their gifts," or that "it is not decent
554 that they come to something such as this." In terms of
571 Bedouin social structure, there are a number of plausible
182 explanations for this "status separation." Fathers should
561 [593] not attend public affairs at which their sons may be "per-
forming," i.e., young men should be allowed to play a public
role outside the confines of the father-son authority
structure. By virtue of the extension of the father role,
and its corresponding authoritarian attitude, every member
of the elder age-set commands certain rights and obligations
which would prevent the free expression that is the hallmark
of Bedouin parties. Conversely, and at the more general
level, members of the "status group" who wish to remain
members of this circle accept certain restrictions on social
[114] intercourse. At the five different Bedouin "parties" which
I attended, there were "elders" present, but none of them
could be classified as members of the "status group." Bedouins
plainly state that elders should not attend parties, but, on
the other hand, they show much more concern and emotion when
they say that a member of the "status group" should not "be

619 [173] Such traditions differentiate between these segments which otherwise occupy an equivalent position in the formal system.

This level of segmentation has no particular political significance except that it is at this level that the client tribes of Murabiteen are attached. People in the area differentiate between Awlad Ali proper, who are called the Sa'adi, and the Murabiteen tribes. Murabiteen tribes occupy a special position which tends to complicate the formal analysis of the tribal organization of the Awlad Ali. The Murabiteen are a number of tribes of varying sizes and origin which are attached to the Sa'adi tribes as their vassals or clients. They exhibit the same principles of tribal organization as the Sa'adi tribes escept that they have no common origin similar to that of the latter groups.

619 173 The original division of the Murabiteen tribes among the Sa'adi was made in the famous meeting at El-Haqfa in which the division of land was also made and the Awlad Ali law was first enacted. The number of client groups attached to each Sa'adi tribe reflects the relative prestige and power of thatparticular tribe at the time of the meeting. 619 173 651 Having a relatively large number of client tribes meant, in addition to prestige of the patron tribe, large financial support. Until half a century ago this financial support was in the form of an obligatory tribute or "sadaqa" which the client tribes had to pay. This tribute is no longer [178] [431] mandatory, but the client groups are still expected to present members of their patron tribes with gifts on occasions such as weddings, funerals 619 or feasts of the tribal saint. Large vassal groups also meant support in fights. Although the client groups did not constitute part of the vengeance group of their Sa'adi, when the Sa'adi tribe fought, their client

613 to Qudura and to tell him that Hakim wanted to show his respect. This
627 156 means in everyday parlance that Hakim was willing to pay him money.
[196] Qudura agreed to meet Hakim the following day.

[114] On the day of the meeting, to which I was invited, Hakim arrived
[431] with his son and gifts of three goats, tea and sugar. One of the goats
[574] was slaughtered and supper was prepared for the guests. While the guests were eating, Hakim and Qudura disappeared inside one of the tents for more than an hour. When they finally joined the gathering, Hakim announced that he and Qudura were now brothers and that it was his fault that Qudura was angry because he had accused him of being stupid and misunderstanding the content of the message sent to him after the meeting of the Aggary awawil. "I admit," said Hakim, "that I might have meant at one time and probably said it to sheikh Qudura that I wanted him to be the Aqila of bait Asabei'. Now that I have admitted this, Sheikh Qudura should not have any grudges against me or my son." Then Qudura addressed the gathering and said, in a very cold and dry manner, "I am glad that Hakim has come to this senses and admitted his mistake." The gathering lasted for most of the evening, spent mostly in behind-the-scenes meetings involving Hakim, Qudura and different guests. Then as the last guest left, Shei'eb, who had been inside the tent throughtout the evening came out and said that Hakim was a fool and that Qudura had tricked him into admitting publicly that he had lied and that Qudura still refused to take the oath.

613 Qudura's stand created a strong reaction which affected almost all
619 the tribal segments in the area. The case overshadowed any other event
578 [521] and was the main topic of discussion. The reaction was mixed, however.

593 cooperation between the wives in household activities difficult. The
595 wives have to have reasonable grounds for their objection to the new
584 bride. But even then, the husband could still marry the woman of his
[431] choice, although in this case he has to bring gifts to the other wives
as "nasafa," or making-up present.

584 If the family has no objections to the marriage, the proceedings
593 start. The initial proceedings are undertaken by the women on both
sides. The groom's mother or a female relative of his mother's generation or older visits the mother of the prospective bride and tells her
of her son's intention to marry the latter's daughter. The bride's
mother then discusses the matter with the girl's father who has the
[429] final say in the matter. If the father is dead, then the authority on
giving the girl in marriage goes to her brother or closest male kin in
the order specified before. The girl has no say in the matter of marriage and cannot refuse to complete the marriage, although after marriage
she can resort to a certain practice which helps her to terminate the
marriage without the consent of her guardian, as will be seen later in
584 the chapter. From this moment until the conclusion of the marriage
[583] negotiations are done by the men of both families. The first thing to
be discussed is the amount of bridewealth, a "mahr." If the two families
agree on the marriage, a small ceremony is held. This ceremony is called
[779] "el-fatha" in reference to reading the first "sura" of the Koraan known
as el-fatha, or "the beginning." The ceremony includes members of the
[675] two families and very few friends. After the fatha is read, the agreement
is achieved. This is considered as an engagement and means that the girl
is spoken for and therefore no other man can ask to marry her.

To break the fatha agreement, the father of the prospective bride

582 779 and although they are not considered wrong or sinful, there is a general feeling of distaste among the tribal population to such marriages. They usually attribute this distaste to the fact that if the marriage with the first sister did not work out, there is no reason to expect the marriage with the second to be successful.* Although this might account, in part, for the low rate of cousin marriage in the group when present wives of the individuals are taken into consideration, yet, the effect of that practice should not be exaggerated. For although that prohibition might curb the marriage with the cousin who is the sister of a previous wife, it does not restrict the marriage with another cousin who is a cousin, rather than a sister of the first wife.

584 431 During the period that follows and until the marriage is final, the groom is supposed to bring gifts to the bride. These gifts are usually a wide silver bracelet that is used as an engagement ring. Also gifts of clothes and jewelry are quite customary. Such gifts become the private property of the bride and are to be returned only if the engagement is broken for fault on the part of the bride or any member of her family. In such cases, her father has to return all the gifts his daughter has accepted as well as the expenses that the groom's visitations have cost him.

585 583 779 431 The marriage is affected and finalized by the payment of the bridewealth. In Islamic law the bridewealth is supposed to be paid to the bride herself as a gift and not to her father, which had been a significant departure from the pre-Islamic practice where two types of bridewealth were paid: the sadaqa paid to the father of the bride or her

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[587] * This does not apply to cases where the first wife dies. In such cases, it is not objectionable to marry her sister, although the incidences of sororate are rare among the population.

585 legal guardian and considered a bride price to compensate the father or
583 the legal guardian of the bride. In earlier times the bride received
779 none of the mahr, although she usually got a sadaq or bridal gift for
431 [178] herself. In Islamic Arabia, the mahr and the sadaq became indistin-
[171] guishable and were given to the woman and took the form of a legal gift
for affecting the marriage. The Koraan no longer contains the concept
[178] of the purchase of the wife, and the mahr becomes a compensation which
the woman has to claim in all cases. The Koraan demands a bridal gift
for a legal marriage: "And give them whom ye have enjoyed their reward
as a wedding gift" (Sura, iv. 24), and again, "And give the women their
dowries voluntarily" (Sura, iv. 3). According to the Koraan, the mahr
[586] remains the property of the wife and remains her own even if the marriage
is dissolved by divorce. But although it took the form of a gift, the
mahr remained in Islamic law a prerequisite for the legalization of the
marriage. It is only upon the giving of the mahr that the marriage is
considered valid. No marriage is legal, according to the Islamic law,
unless that transfer of the mahr is affected. Mutual consent of the
two parties to forfeit the mahr does not change that rule, and the mar-
58 riage is considered void. According to Muslim jurisprudence, marriage
675 is a contract ('acd) made betweeen the bridegroom and the bride or her
184 wali or guardian. An essential element in that contract is the mahr.
The jurists themselves are not sure about the nature of the mahr. Some
regard it as practically a purchase money or as an equivalent ('iwad)
for the possession of the woman and the rights over her, so it is like
a price paid in a contract of sale; while other jurists see in the mahr
a legal symbol, a mark of honor and a proper legal security of property
for the woman.

593 595 providing them with the same kind of food and clothing.* It also in-
562 cludes dividing his time equally between them, spending one night in
each wife's tent. The first wife, being the chief one, has certain
privileges: her tent is the guest house, food is brought to her resi-
dence, and she is the one to divide it among the other wives, and her
house is the place for the husband to stay if he becomes sick and unable
to move every night from one tent to another. Other than the exceptions
given to the first wife, the husband has to treat all his wives equally.

593 Normally, such cases of mistreatment do not result in divorce un-
(586) less they are persistent. In most cases, if the wife is mistreated, she
goes to her father's or brother's house or sends for them to come and
593 take her. For the husband to bring her back to his tent, he must pay
431 her "nasafa." This is a gift given by the husband to his wife as an
acknowledgement of guilt and as a form of apology for not giving her
fair treatment. In some cases the nasafa is equal to what the husband
originally paid as mahr.

581 These are some of the rights that marriage gives both men and women
585 in the tribal society of Awlad Ali. These rights, however, are useless
626 unless they are backed by certain means of enforcing them. The husband's
586 rights are guaranteed by his ability to dissolve the marriage at will.
626 593 According to Islamic law, a man can divorce his wife by simply pronounc-
ing the sentence "I divorce you" in the presence of credible witnesses.
[779] No justification for divorce is demanded from the husband according to
[562] the Koraan. No such privilege is given to the wife. She can obtain a

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* With provision for wives with more children.

absolutely obligatory and sinful to omit. I very much doubt 771
whether many of the Bedouin know how to pray in the pre- [782]
scribed manner. As I have mentioned earlier, the Bedouin used [794]
to give alms to their zawiyas and in doing so they carried out [735]
one of the five major duties of a Muslim, but they regarded these [431] •
alms as charity rather than legal dues. I have never met an
ordinary Bedouin who had been to Mecca, or who even contemplated going there. Nevertheless, however lax they may [785]
be in other things, all Cyrenaican Bedouin keep the fast of
Ramadan, and in this annual fast is summed up for them, more
than in anything else, the obligations and privileges of Islam
and its unity and strength. Moreover, although they are [829]
negligent Muslims themselves they respect piety in others.
Brothers of the Sanusiya Order and religious men in general
ought to pray regularly. That is their business and it is very
necessary for the well-being of the community and worthy of
liberal support, but the Bedouin is an unlettered man, a
shepherd, and a warrior, and he has his own affairs to see to.
Perhaps the Bedouin make up for their shortcomings by their
enthusiasm for the *jihad*, holy war against unbelievers. They [798]
consider that they have fulfilled their obligation under this [648] *
head in ample measure by their long and courageous fight,
formally declared a holy war by the Caliph of Islam, against
the Italians, the French, and the British. A Bedouin once
said to me when I remarked how rarely I had seen Bedouin
at prayer: '*nasum wa najhad*', '(but) we fast and we wage
holy war'.

It must also be said that it would be an error to suppose that Islam had not, long before the time of the Grand Sanusi, strongly affected the character and custom of the Sulaimid Bedouin. This question, which is far from simple, need not be discussed in the present account and it is only necessary to note that the Bedouin assume that their customs are Muslim customs. It would also be a questionable judgement to assert that the Bedouin of Cyrenaica are not religious because they do not pay the same attention to outward ritual as do townspeople and peasants, for piety and holiness, as we have often been admonished, are not the same. The Bedouin certainly have a profound faith in God and trust in the destiny He has prepared for them and this faith and trust enhance that superb dignity

*175 Taukra zawiya and given in an Italian translation by Judge
*795 Colucci.[1] In it the tribal sections of the Baraghtha, Tursh,
794 Dinal, and Shilmani place themselves under obligation, through
the signatories to the deed, to pay the zawiya of Taukra alms
on flocks and crops, to supply camels to carry supplies to
Jaghbub, and to help the zawiya in sowing, building, excavations,
and other works. Subject to the penalty of paying double
alms they will not, without the permission of the Shaikh of the
zawiya, render like services to other zawiyas. They promise
also to defend the zawiya and to respect those who live in it, or
who are its guests, and agree that those who fail to do so may
be punished in body or in estate. Each will be for the zawiya
and the zawiya for each. God is greater than any man. Those
who are obedient will be recompensed by Him. Peace be to
those who follow the right path.

*795 The estates of the Sanusiya Order were *waqf* (called in
423 Cyrenaica *habus*), inalienable endowments made in love of God
by tribal sections and sometimes by individuals. They belonged
to the various lodges to which they were donated, with the
Order as a whole as residuary, and not to the family of the
Grand Sanusi or to the Shaikhs of the lodges.[2] It was understood
that when Bedouin donated tracts of country round a
lodge they could continue to pasture and sow on any land not
being used by the resident Brothers and to use the wells when
[793] there was sufficient water in them. The Shaikh of a zawiya was
the legal administrator of its properties. The Head of the Order
had no direct say in the administration of the estates, and in all
probability only knew roughly of their extent. The revenues of
[434] one lodge could not be used for the upkeep of another, but any
surplus over the expenses of a lodge were paid into a central
*795 pool. The members of the Sanusi family and the teachers and
794 administrative officials of the Order lived in the distant oases
of Jaghbub and Kufra, which produced little but dates, and had
to be supplied from the lodges of the coastal region. Supplies
were sent by caravan partly in local produce, such as skins,
wool, grain, butter, honey, and meat, and partly in money or
[431] imported goods: rice, tea, sugar, and cloth. These gifts were

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[1] Op. cit., pp. 434-5.

[2] Fernando Valenzi, 'La Senussia in Cirenaica ed il suo Patrimonio', *Rivista delle Colonie Italiane*, 1932, pp. 432-3.

sadaqa, freewill gifts, though if a lodge did not send them its 795*
Shaikh was reminded of his obligations. The lodges dealt with 794
certain trading houses at Banghazi, giving them import orders [431] •
against future sales of local produce. [439]

This practice worked well enough during the lifetime of the founder and his sons but, as so often happens in Islamic Orders, later descendants began to demand individual shares in the
wealth of the Order. While Sayyid Ahmad al-Sharif was its 795*
third Head it began to be the custom, a few years before the 794
Italian invasion, to earmark the surplus revenues of particular 602
lodges for particular members of the Sanusi family, and these [434]
members became regarded as patrons of the lodges which supplied them and responsible for their supervision. The territories in which the Order was dominant began to fall into spheres of influence controlled by individual members of the family, the allocation of spheres tending to be determined by the maternal kinship of various members with *Ikhwan* families occupying lodges in them. Sayyid Muhammad 'Abid and his brother Sayyid 'Ali al-Khattab had a lien on the *barqa al-baida* and Fazzan, where their maternal relatives the Ashhab family were influential Shaikhs of lodges; Sayyid Safi al-Din on the *barqa al-hamra*, where his maternal kinsmen the Mahajib family were predominant; Sayyid Muhammad Hilal on the Marmarica where his maternal kinsmen of the Sharifian Tursh lineage had considerable influence; and Sayyid Idris and his brother Sayyid al-Rida on the Cyrenaican plateau, where they had maternal ties with the important Bu Saif and Ghumari families. Sayyid Ahmad al-Sharif had a lien on Tripolitania, where lived his maternal kinsmen the powerful Fawatir tribe of Zlitin territory.

The endowments of the Order in Cyrenaica ran into thousands 795*
of hectares.[1] Several lodges had each more than 1,000 hectares 423
attached to them. The fourteen lodges whose lands were technically registered in 1919 by a mixed Italo-Sanusi commission possessed more than 50,000 hectares. The total lands of the Order may well have been more than 200,000 hectares,
or somewhere in the neighbourhood of 500,000 acres. Much of [311]
the land was of use only for grazing, but much was valuable agricultural country on the plateau. Wherever there were

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[1] An *Ettaro* is 10,000 sq. metres or 2·471 acres.

days on which kin of various sorts should attend the mourning 613
ceremonies, which extend over a period of a week. Allowance is 621
made for those who may be away temporarily, although they are 765
expected to hasten to the mourning camp as quickly as possible.
Agnatic kin are expected not only to be present on the appropriate 613
day, but are required to offer gifts consistent with their 621
relationship to the bereaved; agnates of the tertiary segment are 765
expected to offer a sheep, while some cognates ought to bring a 431
goat and others a quantity of sugar and tea. At one funeral in a camp where I was resident, soon after the death occurred, the main concern of its inhabitants was whether or not certain men of their section would attend the mourning rites and bring appropriate gifts with them. These men lived at the time in another camp a few miles away, as they had been doing for several years past. They did not come when they were expected, and when they finally arrived at the end of the week they brought with them gifts of sugar and tea only—gifts which were totally inappropriate for agnates of the group. They were, in fact, now no longer members of it, and my neighbours were able to tell me, 'They have branched off from us. We will never live together again.' The lineage had proliferated and this was the first occasion for showing it.

Wide-spread in Cyrenaica is a cult of saints. The number of 794
saints' tombs varies from tribe to tribe, there being fewer among 776
the camel herders of the semi-desert than among the cow-herding, 778
almost sedentary, folk of the plateau area. Whatever the number, the members of the group that venerates a particular [788]
saint make an annual pilgrimage to his tomb, and sometimes more frequent pilgrimages are made. In one area there were two 794
men, accepted by their respective kin groups as leaders, who vied 554
against each other for the leadership of their section. One of them had been a famous warrior during the Italian wars and, after [648]
being injured, fled to Egypt where he lived for seventeen years, until he returned to his homeland in 1947. The other had also fought against the Italians, failed to win renown, was a captive for a time, later released, and subsequently appointed leader of his section by the Italian authorities. The first, during his period of exile, had become impoverished. The second during his years of freedom had prospered. As far as their personalities

794 were concerned, there was little doubt who was leader—the
554 name of the former was known throughout the land. Now when
the warrior returned from his Egyptian exile, his rival offered
794 him a sheep as a gift. This act was wholly appropriate. Subsequently
554 they continued to compete fiercely, but it soon became
578 clear that the returned warrior was winning the greater support.
In the face of this, the rival, in 1948, decided to break with tradition
[788] by staying away from the annual pilgrimage to the tomb of
[175] the local saint. Instead, he and his followers made their pilgrimage
to a different tomb in the vicinity of their camp, and later
built a low wall round the tomb, whitewashed it, and made it
known that henceforward they would regularly use it for pilgrimages.
[613] The two kinship groups of a tertiary section now had their
[778] separate saint's tomb. Some months later, the rival decided to
move with his small group to an area in which they had not previously
794 resided. It is the custom among the Bedouin when they
554 pitch their tents in a place for the first time, that the people of
578 the neighbourhood should bring them gifts to mark the event.
● 431 The returned warrior, who had now become a close neighbour
[166] of his rival was obliged, like others, to offer the latter a gift; he
was also obliged to return the gift of a sheep that he had been
given on rejoining his section in 1947. He brought a gift within a
few hours of his rival's arrival, but it was a goat.[14] The rival and
his followers were furious, and the argument that the warrior was
too poor to give more was dismissed summarily. This was the
final insult. The donor, in return, had been given less than he had
presented. The reciprocity of gift exchanges had not only been
arrested, it had been reversed. From then onwards the two groups
made no attempt to conceal their hostility and went their separate ways.

613 Disputes stemming from circumstances such as these are the
578 occasions which mark the proliferation of groups, although in
all three cases cited, difficulties over water supplies had preceded
the outbreaks of quarrelling.

613 In this discussion of the ways in which proliferation of segments
602 takes place, the emphasis had been put on the tug of war
121 between the interests of people in their agnatic connexions and

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[14] A goat is inferior to a sheep in gift exchanges.

571 between man and man, although the various cereal dishes which constitute
231 their regular meals are said to have a similar effect.
264 The son who continues to eat with his father "as he always had been
182 doing," also continues to accept his authority. Indeed he could do little else
593 at this stage, for he lacks the economic means to cut away. Neither at mar-
585 riage nor after is there any transfer of wealth from father to son. The new
182 tent recently pitched is no more than a dormitory to which the young couple
retire at night. During the daytime the son is still to be seen in his father's
425 tent, and, in the male quarters, things appear to be much the same as before.
556 In the female quarters, the only superficial change is the more frequent appearance among the women of one who, before marriage, often sat among them if she had been a close neighbour or a close cousin previously; or of an additional helper if she had come from afar. On the surface things remain "as they always have been," although in fact, a whole set of changes have been initiated.

852 *Rites de passage* are few among the Bedouin. A man's progress in life is
881 ceremonially marked by only four events: his birth, circumcision, marriage
764 and burial. His development into manhood is not marked by clearly defined
stages. About the age of seven, the henna markings on the front of a boy's
858 shirt for protection from the evil eye are not renewed, the cowrie shell stitched
789 to the front of his cap as a kind of talisman against the evil eye is removed
and he is no longer permitted free access to the women's quarters. As he
857 grows older, he will be instructed in goat-herding, and later taught to follow
233 the sheep. In his late teens he will have to undertake the more arduous and
883 responsible task of herding the camels. Coincident with camel-herding, he
233 may be given a gun by his father. Shortly afterwards he must undertake the
431 stringent test of manhood, a journey to a distant oasis for dates. These
411 changes are not marked off by a *rite de passage*. The rites a man undergoes
484 during the course of a lifetime are minimal and in the sense that they are
885 concerned with only the basic events in a man's life anywhere (save for
852 circumcision, which is a minor celebration anyway), they are irreducible.
88 Moreover, the rituals which exist do not comprehend the same multiplicity of
796 relationships as rituals which occur in many other African societies.[4] It is
771 true that the ceremonies referred to in this chapter by no means include
all the Bedouin rituals. It is also true that the events mentioned vary in
554 elaboration, and in the number of symbols present in them, but they are
not multiplied or reduced for different people.

In this context it is important to stress that we are here dealing with a
613 lineage society where social differentiation is not built up into differences
554 of rank, where the roles to which a man succeeds are almost wholly cap-
602 tured by his kinship relationships with other men and which are sociologically
to be distinguished from the roles a man enters into by acquisition of office,

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[4] See, for example, the elaboration of rituals discussed in M. Gluckman (Ed.), *Essays on the Ritual of Social Relations*. Manchester: University of Manchester Press, 1962.

613

her father takes, but in certain critical situations he can be relieved of choice 593
if the interests of the group as a whole are at stake. [421

Political authority is the preserve of a corporation, and its exercise leads 428
to invasion of a man's authority in the field of domestic relations. This 584]
does not mean, however, that discrete areas of authority do not remain with
the father. In the tent his authority over his son is so overwhelming as to
keep the son in almost complete subordination. The son is referred to as a
slave, and in daily life he has to behave as one. He must obey every command,
for, were he to rebel, he would find little or no support among his
agnates, whatever the extent of the provocation. Retreat from his father is [422]
hardly an alternative, since, while his father is alive, he has no animals of
his own, and to leave camp would only mean that he would have to move
outside his group to seek employment elsewhere as a shepherd. If he did [558]
this he would forfeit status, and almost certainly cut himself off from property [428]
which would fall to him after his father's death. A man who "denies"
his father looses too many privileges for the practice to become widespread.

Caught in this dilemma, a son's predicament is worsened by the fact that 593
he cannot initiate marriage negotiations — to be able to do so requires some 584
animals to offer a girl's father. Through his mother's brother he has the [431]•
means of bringing pressure to bear on his father, but the latter can resist for [604]
years. Finally, a marriage is arranged for him. It is difficult to convey the 581
yearning of young Bedouin for marriage. They discuss it among themselves 521
ad nauseam. For the most part their talk is about the sexual aspect of marriage. 831
Premarital sex relations are strictly controlled, and the movements
of each young girl are carefully guarded because, if on the day of her marriage 836
the test shows that she is not a virgin, she not only brings disgrace to [585]
her family, but the marriage may be revoked and her worth as a bride for
another man seriously diminished. Nevertheless premarital relations do [837]
occur, if not between youths and maidens to any extent, between young
men and married women.

The question still remains: why is marriage the occasion of such ebul- 581
lient celebration? The formal authority a father exercises over his son 593
changes little on marriage. Economically the son is still harnessed to the
father. The latter still shouts his orders at him, and obedience remains
unaltered. Any sign of an independent view on a matter is met with a gruff
rebuff. If the marriage turns out to be disagreeable to the father, he has
the authority — if not always the power — to break it. Marriage does not
mean a change in the general mode of behaviour between the two; the legal
relations remain unaltered, albeit modified in practice, as the married son
matures in age. But marriage does mean the acquisition of rights and status
previously denied a son. Henceforward, he has a domain of his own. This [554]
is high drama, indeed, for although every effort is made to give substance to
the expressed view that "nothing has happened," for the first time in his
life the son has seized publicly, amid the jubilations of his fellows, a status
which hitherto was the possession of the father.

would be impossible to satisfy all marriage expectations of men within the 621
universe of the minimal tribal section. For this reason alone external links 613
are inevitable and persistent. Also, the small territorial strip such a group 582
claims as a homeland produces an economy which, in this environment, 182
is unstable. Additional security is gained by making connections with other [423]
tribal sections, each with its specific ecological character. Men also marry [433]
into their client groups. The proportion of these for this camp was 9 per cent [619]
of the total. From these links they gain economic advantages, they can claim services and a client-following is politically significant. Finally, 7 per cent of the total[13] are marriages with women of other tribes, which again not only reduces the instability of the economy (in that a large tribal area suffering near-famine conditions has access to areas of markedly different ecology), but also provides political connections for men whose power ambitions have passed the point of leadership limited to their own tribes. In one way or another all these interests are manifest in the small camp and attention is now directed to the latter.

The disposition of people in the camp is represented diagrammatically 621
on the page following. 592

The nucleus of the camp is Tent A. Its owner (1) was a powerful *Shaikh,* [554]
the son of a famous father. His marriage represents a political link with a [619]
group of one of the primary sections of his own tribe. His father died only a [428]
few years before I recorded my census, and the large amount of moveable property he left had still not been divided among the sons; the owner of the tent, as eldest brother, still controlled the flocks and herds. Most of his time he spent away from the camp engaging in political intrigue. His two younger brothers lived in his tent, but the second (5) would not remain there long because negotiations for his marriage had been started. His father (2) mar- [582]
ried a parallel cousin; she died and shortly afterwards he took her sister (3) [587]
in sororal union. When this occurred an amount of bride-wealth was [583]
agreed, but instead of giving any of it to her father, the entire amount was "put in front of her" (that is, the animals were allowed to remain with her husband's flock), and these animals she had marked with her brother's tribal sign to distinguish them from those of her husband. It was widely [428]
known that she was going to leave these animals to her husband's second [562]
son, for although she could not transfer them to a male outside her husband's corporate group, she could decide who, among his heirs, should inherit.

During my stay in this camp, her brother's son (4) came to it as a 621
temporary resident for a month. Since he was poor, the purpose of his visit 592
was to capture some of his aunt's wealth while she was still alive and the 574
possibility still existed. During his stay he was fed well but did no work. [604]
His kinsmen found his company tiresome, so, to cut short his stay, and after [431]
consulting her nominated heir (5), she gave him three grown goats. Also
when an occasion arose for an animal slaughter, she provided the sheep, and, [231]

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[13] The remainder is made up of marriages to the daughters of men incorporated into the lineages.

Cases

621 Genealogically he was their father's brother, but he was of their same age
592 generation, and behaved as if he was their agnatic equal. Towards his own
578 brother (16), he behaved as if the latter was his uncle, for he was much his
[604] junior in age and his uncle had virtually brought him up from boyhood.
They had quarrelled bitterly because his brother (16) had given him only
[428] a fraction of his inheritance, which he himself, in turn, should have
[593] shared with his young full brother (not shown on the diagram) but he did
not do so. This youngest brother left (15) for this reason and now resides
621 with (16), his full brother's enemy. Two of the men (14 and 13) of this
592 group of four were the chief herdsmen of the camp, although they were
[233] assisted for short periods by (12) and (15), who also helped tend the
camels in other ways. Their connection with the group centered on Tent
[571] A was a mutual close link to a politically powerful person (not shown on the
genealogies) to whom they are deeply loyal and who, while I was among
them, was actively opposed to the common political enemy of them all (16),
and who in earlier years had challenged the leadership of (2) of Tent A.
There is also the fact that they were all linked within a close range of
[613] agnation. This linkage included, too, the owner of Tent F (17), not in
[602] fact the descendant of the man shown in the diagram — he was the son of
a slave wife; his genitor was a slave, but his mother's master reared him,
freed him and he is now given as his son in the genealogy. He lives with his
wife, of client origin, together with her children from a previous husband,
(18), who divorced her, and his own children. Aging, he no longer acted
as a regular herdsmen, but relieved other men in the camp, and also spent
some time shepherding.

621 The details given of the strands which run through the camp to tie these
571 particular people together are so few that, like the Bedouin plough, they do
no more than scratch the surface, but they are sufficient to permit a few
general statements. The camp, and particularly the precise disposition of
621 its tents, shows a group of males clustered together to share two of the main
571 economic tasks: shepherding and herding. The physically strong adult males
233 of Tents D and E shoulder the burden of herding all the camels of the camp,
462 and the men of Tents B, A and C shepherd all the sheep, with (17) of
Tent F serving both purposes. This number of men allows some to remain
in the camp at all times, to free one of them for a journey to the distant
market when supplies of sugar and tea are necessary, and to enable one or
two men, at short notice, to hurry away on horse or camel to search for
lost animals.[14]

621

Economic Determinants of the General Structure of the Camp

574 It is also clear from these details that, given the disparities in wealth
231 (although all men have some wealth), the diet of most is considerably
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431 [14] There is little point in seeking the lost animals themselves in the first instance.
[556] A man travels from camp to camp asking for information, and when he has gathered
his clues, he searches a neighbourhood.

ameliorated in its protein content, particularly by the generosity of the oc- 621
cupants of the nucleating Tent A. Not that they are the only ones who ever 574
slaughter their animals for food. Others do so, albeit much less frequently. 231
Whoever kills an animal, everyone present in the camp is given a share, and 262
the men always eat in the tent of the donor, sitting around one bowl. Thus, 431 •
the surplus that builds up at one point is redistributed among those suffering [556]
a shortage, and meat, in a society where the climate and way of life militate against its storage for more than a few days, is more efficiently used. Many other general economic points could be deduced. These general statements could, however, be made of practically any camp, whatever the specific differences.

Affinity and Matrilaterality in the Structure of the Camp

Economic considerations determine the general structure of these small 621
camps, but do not account for the particular people gathered in them. Per- 613
haps one of the most striking features of these camps, which comes out 602
clearly in the one discussed here, is the confined agnatic span which links the males. Lest it be underestimated, I wish to stress the profound significance of this fact. While granting its importance it is equally necessary to stress that the span, potentially, could be considerably reduced; in some camps it is. Many of the closer agnates of the men of this camp are not shown on the genealogy included with the diagram; (7), (15) and (16), for example, all have brothers, (12) has a large number of first paternal cousins and so on. Therefore, this particular cluster of agnates formed for reasons other than agnatic ties. The most direct single thread connecting Tents A, B and C is that which runs through women. Men of many other camps are all linked in this way, directly. Five tents of this camp are connected through a female link to a common ancestress, whose name still defines the group, two ascending generations for one adult male, three from others and four from others. If greater elaboration could have been shown on the genealogy without confusion, additional links through women could have been demonstrated. Affinity and matrilaterality are the prime movers in bringing agnates together as neighbours.

Other Factors Affecting the Structure of the Camp

Other considerations narrow the area in choice of residence. The quest 621
for power where every man entertains hope of achievement where ambitions 571
are not stifled by the rigour of rank and a small amount of wealth provides 554
a basis for a beginning is also a significant factor in considering the composition of camps. The generosity of the people in Tent A was not entirely altruistic. Justly, it had won them repute, but the repute itself was an important aspect of the political power they enjoyed. They also acquired the services of several men to manage their animals, an impossible strain for them alone. And with their shepherds and herdsmen they secured devoted followers. It was hinted in discussing the structure of the camp that changes

407 the lack of spare parts. Three of the tractors were Russian-built, and two were Egyptian made. The Bedouins say that the Russian tractors are the better.

407 In 1964, the Western Desert received its heaviest
241 rainfall since 1947. To take advantage of this, local govern-
654 ment officials of the reclamation project requested an additional
[132] fifty tractors for plowing on the coastal zone. They received
only six additional tractors. In that year, the thirty-nine
tractors used in the entire Western Desert were able to plow
15,240 acres of land. During this period of economic change,
731 a bad barley crop causes a fodder shortage for the animals,
233 and seldom is the aid program able to compensate for this.
[654] Consequently, there is a need to ship sheep to the Nile Valley,
[166] or to seek permission to take them to the pastures of Cyrenaica.
Both situations create tremendous difficulties for both the
Bedouins and the government. A third alternative for the
•[432] Bedouin is to buy barley on the black-market. In doing this,
[435] he must pay six times the normal cost of grain, and risk
reprisals.

177 Prior to 1960, change in al-Qasr might be characterized
657 as a steady and endogenous process of sedentarization. It had
been taking place for about a century and a half. Exogenous
change, social and economic, may be identified with the desire
of the government to reclaim land in al-Qasr for agricultural
use, and to integrate the Bedouin into the national economy.

178 than they were in the past. These conditions reflect a change
423 in social and authority relations.

423 In the 'izba sector of al-Qasr, as of 1964, there were
•432 two cases of land purchase. In one case, land was sold to an
Egyptian, "an outsider" from the Nile Valley. This, of course,
could only occur where such a transaction would be upheld by
423 the Egyptian government. Land ownership, when it involves
registered land, is absolute. This, to a great extent, works
*[613] to lessen the influence of the lineage structure on property
423 relations. The law governing property, whether in traditional
178 or modern al-Qasr, reflects a set of social relationships.
571 When an individual can own property in the absolute sense,
rather than with respect to his being a member of a group
which enjoys sovereign rights of ownership, then, there has
been a change in traditional corporate relations (Herskovits
[184] 1952:260). This has definitely been the case for most of
al-Qasr, and it is adumbrated in the southern sector where
a person's rights over land are nearly absolute. A compar-
423 ison of land tenure patterns on the coast and in the southern
184 region reflect not only the contrast between methods of land
use, but, also the fact that as land becomes valuable it
becomes scarce and land holdings become fragmented (compare
Figures 5 and 6).

428 When the head of a household dies, his eldest son
596 inherits his authority, but all of the sons share equally in

236 Wool is also very important to the economy of Awlad Ali. Lamb's
286 wool is either sold or spun and woven into rugs. Goat's wool is spun
and woven to provide the cover for the tents.

231 Sheep and goats are rarely slaughtered for meat except on special
[262] occasions. Most male and many female lambs and kids are sold in the
● [432] market and the money is used to buy the necessary supply of food (like
[438] tea, sugar, salt, etc.), clothes, and other household items. Most of
438 these items are obtained from the shops in the settled communities in
489
443 the area, although some of the major items can be obtained only from
large urban centers like Alexandria.

231 The other domesticated animals that Awlad Ali keep are the donkey
492 for transport and riding, a few camels for heavy transport and also for
[236] wool, very few horses for riding on special occasions (they are considered
[554] as a status symbol for those who own them), and the dog to
guard the camp and to protect the herds from wolves and other predators.
235 Poultry are usually kept for meat and eggs which are sometimes sold by
432 the women in the nearby markets.

233 The main occupation in the area is stock raising. Grazing lands
137 extend generally south of the cultivated land in the northern strip.
[132] The growth of pasture plants is affected by the amount of rainfall in
a particular year. Low rainfall causes acute shortages of pasture and
herbage, and leads to the death of animals by both starvation and thirst.
Pasture plants comprise a wide variety of bushes, scrub, and many other
species of grasses, most of which have a very short life span. These
plants normally persist from December to May; then the land is turned
into arid, hard desert with only a few dispersed patches of dry grass.

423 can he do this, but he can also sell that right. The right to sell the
311 share of the tribal land has recently become recognized in the Western
619 Desert, and the usufruct right is being treated in the same way as
ownership.

423 While the boundaries of the cultivable land belonging to the tribe
311 are guarded, when it comes to grazing land, the boundaries are not so
619 much enforced. The tribes of the Western Desert of Egypt are quite tol-
233 erant in allowing members of other tribal segments to graze their flocks
wherever grazing lands are available. Everyone from any tribe can graze
his flocks in areas that offer better pasture. But in doing so, he does
not have the right to use the wells and cisterns of the tribal segment.
[312] Water is scarce and valuable. Cisterns are owned by the tribal segments,
[432] and if an outsider wants to use the water, he has to buy it from the
owner for the whole season for a sum ranging between $100-$180.

423 In 1958, with the extension of the Mariut irrigation project, a
656 Desert Land Possession Law was enacted and came into force in 1960.
This law restates the right of the government to the ownership of the land, and therefore does not recognize the tribal possessions of the land, even when they have made certain improvements in it, such as planting trees or digging wells. However, it gave the right of the occupants of a certain area of land to request either the purchase of the land or its lease for a period not exceeding nine years, granted that such is made within one year of the passing of the law. Failing to do so within one year, the government will either remove the plants and buildings, or confiscate them without compensation.

462 them or any innate aptitude for them; this insistence is an index of the
424 jealousy with which she is prepared to guard her rights. Each right derived
from this or that small task is an extension of her control over the male.

462 The force and significance of this control is, perhaps, best seen in a
woman's right to cook. At marriage a woman must have at least the minimum
424 of cooking utensils, and one of the rights a man acquires in a woman is
252 that she cooks for him. This is something a man cannot do for himself.
Therefore, when a man ill-treats his wife or threatens her with divorce, she
[593] can retaliate by refusing to cook, or leave the tent altogether to return to her
father. A man bereft of this service is in a very sorry plight indeed. The
legal dominance of the male, seemingly autocratic, is reduced at every
point by the control a woman exercises through her exclusive right to perform tasks. The limits to the area of her coercive powers are significant.
562 They are confined almost wholly to domestic relationships. Legally, women
suffer such disabilities that they are almost of the status of minors; in
reality, their day-to-day living is far from intolerable because they are able
to control males over a wide field of relationships.

462 Men, excluded in the main from domestic duties around the tent, per-
424 form tasks to which their legal rights are tied. While women have access
231 to wells for water used by human beings, the transport of larger quantities
of water over longer distances, requiring the use of camels, is a task which
falls to the men. Watering of animals is done by men. Only they can
slaughter the animals for food. The meat of an animal slaughtered by a
woman is not "free," in a ritual sense, for human consumption. In an
extremity only, a woman can, in effect, kill an animal, but the knife which
cuts its throat must be held in a male hand, even if it is the hand of a very
462 small boy. The exploitation of the land is also the male prerogative. They
[424] plough and sow the grain; incidental help may be provided by wives working
[241] alongside their husbands during the early part of reaping, but the main
reaping is done entirely by men. Transportation of grain to the mounds is
also carried out by men, and it is they only who have access to the grain
stores when quantities are withdrawn for family use. Sheep-shearing is
[236] carried out entirely by males,[10] the fleeces are stacked by them and the
[432] distribution and sales of these is directed by the male head of the tent.

Additional to these major tasks which males undertake are a number of
minor ones. Men sew strips of cotton together to make clothes for both
sexes. They also make rope of grass, albeit in a desultory sort of way, by
twisting together the strands between the palms of the hands. A number of
[334] other tasks fall to the men by virtue of the fact that the sexes are separated
[342] in the tent by a divider of blanket material, which may be taken down
when only members of the elementary family are about, but which is put

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[10] This work is reserved for the younger men and takes the form of a festival during which lewd songs are sung and poems with obscene themes or references are recited loudly and within the hearing of elders, in a manner not dissimilar to the behaviour of bachelors at a wedding.

Had the Senussi been successful in the last war, they 175
would no doubt have brought in the ‘Ibeidat or the ‘Awaqir 619
from Cyrenaica to replace the Awlad ‘Ali in Egypt.

At the present day the Awlad ‘Ali, especially the eastern 619
sections near the Nile Valley, have almost ceased to be nomadic, 178
and only the old men have memories of their former warlike
habits. They suffered considerably during the Great War,
but are again becoming prosperous. They now own large
comfortable tents, are beginning to build houses and clear
out cisterns, and are also said to be increasing in numbers.[1]
So civilized have they grown that my guides, one a Sinai
Arab and the other an ‘Abadi, concurred in calling them
"green"—not real desert-worthy Bedouins.

Perhaps as a result of Libyan influence, or more probably 142
the better nurture and climate, they are taller, heavier, stronger,
and lighter-complexioned than the lightly built Arabs of
Sinai and Hijaz. Also they are much franker and more 157
straightforward than their shifty and suspicious eastern cousins, 181
and altogether more trustworthy. Their women only veil 562
themselves to strangers, and talk quite naturally and cheerfully 834
to the men of their own tribe. 609

They cultivate as much barley as they can, using a 243
primitive plough drawn by camels, in the clayey hollows [illegible]
scattered over their very stony limestone desert, but, as the [432]
rainfall is very uncertain, a good crop only occurs every five
or six years. After harvest, they exchange some of their [437]
barley for maize, which the women grind to make bread
as required, and some for dried dates. The seed for next [251]
year is buried in a hole lined with straw and covered with
clay, and a year's forage for the animals is set aside. The [432]
rest of the crop goes to market, and for a short time the [426]
Arab has money to buy clothes for himself and his family
and at utmost need to pay off some of the numerous debts he
has inherited from his forefathers. Soon he is reduced again
to the clothes he wears, the tent he sleeps in, and his animals
grazing in the desert.

They are great breeders of camels and sheep, and a busy 436
traffic in these goes on weekly in the markets of Hammam, 148
‘Amriya, and the Beheira. So they have got into the habit [illegible]

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[1] At the 1927 census, the Western Desert Arabs, Awlad ‘Ali, Jawabis, etc., numbered 38,928 souls exclusive of those settled in Beheira. But Pacho, 100 years ago, estimated them at 38,000 souls. [161]

423 cost payable over a period of thirty years. As pointed out
657 by Professor Abu-Zeid (n.d.), this law is welcomed in part
656 because the garden area to which it really applies (the garden
area in al-Qasr would be the _'izba_ sector) is not considered
"tribal territory" or lineage-owned as are the barley and
pasture regions.

653 Governmental activity growing out of the "Desert Law"
177 has been an important catalyst for social, economic and
*613 political change. All of these aspects of change had repercussions on the lineage system and the authority structure of
the Bedouins. In 1959, the government entered al-Qasr with
the goal of revitalizing and reorganizing the hydraulic system
of the area. The revival of the Roman water system, especially
the network of cisterns covering the southern region of al-Qasr, and, on the coast, the restoration of the well system and
underground galleries, the drilling of new wells and the
intensification of olive farming have all led to a levelling
of economic differentiation between lineages and between individuals.

657 In 1956, the Egyptian government passed the Cooperative
177 Law (U.A.R. Law Number 217) establishing agricultural cooperative
474 societies throughout the country. But not until 1959 did this
law have any impact on the tribes of the Western Desert.
Generally, the cooperative society has served as a primary
• [433] and successful agent of social change in the desert. It has

657 sanctioned the direction of economic development from a
177 pastoral to a market-oriented, agricultural mode of production.
474 Land reclamation and development projects administered by the
•433 cooperatives encourage the Bedouins to produce cash crops.
In this way, Al-Qasr is being drawn into the national economy.
Price changes and seasonal commodity preferences in the Nile
Valley now affect the economy of al-Qasr. The generation of a
[181] cash economy has created a competitive spirit and a degree of
individual independence which cuts across tribal loyalty and
affiliations. The cooperative society, in this manner, tends
to be a "social equalizer."

657 But economic transformation as the intended goal of the
177 Cooperative Law is far from being an accomplished fact. Al-
178 Qasr is still a traditional Bedouin society in the sense that
474 the lineage structure is the framework in which economic and
*613 social relations take place. Because the cooperative society,
as a new basis for association, threatens the dominance of the
lineage principle, it has become the focal point for a struggle
between the old and new.

The major problem encountered by the government officials
657 in this program is that the cooperative society, as a central
177 agent for the dispensation of aid products, becomes a pawn in
474 tribal power politics. The government, forced to rely upon the
661 prestigious and wealthy men for the initiation of an innovative
435 program, found itself unable to prevent profiteering and the

474 of the needs of their tribesmen; that, in fact, the patronage
661 system is relative to the traditional situation. Unavoidably,
474 the al-Qasr cooperative society is dominated by one tribe;
619 107 of its members are from the 'Aishaibat, while only 12 are
from other tribes. This relationship between traditional and
modern structures is common throughout the Western Desert.
When a new cooperative is organized within the boundaries of
a certain tribal mintaqa, members of the local tribe will
resign from other cooperatives to join "their own." Thus,
when a new cooperative was founded in Marsa Matruh, twenty
members of the Jum'iat tribe left the al-Qasr branch to join
the new chapter which catered largely to the needs of the
Jum'iat in the town.

474 The World Food Program of the Food and Agriculture
747 Organization (F.A.O.) of the United Nations operates through
433 the cooperative society. It has had an impact on the economy
177 of the Bedouins of al-Qasr. In 1963, this organization, with
the cooperation of the U.A.R. government, proposed to stabilize
economic conditions in the Western Desert by providing 4,000
Bedouin families (20,000 persons) with enough food and fodder
to help them through the three dry summer months. The program
was designed to encourage mixed and settled farming through
the reclamation of 20,000 acres of arid desert land, while its
range improvement project was to furnish pasturage for 100,000
sheep throughout the Northwestern Coastal Zone. In al-Qasr,

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this number included pasturage for 11,000 sheep (Abu-Zeid n.d.: 19-2[illegible]).

F.A.O. has encountered a number of serious problems and the program has received setbacks. The program, as an agent of social change, failed to take proper measure of the structural and ideological aspects of the Bedouin traditional system. Range improvement projects were carried out with disregard for existing tribal boundaries (the _mintaga_) in the desert. In one case, the Bedouins removed fences on _their_ property, and allowed sheep to destroy an entire experimental range area. Food distribution has fallen short because polygamy as a structural feature of marriage and the Bedouin family was not taken into account. The government estimated five persons per family, and planned to distribute food to 4,000 families. They were only able to subsidize 3,281 families. Aid officials failed to consider the strength of Bedouin values. To qualify

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for government aid, a Bedouin must belong to his local cooperative society. Some Bedouins wish to remain independent of government business, and others cannot afford the 50 piasters membership dues. A man may borrow money from another, of course, but in al-Qasr a "debt" is actually a particular kind of social relation which, like all others, carries with it a set of specific rights and obligations. A debt among Bedouins is a

[571]

complex relationship: it may draw two parties together, or it may be, as it is with the Kachins of Burma (Leach 1954:153),

747 the basis of conflict. Bedouins may be unwilling to contract
177 such a potentially significant relationship for the 30 piasters
474 426 it takes to join the cooperative society. In yet another area,
571 program administrators concerned with nutritional improvement
747 have ignored the culturally important areas of food preferences
177 and, more seriously, food prohibitions. The Bedouins, who
262 subsist mainly on their own animal products, barley bread, and
a few fresh vegetables, are extremely hesitant to accept what
they consider ritually "unclean meat from foreigners," powdered
milk, dried fish, and Kraft cheese. They are willing to
747 177 accept grain, flour, and the cottonseed cakes which are used
as fodder. In other words, the Bedouins seem to be presented
[178] with poor alternatives which may tend to reinforce choices
●[433] related to the traditional productive organization, i.e.,
pastoralism. The exogenous stimuli to change are so culturally
objectionable that they actually generate conflict situations
and misunderstanding between agents and recipients of change.

747 Government programs have aimed at one aspect of
177 Bedouin society, the economic structure. They have ignored
433 the cultural underpinning of social organization, the system
of meanings in terms of which social action takes place
(Geertz 1957:32-54). The relationship between social and
economic behavior is, of course, an extremely important one.
But the economic structure cannot be transformed independently
of a specific cultural structure.

433
233 The Bedouin of al-Qasr idealise the life of the pastor-
183 alist. It is a dominant theme in their culture. Gardening
241 and arboriculture are perceived by the Bedouins as involving
[461] long hours of work, anxiety over waiting for profits, and
complex market operations. They understand the logic and
[556] operation of the sheep market. Sheep are a store of value, a
source of security, and a medium of exchange. In a good year
of rain, a man can reap a good crop of barley, and buy more
sheep against the inevitable bad year to come. While most
472 Bedouins are, in one way or another, involved with the modern
433 cash economy which ties al-Qasr to Marsa Matruh, the Bedouins
241 who go into the production of cash crops on a large scale are
434
177 those who can afford the risk of failure and who can survive
the meager profits of the initial stage. These are the men who
can adjust their world view from that of the pastoralist to
that of the entrepreneur. There are only a few of these men
in al-Qasr but they dominate the economy. Through them, most
of the Bedouins of al-Qasr are linked to the national economy.

Land and Economy

433 The period between 1960 and 1964 was one of significant
177 economic change in al-Qasr. Dependence upon farming increased
178 while pastoralist activities became less important. In the
past, none of the Bedouins now living in al-Qasr were "nomads,"
even my oldest informants had moved only once or twice to

433 plant a small crop or graze their animals on the land of
177 relatives. In terms of economic speciality, the economy of
178 al-Qasr has for some time been a mixed one. Traditionally,
433 dependence was upon animal products with relatively few
177 vegetables being grown in the _'isha_ sector of the coast and
178 the barley sector to the south. Now, over one-half of the
241 registered land in al-Qasr is aboricultural land, and much
311 more land is given over to the growing of vegetables than in
the past. Correspondingly, the barley land has decreased.
The Bedouins still use barley primarily for fodder but much
of this comes from the government. With the shift to [illegible]
arboriculture and government aid in the form of flour and
grain, naturally the barley crop has become less crucial.
But it remains indispensable for many Bedouins during this
transitional period. All Bedouins of al-Qasr are concerned
with securing a good livlihood. They express this need in
the term _ma'isha simha_, and, as I have noted, they identify
it with the garden coastal sector of al-Qasr. The amenities
of a cash economy and participation in the national economy
433 have been realized by the Bedouins. I have no figures on the
241 amount of land registered prior to 1960, but, as of 1964,
311 al-Qasr consisted of 2,000 registered acres. Over one-half
434 of this land is in the garden area of al-Qasr, and is planted
with orchards. All of this land represents cash crops. Planted
in between the orchards are vegetable gardens. These gardens

These gardens

433 furnish staples for local consumption and more cash crops for
241 the Marsa Matruh market. Maṭruh is dependent upon these
311 vegetable goods from al-Qasr, to the extent that the Government
434 has forbidden the Bedouins to truck their goods to the higher
443
[656] priced market in Alexandria.

654 The success of arboriculture in al-Qasr has been the
245 result of a well-organized reclamation program in this area
177 by the government. The relatively good supply of fresh water
433 and the proximity of a large market town has made al-Qasr an
atypical case in the government's attempt to transform the
desert pastoral economy. Since 1960, the government's program
has met with a great deal of success. Such results have, of
course, induced the Bedouins of al-Qasr to accept change,
and have further enhanced the future of the program. The
figures below show, as of 1964, the plant distribution of
orchards in the _'izba_ of al-Qasr, and indicate the measure
of success attained by the governmental reclamation program.

The environmental conditions of al-Qasr are particularly
well-suited for the olive tree: the olive has been the basis
of the economic transformation of al-Qasr. The Bedouins tend
to play down the government's role in developing olive arbori-
culture in the al-Qasr area. But before 1960, only the very
[556] wealthy men could afford to deal in the olive market, since it
involves a great initial financial risk. Hence, prior to the
entry of the government's program, there were 2,741 olive trees

TABLE 1

ARBORICULTURE IN AL-QASR, 1964

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Plant	Acres	Plants Distributed	Successful Plants
Olive	947	40,399	[illegible]
Almond	57	2,570	[illegible]
Fig	66	10,537	([illegible] stage)
Grape	.5	512	512 [illegible]
Peach	2.5	804	[illegible]

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[556]

in al-Qasr, and these were distributed among only [illegible] men. Most of these men also owned large numbers of sheep.

In 1960, the government began planting olive trees on the registered land of individuals living in the "[illegible]" sector. This plan also involved instructing the Bedouins in the care of the tree: an individual who had traditionally depended on the rains now had to learn irrigation farming. This aspect of the program, learning modern "water discipline," was a source of conflict for the Bedouin with his pastoralist outlook on life. The olive tree must be watered twice weekly. The Bedouins say that this made them feel like "peasants." The Bedouins were also apprehensive over the fact that the olive tree did not bear its first fruit, i.e., the first [illegible]

654 245 177 433 [747] crop, until five to seven years after planting. To alleviate the difficulties of this period of apprehension, which the Governor of the desert province refers to as "the dangerous period," the United Nations F.A.O. aid program was designed and put into operation in al-Qasr.

654 245 177 433 435 A Bedouin may purchase an olive seedling from the government for the price of two piasters (about six cents). This same seedling costs the government 25 piasters. Once through "the dangerous period," a Bedouin can expect a yield of 120 to 150 kilos of olives from one tree. Olives sell for about 15 piasters per kilo. Or, at a cost of 3 piasters per kilo, the olives can be converted into oil. One ton of olives will render about 23 per cent oil. Olive oil is now considered a luxury item in Egypt, and the market price is very high. But only the Bedouin with a large harvest of olives finds it profitable to sell his product on the oil market. These conditions have made many Bedouins willing to convert from horticulture and sedentary pastoralism to arboriculture.

654 245 177 Between 1960 and 1964, the government reclamation program has planted a total of 9,514 olive trees on land registered to 124 individuals. The average distribution of trees, about seventy-six per man, is indicative of one of the problems related to change in al-Qasr and about which we have spoken earlier. Most of the trees have gone to men who, before

233 with the movement toward a cash economy, this has changed.
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[465] The shepherd receives 8 to 10 piasters for each head of sheep
which he tends. The Bedouins who have taken up farming can
spare none of their family for sheep-herding chores. If he
[497] can afford it, during the dry season, a Bedouin may ship his
sheep to the Nile Valley by train at 12 piasters per head.
But the government will not accept sheep for shipment unless
they are accompanied by a shepherd. The role of shepherd
has become a very specialized one in the al-Qasr area. Few
[554] of the al-Qasr Bedouins are shepherds, and the role is
reserved for the poorer men without land.

241 Plowing in the garden area is done by hand. Usually,
407 the plow is pulled by a donkey, but occasionally, if one can
492 afford it, a camel or a horse will be used. A man and his
[462] sons handle all of the agricultural chores with the exception
178 of the winnowing process which the women do. Traditionally,
241 barley was threshed by camels plodding on it. The Bedouins say
492 that this is the best way because the soft feet of the camel
do not crush the kernel. Now, however, very few men can afford
[407] a camel. Threshing is done with a heavy wooden sled pulled by
241 a donkey or a horse. Tractors, when available, are used for
407 agricultural plowing in the southern barley zone. This zone,
434 during the year 1963, also became important for raising water-
•433 melons (batiikh), and this product figures to be an excellent
cash crop for al-Qasr. Melons and barley can bring high profits

241 407 434 •433 when planted in large quantities. The southern zone of al-Qasr is best suited for these crops, and the tractor is necessary for a successful crop.

407 474 [427] Tractors are rented through the cooperative society. Local cooperative officers are responsible for seeing that all members share in the use of the tractor. But, in fact, officers and their closer relatives monopolize the tractors. The government has allotted to the al-Qasr cooperative five tractors. [654] They feel that it would jeopardize the whole program of economic reform if they were to dictate the way in which the tractors are to be used. 407 619 474 Consequently, the tractor, like the rations of foodstuffs, has become a pawn in tribal power plays. In one case, not in al-Qasr, a tractor-driver who was a member of the 'Ali Abyad tribe insisted that members of the 'Ali Ahmar tribe pay him a 50 piaster "tip" to have their fields plowed. Because of situations such as these, most Bedouins prefer that cooperative membership coincide with local group membership. It is better, they say, if the 'Aishaibat of al-Qasr have their own cooperative because they know how to handle problems among themselves. The government, during this transitional period, seems to agree.

407 One reason that tractors are monopolized by a small group is that there are not enough of the machines to handle the plowing. Of the five tractors in al-Qasr, seldom were more than two working simultaneously. Often, this was a result of

177 657 This program cannot be divorced from the fundamental political aim of the government which is to make the Bedouins politically-conscious participants in the Egyptian political community. The reform program, which has been only outlined here, has had ramifying effects on the Bedouin traditional systems, especially the political, and that is a major concern of this study. Changes in one structure of society are apt to have repercussions in other structures. This seems particularly the case where the economic and political structures are concerned. Economic change has been a background to political structural change in al-Qasr. Political change is historical in al-Qasr, but it has been accelerated in the period starting with 1960. For these reasons, we are interested in both the traditional and the modern systems.

177 433 434 Change will continue to occur in al-Qasr. This is because the advantages of cash crops and a market economy are obvious to the Bedouin. He can even have more of what has been traditionally valued if he is successful in the modern market system. He can buy a sheep for 10 L.E., a goat for [435] 8 L.E.; a horse for 90 L.E.; a camel for 150 L.E.; and a fine spring tent for 125 L.E.. A Bedouin knows that he must, as an individual, register his land, build a stone house on it (which costs about 100 L.E.), and learn the technique of irrigation farming. All of the Bedouins of al-Qasr are in some degree willing to do this for the *ma'isha simha* which it

177 brings. The future of the olive tree on the coast, and the
•433 growing importance of the melon crop in the southern sector
434 will be the bases of a modern al-Qasr. The table below gives
177 some indication of what the Bedouins of al-Qasr can hope for,
434 in terms of material profits, by a shift to a cash economy.
435 Prices are approximate, and as of 1964.

TABLE 4

PRICES OF KEY PRODUCTS IN AL-QASR, 1964

Crop	Price Per Unit	Possible Profit
Barley	3 L.E. per ardab (120 kg.)	20 L.E. per acre
Melon	8-12 piasters each	70-100 L.E. per acre
Mint	Few piaster per bunch	150 L.E. per acre
Olive	15 piasters per kg. of olives	1 tree=150 kg. of olives =22.5 L.E.
	40 piasters per kg. of oil	1 tree=30 kg. of olive oil =12.5 L.E.

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*613

Land Tenure and Rights of Ownership

Traditionally, an individual's rights in the land were of usufruct and tenancy. Sovereignty over the land was vested in the corporate secondary lineage group (see Figure 7). The territory of al-Qasr is a division of lineage zones, and more will be said about this in the next chapter since it relates directly to the structural organization of Bedouin

423 society. Private ownership of land with sovereign rights
*[613] over it is now the normal practice in al-Qasr. Rights are
[178]
[596] held by the family head, the shaib. If the family head is
deceased, land tenure rights are held jointly by the sons.

In the area beyond the plateau, in the extreme
[184] south of al-Qasr, land rights to grazing and water still are
*[613] associated with lineages. But here agriculture is impossible.
[241] The type of rights over the land varies with the method by
which it is exploited. The southern and coastal sections of
●[433] al-Qasr represent the old and the new, the pastoral traditional
mode of production and the modern agricultural cash economy.
[233] But, as noted, of the total population only a few Bedouins
are actually engaged in pastoralist activities. Hence, tribal
tenure rights, in general, are not overly important at this
time. Not too long ago they were, and many cases in the recent
[671] history of Bedouin customary law relate to conflicts over land
and water in the southern region. The Bedouins say that
[178] traditionally no lineage could use the pasturage or water of
*[613] another without some agreement, usually of long standing,
[233] made beforehand. Now, they say, permission is not needed.
[675] In the old days, these agreements were made between lineage
representatives, not individuals per se. Today, the grass
178 and water in the southern zone are claimed, though not in a
423 legal sense, by the families using them: the rights of
usufruct over the land are closer to rights of sovereignty

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[422] inherited by a woman's daughters. The carpets and the tent, which are woven by women, are not their property to pass on for they belong to the head of the household, the shaib.

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[124] Economic change in al-Qasr has had its impact at the level of production mode, and, also, it has affected the composition of the basic family structure. One informant, who is now nineteen years old, remembers growing up in a household composed of his grandfather, father, father's brothers and their families. Since that time, his father has built another house away from the family home; one uncle has moved to Marsa Matruh and opened a shop there; his youngest uncle has built a house not far from the family home; and one uncle remains with his three wives in the original house. 182
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*613
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434 This fission-type process is not uncommon in a segmentary society, although as a traditional process, it represented a mechanism for dealing with ecological pressures. In the modern case, in al-Qasr, the process of fission in the Bedouin social structure proves to be an adaptive mechanism also: the fragmentation of lineage property and relations is a positive condition for the transition to a cash and market economy. Among most of the families of al-Qasr, as market orientation increases brothers begin to economically differentiate their tasks and interests with an eye to individual profits.

312 (literally, sky-wells, to indicate that they are dug to receive and
[172] preserve rain water). Most of these are ancient Roman pools which were
claimed either by the government or by individuals, and are put into
[653] use again to store rain water. Recently, the government has erected a
number of dams to preserve the rain water in exceptionally good years
from flowing into the sea. All this, however, is not enough to provide
the tribal population in the area with a permanent supply of water because of the limited capacity of the cisterns and the pools and the
scarcity of rain and its erratic nature. Recent attempts have been
made to tap the underground water in some parts of the area. A large
number of wells were sunk, especially along the coast.

433 The economy of Awlad Ali is based on livestock husbandry, supple-
221 mented by occasional cultivation of barley. Owing largely to the variation in the amount of rainfall, the sources of food in the area have the
important characteristic that the place and amount of their occurrence
vary from one year to the next. Throughout most of the area, the tribal
populations are concerned predominantly with warding off shortages in
the food supply by moving with their flocks to areas where grazing lands
are available.

233 Awlad Ali keep a variety of domestic animals, the most important
of which, from the economic point of view, are sheep and goats. The
[433] economy of Awlad Ali is based on the utilization of the products of
[237] these two animals. These products are milk, meat, wool, and hides.
[262] Milk and its products constitute the basic element of the people's
[272] diet. Milk is never consumed fresh. It is always made into sour milk
272
252 (maleh), kishk (dried milk), or butter.

233 The grazing season extends between November and April. As the dry season
221 advances, the flocks are moved northward to the cultivated lands so
as to be nearer to fodder and to the waterholes which stand usually
very close to the coastal zone. During the dry season, animals live
mainly on barley straw and very little dry grass. In exceptionally bad
years, the people are compelled to dispose of their animals or to sell
some of them in order to be able to maintain the rest. In such years
the shepherds find it necessary to cross the border to the permanent
pasture of Cyrenaica in northeastern Libya, or to move to the Delta
where they may purchase the right to graze in wheat fields after reaping
the crop.

243 Grain crops, mainly barley, are also grown in the area. Depending
on the rainfall, pockets of land characterized by deep alluvial soil
and underground water at various depths are cultivated with barley and
other grain crops. Barley cultivation is preferred by the people because
[246] it grows quickly and matures faster than wheat; also, it can be
cultivated in a range of soils and climates; it is mostly used as animal
feed. Barley straw is also used as fodder for animals. Because of
[132] the erratic nature of rainfall, barley production is hazardous in most
[233] of the region. For this reason, pastoralism remains the most important
[433] mode of subsistence, and cultivation becomes secondary. Cultivation
is done on the basis of shifting cultivation, which means that the
areas cultivated vary from one year to the next following the rainfall.

Land Tenure

423 Most of the cultivable lands, as well as the grazing lands, are
311 under tribal occupation. Awlad Ali have, by custom and usage, had for

243 They could not sow a better crop. There are wild varieties of
barley in Cyrenaica and the country is in every way suited to
its culture. It is very hardy, stands up to drought, and easily
holds its own against the grasses, which are ploughed in with
[251] the seed on the plateau. When the barley and wheat have
been reaped, the grain is stored in *kuf*. On the plateau these
are ancient tomb-caves; elsewhere they are holes dug in the
ground.

[731] In a bad year, and even more in a succession of bad years,
the Bedouin have experienced famine, but in most years the
barley, and to a lesser extent the wheat, give an abundant
[433] yield. Bedouin have told me that they expect from sowing in
the beds of wadis up to a hundredfold of barley and in the
barqa up to fiftyfold. On the plateau the yield is smaller and
in the Marmarica and Sirtica much smaller. In Turkish times
[439] there was a large export of grain from Cyrenaica. Mondaini says
that it was to the mean annual value of 40,000 Lire Sterling
for the years 1885 to 1900.[1] Much of this surplus was bought
by English brewers.

433 The Bedouin way of life is well adapted to their environment.
182 Given the inconstancy of the rainfall and the distribution of
water supplies they would be foolish indeed were they not, at
any rate in part, shepherds. They are not, of course, in all
433 respects self-supporting. They make their winter tents and a
439 good part of their equipment, carpets, sacks, and so forth, from
182 the wool of their beasts, but some things the Bedouin regard as
[237] necessities have to be imported, notably tea, sugar, some rice,
and cloth, especially the *jird*, the woollen cloak of the country.
They trade these with surplus stock on the hoof, skins, wool,
clarified butter, surplus barley, and honey and wax, so that
they are in an economic sense self-supporting.

433 Cyrenaica is a rich country for Bedouin, a poor country for
182 Europeans. Bedouin generally have no overhead expenses in
[556] production. I say generally, because rich men sometimes
[233] employ shepherds, though this is usually the practice of urban
[464] merchants engaged in the sheep trade. Bedouin use their own
labour and that of their families and animals. What is perhaps
[511] more important is that they are prepared to live on what

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[1] G. Mondaini, *Manuale di Storia e Legislazione Coloniale del Regno d'Italia*, 1927, p. 308.

Europeans consider to be a low level of civilisation. They do 111
not feel the need for expensive roads and ports, electric light, 511
wireless sets, telephones, schools, churches, newspapers, and 182
so forth; and clearly their economy could not support them.
Time and again colonists, tempted from their homes by the 182
short sea routes and the wooded plateau, have settled in the 167
country and dispossessed the Bedouin, but in the end it is the
Bedouin, and not the colonists, who have survived. When one
looks at the massive Phoenician, Greek, Egyptian, and Roman
ruins and the already half-ruined Italian towns, villages, and
farms, and then on the flimsy tents of the Arabs, one cannot
but reflect that the race is not always to the swift nor the battle
to the strong.

III

Even in the steppe country it is difficult to find a Bedouin 361
naja', camp, for the camps are pitched in hollows and on the
slopes of wadis and their feeders for shelter from rain and wind
and too many visitors. On the plateau they are hidden in the
forest. One cannot, therefore, make more than a very approximate 161
estimate of the population of any part of the country, or 162
of its distribution, by bare observation. It can, however, be
said that at present the country is underpopulated and that the
population is badly distributed between town and country, the
urban part of it, which is almost entirely unproductive, being
too large in relation to the whole.

There have been a number of estimates of the population by 161
early travellers who visited the country in Turkish times. They 175
had to make a guess at the population figure, aided by Turkish
censuses. It has been suggested on the basis of their reports
that the country then supported round about 250,000 souls.[1]
The Turkish census of 1911 gave the population as 198,345,
excluding Kufra.[2] Taking into account the various estimates
which were made during the Italo-Sanusi wars, in the interval
between them, and since, it may be said that to-day the total
population of Cyrenaica is probably round about 200,000, of
whom about a quarter live in the towns, the remainder being
tented Bedouin and a few thousand oasis dwellers.

[1] Dr. Gotthold Hildebrandt, *Cyrenaika als Gebiet künftiger Besiedelung*, 1904, p. 317. 113

[2] Coro, op. cit., p. [illegible]

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secondary sections, in their very unevenness, show a more sensitive relation to more detailed ecological differences.

At all levels of segmentation, therefore, a high degree of consistency between the ecological divisions of the country and the genealogical divisions can be shown. Indeed the relationship is so close that it is tempting to consider the contemporary pattern of things as the only one possible. What historical evidence exists is against such a view being taken. It is known that tribes [167] have been displaced in the past, some of them or sections of them having been pushed out into Egypt, and others having altered their position. This being so, there obviously cannot be any finality about the present distribution of tribes in relation to the ecological divisions of the country. Rather, the existing pattern is one of a number of possible permutations. Again, as the relation between groups of people to their environment becomes progressively sensitive with the decrease in the size and order of the group, then the more unstable will be the relationship between the two. Conversely the greater the size and order of the group the more persistent will be its relationship to the ecology. In other words, the major ecological divisions are more fundamental in their effect on the way of life and the economy of people, whereas the more detailed ecological differences between, say, tertiary sections have a relatively minor effect. The [233] ecological differences between the wooded plateau area with its cow and goat herding economy, and the arid semi-desert [433] area with its camel and sheep herding economy has a much more profound effect on the general way of life, and is a more persistent division, than that which exists between two tertiary sections where the differences may only be in topographical details.

While therefore, the division of people into groups of various sorts is not permanently fixed in relation to ecological divisions, there is always an intimate relationship between the two which is progressively more enduring as the order of the structural segment increases. Yet even this statement of the relationship, guarded as it is, does not suffice, for the pattern and distribution of tribes and their sections at any given moment are not only a function of ecology, but they are also the result of a number of other complex factors which may be operating to reinforce or to

would be impossible to satisfy all marriage expectations of men within the universe of the minimal tribal section. For this reason alone external links are inevitable and persistent. Also, the small territorial strip such a group claims as a homeland produces an economy which, in this environment, is unstable. Additional security is gained by making connections with other tribal sections, each with its specific ecological character. Men also marry into their client groups. The proportion of these for this camp was 9 per cent of the total. From these links they gain economic advantages, they can claim services and a client-following is politically significant. Finally, 7 per cent of the total[13] are marriages with women of other tribes, which again not only reduces the instability of the economy (in that a large tribal area suffering near-famine conditions has access to areas of markedly different ecology), but also provides political connections for men whose power ambitions have passed the point of leadership limited to their own tribes. In one way or another all these interests are manifest in the small camp and attention is now directed to the latter.

The disposition of people in the camp is represented diagrammatically on the page following.

The nucleus of the camp is Tent A. Its owner (1) was a powerful Shaikh, the son of a famous father. His marriage represents a political link with a group of one of the primary sections of his own tribe. His father died only a few years before I recorded my census, and the large amount of moveable property he left had still not been divided among the sons; the owner of the tent, as eldest brother, still controlled the flocks and herds. Most of his time he spent away from the camp engaging in political intrigue. His two younger brothers lived in his tent, but the second (5) would not remain there long because negotiations for his marriage had been started. His father (2) married a parallel cousin; she died and shortly afterwards he took her sister (3) in sororal union. When this occurred an amount of bride-wealth was agreed, but instead of giving any of it to her father, the entire amount was "put in front of her" (that is, the animals were allowed to remain with her husband's flock), and these animals she had marked with her brother's tribal sign to distinguish them from those of her husband. It was widely known that she was going to leave these animals to her husband's second son, for although she could not transfer them to a male outside her husband's corporate group, she could decide who, among his heirs, should inherit.

During my stay in this camp, her brother's son (4) came to it as a temporary resident for a month. Since he was poor, the purpose of his visit was to capture some of his aunt's wealth while she was still alive and the possibility still existed. During his stay he was fed well but did no work. His kinsmen found his company tiresome, so, to cut short his stay, and after consulting her nominated heir (5), she gave him three grown goats. Also when an occasion arose for an animal slaughter, she provided the sheep, and

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[13] The remainder is made up of marriages to the daughters of men incorporated into the lineages.

433
233 The Bedouin of al-Qasr idealize the life of the pastor-
183 alist. It is a dominant theme in their culture. Gardening
241
and arboriculture are perceived by the Bedouins as involving
[461] long hours of work, anxiety over waiting for profits, and
complex market operations. They understand the logic and
[556] operation of the sheep market. Sheep are a store of value, a
source of security, and a medium of exchange. In a good year
of rain, a man can reap a good crop of barley, and buy more
sheep against the inevitable bad year to come. While most
472 Bedouins are, in one way or another, involved with the modern
433 cash economy which ties al-Qasr to Marsa Matruh, the Bedouins
241 who go into the production of cash crops on a large scale are
434
177 those who can afford the risk of failure and who can survive
the meager profits of the initial stage. These are the men who
can adjust their world view from that of the pastoralist to
that of the entrepreneur. There are only a few of these men
in al-Qasr but they dominate the economy. Through them, most
of the Bedouins of al-Qasr are linked to the national economy.

Land and Economy

433 The period between 1960 and 1964 was one of significant
177 economic change in al-Qasr. Dependence upon farming increased
178 while pastoralist activities became less important. In the
past, none of the Bedouins now living in al-Qasr were "nomads,"
even my oldest informants had moved only once or twice to

433 plant a small crop or graze their animals on the land of
177 relatives. In terms of economic specialty, the economy of
178 al-Qasr has for some time been a mixed one. Traditionally,
433 dependence was upon animal products with relatively few
177 vegetables being grown in the 'izba sector of the coast and
178 the barley sector to the south. Now, over one-half of the
241 registered land in al-Qasr is aboricultural land, and much
311 more land is given over to the growing of vegetables than in
the past. Correspondingly, the barley land has decreased.
The Bedouins still use barley primarily for fodder but much
of this comes from the government. With the shift to olive
arboriculture and government aid in the form of flour and
grain, naturally the barley crop has become less crucial.
But it remains indispensable for many Bedouins during this
transitional period. All Bedouins of al-Qasr are concerned
with securing a good livlihood. They express this idea in
the term ma'isha simha, and, as I have noted, they identify
it with the garden coastal sector of al-Qasr. The security
of a cash economy and participation in the national economy
433 have been realized by the Bedouins. I have no figures on the
241 amount of land registered prior to 1960, but, as of 1964,
311 al-Qasr consisted of 2,000 registered acres. Over one-half
434 of this land is in the garden area of al-Qasr, and is planted
with orchards. All of this land represents cash crops. Planted
in between the orchards are vegetable gardens. These gardens

These gardens

433 furnish staples for local consumption and more cash crops for
241 the Marsa Matruh market. Matruh is dependent upon these
311 vegetable goods from al-Qasr, to the extent that the Governor
●434 has forbidden the Bedouins to truck their goods to the higher
443 [656] priced market in Alexandria.

654 The success of arboriculture in al-Qasr has been the
245 result of a well-organized reclamation program in this area
177 by the government. The relatively good supply of fresh water
433 and the proximity of a large market town has made al-Qasr an atypical case in the government's attempt to transform the desert pastoral economy. Since 1960, the government's program has met with a great deal of success. Such results have, of course, induced the Bedouins of al-Qasr to accept change, and have further enhanced the future of the program. The figures below show, as of 1964, the plant distribution of orchards in the 'izba of al-Qasr, and indicate the measure of success attained by the governmental reclamation program.

The environmental conditions of al-Qasr are particularly well-suited for the olive tree: the olive has been the basis of the economic transformation of al-Qasr. The Bedouins tend to play down the government's role in developing olive arboriculture in the al-Qasr area. But before 1960, only the very
[556] wealthy men could afford to deal in the olive market, since it involves a great initial financial risk. Hence, prior to the entry of the government's program, there were 2,743 olive trees

233 178 with the movement toward a cash economy, this has changed.
[465] The shepherd receives 8 to 10 piasters for each head of sheep
which he tends. The Bedouins who have taken up farming can
spare none of their family for sheep-herding chores. If he
[497] can afford it, during the dry season, a Bedouin may ship his
sheep to the Nile Valley by train at 12 piasters per head.
But the government will not accept sheep for shipment unless
they are accompanied by a shepherd. The role of shepherd
has become a very specialized one in the al-Qasr area. Few
[554] of the al-Qasr Bedouins are shepherds, and the role is
reserved for the poorer men without land.

241 Plowing in the garden area is done by hand. Usually,
407 the plow is pulled by a donkey but occasionally, if one can
492 afford it, a camel or a horse will be used. A man and his
[462] sons handle all of the agricultural chores with the exception
178 of the winnowing process which the women do. Traditionally,
241 barley was threshed by camels plodding on it. The Bedouins say
492 that this is the best way because the soft feet of the camel
do not crush the kernel. Now, however, very few men can afford
[407] a camel. Threshing is done with a heavy wooden sled pulled by
241 a donkey or a horse. Tractors, when available, are used for
407 agricultural plowing in the southern barley zone. This zone,
●434 during the year 1963, also became important for raising water-
433 melons (batiikh), and this product figures to be an excellent
cash crop for al-Qasr. Melons and barley can bring high profits

241 when planted in large quantities. The southern zone of al-Qasr
407
434 is best suited for these crops, and the tractor is necessary
433 for a successful crop.

407 Tractors are rented through the cooperative society.
474 Local cooperative officers are responsible for seeing that all
[427] members share in the use of the tractor. But, in fact, officers
and their closer relatives monopolise the tractors. The gov-
[654] ernment has allotted to the al-Qasr cooperative five tractors.
They feel that it would jeopardize the whole program of economic
reform if they were to dictate the way in which the tractors
407 are to be used. Consequently, the tractor, like the rations
619 of foodstuffs, has become a pawn in tribal power plays. In
474 one case, not in al-Qasr, a tractor-driver who was a member of
the 'Ali Abyad tribe insisted that members of the 'Ali [illegible]
tribe pay him a 50 piaster "tip" to have their fields plowed.
Because of situations such as these, most Bedouins prefer that
cooperative membership coincide with local group membership.
It is better, they say, if the 'Aishaibat of al-Qasr have
their own cooperative because they know how to handle problems
among themselves. The government, during this transitional
period, seems to agree.

407 One reason that tractors are monopolised by a small
group is that there are not enough of the machines to handle
the plowing. Of the five tractors in al-Qasr, seldom were more
than two working simultaneously. Often, this was a result of

177 This program cannot be divorced from the fundamental political
657 aim of the government which is to make the Bedouins politically-conscious participants in the Egyptian political community. The reform program, which has been only outlined here, has had ramifying effects on the Bedouin traditional systems, especially the political, and that is a major concern of this study. Changes in one structure of society are apt to have repercussions in other structures. This seems particularly the case where the economic and political structures are concerned. Economic change has been a background to political structural change in al-Qasr. Political change is historical in al-Qasr, but it has been accelerated in the period starting with [illegible]. For these reasons, we are interested in both the traditional and the modern systems.

177 Change will continue to occur in al-Qasr. This is
433 because the advantages of cash crops and a market economy
• 434 are obvious to the Bedouin. He can even have more of what has been traditionally valued if he is successful in the modern market system. He can buy a sheep for 10 L.E.; a goat for
[435] 8 L.E.; a horse for 90 L.E.; a camel for 150 L.E.; and a [illegible] spring tent for 125 L.E.. A Bedouin knows that he must, as an individual, register his land, build a stone house on it (which costs about 100 L.E.), and learn the technique of irrigation farming. All of the Bedouins of al-Qasr are to some degree willing to do this for the ma'isha [illegible] which, it

177 433 •434 brings. The future of the olive tree on the coast, and the growing importance of the melon crop in the southern sector will be the bases of a modern al-Qasr. The table below gives some indication of what the Bedouins of al-Qasr can hope for, 177 434 435 in terms of material profits, by a shift to a cash economy. Prices are approximate, and as of 1964.

TABLE 4

PRICES OF KEY PRODUCTS IN AL-QASR, 1964

Crop	Price Per Unit	Possible Profits
Barley	3 L.E. per ardab (120 kg.)	20 L.E. per acre
Melon	6-12 piasters each	70-100 L.E. per acre
Mint	Few piaster per bunch	150 L.E. per acre
Olive	15 piasters per kg. of olives	1 tree=150 kg. of olives =22.5 L.E.
	40 piasters per kg. of oil	1 tree=30 kg. of olive oil =12.5 L.E.

Land Tenure and Rights of Ownership

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*613

Traditionally, an individual's rights in the land were of usufruct and tenancy. Sovereignty over the land was vested in the corporate secondary lineage group (see Figure 7). The territory of al-Qasr is a division of lineage zones, and more will be said about this in the next chapter since it relates directly to the structural organization of Bedouin

428 inherited by a woman's daughters. The carpets and the tent,
562 which are woven by women, are not their property to pass on
[422] for they belong to the head of the household, the sheikh.

596 Economic change in al-Qasr has had its impact at the
177 level of production mode, and, also, it has affected the
178 composition of the basic family structure. One informant,
[124] who is now nineteen years old, remembers growing up in a
household composed of his grandfather, father, father's
brothers and their families. Since that time, his father
has built another house away from the family home; one uncle
has moved to Marsa Matruh and opened a shop there; his
youngest uncle has built a house not far from the family home,
and one uncle remains with his three wives in the original
182 house. This fission-type process is not uncommon in a seg-
177 mentary society, although as a traditional process, it
*613 represented a mechanism for dealing with ecological pressures.
433 In the modern case, in al-Qasr, the process of fission in the
● 434 Bedouin social structure proves to be an adaptive mechanism
also: the fragmentation of lineage property and relations is
a positive condition for the transition to a cash and market
economy. Among most of the families of al-Qasr, as market
orientation increases brothers begin to economically differ-
entiate their tasks and interests with an eye to individual
profits.

613 Written agreements such as the above are becoming more common in
675 the area. The need to have the responsibility of the vengeance group
[178] or the Amar recorded and the names of its members listed stems from the
[361] increase in the geographical mobility of individuals and separate house-
[464] holds seeking jobs with the government organizations in the area or with
the various industries in the towns and cities outside the Western Desert.
233 The uncertainty of pastoral nomadism and the delicate balance which exists
178 between pastures, animal population, and human population is pushing an
182 ever-increasing number of people to abandon the way of life which they
had lived for generations. Animals are extremely important to maintain
233 the pastoral life of Awlad Ali. Once the balance between the pasture and
182 the animal population is upset by a draught, a segment of the human popu-
731 lation has to make new adjustments. This adjustment is first made by
166 moving with one's flocks to areas in the Delta or in the Cyrenaica region
of Libya. This is a short-term adjustment, however, and cannot be con-
tinued for long periods of time. Pastures in the Delta have to be pur-
chased, and in most cases the owner of the herd has to sell part of his
[619] herd to feed the rest. The Cyrenaica pasture is very limited and re-
stricted by the strong tribal control of the Cyrenaica Bedouins, who in
general are not friendly with many of the tribal segments living in the
233 Egyptian Western Desert. If the draught continues beyond a certain time,
731 the individual owner of a herd may find himself forced to sell the herd
464 and seek other modes of subsistence in the form of part-time or full-time
434 employment as a semi-skilled or unskilled worker with the government or
182 industrial organizations. Such jobs are usually viewed as a temporary
source of income to help the individual and his immediate family live

233 through a hard year and to help him replace the herd he has lost. In
731 many cases a dry year is followed by another and many of those employed
464 434 find themselves depending more and more on their income from the jobs.
182 The security of the employment is often compared favorably with the uncertainty of nomadic existence, and many decide to abandon the pastoral life on a more or less permanent basis. But even when one makes such a decision, he usually retains a strong affiliation with his original way
613 of life. He retains an active interest in the affairs of his Amar, es-
182 pecially those from which he can benefit in one way or another. One im-
682 portant gain he might get is through sharing in the receipt of bloodmoney for the killing of any member of the Amar, and having the same paid in his behalf. But while asserting their membership in the Amar at the time of such distribution, very few, if any, would show themselves when the membership of the Amar is called upon for the collection of bloodmoney which the Amar has to pay for a murder committed by one of its members.
613 It is known in the area that members of one bait of the Aggary Amar (Bait
682 Ahmad) have never paid their share of the bloodmoney of the last twenty
578 years, but always claim their share in the distribution of bloodmoney. Many members of that Bait claim that the Bait has long been separated from the Aggary Amar, although this claim is denied by the rest of the Amar as well as by those members of Bait Ahmad who claim their share in the receipt of bloodmoney.

613 Disputes such as these, which are not limited to the Aggary, led
675 many Amars to attempt to make comprehensive lists of all members of the
578 Amar and to require a written agreement in case of separation of a given Bait from the Amar.

613 671 first appeared, the rule has become a practice so common that other Amars
675 find it unnecessary to specify it in their own papers.

682 Another new rule which is in the process of acquiring a great amount
613 of consensus among the tribal population of Awlad Ali is that of the re-
672 675 sponsibility of the Amar for the payment of the lawyer's fees for members
[693] of the Amar who are tried by the government (article 13 of the Aggary
[695] papers). Another less agreed upon rule is that of the responsibility of
613 the Amar for the financial losses caused by the confiscation of smuggled
672 goods or the payment of money for the destruction of government property
675 439 by a member of the Amar. Where smuggling is an important source of in-
[434] come for the group, Amar papers usually include rules making it a cor-
porate responsibility; other Amar papers, especially those of tribal
segments not deeply involved in smuggling, make it an individual respon-
sibility, while still others leave it intentionally with no specific
rule, as in the case of the Aggary Amar paper.

613 The Aggary document is a relatively elaborate one. Not all Amar
[675] papers, or at least the ones I had a chance to examine, are as detailed.
[131] Eilat Aggary is the largest Amar in the area of Dera'el Baheri, which
extends from Alexandria 60 miles westward to the town of Alamein. The
613 distinctive characteristics of the Aggary Eila is that it is composed
563 mainly of peasant groups who joined the Aggary by means of tribal adop-
619 tion. Of the 16 Baits constituting the Aggary Amar, only three are be-
lieved to be Awlad Ali proper. The attractiveness of the Aggary for the
peasant groups seeking to be adopted by the tribal population of the area
may be partly explained in terms of the location of Eilat Aggary in an
area relatively close to the Delta from where these groups usually migrate.

*175 Taukra zawiya and given in an Italian translation by Judge
*795 Colucci.[1] In it the tribal sections of the Baraghtha, Turah,
794 Dinal, and Shilmani place themselves under obligation, through
the signatories to the deed, to pay the zawiya of Taukra alms
on flocks and crops, to supply camels to carry supplies to
Jaghbub, and to help the zawiya in sowing, building, excavations,
and other works. Subject to the penalty of paying double
alms they will not, without the permission of the Shaikh of the
zawiya, render like services to other zawiyas. They promise
also to defend the zawiya and to respect those who live in it, or
who are its guests, and agree that those who fail to do so may
be punished in body or in estate. Each will be for the zawiya
and the zawiya for each. God is greater than any man. Those
who are obedient will be recompensed by Him. Peace be to
those who follow the right path.

*795 The estates of the Sanusiya Order were *waqf* (called in
423 Cyrenaica *habus*), inalienable endowments made in love of God
by tribal sections and sometimes by individuals. They belonged
to the various lodges to which they were donated, with the
Order as a whole as residuary, and not to the family of the
Grand Sanusi or to the Shaikhs of the lodges.[2] It was understood
that when Bedouin donated tracts of country round a
lodge they could continue to pasture and sow on any land not
being used by the resident Brothers and to use the wells when
there was sufficient water in them. The Shaikh of a zawiya was
[793] the legal administrator of its properties. The Head of the Order
had no direct say in the administration of the estates, and in all
probability only knew roughly of their extent. The revenues of
● [434] one lodge could not be used for the upkeep of another, but any
surplus over the expenses of a lodge were paid into a central
*795 pool. The members of the Sanusi family and the teachers and
794 administrative officials of the Order lived in the distant oases
of Jaghbub and Kufra, which produced little but dates, and had
to be supplied from the lodges of the coastal region. Supplies
were sent by caravan partly in local produce, such as skins,
wool, grain, butter, honey, and meat, and partly in money or
[431] imported goods: rice, tea, sugar, and cloth. These gifts were

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[1] Op. cit., pp. 434-5.

[2] Fernando Valenzi, 'La Senussia in Cirenaica ed il suo Patrimonio', *Rivista delle Colonie Italiane*, 1932, pp. 432-3.

sadaqa, freewill gifts, though if a lodge did not send them its 795 Shaikh was reminded of his obligations. The lodges dealt with 794 certain trading houses at Banghazi, giving them import orders [430] against future sales of local produce. [434]

This practice worked well enough during the lifetime of the founder and his sons but, as so often happens in Islamic Orders, later descendants began to demand individual shares in the wealth of the Order. While Sayyid Ahmad al-Sharif was its 795 third Head it began to be the custom, a few years before the 794 Italian invasion, to earmark the surplus revenues of particular 602 lodges for particular members of the Sanusi family, and these [434] members became regarded as patrons of the lodges which supplied them and responsible for their supervision. The territories in which the Order was dominant began to fall into spheres of influence controlled by individual members of the family, the allocation of spheres tending to be determined by the maternal kinship of various members with *Ikhwan* families occupying lodges in them. Sayyid Muhammad 'Abid and his brother Sayyid 'Ali al-Khattab had a lien on the *barqa al-bayda* and Fazzan, where their maternal relatives the Ashhab family were influential Shaikhs of lodges; Sayyid Safi al-Din on the *barqa al-hamra*, where his maternal kinsmen the Mahajib family were predominant; Sayyid Muhammad Hilal on the Marmarica where his maternal kinsmen of the Sharifian Tursh lineage had considerable influence; and Sayyid Idris and his brother Sayyid al-Rida on the Cyrenaican plateau, where they had maternal ties with the important Bu Saif and Ghumari families. Sayyid Ahmad al-Sharif had a lien on Tripolitania, where lived his maternal kinsmen the powerful Fawatir tribe of Zlitin territory.

The endowments of the Order in Cyrenaica ran into thousands 795 of hectares.[1] Several lodges had each more than 1,000 hectares 423 attached to them. The fourteen lodges whose lands were technically registered in 1919 by a mixed Italo-Sanusi commission possessed more than 50,000 hectares. The total lands of the Order may well have been more than 200,000 hectares, or somewhere in the neighbourhood of 500,000 acres. Much of [311] the land was of use only for grazing, but much was valuable agricultural country on the plateau. Wherever there were

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[1] An *Ettaro* is 10,000 sq. metres or 2·471 acres.

*795 423 springs and gardens there were properties of the Order, for such sites were particularly suitable for settlements of its Brothers since, unlike the Bedouin, they were sedentary and house-dwellers. In the semi-desert the Order owned, or part-owned, many of the best wells. In the oases of the 29th parallel and in the Archipelago of Kufra it owned extensive gardens and shares in springs and many thousands of date-palms. As it was a country and Bedouin Order its urban properties were inconsiderable: a few houses, mostly used as shops, in Banghazi, Darna, and al-Marj.

*795 361 Anyone who studies the distribution of the Sanusiya lodges in Cyrenaica will observe that they were placed where he might expect them to have been placed on a politico-economic plan. A very large number were, as I have mentioned, built on Graeco-Roman foundations, and they were constructed on important caravan routes, on small inlets in the coast to command schooner trade, and in strong defensive positions. They were distributed to cover all the more important tribal aggregates, and the principal lodges were built at the centres of tribal life, as is especially evident among the southern nomads, who concentrate in summer time at such points as al-'Azziyat, al-Makhili, al-Nayyan, al-Qatafiya, and al-Naufiliya. In other words, where the Greeks and Romans and Turks found it convenient or essential to build villages and posts was where the Sanusiya established its lodges. Later the Italians used many of the same sites for their administrative and colonist settlements.

*795 434 On assessments made by the Italians in the early days of their occupation, in 1913 and in 1919, for twenty Cyrenaican lodges of the Order it can be reckoned that their total annual revenues were about 150,000 Lire. On this basis, as those assessed were representative, a rough estimate of the total revenue of all the lodges in Cyrenaica would be about L. 400,000 or 10,000 Pounds Sterling at the 1919 rate of exchange. Of the lodges for which assessments were made, those with the largest revenues were al-'Azziyyat, al-Qasur (L. 15,000), Msus (L. 20,000), and al-Tailimum (L. 20,000). The surpluses sent to the Headquarters of the Order were estimated for only eight of the zawiyas, and in these eight cases the surplus amounted to rather under a third of the total revenues. Gen. Rodolfo Graziani

states that the total annual revenue of the lodges of the Order, 795*
excluding those at Jaghbub and Kufra, was calculated at more 434
than 200,000 Lire.[1]

The Italian figures appear to include all sources of revenue, agricultural produce, increase in stock, and the gifts received in beasts, cereals, honey, skins, mats, carpets, and butter. At the time there could have been no adequate assessment and an estimate of revenue in money is an inappropriate measure in what was for the most part a subsistence economy. The zawiya community lived partly by its own labour, largely that of servants and slaves, assisted, as explained, by the Bedouin of the vicinity at seed-time and harvest. The produce of its cultiva- 795*
tions and gardens and of its flocks and herds was supplemented 794
by contributions in kind from the Bedouin. In theory such contributions were an annual tithe, but in practice it is more likely that the Bedouin brought presents of beasts, butter, honey, &c., to the zawiya when they happened to visit it, or when its Shaikh let it be known that he was in need of something; and that now and again there was a general whip-round for a caravan to Jaghbub or Kufra. That is the Bedouin way of doing things.

Bedouin are hard-headed people and they expect a return for 795*
their labour and gifts. The neighbouring tribesmen considered 794
that they were adequately rewarded for their support of their 182
zawiya by the services it rendered, for, like the Christian [157]
monasteries of Europe in the Dark Ages, Sanusiya lodges served many purposes besides catering for religious needs. They were schools, caravanserai, commercial centres, social centres, forts, courts of law, banks, store houses, poor houses, sanctuary, and burial grounds, besides being channels through which ran a generous stream of God's blessing. They were centres of culture and security in a wild country and amid a fierce people, and they were stable points in a country where all else was constantly on the move. A Bedouin camp might be anywhere. A zawiya was fixed to the earth and its community with it. But the chief benefits the lodges conferred on the Bedouin were, as the Grand Sanusi told them in the letter quoted earlier, that they and their children might learn from scholarly and pious men the faith and precepts of Islam, that they might have the

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[1] *Cirenaica Pacificata*, 1932, p. 125.

*175 hold their posts. In 1919 they began to establish civil govern-
*648 ment in the territory under their control and to extend their
influence farther afield. On 31 October of that year Cyrenaica
*175 was given a constitution similar to that given to Tripolitania,
*648 and its parliament first met in April 1921 under the unlikely
642 presidency of Sayyid Safi al-Din, the old enemy of the Italians
[646] in the Sirtica. The tribesmen, of course, elected their own
Shaikhs. It held altogether five sessions up to March 1923,
when it was closed down. From the Italian point of view the
best that could be said for the constitution was that it implied
a tacit acceptance of sovereignty and that a parliament brought
their officials into personal touch with tribal leaders. Writers
of the Fascist period, when the Wilsonian sentiments which
inspired the Libyan constitutions were regarded with disfavour,
strongly criticized the Government of the day for granting them.
Thus Gaibi says that they were bound to bear evil fruit and that
'the Government thought to present itself as a magnanimous
conqueror, and the Libyans thought it a beaten coward'.[1] The
Bedouin certainly distrusted and despised the Italians and cared
as little for their authority in Cyrenaica as their brothers cared
for it in Tripolitania. About 100 of their Shaikhs met at
Ajadabiya, where they issued a manifesto declaring that, con-
stitution or no constitution, they would not tolerate the Italians
outside the coastal towns, and there only as traders. To
this insult the Government lamely responded by opening new
*175 conversations. After long discussions between the Colonial
*648 Governor, Giacomo de Martino, and 'Umar Pasha al-Kakhiya,
*795 representing Sayyid Idris, and an exploratory visit by Sayyid
al-Rida to Rome, it was agreed that the *modus vivendi* of
'Akrama should be superseded by a new pact, the Accord of
al-Rajma of 25 October 1920.

*175 By this new agreement Sayyid Idris was given the hereditary
*648 title of 'Sanusi Amir' with the honorific address of Highness
*795 and was created Head of the autonomous administration of the
oases of Jaghbub, Aujila, Jalu, and Kufra, with the right of
631 using Ajadabiya as the seat of his administration. He was
793 granted a personal monthly allowance of L. 63,000 (on the day
[434] of the signing of the accord the Lira was 92 to the Pound

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[1] Agostino Gaibi, *Manuale di Storia politico-militare delle Colonie Italiane*, 1928, p. 531.

175* 648* 795* 631 793 [434]

Sterling) and was allowed his own flag, the first place of honour after the Governor on official occasions, a salute of guns on official visits, and the use of an official steamer. Sums of money amounting to L. 93,000 were to be paid in monthly allowances to members of his family. In addition the Government undertook to pay the police and military necessary to maintain order within the area under the Amir's administrative control, and a further L. 2,600,000 to meet the Amir's general expenses, of which L. 300,000 was to be in gold, and half this sum, including the gold portion, was to be paid on the signing of the accord and the other half on the suppression of the armed Sanusi camps. The Italians also subsidized tribal Shaikhs and zawiya Shaikhs and they paid stipends to the Members of Parliament. Notables, zawiya officials, qadis, scribes, chiefs of irregular bands, political counsellors, and informers, were all on the Italian pay-roll. The Italians were, in fact, bribing the whole country to keep quiet. The Italian Government further undertook to act in agreement with the Amir in making appointments to posts within the territory entrusted to his administration; recognized his right to move about freely; permitted the oases to send representatives to the local parliament; allowed the population to keep their arms; and guaranteed exemption of the Sanusiya lands from taxation. It specifically and solemnly declared that it had no intention of expropriating Arab lands, privately or collectively owned, or endowments of the Order, in favour of colonists. On his side the Sayyid promised to aid the Government in the application of the new constitution; to suppress within eight months the camps and posts and other Sanusi organizations of a political, administrative, or military character in the territory not entrusted to his administration; to keep his army to 1,000 men, subject to increase by mutual agreement; to encourage trade and communications; and not to tax the population other than by collection of religious tithes without coercion.

It was felt by the Italian Government that though in this new pact it had to make considerable concessions it had gained in return a more definite acceptance of its claim to sovereignty over the whole of Cyrenaica, which was henceforth divided into two zones, Cyrenaica proper under direct Italian administration and the oases under Sanusiya administration. The Sanusiya,

*175 as well as Italy, had been forced to compromise. Critics of the *648 Fascist period were later to complain that the pact was a blow 631 to Italian prestige in that it virtually recognized 'the existence *795 of two distinct Governments',[1] and Macaluso goes so far as to 793 say that the making of the Sayyid into an Amir 'was the ratification of the undisputed sovereignty of the Sanusiya in Cyrenaica'.[2] Even those who defended the agreement had to admit that the Order was not being treated as a purely religious body, but as a politico-religious fraternity and that there was, therefore, doubt about what its relations with the Italian Government were supposed to be. 'Amir' to the Italians meant Honorary Prince but it had a very different sense to the Arabs. It was, moreover, uncertain whether a seat at Ajadabiya implied that the warlike **Magharba** tribe of the *barqa* and the Sirtica came within the Sayyid's political orbit or not. On the whole one can say that the Sayyid, or rather the Amir, as we can now call him, bargained autonomy of the oases and the hinterland for his armed camps and administrative posts on the plateau. As he did not, in fact, disband these he may be said to have had the better of the bargain. After the Accord of al-Rajma was signed the Amir visited Rome.

The accord was supplemented by a further agreement known as *Sistemazione definitiva delle zauie* of 16 August 1921 by which nomination, suspension, and transfer of Shaikhs of Sanusiya lodges were to be in the hands of the Amir, but he had to give notice of these acts to the Government, and he promised to remove Shaikhs who embittered relations between the Government and the people. The Government undertook to pay the [434] Shaikhs of lodges (in two categories of L. 900 and L. 600 a [728] month), to hand back to the Order all lodges in its occupation, except those being used as forts, and to pay the sum of L. 500,000 as indemnity for lodges destroyed during the war.[3]

IV

The Italians pretended afterwards that 'Umar al-Kakhiya, who closely followed political events in Italy, had in bad faith, believing that the Socialists were in the ascendant and that

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[1] Agostino Gaibi, op. cit., p. 463.

[2] Macaluso, op. cit., p. 100.

[3] *L'Occupazione di Cufra*, 1931, pp. 62-3. On 16 August 1921 the Lira was 84 to the Pound Sterling.

423 boundary marker is usually a pile of stones, a tree, a *wadi*, or, a line recorded on paper by two parties and given to a third to hold in case of future differences of opinion.

342 361 [656] In the extreme southern pastoral zone, there were few permanent houses but with new government land registration laws the number is increasing. The settlement pattern in this area might be characterized as a scattered homestead type, "homesteads" being defined as tents or houses whose location is permanent. Tents are seldom, if ever, moved these days even [657] during a heavy rainy season. This is because barley production has increased, and, mainly because government aid programs supply fodder for the sheep. Bedouin shepherds in the pasture area change dwelling places, but only to move their tents from their winter protective hiding places out into the open for the springtime, or to move from their tent into the stone house for the cold, rainy winter. In either case, no real change in location is involved.

342 The tent is called *bait al-'Arab* ("house of the Arabs"). There are two types: the *bait al-saif* ("summer house"), and the *bait al-rabi'a* ("spring house"). The summer tent, made of "gummy" and flour sacks sewn together, is for protection from the sun. The spring tent is the real Bedouin tent. It is [286] [237] [435] woven from the wool of the sheep and camel hair, and is used during the winter. Most Bedouin now say that they cannot afford the 125 Egyptian pounds (1 pound = $2.80) which the *bait al-rabi'a* costs to make or buy.

657 177 474 433 sanctioned the direction of economic development from a pastoral to a market-oriented, agricultural mode of production. Land reclamation and development projects administered by the cooperatives encourage the Bedouins to produce cash crops. In this way, Al-Qasr is being drawn into the national economy. Price changes and seasonal commodity preferences in the Nile Valley now affect the economy of al-Qasr. The generation of a [181] cash economy has created a competitive spirit and a degree of individual independence which cuts across tribal loyalty and affiliations. The cooperative society, in this manner, tends to be a "social equalizer."

657 177 178 474 *613 But economic transformation as the intended goal of the Cooperative Law is far from being an accomplished fact. Al-Qasr is still a traditional Bedouin society in the sense that the lineage structure is the framework in which economic and social relations take place. Because the cooperative society, as a new basis for association, threatens the dominance of the lineage principle, it has become the focal point for a struggle between the old and new.

657 177 474 661 •435 The major problem encountered by the government officials in this program is that the cooperative society, as a central agent for the dispensation of aid products, becomes a pawn in tribal power politics. The government, forced to rely upon the prestigious and wealthy men for the initiation of an innovative program, found itself unable to prevent profiteering and the

657 177 474 661 [435] sale of goods on the black-market. Tribal leaders, or members of a "status group," in whose hands the operation of the cooperative society had been placed, confiscated more than their share of food and fodder and resold it either in the Nile Valley or to their own tribesmen for whom it had originally been intended. The government could not really prosecute the guilty parties for fear of jeopardizing the entire program. Nor could they convince the cheated tribesmen that they had been treated unfairly by their leaders. [673] For one thing, the Bedouins did not consider that their leaders were committing a wrong; furthermore, any Bedouin who would go to the government to inform on another Bedouin would be subjected to a [577] trial by Bedouin justice. It is still the traditional codes of Bedouin law and honor, and not the modern judiciary system, which prevail in al-Qasr.

474 The cooperative society in al-Qasr is one of thirteen in the general area of Marsa Matruh. It began with a membership of twenty-five, twenty-two of these were from the 'Aishaibat tribe. Today, the enrollment is 139 official, and another [illegible] "unofficial" members. The unofficial members represent unregistered branches of the al-Qasr cooperative. The Bedouins [735] explain that they cannot allow any members of the tribe to go hungry, and, therefore, they will distribute food to all those who need it (Zein, n.d.). [661] This, of course, shows that those cooperative officers who do profiteer are not entirely oblivious

654 crop, until five to seven years after planting. To alleviate
245 the difficulties of this period of apprehension, which the
177 Governor of the desert province refers to as "the dangerous
433 period," the United Nations F.A.O. aid program was designed
[749] and put into operation in al-Qasr.

654 A Bedouin may purchase an olive seedling from the
245 government for the price of two piasters (about six cents).
177 This same seedling costs the government 26 piasters. Once
433 through "the dangerous period," a Bedouin can expect a yield
•435 of 120 to 150 kilos of olives from one tree. Olives sell
for about 15 piasters per kilo. Or, at a cost of 5 piasters
per kilo, the olives can be converted into oil. One ton of
olives will render about 23 per cent oil. Olive oil is now
considered a luxury item in Egypt, and the market price is
very high. But only the Bedouin with a large harvest of
olives finds it profitable to sell his product on the oil
market. These conditions have made many Bedouins willing to
convert from horticulture and sedentary pastoralism to arboriculture.

654 Between 1960 and 1964, the government reclamation
245 program has planted a total of 9,514 olive trees on land
177 registered to 124 individuals. The average distribution of
trees, about seventy-six per man, is indicative of one of the
problems related to change in al-Qasr and about which we have
spoken earlier. Most of the trees have gone to men who, before

407 the lack of spare parts. Three of the tractors were Russian-built, and two were Egyptian made. The Bedouins say that the Russian tractors are the better.

407 In 1964, the Western Desert received its heaviest
241 rainfall since 1947. To take advantage of this, local govern-
654 ment officials of the reclamation project requested an additional
[132] fifty tractors for plowing on the coastal zone. They received
only six additional tractors. In that year, the thirty-nine
tractors used in the entire Western Desert were able to plow
15,240 acres of land. During this period of economic change,
731 a bad barley crop causes a fodder shortage for the animals,
233 [654] and seldom is the aid program able to compensate for this.
[166] Consequently, there is a need to ship sheep to the Nile Valley,
or to seek permission to take them to the pastures of Cyrenaica.
Both situations create tremendous difficulties for both the
Bedouins and the government. A third alternative for the
[432] Bedouin is to buy barley on the black-market. In doing this,
[435] he must pay six times the normal cost of grain, and risk
reprisals.

177 Prior to 1960, change in al-Qasr might be characterized
657 as a steady and endogenous process of sedentarization. It had been taking place for about a century and a half. Exogenous change, social and economic, may be identified with the desire of the government to reclaim land in al-Qasr for agricultural use, and to integrate the Bedouin into the national economy.

177 This program cannot be divorced from the fundamental political
657 aim of the government which is to make the Bedouins politically-conscious participants in the Egyptian political community. The reform program, which has been only outlined here, has had ramifying effects on the Bedouin traditional systems, especially the political, and that is a major concern of this study. Changes in one structure of society are apt to have repercussions in other structures. This seems particularly the case where the economic and political structures are concerned. Economic change has been a background to political structural change in al-Qasr. Political change is historical in al-Qasr, but it has been accelerated in the period starting with 1960. For these reasons, we are interested in both the traditional and the modern systems.

177 Change will continue to occur in al-Qasr. This is
433 because the advantages of cash crops and a market economy
434 are obvious to the Bedouin. He can even have more of what has been traditionally valued if he is successful in the modern market system. He can buy a sheep for 10 L.E.; a goat for
● [435] 8 L.E.; a horse for 90 L.E.; a camel for 150 L.E.; and a fine spring tent for 125 L.E.. A Bedouin knows that he must, as an individual, register his land, build a stone house on it (which costs about 100 L.E.), and learn the technique of irrigation farming. All of the Bedouins of al-Qasr are to some degree willing to do this for the _ma'ishe [illegible]_ which it

177 brings. The future of the olive tree on the coast, and the
433 growing importance of the melon crop in the southern sector
434 will be the bases of a modern al-Qasr. The table below gives
177 some indication of what the Bedouins of al-Qasr can hope for,
434 in terms of material profits, by a shift to a cash economy.
•435 Prices are approximate, and as of 1964.

TABLE 4

PRICES OF KEY PRODUCTS IN AL-QASR, 1964

Crop	Price Per Unit	Possible Profit
Barley	3 L.E. per ardab (120 kg.)	20 L.E. per acre
Melon	6-12 piasters each	70-100 L.E. per acre
Mint	Few piaster per bunch	150 L.E. per acre
Olive	15 piasters per kg. of olives	1 tree=150 kg. of olives =22.5 L.E.
	40 piasters per kg. of oil	1 tree=30 kg. of olive oil =12.5 L.E.

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Land Tenure and Rights of Ownership

Traditionally, an individual's rights in the land were of usufruct and tenancy. Sovereignty over the land was vested in the corporate secondary lineage group (see Figure 7). The territory of al-Qasr is a division of lineage space, and more will be said about this in the next chapter since it relates directly to the structural organization of Bedouin

583 554 556 expected. The price is set by the corporate group but can vary, and usually does, from one tertiary segment to another. The wealthier tertiary segments tend to have higher bride-prices. This is explained by the fact that they occupy a "higher status" on the prestige scale, and also, by the fact that they wish to carefully control and maintain this status.

[435] For instance, "between cousins" of 'Ailit Ma'fas the mahr is fixed at 60 Egyptian pounds, but "a man can pay more out of generosity if he wishes." Hence, a member of the Ma'fas lineage can increase his prestige within and without his family by paying beyond that which is expected of him. In this case, "generosity" is the variable related to a man's place on the scale of prestige. 583 554 556 435 On the other hand, in another "poorer" lineage, 'Ailit Zagharat, the mahr is 30 L.E. to members of the in-group but "the stranger will pay 50 to 60 L.E., according to the father's wealth." The largest and most famous mahr payment in the area was made by the wealthiest man in al-Qasr who paid seven camels (each worth about 150 L.E.) for his son's wife. The highest fixed mahr in al-Qasr was that of Bait Bu Tarram of 'Ailit Lazumi. It was 100 L.E. for members of 'Ailit Lazumi and, accordingly, much more for strangers. This mahr is in contrast to the average for the area which is about 30 L.E. within the secondary group.

586 521 784 Divorce is a forbidden topic of conversation in al-Qasr. Any talk about one's wife, mother, or sister is considered injudicious.

*613 Each member of the corporate group contributes an
682 equal share to the blood-money due in a compensation case.
•435 The blood-price for intentional killing is presently set at
436 400 L.E. In the olden days, the blood-price was 100 camels.
178 If a man had no camels, he was expected to contribute his
[571] share in cash, the value to be assessed at current market prices. Eventually, cash came to replace camels altogether in
[231] the exchange of blood-money. This reflects the growing unimportance of the camel in the Western Desert. Today, there
[556] is only one man in al-Qasr who may be considered a "camel owner," and he is the richest man in the area. Since at least 1935 the blood-price has been met with cash.

*613 When it has been decided that the right of blood-
682 revenge as a retaliatory measure is to be waived, the *'aqila*
554 must go to each member of the group for his share of the blood-
571 money. Each *'aqila* of the secondary group does this, and together their collections make up the 400 L.E. blood price. For instance, if there happens to be 400 men in a secondary lineage group, then the share which each contributes will be 1 L.E. The *'aqila* must account for his own group's share even if this means making up deficiencies from his own pocket. It is for this reason that the *'aqila* "should be rich." Though the *'aqagil* of al-Qasr are generally members of the "status group," this is not always the case. Hussain, the man destined to become the *'aqila* of Bait Braik, was comparatively poor. He admitted to this fact, and said that for this reason he was reluctant to become an *'aqila*: "The *'aqila* is responsible for his *bait*.

Part 2: Bodily Injuries

683 Awlad Ali recognize compensation for all sorts of bodily injuries sustained intentionally or accidentally. An elaborate scale of compensations is set as a basis for compromise. The basic principle involved is that an injury should be met by compensation in direct ratio to its severity, and the severity is assessed by the extent of a man's disability. Disability, in turn, is measured by the extent to which a man is prevented from participating in the communal activities which enable him to defend and maintain himself and his family according to the customary standards they are used to. It is a collective, as well as an individual, concern. A head injury or an injury to the hand may amount to a very serious defect if the person is unable to cultivate the barley fields or move with the herds for grazing or holding a gun to defend the family and group against an intruder who intends to do him harm. Death is considered the maximum disability, as are other injuries that take the person totally out of the collective activities, as in the case of injury resulting in paralysis or blindness. All other injuries are compensated
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435 by a fraction of the bloodmoney for homicide or L.E. 400.

Scale of Compensation for Bodily Injuries

El damiah Sughra (a small wound which does not cut the skin)	L. 3
El damiah kubrah (a small wound which cuts the skin)	L. 6
El fakhera (a wound which cuts the skin and reaches the flesh under it)	L. 12
El badi'a (a wound which cuts the flesh on both sides)	L. 25
El mutifah (severe cuts to the flesh)	L. 30

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El malta (a wound which cuts the skin and flesh and reaches the fat next to the bone)	L. 25
El muvadiha (a wound which cuts the skin, the flesh and the fat next to the bone and leaves the latter exposed)	L. 50
El hashima (skull fracture)	L. 100
El munkala (a head injury in which a piece of skull is removed)	L. 150
El maimuma (a head wound that causes permanent brain damage)	L. 400
Damage to the head hair:	
if permanently damaged	L. 100
if grew back without damage	L. 25
(The above rule applies to the hair of the beard, mustache and eyelashes.)	
Fracture of the hand: for each finger	L. 50
Fracture of the arm: for each bone	L. 50
Fracture of the leg: for each bone	L. 100
Broken ribs (unspecified number)	L. 100
Fracture of the foot	L. 100
Paralysis or severance of the fingers: each joint (except those of the thumb)	L. 33
Paralysis or severance of the thumb: each joint	L. 50
Loss of two ears	L. 400
Loss of one ear	L. 200

If hearing is impared, the defect is measured in relationship to the total utility of the ears, and compensation is estimated accordingly.

Complete loss of the eyesight	L. 400

Partial loss: to be assessed in proportion of that loss to the total utility.

Nose: if totally cut off	L. 400
Piercing the nostrils	L. 100

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If the two lips are cut off:	L. 400
just the lower lip	L. 300
just the upper lip	L. 100
Visible piercing of the lips	L. 50
The tongue: if results in total loss of speech	L. 400
Partial loss of speech is measured in proportion to that total loss.	
All the teeth	L. 400
Each tooth	L. 50
Testicles: if cut off	L. 400
The entire genitals	L. 800
The breasts:	
of a nubile woman	L. 200
of an old woman	L. 100

683 As in the case of homicide, the above scale of compensation serves
only as a basis for compromise rather than as a definite or exact fine.
683 To assess the amount of injury and therefore the category of compensation,
629 the victim and his group, as well as a representative of the offender,
463 have to take the injured person to the "nassar" who examines him and defines the kind of injury sustained. The nassar is usually a member of
[619] one of the Murabiteen tribes who is known to possess a number of sheri'a books specifying the injuries and the amount of compensation required in each case. Before he assesses the wounds, both parties have to swear that
[465] they will accept his judgment, and they pay him a token fee that varies according to the ability to pay and the position of the parties involved.
683 The amount of money estimated by the nassar is not necessarily the final amount of money paid. For, as in the case of homicide, it is subject to deductions in honor of various members who attend the meeting in which

CHAPTER VII

BLOODMONEY—WESTERN DESERT

000 Payment in Cash—Agreements to pay—Reprisals discouraged—Patricide—Detective Work—Death from Fright—Public Aversion—The twelve-year-old Bill—Informers—Ali Abu Bakr's Cistern—The Broken Rope—Found Drowned—Three Months' Hard Labour—Whose Rope?—Payment—The Old Man who fell off the Wall—The Clutches of the Police—A Well-conceived Lie—Ibrahim's Broken Leg—Ali's Cunning—The Fiasco at the Tomb—Reductions in Payment—The Dead Baby—Amateur Lawyers—The Two Shepherds and the Trespasser—Stick or Stone?—Legal Arguments—Travelling Allowance—Misappropriation—Chaos—Mirtah buys Sheep, while the Sayed buy Dates—The Clash—£300—Abdel Kerim and his Cousin—The Boys Fight—Result of pointing a Gun—Dirty Fingers—Serve him Right—The Two Married Sisters—A Gun Accident—Poor Towida—Successful Bluffing.

682 In the Western Desert the laws of bloodmoney differ
[171] considerably from those of Sinai, the former being of
African origin and the latter of Arabian. The Western
[435] Bedouin regard the price of a man as £300, irrespective of
[562] the market price of a camel; and the value of a woman's
life as normally £150, or half that of a man.

682 In the absence of satisfactory evidence in a case of
695 murder, if the oath be employed to decide the issue, fifty
men will swear for a man's life, and twenty-five in a case
562 involving the life of a woman. (Note. In some tribes
these numbers are increased to fifty-five and twenty-seven
respectively.)

682 As regards the payment and acceptance of bloodmoney,
621 this is almost invariably by agreement between the families,
and it is often difficult for an outsider to see any rhyme or

the different families. A year later the Gottaan brought 682
up the case again, acknowledging the receipt of £50 from 672
the Magai, but protesting that they had still not received 693
anything from the Nefoofa. On an enquiry being held,
a representative collection of infuriated members of the 695
Nefoofa family came to court, protesting that Abd el Gelil
had already collected their payments, and that if he had not
handed over the money, their responsibility at any rate had
ended for the moment.

It subsequently transpired, when Abd el Gelil was with
difficulty got hold of and brought to court, that he had
collected about £50, but claimed this sum as his own
personal travelling expenses for collection. Then followed [685]
another lawsuit, in which the Nefoofa family sued their
self-appointed lawyer for mis-appropriation of tribal funds.
The details of this new case, and those of the original suit,
were then re-capitulated and muddled up together, to the
complete bewilderment of the writer and the entire satisfaction of the Bedouin assessors.

Mention has been made of the extra £100 (£400 instead 682
of £300) usually paid among the Gawabees tribe as the 672
price of a life. It seems, however, as though there are exceptions to this rule; and the following case seems to shew [435] •
that the payment of "Sanaa" depends on a variety of
circumstances.

A family called Sirdani had had a bloodfeud with another 682
family of the Gawabees called Sayed, one of the former 628
having killed one of the latter some fifty years ago. The 672
two families had been living in totally different districts,
and for years had not come into contact with each other,
and so the feud had been allowed to continue.

In the spring of 1921 a man of the first family, about forty-five years old, called Mirtah el Sirdani, left the Wadi Natrun for the Nile Valley to buy some sheep from the Fellaheen, taking with him his old mother and a small boy, to help him bring them back across the desert to the luscious grazing in the wadi swamps. He arrived at the

should have called a meeting with Abd el Salam, discussed 683
the position sensibly with him, and then the two of them 682
should have beaten all the boys soundly. Secondly, he ought 695
never to have taken his gun with him, which was as stupid 672
as it was dangerous. The fact that Abd el Kerim himself
knew that it was not loaded made not the slightest difference to the case, as the boys did not, and could not, know
whether it was loaded or not. As one of the sheikhs
expressed it, "If you point a gun at me, loaded or unloaded,
I'm not going to risk it. So if I retaliate by braining you,
then that's your fault—not mine!"

As compared with some of the customs obtaining among 682
the Sinai Arabs, the following case among the Aulad Ali 171
in the Western Desert is illuminating, and will be quoted
in full. The question of who is "chief mourner" of the
deceased, and who draws the largest share in a bloodmoney
case varies considerably between the tribes of Arab and
Berber origin. Among the Aulad Ali a woman killed is [562]
automatically half the value of a man, whereas among the [435]
Arabs the value of a woman depends on a variety of conditions.

A man called Idris had two daughters, Towida and 682
Beida. Beida married a man called Korayem Shushan of 672
the Gereidat tribe, and Towida married Farag Gueida of the Mowalik tribe. A son had been born to Towida and Farag called Lataif Farag; and when Lataif was about four years old, his parents quarrelled about some trifling matter, and Farag divorced Towida. Two months after this, Towida went to spend a day or two with her sister Beida and Korayem, and it was while sitting alone in their tent that the accident happened which was the cause of this lawsuit. It seems that Korayem had left a loaded gun tied up with cord to the roof of the tent, suspended from the poles. While Towida was sitting there, a sudden gust of wind got up, and shook the tent violently. As the tent rocked in the wind, the gun came tumbling down on to a wooden chest between the poles; the impact fired the

*613 682 435 •436 178 [571] [231] [556]

Each member of the corporate group contributes an equal share to the blood-money due in a compensation case. The blood-price for intentional killing is presently set at 400 L.E. In the olden days, the blood-price was 100 camels. If a man had no camels, he was expected to contribute his share in cash, the value to be assessed at current market prices. Eventually, cash came to replace camels altogether in the exchange of blood-money. This reflects the growing unimportance of the camel in the Western Desert. Today, there is only one man in al-Qasr who may be considered a "camel owner," and he is the richest man in the area. Since at least 1935 the blood-price has been met with cash.

*613 682 554 571

When it has been decided that the right of blood-revenge as a retaliatory measure is to be waived, the _'aqila_ must go to each member of the group for his share of the blood-money. Each _'aqila_ of the secondary group does this, and together their collections make up the 400 L.E. blood price. For instance, if there happens to be 400 men in a secondary lineage group, then the share which each contributes will be 1 L.E. The _'aqila_ must account for his own group's share even if this means making up deficiencies from his own pocket. It is for this reason that the _'aqila_ "should be rich." Though the _'awaaqil_ of al-Qasr are generally members of the "status group," this is not always the case. Hussain, the man destined to become the _'aqila_ of Bait Braik, was comparatively poor. He admitted to this fact, and said that for this reason he was reluctant to become an _'aqila_: "The _'aqila_ is responsible for his _bait_.

Had the Senussi been successful in the last war, they 175
would no doubt have brought in the 'Ibeidat or the 'Awaqir 619
from Cyrenaica to replace the Awlad 'Ali in Egypt.

At the present day the Awlad 'Ali, especially the eastern 619
sections near the Nile Valley, have almost ceased to be nomadic, 178
and only the old men have memories of their former warlike
habits. They suffered considerably during the Great War,
but are again becoming prosperous. They now own large
comfortable tents, are beginning to build houses and clear
out cisterns, and are also said to be increasing in numbers.[1]
So civilized have they grown that my guides, one a Sinai
Arab and the other an 'Abadi, concurred in calling them
"green"—not real desert-worthy Bedouins.

Perhaps as a result of Libyan influence, or more probably 142
the better nurture and climate, they are taller, heavier, stronger,
and lighter-complexioned than the lightly built Arabs of
Sinai and Hijaz. Also they are much franker and more 157
straightforward than their shifty and suspicious eastern cousins, 181
and altogether more trustworthy. Their women only veil 562
themselves to strangers, and talk quite naturally and cheerfully 834
to the men of their own tribe. 609

They cultivate as much barley as they can, using a 243
primitive plough drawn by camels, in the clayey hollows [492]
scattered over their very stony limestone desert, but, as the [132]
rainfall is very uncertain, a good crop only occurs every five
or six years. After harvest, they exchange some of their [437]
barley for maize, which the women grind to make bread
as required, and some for dried dates. The seed for next [251]
year is buried in a hole lined with straw and covered with
clay, and a year's forage for the animals is set aside. The [432]
rest of the crop goes to market, and for a short time the [426]
Arab has money to buy clothes for himself and his family
and at utmost need to pay off some of the numerous debts he
has inherited from his forefathers. Soon he is reduced again
to the clothes he wears, the tent he sleeps in, and his animals
grazing in the desert.

They are great breeders of camels and sheep, and a busy 436
traffic in these goes on weekly in the markets of Hammam, 178
'Amriya, and the Beheira. So they have got into the habit [illegible]

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[1] At the 1927 census, the Western Desert Arabs, Awlad 'Ali, Jawabis, etc., numbered 38,928 souls exclusive of those settled in Beheira. But Pacho, 100 years ago, estimated them at 38,000 souls. [161]

9: Murray E, K-3, 4 (ca. 1910-1935) 1935 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9
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436 of thinking in money, and they reckon blood-money in cash
178 (£300) and not in camels, as Bedouin should.

484 The more adventurous make, annually, long and waterless journeys to the oases of Siwa and Bahariya to remove the date
245 crop, and, after their own wants are provided for, a good profit usually results from the sale of the remainder.

181 An Egyptian critic, who should know them only too well,[1] calls them "haughty, independent, and untrustworthy in character. They are dull and so abnormally lazy that they have no desire whatever to do more than they learnt (when young)". But he puts this down to the nature of the country; less generous critics ascribe the nature of the country to them!

173 Besides the descendants from 'Ali's three sons, 'Ali el-
619 Abyad, 'Ali el-Ahmar, and Sineina, a large section called Sinaqra reckons its descent from Sinqir, a mysterious white man who was wrecked and washed up on the coast near Salum some time in the seventeenth century.[2] These are the true Awlad 'Ali, whose sections live mingled together in the most intricate fashion. Among them live also the Jumei'at, who invited them into the country, and various families of other *murabitin*, such as Qat'an, Awlad Suleiman, Hawara, Habun, etc.
619 To distinguish themselves from their vassals, the Awlad 'Ali call themselves *hurr* free, and the *murabitin* are divided into various grades, according as they pay tribute or not.

The Awlad 'Ali are divided into three main divisions, with section (*badanat*) and subsections (*'eilat*) as follows. Some of these are so numerous that they practically constitute fresh tribes of their own.

I. Awlad Kharuf

[173] These are the descendants of 'Ali el-Abyad ("The White"), the eldest son of 'Ali bin 'Aqar bin Dib, and are subdivided again into:

	Section.	*Subsections.*
(1)	'Eilet Bu Hindi	'Eilet Bu Zayyana, 'Eilet Bahiya, 'Eilet Da'ud
(2)	'Eilet Bu Diya	'Eilet Ibrahim, 'Eilet Jereisat
(3)	Awlad Mansur	El-Afrad, El-Tawa'il, 'Eilet 'Abd Allah

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[1] Muhammad Bey Wasfi, for many years Inspector at Borg el-'Arab.

[2] Their sheikh told Hamilton in 1853, there were seven generations between him and Sinqir.

savants, and later at Mecca. He is said to have been an eloquent 795*
and inspiring leader and he was evidently an able organizer. 793
Unlike his father the Grand Sanusi and his nephew Sayyid 159
Ahmad al-Sharif he has left no writings behind and he seems 175*
to have had less interest than they in literature and speculation.
He lived an austere life and was considered by his followers to
have been a saint and worker of miracles as great, or greater,
than his father.

The Order expanded considerably under Sayyid al-Mahdi's
leadership, particularly into the Sahara and the Sudan, and its
greatly extended missionary enterprises demanded his personal
attention. The conversion of the heathen and semi-heathen [797]
tribes of these regions created political problems and the trading
activities of the Order required organization. The trade routes [487]
through the Libyan oases to the coast had increased in importance
since the rise of the Sudanese Mahdi in 1881 had closed
the Nile route. Personal direction was difficult from Jaghbub,
so in 1895 Sayyid al-Mahdi moved the seat of the Order to
Kufra, a more central position than Jaghbub in the theocratic
empire being slowly built up. He first went to live at the
zawiya of al-Ustad but shortly afterwards built a new zawiya,
in which he resided, on a site which became known as al-Taj.
He departed from Jaghbub amid the lamentations of his
followers, only some of whom he was able to take with him to
Kufra, leaving the rest behind at Jaghbub, with his nephew al-Sayyid
Muhammad 'Abid as his titular representative there. 175*

There are few places in the world so remote as Kufra oasis, 795*
but it was at the centre of the Sanusi empire and the meeting- 793
place of a number of important desert routes. Before Sayyid 159
al-Mahdi made it the seat of his Order, Kufra had been little 487
more than a watering place for caravans and the centre for the 437
wandering Tibbu tribes of the region, though the Zuwaya of [361]
al-Jikharra went there each year to collect dates. It now became
an emporium through which caravans were constantly passing
and exchange was carried on. The Sanusiya profited both
by directly engaging in trade and transport and through
customs dues.

The little village of mud and palmwood houses at al-Taj also 795*
became a centre of religious life and propaganda. The mis- 793
sionary efforts of the Order intensified all over Fazzan and into 159
175*
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619 [175] [162] later Wilkinson estimated them at about 400 men near El Terrana and the Wadi Natrun.

At the present day they are still reckoned *Murabitin*, but, like the Jumei'at, are sufficiently independent not to have to [439] pay tribute. They share with the Awlad 'Ali in the date traffic with Bahariya Oasis, where the produce of the village of Mandisha is reserved for them, and that from Bawitti for the Awlad 'Ali.

619 682 181 Kennett notes (p. 54) that they demand £400 for blood-money instead of £300, the usual price in the Western Desert, and alludes (p. 67) to :

> "The free and easy way in which the Gawabees tribe near the Wadi Natrun pack up their summer tents and leave them in situ while they themselves trek off with their winter tents into the open desert for the winter grazing is indicative of this code of honesty prevailing among them."

142 619 On page 101, he calls them "nearly all very small men, with strangely similar features and characteristics running through all the families of the tribe".

619 173 Bramly has collected three pedigrees of the tribe all going back to Sheikh 'Abd el-Jawad el-Kassar. They state that they are an offshoot from the Qadadfa, and about 500 years ago left Saqiet el-Hamra in Morocco to settle in Egypt.

As a reward for "settling some affairs in the Wadi Natrun", Muhammad 'Ali Pasha granted them the usual Bedouin privilege of exemption from military service. There are small colonies of them elsewhere among the Awlad Ali, while others are settled in the cultivated provinces of Giza, Beheira, Menufiya, and Gharbiya.

Jumei'at.—This tribe, possibly a remnant of the original Libyan inhabitants of Mariut, is of quite respectable antiquity, for Ibn Khaldûn includes the Jumei'at as a subtribe of "Beni 'Ali", themselves an offshoot from Beni Suleim. Whether his "Beni 'Ali" are the same as the modern Awlad 'Ali may be questioned, yet it is a reasonable assumption, for the exchange of the words "Beni" and "Awlad" in tribal names can be paralleled elsewhere.

The Jumei'at all agree that their remote ancestor, whom they share with the Awlad Suleiman and the Qat'an, was called Ka'b, and a Ka'b indeed appears in the pedigree ascribed

236 Wool is also very important to the economy of Awlad Ali. Lamb's
286 wool is either sold or spun and woven into rugs. Goat's wool is spun
and woven to provide the cover for the tents.

231 Sheep and goats are rarely slaughtered for meat except on special
[262] occasions. Most male and many female lambs and kids are sold in the
[432] market and the money is used to buy the necessary supply of food (like
[438] tea, sugar, salt, etc.), clothes, and other household items. Most of
438 these items are obtained from the shops in the settled communities in
439
443 the area, although some of the major items can be obtained only from
large urban centers like Alexandria.

231 The other domesticated animals that Awlad Ali keep are the donkey
492 for transport and riding, a few camels for heavy transport and also for
[236] wool, very few horses for riding on special occasions (they are con-
[554] sidered as a status symbol for those who own them), and the dog to
guard the camp and to protect the herds from wolves and other predators.
235 Poultry are usually kept for meat and eggs which are sometimes sold by
432 the women in the nearby markets.

233 The main occupation in the area is stock raising. Grazing lands
137 extend generally south of the cultivated land in the northern strip.
[132] The growth of pasture plants is affected by the amount of rainfall in
a particular year. Low rainfall causes acute shortages of pasture and
herbage, and leads to the death of animals by both starvation and thirst.
Pasture plants comprise a wide variety of bushes, scrub, and many other
species of grasses, most of which have a very short life span. These
plants normally persist from December to May; then the land is turned
into arid, hard desert with only a few dispersed patches of dry grass.

632 communities. They are strangers to each other who meet but
369 do not mix. There is a barrier between them and each distrusts
641 the other. Nevertheless there is a measure of economic interdependence between them, and the tribes and the towns affect
each other politically. In Turkish times the urban population,
632 which, as we have seen, was small and contained a high pro-
439 portion of Jews, was engaged in trade and domestic industries.
• 438 The townsmen bought from the Bedouin animals, hides, wool,
clarified butter, honey, beeswax, and ostrich feathers (ostriches
369 were still hunted in the southern steppe in those days), and they
supplied the Bedouin with those things he required but could
not, or would not, make for himself: tea, sugar, rice, cloth,
horseshoes, musket balls, flints, gunpowder, and earthenware.
The urban craftsmen also made leather goods, manufactured
salt from sea water, and conducted trade and exchange. Imports
came by sea from Tripoli, Marseilles, London, Malta, Alexandria,
and Crete, and overland from Alexandria.

But the townsmen of Cyrenaica never dominated the country
as they dominate most of the Arab lands, where through usury,
intimidation, monopoly of trade, and influence in the administration and the courts they have reduced the countryman to
the position of landless labourer or *métayage* serf. There was
nothing in the Bedouin way of life which gave an opening to the
usurer. Moreover, the towns had no monopoly of trade for, if
necessary, the Bedouin could, since they were self-supporting
in necessities, either go without urban supplies or obtain them
overland from Egypt, as they showed during their war with the
[565] Italians. Consequently there were no rich landowning families
living in the towns at the expense of the country-side, no aghas,
beys, and pashas; and an educated middle class hardly existed
outside the small official circle and lacked both wealth and
influence. In general it may be said that in Cyrenaica the towns
were not parasites on the country, but had their proper functions as trading centres and suppliers of the needs of the Bedouin
population. The markets were free, not tied to town societies.

632 Nor could the Bedouin be coerced by force or law. The tribes
*648 were largely inaccessible and they were stronger than the towns,
369 even with the administration behind them. The Bedouin were
not afraid of the Turkish Administration, which sat very lightly
on their shoulders, and they did not use the courts. The

degree and is ephemeral, so that the opportunity for the development of trade relations is absent.[1] Save for straying animals, a section has no urgent need to seek relationships with others, as long as the rainfall is sufficient to permit the exploitation of local resources. 621 311 (619)

The tertiary section is also regarded as the corporate group *par excellence*, in which 'the one word does for all'. Corporate identity is conceptualized as 'one bone' or 'one body'. An offence against one of its members is held to be an offence against all; if one of its members is killed 'we all lose blood'. When one of its members commits homicide the responsibility falls on all equally. Blood money, when received, is shared by all save for a special portion reserved for the 'owner of the blood', the nearest agnate of the victim. In opposite circumstances, all adult males accept the responsibility of contributing an equal share to the blood money. Rules of membership, simple in their brevity, express graphically this corporate identity: 'You must strike with us and be struck with us; you must pay with us and receive with us.' The group also bears a name, and there is never any doubt about the affiliation of any tribesman. That group of men—known as the *'amarā dam*—who are agreed on the obligation to exact vengeance, to pay blood money when necessary, to engage in common defence, and to accept the possibility of death in vengeance, is a fixed and clear-cut group, not one whose membership has to be calculated by reference to degrees of kinship in regard to a specific situation, as appears to be the case among other peoples. 621 613 (682) (672)

Homicide within the *'amarā dam* brings about an impasse in relationships. A blood-money payment is out of the question since the acceptance of blood money by one part of a tertiary section from another of its parts is tantamount to a statement of split. Only in conditions where relationships within the lineage have developed to the point of political severance is it anticipated that a blood-money payment may be demanded; but this problem is not the same as that at present under discussion. Bedouin say that blood money cannot pass within the *'amarā dam* for those making the payment would be the persons receiving it. This is spurious reasoning, since the 'owner of the blood' is awarded more than any other members of the group as it is, and arrangements could obviously be made to pay him separately. Blood money is out of the question because it distinguishes relationships between people as belonging to two distinct political communities, and not because of any difficulty of distribution. In Bedouin thinking, an injury to 'the one body' is an injury to all its parts. Blood-money payments by members of a corporation to one or more of its members is a contradiction in terms. In the same way vengeance is also excluded, for this merely doubles the original loss. A reprisal exacted in hot blood is always a possibility, but this is not referred to as *thār*, vengeance. Even if, at a later date, the closest kinsman of the victim should slay the offender, the act would not be referred to as *thār* and any connexion with earlier homicides would be denied. 621 613 682 627 (829) (829)

Stultified in the field of political action, there is little else that can be done. Expulsion is a possible course of action—and expulsion has occurred. Records show, however, that exile is almost invariably voluntary.[2] Moreover, exile is terminated as 682

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[1] Many sections trade fleeces for dates with the folk of distant oases, but the sections do not trade among themselves.

[2] I recorded one case of a man who was expelled from his group and the tribes around were warned that the rules of sanctuary were not to apply to him. He is said to have died from grief and hunger. The reason given for such drastic action is that he killed (438)

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554 seen" at any such function. It would appear that the mechanism
571 at work here is not simply a device to provide the younger
182 generation with a tension-release situation, but also a
561 symbolic expression of the difference between the possessors
[154] and the non-possessors of authority, a confirmation of the
political order.

[578] The avoidance practice, or separation, between the old and the young in the "party" situation is a structural fact of Bedouin society, and, though it may ultimately be defined as a conflict control or legitimating mechanism, in the context of culture change new aspects and meanings attach
554 to the phenomenon. The "status group" is an agent of change
571 in al-Qasr; its members can afford to gamble in the market
178 economy of Marsa Matruh since they possess the reserve capital
[471] (in the form of sheep) and the social prestige which permits
[439] this. The "status group," with business and social relations
[177] in Marsa Matruh, enjoys both the benefits of associational ties with the Egyptians and the communal ties with their fellow Bedouins. They see themselves as being different from their fellow tribesmen, and they tend to face more towards Marsa Matruh than al-Qasr. In short, they are the "cultural brokers" who support an ideology of change, they extol the benefits of a new way of life over and against the old.

[789] One repudiation of tradition which constitutes an
[796] attempt to define the style of life of the "status group"

156 of them) cater largely to the needs of the lineage in whose
159 territory they are located. They are operated mostly on a
554 credit basis. Lineage members, as debtors, feel gratitude
443 but also, and more importantly, loyalty toward their kinsman
423
472 and creditor. Hajj 'Ali is the only member of al-Qasr who
*[613]
[452] owns two shops, and the only Bedouin in the whole Western Desert
who owns three shops. His brother owns a shop in Matruh.
156 Furthermore, the shop in Sallum is in a strategic position on
159 the Libyan border which, coincidentally or not, is a point
554 for importing, and also smuggling, foreign goods into Egypt.
443
•439 The possession and utilization of foreign products is definitely
472 a status symbol all over Egypt. Hence, the person in this
area who can control, however slightly, the distribution of
such goods has a lever with which to exact prestige and
favors from the "status group" in al-Qasr who now welcome
these symbols (tobacco, pistols, rifles, radios) and the
bureaucrats of Marsa Matruh who crave them (food goods,
clothing materials, car parts).

156 Besides all this, Hajj 'Ali is involved in a small
159 stone-cutting operation which supplies stones for house
554 building, he cooperates with his three brothers in a well-
[316]
[312] cleaning concern, and contracts government heavy equipment
[427] to build earth dams. The material evidence of his status
[342] is that he is the only man in al-Qasr with two compound-type
[595] houses (one he built thirteen years ago), and the only man
with four wives.

156 159 554 627 124 with four wives. It is not hard to understand why the people of al-Qasr consider Hajj 'Ali a rajal khair par excellence. For instance, when I asked one man if he could give me some examples of court cases, he replied: "The one who is not an 'aqila pays no attention to anything save getting food for his children. The rajal khair has money and men (a reference to the "old days" when a person needed cohorts for battle), and so he always pays instead of us. He lends us money and helps us in doing anything, like Hajj 'Ali does." In another

124 156 159 554 •439 472 245 interview, one man showed great respect for Hajj 'Ali's traditional status and modern ability to deal with the outside world by giving him the honorific title of "shaikh," and showing that the Bedouins of al-Qasr put their trust in him: "When the olive merchants come from Alexandria, they go to Shaikh 'Ali, someone who knows about olives. They ask him what kind of olives al-Qasr has. He shows the merchants, and they say: 'I will give you so much for them.' They make an agreement, and Hajj 'Ali collects the olives and gets the price for them."

156 159 554 [627] [114] In terms of local politics, I would guess, but do not have data to prove, that Hajj 'Ali was the third party most frequently referred to in seeking a termination of conflict. He was commonly asked to participate in these matters not only by the disputants themselves but also by the 'aqila or other third party presiding. He was sometimes

236 Wool is also very important to the economy of Awlad Ali. Lamb's
286 wool is either sold or spun and woven into rugs. Goat's wool is spun
and woven to provide the cover for the tents.

231 Sheep and goats are rarely slaughtered for meat except on special
[262] occasions. Most male and many female lambs and kids are sold in the
[432] market and the money is used to buy the necessary supply of food (like
[438] tea, sugar, salt, etc.), clothes, and other household items. Most of
438 these items are obtained from the shops in the settled communities in
439 the area, although some of the major items can be obtained only from
443 large urban centers like Alexandria.

231 The other domesticated animals that Awlad Ali keep are the donkey
492 for transport and riding, a few camels for heavy transport and also for
[236] wool, very few horses for riding on special occasions (they are con-
[554] sidered as a status symbol for those who own them), and the dog to
guard the camp and to protect the herds from wolves and other predators.
235 Poultry are usually kept for meat and eggs which are sometimes sold by
432 the women in the nearby markets.

233 The main occupation in the area is stock raising. Grazing lands
137 extend generally south of the cultivated land in the northern strip.
[132] The growth of pasture plants is affected by the amount of rainfall in
a particular year. Low rainfall causes acute shortages of pasture and
herbage, and leads to the death of animals by both starvation and thirst.
Pasture plants comprise a wide variety of bushes, scrub, and many other
species of grasses, most of which have a very short life span. These
plants normally persist from December to May; then the land is turned
into arid, hard desert with only a few dispersed patches of dry grass.

There was some smuggling
● 439 648 of goods across the Libyan border, but this smuggling was done on a
very small scale. Before the Egyptian government imposed restrictions
on imports, the prices of the goods in the Libyan market were close to
their prices on the Egyptian market. Except for a very few items which
were not found on the Egyptian market, smuggling goods from Libya offered
653 a very limited financial gain to the smugglers. In recent years, this
situation has changed, however. With population increase in Egypt
threatening disaster, and with the cultivable land in the valley reaching
its maximum productivity, the attention of the government was drawn to
the fertile yet dry land of the northern strip of the Western Desert as
a possible means of expanding the cultivated area. A number of projects
are taking place at the present time under the land reclamation act. The
most important of these projects is the Eastern Mariut project which is
directed toward the irrigation of the lands of the Western Desert
through the channelling of the flood waters of the Nile into a network
of canals covering an extensive area of the northern strip of the Western
315 Desert. Also, recently, oil has been discovered in the area, and since
457 the end of the Second World War, the area has been a major attraction
for tourists.

439 More important is the increase in traffic of smuggled goods from
[651] Libya. Custom restrictions on imported goods to Egypt have created a
[656] scarcity of American and British manufactured goods which raised their
price on the Egyptian market and made smuggling a profitable activity.
An opposite-direction smuggling of sheep and goats from Egypt to Libya
[315] created a great shortage in the Egyptian meat market. Before the discovery of oil in Libya, the Western Desert area supplied the Egyptian

439 market with more than one-third of its lamb meat. The other two-
[315] thirds of the lamb market was supplied from the Sudan, the Delta, and
[315] from Libya. Oil industry in Libya attracted a large number of the young
[178] tribal members in Libya, who had originally undertaken the main task of
[464] sheep pastoralism. As a result, the population of sheep and goats in
Libya dropped sharply. Not only did the Libyan market become unable
to supply the Egyptian market, but it was also unable to support itself
and was forced to pay high prices for the Western Desert sheep and goats.
[457] The price became even more attractive after the devaluation of the
Egyptian pound which gave higher value to the Libyan currency, and
hence, the price of sheep. In the last decade, the number of smuggled
sheep reached a point where it created a great shortage of lamb meat in
Egypt. All government attempts to stop smuggling activities in either
direction have failed.

657 All these factors attracted the attention of the government to the
area and its people. The need to control the tribal population became
evident. But since it is difficult, if not impossible, to control a
population which is constantly on the move, the first step the govern-
ment took to control the tribal population was to settle them in perman-
ent villages. A number of projects are underway. The aims of these
[654] projects are to increase the cultivated land and to improve the pastures
[137] by introducing new and highly nutritive pasture plants in areas where
agriculture is not feasible. Attempts have also been made to promote
local crafts and industries. The intentional efforts of the government
[178] to settle the tribal population is supplemented by the gradual drift of
[464] many tribesmen, especially the younger generation, to seek part-time or

613 682 683 672 558 (124) it was impossible to verify the actual facts or to know what exactly happened. But since the parties involved are still alive and since these events are closely related to present-day happenings, the case is still alive in the minds of the parties involved as well as those of outsiders. Naturlaly, each party tries to present the facts in such a way as to support his own claims. 613 682 683 156 558 Shei'eb, for example, insists that Hakim had bribed members of bait Asabei' to refuse to pay their share in order to embarrass him and make him appear as unable to perform his duties as Aqila. "Hakim always had his eyes on becoming the Aqila of bait Asabei'," said Shei'eb, "but he had no business becoming the Aqila, so he had to make me look bad to the other Awaqil.... He likes to be looked up to as a big man, but it wouldn't work." While other members of bait Asabei' deny that Hakim had bribed them, they agree with Shei'eb that Hakim is a dishonest man. 156 551 788 685 In fact, Hakim's reputation is so widespread in the area that it has earned him the nickname of "the thief". The nickname was given to him a few years ago when he went to Mecca for a pilgrimage with another fellow tribesman. The latter told the story that while in Mecca Hakim had found a purse with two hundred pounds in it. He was supposed to return the purse to the authorities or it would be considered as stealing if he kept it. Stealing in Mecca is not only a crime but also a great sin which makes the holy trip void for the offender. Hakim told his companion that he had given the purse to the authorities. But later, on their way back from Mecca, the friend found the purse hidden in Hakim's luggage. When the story was known in the area, he was referred to as "the thief". 156 685 439 Other accounts of Hakim's dishonesty are told throughout the area, including stories of how he acquired his wealth through stealing

156 equipment from the government projects and from smuggling sheep and mer-
[685] [439] chandise across the Libyan border. Although some of these stories might
be exaggerated, they all point to the fact that Hakim, despite his wealth,
is not the most popular or reputable individual in bait Asabei', and that
although Shei'eb is not a popular individual either, he definitely comes
up the winner in any popularity contest between the two. The question is
156 why Hakim was selected by the Awaqil to replace Shei'eb. The case in-
613 volved more than Shei'eb's inability to collect the money from members of
558 682 his bait. Shei'eb's ineffectiveness seemed to have been taken as an ex-
683 cuse rather than as the direct cause. Many Aqaqil, before Shei'eb, had
failed in collecting money from their own bait without being subject to
direct challenge. What seems to be involved is more than a challenge to
a particular member, Shei'eb. It is a challenge to the whole principle
by which Shei'eb acquired his position as Aqila of bait Asabei': patrilineal succession.

156 Shei'eb is the youngest of four sons of the former Aqila of bait
159 Asabei', Sheikh Elewa. For more than fifty years Sheikh Elewa was the
613 463 undisputed Aqila of bait Asabei'. He also had considerable influence
683 among other tribal segments throughout the whole of the Western Desert
554 by virtue of his position as "nazzar", that is, the expert who assesses
the amount of compensation for wound inflicted in a liable case. The
[428] position of nazzar is a hereditary one and had been handed down from
[779] father to son. The basis for his assessment of wounds are a number of
old books believed to be obtained from Mecca and contain all the judgments of famous Islamic leaders in their assessments of wounds.

[428] Eleven years ago when Sheikh Elewa became blind and too old to

156 159 613 463 683 554 428 (079) exercise his functions, he invited all the important people in the area into a large gathering during which he announced that he was handing the sacred books to Shei'eb, who was to become the nazzar and also to succeed him as the Aqila of bait Asabei'. Although at that time Shei'eb was fairly young, twenty-six, nobody questioned Sheikh Elewa's decision. "He is the Aqila," said one informant, "and he has the right to decide which of his sons is to succeed him. After all, he knows his sons better than anybody else and knows which one is best for the job." Most people

156 159 613 554 578 [661] thought that Sheikh Elewa, being still alive and with clear thinking, would help Shei'eb in performing his duties as Aqila. A few months after Shei'eb took over his father's position, it became apparent that he was too immature for the job. He tried to use his position to take money from members of his bait and when they refused to give him any money, he entered into fights with a number of them. Rumors spread that he took bribes from the disputing parties who came to him for him to assess the legal compensation for wounds to raise or lower his estimate. But still people within bait Asabei' as well as outside it respected Sheikh Elewa's decision and did not challenge Shei'eb openly. But as time passed the dissatisfaction with Shei'eb grew. This dissatisfaction came mainly from members of the Amar who were affected directly by Shei'eb's actions, especially those actions which resulted in the payment of compensation for wounds inflicted in fights.

PHASE II

439 On the evening of May 16, 1966, two members of the Geneishat tribe of Matruh area came to Burg-el-Arab with a large shipment of smuggled cigarettes to leave with their partner in the area, Hadi, from the

439 Aggary Eila. When they arrived with the cigarettes, Hadi was not at his tent; he was in the market of the nearby town selling sheep. They left the cigarettes and left for Alexandria to arrange for their distribution. In Alexandria they met Rabbuh Hakim, the son of Hakim, who married a girl from Alexandria and lived there. He made his income from buying smuggled goods at wholesale prices and selling them at a profit. When he met the two members of the Geneishat tribe and learned from them about the shipment they left at Hadi's place, he wanted to buy it. But they refused on the grounds that Hadi had already contacted someone and that all they could do was to give the first option to that individual. Two
439
625 hours after the conversation between Rabbuh Hakim and the Geneishat, the police officer on duty at the station of Burg el-Arab received an anonymous call from Alexandria informing him that a shipment of smuggled cigarettes worth more than three thousand pounds was hidden in Hadi's olive mill (which was not in use at that time). The call was overheard by a member of the Sanagrah tribe who works as a detective with the police. He tried to warn Hadi of the police raid but it was too late. The officer found the cigarettes in Hadi's olive mill in the exact place where the informant said they would be. The cigarettes were confiscated and Hadi was arrested and later released when the officer didn't find enough evidence to prove that he knew about the shipment or that it belonged to him.

685 The confiscation of the cigarettes enraged both Hadi and his part-
627 ners. They went to Sheikh Ta'ib, the Aqila of bait Eweidha to which Hadi
578 belonged. They told him about their conversation with Rabbu in Alexandria and said that they thought he was the one who informed the police about the shipment. Ta'ib said that Rabbu must have done this because of old

221 them to live on the country to a great extent. In normal times
233 the Bedouin drive their animals on the hoof to Egyptian
[439] markets, slowly, along this rich southern pasture belt, grazing
as they go, so that they arrive in good condition. Finally, there
can be no doubt about the correctness of the Arab claim that a
few weeks residence in the open steppe is a tonic for man and
beast.

233 It must be remembered that there are no water problems at
312 this time of year. Sheep, goats, and camels do not have to be
423 watered from the time the first rains make grass till the end
of April or early in May: even horses do not drink until well
into April. This fact is important, because it means that the
prolific pastures can be grazed by all without dispute, since
the wells, which belong to tribal sections or families, are
not drawn on. While rain is still falling regularly human requirements
are met from pools. To the south of the Tariq
'Aziza, generally speaking, there is no ownership in land—
there are no *hudud*, boundaries, as the Arabs say—and anyone
may cultivate or graze where he pleases, but there is strict
ownership in wells; whereas to the north of the Tariq 'Aziza
there is less narrowly restricted ownership in water, which is
here spring water in abundance, but there are well-defined
rights in arable.[1] The water of the southern wells is essential
for the Bedouin who own the country and who live in it all the
year round, and their rights are respected by those who graze
233 there. Sheep and goats need only drink every second or third
312 day, even in the hottest weather, so that in the period of meagre
pasturage they have a wide range of grazing from the wells,
and the dry grasses, supplemented by evergreen shrubs of the
goosefoot family, are sufficient nourishment for them. Wells
are numerous in the steppe but few of them last out the summer.

233 The animals grazed in the southern steppe are mostly sheep
and camels. The Bedouin say 'Cattle and goats do not migrate;
[221] camels and sheep do'. Camels are essential to nomadic life as
it is impossible to move camp without them, and the richer
Bedouin are in camels the more frequently they move, seeking
231 richer pastures. Cyrenaican dromedaries are heavy beasts,

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[1] Enzo Savarese, *Le Terre della Cirenaica*, Pt. II, 1928, Chap. VII; Massimo Colucci, *Il Regime della Proprietà Fondiaria nell' Africa Italiana*, vol. i, 1942, pp. 210 seq. and 220 seq.

useful mostly for transport and ploughing, though they give a good milk yield and a fair harvest of wool. There are horses, of Berber rather than of Arab type, in every big camp. They are kept for the saddle alone, being much used in old days for hawking, and are a sign of wealth and social position. 231

The census figures for domesticated animals are probably highly inaccurate. The flocks and herds were certainly much greater, especially for camels and horses, before the Italians ravaged the country. The Turkish figures for 1910 were 713,000 sheep, 546,300 goats, 83,300 camels, 23,600 cattle, and 27,000 horses, and it has been reckoned that by 1933 these had been reduced to 98,000 sheep, 25,000 goats, 2,600 camels, 8,700 cattle, and 1,000 horses.[1] Before the outbreak of the second Italo-Sanusi war in 1923 the normal export to the markets of Egypt was 80,000 sheep and goats a year, and it was reckoned that a settled Cyrenaica could produce annually for export at least 100,000 to 150,000 sheep and goats and 6,000 camels. The country used to satisfy a considerable portion of Egypt's meat requirements. It also exported clarified butter in big quantities, 91,835 kilograms being the figure for 1922 and 75,462 the figure for 1923.[2] [648]* [648]* [439] 234 439

Although the Bedouin are by practice and inclination shepherds first and cultivators afterwards, all plough. Barley and some wheat are a staple food. Indeed, in most years they cultivate a surplus of barley which they trade, and it may be said that for the most part they are self-supporting as far as their flour requirements go. On the southern slopes of the plateau and in the *barqa* plain ploughing begins from the middle of October to the middle of November, according to the rains. The coastal belt is sown a little later and the plateau in December and January when the grasses begin to sprout. By mid-April the first harvest, that of the *barqa* and the southern slopes of the plateau, is being reaped, and on the plateau reaping goes on from May to the end of August. Everywhere barley is sown greatly in excess of wheat, for wheaten bread is not considered a necessity and barley is required for horses as well as for men. 243 [262] [231]

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[1] Jean Despois, *La Colonisation Italienne en Libya: Problèmes et Méthodes*, 1935, p. 44; Hans w: son Ahlmann, *La Libia Settentrionale*, 1930, p. 78. (First published in 1928.) [113]

[2] *L'Oltremare*, Mar. 1930; *Rivista delle Colonie Italiane*, 1934, p. 885; Francesco Coro, *Settantasei Anni di Dominazione Turca in Libia*, 1937, p. 82. [113]

243 They could not sow a better crop. There are wild varieties of
barley in Cyrenaica and the country is in every way suited to
its culture. It is very hardy, stands up to drought, and easily
holds its own against the grasses, which are ploughed in with
[251] the seed on the plateau. When the barley and wheat have
been reaped, the grain is stored in *kuf*. On the plateau these
are ancient tomb-caves; elsewhere they are holes dug in the
ground.

[731] In a bad year, and even more in a succession of bad years,
the Bedouin have experienced famine, but in most years the
barley, and to a lesser extent the wheat, give an abundant
[433] yield. Bedouin have told me that they expect from sowing in
the beds of wadis up to a hundredfold of barley and in the
barqa up to fiftyfold. On the plateau the yield is smaller and
in the Marmarica and Sirtica much smaller. In Turkish times
[439] there was a large export of grain from Cyrenaica. Mondaini says
that it was to the mean annual value of 40,000 Lire Sterling
for the years 1885 to 1900.[1] Much of this surplus was bought
by English brewers.

433 The Bedouin way of life is well adapted to their environment.
182 Given the inconstancy of the rainfall and the distribution of
water supplies they would be foolish indeed were they not, at
any rate in part, shepherds. They are not, of course, in all
433 respects self-supporting. They make their winter tents and a
439 good part of their equipment, carpets, sacks, and so forth, from
182 the wool of their beasts, but some things the Bedouin regard as
[237] necessities have to be imported, notably tea, sugar, some rice,
and cloth, especially the *jird*, the woollen cloak of the country.
They trade these with surplus stock on the hoof, skins, wool,
clarified butter, surplus barley, and honey and wax, so that
they are in an economic sense self-supporting.

433 Cyrenaica is a rich country for Bedouin, a poor country for
182 Europeans. Bedouin generally have no overhead expenses in
[556] production. I say generally, because rich men sometimes
[233] employ shepherds, though this is usually the practice of urban
[464] merchants engaged in the sheep trade. Bedouin use their own
labour and that of their families and animals. What is perhaps
[511] more important is that they are prepared to live on what

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[1] G. Mondaini, *Manuale di Storia e Legislazione Coloniale del Regno d'Italia*. 1927, p. 308.

632 communities. They are strangers to each other who meet but
369 do not mix. There is a barrier between them and each distrusts
641 the other. Nevertheless there is a measure of economic interdependence
between them, and the tribes and the towns affect
each other politically. In Turkish times the urban population,
632 which, as we have seen, was small and contained a high proportion
• 439 of Jews, was engaged in trade and domestic industries.
438 The townsmen bought from the Bedouin animals, hides, wool,
clarified butter, honey, beeswax, and ostrich feathers (ostriches
369 were still hunted in the southern steppe in those days), and they
supplied the Bedouin with those things he required but could
not, or would not, make for himself: tea, sugar, rice, cloth,
horseshoes, musket balls, flints, gunpowder, and earthenware.
The urban craftsmen also made leather goods, manufactured
salt from sea water, and conducted trade and exchange. Imports
came by sea from Tripoli, Marseilles, London, Malta, Alexandria,
and Crete, and overland from Alexandria.

But the townsmen of Cyrenaica never dominated the country
as they dominate most of the Arab lands, where through usury,
intimidation, monopoly of trade, and influence in the administration
and the courts they have reduced the countryman to
the position of landless labourer or *métayage* serf. There was
nothing in the Bedouin way of life which gave an opening to the
usurer. Moreover, the towns had no monopoly of trade for, if
necessary, the Bedouin could, since they were self-supporting
in necessities, either go without urban supplies or obtain them
overland from Egypt, as they showed during their war with the
[565] Italians. Consequently there were no rich landowning families
living in the towns at the expense of the country-side, no aghas,
beys, and pashas; and an educated middle class hardly existed
outside the small official circle and lacked both wealth and
influence. In general it may be said that in Cyrenaica the towns
were not parasites on the country, but had their proper functions
as trading centres and suppliers of the needs of the Bedouin
population. The markets were free, not tied to town societies.

632 Nor could the Bedouin be coerced by force or law. The tribes
*648 were largely inaccessible and they were stronger than the towns,
369 even with the administration behind them. The Bedouin were
not afraid of the Turkish Administration, which sat very lightly
on their shoulders, and they did not use the courts. The

619 same time as the Jawazi, by a combination of the ‘Awaqir, the
167 Magharba, and the Bara‘asa, assisted by the Caramanli rulers of
131 Tripoli, and are now settled in the provinces of Fayum, Bani Suef,
Bahaira, and Minya in Egypt. The Jawazi used to live in the
*175 country now occupied by the ‘Awaqir, and they now mostly live
in Minya Province of Egypt and in the Fayum. Another struggle
which greatly altered the tribal distribution in Cyrenaica was
*[648] two wars, the last about 1832, of the Magharba and ‘Awaqir,
aided by their Jibarna kinsmen the ‘Abid and ‘Arafa, against
the tribes which occupied the *barqa* and the remnants of which
now range the littoral of the western Sirtica. These tribes are
known as *al-‘Arab al-Gharb*, the Western Arabs.

*175 So, in 1800 the Harabi and Jibarna tribes, which are now in
131 undisputed control of all Cyrenaica outside the towns, occupied
only part of the country, mostly the central, and the most
619 northerly reaches of the western plateau. The Jibarna were
cut off from the southern steppe by the Fawayid and Jawazi,
the whole of the *barqa* was occupied by *al-‘Arab al-Gharb*, and
the eastern part of the plateau by the Aulad ‘Ali. The wars by
[776] which they drove out their rivals were long and savagely fought
and many incidents in them still form part of Bedouin tradition.

As a result of these tribal wars the descendants of the Bani
*175 Sulaim invaders of Cyrenaica and the Maghrib thus began to
131 return eastwards with a quota of Berber blood about the end of
167 the seventeenth century and pushed out the tribes they found
619 dwelling in the Western Desert of Egypt and pressed them into
the Delta, where they were absorbed by the *fallahin*. The first
intruders from the west were pushed to the Nile by stronger
tribes coming behind them and these by yet stronger. They
pushed one another like trucks on a siding. The Hanadi pushed
out the Bani ‘Una and the Aulad ‘Ali pushed out the Hanadi,
being themselves pushed on from behind by the ‘Abaidat and
other Harabi tribes. Besides the migration of whole tribes from
Cyrenaica into Egypt there has taken place an exodus of many
tribal sections and fragments, owing to intertribal fighting, until
to-day there is not a Cyrenaican tribe, or even large section,
which has not some of its members in Egypt, often whole
619 lineages. The Bedouin of Cyrenaica know their kinsmen in
167 Egypt and sometimes when the price of sheep is low in the
602 Egyptian markets they leave their animals with them to sell on
439 their behalf when prices rise.

sadaqa, freewill gifts, though if a lodge did not send them its 795*
Shaikh was reminded of his obligations. The lodges dealt with 794
certain trading houses at Banghazi, giving them import orders [430]
against future sales of local produce. [439]

This practice worked well enough during the lifetime of the
founder and his sons but, as so often happens in Islamic Orders,
later descendants began to demand individual shares in the
wealth of the Order. While Sayyid Ahmad al-Sharif was its 795*
third Head it began to be the custom, a few years before the 794
Italian invasion, to earmark the surplus revenues of particular 602
lodges for particular members of the Sanusi family, and these [434]
members became regarded as patrons of the lodges which
supplied them and responsible for their supervision. The
territories in which the Order was dominant began to fall into
spheres of influence controlled by individual members of the
family, the allocation of spheres tending to be determined by
the maternal kinship of various members with *Ikhwan* families
occupying lodges in them. Sayyid Muhammad 'Abid and his
brother Sayyid 'Ali al-Khattab had a lien on the *barqa al-baida*
and Fazzan, where their maternal relatives the Ashhab family
were influential Shaikhs of lodges; Sayyid Safi al-Din on the
barqa al-hamra, where his maternal kinsmen the Mahajib family
were predominant; Sayyid Muhammad Hilal on the Marmarica
where his maternal kinsmen of the Sharifian Tursh lineage
had considerable influence; and Sayyid Idris and his brother
Sayyid al-Rida on the Cyrenaican plateau, where they had
maternal ties with the important Bu Saif and Ghumari
families. Sayyid Ahmad al-Sharif had a lien on Tripolitania,
where lived his maternal kinsmen the powerful Fawatir tribe
of Zlitin territory.

The endowments of the Order in Cyrenaica ran into thousands 795*
of hectares.[1] Several lodges had each more than 1,000 hectares 423
attached to them. The fourteen lodges whose lands were
technically registered in 1919 by a mixed Italo-Sanusi commission
possessed more than 50,000 hectares. The total lands
of the Order may well have been more than 200,000 hectares,
or somewhere in the neighbourhood of 500,000 acres. Much of [311]
the land was of use only for grazing, but much was valuable
agricultural country on the plateau. Wherever there were

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[1] An *Ettaro* is 10,000 sq. metres or 2·471 acres.

*175 *648 zone of al-Marj there was also heavy fighting. Here the Italians were on the defensive and the Arabs attacking in a way very costly to themselves. There was also fighting in the Darna zone.

The total result of these operations in all parts of the country was that by mid-July all the principal Turco-Arab camps in central and western Cyrenaica had been occupied: al-'Arqub, Marawa, Taknis, al-Shlaidima, and Ajadabiya. The Bedouin forces had been compelled to withdraw to south of the Wadi al-Farigh, to the southern slopes of the plateau, and to the Marmarica. They continued, nevertheless, especially from the southern slopes of the plateau, to conduct improvised attacks on caravans and advanced posts. It was therefore decided to expel them from their new refuges on these slopes, and with this end in view Italian columns penetrated into the desert-scrub country to the south of the plateau in pursuit of the enemy. The Bedouin bands withdrew eastwards under the pressure of these attacks and formed concentrations at Khawalan and in the Marmarica. They were being hard pressed and had to face at the same time enemies more lethal and demoralizing than Italian arms: plague, smallpox, typhus, and drought and locusts
[931] bringing famine in their train. The crops had failed for two years in succession in Cyrenaica and Tripolitania; and local markets were in the hands of the Italians. The only source of
[439] supplies open to the Bedouin were the Egyptian ports, chiefly al-Sallum, and the markets of the Delta, and from these points large, but insufficient, quantities of food, particularly flour, poured in a steady stream across the frontier.

Bedouin mortality was certainly high. Lo Bello reckoned that by the end of 1914 nearly two-thirds of the population of Cyrenaica had died, 300,000 in 1911 being reduced to 120,000 in 1915.[1] One must agree, however, with Mondaini,[2] that Lo Bello's figure is exaggerated, for the casualties were almost entirely among the Bedouin and had they been as high as he puts them the long resistance of the Bedouin against the Italians in the second Italo-Sanusi war would have been impossible. In spite of their heavy losses and the great hardships they had to endure they kept up the struggle in a succession of to adapt themselves to the kind of fighting which seldom fails 175* to upset the orthodox military mind. Text-book strategy does 648* not apply to an enemy who wanders at will over a country with 795* which he is familiar from birth, among a friendly people ready to provide him with exact intelligence, and in small mobile bands; and whose strategy is little more than the guerrilla imperatives—strike suddenly, strike incessantly, strike hard, get out quick. An army can only be manœuvred to inflict defeats on the enemy and to destroy his armed forces when he has an opposing army which can be brought to decisive engagements. The Italians were fighting a people, not an army, and a people can only be defeated by total imprisonment or extermination.

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[1] 'Le Vicende politico-militari dei primi dodici Anni di Occupazione Italiana in Cirenaica', *Rivista Coloniale*, 1925, p. 126.

[2] Op. cit., p. 374.

If the Bedouin had had anything which could clearly have been isolated as 'armed forces', these could easily have been destroyed by Italian superiority in men and machines. But [701] they had nothing which could, properly speaking, be called an army, and they had no lines which could be pierced or turned and no strongholds which could be taken or in which troops could be contained. Against Bedouin it was of little profit to occupy towns and villages, for they retired to less accessible regions or circulated gaily between the Italian garrisons. Control of the roads and ports was also of little benefit. Roads were [439] meaningless to the Bedouin and they were independent of overseas trade since they could live on the country for immediate [705] necessities and obtain from Egypt what few additional supplies they required to carry on the war. To ease the supply problem, as well as to be of maximum nuisance to the Italian garrisons [701] and convoys, the guerrilla bands were kept as small and mobile as possible. Their smallness and mobility confused the slow and unwieldy Italian columns. If the columns split up they were liable to be surrounded by concerted action of the bands and annihilated, whereas if they kept together, the cost of formation was the loss of speed and surprise. There seemed to be no enemy forces to fight, yet attack was incessant. There were no fixed points of opposition. It was indefinite and disseminated.

Even when contact could be established with the guerrilla bands and they could be defeated, as they often were, their defeat could not be turned into more than a temporary rout, for there was no highly organized tactical system to be upset,

Second, the fiction that nothing has happened, which characterises the father's behavior, does not cease with the termination of the celebrations. Each morning, soon after daybreak and before the camp is astir, the groom must leave his bride and repair to his father's tent to lie at his father's side "as he always had done in the past, as if he had not left him." This conventional ruse is followed, not just for the seven days of wedding festivities, but is continued after the groom has moved back into the camp proper, and pitched his tent alongside his father's, with the ropes of the two tents crossing. 585 593

In matters other than sleeping arrangements, this fiction that "nothing has happened" is maintained. Marriage does not mean the immediate creation of a wholly separate domestic unit. Save for the appearance of an additional tent, the ordinary run of daytime activities is scarcely altered. To mention perhaps the most important feature of the relationships between father and son, the groom continues to eat with his father. As yet, the son does not use his own bowl,[1] and may not, indeed, do so for several years. The important symbolism of "eating together" or "eating out of the one bowl," the act of commensality creating a bond of fellowship about which Robertson Smith[2] wrote so eloquently can only be referred to here in one of its many aspects. Bedouin themselves stress that eating together is a strong bond, and the communal meal is always used for this purpose after the settlement of a dispute, or at the conclusion of a blood-money agreement, and so on. It is significant also in the sense that those who partake of a meal accept the authority of the host; he becomes their protector, and a blow against one of them is struck at him also. Even if the guest is an enemy,[3] as long as he has eaten from another's bowl his life is safe. [592] 593 264 571 182 [574]

The slaughter of an animal for another person creates a bond which has its roots in the intimate connection between man and his animals. In a very vivid way, the Bedouin view their animals as part of themselves, as part of their *Risiq*, their general wealth, in which their sons are included. It is this mystical association between a man and his animals which distinguishes a meal consisting of the meat of an animal slaughtered from ones' own flock or herd from a meal consisting of meat bought from a butcher's shop — often given by the plateau peoples of Northern Cyrenaica to their guests, but which the camel-herding Bedouin of the south regard as despicable hospitality. A slaughtered animal is the food, *par excellence*, which establishes this bond 571 231 264 182 [574] [186]

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[1] When Bedouin take their meals, they eat from large wooden bowls imported from south of the Sahara. It is a matter of custom that a man does not eat alone unless it is unavoidable, a custom of such strength, that, when, one day, only an elder, occupying a tent the ropes of which were crossed with mine, was left in camp, he brought his bowl into my tent "so that I will be eating with a man." [415] [439] [123]

[2] William Robertson Smith. *The Religion of the Semites*. 3rd ed. London: Macmillan, 1927. [113]

[3] A stranger entering a camp is under no obligation to give his identity. Few do so until they have partaken of a meal. In the past, the Bedouin claim, the period of anonymity could last for 40 days, but nowadays, they say they limit it to two only. I have known strangers enter a camp, receive entertainment, and leave without offering any specific identity. [574] [609]

of the more independent client tribes. In other words, all the 161
Bedouin of Cyrenaica are nomadic in some degree, some more 162
and some less, and Col. De Agostini rightly stresses that 114
whether they move much or little they all have the same
characteristics when compared to peasants and townsmen.[1]
They are all *bwadi*, as the Cyrenaican dialect has it, people of
the tents, and they see themselves as a single people against
the *hadur*, the citizens.

I have so far said nothing of the towns of Cyrenaica or of 632
their inhabitants. They play a minor part in this story, which
is about the Bedouin, but they cannot be entirely left out of it
on account of their economic and political relations with the
Bedouin, so I take this opportunity to give a brief account of
them.[2]

Banghazi, which is supposed to be called after the saint Sidi 175
Ghazi, buried in the town, is on the site of the classical Berenice. 632
It is believed that after the disappearance of the Graeco-
Roman community the site was unoccupied till the fifteenth
century, when it was reoccupied by immigrants from the
mercantile communities of the Tripolitanian coast, among
whom Misuratans, both Muslims and Jews, preponderated in
numbers and wealth. The Genoese Della Cella, who passed [162]
through the fly-infested town in 1817–18, in the time of the
Caramanlis, says that it then contained about 5,000 inhabitants, [441]
at least half of whom were Jews.[3] Shaikh Muhammad 'Uthman
al-Hashaishi, who was in the town in 1896, says that the [167]
greater part of the traders were immigrants from Sfax and the [114]
Island of Jerba—he was himself a Tunisian and often tended
to exaggerate Tunisian influence—with some Greeks and a few
Italians. 'As to the Turks, they do not give themselves to
trade.' At this time Banghazi was a very simple, mostly mud-
and-rubble, town, and the learned Shaikh makes a point of
telling us that there were no posts or telegraphs, nor even a
railway, save a line of three kilometres joining the official

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[1] Ibid., pp. 32–3.

[2] The historical information is chiefly derived from Agostini, ibid., pp. 413–43.

[3] Paolo Della Cella, *Narrative of an Expedition from Tripoli in Barbary to the Western Frontier of Egypt in 1817*, 1822, pp. 194–5. (First published in 1819.) F. W. and H. W. Beechey (*Proceedings of the Expedition to explore the Northern Coast of Africa from Tripoly Eastward in 1821 and 1822*, 1828, p. 299) [113]
consider Della Cella's estimate too high. Theirs is 2,000.

162 true numbers. As recipients of aid programs, their rations
114 are based upon the number of members per family. For these
[657] purposes, they are anxious to present as high a population
figure as possible. They exaggerate their livestock count in
order to receive more fodder, and, at other times, underestimate
their numbers to escape taxes.

162 For purposes of this study, the Bedouin population of
161 al-Qasr is about 1,500 to 3,000. Most of this population lives
361 on the coastal area and in the cultivable *wadi* areas. The
remainder is scattered south of the plateau region, near the
621 desert proper. The *'izba* sector of al-Qasr may be described
*613 as a nucleated cluster or settlement, but due to the nature
of the Bedouin segmentary lineage system, with its relatively
autonomous kin-based residence groups, this sector lacks the
usual degree of social interaction and integration associated
621 with the village or hamlet. The *'izba* might be described as a
multi-nucleated settlement or cluster. Each lineage has its
*613
423 own *mintaqa*. Each *mintaqa* usually has a small dry-goods store
631 owned and operated by a lineage member and catering chiefly
•443 to his own lineage-mates. Water and land in the *'izba* sector
423 are individually owned. In the barley-pasture area, rights
*613
621 and privileges of ownership are vested in the corporate group,
even though the Bedouins and the government claim that tribally
423 owned land is illegal. All land boundaries, whether a *mintaqa*
or an individual's plot, are well-marked and well-known. The

These gardens

433 furnish staples for local consumption and more cash crops for
241 the Marsa Matruh market. Matruh is dependent upon these
311 vegetable goods from al-Qasr, to the extent that the Governor
434 has forbidden the Bedouins to truck their goods to the higher
• 443 priced market in Alexandria.
[656]

654 The success of arboriculture in al-Qasr has been the
245 result of a well-organized reclamation program in this area
177 by the government. The relatively good supply of fresh water
433 and the proximity of a large market town has made al-Qasr an
atypical case in the government's attempt to transform the desert pastoral economy. Since 1960, the government's program has met with a great deal of success. Such results have, of course, induced the Bedouins of al-Qasr to accept change, and have further enhanced the future of the program. The figures below show, as of 1964, the plant distribution of orchards in the _'izba_ of al-Qasr, and indicate the measure of success attained by the governmental reclamation program.

The environmental conditions of al-Qasr are particularly well-suited for the olive tree: the olive has been the basis of the economic transformation of al-Qasr. The Bedouins tend to play down the government's role in developing olive arboriculture in the al-Qasr area. But before 1960, only the very
[556] wealthy men could afford to deal in the olive market, since it
involves a great initial financial risk. Hence, prior to the entry of the government's program, there were 2,743 olive trees

*613 with Bait Bu Taram of 'Ailit Lazumi. These marriages and
159 their resultant alliances enhance the political power and
581 social status of Hajj 'Ali within and without al-Qasr.
156

Although he has no education himself, and neither reads
159 nor writes, Hajj 'Ali has sent his son to the University of
156 Alexandria. Hajj 'Ali's son is the only boy from al-Qasr
873
[212] ever to attend the university. Hajj 'Ali desired that his
son study law at the university or enter the military academy
"and become an officer." But his son objected to this, saying:
"Either way I will be employed by the government and will not
be permitted to travel and see other countries." Hajj 'Ali did
not argue with this: he said that his son should study what
he wished. The son is now studying in the Faculty of Commerce
156 at Alexandria. Hajj 'Ali is also sending his daughters to
159 the primary school in al-Qasr. Not all of the Bedouins believe
872
562 that girls should receive an education.

156 Hajj 'Ali places among the "status group" in terms
159 of wealth. Although he has now committed himself to olive-
554 farming as a way of life, he remains one of the biggest sheep
472 owners in al-Qasr. Therefore, he is identified with both traditional
and modern symbols of status. Hajj 'Ali differs in
156 one important way from other members of the "status group"
159
554 in that he owns three small general stores, two in al-Qasr
443 and one far to the west in Sallum. This fact has several
423 significant implications. Shops in al-Qasr (there are five
472
*[613]

156 of them) cater largely to the needs of the lineage in whose
159 territory they are located. They are operated mostly on a
554 credit basis. Lineage members, as debtors, feel gratitude
● 443 but also, and more importantly, loyalty toward their kinsman
423 and creditor. Hajj 'Ali is the only member of al-Qasr who
472
*[613]
[452] owns two shops, and the only Bedouin in the whole Western Desert
who owns three shops. His brother owns a shop in Matruh.
156 Furthermore, the shop in Sallum is in a strategic position on
159 the Libyan border which, coincidentally or not, is a point
554 for importing, and also smuggling, foreign goods into Egypt.
443 The possession and utilization of foreign products is definitely
439
472 a status symbol all over Egypt. Hence, the person in this
area who can control, however slightly, the distribution of
such goods has a lever with which to exact prestige and
favors from the "status group" in al-Qasr who now welcome
these symbols (tobacco, pistols, rifles, radios) and the
bureaucrats of Marsa Matruh who crave them (food goods,
clothing materials, car parts).

156 Besides all this, Hajj 'Ali is involved in a small
159 stone-cutting operation which supplies stones for house
554 building, he cooperates with his three brothers in a well-
[316] cleaning concern, and contracts government heavy equipment
[312]
[427] to build earth dams. The material evidence of his status
[342] is that he is the only man in al-Qasr with two compound-type
[595] houses (one he built thirteen years ago), and the only man
with four wives.

1

236 286 Wool is also very important to the economy of Awlad Ali. Lamb's wool is either sold or spun and woven into rugs. Goat's wool is spun and woven to provide the cover for the tents.

231 [262] [432] [438] 438 439 443 Sheep and goats are rarely slaughtered for meat except on special occasions. Most male and many female lambs and kids are sold in the market and the money is used to buy the necessary supply of food (like tea, sugar, salt, etc.), clothes, and other household items. Most of these items are obtained from the shops in the settled communities in the area, although some of the major items can be obtained only from large urban centers like Alexandria.

231 492 [236] [554] The other domesticated animals that Awlad Ali keep are the donkey for transport and riding, a few camels for heavy transport and also for wool, very few horses for riding on special occasions (they are considered as a status symbol for those who own them), and the dog to guard the camp and to protect the herds from wolves and other predators. 235 432 Poultry are usually kept for meat and eggs which are sometimes sold by the women in the nearby markets.

233 137 [132] The main occupation in the area is stock raising. Grazing lands extend generally south of the cultivated land in the northern strip. The growth of pasture plants is affected by the amount of rainfall in a particular year. Low rainfall causes acute shortages of pasture and herbage, and leads to the death of animals by both starvation and thirst. Pasture plants comprise a wide variety of bushes, scrub, and many other species of grasses, most of which have a very short life span. These plants normally persist from December to May; then the land is turned into arid, hard desert with only a few dispersed patches of dry grass.

682 settlement is usually made after the parties have agreed to it,
627 yet, in certain instances where one of the parties later feels that
672 the settlement was not just or that he was coerced into accepting
695 it, he may ask for a second Mi'ad during which new procedures start
in the case. In the present case, although Mahdi had originally
accepted the judgment of the awaqil, as time passed and he realized that he was unable to pay the bloodmoney, he started to question the feasibility of the settlement. He discussed the matter
682 672 with Sheikh Suliman el-Gerery from the Murabiteen tribe of Gerera,
695 a tribe whose members are feared throughout the area for the belief
554 that they have certain supernatural powers. Sheikh Suliman himself
792 [776] is highly respected, and people believe that after his death he will
become "wali" or a saint. After hearing Mahdi's complaint, Sheikh
Suliman told him that the settlement was unjust and told him that he
would do something about it. The following Thursday, Sheikh Suliman
called on Mahdi and asked him to bring his donkey and follow him.
They rode to a small desert town called Bahig where the local market
613 is held every Thursday. On market day, the awaqil of various tribal
517 segments usually gather in front of the general store in the town
571 443 drinking tea and chatting until their sons or the younger members
576 of their families sell the sheep and buy the necessary items. Everyone passing by the gathering is expected to greet the gathering, getting off his donkey as a sign of respect to the prominent people.
[589] Failure to greet a fellow tribesman is considered a serious offense
liable to a fine of more than L. 50 and ten goats in certain cases.
[673] It is considered a very serious crime. One informant once told me,
000

would have dropped in on the camp. In another situation, two men entered a shop 613
in a market-place; inside sat two men of a feuding group who, instead of retreating 628
hastily, greeted those who had just entered, and the latter returned the greeting with 682
blows on the head from the butts of their rifles. Markets in Cyrenaica are recognized [443]
to be places of peace. In their actions the two offenders not only injured two others [683]
but also broke a taboo in a public place. The victim's group now had to avenge not
only the injury but the insult that the breach of taboo carried with it, as well. In
most feud relationships this is characteristic. It is never a matter of a simple homicide,
but of killing a man at the entrance to his tent, between the centre poles of his tent,
or taking the life of a minor, or an elder too old to carry arms and so on. Each successive killing ensures that the hostile relationships will be perpetuated.

The third step in this exposition, therefore, is the association of a state of feud with the secondary order of segmentation.

When the relationships between the structurally superior primary tribal sections 619
are examined, the arguments against the necessity for peace are stronger than in the
case of secondary sections. Relationships between them are few and irregular. Only
occasionally do members of these groups meet, and then often accidentally; very
many men of collateral primary sections are complete strangers one to the other.
If a homicide occurs between two primary sections it is unlikely that any attempt to 619
open negotiations will be made. The offender's camp may be raided by a *ghazi* 682
recruited from the victim's kinsmen. There would be no question of these primary [721]
sections going to war. On a raid firearms may be used, but the action is limited to a
strike-and-run affair. If the issue is joined and members of both sides are ranged [726]
against each other they fight with sticks to avoid large-scale slaughter: warfare must
not be allowed within the tribe. Wars belong to intertribal relationships. For one of 175
these wars, apart from hearsay evidence, some records exist. These tell of a war 619
which took place during the period 1860 to 1865, in which there were planned cam- 726
paigns, the organization of fighters into groups, and provisions for a labour force
in the home territory, large enough to produce sufficient food to maintain an army
in the field. During this war several hundred people were killed.

At this point, it is possible to summarize the stages in this exposition of the 619
Bedouin view in diagrammatic form. 726

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

Had the Senussi been successful in the last war, they 175
would no doubt have brought in the 'Ibeidat or the 'Awaqir 619
from Cyrenaica to replace the Awlad 'Ali in Egypt.

At the present day the Awlad 'Ali, especially the eastern 619
sections near the Nile Valley, have almost ceased to be nomadic, 178
and only the old men have memories of their former warlike
habits. They suffered considerably during the Great War,
but are again becoming prosperous. They now own large
comfortable tents, are beginning to build houses and clear
out cisterns, and are also said to be increasing in numbers.[1]
So civilized have they grown that my guides, one a Sinai
Arab and the other an 'Abadi, concurred in calling them
"green"—not real desert-worthy Bedouins.

Perhaps as a result of Libyan influence, or more probably 142
the better nurture and climate, they are taller, heavier, stronger,
and lighter-complexioned than the lightly built Arabs of
Sinai and Hijaz. Also they are much franker and more 157
straightforward than their shifty and suspicious eastern cousins, 181
and altogether more trustworthy. Their women only veil 562
themselves to strangers, and talk quite naturally and cheerfully 834
to the men of their own tribe. 609

They cultivate as much barley as they can, using a 243
primitive plough drawn by camels, in the clayey hollows [492]
scattered over their very stony limestone desert, but, as the [132]
rainfall is very uncertain, a good crop only occurs every five
or six years. After harvest, they exchange some of their [437]
barley for maize, which the women grind to make bread
as required, and some for dried dates. The seed for next [251]
year is buried in a hole lined with straw and covered with
clay, and a year's forage for the animals is set aside. The [432]
rest of the crop goes to market, and for a short time the [426]
Arab has money to buy clothes for himself and his family
and at utmost need to pay off some of the numerous debts he
has inherited from his forefathers. Soon he is reduced again
to the clothes he wears, the tent he sleeps in, and his animals
grazing in the desert.

They are great breeders of camels and sheep, and a busy 436
traffic in these goes on weekly in the markets of Hammam, 178
'Amriya, and the Beheira. So they have got into the habit [438] [433] [illegible]

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[1] At the 1927 census, the Western Desert Arabs, Awlad 'Ali, Jawabis, etc., numbered
38,928 souls exclusive of those settled in Beheira. But Pacho, 100 years ago, estimated them [161]
at 38,000 souls.

562 such compensation. In forfeiting her rights of inheritance, a woman
428 secures for herself and her children the continuous support of her
593 kin-group and the protection of her rights. This support was denied in the few cases I was able to collect in which the woman demanded her share of inheritance. The following is one of these cases. The material
159 presented is a summary of the life history of Fatma, who at the time of
562 the study, was a shopkeeper managing the small general store she owned
428
593 near the railroad station of Burg el-Arab, some fifty miles west of
[444] Alexandria. She also practiced healing and midwifery on a part-time
[759] basis.

Fatma was the only daughter with four sons of sheikh El-Asi, who at one time was the aqila of bait Hussein of the Sanagrah tribal segment
[627] in the area. He was also known as a mardi and was frequently sought in
[755] mediation of disputes. He was believed to have supernatural power which he used to cure people for a certain amount of money. During his life-
[454] time, he had acquired a sizable sum of money which he invested in live-
[233] stock. At the time of his death his herd, which numbered more than 900
[422] sheep and goats, was considered the finest in the area. He had no barley
[423] lands because his camp was deep in the desert, but he had fine grazing land.

Throughout the area the four sons were known for being arrogant and irresponsible. Three of them were employed by one of the irrigation projects carried on by the government in the area as construction workers; the fourth looked after the herd of his father. All four were known as chasers of women, and they frequently went to Alexandria to visit prostitutes and drink liquor.

[444) Fatma was first married when she was eighteen to a man from Alexandria who had opened a general store in the area where her father

159 lived. Five years ago the husband died in a mining accident leaving
562 Fatma with a ten-month-old boy. By that time, her father had been dis-
428 abled, and her brothers wanted to manage her husband's store on her be-
593 444 half. Knowing that her brothers were greedy, she refused and insisted
that she take care of the store herself. The brothers objected on the
grounds that it was not customary for a decent woman to be exposed to
the customers in the store. When she insisted, the brothers threatened
her. When the threats did not work, they beat her. After that, she
[625] went to the police station in the area, filed a complaint against her
brothers, and asked for police protection. The police officer in charge
brought the brothers in and warned them that if they interfered with the
store, not only would he arrest them, but he would also use his influ-
ence to get them forced from the irrigation projects where three of them
worked. The threat worked, and they became friendly with their sister,
buying things for the store whenever they went to Alexandria and some-
times helping in the store with her consent when she was on housecalls
159 as a midwife. A year later Fatma was married for the second time to a
562 distant cousin; a few months later her father died. In a family meeting
428 593 that followed the funeral, Fatma made her announcement that she was claim-
233 ing her share of her father's herd. The brothers were angry and tried to
[587] beat her. But the older members of the bait who were present at the meet-
ing stopped them and told them that Fatma had all the right to claim her
share of the inheritance according to Awlad Ali ways and that there was
[578] nothing that they could do about it. She was characterized in that
meeting as "bint haram" (illegitimate child), an insult used to refer
to those who show selfishness in their kinship obligations. When she
left the camp with her share of the herd, this seemed to have severed

159 the relationship between her and her brothers.

562 428 Following her action and until the time of the study, they had
593 never visited her and she had never visited them. Her husband took
[237] care of the herd; and the arrangement worked out all right until the
159 husband told Fatma one day that he was going to marry a second wife.
562 593 She refused, but he went ahead with the marriage without her consent.
595 He brought the new wife to live with Fatma in the same tin hut in which
they were living. He started to pay more attention to the new wife and
to neglect Fatma; whenever the latter complained, he beat her. Then,
before one of the religious feasts, he sold two of Fatma's sheep and
bought his new wife a dress and a silver bracelet. When Fatma objected
[164] and they argued, he hit her with a stick on the head; she was hospitalized for a week with a serious head wound. While in the hospital, she
went to her brothers who lived only two miles away, but they refused to
159 come to her assistance. She theh went to sheikh Elewa (the aqila of
562 Bait Asabei) and threw herself on him. He met with the husband and con-
574 593 vinced him to divorce Fatma. He kept forty sheep of Fatma's herd as com-
595 pensation for the mahr he had paid her and the marriage expenses, then
586 took his new wife and moved from Fatma's hut. Fatma then returned and
159 managed her financial affairs successfully herself. She managed the
562 444 store and hired a shepherd to take care of the sheep. At the time of
[233] the present study she was respected by almost everybody in the area, including members of the local administration. She is known to be reason-
[629] able and of sound opinion, and her store functions as the meeting place
[521] for many of the tribal mi'ads and for casual conversations. She is also
considered as a liason between the tribal population in the area and the
local government administration, and is respected by both sides.

654 245 177 1960, were olive tree owners. One individual, who owned 400 trees before the reclamation program, now owns 1,400 trees. His increase has not all been at government expense, but a large share of it has been. Of the 9,514 trees planted by the government, 4,666 of them have been planted in the barley and wadi area to the south; 4,848 in the garden area on the coast. In the southern sector, a Bedouin who owns at [312] least ten acres of land may have the government drill a well and erect a windmill pump on his property. For this, he pays [452] 350 Egyptian pounds (approximately $1,000.00) over a thirty-year period. The Bedouin is willing to undertake this contract, and also to take land out of barley production, because he sees the future security of the olive market. Because of this, also, he is willing to agree on land boundaries and to register his land with the government.

657 Economic transition would not be possible, nor could the Bedouins afford to hazard it, were it not for government welfare payments in the form of staple products. These rations stabilize the mixed economy of the al-Qasr while promoting a shift to a fuller dependence on agriculture. Of the thirteen 657 474 cooperative societies in the Matruh area, al-Qasr is the largest and has been designated as a pilot project for the whole Western Desert. Al-Qasr garners the largest share of government aid, and, consequently, is heavily dependent upon it. The table below shows the amount of aid given monthly to

156 of them) cater largely to the needs of the lineage in whose
159 554 territory they are located. They are operated mostly on a
443 credit basis. Lineage members, as debtors, feel gratitude
423 but also, and more importantly, loyalty toward their kinsman
472 *[613] and creditor. Hajj 'Ali is the only member of al-Qasr who
● [452] owns two shops, and the only Bedouin in the whole Western Desert
who owns three shops. His brother owns a shop in Matruh.
156 Furthermore, the shop in Sallum is in a strategic position on
159 the Libyan border which, coincidentally or not, is a point
554 443 for importing, and also smuggling, foreign goods into Egypt.
439 The possession and utilization of foreign products is definitely
472 a status symbol all over Egypt. Hence, the person in this
area who can control, however slightly, the distribution of
such goods has a lever with which to exact prestige and
favors from the "status group" in al-Qasr who now welcome
these symbols (tobacco, pistols, rifles, radios) and the
bureaucrats of Marsa Matruh who crave them (food goods,
clothing materials, car parts).

156 Besides all this, Hajj 'Ali is involved in a small
159 stone-cutting operation which supplies stones for house
554 [316] building, he cooperates with his three brothers in a well-
[312] cleaning concern, and contracts government heavy equipment
[427] to build earth dams. The material evidence of his status
[342] is that he is the only man in al-Qasr with two compound-type
[595] houses (one he built thirteen years ago), and the only man
with four wives.

562 such compensation. In forfeiting her rights of inheritance, a woman
428 secures for herself and her children the continuous support of her
593 kin-group and the protection of her rights. This support was denied
in the few cases I was able to collect in which the woman demanded her
share of inheritance. The following is one of these cases. The material
159 presented is a summary of the life history of Fatma, who at the time of
562 the study, was a shopkeeper managing the small general store she owned
428
593 near the railroad station of Burg el-Arab, some fifty miles west of
[444] Alexandria. She also practiced healing and midwifery on a part-time
[759] basis.

Fatma was the only daughter with four sons of sheikh El-Asi, who
at one time was the aqila of bait Hussein of the Sanagrah tribal segment
[627] in the area. He was also known as a mardi and was frequently sought in
[755] mediation of disputes. He was believed to have supernatural power which
he used to cure people for a certain amount of money. During his life-
[454] time, he had acquired a sizable sum of money which he invested in live-
[233] stock. At the time of his death his herd, which numbered more than 900
[422] sheep and goats, was considered the finest in the area. He had no barley
[423] lands because his camp was deep in the desert, but he had fine grazing
land.

Throughout the area the four sons were known for being arrogant and irresponsible. Three of them were employed by one of the irrigation projects carried on by the government in the area as construction workers; the fourth looked after the herd of his father. All four were known as chasers of women, and they frequently went to Alexandria to visit prostitutes and drink liquor.

[444] Fatma was first married when she was eighteen to a man from Alexandria who had opened a general store in the area where her father

There was some smuggling
439 of goods across the Libyan border, but this smuggling was done on a
648 very small scale. Before the Egyptian government imposed restrictions
on imports, the prices of the goods in the Libyan market were close to
their prices on the Egyptian market. Except for a very few items which
were not found on the Egyptian market, smuggling goods from Libya offered
653 a very limited financial gain to the smugglers. In recent years, this
situation has changed, however. With population increase in Egypt
threatening disaster, and with the cultivable land in the valley reaching
its maximum productivity, the attention of the government was drawn to
the fertile yet dry land of the northern strip of the Western Desert as
a possible means of expanding the cultivated area. A number of projects
are taking place at the present time under the land reclamation act. The
most important of these projects is the Eastern Mariut project which is
directed toward the irrigation of the lands of the Western Desert
through the channelling of the flood waters of the Nile into a network
of canals covering an extensive area of the northern strip of the Western
315 Desert. Also, recently, oil has been discovered in the area, and since
457 the end of the Second World War, the area has been a major attraction
for tourists.

439 More important is the increase in traffic of smuggled goods from
[651] Libya. Custom restrictions on imported goods to Egypt have created a
[656] scarcity of American and British manufactured goods which raised their
price on the Egyptian market and made smuggling a profitable activity.
An opposite-direction smuggling of sheep and goats from Egypt to Libya
[315] created a great shortage in the Egyptian meat market. Before the discovery of oil in Libya, the Western Desert area supplied the Egyptian

439 market with more than one-third of its lamb meat. The other two-
[315] thirds of the lamb market was supplied from the Sudan, the Delta, and
[315] from Libya. Oil industry in Libya attracted a large number of the young
[178] tribal members in Libya, who had originally undertaken the main task of
[464] sheep pastoralism. As a result, the population of shcep and goats in
Libya dropped sharply. Not only did the Libyan market become unable
to supply the Egyptian market, but it was also unable to support itself
and was forced to pay high prices for the Western Desert sheep and goats.
[457] The price became even more attractive after the devaluation of the
Egyptian pound which gave higher value to the Libyan currency, and
hence, the price of sheep. In the last decade, the number of smuggled
sheep reached a point where it created a great shortage of lamb meat in
Egypt. All government attempts to stop smuggling activities in either
direction have failed.

657 All these factors attracted the attention of the government to the
area and its people. The need to control the tribal population became
evident. But since it is difficult, if not impossible, to control a
population which is constantly on the move, the first step the govern-
ment took to control the tribal population was to settle them in perman-
ent villages. A number of projects are underway. The aims of these
[654] projects are to increase the cultivated land and to improve the pastures
[137] by introducing new and highly nutritive pasture plants in areas where
agriculture is not feasible. Attempts have also been made to promote
local crafts and industries. The intentional efforts of the government
[178] to settle the tribal population is supplemented by the gradual drift of
[464] many tribesmen, especially the younger generation, to seek part-time or

433 233 183 241 The Bedouin of al-Qasr idealize the life of the pastoralist. It is a dominant theme in their culture. Gardening and arboriculture are perceived by the Bedouins as involving [461] long hours of work, anxiety over waiting for profits, and complex market operations. They understand the logic and [556] operation of the sheep market. Sheep are a store of value, a source of security, and a medium of exchange. In a good year of rain, a man can reap a good crop of barley, and buy more sheep against the inevitable bad year to come. While most 472 433 241 434 177 Bedouins are, in one way or another, involved with the modern cash economy which ties al-Qasr to Marsa Matruh, the Bedouins who go into the production of cash crops on a large scale are those who can afford the risk of failure and who can survive the meager profits of the initial stage. These are the men who can adjust their world view from that of the pastoralist to that of the entrepreneur. There are only a few of these men in al-Qasr but they dominate the economy. Through them, most of the Bedouins of al-Qasr are linked to the national economy.

Land and Economy

433 177 178 The period between 1960 and 1964 was one of significant economic change in al-Qasr. Dependence upon farming increased while pastoralist activities became less important. In the past, none of the Bedouins now living in al-Qasr were "nomads;" even my oldest informants had moved only once or twice to

462 them or any innate aptitude for them; this insistence is an index of the
424 jealousy with which she is prepared to guard her rights. Each right derived
from this or that small task is an extension of her control over the male.

462 The force and significance of this control is, perhaps, best seen in a
woman's right to cook. At marriage a woman must have at least the minimum
424 of cooking utensils, and one of the rights a man acquires in a woman is
252 that she cooks for him. This is something a man cannot do for himself.
[593] Therefore, when a man ill-treats his wife or threatens her with divorce, she
can retaliate by refusing to cook, or leave the tent altogether to return to her
father. A man bereft of this service is in a very sorry plight indeed. The
legal dominance of the male, seemingly autocratic, is reduced at every
point by the control a woman exercises through her exclusive right to perform tasks. The limits to the area of her coercive powers are significant.
562 They are confined almost wholly to domestic relationships. Legally, women
suffer such disabilities that they are almost of the status of minors; in
reality, their day-to-day living is far from intolerable because they are able
to control males over a wide field of relationships.

462 Men, excluded in the main from domestic duties around the tent, perform tasks to which their legal rights are tied. While women have access
424
231 to wells for water used by human beings, the transport of larger quantities
of water over longer distances, requiring the use of camels, is a task which
falls to the men. Watering of animals is done by men. Only they can
slaughter the animals for food. The meat of an animal slaughtered by a
woman is not "free," in a ritual sense, for human consumption. In an
extremity only, a woman can, in effect, kill an animal, but the knife which
cuts its throat must be held in a male hand, even if it is the hand of a very
462 small boy. The exploitation of the land is also the male prerogative. They
[424] plough and sow the grain; incidental help may be provided by wives working
[241] alongside their husbands during the early part of reaping, but the main
reaping is done entirely by men. Transportation of grain to the mounds is
also carried out by men, and it is they only who have access to the grain
stores when quantities are withdrawn for family use. Sheep-shearing is
[236] carried out entirely by males,[10] the fleeces are stacked by them and the
[432] distribution and sales of these is directed by the male head of the tent.

Additional to these major tasks which males undertake are a number of
minor ones. Men sew strips of cotton together to make clothes for both
sexes. They also make rope of grass, albeit in a desultory sort of way, by
twisting together the strands between the palms of the hands. A number of
[334] other tasks fall to the men by virtue of the fact that the sexes are separated
[342] in the tent by a divider of blanket material, which may be taken down
when only members of the elementary family are about, but which is put

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[461]
[533]
[538]
[831]
[10] This work is reserved for the younger men and takes the form of a festival during which lewd songs are sung and poems with obscene themes or references are recited loudly and within the hearing of elders, in a manner not dissimilar to the behaviour of bachelors at a wedding.

233 178 with the movement toward a cash economy, this has changed.
[465] The shepherd receives 8 to 10 piasters for each head of sheep
which he tends. The Bedouins who have taken up farming can
spare none of their family for sheep-herding chores. If he
[497] can afford it, during the dry season, a Bedouin may ship his
sheep to the Nile Valley by train at 12 piasters per head.
But the government will not accept sheep for shipment unless
they are accompanied by a shepherd. The role of shepherd
has become a very specialized one in the al-Qasr area. Few
[554] of the al-Qasr Bedouins are shepherds, and the role is
reserved for the poorer men without land.

241 Plowing in the garden area is done by hand. Usually,
407 the plow is pulled by a donkey but occasionally, if one can
492 afford it, a camel or a horse will be used. A man and his
● [462] sons handle all of the agricultural chores with the exception
178 of the winnowing process which the women do. Traditionally,
241 barley was threshed by camels plodding on it. The Bedouins say
492 that this is the best way because the soft feet of the camel
do not crush the kernel. Now, however, very few men can afford
[409] a camel. Threshing is done with a heavy wooden sled pulled by
241 a donkey or a horse. Tractors, when available, are used for
407 agricultural plowing in the southern barley zone. This zone,
434 during the year 1963, also became important for raising water-
433 melons (batiikh), and this product figures to be an excellent
cash crop for al-Qasr. Melons and barley can bring high profits

829 is to constitute a viable economic unit; and if it is to expand, the number
594 of males must be increased disproportionately compared with females. Since
562 the structure of this "ideal family" (which in the sentiments of the Bedouin
858 is the only family) is based on the division of labour, some details of the
tasks and their allocation among members of a family are included to estimate
the importance of this notional "ideal family."

The Division of Labour, by Sex

• 462 The tasks women perform are almost entirely associated with the tent.
286 They make the tent top, and the gaily coloured carpets which cover the
sandy ground in the men's quarters. They also weave the material for making
sacks, and nose bags for horses and camels. Throughout the year a
piece of weaving is always on the loom waiting, and while any women of
the tent may take a turn at weaving, the mother decides what is to be made,
462 its pattern and colours and in general directs operations. Women also pitch
342 the tent when the camp is moved; they do so unaided by the men. It is a
task which requires considerable strength and only grown girls and mature
women can assist in this; younger girls scour the vicinity in search of
stones to hold the sides of the tent on the ground after it has been erected.
[356] As soon as pitching is complete, the floor of the tent is brushed clean before
carpets are spread and the few articles of personal belongings placed in
their proper position.

462 Next, brushwood must be fetched in large quantities for fires. Apart
313 from cooking needs and winter warmth, the fire of each tent is in constant
use for preparing the sickly sweet tea, almost the consistency of syrup,
which is drunk several times a day regularly and which is made again for
even the casual visitor. The task of fetching brushwood is performed daily,
and each load takes a few hours of a woman's time to gather and bring back
[412] to the tent. Bushes are uprooted with the aid of a long-handled adze and
piled together, to be carried on her back for the homeward journey. The
load is cumbersome and heavy; only girls in their late teens and mature
women can cope with it.

462 All cooking is done by the women. Most meals consist of cereal dishes of
252 various sorts, so that grinding, using heavy millstones, is a perpetual activity
to satisfy the demands for large quantities of flour. Millstones are
412 bought in the villages. In most small camps there only one or two sets,
so they are passed round from one woman to another. The stones are very
heavy but when they are carried from tent to tent men offer no assistance.

462 Each tent also requires large quantities of water for human consumption.
If the camp is located near a well, water is drawn in small quantities, frequently.
312 Young girls and boys take a donkey to the well, fill a couple of
[492] jerry cans with water, wait for an older sister to load them on the donkey
and then drive the beast back to camp. After a fall of rain, while puddles
of water remain on the ground, mature women make haste to gather the

surface water in jerry cans, bringing them back to the tents, one at a time, 462
on their backs. Clothes are kept clean in the desert, and the women do the [312]
washing. [296]

The care of children from birth until they are a few years old is the re- 462
sponsibility of the woman. Childbirth causes a minimum interruption in the 854
daily sequence of a mother's activities. The child is breastfed if the mother [844]
has milk; if not, a wet nurse is sought or goat milk is substituted. Other [853]
than the time given to feeding it, the infant does not take up much of the
mother's time. It is placed in a hammock slung between the centre poles
of the tent and rocked by the mother as she passes to and fro. If nursing in
illness is required, the mother devotes herself to it; her other tasks must
then be performed by another woman.

As children acquire mobility, and at a time when, perhaps, the mother 855
is pregnant again, they become so fractious one with the other that if help 462
was unavailable the nervous strain could seriously disrupt the normal routine
of work. During the early years of marriage, when daughters are still too 855
young to look after their small brothers and sisters, the grandmother's help 462
in child-rearing is invaluable. Too old for the arduous tasks of the daily 603
routine, she may assist in teasing and spinning the raw wool, but it is in her
role as nursemaid that she assumes importance. Children of both sexes
are given the comfort of suckling at her breast, receiving attention and care
for which the young mother could not possibly afford the time.

Caring for children takes up little of a man's time, and is mostly in- 462
cidental. The woman, on the other hand, devotes relatively little of her 233
time to the animals. She does the milking in spring — of camels, sheep and [234]
goats — but herding is not her responsibility, save for partly tending goats.
Goats, when they are in the vicinity of the camp, are looked after by boys and [857]
girls of about eight to ten years of age. In springtime when they have
dropped their young, or if some of them have to be retained in the camp at
night for various reasons, the woman makes a brushwood enclosure at the
side of the tent and sees the goats safely inside before nightfall.

A catalogue of the tasks for which women are responsible may not seem 462
very impressive; the number of tasks is not excessive, but the persistence of
the routine bends the backs of most women. Paradoxically, any suggestion
that men should take over female tasks would strike them as absurd. Assist-
ance from one of the same sex is always a welcome relief, but the abrogation
of a particular task by men would be interpreted by women as the loss of a
right. For, in the division of labour, it is not merely that tasks are allocated
between the sexes for expedient reasons, or in consideration of the labour
involved or because tasks which can be performed in the vicinity of the
camp are left to women; division of labour would not make sense on these
grounds, however strong they may be in Bedouin sentiments. Each task which [424]
falls to the lot of woman constitutes a right exclusive to her. Fetching fire-
wood is not only a chore; it is a woman's prerogative. The insistence that
only a woman can undertake certain tasks has nothing to do with her liking

Cases

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424 jealousy with which she is prepared to guard her rights. Each right derived
from this or that small task is an extension of her control over the male.

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point by the control a woman exercises through her exclusive right to perform tasks. The limits to the area of her coercive powers are significant.
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424 form tasks to which their legal rights are tied. While women have access
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of water over longer distances, requiring the use of camels, is a task which
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462 small boy. The exploitation of the land is also the male prerogative. They
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minor ones. Men sew strips of cotton together to make clothes for both
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[461] [10] This work is reserved for the younger men and takes the form of a festival during
[533] which lewd songs are sung and poems with obscene themes or references are recited
[538] loudly and within the hearing of elders, in a manner not dissimilar to the behaviour
[831] of bachelors at a wedding.

462●

in position immediately anyone else appears at the entrance to the tent.[11] [834 [342]
Women cook, but they do not serve the meal to males, nor are they responsible [864]
for the distribution of meat among them. Parts of an animal are 264
carefully specified, and the various portions distributed at a meal carry 574
with them a great deal of significance. A host can honour, flatter, disappoint 571
or even insult his guest, depending on the precise distribution of meat
he adopts. Designated portions should go to certain kinsmen if they are [602]
present, but this still leaves a wide margin of choice, and a host can use
this choice as part of the many means at his disposal for directing his relationships
with other men. A political link can be forged or another
snapped by the distribution of portions of meat at the commensal meal.

The Bedouin Ideal Type of Family as a Unit of Production

This account of the division of labour is far from inclusive of all the tasks 594
carried out. The details given are only barely sufficient to provide some 183
indication of the necessary composition of a family. Referring again to the [462]
Bedouin sentiments about the matter, it is now possible to give it some
numerical precision. The number of females should be a minimum of
about three, including a mother, a teen-age daughter and a child of about
eight years. Males should number about six: a father, relieved of most [857]
chores to act as director; a son in his middle to late twenties, to plough; a [883]
second son, in his early to middle twenties, to herd the camels; a third, in [462]
his late teens to early twenties, to shepherd the sheep; a fourth, middle to [561]
late teens, to look after the goats; and a younger son to fetch, carry and
run errands about the camp. The family of the ordinary Bedouin, they say,
shows this sex and age distribution, although they recognise that a politically [554]
ambitious man with the wealth to match his aspirations would require more [556]
of both sexes — particularly women, since the burden of entertainment increases
rapidly with a man's climb to power and fame.

Clearly, the basis of Bedouin sentiment concerning family structure is its 121
approximation to an ideal production unit. Some families display the features 183
of this ideal, but even they enjoy the productive benefits of this composition
for a very limited period only. The family, as described above, can only be an 594
ephemeral unit, since the age structure constantly changes, women are removed
by marriage, men move away and death affects it at any point at any
time. The Bedouin family is a fiction in the sense that it can be said to have a
characteristic composition. The mistake they make is to conceive of it as a
particular kinship structure related to production. The substance of what
has been referred to as a fiction is that, if viewed as a productive unit, it
bears close consistency with reality. Freed of the need to examine it in terms [621]
of specifically limited kinship relationships, and no longer anchored to the
inhabitants of a single tent, the distribution of people according to sex and

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[11] This is the general rule. In practice, the use of the divider can indicate an intimacy or distance in relationships, most subtly.

621 Genealogically he was their father's brother, but he was of their same age
592 generation, and behaved as if he was their agnatic equal. Towards his own
578 brother (16), he behaved as if the latter was his uncle, for he was much his
[604] junior in age and his uncle had virtually brought him up from boyhood.
They had quarrelled bitterly because his brother (16) had given him only
[428] a fraction of his inheritance, which he himself, in turn, should have
[593] shared with his young full brother (not shown on the diagram) but he did
not do so. This youngest brother left (15) for this reason and now resides
621 with (16), his full brother's enemy. Two of the men (14 and 13) of this
592 group of four were the chief herdsmen of the camp, although they were
[233] assisted for short periods by (12) and (15), who also helped tend the
[571] camels in other ways. Their connection with the group centered on Tent
A was a mutual close link to a politically powerful person (not shown on the
genealogies) to whom they are deeply loyal and who, while I was among
them, was actively opposed to the common political enemy of them all (16),
and who in earlier years had challenged the leadership of (2) of Tent A.
There is also the fact that they were all linked within a close range of
[613] agnation. This linkage included, too, the owner of Tent F (17), not in
[602] fact the descendant of the man shown in the diagram — he was the son of
a slave wife; his genitor was a slave, but his mother's master reared him,
freed him and he is now given as his son in the genealogy. He lives with his
wife, of client origin, together with her children from a previous husband,
(18), who divorced her, and his own children. Aging, he no longer acted
as a regular herdsmen, but relieved other men in the camp, and also spent
some time shepherding.

621 The details given of the strands which run through the camp to tie these
571 particular people together are so few that, like the Bedouin plough, they do
no more than scratch the surface, but they are sufficient to permit a few
general statements. The camp, and particularly the precise disposition of
621 its tents, shows a group of males clustered together to share two of the main
571 economic tasks: shepherding and herding. The physically strong adult males
233 of Tents D and E shoulder the burden of herding all the camels of the camp,
•462 and the men of Tents B, A and C shepherd all the sheep, with (17) of
Tent F serving both purposes. This number of men allows some to remain
in the camp at all times, to free one of them for a journey to the distant
market when supplies of sugar and tea are necessary, and to enable one or
two men, at short notice, to hurry away on horse or camel to search for
lost animals.[14]

621 Economic Determinants of the General Structure of the Camp

574 It is also clear from these details that, given the disparities in wealth
231 (although all men have some wealth), the diet of most is considerably
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43 [14] There is little point in seeking the lost animals themselves in the first instance.
A man travels from camp to camp asking for information, and when he has gathered
[556] his clues, he searches a neighbourhood.

*613 778 182 682 The nazaala as a regulatory mechanism functions only between secondary segments. This indicates that blood-revenge as a negative sanction is operative only in the external system of political relations. Political relations at this level, where the feeling of corporateness is relatively lacking, are in delicate balance. Therefore, once conflict is successfully mediated and the injury redressed, it is best forgotten, for it is unlikely that either party feels their rights have been completely restored.

683 Sanctions against personal injury, besides killing, are dealt out in terms of fines, the fines being figured as proportions of the diiya. Every part of the body has a price on it: the Bedouins say, "Banu Adam kill-i-filuus" ("The sons of Adam are all money"). A proportion of the diiya is due for injury to any of the following parts of the body: the beard, hair on the head and the nape of the neck, and eyelashes; wounds to any part of the body; fractures and dislocations of bones; the tongue and the teeth; the testicles and the breasts; and the loss of mind. Bodily injuries are ● [463] evaluated by a considered expert, the nathaara ("the keen-eyed one"). [305] If the services of a nathaara become necessary in al-Qasr, the barber in Marsa Matruh (the same person who performs most of the Bedouins' circumcisions) fills the role. [178] But the Bedouins say, "Now that we are educated we are able to make our own evaluations."

156 equipment from the government projects and from smuggling sheep and merchandise
[685] [439] across the Libyan border. Although some of these stories might
be exaggerated, they all point to the fact that Hakim, despite his wealth,
is not the most popular or reputable individual in bait Asabei', and that
although Shei'eb is not a popular individual either, he definitely comes
up the winner in any popularity contest between the two. The question is
156 why Hakim was selected by the Awaqil to replace Shei'eb. The case involved
613 more than Shei'eb's inability to collect the money from members of
558 682 his bait. Shei'eb's ineffectiveness seemed to have been taken as an excuse
683 rather than as the direct cause. Many Aqaqil, before Shei'eb, had
failed in collecting money from their own bait without being subject to
direct challenge. What seems to be involved is more than a challenge to
a particular member, Shei'eb. It is a challenge to the whole principle
by which Shei'eb acquired his position as Aqila of bait Asabei': patrilineal
succession.

156 Shei'eb is the youngest of four sons of the former Aqila of bait
159 Asabei', Sheikh Elewa. For more than fifty years Sheikh Elewa was the
613 undisputed Aqila of bait Asabei'. He also had considerable influence
463 683 among other tribal segments throughout the whole of the Western Desert
554 by virtue of his position as "nazzar", that is, the expert who assesses
the amount of compensation for wound inflicted in a liable case. The
[428] position of nazzar is a hereditary one and had been handed down from
[779] father to son. The basis for his assessment of wounds are a number of
old books believed to be obtained from Mecca and contain all the judgments
of famous Islamic leaders in their assessments of wounds.

[428] Eleven years ago when Sheikh Elewa became blind and too old to

156 exercise his functions, he invited all the important people in the area
159 into a large gathering during which he announced that he was handing the
613 sacred books to Shei'eb, who was to become the nazzar and also to succeed
463 him as the Aqila of bait Asabei'. Although at that time Shei'eb was
683 fairly young, twenty-six, nobody questioned Sheikh Elewa's decision.
554 428 [079] "He is the Aqila," said one informant, "and he has the right to decide
which of his sons is to succeed him. After all, he knows his sons better
than anybody else and knows which one is best for the job." Most people
156 thought that Sheikh Elewa, being still alive and with clear thinking,
159 would help Shei'eb in performing his duties as Aqila. A few months after
613 Shei'eb took over his father's position, it became apparent that he was
554 578 too immature for the job. He tried to use his position to take money
[661] from members of his bait and when they refused to give him any money, he
entered into fights with a number of them. Rumors spread that he took bribes from the disputing parties who came to him for him to assess the legal compensation for wounds to raise or lower his estimate. But still people within bait Asabei' as well as outside it respected Sheikh Elewa's decision and did not challenge Shei'eb openly. But as time passed the dissatisfaction with Shei'eb grew. This dissatisfaction came mainly from members of the Amar who were affected directly by Shei'eb's actions, especially those actions which resulted in the payment of compensation for wounds inflicted in fights.

PHASE II

439 On the evening of May 16, 1966, two members of the Geneishat tribe of Matruh area came to Burg-el-Arab with a large shipment of smuggled cigarettes to leave with their partner in the area, Hadi, from the

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If the two lips are cut off:	L. 400
just the lower lip	L. 300
just the upper lip	L. 200
Visible piercing of the lips	L. 50
The tongue: if results in total loss of speech	L. 400
Partial loss of speech is measured in proportion to that total loss.	
All the teeth	L. 400
Each tooth	L. 50
Testicles: if cut off	L. 400
The entire genitals	L. 800
The breasts:	
of a nubile woman	L. 200
of an old woman	L. 100

683 As in the case of homicide, the above scale of compensation works only as a basis for compromise rather than as a definite or exact fine. 683 To assess the amount of injury and therefore the category of compensation, 627 the victim and his group, as well as a representative of the offender, 463 have to take the injured person to the "nazzar" who examines him and defines the kind of injury sustained. The nazzar is usually a member of [619] one of the Murabiteen tribes who is known to possess a number of shari's books specifying the injuries and the amount of compensation required in each case. Before he assesses the wounds, both parties have to swear that [465] they will accept his judgment, and they pay him a token fee that varies according to the ability to pay and the position of the parties involved. 683 The amount of money estimated by the nazzar is not necessarily the final amount of money paid. For, as in the case of homicide, it is subject to deductions in honor of various members who attend the meeting in which

593 was with his brother and not his brother's sons. When the father persisted with his intention to embarrass his nephews, his sons, as a last alternative, threatened to leave him. In the face of this threat, the father capitulated.

The rights and duties of the father-son relationship, although they do not change in sentiment, will change in content during the lifetime of the father. The main change [421] in content will be a reflection of a change in property re-
593 lations. The Bedouin believe that this is the way it ought
597 to be; they say that

> A son must respect and obey his father. The son must do anything that he can to help and please his father. When the son grows up and begins to earn money, he must contribute generously to his father. A son pleases his father by giving him money and helping him to be comfortable.

593 In boyhood and manhood, the father has disposal over his son's
596 labor. As long as a son lives in his father's naja' this is
• [464] so. One son, who worked for an American oil company in the desert, regularly turned over his pay check to his father. It is the father who decides where the son will live, and, whether or not he will have his own domicile away from the
[591] main naja'. When the son marries and brings his wife to the naja', he will usually set up his tent next to his father's tent. The tent is given to the boy by his father. During
593
431 the son's growing-up period, he will be given, as gifts on various occasions, a sheep or a number of sheep which will be kept with the father's flock.

439 market with more than one-third of its lamb meat. The other two-
[315] thirds of the lamb market was supplied from the Sudan, the Delta, and
[315] from Libya. Oil industry in Libya attracted a large number of the young
[178] tribal members in Libya, who had originally undertaken the main task of
[464] sheep pastoralism. As a result, the population of sheep and goats in
Libya dropped sharply. Not only did the Libyan market become unable
to supply the Egyptian market, but it was also unable to support itself
and was forced to pay high prices for the Western Desert sheep and goats.
[457] The price became even more attractive after the devaluation of the
Egyptian pound which gave higher value to the Libyan currency, and
hence, the price of sheep. In the last decade, the number of smuggled
sheep reached a point where it created a great shortage of lamb meat in
Egypt. All government attempts to stop smuggling activities in either
direction have failed.

657 All these factors attracted the attention of the government to the
area and its people. The need to control the tribal population became
evident. But since it is difficult, if not impossible, to control a
population which is constantly on the move, the first step the govern-
ment took to control the tribal population was to settle them in perman-
ent villages. A number of projects are underway. The aims of these
[654] projects are to increase the cultivated land and to improve the pastures
[137] by introducing new and highly nutritive pasture plants in areas where
agriculture is not feasible. Attempts have also been made to promote
local crafts and industries. The intentional efforts of the government
[178] to settle the tribal population is supplemented by the gradual drift of
[464] many tribesmen, especially the younger generation, to seek part-time or

657 full-time employment with the government projects in the area and [178] settle in fairly permanent houses near the place of work. ●[464]

657 With the movement toward settling down, the relative legal and 701 political autonomy which Awlad Ali once enjoyed is breaking down. This 642 was reflected first in the loss of military exemption. In 1947, the draft law was applied to all tribal populations in Egypt, including Awlad Ali. The application is not seriously enforced, however, due to the fact that births are still not recorded in the area. In 1954, 657 the "omda" or mayorship system practiced in the rural areas of Egypt 634 was extended to the Western Desert with certain modifications to fit 177 the tribal organization of populations in the area. This put a strain on the native system of leadership, a point which will be covered in 657 later chapters. Finally, and along with the extension of the omda sys- 692 tem, the jurisdiction of the legal system of the state was extended 177 over the area. This resulted in a duality in the judicial process. 178 The tribal law, with its traditional tribal mediators, is still functioning side by side with the modern court system of the state law. In many cases, especially in criminal cases, the individual is tried under both systems, and sometimes receives two different judgments for the same offense. Various efforts are being made to minimize the effects of this duality. In civil cases, the problem does not seem serious, since it is the parties themselves, or one of them, who voluntarily bring the case to the attention of the legal authorities. Therefore, they can choose between the traditional legal system and the modern courts of law. So far, civil cases are brought to the modern court system only when the native procedures fail to achieve a settlement. As such, the

613 Written agreements such as the above are becoming more common in
675 the area. The need to have the responsibility of the vengeance group
[178] or the Amar recorded and the names of its members listed stems from the
[361] increase in the geographical mobility of individuals and separate households
[464] seeking jobs with the government organizations in the area or with
the various industries in the towns and cities outside the Western Desert.
233 The uncertainty of pastoral nomadism and the delicate balance which exists
178 between pastures, animal population, and human population is pushing an
182 ever-increasing number of people to abandon the way of life which they
had lived for generations. Animals are extremely important to sustain
233 the pastoral life of Awlad Ali. Once the balance between the pasture and
182 the animal population is upset by a draught, a segment of the human population
731 has to make new adjustments. This adjustment is first made by
166 moving with one's flocks to areas in the Delta or in the Cyrenaica region
of Libya. This is a short-term adjustment, however, and cannot be continued
for long periods of time. Pastures in the Delta have to be purchased,
and in most cases the owner of the herd has to sell part of his
[619] herd to feed the rest. The Cyrenaica pasture is very limited and restricted
by the strong tribal control of the Cyrenaica Bedouins, who in
general are not friendly with many of the tribal segments living in the
233 Egyptian Western Desert. If the draught continues beyond a certain time,
731 the individual owner of a herd may find himself forced to sell the herd
464 and seek other modes of subsistence in the form of part-time or full-time
434 182 employment as a semi-skilled or unskilled worker with the government or
industrial organizations. Such jobs are usually viewed as a temporary
source of income to help the individual and his immediate family live

233 through a hard year and to help him replace the herd he has lost. In
731 464 many cases a dry year is followed by another and many of these employed
434 find themselves depending more and more on their income from the jobs.
182 The security of the employment is often compared favorably with the uncertainty
of nomadic existence, and many decide to abandon the pastoral
life on a more or less permanent basis. But even when one makes such a
decision, he usually retains a strong affiliation with his original way
613 of life. He retains an active interest in the affairs of his Amar, especially
182 682 those from which he can benefit in one way or another. One important
gain he might get is through sharing in the receipt of bloodmoney
for the killing of any member of the Amar, and having the Amar paid in
his behalf. But while asserting their membership in the Amar at the time
of such distribution, very few, if any, would show themselves when the
membership of the Amar is called upon for the collection of bloodmoney
which the Amar has to pay for a murder committed by one of its members.
613 It is known in the area that members of one bait of the Aggary Amar (Bait
682 578 Ahmad) have never paid their share of the bloodmoney of the last twenty
years, but always claim their share in the distribution of bloodmoney.
Many members of that Bait claim that the Bait has long been separated from
the Aggary Amar, although this claim is denied by the rest of the Amar as
well as by those members of Bait Ahmad who claim their share in the receipt
of bloodmoney.

613 Disputes such as these, which are not limited to the Aggarty, led
675 many Amars to attempt to make comprehensive lists of all members of the
578 Amar and to require a written agreement in case of separation of a given
Bait from the Amar.

PHASE I

613 In September of 1956, Mansur from bait Eweidha of the Aggary Eila,
578 682 who works as a driver in one of the government projects in the area, went
● [464] to Alexandria with a friend, a member of the Gemei'at tribe. In one of
the bars there, Mansur got drunk and entered into an argument with his friend. The argument turned into a fight during which he hit his friend with a broken bottle. Two days later, the friend died. A settlement was made between Mansur and the victim's family and bloodmoney was established at L. 300.

613 Two weeks after the above incident, the same person, Mansur, was
682 driving the government car on his regualr duty when he ran over two mem-
683 bers of the Sanagrah tribe who were sitting on the side of the road,
killing one and breaking the leg of the other. Another settlement was made with the families of the victims. The bloodmoney for the dead man was established at L. 300 and another L. 50 was set as the compensation for the broken leg of the other man.

The total sum of compensations in the two incidents was divided among the sixteen baits constituting the Aggary Amar. The share of each bait was decided in proportion to the number of adult males (sayems) in each. The share of bait Asabei' alone was established at about L. 100.

613 As the Aqila of Bait Asabei', Shei'eb was responsible for collecting
682 the money from members of his bait. But for the following six months he
683 was unable to collect from any member of his bait, including Sheikh Hakim,
672 558 Shei'eb's cousin and the wealthiest person in bait Asabei' and the Aggary
Amar as a whole. Most of them gave the execuse that it was a bad year and they had lost most of their herds. When the money was not collected,

613 usually has no difficulty collecting the individual shares. His own
682 [554] financial ability is rarely called upon. When a member is unable to
[178] pay for any reason, his share is divided among the able members. However,
in recent years this seems to be changing, especially among the baits
closely located to the settled communities or the urban centers. Among
613 these baits individual mobility has increased significantly with a large
178 166 number of younger members either leaving the area for the urban centers
464 or accepting salaried jobs with the government organizations. Among
369 certain baits in the area of Burg el-Arab, for example, the percentage
of adult males engaged in such jobs sometimes reaches sixty percent.
More than thirty-five out of fifty-six males constituting bait Asabei'
have a full-time or part-time job.

613 The individualistic attitudes accompanying the dependency on sal-
178 166 aries and living in towns and cities have their effects on the kinship
464 ties among members of these baits. With the prevalence of the individ-
682 ualistic attitudes among members of a certain bait, they become more
369 reluctant to pay their financial obligations and the Aqila finds it more
and more difficult to rely, for the fulfillment of the bait's financial
obligations, on the willingness of members to pay. His success within
613 554 the domain of the amar becomes more determined by his ability to pay
556 from his own money for those members of his bait who refuse or are un-
682 able to pay. Wealth becomes an important asset for the Aqila's per-
formance of his duties within the amar. When this happens, there seems
to be a certain shift in the source of political support for the Aqila.
613 In a well-integrated bait the popularity (or unopopularity) of the Aqila
554 among the other Awaqil of the amar had very little influence on his

613 position as the leader of the bait. The principle of patrilineal suc-
554 cession is so respected in such baits that it overshadows any other con-
613 554 sideration. This continues to be the case as long as the kinship ties
428 within the bait remain strong. When the kinship ties in a given bait
178 weaken, the principle of patrilineal succession also weakens. This is
[166] more likely to occur in baits where a relatively large number of the
● [464] members leave the area permanently or for a more or less prolonged period
613 of time, seeking jobs on a part or a full-time basis. Many of these
178 members maintain only a minimal contact with their respective baits.
166 464 They become more reluctant to fulfill their kinship obligations, es-
561 pecially when they entail any financial liability. The older members
369 complain about how younger persons are less loyal to their elders and
how selfish they have become. "All they care about is their jobs and
the pleasure they get from the city; they are becoming city people."
Younger members, on the other hand, maintain that their reluctance to
fulfill their kinship obligations stems from their feeling that they
do not get anything in return. "Life is expensive and money is hard to
obtain. I cannot make enough money to support myself and my wife and
children and at the same time pay my cousin's financial debts," said a
member of eilat Asabei', who works as a driver with the Desert Organi-
zation in Alexandria.

613 When this happens, there seems to be a tendency toward shifting the
554 emphasis from the bait to the eila or the amar as the source of the po-
[556] litical support of the Aqila. This is turn makes wealth an important
basis of the Aqila's power. No more can the bait impose an ineffective
Aqila on the amar unless it is ready to back him by their own share of
money. If this is lacking as was the case with Shei'eb, there is nothing

634 who reach the age of military service. He is also supposed to report
554 the presence of any fugitive or crininal in his district and report
657 crimes accurring in that district and which involve members of the tribal
segment he represents.[1]

634 The first two duties of the omda to the government do not involve
554 any conflict of interest. Unlike the rural areas where sons are con-
657 sidered a very important economic asset to their parents, and therefore,
562 there is a general resentment of military service which takes the sons
701 away and deprives the parents of their important work around the fields,
178 Awlad Ali look at military service as an opportunity to have their sons go to the city, obtain guaranteed payment, and escape the hardship of nomadic existence. Economic activities
[233] in the area do not require the cooperation of a large number of individuals, and most of the grazing of animals is done either by a paid shepherd or by one of the grown-up sons. Although there still exists an
[183] ideology which values having many sons, yet with the cessation of hostilities between the tribal segments, their presence in the area has lost its
[464] value. Many of the younger generation are seeking jobs with the government projects in the area or in the city. Neither one is easy to find. Joining the army is increasingly considered as an easy alternative.

634 The omda's function which seems to involve some conflicting loyalties
554 is that of reporting crimes involving members of his tribal segment. But
657 even this does not pose a serious problem as it might seem. Almost all
674 minor crimes committed against property or persons as well as all civil disputes are left to be handled by the tribal proceedings. The duties of the omda are limited to reporting the cases of murder and serious assault

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1 On the basis of one percent of the yearly yield.

613 the tent and fearing that he might have been a member of the
628 feuding Bait intending to harm him or members of his family,
Galil took his gun and went outside to see who was there. He
called on the person to identify himself. When he got no answer,
he warned him that unless he identify himself, he (Galil) would
fire his gun in the air as a warning. After a short period of no
613 response, Galil fired his gun in the air. A moment later, Galil
628 heard a cry coming from the direction of a small hill at the side
682 of the tent. When Galil went there, he found Salem, a member of
a neighboring camp, lying on the ground with a bullet wound in his
stomach. He told Galil that his wife was sick and that he had
come to borrow Galil's donkey to take her to the doctor in the
nearby medical center. He had taken the short cut to Galil's tent
when he was hit by the bullet which Galil had fired in the air.
Galil took his wounded neighbor to the medical center, but Salem
died before they reached it.

682 The Mi'ad was held, and Galil and his family had to pay L.E. 400
672 to the victim's kin group. The amount was that specified for in-
627 tentional killing, since the wound that caused the death was in-
673 flicted by a lethal weapon.

CASE #5: The Case of the Startled Shepherd

233 This case involves Idris, a poor member of the Sheresat tribal
[464] segment. He earned his living by working as a hired shepherd for
[619] 'Awwad from Bait Ibrahim in the area of Gharbaniat. During the dry
[312] season, each shepherd takes his flocks to the water wells near the
coast and leaves them there for three or four hours to get their
fill of drinking water. That afternoon, Idris, waiting for the

243 They could not sow a better crop. There are wild varieties of
barley in Cyrenaica and the country is in every way suited to
its culture. It is very hardy, stands up to drought, and easily
holds its own against the grasses, which are ploughed in with
[251] the seed on the plateau. When the barley and wheat have
been reaped, the grain is stored in *kuf*. On the plateau these
are ancient tomb-caves; elsewhere they are holes dug in the
ground.

[131] In a bad year, and even more in a succession of bad years,
the Bedouin have experienced famine, but in most years the
barley, and to a lesser extent the wheat, give an abundant
[433] yield. Bedouin have told me that they expect from sowing in
the beds of wadis up to a hundredfold of barley and in the
barqa up to fiftyfold. On the plateau the yield is smaller and
in the Marmarica and Sirtica much smaller. In Turkish times
[439] there was a large export of grain from Cyrenaica. Mondaini says
that it was to the mean annual value of 40,000 Lire Sterling
for the years 1885 to 1900.[1] Much of this surplus was bought
by English brewers.

433 The Bedouin way of life is well adapted to their environment.
182 Given the inconstancy of the rainfall and the distribution of
water supplies they would be foolish indeed were they not, at
any rate in part, shepherds. They are not, of course, in all
433 respects self-supporting. They make their winter tents and a
439 good part of their equipment, carpets, sacks, and so forth, from
182 the wool of their beasts, but some things the Bedouin regard as
[237] necessities have to be imported, notably tea, sugar, some rice,
and cloth, especially the *jird*, the woollen cloak of the country.
They trade these with surplus stock on the hoof, skins, wool,
clarified butter, surplus barley, and honey and wax, so that
they are in an economic sense self-supporting.

433 Cyrenaica is a rich country for Bedouin, a poor country for
182 Europeans. Bedouin generally have no overhead expenses in
[556] production. I say generally, because rich men sometimes
[233] employ shepherds, though this is usually the practice of urban
[464] merchants engaged in the sheep trade. Bedouin use their own
labour and that of their families and animals. What is perhaps
[511] more important is that they are prepared to live on what

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[1] G. Mondaini, *Manuale di Storia e Legislazione Coloniale del Regno d'Italia.* 1927, p. 308.

tions and gardens. On the other hand, it was recognized that if 175*
they were to be able to lead a nomadic life at all, and they 648*
had to do so if they were to rear their animals, they must have 423
access to water-supplies and grazing-grounds, and that this 233
would sometimes mean their crossing the plateau through the
area of Italian colonization. To solve this problem corridors [487]
running north and south across the plateau were, as explained
in an earlier section, marked out for the transit of Bedouin
flocks and herds.

It was envisaged that the Bedouin would continue to lead
a predominantly pastoral life on the more rugged parts of
the first terrace of the plateau, on its southern slopes, and in the
steppe country of the *sirwal*, the *barqa*, the Marmarica, and the
Sirtica. It was thought that they had in these areas all the land
they needed for grazing and catch-crop cultivation, though it
was evident that in years of drought they could not have
managed to survive without summer grazing on the plateau.
Nevertheless, efforts were made to raise the economic level of 175*
the Bedouin by improving their methods of cultivation and 648*
stock-raising so that, as both producers and labourers, they [511]
might be more valuable an adjunct to Italian husbandry, and
might become more dependent on the State and more closely
linked with metropolitan activities. It was intended that they [464]
should constitute a cheap reserve of labour for general unskilled
work and for seasonal labour on the farms of the colonists. By
using them in this way it was hoped that it would be possible
to avoid the growth of a metropolitan proletariat.[1] These efforts 175*
included, largely for political reasons, the creation of Arab 648*
colonization centres. Agricultural villages and farms were to 167
be built by the *Ente* similar to, but smaller than, those built for 563
the Italian immigrants. The first two such villages, Fiorita and
Alba, were built in 1939. Each Arab farming family was provided with a house, a well, a camel, a cow, and farm implements.
Like the Italian, the Arab colonist was to be first salaried
labourer, then partner with the State, then mortgagor, and
finally owner. As only thirty-two holdings were prepared at
Fiorita and Alba the contribution to native agriculture cannot
be regarded as more than a token one. Moreover, the Italians
experienced difficulty in finding Arab colonists for even these

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[1] Ibid., p. 622.

245 blossoms of the tree are stripped away by these winds before
177 the fruit can mature.

178 Traditional values affect the Bedouins' perception of
517 their new life. Men are fond of gathering for their ritual
272 three cups of mint tea and recalling "the good old days." In
[829] those days, they say, men only had to ride, shoot, and drink
233 tea. In the past, there was a great deal of security in
178 owning animals which are not as dependent on the rains as
422 is agriculture. During a year of bad rains, a Bedouin could
233 always move his flock to Libya or to the Nile Valley: "When
731 we have a bad year, we take our animals to the grass of our
166 relatives. When they have a bad year, they come here." In
167 the drought year of 1960, 20,000 Egyptian Bedouins migrated
to Libya in search of pasturage. This caused an international
[648] conflict and King Idris of Libya, for a short time, closed the
border to Bedouins. The conflict was finally resolved, and
the Bedouins were given permission to use the pastures of
Cyrenaica. None of the Bedouins of al-Qasr were involved in
this movement.

233 The Bedouins who have settled in the 'izba sector of
al-Qasr also prefer to keep some sheep. The security which
they represent is worth the time and expense of maintaining
233 them and paying a shepherd to look after them. The Bedouins,
178 in the past, paid their shepherds one sheep for every ten
465 sheep that he tended. Payment was made twice a year. Today,

233 178 with the movement toward a cash economy, this has changed. [465] The shepherd receives 8 to 10 piasters for each head of sheep which he tends. The Bedouins who have taken up farming can spare none of their family for sheep-herding chores. If he [497] can afford it, during the dry season, a Bedouin may ship his sheep to the Nile Valley by train at 12 piasters per head. But the government will not accept sheep for shipment unless they are accompanied by a shepherd. The role of shepherd has become a very specialized one in the al-Qasr area. Few [554] of the al-Qasr Bedouins are shepherds, and the role is reserved for the poorer men without land.

241 407 492 Plowing in the garden area is done by hand. Usually, the plow is pulled by a donkey but occasionally, if one can afford it, a camel or a horse will be used. A man and his [462] sons handle all of the agricultural chores with the exception of the winnowing process which the women do. 178 241 492 Traditionally, barley was threshed by camels plodding on it. The Bedouins say that this is the best way because the soft feet of the camel do not crush the kernel. Now, however, very few men can afford [407] a camel. Threshing is done with a heavy wooden sled pulled by a donkey or a horse. 241 407 434 433 Tractors, when available, are used for agricultural plowing in the southern barley zone. This zone, during the year 1963, also became important for raising watermelons (batiikh), and this product figures to be an excellent cash crop for al-Qasr. Melons and barley can bring high profits

159 bait Mughaieb of the Sanagrah tribe, went to the officer and apol-
634 ogized to him on behalf of the whole group and invited him to a
554 lavish dinner party. The charges against the tribesman were soon
657 dropped, and it was concluded that it was because of the way Muftah
666 [578] [625] had handled the situation. Since that incident, Muftah has been
known as an expert in handling the government officials. One year
later, the sheikh of the tribal segment died, and a meeting was
held during which the important members of the Sanagrah tribal
segment in the district decided to nominate Muftah for the posi-
tion of the sheikh, vacant by the death of his uncle. Muftah, who
was attending the meeting, was asked to accept the nomination, and
he agreed. "...I accepted the nomination reluctantly." Muftah
159 later told me, "I did not really want to become the sheikh. The
634 position does not bring any personal benefit, and it involves a
554 lot of responsibility. The sheikh has to act as an attorney for
657 his tribe, represent it to the government and competes with other
sheikhs to bring his people things that the other sheikhs cannot
get for theirs, like more membership in the cooperative units or
in the socialist union. And what does he get in return? Nothing...
not even the gratitude of his people. To them, he is a servant of
the tribe, and his duty is to look after its interest. If he
doesn't, then everybody is quick to criticize him. I had to ac-
cept the nomination because I felt it was my duty to do so and not
to embarrass the awaqil and the important people of the tribe who
● [465] put their confidence in me. As far as the government, all I get is
six pounds a month."

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If the two lips are cut off:	L. 400
just the lower lip	L. 300
just the upper lip	L. 200
Visible piercing of the lips	L. 50
The tongue: if results in total loss of speech	L. 400
Partial loss of speech is measured in proportion to that total loss.	
All the teeth	L. 400
Each tooth	L. 50
Testicles: if cut off	L. 400
The entire genitals	L. 800
The breasts:	
of a nubile woman	L. 200
of an old woman	L. 100

683 As in the case of homicide, the above scale of compensation works only as a basis for compromise rather than as a definite or exact fine. 683 To assess the amount of injury and therefore the category of compensation, 629 the victim and his group, as well as a representative of the offender, 463 have to take the injured person to the "nazzar" who examines him and defines the kind of injury sustained. The nazzar is usually a member of [619] one of the Murabiteen tribes who is known to possess a number of shari's books specifying the injuries and the amount of compensation required in each case. Before he assesses the wounds, both parties have to swear that [465] they will accept his judgment, and they pay him a token fee that varies according to the ability to pay and the position of the parties involved. 683 The amount of money estimated by the nazzar is not necessarily the final amount of money paid. For, as in the case of homicide, it is subject to deductions in honor of various members who attend the meeting in which

554 seen" at any such function. It would appear that the mechanism
571 at work here is not simply a device to provide the younger
182 generation with a tension-release situation, but also a
561 symbolic expression of the difference between the possessors
[154] and the non-possessors of authority, a confirmation of the
political order.

[578] The avoidance practice, or separation, between the
old and the young in the "party" situation is a structural
fact of Bedouin society, and, though it may ultimately be
defined as a conflict control or legitimating mechanism, in
the context of culture change new aspects and meanings attach
554 to the phenomenon. The "status group" is an agent of change
571 in al-Qasr; its members can afford to gamble in the market
178 economy of Marsa Matruh since they possess the reserve capital
[471] (in the form of sheep) and the social prestige which permits
[439] this. The "status group," with business and social relations
[177] in Marsa Matruh, enjoys both the benefits of associational
ties with the Egyptians and the communal ties with their
fellow Bedouins. They see themselves as being different from
their fellow tribesmen, and they tend to face more towards
Marsa Matruh than al-Qasr. In short, they are the "cultural
brokers" who support an ideology of change, they extol the
benefits of a new way of life over and against the old.

[789] One repudiation of tradition which constitutes an
[796] attempt to define the style of life of the "status group"

433
233 The Bedouin of al-Qasr idealize the life of the pastor-
183 alist. It is a dominant theme in their culture. Gardening
241 and arboriculture are perceived by the Bedouins as involving
[461] long hours of work, anxiety over waiting for profits, and
complex market operations. They understand the logic and
[556] operation ot the sheep market. Sheep are a store of value, a
source of security, and a medium of exchange. In a good year
of rain, a man can reap a good crop of barley, and buy more
sheep against the inevitable bad year to come. While most
● 472 Bedouins are, in one way or another, involved with the modern
433 cash economy which ties al-Qasr to Marsa Matruh, the Bedouins
241 who go into the production of cash crops on a large scale are
434
177 those who can afford the risk ot failure and who can survive
the meager protits of the initial stage. These are the men who
can adjust their world view from that of the pastoralist to
that of the entrepreneur. There are only a few of these men
in al-Qasr but they dominate the economy. Through them, most
of the Bedouins of al-Qasr are linked to the national economy.

Land and Economy

433 The period between 1960 and 1964 was one of significant
177 economic change in al-Qasr. Dependence upon farming increased
178 while pastoralist activities became less important. In the
past, none of the Bedouins now living in al-Qasr were "nomads;"
even my oldest informants had moved only once or twice to

*613 with Bait Bu Taram of 'Ailit Lazumi. These marriages and
159 581 their resultant alliances enhance the political power and
156 social status of Hajj 'Ali within and without al-Qasr.

Although he has no education himself, and neither reads
159 nor writes, Hajj 'Ali has sent his son to the University of
156 873 Alexandria. Hajj 'Ali's son is the only boy from al-Qasr
[212] ever to attend the university. Hajj 'Ali desired that his
son study law at the university or enter the military academy
"and become an officer." But his son objected to this, saying:
"Either way I will be employed by the government and will not
be permitted to travel and see other countries." Hajj 'Ali did
not argue with this: he said that his son should study what
he wished. The son is now studying in the Faculty of Commerce
156 at Alexandria. Hajj 'Ali is also sending his daughters to
159 872 the primary school in al-Qasr. Not all of the Bedouins believe
562 that girls should receive an education.

156 Hajj 'Ali places among the "status group" in terms
159 of wealth. Although he has now committed himself to olive-
554 farming as a way of life, he remains one of the biggest sheep
•472 owners in al-Qasr. Therefore, he is identified with both tra-
ditional and modern symbols of status. Hajj 'Ali differs in
156 one important way from other members of the "status group"
159 554 in that he owns three small general stores, two in al-Qasr
443 and one far to the west in Sallum. This fact has several
423 472 *[613] significant implications. Shops in al-Qasr (there are five

156 of them) cater largely to the needs of the lineage in whose
159 554 territory they are located. They are operated mostly on a
443 credit basis. Lineage members, as debtors, feel gratitude
423 but also, and more importantly, loyalty toward their kinsman
•472 *[613] and creditor. Hajj 'Ali is the only member of al-Qasr who
[452] owns two shops, and the only Bedouin in the whole Western Desert
who owns three shops. His brother owns a shop in Matruh.
156 Furthermore, the shop in Sallum is in a strategic position on
159 the Libyan border which, coincidentally or not, is a point
554 443 for importing, and also smuggling, foreign goods into Egypt.
439 The possession and utilization of foreign products is definitely
472 a status symbol all over Egypt. Hence, the person in this
area who can control, however slightly, the distribution of
such goods has a lever with which to exact prestige and
favors from the "status group" in al-Qasr who now welcome
these symbols (tobacco, pistols, rifles, radios) and the
bureaucrats of Marsa Matruh who crave them (food goods,
clothing materials, car parts).

156 Besides all this, Hajj 'Ali is involved in a small
159 stone-cutting operation which supplies stones for house
554 [316] building, he cooperates with his three brothers in a well-
[312] cleaning concern, and contracts government heavy equipment
[427] to build earth dams. The material evidence of his status
[342] is that he is the only man in al-Qasr with two compound-type
[595] houses (one he built thirteen years ago), and the only man
with four wives.

156 with four wives. It is not hard to understand why the people
159 of al-Qasr consider Hajj 'Ali a rajal khair par excellence.
554 627 For instance, when I asked one man if he could give me some
124 examples of court cases, he replied: "The one who is not an
'aqila pays no attention to anything save getting food for
his children. The rajal khair has money and men (a reference
to the "old days" when a person needed cohorts for battle),
and so he always pays instead of us. He lends us money and
helps us in doing anything, like Hajj 'Ali does." In another
124 interview, one man showed great respect for Hajj 'Ali's tradi-
156 159 tional status and modern ability to deal with the outside
554 world by giving him the honorific title of "shaikh," and
439 showing that the Bedouins of al-Qasr put their trust in him:
•472 "When the olive merchants come from Alexandria, they go to
245 Shaikh 'Ali, someone who knows about olives. They ask him
what kind of olives al-Qasr has. He shows the merchants, and
they say: 'I will give you so much for them.' They make an
agreement, and Hajj 'Ali collects the olives and gets the
price for them."

156 In terms of local politics, I would guess, but do
159 not have data to prove, that Hajj 'Ali was the third party
554 most frequently referred to in seeking a termination of
[627] [114] conflict. He was commonly asked to participate in these
matters not only by the disputants themselves but also by
the 'aqila or other third party presiding. He was sometimes

423 657 656 cost payable over a period of thirty years. As pointed out by Professor Abu-Zeid (n.d.), this law is welcomed in part because the garden area to which it really applies (the garden area in al-Qasr would be the 'izba sector) is not considered "tribal territory" or lineage-owned as are the barley and pasture regions.

653 177 *613 Governmental activity growing out of the "Desert Law" has been an important catalyst for social, economic and political change. All of these aspects of change had repercussions on the lineage system and the authority structure of the Bedouins. In 1959, the government entered al-Qasr with the goal of revitalizing and reorganizing the hydraulic system of the area. The revival of the Roman water system, especially the network of cisterns covering the southern region of al-Qasr, and, on the coast, the restoration of the well system and underground galleries, the drilling of new wells and the intensification of olive farming have all led to a levelling of economic differentiation between lineages and between individuals.

657 177 • 474 In 1956, the Egyptian government passed the Cooperative Law (U.A.R. Law Number 217) establishing agricultural cooperative societies throughout the country. But not until 1959 did this law have any impact on the tribes of the Western Desert. [433] Generally, the cooperative society has served as a primary and successful agent of social change in the desert. It has

657 sanctioned the direction of economic development from a
177 pastoral to a market-oriented, agricultural mode of production.
• 474 Land reclamation and development projects administered by the
433 cooperatives encourage the Bedouins to produce cash crops.
In this way, Al-Qasr is being drawn into the national economy.
Price changes and seasonal commodity preferences in the Nile
Valley now affect the economy of al-Qasr. The generation of a
[181] cash economy has created a competitive spirit and a degree of
individual independence which cuts across tribal loyalty and
affiliations. The cooperative society, in this manner, tends
to be a "social equalizer."

657 But economic transformation as the intended goal of the
177 Cooperative Law is far from being an accomplished fact. Al-
178 Qasr is still a traditional Bedouin society in the sense that
474 the lineage structure is the framework in which economic and
*613 social relations take place. Because the cooperative society,
as a new basis for association, threatens the dominance of the
lineage principle, it has become the focal point for a struggle
between the old and new.

657 The major problem encountered by the government officials
177 in this program is that the cooperative society, as a central
474 agent for the dispensation of aid products, becomes a pawn in
661 tribal power politics. The government, forced to rely upon the
435 prestigious and wealthy men for the initiation of an innovative
program, found itself unable to prevent profiteering and the

657 177 474 661 [435] sale of goods on the black-market. Tribal leaders, or members of a "status group," in whose hands the operation of the cooperative society had been placed, confiscated more than their share of food and fodder and resold it either in the Nile Valley or to their own tribesmen for whom it had originally been intended. The government could not really prosecute the guilty parties for fear of jeopardizing the entire program. Nor could they convince the cheated tribesmen that they had been treated unfairly by their leaders. [673] For one thing, the Bedouins did not consider that their leaders were committing a wrong; furthermore, any Bedouin who would go to the government to inform on another Bedouin would be subjected to a [577] trial by Bedouin justice. It is still the traditional codes of Bedouin law and honor, and not the modern judiciary system, which prevail in al-Qasr.

474 The cooperative society in al-Qasr is one of thirteen in the general area of Marsa Matruh. It began with a membership of twenty-five, twenty-two of these were from the 'Aishaibat tribe. Today, the enrollment is 139 official, and another 195 "unofficial" members. The unofficial members represent unregistered branches of the al-Qasr cooperative. The Bedouins [735] explain that they cannot allow any members of the tribe to go hungry, and, therefore, they will distribute food to all those who need it (Zein, n.d.). [661] This, of course, shows that those cooperative officers who do profiteer are not entirely oblivious

474 of the needs of their tribesmen; that, in fact, the patronage
661 system is relative to the traditional situation. Unavoidably,
474 the al-Qasr cooperative society is dominated by one tribe:
619 107 of its members are from the 'Aishaibat, while only 32 are
from other tribes. This relationship between traditional and modern structures is common throughout the Western Desert. When a new cooperative is organized within the boundaries of a certain tribal mintaqa, members of the local tribe will resign from other cooperatives to join "their own." Thus, when a new cooperative was founded in Marsa Matruh, twenty members of the Jum'iat tribe left the al-Qasr branch to join the new chapter which catered largely to the needs of the Jum'iat in the town.

474 The World Food Program of the Food and Agriculture
747 Organization (F.A.O.) of the United Nations operates through
433 the cooperative society. It has had an impact on the economy
177 of the Bedouins of al-Qasr. In 1963, this organization, with
the cooperation of the U.A.R. government, proposed to stabilize economic conditions in the Western Desert by providing 4,000 Bedouin families (20,000 persons) with enough food and fodder to help them through the three dry summer months. The program was designed to encourage mixed and settled farming through the reclamation of 20,000 acres of arid desert land, while its range improvement project was to furnish pasturage for 500,000 sheep throughout the Northwestern Coastal Zone. In al-Qasr,

747 177 433 this number included pasturage for 11,000 sheep (Abu-Zeid n.d.: 19-27).

[474] F.A.O. has encountered a number of serious problems and the program has received setbacks. The program, as an agent of social change, failed to take proper measure of the structural and ideological aspects of the Bedouin traditional system. Range improvement projects were carried out with disregard for existing tribal boundaries (the mintaqa) in the desert. In one case, the Bedouins removed fences on their property, and allowed sheep to destroy an entire experimental range area. Food distribution has fallen short because polygyny as a structural feature of marriage and the Bedouin family was not taken into account. The government estimated five persons per family, and planned to distribute food to 4,000 families. They were only able to subsidize 3,281 families. Aid officials failed to consider the strength of Bedouin values. To qualify 747 177 474 426 for government aid, a Bedouin must belong to his local cooperative society. Some Bedouins wish to remain independent of government business, and others cannot afford the 50 piasters membership dues. A man may borrow money from another, of course, but in al-Qasr a "debt" is actually a particular kind of social relation which, like all others, carries with it a set of specific rights and obligations. A debt among Bedouins is a [571] complex relationship: it may draw two parties together, or it may be, as it is with the Kachins of Burma (Leach 1954:153),

747 the basis of conflict. Bedouins may be unwilling to contract
177 such a potentially significant relationship for the 50 piasters
474 it takes to join the cooperative society. In yet another area,
426
571 program administrators concerned with nutritional improvement
747 have ignored the culturally important areas of food preferences
177 and, more seriously, food prohibitions. The Bedouins, who
262 subsist mainly on their own animal products, barley bread, and
a few fresh vegetables, are extremely hesitant to accept what
they consider ritually "unclean meat from foreigners," powdered
milk, dried fish, and Kraft cheese. They are willing to
747 accept grain, flour, and the cottonseed cakes which are used
177 as fodder. In other words, the Bedouins seem to be presented
[178] with poor alternatives which may tend to reinforce choices
[433] related to the traditional productive organization, i.e.,
pastoralism. The exogenous stimuli to change are so culturally
objectionable that they actually generate conflict situations
and misunderstanding between agents and recipients of change.

747 Government programs have aimed at one aspect of
177 Bedouin society, the economic structure. They have ignored
433 the cultural underpinning of social organization, the system
of meanings in terms of which social action takes place
(Geertz 1957:32-54). The relationship between social and
economic behavior is, of course, an extremely important one.
But the economic structure cannot be transformed independently
of a specific cultural structure.

654 245 177 1960, were olive tree owners. One individual, who owned 400 trees before the reclamation program, now owns 1,400 trees. His increase has not all been at government expense, but a large share of it has been. Of the 9,514 trees planted by the government, 4,666 of them have been planted in the barley and wadi area to the south; 4,848 in the garden area on the coast. In the southern sector, a Bedouin who owns at [312] least ten acres of land may have the government drill a well and erect a windmill pump on his property. For this, he pays [452] 350 Egyptian pounds (approximately $1,000.00) over a thirty-year period. The Bedouin is willing to undertake this contract, and also to take land out of barley production, because he sees the future security of the olive market. Because of this, also, he is willing to agree on land boundaries and to register his land with the government.

657 Economic transition would not be possible, nor could the Bedouins afford to hazard it, were it not for government welfare payments in the form of staple products. These rations stabilize the mixed economy of the al-Qasr while promoting a shift to a fuller dependence on agriculture. Of the thirteen 657 474 cooperative societies in the Matruh area, al-Qasr is the largest and has been designated as a pilot project for the whole Western Desert. Al-Qasr garners the largest share of government aid, and, consequently, is heavily dependent upon it. The table below shows the amount of aid given monthly to

TABLE 2

AID PER MONTH TO THIRTEEN COOPERATIVE SOCIETIES OF MATRUH AREA, 1963

657
474

	No. of Families	Beef	Fish	Oil	Cheese	Tea	Powdered Milk
al-Qasr Aid:	308 (1344)*	1008	604	604	1209	201	1209
Total Aid:	627 (3134)*	2350	1410	1410	2826	470	2820

*Number of Persons

al-Qasr during the year 1963. This amount is compared with the total amount of aid given to all thirteen cooperatives in the area.

654
233
During this period, 1960 to 1964, the government has succeeded in stabilizing the pastoral sector of the economy. The Bedouins are given barley and cottonseed-oil cakes as fodder for their animals. Consequently, they must depend upon their own barley crop only to a minimal degree. There are 144,804 sheep in the Marsa Matruh area, as of 1963. In al-Qasr, 332 men own 9,958 sheep, about 30 sheep per man. One sheep requires a kilogram of barley and six kilograms of cottonseed [474] cake per month. The table below shows the amount of fodder distributed to al-Qasr and the whole Matruh sector, in 1963, through the cooperative societies.

241 when planted in large quantities. The southern zone of al-Qasr
407 is best suited for these crops, and the tractor is necessary
434 for a successful crop.
433

407 Tractors are rented through the cooperative society.
474 Local cooperative officers are responsible for seeing that all
[427] members share in the use of the tractor. But, in fact, officers
and their closer relatives monopolize the tractors. The gov-
[654] ernment has allotted to the al-Qasr cooperative five tractors.
They feel that it would jeopardize the whole program of economic
reform if they were to dictate the way in which the tractors
407 are to be used. Consequently, the tractor, like the rations
619 of foodstuffs, has become a pawn in tribal power plays. In
474 one case, not in al-Qasr, a tractor-driver who was a member of
the 'Ali Abyad tribe insisted that members of the 'Ali Ahmar
tribe pay him a 50 piaster "tip" to have their fields plowed.
Because of situations such as these, most Bedouins prefer that
cooperative membership coincide with local group membership.
It is better, they say, if the 'Aishaibat of al-Qasr have
their own cooperative because they know how to handle problems
among themselves. The government, during this transitional
period, seems to agree.

407 One reason that tractors are monopolized by a small
group is that there are not enough of the machines to handle
the plowing. Of the five tractors in al-Qasr, seldom were more
than two working simultaneously. Often, this was a result of

634 which result in permanent bodily harm. Reporting such cases is a fairly
554 minor proceeding since such cases come to the knowledge of the authori-
657 ties through other channels, mainly from talks involved in the mediation
674 [743] for the bloodmoney or from the hospital to which serious assault cases
are usually taken. Besides, reporting a crime does not mean convicting
the offender. This latter depends on evidence which, in case the dispute has been settled by tribal proceedings, is hard for the police authorities to find.

634 While the government demands do not impose serious conflicts of
554 loyalty on the part of the omda, if successful, his position with the
657 government can bring to his tribal segments great benefits. These benefits are usually in the form of various social and economic aids including fodder for the animals and food and clothing for the people during the dry years. Other benefits including providing the tribal population with olive trees and helping them clear many of the old Roman wells and establishing wind mills for nominal fees. Not everyone in the area can have such benefits. Some do not even know they exist. A successful omda could manipulate the administration to get as many benefits for
his tribal segment as possible.. Some successful omdas were able to have
[871] ● [474] the government build schools in their districts, establish cooperative
units to market local products such as wool, sheep, and olive oil.

634 This should not lead us, however, to conclude that the position of
554 the omda in the Western Desert does not involve any kind of conflicting
657 loyalty or that he is always supported by his people or even trusted by
578 them. One informant said that the omda of his biat is "...government man, not ours....He would sell us all if this pleases his masters in the

for they might then settle the matter by surrendering their claims to the zawiya.[1] Another way in which a lodge obtained rights in land was by asking permission of its owners to sow it. Constant repetition of this favour eventually gave the zawiya rights of use in it in perpetuity. 795 793 425

The tribesmen also assisted the Shaikh of the lodge in the cultivation of the lands, though most of the work was done by 795 793 241 476



102 795 491 241 423

Sanusiya Estates of the Zawiyas of Shahhat, Tart, al-Faydiya and al-Zawiya al-Baida

the zawiya community itself. At sowing time the Shaikh would pitch his tent near the area to be cultivated and prepare a communal meal, taking with him some sacks of rice for the purpose. The local Bedouin then came with their draught animals and sowed and ploughed for a couple of days on behalf of the zawiya. The same procedure took place at harvest time. Besides gifts of land and voluntary service in cultivating, the Bedouin were expected to pay a tithe to the lodge at harvest time and after lambing. No doubt many of them paid annual dues but it is unlikely that any strict record was kept or that payment could have been enforced had they been averse to making it. 795 793 241 476 [794]

That it was expected that the Bedouin might promise services more readily than perform them is suggested by an interesting document, dated 1307 A.H., found by the Italians at the 175 795 794

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[1] Savarese, op. cit., p. 193.

571
231 between man and man, although the various cereal dishes which constitute
264 their regular meals are said to have a similar effect.
The son who continues to eat with his father "as he always had been
182 doing," also continues to accept his authority. Indeed he could do little else
593 at this stage, for he lacks the economic means to cut away. Neither at mar-
585 riage nor after is there any transfer of wealth from father to son. The new
182 tent recently pitched is no more than a dormitory to which the young couple
[425] retire at night. During the daytime the son is still to be seen in his father's
[556] tent, and, in the male quarters, things appear to be much the same as before.
In the female quarters, the only superficial change is the more frequent ap-
pearance among the women of one who, before marriage, often sat among
them if she had been a close neighbour or a close cousin previously, or of
an additional helper if she had come from afar. On the surface things re-
main "as they always have been," although in fact, a whole set of changes
have been initiated.

852 *Rites de passage* are few among the Bedouin. A man's progress in life is
881 ceremonially marked by only four events: his birth, circumcision, marriage
764 and burial. His development into manhood is not marked by clearly defined
stages. About the age of seven, the henna markings on the front of a boy's
858 shirt for protection from the evil eye are not renewed, the cowrie shell stitched
789 to the front of his cap as a kind of talisman against the evil eye is removed
857 and he is no longer permitted free access to the women's quarters. As he
233 grows older, he will be instructed in goat-herding, and later taught to follow
the sheep. In his late teens he will have to undertake the more arduous and
883 responsible task of herding the camels. Coincident with camel-herding, he
233 may be given a gun by his father. Shortly afterwards he must undertake the
[431] stringent test of manhood, a journey to a distant oasis for dates. These
[411] changes are not marked off by a *rite de passage*. The rites a man undergoes
[484] during the course of a lifetime are minimal, and in the sense that they are
[885] concerned with only the basic events in a man's life anywhere (save for
852 circumcision, which is a minor celebration anyway), they are irreducible.
88 Moreover, the rituals which exist do not comprehend the same multiplicity of
796 relationships as rituals which occur in many other African societies.[4] It is
[171] true that the ceremonies referred to in this chapter by no means include
all the Bedouin rituals. It is also true that the events mentioned vary in
[554] elaboration, and in the number of symbols present in them, but they are
not multiplied or reduced for different people.

[613] In this context it is important to stress that we are here dealing with a
lineage society where social differentiation is not built up into differences
[554] of rank, where the roles to which a man succeeds are almost wholly cap-
[602] tured by his kinship relationships with other men and which are sociologically
to be distinguished from the roles a man enters into by acquisition of office,

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[4] See, for example, the elaboration of rituals discussed in M. Gluckman (Ed.), *Essays on the Ritual of Social Relations.* Manchester: University of Manchester Press, 1962.

436 of thinking in money, and they reckon blood-money in cash
178 (£300) and not in camels, as Bedouin should.

• 484 The more adventurous make, annually, long and waterless
journeys to the oases of Siwa and Bahariya to remove the date
245 crop, and, after their own wants are provided for, a good profit usually results from the sale of the remainder.

181 An Egyptian critic, who should know them only too well,[1] calls them "haughty, independent, and untrustworthy in character. They are dull and so abnormally lazy that they have no desire whatever to do more than they learnt (when young)". But he puts this down to the nature of the country; less generous critics ascribe the nature of the country to them!

173 Besides the descendants from 'Ali's three sons, 'Ali el-
619 Abyad, 'Ali el-Ahmar, and Sineina, a large section called Sinaqra reckons its descent from Sinqir, a mysterious white man who was wrecked and washed up on the coast near Salum some time in the seventeenth century.[2] These are the true Awlad 'Ali, whose sections live mingled together in the most intricate fashion. Among them live also the Jumei'at, who invited them into the country, and various families of other *murabitin*, such as Qat'an, Awlad Suleiman, Hawara, Habun, etc.
619 To distinguish themselves from their vassals, the Awlad 'Ali call themselves *hurr* free, and the *murabitin* are divided into various grades, according as they pay tribute or not.

The Awlad 'Ali are divided into three main divisions, with section (*badanat*) and subsections (*'eilat*) as follows. Some of these are so numerous that they practically constitute fresh tribes of their own.

I. Awlad Kharuf

[173] These are the descendants of 'Ali el-Abyad ("The White"), the eldest son of 'Ali bin 'Aqar bin Dib, and are subdivided again into:

	Section.	*Subsections.*
(1)	'Eilet Bu Hindi	'Eilet Bu Zayyana, 'Eilet Bahiya, 'Eilet Da'ud
(2)	'Eilet Bu Diya	'Eilet Ibrahim, 'Eilet Jereisat
(3)	Awlad Mansur	El-Afrad, El-Tawa'il, 'Eilet 'Abd Allah

---

[1] Muhammad Bey Wasfi, for many years Inspector at Borg el-'Arab.

[2] Their sheikh told Hamilton in 1853, there were seven generations between him and Sinqir.

175 the Bedouins of the Hijaz area. This Sanusi success aroused
795 the jealousy and animosities of the orthodox *'ulama* ("clergy")
[798] of the Mecca area. Al-Sanusi was forced to flee the Arabian
[793] peninsula, and in 1843 he founded his first *zawiya* ("lodge"),
[346] *al-zawiya al-baida*, in Cyrenaica. The Sanusi doctrine was as
acceptable to the Bedouins of Cyrenaica as it had been to the
[793] tribes of the Hijaz. The person and teachings of *al-Sanusi
al-kabir* ("the grand Sanusi"), as he came to be known, fit
into the "holy man" religious tradition of Cyrenaica and even
spread beyond into the Sudan and Lake Chad area. The Order
[993] showed primary concern for the people of the desert: the
[346] Sanusi *shaikh* ("holy man") cared for the poor, and the *zawiya*
[485] became rest stops, storehouses, and religious centers where
[794] Bedouin children were taught their Quranic lessons. Through
175 the *zawiya*, the Sanusiyya became a political and economic
795 integrating factor in the desert, and al-Sanusi became the
346 182 legitimate authority of the Bedouins. The *zawiya* became a
[793] very important part of the traditional desert economic system.
Today one *zawiya* remains near al-Qasr but it is scarcely used.
The Bedouins say: "Before, when Alexandria was far away by
camel, we could get what we wanted at the *zawiya*. Now that we
have trucks and trains no one goes to the *zawiya*."

175 The fortunes of the Bedouin became linked with those
795 of the Order. When the Sanusi became involved in full-scale
648 conflict with the Italian colonial power, the Bedouins bore

of their affiliations. Hence the Sanusiya does not oppose the 795*
other Orders in the towns on a religious plane, although it does 798
not approve of those which are convulsionary, and they do not
compete with it politically. It is only in the interior that the
Order will not permit a rival, because competition for the
allegiance of the Bedouin must be political. Italian efforts to [648]*
play off these Orders against the Sanusiya were founded on
ignorance of the nature of an Islamic *tariqa* and seem to have
been ineffectual.

Since almost all the non-Sanusiya lodges are urban it follows 795*
that the history of the growth and spread of the Orders is 369
part of the general history of the growth and spread of the
urban centres of Cyrenaica. Some of the older lodges in
Benghazi and Darna are over 150 years old, but most of them
and all those in the smaller administrative centres date from
late Turkish times or were built during the Italian occupation.
An urban lodge is generally a small, very simple, structure and
its members seldom total more than 50 to 100. It may be [575]
regarded as a kind of club, founded for religious exercises, for
the performance of good works, and for social insurance. It [485]
also serves as a resthouse for travelling members of the Order
and as a *malja*, a place of refuge for the poor and the sick. Few
of the lodges are endowed, and most are very poor.

I do not wish to underestimate the social and, in the broadest 795*
sense, political importance of the urban Orders in Cyrenaica. 182
They provide the only spontaneous and co-operative associations
in the towns and thus fill a gap for ordinary people both in
the town society and in a religion which pays little attention
either to corporeal works or, outside the mosques, to corporate
worship. Outside the lodges of the Orders there were in Turkish
times no associations dispensing charity or giving education,
and worship in the mosques within the wide society of Islam
does not provide the intimacy and colour men need in acts of
common devotion. The lodges give to their members a double
attachment and a double security, membership of a welfare
association, which gives them a feeling of material security, and
membership of a devotional group, which gives them a feeling
of spiritual security. Also, in spite of their lack of numbers and
organization, the urban lodges are links in chains which,
running through Islamic countries and cutting across natural

Yet, even when the problem of role definition was solved, it was 114
still difficult to follow closely all aspects and phases of any particular 123
dispute. This was mainly the result of the semi-nomadic nature of 361 [329]
the population. In settled communities, the anthropologist usually finds
himself in the midst of the social life of the community. He might not
be a part of it, but at least a major portion of it is happening around
him. In the case of nomadic or semi-nomadic populations, the situation is
different. There were no large tribal concentrations in the area. The [22]
largest residential unit was the camp, and it consisted of no more than
thirteen tents which changed in composition quite rapidly. In one camp,
out of the thirteen tents which were there when I joined, only six remained
unchanged by the time I left three months later. Originally I had
planned to stay in the small village of El-Hammam, which was believed to
be in the tribal route of the major tribal segment in the area. It took [47]
me only a few weeks to realize that the tribal segments did not follow
any definite migratory route, and for more than four weeks I saw nothing
of the life of the group more than the few individuals who came occasionally
to the small settlement to buy tea or sugar, or to catch the train
to Alexandria. It was then that I decided to leave the settlement and
live with the camp. My stay in the camp was very insightful as far as
information about the daily activities of the camp members and the relationship
between the camp and other tribal segments in the area. But the
camp was a very small group and fairly isolated. Besides, there was no
way of knowing how typical that camp was to the other camps in the area.
I finally decided that the best strategy was to live with a number of camps
in the surrounding area for relatively short periods of time, making my base
of operation a relatively settled camp in close proximity to a number of
other camps.

*795 that he did not choose Cyrenaica as his field of labour but was
793 compelled to settle in Libya for a time because the road to the
159 west was closed by the French and the road to the east by the
authorities in Cairo and Mecca. The Grand Sanusi was a
*175 cosmopolitan, a townsman, and more at home in the schools
and libraries of Fez, Cairo and Mecca than amid the lentisk and
juniper of the Cyrenaican plateau or the thyme and wormwood
of its rolling plains. Even after founding in 1843 what has
become the Mother Lodge of the Order, al-Zawiya al-Baida, on
the central Cyrenaican plateau, not far from the ancient city
of Cyrene, and while the Sanusi movement was still young in
the country, he returned in 1846 to Mecca and stayed there till
1853. Altogether he spent only about ten years of his teaching
life in Cyrenaica, whereas he spent some twenty years in the
Hijáz.

On his return to Cyrenaica he seems to have felt the need for
greater solitude. He was then nearing seventy years of age and
doubtless felt that what was left to him of life should be given
*[648] to contemplation, prayer, and study. It may be true also, as is
commonly stated in books written by Europeans, that he desired
to place a wide stretch of desert between himself and the Turkish
authorities who, as the Sanusiya movement grew, began to take
greater interest in it. He therefore first went to live for a short
while at al-ʻAzzīyyat on the southern edge of the plateau, where
he built a zawiya, and afterwards at Jaghbub, about 160 km.
from the sea.

[873] Jaghbub, now to become the centre of the Order and the seat
of an Islamic University second only in Africa to al-Azhar, was
till 1856, when the Grand Sanusi made it his seat, an uninhabited
oasis, in which the water was brackish, highly
sulphurous, and insufficient to irrigate more than a small area
of gardens. It was not a place for luxurious living, though it
seems to have been healthy and, unlike Siwa, free from malaria;
but it had certain political advantages. It was out of reach of
*[648] the Turkish, French, or Egyptian governments, it was on the
● [487] main pilgrimage route from North-west Africa through Egypt
to Mecca, and this pilgrimage route bisected at the oasis one
of the trade routes from the coast to the Sahara and the Sudan.
Moreover, since Cyrenaica is a peninsula, it was the most
central point he could have chosen at that time to be in equal

savants, and later at Mecca. He is said to have been an eloquent 795*
and inspiring leader and he was evidently an able organizer. 793
Unlike his father the Grand Sanusi and his nephew Sayyid 159
Ahmad al-Sharif he has left no writings behind and he seems 175*
to have had less interest than they in literature and speculation.
He lived an austere life and was considered by his followers to
have been a saint and worker of miracles as great, or greater,
than his father.

The Order expanded considerably under Sayyid al-Mahdi's
leadership, particularly into the Sahara and the Sudan, and its
greatly extended missionary enterprises demanded his personal
attention. The conversion of the heathen and semi-heathen [797]
tribes of these regions created political problems and the trading
activities of the Order required organization. The trade routes [487] *
through the Libyan oases to the coast had increased in importance
since the rise of the Sudanese Mahdi in 1881 had closed
the Nile route. Personal direction was difficult from Jaghbub,
so in 1895 Sayyid al-Mahdi moved the seat of the Order to
Kufra, a more central position than Jaghbub in the theocratic
empire being slowly built up. He first went to live at the
zawiya of al-Ustad but shortly afterwards built a new zawiya,
in which he resided, on a site which became known as al-Taj.
He departed from Jaghbub amid the lamentations of his
followers, only some of whom he was able to take with him to
Kufra, leaving the rest behind at Jaghbub, with his nephew al-Sayyid
Muhammad 'Abid as his titular representative there. 175*

There are few places in the world so remote as Kufra oasis, 795*
but it was at the centre of the Sanusi empire and the meeting-place 793
of a number of important desert routes. Before Sayyid 159
al-Mahdi made it the seat of his Order, Kufra had been little 487
more than a watering place for caravans and the centre for the 437
wandering Tibbu tribes of the region, though the Zuwaya of [361]
al-Jikharra went there each year to collect dates. It now became
an emporium through which caravans were constantly passing
and exchange was carried on. The Sanusiya profited both
by directly engaging in trade and transport and through
customs dues.

The little village of mud and palmwood houses at al-Taj also 795*
became a centre of religious life and propaganda. The missionary 793
efforts of the Order intensified all over Fazzan and into 159
175*
[797]


Apollonia
CIRENE
Giovanni Berta
DERNA
Luigi Razza
Beda Littoria
Luigi di Savoia
Tolmeta
Oberdan
Maddalena
Tocra
BARCE
Baracca
Tecnis
Maraua
Slonta
Oriana
el Abiar
BENGASI
Boundary of area to be colonised
Boundary of area for Organised Government Settlement
Narrow gauge railway
Main roads
Tracks for passage of Arab Flocks
Provincial boundary (Bengasi Province)
Scale
0
25
50
75
100 kms.

The Italian plan for the colonization of northern Cyrenaica.

*175 [P. 224]
*648
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3:Evans-Pritchard E-4,5 (1942-1944) 1949 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9
(1837-1942).
Sanusi

tions and gardens. On the other hand, it was recognized that if 175*
they were to be able to lead a nomadic life at all, and they 648*
had to do so if they were to rear their animals, they must have 423
access to water-supplies and grazing-grounds, and that this 233
would sometimes mean their crossing the plateau through the
area of Italian colonization. To solve this problem corridors [487]
running north and south across the plateau were, as explained
in an earlier section, marked out for the transit of Bedouin
flocks and herds.

It was envisaged that the Bedouin would continue to lead
a predominantly pastoral life on the more rugged parts of
the first terrace of the plateau, on its southern slopes, and in the
steppe country of the *sirwal*, the *barqa*, the Marmarica, and the
Sirtica. It was thought that they had in these areas all the land
they needed for grazing and catch-crop cultivation, though it
was evident that in years of drought they could not have
managed to survive without summer grazing on the plateau.
Nevertheless, efforts were made to raise the economic level of 175*
the Bedouin by improving their methods of cultivation and 648*
stock-raising so that, as both producers and labourers, they [511]
might be more valuable an adjunct to Italian husbandry, and
might become more dependent on the State and more closely
linked with metropolitan activities. It was intended that they [464]
should constitute a cheap reserve of labour for general unskilled
work and for seasonal labour on the farms of the colonists. By
using them in this way it was hoped that it would be possible
to avoid the growth of a metropolitan proletariat.[1] These efforts 175*
included, largely for political reasons, the creation of Arab 648*
colonization centres. Agricultural villages and farms were to 167
be built by the *Ente* similar to, but smaller than, those built for
the Italian immigrants. The first two such villages, Fiorita and 563
Alba, were built in 1939. Each Arab farming family was provided
with a house, a well, a camel, a cow, and farm implements.
Like the Italian, the Arab colonist was to be first salaried
labourer, then partner with the State, then mortgagor, and
finally owner. As only thirty-two holdings were prepared at
Fiorita and Alba the contribution to native agriculture cannot
be regarded as more than a token one. Moreover, the Italians
experienced difficulty in finding Arab colonists for even these

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[1] Ibid., p. 622.

156 the _'umda_, Hajj 'Ali seems to imply that he himself is capable
159 554 of understanding and leading the Bedouins during this period.

178 Hajj 'Ali has formulated some positive and constructive
177 ideas relating to the period of transition which now faces
829 al-Qasr, and they are related to his analysis of the pressing
needs of the day.

> The Bedouins need many things: they need factories
> as there are in the Nile Valley. For the desert,
> here in particular, we need olive presses. This
> will raise the profits of the farmer . . . We need
> [244] a factory for canning tomatoes, for the whole desert
> plants them and the transportation is such that we
> ●[489] cannot get them to the market . . . The biggest
> change in the desert results from the presence of
> 12,000 government workers; there were only 20 or
> [871] 30 before the World War. There were no schools,
> now there a few. You cannot find a six year-old
> boy who does not go to school; about thirty per cent
> of the girls in al-Qasr go to school also . . .
> Another cause of change is due to the fact that
> everyone now watches his neighbor, he sees what he
> [207] does and he imitates him. Today, I listen to the
> radio and tomorrow my neighbor buys one. Evolution
> (_tatawwar_) is taking place, and the people here are
> [212] realistic about it. For instance, I do not know
> reading and writing, and sometimes I must dictate a
> letter to my son . . . My son knows better than I,
> and I know better than my father did, who lived in
> al-Qasr for thirty five years without knowing anything about the streets of Marsa Matruh.

156 Hajj 'Ali is both subjective and objective about
159 554 change, as we can note from the comment about the radio.
178 In a non-doctrinaire fashion, Hajj 'Ali stresses the great
177 value of education while being aware of his own deficiencies
in this area. However, as a counterbalance, he seems to

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
SEA
N
OLIVES AND VEGETABLES
ROAD TO MARSA MATRUH
('AILIT SHRAIF)
('AILIT ABU QAR ASA)
('AILIT DAWLAT)
('AILIT SULWATIY YA)
('AILIT ZALLAT)
('AILIT ZAGHARAT)
('AILIT MA'FAS)
('AILIT LAZUM)
PLATEAU
BARLEY
ROAD TO AL-SALLUM
(KAMAILAT TRIBE)
WADI
PASTURE
DESERT

FIGURE 3a. LINEAGE TERRITORIES OF AL-QASR.

2: Mohsen E.O-5 (1958-1966) 1971 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9
Awlad Ali

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
APPENDIX II
MEDITERRANEAN SEA
SENENAH
LIBYA
SEREINAT
SIWA OASIS
أولاد ع
قبائل البدو
BEDWIN TRIBES
ROAD MAP OF NORTH COAST
REFERENCE
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361
133

for they might then settle the matter by surrendering their claims to the zawiya.[1] Another way in which a lodge obtained rights in land was by asking permission of its owners to sow it. Constant repetition of this favour eventually gave the zawiya rights of use in it in perpetuity. 795 793 423 425

The tribesmen also assisted the Shaikh of the lodge in the cultivation of the lands, though most of the work was done by the zawiya community itself. At sowing time the Shaikh would pitch his tent near the area to be cultivated and prepare a communal meal, taking with him some sacks of rice for the purpose. The local Bedouin then came with their draught animals and sowed and ploughed for a couple of days on behalf of the zawiya. The same procedure took place at harvest time. 795 793 241 476



Sanusiya Estates of the Zawiyas of Shahhat, Tart, al-Faydiya, and al-Zawiya al-Baida.

102 795 441 241 423

Besides gifts of land and voluntary service in cultivating, the Bedouin were expected to pay a tithe to the lodge at harvest time and after lambing. No doubt many of them paid annual dues but it is unlikely that any strict record was kept or that payment could have been enforced had they been averse to making it. [794]

That it was expected that the Bedouin might promise services more readily than perform them is suggested by an interesting document, dated 1307 A.H., found by the Italians at the 175 795 794

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[1] Savarese, op. cit., p. 193.

233 178 with the movement toward a cash economy, this has changed.
[465] The shepherd receives 8 to 10 piasters for each head of sheep
which he tends. The Bedouins who have taken up farming can
spare none of their family for sheep-herding chores. If he
[497] can afford it, during the dry season, a Bedouin may ship his
sheep to the Nile Valley by train at 12 piasters per head.
But the government will not accept sheep for shipment unless
they are accompanied by a shepherd. The role of shepherd
has become a very specialized one in the al-Qasr area. Few
[554] of the al-Qasr Bedouins are shepherds, and the role is
reserved for the poorer men without land.

241 Plowing in the garden area is done by hand. Usually,
407 the plow is pulled by a donkey but occasionally, if one can
•492 afford it, a camel or a horse will be used. A man and his
[462] sons handle all of the agricultural chores with the exception
178 of the winnowing process which the women do. Traditionally,
241 barley was threshed by camels plodding on it. The Bedouins say
492 that this is the best way because the soft feet of the camel
do not crush the kernel. Now, however, very few men can afford
[407] a camel. Threshing is done with a heavy wooden sled pulled by
241 a donkey or a horse. Tractors, when available, are used for
407 agricultural plowing in the southern barley zone. This zone,
434 during the year 1963, also became important for raising water-
433 melons (batiikh), and this product figures to be an excellent
cash crop for al-Qasr. Melons and barley can bring high profits

236 Wool is also very important to the economy of Awlad Ali. Lamb's
286 wool is either sold or spun and woven into rugs. Goat's wool is spun
and woven to provide the cover for the tents.

231 Sheep and goats are rarely slaughtered for meat except on special
[262] occasions. Most male and many female lambs and kids are sold in the
[432] market and the money is used to buy the necessary supply of food (like
[438] tea, sugar, salt, etc.), clothes, and other household items. Most of
438 439 these items are obtained from the shops in the settled communities in
443 the area, although some of the major items can be obtained only from
large urban centers like Alexandria.

231 The other domesticated animals that Awlad Ali keep are the donkey
● 492 for transport and riding, a few camels for heavy transport and also for
[234] wool, very few horses for riding on special occasions (they are con-
[554] sidered as a status symbol for those who own them), and the dog to
guard the camp and to protect the herds from wolves and other predators.
235 Poultry are usually kept for meat and eggs which are sometimes sold by
432 the women in the nearby markets.

233 The main occupation in the area is stock raising. Grazing lands
137 extend generally south of the cultivated land in the northern strip.
[132] The growth of pasture plants is affected by the amount of rainfall in
a particular year. Low rainfall causes acute shortages of pasture and
herbage, and leads to the death of animals by both starvation and thirst.
Pasture plants comprise a wide variety of bushes, scrub, and many other
species of grasses, most of which have a very short life span. These
plants normally persist from December to May; then the land is turned
into arid, hard desert with only a few dispersed patches of dry grass.

685 such, deviates from the normal pattern of cases dealt with by the customary
627 law in the conventional way. The men selected by the Geneishat
695 included, in addition to Rabbu and his father Hakim, Shei'eb and his
613 three brothers, Hakim's cousin Samsoun and his four brothers and Hakim's
uncle Sheikh Qudura and his sons. The date of the oath was set for June
tenth. Two days before, the two parties involved in the dispute invited
a number of the important people of other tribal segments in the area to
● [492] be witnesses to the oath. All involved started to travel to the tomb of
[494] Sidi Dmain, some on donkeys, others by bus or train. At six o'clock on
[497] the morning of the oath everybody gathered in the courtyard outside the
[498] tomb of the saint. The granddaughter of the saint works as a mediator
[789] between the spirit of her grandfather and his followers announced that
[776] the saint was ready for the oath and everybody went inside preparing for
the oath. Before the oath was taken the Geneishat asked Hakim if his son
and the fourteen men they had chosen were present and Hakim said they
were. Since the Geneishat were from a different tribal segment and
lived outside the area, they had no personal knowledge of most of the
[212] men who were to take the oath. Knowing the reputation of Hakim they
asked the men to present their identification cards to check them against
[747] the list they had. At that time Hakim said that some of the men didn't
have identification cards because they had not applied for aid from the
World Food Program. Then the Geneishat demanded that those without cards
should be identified by members of other tribal segments who had come as
witnesses. Hakim refused and then admitted that one of the men was absent
and that he had put another in place of him. But when the Geneishat
learned that the one to be absent was Sheikh Qudura, they insisted that

CHAPTER II

THE BEDOUIN OF CYRENAICA

I

In the last chapter I recorded the development of the Sanusiya. 128
In this chapter I give a brief description of Cyrenaica and of the
way of life of the Bedouin who live there and an equally brief
account of the history of these Bedouin and of their tribal
system.

The geographical isolation of Cyrenaica proper, the large 13
peninsula which juts into the Mediterranean from the Bay of
al-Sallum to the eastern Sirtica, has greatly affected its history.
It is cut off from the Nile Delta by 700 km. of semi-desert and
from Tripolitania by 650 km. of the Sahara round the shores
of the Sirtica, while to the south of it stretch endless desert
wastes, for Cyrenaica proper is only just over 200,000 sq. km.
with a Saharan hinterland of over 500,000 sq. km. On the other
hand the coast of Cyrenaica lies only 300 km. from Crete and
400 km. from the Greek mainland, and it belongs by climate
and vegetation to Europe.

The physiographic features of the country which influence 133
to any extent the life of its people can rapidly be summarized. 137
Northern Cyrenaica is a calcareous mountain rising to a table-
land, *al-Jabal al-Akhdar*, the Green Mountain, so called from
its evergreen forests. To the north its slopes rise steeply from
the sea or its littoral, while to the south it billows gently
towards the great Saharan desert. The two major divisions of
the country are known as *al-jabal*, the mountain—or *al-ghaba*,
the forest, since its northern part is covered with bush—and
al-barr, the steppe. The mountain and the steppe alike fall into 133
a number of zones, the principal of which are shown in the
accompanying sketch-map. There is a narrow strip of coastal
plain which broadens towards Banghazi and then spreads south-
westwards into the great *barqa* plain. Animal transport can [492]
only mount the plateau from the coast by steep and infrequent
paths which lead up deep ravines to the first terrace, the so-
called *arqub* country, a succession of thickly wooded ridges
broken into myriad bosses and cut deep by many wide wadis,

[TEXT CONTINUED ON PAGE 31]

584 593 Prior to the wedding festivities, the father will have participated in negotiations, although even in these he will have remained silent, leaving an affine, as a rule, to arrange the details with the girl's father and his kinsmen. The father feigns aloofness from the start of negotiations until after the wedding celebrations have ended. Before inquiring into this seemingly odd behaviour, a few further details of marriage ceremonies need to be mentioned briefly.

585 342 •[492] [788] The bride is carried to the nuptial tent on a camel, seated in a cagelike structure placed on the camel's back, this canopy covered over with carpets and at least one long blanket — later to be used to divide her tent into male and female quarters — which constitute part of the goods given to a woman on marriage. On her arrival, while she is still seated in her canopy, the camel is led round the tent seven times by a small boy. She then descends and is hustled into the tent by a number of women who make a show of their attempts to conceal her from view. Inside the tent the bride is enclosed in one corner in a kind of cubicle partitioned off by a length of blanket.

585 [533] [831] In the meantime, the groom has affected to escape, but is "caught," while running away, by his fellows, who "compel" him to return to the nuptial tent, to the accompaniment of their lewd songs telling of the sexual pleasures awaiting him. Much of this is horseplay, but the young men carry it out brazenly and the groom is required to show reluctance to continue with the ceremonies. His entry into the nuptial tent is marked by an expectant hush that falls over the crowd of men gathered, as they await the result of the virginity test the groom is about to perform, which he does by wrapping part of his toga round one of his fingers to pierce the hymen. Sharp shrieks from [202] the bride give the signal that the test has been undertaken; not a stir moves the crowd until evidence of its success has been publicly displayed, which is given by the groom hoisting the blood-stained portion of the toga through the corner of the tent on a pole, followed by firing three shots from his rifle. Jubilantly, the men gathered fire volley after volley from their rifles just over the nuptial tent, and the seven-day celebrations begin.

585 589 [593] [561] [535] [533] A full descriptive account of a marriage, or many of the ritual details woven into it need not be given here. What is included is intended to illustrate certain relationships between father and son, and between one generation and another. In this connection two further points are appropriate. First, during the week of festival, young men gather outside the nuptial tent each night to encourage a maiden in her dancing, clapping their hands to the point of injury "so that we will have a wife soon." The celebrations belong to the bachelors, and they are the only ones to engage in the singing and hand clapping. It is they too who stop the bridal camel on its way to [538] [831] the nuptial tent to recite obscene rhymes to the bride, and they also shout their rather dubious consolations to the bride who, during the virginity test, crying out for her mother, is assured by them that the night holds promise 585 602 521 for her which her mother could never extend. The married men, particularly the close senior agnates of the groom, stay away from it all, discussing matters unconnected with the affair.

829 is to constitute a viable economic unit; and if it is to expand, the number
594 of males must be increased disproportionately compared with females. Since
562 the structure of this "ideal family" (which in the sentiments of the Bedouin
858 is the only family) is based on the division of labour, some details of the
tasks and their allocation among members of a family are included to estimate
the importance of this notional "ideal family."

The Division of Labour, by Sex

462
286 The tasks women perform are almost entirely associated with the tent.
They make the tent top, and the gaily coloured carpets which cover the
sandy ground in the men's quarters. They also weave the material for making
sacks, and nose bags for horses and camels. Throughout the year a
piece of weaving is always on the loom waiting, and while any women of
the tent may take a turn at weaving, the mother decides what is to be made,
462 its pattern and colours and in general directs operations. Women also pitch
342 the tent when the camp is moved; they do so unaided by the men. It is a
task which requires considerable strength and only grown girls and mature
women can assist in this; younger girls scour the vicinity in search of
stones to hold the sides of the tent on the ground after it has been erected.
[356] As soon as pitching is complete, the floor of the tent is brushed clean before
carpets are spread and the few articles of personal belongings placed in
their proper position.

462 Next, brushwood must be fetched in large quantities for fires. Apart
313 from cooking needs and winter warmth, the fire of each tent is in constant
use for preparing the sickly sweet tea, almost the consistency of syrup,
which is drunk several times a day regularly and which is made again for
even the casual visitor. The task of fetching brushwood is performed daily,
and each load takes a few hours of a woman's time to gather and bring back
[412] to the tent. Bushes are uprooted with the aid of a long-handled adze and
piled together, to be carried on her back for the homeward journey. The
load is cumbersome and heavy; only girls in their late teens and mature
women can cope with it.

462 All cooking is done by the women. Most meals consist of cereal dishes of
252 various sorts, so that grinding, using heavy millstones, is a perpetual activity
to satisfy the demands for large quantities of flour. Millstones are
412 bought in the villages. In most small camps there only one or two sets,
so they are passed round from one woman to another. The stones are very
heavy but when they are carried from tent to tent men offer no assistance.

462 Each tent also requires large quantities of water for human consumption.
If the camp is located near a well, water is drawn in small quantities, fre-
312 quently. Young girls and boys take a donkey to the well, fill a couple of
● [492] jerry cans with water, wait for an older sister to load them on the donkey
and then drive the beast back to camp. After a fall of rain, while puddles
of water remain on the ground, mature women make haste to gather the

Had the Senussi been successful in the last war, they 175
would no doubt have brought in the 'Ibeidat or the 'Awaqir 619
from Cyrenaica to replace the Awlad 'Ali in Egypt.

At the present day the Awlad 'Ali, especially the eastern 619
sections near the Nile Valley, have almost ceased to be nomadic, 108
and only the old men have memories of their former warlike habits. They suffered considerably during the Great War, but are again becoming prosperous. They now own large comfortable tents, are beginning to build houses and clear out cisterns, and are also said to be increasing in numbers.[1] So civilized have they grown that my guides, one a Sinai Arab and the other an 'Abadi, concurred in calling them "green"—not real desert-worthy Bedouins.

Perhaps as a result of Libyan influence, or more probably 142
the better nurture and climate, they are taller, heavier, stronger, and lighter-complexioned than the lightly built Arabs of
Sinai and Hijaz. Also they are much franker and more 157
straightforward than their shifty and suspicious eastern cousins, 181
and altogether more trustworthy. Their women only veil 562
themselves to strangers, and talk quite naturally and cheerfully 834
to the men of their own tribe. 609

They cultivate as much barley as they can, using a 243
primitive plough drawn by camels, in the clayey hollows [illegible]
scattered over their very stony limestone desert, but, as the [illegible]
rainfall is very uncertain, a good crop only occurs every five [032]
or six years. After harvest, they exchange some of their [437]
barley for maize, which the women grind to make bread
as required, and some for dried dates. The seed for next [251]
year is buried in a hole lined with straw and covered with
clay, and a year's forage for the animals is set aside. The [432]
rest of the crop goes to market, and for a short time the [426]
Arab has money to buy clothes for himself and his family
and at utmost need to pay off some of the numerous debts he has inherited from his forefathers. Soon he is reduced again to the clothes he wears, the tent he sleeps in, and his animals grazing in the desert.

They are great breeders of camels and sheep, and a busy 436
traffic in these goes on weekly in the markets of Hammam, [illegible]
'Amriya, and the Beheira. So they have got into the habit [illegible]

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[1] At the 1927 census, the Western Desert Arabs, Awlad 'Ali, Jawabis, etc., numbered 38,928 souls exclusive of those settled in Beheira. But Pacho, 100 years ago, estimated them at 38,000 souls. [161]

685 such, deviates from the normal pattern of cases dealt with by the cus-
627 tomary law in the conventional way. The men selected by the Geneishat
695 included, in addition to Rabbu and his father Hakim, Shei'eb and his
613 three brothers, Hakim's cousin Samsoun and his four brothers and Hakim's
uncle Sheikh Qudura and his sons. The date of the oath was set for June
tenth. Two days before, the two parties involved in the dispute invited
a number of the important people of other tribal segments in the area to
[492] be witnesses to the oath. All involved started to travel to the tomb of
[494] Sidi Dmain, some on donkeys, others by bus or train. At six o'clock on
[497] the morning of the oath everybody gathered in the courtyard outside the
[778] tomb of the saint. The granddaughter of the saint works as a mediator
[787] between the spirit of her grandfather and his followers announced that
[776] the saint was ready for the oath and everybody went inside preparing for
the oath. Before the oath was taken the Geneishat asked Hakim if his son
and the fourteen men they had chosen were present and Hakim said they
were. Since the Geneishat were from a different tribal segment and
lived outside the area, they had no personal knowledge of most of the
[212] men who were to take the oath. Knowing the reputation of Hakim they
asked the men to present their identification cards to check them against
[747] the list they had. At that time Hakim said that some of the men didn't
have identification cards because they had not applied for aid from the
World Food Program. Then the Geneishat demanded that those without cards
should be identified by members of other tribal segments who had come as
witnesses. Hakim refused and then admitted that one of the men was absent and that he had put another in place of him. But when the Geneishat
learned that the one to be absent was Sheikh Qudura, they insisted that

233 178 with the movement toward a cash economy, this has changed.
[465] The shepherd receives 8 to 10 piasters for each head of sheep
which he tends. The Bedouins who have taken up farming can
spare none of their family for sheep-herding chores. If he
[497] can afford it, during the dry season, a Bedouin may ship his
sheep to the Nile Valley by train at 12 piasters per head.
But the government will not accept sheep for shipment unless
they are accompanied by a shepherd. The role of shepherd
has become a very specialized one in the al-Qasr area. Few
[554] of the al-Qasr Bedouins are shepherds, and the role is
reserved for the poorer men without land.

241 Plowing in the garden area is done by hand. Usually,
407 the plow is pulled by a donkey but occasionally, if one can
492 afford it, a camel or a horse will be used. A man and his
[462] sons handle all of the agricultural chores with the exception
178 of the winnowing process which the women do. Traditionally,
241 barley was threshed by camels plodding on it. The Bedouins say
492 that this is the best way because the soft feet of the camel
do not crush the kernel. Now, however, very few men can afford
[409] a camel. Threshing is done with a heavy wooden sled pulled by
241 a donkey or a horse. Tractors, when available, are used for
407 agricultural plowing in the southern barley zone. This zone,
434 during the year 1963, also became important for raising water-
433 melons (batiikh), and this product figures to be an excellent
cash crop for al-Qasr. Melons and barley can bring high profits

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627 law in the conventional way. The men selected by the Geneishat
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learned that the one to be absent was Sheikh Qudura, they insisted that

586 divorce only under specific circumstances in the absence of which the
626 husband can force her to live with him.[8] Following the Koranic rules,
593 [562] Awlad Ali give men the right to dissolve the marriage at will and with-
[779] out any necessary justification; however, they differentiate between
cases where divorce is justified and those in which it is not. In a
case of justifiable divorce, the husband can take back the mahr and pos-
sibly all other marriage expenses. In the case of unjustifiable divorce,
the husband forfeits his right to regain the mahr. Divorce is justified
whenever one or more of the husband's rights are violated by the wife or
members of her family. Not all degrees of violation are considered as
justification for divorce, however. Only intolerable violations can be
considered as such. In deciding whether or not an act constitutes an
[183] intolerable violation, Awlad Ali judge it against the standard of the
reasonable man, the customary man, and what he would have tolerated in
a similar situation.

586 What constitutes reasonable behavior does not only vary according
183 to the situation and the manner in which the actions are taken, but also
554 with the relative position in the social structure of the parties in-
volved and their initial relations to one another. In the case of di-
vorce, what constitutes grounds for justifiable divorce in one case may
not be sufficient grounds for justifiable divorce in another. In one of
586 183 the cases I witnessed during the year of study, a man who divorced his
554 wife because of her insistence that he buy her meat from the market
● 511 every day of the week, was forced to forfeit his right to redeem the
[114] mahr on the basis that the wife's actions had not established a basis
for justifiable divorce. In the negotiations that followed, the position
of the husband, as well as that of the family of the wife, were discussed

7

586 183 554 511 The husband had a big herd by the standards of the tribe (600 sheep and goats). In addition, he also cultivated a large stretch of the fig land in the coastal area and was making good money. In other words, the husband could afford the standard of living the wife demanded. The other question that was discussed was the actions of the wife herself. She was the daughter of one of the wealthiest members of the same tribe as her husband; and according to the people who knew her, she was used to meat every day of the week. In other cases, similar demands by the wife to have a certain kind of food or to be clothed in certain kinds of material were considered as an intolerable situation, and the husband was justified in his divorcing her and had the right to retrieve his mahr. This was obvious in the case of one of my informants whose wife insisted that every time he went to Alexandria, he bring her silk material for a dress. Since the husband could not afford to meet her demands, her insistence was considered as grounds for the husband. 586 183 554 The assessment of reasonableness on the part of the husband in his divorce action and therefore his right to the mahr paid is frequently influenced by the relative position of the husband and the wife's guardian in the social structure. An influential man who marries his daughter to a poor relative or nephew rarely has to return the mahr.

586 562 Although women among Awlad Ali are not given the same legal right of divorcing the husband by pronouncing the "dismissal formula," they are given the right of certain customary procedures which in practice give them equal facilities for dissolving the marriage. This is known as the 594 right of the woman to "throw herself." This means that the woman takes all her clothes and sometimes her children and goes to the dwelling of

243 They could not sow a better crop. There are wild varieties of
barley in Cyrenaica and the country is in every way suited to
its culture. It is very hardy, stands up to drought, and easily
holds its own against the grasses, which are ploughed in with
[251] the seed on the plateau. When the barley and wheat have
been reaped, the grain is stored in *kuf*. On the plateau these
are ancient tomb-caves; elsewhere they are holes dug in the
ground.

[731] In a bad year, and even more in a succession of bad years,
the Bedouin have experienced famine, but in most years the
barley, and to a lesser extent the wheat, give an abundant
[433] yield. Bedouin have told me that they expect from sowing in
the beds of wadis up to a hundredfold of barley and in the
barqa up to fiftyfold. On the plateau the yield is smaller and
in the Marmarica and Sirtica much smaller. In Turkish times
[439] there was a large export of grain from Cyrenaica. Mondaini says
that it was to the mean annual value of 40,000 Lire Sterling
for the years 1885 to 1900.[1] Much of this surplus was bought
by English brewers.

433 The Bedouin way of life is well adapted to their environment.
182 Given the inconstancy of the rainfall and the distribution of
water supplies they would be foolish indeed were they not, at
any rate in part, shepherds. They are not, of course, in all
433 respects self-supporting. They make their winter tents and a
439 good part of their equipment, carpets, sacks, and so forth, from
182 the wool of their beasts, but some things the Bedouin regard as
[237] necessities have to be imported, notably tea, sugar, some rice,
and cloth, especially the *jird*, the woollen cloak of the country.
They trade these with surplus stock on the hoof, skins, wool,
clarified butter, surplus barley, and honey and wax, so that
they are in an economic sense self-supporting.

433 Cyrenaica is a rich country for Bedouin, a poor country for
182 Europeans. Bedouin generally have no overhead expenses in
[556] production. I say generally, because rich men sometimes
[233] employ shepherds, though this is usually the practice of urban
[464] merchants engaged in the sheep trade. Bedouin use their own
labour and that of their families and animals. What is perhaps
[511] more important is that they are prepared to live on what

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[1] G. Mondaini, *Manuale di Storia e Legislazione Coloniale del Regno d'Italia*. 1927, p. 308.

Europeans consider to be a low level of civilization. They do 433
not feel the need for expensive roads and ports, electric light, 511
wireless sets, telephones, schools, churches, newspapers, and 182
so forth; and clearly their economy could not support them.
Time and again colonists, tempted from their homes by the 182
short sea routes and the wooded plateau, have settled in the 167
country and dispossessed the Bedouin, but in the end it is the
Bedouin, and not the colonists, who have survived. When one
looks at the massive Phoenician, Greek, Egyptian, and Roman
ruins and the already half-ruined Italian towns, villages, and
farms, and then on the flimsy tents of the Arabs, one cannot
but reflect that the race is not always to the swift nor the battle
to the strong.

III

Even in the steppe country it is difficult to find a Bedouin 361
naja', camp, for the camps are pitched in hollows and on the
slopes of wadis and their feeders for shelter from rain and wind
and too many visitors. On the plateau they are hidden in the
forest. One cannot, therefore, make more than a very approxi- 161
mate estimate of the population of any part of the country, or 162
of its distribution, by bare observation. It can, however, be
said that at present the country is underpopulated and that the
population is badly distributed between town and country, the
urban part of it, which is almost entirely unproductive, being
too large in relation to the whole.

There have been a number of estimates of the population by 161
early travellers who visited the country in Turkish times. They 175
had to make a guess at the population figure, aided by Turkish
censuses. It has been suggested on the basis of their reports
that the country then supported round about 250,000 souls.[1]
The Turkish census of 1911 gave the population as 198,345,
excluding Kufra.[2] Taking into account the various estimates
which were made during the Italo-Sanusi wars, in the interval
between them, and since, it may be said that to-day the total
population of Cyrenaica is probably round about 200,000, of
whom about a quarter live in the towns, the remainder being
tented Bedouin and a few thousand oasis dwellers.

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[1] Dr. Gotthold Hildebrandt, *Cyrenaika als Gebiet künftiger Besiedelung*, 1904, p. 317.

[2] Coro, op. cit., p. 20.

tions and gardens. On the other hand, it was recognized that if 175*
they were to be able to lead a nomadic life at all, and they 648*
had to do so if they were to rear their animals, they must have 423
access to water-supplies and grazing-grounds, and that this 233
would sometimes mean their crossing the plateau through the
area of Italian colonization. To solve this problem corridors [487]
running north and south across the plateau were, as explained
in an earlier section, marked out for the transit of Bedouin
flocks and herds.

It was envisaged that the Bedouin would continue to lead
a predominantly pastoral life on the more rugged parts of
the first terrace of the plateau, on its southern slopes, and in the
steppe country of the *sirwal*, the *barqa*, the Marmarica, and the
Sirtica. It was thought that they had in these areas all the land
they needed for grazing and catch-crop cultivation, though it
was evident that in years of drought they could not have
managed to survive without summer grazing on the plateau.
Nevertheless, efforts were made to raise the economic level of 175*
the Bedouin by improving their methods of cultivation and 648*
stock-raising so that, as both producers and labourers, they [511] ●
might be more valuable an adjunct to Italian husbandry, and
might become more dependent on the State and more closely
linked with metropolitan activities. It was intended that they [464]
should constitute a cheap reserve of labour for general unskilled
work and for seasonal labour on the farms of the colonists. By
using them in this way it was hoped that it would be possible
to avoid the growth of a metropolitan proletariat.[1] These efforts 175*
included, largely for political reasons, the creation of Arab 648*
colonization centres. Agricultural villages and farms were to 167
be built by the *Ente* similar to, but smaller than, those built for 563
the Italian immigrants. The first two such villages, Fiorita and
Alba, were built in 1939. Each Arab farming family was provided with a house, a well, a camel, a cow, and farm implements.
Like the Italian, the Arab colonist was to be first salaried
labourer, then partner with the State, then mortgagor, and
finally owner. As only thirty-two holdings were prepared at
Fiorita and Alba the contribution to native agriculture cannot
be regarded as more than a token one. Moreover, the Italians
experienced difficulty in finding Arab colonists for even these

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[1] Ibid., p. 622.

245 177 blossoms of the tree are stripped away by these winds before the fruit can mature.

178 517 272 [829] Traditional values affect the Bedouins' perception of their new life. Men are fond of gathering for their ritual three cups of mint tea and recalling "the good old days." In those days, they say, men only had to ride, shoot, and drink tea. 233 178 422 233 731 166 167 In the past, there was a great deal of security in owning animals which are not as dependent on the rains as is agriculture. During a year of bad rains, a Bedouin could always move his flock to Libya or to the Nile Valley: "When we have a bad year, we take our animals to the grass of our relatives. When they have a bad year, they come here." In the drought year of 1960, 20,000 Egyptian Bedouins migrated to Libya in search of pasturage. [648] This caused an international conflict and King Idris of Libya, for a short time, closed the border to Bedouins. The conflict was finally resolved, and the Bedouins were given permission to use the pastures of Cyrenaica. None of the Bedouins of al-Qasr were involved in this movement.

233 The Bedouins who have settled in the *'izba* sector of al-Qasr also prefer to keep some sheep. The security which they represent is worth the time and expense of maintaining them and paying a shepherd to look after them. 233 178 465 The Bedouins, in the past, paid their shepherds one sheep for every ten sheep that he tended. Payment was made twice a year. Today,

682 settlement is usually made after the parties have agreed to it,
627 yet, in certain instances where one of the parties later feels that
672 the settlement was not just or that he was coerced into accepting
695 it, he may ask for a second Mi'ad during which new procedures start
in the case. In the present case, although Mahdi had originally
accepted the judgment of the aweqil, as time passed and he realised that he was unable to pay the bloodmoney, he started to question the feasibility of the settlement. He discussed the matter
682 with Sheikh Suliman el-Gerery from the Murabiteen tribe of Gerera,
692 a tribe whose members are feared throughout the area for the belief
695 that they have certain supernatural powers. Sheikh Suliman himself
554
792 is highly respected, and people believe that after his death he will
[776] become "wali" or a saint. After hearing Mahdi's complaint, Sheikh Suliman told him that the settlement was unjust and told him that he would do something about it. The following Thursday, Sheikh Suliman called on Mahdi and asked him to bring his donkey and follow him. They rode to a small desert town called Bahig where the local market is held every Thursday. On market day, the aweqil of various tribal
613
517 segments usually gather in front of the general store in the town
571 drinking tea and chatting until their sons or the younger members
443
576 of their families sell the sheep and buy the necessary items. Everyone passing by the gathering is expected to greet the gathering, getting off his donkey as a sign of respect to the prominent people.
[589] Failure to greet a fellow tribesman is considered a serious offense liable to a fine of more than L. 30 and ten goats in certain cases.
[673] It is considered a very serious crime. One informant once told me,
000

583 expected. The price is set by the corporate group but can
554 vary, and usually does, from one tertiary segment to another.
556 The wealthier tertiary segments tend to have higher bride-prices. This is explained by the fact that they occupy a "higher status" on the prestige scale, and also, by the fact that they wish to carefully control and maintain this status.

[435] For instance, "between cousins" of 'Ailit Ma'fas the
mahr is fixed at 60 Egyptian pounds, but "a man can pay more out of generosity if he wishes." Hence, a member of the Ma'fas lineage can increase his prestige within and without his family by paying beyond that which is expected of him. In this case, "generosity" is the variable related to a man's
583 place on the scale of prestige. On the other hand, in another
554 "poorer" lineage, 'Ailit Zagharat, the mahr is 30 L.E. to
556 members of the in-group but "the stranger will pay 60 to 80
435 L.E., according to the father's wealth." The largest and most famous mahr payment in the area was made by the wealthiest man in al-Qasr who paid seven camels (each worth about 150 L.E.) for his son's wife. The highest fixed mahr in al-Qasr was that of Bait Bu Tarram of 'Ailit Lazumi. It was 100 L.E. for members of 'Ailit Lazumi and, accordingly, much more for strangers. This mahr is in contrast to the average for the area which is about 30 L.E. within the secondary group.

586 Divorce is a forbidden topic of conversation in al-Qasr.
521 Any talk about one's wife, mother, or sister is considered in-
784 judicious.

657 692 modern court system may be viewed as a form of appeal to the tribal
177 justice. One has to be careful, however, in calling such a procedure
178 an appeal, since the tribal proceedings have no relevance in the court
proceedings.

69 The duality is more serious in criminal cases. When an act is de-
68 fined as illegal by both the tribal and modern law, persons committing
177 it come automatically under the jurisdiction of both laws. As long as
such acts remain unknown to the police, the duality of procedures is
not undertaken. This is possible in minor cases of assault or theft or
adultery. But in major cases, such as homocide or serious assault re-
sulting in the serious injury of a tribal member, it is difficult to
keep the news a secret from the authorities. The funeral proceedings
in the former cases and the medical attention needed in the latter cases
[627] are hard to conceal. Besides, serious cases start a whole series of
[521] mediations and go-betweens which always become the general knowledge
in the entire area and the subject of conversation among the people.
When the authorities know about such cases, they have to take immediate
action to bring the offender to trial, even when the government authori-
ties know that the tribal proceedings are being conducted in the case.
Some attempts are made by both the tribal law and the modern law to mini-
mize the effect of that duality. It is common that when the district
attorney knows that a certain criminal case has been successfully solved
according to the tribal proceedings, to ask for the minimum penalty for
the offense. On the side of the tribal proceedings, once the case has
been solved, the witnesses needed to testify for the prosecutor are in-
structed by their fellow tribesmen to refrain from giving the information

685 refused to see them. Later Hakim had Shei'eb spread the rumor that Qudura
627 had taken a bribe from the Geneishat to refuse to take the oath, and the
578 [521] story of an old dispute between Qudura, on the one hand, and both Hakim
613 and Shei'eb, on the other. This dispute dates back to the time when the
156 Awaqil of the Aggary Amar decided to replace Shei'eb with Hakim as the
554 Aqila of bait Asabei'. Shortly after the decision of the Aggary Awaqil
578 was publicly known, Qudura was very unhappy and refused to recognize it. His reaction was not out of loyalty to Shei'eb whom he thought was a very unfit person for the position, but it stemmed rather, from a deep resentment of Hakim. According to my information, Qudura's position was met with sympathy by the majority of the people outside the Aggary Amar who share with him the belief that Hakim was a dishonest person who could not be trusted as a representative of bait Asabei'. It was at that time that the stories of Hakim's dishonest dealings were being discussed publicly, mainly by Qudura and members of his camp. At that time many believed that Qudura was the best man for the position of Aqila of bait Asabei' and that he was the only qualified member of that bait. He was the oldest able man in the bait, and although he was poor, yet he was known throughout the area for his honesty and sound decision. In fact many people in the area told me that they believe Qudura to be the only honest member of bait Asabei'. Realizing that Qudura was getting all the attention, Hakim sent his son Rabbu to Qudura with a message that Hakim acknowledged Qudura as the Aqila and that he (Hakim) had neither the time nor the interest in taking the position himself. Hakim also conveyed the view that he would support Qudura if the latter denounced Shei'eb and appointed himself in his place. Qudura agreed and a date

613
629 to Qudura and to tell him that Hakim wanted to show his respect. This
156 means in everyday parlance that Hakim was willing to pay him money.
[196] Qudura agreed to meet Hakim the following day.

[114] On the day of the meeting, to which I was invited, Hakim arrived
[431] with his son and gifts of three goats, tea and sugar. One of the goats
[574] was slaughtered and supper was prepared for the guests. While the guests were eating, Hakim and Qudura disappeared inside one of the tents for more than an hour. When they finally joined the gathering, Hakim announced that he and Qudura were now brothers and that it was his fault that Qudura was angry because he had accused him of being stupid and misunderstanding the content of the message sent to him after the meeting of the Aggary awawil. "I admit," said Hakim, "that I might have meant at one time and probably said it to sheikh Qudura that I wanted him to be the Aqila of bait Asabei'. Now that I have admitted this, Sheikh Qudura should not have any grudges against me or my son." Then Qudura addressed the gathering and said, in a very cold and dry manner, "I am glad that Hakim has come to this senses and admitted his mistake." The gathering lasted for most of the evening, spent mostly in behind-the-scenes meetings involving Hakim, Qudura and different guests. Then as the last guest left, Shei'eb, who had been inside the tent throughtout the evening came out and said that Hakim was a fool and that Qudura had tricked him into admitting publicly that he had lied and that Qudura still refused to take the oath.

613 Qudura's stand created a strong reaction which affected almost all
619 the tribal segments in the area. The case overshadowed any other event
578
● [521] and was the main topic of discussion. The reaction was mixed, however.

159 the relationship between her and her brothers.
562
428 Following her action and until the time of the study, they had
593 never visited her and she had never visited them. Her husband took
[237] care of the herd; and the arrangement worked out all right until the
159 husband told Fatma one day that he was going to marry a second wife.
562
593 She refused, but he went ahead with the marriage without her consent.
595 He brought the new wife to live with Fatma in the same tin hut in which
they were living. He started to pay more attention to the new wife and
to neglect Fatma; whenever the latter complained, he beat her. Then,
before one of the religious feasts, he sold two of Fatma's sheep and
bought his new wife a dress and a silver bracelet. When Fatma objected
[164] and they argued, he hit her with a stick on the head; she was hospitalized
for a week with a serious head wound. While in the hospital, she
went to her brothers who lived only two miles away, but they refused to
159 come to her assistance. She then went to sheikh Elewa (the aqila of
562 Bait Asabei) and threw herself on him. He met with the husband and con-
594
593 vinced him to divorce Fatma. He kept forty sheep of Fatma's herd as com-
595 pensation for the mahr he had paid her and the marriage expenses, then
586 took his new wife and moved from Fatma's hut. Fatma then returned and
159 managed her financial affairs successfully herself. She managed the
562
444 store and hired a shepherd to take care of the sheep. At the time of
[233] the present study she was respected by almost everybody in the area, including
members of the local administration. She is known to be reasonable
[629] able and of sound opinion, and her store functions as the meeting place
[521] for many of the tribal mi'ads and for casual conversations. She is also
considered as a liason between the tribal population in the area and the
local government administration, and is respected by both sides.

Cases

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593 father will have participated in negotiations, although even in these he will have remained silent, leaving an affine, as a rule, to arrange the details with the girl's father and his kinsmen. The father feigns aloofness from the start of negotiations until after the wedding celebrations have ended. Before inquiring into this seemingly odd behaviour, a few further details of marriage ceremonies need to be mentioned briefly.

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her father takes, but in certain critical situations he can be relieved of choice if the interests of the group as a whole are at stake. [illegible]

Political authority is the preserve of a corporation, and its exercise leads to invasion of a man's authority in the field of domestic relations. This does not mean, however, that discrete areas of authority do not remain with the father. In the tent his authority over his son is so overwhelming as to keep the son in almost complete subordination. The son is referred to as a slave, and in daily life he has to behave as one. He must obey every command, for, were he to rebel, he would find little or no support among his agnates, whatever the extent of the provocation. Retreat from his father is hardly an alternative, since, while his father is alive, he has no animals of [482] his own, and to leave camp would only mean that he would have to move outside his group to seek employment elsewhere as a shepherd. If he did [559] this he would forfeit status, and almost certainly cut himself off from property [428] which would fall to him after his father's death. A man who "denies" his father looses too many privileges for the practice to become widespread.

Caught in this dilemma, a son's predicament is worsened by the fact that [593] he cannot initiate marriage negotiations — to be able to do so requires some [594] animals to offer a girl's father. Through his mother's brother he has the [435] means of bringing pressure to bear on his father, but the latter can resist for [604] years. Finally, a marriage is arranged for him. It is difficult to convey the yearning of young Bedouin for marriage. They discuss it among themselves *ad nauseam*. For the most part their talk is about the sexual aspect of marriage. [illegible] Premarital sex relations are strictly controlled, and the movements of each young girl are carefully guarded because, if on the day of her marriage [836] the test shows that she is not a virgin, she not only brings disgrace to [585] her family, but the marriage may be revoked and her worth as a bride for another man seriously diminished. Nevertheless premarital relations do [831] occur, if not between youths and maidens to any extent, between young men and married women.

The question still remains: why is marriage the occasion of such ebullient [581] celebration? The formal authority a father exercises over his son [593] changes little on marriage. Economically the son is still harnessed to the father. The latter still shouts his orders at him, and obedience remains unaltered. Any sign of an independent view on a matter is met with a gruff rebuff. If the marriage turns out to be disagreeable to the father, he has the authority — if not always the power — to break it. Marriage does not mean a change in the general mode of behaviour between the two; the legal relations remain unaltered, albeit modified in practice, as the married son matures in age. But marriage does mean the acquisition of rights and status previously denied a son. Henceforward, he has a domain of his own. This is high drama, indeed, for although every effort is made to give substance to [554] the expressed view that "nothing has happened," for the first time in his life the son has seized publicly, amid the jubilations of his fellows, a status which hitherto was the possession of the father.

554 792 of the Bedouin attitude, or lack of it, toward religion.
771 Since the time of Muhammad, the Bedouins have been considered
notoriously bad Muslims. Today, the Bedouins tend to joke
about their lack of zeal, and often point out that "holy
619 men" are not to be trusted.[2] This is seen in Sa'adi behavior
771 toward the Marabtin tribes who are their vassals. Theoretically,
792 the Marabtin who trace descent to the Prophet and might be
554 [778] considered "sacred Tribes" should be respected by the "secular"
Sa'adi tribes. But the Sa'adi of al-Qasr tend to deride the
554 Marabit. For instance, the "holy man" of al-Qasr, 'Amm Salih,
792 is a Marabit and well-known for his ability to successfully
627 mediate in conflict situations. But one informant, pointing
619 out this gift which 'Amm Salih possesses, said: "Amm Salih
is a good man, he is not a Marabit." But 'Amm Salih identifies
himself as a "rajal saalih" and a "Marabit"; he sees no role
conflict here.

771 The Bedouins also joke about the manner in which they
●[522] practice the "pillars of Islam." Especially, they make light
of the fact that they are irregular in mosque attendance.
They say, with a slight smile, "we pray in the desert." A
[124] common way for an interview to end was by an informant rising
and saying: "Now I must wash for prayers." This happened

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[184] [2] Professor Abou-Zeid also notes this trait in his study of the Bedouin near Sallum, on the Libyan border (1966:248).

156
159 and they sat on chairs inside the tent. I returned to
554 Marsa Matruh in the *'umda's* car (1964 Ford, highly polished)
635
537 with the *'umda* and the *shaikh*. They openly joked about Hajj
[634] 'Ali and his manner of presentation; they repeated some of
[122] his "stilted" phrases and laughed. Hajj 'Ali gave last year's
[522] reception speech also. This is because, his son says, Hajj
'Ali is considered a fine speaker by the Bedouins of al-Qasr.

121 We can see how these details carry larger implications
177 within the context of political and social structures under-
178 going change. It is the stuff which the anthropologist finds
important for an understanding of the process of change.

156 If I have established thus far that Hajj 'Ali is
159 politically active and representative in both the traditional
554 and the modern systems, then the attempt is now to prove that
177 he consciously seeks to change the traditional in the direction
178 of the modern for political and moral reasons, and for social
and personal reasons.

156 Hajj 'Ali, when he spoke with me, inevitably came
159 around to the subject of international politics, whether this
554 was the question of Israel or the image which America's racial
177 problems presented. Hajj 'Ali was the only man from the whole
178 Marsa Matruh area who was neither *shaikh* nor *'umda* to attend
124
829 the nomination of Jamal Abd al-Nasser in January of 1965. In
[577] all of this, I detect a move on the part of Hajj 'Ali to
identify himself with an Egyptian reference group and to

684 The contractual nature of marriage is most clearly manifested in
613 the case of the wife's adultery. Since the woman belongs to her ag-
562
593 natic group, her behavior has direct effect on the honor of that group.
It is, therefore, the responsibility of her closest kin to keep an eye on her. If the woman commits adultery, it is her father or her male kin who is supposed to avenge the honor of the family by taking drastic actions, including killing, against the adulteress and/or her partner. But the marriage usually takes the woman away from the close watch of her family and puts her under the supervision of her husband who becomes entrusted with the duty of guarding her, and therefore partially responsible for her action. His responsibility is enhanced by the fact that although the wife's behavior does not affect him or his family, it has a definite effect on the honor and reputation of his children (Abou-Zeid, 1965).

684 The gravest insult that one can direct to a person in the area is
578 to describe his mother of being of disrepute. In their joking relations,
562 young men usually refer to eachother's father as being a dog or a theif
593
● [522] or a cheat, but none could refer to the mother. A woman of questionable
reputation affects the reputation of her family in general and her children in particular. Any reference to the mother in the form of an accusation is supposed to be cleaned only by blood. Not only does this apply to the woman's voluntary behavior, but also to her physical and mental
[734] condition. If a woman loses her mind, the news is usually kept a secret,
684 especially by her children. The responsibility for retaliation in the
613 case of adultery, then, is divided between her nearest kinsman and her
562 husband. This gives both sides a vague and undetermined right of re-
593 venge. This division of the right of revenge explains the infrequency

[facing P. 16]



THE TOMB OF THE GRAND SANUSI (HASANAIN PASHA)

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THE SAYYID AHMAD AL-SHARIF (MACALUSO)

[facing p. 128]

*613 'Ailit Lazumi, the other lineage, along with 'Ailit Ma'fas,
582 considered to be the most powerful in al-Qasr. In the fourth
[423] case, Abd al-Latif's marriage into 'Ailit Dawlat, this individual owns an olive orchard in Dawlat territory, adjacent to that of Ma'fas, which he purchased from a member of his
*613 wife's lineage before their marriage. In every case, with
582 one exception, marriage ties are intimately related to property
421 relations, cognation with local contiguity. The two groups become politically entwined, and property relations become a basis for authority relations.

*613 All things considered, complementary filiation is as important in Bedouin society as it is in other societies: "The bilateral family is the focal element in the web of
●[533] kinship" (Fortes 1953:33). As one Bedouin wedding song puts it: "The bride is the flower of the stem," the stem here symbolizing her tertiary group.

583 The amount of brideprice which a man is expected to
554 pay will depend upon his status as an "outsider" or an "insider,"
556 and his position on the prestige scale which is figured largely in terms of wealth. A man adds to his prestige and reputation when he pays beyond the "going price" to obtain a bride for his son. On the other hand, if a man is an "outsider," he is expected to pay well beyond the normal brideprice for the privilege of marrying into the family, and he receives no additional prestige unless he goes even higher than what is

795*

praise of which many poems have been written by Brothers of 793
the Order. The Grand Sanusi forbad music, dancing, and singing 784
in the recitations of the Order, but in this he was at one with 114
all the official spokesmen of Islam. Most reformist movements [272]
in Islam tend towards asceticism. [533]

Far from being extreme ascetics, however, the Sanusi [536]
Brothers eat and dress well, even using scent, and are amiable 795*
and merry companions. The Tunisian scholar and traveller 157
Muhammad 'Uthman al-Hashaishi, who travelled in 1896 via [785]
Malta, Tripoli, and Banghazi to Kufra to visit al-Sayyid al-Mahdi and met the leading Brothers of the time, remarks that 'they are fond of diversions, honest jesting. I have visited many of their zawiyas and I have made the acquaintance of many of their notables: I have seen only cheerful and smiling faces, welcoming me with benevolence and kindness. May God reward them!'[1]

The Grand Sanusi discouraged the trappings of poverty by 799*
his example, his exhortations, and his insistence on the Brothers 793
being self-supporting. Although the Heads of the Sanusiya 735
Order, like the Wahhabi leaders, encouraged settlement on the land, they can hardly have hoped to have greatly influenced the Bedouin to this end; but they insisted on the lodges of the Order supporting themselves by agriculture supplemented by stock-raising, and thereby took a stand against *ittikal*, the dependence for livelihood on alms and not on labour which some mendicant Orders have advocated.

The Order has always been, in fact, conventional as well as 795*
orthodox. In its early period it was essentially a missionary 797
Order with the limited aim of bringing by peaceful persuasion the Bedouin Arabs and the peoples of the Sahara and the Sudan to a fuller understanding of the beliefs and morals of Islam, while giving them at the same time the blessings of civilization: justice, peace, trade, and education. Its principles were, as Shaikh Muhammad 'Uthman says, simply 'to do good and avoid evil'.[2]

The accusation of fanaticism is not borne out by either the 795*
character of the Bedouin adherents of the Order or by its actions.

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band is required to take gifts to his mother-in-law in recognition of the fact 583
that she nourished his wife as an infant (the literal meaning of the word 584
used for this gift is "milk"). A return visit is made and gifts are given to 606
the daughter. When the first child is born an animal is presented by the
affines, and if the child is a male, the gift may be several sheep, or even a 851
few camels if the father-in-law is very wealthy. Formal exchange of gifts 425
continue, but, in addition, informal transfers are made. Moreover, if re- 606
lations between a man and his father-in-law develop favourably, it is not un- 606
common for a young husband, during the early years of marriage, to move 591
away from his father and pitch his tent alongside that of his father-in-law. 593
Marriage gives a son affinal relations of his own. Affinity can alleviate the dead weight of paternal authority.

It is suggested that the crisis the marriage of a son assumes for a father 585
is the shift it entails in the distribution of authority. This is borne out by 561
other details in the marriage ceremony referred to earlier. Ordinarily, young 602
men dare not sing within earshot of their senior agnates. Far from allowing 533●
obscenities, agnates of the ascending generation would not allow even a
mention of women to be made by young men, in their presence. In a group [593]
consisting of young men and an agnate, I chanced to use the noun for [123]
woman and immediately my tent was cleared of all but the senior agnate.
At a wedding the young men revel in their lewd songs and shout their [831]
obscenities for all to hear. The senior agnates stand aside and make a show of ignoring the proceedings. And well they may, for each marriage is a challenge to the exclusive authority they have enjoyed; each nuptial tent is an invasion of the domain of which they have been undisputed masters. Marriage is the only occasion when the men of one generation can clap and sing their defiance of an older one, and give warning of the changes which must be accommodated however great the pretence that nothing has happened.

Marriage ceremonies dramatise the clash between adjacent generations 561
over the distribution of certain forms of authority. If this authority is as 602
overwhelming as has been suggested, and if it is so deeply resented, how, is it that life is endurable for juniors? Relationships between junior and senior agnates are so restrictive that they almost amount to what Professor Fortes has suggested I view as a form of avoidance relationships. Juniors must always defer, they must obey commands promptly, they serve their seniors, they must accept a lead when it is given and the restrictions on conversations exclude all reference to women, marriage or sex. These are not simply a set of general guides for behaviour, they are rigidly applied rules, deviation from which is countered with rebuke or greater severity. It would appear from this

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many African societies is that wealth is transferred. Obviously, in societies where the 583
rules of exogamy compel a dispersion of links outside a man's own clan, what is in- 584
volved in this transfer of wealth cannot be sociologically similar to one in which mar- 582
riage to the first cousin on either side is permitted. 606
171

462 them or any innate aptitude for them; this insistence is an index of the
424 jealousy with which she is prepared to guard her rights. Each right derived
from this or that small task is an extension of her control over the male.

462 The force and significance of this control is, perhaps, best seen in a
424 woman's right to cook. At marriage a woman must have at least the minimum
of cooking utensils, and one of the rights a man acquires in a woman is
252 that she cooks for him. This is something a man cannot do for himself.
Therefore, when a man ill-treats his wife or threatens her with divorce, she
[593] can retaliate by refusing to cook, or leave the tent altogether to return to her
father. A man bereft of this service is in a very sorry plight indeed. The
legal dominance of the male, seemingly autocratic, is reduced at every
point by the control a woman exercises through her exclusive right to perform tasks. The limits to the area of her coercive powers are significant.
562 They are confined almost wholly to domestic relationships. Legally, women
suffer such disabilities that they are almost of the status of minors; in
reality, their day-to-day living is far from intolerable because they are able
to control males over a wide field of relationships.

462 Men, excluded in the main from domestic duties around the tent, per-
424 form tasks to which their legal rights are tied. While women have access
231 to wells for water used by human beings, the transport of larger quantities
of water over longer distances, requiring the use of camels, is a task which
falls to the men. Watering of animals is done by men. Only they can
slaughter the animals for food. The meat of an animal slaughtered by a
woman is not "free," in a ritual sense, for human consumption. In an
extremity only, a woman can, in effect, kill an animal, but the knife which
cuts its throat must be held in a male hand, even if it is the hand of a very
462 small boy. The exploitation of the land is also the male prerogative. They
[424] plough and sow the grain; incidental help may be provided by wives working
[241] alongside their husbands during the early part of reaping, but the main
reaping is done entirely by men. Transportation of grain to the mounds is
also carried out by men, and it is they only who have access to the grain
stores when quantities are withdrawn for family use. Sheep-shearing is
[236] carried out entirely by males,[10] the fleeces are stacked by them and the
[432] distribution and sales of these is directed by the male head of the tent.

Additional to these major tasks which males undertake are a number of
minor ones. Men sew strips of cotton together to make clothes for both
sexes. They also make rope of grass, albeit in a desultory sort of way, by
[834] twisting together the strands between the palms of the hands. A number of
other tasks fall to the men by virtue of the fact that the sexes are separated
[342] in the tent by a divider of blanket material, which may be taken down
when only members of the elementary family are about, but which is put

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[461] [10] This work is reserved for the younger men and takes the form of a festival during
[533] which lewd songs are sung and poems with obscene themes or references are recited
[538] loudly and within the hearing of elders, in a manner not dissimilar to the behaviour
[831] of bachelors at a wedding.

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6: Peters E-5 (1948-1950) 1965 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9
Cyrenaica

Chapter

7

Aspects of the Family Among the Bedouin of Cyrenaica*

E. L. Peters
University of Manchester

Marriage and the Father-Son Relationship

When a marriage takes place among the Bedouin of Cyrenaica, a nuptial 585
tent is set up some distance away from that of the groom's father. There is 593
no particular significance about the nuptial tent itself, but it must be pitched at a distance so that the father "will not see it" — although, obviously, in a country of large level plains, it stands out conspicuously. This pretence that the tent remains unseen by the father is pushed to the point of his denying any knowledge of what is afoot. A middle-aged or elderly man with a family adopts a similar attitude to any marriage in which his son participates, as groom or as guest. An elder, the father of three unmarried sons (one of [535]
whom, in his late twenties, was known to be getting impatient about marriage), when I asked after his eldest son, insisted that he was away with the [831]
camels, although the son was conspicuous in a semicircle of young men encouraging a blindfolded maiden in the movements of her seductive dance outside a wedding tent in his full view. Prior to the wedding festivities, the

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* I wish to express my gratitude to Mr. R. Werbner for reading this essay in manuscript. 128

The information presented is based on 27 months fieldwork carried out during 114
1948 to 1950, among the Cyrenaica Bedouin. I am indebted to the Trustees of the 122
Horniman Studentship Fund, and the Committee for Treasury Studentships in Oriental Languages and Cultures, for making the research financially possible.

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585 [533] [831] [202] In the meantime, the groom has affected to escape, but is "caught," while running away, by his fellows, who "compel" him to return to the nuptial tent, to the accompaniment of their lewd songs telling of the sexual pleasures awaiting him. Much of this is horseplay, but the young men carry it out brazenly and the groom is required to show reluctance to continue with the ceremonies. His entry into the nuptial tent is marked by an expectant hush that falls over the crowd of men gathered, as they await the result of the virginity test the groom is about to perform, which he does by wrapping part of his toga round one of his fingers to pierce the hymen. Sharp shrieks from the bride give the signal that the test has been undertaken; not a stir moves the crowd until evidence of its success has been publicly displayed, which is given by the groom hoisting the blood-stained portion of the toga through the corner of the tent on a pole, followed by firing three shots from his rifle. Jubilantly, the men gathered fire volley after volley from their rifles just over the nuptial tent, and the seven-day celebrations begin.

585 589 [593] [561] [535] [533] [538] [831] A full descriptive account of a marriage, or many of the ritual details woven into it need not be given here. What is included is intended to illustrate certain relationships between father and son, and between one generation and another. In this connection two further points are appropriate. First, during the week of festival, young men gather outside the nuptial tent each night to encourage a maiden in her dancing, clapping their hands to the point of injury "so that we will have a wife soon." The celebrations belong to the bachelors, and they are the only ones to engage in the singing and hand clapping. It is they too who stop the bridal camel on its way to the nuptial tent to recite obscene rhymes to the bride, and they also shout their rather dubious consolations to the bride who, during the virginity test, crying out for her mother, is assured by them that the night holds promise for her which her mother could never extend. The married men, particularly the close senior agnates of the groom, stay away from it all, discussing matters unconnected with the affair. 585 602 521

156 administrative business took up most of the time at the
159 meeting, and only the Governor and the Egyptians took part
554 in the discussion. At the conclusion of the meeting, the
635 648 Governor asked if any present had comments to make. Hajj
[871] 'Ali rose, and delivered a formal and well-prepared speech
[539] on the inadequacies of the educational facilities in Matruh.
He noted that the Governor had promised the Bedouins that if
they sent their sons in from the desert for secondary schooling,
their material needs would be taken care of, but that in fact
the Governor had not kept his promise for there was not enough
space and beds for the boys. The Governor apologized for this
condition and said he was trying to correct it. I noted that
a few Egyptians found something amusing about this incident,
but that all of the Bedouins present were serious and nodded
in agreement with the points made by Hajj 'Ali.

156 We should note that Hajj 'Ali was the only Bedouin to
159 speak up at the meeting, that he spoke in the formal, tradi-
554 tional manner, and that he showed concern for the real problems
635 of the Bedouins. Hajj 'Ali is careful to protect his identity
as a Bedouin, and in this he differs from the _'umda_ and
most of the "status group."

121 In situations of induced change, the cultural problems
156 involved differ in their conception and immediacy as defined
159 by the agents and the recipients of change. Hajj 'Ali, who
554 177 is both an agent and a recipient of change, is intimate with
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156 159 554 635 177 by the secretary of the cooperative society who requested that the government furnish bus service between Matruh and al-Qasr. The Governor thought this a good idea and said he would inquire into the matter.

156 159 554 635 177 537 As the Governor suggested that the meeting be adjourned, Hajj 'Ali stood up, faced the Governor and began another of his formal speeches in the rich tradition of Arabic; it was the best Arabic I had heard spoken in the desert. This speech was for the benefit of all present, Bedouins and officials alike. Hajj 'Ali made no requests but simply thanked the Governor for honoring al-Qasr with his presence. In this short well-prepared tribute, he said:

> We feel the efforts of the government and we can scarcely imagine or dream of this development. For instance, we were living in tents and now only five per cent remain in tents while the remainder are in houses. We were dressed simply, but now we are dressed in poplin material. Those who could afford one set of clothes now can afford two. Thanks be to God, all this is due to Jamal Abd al-Nasser.

156 159 554 635 537 It is significant, of course, that smiles once again played on the faces of the Governor's entourage and nothing but admiration on the faces of the Bedouins. As Hajj 'Ali spoke he did not face the Governor directly but turned aside, speaking both to him and the Bedouins--Hajj 'Ali, the Bedouin, had been sitting on the ground before the Governor. The [634] _'umda_ and _shaikh_ had accompanied the Governor on his tour

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159 and they sat on chairs inside the tent. I returned to
554 Marsa Matruh in the *'umda's* car (1964 Ford, highly polished)
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537 with the *'umda* and the *shaikh*. They openly joked about Hajj
[634] 'Ali and his manner of presentation; they repeated some of
[122] his "stilted" phrases and laughed. Hajj 'Ali gave last year's
[522] reception speech also. This is because, his son says, Hajj
'Ali is considered a fine speaker by the Bedouins of al-Qasr.

121 We can see how these details carry larger implications
177 within the context of political and social structures under-
178 going change. It is the stuff which the anthropologist finds
important for an understanding of the process of change.

156 If I have established thus far that Hajj 'Ali is
159 politically active and representative in both the traditional
554 and the modern systems, then the attempt is now to prove that
177 he consciously seeks to change the traditional in the direction
178 of the modern for political and moral reasons, and for social
and personal reasons.

156 Hajj 'Ali, when he spoke with me, inevitably came
159 around to the subject of international politics, whether this
554 was the question of Israel or the image which America's racial
177 problems presented. Hajj 'Ali was the only man from the whole
178 Marsa Matruh area who was neither *shaikh* nor *'umda* to attend
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829 the nomination of Jamal Abd al-Nasser in January of 1965. In
[571] all of this, I detect a move on the part of Hajj 'Ali to
identify himself with an Egyptian reference group and to

604 182 war.

The Bedouins of al-Qasr are conscious of the prac-
604 602 182 ticality of external kinship ties. The role of mother's
brother becomes a significant symbol for the maintenance
of these ties. Boys are supposed to respect their khal
("mother's brother") in order "to avoid wars which could end
the world." The Bedouins claim vehemently that "no quarrel
can happen between me and a member of that tribe because
[181] my brother has married into that tribe." They make the value
of the mother's brother link very explicit: "Marriage into
other tribes makes quarrels impossible."

604 There are many Bedouin proverbs pointing to the place
538 of the mother's brother in the social structure. Proverbs,
in any culture, trace out areas of behavior which have become
important. Kenneth Burke (1957:256) says of proverbs, that
they are "strategies for dealing with situations. In so far
as situations are typical and recurrent in a given social
structure, people develop names for them and strategies for
handling them. Another name for strategies might be atti-
[829] tudes." The Bedouins likewise look upon proverbs as tem-
plates for behavior. They say that "we should heed proverbs
because they are the words of the elders; they are like a
white flag which marks the way, and people should not go
beyond these flags."

A most common proverb which elevates the mother's

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538 brother to special place in the social structure states that [539] "Two-thirds of the boy belongs to the khal, and he is like the father: the remaining one-third is divided equally between the father and the khal." The Bedouins are always quick to point out to the stranger, such as I was, that this means there is only one-sixth of the boy which belongs to the father. A clearer case of the ideology of kinship versus [539] descent could not be had. Another proverb has it that "the good which you see in a boy comes from khal khalu ("the maternal uncle of his maternal uncle"). Any kinship relation may be the basis for a new network of social relations by making use of the classificatory principle. The Bedouins [539] exaggerate the status and role of the mother's brother by saying that "when a boy does good or bad, one wants to know the name of his khal not the name of his father." This statement, which favors cognatic links over patrilineal ties, is not true but such an attempt at emphasis indicates that this relationship is something of value in the Bedouin society.

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578 In the case of any conflict "between his tribes," the Bedouins say, "the boy must support the tribe of his khal." This, of course, does not mean that the individual should take up arms against his patrilineal corporate group, but that he should seek to mediate the conflict. The political value of conflict avoidance and conflict control is also conspicuous in the dual role which the mature female plays
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Cases

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593 father will have participated in negotiations, although even in these he will
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the girl's father and his kinsmen. The father feigns aloofness from the start
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and female quarters — which constitute part of the goods given to a woman
[788] on marriage. On her arrival, while she is still seated in her canopy, the
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and is hustled into the tent by a number of women who make a show of their
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one corner in a kind of cubicle partitioned off by a length of blanket.

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585 for her which her mother could never extend. The married men, particularly
602 the close senior agnates of the groom, stay away from it all, discussing matters
521 unconnected with the affair.

462 them or any innate aptitude for them; this insistence is an index of the
424 jealousy with which she is prepared to guard her rights. Each right derived
from this or that small task is an extension of her control over the male.

462 The force and significance of this control is, perhaps, best seen in a
woman's right to cook. At marriage a woman must have at least the minimum
424 of cooking utensils, and one of the rights a man acquires in a woman is
252 that she cooks for him. This is something a man cannot do for himself.
Therefore, when a man ill-treats his wife or threatens her with divorce, she
[593] can retaliate by refusing to cook, or leave the tent altogether to return to her
father. A man bereft of this service is in a very sorry plight indeed. The legal dominance of the male, seemingly autocratic, is reduced at every point by the control a woman exercises through her exclusive right to perform tasks. The limits to the area of her coercive powers are significant.
562 They are confined almost wholly to domestic relationships. Legally, women
suffer such disabilities that they are almost of the status of minors; in reality, their day-to-day living is far from intolerable because they are able to control males over a wide field of relationships.

462 Men, excluded in the main from domestic duties around the tent, per-
424 form tasks to which their legal rights are tied. While women have access
231 to wells for water used by human beings, the transport of larger quantities
of water over longer distances, requiring the use of camels, is a task which falls to the men. Watering of animals is done by men. Only they can slaughter the animals for food. The meat of an animal slaughtered by a woman is not "free," in a ritual sense, for human consumption. In an extremity only, a woman can, in effect, kill an animal, but the knife which cuts its throat must be held in a male hand, even if it is the hand of a very
462 small boy. The exploitation of the land is also the male prerogative. They
[424] plough and sow the grain; incidental help may be provided by wives working
[241] alongside their husbands during the early part of reaping, but the main
reaping is done entirely by men. Transportation of grain to the mounds is also carried out by men, and it is they only who have access to the grain stores when quantities are withdrawn for family use. Sheep-shearing is
[236] carried out entirely by males,[10] the fleeces are stacked by them and the
[432] distribution and sales of these is directed by the male head of the tent.

Additional to these major tasks which males undertake are a number of minor ones. Men sew strips of cotton together to make clothes for both sexes. They also make rope of grass, albeit in a desultory sort of way, by twisting together the strands between the palms of the hands. A number of
[834] other tasks fall to the men by virtue of the fact that the sexes are separated
[342] in the tent by a divider of blanket material, which may be taken down
when only members of the elementary family are about, but which is put

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[461] [10] This work is reserved for the younger men and takes the form of a festival during
[533] which lewd songs are sung and poems with obscene themes or references are recited
[538] loudly and within the hearing of elders, in a manner not dissimilar to the behaviour
[831] of bachelors at a wedding.

619 'Ali tribe. There is one lineage, the Sulwatiyya shown in
*[613] Figure 7a, which does not claim descent from Sa'ada and hence are no relations of the Awlad 'Ali Bedouin. Nor are any serious ideological claims for tribal membership provided by them or their Awlad 'Ali neighbors. The first social differentiation found in al-Qasr, then, is between those who belong to the Sa'adi tribes and those of the Marabit tribes. In terms of Bedouin social ideal types, the Sa'adi tribesmen are warriors, known for their courage and generosity; the Marabit tribesmen are weak and dependent on the protection
[992] which the Sa'adi offers them. The Marabit tends to specialize in the role of "holy man." The dichotamy here is a reflection
[171] of the structural differentiation, common to North Africa, between sacred and secular tribes, or client and protector tribes.

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The Sa'adi-Marabit division in al-Qasr is defined geographically, in name, and in Bedouin tradition and myth. Here is the way in which the Marabit "holy man" of al-Qasr conceives of the difference between the two types and its origin:

> They are brothers and there is no difference. The Sa'adi is always one step in front of the Marabit, he handles things for the Marabit and helps him. In political matters the Sa'adi is more advanced . . . When the Marabit is in trouble, the Sa'adi will defend him. They are two different groups because the Sa'adi are from one mother. Once Sa'ada was riding in a caravan through the desert.

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> Her riding booth struck a tree and she found herself stranded there in the tree; her camel had gone and the rest of the caravan noticed nothing and continued on. Then a Marabit passed by and saw her there. He helped her down and they later married. She already had three sons to a former husband: Ali Ahmar, Ali Abyad and Sinaina. The Marabit also had children from another marriage. He was very rich and they could afford to live together. One day thieves began to harrass the man, but when the three Sa'adi sons offered him their help he told them not to bother with the thieves, that they would go away. But they did not, and they continued to harrass the man for a long time. The three sons were still very young at this time. When they grew up they asked the Marabit for arms and horses with which to fight off the thieves. They received them and succeeded in driving off the thieves. The Marabit was very happy and offered the three sons one-half of his wealth, and he was very rich. The sons refused this generous offer saying to the Marabit that they were no different from his other sons and would take only one-tenth of his wealth.

619 The differentiation between the Sa'adi and Marabit has structural consequences only in that it defines psychological types and tends to assign them to certain roles in society. By his [181] psychological make-up, the Marabit, who is weak and retiring, is unfit for the tasks which the Sa'adi undertakes, i.e., war, trade, and politics. It is, nevertheless, expected that the Marabit will act as a support mechanism for the secular operations of the Sa'adi. Usually, this support takes the form of financial contributions.

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675 Each Marabit group is related through contractual agreement to a Sa'adi group. For instance, the Sulwatiyya lineage of al-Qasr are members of the Jumi'at tribe, a Marabit tribe; when identifying themselves they will say

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segment, may choose to belong to, or to secede from, the larger corporate group. This element of choice helps to define the authority of the corporate sole. Authority is illegitimate, i.e. it is mere power, when control is exercised against the will of the subjects (Weber 1947).

Above, I have said that authority is legitimated beyond the tertiary level, i.e., at the secondary level, through contractual alliance. By that I mean the same agreement on values is replicated by the authority groups of the lineage. The five authority groups of 'Ailit Ma'fas are bound together by what the Bedouins call "the bonds of the _'awaaqil"_ (_rawaabit al-'awaaqil_). Below I present a number of examples of the _rawaabit_ from al-Qasr. Then I continue on to show the nature of the corporate group, and the dynamics of structure and authority in Bedouin society.

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BONDS BETWEEN THE 'AWAAQIL OF 'AILIT MA'FAS

1. Every member of the tribe who has proved against him an intrigue concerning the _'aiela_,
2. every member of the tribe who claims against his brother a case which has no basis,
3. every member of the tribe who shifts a border of the borders of a land from one place to another place,
4. every _'aqila_ is responsible for his followers and must present each with the right direction if he does not convince him first (i.e. if he fails at moral discourse, he must arrange the court session),
5. every member of the tribe who departs from the opinion of his _'aqila_ and who follows the wrong and erroneous

*613 675 571 6. every member of the tribe who submits a complaint without first consulting his 'aqila, (i.e. who goes to the government before the 'aqila),

•539 7. every member of the tribe shall back the members of his bait against an opponent without right,

8. every member of the tribe who has proved against him the showing of sympathy toward another tribe knowing that this tribe is antagonistic to his own tribe,

9. every member of the tribe who has proved against him that he helped a relative in payment or in a quarrel against his brother.

we signed this document and declare that these customs are valid from the date of today and everyone who disobeys them pays a dhabiiha ("lamb") and 10 L.E. without any objection if any of the items of the above items is proven against him.

Date: August 8, 1953
The 'awaaqil (signatures or stamps):
Abd al-Ruwaf (Bait Firjani)
Hussain 'Umar (Bait 'Umar)
Shi'ath Abd al-Hadi (deceased, Bait Braik)
'Atiya 'Umran (Bait Kailani)
Khalid Idris (Bait Muhammad)

114 619 675 *613 In the rawaabit, or contract, just noted the term "tribe" refers to the secondary segment ('aiela). Murray (1935:315n) has also pointed to an instance of the Bedouins' use, in a formal document, of the word qabiila ("tribe") when reference to "some smaller division, such as 'eila is clearly meant."

675 681 [183] *[613] Through the rawaabit norms are expressed and action is oriented with respect to them. If it is otherwise, sanctions may be brought to bear to insure conformity to norms. The minimal sanction which the 'aqila may impose is the dhabiiha

675 ("blood sacrifice") and a fine of 10 L.E. The most serious
681 sanction which the group, through the 'agila, can administer
*613 is banishment. In this case, the decision "to wash one's
hands of another" may originate with the 'agila but must be
executed by the next of kin, or the process can originate
with the next of kin and be carried out with the approval of
the 'awaaqil. In any case, it is an ultimate negative sanction
which ranks with blood-revenge in degree of seriousness, since
social and political status is withdrawn from the person. A
banished person is no longer protected in accordance with the
principle of collective responsibility, and his group may no
675 longer demand blood-money for his life. The charter of 'Ailit
*613 Lazumi presented below is similar in most respects to that of
571 'Ailit Ma'fas with the exception that it makes provision for
681 the barawwa, the act of banishing from the group. The document
was issued in four copies to each of the 'awaaqil of Lazumi.
Note that in both charters thus far shown, not only are the
individuals of the group bound by the rules but, also, the
'agila comes under the rule of law.

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BONDS BETWEEN MEMBERS OF 'AILIT LAZUMI AL-'AISHAIBAT, (Wednesday, January 19, 1952)

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681 In the name of God the Merciful and Compassionate

•539 In the presence of 'Umran Kailani, Hajj 'Ali, the 'awaaqil and individuals of Bait Bu Jafaila who signed below, this agreement took place and the 'awaaqil of this 'aiela are:

675 1 - Hajj Salah Bu Jafaila, 'aqila of Bait Bu Halaiqa
*613 2 - Kuraim Juhami, 'aqila of Bait Uthman
571 3 - Ruwaf Jadalla, 'aqila of Bait Jadella
4 - Muftah Tahir, 'aqila of Bait Tahir

681 •539 Every 'aqila is responsible for his family whether conconcerning the occurrence of problems, and collecting money from his family, or other matters. Every person who rejects the opinion of the 'aqila, or reports to the government without the consent of the 'aqila will be subjected to a fine of 10 L.E. and a dabiha according to the 'awaiyid. And every person who delays in carrying out the decisions of the 'aqila and all that he indicates will also be subject to the same fine. And also, any one who delays in swearing the oath or in supporting his family, and in so doing loses the interest which belongs to the 'aiela, he will be subject to the same fine. Any of the 'awaaqil who cause the loss of any right of the rights of the members of the 'aiela will also be subject to the same fine. And any member who makes false claims against any of the other members of the 'aiela is subject to the same fine. And any 'aqila or member from the members of the 'aiela who has proven against him an intrigue, or a quarrel, or prejudice between him and his brother or paternal cousin is subject to the same fine. He is also subject to the same fine who has proven against him prejudice in favor of another party against his paternal cousins, that is to say, the members of this 'aiela. And every 'aqila or individual who delays in signing and accepting these bonds, or in executing them, is considered an outsider by this 'aiela and the 'aiela will not be responsible for him in the future, and this will be considered a barawwa for him from the 'aiela.

This was issued in four copies to the 'awaaqil, and all previous bonds are cancelled from this date and are no longer effective.

Signatures and stamps of 'awaaqil and witnesses.

675 681 The barawwa (literally: "the act of putting outside") is a formal procedure, formal enough to entail having the process notarized as a legal document according to Egyptian civil law. The Bedouins say that the legal document of barawwa is "to show that we have washed our hands of the

*613 of secession, and the nature of the collective responsibility
571 principle in Bedouin society are made clear. The occasion of
681 the writing of this document was the issuance of a "fraternity
675 paper."

BONDS BETWEEN MEMBERS OF 'AILIT ABU QARASA

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571 Thanks to God alone and nothing survives but His
681 kingdom, praise and peace to Him Who will never
•539 have a Prophet who is greater than Himself.

675 It came into our hands on 10 Shawal 1363 (September 9, 1944), the _'awaaqil_ of 'Ailit Abu Qarasa of the 'Aishaibat; and the reason for their coming together is in order to merge 'Ailit Abu Qula with the other _buyuut_ as they were in the past. And this is in accordance with the agreement of all the parties to this paper. By the free will of all it became, as of this day, that all of the mentioned _buyuut_ will be connected with the other _buyuut_ in receiving and giving. But all blood-money of the mentioned _buyuut_ which was due before the date 3 Shawal 1361, that is to say all debts for past offences, they and their former relatives will be responsible for. After this date, which is 3 Shawal 1361, each of the mentioned _buyuut_ will share the good and the bad equally. And the _'awaiyid_ which the mentioned _buyuut_ agreed upon are the following:

1 - First, he who intentionally beats his brother in the _'aiela_ will pay by himself and no one from the _'aiela_ will pay anything with him.

2 - But the offense which takes place within the _'aiela_, the fine for it will be distributed in such a way that the first half of the payment will go to the offended _bait_ and the second half will be distributed among all of the mentioned _buyuut_.

3 - The offense which happens to the _'aiela_ from an outside party, half of the payment goes to the _'aiela_ and the second half to the offended _bait_.

*613 4 - The thief from the mentioned buyuut will be
571 responsible for himself alone, and his relatives
681 in blood (i.e. his bait) will be responsible for
him.

•539 5 - The one who is known to lie under oath from
675 the mentioned buyuut, everyone who supports him
must be a blood-relative from his bait.

6 - The one who delays paying the share which is requested by the 'aiela, his rich relative will pay.

7 - The one who asks for a barawwa from the 'aiela will pay what is asked for, and at the same time will also pay 20 L.E. barawwa fee for every man who fasts.

8 - The one who supports his relative from some other 'aiela against his paternal cousin will be required to pay 10 L.E. as a fine.

Signatures or stamps of the 'awaaqil of 'Ailit Abu Qarasa, and the 'awaaqil of 'Ailit Ghriba (who are the former relatives of Bait Abu Qula, the reconciled bait).

*613 Every point of the above rawaabit shows the moral
554 and political significance of the secondary group in the
571 Bedouin community. Membership in a secondary compound
[675] authority group entitles one to political status without which the individual could not survive. The Bedouin community shares certain activities, relationships, and goals so that the aims of any individual can be achieved only by participation in social action with others: this the Bedouins have in common with every other human community (Firth 1951:41). Specifically, in considering society in terms of authority roles and authority groups, we are interested in the political community in which the Bedouins participate.

578 *613 682 683 Dawlat, on the decision of the 'awaaqil, paid a 200 L.E. diiya for the leg and the eye. After this, the two families resumed friendly relations.

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> In the Name of God the Merciful,
> It is the day, 28 Muharram 1382, the same as 1 July 1962. This agreement took place between the following parties: 'Ailit Abu Qarasa and 'Ailit al-Zallat. The reason for this agreement is the quarrel which happened on Wednesday, 24 Muharram, and 27 June. Out of this quarrel resulted the death of the late Juwaida Abd al-Salam. This [illegible]ement is made in the presence of the 'awaqil of the tw[illegible]ties and with their full approval (also present was Hajj 'Ali, an important rajal khair about whom we will have more to say). The offending group, namely 'Ailit al-Zallat, will go to live with Hajj Sabr Hamad al-Dawlat at Ras Abu Laha area, according to the way of the nazala among the Awlad 'Ali. 'Ailit al-Zallat may walk between Wadi Umm al-Shitan and Wadi al-Hawari on the west side, the sea on the north side, and the borders of the Qinaishat land on the southern side without a nazil (i.e. one from the protecting party). And if they go out from these mentioned borders, they must be accompanied by one from 'Ailit Dawlat. And if they go beyond the mentioned borders, without a nazil, no one from the protecting party has a right to stop them. And if any from the other party offends them within the mentioned borders, then 'Ailit Abu Qarasa will be subject to whatever is decided against them in accordance with the 'awaiyid Awlad 'Ali. This agreement was made and signed in the presence of the 'awaqil of the Abu Qarasa, and the period of nazala will be one year beginning the date of today. We hope for the help of God.
>
> Signatures or seals of eleven men.
> Signature and approval of Marsa Matruh Police Office
> Dated: 1 July 1962

578 *613 682 Date: 1919. Case: Quarrel between 'Ailit Zallat ('Aishaibat, 'Ali Ahmar) and 'Ailit Hafiyan (Awlad Kharuf, 'Ali Abyad) concerning murder. The problem began over the ownership of a well. Three men from the Hafiyan were killed, and in revenge the

Date: 24 January 1946 Marsa Matruh

1st Party: 'Awaqil of so-called Harun Abd al-Zain of al-Kamailat

2nd Party: 'Awaqil of so-called Hamad Idris of al-'Aishaibat

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Both parties, the first and the second, met before the _'awaaqil_ and witnesses to solve the prevailing problem between them concerning the wounding of so-called Harun Abd al-Zain who claims that this wound is from Hamad Idris. In the presence of the _'awaaqil_ all agreed that Hamad Idris should swear the oath and be supported by the below named. And the text of the oath which they will say, is: "By the truth (i.e. _haqq_, which also refers to a divine attribute) of the owner of this shrine, I swear that this bullet which hurt Harun is neither from me nor do I know who shot the bullet at the time of his injury." And a number of sixteen men must support him at the shrine of Sidi Yunis al-Jaraira on the date of Friday, the 29th of Saffar, 1946. And if any does not present himself for the oath, then the wounds which are present in Harun Abd al-Zain will be from the 'Aishaibat tribe. And if all swear this oath, the two parties will be even with each other. After this, none of them will hold anything against the other. This was issued in the presence of all of their _'awaaqil_ and with their satisfaction without any force or ill-will.

(On the original document is presented a list of the sixteen men from the lineage of Ma'fas of the 'Aishaibat who were chosen by the Kamailat to support Hamad Idris in the Oath.)

All of the seventeen above mentioned (including Hamad Idris) must be present at the shrine of Sidi Yunis al-Jaraira on the day Friday, 29 Saffar, in order to swear the oath, and this is what took place at the hand of witnesses, and God is the best witness.

Signatures or seals of all _'awaaqil_ who were present.

Day of the Oath:

It is on the day Friday, the last of the blessed month of Saffar, 1946. The 'Ailit Ma'fas of al-'Aishaibat, and with them 'Ailit al-Mahatha of al-Kamailat, came in order to swear the oath at the shrine of Shaikh Yunis al-Jaraira. And they swore this oath and the Kamailat became reconciled

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that they had received their rights in this case. And the two parties are satisfied by this according to the witnesses present.

Signatures or seals of four witnesses.

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The next case represents the only time in the memory of informants that all of the _'awaaqil_ of the 'Ali Ahmar met to intervene in a case of conflict. This case is extremely unusual because it may be the only time in Awlad 'Ali history that political mobilization of this scale has taken place. As noted, political action, in war or peace, usually involves only secondary segments. In view of this, the case probably reflects an instance of social change: the Egyptian government, anxious to maintain good relations with Libya, encouraged and facilitated the settlement of this dispute by furnishing transportation and cutting administrative red tape so that the _'awaaqil_ of the 'Ali Ahmar could handle this case in a most expeditious way. Here is a case where Bedouin traditional political structures function adequately in the modern situation. Note here also that, in certain circumstances, the _diiya_ payment can be divided symbolically and specifically to place guilt and to indicate the seriousness of a crime.

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Date: 1963. Case: Quarrel between the tribe of 'Ali Ahmar (Egypt) and the Harabi (Libya) concerning murder. A young boy of 'Ailit X was visiting his sister in Libya. He learned

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that 'Ait Idris take the oath as proof that the well was owned by them. Upon the decision of the _'awaaqil_, however, 'Ait 'Umran refused to allow 'Ait Idris to swear the oath "because we are all one family." This means, as one _'aqila_ actually stated at the conclusion of the case, that " 'Ait Idris is indebted to 'Ait 'Umran."

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The following two cases which occur in the external system of political relations, one within the 'Aishaibat territory and the other dealing with land rights in the territory between two primary authority groups, indicate the formal aspect of Bedouin adjudication in establishing contracts.

• [539]

Date: 12 August 1963. _A Contract of Agreement on Land Rights_.
Agreement and satisfaction took place between Hussain Karim al-Dawlat of al-'Aishaibat and Khalid Idris al-Ma'fas of al-'Aishaibat, the first and second party. And the reason for this agreement is that each of the two parties own cultivable land at Ras Wadi Madwar. The two parties wish to make a dividing line between this linear piece of land and to declare the borders. The two parties agreed on the following: first, the beginning of the border extends from the eastern side at south Ras Raqabit al-Shumar to the western side at Hatiyid and is shown by stone markers; secondly, this line should be established from the east to the west, and this is a dividing line between the two parties and was executed by them and with their satisfaction; thirdly, whoever rejects or modifies this line will be responsible in front of law and the _'awaiyid Awlad 'Ali_; each party is responsible for his children and relatives as to their actions regarding this line which is the subject of the agreement; fifthly, this contract of agreement which defines the borders between the two parties was issued in two copies, a copy to each party to use when it is needed.

Signatures or seals of seven men.

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Date: 12 October 1954. There came to us (i.e. the 'awaqil) on this day, Khalid Idris of al-'Aishaibat and Yunis Abd al-Nabi of al-Kamailat. The reason for their coming is a quarrel over land rights at Wadi al-Hijnaiya. And we put distinct markers between the land of the two parties, the first, Khalid Idris, and the second, Yunis Abd al-Nabi. And the boundary passes by the distinct markers; the first is the wadi marker, the second to the sea and beside the tree, and the final marker we put east of Halima well. This is a decision between the two parties in the presence of the following witnesses:

Signatures or seals of five men.

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The case given below indicates, by the use of two documents, the process of conflict settlement involving two secondary segments of al-Qasr, one Sa'adi and one Marabit. 'Ailit al-Sulwatiyya, though genealogically not members of the Awlad 'Ali and holders of a client or vassal status in traditional times, are within the jurisdiction of the 'awaiyid Awlad 'Ali. They claim their rights under it by virtue of the fact of their residence in al-Qasr. The power of ritual sanction is clearly illustrated by this case.

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Date: 30 July 1964, Marsa Matruh. First Party: Shaikh Khalid Za'aluk al-Sulwatiyya and four relatives. Second Party: Khalid Idris of 'Ailit Ma'fas and three relatives. They are present. The cause of these two parties coming together is a quarrel over a well named Halima. Since the choice to swear the oath has been made by the two parties, Khalid Idris, the second party, will swear the oath supported by twenty-four members of his 'umraa al-dam ("blood group") to

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578 be chosen by Shaikh Khalid Za'aluk, the first party. The text
685 of the oath which Khalid Idris will swear is: "By the truth
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619 of the owner of this tomb (maqaam), and this book of God, I
695 swear that you (i.e. the 'Ailit Sulwatiyya represented by
[539] Shaikh Khalid Za'aluk) have neither work of hand nor a grandfather's stake in this well." If any of the oath-takers are missing on the day of the oath, the well will be owned Khalid Za'aluk. And if they swear the oath, the well will be owned by 'Ailit Ma'fas.

The date of the oath will be the first Friday of month nine,
[778] 1964. The oath will be taken at the shrine of Sidi 'Awam, and the swearing will deal with the well only. For the land which is west of the well belongs to Khalid Za'aluk and his family, and the land to the east of the well belongs to Khalid Idris and his family. And the water which is west of the well belongs to Khalid Za'aluk. The two parties agreed to this. (Each party, and five witnesses, i.e. rajal khair, for each party, signed the document.)

423 Date: 30 July 1964. I, Khalid Za'aluk, have decided to cancel
619 the oath which was supposed to have been sworn on 9 September
578 1964 at the shrine of Sidi Awam. Khalid Idris and the oath-
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[695] takers were present and were stopped from taking the oath. And the well named al-Halima which was the cause of the quarrel

554 hence the *rajal khair* represents a face-saving mechanicam
571 and an alternative which is needed. The *rajal khair* may even
627 violate group norms in acting to restore the balance of
[829] honor: he may lie with intent to deceive, behavior which at
*[613] any other time would be considered "wrong" by the Bedouin.
[577] An informant said that

• [539]

> the real *rajal khair* is a man who goes to men in a quarrel and asks them to be on good terms and to avoid the devil. He uses good judgement in quarrels. In this case, he may even have to lie. He goes to both parties and listens to them insult each other, but when he returns he tells each that the other is a good man and wishes to settle the quarrel. He tells them: 'Do not let the devil interfere.' He tells each that the other wants his friendship.

554 I pursued the detail that a *rajal khair* may lie to restore
571 peace, since other informants had made a point of this. My
577 informant then explained:
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> I don't want to commit myself because no one knows if the *rajal khair* is really lying; the men at the time of the quarrel do not know that he is lying. Not all men are *rajal khair*: there are only a few. The *rajal khair* puts himself in trouble to help others, therefore, the people do not want to harm him (by thinking ill of him). The *rajal khair* must be a good man and help others, and he always speaks the truth. He lies but he is doing good, and the people do not want to harm him. When the *rajal khair* lies, a man does not lose his rights. A man tells the *rajal khair* this; he tells him that he does not want to lose his rights, and he does not care what he says as long as he does not lose his rights.

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One 'aqila, who is famous for the sharpness of his tongue in dealing with litigants, was explicit about the authority of the rajal khair as compared to his own in matters of conflict regulation:

> Both are one (i.e. the 'aqila and the rajal khair), for the rajal khair can also finish a problem. The rajal khair tries to solve the problem, but only the 'aqila judges (yahkum). The rajal khair worries about the feelings of the two men involved, but the 'aqila cares only about justice and what is right . . . The rajal khair does not want the two men to lose one another. It is a friendly way to solve problems.

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Bedouins of low status in al-Qasr who are economically linked to the rajal khair in what resembles a patron-client relationship permit this fact to influence their own interpretation of the authority structure. A common view of the 'aqila's formal authority indicates that the Bedouins themselves are conscious of a structural comparison of political roles, but not of the underlying economic conditioners at work.

[539]

> There are good men and there are bad men: the rajal khair is the opposite of a bad man. The rajal khair is not responsible for his group, but the 'aqila is. The 'aqila is chosen from among the elders of the bait so that he is not always a good man. But when they want a man to solve problems, they get him from among the rajal khair. The 'aqila is responsible before the 'umda and shaikh, and he is responsible for collecting and receiving the diya.

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The rajal khair represents a vital element in Bedouin society. He is a symbol of security, the man to whom one

771 at any time of the day! As one Bedouin put it: "According to the idea of goodness (salih), we are not good. This is because we do not pray, we are part-timers in prayer."

554 A good rajal saalih is considered by the Bedouin to
792 have a special "blessing" (baraka), a concept somewhat
778 equivalent to that of mana. Someone such as 'Amm Salih is thought to have baraka, and this type of power naturally increases his influence and enhances his status. The following
[124] informant's account brings this out and shows something of the magico-religious element at work in Bedouin power relations.

> [539] Hajj 'Ali does not believe in magic but he respects the "holy man" like anyone else. He owns a field from which are taken stones for building houses. One day he saw some men taking stones from this field. They were digging near a well so that the well would not be able to hold water after they had finished. Hajj 'Ali told the men to stop digging. One man answered: "I am cutting these stones for the Jaraira family (the family of 'Amm Salih), and only a few more and we will be finished." Hajj 'Ali replied: "For the Jaraira as for anyone else, we don't favor anyone, so stop the work now." Then Hajj 'Ali went home, never thinking that they would cause any trouble for him, and he was afraid of no harm. He slept and he had a dream.
> [787] In the dream he saw three of the Jaraira family, all of whom were dead and whom he had known in life. In the dream they only watched him and spoke no words. In the morning Hajj 'Ali went to the co-operative society's office and there he met 'Amm Salih. He said to him: "'Amm Salih, I want to tell you something." Then he related the whole story to him, and said: "I had no fear that you would do me any harm. But last night I saw your relatives in my dream; I had not even thought of them yesterday, so they are not
> [828] the cause of the dream. (The Bedouins believe that dreams reflect, and are connected with, what you saw or did during the day). So come and take all of the stones that you want, even if you are going to build a palace."

613 672 682 member falls on all members alike, regardless of the exact genealogical relationship to the victim. When bloodmoney is to be paid, its members pay it as a group, divided among all male adults; and although when they receive it, a bigger portion goes to the nearest agnates of the victim, the remainder is distributed equally among all its members.

613 The genealogical depth of the Eila is usually five generations. This is not always true, however. In certain instances the number of generations intervening between the founder of the Eila and its living members is nine or even ten. Naturally, the more generations the larger the size of the Eila. Sometimes the Eila becomes so numerous that it is [217] hard to keep records of all members who are supposed to share in the payment of the bloodmoney in a specific case. When the size of the Eila reaches this point, one of two things may happen. The first is an attempt to make lists of the members. Many of the Eilas have such lists. This 613 675 is usually accompanied by a tendency toward writing down the specific rules and regulations of the vengeance group. These lists are referred to as Amar papers. They constitute a formal statement of an otherwise informally recognized responsibility of the group for certain actions of its members. The other is a tendency toward the fission of one or more of its constiuent units, which, after separation, establishes itself as an independent Amar. The factors underlying this process of fission are discussed in the next chapter.

[539] The following is an example of an Amar paper, that of the Eilat Aggary, which was put into effect in 1954.

IN THE NAME OF GOD THE FORGIVER

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539 The following Awaqil (sing. aqila, the leader of a bait) representing the various "buite" (sing. bait, the tribal segment below the level of eila) of the Aggary Family were witnesses to the treaty and their signatures signify their commitment and that of their respective buite to the content of this agreement.

(a list of the various awaqil)

The above signing awaqil agreed unanimously on the content of the document and all the conditions included. No objection by any of the above persons was noted at the meeting.

Article 1:

The content of this document should be kept as a secret of the Aggary Family. It constitutes the Aggary Amar in accordance with the customs and the Daraieb of Awlad Ali. The content of the document should be revealed only at the request of both parties of a dispute which involves a member of the Amar.

Article 2:

[627] Peace should exist between members of the Amar. No secret grudges or open disputes should be permitted between them. In case such an unfortunate situation exists, the other non-involved members of the Amar should intervene between the disputants, try to solve the dispute, and prevent it from damaging the solidarity of the Amar. They should investigate the facts of the case and force the guilty party to compensate his brother (the wronged party) without giving the former a chance to object.

Article 3:

[681] When the Amar is called upon because of obligation involving the payment of money, all the Awaqil should meet and decide the amount of money that should be collected from each Bait of the Aggary Family. It becomes then the responsibility of each Aqila to collect the amount from his Bait.

Article 4:

[681
885] The share of each Bait is based upon the number of "Sayems", (literally, "fasting males", which is interpreted to mean 15 years of age or over), regardless of whether or not they have a source of income for themselves. The share of those without means of their own is distributed among the other members of the Bait.

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Each Aqila is responsible for submitting to the Amar a list of the Sayems in his bait, and this will be the basis for establishing the share of the bait in payment or receipt of the money.

Article 5:

No Aqila can act on any matter involving loss or gain to the Amar without the presence of the other Awaqil of the Amar, unless an urgent matter occurs in which waiting for the rest of the Awaqil might jeopardize the interest of the Amar. In such cases the Awaqil present can act on behalf of the Amar as a whole.

Article 6:

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The following acts should not involve the Amar as a whole and the offender is considered individually (or with his own Bait) responsible for them:

1. Theft and cheating.
2. Insult or disrespect of a younger member of the Amar to an older person whether from the Amar or not.
3. Entering someone's tent or home without permission.
4. Seduction of women (including rape and adultery).

[681] In all the above cases the individual has to bear the responsibility for his own actions. For to let the Amar pay for him in such circumstances is to encourage him and other such members of the Amar to commit more of such acts and bring disgrace to the Amar. If the offender is unable to pay for his crime, his nearest male kin should pay for him in accordance with the Awlad Ali Daraieb. Such payments are considered as personal debts which the offender has to pay back as soon as he is financially able.

Article 7:

[627] When an older person does injustice to a younger one, the latter should take his complaint to the Aqila of his own bait. The Aqila in turn should take the matter up with the Aqila of the older man or to all the awaqil of the Amar if the matter is serious enough. The awaqil must assess the facts and prevent the older man from doing any more injustice to the younger man and have the former compensate him for any damage he might have caused the younger man by his actions. If the awaqil fail to do this and if their failure resulted in the younger insulting or hurting the older, his acts become no longer an individual responsibility for which he has to pay alone, and the Amar should pay for him.

Article 8:

[627] No members of the Amar should take sides in disputes involving families or individuals outside the Amar unless the awaqil in the Amar investigate the matter and the reasons for the dispute and decide that the Amar as a whole should be on one side of the dispute or the other.

613 **Article 9:**

675 The Amar should never fight on the side of the wrongdoer, because if it does, it will have to pay with him for his wrongdoings.

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Article 10:

[628] Any dispute or fight involving a member of the Amar and an outsider should be reported to the awaqil in the Amar who are supposed to take the matter up with the other party. If the awaqil are convinced that the outsider is the aggressor or that he is at fault, they should try to make him accede to the demands of the members of the Amar, using all their efforts to convince him and the aqila of his bait. If he refuses, they [619] should call him for a "Miad" (tribal meeting) in which all parties involved should be represented by their respective awaqil.

Article 11:

[563] [619] With regard to "iktitab" (tribal adoption), an outsider wanting to join the Aggary Family or one of its constiuent buite must be asked first about the reason or reasons for his desire to join. This must be done in order to know what kind of person he is and whether he will become a burden and liability to the Amar. If he proves to be of reputable standing, the aqila of the bait he wants to join can accept him without consultation with the rest of the awaqil. If on the other hand he is found to have grudges against someone or if someone has a financial claim over him, then the aqila of the bait cannot accept him without consultation with the other awaqil in the Amar. If all the awaqil agree to accept him, he is considered like one of the Eilat Aggary, having the same rights and bearing the same responsibilities.

Article 12:

A memberof the Amar who wants to separate himself from the Amar and get a "barawa" has to state his reasons beforehe can be released from the obligations of his membership in the amar. If his request to get the barawa was because of injustice he suffered by the Amar or any of its members, the awaqil have the duty to straighten the injustice and restore his rights. If, on the other hand, his request for the barawa was to avoid paying the Amar, then he cannot be released from his membership unless he pays all of his share, or else he must return all that the Amar has paid him until the time he asked for the barawa.

Article 13:

[695] [693] If one of the Amar is accused of an offense for which he is tried by the legal system of the state, the Amar as a whole share the expenses of hiring an attorney to defend him. This, however, is done after the awaqil are sure (by means of administering the oath) that he is innocent and that the accusation is false.

first successes in Senegal, the Beni Hilal and the Beni Suleim were being despatched by the Caliph Mustansir billah against 175 619 Mu'izz ibn Badis, his rebellious viceroy in Tripoli. They sang of their conquest : [539]

> " Great was the king, son of Badis, a mighty man of war !
> Yet we routed his thirty thousand men !
> We were but three thousand, yet the victory was ours, and ours
> the spoil !
> Their hearts were as water, not a man was in their ranks !
> We routed them and they fled far and wide ! "

These Beni Hilal, now extinct, are famous wherever Arabic is spoken for the exploits of their legendary hero Abu Zeid, while the Beni Suleim had helped the Prophet at the battle of Hunein, and are said by Hogarth to be the ancestors of the great modern tribe of Harb.[1]

The confusion of these two invasions caused the races of North Africa to become inextricably mixed. Both Arabs and Berbers spent their lives in the desert herding their flocks, and both were warlike. So it is natural that the intermarriages of a few generations should have made one people of them, and it is also natural that the conquered should claim relationship with the conquerors and not vice versa. But this aspiration of the Berbers has flooded their genealogies with so many lies that it is difficult to disentangle the truth.

The descendants of the original colonists, much mixed [792] with Berber blood, still preserve their title of Murabitin, though no longer living in *ribat*, which soon lost their military character and were turned into *Zawia* " monasteries ", where the more peacefully inclined of the sect retired for religious teaching and contemplation. Later, when the *ribat* came to be deserted, the peaceful Murabitin, ill-fitted by their monastic habits for the resumption of an active nomadic life, sank into dependence on their warlike brethren the Sa'adi, and, among a primitive race, dependence means inferiority. Thus in Arabia any tribe that pays tribute to another [186] is despised as Hiteim. And so the once proud title of " Murabitin " has simply come to mean " vassal " and nothing more.

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[1] *History of Arabia*, 38.

585 [684] probably by pricking himself, and will wipe it on the toga.

About two weeks after the wedding, the bride and
585 606 groom take a lamb or a goat and go to spend a few days with
[574] the bride's parents. The Bedouin say that the relationship
between the groom and his in-laws is extremely important.
The man should treat his wife's mother and father as if they
were his own. "When a man's father-in-law and mother-in-law
come to visit him, he must slaughter a lamb for them. He
must respect both of them. Remember, this man and woman are
the grandparents of his children."

585 The marriage, then, is only the first step in the
571 ritualization of new group bonds established between the
182 families of the bride and groom. Bonds are subsequently in-
[574] [431] tensified through a process of visitation, gift-exchange and
[782] sacrifice. The most important factor linking the two groups
*[613] is the actual presence of the bride in the midst of her hus-
band's group, for she remains, in terms of the patrilineal
585 principle, a member of her father's lineage. This is made
*613 perfectly clear by the fact that she is referred to, never
●551 by her name but, by the name of her tribal grouping if she is
571 other than 'Aishaibi. If she is of the 'Aishaibat tribe,
182 she will be referred to as bint of so-and-so. Hence the
[193] Bedouins stress the importance of extra-group bonds by re-
ferring to the women in their residence group as al-Qinaishiyya
or al-Kamailiyya, for instance (-iyya is the Arabic feminine
marker).

182 marker).

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[585] In al-Qasr, if a man's mother is 'Aishaibiiya, he will refer to her as ummi ("my mother"): if she is otherwise, he will refer to her by the tribal tag, i.e. al-Qinaishiyya. A man will also add the name of his mother's tribe, to identify himself with the tribe and to symbolize tribal links, as an appendage to his own full name. The use of the maternal appendage by an individual links him to his mother's tribe through the idea of what Peters (1960:29) has called "the concept of the one womb of maternal origin."

In the case of al-Qasr, this maternal appendage refers to links with the mother's tribe at the primary level (see Figure 9). For instance, two brothers of the Bait Abd al-Malik might wish to differentiate between their maternal origins for some reason or other; one would refer to himself as Yunis Abd al-Malik al-Kamailiyya and, the other as Jabril Abd al-Malik al-Qinaishiyya. This is shown in Figure 9, page 125.

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604 Although a person is obviously related to the mother's tribe through the mother, this matrilateral structural relationship is expressed as one between the individual and
[182] his mother's brother's tribe. The set of relationships surrounding the sister's son-mother's brother dyad is central to Bedouin political organization; it is the basis for the formation of relations of alliance along cognatic lines.

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FIGURE 9 - USE OF MATERNAL APPENDAGE OR SUFFIX


WIFE FROM
KAMAILAT
TRIBE
ABD
AL-MALIK
WIFE FROM
QINAISHAT
TRIBE
YUNIS
ABD AL-MALIK
AL-KAMAILIYYA
JABRIL
ABD AL-MALIK
AL-QINAISHIYYA

604
182 The sister's son-mother's brother relationship receives a high degree of attention in al-Qasr. No other kinship relationship except for that between the father and the son is better defined. Peters (1965:135) sees the importance of the sister's son-mother's brother relationship to be based on the need for economic symbiosis. This factor, but also the necessity for political cooperation, probably account for the central significance of this relationship. One chief political value, i.e., one type of behavior valued by the group and relevant to the political process (see LeVine 1960), which Bedouin children learn relates to the desire to avoid conflict, especially if it concerns their mothers' tribes. Children are taught that any quarrel, however slight at first, could conceivably grow to become a large-scale tribal war.

[181]
[867]
[865]

619 Awlad Ali themselves are divided into three major sections: Ahmar
173 (the Reds); Abiad (the Whites); and Senenah. Each of these sections is referred to as "tribe" and sometimes "tribes." The first two major sections, those of Ahmar or the Reds and Abiad (Whites), are named after their mothers, the wives of Ali (founder of Awlad Ali). The Whites are named after their white mother, and the Reds after their Sudanese mother who, owing to her dark complexion, was known as El-Hamra (the red one).

613 In the past, writers such as Robertson-Smith (1903) have inter-
114 preted the reference to female names in patrilineal genealogies as in-
551 dicating an earlier matrilineal descent. I tend to agree with a more
[595] recent writer, E. Peters (1959), who explains the reference to female ancestors by two factors: patrilineal descent and polygyny. According to him, it is a way of distinguishing full brothers from half brothers and a means to show this genealogically. "The concept of the 'one womb', of maternal origin, is a critical one in the context of social cohesion, but it does not deny patriliny; on the contrary, it serves a sense to enforce it. Female names can be used to show a greater notion of cohesion than the mere use of male names, and the significance of a female name . . . is that it is symbol of full brother unity at the highest political level." (p.29).

613 This can be further supported by evidence from my own data which
551 show that reference to female names occur more frequently in charts
173 where tribal names rather than proper names are used. In genealogies
619 using proper names, informants rarely, if ever, trace their descent to an ancestress. But when charts of tribal names are used, it is not

613 uncommon to find reference to female names. This indicates that it is 551 only when the unity of the full brothers becomes politically signifi- 173 cant that the uame of the mother rather than the name of the father is 619 used. This may explain why the occurrence of female names in Awlad Ali [595] genealogies is not as common as one might expect judging from the frequency of polygynous marriages among the group.


Awlad Mansur
Mutair
'aggary
Gedaidah
Bu-Zewah
El-Hafian
El-Marries
Suliman

Fig. 3. Recognized tribal segments of Awlad Mansur (a segment of Awlad Ali)


Mansur
Bu-Asabei
Bu-Mutair
'aggar
Muhammed
Bu-Zewah
Abdellah
Hussein (Hafian)
Muhammed
Suliman
Muhammed
Suliman

613 The two charts show the same unit of Awlad Mansour. The first of
619 the two charts shows the tribal segments in which Eilat Gedaida (a female
173 551 name) appears as one of the segments. When the actual genealogical
chart of one of the living members of that segment was drawn, descent
was traced to Mohammed, the husband of Gedaida, as shown on the second
chart. In this case Gedaida is not a member of Awald Mansour segment.
The unity of the full brothers is emphasized without changing the affiliation
of the segment. It is simply a means of carrying on the patriline
using the mother's name. This is not always the case, however. Examination
of other cases in which the female name was used reveals the fact
that in certain instances using the female name is a means of carrying
on the line of descent through a daughter. This meant incorporating
within the tribal segment a whole group of individuals who otherwise
613 would have belonged to a different patriline. Carrying the line through
619 the daughter in this manner has the same result as adopting her husband
551 unto the tribe. The question then is why wasn't adoption used. Examination
597 of the two cases in which this happened indicates that a possible
explanation may be that this occurs whenever the husband is unadoptable.
Adoption is possible whenever a man does not have any tribal affiliation.
613 In one of the two cases the husband belonged to the Gemei'at tribe, a
619 Murabiteen tribe which enjoys a relatively higher status than the
551 other Murabiteen tribes by virtue of their being the original settlers
597 of the area and helping the Awald Ali in their fight with the Hanadi,
554 yet compared to Awlad Ali proper occupies an inferior position. In
this case, relating to the patriline of the mother carried with it a

613 definite political advantage. In the second case in which the female
619 name was used, the husband was a member of the Bara'asa tribe of Libya.
551 Although this tribe is one the powerful tribes of Libya, it has no
597
554 political influence in the Egyptian Western Desert. Changing affiliation carried with it the strong political support of the mother's tribal segment.

619
131 In general the Reds occupy the western half of the coastal area of the Western Desert from the town of Matruh westward to the Libyan border, while the Whites occupy the eastern part which stretches to Alexandria. The Senenah are fairly scattered although their largest concentration is located in the extreme western part overlapping that of the Reds. The territorial division of the area among the three major sections of Awlad Ali is not a strict one. Historical evidence shows that there has been
[174] a considerable tribal displacement throughout the area. This displacement occurred mainly during the intratribal war era and during the Second World War when the area was a main battlefield. In general, however, there is a significant relationship between territorial distribution and tribal segmentation, and this is especially true on the higher levels of segmentation than on the lower ones.

619 Each of the three sections of the apex of a three-tiered order of
613 segments which, following the native usage, will be called Kabila (tribe), Eila (family), and Bait (house).

619 The first order referred to as tribes are structurally equivalent
173 units but of highly variable size. Each of them has its traditional history. Some of these histories are important to the tribe as a whole.

613 682 it was impossible to verify the actual facts or to know what exactly
683 happened. But since the parties involved are still alive and since these
672 events are closely related to present-day happenings, the case is still
558 alive in the minds of the parties involved as well as those of outsiders-
(124) Naturlaly, each party tries to present the facts in such a way as to
613 682 support his own claims. Shei'eb, for example, insists that Hakim had
683 bribed members of bait Asabei' to refuse to pay their share in order to
156 embarrass him and make him appear as unable to perform his duties as
558 Aqila. "Hakim always had his eyes on becoming the Aqila of bait Asabei'," said Shei'eb, "but he had no business becoming the Aqila, so he had to make me look bad to the other Awaqil.... He likes to be looked up to as a big man, but it wouldn't work." While other members of bait Asabei' deny that Hakim had bribed them, they agree with Shei'eb that Hakim is a
156 dishonest man. In fact, Hakim's reputation is so widespread in the area
551 that it has earned him the nickname of "the thief". The nickname was
788 given to him a few years ago when he went to Mecca for a pilgrimage with
685 another fellow tribesman. The latter told the story that while in Mecca Hakim had found a purse with two hundred pounds in it. He was supposed to return the purse to the authorities or it would be considered as stealing if he kept it. Stealing in Mecca is not only a crime but also a great sin which makes the holy trip void for the offender. Hakim told his companion that he had given the purse to the authorities. But later, on their way back from Mecca, the friend found the purse hidden in Hakim's luggage. When the story was known in the area, he was referred to as
156 "the thief". Other accounts of Hakim's dishonesty are told throughout
685 the area, including stories of how he acquired his wealth through stealing
439

[P.363]

EMRYS PETERS

18. *The Proliferation of Segments in the Lineage of the Bedouin of Cyrenaica* [*Libya*][1]

121 In this article I do not propose to discuss the genealogies of the
128 Cyrenaican Bedouin in full, but only such aspects of them as are strictly relevant to an understanding of their process of growth. Many other aspects of these genealogies will be referred to, and indeed, some of the arguments put forward will presume an acceptance of views which cannot be developed adequately in this article. A fuller and more general account of Cyrenaican genealogies is in preparation, and, until this is published, there is no alternative to the somewhat dogmatic statements about them which appear in the introductory part of this article.

174 The Bedouin of Cyrenaica claim that they are all descendants
613 of a unique ancestress, Sa'ada. Writers in the past (e.g.
551 Robertson-Smith 1903) have considered the occurrence of fe-
562 male names in patrilineal genealogies as evidence of an earlier
[173] and matrilineal mode of descent. A more satisfactory explanation of the occurrence of female names is to be found in the combination of two facts: descent in the patriline, whether or

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[1] My field work among the Cyrenaican Bedouin was made possible by an
122 award from the Emslie Horniman Fund and a later award from the Treasury Committee for Studentships in Oriental Languages and Cultures. I wish here
121 to express my indebtedness to both committees for their generosity. Much of the work I have done on genealogies was included in a thesis presented for
128 the degree of D.Phil. at Oxford University in 1951. The ideas included in this thesis I developed more systematically in a course of lectures on the Bedouin which I gave at Manchester University during the session 1953–54. I subsequently read papers around the problems discussed in this paper at
128 Oxford and Cambridge Universities. I am grateful to Professor Gluckman for reading this article in manuscript, and for the numerous discussions I have had with him on problems relating to lineage organization.

174 not male names are used, is assumed; and secondly that the
613 Bedouin are polygamous. If, then, half-brother differentiation
551 or full sibling unity is to be shown genealogically, the obvious
562 way in which this can be done is to use a maternal name in the genealogy. Thus, in the Cyrenaican genealogy, a number of tribal groups will be shown as sons of a particular father. If dif-
182 ferentiation of these groups needs to be shown, this can be ef-
613 fected by clustering the groups round, say, two female names
551 (the names of the respective mothers) thereby making the two
562 clusters of groups stand in the relationship of paternal half brothers. The concept of the 'one womb', of maternal origin, is a critical one in the context of social cohesion, but it does not deny patriliny; on the contrary, it serves in a sense to reinforce it. Female names can be used to show a greater notion of cohesion than the mere use of male names, and the significance of a female name placed at the apex of the Cyrenaican genealogy is that it is the symbol of full brother unity at the highest political level.

173 The founding ancestress Sa'ada is credited with two sons, who
613 in turn are considered to be the founding ancestors of the two
619 largest groups of tribes in Cyrenaica. Each of these sons is said to have begottten two sons, as shown on the accompanying genealogy. The next generation shows a total of nine names, and these nine ancestors are considered to be the founding ancestors of the nine noble tribes of Cyrenaica.[2] Continuing the line of descent of one of these tribes—the Magharba—the same pattern of segmentation repeats itself: the tribe is divided into two primary sections having ar-Ra'aid and ash-Shamakh as the respective founding ancestors. Ash-Shamakh is said to have had four sons, and these are the founding ancestors of four secondary sections. These latter four are credited with a varying number of sons, as shown in the genealogy (Fig. 18-1).

One feature of the Cyrenaican genealogy immediately stands out from this brief description: the uniformity in the number of segments at the various levels of segmentation. Along the line of descent from Sa'ada to Nasr, the number of sons shown in the

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[162] [2] One of these, the 'Ailat Fayid, now only numbers about 150 souls, and although it is given the structural position of a tribe in the genealogy, it scarcely merits this distinction in practice.

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173
613
619


SA'ADA
(1)
BARAGHITH
'AQQARA
(2)
BARAGHUTH AL-SGHAIR
JIBARNA
HARABI
'ALI
(In Egypt)
TRIBES
(3)
'ABID
'ARIF
'AWAQIR
MAGHARBA
DARSA
HASA
BARA'ASA
'AILAT FAYID
ABAIDAT
(4) PRIMARY
AL-RA'AIDAT
AULAD AL-SHAMAKH
(5) SECONDARY
'ALI
MANSUR
NASR
SUBH
(6) TERTIARY
13
6
4
4
MADHKUR
HAIBA
AL-DAWWAS
UMBARAKA

FIG. 18-1 GENEALOGY 1. The names given in this genealogy are the tribal names in use. All are derivatives of personal names of ancestors, like all tribal names, except for some nicknames (e.g. Baraghith means 'the fleas') and a few which refer to a general location (e.g. the Magharba means the 'Westerners'). [551]

first four descending generations is two. At the fifth level the 173
number increases to four and finally, at the sixth level there 613
characteristically occurs a marked irregularity in the number of 619
descendants forming the founding ancestors of the tertiary sections.

Another feature of the Cyrenaican genealogy is that its 613
branches show an intimate relationship with ecological areas. 619
Thus, the major division into two branches stemming from 13
Sa'ada represents the eastern and western halves of the country 182
with associated and clear differences in ecology. Continuing the line of descent, the Jibarna and Baraghith groups of tribes occupy plain and mountain foot-hills respectively. The two Jibarna tribes in turn occupy two distinct kinds of plain. Following now the division of the Magharba tribe, its two primary sections are divided by a very conspicuous dry valley. The four secondary divisions of the Aulad ash-Shamakh primary section likewise show a relation to ecological boundaries, albeit on a smaller scale than those previously referred to, but none the less important in this more local context. Finally, the unevenly numbered tertiary sections which are derived from these four

621
tion which enable the genealogy to remain constant in length 613
and fixed in form despite its dynamic content. 128

One of the main processes at work in foreshortening gene- 173
alogies is that referred to by Evans-Pritchard as telescoping.[8] 178
This process is also a characteristic feature of the Cyrenaican 613
genealogy, although its effects, to be discussed presently, differ 551
conspicuously. The way in which telescoping works in the Cyrenaican genealogy is that several male names come to be omitted in the genealogy below the name of the founding ancestor of the tertiary group. Usually, the form in which this occurs it that the name of a famous tribesman, and particularly his nickname if he has one, is retained along with the personal names of his lineal descendants in successive generations. The example given below is taken from the genealogy of the Haiba tertiary section of the Magharba tribe:



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[8] 'It is evident, moreover, that since the minimal lineage consists of four or five actual steps in ascent, there has been telescoping of the agnatic line from the founder of the minimal lineage further up the line of ascent to the founder of the clan, for the founder of the minimal lineage was himself the extremity of another minimal lineage which has, by increase in generations, become the minor lineage, and so on' (Fortes & Evans-Pritchard 1940, p. 199). Since Evans-Pritchard first wrote on the telescoping of genealogies (171)
among the Nuer, other anthropologists have discussed the process in various systems. Fortes, Richards, Laura Bohannan, Cunnison, and Mitchell in their writings on the Tallensi, Bemba, the Tiv, the Luapula people, and the Yao respectively are notable examples . . . As the mode of manipulation of Bedouin genealogies is marginal to my present problem, the main comparison is not with these works but with Evans-Pritchard's earlier work on the Nuer, because the Bedouin and Nuer lineage system have more in common than either have with the other systems, excepting possibly the Tiv.

173 178 613 • 551 The line shows five male names in all. The eldest surviving members of this line is Sa'aid, who almost invariably is referred to, not by his personal name, but as Bu Shliby,[9] and on the infrequent occasions when his personal name is used it is followed by Bu Shliby and not by his father's name, which is the more common practice. Again, Abdul Qadar, when his father is not about, is called Bu Shliby, and when it is necessary to give him his personal name Bu Shliby is added, except among his more intimate family kindred, when only his personal name would be used. Likewise, his son Yunis carries Bu Shliby in addition to his personal name and is sometimes even referred to as Bu Shliby only. Abdul Qadar had never known his grandfather, was aware however of his existence in the past, but did not feel it necessary to use his name, and whatever obligation he might have felt to keep the memory of his grandfather alive, he fulfilled it when he named his son after him. Many of the older members of the group are also aware of the lineal connexions between Bu Shliby and Yunis, even though they use this knowledge in a genealogical context only, but many of the younger men of the group do not know these details. It is clear that when the boy Yunis grows to old age, three names in this line will have ceased to be used.

This practice of adding to a personal name the name of a deceased ancestor making one the son of the other, is pushed to the extent of carrying forward through the generations a nickname which referred to some peculiar characteristic of the ancestor, but which has little relation to the present bearer. Thus the ancestor whose name has been retained might have been nicknamed 'The Lame One' or 'The Squint-Eyed One' because he suffered either of these personal defects; or he might have been nicknamed 'The Old One' because he lived to a ripe old age. Such nicknames might later be carried by men who are not lame, nor squint-eyed, nor old, while the names of the intervening ancestors are dropped in normal use.

Another process is at work, which needs to be distinguished from telescoping, for although the results in genealogical terms are similar, Bedouin view it in quite a different light. This is the [553] process of fusing names. It is common practice among the Bed-

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[193] [9] The prefix *Bu* is used by the Bedouin to mean 'son of.'

ouin—and, for that matter, Arabs in other lands—to name a boy 173
after a deceased relative. Rarely is a boy named after his father, 178
unless the father's death occurs before the boy is born, in which 613
circumstance, the new-born boy would certainly take his father's 551
name. A much more common form of this practice is to name a [553]
boy after his grandfather, assuming the latter to be dead. The eldest son usually accepts this responsibility, but it by no means falls invariably to him. There is a number of reasons for this, but they need not concern us here, since they are of no relevance to the general argument. What is of concern at present is that one name in the genealogy might represent the fusion of several other similar names. When circumstances permit, an individual's line might run as follows: Muhammad—'Ali—Muhammad—'Ali—Muhammad. It is true that the man himself and those closely related to him might know full well that there are three men named Muhammad and two named 'Ali, but it would not be considered irregular if only one Muhammad and one 'Ali were given in the genealogy. A mature man, giving his genealogy, omitted his father's name, Ibrahim. When asked about the omission, he insisted that he had given it, and when he was told that the name Ibrahim given by him was intended to refer to his young son, he impatiently dismissed the matter with the observation that having given the name Ibrahim once, it mattered little whether it had been put in the position of his son or father. Pointing to his son he added, 'There is my father, Ibrahim. He has taken my father's position, has he not?'

By the fusion of names, several persons drop out of the genealogy, and by and by, the line comes to be shortened. It also has the effect of giving a person's name a weighting which otherwise it would not possess. In a sense, a young son named after a father is not merely a son but a father and possibly a great-grandfather also. The young boy becomes the contemporary carrier of the personalities of those of similar name who have preceded him, while the behaviour of the living towards him is, in virtue of this, affected in a number of details. A man who had named his son in this way, explained the matter thus: 'He is my son, but also my father because he has his name. I cannot beat him for it would be like beating my father. When he grows up and I grow old, he will look after me as if I were his son.'

173 Fusion of names appears in another context and for similar
178 reasons. Not only are lineal descendants given the name of de-
551 ceased ancestors, but a man may be given the name of any de-
613 ceased agnate of his tertiary section. Usually, this is only done
428 when a man passes on property to another who is not his direct
[553] heir. Commonly, this occurs when an agnate is also a mother's
brother, as often happens as a result of parallel cousin marriage,
and this mother's brother has no sons of his own. If he has a
sister's son, who is also his paternal nephew, he is likely to pass
on his wealth to this nephew. A father, the Bedouin insist, ought
[183] to perform three duties for his sons: attend to their circumcision,
[593] and their education in the Koran, and provide bride-wealth when
[852] they marry. All fathers attend to the circumcision of all their sons;
[871] few provide for the Koranic education of any of their sons; most
bear the burden of marrying off at least one of their sons. The
[583] performance of the latter duty is what makes the continuance
of the deceased's name an obligation, and whoever performs this duty must have his name perpetuated in one male offspring of the union which was brought about with his wealth. Wealth need not take the form of bride-wealth; it can be a legacy willed by a father, maternal uncle of the kind described above, or any other agnate who has died without male issue. Conversely, if a man dies without leaving any property, even his sons might not perpetuate his name, and eventually it will drop out of the genealogy.[10] There are instances of men inheriting the wealth of a number of agnates, using each parcel of wealth to make a new marriage and naming the sons of the various unions after the several dead who had left wealth. The example given below is taken from the genealogy of the Dawwas section of the Magharba tribe. What happened here was that the two lines stemming from Faraj and Sha'aban, after proliferating normally, became extinct. As this happened, Ibrahim, the son of Miftah, began to inherit wealth to which he was not a direct heir; and

---

[588] [10] To avoid confusion, it ought to be made clear that this is not ghost marriage. As I understand ghost marriages from Evans-Pritchard's (1951) account, two main conditions must be satisfied: (i) that there should be inherited wealth to make a marriage, and (ii) that the wealth remaining after the ghost marriage has been made is inherited by the ghost children only. In Cyrenaica, wealth thus inherited becomes part of a man's total wealth and is not reserved for a ghost marriage and its issue.

as he did so, he entered into a plurality of marriages, begat sons, 173
and replaced those men in the genealogy who had died without 178
heirs. In the following generation the twin process of death and 551
replacement continued. Death removed all the male descendants 613
of Sha'aban and Faraj, and of Ibrahim Bu Miftah's many sons 428
only two, Sharif and Abdallah, were of age to marry at the time of my visits to their camp. Both had enjoyed a plurality of wives, although still young to have done so, and each marriage they contracted took place after the death of one of their kinsmen. The full and intricate details of this interesting genealogy are irrelevant here, since all the example is intended to show is how nine of eleven male names were perpetuated in the genealogy by repeating five of them twice and four of them three times, accounting in all for twenty-two names; and to do this, three men (one of them had died, but the other two were both under forty years of age) married eight wives. All the names in the two lines which have died out have not yet been brought back into the genealogy, but 'Abdallah, the son of Ibrahim, who had already done extremely well in this respect, was confident that soon the obligations towards Musa, Abd al-Rahim, and Sa'ad would be redeemed.

Thus the fusion of names not only ensures that names threatened with extinction are perpetuated, but that one person, in the name he bears, can carry the genealogical burden of several other men of that name.


SA'AID
MIFTAH
SHA'ABAN
FARAJ
IBRAHIM
IBRAHIM
SALIM
SA'AID
BU GHAWIYA
SHA'ABAN
'ABD AL RAHIM
MIFTAH
MUSA
SA'AD
FATALLAH
SHARIF
'ABDALLAH
MIFTAH
SALIM
ZAIDAN
SA'AD
SALAH
SHA'ABAN
SULAIMAN
MUHAMMAD
IBRAHIM
HAMAD
SA'AID
BU GHAWIYA
FARAJ
GHAITH
SALAH

[601]

FIG. 18-2 GENEALOGY 2. The names of dead men are underlined.

173 Telescoping of names, and fusion of names, taken together,
178 can account for the fixity of the genealogy to a large extent. In
551 addition, lines which showed every sign of normal development
613 at one time, have petered out completely, even after they have
sometimes assumed the status of tertiary segments. Conditions
173 under which this is likely to happen are not difficult to envisage.
178 If hearsay evidence is correct, disease, when it strikes in the
551 desert, might rage in a camp like wild fire, bringing death to
613 many, but not spreading to other camps, because the camps are
731 so far apart. Even in springtime when men and beasts are together
361 in the pastures, and the larger summer camp has split into
four or five smaller ones, the distance between camps may still be
[221] a few miles. In summer, when camps are concentrated on the
large watering points, the distances between them are considerably
more. Disease, therefore, does not spread from camp to camp
as rapidly as one might expect in such primitive conditions of
living. In 1949 a number of men of a small camp died within a
[761] few days of each other. Bedouin opinion attributed these deaths
to an allegedly false oath sworn by the deceased a year earlier.
[784] Medical opinion ascribed them to filth in a well which the deceased
had been cleaning before their illness. In any event, a
thriving line of a lineage was wiped off the genealogy. The portion
173 of the Dawwas genealogy shown on this page shows a
178 similar process at work. Again, to give another example, the Nasr
613 section of the Magharba tribe once included six tertiary sections,
not four as are now given. Two of these six sections are now
represented by only four men of whom two are too old and decrepit
to have heirs any longer, and are unmarried in any case;
a third, whose wife has long passed child-bearing age, had two
sons, but both died before marriage; and the fourth, a very poor
and old man, has only one daughter, and is a widower. Three
of the four now live with their collateral tribal section, Madhkur,
and count themselves members of this group. That they once belonged
to two different groups might have passed unnoticed were
it not that two elders of the Madhkur section insisted that they
should be correctly placed and their entire genealogies be recorded.
The younger men argued that although they were aware
that the two groups named Farjiani and al-Khadhar at one time

drought giving insufficient pastures and poor crops. Good or bad 178 613
crops, poor or abundant pasture, in turn mean a higher or lower 621
milk yield from the animals and better or worse living conditions 16
for human beings. Such factors as these may well, over a number 182
of years, lead to unevenness in the distribution of population [132]
throughout the tertiary sections. Whatever the cause, the genealogies
show that the population of the numerous tertiary sections [173]
is unequal. Some are numerically so weak that they have to
join a collateral section. Others are numerically so strong that
their natural resources are insufficient to meet the needs of all
their members. It was these latter segments which were in the
process of splitting, and which in some cases have already done
so. The next task, then, is to demonstrate where, on the genealogy, [128]
proliferation is effected.

We have seen that in Nuer genealogies segments proliferate at 173
all orders of segmentation. Here, the process is a continuous one, 171
beginning at any point in time within the minimal lineage and 613
progressing upwards to the apex of lineage bifurcation. As particular 551 ●
names become significant within the minimal segment,
they are retained and become a permanent addition to the genealogy.
In order to include these successively additional names,
names of ascending ancestors are shunted further and further
into the genealogical past, until presumably the effect is felt at
the topmost limit of the genealogy, when the names here are
pushed out of the genealogical framework altogether, and forgotten
for ever. More than this, the upward shift in names at
each and every point in the genealogical line means also a consequent
re-ordering of structural relationships, at all levels in the
system. One vital difference between Nuer and Bedouin societies 173
which may partly, at least, account for the different genealogical 178
processes at work among them is that the Nuer, when they were 613
studied by Evans-Pritchard, were expanding territorially, and [171]
that continuous proliferation of segments throughout the structure
was the mode of dealing with a situation of expansion. The
Bedouin, on the other hand, had suffered twenty years of terrible [648]
privation at the hands of the Italians, during which period thousands
of them died in battle and in concentration camps, were
shot up in their camps from the air, or died from want, before I
went to live among them. Although I must confess that I now

Although I must confess that I now
173 find it difficult to accept Evans-Pritchard's view of genealogical
178 growth and development as stated for the Nuer, it was the view
613 I originally held with regard to Bedouin genealogies. Indeed,
551 thinking in genealogical terms only, it appears inevitable that the
114 addition of successive generations can only mean the lengthening
of the genealogy, or, if the length is to remain constant, extrusion of ancestral names must take place at the apex of the genealogy. If this view is to be accepted, several other conclusions must be accepted with it. The genealogy, as far as it goes at least, is an accurate record of descent—some names may have been lopped off at the top, but otherwise the genealogy represents a faithful statement of succession. Again, if successive generations are to be added to the genealogy, then its base must continually expand laterally. From what is known of contemporary Bedouin genealogies, there is no evidence which leads to the supposition that their base is progressively widening. With regard to the authenticity of the names in the genealogy, above the point of tertiary segmentation, I hope to show in a subsequent article on Bedouin genealogies in general, that names above the tertiary point of segmentation have remained fixed for very long periods of time, and that they bear slight relation to the passage of generations over the last century at least; moreover, in this article I hope to demonstrate that what manipulation of the genealogy takes place does not affect more than about four or five ascending generations from the living.

121 Part of the difficulty in a study of this sort lies in the strong
173 temptation to think of the genealogy *per se*, even though it is
613 readily admitted that it has a value in itself for the Bedouin. Yet
even in these terms the genealogy must always represent an ordered grouping of people, and these people live on strips of territory. The starting point of the analysis then ought to begin with the territorial ordering of groups of people. The relation of groups of people to land, moreover, is determined by the carrying capacity of that land, and it is this prerequisite which is the main variable in discussing genealogical manipulation, and not the
[182] other way about. The main landmarks of the Cyrenaican ecology
are fixed points which cannot be manipulated to fit in with the genealogy; it is the genealogy which must be altered to comprehend the distribution of people in their ecological setting.

stretching across to the village of Ajadabiya in the east, topples 613
in undulations away into the flat expanses of the desert to the 619
south. At all these points of segmentation, the territories occupied 621
by the various sections are large and roughly defined, and 133
the population aggregates supported on these territories run from 182
over a thousand at one end to tens of thousands at the upper 131
limits. The tertiary sections are numerically much smaller, some of them numbering as few as a hundred souls in all, and the territories to which they are attached are correspondingly smaller. The relationship between the numbers in this order of section, and the precise amount of water available in the local wells is an intimate one. If the population of one of these groups increases, or if the number of animals rises, or if the springs show a decline in the volume of water they give forth, or if the winter rainfall has allowed the storage in wells of only a small quantity of water, a rearrangement of the group must be effected. A significant alteration of any one of these components must mean that the local group must split to enable a new adjustment to be made in the relationship of man and animals to water.

Whatever changes occur within groups of any size, since the 173
genealogy embraces the entire population, these must appear on 178
the genealogy in some way or other. Now a genealogy is as rigid 829
a framework, as fixed and final a pattern of grouping, as can be 613
imagined. The impression that they are thus rigid and fixed, except 551
for the addition of successive generations, is strengthened by the way in which the Bedouin use them. From their young boys to their old men, the Bedouin are expert genealogists, and the names of ancestors, for one reason or another, are never far
from their lips. Names are kept alive by constant use, since all [571]
references to inter-group relationships must be in terms of these
names. More than this, the Bedouin were proud to the point of 173
boastfulness of their genealogical knowledge, and, wherever I 829
travelled, the first request I had to comply with was to take down 613
a large portion of a tribal genealogy. In recording their endless 551
genealogies, one feature about them came to assume increasing 123
interest; while there was remarkable unanimity with regard to 126
most of the names given, there was one point of marked ambiguity—at the tertiary level of segmentation. I recorded genealogies in four tribes on an extensive scale, and in each tribe

173 ambiguity surrounding the actual names and their correct position
829 occurred at about the fifth ascending generation. Whenever
613 this point was reached in the recordings, arguments would flare
551 up over the names to be included or excluded and over the relation
123 of these names to those above and below, with the result
126 that for several people of the same segment there would be several versions of a genealogy which differed only at this one point. An example of this sort is given below from the genealogy of the Nasr section, which shows seven different versions of the arrangement of ancestors round about the fifth ascending generation from the living.

173 The confusion at and around the fifth ascending generation
829 appeared with such regularity in the genealogies that I feel justi-
613 fied in referring to it as 'the area of ambiguity'. It seems likely,
551 moreover, that in any society where the lineage structure is closely tied to the territorial disposition of groups, since the genealogy is so rigid, there needs to be in it somewhere an area of ambiguity if it is to be related to reality. Without this ambiguity, the form of the genealogy is too rigid to comprehend changes which occur. This point in the genealogy came to assume critical significance as the point where adjustments in it are made. Other kinds of evidence point to the same conclusion.

[601]


(1)
NASR*
UMBARAKA
MADHKUR
HAIBA
UMBARAKA
SA'AID
SA'AID
SA'AD
HAIBA
MADHKUR
MUMEN
(3)
(6)
HASAIN
HASAN
MUMAN
BIN NASR
MADHKUR
HAIBA
(4)
MADHKUR
HAIBA
(7)
HAIBA
MADHKUR
UMBARAKA
SAAD
(2)
MUMEN
UMBARAKA
MADHKUR
HAIBA

FIG. 18-3 GENEALOGY 3. *There is another section, al-Dawwas, which belongs to this group, but to include this as well would greatly complicate the issue without giving any additional information.

the interests they have in their maternal relatives. Stated thus 613
sharply, this is a distortion of the process. To speak of the prin- 602
ciple of agnation conflicting with the principle of cognation or 121
maternal origin is nonsense, as the facts included in the discussion show. Agnation is not one thing, but many. Within its scope are included such aspects of social organization as succession, status, inheritance, bride-wealth, blood-money, modes of domestic and political behaviour, and so forth; and each of these aspects, the closer we stick to reality, can be broken up into a number of components. The same can be said of cognation and maternal origin. All these principles, so called, are clusters of numerous component parts, which combine, in reality, in a kaleidoscopic number of ways. In one situation a component of one combines with that of another to strengthen it; in a different situation the one component may repel the other; in a third situation, a number of the components in one will combine to exclude those of the other, and so on. If, therefore, an understanding of the way in which lineage proliferation occurs is sought, a view of the process as a conflict between the principle of agnation and the opposing pull of maternal origin is quite erroneous. It is of use in predicting the direction of cleavage to know that within a tertiary group there are also clusters of kin which are defined roughly by maternal links, and this knowledge serves as a rough and ready guide in predicting what the composition of groups, after they have split away from the parent group, will be. If a more precise picture of this composition is desired, other and more complex kinship links and the behaviour which accompanies them must be taken into account. If a still more accurate picture is desired, details of inheritance disputes, debts of bride-wealth, the size of flocks and herds, and the like, must also be taken into consideration. If, finally, one has the opportunity to study groups after they have proliferated, the presence or absence of this or that man can often be explained only in terms of his eye for a pretty girl or a personal preference for neighbours.

The kind of change which has been discussed in this essay is [178]
not difficult to negotiate in genealogical terms. Earlier it was [621]
stressed that within the tertiary tribal sections, although they [173]
are always predominantly agnatic groups, clusters of cognatic [551]

613 kin also exist. Two ways of naming these clusters are adopted—
602 all groups, whether they are elementary families, an odd assort-
121 ment of kindred sharing a common tent for reasons of expedi-
178 ency, or tribal groups, have a name. Sometimes these clusters are
621 named after a prominent living male, or a deceased kinsman of
173 the same kind. Sometimes these little groups are named after a
551 woman, perhaps the grandmother of the group.[15] Thus a small
group of two or three tents will be distinguished from another similar cluster within the camp, and so on for a number of groups, depending on the size of the camp. Most camps, however many tents they contain, have names for progressively inclusive clusters of tents until a twofold named division is reached. Tertiary segments that are forced to split contain therefore two groups with names already attached to them. When a split occurs, the name of the tertiary segment is pushed into the area of ambiguity and the names of what were previously two clusters become the names of two new tertiary segments, with a minimum adjustment in usage and a minor re-shuffle at the tertiary level of segmentation. Names cannot continue to be pushed into this area of the genealogy interminably, otherwise it would gradually expand into a vast pool of names. For a few generations the name dispensed with in this way becomes one of those ancestors about whom there is argument when genealogies are given. In the course of time, name after name is subjected to the process of elision and eventually will cease to be of concern to anyone.

105 I now summarize the main points of the discussion. The evi-
613 dence that has been examined suggests that the mechanical de-
613 vices of telescoping, fusion of names, and extinction of lines do
173 not affect orders of segmentation superior to that of the tertiary
178 order, and that in conditions of a completely stable population,
[551] these devices alone would suffice to retain the form of the genea-
logical structure. But, it was argued, conditions of complete stability cannot be assumed; the evidence of the present distribution of population among the numerous tertiary groups clearly points to marked fluctuations occurring within these small groups. This being so, proliferation of these groups in some areas at some

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[15] The naming of groups within a tertiary segment is an interesting study in itself, but it would be outside the limits of this discussion to make more than a brief mention of it.

times, must follow, and conversely, while proliferation takes 105
place here, combination will be taking place elsewhere as the 613
population of groups decreases. The condition which compels 173
proliferation is the alteration in the relationship of man and ani- 178
mals to the natural resources; and when this alteration builds up to an acute pressure on water and land, one group of a divided segment must move off to seek water elsewhere.

The next task was to demonstrate where this kind of change occurred on the genealogy. The sudden irregularity in the number of segments at the tertiary order, compared with the uniformity at others, provided a clue. Other evidence also pointed to this as a significant order in this context: there is ambiguity displayed with regard to the identity and positioning of ancestors here; members adopted into a lineage are grafted on to it here; clients are attached to tertiary sections; groups of noblemen, when they are detached and move off to another tribe, break away at this point. This is where change occurs, but, it was agreed, in understanding the way in which it takes place, certain forms of marriage have to be taken into account. Particular emphasis was placed on cross-cousin marriage with the mother's brother's daughter, and to women outside the tertiary segment, since the effect of these forms of marriage is to produce two or more clusters of cognatic kindred in camps largely composed of agnates, and to emphasize the line of cleavage in a lineage segment. So that when, therefore, a split occurs, the line it takes is predetermined. Proliferation, even when necessary, does not finally come about, however, until an occasion permits the separation of groups to be demonstrated by a violation of the conditions of membership of a group. Details of three such occasions were offered: the demand for blood-money between agnates who previously had constituted a politically undivided section; behaviour contrary to the demands of agnatic kinship in attendance and gift-giving at funerals; and failure to participate in a pilgrimage to the saint's tomb of a particular section. But another query [551]
remained: how are the newly formed groups named? It was seen that names already in daily use by the small group of people concerned came to assume a new significance, while the name which had previously spanned them all is disregarded and pushed into the area of ambiguity whence later it is elided altogether.

682 a rule by the return of the offender to his camp after the lapse of a number of years. A man who had already killed six people killed a seventh, his first paternal cousin. He and his brothers fled the tribe; he died in exile and it was not until some thirty
[123] years later that his brother and nephew returned. Another man, who had killed his first paternal cousin, used my entry into a camp as the occasion for his re-entry, pitching his tent rope on rope with mine, and mine in turn was rope on rope with the tent of the camp's shaikh.[1]

621 An effort is always made to hush up the matter when a homicide occurs within a
682 tertiary section. It is for this reason that the name of the victim is not perpetuated.
613 Normally it is an obligation to perpetuate the names of the deceased, especially when
[551] they have been killed in homicide, but in the circumstances now being discussed the name is suppressed. As one man expressed the general sentiments, stretching out his toga in front of him: 'Look at the hole in my toga; it would be better without it, but what can I do? Make it bigger? It is better to cover it up.' Any penal action taken against the offender could only enlarge the wound he had already opened. The notion of corporate identity is so strong that it eliminates the use of penal action against one of its members for the greatest offence of all. While overtly every effort is made to expunge the memory of a homicide of the sort described above, the Bedouin are most articulate in their views about the offender. He is referred to as one who 'defecates in the tent' thus likening him to an animal, for no human being would do this. Other expletives used in reference to him are: one who 'destroys the lineage', who 'corrupts the family'; he is one who 'brings confusion', who 'provokes God' and causes 'the evil of leprosy to eat into relationships'. Their feelings about the offender, who 'commits robbery internally', are summed up in the word *fitna*. This, in its Cyrenaican use, corresponds closely to the notion of sin as it is used in the Old Testament; in the sense, that is to say, of an act which causes an impasse in relationships, which creates chaos among a small group of related people, and produces internal calamity. And this is indeed the situation brought about by such homicide among the Bedouin. Flowing blood, they are wont to say, can only be staunched by blood (i.e. a vengeance killing), but if a man kills within a close agnatic range the corporate body continues to bleed. Nothing can be done. The group is left helpless, and this is sin.

The first step in this exposition, therefore, is to attach to homicide within a tertiary section the notion of its being *fitna*, carrying with it voluntary and temporary expulsion.

682 A homicide which involves two collateral tertiary sections is a different matter
628 altogether, for now the parties constitute two discrete political groups. Political
621 machinery can be set in motion to deal with the breach in relationships, and consequently a homicide of this sort does not pose the dilemma which is created when it
613 occurs within a politically undivided group. Not only do agnates of two collateral tertiary sections behave towards each other as two groups of people, but the nature of their relationships is fundamentally different from those obtaining between mem-

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682 a first cousin in cold blood because of a dispute between them over the ownership of a new-born kid. Although this was the only reason given by the Bedouin other considerations were involved—the victim was said to have been a fine person, and his killer a constant trouble maker, and so on.

[1] See for comparison Robertson Smith, 1903. The tent is an area of sanctuary, and this extends to include the ropes also.

173 178 613 551 The line shows five male names in all. The eldest surviving members of this line is Sa'aid, who almost invariably is referred to, not by his personal name, but as Bu Shliby,[9] and on the infrequent occasions when his personal name is used it is followed by Bu Shliby and not by his father's name, which is the more common practice. Again, Abdul Qadar, when his father is not about, is called Bu Shliby, and when it is necessary to give him his personal name Bu Shliby is added, except among his more intimate family kindred, when only his personal name would be used. Likewise, his son Yunis carries Bu Shliby in addition to his personal name and is sometimes even referred to as Bu Shliby only. Abdul Qadar had never known his grandfather, was aware however of his existence in the past, but did not feel it necessary to use his name, and whatever obligation he might have felt to keep the memory of his grandfather alive, he fulfilled it when he named his son after him. Many of the older members of the group are also aware of the lineal connexions between Bu Shliby and Yunis, even though they use this knowledge in a genealogical context only, but many of the younger men of the group do not know these details. It is clear that when the boy Yunis grows to old age, three names in this line will have ceased to be used.

This practice of adding to a personal name the name of a deceased ancestor making one the son of the other, is pushed to the extent of carrying forward through the generations a nickname which referred to some peculiar characteristic of the ancestor, but which has little relation to the present bearer. Thus the ancestor whose name has been retained might have been nicknamed 'The Lame One' or 'The Squint-Eyed One' because he suffered either of these personal defects; or he might have been nicknamed 'The Old One' because he lived to a ripe old age. Such nicknames might later be carried by men who are not lame, nor squint-eyed, nor old, while the names of the intervening ancestors are dropped in normal use.

Another process is at work, which needs to be distinguished from telescoping, for although the results in genealogical terms are similar, Bedouin view it in quite a different light. This is the
• [553] process of fusing names. It is common practice among the Bed-

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[9] The prefix *Bu* is used by the Bedouin to mean 'son of.'

ouin—and, for that matter, Arabs in other lands—to name a boy 173
after a deceased relative. Rarely is a boy named after his father, 178
unless the father's death occurs before the boy is born, in which 613
circumstance, the new-born boy would certainly take his father's 551
name. A much more common form of this practice is to name a [553]
boy after his grandfather, assuming the latter to be dead. The eldest son usually accepts this responsibility, but it by no means falls invariably to him. There is a number of reasons for this, but they need not concern us here, since they are of no relevance to the general argument. What is of concern at present is that one name in the genealogy might represent the fusion of several other similar names. When circumstances permit, an individual's line might run as follows: Muhammad—'Ali—Muhammad—'Ali—Muhammad. It is true that the man himself and those closely related to him might know full well that there are three men named Muhammad and two named 'Ali, but it would not be considered irregular if only one Muhammad and one 'Ali were given in the genealogy. A mature man, giving his genealogy, omitted his father's name, Ibrahim. When asked about the omission, he insisted that he had given it, and when he was told that the name Ibrahim given by him was intended to refer to his young son, he impatiently dismissed the matter with the observation that having given the name Ibrahim once, it mattered little whether it had been put in the position of his son or father. Pointing to his son he added, 'There is my father, Ibrahim. He has taken my father's position, has he not?'

By the fusion of names, several persons drop out of the genealogy, and by and by, the line comes to be shortened. It also has the effect of giving a person's name a weighting which otherwise it would not possess. In a sense, a young son named after a father is not merely a son but a father and possibly a great-grandfather also. The young boy becomes the contemporary carrier of the personalities of those of similar name who have preceded him, while the behaviour of the living towards him is, in virtue of this, affected in a number of details. A man who had named his son in this way, explained the matter thus: 'He is my son, but also my father because he has his name. I cannot beat him for it would be like beating my father. When he grows up and I grow old, he will look after me as if I were his son.'

173 Fusion of names appears in another context and for similar
178 reasons. Not only are lineal descendants given the name of deceased
551 ancestors, but a man may be given the name of any deceased
613 agnate of his tertiary section. Usually, this is only done
428 when a man passes on property to another who is not his direct
[553] heir. Commonly, this occurs when an agnate is also a mother's
brother, as often happens as a result of parallel cousin marriage,
and this mother's brother has no sons of his own. If he has a
sister's son, who is also his paternal nephew, he is likely to pass
on his wealth to this nephew. A father, the Bedouin insist, ought
[183] to perform three duties for his sons: attend to their circumcision,
[593] and their education in the Koran, and provide bride-wealth when
[852] they marry. All fathers attend to the circumcision of all their sons;
[871] few provide for the Koranic education of any of their sons; most
bear the burden of marrying off at least one of their sons. The
[583] performance of the latter duty is what makes the continuance of the deceased's name an obligation, and whoever performs this duty must have his name perpetuated in one male offspring of the union which was brought about with his wealth. Wealth need not take the form of bride-wealth; it can be a legacy willed by a father, maternal uncle of the kind described above, or any other agnate who has died without male issue. Conversely, if a man dies without leaving any property, even his sons might not perpetuate his name, and eventually it will drop out of the genealogy.[10] There are instances of men inheriting the wealth of a number of agnates, using each parcel of wealth to make a new marriage and naming the sons of the various unions after the several dead who had left wealth. The example given below is taken from the genealogy of the Dawwas section of the Magharba tribe. What happened here was that the two lines stemming from Faraj and Sha'aban, after proliferating normally, became extinct. As this happened, Ibrahim, the son of Miftah, began to inherit wealth to which he was not a direct heir; and

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[588] [10] To avoid confusion, it ought to be made clear that this is not ghost marriage. As I understand ghost marriages from Evans-Pritchard's (1951) account, two main conditions must be satisfied: (i) that there should be inherited wealth to make a marriage, and (ii) that the wealth remaining after the ghost marriage has been made is inherited by the ghost children only. In Cyrenaica, wealth thus inherited becomes part of a man's total wealth and is not reserved for a ghost marriage and its issue.

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Libyan Bedouin MT9

[For information on the marabtin or "client tribes," see Category 619.]

175 795 648 bat from al-Qasr joined the Sanusi army. The importance of their contribution to the Sanusi effort is vague, even though most of my informants claimed that their fathers "fought the British." Some of the al-Qasr activity was on a part-time basis. [124] One informant, whose father was the paramount leader of the 'Aishaibat tribe in 1916, told me that his father "used to take his rifle and ride out every morning to join the troops of Sayyid Ahmad al-Sharif (the grandson of al-Sanusi al-kabiir), and there he would kill many British soldiers. Then he would come home again at night." There was at least one group of al-Qasr Bedouins who joined the Sanusi in Libya before the start of the war. After the end of the fighting, this group returned to Egypt and asked to be pardoned by the British. They appealed to the Governor of Marsa Matruh that there should be no reprisals taken against them since the Turks had actually forced them to fight for the Sanusi. The British Governor, who was fluent in the Bedouin dialect and considered a great man by the Bedouins, replied to them in the form of a famous Bedouin proverb: "The ropes can be stretched far enough for forgiveness."

175 177 •554 631 648 Traditionally, the Bedouins of the Marsa Matruh area were held in check by an officially created political structure which dated from the time of Muhammad 'Ali. This structure depended upon two political roles for the control of the Awlad 'Ali, the 'umda and the shaikh, neither of which had previously existed in the Bedouin authority system.

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648 Historically, the modern aspect of role differentiation and political specialization began with the appointment of Mitkhatri 'Adam at Sidi Barrani, west of Marsa Matruh. This was under Muhammad 'Ali Pasha. The new role was that of _'umda_, the same term used for the village leader in the Valley of the Nile. The first Bedouin _'umda_ died in 1909. At this time, under the British, another political role was instituted. This new role, that of _shaikh_, was a kind of vice-_'umda_ position. The son of the first _shaikh_ is now about 80 years old
[115] and still lives in Marsa Matruh. (He was my chief informant for Bedouin history.) During this early period, there were few government officials in the desert, and, according to my informant, "there was need for only a few _'umdas_ and _shaikhs_. But later there was a need for more and more. The job of these men in those times was to work for the Egyptians in their dealings with the Bedouins of the desert." The number of incumbents in the offices of _'umda_ and _shaikh_ increased as the political needs of the British grew.

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648 According to the Bedouins, the British administration did not arrive in the desert until about 1914. Up until that time, matters were in the hands of the Egyptians who governed the desert province for the colonial government. When the British arrived in Marsa Matruh, the opening of World War I was at hand. The Bedouins say, quite proudly, that the British knew of their sympathy for, and cooperation with, the Sanusi against the Italians in Cyrenaica.

175 Sanusi against the Italians in Cyrenaica. "When the British
648 reached Matruh, they jailed all of the 'umdas and shaikhs
•554 (two 'umdas and five shaikhs, at that time). Then they chose
631 new leaders, from the families of the old leaders, to work
with them." But, "these men did not fight with the British,
they only acted as their guides in dealing with the Bedouins
of the desert. When the old leaders were released from jail,
they returned to their positions of political office. While
they were in jail, their replacements had only helped the
[178] British with supplies." Apparently, the British saw the need
of maintaining the continuity of the Bedouin authority structure.

175 Data on the condition of the Bedouins of the Western
648 Desert between the two world wars are absent. The Bedouins
say that they lived with no trouble, or any help, from the
Egyptians. The Bedouins have no fond memories of their
experiences during World War II. They first heard of the war
in 1940 when the Italians marched into Western Desert from
Libya. The Germans occupied al-Qasr from May to October of
1942, when the famous General Rommel had his headquarters at
Marsa Matruh. The British had told the Bedouins, in 1940,
that they should flee the Italians, and that unless they did
175 they would be held responsible for their actions. Most of the
648 people of al-Qasr agreed to go to refugee camps at Amriyya
722 near Alexandria for the duration of the war.

166 (556) Some of the Bedouins refused to leave for Amriyya.

233 178 with the movement toward a cash economy, this has changed.
[465] The shepherd receives 8 to 10 piasters for each head of sheep
which he tends. The Bedouins who have taken up farming can
spare none of their family for sheep-herding chores. If he
[497] can afford it, during the dry season, a Bedouin may ship his
sheep to the Nile Valley by train at 12 piasters per head.
But the government will not accept sheep for shipment unless
they are accompanied by a shepherd. The role of shepherd
has become a very specialized one in the al-Qasr area. Few
[554] of the al-Qasr Bedouins are shepherds, and the role is
reserved for the poorer men without land.

241 Plowing in the garden area is done by hand. Usually,
407 the plow is pulled by a donkey but occasionally, if one can
492 afford it, a camel or a horse will be used. A man and his
[462] sons handle all of the agricultural chores with the exception
178 of the winnowing process which the women do. Traditionally,
241 barley was threshed by camels plodding on it. The Bedouins say
492 that this is the best way because the soft feet of the camel
do not crush the kernel. Now, however, very few men can afford
[407] a camel. Threshing is done with a heavy wooden sled pulled by
241 a donkey or a horse. Tractors, when available, are used for
407 agricultural plowing in the southern barley zone. This zone,
434 during the year 1963, also became important for raising water-
433 melons (batiikh), and this product figures to be an excellent
cash crop for al-Qasr. Melons and barley can bring high profits

*613 formal leadership. Ideologically, group solidarity at this
level is explained solely in terms of patrilineality; in
fact, local contiguity and explicit contractual ties are
*613 just as important. When we add to this the principle of
582 cognation in the form of the Bedouin preferred form of
marriage, parallel-cousin marriage, the resulting structure
is what Emrys Peters (1965) has called "the corporate group
[183] par excellence." But, as we shall see later, father's
brother's daughter-marriage is more of a cultural ideal than
it is a social reality in al-Qasr.

*613 The interplay of kinship, residence and contract ties
●554 defines a corporate structure of authority and also informs
571 an external system of authority relations including all who
claim descent from 'Ali 'Aqar, son of the mythological Sa'ada.
The feeling of "corporateness," and the concomitant structural
demands upon the individual changes as the scope of political
action widens. This degree of corporate feeling is related
to the structural differentiation between what has been interpreted as "domestic relations based on kinship and descent"
and "the field of political relations" (Fortes 1953:26). In
121 this study, I maintain that both the internal and the external
*613
554 systems of relations are "political" since power and legitimate
571 authority are exercized in both. Therefore, rather than use
the terms "domestic" and "political," I shall refer to the
internal system of political relations and the external system

121 *613 •554 571 of political relations. The structural differentiation between them relates to certain specifics of role differentiation and articulation, and corporate goals. Different roles function differently in different spheres of politics. This is clear when we consider that the two structural aspects of corporate group politics serve the double purpose of insuring local autonomy while promoting integration into the larger lineage segments. This I will cover more thoroughly in the next chapter. Most of the discussion here deals with social structure and, in particular, the internal elements of the corporate group.

*613 619 In the total societal context, the tertiary segment is pivotal for the conceptualization of two models: the Bedouin's model of his tribal system, and the observer's model of a segmentary lineage system. Both of these constructs are shown in Figure 7.[1] Both genealogical models can be completed by the addition of Figures 2, 3, and 8, extending the systems both horizontally and vertically.

Theoretically, all of the levels of the Awlad 'Ali tribal system constitute a political community, i.e., the various segments shown in Figure 3 regulate and maintain relations with each other through complementary opposition (Fallers 1963). But in fact, political action of any functional significance rarely occurs beyond the secondary lineage level. In terms of the structural principles, agnation, real or

[1], [See p. 77--Analyst]

*613 fictive, has practical political consequences only at the
619 tertiary and secondary levels of segmentation. Most political
activity in al-Qasr is the result of either cooperation
or conflict between corporate groups the size of Bait 'Umar
or 'Ailit Ma'fas. 'Ailit Ma'fas is made up of five structurally
replicated political groups such as Bait 'Umar. Toward outsiders,
[609] these five groups act as one; they represent a corporate
entity before the rest of the tribe. As a member of 'Ailit
*613 Ma'fas, an individual has jural status in the whole tribe.
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•554 He also has the means and the moral obligation to articulate
his interests and to settle his arguments with other members
of the tribe. When an individual is involved in an activity
which relates to matters of power and authority, he is playing
a political role in the political process. The units which
make up the internal and external political systems of the
'Aishaibat tribe of al-Qasr are roles. Roles then are the
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*613 analytical focus of this study. Of course, I realize that
619 the concrete entities present in al-Qasr are human beings.
554 I only use roles as methodological constructs in order to
abstract from, and to understand, Bedouin behavior. By
conceptualizing sets of roles as structures, we will be able
to understand the internal and external political structures
as well as the traditional and modern political structures
of Bedouin society. In al-Qasr, these political roles and
structures emerge from the more generalized kinship structure

[TEXT CONTINUED ON PAGE 79]

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554 and are related to the organizational principles mentioned above.

619 The Awlad 'Ali represent a cultural entity whose membership is defined in patrilineal terms. Cutlurally, and genealogically, they are related to the Cyrenaican Bedouin but distinct from the Egyptians of the Nile Valley. The 619 177 political system of the Awlad 'Ali can be extended to include Cyrenaicans "as Bedouins" but it can only interact with the Egyptians "as foreigners." This means that the Awlad 'Ali possess common roles, structures, and cultural institutions which can articulate with those of the Cyrenaican Bedouin. In the case of the Egyptians, however, social interaction calls forth new cultural categories and new structural elements in Bedouin society. This is the basis of political change in al-Qasr. Role differentiation and ideological replacement are taking place vis a vis the nation-state: the traditional political structure of the Bedouins is adapting to the Egyptian political environment. In the language of the "politics of modernization," this process is referred to as "politicization" or "political socialization." We shall deal with this process in later chapters.

The principles which relate the Bedouins of al-Qasr to other Bedouins of the Western Desert and Libya are the organizational principles of kinship, residence, and contract; but the principle which relates them to the Egyptian state is

Familial Authority and Rights and Duties in Kin Relations

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The analysis of authority structure, whether it has reference to a group as small as the family or as large as the nation, assumes as its unit of study the social position or the role. The role is the organized complex of rights and duties by which individuals, or categories of individuals, participate in an interactive process. Roles are linked together into a set, or a structure, by the rights which incumbents claim and the duties they fulfill (Linton 1936:113; Parsons and Shils 1951:23; Gluckman 1963:185). The heuristic value of role analysis is well established. Role theory has been referred to as "the highest level of generalization about social phenomena that has yet become in any sense operational (Southall 1959:17).

Since all social roles possess rights and duties just because they are defined with respect to other roles, we may assume that each and every social role has an authoritative aspect to it. The authoritative aspect of roles refers to the way in which authority positions relate in order to give form to an authority structure. We want to know how the authority positions at all levels of the authority structure function, but for the time being we are concerned with familial authority relations. Until we understand the operation of authority at the familial level, which is the source of legitimate political authority in a kin-based

121 moral community, we cannot proceed to a discussion of the
571 554 internal and external systems of political relations.

577 As a result of the socialization process, and through
181 relations with other members of the family, an individual
[867] comes to recognize that his conduct is measurable by certain
standards of, what is considered by the group to be, good and
bad, right and wrong. In al-Qasr, such standards are intrinsically correct, or "decent" as the Bedouins say; obedience
to the authority representing these standards is interpreted
as a "duty." The authoritative aspect of the role of household
[596] head (*shaib al-bait*), and the moral obligations which it represents, emerge from and reinforce values and structural arrangements central to Bedouin social order, namely, respect for
authority and devotion to social groups, the two basic elements
of morality defined by Durkheim (Parsons 1937:382-385).

577 The value placed upon social order, and the structural
571 mechanisms for insuring its realization and extension--kinship,
181 residence and contract--inform an authority structure which
182 ranges between filial piety at the family level and a set of
legal norms at the level of the external political system.
The fact that the Bedouins of al-Qasr are interested in
integrating a larger population into their authority structure
means that a common value is operative in the range of it;
also that one sphere of authority will tend to merge into another.
[593] Hence the father-son authority relation has importance for
[671] the strength of Bedouin customary law in the desert. The

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538 brother to special place in the social structure states that [539] "Two-thirds of the boy belongs to the khal, and he is like the father: the remaining one-third is divided equally between the father and the khal." The Bedouins are always quick to point out to the stranger, such as I was, that this means there is only one-sixth of the boy which belongs to the father. A clearer case of the ideology of kinship versus [539] descent could not be had. Another proverb has it that "the good which you see in a boy comes from khal khalu ("the maternal uncle of his maternal uncle"). Any kinship relation may be the basis for a new network of social relations by making use of the classificatory principle. The Bedouins [539] exaggerate the status and role of the mother's brother by saying that "when a boy does good or bad, one wants to know the name of his khal not the name of his father." This statement, which favors cognatic links over patrilineal ties, is not true but such an attempt at emphasis indicates that this relationship is something of value in the Bedouin society.

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578 In the case of any conflict "between his tribes," the Bedouins say, "the boy must support the tribe of his khal." This, of course, does not mean that the individual should take up arms against his patrilineal corporate group, but that he should seek to mediate the conflict. The political value of conflict avoidance and conflict control is also conspicuous in the dual role which the mature female plays

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562 593 in Bedouin society, that is, the role of wife-daughter. The
•554 principles of patrilineality and cognation do not work against
182 each other when the girl marries outside her corporate group,
578 nor does her new dual role present a case of role conflict.
562 On the contrary, the wife-daughter role functions to bind to-
593 554 gether two groups which are structurally differentiated by
182 578 the rule of patrilineality. During time of peace, the wife-
*613 daughter acts as a bond-maker by carrying gifts back and
[431] forth between the two groups, often bringing some of her
[628] [574] younger patrilineal relatives back to her husband's house or
tent for short visits. During a time of conflict or war, the
562 593 Bedouins point out, she is the only person who can cross the
554 battle lines unharmed. She is a match-maker as well as a
[726] [584] peace-maker. Often she influences the selection of mates by
individuals in both her husband's group and her father's
562 group. The Bedouins say that "after the *bint 'amm*, a man
593 should marry his *bint khal* ("mother's brother's daughter")
554 582 because she is like his *bint 'amm*." Usually, over a period
of a few generations, a given direction in marriage is sustained (see Figure 10), and it is one function of this wife-daughter role to accomplish this important political action.

562 The role of wife-daughter, then, may be seen as one
593 important aspect of what Fortes (1953:33) calls, "complemen-
554 *613 tary filiation," the essential mechanism which provides the
182 link between the corporate groups of al-Qasr society and the
kin groups of the parent who does not determine descent.

*613 582 'Ailit Lazumi, the other lineage, along with 'Ailit Ma'fas, considered to be the most powerful in al-Qasr. In the fourth [423] case, Abd al-Latif's marriage into 'Ailit Dawlat, this individual owns an olive orchard in Dawlat territory, adjacent to that of Ma'fas, which he purchased from a member of his wife's lineage before their marriage. In every case, with *613 582 421 one exception, marriage ties are intimately related to property relations, cognation with local contiguity. The two groups become politically entwined, and property relations become a basis for authority relations.

*613 All things considered, complementary filiation is as important in Bedouin society as it is in other societies: "The bilateral family is the focal element in the web of kinship" (Fortes 1953:33). As one Bedouin wedding song puts [533] it: "The bride is the flower of the stem," the stem here symbolizing her tertiary group.

583 554 556 The amount of brideprice which a man is expected to pay will depend upon his status as an "outsider" or an "insider," and his position on the prestige scale which is figured largely in terms of wealth. A man adds to his prestige and reputation when he pays beyond the "going price" to obtain a bride for his son. On the other hand, if a man is an "outsider," he is expected to pay well beyond the normal brideprice for the privilege of marrying into the family, and he receives no additional prestige unless he goes even higher than what is

583 •554 556 expected. The price is set by the corporate group but can vary, and usually does, from one tertiary segment to another. The wealthier tertiary segments tend to have higher bride-prices. This is explained by the fact that they occupy a "higher status" on the prestige scale, and also, by the fact that they wish to carefully control and maintain this status.

[435] For instance, "between cousins" of 'Ailit Ma'fas the mahr is fixed at 60 Egyptian pounds, but "a man can pay more out of generosity if he wishes." Hence, a member of the Ma'fas lineage can increase his prestige within and without his family by paying beyond that which is expected of him. In this case, "generosity" is the variable related to a man's place on the scale of prestige. 583 554 556 435 On the other hand, in another "poorer" lineage, 'Ailit Zagharat, the mahr is 30 L.E. to members of the in-group but "the stranger will pay 60 to 80 L.E., according to the father's wealth." The largest and most famous mahr payment in the area was made by the wealthiest man in al-Qasr who paid seven camels (each worth about 150 L.E.) for his son's wife. The highest fixed mahr in al-Qasr was that of Bait Bu Tarram of 'Ailit Lazumi. It was 100 L.E. for members of 'Ailit Lazumi and, accordingly, much more for strangers. This mahr is in contrast to the average for the area which is about 30 L.E. within the secondary group.

586 521 784 Divorce is a forbidden topic of conversation in al-Qasr. Any talk about one's wife, mother, or sister is considered injudicious.

*613 concepts of what is desirable and undesirable. "Every structural
571 arrangement," Raymond Firth has said, "has its moral
attributes of obligation" (1961:212). This is most essential
in an uncentralized system, such as that of al-Qasr, where
no institutions exist outside of the corporate group for the
introduction of new principles of organization and association.

181 Among the Bedouins, the conceptualization of an authority
578 structure in the role of *'aqila* relates to the high value which
577 they place upon a peaceful and orderly world. Children in al-Qasr
*[613] are taught that one of their serious duties in life is
[571] to mediate conflicts, especially, when they are potentially
•[554] situations which may lead to protracted conflict. And, in a
segmentary society where a member's status links him to many
different groups in differing degrees of importance, all
quarrels are potential group wars. The Bedouin child knows
that his elders, and God, want him to follow "the path of the
good" (*tariiq al-khair*). Mainly, this involves helping others
to follow "the path of the good" by "bringing them back together"
when they are in conflict. When two individuals
quarrel and refuse to return to "the path of the good," this
brings *'aib* ("shame") to each of the persons. When two individuals
*[613] quarrel, setting off a group conflict, this brings
'ar ("shame") to the respective corporate groups of the individuals
[626] (Abou-Zeid 1966). Against individuals who persist
[784] in the ways which cause *'aib* to himself, or *'ar* to his group,

CHAPTER IV

THE STRUCTURE OF AUTHORITY

The 'Aqila as a Political Role

*613 •554 [596] The role of 'aqila is the single specialized role in Bedouin political organization. Although it is possible to differentiate another authority role, that of the shaib (elder), this role is primarily a kinship role and in this sense is not an institutionalized political complex of rights and obligations. The 'aqila represents a unique political status in al-Qasr having one incumbent at a time: "The present incumbent is merely a link in a chain of indefinite extent, the temporary custodian of all the properties, powers and privileges which constitute the office" (Smith 1966;117).

*613 554 571 The role of 'aqila is instituted at the tertiary structural level of the lineage system. In theory, each tertiary bait has its own 'aqila. But, in fact, not every tertiary segment is large enough and, therefore, powerful enough to constitute an authority group in the political structure of the lineage. [128] In the next section, we will draw a distinction between authority groups and tertiary groups. The 'aqila acts alone in juridical matters concerning his own

*613 segment. He acts in concert with other 'awaaqil (plural of
554 'aqila) of the tertiary segments of his secondary group when
571 lineage matters call for decision-making at this level.
*613 Tertiary segments are replicate groups descended from one
571 ancestor, they operate with a common ideology pursuant of
183 common interests and goals. As we shall see, this common
675 ideology is expressed in a kind of code, or contract, which
all members of the group swear to uphold and abide by according
to the principle of blood responsibility. Tertiary codes in
[181] al-Qasr are a reflection and an affirmation of a wider system
of values and norms which bind the Bedouins of the Western
Desert together into a political system. This wider normative
[671] system is expressed in the customary legal system of the
Bedouins known as 'awaiyid Awlad 'Ali ("the customs of the
Awlad 'Ali tribe").

*613 The primary duty attached to the office of 'aqila is
578 the regulation of conflict. It is worth noting here that
571 conflict regulation is not equivalent to conflict resolution.
554 The latter process carries with it the intimation that the
causes of conflict have been treated and resolved, that conflict
has been eliminated. Nothing could be further from the truth
in a segmentary society where the various segments actually
constitute conflict groups; consequently, conflict between
groups or individuals who represent groups may be contained
but never forgotten. Conflict is an ongoing process among

*613 578 the Bedouins. Conflict regulation treats the expressions of
571 social conflict and not its causes.

•554 The *'aqila* regulates conflict between the members of
his tertiary segment, between this group and the other groups
of the secondary unit, and between secondary units of the
tribe. He operates in both the internal and external systems
*613 of authority relations. The *'aqila* may pre-empt the authority
578 of the *shaib* in the sphere of familial authority, though the
593 Bedouins say, this seldom happens because the son is willing
554 [596] to obey his father. Having been reared in the culture, and
as a future father himself, the son supports the respect-
*613 discipline principle of Bedouin society. But in extreme cases,
578 such as the threat of a father to disown his son, the explicit
593 approval of the *'aqila*, and of all the *'awaaqil* of the secondary
428 corporate group, is necessary. This is the procedure in all
554 cases of banishment. In one case (which I document below), a
man disinherited his younger brother with the formal approval
of his *'awaaqil*.

*613 The tertiary group in Bedouin society is by definition
682 the blood-vengence group. However, in view of the common
578 values and pragmatic interests of its members, the secondary
[181] group fulfills this function. Traditionally, when revenge
[681] killings were carried out according to the *lex talionis*, it
was usually at the hand of some member of the victim's tertiary
group. In the case of protracted conflict, such as extended

*613 682 578 feuds or war, secondary groups, and even whole tribes, became involved. If the tertiary group is in the structural sense a blood-revenge group, the _'aqila_ is the corporate sole of the *613 554 682 578 blood-revenge corporation: an important function of the _'aqila's_ office derives from this. The _'aqila_ is responsible for the collection and distribution of the blood-money. It is this specific authoritative function of the office which is the necessary condition for the existence of a corporate group. If there is no _'aqila_ to collect blood-money, then a kinship segment is not a corporation and it will merge into another group headed by an _'aqila_ in order to realize collective benefits.

*613 554 Bait Braik of 'Ailit Ma'fas (see Figure 8) had no _'aqila_ while I was in the field. Their _'aqila_ had recently died and his office had not yet been filled. The person who [666] would succeed to the office was known by all, but still his election or formal appointment did not take place. In other *613 554 578 words, the office of _'aqila_ will remain vacant until conflict and the need to regulate it force an election. The Bedouins were pleased about the vacant _'aqila_ office in Bait Braik: "Thank God that it is vacant. When it is necessary, we will meet and name an _'aqila_." Any of the _'awaaqil_ of the lineage [682] can mediate conflict, but no _'aqila_ is willing to take the responsibility of collecting the blood-money from another man's _bait._

*613 Each member of the corporate group contributes an
682 equal share to the blood-money due in a compensation case.
435 436 The blood-price for intentional killing is presently set at
178 400 L.E. In the olden days, the blood-price was 100 camels.
[571] If a man had no camels, he was expected to contribute his
share in cash, the value to be assessed at current market
prices. Eventually, cash came to replace camels altogether in
[231] the exchange of blood-money. This reflects the growing unimportance of the camel in the Western Desert. Today, there
[556] is only one man in al-Qasr who may be considered a "camel
owner," and he is the richest man in the area. Since at least 1935 the blood-price has been met with cash.

*613 When it has been decided that the right of blood-
682 revenge as a retaliatory measure is to be waived, the _'aqila_
•554 must go to each member of the group for his share of the blood-
571 money. Each _'aqila_ of the secondary group does this, and together their collections make up the 400 L.E. blood price. For instance, if there happens to be 400 men in a secondary lineage group, then the share which each contributes will be 1 L.E. The _'aqila_ must account for his own group's share even if this means making up deficiencies from his own pocket. It is for this reason that the _'aqila_ "should be rich." Though the _'awaaqil_ of al-Qasr are generally members of the "status group," this is not always the case. Hussain, the man destined to become the _'aqila_ of Bait Braik, was comparatively poor. He admitted to this fact, and said that for this reason he was reluctant to become an _'aqila_: "The _'aqila_ is responsible for his _bait_.

*613 He must pay the diiya with the shares which he collects from
682 the others. It makes no difference if the 'aqila must pay
• 554 with his own money. He is responsible for this matter before
571 the whole tribe."

*613 The collection of the diiya is only one aspect of the
554 process of conflict regulation, but it stands out as the funda-
682 mental manifestation of the office of 'aqila. In the course
[692] of office, an 'aqila will spend much more time arbitrating
disputes, but it is his responsibility concerning blood-money
which defines his position and his jurisdiction as corporate
682 ones. During the present period in al-Qasr, the practice of
178 blood-revenge has all but disappeared as a mechanism of social
[626] control. Nevertheless, the possibility of its happening is
not too remote. The payment of blood-money is the alternative
[619] to blood-revenge, and blood-revenge is a condition for all-out
[721] tribal warfare--something which the Bedouins look upon with
[829] horror. One informant once likened a primary-level war between
the 'Aishaibat and the Kamailat (should it ever occur) to
*613 "the end of the world." The 'aqila as a representative of a
682 group can prevent war by preventing reciprocal homicides: by
554 presenting his share of the blood-money he regulates conflict
578 and promotes integration. The blood-money is usually paid
over a period of from one to two years. In this case, the
[571] notion of "debt" represents a contingent, institutionalized
social relationship for the purpose of maintaining political
order.

000 order.

*613 The *'aqila* is elected by the elders of the secondary
554 lineage group. The election usually takes place when these
666 men are gathered for some festive occasion, such as a wedding.
[578] The name of the man chosen to succeed to the political office
will not be made public until it is absolutely necessary, i.e.,
in the case of conflict within the man's *bait,* or more especially,
in the case where blood-money is due. According to the Bedouins,
the only qualification for the office of *'aqila* is wisdom--
*613 the ability to arbitrate disputes. On the other hand, it is
554 implicit that the *'aqila* be a member of the "status group."
556 Prestige commands respect and obedience, and prestige in
al-Qasr usually comes with wealth. In general, the *'aqila* is
an elder, i.e., one with wisdom, and a member of a wealthy
and influential family.

*613 Technically, the *'aqila-ship* is not inherited, but
554 succession tends in this direction. An *'aqila* must "speak the
[428] good and show men how to follow the path of the good." Not
all men have the ability to do this, and, the Bedouins say,
it is natural that such a great gift resides with a particular
family "because the son learns from the father." All of the
'awaaqil in al-Qasr claim that they knew how to settle disputes
before they became *'awaaqil*. If they had not, they would not
[428] have been worthy of the office. Actually, the choice of an
'aqila is a restricted one: the office may pass, according to

*613 •554 428 [666] the unilineal rule, only to the son or the brother of the former 'aqila. In Bait 'Umar, for instance, the office went from father to son to brother (see Figure 8). The election amounts to a choice between the son or the brother, and partiality is usually shown towards the eldest of the two candidates.

The 'aqila's term of office may be terminated by the members of the bait. Such an action may be the result of *613 554 687 ineffectiveness due to old age, or it may stem from a violation of the norms of the office by the incumbent. Two cases of an 'aqila being impeached were reported to me. One, which did not take place in al-Qasr, was brought about when the 'aqila was accused of taking a bribe, and favoring one party to the conflict over the other. The second case, which happened about fifteen years ago in al-Qasr, involved an 'aqila from 'Ailit Ma'fas. This man informed Egyptian officials that his fellow tribesmen were storing guns and ammunition beyond the quantity permitted by national security laws. Not only was this man removed from his 'aqila-ship, but he was also expelled from his tertiary segment, and hence the tribe. But, in most *613 554 cases, term of office is ended by death or senility. The Bedouins say: "An 'aqila will be removed if he can no longer solve problems; if he says bad things about his tribe; if he is too old, or too lazy; in other terms, if he is not a good man, he is removed."

*613 554 578 692 Conflict regulation, in the formal sense, is the province of the _'aqila_. All complaints should be taken before the _'aqila_. In al-Qasr, every individual has certain rights, and when any of these rights are infringed upon he may demand a redress of wrongs: he demands his rights, or exercises _haqq al-'Arab_ ("the right of the Arabs"). The _haqq al-'Arab_ is opposed to the _haqq Allah_, "the right of God," which concerns crimes against religion (i.e., wine-drinking, apostasy). The dichotamy represents private claims over against the claims of a religious state which is characteristic of Islamic society. [688] In al-Qasr, crimes against religion have never occurred, and if they did they would be handled in Marsa Matruh by the local _shaikh_ ("holy man").

*613 554 69 The litigation process is initiated when an individual appears before his _'aqila_ with a claim, and the statement: "I do not wish so-and-so to take any of my rights." The _'aqila_ first attempts to persuade each party "to return to the path of the good," to come together and to cease quarreling. This type of moral persuasion is preliminary to a full court-hearing in which both parties will appear with witnesses before their respective _'awaaqil_, and other "third parties" who aid the _'awaaqil_ in their decision. The decision reached by the court is morally binding upon both parties. [671] [178] According to recent innovation in Bedouin customary law, the details of the litigation and the decision reached by the court are to be recorded

*613 554 69 [671] [178] on paper in triplicate, one copy going to each litigant and a third copy to the chief of police of the Marsa Matruh sector. In practice, though, a copy usually goes to the litigants, but not to the chief of police (who had not a single Bedouin court case in his files).

*613 695 692 [671] As is not the case in Islamic law, in Bedouin customary law the decision of the judge may be appealed. The system of appeals may even function at the level of familial authority, i.e., the son may, in theory, appeal a ruling by his own father. The Bedouins insist that this is an important right of every man. In the situation where a man wishes to appeal a decision of his own _'aqila_, he will generally take his claim to another _'aqila_ of his secondary group. When an appeal is to be made, it is done with the permission of the _'aqila_ who rendered the original decision. The one who appeals his case does so with the understanding that the decision returned by the court of appeal will be final and binding. Further, if [681] the court of appeal concurs with the findings of the original court, the plaintiff pays a double fine (twice the original fine), and also pays his own _'aqila_ an expiation fee (_kubaara_).

69 648 [682] [685] The Egyptians have preferred to leave the Bedouins of al-Qasr to settle their own disputes except in the more serious criminal matters. Police from Matruh will enter homicide cases and those conflicts over property rights which threaten to explode into tribal warfare. But these types of conflict have

692 police and not to his *'aqila*. This was a serious case because
685 the police were forced to imprison the dike-builder for two
648 days before he would agree to their demands. The two men in-
*613 volved in the conflict were from different lineages, and it
soon became necessary for Bedouin justice to intervene even
after the matter had been settled by the police. The
'awaaqil of each man met, along with other notables of the
tribe, and investigated the area where the dikes had been;
they listened to witnesses and tried to calculate the amount
of water which each man should receive. In the end, the
decision of the police was upheld.

692 Although, ideally, litigation should be instigated
691 through the office of the *'aqila*, alternatives do exist. As
*613 noted in discussing the values of Bedouin society, it is the
[577] moral obligation of each and every person to moderate between
conflicting parties; any one conflict situation may be modera-
ted by many well-meaning parties. Or, if a person suspects
prejudice on the part of his own *'aqila*, he may choose to take
627 his claim to another *'aqila*, or third party. The notion of a
•554 third party to a conflict, when it does not refer to the *'aqila*
692 or a close kinsman who may act as an arbitrator, has reference
to a non-institutionalized role in al-Qasr. This role-holder,
the Bedouins call *rajal khair* ("good man") or *qawaal al-khair*
("the speaker of the good").

"Role differentiation implies organization" (Levy

554 1952:165), and the role rajal khair along with the other roles
627 concerned with political action, the 'aqila, shaikh, and 'umda,
692 represent political organization in al-Qasr. Although the role of rajal khair is not institutionalized to the same degree that the others are, we shall see in the next chapter that it is an important one for an understanding of power relations in al-Qasr. All of these roles carry with them some type of right to make binding decisions in matters regarding conflict regulation. That is, an individual should take his
*[613] claims to the 'aqila, but may take them to any of the other political specialists. In any of the cases, the litigants concerned become bound by the decision of the third party.
*[613] But only at the hand of the 'aqila can a decision be made
[695] which will effect a whole group, i.e., only an 'aqila can
[682] give judgment against a corporation for the blood-money in a case of homicide (Schacht 1953:328).

691 If, however, blood-money is not an immediate concern,
692 the litigants may utilize any and all of the political roles
*613 available in the judicial system. A statement from one of my
554 informants, an 'aqila, is useful here.
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> The bait is made up of thirty or fourty men, and there is one most important man (rajal kabiir), the 'aqila. The 'aqila puts an end to problems, he sees who deserves this and who deserves that. Problems must be settled. It happened five or six years ago that I and my paternal cousins quarreled over land at Wadi Raml. I went to the police station and complained to the shaikh of the 'Aishaibat. I asked him to choose a person to judge

691 between me and my cousins, according to Bedouin law
692 (yinafth al-'awaiyid bainaana). I went to the shaikh
because my cousins did not agree that we go to the
*613 'aqila right away. We agreed that the shaikh would
choose the third party, and the judgment would be
•554 binding on both of us. The shaikh chose Bu Halaiqa as
629 the third party, and Bu Halaiqa chose three others as
consultants. (Two of the three were rajal khair, and
the other was an 'aqila.) The judgment was that my
cousins were in the wrong. They were fined 10 L.E.
and a dhabiiha("blood sacrifice"). 'Ali intervened and
did not allow my cousins to pay the fine. He had them
write a paper stating, that if they resume this quarrel
in the future they must pay the fine plus another 10 L.E.
fine. (Hajj 'Ali is a rajal khair.)

695 Sometimes the Egyptian police must be brought into a judicial
648 affair to insure the execution of a judgment. In one case,
696 an individual in al-Qasr did not accept the decision of his
'aqila; his 'aqila wrote the decision on paper and sent him to another 'aqila. The second 'aqila agreed with the first, but the man also refused this decision. The second 'aqila wrote his decision on paper and sent it to the shaikh of the 'Aishaibat in Matruh. The shaikh summoned the culprit and sent him to the police station. Finally, the police were able to convince the man to pay his fine, and also his expiation fee to his own 'aqila. My informant said that this was a minor affair, and that had it been a serious offense committed by the man he would have been threatened with expulsion from the corporate group.

*613 As the corporate sole, the 'aqila has political authority
554 which is legitimate and morally binding on all who wish to
571 maintain their status in the group and tribe. Any individual

*613 ●554 571 or whole tertiary group may be expelled from the lineage group, or if they so desire, they may resign their status in the group. In either case, and both cases rarely occur, the permission and approval of the _'aqila_ are required. Or, I should say, the approval of the _'awaaqil_ is required, for both cases represent structural changes which affect the juristic personality and constitution of the maximal corporation. The legitimacy of the _'aqila_ and the whole political structure are tied up together. Social structure and authority roles are both objects of legitimacy, as Easton (1965:278-301) says, and hence the legitimacy of the _'aqila_ in al-Qasr flows from the structural legitimacy of a segmentary political system. Thus in al-Qasr, politics operates through authority groups in opposition to one another, each represented by an authority role. An _'aqila_ once told me that "the tribe of the _'aqila_ gives him the authority to judge between its members." Another _'aqila_ said that "the _'awaaqil_ are bound [675] by a contract (_rawaabit_) to perform their duty on behalf of their _bait_." The _rawaabit_ ("bonds") we will discuss in the next section.

Spheres and Focus of Authority

121 Authority, as it is used in this study, refers to the Weberian notion of "imperative control" (_Herrschaft_); that is, "the probability that a command with a given specific

121 the "political." Previous studies, then, indicate that a
114 conceptualization of a division between spheres or foci of
*613 authority relations is fundamental to an understanding of the
571 political aspect of segmentary societies. There is no need, however, to relegate the political to any particular social area if "we generally mean by 'political,' things that have to do with relations of authority . . ." (Weber 1947:155). Conflict, and the need for it to be regulated, occur at all levels of the lineage system, from the family to the tribal level. Authority must be exercised if the system is to
persist. The legitimate exercise of authority in al-Qasr is
•[554] expressed through two structures: an authority role and authority groups, the _'aqila_ and the tertiary segments, the corporate sole and corporate groups.

121 The analysis which follows considers society as a
554 composite of authority groups and authority roles. Roles are the basic elements of social structures which "order the human beings who make up the society" (Nadel 1957:11). The authority role is a focus for the study of politics at all levels of the social structure, and, also, the basis for extending role analysis. For the most part, political action in al-Qasr, from the family to the tribal levels, takes the form of the exercise of legitimate authority. Power, as illegitimate control, exists in the form of extra-processual authority roles which we will discuss in the next chapter.

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Here we are interested in the way in which roles and groups, and a whole structure of authority, operate over a wide area.

In the previous section, I presented the _'aqila_ as a specialized political role in Bedouin political organization. As Radcliffe-Brown (1940:xviii-xxi) has pointed out, in the political analysis of segmentary societies it is necessary to isolate incipient authority roles which function to make decisions concerning rightness and wrongness in disputes and which represent the community, giving voice to public sentiment. The notion of society as a functional system of authority roles and authority groups is clear in Radcliffe-Brown's treatment of politics.

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*[613]
Local groups of political significance, i.e., authority groups, are identified by the status position, or office, referred to as _'aqila_. The political relations within a local tertiary group, and between it and similar groups of a lineage and tribe, must be seen as relationships between authority roles.

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In the domestic field of political relations, the authority of the Bedouin _'aqila_ shades into the familial authority sphere of the household head (_shaib_). The _shaib_, as senior agnate of his _naja'_, is dominant over the other males of his tertiary sub-unit, but not to the extent that he can pre-empt any of their rights as members of the tertiary corporate group. A _shaib_, by virtue of his age, is supposed to possess the wisdom which it takes to regulate conflict.
(888)
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600 to possess the wisdom which it takes to regulate conflict.
*613 Theoretically, as one *'aqila* said, conflict should be stopped
578 at the familial level, either by the father or the paternal
593 uncle, and should never reach the level of the *'aqila*. Once
[604] before the *'aqila*, conflict assumes new structural poses, or
different orientation in authority relations. Authority here
is differentiated in terms of the context: the father's authority
relates to the familial structural level, and beyond this
level the father *per se* cannot exercise legitimate authority.
*613 The *'aqila*, who is responsible for internal order and external
578 relations exercises legitimate authority at each level of the
182 political structure. The authority of the *'aqila* is checked
and prevented from growing into naked power in that any single
'aqila must consult with the other *'awaaqil* of the secondary
segment concerning matters which may concern the structural
nature and continuity of the group.

*613 In many respects, the authority structure in al-Qasr
•559 corresponds to that defined for the Lugbara of Uganda
571 (Middleton 1960). The structural levels (see Figure 7 above)
171 of 'Ailit Ma'fas (secondary), Bait 'Umar (tertiary), and 'Ait
Abd al-Malik (sub-tertiary) are approximately equivalent to
Middleton's major, minor, and minimal lineages (1960:7-9). But
[596] whereas among the Lugbara authority roles are purely kinship
roles, i.e., genealogically senior heads are responsible for
internal control and representation, among the Bedouins of

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al-Qasr there is definite role differentiation between the shaib and the 'aqila. The incumbents of the two roles may have exactly the same genealogical position in the tertiary segment, but they will never have the same social status. There are as many elders as there are households, but there is only one 'aqila for each group. Another difference between the Bedouins and the Lugbara is that in the latter society a kinship role which doubles as an authority role does not occur above the familial (i.e. shaib) level.

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The difference between the shaib and the 'aqila is the distinguishing factor between informal and formal social control. The shaib acts in accordance with the values implied by Bedouin authority structure: the action of the 'aqila is legitimate in the explicit terms of the Bedouin authority structure. These two spheres of political action represent familial and internal (or domestic) levels of authority and authority relations. Legal matters which affect the whole tertiary segment are dealt with at the internal level.

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Affairs of a purely personal nature and of lesser importance are dealt with at the familial level of authority. For instance, it happened that the dog of one man killed a neighbor's chicken. No one sent for the 'aqila. They sent for the shaib of the woman who owned the chicken, i.e., they sent for her husband. He spoke to the woman, his wife, to determine the value of the chicken and this price he demanded as compensation

*613 571 178 have noted previously, informants very definitely disagreed over the matter; by looking at the two genealogies one is unable to say one way or the other. The process of fission and fusion in the form of secession and adoption is another instance of genealogical manipulation through patrilineal ideology. In this case, patrilineal ideology also may succeed in concealing real biological links in favor of political relations. We shall see below how secession and adoption actually function in Bedouin society.

*613 675 •554 571 We have said that the authority of the _'aqila_ is legitimate at each structural level. The Bedouins of al-Qasr often legitimate the authority of the _'aqila_ in writing, and, at the same time, make an explicit statement of social compact which outlines the pragmatic and moral values of the corporate group. The corporate charter in al-Qasr is a document of self-interest which defines expectations and consequences for corporate members: it governs the conduct of members in situations relevant to internal order, and gives the _'aqila_ powers of representation in external affairs. The charter is a [181] reflection of the high value the Bedouins place upon security and order, and is a condition for a legal system of wider *613 675 571 scope. Max Weber (1947:120) has expressed the idea of social relationship as contract so well that it is worthwhile to quote him extensively here.

*613 4 - The thief from the mentioned buyuut will be
571 responsible for himself alone, and his relatives
681 in blood (i.e. his bait) will be responsible for
him.

539 5 - The one who is known to lie under oath from
675 the mentioned buyuut, everyone who supports him
must be a blood-relative from his bait.

6 - The one who delays paying the share which is requested by the 'aiela, his rich relative will pay.

7 - The one who asks for a barawwa from the 'aiela will pay what is asked for, and at the same time will also pay 20 L.E. barawwa fee for every man who fasts.

8 - The one who supports his relative from some other 'aiela against his paternal cousin will be required to pay 10 L.E. as a fine.

Signatures or stamps of the 'awaaqil of 'Ailit Abu Qarasa, and the 'awaaqil of 'Ailit Ghriba (who are the former relatives of Bait Abu Qula, the reconciled bait).

*613 Every point of the above rawaabit shows the moral
•554 and political significance of the secondary group in the
571 Bedouin community. Membership in a secondary compound
[675] authority group entitles one to political status without
which the individual could not survive. The Bedouin community shares certain activities, relationships, and goals so that the aims of any individual can be achieved only by participation in social action with others: this the Bedouins have in common with every other human community (Firth 1951:41). Specifically, in considering society in terms of authority roles and authority groups, we are interested in the political community in which the Bedouins participate.

671 the Bedouins, the government soon discovered their own error,
182 for they were unable to effectively manage group and tribal
648 political relations: "They (the government) found out that they could not solve murders in the desert. They would arrest the killer but the trouble continued between families (i.e. feuding went on). There were more killings instead of less, and, finally, the government asked us to return to the _'awaiyid_ because it alone can solve murders in the desert." I was unable to document the claim that the government had "abolished" the _'awaiyid_ in 1933, but a number of officials who worked at the Governor's Office in Marsa Matruh said that it was true.

671 In al-Qasr, and in the Western Desert in general,
641 adherence to law and political order rests upon the conviction
577 that each individual and territorial group have guaranteed
571 rights which are related to honor and property. A violation
554 of any single man's honor or property may easily be interpreted, according to the principle of collective responsibility, as an offense against the rights of a group. And in this sense, legal and moral violations in Bedouin society are relative to the structure of interrelations, and they must be regulated with reference to the various levels of the authority structure.

181 Bedouins place a high value on political order, but
641 also on the idea that political order can only be guaranteed
578 through a man's willingness "not to allow another to take any
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They said that if a man

insisted on keeping a promiscuous wife, his family would "write a barawwa aginst him." I heard of no sex offenses in al-Qasr while I was there.

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The penalty for stealing, according to the 'awaiyid, is that the thief shall pay compensation, by himself, in the amount of four times the value of the stolen object. On the other hand, if the thief is a poor man, he will pay thrice the value of the stolen object and the remaining fourth will be paid by his lineage.

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The 'awaiyid recognizes the territorial claims of the lineage. Disputes arising over conflicting claims to land and wells are handled at Bedouin courts in much the same way as personal injury cases are, with one exception. Usually, a larger number of elders and rajal khair will be consulted in an advisory capacity by the 'awaaqil handling the case. The 'awaaqil consider the specific history of a particular piece of land or well (for instance, each well is known by its own name), and determine the ownership in accordance with the testimony of elders and individuals of high social status. Most of the problems over land and water rights in al-Qasr have reference to what is still considered lineage-owned

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territory in the barley-and-pasture sector. In the 'izba sector, conflict over land ownership rights, since they are rights which are registered with the government, is settled in the Egyptian court of law. Only one such case came up while

CHAPTER V

STRUCTURAL DIFFERENTIATION AND AUTHORITY

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Political Role Analysis: Theoretical Framework

There is current confusion over the definition and use of concepts in political analysis. Ideas concerning power, influence, authority, and the general notion of leadership itself, are variously treated and dealt with equally well. But in every case, a necessary and common aspect of political studies is that of role analysis.

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"Role" is that part of the actor's behavior which constitutes and defines his participation in the social interactive process (Parsons and Shils 1951:23). Political roles define who does what with respect to the political aspect of the social interactive process, i.e. in the system of authority relations. In a most general sense, political role structure may be divided into the two categories of "followers" and "leaders" (Leach 1954:8-10; Easton 1965:205). From the level of the family to the largest social grouping, persons are assigned by the group, or take it upon themselves, to make and help execute decisions. This is to say, that some degree of leadership exists in all social groupings. Whether or not such leadership is institutionalized is another question with which we shall

121 554 571 deal in the course of this discussion.

No political system can persist without a separation of duties between decision-makers and others. The specialized function of decision-making in the political sphere helps "to bring about some adjustment or accommodation in conflicting demands and to implement any settlement where necessary" (Easton 1965:206). It follows then that there is no society without some type of authority role, however simple, and, we assume, that this role can be defined.

121 171 554 571 I do not consider this point a debatable one, though writings on the subject of political organization in primitive society seem to indicate that I should consider it debatable. For example, Steward (1938:247) reports on small bands of American Indians in the Basin-Plateau region who are without chiefs (leaders?). Sharp (1958:5) states that the Yir Yoront cannot tolerate even "mild chiefs"; Schapera (1956:93) notes that "chiefs everywhere in South Africa" are only part-time specialists, and this is taken to mean that the Bushman and Bergdama are without political roles. Service (1966:51) defines "leadership" as "administration" and finds that it is unstructured, which moves from one person to another, and, above all, cannot be associated with the word "chief." All 121 554 of these discussions consider specialization to mean full-time spent in role-playing and the singularity of role assignment. On these bases conclusions are reached as to the presence

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or absence of political roles in primitive societies. It is obvious that in no society does an individual play one, and only one, role. Every social role is, in some degree, a part-time role. Even at the apex of role specialization and structural complexity (the presidency of the United States, for instance), an individual plays his political role along with others. Also, in trying to determine the presence or absence of roles in a society, it should be kept in mind that the notion of institutionalization refers to a process and not a state of being. Therefore, in any one society at any one point in time, there may be a number of roles "happening." This, it seems, will especially be the case in the dynamic field of politics.

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In political analysis, influential and leadership roles may be viewed in terms of differential responsibility. Authority is the institutionalization of a responsible relationship between the leader and other members of the collectivity wherein the former has the right to expect support from the latter in given situations (Parsons 1960:183-186). A role which is imbued with power, but not authority in the analytical sense which I wish to bring out here, lacks this institutionalized right to expect support. M.G. Smith (1966:127) makes this analytical distinction most clearly:

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> As a regulatory capacity, authority is legitimated and identified by the rules, traditions, and precedents which embody it and which govern its exercise and objects. Power is also regulatory, but is neither fully prescribed nor governed by norms and rules.

Authority is always attached to specific roles while power is a generalized control over others. For instance, power may be based on religious or economic grounds and operate with equal influence in the political sphere. The basis of the legitimacy of authority is the backing which it receives from the legal system. Power, however, is the probability that one actor within a social relationship will be able to carry out his will regardless of the basis on which this probability rests (Weber 1947:152). Power over others is a type of influence which may operate without their consent, their "will," or even their awareness and understanding. For instance, when one party controls property or other values essential to person's existence, he has power over those others (Goldhamer and Shils 1939).

Influence of the authority type is explicit and institutionalized control of certain symbols which emphasizes group goals. Power-type influence is the control of goods and symbols, often the inexplicit manipulation of these things, which emphasizes particularistic goals usually with a private individual referent. Power and authority are two types of influence. For analytical purposes, they may be considered at opposite ends of a scale of institutionalization. In this

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way, each may be considered as having aspects of the other attached to it: a power role may at times take on an authoritative aspect, and an authority role, when its incumbent "pulls rank," may be said to be exerting power rather than authority.

I have found it necessary to utilize the concepts and ideas discussed here in order to understand the distribution of power in al-Qasr. The range of authoritative action is wide in Bedouin society, and no simple dichotamy between power and authority will suffice to explain it. However, authority does crystallize at certain points in the al-Qasr social structure, and political rights and duties at these reference points become relatively formal and well-defined. When we speak of the crystallization of authority roles, we refer to a tendency toward legitimacy as a process of institutionalization taking place in society. Authority among the 'Aishaibat tribe is legitimate, public, and representative because it is distributed and exercised with reference to imperatively coordinated associations, or corporate groups.

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Furthermore, the manner in which authority is segmented and distributed informs and legitimates the Bedouin lineage structure. On the other hand, power and power roles possessing no legitimate or representative influence with reference to the lineage structure, may actually inform "structures" and "modes" which combine and "are quite unlike the articulations

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in a lineage system" (Peters 1967:280).

My own study indicates that authority roles are more easily studied since they are more easily observable. Power roles are subtle simply because they are less institutionalized; closer field work is required if we are to understand their structure and function. Al-Qasr is characterized by segmentation in communication structure which follows the lines of lineage segmentation. As a consequence of this, social intercourse is of a restricted nature wherein each lineage group tends to be its own audience. In cases such as these, where social interaction is anything but intense, the character of political relations between groups is difficult to perceive. Thus the operation of influence at the informal level, i.e. power, is difficult to comprehend. But it seems absolutely necessary that politics per se be studied in the tribal situation, and the only way that I can handle it in the al-Qasr case is to consider leadership in the context of an institutionalization process.

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There are precedents for this approach, and these also serve to point up the importance of leadership studies in primitive societies. Radcliffe-Brown (1940:xi-xxiii), referring to decision-making processes in tribal societies, was convinced that even in cases of contingencies, and seemingly "spur of the moment" group activities, careful observation would show that "they were directed by leaders who had some

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measure of recognized authority" (p. xv). Radcliffe-Brown conceived of politics as a process, and actually worked with concepts of increasing specialization in decision-making and role differentiation to bring this out (p. xxi). The structural focus of political analysis is the role: he reminds us that analytical concepts such as the "State" do not exist in the phenomenal world, that there exists only individuals who play roles and interrelate as possessors and non-possessors of authority (p. xxiii).

More recently, Pospisil (1968:201-222) has claimed that all societies necessarily possess authority roles by virtue of the fact that justice and its administration is "vested in the decision-making activity, irrespective of its informality or subtlety, of an individual or group of individuals of influence." According to Pospisil, law and conflict regulation upon which political order rests cannot be divorced from "the decision-making process of authority or group leaders" (1968:206). In his study of the Kapauku Papuans, Pospisil (1963:52-55) describes the basis of a "power" struggle between different "authorities."

In this study, I have tried to use the concepts of decision-making process, power-authority continuum, and role-structure for an analysis of Bedouin leadership. Such an approach may be better suited for a study of peasant or modern-complex societies where roles are more differentiated

121 554 571 and better defined, but I feel that the area of leadership in tribal society is more complex and less well studied than we are led to believe. Both the decision-making process and some kind of authority are present in all societies, but we know less about such universals in tribal society. It is as Easton (1965:205) has said: "Even in the smallest group, we can expect to find that the power and responsibility of caring for recurring matters as well as crises tend to reside in the hands of the few."

Status and Role Differentiation

554 565 Although structural differentiation along class lines does not exist in al-Qasr, status differential does exist and a discussion of it is essential for an understanding of Bedouin authority structure. Classes exist only where individuals at a specific socio-economic level "become conscious of their common interests and organize themselves"(Linton 1936:110). Status stratification in and of itself is not indicative of a class structure, for "a size beyond the possibility of facial recognition" is an additional prerequisite (Bierstedt 1957:404).

554 571 Authority structure in al-Qasr, like any of the other structures of society, constitites a system of roles. The actors who act out the roles in this particular system occupy a special status, or position, in the Bedouin social system

554 and political structure. This group of actors corresponds
571 to Max Weber's concept of stand, or "status group," a group set apart from the rest of society by the amount of "status honor" which its members possess. In content, "status honor" is normally expressed by the fact that above all else a specific style of life can be expected from all of those who wish to belong to the circle. Linked with this expectation are restrictions on social intercourse" (Gerth and Mills 1946:186-188).

In the course of daily observation in al-Qasr, one begins to understand that certain persons communicate more frequently and more easily with certain others; that the member families of this group tend to intermarry; and even that the men of this group tend to dress similarly. In each case, they visibly and socially set themselves apart from other Bedouins in al-Qasr and the surrounding area: one can identify a member of this "status group" on the streets of Marsa Matruh. They do not represent a well-structured group, least of all an association. More concisely, Weber refers to these individuals as

> A status group (which) is always somehow societalized, but is not organized into an association. Commercium, in the sense of "social intercourse," and connubium among groups are the typical characteristics of the mutual esteem among status equals; their absence signifies status differences (Gerth and Mills 1946:300).

554 It would be considered "wrong" for the members of
571 this group to present themselves at an al-Qasr wedding party,
[579] or the annual celebration held in honor of a local saint of
[585] the area. When I inquired about the conspicuous absence of
[796] some of my chief informants from such gatherings, I was told
[124] that "they will send their gifts," or that "it is not decent
[431] that they come to something such as this." In terms of
554 Bedouin social structure, there are a number of plausible
571 explanations for this "status separation." Fathers should
182 not attend public affairs at which their sons may be "performing,"
561 i.e., young men should be allowed to play a public
[593] role outside the confines of the father-son authority
structure. By virtue of the extension of the father role,
and its corresponding authoritarian attitude, every member
of the elder age-set commands certain rights and obligations
which would prevent the free expression that is the hallmark
of Bedouin parties. Conversely, and at the more general
level, members of the "status group" who wish to remain
members of this circle accept certain restrictions on social
[114] intercourse. At the five different Bedouin "parties" which
I attended, there were "elders" present, but none of them
could be classified as members of the "status group." Bedouins
plainly state that elders should not attend parties, but, on
the other hand, they show much more concern and emotion when
they say that a member of the "status group" should not "be

554 seen" at any such function. It would appear that the mechanism
571 at work here is not simply a device to provide the younger
182 generation with a tension-release situation, but also a
561 symbolic expression of the difference between the possessors
[154] and the non-possessors of authority, a confirmation of the
political order.

[578] The avoidance practice, or separation, between the old and the young in the "party" situation is a structural fact of Bedouin society, and, though it may ultimately be defined as a conflict control or legitimating mechanism, in the context of culture change new aspects and meanings attach
554 to the phenomenon. The "status group" is an agent of change
571 in al-Qasr; its members can afford to gamble in the market
178 economy of Marsa Matruh since they possess the reserve capital
[471] (in the form of sheep) and the social prestige which permits
[439] this. The "status group," with business and social relations
[177] in Marsa Matruh, enjoys both the benefits of associational
ties with the Egyptians and the communal ties with their fellow Bedouins. They see themselves as being different from their fellow tribesmen, and they tend to face more towards Marsa Matruh than al-Qasr. In short, they are the "cultural brokers" who support an ideology of change, they extol the benefits of a new way of life over and against the old.

[789] One repudiation of tradition which constitutes an
[796] attempt to define the style of life of the "status group"

554 concerns magic. Each August there is a celebration in honor
571 of al-Qasr's local saint. At these celebrations, the _darwish_
178 performs his special skills such as putting a red-hot iron
789 to his tongue, or standing on a skin drum held high by his
796 two assistants. No member of the "status group" attends these
affairs because the _darwish_ and his magic "belong totally to
the old way of life." This is a restriction on social intercourse. It may also be a rejection of the saint's sacred
power, or reluctance on the part of the "status group" to
554 share authority. The ideology which the "status group" in
571 al-Qasr has developed embodies attitudes of cooperation and
183 patience with induced programs of change. These attitudes
are invoked in varying degrees corresponding to motives of economic gain, desire for power, and altruistic concern. But the result is a "status group" mood which may be described as one of disdain for the old way of life. Ideology and discontent in al-Qasr are mainly evident among the members of the "status group."

554 The pool from which the members of the "status group"
556 are recruited consists of the "status honor" possessors of
571 three lineages (two Sa'adi and one Marabit). These have been,
* [613] traditionally and presently, the wealthiest and most influential
in al-Qasr. Wealth in al-Qasr is defined in terms of three things: sheep, land, and olives. Olives are becoming the measure of wealth in the modern al-Qasr: sheep are the tradi-

554 571 556 tional symbol of wealth. A comparison of wealth between the "status group" and "other members" of al-Qasr, and the picture of stratification which emerges, are shown on Table 6.

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TABLE 6

COMPARATIVE DATA ON SOCIO-ECONOMIC STRATIFICATION IN AL-QASR[1]

Average Per Person	Status Group	Others
OLIVE - trees	661	86
SHEEP - head	402	30
LAND - acres	91	5

554 571 627 *613 One most important way of accruing "status honor" in al-Qasr is by acting the part of the third party in conflict situations. The role of the third party represents an effective and acceptable way of bypassing formal litigation through the [778] office of _'aqila_. For instance, by mediating through the process of _nazaala_, the third party prevents feuds.

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[114] [128] [1] This data is both approximate and partial. Some data are excellent and completely reliable, others are not so dependable. Factors which could conceivably change the picture here presented would be a count of land and animals outside al-Qasr which would be extremely difficult to obtain. Also, some land is not in the name of the owner but in the names of relatives. Of all the data, land data is the most unreliable. Nevertheless, the addition of new data, I feel, would only serve to substantiate the picture of socio-economic stratification shown here.

554 process of *nazaala*, the third party prevents feuds. In this
571 sense, the third party is a legitimate moral and political
627 influence, but not formalized to the degree as that of the
*[613] *'aqila*. A discussion of the authority structure in al-Qasr, then, requires that the allocation of authoritative action in terms of the loci, or roles, of political influence be designated.

[792] The central place of the third party role in the Bedouin political structure is manifested in the many laudable terms which refer to it: *rajal khair* ("good man") is the most general and often used referent; *rajal saalih* ("pious man") refers almost always to a "holy man," a specialized role in al-Qasr; *quwaal al-khair* ("the speaker of good"); and *fa'aal al-khair* or *'amaal al-khair* ("the doer of good"). The latter three roles are approximately equivalent to that of *rajal khair*, though some informants argued that *rajal khair* is especially designated because he mediates quarrels while the *fa'aal al-khair* or *'amaal al-khair* help a man when he is in financial difficulties.

554 The functioning of the third party in conflict media-
571 tion is formal to the degree that two parties agree on his
627 intervention and to abide by his decision; but the structuring
*613 of the third party is informal by comparison with the in-
182 stitutionalized role of *'aqila*. However, the existence of the third party role, and its various expressions in al-Qasr

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571 politics, and the fact that it is differentiated from the
627 role of _'aqila_, are the bases for conceptualizing a structural
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[182] division of political duties and authority distribution.

554 Role differentiation in the authority structure may be
571 discussed from two points of view: the degree of difference
between authoritative decision-making roles and the other roles, and, the way in which one authoritative role differs from another. These refer to the different degrees of specialization characterized by any one role as compared to another. I have already discussed the way in which the role of _'aqila_ differs from other social roles (such as the kinship roles)
[128] in the authority structure of al-Qasr. In the following
discussion, I focus on role differentiation in the non-institutionalized aspect of the authority structure, on power and influence.

Societies differ from culture to culture in the complexity of role differentiation. Within any one culture it
554 may differ from social domain to social domain. The political
571 system in al-Qasr is from this point of view structurally
627 simple, the assignment of duties in the traditional authority
*[613] structure being divided between the _'aqila_ and the third party.
What legitimate influence is possessed by the third party is derivative from the "status honor" of its members. The
[792] exception to this is the _rajal saalih_ who derives his power
or influence as a result of his special relationship with God.

● 554 571 627 Thus within the "status group" a difference exists between those members whose power might be considered "secular" (i.e. the rajal khair), and those whose power might be considered "sacred" (i.e. the rajal saalih). Their right to mediate and to overseer the execution of decisions binding on parties to conflict derives from this status. In a way, authority role patterns may be seen to overlap, and the "status group" impinges on the legitimate authority of the 'aqila by virtue of the fact that they are, for one reason or another, his status equals inside and outside the political structure.

554 571 182 *613 This structural division of political duties for dealing with conflict corresponds to Eisenstadt's (1965:30) differentiation of roles in terms of degrees of instituional-ization. The role of 'aqila is present and enduring in each tertiary authority group. There is an incumbent who can be pointed out. His rights and privileges are circumscribed, and his duties and obligations are well defined: the power of the 'aqila role is limited by the very fact that it is institutionalized. 554 571 182 627 The role of the third party, or the mediator in Bedouin society, is less institutionalized, and therefore, less structured and less confining with respect to the kind and amount of influence which the role-player might exert.

The role of the rajal khair, and this implies reference to all third parties, carries with it power. When power is

554 571 182 *[613] When power is institutionalized, such as it is in the role of _'aqila_, it becomes authority. This is the Weberian notion of power and authority which has been used by Bohannan (1958) for an analysis of, what he refers to as, "extra-processual events." "Extra-processual events" refers to the operation of power in everyday social relationships, whenever some people make others do what they want them to do. In other words, possessors of "status honor" are also possessors of power, and, I would claim, by virtue of this, such people are recruited into decision-making roles. Not only do members of the "status group" manipulate others in everyday dyadic social relationships, but, more importantly, in the context of conflict control they are able to dominate in political triadic relationships. Furthermore, since they are not structurally bound in their decision-making role, i.e., they operate across group and lineage lines, they accrue even more power and widen their power-base or support structure. What is highlighted in this kind of political role analysis is the fact that different individuals play the game of power politcs in various ways, (128) and with varying degrees of success. In the next chapter, I will bring out this very point by presenting a case study of one such role-player.

554 571 *613 627 When we contrast the roles of _'aqila_ and _rajal khair_, we are defining a political role-set. In an attempt to differentiate between the two roles further than we already have,

•554 571 *613 627 and to clarify the concept of political role structure for al-Qasr, we may make the useful analytical distinction between an "arbitrator" and a "mediator." George Simmel (Wolff 1950), in his discussion of the sociological significance of the third element, i.e. "the triad," notes the important difference between the "mediator" who only guides "the process of coming to terms," and the "arbitrator" who "ends up by taking sides" (1950:146-149). In the process of mediation, the termination of conflict is in the hands of the parties themselves, and there is no final authority to which one may appeal. In the process of arbitration, the 'aqila may, after deciding that mediation has been unsuccessful, impose his will over the wills of the litigants and appeal to the rawaabit as the final authority. The mediator attempts to reduce "will" to "understanding" (Simmel 1950:148). Mediation may be considered an initial stage of most Bedouin judicial processes; thus the mediating and arbitrating attributes of political authority are not always separate, as in the role of 'aqila. In so far as the regulation of conflict is a political mechanism for the reduction of strain, then " . . . the existence of the third element serves the perpetuation of the group" (1950:152).

554 571 627 The rajal khair and the "status group" in al-Qasr have much in common with Evans-Pritchard's tut role in Nuer society (1940:178-181).

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> A tut in this rather wide sense of 'man of good standing,' or 'social leader' is usually a scion of an important lineage, the head of his own family, and master of his homestead and herd . . . (His) authority is never formalized. He has no defined status (i.e. specifically delimited position), powers, or sphere of leadership . . . Beyond his domestic groups a tut has authority in his village only in the sense that he takes a prominent part in questions of procedure and other discussions.

The non-institutionalized third party role in al-Qasr has power and influence in political affairs, and this condition arises from certain structural features and economic facts about Bedouin society. In a word, outside the lone formal role of 'aqila, a person's political influence is directly related to the traditional influence which attaches to his family, or to his economic status. In all cases, the person of "good" family and sufficient wealth has a high status on the social prestige scale of al-Qasr. The people who have high esteem do not have prescribed roles to play in al-Qasr, but their roles are indeed important. Furthermore, the rajal khair role can be just as important as any political role which is prescribed, and it may even become more important.

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Besides the 'aqila and the third party, there exists two external but related roles which form part of the total system of Bedouin authority. The roles of 'umda and shaikh represent institutionalized offices. They function, however, more as structural aspects of the Egyptian governmental authority structure. Of course, no complete separation between the two structures can be claimed. It is recognized

554 571 177 that these officers, as representatives of the Bedouin, must figure in both structures. Therefore, we must understand and explain the relationship between the two sets of roles extant in the Bedouin total political structure, one set pertaining to the traditional authority structure and the other to the relatively new legal authority structure of the nation state.

554 571 The one factor common to all Bedouins in politically influential roles is that they possess a high degree of "status honor," and thus belong to the "status group" of al-Qasr. The "status group" is responsible for political order in al-Qasr and the political links which it maintains with other systems, Bedouin and Egyptian. Bedouins say that responsible action in conflict control belongs to one who knows how to give a man his rights while maintaining the honor of both parties; at the ideal level, it is the duty of all to do this. The fact that the power group and "the rich" comprise two coterminous groups is accidental and even incidental to the Bedouins. In theory, there could be a person of low economic status but who would belong to the "status group" simply as a result of his ability to mediate. * [613] [177] The authority of the 'aqila and the governmental offices of 'umda and shaikh are legitimate only where formal litigation is concerned. [627] Beyond this, they may have influence, not legitimate authority, and in this case, they switch roles and operate as a rajal khair.

●554 571 and operate as a rajal khair.

554 571 177 *613 [627] There are two primary types of political roles in al-Qasr, the traditional and the modern legal. Modern legal political roles have been decreed from above by the government. The traditional roles of 'aqila and "third party" represent autochthonous roles emerging from Bedouin social and cultural structures. Bedouin traditional roles correspond to Weber's ideal-type "traditional authority" which is based upon "piety for what actually, allegedly, or presumably has always existed" (Gerth and Mills 1946:296). The role of 'aqila is "traditional" rather than "legal" despite its fully institutionalized status. The relatively modern roles of 'umda and shaikh are what I term here "legal"; these offices are not, nor did any of my informants consider them to be, roles natural in the Bedouin political system. The legitimacy of these roles stems from, what Weber called, "legal authority" in which "submission . . . is based upon an impersonal bond to the generally defined and functional duty of office" [627] (1946:299). In this case, the norms to which conformity is demanded are not those espoused by the 'aqila or the "third party," but are established by national governmental decrees and regulations.

128 In the remaining part of this chapter, the attempt is to show two things which I consider essential to an understanding of Bedouin political structure and a perspective of

128 Bedouin culture change: how the Bedouins perceive their authority structure, and how political authorities relate to members of the political system.

Traditional Roles

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627 The authority and role of the _'aqila_ has been discussed so that I can devote attention to the "third party" roles in this section. No formalized document exists to stipulate the rights and duties of the "third party," such as exists for the _'aqila_ in the form of the _rawaabit al-'awaaqil_. Nevertheless, Bedouin litigants have certain expectations of a _rajal khair_ when he mediates in a case of conflict. Before a _rajal khair_ agrees to take part in the judicial process, the disputants make it explicit that they will accept his decision as final and binding. Such an agreement is not put into writing. On the other hand, a _rajal khair_ can intervene into a dispute on his own. In so doing, he may gain in prestige relative to the manner and degree of success with which he handles the problem. By saving face for both parties in the quarrel, by cajoling an ingratiating attitude from both parties, the _rajal khair_ may reinforce or augment his "status honor" and his local following.

*[613] A person occupying the office of _'aqila_ can participate in the process of conflict regulation as a _rajal khair_. We noted that this is a case of role-switching. It is conceivable

554 571 627 *613 then that the _'aqila_ can increase his prestige and status beyond the limits of his formal role. When he does take the role of _rajal khair_, he does so only in conflict cases involving two lineages other than his own. Where any member of his own lineage is concerned, an incumbent _'aqila_ cannot be considered a neutral "third party" which is a prerequisite of this role. This factor constitutes a limit on the power of the _'aqila_.

One _'aqila_ explained the relationship between the _rajal khair_ and _'aqila_ roles in this way: "The two are equal. The _'aqila_ is responsible for one _bait_, but the _rajal khair_ solves any problem in any place, for any _bait_. He goes to them or they come to him. I am, for instance, responsible for the members of _Bait 'Umar_, but it is quite possible that any other _bait_ can ask for my advice in a problem. And so I go as a _rajal khair_."

In a general sense, the office of the _'aqila_ represents an ideal, while the real aspects of conflict regulation in al-Qasr center around the role of the "third party." In fact, many of the cases formally handled by the _'aqila_ afterwards undergo readjustment, as it were, by a _rajal khair_. 554 571 627 This is done by the _rajal khair's_ suggesting a "more reasonable" settlement which is agreeable to both sides. For example, in a case of conflict over water rights the following was reported: "The _'awaqil_ passed the judgement that they should pay a

554 571 627 dhabiiha and 10 L.E. But Hajj 'Ali intervened and did not let them pay the fine. Instead, he had them write a paper declaring that should they reopen this matter, they would have to pay the old fine plus a new fine of the same amount." Simmel (Wolff 1950) notes that the mediator saves group unity through his "intellectuality," but that he is also an exploiter of the situation. It is obvious that Hajj 'Ali could have increased his "status honor" in the eyes of both parties to this conflict. The rajal khair who is facile enough to salvage the honor of both parties in a dispute increases his chances for future mediation and, hence, the chance to further augment his "status honor." The minimal fine involved in most of Bedouin litigation indicates a concern, not with punishment per se, but with "taking one's rights" and lawful share of honor. Social harmony is viewed in terms of an equitable distribution of honor. The power which a rajal khair has over litigants, which derives from his status in the social structure, contributes to this social harmony necessary for the persistence of the community.

554 571 627 829 [691] * [613] The Bedouins say that one goes to the rajal khair, or rajal salih, because he knows that he will "get his rights." Litigation is entered into with the understanding that neither party will emerge a "loser." On the other hand, the 'aqila, who is expected to be dispassionate and totally objective, must rule on the rightness or wrongness of an act;

554 hence the *rajal khair* represents a face-saving mechanicsm
571 and an alternative which is needed. The *rajal khair* may even
627 violate group norms in acting to restore the balance of
[829] honor: he may lie with intent to deceive, behavior which at
*[613] any other time would be considered "wrong" by the Bedouin.
[577] An informant said that

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> the real *rajal khair* is a man who goes to men in a quarrel and asks them to be on good terms and to avoid the devil. He uses good judgement in quarrels. In this case, he may even have to lie. He goes to both parties and listens to them insult each other, but when he returns he tells each that the other is a good man and wishes to settle the quarrel. He tells them: 'Do not let the devil interfere.' He tells each that the other wants his friendship.

554 I pursued the detail that a *rajal khair* may lie to restore
571 peace, since other informants had made a point of this. My
577 informant then explained:
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> I don't want to commit myself because no one knows if the *rajal khair* is really lying; the men at the time of the quarrel do not know that he is lying. Not all men are *rajal khair*: there are only a few. The *rajal khair* puts himself in trouble to help others, therefore, the people do not want to harm him (by thinking ill of him). The *rajal khair* must be a good man and help others, and he always speaks the truth. He lies but he is doing good, and the people do not want to harm him. When the *rajal khair* lies, a man does not lose his rights. A man tells the *rajal khair* this; he tells him that he does not want to lose his rights, and he does not care what he says as long as he does not lose his rights.

554 One *'aqila*, who is famous for the sharpness of his tongue in
571 dealing with litigants, was explicit about the authority of
*613 the *rajal khair* as compared to his own in matters of conflict
627 regulation:
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> Both are one (i.e. the *'aqila* and the *rajal khair*), for the *rajal khair* can also finish a problem. The *rajal khair* tries to solve the problem, but only the *'aqila* judges (*yahkum*). The *rajal khair* worries about the feelings of the two men involved, but the *'aqila* cares only about justice and what is right . . . The *rajal khair* does not want the two men to lose one another. It is a friendly way to solve problems.

554 Bedouins of low status in al-Qasr who are economically
571 linked to the *rajal khair* in what resembles a patron-client
627 relationship permit this fact to influence their own inter-
829 pretation of the authority structure. A common view of the
*613 *'aqila's* formal authority indicates that the Bedouins themselves
are conscious of a structural comparison of political roles,
but not of the underlying economic conditioners at work.

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> There are good men and there are bad men: the *rajal khair* is the opposite of a bad man. The *rajal khair* is not responsible for his group, but the *'aqila* is. The *'aqila* is chosen from among the elders of the *bait* so that he is not always a good man. But when they want a man to solve problems, they get him from among the *rajal khair*. The *'aqila* is responsible before the *'umda* and *shaikh*, and he is responsible for collecting and receiving the *diya*.

554 The *rajal khair* represents a vital element in Bedouin
571 society. He is a symbol of security, the man to whom one
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•554 turns in times of need dealing with financial and personal
571 problems. In view of the value stress which the Bedouins
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182 place upon generosity, manifest in the redistributive system
[181] of the lineage, the wealth of the rajal khair is the wealth
[556] of the community. Wealth divides, not only possessors from non-possessors, but also, seekers after security from power seekers. It is as Peters (1965:145) has noted in Cyrenaica: generosity, not being entirely altruistic, wins repute and repute is an important aspect of political power.

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In an interview concerning the justice of blood-
682 revenge, there was general agreement that if a man kills
627 intentionally, then blood-revenge must be taken by the
*613 murdered man's bait against someone in the murderer's aiela.
829 But one prominent man (a rajal khair) protested that "the best man in the killer's family must not be harmed." This statement generated a rather heated debate. One man said: "The best man should be killed for this is right in the Bedouin type of justice." (This comment was made by a man who is the 'aqila of a low-status lineage in al-Qasr.) The first speaker's reply to the protest was this:

> Nevertheless, it all depends upon the character of the best man . . . if he is evil and on bad terms with your family, then he will be the first one to be killed. But if he is a good man, then you kill the murderer himself . . . You must never kill a rajal khair because he may do good in the future.
> [178] In the old days, the killing started right away, and all problems were big ones: today there is negotiation--people are improving.

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One _'agila_ claimed that the _rajal khair_ is a person who shares in his own authority and presides when he is away, but he separated the "rights" of the two roles. The _'agila_ is able to force two parties in conflict to read the _Fatiha_, the first _sura_ of the Quran, in order to terminate the problem; this is beyond the rights of the _rajal khair_ whose influence is not directly supported by sacred sanctions. But
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the role of _rajal khair_ does have its "sacred" aspects, for all Bedouins know that "you should never harm a _rajal khair_ or God will punish you for this." I never heard this same thing said about the _'agila_.

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Historically, it was perhaps the case that the _rajal khair_ was the person of high status who represented the authority of an absent _'agila_. The role never became institutionalized but functioned as a support and substitute role in a structure dominated by that of the _'agila_. In a segmentary society
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where the various structures exist in opposition to one another, it is important that an institution, such as a third non-partisan element, exists to facilitate communication between parties for the purposes of conflict regulation. Besides the _rajal khair_, an example of this would be the traditional case of the wife from an outside tribe who alone was permitted freedom of passage between the two warring parties. Her purpose, it was assumed, was that of peace-making.

554 571 627 The *rajal khair*, then, is a broker in social relationships, a manipulator of loyalties. As a member of the "status group," he can afford to spend time and money in courting his fellow tribesmen, and, as a result, can accrue prestige and loyalty. This role, like that of the *'aqila*, is a secular [681] one. The sanctions which it controls are as economical as those of the *'aqila's* are political. In this sense, they are differentiated from the role of *rajal saalih* whose sanctions are sacred in nature.

554 792 [178] The traditional role which we define as that of the *rajal saalih*, "the holy man," was probably much more important in the past than it is today. In al-Qasr, there are only two *rajal saalih* who share in traditional power: the one is a resident of al-Qasr proper, and the other, a member of the prestigious Sanusi family, lives near Marsa Matruh.

The *rajal saalih* of al-Qasr, i.e. the local "holy man," is assured of status because he is an *ashraf*, one who claims descent from the family of the Prophet. He is also a [561] member of the elder age-set, and while he is not rich, he cannot be considered poor. Though the "holy man" al-Sanusi [793] lives near Matruh, he participates in the authority structure of al-Qasr and is a member of the "status group." He is sometimes referred to as *rajal saalih kabir*, "a great holy man," by virtue of his Sanusi heritage.

[771] The relative unimportance of this role as compared to that of the *rajal khair* in conflict regulation is a function

•554 of the Bedouin attitude, or lack of it, toward religion.
792 Since the time of Muhammad, the Bedouins have been considered
771 notoriously bad Muslims. Today, the Bedouins tend to joke
about their lack of zeal, and often point out that "holy
619 men" are not to be trusted.[2] This is seen in Sa'adi behavior
771 toward the Marabtin tribes who are their vassals. Theoretically,
792 the Marabtin who trace descent to the Prophet and might be
554 [778] considered "sacred Tribes" should be respected by the "secular"
Sa'adi tribes. But the Sa'adi of al-Qasr tend to deride the
554 Marabit. For instance, the "holy man" of al-Qasr, 'Amm Salih,
792 is a Marabit and well-known for his ability to successfully
627 mediate in conflict situations. But one informant, pointing
619 out this gift which 'Amm Salih possesses, said: "Amm Salih
is a good man, he is not a Marabit." But 'Amm Salih identifies
himself as a "rajal saalih" and a "Marabit"; he sees no role
conflict here.

771 The Bedouins also joke about the manner in which they
[522] practice the "pillars of Islam." Especially, they make light
of the fact that they are irregular in mosque attendance.
They say, with a slight smile, "we pray in the desert." A
[124] common way for an interview to end was by an informant rising
and saying: "Now I must wash for prayers." This happened

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[184] [2] Professor Abou-Zeid also notes this trait in his study of the Bedouin near Sallum, on the Libyan border (1966:248).

771 at any time of the day! As one Bedouin put it: "According
to the idea of goodness (*salih*), we are not good. This is
because we do not pray, we are part-timers in prayer."

554 A good *rajal saalih* is considered by the Bedouin to
792 have a special "blessing" (*baraka*), a concept somewhat
778 equivalent to that of *mana*. Someone such as 'Amm Salih
is thought to have *baraka*, and this type of power naturally
increases his influence and enhances his status. The following
[124] informant's account brings this out and shows something of
the magico-religious element at work in Bedouin power relations.

> [539] Hajj 'Ali does not believe in magic but he respects
> the "holy man" like anyone else. He owns a field
> from which are taken stones for building houses.
> One day he saw some men taking stones from this
> field. They were digging near a well so that the
> well would not be able to hold water after they had
> finished. Hajj 'Ali told the men to stop digging.
> One man answered: "I am cutting these stones for
> the Jaraira family (the family of 'Amm Salih), and
> only a few more and we will be finished." Hajj
> 'Ali replied: "For the Jaraira as for anyone else,
> we don't favor anyone, so stop the work now."
> Then Hajj 'Ali went home, never thinking that they
> would cause any trouble for him, and he was
> afraid of no harm. He slept and he had a dream.
> [787] In the dream he saw three of the Jaraira family,
> all of whom were dead and whom he had known in life.
> In the dream they only watched him and spoke no words.
> In the morning Hajj 'Ali went to the co-operative
> society's office and there he met 'Amm Salih. He
> said to him: "'Amm Salih, I want to tell you something."
> Then he related the whole story to him, and said:
> "I had no fear that you would do me any harm. But
> last night I saw your relatives in my dream; I had
> not even thought of them yesterday, so they are not
> the cause of the dream. (The Bedouins believe that
> [828] dreams reflect, and are connected with, what you saw
> or did during the day). So come and take all of
> the stones that you want, even if you are going to
> build a palace."

554 It is interesting to note that Hajj 'Ali is one of the most
[571] powerful members of the "status group" in al-Qasr. He is
[178] also a leading proponent of social change and a critic of
the old way of life which includes belief in magic. One can
[792] see how 'Amm Salih's influence and status might work in other
areas of social action.

554 Although it is conceivable that a *rajal salih* can
792 be asked to intervene in any type of conflict, it is more
627 likely that he will preside at cases involving marriage and
[695] divorce. The *rajal saalih* may also be asked to serve as a
[691] witness or consultant in litigation cases. The Bedouins
* [613] point out that the "holy man," like the *rajal khair*, is apt
[829] to be more trustworthy than the formal authority, the *'aqila*.

> Sanusi is a good man and the people should listen to him. He is a *rajal khair*, a *rajal saalih*, not an *'aqila*. He is better than an *'aqila*--he is our brother. He is much better than the *'umda* because he never changes the truth. The *'umda* may go and accuse me wrongly to the government but Sanusi would never do this.

554 It is, of course, difficult to decide whether Sanusi's
792 charisma stems from the fact that he is a *rajal salih*, or the
facts of his wealth and family. Most probably it is a little
of both, the sacred as well as the secular. 'Amm Salih, on
the other hand, is neither wealthy nor from a particularly
prestigious family by economic standards of al-Qasr: he
derives his influence and status from the sacred aspects of

554 792 his role.

The people of al-Qasr identify 'Amm Salih as the "holy man" in the area. In my interviews, when I asked for [124] [627] the name of a party, besides the 'aqila, who solves the Bedouins' problems, the answer was either Hajj 'Ali, the rajal khair, or "the Jaraira family." (This refers to 'Amm Salih and his brother.) When I asked for the name of a man who could tell me "how the Bedouin should act," the only name mentioned was that of 'Amm Salih.

554 792 627 'Amm Salih says that he solves many problems, not all of which deal with marriage and divorce. He claimed that he could settle conflicts over land and water. Just as a man may choose to go to the rajal khair, so also might he go to the rajal salih. Often enough, the selection of a "third party" will be determined by his propinquity. One 'aqila told me: "Salih Jaraira is a good man . . . If two men wish to accept Jaraira's decision, and if he lives near them, it is * [613] [571] all right. If Jaraira cannot solve the problem, then they will return to the 'aqila. The 'aqila can solve it or he can call in other 'awaqil who can solve it."

[114] When I asked 'Amm Salih for case studies of problems which he has handled, he said that he would not reveal them because they are private affairs. He was willing, however, to describe the method in which he solves a problem.

> 554 Suppose the donkey of A (a man present at the interview)
> 792 gets into the barley of B (another man present). This is
> 627 actually a serious matter since it could conceivably lead
> to a big fight between A's *'aiela* and B's *'aiela.* First,
> I separate them and make each go to his home. Then I
> get A's three brothers (his father is dead), we take a
> [779] *dhabiiha* (lamb) and go to B's place and all eat together.
> After the meal, we read the *Fatiha* (opening *sura* of the
> Quran) together to show that all is forgiven. After the
> *Fatiha* has been read no trouble will start because this
> is done in the presence of the Jaraira.

[784] He explained that reading the *Fatiha* in bad faith would bring
the same curse from God that a bad oath would bring. He also
*[613] claimed that only he and the *'aqila* have the authority to
command men to read the *Fatiha*.

554 'Amm Salih says that he uses the *'awaiyid* as a guide
792 in solving problems, and that it is necessary because
627 "quarrels spread like fire, it is like fire; they spread to
671 killing and war." He was the only person in al-Qasr who
554 tried to conceptualize the difference between the *'awaiyid*
792 *Awlad 'Ali* and the *Sharii'a*. 'Amm Salih said that it is
627 671 wrong to lie, according to both the secular and the sacred
779 authority codes: "One who lies exceeds the word of God,
577 and God will punish him for this. No one can know how this
[784] punishment will take place, only God will know this . . .
Sometimes a car goes off the road and people will say that it
is the punishment of God. But you never know because the
554 punishment of God comes in the after-life." I asked him:
792 "If this is so, why may the *rajal khair* lie in trying to
627 settle quarrels?" He replied:
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> Lying is bad (*haram*), but this is "the lie of a peace-maker" (*kadhib musaalih*). For instance, if you have a quarrel with Yunis here, then I have words with both of you. I use different words with each of you. I use different words than those which you used in the quarrel--I use good words. This is to bring you two together again. Maybe I see that you are going to kill, or I hear bad words from you; I do not go and tell him what you said.

'Amm Salih said that it is his "duty" to mediate disputes, and that he never hesitates "because God will reward me later." He did not want the quarrels to grow into wars. He also bases his pleas for conciliation upon moral discoure, the method used by the other traditional authorities.[3] 'Amm Salih said that in trying to solve a problem, "I give priority to the elder. I go to the younger man and tell him that he should make peace with the elder because no one cares more for him than his antagonist, and that he really cares more for his antagonist than for any other." The *rajal saalih* mediates but does not arbitrate: he attempts to redress the balance of good relations but does not impose judgements.

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This approach to conflict regulation is not that of the *'aqila* in his formal role, but it is similar to what the *rajal khair* would use. The main procedural difference between the two informal roles (i.e. *rajal khair* and *rajal saalih*) is that, in each case, the *rajal saalih* reads the *Fatiha* with

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[3] The approach which I used in my interviews with 'Amm Salih derives from the work of John Ladd as presented in his book, *The Structure of a Moral Code*, 1957.

554 the disputants. As noted, the rajal saalih shares this right
792 with the 'aqila. The rajal khair does not have recourse
629 to this mechanism which amounts to divine approval of the
*613 binding decision of the "third party." 'Amm Salih in his
779 discussion of the Bedouin moral code corroborated this
point: "Any 'aqila can read the Fatiha. In this way, he
and the two parties involved terminate the quarrel. This is
a way to show that all agree on the settlement. Originally,
only the rajal saalih did this, but now the 'awaaqil do it
in all cases." It would be interesting to know if in Cyrenaica
both roles perform this function or if it belongs only to the
role of rajal salih.

554 I cannot generalize concerning this role for the whole
184 of the Western Desert. Sayyid al-Sanusi and 'Amm Salih seem
629 to be special men. On the other hand, the 'aqila and the
792 rajal khair are roles which we would expect to find all over
*613 the desert, and in Libya also. The 'aqila is the focus of
institutionalized traditional authority structure, and the
rajal khair and "status group" represent the power structure.
554 This attempt to differentiate between authority and power
121 is essentially one which deals with the more general problem
of leadership. Any study of the structure of authority must
have reference to the notion of leadership. Role analysis seems
the best method of dealing with leaders and their functions.
Role analysis together with the conceptualization of institution
as a process is an adequate way of dealing with the tendency

554 toward legitimacy and the phenomenon of change in the
121 political structure. Peters (1967:271-279), in a long awaited discussion of the political aspect of Cyrenaican Bedouin society, adumbrates this problem of differentiating between instituted authority and the distribution of power:

> In order to discuss this adequately, a lengthy diversion into an analysis of the distribution of power would be necessary . . . there are men who wield power over groups of varying populations, and the extent of their domains cannot be understood by reference to orders in the lineage. Perhaps it is for this reason--because, that is to say, lineage theory effectively blocks the exercise--that relatively little has been written about the problem of leadership in these societies (i.e. lineage societies).

554 Foci of power and authority change and at times
178 irrespectively of the lineage structure. The role of the
792 *rajal saalih* was more influential during the days of the
571 Sanusiiya movement than it is today. At that time, "holy
[795] men" controlled economic, and thus political, relations through the *zawiya* system: they were in a position to command respect and obedience and could be considered a "status group" in their own right. Today, "holy men" are rarely found among the members of the "status group." As one informant phrased it: "They used to solve problems more in the past than now. People in the old days were not educated as they are today:
554 the mind of the son is larger than that of the father. In
178 the past, the "holy man" was so important that were he to ask
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554 you for your cloak, you would have immediately given it to
178 [792] him. God was pleased with them at that time."

This notion of changing foci of authority and power cannot be divorced from the related political phenomena of the tendency toward legitimacy and the role institutionalization
128 process. In the next chapter, I will attempt to show how such a conceptual framework can be utilized in an analysis of culture and political change.

Modern Legal Roles

634 554 [648] [177] The roles of 'umda and shaikh were created and imposed upon the Bedouins by Muhammad 'Ali sometime during the early part of the nineteenth century in order to facilitate administration, maintain security in the desert, and protect the Western frontier.

[619] Both of these roles are representative offices at the primary level of the tribal structure. The 'Aishaibat have an 'umda and a shaikh who reside in Marsa Matruh and work in close relation with the Governor. In terms of a chain of command, these offices receive demands which may originate either with the Governor in Matruh or with Bedouins in al-Qasr. But these offices are subservient to both the Governor and the Bedouins since no decision-making powers of any consequence
[571] [635] resides with them. With reference to the two authority structures, the Egyptian and the Bedouin, the 'umda and the

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shaikh are administrators, not executives, in the service of the Governor and the "status group" of al-Qasr. Nevertheless, under the influence of the bureaucratic principle, as a new structural principle in Bedouin society, these offices could conceivably become seats of power.[4]

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The **'umda** and **shaikh** are described as "elective" offices by the Bedouins but, in fact, they are appointive just like the office of **'aqila**. Theoretically, every man has a vote but, actually, only the members of the "status group" vote. Paradoxically, perhaps, the Bedouins stress two major qualifications for these offices: the **'umda** and the **shaikh** must be men "who know the needs of the Bedouin of the desert, and know how to talk to the Governor"; and, "they must be men who do nothing without the permission of the **'awaaqil** (i.e. without the permission of the "status group" who elected the **'aqila** in the first place).

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The two offices are not equal in prestige and status neither in the eyes of the Bedouins or of the Egyptians. The office of **shaikh** is the lesser office. It amounts to a clerical post, and the **shaikh** really functions as an assistant

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[4] The Governor, who is of Bedouin origin, has already recognized this potential and has moved to eliminate the possibility of a more powerful **'umda** representing a more powerful "status group." When I left the field, the Governor was in the process of drawing up new ground rules for electing the **'umda** and the **shaikh** which would call for public elections on a "one man, one vote" basis.

634 to the *'umda*. Both offices are for a life-term, only being
•554 terminated by bad behavior or senility. At the expiration
634 of an incumbent's term, the "status group" meets in al-Qasr
571 to decide upon his replacement. The name of a "nominee"
635 is passed on to the Governor who is expected to approve the
666 Bedouins' selection of a representative to the government.
It is this "status group"-controlled process which the
[178] Governor seeks to change. Since these are officially held
[177] offices in the U.A.R. governmental structure, he feels that
elections to fill their vacancies should be a public affair.
Naturally, he will exercise more influence over the naming
of candidates in this way, and the Bedouins perceive this as
a challenge to the traditional structure of leadership and
control of external relations.

634 The offices of *'umda* and *shaikh* are even more heredi-
*613 tary than that of *'aqila*, which theoretically should not be
666 the case. By definition, the role of *'aqila* is functional at
[428] the *bait* level, and so the recruitment pool of candidates
for this office is inherently limited. By comparison, the
offices of *'umda* and *shaikh* should go to the "best men" in
the tribe, and, therefore, the recruitment pool should be
634 tribal-wide. But, in fact, these two offices are considered
*613 "the property" of the wealthiest lineages in the al-Qasr area.
666 There is a traditional rationale behind this fact: there is
428 the structural necessity for, and conscious practice of, an
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> 124 If the office left the family,
> *613 all of the lineages would be fighting over it . . . The
> 634 job should stay in Bait Bu Taram; if this is impossible,
> 571 then it should stay in 'Ailit Lazumi. In any case, the
> 666 _'awaaqil_ will decide.

578 A change in the present locus of legal authority in
634 the Bedouin-Egyptian government structural relationship
178 would amount to a re-structuring process, and could lead to
121 serious conflict. In the very least, it would call for a clear explanation and new statement of social reality since it would challenge what is, and "has always been," a legitimate distribution of power and political order.

634 The office of the _shaikh_ is not a potential power-
•554 base by comparison with the office of _'umda_. The _shaikh_, rather than being in direct communication with the Governor, executes the official orders made known to the _'umda._ As an administrator, he takes care of issuing drivers' licenses, notifies men of their military draft status, etc. The government sees this as a necessary post because of the difficulty of contacting Bedouins deep in the desert. In one sense, the _shaikh's_ office is becoming less functional as the Bedouin move in from the desert and begin to take part in the national society, but in another sense it is becoming more functional as bureaucracy and red tape become increasingly complex. But the _shaikh_ remains in the shadow of the _'umda_. He never substitutes for the _'umda,_ for this would infringe on the rightful power of the _'umda's_ family; when the _'umda_ is absent,

634 his brother sits in his place.

•554 The present *shaikh* is a member of 'Ailit Ma'fas, and
634 this is to offset the fact that the office of *'umda* is in
*613 'Ailit Lazumi. It reflects the need to distribute official
554 power and to symbolize the real power structure. Historically,
the Lazumi were more powerful than the Ma'fas. These two
lineages are the largest, wealthiest, and most influential
in al-Qasr and among the 'Aishaibat. When the present
[666] *shaikh's* father decided to retire due to old age, he requested
[571] that his son be allowed to take up his role. The *'awaaqil*
of the 'Aishaibat in al-Qasr approved this "nomination" and
[556] the son was "elected." It is a fact that the *shaikh's* father
is the richest man among the members of the 'Ailit Ma'fas
and that the *'umda's* father was the richest man of 'Ailit
Lazumi.

571 Power groups tend to interact so as to enhance not
*613 the official authority structure but the political *status quo*
582 (Peters 1967:279). This explains a practice of the "status
group" which Max Weber referred to as "connubism," the tendency
of the members of this group to exchange women among themselves.
*613 In Figure 10,[1] the marriages of 'Ait Abd al-Malik of Bait 'Umar
582 of 'Ailit Ma'fas show that out of seventeen marriages only
four of these were within the 'Aishaibat, and that three out
of four of these marriages were with 'Ailit Lazumi. Even
more impressive is the information obtained from considering

[1] [See p. 132--Analyst]

*613 582 all of the marriages in the history of 'Ailit Ma'fas (see Table 1).[1] From a total of 197 marriages, 33 were within the 'Aishaibat tribe. Of these 33 marriages with the other lineages of al-Qasr (see Figure 3 for the lineages of al-Qasr), 2 were with 'Ailit Abu Qarasa, and 2 with 'Ailit Zallat, 4 each were with 'Ailit Zagharat, 'Ailit Dawlat, and 'Ailit Shraif, but 17, or just over 50 per cent, were with 'Ailit Lazumi.

634 •554 For the time being, the offices of 'umda and shaikh seem to be modern symbols of the traditional power structure rather than loci of real power, though this does not preclude their becoming so in the future. But for the present, these roles are considered "not of the people, not of the desert, they belong to the government." Here is the way one 'aqila explained it: 634 554 *613

> 634 635 *613 554 The 'umda is higher in the government but the 'aqila is the responsible one in the 'aiela. The shaikh has nothing to do with 'awaqil, he only makes contact between them and the government . . . The 'umda gets the request from the government and asks the 'awaqil to handle the situation, but he does not tell them how to do it . . . The 'umda and shaikh go to meetings with the Governor, then they tell the 'awaqil about the matters discussed. There is no direct contact between the Governor and the 'awaqil . . . The 'umda comes to the 'awaqil concerning general problems . . . If the Arabs need something from the government, they go to the 'umda. They tell him to go and tell the Governor what they want . . . The 'umda represents them and he does good in this. God only knows if he is doing a good job. If he is not it will show in the next election.

634 554 From the standpoint of the political system of al-Qasr, we might conclude that the 'umda and shaikh are roles

[1] [This should read Table 5. See p.115--Analyst]

634 554 of little significance in the authority structure. Very few people of the al-Qasr area have had any contact with these officers, and very few want any contact. 634 554 178 On the other hand, the direction of change in al-Qasr and the bureaucratic growth of the government in the Western Desert makes it likely that all Bedouins will be drawn into the total authority structure, and that the roles of 'umda and shaikh will expand. These roles will not increase in terms of traditional prestige and status, but they may gain the authority which they do not possess now. This is in view of the fact that the traditional authority structure remains relatively intact. The 'umda and the shaikh have no traditional basis of authority, so they cannot make decisions which are morally binding for Bedouins of al-Qasr at this time. 634 635 554 178 It is obvious, of course, that the 'umda may refer to the Governor, and even the use of governmental force, as the basis of his legitimacy. But this has never happened. The incumbent 'umda is still a Bedouin, and this prevents him from challenging the traditional ways. Also, the Governor is concerned with restricting the 'umda's influence not increasing it.

634 613 178 578 I do not mean to imply that there is, or will be, a struggle for power between traditional authority represented by the 'aqila and modern legal authority represented by the 'umda. Such a struggle could not actually occur since when, and if, the 'umda came to represent authority in a newly

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*613 structured situation the traditional authority structure
178 578 would have disappeared from the scene.

178 But, there is a struggle for authority recognition
•554 going on in al-Qasr. It is related to the change from the
627 old basis of traditional authority to a new basis of legal authority. At the heart of this struggle is the role of the rajal khair. The rajal khair has a firm public basis for establishing himself in an authoritative and representative role. Traditionally, the rajal khair has faced inward and outward: he has used his ascribed position on the al-Qasr prestige scale to augment his status and influence, and, at the same time, his economic rationality has oriented him
[648] toward Marsa Matruh. In the present stage of culture change, the rajal khair is in a position to combine his ascribed and achieved attributes to gain entrance to a new reference group, the Egyptian bureaucracy. This offers him a new kind of prestige as well as affording him new opportunities for power, and even authority, over his fellow Bedouins.

The rajal khair, in view of his movement between the old and new in Egypt, maintains a tertium quid status in two camps. While he has one foot in the traditional community because of his role in conflict regulation and the manipulation of traditional values, the rajal khair also has a foot in the

178 modern camp. He has been able to enter into dialogue with
•554 modernizing agents because his intra-tribal "status honor"
627 renders him public recognition at the institutional level,
and because his worldly style of life allows him to, in part,
identify with a modern reference group.

554 The *'aqila* and the *'umda* might be seen as the two
178 extremes of a temporary and emerging authority structure for
634 the Bedouin of al-Qasr: the traditional authority bound to
*613 the old moral order, and the modern legal authority identified
wholly with an, as of yet, outside political and moral order.
[627] Ideally, it seems that only the *rajal khair*, who is neither an
'aqila nor an *'umda*, is in the structural and ideological
position to assume leadership and to guide the Bedouins during
this period of culture change.

121 and political connections," with nation-oriented persons who operate at a national socio-cultural level of integration (1956:1075-1076).

Clifford Geertz (1960) has also examined the role of a "cultural broker" in Indonesia as an instance of "a vigorous, imaginative regional leadership, able to play a cultural middleman role between peasant and metropolitan life, and so create an effective juncture between traditional cultural patterns and modern ones" (1960:229). In the case of the Mexican "broker" described by Wolf, the major means of consolidating and obtaining power both at the regional and the national levels were through political channels. In the case of the Indonesian "broker," both religious and political channels are the means by which the local Muslim teacher, or _kijaji_, has obtained power: traditionally, he was a specialist in communication of Islam to the countryside, and today he has taken on the role of local party leader (Geertz 1960:230).

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In al-Qasr, the _rajal khair_ seems to be the Bedouin counterpart of the Mexican and Indonesian "broker." With a firm economic base in the local community, and with his ability to adopt new patterns of public behavior, i.e., "he knows how to speak to the Governor and public officials," the role of _rajal khair_ provides the means for one to move upwards through political channels (Wolf 1956:1071). Within the context of a newly emerging authority system based upon the

121 structural principle of bureaucracy, the *rajal khair* lacking
554 legitimacy in the traditional lineage-based system may en-
627 visage an authoritative role and increased chances to "improve
557 his status through the judicious manipulation of social ties."

121 Leadership studies in the context of cultural change,
554 such as those which deal with "broker" types, have important
178 implications for a more general and fundamental theoretical
problem: the role of the individual in culture and society. Radin, as early as 1927, Redfield (1960), Geertz (1960), Fallers (1964), and Mead (1964) have spoken of "primitive philosophers," "the hinge group," "the cultural brokers," "the new men," and "the evolutionary clusters." All terms have direct reference to role types constructed from the observation of individuals possessed of the ability and creativity to offer new ideas and methods of dealing with the pressing cultural problems of their times. The unitary goal of all these researchers was to understand culture change through a focus on the way in which the individual manipulates his cultural resources.

121 I would maintain that, especially in political analysis,
the approach and focus of the researcher is directly related to his ontologic position concerning the concepts of culture and human nature. That is to say, whether or not the researcher believes that "man has no choice in life, that culture determines his behavior," then he will or will not find it relevant

121 tradition" and "the little tradition." The "little tradition" refers to peasant or folk culture, and the "great tradition" to a specialized and systematized body of thought which is, in most cases, esoteric, written, related to religion, and the property of an intellectual group (1960:40-59; 1962:302). Of course, Redfield's notion of a "literati" does not apply in the Bedouin case. But in an earlier work (1953:44) Redfield drew attention to the more general concept of "intelligentsia" which further refines the scope and types of leadership. Redfield refers to "the member of the intelligentsia . . . (who) belongs to two worlds, not one; he is a marginal man." He then goes on to differentiate between the "literati" type and the "intelligentsia" type, stating that the former type uses literacy to carry on the sacred tradition while the member of the "intelligentsia" may use literacy "to admit
121 the ways of the world outside." While the rajal khair does
554 not become the representative of the great and sacred tradition
627 of Islam, he does utilize the bureaucratic means at hand to
177 admit the outside world into al-Qasr. The rajal khair may be
[571] considered a member of an "intelligentsia."

121 Gustave von Grunebaum (1962) has used Redfield's model of cultural dynamics to understand change and social mobility in the Arab World with special reference to Egypt. The author, an Islamicist, states that the "great tradition" of orthodox Islam in contrast to popular Islam is recognized as "the more

121 the values of a non-membership group in order to "find readier
177 acceptance by that group and make an earlier adjustment to
571 it" (Merton 1957:265). In a relatively closed society such as
181 al-Qasr, when those who qualify for membership in other
reference groups are able to do more than merely aspire, when
they actually anticipate and adjust their behavior to a type
of status consciously desired, the local authority and social
structures are likely to be transformed.

121 We can generalize from the literature on social
571 stratification that the hierarchial structure characteristic
•554 of traditional societies carries with it a relationship of
mutual obligation. The "inferior" owes rent, respect, loyalty,
obedience, etc., while the "superior" owes, in return, protection, advice, help in emergency, action in conflict regulation, representation in extralocal matters, etc. (Hagen 1962:
121 55-86; Parsons 1953: 108). In al-Qasr, the *'aqila* fulfills
554 only one of the functions of the "superior," that which deals
*[613] with conflict regulation. The *rajal khair* role, as I have
[627] developed it, may function in full capacity as a "superior."
121 The *rajal khair* dominates the internal system through power
554 derived from rank on the prestige scale: he is prominent in
627 the external system as member and representative of a new
power structure based on national and political consciousness.
Traditionally, *rajal khair*-dominance was not by force but
through influence and prestige: in the new situation, with a

121 fully organized government behind the role, the element of
•554 force may enter into the *rajal khair* style of domination.
627 Thus far, the *'umda* and the *shaikh* roles have functioned
[634] through the traditional roles of the *'aqila* and the *rajal*
*[613] *khair*, that is, the "status group." In the future, this pattern
[178] may change. It is also possible that new roles will emerge. This is what I wish to explore.

121 The "status group" of al-Qasr operating with a sense
571 of identity with a modern reference group deem themselves
554 responsible for making decisions on the behalf of "the people"
[177] or "the Bedouin." Members of the "status group" would occasionally dress in Western clothes; they would hunt gazelle for sport; they owned the few autos there were in the area; and a few partook of alcoholic beverages. Their rights and obligations in social relations are still relatively stable and depend on the ascribed values of al-Qasr Bedouin society, but one can detect the start of a power struggle within the group. It is a competitive desire for social mobility and is stated in terms of the achieved attributes considered important by the reference group to which they aspire, the Egyptian society. For example, one sometimes heard the complaint from various members of the "status group" that the Governor was not giving proper recognition to those "who understood the ways of the Bedouin," and "those who could speak for the Bedouin."

121 554 571 156 My approach here is to state the problem of authority and change using a case study of one man whom I consider the most prestigious member of the "status group" of al-Qasr. He is a member of the "status group" by virtue of his wealth and family connections; he has reinforced and enhanced his "status honor" by the practice of intervening into various conflict situations and mustering support, favors, and loyalty as he goes; and he has proved his "superiority" by excelling in the outside business world. All this he has done while remaining a "good Bedouin."

124 554 156 The name of Hajj 'Ali appeared time and time again as my research progressed and increasingly concentrated on the authority structure.[2] I asked questions which required the informants to name a person in al-Qasr to whom he would go if he needed help, money or advice. I asked: "Who is the leader of the Bedouin?";"Who knows the wants and needs of the [571] Bedouin most intimately?" On the basis of the data collected in this manner, I was able to perceive a "status group" and gain an idea of the real leaders of al-Qasr. It also gave me a working knowledge of the local role structure. Hajj 'Ali's name came up with the highest frequency in the questionnaires, and my observations and interviews with him corroborated his central place in the authority structure. [126] I also recorded the life history of Hajj 'Ali's son, and gained valuable insights from this data.

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[2] The name, Hajj 'Ali, is of course a pseudonym.

156 I know that Hajj 'Ali consciously and actively seeks
554 to be a leader among the Bedouin, that he seeks a place in
121 the new governmental structure in Marsa Matruh, and hence that he desires power, however benevolent his intentions may be. In what follows, I hope to bring this out by presenting Hajj 'Ali as himself and as a "cultural broker."

When I say that Hajj 'Ali desires power I mean nothing derogatory. Power-seeking is a kind of social phenomenon which characterizes man-in-society around the world: the quest occurs in primitive and modern groups, and university structures alike (Moore 1958:1-30). Hajj 'Ali's desire for power, and also authority, has not wrought change in the whole structure of the al-Qasr social system. As we shall see, Hajj 'Ali is discontent with the present structure of al-Qasr and feels that the Bedouins must accept change. His discontent is related to the changing conditions in and about al-Qasr; the chance to express it or re-channel it, at this time, derives from his ascribed place in the al-Qasr system. Whether his desire for power is a result or a cause of his discontent I cannot tell. Only a personality study in depth could answer this question.

In terms of this study, one way to look at Hajj 'Ali's case is to view it as his attempt to convert power in the internal system into authority in the external system. But in this context "external" refers to the national level rather

156 than the Awlad 'Ali societal level. In the traditional
•554 system, his influence and power have been informal, and,
121 although this has been advantageous over against the formal
role of _'aqila_, his political activity was ultimately limited
by this structural differentiation and definition of authority.
[177] In gaining access to the bureaucratic structure of Egyptian
officialdom with its firm allocation of rights and duties,
Hajj 'Ali could operate as an authority within the total authority
structure which has reference to both the internal and external
political relational systems of al-Qasr.

Practical Application

*613 In al-Qasr, the two most influential and powerful
lineages, 'Ailit Lazumi and 'Ailit Ma'fas, each have a
[634] "most powerful _bait_." We have noted that in 'Ailit Lazumi
it is Bait Bu Taram which controls the office of _'umda_: in
*613 'Ailit Ma'fas it is Bait 'Umar which has Hajj 'Ali. Hajj 'Ali
159 is fifty three years old. He has married five times, divorced
581 one wife, and at present has four wives. Whatever his motives
156 for these marriages, at least some of them have obviously
[595] been made as economic and political moves. A check on his
wives' tribal origins will show this. In each case, Hajj
'Ali's wife is from a lineage which holds land contiguous to
his own property in the _'izba_ sector of al-Qasr. The one
exception to this is a marriage contracted to establish ties

*613 with Bait Bu Taram of 'Ailit Lazumi. These marriages and
159 581 their resultant alliances enhance the political power and
156 social status of Hajj 'Ali within and without al-Qasr.

Although he has no education himself, and neither reads
159 156 nor writes, Hajj 'Ali has sent his son to the University of
873 Alexandria. Hajj 'Ali's son is the only boy from al-Qasr
[212] ever to attend the university. Hajj 'Ali desired that his son study law at the university or enter the military academy "and become an officer." But his son objected to this, saying: "Either way I will be employed by the government and will not be permitted to travel and see other countries." Hajj 'Ali did not argue with this: he said that his son should study what he wished. The son is now studying in the Faculty of Commerce
156 at Alexandria. Hajj 'Ali is also sending his daughters to
159 872 the primary school in al-Qasr. Not all of the Bedouins believe
562 that girls should receive an education.

156 Hajj 'Ali places among the "status group" in terms
159 of wealth. Although he has now committed himself to olive-
•554 farming as a way of life, he remains one of the biggest sheep
472 owners in al-Qasr. Therefore, he is identified with both traditional and modern symbols of status. Hajj 'Ali differs in
156 159 one important way from other members of the "status group"
554 in that he owns three small general stores, two in al-Qasr
443 and one far to the west in Sallum. This fact has several
423 472 significant implications. Shops in al-Qasr (there are five
*[613]

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156 of them) cater largely to the needs of the lineage in whose
159 territory they are located. They are operated mostly on a
554 443 credit basis. Lineage members, as debtors, feel gratitude
423 but also, and more importantly, loyalty toward their kinsman
472 *[613] and creditor. Hajj 'Ali is the only member of al-Qasr who
[452] owns two shops, and the only Bedouin in the whole Western Desert
who owns three shops. His brother owns a shop in Matruh.
156 Furthermore, the shop in Sallum is in a strategic position on
159 the Libyan border which, coincidentally or not, is a point
554 443 for importing, and also smuggling, foreign goods into Egypt.
439 The possession and utilization of foreign products is definitely
472 a status symbol all over Egypt. Hence, the person in this
area who can control, however slightly, the distribution of
such goods has a lever with which to exact prestige and
favors from the "status group" in al-Qasr who now welcome
these symbols (tobacco, pistols, rifles, radios) and the
bureaucrats of Marsa Matruh who crave them (food goods,
clothing materials, car parts).

156 Besides all this, Hajj 'Ali is involved in a small
159 stone-cutting operation which supplies stones for house
554 [316] building, he cooperates with his three brothers in a well-
[312] cleaning concern, and contracts government heavy equipment
[427] to build earth dams. The material evidence of his status
[342] is that he is the only man in al-Qasr with two compound-type
[595] houses (one he built thirteen years ago), and the only man
with four wives.

156 with four wives. It is not hard to understand why the people
159 of al-Qasr consider Hajj 'Ali a rajal khair par excellence.
•554 For instance, when I asked one man if he could give me some
627 examples of court cases, he replied: "The one who is not an
124 'aqila pays no attention to anything save getting food for
his children. The rajal khair has money and men (a reference
to the "old days" when a person needed cohorts for battle),
and so he always pays instead of us. He lends us money and
helps us in doing anything, like Hajj 'Ali does." In another
124 interview, one man showed great respect for Hajj 'Ali's tradi-
156 159 tional status and modern ability to deal with the outside
554 world by giving him the honorific title of "shaikh," and
439 showing that the Bedouins of al-Qasr put their trust in him:
472 "When the olive merchants come from Alexandria, they go to
245 Shaikh 'Ali, someone who knows about olives. They ask him
what kind of olives al-Qasr has. He shows the merchants, and
they say: 'I will give you so much for them.' They make an
agreement, and Hajj 'Ali collects the olives and gets the
price for them."

156 In terms of local politics, I would guess, but do
159 554 not have data to prove, that Hajj 'Ali was the third party
[627] most frequently referred to in seeking a termination of
[114] conflict. He was commonly asked to participate in these
matters not only by the disputants themselves but also by
the 'aqila or other third party presiding. He was sometimes

156 He was sometimes
159 asked to sit-in as a witness for important contractual
•554 matters. Note that in the rawaabit al-'awaaqil of Bait
675 Shafaila of 'Ailit Lazumi (presented in Chapter Four),
Hajj 'Ali who is neither from 'Ailit Lazumi nor an 'aqila
was present to sign and validate this document.

156 Hajj 'Ali, then, operates in the micropolitical
159 system and the traditional authority structure of al-Qasr.
554 But what is just as important, he has secured a firm foothold in the modern bureaucratic structure of the near-by
town. He straddles both camps. The Governor of Marsa Matruh
635 was an important aid to my understanding of Hajj 'Ali's
634 role as "broker." The Governor claimed that the British
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159 first introduced the roles of 'umda and shaikh; they did this
554 to "control the Bedouin" and to "get the men out of the tents."
124 He explained in his own way what he considered to be the
[648] structural differentiation of political roles in al-Qasr.

> Let me tell you, these fellows are very clever. They have an 'umda . . . he comes to my office and says: "I want this and this." I say, "No." Then he goes back to the 'awaqil and tells them that, and then these fellows begin to think in what way they can get what they want. But the 'umda is nothing; it is the
> *[613] 'aqila whom the Bedouins listen to and love . . . The 'umda is elected (at this time) by the Bedouins. They put forward a man who hesitates, one who can say yes or no . . . But there is a real leader for the people, this is a man such as Hajj 'Ali, here is a man the Bedouins love.

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635 The Governor said that Hajj 'Ali speaks well and
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159 thinks well. Twice in the interview the Governor said that
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*[613]

124 635 Hajj 'Ali "became an _'aqila_ by his way of life." Of course,
156 159 the fact is that Hajj 'Ali is not an _'aqila_ at all. Although
•554 I feel that the Governor should understand the Bedouin authority
*[613] structure, he is not alone in his misconceptions. The chief
156 agricultural engineer for the G.D.D.O., who works very closely
159 with the Bedouins of al-Qasr, also thought that Hajj 'Ali
554 was the _'aqila_ of Bait 'Umar in 'Ailit Ma'fas. Furthermore,
*613 and most impressive of all, one _'aqila_ in 'Ailit Dawlat and
his four sons all thought that Hajj 'Ali was the _'aqila_ of Bait 'Umar. There is more here than just ignorance of Bedouin society on the part of officials, and disinterest on the part of the Dawlat _'aqila_. There is good reason for these different parties to mistake Hajj 'Ali as a key traditional "authority," or spokesman for his corporate group. It seems clear that in their respective dealings they must have encountered Hajj 'Ali in some kind of representative capacity. The _'aqila_ who insisted that Hajj 'Ali was an _'aqila_, even after I pointed out that he was not, lived outside the _'izba_ sector and hence mistook an important _rajal khair_ for an _'aqila_. The Governor understandably mistook the most influential man in al-Qasr as an _'aqila_.

635 There are other traits which qualify Hajj 'Ali as
648 the singular leader of the Bedouins. A few years back, the
[554] [156] Governor of Marsa Matruh formed a Governor's Council
[159] (_Majlis al-Muhafza_) made up of representatives of the Bedouin

635 [648] population of the whole Western Desert, and representatives of the Egyptian government employees working in the province. [634] The Bedouin representatives appointed to this council need not be an 'umda or a shaikh, although they may be. The oldest Bedouin member of the council, who happens to be an 'umda, told me that "the Governor picks the men who he feels understand the problems of the people."

635 124 *613 The Governor himself thinks that every Bedouin on his council is an 'aqila. He replied to my question about the criteria for membership on the Majlis al-Muḥafza: "I am using a new selection system. Rather than choose the 'umda or shaikh, I choose the 'aqila. Every man on the council is an 'aqila, and the number is determined by the population of the area . . . But I appoint more men from the [619] 'Ali Ahmar (see Figures 3 and 7)[1] than from other tribes. This is because they are more numerous, and they are near Matruh where I am able to contact them immediately. The 'Ali Ahmar are represented by six men and the other tribes by just three men."

156 159 •554 635 648 [114] Hajj 'Ali is one of these six men and the only member of the Council who resides in al-Qasr. I attended and observed the December meeting of the Council. The Governor sat at the head of a long table with the Egyptian representatives on either side of him. At the other end of the table sat the Bedouin representatives, Hajj 'Ali among them. Purely

[1] [See pp. 65 & 77 respectively--Analyst]

156 administrative business took up most of the time at the
159 meeting, and only the Governor and the Egyptians took part
•554 in the discussion. At the conclusion of the meeting, the
635 Governor asked if any present had comments to make. Hajj
648 [871] 'Ali rose, and delivered a formal and well-prepared speech
[537] on the inadequacies of the educational facilities in Matruh.
He noted that the Governor had promised the Bedouins that if
they sent their sons in from the desert for secondary schooling,
their material needs would be taken care of, but that in fact
the Governor had not kept his promise for there was not enough
space and beds for the boys. The Governor apologized for this
condition and said he was trying to correct it. I noted that
a few Egyptians found something amusing about this incident,
but that all of the Bedouins present were serious and nodded
in agreement with the points made by Hajj 'Ali.

156 We should note that Hajj 'Ali was the only Bedouin to
159 speak up at the meeting, that he spoke in the formal, tradi-
554 tional manner, and that he showed concern for the real problems
635 of the Bedouins. Hajj 'Ali is careful to protect his identity
as a Bedouin, and in this he differs from the 'umda and
most of the "status group."

121 In situations of induced change, the cultural problems
156 involved differ in their conception and immediacy as defined
159 by the agents and the recipients of change. Hajj 'Ali, who
554 177 is both an agent and a recipient of change, is intimate with
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121 156 159 554 635 177

the problems of the Bedouins of al-Qasr. He knows how to phrase them, and his place on the Majlis al-Muhafza gives him the right and the opportunity to air them. This is the role of the "cultural broker." Before the meeting of the council, Hajj 'Ali had gathered a group of the men from al-Qasr and they had talked about which demands should be presented to the Governor. This is purely a political process which Hajj 'Ali manipulates. The formulation and presentation [648] of demands became, in the hands of Hajj 'Ali, "inputs" into the Egyptian political system with the hope that they will materialize as "outputs" and the satisfaction of needs - to use the terminology of David Easton's "systems analysis" (1965b).

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On another occasion, Hajj 'Ali demonstrated his status and political leadership and the fact that he has assumed the position of spokesman for the Bedouin of al-Qasr during this period of change. Once each year the Governor makes a tour of al-Qasr to inspect the school, the cooperative building, the government experimental farm, and the area in general. After the inspection tour, he holds a reception in a ceremonial tent set up for the occasion. At this time, he states his evaluations and opinions, distributes some clothing material to the poorer families of the area, and asks for suggestions from the Bedouins who sit on the ground before the tent. The only suggestion forthcoming from the Bedouins was

156 by the secretary of the cooperative society who requested
159 that the government furnish bus service between Matruh and
554 al-Qasr. The Governor thought this a good idea and said he
635 would inquire into the matter.
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156 As the Governor suggested that the meeting be adjourned,
159 Hajj 'Ali stood up, faced the Governor and began another of
554 his formal speeches in the rich tradition of Arabic; it was
635 the best Arabic I had heard spoken in the desert. This speech
177 was for the benefit of all present, Bedouins and officials
537 alike. Hajj 'Ali made no requests but simply thanked the
Governor for honoring al-Qasr with his presence. In this
short well-prepared tribute, he said:

> We feel the efforts of the government and we can scarcely imagine or dream of this development. For instance, we were living in tents and now only five per cent remain in tents while the remainder are in houses. We were dressed simply, but now we are dressed in poplin material. Those who could afford one set of clothes now can afford two. Thanks be to God, all this is due to Jamal Abd al-Nasser.

156 It is significant, of course, that smiles once again
159 played on the faces of the Governor's entourage and nothing
554 but admiration on the faces of the Bedouins. As Hajj 'Ali
635 spoke he did not face the Governor directly but turned aside,
537 speaking both to him and the Bedouins--Hajj 'Ali, the Bedouin,
had been sitting on the ground before the Governor. The
[634] _'umda_ and _shaikh_ had accompanied the Governor on his tour

156 159 and they sat on chairs inside the tent. I returned to
554 Marsa Matruh in the 'umda's car (1964 Ford, highly polished)
635 537 with the 'umda and the shaikh. They openly joked about Hajj
[634] 'Ali and his manner of presentation; they repeated some of
[122] his "stilted" phrases and laughed. Hajj 'Ali gave last year's
[522] reception speech also. This is because, his son says, Hajj
'Ali is considered a fine speaker by the Bedouins of al-Qasr.

121 We can see how these details carry larger implications
177 within the context of political and social structures under-
178 going change. It is the stuff which the anthropologist finds
important for an understanding of the process of change.

156 If I have established thus far that Hajj 'Ali is
159 politically active and representative in both the traditional
554 and the modern systems, then the attempt is now to prove that
177 he consciously seeks to change the traditional in the direction
178 of the modern for political and moral reasons, and for social
and personal reasons.

156 Hajj 'Ali, when he spoke with me, inevitably came
159 around to the subject of international politics, whether this
554 was the question of Israel or the image which America's racial
177 problems presented. Hajj 'Ali was the only man from the whole
178 Marsa Matruh area who was neither shaikh nor 'umda to attend
124 829 the nomination of Jamal Abd al-Nasser in January of 1965. In
[571] all of this, I detect a move on the part of Hajj 'Ali to
identify himself with an Egyptian reference group and to

156 159 draw al-Qasr into the Egyptian political community. He has
554 committed himself to work-hand-in-hand with the Governor of
177 Marsa Matruh in introducing changes connected with economics
178 124 and education into al-Qasr. He does not conceal this fact.
829 When I spoke with him about helping me with my study of
[571] changing attitudes in al-Qasr, he said: "I might have the
time to do this, but before I decide you will have to bring
me a letter from the Governor stating that he wishes me to
cooperate with you." The identity and responsibility which
Hajj 'Ali feels for his role of agent of change is indicated
in his remark to me that he had heard "there were others in
the desert who feel and think the way I myself do."

156 Hajj 'Ali is discretely aware of the status difference
159 between himself, as a member of the "status group," and the
554 others of al-Qasr. As Weber would say, he perceives the
571 difference in "style of life." I was invited to Hajj 'Ali's
574 796 house for 'iid al-fitr, the feast marking the end of Ramadan.
123 I thought that this would be a good opportunity to observe
the "leaders" of al-Qasr together. I was very much surprised
to find present no members of the "status group" but only
[556] their exact opposites. On the occasion of this feast it is
[735] the custom that the rich treat the poor. As an additional
surprise, we had a very simple meal of bread, dates, peanuts,
and tea. Hajj 'Ali explained to me: "My neighbors do not
have my economic advantages, and I do not think it is proper

156 159 to serve other than what they eat." Hajj 'Ali is not only
554 conscious of social stratification in his society, but he also
571 has a great deal of empathy with the less endowed, a pre-
574 requisite of a traditional Bedouin leader and an advantageous
796 123 one for a modern leader.

He is aware of most traditional institutions and how
156 they relate to conditions of modernity. Hajj 'Ali, whose own
159 marriages speak for his political acumen, sees only disadvantages
554 829 in the cousin-right marriage custom of the Bedouins. His
582 interest in getting on with the business of change, so to
speak, has led him to question a basic right contained in the
Bedouin principle of lineage structure and corporate membership.

> A thing which I do not like about our customs is the idea that a man has a right to his uncle's daughter. The man binds his cousin and in the end he might not marry her and will be the cause of her never marrying. He gives himself the authority to decide whom she may or may not marry. If he knows she desires to marry a certain man, he says: "She can marry anyone but not that one."

[562] Here he challenges the traditional right of the individual
male in Bedouin society, favoring the rights of the female.
[177] The emancipation of the female, especially in rights and
[178] duties concerned with the marriage contract, is an element
[562] of the modernization process in Egyptian society and the
Middle East in general.

*613 The *bait*, as a political group, is in part structurally
602 defined by the corporate principle which states that blood-kin
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at this lineage level must bear collective responsibility in matters of compensation and blood-revenge. This principle, as we have seen, is extended until the whole *'aiela* is included in a symbolic expression of corporate group solidarity. In order for this expression to persist, of course, the mechanism, or ideology, of blood-revenge must be maintained. [124] All of my informants, though they disagreed over the details of revenge, insisted that it was the inviolable right of the
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Arabs. But Hajj 'Ali took exception to the practice of blood-revenge for a number of reasons. He said:

> The world changes. Before it was only the *'awaiyid Awlad 'Ali* and the Border Guards which kept order. The government now enters into the matter of killings. Personally, I do not agree with the custom and the way it operates. In the case of killing, for instance, someone who is not worth anything, and has no brains, kills one from another tribe. Then the tribe of the [778] killer asks for the *nazaala*, and a third party becomes involved. The third party agrees to guard the killer's *bait* for twelve months and the business of all those involved must stop. A member of the third party's family must accompany each member of the killer's tribe. But even after the twelve months one must live in fear at his own home, for after the twelve months the tribe of the deceased will try to kill the best man in the killer's tribe. How many good ones do we have in one tribe? I have heard that in Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia the deceased man's family has the right to kill the killer only . . . (I then commented that perhaps blood-revenge functions to discourage killing in the desert.) But there are unbalanced people who actually commit murder just to tease their tribe: they have nothing to fear because no one is interested in killing them in retaliation.

In challenging the Arabs' traditional right to blood-revenge, Hajj 'Ali--besides questioning a structural basis of

156 the group--in effect questions a great deal about the whole
159 traditional authority structure. Blood-revenge functions as
• 554 a deterrent to social disorder in that it represents an
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682 automatic mechanism for restoring a balance of good relations
[182] in the society. Actually, Hajj 'Ali exaggerated to make a point when he spoke of the existence of "unbalanced people."
682 A person would indeed be "unbalanced" who did not take into
672 consideration the repercussions of his acts with respect to
*613 the personal danger and the dishonor and shame it would bring to his _'aiela_ and _bait_. Although the _'aiela_ members are willing to share in the blood money for accidental or unpremeditated killings, it is wrong to suppose that the Bedouins do not attempt to weigh the justifiability and culpability
[671] in matters of killing. The very existence of the _'awaiyid Awlad 'Ali_ argues against this. Obviously, the dichotomy made between killing in the _'awaiyid_, i.e., intentional and accidental, and the concomitant gradation in compensation points to some kind of reasonable consideration in cases of killing.

156 Hajj 'Ali is discontent with yet another aspect of
159 the traditional authority structure. He questions the logic
554 and authority represented in the oath as a sacred sanction.
695 This says something about the degree of secularization which
829 Hajj 'Ali has undergone. Although he does not say so, he apparently favors a more secular and logical procedure for determining a man's guilt or innocence.

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> Another thing which I do not like about our old ways is the idea of swearing the oath. For instance, if I steal 1,000 L.E. from you, then you will accuse me. The 'aqila will then come to me and say: "If you did not steal the money, swear the oath." Some of my family will support me in this, swearing that I did not steal the money. The swearing of the oath will take place at a tomb, in the presence of the Quran. This tomb belongs to a dead man, and they tell you that he is a saint. First of all, the thief will swear the oath and then they will believe him; and, secondly, what is the sense of swearing in front of a dead body?

[784] Hajj 'Ali made no mention of God or of the Bedouin belief that misfortune will be visited upon the one who swears the oath in bad faith. There is an Arabic proverb which Hajj 'Ali repeated here which says in effect that "the thief will always swear."

156 159 554 829 178 Hajj 'Ali actively challenges the traditional basis of the Bedouin moral and political community. Striving to do away with prescribed cousin-right in marriage and the mechanisms of blood-revenge and the oath as means of supporting law and order in al-Qasr is a course which we might expect from an Egyptian official who seeks to integrate the Bedouins into national society. And, in fact, these are all customs which the Governor believes must eventually be eradicated. It is not surprising that Hajj 'Ali's son believes that "it is not civilized" to lay claim to his cousin for, like his father, he also is redefining morality vis a vis "civilization."

It appears obvious in all that he says, including his comments at the Governor's reception, that Hajj 'Ali has

156 undertaken to transform his rajal khair role into an authority
159 which transcends the bounds of the local community. During
554 my talks with him, he never once insinuated that the people
829 of al-Qasr, nor even the 'Aishaibat or 'Ali Ahmar (terms
178 he rarely ever used), owe anything to a larger entity or
community known as "the Bedouin" or "the Awlad 'Ali."
If Hajj 'Ali is to legitimate his own authority in a new
political system, he must, at the same time, show the Bedouins
the legitimacy of the new political community. The Bedouins
829 178 must feel a moral commitment toward the new national political
177 community or else it has no meaning or authority. Most of the
Bedouins of al-Qasr still take it for granted that the allocation of political values and distribution of power in terms of
traditional and modern legal roles will be carried over into
the modern community and its politics. Hence, if anyone should
[634] go on to Cairo to represent the Bedouin of the Western Desert,
[648] naturally it should be the 'umda or the shaikh "who knew how
to deal with the Egyptians." The majority of the people of
the al-Qasr area see change coming but do not conceptualize
it as any threat to the traditional authority structure.

156 Hajj 'Ali anticipates the change as fundamental
159 enough to require a new sense of identity. I think this is
554 evident in the following statement in which he takes issue
829 with the traditional way of doing things and appears to be
178 177 preparing himself for a role in the readjustment process.

> 156 There is another objection which I have concerning
> 159 our customs. I mean the case of elections. For
> •554 instance, one from the 'Aishaibat and one from the
> 829 Sanagra, of the 'Ali Abyad, are nominated. Then,
> 666 each man must vote for the one from his own tribe.
> He must vote for the 'Aishaibi even if the other is
> the better man. But, we should consider that the
> best man is the man with the best qualifications.
> 'Umda Ibrahim, for instance, knows how to greet an
> official or a minister, but he does not know the
> _'awaiyid_ nor the problems of the Bedouins. His
> brother (who will probably be the next _'umda_) is a
> good man and is educated, but he does not know
> the _'awaiyid_ either.

829 This view contrasts sharply with the traditional stand
666 of most Bedouins in al-Qasr, including the members of the
"status group." For instance, one _'aqila_ voiced what is a
prevalent opinion when he said:

> [619] If a man chooses to become a political candidate
> against a Bedouin, he must understand that the
> [186] members of the tribe should and would vote for
> their _'umda_ because he is a member of their own
> tribe. Even if a man is crazy and his opponent
> has the highest college degree, the Bedouins must
> vote for the man from their own tribe.

156 Hajj 'Ali is modern in his evaluation of the political
159 situation here: a politician should know the problems of his
554 constituents rather than follow principles based on traditional
178 relationships. His motive is not to promote the _'awaiyid_ as
177 a good way of life, for we know he does not think this to be
829 the case. Instead, Hajj 'Ali believes that in order to help
[671] the Bedouins through a period of change one must know what
they are changing from. Through his negative appraisal of

156 the 'umda, Hajj 'Ali seems to imply that he himself is capable
159 of understanding and leading the Bedouins during this period.

554 178 Hajj 'Ali has formulated some positive and constructive
177 ideas relating to the period of transition which now faces
829 al-Qasr, and they are related to his analysis of the pressing
needs of the day.

> The Bedouins need many things: they need factories
> as there are in the Nile Valley. For the desert,
> here in particular, we need olive presses. This
> will raise the profits of the farmer . . . We need
> [244] a factory for canning tomatoes, for the whole desert
> [489] plants them and the transportation is such that we
> cannot get them to the market . . . The biggest
> change in the desert results from the presence of
> 12,000 government workers; there were only 20 or
> [871] 30 before the World War. There were no schools,
> now there a few. You cannot find a six year-old
> boy who does not go to school; about thirty per cent
> of the girls in al-Qasr go to school also . . .
> Another cause of change is due to the fact that
> everyone now watches his neighbor, he sees what he
> [207] does and he imitates him. Today, I listen to the
> radio and tomorrow my neighbor buys one. Evolution
> (tatawwar) is taking place, and the people here are
> [212] realistic about it. For instance, I do not know
> reading and writing, and sometimes I must dictate a
> letter to my son . . . My son knows better than I,
> and I know better than my father did, who lived in
> al-Qasr for thirty five years without knowing any-
> thing about the streets of Marsa Matruh.

156 Hajj 'Ali is both subjective and objective about
159 change, as we can note from the comment about the radio.
554 178 In a non-doctrinaire fashion, Hajj 'Ali stresses the great
177 value of education while being aware of his own deficiencies
in this area. However, as a counterbalance, he seems to

156 imply that one cannot be educated and know the *'awaiyid* at
159 the same time--the attitude of a self-made man. Hajj 'Ali
● 554 178 realizes his marginal position between the new and the old,
177 and his attitude concerning change through education seems
to be that of an unselfish leader. Elaborating further on
156 the role of education, Hajj 'Ali showed insight into some of
159 554 the psychological aspects underlying social change:

> 178 As I said before, the people here are realistic about
> 177 change. There are now only about three or four of
> 829 us who send our sons to study at the university, the
> rest of the people are waiting to see what these boys
> 871 will amount to. The other day, one of our educated boys, an officer in the army, came to visit al-Qasr. All of the women are now hoping to see their sons become as successful as this. This is exactly like the first time we cultivated olives in the desert: the Bedouins mocked those who planted the olive. After the olive began to show profits, everyone regretted that they did not cultivate it. Time is changing, and the people are changing. Education is the basis of everything in any nation. Now the agricultural engineer directs me, telling me what to do and how to do it . . . and before 1952 (pre-Nassar regime) they knew nothing about us and we had nothing.

156 As culture and social change proceeds in al-Qasr, it
159 is evident that Hajj 'Ali and the national political community
554 are becoming legitimate authorities in the eyes of the Bedouins.
829 This is indicated by the following event. One month before
574 I left the field, the first vice-President of the Republic was
648 expected to visit the province of Marsa Matruh, and al-Qasr was named as one of the places which he would tour. Hajj 'Ali took it upon himself to set up three tents in the tradi-

156 tional style of Bedouin hospitality--"as we used to do in
159 Cyrenaica"--and spent a total of 50 L.E. for the welcoming
554 829 ceremony. "This money was from his own pocket," as the
574 Bedouins of al-Qasr complained after it was learned that
648 the vice-President would not visit Matruh after all. As
a matter of fact, all of the Bedouin leaders who had been
invited to the reception by Hajj 'Ali refused to eat the
food, for they said that it had not been prepared for them.
[576] This act was taken as a show of respect for Hajj 'Ali and
anger with bureaucrats.

156 Hajj 'Ali is the representative of al-Qasr to the
159 Arab Socialist Union which meets in Marsa Matruh and has
554 cell meetings in al-Qasr. The socialist cell in al-Qasr
648 668 meets about three times a month. When I asked why Hajj 'Ali
[124] was the man chosen to represent all of al-Qasr at section
meetings of the Union, the reply was: "Because he is a member
[635] of the *Majlis al-Muhafza.*" There was one section meeting
of the Union in Matruh while I was in the field. The theme
of the meeting was "The Meaning of Socialism." Hajj 'Ali
attended this meeting.

156 In sum, it seems not too far afield to say that Hajj
159 'Ali is prepared to take over the leadership of the Bedouins
554 in a much more sophisticated manner than one could possibly
expect from the traditional style of politics. Hajj 'Ali's
[634] comments about the *'umda* and the *'umda's* probable successor

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imply that he feels they are not really equipped to represent their traditional constituency. Hajj 'Ali, as everyone in al-Qasr knows, is traditional and modern at the same time. It seems that he has only alienated those whom he threatens and those who are a threat to him, i.e., the _'umda_ and the _shaikh_.

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He may not be educated, but he knows the _'awaiyid_; at the same time he stresses the fact that his son will have the education which he never had. Empathy is a primary trait of the charismatic leader and the "cultural broker" who seeks to manipulate social relations. No one could explain to me why Hajj 'Ali did not have an education while his brother (who is only three years younger) and other members of the "status group" do read and write. He perhaps only became concerned in the period of change. Hajj 'Ali, the "cultural broker," is more politically conscious and creative within the context of two worlds in change.

236 Wool is also very important to the economy of Awlad Ali. Lamb's
286 wool is either sold or spun and woven into rugs. Goat's wool is spun
and woven to provide the cover for the tents.

231 Sheep and goats are rarely slaughtered for meat except on special
[262] occasions. Most male and many female lambs and kids are sold in the
[432] market and the money is used to buy the necessary supply of food (like
[438] tea, sugar, salt, etc.), clothes, and other household items. Most of
438 these items are obtained from the shops in the settled communities in
439 443 the area, although some of the major items can be obtained only from
large urban centers like Alexandria.

231 The other domesticated animals that Awlad Ali keep are the donkey
492 for transport and riding, a few camels for heavy transport and also for
[236] wool, very few horses for riding on special occasions (they are con-
[554] sidered as a status symbol for those who own them), and the dog to
guard the camp and to protect the herds from wolves and other predators.
235 Poultry are usually kept for meat and eggs which are sometimes sold by
432 the women in the nearby markets.

233 The main occupation in the area is stock raising. Grazing lands
137 extend generally south of the cultivated land in the northern strip.
[132] The growth of pasture plants is affected by the amount of rainfall in
a particular year. Low rainfall causes acute shortages of pasture and
herbage, and leads to the death of animals by both starvation and thirst.
Pasture plants comprise a wide variety of bushes, scrub, and many other
species of grasses, most of which have a very short life span. These
plants normally persist from December to May; then the land is turned
into arid, hard desert with only a few dispersed patches of dry grass.

619 [563] The name also includes various peasant groups and individuals who migrated from the Nile valley and who were incorporated into the tribal organization by a system of tribal adoption called "Iktitab." Most of these peasant groups came to the desert [701] to avoid military drafting by becoming part of Awlad Ali, who, until 1947, were exempted from serving in the Egyptian army. Although groups [554] and individuals thus adopted become part of the pedigrees of the adopting tribal segments and are supposed to enjoy equal status, yet, insofar as their origin is still remembered, they are looked down upon by the Sa'adi and occupy a position somewhere between that of Awlad Ali Sa'adi and that of the Murabiteen.

619 173 The Sa'adi tribes consider themselves to be the descendants of a certain Aqqar Ben Sa'ada or Aqqar El-Sherif, a descendant of Bani Suleim, who settled in Cyrenaica in the Fifth Century. Although they claim to [144] be of pure Arab ancestory, all sources agree that a considerable amount of mixture between Arab and indigenous Berber populations took place during the period they have been in North Africa.



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Fig. 1. The Sa'adi Tribes

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* The exact relationship of the Gemeiat tribe to the Sa'adi tribes is not exactly known. Many informants, as well as accounts of earlier travelers in the area, assert that descent from Hkadiga, a sister of Ali and Harb, and therefore are cousins of Awlad Ali. Others, especially members of Sa'adi tribes, themselves, deny any genealogical

613 The two charts show the same unit of Awlad Mansour. The first of
619 the two charts shows the tribal segments in which Eilat Gedaida (a fe-
173 551 male name) appears as one of the segments. When the actual genealogical
chart of one of the living members of that segment was drawn, descent
was traced to Mohammed, the husband of Gedaida, as shown on the second
chart. In this case Gedaida is not a member of Awald Mansour segment.
The unity of the full brothers is emphasized without changing the affil-
iation of the segment. It is simply a means of carrying on the patriline
using the mother's name. This is not always the case, however. Examin-
ation of other cases in which the female name was used reveals the fact
that in certain instances using the female name is a means of carrying
on the line of descent through a daughter. This meant incorporating
within the tribal segment a whole group of individuals who otherwise
would have belonged to a different patriline. Carrying the line through
613 619 the daughter in this manner has the same result as adopting her husband
551 unto the tribe. The question then is why wasn't adoption used. Examin-
597 ation of the two cases in which this happened indicates that a possible
explanation may be that this occurs whenever the husband is unadoptable.
Adoption is possible whenever a man does not have any tribal affiliation.
613 In one of the two cases the husband belonged to the Gemei'at tribe, a
619 Murabiteen tribe which enjoys a relatively higher status than the
551 other Murabiteen tribes by virtue of their being the original settlers
599 of the area and helping the Awald Ali in their fight with the Hanadi,
● 554 yet compared to Awlad Ali proper occupies an inferior position. In
this case, relating to the patriline of the mother carried with it a

1

613 619 551 597 554 definite political advantage. In the second case in which the female name was used, the husband was a member of the Bara'asa tribe of Libya. Although this tribe is one the powerful tribes of Libya, it has no political influence in the Egyptian Western Desert. Changing affiliation carried with it the strong political support of the mother's tribal segment.

619 131 In general the Reds occupy the western half of the coastal area of the Western Desert from the town of Matruh westward to the Libyan border, while the Whites occupy the eastern part which stretches to Alexandria. The Senenah are fairly scattered although their largest concentration is located in the extreme western part overlapping that of the Reds. The territorial division of the area among the three major sections of Awlad Ali is not a strict one. Historical evidence shows that there has been [174] a considerable tribal displacement throughout the area. This displacement occurred mainly during the intratribal war era and during the Second World War when the area was a main battlefield. In general, however, there is a significant relationship between territorial distribution and tribal segmentation, and this is especially true on the higher levels of segmentation than on the lower ones.

619 613 Each of the three sections of the apex of a three-tiered order of segments which, following the native usage, will be called Kabila (tribe), Eila (family), and Bait (house).

619 173 The first order referred to as tribes are structurally equivalent units but of highly variable size. Each of them has its traditional history. Some of these histories are important to the tribe as a whole.

613 563 619 This makes it possible for those adopted by the tribe to keep in touch with their relatives and friends they left behind in the Delta while enjoying the military exemption gained from their adoption by the Awlad Ali population. It is also believed that Eilat Aggary, made up mostly of peasants themselves, are very lenient in the conditions they put for tribal adoption. Finally, the Eilat Aggary is not among the most powerful tribal segments of Awlad Ali, possibly because of their composition. This assures the adopted peasant groups an equal status not normally obtained if adopted by one of the powerful tribal segments of Awlad Ali.

613 [675] The Amar paper of the Aggary explicitly states some of the basic characteristics of the Amar as a unit in the tribal organization of Awlad Ali. The most distinctive aspect of the Eila or the Amar as a political unit is the absence of any formalized leadership. Although the Amar is viewed by outsiders as a corporate group as far as its legal responsibility in certain cases, from the standpoint of its members, the Amar is no more than the sum total of its constiuent units or Baits. This is shown in the Amar paper of Aggary which states that matters affecting the Amar be decided upon by all the bait represented by their respective leaders, the awaqil. There is no formalized authority above the 613 554 627 awaqil, although one of the awaqil might acquire a position of informal leadership by virtue of personal or other qualities. He will be considered as a mediator and go-between for the various leaders of the Baits. In the case of the Aggary, Sheihk Selouma, the Aqila of Bait Eweida, has acquired such a leadership among the Eilat Aggary. Although Shiehk Selouma is relatively young, (he is about 40 years old), he has the reputation of getting things done. His Bait is the wealthiest in the

His Bait is the wealthiest in the
613 554 Aggary and he himself has recently acquired a great amount of wealth,
627 mostly from smuggling goods across the Libyan borders. Because of his
[556] position as a Government Sheihk, he is believed to have influencial connections
in the government. He is the only member of the Aggary Amar
who has a car. He considers himself to be the spokesman of the Aggary
Family, and he is known to be able to persuade the reluctant awaqil to
conform to decisions made by the rest of the awaqil. In a number of instances
[682] he was able to collect bloodmoney from members of the Amar who
had previously refused to pay. Some people in the area believe that had
it not been for the persuasive abilities of Sheihk Selouma, the Aggary
Amar could never have persisted, and it would have long ago been divided
into smaller units due to the lack of agreement among its members. The
613 lack of formalized leadership of the Amar or the Eila makes consensus of
extreme importance for the Amar. The emphasis on the unity of the Amar
[675] is stated in Article 2 and is implied in a number of other articles in
[578] the Amar paper of Aggary. Disagreement among the awaqil is very rare although
613 not unknown in the area. The relative consensus among the awaqil
682 stems from the fact that the Amar as a group has a fairly limited function.
[182] Until very recently the only practical function of the Amar was the collection
of money to pay for a murder commited by one of its members. Since
establishing the innocence or guilt of the accused is not the duty of the
Amar, once his guilt has been established, there is no question about
613 the payment. Disagreements are likely to occur in the case of new circumstances
682 where money has to be paid, since payment in such cases are not
578 yet institutionalized, even when specified in a given Amar paper. This
000 has not yet become a major problem. If any disagreement between the

613 If any disagreement between the
578 responsibility of the majority of the awaqil to persuade the minority to
571 conform to the majority's decision. This is usually done by simple per-
613 sonal persuasion. In certain instances, however, when a particular aqila
● 554 is known for being troublesome to the Amar, refusing to abide by the ma-
571 578 jority decisions, an attempt may be made by the others to build up popular support around another person in the Bait which the aqila represents. If this strategy is successful, it might lead to replacing the aqila by another who is more abiding to the Amar's decisions. This approach is more likely to succeed if the aqila is not a popular person in his own Bait, for if he is popular, any attempt by the other Baits to disqualify the aqila would be viewed by the members of his Bait as interference in their own affairs and might lead them to rally even more strongly around their leader.

613 The other tendency occurring when the size of the Eilat increases is toward the separation of one or more of its constiuent Baits. Origi-
613 nally this was done by merely refusing to share in the payment of blood-
682 money. If this refusal continued, it was considered as a sign of
[178] separation of the Bait. In recent years this created problems with an increasing number of individuals claiming separation from the Amar to avoid the payment of the bloodmoney, while claiming membership when dis-
613 tribution is done. This led many tribal segments to require that the
675 "barawa" or separation of individuals or tribal units from any particular Amar should be put in writing, after getting the approval of the Amar to which he belonged. When the approval is given and the separation in put in writing, it is announced to all other tribal segments. If this is
[672] done, members of the separated tribal segment are not held responsible

628 the settlement achieved. In many such interest is best served by taking
613 into consideration the welfare of the other party to the dispute as well.

613 Reasonableness is an important prerequisite for the success of the
554 Aqila in performing this functions in dispute settlement. This is true
157 whether the Aqila is dealing with disputes between members of his own
bait or between members of his bait and outsiders. But while reasonableness
and the personal qualities constitute important assets for the Aqila,
they are not the basis of his political authority. Proven abilities are
613 554 admired but they are, or had been until very recently, irrelevant to the
178 question of succession to the position of Aqila. The structurally significant
source of the Aqila's authority is patrilineal succession. This
principle has recently been challenged under the impact of social and
economic changes that are taking place in the area. To analyze the role
121 of the Aqila and the source of his authority, I shall utilize, to some
613 extent, Turner's concept of "social drama" by presenting and analyzing a
128 case of dispute whose developmental stages happened over a period of more
than eleven years. The major part of these developments occurred at the
time of the field work and I had a chance to observe at lease part of it.
The case in all its phases offers a rare example of a disturbance that
happened in the social life of a particular tribal segment. It offers
what Turner called "... a limited area of transparency in the otherwise
opaque surface of regular, uneventful social life" (p. 93). The political
unit involved is that of bait Asabe'i, the largest in size of all
baits in the Aggary Eila. As events of the case unfolded themselves,
some of the important principles of social structure, at least as they
operate at a given point, were revealed.

156 equipment from the government projects and from smuggling sheep and merchandise
[685]
[439] across the Libyan border. Although some of these stories might
be exaggerated, they all point to the fact that Hakim, despite his wealth,
is not the most popular or reputable individual in bait Asabei', and that
although Shei'eb is not a popular individual either, he definitely comes
up the winner in any popularity contest between the two. The question is
156 why Hakim was selected by the Awaqil to replace Shei'eb. The case involved
613 more than Shei'eb's inability to collect the money from members of
558
682 his bait. Shei'eb's ineffectiveness seemed to have been taken as an excuse
683 rather than as the direct cause. Many Aqaqil, before Shei'eb, had
failed in collecting money from their own bait without being subject to
direct challenge. What seems to be involved is more than a challenge to
a particular member, Shei'eb. It is a challenge to the whole principle
by which Shei'eb acquired his position as Aqila of bait Asabei': patrilineal
succession.

156 Shei'eb is the youngest of four sons of the former Aqila of bait
159 Asabei', Sheikh Elewa. For more than fifty years Sheikh Elewa was the
613 undisputed Aqila of bait Asabei'. He also had considerable influence
463
683 among other tribal segments throughout the whole of the Western Desert
● 554 by virtue of his position as "nazzar", that is, the expert who assesses
the amount of compensation for wound inflicted in a liable case. The
[428] position of nazzar is a hereditary one and had been handed down from
[779] father to son. The basis for his assessment of wounds are a number of
old books believed to be obtained from Mecca and contain all the judgments
of famous Islamic leaders in their assessments of wounds.

[428] Eleven years ago when Sheikh Elewa became blind and too old to

156 exercise his functions, he invited all the important people in the area
159 into a large gathering during which he announced that he was handing the
613 463 sacred books to Shei'eb, who was to become the nazzar and also to succeed
683 him as the Aqila of bait Asabei'. Although at that time Shei'eb was
554 fairly young, twenty-six, nobody questioned Sheikh Elewa's decision.
428 (079) "He is the Aqila," said one informant, "and he has the right to decide
which of his sons is to succeed him. After all, he knows his sons better
156 than anybody else and knows which one is best for the job." Most people
159 thought that Sheikh Elewa, being still alive and with clear thinking,
613 would help Shei'eb in performing his duties as Aqila. A few months after
554 Shei'eb took over his father's position, it became apparent that he was
578 too immature for the job. He tried to use his position to take money
[661] from members of his bait and when they refused to give him any money, he
entered into fights with a number of them. Rumors spread that he took
bribes from the disputing parties who came to him for him to assess the
legal compensation for wounds to raise or lower his estimate. But still
people within bait Asabei' as well as outside it respected Sheikh Elewa's
decision and did not challenge Shei'eb openly. But as time passed the
dissatisfaction with Shei'eb grew. This dissatisfaction came mainly from
members of the Amar who were affected directly by Shei'eb's actions, especially those actions which resulted in the payment of compensation for
wounds inflicted in fights.

PHASE II

439 On the evening of May 16, 1966, two members of the Geneishat tribe of Matruh area came to Burg-el-Arab with a large shipment of smuggled cigarettes to leave with their partner in the area, Hadi, from the

685 refused to see them. Later Hakim had Shei'eb spread the rumor that Qudura
627 had taken a bribe from the Geneishat to refuse to take the oath, and the
578 [521] story of an old dispute between Qudura, on the one hand, and both Hakim
and Shei'eb, on the other. This dispute dates back to the time when the
613 156 Awaqil of the Aggary Amar decided to replace Shei'eb with Hakim as the
554 Aqila of bait Asabei'. Shortly after the decision of the Aggary Awaqil
578 was publicly known, Qudura was very unhappy and refused to recognize it. His reaction was not out of loyalty to Shei'eb whom he thought was a very unfit person for the position, but it stemmed rather, from a deep resentment of Hakim. According to my information, Qudura's position was met with sympathy by the majority of the people outside the Aggary Amar who share with him the belief that Hakim was a dishonest person who could not be trusted as a representative of bait Asabei'. It was at that time that the stories of Hakim's dishonest dealings were being discussed publicly, mainly by Qudura and members of his camp. At that time many believed that Qudura was the best man for the position of Aqila of bait Asabei' and that he was the only qualified member of that bait. He was the oldest able man in the bait, and although he was poor, yet he was known throughout the area for his honesty and sound decision. In fact many people in the area told me that they believe Qudura to be the only honest member of bait Asabei'. Realizing that Qudura was getting all the attention, Hakim sent his son Rabbu to Qudura with a message that Hakim acknowledged Qudura as the Aqila and that he (Hakim) had neither the time nor the interest in taking the position himself. Hakim also conveyed the view that he would support Qudura if the latter denounced Shei'eb and appointed himself in his place. Qudura agreed and a date

613 was set for a meeting in which Quadra was to announce his decision.
156 554 Meanwhile, Qudura stopped attacking Hakim and directed his attack to-
578 ward the inadequacy of Shei'eb as the Aqila.

The meeting was held two weeks later and all the important people in the area were invited. After dinner was served Qudura announced his agreement with Hakim to become the Aqila of bait Asabei' replacing Shei'eb. Everybody expected Hakim to support Qudura in his claim, but instead Hakim directed his comment to Qudura telling him that there had been a misunderstanding on Qudura's part and that all his message to Qudura was to acknowledge the latter as the Aqila for his own camp alone not for bait Asabei' as a whole as Qudura claimed. This announcement was a surprise to everyone in the meeting since this meant recognizing the camp of Qudura as a separate bait, a result which nobody, including Qudura, had ever anticipated. Qudura was very angry and dissolved the meeting immediately. Ever since that incident, the relationship between
578 Qudura and Hakim has been very unfriendly. Almost all of my informants
156 explained Qudura's failure to show up at the oath as a means of revenge
695 against Hakim who had embarrassed him among the people who attended the
685 627 meeting. Qudura himself had told me later that the reason for his not
[124] coming to the oath was that he was not sure that Rabbu was innocent:

> Rabbu has been known to do these thins (inform the police) and I cannot trust him. I cannot take a false oath and endanger myself for someone like Rabbuh. Besides, Hakim never came to me to discuss the oath like he did with all the others who were to swear with them. If he had brought his son and come to me before I would have been able to tell whether they were lying or not, and If not, I would have sworn with a clear conscience and without fear. The oath is something that one does not take lightly. It involves the supernatural.

613 627 When Qudura refused to see Hakim and Shei'eb, Hakim asked Sheikh
156 196 Saleh, the Aqila of one of the most powerful baits in the area, to talk

613 627 182 underlying the authority of the Aqila and the source of his political support. Three such principles were evident in the above case: patrilineal succession, wealth, and social and personal renown.


Ability to deal fairly with disputes involving members of his bait and outsiders
(wisdom and social renown)
Ability to fulfil financial obligations of the bait (wealth)
Patrilineal succession
other tribal groups
'Eila
Bait

613 554 To better understand the importance of the three principles to the authority of the Aqila, it is important to examine the domains within the Aqila normally functions. First, the Aqila is the leader of a certain kinship unit: the bait. Historically, the bait has been the main field of action for the Aqila and from it he draws his main political support. 613 627 554 As the leader of his bait, the Aqila settles disputes among members of his bait and represents the group for political and administrative purposes. His function is to hold the bait together by preventing major disputes between members from leading to the fission of the group into smaller, separate units. He performs his function by exercising authority and/or personal influence to establish long-lasting agreements.

613 In performing his functions within the bait, personal qualities such as
●554 [157] wisdom, soundness of ideas, personal persuasiveness are of importance.
[428] But the main basis of his authority is patrilineal succession. The Aqila
[556] has no economic power to speak of. Although many aqila are among the
wealthiest members of their baits, many more are among its poorest. The
nature of the economic process and the pastoral life of Awald Ali is
such that the economic position of the individual is always flucuating.
Nor does the Aqila have any military power at his disposal, or any command
of the use of force to back his decisions or to make them binding
[428] upon members of his bait. The main source of compliance to the Aqila's
decisions comes from the knowledge that the Aqila has the authority to
make such decisions and that he has acquired this authority through the
legitimate channel of patrilineal succession.

613 Where membership in formal groups is transmitted by descent, Awlad
428 Ali always choose the patriline. The son of Awlad Ali is regarded as
562 [619] Awlad Ali even though his mother might not be from the tribe, while a
woman who marries outside the tribe transmits no rights in the tribe to her children. The importance of agnatic kin is reinforced by an solidary of brothers which is extended laterally to patrilateral cousins. It is also shown in the fact that sons are favored in inheritance usually to the exclusion of daughters. The male line is viewed by Awlad Ali as the natural principle when it comes to anything which is inheritable, whether property or position. In an attempt to defend Shei'eb's position and his right to be the Aqila, one informant told me: "The main purpose that a man has in life is to have sons because it is the son who makes the man live forever. Daughters don't count. A man gives his son

613 everything ... his property, his name, and anything he can give him, like
428 the position of the Aqila. This is only natural." While the office of
[562] the Aqila is inherited through the male line, there seems to be no spec-
ial regard for seniority. Any son of the Aqila can succeed him in the
position and it is usually left to the Aqila to select the son who is to
613 succeed him. This decision is not usually the subject matter of brother-
428 ly rivalry since the position of Aqila is regarded more as a duty than
593 as a privilege. There has been only one case in the entire area of the
Western Desert in which such a decision has lead to open fighting between
brothers. "When my father became very old and his eyes bothered him, he
told me that I should become the Aqila and could not say no to him,"
said Shei'eb. "I didn't want to become the Aqila but this was the choice
of my father and I have to obey .... You owe it to your father and family
to carry on his responsibilities the same way you carry his name." It
was patrilineal succession upon which Shei'eb based his case. Most un-
interested parties believe that he and he alone had the legitimate claim
to the position.

613 The importance of patrilineal succession as the basis of the Aqila's
627 authority may be better understood by contrasting it to a closely related
554 position, that of the "mardi". A man within a bait may acquire, by virtue
of personal qualities, a reputation for wisdom and soundness of opinion
which may overshadow that of the Aqila. Such a person becomes known
throughout a certain area as a successful mediator and go-between; and
therefore is called upon to solve disputes not limited to members of his
own bait. He thus acquires an informal position which cuts across a
number of baits and sometimes larger political units.

613 627 554 [192] The word mardi is derived from the Arabic verb "yardi" which means to accept or agree upon. The mardi therefore is the person who is accepted by one or both parties to a dispute as a mediator. If he is accepted by only one of the parties, his work is more that of a legal representative of that party. He makes all efforts, using all powers of persuasion to get the other party to concede to the demands of the party he represents. If, on the other hand, he is chosed by both parties to a dispute, he acts as an impartial judge and avoids taking sides in the case. His fame is determined by his ability to achieve permanent, long-lasting settlements. His success in this area depends, in addition to personal qualities, upon the respect he has within his own tribal segment and the weight that tribal segment has among other tribal segments. Similarly, his success and the fame he gets as a mardi may give him considerable influence within the bait. But this influence does not develop [182] [428] into authority because the mardi in this case does not have an established basis for the effective maintenance of that authority, in this case, patrilineal succession.

613 554 682 The other domain within which the Aqila performs his duties is that of the Eila or the amar. His main function within this area is to represent his bait in matters involving the collection or the distribution of bloodmoney within the vengeance group. Within the amar, the aqila is considered successful insofar as he is able to fulfill his bait's financial obligations to the amar. This ability is in turn determined by his success in collecting money from individual members of his bait and/or his willingness to pay from his own money for those members who are unable or unwilling to pay their share. Where kinship ties are strong, the Aqila

613 usually has no difficulty collecting the individual shares. His own
682 ●[554] financial ability is rarely called upon. When a member is unable to
[178] pay for any reason, his share is divided among the able members. However,
in recent years this seems to be changing, especially among the baits
closely located to the settled communities or the urban centers. Among
613 these baits individual mobility has increased significantly with a large
178 166 number of younger members either leaving the area for the urban centers
464 or accepting salaried jobs with the government organizations. Among
369 certain baits in the area of Burg el-Arab, for example, the percentage
of adult males engaged in such jobs sometimes reaches sixty percent.
More than thirty-five out of fifty-six males constituting bait Asabei'
have a full-time or part-time job.

613 The individualistic attitudes accompanying the dependency on salaries
178 and living in towns and cities have their effects on the kinship
166 464 ties among members of these baits. With the prevalence of the individualistic
682 attitudes among members of a certain bait, they become more
369 reluctant to pay their financial obligations and the Aqila finds it more
and more difficult to rely, for the fulfillment of the bait's financial
obligations, on the willingness of members to pay. His success within
613 554 the domain of the amar becomes more determined by his ability to pay
556 from his own money for those members of his bait who refuse or are unable
682 to pay. Wealth becomes an important asset for the Aqila's performance
of his duties within the amar. When this happens, there seems
to be a certain shift in the source of political support for the Aqila.
613 In a well-integrated bait the popularity (or unopopularity) of the Aqila
554 among the other Awaqil of the amar had very little influence on his

613 position as the leader of the bait. The principle of patrilineal succession
554 is so respected in such baits that it overshadows any other consideration.
613 554 This continues to be the case as long as the kinship ties
428 within the bait remain strong. When the kinship ties in a given bait
178 weaken, the principle of patrilineal succession also weakens. This is
[166] more likely to occur in baits where a relatively large number of the
[464] members leave the area permanently or for a more or less prolonged period
of time, seeking jobs on a part or a full-time basis. Many of these
613 178 members maintain only a minimal contact with their respective baits.
166 They become more reluctant to fulfill their kinship obligations, especially
464 561 when they entail any financial liability. The older members
369 complain about how younger persons are less loyal to their elders and
how selfish they have become. "All they care about is their jobs and
the pleasure they get from the city; they are becoming city people."
Younger members, on the other hand, maintain that their reluctance to
fulfill their kinship obligations stems from their feeling that they
do not get anything in return. "Life is expensive and money is hard to
obtain. I cannot make enough money to support myself and my wife and
children and at the same time pay my cousin's financial debts," said a
member of eilat Asabei', who works as a driver with the Desert Organization
in Alexandria.

613 When this happens, there seems to be a tendency toward shifting the
554 emphasis from the bait to the eila or the amar as the source of the political
[556] support of the Aqila. This is turn makes wealth an important
basis of the Aqila's power. No more can the bait impose an ineffective
Aqila on the amar unless it is ready to back him by their own share of
money. If this is lacking as was the case with Shei'eb, there is nothing

613 554 that prevents the Awaqil of the amar from rallying support around another person.

613 178 554 In the case of the Aggary amar Hakim was their choice as the man to replace the original Aqila. What happened in the Aggary amar could never have happened if bait Asabei' were more cohesive than it was or if the kinship ties "were still strong and durable" as one important member of the Sanagrah tribe commented. "If there was any respect to the forefathers left, Hakim could never have agreed to replace Shei'eb....Nobody would dare take a position from someone who inherited it from his father.... but bait Asabei' is not as it used to be."

613 628 554 The third domain within which the Aqila normally pursues his activities is that of the wide scope of tribal society in the area. The Aqila represents his bait in all matters involving the bait either as a unit or any particular member of it with other tribal segments. When an individual from the bait is involved in a dispute with a member of another tribal segment, the Aqila acts as the legal representative and the attorney of that member trying to achieve a settlement which is not fair for his client but also fair for the other party. To be successful in this area, the Aqila relies on his own personal qualities and persuasive abilities. If the Aqila is known to be fair and honest, a quick and permanent settlement is usually achieved since he is trusted also by the other party. If, on the other hand, he has the reputation of using dishonest techniques, mistrust prevails and achieving a settlement is usually delayed.

Like the domain of the amar, the present field of activities is no major source for the Aqila's political support in the baits where kinship solidarity is strong. His success in solving disputes between members

613 628 554 [428] His success in solving disputes between members of his baits and outsiders might enhance his prestige within the bait, but it is not a substitute for patrilineal succession as the basis of the Aqila's authority. But in less integrated baits the situation is [627] different. The ineffectiveness of the Aqila in solving disputes may lead members of his bait to seek another man as their representative who would act as a mediator in their behalf. If this continues for a long time the Aqila might find himself with no functions and the new person would become a de facto Aqila.

613 554 622 The Aqila represents the only effective indigenous form of leadership among Awlad Ali at the present time. The camp headman provides another form of leadership on the camp level, but, as mentioned before, the leadership of the headman is very limited and involves minimal 634 622 656 177 authority. In addition to the indigenous leadership represented by the Aqila, there is the superimposed administrative structure of the government representative in the form of the "omda" system introduced into the area by the government decree no. 1187 of 1958. The system of omda or mayorship is essentially that applied to the rural areas of Egypt with certain modifications to fit the tribal organization and the semi-nomadic existence of the populations of the Western Desert. In rural areas, the 622 omda is the administrative head of the village. He is appointed by the [554] [212] [556] government from among the village inhabitants who have certain qualifications with regard to education (must be able at least to read and write), wealth (own at least 5 feddans of land in the area), and sound reputation. As such, the omda system in the rural areas is a territorial system. The omda's authority covers the territory of the village and all individuals living in it regardless of their kinship affiliation.

622 His main function is to manage the affairs of the village, apprehend
554 criminals, report and register births and deaths, collect taxes and
represent the government in all matters involving the relationship be-
tween the government and his village. Because of his position as the
[661] representative of the govrernment, he usually enjoys a considerable
amount of power which, over the years, many omdas have used it to obtain
personal benefits.

361 In 1958 the committee appointed for the examination of the possi-
631 bility of applying the system to Awlad Ali noticed that villages in the
sense of a compact settlement similar to that existing in the rural area
simply do not exist in the Western Desert region. There are a few
settled communities in the area but they are scattered homes or a few
stores. These communities have no identifiable boundaries or adminis-
631 trative existence. The area as a whole is divided into ten adminis-
634 trative districts, each having a police station. These districts cor-
[625] respond to the old Senusia Zawyas which played an important role in
[795] maintaining order in the era until the First World War. Until that time
[175] the area was divided into fourteen zones each of which was under the
795 jurisdiction of one of the zawyas. The zawyas were mainly religious
175 centers, or shrines, inhabited and directed by a member of the Senusi
[793] order of Cyrenaica. The role of the head of the zawya was to teach the
Qoraan and spread the teachings of the Senusi order. One of the ways
[794] the zawyas attracted followers was through distribution of food and
clothing to those who joined it. The zawyas also provided places of
[778] refuge for those who needed protection since no one could force his way
into the sacred zawyas. Because of their religious position which put

554 The most powerful
177 and numerous segments are then represented by the omda, and the lesser
634 ones are represented by a sheikh. Unlike the system in the rural areas
619 where the sheikh is a subordinate to the omda, the sheikh in the Western
[622] Desert does not occupy the same position. Instead he has the same functions and occupies, with regard to his tribal segment, the same position the omda occupies with regard to his. He does not take orders from the omda and has direct relations with the administration. Sheikhs and omdas from one district are supposed to meet periodically in the police station and discuss with the police officer in charge of the station matters concerning the district and their own tribal groups. The only difference between the omda and the sheikh in the Western Desert seems to be the label of the office. The label itself carries a certain amount of prestige to the tribal segment represented by the omda, since it is an acknowledgement by the government of its importance. This is why many of the tribal segments try to be represented by an omda rather than by a sheikh. In certain districts where two or more strong tribal segments compete for the honor of being represented by an omda, the district may have two or more omdas representing the strong tribal segments and a number of sheikhs representing the lesser tribal groups in the district. Not every tribal segment in a district is represented by an omda or even a sheikh, however. Very small tribal segments may join together and have one sheikh, while others may agree to be represented by one of the larger segment's sheikh or omda.

634 Obviously, the number of omdas and sheikhs differ from one district
554 to another depending on the number of important tribal segments in each.
619
657 There is no specific rule whereby a certain tribal segment is considered

634 554 619 657 by the government to be significant enough to be represented. This matter is left almost entirely to the ability of members of a given tribal segment to convince the authorities that their group is sizable enough to give them the right of omda, or at least sheikh's representation. A segment represented by a sheikh may later ask for an omda because of the prestige involved. It is worth noting in this respect that the various tribal segments in the area are eager to be represented in the government administrative structure. Gaining prestige among the other tribal segments is only one motive for such eagerness. [622] Unlike the omda in the rural areas who functions mainly as a representative of the government to the village, the omda or sheikh in the Western Desert is a representative of the people to the government. This is not a theoretical difference but involves a real difference in the relation of the government and the omda, on the one hand, and between the latter and the people his represnets, on the other. 622 554 657 The omda in the village is a symbol of authority to his people. He is the undisputed ruler of the village. His authority is backed by his ability to mobilize and use the force put at his diposal by the government, in the implementation of his decisions. Since he is appointed by the government and not elected by the people, he does not have to rely on his popularity to hold or maintain office. His main concern is to please the government, rather than the people of the village to whom he is merely a symbol of authority. There is very little that the village omda can bring to his people form the outside, while he has to implement government policies, collect taxation, apprehend criminals, all tasks which the villagers are not eager to have done.

634 The situation is quite different in the Western Desert. Although
666
657 it is the government, represented by the province council, which makes
554 the final decision in appointing the omda or sheikh, yet this appointment
619 is made on the basis of nominations given by the gribal segment
635 or segments which he would represent. Since the tribal segment usually
nominates one person, the decision of the council is limited to the
examination of the credentials of the nominee and to see if he meets the
basic requirements of the law. If a certain nominee is rejected by the
council, a very rare occurrence, the matter goes back to the tribal
segment to make another nomination. In practice, then, the omda of the
Western Desert is elected by the people and the appointment by the government
of the omda is significant only in cases where the omda is to represent
more than one small tribal segment and each nominates one. Here the
council has to choose between the various nominaees and appoints the best
634 qualified. Unlike the omda of the village, the tribal omda is a real representative
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657 of his people. Despite the fact that he becomes part of a
619 governmental structure, his basic function is to look after the interest
[622] of his tribal group. Or, as one informant put it, "The omda is the servant
of the people." In many cases the best interest of the tribal segment
is served through full cooperation of the omda with the government. So
far there seems to be very little conflict between the interest of the
tribal populations and that of the government. There is very little in
[651] the area that the government demands or needs. There is no taxable land
to speak of. There are only a few acres of barley land and even these
634 are minimally taxed. The main responsibility of the omda to the government
554
657 is to report births and deaths and give a yearly list of young men

634 who reach the age of military service. He is also supposed to report
554 the presence of any fugitive or crininal in his district and report
657 crimes accurring in that district and which involve members of the tribal segment he represents.

634 The first two duties of the omda to the government do not involve
554 any conflict of interest. Unlike the rural areas where sons are con-
657 sidered a very important economic asset to their parents, and therefore,
562 there is a general resentment of military service which takes the sons
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178 away and deprives the parents of their important work around the fields, Awlad Ali look at military service as an opportunity to have their sons go to the city, obtain guaranteed payment, and escape the hardship of nomadic existence. Economic activities
[233] in the area do not require the cooperation of a large number of individuals, and most of the grazing of animals is done either by a paid shepherd or by one of the grown-up sons. Although there still exists an
[183] ideology which values having many sons, yet with the cessation of hostilities between the tribal segments, their presence in the area has lost its
[464] value. Many of the younger generation are seeking jobs with the government projects in the area or in the city. Neither one is easy to find. Joining the army is increasingly considered as an easy alternative.

634 The omda's function which seems to involve some conflicting loyalties
554 is that of reporting crimes involving members of his tribal segment. But
657 even this does not pose a serious problem as it might seem. Almost all
674 minor crimes committed against property or persons as well as all civil disputes are left to be handled by the tribal proceedings. The duties of the omda are limited to reporting the cases of murder and serious assault

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1 On the basis of one percent of the yearly yield.

634 which result in permanent bodily harm. Reporting such cases is a fairly
554 minor proceeding since such cases come to the knowledge of the authori-
657 ties through other channels, mainly from talks involved in the mediation
674 [743] for the bloodmoney or from the hospital to which serious assault cases are usually taken. Besides, reporting a crime does not mean convicting the offender. This latter depends on evidence which, in case the dispute has been settled by tribal proceedings, is hard for the police authorities to find.

634 While the government demands do not impose serious conflicts of
554 loyalty on the part of the omda, if successful, his position with the
657 government can bring to his tribal segments great benefits. These benefits are usually in the form of various social and economic aids including fodder for the animals and food and clothing for the people during the dry years. Other benefits including providing the tribal population with olive trees and helping them clear many of the old Roman wells and establishing wind mills for nominal fees. Not everyone in the area can have such benefits. Some do not even know they exist. A successful omda could manipulate the administration to get as many benefits for
[871] his tribal segment as possible.. Some successful omdas were able to have
[474] the government build schools in their districts, establish cooperative units to market local products such as wool, sheep, and olive oil.

634 This should not lead us, however, to conclude that the position of
554 the omda in the Western Desert does not involve any kind of conflicting
657 loyalty or that he is always supported by his people or even trusted by
578 them. One informant said that the omda of his biat is "...government man, not ours....He would sell us all if this pleases his masters in the

634 554 657 [578] government." But due to the nature of the representation and the specific relation of the government to the area, the position of the omda does not pose serious demands upon the loyalty of the omda to his tribal group.

634 554 657 666 Because of the omda's ability to bring benefits to his tribal segment from the government, the ability to manipulate the administrative officials is the most important basis for the nomination of a given individual for the position of the omda. "The omda is one who can speak city talk and knows how to deal with the government officials." Age is not important; young people know more about city ways than old people. "A man may be a cheat, but as long as he can get our things done, he is the best man for the job...of course, we don't want to nominate someone with a bad reputation who may blacken our face in front of everybody. However, if he has a bad reputation the council would not approve his appointment...he just has to be someone who can get things done..."

159 634 554 Muftah Mughaieb, the sheikh of the Sanagrah tribal segment in the district of Haman, described the circumstances of his nomination as follows:

> 657 666 578 625 Before the former sheikh of that tribal segment died (he was Muftah's uncle), one member of the group got into an argument with the police officer in charge of the police station in the district. The tribesman insulted the police officer who insisted on arresting him. Rumors also had it that the police officer was using his authority to reduce the share of the tribal segment in the government aid which was badly needed during that particular year. Sheikh Muftah, whose father is the Aqila of

159 bait Mughaieb of the Sanagrah tribe, went to the officer and apologized
634 to him on behalf of the whole group and invited him to a
554 lavish dinner party. The charges against the tribesman were soon
657 dropped, and it was concluded that it was because of the way Muftah
666 [578] [625] had handled the situation. Since that incident, Muftah has been
known as an expert in handling the government officials. One year
later, the sheikh of the tribal segment died, and a meeting was
held during which the important members of the Sanagrah tribal
segment in the district decided to nominate Muftah for the position
of the sheikh, vacant by the death of his uncle. Muftah, who
was attending the meeting, was asked to accept the nomination, and
he agreed. "...I accepted the nomination reluctantly." Muftah
later told me, "I did not really want to become the sheikh. The
159 634 position does not bring any personal benefit, and it involves a
554 lot of responsibility. The sheikh has to act as an attorney for
657 his tribe, represent it to the government and competes with other
sheikhs to bring his people things that the other sheikhs cannot
get for theirs, like more membership in the cooperative units or
in the socialist union. And what does he get in return? Nothing...
not even the gratitude of his people. To them, he is a servant of
the tribe, and his duty is to look after its interest. If he
doesn't, then everybody is quick to criticize him. I had to accept
the nomination because I felt it was my duty to do so and not
to embarrass the awaqil and the important people of the tribe who
[465] put their confidence in me. As far as the government, all I get is
six pounds a month."

634 "The omda or sheikh is both a blessing and a curse to his tribe,"
554 said one member of the Aggary 'eila. "He can bring benefits to his
619 tribe, but at the same time, he has to report his own people if one of
them breaks the city laws... His position is like that of a double-edged razor."

Most of the people in the area, however, tolerate the negative aspects of the omda's functions as a moderate price for the possible benefits they may get through his position. This is why each tribal segment does its best to be represented by an omda, or at least by a sheikh.

Within his tribal segment he enjoys a great deal of respect. He does not, by means of position alone, command any power over members of his group similar to the power the omda of the village has over his
[613] people. It seems, however, that although the position itself does not
carry with it any power, yet, when the holder of that position is at the same time a native tribal leader or aqila, it tends to enhance his position as a tribal leader and to give him more respect among members of his tribal unit as well as among the rest of the tribal groupings.
634 This may be explained by the fact that the establishment of the omda
554 system in that area did not involve direct interference with the native
619 political system except in a minimal way, mainly to keep the tribal
182 populations in the area from interfering in the progress of various
657 government projects in the area. As such, the system did not impose
613 too many demands upon the tribal loyalties of the omdas or sheikhs.
In the relationship between the government and the tribal population, the balance so far has been in favor of the latter, who, by means of

634 omda representation, are taking from the government much more than
● 554 they are giving in return. Being the link between his people and
619 the government in such a system gives the aqila a new basis of
182 political support.
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593 spent the night inside. In the morning Muftah ordered his daughter to
574 pack her clothes because she was to leave with him. He refused to give
606 586 her husband any explanation as to why he was taking his daughter away.
The husband could not prevent him from taking her away because, as he
said, "He is her father and has the right to take her away with him at
any time."

When the wife did not return for two weeks, her husband went to her
father's house to take her, but her father refused to let her go. Hemeida
593 then went to a religious man in the area and asked him to intervene in
574 606 the matter and see why Muftah had taken away his wife. He also asked him
586 to arrange a mi'ad with Muftah to discuss the matter.

627 792 The religious man was selected in this case because he was a close
friend of Muftah and was believed to have influence over him. He was
also known throughout the area to be fair and of sound opinion. It is
important in the cases of disputes that the person selected as a mardi
is known as a wise and fair man. It is only then that he is able to
mediate between the two parties without being accused of taking sides.
792 The religious men, members of the Murabiteen tribes in the area, by their
619 relative position outside the formal tribal organization of the Sa'adi
627 tribes, are the most likely candidates for such activity. Yet, this is
● 554 not always the case. For this aspect of assumed impartiality is frequently balanced off by the fact that these religious men lack the support of a powerful tribal segment behind them. To be effective, the mardi
has to be respected, not only for his personal qualities, but also for
being a member of a respectable tribal segment whose power lends authority to the mardi's decision. This is not usually the case with the client
000 tribes of Murabiteen. Wealth in many cases is also considered an important

Wealth in many cases is also considered an important
792 requirement for the selection of the mardi. This does not mean that
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● 554 religious men in the area have no role in dispute settlement, for they
[556] do. It simply means that the mardi is selected according to a number of criteria that vary from case to case, and that in some of these cases sound wisdom and fairness characteristic of religious men are not enough basis for their selection as mardis. This means that the religious men have no special mediatory role based on their religious nature alone. In certain cases religious men offer the best possibility for mediation; in others, a non-religious person might offer a better chance for settling the dispute. In cases of women seeking
[586] divorce from their husbands, the wealth of the mediator, more than any-
(556) thing else, seems to determine the selection of the man whom the woman asks to negotiate on her behalf, a point to which I will return later in the chapter.

593 The Mi'ad was held in the house of Muftah. Present at the mi'ad
574 were Muftah, his son-in-law, Hemeida, the heads of households in Muftah's
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586 camp (one of them was his brother and the other five were members of
627 different tribal segments), my driver (who was a member of the neighbor-
792 ing Sanagrah tribal segment), myself, and the religious man. After the tea was served, the religious man said that the discussion should start. He reminded the gathering that this case is a family one and should not develop into a larger dispute. "After all, the daughter's husband is a son, and the case is actually a misunderstanding between a father and a son and should be viewed in that context." Then he turned to Muftah and said that in that spirit he was asking him why he had taken his daughter away from her husgand. Muftah said that he had taken his daughter away

681 The ten pounds paid to the husband in this case is considered as
558 a kabara for the husband's injured pride. The kabara is one of the
[684] vaguest and least determined fines in the tribal law. As a face-saving
device, it varies from one case to another. It is determined in each
case by the seriousness of the insult, the publicity of that insult
(insults in a public place require a much larger kabara than insults
[561] in a private place). The relative age of the insulted and the offender
is also taken into consideration in assessing the kabara. If the insulted
is older than the offender, the kabara is much higher than if the
situation were reversed. In fact, in the last case the insulted might
● [554] not be able to collect any kabara at all. The relative status of the
two parties is also a factor. A member of a Murabiteen tribe who insults
a Sa'adi is likely to be charged with a larger kabara than the reverse
situation. The amount of kabara is left for the bargaining of the two
parties and their representatives and varies greatly from one case to
another. As such, the kabara is not exactly a fine or an independent
punishment. In most of the cases it is an additional punishment added
to a regular one. It is hard to imagine a crime in which the victim is
not considered in one way or another insulted or belittled. The only
681 specified kabara that I found in the tribal law was in the case of adul-
558 tery. The kabara in that case is the same regardless of the relative
684 position of the people involved. The kabara differs, however, according
to a standardized set of circumstances surrounding the place in which the
adultery is committed. Adultery committed in the husband's tent requires
kabara of the maximum L.E. 20; adultery within the camp of the husband
but outside his tent can bring a kabara of only L.E. 10, while adultery
committed outside the camp brings a mere L.E. 5. The justification for

586 626 divorce only under specific circumstances in the absence of which the
593 husband can force her to live with him. Following the Koraanic rules,
[562] Awlad Ali give men the right to dissolve the marriage at will and without
[779] any necessary justification; however, they differentiate between
cases where divorce is justified and those in which it is not. In a
case of justifiable divorce, the husband can take back the mahr and possibly
all other marriage expenses. In the case of unjustifiable divorce,
the husband forfeits his right to regain the mahr. Divorce is justified
whenever one or more of the husband's rights are violated by the wife or
members of her family. Not all degrees of violation are considered as
justification for divorce, however. Only intolerable violations can be
considered as such. In deciding whether or not an act constitutes an
[183] intolerable violation, Awlad Ali judge it against the standard of the
reasonable man, the customary man, and what he would have tolerated in
a similar situation.

586 What constitutes reasonable behavior does not only vary according
183 to the situation and the manner in which the actions are taken, but also
554 with the relative position in the social structure of the parties involved
and their initial relations to one another. In the case of divorce,
what constitutes grounds for justifiable divorce in one case may
not be sufficient grounds for justifiable divorce in another. In one of
586 183 the cases I witnessed during the year of study, a man who divorced his
554 wife because of her insistence that he buy her meat from the market
511 every day of the week, was forced to forfeit his right to redeem the
[114] mahr on the basis that the wife's actions had not established a basis
for justifiable divorce. In the negotiations that followed, the position
of the husband, as well as that of the family of the wife, were discussed.

586 183 554 511 The husband had a big herd by the standards of the tribe (600 sheep and goats). In addition, he also cultivated a large stretch of the fig land in the coastal area and was making good money. In other words, the husband could afford the standard of living the wife demanded. The other question that was discussed was the actions of the wife herself. She was the daughter of one of the wealthiest members of the same tribe as her husband; and according to the people who knew her, she was used to meat every day of the week. In other cases, similar demands by the wife to have a certain kind of food or to be clothed in certain kinds of material were considered as an intolerable situation, and the husband was justified in his divorcing her and had the right to retrieve his mahr. This was obvious in the case of one of my informants whose wife insisted that every time he went to Alexandria, he bring her silk material for a dress. Since the husband could not afford to meet her demands, her insistence was considered as grounds for the husband. 586 183 554 The assessment of reasonableness on the part of the husband in his divorce action and therefore his right to the mahr paid is frequently influenced by the relative position of the husband and the wife's guardian in the social structure. An influential man who marries his daughter to a poor relative or nephew rarely has to return the mahr.

586 562 Although women among Awlad Ali are not given the same legal right of divorcing the husband by pronouncing the "dismissal formula," they are given the right of certain customary procedures which in practice give them equal facilities for dissolving the marriage. This is known as the 574 right of the woman to "throw herself." This means that the woman takes all her clothes and sometimes her children and goes to the dwelling of

586 the man she chooses. She informs him before she enters his house that
562 she is the wife of so and so and the daughter of so and so and that she
574 is throwing herself on him to protect her from her husband with whom
she no longer wishes to live. Like the right of refuge, the man cannot
[778] refuse to let her in; and from this moment until her dispute with her
husband is resolved, she is considered as his house guest and is entitled to all the hospitality a guest receives. If he refuses to ex-
[627] tend that hospitality or refuses to take her in, she can ask for a mi'ad
[681] and is entitled to kabara from him. There has been no reported incidents
in which a man refused that right to a woman. As soon as she settles
down in the host's house, the latter takes immediate measures to find
the husband and to convince him to let his wife go. In doing this, the
man uses all the power of persuasion. The man selected for this purpose
586 is usually a respected man who can put pressure upon the husband. Some-
562 574 times he has to bribe the husband to release the wife, paying from his
● 554 own money. The man has to have money, not only to be able to support
[556] the wife during her stay in his house and to bribe the husband, but also
because in certain instances he has to pay the husband the mahr that the
father of the wife had taken in order to free her. The next step after
getting the agreement of the husband to divorce his wife is to contact
the father of the wife or her guardian and convince him to pay the mahr
to the husband. If the father does not agree, or if he is financially
unable to do so, the man on whom the woman has thrown herself is supposed
to pay from his own money. In cases where the woman left the husband to
be married to another man with whom she had had a relationship, the respected man tries to have the future husband pay the present husband the
mahr he is supposed to pay the woman after she is divorced from her

586 husband. In a number of cases the husband was willing to divorce the
562 574 woman after a promise by the man that she would pay him the mahr when
● 554 she got married. In most cases, however, the process costs the man a considerable amount of money. Sometimes, when the woman is young and attractive, the man finds it to his advantage to keep her as his wife, since she will cost him no more expenses. On the other hand, the man cannot refuse a woman the right of refuge, since to do this or to deny her the right of hospitality will make him liable to pay kabara if she made the refusal known publicly. On the other hand, it is prestigious to be known in the area as a man to whom women go to be released from their husbands. In fact, a man who acquires a reputation of getting wives released is likely to be sought as mardi in other cases as well.

Due to the nature of his role in mediating, the woman must be careful in selecting the man over whom she throws herself. These considerations are manifested in the following case taken from my field notes.
[584] Hadia was forced by her father to marry a man from the same tribe who
[583] paid her father L.E. 100 as mahr. She did not want to marry him because she was in love with someone else of whom her father did not approve. One month after she was married, she left the tent and never came back.
586 Later, she appeared in the house of Omda Ali, the chief of another tribe,
562 and everyone knew that she had thrown herself on him. She later told me
574 554 why she had selected Omda Ali and not the Omda of her own tribe. "Be-
634 cause my husband works for the Omda of my own tribe, and I thought he would be biased. Of course, I couldn't have gone to my father; he was the one who forced me to marry that man. Omda Ali is very respected and can support me... He is also rich and is known for releasing wives from their husbands." Omda Ali called the husband in and asked him to divorce

586 his wife. The husband agreed but insisted that she pay him L.E. 300
562 (this included the mahr and the marriage expenses). The Omda tried to
574 reduce the amount but could not. He then tried to get the father to
554 pay, but the father refused. He had to pay the husband L.E. 200 of
634 his own money and promised that the rest would be paid when the woman
remarried (it would be paid from the mahr). The husband divorced Haida.
One week later she was married to her lover. I have no information
about whether or not the 100 pounds was paid.

586 In another example, Sabha was forced by her father to marry her
562 cousin (ibn 'amm). She could not live with him, so she threw herself
574 554 on one of the holy men in the area. The holy man convinced the hus-
792 band to divorce Sabha and then went to her father and convinced him to
pay back the mahr to the husband, and the case was settled. People say
[626] that both the husband and the father agreed to the demands of the holy
man because they were afraid of his supernatural curse. Sabha went
back to her father's house.

586 It is obvious from these and similar cases that the success or
562 failure of the procedure depends on the careful selection of the man
593 on whom a woman throws herself. It is also apparent from the above
(554) (574) examples that his right of refuge is resorted to only in cases where the
woman cannot go to her father or to her closest kin to help her get a
divorce because he is either unable or unwilling to help her. A father
is unable to help if the husband is powerful or if he is the woman's
ibn 'amm (father's brother's son) who has, according to the tribal law,
the undisputed right to marry his bint 'amm (father's brother's daughter).
The father is usually unwilling to help his daughter if he is the one

682 settlement is usually made after the parties have agreed to it,
627 yet, in certain instances where one of the parties later feels that
672 the settlement was not just or that he was coerced into accepting
695 it, he may ask for a second Mi'ad during which new procedures start
in the case. In the present case, although Mahdi had originally
accepted the judgment of the awaqil, as time passed and he real-
ized that he was unable to pay the bloodmoney, he started to ques-
682 tion the feasibility of the settlement. He discussed the matter
672 with Sheikh Suliman el-Gerery from the Murabiteen tribe of Gerera,
695 a tribe whose members are feared throughout the area for the belief
● 554 that they have certain supernatural powers. Sheikh Suliman himself
792 is highly respected, and people believe that after his death he will
[776] become "wali" or a saint. After hearing Mahdi's complaint, Sheikh
Suliman told him that the settlement was unjust and told him that he
would do something about it. The following Thursday, Sheikh Suliman
called on Mahdi and asked him to bring his donkey and follow him.
They rode to a small desert town called Bahig where the local market
613 is held every Thursday. On market day, the awaqil of various tribal
517 segments usually gather in front of the general store in the town
571 drinking tea and chatting until their sons or the younger members
443 576 of their families sell the sheep and buy the necessary items. Every-
one passing by the gathering is expected to greet the gathering, get-
ting off his donkey as a sign of respect to the prominent people.
[689] Failure to greet a fellow tribesman is considered a serious offense
liable to a fine of more than L. 50 and ten goats in certain cases.
[673] It is considered a very serious crime. One informant once told me,
000

124 One informant once told me,
576 "If you don't greet me, this means that you hate me, and if you
829 hate me, there is no limit to the kind of harm you can do me and
my family. One who hates you can kill you, and none can walk
safely anywhere if he fears that he will be killed."

682 As Sheikh Suliman and Mahdi reached the general store, every-
689 one was gathering there as usual, including the two awaqil who
672 were involved in the original settlement. Sheikh Suliman told
695 554 Mahdi not to dismount his donkey and not to say the customary
792 greeting as they passed by the gathering. When they passed the
576 gathering, everyone stood to greet Sheikh Suliman who ignored them
and left with Mahdi. No one believed that Sheikh Suliman, who
should be the guard of the tribal tradition, should commit such an
unforgivable violation of the norms of the people. The next morn-
682 ing the whole area was talking about a big Mi'ad to "take the right"
689 from Sheikh Suliman and Mahdi, who had insulted the gathering. The
672 Mi'ad was held a week after the incident. During the Mi'ad, Sheikh
695 554 Suliman was asked to explain his behavior, and his answer was, "How
792 do you want me to greet all those people who were sitting in front
576 of the store? There were more than thirty men in that gathering,
627 and I was afraid that if I said the customary greeting, I might
have startled some of them causing them to harm themselves, leaving
me with the payment of so many bloodmoneys." Immediately, the
attendants of the Mi'ad knew what Sheikh Suliman was referring to,
and that his action was to prove that the settlement reached in
the case of Mahdi was wrong and that it set a very dangerous prece-
dent which would cause people to avoid greeting one another, "and
hatred will prevail among brothers and nobody will be safe in his
own home."

105 On the other hand, there is always a feeling of rivalry and hostility
598 between the different tribal segments which goes back to the era of
571 tribal warfare. Thus, the social relations among the tribal population
are characterized by a certain amount of ambivalence which is hidden behind
a facade of formality in the way tribal members treat one another
105 in day-to-day activities. There are certain rules of etiquette describing
571 the way members of the same tribal segment should behave toward one
576 another and toward other tribesmen and outsiders. Failure to abide by
[589] these rules may subject the violator to a symbolic fine of a goat or a
[574] sheep slaughtered for a feast to which everyone is invited. These feasts,
[182] or dinners as they are called, have various functions, the most important
105 of which is the integrative one. In an area where the population is usually
571 dispersed, these dinners offer an opportunity to the tribesmen who
574 happen to be in the area at the time of the feast to attend, where they
182 eat, meet other tribesmen, and exchange information about what is happening
in other parts of the area. It is from such dinners that the tribesmen
get to know about the available pastures, about the prices of sheep
and goats in different markets, and about who is doing what and where.
The occasion also signifies the restoration of the violator of the rules
to the social life of the group and the reinforcement of those rules.
105 This is also true with the tribal meetings, or mi'ad, which are held to
627 announce settlements in more serious cases. It is on this basis that
182 628 the mi'ad should not be considered as a tribal court. It is more of a
[574] social occasion where food and drinks are served and where parties involved
and all those invited by them talk about everything except the
[589] dispute itself. In certain instances, the financial settlement agreed
upon in the informal mediation is exaggerated when announced in the mi'ad

105 so that part of it may be reduced in honor of some prominent members
627 182 who are attending the meeting. When part of the financial agreement is
681 reduced in honor of a person, this creates an obligation on the part of
● 554 that person to reciprocate in a similar situation when one arises. This creates an active interest in the settlement on the part of individuals who otherwise are not involved, and insures the durability of the settlement. The social cohesion is maintained.

105 The need to keep friendly relations with all tribesmen is reflected
571 578 in the judicial process in its procedural aspect, as well as in judicial
627 reasoning, that is, the logic according to which facts in certain cases
182 are assessed. With regard to procedures, there is an emphasis on avoiding face-to-face confrontations between the disputing parties until an agreement has been reached by means of the mediators. Only then is it that the parties see and talk to one another. This is especially true in serious cases such as homicide or serious assault where face-to-face confrontation is likely to lead to more hostilities.

105 The emphasis on reconciliation may explain, at least in part, the in-
571 formality of the judicial process. Leaving the process of dispute settle-
627 182 ment informal gives it a measure of flexibility which permits the treatment of each case as unique without being tied down by rigid formal rules. This does not mean, however, that there are no rules to be followed, or that there is no place for legal precedents. It simply means that the rules are very general and that the legal precedents are used merely as a guide in solving similar cases. The main guide remains, however, the desire to achieve a successful settlement that satisfies all parties. It is only through achieving such successful settlements that the social order is maintained and the tribal cohesion is secured.

tions of soil, water, and grazing. We trace the segmentation of 619
the Qalabta alone and see that it has two divisions, the Muasa 613
and the Mahamda. We follow the line of Muhammad alone and note that it splits into three lineages, *'Ailat* Brahim, *'Ailat* al-Mzatal, and *'Ailat* al-Shauqi (there is dispute, arising from quarrels over land, about the legitimacy of this branch). From Mzatal descend the three minor *'ailat*, al-Slailikh, al-Aqta', and Balraba'i. Following only the first line we note that *'Ailat* al-Shlailikh then divides into the various *biyut* shown on the chart, al-Habal, Mustafa, Brahim, &c., the male membership of only one of which, *bait* al-Habal, is presented in the genealogy. Where the name of an *'aila* or *bait* is different from that of its founder, it almost invariably means that the founder's nickname has been used, the Cyrenaican Bedouin having a partiality for nicknames.

Each section of a tribe, from the smallest to the largest, has 619
its Shaikh or Shaikhs. The tribal system, typical of segmentary 554
structures everywhere, is a system of balanced opposition between tribes and tribal sections from the largest to the smallest divisions, and there cannot therefore be any single authority in a tribe. Authority is distributed at every point of the tribal structure and political leadership is limited to situations in which a tribe or a segment of it acts corporately. With a tribe this only happens in war or in dealings with an outside authority which for its own purposes recognizes the tribe as an
administrative unit. There cannot, obviously, be any absolute [643]
authority vested in a single Shaikh of a tribe when the funda-
mental principle of tribal structure is opposition between its [671]
segments, and in such segmentary systems there is no state and no government as we understand these institutions; and criminal law is absent and civil law exists only in a very rudi-
mentary form. Consequently the exact status of a Shaikh can 554
only be defined in terms of a complicated network of kinship ties and structural relations. It is only necessary here to emphasize that his social position is unformalized and that he must in no sense be regarded as a ruler or administrator. Bedouin respect their Shaikhs, but they do not regard them as superiors. Rather their influence and wealth are considered as capital to be drawn on for the benefit of whoever is in need of them. So long as a Shaikhly family can keep their prestige,

● 554 derived from the strength of their section, their wealth, their traditional place in Bedouin society, and the character of their leading members, so long only are they regarded as Shaikhs of whatever the grade may be.

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[642]
In recording his impressions of the Aulad 'Ali tribe the generous and unfortunate Pacho gives an excellent picture of the Bedouin Shaikh's position in tribal society. He says that it is difficult to discover any government in their society, which might be called aristocratic, though it is such in form rather than in substance. The precarious authority of the Shaikhs rests not on force but on the renown and esteem they enjoy in the tribe.

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He adds that at the time of his visit it had become customary, after Muhammad 'Ali Pasha had broken the tribe, for the Shaikhs to get their titles confirmed by the Pasha of Egypt but that when they returned to their camps with the robes of honour bestowed on them by the Pasha of Egypt, these garments, far from adding to their prestige and making them objects of regard, excited derision and aversion unless the backing of the tribe had preceded the approval of the Pasha.[1]

554
613
[556]
The Italian lawyer Savarese has also written an illuminating description of the status of a Cyrenaican Bedouin Shaikh. Each *bait* and each *'aila* has its Shaikh, chosen for his age and wisdom or for his prowess, though the Shaikhship is generally hereditary in certain families. A Shaikh receives obedience and respect from his dependants but ought to be rich because the demands of hospitality are considerable. He takes a leading part in the settlement of disputes and must have the tact necessary to maintain the unity of the group in opposition to other groups of the same order. He represents his group in relations with these other groups and in the larger group of which it forms part. In matters in which his group as a whole is concerned he takes the advice of the Shaikhs of its divisions. He commands the men of the group in war and he collects the tribute due from

554 the group to the Government. Nevertheless, a Bedouin Shaikh, however large the group he represents, lives and dresses like his fellow Bedouin, though, being rich, his tent may be larger than most and he has more horses and they are more richly appointed.

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[1] J. R. Pacho, *Relation d'un Voyage dans la Marmarique, la Cyrénaïque et les Oasis d'Audjelah et de Maradèh*, 1827, p. 67.

He also has more wives than other Bedouin and is usually more 554 [595]
cultured and intelligent.[1]

The most important of the Shaikhly families of the country, 554
those which represented large tribal divisions vis-à-vis the 558
Turkish Government, the Sanusiya, others sections of their 648*
tribe, adjacent tribes, and attached client groups, lost much of their influence with the loss of their stock and the exile of some of their more prominent members during the second Italo-Sanusi war. The authority of these traditional Shaikhly lineages was also undermined by Italian policies, first of recognizing and paying salaries to so many Shaikhs, some of whom were persons of little importance, that the office of Shaikh lost much of its virtue in the eyes of the people, and afterwards of ignoring the Shaikhs altogether. The better known of these Shaikhly families are the house of Bu Bakr bu Hadduth among the Bara'asa, the house of Lataiwish among the Magharba, the house of 'Abdalla among the 'Abaidat, the houses of Kizzih and 'Abbar among the 'Awaqir, the house of Asbali among the 'Arafa, the houses of Suwaikir and 'Ilwani among the 'Abid, the house of Bu Khatara bu Halaiqa among the Hasa, and, in the Sirtica, the most famous house of all, that of Saif al-Nasir among the highly nomadic Aulad Suliman.

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[1] Op. cit., Pt. II, pp. 39–40.

778 to act as mediators between tribes and between one tribal
619 section and another. Even to-day their tombs are regarded as
792 neutral points, as it were, and are often the place chosen for a
776 meeting between the Shaikhs of one tribe, or tribal section, and
those of an adjacent tribe, or section, when some matter has to be settled between them. It has sometimes happened also that when two tribes have disputed the ownership of territory, they have settled the dispute by allotting it to a Marabout, which means to his descendants, so that one then finds a *Marabtin* strip between two *Sa‘adi* tribes or tribal sections. One of the best examples of this is the strip of country owned by the Aulad al-Shaikh tribe between the ‘Awaqir and the ‘Abid and ‘Arafa tribal domains. In the same way tribes made gifts of disputed wells to dead saints. Where a *Marabtin* tribe has grown out of a Marabout family they will be found living in the area around their tombs. Thus the Aulad al-Shaikh territory spreads out from Sidi Mahiyus, part of the Masamir live near Sidi Nuh, the Mshaitat live around Sidi al-Mshaiti, and the Qat‘an live near Sidi Hashim and Sidi Suliman al-Tair.

792 So, long centuries before the Grand Sanusi began his mission
776 in Cyrenaica, the Bedouin were used to the sight of an *‘alim*, a
212 learned man—for anyone who can read and write is a learned
● 554 man to the Bedouin—coming from the west to heal their
children and beasts, break droughts, write talismans, and teach them the beliefs and law of Islam. Such a man was also a *muhakkam*, one who arbitrated in their disputes and said the *fatiha* at their settlements and undertakings to make them binding. He could arbitrate among them because he was not of them. He was not like them a tented son of the steppe, though his descendants may have learned to live as such, but a *Marabat*, a man who follows religion and not the rains. The Bedouin of Cyrenaica owe much to these holy men, for, ignorant and superstitious though they may have been, they taught the tribesmen to respect learning and religion and kept those twin lights burning, even if dimly, through centuries. The Bedouin do not forget them, or to say a prayer for them, when they pass their tombs; and they have given the freedom of their earth and water to their descendants. Without these forerunners the
[182] Grand Sanusi could not have planted his Order in the country.
*[795] It is planted in their bones.

*795 find hereditary transmission of Shaikhship of lodges most
793 accentuated, such as the Bara'asa-Tamia section (al-Zawiya
613 al-Baida), the 'Awaqir-Sdaidi section (Msus zawiya), and the
428 'Abaidat-Ghaith section (Tart zawiya). In the same way the
[792] earlier Marabouts became, as has been noted, founders of
lineages which were on the pattern of the branches of the
Bedouin clans among whom they lived, and attached to them.

*795 Also it must be remembered that the lodges were tribal
institutions built by the local Bedouin so that they might
778 participate in the *baraka* of Sayyid Muhammad bin 'Ali al-
793 Sanusi. They participated in it through the Shaikhs of their
619 zawiyas who received their *baraka* direct from the hands of the
182 Grand Sanusi himself, or from the hands of son Sayyid al-Mahdi, and passed it on to their sons. This *baraka* belonged to the tribe, or tribal section, which built a lodge just as the *shaukha*, the secular Shaikhship of the tribe, or tribal section, belonged to it and had to be kept in it. In both the continuity of family succession had to be maintained, unless there were good reasons for acting otherwise. Thus each tribal section emphasized its autonomy in its hereditary line of religious Shaikhs, through whom the *baraka* of the founder of the Order was transmitted to them, whilst proclaiming its membership of a tribal federation with common allegiance to the Head of the Order.

*795 As I have pointed out when speaking of the sacred *Marabtin*
793 tribes of Cyrenaica, it was customary for the descendants of a
778 Marabout to reside near his tomb. I have further mentioned
[776] that the Shaikh of a Sanusiya lodge, who is also called a *Mara-
bat* by the Bedouin, might, if he had during life a reputation for piety, rather easily gained in Islam, be venerated as a saint when he was dead and his tomb become a shrine. This is another reason why Shaikhly families have tended to become hereditary directors of lodges.

*795 Just as almost all the Marabouts of Cyrenaica were foreigners
793 from the west, so were almost all the Shaikhs of the Sanusiya
554 lodges. The Dardafi and Isma'ili families came from Tripoli-
[167] tania, the Ghumari family from Morocco, the 'Ammur, Bu
Jibali, and Khattab families came from Algeria, and so on. As a class they enjoyed, and still enjoy, a reputation for sanctity among the Bedouin on account of their knowledge of the Koran

and of reading and writing, and of their strict performance of 795* religious duties. This reputation was doubtless enhanced by 793 their foreign origin, for the Bedouin of Cyrenaica were accustomed 554 to look to the west for piety.

At one time many, perhaps all, the Shaikhs of lodges were fairly well educated in such subjects as theology, canon law, [212] and commentaries on sacred texts. To-day most of these alumni of Jaghbub University are dead and their successors, brought up in the bitter years since 1911, are for the most part very ignorant, some being almost as illiterate as the Bedouin themselves. The Bedouin regard them with a curious mixture of respect and condescension. They look up to them as learned and pious men who possess *baraka*, they kiss their hands, they call them '*Sidi*', and they listen respectfully to their admonishments and arbitraments. At the same time they look down on them for not being tribesmen and Bedouin, children of the tents. The Bedouin harmonize these conflicting attitudes by saying that a *Marabat* is a different kind of person from a Bedouin and cannot be expected to behave in the same way or to have the same outlook. He has been brought up to read books, pray, wash, and to do other things the Bedouin finds unnecessary in his own life. He has not been reared in the roving life of the tents nor learned the shepherd's art. Since [582] they regard the *Ikhwan* as a different kind of people, the Bedouin do not intermarry with them nor with the Sanusi family, who belong to the same category. The *Ikhwan* families 795* marry among themselves. The Sanusi family marry the 582 daughters of *Ikhwan*, but do not give their daughters to persons outside their own kin.

The importance of the *Ikhwan* families in the history of the 795* development of the Sanusiya is evidently very great. From the 554 foundation of al-Zawiya al-Baida in 1843 to the appearance of Sayyid Ahmad al-Sharif in Cyrenaica in 1912 the Heads of the Order were absent from the country, either in Arabia or in distant oases, and its direct influence on the tribes was exercised by the Shaikhs of its lodges in their midst. Their ritual position within the tribal system combined with their structural position outside it enabled them to settle disputes and to unite and lead the various sections which had sponsored their lodges when the Order required their support. It was they who roused the [648]*

3:Evans-Pritchard E-4, 5 (1942-1944) 1949 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9
(1837-1942) Sanusi

*795 Sudanese against the French in 1902 and, as we will see, it was
• 554 they who roused the Bedouin of Cyrenaica and of large parts of
*648 Tripolitania and Fazzan against the Italians in 1911; and it was they who attempted, unsuccessfully, to rouse the Bedouin of Egypt against the British in 1915. It was, above all, their propaganda and personal example in the field which made the struggle against Italy a national war and a religious crusade. [178] To-day they have been broken by death, exile, and expropriation, and are poor and ignorant, but in the heyday of their power the Turks rightly estimated their influence and were careful not to encroach on their prerogatives.

VI

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182 The thesis I have maintained in the foregoing pages, that the Sanusiya kept its cohesion and developed into a political organization largely because it was identified with the tribal system of the Bedouin, is supported by the lack of cohesion, common direction, and political influence of the other Islamic Orders in Libya, which won adherents only in the towns of Cyrenaica and among the citizens and peasants of Tripolitania, and in neither country found support among the Bedouin. I mention these other Orders for this reason, and also because a reference to them, however brief, places the Sanusiya in a more general setting as only one among many Darwish Orders. These other Orders are, however, described barely, since the part they have played in the political history of Cyrenaica is negligible.

*795 The following Orders besides the Sanusiya are represented in Cyrenaica: Qadiriya, Rifa'iya, 'Arusiya, 'Isawiya, Tayyibiya, 'Azuziya, Madaniya, and Sa'adiya. The Qadiriya and the Rifa'iya are the only two classical Orders with lodges in the country, though the others eventually trace their descent from classical sources by those tortuous ramifications so confusing to the student of Islamic fraternities.

The distribution of the lodges of these Orders in Cyrenaica at the present time is shown in the table opposite. A knowledge of the history of the Orders is not necessary for an understanding of the history of the Sanusiya in Cyrenaica and is therefore omitted. It is necessary only to know that they all entered Cyrenaica from the west, both those, the majority,

[TEXT CONTINUED ON PAGE 86]

mon symbol which stood for their common interests. Faced 175*
with amorphous, but seemingly ineradicable, opposition from 648*
the Bedouin the Italians more and more directed their hostility 795*
to the Sanusiya Order as a tangible head to the resistance which 619
could be destroyed. Failing to crush opposition they were forced [793]
to come to terms with it, but they could not come to terms with
a tribal system—only with an organization and through a
person, the Head of the Order, who could speak for that
organization and for the tribes which it represented. Both in
fighting the tribes and in trying to come to terms with them,
the Italians thus threw the Sanusiya organization into political
relief, and the *tariqa*, the religious Order, began to speak of
itself as a *hakuma*, government. The peace negotiations, therefore,
centred round a contradiction. The Italians attempted to 175*
exact recognition of sovereignty and this implied recognition of 648*
the right of the Head of the Order to surrender sovereignty,
which he could do only if he were in a position analogous to 728
that of the Head of the Italian State, a status the Italians would 795*
not concede. Nevertheless they were compelled, in order to 793
establish relations with the tribes, to grant the Head of the 554 •
Order the title of Amir, and implicitly to recognize him as not
only the Shaikh of a religious Order, but the Head of a political
organization. As will be seen, the dilemma led to much equivocation
and finally to a second Italo-Sanusi war. In this
second war the Sanusiya was entirely destroyed as an organization,
political, economic, and religious. It persisted nevertheless
as a sentiment, and the Head of the Order in exile in Egypt still
retained the allegiance of the Bedouin who saw in his freedom
the hope of their own.

When the last European war broke out and Cyrenaica became 175*
a battlefield of first importance it was in the interests of each 648*
side to ensure that the local population would be favourable 795*
to it. The Italians, having destroyed the Order, the one
organization through which they might have made effective
propaganda among the Bedouin, were confronted in the country
with an unimpressionable mass of sullen resentment which
could in no way be influenced to their advantage. The British,
on the other hand, who sought to rouse the Bedouin to renewed [793]
rebellion, at any rate up to the point at which they gave what [554]
assistance to British arms they were capable of, had a ready

*175 means of influencing them to this end in the exiled Head of the
*648 Order and many influential Shaikhs of tribes who recognized his
*795 authority. But the British Government, which in the past had
793 consistently refused to admit that Sayyid Muhammad Idris was
more than the Head of a religious Order, were in the new
● 554 circumstances compelled to accept his offer of help as coming
from a person who could act in a political sense and for the whole population of Cyrenaica. The Sayyid had, therefore, to be recognized as an Amir and to be permitted to recruit his own army under the Sanusiya flag. The Bedouin of Cyrenaica could only take part in a world struggle between states as a unit within their structure, as a political unit of the same order as the other allied countries, which were autonomous states acting through their own governments in their relations with the British Government and Armed Forces. The recognition of Sayyid Muhammad Idris as a political leader was easier for the British in that in war national sentiment is at a high pitch and those engaged in the struggle are particularly sensitive to national aspirations and sympathetic towards them. They are then anxious to placate national movements in their own empires and to encourage those in the empires of their oppo-
*175 nents. To the British all the people of Cyrenaica were Sanusi
*648 and they so spoke of themselves in their dealings with British
*795 troops, and not as members of particular tribes or as citizens of
particular towns. Through the long years of struggle Bedouin and townsmen alike had come to identify their interests with those of the Sanusiya Order, and to see in the Order the symbol of their particularist aspirations. 'Sanusi' had become a word which could be translated 'Cyrenaican'. It had ceased to have a religious content and had acquired a purely political one.

II

*175 This is a history of the Sanusi of Cyrenaica and not of Italy
*648 so that there is no need to record the domestic and international
circumstances in which Italy went to war with Turkey. Nor is it necessary to narrate the reasons the Italians gave for their declaration of war. Italy had certain historic claims to a sphere of influence in Libya and her strategic interests in the coast of Africa opposite her shores are obvious. It is easy to understand

than in Tripolitania, and they had learned the reason for this: 175*
'Inasmuch as in Cyrenaica the opposition to our rule was not 648*
fractionized and enfeebled by the personal ambitions and 795*
rivalries of numerous chiefs, but was retrenched and assembled 619
around a single will, the Sanusiya, which manipulated it as it pleased.'[1] They started the war afresh in 1923 with this conclusion firmly fixed in their minds: *delenda est Sanusiya*. But they still believed, not understanding the place of the Order in tribal life, that the attachment of the Bedouin to it was superficial, that it was some kind of parasitic growth which could be cut out of the tribal system. They further believed that their incessant propaganda had already undermined the hold of the Order on the Bedouin.

The Sanusi family, as will be seen, played an inconspicuous 175*
and inglorious part in the resistance. Italian writers confess 648*
surprise that the Bedouin should have continued to show 795*
devotion to persons whose character displayed so few of those 793
qualities Bedouin admire. The Bedouin may indeed have 554
expected a higher standard of conduct than some members of the family lived up to, but they did not suppose that they would distinguish themselves as military leaders. They knew that the descendants of the Grand Sanusi had been brought up in the oases to a sedentary and bookish life and not in the hard way of their own children and that they were unsuited to the frugal and exhausting life of a guerrilla. Their duty, in most cases little in evidence in fulfilment, was to pursue holiness and learning that their presence among the people might bring down on them God's blessing. In the eyes of the Bedouin they lacked in full measure the manly qualities of courage and endurance that Bedouin demand in their own folk, but they were credited with the scholarship and sanctity of the religious, which Bedouin admire in their spiritual guides rather than seek to emulate in their own lives. Italian writers sometimes refer to a member of the family accompanying the guerrilla bands, as did Sayyid al-Hasan and Sayyid Saddiq, as having the role of a standard (*insegna*), a word which well describes their peculiar position in the resistance. Where in a man the qualities of *marabat*, holy man, and of *mujahid*, fighter for the faith, were combined, as in Sayyid Ahmad al-Sharif and Sidi 'Umar al-Mukhtar, the

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[1] Agostino Gaibi, *Storia delle Colonie Italiane*, 1934, p. 344.

*175 Bedouin followed them at great sacrifice. They were combined
*648 in many of the Sanusiya Brothers.

*795 The Shaikhs and Brothers of the Order, with few exceptions,
793 played a prominent part in the war, both in the field and by
● 554 keeping the Bedouin, submitted and unsubmitted alike, in a
ferment. The Italian soldiers and administrators constantly
*175 complained that whenever the Bedouin were tiring of the
*648 struggle the Brothers of the Order urged them to continue it.
619 It was their example and exhortations which made it something
793 more than the usual piecemeal resistance of a barbarous people
794 to colonial conquest or more than a succession of raids of the
kind Bedouin have enjoyed for so many centuries. Their parti-
*795 cipation made it both a national and a religious movement. It did much also to establish the Sanusiya in the hearts of the Bedouin. Some of the best-known names of the resistance, like Salih Lataiwish, 'Abd al-Hamid al-'Abbar, Saifat and Muhammad bu Farwa, Husain al-Juwaifi, Brahim al-Fallah, Fadil al-Mahashash, and Qtait bu Musa, were those of Bedouin Shaikhs, but most of the leading figures were Sanusiya *Ikhwan*, men like 'Umar al-Mukhtar, Yusif bu Rahil, Khalid al-Humri, Sharif al-Mailud, 'Abd al-Qadir Farkash, Fadil bu 'Umar, Salih al-'Awwami, and Muhammad bu Najwa al-Masmari.

*175 The indomitable Sidi 'Umar al-Mukhtar was the soul of the
*648 resistance and the struggle is always associated with his name
as similar struggles against French aggression in Algeria and
*795 Morocco are associated with the names of 'Abd al-Qadir and
793 'Abd al-Karim. Sidi 'Umar, 'our irreducible enemy, the faith-
159 ful and able servant of Idris, the heart and soul of the Cyrenaican rebellion', as Graziani called him,[1] was that rare combination of Bedouin and Sanusiya Shaikh. He was born about 1862 of the *'Ailat* Farhan of the Braidan section of the Minifa tribe of the Marmarica and was educated first at the Sanusiya school at Janzur and afterwards at Jaghbub. He was nominated by Sayyid Ahmad al-Sharif Shaikh of al-Qasur lodge among the stubborn 'Abid tribe but only performed his duties there for two years before being summoned to Kufra to serve against the French in the Wadai. He returned to al-Qasur about 1906 and later took a prominent part in the first Italo-Sanusi war and in obstructing Italian penetration in the years of peace which

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[1] Op. cit., p. 235.

There are, in Cyrenaica, three major status groups among the 619
tribes: the noble or free-born tribesmen (*al-Hurr*), those who 554
have been adopted or grafted on to a tribe (the *Laff*), and the 608
clients (*Marabtin*).

Those who claim to be free-born also claim ownership of the 619
natural resources. The *Laff* do not own these. They are people 608
thought not to have originally been of the lineage of the tribe 621
with which they are resident. They are found sometimes in ones 613
and twos in the camps of the free-born, but sometimes constituting [423]
tertiary groups themselves. Now when such people have resided 619
with their free-born hosts for several years and one of them 608
has married one of the host's daughters, they are grafted to the 613
genealogy at the point of tertiary segmentation, that is, where 621
ambiguity occurs in the genealogy. Obviously, persons thus 173
grafted to the lineage cannot be shown as descendants of one of the living or of the recently dead, remembered perhaps by some of the elders still living. It is equally true to say that they cannot be grafted to the lineage at a point superior to that of the tertiary segments, since this would involve recognition by a number of tertiary groups whose members may know little or nothing about them. When a person enters a new tribe, the only way in which he can do so is to go to live in a camp, and it is the concern of the people of that particular camp whether or not they accept him, since it is they who have to decide whether their resources are sufficient to support a newcomer. Once a man has been accepted as a full member of a tertiary section, membership of superior tribal sections is automatic, although to enter into tribal membership he requires the permission of members of a tertiary section only. To graft at a point superior to the tertiary would be the same as giving a man superior structural status, but without a camp in which to dwell. There is only one place for his incorporation, and that is where the ambiguity in the genealogy permits manipulation to include new lines. In this way the [597]
adoption of a person into a lineage does not offend the sense of kinship of the receiving group since the point of inclusion is an ancestor about whom little or nothing is known and whose authenticity is frequently doubted by some. What has been referred to as an area of ambiguity is, moreover, something of a jumble of names, and it is not a difficult matter, if a new line has to be

days on which kin of various sorts should attend the mourning 613
ceremonies, which extend over a period of a week. Allowance is 621
made for those who may be away temporarily, although they are 765
expected to hasten to the mourning camp as quickly as possible.
Agnatic kin are expected not only to be present on the appropriate 613
day, but are required to offer gifts consistent with their 621
relationship to the bereaved; agnates of the tertiary segment are 765
expected to offer a sheep, while some cognates ought to bring a 431
goat and others a quantity of sugar and tea. At one funeral in a camp where I was resident, soon after the death occurred, the main concern of its inhabitants was whether or not certain men of their section would attend the mourning rites and bring appropriate gifts with them. These men lived at the time in another camp a few miles away, as they had been doing for several years past. They did not come when they were expected, and when they finally arrived at the end of the week they brought with them gifts of sugar and tea only—gifts which were totally inappropriate for agnates of the group. They were, in fact, now no longer members of it, and my neighbours were able to tell me, 'They have branched off from us. We will never live together again.' The lineage had proliferated and this was the first occasion for showing it.

Wide-spread in Cyrenaica is a cult of saints. The number of 794
saints' tombs varies from tribe to tribe, there being fewer among 776
the camel herders of the semi-desert than among the cow- 778
herding, almost sedentary, folk of the plateau area. Whatever [788]
the number, the members of the group that venerates a particular
saint make an annual pilgrimage to his tomb, and sometimes
more frequent pilgrimages are made. In one area there were two 794
men, accepted by their respective kin groups as leaders, who vied 554 •
against each other for the leadership of their section. One of them [648]
had been a famous warrior during the Italian wars and, after being injured, fled to Egypt where he lived for seventeen years, until he returned to his homeland in 1947. The other had also fought against the Italians, failed to win renown, was a captive for a time, later released, and subsequently appointed leader of his section by the Italian authorities. The first, during his period of exile, had become impoverished. The second during his years of freedom had prospered. As far as their personalities

794 were concerned, there was little doubt who was leader—the
554 name of the former was known throughout the land. Now when
the warrior returned from his Egyptian exile, his rival offered
794 him a sheep as a gift. This act was wholly appropriate. Subse-
554 quently they continued to compete fiercely, but it soon became
578 clear that the returned warrior was winning the greater support.
[788] In the face of this, the rival, in 1948, decided to break with tradi-
tion by staying away from the annual pilgrimage to the tomb of
[175] the local saint. Instead, he and his followers made their pilgrim-
age to a different tomb in the vicinity of their camp, and later
built a low wall round the tomb, whitewashed it, and made it
known that henceforward they would regularly use it for pilgrim-
[613] ages. The two kinship groups of a tertiary section now had their
[778] separate saint's tomb. Some months later, the rival decided to
794 move with his small group to an area in which they had not pre-
554 viously resided. It is the custom among the Bedouin when they
pitch their tents in a place for the first time, that the people of
578 the neighbourhood should bring them gifts to mark the event.
431 The returned warrior, who had now become a close neighbour
[166] of his rival was obliged, like others, to offer the latter a gift; he
was also obliged to return the gift of a sheep that he had been
given on rejoining his section in 1947. He brought a gift within a
few hours of his rival's arrival, but it was a goat.[14] The rival and
his followers were furious, and the argument that the warrior was
too poor to give more was dismissed summarily. This was the
final insult. The donor, in return, had been given less than he had
presented. The reciprocity of gift exchanges had not only been
arrested, it had been reversed. From then onwards the two groups
made no attempt to conceal their hostility and went their sepa-
rate ways.

613 Disputes stemming from circumstances such as these are the
578 occasions which mark the proliferation of groups, although in
all three cases cited, difficulties over water supplies had pre-
ceded the outbreaks of quarrelling.

613 In this discussion of the ways in which proliferation of seg-
602 ments takes place, the emphasis had been put on the tug of war
121 between the interests of people in their agnatic connexions and

[14] A goat is inferior to a sheep in gift exchanges.

121 kill within this range is, in terms of the general pattern of behaviour, stupid. What is of
613 interest is that such killings do occur. I recorded three instances of men killing the
682 mother's brother in the contemporary population, not to mention many others
674 based on hearsay evidence only. Clearly, the relationship is more than a merely per-
829 missive one. The mother's brother may well be the only person who can help in
certain crises, and if he withholds his assistance the sister's son is left in a dilemma.
604 The form of behaviour in which demands are made is, as the Bedouin rightly say,
121 that of asking a favour, but this does not mean that it is any the less urgent than a
613 demand made against agnates. The range of favours is large, and only a few can be
604 detailed here. If a group has insufficient water to meet its needs a man first seeks help
from his mother's brother. The request has a number of aspects to it: it is a test of
● [554] the relationship itself; it is a matter of pride and status that a man can 'call' on
another to help his group out of difficulties, it is an assurance that resources other than
those jealously guarded by his agnates are available to him, and if a man is seeking
to increase his power he must have available more than an agnate's share of local
[682] water resources to supply his flocks and herds. When a blood-money payment has to
be made, the mother's brother is expected to come forward—it is his right to give
[584] without being asked. If a man wants a wife, he is not permitted to approach his father
directly, but his mother's brother can put pressure on the father instead. If a man dies
[429] while his eldest son is still a minor, his brother may be required to act as guardian,
and in this role he controls the son's property; disputes frequently break out as a
result, with the son at a considerable disadvantage, for he cannot engage his father's
brother in hostilities—but his mother's brother can do so for him. Whenever men
[422] come to possess animals before the demise of their fathers or when the father's
brother is acting as guardian they mark them with the tribal and personal signs of their
[583] mothers' brothers. Men have the right to demand contributions for bridewealth
from their agnates if they lack wealth; in practice it comes not from them, but from
the mother's brother. Finally, in certain circumstances, if a man does not have male
heirs, his sister's son might inherit all his wealth.

121 Affinity also carries with it a large number of rights. A poor man may take up
613 residence in the camp of his father-in-law, and be kept by him. The latter may come
to his son-in-law's aid in many of his dealings with his father. Like the mother's
606 brother, the affine is a potential source of water-supply when rain has been insufficient
on the homeland. He also helps with blood money and bridewealth, and he is expected
to aid his daughter and her husband with gifts of food and wool.

121 The details given above by no means exhaust the list of rights a man possesses in
613 his matrilateral and affinal relatives. Obviously, these are not the only forms of
relationship either, and the other forms carry with them yet other claims of various
sorts. Enough detail has been given, however, to make clear the point that local
agnatic groups are so differentiated, and inter-group relationships are so important,
that each aspect of homicide settlement previously described will require further
examination, not in the sense that additional complications must be introduced, but
with the question in mind, is not the structural presentation false? Before beginning
this stage of the argument it is necessary to establish the fact that the links of affinity
and matrilaterality which a group has with another are of a kind which necessitate
their inclusion in an analysis of the arrangements for settling homicides.

121 celebrated war between the ʿAbaidat and the Bara ʿasa tribes occupying a large part
619 of central and eastern Cyrenaica. This war took place a hundred years ago, so that the
682 evidence is mainly hearsay, but it is significant that when asked for details of the
726 groups taking part the Bedouin make it clear that the entire tribes were not at war—
[173] some sections on both sides are said to have remained on friendly terms. Yet when
121 wars are discussed in a general fashion, the Bedouin insist that tribes confront each
619 other as such. If it is pointed out to them that men might be ranged against their
726 maternal relatives the Bedouin mumble apologetically that they would not kill their
maternal relatives—a lame argument since in the heat of battle men cannot make this
602 kind of discrimination. Details of other wars also illustrate the point that only parts
of tribes face each other in strife, for though the stories of past events may be inac-
curate there is genealogical evidence to substantiate their claims that certain groups
were linked in the past, and in any case their statements assert that where these links
exist they are not prepared to engage in hostilities. The several parts of each tribe,
121 like the parts of primary and secondary sections, have as many different sorts of
619 relationships as there are groups, and the general statement that tribes are warring
571 units merely obscures the interest there is in their relationships. Tribes, further, lack
the leadership to make war. I repeat that leadership does exist, but not even the
121 greatest leaders, past or present, can rightly be described as leaders of their tribes,
619 using the term in its structural connotation. Literature on the subject gives the
613 impression that there are tribal leaders, because successive administrations have used
554 the tribes and their divisions as a framework for attempting to rule the Bedouin, but
the details of the power domains of individual leaders make it clear that they have
little to do with the ordered divisions of tribes. A leader within part of one tribe may
carry with him tertiary sections of another tribe, and if major hostilities break out
between parts of these tribes, the sections of both which are joined as allies and
related as kinsfolk will not fight against each other, for sections so linked enjoy
stronger connexions than the structurally linked tertiary sections of a very large
[682] secondary section. Consequently the statement that homicide results in tribal war
[114] when the offender and his victim are members of two separate tribes is not merely
incomplete, not merely a simplification, it is wrong.

121 A point which has been implicit throughout the second part of this paper needs
now to be made quite explicit: groups do not come together in their respective
613 structural genealogical orders. During my entire residence in Cyrenaica I did not
571 see a group of agnates larger than a tertiary tribal section assemble for any purpose.
[114] It is true that the occasions when large groups are required to assemble are infrequent.
[648] It is also true that although the British Administration was serving a caretaker role
only, it may have had an affect on the nature of tribal gatherings. Despite this quali-
fication, there were several occasions when I expected tribal groups to assemble in
lineage order if the fusion of sections in relation to like sections has any meaning in
practice. Large groups of men did gather to dispute claims to wells, to argue about
rights to ploughland, and to make peace. In every case that I recorded the agnatically
closest groups of the main participants were absent, while members of genealogi-
cally more remote groups were present in strength. This statement applies to gather-
[628] ings in the camps and in the administrative centres. One of the biggest gatherings I
witnessed assembled in an administrative office in a village near the coast in the

571 between man and man, although the various cereal dishes which constitute
231 their regular meals are said to have a similar effect.

264 The son who continues to eat with his father "as he always had been
182 doing," also continues to accept his authority. Indeed he could do little else
593 at this stage, for he lacks the economic means to cut away. Neither at marriage
585 nor after is there any transfer of wealth from father to son. The new
182 tent recently pitched is no more than a dormitory to which the young couple
[425] retire at night. During the daytime the son is still to be seen in his father's
[556] tent, and, in the male quarters, things appear to be much the same as before.
In the female quarters, the only superficial change is the more frequent appearance
among the women of one who, before marriage, often sat among
them if she had been a close neighbour or a close cousin previously; or of
an additional helper if she had come from afar. On the surface things remain
"as they always have been," although in fact, a whole set of changes
have been initiated.

852 *Rites de passage* are few among the Bedouin. A man's progress in life is
881 ceremonially marked by only four events: his birth, circumcision, marriage
764 and burial. His development into manhood is not marked by clearly defined
stages. About the age of seven, the henna markings on the front of a boy's
858 shirt for protection from the evil eye are not renewed, the cowrie shell stitched
789 to the front of his cap as a kind of talisman against the evil eye is removed
and he is no longer permitted free access to the women's quarters. As he
857 grows older, he will be instructed in goat-herding, and later taught to follow
233 the sheep. In his late teens he will have to undertake the more arduous and
883 responsible task of herding the camels. Coincident with camel-herding, he
233 may be given a gun by his father. Shortly afterwards he must undertake the
[431] stringent test of manhood, a journey to a distant oasis for dates. These
[411] changes are not marked off by a *rite de passage*. The rites a man undergoes
[484] during the course of a lifetime are minimal, and in the sense that they are
[885] concerned with only the basic events in a man's life anywhere (save for
852 circumcision, which is a minor celebration anyway), they are irreducible.
88 Moreover, the rituals which exist do not comprehend the same multiplicity of
776 relationships as rituals which occur in many other African societies.[4] It is
[771] true that the ceremonies referred to in this chapter by no means include
all the Bedouin rituals. It is also true that the events mentioned vary in
[554] elaboration, and in the number of symbols present in them, but they are
not multiplied or reduced for different people.

In this context it is important to stress that we are here dealing with a
[613] lineage society where social differentiation is not built up into differences
[554] of rank, where the roles to which a man succeeds are almost wholly captured
[602] by his kinship relationships with other men and which are sociologically
to be distinguished from the roles a man enters into by acquisition of office,

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[4] See, for example, the elaboration of rituals discussed in M. Gluckman (Ed.), *Essays on the Ritual of Social Relations.* Manchester: University of Manchester Press, 1962.

membership of associations and so on. The statuses a Bedouin achieves de- 796
pend not on an ordered acquisition through the inheritance of roles or elec- 852
tion to them, but on his personal manipulation of linkages in his jockeying 88
with others. Rites are minimal because there are few defined statuses an 554 •
individual can predictably acquire. The equalitarianism of the desert denudes 602
the Bedouin of ritual riches. Complimentarily, rites which do occur are 613
thrown into exaggerated relief by the absence of others, and in their isolation, [557]
become not merely a "passage" but a cataclysmic change. Marriage and 585
burial both comprehend limited fields of relations, but accompanying cere- 764
monies may bring several hundred people together, people who otherwise 796
rarely gather in these numbers to meet one another as kinsmen and neigh- 602
bours, and it is suggested that the emphasis given to the events dramatises the 182
significance of the changes they produce. In the discussion of the changes
brought about by marriage, the Bedouin view of what is entailed will be
considered first.

The Bedouin View of Marriage

After marriage, the Bedouin argue, a son has a tent of his own, a woman 585
over whom he has authority and soon children to make him a father. Mar- 581
riage causes split, branching. A new family is created, holding the poten- [613]
tial of a new lineage. The separation is so painful a matter for the father
that he cannot contemplate it, hence his pretence that he has no knowledge of [593]
wedding festivities, and his subsequent attitude that nothing has happened.

Interestingly, there are two other occasions when this attitude is to be 682
observed. When a man kills within his corporate group,[5] he may flee his 613
tribe or he may be compelled to leave; later he is likely to return and, when 621
he does, he is received with a minimum of show. Every attempt is made to
suppress knowledge of the event.

Again, if incest occurs, the memory of it must somehow be suppressed, and 835
it is an ever-present danger. Men, permitted four wives simultaneously and 561
also able to engage in a plurality of marriages through divorce or death of [595]
spouses, may have children showing an age difference of two or three gen-
erations. Thus it comes about that a man may be of an age in relation to his
father's sister which permits them as children to behave as if they were
first paternal cousins. As an adult, the preferred spouse for a man is a [582]
father's brother's daughter. In terms of relationships between adolescents
the situation in which a man is of the same age generation as his father's
sister is fraught with danger. In one such case, between a man and his [684]
father's sister, the male child of the union was put out in the desert to be

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[5] Bedouin are disposed in groups which, in summer, usually constitute a single community, around or near a watering point. The men of this group are interlinked by reference to an ancestor four or five ascending generations, reckoning from the generation of men of about 20 years. When, elsewhere in this chapter reference is made to corporations, it will be to groups of this kind.

835 devoured by wild animals, the girl was "given"* to a close cousin who had
561 shot his sister. Both now reside with an enemy tribal section. The two acts
684 were equated. They were similar to the extent that both created a situation
which defied institutional resolution. The culprits were exorcised. The
girl's lover remains with his group — the odium for the male is incomparably
less than for the female, since, while maternity is easy to establish, paternity
is frequently shrouded in doubt — and during the months I lived with this
particular group, there was never a mention of the affair. It was as if "nothing had happened."

829 If asked why these two events cause such profound distress, the answers
578 the Bedouin give are twofold: they can do nothing about them, and they
613 cause split. By split in this context they mean split in the lineage; split in
[682] the case of homicide because it may lead to a demand for blood-money which
[684] is payable only between corporations, and split in the case of incest because
it causes chaos in relationships. Marriage, in one sense, their reasoning
581 runs, is similar, for it too causes split. Whatever may be the analytic strength
829 of the arguments that homicide and incest precipitate splitting, the argu-
613 ment that marriage does so is spurious. In what sense can marriage mean
split? Bedouin men marry "so that we may beget many sons, to make a
big lineage later on." The worst fate that can befall a man as a result of his
son's marriage is that he, in later generations, will become the focal point in
a series of branching descent lines. The alternative — that his sons remain
unmarried — can only mean that his name would disappear through want of
successors to carry it on, which is one of the greatest evils which can befall
a man, according to Bedouin sentiment: better split than oblivion. If the
key to the interpretation of the father's attitude to his son's marriage is not
581 that it causes split, it must lie elsewhere in their relationship. What mar-
585 riage does is alter the distribution of authority between father and son. In
593 order to pursue this, it is necessary first to clarify the types of authority involved, and then assess them in a post-marital situation.

554

The Division of Authority Between the Family and the Corporation

851 Politically, a person's status is determined for him at birth. At this time
a man has the right to accept or deny paternity. Denial is tantamount to an
accusation of adultery by his wife. In practice, once a wife has given birth
to a male child, whatever doubts people may harbour regarding paternity,
the husband accepts the child as his. "The boy for the bed," is a saying often
heard among the Bedouin; but it remains the husband's prerogative to invest
the child with legitimacy, hence, political status. Only if a husband becomes
[837] aware that he is publicly considered a cuckold, or if he catches his wife and a
lover *in flagrante delicto,* is he at all likely to take action. Otherwise he may

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[585]
[581] * A marriage is illegal unless it is accompanied by an agreement to transfer wealth to the girl's father.

554 851 837 indeed welcome unfaithfulness on his wife's part. If a man is very old, and his wife very young, it is likely that she will entertain lovers; if a man leaves camp for a long absence his wife may not remain chaste. In both cases, if the liaisons lead to the birth of a child, particularly a male, the husband greets the news with unrestrained enthusiasm — "praise be to God," as their saying goes. Incapacity[7] to produce offspring, if a husband is convinced of it, may lead him to delegate a kinsman to serve his wife for procreative purposes: he has the legal authority, as husband, to do so, and to require his wife to submit, for the only alternative, if he is not to die without "issue," is to "take" a son from his brother and fulfill the obligations towards this boy required of a pater, namely, attend to his circumcision, provide him with teaching in the Koran (a duty neglected by most) and give him the wealth with which to marry.

593 554 [851] [613] Granting the acceptance of paternity, whatever the circumstances of conception, a male child, *ipso facto*, acceeds to membership of a corporation, and is subject to the authority of that group in a number of matters. In many situations it would appear that a son is under the father's political control. At a moot, the son, if he speaks at all, will do so only to corroborate his father. Discussions among men in a small camp evoke a similar pattern of behaviour. Until the father becomes senile or dies, a son cannot publicly pursue an independent course, but he desists by virtue of his relationships with his father *qua* pater, not because of his father's political power to coerce. (613) All men of a corporation, in any event, "speak with one word" at a moot, and a son, by his assent to the common view, also supports his father; in so doing he yields to the political authority of his corporation, and not that of his father.

593 613 Membership in the corporation invests a man with other privileges and duties. Protection against external enemies comes within the corporation's jurisdiction, although in a particular situation, the father may well be the person who dispenses it. [681] Complimentarily, if a man commits an offense against a person not of his group, whatever private thoughts his father may have about the act, the responsibility lies not on his shoulders but on the group, and he is compelled to share this responsibility equally with all other members. [682] For example, if a son commits a homicide the father bears the same legal responsibility for the act, and is under obligation to contribute the same share of blood-money as he would be if the act had been perpetrated by any male of the group other than his son. Even in a narrower field of relations between father and son the group exercises its authority. Acting as pater, a man may punish his son, physically or otherwise; he may not do so to the point of injury, for personal injury comes within the legitimate sphere of the corporation. A man's "bone" belongs to his group; he is an in-

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[7] Impotency is a special case, because it is dishonourable for a woman to remain wife to an impotent man. She cannot divorce him, but her father can insist on a witnessed test of impotency and, if it is proven, the husband is compelled to divorce her. Barrenness, obviously, is a different matter. [833] [586]

her father takes, but in certain critical situations he can be relieved of choice 613 593
if the interests of the group as a whole are at stake. [421]

Political authority is the preserve of a corporation, and its exercise leads [428]
to invasion of a man's authority in the field of domestic relations. This [584]
does not mean, however, that discrete areas of authority do not remain with
the father. In the tent his authority over his son is so overwhelming as to
keep the son in almost complete subordination. The son is referred to as a
slave, and in daily life he has to behave as one. He must obey every com-
mand, for, were he to rebel, he would find little or no support among his
agnates, whatever the extent of the provocation. Retreat from his father is
hardly an alternative, since, while his father is alive, he has no animals of [422]
his own, and to leave camp would only mean that he would have to move
outside his group to seek employment elsewhere as a shepherd. If he did [558]
this he would forfeit status, and almost certainly cut himself off from prop- [428]
erty which would fall to him after his father's death. A man who "denies"
his father looses too many privileges for the practice to become widespread.

Caught in this dilemma, a son's predicament is worsened by the fact that 593
he cannot initiate marriage negotiations — to be able to do so requires some 584
animals to offer a girl's father. Through his mother's brother he has the [431]
means of bringing pressure to bear on his father, but the latter can resist for [604]
years. Finally, a marriage is arranged for him. It is difficult to convey the
yearning of young Bedouin for marriage. They discuss it among themselves 581
ad nauseam. For the most part their talk is about the sexual aspect of mar- 521
riage. Premarital sex relations are strictly controlled, and the movements 831
of each young girl are carefully guarded because, if on the day of her mar- 836
riage the test shows that she is not a virgin, she not only brings disgrace to [585]
her family, but the marriage may be revoked and her worth as a bride for
another man seriously diminished. Nevertheless premarital relations do [837]
occur, if not between youths and maidens to any extent, between young
men and married women.

The question still remains: why is marriage the occasion of such ebul- 581
lient celebration? The formal authority a father exercises over his son 593
changes little on marriage. Economically the son is still harnessed to the
father. The latter still shouts his orders at him, and obedience remains
unaltered. Any sign of an independent view on a matter is met with a gruff
rebuff. If the marriage turns out to be disagreeable to the father, he has
the authority — if not always the power — to break it. Marriage does not
mean a change in the general mode of behaviour between the two; the legal
relations remain unaltered, albeit modified in practice, as the married son
matures in age. But marriage does mean the acquisition of rights and status
previously denied a son. Henceforward, he has a domain of his own. This
is high drama, indeed, for although every effort is made to give substance to [554]
the expressed view that "nothing has happened," for the first time in his
life the son has seized publicly, amid the jubilations of his fellows, a status
which hitherto was the possession of the father.

daughters of agnates and, in view of the high agnatic concentration, the 582 daughters of agnates who are co-residents as well. Parallel-cousin marriage 602 therefore creates affinity between co-resident agnates.

The rate of parallel-cousin marriage is high, producing such a density of kinship relationships as to afford a reliable index for defining the agnatic corporation. As a form of marriage it persists; genealogical records clearly demonstrate this. Frequency of parallel-cousin marriage taken together with its persistency, means, above all else, that it makes an agnatic group a cognatic group as well. The matter is put in this way to suit the general development of the argument, but it would be a serious error to think that this means I am giving priority to agnation and that I am considering cognation as intrusive, or that, in this society, agnation can stand on its own because it has a kind of absolute significance other forms of relationship do not possess. Both forms exist in reality.

The great Bu Bakr of Cyrenaica's most celebrated lineage is alleged to have [613] exhorted his fellow tribesmen to "marry your father's brother's daughters and then your paternal relatives and your maternal relatives will become one." Whether he had given the advice or not, the Bedouin, as their society is constituted, would marry them anyway. The Bedouin form of agnation without its accompanying parallel-cousin marriage would impose impossible restrictions, if indeed there is any point in attempting to conceive of a situation so remote from reality. With parallel-cousin marriage present in the corporate group, men referred to as agnates are not agnates only; each and [613] every one of them is the centre of a bundle of roles, each role potentially [554] as important as the other. It would be false to argue, moreover, that complexities of relationships can be unravelled by analytically separating them, giving precedence to the agnatic role in an "agnatic" situation, the mother's brother's role in a domestic situation and so on. An agnate who is also a mother's brother is never the same, in any situation, as an agnate to whom one is not otherwise related. The prime significance of parallel-cousin marriage is that it creates a complexity of linkages which almost amount to confusion, [182] thereby maximising the choice available to individuals to meet whatever contingencies befall them.

The only area of relationships left relatively undisturbed by parallel-cousin marriage is the son, father and father's brother triangle. Freed of the complications stemming from parallel-cousin marriage, agnation can here approximate its true form. Other complications arise out of marriage. A 582 few are listed here: father and son marry a mother and her daughter; a 583 form of exchange marriage between first parallel-cousins occur; two brothers marry two sisters; the marriage of two brothers to two sisters is followed, in the succeeding generation, by the son of one union marrying the daughter of the other, making this latter a double first parallel-cousin marriage — both a father's brother's daughter's and a mother's sister's daughter's marriage. These forms can all occur within a corporate group. No citadel of agnation [613] can withstand this attack. All forms of marriage combine to break the grip [602]

462

in position immediately anyone else appears at the entrance to the tent.[11] [834
Women cook, but they do not serve the meal to males, nor are they responsible 342
for the distribution of meat among them. Parts of an animal are 264]
carefully specified, and the various portions distributed at a meal carry 264
with them a great deal of significance. A host can honour, flatter, disappoint 574
or even insult his guest, depending on the precise distribution of meat 571
he adopts. Designated portions should go to certain kinsmen if they are [602]
present, but this still leaves a wide margin of choice, and a host can use
this choice as part of the many means at his disposal for directing his relationships
with other men. A political link can be forged or another
snapped by the distribution of portions of meat at the commensal meal.

The Bedouin Ideal Type of Family as a Unit of Production

This account of the division of labour is far from inclusive of all the tasks 594
carried out. The details given are only barely sufficient to provide some 183
indication of the necessary composition of a family. Referring again to the [462]
Bedouin sentiments about the matter, it is now possible to give it some
numerical precision. The number of females should be a minimum of
about three, including a mother, a teen-age daughter and a child of about
eight years. Males should number about six: a father, relieved of most [857
chores to act as director; a son in his middle to late twenties, to plough; a 883
second son, in his early to middle twenties, to herd the camels; a third, in 462
his late teens to early twenties, to shepherd the sheep; a fourth, middle to 561]
late teens, to look after the goats; and a younger son to fetch, carry and
run errands about the camp. The family of the ordinary Bedouin, they say,
shows this sex and age distribution, although they recognise that a politically [554 •
ambitious man with the wealth to match his aspirations would require more 556]
of both sexes — particularly women, since the burden of entertainment increases
rapidly with a man's climb to power and fame.

Clearly, the basis of Bedouin sentiment concerning family structure is its 121
approximation to an ideal production unit. Some families display the features
of this ideal, but even they enjoy the productive benefits of this composition 183
for a very limited period only. The family, as described above, can only be an 594
ephemeral unit, since the age structure constantly changes, women are removed
by marriage, men move away and death affects it at any point at any
time. The Bedouin family is a fiction in the sense that it can be said to have a
characteristic composition. The mistake they make is to conceive of it as a
particular kinship structure related to production. The substance of what
has been referred to as a fiction is that, if viewed as a productive unit, it
bears close consistency with reality. Freed of the need to examine it in terms
of specifically limited kinship relationships, and no longer anchored to the [621]
inhabitants of a single tent, the distribution of people according to sex and

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[11] This is the general rule. In practice, the use of the divider can indicate an intimacy or distance in relationships, most subtly.

would be impossible to satisfy all marriage expectations of men within the 621
universe of the minimal tribal section. For this reason alone external links 613
are inevitable and persistent. Also, the small territorial strip such a group 582
claims as a homeland produces an economy which, in this environment, 182
is unstable. Additional security is gained by making connections with other [423]
tribal sections, each with its specific ecological character. Men also marry [433]
into their client groups. The proportion of these for this camp was 9 per cent [619]
of the total. From these links they gain economic advantages, they can
claim services and a client-following is politically significant. Finally, 7
per cent of the total[13] are marriages with women of other tribes, which
again not only reduces the instability of the economy (in that a large tribal
area suffering near-famine conditions has access to areas of markedly different
ecology), but also provides political connections for men whose power
ambitions have passed the point of leadership limited to their own tribes. In
one way or another all these interests are manifest in the small camp and
attention is now directed to the latter.

The disposition of people in the camp is represented diagrammatically 621
on the page following. 592

The nucleus of the camp is Tent A. Its owner (1) was a powerful *Shaikh*, [554]
the son of a famous father. His marriage represents a political link with a [619]
group of one of the primary sections of his own tribe. His father died only a [428]
few years before I recorded my census, and the large amount of moveable
property he left had still not been divided among the sons; the owner of the
tent, as eldest brother, still controlled the flocks and herds. Most of his time
he spent away from the camp engaging in political intrigue. His two younger
brothers lived in his tent, but the second (5) would not remain there long
because negotiations for his marriage had been started. His father (2) mar- [582]
ried a parallel cousin; she died and shortly afterwards he took her sister (3) [587]
in sororal union. When this occurred an amount of bride-wealth was
agreed, but instead of giving any of it to her father, the entire amount was [583]
"put in front of her" (that is, the animals were allowed to remain with her
husband's flock), and these animals she had marked with her brother's
tribal sign to distinguish them from those of her husband. It was widely [428]
known that she was going to leave these animals to her husband's second [562]
son, for although she could not transfer them to a male outside her husband's
corporate group, she could decide who, among his heirs, should inherit.

During my stay in this camp, her brother's son (4) came to it as a 621
temporary resident for a month. Since he was poor, the purpose of his visit 592
was to capture some of his aunt's wealth while she was still alive and the 574
possibility still existed. During his stay he was fed well but did no work. [604]
His kinsmen found his company tiresome, so, to cut short his stay, and after [431]
consulting her nominated heir (5), she gave him three grown goats. Also
when an occasion arose for an animal slaughter, she provided the sheep, and, [231]

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[13] The remainder is made up of marriages to the daughters of men incorporated into the lineages.

ameliorated in its protein content, particularly by the generosity of the oc- 621
cupants of the nucleating Tent A. Not that they are the only ones who ever 574
slaughter their animals for food. Others do so, albeit much less frequently. 231
Whoever kills an animal, everyone present in the camp is given a share, and 262
the men always eat in the tent of the donor, sitting around one bowl. Thus, 431
the surplus that builds up at one point is redistributed among those suffering [556]
a shortage, and meat, in a society where the climate and way of life militate against its storage for more than a few days, is more efficiently used. Many other general economic points could be deduced. These general statements could, however, be made of practically any camp, whatever the specific differences.

Affinity and Matrilaterality in the Structure of the Camp

Economic considerations determine the general structure of these small 621
camps, but do not account for the particular people gathered in them. Per- 613
haps one of the most striking features of these camps, which comes out 602
clearly in the one discussed here, is the confined agnatic span which links the males. Lest it be underestimated, I wish to stress the profound significance of this fact. While granting its importance it is equally necessary to stress that the span, potentially, could be considerably reduced; in some camps it is. Many of the closer agnates of the men of this camp are not shown on the genealogy included with the diagram; (7), (15) and (16), for example, all have brothers, (12) has a large number of first paternal cousins and so on. Therefore, this particular cluster of agnates formed for reasons other than agnatic ties. The most direct single thread connecting Tents A, B and C is that which runs through women. Men of many other camps are all linked in this way, directly. Five tents of this camp are connected through a female link to a common ancestress, whose name still defines the group, two ascending generations for one adult male, three from others and four from others. If greater elaboration could have been shown on the genealogy without confusion, additional links through women could have been demonstrated. Affinity and matrilaterality are the prime movers in bringing agnates together as neighbours.

Other Factors Affecting the Structure of the Camp

Other considerations narrow the area in choice of residence. The quest 621
for power where every man entertains hope of achievement where ambitions 571
are not stifled by the rigour of rank and a small amount of wealth provides 554•
a basis for a beginning is also a significant factor in considering the composition of camps. The generosity of the people in Tent A was not entirely altruistic. Justly, it had won them repute, but the repute itself was an important aspect of the political power they enjoyed. They also acquired the services of several men to manage their animals, an impossible strain for them alone. And with their shepherds and herdsmen they secured devoted followers. It was hinted in discussing the structure of the camp that changes

Cases

621 were imminent, because the marriages of two of the men were anticipated,
571 two others harboured more distant hopes and boys in all the tents would soon
[554] be youths. The composition of this camp, caught at a moment in time, was
a function of the age and sex distribution of its inhabitants. All camps
show regularities in their structure, but their content is dynamic. Certain
general features persist, but the alignments of people undergo change with
[128] equal persistency. What priority is given to each of these considerations,
which component occupies the nucleating centre for others, will depend on
the problem under analysis, for while I have stressed that this or that is
important, I do not wish to suggest that any single factor has an absolute
importance compared with others, except in relation to a specific problem.

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619 The independent Sa'adi tribes fall into four groups :

1. The Jawazi, Fawayid, and Rammah, all of common origin with the 'Awaqir of Cyrenaica.
2. The Harabi and Bar'asa, both of common origin with the 'Ibeidat of Cyrenaica.
3. The Hanadi, and
4. The Awlad 'Ali

[173] The original ancestor whom these Sa'adi all claim is one Abu Dib, said to be of Suleim descent.

175 554 619 This sheikh was a real personage and a contemporary of Ibn Khaldun (who died in A.D. 1406). He was sheikh of the Beni Ja'afir, and a man of great importance in Barka, the very place that the four tribes inhabited for centuries before they came to Egypt. Also the period of fifteen or sixteen generations, which the modern Bedouin assert to separate them from Abu Dib, agrees with this chronology well enough.[1]

619 [173] Some are found to assert that their title of Sa'adi "helping" is derived from an ancestress called Sa'ada, the wife of Abu Dib, or, according to a hostile account, of a Jew called Yana. But the real explanation of the term has already been given above.

619 651 At the present day a sort of feudal system prevails both in Egypt and Cyrenaica, by which families are *mrabit*,[2] or vassal families, not tribes to tribes ; thus the Qat'an tribe of Murabitin is divided, one part vassal to a family of Awlad 'Ali el-Ahmar, another to the Sinaqra, and a third to the Sinana. For a tribute called "alms", which by hereditary obligation each Mrabit family must pay, the Sa'adi family to which it is attached is bound to afford the Mrabit family protection in all minor difficulties of life, such as robbery by another family of Sa'adi, etc.

Thus a "Mrabit" family by paying tribute can herd its flocks in peace, calling upon the Sa'adi to see that justice is done them, but they are bound to join the Sa'adi to fight with them in any serious conflict with other tribes.

Among the "Mrabit" tribes of the present day are the Jumei'at, Qat'an, and Awlad Suleiman, all claiming as common ancestor one Ka'b, and feudal relations are

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[1] The pedigrees of which these Western Bedouin are so proud can only be trusted so far back as the individual whose name a subdivision has adopted, such as Kharûf in the Awlad Kharûf pedigree. Taking them separately, the pedigrees will be found to dovetail into each other up to that point, but beyond it things become problematical.

[2] Sing. of "Murabitin".

175 648 554 631 Sanusi against the Italians in Cyrenaica. "When the British reached Matruh, they jailed all of the 'umdas and shaikhs (two 'umdas and five shaikhs, at that time). Then they chose new leaders, from the families of the old leaders, to work with them." But, "these men did not fight with the British, they only acted as their guides in dealing with the Bedouins of the desert. When the old leaders were released from jail, they returned to their positions of political office. While they were in jail, their replacements had only helped the British with supplies." [178] Apparently, the British saw the need of maintaining the continuity of the Bedouin authority structure.

175 648 Data on the condition of the Bedouins of the Western Desert between the two world wars are absent. The Bedouins say that they lived with no trouble, or any help, from the Egyptians. The Bedouins have no fond memories of their experiences during World War II. They first heard of the war in 1940 when the Italians marched into Western Desert from Libya. The Germans occupied al-Qasr from May to October of 1942, when the famous General Rommel had his headquarters at Marsa Matruh. The British had told the Bedouins, in 1940, that they should flee the Italians, and that unless they did they would be held responsible for their actions. 175 648 722 166 Most of the people of al-Qasr agreed to go to refugee camps at Amriyya near Alexandria for the duration of the war.

[556] Some of the Bedouins refused to leave for Amriyya.

175 These were the wealthy group who had large numbers of sheep
648 and camels. In fact, most of the animals taken east to
722
556 Amriyya died on the way or were expropriated by the British.
166 'Umran Kailani, "who owned one thousand camels" and was the shaikh of the 'Ali Ahmar section of the Awlad 'Ali at the time, refused to go to Amriyya. The Bedouins say that he was treated very well by the Germans who asked him to form a local government and promised him all the help and supplies that he needed. It is difficult to obtain figures on how many Bedouins made the migration to the Nile Valley and how many remained behind in the Al-Qasr area. One informant told me that before
[162] the war there were about 80,000 members of the Awlad 'Ali in the Western Desert and that out of this number, about 30,000 remained behind.

175 Those who sought refuge at Amriyya returned to the
648 al-Qasr area at the end of 1942 after the defeat of the Germans
727 at al-Alamain. They found things greatly changed. Before the war, there had been about twenty buildings in the al-Qasr area and most of these were bombed out by the air war. The loss of animals and the damage to the land made the resumption of normal life quite difficult for the Bedouins. Underneath, the land was literally a bed of anti-tank and anti-personnel mines left by the advance and retreat of three different armies. This restricted Bedouin travel and everyday food-
648 getting activities. This condition, which still exists, has
727

342 costs to make or buy. In the 'izba sector, most of the Bedouin
have a summer tent which they place next to their stone house
for the hot months. According to the governmental community
[657] development program, in order to own land and register it
properly one must build at least one room upon it. The one-
[735] room house (daar) is not common in al-Qasr: it is a symbol
of poverty. The multi-roomed house (duwaar) is common. It is
[333] built of large pieces of cut sandstone which are quarried in
[316] al-Qasr. Those who can afford it build the duwaar and surround
342 it with a wall in compound fashion. Only one man in al-Qasr
•556 is rich enough to afford two of these compound-type houses.
The size and style of a house reflect status. Traditionally,
[184] a man furnished a tent for each wife and for each married son.
Although this is still the custom in parts of the desert, in
al-Qasr the private room (daar) in a duwaar has replaced the
private tent.

596 The basic residential unit is called naja' (literally,
"hamlet"). It is composed of the father, his wife (wives), his
unmarried children, and married sons and their families. The
naja' takes the name of the father who is called the shaib
("elder," literally, "white-haired one") of the group. In
the naja', the word of the shaib is law, and the members'
chief duty is unquestionable obedience. The average naja'
in al-Qasr consists of about three or four houses or tents.

361 1925 and 1930 because, as they point out, the British
648 administration provided employment for "the poor Bedouin."
361 The wealthier Bedouins who owned camels and large numbers of
•556 sheep remained in the desert. Just the reverse is happening
178 at the present time. The rich men who see the advantages in
business, and the comforts which Matruh offers, can also afford the change of residence or the maintenance of two residences.

175 In 1922, the Egyptian government first registered land
423 in al-Qasr. At this time, they sanctioned the tribal division
657 of territory which existed. There was no attempt to force
political integration upon the Bedouins. Egypt has never had a nomad problem as have other Middle Eastern countries. The history of Egypt is essentially the history of the Nile Valley. Consequently, it is not odd that we find no mention of the Awlad 'Ali in the historical record. The Bedouins of the Western Desert were resigned to their place in the desert, and the central government saw no particular advantage or disadvantage in this.

423 Concern for the Bedouin minority in Egypt emerged only
648 with nationalistic programs of modernization. In 1954, the
Fourth United Nations Social Welfare Seminar for Arab States in the Middle East convened in Baghdad. From this meeting came some general recommendations for dealing with the problems of the Bedouin. The major proposal was calculated to transform

433 233 The Bedouin of al-Qasr idealize the life of the pastor-
183 alist. It is a dominant theme in their culture. Gardening
241 and arboriculture are perceived by the Bedouins as involving
[461] long hours of work, anxiety over waiting for profits, and
complex market operations. They understand the logic and
operation of the sheep market. Sheep are a store of value, a
● [556] source of security, and a medium of exchange. In a good year
of rain, a man can reap a good crop of barley, and buy more
sheep against the inevitable bad year to come. While most
472 Bedouins are, in one way or another, involved with the modern
433 cash economy which ties al-Qasr to Marsa Matruh, the Bedouins
241 who go into the production of cash crops on a large scale are
434 those who can afford the risk of failure and who can survive
177 the meager profits of the initial stage. These are the men who
can adjust their world view from that of the pastoralist to
that of the entrepreneur. There are only a few of these men
in al-Qasr but they dominate the economy. Through them, most
of the Bedouins of al-Qasr are linked to the national economy.

Land and Economy

433 The period between 1960 and 1964 was one of significant
177 economic change in al-Qasr. Dependence upon farming increased
178 while pastoralist activities became less important. In the
past, none of the Bedouins now living in al-Qasr were "nomads;"
even my oldest informants had moved only once or twice to

These gardens

433 furnish staples for local consumption and more cash crops for
241 the Marsa Matruh market. Matruh is dependent upon these
311 vegetable goods from al-Qasr, to the extent that the Governor
434 has forbidden the Bedouins to truck their goods to the higher
443 [556] priced market in Alexandria.

654 The success of arboriculture in al-Qasr has been the
245 result of a well-organized reclamation program in this area
177 by the government. The relatively good supply of fresh water
433 and the proximity of a large market town has made al-Qasr an
atypical case in the government's attempt to transform the desert pastoral economy. Since 1960, the government's program has met with a great deal of success. Such results have, of course, induced the Bedouins of al-Qasr to accept change, and have further enhanced the future of the program. The figures below show, as of 1964, the plant distribution of orchards in the _'izba_ of al-Qasr, and indicate the measure of success attained by the governmental reclamation program.

The environmental conditions of al-Qasr are particularly well-suited for the olive tree: the olive has been the basis of the economic transformation of al-Qasr. The Bedouins tend to play down the government's role in developing olive arboriculture in the al-Qasr area. But before 1960, only the very
[556] wealthy men could afford to deal in the olive market, since it
involves a great initial financial risk. Hence, prior to the entry of the government's program, there were 2,743 olive trees

TABLE 1

ARBORICULTURE IN AL-QASR, 1964

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Plant	Acres	Plants Distributed	Successful Plants
Olive	947	40,399	32,488 (80%)
Almond	57	2,570	1,752 (67%)
Fig	66	10,537	(experimental stage)
Grape	.5	512	512 (100%)
Peach	2.5	804	200 (20%)

654
245
177
433
[556]

in al-Qasr, and these were distributed among only 27 men. Most of these men also owned large numbers of sheep.

In 1960, the government began planting olive trees on the registered land of individuals living in the _'izba_ sector. This plan also involved instructing the Bedouins in the care of the tree: an individual who had traditionally depended on the rains now had to learn irrigation farming. This aspect of the program, learning modern "water discipline," was a source of conflict for the Bedouin with his pastoralist outlook on life. The olive tree must be watered twice weekly. The Bedouins say that this made them feel like "peasants." The Bedouins were also apprehensive over the fact that the olive tree did not bear its first fruit, i.e., the first cash

*613 582 'Ailit Lazumi, the other lineage, along with 'Ailit Ma'fas, considered to be the most powerful in al-Qasr. In the fourth [423] case, Abd al-Latif's marriage into 'Ailit Dawlat, this individual owns an olive orchard in Dawlat territory, adjacent to that of Ma'fas, which he purchased from a member of his wife's lineage before their marriage. In every case, with *613 582 421 one exception, marriage ties are intimately related to property relations, cognation with local contiguity. The two groups become politically entwined, and property relations become a basis for authority relations.

*613 All things considered, complementary filiation is as important in Bedouin society as it is in other societies: "The bilateral family is the focal element in the web of [533] kinship" (Fortes 1953:33). As one Bedouin wedding song puts it: "The bride is the flower of the stem," the stem here symbolizing her tertiary group.

583 554 ● 556 The amount of brideprice which a man is expected to pay will depend upon his status as an "outsider" or an "insider," and his position on the prestige scale which is figured largely in terms of wealth. A man adds to his prestige and reputation when he pays beyond the "going price" to obtain a bride for his son. On the other hand, if a man is an "outsider," he is expected to pay well beyond the normal brideprice for the privilege of marrying into the family, and he receives no additional prestige unless he goes even higher than what is

583 expected. The price is set by the corporate group but can
554 vary, and usually does, from one tertiary segment to another.
•556 The wealthier tertiary segments tend to have higher bride-prices. This is explained by the fact that they occupy a "higher status" on the prestige scale, and also, by the fact that they wish to carefully control and maintain this status.

[435] For instance, "between cousins" of 'Ailit Ma'fas the mahr is fixed at 60 Egyptian pounds, but "a man can pay more out of generosity if he wishes." Hence, a member of the Ma'fas lineage can increase his prestige within and without his family by paying beyond that which is expected of him. In this case, "generosity" is the variable related to a man's
583 place on the scale of prestige. On the other hand, in another
554 "poorer" lineage, 'Ailit Zagharat, the mahr is 30 L.E. to
556 members of the in-group but "the stranger will pay 60 to 80
435 L.E., according to the father's wealth." The largest and most famous mahr payment in the area was made by the wealthiest man in al-Qasr who paid seven camels (each worth about 150 L.E.) for his son's wife. The highest fixed mahr in al-Qasr was that of Bait Bu Tarram of 'Ailit Lazumi. It was 100 L.E. for members of 'Ailit Lazumi and, accordingly, much more for strangers.* This mahr is in contrast to the average for the area which is about 30 L.E. within the secondary group.

586 Divorce is a forbidden topic of conversation in al-Qasr.
521 Any talk about one's wife, mother, or sister is considered in-
784 judicious.

*613 Each member of the corporate group contributes an
682 equal share to the blood-money due in a compensation case.
435 The blood-price for intentional killing is presently set at
436 400 L.E. In the olden days, the blood-price was 100 camels.
178 [571] If a man had no camels, he was expected to contribute his share in cash, the value to be assessed at current market prices. Eventually, cash came to replace camels altogether in
[231] the exchange of blood-money. This reflects the growing unimportance of the camel in the Western Desert. Today, there
•[556] is only one man in al-Qasr who may be considered a "camel owner," and he is the richest man in the area. Since at least 1935 the blood-price has been met with cash.

*613 When it has been decided that the right of blood-
682 revenge as a retaliatory measure is to be waived, the _'aqila_
554 must go to each member of the group for his share of the blood-
571 money. Each _'aqila_ of the secondary group does this, and together their collections make up the 400 L.E. blood price. For instance, if there happens to be 400 men in a secondary lineage group, then the share which each contributes will be 1 L.E. The _'aqila_ must account for his own group's share even if this means making up deficiencies from his own pocket. It is for this reason that the _'aqila_ "should be rich." Though the _'awaaqil_ of al-Qasr are generally members of the "status group," this is not always the case. Hussain, the man destined to become the _'aqila_ of Bait Braik, was comparatively poor. He admitted to this fact, and said that for this reason he was reluctant to become an _'aqila_: "The _'aqila_ is responsible for his _bait_.

000 order.

*613 554 666 The 'aqila is elected by the elders of the secondary lineage group. The election usually takes place when these men are gathered for some festive occasion, such as a wedding. [578] The name of the man chosen to succeed to the political office will not be made public until it is absolutely necessary, i.e., in the case of conflict within the man's bait, or more especially, in the case where blood-money is due. According to the Bedouins, the only qualification for the office of 'aqila is wisdom--*613 554 the ability to arbitrate disputes. On the other hand, it is implicit that the 'aqila be a member of the "status group." ● 556 Prestige commands respect and obedience, and prestige in al-Qasr usually comes with wealth. In general, the 'aqila is an elder, i.e., one with wisdom, and a member of a wealthy and influential family.

*613 554 [428] Technically, the 'aqila-ship is not inherited, but succession tends in this direction. An 'aqila must "speak the good and show men how to follow the path of the good." Not all men have the ability to do this, and, the Bedouins say, it is natural that such a great gift resides with a particular family "because the son learns from the father." All of the 'awaaqil in al-Qasr claim that they knew how to settle disputes before they became 'awaaqil. If they had not, they would not [428] have been worthy of the office. Actually, the choice of an 'aqila is a restricted one: the office may pass, according to

554 concerns magic. Each August there is a celebration in honor
571 of al-Qasr's local saint. At these celebrations, the darwish
178 performs his special skills such as putting a red-hot iron
789 to his tongue, or standing on a skin drum held high by his
796 two assistants. No member of the "status group" attends these
affairs because the darwish and his magic "belong totally to
the old way of life." This is a restriction on social inter-course. It may also be a rejection of the saint's sacred
power, or reluctance on the part of the "status group" to
554 share authority. The ideology which the "status group" in
571 al-Qasr has developed embodies attitudes of cooperation and
183 patience with induced programs of change. These attitudes
are invoked in varying degrees corresponding to motives of
economic gain, desire for power, and altruistic concern. But
the result is a "status group" mood which may be described
as one of disdain for the old way of life. Ideology and
discontent in al-Qasr are mainly evident among the members of
the "status group."

554 The pool from which the members of the "status group"
556 are recruited consists of the "status honor" possessors of
571 three lineages (two Sa'adi and one Marabit). These have been,
* [613] traditionally and presently, the wealthiest and most influential
in al-Qasr. Wealth in al-Qasr is defined in terms of three
things: sheep, land, and olives. Olives are becoming the
measure of wealth in the modern al-Qasr: sheep are the tradi-

554 tional symbol of wealth. A comparison of wealth between
571 the "status group" and "other members" of al-Qasr, and the
556 picture of stratification which emerges, are shown on Table 6.

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TABLE 6

COMPARATIVE DATA ON SOCIO-ECONOMIC STRATIFICATION IN AL-QASR[1]

Average Per Person	Status Group	Others
OLIVE - trees	661	86
SHEEP - head	402	30
LAND - acres	91	5

554
571
627
*613

One most important way of accruing "status honor" in al-Qasr is by acting the part of the third party in conflict situations. The role of the third party represents an effective and acceptable way of bypassing formal litigation through the
[778] office of _'aqila_. For instance, by mediating through the process of **nazaala**, the third party prevents feuds.

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[114]
[128]

[1] This data is both approximate and partial. Some data are excellent and completely reliable, others are not so dependable. Factors which could conceivably change the picture here presented would be a count of land and animals outside al-Qasr which would be extremely difficult to obtain. Also, some land is not in the name of the owner but in the names of relatives. Of all the data, land data is the most unreliable. Nevertheless, the addition of new data, I feel, would only serve to substantiate the picture of socio-economic stratification shown here.

554 turns in times of need dealing with financial and personal
571 problems. In view of the value stress which the Bedouins
627 place upon generosity, manifest in the redistributive system
182 of the lineage, the wealth of the *rajal khair* is the wealth
[181] of the community. Wealth divides, not only possessors from
● [556] non-possessors, but also, seekers after security from power seekers. It is as Peters (1965:145) has noted in Cyrenaica: generosity, not being entirely altruistic, wins repute and repute is an important aspect of political power.

554 In an interview concerning the justice of blood-
682 revenge, there was general agreement that if a man kills
627 intentionally, then blood-revenge must be taken by the
*613 murdered man's *bait* against someone in the murderer's *aiela*.
829 But one prominent man (a *rajal khair*) protested that "the best man in the killer's family must not be harmed." This statement generated a rather heated debate. One man said: "The best man should be killed for this is right in the Bedouin type of justice." (This comment was made by a man who is the *'aqila* of a low-status lineage in al-Qasr.) The first speaker's reply to the protest was this:

> Nevertheless, it all depends upon the character of the best man . . . if he is evil and on bad terms with your family, then he will be the first one to be killed. But if he is a good man, then you kill the murderer himself . . . You must never kill a *rajal khair* because he may do good in the future.
> [178] In the old days, the killing started right away, and all problems were big ones: today there is negotiation--people are improving.

634 his brother sits in his place.

554 The present shaikh is a member of 'Ailit Ma'fas, and 634 this is to offset the fact that the office of 'umda is in *613 'Ailit Lazumi. It reflects the need to distribute official 554 power and to symbolize the real power structure. Historically, the Lazumi were more powerful than the Ma'fas. These two lineages are the largest, wealthiest, and most influential in al-Qasr and among the 'Aishaibat. When the present [666] shaikh's father decided to retire due to old age, he requested [571] that his son be allowed to take up his role. The 'awaaqil of the 'Aishaibat in al-Qasr approved this "nomination," and ●[556] the son was "elected." It is a fact that the shaikh's father is the richest man among the members of the 'Ailit Ma'fas and that the 'umda's father was the richest man of 'Ailit Lazumi.

571 Power groups tend to interact so as to enhance not *613 the official authority structure but the political status quo 582 (Peters 1967:279). This explains a practice of the "status group" which Max Weber referred to as "connubism," the tendency of the members of this group to exchange women among themselves. *613 In Figure 10,[1] the marriages of 'Ait Abd al-Malik of Bait 'Umar 582 of 'Ailit Ma'fas show that out of seventeen marriages only four of these were within the 'Aishaibat, and that three out of four of these marriages were with 'Ailit Lazumi. Even more impressive is the information obtained from considering

[1] [See p. 132--Analyst]

156 159 draw al-Qasr into the Egyptian political community. He has
554 committed himself to work hand-in-hand with the Governor of
177 Marsa Matruh in introducing changes connected with economics
178 124 and education into al-Qasr. He does not conceal this fact.
829 When I spoke with him about helping me with my study of
[571] changing attitudes in al-Qasr, he said: "I might have the
time to do this, but before I decide you will have to bring
me a letter from the Governor stating that he wishes me to
cooperate with you." The identity and responsibility which
Hajj 'Ali feels for his role of agent of change is indicated
in his remark to me that he had heard "there were others in
the desert who feel and think the way I myself do."

156 Hajj 'Ali is discretely aware of the status difference
159 between himself, as a member of the "status group," and the
554 others of al-Qasr. As Weber would say, he perceives the
571 difference in "style of life." I was invited to Hajj 'Ali's
574 796 house for _'iid al-fitr_, the feast marking the end of Ramadan.
123 I thought that this would be a good opportunity to observe
the "leaders" of al-Qasr together. I was very much surprised
to find present no members of the "status group" but only
● [556] their exact opposites. On the occasion of this feast it is
[735] the custom that the rich treat the poor. As an additional
surprise, we had a very simple meal of bread, dates, peanuts,
and tea. Hajj 'Ali explained to me: "My neighbors do not
have my economic advantages, and I do not think it is proper

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many generations a recognized right by the Egyptian government to use the land for grazing and cultivation, and the tribal concept is that the land belongs to the tribe.

The concept is true with regard to wells and cisterns. But legally speaking, land belongs to the state, and the tribal populations in the area have only the right of usufruct. This does not mean that the land is exploited jointly by all members of one tribe or tribal segment, or that a man can cultivate or graze his flocks in any part he chooses, for there is a certain correlation between the right of usufruct and the distribution of the tribes in the area on the one hand, and the inner tribal segmentation on the other. Although land is not [556] an object of ownership in itself, and wealth is not spoken of in terms of land, yet, the distinction between ownership and usufruct in the area is sometimes very hard to draw. 423 311 619 Each tribal segment has its name associated with a specific area of land which it regards as its own and whose boundaries it defends against other tribal segments. The tribal segment whose name is associated with a certain locality not only has the right to use the land, but this right is also vested in it to the exclusion of other segments. Within such an area, each subsegment has the right to a portion of the land to the exclusion of the other subsegments. While individual members of the tribal segments know the land belonging to their tribal segments, their right is not associated with a specific patch within the total area. Individuals usually cultivate different patches within that total area as the need may arise; but one cannot cultivate a patch in an area belonging to another tribal segment except under certain conditions. This does not mean that the individual cannot claim the right to a specific patch, for not only

His Bait is the wealthiest in the
613 554 Aggary and he himself has recently acquired a great amount of wealth,
627 mostly from smuggling goods across the Libyan borders. Because of his
[556] position as a Government Sheihk, he is believed to have influencial con-
nections in the government. He is the only member of the Aggary Amar
who has a car. He considers himself to be the spokesman of the Aggary
Family, and he is known to be able to persuade the reluctant awaqil to
conform to decisions made by the rest of the awaqil. In a number of in-
[682] stances he w[illegible] able to collect bloodmoney from members of the Amar who
had previously refused to pay. Some people in the area believe that had
it not been for the persuasive abilities of Sheihk Selouma, the Aggary
Amar could never have persisted, and it would have long ago been divided
into smaller units due to the lack of agreement among its members. The
613 lack of formalized leadership of the Amar or the Eila makes consensus of
extreme importance for the Amar. The emphasis on the unity of the Amar
[675] is stated in Article 2 and is implied in a number of other articles in
[578] the Amar paper of Aggary. Disagreement among the awaqil is very rare al-
613 though not unknown in the area. The relative consensus among the awaqil
682 stems from the fact that the Amar as a group has a fairly limited function.
[182] Until very recently the only practical function of the Amar was the collec-
tion of money to pay for a murder committed by one of its members. Since
establishing the innocence or guilt of the accused is not the duty of the
Amar, once his guilt has been established, there is no question about
613 the payment. Disagreements are likely to occur in the case of new circum-
682 stances where money has to be paid, since payment in such cases are not
578 yet institutionalized, even when specified in a given Amar paper. This
000 has not yet become a major problem. If any disagreement between the

613 In performing his functions within the bait, personal qualities such as
554 wisdom, soundness of ideas, personal persuasiveness are of importance.
[157]
[428] But the main basis of his authority is patrilineal succession. The Aqila
[556] has no economic power to speak of. Although many aqila are among the
wealthiest members of their baits, many more are among its poorest. The
nature of the economic process and the pastoral life of Awald Ali is
such that the economic position of the individual is always flucuating.
Nor does the Aqila have any military power at his disposal, or any command of the use of force to back his decisions or to make them binding
[428] upon members of his bait. The main source of compliance to the Aqila's
decisions comes from the knowledge that the Aqila has the authority to
make such decisions and that he has acquired this authority through the
legitimate channel of patrilineal succession.

613 Where membership in formal groups is transmitted by descent, Awlad
428 Ali always choose the patriline. The son of Awlad Ali is regarded as
562
[619] Awlad Ali even though his mother might not be from the tribe, while a
woman who marries outside the tribe transmits no rights in the tribe to
her children. The importance of agnatic kin is reinforced by an solidary of brothers which is extended laterally to patrilateral cousins. It
is also shown in the fact that sons are favored in inheritance usually
to the exclusion of daughters. The male line is viewed by Awlad Ali as
the natural principle when it comes to anything which is inheritable,
whether property or position. In an attempt to defend Shei'eb's position and his right to be the Aqila, one informant told me: "The main purpose that a man has in life is to have sons because it is the son who
makes the man live forever. Daughters don't count. A man gives his son

613 682 usually has no difficulty collecting the individual shares. His own
[554] financial ability is rarely called upon. When a member is unable to
[178] pay for any reason, his share is divided among the able members. However,
in recent years this seems to be changing, especially among the baits
closely located to the settled communities or the urban centers. Among
613 these baits individual mobility has increased significantly with a large
178 166 number of younger members either leaving the area for the urban centers
464 or accepting salaried jobs with the government organizations. Among
369 certain baits in the area of Burg el-Arab, for example, the percentage
of adult males engaged in such jobs sometimes reaches sixty percent.
More than thirty-five out of fifty-six males constituting bait Asabei'
have a full-time or part-time job.

613 The individualistic attitudes accompanying the dependency on sal-
178 aries and living in towns and cities have their effects on the kinship
166 464 ties among members of these baits. With the prevalence of the individ-
682 ualistic attitudes among members of a certain bait, they become more
369 reluctant to pay their financial obligations and the Aqila finds it more
and more difficult to rely, for the fulfillment of the bait's financial
obligations, on the willingness of members to pay. His success within
613 554 the domain of the amar becomes more determined by his ability to pay
● 556 from his own money for those members of his bait who refuse or are un-
682 able to pay. Wealth becomes an important asset for the Aqila's per-
formance of his duties within the amar. When this happens, there seems
to be a certain shift in the source of political support for the Aqila.
613 In a well-integrated bait the popularity (or unopopularity) of the Aqila
554 among the other Awaqil of the amar had very little influence on his

613 position as the leader of the bait. The principle of patrilineal suc-
554 cession is so respected in such baits that it overshadows any other con-
613 sideration. This continues to be the case as long as the kinship ties
554 within the bait remain strong. When the kinship ties in a given bait
428 weaken, the principle of patrilineal succession also weakens. This is
178 more likely to occur in baits where a relatively large number of the
[166] members leave the area permanently or for a more or less prolonged period
[464] of time, seeking jobs on a part or a full-time basis. Many of these
613 members maintain only a minimal contact with their respective baits.
178 They become more reluctant to fulfill their kinship obligations, es-
166 pecially when they entail any financial liability. The older members
464 complain about how younger persons are less loyal to their elders and
561 how selfish they have become. "All they care about is their jobs and
369 the pleasure they get from the city; they are becoming city people."
Younger members, on the other hand, maintain that their reluctance to fulfill their kinship obligations stems from their feeling that they do not get anything in return. "Life is expensive and money is hard to obtain. I cannot make enough money to support myself and my wife and children and at the same time pay my cousin's financial debts," said a member of eilat Asabei', who works as a driver with the Desert Organization in Alexandria.

613 When this happens, there seems to be a tendency toward shifting the
554 emphasis from the bait to the eila or the amar as the source of the po-
● [556] litical support of the Aqila. This is turn makes wealth an important
basis of the Aqila's power. No more can the bait impose an ineffective Aqila on the amar unless it is ready to back him by their own share of money. If this is lacking as was the case with Shei'eb, there is nothing

His success in solving disputes between members
613 of his baits and outsiders might enhance his prestige within the bait,
628
554 but it is not a substitute for patrilineal succession as the basis of
[428] the Aqila's authority. But in less integrated baits the situation is
[627] different. The ineffectiveness of the Aqila in solving disputes may
lead members of his bait to seek another man as their representative who
would act as a mediator in their behalf. If this continues for a long
time the Aqila might find himself with no functions and the new person
would become a de facto Aqila.

613 The Aqila represents the only effective indigenous form of leader-
554 ship among Awlad Ali at the present time. The camp headman provides
622 another form of leadership on the camp level, but, as mentioned before,
the leadership of the headman is very limited and involves minimal
634 authority. In addition to the indigenous leadership represented by the
622 Aqila, there is the superimposed administrative structure of the govern-
656 ment representative in the form of the "omda" system introduced into the
177 area by the government decree no. 1187 of 1958. The system of omda or
mayorship is essentially that applied to the rural areas of Egypt with
certain modifications to fit the tribal organization and the semi-nomadic
existence of the populations of the Western Desert. In rural areas, the
622 omda is the administrative head of the village. He is appointed by the
[554] government from among the village inhabitants who have certain qualifi-
[212] cations with regard to education (must be able at least to read and
[556] write), wealth (own at least 5 feddans of land in the area), and sound
reputation. As such, the omda system in the rural areas is a territorial
system. The omda's authority covers the territory of the village and
all individuals living in it regardless of their kinship affiliation.

Wealth in many cases is also considered an important
792 requirement for the selection of the mardi. This does not mean that
627
554 religious men in the area have no role in dispute settlement, for they
[556] do. It simply means that the mardi is selected according to a number
of criteria that vary from case to case, and that in some of these cases sound wisdom and fairness characteristic of religious men are not enough basis for their selection as mardis. This means that the religious men have no special mediatory role based on their religious nature alone. In certain cases religious men offer the best possibility for mediation; in others, a non-religious person might offer a better chance for settling the dispute. In cases of women seeking
[586] divorce from their husbands, the wealth of the mediator, more than any-
(556) thing else, seems to determine the selection of the man whom the woman asks to negotiate on her behalf, a point to which I will return later in the chapter.

593 The Mi'ad was held in the house of Muftah. Present at the mi'ad
574 were Muftah, his son-in-law, Hemeida, the heads of households in Muftah's
606 camp (one of them was his brother and the other five were members of
586
627 different tribal segments), my driver (who was a member of the neighbor-
792 ing Sanagrah tribal segment), myself, and the religious man. After the tea was served, the religious man said that the discussion should start. He reminded the gathering that this case is a family one and should not develop into a larger dispute. "After all, the daughter's husband is a son, and the case is actually a misunderstanding between a father and a son and should be viewed in that context." Then he turned to Muftah and said that in that spirit he was asking him why he had taken his daughter away from her husgand. Muftah said that he had taken his daughter away

586 the man she chooses. She informs him before she enters his house that
562 she is the wife of so and so and the daughter of so and so and that she
574 is throwing herself on him to protect her from her husband with whom
she no longer wishes to live. Like the right of refuge, the man cannot
[778] refuse to let her in; and from this moment until her dispute with her
husband is resolved, she is considered as his house guest and is entitled
to all the hospitality a guest receives. If he refuses to extend
[627] that hospitality or refuses to take her in, she can ask for a mi'ad
[281] and is entitled to kabara from him. There has been no reported incidents
in which a man refused that right to a woman. As soon as she settles
down in the host's house, the latter takes immediate measures to find
the husband and to convince him to let his wife go. In doing this, the
man uses all the power of persuasion. The man selected for this purpose
586 is usually a respected man who can put pressure upon the husband. Sometimes
562 574 he has to bribe the husband to release the wife, paying from his
554 own money. The man has to have money, not only to be able to support
[556] the wife during her stay in his house and to bribe the husband, but also
because in certain instances he has to pay the husband the mahr that the
father of the wife had taken in order to free her. The next step after
getting the agreement of the husband to divorce his wife is to contact
the father of the wife or her guardian and convince him to pay the mahr
to the husband. If the father does not agree, or if he is financially
unable to do so, the man on whom the woman has thrown herself is supposed
to pay from his own money. In cases where the woman left the husband to
be married to another man with whom she had had a relationship, the respected
man tries to have the future husband pay the present husband the
mahr he is supposed to pay the woman after she is divorced from her

243 They could not sow a better crop. There are wild varieties of
barley in Cyrenaica and the country is in every way suited to
its culture. It is very hardy, stands up to drought, and easily
holds its own against the grasses, which are ploughed in with
[251] the seed on the plateau. When the barley and wheat have
been reaped, the grain is stored in *kuf*. On the plateau these
are ancient tomb-caves; elsewhere they are holes dug in the
ground.

[731] In a bad year, and even more in a succession of bad years,
the Bedouin have experienced famine, but in most years the
barley, and to a lesser extent the wheat, give an abundant
[433] yield. Bedouin have told me that they expect from sowing in
the beds of wadis up to a hundredfold of barley and in the
barqa up to fiftyfold. On the plateau the yield is smaller and
in the Marmarica and Sirtica much smaller. In Turkish times
[439] there was a large export of grain from Cyrenaica. Mondaini says
that it was to the mean annual value of 40,000 Lire Sterling
for the years 1885 to 1900.[1] Much of this surplus was bought
by English brewers.

433 The Bedouin way of life is well adapted to their environment.
182 Given the inconstancy of the rainfall and the distribution of
water supplies they would be foolish indeed were they not, at
any rate in part, shepherds. They are not, of course, in all
433 respects self-supporting. They make their winter tents and a
439 good part of their equipment, carpets, sacks, and so forth, from
182 the wool of their beasts, but some things the Bedouin regard as
[237] necessities have to be imported, notably tea, sugar, some rice,
and cloth, especially the *jird*, the woollen cloak of the country.
They trade these with surplus stock on the hoof, skins, wool,
clarified butter, surplus barley, and honey and wax, so that
they are in an economic sense self-supporting.

433 Cyrenaica is a rich country for Bedouin, a poor country for
182 Europeans. Bedouin generally have no overhead expenses in
[556] production. I say generally, because rich men sometimes
[233] employ shepherds, though this is usually the practice of urban
[464] merchants engaged in the sheep trade. Bedouin use their own
labour and that of their families and animals. What is perhaps
[511] more important is that they are prepared to live on what

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[1] G. Mondaini, *Manuale di Storia e Legislazione Coloniale del Regno d'Italia*. 1927, p. 308.

554 derived from the strength of their section, their wealth, their traditional place in Bedouin society, and the character of their leading members, so long only are they regarded as Shaikhs of whatever the grade may be.

In recording his impressions of the Aulad 'Ali tribe the
554 generous and unfortunate Pacho gives an excellent picture of
619 the Bedouin Shaikh's position in tribal society. He says that it
[642] is difficult to discover any government in their society, which might be called aristocratic, though it is such in form rather than in substance. The precarious authority of the Shaikhs rests not on force but on the renown and esteem they enjoy in
554 the tribe. He adds that at the time of his visit it had become
619 customary, after Muhammad 'Ali Pasha had broken the tribe, for the Shaikhs to get their titles confirmed by the
*648 Pasha of Egypt but that when they returned to their camps with the robes of honour bestowed on them by the Pasha of Egypt, these garments, far from adding to their prestige and making them objects of regard, excited derision and aversion unless the backing of the tribe had preceded the approval of the Pasha.[1]

554 The Italian lawyer Savarese has also written an illuminating
613 description of the status of a Cyrenaican Bedouin Shaikh. Each *bait* and each *'aila* has its Shaikh, chosen for his age and wisdom or for his prowess, though the Shaikhship is generally
[556] hereditary in certain families. A Shaikh receives obedience and respect from his dependants but ought to be rich because the demands of hospitality are considerable. He takes a leading part in the settlement of disputes and must have the tact necessary to maintain the unity of the group in opposition to other groups of the same order. He represents his group in relations with these other groups and in the larger group of which it forms part. In matters in which his group as a whole is concerned he takes the advice of the Shaikhs of its divisions. He commands the men of the group in war and he collects the tribute due from
554 the group to the Government. Nevertheless, a Bedouin Shaikh, however large the group he represents, lives and dresses like his fellow Bedouin, though, being rich, his tent may be larger than most and he has more horses and they are more richly appointed.

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[1] J. R. Pacho, *Relation d'un Voyage dans la Marmarique, la Cyrénaïque et les Oasis d'Audjelah et de Maradèh*, 1827, p. 67.

*175 *648 651 *795 793 [619] [634] Heads of the Sanusiya lodges, who often accompanied the mudirs and tax commissions to the Shaikhs of the tribal sections attached to their lodges. It was to the common interest of the Turkish Administration and of the Sanusiya that there should be order, security, justice, and trade in the country, and they co-operated to maintain them.

The Turkish officials did their utmost to remain on good terms with the Sanusiya Shaikhs and to this end, and doubtless also because they found no difficulty in accepting, as educated men, its exalted teachings, some of them affiliated themselves to the Order. Membership of it gave them prestige in the eyes of the Bedouin as great, if not greater, than their official status gave them. Likewise the more prosperous merchants who had dealings [556] with the Bedouin tribes or sent caravans to the Sahara and Sudan found it advisable to be received into the Order. It is for this reason that in all the towns of Libya we find a small body of the richer and more cultured citizens ascribed to the Order, while the common people belong to other or no Orders.[1]

*175 *648 651 *795 But though the administration of Cyrenaica might be called at this period a Turco-Sanusi condominium there was an undercurrent of jealousy on both sides which occasionally gave rise to open conflict. A sure occasion was any effort on the part of the Administration to tax the Sanusiya estates. Although these had been exempted from taxation by the Sultan's firman, the local administration made rare and unsuccessful efforts to exact taxation on them. When in 1908 they tried to tax the crops of the Sanusiya holdings a tribal meeting, attended by 150 Shaikhs headed by 'Umar bu Rqaia of the Darsa tribe, met at the zawiya of al-Haniya and decided not to pay any more tribute to the Turkish Government till it revoked the tax. The Government then dropped the matter, though the trouble continued till 1910. Earlier, the Governor Ahmad Pasha Zuhadi (1904–5), acting on instructions from Istanbul, had tried to impose a tax on the crops of tribesmen and zawiyas alike. The Bedouin round al-Marj had thereupon attacked a Turkish detachment charged with collecting the tax and sent them back to Banghazi stripped of everything they possessed. The outcome was that the Governor was relieved of his office.

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[1] Capt. Emilio Canevari, *Zauie ed Ichuan Senussiti della Tripolitania*, 1917, *passim*.

571 between man and man, although the various cereal dishes which constitute
231 their regular meals are said to have a similar effect.

264 The son who continues to eat with his father "as he always had been
182 doing," also continues to accept his authority. Indeed he could do little else
593 at this stage, for he lacks the economic means to cut away. Neither at mar-
585 riage nor after is there any transfer of wealth from father to son. The new
182 tent recently pitched is no more than a dormitory to which the young couple
retire at night. During the daytime the son is still to be seen in his father's
[425] tent, and, in the male quarters, things appear to be much the same as before.
• [556] In the female quarters, the only superficial change is the more frequent ap-
pearance among the women of one who, before marriage, often sat among
them if she had been a close neighbour or a close cousin previously; or of
an additional helper if she had come from afar. On the surface things re-
main "as they always have been," although in fact, a whole set of changes
have been initiated.

852 *Rites de passage* are few among the Bedouin. A man's progress in life is
881 ceremonially marked by only four events: his birth, circumcision, marriage
764 and burial. His development into manhood is not marked by clearly defined
stages. About the age of seven, the henna markings on the front of a boy's
858 shirt for protection from the evil eye are not renewed, the cowrie shell stitched
789 to the front of his cap as a kind of talisman against the evil eye is removed
and he is no longer permitted free access to the women's quarters. As he
857 grows older, he will be instructed in goat-herding, and later taught to follow
233 the sheep. In his late teens he will have to undertake the more arduous and
883 responsible task of herding the camels. Coincident with camel-herding, he
233 may be given a gun by his father. Shortly afterwards he must undertake the
[431] stringent test of manhood, a journey to a distant oasis for dates. These
[411] changes are not marked off by a *rite de passage*. The rites a man undergoes
[484] during the course of a lifetime are minimal, and in the sense that they are
[885] concerned with only the basic events in a man's life anywhere (save for
852 circumcision, which is a minor celebration anyway), they are irreducible.
88 Moreover, the rituals which exist do not comprehend the same multiplicity of
796 relationships as rituals which occur in many other African societies.[4] It is
[771] true that the ceremonies referred to in this chapter by no means include
all the Bedouin rituals. It is also true that the events mentioned vary in
[554] elaboration, and in the number of symbols present in them, but they are
not multiplied or reduced for different people.

In this context it is important to stress that we are here dealing with a
[613] lineage society where social differentiation is not built up into differences
[554] of rank, where the roles to which a man succeeds are almost wholly cap-
[602] tured by his kinship relationships with other men and which are sociologically
to be distinguished from the roles a man enters into by acquisition of office,

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[4] See, for example, the elaboration of rituals discussed in M. Gluckman (Ed.), *Essays on the Ritual of Social Relations.* Manchester: University of Manchester Press, 1962.

593 tegral part of "the one body"; events which affect a man in this context lie
613 outside a father's field of jurisdiction. The political authority vested in a
corporation acts to circumscribe the authority of persons in other fields.

Other rights stem from political membership. As a person with a defined
position in a lineage corporation, a man has the right to use the
natural resources of its territory. His father, although he instructs his son
where to plough and when to water the animals, cannot deny him access
to wells, pastures and ploughland. Economically, a son is independent to this
extent, although his ability to exploit his right to the natural resources is
restricted by his father's control of animals. Ultimately, however, this restriction
cannot amount to stultification, because a man has the right to
613 demand food. In practice, a poor man staves off hunger with donations from
422 this or that individual, and superficially it appears that he is dependent on
735 the personal charity of his fellowmen. This is not so, for what is implicit is
that the parcels of wealth controlled by individuals are the possessions of
the corporation. It is not accidental that poor people do not go hungry.
During my entire stay among the Bedouin I never saw one of them beg or
•[556] suffer hunger, however marginal the diet of many. Clearly, those with a
surplus can and do use it for personal advantage, but the extent to which
they can do so is circumscribed by the legal claims which members of a
corporation have on the parcels of moveable property held by each of them.

613 Control over the wealth, whether it be animals or the procreative functions
421 of women, rests, in the final analysis, in a corporation. Inheritance laws
428 specify that women are not legal heirs,[8] and that all male children are
[562] equal heirs. Women do, in fact, come to control property, and it is rare that
wealth is equally divided among male heirs. The precise details of inheritance
[593] may partly be decided by a father, but he is limited in his actions. Most
of the time inheritance disputes are not of the kind which require action by
the corporate group; a case which occured while I was resident with the
Bedouin did, however, invoke immediate action. A man, who had left the
desert to live in a village on the plateau, had only one daughter. He made
it known that he intended to will his entire property to his daughter. When
the news was brought to the camps of his fellow agnates, there was great
consternation, because, as became clear in their lengthy discussions, the
threat now existed that a substantial parcel of property would be removed
from the group, a threat made real by the proposed marriage of the daughter
[584] to a man of another tribe. The court would have to recognise the daughter's
right to some of the property, and the members of the group reluctantly had
to concede that there was little they could do about this, but they had one
[593] action left to them — they decided that her nearest agnate should demand
[584] her in marriage. Usually, the choice of husband for a daughter is a decision

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[771] [8] The Bedouin are Sunni Muslims, and, as Samusi, belong to the Maliki school in
[795] legal matters. According to court law, women are heirs. However, actual Bedouin
[671] practice is contrary to law. For, if women were permitted to inherit, since many marry
outside the corporation into which they were born, they could alienate its resources.

The Meaning of Marriage

581 Until marriage the changes in a man's life have been in the nature of
585 an ordered sequence of development from a child to be cared for — the only
342 time in his life when a father, without inhibition, showers on him his love
[593] and affection — to one who, by degrees, makes an increasing contribution to
a production unit. Marriage necessitates that a man pitch a tent for himself.
With a tent he becomes a potential host and protector of others. The local
idiom for marriage is "to set up a tent." It would be quite improper to use
[196] the verb "to marry" when inquiring whether a marriage has taken place
since this verb also has the meaning of "to have sexual intercourse." In-
[195] stead the euphemism, "Have you pitched a tent?" is used. The Arabic word
for a tent in this context is *Bait*. It is not used to refer to a military tent, nor
to the small tent which shelters only a widow. It is reserved for the Bedouin
tent, which usually has a wool top, and, most importantly, holds the promise
of the continuation of life, whether it shelters a newly married couple, a
mature family or young unmarried people. (The word *Bait* represents a
complex concept, and it would be too much of a diversion here to discuss
the various points of its significance. It is essential to understand that its
[778] meaning is not confined to a tent in the physical sense.) Its top has *Baraka*
(divine goodness) in it; the quality of *Haram*, which makes it possible for the
tent to be used as a sanctuary, is associated with it and this quality of *Haram*
extends, moreover, to the ropes of the tent, so that anyone who clutches them
comes under the protection of the owner. In it, the wife must permanently
reside and her husband has the legal right to insist on this. In it too, he
has the legal right of sexual access to a woman, his wife. Any children
[885] born in it he can claim as his own. With the erection of a tent the son
reaches adulthood, and it is in this sense that he can be said to have acquired
a domain of his own.

581 Marriage gives a son greater freedom and less dependence on his father
585 in another sense. A second euphemism used for marriage is "making a
[593] relationship," specifically an affinal one. Relationships between a man and
[195] his father-in-law are diverse and are used in various ways in different situa-
tions. Here, the particular aspect which needs to be stressed is that a man
606 can cajole his father-in-law, and (through his wife) wealth, in the form
425 of animals, may pass from the former to the latter. Reciprocal gifts are passed
• 556 between affines on certain occasions, but in addition small amounts may
pass which are not connected with the formal occasions of exchanges. Debt
583 lies between them. It begins with the initiation of marriage negotiations,
584 when the suitor's kinsmen take a prescribed number of sheep to present to
606 the girl's father if negotiations are successful. They promise to transfer
bride-wealth[*] to the girl's father. A few weeks after the marriage, the hus-

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[171] [*] I use the word "bride-wealth" because it has become so familiar in the literature,
but the only similarity between the *Sahiba* of the Bedouin and the bride-wealth of

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in position immediately anyone else appears at the entrance to the tent.[11] [834 342]
Women cook, but they do not serve the meal to males, nor are they responsible [264]
for the distribution of meat among them. Parts of an animal are 264
carefully specified, and the various portions distributed at a meal carry 574
with them a great deal of significance. A host can honour, flatter, disappoint 571
or even insult his guest, depending on the precise distribution of meat
he adopts. Designated portions should go to certain kinsmen if they are [602]
present, but this still leaves a wide margin of choice, and a host can use
this choice as part of the many means at his disposal for directing his relationships
with other men. A political link can be forged or another
snapped by the distribution of portions of meat at the commensal meal.

The Bedouin Ideal Type of Family as a Unit of Production

This account of the division of labour is far from inclusive of all the tasks 594
carried out. The details given are only barely sufficient to provide some 183
indication of the necessary composition of a family. Referring again to the [462]
Bedouin sentiments about the matter, it is now possible to give it some
numerical precision. The number of females should be a minimum of
about three, including a mother, a teen-age daughter and a child of about
eight years. Males should number about six: a father, relieved of most [857]
chores to act as director; a son in his middle to late twenties, to plough; a [883]
second son, in his early to middle twenties, to herd the camels; a third, in [462]
his late teens to early twenties, to shepherd the sheep; a fourth, middle to [561]
late teens, to look after the goats; and a younger son to fetch, carry and
run errands about the camp. The family of the ordinary Bedouin, they say,
shows this sex and age distribution, although they recognise that a politically [554]
ambitious man with the wealth to match his aspirations would require more [556]
of both sexes — particularly women, since the burden of entertainment increases
rapidly with a man's climb to power and fame.

Clearly, the basis of Bedouin sentiment concerning family structure is its 121
approximation to an ideal production unit. Some families display the features 183
of this ideal, but even they enjoy the productive benefits of this composition
for a very limited period only. The family, as described above, can only be an 594
ephemeral unit, since the age structure constantly changes, women are removed
by marriage, men move away and death affects it at any point at any
time. The Bedouin family is a fiction in the sense that it can be said to have a
characteristic composition. The mistake they make is to conceive of it as a
particular kinship structure related to production. The substance of what
has been referred to as a fiction is that, if viewed as a productive unit, it
bears close consistency with reality. Freed of the need to examine it in terms
of specifically limited kinship relationships, and no longer anchored to the [621]
inhabitants of a single tent, the distribution of people according to sex and

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[11] This is the general rule. In practice, the use of the divider can indicate an intimacy or distance in relationships, most subtly.

621 Genealogically he was their father's brother, but he was of their same age
592 generation, and behaved as if he was their agnatic equal. Towards his own
578 brother (16), he behaved as if the latter was his uncle, for he was much his
[604] junior in age and his uncle had virtually brought him up from boyhood.
They had quarrelled bitterly because his brother (16) had given him only
[428] a fraction of his inheritance, which he himself, in turn, should have
[593] shared with his young full brother (not shown on the diagram) but he did
not do so. This youngest brother left (15) for this reason and now resides
621 with (16), his full brother's enemy. Two of the men (14 and 13) of this
592 group of four were the chief herdsmen of the camp, although they were
[233] assisted for short periods by (12) and (15), who also helped tend the
camels in other ways. Their connection with the group centered on Tent
[571] A was a mutual close link to a politically powerful person (not shown on the
genealogies) to whom they are deeply loyal and who, while I was among
them, was actively opposed to the common political enemy of them all (16),
and who in earlier years had challenged the leadership of (2) of Tent A.
There is also the fact that they were all linked within a close range of
[613] agnation. This linkage included, too, the owner of Tent F (17), not in
[602] fact the descendant of the man shown in the diagram — he was the son of
a slave wife; his genitor was a slave, but his mother's master reared him,
freed him and he is now given as his son in the genealogy. He lives with his
wife, of client origin, together with her children from a previous husband,
(18), who divorced her, and his own children. Aging, he no longer acted
as a regular herdsmen, but relieved other men in the camp, and also spent
some time shepherding.

621 The details given of the strands which run through the camp to tie these
571 particular people together are so few that, like the Bedouin plough, they do
no more than scratch the surface, but they are sufficient to permit a few
general statements. The camp, and particularly the precise disposition of
621 its tents, shows a group of males clustered together to share two of the main
571 economic tasks: shepherding and herding. The physically strong adult males
233 of Tents D and E shoulder the burden of herding all the camels of the camp,
462 and the men of Tents B, A and C shepherd all the sheep, with (17) of
Tent F serving both purposes. This number of men allows some to remain
in the camp at all times, to free one of them for a journey to the distant
market when supplies of sugar and tea are necessary, and to enable one or
two men, at short notice, to hurry away on horse or camel to search for
lost animals.[14]

621 Economic Determinants of the General Structure of the Camp

574 It is also clear from these details that, given the disparities in wealth
231 (although all men have some wealth), the diet of most is considerably
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433 [14] There is little point in seeking the lost animals themselves in the first instance.
A man travels from camp to camp asking for information, and when he has gathered
[556] his clues, he searches a neighbourhood.

ameliorated in its protein content, particularly by the generosity of the oc- 621
cupants of the nucleating Tent A. Not that they are the only ones who ever 574
slaughter their animals for food. Others do so, albeit much less frequently. 231
Whoever kills an animal, everyone present in the camp is given a share, and 262
the men always eat in the tent of the donor, sitting around one bowl. Thus, 431
the surplus that builds up at one point is redistributed among those suffering [556]
a shortage, and meat, in a society where the climate and way of life militate against its storage for more than a few days, is more efficiently used. Many other general economic points could be deduced. These general statements could, however, be made of practically any camp, whatever the specific differences.

Affinity and Matrilaterality in the Structure of the Camp

Economic considerations determine the general structure of these small 621
camps, but do not account for the particular people gathered in them. Per- 613
haps one of the most striking features of these camps, which comes out 602
clearly in the one discussed here, is the confined agnatic span which links the males. Lest it be underestimated, I wish to stress the profound significance of this fact. While granting its importance it is equally necessary to stress that the span, potentially, could be considerably reduced; in some camps it is. Many of the closer agnates of the men of this camp are not shown on the genealogy included with the diagram; (7), (15) and (16), for example, all have brothers, (12) has a large number of first paternal cousins and so on. Therefore, this particular cluster of agnates formed for reasons other than agnatic ties. The most direct single thread connecting Tents A, B and C is that which runs through women. Men of many other camps are all linked in this way, directly. Five tents of this camp are connected through a female link to a common ancestress, whose name still defines the group, two ascending generations for one adult male, three from others and four from others. If greater elaboration could have been shown on the genealogy without confusion, additional links through women could have been demonstrated. Affinity and matrilaterality are the prime movers in bringing agnates together as neighbours.

Other Factors Affecting the Structure of the Camp

Other considerations narrow the area in choice of residence. The quest 621
for power where every man entertains hope of achievement where ambitions 571
are not stifled by the rigour of rank and a small amount of wealth provides 554
a basis for a beginning is also a significant factor in considering the composition of camps. The generosity of the people in Tent A was not entirely altruistic. Justly, it had won them repute, but the repute itself was an important aspect of the political power they enjoyed. They also acquired the services of several men to manage their animals, an impossible strain for them alone. And with their shepherds and herdsmen they secured devoted followers. It was hinted in discussing the structure of the camp that changes

121 and political connections," with nation-oriented persons who operate at a national socio-cultural level of integration (1956:1075-1076).

Clifford Geertz (1960) has also examined the role of a "cultural broker" in Indonesia as an instance of "a vigorous, imaginative regional leadership, able to play a cultural middleman role between peasant and metropolitan life, and so create an effective juncture between traditional cultural patterns and modern ones" (1960:229). In the case of the Mexican "broker" described by Wolf, the major means of consolidating and obtaining power both at the regional and the national levels were through political channels. In the case of the Indonesian "broker," both religious and political channels are the means by which the local Muslim teacher, or kijaji, has obtained power: traditionally, he was a specialist in communication of Islam to the countryside, and today he has taken on the role of local party leader (Geertz 1960:230).

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557 In al-Qasr, the rajal khair seems to be the Bedouin counterpart of the Mexican and Indonesian "broker." With a firm economic base in the local community, and with his ability to adopt new patterns of public behavior, i.e., "he knows how to speak to the Governor and public officials," the role of rajal khair provides the means for one to move upwards through political channels (Wolf 1956:1071). Within the context of a newly emerging authority system based upon the

121 structural principle of bureaucracy, the rajal khair lacking
554 legitimacy in the traditional lineage-based system may en-
627 visage an authoritative role and increased chances to "improve
●557 his status through the judicious manipulation of social ties."

121 Leadership studies in the context of cultural change,
554 such as those which deal with "broker" types, have important
178 implications for a more general and fundamental theoretical
problem: the role of the individual in culture and society. Radin, as early as 1927, Redfield (1960), Geertz (1960), Fallers (1964), and Mead (1964) have spoken of "primitive philosophers," "the hinge group," "the cultural brokers," "the new men," and "the evolutionary clusters." All terms have direct reference to role types constructed from the observation of individuals possessed of the ability and creativity to offer new ideas and methods of dealing with the pressing cultural problems of their times. The unitary goal of all these researchers was to understand culture change through a focus on the way in which the individual manipulates his cultural resources.

121 I would maintain that, especially in political analysis, the approach and focus of the researcher is directly related to his ontologic position concerning the concepts of culture and human nature. That is to say, whether or not the researcher believes that "man has no choice in life, that culture determines his behavior," then he will or will not find it relevant

582 124 to their nephews if the latter demanded "because it is the right of the girl's cousin." And all but two said they would ask the permission of the girl's cousin before marrying her to an outsider, even if they knew that the nephew had no intention of marrying her himself, "to prevent the development of difficulties in the future."

On the other hand, when the same group was asked, "If you had your choice, would you rather marry your cousin or another woman who was wealthier or more beautiful," they answered as follows:

Marry their cousin	11
Marry someone else	24
Total	35

Two reasons were given by the eleven who chose to marry their cousins. The first is that they knew more about the temperament and the moral character of their cousin than about the other woman no matter how beautiful or wealthy she might be. Four of the eleven respondents said they would like to marry their cousin because they could not afford to pay the high bridewealth for a distant relative or an outsider. Although the sample I selected was by no means representative of the total tribal population in the area, yet, it points at least to the fact that parallel cousin marriage is considered by the father of the girl more as a duty or obligation than a choice, while from the standpoint of the suitor, it is viewed as a right which he can invoke at will.

582 557 It seems that many invoke such a right even when they have no serious intention of marrying their bint'amm. The purpose apparent in the numerous cases where this happened was to obtain money from the prospective groom who has to get the approval of the cousin to prevent trouble. In some cases the man invokes his right to force his uncle or the groom to concede to some demands, such as the sale of the right to use a piece

582 of parley land or a well or to make him a partner in a business or smuggling
557 activities or even as revenge on his uncle by keeping his daughters
582 unmarried. In 1961 the heads of 25 prominant baits of various tribes
557 in the area of Matruh met and decided that the right of ibn 'amm had
178 become a major problem, and that invoking that right when the man had
613 no intention of marrying the girl had resulted in a number of disputes
that became serious over a period of time. They felt that the time was
suitable to revise that right and make it subject to the concept of fair
582 behavior applicable to other rights. They wrote a new rule which specifies
557 that the man has the right to prevent his cousin from marrying an
178 outsider or a more distant relative only if he himself intends to marry
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675 her either in the present or in the reasonable future. If the circumstances
show that he cannot do so, then he forfeits the right.

[558] To prevent his cousin from marrying another man without a proven
[681] intention on the part of the man to marry her himself in the foreseeable
future, is considered as an unreasonable behavior for which
ibn 'amm could be liable to pay kabara to his uncle as well as to the
prospective groom. It also denies him the right of taking her away from
[583] her marital residence by force. If he does this, he would be liable to
the compensation for assault. The agreement was signed by the awaqil
and is considered binding as far as the baits they represented are concerned.
Other tribal segments in the area refuse to abide by the agreement
and consider it as a pretentious departure from the ways of Awlad Ali
which should not be encouraged. Even within the tribal segments involved
in the agreement, there have been reports of individuals who refused to
[629] abide by the agreement. In certain of these latter cases, the ibn 'amm
selected as his mardi a member of a tribal segment not involved in the
agreement and therefore not morally bound to abide by
its contents.

593 went to see Muftah and his company. Half an hour later the religious
574 man came and took Hemeida aside and talked to him in a very low voice,
606 then left the tent again. A few minutes more had passed; everyone re-
586 turned to the tent; Muftah was not angry anymore. The religious man
627 read the fatha, or the beginning sura of the Koraan, then said that the
792 [779] souls were now pure and that Hemeida was considered as a son of Muftah
and that disagreements such as this should not alter the good relations
between the two. He said that the devil had found his way into the souls
of the two people, but now, thanks to God and the good people present,
they both had come back to their senses. Hemeida then rose and went to
where his father-in-law was sitting and shook hands with him. Then he
[681] handed the religious man ten pounds which the latter passed to Muftah
and promised to send him a goat as a gift to his daughter. Muftah left
the tent and went to the tent of the women. When he came back he announced
that a goat had been slaughtered and that everyone was invited to eat.
Everybody then left and Muftah promised to return his daughter to her
husband the following day.

593 While the right of the father to take his daughter away from her
606 husband constitutes a check on the authority of the latter and insures
557 the wife good treatment by her husband and her in-laws, not infrequently
586 that right has been invoked for personal or individual interest on the
[429] part of the woman's father or her closest male kin. Several cases have
been cited in the area where the father or guardian had invoked the right
to force the husband to concede to certain demands of the wife's guardian,
even when the wife objected to those demands or disagreed with her guard-
ian. One of these is the case of Mabroka who is married to a distant

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member of the same tribe. At the time that the dispute had occurred she had been married for fifteen years and had four children ranging in age from thirteen to two years. The husband possessed a piece of land on the coast where a few olive and fig trees were growing. The husband, Mukheimer, made no use of either the land or the trees. Then, in 1966, the father became employed by the government organization in the area where his daughter and her husband lived and where the land was. He asked his son-in-law to give him the right to use the land for one pound a year. Mukheimer, who at that time worked part-time for the same government organization as a driver, refused. The reason was that his job with the government made it possible for him to apply for a power pump to be installed over the Roman well that existed on the land, and he intended to utilize the land himself. All attempts to convince Hukheimer to let him use the land failed. Then one day Mukheimer came back to his tent to find that his father-in-law had taken his wife and the youngest child and left the other three children with the second wife. The father-in-law told the second wife to inform Mukheimer that if he wanted his wife and child back, he had to think about the land he wanted to take possession of. Mukheimer tried to discuss the matter with his father-in-law, buth the latter refused to see him. After a month there were rumors that the daughter was not happy that her father had taken her away from her husband and children and that she wanted to go back to her family. She asked a number of people to help her, including myself, since her father was one of my informants at that time; but he insisted that the only way Mukheimer could have his wife and child back was by giving him the rights to the land. Mukheimer, on the other hand, threatened to divorce his wife and marry another woman if his father-in-law did not return his wife.

593 606 The case persisted for more than two months with no sign that either
557 party was willing to give into the demands of the other. I left the
586 area before any solution to the case was achieved.
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584 Another relevant case is one which involved a dispute between
578 Hassan Hassanein from the Sanagrah tribe and the father-in-law of his
606 daughter who was also from the same tribe and who lived in the same
area. The case started when Hassanein was visited by a friend from the
[594] Esheibat tribe in Matruh, an old man of 60 or 70 years. During the night
that this guest spent at Hassanein's house, they got to talking about
marriage and the fact that although his guest was a wealthy and re-
[595] spected man, he had only one wife. After a lengthy talk, it seemed
that the old man was convinced that he should have a second wife and
asked Hassanein if he knew of a suitable girl to marry. Hassanein sug-
584 gested his daughter's sister-in-law. Hassanein took the prospective
583 groom to the tent of his daughter's father-in-law and discussed the
578 606 matter with the father of the prospective bride who agreed to marry his
daughter to Hassanein's guest if he paid the sume of 200 pounds, in ad-
dition to slaughtering a number of goats and presenting him with the
[999] appropriate presents. When the man agreed to the terms, the fatha was
read to signify the agreement between the two parties. Hassanein left
the man to spend the night in the camp of his future in-laws. In the
morning the groom told the bride's father that he must go to nearby
Alexandria to bring the money for the bride price. When he came back
late that afternoon, he paid the money and set a date for the wedding
the next Thursday and then left for Matruh to prepare for the arrival
of the new wife.

membership of associations and so on. The statuses a Bedouin achieves de- 796
pend not on an ordered acquisition through the inheritance of roles or elec- 852
tion to them, but on his personal manipulation of linkages in his jockeying 889
with others. Rites are minimal because there are few defined statuses an 554
individual can predictably acquire. The equalitarianism of the desert denudes 602
the Bedouin of ritual riches. Complimentarily, rites which do occur are 613
thrown into exaggerated relief by the absence of others, and in their isolation, [557] ●
become not merely a "passage" but a cataclysmic change. Marriage and
burial both comprehend limited fields of relations, but accompanying cere- 585
monies may bring several hundred people together, people who otherwise 764
rarely gather in these numbers to meet one another as kinsmen and neigh- 796
bours, and it is suggested that the emphasis given to the events dramatises the 602
significance of the changes they produce. In the discussion of the changes 182
brought about by marriage, the Bedouin view of what is entailed will be
considered first.

The Bedouin View of Marriage

After marriage, the Bedouin argue, a son has a tent of his own, a woman 585
over whom he has authority and soon children to make him a father. Mar- 581
riage causes split, branching. A new family is created, holding the poten- [613]
tial of a new lineage. The separation is so painful a matter for the father
that he cannot contemplate it, hence his pretence that he has no knowledge of [593]
wedding festivities, and his subsequent attitude that nothing has happened.

Interestingly, there are two other occasions when this attitude is to be 682
observed. When a man kills within his corporate group,[8] he may flee his 613
tribe or he may be compelled to leave; later he is likely to return and, when 621
he does, he is received with a minimum of show. Every attempt is made to
suppress knowledge of the event.

Again, if incest occurs, the memory of it must somehow be suppressed, and 835
it is an ever-present danger. Men, permitted four wives simultaneously and 561
also able to engage in a plurality of marriages through divorce or death of [595]
spouses, may have children showing an age difference of two or three gen-
erations. Thus it comes about that a man may be of an age in relation to his
father's sister which permits them as children to behave as if they were
first paternal cousins. As an adult, the preferred spouse for a man is a [582]
father's brother's daughter. In terms of relationships between adolescents
the situation in which a man is of the same age generation as his father's
sister is fraught with danger. In one such case, between a man and his [684]
father's sister, the male child of the union was put out in the desert to be

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[8] Bedouin are disposed in groups which, in summer, usually constitute a single community, around or near a watering point. The men of this group are interlinked by reference to an ancestor four or five ascending generations, reckoning from the generation of men of about 20 years. When, elsewhere in this chapter reference is made to corporations, it will be to groups of this kind.

571
672 other than those dealing with blood-revenge too. For instance,
*613 in matters concerning personal debts incurred, the group is
571 not responsible for the individual. The Bedouins say that if
672
*613 a man has the money he must repay his debts: if he does not
426 have the money, then he must ask a rich relative to pay his
debts for him. He is then in debt to his relative and, out
of respect for him, should not borrow money or go into debt
● [558] again. If he does, he will bring dishonor ('ar) to his
[681] family and they will, ultimately, banish him. There was dis-
682 agreement among my informants as to whether or not they
*613 should contribute to a diiya which was compensation for an
829 intentional slaying. Some said that they would not question
124 the motives of their kinsman who has killed because "we are
together in the good and the bad, and I must pay for him
just as he must pay for me." But others held the opinion,
which I feel was a prevailing one, that one must take into
account the justifiability of the killing. This seems to
have been the case in the past, for the Bedouins say that
traditionally the bait of the killer had to pay one-half
of the diiya.

*613 All things political somehow relate to the payment
682 of blood-money. We have seen that the essential function
681 of the 'agila, and even the condition of his taking office,
182
571 refers to the responsibility of collecting the diiya from
the members of his group. The criterion of being a member

671
562 Implicit in the _'awaiyid_ is the assumption that the woman is less responsible for her deeds and something of a weakling. The Bedouins have a proverb which says that "the devil whispers in the ear of the woman." If a woman slays a
[682] man, intentionally or accidentally, the _diiya_ is considered
671 as for unintentional killing. Where sex offenses are con-
562 cerned, it makes a difference if the act takes place in the
684 man's (i.e. the husband's) tent or in the desert, and, of course, it makes a difference whether or not it is a case of rape or adultery. If a man finds another man and his wife in his dwelling in the act of adultery, he may kill the man and pay the _diiya_ for unintentional killing. From this _diiya_, he deducts the amount of the bride-price and 50 L.E. for trespassing. The fine for rape ranges from 10 L.E. to 100 L.E. On the other hand, if intercourse takes place with the woman's consent, the fine is only 5 L.E. or 10 L.E. If a virgin is deflowered, the fine will be 100 L.E., and the man will have to marry her, paying the bride-price asked for by the girl's father and going through the normal procedure for marriage. Where offenses involve unmarried women, all fines are paid to the father. In cases concerning married women, fines go to the husband. According to the
[586] Bedouins, it would be a great dishonor to the man's family
● [558] if the husband were not to divorce his wife after it becomes known that she has been promiscuous. They said that if a man

PHASE I

613 578 682 [464] In September of 1956, Mansur from bait Eweidha of the Aggary Eila, who works as a driver in one of the government projects in the area, went to Alexandria with a friend, a member of the Gemei'at tribe. In one of the bars there, Mansur got drunk and entered into an argument with his friend. The argument turned into a fight during which he hit his friend with a broken bottle. Two days later, the friend died. A settlement was made between Mansur and the victim's family and bloodmoney was established at L. 300.

613 682 683 Two weeks after the above incident, the same person, Mansur, was driving the government car on his regualr duty when he ran over two members of the Sanagrah tribe who were sitting on the side of the road, killing one and breaking the leg of the other. Another settlement was made with the families of the victims. The bloodmoney for the dead man was established at L. 300 and another L. 50 was set as the compensation for the broken leg of the other man.

The total sum of compensations in the two incidents was divided among the sixteen baits constituting the Aggary Amar. The share of each bait was decided in proportion to the number of adult males (sayems) in each. The share of bait Asabei' alone was established at about L. 100.

613 682 683 672 558 As the Aqila of Bait Asabei', Shei'eb was responsible for collecting the money from members of his bait. But for the following six months he was unable to collect from any member of his bait, including Sheikh Hakim, Shei'eb's cousin and the wealthiest person in bait Asabei' and the Aggary Amar as a whole. Most of them gave the execuse that it was a bad year and they had lost most of their herds. When the money was not collected,

613 the victims' families sent their representatives to demand that the money
682 be paid. To face the situation, a meeting of all the Awaqil of Eilat
683
672 Aggary was called and Sheikh Selouma, the Aqila of bait Eweidha, took the
558 responsibility of notifying the other Awaqil. The meeting was held in
[115] the tent of Hemeida (my driver and informant) from the Sanagrah tribe.
Each bait was represented by its Aqila with the exception of bait Asabei',
from which both Shei'eb and Hakim were present. Since bait Asabei' was
the only bait which did not submit to its share of the bloodmoney, the
discussion centered around the inability of Shei'eb to collect it. In a
gesture which he meant to appear as helping out Shei'eb, Hakim offered
to pay not only his share but that of all members of bait Asabei', and
followed his offer by handing the money to Sheikh Selouma. After this
act which was a complete surprise to Shei'eb, Sheikh Slouma, the Aqila
of bait Eweidha, suggested that Hakim should be considered as the Aqila
of bait Asabei' instead of Shei'eb, who had demonstrated his inability
to collect from members of his own bait. He emphasized the fact that he
had nothing against Shei'eb who had legitimately acquired his position
as Aqila by means of succession. But he insisted that the survival of
the Amar depended upon the fulfullment of its financial obligations to
outsiders and that Hakim was wealthy and could pay. Shei'eb did not
comment and the rest of the Awaqil nodded indicating their agreement with
Sheikh Selouma.

[124] The above is the summary of events that happened before I came to
the area, and which were told to me by informants including the parties
involved. Since most of these events occurred more than ten years ago,

7

613 it was impossible to verify the actual facts or to know what exactly
682 happened. But since the parties involved are still alive and since these
683 events are closely related to present-day happenings, the case is still
672 alive in the minds of the parties involved as well as those of outsiders-
558 (124) Naturlaly, each party tries to present the facts in such a way as to
613 support his own claims. Shei'eb, for example, insists that Hakim had
682 bribed members of bait Asabei' to refuse to pay their share in order to
683 embarrass him and make him appear as unable to perform his duties as
156 558 Aqila. "Hakim always had his eyes on becoming the Aqila of bait Asabei',"
said Shei'eb, "but he had no business becoming the Aqila, so he had to
make me look bad to the other Awaqil.... He likes to be looked up to as
a big man, but it wouldn't work." While other members of bait Asabei'
deny that Hakim had bribed them, they agree with Shei'eb that Hakim is a
156 dishonest man. In fact, Hakim's reputation is so widespread in the area
551 that it has earned him the nickname of "the thief". The nickname was
788 given to him a few years ago when he went to Mecca for a pilgrimage with
685 another fellow tribesman. The latter told the story that while in Mecca
Hakim had found a purse with two hundred pounds in it. He was supposed
to return the purse to the authorities or it would be considered as
stealing if he kept it. Stealing in Mecca is not only a crime but also
a great sin which makes the holy trip void for the offender. Hakim told
his companion that he had given the purse to the authorities. But later,
on their way back from Mecca, the friend found the purse hidden in Hakim's
luggage. When the story was known in the area, he was referred to as
156 "the thief". Other accounts of Hakim's dishonesty are told throughout
685 the area, including stories of how he acquired his wealth through stealing
439

156 equipment from the government projects and from smuggling sheep and merchandise
[685] [439] across the Libyan border. Although some of these stories might
be exaggerated, they all point to the fact that Hakim, despite his wealth,
is not the most popular or reputable individual in bait Asabei', and that
although Shei'eb is not a popular individual either, he definitely comes
up the winner in any popularity contest between the two. The question is
156 why Hakim was selected by the Awaqil to replace Shei'eb. The case involved
613 558 more than Shei'eb's inability to collect the money from members of
682 his bait. Shei'eb's ineffectiveness seemed to have been taken as an excuse
683 rather than as the direct cause. Many Aqaqil, before Shei'eb, had
failed in collecting money from their own bait without being subject to
direct challenge. What seems to be involved is more than a challenge to
a particular member, Shei'eb. It is a challenge to the whole principle
by which Shei'eb acquired his position as Aqila of bait Asabei': patrilineal
succession.

156 Shei'eb is the youngest of four sons of the former Aqila of bait
159 Asabei', Sheikh Elewa. For more than fifty years Sheikh Elewa was the
613 undisputed Aqila of bait Asabei'. He also had considerable influence
463 683 among other tribal segments throughout the whole of the Western Desert
554 by virtue of his position as "nazzar", that is, the expert who assesses
the amount of compensation for wound inflicted in a liable case. The
[428] position of nazzar is a hereditary one and had been handed down from
[779] father to son. The basis for his assessment of wounds are a number of
old books believed to be obtained from Mecca and contain all the judgments
of famous Islamic leaders in their assessments of wounds.

[428] Eleven years ago when Sheikh Elewa became blind and too old to

The bride's father
584 did not have to pay kabara, although he held
686 a big feast in which he slaughtered three sheep and invited the groom,
● 558 his father and a number of his friends and friends of the girl's father
in honor of the groom as a compromise.

583 Before the fatha is read, the two families usually agree on the
amount of bridewealth, or "mahr", to be paid by the groom or his father.
The amount of bridewealth depends upon a number of criteria, important
among which is the relative position of the bride's and groom's families
and the degree of relationship that exists between them. The lowest
mahr is usually paid in the case of cousin marriages. The amount ranges
from 10 to 50 pounds. Sometimes when the groom cannot afford any mahr,
he pays only the religiously required sum of 25 Egyptian piasters.
This is never the case if the groom and bride are more distantly related.
When the groom is an outsider or a member of another tribe, the
mahr is usually much higher. Several cases of mahr of more than 2,000
pounds are reported in the area. There was a case in which the mahr
reached 10,000 Egyptian pounds ($22,000). The amount of mahr also depends
on the beauty of the bride. In the case of the highest known
mahr mentioned above, the woman was known to be of great beauty. There
[587] is no distinction made between previously married women and ones married
for the first time. In the case above, the woman was married three
times before, and the mahr was apparently higher than that paid for her
[602] in her first marriage. Increasing the mahr according to the kinshp
distance between the bride and groom reflects the preference of endogamous
582 marriages. The preferred marriage match in the area is that of
the patrilateral parallel cousin marriage. The father's brother's son,
"ibn 'amm," has an undisputed claim over his cousin, "bint 'amm." Even
when they are of incompatible age, or even if the man is married or for

582 of parley land or a well or to make him a partner in a business or smuggling
557 activities or even as revenge on his uncle by keeping his daughters
582 unmarried. In 1961 the heads of 25 prominant baits of various tribes
557 in the area of Matruh met and decided that the right of ibn 'amm had
178 become a major problem, and that invoking that right when the man had
613 no intention of marrying the girl had resulted in a number of disputes
that became serious over a period of time. They felt that the time was
suitable to revise that right and make it subject to the concept of fair
behavior applicable to other rights. They wrote a new rule which speci-
582 557 fies that the man has the right to prevent his cousin from marrying an
178 outsider or a more distant relative only if he himself intends to marry
613 her either in the present or in the reasonable future. If the circum-
675 stances show that he cannot do so, then he forfeits the right.

[558] To prevent his cousin from marrying another man without a proven
[681] intention on the part of the man to marry her himself in the foreseeable
future, is considered as an unreasonable behavior for which
ibn 'amm could be liable to pay kabara to his uncle as well as to the
prospective groom. It also denies him the right of taking her away from
[683] her marital residence by force. If he does this, he would be liable to
the compensation for assault. The agreement was signed by the awaqil
and is considered binding as far as the baits they represented are concerned.
Other tribal segments in the area refuse to abide by the agreement
and consider it as a pretentious departure from the ways of Awlad Ali
which should not be encouraged. Even within the tribal segments involved
in the agreement, there have been reports of individuals who refused to
[629] abide by the agreement. In certain of these latter cases, the ibn 'amm
selected as his mardi a member of a tribal segment not involved in the
agreement and therefore not morally bound to abide by
its contents.

Muftah said that he had taken his daughter away
593 to punish Hemeida for what he thought was disrespectful behavior. He
574 606 then proceeded to descirbe how Hemeida, after bringing the blanket out
586 for Muftah, went inside and spent the night with his wife, defying the
627 792 basic rule of not showing intimacy in the presence of older people,
888 especially the parents or parents-in-law. For, to show such intimacy
is a sign of disrespect. He demanded that Hemeida pay him "kabara"
[681] for his injured pride. The term kabara refers to the adjective "kebir"
[558] (lit. respected or big man). Kabara is the fine paid for belittling
someone by word or deed. Muftah insisted that he would not allow his
daughter to return to her husband until Hemeida had paid that kabara.
Hemeida conceded the fact that intimacy constitutes an insult; but he
insisted that his action did not constitute an act of intimacy with his
wife, but was a matter of convenience and necessity, since he had only
593 two blankets, and the only one left was that inside the tent. Muftah
574 became angry and started shouting at Hemeida, who, in turn, started
606 586 shouting back; it became impossible to follow what was being said.
627 The religious man interfered in the discussion, trying to stop the argu-
792 ment between Muftah and Hemeida. The others attending the mi'ad also
[578] interfered. The religious man and two neighbors took Muftah outside
the tent while Muftah's brother tried to calm Hemeida down. The other
members of the group also calmed Hemeida, reminding him that he was the
younger person and must be more tolerant of older people. They also re-
minded Hemeida that Muftah was his father-in-law and had the right to take
his daughter away any time he chose. They urged him to "defeat the devil"
[681] and to apologize to his father-in-law and pay him kabara. He seemed
convinced but insisted that all he was going to pay was five pounds and
a goat. Muftah's brother and one of the neighbors then left the tent and

681 The ten pounds paid to the husband in this case is considered as
558 a kabara for the husband's injured pride. The kabara is one of the
[684] vaguest and least determined fines in the tribal law. As a face-saving
device, it varies from one case to another. It is determined in each
case by the seriousness of the insult, the publicity of that insult
(insults in a public place require a much larger kabara than insults
[561] in a private place). The relative age of the insulted and the offender
is also taken into consideration in assessing the kabara. If the insulted is older than the offender, the kabara is much higher than if the
situation were reversed. In fact, in the last case the insulted might
[554] not be able to collect any kabara at all. The relative status of the
two parties is also a factor. A member of a Murabiteen tribe who insults
a Sa'adi is likely to be charged with a larger kabara than the reverse
situation. The amount of kabara is left for the bargaining of the two
parties and their representatives and varies greatly from one case to
another. As such, the kabara is not exactly a fine or an independent
punishment. In most of the cases it is an additional punishment added
to a regular one. It is hard to imagine a crime in which the victim is
not considered in one way or another insulted or belittled. The only
681 specified kabara that I found in the tribal law was in the case of adul-
558 tery. The kabara in that case is the same regardless of the relative
684 position of the people involved. The kabara differs, however, according
to a standardized set of circumstances surrounding the place in which the
adultery is committed. Adultery committed in the husband's tent requires
kabara of the maximum L.E. 20; adultery within the camp of the husband
but outside his tent can bring a kabara of only L.E. 10, while adultery
committed outside the camp brings a mere L.E. 5. The justification for

681 this variation is that committing the adultery within the camp of the
558 husband constitutes a greater humiliation, since it affects his honor
684 among his neighbors. Also, adultery inside the tent of the couple carries
with it the possibility of rape, while adultery outside the tent
at least implies an element of consent on the part of the wife. The
[583] penalty in the case of adultery is the return by the wife's father of
the mahr and all other expenses of the marriage ceremony and the gifts
the husband had presented during the engagement period. This is a
further indication that the father of the wife is still responsible
for her behavior even after she is married. It is in this respect that
the crime of adultery differs from theft. In the case of theft, the
[685] thief has to return twice the amount stolen and in the case of repeated
offenders, four times the amount stolen. This is in addition to a certain
amount of money as kabara. Yet, in the latter case the kabara is
not specified and is subject to the proof by the victim that the theft
constituted an insult to him. This insult is assumed in the case of
adultery, which makes the kabara in the case of adultery part of the
punishment--an integral part of the punishment. The kabara is not among
[613] the collective responsibility of the amar and is paid only by the person
involved, unless he is totally unable to pay or refuses to pay. In such
426 cases, his closest male kin (his father, son, or brother) pays on his
593
681 behalf with the understanding that such payment constitutes a debt which
684 should be repaid. The person paying on his behalf in this case can go
558 to his tent and take by force anything of value, such as blankets, utensils,
or even sheep and goats, and keep them as pawns until the debt is
paid.

581 Marriage does not deprive the woman of some rights of her own.
585 562 The customary law gives the wife three basic rights corresponding to
671 those of the husband's sexual services, domestic work, and obedience.
Corresponding to the first of these, the wife has the right to have a
normal sexual life with her husband. This right, however, is not an exclusive
one, since the husband can marry more than one wife. A woman
585 can be divorced from her husband without having to return the mahr if
586 she claims that the husband is unable to perform his sexual duties. In
593 such cases, the marriage is usually dissolved quietly. In certain rare
585 instances, the husband may deny his wife's accusations. If both insist
586 on their stand, one or both may ask to be submitted to "bait el-shana'a,"
593 or house of the dreadful deeds. Reports are extremely vague about the
627 exact procedures involved in this case. Some informants stated that the
married couple would live in a tent without sidewalls so that everybody
could see what goes on inside. Most informants, however, insist that it
merely means that the couple move their tent near that of a respectable
man whose word is believed and honored. This man is supposed to keep a
close watch on the couple's activities, by listening or looking through
holes in the tent. His verdict determines the future of the marriage.
583 If the wife is justified in her claim, the husband is forced to divorce
681 her and to forfeit his mahr. If, on the other hand, the verdict is for
558 the husband, he not only can divorce her and get back the mahr, but is
also entitled to kabara, or compensation, for his injured pride. There
114 is no case of bait el-shana'a in the area during the time of the field
178 work, and most people insist that this practice is something of the past
583 when the mahr was relatively high and was paid in livestock, in which

He also has more wives than other Bedouin and is usually more cultured and intelligent.[1] 554 [595]

The most important of the Shaikhly families of the country, those which represented large tribal divisions vis-à-vis the Turkish Government, the Sanusiya, others sections of their tribe, adjacent tribes, and attached client groups, lost much of their influence with the loss of their stock and the exile of some of their more prominent members during the second Italo-Sanusi war. The authority of these traditional Shaikhly lineages was also undermined by Italian policies, first of recognizing and paying salaries to so many Shaikhs, some of whom were persons of little importance, that the office of Shaikh lost much of its virtue in the eyes of the people, and afterwards of ignoring the Shaikhs altogether. The better known of these Shaikhly families are the house of Bu Bakr bu Hadduth among the Bara'asa, the house of Lataiwish among the Magharba, the house of 'Abdalla among the 'Abaidat, the houses of Kizzih and 'Abbar among the 'Awaqir, the house of Asbali among the 'Arafa, the houses of Suwaikir and 'Ilwani among the 'Abid, the house of Bu Khatara bu Halaiqa among the Hasa, and, in the Sirtica, the most famous house of all, that of Saif al-Nasir among the highly nomadic Aulad Suliman. 554 558 ● 648 *

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[1] Op. cit., Pt. II, pp. 39–40.

her father takes, but in certain critical situations he can be relieved of choice 613 593
if the interests of the group as a whole are at stake. [421]

Political authority is the preserve of a corporation, and its exercise leads [428]
to invasion of a man's authority in the field of domestic relations. This [584]
does not mean, however, that discrete areas of authority do not remain with
the father. In the tent his authority over his son is so overwhelming as to
keep the son in almost complete subordination. The son is referred to as a
slave, and in daily life he has to behave as one. He must obey every command,
for, were he to rebel, he would find little or no support among his
agnates, whatever the extent of the provocation. Retreat from his father is [422]
hardly an alternative, since, while his father is alive, he has no animals of
his own, and to leave camp would only mean that he would have to move
outside his group to seek employment elsewhere as a shepherd. If he did [558] •
this he would forfeit status, and almost certainly cut himself off from property [428]
which would fall to him after his father's death. A man who "denies"
his father looses too many privileges for the practice to become widespread.

Caught in this dilemma, a son's predicament is worsened by the fact that 593
he cannot initiate marriage negotiations — to be able to do so requires some 584
animals to offer a girl's father. Through his mother's brother he has the [431]
means of bringing pressure to bear on his father, but the latter can resist for [604]
years. Finally, a marriage is arranged for him. It is difficult to convey the 581
yearning of young Bedouin for marriage. They discuss it among themselves 521
ad nauseam. For the most part their talk is about the sexual aspect of marriage. 831
Premarital sex relations are strictly controlled, and the movements
of each young girl are carefully guarded because, if on the day of her marriage 836
the test shows that she is not a virgin, she not only brings disgrace to [585]
her family, but the marriage may be revoked and her worth as a bride for
another man seriously diminished. Nevertheless premarital relations do [837]
occur, if not between youths and maidens to any extent, between young
men and married women.

The question still remains: why is marriage the occasion of such ebullient 581
celebration? The formal authority a father exercises over his son 593
changes little on marriage. Economically the son is still harnessed to the
father. The latter still shouts his orders at him, and obedience remains
unaltered. Any sign of an independent view on a matter is met with a gruff
rebuff. If the marriage turns out to be disagreeable to the father, he has
the authority — if not always the power — to break it. Marriage does not
mean a change in the general mode of behaviour between the two; the legal
relations remain unaltered, albeit modified in practice, as the married son
matures in age. But marriage does mean the acquisition of rights and status
previously denied a son. Henceforward, he has a domain of his own. This
is high drama, indeed, for although every effort is made to give substance to [554]
the expressed view that "nothing has happened," for the first time in his
life the son has seized publicly, amid the jubilations of his fellows, a status
which hitherto was the possession of the father.

577 high value placed upon conformity to rules governing authority
571 relations makes Bedouin society of al-Qasr less individualistic
181 than, for instance, the Iatmul of New Guinea who "set no
182 exaggerated value upon extremely orderly behavior" (Bateson 1958:31). Social cohesion in al-Qasr is sustained through what Durkheim called "mechanical solidarity."

593 The Bedouin father is in a disciplinary position over his washuun, his wife (wives) and his children. (The word, washuun, must be of Berber origin for I am unable to trace it in Arabic.) Although the father has the right to beat his washuun, the Bedouins say that he does so "only in rare cases, when it is necessary." During my time in the field I heard of no physical punishment being dealt out by a father.

The dyadic relationship of father and son roles is the focal field of authority in the family. The pattern of behavior in this relationship is marked typically by restraint on the part of the son. The father orders and the son obeys unquestioningly. If the father accidentally uses a taboo
[192] word, such as 'ammar which in standard Arabic means "to fill" but in the Bedouin dialect means "to have sexual intercourse," the son will immediately depart the scene in a high state of embarrassment. In this way, the boy is not only excluded
● [561] from gatherings and activities in which his father participates, but he is also made to maintain a respectable social distance from his father's age-set. There are other ways of

593 During the
[207] present time when most of the Bedouins own a transistor radio,
[177] a son will not even listen to songs or poetry broadcast over
the air if his father is within hearing distance. I once
witnessed a well-meaning father try unsuccessfully to get his
ten year old son to sit down and listen with him to the news
593 on the radio. This automatic deference paid to the father
561 is extended to all male elders: the father-son relationship
is the model for authority relations between generations.
[276] But there are degrees in which the model is applied to behavior; for instance, a boy will not smoke in front of his older brother, his uncles and grandfather, but will feel no uneasiness about smoking in the company of an elder with whom he has no immediate authority relationship.

593 The filial piety which marks the father-son authority relationship is owed to the father until his death. As the son grows older, he may show a little less constraint but he still plays the role of the subordinate. For example, I never saw a son argue with his father over anything during my stay in the field, with one serious exception. One man who had broken off friendly relations with his brother objected to the presence of his brother's sons at the wedding of his own daughter. When he threatened to cause a public scene to embarrass his nephews before the other guests, his own sons defended the right of their cousins to be at their sister's wedding. They told their father that his quarrel

000 kin groups of the parent who does not determine descent. A
182 corollary aspect of the filiation principle in al-Qasr is the
601 602 practice of collaterally extending the term, khal, to include
604 many others besides the real mother's brother. This usage
[114] of classificatory terminology, like that in the case of bint
601 'amm, leads to confusion for the fieldworker. When an in-
604 dividual marries into an outside group, or even within the
•561 secondary group, the wife's brother becomes khal not only to
182 the offspring of the marriage, but to all the children (awlad)
at the same generation level as the offspring. All boys of
the age of sister's son will refer to his mother's brother
as khali ("my mother's brother"). Besides extending the web
of kinship, this practice also has the function of uniting
age-mates of the local descent group.

604 Throughout this discussion of mother's brother, I
582 have been stressing the fact that the sentiment which a
[829] Bedouin develops toward this person is to be construed as a
political value, i.e., a behavioral disposition relevant to
the political process. It is patent then that the sister's
son-mother's brother relationship should be more crucial in
exogamous marriages, for in these cases cognation becomes the
principal mechanism for establishing authority relations and
effecting political alliance. In endogamous marriages, cognation complements the other structural principles which
define the corporate group, and makes it the corporate group
par excellence.

554 It would be considered "wrong" for the members of
571 this group to present themselves at an al-Qasr wedding party,
[577] or the annual celebration held in honor of a local saint of
[585] the area. When I inquired about the conspicuous absence of
[796] some of my chief informants from such gatherings, I was told
[124] that "they will send their gifts," or that "it is not decent
[431] that they come to something such as this." In terms of
554 Bedouin social structure, there are a number of plausible
571 explanations for this "status separation." Fathers should
182 not attend public affairs at which their sons may be "performing,"
561 i.e., young men should be allowed to play a public
[593] role outside the confines of the father-son authority
structure. By virtue of the extension of the father role,
and its corresponding authoritarian attitude, every member
of the elder age-set commands certain rights and obligations
which would prevent the free expression that is the hallmark
of Bedouin parties. Conversely, and at the more general
level, members of the "status group" who wish to remain
members of this circle accept certain restrictions on social
[114] intercourse. At the five different Bedouin "parties" which
I attended, there were "elders" present, but none of them
could be classified as members of the "status group." Bedouins
plainly state that elders should not attend parties, but, on
the other hand, they show much more concern and emotion when
they say that a member of the "status group" should not "be

554 seen" at any such function. It would appear that the mechanism
571 at work here is not simply a device to provide the younger
182 generation with a tension-release situation, but also a
561 symbolic expression of the difference between the possessors
[154] and the non-possessors of authority, a confirmation of the
political order.

[578] The avoidance practice, or separation, between the
old and the young in the "party" situation is a structural
fact of Bedouin society, and, though it may ultimately be
defined as a conflict control or legitimating mechanism, in
the context of culture change new aspects and meanings attach
554 to the phenomenon. The "status group" is an agent of change
571 in al-Qasr; its members can afford to gamble in the market
178 economy of Marsa Matruh since they possess the reserve capital
[471] (in the form of sheep) and the social prestige which permits
[439] this. The "status group," with business and social relations
[177] in Marsa Matruh, enjoys both the benefits of associational
ties with the Egyptians and the communal ties with their
fellow Bedouins. They see themselves as being different from
their fellow tribesmen, and they tend to face more towards
Marsa Matruh than al-Qasr. In short, they are the "cultural
brokers" who support an ideology of change, they extol the
benefits of a new way of life over and against the old.

[789] One repudiation of tradition which constitutes an
[796] attempt to define the style of life of the "status group"

554 The rajal khair, then, is a broker in social relation-
571 ships, a manipulator of loyalties. As a member of the "status
627 group," he can afford to spend time and money in courting his
fellow tribesmen, and, as a result, can accrue prestige and
loyalty. This role, like that of the 'aqila, is a secular
[681] one. The sanctions which it controls are as economical as
those of the 'aqila's are political. In this sense, they
are differentiated from the role of rajal saalih whose
sanctions are sacred in nature.

554 The traditional role which we define as that of the
792 rajal saalih, "the holy man," was probably much more important
[178] in the past than it is today. In al-Qasr, there are only two
rajal saalih who share in traditional power: the one is a
resident of al-Qasr proper, and the other, a member of the
prestigious Sanusi family, lives near Marsa Matruh.

The rajal saalih of al-Qasr, i.e. the local "holy
man," is assured of status because he is an ashraf, one who
claims descent from the family of the Prophet. He is also a
[561] member of the elder age-set, and while he is not rich, he
cannot be considered poor. Though the "holy man" al-Sanusi
[793] lives near Matruh, he participates in the authority structure
of al-Qasr and is a member of the "status group." He is
sometimes referred to as rajal saalih kabir, "a great holy
man," by virtue of his Sanusi heritage.

[771] The relative unimportance of this role as compared
to that of the rajal khair in conflict regulation is a function

613 position as the leader of the bait. The principle of patrilineal suc-
554 cession is so respected in such baits that it overshadows any other con-
613 554 sideration. This continues to be the case as long as the kinship ties
428 within the bait remain strong. When the kinship ties in a given bait
178 weaken, the principle of patrilineal succession also weakens. This is
[166] more likely to occur in baits where a relatively large number of the
[464] members leave the area permanently or for a more or less prolonged period
of time, seeking jobs on a part or a full-time basis. Many of these
613 178 members maintain only a minimal contact with their respective baits.
166 They become more reluctant to fulfill their kinship obligations, es-
464 ●561 pecially when they entail any financial liability. The older members
369 complain about how younger persons are less loyal to their elders and
how selfish they have become. "All they care about is their jobs and the pleasure they get from the city; they are becoming city people." Younger members, on the other hand, maintain that their reluctance to fulfill their kinship obligations stems from their feeling that they do not get anything in return. "Life is expensive and money is hard to obtain. I cannot make enough money to support myself and my wife and children and at the same time pay my cousin's financial debts," said a member of eilat Asabei', who works as a driver with the Desert Organization in Alexandria.

613 When this happens, there seems to be a tendency toward shifting the
554 emphasis from the bait to the eila or the amar as the source of the po-
[556] litical support of the Aqila. This is turn makes wealth an important
basis of the Aqila's power. No more can the bait impose an ineffective Aqila on the amar unless it is ready to back him by their own share of money. If this is lacking as was the case with Shei'eb, there is nothing

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[684] The ten pounds paid to the husband in this case is considered as a kabara for the husband's injured pride. The kabara is one of the vaguest and least determined fines in the tribal law. As a face-saving device, it varies from one case to another. It is determined in each case by the seriousness of the insult, the publicity of that insult (insults in a public place require a much larger kabara than insults
● [561] in a private place). The relative age of the insulted and the offender is also taken into consideration in assessing the kabara. If the insulted is older than the offender, the kabara is much higher than if the situation were reversed. In fact, in the last case the insulted might
[554] not be able to collect any kabara at all. The relative status of the two parties is also a factor. A member of a Murabiteen tribe who insults a Sa'adi is likely to be charged with a larger kabara than the reverse situation. The amount of kabara is left for the bargaining of the two parties and their representatives and varies greatly from one case to another. As such, the kabara is not exactly a fine or an independent punishment. In most of the cases it is an additional punishment added to a regular one. It is hard to imagine a crime in which the victim is not considered in one way or another insulted or belittled. The only
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684 specified kabara that I found in the tribal law was in the case of adultery. The kabara in that case is the same regardless of the relative position of the people involved. The kabara differs, however, according to a standardized set of circumstances surrounding the place in which the adultery is committed. Adultery committed in the husband's tent requires kabara of the maximum L.E. 20; adultery within the camp of the husband but outside his tent can bring a kabara of only L.E. 10, while adultery committed outside the camp brings a mere L.E. 5. The justification for

582 any summer camp will have descent lines cross linked by the
613 bonds of marriage with parallel cousins, and at the same time
[621] cleaved by the maternal links established by repetitive cross-
cousin marriage to different groups outside the segment. Thus,
in one of its aspects, marriage makes of an agnatic group a group
582 of cognates as well. 'Marry your paternal cousins and both your
613 paternal and maternal relatives will be one,' to quote Bedouin
602 sentiment on the matter. Within this agnatic group, nevertheless,
two other clusters of kin exist—those with maternal connexions
outside. In all, three areas of kinship can be defined,[13] although
all the members of the segment will have the lineage bond of
agnation in common. In normal circumstances, when split does
not threaten the group, the bond of agnation, strengthened by
parallel cousin marriage, takes precedence, although behaviour
is significantly affected by maternal links at any time. There is,
152 in the first instance, great jealousy between co-wives, which is
595 passed on to their children. Each wife has her separate tent, and
593 each is entitled to a strictly equal share of the husband's time
they have in common. This applies similarly to favours he may
grant his wives, and the distribution of his wealth among them.
If, for example, the husband is the owner of a horse, he is required to tether it outside the tents of his wives in strict rotation; if he retires for the night with one wife, the following night he must favour the other; if he buys dress material for the one he must buy a length of identical material for the other; if he bestows favours on the children of one the children of the other must be given equal consideration. Many such details are meticulously observed; but while many are observed most of the time, it is difficult to observe them all, the whole time. Any breach of the rules is quickly taken up by the wives, and quarrels ensue, leading not only to bitterness among the co-wives, but between the offended wife and her husband, between the children
595 of both wives, and between the children and their father. Often,
593 when a man has co-wives, there is a marked discrepancy in age
561 between them, for, when an elderly Bedouin marries a second

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[13] The situation is not always as simple as this. Cross-cousin marriage may take more than two directions, and marriage within the segment might bring about great complexity, but the argument put forward above is not seriously affected by neglecting these details here.

wife he usually chooses a young girl of about twenty years. Children 595
of the elder wife might be adult, therefore, when the children 593
of the junior wife are infants. Great emphasis is placed on 561
seniority, particularly among males, but strong emphasis is also
placed on the equality of siblings and their equal legal status.
Between brothers of widely differing ages, there is, then, this
field of potential conflict. From an early date competitive, if not
hostile, relationships develop between the sons of co-wives. Competition 593
between half-brothers results not only from their 586
mothers being co-wives: one group might be the sons of a divorced 587
wife. The latter situation is often much worse, for the sons
born of the divorced wife are now being fostered by a woman
who is not their mother. A similar condition of things is brought
about when a widower with sons remarries. Yet again, when a
wife grows old and her sons have reached maturity, her husband
may not divorce her formally, but merely 'throw her off his
back'; she will then go to live with her grown sons, while her
husband, in turn, takes a new wife, usually taking up residence
in another camp for a time at least. It would be too much of a
digression here to discuss the inheritance disputes, and the disputes
over marriage and bride-wealth, which arise out of these
various circumstances. Suffice it to note that such disputes are [613]
common and affect the alignment of people within a tertiary
segment.

As half-brothers grow to maturity some of them will marry 613
their maternal cross-cousins, and in succeeding generations some 621
of their descendants will do likewise. In this way, a tertiary segment [582]
united by the bond of agnation, will also have within it
smaller groups of kin having different sets of cognatic links. This
group, as a residential unit, shows a very high concentration of
agnates, and the Bedouin say with pride that members of the
camps are always 'one' because of this agnatic bond, and indeed,
the corporate identity of this group is strikingly displayed in
many circumstances. It does not take precedence in all circumstances, 613
for, built into agnation, with the heavy burden of duties 578
which go with it, are serious stresses and strains which in some 602
circumstances regularly come out into the open. In yet other
circumstances cognatic kinship affiliations appear to be dominant,
causing friction among agnates. A man, for example, may permit

Cases

584 Prior to the wedding festivities, the
593 father will have participated in negotiations, although even in these he will
have remained silent, leaving an affine, as a rule, to arrange the details with
the girl's father and his kinsmen. The father feigns aloofness from the start
of negotiations until after the wedding celebrations have ended. Before inquiring into this seemingly odd behaviour, a few further details of marriage
ceremonies need to be mentioned briefly.

585 The bride is carried to the nuptial tent on a camel, seated in a cagelike
342 structure placed on the camel's back, this canopy covered over with carpets
[492] and at least one long blanket — later to be used to divide her tent into male
and female quarters — which constitute part of the goods given to a woman
[788] on marriage. On her arrival, while she is still seated in her canopy, the
camel is led round the tent seven times by a small boy. She then descends
and is hustled into the tent by a number of women who make a show of their
attempts to conceal her from view. Inside the tent the bride is enclosed in
one corner in a kind of cubicle partitioned off by a length of blanket.

585 In the meantime, the groom has affected to escape, but is "caught," while
[533] running away, by his fellows, who "compel" him to return to the nuptial tent,
[831] to the accompaniment of their lewd songs telling of the sexual pleasures
awaiting him. Much of this is horseplay, but the young men carry it out
brazenly and the groom is required to show reluctance to continue with the
ceremonies. His entry into the nuptial tent is marked by an expectant hush
that falls over the crowd of men gathered, as they await the result of the
virginity test the groom is about to perform, which he does by wrapping part
of his toga round one of his fingers to pierce the hymen. Sharp shrieks from
[202] the bride give the signal that the test has been undertaken; not a stir moves
the crowd until evidence of its success has been publicly displayed, which is
given by the groom hoisting the blood-stained portion of the toga through
the corner of the tent on a pole, followed by firing three shots from his rifle.
Jubilantly, the men gathered fire volley after volley from their rifles just over
the nuptial tent, and the seven-day celebrations begin.

585 A full descriptive account of a marriage, or many of the ritual details
589 woven into it need not be given here. What is included is intended to illus-
[593] trate certain relationships between father and son, and between one
[561] generation and another. In this connection two further points are appropriate. First, during the week of festival, young men gather outside the nuptial
[535] tent each night to encourage a maiden in her dancing, clapping their hands
[533] to the point of injury "so that we will have a wife soon." The celebrations
belong to the bachelors, and they are the only ones to engage in the singing
[538] and hand clapping. It is they too who stop the bridal camel on its way to
the nuptial tent to recite obscene rhymes to the bride, and they also shout
[831] their rather dubious consolations to the bride who, during the virginity test,
crying out for her mother, is assured by them that the night holds promise
585 for her which her mother could never extend. The married men, particularly
602 the close senior agnates of the groom, stay away from it all, discussing mat-
521 ters unconnected with the affair.

membership of associations and so on. The statuses a Bedouin achieves depend 796
not on an ordered acquisition through the inheritance of roles or election 852
to them, but on his personal manipulation of linkages in his jockeying 88
with others. Rites are minimal because there are few defined statuses an 554
individual can predictably acquire. The equalitarianism of the desert denudes 602
the Bedouin of ritual riches. Complimentarily, rites which do occur are 613
thrown into exaggerated relief by the absence of others, and in their isolation, [557]
become not merely a "passage" but a cataclysmic change. Marriage and 585
burial both comprehend limited fields of relations, but accompanying ceremonies 764
may bring several hundred people together, people who otherwise 796
rarely gather in these numbers to meet one another as kinsmen and neighbours, 602
and it is suggested that the emphasis given to the events dramatises the 182
significance of the changes they produce. In the discussion of the changes brought about by marriage, the Bedouin view of what is entailed will be considered first.

The Bedouin View of Marriage

After marriage, the Bedouin argue, a son has a tent of his own, a woman 585
over whom he has authority and soon children to make him a father. Marriage 581
causes split, branching. A new family is created, holding the potential [613]
of a new lineage. The separation is so painful a matter for the father [593]
that he cannot contemplate it, hence his pretence that he has no knowledge of wedding festivities, and his subsequent attitude that nothing has happened.

Interestingly, there are two other occasions when this attitude is to be 682
observed. When a man kills within his corporate group,[5] he may flee his 613
tribe or he may be compelled to leave; later he is likely to return and, when 621
he does, he is received with a minimum of show. Every attempt is made to suppress knowledge of the event.

Again, if incest occurs, the memory of it must somehow be suppressed, and 835
it is an ever-present danger. Men, permitted four wives simultaneously and 561
also able to engage in a plurality of marriages through divorce or death of [595]
spouses, may have children showing an age difference of two or three generations. Thus it comes about that a man may be of an age in relation to his father's sister which permits them as children to behave as if they were
first paternal cousins. As an adult, the preferred spouse for a man is a [582]
father's brother's daughter. In terms of relationships between adolescents the situation in which a man is of the same age generation as his father's
sister is fraught with danger. In one such case, between a man and his [684]
father's sister, the male child of the union was put out in the desert to be

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[5] Bedouin are disposed in groups which, in summer, usually constitute a single community, around or near a watering point. The men of this group are interlinked by reference to an ancestor four or five ascending generations, reckoning from the generation of men of about 20 years. When, elsewhere in this chapter reference is made to corporations, it will be to groups of this kind.

835 devoured by wild animals, the girl was "given"[8] to a close cousin who had
•561 shot his sister. Both now reside with an enemy tribal section. The two acts
684 were equated. They were similar to the extent that both created a situation
which defied institutional resolution. The culprits were exorcised. The
girl's lover remains with his group — the odium for the male is incomparably
less than for the female, since, while maternity is easy to establish, paternity
is frequently shrouded in doubt — and during the months I lived with this
particular group, there was never a mention of the affair. It was as if "nothing had happened."

829 If asked why these two events cause such profound distress, the answers
578 the Bedouin give are twofold: they can do nothing about them, and they
613 cause split. By split in this context they mean split in the lineage; split in
[682] the case of homicide because it may lead to a demand for blood-money which
[684] is payable only between corporations, and split in the case of incest because
581 it causes chaos in relationships. Marriage, in one sense, their reasoning
829 runs, is similar, for it too causes split. Whatever may be the analytic strength
613 of the arguments that homicide and incest precipitate splitting, the argument that marriage does so is spurious. In what sense can marriage mean
split? Bedouin men marry "so that we may beget many sons, to make a
big lineage later on." The worst fate that can befall a man as a result of his
son's marriage is that he, in later generations, will become the focal point in
a series of branching descent lines. The alternative — that his sons remain
unmarried — can only mean that his name would disappear through want of
successors to carry it on, which is one of the greatest evils which can befall
a man, according to Bedouin sentiment: better split than oblivion. If the
key to the interpretation of the father's attitude to his son's marriage is not
581 that it causes split, it must lie elsewhere in their relationship. What marriage does is alter the distribution of authority between father and son. In
585 order to pursue this, it is necessary first to clarify the types of authority in-
593 volved, and then assess them in a post-marital situation.

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The Division of Authority Between the Family and the Corporation

851 Politically, a person's status is determined for him at birth. At this time
a man has the right to accept or deny paternity. Denial is tantamount to an
accusation of adultery by his wife. In practice, once a wife has given birth
to a male child, whatever doubts people may harbour regarding paternity,
the husband accepts the child as his. "The boy for the bed," is a saying often
heard among the Bedouin; but it remains the husband's prerogative to invest
[837] the child with legitimacy, hence, political status. Only if a husband becomes
aware that he is publicly considered a cuckold, or if he catches his wife and a
lover *in flagrante delicto*, is he at all likely to take action. Otherwise he may

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[585] [581] [8] A marriage is illegal unless it is accompanied by an agreement to transfer wealth to the girl's father.

band is required to take gifts to his mother-in-law in recognition of the fact 583
that she nourished his wife as an infant (the literal meaning of the word 584
used for this gift is "milk"). A return visit is made and gifts are given to 606
the daughter. When the first child is born an animal is presented by the 851
affines, and if the child is a male, the gift may be several sheep, or even a 425
few camels if the father-in-law is very wealthy. Formal exchange of gifts 606
continue, but, in addition, informal transfers are made. Moreover, if relations
between a man and his father-in-law develop favourably, it is not uncommon 606
for a young husband, during the early years of marriage, to move 591
away from his father and pitch his tent alongside that of his father-in-law. 593
Marriage gives a son affinal relations of his own. Affinity can alleviate the
dead weight of paternal authority.

It is suggested that the crisis the marriage of a son assumes for a father 585
is the shift it entails in the distribution of authority. This is borne out by 561
other details in the marriage ceremony referred to earlier. Ordinarily, young 602
men dare not sing within earshot of their senior agnates. Far from allowing 533
obscenities, agnates of the ascending generation would not allow even a
mention of women to be made by young men, in their presence. In a group [593]
consisting of young men and an agnate, I chanced to use the noun for [123]
woman and immediately my tent was cleared of all but the senior agnate.
At a wedding the young men revel in their lewd songs and shout their [831]
obscenities for all to hear. The senior agnates stand aside and make a show
of ignoring the proceedings. And well they may, for each marriage is a
challenge to the exclusive authority they have enjoyed; each nuptial tent is
an invasion of the domain of which they have been undisputed masters.
Marriage is the only occasion when the men of one generation can clap and
sing their defiance of an older one, and give warning of the changes which
must be accommodated however great the pretence that nothing has happened.

Marriage ceremonies dramatise the clash between adjacent generations 561
over the distribution of certain forms of authority. If this authority is as 602
overwhelming as has been suggested, and if it is so deeply resented, how is it that life is endurable for juniors? Relationships between junior and senior agnates are so restrictive that they almost amount to what Professor Fortes has suggested I view as a form of avoidance relationships. Juniors must always defer, they must obey commands promptly, they serve their seniors, they must accept a lead when it is given and the restrictions on conversations exclude all reference to women, marriage or sex. These are not simply a set of general guides for behaviour, they are rigidly applied rules, deviation from which is countered with rebuke or greater severity. It would appear from this

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many African societies is that wealth is transferred. Obviously, in societies where the 583
rules of exogamy compel a dispersion of links outside a man's own clan, what is in- 584
volved in this transfer of wealth cannot be sociologically similar to one in which mar- 606
riage to the first cousin on either side is permitted. 171

561 that young men spend their premarital lives in an environment of unmiti-
602 gated agnatic hostility. Greater substance is given to this view when it is
realised that agnates live together. The residential concentration of agnates
561 in Cyrenaica exceeds 80 per cent. I wish to stress that this figure is based
602 on the universe of the small camp, and the only males included as agnates are
621 those who are consanguinely related. Over 50 such camps were used in
arriving at the figure. Obviously, the figure of agnatic concentration will
vary depending on the universe. If all men who claim to belong to a tribe
of, say, 15,000 souls, who claim that they are agnates in a political sense are
included, then the figure will not be the same as that derived from a small
group where the criterion for inclusion is consanguinity, not mere political
affiliation. It is necessary to make this clear to emphasise that the Cyrenaican
figure is unusually high, and also because the modes of behaviour between
consanguineal and political agnates differ critically. Granted the hostility
[578] built into agnation, and recognising in addition the significance of the high
degree of agnatic concentration, unless there are other factors present in the
situation, life would be intolerably burdensome. Parallel-cousin marriage
comes to the rescue.

Parallel-Cousin Marriage

582

Among the Bedouin the prohibited degrees of marriage are few. A man
may not marry within a closer range than first paternal or maternal cousin;
he cannot marry a woman of a senior generation, nor a woman known to
be older. He cannot marry the daughters of a woman who has acted as wet
nurse to him or to any of his brothers and sisters. Otherwise he is permitted
to marry any other woman. Marriage with the first paternal cousin is pre-
582 ferred, and is more than a sentiment. A man has a right to his father's
brother's daughter, and before a marriage is arranged with anyone else, the
585 girl's father seeks the opinion of his brother's son. If he neglects to do this,
578 or if he flouts the opinion offered him, he runs the risk of the marriage
being brought to a halt on the very wedding day. I have witnessed this. In
most of the records I possess, it usually happens that the brother's son is
bought off with a few sheep (about five) and some articles of clothing.
Here the brother's son was seizing the occasion to extort from a farmer's
[589] brother wealth which he considered was due him from an earlier inheritance
dispute. Occasionally the intervention is genuinely designed to prevent a
marriage; if the girl refuses to marry her father's brother's son, he can force
582 her into spinsterhood. Men exercise their right to marry their first parallel
cousins. They also marry other parallel cousins. The significance of parallel-
cousin marriage varies with the exact degree of the relationship. First- and,
say, third-parallel cousins are sociologically different in a number of respects,
and in relation to specific problems these differences may assume major
[602] importance. In the present discussion the various degrees have this in
common: that whatever the precise relationship, all parallel cousins are the

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[834]

in position immediately anyone else appears at the entrance to the tent.[11] [342]
Women cook, but they do not serve the meal to males, nor are they responsible [264]
for the distribution of meat among them. Parts of an animal are 264
carefully specified, and the various portions distributed at a meal carry 574
with them a great deal of significance. A host can honour, flatter, disappoint 571
or even insult his guest, depending on the precise distribution of meat
he adopts. Designated portions should go to certain kinsmen if they are [602]
present, but this still leaves a wide margin of choice, and a host can use
this choice as part of the many means at his disposal for directing his relationships
with other men. A political link can be forged or another
snapped by the distribution of portions of meat at the commensal meal.

The Bedouin Ideal Type of Family as a Unit of Production

This account of the division of labour is far from inclusive of all the tasks 594
carried out. The details given are only barely sufficient to provide some 183
indication of the necessary composition of a family. Referring again to the [462]
Bedouin sentiments about the matter, it is now possible to give it some
numerical precision. The number of females should be a minimum of
about three, including a mother, a teen-age daughter and a child of about
eight years. Males should number about six: a father, relieved of most [857]
chores to act as director; a son in his middle to late twenties, to plough; a [883]
second son, in his early to middle twenties, to herd the camels; a third, in [462]
his late teens to early twenties, to shepherd the sheep; a fourth, middle to [561]
late teens, to look after the goats; and a younger son to fetch, carry and
run errands about the camp. The family of the ordinary Bedouin, they say, [554]
shows this sex and age distribution, although they recognise that a politically [556]
ambitious man with the wealth to match his aspirations would require more
of both sexes — particularly women, since the burden of entertainment increases
rapidly with a man's climb to power and fame.

Clearly, the basis of Bedouin sentiment concerning family structure is its 121
approximation to an ideal production unit. Some families display the features 183
of this ideal, but even they enjoy the productive benefits of this composition 594
for a very limited period only. The family, as described above, can only be an
ephemeral unit, since the age structure constantly changes, women are removed
by marriage, men move away and death affects it at any point at any
time. The Bedouin family is a fiction in the sense that it can be said to have a
characteristic composition. The mistake they make is to conceive of it as a
particular kinship structure related to production. The substance of what
has been referred to as a fiction is that, if viewed as a productive unit, it
bears close consistency with reality. Freed of the need to examine it in terms [621]
of specifically limited kinship relationships, and no longer anchored to the
inhabitants of a single tent, the distribution of people according to sex and

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[11] This is the general rule. In practice, the use of the divider can indicate an intimacy or distance in relationships, most subtly.

The Bedouins of al-Qasr claim that they
428 follow the Islamic laws of inheritance, in which case, a
562 surviving daughter is entitled to one-half the share of a surviving son (Quran IV: 177). But, in only two cases did
[423] women own land in al-Qasr: one woman was the only close survivor of her father, and, the other woman was a widow without sons. In fact, my informant even admitted that these cases were exceptional, that the women were permitted to keep the land only because the brothers of the deceased men, who are the "rightful heirs" after the sons, did not want the land. The Bedouins insist, on the other hand, that a girl can claim her share of the inheritance: "It is her right." But she will never do such a thing "because she respects her brothers too much to accept the land which is offered to her."

428 When the father's estate is large, certain measures are taken to divide it between his sons. In some cases, the division may be somewhat complex and determined over a period of time. One example of this in al-Qasr involved a wealthy man whose own property was divisible into parts roughly corresponding to ecological subdivisions. The subdivisions of the estate became the shares of the sons, and could then be separated but remain symbiotically dependent. Ecological relationships affirm social relations. The following is an
[159] account of inheritance rules in al-Qasr:

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> I am 45 years old and my eldest brother is 53 years old. I have two younger brothers. When my father died, we four sons inherited the property of our father jointly. I told my older brother to divide the land the way in which he wanted . . . My father had divided his land into four parts before he died. Each part was a separate "farm" so that a son could raise barley or olives, as he liked . . . But my brother told me to make the decision. As it turned out, my youngest brother was the first to make his choice of the four parts. He took his land but we still kept all of our sheep together. One year later, my older brother took his share of the land, but Jabril (the next to the youngest brother) and I remained together, and still remain together. Some men want to be on their own and others do not. Our eldest brother was the first to separate his animals from the collective herd . . . When the decisions were made to divide the land between us, we got the local "holy man" to go around the area with us and to witness the boundaries. This is done so that later if a brother changes his mind, or wants to take different land, the true borders will be known. We recorded them on paper and the "holy man" knows them . . . In matters of inheritance, all sons get equal shares, but in a case where there are ten camels and three sons, then, each gets three camels and the tenth goes to the eldest brother.

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562 Any property which a female may own, if it is land or livestock, will go to her sons upon her death. In al-Qasr, [431] such property will usually be sheep which a woman may accumulate through gift-giving. In one case, which is unique in al-Qasr, a woman received thirteen camels from her husband [583] at the time of her wedding. (This was not the brideprice, for that goes to the bride's father.) At the time of her death her camels numbered seventy, and they were divided equally among her five sons. Concerning lesser items, such as clothing and jewelry, and also chickens, these are

428 •562 [422] inherited by a woman's daughters. The carpets and the tent, which are woven by women, are not their property to pass on for they belong to the head of the household, the shaib.

596 177 178 [124] Economic change in al-Qasr has had its impact at the level of production mode, and, also, it has affected the composition of the basic family structure. One informant, who is now nineteen years old, remembers growing up in a household composed of his grandfather, father, father's brothers and their families. Since that time, his father has built another house away from the family home; one uncle has moved to Marsa Matruh and opened a shop there; his youngest uncle has built a house not far from the family home; and one uncle remains with his three wives in the original house. 182 177 *613 433 434 This fission-type process is not uncommon in a segmentary society, although as a traditional process, it represented a mechanism for dealing with ecological pressures. In the modern case, in al-Qasr, the process of fission in the Bedouin social structure proves to be an adaptive mechanism also: the fragmentation of lineage property and relations is a positive condition for the transition to a cash and market economy. Among most of the families of al-Qasr, as market orientation increases brothers begin to economically differentiate their tasks and interests with an eye to individual profits.

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One of my informants, a wealthy man and a poet, said that since he could not love two women equally he would never take a second wife. He also said that he was unwilling to give his daughter to a man who refused to promise him that she would be his only wife.

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[596]
[768]
Throughout his life, the father is dominant and his washuun is subjective. He is the master of his naja' and the social behavior of his wife and offspring toward him has both a moral and a pragmatic aspect. They show respect and obedience because "it is the decent thing to do;" further, just as he provides for their material needs while he is alive, so the property which he leaves them will sustain them after his death.

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[562]
As we have already noted, in theory, the daughters inherit one-half of the shares which the sons receive; in fact, females inherit only if they are the sole survivors of the male. But the surviving wife, or wives, will take a cash amount equal to their brideprice from the husband's estate. The Bedouins say that this price will be paid before any other inheritance shares are distributed.

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In addition, the wife has the right to remain in her husband's house or tent, and it is the duty of the eldest son to look after her. She may remain at home until death, provided she never brings a man who may be considered a prospective husband into the house.

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The rights and duties involved in the father-washuun relationship show that the ideal authority structure of the

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538 brother to special place in the social structure states that
[539] "Two-thirds of the boy belongs to the khal, and he is like the father: the remaining one-third is divided equally between the father and the khal." The Bedouins are always quick to point out to the stranger, such as I was, that this means there is only one-sixth of the boy which belongs to the father. A clearer case of the ideology of kinship versus
[539] descent could not be had. Another proverb has it that "the good which you see in a boy comes from khal khalu ("the maternal uncle of his maternal uncle"). Any kinship relation may be the basis for a new network of social relations by making use of the classificatory principle. The Bedouins
[539] exaggerate the status and role of the mother's brother by saying that "when a boy does good or bad, one wants to know the name of his khal not the name of his father." This statement, which favors cognatic links over patrilineal ties, is not true but such an attempt at emphasis indicates that this relationship is something of value in the Bedouin society.

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578 In the case of any conflict "between his tribes," the Bedouins say, "the boy must support the tribe of his khal." This, of course, does not mean that the individual should take up arms against his patrilineal corporate group, but
562 that he should seek to mediate the conflict. The political
593 value of conflict avoidance and conflict control is also
554 conspicuous in the dual role which the mature female plays
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562 593 in Bedouin society, that is, the role of wife-daughter. The
554 principles of patrilineality and cognation do not work against
182 each other when the girl marries outside her corporate group,
578 nor does her new dual role present a case of role conflict.
562 593 On the contrary, the wife-daughter role functions to bind to-
554 gether two groups which are structurally differentiated by
182 578 the rule of patrilineality. During time of peace, the wife-
*613 daughter acts as a bond-maker by carrying gifts back and
[431] forth between the two groups, often bringing some of her
[628] [574] younger patrilineal relatives back to her husband's house or
562 tent for short visits. During a time of conflict or war, the
593 Bedouins point out, she is the only person who can cross the
554 battle lines unharmed. She is a match-maker as well as a
[726] peace-maker. Often she influences the selection of mates by
[584] individuals in both her husband's group and her father's
562 group. The Bedouins say that "after the *bint 'amm*, a man
593 should marry his *bint khal* ("mother's brother's daughter")
554 because she is like his *bint 'amm*." Usually, over a period
582 of a few generations, a given direction in marriage is sustained (see Figure 10), and it is one function of this wife-daughter role to accomplish this important political action.

562 The role of wife-daughter, then, may be seen as one
593 important aspect of what Fortes (1953:33) calls, "complemen-
554 tary filiation," the essential mechanism which provides the
*613 182 link between the corporate groups of al-Qasr society and the
kin groups of the parent who does not determine
descent.

671 change in al-Qasr must proceed.

671 Bedouin law should be considered within its historical
177 context, especially as it has reference to the Maliki school
of Islamic Law. The Maliki school, or "rite," (madhhab) of
law is considered to be the most conservative interpretation
of the doctrine of the Prophet Muhammad. Therefore, the
Maliki school is thought to reflect the society and tribal
traditions of pre-Islamic Arabia more dependably than any of
the other three schools of law. For instance, the Maliki
671 177 school, in the domain of family law, stresses the importance
428 and the primacy of agnate rights and claims. This is especially so in matters of inheritance: the law states that
in the absence of agnate heirs the property of the deceased
passes, not to female survivors but, to the central treasury
• [562] of the State. This single legal aspect helps us to understand the Bedouin practice of disallowing the female to
inherit and should be a consideration in any study of Bedouin
succession rules.

175 Maliki Law was introduced into North Africa during
671 the ninth century, and became the official legal doctrine of
177 the Berber dynasties. It was first taught in this part of
the world, probably, by Yahya ibn Yahya, a student of Malik
ibn Anas, the founder of the school. Murray (1935:313)
presents a valuable legal document from the Western Desert
in which the name "Yahya" is frequently cited as the authority

175 671 177 for legal interpretation. For instance: "We are also told by Yahya that (the Caliph) Mu'awiya ibn Sufian said that a wound on the body should be assessed at half the value of that wound on the head or face" (1935:324). 671 177 Maliki law, derived in large part from the Bedouin traditions of Arabia, may be seen to characterize the legal norms of the tribal-based social structure in the Western Desert. [428] [562] The Bedouins of al-Qasr themselves claim that they are within the bounds of Islamic Law when they deny the female the right to inherit, though they do have other, and more secular, justifications for the practice.

671 182 648 As we have already noted, in the above quote from the "holy man" of al-Qasr, the Bedouins feel that the _'awaiyid_ can succeed where governmental law will fail. They say that "the government does not understand the problems of the Bedouins," that "government troops cannot function in the desert." They feel that they need the _'awaiyid_ for the sake of political order itself: "If the Bedouins did not have the _'awaiyid_, they would eat each other. The _'awaiyid_ is so important that a man who commits a wrong in town will lie to the government, and then dutifully return to the tribe for Bedouin justice."

[656] In 1933, the government "abolished" the _'awaiyid_ and insisted that the Bedouins settle their difference in the civil courts in accord with Egyptian law. According to

67 [124] I checked the contents of this document with my own informants who agreed that it was authentic and represented the 'awaiyid as it should be practiced. Almost [682] the whole of the 'awaiyid refers to the circumstances surrounding the occurrence of killing and the payment of the [128] diiya. The case studies which I present below reflect the 'awaiyid as it was practiced in 1935.

682 Blood-money is calculated relative to three things: whether or not a killing was premeditated or accidental; the sex of the victim; and whether or not the victim was a freeman or a slave. The full diiya is paid in the case of intentional killing, and three-fourths of this amount is due in the case ●[562] of accidental killing. The diiya for a woman is one-half that for a man whether or not the killing is intentional. [567] There are no slaves in al-Qasr, only their descendents who are now freemen. In the case where a pregnant woman is killed, the foetus will be examined and should it prove to be a male then the full diiya will be due.

578 682 *613 778 An important mechanism for conflict regulation in the Western Desert is the nazaala, i.e., "the act of taking refuge." If a killing is committed, the killer immediately seeks protection by going to the residence of a neutral third party. The third party, who may or may not be an 'aqila, and his lineage give protection to the whole tertiary segment of the killer. This may involve the actual relocation of the killer's bait to the residence of the protecting group for

671 Implicit in the _'awaiyid_ is the assumption that the
562 woman is less responsible for her deeds and something of a
weakling. The Bedouins have a proverb which says that "the
devil whispers in the ear of the woman." If a woman slays a
[682] man, intentionally or accidentally, the _diiya_ is considered
671 as for unintentional killing. Where sex offenses are con-
562 cerned, it makes a difference if the act takes place in the
684 man's (i.e. the husband's) tent or in the desert, and, of
course, it makes a difference whether or not it is a case
of rape or adultery. If a man finds another man and his
wife in his dwelling in the act of adultery, he may kill
the man and pay the _diiya_ for unintentional killing. From
this _diiya_, he deducts the amount of the bride-price and
50 L.E. for trespassing. The fine for rape ranges from
10 L.E. to 100 L.E. On the other hand, if intercourse takes
place with the woman's consent, the fine is only 5 L.E. or
10 L.E. If a virgin is deflowered, the fine will be 100 L.E.,
and the man will have to marry her, paying the bride-price
asked for by the girl's father and going through the normal
procedure for marriage. Where offenses involve unmarried
women, all fines are paid to the father. In cases concerning
married women, fines go to the husband. According to the
[586] Bedouins, it would be a great dishonor to the man's family
[558] if the husband were not to divorce his wife after it becomes
known that she has been promiscuous. They said that if a man

671 They said that if a man
•562
684 insisted on keeping a promiscuous wife, his family would
681 "write a barawwa aginst him." I heard of no sex offenses in
[114] al-Qasr while I was there.

671 The penalty for stealing, according to the 'awaiyid,
685 is that the thief shall pay compensation, by himself, in the
amount of four times the value of the stolen object. On the
*[613] other hand, if the thief is a poor man, he will pay thrice the
value of the stolen object and the remaining fourth will be
paid by his lineage.

671 The 'awaiyid recognizes the territorial claims of the
685 lineage. Disputes arising over conflicting claims to land
*613 and wells are handled at Bedouin courts in much the same way
578 as personal injury cases are, with one exception. Usually, a
[554] larger number of elders and rajal khair will be consulted in
an advisory capacity by the 'awaaqil handling the case. The
'awaaqil consider the specific history of a particular piece
of land or well (for instance, each well is known by its own
name), and determine the ownership in accordance with the
testimony of elders and individuals of high social status.
Most of the problems over land and water rights in al-Qasr
have reference to what is still considered lineage-owned
685 territory in the barley-and-pasture sector. In the 'izba
578 sector, conflict over land ownership rights, since they are
648 rights which are registered with the government, is settled
in the Egyptian court of law. Only one such case came up while

423 *613 182 [691] long time ago. This seems to be supported by the evidence shown below, for often conflict over land and water rights is represented by litigation between individuals and not groups.

422 •562 *613 I have arbitrarily assigned to the classification of property rights the rights over women. I have done this because a man acquires such rights as a member of a lineage jural group and secures them with the backing of public opinion and the 'awaiyid. Also, though a man in al-Qasr does not "own" his wife, he does have the legal rights to certain things related to her: he has the right to her sexual favors, and the right to claim her offspring for his own lineage.

685 695 Settlement in cases dealing with the infringement of property rights, if they do not lead to personal injury cases, will usually be concluded by arbitration or oath-taking, either of which brings the two parties into agreement.

691 685 *613 578 *692 Date: 1964. Case: Quarrel between Bait 'Umran and Bait Idris of 'Ailit Ma'fas over the ownership of a well. The 'awaaqil sent for the two parties involved, and they met on Wednesday, market day. And the 'awaaqil told the two parties: "This is a shame ('aib), you must be friends because you are from the same tribe." The 'awaaqil knew "from past history and from truthful elders" that the well belonged to 'Ait Idris. The 'awaaqil made 'Ait 'Umran change their minds about their claim [695] to the well. Before the litigation 'Ait 'Umran had insisted

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578 said: "I did not take anything." The *'awaaqil* of both parties
685 met and told the accused: "If you have anything give it to
*613 us; if you do not have anything then swear the oath to this
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[571] fact." Members of 'Ailit Ma'fas said that the boy was innocent
[692] and told the *'awaaqil* that the boy should have his rights
according to the *'awaiyid* (i.e. he should be allowed to swear
the oath to establish his innocence). The boy accused of the
theft, his father, and two other members of 'Ailit Ma'fas
selected by the accusers swore the oath and the problem was
619 over. Two months later, the accuser from the Kamailat lost
578 his eye in an accident, because swearing the oath has con-
685 sequences for both parties. A bad oath will work against the
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784 one who makes it; there will be a curse upon him, his children,
and his money. And the bad effects of an oath will also work
against the one who falsely accuses another making him swear
the oath.

582 The final two cases deal with marriage rights. The
•562 first illustrates a number of things which I have touched on
*613 in the previous discussion of marriage: that a man may choose
792 to ignore the jural structures of the lineage group where the
desires of his offspring are concerned; that the female is
not the totally subjugated person which one might expect to
find in the strongly patrilineal Bedouin society; and that the
role of "holy man" functions in the marital area of authority
relations.

114 792 562 The second, rather complex, case occurred while I was in the field. Once again, the role of the "holy man" is shown to operate in cases dealing with women. Shown here also is an interesting example of the cultural definition of abnormality.

*613 578 582 792 No Date. Case: Quarrel between 'Ailit al-Abaidi ('Ali Abyad) and 'Ailit al-Afrad ('Ali Abyad) over marriage rights. A man from al-Abaidi agreed that his daughter could marry a man but the rest of the 'aiela did not approve of this marriage. Since the man could not go to his 'aqila, who disapproved of the marriage, he took his problem to a "holy man." The "holy man" decided that the girl should marry the man she wanted to marry, but he was afraid that this would cause trouble in the 'aiela. [586] The "holy man" decided to marry the man and woman, and then to divorce them for a period of one year so that the conflict would abate. The girl's father knew of this marriage but the other members of the 'aiela did not. After a period of one year, the groom went to the "holy man" and said: "Decide anything that I can do, but I must have the girl." [681] [684] The "holy man" decided to make him pay a kubaara (expiation) fee of 100 L.E. to the girl's 'aiela, and he married them again.

*613 619 578 582 Date: 1965. Case: Quarrel within a tertiary segment of the Qinaishat tribe concerning marriage rights. A girl from the Qinaishat tribe had refused to marry her paternal cousin, but he was insistent upon his right to have her.

*613 with Bait Bu Taram of 'Ailit Lazumi. These marriages and
159 their resultant alliances enhance the political power and
581 social status of Hajj 'Ali within and without al-Qasr.
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Although he has no education himself, and neither reads
159 nor writes, Hajj 'Ali has sent his son to the University of
156 Alexandria. Hajj 'Ali's son is the only boy from al-Qasr
873 [212] ever to attend the university. Hajj 'Ali desired that his
son study law at the university or enter the military academy
"and become an officer." But his son objected to this, saying:
"Either way I will be employed by the government and will not
be permitted to travel and see other countries." Hajj 'Ali did
not argue with this: he said that his son should study what
he wished. The son is now studying in the Faculty of Commerce
156 at Alexandria. Hajj 'Ali is also sending his daughters to
159 the primary school in al-Qasr. Not all of the Bedouins believe
872 •562 that girls should receive an education.

156 Hajj 'Ali places among the "status group" in terms
159 of wealth. Although he has now committed himself to olive-
554 farming as a way of life, he remains one of the biggest sheep
472 owners in al-Qasr. Therefore, he is identified with both tra-
ditional and modern symbols of status. Hajj 'Ali differs in
156 one important way from other members of the "status group"
159 554 in that he owns three small general stores, two in al-Qasr
443 and one far to the west in Sallum. This fact has several
423 472 significant implications. Shops in al-Qasr (there are five
*[613]

156 to serve other than what they eat." Hajj 'Ali is not only
159 554 conscious of social stratification in his society, but he also
571 has a great deal of empathy with the less endowed, a pre-
574 requisite of a traditional Bedouin leader and an advantageous
796 one for a modern leader.

123 He is aware of most traditional institutions and how
156 they relate to conditions of modernity. Hajj 'Ali, whose own
159 554 marriages speak for his political acumen, sees only disadvantages
829 in the cousin-right marriage custom of the Bedouins. His
582 interest in getting on with the business of change, so to
speak, has led him to question a basic right contained in the
Bedouin principle of lineage structure and corporate membership.

> A thing which I do not like about our customs is the idea that a man has a right to his uncle's daughter. The man binds his cousin and in the end he might not marry her and will be the cause of her never marrying. He gives himself the authority to decide whom she may or may not marry. If he knows she desires to marry a certain man, he says: "She can marry anyone but not that one."

● [562] Here he challenges the traditional right of the individual
male in Bedouin society, favoring the rights of the female.
[177] The emancipation of the female, especially in rights and
[178] duties concerned with the marriage contract, is an element
[562] of the modernization process in Egyptian society and the
Middle East in general.

*613 The bait, as a political group, is in part structurally
602 defined by the corporate principle which states that blood-kin
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from the process of dispute settlement; and the semi-nomadic nature of the population in the area. 114 123

The reliance on the case-study method and especially that of Turner's "social drama" which requires extensive and detailed knowledge of the sequential development of a number of cases over a long period of time proved to be a major task in a society where disputes are settled not in formal hearings, but by means of informal mediation and behind the scene negotiations. These activities covered a large area, and were shrouded in a great deal of secrecy. The assumption is that the parties involved in the dispute should be given the privacy and chance to arrive at an acceptable settlement without being conscious of or influenced by the opinion of non-interested parties. The public hearing, or the mi'ad, loves the announcement of the agreement arrived at in private. As will be seen later, very little factual information about the dispute is discussed in the mi'ad. No record is kept of either the discussion in the mi'ad or the preceding negotiations. The process of dispute settlement is, then, highly decentralized. To be able to follow one particular dispute involves the constant reliance on informants not only to acquaint the anthropologist with the places of negotiations, but also to fill the gaps in the information about the process of negotiation itself. 114 123 124 627 578

As a woman anthropologist, I found myself at a disadvantage in a society where women were excluded from public participation. It is true that from the very beginning of the field work I was never cast into the role of the native woman, yet, my position as a woman posed a certain number of problems. When I first arrived in the area, I made a deliberate effort not to identify with the native women. When it was suggested to me that the relatively short skirts I wore were not practical for riding donkeys 114 123 562

or walking in the strong winds characteristic of the area, and that the 114
floor-length native dress would be more appropriate, I refused the advice 123
for fear of being identified in the minds of the people with the natives, 562 ●
and thus being treated in the same way. The possibility of being identified with native women was not very strong, because from the very beginning I did not act like one. I did things and talked about things that native women had never done or talked about. I drove a car, read, and wrote, and talked about national and local politics. More important than that though, to the tribal population, was that I was a member of the bar association of Egypt, and that I had practiced law for a year in Cairo. Every time I was introduced, the fact that I was an attorney was made evident. This gave legitimacy to my interest in studying the tribal legal system, and in many ways they were flattered than an attorney, especially a woman city attorney, would be interested in their law. Yet, in native clothes or not, in the native female role or not, I was still a woman, and as such I was not part
of any serious activity, especially those of dispute settlement. My mere 114
presence in any part of the dispute settlement made the gathering seem some- 123
how less serious. At the beginning of the field work a deliberate effort 562
was made to keep me from knowing anything about the whereabouts of the nego- 627
tiations or what was going on. I had to bribe men, women and children to [124]
tell me where the negotiations were taking place and who they involved, and then appear on the scene uninvited. This condition lasted for about two months. At that time the news of my presence in the area spread around, and I had attended many of the negotiations that men became less conscious of my presence. In fact, some even asked me to attend the meetings where some parts of the negotiations were conducted and give them my opinion as to the fairness of the settlement.

613 554 [157] [428] [556] In performing his functions within the bait, personal qualities such as wisdom, soundness of ideas, personal persuasiveness are of importance. But the main basis of his authority is patrilineal succession. The Aqila has no economic power to speak of. Although many aqila are among the wealthiest members of their baits, many more are among its poorest. The nature of the economic process and the pastoral life of Awald Ali is such that the economic position of the individual is always flucuating. Nor does the Aqila have any military power at his disposal, or any command of the use of force to back his decisions or to make them binding [428] upon members of his bait. The main source of compliance to the Aqila's decisions comes from the knowledge that the Aqila has the authority to make such decisions and that he has acquired this authority through the legitimate channel of patrilineal succession.

613 428 •562 [619] Where membership in formal groups is transmitted by descent, Awlad Ali always choose the patriline. The son of Awlad Ali is regarded as Awlad Ali even though his mother might not be from the tribe, while a woman who marries outside the tribe transmits no rights in the tribe to her children. The importance of agnatic kin is reinforced by an solidary of brothers which is extended laterally to patrilateral cousins. It is also shown in the fact that sons are favored in inheritance usually to the exclusion of daughters. The male line is viewed by Awlad Ali as the natural principle when it comes to anything which is inheritable, whether property or position. In an attempt to defend Shei'eb's position and his right to be the Aqila, one informant told me: "The main purpose that a man has in life is to have sons because it is the son who makes the man live forever. Daughters don't count. A man gives his son

613 428 ● [562] everything ... his property, his name, and anything he can give him, like the position of the Aqila. This is only natural." While the office of the Aqila is inherited through the male line, there seems to be no special regard for seniority. Any son of the Aqila can succeed him in the position and it is usually left to the Aqila to select the son who is to succeed him. 613 428 593 This decision is not usually the subject matter of brotherly rivalry since the position of Aqila is regarded more as a duty than as a privilege. There has been only one case in the entire area of the Western Desert in which such a decision has lead to open fighting between brothers. "When my father became very old and his eyes bothered him, he told me that I should become the Aqila and could not say no to him," said Shei'eb. "I didn't want to become the Aqila but this was the choice of my father and I have to obey .... You owe it to your father and family to carry on his responsibilities the same way you carry his name." It was patrilineal succession upon which Shei'eb based his case. Most uninterested parties believe that he and he alone had the legitimate claim to the position.

613 627 554 The importance of patrilineal succession as the basis of the Aqila'a authority may be better understood by contrasting it to a closely related position, that of the "mardi". A man within a bait may acquire, by virtue of personal qualities, a reputation for wisdom and soundness of opinion which may overshadow that of the Aqila. Such a person becomes known throughout a certain area as a successful mediator and go-between; and therefore is called upon to solve disputes not limited to members of his own bait. He thus acquires an informal position which cuts across a number of baits and sometimes larger political units.

634 who reach the age of military service. He is also supposed to report
554 the presence of any fugitive or crininal in his district and report
657 crimes accurring in that district and which involve members of the tribal
segment he represents.

634 The first two duties of the omda to the government do not involve
554 any conflict of interest. Unlike the rural areas where sons are con-
657 sidered a very important economic asset to their parents, and therefore,
562 there is a general resentment of military service which takes the sons
701 away and deprives the parents of their important work around the fields,
178 Awlad Ali look at military service as an opportunity to have their sons go to the city, obtain guaranteed payment, and escape the hardship of nomadic existence. Economic activities
[233] in the area do not require the cooperation of a large number of individuals, and most of the grazing of animals is done either by a paid shepherd or by one of the grown-up sons. Although there still exists an
[183] ideology which values having many sons, yet with the cessation of hostilities between the tribal segments, their presence in the area has lost its
[464] value. Many of the younger generation are seeking jobs with the government projects in the area or in the city. Neither one is easy to find. Joining the army is increasingly considered as an easy alternative.

634 The omda's function which seems to involve some conflicting loyalties
554 is that of reporting crimes involving members of his tribal segment. But
657 even this does not pose a serious problem as it might seem. Almost all
674 minor crimes committed against property or persons as well as all civil disputes are left to be handled by the tribal proceedings. The duties of the omda are limited to reporting the cases of murder and serious assault

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1 On the basis of one percent of the yearly yield.

593 586 and expenses to the husband that constitutes the most important check
(583) on the otherwise undisputed right of the father to take away his
daughter.

593 The woman, on the other hand, cannot refuse to go with her father,
562 for this means that she would be disobeying him. A woman who disobeys
586 her father is not worthy of his name. He can cut her off from the family, which means that she is left without any support or protection. A woman who is cut off from her family is left vulnerable to her husband and to society. She will have nobody to defend her or to be responsible for her actions. The responsibility for the woman's behavior is not transferred by marriage to the husband or his family.

682 If the woman kills or assaults someone or causes damage to property
683 for which compensation is required, her male kin pays the blood money or
602 the compensation on her behalf. It is sometimes stated that if the woman
613 562 has grown-up sons, they, and not her family, pay for her. Since the
593 children belong to their father's family, it may seem like transfering the responsibility for the woman's actions to her husband's family. However, in all three cases where this happened, the woman was quite old, her father was dead, and her brothers were either dead or had moved outside the area and had cut off all relations with the area. She also had no nephews in the area. In such cases, the sons were the woman's closest male kin.

682 On the other hand, if the woman is the victim of murder or assault
683 for which blood money or compensation is to be paid, the husband is the
593 562 one to benefit from the situation. To understand why this happens, we have to consider the contractual nature of marriage among Awlad Ali. It
584 583 has been mentioned earlier that before marriage is final, the prospective

684 The contractual nature of marriage is most clearly manifested in
613 the case of the wife's adultery. Since the woman belongs to her ag-
562 natic group, her behavior has direct effect on the honor of that group.
593 It is, therefore, the responsibility of her closest kin to keep an eye
on her. If the woman commits adultery, it is her father or her male
kin who is supposed to avenge the honor of the family by taking drastic
actions, including killing, against the adulteress and/or her partner.
But the marriage usually takes the woman away from the close watch of
her family and puts her under the supervision of her husband who becomes
entrusted with the duty of guarding her, and therefore partially respon-
sible for her action. His responsibility is enhanced by the fact that
although the wife's behavior does not affect him or his family, it has
a definite effect on the honor and reputation of his children (Abou-Zeid,
1965).

684 The gravest insult that one can direct to a person in the area is
578 to describe his mother of being of disrepute. In their joking relations,
562 young men usually refer to eachother's father as being a dog or a theif
593 [522] or a cheat, but none could refer to the mother. A woman of questionable
reputation affects the reputation of her family in general and her child-
ren in particular. Any reference to the mother in the form of an accusa-
tion is supposed to be cleaned only by blood. Not only does this apply
to the woman's voluntary behavior, but also to her physical and mental
[734] condition. If a woman loses her mind, the news is usually kept a secret,
684 especially by her children. The responsibility for retaliation in the
613 case of adultery, then, is divided between her nearest kinsman and her
562 husband. This gives both sides a vague and undetermined right of re-
593 venge. This division of the right of revenge explains the infrequency

684 of drastic actions taken in cases of adultery. Of the fourteen cases
613 of adultery that I examined furing my field work, none resulted in the
562
593 killing of the adulteress, and only three resulted in the murder of her
[114] partner. In all three cases where the adulterer was killed, the avenger
684 was the husband; and in all three cases, the husband had to pay the
682
613 bloodmoney to the murdered man's kin group. His payment of the bloodmoney, among other things, may indicate that the right of the husband to kill the adulterer is not completely accepted among Awlad Ali. All
[628] agree, however, that such killings never result in blood feuds because of the shameful circumstances in which the victim dies.

684 It was very difficult to obtain any detailed or reliable information
126 about adultery cases. All the above mentioned fourteen cases were gath-
[124] ered from the informants, twelve of which were cases which had already been solved. For the two cases which were still open at the time of the study, information was quite vague. Usually such cases are conducted with a great amount of secrecy, with the involved parties referring to them as cases of theft, or merely by saying that the cases involve women. Only when the adultery leads to the killing of the adulteress or the adulterer are more details publicly known about the case.

684 But while the right to retaliate for the shameful action of an adulterous wife is vague and diffused, the right of the husband for compensation from the adulterer remains clear and undisputed. In this resepct, adultery is treated very much like theft; the adulterer has stolen the husband's exclusive right to his wife's sexual activities. The com-
[583] pensation for this offense is estimated at L.E. 20, in addition to the
[586] mahr, if the husband decides to divorce his wife as a result of her adultery.

581 Marriage does not deprive the woman of some rights of her own.
585 The customary law gives the wife three basic rights corresponding to
562 those of the husband's sexual services, domestic work, and obedience.
671 Corresponding to the first of these, the wife has the right to have a
normal sexual life with her husband. This right, however, is not an exclusive
one, since the husband can marry more than one wife. A woman
585 can be divorced from her husband without having to return the mahr if
586 she claims that the husband is unable to perform his sexual duties. In
593 such cases, the marriage is usually dissolved quietly. [illegible] certain rare
585 instances, the husband may deny his wife's accusations. If both insist
586 on their stand, one or both may ask to be submitted to "bait el-shana'a,"
593 or house of the dreadful deeds. Reports are extremely vague about the
627 exact procedures involved in this case. Some informants stated that the
married couple would live in a tent without sidewalls so that everybody
could see what goes on inside. Most informants, however, insist that it
merely means that the couple move their tent near that of a respectable
man whose word is believed and honored. This man is supposed to keep a
close watch on the couple's activities, by listening or looking through
holes in the tent. His verdict determines the future of the marriage.
[583] If the wife is justified in her claim, the husband is forced to divorce
[681] her and to forfeit his mahr. If, on the other hand, the verdict is for
[558] the husband, he not only can divorce her and get back the mahr, but is
also entitled to kabara, or compensation, for his injured pride. There
[114] is no case of bait el-shana'a in the area during the time of the field
[178] work, and most people insist that this practice is something of the past
[583] when the mahr was relatively high and was paid in livestock, in which

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586
593 case its return to the husband would have caused great financial in-
627
[114] convenience for the wife's family.

[178]
(583) Corresponding to the second right, the husband's right to his
581 wife's domestic work, is the wife's right to maintenance. The husband
585 has to support his wife. This includes providing her and her children
562 with adequate food and proper clothing. If the husband fails to do so
593 because of poverty, sickness, crop failure or unexpected disaster, the
wife's brother or father provides her and her children with the neces-
[586] sary food and clothing. If the husband's failure to fulfill his duties
is due to neglect, the wife can leave him and go to her father or brother
who talks the matter over with the husband who, in turn, either agrees
to their demands or has to divorce his wife and forfeit his mahr.

593 Finally, corresponding to the husband's right to his wife's obedi-
562 ence is the wife's right to fair treatment by her husband. There are a
[779] number of ways in which the wife is mistreated. One is excessive punish-
ment; although the right of the husband to punish his wife is provided in
the Koraan, the punishment must be excessive or severe. Awlad Ali draw
a line between acceptable and severe punishment. A punishment is severe
if it results in something that other people can see or hear. If the
husband insults his wife or her family and others hear the action, or if
he beats her and this results in visible traces, then the punishment is
severe.

593 A wife considers herself mistreated if the husband, when married
595 to more than one, treats any of the other wives better than he treats
562 her. Although the wife cannot deny her husband the right to have ad-
ditional wives, he must give them all equal treatment. This includes

593 595 providing them with the same kind of food and clothing.* It also in-
562 cludes dividing his time equally between them, spending one night in
each wife's tent. The first wife, being the chief one, has certain
privileges: her tent is the guest house, food is brought to her resi-
dence, and she is the one to divide it among the other wives, and her
house is the place for the husband to stay if he becomes sick and unable
to move every night from one tent to another. Other than the exceptions
given to the first wife, the husband has to treat all his wives equally.

593 Normally, such cases of mistreatment do not result in divorce un-
[586] less they are persistent. In most cases, if the wife is mistreated, she
goes to her father's or brother's house or sends for them to come and
593 take her. For the husband to bring her back to his tent, he must pay
431 her "nasafa." This is a gift given by the husband to his wife as an
acknowledgement of guilt and as a form of apology for not giving her
fair treatment. In some cases the nasafa is equal to what the husband
originally paid as mahr.

581 These are some of the rights that marriage gives both men and women
585 in the tribal society of Awlad Ali. These rights, however, are useless
626 unless they are backed by certain means of enforcing them. The husband's
586 rights are guaranteed by his ability to dissolve the marriage at will.
626 593 According to Islamic law, a man can divorce his wife by simply pronounc-
ing the sentence "I divorce you" in the presence of credible witnesses.
[779] No justification for divorce is demanded from the husband according to
[562] the Koraan. No such privilege is given to the wife. She can obtain a

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* With provision for wives with more children.

586 divorce only under specific circumstances in the absence of which the
626 husband can force her to live with him. Following the Koraanic rules,
593 [562] Awlad Ali give men the right to dissolve the marriage at will and with-
[779] out any necessary justification; however, they differentiate between
cases where divorce is justified and those in which it is not. In a
case of justifiable divorce, the husband can take back the mahr and pos-
sibly all other marriage expenses. In the case of unjustifiable divorce,
the husband forfeits his right to regain the mahr. Divorce is justified
whenever one or more of the husband's rights are violated by the wife or
members of her family. Not all degrees of violation are considered as
justification for divorce, however. Only intolerable violations can be
considered as such. In deciding whether or not an act constitutes an
[183] intolerable violation, Awlad Ali judge it against the standard of the
reasonable man, the customary man, and what he would have tolerated in
a similar situation.

586 What constitutes reasonable behavior does not only vary according
183 to the situation and the manner in which the actions are taken, but also
554 with the relative position in the social structure of the parties in-
volved and their initial relations to one another. In the case of di-
vorce, what constitutes grounds for justifiable divorce in one case may
not be sufficient grounds for justifiable divorce in another. In one of
586 the cases I witnessed during the year of study, a man who divorced his
183 wife because of her insistence that he buy her meat from the market
554 every day of the week, was forced to forfeit his right to redeem the
511 [114] mahr on the basis that the wife's actions had not established a basis
for justifiable divorce. In the negotiations that followed, the position
of the husband, as well as that of the family of the wife, were discussed.

586 The husband had a big herd by the standards of the tribe (600 sheep
183 and goats). In addition, he also cultivated a large stretch of the fig
554 land in the coastal area and was making good money. In other words, the
511 husband could afford the standard of living the wife demanded. The other
question that was discussed was the actions of the wife herself. She was
the daughter of one of the wealthiest members of the same tribe as her
husband; and according to the people who knew her, she was used to meat
every day of the week. In other cases, similar demands by the wife to
have a certain kind of food or to be clothed in certain kinds of material
were considered as an intolerable situation, and the husband was justified in his divorcing her and had the right to retrieve his mahr. This
was obvious in the case of one of my informants whose wife insisted that
every time he went to Alexandria, he bring her silk material for a dress.
Since the husband could not afford to meet her demands, her insistence
was considered as grounds for the husband. The assessment of reasonable-
586 ness on the part of the husband in his divorce action and therefore his
183 right to the mahr paid is frequently influenced by the relative position
554 of the husband and the wife's guardian in the social structure. An influential man who marries his daughter to a poor relative or nephew rarely
has to return the mahr.

586 Although women among Awlad Ali are not given the same legal right
562 of divorcing the husband by pronouncing the "dismissal formula," they are
given the right of certain customary procedures which in practice give
them equal facilities for dissolving the marriage. This is known as the
574 right of the woman to "throw herself." This means that the woman takes
all her clothes and sometimes her children and goes to the dwelling of

586 the man she chooses. She informs him before she enters his house that
562 she is the wife of so and so and the daughter of so and so and that she
574 is throwing herself on him to protect her from her husband with whom
[778] she no longer wishes to live. Like the right of refuge, the man cannot
refuse to let her in; and from this moment until her dispute with her
husband is resolved, she is considered as his house guest and is entitled to all the hospitality a guest receives. If he refuses to ex-
[627] tend that hospitality or refuses to take her in, she can ask for a mi'ad
[681] and is entitled to kabara from him. There has been no reported incidents
in which a man refused that right to a woman. As soon as she settles
down in the host's house, the latter takes immediate measures to find
the husband and to convince him to let his wife go. In doing this, the
man uses all the power of persuasion. The man selected for this purpose
586 562 is usually a respected man who can put pressure upon the husband. Some-
574 times he has to bribe the husband to release the wife, paying from his
554 own money. The man has to have money, not only to be able to support
[556] the wife during her stay in his house and to bribe the husband, but also
because in certain instances he has to pay the husband the mahr that the father of the wife had taken in order to free her. The next step after getting the agreement of the husband to divorce his wife is to contact the father of the wife or her guardian and convince him to pay the mahr to the husband. If the father does not agree, or if he is financially unable to do so, the man on whom the woman has thrown herself is supposed to pay from his own money. In cases where the woman left the husband to be married to another man with whom she had had a relationship, the respected man tries to have the future husband pay the present husband the mahr he is supposed to pay the woman after she is divorced from her

586 husband. In a number of cases the husband was willing to divorce the
● 562 woman after a promise by the man that she would pay him the mahr when
574 she got married. In most cases, however, the process costs the man a
554 considerable amount of money. Sometimes, when the woman is young and attractive, the man finds it to his advantage to keep her as his wife, since she will cost him no more expenses. On the other hand, the man cannot refuse a woman the right of refuge, since to do this or to deny her the right of hospitality will make him liable to pay kabara if she made the refusal known publicly. On the other hand, it is prestigious to be known in the area as a man to whom women go to be released from their husbands. In fact, a man who acquires a reputation of getting wives released is likely to be sought as mardi in other cases as well.

Due to the nature of his role in mediating, the woman must be careful in selecting the man over whom she throws herself. These considerations are manifested in the following case taken from my field notes.
[584] Hadia was forced by her father to marry a man from the same tribe who
[583] paid her father L.E. 100 as mahr. She did not want to marry him because she was in love with someone else of whom her father did not approve. One month after she was married, she left the tent and never came back.
586 Later, she appeared in the house of Omda Ali, the chief of another tribe,
562 and everyone knew that she had thrown herself on him. She later told me
574 why she had selected Omda Ali and not the Omda of her own tribe. "Be-
554
634 cause my husband works for the Omda of my own tribe, and I thought he would be biased. Of course, I couldn't have gone to my father; he was the one who forced me to marry that man. Omda Ali is very respected and can support me... He is also rich and is known for releasing wives from their husbands." Omda Ali called the husband in and asked him to divorce

586 his wife. The husband agreed but insisted that she pay him L.E. 300
562 (this included the mahr and the marriage expenses). The Omda tried to
574 reduce the amount but could not. He then tried to get the father to
554 pay, but the father refused. He had to pay the husband L.E. 200 of
634 his own money and promised that the rest would be paid when the woman
remarried (it would be paid from the mahr). The husband divorced Haida.
One week later she was married to her lover. I have no information
about whether or not the 100 pounds was paid.

586 In another example, Sabha was forced by her father to marry her
562 cousin (ibn 'amm). She could not live with him, so she threw herself
574 on one of the holy men in the area. The holy man convinced the hus-
554 band to divorce Sabha and then went to her father and convinced him to
792 pay back the mahr to the husband, and the case was settled. People say
[626] that both the husband and the father agreed to the demands of the holy
man because they were afraid of his supernatural curse. Sabha went
back to her father's house.

586 It is obvious from these and similar cases that the success or
562 failure of the procedure depends on the careful selection of the man
593 on whom a woman throws herself. It is also apparent from the above
[554] examples that his right of refuge is resorted to only in cases where the
[574] woman cannot go to her father or to her closest kin to help her get a
divorce because he is either unable or unwilling to help her. A father
is unable to help if the husband is powerful or if he is the woman's
ibn 'amm (father's brother's son) who has, according to the tribal law,
the undisputed right to marry his bint 'amm (father's brother's daughter).
The father is usually unwilling to help his daughter if he is the one

586 who forced her to marry the husband, or if she was cut off from the
562 593 family for some reason or another.

586 From the frequency of women using this right in the area, it
562 seems that no social disapproval is associated with it, nor is there
574 a social stigma attached to women who throw themselves. They seem to
626 find it as easy to find a husband as those women divorced voluntarily
by their husbands or with the help of their fathers. In fact, as was
586 562 mentioned earlier, many of them marry the rich men over whom they
587 throw themselves. As to the amount of mahr paid for their subsequent
[583] marriages, the fact of throwing themselves does not seem to be a factor
[579] in determining the amount of mahr paid. In one of the cases, the woman
threw herself on an 'aqila of one of the Geneishat tribe after her
father refused to help her get a divorce from her husband who had mar-
ried a second wife without first asking the first wife's permission.
[429] When the Geneishat member succeeded in convincing the husband to di-
vorce his wife, the latter had no place to stay so remained in the
house of her protector who acted as her guardian in place of her father
[583] who had refused to take her back in his home. While staying in the
house of her protector, she got many marriage offers; one of the suitors
offered a mahr of L.E. 4,000 ($10,000), one of the highest mahrs re-
ported in the area. She agreed, and the marriage was affected. This
mahr is about ten times the mahr she got for her first marriage. This
586 562 procedure offers the woman a considerable guarantee of her marital
rights. It also gives her, as far as the ability to dissolve the mar-
riage, a status close to that of her husband. This relative equality
is reflected is reflected in the lack of stigma associated with divorced

586 women in the Western Desert, and that the women usually have no diffi-
562 culty in finding another husband.

586 While the right of "throwing herself" offers the wife some guar-
562 antee of her rights, her main guarantee is derived from the security
593 she gets from retaining membership in her father's family. After the
768 death of the father, the woman's claims extend to the households of her
brothers. She acquires in them the same rights she had in her father's
household, and the brothers take the responsibility of their father in
[428] protecting and defending their sister. The woman achieves this continuation of support partially through forfeiting her rights of inheritance
to her brothers.

562 Awlad Ali recognize the right of the daughters to inherit in their
428 father's estate. They accept the system of inheritance specified in
[779] the Koraan which gives the woman half the share of her brother. In practice, this is usually side-stepped. Only sons inherit their father's
[233] property. The justification given for the non-inheritance of women is
[311] that the main items of inheritance in the Western Desert, livestock and
the right of land use, require certain protection and care which are beyond the culturally defined roles of women. Livestock require moving
233 from one grazing ground to another, almost always crossing tribal lands
562 belonging to various tribal segments, some of whom might be hostile.
428 It also requires the ability to protect the herds from predators and
from raids, especially in earlier times. Similarly, land requires preparation and protection against trespassers, especially when the barley
is growing.

562 Women, however, are supposed to be compensated by their brothers
428 for their shares. But very few would actually ask their brothers for
593

562 such compensation. In forfeiting her rights of inheritance, a woman
428 secures for herself and her children the continuous support of her
593 kin-group and the protection of her rights. This support was denied
in the few cases I was able to collect in which the woman demanded her
share of inheritance. The following is one of these cases. The material
159 presented is a summary of the life history of Fatma, who at the time of
562 the study, was a shopkeeper managing the small general store she owned
428
593 near the railroad station of Burg el-Arab, some fifty miles west of
[444] Alexandria. She also practiced healing and midwifery on a part-time
[759] basis.

Fatma was the only daughter with four sons of sheikh El-Asi, who
at one time was the aqila of bait Hussein of the Sanagrah tribal segment
[627] in the area. He was also known as a mardi and was frequently sought in
[755] mediation of disputes. He was believed to have supernatural power which
he used to cure people for a certain amount of money. During his life-
[454] time, he had acquired a sizable sum of money which he invested in live-
[233] stock. At the time of his death his herd, which numbered more than 900
[422] sheep and goats, was considered the finest in the area. He had no barley
[423] lands because his camp was deep in the desert, but he had fine grazing
land.

Throughout the area the four sons were known for being arrogant and irresponsible. Three of them were employed by one of the irrigation projects carried on by the government in the area as construction workers; the fourth looked after the herd of his father. All four were known as chasers of women, and they frequently went to Alexandria to visit prostitutes and drink liquor.

[444] Fatma was first married when she was eighteen to a man from
Alexandria who had opened a general store in the area where her father

159 562 lived. Five years ago the husband died in a mining accident leaving
428 Fatma with a ten-month-old boy. By that time, her father had been disabled,
593 and her brothers wanted to manage her husband's store on her behalf.
444 Knowing that her brothers were greedy, she refused and insisted
that she take care of the store herself. The brothers objected on the
grounds that it was not customary for a decent woman to be exposed to
the customers in the store. When she insisted, the brothers threatened
her. When the threats did not work, they beat her. After that, she
[625] went to the police station in the area, filed a complaint against her
brothers, and asked for police protection. The police officer in charge
brought the brothers in and warned them that if they interfered with the
store, not only would he arrest them, but he would also use his influence
to get them forced from the irrigation projects where three of them
worked. The threat worked, and they became friendly with their sister,
buying things for the store whenever they went to Alexandria and sometimes
helping in the store with her consent when she was on housecalls
159 as a midwife. A year later Fatma was married for the second time to a
562 distant cousin; a few months later her father died. In a family meeting
428 593 that followed the funeral, Fatma made her announcement that she was claiming
233 her share of her father's herd. The brothers were angry and tried to
[587] beat her. But the older members of the bait who were present at the meeting
stopped them and told them that Fatma had all the right to claim her
share of the inheritance according to Awlad Ali ways and that there was
[578] nothing that they could do about it. She was characterized in that
meeting as "bint haram" (illegitimate child), an insult used to refer
to those who show selfishness in their kinship obligations. When she
left the camp with her share of the herd, this seemed to have severed

159 the relationship between her and her brothers.

562
428 Following her action and until the time of the study, they had
593 never visited her and she had never visited them. Her husband took
[237] care of the herd; and the arrangement worked out all right until the
159 husband told Fatma one day that he was going to marry a second wife.
562
593 She refused, but he went ahead with the marriage without her consent.
595 He brought the new wife to live with Fatma in the same tin hut in which
they were living. He started to pay more attention to the new wife and
to neglect Fatma; whenever the latter complained, he beat her. Then,
before one of the religious feasts, he sold two of Fatma's sheep and
bought his new wife a dress and a silver bracelet. When Fatma objected
[164] and they argued, he hit her with a stick on the head; she was hospitalized for a week with a serious head wound. While in the hospital, she
went to her brothers who lived only two miles away, but they refused to
159 come to her assistance. She then went to sheikh Elewa (the aqila of
562 Bait Asabei) and threw herself on him. He met with the husband and con-
594 vinced him to divorce Fatma. He kept forty sheep of Fatma's herd as com-
593 pensation for the mahr he had paid her and the marriage expenses, then
595
586 took his new wife and moved from Fatma's hut. Fatma then returned and
159 managed her financial affairs successfully herself. She managed the
562 store and hired a shepherd to take care of the sheep. At the time of
444
[233] the present study she was respected by almost everybody in the area, including members of the local administration. She is known to be reason-
[229] able and of sound opinion, and her store functions as the meeting place
[521] for many of the tribal mi'ads and for casual conversations. She is also
considered as a liason between the tribal population in the area and the
local government administration, and is respected by both sides.

159 This apparently is not a typical case, nor is Fatma by any means
156
562 representative of a typical tribal women. It is a case of a marginal
woman who had revolted against the tribal definition of a female role.
[428] She violated the customary ways of her society and claimed her share of
[593] her father's inheritance; and by doing this, she forfeited her right to
[183] protection by her brothers. She was able to do this because of her mar-
[625] ginality which enabled her to draw upon sources of protection outside
the tribal pattern, the police. It is interesting to note here that by
doing so, she was not totally eliminated or ostracized from her society;
rather, her role was redefined as that of a man, and she was treated
as such.

EMRYS PETERS

18. *The Proliferation of Segments in the Lineage of the Bedouin of Cyrenaica* [*Libya*][1]

121 In this article I do not propose to discuss the genealogies of the
128 Cyrenaican Bedouin in full, but only such aspects of them as are
strictly relevant to an understanding of their process of growth. Many other aspects of these genealogies will be referred to, and indeed, some of the arguments put forward will presume an acceptance of views which cannot be developed adequately in this article. A fuller and more general account of Cyrenaican genealogies is in preparation, and, until this is published, there is no alternative to the somewhat dogmatic statements about them which appear in the introductory part of this article.

174 The Bedouin of Cyrenaica claim that they are all descendants
613 of a unique ancestress, Sa'ada. Writers in the past (e.g.
551 Robertson-Smith 1903) have considered the occurrence of fe-
562 male names in patrilineal genealogies as evidence of an earlier
[173] and matrilineal mode of descent. A more satisfactory explanation of the occurrence of female names is to be found in the combination of two facts: descent in the patriline, whether or

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122 award from the Emslie Horniman Fund and a later award from the Treasury Committee for Studentships in Oriental Languages and Cultures. I wish here
121 to express my indebtedness to both committees for their generosity. Much of the work I have done on genealogies was included in a thesis presented for
128 the degree of D.Phil. at Oxford University in 1951. The ideas included in this thesis I developed more systematically in a course of lectures on the Bedouin which I gave at Manchester University during the session 1953–54. I subsequently read papers around the problems discussed in this paper at
128 Oxford and Cambridge Universities. I am grateful to Professor Gluckman for reading this article in manuscript, and for the numerous discussions I have had with him on problems relating to lineage organization.

174 613 551 562 not male names are used, is assumed; and secondly that the Bedouin are polygamous. If, then, half-brother differentiation or full sibling unity is to be shown genealogically, the obvious way in which this can be done is to use a maternal name in the genealogy. Thus, in the Cyrenaican genealogy, a number of tribal groups will be shown as sons of a particular father. If differentiation of these groups needs to be shown, this can be effected by clustering the groups round, say, two female names (the names of the respective mothers) thereby making the two clusters of groups stand in the relationship of paternal half brothers. The concept of the 'one womb', of maternal origin, is a critical one in the context of social cohesion, but it does not deny patriliny; on the contrary, it serves in a sense to reinforce it. Female names can be used to show a greater notion of cohesion than the mere use of male names, and the significance of a female name placed at the apex of the Cyrenaican genealogy is that it is the symbol of full brother unity at the highest political level. 182 613 551 562

173 613 619 The founding ancestress Sa'ada is credited with two sons, who in turn are considered to be the founding ancestors of the two largest groups of tribes in Cyrenaica. Each of these sons is said to have begottten two sons, as shown on the accompanying genealogy. The next generation shows a total of nine names, and these nine ancestors are considered to be the founding ancestors of the nine noble tribes of Cyrenaica.[2] Continuing the line of descent of one of these tribes—the Magharba—the same pattern of segmentation repeats itself: the tribe is divided into two primary sections having ar-Ra'aid and ash-Shamakh as the respective founding ancestors. Ash-Shamakh is said to have had four sons, and these are the founding ancestors of four secondary sections. These latter four are credited with a varying number of sons, as shown in the genealogy (Fig. 18-1).

One feature of the Cyrenaican genealogy immediately stands out from this brief description: the uniformity in the number of segments at the various levels of segmentation. Along the line of descent from Sa'ada to Nasr, the number of sons shown in the

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[162] [2] One of these, the 'Ailat Fayid, now only numbers about 150 souls, and although it is given the structural position of a tribe in the genealogy, it scarcely merits this distinction in practice.

682 To complete this general statement, two further circumstances are cited by the
602 Bedouin. If a man kills a related person who is not an agnate (it is expressed as killing
the mother's brother) the breach in relationships must be healed as quickly as possible.
The convention for dealing with this is that the offender, bound hand and foot,
mounted on a horse, is sent to the camp of 'the owner of the blood', in the company
of a holy man, there to make an offer of his life, saying: 'Here is my knife, my life
is yours; here is my shroud, my life is yours.' No Bedouin would agree for a moment
to undertake this journey if he thought the offer might be accepted. In Bedouin
sentiments a life offered in this way cannot be taken. It is the convention which precedes
a peace meeting and blood money. Any other way of dealing with the confusion,
which spreads as a result of a homicide between cognates, is excluded.

682 Secondly, if a woman is killed, whatever the intersegmentary distance, the homicide
562 is said to be accidental, because a man never 'intends' to kill a woman. Blood-money
arrangements are made as soon as possible, and the wealth—half that of a
613 man—passes to the deceased's father, not to her husband, for a woman's 'bone'
always belongs to her father. Obviously women cannot be allowed to enter into
[582] feud; since it is demographically compelling (apart from other reasons) for some of
[591] them to marry outside their natal groups, then they might well find themselves residents
in the enemy's camps, if they were to become involved in feuds.

121 This statement of the different means available for the regulation of homicide at
682 the several orders of tribal segmentation is the view the Bedouin themselves hold of
their relationships. An analysis of the facts presented thus far could bring out a
613 number of interesting points with regard to the relativity of morals, the typification
829 of acts by their social context, the significance of the orders of segmentation, and so
619 on. Rather than proceed along these lines, however, it is more urgently necessary
to reflect on the significance of the fact that the arrangement of the material in terms
of what is usually called the lineage structure coincides with the Bedouin ordering
of the same details. It is, of course, important to note that the account is not based
on mere hearsay evidence. Each statement made can be documented from known
homicides, and to this extent the model that has been used is consistent with reality.
The model, nevertheless, can only be a representation of what a particular people,
the Bedouin, conceive their social reality to be; it is a kind of ideology which enables
them, without making absurd demands on their credulity, to understand their field
of social relationships, and to give particular relationships their *raison d'être*. But, as
will be shown, it would be a serious error to mistake such a folk model for sociological
analysis. Such an error is difficult to avoid because the Bedouin, when defending their
view, are able to cite enough bits and pieces of reality to make their argument con-
121 vincing. The flaw in the reasoning is seen when it can be shown that its consequences
114 are absurd. As an example of what is meant, the statement that feud is attached to
groups at the secondary order of segmentation may be considered. If the statement
613 were true, if each and every secondary section were at feud one with the other (and
619 in a structural sense this ought to be so), then each tribe would be divided into small
829 mutually hostile groups, which completely lacked any possibility of movement, even
578 for pasturing purposes. Presented with this, the Bedouin would argue that this is not
in fact so, because secondary and primary sections are interlinked in many ways. That
is, they evoke what to them are contingencies to explain why they are at feud with one

121 These three objections to the lineage theory as a useful model for examining the
613 consequences of homicide are serious enough in themselves, but another objection
● 562 renders it still less satisfactory. This fourth objection relates to the implication that
114 lineage theory cannot take account of women. Indeed, in some of the accounts of the
political organization of lineage societies, the impression is given that they are all-male
societies: women belong only to the domestic and kinship realms. In terms of
the theory, this must be so. Women, the marriage links they create, the forms of
relationships that derive from marriage, the right of men to joke with others by
virtue of a link through women, their rights to demand favours of men who are not
their agnates, their right to expect contributions to bridewealth or blood money
from maternal relatives—all these, and other forms of behaviour, have been dealt
with as patterns of behaviour which interfere with or disturb agnation, or that cut
121 across lineage affiliations. Such metaphors can only be justified if it is accepted that
613 precedence must be given to agnation, to what people say they think their lineage
relationships to be, and that there is some kind of primacy about what have frequently
been called jural rules which constitute the structure, while behaviour which is not
governed by these rules is to be relegated to the position of secondary forms having
the effect of intruding only. But these secondary forms of behaviour are as impelling,
as persisting, and are as much a part of social life as any of the so-called jural rules.
[582] It is possible to go further than this, and state that in societies where there is a high
incidence of marriage among agnates of the local group, as occurs among the Bedouin,
jural rules rarely appear in their ' pure ' form in behaviour, since, in groups of this
sort, each and every person constitutes a bundle of roles by virtue of the fact that he
is one of a very complex cognatic group; a particular role, it is true, may take precedence
in a particular situation, but all roles are present in each situation and affect
behaviour. Precedence can only be given to specific forms of behaviour in relation
to situations. There is no such thing as a general primacy with regard to any form.
The concept of agnation as the centre of all political problems, disturbed or disrupted
by, say, matrilaterality, is as inadequate as saying that the nucleus which pulls all other
components into position is matrilaterality with agnation as a disturbing element. In
reality there are numerous components present in all situations, which should not
be lumped together under such categorizing terms as agnation and matrilaterality,
but which combine as separate components in a kaleidoscopic range of clusters.

121 Some of the components of behaviour subsumed under the notion of matrilaterality
613 are briefly given here in order to appreciate more fully the consequence of inter-group
682 marriage. Of paramount importance is the fact that, in Bedouin sentiment, to kill
674 a relative is as sinful an act as the killing of a close agnate. When such a homicide
829 did occur, during my period of residence among them, the Bedouin response was to
[602] assert that the offender was out of his mind—it was inconceivable that he could have
committed the offence otherwise. Their attitude was reminiscent of the horror they
display when a man kills his father or a full brother, and represents a much stronger
reaction than is manifested when a man kills an agnate of, say, the third or fourth
[604] degree. They have every reason to be disturbed by the killing of a mother's brother,
for, whatever personal affections may be involved, a crucial link is threatened. Their
reasoning, however, is that relationships with the mother's brother are characteristically
easy, that they are not demanding, that there is much joking in them, and that to

593 tegral part of "the one body"; events which affect a man in this context lie 613 outside a father's field of jurisdiction. The political authority vested in a corporation acts to circumscribe the authority of persons in other fields.

Other rights stem from political membership. As a person with a defined position in a lineage corporation, a man has the right to use the natural resources of its territory. His father, although he instructs his son where to plough and when to water the animals, cannot deny him access to wells, pastures and ploughland. Economically, a son is independent to this extent, although his ability to exploit his right to the natural resources is restricted by his father's control of animals. Ultimately, however, this restriction cannot amount to stultification, because a man has the right to 613 demand food. In practice, a poor man staves off hunger with donations from 422 this or that individual, and superficially it appears that he is dependent on 735 the personal charity of his fellowmen. This is not so, for what is implicit is that the parcels of wealth controlled by individuals are the possessions of the corporation. It is not accidental that poor people do not go hungry. During my entire stay among the Bedouin I never saw one of them beg or [556] suffer hunger, however marginal the diet of many. Clearly, those with a surplus can and do use it for personal advantage, but the extent to which they can do so is circumscribed by the legal claims which members of a corporation have on the parcels of moveable property held by each of them.

613 Control over the wealth, whether it be animals or the procreative functions 421 of women, rests, in the final analysis, in a corporation. Inheritance laws 428 specify that women are not legal heirs,[8] and that all male children are [562] equal heirs. Women do, in fact, come to control property, and it is rare that wealth is equally divided among male heirs. The precise details of inherit- [593] ance may partly be decided by a father, but he is limited in his actions. Most of the time inheritance disputes are not of the kind which require action by the corporate group; a case which occured while I was resident with the Bedouin did, however, invoke immediate action. A man, who had left the desert to live in a village on the plateau, had only one daughter. He made it known that he intended to will his entire property to his daughter. When the news was brought to the camps of his fellow agnates, there was great consternation, because, as became clear in their lengthy discussions, the threat now existed that a substantial parcel of property would be removed from the group, a threat made real by the proposed marriage of the daughter [584] to a man of another tribe. The court would have to recognise the daughter's right to some of the property, and the members of the group reluctantly had to concede that there was little they could do about this, but they had one [593] action left to them — they decided that her nearest agnate should demand [584] her in marriage. Usually, the choice of husband for a daughter is a decision

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[771] [8] The Bedouin are Sunni Muslims, and, as Samusi, belong to the Maliki school in [795] legal matters. According to court law, women are heirs. However, actual Bedouin [671] practice is contrary to law. For, if women were permitted to inherit, since many marry outside the corporation into which they were born, they could alienate its resources.

sorts of petty ways, listen to his grumbles about his agnates, interfere on his 604
behalf in petty camp quarrels, shield him from the disciplinarian father and 613
guard his property interests against the predatory father's brother; if the 428
mother's brother dies without heirs, the sister's son can reasonably expect at
least a share of his wealth. When the mother's brother is a member of a
different corporate group, a sister's son cannot possibly expect to inherit
from him in any circumstance.

The mother's brother may reside in a camp too distant to be much effective 604
direct help in day-to-day living. His relative remoteness gives the relationship 591
other possible opportunities, however. Rainfall in the semi-desert area 312
of Cyrenaica is highly variable, both from year to year, and from place to 233
place in any given year. As a result this shallow saucer of a depression may 241
have sufficient rain to supply both the water needs of animals and crops,
while an area a few miles distant will have inadequate water supplies for
either. The mother's brother-sister's son link can mean water for animals and
a crop of barley for both when, in successive years, the resources of one area
or the other are inadequate.

The differences in the relations between men and their mother's brother 604
do not end with a characterisation of their antipodal forms. The demographic
structure of a group may be such that one man may have a number
of mother's brothers, another only one; one man may have to share with
several brothers, another may be an only son. Complications of this sort determine [613]
the precise relationships between men, but however intricate these
may be, each corporate group has its matrilateral links with a group occupying
a slightly different ecological area, and it also has a plurality of matrilateral
connections within it. Further, if a direct connection is not available [603]
to any particular individual he can use an indirect link (e.g. father's mother's
brother or mother's mother's brother) to satisfy his needs.

The Preference for Males

Thus far, the family and the social matrix in which it is embedded has 128
been discussed in general terms, most particularly in reference to several
selected sets of relationships. I wish now to place these relationships in a
more specific setting with a brief discussion of the composition of a small
camp of a group inhabiting the arid areas of central Cyrenaica. When the 829
Bedouin give their views on the structure of the family in Cyrenaica they
speak of it as consisting of a pair of spouses and about ten children, mainly 594
males. The emphasis on males is not mere sentiment, overwhelmingly though 562
it favours them against females. Additional males in a family increase the 858
productive possibilities of a family in the sense that more herdsmen become
available and larger ploughing commitments can be undertaken; an increase
in the number of females has small effect on production since they are precluded
from any direct participation in these activities. Both sexes, ranging
in age from about seven years to mature adulthood, are necessary if a family

829 is to constitute a viable economic unit; and if it is to expand, the number
594 of males must be increased disproportionately compared with females. Since
● 562 the structure of this "ideal family" (which in the sentiments of the Bedouin
858 is the only family) is based on the division of labour, some details of the
tasks and their allocation among members of a family are included to estimate
the importance of this notional "ideal family."

The Division of Labour, by Sex

462
286 The tasks women perform are almost entirely associated with the tent.
They make the tent top, and the gaily coloured carpets which cover the
sandy ground in the men's quarters. They also weave the material for making
sacks, and nose bags for horses and camels. Throughout the year a
piece of weaving is always on the loom waiting, and while any women of
the tent may take a turn at weaving, the mother decides what is to be made,
462 its pattern and colours and in general directs operations. Women also pitch
the tent when the camp is moved; they do so unaided by the men. It is a
342 task which requires considerable strength and only grown girls and mature
women can assist in this; younger girls scour the vicinity in search of
stones to hold the sides of the tent on the ground after it has been erected.
[356] As soon as pitching is complete, the floor of the tent is brushed clean before
carpets are spread and the few articles of personal belongings placed in
their proper position.

462 Next, brushwood must be fetched in large quantities for fires. Apart
313 from cooking needs and winter warmth, the fire of each tent is in constant
use for preparing the sickly sweet tea, almost the consistency of syrup,
which is drunk several times a day regularly and which is made again for
even the casual visitor. The task of fetching brushwood is performed daily,
and each load takes a few hours of a woman's time to gather and bring back
[412] to the tent. Bushes are uprooted with the aid of a long-handled adze and
piled together, to be carried on her back for the homeward journey. The
load is cumbersome and heavy; only girls in their late teens and mature
women can cope with it.

462 All cooking is done by the women. Most meals consist of cereal dishes of
252 various sorts, so that grinding, using heavy millstones, is a perpetual activity
to satisfy the demands for large quantities of flour. Millstones are
412 bought in the villages. In most small camps there only one or two sets,
so they are passed round from one woman to another. The stones are very
heavy but when they are carried from tent to tent men offer no assistance.

462 Each tent also requires large quantities of water for human consumption.
If the camp is located near a well, water is drawn in small quantities, fre-
312 quently. Young girls and boys take a donkey to the well, fill a couple of
[492] jerry cans with water, wait for an older sister to load them on the donkey
and then drive the beast back to camp. After a fall of rain, while puddles
of water remain on the ground, mature women make haste to gather the

462 them or any innate aptitude for them; this insistence is an index of the 424 jealousy with which she is prepared to guard her rights. Each right derived from this or that small task is an extension of her control over the male.

462 The force and significance of this control is, perhaps, best seen in a woman's right to cook. At marriage a woman must have at least the minimum 424 of cooking utensils, and one of the rights a man acquires in a woman is 252 that she cooks for him. This is something a man cannot do for himself. Therefore, when a man ill-treats his wife or threatens her with divorce, she [593] can retaliate by refusing to cook, or leave the tent altogether to return to her father. A man bereft of this service is in a very sorry plight indeed. The legal dominance of the male, seemingly autocratic, is reduced at every point by the control a woman exercises through her exclusive right to perform tasks. The limits to the area of her coercive powers are significant. They are confined almost wholly to domestic relationships. Legally, women •562 suffer such disabilities that they are almost of the status of minors; in reality, their day-to-day living is far from intolerable because they are able to control males over a wide field of relationships.

462 Men, excluded in the main from domestic duties around the tent, per- 424 form tasks to which their legal rights are tied. While women have access 231 to wells for water used by human beings, the transport of larger quantities of water over longer distances, requiring the use of camels, is a task which falls to the men. Watering of animals is done by men. Only they can slaughter the animals for food. The meat of an animal slaughtered by a woman is not "free," in a ritual sense, for human consumption. In an extremity only, a woman can, in effect, kill an animal, but the knife which cuts its throat must be held in a male hand, even if it is the hand of a very 462 small boy. The exploitation of the land is also the male prerogative. They [424] plough and sow the grain; incidental help may be provided by wives working [241] alongside their husbands during the early part of reaping, but the main reaping is done entirely by men. Transportation of grain to the mounds is also carried out by men, and it is they only who have access to the grain stores when quantities are withdrawn for family use. Sheep-shearing is [236] carried out entirely by males,[10] the fleeces are stacked by them and the [432] distribution and sales of these is directed by the male head of the tent.

Additional to these major tasks which males undertake are a number of minor ones. Men sew strips of cotton together to make clothes for both sexes. They also make rope of grass, albeit in a desultory sort of way, by twisting together the strands between the palms of the hands. A number of [334] other tasks fall to the men by virtue of the fact that the sexes are separated [342] in the tent by a divider of blanket material, which may be taken down when only members of the elementary family are about, but which is put

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[461] [10] This work is reserved for the younger men and takes the form of a festival during [533] which lewd songs are sung and poems with obscene themes or references are recited [538] loudly and within the hearing of elders, in a manner not dissimilar to the behaviour [831] of bachelors at a wedding.

would be impossible to satisfy all marriage expectations of men within the 621
universe of the minimal tribal section. For this reason alone external links 613
are inevitable and persistent. Also, the small territorial strip such a group 582
claims as a homeland produces an economy which, in this environment, 182
is unstable. Additional security is gained by making connections with other [423]
tribal sections, each with its specific ecological character. Men also marry [433]
into their client groups. The proportion of these for this camp was 9 per cent [619]
of the total. From these links they gain economic advantages, they can claim services and a client-following is politically significant. Finally, 7 per cent of the total[13] are marriages with women of other tribes, which again not only reduces the instability of the economy (in that a large tribal area suffering near-famine conditions has access to areas of markedly different ecology), but also provides political connections for men whose power ambitions have passed the point of leadership limited to their own tribes. In one way or another all these interests are manifest in the small camp and attention is now directed to the latter.

The disposition of people in the camp is represented diagrammatically 621
on the page following. 592

The nucleus of the camp is Tent A. Its owner (1) was a powerful *Shaikh*, [554]
the son of a famous father. His marriage represents a political link with a [619]
group of one of the primary sections of his own tribe. His father died only a [428]
few years before I recorded my census, and the large amount of moveable property he left had still not been divided among the sons; the owner of the tent, as eldest brother, still controlled the flocks and herds. Most of his time he spent away from the camp engaging in political intrigue. His two younger brothers lived in his tent, but the second (5) would not remain there long because negotiations for his marriage had been started. His father (2) mar- [582]
ried a parallel cousin; she died and shortly afterwards he took her sister (3) [587]
in sororal union. When this occurred an amount of bride-wealth was
agreed, but instead of giving any of it to her father, the entire amount was [583]
"put in front of her" (that is, the animals were allowed to remain with her husband's flock), and these animals she had marked with her brother's tribal sign to distinguish them from those of her husband. It was widely [428]
known that she was going to leave these animals to her husband's second [562]
son, for although she could not transfer them to a male outside her husband's corporate group, she could decide who, among his heirs, should inherit.

During my stay in this camp, her brother's son (4) came to it as a 621
temporary resident for a month. Since he was poor, the purpose of his visit 592
was to capture some of his aunt's wealth while she was still alive and the 574
possibility still existed. During his stay he was fed well but did no work. [604]
His kinsmen found his company tiresome, so, to cut short his stay, and after [431]
consulting her nominated heir (5), she gave him three grown goats. Also
when an occasion arose for an animal slaughter, she provided the sheep, and, [231]

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[13] The remainder is made up of marriages to the daughters of men incorporated into the lineages.

CHAPTER VII

BLOODMONEY—WESTERN DESERT

000 Payment in Cash—Agreements to pay—Reprisals discouraged—Patricide—Detective Work—Death from Fright—Public Aversion—The twelve-year-old Bill—Informers—Ali Abu Bukr's Cistern—The Broken Rope—Found Drowned—Three Months' Hard Labour—Whose Rope?—Payment—The Old Man who fell off the Wall—The Clutches of the Police—A Well-conceived Lie—Ibrahim's Broken Leg—Ali's Cunning—The Fiasco at the Tomb—Reductions in Payment—The Dead Baby—Amateur Lawyers—The Two Shepherds and the Trespasser—Stick or Stone?—Legal Arguments—Travelling Allowance—Misappropriation—Chaos—Mirtah buys Sheep, while the Sayed buy Dates—The Clash—£300—Abdel Kerim and his Cousin—The Boys Fight—Result of pointing a Gun—Dirty Fingers—Serve him Right—The Two Married Sisters—A Gun Accident—Poor Towida—Successful Bluffing.

682 In the Western Desert the laws of bloodmoney differ
[171] considerably from those of Sinai, the former being of
African origin and the latter of Arabian. The Western
[435] Bedouin regard the price of a man as £300, irrespective of
• [562] the market price of a camel; and the value of a woman's
life as normally £150, or half that of a man.

682 In the absence of satisfactory evidence in a case of
695 murder, if the oath be employed to decide the issue, fifty
562 men will swear for a man's life, and twenty-five in a case involving the life of a woman. (Note. In some tribes these numbers are increased to fifty-five and twenty-seven respectively.)

682 As regards the payment and acceptance of bloodmoney,
621 this is almost invariably by agreement between the families, and it is often difficult for an outsider to see any rhyme or

should have called a meeting with Abd el Salam, discussed 683
the position sensibly with him, and then the two of them 682
should have beaten all the boys soundly. Secondly, he ought 695
never to have taken his gun with him, which was as stupid 672
as it was dangerous. The fact that Abd el Kerim himself knew that it was not loaded made not the slightest difference to the case, as the boys did not, and could not, know whether it was loaded or not. As one of the sheikhs expressed it, "If you point a gun at me, loaded or unloaded, I'm not going to risk it. So if I retaliate by braining you, then that's your fault—not mine!"

As compared with some of the customs obtaining among 682
the Sinai Arabs, the following case among the Aulad Ali 171
in the Western Desert is illuminating, and will be quoted in full. The question of who is "chief mourner" of the deceased, and who draws the largest share in a bloodmoney case varies considerably between the tribes of Arab and
Berber origin. Among the Aulad Ali a woman killed is [562]
automatically half the value of a man, whereas among the [435]
Arabs the value of a woman depends on a variety of conditions.

A man called Idris had two daughters, Towida and 682
Beida. Beida married a man called Korayem Shushan of 672
the Gereidat tribe, and Towida married Farag Gueida of the Mowalik tribe. A son had been born to Towida and Farag called Lataif Farag; and when Lataif was about four years old, his parents quarrelled about some trifling matter, and Farag divorced Towida. Two months after this, Towida went to spend a day or two with her sister Beida and Korayem, and it was while sitting alone in their tent that the accident happened which was the cause of this lawsuit. It seems that Korayem had left a loaded gun tied up with cord to the roof of the tent, suspended from the poles. While Towida was sitting there, a sudden gust of wind got up, and shook the tent violently. As the tent rocked in the wind, the gun came tumbling down on to a wooden chest between the poles; the impact fired the

Had the Senussi been successful in the last war, they 175
would no doubt have brought in the 'Ibeidat or the 'Awaqir 619
from Cyrenaica to replace the Awlad 'Ali in Egypt.

At the present day the Awlad 'Ali, especially the eastern 619
sections near the Nile Valley, have almost ceased to be nomadic, 178
and only the old men have memories of their former warlike habits. They suffered considerably during the Great War, but are again becoming prosperous. They now own large comfortable tents, are beginning to build houses and clear out cisterns, and are also said to be increasing in numbers.[1] So civilized have they grown that my guides, one a Sinai Arab and the other an 'Abadi, concurred in calling them "green"—not real desert-worthy Bedouins.

Perhaps as a result of Libyan influence, or more probably 142
the better nurture and climate, they are taller, heavier, stronger, and lighter-complexioned than the lightly built Arabs of Sinai and Hijaz. Also they are much franker and more 157
straightforward than their shifty and suspicious eastern cousins, 181
and altogether more trustworthy. Their women only veil 562
themselves to strangers, and talk quite naturally and cheerfully 834
to the men of their own tribe. 609

They cultivate as much barley as they can, using a 243
primitive plough drawn by camels, in the clayey hollows [492]
scattered over their very stony limestone desert, but, as the [132]
rainfall is very uncertain, a good crop only occurs every five or six years. After harvest, they exchange some of their [437]
barley for maize, which the women grind to make bread as required, and some for dried dates. The seed for next [251]
year is buried in a hole lined with straw and covered with clay, and a year's forage for the animals is set aside. The [432]
rest of the crop goes to market, and for a short time the Arab has money to buy clothes for himself and his family [426]
and at utmost need to pay off some of the numerous debts he has inherited from his forefathers. Soon he is reduced again to the clothes he wears, the tent he sleeps in, and his animals grazing in the desert.

They are great breeders of camels and sheep, and a busy 436
traffic in these goes on weekly in the markets of Hammam, 178
'Amriya, and the Beheira. So they have got into the habit [438] [493] [233]

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[1] At the 1927 census, the Western Desert Arabs, Awlad 'Ali, Jawabis, etc., numbered 38,928 souls exclusive of those settled in Beheira. But Pacho, 100 years ago, estimated them at 38,000 souls. [161]

619 The name also includes various peasant
[563] groups and individuals who migrated from the Nile valley and who were
incorporated into the tribal organization by a system of tribal adop-
tion called "Iktitab." Most of these peasant groups came to the desert
[701] to avoid military drafting by becoming part of Awlad Ali, who, until
[554] 1947, were exempted from serving in the Egyptian army. Although groups
and individuals thus adopted become part of the pedigrees of the adopt-
ing tribal segments and are supposed to enjoy equal status, yet, insofar
as their origin is still remembered, they are looked down upon by the
Sa'adi and occupy a position somewhere between that of Awlad Ali Sa'adi
and that of the Murabiteen.

619 The Sa'adi tribes consider themselves to be the descendants of a
173 certain Aqqar Ben Sa'ada or Aqqar El-Sherif, a descendant of Bani Suleim,
who settled in Cyrenaica in the Fifth Century. Although they claim to
[144] be of pure Arab ancestory, all sources agree that a considerable amount
of mixture between Arab and indigenous Berber populations took place
during the period they have been in North Africa.



Fig. 1. The Sa'adi Tribes

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* The exact relationship of the Gemeiat tribe to the Sa'adi tribes is not exactly known. Many informants, as well as accounts of earlier travelers in the area, assert that descent from Hkadiga, a sister of Ali and Harb, and therefore are cousins of Awlad Ali. Others, especially members of Sa'adi tribes, themselves, deny any genealogical

CHAPTER III

TRIBAL ORGANIZATION

121 In discussing the tribal organization of Awlad Ali two modes of 619 analysis are employed. One is a structural form of analysis in which emphasis is on the hierarchy of groups and subgroups by which the tribesmen order themselves. This view of the system is an outside one regarding all smaller units as parts of a delimited whole: Awlad Ali. The other mode of analysis involves the description of some of these groups in terms of the processes by which they emerge and maintain themselves.

The first problem one encounters in pursuing the first kind of 121 analysis is that of definition of the tribal boundaries. It has been 619 mentioned earlier that the name Awlad Ali includes a number of groups ● 563 of different ethnic backgrounds. Some of these have been incorporated into the tribe by the system of tribal adoption known as "Iktitab." Such groups consider themselves as Awlad Ali and are considered as such by Awlad Ali proper as well as by outsiders. Other groups such 121 619 as the Murabiteen are not thus incorporated into the tribe; and although they consider themselves to be Awlad Ali, they are not viewed as such by Awlad Ali themselves who prefer to keep the position of the Murabiteen distinct as an inferior group. On the other hand, many [167] Awlad Ali have moved outside the area of the Western Desert and have become settled cultivators on the banks of the Nile. These retain a vague and remote genetic connection to the name Awlad Ali.

To avoid this problem, it is best to define the tribe by political rather than by ethnic criterion. There is no paramount chief of the

There is no paramount chief of the
121 tribe at the present time; yet, the unifying force is the recognition
619 by the group of the tribal law, the Daraieb, as a binding set of rules
671 [643] and as the regulator of behavior within the area. In these terms,
Awlad Ali are a clearly delimited group, and it is in terms of the
jurisdiction of these rules that Awlad Ali are treated as a unit for
administrative purposes by the Egyptian government. Viewed this
way, Awlad Ali will be defined as those who recognize and abide by
the Daraieb or the customary law. This includes the Murabiteen tribes
[563] as well as all those who became part of the tribal organization of
Awlad Ali by means of Iktitab. Since the territorial jurisdiction of
the Daraieb is limited to the Western Desert of Egypt, those groups
and individuals of Awlad Ali origin who have moved on a permanent basis
from the area will be excluded from the group. Groups and individuals
who live in the area but are not part of the tribal organization of
Awlad Ali are not subject to the Daraieb.

619 Awlad Ali of the Western Desert of Egypt are an offshoot of the
173 Cyrenaica tribes who in turn believe themselves to be the descendants
of a unique ancestress Sa'ada.


Syrenaica tribes
Sa'ad
Baraghuth
'Aggar
El-Saghir
Jibran
Harb
Ali
Tribe
Abiad
Ahmar
Senenah
Tribe
Awlad Kharouf
Awlad Mansur
El-Sanagrah
'Eila
El-'aggary
Gedeidah
Bu-Mutair
Bait ('Eila)
El-Asabei
Yousef
'afash
Helleis
Daghash
Bait
Semeida
Yunis
Makhum
Hussein

613 675 539

Article 9:

The Amar should never fight on the side of the wrongdoer, because if it does, it will have to pay with him for his wrongdoings.

Article 10:

[628] [619] Any dispute or fight involving a member of the Amar and an outsider should be reported to the awaqil in the Amar who are supposed to take the matter up with the other party. If the awaqil are convinced that the outsider is the aggressor or that he is at fault, they should try to make him accede to the demands of the members of the Amar, using all their efforts to convince him and the aqila of his bait. If he refuses, they should call him for a "Miad" (tribal meeting) in which all parties involved should be represented by their respective awaqil.

Article 11:

● [563] [619] With regard to "iktitab" (tribal adoption), an outsider wanting to join the Aggary Family or one of its constiuent buite must be asked first about the reason or reasons for his desire to join. This must be done in order to know what kind of person he is and whether he will become a burden and liability to the Amar. If he proves to be of reputable standing, the aqila of the bait he wants to join can accept him without consultation with the rest of the awaqil. If on the other hand he is found to have grudges against someone or if someone has a financial claim over him, then the aqila of the bait cannot accept him without consultation with the other awaqil in the Amar. If all the awaqil agree to accept him, he is considered like one of the Eilat Aggary, having the same rights and bearing the same responsibilities.

Article 12:

A memberof the Amar who wants to separate himself from the Amar and get a "barawa" has to state his reasons beforehe can be released from the obligations of his membership in the amar. If his request to get the barawa was because of injustice he suffered by the Amar or any of its members, the awaqil have the duty to straighten the injustice and restore his rights. If, on the other hand, his request for the barawa was to avoid paying the Amar, then he cannot be released from his membership unless he pays all of his share, or else he must return all that the Amar has paid him until the time he asked for the barawa.

Article 13:

[695] [693] If one of the Amar is accused of an offense for which he is tried by the legal system of the state, the Amar as a whole share the expenses of hiring an attorney to defend him. This, however, is done after the awaqil are sure (by means of administering the oath) that he is innocent and that the accusation is false.

613
671 first appeared, the rule has become a practice so common that other Amars
675 find it unnecessary to specify it in their own papers.
682

Another new rule which is in the process of acquiring a great amount
613 of consensus among the tribal population of Awlad Ali is that of the re-
672 675 sponsibility of the Amar for the payment of the lawyer's fees for members
[693] of the Amar who are tried by the government (Article 13 of the Aggary
[695] papers). Another less agreed upon rule is that of the responsibility of
613 the Amar for the financial losses caused by the confiscation of smuggled
672 goods or the payment of money for the destruction of government property
675 439 by a member of the Amar. Where smuggling is an important source of in-
[434] come for the group, Amar papers usually include rules making it a corporate responsibility; other Amar papers, especially those of tribal segments not deeply involved in smuggling, make it an individual responsibility, while still others leave it intentionally with no specific rule, as in the case of the Aggary Amar paper.

613 The Aggary document is a relatively elaborate one. Not all Amar
[675] papers, or at least the ones I had a chance to examine, are as detailed.
[131] Eilat Aggary is the largest Amar in the area of Dera'el Bahari, which
extends from Alexandria 60 miles westward to the town of Alamein. The
613 distinctive characteristics of the Aggary Eila is that it is composed
● 563 mainly of peasant groups who joined the Aggary by means of tribal adop-
619 tion. Of the 16 Baits constituting the Aggary Amar, only three are believed to be Awlad Ali proper. The attractiveness of the Aggary for the peasant groups seeking to be adopted by the tribal population of the area may be partly explained in terms of the location of Eilat Aggary in an area relatively close to the Delta from where these groups usually migrate.

613 This makes it possible for those adopted by the tribe to keep in touch
563 with their relatives and friends they left behind in the Delta while en-
619 joying the military exemption gained from their adoption by the Awlad Ali population. It is also believed that Eilat Aggary, made up mostly of peasants themselves, are very lenient in the conditions they put for tribal adoption. Finally, the Eilat Aggary is not among the most powerful tribal segments of Awlad Ali, possibly because of their composition. This assures the adopted peasant groups an equal status not normally obtained if adopted by one of the powerful tribal segments of Awlad Ali.

613 The Amar paper of the Aggary explicitly states some of the basic
[675] characteristics of the Amar as a unit in the tribal organization of Awlad Ali. The most distinctive aspect of the Eila or the Amar as a political unit is the absence of any formalized leadership. Although the Amar is viewed by outsiders as a corporate group as far as its legal responsibility in certain cases, from the standpoint of its members, the Amar is no more than the sum total of its constiuent units or Baits. This is shown in the Amar paper of Aggary which states that matters affecting the Amar be decided upon by all the bait represented by their respective leaders, the awaqil.
613 There is no formalized authority above the
554 awaqil, although one of the awaqil might acquire a position of informal
627 leadership by virtue of personal or other qualities. He will be considered as a mediator and go-between for the various leaders of the Baits. In the case of the Aggary, Sheihk Selouma, the Aqila of Bait Eweida, has acquired such a leadership among the Eilat Aggary. Although Shiehk Selouma is relatively young, (he is about 40 years old), he has the reputation of getting things done. His Bait is the wealthiest in the

621 613 different principle from the principle of patrilineal succession charac-
teristic of the bait and all other units on the higher levels of tribal
segmentation.

Some of the camps I visited were composed of three patrilines, while
others contained individuals belonging to five patrilines. In some camps
each tent belonged to a different patriline, some of which did not even
belong to the same bait. The composite nature of the camps is partic-
ularly clear in the case of what the people in the area called "nagei
gheir aseil" or the artificial camp. This kind of camp is usually found
near the towns and settled communities of the area. They include one or
two tents of individuals belonging to the bait whose land the camp is
built one, and who give the camp its name, but the rest of the tents are
occupied by individuals from different baits or even tribes and also by
621 outsiders who came to work in the area. Such a camp does not act as a
unit for any purpose. It has a rudimentary structure, and is held to-
gether by mere physical proximity of its members which stems from the
need of "wanas" or togetherness. The composition of the artificial camps
is highly changeable with new members joining and others leaving through-
out the year. When I joined the camp of Ragi from the Sanagra tribe, it
consisted of twelve tents. Four of the twelve tents were occupied by
[563] Sheihk Ragi (two tents for the two wives) and his two married sons, five
occupied by members of tribal segments other than Sanagrah, and four by
workers who came from Alexandria to work for the government project in
the area. One week after I joined the camp another tent was added to
[563] the camp. It belonged to a man from the Geneishat tribe of the Natruh
area. He came with his wife to work on the new irrigation project which

621 had started in the area at that time. No special permission was re-
563 quired for the newcomer to join the camp. He only got the permission
of the person whose tent was at the far end of the camp to put his tent
[574] next to it. The first night after the man joined the camp, his next
door neighbor slaughtered a goat in honor of the new member and invited
all members of the camp.

621 Leaving the camp also does not require any permission, although the
622 custom specifies that before one leaves he should inform either his
[576] neighbor or the headman of his time of departure. With the exception of
[613] cases where the headman of a particular camp is at the same time the
Aqila of the bait, the headman of the camp has no authority over the mem-
622 bers of the camp. He is usually called upon to solve minor problems be-
627 tween brothers or husband and wife, or give his opinion in decisions of
minor importance. "A headman is like a father," said one informant, "we
call him kabir el-nagi (the old man of the camp)." When a member of the
627 nagei is involved in a serious dispute with another, the one to handle
613 the case is the aqila or awaqil to whom the two disputing parties belong.

619 Group	Leadership	Identifying aspects
613 Kabila	None	Client groups attached.
621 Eila	None	Vengeance group, Vaguely defined tribal land ("watan").
Bait	Aqila	Corporate land-holding. Formally recognized leadership.
[622] Nagei	Headman	Residential unit with unsegmented structure.

lodges. The Italians, who had some small schools in Libya even 175*
before 1911, gave considerable attention to educational matters 648*
from the earliest days of their occupation. The first educational programme for Libya, drawn up by the Arabist C. A. Nallino, was not accepted by the Central Government because it was felt that the proposals did not give the Administration effective control over the schools and that consequently education could not be sufficiently directed to political ends. Military conquest must be consolidated by moral conquest. This feeling hardened under the Fascists into an educational policy designed to meet the new programme of colonization. Mixed schools and classes were abolished in favour of schools for Italian boys and schools for Arab boys or, where they had to be taught in the same building, separate classes for each. Teaching, except of the Koran to the most junior pupils, was entirely in the hands of Italians. In the curriculum Italian took precedence over Arabic and it was intended that it should become eventually the sole medium of instruction. Arab boys learnt under the system to write Italian with greater facility than their own language. The aims of this education were to satisfy the cultural ambitions of the Arabs, while keeping them under control and preventing them from reaching a level of cultural equality with the Italians, and to provide minor government officials and a means of intercommunication by which the Arabs could more easily be employed in menial work.[1] It seems that by 1940 there were twenty-three schools for Arabs in Cyrenaica. Some of these were in centres within reach of Bedouin and a number of medical clinics were also opened in Bedouin areas. Less use was made of the schools than of the clinics.

Thus in every department of public life power and authority 175*
were retained by the Italians in their own hands and the people 648*
of the country had no representation in the Government and 563 ●
were not consulted about plans for their future. It was, however, necessary for the Italians to employ a number of Arabs in minor administrative posts, because they could not themselves make contact with the people, and in the Islamic courts, where they could not themselves function. After 1935, when Italy

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[1] Dr. R. Micacchi, 'L'Instruction publique en Libye de 1912 à 1924', *Institut Colonial International*, 1926, and 'L'Enseignement aux indigènes dans les colonies italiennes dépendant directement de la Couronne', ibid. 1931. [113]

*175 *648 • 563 found herself in none too friendly a world with the added cares of an imperial power, efforts were made to identify more closely with Italian interests those of the better-educated section of the Arab population through this bureaucratic *élite*. If it was to be an asset in the future it would have to be given a larger stake in the administration of the country. Balbo emphasized this requirement in his plan of development. He said in 1938 that he wished to raise the cultural and social level of the Arabs by allowing them to collaborate in greater numbers and more positively in public offices and duties. If such collaboration was still limited and the participation of Arabs in posts of responsibility was still rare it was due 'to the poverty of capable and reliable elements, and certainly not to an obstinate prejudice on the part of the Government'.[1]

This *élite* had to be very small to begin with, for suitable material was, as Balbo wrote in the passage quoted above, hard to find in Cyrenaica. Excluding persons employed in such menial offices as sweepers, door-keepers, and office messengers, and the large numbers of Cyrenaicans in the army and police under Italian officers and N.C.O.s, there were in 1940 only about 150 Arabs employed in the Civil Service. About 100 of these were administrative officials, advisers, mudirs, and sub-mudirs, and the rest were religious functionaries, qadis and officials of the religious courts. The administrative officials had no real authority, their duties being limited to collecting information about the Arab population and circulating among it the instructions of the Government. They were treated as servants in the domestic rather than in the public sense and they were ill-paid. Nevertheless, through their many social contacts with their fellow countrymen they exercised more influence than the Italians would have wished, and the Italians were, owing to their ignorance of Arabic and of Arab ways of life and thought, very largely in their hands. They undoubtedly deceived their masters to their own advantage and in the interests of their fellow countrymen. These Arab bureaucrats were townsmen, mostly from Banghazi and Darna. Some were members of respectable urban families of Turkish days, such as the Banghazi families of Bin 'Amir, Bsaikri, Biju, and 'Anaisi, and the Darna families of Bannani, Darbi, Dillal, and

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[1] Italo Balbo, op. cit., p. 15.

175*
648*
563 ●

Jarbi, and had been educated in Turco-Arab schools in the country, and a few at Istanbul. Most, however, were less reputable and had a record of close and active collaboration with the Italians as informers, spies, guides, interpreters, leaders of 'friendlies', and overseers in concentration camps. When the fighting was over the Italians felt under an obligation to these men, their only friends in the country, and rewarded them with administrative posts for which they had few qualifications. It is not surprising that later they often found them an embarrassment and had to admit that the Bedouin for preference avoided their company. Before the last European war they were being slowly replaced by a new class of officials brought up in the towns under Italian rule and educated in Italo-Arab schools. These *évolués* showed a marked preoccupation with their own affairs and little inclination to use their superior education for the benefit of their own people in the towns, while their repugnance to the Bedouin made them regard a posting to one of the country districts as a punishment. But if they had no strong sense of loyalty to their own people they likewise had none to their masters. They might join Fascist clubs and syndics and apply for special Italian citizenship but they did so passively, without conviction that these things would mean more to them than payment of subscriptions. They knew moreover that the swarms of Italian immigrants settling like locusts on Cyrenaica would spell disaster to them no less than to the rest of the Arab population. It is not surprising, therefore, to find that during the late war the Italians watched them closely for *disfattismo politico*, and not without cause, for they showed themselves very ready to co-operate with the British during their first two occupations of Cyrenaica, and some, including ten senior officials, showed themselves so openly anti-Italian during these periods that they thought it wise to retire with the British forces in their second retreat to Egypt.

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The Bedouin accepted all these Italian measures, good and bad, with resignation and indifference. They were powerless to oppose them, but as far as possible they ignored them. Plagued with concentration camps, loss of stock, confiscation of arms, rape of sowing and pasture grounds, the pass system, corrupt officials, and neglect of their Shaikhs, they found the odd mosque, school, and clinic poor consolation and retired

tary command of the Sahara. The other Articles of the 1934 175*
decree were designed chiefly to meet the new conditions arising, 648*
or likely to arise, from colonization by nationals. In no important respect did it alter the status of the Arab population or what rights it still possessed. In the first enthusiasm of turning Libya into a metropolitan colony the Arabs were of secondary interest to those who made the laws.

In view of the coming struggle between the powers of Europe, 175*
already seen by Mussolini to be inevitable, the Italian Govern- 648*
ment considered it advisable to pay more attention to the feel-
ings of its colonists and native peoples. To encourage the 167
colonists already in the country and those about to join them from Italy a Royal Decree was promulgated on 9 January 1939 declaring Libya to be an integral part of the Kingdom of Italy, its four provinces becoming the ninety-seventh, ninety-eighth, ninety-ninth, and hundredth provinces of the Kingdom. The military status of the Libyan Sahara remained unchanged. The colonists no longer had to feel that they had left their fatherland for inhospitable shores. The *Colonia* had become *Terra Italiana*. The *Quarta Sponda*, Italy's Fourth Shore, had
become a political fact. At the same time, to quiet any uneasi- 175*
ness which the incorporation of their country in the Kingdom of 648*
Italy might create among those educated Arabs whose services 641
the Italians needed, and to implement the promise Mussolini 563 ●
had made during his tour of Libya in 1937 that he would remember the part played by Libyan volunteers in the Ethiopian campaign, the Decree offered the Arabs a new special citizenship which took the place of the right of acquiring metropolitan citizenship allowed in the earlier decrees and now abrogated. That the Italians had attached importance to the partial assimilation of a small *élite* of natives is shown by the retention of the right of acquiring metropolitan citizenship through all the decrees and laws, from the invasion of Libya in 1911 till the present decree, in both pre-Fascist and Fascist times. It had been found, however, that the Arabs had not availed themselves of the privilege. Employees of the administration could not feel that any advantages they might derive from it could compensate them for loss of status before the religious courts in matters of personal law, a loss considered shameful even by whole-hearted collaborators. Also, the new special citizenship,

*175 *cittadinanza italiana speciale*, was more in accordance with
*648 Balbo's policy of parallel development than acquisition of
641 metropolitan citizenship.

● 563 The new special citizenship could be acquired, without prejudice to Muslim personal law, by persons who had reached the age of eighteen, provided they had a good record and had in some way or other served the State or could read and write Italian. The status carried with it certain privileges: the right to bear arms, the right to be inscribed in the Arab Blackshirt Organization, the right to a military career in Libyan units (now withdrawn from other Libyans), the right to become mayor in Arab communities and adviser in mixed Italo-Arab communities, and the right to come under the *Ordinamento sindacale-corporativo*, an ordinance by which the Fascist guild system had been adapted to suit colonial conditions, and to take some part in the activities of these guilds. These rights could be exercised only in Italian African territories and no Arab could, in any case, occupy posts or practise professions which would necessitate Italians serving under him.

The reception of the new decree by the colonists and by Arab employees of the Administration was enthusiastic. It may be doubted, however, whether the sentiments expressed by the mudirs, the qaḍis, and some of the richer merchants, in the telegrams of thanks they sent to Mussolini and Balbo were felt. It was tacitly assumed to be a condition of continued employment that special citizenship should be applied for. The first batch of diplomas included ninety Cyrenaican names, almost all of native officials and government pensioners of the urban centres: the decree could not have been of the slightest interest to the Bedouin. Conscription for military service followed shortly afterwards. Of their bounty the Italians had given to the Arabs of Cyrenaica a *Patria, l'Italia Fascista*, and they were expected to show their gratitude by fighting for it. On 10 June 1940 Italy entered the war on the side of Germany.

Thus in 1911 the Arabs of Cyrenaica became enemy subjects and were afterwards declared to be Italian subjects. In 1919 they became Italian citizens. When the Italians renewed operations against them in 1923 those who resisted were declared to be *ribelli*. Under the Fascists they lost the Italian citizenship they had been granted under the democratic régime of 1919 and

became instead Italian-Libyan citizens. In 1939 they were 175*
granted the privilege of applying, if they had the necessary 648*
qualifications, for a special Italian citizenship, a status half-way 641
between that of the ordinary Arab of the country and that of 563
the Italian colonists. There were, therefore, in Cyrenaica in 1940 three categories of citizenship, that of the *cittadini metropolitani*, Italian settlers and officials, that of the *cittadini italiani speciali*, a small intermediate urban class of educated Arab officials, and that of the *cittadini italiani libici* (*musulmani*), which comprised almost the entire native population of the country. These changes in the civil status of the Arabs were to a considerable extent a response to the development of the
political situation in Cyrenaica itself. The Royal Decree of 175*
1913 was an optimistic anticipation of easy victory; the Royal 648*
Decree of 1919 was an acknowledgement of political and 641
military failure; the Royal Decree of 1927 was a sign that apathy and compromise had given way to determination to fight the Bedouin if necessary, and even by preference, to the point of extermination; the Royal Decree of 1934 marked the end of all resistance and envisaged the settlement of Italian colonists on the best lands of the country; and the Royal Decree of 1939 signalled the realization of this programme and at the same time made a bid for co-operation of the Arab intelligentsia. But to an equal extent the changes in civil status were determined by political events in Italy and in Europe. The Royal Decree of 1913 was a plain colonial declaration such as any European Power would have made in similar circumstances. In 1919 Italian politics were defeatist, demagogic, socialist, and internationalist, and the Royal Decree of that year was a stew of these ingredients. The Royal Decrees of 1927 and 1934 were typical Fascist pieces of legislation with emphasis on State requirements rather than on citizenship and the rights of the individual, and showed a strong bias towards bureaucratic centralization and hypertrophy. The Royal Decree of 1939 bore the stamp of empire.

IV

The Bedouin were altogether unimpressed either by Italian 175*
propaganda or by their social services, and they did not believe 648*
in their promises of future benefits. *'Bukra al-'id'*, 'The feast

tions and gardens. On the other hand, it was recognized that if 175*
they were to be able to lead a nomadic life at all, and they 648*
had to do so if they were to rear their animals, they must have 423
access to water-supplies and grazing-grounds, and that this 233
would sometimes mean their crossing the plateau through the
area of Italian colonization. To solve this problem corridors [487]
running north and south across the plateau were, as explained
in an earlier section, marked out for the transit of Bedouin
flocks and herds.

It was envisaged that the Bedouin would continue to lead
a predominantly pastoral life on the more rugged parts of
the first terrace of the plateau, on its southern slopes, and in the
steppe country of the *sirwal*, the *barqa*, the Marmarica, and the
Sirtica. It was thought that they had in these areas all the land
they needed for grazing and catch-crop cultivation, though it
was evident that in years of drought they could not have
managed to survive without summer grazing on the plateau.
Nevertheless, efforts were made to raise the economic level of 175*
the Bedouin by improving their methods of cultivation and 648*
stock-raising so that, as both producers and labourers, they [511]
might be more valuable an adjunct to Italian husbandry, and
might become more dependent on the State and more closely
linked with metropolitan activities. It was intended that they [464]
should constitute a cheap reserve of labour for general unskilled
work and for seasonal labour on the farms of the colonists. By
using them in this way it was hoped that it would be possible
to avoid the growth of a metropolitan proletariat.[1] These efforts 175*
included, largely for political reasons, the creation of Arab 648*
colonization centres. Agricultural villages and farms were to 167
be built by the *Ente* similar to, but smaller than, those built for
the Italian immigrants. The first two such villages, Fiorita and 563 •
Alba, were built in 1939. Each Arab farming family was provided
with a house, a well, a camel, a cow, and farm implements.
Like the Italian, the Arab colonist was to be first salaried
labourer, then partner with the State, then mortgagor, and
finally owner. As only thirty-two holdings were prepared at
Fiorita and Alba the contribution to native agriculture cannot
be regarded as more than a token one. Moreover, the Italians
experienced difficulty in finding Arab colonists for even these

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[1] Ibid., p. 622.

*175 thirty-two holdings, for the Bedouin showed no inclination to
*648 work as serfs the lands they had worked as freemen: 'In their
[167] daily attitude coldness and scepticism were apparent so that
[563] the part they took in collaborating was purely formal.'[1] A pastoral village, furnished with veterinary and stud services and offices for the collection, classification, and weighing of wool, was built at Nahiba (Jardis al-'Abid) and another was planned to be built at Verde (Jardis al-Jarrari). Some may consider that these measures are evidence of Balbo's sincerity. The Bedouin believed that he intended to destroy them by guile as surely as Graziani had destroyed them with machine-gun and bomb.

V

When Giolitti landed troops in Cyrenaica and Tripolitania in 1911 he started his country on the road to ruin. The first Libyan war was from 1911 to 1917. In the midst of it Italy was involved, from 1915 to 1918, in the first Great War. From 1921 to 1932 she was again engaged in prosecuting her colonial war in Libya, first in Tripolitania, then in Cyrenaica also. From 1934 to 1936 she participated in the Spanish civil war. In 1935 and 1936 she conquered Ethiopia. In 1939 she seized Albania. From 1940 to 1944 she was engaged in the second Great War. It was appropriate that disaster should overcome the Italians in Cyrenaica, that the Bedouin of that country who had suffered so much at their hands should witness their humiliation, and that it should fall on the head of Graziani, who became Governor of Libya when Balbo was killed at Tubruq on 28 June 1940.

As the day of retribution drew near the Italians showed some uneasiness about the situation in Cyrenaica and, as I have recorded, they made belated attempts to conciliate the Arabs.
*175 Their uneasiness was partly due to the presence of the Sanusi
*648 leader Sayyid Idris and of a number of notable Cyrenaican and
*795 Tripolitanian Shaikhs in exile in Egypt. It could hardly be
793 doubted that they would approach the British with offers of assistance should Italy enter the war on the side of Germany. This is what happened. In October 1939, when Italy's participation seemed imminent, the Cyrenaican and Tripolitanian

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[113] [1] Giuseppe Palloni, *The Action of the Italian Government in Favour of the Lybian Agriculture*, 1945, p. 31.

121 554 571 and better defined, but I feel that the area of leadership in tribal society is more complex and less well studied than we are led to believe. Both the decision-making process and some kind of authority are present in all societies, but we know less about such universals in tribal society. It is as Easton (1965:205) has said: "Even in the smallest group, we can expect to find that the power and responsibility of caring for recurring matters as well as crises tend to reside in the hands of the few."

Status and Role Differentiation

554 565 Although structural differentiation along class lines does not exist in al-Qasr, status differential does exist and a discussion of it is essential for an understanding of Bedouin authority structure. Classes exist only where individuals at a specific socio-economic level "become conscious of their common interests and organize themselves"(Linton 1936:110). Status stratification in and of itself is not indicative of a class structure, for "a size beyond the possibility of facial recognition" is an additional prerequisite (Bierstedt 1957:404).

554 571 Authority structure in al-Qasr, like any of the other structures of society, constitites a system of roles. The actors who act out the roles in this particular system occupy a special status, or position, in the Bedouin social system

632 communities. They are strangers to each other who meet but
369 do not mix. There is a barrier between them and each distrusts
641 the other. Nevertheless there is a measure of economic interdependence
between them, and the tribes and the towns affect
each other politically. In Turkish times the urban population,
632 which, as we have seen, was small and contained a high proportion
439 of Jews, was engaged in trade and domestic industries.
438 The townsmen bought from the Bedouin animals, hides, wool,
clarified butter, honey, beeswax, and ostrich feathers (ostriches
369 were still hunted in the southern steppe in those days), and they supplied the Bedouin with those things he required but could not, or would not, make for himself: tea, sugar, rice, cloth, horseshoes, musket balls, flints, gunpowder, and earthenware. The urban craftsmen also made leather goods, manufactured salt from sea water, and conducted trade and exchange. Imports came by sea from Tripoli, Marseilles, London, Malta, Alexandria, and Crete, and overland from Alexandria.

But the townsmen of Cyrenaica never dominated the country as they dominate most of the Arab lands, where through usury, intimidation, monopoly of trade, and influence in the administration and the courts they have reduced the countryman to the position of landless labourer or *métayage* serf. There was nothing in the Bedouin way of life which gave an opening to the usurer. Moreover, the towns had no monopoly of trade for, if necessary, the Bedouin could, since they were self-supporting in necessities, either go without urban supplies or obtain them overland from Egypt, as they showed during their war with the Italians. Consequently there were no rich landowning families
[565] living in the towns at the expense of the country-side, no aghas,
beys, and pashas; and an educated middle class hardly existed outside the small official circle and lacked both wealth and influence. In general it may be said that in Cyrenaica the towns were not parasites on the country, but had their proper functions as trading centres and suppliers of the needs of the Bedouin population. The markets were free, not tied to town societies.
632 Nor could the Bedouin be coerced by force or law. The tribes
*648 were largely inaccessible and they were stronger than the towns,
369 even with the administration behind them. The Bedouin were
not afraid of the Turkish Administration, which sat very lightly on their shoulders, and they did not use the courts. The

The Turkish Administration was centred in the towns but operated, 632
as will be explained later, through the contacts of its local 648*
officials, who were generally Arabs of the country, with the leading 571
tribal Shaikhs, with whom they made friends. These officials 369
were townsmen or sons of Bedouin who had received an urban
education and they acted as links between the citizen communities
and the Bedouin. Through Bedouin relations with
town merchants and officials what was happening in the world
outside Cyrenaica percolated to the most distant tents. Another 795*
channel of political and cultural infiltration was the network of 571
Sanusiya lodges. The Shaikh of the Sanusiya lodge at Banghazi 648*
was regarded as the ambassador of the head of the Order to the 177
Governor of Cyrenaica and he was chosen for qualities which 632
fitted him for this role. He was consulted by the Governor on 793
matters in which the tribes were involved, and through him 369
and the Brothers of the lodges of the towns news of the outside
world reached the Head of the Order in the distant oasis of
Kufra and the Heads of the local lodges, whose relations with
the Bedouin in their localities were intimate. Thus, as will be
seen, the Bedouin had a general idea of what the revolution of
the 'Young Turks' meant and were aware of the impending crisis
long before the Italian attack on their country was delivered.
But though maintaining communications with the towns, 632
neither the tribal Shaikhs nor the Sanusiya allowed themselves 571
to be subordinated to them or identified themselves with urban 795
interests. The Bedouin Shaikh did not, like the Syrian landowner, 369
feel any need to have a town house, and the Sanusiya
ever remained a country and Bedouin Order and directed its
affairs from the desert.

Town and country kept apart, with the towns dependent on 632
the country and not the country on the towns, because there 369
was in Cyrenaica no client peasantry bound by debt, need of 565
protection, and trade monopoly to the towns. The Bedouin
did not settle on the land where they would be an easy prey to
the usurer, overseer, and tax collector. Those who were defeated [167]
in the great tribal wars of the past and in the inter-tribal and
inter-sectional fighting of more recent times migrated to Egypt
and settled there as *fallahin*, and not in Cyrenaica. In Cyrenaica 565
there is not the spur of adverse climatic conditions or the lash 167
of land shortage to drive them to depart from their ancient

565 Arabian ways. In Egypt necessity has slowly subjugated the
167 exiles to the peasant yoke. They long resisted but, like the
Bedouin nomads coming from the Sinai Peninsula, had in the
end to submit or perish. The absence of a substantial peasantry
in Cyrenaica is one of the characteristics which most distinguish
it from the Arab societies of Palestine, Syria, Iraq, Egypt, and
565 the Maghrib. The peasant can be dominated. He is fixed to the
earth and can be made to surrender it and till it for others. The
Cyrenaican Bedouin is fixed to no place and cannot be forced to
sell his birthright by bad seasons or intimidation. This has
565 meant that there have not been in Cyrenaica any social enclaves
632 attached to the towns through which the towns and administrative centres could lord it over the Bedouin. Outside the towns
*[648] all is Bedouin and the Turkish Administration, and afterwards
[619] the Italian Administration, found that they could not get a
grip on the Bedouin of Cyrenaica as they could on the peasantry
of Tripolitania.

632 Nevertheless the towns and the Turkish, and later the Italian,
*648 Administration in them affected the tribal system by acting as
619 a pull on those tribal segments which lived nearest to them, so
that the tribes which lay between the towns and the steppe
were attracted towards one or other of these poles. The political
structure of Cyrenaica as a whole exercised in this way a significant influence on the segmentary tribal system.

IV

619 The Bedouin who became followers of the Sanusiya Order
178 and whose country and way of life I have described are divided
into tribes and tribal sections owning different tracts of the
[793] country. This tribal system existed in Cyrenaica long before
the Grand Sanusi preached there and it continued to exist after
*[795] his grandson Sayyid Muhammad Idris had fled the country
and the Sanusiya Order had been abolished and its lodges
destroyed by the Italians. It is the fundamental structure of
Bedouin society which the Sulaimid tribes brought with them
from Arabia.

619 The Bedouin of Cyrenaica are Arabs. The Arabian tribes
101 who conquered the country and settled in it mixed with the
144 indigenous Berbers, as is evident in their physical features to-

671 [124] I checked the contents of this document with my own informants who agreed that it was authentic and represented the _'awaiyid_ as it should be practiced. Almost [682] the whole of the _'awaiyid_ refers to the circumstances surrounding the occurrence of killing and the payment of the [128] _diiya_. The case studies which I present below reflect the _'awaiyid_ as it was practiced in 1935.

682 Blood-money is calculated relative to three things: whether or not a killing was premeditated or accidental; the sex of the victim; and whether or not the victim was a freeman or a slave. The full _diiya_ is paid in the case of intentional killing, and three-fourths of this amount is due in the case [562] of accidental killing. The _diiya_ for a woman is one-half that for a man whether or not the killing is intentional. • [567] There are no slaves in al-Qasr, only their descendents who are now freemen. In the case where a pregnant woman is killed, the foetus will be examined and should it prove to be a male then the full _diiya_ will be due.

578 682 *613 778 An important mechanism for conflict regulation in the Western Desert is the _nazaala_, i.e., "the act of taking refuge." If a killing is committed, the killer immediately seeks protection by going to the residence of a neutral third party. The third party, who may or may not be an _'aqila_, and his lineage give protection to the whole tertiary segment of the killer. This may involve the actual relocation of the killer's _bait_ to the residence of the protecting group for

[For information on the Bedouin concept of laf in which a stranger group, sometimes of "client tribe" origin, attaches itself to the dominant clan in an area, and through some fiction, myth or fraud grafts their branch of descent on to the genealogical tree of this clan, see Categories 608 and 619.]

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Libyan Bedouin MT9

[For information on the role of the Arab "elite," groups of townsmen from Banghazi and Darna of mixed ethnic backgrounds, who functioned as administrators under Italian rule, see Category 563.]

121 sedentary, but the semi-autonomous nature of the lineage segments
114 is maintained to a large extent. The result of this is a de-
*613 emphasis of the "we-feeling" among the population of al-Qasr
[178] and an absence of "sense of community" (Easton 1965:332). By
[186] "community," I refer to a pattern of relatively intensive,
[571] face-to-face social relationships, and the values of solidarity
and common goals to which these give rise. The relationship
121 between lineage structure and territoriality was such that
*613 kinship segments within the same lineage unit might go days,
571 and even weeks, with no inter-communication, and the degree
of communication between separate lineage units of the tribe
was less intensive than this. Such a communication pattern
made observation difficult. The fact that Bedouin tribal
society relatively lacks the group ceremonial aspect compounded
the difficulty of gaining an overall perspective of structural
relations, and of witnessing the bases and nature of social
interaction outside the lineage structure. All of this
emerges from a communication structure and kinship structure
differentiated into corporate groups which "discourage close
participation of members in the social relations of the larger
society" (Wolf 1957:7).

121 The structural arrangement of al-Qasr was such that,
in plain language, not a great deal was happening in the
sociological sense. I say this about al-Qasr in comparison
[123] with, for instance, a full-blown village community. Consequently,
I observed from day to day that which I could,

175 with one move, the Caliph sent these Bedouins into battle in order to enforce authority in his western Berber provinces. This order set in motion the great "Hilali invasion." The tribesmen of Banu Hilal and Banu Sulaim literally slashed their way across eastern North Africa laying waste to towns and fields as they went (Ibn Khaldun 1925:29; Brockelmann 1939: 204).

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648 The Arab Bedouins recruited Berbers as they went, especially in Libya. Between the years 1052 and 1054, these marauding nomads sacked the rich agricultural lands of Tripolitania and Tunisia, lands which had been in production since the time of the Romans (Mahdi 1964:21). The Banu Sulaim, according to Ibn Khaldun (1925:136), concentrated their action in an area from Alexandria to Tripolitania. It was over this region, which includes Cyrenaica in eastern Libya, that they established their rule. Ibn Khaldun states that the two tribes agreed to divide the conquered territory between them, the eastern lands going to the Banu Sulaim and the western lands to the Banu
175 Hilal (1925:33-34). Such a division of territorial rights in
571 Arab Bedouin society is representative of a set of authority
182 relationships. Differentiation in the locus of authority,
*[613] whether it be horizontal or hierarchical, is a method of maintaining political order among segments of the lineage structure.

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619 Evans-Pritchard states that the Cyrenaican Bedouins are descendants of the Banu Sulaim and represent an admixture

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this number included pasturage for 11,000 sheep (Abu-Zeid n.d.: 19-27).

F.A.O. has encountered a number of serious problems and the program has received setbacks. The program, as an agent of social change, failed to take proper measure of the structural and ideological aspects of the Bedouin traditional system. Range improvement projects were carried out with disregard for existing tribal boundaries (the mintaqa) in the desert. In one case, the Bedouins removed fences on their property, and allowed sheep to destroy an entire experimental range area. Food distribution has fallen short because polygyny as a structural feature of marriage and the Bedouin family was not taken into account. The government estimated five persons per family, and planned to distribute food to 4,000 families. They were only able to subsidize 3,281 families. Aid officials failed to consider the strength of Bedouin values. To qualify for government aid, a Bedouin must belong to his local cooperative society. Some Bedouins wish to remain independent of government business, and others cannot afford the 50 piasters membership dues. A man may borrow money from another, of course, but in al-Qasr a "debt" is actually a particular kind of social relation which, like all others, carries with it a set of specific rights and obligations. A debt among Bedouins is a complex relationship: it may draw two parties together, or it may be, as it is with the Kachins of Burma (Leach 1954:153),

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● [571]

747 the basis of conflict. Bedouins may be unwilling to contract
177 such a potentially significant relationship for the 50 piasters
474 426 it takes to join the cooperative society. In yet another area,
●571 program administrators concerned with nutritional improvement
747 have ignored the culturally important areas of food preferences
177 and, more seriously, food prohibitions. The Bedouins, who
262 subsist mainly on their own animal products, barley bread, and
a few fresh vegetables, are extremely hesitant to accept what
they consider ritually "unclean meat from foreigners," powdered
milk, dried fish, and Kraft cheese. They are willing to
747 accept grain, flour, and the cottonseed cakes which are used
177 as fodder. In other words, the Bedouins seem to be presented
[178] with poor alternatives which may tend to reinforce choices
[433] related to the traditional productive organization, i.e.,
pastoralism. The exogenous stimuli to change are so culturally
objectionable that they actually generate conflict situations
and misunderstanding between agents and recipients of change.

747 Government programs have aimed at one aspect of
177 Bedouin society, the economic structure. They have ignored
433 the cultural underpinning of social organization, the system
of meanings in terms of which social action takes place
(Geertz 1957:32-54). The relationship between social and
economic behavior is, of course, an extremely important one.
But the economic structure cannot be transformed independently
of a specific cultural structure.

178 than they were in the past. These conditions reflect a change
423 in social and authority relations.

423 In the *'izba* sector of al-Qasr, as of 1964, there were
432 two cases of land purchase. In one case, land was sold to an
Egyptian, "an outsider" from the Nile Valley. This, of course,
could only occur where such a transaction would be upheld by
423 the Egyptian government. Land ownership, when it involves
registered land, is absolute. This, to a great extent, works
*[613] to lessen the influence of the lineage structure on property
423 relations. The law governing property, whether in traditional
178 or modern al-Qasr, reflects a set of social relationships.
•571 When an individual can own property in the absolute sense,
rather than with respect to his being a member of a group
which enjoys sovereign rights of ownership, then, there has
been a change in traditional corporate relations (Herskovits
[184] 1952:260). This has definitely been the case for most of
al-Qasr, and it is adumbrated in the southern sector where
a person's rights over land are nearly absolute. A compar-
423 ison of land tenure patterns on the coast and in the southern
184 region reflect not only the contrast between methods of land
use, but, also the fact that as land becomes valuable it
becomes scarce and land holdings become fragmented (compare
Figures 5 and 6).

428 When the head of a household dies, his eldest son
596 inherits his authority, but all of the sons share equally in

173 *613 619 597 that in those days it was important "to have men to go to war; Hajj 'Ali came from the Sinai with many men and wrote his name into the books of Lazumi." Today, in the Lazumi genealogy Hajj 'Ali's name appears as the brother of Taram, [114] both are claimed as sons of Mighawsiz. This kind of data is difficult to uncover and I may have missed gathering other cases of ideological kinship ties.

*613 [171] The specific unilinear principle which operates in al-Qasr is partrilineality, common to the Middle Eastern culture area. A corollary principle is the corporate group. *613 •571 Together, these two rules structure the social world of the individual and effectively define a range of social choices for him. The individual's social relations and social roles are relative to the rights and obligations of the people related to him through his father. In a sense, the social world for the individual in al-Qasr is his father's group and its network of relationships with other similar groups; he would not think of leaving this group of his own free will though, in reality, he could. The Bedouins believe [181] [829] that a man cannot be happy if he lives with strangers, i.e., outside his corporate group. This value holds up today to the extent that a man will expect his son to return to the desert even after his education as a merchant, a government clerk, or an army officer.

Structural differentiation in al-Qasr is not solely

*613 the result of the patrilineal principle even though it is
● 571 by far the most ideologically significant. Other principles lend structure to associative relationships which may or may not complement those established by the unilinear rule. It is the operation of these other principles which give complexity to the social and political organization of al-Qasr. They may be identified in terms of residence, cognation and social compacts, or the establishment of contractual relations above and beyond those defined by patrilineality. The force of these four structural principles constitute the range or the structural constraints within which individuals and groups in al-Qasr conduct their social relations. Specifically, we
*613 are not interested in all social relations. The main interest
571 here is in those relationships in which individuals or groups
121 struggle for control, or attempt to exercise power. Our interest is, then, the political aspect of social relations or, what Max Weber discussed in terms of, power and established authority (Bendix 1962:290-297).

*613 It is necessary to discuss the lineage system in al-
[121] Qasr because in a segmentary society, kinship and politics are analytical aspects of the same process. In the political structure of al-Qasr, we note first of all that the tertiary and secondary segments (see Figure 7 below) are the functionally significant units. Bait 'Umar, the tertiary segment diagramed in Figure 8 below, is typical: it is an autonomous political unit with a discernible authority structure and

*613 formal leadership. Ideologically, group solidarity at this
level is explained solely in terms of patrilineality; in
fact, local contiguity and explicit contractual ties are
*613 just as important. When we add to this the principle of
582 cognation in the form of the Bedouin preferred form of
marriage, parallel-cousin marriage, the resulting structure
is what Emrys Peters (1965) has called "the corporate group
[183] par excellence." But, as we shall see later, father's
brother's daughter-marriage is more of a cultural ideal than
it is a social reality in al-Qasr.

*613 The interplay of kinship, residence and contract ties
554 defines a corporate structure of authority and also informs
•571 an external system of authority relations including all who
claim,descent from 'Ali 'Aqar, son of the mythological Sa'ada.
The feeling of "corporateness," and the concomitant structural
demands upon the individual changes as the scope of political
action widens. This degree of corporate feeling is related
to the structural differentiation between what has been inter-
preted as "domestic relations based on kinship and descent"
and "the field of political relations" (Fortes 1953:26). In
121 this study, I maintain that both the internal and the external
*613
554 systems of relations are "political" since power and legitimate
571 authority are exercized in both. Therefore, rather than use
the terms "domestic" and "political," I shall refer to the
internal system of political relations and the external system

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●571 of political relations. The structural differentiation between them relates to certain specifics of role differentiation and articulation, and corporate goals. Different roles function differently in different spheres of politics. This is clear when we consider that the two structural aspects of corporate group politics serve the double purpose of insuring local autonomy while promoting integration into the larger lineage segments. This I will cover more thoroughly in the next chapter. Most of the discussion here deals with social structure and, in particular, the internal elements of the corporate group.

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619 In the total societal context, the tertiary segment is pivotal for the conceptualization of two models: the Bedouin's model of his tribal system, and the observer's model of a segmentary lineage system. Both of these constructs are shown in Figure 7.[1] Both genealogical models can be completed by the addition of Figures 2, 3, and 8, extending the systems both horizontally and vertically.

Theoretically, all of the levels of the Awlad 'Ali tribal system constitute a political community, i.e., the various segments shown in Figure 3 regulate and maintain relations with each other through complementary opposition (Fallers 1963). But in fact, political action of any functional significance rarely occurs beyond the secondary lineage level. In terms of the structural principles, agnation, real or

[1], [See p. 77--Analyst]

619 the bureaucratic principle. Here we are concerned with the
177 traditional situation.
[121]

The 'Aishaibi Bedouins of al-Qasr are a residence
619 group. Each sub-group of the tribe, i.e., the secondary and
*613 tertiary units, is assigned their own territory (mintaqa).
•571 Kinship and residence are the primary determinants of group
differentiation; agnates who dwell together represent
concrete authority structures, or political groups. This
follows from the fact that patterns of political action, or
what we call political structures, most often deal with the
exercise of legitimate authority--as opposed to power. Power
relations do occur and when present complicate the situation.
In al-Qasr, power relations and structures emerge when the
principle of cognation or contracted alliance form groups
which crosscut the effectiveness of local, agnatic political
structures. But, in al-Qasr, as in most societies, political
action usually takes the form of the exercise of authority
(Southall 1965:120).

173 The genealogical map as an idological charter argues
114 against the formation of power relations. Genealogical re-
*613 lations represent a set of social relations each replete with
571 definite rights and obligations. Fallers (1956) has noted
the tendency in segmentary lineage societies to cast all
*613 authority relations in a unilinear genealogical mould. The
829 Bedouin visualize their world, extending from Alexandria to
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*613 829 173 ●571 Libya, as a territorially segmented one corresponding to the lineage divisions of the tribe. They say that every Bedouin knows the owner of each centimeter of this world. Not only does the genealogy represent a set of property relations, it also represents and upholds a set of authority relations. In *613 173 571 Cyrenaica also (Peters 1960), the Bedouin genealogical map corresponds to the distribution of groups on the ground. Kinship relations as social relations in Bedouin society may be properly interpreted as property relations between groups. Property relations as part of the Bedouin world view are an essential premise upon which the social and political order rests, although it is not the only premise.

619 *613 The 'Aishaibat are identified with the al-Qasr portion of the Awlad 'Ali homeland. The 'Aishaibi segments are separate and contiguous on the ground. Figure 3a[1] shows the correspondence between the 'Aishaibi genealogical and territorial divisions at the secondary lineage level of segmentation.

121 *613 That kinship as an organizing principle in segmentary societies cannot be considered apart from local contiguity is an old and well-known fact. Sir Henry Maine (1917:76-79) in analyzing the evolution of "political ideas" noted the interrelationship between "the principle of local contiguity" and the central principle of the "connexion in blood," how they combine to become "the condition of community in political

[1] [See p. 66--Analyst]

619 *613 study of the whole Western Desert, or in an analysis of contemporary politics in Marsa Matruh.

The Bedouins of al-Qasr are, in this study, the 'Aishaibat of the 'Ali Ahmar of the Awlad 'Ali tribe. The
[171] Bedouin tribal unit throughout the Middle East is described as a segmentary lineage system. Something of the meaning of this concept has already been made clear in our discussion of the structural principles of Bedouin society. This type
[114] of society has been adequately analyzed by Evans-Pritchard (1940), Fortes (1945 and 1949), Smith (1956), Middleton and Tait (1958), and Peters (1960). My own ideas about the segmentary lineage society as it functions in al-Qasr derive from these sources.

*613 Politically, the 'Aishaibat of al-Qasr are a stateless
•571 society; they have no centralized political institution. The
[642] lineage system is the structural framework for social and political relations. The basis of government, i.e., the regulation of authority relations, is the balanced protraction of corporate groups which support institutional uniformities in the form of similar organization, ideology and procedure (Smith 1956). Although the various groupings of the segmentary system can be analytically identified, and each grouping thinks of itself as a distinct group, in actuality, it is difficult to define the groups because of the way in which each fuses into lesser or greater differentiated units in one

*613 situation or another (Middleton and Tait 1958:11). The most
•571 effective approach to understanding the segmentary society,
121 in view of this dynamic situation, is to isolate the function-
*613 ally significant unit and to analyze its social and political
571 relations (Fortes 1945). This is what I attempted to do in my study of the 'Aishaibat of al-Qasr.

*613 In al-Qasr, the secondary segment, i.e., 'Ailit Ma'fas, is the basic unit of the social structure. This statement must be qualified seeing that this unit consists of a balanced opposition of smaller tertiary segments, and action at the secondary level is a resultant of political consensus at the tertiary level. However, the ties which emerge from descent, residence, marriage, and contract are highly moral and utilitarian ones; with reference to tribal politics, we can state that corporate action is consensual and most functional at the secondary segment level. We may consider this group, in terms of two levels of corporateness, the basic unit of 'Aishaibat political structure.

*613 All of the segmentary groups of the 'Aishaibat are
619 bound together by the same patrilineal principle; they all trace descent to 'Ali the son of Sa'ada. This principle also links them to the "noble tribes" of Cyrenaica who claim descent from this same ancestress. This principle is the genealogical and ideological basis of a man's claiming to be "Sa'adi," or "Awlad 'Ali," or "Aishaibi," etc. In theory,

196 only from area to area but also from person to person.

121 In terms of the Bedouin social structure, it is useful
*613 to discuss politics as a set of authority relations operating
•571 in a problem-solving situation. This operation takes place at all levels of the lineage system with the exception of the sub-tertiary group; below the tertiary group level authority is purely a function of certain kinship roles. Since we cannot analytically separate the political aspect of the role "family head" from the moral aspect of the role "father," it seems best to designate this type of authority as being something distinct from political authority. We will call this type of authority either "familial" or "domestic," and "political authority" will be considered to exist in cases where there is some degree of role specialization and role differentiation with respect to decision-making and problem-solving. As I conceptualize it, then, the tertiary group is a political group because it is structurally identified with a corporate office, or institutionalized role of leadership. At the end
[128] of this chapter, and in the next chapter, I will elaborate on this because it is a focal point of the study.

121 Structural principles designed to promote integration
571 in a society also shed light on the degree of coercion and
181 conflict in social "organization." Individuals and groups in society have interests and values which they seek to maximize in the face of competition and opposition from other individ-

121 uals and groups. Radcliffe-Brown (1952:199) spoke of social
571 relations existing where there was "some adjustment of
181 respective interests, by convergence of interest, or by limitation of conflicts that might arise from divergence of interests." When a person or group has an interest in an object, material or immaterial, that object has a certain value for the person or group. Thus does the study of social structure become, for Radcliffe-Brown, "the study of interests and values as the determinants of social relations." Convergence of interests side by side with a divergence of interests characterizes any society, and all societies are segmented on one basis or
121 another. I have found it enlightening to consider the seg-
571 ments of al-Qasr Bedouin society as "interest groups." Interest groups are the real groups which one can observe in either integration or conflict. They are real in the sense that their behavior can be observed. They are real in that they can be defined by a stable pattern of authority relations whereas other groups are non-existent in this sense. The tertiary group and the secondary group, in so far as it is a coordination of replicate corporate groups, are real groups in al-Qasr whereas the primary and tribal levels are theoretical or quasi-groups. That is, they are only potentially interest groups, seeing that, for the time being, they lack the common interests and coordinated activity to be classified as an authority, or political, or interest group.

Familial Authority and Rights and Duties in Kin Relations

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The analysis of authority structure, whether it has reference to a group as small as the family or as large as the nation, assumes as its unit of study the social position or the role. The role is the organized complex of rights and duties by which individuals, or categories of individuals, participate in an interactive process. Roles are linked together into a set, or a structure, by the rights which incumbents claim and the duties they fulfill (Linton 1936:113; Parsons and Shils 1951:23; Gluckman 1963:185). The heuristic value of role analysis is well established. Role theory has been referred to as "the highest level of generalization about social phenomena that has yet become in any sense operational (Southall 1959:17).

Since all social roles possess rights and duties just because they are defined with respect to other roles, we may assume that each and every social role has an authoritative aspect to it. The authoritative aspect of roles refers to the way in which authority positions relate in order to give form to an authority structure. We want to know how the authority positions at all levels of the authority structure function, but for the time being we are concerned with familial authority relations. Until we understand the operation of authority at the familial level, which is the source of legitimate political authority in a kin-based

121 571 554 moral community, we cannot proceed to a discussion of the internal and external systems of political relations.

577 181 [867] As a result of the socialization process, and through relations with other members of the family, an individual comes to recognize that his conduct is measurable by certain standards of, what is considered by the group to be, good and bad, right and wrong. In al-Qasr, such standards are intrinsically correct, or "decent" as the Bedouins say; obedience to the authority representing these standards is interpreted as a "duty." [596] The authoritative aspect of the role of household head (shaib al-bait), and the moral obligations which it represents, emerge from and reinforce values and structural arrangements central to Bedouin social order, namely, respect for authority and devotion to social groups, the two basic elements of morality defined by Durkheim (Parsons 1937:382-385).

577 571 181 182 The value placed upon social order, and the structural mechanisms for insuring its realization and extension--kinship, residence and contract--inform an authority structure which ranges between filial piety at the family level and a set of legal norms at the level of the external political system. The fact that the Bedouins of al-Qasr are interested in integrating a larger population into their authority structure means that a common value is operative in the range of it; also that one sphere of authority will tend to merge into another. [593] [671] Hence the father-son authority relation has importance for the strength of Bedouin customary law in the desert. The

577 571 181 182 high value placed upon conformity to rules governing authority relations makes Bedouin society of al-Qasr less individualistic than, for instance, the Iatmul of New Guinea who "set no exaggerated value upon extremely orderly behavior" (Bateson 1958:31). Social cohesion in al-Qasr is sustained through what Durkheim called "mechanical solidarity."

593 The Bedouin father is in a disciplinary position over his washuun, his wife (wives) and his children. (The word, washuun, must be of Berber origin for I am unable to trace it in Arabic.) Although the father has the right to beat his washuun, the Bedouins say that he does so "only in rare cases, when it is necessary." During my time in the field I heard of no physical punishment being dealt out by a father.

The dyadic relationship of father and son roles is the focal field of authority in the family. The pattern of behavior in this relationship is marked typically by restraint on the part of the son. The father orders and the son obeys unquestioningly. If the father accidentally uses a taboo [192] word, such as 'ammar which in standard Arabic means "to fill" but in the Bedouin dialect means "to have sexual intercourse," the son will immediately depart the scene in a high state of embarrassment. In this way, the boy is not only excluded [561] from gatherings and activities in which his father participates, but he is also made to maintain a respectable social distance from his father's age-set. There are other ways of

582 [584] she could marry no man.

582 578 Most of the older Bedouins say that bint 'amm marriage as it is practiced in the desert is an evil, that it causes nothing but trouble. They say that if there are bad feelings between two men they will place claims upon each other's sister with the intention of preventing the girls from ever marrying. The younger Bedouins say that "it is better to marry the bint 'amm than to let a stranger take her." The [182] [571] [586] claim on the bint 'amm, of course, should be seen as a basis for social relationships between groups, regardless of any conflict it may or may not lead to. This is why the Bedouins say that a man "will never divorce his bint 'amm, because if he does that means that she is no good." It follows, then, that if "she is no good" none of her other paternal cousins will marry her. Implicit here is the reference to the making [182] and breaking of group ties. Similarly, to regulate and to maximize kinship ties, a man can claim only one of his father's brother's daughters. In the case where there is only one bint 'amm, her eldest cousin has first claim to her. 582 578 159 This sometimes causes conflict between brothers as the following informant's story indicates.

> The father of Salih and Aziz was dead which meant that Aziz, being the elder, would have to furnish the brideprice if Salih were to marry first. In fact, Salih wanted to marry his bint 'amm. Aziz refused him permission to do so: Aziz had first claim to the bint 'amm, and, also, he thought that the brideprice which

585 [684] probably by pricking himself, and will wipe it on the toga.

585 About two weeks after the wedding, the bride and
606 groom take a lamb or a goat and go to spend a few days with
[574] the bride's parents. The Bedouin say that the relationship
between the groom and his in-laws is extremely important.
The man should treat his wife's mother and father as if they
were his own. "When a man's father-in-law and mother-in-law
come to visit him, he must slaughter a lamb for them. He
must respect both of them. Remember, this man and woman are
the grandparents of his children."

585 The marriage, then, is only the first step in the
•571 ritualization of new group bonds established between the
182 families of the bride and groom. Bonds are subsequently in-
[574] tensified through a process of visitation, gift-exchange and
[431] [782] sacrifice. The most important factor linking the two groups
*[613] is the actual presence of the bride in the midst of her hus-
band's group, for she remains, in terms of the patrilineal
585 principle, a member of her father's lineage. This is made
*613 perfectly clear by the fact that she is referred to, never
551 by her name but, by the name of her tribal grouping if she is
571 other than 'Aishaibi. If she is of the 'Aishaibat tribe,
182 she will be referred to as bint of so-and-so. Hence the
[193] Bedouins stress the importance of extra-group bonds by re-
ferring to the women in their residence group as al-Qinaishiyya
or al-Kamailiyya, for instance (-iyya is the Arabic feminine
marker).

182 marker).

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[585]

In al-Qasr, if a man's mother is 'Aishaibiiya, he will refer to her as ummi ("my mother"): if she is otherwise, he will refer to her by the tribal tag, i.e. al-Qinaishiyya. A man will also add the name of his mother's tribe, to identify himself with the tribe and to symbolize tribal links, as an appendage to his own full name. The use of the maternal appendage by an individual links him to his mother's tribe through the idea of what Peters (1960:29) has called "the concept of the one womb of maternal origin."

In the case of al-Qasr, this maternal appendage refers to links with the mother's tribe at the primary level (see Figure 9). For instance, two brothers of the Bait Abd al-Malik might wish to differentiate between their maternal origins for some reason or other; one would refer to himself as Yunis Abd al-Malik al-Kamailiyya and, the other as Jabril Abd al-Malik al-Qinaishiyya. This is shown in Figure 9, page 125.

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[182]

Although a person is obviously related to the mother's tribe through the mother, this matrilateral structural relationship is expressed as one between the individual and his mother's brother's tribe. The set of relationships surrounding the sister's son-mother's brother dyad is central to Bedouin political organization; it is the basis for the formation of relations of alliance along cognatic lines.

FIGURE 9 — USE OF MATERNAL APPENDAGE OR SUFFIX

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
WIFE FROM KAMAILAT TRIBE
ABD AL-MALIK
WIFE FROM QINAISHAT TRIBE
YUNIS ABD AL-MALIK AL-KAMAILIYYA
JABRIL ABD AL-MALIK AL-QINAISHIYYA

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The sister's son-mother's brother relationship receives a high degree of attention in al-Qasr. No other kinship relationship except for that between the father and the son is better defined. Peters (1965:135) sees the importance of the sister's son-mother's brother relationship to be based on the need for economic symbiosis. This factor, but also the necessity for political cooperation, probably account for the central significance of this relationship. One chief political value, i.e., one type of behavior valued by the group and relevant to the political process (see LeVine 1960), which Bedouin children learn relates to the desire to avoid conflict, especially if it concerns their mothers' tribes. Children are taught that any quarrel, however slight at first, could conceivably grow to become a large-scale tribal war.

[181]
[867]
[865]

The Corporate Group

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*613 Two key concepts have derived from Radcliffe-Brown's (1952:32-49) notion of kinship as a reflection of juridicial relations. Fallers (1956:14), discussing the expression of these concepts in segmentary societies, refers to them as "the lineage principle and its corollary, the corporate lineage group." For Radcliffe-Brown, kinship organization represented social order and this was the basis of societal survival: a social system in order to survive must conform to certain conditions.
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•571 Adaptive mechanisms, expressed through the institutions of a society, consist of a "network of relations between individuals and groups" (1952:43). These social relations represent a collection of rights and implied duties which reside either with an individual or a group. Though reference is made to the place of the individual in society, the idea of the group is central in the theory of Radcliffe-Brown.

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621 Most important is the group referred to as "corporation:" a collectivity of individuals "who jointly exercise some right or rights," and who share common interests deriving from residence and kinship (1952:45). The corporation has rights in rem over its members; thus, the group imposes certain duties and obligations on other persons with respect to the rights of a particular person who is a member of the corporation. The law of blood-revenge is seen by Radcliffe-Brown to bring out

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this aspect of the corporation clearly.

The concept of the corporation as a sociological construct was first used by Maine (1904). The concept was a central one in the work of Max Weber (1947; 1954). As it was used by Maine, and later by Radcliffe-Brown, the corporation as a collection of rights and duties functioned primarily to maintain struetural continuity in society. Weber was concerned mainly with the political aspects of the corporation; this follows from his theoretical and empirical focus on political action and the exercise of authority. The two main elements of the corporate group as a social relationship according to Weber are that it is limited and defined by rules of admission, and that the administration of the group is carried out by functionaries, incumbents of political roles. An explicit structure of authority is the key to Weber's concept of corporate group: "Whether or not a corporate group exists is entirely a matter of the presence of a person in authority, with or without an administration staff" (1947: 145-146). Weber did differentiate analytically the corporate group from the other concept, first defined by Maine (1907: 108-110), the "Corporation sole" or "Public officer." However, he insisted that one could not exist without the other. Any analysis of the structure of authority in society must focus on both of these concepts.

The conditions for the formation of a corporate group

121 are, as Radcliffe-Brown correctly stated, the existence of
602 kinship ties and common residence. But, as Weber noted, the
571 expression of corporation is absent without a structure of
621 authority. The corporate authority structure functions to allot group membership and political status; to formulate and enforce a rule of succession governing the transmission of property and roles; and to define and assign rights and duties of group members toward others. Group rights over members, as rights _in rem_, produce mutual rights for members which entitle them to protection against external enemies. Hence the corporate group is characterized by internal functions which define and control relationships between members, and external functions which identify the group within a given structural context where it has jurisdiction and governs its relations with other elements in this environment. Within this context, the corporate group is representative of any individual member. Both the internal and external functional aspects of the corporate group operate through the office of a specialized role whose incumbent has authoritative and representative powers. This is the role, or office, which Maine referred to as the "Corporation sole," and which Weber later called the _Leiter_ ("chief").

*613 In al-Qasr, the corporate lineage group is composed
621 of agnates who reside together in a _mintaqa_, and who accept
571 as legitimate and morally binding an explicit process of

*613 621 •571 decision-making which allocates values in society. This process orders the internal and external political relations of corporation members. The corporate office which acts to regulate internal affairs, and to represent the group in external affairs is a unique status in al-Qasr having only one incumbent at a time. In Bedouin society, then, the corporation is to be considered distinct from the corporate sole (Smith 1966).

621 626 571 [183] The corporate group, although based on common interests and values, is not an integrated body simply in terms of consensus. Coercion also maintains corporate relationships. Consensus derives from the code of the group (Nadel 1951: 161), a set of common ideals. But in practice, the group must exert coercive pressures, sanctions, against individual behavior which threatens the welfare of the collectivity. Coercion may be seen as a necessary condition for what Durkheim called "mechanical solidarity." In al-Qasr, as in most societies, the desire for conformity to norms predicates coercive measures; coercion and consensus derive from the same cause, i.e., the requirement of some degree of integration. 621 571 182 [121] The corporate group and its authority structure is the mechanism which insures, through political means, the necessary degree of integration for the survival of al-Qasr society. In order to understand the phenomenon of social change occurring in al-Qasr, politics as an aspect of culture

621 should be thought of as an adaptive mechanism. This will help
571 us to understand two structural features of the Bedouin politi-
182 cal system: the establishment of cognatic alliances and the
121 differentiation of political roles. In tradition and modernity,
the integration and the survival of the Bedouin social system
have depended upon the proliferation of these features.

121 It is quite obvious that "a corporation can only form
621 itself on the basis of a common interest" (Radcliffe-Brown
571 1952:45); that any social relationship, or political group
[626] is characterized by both "pragmatic contents" and "moral
aspects;" and that "political sentiments" as part of the
group's moral and legal norms are enforcible by secular
sanctions brought to bear on individuals or groups (Fortes
121 and Evans-Pritchard 1940:20). But the discovery of what
underlies a "common interest," "moral aspect," and "political
sentiment" is a subtle problem which varies from culture to
culture. It deals with what Weber referred to as "problems
of meaning," and ultimately, the legitimation of the normative
system. What makes morality and sentiments meaningful and
sanctions legitimate is a value, a connecting element between
the social and cultural systems, "the constitutive symbolism
which grounds the identity and solidarity of the community"
(Parsons 1966:17). It is unlikely that such a value will
ever be obvious, no matter how essential it is, because

> 121 a tradition is not a mere observed fact like an existing custom . . .; it is an idea which expresses a value judgment. A certain way of acting is regarded as right; a certain order or arrangement is held desirable. The maintenance of the tradition is the assertion of this judgment (Radin 1935:63).

121 For al-Qasr, I have traced social ideas, social action,
181 and social order to a central traditional value which promotes
621 group consciousness, solidarity, and corporateness. Such a
571 value does not derive from Islam, for Bedouin tradition
171 preceded Islamic tradition, and much of the latter derives
from the former. According to Robertson Smith (1903:26-62), the structurally significant unit in pre-Islamic Arabia was the hayy: "a collection of people of the same blood" who lived together and fought together. But, that which actually bound the members with a sense of corporateness to the hayy was the law of blood-revenge. For Smith, the key element in the Bedouin corporate group was the existence of a covenant of blood responsibility. The group was bound by a compact of mutual responsibility, the group had rights in rem over its members, and within the group there could be no blood-feud. Around this idea of mutual responsibility revolve the traditional values which are the basis of corporate grouping in Bedouin society: "The greater part of the traditions of the Arabs turns on blood-revenge and war . . ." (Smith 1903:26).

Smith developed his analysis of Arabian society in terms of certain structural principles: patrilineal ideology,

121 residence, cognatic ties, and contractual relations are all
181 seen to be structurally important in early Arabian society.
621 571 Structural differentiation into groups is based on the
171 lineage principle and sustained through "the law of blood-revenge." And it is important to note that the *hayy* was characterized by a structure of authority, it was "guided in war and on the march by one chief" (Smith 1903:44). The
121 law of blood-revenge as an expression of group rights *in rem*
621 and a system of mutual protection point up the importance of
571 contractual relations in Bedouin society. Whether or not
675 real blood ties are involved, a contract must be present or there can be no corporate group. Contract legitimizes authority and provides the basis for the lateral extension of the group; it is primary though it functions coordinately with a principle of cognation, residence, adoption, etc. Contractual ties
121 operate outside of kinship at times but will always be validated
621 by it eventually, "for a legal fiction is always adopted to
571 675 reconcile an act with a principle too firmly established to
608 be simply ignored" (Smith 1903:62). "Blood brothers," in
597 al-Qasr, are defined both biologically and ideologically. As
[602] noted in the case of al-Qasr, there were at least three cases of contractual adoption in which one individual and two whole corporate groups "wrote their names into the books of the 'Aishaibat tribe" (*katab jinnsiyya 'Aishaibiyya*). The integration or adoption of elements in al-Qasr takes place on the

121 basis of an agreement "to share the good and the bad" by
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571 all parties concerned. Once the integration is effected,
675 patrilineal ideology and legal fiction succeed in concealing
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597 the jointure.

The concept which derives from ancient Arabia, and
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571 which expresses fully the structural principles of Bedouin
*613 society is that of _'aqila_. The _'aqila_, in al-Qasr, is the
head of the corporate group, the tertiary unit or _bait_. A
[884] person becomes part of the Bedouin jural body when he reaches
the age of 15, begins to keep the Ramadan fast, and is expected
to pay his share of the blood-money. At this time, a man
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571 acquires rights over his corporate lineage-mates and they
*613 over him: they claim a share in the indemnity ("blood-
672 money" - _diiya_) of each other, and are under obligation to
[682] contribute equal shares to any _diiya_ which becomes due from
the group as a whole. Further, each corporate member is morally bound to support his lineage-mates by swearing the oath (_yamiin_) on the behalf of any who are accused of falsehoods in the course of litigation. All of these rights and obligations are guaranteed by the presence of an _'aqila_.

*613 The tertiary _bait_ is the minimal corporate group. It usually includes three to five generations of members. Tertiary units which are descended from a common ancestor combine through contractual relations into the maximal corporate group, the secondary unit or _'aiela_. Beyond the secondary level

*613 (Schacht 1953:207).

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So, in pre-Islamic Arabia and later, the _'aqila_ and not the culprit was responsible for payment of the _diya_ or for retaliation. And the _'aqila_, which means every single corporate member, risked its life in the face of retaliation from without. According to Islamic law, only the killer may be retaliated upon. But in pre-Islamic Arabia and in al-Qasr, any member of the killer's corporate group may be revenged upon. The Bedouins say that revenge should be taken upon the best man of the family, for this will cause the most damage. Both the legal schools of Madina (Maliki) and Kufa recognized the principle of self-help, or collective responsibility, for payment or retaliation in cases of homicide and wounding. And, according to Coulson (1964:49), "they both called the group which shoulders the burden the _'aqila_."

*613 The _'aqila_ in al-Qasr, which is an uncentralized system, is a corporate sole and a political office. It functions both in internal domestic (i.e. within the tertiary segment) authority relations, and at the level of external authority relations. The _'aqila_ is a symbol of his corporation and, as such, speaks for its members in matters of social regulation and the enforcement of political decisions growing out of conflict situations. Political order in al-Qasr depends

[591] upon the values inculcated and the type of authority exercised within the corporate group (Southall 1956:27). The model of

571 *613 [593] [604] The model of corporate authority structure, i.e., that which makes the corporation-corporate sole relationship meaningful, is the father-son-father's brother triad. The submission of the son in the fundamental dyadic and triadic relationships of Bedouin society is carried over to the, just as axiomatic, relationship between corporate member and corporate sole. Peters (1965:127) is enlightening on this point when he says

> [593] All men of a corporation, in any event, "speak with one word" at a moot, and a son, by his assent to the common view, also supports his father; in so doing he yields to the political authority of his corporation, and not that of his father.

The structure of authority relations which obtains within and between the groups of al-Qasr, then, is reflected in the idea or concept of _'aqila_. It is meaningful to the Bedouins. The social order which it represents is legitimate because of the moral attribute and obligation which attaches to its symbolization in the political office. At the same time, this focus or office of authority tends to become pivotal for the extension of a sphere of moral judgments and authority relations along with the expansion of social structural relations and promotion of common interests. Easton (1959) has referred to this expansion as "the political community," and Middleton and Tait (1958) as "the jural community." At all levels of society, conflict and consensus take place in terms of certain ideas concerning good and bad, operational

*613 concepts of what is desirable and undesirable. "Every structural
*571 arrangement," Raymond Firth has said, "has its moral
attributes of obligation" (1961:212). This is most essential
in an uncentralized system, such as that of al-Qasr, where
no institutions exist outside of the corporate group for the
introduction of new principles of organization and association.

181 Among the Bedouins, the conceptualization of an authority
578 structure in the role of *'aqila* relates to the high value which
577 they place upon a peaceful and orderly world. Children in al-
*[613] Qasr are taught that one of their serious duties in life is
[571] to mediate conflicts, especially, when they are potentially
[554] situations which may lead to protracted conflict. And, in a
segmentary society where a member's status links him to many
different groups in differing degrees of importance, all
quarrels are potential group wars. The Bedouin child knows
that his elders, and God, want him to follow "the path of the
good" (*tariiq al-khair*). Mainly, this involves helping others
to follow "the path of the good" by "bringing them back together"
when they are in conflict. When two individuals
quarrel and refuse to return to "the path of the good," this
brings *'aib* ("shame") to each of the persons. When two in-
*[613] dividuals quarrel, setting off a group conflict, this brings
'ar ("shame") to the respective corporate groups of the in-
[626] dividuals (Abou-Zeid 1966). Against individuals who persist
[784] in the ways which cause *'aib* to himself, or *'ar* to his group,

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578 certain sanctions of both a secular and sacred nature may be
577 imposed: expulsion from the group and the curse of God are
626 ultimate coercive interventions in the process of conflict
784 regulation.

*613 The role of _'aqila_ presents the corporate group as
181 "one person" in opposition to other similarly defined groups.
182 Thus, Fortes says (1953:25), "the way a lineage system works
*• 571 depends on the kind of legal institutions found in the society," and this is a function of its political organization. The Bedouin political organization is characterized by two aspects: the internal political system, and the external political system. Both systems are regulated by the same values and norms. Authority relations within the corporate level are founded on values inculcated in the socialization process, and prescribe political behavior for all who come under the jurisdiction of the respective _'aqila_. Authority relations outside the corporate level are conducted through the _'aqila_. This political role as a functional part of the lineage structure operates in terms of kinship values; politics at the external level are characterized by no new principles.

*613 Politics in al-Qasr, and elsewhere for that matter, is
571 a process of problem-solving and conflict regulation between
182 individuals and groups. Political action occurs at different levels of the lineage structure, and each is demarcated as a focus or sphere of authority. But all authority stems from

*613 •571 182 the central value and traditional institution of _'aqila_ which has always existed and is still binding. All authority is referable in some way and in varying degrees to the office of _'aqila_ which alone represents "the legitimate exercise of imperative control" (Weber 1947:153). Because private interests clash with the duties and obligations of social roles and corporate interests, political action, or the exercise of authority and the regulation of conflict, may be assigned to levels of
128 the social structure and analyzed in this way. In this chapter we have discussed the social structure of al-Qasr, and have touched on what gives structure and meaning to political action. We have seen that the structure of authority operating through the office of _'aqila_ deals with both an internal and an external system of political relations, a corporate group and a societal unit. The purpose of the following discussion will be to make clear some of the abstractions and concepts used here in outlinging structure and authority in Bedouin society.

CHAPTER IV

THE STRUCTURE OF AUTHORITY

The 'Aqila as a Political Role

*613 554 [596] The role of _'aqila_ is the single specialized role in Bedouin political organization. Although it is possible to differentiate another authority role, that of the _shaib_ (elder), this role is primarily a kinship role and in this sense is not an institutionalized political complex of rights and obligations. The _'aqila_ represents a unique political status in al-Qasr having one incumbent at a time: "The present incumbent is merely a link in a chain of indefinite extent, the temporary custodian of all the properties, powers and privileges which constitute the office" (Smith 1966;117).

*613 554 •571 The role of _'aqila_ is instituted at the tertiary structural level of the lineage system. In theory, each tertiary _bait_ has its own _'aqila_. But, in fact, not every tertiary segment is large enough and, therefore, powerful enough to constitute an authority group in the political [128] structure of the lineage. In the next section, we will draw a distinction between authority groups and tertiary groups. The _'aqila_ acts alone in juridical matters concerning his own

*613 segment. He acts in concert with other _'awaaqil_ (plural of
554 _'aqila_) of the tertiary segments of his secondary group when
•571 lineage matters call for decision-making at this level.
*613 Tertiary segments are replicate groups descended from one
571 ancestor, they operate with a common ideology pursuant of
183 common interests and goals. As we shall see, this common
675 ideology is expressed in a kind of code, or contract, which
all members of the group swear to uphold and abide by according
to the principle of blood responsibility. Tertiary codes in
[181] al-Qasr are a reflection and an affirmation of a wider system
of values and norms which bind the Bedouins of the Western
Desert together into a political system. This wider normative
[671] system is expressed in the customary legal system of the
Bedouins known as _'awaiyid Awlad 'Ali_ ("the customs of the
Awlad 'Ali tribe").

*613 The primary duty attached to the office of _'aqila_ is
578 the regulation of conflict. It is worth noting here that
571 conflict regulation is not equivalent to conflict resolution.
554 The latter process carries with it the intimation that the
causes of conflict have been treated and resolved, that conflict has been eliminated. Nothing could be further from the truth in a segmentary society where the various segments actually constitute conflict groups; consequently, conflict between groups or individuals who represent groups may be contained but never forgotten. Conflict is an ongoing process among

*613 578 the Bedouins. Conflict regulation treats the expressions of
•571 social conflict and not its causes.

554 The *'aqila* regulates conflict between the members of
his tertiary segment, between this group and the other groups
of the secondary unit, and between secondary units of the
tribe. He operates in both the internal and external systems
*613 of authority relations. The *'aqila* may pre-empt the authority
578 of the *shaib* in the sphere of familial authority, though, the
593 Bedouins say, this seldom happens because the son is willing
554 [596] to obey his father. Having been reared in the culture, and
as a future father himself, the son supports the respect-
*613 discipline principle of Bedouin society. But in extreme cases,
578 such as the threat of a father to disown his son, the explicit
593 approval of the *'aqila*, and of all the *'awaaqil* of the secondary
428 corporate group, is necessary. This is the procedure in all
554 cases of banishment. In one case (which I document below), a
man disinherited his younger brother with the formal approval
of his *'awaaqil*.

*613 The tertiary group in Bedouin society is by definition
682 the blood-vengence group. However, in view of the common
578 values and pragmatic interests of its members, the secondary
[181] group fulfills this function. Traditionally, when revenge
[681] killings were carried out according to the *lex talionis*, it
was usually at the hand of some member of the victim's tertiary
group. In the case of protracted conflict, such as extended

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●[571] Each member of the corporate group contributes an equal share to the blood-money due in a compensation case. The blood-price for intentional killing is presently set at 400 L.E. In the olden days, the blood-price was 100 camels. If a man had no camels, he was expected to contribute his share in cash, the value to be assessed at current market prices. Eventually, cash came to replace camels altogether in [231] the exchange of blood-money. This reflects the growing unimportance of the camel in the Western Desert. Today, there [556] is only one man in al-Qasr who may be considered a "camel owner," and he is the richest man in the area. Since at least 1935 the blood-price has been met with cash.

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571 When it has been decided that the right of blood-revenge as a retaliatory measure is to be waived, the _'aqila_ must go to each member of the group for his share of the blood-money. Each _'aqila_ of the secondary group does this, and together their collections make up the 400 L.E. blood price. For instance, if there happens to be 400 men in a secondary lineage group, then the share which each contributes will be 1 L.E. The _'aqila_ must account for his own group's share even if this means making up deficiencies from his own pocket. It is for this reason that the _'aqila_ "should be rich." Though the _'awaaqil_ of al-Qasr are generally members of the "status group," this is not always the case. Hussain, the man destined to become the _'aqila_ of Bait Braik, was comparatively poor. He admitted to this fact, and said that for this reason he was reluctant to become an _'aqila_: "The _'aqila_ is responsible for his _bait_.

*613 He must pay the diiya with the shares which he collects from
682 the others. It makes no difference if the 'aqila must pay
554 with his own money. He is responsible for this matter before
•571 the whole tribe."

*613 The collection of the diiya is only one aspect of the
554 process of conflict regulation, but it stands out as the funda-
682 mental manifestation of the office of 'aqila. In the course
[692] of office, an 'aqila will spend much more time arbitrating
disputes, but it is his responsibility concerning blood-money
which defines his position and his jurisdiction as corporate
682 ones. During the present period in al-Qasr, the practice of
178 blood-revenge has all but disappeared as a mechanism of social
[626] control. Nevertheless, the possibility of its happening is
not too remote. The payment of blood-money is the alternative
[619] to blood-revenge, and blood-revenge is a condition for all-out
[721] tribal warfare--something which the Bedouins look upon with
[829] horror. One informant once likened a primary-level war between
the 'Aishaibat and the Kamailat (should it ever occur) to
*613 "the end of the world." The 'aqila as a representative of a
682 group can prevent war by preventing reciprocal homicides: by
554 presenting his share of the blood-money he regulates conflict
578 and promotes integration. The blood-money is usually paid
over a period of from one to two years. In this case, the
[571] notion of "debt" represents a contingent, institutionalized
social relationship for the purpose of maintaining political
order.

> 691 between me and my cousins, according to Bedouin law
> 692 (*yinafth al-'awaiyid bainaana*). I went to the *shaikh*
> *613 because my cousins did not agree that we go to the
> 554 *'aqila* right away. We agreed that the *shaikh* would
> 629 choose the third party, and the judgment would be
> binding on both of us. The *shaikh* chose Bu Halaiqa as
> the third party, and Bu Halaiqa chose three others as
> consultants. (Two of the three were *rajal khair*, and
> the other was an *'aqila*.) The judgment was that my
> cousins were in the wrong. They were fined 10 L.E.
> and a *dhabiiha*("blood sacrifice"). 'Ali intervened and
> did not allow my cousins to pay the fine. He had them
> write a paper stating, that if they resume this quarrel
> in the future they must pay the fine plus another 10 L.E.
> fine. (Hajj 'Ali is a rajal khair.)

695 Sometimes the Egyptian police must be brought into a judicial
648 affair to insure the execution of a judgment. In one case,
696 an individual in al-Qasr did not accept the decision of his
'aqila; his *'aqila* wrote the decision on paper and sent him to another *'aqila*. The second *'aqila* agreed with the first, but the man also refused this decision. The second *'aqila* wrote his decision on paper and sent it to the *shaikh* of the 'Aishaibat in Matruh. The *shaikh* summoned the culprit and sent him to the police station. Finally, the police were able to convince the man to pay his fine, and also his expiation fee to his own *'aqila*. My informant said that this was a minor affair, and that had it been a serious offense committed by the man he would have been threatened with expulsion from the corporate group.

*613 As the corporate sole, the *'aqila* has political authority
554 which is legitimate and morally binding on all who wish to
•571 maintain their status in the group and tribe. Any individual

*613 554 ●571 or whole tertiary group may be expelled from the lineage group, or if they so desire, they may resign their status in the group. In either case, and both cases rarely occur, the permission and approval of the *'aqila* are required. Or, I should say, the approval of the *'awaaqil* is required, for both cases represent structural changes which affect the juristic personality and constitution of the maximal corporation. The legitimacy of the *'aqila* and the whole political structure are tied up together. Social structure and authority roles are both objects of legitimacy, as Easton (1965:278-301) says, and hence the legitimacy of the *'aqila* in al-Qasr flows from the structural legitimacy of a segmentary political system. Thus in al-Qasr, politics operates through authority groups in opposition to one another, each represented by an authority role. An *'aqila* once told me that "the tribe of the *'aqila* gives him the authority to judge between its members." Another *'aqila* said that "the *'awaaqil* are bound [675] by a contract (*rawaabit*) to perform their duty on behalf of their *bait*." The *rawaabit* ("bonds") we will discuss in the next section.

Spheres and Focus of Authority

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Authority, as it is used in this study, refers to the Weberian notion of "imperative control" (*Herrschaft*); that is, "the probability that a command with a given specific

121 content will be obeyed by a given group of persons" (Weber 1947:152). In the next chapter, it will be useful to distinguish between the concept of authority and that of "power." Mainly, we are concerned here with the legitimate exercise of authority in the regulation of conflict involving members of an "imperatively coordinated group" (1947:153), or corporation, at both the internal and external levels of the Bedouin political system.

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●571 It has already been stated in the last chapter that political action occurs at all levels of the social structure; it is not peculiar to the external relational system. The tendency to differentiate structurally between "domestic relations" and "political relations" began with Evans-Pritchard (1940:148) who analyzed the Nuer political system as "an expanding series of opposed segments from the relations within the smallest tribal section to intertribal and foreign relations." This definition could serve as a description of the political system of the Bedouins of al-Qasr, or of any other segmentary society. Fortes (1949; 1953:26) first used the terms "domestic relations" and "political relations." He arbitrarily limited political action to the lineage structure, and assigned "person-to-person relations" to the sphere of kinship or domestic organization. Southall (1953), who applied the ideas of Max Weber, isolated what he referred to as two different types of authority: the "familial" and

121 114 *613 •571 the "political." Previous studies, then, indicate that a conceptualization of a division between spheres or foci of authority relations is fundamental to an understanding of the political aspect of segmentary societies. There is no need, however, to relegate the political to any particular social area if "we generally mean by 'political,' things that have to do with relations of authority . . ." (Weber 1947:155). Conflict, and the need for it to be regulated, occur at all levels of the lineage system, from the family to the tribal level. Authority must be exercised if the system is to [554] persist. The legitimate exercise of authority in al-Qasr is expressed through two structures: an authority role and authority groups, the 'aqila and the tertiary segments, the corporate sole and corporate groups.

121 554 The analysis which follows considers society as a composite of authority groups and authority roles. Roles are the basic elements of social structures which "order the human beings who make up the society" (Nadel 1957:11). The authority role is a focus for the study of politics at all levels of the social structure, and, also, the basis for extending role analysis. For the most part, political action in al-Qasr, from the family to the tribal levels, takes the form of the exercise of legitimate authority. Power, as illegitimate control, exists in the form of extra-processual authority roles which we will discuss in the next chapter.

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554 Here we are interested in the way in which roles and groups, and a whole structure of authority, operate over a wide area.

In the previous section, I presented the _'aqila_ as a specialized political role in Bedouin political organization. As Radcliffe-Brown (1940:xviii-xxi) has pointed out, in the political analysis of segmentary societies it is necessary to isolate incipient authority roles which function to make decisions concerning rightness and wrongness in disputes and which represent the community, giving voice to public sentiment. The notion of society as a functional system of authority roles and authority groups is clear in Radcliffe-Brown's treatment of politics.

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*[613] Local groups of political significance, i.e., authority groups, are identified by the status position, or office, referred to as _'aqila_. The political relations within a local tertiary group, and between it and similar groups of a lineage and tribe, must be seen as relationships between authority roles.

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*613 In the domestic field of political relations, the authority of the Bedouin _'aqila_ shades into the familial authority sphere of the household head (_shaib_). The _shaib_, as senior agnate of his _naja'_, is dominant over the other males of his tertiary sub-unit, but not to the extent that he can pre-empt any of their rights as members of the tertiary
[888]
[578] corporate group. A _shaib_, by virtue of his age, is supposed to possess the wisdom which it takes to regulate conflict.

600 to possess the wisdom which it takes to regulate conflict.
*613 Theoretically, as one 'aqila said, conflict should be stopped
578 at the familial level, either by the father or the paternal
593 [604] uncle, and should never reach the level of the 'aqila. Once
before the 'aqila, conflict assumes new structural poses, or
different orientation in authority relations. Authority here
is differentiated in terms of the context: the father's authority relates to the familial structural level, and beyond this
level the father per se cannot exercise legitimate authority.
*613 The 'aqila, who is responsible for internal order and external
578 relations exercises legitimate authority at each level of the
182 political structure. The authority of the 'aqila is checked
and prevented from growing into naked power in that any single
'aqila must consult with the other 'awaaqil of the secondary
segment concerning matters which may concern the structural
nature and continuity of the group.

*613 In many respects, the authority structure in al-Qasr
559 corresponds to that defined for the Lugbara of Uganda
•571 171 (Middleton 1960). The structural levels (see Figure 7 above)
of 'Ailit Ma'fas (secondary), Bait 'Umar (tertiary), and 'Ait
Abd al-Malik (sub-tertiary) are approximately equivalent to
Middleton's major, minor, and minimal lineages (1960:7-9). But
[596] whereas among the Lugbara authority roles are purely kinship
roles, i.e., genealogically senior heads are responsible for
internal control and representation, among the Bedouins of

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554 al-Qasr there is definite role differentiation between the
●571 shaib and the 'aqila. The incumbents of the two roles may
171 have exactly the same genealogical position in the tertiary
596 segment, but they will never have the same social status. There are as many elders as there are households, but there is only one 'aqila for each group. Another difference between the Bedouins and the Lugbara is that in the latter society a kinship role which doubles as an authority role does not occur above the familial (i.e. shaib) level.

*613 The difference between the shaib and the 'aqila is
554 the distinguishing factor between informal and formal social
596 control. The shaib acts in accordance with the values implied by Bedouin authority structure: the action of the 'aqila is legitimate in the explicit terms of the Bedouin authority structure. These two spheres of political action represent familial and internal (or domestic) levels of authority and authority relations. Legal matters which affect the whole tertiary segment are dealt with at the internal level.
629 Affairs of a purely personal nature and of lesser importance
596 are dealt with at the familial level of authority. For in-
685 stance, it happened that the dog of one man killed a neighbor's chicken. No one sent for the 'aqila. They sent for the shaib of the woman who owned the chicken, i.e., they sent for her husband. He spoke to the woman, his wife, to determine the value of the chicken and this price he demanded as compensation

627 from the owner of the dog. If the man had refused to pay the
596 price of the chicken, as demanded for settlement, then the
685 next step would have been to inform the appropriate _'aqila_
*[613] to bring greater force, and perhaps greater sanctions, to
bear.

*613 Bait 'Umar (Figure 8) is one of the authority groups
● 571 of al-Qasr, a corporate group represented by a corporate sole.
682 Both the tertiary corporate group and the corporate sole are
referred to, according to the ancient tradition of the Bedouins,
as an _'aqila_. This group is a blood-revenge group, and is
referred to as _'umraa al-dam_ ("donator of blood"), or _waliiy
al-dam_ ("executor of a blood feud"). It is the group which
[681] decides whether or not retaliation will be taken according
to _lex talionis_, or if blood-money as compensation for the
loss of one of its members is acceptable. The Bedouins say
that no amount of money can replace a human life, that blood-money
is only a means to prevent the loss of more men. This
group, when it functions as _waliiy al-dam_ ("executor of a
blood feud"), has the authority to demand retaliation; to
waive it entirely; or to demand, along with blood-money, that
the guilty party be punished by his _'aqila_. When this group
pays or receives blood-money it does so as a partner in the
larger corporate group, the secondary segment. The principle
of collective responsibility interplays with the other structural
principles of Bedouin society. The convergence represents

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the conversion of small authority groups into larger ones. Political order depends upon this convergence of principles and the affirmation of the values and institutions which the principles imply. In turn, the resulting political organization helps to maintain the "body of interconnected moral and legal norms" (Fortes and Evans-Pritchard 1940:20).

When blood-money is paid out, all of the tertiary groups contribute an equal share. When blood-money is received, the group of the killed man receives one-half of the diiya and the remainder is divided equally among the members of the secondary group. The distribution of blood-money was explained as follows:

> The one-half of the diiya which goes to the murdered man's bait belongs to his sons. If the man was not married and had no sons, then the money goes to his brothers or those closely related to him (bi-dam), like his uncles or paternal cousins. If the man was married and had only daughters, and they had no brothers, these females can claim the diiya only if they are married to someone in the tribe. (Here the word tribe refers to the secondary lineage group.) If they are married to someone from outside the tribe, the female will take no money because her husband will not contribute to the next diiya in the tribe.

This is the ideal situation. But blood-money distribution is relative to the level at which conflict takes place, i.e., depending upon the nature of the relationship between the authority groups concerned. For instance, it means a great deal if the groups concerned are of the same secondary segment.

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> In 1947, party A of Bait 'Umar, 'Ailit Ma'fas accidentally shot party B of Bait Muhammad, 'Ailit Ma'fas. Since both parties were of the same family, _'awaaqil_ from 'Ailit Lazumi, a third party, were called to adjudicate. The _'awaaqil_ decided that a _diiya_ of 400 L.E. should be paid to Bait Muhammad. Of the 400 L.E. _diiya_, Bait 'Umar was to pay 200 L.E. and the rest of the secondary group, with the exception of Bait Muhammad, was to pay 200 L.E. The brother of the killed man said that they would accept the 200 L.E. from Bait 'Umar, but would take only 100 L.E. from the rest of the family. The 300 L.E. _diiya_ then went to the brothers of the killed man who had no sons and whose father was deceased. The _diiya_ was paid in one week's time.

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Although I have tended to use the terms tertiary segment and corporate group interchangeably, the two are not structurally synonymous. Not every tertiary segment is a corporate group or authority group. Just as tertiary corporate groups combine into larger secondary corporate groups so do tertiary groups which lack size and property, i.e., political power, ally themselves together under one _'aqila_ to form corporate authority groups. Subsumed under the secondary segmental heading of 'Ailit Ma'fas (see Figure 8) are eleven structurally separate tertiary segments, but the corporate authority structure of 'Ailit Ma'fas includes only five groups. Thus there are only five politically significant authority groups, or _'awaaqil_, which represent 'Ailit Ma'fas to the outside world. Six of the tertiary segments are numerically small enough that they have found it politically advantageous to consolidate "in sharing the good and the bad." The combination of tertiary segments into authority groups is as follows:

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Authority Group	Components	No. of Persons	Total Persons
I. Bait 'Umar	Bait 'Umar	73	73
II. Bait Kailani	Bait Kailani	67	67
III. Bait Firjani	Bait Firjani	31	43
	Bait Salih	12	
IV. Bait Muhammad	Bait Muhammad	27	30
	Bait Yunis	3	
V. Bait Braik	Bait Braik	6	32
	Bait Abd al-Hadi	6	
	Bait Fadl	3	
	Bait Mahaishi	8	
	Bait Maraja	9	
		245	245

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These five groups represent the political structure of 'Ailit Ma'fas. Authority relations between the 245 members, and between the five groups, proceed with reference to the five _'awaaqil_ of the secondary group. External relations of 'Ailit Ma'fas, either in the form of demanding rights from other secondary segments, or of meeting obligations toward these groups, proceed through the five _'awaaqil_ "speaking with one voice." One group in 'Ailit Ma'fas, Bait Musa, migrated to the Nile Valley sometime during the 1930's. Bait Musa no longer possesses jural rights or obligations in the lineage. But jural relations are not always severed as a result of moving. 'Ailit Shraif, another secondary group in al-Qasr, has one _bait_ in the Nile Valley which maintains its

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•571 jural status in the lineage by contributing its share of the blood-money.

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178 The consolidation of tertiary groups into authority groups may shed some light on the dual process of fission and fusion common in segmentary societies. The structure of authority groups which make up a secondary group is a reflection of the way in which tertiary segments grow and segment, or decline and fuse, into other groups. In the process, one group, or many small groups of agnates, are incorporated under a name other than that of their genealogical ancestor. Through time, and in the interest of group solidarity and political order, real biological ties may be obscured: the regulation of political relations favors ideological jural ties over genealogical ties which indicate lineal differences. With reference to 'Ailit Ma'fas, perhaps in the future, Bait Yunis, with only three members, will be totally submerged into the authority group, Bait Muhammad, so that the individual, Yunis, will be dropped from the genealogy of 'Ailit Ma'fas. Then the descendents of Yunis will be linked to Muhammad, the founder of Bait Muhammad, by an artificial link, though the patrilineal ideology will define it as a descent link. During the period of solidification, there is apt to be confusion concerning the exact nature of kinship ties. For instance, in al-Qasr, there was a great deal of argument about whether or not 'Ailit Ma'fas was once a segment of 'Ailit Lazumi. As I

*613 have noted previously, informants very definitely disagreed
• 571 over the matter; by looking at the two genealogies one is
178 unable to say one way or the other. The process of fission and fusion in the form of secession and adoption is another instance of genealogical manipulation through patrilineal ideology. In this case, patrilineal ideology also may succeed in concealing real biological links in favor of political relations. We shall see below how secession and adoption actually function in Bedouin society.

*613 We have said that the authority of the 'aqila is
675 legitimate at each structural level. The Bedouins of al-Qasr
554 often legitimate the authority of the 'aqila in writing, and,
571 at the same time, make an explicit statement of social compact which outlines the pragmatic and moral values of the corporate group. The corporate charter in al-Qasr is a document of self-interest which defines expectations and consequences for corporate members: it governs the conduct of members in situations relevant to internal order, and gives the 'aqila powers of representation in external affairs. The charter is a
[181] reflection of the high value the Bedouins place upon security and order, and is a condition for a legal system of wider
*613 scope. Max Weber (1947:120) has expressed the idea of social
675 relationship as contract so well that it is worthwhile to
571 quote him extensively here.

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> The meaningful content which remains relatively constant in a social relationship is capable of formulation in terms of maxims which the parties concerned expect to be adhered to by their partners . . . The more rational in relation to values or to given ends the action is, the more is this likely to be the case . . . The meaning of a social relationship may be agreed upon by mutual consent. This implies that the parties make promises covering their future behavior, whether toward each other or toward third persons. In such cases each party then normally counts, so far as he acts rationally, in some degree on the fact that the other will orient his action to the meaning of the agreement as he (the first actor) understands it . . . But in part also they are motivated each by the value to him of his "duty" to adhere to the agreement in the sense in which he understands it.

The idea of "duty" makes collective responsibility meaningful, and the authority of "the third party," or _'aqila_, legitimate.

The ties which bind the corporate group may be defined in terms of the structural principles of kinship and residence. But these ties must be affirmed and further defined by contractual obligations which inform an authority structure. Further, the legitimacy of authority relations beyond the tertiary level is based mainly upon contractual alliance. The relationship between contract and the other structural principles is a mutually reinforcing one. Kinship and residence alone cannot be the basis for the existence of a corporate group. The Bedouins of the Western Desert in their statements of contractual alliance not only proclaim the conditions for brotherhood, but, also, the consequences for those who do not meet these conditions. A Bedouin, or a whole corporate tertiary

*613 675 •571 segment, may choose to belong to, or to secede from, the larger corporate group. This element of choice helps to define the authority of the corporate sole. Authority is illegitimate, i.e. it is mere power, when control is exercised against the will of the subjects (Weber 1947).

Above, I have said that authority is legitimated beyond the tertiary level, i.e., at the secondary level, through contractual alliance. By that I mean the same agreement on values is replicated by the authority groups of the lineage. The five authority groups of 'Ailit Ma'fas are bound together by what the Bedouins call "the bonds of the _'awaaqil"_ (_rawaabit al-'awaaqil_). Below I present a number of examples of the _rawaabit_ from al-Qasr. Then I continue on to show the nature of the corporate group, and the dynamics of structure and authority in Bedouin society.

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BONDS BETWEEN THE 'AWAAQIL OF 'AILIT MA'FAS

1. Every member of the tribe who has proved against him an intrigue concerning the _'aiela_,
2. every member of the tribe who claims against his brother a case which has no basis,
3. every member of the tribe who shifts a border of the borders of a land from one place to another place,
4. every _'aqila_ is responsible for his followers and must present each with the right direction if he does not convince him first (i.e. if he fails at moral discourse, he must arrange the court session),
5. every member of the tribe who departs from the opinion of his _'aqila_ and who follows the wrong and erroneous

*613 6. every member of the tribe who submits a complaint
675 without first consulting his 'aqila, (i.e. who
•571 goes to the government before the 'aqila),

539 7. every member of the tribe shall back the members of his bait against an opponent without right,

8. every member of the tribe who has proved against him the showing of sympathy toward another tribe knowing that this tribe is antagonistic to his own tribe,

9. every member of the tribe who has proved against him that he helped a relative in payment or in a quarrel against his brother.

we signed this document and declare that these customs are valid from the date of today and everyone who disobeys them pays a dhabiiha ("lamb") and 10 L.E. without any objection if any of the items of the above items is proven against him.

Date: August 8, 1953
The 'awaaqil (signatures or stamps):
Abd al-Ruwaf (Bait Firjani)
Hussain 'Umar (Bait 'Umar)
Shi'ath Abd al-Hadi (deceased, Bait Braik)
'Atiya 'Umran (Bait Kailani)
Khalid Idris (Bait Muhammad)

114 In the rawaabit, or contract, just noted the term
619 "tribe" refers to the secondary segment ('aiela). Murray
675 (1935:315n) has also pointed to an instance of the Bedouins'
*613 use, in a formal document, of the word qabiila ("tribe") when
reference to "some smaller division, such as 'eila is clearly
meant."

675 Through the rawaabit norms are expressed and action
681 is oriented with respect to them. If it is otherwise, sanctions
[183] may be brought to bear to insure conformity to norms. The
*[613] minimal sanction which the 'aqila may impose is the dhabiiha

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("blood sacrifice") and a fine of 10 L.E. The most serious sanction which the group, through the _'aqila_, can administer is banishment. In this case, the decision "to wash one's hands of another" may originate with the _'aqila_ but must be executed by the next of kin, or the process can originate with the next of kin and be carried out with the approval of the _'awaaqil_. In any case, it is an ultimate negative sanction which ranks with blood-revenge in degree of seriousness, since social and political status is withdrawn from the person. A banished person is no longer protected in accordance with the principle of collective responsibility, and his group may no

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longer demand blood-money for his life. The charter of 'Ailit Lazumi presented below is similar in most respects to that of 'Ailit Ma'fas with the exception that it makes provision for the _barawwa_, the act of banishing from the group. The document was issued in four copies to each of the _'awaaqil_ of Lazumi. Note that in both charters thus far shown, not only are the individuals of the group bound by the rules but, also, the _'aqila_ comes under the rule of law.

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BONDS BETWEEN MEMBERS OF 'AILIT LAZUMI AL-'AISHAIBAT, (Wednesday, January 19, 1952)

In the name of God the Merciful and Compassionate

In the presence of 'Umran Kailani, Hajj 'Ali, the _'awaaqil_ and individuals of Bait Bu Jafaila who signed below, this agreement took place and the _'awaaqil_ of this _'aiela_ are:

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675 1 - Hajj Salah Bu Jafaila, 'aqila of Bait Bu Halaiqa
*613 2 - Kuraim Juhami, 'aqila of Bait Uthman
•571 3 - Ruwaf Jadalla, 'aqila of Bait Jadella
681 4 - Muftah Tahir, 'aqila of Bait Tahir
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Every *'aqila* is responsible for his family whether concerning the occurrence of problems, and collecting money from his family, or other matters. Every person who rejects the opinion of the *'aqila*, or reports to the government without the consent of the *'aqila* will be subjected to a fine of 10 L.E. and a *dabiha* according to the *'awaiyid.* And every person who delays in carrying out the decisions of the *'aqila* and all that he indicates will also be subject to the same fine. And also, any one who delays in swearing the oath or in supporting his family, and in so doing loses the interest which belongs to the *'aiela*, he will be subject to the same fine. Any of the *'awaaqil* who cause the loss of any right of the rights of the members of the *'aiela* will also be subject to the same fine. And any member who makes false claims against any of the other members of the *'aiela* is subject to the same fine. And any *'aqila* or member from the members of the *'aiela* who has proven against him an intrigue, or a quarrel, or prejudice between him and his brother or paternal cousin is subject to the same fine. He is also subject to the same fine who has proven against him prejudice in favor of another party against his paternal cousins, that is to say, the members of this *'aiela*. And every *'aqila* or individual who delays in signing and accepting these bonds, or in executing them, is considered an outsider by this *'aiela* and the *'aiela* will not be responsible for him in the future, and this will be considered a *barawwa* for him from the *'aiela*.

This was issued in four copies to the *'awaaqil*, and all previous bonds are cancelled from this date and are no longer effective.

Signatures and stamps of *'awaaqil* and witnesses.

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681 The *barawwa* (literally: "the act of putting outside") is a formal procedure, formal enough to entail having the process notarized as a legal document according to Egyptian civil law. The Bedouins say that the legal document of *barawwa* is "to show that we have washed our hands of the

675 culprit, and are no longer responsible for his acts." The
681 *barawwa* is not only the imposition of a most severe sanction
675 by the group, but it is also the withdrawal of all positive
681 sanctions which would apply to an individual as a member of
•571 the group. The withdrawal of sanctions means the withdrawal
of the right of reciprocity; consequently, the banished no
longer comes under the rule of succession, and he has no
[421] rights over either persons or things. The banished may claim
no property of the property of the group other than that which
he takes with him, and he may claim no women from the group.
675 The *barawwa*, naturally enough, is uncommon in al-Qasr. The
681 last occurred in 1957, the declaration of which is reproduced
below.

DECLARATION OF BARAWWA

Law Office of Abd al-Rahman Marsa Matruh	50 milleme tax stamp

On this date the following came: Kuraim Juhami of the 'Aishaibat on behalf of himself and his paternal uncle, and their *'umda*, the first party. And there also came Sa'ad Uthman on behalf of himself and his children, the second party. The reason for the coming together of these two parties is in order to ask the *barawwa* from each other. Since they have all agreed by their own will without any force or ill feeling that the two parties shall not be responsible for each other's actions, it is a valid agreement that can never be rejected. No one from either of the parties is responsible to the other in supporting oaths, in paying for wounds, or in paying blood-revenge (*diya*), and no one from either party involved in *barawwa* will take girls from the other. This *barawwa* became a dividing line between the two parties, and if later there appears a fraternity paper, the *barawwa* will be cancelled and be to no avail. This paper is signed

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681 by us and by the below mentioned witnesses to be used when it is necessary. This barawwa was issued in two copies at the hand of each of the two parties to be used in time of necessity.

Approving what is included, the first party, Kuraim Juhami (stamp)	Approving what is included the second party Sa'ad Uthman (stamp)

Witness to this:
Abd al-Rahman, the lawyer
Date: September 24, 1957

STAMP OF MINISTRY OF WAR
BORDER GUARDS
MATRUH SECTOR

Signatures or stamps of eight witnesses.

1 - Copy to Marsa Matruh Police Station
2 - Copy at the hand of the first party
3 - Copy at the hand of the second party

Seen and the original must be kept in the files of the administration of complaints, and a copy must be delivered to each of the two parties.

Signed: Colonel Ahmad Sa'ad
Marsa Matruh Police Station

Date: October 12, 1957

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•571 The rawaabit in Bedouin society is essentially a charter at the tertiary level, but it structures relations at the secondary level. At the tertiary level, the charter functions to establish group boundaries and identity, and to
*613
571 express the conditions for membership. Group solidarity and maintenance at the tertiary level is a necessary condition for structural continuity of the larger secondary corporation: the lineage persists through these groups with replicate
060 functions, structures, and a common ancestor. That the

*613 That the
173 secondary segment is as significant as the tertiary group
seems to be indicated by the Bedouin tendency to mythologize
the founder of the secondary group. For instance, Ma'fas is
a nickname literally meaning "the big-footed one;" the
Zagharat take their name from a man who used the zaghaariid
("shrill cry of joy" used by women) as his battle-cry; Abu
Qarasa means "father of bread-loaf;" Sayyid Shraif was a
very "noble" (shraif - "high-bred, noble") man. Along with
each name there are a number of different myths to explain it:
hence Ma'fas was a cattle thief who left large footprints in
the mud so that all would know of his daring exploits; Abu
Qarasa baked hugh loaves of bread to honor his in-laws when
they visited him. On the other hand, there are no myths about
*613 founders of tertiary segments. Tertiary segments might, in
178 the future, disappear from the Bedouins' genealogy, either
because of death, barawwa, or secession, but the secondary
group survives these events. It is the secondary segment,
as we shall see in our discussion of law and sanctions, which
is structurally important for the political community of the
Awlad 'Ali.

*613 Because the secondary level is the more structurally
• 571 important, seeing that the greater benefits of collective
responsibility derive from it, the tertiary group surrenders
part of its autonomy to it. The tertiary group does so in
just the way that the individual member of any polity allows

*613 public obligations to temper private interests. This temper-
*613 ing process in Bedouin society is effected through the agree-
• 571 ment, or bonds, between the 'awaaqil of the secondary group
675 as representatives of the members of the tertiary groups.
The 'aqila and the members of a tertiary group submit to
structural arrangements of organization and procedure at
the secondary level of interest and authority. All this is
symbolized in the duplicate copies of the rawaabit and the
name of the "famous" ancestor.

*613 I do not underestimate the importance of the tertiary
571 segment. I realize that internal order at this level is what
prevents anarchy at the secondary level. And I do not mean
to imply that integration is necessarily any greater at the
tertiary level than at the secondary level--it may or it may
*613 not be the case. Conflict is more difficult to detect at the
571 tertiary level than at the secondary level due to the practical
578 value which the Bedouins place upon stable relations between
brothers and immediate relatives. But conflict does take
place, and the Bedouins do attempt to regulate it at this
level.

*613 The Bedouins say that blood-revenge and the feud
682 cannot possibly operate at the tertiary level. On the other
hand, homicide does occur "between brothers." We have already
described the case of manslaughter in 'Ailit Ma'fas and the
manner in which it was dealt with: no retaliation would have

*613 been justified in this case since the killing was accidental.
682 In another case of killing which occurred between tertiary units of the same secondary group, we see what happens in the
*613 case of intentional killing. This case of murder in 'Ailit
682 Lazumi is interesting and valuable because it illustrates
•571 the dynamics of authority relations within the secondary segment, and the degree to which authority relations are manageable without a resulting structural change.

> *613 682 571 675 In 1959, a rearrangement of authority relations took place within 'Ailit Lazumi: Bait A and Bait B agreed that they would be collectively responsible for each other, and Bait C and Bait D made a similar compact. The compacts involved the sharing of diiya and kubaara (expiation) payments. Shortly after 1959, Bait A and Bait C quarreled, and the result of the litigation was that the 'awaaqil ordered Bait A to pay a kubaara of 20 L.E. to Bait C. Bait B, as the partner of Bait A, decided to pay 10 L.E. of the kubaara and Bait A paid the other 10 L.E. But Bait D protested this sharing of the kubaara saying that Bait B is a third brother and, as such, should act as a quwaal al-kahair ("a speaker of good"); that no brother should take sides against the others. As a result of this incident, the split between the two groups (A-B and C-D) became deeper. Afterwards, one group would not contribute to the diiya involving members of the other group even if it concerned external conflict with other secondary groups. This division in 'Ailit Lazumi was finally ended in 1960 when a member of Bait A killed a member of Bait B--the killing was within the same contractual alliance. At this time, the whole lineage decided to forget its differences and, all together, paid Bait B its diiya.

*613 Ideally, conflict should not be permitted to threaten
578 the structural continuity of the secondary corporation, but it
[581) happens. Usually, however, safety mechanisms such as the barawwa and the right to secede are effective enough to prevent structural deterioration.

*613 571 675 681 578 [597] structural deterioration. Secession, the right to break authority relations, and adoption, the right to contract new authority relations, are rights of the authority group. This can be noted in the "Declaration of Barawwa" presented earlier. It was stated in that document that "the reason for the coming together of these two parties is in order to ask the barawwa from each other." Further, mention was made of a "fraternity paper" which would cancel the effects of the barawwa. So, secession can be a means of regulating [597] conflict, and it can become the basis for a re-integrative move; that is, an adopted party may decide to secede from its foster lineage and return to its original lineage, or secondary group.

*613 571 [578] Secession, as distinct from segmentary fission as a response to ecological demands, represents a structural change in authority relations short of distrubing the structure of the secondary group. In a process of secession, i.e., breaking with the secondary group, joining a new secondary group, and returning to the "blood-brother" group, the fundamental condition of "belonging" is the acceptance of collective responsibility. This is a most important point. The office *613 571 681 675 of 'aqila, the Bedouin charters, and the raison d'etre of the corporation revolves about the notion of sharing in the blood-money. This can be shown by an extremely interesting document belonging to 'Ailit Abu Qarasa of al-Qasr. Here the process

*613 of secession, and the nature of the collective responsibility
•571 principle in Bedouin society are made clear. The occasion of
681 the writing of this document was the issuance of a "fraternity
675 paper."

BONDS BETWEEN MEMBERS OF 'AILIT ABU QARASA

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Thanks to God alone and nothing survives but His kingdom, praise and peace to Him Who will never have a Prophet who is greater than Himself.

It came into our hands on 10 Shawal 1363 (September 9, 1944), the 'awaaqil of 'Ailit Abu Qarasa of the 'Aishaibat; and the reason for their coming together is in order to merge 'Ailit Abu Qula with the other buyuut as they were in the past. And this is in accordance with the agreement of all the parties to this paper. By the free will of all it became, as of this day, that all of the mentioned buyuut will be connected with the other buyuut in receiving and giving. But all blood-money of the mentioned buyuut which was due before the date 3 Shawal 1361, that is to say all debts for past offences, they and their former relatives will be responsible for. After this date, which is 3 Shawal 1361, each of the mentioned buyuut will share the good and the bad equally. And the 'awaiyid which the mentioned buyuut agreed upon are the following:

1 - First, he who intentionally beats his brother in the 'aiela will pay by himself and no one from the 'aiela will pay anything with him.

2 - But the offense which takes place within the 'aiela, the fine for it will be distributed in such a way that the first half of the payment will go to the offended bait and the second half will be distributed among all of the mentioned buyuut.

3 - The offense which happens to the 'aiela from an outside party, half of the payment goes to the 'aiela and the second half to the offended bait.

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4 - The thief from the mentioned buyuut will be responsible for himself alone, and his relatives in blood (i.e. his bait) will be responsible for him.

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5 - The one who is known to lie under oath from the mentioned buyuut, everyone who supports him must be a blood-relative from his bait.

6 - The one who delays paying the share which is requested by the 'aiela, his rich relative will pay.

7 - The one who asks for a barawwa from the 'aiela will pay what is asked for, and at the same time will also pay 20 L.E. barawwa fee for every man who fasts.

8 - The one who supports his relative from some other 'aiela against his paternal cousin will be required to pay 10 L.E. as a fine.

Signatures or stamps of the 'awaaqil of 'Ailit Abu Qarasa, and the 'awaaqil of 'Ailit Ghriba (who are the former relatives of Bait Abu Qula, the reconciled bait).

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Every point of the above rawaabit shows the moral and political significance of the secondary group in the Bedouin community. Membership in a secondary compound authority group entitles one to political status without which the individual could not survive. The Bedouin community shares certain activities, relationships, and goals so that the aims of any individual can be achieved only by participation in social action with others: this the Bedouins have in common with every other human community (Firth 1951:41). Specifically, in considering society in terms of authority roles and authority groups, we are interested in the political community in which the Bedouins participate.

619 *613 •571 [671] The boundaries of the Bedouin political community may be defined so as to include all of those authority groups which operate in accordance with the recognized legal code of the Western Desert. This code is referred to as _'awaiyid Awlad 'Ali_, i.e. "the customs of the sons of 'Ali." The members of the Awlad 'Ali tribe identify with each other as a group. They recognize their common heritage and speak of "the Awlad 'Âli as one." But more importantly, the Awlad 'Ali represents a political community because they are "prepared to regulate their differences by means of decisions accepted as binding because they are made in accordance with shared political norms and structures" (Easton 1959:229). Recalling the discussion of familial authority and internal and external systems of authority relations, we may think of the Bedouin political community as a composite of authority or jural groups "within which there are a moral obligation and a means ultimately to settle disputes peaceably" (Middleton and Tait 1959:9).

*613 571 681 628 626 In al-Qasr, political order and the articulation of political relations between secondary corporate groups depend upon something besides structural and ideological uniformities. Although blood-revenge and feuding do not take place at the internal system of authority relations, they are common means of controlling the distribution of authority and power between secondary units. Though these mechanisms or sanctions are [671] considered "the right of the Arabs," since they do threaten

*613 •571 peace and security in the desert they are discouraged by
681 means of the moral and legal norms expressed in the *'awaiyid*,
628 or law of the Bedouins.
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671 Conflict regulation between secondary groups is the
*613 function of the *'awaaqil* who act as legitimate representatives
571 in terms of the *rawaabit*, and as legitimate judges and decision-
578 makers in terms of the *'awaiyid*. Not all conflict in the
external political system is, in terms of our structural
levels, between secondary authority groups, but seldom is
any group larger than the secondary unit mobilized for political
619 action. In other words, even where we note that conflict is
*613 between two primary units, i.e., the 'Aishaibat and the
571 Kamailat, there is probably, in fact, political action taking
578 place between two secondary groups within the respective primary groups. However, there always exists the very real possibility that greater conflict will be generated involving primary and even tribal units.

128 In the next section of this chapter, I will discuss Bedouin law and sanctions within the framework of the lineage structure and the authority levels at which they operate. The following section will further illustrate the legitimacy and dynamics of authority and structure in Bedouin society.

671 the Bedouins, the government soon discovered their own error,
182 for they were unable to effectively manage group and tribal
648 political relations: "They (the government) found out that
they could not solve murders in the desert. They would arrest
the killer but the trouble continued between families (i.e.
feuding went on). There were more killings instead of less,
and, finally, the government asked us to return to the
'awaiyid because it alone can solve murders in the desert."
I was unable to document the claim that the government had
"abolished" the _'awaiyid_ in 1933, but a number of officials
who worked at the Governor's Office in Marsa Matruh said that
it was true.

671 In al-Qasr, and in the Western Desert in general,
641 adherence to law and political order rests upon the conviction
577 that each individual and territorial group have guaranteed
•571 rights which are related to honor and property. A violation
554 of any single man's honor or property may easily be interpreted,
according to the principle of collective responsibility, as an
offense against the rights of a group. And in this sense,
legal and moral violations in Bedouin society are relative to
the structure of interrelations, and they must be regulated
with reference to the various levels of the authority structure.

181 Bedouins place a high value on political order, but
641 also on the idea that political order can only be guaranteed
578 through a man's willingness "not to allow another to take any
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181 of his rights;" a man should be courageous enough to fight
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578 for what belongs to him and his family. These values, which
● 571 become political values in a tribal context, coupled with the idea of self-help make for a political order which is ultimately based upon the law of blood-revenge and feud. At least this is the case where the external system of authority relations
578 is concerned. But force as the ultimate mechanism for the
571 establishment of political order is better considered an
182 extreme, and only one of the mechanisms used by the Bedouins in the process of conflict regulation. The attempt is to establish a balance of rights, concerning honor and property, and not to go beyond another's boundaries lest he retaliate. Force, as a coercive institution, can never be the sole basis of political structure, as Schapera has shown in the case of the Bergdama and Bushmen (1956:211-221). Thus the Bedouins
[681] say blood-revenge would be impossible within the secondary
* [613] corporate group; relations this important cannot be based
[682] upon force. In the case of homicide within this group compensation is immediately forthcoming.

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[578] Also, it has been pointed out that self-help and collective responsibility do not operate indiscriminately. That is, an individual cannot depend upon the backing of his group irrespective of his own motivations in a particular situation which calls for retaliation or threatened the group with retaliation. Individual responsibility figures in cases

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672 other than those dealing with blood-revenge too. For instance,
*613 in matters concerning personal debts incurred, the group is
571 not responsible for the individual. The Bedouins say that if
672 a man has the money he must repay his debts: if he does not
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426 have the money, then he must ask a rich relative to pay his
debts for him. He is then in debt to his relative and, out
of respect for him, should not borrow money or go into debt
[558] again. If he does, he will bring dishonor ('ar) to his
[681] family and they will, ultimately, banish him. There was dis-
682 agreement among my informants as to whether or not they
*613 should contribute to a diiya which was compensation for an
829 intentional slaying. Some said that they would not question
124 the motives of their kinsman who has killed because "we are
together in the good and the bad, and I must pay for him
just as he must pay for me." But others held the opinion,
which I feel was a prevailing one, that one must take into
account the justifiability of the killing. This seems to
have been the case in the past, for the Bedouins say that
traditionally the bait of the killer had to pay one-half
of the diiya.

*613 All things political somehow relate to the payment
682 of blood-money. We have seen that the essential function
681 of the 'aqila, and even the condition of his taking office,
182 refers to the responsibility of collecting the diiya from
571 the members of his group. The criterion of being a member

*613 of the group, of joining a new group, or of becoming a man,
682 all refer to the notion of sharing in the payment of the diiya.
681 All obligations and sanctions which carry the force of law in
182 Bedouin society also are directly related to compensation and
●571 retaliation. Weber (1954:110) has stated the general case: "The wergilt debt as set by the judge was the most ancient debt and all forms of obligation have derived from it."
[171] Evans-Pritchard (1940:171) has stated the particular case: ". . . Nuer law, in so far as it applies to a study of political relations, must be treated in connexion with the blood-feud." The blood-feud and the diiya are institutions by which authority groups interact and political order is main-
681 tained. Blood-revenge, or the threat that it may take place
578 and spread, is a most serious sanction in the Bedouin political
682 system. Of the twenty-two cases of conflict in al-Qasr about which I have good details, nine of these deal with homicide or attempted homicide, and thirteen involve quarrels over rights to land, water, and women which could have led to violence had not arbitration succeeded. In fact, seven of the nine cases of personal injury began over property rights.

*613 Rules regarding the diiya in Bedouin society apply
682 at all levels of the lineage structure. This seems important to note for it points up an unusual degree of autonomous authority at the tertiary level. Research on segmentary societies has often stressed the fact that compensation is

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Date: 1947. Case: Quarrel between 'Ailit Dawlat and 'Ailit Zagharat of the 'Aishaibat concerning murder. The quarrel began over the ownership of land. Members of the Dawlat assaulted a member of the Zagharat but he did not die. Then members of the Zagharat killed a member of the Dawlat in revenge for the beating. Many _'awaaqil_ from the tribe came to judge this case. They told the Dawlat and the Zagharat: "Shame on you, you are of one tribe." The decision of the _'awaaqil_ was made according to the _'awaiyid Awlad 'Ali_. A _diiya_ of 400 L.E. was judged against 'Ailit Zagharat. The _diiya_ was collected from all of the members of the Zagharat, and it was paid over the period of three years. The _diiya_ was divided into two parts: one-half went to the sons of the killed man, and the other half went to the _'aiela_. [571] [692]

Date: 1946. Case: Quarrel between 'Ailit Dawlat and 'Ailit Zagharat concerning murder. The conflict began when a member of the Dawlat argued with the Zagharat about a piece of land. One night when the man from the Dawlat and his father were on their way home some members of the Zagharat ambushed and killed the father. They did not bother the son because he was only a boy. The _'awaaqil_ settled the case, and the Zagharat paid a 400 L.E. _diiya_. In 1959, after all those years, the son and his uncle ambushed the man from the Zagharat who had shot the father; they shot him four times. The man did not die but his leg was paralyzed and he lost the sight in one eye. The [571] [692] [683]

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that they had received their rights in this case. And the two parties are satisfied by this according to the witnesses present.

Signatures or seals of four witnesses.

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The next case represents the only time in the memory of informants that all of the _'awaaqil_ of the 'Ali Ahmar met to intervene in a case of conflict. This case is extremely unusual because it may be the only time in Awlad 'Ali history that political mobilization of this scale has taken place. As noted, political action, in war or peace, usually involves only secondary segments. In view of this, the case probably reflects an instance of social change: the Egyptian government, anxious to maintain good relations with Libya, encouraged and facilitated the settlement of this dispute by furnishing transportation and cutting administrative red tape so that the _'awaaqil_ of the 'Ali Ahmar could handle this case in a most expeditious way. Here is a case where Bedouin traditional political structures function adequately in the modern situation. Note here also that, in certain circumstances, the _diiya_ payment can be divided symbolically and specifically to place guilt and to indicate the seriousness of a crime.

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Date: 1963. Case: Quarrel between the tribe of 'Ali Ahmar (Egypt) and the Harabi (Libya) concerning murder. A young boy of 'Ailit X was visiting his sister in Libya. He learned

619 that one old man kept a large sum of money at home. One day
*613 the boy went to beg a watermelon from the old man, but really
682 he went to learn the layout of the man's house. In the night,
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[685] the boy returned to the man's house and demanded his money.
The man refused saying that he had no money. The boy stabbed
the old man to death. The boy then went to his sister's
house and washed the blood from his hands, and had the girl
clean the blood from his robe. The police came to the sister's
house in search of the boy, but he was hiding in a cave nearby.
The police asked the sister: "Where is your brother, he has
killed your mother?" The girl was horrified and told the
police where they could find her brother.

*613 All of the *'awaaqil* of the 'Ali Ahmar met at the farm of
619 'Umda Ibrahim. There were forty-one *'awaaqil* plus 'Umda Ibra-
●571 him. They proceeded to Libya by bus, and took forty sheep
682 with them as a *kubaara*. In Libya, they met with officials of
578 the Libyan government and the *'awaaqil* of the Harabi tribe.
682 The Harabi asked for a *diiya* of 3000 L.E. The blood-money
578 asked for was extra high for two reasons: a young man had
619 killed an elder; and, the murder was connected with in-
*613 tentional theft. After discussing the crime, the Harabi
[685] reduced the price to 700 L.E. They did this out of respect
for the 'Ali Ahmar who had come so far, and who had paid money
for the sugar and tea. All of the 'Ali Ahmar contributed to

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578 said: "I did not take anything." The _'awaaqil_ of both parties
685 met and told the accused: "If you have anything give it to
*613 us; if you do not have anything then swear the oath to this
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•[571] fact." Members of 'Ailit Ma'fas said that the boy was innocent
[692] and told the _'awaaqil_ that the boy should have his rights according to the _'awaiyid_ (i.e. he should be allowed to swear the oath to establish his innocence). The boy accused of the theft, his father, and two other members of 'Ailit Ma'fas selected by the accusers swore the oath and the problem was
619 over. Two months later, the accuser from the Kamailat lost
578 his eye in an accident, because swearing the oath has con-
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695 sequences for both parties. A bad oath will work against the
784 one who makes it; there will be a curse upon him, his children, and his money. And the bad effects of an oath will also work against the one who falsely accuses another making him swear the oath.

582 The final two cases deal with marriage rights. The
562 first illustrates a number of things which I have touched on
*613 in the previous discussion of marriage: that a man may choose
792 to ignore the jural structures of the lineage group where the desires of his offspring are concerned; that the female is not the totally subjugated person which one might expect to find in the strongly patrilineal Bedouin society; and that the role of "holy man" functions in the marital area of authority relations.

CHAPTER V

STRUCTURAL DIFFERENTIATION AND AUTHORITY

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Political Role Analysis: Theoretical Framework

There is current confusion over the definition and use of concepts in political analysis. Ideas concerning power, influence, authority, and the general notion of leadership itself, are variously treated and dealt with equally well. But in every case, a necessary and common aspect of political studies is that of role analysis.

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"Role" is that part of the actor's behavior which constitutes and defines his participation in the social interactive process (Parsons and Shils 1951:23). Political roles define who does what with respect to the political aspect of the social interactive process, i.e. in the system of authority relations. In a most general sense, political role structure may be divided into the two categories of "followers" and "leaders" (Leach 1954:8-10; Easton 1965:205). From the level of the family to the largest social grouping, persons are assigned by the group, or take it upon themselves, to make and help execute decisions. This is to say, that some degree of leadership exists in all social groupings. Whether or not such leadership is institutionalized is another question with which we shall

121 554 571 deal in the course of this discussion.

No political system can persist without a separation of duties between decision-makers and others. The specialized function of decision-making in the political sphere helps "to bring about some adjustment or accommodation in conflicting demands and to implement any settlement where necessary" (Easton 1965:206). It follows then that there is no society without some type of authority role, however simple, and, we assume, that this role can be defined.

121 171 554 571 I do not consider this point a debatable one, though writings on the subject of political organization in primitive society seem to indicate that I should consider it debatable. For example, Steward (1938:247) reports on small bands of American Indians in the Basin-Plateau region who are without chiefs (leaders?). Sharp (1958:5) states that the Yir Yoront cannot tolerate even "mild chiefs"; Schapera (1956:93) notes that "chiefs everywhere in South Africa" are only part-time specialists, and this is taken to mean that the Bushman and Bergdama are without political roles. Service (1966:51) defines "leadership" as "administration" and finds that it is unstructured, which moves from one person to another, and, above all, cannot be associated with the word "chief." All
121 554 of these discussions consider specialization to mean full-time spent in role-playing and the singularity of role assignment. On these bases conclusions are reached as to the presence

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554 or absence of political roles in primitive societies. It is obvious that in no society does an individual play one, and only one, role. Every social role is, in some degree, a part-time role. Even at the apex of role specialization and structural complexity (the presidency of the United States, for instance), an individual plays his political role along with others. Also, in trying to determine the presence or absence of roles in a society, it should be kept in mind that the notion of institutionalization refers to a process and not a state of being. Therefore, in any one society at any one point in time, there may be a number of roles "happening." This, it seems, will especially be the case in the dynamic field of politics.

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●571 In political analysis, influential and leadership roles may be viewed in terms of differential responsibility. Authority is the institutionalization of a responsible relationship between the leader and other members of the collectivity wherein the former has the right to expect support from the latter in given situations (Parsons 1960:183-186). A role which is imbued with power, but not authority in the analytical sense which I wish to bring out here, lacks this institutionalized right to expect support. M.G. Smith (1966:127) makes this analytical distinction most clearly:

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> As a regulatory capacity, authority is legitimated and identified by the rules, traditions, and precedents which embody it and which govern its exercise and objects. Power is also regulatory, but is neither fully prescribed nor governed by norms and rules.

Authority is always attached to specific roles while power is a generalized control over others. For instance, power may be based on religious or economic grounds and operate with equal influence in the political sphere. The basis of the legitimacy of authority is the backing which it receives from the legal system. Power, however, is the probability that one actor within a social relationship will be able to carry out his will regardless of the basis on which this probability rests (Weber 1947:152). Power over others is a type of influence which may operate without their consent, their "will," or even their awareness and understanding. For instance, when one party controls property or other values essential to person's existence, he has power over those others (Goldhamer and Shils 1939).

Influence of the authority type is explicit and institutionalized control of certain symbols which emphasizes group goals. Power-type influence is the control of goods and symbols, often the inexplicit manipulation of these things, which emphasizes particularistic goals usually with a private individual referent. Power and authority are two types of influence. For analytical purposes, they may be considered at opposite ends of a scale of institutionalization. In this

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way, each may be considered as having aspects of the other attached to it: a power role may at times take on an authoritative aspect, and an authority role, when its incumbent "pulls rank," may be said to be exerting power rather than authority.

I have found it necessary to utilize the concepts and ideas discussed here in order to understand the distribution of power in al-Qasr. The range of authoritative action is wide in Bedouin society, and no simple dichotamy between power and authority will suffice to explain it. However, authority does crystallize at certain points in the al-Qasr social structure, and political rights and duties at these reference points become relatively formal and well-defined. When we speak of the crystallization of authority roles, we refer to a tendency toward legitimacy as a process of institutionalization taking place in society. Authority among the 'Aishaibat tribe is legitimate, public, and representative because it is distributed and exercised with reference to imperatively coordinated associations, or corporate groups.

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Furthermore, the manner in which authority is segmented and distributed informs and legitimates the Bedouin lineage structure. On the other hand, power and power roles possessing no legitimate or representative influence with reference to the lineage structure, may actually inform "structures" and "modes" which combine and "are quite unlike the articulations

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554 in a lineage system" (Peters 1967:280).

571 My own study indicates that authority roles are more
*613 easily studied since they are more easily observable. Power
roles are subtle simply because they are less institutionalized; closer field work is required if we are to understand their structure and function. Al-Qasr is characterized by segmentation in communication structure which follows the lines of lineage segmentation. As a consequence of this, social intercourse is of a restricted nature wherein each lineage group tends to be its own audience. In cases such as these, where social interaction is anything but intense, the character of political relations between groups is dif-
121 ficult to perceive. Thus the operation of influence at the
554 informal level, i.e. power, is difficult to comprehend. But
571 it seems absolutely necessary that politics per se be studied
in the tribal situation, and the only way that I can handle it in the al-Qasr case is to consider leadership in the context of an institutionalization process.

There are precedents for this approach, and these also serve to point up the importance of leadership studies in primitive societies. Radcliffe-Brown (1940:xi-xxiii), referring to decision-making processes in tribal societies, was convinced that even in cases of contingencies, and seemingly "spur of the moment" group activities, careful observation would show that "they were directed by leaders who had some

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measure of recognized authority" (p. xv). Radcliffe-Brown conceived of politics as a process, and actually worked with concepts of increasing specialization in decision-making and role differentiation to bring this out (p. xxi). The structural focus of political analysis is the role: he reminds us that analytical concepts such as the "State" do not exist in the phenomenal world, that there exists only individuals who play roles and interrelate as possessors and non-possessors of authority (p. xxiii).

More recently, Pospisil (1968:201-222) has claimed that all societies necessarily possess authority roles by virtue of the fact that justice and its administration is "vested in the decision-making activity, irrespective of its informality or subtlety, of an individual or group of individuals of influence." According to Pospisil, law and conflict regulation upon which political order rests cannot be divorced from "the decision-making process of authority or group leaders" (1968:206). In his study of the Kapauku Papuans, Pospisil (1963:52-55) describes the basis of a "power" struggle between different "authorities."

In this study, I have tried to use the concepts of decision-making process, power-authority continuum, and role-structure for an analysis of Bedouin leadership. Such an approach may be better suited for a study of peasant or modern-complex societies where roles are more differentiated

121 554 571 and better defined, but I feel that the area of leadership in tribal society is more complex and less well studied than we are led to believe. Both the decision-making process and some kind of authority are present in all societies, but we know less about such universals in tribal society. It is as Easton (1965:205) has said: "Even in the smallest group, we can expect to find that the power and responsibility of caring for recurring matters as well as crises tend to reside in the hands of the few."

Status and Role Differentiation

554 565 Although structural differentiation along class lines does not exist in al-Qasr, status differential does exist and a discussion of it is essential for an understanding of Bedouin authority structure. Classes exist only where individuals at a specific socio-economic level "become conscious of their common interests and organize themselves"(Linton 1936:110). Status stratification in and of itself is not indicative of a class structure, for "a size beyond the possibility of facial recognition" is an additional prerequisite (Bierstedt 1957:404).

554 571 Authority structure in al-Qasr, like any of the other structures of society, constitites a system of roles. The actors who act out the roles in this particular system occupy a special status, or position, in the Bedouin social system

554 571 and political structure. This group of actors corresponds to Max Weber's concept of stand, or "status group," a group set apart from the rest of society by the amount of "status honor" which its members possess. In content, "status honor" is normally expressed by the fact that above all else a specific style of life can be expected from all of those who wish to belong to the circle. Linked with this expectation are restrictions on social intercourse" (Gerth and Mills 1946:186-188).

In the course of daily observation in al-Qasr, one begins to understand that certain persons communicate more frequently and more easily with certain others; that the member families of this group tend to intermarry; and even that the men of this group tend to dress similarly. In each case, they visibly and socially set themselves apart from other Bedouins in al-Qasr and the surrounding area: one can identify a member of this "status group" on the streets of Marsa Matruh. They do not represent a well-structured group, least of all an association. More concisely, Weber refers to these individuals as

> A status group (which) is always somehow societalized, but is not organized into an association. Commercium, in the sense of "social intercourse," and connubium among groups are the typical characteristics of the mutual esteem among status equals; their absence signifies status differences (Gerth and Mills 1946:300).

554 It would be considered "wrong" for the members of
571 this group to present themselves at an al-Qasr wedding party,
[577] or the annual celebration held in honor of a local saint of
[585] [796] the area. When I inquired about the conspicuous absence of
[124] some of my chief informants from such gatherings, I was told
[431] that "they will send their gifts," or that "it is not decent
554 that they come to something such as this." In terms of
571 Bedouin social structure, there are a number of plausible
182 explanations for this "status separation." Fathers should
561 [593] not attend public affairs at which their sons may be "per-
forming," i.e., young men should be allowed to play a public
role outside the confines of the father-son authority
structure. By virtue of the extension of the father role,
and its corresponding authoritarian attitude, every member
of the elder age-set commands certain rights and obligations
which would prevent the free expression that is the hallmark
of Bedouin parties. Conversely, and at the more general
level, members of the "status group" who wish to remain
members of this circle accept certain restrictions on social
[114] intercourse. At the five different Bedouin "parties" which
I attended, there were "elders" present, but none of them
could be classified as members of the "status group." Bedouins
plainly state that elders should not attend parties, but, on
the other hand, they show much more concern and emotion when
they say that a member of the "status group" should not "be

554 seen" at any such function. It would appear that the mechanism
571 at work here is not simply a device to provide the younger
182 generation with a tension-release situation, but also a
561 symbolic expression of the difference between the possessors
[154] and the non-possessors of authority, a confirmation of the
political order.

[578] The avoidance practice, or separation, between the
old and the young in the "party" situation is a structural
fact of Bedouin society, and, though it may ultimately be
defined as a conflict control or legitimating mechanism, in
the context of culture change new aspects and meanings attach
554 to the phenomenon. The "status group" is an agent of change
571 in al-Qasr; its members can afford to gamble in the market
178 economy of Marsa Matruh since they possess the reserve capital
[471] (in the form of sheep) and the social prestige which permits
[439] this. The "status group," with business and social relations
[177] in Marsa Matruh, enjoys both the benefits of associational
ties with the Egyptians and the communal ties with their
fellow Bedouins. They see themselves as being different from
their fellow tribesmen, and they tend to face more towards
Marsa Matruh than al-Qasr. In short, they are the "cultural
brokers" who support an ideology of change, they extol the
benefits of a new way of life over and against the old.

[789] One repudiation of tradition which constitutes an
[796] attempt to define the style of life of the "status group"

554 concerns magic. Each August there is a celebration in honor
● 571 of al-Qasr's local saint. At these celebrations, the darwish
178 performs his special skills such as putting a red-hot iron
789 to his tongue, or standing on a skin drum held high by his
796 two assistants. No member of the "status group" attends these
affairs because the darwish and his magic "belong totally to
the old way of life." This is a restriction on social inter-
course. It may also be a rejection of the saint's sacred
power, or reluctance on the part of the "status group" to
554 share authority. The ideology which the "status group" in
571 al-Qasr has developed embodies attitudes of cooperation and
183 patience with induced programs of change. These attitudes
are invoked in varying degrees corresponding to motives of
economic gain, desire for power, and altruistic concern. But
the result is a "status group" mood which may be described
as one of disdain for the old way of life. Ideology and
discontent in al-Qasr are mainly evident among the members of
the "status group."

554 The pool from which the members of the "status group"
556 are recruited consists of the "status honor" possessors of
571 three lineages (two Sa'adi and one Marabit). These have been,
* [613] traditionally and presently, the wealthiest and most influential
in al-Qasr. Wealth in al-Qasr is defined in terms of three
things: sheep, land, and olives. Olives are becoming the
measure of wealth in the modern al-Qasr: sheep are the tradi-

554 tional symbol of wealth. A comparison of wealth between
•571 the "status group" and "other members" of al-Qasr, and the
556 picture of stratification which emerges, are shown on Table 6.

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TABLE 6

COMPARATIVE DATA ON SOCIO-ECONOMIC STRATIFICATION IN AL-QASR[1]

Average Per Person	Status Group	Others
OLIVE - trees	661	86
SHEEP - head	402	30
LAND - acres	91	5

554 One most important way of accruing "status honor"
571 in al-Qasr is by acting the part of the third party in conflict
627 situations. The role of the third party represents an effective
*613 and acceptable way of bypassing formal litigation through the
[778] office of _'aqila_. For instance, by mediating through the
process of _nazaala_, the third party prevents feuds.

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[114] [1] This data is both approximate and partial. Some data are excellent and completely reliable, others are not so de-
[128] pendable. Factors which could conceivably change the picture here presented would be a count of land and animals outside al-Qasr which would be extremely difficult to obtain. Also, some land is not in the name of the owner but in the names of relatives. Of all the data, land data is the most unreliable. Nevertheless, the addition of new data, I feel, would only serve to substantiate the picture of socio-economic stratification shown here.

554 571 627 *[613] process of nazaala, the third party prevents feuds. In this sense, the third party is a legitimate moral and political influence, but not formalized to the degree as that of the 'aqila. A discussion of the authority structure in al-Qasr, then, requires that the allocation of authoritative action in terms of the loci, or roles, of political influence be designated.

[792] The central place of the third party role in the Bedouin political structure is manifested in the many laudable terms which refer to it: rajal khair ("good man") is the most general and often used referent; rajal saalih ("pious man") refers almost always to a "holy man," a specialized role in al-Qasr; quwaal al-khair ("the speaker of good"); and fa'aal al-khair or 'amaal al-khair ("the doer of good"). The latter three roles are approximately equivalent to that of rajal khair, though some informants argued that rajal khair is especially designated because he mediates quarrels while the fa'aal al-khair or 'amaal al-khair help a man when he is in financial difficulties.

554 571 627 *613 182 The functioning of the third party in conflict mediation is formal to the degree that two parties agree on his intervention and to abide by his decision; but the structuring of the third party is informal by comparison with the institutionalized role of 'aqila. However, the existence of the third party role, and its various expressions in al-Qasr

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[182] politics, and the fact that it is differentiated from the role of *'aqila*, are the bases for conceptualizing a structural division of political duties and authority distribution.

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591 Role differentiation in the authority structure may be discussed from two points of view: the degree of difference between authoritative decision-making roles and the other roles, and, the way in which one authoritative role differs from another. These refer to the different degrees of specialization characterized by any one role as compared to another. I have already discussed the way in which the role of *'aqila* differs from other social roles (such as the kinship roles) in the authority structure of al-Qasr. In the following [128] discussion, I focus on role differentiation in the non-institutionalized aspect of the authority structure, on power and influence.

Societies differ from culture to culture in the complexity of role differentiation. Within any one culture it 554 may differ from social domain to social domain. The political 571 system in al-Qasr is from this point of view structurally 627 simple, the assignment of duties in the traditional authority *[613] structure being divided between the *'aqila* and the third party. What legitimate influence is possessed by the third party is derivative from the "status honor" of its members. The [792] exception to this is the *rajal saalih* who derives his power or influence as a result of his special relationship with God.

554 571 627 Thus within the "status group" a difference exists between those members whose power might be considered "secular" (i.e. the rajal khair), and those whose power might be considered "sacred" (i.e. the rajal saalih). Their right to mediate and to overseer the execution of decisions binding on parties to conflict derives from this status. In a way, authority role patterns may be seen to overlap, and the "status group" impinges on the legitimate authority of the 'aqila by virtue of the fact that they are, for one reason or another, his status equals inside and outside the political structure.

554 571 182 *613 This structural division of political duties for dealing with conflict corresponds to Eisenstadt's (1965:30) differentiation of roles in terms of degrees of instituional-ization. The role of 'aqila is present and enduring in each tertiary authority group. There is an incumbent who can be pointed out. His rights and privileges are circumscribed, and his duties and obligations are well defined: the power of the 'aqila role is limited by the very fact that it is

554 571 182 627 institutionalized. The role of the third party, or the mediator in Bedouin society, is less institutionalized, and therefore, less structured and less confining with respect to the kind and amount of influence which the role-player might exert.

The role of the rajal khair, and this implies reference to all third parties, carries with it power. When power is

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When power is institutionalized, such as it is in the role of 'aqila, it becomes authority. This is the Weberian notion of power and authority which has been used by Bohannan (1958) for an analysis of, what he refers to as, "extra-processual events." "Extra-processual events" refers to the operation of power in everyday social relationships, whenever some people make others do what they want them to do. In other words, possessors of "status honor" are also possessors of power, and, I would claim, by virtue of this, such people are recruited into decision-making roles. Not only do members of the "status group" manipulate others in everyday dyadic social relationships, but, more importantly, in the context of conflict control they are able to dominate in political triadic relationships. Furthermore, since they are not structurally bound in their decision-making role, i.e., they operate across group and lineage lines, they accrue even more power and widen their power-base or support structure. What is highlighted in this kind of political role analysis is the fact that different individuals play the game of power politcs in various ways, and with varying degrees of success. In the next chapter, I will bring out this very point by presenting a case study of one such role-player. [128]

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When we contrast the roles of 'aqila and rajal khair, we are defining a political role-set. In an attempt to differentiate between the two roles further than we already have,

554 •571 *613 627 and to clarify the concept of political role structure for al-Qasr, we may make the useful analytical distinction between an "arbitrator" and a "mediator." George Simmel (Wolff 1950), in his discussion of the sociological significance of the third element, i.e. "the triad," notes the important difference between the "mediator" who only guides "the process of coming to terms," and the "arbitrator" who "ends up by taking sides" (1950:146-149). In the process of mediation, the termination of conflict is in the hands of the parties themselves, and there is no final authority to which one may appeal. In the process of arbitration, the 'aqila may, after deciding that mediation has been unsuccessful, impose his will over the wills of the litigants and appeal to the rawaabit as the final authority. The mediator attempts to reduce "will" to "understanding" (Simmel 1950:148). Mediation may be considered an initial stage of most Bedouin judicial processes; thus the mediating and arbitrating attributes of political authority are not always separate, as in the role of 'aqila. In so far as the regulation of conflict is a political mechanism for the reduction of strain, then " . . . the existence of the third element serves the perpetuation of the group" (1950:152).

554 571 627 The rajal khair and the "status group" in al-Qasr have much in common with Evans-Pritchard's tut role in Nuer society (1940:178-181).

554 571 627 [171]

> A tut in this rather wide sense of 'man of good standing,' or 'social leader' is usually a scion of an important lineage, the head of his own family, and master of his homestead and herd . . . (His) authority is never formalized. He has no defined status (i.e. specifically delimited position), powers, or sphere of leadership . . . Beyond his domestic groups a tut has authority in his village only in the sense that he takes a prominent part in questions of procedure and other discussions.

The non-institutionalized third party role in al-Qasr has power and influence in political affairs, and this condition arises from certain structural features and economic facts about Bedouin society. In a word, outside the lone formal role of 'aqila, a person's political influence is directly related to the traditional influence which attaches to his family, or to his economic status. In all cases, the person of "good" family and sufficient wealth has a high status on the social prestige scale of al-Qasr. The people who have high esteem do not have prescribed roles to play in al-Qasr, but their roles are indeed important. Furthermore, the rajal khair role can be just as important as any political role which is prescribed, and it may even become more important.

554 571 177 [634] Besides the 'aqila and the third party, there exists two external but related roles which form part of the total system of Bedouin authority. The roles of 'umda and shaikh represent institutionalized offices. They function, however, more as structural aspects of the Egyptian governmental authority structure. Of course, no complete separation between the two structures can be claimed. It is recognized

554 that these officers, as representatives of the Bedouin, must
• 571 figure in both structures. Therefore, we must understand
177 and explain the relationship between the two sets of roles extant in the Bedouin total political structure, one set pertaining to the traditional authority structure and the other to the relatively new legal authority structure of the nation state.

554 The one factor common to all Bedouins in politically
571 influential roles is that they possess a high degree of "status honor," and thus belong to the "status group" of al-Qasr. The "status group" is responsible for political order in al-Qasr and the political links which it maintains with other systems, Bedouin and Egyptian. Bedouins say that responsible action in conflict control belongs to one who knows how to give a man his rights while maintaining the honor of both parties; at the ideal level, it is the duty of all to do this. The fact that the power group and "the rich" comprise two coterminous groups is accidental and even incidental to the Bedouins. In theory, there could be a person of low economic status but who would belong to the "status group" simply as a result of his ability to mediate.
* [613] The authority of the _'aqila_ and the governmental offices of
[177] _'umda_ and _shaikh_ are legitimate only where formal litigation
[627] is concerned. Beyond this, they may have influence, not legitimate authority, and in this case, they switch roles and operate as a _rajal khair_.

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571 and operate as a rajal khair.

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[627] There are two primary types of political roles in al-Qasr, the traditional and the modern legal. Modern legal political roles have been decreed from above by the government. The traditional roles of 'aqila and "third party" represent autochthonous roles emerging from Bedouin social and cultural structures. Bedouin traditional roles correspond to Weber's ideal-type "traditional authority" which is based upon "piety for what actually, allegedly, or presumably has always existed" (Gerth and Mills 1946:296). The role of 'aqila is "traditional" rather than "legal" despite its fully institutionalized status. The relatively modern roles of 'umda and shaikh are what I term here "legal"; these offices are not, nor did any of my informants consider them to be, roles natural in the Bedouin political system. The legitimacy of these roles stems from, what Weber called, "legal authority" in which "submission . . . is based upon an impersonal bond to the generally defined and functional duty of office" (1946:299). [627] In this case, the norms to which conformity is demanded are not those espoused by the 'aqila or the "third party," but are established by national governmental decrees and regulations.

128 In the remaining part of this chapter, the attempt is to show two things which I consider essential to an understanding of Bedouin political structure and a perspective of

128 Bedouin culture change: how the Bedouins perceive their authority structure, and how political authorities relate to members of the political system.

Traditional Roles

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627 The authority and role of the 'aqila has been discussed so that I can devote attention to the "third party" roles in this section. No formalized document exists to stipulate the rights and duties of the "third party," such as exists for the 'aqila in the form of the rawaabit al-'awaaqil. Nevertheless, Bedouin litigants have certain expectations of a rajal khair when he mediates in a case of conflict. Before a rajal khair agrees to take part in the judicial process, the disputants make it explicit that they will accept his decision as final and binding. Such an agreement is not put into writing. On the other hand, a rajal khair can intervene into a dispute on his own. In so doing, he may gain in prestige relative to the manner and degree of success with which he handles the problem. By saving face for both parties in the quarrel, by cajoling an ingratiating attitude from both parties, the rajal khair may reinforce or augment his "status honor" and his local following.

*[613] A person occupying the office of 'aqila can participate in the process of conflict regulation as a rajal khair. We noted that this is a case of role-switching. It is conceivable

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*613 then that the _'aqila_ can increase his prestige and status beyond the limits of his formal role. When he does take the role of _rajal khair_, he does so only in conflict cases involving two lineages other than his own. Where any member of his own lineage is concerned, an incumbent _'aqila_ cannot be considered a neutral "third party" which is a prerequisite of this role. This factor constitutes a limit on the power of the _'aqila_.

One _'aqila_ explained the relationship between the _rajal khair_ and _'aqila_ roles in this way: "The two are equal. The _'aqila_ is responsible for one _bait_, but the _rajal khair_ solves any problem in any place, for any _bait_. He goes to them or they come to him. I am, for instance, responsible for the members of _Bait 'Umar_, but it is quite possible that any other _bait_ can ask for my advice in a problem. And so I go as a _rajal khair_."

In a general sense, the office of the _'aqila_ represents an ideal, while the real aspects of conflict regulation in al-Qasr center around the role of the "third party." In fact, many of the cases formally handled by the _'aqila_ afterwards undergo readjustment, as it were, by a _rajal khair_.
554 This is done by the _rajal khair's_ suggesting a "more reasonable"
571 settlement which is agreeable to both sides. For example, in
627 a case of conflict over water rights the following was reported: "The _'awaqil_ passed the judgement that they should pay a

554 dhabiiha and 10 L.E. But Hajj 'Ali intervened and did not
● 571 let them pay the fine. Instead, he had them write a paper
627 declaring that should they reopen this matter, they would
have to pay the old fine plus a new fine of the same amount." Simmel (Wolff 1950) notes that the mediator saves group unity through his "intellectuality," but that he is also an exploiter of the situation. It is obvious that Hajj 'Ali could have increased his "status honor" in the eyes of both parties to this conflict. The rajal khair who is facile enough to salvage the honor of both parties in a dispute increases his chances for future mediation and, hence, the chance to further augment his "status honor." The minimal fine involved in most of Bedouin litigation indicates a concern, not with punishment per se, but with "taking one's rights" and lawful share of honor. Social harmony is viewed in terms of an equitable distribution of honor. The power which a rajal khair has over litigants, which derives from his status in the social structure, contributes to this social harmony necessary for the persistence of the community.

554 The Bedouins say that one goes to the rajal khair,
571 or rajal salih, because he knows that he will "get his
627 rights." Litigation is entered into with the understanding
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[691] that neither party will emerge a "loser." On the other hand,
*[613] the 'aqila, who is expected to be dispassionate and totally
objective, must rule on the rightness or wrongness of an act;

554 hence the rajal khair represents a face-saving mechanicsm
• 571 and an alternative which is needed. The rajal khair may even
627 [829] violate group norms in acting to restore the balance of
* [613] honor: he may lie with intent to deceive, behavior which at
[577] any other time would be considered "wrong" by the Bedouin.
An informant said that

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> the real rajal khair is a man who goes to men in a quarrel and asks them to be on good terms and to avoid the devil. He uses good judgement in quarrels. In this case, he may even have to lie. He goes to both parties and listens to them insult each other, but when he returns he tells each that the other is a good man and wishes to settle the quarrel. He tells them: 'Do not let the devil interfere.' He tells each that the other wants his friendship.

554 I pursued the detail that a rajal khair may lie to restore
571 peace, since other informants had made a point of this. My
577 informant then explained:
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> I don't want to commit myself because no one knows if the rajal khair is really lying; the men at the time of the quarrel do not know that he is lying. Not all men are rajal khair: there are only a few. The rajal khair puts himself in trouble to help others, therefore, the people do not want to harm him (by thinking ill of him). The rajal khair must be a good man and help others, and he always speaks the truth. He lies but he is doing good, and the people do not want to harm him. When the rajal khair lies, a man does not lose his rights. A man tells the rajal khair this; he tells him that he does not want to lose his rights, and he does not care what he says as long as he does not lose his rights.

554 •571 *613 627 [539] One 'aqila, who is famous for the sharpness of his tongue in dealing with litigants, was explicit about the authority of the rajal khair as compared to his own in matters of conflict regulation:

> Both are one (i.e. the 'aqila and the rajal khair), for the rajal khair can also finish a problem. The rajal khair tries to solve the problem, but only the 'aqila judges (yahkum). The rajal khair worries about the feelings of the two men involved, but the 'aqila cares only about justice and what is right . . . The rajal khair does not want the two men to lose one another. It is a friendly way to solve problems.

554 571 627 829 *613 Bedouins of low status in al-Qasr who are economically linked to the rajal khair in what resembles a patron-client relationship permit this fact to influence their own interpretation of the authority structure. A common view of the 'aqila's formal authority indicates that the Bedouins themselves are conscious of a structural comparison of political roles, but not of the underlying economic conditioners at work.

> [539] There are good men and there are bad men: the rajal khair is the opposite of a bad man. The rajal khair is not responsible for his group, but the 'aqila is. The 'aqila is chosen from among the elders of the bait so that he is not always a good man. But when they want a man to solve problems, they get him from among the rajal khair. The 'aqila is responsible before the 'umda and shaikh, and he is responsible for collecting and receiving the diya.

554 571 627 182 The rajal khair represents a vital element in Bedouin society. He is a symbol of security, the man to whom one

554 turns in times of need dealing with financial and personal
•571 problems. In view of the value stress which the Bedouins
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182 place upon generosity, manifest in the redistributive system
[181] of the lineage, the wealth of the rajal khair is the wealth
[556] of the community. Wealth divides, not only possessors from
non-possessors, but also, seekers after security from power seekers. It is as Peters (1965:145) has noted in Cyrenaica: generosity, not being entirely altruistic, wins repute and repute is an important aspect of political power.

554 In an interview concerning the justice of blood-
682 revenge, there was general agreement that if a man kills
627 intentionally, then blood-revenge must be taken by the
*613 murdered man's bait against someone in the murderer's aiela.
829 But one prominent man (a rajal khair) protested that "the
best man in the killer's family must not be harmed." This statement generated a rather heated debate. One man said: "The best man should be killed for this is right in the Bedouin type of justice." (This comment was made by a man who is the 'aqila of a low-status lineage in al-Qasr.) The first speaker's reply to the protest was this:

> Nevertheless, it all depends upon the character of the best man . . . if he is evil and on bad terms with your family, then he will be the first one to be killed. But if he is a good man, then you kill the murderer himself . . . You must never kill a rajal khair because he may do good in the future.
> [178] In the old days, the killing started right away, and all problems were big ones: today there is negotiation--people are improving.

554 The rajal khair, then, is a broker in social relation-
571 ships, a manipulator of loyalties. As a member of the "status
627 group," he can afford to spend time and money in courting his
fellow tribesmen, and, as a result, can accrue prestige and
loyalty. This role, like that of the 'aqila, is a secular
[681] one. The sanctions which it controls are as economical as
those of the 'aqila's are political. In this sense, they
are differentiated from the role of rajal saalih whose
sanctions are sacred in nature.

554 The traditional role which we define as that of the
792 rajal saalih, "the holy man," was probably much more important
[178] in the past than it is today. In al-Qasr, there are only two
rajal saalih who share in traditional power: the one is a
resident of al-Qasr proper, and the other, a member of the
prestigious Sanusi family, lives near Marsa Matruh.

The rajal saalih of al-Qasr, i.e. the local "holy
man," is assured of status because he is an ashraf, one who
claims descent from the family of the Prophet. He is also a
[561] member of the elder age-set, and while he is not rich, he
cannot be considered poor. Though the "holy man" al-Sanusi
[793] lives near Matruh, he participates in the authority structure
of al-Qasr and is a member of the "status group." He is
sometimes referred to as rajal saalih kabir, "a great holy
man," by virtue of his Sanusi heritage.

[771] The relative unimportance of this role as compared
to that of the rajal khair in conflict regulation is a function

554 [571] [178] It is interesting to note that Hajj 'Ali is one of the most powerful members of the "status group" in al-Qasr. He is also a leading proponent of social change and a critic of the old way of life which includes belief in magic. [792] One can see how 'Amm Salih's influence and status might work in other areas of social action.

554 792 627 [695] [691] * [613] [829] Although it is conceivable that a rajal salih can be asked to intervene in any type of conflict, it is more likely that he will preside at cases involving marriage and divorce. The rajal saalih may also be asked to serve as a witness or consultant in litigation cases. The Bedouins point out that the "holy man," like the rajal khair, is apt to be more trustworthy than the formal authority, the 'aqila.

> Sanusi is a good man and the people should listen to him. He is a rajal khair, a rajal saalih, not an 'aqila. He is better than an 'aqila--he is our brother. He is much better than the 'umda because he never changes the truth. The 'umda may go and accuse me wrongly to the government but Sanusi would never do this.

554 792 It is, of course, difficult to decide whether Sanusi's charisma stems from the fact that he is a rajal salih, or the facts of his wealth and family. Most probably it is a little of both, the sacred as well as the secular. 'Amm Salih, on the other hand, is neither wealthy nor from a particularly prestigious family by economic standards of al-Qasr: he derives his influence and status from the sacred aspects of

554 792 his role.

The people of al-Qasr identify 'Amm Salih as the "holy man" in the area. [124] [627] In my interviews, when I asked for the name of a party, besides the *'aqila*, who solves the Bedouins' problems, the answer was either Hajj 'Ali, the *rajal khair*, or "the Jaraira family." (This refers to 'Amm Salih and his brother.) When I asked for the name of a man who could tell me "how the Bedouin should act," the only name mentioned was that of 'Amm Salih.

554 792 627 'Amm Salih says that he solves many problems, not all of which deal with marriage and divorce. He claimed that he could settle conflicts over land and water. Just as a man may choose to go to the *rajal khair*, so also might he go to the *rajal salih*. Often enough, the selection of a "third party" will be determined by his propinquity. One *'aqila* told me: "Salih Jaraira is a good man . . . If two men wish to accept Jaraira's decision, and if he lives near them, it is all right. *[613] ●[571] If Jaraira cannot solve the problem, then they will return to the *'aqila*. The *'aqila* can solve it or he can call in other *'awaqil* who can solve it."

[114] When I asked 'Amm Salih for case studies of problems which he has handled, he said that he would not reveal them because they are private affairs. He was willing, however, to describe the method in which he solves a problem.

554 toward legitimacy and the phenomenon of change in the
121 political structure. Peters (1967:271-279), in a long
awaited discussion of the political aspect of Cyrenaican Bedouin society, adumbrates this problem of differentiating between instituted authority and the distribution of power:

> In order to discuss this adequately, a lengthy diversion into an analysis of the distribution of power would be necessary . . . there are men who wield power over groups of varying populations, and the extent of their domains cannot be understood by reference to orders in the lineage. Perhaps it is for this reason--because, that is to say, lineage theory effectively blocks the exercise--that relatively little has been written about the problem of leadership in these societies (i.e. lineage societies).

554 Foci of power and authority change and at times
178 irrespectively of the lineage structure. The role of the
792 rajul saalih was more influential during the days of the
● 571 Sanusiiya movement than it is today. At that time, "holy
[795] men" controlled economic, and thus political, relations
through the zawiya system: they were in a position to command respect and obedience and could be considered a "status group" in their own right. Today, "holy men" are rarely found among the members of the "status group." As one informant phrased it: "They used to solve problems more in the past than now. People in the old days were not educated as they are today:
554 the mind of the son is larger than that of the father. In
178 the past, the "holy man" was so important that were he to ask
792

554 178 [792] you for your cloak, you would have immediately given it to him. God was pleased with them at that time."

This notion of changing foci of authority and power cannot be divorced from the related political phenomena of the tendency toward legitimacy and the role institutionalization
128 process. In the next chapter, I will attempt to show how such a conceptual framework can be utilized in an analysis of culture and political change.

Modern Legal Roles

634 554 [648] [177] The roles of 'umda and shaikh were created and imposed upon the Bedouins by Muhammad 'Ali sometime during the early part of the nineteenth century in order to facilitate administration, maintain security in the desert, and protect the Western frontier.

[619] Both of these roles are representative offices at the primary level of the tribal structure. The 'Aishaibat have an 'umda and a shaikh who reside in Marsa Matruh and work in close relation with the Governor. In terms of a chain of command, these offices receive demands which may originate either with the Governor in Matruh or with Bedouins in al-Qasr. But these offices are subservient to both the Governor and the Bedouins since no decision-making powers of any consequence resides with them. With reference to the two authority
[591] [635] structures, the Egyptian and the Bedouin, the 'umda and the

634 554 [571] [635] shaikh are administrators, not executives, in the service of the Governor and the "status group" of al-Qasr. Nevertheless, under the influence of the bureaucratic principle, as a new structural principle in Bedouin society, these offices could conceivably become seats of power.[4]

634 554 666 571 The 'umda and shaikh are described as "elective" offices by the Bedouins but, in fact, they are appointive just like the office of 'aqila. Theoretically, every man has a vote but, actually, only the members of the "status group" vote. Paradoxically, perhaps, the Bedouins stress two major qualifications for these offices: the 'umda and the shaikh must be men "who know the needs of the Bedouin of the desert, and know how to talk to the Governor"; and, "they must be men who do nothing without the permission of the 'awaaqil (i.e. without the permission of the "status group" who elected the 'aqila in the first place).

634 554 The two offices are not equal in prestige and status neither in the eyes of the Bedouins or of the Egyptians. The office of shaikh is the lesser office. It amounts to a clerical post, and the shaikh really functions as an assistant

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[635] [4] The Governor, who is of Bedouin origin, has already recognized this potential and has moved to eliminate the possibility of a more powerful 'umda representing a more powerful "status group." When I left the field, the Governor was in the process of drawing up new ground rules for electing the 'umda and the shaikh which would call for public elections on a "one man, one vote" basis.

634 to the 'umda. Both offices are for a life-term, only being
554 terminated by bad behavior or senility. At the expiration
634 of an incumbent's term, the "status group" meets in al-Qasr
•571 to decide upon his replacement. The name of a "nominee"
635 is passed on to the Governor who is expected to approve the
666 Bedouins' selection of a representative to the government.
[178] It is this "status group"-controlled process which the
[177] Governor seeks to change. Since these are officially held
offices in the U.A.R. governmental structure, he feels that
elections to fill their vacancies should be a public affair.
Naturally, he will exercise more influence over the naming
of candidates in this way, and the Bedouins perceive this as
a challenge to the traditional structure of leadership and
control of external relations.

634 The offices of 'umda and shaikh are even more heredi-
*613 tary than that of 'aqila, which theoretically should not be
666 the case. By definition, the role of 'aqila is functional at
[428] the bait level, and so the recruitment pool of candidates
for this office is inherently limited. By comparison, the
offices of 'umda and shaikh should go to the "best men" in
the tribe, and, therefore, the recruitment pool should be
634 tribal-wide. But, in fact, these two offices are considered
*613 "the property" of the wealthiest lineages in the al-Qasr area.
666 There is a traditional rationale behind this fact: there is
428 the structural necessity for, and conscious practice of, an
[570]

634 asymmetrical power relationship between commoners and "status
*613 group" which maintains political order. The Bedouins say of
666 the _'umda's_ office, as they did of the _'aqila_, "if the son is
428 worthy of the office, then he should take his father's place."
•[571] Such a statement is usually qualified by noting that if the son does not possess the qualifications of the office, of course, he will not succeed. This is not simply a case of power politics, there is more to it. Behind the inheritance of the _'umda_ and _shaikh_ office is a logical concern and attempt to sustain a balance of political and social relations.

The "inheritance" of the _'aqila's_ office is explained by showing that the candidates for the office are limited to the brothers and sons of the incumbent, the former _'aqila_. The offices of _'umda_ and _shaikh_, in contrast, have a recruitment pool which includes, potentially, every man at the primary tribal level, the 'Aishaibat. The rule of succession, where the modern legal roles are concerned, is a mechanism for maintaining, what is considered by most Bedouins to be, the legitimate distribution of power in al-Qasr. Once the roles
634 of _'umda_ and _shaikh_ have been "captured" by a _bait_, for
*613 political power resides at the tertiary level of the lineage
666 structure, any attempt to change the distribution or locus
428 of power will be culturally transformed into a threat to the
578 honor, not of the individual, but of his _bait_ and _'aiela_. And this is a basis for conflict in Bedouin society. It is

634 *613 666 428 [578] no coincidence, then, that the present 'umda and shaikh are the sons of the former 'umda and shaikh. This reveals not only the structural rules of succession, but also indicates that "social honor," and thus power, still resides with these families.

[178] It is important to note that since the time of their inception, these roles have not changed 'aiela or even bait in al-Qasr. When the former 'umda from 'Ailit Lazumi died, 634 *613 666 428 •571 his eldest son petitioned to the 'awaaqil of the 'Aishaibat that he be approved to succeed to his father's position. The 'awaaqil met and made their decision. One 'aqila who was present at the election said: "The office of 'umda should stay in the Lazumi family since the father was 'umda. The 'awaaqil agreed on the son. But the son will be accepted to follow his father only if he is good. If he is not good, the 'awaaqil will find a new bait." Although the Bedouins speak of "the 'awaaqil" electing the 'umda, it must be remembered that it is the "status group" which makes the decision, and that the 'awaaqil are only part of this group. The names of [627] the men who elected the present 'umda include less 'awaaqil and more rajal khair.

114 634 666 Before I arrived in the field, the present acting 'umda of the 'Aishaibat tribe was elected to the national parliament to represent the province of Marsa Matruh. The election of his replacement was not scheduled to take place

114 634 until sometime after my departure from the field.[5] Never-
666 theless, before I left the field I discussed the pending
114 election with some of my informants and members of the
634 "status group." The interviews reveal that the "status
666 group" still intends to dominate the area of power relations
124 829 with the government. As one informant said: "The present
*[613] *'umda* and the one before him were from Bait Bu Taram of
'Ailit Lazumi, and the next one will be from Bu Taram also."

634 The tenacity of traditional politics and the influence
•571 of the "status group" are reflected in the affairs surrounding
666 the election of a new incumbent to the office of *'umda*. In
this situation, all Bedouins become concerned more with the
distribution of power than with the actual person who will
124 fill the authority role. One informant, an *'aqila*, gave
*613 indication that formal authorities support the "status group"
634 and the distribution of power which they represent and maintain.

> 571 666 Mustafa, the brother of the *'umda*, takes his place
> while he is in Cairo attending Parliament. The *'umda*
> told me that he was going to ask the *'awaaqil to*
> sacrifice (i.e. slaughter a lamb) and write a paper
> making Mustafa the new *'umda*. (Here I told the informant
> that I had spoken with Mustafa about this, and he told
> me that he did not want to be the *'umda*).
> Even if Mustafa does not want to be the *'umda*, the
> *'awaaqil* will force him to accept . . . It should remain
> in the same family, it would be a shame if the office
> went to another family. Mustafa's father and brother
> were *'umdas* before him. If the office left the family,

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[5] Technically, the 'Aishaibat were without an *'umda* while I was in the field. However, he spent enough time in Matruh that he was able to carry on his duties until his successor could be named.

> 124 If the office left the family,
> *613 all of the lineages would be fighting over it . . . The
> 634 job should stay in Bait Bu Taram; if this is impossible,
> •571 then it should stay in 'Ailit Lazumi. In any case, the
> 666 *'awaagil* will decide.

578 A change in the present locus of legal authority in
634 the Bedouin-Egyptian government structural relationship
178 would amount to a re-structuring process, and could lead to
121 serious conflict. In the very least, it would call for a clear explanation and new statement of social reality since it would challenge what is, and "has always been," a legitimate distribution of power and political order.

634 The office of the *shaikh* is not a potential power-
554 base by comparison with the office of *'umda*. The *shaikh*, rather than being in direct communication with the Governor, executes the official orders made known to the *'umda.* As an administrator, he takes care of issuing drivers' licenses, notifies men of their military draft status, etc. The government sees this as a necessary post because of the difficulty of contacting Bedouins deep in the desert. In one sense, the *shaikh's* office is becoming less functional as the Bedouin move in from the desert and begin to take part in the national society, but in another sense it is becoming more functional as bureaucracy and red tape become increasingly complex. But the *shaikh* remains in the shadow of the *'umda*. He never substitutes for the *'umda*, for this would infringe on the rightful power of the *'umda's* family; when the *'umda* is absent,

634 his brother sits in his place.

554 The present *shaikh* is a member of 'Ailit Ma'fas, and
634 this is to offset the fact that the office of *'umda* is in
*613 'Ailit Lazumi. It reflects the need to distribute official
554 power and to symbolize the real power structure. Historically,
the Lazumi were more powerful than the Ma'fas. These two
lineages are the largest, wealthiest, and most influential
in al-Qasr and among the 'Aishaibat. When the present
[666] *shaikh's* father decided to retire due to old age, he requested
● [571] that his son be allowed to take up his role. The *'awaaqil*
of the 'Aishaibat in al-Qasr approved this "nomination" and
[556] the son was "elected." It is a fact that the *shaikh's* father
is the richest man among the members of the 'Ailit Ma'fas
and that the *'umda's* father was the richest man of 'Ailit
Lazumi.

571 Power groups tend to interact so as to enhance not
*613 the official authority structure but the political *status quo*
582 (Peters 1967:279). This explains a practice of the "status
group" which Max Weber referred to as "connubism," the tendency
of the members of this group to exchange women among themselves.
*613 In Figure 10,[1] the marriages of 'Ait Abd al-Malik of Bait 'Umar
582 of 'Ailit Ma'fas show that out of seventeen marriages only
four of these were within the 'Aishaibat, and that three out
of four of these marriages were with 'Ailit Lazumi. Even
more impressive is the information obtained from considering

[1] [See p. 132--Analyst]

121 tradition" and "the little tradition." The "little tradition" refers to peasant or folk culture, and the "great tradition" to a specialized and systematized body of thought which is, in most cases, esoteric, written, related to religion, and the property of an intellectual group (1960:40-59; 1962:302). Of course, Redfield's notion of a "literati" does not apply in the Bedouin case. But in an earlier work (1953:44) Redfield drew attention to the more general concept of "intelligentsia" which further refines the scope and types of leadership. Redfield refers to "the member of the intelligentsia . . . (who) belongs to two worlds, not one; he is a marginal man." He then goes on to differentiate between the "literati" type and the "intelligentsia" type, stating that the former type uses literacy to carry on the sacred tradition while the member of the "intelligentsia" may use literacy "to admit
121 the ways of the world outside." While the rajal khair does
554 not become the representative of the great and sacred tradition
627 of Islam, he does utilize the bureaucratic means at hand to
177 admit the outside world into al-Qasr. The rajal khair may be
[571] considered a member of an "intelligentsia."

121 Gustave von Grunebaum (1962) has used Redfield's model of cultural dynamics to understand change and social mobility in the Arab World with special reference to Egypt. The author, an Islamicist, states that the "great tradition" of orthodox Islam in contrast to popular Islam is recognized as "the more

121 advanced" and is assumed "to have authority"; that the
"great tradition" is represented in the writings and public
actions of the political elite; and that "social prestige is
dependent on its adoption (or at least on its profession)"
(1962:69). Implicit in von Grunebaum's analysis, and also
contained in Redfield's model, is the employment of reference
121 group theory to understand human behavior in society. In
177 the al-Qasr case, I have tried to show that "status group"
●571 members repudiate many of the traditional ways of life while
181 at the same time identifying more and more with the Egyptian
"status group," the bureaucrats of Marsa Matruh. The implication here is that the Bedouin "status group" is in the
process of taking on the values of a new reference group to
which they do not yet belong but to which they seek admission.

The bureaucrats of Marsa Matruh, like those of Cairo
and Alexandria described by von Grunebaum, represent the
"great tradition." The "status group" of al-Qasr while
aspiring to the "great tradition" emulate certain of the
behavioral traits and expectations of the elite group. For
[771] instance, they are conspicuous for their regular attendance
at Friday mosque services in Matruh. Merton, who has developed
reference group theory, points out that "men frequently orient
themselves to groups other than their own in shaping their
behavior and evaluations" (1957:234). This type of behavior,
or "anticipatory socialization," is the process of taking on

121 the values of a non-membership group in order to "find readier
177 acceptance by that group and make an earlier adjustment to
•571 it" (Merton 1957:265). In a relatively closed society such as
181 al-Qasr, when those who qualify for membership in other
reference groups are able to do more than merely aspire, when
they actually anticipate and adjust their behavior to a type
of status consciously desired, the local authority and social
structures are likely to be transformed.

121 We can generalize from the literature on social
571 stratification that the hierarchial structure characteristic
554 of traditional societies carries with it a relationship of
mutual obligation. The "inferior" owes rent, respect, loyalty,
obedience, etc., while the "superior" owes, in return, protection, advice, help in emergency, action in conflict regulation, representation in extralocal matters, etc. (Hagen 1962:
121 55-86; Parsons 1953: 108). In al-Qasr, the 'aqila fulfills
554 only one of the functions of the "superior," that which deals
*[613] with conflict regulation. The rajal khair role, as I have
[627] developed it, may function in full capacity as a "superior."
121 The rajal khair dominates the internal system through power
554 derived from rank on the prestige scale: he is prominent in
627 the external system as member and representative of a new
power structure based on national and political consciousness.
Traditionally, rajal khair-dominance was not by force but
through influence and prestige: in the new situation, with a

121 fully organized government behind the role, the element of
554 force may enter into the *rajal khair* style of domination.
627 Thus far, the *'umda* and the *shaikh* roles have functioned
[634] through the traditional roles of the *'aqila* and the *rajal*
*[613] *khair*, that is, the "status group." In the future, this pattern
[178] may change. It is also possible that new roles will emerge. This is what I wish to explore.

121 The "status group" of al-Qasr operating with a sense
•571 of identity with a modern reference group deem themselves
554 responsible for making decisions on the behalf of "the people"
or "the Bedouin." Members of the "status group" would
[177] occasionally dress in Western clothes; they would hunt gazelle for sport; they owned the few autos there were in the area; and a few partook of alcoholic beverages. Their rights and obligations in social relations are still relatively stable and depend on the ascribed values of al-Qasr Bedouin society, but one can detect the start of a power struggle within the group. It is a competitive desire for social mobility and is stated in terms of the achieved attributes considered important by the reference group to which they aspire, the Egyptian society. For example, one sometimes heard the complaint from various members of the "status group" that the Governor was not giving proper recognition to those "who understood the ways of the Bedouin," and "those who could speak for the Bedouin."

121 My approach here is to state the problem of authority
554 and change using a case study of one man whom I consider the
571 most prestigious member of the "status group" of al-Qasr. He
156 is a member of the "status group" by virtue of his wealth and family connections; he has reinforced and enhanced his "status honor" by the practice of intervening into various conflict situations and mustering support, favors, and loyalty as he goes; and he has proved his "superiority" by excelling in the outside business world. All this he has done while remaining a "good Bedouin."

124 The name of Hajj 'Ali appeared time and time again as
554 my research progressed and increasingly concentrated on the
156 authority structure.[2] I asked questions which required the informants to name a person in al-Qasr to whom he would go if he needed help, money or advice. I asked: "Who is the leader of the Bedouin?";"Who knows the wants and needs of the Bedouin most intimately?" On the basis of the data collected
[571] in this manner, I was able to perceive a "status group" and gain an idea of the real leaders of al-Qasr. It also gave me a working knowledge of the local role structure. Hajj 'Ali's name came up with the highest frequency in the questionnaires, and my observations and interviews with him corroborated his central place in the authority structure.
[126] I also recorded the life history of Hajj 'Ali's son, and gained valuable insights from this data.

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[2] The name, Hajj 'Ali, is of course a pseudonym.

156
159 and they sat on chairs inside the tent. I returned to
554 Marsa Matruh in the 'umda's car (1964 Ford, highly polished)
635
537 with the 'umda and the shaikh. They openly joked about Hajj
[634] 'Ali and his manner of presentation; they repeated some of
[122] his "stilted" phrases and laughed. Hajj 'Ali gave last year's
[522] reception speech also. This is because, his son says, Hajj
'Ali is considered a fine speaker by the Bedouins of al-Qasr.

121 We can see how these details carry larger implications
177 within the context of political and social structures undergoing
178 going change. It is the stuff which the anthropologist finds
important for an understanding of the process of change.

156 If I have established thus far that Hajj 'Ali is
159 politically active and representative in both the traditional
554 and the modern systems, ~~then~~ the attempt is now to prove that
177 he consciously seeks to change the traditional in the direction
178 of the modern for political and moral reasons, and for social
and personal reasons.

156 Hajj 'Ali, when he spoke with me, inevitably came
159 around to the subject of international politics, whether this
554 was the question of Israel or the image which America's racial
177 problems presented. Hajj 'Ali was the only man from the whole
178 Marsa Matruh area who was neither shaikh nor 'umda to attend
124
829 the nomination of Jamal Abd al-Nasser in January of 1965. In
● [577] all of this, I detect a move on the part of Hajj 'Ali to
identify himself with an Egyptian reference group and to

156 draw al-Qasr into the Egyptian political community. He has
159 committed himself to work hand-in-hand with the Governor of
554 Marsa Matruh in introducing changes connected with economics
177 and education into al-Qasr. He does not conceal this fact.
178 When I spoke with him about helping me with my study of
124 changing attitudes in al-Qasr, he said: "I might have the
829 time to do this, but before I decide you will have to bring
● [571] me a letter from the Governor stating that he wishes me to
cooperate with you." The identity and responsibility which
Hajj 'Ali feels for his role of agent of change is indicated
in his remark to me that he had heard "there were others in
the desert who feel and think the way I myself do."

156 Hajj 'Ali is discretely aware of the status difference
159 between himself, as a member of the "status group," and the
554 others of al-Qasr. As Weber would say, he perceives the
571 difference in "style of life." I was invited to Hajj 'Ali's
574 house for _'iid al-fitr_, the feast marking the end of Ramadan.
796 I thought that this would be a good opportunity to observe
123 the "leaders" of al-Qasr together. I was very much surprised
to find present no members of the "status group" but only
[556] their exact opposites. On the occasion of this feast it is
[735] the custom that the rich treat the poor. As an additional
surprise, we had a very simple meal of bread, dates, peanuts,
and tea. Hajj 'Ali explained to me: "My neighbors do not
have my economic advantages, and I do not think it is proper

156 to serve other than what they eat." Hajj 'Ali is not only
159 554 conscious of social stratification in his society, but he also
571 has a great deal of empathy with the less endowed, a pre-
574 requisite of a traditional Bedouin leader and an advantageous
796 123 one for a modern leader.

He is aware of most traditional institutions and how
156 they relate to conditions of modernity. Hajj 'Ali, whose own
159 554 marriages speak for his political acumen, sees only disadvantages
829 in the cousin-right marriage custom of the Bedouins. His
582 interest in getting on with the business of change, so to
speak, has led him to question a basic right contained in the
Bedouin principle of lineage structure and corporate membership.

> A thing which I do not like about our customs is the idea that a man has a right to his uncle's daughter. The man binds his cousin and in the end he might not marry her and will be the cause of her never marrying. He gives himself the authority to decide whom she may or may not marry. If he knows she desires to marry a certain man, he says: "She can marry anyone but not that one."

[562] Here he challenges the traditional right of the individual
male in Bedouin society, favoring the rights of the female.
[177] The emancipation of the female, especially in rights and
[178] duties concerned with the marriage contract, is an element
[562] of the modernization process in Egyptian society and the
Middle East in general.

*613 The bait, as a political group, is in part structurally
602 defined by the corporate principle which states that blood-kin
571
682

*613 602 •571 682 at this lineage level must bear collective responsibility in matters of compensation and blood-revenge. This principle, as we have seen, is extended until the whole 'aiela is included in a symbolic expression of corporate group solidarity. In order for this expression to persist, of course, the mechanism, or ideology, of blood-revenge must be maintained. [124] All of my informants, though they disagreed over the details of revenge, insisted that it was the inviolable right of the 156 159 554 829 682 Arabs. But Hajj 'Ali took exception to the practice of blood-revenge for a number of reasons. He said:

> The world changes. Before it was only the 'awaiyid Awlad 'Ali and the Border Guards which kept order. The government now enters into the matter of killings. Personally, I do not agree with the custom and the way it operates. In the case of killing, for instance, someone who is not worth anything, and has no brains, kills one from another tribe. Then the tribe of the [778] killer asks for the nazaala, and a third party becomes involved. The third party agrees to guard the killer's bait for twelve months and the business of all those involved must stop. A member of the third party's family must accompany each member of the killer's tribe. But even after the twelve months one must live in fear at his own home, for after the twelve months the tribe of the deceased will try to kill the best man in the killer's tribe. How many good ones do we have in one tribe? I have heard that in Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia the deceased man's family has the right to kill the killer only . . . (I then commented that perhaps blood-revenge functions to discourage killing in the desert.) But there are unbalanced people who actually commit murder just to tease their tribe: they have nothing to fear because no one is interested in killing them in retaliation.

In challenging the Arabs' traditional right to blood-revenge, Hajj 'Ali--besides questioning a structural basis of

613 If any disagreement between the
578 responsibility of the majority of the awaqil to persuade the minority to
● 571 conform to the majority's decision. This is usually done by simple personal
613 persuasion. In certain instances, however, when a particular aqila
554 is known for being troublesome to the Amar, refusing to abide by the majority
571 578 decisions, an attempt may be made by the others to build up popular
support around another person in the Bait which the aqila represents.
If this strategy is successful, it might lead to replacing the aqila by
another who is more abiding to the Amar's decisions. This approach is
more likely to succeed if the aqila is not a popular person in his own
Bait, for if he is popular, any attempt by the other Baits to disqualify
the aqila would be viewed by the members of his Bait as interference in
their own affairs and might lead them to rally even more strongly around
their leader.

613 The other tendency occurring when the size of the Eilat increases
is toward the separation of one or more of its constiuent Baits. Originally
613 this was done by merely refusing to share in the payment of bloodmoney.
682 If this refusal continued, it was considered as a sign of
[178] separation of the Bait. In recent years this created problems with an
increasing number of individuals claiming separation from the Amar to
avoid the payment of the bloodmoney, while claiming membership when distribution
613 is done. This led many tribal segments to require that the
675 "barawa" or separation of individuals or tribal units from any particular
Amar should be put in writing, after getting the approval of the Amar to
which he belonged. When the approval is given and the separation in put
in writing, it is announced to all other tribal segments. If this is
[672] done, members of the separated tribal segment are not held responsible

682 settlement is usually made after the parties have agreed to it,
627 yet, in certain instances where one of the parties later feels that
672 the settlement was not just or that he was coerced into accepting
695 it, he may ask for a second Mi'ad during which new procedures start
in the case. In the present case, although Mahdi had originally
accepted the judgment of the awaqil, as time passed and he realized
that he was unable to pay the bloodmoney, he started to question
682 the feasibility of the settlement. He discussed the matter
672 with Sheikh Suliman el-Gerery from the Murabiteen tribe of Gerera,
695 a tribe whose members are feared throughout the area for the belief
554 that they have certain supernatural powers. Sheikh Suliman himself
792 [776] is highly respected, and people believe that after his death he will
become "vali" or a saint. After hearing Mahdi's complaint, Sheikh
Suliman told him that the settlement was unjust and told him that he
would do something about it. The following Thursday, Sheikh Suliman
called on Mahdi and asked him to bring his donkey and follow him.
They rode to a small desert town called Bahig where the local market
613 is held every Thursday. On market day, the awaqil of various tribal
517 segments usually gather in front of the general store in the town
571 drinking tea and chatting until their sons or the younger members
443 576 of their families sell the sheep and buy the necessary items. Everyone
passing by the gathering is expected to greet the gathering, getting
off his donkey as a sign of respect to the prominent people.
[689] Failure to greet a fellow tribesman is considered a serious offense
liable to a fine of more than L. 50 and ten goats in certain cases.
[673] It is considered a very serious crime. One informant once told me,
000

105 On the other hand, there is always a feeling of rivalry and hostility
578 between the different tribal segments which goes back to the era of
571 tribal warfare. Thus, the social relations among the tribal population
are characterized by a certain amount of ambivalence which is hidden behind
a facade of formality in the way tribal members treat one another
105 in day-to-day activities. There are certain rules of etiquette describing
571 the way members of the same tribal segment should behave toward one
576 another and toward other tribesmen and outsiders. Failure to abide by
[589] these rules may subject the violator to a symbolic fine of a goat or a
[574] sheep slaughtered for a feast to which everyone is invited. These feasts,
[182] or dinners as they are called, have various functions, the most important
105 of which is the integrative one. In an area where the population is usually
571 dispersed, these dinners offer an opportunity to the tribesmen who
574 happen to be in the area at the time of the feast to attend, where they
182 eat, meet other tribesmen, and exchange information about what is happening
in other parts of the area. It is from such dinners that the tribesmen
get to know about the available pastures, about the prices of sheep
and goats in different markets, and about who is doing what and where.
The occasion also signifies the restoration of the violator of the rules
to the social life of the group and the reinforcement of those rules.
105 This is also true with the tribal meetings, or mi'ad, which are held to
629 announce settlements in more serious cases. It is on this basis that
182 [illegible] the mi'ad should not be considered as a tribal court. It is more of a
[574] social occasion where food and drinks are served and where parties involved
and all those invited by them talk about everything except the
[589] dispute itself. In certain instances, the financial settlement agreed
upon in the informal mediation is exaggerated when announced in the mi'ad

105 so that part of it may be reduced in honor of some prominent members
627 who are attending the meeting. When part of the financial agreement is
182 reduced in honor of a person, this creates an obligation on the part of
681 that person to reciprocate in a similar situation when one arises. This
554 creates an active interest in the settlement on the part of individuals who otherwise are not involved, and insures the durability of the settlement. The social cohesion is maintained.

105 The need to keep friendly relations with all tribesmen is reflected
571 in the judicial process in its procedural aspect, as well as in judicial
578 reasoning, that is, the logic according to which facts in certain cases
627 are assessed. With regard to procedures, there is an emphasis on avoid-
182 ing face-to-face confrontations between the disputing parties until an agreement has been reached by means of the mediators. Only then is it that the parties see and talk to one another. This is especially true in serious cases such as homicide or serious assault where face-to-face confrontation is likely to lead to more hostilities.

105 The emphasis on reconciliation may explain, at least in part, the in-
571 formality of the judicial process. Leaving the process of dispute settle-
627 ment informal gives it a measure of flexibility which permits the treatment
182 of each case as unique without being tied down by rigid formal rules. This does not mean, however, that there are no rules to be followed, or that there is no place for legal precedents. It simply means that the rules are very general and that the legal precedents are used merely as a guide in solving similar cases. The main guide remains, however, the desire to achieve a successful settlement that satisfies all parties. It is only through achieving such successful settlements that the social order is maintained and the tribal cohesion is secured.

The
Turkish Administration was centred in the towns but operated, 632
as will be explained later, through the contacts of its local 648*
officials, who were generally Arabs of the country, with the lead- 571
ing tribal Shaikhs, with whom they made friends. These officials 369
were townsmen or sons of Bedouin who had received an urban
education and they acted as links between the citizen com-
munities and the Bedouin. Through Bedouin relations with
town merchants and officials what was happening in the world
outside Cyrenaica percolated to the most distant tents. Another 795*
channel of political and cultural infiltration was the network of 571
Sanusiya lodges. The Shaikh of the Sanusiya lodge at Banghazi 648*
was regarded as the ambassador of the head of the Order to the 177
Governor of Cyrenaica and he was chosen for qualities which 632
fitted him for this role. He was consulted by the Governor on 793
matters in which the tribes were involved, and through him 369
and the Brothers of the lodges of the towns news of the outside
world reached the Head of the Order in the distant oasis of
Kufra and the Heads of the local lodges, whose relations with
the Bedouin in their localities were intimate. Thus, as will be
seen, the Bedouin had a general idea of what the revolution of
the 'Young Turks' meant and were aware of the impending crisis
long before the Italian attack on their country was delivered.
But though maintaining communications with the towns, 632
neither the tribal Shaikhs nor the Sanusiya allowed themselves 571
to be subordinated to them or identified themselves with urban 795
interests. The Bedouin Shaikh did not, like the Syrian land- 369
owner, feel any need to have a town house, and the Sanusiya
ever remained a country and Bedouin Order and directed its
affairs from the desert.

Town and country kept apart, with the towns dependent on 632
the country and not the country on the towns, because there 369
was in Cyrenaica no client peasantry bound by debt, need of 565
protection, and trade monopoly to the towns. The Bedouin
did not settle on the land where they would be an easy prey to
the usurer, overseer, and tax collector. Those who were defeated [167]
in the great tribal wars of the past and in the inter-tribal and
inter-sectional fighting of more recent times migrated to Egypt
and settled there as *fallahin*, and not in Cyrenaica. In Cyrenaica 565
there is not the spur of adverse climatic conditions or the lash 167
of land shortage to drive them to depart from their ancient

stretching across to the village of Ajadabiya in the east, topples 613
in undulations away into the flat expanses of the desert to the 619
south. At all these points of segmentation, the territories occupied 621
by the various sections are large and roughly defined, and 133
the population aggregates supported on these territories run from 182
over a thousand at one end to tens of thousands at the upper 131
limits. The tertiary sections are numerically much smaller, some of them numbering as few as a hundred souls in all, and the territories to which they are attached are correspondingly smaller. The relationship between the numbers in this order of section, and the precise amount of water available in the local wells is an intimate one. If the population of one of these groups increases, or if the number of animals rises, or if the springs show a decline in the volume of water they give forth, or if the winter rainfall has allowed the storage in wells of only a small quantity of water, a rearrangement of the group must be effected. A significant alteration of any one of these components must mean that the local group must split to enable a new adjustment to be made in the relationship of man and animals to water.

Whatever changes occur within groups of any size, since the 173
genealogy embraces the entire population, these must appear on 178
the genealogy in some way or other. Now a genealogy is as rigid 829
a framework, as fixed and final a pattern of grouping, as can be 613
imagined. The impression that they are thus rigid and fixed, except 551
for the addition of successive generations, is strengthened by the way in which the Bedouin use them. From their young boys to their old men, the Bedouin are expert genealogists, and the names of ancestors, for one reason or another, are never far
from their lips. Names are kept alive by constant use, since all [571] ●
references to inter-group relationships must be in terms of these
names. More than this, the Bedouin were proud to the point of 173
boastfulness of their genealogical knowledge, and, wherever I 829
travelled, the first request I had to comply with was to take down 613
a large portion of a tribal genealogy. In recording their endless 551
genealogies, one feature about them came to assume increasing 123
interest; while there was remarkable unanimity with regard to 126
most of the names given, there was one point of marked ambiguity—at the tertiary level of segmentation. I recorded genealogies in four tribes on an extensive scale, and in each tribe

619 attached somewhere along the line, to attach it to one of these
608 names. Bedouin welcome, as members of their camps, practically
613 anyone who wishes to join, even, in the case of one group, an
621 Italian. The limit to this acceptance of members is, of course, the
173 number of people who can be supported by the local resources.
If people are being admitted freely to membership of a particular
[182] camp, this means that there is a local surplus of land and water,
so that the number of grafts being supported by any particular
section is a useful index of the extent to which the resources are
being used. Conversely, as sometimes happens when grafted elements become numerous, or when the water supply, for various
reasons, dwindles, it may be necessary to detach a grafted group.
[578] Such action is always the occasion of a violent dispute, usually
over watering rights, and not infrequently fights break out.
Whether or not the grafted group wins, from then onwards it will be forced to exist as an independent group, and a new tertiary section will have been born. No matter which of the processes involving grafts is considered—incorporation or detachment—both are contained within the framework of the tertiary section, without any effect on the rest of the structure.

619 The position of the clients, in the context of this discussion, is
not unlike that of the grafts. Briefly, clients are men who are con-
[423] sidered to have originated from a country other than Cyrenaica,
and who for this reason cannot claim rights to land and water—at least this is the theory, although in some circumstances they are able to do so successfully. They are of various kinds, but they are not included in the genealogies given by the free-born. Clients are found grouped in two main ways. There are some large groups which constitute tribes in the sense that they display a genealogical and territorial organization like those of the free-born, and are usually to be found flanking the main tribes of the country on their borders. Some of these are powerful groups and enjoy considerable independence of action, but whatever their characteristics they none the less speak of themselves as 'for' or
619 tied to the noble tribe whose territory includes theirs. Further,
571 the sections of these client tribes have their special ties with
621 tertiary sections of the noble tribes, which are not merely ties of
613 sentiment, but which take the form of valuable mutual help in a
number of situations. A whole client tribe, in the sense that it is

occupying territory which cannot be said to belong to any particular 619
section of their noble patron tribe, is tied to the patron 571
tribe as such. Yet it is through the small tertiary segments that 621
these ties are made effective. In this sense, a client tribe is a combination 613
of small groups of people each group having specific
relationships with defined tertiary sections, and participating in
the tribe of their patrons through these relationships.

Secondly, clients are found distributed in small groups, sometimes 619
no more than one or two men, but often in clusters large 621
enough to compose a small camp. Practically all tertiary sections 613
of the noble tribes have some clients either living with them or
sharing their resources. While clients continue to reside with a 619
particular tertiary section, it is the members of the latter who are 621
responsible for them and vice versa. If, for example, one of the 613
clients commits a homicide, the gathering of blood-money is the 672
responsibility of the noble tertiary section to which he is attached, [682]
and vengeance can be exacted on any member of the
noble section. In other circumstances, when the offender is a
nobleman, then the clients of his group are the first to be approached
for blood-money. Tied in this way to a particular 619
tertiary section, they are not, however, compelled to reside with 621
its members permanently. On the contrary, they may be forced 182
to move. If, for example, there is a pressure on local water supplies, 166
the first to feel it are the clients. Annually, they supplicate 613
for the use of water, and if their patrons decide that there is insufficient
to meet all needs, the request is refused, albeit reluctantly.
Clients constitute a socially mobile group; they are the
pawns in the annual readjustment of men to their resources.
Whenever they move, they pass on to another tertiary section,
which may be a collateral section of the one they have left or
structurally far removed from it, but as soon as they leave one,
their duties and obligations cease and are taken up anew with
another structurally like group. It is because their attachment is
to a tertiary section, and not to one of superior order, that they
can be as socially mobile as they are, which in turn facilitates a
more efficient adjustment to the ecological situation from year
to year.

Small groups of clients move frequently, groups of adopted
people less frequently, and groups composed of the free-born

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SOME STRUCTURAL ASPECTS OF THE FEUD AMONG THE CAMEL-HERDING BEDOUIN OF CYRENAICA[1]

E. L. PETERS

WHEN a Bedouin kills another in Cyrenaica, one of a number of consequences 682
ensues. According to the Bedouin, the particular consequence is determined by 571
the genealogical positions of the persons or groups concerned. In the first part of 829
this article an analysis of the disturbances in social relationships precipitated by 128
homicide is made, using a lineage model as a framework. In this part of the discussion the arrangement of the information corresponds closely to the view the
Bedouin give of their relationships. Additional information is then presented to show [613]
that this lineage model neither covers several important areas of social relationships
nor enables an accurate prediction of events to be made. This raises the issue: can the 121
comprehensive power of the model be increased by complicating it, or does com- 613
plexity destroy its utility? The argument advanced is that the lineage model is not a 571
sociological one, but that it is a frame of reference used by a particular people to give them a common-sense kind of understanding of their social relationships. For
sociological purposes this means that the lineage model, with its supporting theoreti-
cal presuppositions, must perforce be abandoned. In the latter part of this article [128]
some of the implications of adopting this position are discussed. Particular stress is [578]

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[1] This study is based on field-work in Cyrenaica carried out over a period of twenty-seven months from January 1948 to December 1950. The field-work was made possible by the award of a Horniman Studentship and of a Treasury Senior Studentship in Oriental Languages and Cultures. I wish to express my thanks to both awarding bodies. The paper was presented in its first form to a seminar at Manchester University. Modified versions were read at Oxford and Cambridge and at University College London in 1963. In a Manchester seminar, Professor W. J. M. Mackenzie raised issues which led me to reconsider my mode of analysis. Professor Ely Devons read a draft of the article, and offered valuable suggestions. I also wish to thank Professor Gluckman for the 12
many profitable discussions we have had on the institution of the feud. My interest in the feud stems [114] ←
directly from Evans-Pritchard's work on the institution among the Nuer. I am most grateful to him for his help and encouragement while I was pursuing my researches. Finally, anyone writing on the feud must acknowledge the contribution made to its understanding by Dr. Elizabeth Colson.

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121 given to the feud, for this is one of the few societies in which it occurs.[1] What is
613 meant here by a state of feud is a set of relationships between two tribal groups which
578 are characterized by hostility whenever two or more of their members meet. These
• 571 hostilities are of a sort which cannot be terminated; feud is not a matter of a group
121 indulging in hostilities here at one moment and there the next, but a sequence of
619 hostilities which, as far as the contemporary Bedouin are concerned at least, know
578 no beginning and are insoluble. Feud and the other forms of relationships to be
[571] discussed presently are to be understood, in part, by reference to the ordered divisions
of the tribes. It is necessary at the outset, therefore, to give a brief statement about
the tribal organization; other details will be included as they become relevant.

619 There are nine noble tribes in Cyrenaica whose members are referred to as freemen.
621 These tribes see themselves as divided into three genealogical orders of sections:
primary, secondary, and tertiary. The tertiary tribal sections correspond to the camps
613 which cluster around the larger watering points during the drought season, May to
[132] November. Such camps consist of clusters of smaller camps in which the concentration
of agnatically related males is over 80 per cent. Within the latter kinship links
are known, so that these agnates are consanguinely related as well as politically
[162] united. The populations of most tertiary groups vary from about 200 to 700 or so,
but a group ceases to be viable if the number of male adults drops much below fifty.
Political division is absent from these tertiary groups, regardless of their precise
size, for, whatever may be the condition of developing local lineages, the acceptance
of a common name carries with it full political responsibility incumbent equally on
[423] all their members. Each of these tertiary sections, moreover, has its own watering
point, ploughland, and pastures; each has its own *watan* or homeland. This statement
is true of all tribal sections of whatever order of segmentation. In other words, the
tribes and their sections correspond to an ordered division of the territory.

619 Names of tribal sections are the same as those given in the genealogies. Both tribe
613 and lineage are identically ordered. Lineages develop, and split at the tertiary order
of segmentation,[2] and, *a fortiori*, the process is the same for the tertiary tribal sections.
Split, in other words, occurs where relationships are most intense.

621 The summer community which constitutes a tertiary section, breaks up once the
rains begin in November or December. At this time of the year water is readily
221 available in the numerous small cisterns, there is pasture in plenty, and the animals
are giving milk. These combined reasons lead the larger summer camp to divide
into smaller camps of some five to ten tents. The latter are separated one from the
other by short distances—a mile or so—but together form a cluster in that they are
621 territorially distinguishable from a neighbouring and similar group of camps. Tertiary
311 sections are discrete also in the sense that all the major necessities of daily living
are available within their several territories. Each controls its own natural resources,
and these resources are the same for all the camel-herding groups—in any given year
one may have more of a particular commodity than another, but the difference is in

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[171] [1] Evans-Pritchard, 1940. The feud might have been present among the Nuer. Exogamy and the other rules of marriage which obtain among them create a dispersion of ties, which superficially appears to militate against a condition of feud. But a dispersal of ties does not mean that they necessarily act as a pressure for peace. Moreover, the exogamous links may link limited numbers of groups only, leaving others with sufficient discreteness to pursue feuding relationships as they are described in this paper.

[2] See Peters, 1959.

621 hundred of their sheep are grazing in the neighbourhood. This is beside the point.
613 What is important is that the offender's group is showing a desire to remain on
628 friendly terms, and members of the victim's group are doing likewise by accepting
682 reduced amounts. Compared with what the payments should be, after four years they
are trivial and soon cease altogether. Blood money, if it is to achieve the purpose of
621 restoring peaceful relationships, must work in this way among the Bedouin, for, as
613 they view the matter, a single payment of the full amount would only terminate
628 relationships. There would be no further obligations to hold them together. The
682 payment of a debt in full means only one thing—hostility. Where there is no debt,
• 571 there are no relationships. Debt must be allowed to run between groups, for it is this
182 which creates obligations and perpetuates social relationships.[1] As the debt of blood
money mounts, the social relationships between the groups improve. The cessation
of payments and the absence of further demands is final earnest that the relationships
are again normal.

613 The second step in this exposition, therefore, is to attach to homicide between
628 tertiary sections the penalty of vengeance or the payment of blood money, both
621 achieving the same end of bringing about a restoration of peaceful relationships.

682 Between secondary sections, relationships are again different. Ecologically, the
619 areas are distinct. The topography may be dissimilar—sand dunes in one area and
613 low valleys in another; secondly, the soils may differ—sandy soil here and firm valley
[133] bottom soil there; thirdly, while the climatic régime of the two areas may be broadly
similar, since there is marked variability in the aggregate annual rainfall which is
[132] coupled with a high variability from place to place, each secondary section has its
own micro-climate, sufficiently well defined for one area to be well watered in any
given year while a neighbouring area suffers partial drought. These differences affect
[221] productive activities. Seasonal movements are also affected: some secondary sections
move annually over considerable distances and in fixed directions, while members of
a collateral section may move only a few miles and these short moves may vary in
direction from year to year. It is true that minor ecological differences exist between
collateral tertiary sections, but these do not affect the economy and the way of life in
the manner described for secondary sections. Partly because of their territorial extent,
partly because of the larger aggregate population, the secondary sections are more
self-contained, not only ecologically and economically but also in terms of social
relationship. More of the requirements of everyday living can be met within the
territory and span of a secondary section than within those of a tertiary section.
Secondary sections develop a kind of specialization to the extent that in any year
some of them will have more usable natural resources than others, but because these
differences are ephemeral they do not lead to the development of permanent trade
relations. Add to all this the fact that agnates are concentrated in camps on the territory
which belongs to their lineage, and the discreteness of secondary sections is
[582] immediately apparent. Marriage rules make this discreteness potentially, at least, even
more sharply defined, for unlike other 'lineage societies' where exogamy, coupled
with other marriage regulations, compels the dispersion of kin links among lineage

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[1] This point becomes clearer when considered in the general context of debt relationship among the Bedouin. Marriage payments, gift exchanges, hospitality, various forms of help, and so on are all aspects, with blood money, of an intricate and fascinating web of debt relationships.

121 part of a secondary section but not with another. Once contingencies are permitted
613 to enter in, the lineage model ceases to be of use, for what is implied is that at all
114 times some parts of sections structurally situated for feuding do not in fact feud.
[619] Other facts can be adduced to show that the structural view is inadequate but, before
[821] proceeding to examine these, some general objections to the lineage theory need to
[578] be raised. In the first instance, the corner stone in the theory of lineage systems is that
they consist of parts which are in balanced opposition. It is no accident that the idiom
generally used in discussing the segmentation of a lineage system is that segments
bifurcate. Indeed bifurcation is necessary if lineage theory is to make sense, because
if at any order there are more than two segments, then combinations can occur which
are not comprehended by the theory. In the Cyrenaican lineage the number of segments at the tertiary order is haphazard, in some cases as few as two but in others as
many as a dozen or so. Where there are many segments at this order it is rather
pointless to speak in terms of balanced opposition. Moreover, at the secondary order
of segmentation the number of segments are fairly consistent throughout the tribes,
but they number more than two in all of them. It is also a fact that combinations
occur and, moreover, these may be between the tertiary segments of two ' opposed '
secondary segments.

121 Secondly, in lineage theory groups come together to constitute larger segments in
613 opposition to like segments. Yet in lineage societies there is a lack of instituted
• 571 authority, there are no chiefs distributed throughout the land as heads of segments
of the hierarchical orders. This being so, then it is not possible for all the sections of,
622 say, a secondary section to come together; there is no one to command the action.
114 In fact, sections combine in Cyrenaica, but not in the way they should according to the
lineage structure. In order to discuss this adequately, a lengthy diversion into an
analysis of the distribution of power would be necessary. The matter must rest here
with the admittedly somewhat dogmatic assertion that there are men who wield
power over groups of varying populations, and that the extent of their domains
cannot be understood by reference to orders in the lineage. Perhaps it is for this
reason—because, that is to say, lineage theory effectively blocks the exercise—that
relatively little has been written about the problem of leadership in these societies.

121 Thirdly, all segments should be fairly equal in numbers of people and economic
613 resources, if the theory of lineage were to have substance in reality. In Cyrenaica
114 the population of one tertiary segment may be three times or more that of another.
[621] Both may be structurally equal in the sense that they are named groups segmenting
as a pair of brothers from a common father. As political groups, however, this
equality has little meaning. Further, with regard to economic resources, some sections possess several wells and a territory of such extent that it straddles two or even
more of what might be called micro-ecological areas. With marked preponderance in
numbers and superiority of resources, some groups have grown into dominance, and
the evidence points to the existence of this dominance in the past also. However,
' like ' sections may appear on a lineage chart, in political action there is conspicuous
[619] disparity. Each tribe possesses one tertiary section or more with a claim to be the
[621] owners of the ' Golden Stirrup '; these are large tertiary groups with relatively plentiful resources, with allies in other groups, and, in sum, with the power to terrorize
other tribal groups.

121 celebrated war between the 'Abaidat and the Bara 'asa tribes occupying a large part
619 of central and eastern Cyrenaica. This war took place a hundred years ago, so that the
682 evidence is mainly hearsay, but it is significant that when asked for details of the
726 groups taking part the Bedouin make it clear that the entire tribes were not at war—
[173] some sections on both sides are said to have remained on friendly terms. Yet when
121 wars are discussed in a general fashion, the Bedouin insist that tribes confront each
619 other as such. If it is pointed out to them that men might be ranged against their
726 maternal relatives the Bedouin mumble apologetically that they would not kill their
maternal relatives—a lame argument since in the heat of battle men cannot make this
602 kind of discrimination. Details of other wars also illustrate the point that only parts
of tribes face each other in strife, for though the stories of past events may be inaccurate
there is genealogical evidence to substantiate their claims that certain groups
were linked in the past, and in any case their statements assert that where these links
exist they are not prepared to engage in hostilities. The several parts of each tribe,
121 like the parts of primary and secondary sections, have as many different sorts of
619 relationships as there are groups, and the general statement that tribes are warring
571 units merely obscures the interest there is in their relationships. Tribes, further, lack
the leadership to make war. I repeat that leadership does exist, but not even the
121 greatest leaders, past or present, can rightly be described as leaders of their tribes,
619 using the term in its structural connotation. Literature on the subject gives the
613 impression that there are tribal leaders, because successive administrations have used
554 the tribes and their divisions as a framework for attempting to rule the Bedouin, but
the details of the power domains of individual leaders make it clear that they have
little to do with the ordered divisions of tribes. A leader within part of one tribe may
carry with him tertiary sections of another tribe, and if major hostilities break out
between parts of these tribes, the sections of both which are joined as allies and
related as kinsfolk will not fight against each other, for sections so linked enjoy
stronger connexions than the structurally linked tertiary sections of a very large
[682] secondary section. Consequently the statement that homicide results in tribal war
[114] when the offender and his victim are members of two separate tribes is not merely
incomplete, not merely a simplification, it is wrong.

121 A point which has been implicit throughout the second part of this paper needs
613 now to be made quite explicit: groups do not come together in their respective
structural genealogical orders. During my entire residence in Cyrenaica I did not
571 see a group of agnates larger than a tertiary tribal section assemble for any purpose.
[114] It is true that the occasions when large groups are required to assemble are infrequent.
[648] It is also true that although the British Administration was serving a caretaker role
only, it may have had an affect on the nature of tribal gatherings. Despite this qualification,
there were several occasions when I expected tribal groups to assemble in
lineage order if the fusion of sections in relation to like sections has any meaning in
practice. Large groups of men did gather to dispute claims to wells, to argue about
rights to ploughland, and to make peace. In every case that I recorded the agnatically
closest groups of the main participants were absent, while members of genealogically
more remote groups were present in strength. This statement applies to gatherings
[628] in the camps and in the administrative centres. One of the biggest gatherings I
witnessed assembled in an administrative office in a village near the coast in the

south-west of the country. Most members of the two tertiary groups directly con- 121
cerned in the dispute were present. The agnates of the collaterally linked groups of 613
the principals were unrepresented; indeed collaterals of one of the principals made 571
it quite explicit that they were opposed to their genealogical allies and considered 628
their perusal of the matter tiresome. The bulk of the crowd present was made up
of men linked to the principals in a variety of different and non-agnatic ways, and it
was they who provided most of the argument once the issue had been opened. It 121
follows, therefore, that an analysis of political organization and behaviour in Cyrena- 613
ica which is based on lineage theory leads to a gross misrepresentation. For, what 114
I am arguing is not that the lineage model in its rarefied state is too simple, not that
additional facts must be injected into it to complicate it, but that it does not provide
an admissible basis for analysis.[1] The complication of something that is founded in
error can only lead to complicated error, however many facts of real life are intro-
duced in an attempt to give it substance. The Bedouin conception of their social
relationships in terms of a genealogical ordering of groups is a fact of their social [829]
life, and in relation to some problems it is an important fact. My objection to the use
which has been made of a people's ideology of their relationships is that it has been
elevated from its status as a component of social life to such a position of universal
dominance in all sets of social relationships that 'every sociological problem', as
Fortes writes of the Tallensi, 'hinges on the lineage system'.[2]

If the ordering of groups within the frame of the Bedouin genealogy is abandoned 121
as a basis for analysis, it does not follow that the only remaining view is that of small 613
groups of people distributed throughout the country enjoying relationships merely 571
as units. Regularity in relationships does exist, it is urgently necessary, and it per- 578
sists; but this regularity is not consistent with a lineage model. Ultimately, feud is a
violent form of hostility between corporations which has its source in the competition
for proprietory rights in land and water. This competition makes it necessary for
groups to combine to prevent the encroachments of others in similar combinations
and also to expand their resources whenever the opportunity arises. The significant
groups in a discussion of the feud are these power groups, and it is their composition,
the shifting alliances within them, the growth and diminution in the power of tertiary

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[1] Dr. Paul Bohannan has distinguished in his writings between what he calls folk systems and analytical systems. The distinction, as he sees it, is set out clearly in the statement 'a certain field of Nuer relationships is explained by Nuer in terms of an agnatic genealogy. This is the folk system. The same field is explained, in English, by Professor Evans-Pritchard, as a lineage system based on the principle of segmental opposition. This is an analytical system' (Bohannan, 1957, p. 5). What is the difference? Is it only a difference of language? Bohannan's analytical statement is little more than a generalisation of what is in the folk system. An analytical system, in his hands, is a sophistication of a folk system, for it is the latter which provides him with his analytical framework. The act of creativity on the part of the social anthropologist about which he writes (Bohannan, 1963, p. 14) is the revealing of a folk system through analysis. But he does not
depart from the framework set by informants—the 121
agnatic genealogy is the lineage, and the fission and
fusion of parts, the opposition of like segments and 613
so on is explained by informants in different lan- 114
guages as adequately as it is explained by social
anthropologists in English. Bohannan's viewpoint 171
is made clearer, perhaps, in his discussion on the arrangement of facts relating to Tiv law. Here he considers what he should do once he has elicited all the facts, and he argues against setting them out as an arrangement of the procedural law of Tiv courts because, 'The error would be that the arrangement is not part of *the Tiv way of looking at it*, and hence would be false' (Bohannan, 1957, p. 69. Italics mine). Why? The Tiv are not the social anthropologists. Is the test of an analytical model its consistency with a folk comprehension?

[2] Fortes, 1945, p. 30.

121 sections constituting the combinations which makes the facts of feud intelligible.
613 Furthermore, several different types of power structures exist which serve the differ-
[571] ent interests of the people composing them, and these are interlinked in combinations
[578] of superior span. But the formation of these structures and the modes in which they
combine are quite unlike the articulations in a lineage system. Characteristically, the
segments in a lineage system are conceived of as building up hierarchically to span
what is spoken of as a total society, the apex of the system affording a spectacular and
fixed definition of its boundaries. Had I been using this concept in this paper the
[173] founding ancestress of the nine Cyrenaican tribes, Sa'ada as named by the Bedouin,
would have served this purpose and would have been given inappropriate promi-
121 nence. The views presented here have the consequences of retreating from a concept
184 of a total society. The people to whom the facts given are related are the camel-
233 herding tribes only. Some of them have relations of many kinds with the cow-herding
folk who inhabit the northern plateau area, and these relations are also significant
619 for the analysis of a wide range of problems; genealogically both cow and camel
herders are seen as part of a single structure, but the differences between them with
regard to their economy, the size, composition, and distribution of their residential
units, their political and ritual life is so great that to conceive of them as a single social
121 structure is not useful. Moreover, the far western tribal sections have relationships
619 of such urgency with their neighbours in Tripolitania (who are excluded from Cyrena-
ican genealogies) that to cut off these relationships as lying outside Cyrenaican society
would be quite unwarranted. The same can be said of the relationships of the tribal
sections in the eastern part of Cyrenaica with their genealogical cousins, the Aulad
'Ali of Egypt, who, although residing across a national border, are closely linked to
some of the Cyrenaican Bedouin. Some tribes also have to rely on the people of the
southern oases for an item of diet and an outlet for surplus wool, and the net of kin-
ship is spread out to include them. In these cases they come into contact with other
[177] ethnic groups such as Berbers and Tibu, and through the oases they extend their lines
of communication southwards to Wadai, Chad, and Bornu. As an indication of the
effectiveness of these links, it is only necessary to add that people inhabiting Cyrenaica
make periodic and regular visits to these far southern places, and that in 1948 a
shaikh, living near Ajadabiya in south-western Cyrenaica, collected blood-money
contributions from kinsmen in Wadai. A single structure cannot possibly include,
for analytical purposes, these sorts of relationships.

121 Finally, it must be stressed that the facts given here refer to the period 1948 to
114 1950. Since then oil has been discovered in large quantities near the territory of a
[315] tribe where I spent most of my time while resident in the country, and where there
was one tin shack in 1950 there is now a modern port with roads extending south-
wards from it into the wilderness. I see no reason to assume that social relations as
I observed them are present today or that they were the same at any time in the past
175 either. Before the advent of the Sanusi Order in the early eighteen-forties, it is known
795 that one lineage at least was dominantly powerful and that its leader tyrannized a
613 large part of Central Cyrenaica.[1] His descendants constituted a powerful group in

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[1] Smith and Porcher, 1864. These two archaeologists met this leader and continued their archaeological researches around Cirene only with his goodwill, although the site is not on the territory of his tribe as I knew it in 1950. They also speak of him as inhabiting a castle which also lies outside the

Second, the fiction that nothing has happened, which characterises the 585
father's behavior, does not cease with the termination of the celebrations. 593
Each morning, soon after daybreak and before the camp is astir, the groom
must leave his bride and repair to his father's tent to lie at his father's side
"as he always had done in the past, as if he had not left him." This conventional ruse is followed, not just for the seven days of wedding festivities,
but is continued after the groom has moved back into the camp proper, and
pitched his tent alongside his father's, with the ropes of the two tents crossing.

In matters other than sleeping arrangements, this fiction that "nothing
has happened" is maintained. Marriage does not mean the immediate crea- [592]
tion of a wholly separate domestic unit. Save for the appearance of an additional tent, the ordinary run of daytime activities is scarcely altered. To 593
mention perhaps the most important feature of the relationships between 264
father and son, the groom continues to eat with his father. As yet, the son 571
does not use his own bowl,[1] and may not, indeed, do so for several years. 182
The important symbolism of "eating together" or "eating out of the one
bowl," the act of commensality creating a bond of fellowship about which
Robertson Smith[2] wrote so eloquently can only be referred to here in one of
its many aspects. Bedouin themselves stress that eating together is a strong
bond, and the communal meal is always used for this purpose after the
settlement of a dispute, or at the conclusion of a blood-money agreement,
and so on. It is significant also in the sense that those who partake of a [574]
meal accept the authority of the host; he becomes their protector, and a blow
against one of them is struck at him also. Even if the guest is an enemy,[3]
as long as he has eaten from another's bowl his life is safe.

The slaughter of an animal for another person creates a bond which has its 571
roots in the intimate connection between man and his animals. In a very 231
vivid way, the Bedouin view their animals as part of themselves, as part of 264
their *Risiq*, their general wealth, in which their sons are included. It is this 182
mystical association between a man and his animals which distinguishes a
meal consisting of the meat of an animal slaughtered from ones' own flock [574]
or herd from a meal consisting of meat bought from a butcher's shop — often [186]
given by the plateau peoples of Northern Cyrenaica to their guests, but which
the camel-herding Bedouin of the south regard as despicable hospitality. A
slaughtered animal is the food, *par excellence,* which establishes this bond

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[1] When Bedouin take their meals, they eat from large wooden bowls imported from [415]
south of the Sahara. It is a matter of custom that a man does not eat alone unless it is [439]
unavoidable, a custom of such strength, that, when, one day, only an elder, occupying [123]
a tent the ropes of which were crossed with mine, was left in camp, he brought his
bowl into my tent "so that I will be eating with a man."

[2] William Robertson Smith. *The Religion of the Semites.* 3rd ed. London: Macmillan, 1927. [113]

[3] A stranger entering a camp is under no obligation to give his identity. Few do so [574]
until they have partaken of a meal. In the past, the Bedouin claim, the period of
anonymity could last for 40 days, but nowadays, they say they limit it to two only. I [609]
have known strangers enter a camp, receive entertainment, and leave without offering
any specific identity.

•571 between man and man, although the various cereal dishes which constitute
231 their regular meals are said to have a similar effect.

264 The son who continues to eat with his father "as he always had been
182 doing," also continues to accept his authority. Indeed he could do little else
593 at this stage, for he lacks the economic means to cut away. Neither at mar-
585 riage nor after is there any transfer of wealth from father to son. The new
182 tent recently pitched is no more than a dormitory to which the young couple
[425] retire at night. During the daytime the son is still to be seen in his father's
[556] tent, and, in the male quarters, things appear to be much the same as before.
In the female quarters, the only superficial change is the more frequent appearance among the women of one who, before marriage, often sat among them if she had been a close neighbour or a close cousin previously; or of an additional helper if she had come from afar. On the surface things remain "as they always have been," although in fact, a whole set of changes have been initiated.

852 *Rites de passage* are few among the Bedouin. A man's progress in life is
881 ceremonially marked by only four events: his birth, circumcision, marriage
764 and burial. His development into manhood is not marked by clearly defined
stages. About the age of seven, the henna markings on the front of a boy's
858 shirt for protection from the evil eye are not renewed, the cowrie shell stitched
789 to the front of his cap as a kind of talisman against the evil eye is removed
857 and he is no longer permitted free access to the women's quarters. As he
233 grows older, he will be instructed in goat-herding, and later taught to follow
the sheep. In his late teens he will have to undertake the more arduous and
883 responsible task of herding the camels. Coincident with camel-herding, he
233 may be given a gun by his father. Shortly afterwards he must undertake the
[431] stringent test of manhood, a journey to a distant oasis for dates. These
[411] changes are not marked off by a *rite de passage*. The rites a man undergoes
[484] during the course of a lifetime are minimal, and in the sense that they are
[885] concerned with only the basic events in a man's life anywhere (save for
852 circumcision, which is a minor celebration anyway), they are irreducible.
88 Moreover, the rituals which exist do not comprehend the same multiplicity of
796 relationships as rituals which occur in many other African societies.[4] It is
[771] true that the ceremonies referred to in this chapter by no means include
all the Bedouin rituals. It is also true that the events mentioned vary in
[554] elaboration, and in the number of symbols present in them, but they are
not multiplied or reduced for different people.

In this context it is important to stress that we are here dealing with a
[613] lineage society where social differentiation is not built up into differences
[554] of rank, where the roles to which a man succeeds are almost wholly cap-
[602] tured by his kinship relationships with other men and which are sociologically
to be distinguished from the roles a man enters into by acquisition of office,

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[4] See, for example, the elaboration of rituals discussed in M. Gluckman (Ed.), *Essays on the Ritual of Social Relations*. Manchester: University of Manchester Press, 1962.

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in position immediately anyone else appears at the entrance to the tent.[11] [834]
Women cook, but they do not serve the meal to males, nor are they re- [342]
sponsible for the distribution of meat among them. Parts of an animal are [264]
carefully specified, and the various portions distributed at a meal carry 264
with them a great deal of significance. A host can honour, flatter, disap- 574
point or even insult his guest, depending on the precise distribution of meat 571
he adopts. Designated portions should go to certain kinsmen if they are [602]
present, but this still leaves a wide margin of choice, and a host can use this choice as part of the many means at his disposal for directing his relationships with other men. A political link can be forged or another snapped by the distribution of portions of meat at the commensal meal.

The Bedouin Ideal Type of Family as a Unit of Production

This account of the division of labour is far from inclusive of all the tasks 594
carried out. The details given are only barely sufficient to provide some 183
indication of the necessary composition of a family. Referring again to the [462]
Bedouin sentiments about the matter, it is now possible to give it some numerical precision. The number of females should be a minimum of about three, including a mother, a teen-age daughter and a child of about
eight years. Males should number about six: a father, relieved of most [857]
chores to act as director; a son in his middle to late twenties, to plough; a [883]
second son, in his early to middle twenties, to herd the camels; a third, in [462]
his late teens to early twenties, to shepherd the sheep; a fourth, middle to [561]
late teens, to look after the goats; and a younger son to fetch, carry and
run errands about the camp. The family of the ordinary Bedouin, they say,
shows this sex and age distribution, although they recognise that a politically [554]
ambitious man with the wealth to match his aspirations would require more [556]
of both sexes — particularly women, since the burden of entertainment increases rapidly with a man's climb to power and fame.

Clearly, the basis of Bedouin sentiment concerning family structure is its 121
approximation to an ideal production unit. Some families display the features
of this ideal, but even they enjoy the productive benefits of this composition 183
for a very limited period only. The family, as described above, can only be an 594
ephemeral unit, since the age structure constantly changes, women are removed by marriage, men move away and death affects it at any point at any time. The Bedouin family is a fiction in the sense that it can be said to have a characteristic composition. The mistake they make is to conceive of it as a particular kinship structure related to production. The substance of what has been referred to as a fiction is that, if viewed as a productive unit, it
bears close consistency with reality. Freed of the need to examine it in terms [621]
of specifically limited kinship relationships, and no longer anchored to the inhabitants of a single tent, the distribution of people according to sex and

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[11] This is the general rule. In practice, the use of the divider can indicate an intimacy or distance in relationships, most subtly.

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

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since meat is shared by all the people of the camp, her wealth was partly dispersed among her poorer kinsfolk.

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[578]
[233]
The location of Tent B was determined by the fact that the wife (6) was the sister of (3) of Tent A. Her husband (7) had moved into the camp a few years earlier as a result of an inheritance quarrel with his elder who robbed him of his fair share. This husband (7) gained in two ways from the move. Although poor, he had a small flock of his own, too small to justify its own shepherd, but which he was permitted to include with his sister-in-law's (3) flock for shepherding. If the flock had been larger he would still have had difficulties, because, at some times of the year, save for short occasional visits to camp, the shepherd is with his sheep for several weeks, day and night. He (7) had three sons, still far too young to follow the sheep, but when they become of age to do so, his dependence on Tent A will cease, for then he can begin to gather the small flocks of other kinsmen around his own, his sons can shepherd them all and he can begin to enjoy the benefits to be derived from dependents. In addition, he enjoyed [574]

the lavish generosity dispensed by the members of Tent A, and fed far better 621
than would have been possible otherwise. 592
571
The location of Tent C was also determined by a link through women. [574]
The only female (8) living in this tent, a middle-aged widow, was the
sister of (3) and (6) of Tents A and B respectively. Her teenage son lived
with her. They possessed only a few sheep, which were put with the flock of
Tent A for shepherding. The son (9) spent some of his time herding for
Tent A. With the mother and her son in Tent C were two other kinsmen.
One, a poor man (10), was this son's first patrilateral cousin, and they both
were the only surviving sons of their respective fathers. He (10) was the
main shepherd of Tent A. The third male (11), also poor and nearly
blind, was a second patrilateral cousin of both, but his sister was also 11's
mother. All occupants of Tent C were almost entirely supported by Tent A.
Relieved of the necessity to live off their own resources, the two young men
(9 and 10) were afforded the opportunity of building up their flocks for the
day when they would be able to negotiate their delayed marriages.

Tents A, B and C sheltered men who were agnatically closely linked. More 621
important, their grandfathers, three sons in a family of 19 children, were 613
full brothers. The latter's mother's name was used when referring to these 592
three tents as a group. During the past few years, many changes have 571
occurred within it, and the death of the pivotal woman (3) of Tent A might
well disperse this small cluster. Further, the nuptials of her heir (5) were
anticipated, and this event, itself likely to precipitate division of his father's
(2) wealth, might also lead to further residential rearrangements.

The owner of Tent D, (12), a man in his late thirties, son of a slave 621
mother, was at loggerheads with his father's brother, much more senior in age. 592
The owner's father, one of a family of 24 children, had been a wealthy man 604
and died leaving a substantial herd and a large flock, but he (12) was bereft 578
of most of this wealth by the father's brother. His first successful strike
against his uncle was the demand he made for his daughter as a wife. [582]
Earlier, when (12) had demanded his father's wealth, his father's brother, [428]
who had for years acted as his guardian, replied, "It is in your stomach,"
(meaning that it had been expended on his upbringing). Later, after the [583]
marriage had taken place, when the uncle demanded payment of the bride-wealth
his own words were thrown back at him, but this time with the
meaning that the bride-wealth had already been paid. While I was resident
in this area, the two men met occasionally: each meeting was hostile, for
(12) was encouraging his half-brother (13) (also the son of a slave mother)
to demand a second daughter as a wife. Included in this tent is a third adult
male (14), virtually a pauper, reduced to this state by the same grasping
father's brother. His link with (12) was their closeness of relationship (first [571]
paternal cousin), together with the fact that all three males (12, 13 and
14) had suffered privations and were allies against the common enemy, their
father's brother.

Associated with them for the same reason, was the owner of Tent E (15).

Cases

621 Genealogically he was their father's brother, but he was of their same age
592 generation, and behaved as if he was their agnatic equal. Towards his own
578 brother (16), he behaved as if the latter was his uncle, for he was much his
[604] junior in age and his uncle had virtually brought him up from boyhood.
They had quarrelled bitterly because his brother (16) had given him only
[428] a fraction of his inheritance, which he himself, in turn, should have
[593] shared with his young full brother (not shown on the diagram) but he did
not do so. This youngest brother left (15) for this reason and now resides
621 with (16), his full brother's enemy. Two of the men (14 and 13) of this
592 group of four were the chief herdsmen of the camp, although they were
assisted for short periods by (12) and (15), who also helped tend the
[233] camels in other ways. Their connection with the group centered on Tent
[571] A was a mutual close link to a politically powerful person (not shown on the
genealogies) to whom they are deeply loyal and who, while I was among
them, was actively opposed to the common political enemy of them all (16),
and who in earlier years had challenged the leadership of (2) of Tent A.
There is also the fact that they were all linked within a close range of
[613] agnation. This linkage included, too, the owner of Tent F (17), not in
[602] fact the descendant of the man shown in the diagram — he was the son of
a slave wife; his genitor was a slave, but his mother's master reared him,
freed him and he is now given as his son in the genealogy. He lives with his
wife, of client origin, together with her children from a previous husband,
(18), who divorced her, and his own children. Aging, he no longer acted
as a regular herdsmen, but relieved other men in the camp, and also spent
some time shepherding.

621 The details given of the strands which run through the camp to tie these
571 particular people together are so few that, like the Bedouin plough, they do
no more than scratch the surface, but they are sufficient to permit a few
general statements. The camp, and particularly the precise disposition of
621 its tents, shows a group of males clustered together to share two of the main
571 economic tasks: shepherding and herding. The physically strong adult males
233 of Tents D and E shoulder the burden of herding all the camels of the camp,
462 and the men of Tents B, A and C shepherd all the sheep, with (17) of
Tent F serving both purposes. This number of men allows some to remain
in the camp at all times, to free one of them for a journey to the distant
market when supplies of sugar and tea are necessary, and to enable one or
two men, at short notice, to hurry away on horse or camel to search for
lost animals.[14]

621 Economic Determinants of the General Structure of the Camp

574 It is also clear from these details that, given the disparities in wealth
231 (although all men have some wealth), the diet of most is considerably

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431 [14] There is little point in seeking the lost animals themselves in the first instance.
A man travels from camp to camp asking for information, and when he has gathered
[556] his clues, he searches a neighbourhood.

ameliorated in its protein content, particularly by the generosity of the oc- 621
cupants of the nucleating Tent A. Not that they are the only ones who ever 574
slaughter their animals for food. Others do so, albeit much less frequently. 231
Whoever kills an animal, everyone present in the camp is given a share, and 262
the men always eat in the tent of the donor, sitting around one bowl. Thus, 431
the surplus that builds up at one point is redistributed among those suffering [556]
a shortage, and meat, in a society where the climate and way of life militate against its storage for more than a few days, is more efficiently used. Many other general economic points could be deduced. These general statements could, however, be made of practically any camp, whatever the specific differences.

Affinity and Matrilaterality in the Structure of the Camp

Economic considerations determine the general structure of these small 621
camps, but do not account for the particular people gathered in them. Per- 613
haps one of the most striking features of these camps, which comes out 602
clearly in the one discussed here, is the confined agnatic span which links the males. Lest it be underestimated, I wish to stress the profound significance of this fact. While granting its importance it is equally necessary to stress that the span, potentially, could be considerably reduced; in some camps it is. Many of the closer agnates of the men of this camp are not shown on the genealogy included with the diagram; (7), (15) and (16), for example, all have brothers, (12) has a large number of first paternal cousins and so on. Therefore, this particular cluster of agnates formed for reasons other than agnatic ties. The most direct single thread connecting Tents A, B and C is that which runs through women. Men of many other camps are all linked in this way, directly. Five tents of this camp are connected through a female link to a common ancestress, whose name still defines the group, two ascending generations for one adult male, three from others and four from others. If greater elaboration could have been shown on the genealogy without confusion, additional links through women could have been demonstrated. Affinity and matrilaterality are the prime movers in bringing agnates together as neighbours.

Other Factors Affecting the Structure of the Camp

Other considerations narrow the area in choice of residence. The quest 621
for power where every man entertains hope of achievement where ambitions 571
are not stifled by the rigour of rank and a small amount of wealth provides 554
a basis for a beginning is also a significant factor in considering the composition of camps. The generosity of the people in Tent A was not entirely altruistic. Justly, it had won them repute, but the repute itself was an important aspect of the political power they enjoyed. They also acquired the services of several men to manage their animals, an impossible strain for them alone. And with their shepherds and herdsmen they secured devoted followers. It was hinted in discussing the structure of the camp that changes

621 were imminent, because the marriages of two of the men were anticipated,
• 571 two others harboured more distant hopes and boys in all the tents would soon
[554] be youths. The composition of this camp, caught at a moment in time, was
a function of the age and sex distribution of its inhabitants. All camps
show regularities in their structure, but their content is dynamic. Certain
general features persist, but the alignments of people undergo change with
[128] equal persistency. What priority is given to each of these considerations,
which component occupies the nucleating centre for others, will depend on
the problem under analysis, for while I have stressed that this or that is
important, I do not wish to suggest that any single factor has an absolute
importance compared with others, except in relation to a specific problem.

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585 room, until he arrives for the test of her virginity. The groom "takes blood with his finger," wipes it on the white toga which his bride had been veiled with, and hands it to the older women waiting outside the tent. In the meantime, [792] the two fathers have met with the faqiih ("holy man") who [675] witnesses the agreement on the mahr payment. They read the Fatiha of the Quran together and conclude the marriage contract. The old women, carrying the toga with the virginal blood on it--a symbol of honor to both of the groups concerned with the marriage--parade around the guests' tent showing it, while all the time letting out shrill victory cries (zaghaariid = "trilling cries of joy"). The toga is then pinned-up on the side of the guests' tent for all to 585 see. Animals are slaughtered and the feast begins. The ●574 central activity of the feast takes place in the guests' tent, the tent of the male guests. The groom's father, in [576] the traditional role of host, does not sit down to eat with his guests but directs the seating and feeding of them.

585
684 Should it happen that the girl is not a virgin, the wedding would end on the spot, and the girl would be sent away or killed by her father. My informants said that this has never happened in al-Qasr. One key informant told me that such a thing never happens because the groom would never permit it to be known that "his cousin was not a virgin." In other words, the groom will get the blood from somewhere,

585 [684] probably by pricking himself, and will wipe it on the toga.

585 About two weeks after the wedding, the bride and
606 groom take a lamb or a goat and go to spend a few days with
● [574] the bride's parents. The Bedouin say that the relationship between the groom and his in-laws is extremely important. The man should treat his wife's mother and father as if they were his own. "When a man's father-in-law and mother-in-law come to visit him, he must slaughter a lamb for them. He must respect both of them. Remember, this man and woman are the grandparents of his children."

585 The marriage, then, is only the first step in the
571 ritualization of new group bonds established between the
182 families of the bride and groom. Bonds are subsequently in-
[574] tensified through a process of visitation, gift-exchange and
[431] sacrifice. The most important factor linking the two groups
[782] is the actual presence of the bride in the midst of her hus-
*[613] band's group, for she remains, in terms of the patrilineal
585 principle, a member of her father's lineage. This is made
*613 perfectly clear by the fact that she is referred to, never
551 by her name but, by the name of her tribal grouping if she is
571 other than 'Aishaibi. If she is of the 'Aishaibat tribe,
182 she will be referred to as *bint* of so-and-so. Hence the
[193] Bedouins stress the importance of extra-group bonds by re-
ferring to the women in their residence group as al-Qinaishiyya or al-Kamailiyya, for instance (-iyya is the Arabic feminine marker).

562 in Bedouin society, that is, the role of wife-daughter. The
593 principles of patrilineality and cognation do not work against
554 each other when the girl marries outside her corporate group,
182 nor does her new dual role present a case of role conflict.
578
562 On the contrary, the wife-daughter role functions to bind to-
593 gether two groups which are structurally differentiated by
554 the rule of patrilineality. During time of peace, the wife-
182
578
*613 daughter acts as a bond-maker by carrying gifts back and
[431] forth between the two groups, often bringing some of her
[628]
•[574] younger patrilineal relatives back to her husband's house or
562 tent for short visits. During a time of conflict or war, the
593 Bedouins point out, she is the only person who can cross the
554 battle lines unharmed. She is a match-maker as well as a
[726] peace-maker. Often she influences the selection of mates by
[584] individuals in both her husband's group and her father's
562 group. The Bedouins say that "after the bint 'amm, a man
593 should marry his bint khal ("mother's brother's daughter")
554 because she is like his bint 'amm." Usually, over a period
582 of a few generations, a given direction in marriage is sustained (see Figure 10), and it is one function of this wife-daughter role to accomplish this important political action.

562 The role of wife-daughter, then, may be seen as one
593 important aspect of what Fortes (1953:33) calls, "complemen-
554 tary filiation," the essential mechanism which provides the
*613
182 link between the corporate groups of al-Qasr society and the kin groups of the parent who does not determine descent.

578 Hafiyan killed three members of the Zallat. This feud lasted
*613 over a period of 25 years. It happened one time that an
682 _'aqila_ of 'Ailit Zallat was walking in the desert and stopped
578 for a visit at a _naja'_, the owners of which he did not know.
•574 He soon discovered that "he was in front of the Hafiyan them-
*613 selves." He tried to conceal his own identity, intending to
682 eat the meal which they offered him and then escape in the dark. But the Hafiyan soon discovered that one from the Zallat was their guest. They told him that they would send men of their tribe with him to give him safe conduct through the desert. They also said that they wished to get together and make peace. Then they made peace, and its conditions were made through the _'awaaqil_. No _diiya_ was transferred because each had killed an equal number of men. Then members of the two groups lived together for two or three days and made a feast, they slaughtered sheep and the problem was over. This problem came to an end in 1938.

578 The next case, dealing with wounding, is presented in
682 the form of two documents. It is valuable for the way in
*613 which it illustrates the judicial process and ritual sanction.
[619] Note that in the first document the case seems to concern two primary segments, i.e., the 'Aishaibat and the Kamailat, but the second document, the "Day of Oath," clearly indicates that the parties involved are 'Ailit Ma'fas ('Aishaibat) and 'Ailit Mahatha (Kamailat), two secondary groups.

156 draw al-Qasr into the Egyptian political community. He has
159 committed himself to work hand-in-hand with the Governor of
554 Marsa Matruh in introducing changes connected with economics
177 and education into al-Qasr. He does not conceal this fact.
178 When I spoke with him about helping me with my study of
124 829 [571] changing attitudes in al-Qasr, he said: "I might have the time to do this, but before I decide you will have to bring me a letter from the Governor stating that he wishes me to cooperate with you." The identity and responsibility which Hajj 'Ali feels for his role of agent of change is indicated in his remark to me that he had heard "there were others in the desert who feel and think the way I myself do."

156 Hajj 'Ali is discretely aware of the status difference
159 between himself, as a member of the "status group," and the
554 others of al-Qasr. As Weber would say, he perceives the
571 difference in "style of life." I was invited to Hajj 'Ali's
● 574 house for 'iid al-fitr, the feast marking the end of Ramadan.
796 123 I thought that this would be a good opportunity to observe the "leaders" of al-Qasr together. I was very much surprised to find present no members of the "status group" but only
[556] their exact opposites. On the occasion of this feast it is
[735] the custom that the rich treat the poor. As an additional surprise, we had a very simple meal of bread, dates, peanuts, and tea. Hajj 'Ali explained to me: "My neighbors do not have my economic advantages, and I do not think it is proper

156 159 554 571 ● 574 796 123 to serve other than what they eat." Hajj 'Ali is not only conscious of social stratification in his society, but he also has a great deal of empathy with the less endowed, a prerequisite of a traditional Bedouin leader and an advantageous one for a modern leader.

156 159 554 829 582 He is aware of most traditional institutions and how they relate to conditions of modernity. Hajj 'Ali, whose own marriages speak for his political acumen, sees only disadvantages in the cousin-right marriage custom of the Bedouins. His interest in getting on with the business of change, so to speak, has led him to question a basic right contained in the Bedouin principle of lineage structure and corporate membership.

> A thing which I do not like about our customs is the idea that a man has a right to his uncle's daughter. The man binds his cousin and in the end he might not marry her and will be the cause of her never marrying. He gives himself the authority to decide whom she may or may not marry. If he knows she desires to marry a certain man, he says: "She can marry anyone but not that one."

[562] Here he challenges the traditional right of the individual male in Bedouin society, favoring the rights of the female. [177] [178] [562] The emancipation of the female, especially in rights and duties concerned with the marriage contract, is an element of the modernization process in Egyptian society and the Middle East in general.

*613 602 571 682 The bait, as a political group, is in part structurally defined by the corporate principle which states that blood-kin

156 imply that one cannot be educated and know the 'awaiyid at
159 the same time--the attitude of a self-made man. Hajj 'Ali
554 realizes his marginal position between the new and the old,
178 and his attitude concerning change through education seems
177 to be that of an unselfish leader. Elaborating further on
156 the role of education, Hajj 'Ali showed insight into some of
159 the psychological aspects underlying social change:

> 554 As I said before, the people here are realistic about
> 178 change. There are now only about three or four of
> 177 us who send our sons to study at the university, the
> 829 rest of the people are waiting to see what these boys
> 871 will amount to. The other day, one of our educated boys, an officer in the army, came to visit al-Qasr. All of the women are now hoping to see their sons become as successful as this. This is exactly like the first time we cultivated olives in the desert: the Bedouins mocked those who planted the olive. After the olive began to show profits, everyone regretted that they did not cultivate it. Time is changing, and the people are changing. Education is the basis of everything in any nation. Now the agricultural engineer directs me, telling me what to do and how to do it . . . and before 1952 (pre-Nassar regime) they knew nothing about us and we had nothing.

156 As culture and social change proceeds in al-Qasr, it
159 is evident that Hajj 'Ali and the national political community
554 are becoming legitimate authorities in the eyes of the Bedouins.
829 This is indicated by the following event. One month before
•574 I left the field, the first vice-President of the Republic was
648 expected to visit the province of Marsa Matruh, and al-Qasr
was named as one of the places which he would tour. Hajj
'Ali took it upon himself to set up three tents in the tradi-

156 tional style of Bedouin hospitality--"as we used to do in
159 Cyrenaica"--and spent a total of 50 L.E. for the welcoming
554 ceremony. "This money was from his own pocket," as the
829 Bedouins of al-Qasr complained after it was learned that
574 the vice-President would not visit Matruh after all. As
648 a matter of fact, all of the Bedouin leaders who had been
invited to the reception by Hajj 'Ali refused to eat the
food, for they said that it had not been prepared for them.
[576] This act was taken as a show of respect for Hajj 'Ali and
anger with bureaucrats.

156 Hajj 'Ali is the representative of al-Qasr to the
159 Arab Socialist Union which meets in Marsa Matruh and has
554 cell meetings in al-Qasr. The socialist cell in al-Qasr
648 meets about three times a month. When I asked why Hajj 'Ali
668 was the man chosen to represent all of al-Qasr at section
[124] meetings of the Union, the reply was: "Because he is a member
[635] of the *Majlis al-Muhafza.*" There was one section meeting
of the Union in Matruh while I was in the field. The theme
of the meeting was "The Meaning of Socialism." Hajj 'Ali
attended this meeting.

156 In sum, it seems not too far afield to say that Hajj
159 'Ali is prepared to take over the leadership of the Bedouins
554 in a much more sophisticated manner than one could possibly
expect from the traditional style of politics. Hajj 'Ali's
[634] comments about the *'umda* and the *'umda*'s probable successor

621 had started in the area at that time. No special permission was re-
563 quired for the newcomer to join the camp. He only got the permission
of the person whose tent was at the far end of the camp to put his tent
● [574] next to it. The first night after the man joined the camp, his next
door neighbor slaughtered a goat in honor of the new member and invited
all members of the camp.

621 Leaving the camp also does not require any permission, although the
622 custom specifies that before one leaves he should inform either his
[576] neighbor or the headman of his time of departure. With the exception of
[613] cases where the headman of a particular camp is at the same time the
Aqila of the bait, the headman of the camp has no authority over the mem-
622 bers of the camp. He is usually called upon to solve minor problems be-
627 tween brothers or husband and wife, or give his opinion in decisions of
minor importance. "A headman is like a father," said one informant, "we
call him kabir el-nagi (the old man of the camp)." When a member of the
627 613 nagei is involved in a serious dispute with another, the one to handle
the case is the aqila or awaqil to whom the two disputing parties belong.

619	Group	Leadership	Identifying aspects
613	Kabila	None	Client groups attached.
621	Eila	None	Vengeance group, Vaguely defined tribal land ("watan").
	Bait	Aqila	Corporate land-holding. Formally recognized leadership.
[622]	Nagei	Headman	Residential unit with unsegmented structure.

613 629 156 [196] to Qudura and to tell him that Hakim wanted to show his respect. This means in everyday parlance that Hakim was willing to pay him money. Qudura agreed to meet Hakim the following day.

[114] [431] [574] On the day of the meeting, to which I was invited, Hakim arrived with his son and gifts of three goats, tea and sugar. One of the goats was slaughtered and supper was prepared for the guests. While the guests were eating, Hakim and Qudura disappeared inside one of the tents for more than an hour. When they finally joined the gathering, Hakim announced that he and Qudura were now brothers and that it was his fault that Qudura was angry because he had accused him of being stupid and misunderstanding the content of the message sent to him after the meeting of the Aggary awawil. "I admit," said Hakim, "that I might have meant at one time and probably said it to sheikh Qudura that I wanted him to be the Aqila of bait Asabei'. Now that I have admitted this, Sheikh Qudura should not have any grudges against me or my son." Then Qudura addressed the gathering and said, in a very cold and dry manner, "I am glad that Hakim has come to this senses and admitted his mistake." The gathering lasted for most of the evening, spent mostly in behind-the-scenes meetings involving Hakim, Qudura and different guests. Then as the last guest left, Shei'eb, who had been inside the tent throughtout the evening came out and said that Hakim was a fool and that Qudura had tricked him into admitting publicly that he had lied and that Qudura still refused to take the oath.

613 619 578 [521] Qudura's stand created a strong reaction which affected almost all the tribal segments in the area. The case overshadowed any other event and was the main topic of discussion. The reaction was mixed, however.

593 As a girl in her father's household, the woman is under the di-
rect authority of her father, who is responsible for her. When the father
dies, this responsibility, as well as the authority, goes to her brother
or her closest male kin in the order specified earlier. At marriage the
[591] girl usually moves to live with her husband, and this subjects her to
[606] his control and sometimes to that of his parents, if the couple lives
with them. But the authority of the husband over his wife remains
593 secondary to that of her father. The woman's membership in her father's
574 household does not cease with marriage, and the strength of her rela-
tions to her kin is maintained by their frequent visits to her new res-
idence and by her occasional visits to them. This right of visitation
593
574 cannot be denied by the husband who not only has to allow such visits,
606 but is also required to treat members of his wife's family, especially
her father, with great respect and hospitality. If the husband fails
[586] to do so, the wife's father can order her to leave her husband and go
back to his household with him.

This point is illustrated by the case of Muftah from the Esheibat tribe in the area of Matruh, whose older daughter is married to Hemeida from the Geneishat segment, which lives in the area of Fokah some 80 miles to the east of Matruh. One winter day in 1965, while passing near the area where his daughter lived, Muftah decided to pay her a visit. When he arrived, her husband was not at home; he was in the market in a nearby town selling sheep. When he came back late that evening, he greeted Muftah with the customary slaughter of a goat and invited the neighbors to the occasion. After dinner Muftah wanted to rest. It was a very hot night, so his son-in-law brought a rug and spread it outside the tent in the cool air. After that he retired to his tent where he spent the night inside.

593 spent the night inside. In the morning Muftah ordered his daughter to
574 pack her clothes because she was to leave with him. He refused to give
606
586 her husband any explanation as to why he was taking his daughter away. The husband could not prevent him from taking her away because, as he said, "He is her father and has the right to take her away with him at any time."

When the wife did not return for two weeks, her husband went to her father's house to take her, but her father refused to let her go. Hemeida
593 then went to a religious man in the area and asked him to intervene in
574
606 the matter and see why Muftah had taken away his wife. He also asked him
586 to arrange a mi'ad with Muftah to discuss the matter.
627
792

The religious man was selected in this case because he was a close friend of Muftah and was believed to have influence over him. He was also known throughout the area to be fair and of sound opinion. It is important in the cases of disputes that the person selected as a mardi is known as a wise and fair man. It is only then that he is able to mediate between the two parties without being accused of taking sides.
792 The religious men, members of the Murabiteen tribes in the area, by their
619 relative position outside the formal tribal organization of the Sa'adi
627 tribes, are the most likely candidates for such activity. Yet, this is
554 not always the case. For this aspect of assumed impartiality is frequently balanced off by the fact that these religious men lack the support of a powerful tribal segment behind them. To be effective, the mardi has to be respected, not only for his personal qualities, but also for being a member of a respectable tribal segment whose power lends authority to the mardi's decision. This is not usually the case with the client
000 tribes of Murabiteen. Wealth in many cases is also considered an important

Wealth in many cases is also considered an important
792 requirement for the selection of the mardi. This does not mean that
627 554 religious men in the area have no role in dispute settlement, for they
[556] do. It simply means that the mardi is selected according to a number of criteria that vary from case to case, and that in some of these cases sound wisdom and fairness characteristic of religious men are not enough basis for their selection as mardis. This means that the religious men have no special mediatory role based on their religious nature alone. In certain cases religious men offer the best possibility for mediation; in others, a non-religious person might offer a
better chance for settling the dispute. In cases of women seeking
[586] divorce from their husbands, the wealth of the mediator, more than any-
(556) thing else, seems to determine the selection of the man whom the woman asks to negotiate on her behalf, a point to which I will return later in the chapter.

593 The Mi'ad was held in the house of Muftah. Present at the mi'ad
574 were Muftah, his son-in-law, Hemeida, the heads of households in Muftah's
606 586 camp (one of them was his brother and the other five were members of
627 different tribal segments), my driver (who was a member of the neighbor-
792 ing Sanagrah tribal segment), myself, and the religious man. After the tea was served, the religious man said that the discussion should start. He reminded the gathering that this case is a family one and should not develop into a larger dispute. "After all, the daughter's husband is a son, and the case is actually a misunderstanding between a father and a son and should be viewed in that context." Then he turned to Muftah and said that in that spirit he was asking him why he had taken his daughter away from her husgand. Muftah said that he had taken his daughter away

Muftah said that he had taken his daughter away
593 to punish Hemeida for what he thought was disrespectful behavior. He
574 then proceeded to descirbe how Hemeida, after bringing the blanket out
606 for Muftah, went inside and spent the night with his wife, defying the
586 basic rule of not showing intimacy in the presence of older people,
627 especially the parents or parents-in-law. For, to show such intimacy
792 is a sign of disrespect. He demanded that Hemeida pay him "kabara"
888 for his injured pride. The term kabara refers to the adjective "kebir"
[681] (lit. respected or big man). Kabara is the fine paid for belittling
[558] someone by word or deed. Muftah insisted that he would not allow his
daughter to return to her husband until Hemeida had paid that kabara.
Hemeida conceded the fact that intimacy constitutes an insult; but he
insisted that his action did not constitute an act of intimacy with his
wife, but was a matter of convenience and necessity, since he had only
593 two blankets, and the only one left was that inside the tent. Muftah
574 became angry and started shouting at Hemeida, who, in turn, started
606 shouting back; it became impossible to follow what was being said.
586 The religious man interfered in the discussion, trying to stop the argu-
627 ment between Muftah and Hemeida. The others attending the mi'ad also
792 [578] interfered. The religious man and two neighbors took Muftah outside
the tent while Muftah's brother tried to calm Hemeida down. The other
members of the group also calmed Hemeida, reminding him that he was the
younger person and must be more tolerant of older people. They also reminded Hemeida that Muftah was his father-in-law and had the right to take
his daughter away any time he chose. They urged him to "defeat the devil"
[681] and to apologize to his father-in-law and pay him kabara. He seemed
convinced but insisted that all he was going to pay was five pounds and
a goat. Muftahb brother and one of the neighbors then left the tent and

593 went to see Muftah and his company. Half an hour later the religious
● 574 man came and took Hemeida aside and talked to him in a very low voice,
606 then left the tent again. A few minutes more had passed; everyone returned
586 629 to the tent; Muftah was not angry anymore. The religious man
792 read the fatha, or the beginning sura of the Koraan, then said that the
[779] souls were now pure and that Hemeida was considered as a son of Muftah
and that disagreements such as this should not alter the good relations
between the two. He said that the devil had found his way into the souls
of the two people, but now, thanks to God and the good people present,
they both had come back to their senses. Hemeida then rose and went to
where his father-in-law was sitting and shook hands with him. Then he
[681] handed the religious man ten pounds which the latter passed to Muftah
and promised to send him a goat as a gift to his daughter. Muftah left
the tent and went to the tent of the women. When he came back he announced
that a goat had been slaughtered and that everyone was invited to eat.
Everybody then left and Muftah promised to return his daughter to her
husband the following day.

593 While the right of the father to take his daughter away from her
606 husband constitutes a check on the authority of the latter and insures
557 the wife good treatment by her husband and her in-laws, not infrequently
586 that right has been invoked for personal or individual interest on the
part of the woman's father or her closest male kin. Several cases have
[429] been cited in the area where the father or guardian had invoked the right
to force the husband to concede to certain demands of the wife's guardian,
even when the wife objected to those demands or disagreed with her guardian.
One of these is the case of Mabroka who is married to a distant

593 606 The case persisted for more than two months with no sign that either
557 party was willing to give into the demands of the other. I left the
586 [114] area before any solution to the case was achieved.

584 Another relevant case is one which involved a dispute between
578 Hassan Hassanein from the Sanagrah tribe and the father-in-law of his
606 daughter who was also from the same tribe and who lived in the same
area. The case started when Hassanein was visited by a friend from the
● [574] Esheibat tribe in Matruh, an old man of 60 or 70 years. During the night
that this guest spent at Hassanein's house, they got to talking about
marriage and the fact that although his guest was a wealthy and re-
[595] spected man, he had only one wife. After a lengthy talk, it seemed
that the old man was convinced that he should have a second wife and
asked Hassanein if he knew of a suitable girl to marry. Hassanein sug-
584 gested his daughter's sister-in-law. Hassanein took the prospective
583 groom to the tent of his daughter's father-in-law and discussed the
578 matter with the father of the prospective bride who agreed to marry his
606 daughter to Hassanein's guest if he paid the sume of 200 pounds, in ad-
dition to slaughtering a number of goats and presenting him with the
[779] appropriate presents. When the man agreed to the terms, the fatha was
read to signify the agreement between the two parties. Hassanein left
the man to spend the night in the camp of his future in-laws. In the
morning the groom told the bride's father that he must go to nearby
Alexandria to bring the money for the bride price. When he came back
late that afternoon, he paid the money and set a date for the wedding
the next Thursday and then left for Matruh to prepare for the arrival
of the new wife.

584 578 Two days after the groom left, the bride's father (who is at the
606 same time Hassanein's daughter's father-in-law) came to Hassanein and
686 told him that the marriage was called off and that he should send a
letter to the groom telling him the news. The reasons given by the
● [574] bride's father were that the groom showed improper manners when he
[576] stayed overnight at the camp and that he followed the prospective bride
to the water well to have a close look at her. He gave the money to
Hassanein and asked him to return it to the man in Matruh. Hassanein
was very disappointed and considered this an insult to him, since he
was the mediator in that marriage, and insisted that the bride's father
584 go on with the marriage. When the latter refused, Hassanein went to his
578 daughter and ordered her to leave with him. Her husband was there and
606 could not refuse to let her go with her father, even when Hassanein
686 627 made it clear that her husband could not have her back unless his father
586 kept his agreement with Hassanein's guest. Elewah, the daughter's husband,
asked for a mi'ad to discuss the matter with his father-in-law.
The mi'ad was held in Hassanein's house and was attended by Hassanein,
his son-in-law, and two people from a different lineage, each selected
by one of the disputing parties. Hassanein refused to give any reason
for taking his daughter away from her husband except that he was exercising
his rights. Eleway, on the other hand, insisted that Hassanein
was not justified in his actions and that it was not right to punish
him for something that his father did. The two representatives tried
to calm both parties and to reach an agreement but were not successful.
The mi'ad dissolved with Hassanein not only insisting on keeping his
daughter, but also threatening to marry her to a rich man in the area.
The case was not solved by the time I left the field.

586 The husband had a big herd by the standards of the tribe (600 sheep
183 and goats). In addition, he also cultivated a large stretch of the fig
554
511 land in the coastal area and was making good money. In other words, the husband could afford the standard of living the wife demanded. The other question that was discussed was the actions of the wife herself. She was the daughter of one of the wealthiest members of the same tribe as her husband; and according to the people who knew her, she was used to meat every day of the week. In other cases, similar demands by the wife to have a certain kind of food or to be clothed in certain kinds of material were considered as an intolerable situation, and the husband was justified in his divorcing her and had the right to retrieve his mahr. This was obvious in the case of one of my informants whose wife insisted that every time he went to Alexandria, he bring her silk material for a dress. Since the husband could not afford to meet her demands, her insistence
586 was considered as grounds for the husband. The assessment of reasonable-
183 ness on the part of the husband in his divorce action and therefore his
554 right to the mahr paid is frequently influenced by the relative position of the husband and the wife's guardian in the social structure. An influential man who marries his daughter to a poor relative or nephew rarely has to return the mahr.

586 Although women among Awlad Ali are not given the same legal right
562 of divorcing the husband by pronouncing the "dismissal formula," they are given the right of certain customary procedures which in practice give them equal facilities for dissolving the marriage. This is known as the
[574] right of the woman to "throw herself." This means that the woman takes all her clothes and sometimes her children and goes to the dwelling of

586 the man she chooses. She informs him before she enters his house that
562 she is the wife of so and so and the daughter of so and so and that she
574 is throwing herself on him to protect her from her husband with whom
she no longer wishes to live. Like the right of refuge, the man cannot
[778] refuse to let her in; and from this moment until her dispute with her
husband is resolved, she is considered as his house guest and is entitled to all the hospitality a guest receives. If he refuses to ex-
[627] tend that hospitality or refuses to take her in, she can ask for a mi'ad
[681] and is entitled to kabara from him. There has been no reported incidents
in which a man refused that right to a woman. As soon as she settles
down in the host's house, the latter takes immediate measures to find
the husband and to convince him to let his wife go. In doing this, the
man uses all the power of persuasion. The man selected for this purpose
586 is usually a respected man who can put pressure upon the husband. Some-
562 times he has to bribe the husband to release the wife, paying from his
574 own money. The man has to have money, not only to be able to support
554 [556] the wife during her stay in his house and to bribe the husband, but also
because in certain instances he has to pay the husband the mahr that the
father of the wife had taken in order to free her. The next step after
getting the agreement of the husband to divorce his wife is to contact
the father of the wife or her guardian and convince him to pay the mahr
to the husband. If the father does not agree, or if he is financially
unable to do so, the man on whom the woman has thrown herself is supposed
to pay from his own money. In cases where the woman left the husband to
be married to another man with whom she had had a relationship, the respected man tries to have the future husband pay the present husband the
mahr he is supposed to pay the woman after she is divorced from her

586 husband. In a number of cases the husband was willing to divorce the
562
574 woman after a promise by the man that she would pay him the mahr when
554 she got married. In most cases, however, the process costs the man a considerable amount of money. Sometimes, when the woman is young and attractive, the man finds it to his advantage to keep her as his wife, since she will cost him no more expenses. On the other hand, the man cannot refuse a woman the right of refuge, since to do this or to deny her the right of hospitality will make him liable to pay kabara if she made the refusal known publicly. On the other hand, it is prestigious to be known in the area as a man to whom women go to be released from their husbands. In fact, a man who acquires a reputation of getting wives released is likely to be sought as mardi in other cases as well.

Due to the nature of his role in mediating, the woman must be careful in selecting the man over whom she throws herself. These considerations are manifested in the following case taken from my field notes.
[584] Hadia was forced by her father to marry a man from the same tribe who
[583] paid her father L.E. 100 as mahr. She did not want to marry him because she was in love with someone else of whom her father did not approve. One month after she was married, she left the tent and never came back.
586 Later, she appeared in the house of Omda Ali, the chief of another tribe,
562 and everyone knew that she had thrown herself on him. She later told me
574
554 why she had selected Omda Ali and not the Omda of her own tribe. "Be-
634 cause my husband works for the Omda of my own tribe, and I thought he would be biased. Of course, I couldn't have gone to my father; he was the one who forced me to marry that man. Omda Ali is very respected and can support me... He is also rich and is known for releasing wives from their husbands." Omda Ali called the husband in and asked him to divorce

586 his wife. The husband agreed but insisted that she pay him L.E. 300
562 574 (this included the mahr and the marriage expenses). The Omda tried to
554 reduce the amount but could not. He then tried to get the father to
634 pay, but the father refused. He had to pay the husband L.E. 200 of
his own money and promised that the rest would be paid when the woman
remarried (it would be paid from the mahr). The husband divorced Haida.
One week later she was married to her lover. I have no information
about whether or not the 100 pounds was paid.

586 In another example, Sabha was forced by her father to marry her
562 cousin (ibn 'amm). She could not live with him, so she threw herself
574 554 on one of the holy men in the area. The holy man convinced the hus-
792 band to divorce Sabha and then went to her father and convinced him to
pay back the mahr to the husband, and the case was settled. People say
[626] that both the husband and the father agreed to the demands of the holy
man because they were afraid of his supernatural curse. Sabha went
back to her father's house.

586 It is obvious from these and similar cases that the success or
562 failure of the procedure depends on the careful selection of the man
593 on whom a woman throws herself. It is also apparent from the above
[554] [574] examples that his right of refuge is resorted to only in cases where the
woman cannot go to her father or to her closest kin to help her get a
divorce because he is either unable or unwilling to help her. A father
is unable to help if the husband is powerful or if he is the woman's
ibn 'amm (father's brother's son) who has, according to the tribal law,
the undisputed right to marry his bint 'amm (father's brother's daughter).
The father is usually unwilling to help his daughter if he is the one

586 562 who forced her to marry the husband, or if she was cut off from the
593 family for some reason or another.

586 From the frequency of women using this right in the area, it
562 seems that no social disapproval is associated with it, nor is there
574 a social stigma attached to women who throw themselves. They seem to
626 find it as easy to find a husband as those women divorced voluntarily
by their husbands or with the help of their fathers. In fact, as was
586 562 mentioned earlier, many of them marry the rich men over whom they
587 throw themselves. As to the amount of mahr paid for their subsequent
[583] marriages, the fact of throwing themselves does not seem to be a factor
[594] in determining the amount of mahr paid. In one of the cases, the woman
threw herself on an 'aqila of one of the Geneishat tribe after her
father refused to help her get a divorce from her husband who had married a second wife without first asking the first wife's permission.
[429] When the Geneishat member succeeded in convincing the husband to divorce his wife, the latter had no place to stay so remained in the
house of her protector who acted as her guardian in place of her father
[583] who had refused to take her back in his home. While staying in the
house of her protector, she got many marriage offers; one of the suitors
offered a mahr of L.E. 4,000 ($10,000), one of the highest mahrs reported in the area. She agreed, and the marriage was affected. This
mahr is about ten times the mahr she got for her first marriage. This
586 562 procedure offers the woman a considerable guarantee of her marital
rights. It also gives her, as far as the ability to dissolve the marriage, a status close to that of her husband. This relative equality
is reflected is reflected in the lack of stigma associated with divorced

159 562 the relationship between her and her brothers.

428 Following her action and until the time of the study, they had
593 never visited her and she had never visited them. Her husband took
[237] care of the herd; and the arrangement worked out all right until the
159 562 husband told Fatma one day that he was going to marry a second wife.
593 She refused, but he went ahead with the marriage without her consent.
595 He brought the new wife to live with Fatma in the same tin hut in which
they were living. He started to pay more attention to the new wife and
to neglect Fatma; whenever the latter complained, he beat her. Then,
before one of the religious feasts, he sold two of Fatma's sheep and
bought his new wife a dress and a silver bracelet. When Fatma objected
[164] and they argued, he hit her with a stick on the head; she was hospitalised
for a week with a serious head wound. While in the hospital, she
went to her brothers who lived only two miles away, but they refused to
159 come to her assistance. She then went to sheikh Elewa (the aqila of
562 Bait Assbei) and threw herself on him. He met with the husband and convinced
594 593 him to divorce Fatma. He kept forty sheep of Fatma's herd as compensation
595 for the mahr he had paid her and the marriage expenses, then
586 took his new wife and moved from Fatma's hut. Fatma then returned and
159 562 managed her financial affairs successfully herself. She managed the
449 store and hired a shepherd to take care of the sheep. At the time of
[233] the present study she was respected by almost everybody in the area, including
members of the local administration. She is known to be reasonable
[229] and of sound opinion, and her store functions as the meeting place
[524] for many of the tribal mi'ads and for casual conversations. She is also
considered as a liason between the tribal population in the area and the
local government administration, and is respected by both sides.

000 own home." The following morning a Mi'ad was called for by the two
627
613 aqila who achieved the first settlement, and in it, Mahdi was re-
682 leased from his obligation to pay the bloodmoney, although he was
695 asked to pay the sum of fifty pounds to the widow of the deceased
as a gesture of friendship.

CASE #6: The Case of the Careless Guest

574 The present case involved Ali from the Geneishat tribe who
682 lives in the desert town of Matruh where he has a general store.
He goes on frequent visits to Alexandria to get supplies for his store. On one of these trips he passed by the camp of 'Awad from a different tribal segment. Hungry and tired, Ali decided to spend the night at the camp and continue his trip the following morning. He went to the first tent in the camp which happened to be that of 'Awad, who welcomed him and ordered his wife to prepare dinner for the guest. He then invited other members of the camp to have tea with the guest as a gesture of hospitality. When Ali sat down to eat, he took off his shoes, and put his rifle against a pile of rugs and blankets behind him. As the group was chatting, a goat belonging to one of the invited neighbors entered the tent where the men were sitting. Afraid that it might soil the carpets which he had put out for the guest, Awad chased the goat out of the tent. On its way out, the goat touched the guest's gun which fired, killing Hussein, the brother-in-law of one of the neighbors.

682 The local authorities were notified of the incident, but after
627 conducting a preliminary investigation, they filed the case as acci-
dental death. The tribal proceedings continued, however. After

682
672 Although the weapon used was not lethal and therefore was classified as an unintentional killing, yet the nature of the crime and the obvious intention on the part of the killers made reduced payment difficult to achieve.

Another way of reducing liability and the amount of money paid in cases of unintentional killing is by taking into consideration all the intervening variables that contributed to the death of the victim and asking them to share the blame. The working of this principle is illustrated in the case of the broken rope where the rope was assigned half the responsibility for the death of the victim. It is also present in the case of the careless guest where the responsibility was divided three ways with the host paying one third, the owner of the gun paying another third, and the goat sharing the responsibility for the rest of the bloodmoney. It is interesting to note the difference in the responsibility to the owner of the gun in the above case and the owner of the rope in the case of the broken rope. The owner of the rope was not held responsible for the death caused by his rope, the same way the owner of the goat in the case of the careless guest was not held responsible for the actions of the animal. Both the goat and the rope are not dangerous things by themselves for which a certain degree of care in handling is required. If such normally harmless things cause injury or death to a person, the owner is not held responsible.

682 The situation is quite different in the case of the gun and the responsibility
672 of its owner. By nature, the gun is a weapon of death, and
41 for that reason the tribal law has required certain precautions in its
67
594 use or handling. Among such precautions is the requirement that a guest,

682 as soon as he settles in the host's place, should unload the gun. In 672 addition 411 to reducing the possibility of the gun being accidentally fired 691 and harming someone, this act expressed the trust of the guest in his 591 host and signifies the ability of the latter to protect his guest against any harm. A person visiting another does not need his gun for protection 682 and therefore must unload it. If the owner of the gun fails to take this 672 customary precaution and leaves his gun loaded, and because of that fail- 411 ure the gun causes the death or injury of a person or even damage to property, the owner is held responsible for that result. The same rule applies to other deadly weapons, such as knives or daggers, as well as to animals 683 which are dangerous by nature, such as dogs. Each tent in the area has a 672 231 dog. Starting the first weeks in the puppy's life, he is trained to guard the tent and to bark at the approach of any stranger. It is also trained to attack any intruder who comes within fifty yards of the tent unless accompanied by a member of the tent. When one goes to visit another, he usually stays away from the tent until someone from the tent hears the dog barking and comes out to get the guest. Most dogs would not attack a person as long as he is the safe fifty yards away from the tent. Occasionally, a dog goes behond the safe distance and bites an individual passing by or a guest waiting to be let inside the tent. If the injured person is able to prove, usually by taking the oath, that he was more than fifty yards away from the tent at the time he was attacked by the dog, the dog's owner is liable to the victim for the injury inflicted by the dog. If, on the other hand, evidence shows that the victim was bitten by the dog while being less than fifty yards away from the tent, then there is no responsibility on the part of the dog's

105 On the other hand, there is always a feeling of rivalry and hostility
598 between the different tribal segments which goes back to the era of
571 tribal warfare. Thus, the social relations among the tribal population
are characterized by a certain amount of ambivalence which is hidden behind
a facade of formality in the way tribal members treat one another
105 in day-to-day activities. There are certain rules of etiquette describing
571 the way members of the same tribal segment should behave toward one
576 another and toward other tribesmen and outsiders. Failure to abide by
[589] these rules may subject the violator to a symbolic fine of a goat or a
574 sheep slaughtered for a feast to which everyone is invited. These feasts,
[182] or dinners as they are called, have various functions, the most important
105 of which is the integrative one. In an area where the population is usually
571 dispersed, these dinners offer an opportunity to the tribesmen who
574 happen to be in the area at the time of the feast to attend, where they
182 eat, meet other tribesmen, and exchange information about what is happening
in other parts of the area. It is from such dinners that the tribesmen
get to know about the available pastures, about the prices of sheep
and goats in different markets, and about who is doing what and where.
The occasion also signifies the restoration of the violator of the rules
to the social life of the group and the reinforcement of those rules.
105 This is also true with the tribal meetings, or mi'ad, which are held to
627 announce settlements in more serious cases. It is on this basis that
182 [illegible] the mi'ad should not be considered as a tribal court. It is more of a
574 social occasion where food and drinks are served and where parties involved
and all those invited by them talk about everything except the
[illegible] dispute itself. In certain instances, the financial settlement agreed
upon in the informal mediation is exaggerated when announced in the mi'ad

619 The figures for the free tribes include attached client groups,
162 for the principal of which estimates are also given separately.
[127] The figures are taken from Col. De Agostini's monograph. The provenance of the chief Bedouin tribes of Tripolitania and of the fringes of Fazzan who are Sanusi, or sympathetic to the Sanusiya, is shown, likewise in relation to the distribution of Sanusiya lodges, on the map on page 52.

VI

619 Although there were in the past intertribal wars and feuds
[671] which have lasted into the present time, and in spite of the
[574] difference in status between free and client tribes, there were laws of the tents which gave every Bedouin the freedom of the whole country, and there was much coming and going between the tribes and exchange of hospitality, especially in the grazing grounds where sections with distinct territories on the plateau shared common pasturage to the south of it, and where the necessities of Bedouin life, watering at wells in transit, the crossing of another tribe's territory on the way to markets, the pursuit of straying camels, and the need to sow where rain fell, imposed a recognition of individual rights without regard to tribal affiliations or social status. Had it not been so, the Grand
[793] Sanusi could not have built on the tribal system his inclusive organization, for there would have been no foundations in
*[795] culture, social structure, and sentiment, on which to build.

128 My inclinations as an anthropologist are to discuss at some length the tribal and kinship systems and the life of the tents,
619 but I refrain from giving more than a bare outline of the tribal system, and I neglect altogether kinship and the life of the tents, because, however interesting detail about these matters might be to the ethnologist, a knowledge of them is, I think, unnecessary for an understanding of the development of the Sanusiya Order in Cyrenaica. I discuss the structure of the Cyrenaican tribe therefore only in so far as it is relevant to this general theme.[1]

619 Use of the term 'tribe' in Cyrenaica, even if it be restricted to the big free tribes, is always to some extent arbitrary for the political structure is highly segmentary. Nevertheless, though

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[1] For a more general account see Savarese, op. cit., Pt. II, *passim*.

bers of an undivided group. It is erroneous to suppose that because the different 621
orders of sections are homologous in their structural aspects they do not differ; they 613
do, because the interests associated with the various orders are different.[1] 628

Collateral tertiary segments are associated with different tracts of territory. Each [682]
has its own watering rights as a group, and although groups may share a grain store, [423]
it is divided on group lines. Members of these different groups do not gather together
in summer to form a single community, though at some of the very big watering
points they are near each other. Social relationships between them are, however,
intense. Visits are frequent. They meet to exchange news, or to inquire after the [574]
sick. They exchange greetings during the major festivals, and members of one group
attend the funerals and weddings of the others, taking gifts. They also meet at the
grain stores. Herdsmen, as they pursue straying animals, wander freely in their neighbours' territory. Relationships of this sort, some of them urgently necessary for
survival, do not permit the feuding relationships to be described presently. Permanent hostility which characterizes the feud would seriously disrupt everyday economic
activities, limit the pastoral movements of the Bedouin beyond endurance, and sever
lines of communication which they always strive to keep open.

A homicide, when it involves two collateral tertiary groups must, therefore, be 621
resolved quickly. This can be effected in two ways. Vengeance may be exacted im- 613
mediately. This is always referred to as a vengeance killing or *thār*, and is to be dis-
tinguished from a superficially similar act within a tertiary group, since *thār* carries 628
with it the implication that it is premeditated. A *thār* between two tertiary sections 682
is considered to be the best way of settling the affair and, after an appropriate lapse
of time, a peace meeting is held at which it is accepted that the killings have cancelled
each other out. The deliberations at this meeting are followed by a meal at which all
present 'eat around the one bowl'; the meal over, they all pray together. A life had
been taken for a life and the way is now open for the restoration of normal peaceful
relationships. Vengeance needs to be distinguished from feud, for while retaliatory
killings provide the propulsive force in the feud a vengeance killing may be the means
whereby a settlement of hostilities is made possible.

An end to hostilities may also be brought about by a promise to pay blood money 621
or *diya*, and its acceptance by the victim's group. Arrangements for blood-money 613
discussions are made by a category of persons known as *marabtin bi'l baraka*, or 628
'clients of the goodness', men who, by virtue of descent and origin, stand outside
the descent lines of the noble tribes, and who are accredited with divine goodness. 682
They tend the sick, write amulets, and are always present at a peace meeting to give 792
it the weight of their baraka. Soon after the homicide has occurred they act as inter-
mediaries to bring the hostile groups together at a peace meeting.[2] Ostensibly, the 621
first part of the proceedings at these meetings is to settle the amount of the blood 613
money, and how and when it is to be paid. Agreement on these counts will have been 628
reached, however, before the large peace gathering is assembled, for there is a gener- 682

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[1] This statement requires more documentation than I am able to give to it in this paper, but the descriptive details given hereafter give it some substance. See also Smith, 1956.

[2] It is necessary to add here that these clients do not assume coercive powers. They are granted the power to curse, but the curse that is feared is the curse of their dead when an oath is given at a saint's tomb. When they know that groups wish to make peace they assist as messengers in bringing people together, but they do not use their power to curse as a pressure.

Second, the fiction that nothing has happened, which characterises the 585
father's behavior, does not cease with the termination of the celebrations. 593
Each morning, soon after daybreak and before the camp is astir, the groom
must leave his bride and repair to his father's tent to lie at his father's side
"as he always had done in the past, as if he had not left him." This conventional
ruse is followed, not just for the seven days of wedding festivities,
but is continued after the groom has moved back into the camp proper, and
pitched his tent alongside his father's, with the ropes of the two tents crossing.

In matters other than sleeping arrangements, this fiction that "nothing
has happened" is maintained. Marriage does not mean the immediate creation [592]
of a wholly separate domestic unit. Save for the appearance of an additional
tent, the ordinary run of daytime activities is scarcely altered. To 593
mention perhaps the most important feature of the relationships between 264
father and son, the groom continues to eat with his father. As yet, the son 571
does not use his own bowl,[1] and may not, indeed, do so for several years. 182
The important symbolism of "eating together" or "eating out of the one
bowl," the act of commensality creating a bond of fellowship about which
Robertson Smith[2] wrote so eloquently can only be referred to here in one of
its many aspects. Bedouin themselves stress that eating together is a strong
bond, and the communal meal is always used for this purpose after the
settlement of a dispute, or at the conclusion of a blood-money agreement,
and so on. It is significant also in the sense that those who partake of a
meal accept the authority of the host; he becomes their protector, and a blow [574]
against one of them is struck at him also. Even if the guest is an enemy,[3]
as long as he has eaten from another's bowl his life is safe.

The slaughter of an animal for another person creates a bond which has its 571
roots in the intimate connection between man and his animals. In a very 231
vivid way, the Bedouin view their animals as part of themselves, as part of 264
their *Risiq*, their general wealth, in which their sons are included. It is this 182
mystical association between a man and his animals which distinguishes a
meal consisting of the meat of an animal slaughtered from ones' own flock [574]
or herd from a meal consisting of meat bought from a butcher's shop — often [186]
given by the plateau peoples of Northern Cyrenaica to their guests, but which
the camel-herding Bedouin of the south regard as despicable hospitality. A
slaughtered animal is the food, *par excellence*, which establishes this bond

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[1] When Bedouin take their meals, they eat from large wooden bowls imported from [415]
south of the Sahara. It is a matter of custom that a man does not eat alone unless it is [439]
unavoidable, a custom of such strength, that, when, one day, only an elder, occupying
a tent the ropes of which were crossed with mine, was left in camp, he brought his [123]
bowl into my tent "so that I will be eating with a man."

[2] William Robertson Smith. *The Religion of the Semites.* 3rd ed. London: Macmillan, 1927. [113]

[3] A stranger entering a camp is under no obligation to give his identity. Few do so
until they have partaken of a meal. In the past, the Bedouin claim, the period of [574]
anonymity could last for 40 days, but nowadays, they say they limit it to two only. I [609]
have known strangers enter a camp, receive entertainment, and leave without offering
any specific identity.

462

in position immediately anyone else appears at the entrance to the tent.[11] [834
Women cook, but they do not serve the meal to males, nor are they responsible 342]
for the distribution of meat among them. Parts of an animal are [264] 264
carefully specified, and the various portions distributed at a meal carry 574•
with them a great deal of significance. A host can honour, flatter, disappoint 571
or even insult his guest, depending on the precise distribution of meat
he adopts. Designated portions should go to certain kinsmen if they are [602]
present, but this still leaves a wide margin of choice, and a host can use this choice as part of the many means at his disposal for directing his relationships with other men. A political link can be forged or another snapped by the distribution of portions of meat at the commensal meal.

The Bedouin Ideal Type of Family as a Unit of Production

This account of the division of labour is far from inclusive of all the tasks 594
carried out. The details given are only barely sufficient to provide some 183
indication of the necessary composition of a family. Referring again to the [462]
Bedouin sentiments about the matter, it is now possible to give it some numerical precision. The number of females should be a minimum of about three, including a mother, a teen-age daughter and a child of about
eight years. Males should number about six: a father, relieved of most [857]
chores to act as director; a son in his middle to late twenties, to plough; a [883]
second son, in his early to middle twenties, to herd the camels; a third, in [462]
his late teens to early twenties, to shepherd the sheep; a fourth, middle to [561]
late teens, to look after the goats; and a younger son to fetch, carry and
run errands about the camp. The family of the ordinary Bedouin, they say, [554]
shows this sex and age distribution, although they recognise that a politically [556]
ambitious man with the wealth to match his aspirations would require more of both sexes — particularly women, since the burden of entertainment increases rapidly with a man's climb to power and fame.

Clearly, the basis of Bedouin sentiment concerning family structure is its 121
approximation to an ideal production unit. Some families display the features 183
of this ideal, but even they enjoy the productive benefits of this composition
for a very limited period only. The family, as described above, can only be an 594
ephemeral unit, since the age structure constantly changes, women are removed by marriage, men move away and death affects it at any point at any time. The Bedouin family is a fiction in the sense that it can be said to have a characteristic composition. The mistake they make is to conceive of it as a particular kinship structure related to production. The substance of what has been referred to as a fiction is that, if viewed as a productive unit, it
bears close consistency with reality. Freed of the need to examine it in terms [621]
of specifically limited kinship relationships, and no longer anchored to the inhabitants of a single tent, the distribution of people according to sex and

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[11] This is the general rule. In practice, the use of the divider can indicate an intimacy or distance in relationships, most subtly.

would be impossible to satisfy all marriage expectations of men within the 621
universe of the minimal tribal section. For this reason alone external links 613
are inevitable and persistent. Also, the small territorial strip such a group 582
claims as a homeland produces an economy which, in this environment, 82
is unstable. Additional security is gained by making connections with other [423]
tribal sections, each with its specific ecological character. Men also marry [433]
into their client groups. The proportion of these for this camp was 9 per cent [619]
of the total. From these links they gain economic advantages, they can
claim services and a client-following is politically significant. Finally, 7
per cent of the total[13] are marriages with women of other tribes, which
again not only reduces the instability of the economy (in that a large tribal
area suffering near-famine conditions has access to areas of markedly different ecology), but also provides political connections for men whose power
ambitions have passed the point of leadership limited to their own tribes. In
one way or another all these interests are manifest in the small camp and
attention is now directed to the latter.

The disposition of people in the camp is represented diagrammatically 621
on the page following. 592

The nucleus of the camp is Tent A. Its owner (1) was a powerful *Shaikh*, [554]
the son of a famous father. His marriage represents a political link with a [619]
group of one of the primary sections of his own tribe. His father died only a [428]
few years before I recorded my census, and the large amount of moveable
property he left had still not been divided among the sons; the owner of the
tent, as eldest brother, still controlled the flocks and herds. Most of his time
he spent away from the camp engaging in political intrigue. His two younger
brothers lived in his tent, but the second (5) would not remain there long
because negotiations for his marriage had been started. His father (2) mar- [582]
ried a parallel cousin; she died and shortly afterwards he took her sister (3) [587]
in sororal union. When this occurred an amount of bride-wealth was
agreed, but instead of giving any of it to her father, the entire amount was [583]
"put in front of her" (that is, the animals were allowed to remain with her
husband's flock), and these animals she had marked with her brother's
tribal sign to distinguish them from those of her husband. It was widely [428]
known that she was going to leave these animals to her husband's second [562]
son, for although she could not transfer them to a male outside her husband's
corporate group, she could decide who, among his heirs, should inherit.

During my stay in this camp, her brother's son (4) came to it as a 621
temporary resident for a month. Since he was poor, the purpose of his visit 592
was to capture some of his aunt's wealth while she was still alive and the 574
possibility still existed. During his stay he was fed well but did no work. [604]
His kinsmen found his company tiresome, so, to cut short his stay, and after [431]
consulting her nominated heir (5), she gave him three grown goats. Also
when an occasion arose for an animal slaughter, she provided the sheep, and, [231]

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[13] The remainder is made up of marriages to the daughters of men incorporated into the lineages.

Cases

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

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since meat is shared by all the people of the camp, her wealth was partly dispersed among her poorer kinsfolk.

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The location of Tent B was determined by the fact that the wife (6) was the sister of (3) of Tent A. Her husband (7) had moved into the camp a few years earlier as a result of an inheritance quarrel with his elder who robbed him of his fair share. This husband (7) gained in two ways from the move. Although poor, he had a small flock of his own, too small to justify its own shepherd, but which he was permitted to include with his sister-in-law's (3) flock for shepherding. If the flock had been larger he would still have had difficulties, because, at some times of the year, save for short occasional visits to camp, the shepherd is with his sheep for several weeks, day and night. He (7) had three sons, still far too young to follow the sheep, but when they become of age to do so, his dependence on Tent A will cease, for then he can begin to gather the small flocks of other kinsmen around his own, his sons can shepherd them all and he can begin to enjoy the benefits to be derived from dependents. In addition, he enjoyed

the lavish generosity dispensed by the members of Tent A, and fed far better 621
than would have been possible otherwise. 592
571

The location of Tent C was also determined by a link through women. [574]
The only female (8) living in this tent, a middle-aged widow, was the sister of (3) and (6) of Tents A and B respectively. Her teenage son lived with her. They possessed only a few sheep, which were put with the flock of Tent A for shepherding. The son (9) spent some of his time herding for Tent A. With the mother and her son in Tent C were two other kinsmen. One, a poor man (10), was this son's first patrilateral cousin, and they both were the only surviving sons of their respective fathers. He (10) was the main shepherd of Tent A. The third male (11), also poor and nearly blind, was a second patrilateral cousin of both, but his sister was also 11's mother. All occupants of Tent C were almost entirely supported by Tent A. Relieved of the necessity to live off their own resources, the two young men (9 and 10) were afforded the opportunity of building up their flocks for the day when they would be able to negotiate their delayed marriages.

Tents A, B and C sheltered men who were agnatically closely linked. More 621
important, their grandfathers, three sons in a family of 19 children, were 613
full brothers. The latter's mother's name was used when referring to these 592
three tents as a group. During the past few years, many changes have 571
occurred within it, and the death of the pivotal woman (3) of Tent A might well disperse this small cluster. Further, the nuptials of her heir (5) were anticipated, and this event, itself likely to precipitate division of his father's (2) wealth, might also lead to further residential rearrangements.

The owner of Tent D, (12), a man in his late thirties, son of a slave 621
mother, was at loggerheads with his father's brother, much more senior in age. 592
The owner's father, one of a family of 24 children, had been a wealthy man 604
and died leaving a substantial herd and a large flock, but he (12) was bereft 578
of most of this wealth by the father's brother. His first successful strike
against his uncle was the demand he made for his daughter as a wife. [582]
Earlier, when (12) had demanded his father's wealth, his father's brother, [428]
who had for years acted as his guardian, replied, "It is in your stomach,"
(meaning that it had been expended on his upbringing). Later, after the [583]
marriage had taken place, when the uncle demanded payment of the bride-wealth his own words were thrown back at him, but this time with the meaning that the bride-wealth had already been paid. While I was resident in this area, the two men met occasionally: each meeting was hostile, for (12) was encouraging his half-brother (13) (also the son of a slave mother) to demand a second daughter as a wife. Included in this tent is a third adult male (14), virtually a pauper, reduced to this state by the same grasping
father's brother. His link with (12) was their closeness of relationship (first [571]
paternal cousin), together with the fact that all three males (12, 13 and 14) had suffered privations and were allies against the common enemy, their father's brother.

Associated with them for the same reason, was the owner of Tent E (15).

Cases

621 Genealogically he was their father's brother, but he was of their same age
592 generation, and behaved as if he was their agnatic equal. Towards his own
578 brother (16), he behaved as if the latter was his uncle, for he was much his
[604] junior in age and his uncle had virtually brought him up from boyhood.
[428 They had quarrelled bitterly because his brother (16) had given him only
a fraction of his inheritance, which he himself, in turn, should have
[593] shared with his young full brother (not shown on the diagram) but he did
not do so. This youngest brother left (15) for this reason and now resides
621 with (16), his full brother's enemy. Two of the men (14 and 13) of this
592 group of four were the chief herdsmen of the camp, although they were
[233] assisted for short periods by (12) and (15), who also helped tend the
[571] camels in other ways. Their connection with the group centered on Tent
A was a mutual close link to a politically powerful person (not shown on the
genealogies) to whom they are deeply loyal and who, while I was among
them, was actively opposed to the common political enemy of them all (16),
and who in earlier years had challenged the leadership of (2) of Tent A.
[613] There is also the fact that they were all linked within a close range of
agnation. This linkage included, too, the owner of Tent F (17), not in
[602] fact the descendant of the man shown in the diagram — he was the son of
a slave wife; his genitor was a slave, but his mother's master reared him,
freed him and he is now given as his son in the genealogy. He lives with his
wife, of client origin, together with her children from a previous husband,
(18), who divorced her, and his own children. Aging, he no longer acted
as a regular herdsmen, but relieved other men in the camp, and also spent
some time shepherding.

621 The details given of the strands which run through the camp to tie these
571 particular people together are so few that, like the Bedouin plough, they do
no more than scratch the surface, but they are sufficient to permit a few
general statements. The camp, and particularly the precise disposition of
621 its tents, shows a group of males clustered together to share two of the main
571 economic tasks: shepherding and herding. The physically strong adult males
233 of Tents D and E shoulder the burden of herding all the camels of the camp,
462 and the men of Tents B, A and C shepherd all the sheep, with (17) of
Tent F serving both purposes. This number of men allows some to remain
in the camp at all times, to free one of them for a journey to the distant
market when supplies of sugar and tea are necessary, and to enable one or
two men, at short notice, to hurry away on horse or camel to search for
lost animals.[14]

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Economic Determinants of the General Structure of the Camp

231 It is also clear from these details that, given the disparities in wealth
262 (although all men have some wealth), the diet of most is considerably

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[556]

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[14] There is little point in seeking the lost animals themselves in the first instance. A man travels from camp to camp asking for information, and when he has gathered his clues, he searches a neighbourhood.

ameliorated in its protein content, particularly by the generosity of the oc- 621
cupants of the nucleating Tent A. Not that they are the only ones who ever 574
slaughter their animals for food. Others do so, albeit much less frequently. 231
Whoever kills an animal, everyone present in the camp is given a share, and 262
the men always eat in the tent of the donor, sitting around one bowl. Thus, 431
the surplus that builds up at one point is redistributed among those suffering [556]
a shortage, and meat, in a society where the climate and way of life militate against its storage for more than a few days, is more efficiently used. Many other general economic points could be deduced. These general statements could, however, be made of practically any camp, whatever the specific differences.

Affinity and Matrilaterality in the Structure of the Camp

Economic considerations determine the general structure of these small 621
camps, but do not account for the particular people gathered in them. Per- 613
haps one of the most striking features of these camps, which comes out 602
clearly in the one discussed here, is the confined agnatic span which links the males. Lest it be underestimated, I wish to stress the profound significance of this fact. While granting its importance it is equally necessary to stress that the span, potentially, could be considerably reduced; in some camps it is. Many of the closer agnates of the men of this camp are not shown on the genealogy included with the diagram; (7), (15) and (16), for example, all have brothers, (12) has a large number of first paternal cousins and so on. Therefore, this particular cluster of agnates formed for reasons other than agnatic ties. The most direct single thread connecting Tents A, B and C is that which runs through women. Men of many other camps are all linked in this way, directly. Five tents of this camp are connected through a female link to a common ancestress, whose name still defines the group, two ascending generations for one adult male, three from others and four from others. If greater elaboration could have been shown on the genealogy without confusion, additional links through women could have been demonstrated. Affinity and matrilaterality are the prime movers in bringing agnates together as neighbours.

Other Factors Affecting the Structure of the Camp

Other considerations narrow the area in choice of residence. The quest 621
for power where every man entertains hope of achievement where ambitions 571
are not stifled by the rigour of rank and a small amount of wealth provides 554
a basis for a beginning is also a significant factor in considering the composition of camps. The generosity of the people in Tent A was not entirely altruistic. Justly, it had won them repute, but the repute itself was an important aspect of the political power they enjoyed. They also acquired the services of several men to manage their animals, an impossible strain for them alone. And with their shepherds and herdsmen they secured devoted followers. It was hinted in discussing the structure of the camp that changes

of their affiliations. Hence the Sanusiya does not oppose the 795*
other Orders in the towns on a religious plane, although it does 798
not approve of those which are convulsionary, and they do not compete with it politically. It is only in the interior that the Order will not permit a rival, because competition for the allegiance of the Bedouin must be political. Italian efforts to [648]*
play off these Orders against the Sanusiya were founded on ignorance of the nature of an Islamic *tariqa* and seem to have been ineffectual.

Since almost all the non-Sanusiya lodges are urban it follows 795*
that the history of the growth and spread of the Orders is 369
part of the general history of the growth and spread of the urban centres of Cyrenaica. Some of the older lodges in Benghazi and Darna are over 150 years old, but most of them and all those in the smaller administrative centres date from late Turkish times or were built during the Italian occupation. An urban lodge is generally a small, very simple, structure and its members seldom total more than 50 to 100. It may be [575] ●
regarded as a kind of club, founded for religious exercises, for the performance of good works, and for social insurance. It [485]
also serves as a resthouse for travelling members of the Order and as a *malja*, a place of refuge for the poor and the sick. Few of the lodges are endowed, and most are very poor.

I do not wish to underestimate the social and, in the broadest 795*
sense, political importance of the urban Orders in Cyrenaica. 182
They provide the only spontaneous and co-operative associations in the towns and thus fill a gap for ordinary people both in the town society and in a religion which pays little attention either to corporeal works or, outside the mosques, to corporate worship. Outside the lodges of the Orders there were in Turkish times no associations dispensing charity or giving education, and worship in the mosques within the wide society of Islam does not provide the intimacy and colour men need in acts of common devotion. The lodges give to their members a double attachment and a double security, membership of a welfare association, which gives them a feeling of material security, and membership of a devotional group, which gives them a feeling of spiritual security. Also, in spite of their lack of numbers and organization, the urban lodges are links in chains which, running through Islamic countries and cutting across natural

*795 182 and political boundaries, help to keep the Islamic world together against the impact of western civilization and imperialism. A member of the Qadiriya or Rifa'iya Orders can wander from lodge to lodge from China to the Atlantic. A member of the Madaniya is received as a brother if he goes to Maknas, Istanbul, or Mecca. An 'Isawi or 'Arusi finds lodges of his Order all over North Africa, obeying the same rules, bearing the same banner, using the same books of devotion, performing the same ritual, and bound by a common brotherhood. These Orders, therefore, are not unimportant in shaping and propagating a common opinion and feeling among Muslims about any question of the day which affects Islam.

*795 369 182 [668] But in a narrower political sense they have little importance, even in the urban centres. They are too weak and poor to act as cells in a movement of a political kind, for they show, as René Brunel says of the 'Isawiya, 'lack of unity of direction' and 'absolute lack of cohesion'.[1] In Cyrenaica the Sanusiya alone has been capable of becoming a political movement and hence of all the Orders alone aroused the suspicion of Istanbul and the hostility of Rome. We may inquire, therefore, what it is which has distinguished the Sanusiya from the other Orders in [186] the country. As we have noted earlier, the fakiristic exhibitions of some of the Orders, so dear to the common man in the towns, were uncongenial, even repellent, to the Bedouin, who, in any case, had no affection for the townsmen and for things emanating from the towns. Also the Bedouin, socially and morally secure in their tribal and kinship systems, felt no need for further associations. Their need was for some authority lying outside their segmentary tribal system which could compose intertribal and intersectional disputes and bind the tribes and tribal sections together within an organization and under a common ● [575] symbol. Hence, while the urban lodges were clubs—and this was the status of the Sanusiya lodges in the towns as much as it was that of the lodges of the other Orders—the Sanusiya lodges in the country-side were political, administrative, and economic, as well as religious and educational, centres. The urban lodges followed the social pattern in urban communities generally. Corporate life was narrowed to small quarters, single streets, a few houses, outside which people belonged, it is true, to a

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[1] *Essai sur la Confrérie religieuse des 'Aîssâoua au Maroc*, 1926, p. 53.

While the Bedouins
795 771 829 respect the Sanusi family they, nevertheless, wear their religion lightly. An informant, speaking of the merits and demerits of the conservative Muslim Brethern Association, said that "you should never listen to a holy man, for he will lead you straight to hell!" [576] [778] But upon meeting any member of the Sanusi family, all Bedouins greet him by kissing his hand. Besides a show of deference, this ritual act, in theory, transfers baraka from al-Sanusi to the layman.

648 641 The citizenship exemptions granted the Bedouins by Muhammad 'Ali have been rescinded by Abd al-Nasser. This has been one aspect of his program to imbue the Bedouin with political consciousness and promote participation in the nation-state. The Bedouins say that this is the way it should be: they want the right to own land and to accept the responsibility of defending the homeland. [651] But they still do not pay land taxes, and they feel justified in this because the desert "is very poor soil, and not like that of the Nile." Nor do they always heed the call to military duty, though they insist that they do.

648 177 423 Egyptian land reform laws would be impractical, or impossible to apply, in al-Qasr. In the Nile Valley, such laws were necessary. The majority of the Egyptian peasants can survive on less than one acre of land, and farms of under five acres comprise 44 per cent of the agricultural land area in the Nile Valley (Warriner 1962:204). Plots this

585 room, until he arrives for the test of her virginity. The groom "takes blood with his finger," wipes it on the white toga which his bride had been veiled with, and hands it to the older women waiting outside the tent. In the meantime, [792] the two fathers have met with the faqiih ("holy man") who [675] witnesses the agreement on the mahr payment. They read the Fatiha of the Quran together and conclude the marriage contract. The old women, carrying the toga with the virginal blood on it--a symbol of honor to both of the groups concerned with the marriage--parade around the guests' tent showing it, while all the time letting out shrill victory cries (zaghaariid = "trilling cries of joy"). The toga is then pinned-up on the side of the guests' tent for all to 585 see. Animals are slaughtered and the feast begins. The 574 central activity of the feast takes place in the guests' tent, the tent of the male guests. The groom's father, in • [576] the traditional role of host, does not sit down to eat with his guests but directs the seating and feeding of them.

585 684 Should it happen that the girl is not a virgin, the wedding would end on the spot, and the girl would be sent away or killed by her father. My informants said that this has never happened in al-Qasr. One key informant told me that such a thing never happens because the groom would never permit it to be known that "his cousin was not a virgin." In other words, the groom will get the blood from somewhere,

156 tional style of Bedouin hospitality--"as we used to do in
159 Cyrenaica"--and spent a total of 50 L.E. for the welcoming
554 ceremony. "This money was from his own pocket," as the
829 Bedouins of al-Qasr complained after it was learned that
574 the vice-President would not visit Matruh after all. As
648 a matter of fact, all of the Bedouin leaders who had been
invited to the reception by Hajj 'Ali refused to eat the
food, for they said that it had not been prepared for them.
[576] This act was taken as a show of respect for Hajj 'Ali and
anger with bureaucrats.

156 Hajj 'Ali is the representative of al-Qasr to the
159 Arab Socialist Union which meets in Marsa Matruh and has
554 cell meetings in al-Qasr. The socialist cell in al-Qasr
648
668 meets about three times a month. When I asked why Hajj 'Ali
[124] was the man chosen to represent all of al-Qasr at section
meetings of the Union, the reply was: "Because he is a member
[635] of the _Majlis al-Muhafza_." There was one section meeting
of the Union in Matruh while I was in the field. The theme
of the meeting was "The Meaning of Socialism." Hajj 'Ali
attended this meeting.

156 In sum, it seems not too far afield to say that Hajj
159 'Ali is prepared to take over the leadership of the Bedouins
554 in a much more sophisticated manner than one could possibly
expect from the traditional style of politics. Hajj 'Ali's
[634] comments about the _'umda_ and the _'umda's_ probable successor

621 had started in the area at that time. No special permission was re-
563 quired for the newcomer to join the camp. He only got the permission
of the person whose tent was at the far end of the camp to put his tent
[574] next to it. The first night after the man joined the camp, his next
door neighbor slaughtered a goat in honor of the new member and invited
all members of the camp.

621 Leaving the camp also does not require any permission, although the
622 custom specifies that before one leaves he should inform either his
● [576] neighbor or the headman of his time of departure. With the exception of
[613] cases where the headman of a particular camp is at the same time the
Aqila of the bait, the headman of the camp has no authority over the mem-
622 bers of the camp. He is usually called upon to solve minor problems be-
627 tween brothers or husband and wife, or give his opinion in decisions of
minor importance. "A headman is like a father," said one informant, "we
call him kabir el-nagi (the old man of the camp)." When a member of the
627 613- nagei is involved in a serious dispute with another, the one to handle
the case is the aqila or awaqil to whom the two disputing parties belong.

619 Group	Leadership	Identifying aspects
613 Kabila	None	Client groups attached.
621 Eila	None	Vengeance group, Vaguely defined tribal land ("watan").
Bait	Aqila	Corporate land-holding. Formally recognized leadership.
[622] Nagei	Headman	Residential unit with unsegmented structure.

628 683 613 the area. He caught him and slapped him and ordered him not to do it again. After a short while the boy returned with his two older brothers who protested Sheikh Mughaieb's hitting their younger brother. The argument developed into a fight during which the two brothers hit Mughaieb with a heavy stick over his head making him unconscious.

The Mi'ad was held two weeks after the incident. When I arrived at Sheikh Mughaieb's house, the meeting was being held in the guest room in the back of the house. Present at the meeting were Sheikh Mughaieb, his father, two distant relatives of Mughaieb who were visiting the area at the time; Sheikh Mutair, the Aqila of the powerful bait of Mutair located some twenty miles east of Mughaieb; the two assailants, their father who at the same time was the Aqila of their bait, and two neighbors of Sheikh Mughaieb.

For the first half hour or so nothing was said. People were sitting
[576] silently except for occasional greetings of "how are you?" and the response of "thank God for everything". Tea was served frequently. Then
[779] Sheikh Mutair addressed the gathering and read the "fatha" or the beginning passage of the Qoraan (which appeals to God to show his right ways to the believers and to guide them to wisdom). He then said, "In the blessed presnece of all these honorable guests and with the help of God and his prophet we will clear the hearts of those concerned of the grudges caused by the shameful and unfortunate incident in which the devil has played a major role." Then Sheikh Karim, the Aqila of the bait to which the accused belonged, continued the speech saying that this shameful thing should never have happened and that his sons must
[867] have been possessed by the devil to have done it. After all, they have been brought up to respect their elders and especially Sheikh Mughaieb, who was like a second father to him.

628 683 613 [576] who was like a second father to them. He praised Sheikh Mughaieb for being understanding. He then said that Sheikh Mughaieb was very generous and that his sons had come to Mughaieb the day before and kissed the top of his head (an expression of respect for forgiveness). He said that no money, no matter how great, could erase the harm done by his sons but that he had offered to pay Sheikh Mughaieb the sum of 400 pounds as "kabara" or face-saving compensation. (The kabara will be discussed in a forthcoming chapter, but for the time being it is worth noting that the above amount is the maximum for such compensation since it equals the bloodmoney for a man). Then he turned to Sheikh Mughaieb and asked him to accept it in front of the respected guests. Sheikh Mughaieb then spoke for the first time and said that the two boys were like sons to him and that he had no hard feelings toward them anymore, since he believed that young people were sometimes carried away in their actions. He then proceeded to say that in honor of the honorable guests who took the time to attend the hearing he was forfeiting half the amount. At that time a woman brought the food the women were cooking for the gathering, and Sheikh Karim asked Mughaieb, "How about the honor of the good women of the house who have done all the work and cooked all the food? If you ask me, they deserve at least another hundred pounds." Mughaieb said, "All right, fifty pounds for the home of the women, but no more." After that Sheikh Karim paid the amount of a hundred and fifty pounds to Sheikh Mughaieb and shook hands with him. He also shook hands with the two young men who had assaulted him, and the gathering started the dinner and tea.

627 628 Not all Mi'ads in the area proveed with that smoothness. Many of them are characterized by shouting and arguments and frequently no .

584 Two days after the groom left, the bride's father (who is at the
578 same time Hassanein's daughter's father-in-law) came to Hassanein and
606 told him that the marriage was called off and that he should send a
686 letter to the groom telling him the news. The reasons given by the
[574] bride's father were that the groom showed improper manners when he
[579] stayed overnight at the camp and that he followed the prospective bride
to the water well to have a close look at her. He gave the money to
Hassanein and asked him to return it to the man in Matruh. Hassanein
was very disappointed and considered this an insult to him, since he
was the mediator in that marriage, and insisted that the bride's father
584 go on with the marriage. When the latter refused, Hassanein went to his
578 daughter and ordered her to leave with him. Her husband was there and
606 could not refuse to let her go with her father, even when Hassanein
686 made it clear that her husband could not have her back unless his father
627 kept his agreement with Hassanein's guest. Elewah, the daughter's hus-
586 band, asked for a mi'ad to discuss the matter with his father-in-law.
The mi'ad was held in Hassanein's house and was attended by Hassanein,
his son-in-law, and two people from a different lineage, each selected
by one of the disputing parties. Hassanein refused to give any reason
for taking his daughter away from her husband except that he was exercising his rights. Eleway, on the other hand, insisted that Hassanein
was not justified in his actions and that it was not right to punish
him for something that his father did. The two representatives tried
to calm both parties and to reach an agreement but were not successful.
The mi'ad dissolved with Hassanein not only insisting on keeping his
daughter, but also threatening to marry her to a rich man in the area.
The case was not solved by the time I left the field.

233 animals to drink, sat on the edge of the well with his feet in the
cool water of the pool completely absorbed in his thoughts amidst
the quiet surroundings. Passing by the pool at that time was Mahdi
233 • 576 from a neighboring tribal segment. Seeing Idris (whom he had not
165 known), he shouted the customary greeting, "Peace on you." Startled
by the voice of Mahdi, Idris lost his balance and fell in the deep
water of the pool. Mahdi rushed to help him, but the water was too
deep, and Idris drowned. Feeling sorry for Idris, Mahdi took the
flock and went back to the camp of Idris where he informed the
682 latter's wife of what had happened. A few days later, Mahdi was
627 paid a visit by Sheikh Elewa, the aqila of Bait Asabei' and known
[613] mardi in the area who informed Mahdi that the family of Idris was
demanding the payment of the sum of L.E. 300 for the death of their
682 relative. A Mi'ad was set for the following week. In that Mi'ad,
627 and after Mahdi admitted that it was his greeting that had startled
672 Idris and caused him to fall in the well, the two Mardis representing
613 the two parties agreed that the payment of the sum of three
hundred pounds was in order and that Mahdi and his amar must pay it
to the victim's family as soon as possible. At first, Mahdi seemed
to accept the judgment of the two Mardis, especially when both were
prominant members of some of the influential tribal segments in the
area. But Mahdi was a poor man, and his amar was very small in number,
which made the payment of the bloodmoney almost impossible.
682 Although appeal in the ordinary legal sense does not exist in such
627 a system like that of Awlad Ali, where no judgment is forced upon
672 695 any of the disputing parties, and where the pronouncement of the

682 settlement is usually made after the parties have agreed to it,
627 yet, in certain instances where one of the parties later feels that
672 the settlement was not just or that he was coerced into accepting
695 it, he may ask for a second Mi'ad during which new procedures start
in the case. In the present case, although Mahdi had originally
accepted the judgment of the awaqil, as time passed and he realised
that he was unable to pay the bloodmoney, he started to question
the feasibility of the settlement. He discussed the matter
682 with Sheikh Suliman el-Gerery from the Murabiteen tribe of Gerera,
672 a tribe whose members are feared throughout the area for the belief
695 that they have certain supernatural powers. Sheikh Suliman himself
554 is highly respected, and people believe that after his death he will
792 become "wali" or a saint. After hearing Mahdi's complaint, Sheikh
[776] Suliman told him that the settlement was unjust and told him that he
would do something about it. The following Thursday, Sheikh Suliman
called on Mahdi and asked him to bring his donkey and follow him.
They rode to a small desert town called Bahig where the local market
613 is held every Thursday. On market day, the awaqil of various tribal
517 segments usually gather in front of the general store in the town
571 drinking tea and chatting until their sons or the younger members
443 of their families sell the sheep and buy the necessary items. Everyone
● 576 passing by the gathering is expected to greet the gathering, getting
off his donkey as a sign of respect to the prominent people.
[689) Failure to greet a fellow tribesman is considered a serious offense
liable to a fine of more than L. 50 and ten goats in certain cases.
[673] It is considered a very serious crime. One informant once told me,
000

124 One informant once told me,

> 576 "If you don't greet me, this means that you hate me, and if you
> 829 hate me, there is no limit to the kind of harm you can do me and my family. One who hates you can kill you, and none can walk safely anywhere if he fears that he will be killed."

682 As Sheikh Suliman and Mahdi reached the general store, every-
689 one was gathering there as usual, including the two awaqil who
672 695 were involved in the original settlement. Sheikh Suliman told
554 Mahdi not to dismount his donkey and not to say the customary
792 greeting as they passed by the gathering. When they passed the
576 gathering, everyone stood to greet Sheikh Suliman who ignored them and left with Mahdi. No one believed that Sheikh Suliman, who should be the guard of the tribal tradition, should commit such an unforgivable violation of the norms of the people. The next morn-
682 ing the whole area was talking about a big Mi'ad to "take the right"
689 from Sheikh Suliman and Mahdi, who had insulted the gathering. The
672 695 Mi'ad was held a week after the incident. During the Mi'ad, Sheikh
554 Suliman was asked to explain his behavior, and his answer was, "How
792 do you want me to greet all those people who were sitting in front
576 of the store? There were more than thirty men in that gathering,
627 and I was afraid that if I said the customary greeting, I might have startled some of them causing them to harm themselves, leaving me with the payment of so many bloodmoneys." Immediately, the attendants of the Mi'ad knew what Sheikh Suliman was referring to, and that his action was to prove that the settlement reached in the case of Mahdi was wrong and that it set a very dangerous precedent which would cause people to avoid greeting one another, "and hatred will prevail among brothers and nobody will be safe in his own home."

105 On the other hand, there is always a feeling of rivalry and hostility
598 between the different tribal segments which goes back to the era of
571 tribal warfare. Thus, the social relations among the tribal population
are characterized by a certain amount of ambivalence which is hidden behind
a facade of formality in the way tribal members treat one another
105 in day-to-day activities. There are certain rules of etiquette describing
571 the way members of the same tribal segment should behave toward one
576 another and toward other tribesmen and outsiders. Failure to abide by
[illegible] these rules may subject the violator to a symbolic fine of a goat or a
[illegible] sheep slaughtered for a feast to which everyone is invited. These feasts,
[illegible] or dinners as they are called, have various functions, the most important
105 of which is the integrative one. In an area where the population is usually
571 dispersed, these dinners offer an opportunity to the tribesmen who
594 happen to be in the area at the time of the feast to attend, where they
182 eat, meet other tribesmen, and exchange information about what is happening
in other parts of the area. It is from such dinners that the tribesmen
get to know about the available pastures, about the prices of sheep
and goats in different markets, and about who is doing what and where.
The occasion also signifies the restoration of the violator of the rules
to the social life of the group and the reinforcement of those rules.
105 This is also true with the tribal meetings, or mi'ad, which are held to
629 announce settlements in more serious cases. It is on this basis that
[illegible] the mi'ad should not be considered as a tribal court. It is more of a
[illegible] social occasion where food and drinks are served and where parties involved
and all those invited by them talk about everything except the
[illegible] dispute itself. In certain instances, the financial settlement agreed
upon in the informal mediation is exaggerated when announced in the mi'ad

657 177 474 661 [435] sale of goods on the black-market. Tribal leaders, or members of a "status group," in whose hands the operation of the cooperative society had been placed, confiscated more than their share of food and fodder and resold it either in the Nile Valley or to their own tribesmen for whom it had originally been intended. The government could not really prosecute the guilty parties for fear of jeopardizing the entire program. Nor could they convince the cheated tribesmen that they had been treated unfairly by their leaders. [673] For one thing, the Bedouins did not consider that their leaders were committing a wrong; furthermore, any Bedouin who would go to the government to inform on another Bedouin would be subjected to a [577] trial by Bedouin justice. It is still the traditional codes of Bedouin law and honor, and not the modern judiciary system, which prevail in al-Qasr.

474 The cooperative society in al-Qasr is one of thirteen in the general area of Marsa Matruh. It began with a membership of twenty-five, twenty-two of these were from the 'Aishaibat tribe. Today, the enrollment is 139 official, and another 195 "unofficial" members. The unofficial members represent unregistered branches of the al-Qasr cooperative. The Bedouins [735] explain that they cannot allow any members of the tribe to go hungry, and, therefore, they will distribute food to all those who need it (Zein, n.d.). [661] This, of course, shows that those cooperative officers who do profiteer are not entirely oblivious

121 571 554 moral community, we cannot proceed to a discussion of the internal and external systems of political relations.

•577 181 [867] As a result of the socialization process, and through relations with other members of the family, an individual comes to recognize that his conduct is measurable by certain standards of, what is considered by the group to be, good and bad, right and wrong. In al-Qasr, such standards are intrinsically correct, or "decent" as the Bedouins say; obedience to the authority representing these standards is interpreted as a "duty." [596] The authoritative aspect of the role of household head (shaib al-bait), and the moral obligations which it represents, emerge from and reinforce values and structural arrangements central to Bedouin social order, namely, respect for authority and devotion to social groups, the two basic elements of morality defined by Durkheim (Parsons 1937:382-385).

577 571 181 182 The value placed upon social order, and the structural mechanisms for insuring its realization and extension--kinship, residence and contract--inform an authority structure which ranges between filial piety at the family level and a set of legal norms at the level of the external political system. The fact that the Bedouins of al-Qasr are interested in integrating a larger population into their authority structure means that a common value is operative in the range of it; also that one sphere of authority will tend to merge into another. [593] [671] Hence the father-son authority relation has importance for the strength of Bedouin customary law in the desert. The

577 high value placed upon conformity to rules governing authority
571 relations makes Bedouin society of al-Qasr less individualistic
181
182 than, for instance, the Iatmul of New Guinea who "set no
exaggerated value upon extremely orderly behavior" (Bateson
1958:31). Social cohesion in al-Qasr is sustained through
what Durkheim called "mechanical solidarity."

593 The Bedouin father is in a disciplinary position over his washuun, his wife (wives) and his children. (The word, washuun, must be of Berber origin for I am unable to trace it in Arabic.) Although the father has the right to beat his washuun, the Bedouins say that he does so "only in rare cases, when it is necessary." During my time in the field I heard of no physical punishment being dealt out by a father.

The dyadic relationship of father and son roles is
the focal field of authority in the family. The pattern of
behavior in this relationship is marked typically by restraint
on the part of the son. The father orders and the son obeys
unquestioningly. If the father accidentally uses a taboo
[192] word, such as 'ammar which in standard Arabic means "to fill"
but in the Bedouin dialect means "to have sexual intercourse,"
the son will immediately depart the scene in a high state of
embarrassment. In this way, the boy is not only excluded
[561] from gatherings and activities in which his father participates, but he is also made to maintain a respectable social
distance from his father's age-set. There are other ways of

593 was with his brother and not his brother's sons. When the
father persisted with his intention to embarrass his nephews,
his sons, as a last alternative, threatened to leave him.
In the face of this threat, the father capitulated.

The rights and duties of the father-son relationship,
although they do not change in sentiment, will change in
content during the lifetime of the father. The main change
[421] in content will be a reflection of a change in property relations.
593 The Bedouin believe that this is the way it ought
577 to be; they say that

> A son must respect and obey his father. The son must do anything that he can to help and please his father. When the son grows up and begins to earn money, he must contribute generously to his father. A son pleases his father by giving him money and helping him to be comfortable.

593 In boyhood and manhood, the father has disposal over his son's
596 labor. As long as a son lives in his father's *naja'* this is
[464] so. One son, who worked for an American oil company in the
desert, regularly turned over his pay check to his father.
It is the father who decides where the son will live, and,
whether or not he will have his own domicile away from the
main *naja'*. When the son marries and brings his wife to the
[591] *naja'*, he will usually set up his tent next to his father's
tent. The tent is given to the boy by his father. During
593 the son's growing-up period, he will be given, as gifts on
431 various occasions, a sheep or a number of sheep which will
be kept with the father's flock.

*613 concepts of what is desirable and undesirable. "Every structural
571 arrangement," Raymond Firth has said, "has its moral
attributes of obligation" (1961:212). This is most essential
in an uncentralized system, such as that of al-Qasr, where
no institutions exist outside of the corporate group for the
introduction of new principles of organization and association.

181 Among the Bedouins, the conceptualization of an authority
578 structure in the role of *'aqila* relates to the high value which
•577 they place upon a peaceful and orderly world. Children in al-Qasr
*[613] are taught that one of their serious duties in life is
[571] to mediate conflicts, especially, when they are potentially
[554] situations which may lead to protracted conflict. And, in a
segmentary society where a member's status links him to many
different groups in differing degrees of importance, all
quarrels are potential group wars. The Bedouin child knows
that his elders, and God, want him to follow "the path of the
good" (*tariiq al-khair*). Mainly, this involves helping others
to follow "the path of the good" by "bringing them back together"
when they are in conflict. When two individuals
quarrel and refuse to return to "the path of the good," this
brings *'aib* ("shame") to each of the persons. When two individuals
*[613] quarrel, setting off a group conflict, this brings
'ar ("shame") to the respective corporate groups of the individuals
[626] (Abou-Zeid 1966). Against individuals who persist
[784] in the ways which cause *'aib* to himself, or *'ar* to his group,

181 certain sanctions of both a secular and sacred nature may be
578 imposed: expulsion from the group and the curse of God are
579 626 ultimate coercive interventions in the process of conflict
784 regulation.

*613 The role of *'aqila* presents the corporate group as
181 "one person" in opposition to other similarly defined groups.
182 Thus, Fortes says (1953:25), "the way a lineage system works
571 depends on the kind of legal institutions found in the society," and this is a function of its political organization. The Bedouin political organization is characterized by two aspects: the internal political system, and the external political system. Both systems are regulated by the same values and norms. Authority relations within the corporate level are founded on values inculcated in the socialization process, and prescribe political behavior for all who come under the jurisdiction of the respective *'aqila*. Authority relations outside the corporate level are conducted through the *'aqila*. This political role as a functional part of the lineage structure operates in terms of kinship values; politics at the external level are characterized by no new principles.

*613 Politics in al-Qasr, and elsewhere for that matter, is
571 a process of problem-solving and conflict regulation between
182 individuals and groups. Political action occurs at different levels of the lineage structure, and each is demarcated as a focus or sphere of authority. But all authority stems from

692 police and not to his *'aqila*. This was a serious case because
685 the police were forced to imprison the dike-builder for two
648 days before he would agree to their demands. The two men in-
*613 volved in the conflict were from different lineages, and it soon became necessary for Bedouin justice to intervene even after the matter had been settled by the police. The *'awaaqil* of each man met, along with other notables of the tribe, and investigated the area where the dikes had been; they listened to witnesses and tried to calculate the amount of water which each man should receive. In the end, the decision of the police was upheld.

692 Although, ideally, litigation should be instigated
691 through the office of the *'aqila*, alternatives do exist. As
*613 noted in discussing the values of Bedouin society, it is the
• [577] moral obligation of each and every person to moderate between conflicting parties; any one conflict situation may be moderated by many well-meaning parties. Or, if a person suspects prejudice on the part of his own *'aqila*, he may choose to take
627 his claim to another *'aqila*, or third party. The notion of a
554 third party to a conflict, when it does not refer to the *'aqila*
692 or a close kinsman who may act as an arbitrator, has reference to a non-institutionalized role in al-Qasr. This role-holder, the Bedouins call *rajal khair* ("good man") or *qawaal al-khair* ("the speaker of the good").

"Role differentiation implies organization" (Levy

671 the Bedouins, the government soon discovered their own error,
182 for they were unable to effectively manage group and tribal
648 political relations: "They (the government) found out that they could not solve murders in the desert. They would arrest the killer but the trouble continued between families (i.e. feuding went on). There were more killings instead of less, and, finally, the government asked us to return to the 'awaiyid because it alone can solve murders in the desert." I was unable to document the claim that the government had "abolished" the 'awaiyid in 1933, but a number of officials who worked at the Governor's Office in Marsa Matruh said that it was true.

671 In al-Qasr, and in the Western Desert in general,
641 adherence to law and political order rests upon the conviction
577 that each individual and territorial group have guaranteed
571 rights which are related to honor and property. A violation
554 of any single man's honor or property may easily be interpreted, according to the principle of collective responsibility, as an offense against the rights of a group. And in this sense, legal and moral violations in Bedouin society are relative to the structure of interrelations, and they must be regulated with reference to the various levels of the authority structure.

181 Bedouins place a high value on political order, but
641 also on the idea that political order can only be guaranteed
578 through a man's willingness "not to allow another to take any
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*613 ultimately, all-out warfare: the role of 'aqila is most
578 critical at this level. Abou-Zeid (1966:259) has suggested
182 an explanation for the delicate balance of political relations
which exists between secondary lineage groups. He thinks that

> •[577] . . . in the segmentary society of the Bedouin of the Western Desert . . . honour has played, and still plays, a most vital role in the field of social control, besides providing an effective code of morality . . . A slight offence inflicted against a lineage . . . is taken as an unfavorable humiliation requiring immediate retaliation to wipe out the shame, regain honour, and restore the same relations as formerly between the groups.

682 Homicide and wounding cases, which usually develop over con-
683 flicting claims to land or water rights, are most prone to
578 lead to grand-scale conflict. Thus the 'aqila will always
*613 mediate and adjudicate these cases whereas he will not
necessarily intervene in those cases involving tertiary groups where appeals to moral solidarity and kinship unity may succeed in restoring relations. It is difficult to muster evidence for this contention since conflict between tertiary groups is more of a private matter than it is public, and, once settled, such conflict is not likely to be discussed, or even admitted.

*613 Most of my details on conflict regulation and the
578 judicial process in al-Qasr involve political action between
619 secondary or primary groups, eighteen of the twenty-two cases
681 in fact. Of the nine cases dealing with personal injury (eight

626 process of conflict regulation is ritually sanctioned and
182 the political order sacralized in a public way at the con-
771 clusion of litigation when the parties involved and the
'aqila read the _Fatiha_ (the first _sura_ of the Quran). For
671 the Bedouins, the _'awaiyid_ is the enactment of the word of
771 God, and the man who follows the _'awaiyid_ follows the command-
771 ments of God. One _'aqila_ speaking of the final authority which
776 directs Bedouin society said this:
•577

> God knows all things. God made the world and gave man a brain with which to think. Therefore, he gave man two choices: the good, and the bad. If a man follows the good, he does not steal, kill, or lie. God gave us Muhammad the Messenger, and he taught the ignorant to follow the word of God. You are an educated man, and so you must choose the good path and follow it. I do not read but I follow the Quran.

577 It follows, then, that "the good man" represents an
183 important Bedouin cultural ideal which is legitimated by
771 reference to the sacred. The practice of this ideal leads
[829] to "the good society." Another _'aqila_, in reply to my
question concerning the definition of a "good man," answered:

> A good man should follow God, and through this he will be a perfect man because such a man could make no mistakes. You could find no better person than this. The good man fasts, prays, makes the pilgrimage, and helps the poor. He avoids stealing and lying; these are the most important things to avoid . . . All men aim to do good. Some men think that they are doing good, but they cannot tell good from bad: this is the origin of badness . . . A man aims to do good so that the Arabs will thank him for it. The Arabs (i.e. the man's fellow Bedouins) will say that he is doing good and that he is following the good path.

577 According to this 'aqila, the "good man" is the "good Muslim"
771 who observes the pillars of Islam (fasting, praying, making
183 the pilgrimage, and alms-giving). Also, the "good man" does
not steal or lie, and this leads, importantly enough, to social
accord.

121 In light of the preceding discussion of authority and
681 law, we can now offer a description of the Bedouin judicial
process in action. Southall (1956:121-151) has drawn the
121 distinction between internal and external delicts on the
681
114 bases of kinds of sanctions rendered, and whether or not
chiefly authority mediates conflict. Such a distinction can
be only partially applied in the case of the Bedouins of the
Western Desert. The kind of sanctions operating in the internal
political system do differ from those applied in the external
political system, though not to the same degree which is true
121 of Southall's Alurland. On the other hand, since Bedouin
681 society, lacking political centralization, cannot be character-
692 ized as a segmentary state with distinct spheres of authority
[642] at successive levels of the lineage structure, the intervention
or non-intervention of chiefly adjudication and decision-
making cannot serve as a basis for differentiating political
* [613] action. Rather, the lone political office of the 'aqila
[627] involves itself in all arbitration which cannot be successfully
concluded by the mechanism of familial authority. There are
[648] just two exceptions which apply to this latter statement:

554 It would be considered "wrong" for the members of
571 this group to present themselves at an al-Qasr wedding party,
[577] or the annual celebration held in honor of a local saint of
[585] [796] the area. When I inquired about the conspicuous absence of
[124] some of my chief informants from such gatherings, I was told
[431] that "they will send their gifts," or that "it is not decent
554 that they come to something such as this." In terms of
571 Bedouin social structure, there are a number of plausible
182 explanations for this "status separation." Fathers should
561 [593] not attend public affairs at which their sons may be "performing," i.e., young men should be allowed to play a public role outside the confines of the father-son authority structure. By virtue of the extension of the father role, and its corresponding authoritarian attitude, every member of the elder age-set commands certain rights and obligations which would prevent the free expression that is the hallmark of Bedouin parties. Conversely, and at the more general level, members of the "status group" who wish to remain members of this circle accept certain restrictions on social
[114] intercourse. At the five different Bedouin "parties" which I attended, there were "elders" present, but none of them could be classified as members of the "status group." Bedouins plainly state that elders should not attend parties, but, on the other hand, they show much more concern and emotion when they say that a member of the "status group" should not "be

554 hence the *rajal khair* represents a face-saving mechanicsm
571 and an alternative which is needed. The *rajal khair* may even
627 [829] violate group norms in acting to restore the balance of
*[613] honor: he may lie with intent to deceive, behavior which at
●[577] any other time would be considered "wrong" by the Bedouin.
An informant said that

> [539] the real *rajal khair* is a man who goes to men in a quarrel and asks them to be on good terms and to avoid the devil. He uses good judgement in quarrels. In this case, he may even have to lie. He goes to both parties and listens to them insult each other, but when he returns he tells each that the other is a good man and wishes to settle the quarrel. He tells them: 'Do not let the devil interfere.' He tells each that the other wants his friendship.

554 I pursued the detail that a *rajal khair* may lie to restore
571 peace, since other informants had made a point of this. My
577 informant then explained:
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> [539] I don't want to commit myself because no one knows if the *rajal khair* is really lying; the men at the time of the quarrel do not know that he is lying. Not all men are *rajal khair*: there are only a few. The *rajal khair* puts himself in trouble to help others, therefore, the people do not want to harm him (by thinking ill of him). The *rajal khair* must be a good man and help others, and he always speaks the truth. He lies but he is doing good, and the people do not want to harm him. When the *rajal khair* lies, a man does not lose his rights. A man tells the *rajal khair* this; he tells him that he does not want to lose his rights, and he does not care what he says as long as he does not lose his rights.

> 554 Suppose the donkey of A (a man present at the interview)
> 792 gets into the barley of B (another man present). This is
> 627 actually a serious matter since it could conceivably lead
> to a big fight between A's *'aiela* and B's *'aiela.* First,
> I separate them and make each go to his home. Then I
> get A's three brothers (his father is dead), we take a
> *dhabiiha* (lamb) and go to B's place and all eat together.
> [779] After the meal, we read the *Fatiha* (opening *sura* of the
> Quran) together to show that all is forgiven. After the
> *Fatiha* has been read no trouble will start because this
> is done in the presence of the Jaraira.

[784] He explained that reading the *Fatiha* in bad faith would bring
the same curse from God that a bad oath would bring. He also
* [613] claimed that only he and the *'aqila* have the authority to
command men to read the *Fatiha*.

554 'Amm Salih says that he uses the *'awaiyid* as a guide
792 in solving problems, and that it is necessary because
627 "quarrels spread like fire, it is like fire; they spread to
671 killing and war." He was the only person in al-Qasr who
554 tried to conceptualize the difference between the *'awaiyid*
792 *Awlad 'Ali* and the *Sharii'a*. 'Amm Salih said that it is
627 wrong to lie, according to both the secular and the sacred
671 authority codes: "One who lies exceeds the word of God,
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577 and God will punish him for this. No one can know how this
[784] punishment will take place, only God will know this . . .
Sometimes a car goes off the road and people will say that it
is the punishment of God. But you never know because the
554 punishment of God comes in the after-life." I asked him:
792 "If this is so, why may the *rajal khair* lie in trying to
627 settle quarrels?" He replied:
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554 792 627 ●[577]

> Lying is bad (haram), but this is "the lie of a peace-maker" (kadhib musaalih). For instance, if you have a quarrel with Yunis here, then I have words with both of you. I use different words with each of you. I use different words than those which you used in the quarrel--I use good words. This is to bring you two together again. Maybe I see that you are going to kill, or I hear bad words from you; I do not go and tell him what you said.

'Amm Salih said that it is his "duty" to mediate disputes, and that he never hesitates "because God will reward me later." He did not want the quarrels to grow into wars. He also bases his pleas for conciliation upon moral discoure, the method used by the other traditional authorities.[3] 'Amm Salih said that in trying to solve a problem, "I give priority to the elder. I go to the younger man and tell him that he should make peace with the elder because no one cares more for him than his antagonist, and that he really cares more for his antagonist than for any other." The rajal saalih mediates but does not arbitrate: he attempts to redress the balance of good relations but does not impose judgements.

554 792 627 *613 [779]

This approach to conflict regulation is not that of the 'aqila in his formal role, but it is similar to what the rajal khair would use. The main procedural difference between the two informal roles (i.e. rajal khair and rajal saalih) is that, in each case, the rajal saalih reads the Fatiha with

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[3] The approach which I used in my interviews with 'Amm Salih derives from the work of John Ladd as presented in his book, The Structure of a Moral Code, 1957.

619 675 and the Marabit.

The Qit'an tribe, based partly in Libya and partly
*[613] in Egypt, is a tribe in the same sense that the Awlad 'Ali
is one, i.e., at the secondary level of the lineage system.
[166] This tribe moved into Egypt sometime around 1900. The
[175] Bedouins of al-Qasr estimate that "50% of the Qit'an are
with Ali Ahmar,.30% with Sinaina, and 20% with Ali Abyad."
619 In 1956, certain events occurred in Libya which brought about
675 a declaration of independence from Sa'adi domination by the
•578 Qit'an in that country. The Qit'an felt that their numbers
were sufficiently large enough that they should represent
themselves in the Libyan parliament. In other words, the
Marabtiin were no longer willing to settle for the traditional
social categories and role structures allotted to them. After
these events in Libya, some members of the Qit'an came to
Egypt and informed their brothers about the formation of the
tribe as a separate entity, and convinced the Egyptian Qit'an
to do the same--which they did.

The Bedouins say that the Governor of Marsa Matruh encouraged the Qit'an tribe to increase their numbers in the area after he learned of their desire to be free from Sa'adi domination. There had been a small number of Qit'an in the town of Marsa Matruh. This number quickly grew in size and political strength so that it could challenge the power of the 'Ali Ahmar who are considered the dominant tribe in this

619 675 578 area of the Western Desert. And, according to the Governor of the province, it is the 'Aishaibat of al-Qasr who are the most powerful of the three primary segments of the 'Ali Ahmar; for example, they have succeeded in sending their _'umda_ (chief) to the National Assembly in Cairo. In fact, it was over the [666] election of the _'umda_ in 1964 that the split between the Marabit Qit'an and the Sa'adi Ali Ahmar became an open one and produced political rumblings among the tribes. This case makes explicit the relationship between the two types of tribes in the Western Desert, and gives an important instance of the operation of structural principles in defining groups and group relations.

619 675 666 578 During the national elections of 1964, it was the traditional duty of the Marabit to vote for his affiliated Sa'adi candidate. Since the Qit'an are allied in a client-protector relationship with the Ali Ahmar, all of the Marabtiin of this tribe should have given their votes to the _'umda_ of the 'Aishaibat who was seeking office to the National Assembly. But, instead, the Qit'an ran a candidate of their own--largely at the urging of the Governor, it is said. But, despite this Marabit opposition, the 'Aishaibat were successful in getting their _'umda_ elected. Furthermore, 619 675 578 626 the 'Aishaibat said that this rebellion of the Marabtiin could not go unpunished, that reprisals would be taken. The type of sanction which the 'Aishaibat directed against the

619 Qit'an is one which is employed in both the internal and
675 the external systems of political relations: it is an or-
• 578 ganized sanction taken by the corporate representatives
626 against socially disapproved behavior. Against the Marabtiin,
619 it involved a closure of group affiliation and protective
675 alliance usually obtainable through affinal ties. The Qit'an
578 were prohibited from marrying into the 'Aishaibat primary
*613 segment. The sanction was tested while I was in the field.
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> In March of 1965, 'Umda Ziyad of the Qit'an contracted a marriage for his son with one of the secondary groups of the 'Aishaibat. He went through all of the marriage preliminaries and paid a brideprice of 70 E.L. (Egyptian pounds). But afterwards, the girl's family, following the advice of the 'Aishaibi corporate heads, returned the brideprice and refused his offer. The 'Umda of the Qit'an then went to talk to the brothers of the girl (for her father was dead) and told them that he would pay a brideprice of 1000 E.L. "but I want the girl." He paid them part of the brideprice (for they had agreed in the face of this unusual offer) and sent a car to pick up the girl. The arrangement did not succeed, for the paternal cousin of the girl who, according to Bedouin custom and tradition, had a prior claim on her, stopped the car at gunpoint. The corporate heads had told the cousin that this was his right, and in this case, his duty. Then the corporate heads of the 'Aishaibat called a council, and the members met with the brothers of the girl. They told the brothers: "You know what happened at the time of the election. 'Umda Ziyad is 'Ali Ahmar and he should have voted for our _'umda_, but he tricked us." The brothers refused to be persuaded by the tribal leaders. They said that if anyone from the 'Aishaibat would pay them more than 1000 E.L., they would give their sister to him. The leaders warned the brothers that if they went through with this marriage they would each be fined 200 E.L. Finally, and after this meeting, the leaders went to 'Umda Ziyad himself with the threat, that were he to go through with this marriage "all of the 'Aishaibat will begin to fight you." The _'umda_

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> could not afford to risk such large scale conflict and so he withdrew his offer of marriage to the brothers. After this, as a display of authority and an attempt to maintain something of the alliance between their group and the Qit'an, the 'Aishaibi leaders made the public announcement that the girl could marry anyone else, but not the son of 'Umda Ziyad.

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The various sets of authority relations operative in the al-Qasr area are obvious from this account, but they will be better defined as the discussion proceeds. Here, I only wanted to make clear that the relationship between Sa'adi and Marabit is one based upon contract and local contiguity, and reinforced by cognation. There is no unilinear basis for the relationship and no attempt to fit it into a "unilinear [582] genealogical mould." The structural differentiation between Sa'adi and Marabit seems to reflect a dominant-subjective relationship, in the sense discussed by Weber (1947) and Southall (1956), but its possible class overtones are played down by the fact that there are normally no objections to [851] intermarrying between groups. The Bedouin of al-Qasr say, "what is the difference, the children from such a marriage will be Sa'adi anyhow?"

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The Sa'adi-Marabit differentiation is relatively unimportant for a study of al-Qasr itself, since the Marabit number is so small--one lineage consisting of five brothers and their families. The contrast between Sa'adi and Marabit, secular and sacred tribes, becomes more important for a

619 the segmentary system is considered by the Bedouins to be a
*613 monolithic unit: "The Awlad 'Ali are one." But, as with all other segmentary lineage systems, in al-Qasr levels of segmentation reflect degrees of corporateness.

*613 Furthermore, the ideology of structural unity dissolves
178 before the empirical evidence of fission and fusion, processes
619 characteristic of the segmentary society in general. These processes are not common in al-Qasr during the present time. But they must have been in the past, because the segments which Murray (1935) names as making up the Ali Ahmar include only one of those which currently comprise the tribe. The
● [578] only admission of fission which I could obtain from my informants was that, at one time, 'Ailit Ma'fas was a tertiary
[124] segment of 'Ailit Lazumi (see Figure 3). I received this information from a number of my key informants so that it can be accepted despite a denial to the contrary by some of my other informants. There is no empirical link below the secondary level to be discovered in the genealogical maps of these two groups; kinship ties have been manipulated to coincide with ideological claims. The fact that these two lineages are now the wealthiest and most powerful in the al-Qasr area may be an indication that economic and political motivations undermined the unity of 'Ailit Lazumi in the
*613 past. We shall have occasion to return to this opposition
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578 between the Lazumi and the Ma'fas when we discuss political

*613 office in modern Bedouin society. Also, we will return to 178 the processes of fission and fusion when we discuss Bedouin •578 law. I will be able to show through the use of legal documents [194] how one tertiary unit went through a process of fission, fusion and re-fusion with its secondary unit.

The capacity for fusion and fission is a result of a number of structural situations. First of all, it is the exercise of choice on the part of the tertiary segment members who have contracted alliance in the form of collective responsibility with other tertiary segments of the lineage. The choice to break off from the major group may be of two kinds: a severence of political ties with one group in favor of a new group or the natural process of segmentation as a response to ecological conditions. In the latter case, no new political alliances are formed, and it usually involves a married son going off to begin his own camp. It is only an expansion of the major or secondary group. But the former case is one of decimation: the secondary group contracts. In both cases, authority is exercised, either between father and son, or, *613 between heads of corporate groups. In al-Qasr, the capacity 578 for either type of fission is limited by the political en- 177 vironment of the Egyptian nation-state, the highest level 178 of authority which the Bedouin encounters. The classic functioning of the segmentary lineage system is, in the case of al-Qasr, being changed by extra-system factors. The

*613 Bedouins, always a minority in Egypt, have been undergoing
178 a transition to peasantry since about 1800. Probably since
177
•578 that time, Bedouin society has been, to use Easton's (1959)
emphasis, a "segmentary society" rather than a "segmenting
society."

196 Formal Bedouin categories of kinship are confusing;
depending upon the situation they use the concepts of bait,
'ait, 'aiela and qabiila interchangeably. The term bait
literally means "house," the term bait al-'Arab may mean
"the tent" or "the people of the tent." "People of the tent"
[594] may refer to either the nuclear family of one man, or the
nuclear families of a man, his brothers and his sons, and
[596] their spouses and offspring. In the latter case, the ex-
[621] tended family is referred to as the naja'. A naja', or camp,
usually consists of three or four tents. The word bait may
196 refer to the tertiary and the sub-tertiary groups, and oc-
*613 casionally one might even refer to the secondary group as a
bait when he wishes to emphasize the quality of corporateness.
The term 'aiela, literally "family," is the word used most
often to designate the secondary lineage segment. The dim-
inutive of this word, i.e. 'ait, usually refers to the sub-
tertiary group but it commonly designates the secondary group
[619] also. The term qabiila, "tribe," is the only word used for
the primary and supra-primary lineage groupings. These are
196 the general Bedouin usages and their frequency will vary not

582 depending upon the needs of the situation.

829 But one is able to differentiate between the various
582 meanings of bint 'amm in al-Qasr. First of all, the Bedouins
196 make an initial dichotamy between the bint 'amm daira (daira =
*613 "homeland") and the bint 'amm shaqiiqa (shaqiiqa = "full sister").
The first term refers to any girl within the primary level of segmentation, i.e., the 'Aishaibat, and the latter term refers to the actual father's brother's daughter. Any marriage within the secondary group, i.e., 'Ailit Ma'fas, is referred to simply as a bint 'amm marriage--even if it is really a bint ibn 'amm marriage. A man has an actual moral claim upon his bint 'amm shaqiiqa: such a marriage is an agreement between their fathers who are brothers. A man cannot claim his bint 'amm daira but he might assume that if she is not claimed by her father's brother's son (ibn 'amm), his claim will be favored over that of an outsider.

582 The differentiation between these two types of cousin role is made in terms of rights and obligations which define social relations in al-Qasr. Social action is based upon these expectations of behavior. In al-Qasr, a man really does claim his bint 'amm shaqiiqa. If his claim is thwarted, he will attempt to do something about it, and whatever the consequences, his group is committed to back him in this
[182] matter. Parallel-cousin marriage may be an important basis
● [578] for integration, or it may be the cause of bitter conflict.

582 [584] she could marry no man.

582 Most of the older Bedouins say that bint 'amm marriage
578 as it is practiced in the desert is an evil, that it causes
nothing but trouble. They say that if there are bad feelings
between two men they will place claims upon each other's
sister with the intention of preventing the girls from ever
marrying. The younger Bedouins say that "it is better to
marry the bint 'amm than to let a stranger take her." The
[182] claim on the bint 'amm, of course, should be seen as a basis
[571] for social relationships between groups, regardless of any
[586] conflict it may or may not lead to. This is why the Bedouins
say that a man "will never divorce his bint 'amm, because if
he does that means that she is no good." It follows, then,
that if "she is no good" none of her other paternal cousins
will marry her. Implicit here is the reference to the making
[182] and breaking of group ties. Similarly, to regulate and to
maximize kinship ties, a man can claim only one of his
father's brother's daughters. In the case where there is
only one bint 'amm, her eldest cousin has first claim to her.
582 This sometimes causes conflict between brothers as the fol-
578 lowing informant's story indicates.
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> The father of Salih and Aziz was dead which meant that Aziz, being the elder, would have to furnish the brideprice if Salih were to marry first. In fact, Salih wanted to marry his bint 'amm. Aziz refused him permission to do so: Aziz had first claim to the bint 'amm, and, also, he thought that the brideprice which

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her father was asking was too high. Salih was angry, so angry that he swore to kill any man who tried to take his bint 'amm. He went away to the Nile Valley to earn enough money to pay the high brideprice. In the meantime, the cousin of the brothers came and paid Aziz for the permission to marry the girl. Salih returned, but, of course, he could not kill his own paternal cousin. He became ill and went into a sleep which lasted for three days. Salih had always been known for his powerful voice but when he awoke he had a very weak voice. Salih never spoke to his brother again. He died seven years ago without every marrying.

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[182]
This story has aprocryphal aspects which announce this to be an important issue in Bedouin culture. The subject of parallel-cousin marriage is a complex one surrounded by controversy and contradiction. The older Bedouins say that the practice is a source of conflict, but they will usually insist that at least one of their sons marry his bint 'amm to insure the corporate link with the brother. In support of their complaints, they say that bint 'amm marriage is not morally sanctioned: "We do not like it and it is not right. But if we try to stop our sons from taking their cousins they will put a gun on their shoulder and go after her." On the other hand, this is contrasted with the complaints of the elders that their sons no longer respect their marriage habits, that they are marrying anyone these days: "Our sons resent the bint 'amm marriage because it is an agreement between fathers."

582 While I was in the field, three marriages took place; one was with the bint 'amm, and the other two were outside the secondary group but within the primary group, i.e., inter-lineage.

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538 brother to special place in the social structure states that
[539] "Two-thirds of the boy belongs to the khal, and he is like the
father: the remaining one-third is divided equally between
the father and the khal." The Bedouins are always quick to
point out to the stranger, such as I was, that this means
there is only one-sixth of the boy which belongs to the
father. A clearer case of the ideology of kinship versus
[539] descent could not be had. Another proverb has it that "the
good which you see in a boy comes from khal khalu ("the
maternal uncle of his maternal uncle"). Any kinship relation
may be the basis for a new network of social relations by
making use of the classificatory principle. The Bedouins
[539] exaggerate the status and role of the mother's brother by
saying that "when a boy does good or bad, one wants to know
the name of his khal not the name of his father." This
statement, which favors cognatic links over patrilineal ties,
is not true but such an attempt at emphasis indicates that
this relationship is something of value in the Bedouin society.

604 In the case of any conflict "between his tribes," the
578 Bedouins say, "the boy must support the tribe of his khal."
This, of course, does not mean that the individual should
take up arms against his patrilineal corporate group, but
562 that he should seek to mediate the conflict. The political
593 value of conflict avoidance and conflict control is also
554 conspicuous in the dual role which the mature female plays
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562 in Bedouin society, that is, the role of wife-daughter. The
593 554 principles of patrilineality and cognation do not work against
182 each other when the girl marries outside her corporate group,
•578 nor does her new dual role present a case of role conflict.
562 On the contrary, the wife-daughter role functions to bind to-
593 554 gether two groups which are structurally differentiated by
182 578 the rule of patrilineality. During time of peace, the wife-
*613 daughter acts as a bond-maker by carrying gifts back and
[431] forth between the two groups, often bringing some of her
[628] [574] younger patrilineal relatives back to her husband's house or
562 tent for short visits. During a time of conflict or war, the
593 Bedouins point out, she is the only person who can cross the
554 battle lines unharmed. She is a match-maker as well as a
[726] peace-maker. Often she influences the selection of mates by
[584] individuals in both her husband's group and her father's
562 group. The Bedouins say that "after the bint 'amm, a man
593 should marry his bint khal ("mother's brother's daughter")
554 because she is like his bint 'amm." Usually, over a period
582 of a few generations, a given direction in marriage is sustained (see Figure 10), and it is one function of this wife-daughter role to accomplish this important political action.

562 The role of wife-daughter, then, may be seen as one
593 important aspect of what Fortes (1953:33) calls, "complemen-
554 tary filiation," the essential mechanism which provides the
*613 182 link between the corporate groups of al-Qasr society and the
kin groups of the parent who does not determine descent.

*613 concepts of what is desirable and undesirable. "Every structural
571 arrangement," Raymond Firth has said, "has its moral
attributes of obligation" (1961:212). This is most essential
in an uncentralized system, such as that of al-Qasr, where
no institutions exist outside of the corporate group for the
introduction of new principles of organization and association.

Among the Bedouins, the conceptualization of an authority
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•578 structure in the role of 'aqila relates to the high value which
577 they place upon a peaceful and orderly world. Children in al-Qasr
*[613] are taught that one of their serious duties in life is
[571] to mediate conflicts, especially, when they are potentially
[554] situations which may lead to protracted conflict. And, in a
segmentary society where a member's status links him to many
different groups in differing degrees of importance, all
quarrels are potential group wars. The Bedouin child knows
that his elders, and God, want him to follow "the path of the
good" (tariiq al-khair). Mainly, this involves helping others
to follow "the path of the good" by "bringing them back together"
when they are in conflict. When two individuals
quarrel and refuse to return to "the path of the good," this
brings 'aib ("shame") to each of the persons. When two individuals
*[613] quarrel, setting off a group conflict, this brings
'ar ("shame") to the respective corporate groups of the individuals
[626] (Abou-Zeid 1966). Against individuals who persist
[784] in the ways which cause 'aib to himself, or 'ar to his group,

181 *578 certain sanctions of both a secular and sacred nature may be
577 imposed: expulsion from the group and the curse of God are
626 ultimate coercive interventions in the process of conflict
784 regulation.

*613 The role of _'aqila_ presents the corporate group as
181 "one person" in opposition to other similarly defined groups.
182 Thus, Fortes says (1953:25), "the way a lineage system works
571 depends on the kind of legal institutions found in the society,"
and this is a function of its political organization. The Bedouin political organization is characterized by two aspects: the internal political system, and the external political system. Both systems are regulated by the same values and norms. Authority relations within the corporate level are founded on values inculcated in the socialization process, and prescribe political behavior for all who come under the jurisdiction of the respective _'aqila_. Authority relations outside the corporate level are conducted through the _'aqila_. This political role as a functional part of the lineage structure operates in terms of kinship values; politics at the external level are characterized by no new principles.

*613 Politics in al-Qasr, and elsewhere for that matter, is
571 a process of problem-solving and conflict regulation between
182 individuals and groups. Political action occurs at different
levels of the lineage structure, and each is demarcated as a focus or sphere of authority. But all authority stems from

*613 segment. He acts in concert with other _'awaaqil_ (plural of
554 _'aqila_) of the tertiary segments of his secondary group when
571 lineage matters call for decision-making at this level.
*613 Tertiary segments are replicate groups descended from one
571 ancestor, they operate with a common ideology pursuant of
183 common interests and goals. As we shall see, this common
675 ideology is expressed in a kind of code, or contract, which
all members of the group swear to uphold and abide by according
to the principle of blood responsibility. Tertiary codes in
[181] al-Qasr are a reflection and an affirmation of a wider system
of values and norms which bind the Bedouins of the Western
Desert together into a political system. This wider normative
[671] system is expressed in the customary legal system of the
Bedouins known as _'awaiyid Awlad 'Ali_ ("the customs of the
Awlad 'Ali tribe").

*613 The primary duty attached to the office of _'aqila_ is
•578 the regulation of conflict. It is worth noting here that
571 conflict regulation is not equivalent to conflict resolution.
554 The latter process carries with it the intimation that the
causes of conflict have been treated and resolved, that conflict
has been eliminated. Nothing could be further from the truth
in a segmentary society where the various segments actually
constitute conflict groups; consequently, conflict between
groups or individuals who represent groups may be contained
but never forgotten. Conflict is an ongoing process among

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•578 the Bedouins. Conflict regulation treats the expressions of
571 social conflict and not its causes.

554 The *'aqila* regulates conflict between the members of
his tertiary segment, between this group and the other groups
of the secondary unit, and between secondary units of the
tribe. He operates in both the internal and external systems
*613 of authority relations. The *'aqila* may pre-empt the authority
578 of the *shaib* in the sphere of familial authority, though, the
593 Bedouins say, this seldom happens because the son is willing
554 to obey his father. Having been reared in the culture, and
[596] as a future father himself, the son supports the respect-
*613 discipline principle of Bedouin society. But in extreme cases,
578 such as the threat of a father to disown his son, the explicit
593 approval of the *'aqila*, and of all the *'awaaqil* of the secondary
428 corporate group, is necessary. This is the procedure in all
554 cases of banishment. In one case (which I document below), a
man disinherited his younger brother with the formal approval
of his *'awaaqil*.

*613 The tertiary group in Bedouin society is by definition
682 the blood-vengence group. However, in view of the common
578 values and pragmatic interests of its members, the secondary
[181] group fulfills this function. Traditionally, when revenge
[681] killings were carried out according to the *lex talionis*, it
was usually at the hand of some member of the victim's tertiary
group. In the case of protracted conflict, such as extended

*613 feuds or war, secondary groups, and even whole tribes, became
682 involved. If the tertiary group is in the structural sense
•578 a blood-revenge group, the *'aqila* is the corporate sole of the
*613 554 blood-revenge corporation: an important function of the
682 *'aqila's* office derives from this. The *'aqila* is responsible
578 for the collection and distribution of the blood-money. It
is this specific authoritative function of the office which
is the necessary condition for the existence of a corporate
group. If there is no *'aqila* to collect blood-money, then a
kinship segment is not a corporation and it will merge into
another group headed by an *'aqila* in order to realize collective
benefits.

*613 Bait Braik of 'Ailit Ma'fas (see Figure 8) had no
554 *'aqila* while I was in the field. Their *'aqila* had recently
died and his office had not yet been filled. The person who
[666] would succeed to the office was known by all, but still his
election or formal appointment did not take place. In other
*613 words, the office of *'aqila* will remain vacant until conflict
554 and the need to regulate it force an election. The Bedouins
578 were pleased about the vacant *'aqila* office in Bait Braik:
"Thank God that it is vacant. When it is necessary, we will
meet and name an *'aqila*." Any of the *'awaaqil* of the lineage
[682] can mediate conflict, but no *'aqila* is willing to take the
responsibility of collecting the blood-money from another man's
bait.

*613 He must pay the diiya with the shares which he collects from
682 the others. It makes no difference if the 'aqila must pay
554 with his own money. He is responsible for this matter before
571 the whole tribe."

*613 The collection of the diiya is only one aspect of the
554 process of conflict regulation, but it stands out as the fundamental
682 manifestation of the office of 'aqila. In the course
[692] of office, an 'aqila will spend much more time arbitrating
disputes, but it is his responsibility concerning blood-money
which defines his position and his jurisdiction as corporate
682 ones. During the present period in al-Qasr, the practice of
178 blood-revenge has all but disappeared as a mechanism of social
[626] control. Nevertheless, the possibility of its happening is
not too remote. The payment of blood-money is the alternative
[619] to blood-revenge, and blood-revenge is a condition for all-out
[721] tribal warfare--something which the Bedouins look upon with
[829] horror. One informant once likened a primary-level war between
the 'Aishaibat and the Kamailat (should it ever occur) to
*613 "the end of the world." The 'aqila as a representative of a
682 group can prevent war by preventing reciprocal homicides: by
554 presenting his share of the blood-money he regulates conflict
•578 and promotes integration. The blood-money is usually paid
over a period of from one to two years. In this case, the
[571] notion of "debt" represents a contingent, institutionalized
social relationship for the purpose of maintaining political
order.

000 order.

*613 554 666 The _'aqila_ is elected by the elders of the secondary lineage group. The election usually takes place when these men are gathered for some festive occasion, such as a wedding. ●[578] The name of the man chosen to succeed to the political office will not be made public until it is absolutely necessary, i.e., in the case of conflict within the man's _bait,_ or more especially, in the case where blood-money is due. According to the Bedouins, the only qualification for the office of _'aqila_ is wisdom-- *613 554 556 the ability to arbitrate disputes. On the other hand, it is implicit that the _'aqila_ be a member of the "status group." Prestige commands respect and obedience, and prestige in al-Qasr usually comes with wealth. In general, the _'aqila_ is an elder, i.e., one with wisdom, and a member of a wealthy and influential family.

*613 554 [428] Technically, the _'aqila-ship_ is not inherited, but succession tends in this direction. An _'aqila_ must "speak the good and show men how to follow the path of the good." Not all men have the ability to do this, and, the Bedouins say, it is natural that such a great gift resides with a particular family "because the son learns from the father." All of the _'awaaqil_ in al-Qasr claim that they knew how to settle disputes before they became _'awaaqil_. If they had not, they would not [428] have been worthy of the office. Actually, the choice of an _'aqila_ is a restricted one: the office may pass, according to

*613 Conflict regulation, in the formal sense, is the
554 province of the *'aqila*. All complaints should be taken before
•578 the *'aqila*. In al-Qasr, every individual has certain rights,
692 and when any of these rights are infringed upon he may demand
a redress of wrongs: he demands his rights, or exercises
haqq al-'Arab ("the right of the Arabs"). The *haqq al-'Arab*
is opposed to the *haqq Allah*, "the right of God," which
concerns crimes against religion (i.e., wine-drinking, apostasy).
The dichotamy represents private claims over against the claims
of a religious state which is characteristic of Islamic society.
[688] In al-Qasr, crimes against religion have never occurred, and
if they did they would be handled in Marsa Matruh by the local
shaikh ("holy man").

*613 The litigation process is initiated when an individual
554 appears before his *'aqila* with a claim, and the statement: "I
69 do not wish so-and-so to take any of my rights." The *'aqila*
first attempts to persuade each party "to return to the path
of the good," to come together and to cease quarreling. This
type of moral persuasion is preliminary to a full court-hearing
in which both parties will appear with witnesses before their
respective *'awaaqil*, and other "third parties" who aid the
'awaaqil in their decision. The decision reached by the court
is morally binding upon both parties. According to recent
[671] innovation in Bedouin customary law, the details of the liti-
[178] gation and the decision reached by the court are to be recorded

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554 Here we are interested in the way in which roles and groups, and a whole structure of authority, operate over a wide area.

In the previous section, I presented the _'aqila_ as a specialized political role in Bedouin political organization. As Radcliffe-Brown (1940:xviii-xxi) has pointed out, in the political analysis of segmentary societies it is necessary to isolate incipient authority roles which function to make decisions concerning rightness and wrongness in disputes and which represent the community, giving voice to public sentiment. The notion of society as a functional system of authority roles and authority groups is clear in Radcliffe-Brown's treatment of politics.

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*[613] Local groups of political significance, i.e., authority groups, are identified by the status position, or office, referred to as _'aqila_. The political relations within a local tertiary group, and between it and similar groups of a lineage and tribe, must be seen as relationships between authority roles.

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*613 In the domestic field of political relations, the authority of the Bedouin _'aqila_ shades into the familial authority sphere of the household head (_shaib_). The _shaib_, as senior agnate of his _naja'_, is dominant over the other males of his tertiary sub-unit, but not to the extent that he can pre-empt any of their rights as members of the tertiary corporate group. A _shaib_, by virtue of his age, is supposed to possess the wisdom which it takes to regulate conflict.

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•(578)

600 to possess the wisdom which it takes to regulate conflict.
*613 Theoretically, as one *'aqila* said, conflict should be stopped
•578 at the familial level, either by the father or the paternal
593 uncle, and should never reach the level of the *'aqila*. Once
[604] before the *'aqila*, conflict assumes new structural poses, or
different orientation in authority relations. Authority here
is differentiated in terms of the context: the father's authority relates to the familial structural level, and beyond this
level the father *per se* cannot exercise legitimate authority.
*613 The *'aqila*, who is responsible for internal order and external
578 relations exercises legitimate authority at each level of the
182 political structure. The authority of the *'aqila* is checked
and prevented from growing into naked power in that any single
'aqila must consult with the other *'awaaqil* of the secondary
segment concerning matters which may concern the structural
nature and continuity of the group.

*613 In many respects, the authority structure in al-Qasr
559 corresponds to that defined for the Lugbara of Uganda
571 (Middleton 1960). The structural levels (see Figure 7 above)
171 of 'Ailit Ma'fas (secondary), Bait 'Umar (tertiary), and 'Ait
Abd al-Malik (sub-tertiary) are approximately equivalent to
Middleton's major, minor, and minimal lineages (1960:7-9). But
[596] whereas among the Lugbara authority roles are purely kinship
roles, i.e., genealogically senior heads are responsible for
internal control and representation, among the Bedouins of

*613 public obligations to temper private interests. This temper-
*613 ing process in Bedouin society is effected through the agree-
571 ment, or bonds, between the _'awaaqil_ of the secondary group
675 as representatives of the members of the tertiary groups.
The _'aqila_ and the members of a tertiary group submit to
structural arrangements of organization and procedure at
the secondary level of interest and authority. All this is
symbolized in the duplicate copies of the _rawaabit_ and the
name of the "famous" ancestor.

*613 I do not underestimate the importance of the tertiary
571 segment. I realize that internal order at this level is what
prevents anarchy at the secondary level. And I do not mean
to imply that integration is necessarily any greater at the
tertiary level than at the secondary level--it may or it may
*613 not be the case. Conflict is more difficult to detect at the
571 tertiary level than at the secondary level due to the practical
• 578 value which the Bedouins place upon stable relations between
brothers and immediate relatives. But conflict does take
place, and the Bedouins do attempt to regulate it at this
level.

*613 The Bedouins say that blood-revenge and the feud
682 cannot possibly operate at the tertiary level. On the other
hand, homicide does occur "between brothers." We have already
described the case of manslaughter in 'Ailit Ma'fas and the
manner in which it was dealt with: no retaliation would have

*613 been justified in this case since the killing was accidental.
682 In another case of killing which occurred between tertiary
units of the same secondary group, we see what happens in the
*613 case of intentional killing. This case of murder in 'Ailit
682 Lazumi is interesting and valuable because it illustrates
571 the dynamics of authority relations within the secondary
segment, and the degree to which authority relations are
manageable without a resulting structural change.

> *613 In 1959, a rearrangement of authority relations took
> 682 place within 'Ailit Lazumi: Bait A and Bait B agreed
> 571 that they would be collectively responsible for each
> 675 other, and Bait C and Bait D made a similar compact. The compacts involved the sharing of *diiya* and *kubaara* (expiation) payments. Shortly after 1959, Bait A and Bait C quarreled, and the result of the litigation was that the *'awaaqil* ordered Bait A to pay a *kubaara* of 20 L.E. to Bait C. Bait B, as the partner of Bait A, decided to pay 10 L.E. of the *kubaara* and Bait A paid the other 10 L.E. But Bait D protested this sharing of the *kubaara* saying that Bait B is a third brother and, as such, should act as a *quwaal al-kahair* ("a speaker of good"); that no brother should take sides against the others. As a result of this incident, the split between the two groups (A-B and C-D) became deeper. Afterwards, one group would not contribute to the *diiya* involving members of the other group even if it concerned external conflict with other secondary groups. This division in 'Ailit Lazumi was finally ended in 1960 when a member of Bait A killed a member of Bait B--the killing was within the same contractual alliance. At this time, the whole lineage decided to forget its differences and, all together, paid Bait B its *diiya*.

*613 Ideally, conflict should not be permitted to threaten
578 the structural continuity of the secondary corporation, but it
[681) happens. Usually, however, safety mechanisms such as the
barawwa and the right to secede are effective enough to prevent
structural deterioration.

*613 structural deterioration. Secession, the right to break
571 authority relations, and adoption, the right to contract
675 new authority relations, are rights of the authority group.
681 This can be noted in the "Declaration of *Barawwa*" presented
578 earlier. It was stated in that document that "the reason
[597] for the coming together of these two parties is in order
to ask the *barawwa* from each other." Further, mention was
made of a "fraternity paper" which would cancel the effects
of the *barawwa*. So, secession can be a means of regulating
[597] conflict, and it can become the basis for a re-integrative
move; that is, an adopted party may decide to secede from its
foster lineage and return to its original lineage, or secondary
group.

*613 Secession, as distinct from segmentary fission as a
571 response to ecological demands, represents a structural
[578] change in authority relations short of distrubing the structure
of the secondary group. In a process of secession, i.e.,
breaking with the secondary group, joining a new secondary
group, and returning to the "blood-brother" group, the fundamental condition of "belonging" is the acceptance of collective
*613 responsibility. This is a most important point. The office
571 of *'aqila*, the Bedouin charters, and the *raison d'etre* of the
681 corporation revolves about the notion of sharing in the blood-
675 money. This can be shown by an extremely interesting document
belonging to 'Ailit Abu Qarasa of al-Qasr. Here the process

*613 571 peace and security in the desert they are discouraged by
681 means of the moral and legal norms expressed in the _'awaiyid_,
628 626 671 or law of the Bedouins.

Conflict regulation between secondary groups is the
*613 function of the _'awaaqil_ who act as legitimate representatives
571 in terms of the _rawaabit_, and as legitimate judges and decision-
*578 makers in terms of the _'awaiyid_. Not all conflict in the
external political system is, in terms of our structural
levels, between secondary authority groups, but seldom is
any group larger than the secondary unit mobilized for political
619 action. In other words, even where we note that conflict is
*613 between two primary units, i.e., the 'Aishaibat and the
571 Kamailat, there is probably, in fact, political action taking
578 place between two secondary groups within the respective primary groups. However, there always exists the very real possibility that greater conflict will be generated involving primary and even tribal units.

128 In the next section of this chapter, I will discuss Bedouin law and sanctions within the framework of the lineage structure and the authority levels at which they operate. The following section will further illustrate the legitimacy and dynamics of authority and structure in Bedouin society.

671 the Bedouins, the government soon discovered their own error,
182 for they were unable to effectively manage group and tribal
648 political relations: "They (the government) found out that they could not solve murders in the desert. They would arrest the killer but the trouble continued between families (i.e. feuding went on). There were more killings instead of less, and, finally, the government asked us to return to the 'awaiyid because it alone can solve murders in the desert." I was unable to document the claim that the government had "abolished" the 'awaiyid in 1933, but a number of officials who worked at the Governor's Office in Marsa Matruh said that it was true.

671 In al-Qasr, and in the Western Desert in general,
641 adherence to law and political order rests upon the conviction
577 that each individual and territorial group have guaranteed
571 rights which are related to honor and property. A violation
554 of any single man's honor or property may easily be interpreted, according to the principle of collective responsibility, as an offense against the rights of a group. And in this sense, legal and moral violations in Bedouin society are relative to the structure of interrelations, and they must be regulated with reference to the various levels of the authority structure.

181 Bedouins place a high value on political order, but
641 also on the idea that political order can only be guaranteed
578 through a man's willingness "not to allow another to take any
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181 of his rights;" a man should be courageous enough to fight
641 for what belongs to him and his family. These values, which
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571 become political values in a tribal context, coupled with the
idea of self-help make for a political order which is ultimately
based upon the law of blood-revenge and feud. At least this
is the case where the external system of authority relations
578 is concerned. But force as the ultimate mechanism for the
571 establishment of political order is better considered an
182 extreme, and only one of the mechanisms used by the Bedouins
in the process of conflict regulation. The attempt is to
establish a balance of rights, concerning honor and property,
and not to go beyond another's boundaries lest he retaliate.
Force, as a coercive institution, can never be the sole basis
of political structure, as Schapera has shown in the case of
the Bergdama and Bushmen (1956:211-221). Thus the Bedouins
[681] say blood-revenge would be impossible within the secondary
* [613] corporate group; relations this important cannot be based
[682] upon force. In the case of homicide within this group compensation is immediately forthcoming.

571 Also, it has been pointed out that self-help and
672 collective responsibility do not operate indiscriminately.
* 613 That is, an individual cannot depend upon the backing of
[578] his group irrespective of his own motivations in a particular
situation which calls for retaliation or threatened the group
with retaliation. Individual responsibility figures in cases

*613 of the group, of joining a new group, or of becoming a man,
682 all refer to the notion of sharing in the payment of the _diiya_.
681 All obligations and sanctions which carry the force of law in
182 Bedouin society also are directly related to compensation and
571 retaliation. Weber (1954:110) has stated the general case:
"The _wergilt_ debt as set by the judge was the most ancient
debt and all forms of obligation have derived from it."
[171] Evans-Pritchard (1940:171) has stated the particular case:
" . . . Nuer law, in so far as it applies to a study of
political relations, must be treated in connexion with the
blood-feud." The blood-feud and the _diiya_ are institutions by
which authority groups interact and political order is main-
681 tained. Blood-revenge, or the threat that it may take place
●578 and spread, is a most serious sanction in the Bedouin political
682 system. Of the twenty-two cases of conflict in al-Qasr about
which I have good details, nine of these deal with homicide
or attempted homicide, and thirteen involve quarrels over
rights to land, water, and women which could have led to
violence had not arbitration succeeded. In fact, seven of
the nine cases of personal injury began over property rights.

*613 Rules regarding the _diiya_ in Bedouin society apply
682 at all levels of the lineage structure. This seems important
to note for it points up an unusual degree of autonomous
authority at the tertiary level. Research on segmentary
societies has often stressed the fact that compensation is

671 I checked the contents of this document with
[124] my own informants who agreed that it was authentic and
represented the _'awaiyid_ as it should be practiced. Almost
[682] the whole of the _'awaiyid_ refers to the circumstances surrounding the occurrence of killing and the payment of the
[128] _diiya_. The case studies which I present below reflect the
'awaiyid as it was practiced in 1935.

682 Blood-money is calculated relative to three things: whether or not a killing was premeditated or accidental; the sex of the victim; and whether or not the victim was a freeman or a slave. The full _diiya_ is paid in the case of intentional killing, and three-fourths of this amount is due in the case
[562] of accidental killing. The _diiya_ for a woman is one-half that for a man whether or not the killing is intentional.
[567] There are no slaves in al-Qasr, only their descendents who are now freemen. In the case where a pregnant woman is killed, the foetus will be examined and should it prove to be a male then the full _diiya_ will be due.

•578 An important mechanism for conflict regulation in
682 the Western Desert is the _nazaala_, i.e., "the act of taking
*613 refuge." If a killing is committed, the killer immediately
778 seeks protection by going to the residence of a neutral third party. The third party, who may or may not be an _'aqila_, and his lineage give protection to the whole tertiary segment of the killer. This may involve the actual relocation of the killer's _bait_ to the residence of the protecting group for

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the period of one year. During the period of sanctuary, it is hoped that two things will happen: that the killed man's group will be placated and agree to compensation rather than retaliation as a means of conflict regulation; and, that over this period of one year the killer's family will pay the diiya.

The practice of nazaala is one means of differentiating between internal and external political relations. Killing between tertiary groups of the same secondary lineage would never be mediated by the nazaala, rather, compensation would immediately be paid and the matter settled--or at least never again mentioned. The Bedouins believe that killings at any level should be forgotten for fear that hostile feelings, or even feuding, will re-emerge. This excerpt from my field notes shows this.

> Hajj Sabr asked if I would take him in the jeep to Ras Abu Laha. As we passed Umm al-Rakham, the territory of 'Ailit Amarik (Marabtiin affiliated with 'Ali Abyad) west of al-Qasr, he told me about a feud which took place there five years ago. The quarrel began, as most do, over the rights to a piece of land: 'Ailit Amarik and a lineage of the Qinaishat tribe both laid claim to a strip of land between their territories. One man from the Qinaishat was killed, and, in revenge, the Qinaishat killed three men and wounded four from 'Ait Amarik. The government intervened to stop the killing. It became settled when the 'awaaqil met at the zawiya of Umm al-Rakham. They ate together and resumed brotherly relations. Since Hajj Sabr was one of the third parties involved in this settlement, I asked him if I might read his copy of the document on this case. He replied: "Shame, shame! If you begin to ask about this case, it may start all over again. There are still bad feelings between the two tribes."

671 They said that if a man
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684 insisted on keeping a promiscuous wife, his family would
681 "write a barawwa aginst him." I heard of no sex offenses in
[114] al-Qasr while I was there.

671 The penalty for stealing, according to the 'awaiyid,
685 is that the thief shall pay compensation, by himself, in the
amount of four times the value of the stolen object. On the
*[613] other hand, if the thief is a poor man, he will pay thrice the
value of the stolen object and the remaining fourth will be
paid by his lineage.

671 The 'awaiyid recognizes the territorial claims of the
685 lineage. Disputes arising over conflicting claims to land
*613 and wells are handled at Bedouin courts in much the same way
•578 as personal injury cases are, with one exception. Usually, a
[554] larger number of elders and rajal khair will be consulted in
an advisory capacity by the 'awaaqil handling the case. The
'awaaqil consider the specific history of a particular piece
of land or well (for instance, each well is known by its own
name), and determine the ownership in accordance with the
testimony of elders and individuals of high social status.
Most of the problems over land and water rights in al-Qasr
have reference to what is still considered lineage-owned
685 territory in the barley-and-pasture sector. In the 'izba
578 sector, conflict over land ownership rights, since they are
648 rights which are registered with the government, is settled
in the Egyptian court of law. Only one such case came up while

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685 I was in al-Qasr, and each party to the conflict hired
•578 Egyptian lawyers in Marsa Matruh to represent them. As one
648 litigant in this case told me: "The Bedouins prefer to settle
their own land disputes because the government's way of
handling these things costs money and long periods of waiting."

69 The notion of jurisprudence in tribal cultures, in
121 general, seems to be one which concentrates on the restoration
578 of a disturbed balance rather than one concerned with formality
and procedure. To a great extent, this is true in the Bedouin
case also. However, the absence of institutionalized ways of
dealing with conflict is more characteristic of the internal
*613 system of political relations. Conflict within the secondary
578 segment, we have noticed, may be regulated at the familial
[593 level of authority by the _shaib_, or one acting in his place:
596] it is hoped by the Bedouins that quarrels never become serious
enough to prompt intervention by the _'aqila_. On the other
hand, the _'aqila_, as a legitimate representative of his
authority group, will almost always become involved in conflict
regulation falling within the sphere of external political
relations, i.e., conflict between secondary, primary, or tribal
segments.

The _'aqila_ as the most effective mechanism of social
*613 control has become institutionalized through time in Bedouin
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182 society. At the interactional level of secondary lineage
group relations, conflict may easily expand into feuding or,

*613 ultimately, all-out warfare: the role of 'aqila is most
•578 critical at this level. Abou-Zeid (1966:259) has suggested
182 an explanation for the delicate balance of political relations which exists between secondary lineage groups. He thinks that

> [579] . . . in the segmentary society of the Bedouin of the Western Desert . . . honour has played, and still plays, a most vital role in the field of social control, besides providing an effective code of morality . . . A slight offence inflicted against a lineage . . . is taken as an unfavorable humiliation requiring immediate retaliation to wipe out the shame, regain honour, and restore the same relations as formerly between the groups.

682 Homicide and wounding cases, which usually develop over con-
683 flicting claims to land or water rights, are most prone to
578 lead to grand-scale conflict. Thus the 'aqila will always
*613 mediate and adjudicate these cases whereas he will not necessarily intervene in those cases involving tertiary groups where appeals to moral solidarity and kinship unity may succeed in restoring relations. It is difficult to muster evidence for this contention since conflict between tertiary groups is more of a private matter than it is public, and, once settled, such conflict is not likely to be discussed, or even admitted.

*613 Most of my details on conflict regulation and the
578 judicial process in al-Qasr involve political action between
619 secondary or primary groups, eighteen of the twenty-two cases
681 in fact. Of the nine cases dealing with personal injury (eight

*613 cases of homicide and one case of wounding) one was at the
●578 tribal level; three at the primary level; three at the
619 secondary level; and two at the tertiary level. Of the
681 thirteen cases dealing with property rights over land, water, or women, none took place at the tribal level; four were at the primary level; seven at the secondary level; and one at the tertiary level. One case dealing with marriage rights took place within a tertiary segment and concerned the legitimacy of a man to claim his bint 'amm. Twelve of the twenty-two cases occurred within the 'Aishabat tribe. Of the ten cases of conflict involving units from outside the 'Aishaibat, six cases were between primary units, three cases were between secondary units, and one case involved the 'Ali Ahmar with the Harabi of Libya.

In almost every case involving primary units and tribal units, the two opposing authority groups were actually secondary groups who had the backing of their primary groupings. The case in which the 'Ali Ahmar mobilized to deal with a problem in Libya probably represents an atypical case in history. It is unlikely that tribal groups of this size
[648] could mobilize in time of war or peace, and in this particular case the good international relations of Egypt and Libya were at stake.

784 There is another realm of sanctions which can be in-
695 voked in cases concerning homicide, wounding, theft, and
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128 68 what happened; some of them are my translations of legal docu-
[124] ments which informants permitted me to see; a few of the cases
[114] happened while I was in the field and represent my reporting
of what happened. I have arbitrarily divided the cases into
those involving personal injury and those concerning property
rights. In each case, I indicate at which level of the authority
structure the conflict and settlement has taken place.

Legal Cases Pertaining to Personal Injury

•578 Two cases of killing have been discussed previously.
681 Below are a number of cases dealing with personal injury which
occurred in the external political system at the various levels
*[613] of segmentation. The first three cases involve conflict
[619] between secondary lineage segments of the 'Aishaibat tribe;
[648] the next two cases take place at the primary and sub-tribal
levels, but note that secondary segments are the actual function-
ing units involved; the final case, an unusual one, deals with
conflict with "foreigners" at the tribal level. Note that the
*[613] *'aqila* as a corporate representative is active in these cases.
[182] The third case presented below is a translation of an actual
[778] document showing how the *nazaala* (discussed above) functions
as a formal mechanism of conflict regulation.

578 *613 682 Date: 1947. Case: Quarrel between 'Ailit Dawlat and 'Ailit Zagharat of the 'Aishaibat concerning murder. The quarrel began over the ownership of land. Members of the Dawlat assaulted a member of the Zagharat but he did not die. Then members of the Zagharat killed a member of the Dawlat in revenge for the beating. [571] [692] Many 'awaaqil from the tribe came to judge this case. They told the Dawlat and the Zagharat: "Shame on you, you are of one tribe." The decision of the 'awaaqil was made according to the 'awaiyid Awlad 'Ali. A diiya of 400 L.E. was judged against 'Ailit Zagharat. The diiya was collected from all of the members of the Zagharat, and it was paid over the period of three years. The diiya was divided into two parts: one-half went to the sons of the killed man, and the other half went to the 'aiela.

Date: 1946. Case: Quarrel between 'Ailit Dawlat and 'Ailit Zagharat concerning murder. The conflict began when a member of the Dawlat argued with the Zagharat about a piece of land. One night when the man from the Dawlat and his father were on their way home some members of the Zagharat ambushed and killed the father. They did not bother the son because he was only a [571] [692] boy. The 'awaaqil settled the case, and the Zagharat paid a 400 L.E. diiya. [683] In 1959, after all those years, the son and his uncle ambushed the man from the Zagharat who had shot the father; they shot him four times. The man did not die but his leg was paralyzed and he lost the sight in one eye. The

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Dawlat, on the decision of the 'awaaqil, paid a 200 L.E. diiya for the leg and the eye. After this, the two families resumed friendly relations.

[539] In the Name of God the Merciful,
It is the day, 28 Muharram 1382, the same as 1 July 1962. This agreement took place between the following parties: 'Ailit Abu Qarasa and 'Ailit al-Zallat. The reason for this agreement is the quarrel which happened on Wednesday, 24 Muharram, and 27 June. Out of this quarrel resulted the death of the late Juwaida Abd al-Salam. This agreement is made in the presence of the 'awaqil of the two parties and with their full approval (also present was Hajj 'Ali, an important rajal khair about whom we will have more to say). The offending group, namely 'Ailit al-Zallat, will go to live with Hajj Sabr Hamad al-Dawlat at Ras Abu Laha area, according to the way of the nazala among the Awlad 'Ali. 'Ailit al-Zallat may walk between Wadi Umm al-Shitan and Wadi al-Hawari on the west side, the sea on the north side, and the borders of the Qinaishat land on the southern side without a nazil (i.e. one from the protecting party). And if they go out from these mentioned borders, they must be accompanied by one from 'Ailit Dawlat. And if they go beyond the mentioned borders, without a nazil, no one from the protecting party has a right to stop them. And if any from the other party offends them within the mentioned borders, then 'Ailit Abu Qarasa will be subject to whatever is decided against them in accordance with the 'awaiyid Awlad 'Ali. This agreement was made and signed in the presence of the 'awaqil of the Abu Qarasa, and the period of nazala will be one year beginning the date of today. We hope for the help of God.

Signatures or seals of eleven men.
Signature and approval of Marsa Matruh Police Office
Dated: 1 July 1962

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Date: 1919. Case: Quarrel between 'Ailit Zallat ('Aishaibat, 'Ali Ahmar) and 'Ailit Hafiyan (Awlad Kharuf, 'Ali Abyad) concerning murder. The problem began over the ownership of a well. Three men from the Hafiyan were killed, and in revenge the

●578 *613 682 Hafiyan killed three members of the Zallat. This feud lasted over a period of 25 years. It happened one time that an 'aqila of 'Ailit Zallat was walking in the desert and stopped 578 574 *613 682 for a visit at a naja', the owners of which he did not know. He soon discovered that "he was in front of the Hafiyan themselves." He tried to conceal his own identity, intending to eat the meal which they offered him and then escape in the dark. But the Hafiyan soon discovered that one from the Zallat was their guest. They told him that they would send men of their tribe with him to give him safe conduct through the desert. They also said that they wished to get together and make peace. Then they made peace, and its conditions were made through the 'awaaqil. No diiya was transferred because each had killed an equal number of men. Then members of the two groups lived together for two or three days and made a feast, they slaughtered sheep and the problem was over. This problem came to an end in 1938.

578 682 *613 [619] The next case, dealing with wounding, is presented in the form of two documents. It is valuable for the way in which it illustrates the judicial process and ritual sanction. Note that in the first document the case seems to concern two primary segments, i.e., the 'Aishaibat and the Kamailat, but the second document, the "Day of Oath," clearly indicates that the parties involved are 'Ailit Ma'fas ('Aishaibat) and 'Ailit Mahatha (Kamailat), two secondary groups.

Date: 24 January 1946
Marsa Matruh

1st Party: 'Awaqil of so-called
Harun Abd al-Zain
of al-Kamailat

2nd Party: 'Awaqil of so-called
Hamad Idris of al-'Aishaibat

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Both parties, the first and the second, met before the 'awaaqil and witnesses to solve the prevailing problem between them concerning the wounding of so-called Harun Abd al-Zain who claims that this wound is from Hamad Idris. In the presence of the 'awaaqil all agreed that Hamad Idris should swear the oath and be supported by the below named. And the text of the oath which they will say, is: "By the truth (i.e. haqq, which also refers to a divine attribute) of the owner of this shrine, I swear that this bullet which hurt Harun is neither from me nor do I know who shot the bullet at the time of his injury." And a number of sixteen men must support him at the shrine of Sidi Yunis al-Jaraira on the date of Friday, the 29th of Saffar, 1946. And if any does not present himself for the oath, then the wounds which are present in Harun Abd al-Zain will be from the 'Aishaibat tribe. And if all swear this oath, the two parties will be even with each other. After this, none of them will hold anything against the other. This was issued in the presence of all of their 'awaaqil and with their satisfaction without any force or ill-will.

(On the original document is presented a list of the sixteen men from the lineage of Ma'fas of the 'Aishaibat who were chosen by the Kamailat to support Hamad Idris in the Oath.)

All of the seventeen above mentioned (including Hamad Idris) must be present at the shrine of Sidi Yunis al-Jaraira on the day Friday, 29 Saffar, in order to swear the oath, and this is what took place at the hand of witnesses, and God is the best witness.

Signatures or seals of all 'awaaqil who were present.

Day of the Oath:

It is on the day Friday, the last of the blessed month of Saffar, 1946. The 'Ailit Ma'fas of al-'Aishaibat, and with them 'Ailit al-Mahatha of al-Kamailat, came in order to swear the oath at the shrine of Shaikh Yunis al-Jaraira. And they swore this oath and the Kamailat became reconciled

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•578 that they had received their rights in this case. And
*613 the two parties are satisfied by this according to the
692 witnesses present.

539 Signatures or seals of four witnesses.
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578 The next case represents the only time in the memory
682 of informants that all of the _'awaaqil_ of the 'Ali Ahmar met
*613 to intervene in a case of conflict. This case is extremely
692 unusual because it may be the only time in Awlad 'Ali history
571 that political mobilization of this scale has taken place. As
619 noted, political action, in war or peace, usually involves
[177] only secondary segments. In view of this, the case probably
[648] reflects an instance of social change: the Egyptian government,
anxious to maintain good relations with Libya, encouraged and
facilitated the settlement of this dispute by furnishing
transportation and cutting administrative red tape so that
the _'awaaqil_ of the 'Ali Ahmar could handle this case in a
most expeditious way. Here is a case where Bedouin traditional
[182] political structures function adequately in the modern situation.
Note here also that, in certain circumstances, the _diiya_ payment
can be divided symbolically and specifically to place guilt and
to indicate the seriousness of a crime.

619 _Date: 1963_. Case: Quarrel between the tribe of 'Ali Ahmar
682 (Egypt) and the Harabi (Libya) concerning murder. A young
578 boy of 'Ailit X was visiting his sister in Libya. He learned
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619 *613 682 •578 [685] that one old man kept a large sum of money at home. One day the boy went to beg a watermelon from the old man, but really he went to learn the layout of the man's house. In the night, the boy returned to the man's house and demanded his money. The man refused saying that he had no money. The boy stabbed the old man to death. The boy then went to his sister's house and washed the blood from his hands, and had the girl clean the blood from his robe. The police came to the sister's house in search of the boy, but he was hiding in a cave nearby. The police asked the sister: "Where is your brother, he has killed your mother?" The girl was horrified and told the police where they could find her brother.

*613 619 571 682 578 All of the _'awaaqil_ of the 'Ali Ahmar met at the farm of 'Umda Ibrahim. There were forty-one _'awaaqil_ plus 'Umda Ibrahim. They proceeded to Libya by bus, and took forty sheep with them as a _kubaara_. In Libya, they met with officials of the Libyan government and the _'awaaqil_ of the Harabi tribe. 682 578 619 *613 [685] The Harabi asked for a _diiya_ of 3000 L.E. The blood-money asked for was extra high for two reasons: a young man had killed an elder; and, the murder was connected with intentional theft. After discussing the crime, the Harabi reduced the price to 700 L.E. They did this out of respect for the 'Ali Ahmar who had come so far, and who had paid money for the sugar and tea. All of the 'Ali Ahmar contributed to

682 the diiya: the Qinaishat paid 50 L.E., the Kamailat paid
*578 50 L.E., but the 'Aishaibat, the tribe of the killer paid
619 600 L.E. Of the 600 L.E. paid by the 'Aishaibat it was
*613 distributed as follows: 'Ailit Lazumi and "Ailit Ma'fas each paid 100 L.E. because they are rich; 'Ailit Dawlat paid only 30 L.E. because they are poor, and each pays according to their means. The 'aiela of the killer, although they are poor, had to pay 70 L.E., and the bait of the killer had to pay 300 L.E. All paid according to their means, except the killer's bait. This was a special case, it never happened before and will never happen again and this is why the killer's bait had to pay more. The killer's bait was very poor, so what they did not have they had to beg from the richer families of the tribe.

Legal Cases Pertaining to Property Rights

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*613 In general, property in al-Qasr is owned either by an individual or by a tertiary group; seldom, in these days, is
423 property held by the secondary lineage group. If we followed
*613 classic segmentary lineage theory, seeing that the tribal
182 political structure and the 'awaiyid are still functionally
[671] intact, we might suppose that land and water possession are rights in usufruct and not of ownership. The Bedouins themselves insist that the rights to land and water are rights of ownership. They state that all of the lineage-owned land, with few exceptions, was parcelled out to tertiary groups a

423 long time ago. This seems to be supported by the evidence
*613 shown below, for often conflict over land and water rights is
182 represented by litigation between individuals and not groups.
[691]

422 I have arbitrarily assigned to the classification of
562 property rights the rights over women. I have done this
*613 because a man acquires such rights as a member of a lineage
jural group and secures them with the backing of public opinion
and the _'awaiyid_. Also, though a man in al-Qasr does not
"own" his wife, he does have the legal rights to certain things
related to her: he has the right to her sexual favors, and the
right to claim her offspring for his own lineage.

685 Settlement in cases dealing with the infringement of
695 property rights, if they do not lead to personal injury cases,
will usually be concluded by arbitration or oath-taking, either
of which brings the two parties into agreement.

691 _Date: 1964_. Case: Quarrel between Bait 'Umran and Bait Idris
685 of 'Ailit Ma'fas over the ownership of a well. The _'awaaqil_
*613 sent for the two parties involved, and they met on Wednesday,
•578 market day. And the _'awaaqil_ told the two parties: "This is
692 a shame (_'aib_), you must be friends because you are from the
same tribe." The _'awaaqil_ knew "from past history and from
truthful elders" that the well belonged to 'Ait Idris. The
'awaaqil made 'Ait 'Umran change their minds about their claim
[695] to the well. Before the litigation 'Ait 'Umran had insisted

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685 that 'Ait Idris take the oath as proof that the well was
*613 owned by them. Upon the decision of the *'awaaqil*, however,
•578 'Ait 'Umran refused to allow 'Ait Idris to swear the oath
692 "because we are all one family." This means, as one *'aqila*
695 actually stated at the conclusion of the case, that " 'Ait
Idris is indebted to 'Ait 'Umran."

423 The following two cases which occur in the external
675 system of political relations, one within the 'Aishaibat
*613 territory and the other dealing with land rights in the
territory between two primary authority groups, indicate the
formal aspect of Bedouin adjudication in establishing contracts.

[539] *Date: 12 August 1963*. *A Contract of Agreement on Land Rights*.
Agreement and satisfaction took place between Hussain Karim al-Dawlat of al-'Aishaibat and Khalid Idris al-Ma'fas of al-'Aishaibat, the first and second party. And the reason for this agreement is that each of the two parties own cultivable land at Ras Wadi Madwar. The two parties wish to make a dividing line between this linear piece of land and to declare the borders. The two parties agreed on the following: first, the beginning of the border extends from the eastern side at south Ras Raqabit al-Shumar to the western side at Hatiyid and is shown by stone markers; secondly, this line should be established from the east to the west, and this is a dividing line between the two parties and was executed by them and with their satisfaction; thirdly, whoever rejects or modifies this line will be responsible in front of law and the *'awaiyid Awlad 'Ali*; each party is responsible for his children and relatives as to their actions regarding this line which is the subject of the agreement; fifthly, this contract of agreement which defines the borders between the two parties was issued in two copies, a copy to each party to use when it is needed.

Signatures or seals of seven men.

423
691 Date: 12 October 1954. There came to us (i.e. the 'awaqil)
•578 on this day, Khalid Idris of al-'Aishaibat and Yunis Abd
*613 al-Nabi of al-Kamailat. The reason for their coming is a
[539] quarrel over land rights at Wadi al-Hijnaiya. And we put
distinct markers between the land of the two parties, the
first, Khalid Idris, and the second, Yunis Abd al-Nabi.
And the boundary passes by the distinct markers; the
first is the wadi marker, the second to the sea and beside
the tree, and the final marker we put east of Halima well.
This is a decision between the two parties in the presence
of the following witnesses:

Signatures or seals of five men.

619 The case given below indicates, by the use of two
578 documents, the process of conflict settlement involving two
secondary segments of al-Qasr, one Sa'adi and one Marabit.
[671] 'Ailit al-Sulwatiyya, though genealogically not members of the
Awlad 'Ali and holders of a client or vassal status in traditional times, are within the jurisdiction of the 'awaiyid
Awlad 'Ali. They claim their rights under it by virtue of the
fact of their residence in al-Qasr. The power of ritual
sanction is clearly illustrated by this case.

578 Date: 30 July 1964, Marsa Matruh. First Party: Shaikh
685 Khalid Za'aluk al-Sulwatiyya and four relatives. Second
691 Party: Khalid Idris of 'Ailit Ma'fas and three relatives.
619 They are present. The cause of these two parties coming to-
423 gether is a quarrel over a well named Halima. Since the choice
[695] to swear the oath has been made by the two parties, Khalid
Idris, the second party, will swear the oath supported by
twenty-four members of his 'umraa al-dam ("blood group") to

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be chosen by Shaikh Khalid Za'aluk, the first party. The text of the oath which Khalid Idris will swear is: "By the truth of the owner of this tomb (maqaam), and this book of God, I swear that you (i.e. the 'Ailit Sulwatiyya represented by Shaikh Khalid Za'aluk) have neither work of hand nor a grandfather's stake in this well." If any of the oath-takers are missing on the day of the oath, the well will be owned Khalid Za'aluk. And if they swear the oath, the well will be owned by 'Ailit Ma'fas.

[778] The date of the oath will be the first Friday of month nine, 1964. The oath will be taken at the shrine of Sidi 'Awam, and the swearing will deal with the well only. For the land which is west of the well belongs to Khalid Za'aluk and his family, and the land to the east of the well belongs to Khalid Idris and his family. And the water which is west of the well belongs to Khalid Za'aluk. The two parties agreed to this. (Each party, and five witnesses, i.e. rajal khair, for each party, signed the document.)

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Date: 30 July 1964. I, Khalid Za'aluk, have decided to cancel the oath which was supposed to have been sworn on 9 September 1964 at the shrine of Sidi Awam. Khalid Idris and the oath-takers were present and were stopped from taking the oath. And the well named al-Halima which was the cause of the quarrel

423 (nizaa'a) belongs to Khalid Idris and his brothers. This
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578 happened with the satisfaction of both tribes, and this re-
691 nunciation of claim is valid from today. This paper concerning the ownership of land around the well is valid from today also. And this happened between the parties: (Signatures or stamps of both parties concerned.)

(There appeared the signatures of twenty-three of the twenty-four men who were to have sworn the oath.)

Only twenty-three oath-takers were present: 30 July 1964. I, Shaikh Khalid Za'aluk, agree on the signatures of only twenty-three oath-takers. (Signature of Khalid Za'aluk.)

648 We have mentioned that the _'awaiyid_ prevails in al-
671 Qasr, but have also noted that where the security of the
578 desert is threatened the government is likely to intervene. The government enters tribal conflict in al-Qasr with the tacit approval of the Bedouins. As one informant remarked: "The _'awaiyid_ is the best way to handle problems, but the police will handle what the _'awaiyid_ cannot."

423 _Date: 1964_. Case: Quarrel between al-Afrad ('Ali Abyad) and
691 'Aishaibat ('Ali Ahmar) over water rights. Many members of
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619 both tribes took part in this conflict. The government had
648 to intervene: they formed a peace committee made up of all
*[613] the _'awaaqil_ of both tribes and the _'umda_ and _shaikh_ from
[634] each tribe.

423 each tribe. It was decided that the water which flows through
691 the *wadi* after the rains should be divided equally between the
• 578 two tribes, and that no one should be stopped from using the
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648 water. Had not the government intervened in this conflict,
and had not they collected all of the weapons from the Bedouins,
this problem would have resulted in the death of many men and
even greater problems.

674 Theft is condemned by the Bedouins: "Everything in
685 the desert is loose. We must punish the thief quickly and
severely." It is a fact that the man who goes to steal and
[682] accidentally kills in the act will have judged against him
[829] the full *diiya*, i.e., the amount for intentional killing. On
the other hand, the people of al-Qasr insist that "Bedouins do
[671] not steal." But legal norms exist to sanction violations against
cultural ideals. The following case shows how social and ritual
sanctions operate to enforce ideals.

619 Date: 1964. Case: Quarrel between the tribe of Kamailat and
578 the tribe of 'Aishaibat over the theft of 16 L.E. Muhammad of
685 'Ailit Ma'fas was accused of stealing 16 L.E. which belonged
*613 to Ahmad of 'Ailit Idris, Kamailat. The theft occurred while
the two were residing at a hotel in Marsa Matruh. There were
twenty other persons in the hotel that night. The accused
said: "I did not take anything."

619
578 said: "I did not take anything." The _'awaaqil_ of both parties
685 met and told the accused: "If you have anything give it to
*613 us; if you do not have anything then swear the oath to this
695 fact." Members of 'Ailit Ma'fas said that the boy was innocent
[571]
[692] and told the _'awaaqil_ that the boy should have his rights according to the _'awaiyid_ (i.e. he should be allowed to swear the oath to establish his innocence). The boy accused of the theft, his father, and two other members of 'Ailit Ma'fas selected by the accusers swore the oath and the problem was
619 over. Two months later, the accuser from the Kamailat lost
578 his eye in an accident, because swearing the oath has con-
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695 sequences for both parties. A bad oath will work against the
784 one who makes it; there will be a curse upon him, his children, and his money. And the bad effects of an oath will also work against the one who falsely accuses another making him swear the oath.

582 The final two cases deal with marriage rights. The
562 first illustrates a number of things which I have touched on
*613 in the previous discussion of marriage: that a man may choose
792 to ignore the jural structures of the lineage group where the desires of his offspring are concerned; that the female is not the totally subjugated person which one might expect to find in the strongly patrilineal Bedouin society; and that the role of "holy man" functions in the marital area of authority relations.

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562 The second, rather complex, case occurred while I was in the field. Once again, the role of the "holy man" is shown to operate in cases dealing with women. Shown here also is an interesting example of the cultural definition of abnormality.

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792 No Date. Case: Quarrel between 'Ailit al-Abaidi ('Ali Abyad) and 'Ailit al-Afrad ('Ali Abyad) over marriage rights. A man from al-Abaidi agreed that his daughter could marry a man but the rest of the _'aiela_ did not approve of this marriage. Since the man could not go to his _'aqila_, who disapproved of the marriage, he took his problem to a "holy man." The "holy man" decided that the girl should marry the man she wanted to marry, but he was afraid that this would cause trouble in the _'aiela_. [586] The "holy man" decided to marry the man and woman, and then to divorce them for a period of one year so that the conflict would abate. The girl's father knew of this marriage but the other members of the _'aiela_ did not. After a period of one year, the groom went to the "holy man" and said: "Decide anything that I can do, but I must have the girl." The "holy man" decided to make him pay a _kubaara_ (expiation) fee of 100 L.E. to the girl's _'aiela_, and he married them again. [681] [684]

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582 Date: 1965. Case: Quarrel within a tertiary segment of the Qinaishat tribe concerning marriage rights. A girl from the Qinaishat tribe had refused to marry her paternal cousin, but he was insistent upon his right to have her.

*613 619 he was insistent upon his right to have her. She went to
578 see the "holy man," al-Sanusi, who lives near al-Qasr. (Al-
582 Sanusi is a descendent of "the Great Sanusi," the founder of
793 al-Sanusiyya, who now lives in Egypt after having been exiled
from Libya.) Al-Sanusi decided to keep the girl at his farm
*613 until he could decide a course of action. One night, the
619 girl's cousin secretly came to the Sanusi farm and found her
578 582 room. The girl was sleeping. The cousin struck a match, the
793 girl awoke and was frightened. She jumped from her bed and
683 began to run, in so doing she fell down a flight of stairs
and suffered a rupture. This was a serious offense which the
cousin had committed, and al-Sanusi decided that he should call
all of the _'awaaqil_ of the area to inform them of this. In the
meantime, he sent the girl back to her home and the cousin
continued to bother her concerning his rights over her.

[584] The cousin went so far as to "offer the blood-sacrifice for
her," a stage in the marriage process which signifies that the
union has been consented to by both families. The girl's
father was dead, and her brothers and uncles were unable to
keep the cousin away from the girl. (It may be assumed that
they were conscious of his rights to _bint 'amm_.) They had
[692] even beaten him once. All of the _'awaaqil_ of 'Ali Ahmar and
'Ali Abyad, and the Marabtiin in the al-Qasr area came to meet
with al-Sanusi at his farm. He (al-Sanusi) said that they all

*613 must come because he, himself, was a Libyan and a member of
619 no tribe in Egypt. Al-Sanusi's petition was two-fold: he
•578 said the cousin should be punished for violating his right of
582 privacy and property, and the question concerning the cousin's
793 right to the girl should be settled. The 'awaaqil decided
683 that al-Sanusi should be awarded a kubaara of 1000 L.E. from
692 the tribes of the area, and that the girl should be permitted
to marry no man of the Qinaishat tribe. Al-Sanusi refused to
accept the kubaara, and this was the correct thing to do since
the kubaara, especially a large one, is only offered ritualistically. The 'awaaqil took note of the cousin's rights to his
bint 'amm: they said that since the girl refused to marry him
it would not be right if she married anyone else from the tribe.
*613 Furthermore, the 'awaaqil, on the basis of the cousin's behavior
619 in this matter, decided that the cousin was insane and should
734 be committed to an asylum. They informed the police in Marsa
[648] Matruh of this diagnosis and decision, and the police came and
transported the boy to the mental hospital in Cairo where he
is today. The uncles of the boy signed the papers which committed him.

554 seen" at any such function. It would appear that the mechanism
571 at work here is not simply a device to provide the younger
182 generation with a tension-release situation, but also a
561 symbolic expression of the difference between the possessors
[154] and the non-possessors of authority, a confirmation of the
political order.

[578] The avoidance practice, or separation, between the old and the young in the "party" situation is a structural fact of Bedouin society, and, though it may ultimately be defined as a conflict control or legitimating mechanism, in the context of culture change new aspects and meanings attach
554 to the phenomenon. The "status group" is an agent of change
571 in al-Qasr; its members can afford to gamble in the market
178 economy of Marsa Matruh since they possess the reserve capital
[471] (in the form of sheep) and the social prestige which permits
[439] this. The "status group," with business and social relations
[177] in Marsa Matruh, enjoys both the benefits of associational
ties with the Egyptians and the communal ties with their fellow Bedouins. They see themselves as being different from their fellow tribesmen, and they tend to face more towards Marsa Matruh than al-Qasr. In short, they are the "cultural brokers" who support an ideology of change, they extol the benefits of a new way of life over and against the old.

[789] One repudiation of tradition which constitutes an
[796] attempt to define the style of life of the "status group"

554 One 'aqila claimed that the rajal khair is a person
627 who shares in his own authority and presides when he is
*613 away, but he separated the "rights" of the two roles. The
[779] 'aqila is able to force two parties in conflict to read the
● [578] Fatiha, the first sura of the Quran, in order to terminate
the problem; this is beyond the rights of the rajal khair whose
influence is not directly supported by sacred sanctions. But
[784] the role of rajal khair does have its "sacred" aspects, for
all Bedouins know that "you should never harm a rajal khair
or God will punish you for this." I never heard this same
thing said about the 'aqila.

554 Historically, it was perhaps the case that the rajal
627 khair was the person of high status who represented the authority
*613 of an absent 'aqila. The role never became institutionalized
182 but functioned as a support and substitute role in a structure
dominated by that of the 'aqila. In a segmentary society
627 where the various structures exist in opposition to one
628 another, it is important that an institution, such as a third
182 non-partisan element, exists to facilitate communication
578 between parties for the purposes of conflict regulation.
Besides the rajal khair, an example of this would be the
traditional case of the wife from an outside tribe who alone
was permitted freedom of passage between the two warring
parties. Her purpose, it was assumed, was that of peace-making.

634 asymmetrical power relationship between commoners and "status
*613 group" which maintains political order. The Bedouins say of
666 the *'umda's* office, as they did of the *'aqila*, "if the son is
428 worthy of the office, then he should take his father's place."
[571) Such a statement is usually qualified by noting that if the son does not possess the qualifications of the office, of course, he will not succeed. This is not simply a case of power politics, there is more to it. Behind the inheritance of the *'umda* and *shaikh* office is a logical concern and attempt to sustain a balance of political and social relations.

The "inheritance" of the *'aqila's* office is explained by showing that the candidates for the office are limited to the brothers and sons of the incumbent, the former *'aqila*. The offices of *'umda* and *shaikh*, in contrast, have a recruitment pool which includes, potentially, every man at the primary tribal level, the 'Aishaibat. The rule of succession, where the modern legal roles are concerned, is a mechanism for maintaining, what is considered by most Bedouins to be, the legitimate distribution of power in al-Qasr. Once the roles
634 of *'umda* and *shaikh* have been "captured" by a *bait*, for
*613 political power resides at the tertiary level of the lineage
666 structure, any attempt to change the distribution or locus
428 of power will be culturally transformed into a threat to the
●578 honor, not of the individual, but of his *bait* and *'aiela*. And this is a basis for conflict in Bedouin society. It is

634 no coincidence, then, that the present *'umda* and *shaikh* are
*613 the sons of the former *'umda* and *shaikh*. This reveals not
666 only the structural rules of succession, but also indicates
●[578] that "social honor," and thus power, still resides with these
families.

It is important to note that since the time of their
[178] inception, these roles have not changed *'aiela* or even *bait*
in al-Qasr. When the former *'umda* from 'Ailit Lazumi died,
634 his eldest son petitioned to the *'awaaqil* of the 'Aishaibat
*613 that he be approved to succeed to his father's position.
666 The *'awaaqil* met and made their decision. One *'aqila* who
428 was present at the election said: "The office of *'umda* should
571 stay in the Lazumi family since the father was *'umda*. The *'awaaqil* agreed on the son. But the son will be accepted to follow his father only if he is good. If he is not good, the *'awaaqil* will find a new *bait*." Although the Bedouins speak of "the *'awaaqil*" electing the *'umda*, it must be remembered that it is the "status group" which makes the decision, and that the *'awaaqil* are only part of this group. The names of
[627] the men who elected the present *'umda* include less *'awaaqil*
and more *rajal khair*.

114 Before I arrived in the field, the present acting
634 *'umda* of the 'Aishaibat tribe was elected to the national
666 parliament to represent the province of Marsa Matruh. The
election of his replacement was not scheduled to take place

> 124 If the office left the family,
> *613 all of the lineages would be fighting over it . . . The
> 634 job should stay in Bait Bu Taram; if this is impossible,
> 571 then it should stay in 'Ailit Lazumi. In any case, the
> 666 *'awaaqil* will decide.

•578 A change in the present locus of legal authority in
634 the Bedouin-Egyptian government structural relationship
178 would amount to a re-structuring process, and could lead to
121 serious conflict. In the very least, it would [illegible] for a clear explanation and new statement of social reality since it would challenge what is, and "has always been," a legitimate distribution of power and political order.

634 The office of the *shaikh* is not a potential power-
554 base by comparison with the office of *'umda*. The *shaikh*, rather than being in direct communication with the Governor, executes the official orders made known to the *'umda.* As an administrator, he takes care of issuing drivers' licenses, notifies men of their military draft status, etc. The government sees this as a necessary post because of the difficulty of contacting Bedouins deep in the desert. In one sense, the *shaikh's* office is becoming less functional as the Bedouin move in from the desert and begin to take part in the national society, but in another sense it is becoming more functional as bureaucracy and red tape become increasingly complex. But the *shaikh* remains in the shadow of the *'umda*. He never substitutes for the *'umda,* for this would infringe on the rightful power of the *'umda's* family; when the *'umda* is absent,

634 of little significance in the authority structure. Very few
554 people of the al-Qasr area have had any contact with these
634 officers, and very few want any contact. On the other hand,
554 the direction of change in al-Qasr and the bureaucratic growth
178 of the government in the Western Desert makes it likely that
all Bedouins will be drawn into the total authority structure,
and that the roles of *'umda* and *shaikh* will expand. These
roles will not increase in terms of traditional prestige and
status, but they may gain the authority which they do not possess
now. This is in view of the fact that the traditional authority
structure remains relatively intact. The *'umda* and the
shaikh have no traditional basis of authority, so they cannot
make decisions which are morally binding for Bedouins of al-
634 Qasr at this time. It is obvious, of course, that the *'umda*
635 may refer to the Governor, and even the use of governmental
554 force, as the basis of his legitimacy. But this has never
178 happened. The incumbent *'umda* is still a Bedouin, and this
prevents him from challenging the traditional ways. Also,
the Governor is concerned with restricting the *'umda's*
influence not increasing it.

634 I do not mean to imply that there is, or will be, a
613 struggle for power between traditional authority represented
178 by the *'aqila* and modern legal authority represented by the
578 *'umda*. Such a struggle could not actually occur since when,
and if, the *'umda* came to represent authority in a newly

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*613 178 •578 structured situation the traditional authority structure would have disappeared from the scene.

178 554 627 But, there is a struggle for authority recognition going on in al-Qasr. It is related to the change from the old basis of traditional authority to a new basis of legal authority. At the heart of this struggle is the role of the _rajal khair_. The _rajal khair_ has a firm public basis for establishing himself in an authoritative and representative role. Traditionally, the _rajal khair_ has faced inward and outward: he has used his ascribed position on the al-Qasr prestige scale to augment his status and influence, and, at the same time, his economic rationality has oriented him [648] toward Marsa Matruh. In the present stage of culture change, the _rajal khair_ is in a position to combine his ascribed and achieved attributes to gain entrance to a new reference group, the Egyptian bureaucracy. This offers him a new kind of prestige as well as affording him new opportunities for power, and even authority, over his fellow Bedouins.

The _rajal khair_, in view of his movement between the old and new in Egypt, maintains a _tertium quid_ status in two camps. While he has one foot in the traditional community because of his role in conflict regulation and the manipulation of traditional values, the _rajal khair_ also has a foot in the

from the process of dispute settlement; and the semi-nomadic nature of 114
the population in the area. 123

The reliance on the case-study method and especially that of Turner's 114
"social drama" which requires extensive and detailed knowledge of the se- 123
quential development of a number of cases over a long period of time proved 124
to be a major task in a society where disputes are settled not in formal 627
hearings, but by means of informal mediation and behind the scene negotia- 578 ●
tions. These activities covered a large area, and were shrouded in a great deal of secrecy. The assumption is that the parties involved in the dispute should be given the privacy and chance to arrive at an acceptable settlement without being conscious of or influenced by the opinion of non-interested parties. The public hearing, or the *mi'ad*, loves the announcement of the agreement arrived at in private. As will be seen later, very little factual information about the dispute is discussed in the *mi'ad*. No record is kept of either the discussion in the *mi'ad* or the preceding negotiations. The process of dispute settlement is, then, highly decentralized. To be able to follow one particular dispute involves the constant reliance on informants not only to acquaint the anthropologist with the places of negotiations, but also to fill the gaps in the information about the process of negotiation itself.

As a woman anthropologist, I found myself at a disadvantage in a 114
society where women were excluded from public participation. It is true 123
that from the very beginning of the field work I was never cast into the 562
role of the native woman, yet, my position as a woman posed a certain number of problems. When I first arrived in the area, I made a deliberate effort not to identify with the native women. When it was suggested to me that the relatively short skirts I wore were not practical for riding donkeys

233 through a hard year and to help him replace the herd he has lost. In
731 many cases a dry year is followed by another and many of these employed
464 find themselves depending more and more on their income from the jobs.
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182 The security of the employment is often compared favorably with the uncertainty of nomadic existence, and many decide to abandon the pastoral life on a more or less permanent basis. But even when one makes such a decision, he usually retains a strong affiliation with his original way
613 of life. He retains an active interest in the affairs of his Amar, especially
182 those from which he can benefit in one way or another. One important
682 gain he might get is through sharing in the receipt of bloodmoney for the killing of any member of the Amar, and having the Amar paid in his behalf. But while asserting their membership in the Amar at the time of such distribution, very few, if any, would show themselves when the membership of the Amar is called upon for the collection of bloodmoney which the Amar has to pay for a murder committed by one of its members.
613 It is known in the area that members of one bait of the Aggary Amar (Bait
682 Ahmad) have never paid their share of the bloodmoney of the last twenty
● 578 years, but always claim their share in the distribution of bloodmoney. Many members of that Bait claim that the Bait has long been separated from the Aggary Amar, although this claim is denied by the rest of the Amar as well as by those members of Bait Ahmad who claim their share in the receipt of bloodmoney.

613 Disputes such as these, which are not limited to the Aggarty, led
675 many Amars to attempt to make comprehensive lists of all members of the
578 Amar and to require a written agreement in case of separation of a given Bait from the Amar.

613 578 672 671 681 Another factor which led to the need to formalize the rules of the Amar was the increase in the kind of disputes for which there is no provision in the customary law of Awlad Ali. Such disputes arise mainly out of situations which are relatively novel to the area. A large number of these situations involve the relationship between the tribal population and the government authorities recently taking a major part in managing the affairs of the area. There were no rules in Awlad Ali law to guide decisions in cases involving financial liability of a member of the Amar in cases such as confiscation of smuggled goods, destruction of government property, or false testimony leading to the conviction of a fellow tribesman by the government authorities. The list of cases such as these is rapidly increasing. Many members of the Amar refuse to share in the payment of liabilities arising out of such cases on the basis that since no provision has been made in the customary law of Awlad Ali, then the Amar as a whole should not take corporate responsibility for such actions. They assert that corporate responsibility of the Amar is the exception rather than the rule and therefore, where there is no specific rule, the responsibility is an individual one. Others insist that it is the corporate responsibility of the Amar in such matters that maintains the Amar as a group and gives incentives to the members to retain their membership in the Amar, and therefore, should be the rule rather than the exception, covering any form of liability unless individual responsibility is specified.

613 672 675 - This made it essential to specify in some kind of formal statement which liabilities are to be considered collective for which the Amar has to pay as a corporate unit and which are to remain as individual responsibility. This is done either by listing the cases of individual

His Bait is the wealthiest in the
613 Aggary and he himself has recently acquired a great amount of wealth,
554 627 mostly from smuggling goods across the Libyan borders. Because of his
[556] position as a Government Sheihk, he is believed to have influencial connections
in the government. He is the only member of the Aggary Amar
who has a car. He considers himself to be the spokesman of the Aggary
Family, and he is known to be able to persuade the reluctant awaqil to
conform to decisions made by the rest of the awaqil. In a number of instances
[682] he was able to collect bloodmoney from members of the Amar who
had previously refused to pay. Some people in the area believe that had
it not been for the persuasive abilities of Sheihk Selouma, the Aggary
Amar could never have persisted, and it would have long ago been divided
613 into smaller units due to the lack of agreement among its members. The
lack of formalized leadership of the Amar or the Eila makes consensus of
extreme importance for the Amar. The emphasis on the unity of the Amar
[675] is stated in Article 2 and is implied in a number of other articles in
● [578] the Amar paper of Aggary. Disagreement among the awaqil is very rare although
613 not unknown in the area. The relative consensus among the awaqil
682 stems from the fact that the Amar as a group has a fairly limited function.
[182] Until very recently the only practical function of the Amar was the collection
of money to pay for a murder committed by one of its members. Since
establishing the innocence or guilt of the accused is not the duty of the
Amar, once his guilt has been established, there is no question about
613 the payment. Disagreements are likely to occur in the case of new circumstances
682 where money has to be paid, since payment in such cases are not
578 yet institutionalized, even when specified in a given Amar paper. This
000 has not yet become a major problem. If any disagreement between the

613 If any disagreement between the
578 responsibility of the majority of the awaqil to persuade the minority to
571 conform to the majority's decision. This is usually done by simple personal
613 persuasion. In certain instances, however, when a particular aqila
554 is known for being troublesome to the Amar, refusing to abide by the majority
571
578 decisions, an attempt may be made by the others to build up popular support around another person in the Bait which the aqila represents. If this strategy is successful, it might lead to replacing the aqila by another who is more abiding to the Amar's decisions. This approach is more likely to succeed if the aqila is not a popular person in his own Bait, for if he is popular, any attempt by the other Baits to disqualify the aqila would be viewed by the members of his Bait as interference in their own affairs and might lead them to rally even more strongly around their leader.

613 The other tendency occurring when the size of the Eilat increases
is toward the separation of one or more of its constiuent Baits. Originally
613
682 this was done by merely refusing to share in the payment of bloodmoney.
If this refusal continued, it was considered as a sign of
[178] separation of the Bait. In recent years this created problems with an
increasing number of individuals claiming separation from the Amar to
avoid the payment of the bloodmoney, while claiming membership when distribution
613 is done. This led many tribal segments to require that the
675 "barawa" or separation of individuals or tribal units from any particular
Amar should be put in writing, after getting the approval of the Amar to
which he belonged. When the approval is given and the separation in put
in writing, it is announced to all other tribal segments. If this is
[692] done, members of the separated tribal segment are not held responsible

...

PHASE I

613 578 682 [464] In September of 1956, Mansur from bait Eweidha of the Aggary Eila, who works as a driver in one of the government projects in the area, went to Alexandria with a friend, a member of the Gemei'at tribe. In one of the bars there, Mansur got drunk and entered into an argument with his friend. The argument turned into a fight during which he hit his friend with a broken bottle. Two days later, the friend died. A settlement was made between Mansur and the victim's family and bloodmoney was established at L. 300.

613 682 683 Two weeks after the above incident, the same person, Mansur, was driving the government car on his regualr duty when he ran over two members of the Sanagrah tribe who were sitting on the side of the road, killing one and breaking the leg of the other. Another settlement was made with the families of the victims. The bloodmoney for the dead man was established at L. 300 and another L. 50 was set as the compensation for the broken leg of the other man.

The total sum of compensations in the two incidents was divided among the sixteen baits constituting the Aggary Amar. The share of each bait was decided in proportion to the number of adult males (sayems) in each. The share of bait Asabei' alone was established at about L. 100.

613 682 683 672 558 As the Aqila of Bait Asabei', Shei'eb was responsible for collecting the money from members of his bait. But for the following six months he was unable to collect from any member of his bait, including Sheikh Hakim, Shei'eb's cousin and the wealthiest person in bait Asabei' and the Aggary Amar as a whole. Most of them gave the execuse that it was a bad year and they had lost most of their herds. When the money was not collected,

156 exercise his functions, he invited all the important people in the area
159 into a large gathering during which he announced that he was handing the
613 463 sacred books to Shei'eb, who was to become the nazzar and also to succeed
683 him as the Aqila of bait Asabei'. Although at that time Shei'eb was
554 fairly young, twenty-six, nobody questioned Sheikh Elewa's decision.
428 (079) "He is the Aqila," said one informant, "and he has the right to decide
which of his sons is to succeed him. After all, he knows his sons better
than anybody else and knows which one is best for the job." Most people
156 159 thought that Sheikh Elewa, being still alive and with clear thinking,
613 would help Shei'eb in performing his duties as Aqila. A few months after
554 Shei'eb took over his father's position, it became apparent that he was
● 578 too immature for the job. He tried to use his position to take money
[661] from members of his bait and when they refused to give him any money, he
entered into fights with a number of them. Rumors spread that he took
bribes from the disputing parties who came to him for him to assess the
legal compensation for wounds to raise or lower his estimate. But still
people within bait Asabei' as well as outside it respected Sheikh Elewa's
decision and did not challenge Shei'eb openly. But as time passed the
dissatisfaction with Shei'eb grew. This dissatisfaction came mainly from
members of the Amaf who were affected directly by Shei'eb's actions, especially those actions which resulted in the payment of compensation for
wounds inflicted in fights.

PHASE II

439 On the evening of May 16, 1966, two members of the Geneishat tribe of Matruh area came to Burg-el-Arab with a large shipment of smuggled cigarettes to leave with their partner in the area, Hadi, from the

439 Aggary Eila. When they arrived with the cigarettes, Hadi was not at his
tent; he was in the market of the nearby town selling sheep. They left
the cigarettes and left for Alexandria to arrange for their distribution.
In Alexandria they met Rabbuh Hakim, the son of Hakim, who married a
girl from Alexandria and lived there. He made his income from buying
smuggled goods at wholesale prices and selling them at a profit. When
he met the two members of the Geneishat tribe and learned from them about
the shipment they left at Hadi's place, he wanted to buy it. But they
refused on the grounds that Hadi had already contacted someone and that
all they could do was to give the first option to that individual. Two
439 hours after the conversation between Rabbuh Hakim and the Geneishat, the
625 police officer on duty at the station of Burg el-Arab received an anonymous
call from Alexandria informing him that a shipment of smuggled cigarettes
worth more than three thousand pounds was hidden in Hadi's olive
mill (which was not in use at that time). The call was overheard by a
member of the Sanagrah tribe who works as a detective with the police.
He tried to warn Hadi of the police raid but it was too late. The officer
found the cigarettes in Hadi's olive mill in the exact place where the informant
said they would be. The cigarettes were confiscated and Hadi was
arrested and later released when the officer didn't find enough evidence
to prove that he knew about the shipment or that it belonged to him.

685 The confiscation of the cigarettes enraged both Hadi and his partners.
627 They went to Sheikh Ta'ib, the Aqila of bait Eweidha to which Hadi
578 belonged. They told him about their conversation with Rabbu in Alexandria
and said that they thought he was the one who informed the police about
the shipment. Ta'ib said that Rabbu must have done this because of old

685 grudges that he had against Ta'ib when the latter dissolved the partner-
627 ship which had existed between them for more than ten years, because of
● 578 Rabbu's attempt to cheat Taieb in dividing the profit gained from smug-
gling goods. They asked Sheikh Ta'ib to be their mediator to Sheikh
Hakim and his son. Ta'ib went to Hakim himself and informed him of the
accusations directed against his son and asked to arrange for a "Mi'ad"
or legal hearing. Hakim agreed and told Taieb that his son accepted
Taieb as a mardi and would abide by whatever decision he made. After
that both parties to the dispute wrote specifying their agreement on Taieb
as a mardi and all signed it. (It is not customary to write the agree-
ment on the mardi but Taieb insisted on that on the grounds that he did
not trust Hakim or his son and that several times they had backed down
on their promises). The Mi'ad was held and all interested parties attend-
ed. It lasted only half an hour, most of it spect drinking tea. Nobody
presented his case or any facts related to it since both parties had
apparently discussed it earlier with Taieb. The only one to speak was
Sheikh Taieb. He stated that Hadi and his partners believed that Rabbu
had informed the police which caused them to loose merchandise worth
685 more than three thousand pounds. He also said that the accusation had
627 been denied by Hakim on behalf of his son, after having his son swear by
578 the Qoraan that he hadn't informed the police. Then in the traditional
695 phrase, Taieb said, "I therefore follow the Awlad Ali Daraieb and make
[671] the judgment to the oath. Rabbu will have to take the oath supported by
fourteen male members of his bait to be selected by the Geneishat." He
added that he had discussed the matter with both parties before announc-
ing it and that both had agreed to it.

685 no one else could take his place. They were mainly angry at Hakim's
627 attempt to cheat them and refused Hakim's offer to substitute ten men
695 for Qudura. The temper of the meeting was becoming very tense; then
● [578] Taieb, who was working very hard to achieve a settlement between the
disputants, took the Geneishat aside and tried to convince them to accept
another man instead of Qudura. When he found that to be impossible, he
asked them to agree to a postponement of the oath until they saw what
prevented Qudura from coming as he had promised. The Geneishat agreed
to the postponement because of the absence of one of the men to swear.
[671] According to Awlad Ali Daraieb, if one of the individuals to take the
oath fails to show up in the saint's tomb for any reason or if he comes
but refuses to take the oath, the whole case for the defense fails, and
the judgment is awarded automatically for the plaintiff. In this case
the Geneishat were entitled to immediate compensation for their confiscated goods. Nobody knew the reason that led the Geneishat to forfeit
their right to immediate compensation and to give Hakim and his son a
second chance despite their intense dislike for the latters. Some attribute this to the skill of Taieb and the respect he commands among all
tribes. Others believe the Geneishat movement to be a reciprocal act to
bait Asabei' as a whole which long ago had one a similar favor for the
Geneishat. Still others beliebe it to be a gesture of good will on the
part of the Geneishat who needed to retain a good and friendly relationship with the tribal segments on their smuggling route.

No date was set at that time for the oath. The parties as well as
685 the witnesses returned to their houses. Hakim then took Shei'eb and
627 went to visit Qudura to see why he hadn't come to the oath but Qudura
578

685 refused to see them. Later Hakim had Shei'eb spread the rumor that Qudura
627 had taken a bribe from the Geneishat to refuse to take the oath, and the
● 578 story of an old dispute between Qudura, on the one hand, and both Hakim
[521] and Shei'eb, on the other. This dispute dates back to the time when the
613 Awaqil of the Aggary Amar decided to replace Shei'eb with Hakim as the
156 Aqila of bait Asabei'. Shortly after the decision of the Aggary Awaqil
554 was publicly known, Qudura was very unhappy and refused to recognize it.
578 His reaction was not out of loyalty to Shei'eb whom he thought was a very unfit person for the position, but it stemmed rather, from a deep resentment of Hakim. According to my information, Qudura's position was met with sympathy by the majority of the people outside the Aggary Amar who share with him the belief that Hakim was a dishonest person who could not be trusted as a representative of bait Asabei'. It was at that time that the stories of Hakim's dishonest dealings were being discussed publicly, mainly by Qudura and members of his camp. At that time many believed that Qudura was the best man for the position of Aqila of bait Asabei' and that he was the only qualified member of that bait. He was the oldest able man in the bait, and although he was poor, yet he was known throughout the area for his honesty and sound decision. In fact many people in the area told me that they believe Qudura to be the only honest member of bait Asabei'. Realizing that Qudura was getting all the attention, Hakim sent his son Rabbu to Qudura with a message that Hakim acknowledged Qudura as the Aqila and that he (Hakim) had neither the time nor the interest in taking the position himself. Hakim also conveyed the view that he would support Qudura if the latter denounced Shei'eb and appointed himself in his place. Qudura agreed and a date

613 156 was set for a meeting in which Quadra was to announce his decision.
554 Meanwhile, Qudura stopped attacking Hakim and directed his attack to-
578 ward the inadequacy of Shei'eb as the Aqila.

The meeting was held two weeks later and all the important people in the area were invited. After dinner was served Qudura announced his agreement with Hakim to become the Aqila of bait Asabei' replacing Shei'eb. Everybody expected Hakim to support Qudura in his claim, but instead Hakim directed his comment to Qudura telling him that there had been a misunderstanding on Qudura's part and that all his message to Qudura was to acknowledge the latter as the Aqila for his own camp alone not for bait Asabei' as a whole as Qudura claimed. This announcement was a surprise to everyone in the meeting since this meant recognizing the camp of Qudura as a separate bait, a result which nobody, including Qudura, had ever anticipated. Qudura was very angry and dissolved the meeting immediately. Ever since that incident, the relationship between
578 Qudura and Hakim has been very unfriendly. Almost all of my informants
156 explained Qudura's failure to show up at the oath as a means of revenge
695 685 against Hakim who had embarrassed him among the people who attended the
627 meeting. Qudura himself had told me later that the reason for his not
[124] coming to the oath was that he was not sure that Rabbu was innocent:

> Rabbu has been known to do these thins (inform the police) and I cannot trust him. I cannot take a false oath and endanger myself for someone like Rabbuh. Besides, Hakim never came to me to discuss the oath like he did with all the others who were to swear with them. If he had brought his son and come to me before I would have been able to tell whether they were lying or not, and If not, I would have sworn with a clear conscience and without fear. The oath is something that one does not take lightly. It involves the supernatural.

613 627 When Qudura refused to see Hakim and Shei'eb, Hakim asked Sheikh
156 196 Saleh, the Aqila of one of the most powerful baits in the area, to talk

613 627 156 [196] to Qudura and to tell him that Hakim wanted to show his respect. This means in everyday parlance that Hakim was willing to pay him money. Qudura agreed to meet Hakim the following day.

[114] [431] [574] On the day of the meeting, to which I was invited, Hakim arrived with his son and gifts of three goats, tea and sugar. One of the goats was slaughtered and supper was prepared for the guests. While the guests were eating, Hakim and Qudura disappeared inside one of the tents for more than an hour. When they finally joined the gathering, Hakim announced that he and Qudura were now brothers and that it was his fault that Qudura was angry because he had accused him of being stupid and misunderstanding the content of the message sent to him after the meeting of the Aggary awawil. "I admit," said Hakim, "that I might have meant at one time and probably said it to sheikh Qudura that I wanted him to be the Aqila of bait Asabei'. Now that I have admitted this, Sheikh Qudura should not have any grudges against me or my son." Then Qudura addressed the gathering and said, in a very cold and dry manner, "I am glad that Hakim has come to this senses and admitted his mistake." The gathering lasted for most of the evening, spent mostly in behind-the-scenes meetings involving Hakim, Qudura and different guests. Then as the last guest left, Shei'eb, who had been inside the tent throughtout the evening came out and said that Hakim was a fool and that Qudura had tricked him into admitting publicly that he had lied and that Qudura still refused to take the oath.

613 619 578 [521] Qudura's stand created a strong reaction which affected almost all the tribal segments in the area. The case overshadowed any other event and was the main topic of discussion. The reaction was mixed, however.

613 619 578 156 Other tribal segments outside the Aggary amar supported the position of Qudura, and most took his position to prove their notion about his honesty and the fact that despite his poverty, he could not be bribed. They were also pleased with Qudura's trick which demonstrated Hakim's dishonest
613 578 156 techniques. Within the Aggary amar, the general sentiment was still with Hakim although his confession of cheating Qudura made it difficult to support him openly. They directed their attack against Qudura who in their view violated the solidarity of the amar and even of his bait and showed it as divided and noncohesive. They were also fearful that Qudura's
[685] refusal to pay would cause the amar to pay the Geneishat the full compensation for the action of Rabbuh, a sum which, as one said, would put the amar in debt for generations to come. The strongest impact of the events affected bait Asabei'itself and left it one step from complete fission into three distinct groups. Shei'eb, finding the tide turning against Hakim, found a chance to assert his claim to the position of the Aqila, stating openly that he would never forfeit his hereditary right. On the other hand, finding the popularity of Qudura increasing rapidly, he started attacking him verbally and even threatened to beat him. He in-
[681] sisted that Qudura and his sons should be excluded from the amar and given the barawa.

613 681 [192] The word "barawa" is derived from the Arabic verb "bara" which means to cure one's self of an illness. It also means to sever social ties with undesirable persons. The term is used among Awlad Ali in a much restrited sense to refer to the process by which a tribal segment detaches itself from any responsibility for the actions of a particular member. It is

613 a request and examine the reasons behind it in an attempt to remedy them
681 if possible. They have to be sure first of all that by his request the
person is not avoiding the paymnet of his share in a particular case.
[695] If this is proven to be the case, then no barawa is granted unless the
person pays all his debts to the amar. This, like the amar's barawa of
the individual, has to be put in writing.

613 I left the area a month after the meeting held at Qudura's camp.
● 578 By the time I left, bait Asabei' was almost in a chaotic situation.
[114] Many thought that the outcome would be in favor of Qudura, who would
emerge from all the happenings as the leader of bait Asabei' as a whole.
Others thought that the only possible outcome was for bait Asabei' to be
divided into two or even three separate units with their own respective
leaders.

Analysis

114 All events of the second phase occurred while I was in the area.
627 Nonetheless I was not able to observe directly all of these events, due
to the nature of the judicial process among Awlad Ali which relies, as
has been mentioned earlier, on informal mediation and influence, rather
than on formal court hearings. Most of the above events happened behind
[124] closed doors and with a great amount of secrecy. For this reason I had
to rely partly on informants' accounts of what exactly had happened between the parties involved.

613 The dispute in its two phases revealed a major weakness in the
627 social structure of the major bait of the Aggary family. As the events
182 of the case unfolded, they shed light on some of the important principles

634 which result in permanent bodily harm. Reporting such cases is a fairly
554 minor proceeding since such cases come to the knowledge of the authori-
657 ties through other channels, mainly from talks involved in the mediation
674 [743] for the bloodmoney or from the hospital to which serious assault cases
are usually taken. Besides, reporting a crime does not mean convicting the offender. This latter depends on evidence which, in case the dispute has been settled by tribal proceedings, is hard for the police authorities to find.

634 While the government demands do not impose serious conflicts of
554 loyalty on the part of the omda, if successful, his position with the
657 government can bring to his tribal segments great benefits. These benefits are usually in the form of various social and economic aids including fodder for the animals and food and clothing for the people during the dry years. Other benefits including providing the tribal population with olive trees and helping them clear many of the old Roman wells and establishing wind mills for nominal fees. Not everyone in the area can have such benefits. Some do not even know they exist. A successful omda could manipulate the administration to get as many benefits for
[871] his tribal segment as possible.. Some successful omdas were able to have
[474] the government build schools in their districts, establish cooperative
units to market local products such as wool, sheep, and olive oil.

634 This should not lead us, however, to conclude that the position of
554 the omda in the Western Desert does not involve any kind of conflicting
657 loyalty or that he is always supported by his people or even trusted by
578 them. One informant said that the omda of his biat is "...government man, not ours....He would sell us all if this pleases his masters in the

634 government." But due to the nature of the representation and the spe-
554 cific relation of the government to the area, the position of the omda
657 does not pose serious demands upon the loyalty of the omda to his tribal
● [578] group.

634 Because of the omda's ability to bring benefits to his tribal seg-
554 ment from the government, the ability to manipulate the administrative
657 officials is the most important basis for the nomination of a given
666 individual for the position of the omda. "The omda is one who can speak city talk and knows how to deal with the government officials." Age is not important; young people know more about city ways than old people. "A man may be a cheat, but as long as he can get our things done, he is the best man for the job...of course, we don't want to nominate someone with a bad reputation who may blacken our face in front of everybody. However, if he has a bad reputation the council would not approve his appointment...he just has to be someone who can get things done..."

159 Muftah Mughaieb, the sheikh of the Sanagrah tribal segment in the
634 district of Haman, described the circumstances of his nomination as
554 follows:

657

> 666 Before the former sheikh of that tribal segment died (he
> 578 was Muftah's uncle), one member of the group got into an argu-
> 625 ment with the police officer in charge of the police station in the district. The tribesman insulted the police officer who insisted on arresting him. Rumors also had it that the police officer was using his authority to reduce the share of the tribal segment in the government aid which was badly needed during that particular year. Sheikh Muftah, whose father is the Aqila of

159 bait Mughaieb of the Sanagrah tribe, went to the officer and apol-
634 554 ogized to him on behalf of the whole group and invited him to a
657 lavish dinner party. The charges against the tribesman were soon
666 [578] dropped, and it was concluded that it was because of the way Muftah
[625] had handled the situation. Since that incident, Muftah has been
known as an expert in handling the government officials. One year
later, the sheikh of the tribal segment died, and a meeting was
held during which the important members of the Sanagrah tribal
segment in the district decided to nominate Muftah for the posi-
tion of the sheikh, vacant by the death of his uncle. Muftah, who
was attending the meeting, was asked to accept the nomination, and
he agreed. "...I accepted the nomination reluctantly." Muftah
159 later told me, "I did not really want to become the sheikh. The
634 position does not bring any personal benefit, and it involves a
554 lot of responsibility. The sheikh has to act as an attorney for
657 his tribe, represent it to the government and competes with other
sheikhs to bring his people things that the other sheikhs cannot
get for theirs, like more membership in the cooperative units or
in the socialist union. And what does he get in return? Nothing...
not even the gratitude of his people. To them, he is a servant of
the tribe, and his duty is to look after its interest. If he
doesn't, then everybody is quick to criticize him. I had to ac-
cept the nomination because I felt it was my duty to do so and not
to embarrass the awaqil and the important people of the tribe who
[465] put their confidence in me. As far as the government, all I get is
six pounds a month."

CHAPTER V

MARRIAGE: A CONTRACTUAL RELATIONSHIP

593 A survey of all disputes occurring among the eilat Aggary in the
● 578 last five years shows that more than 70% were disputes over "women,"
the usual phrase referring to cases involving marital relations.
Disagreement over matters arising out of quarrels between husband and wife
or between one of the spouses and his or her in-laws often constitute
593 the basis for these disputes. What seems to make marriage and the
578 family particularly productive of conflict is the fact that although
602 residence is commonly virilocal, and the majority of the women
613 leaving their own families to live with the husband, the woman retains her
[591] membership in her father's family after the marriage, and her agnatic
group keeps an active interest in her, even after she is married.
Marriage then brings face to face the interests of two groups. These
interests affect the relationship between the married couple; and, more
importantly, the relationship between the latter affects the interests
of their respective groups. This, in many instances, leads to direct
conflict between the two groups.

581 The position of the Awlad Ali daraieb with regard to marriage
671 relations is based on the Islamic law with minor modifications to suit the
585 requirements of local life. According to the Muslim law, marriage is
675 a civil contract affected by the request of one party and the agreement
of the other. No witnesses are needed for the legalization of the
marriage, according to some of the Shi'a sects, although the Sunni schools
of Muslim jurisprudence insist that two adult male and two adult females

Muftah said that he had taken his daughter away
593 to punish Hemeida for what he thought was disrespectful behavior. He
574 606 then proceeded to descirbe how Hemeida, after bringing the blanket out
586 for Muftah, went inside and spent the night with his wife, defying the
627 basic rule of not showing intimacy in the presence of older people,
792 888 especially the parents or parents-in-law. For, to show such intimacy
is a sign of disrespect. He demanded that Hemeida pay him "kabara"
for his injured pride. The term kabara refers to the adjective "kebir"
[681] (lit. respected or big man). Kabara is the fine paid for belittling
[558] someone by word or deed. Muftah insisted that he would not allow his
daughter to return to her husband until Hemeida had paid that kabara.
Hemeida conceded the fact that intimacy constitutes an insult; but he
insisted that his action did not constitute an act of intimacy with his
wife, but was a matter of convenience and necessity, since he had only
593 two blankets, and the only one left was that inside the tent. Muftah
574 606 became angry and started shouting at Hemeida, who, in turn, started
586 shouting back; it became impossible to follow what was being said.
627 The religious man interfered in the discussion, trying to stop the argu-
792 ment between Muftah and Hemeida. The others attending the mi'ad also
[578] interfered. The religious man and two neighbors took Muftah outside
the tent while Muftah's brother tried to calm Hemeida down. The other
members of the group also calmed Hemeida, reminding him that he was the
younger person and must be more tolerant of older people. They also reminded Hemeida that Muftah was his father-in-law and had the right to take
his daughter away any time he chose. They urged him to "defeat the devil"
[681] and to apologize to his father-in-law and pay him kabara. He seemed
convinced but insisted that all he was going to pay was five pounds and
a goat. Muftahb brother and one of the neighbors then left the tent and

593 606 The case persisted for more than two months with no sign that either
557 party was willing to give into the demands of the other. I left the
586 area before any solution to the case was achieved.
[143]

Another relevant case is one which involved a dispute between
584 578 Hassan Hassanein from the Sanagrah tribe and the father-in-law of his
606 daughter who was also from the same tribe and who lived in the same
area. The case started when Hassanein was visited by a friend from the
[574] Esheibat tribe in Matruh, an old man of 60 or 70 years. During the night
that this guest spent at Hassanein's house, they got to talking about
marriage and the fact that although his guest was a wealthy and re-
[595] spected man, he had only one wife. After a lengthy talk, it seemed
that the old man was convinced that he should have a second wife and
asked Hassanein if he knew of a suitable girl to marry. Hassanein sug-
584 gested his daughter's sister-in-law. Hassanein took the prospective
583 groom to the tent of his daughter's father-in-law and discussed the
578 606 matter with the father of the prospective bride who agreed to marry his
daughter to Hassanein's guest if he paid the sume of 200 pounds, in ad-
dition to slaughtering a number of goats and presenting him with the
[779] appropriate presents. When the man agreed to the terms, the fatha was
read to signify the agreement between the two parties. Hassanein left
the man to spend the night in the camp of his future in-laws. In the
morning the groom told the bride's father that he must go to nearby
Alexandria to bring the money for the bride price. When he came back
late that afternoon, he paid the money and set a date for the wedding
the next Thursday and then left for Matruh to prepare for the arrival
of the new wife.

584 578 Two days after the groom left, the bride's father (who is at the
606 same time Hassanein's daughter's father-in-law) came to Hassanein and
686 told him that the marriage was called off and that he should send a
letter to the groom telling him the news. The reasons given by the
[574] bride's father were that the groom showed improper manners when he
[579] stayed overnight at the camp and that he followed the prospective bride
to the water well to have a close look at her. He gave the money to
Hassanein and asked him to return it to the man in Matruh. Hassanein
was very disappointed and considered this an insult to him, since he
was the mediator in that marriage, and insisted that the bride's father
584 go on with the marriage. When the latter refused, Hassanein went to his
578 daughter and ordered her to leave with him. Her husband was there and
606 could not refuse to let her go with her father, even when Hassanein
686 627 made it clear that her husband could not have her back unless his father
586 kept his agreement with Hassanein's guest. Elewah, the daughter's husband, asked for a mi'ad to discuss the matter with his father-in-law. The mi'ad was held in Hassanein's house and was attended by Hassanein, his son-in-law, and two people from a different lineage, each selected by one of the disputing parties. Hassanein refused to give any reason for taking his daughter away from her husband except that he was exercising his rights. Eleway, on the other hand, insisted that Hassanein was not justified in his actions and that it was not right to punish him for something that his father did. The two representatives tried to calm both parties and to reach an agreement but were not successful. The mi'ad dissolved with Hassanein not only insisting on keeping his daughter, but also threatening to marry her to a rich man in the area. The case was not solved by the time I left the field.

2

684 613 562 593 The contractual nature of marriage is most clearly manifested in the case of the wife's adultery. Since the woman belongs to her agnatic group, her behavior has direct effect on the honor of that group. It is, therefore, the responsibility of her closest kin to keep an eye on her. If the woman commits adultery, it is her father or her male kin who is supposed to avenge the honor of the family by taking drastic actions, including killing, against the adulteress and/or her partner. But the marriage usually takes the woman away from the close watch of her family and puts her under the supervision of her husband who becomes entrusted with the duty of guarding her, and therefore partially responsible for her action. His responsibility is enhanced by the fact that although the wife's behavior does not affect him or his family, it has a definite effect on the honor and reputation of his children (Abou-Zeid, 1965).

684 578 562 593 [522] The gravest insult that one can direct to a person in the area is to describe his mother of being of disrepute. In their joking relations, young men usually refer to eachother's father as being a dog or a theif or a cheat, but none could refer to the mother. A woman of questionable reputation affects the reputation of her family in general and her children in particular. Any reference to the mother in the form of an accusation is supposed to be cleaned only by blood. Not only does this apply to the woman's voluntary behavior, but also to her physical and mental
[934] 684 613 562 593 condition. If a woman loses her mind, the news is usually kept a secret, especially by her children. The responsibility for retaliation in the case of adultery, then, is divided between her nearest kinsman and her husband. This gives both sides a vague and undetermined right of revenge. This division of the right of revenge explains the infrequency

159 562 lived. Five years ago the husband died in a mining accident leaving
428 Fatma with a ten-month-old boy. By that time, her father had been disabled,
593 and her brothers wanted to manage her husband's store on her behalf.
444 Knowing that her brothers were greedy, she refused and insisted
that she take care of the store herself. The brothers objected on the
grounds that it was not customary for a decent woman to be exposed to
the customers in the store. When she insisted, the brothers threatened
her. When the threats did not work, they beat her. After that, she
[625] went to the police station in the area, filed a complaint against her
brothers, and asked for police protection. The police officer in charge
brought the brothers in and warned them that if they interfered with the
store, not only would he arrest them, but he would also use his influence
to get them forced from the irrigation projects where three of them
worked. The threat worked, and they became friendly with their sister,
buying things for the store whenever they went to Alexandria and sometimes
helping in the store with her consent when she was on housecalls
159 as a midwife. A year later Fatma was married for the second time to a
562 distant cousin; a few months later her father died. In a family meeting
428 593 that followed the funeral, Fatma made her announcement that she was claiming
233 her share of her father's herd. The brothers were angry and tried to
[587] beat her. But the older members of the bait who were present at the meeting
stopped them and told them that Fatma had all the right to claim her
share of the inheritance according to Awlad Ali ways and that there was
nothing that they could do about it. She was characterized in that
[578] meeting as "bint haram" (illegitimate child), an insult used to refer
to those who show selfishness in their kinship obligations. When she
left the camp with her share of the herd, this seemed to have severed

682 672 627 695 "...It means that I will never lend my cooking pot to my neighbor lest his child trip over it and I would be asked to pay his bloodmoney."

So, the bloodmoney was divided into two sections, one to be paid by Hemeida, and the other to be the responsibility of the rope, which meant that the victim's relatives only took home half of the bloodmoney.

683 CASE #2: The Case of the Curious Neighbor

682 578 672 This is the case of 66-year-old Selouma whose barley land bordered that of Muftah, a distant member of the same tribe. A small area of rocky land separated the two areas. Throughout the time that Muftah was preparing his land for barley cultivation, Selouma used to sit on the dividing rocks, observing his neighbor work on his land and making jokes about the amount of time and effort Muftah was putting into his land, especially when it looked like a dry year, anyway, and no barley would be cultivated. For more than a week Muftah tolerated his neighbor's remarks. "I always said to myself, 'Don't follow the devil... He is an old man and doesn't know what he is saying.' But that day I could not take it any longer. My wife and children were sick, and I didn't have any money to bring them medicine or even food. I wanted to finish preparing the land because it looked like it was going to rain that day. I went to the area I was working on when Selouma started his jokes. I was mad. I took a small stone and threw it at him to scare him and make him stop. The stone hit his leg. It was a small stone, and I didn't think it would harm him. Actually, he stood on his

683
682 feet after that and left." It seems that later the wound got infected.
672 Six months after the incident, Selouma was taken to the
• [578] hospital with an infected wound, and three days later he died from
that infection. Selouma's son, Ali, demanded that Muftah pay a
full bloodmoney (L.E. 400) for the death of his father, since the
death was directly caused by the wound inflicted by Muftah. Muftah
denied the charges and claimed that the infected wound which caused
683 the death of Selouma was not the one inflicted by the stone. Mediations
682 continued for some time, and when no agreement was achieved,
672 the aqilas of the two baits to which the parties belonged declared
695 that the decision should be made by the oath which Muftah had to
613 take if he insisted on his claims that the wound was not caused by
his action. Since the case involved the life of a man, Muftah had
to be supported in his oath by fifty-five adult male members of
[691] his 'amar, or 'eila. In accordance with the Daraieb, the selection
[778] was done by members of Selouma's Bait who also selected the tomb of
the saint where the oath would be undertaken. On the date the oath
was to be taken, the disputing parties, as well as all the notables
of friendly tribal segments who were invited to witness the oath,
went to the tomb of the saint. As they started with the procedures,
[784] two of Muftah's cousins who were to support him in the oath and his
uncle refused to swear on the grounds that they were not sure that
Muftah was telling the truth and therefore could not subject themselves
to the supernatural hazards of taking a false oath. Attempts
by other members who were to support Muftah were made to force the
three men to swear, since their refusal meant that the bloodmoney

311 423 was a large area of grazing land which also belonged to the Bait
613 of Yadem. The area attracted a large number of tribesmen who
233 brought their herds for grazing. One of these was Kuraiem from
311 Awlad Kharouf tribal segment. He brought his wife and child and
619 613 a herd of more than two hundred sheep and goats. Although it is
not proper for one to cultivate the land belonging to another
tribal segment, yet, when it comes to grazing land, no such restriction
is imposed. Only the permission of the aqila of that
tribal segment is required, and even that is granted so automatically
that many tribesmen do not bother to ask for such permission.
Kuraiem took this permission for granted and pitched his
233 tent in the grazing land of Yadem and his Bait. Yadem, however,
311 was disturbed because he thought that Kuraiem grazed his flocks in
● 578 an area very close to his cultivated barley, so close that he feared
that the animals might eat the growing barley. When Yadem asked
Kuraiem to move a little further and Kuraiem refused, they entered
into an argument during which Yadem told him that if he did not
move by the following day, he would break his neck. The following
morning Yadem went with his brother to see if Kuraiem was still
there. Both Yadem and his brother were armed with heavy sticks.
As they reached Kuraiem's tent, they hit him with the sticks on
[682] the head. Kuraiem fell on the ground, and they kept hitting him
until he was dead.

682 In due course, Kuraiem's family claimed L.E. 400 bloodmoney
672 for the intentional killing of Kuraiem. Yadem and his family rejected
[627] the claim and insisted that the killing was unintentional. The
Mi'ad was held, and the two Mardis selected by the two parties

105 On the other hand, there is always a feeling of rivalry and hostility
598 between the different tribal segments which goes back to the era of
571 tribal warfare. Thus, the social relations among the tribal population
are characterized by a certain amount of ambivalence which is hidden behind a facade of formality in the way tribal members treat one another
105 in day-to-day activities. There are certain rules of etiquette describing
571 the way members of the same tribal segment should behave toward one
576 another and toward other tribesmen and outsiders. Failure to abide by
[689] these rules may subject the violator to a symbolic fine of a goat or a
[574] sheep slaughtered for a feast to which everyone is invited. These feasts,
[182] or dinners as they are called, have various functions, the most important
105 of which is the integrative one. In an area where the population is usually
571 dispersed, these dinners offer an opportunity to the tribesmen who
574 happen to be in the area at the time of the feast to attend, where they
182 eat, meet other tribesmen, and exchange information about what is happening in other parts of the area. It is from such dinners that the tribesmen get to know about the available pastures, about the prices of sheep and goats in different markets, and about who is doing what and where. The occasion also signifies the restoration of the violator of the rules to the social life of the group and the reinforcement of those rules.
105 This is also true with the tribal meetings, or mi'ad, which are held to
629 announce settlements in more serious cases. It is on this basis that
182 [illegible] the mi'ad should not be considered as a tribal court. It is more of a
[574] social occasion where food and drinks are served and where parties involved and all those invited by them talk about everything except the
[illegible] dispute itself. In certain instances, the financial settlement agreed upon in the informal mediation is exaggerated when announced in the mi'ad

105 so that part of it may be reduced in honor of some prominent members
629 who are attending the meeting. When part of the financial agreement is
182 reduced in honor of a person, this creates an obligation on the part of
681 that person to reciprocate in a similar situation when one arises. This
554 creates an active interest in the settlement on the part of individuals who otherwise are not involved, and insures the durability of the settlement. The social cohesion is maintained.

105 The need to keep friendly relations with all tribesmen is reflected
571 in the judicial process in its procedural aspect, as well as in judicial
578 reasoning, that is, the logic according to which facts in certain cases
627 are assessed. With regard to procedures, there is an emphasis on avoid-
182 ing face-to-face confrontations between the disputing parties until an agreement has been reached by means of the mediators. Only then is it that the parties see and talk to one another. This is especially true in serious cases such as homicide or serious assault where face-to-face confrontation is likely to lead to more hostilities.

105 The emphasis on reconciliation may explain, at least in part, the in-
571 formality of the judicial process. Leaving the process of dispute settle-
627 ment informal gives it a measure of flexibility which permits the treatment
182 of each case as unique without being tied down by rigid formal rules. This does not mean, however, that there are no rules to be followed, or that there is no place for legal precedents. It simply means that the rules are very general and that the legal precedents are used merely as a guide in solving similar cases. The main guide remains, however, the desire to achieve a successful settlement that satisfies all parties. It is only through achieving such successful settlements that the social order is maintained and the tribal cohesion is secured.

*175 provocation, did the same in Cyrenaica, the Order had no
[159] choice but to resist.

[793] But though it was attacks from the outside which destroyed
*[648] the theocratic empire of the Sanusiya, it may be considered doubtful whether in any case such extensive territories could have been maintained under single direction. The economic and political organization of the Order was crude, even when elaborated in the days of Sayyid al-Mahdi in response to increased trading activities and to the need of maintaining peace in the petty and barbarous states that had come under its influence. Its administrative machinery was at no time adequate for effective control over such wide domains, with their poor communications and their manifold tribal, racial,
• [578] and cultural divergencies. To these weaknesses must be added, after Sayyid al-Mahdi's death, personal rivalries within the Sanusi family on the lines of which cracks began to appear in the loose empire, and it is probable that even if it had not been attacked by the Powers of Europe it would have broken up into a number of principalities, or spheres of religious influence, ruled by various members of the family. It might indeed be
*[648] possible to sustain the thesis that it was the Italian occupation
[182] of Libya which prevented the complete break-up of the Order by rallying the outraged sentiment of the Bedouin to its side as the symbol of their common resistance to conquest and alien rule.

The administrative organization of the Order in the time of Sayyid al-Mahdi was simple indeed. Each lodge of the Order
[794] lived on its own revenues, derived from endowments, tithes, contributions of money, goods, transport, and labour, and sent its surplus to Jaghbub and Kufra for the maintenance of the University and of the Sanusi family and for the general purposes
[628] of the Order. The Shaikh of each lodge arbitrated in disputes in the district in which it was situated and could generally wield spiritual sanctions sufficiently weighty to compel acceptance of his awards. The Shaikh of a lodge was appointed by the head of the Order and was responsible to him. There was, however, so little centralized planning that new lodges seem occasionally to have been founded by the initiative of influential families without the head of the Order hearing of the new foundation till its completion. In the more distant parts

619 182 *795 793 *[648] nation, was common hostility to outside interference, an ingredient supplied in measured quantities by the Turks and copiously by the Italians.

III

[578] [361] The rudiments of Islam which the Grand Sanusi found in Cyrenaica made his teachings acceptable, delivered as they were without embellishments, to the Bedouin of the country, and the Marabout tradition which he also found there made him personally acceptable to them. His chief difficulty must have been the rivalries between tribe and tribe and between tribal section and tribal section down to the smallest sections. This difficulty was overcome by transferring the centre of the Order to desert oases, where it could not become identified with any particular tribe, and by distributing its lodges impartially throughout the tribal territories.

*795 793 *175 Of the forty-five zawiyas belonging to the tribes of Cyrenaica proper (including al-Naufiliya and excluding the Kufra lodges) probably twenty-one were founded before 1860 or during the lifetime of the Grand Sanusi, twenty-two during the lifetime of Sayyid al-Mahdi, and two when Sayyid Ahmad al-Sharif was Head of the Order.

*795 361 [175] A high proportion of the lodges of the Order in the time of the Grand Sanusi were along the line of oases on the 29th parallel, for to the lodges of the Cyrenaican oases on that line must be added those in the oases of the Sirtica, Zalla, Saukna, Hun, and Waddan, all founded round about 1855, and probably that in al-Fuqha also. Lodges were early planted in the oases partly on account of their importance as caravanserai and trading centres, partly because the oases-folk were more tractable than the Bedouin, and partly because the stability of these centres gave greater opportunity for corporate religious life. The Sanusiya certainly made a deeper religious impression on the peoples of the oases than on the Bedouin.

*795 632 361 [175] It will have been noticed also how few of the Sanusiya lodges were founded in the towns of North Africa. There are no lodges in the towns of Egypt and though the Order counts many followers in the towns of Cyrenaica and is politically dominant in them it has only one zawiya in each, Banghazi, Darna, and al-Marj; and that at Banghazi, the capital of the country, was

*795 619 have reflected tribal segmentation, mirroring lines of cleavage between tribes and between tribal sections. The Sanusiya organization was fractionized along these fissures. The distribution of lodges among the 8 *Sa'adi* tribes was Hasa, 1; 'Ailat Fayid, 1; Bara'asa, 1 (a second lodge, al-Nayyan, was little more than a grain store attached to al-Zawiya al-Baida); 'Abid, 1; 'Arafa, 1; Magharba, 2; 'Awaqir, 6; Darsa, 9; and 'Abaidat, 14. There were 17 lodges among the Aulad 'Ali tribe in Egypt and for the Aulad Suliman with their attached tribes in the Sirtica only one, Sirt, if we exclude the lodges in the Sirtican oases. This uneven distribution may be related in part to the location of trade routes, harbours, springs, concentration of summer wells, and so forth, but it was undoubtedly due chiefly to variations in tribal cohesion. The more cohesive tribes had a single lodge, or, in the case of the Magharba, 2 lodges. The very cantonized Darsa tribe, whose lack of solidarity was largely due to their very broken country and the oecological self-sufficiency of their sections, each of which was more or less stable in its own territory, had no less than 9 lodges. The ethnically heterogeneous, widely dispersed, and structurally confused 'Awaqir tribe had 6 lodges, and the 'Abaidat tribe, which showed even less unity of sentiment and action, had 9 lodges. The most broken up tribe of all, the tribe in which the sections were most intermixed, and the tribe which displayed the minimum of political cohesion, was the Aulad 'Ali of Egypt, which had 17 lodges.

[578] Among the Hasa, who possessed only the Shahhat lodge, in the territory of the Shabarqa section, though on the edge of the territory of the Qalabta section, rivalry between these two sections led to the foundation of a lodge at Marsa Susa, where the Order still claims the endowments, but a sense of tribal unity in the end prevailed and the project was abandoned. Likewise in the leading Tamia section of the Bara'asa tribe the rivalry between its two principal sub-sections, the Hadduth, in whose territory was the al-Baida lodge, and the Jilghaf, led to the Jilghaf marking out with a low wall the site of a new zawiya in the *silk* al-Hamama in the southern steppe country; but, here again, the lodge was never built. The location of al-Qatafiya and al-Naufiliya corresponded to a traditional jealousy between the Shamakh and the Ra'idat sections of the Magharba

Order concurred. Thus we find charge of a zawiya continuing 795*
in the hands of a single family to the point at which Muhammad 793
Yahiya bin al-Sanusi bin 'Umar al-Ashhab was appointed by 423
Sayyid Ahmad al-Sharif to succeed his father as Shaikh of Msus 428
at the age of sixteen. Some of these families sent their roots so 602
deep that not only did they obtain what amounted to hereditary rights to a particular lodge, but controlled several lodges. Such were the influential families of Ghumari, Kalili, Farkash, and Ashhab, and the Khattabi families.

Hence we find to-day that many of the lodges are in hereditary charge of a family of Shaikhs who consider that they have a pre-emptive claim to its directorship and to enjoyment of its revenues, a claim backed by tribal opinion and by the acquiescence of the present Head of the Order. Thus the Dardafi family may be said to own the Shahhat lodge, the Isma'ili family to own the Fayidiya lodge, the 'Ammur family to own
the Qafanta lodge, and so on. So much is this the case that [578]
disputes now sometimes arise, as in 1942 at Qafanta and Mirad Mas'ud, between members of a family about which of its members should succeed to the directorship of a lodge and control of its revenues.

This development is not surprising. Poor communications 795*
and the troubled times since 1911 have encouraged local autonomy 793
in the Sanusiya organization. The Shaikh of a lodge 428
brought up his family in it and his sons had no other home than
the lodge and no other friends than the Bedouin around it and
the families of Shaikhs in nearby lodges. Tribesmen dislike [178]
change and prefer to have for the Shaikhs of their lodges
members of families they know and who share their local
interests. But the tendency towards hereditary succession is 795*
also related to the fundamental lineage structure of the tribes 793
among whom the lodges are distributed, for it is noticeable that
whereas hereditary succession became customary in the Bedouin, 613
or tribal, lodges, it has been by comparison lacking in the urban 428
lodges of Banghazi and Darna and in those oases where tribal [369]
structure has become obscured by village life. This would seem to suggest that *Ikhwan* families tend the more easily to become stabilized as lines of hereditary Shaikhs the more closely they are associated with tribal structure. It is precisely in the most powerful, numerous, and integrated tribal sections that we

reconquer Tripolitania and Cyrenaica, but they lacked the will 175*
to action. Instead, they vacillated between threats of force on 648*
the one side and appeasements and diplomatic surrenders on
the other.

Considerable reinforcements were indeed sent to Tripolitania, [728]
but when there were assembled there 80,000 men ready for the
reconquest of the country, the Government signed with the
Arab leaders the humiliating pourparlers of Kallet al-Zaituna
in the spring of 1919. The agreement was supplemented on 175*
1 June 1919 by a constitution giving to the Arabs a parliament, 648*
Italian citizenship, exemption from taxation, &c. The Arabs 642
were more than ever convinced of Italian impotence. In theory,
an Arab republic, the *Jumhuriya al-Trabulsiya*, founded in the
previous year under Turco-Germanic influence, now ruled the
country through its Committee of Reform at Misurata under
the leadership of Ramadan al-Shtaiwi. In fact, there was little
order of any kind. Quarrels broke out between tribes and [578] ●
between tribal leaders, anyone powerful enough set himself up
as overlord of his district, the Arabs raided the Berbers, outside
the narrow coastal region held by their troops Italian
officials were little more than consular agents, and when Italian
forces took part in Arab disputes they did so rather as mercenaries
or allies than as rulers of a colony responsible for peace
and security in it. Meanwhile the Committee of Reform made 175*
preparations to achieve the complete independence of Tripolitania 648*
from Italian rule by securing agreement in principle to a
Tripolitanian Amirate from an assembly of notables at Ghariyan
in November 1921. The deputation which carried this resolution
to Rome, though it received no official encouragement,
found much support among Communists, Socialists, and troublemakers
of all kinds. Its leader, Muhammad Khalid al-Qarqani,
went on to attend the Muslim Revolutionary Congress in
Moscow. Such a state of affairs could not last, and in the midst
of it Count Giuseppe Volpi was nominated Governor of Tripolitania.
He was an energetic man prepared to act on his own
responsibility, and by March 1922 he had recaptured Misurata
and the whole coastal region between that town and Tunisia
and had commenced operations in the Sirtica.

During this period there was peace in Cyrenaica, the fruit of
the Accord of 'Akrama. At first the Italians did no more than

their rights in it, and this presented no more difficulty to the 175*
lawyers than the discovery of a formula to cover confiscation of 648*
the Sanusiya properties had done. 167

Ancient rights in the lands of Cyrenaica rested with the 175*
Sa'adi tribes and whatever tribal fragments they permitted to 648*
reside there by grace. Disputes about ownership had been 423
settled either by war or through discussion between the groups 619
concerned in them, sometimes with the aid of Turkish officials [795]
or Marabouts, particularly of the Shaikhs of Sanusiya lodges [578]
after the Order had become established in the country. In 1858 the Ottoman Government, under pressure of Western ideas, promulgated a land code in all parts of the empire, and to put it into effect in Cyrenaica the Governor, Khalil Sami Pasha (1863–8), appointed a committee which declared the lands round Banghazi and Darna to be for the use of these towns and the rest of the country for the use of the tribes in occupation of it, except for barren hills and deserts which, like woods and roads, were regarded as the natural demesne of the State. The tribal boundaries of to-day were finally fixed by this committee, though the fixing of them was less an adjudication than a recording of existing conditions.

The new Turkish land code operated in the towns and just outside them and was not applied to tribal lands and grazing grounds, and the tribes were not asked to acquire a title to their lands by registration of them. This would have been an impossible task, and the Turks were in any case too wise to meddle with Bedouin lands, knowing that the Bedouin would not have consented to change or interference of any kind. Nevertheless the State claimed all tribal lands not bearing buildings or plantations as *miri*, public demesne, and from a legal point of view it was in virtue of this absolute and residuary ownership that it taxed the tribal occupiers and users of the land. This was a legal formalism which made no difference to anyone since the Government had neither the wish nor the power to exploit the lands and accepted that the tribes had rights of use, the *tassaruf*, in them in perpetuity. The Italian Land Registry, created in 1913 on the basis of the Turkish registers, followed Turkish practice in this matter, classing tribal lands as State demesne in which the occupiers had rights of use, and also in allowing tribal disputes to be settled by tribal custom, which

619 attached somewhere along the line, to attach it to one of these
608 names. Bedouin welcome, as members of their camps, practically
613 anyone who wishes to join, even, in the case of one group, an
621 Italian. The limit to this acceptance of members is, of course, the
173 number of people who can be supported by the local resources.
If people are being admitted freely to membership of a particular
[182] camp, this means that there is a local surplus of land and water,
so that the number of grafts being supported by any particular
section is a useful index of the extent to which the resources are
being used. Conversely, as sometimes happens when grafted elements become numerous, or when the water supply, for various
reasons, dwindles, it may be necessary to detach a grafted group.
[578] Such action is always the occasion of a violent dispute, usually
over watering rights, and not infrequently fights break out.
Whether or not the grafted group wins, from then onwards it will
be forced to exist as an independent group, and a new tertiary
section will have been born. No matter which of the processes
involving grafts is considered—incorporation or detachment—
both are contained within the framework of the tertiary section,
without any effect on the rest of the structure.

619 The position of the clients, in the context of this discussion, is
not unlike that of the grafts. Briefly, clients are men who are considered to have originated from a country other than Cyrenaica,
[423] and who for this reason cannot claim rights to land and water—
at least this is the theory, although in some circumstances they
are able to do so successfully. They are of various kinds, but they
are not included in the genealogies given by the free-born. Clients are found grouped in two main ways. There are some large
groups which constitute tribes in the sense that they display a
genealogical and territorial organization like those of the free-born, and are usually to be found flanking the main tribes of the
country on their borders. Some of these are powerful groups and
enjoy considerable independence of action, but whatever their
characteristics they none the less speak of themselves as 'for' or
619 tied to the noble tribe whose territory includes theirs. Further,
571 the sections of these client tribes have their special ties with
621 tertiary sections of the noble tribes, which are not merely ties of
613 sentiment, but which take the form of valuable mutual help in a
number of situations. A whole client tribe, in the sense that it is

619 change their structural position only rarely. The latter change
621 sometimes does, however, occur, and there is evidence to show
182 that it does. For example, Agostini (1922–23, p. 323) in his tribal
166 survey, records a section named Barsha as one of the groups stemming
613 from Nasr.[12] In the genealogies I was given, the name did
not appear, and even after some questioning, what information
was known about it was concealed. Some time later the name
[578] cropped up accidentally in conversation, and I was then told that
at one time it had been one of the Nasr groups, but that after a quarrel during a year of water shortage, the Barsha folk went to live with people with whom they had maternal connexions, and in whose territory there was ample water that year, and never returned. The group, a tertiary one, was detached from the tertiary point of segmentation in the genealogies, and tied on to a tertiary group of another tribe in its new homeland.

178 To summarize briefly the argument thus far, the mechanical
173 devices of telescoping, fusion of names, the ejection of those
619 names which cease to be of any social consequence, and the
621 elision of names at or around the fifth ascending generation,
613 taken together point to the importance of the tertiary order of
segmentation in discussing the problem of maintaining the form of the genealogy constant in face of its natural tendency to alter; further, evidence of changes (adoption into a lineage, detachment from it, the inclusion and exclusion of clients) was presented, and this again led to the conclusion that the tertiary point of segmentation is critical in this respect. This being so, the manner
[128] in which change actually occurs, still remains to be shown,
and this is best done, perhaps, by discussing the mode of proliferation of tertiary segments. In order to do this adequately, it is necessary to say something briefly about certain features of Bedouin marriage.

582 Among the Bedouin there exists a preferential form of marriage
605 between a man and his father's brother's daughter. Parallel
cousin marriage of this sort carries with it the exclusive right of a man to this cousin. Without his consent no one else can marry her, and to attempt to do so would be to risk the marriage arrangements being nullified after negotiations had almost been

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[114] [12] Barsha's position is incorrectly given as a sub-group of Haiba; it should be shown as structurally equivalent to Haiba. See also note 11.

wife he usually chooses a young girl of about twenty years. Children 595
of the elder wife might be adult, therefore, when the children 593
of the junior wife are infants. Great emphasis is placed on 561
seniority, particularly among males, but strong emphasis is also
placed on the equality of siblings and their equal legal status.
Between brothers of widely differing ages, there is, then, this
field of potential conflict. From an early date competitive, if not
hostile, relationships develop between the sons of co-wives. Competition 593
between half-brothers results not only from their 586
mothers being co-wives: one group might be the sons of a divorced 587
wife. The latter situation is often much worse, for the sons
born of the divorced wife are now being fostered by a woman
who is not their mother. A similar condition of things is brought
about when a widower with sons remarries. Yet again, when a
wife grows old and her sons have reached maturity, her husband
may not divorce her formally, but merely 'throw her off his
back'; she will then go to live with her grown sons, while her
husband, in turn, takes a new wife, usually taking up residence
in another camp for a time at least. It would be too much of a
digression here to discuss the inheritance disputes, and the disputes
over marriage and bride-wealth, which arise out of these
various circumstances. Suffice it to note that such disputes are [613]
common and affect the alignment of people within a tertiary
segment.

As half-brothers grow to maturity some of them will marry 613
their maternal cross-cousins, and in succeeding generations some 621
of their descendants will do likewise. In this way, a tertiary segment [582]
united by the bond of agnation, will also have within it
smaller groups of kin having different sets of cognatic links. This
group, as a residential unit, shows a very high concentration of
agnates, and the Bedouin say with pride that members of the
camps are always 'one' because of this agnatic bond, and indeed,
the corporate identity of this group is strikingly displayed in
many circumstances. It does not take precedence in all circumstances, 613
for, built into agnation, with the heavy burden of duties 578
which go with it, are serious stresses and strains which in some 602
circumstances regularly come out into the open. In yet other
circumstances cognatic kinship affiliations appear to be dominant,
causing friction among agnates. A man, for example, may permit

613 his maternal kinsmen to use the land and water facilities of
• 578 his lineage; his agnates may give ready consent or bicker about
602 it, but when it becomes necessary to clean a well, disputes are
almost certain to break out in the camp between those who argue
that their maternal relatives should not be expected to assist in
its cleaning and those who insist they should as an acknowledgement
of the use they have made of it. In these circumstances
613 maternal links divide agnates. Conversely, if it becomes necessary
602 for some of the same men to use the water and ploughland
of their maternal kin, their agnates are only too pleased that
they are able to do so, because the pressure on their own resources
is relieved. In these circumstances, the maternal link
strengthens the agnatic group. When, to give another instance,
613 blood-money has to be gathered, it is the duty of all agnates to
682 contribute equally, and no member of the group, rich or poor,
can contract out of this obligation without sacrificing his membership
of the group. Payments of blood-money are witness of
the strength of the notion of 'oneness' among agnates, in one
sense, but in so far as they are compulsory, they point also to the
weakness in the relationship. Maternal kin are not directly concerned
in this, but they can and do make contributions. In this
context two aspects of agnation appear, and the value of the
602 maternal link is emphasized. Again, maternal kinsmen are not
428 directly concerned in inheritance disputes, but they are expected
578 to intercede for their sister's sons, who often use their mother's
brother's tribal brand on their own animals. During disputes of
this kind, blame is thrown on to the maternal kinsmen for their
interference in matters which, properly speaking, are not their
613 business. In marriage, however, events take quite a different
582 turn. The responsibility for providing a man with a wife is first
that of the father, and secondly of the members of the tertiary
section; the father takes the initiative, and his agnates assist, not
only in the negotiations, but also in defraying the heavy costs of
the wedding festivities, the various gifts that precede it, and the
604 bride-wealth which follows. The mother's brother is also a key
613 person in all these arrangements. He enters into the negotiations,
585 assists with the entertainment on the wedding day, and makes a
[583] substantial contribution to the bride-wealth. On the wedding day,
there is no kinsman to compare with the mother's brother; a few

794 were concerned, there was little doubt who was leader—the
554 name of the former was known throughout the land. Now when
the warrior returned from his Egyptian exile, his rival offered
794 him a sheep as a gift. This act was wholly appropriate. Subse-
554 quently they continued to compete fiercely, but it soon became
578 clear that the returned warrior was winning the greater support.
In the face of this, the rival, in 1948, decided to break with tradi-
[788] tion by staying away from the annual pilgrimage to the tomb of
[175] the local saint. Instead, he and his followers made their pilgrim-
age to a different tomb in the vicinity of their camp, and later
built a low wall round the tomb, whitewashed it, and made it
known that henceforward they would regularly use it for pilgrim-
[613] ages. The two kinship groups of a tertiary section now had their
[778] separate saint's tomb. Some months later, the rival decided to
794 move with his small group to an area in which they had not pre-
viously resided. It is the custom among the Bedouin when they
554 pitch their tents in a place for the first time, that the people of
578 the neighbourhood should bring them gifts to mark the event.
431 The returned warrior, who had now become a close neighbour
[166] of his rival was obliged, like others, to offer the latter a gift; he
was also obliged to return the gift of a sheep that he had been
given on rejoining his section in 1947. He brought a gift within a
few hours of his rival's arrival, but it was a goat.[14] The rival and
his followers were furious, and the argument that the warrior was
too poor to give more was dismissed summarily. This was the
final insult. The donor, in return, had been given less than he had
presented. The reciprocity of gift exchanges had not only been
arrested, it had been reversed. From then onwards the two groups
made no attempt to conceal their hostility and went their sepa-
rate ways.

613 Disputes stemming from circumstances such as these are the
578 occasions which mark the proliferation of groups, although in
all three cases cited, difficulties over water supplies had pre-
ceded the outbreaks of quarrelling.

613 In this discussion of the ways in which proliferation of seg-
602 ments takes place, the emphasis had been put on the tug of war
121 between the interests of people in their agnatic connexions and

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[14] A goat is inferior to a sheep in gift exchanges.

A F R I C A

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SOME STRUCTURAL ASPECTS OF THE FEUD AMONG THE CAMEL-HERDING BEDOUIN OF CYRENAICA[1]

E. L. PETERS

WHEN a Bedouin kills another in Cyrenaica, one of a number of consequences 682
ensues. According to the Bedouin, the particular consequence is determined by 571
the genealogical positions of the persons or groups concerned. In the first part of 829
this article an analysis of the disturbances in social relationships precipitated by 128
homicide is made, using a lineage model as a framework. In this part of the discussion the arrangement of the information corresponds closely to the view the
Bedouin give of their relationships. Additional information is then presented to show [613]
that this lineage model neither covers several important areas of social relationships
nor enables an accurate prediction of events to be made. This raises the issue: can the 121
comprehensive power of the model be increased by complicating it, or does complexity destroy its utility? The argument advanced is that the lineage model is not a 613 571
sociological one, but that it is a frame of reference used by a particular people to
give them a common-sense kind of understanding of their social relationships. For
sociological purposes this means that the lineage model, with its supporting theoretical presuppositions, must perforce be abandoned. In the latter part of this article [128]
some of the implications of adopting this position are discussed. Particular stress is [578]

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[1] This study is based on field-work in Cyrenaica carried out over a period of twenty-seven months from January 1948 to December 1950. The field-work was made possible by the award of a Horniman Studentship and of a Treasury Senior Studentship in Oriental Languages and Cultures. I wish to express my thanks to both awarding bodies. The paper was presented in its first form to a seminar at Manchester University. Modified versions were read at Oxford and Cambridge and at University College London in 1963. In a Manchester seminar, Professor W. J. M. Mackenzie raised issues which led me to reconsider my mode of analysis. Professor Ely Devons read a draft of the article, and offered valuable suggestions.
I also wish to thank Professor Gluckman for the 12
many profitable discussions we have had on the
institution of the feud. My interest in the feud stems [114] ←
directly from Evans-Pritchard's work on the institution among the Nuer. I am most grateful to him for his help and encouragement while I was pursuing my researches. Finally, anyone writing on the feud must acknowledge the contribution made to its understanding by Dr. Elizabeth Colson.

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121 given to the feud, for this is one of the few societies in which it occurs.[1] What is
613 meant here by a state of feud is a set of relationships between two tribal groups which
● 578 are characterized by hostility whenever two or more of their members meet. These
591 hostilities are of a sort which cannot be terminated; feud is not a matter of a group
121 indulging in hostilities here at one moment and there the next, but a sequence of
619 hostilities which, as far as the contemporary Bedouin are concerned at least, know
578 no beginning and are insoluble. Feud and the other forms of relationships to be
[591] discussed presently are to be understood, in part, by reference to the ordered divisions
of the tribes. It is necessary at the outset, therefore, to give a brief statement about
the tribal organization; other details will be included as they become relevant.

619 There are nine noble tribes in Cyrenaica whose members are referred to as freemen.
621 These tribes see themselves as divided into three genealogical orders of sections:
primary, secondary, and tertiary. The tertiary tribal sections correspond to the camps
613 which cluster around the larger watering points during the drought season, May to
[132] November. Such camps consist of clusters of smaller camps in which the concentration
of agnatically related males is over 80 per cent. Within the latter kinship links
are known, so that these agnates are consanguinely related as well as politically
[162] united. The populations of most tertiary groups vary from about 200 to 700 or so,
but a group ceases to be viable if the number of male adults drops much below fifty.
Political division is absent from these tertiary groups, regardless of their precise
size, for, whatever may be the condition of developing local lineages, the acceptance
of a common name carries with it full political responsibility incumbent equally on
[423] all their members. Each of these tertiary sections, moreover, has its own watering
point, ploughland, and pastures; each has its own *watan* or homeland. This statement
is true of all tribal sections of whatever order of segmentation. In other words, the
tribes and their sections correspond to an ordered division of the territory.

619 Names of tribal sections are the same as those given in the genealogies. Both tribe
613 and lineage are identically ordered. Lineages develop, and split at the tertiary order
of segmentation,[2] and, *a fortiori*, the process is the same for the tertiary tribal sections.
Split, in other words, occurs where relationships are most intense.

621 The summer community which constitutes a tertiary section, breaks up once the
221 rains begin in November or December. At this time of the year water is readily
available in the numerous small cisterns, there is pasture in plenty, and the animals
are giving milk. These combined reasons lead the larger summer camp to divide
into smaller camps of some five to ten tents. The latter are separated one from the
other by short distances—a mile or so—but together form a cluster in that they are
621 territorially distinguishable from a neighbouring and similar group of camps. Tertiary
311 sections are discrete also in the sense that all the major necessities of daily living
are available within their several territories. Each controls its own natural resources,
and these resources are the same for all the camel-herding groups—in any given year
one may have more of a particular commodity than another, but the difference is in

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[171] [1] Evans-Pritchard, 1940. The feud might have been present among the Nuer. Exogamy and the other rules of marriage which obtain among them create a dispersion of ties, which superficially appears to militate against a condition of feud. But a dispersal of ties does not mean that they necessarily act as a pressure for peace. Moreover, the exogamous links may link limited numbers of groups only, leaving others with sufficient discreteness to pursue feuding relationships as they are described in this paper.

[2] See Peters, 1959.

682 To complete this general statement, two further circumstances are cited by the
602 Bedouin. If a man kills a related person who is not an agnate (it is expressed as killing
the mother's brother) the breach in relationships must be healed as quickly as possible.
The convention for dealing with this is that the offender, bound hand and foot,
mounted on a horse, is sent to the camp of ' the owner of the blood ', in the company
of a holy man, there to make an offer of his life, saying: ' Here is my knife, my life
is yours; here is my shroud, my life is yours.' No Bedouin would agree for a moment
to undertake this journey if he thought the offer might be accepted. In Bedouin
sentiments a life offered in this way cannot be taken. It is the convention which pre-
cedes a peace meeting and blood money. Any other way of dealing with the confusion,
which spreads as a result of a homicide between cognates, is excluded.

682 Secondly, if a woman is killed, whatever the intersegmentary distance, the homi-
562 cide is said to be accidental, because a man never ' intends ' to kill a woman. Blood-
money arrangements are made as soon as possible, and the wealth—half that of a
613 man—passes to the deceased's father, not to her husband, for a woman's ' bone '
always belongs to her father. Obviously women cannot be allowed to enter into
[582 feud; since it is demographically compelling (apart from other reasons) for some of
[591 them to marry outside their natal groups, then they might well find themselves resi-
dents in the enemy's camps, if they were to become involved in feuds.

121 This statement of the different means available for the regulation of homicide at
682 the several orders of tribal segmentation is the view the Bedouin themselves hold of
their relationships. An analysis of the facts presented thus far could bring out a
613 number of interesting points with regard to the relativity of morals, the typification
829 of acts by their social context, the significance of the orders of segmentation, and so
619 on. Rather than proceed along these lines, however, it is more urgently necessary
to reflect on the significance of the fact that the arrangement of the material in terms
of what is usually called the lineage structure coincides with the Bedouin ordering
of the same details. It is, of course, important to note that the account is not based
on mere hearsay evidence. Each statement made can be documented from known
homicides, and to this extent the model that has been used is consistent with reality.
The model, nevertheless, can only be a representation of what a particular people,
the Bedouin, conceive their social reality to be; it is a kind of ideology which enables
them, without making absurd demands on their credulity, to understand their field
of social relationships, and to give particular relationships their *raison d'être*. But, as
will be shown, it would be a serious error to mistake such a folk model for sociological
analysis. Such an error is difficult to avoid because the Bedouin, when defending their
view, are able to cite enough bits and pieces of reality to make their argument con-
121 vincing. The flaw in the reasoning is seen when it can be shown that its consequences
114 are absurd. As an example of what is meant, the statement that feud is attached to
groups at the secondary order of segmentation may be considered. If the statement
613 were true, if each and every secondary section were at feud one with the other (and
619 in a structural sense this ought to be so), then each tribe would be divided into small
829 mutually hostile groups, which completely lacked any possibility of movement, even
● 578 for pasturing purposes. Presented with this, the Bedouin would argue that this is not
in fact so, because secondary and primary sections are interlinked in many ways. That
is, they evoke what to them are contingencies to explain why they are at feud with one

121 part of a secondary section but not with another. Once contingencies are permitted
613 to enter in, the lineage model ceases to be of use, for what is implied is that at all
114 times some parts of sections structurally situated for feuding do not in fact feud.
[619] Other facts can be adduced to show that the structural view is inadequate but, before
[829] proceeding to examine these, some general objections to the lineage theory need to
● [578] be raised. In the first instance, the corner stone in the theory of lineage systems is that
they consist of parts which are in balanced opposition. It is no accident that the idiom generally used in discussing the segmentation of a lineage system is that segments bifurcate. Indeed bifurcation is necessary if lineage theory is to make sense, because if at any order there are more than two segments, then combinations can occur which are not comprehended by the theory. In the Cyrenaican lineage the number of segments at the tertiary order is haphazard, in some cases as few as two but in others as many as a dozen or so. Where there are many segments at this order it is rather pointless to speak in terms of balanced opposition. Moreover, at the secondary order of segmentation the number of segments are fairly consistent throughout the tribes, but they number more than two in all of them. It is also a fact that combinations occur and, moreover, these may be between the tertiary segments of two 'opposed' secondary segments.

121 Secondly, in lineage theory groups come together to constitute larger segments in
613 opposition to like segments. Yet in lineage societies there is a lack of instituted
571 authority, there are no chiefs distributed throughout the land as heads of segments
622 of the hierarchical orders. This being so, then it is not possible for all the sections of,
say, a secondary section to come together; there is no one to command the action.
114 In fact, sections combine in Cyrenaica, but not in the way they should according to the
lineage structure. In order to discuss this adequately, a lengthy diversion into an analysis of the distribution of power would be necessary. The matter must rest here with the admittedly somewhat dogmatic assertion that there are men who wield power over groups of varying populations, and that the extent of their domains cannot be understood by reference to orders in the lineage. Perhaps it is for this reason—because, that is to say, lineage theory effectively blocks the exercise—that relatively little has been written about the problem of leadership in these societies.

121 Thirdly, all segments should be fairly equal in numbers of people and economic
613 resources, if the theory of lineage were to have substance in reality. In Cyrenaica
114 the population of one tertiary segment may be three times or more that of another.
[621] Both may be structurally equal in the sense that they are named groups segmenting
as a pair of brothers from a common father. As political groups, however, this equality has little meaning. Further, with regard to economic resources, some sections possess several wells and a territory of such extent that it straddles two or even more of what might be called micro-ecological areas. With marked preponderance in numbers and superiority of resources, some groups have grown into dominance, and the evidence points to the existence of this dominance in the past also. However, 'like' sections may appear on a lineage chart, in political action there is conspicuous
[619] disparity. Each tribe possesses one tertiary section or more with a claim to be the
owners of the 'Golden Stirrup'; these are large tertiary groups with relatively plenti-
[621] ful resources, with allies in other groups, and, in sum, with the power to terrorize
other tribal groups.

5: Peters E-5 (1948-1950) 1967 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9
Cyrenaica

613 Among the Bedouin, men are permitted to marry their father's brother's daughter
582 and any other cousin of similar type within the local agnatic group. This means that
121 most agnates will be related in other ways as well. Parallel-cousin marriage has the
effect of diversifying the agnatic group, and creates small nuclei within it, each having
its own characteristics and patterns of behaviour with others. Diversification of this
kind leads to a differentiation between homicides within the tertiary group.

The Bedouin say that they always marry their parallel cousins, and do not give their
daughters to others if they can help it. Census data does not support this view. Nearly
as many men find wives outside their agnatic group as within it. Of importance
in the present context is the direction taken by these external marriages. Perhaps
121 the most striking feature is that the number of marriages with men of a collateral
582 tertiary group is low, so low that they can be explained by special circumstances.
628 Now collateral tertiary groups whose territories are adjacent experience intense day-
613 to-day relationships. In the context of descent these are the most closely linked
[621] lineages—among older men there may be the recollection of the time when the two
constituted a single community, and when they all lived together in the same summer
camp. Common sentiment between them is very strong. The strips of territory they
inhabit may be almost identical. Their discreteness lies almost entirely in the pos-
session of separate natural resources, although in some cases pastures are shared.
But their social boundaries are nevertheless sharply drawn, for the high incidence of
parallel-cousin marriage within them, and the tendency for external links to leap-frog
collateral segments, gives them a definition which could not be bettered by exogamy.
121 The basis of their discreteness lies, of course, in the competition that exists between
628 them for natural resources; however much the Bedouin protest that their real enemies
613 are the secondary or primary groups lying some thirty to fifty miles away, when they
● 578 wish to enlarge their resources there is little point in attempting to capture a well a
long distance away, which cannot be defended, and might be located alongside an
enemy group. They do, it is true, engage in competitive hostilities over land and
water situated some distance from their homeland, but when they engage in these
activities they do so on behalf of a linked group, albeit with their own interests
uppermost. The capture of natural resources for use by a tertiary group can only be
achieved by an enlargement of its homeland, and this is only possible by expanding
into a neighbour's territory.

121 Another feature of external marriages is that they are not spread among as many
613 groups as in societies where there are exogamous clans, and where other rules of
marriage appear to compel the maximum amount of dispersal. Instead, the external
582 links created through marriage are highly selective, and are thrown out into ecologi-
cally differentiated areas, giving added economic security, or, in the case of date oases,
an additional item to the diet at a time of the year when it is sorely needed. Once
established these external links are perpetuated through cross-cousin marriages in
successive generations. If the link is considered valuable, and relationships develop
satisfactorily, other marriage connexions will be woven around the first. Multiplicity
gives added strength and durability, not in the mechanical sense of duplication, but of
creating a more diverse kin structure, with its greater range of rights and claims, in
which links can flourish. While the number of groups linked in marriage are few,
the geographical spread is great. Marriage links exist with tertiary sections of colla-

121 teral secondary sections, with collateral primary sections, and long distances away
613 into other tribes. This spread can be interpreted as giving each tertiary group access
582 to resources of wide ecological diversity. What is of interest in the present context
is not the interpretation of the links but the effect they have on behaviour. Spread
means that a group can call for help from a number of differently situated groups.
121 Each one of these links not merely modifies the structural means for settling homi-
613 cide, but converts the homicide into a sociologically quite different sort of act. It can,
582 as the Bedouin like to think, be an act of merit for a man to kill another from a feud-
578 ing secondary section, but there is no merit whatsoever in it if the tertiary section of
that secondary section happens to contain affines or maternal relatives; this is a sinful
682 act. The Bedouin themselves recognize this when they add to their structural
explanation the rider that they do not feud with cognatic relatives. The difference
between their position and a sociological one is that they see this as a contingency not
as a persistent necessity; they are able to maintain their position because they see their
behaviour as explicable in terms of the simple ossified structure of their genealogical
relationships. What they fail to appreciate is that these ' contingencies ' are ecologically, economically, demographically, and politically essential. They are able to maintain their position also, because the model of a lineage structure they use, along with the two riders previously mentioned (see p. 270) affords them a kind of explanation for most occurrences. The argument is attractive both to Bedouin and to anthropologists because it is comprehensive and neat in its logicality. The next stage in the argument is to show that there is a far greater range of possible consequences to a homicide than those summarized in the diagram (see p. 269) and that the additional consequences are related, not to the lineage structure, but to the linkages which have been discussed above.

121 I begin with a review of a homicide which involves two men of the same tertiary
613 section. Bedouin classify all homicides within this range—as they do for any of the
682 structural orders—as undifferentiated, but in each case, different sorts of relatives
829 are concerned in the ensuing hostilities, and the consequences are, therefore, different
also. Bedouin say that a man never kills his father or full brother. In the event of a
man killing another man acknowledged to be his father, the act itself proves that he
cannot possibly be his son. He is said to be illegitimate, thus making his mother an
adultress and relieving the males of the agnatic line of the responsibility and the
121 odium. If a maternal uncle of the agnatic group is killed, the offence is almost on a
613 par with that of patricide or fratricide. When, however, the homicide is between two
men who are agnatically distant, and not closely related cognatically either, but both
682 are members of the same local agnatic group, what follows will depend largely on the
size and stage of development of the group; if it is small, the homicide threatens to wreck it, but if it is large and on the verge of splitting the homicide may be the occasion for split taking place and being recognized publicly by a demand for blood money. Threatened with wreckage, a small group meets a homicide by closing its ranks for self preservation; a large group splits. The same event within the same kind of structural unit results in two quite dissimilar consequences. The reason is clear enough—the two groups are similar only in a general structural way, but sociologically they are not comparable.

When a homicide occurs between tertiary segments the solution, it was said earlier,

The consequences of homicides in which secondary groups are concerned present 121 an even greater variety, for now the span has expanded to include many more groups, 613 with a total population of several thousand people. Groups of this order are spread 682 over a much wider territorial range; some structurally distant groups are neighbours by virtue of their propinquity, while some structurally proximate groups are far removed territorially. Some feuds lie dormant for long periods. Others erupt [578] frequently. Some homicides between these groups are followed by the 'laying down of the denial '—the feud situation with most acrimony built into it, for one denial, followed by a vengeance killing, is met by a second denial and so on, excluding thereby any chance of a settlement. In other circumstances the offender's group boast that they are responsible for a homicide, thus challenging the victim's group to a show of force. Only the more powerful tertiary groups would venture to do this, and it is only they who could meet a homicide against them with a spectacular show of force, compelling a weaker tertiary group (according to hearsay evidence) to break up and leave its homeland. The modes of killing in homicide differ in character. Some killings have been heinous and offensive in terms of general morality; their purpose is to sting the victim's kin to retaliate or to cause them to suffer general discredit and loss of status. While some parts of secondary segments are at feud, others are not. A homicide between affinally or matrilaterally linked groups, whether they are secondary or primary groups, is settled as quickly and as amicably as possible to prevent turmoil in their relationships. Feud concerns two tertiary sections, not the [578] opposed secondary sections of which they are parts. Blood money and vengeance is [628] not the responsibility of secondary sections, but of their respective tertiary sections.

At this point, a further statement concerning the external marriage links of tertiary segments throws further light on the feud. Previously it was stated that the competi- 121 tion between collateral tertiary groups for natural resources is indicated by a low 613 rate of marriage between them. Their external marriage links reinforce the separation. 582 One tertiary section, A, takes some of its spouses from section X of a collateral 578 secondary section; A's collateral, B, takes some of its spouses from X's collateral, Y. A may be at feud with Y and B with X. The agnatic links between A and B, and X and Y do not mitigate the severity of the hostility in the two feuds, they exacerbate it. It would be erroneous to think of them as cross-cutting ties which promote peace. Stultified in the development of their hostilities by virtue of their territorial proximity and the sentiment associated with putatively close agnatic connexion, A and B are able to express hostilities indirectly through their linked groups X and Y respectively. During discussions of disputes, homicides, or rival claims to water, whether the disputants meet in the camps or in administrative offices in the villages, men from the matrilateral and affinal groups of the parties directly concerned are also present to do most of the shouting. In some cases I recorded a maternal relative was killed on behalf of an agnatic group to which he did not belong, although the latter accepted the responsibility. In the light of facts of this sort the lineage model obstructs analysis.

I now wish to make a few brief remarks about the relationships between collateral 121 primary sections and paired tribes. Homicide, it was asserted earlier, results in raids 619 and war between groups of these orders of segmentation respectively. Evidence 682 can be adduced to show that both consequences have followed. The case usually 726 cited to demonstrate that a single killing precipitates war between tribes is the

south-west of the country. Most members of the two tertiary groups directly concerned 121
in the dispute were present. The agnates of the collaterally linked groups of 613
the principals were unrepresented; indeed collaterals of one of the principals made 571
it quite explicit that they were opposed to their genealogical allies and considered 628
their perusal of the matter tiresome. The bulk of the crowd present was made up
of men linked to the principals in a variety of different and non-agnatic ways, and it
was they who provided most of the argument once the issue had been opened. It 121
follows, therefore, that an analysis of political organization and behaviour in Cyrenaica 613
which is based on lineage theory leads to a gross misrepresentation. For, what 114
I am arguing is not that the lineage model in its rarefied state is too simple, not that
additional facts must be injected into it to complicate it, but that it does not provide
an admissible basis for analysis.[1] The complication of something that is founded in
error can only lead to complicated error, however many facts of real life are introduced
in an attempt to give it substance. The Bedouin conception of their social
relationships in terms of a genealogical ordering of groups is a fact of their social [829]
life, and in relation to some problems it is an important fact. My objection to the use
which has been made of a people's ideology of their relationships is that it has been
elevated from its status as a component of social life to such a position of universal
dominance in all sets of social relationships that 'every sociological problem', as
Fortes writes of the Tallensi, 'hinges on the lineage system'.[2]

If the ordering of groups within the frame of the Bedouin genealogy is abandoned 121
as a basis for analysis, it does not follow that the only remaining view is that of small 613
groups of people distributed throughout the country enjoying relationships merely 571
as units. Regularity in relationships does exist, it is urgently necessary, and it persists; 578
but this regularity is not consistent with a lineage model. Ultimately, feud is a
violent form of hostility between corporations which has its source in the competition
for proprietory rights in land and water. This competition makes it necessary for
groups to combine to prevent the encroachments of others in similar combinations
and also to expand their resources whenever the opportunity arises. The significant
groups in a discussion of the feud are these power groups, and it is their composition,
the shifting alliances within them, the growth and diminution in the power of tertiary

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[1] Dr. Paul Bohannan has distinguished in his writings between what he calls folk systems and analytical systems. The distinction, as he sees it, is set out clearly in the statement 'a certain field of Nuer relationships is explained by Nuer in terms of an agnatic genealogy. This is the folk system. The same field is explained, in English, by Professor Evans-Pritchard, as a lineage system based on the principle of segmental opposition. This is an analytical system' (Bohannan, 1957, p. 5). What is the difference? Is it only a difference of language? Bohannan's analytical statement is little more than a generalisation of what is in the folk system. An analytical system, in his hands, is a sophistication of a folk system, for it is the latter which provides him with his analytical framework. The act of creativity on the part of the social anthropologist about which he writes (Bohannan, 1963, p. 14) is the revealing of a folk system through analysis. But he does not
depart from the framework set by informants—the 121
agnatic genealogy is the lineage, and the fission and 613
fusion of parts, the opposition of like segments and
so on is explained by informants in different languages 114
as adequately as it is explained by social
anthropologists in English. Bohannan's viewpoint 171
is made clearer, perhaps, in his discussion on the arrangement of facts relating to Tiv law. Here he considers what he should do once he has elicited all the facts, and he argues against setting them out as an arrangement of the procedural law of Tiv courts because, 'The error would be that the arrangement is not part of *the Tiv way of looking at it*, and hence would be false' (Bohannan, 1957, p. 69. Italics mine). Why? The Tiv are not the social anthropologists. Is the test of an analytical model its consistency with a folk comprehension?

[2] Fortes, 1945, p. 30.

121 sections constituting the combinations which makes the facts of feud intelligible.
613 Furthermore, several different types of power structures exist which serve the differ-
[577 ent interests of the people composing them, and these are interlinked in combinations
578] of superior span. But the formation of these structures and the modes in which they
combine are quite unlike the articulations in a lineage system. Characteristically, the
segments in a lineage system are conceived of as building up hierarchically to span
what is spoken of as a total society, the apex of the system affording a spectacular and
fixed definition of its boundaries. Had I been using this concept in this paper the
[173] founding ancestress of the nine Cyrenaican tribes, Sa‘ada as named by the Bedouin,
would have served this purpose and would have been given inappropriate promi-
121 nence. The views presented here have the consequences of retreating from a concept
184 of a total society. The people to whom the facts given are related are the camel-
herding tribes only. Some of them have relations of many kinds with the cow-herding
233 folk who inhabit the northern plateau area, and these relations are also significant
619 for the analysis of a wide range of problems; genealogically both cow and camel
herders are seen as part of a single structure, but the differences between them with
regard to their economy, the size, composition, and distribution of their residential
units, their political and ritual life is so great that to conceive of them as a single social
121 structure is not useful. Moreover, the far western tribal sections have relationships
619 of such urgency with their neighbours in Tripolitania (who are excluded from Cyrena-
ican genealogies) that to cut off these relationships as lying outside Cyrenaican society
would be quite unwarranted. The same can be said of the relationships of the tribal
sections in the eastern part of Cyrenaica with their genealogical cousins, the Aulad
‘Ali of Egypt, who, although residing across a national border, are closely linked to
some of the Cyrenaican Bedouin. Some tribes also have to rely on the people of the
southern oases for an item of diet and an outlet for surplus wool, and the net of kin-
ship is spread out to include them. In these cases they come into contact with other
[177] ethnic groups such as Berbers and Tibu, and through the oases they extend their lines
of communication southwards to Wadai, Chad, and Bornu. As an indication of the
effectiveness of these links, it is only necessary to add that people inhabiting Cyrenaica
make periodic and regular visits to these far southern places, and that in 1948 a
shaikh, living near Ajadabiya in south-western Cyrenaica, collected blood-money
contributions from kinsmen in Wadai. A single structure cannot possibly include,
for analytical purposes, these sorts of relationships.

121 Finally, it must be stressed that the facts given here refer to the period 1948 to
114 1950. Since then oil has been discovered in large quantities near the territory of a
tribe where I spent most of my time while resident in the country, and where there
(315) was one tin shack in 1950 there is now a modern port with roads extending south-
wards from it into the wilderness. I see no reason to assume that social relations as
I observed them are present today or that they were the same at any time in the past
175 either. Before the advent of the Sanusi Order in the early eighteen-forties, it is known
795 that one lineage at least was dominantly powerful and that its leader tyrannized a
613 large part of Central Cyrenaica.[1] His descendants constituted a powerful group in

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[1] Smith and Porcher, 1864. These two archaeologists met this leader and continued their archaeological researches around Cirene only with his goodwill, although the site is not on the territory of his tribe as I knew it in 1950. They also speak of him as inhabiting a castle which also lies outside the

835 devoured by wild animals, the girl was "given"[6] to a close cousin who had
561 shot his sister. Both now reside with an enemy tribal section. The two acts
684 were equated. They were similar to the extent that both created a situation
which defied institutional resolution. The culprits were exorcised. The
girl's lover remains with his group — the odium for the male is incomparably
less than for the female, since, while maternity is easy to establish, paternity
is frequently shrouded in doubt — and during the months I lived with this
particular group, there was never a mention of the affair. It was as if "nothing had happened."

829 If asked why these two events cause such profound distress, the answers
the Bedouin give are twofold: they can do nothing about them, and they
● 578 cause split. By split in this context they mean split in the lineage; split in
613 the case of homicide because it may lead to a demand for blood-money which
[682] is payable only between corporations, and split in the case of incest because
[684] it causes chaos in relationships. Marriage, in one sense, their reasoning
581 runs, is similar, for it too causes split. Whatever may be the analytic strength
829 of the arguments that homicide and incest precipitate splitting, the argument that marriage does so is spurious. In what sense can marriage mean
613 split? Bedouin men marry "so that we may beget many sons, to make a big lineage later on." The worst fate that can befall a man as a result of his son's marriage is that he, in later generations, will become the focal point in a series of branching descent lines. The alternative — that his sons remain unmarried — can only mean that his name would disappear through want of successors to carry it on, which is one of the greatest evils which can befall a man, according to Bedouin sentiment: better split than oblivion. If the key to the interpretation of the father's attitude to his son's marriage is not
581 that it causes split, it must lie elsewhere in their relationship. What mar-
585 riage does is alter the distribution of authority between father and son. In
593 order to pursue this, it is necessary first to clarify the types of authority involved, and then assess them in a post-marital situation.

554

The Division of Authority Between the Family and the Corporation

851 Politically, a person's status is determined for him at birth. At this time a man has the right to accept or deny paternity. Denial is tantamount to an accusation of adultery by his wife. In practice, once a wife has given birth to a male child, whatever doubts people may harbour regarding paternity, the husband accepts the child as his. "The boy for the bed," is a saying often heard among the Bedouin; but it remains the husband's prerogative to invest
[837] the child with legitimacy, hence, political status. Only if a husband becomes aware that he is publicly considered a cuckold, or if he catches his wife and a lover *in flagrante delicto*, is he at all likely to take action. Otherwise he may

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[585] [581] [6] **A marriage is illegal unless it is accompanied by an agreement to transfer wealth to the girl's father.**

561 that young men spend their premarital lives in an environment of unmiti-
602 gated agnatic hostility. Greater substance is given to this view when it is
realised that agnates live together. The residential concentration of agnates
561 in Cyrenaica exceeds 80 per cent. I wish to stress that this figure is based
602 on the universe of the small camp, and the only males included as agnates are
621 those who are consanguinely related. Over 50 such camps were used in
arriving at the figure. Obviously, the figure of agnatic concentration will
vary depending on the universe. If all men who claim to belong to a tribe
of, say, 15,000 souls, who claim that they are agnates in a political sense are
included, then the figure will not be the same as that derived from a small
group where the criterion for inclusion is consanguinity, not mere political
affiliation. It is necessary to make this clear to emphasise that the Cyrenaican
figure is unusually high, and also because the modes of behaviour between
consanguineal and political agnates differ critically. Granted the hostility
[578] built into agnation, and recognising in addition the significance of the high
degree of agnatic concentration, unless there are other factors present in the
situation, life would be intolerably burdensome. Parallel-cousin marriage
comes to the rescue.

582

Parallel-Cousin Marriage

Among the Bedouin the prohibited degrees of marriage are few. A man
may not marry within a closer range than first paternal or maternal cousin;
he cannot marry a woman of a senior generation, nor a woman known to
be older. He cannot marry the daughters of a woman who has acted as wet
nurse to him or to any of his brothers and sisters. Otherwise he is permitted
to marry any other woman. Marriage with the first paternal cousin is pre-
582 ferred, and is more than a sentiment. A man has a right to his father's
brother's daughter, and before a marriage is arranged with anyone else, the
585 girl's father seeks the opinion of his brother's son. If he neglects to do this,
578 or if he flouts the opinion offered him, he runs the risk of the marriage
being brought to a halt on the very wedding day. I have witnessed this. In
most of the records I possess, it usually happens that the brother's son is
bought off with a few sheep (about five) and some articles of clothing.
Here the brother's son was seizing the occasion to extort from a farmer's
[589] brother wealth which he considered was due him from an earlier inheritance
dispute. Occasionally the intervention is genuinely designed to prevent a
marriage; if the girl refuses to marry her father's brother's son, he can force
582 her into spinsterhood. Men exercise their right to marry their first parallel
cousins. They also marry other parallel cousins. The significance of parallel-
cousin marriage varies with the exact degree of the relationship. First- and,
say, third-parallel cousins are sociologically different in a number of respects,
and in relation to specific problems these differences may assume major
[602] importance. In the present discussion the various degrees have this in
common: that whatever the precise relationship, all parallel cousins are the

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

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574 since meat is shared by all the people of the camp, her wealth was partly
231 dispersed among her poorer kinsfolk.

621 The location of Tent B was determined by the fact that the wife (6) was
592 the sister of (3) of Tent A. Her husband (7) had moved into the camp a
571 few years earlier as a result of an inheritance quarrel with his elder who
● [578] robbed him of his fair share. This husband (7) gained in two ways from
[233] the move. Although poor, he had a small flock of his own, too small to justify its own shepherd, but which he was permitted to include with his sister-in-law's (3) flock for shepherding. If the flock had been larger he would still have had difficulties, because, at some times of the year, save for short occasional visits to camp, the shepherd is with his sheep for several weeks, day and night. He (7) had three sons, still far too young to follow the sheep, but when they become of age to do so, his dependence on Tent A will cease, for then he can begin to gather the small flocks of other kinsmen around his own, his sons can shepherd them all and he can begin to
[574] enjoy the benefits to be derived from dependents. In addition, he enjoyed

the lavish generosity dispensed by the members of Tent A, and fed far better 621 592
than would have been possible otherwise. 571

The location of Tent C was also determined by a link through women. [574]
The only female (8) living in this tent, a middle-aged widow, was the sister of (3) and (6) of Tents A and B respectively. Her teenage son lived with her. They possessed only a few sheep, which were put with the flock of Tent A for shepherding. The son (9) spent some of his time herding for Tent A. With the mother and her son in Tent C were two other kinsmen. One, a poor man (10), was this son's first patrilateral cousin, and they both were the only surviving sons of their respective fathers. He (10) was the main shepherd of Tent A. The third male (11), also poor and nearly blind, was a second patrilateral cousin of both, but his sister was also 11's mother. All occupants of Tent C were almost entirely supported by Tent A. Relieved of the necessity to live off their own resources, the two young men (9 and 10) were afforded the opportunity of building up their flocks for the day when they would be able to negotiate their delayed marriages.

Tents A, B and C sheltered men who were agnatically closely linked. More 621
important, their grandfathers, three sons in a family of 19 children, were 613
full brothers. The latter's mother's name was used when referring to these 592
three tents as a group. During the past few years, many changes have 571
occurred within it, and the death of the pivotal woman (3) of Tent A might well disperse this small cluster. Further, the nuptials of her heir (5) were anticipated, and this event, itself likely to precipitate division of his father's (2) wealth, might also lead to further residential rearrangements.

The owner of Tent D, (12), a man in his late thirties, son of a slave 621
mother, was at loggerheads with his father's brother, much more senior in age. 592
The owner's father, one of a family of 24 children, had been a wealthy man 604
and died leaving a substantial herd and a large flock, but he (12) was bereft 578
of most of this wealth by the father's brother. His first successful strike
against his uncle was the demand he made for his daughter as a wife. [582]
Earlier, when (12) had demanded his father's wealth, his father's brother, [428]
who had for years acted as his guardian, replied, "It is in your stomach,"
(meaning that it had been expended on his upbringing). Later, after the [583]
marriage had taken place, when the uncle demanded payment of the bride-wealth his own words were thrown back at him, but this time with the meaning that the bride-wealth had already been paid. While I was resident in this area, the two men met occasionally: each meeting was hostile, for (12) was encouraging his half-brother (13) (also the son of a slave mother) to demand a second daughter as a wife. Included in this tent is a third adult male (14), virtually a pauper, reduced to this state by the same grasping
father's brother. His link with (12) was their closeness of relationship (first [571]
paternal cousin), together with the fact that all three males (12, 13 and 14) had suffered privations and were allies against the common enemy, their father's brother.

Associated with them for the same reason, was the owner of Tent E (15).

Cases

621 Genealogically he was their father's brother, but he was of their same age
592 generation, and behaved as if he was their agnatic equal. Towards his own
578 brother (16), he behaved as if the latter was his uncle, for he was much his
[604] junior in age and his uncle had virtually brought him up from boyhood.
They had quarrelled bitterly because his brother (16) had given him only
[428] a fraction of his inheritance, which he himself, in turn, should have
[593] shared with his young full brother (not shown on the diagram) but he did
not do so. This youngest brother left (15) for this reason and now resides
621 with (16), his full brother's enemy. Two of the men (14 and 13) of this
592 group of four were the chief herdsmen of the camp, although they were
[233] assisted for short periods by (12) and (15), who also helped tend the
camels in other ways. Their connection with the group centered on Tent
[571] A was a mutual close link to a politically powerful person (not shown on the
genealogies) to whom they are deeply loyal and who, while I was among
them, was actively opposed to the common political enemy of them all (16),
and who in earlier years had challenged the leadership of (2) of Tent A.
There is also the fact that they were all linked within a close range of
[613] agnation. This linkage included, too, the owner of Tent F (17), not in
[602] fact the descendant of the man shown in the diagram — he was the son of
a slave wife; his genitor was a slave, but his mother's master reared him,
freed him and he is now given as his son in the genealogy. He lives with his
wife, of client origin, together with her children from a previous husband,
(18), who divorced her, and his own children. Aging, he no longer acted
as a regular herdsmen, but relieved other men in the camp, and also spent
some time shepherding.

621 The details given of the strands which run through the camp to tie these
571 particular people together are so few that, like the Bedouin plough, they do
no more than scratch the surface, but they are sufficient to permit a few
general statements. The camp, and particularly the precise disposition of
621 its tents, shows a group of males clustered together to share two of the main
571 economic tasks: shepherding and herding. The physically strong adult males
233 of Tents D and E shoulder the burden of herding all the camels of the camp,
462 and the men of Tents B, A and C shepherd all the sheep, with (17) of
Tent F serving both purposes. This number of men allows some to remain
in the camp at all times, to free one of them for a journey to the distant
market when supplies of sugar and tea are necessary, and to enable one or
two men, at short notice, to hurry away on horse or camel to search for
lost animals.[14]

621

Economic Determinants of the General Structure of the Camp

574 It is also clear from these details that, given the disparities in wealth
231 (although all men have some wealth), the diet of most is considerably

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[556]

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[14] There is little point in seeking the lost animals themselves in the first instance. A man travels from camp to camp asking for information, and when he has gathered his clues, he searches a neighbourhood.

233 wandered over the boundary of Abd el Salam's grazing
685 rights. The juvenile members of Abd el Salam's family
came out from their tents in a body, to drive off their
• [578] intruding second cousins with their camels. An altercation
ensued, and the excitement grew; and eventually a pitched
battle with sticks and stones began among the lads.

683 One of Abd el Kerim's sons, leaving his brother to hold
on for a moment, ran back the half mile to call his father,
who returned with him to the scene of the fight carrying
his gun. On arrival at the camels, Abd el Salam's sons
set on him in a body. Abd el Kerim pointed his gun at
one of them and took aim; whereupon one of the other
family from behind laid him low with a blow on the top
of his head, sufficient to fell an ox.

Abd el Kerim was carried back to his tent, where the
[114] writer witnessed the horrible sight of sympathetic but
homicidal relatives pawing his open wound with their filthy
fingers. A large hole had been knocked in the side of his
head, and portions of brain were visible. After some
months of surgical treatment Abd el Kerim came out of
[694] hospital; and, as the blow was reported to have affected
his reason, a case was brought on his behalf by some of his
relatives, claiming damages from the family of Abd el
Salam. However, before the case was fully completed,
[682] Abd el Kerim was taken ill, was re-admitted to hospital,
and died. The case therefore became one of bloodmoney,
and was dealt with in the usual way.

683 The interesting point about the case, however, lies in
the decision of the court, when the first claim for damages
682 was brought up. A very strong line was adopted by the
695 sheikhs, and in the opinion of the court the wounds re-
ceived by Abd el Kerim were only what he might reason-
672 ably expect. They maintained that, after the way in which
he had behaved, he was lucky to have got off as lightly as
he did. The sheikhs protested that he ought never to have
gone out from his tent, and mixed himself up in a fight
between a lot of boys. If he had any authority at all, he

● 578

[For information on internal antagonisms within the society which have led to bloodshed and death, see Categories 682 and 683.]

herds have a black goat or two—such are the Shiheibat." 619 [186] They are families of shepherds scattered amongst the Sa'adi families, and must not be confused with the 'Esheibat section of the Awlad 'Ali.

Dumreicher (pp. 52–7) gives a lively account of a quarrel between the Jawabis and the Shiheibat. [175] [578]

CHAPTER VI

HOMICIDE AND BODILY INJURIES

Part 1: Homicide

579 Fighting is quite common among Awlad Ali. Many of these fights
involve a large number of individuals and result in many casualties
579 and sometimes even deaths. Fighting is considered "shar," or evil,
673 for according to Awlad Ali, it threatens the social cohesion which is
182 highly valued in the area. Yet, although undesirable, fighting and
[682] even homicide are not considered a crime against society and sometimes
are viewed as necessary to safeguard individual and collective rights
in the absence of an established authority which could protect these
[177] rights. Although this absence of an authority is remedied now by the
[692] introduction of state administrative justice, this has not yet achieved
enough efficiency and recognition to replace the old tribal system.

619 In the tribal system, there is no concept of individual punishment
681 inflicted upon the suspect. There is no recognized authority to inflict
692 it. The mardi or the 'aqila who performs the function of dispute settle-
[627] ment in the case of homicide has no power to pass or inflict any punish-
ment. His role is restricted to mediation between the two parties involved
682 as was earlier mentioned. Homicide, like all other wrongs among Awlad Ali,
673 are private wrongs affecting the individual or a group of individuals.
[182] The main purpose of the tribal proceedings in the case of homicide is to
restore some form of harmony and order among the group. This harmony is
sometimes restored by killing the murderer or any member of his vengeance
682 group, or amar. Feuds may result from such killing, and a few instances
628 of feuds have, in fact, been recorded in the area (although not in the

586 Naturally, according to the rule of patriliny, all
851 children from a marriage belong to the husband and become
*613 members of his lineage. Should divorce occur while a woman
is nursing, she will take the child with her and it will be
returned after weaning. Sometimes the husband will permit the
wife to keep one child--always a girl--in order "to keep her
company."

587 The practice of the sororate has been noted. The
Bedouins also believe that "a man should marry his brother's
widow so that she will have someone to help her with the
children." But I have no data on the frequencies of these
12 practices. When I gathered my data on marriage, my informants
•58 would give me only the name of the tribe or lineage into which
a man married, and never did I get the name of a man's wife.
[829] (One lineage in al-Qasr, entirely refused to give me data
on genealogy or marriage because, as one leader said, "it is
not decent to speak of these things with people.") Sororal
595 polygny is forbidden (Quran IV:23), and the Bedouins say
that a man cannot marry more than one bint 'amm. Marriage
182 practices, such as sororate and levirate, I interpret as
[587] patterns which maintain structural continuity and political
advantage. The custom of permitting a man to marry only
[582] one of his father's brother's daughters may be seen as a
precaution against intensifying authority relations and the
degree of segmentation.

585 legal guardian and considered a bride price to compensate the father or
583 the legal guardian of the bride. In earlier times the bride received
779 none of the mahr, although she usually got a sadaq or bridal gift for
431 [178] herself. In Islamic Arabia, the mahr and the sadaq became indistin-
[171] guishable and were given to the woman and took the form of a legal gift
for affecting the marriage. The Koraan no longer contains the concept
[178] of the purchase of the wife, and the mahr becomes a compensation which
the woman has to claim in all cases. The Koraan demands a bridal gift
for a legal marriage: "And give them whom ye have enjoyed their reward
as a wedding gift" (Sura, iv. 24), and again, "And give the women their
[586] dowries voluntarily" (Sura, iv. 3). According to the Koraan, the mahr
remains the property of the wife and remains her own even if the marriage
is dissolved by divorce. But although it took the form of a gift, the
mahr remained in Islamic law a prerequisite for the legalization of the
marriage. It is only upon the giving of the mahr that the marriage is
considered valid. No marriage is legal, according to the Islamic law,
unless that transfer of the mahr is affected. Mutual consent of the
two parties to forfeit the mahr does not change that rule, and the mar-
58 riage is considered void. According to Muslim jurisprudence, marriage
675 is a contract ('acd) made betweeen the bridegroom and the bride or her
184 wali or guardian. An essential element in that contract is the mahr.
The jurists themselves are not sure about the nature of the mahr. Some
regard it as practically a purchase money or as an equivalent ('iwad)
for the possession of the woman and the rights over her, so it is like
a price paid in a contract of sale; while other jurists see in the mahr
a legal symbol, a mark of honor and a proper legal security of property
for the woman.

593 cerned with his own and his group's status in marriage arange-
[584] ments. One informant said that a rich man must marry into a
•[581] rich group. The Bedouin have a saying which is relevant here:
*[613] "Your bait is equal to the bait into which you marry." Before
her marriage the girl's duty toward her father is to respect
and obey him. After her marriage "her only duty is that she
[758] must visit him from time to time. If he becomes sick, and
he has no wife, she must care for him and nurse him."

593 It was a common sight to see a Bedouin father fondle
834 his daughter of age six years or younger, but beyond this
age physical intimacy ceases. The Bedouin say that a father should not kiss or hold on his knee a daughter over the age of eleven. After the girl marries, a definite avoidance custom characterizes the father-daughter role relationship. The Bedouin say that the father will not see the face of his daughter after her marriage. This means that the married daughter remains veiled before her father, and even before her older brothers. This type of avoidance custom is rare by comparison with the cross-cultural data (Driver 1966).

593 A wife obeys her husband concerning all matters: "she does not even leave the house without his permission." A woman may go and complain to her father if her husband does not provide for her, i.e., with food and clothing, or if he unjustly beats her or continually threatens to beat her. On the other hand, if a woman is in the wrong "it is

156 than the Awlad 'Ali societal level. In the traditional
554 system, his influence and power have been informal, and,
121 although this has been advantageous over against the formal
role of _'agila_, his political activity was ultimately limited
by this structural differentiation and definition of authority.
[177] In gaining access to the bureaucratic structure of Egyptian
officialdom with its firm allocation of rights and duties,
Hajj 'Ali could operate as an authority within the total authority
structure which has reference to both the internal and external
political relational systems of al-Qasr.

Practical Application

*613 In al-Qasr, the two most influential and powerful
lineages, 'Ailit Lazumi and 'Ailit Ma'fas, each have a
[634] "most powerful _bait_." We have noted that in 'Ailit Lazumi
it is Bait Bu Taram which controls the office of _'umda_: in
*613 'Ailit Ma'fas it is Bait 'Umar which has Hajj 'Ali. Hajj 'Ali
159 is fifty three years old. He has married five times, divorced
581 one wife, and at present has four wives. Whatever his motives
156 for these marriages, at least some of them have obviously
[595] been made as economic and political moves. A check on his
wives' tribal origins will show this. In each case, Hajj
'Ali's wife is from a lineage which holds land contiguous to
his own property in the _'izba_ sector of al-Qasr. The one
exception to this is a marriage contracted to establish ties

*613 with Bait Bu Taram of 'Ailit Lazumi. These marriages and
159 •581 their resultant alliances enhance the political power and
156 social status of Hajj 'Ali within and without al-Qasr.

Although he has no education himself, and neither reads
159 156 nor writes, Hajj 'Ali has sent his son to the University of
873 Alexandria. Hajj 'Ali's son is the only boy from al-Qasr
[212] ever to attend the university. Hajj 'Ali desired that his
son study law at the university or enter the military academy
"and become an officer." But his son objected to this, saying:
"Either way I will be employed by the government and will not
be permitted to travel and see other countries." Hajj 'Ali did
not argue with this: he said that his son should study what
he wished. The son is now studying in the Faculty of Commerce
156 at Alexandria. Hajj 'Ali is also sending his daughters to
159 the primary school in al-Qasr. Not all of the Bedouins believe
872 562 that girls should receive an education.

156 Hajj 'Ali places among the "status group" in terms
159 of wealth. Although he has now committed himself to olive-
554 farming as a way of life, he remains one of the biggest sheep
472 owners in al-Qasr. Therefore, he is identified with both traditional
and modern symbols of status. Hajj 'Ali differs in
156 159 one important way from other members of the "status group"
554 in that he owns three small general stores, two in al-Qasr
443 and one far to the west in Sallum. This fact has several
423 472 significant implications. Shops in al-Qasr (there are five
*[613]

CHAPTER V

MARRIAGE: A CONTRACTUAL RELATIONSHIP

593 A survey of all disputes occurring among the eilat Aggary in the
578 last five years shows that more than 70% were disputes over "women,"
the usual phrase referring to cases involving marital relations. Dis-
agreement over matters arising out of quarrels between husband and wife
or between one of the spouses and his or her in-laws often constitute
593 the basis for these disputes. What seems to make marriage and the
578 family particularly productive of conflict is the fact that although
602 residence is commonly virilocal, and the majority of the women leav-
613 ing their own families to live with the husband, the woman retains her
[591] membership in her father's family after the marriage, and her agnatic
group keeps an active interest in her, even after she is married. Mar-
riage then brings face to face the interests of two groups. These in-
terests affect the relationship between the married couple; and, more
importantly, the relationship between the latter affects the interests
of their respective groups. This, in many instances, leads to direct
conflict between the two groups.

● 581 The position of the Awlad Ali daraieb with regard to marriage rela-
671 tions is based on the Islamic law with minor modifications to suit the
585 requirements of local life. According to the Muslim law, marriage is
675 a civil contract affected by the request of one party and the agree-
ment of the other. No witnesses are needed for the legalization of the
marriage, according to some of the Shi'a sects, although the Sunni schools
of Muslim jurisprudence insist that two adult male and two adult females

581 are necessary for the validation of the marriage contract. Modern
585 671 legal systems which took as their basis the Islamic law of marriage
675 and the family further required the registration of the marriage contract for the marriage to be legal.

584 The request and necessary response forming the marriage are supposed
585 to be carried on by the parties involved. However, if either the
429 groom or the bride is not of age, or is mentally unqualified, the transaction
593 is carried on by his or her guardian, or "wakil." The wakil is the father, unless he is dead or an invalid, in which case the brothers
[604] become the wakils. If the person has no brothers, then the uncles become
[184] the wakil in the order stated. According to certain Sunni sects in Islam, a woman marrying for the first time is always represented by her wakil, even if she is of age. The assumption is that a woman who has never been married does not have the experience that enables her to enter into any kind of legally binding relationship such as marriage.

585 Following the original Islamic idea, marriage among Awlad Ali is
675 an oral agreement between the groom or his father and the guardian
593 429 (wakil) of the bride-to-be (her father, if alive, or her closest male
[604] kin in the following order: her brothers, her uncles, her grandfather).
585 A religious man is sometimes asked to perform the marriage, although it
792 is not required. Some persons might invite a member of the Murabiteen
[619] tribe or holy men to witness the marriage on the basis that his presence
[778] gives "baraka," or blessing, to the marriage. Before the application of
585 the State legal system to the area, marriage contracts were not registered.
656 177 In recent years, however, and with the increased mobility of
[675] the tribal populations, more and more marriages are being registered in
[634] the administrative districts. Still, according to the unofficial estimates,

Still, according to the unofficial estimates,
585 only about ten per cent of all marriages are registered, and these are
656 mainly mixed marriages involving a tribal person and a non-tribal one
179 or a tribal member who is not living in the area anymore. The reason
582 619 is that such a spouse, especially when he is the husband, is not under
the control of the tribal customs and therefore cannot be forced to fulfill his obligations if he fails to do so. Most of the tribal popula-
● [581] tion still feel that marriage is a personal and family affair that
should be kept away from the State legal system.

584 Marriage among Awlad Ali is a relatively informal procedure. When
593 a man decides to marry a certain girl, he informs his mother who, in
turn, informs his father. The father may have objections to his son's choice of the bride. Such objections may be based on already strained relations between the two families or the questionable reputation of the girl or any member of her family. In such cases, the father tries to dissuade his son from going ahead with the marriage. The father is
[583] usually successful in controlling his son's choice when the latter is
dependent on his father for the payment of the bridewealth called "mahr" and for the support of his new household. This is usually the case in the man's first marriage. In subsequent marriages and in the cases where the son has independent means of support for himself and his bride, the father's control of the son's choice is minimal, and asking the father's approval is a matter of formality. In second and subse-
593 595 quent marriages, the approval of the older wives is essential. The
584 older wives have no right to object to the husband taking an additional
wife, but they have the right to object to the choice on the basis that the new bride is hard to get along with or that there is animosity between her family and the families of the other wives which makes

584 husband or his father pays the woman's father the bridewealth, or mahr.
583 In exchange for the mahr, the husband expects his father-in-law to out-
fit his daughter with such items as rugs, blankets, and a few other house-
hold items, like cooking pots, serving dishes, and a metal or wooden chest
[422] to keep her clothes in. These items become the private property of the
wife, but the husband has the right to use them. In addition, the man
● 581 expects to gain certain rights to the woman. The customary law of Awlad
671
585 Ali gives the husband three basic rights over his wife: the right to her
sexual services (including the right to bear him children); the right to
her labor in domestic activities; and the right to her obedience. Of the
three rights, the first is the most exclusive. Not only doesthe husband
have a complete monopoly over his wife's present sexual services, but he
also has the right, if the girl has never been married before, to be the
[583] first to use such services. If he discovers that she is not a virgin, he
can send her back to her father and get back his mahr.

581 The other two rights are not as exclusive. The husband's right to
585 his wife's domestic labor does not prevent her from occasionally helping
593 out in her father's or brother's household, especially if they live nearby.
Finally, the husband's right to be obeyed by his wife is always subordin-
ated to that of her father, who retains the ultimate authority over his
daughter.

682 If the woman is killed or injured, the husband is deprived of all
683 or some of her services, depending on the seriousness and the permanence
581
585 of the injury, and therefore is entitled to compensation. The right of
593 avenging the woman's murder remains, however, that of her family, since
she is still a member of that family.

581 Marriage does not deprive the woman of some rights of her own.
585 The customary law gives the wife three basic rights corresponding to
562 those of the husband's sexual services, domestic work, and obedience.
671 Corresponding to the first of these, the wife has the right to have a
normal sexual life with her husband. This right, however, is not an exclusive
one, since the husband can marry more than one wife. A woman
585 can be divorced from her husband without having to return the mahr if
586 she claims that the husband is unable to perform his sexual duties. In
593 such cases, the marriage is usually dissolved quietly. In certain rare
instances, the husband may deny his wife's accusations. If both insist
585 on their stand, one or both may ask to be submitted to "bait el-shana'a,"
586 or house of the dreadful deeds. Reports are extremely vague about the
593 exact procedures involved in this case. Some informants stated that the
627 married couple would live in a tent without sidewalls so that everybody
could see what goes on inside. Most informants, however, insist that it
merely means that the couple move their tent near that of a respectable
man whose word is believed and honored. This man is supposed to keep a
close watch on the couple's activities, by listening or looking through
holes in the tent. His verdict determines the future of the marriage.
586 If the wife is justified in her claim, the husband is forced to divorce
681 her and to forfeit his mahr. If, on the other hand, the verdict is for
558 the husband, he not only can divorce her and get back the mahr, but is
also entitled to kabara, or compensation, for his injured pride. There
114 is no case of bait el-shana'a in the area during the time of the field
178 work, and most people insist that this practice is something of the past
583 when the mahr was relatively high and was paid in livestock, in which

585 586 593 627 [114] case its return to the husband would have caused great financial inconvenience for the wife's family.

[778] (583) Corresponding to the second right, the husband's right to his 581 wife's domestic work, is the wife's right to maintenance. The husband 585 has to support his wife. This includes providing her and her children 562 with adequate food and proper clothing. If the husband fails to do so 593 because of poverty, sickness, crop failure or unexpected disaster, the wife's brother or father provides her and her children with the necessary food and clothing. [586] If the husband's failure to fulfill his duties is due to neglect, the wife can leave him and go to her father or brother who talks the matter over with the husband who, in turn, either agrees to their demands or has to divorce his wife and forfeit his mahr.

593 Finally, corresponding to the husband's right to his wife's obedi- 562 ence is the wife's right to fair treatment by her husband. There are a [779] number of ways in which the wife is mistreated. One is excessive punishment; although the right of the husband to punish his wife is provided in the Koraan, the punishment must be excessive or severe. Awlad Ali draw a line between acceptable and severe punishment. A punishment is severe if it results in something that other people can see or hear. If the husband insults his wife or her family and others hear the action, or if he beats her and this results in visible traces, then the punishment is severe.

593 A wife considers herself mistreated if the husband, when married 595 to more than one, treats any of the other wives better than he treats 562 her. Although the wife cannot deny her husband the right to have additional wives, he must give them all equal treatment. This includes

593 595 562 providing them with the same kind of food and clothing.* It also includes dividing his time equally between them, spending one night in each wife's tent. The first wife, being the chief one, has certain privileges: her tent is the guest house, food is brought to her residence, and she is the one to divide it among the other wives, and her house is the place for the husband to stay if he becomes sick and unable to move every night from one tent to another. Other than the exceptions given to the first wife, the husband has to treat all his wives equally.

593 [586] Normally, such cases of mistreatment do not result in divorce unless they are persistent. In most cases, if the wife is mistreated, she goes to her father's or brother's house or sends for them to come and 593 431 take her. For the husband to bring her back to his tent, he must pay her "nasafa." This is a gift given by the husband to his wife as an acknowledgement of guilt and as a form of apology for not giving her fair treatment. In some cases the nasafa is equal to what the husband originally paid as mahr.

● 581 585 626 These are some of the rights that marriage gives both men and women in the tribal society of Awlad Ali. These rights, however, are useless unless they are backed by certain means of enforcing them. The husband's 586 626 593 rights are guaranteed by his ability to dissolve the marriage at will. According to Islamic law, a man can divorce his wife by simply pronouncing the sentence "I divorce you" in the presence of credible witnesses. [779] [562] No justification for divorce is demanded from the husband according to the Koraan. No such privilege is given to the wife. She can obtain a

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* With provision for wives with more children.

121 613 682 is found in either a vengeance killing or a blood-money agreement which later becomes caught up in a wider set of debt relationships. Records show that this is true in some cases, but in others the blood money is paid in one instalment and immediately. The recognition of a debt and its liquidation among the Bedouin is tantamount to a declaration of hostility, since without a debt the means for smooth-running relationships is lacking. Such a blood-money payment was made between two tertiary groups in the absence of the 'owner of the blood'; when he returned he sought out his brother's killer, and took two lives for one. Subsequently, there was a further blood-money settlement but there remained 'a man left over'. In other circumstances an annual payment, called *sana'*, is demanded in addition to the prompt and full payment of the blood money. The attachment of the *sana'* to a settlement is an invidious condition since it is regarded as a fee by those who have to pay it, it is said to lower the status of a group and ' one day, it must be repudiated '.[1] It may, circumstances permitting, serve to cast off all pretence of friendly relationships. It is more likely that it will lead to a further outbreak of hostilities. When I witnessed the payment of the *sana'* the terms in which it was demanded were: ' You have a man on your backs. Are you going to repudiate this or are you going to give me *sana'*? If you repudiate, we must seek vengeance.' The payment, one in a long series, was made on that occasion but there were loud grumblings among the men of the camp against their leader for his acquiescence and one suggested that they terminate the payments forthwith by shooting the claimant. Of the three forms of blood money cited, this latter is the extreme to which groups can go short of open feud. Its opposite is a blood-money payment which is mainly left as a debt, and which is accompanied by the ' gift ' of a wife to the victim's group.[2] The wife is ' given ' as an earnest that the offender's group wishes the full restoration of relationships ruptured by the homicide. There are, therefore, four forms of blood-money payment. The Bedouin view of these is that they are variants of what is, in principle, the same thing. Their view cannot be accepted. Each of the four payments points to diverse kinds of social relationships between groups, and their consequences are wholly disparate. These various kinds of relationships between the tertiary sections of the same secondary section exist because the relationships between all sections cannot possibly be the same if they are more than a pair in number. A secondary section which spans ten tertiary sections is not the same type of unit as one which spans only three. The greater the number of tertiary sections the greater the possible permutations in their relationships. What the Bedouin think of as variations in the form of blood-money
[829] payment is related to the complexities that lie behind their simple lineage model. Bedouin can comprehend this complexity only by thinking in terms of a kind of average behaviour, regarding deviations from the average as fortuitous and explicable by the faulty reasoning that ' in this particular case, it just so happened ' that this, that, and the other were part of the situation, failing to appreciate that apparent aberrations are constants to the extent that some sort of specifics occur in all cases. There is no reason why Bedouin reasoning should be followed in sociological analysis.

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[1] See Peters, 1966.

[581] [585] [2] A marriage is not legal unless at least a promise to hand over wealth has been made beforehand. In the case cited the amount promised would be no more than a token—a sheep or a goat.

membership of associations and so on. The statuses a Bedouin achieves de- 796
pend not on an ordered acquisition through the inheritance of roles or elec- 852
tion to them, but on his personal manipulation of linkages in his jockeying 88
with others. Rites are minimal because there are few defined statuses an 554
individual can predictably acquire. The equalitarianism of the desert denudes 602
the Bedouin of ritual riches. Complimentarily, rites which do occur are 613
thrown into exaggerated relief by the absence of others, and in their isolation, [557]
become not merely a "passage" but a cataclysmic change. Marriage and 585
burial both comprehend limited fields of relations, but accompanying cere- 764
monies may bring several hundred people together, people who otherwise 796
rarely gather in these numbers to meet one another as kinsmen and neigh- 602
bours, and it is suggested that the emphasis given to the events dramatises the 182
significance of the changes they produce. In the discussion of the changes
brought about by marriage, the Bedouin view of what is entailed will be
considered first.

The Bedouin View of Marriage

After marriage, the Bedouin argue, a son has a tent of his own, a woman 585
over whom he has authority and soon children to make him a father. Mar- 581
riage causes split, branching. A new family is created, holding the poten- [613]
tial of a new lineage. The separation is so painful a matter for the father
that he cannot contemplate it, hence his pretence that he has no knowledge of [593]
wedding festivities, and his subsequent attitude that nothing has happened.

Interestingly, there are two other occasions when this attitude is to be 682
observed. When a man kills within his corporate group,[5] he may flee his 683
tribe or he may be compelled to leave; later he is likely to return and, when
he does, he is received with a minimum of show. Every attempt is made to
suppress knowledge of the event.

Again, if incest occurs, the memory of it must somehow be suppressed, and 835
it is an ever-present danger. Men, permitted four wives simultaneously and 561
also able to engage in a plurality of marriages through divorce or death of [595]
spouses, may have children showing an age difference of two or three gen-
erations. Thus it comes about that a man may be of an age in relation to his
father's sister which permits them as children to behave as if they were
first paternal cousins. As an adult, the preferred spouse for a man is a [582]
father's brother's daughter. In terms of relationships between adolescents
the situation in which a man is of the same age generation as his father's
sister is fraught with danger. In one such case, between a man and his [684]
father's sister, the male child of the union was put out in the desert to be

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[5] Bedouin are disposed in groups which, in summer, usually constitute a single community, around or near a watering point. The men of this group are interlinked by reference to an ancestor four or five ascending generations, reckoning from the generation of men of about 20 years. When, elsewhere in this chapter reference is made to corporations, it will be to groups of this kind.

835 devoured by wild animals, the girl was "given"* to a close cousin who had
561 shot his sister. Both now reside with an enemy tribal section. The two acts
684 were equated. They were similar to the extent that both created a situation
which defied institutional resolution. The culprits were exorcised. The
girl's lover remains with his group — the odium for the male is incomparably
less than for the female, since, while maternity is easy to establish, paternity
is frequently shrouded in doubt — and during the months I lived with this
particular group, there was never a mention of the affair. It was as if "nothing had happened."

829 If asked why these two events cause such profound distress, the answers
578 the Bedouin give are twofold: they can do nothing about them, and they
613 cause split. By split in this context they mean split in the lineage; split in
[682] the case of homicide because it may lead to a demand for blood-money which
[684] is payable only between corporations, and split in the case of incest because
it causes chaos in relationships. Marriage, in one sense, their reasoning
• 581 runs, is similar, for it too causes split. Whatever may be the analytic strength
829 of the arguments that homicide and incest precipitate splitting, the argu-
613 ment that marriage does so is spurious. In what sense can marriage mean
split? Bedouin men marry "so that we may beget many sons, to make a
big lineage later on." The worst fate that can befall a man as a result of his
son's marriage is that he, in later generations, will become the focal point in
a series of branching descent lines. The alternative — that his sons remain
unmarried — can only mean that his name would disappear through want of
successors to carry it on, which is one of the greatest evils which can befall
a man, according to Bedouin sentiment: better split than oblivion. If the
key to the interpretation of the father's attitude to his son's marriage is not
581 that it causes split, it must lie elsewhere in their relationship. What mar-
585 riage does is alter the distribution of authority between father and son. In
593 order to pursue this, it is necessary first to clarify the types of authority involved, and then assess them in a post-marital situation.

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The Division of Authority Between the Family and the Corporation

851 Politically, a person's status is determined for him at birth. At this time
a man has the right to accept or deny paternity. Denial is tantamount to an
accusation of adultery by his wife. In practice, once a wife has given birth
to a male child, whatever doubts people may harbour regarding paternity,
the husband accepts the child as his. "The boy for the bed," is a saying often
heard among the Bedouin; but it remains the husband's prerogative to invest
the child with legitimacy, hence, political status. Only if a husband becomes
[837] aware that he is publicly considered a cuckold, or if he catches his wife and a
lover *in flagrante delicto*, is he at all likely to take action. Otherwise he may

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[585] *** A marriage is illegal unless it is accompanied by an agreement to transfer wealth**
[581] **to the girl's father.**

her father takes, but in certain critical situations he can be relieved of choice 613 593
if the interests of the group as a whole are at stake. [421]
Political authority is the preserve of a corporation, and its exercise leads [428]
to invasion of a man's authority in the field of domestic relations. This [584]
does not mean, however, that discrete areas of authority do not remain with
the father. In the tent his authority over his son is so overwhelming as to
keep the son in almost complete subordination. The son is referred to as a
slave, and in daily life he has to behave as one. He must obey every command,
for, were he to rebel, he would find little or no support among his
agnates, whatever the extent of the provocation. Retreat from his father is [422]
hardly an alternative, since, while his father is alive, he has no animals of
his own, and to leave camp would only mean that he would have to move
outside his group to seek employment elsewhere as a shepherd. If he did [558]
this he would forfeit status, and almost certainly cut himself off from property [428]
which would fall to him after his father's death. A man who "denies"
his father looses too many privileges for the practice to become widespread.

Caught in this dilemma, a son's predicament is worsened by the fact that 593
he cannot initiate marriage negotiations — to be able to do so requires some 584
animals to offer a girl's father. Through his mother's brother he has the [431]
means of bringing pressure to bear on his father, but the latter can resist for [604]
years. Finally, a marriage is arranged for him. It is difficult to convey the 581
yearning of young Bedouin for marriage. They discuss it among themselves 521
ad nauseam. For the most part their talk is about the sexual aspect of marriage. 831
Premarital sex relations are strictly controlled, and the movements
of each young girl are carefully guarded because, if on the day of her marriage 836
the test shows that she is not a virgin, she not only brings disgrace to [585]
her family, but the marriage may be revoked and her worth as a bride for
another man seriously diminished. Nevertheless premarital relations do [837]
occur, if not between youths and maidens to any extent, between young
men and married women.

The question still remains: why is marriage the occasion of such ebullient 581
celebration? The formal authority a father exercises over his son 593
changes little on marriage. Economically the son is still harnessed to the
father. The latter still shouts his orders at him, and obedience remains
unaltered. Any sign of an independent view on a matter is met with a gruff
rebuff. If the marriage turns out to be disagreeable to the father, he has
the authority — if not always the power — to break it. Marriage does not
mean a change in the general mode of behaviour between the two; the legal
relations remain unaltered, albeit modified in practice, as the married son
matures in age. But marriage does mean the acquisition of rights and status
previously denied a son. Henceforward, he has a domain of his own. This
is high drama, indeed, for although every effort is made to give substance to [554]
the expressed view that "nothing has happened," for the first time in his
life the son has seized publicly, amid the jubilations of his fellows, a status
which hitherto was the possession of the father.

The Meaning of Marriage

581 Until marriage the changes in a man's life have been in the nature of
585 an ordered sequence of development from a child to be cared for — the only
342 time in his life when a father, without inhibition, showers on him his love
[593] and affection — to one who, by degrees, makes an increasing contribution to
a production unit. Marriage necessitates that a man pitch a tent for himself.
With a tent he becomes a potential host and protector of others. The local
idiom for marriage is "to set up a tent." It would be quite improper to use
[196] the verb "to marry" when inquiring whether a marriage has taken place
since this verb also has the meaning of "to have sexual intercourse." In-
[195] stead the euphemism, "Have you pitched a tent?" is used. The Arabic word
for a tent in this context is *Bait*. It is not used to refer to a military tent, nor
to the small tent which shelters only a widow. It is reserved for the Bedouin
tent, which usually has a wool top, and, most importantly, holds the promise
of the continuation of life, whether it shelters a newly married couple, a
mature family or young unmarried people. (The word *Bait* represents a
complex concept, and it would be too much of a diversion here to discuss
the various points of its significance. It is essential to understand that its
[778] meaning is not confined to a tent in the physical sense.) Its top has *Baraka*
(divine goodness) in it; the quality of *Haram*, which makes it possible for the
tent to be used as a sanctuary, is associated with it and this quality of *Haram*
extends, moreover, to the ropes of the tent, so that anyone who clutches them
comes under the protection of the owner. In it, the wife must permanently
reside and her husband has the legal right to insist on this. In it too, he
has the legal right of sexual access to a woman, his wife. Any children
[885] born in it he can claim as his own. With the erection of a tent the son
reaches adulthood, and it is in this sense that he can be said to have acquired
a domain of his own.

581 Marriage gives a son greater freedom and less dependence on his father
585 in another sense. A second euphemism used for marriage is "making a
[593] relationship," specifically an affinal one. Relationships between a man and
[195] his father-in-law are diverse and are used in various ways in different situa-
tions. Here, the particular aspect which needs to be stressed is that a man
606 can cajole his father-in-law, and (through his wife) wealth, in the form
425 of animals, may pass from the former to the latter. Reciprocal gifts are passed
556 between affines on certain occasions, but in addition small amounts may
pass which are not connected with the formal occasions of exchanges. Debt
583 lies between them. It begins with the initiation of marriage negotiations,
584 when the suitor's kinsmen take a prescribed number of sheep to present to
606 the girl's father if negotiations are successful. They promise to transfer
bride-wealth[9] to the girl's father. A few weeks after the marriage, the hus-

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[171] [9] I use the word "bride-wealth" because it has become so familiar in the literature,
but the only similarity between the *Sahiba* of the Bedouin and the bride-wealth of

*613 formal leadership. Ideologically, group solidarity at this
level is explained solely in terms of patrilineality; in
fact, local contiguity and explicit contractual ties are
*613 just as important. When we add to this the principle of
•582 cognation in the form of the Bedouin preferred form of
marriage, parallel-cousin marriage, the resulting structure
is what Emrys Peters (1965) has called "the corporate group
[183] _par excellence_." But, as we shall see later, father's
brother's daughter-marriage is more of a cultural ideal than
it is a social reality in al-Qasr.

*613 The interplay of kinship, residence and contract ties
554 defines a corporate structure of authority and also informs
571 an external system of authority relations including all who
claim descent from 'Ali 'Aqar, son of the mythological Sa'ada.
The feeling of "corporateness," and the concomitant structural
demands upon the individual changes as the scope of political
action widens. This degree of corporate feeling is related
to the structural differentiation between what has been interpreted as "domestic relations based on kinship and descent"
and "the field of political relations" (Fortes 1953:26). In
121 this study, I maintain that both the internal and the external
*613 systems of relations are "political" since power and legitimate
554
571 authority are exercized in both. Therefore, rather than use
the terms "domestic" and "political," I shall refer to the
internal system of political relations and the external system

619 Qit'an is one which is employed in both the internal and
675 the external systems of political relations: it is an or-
578 ganized sanction taken by the corporate representatives
626 against socially disapproved behavior. Against the Marabtiin,
619 it involved a closure of group affiliation and protective
675 578 alliance usually obtainable through affinal ties. The Qit'an
*613 were prohibited from marrying into the 'Aishaibat primary
626 segment. The sanction was tested while I was in the field.
•582

> In March of 1965, 'Umda Ziyad of the Qit'an contracted a marriage for his son with one of the secondary groups of the 'Aishaibat. He went through all of the marriage preliminaries and paid a brideprice of 70 E.L. (Egyptian pounds). But afterwards, the girl's family, following the advice of the 'Aishaibi corporate heads, returned the brideprice and refused his offer. The 'Umda of the Qit'an then went to talk to the brothers of the girl (for her father was dead) and told them that he would pay a brideprice of 1000 E.L. "but I want the girl." He paid them part of the brideprice (for they had agreed in the face of this unusual offer) and sent a car to pick up the girl. The arrangement did not succeed, for the paternal cousin of the girl who, according to Bedouin custom and tradition, had a prior claim on her, stopped the car at gunpoint. The corporate heads had told the cousin that this was his right, and in this case, his duty. Then the corporate heads of the 'Aishaibat called a council, and the members met with the brothers of the girl. They told the brothers: "You know what happened at the time of the election. 'Umda Ziyad is 'Ali Ahmar and he should have voted for our _'umda_, but he tricked us." The brothers refused to be persuaded by the tribal leaders. They said that if anyone from the 'Aishaibat would pay them more than 1000 E.L., they would give their sister to him. The leaders warned the brothers that if they went through with this marriage they would each be fined 200 E.L. Finally, and after this meeting, the leaders went to 'Umda Ziyad himself with the threat, that were he to go through with this marriage "all of the 'Aishaibat will begin to fight you." The _'umda_

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> could not afford to risk such large scale conflict and so he withdrew his offer of marriage to the brothers. After this, as a display of authority and an attempt to maintain something of the alliance between their group and the Qit'an, the 'Aishaibi leaders made the public announcement that the girl could marry anyone else, but not the son of 'Umda Ziyad.

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The various sets of authority relations operative in the al-Qasr area are obvious from this account, but they will be better defined as the discussion proceeds. Here, I only wanted to make clear that the relationship between Sa'adi and Marabit is one based upon contract and local contiguity, and reinforced by cognation. There is no unilinear basis for the relationship and no attempt to fit it into a "unilinear genealogical mould." [582] The structural differentiation between Sa'adi and Marabit seems to reflect a dominant-subjective relationship, in the sense discussed by Weber (1947) and Southall (1956), but its possible class overtones are played down by the fact that there are normally no objections to [851] intermarrying between groups. The Bedouin of al-Qasr say, "what is the difference, the children from such a marriage will be Sa'adi anyhow?"

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The Sa'adi-Marabit differentiation is relatively unimportant for a study of al-Qasr itself, since the Marabit number is so small--one lineage consisting of five brothers and their families. The contrast between Sa'adi and Marabit, secular and sacred tribes, becomes more important for a

593 The daughter and wife roles are also subject to the
dominant role of father in al-Qasr Bedouin society. The
father has virtually the right of life and death over his
daughter in certain situations. But in no case does he have
593 this right over his wife. The differentiation in right here
*613 is again a matter of the authority principle operating within
the framework of the lineage system. A man's daughter belongs
[851] to his patrilineage or authority group while his wife belongs
to the authority group of her father. There is an obvious
● [582] exception to this statement about Bedouin society, for given
the practice of parallel-cousin marriage a man and his wife
can belong to the same authority group, the same tertiary
593 group. Even so, only the father has the right of life and
death over the girl who is his daughter. The Bedouins say,
"The bones of the girl belong to the father." There are two
593 situations in which a father may rightfully put his daughter
684 to death: when she is found guilty of pre-marital intercourse
(loss of virginity), or if it is proved that she has had any
extra-marital sexual activity. In either case, if the husband
were to kill the girl he would be guilty of murder and his
group would have to forfeit blood-money or be threatened with
retaliation. I heard of no such actual cases.

593 The father's major duty toward his daughter is to
584 provide her with "a good marriage." This, of course, parallels
his duty toward his son and emphasizes that a father is con-

593 family is a dominant-subjective one. But the rights and duties of the father have no legal sanctions. His authority grows out of the moral and mutual dependence, the common interests and value, which hold the family together. The
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867 authority relations learned in the family become the norms of behavior to be applied by the individual in a wider-scale network of social relations. The son learns the discipline-respect relationship which is the model of behavior between generations. The subjective role which the daughter plays in the father-daughter relationship prepares her for the role of wife.

Marriage and Kinship Relations

● 582

The parallel-cousin, the father's brother's daughter, is the preferred mate in Bedouin marriage. Parallel-cousin marriage in al-Qasr is more of an ideal than a practice. In fact, parallel-cousin marriage is not practical in the case where social order depends upon the integration of a larger and clearly segmented population. Endogamy of this kind in this type of society works against survival in a double-edged way: economic security through cooperation with a larger group is discouraged, and political security through coalition is undermined. In the Middle East, as elsewhere,
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582 cross-cousin marriage is the normative practice which functions "as a counterweight to the tendency of unilineal descent group-

ing to harden social barriers" (Fortes 1953:29).

Wood (1959:74) notes that only 13.3 per cent of the marriages in a Palestinian Arab village, and 9.1 per cent of the marriages in a Syrian Druze village were parallel-cousin marriages. But although parallel-cousin marriage was infrequent, marriage within the secondary group was consistently high. This is true in general for the Middle East. Baer (1964:64) reports that 62.2 per cent of all the marriages in a southern Iraqi village were between members of the secondary group. Rosenfeld (1957), in a comparative study of three Palestinian villages, found the frequency of parallel-cousin marriage to be less than 13.0 per cent in all three villages while the frequencies for intra-secondary group marriage were 33.7 per cent, 31.5 per cent, and 55.8 per cent.

The function of parallel-cousin marriage has been variously explained. The early Orientalists claimed that this form of marriage "strengthened kin ties and kept property in the family" (Westermarck 1925:151). It was noted that the ties between cousins are stronger than those between spouses, that "blood ties are indissoluble but that of matrimony is very precarious" (Lane 1908:161). Patai (1962:170-173) seems to make parallel-cousin marriage a condition for society in the Middle East: this type of marriage functions to keep property in the family; it assures continuation of group harmony in that it presents no new adaptive social situations;

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and, the individual has been socially conditioned to prefer his father's brother's daughter.

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All of these explanations are as plausible as they are obvious. They are, in fact, the same explanations which the Bedouins themselves offer for their marriage ideal. But one cannot help noticing that the explanations offered actually concern an ideal, in Bedouin social behavior, and not a practice. Theories showing the logic of parallel-cousin marriage are placed along side the fact that this type of marriage is statistically atypical.

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[671]
If, as Islamic Law decrees, the daughter did inherit some share of her father's property, then parallel-cousin marriage as an attempt to keep land in the tertiary group would be logical. But we know that usually the sons inherit all of the father's property, Islamic Law to the contrary (Levy 1957:245-246). In this case, parallel-cousin marriage can only be seen as an ideal which functions side by side with the other ideal of a girl's right to inherit.

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Barth (1954), and Murphy and Kasdan (1959) have stressed the political advantages which attach to parallel-cousin marriage in the context of factional struggle. The general idea is that political differentiation between collateral branches of the lineage structure is intensified and political autonomy enhanced by the practice of turning affinal bonds inward. Parallel-cousin marriage then has the opposite

582 171 effect of cross-cousin marriage which is a way for kinship groupings to interrelate and to increase the integration of a larger population.

582 171 114 Such an explanation of parallel-cousin marriage may suffice for an analysis of politics in the tribal mountain villages of Kurdistan. Because Barth (1954:68) found that 48.0 per cent of the Kurd marriages were with the father's brother's daughter, we must assume that this type of relationship is politically significant. But we must question the fact that Murphy and Kasdan arrive at the same conclusion when dealing with parallel-cousin marriage as an abstract concept. If this type of marriage is really politically rational behavior, then it should be the normative practice in the Middle East. In other words, Murphy and Kasdan are explaining a phenomenon which exists only as a cultural ideal, and one which may have never really been a general practice at all--except in those few cases of adaptation to ecological extremes, such as pure nomadism and mountain tribalism. The few records which we have on the marriage practices of pre-Islamic and early Islamic Arabia indicate that parallel-cousin marriage was highly atypical in the Mecca and Hijaz areas. For instance, of the 71 marriages recorded for the Quraish only 9 were with father's brother's daughter and 32 of them were within the secondary group. In the Hijaz, only 15 of 113 marriages, or 3.3 per cent, were with the parallel-cousin (Patai 1962: Ch.6).

582 171 (Patai 1962:Ch. 6).

The point of this is that most of the Middle East's inhabitants are villagers dependent upon agriculture. The dominant form of marriage is not parallel-cousin marriage. As a matter of fact, marriage may or may not be considered exogamous depending upon the level of segmentation at which one wishes to draw the line for his definition of endogamy. Ayoub (1959) suggests that parallel-cousin marriage be considered only as an extreme expression of an overall preference for endogamy. She found in a sample of 514 marriages from a Syrian village that 9.1 per cent of them were with the parallel-cousin while 63.4 per cent were within the secondary group. She concludes from this that intra-lineage marriage is frequent enough that it cannot be accounted for by random mate selection.

582 162 *[613] [595] In 'Ailit Ma'fas of al-Qasr, out of 197 recorded marriages over a period of five generations the frequency of parallel-cousin marriage was 11.1 per cent and marriage within the lineage was 41.6 per cent of the total. Of these 197 marriages, only 39 were cases of polygny and most of these involved a man taking two wives (see Table 5 below).

582 114 196 The confusion over the presence or absence of parallel-cousin marriage in the Middle East is related to the question of whether or not the researcher and the native are talking about the same thing. In Qasr, for instance, the term

[TEXT CONTINUED ON PAGE 116]

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	GENERATIONS					
	5th	4th	3rd	2nd	1st	Total
EXOGAMY						
Extra-Awlad 'Ali	3	11	20	24	3	61
Extra-'Ali Ahmar	1	2	2	1	0	6
Extra-'Aishaibat	1	3	6	4	1	15
Extra-'Ailit Ma'fas	0	1	15	12	5	33
	5	17	43	41	9	115 (58.4%)
ENDOGAMY (within 'Ailit Ma'fas)						
FaBrDa	1	2	8	10	1	22
FaBrSoDa	1	3	3	2	0	9
FaFaBrSoDa	0	0	3	10	5	18
FaFaBrSoSoDa	0	3	1	7	0	11
FaFaFaBrSoDa	0	0	0	0	3	3
FaFaFaBrSoSoDa	0	0	3	4	3	10
FaFaFaBrSoSoSoDa	0	0	1	2	0	3
FaFaFaFaBrSoSoDa	0	0	0	3	0	3
FaFaFaFaFaBrSoSoDa	0	0	0	0	3	3
	2	8	19	38	15	82 (41.6%)
Total	7	25	62	79	24	197

TABLE 5

HISTORY OF EXOGAMY AND ENDOGAMY FOR 'AILIT MA'FAS

582 "parallel cousin" (i.e. bint 'amm) is perfectly interchangeable
114 with the term "parallel-cousin once removed" (i.e. bint ibn
196 'amm, "daughter of the father's brother's son"). After I
[124] had familiarized myself with the genealogies of al-Qasr, I
began to realize that many of my informants were using the
term bint 'amm to refer to the parallel-cousin once, twice,
or even thrice removed. When I pointed this out to one of the
Bedouins, he replied: "So what, there is nothing forbidden
about this type of marriage." Table 5 shows that this is
582 indeed the case. There are a number of cultural ideals
183 which influence the practice of marriage in al-Qasr: endo-
182 gamy is encouraged because it cements and intensifies corpor-
ate ties; exogamy is desired because it widens the web of
kinship; men prefer younger women to older women and may
utilize their cousin-right privilege to realize this preference.

582 The Bedouins of al-Qasr define the bint 'amm over a
829 wide range. One informant said that "all of the girls of the
Awlad 'Ali tribe are my bint 'amm, we are all one." Another
said to me, that "any girl of the 'Ali Ahmar is a man's bint
'amm." And yet another informed me that "a man of the
Qinaishat tribe will reserve his daughter for me before he
will give her to an outsider." Ideologically, a bint 'amm
seemed to be anything except the father's brother's daughter.
This is quite convenient for the Bedouins because an ideologi-
cal concept can be placed anywhere along the scale of actuality

• 582 depending upon the needs of the situation.

829 But one is able to differentiate between the various
582 meanings of *bint 'amm* in al-Qasr. First of all, the Bedouins
196 make an initial dichotamy between the *bint 'amm daira* (*daira* =
*613 "homeland") and the *bint 'amm shaqiiqa* (*shaqiiqa* = "full sister").
The first term refers to any girl within the primary level of segmentation, i.e., the 'Aishaibat, and the latter term refers to the actual father's brother's daughter. Any marriage within the secondary group, i.e., 'Ailit Ma'fas, is referred to simply as a *bint 'amm* marriage--even if it is really a *bint ibn 'amm* marriage. A man has an actual moral claim upon his *bint 'amm shaqiiqa*: such a marriage is an agreement between their fathers who are brothers. A man cannot claim his *bint 'amm daira* but he might assume that if she is not claimed by her father's brother's son (*ibn 'amm*), his claim will be favored over that of an outsider.

582 The differentiation between these two types of cousin role is made in terms of rights and obligations which define social relations in al-Qasr. Social action is based upon these expectations of behavior. In al-Qasr, a man really does claim his *bint 'amm shaqiiqa*. If his claim is thwarted, he will attempt to do something about it, and whatever the consequences, his group is committed to back him in this
[182] matter. Parallel-cousin marriage may be an important basis
[578] for integration, or it may be the cause of bitter conflict.

584 A girl has the right to refuse to marry her ibn 'amm.
•582 But if she exercises this right, he can actually insure that she remains unmarried for the rest of her life. While I was in the field there were three cases of a girl refusing to marry her cousin. In one, the boy was persuaded into allowing the bint 'amm to marry his rival. In this case, the rival presented the girl's cousin with a sheep and a small cash sum. The Bedouins say that a man will claim his cousin even if he does not wish to marry her. He will wait until someone does wish to marry the girl, and then he will demand a payment from the suitor for the right to marry his cousin. In another case, a man and his daughter of a Marabit tribe came to al-Qasr to plant a small patch of barley during the rainy season. While they were there, the father married the girl off to a member of 'Ailit Ma'fas. The father did this despite the fact that her cousin back in her own territory had made explicit his claim to her. The father, when he returned home,
*[613] [686] was fined 30 L.E. by his lineage, the money going to the girl's cousin as a "expiatory payment." The father could afford to do this considering the large brideprice which he received from 'Ailit Ma'fas, and the fact that he had no other sons or daughters to marry off meant that he need not fear the closure of marriage channels by the group. In the third case, a girl openly refused to marry her cousin because she loved another man. To avoid conflict, her father said that

582 [584] she could marry no man.

582 578 Most of the older Bedouins say that bint 'amm marriage as it is practiced in the desert is an evil, that it causes nothing but trouble. They say that if there are bad feelings between two men they will place claims upon each other's sister with the intention of preventing the girls from ever marrying. The younger Bedouins say that "it is better to marry the bint 'amm than to let a stranger take her." The [182] [571] [586] claim on the bint 'amm, of course, should be seen as a basis for social relationships between groups, regardless of any conflict it may or may not lead to. This is why the Bedouins say that a man "will never divorce his bint 'amm, because if he does that means that she is no good." It follows, then, that if "she is no good" none of her other paternal cousins will marry her. Implicit here is the reference to the making [182] and breaking of group ties. Similarly, to regulate and to maximize kinship ties, a man can claim only one of his father's brother's daughters. In the case where there is only one bint 'amm, her eldest cousin has first claim to her. 582 578 159 This sometimes causes conflict between brothers as the following informant's story indicates.

> The father of Salih and Aziz was dead which meant that Aziz, being the elder, would have to furnish the brideprice if Salih were to marry first. In fact, Salih wanted to marry his bint 'amm. Aziz refused him permission to do so: Aziz had first claim to the bint 'amm, and, also, he thought that the brideprice which

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her father was asking was too high. Salih was angry, so angry that he swore to kill any man who tried to take his bint 'amm. He went away to the Nile Valley to earn enough money to pay the high brideprice. In the meantime, the cousin of the brothers came and paid Aziz for the permission to marry the girl. Salih returned, but, of course, he could not kill his own paternal cousin. He became ill and went into a sleep which lasted for three days. Salih had always been known for his powerful voice but when he awoke he had a very weak voice. Salih never spoke to his brother again. He died seven years ago without every marrying.

582 578 829 [182] This story has aprocryphal aspects which announce this to be an important issue in Bedouin culture. The subject of parallel-cousin marriage is a complex one surrounded by controversy and contradiction. The older Bedouins say that the practice is a source of conflict, but they will usually insist that at least one of their sons marry his bint 'amm to insure the corporate link with the brother. In support of their complaints, they say that bint 'amm marriage is not morally sanctioned: "We do not like it and it is not right. But if we try to stop our sons from taking their cousins they will put a gun on their shoulder and go after her." On the other hand, this is contrasted with the complaints of the elders that their sons no longer respect their marriage habits, that they are marrying anyone these days: "Our sons resent the bint 'amm marriage because it is an agreement between fathers."

582 While I was in the field, three marriages took place; one was with the bint 'amm, and the other two were outside the secondary group but within the primary group, i.e., inter-lineage.

562 593 in Bedouin society, that is, the role of wife-daughter. The
554 principles of patrilineality and cognation do not work against
182 each other when the girl marries outside her corporate group,
578 nor does her new dual role present a case of role conflict.
562 593 On the contrary, the wife-daughter role functions to bind to-
554 gether two groups which are structurally differentiated by
182 578 the rule of patrilineality. During time of peace, the wife-
*613 daughter acts as a bond-maker by carrying gifts back and
[431] forth between the two groups, often bringing some of her
[628] [574] younger patrilineal relatives back to her husband's house or
562 tent for short visits. During a time of conflict or war, the
593 Bedouins point out, she is the only person who can cross the
554 battle lines unharmed. She is a match-maker as well as a
[726] [584] peace-maker. Often she influences the selection of mates by
individuals in both her husband's group and her father's
562 group. The Bedouins say that "after the bint 'amm, a man
593 should marry his bint khal ("mother's brother's daughter")
554 because she is like his bint 'amm." Usually, over a period
582 of a few generations, a given direction in marriage is sustained (see Figure 10), and it is one function of this wife-daughter role to accomplish this important political action.

562 The role of wife-daughter, then, may be seen as one
593 important aspect of what Fortes (1953:33) calls, "complemen-
554 *613 tary filiation," the essential mechanism which provides the
182 link between the corporate groups of al-Qasr society and the kin groups of the parent who does not determine descent.

000 kin groups of the parent who does not determine descent. A
182 corollary aspect of the filiation principle in al-Qasr is the
601 602 practice of collaterally extending the term, *khal*, to include
604 many others besides the real mother's brother. This usage
[114] of classificatory terminology, like that in the case of *bint
601 'amm*, leads to confusion for the fieldworker. When an in-
604 dividual marries into an outside group, or even within the
561 secondary group, the wife's brother becomes *khal* not only to
182 the offspring of the marriage, but to all the children (*awlad*)
at the same generation level as the offspring. All boys of
the age of sister's son will refer to his mother's brother
as *khali* ("my mother's brother"). Besides extending the web
of kinship, this practice also has the function of uniting
age-mates of the local descent group.

604 Throughout this discussion of mother's brother, I
582 have been stressing the fact that the sentiment which a
[829] Bedouin develops toward this person is to be construed as a
political value, i.e., a behavioral disposition relevant to
the political process. It is patent then that the sister's
son-mother's brother relationship should be more crucial in
exogamous marriages, for in these cases cognation becomes the
principal mechanism for establishing authority relations and
effecting political alliance. In endogamous marriages, cog-
nation complements the other structural principles which
define the corporate group, and makes it the corporate group
par excellence.

000 par excellence.

604 829 867 The inculcation of political values is part of the socialization process. A Bedouin boy is taught that his khal is a very special person, and one whom he should admire. It is commonplace in al-Qasr to hear small boys matching the exploits and skills of their maternal uncles, bragging and exaggerating about their khal: this one is a great horseman, and that one is a great marksman with the rifle. On the other hand, if the mother's brother is from within the local group, rights and obligations toward him will be structured in terms of other kinship roles which take precedence according to the rule of descent. 604 602 582 [605] For instance, in the ideal-typical case of bint 'amm marriage the mother's brother of sister's son would also be the father's father's brother's son in relation to ego. This would mean, in another way, that ego's mother's brother is also ego's father's parallel cousin. Male parallel cousins "are like brothers," and so ego would be expected to behave toward this person not as a "mother's brother" but as a "father." Whereas the boy enjoys a certain freedom of expression and comradeship with his exogamous mother's brother, he would have to pay "father-like" respect and obedience to his endogamous mother's brother.

604 582 The crucial importance of the khal, and the political significance of the bonds which this role represents, is made clear in the following statement of an informant who contrasted

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582 the exogamous and endogamous mother's brother.

> If the khal is from outside the tribe, we can do no wrong to him if he does no wrong to us. If the khal is a member of the tribe, he is respected; but not like the khal from outside the tribe. The feeling between a man and his khal is much stronger if the khal is from outside the tribe. Within my own 'aiela (secondary group), I respect the maternal uncles of Bait so-and-so as much as I respect the maternal uncles of my own bait (tertiary group).

[829] Ideas and sentiment about the mother's brother as they are related to complementary filiation should be interpreted as having a definite influence on marriage practice and politics in al-Qasr.

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*613 A sample from the marriages of 'Ailit Ma'fas (see Figure 10 below) shows that endogamous marriages are no more frequent than those which function to bring a new member into the corporate group--although the man's spouse never really becomes a member of the lineage. [587] Only five of the seventeen marriages were within the 'aiela, and one of these was a case of sororate which acted to maintain an already established tie. Six of the marriages were with groups not belonging to the Awlad 'Ali tribe. In each of these cases, with the exception of one, the marriage represents the establishment of ties between groups who live in areas contiguous with one another. Four of the marriages shown in Figure 10 were within the primary segment, i.e., with other lineages of al-Qasr; three out of these four were contracted with

[TEXT CONTINUED ON PAGE 133]

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
'Umar Hassan Ma'fas =1. Lazumi of 'Aishaibat
2. Suwaitat of Jumi'at
3. Masamir in Libya
4. Kamailat of 'Ali Ahmar
Abd al-Malik =1. Bait Kailani of Ma'fas
2. Kamailat of 'Ali Ahmar
3. Sister of #1
Yunis=1. FaBrSoDa
2. Jumi'at
Jabril=1. FaBrDa
Ya'qub=1. Lazumi of 'Aishaibat
2. Suwaitat of Jumi'at
Abd al-Latif=1. Harabi
2. Bait Braik of Ma'fas
3. Lazumi
4. Suwaitat of Jumi'at
5. Dawlat of 'Aishaibat

FIGURE 10

Endogamic and Exogamic Marriages in Bait 'Umar of 'Ailit Ma'fas

*613 •582 'Ailit Lazumi, the other lineage, along with 'Ailit Ma'fas, considered to be the most powerful in al-Qasr. In the fourth [423] case, Abd al-Latif's marriage into 'Ailit Dawlat, this individual owns an olive orchard in Dawlat territory, adjacent to that of Ma'fas, which he purchased from a member of his wife's lineage before their marriage. *613 582 421 In every case, with one exception, marriage ties are intimately related to property relations, cognation with local contiguity. The two groups become politically entwined, and property relations become a basis for authority relations.

*613 All things considered, complementary filiation is as important in Bedouin society as it is in other societies: "The bilateral family is the focal element in the web of kinship" (Fortes 1953:33). [533] As one Bedouin wedding song puts it: "The bride is the flower of the stem," the stem here symbolizing her tertiary group.

583 554 556 The amount of brideprice which a man is expected to pay will depend upon his status as an "outsider" or an "insider," and his position on the prestige scale which is figured largely in terms of wealth. A man adds to his prestige and reputation when he pays beyond the "going price" to obtain a bride for his son. On the other hand, if a man is an "outsider," he is expected to pay well beyond the normal brideprice for the privilege of marrying into the family, and he receives no additional prestige unless he goes even higher than what is

586 Naturally, according to the rule of patriliny, all
851 children from a marriage belong to the husband and become
*613 members of his lineage. Should divorce occur while a woman
is nursing, she will take the child with her and it will be
returned after weaning. Sometimes the husband will permit the
wife to keep one child--always a girl--in order "to keep her
company."

587 The practice of the sororate has been noted. The
Bedouins also believe that "a man should marry his brother's
widow so that she will have someone to help her with the
children." But I have no data on the frequencies of these
12 practices. When I gathered my data on marriage, my informants
58 would give me only the name of the tribe or lineage into which
a man married, and never did I get the name of a man's wife.
[829] (One lineage in al-Qasr, entirely refused to give me data
on genealogy or marriage because, as one leader said, "it is
not decent to speak of these things with people.") Sororal
595 polygny is forbidden (Quran IV:23), and the Bedouins say
that a man cannot marry more than one bint 'amm. Marriage
182 practices, such as sororate and levirate, I interpret as
[587] patterns which maintain structural continuity and political
advantage. The custom of permitting a man to marry only
•[582] one of his father's brother's daughters may be seen as a
precaution against intensifying authority relations and the
degree of segmentation.

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578 said: "I did not take anything." The *'awaaqil* of both parties
685 met and told the accused: "If you have anything give it to
*613 695 us; if you do not have anything then swear the oath to this
[571] fact." Members of 'Ailit Ma'fas said that the boy was innocent
[692] and told the *'awaaqil* that the boy should have his rights
according to the *'awaiyid* (i.e. he should be allowed to swear
the oath to establish his innocence). The boy accused of the
theft, his father, and two other members of 'Ailit Ma'fas
selected by the accusers swore the oath and the problem was
619 over. Two months later, the accuser from the Kamailat lost
578 his eye in an accident, because swearing the oath has con-
685 695 sequences for both parties. A bad oath will work against the
784 one who makes it; there will be a curse upon him, his children,
and his money. And the bad effects of an oath will also work
against the one who falsely accuses another making him swear
the oath.

•582 The final two cases deal with marriage rights. The
562 first illustrates a number of things which I have touched on
*613 in the previous discussion of marriage: that a man may choose
792 to ignore the jural structures of the lineage group where the
desires of his offspring are concerned; that the female is
not the totally subjugated person which one might expect to
find in the strongly patrilineal Bedouin society; and that the
role of "holy man" functions in the marital area of authority
relations.

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562 The second, rather complex, case occurred while I was in the field. Once again, the role of the "holy man" is shown to operate in cases dealing with women. Shown here also is an interesting example of the cultural definition of abnormality.

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792 No Date. Case: Quarrel between 'Ailit al-Abaidi ('Ali Abyad) and 'Ailit al-Afrad ('Ali Abyad) over marriage rights. A man from al-Abaidi agreed that his daughter could marry a man but the rest of the _'aiela_ did not approve of this marriage. Since the man could not go to his _'aqila_, who disapproved of the marriage, he took his problem to a "holy man." The "holy man" decided that the girl should marry the man she wanted to marry, but he was afraid that this would cause trouble in the _'aiela_. The "holy man" decided to marry the man and woman, [586] and then to divorce them for a period of one year so that the conflict would abate. The girl's father knew of this marriage but the other members of the _'aiela_ did not. After a period of one year, the groom went to the "holy man" and said: "Decide anything that I can do, but I must have the girl." The "holy man" decided to make him pay a _kubaara_ (expiation) fee of [681] [684] 100 L.E. to the girl's _'aiela_, and he married them again.

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582 Date: 1965. Case: Quarrel within a tertiary segment of the Qinaishat tribe concerning marriage rights. A girl from the Qinaishat tribe had refused to marry her paternal cousin, but he was insistent upon his right to have her.

*613 he was insistent upon his right to have her. She went to
619 578 see the "holy man," al-Sanusi, who lives near al-Qasr. (Al-
•582 Sanusi is a descendent of "the Great Sanusi," the founder of
793 al-Sanusiyya, who now lives in Egypt after having been exiled
from Libya.) Al-Sanusi decided to keep the girl at his farm
*613 until he could decide a course of action. One night, the
619 girl's cousin secretly came to the Sanusi farm and found her
578 582 room. The girl was sleeping. The cousin struck a match, the
793 girl awoke and was frightened. She jumped from her bed and
683 began to run, in so doing she fell down a flight of stairs
and suffered a rupture. This was a serious offense which the
cousin had committed, and al-Sanusi decided that he should call
all of the 'awaaqil of the area to inform them of this. In the
meantime, he sent the girl back to her home and the cousin
continued to bother her concerning his rights over her.

[584] The cousin went so far as to "offer the blood-sacrifice for
her," a stage in the marriage process which signifies that the
union has been consented to by both families. The girl's
father was dead, and her brothers and uncles were unable to
keep the cousin away from the girl. (It may be assumed that
they were conscious of his rights to bint 'amm.) They had
[692] even beaten him once. All of the 'awaaqil of 'Ali Ahmar and
'Ali Abyad, and the Marabtiin in the al-Qasr area came to meet
with al-Sanusi at his farm. He (al-Sanusi) said that they all

*613 must come because he, himself, was a Libyan and a member of
619 no tribe in Egypt. Al-Sanusi's petition was two-fold: he
578 said the cousin should be punished for violating his right of
•582 privacy and property, and the question concerning the cousin's
793 right to the girl should be settled. The _'awaaqil_ decided
683 that al-Sanusi should be awarded a _kubaara_ of 1000 L.E. from
692 the tribes of the area, and that the girl should be permitted to marry no man of the Qinaishat tribe. Al-Sanusi refused to accept the _kubaara_, and this was the correct thing to do since the _kubaara_, especially a large one, is only offered ritualistically. The _'awaaqil_ took note of the cousin's rights to his _bint 'amm_: they said that since the girl refused to marry him it would not be right if she married anyone else from the tribe.
*613 Furthermore, the _'awaaqil_, on the basis of the cousin's behavior
619 in this matter, decided that the cousin was insane and should
734 be committed to an asylum. They informed the police in Marsa
[648] Matruh of this diagnosis and decision, and the police came and transported the boy to the mental hospital in Cairo where he is today. The uncles of the boy signed the papers which committed him.

634 his brother sits in his place.

554 The present shaikh is a member of 'Ailit Ma'fas, and
634 this is to offset the fact that the office of 'umda is in
*613 'Ailit Lazumi. It reflects the need to distribute official
554 power and to symbolize the real power structure. Historically,
the Lazumi were more powerful than the Ma'fas. These two
lineages are the largest, wealthiest, and most influential
in al-Qasr and among the 'Aishaibat. When the present
[666] shaikh's father decided to retire due to old age, he requested
[571] that his son be allowed to take up his role. The 'awaaqil
of the 'Aishaibat in al-Qasr approved this "nomination" and
[556] the son was "elected." It is a fact that the shaikh's father
is the richest man among the members of the 'Ailit Ma'fas
and that the 'umda's father was the richest man of 'Ailit
Lazumi.

571 Power groups tend to interact so as to enhance not
*613 the official authority structure but the political status quo
•582 (Peters 1967:279). This explains a practice of the "status
group" which Max Weber referred to as "connubism," the tendency
of the members of this group to exchange women among themselves.
*613 In Figure 10,[1] the marriages of 'Ait Abd al-Malik of Bait 'Umar
582 of 'Ailit Ma'fas show that out of seventeen marriages only
four of these were within the 'Aishaibat, and that three out
of four of these marriages were with 'Ailit Lazumi. Even
more impressive is the information obtained from considering

[1] [See p. 132--Analyst]

*613 all of the marriages in the history of 'Ailit Ma'fas (see
•582 Table 1).[1] From a total of 197 marriages, 33 were within the 'Aishaibat tribe. Of these 33 marriages with the other lineages of al-Qasr (see Figure 3 for the lineages of al-Qasr), 2 were with 'Ailit Abu Qarasa, and 2 with 'Ailit Zallat, 4 each were with 'Ailit Zagharat, 'Ailit Dawlat, and 'Ailit Shraif, but 17, or just over 50 per cent, were with 'Ailit Lazumi.

634 For the time being, the offices of _'umda_ and _shaikh_
554 seem to be modern symbols of the traditional power structure rather than loci of real power, though this does not preclude their becoming so in the future. But for the present, these roles are considered "not of the people, not of the desert,
634 they belong to the government." Here is the way one _'aqila_
554 explained it:
*613

> The _'umda_ is higher in the government but the _'aqila_ is the responsible one in the _'aiela_. The _shaikh_ has nothing to do with _'awaqil_, he only makes contact between them and the government . . . The _'umda_ gets the request from the government and asks the _'awaqil_ to handle the situation, but he does not tell them how
> 634 to do it . . . The _'umda_ and _shaikh_ go to meetings with
> 635 the Governor, then they tell the _'awaqil_ about the matters discussed. There is no direct contact between
> *613 the Governor and the _'awaqil_ . . . The _'umda_ comes to the _'awaqil_ concerning general problems . . .
> 554 If the Arabs need something from the government, they go to the _'umda_. They tell him to go and tell the Governor what they want . . . The _'umda_ represents them and he does good in this. God only knows if he is doing a good job. If he is not it will show in the next election.

634
554 From the standpoint of the political system of al-Qasr, we might conclude that the _'umda_ and _shaikh_ are roles

[1] [This should read Table 5. See p.115--Analyst]

156 to serve other than what they eat." Hajj 'Ali is not only
159 conscious of social stratification in his society, but he also
554
571 has a great deal of empathy with the less endowed, a pre-
574 requisite of a traditional Bedouin leader and an advantageous
796 one for a modern leader.
123

He is aware of most traditional institutions and how
156 they relate to conditions of modernity. Hajj 'Ali, whose own
159 marriages speak for his political acumen, sees only disadvantages
554
829 in the cousin-right marriage custom of the Bedouins. His
• 582 interest in getting on with the business of change, so to
speak, has led him to question a basic right contained in the
Bedouin principle of lineage structure and corporate membership.

> A thing which I do not like about our customs is the idea that a man has a right to his uncle's daughter. The man binds his cousin and in the end he might not marry her and will be the cause of her never marrying. He gives himself the authority to decide whom she may or may not marry. If he knows she desires to marry a certain man, he says: "She can marry anyone but not that one."

[562] Here he challenges the traditional right of the individual
male in Bedouin society, favoring the rights of the female.
[177] The emancipation of the female, especially in rights and
[178] duties concerned with the marriage contract, is an element
[562] of the modernization process in Egyptian society and the
Middle East in general.

* 613 The bait, as a political group, is in part structurally
602 defined by the corporate principle which states that blood-kin
571
682

682 if the host group is genealogically close enough to the murderer's group
778 as to be themselves part of the vengeance group. As soon as the per-
613 mission is granted the head of the host group starts negotiations on behalf of the murderer. Since the basic reason for the nazala is to avoid the direct confrontation between the two opposing groups, the first task of the negotiations is to define which places and markets each group can go to during the year of the nazala. Once this has been agreed upon, the difficult task of settling the dispute begins. The success or failure of the negotiations depends on the skill of the negotiator and the weight his tribal segment has in the area. This makes it of extreme importance for the murderer to select the tribal segment which can affect such a settlement. In cases where the host group is not particularly powerful, the victim's group pretends to agree to a settlement in order to have the murderer and his group leave the locality of the host group and then takes revenge by killing the murderer. This cannot happen when the host group is powerful, since such an action would automatically make the host group enemies of the victim's group.

619 With very few exceptions which will be dealt with later, the right
184 to offer refuge is limited to the Sa'adi tribes. No Murabiteen tribe can
778
682 grant refuge to a murderer, although they themselve can seek refuge at a Sa'adi tribal segment if one of them is involved in murder.

619 Another less conspicuous manifestation of the inferior position of
184 the Murabiteen relative to the Sa'adi is the fact that the bloodmoney
[682] for the Murabit is two-thirds that for the Sa'adi man. Also, until very
[582] recently, marriage of a Sa'adi to a member of the Murabiteen tribes was considered by the Sa'adi as a very poor choice and was discouraged.

619
184 In recent years this has changed, however. The increased importance
178 of wealth in the recently introduced money economy relaxed the en-
582 dogamous tendency that was characteristic of the Sa'adi tribes.

619 In discussing the position of the Murabiteen tribes it is worth
184 noting that not all the Murabiteen tribes in the area occupy the same
position. Some enjoy relatively higher positions than the others. Actually, there are two kinds of Murabiteen in the area: Mustaqillen (independent Murabiteen); and the dependent Murabiteen. The latter are further subdivided into Murabiteen bil-baraka (with the blessing); and Murabiteen bil-sadaqa (with the tribute). The only independent Murabiteen in the area is the Gemei'at tribe. These are the original settlers
[173] of the area. Because of their help to Awlad Ali against the Hanadi, the
latter were defeated and Awlad Ali were able to occupy the Western Desert. For their part the Gemei'at tribe was granted its independence by Awlad Ali and were given one-third of the total area as their homeland (watan).
619 In theory, the Gemei'at tribe occupies the same position and has the same
184 rights as the Sa'adi tribes, including the right to offer their protec-
778 tion which is denied to all other client groups. In practice, however,
682 this seems to be of no practical value. None of my informants could remember a single case in which a murderer has taken refuge at a segment
619 of the Gemei'at tribe. The importance of the nazala is not merely to be
778 safe from the pursuit of the victim's group but rather to provide the
184 mediators who undertake the crucial task of negotiation on behalf of the
682 murderer and his gorup. It is the ability to settle the dispute on a
627
628 permanent basis that offers the actual long-lasting protection, even
after the time of the nazala expires. To be successful in his pursuit,

Still, according to the unofficial estimates,
585 only about ten per cent of all marriages are registered, and these are
656 177 mainly mixed marriages involving a tribal person and a non-tribal one
582 or a tribal member who is not living in the area anymore. The reason
619 is that such a spouse, especially when he is the husband, is not under
the control of the tribal customs and therefore cannot be forced to fulfill
his obligations if he fails to do so. Most of the tribal population
[581] still feel that marriage is a personal and family affair that
should be kept away from the State legal system.

584 Marriage among Awlad Ali is a relatively informal procedure. When
593 a man decides to marry a certain girl, he informs his mother who, in
turn, informs his father. The father may have objections to his son's choice of the bride. Such objections may be based on already strained relations between the two families or the questionable reputation of the girl or any member of her family. In such cases, the father tries to dissuade his son from going ahead with the marriage. The father is
[583] usually successful in controlling his son's choice when the latter is
dependent on his father for the payment of the bridewealth called "mahr" and for the support of his new household. This is usually the case in the man's first marriage. In subsequent marriages and in the cases where the son has independent means of support for himself and his bride, the father's control of the son's choice is minimal, and asking the father's approval is a matter of formality. In second and subsequent
593 595 marriages, the approval of the older wives is essential. The
584 older wives have no right to object to the husband taking an additional
wife, but they have the right to object to the choice on the basis that the new bride is hard to get along with or that there is animosity between her family and the families of the other wives which makes

The bride's father
584 did not have to pay kabara, although he held
586 a big feast in which he slaughtered three sheep and invited the groom,
558 his father and a number of his friends and friends of the girl's father
in honor of the groom as a compromise.

583 Before the fatha is read, the two families usually agree on the
amount of bridewealth, or "mahr", to be paid by the groom or his father.
The amount of bridewealth depends upon a number of criteria, important
among which is the relative position of the bride's and groom's families
and the degree of relationship that exists between them. The lowest
mahr is usually paid in the case of cousin marriages. The amount ranges
from 10 to 50 pounds. Sometimes when the groom cannot afford any mahr,
he pays only the religiously required sum of 25 Egyptian piasters.
This is never the case if the groom and bride are more distantly re-
lated. When the groom is an outsider or a member of another tribe, the
mahr is usually much higher. Several cases of mahr of more than 2,000
pounds are reported in the area. There was a case in which the mahr
reached 10,000 Egyptian pounds ($22,000). The amount of mahr also de-
pends on the beauty of the bride. In the case of the highest known
mahr mentioned above, the woman was known to be of great beauty. There
[587] is no distinction made between previously married women and ones mar-
ried for the first time. In the case above, the woman was married three
times before, and the mahr was apparently higher than that paid for her
[602] in her first marriage. Increasing the mahr according to the kinshp
distance between the bride and groom reflects the preference of endoga-
582 mous marriages. The preferred marriage match in the area is that of
the patrilateral parallel cousin marriage. The father's brother's son,
"ibn 'amm," has an undisputed claim over his cousin, "bint 'amm." Even
when they are of incompatible age, or even if the man is married or for

582 some reason or other cannot marry his cousin, he still has that legal claim on his cousin. She cannot marry another man without the consent of her cousin. He has the right to forcibly take her away and even kill her or her husband in protection of his right. Although in the few cases where this had happened in the past, the groom had to pay full blood money. Such killing, however, was considered as justified and never resulted in retaliation or feuds among the tribal segments involved.

582
682

582
124 However, it is difficult to call cousin marriage among the group "preferential" marriage. In a limited quantitative study I asked 35 tribal members who have unmarried daughters over the age of 12 the following question: "If you had your choice, to whom would you give your daughter in marriage: your brother's son or another man who is wealthier or more respected?" Twenty-six said they would rather have their daughters married to someone other than their nephews. The reasons given were that their nephews did not make enough money to either pay her a good mahr or to support her without outside help. The nine who preferred to marry their daughters to their nephews emphasized the fact that the girl's cousin is likely to look after her interests and take care of her more than the outsider "who may not fear God in his treatment of my daughter," as one of the respondents to the questionnaire expressed it. They also said that their nephew is more under their control than the outsider. They further maintained that a person is likely to know his nephew more than he knows an outsider or a more distant relative. One of the informants put it, "Even if my nephew is a cheat, at least I know that this is all that is wrong with him." All thirty-five informants felt that they were obliged to give their daughters in marriage

582 124 to their nephews if the latter demanded "because it is the right of the girl's cousin." And all but two said they would ask the permission of the girl's cousin before marrying her to an outsider, even if they knew that the nephew had no intention of marrying her himself, "to prevent the development of difficulties in the future."

On the other hand, when the same group was asked, "If you had your choice, would you rather marry your cousin or another woman who was wealthier or more beautiful," they answered as follows:

Marry their cousin	11
Marry someone else	24
Total	35

Two reasons were given by the eleven who chose to marry their cousins. The first is that they knew more about the temperament and the moral character of their cousin than about the other woman no matter how beautiful or wealthy she might be. Four of the eleven respondents said they would like to marry their cousin because they could not afford to pay the high bridewealth for a distant relative or an outsider. Although the sample I selected was by no means representative of the total tribal population in the area, yet, it points at least to the fact that parallel cousin marriage is considered by the father of the girl more as a duty or obligation than a choice, while from the standpoint of the suitor, it is viewed as a right which he can invoke at will.

582 557 It seems that many invoke such a right even when they have no serious intention of marrying their bint'amm. The purpose apparent in the numerous cases where this happened was to obtain money from the prospective groom who has to get the approval of the cousin to prevent trouble. In some cases the man invokes his right to force his uncle or the groom to concede to some demands, such as the sale of the right to use a piece

582 of parley land or a well or to make him a partner in a business or smug-
557 gling activities or even as revenge on his uncle by keeping his daughters
582 unmarried. In 1961 the heads of 25 prominant baits of various tribes
557 in the area of Matruh met and decided that the right of ibn 'amm had
178 become a major problem, and that invoking that right when the man had
613 no intention of marrying the girl had resulted in a number of disputes
that became serious over a period of time. They felt that the time was
suitable to revise that right and make it subject to the concept of fair
behavior applicable to other rights. They wrote a new rule which speci-
582 fies that the man has the right to prevent his cousin from marrying an
557 outsider or a more distant relative only if he himself intends to marry
178 her either in the present or in the reasonable future. If the circum-
613 stances show that he cannot do so, then he forfeits the right.
625

[558] To prevent his cousin from marrying another man without a proven
[681] intention on the part of the man to marry her himself in the fore-
seeable future, is considered as an unreasonable behavior for which
ibn 'amm could be liable to pay kabara to his uncle as well as to the
prospective groom. It also denies him the right of taking her away from
[683] her marital residence by force. If he does this, he would be liable to
the compensation for assault. The agreement was signed by the awaqil
and is considered binding as far as the baits they represented are con-
cerned. Other tribal segments in the area refuse to abide by the agree-
ment and consider it as a pretentious departure from the ways of Awlad Ali
which should not be encouraged. Even within the tribal segments involved
in the agreement, there have been reports of individuals who refused to
[629] abide by the agreement. In certain of these latter cases, the ibn 'amm
selected as his mardi a member of a tribal segment not involved in the
agreement and therefore not morally bound to abide by
its contents.

000 agreement and therefore not morally bound to abide by its contents.

● 582 The lack of serious intentions to marry one's cousin is reflected in the actual frequency of patrilateral parallel cousin marriage in the
582 area. The following table is taken from the genealogies of five camps
621 in the area of Burg el Arab. The camps belong to different tribal
613 groupings:
619

Agnatic cousins	5
Other cousins	12
Within the bait (other than above)	9
Within the Eila (other than above)	13
Within the tribe (other than above	11
With members of the client tribe	15
With outsiders	9
Total	74

The above table shows that the frequency of patrilateral parallel cousin marriage is less than eight per cent of the total marriages included in
582 the genealogies of the camps studied. It also shows that the largest
619 frequency of marriage is with a member of a client tribe of Murabiteen. In the majority of the fifteen cases (eleven cases), it is the woman who is a member of the Murabiteen tribe while the man is a member of the Sa'adi tribe. The Murabiteen tribes from which the wives came are not always the clients of the particular tribal segment to which the husband belonged.
[583] One explanation of the popularity of marriage to the Murabiteen is that the bridewealth among them is generally less than it is for the Sa'adi girls. It therefore gives the man the advantage of lower bride-
582 wealth without the lack of choice involved in the cousin marriage. It is important to bear in mind, however, that the sample given above is by no means representative of the entire tribal population. Furthermore, the material presented above was based on the actual marriages at the

582 [114] [586] time of the study. I have no information about the marital history of the men included in the genealogies. This is particularly important if we realize that the frequency of divorce in the area is quite high and that there is a certain prohibition against ever marrying within a certain degree of relationship of his first wife.

582 779 According to the Koraan, a man is forbidden to marry certain classes of women. Some of these women are permanently prohibited and others are only temporarily so. Marriage is forbidden with what are called the "maharem" (sing. mahram or non-marriageables). They are one's female ascendants and descendants; the former wives of one's ascendants or desendants; one's sister and the female descendants of one's sister and brother; one's paternal and maternal aunts and the sisters and aunts of the ascendants; one's mother-in-law and all female ascendants of one's wife. Marriage with the first cousin and the half-brother's half-sister (from another marriage) is therefore permitted. The second category of [853] forbidden women are those related to the man by nursing. The wet nurse takes the place of the mother, and her relatives are treated as if she was the actual mother of the person in question.

In addition to the above, there is the prohibition of the simultaneous marriage of two women who are related to each other to the extent that had one of them been male and the other female, they would have come to the forbidden degree in marriage. This latter prohibition is not a permanent one and is restricted to the marriage of the two women at the same time. As soon as the marriage with one of them is dissolved, there is no prohibition on marrying the other one. Yet, although aware of the lecense given by the Islamic law to such marriage,

582 779 and although they are not considered wrong or sinful, there is a general feeling of distaste among the tribal population to such marriages. They usually attribute this distaste to the fact that if the marriage with the first sister did not work out, there is no reason to expect the marriage with the second to be successful.* Although this might account, in part, for the low rate of cousin marriage in the group when present wives of the individuals are taken into consideration, yet, the effect of that practice should not be exaggerated. For although that prohibition might curb the marriage with the cousin who is the sister of a previous wife, it does not restrict the marriage with another cousin who is a cousin, rather than a sister of the first wife.

584 431 During the period that follows and until the marriage is final, the groom is supposed to bring gifts to the bride. These gifts are usually a wide silver bracelet that is used as an engagement ring. Also gifts of clothes and jewelry are quite customary. Such gifts become the private property of the bride and are to be returned only if the engagement is broken for fault on the part of the bride or any member of her family. In such cases, her father has to return all the gifts his daughter has accepted as well as the expenses that the groom's visitations have cost him.

585 583 779 431 The marriage is affected and finalized by the payment of the bridewealth. In Islamic law the bridewealth is supposed to be paid to the bride herself as a gift and not to her father, which had been a significant departure from the pre-Islamic practice where two types of bridewealth were paid: the sadaqa paid to the father of the bride or her

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[587] * This does not apply to cases where the first wife dies. In such cases, it is not objectionable to marry her sister, although the incidences of sororate are rare among the population.

and of reading and writing, and of their strict performance of religious duties. This reputation was doubtless enhanced by their foreign origin, for the Bedouin of Cyrenaica were accustomed to look to the west for piety. 795* 793 554

At one time many, perhaps all, the Shaikhs of lodges were fairly well educated in such subjects as theology, canon law, and commentaries on sacred texts. To-day most of these alumni of Jaghbub University are dead and their successors, brought up in the bitter years since 1911, are for the most part very ignorant, some being almost as illiterate as the Bedouin themselves. The Bedouin regard them with a curious mixture of respect and condescension. They look up to them as learned and pious men who possess *baraka*, they kiss their hands, they call them '*Sidi*', and they listen respectfully to their admonishments and arbitraments. At the same time they look down on them for not being tribesmen and Bedouin, children of the tents. The Bedouin harmonize these conflicting attitudes by saying that a *Marabat* is a different kind of person from a Bedouin and cannot be expected to behave in the same way or to have the same outlook. He has been brought up to read books, pray, wash, and to do other things the Bedouin finds unnecessary in his own life. He has not been reared in the roving life of the tents nor learned the shepherd's art. Since they regard the *Ikhwan* as a different kind of people, the Bedouin do not intermarry with them nor with the Sanusi family, who belong to the same category. The *Ikhwan* families marry among themselves. The Sanusi family marry the daughters of *Ikhwan*, but do not give their daughters to persons outside their own kin. [212] [582] 795* 582

The importance of the *Ikhwan* families in the history of the development of the Sanusiya is evidently very great. From the foundation of al-Zawiya al-Baida in 1843 to the appearance of Sayyid Ahmad al-Sharif in Cyrenaica in 1912 the Heads of the Order were absent from the country, either in Arabia or in distant oases, and its direct influence on the tribes was exercised by the Shaikhs of its lodges in their midst. Their ritual position within the tribal system combined with their structural position outside it enabled them to settle disputes and to unite and lead the various sections which had sponsored their lodges when the Order required their support. It was they who roused the 795* 554 [648]*

619 change their structural position only rarely. The latter change
621 sometimes does, however, occur, and there is evidence to show
182 that it does. For example, Agostini (1922–23, p. 323) in his tribal
166 survey, records a section named Barsha as one of the groups stem-
613 ming from Nasr.[12] In the genealogies I was given, the name did
not appear, and even after some questioning, what information
was known about it was concealed. Some time later the name
[578] cropped up accidentally in conversation, and I was then told that
at one time it had been one of the Nasr groups, but that after a
quarrel during a year of water shortage, the Barsha folk went
to live with people with whom they had maternal connexions,
and in whose territory there was ample water that year, and
never returned. The group, a tertiary one, was detached from the
tertiary point of segmentation in the genealogies, and tied on to
a tertiary group of another tribe in its new homeland.

178 To summarize briefly the argument thus far, the mechanical
173 devices of telescoping, fusion of names, the ejection of those
619 names which cease to be of any social consequence, and the
621 elision of names at or around the fifth ascending generation,
613 taken together point to the importance of the tertiary order of
segmentation in discussing the problem of maintaining the form
of the genealogy constant in face of its natural tendency to alter;
further, evidence of changes (adoption into a lineage, detachment from it, the inclusion and exclusion of clients) was presented, and this again led to the conclusion that the tertiary point
of segmentation is critical in this respect. This being so, the man-
[128] ner in which change actually occurs, still remains to be shown,
and this is best done, perhaps, by discussing the mode of proliferation of tertiary segments. In order to do this adequately, it is necessary to say something briefly about certain features of Bedouin marriage.

582 Among the Bedouin there exists a preferential form of marriage
605 between a man and his father's brother's daughter. Parallel
cousin marriage of this sort carries with it the exclusive right of a man to this cousin. Without his consent no one else can marry her, and to attempt to do so would be to risk the marriage arrangements being nullified after negotiations had almost been

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[114] [12] Barsha's position is incorrectly given as a sub-group of Haiba; it should be shown as structurally equivalent to Haiba. See also note 11.

concluded. I have been present on occasions when, after both 582
parties have agreed to a marriage and the groom has collected 605
most of the things necessary to present to the bride at the wedding celebrations, the girl's father's brother's son appears and demands the discontinuance of the arrangements; on one occasion, he did not appear until the actual day of the wedding, but was bought off with a cap, a cloak, and the promise of two sheep. The highest incidence for any form of marriage, moreover, is with the patrilineal parallel cousin, although not necessarily with the first cousin.

Parallel cousin marriage of this sort is not, however, the only 582
form practised among the Bedouin. Much of the writing on Bedouin marriage leaves the impression that a solution of the problem of parallel cousin marriage (Murphy & Kasdal 1959) solves all the problems involved in their system of marriage. In addition to this form, there is a number of others; indeed there is another form of preferential marriage among them, which, although it does not have the compulsive character of parallel cousin marriage, is of major importance. I refer to cross-cousin marriage with the mother's brother's daughter. Such a cousin may be, of course, as a result of patrilineal parallel cousin marriage, a patrilineal parallel cousin as well. Such a cousin may be, on the other hand, a woman of another tribal section or of a different tribe altogether. A characteristic form of this marriage is that once it has been initiated, it is perpetuated in successive
generations. Members of one line in a tertiary segment will, 582
therefore, be building up kinship ties through marriage in one 613
particular direction. At the same time, another line, by practising the same form of marriage will be weaving ties in a quite different direction. One direction these marriages could take might be to a tertiary segment of a collateral secondary segment; another might be to a primary segment of the same tribe, and yet another to people living in a date oasis. Only occasionally do marriages occur between collateral tertiary segments, and then there is usually some specific reason. In other words, when men marry outside the limits of their own tertiary segment, they leap-frog adjacent segments and marry into structurally more remote groups.

The result of these two marriage patterns is that the people of [621]

582 any summer camp will have descent lines cross linked by the
613 bonds of marriage with parallel cousins, and at the same time
[621] cleaved by the maternal links established by repetitive cross-cousin marriage to different groups outside the segment. Thus,
582 in one of its aspects, marriage makes of an agnatic group a group
613 of cognates as well. 'Marry your paternal cousins and both your
602 paternal and maternal relatives will be one,' to quote Bedouin sentiment on the matter. Within this agnatic group, nevertheless, two other clusters of kin exist—those with maternal connexions outside. In all, three areas of kinship can be defined,[18] although all the members of the segment will have the lineage bond of agnation in common. In normal circumstances, when split does not threaten the group, the bond of agnation, strengthened by parallel cousin marriage, takes precedence, although behaviour is significantly affected by maternal links at any time. There is,
152 in the first instance, great jealousy between co-wives, which is
595 passed on to their children. Each wife has her separate tent, and
593 each is entitled to a strictly equal share of the husband's time they have in common. This applies similarly to favours he may grant his wives, and the distribution of his wealth among them. If, for example, the husband is the owner of a horse, he is required to tether it outside the tents of his wives in strict rotation; if he retires for the night with one wife, the following night he must favour the other; if he buys dress material for the one he must buy a length of identical material for the other; if he bestows favours on the children of one the children of the other must be given equal consideration. Many such details are meticulously observed; but while many are observed most of the time, it is difficult to observe them all, the whole time. Any breach of the rules is quickly taken up by the wives, and quarrels ensue, leading not only to bitterness among the co-wives, but between the offended wife and her husband, between the children of both wives, and between the children and their father. Often,
595 when a man has co-wives, there is a marked discrepancy in age
593 between them, for, when an elderly Bedouin marries a second
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[18] The situation is not always as simple as this. Cross-cousin marriage may take more than two directions, and marriage within the segment might bring about great complexity, but the argument put forward above is not seriously affected by neglecting these details here.

wife he usually chooses a young girl of about twenty years. Children 595
of the elder wife might be adult, therefore, when the children 593
of the junior wife are infants. Great emphasis is placed on 561
seniority, particularly among males, but strong emphasis is also placed on the equality of siblings and their equal legal status. Between brothers of widely differing ages, there is, then, this field of potential conflict. From an early date competitive, if not
hostile, relationships develop between the sons of co-wives. Competition 593
between half-brothers results not only from their 586
mothers being co-wives: one group might be the sons of a divorced 587
wife. The latter situation is often much worse, for the sons born of the divorced wife are now being fostered by a woman who is not their mother. A similar condition of things is brought about when a widower with sons remarries. Yet again, when a wife grows old and her sons have reached maturity, her husband may not divorce her formally, but merely 'throw her off his back'; she will then go to live with her grown sons, while her husband, in turn, takes a new wife, usually taking up residence in another camp for a time at least. It would be too much of a digression here to discuss the inheritance disputes, and the disputes over marriage and bride-wealth, which arise out of these
various circumstances. Suffice it to note that such disputes are [613]
common and affect the alignment of people within a tertiary segment.

As half-brothers grow to maturity some of them will marry 613
their maternal cross-cousins, and in succeeding generations some 621
of their descendants will do likewise. In this way, a tertiary segment [582]
united by the bond of agnation, will also have within it smaller groups of kin having different sets of cognatic links. This group, as a residential unit, shows a very high concentration of agnates, and the Bedouin say with pride that members of the camps are always 'one' because of this agnatic bond, and indeed, the corporate identity of this group is strikingly displayed in
many circumstances. It does not take precedence in all circumstances, 613
for, built into agnation, with the heavy burden of duties 578
which go with it, are serious stresses and strains which in some 602
circumstances regularly come out into the open. In yet other circumstances cognatic kinship affiliations appear to be dominant, causing friction among agnates. A man, for example, may permit

613 his maternal kinsmen to use the land and water facilities of
578 his lineage; his agnates may give ready consent or bicker about
602 it, but when it becomes necessary to clean a well, disputes are
almost certain to break out in the camp between those who argue
that their maternal relatives should not be expected to assist in
its cleaning and those who insist they should as an acknowledgement
of the use they have made of it. In these circumstances
613 maternal links divide agnates. Conversely, if it becomes necessary
602 for some of the same men to use the water and ploughland
of their maternal kin, their agnates are only too pleased that
they are able to do so, because the pressure on their own resources
is relieved. In these circumstances, the maternal link
strengthens the agnatic group. When, to give another instance,
613 blood-money has to be gathered, it is the duty of all agnates to
682 contribute equally, and no member of the group, rich or poor,
can contract out of this obligation without sacrificing his membership
of the group. Payments of blood-money are witness of
the strength of the notion of 'oneness' among agnates, in one
sense, but in so far as they are compulsory, they point also to the
weakness in the relationship. Maternal kin are not directly concerned
in this, but they can and do make contributions. In this
context two aspects of agnation appear, and the value of the
602 maternal link is emphasized. Again, maternal kinsmen are not
428 directly concerned in inheritance disputes, but they are expected
578 to intercede for their sister's sons, who often use their mother's
brother's tribal brand on their own animals. During disputes of
this kind, blame is thrown on to the maternal kinsmen for their
interference in matters which, properly speaking, are not their
613 business. In marriage, however, events take quite a different
582 turn. The responsibility for providing a man with a wife is first
that of the father, and secondly of the members of the tertiary
section; the father takes the initiative, and his agnates assist, not
only in the negotiations, but also in defraying the heavy costs of
the wedding festivities, the various gifts that precede it, and the
604 bride-wealth which follows. The mother's brother is also a key
613 person in all these arrangements. He enters into the negotiations,
585 assists with the entertainment on the wedding day, and makes a
[583] substantial contribution to the bride-wealth. On the wedding day,
there is no kinsman to compare with the mother's brother; a few

621 hundred of their sheep are grazing in the neighbourhood. This is beside the point.
613 What is important is that the offender's group is showing a desire to remain on
628 friendly terms, and members of the victim's group are doing likewise by accepting
682 reduced amounts. Compared with what the payments should be, after four years they
are trivial and soon cease altogether. Blood money, if it is to achieve the purpose of
621 restoring peaceful relationships, must work in this way among the Bedouin, for, as
613 they view the matter, a single payment of the full amount would only terminate
628 relationships. There would be no further obligations to hold them together. The
682 payment of a debt in full means only one thing—hostility. Where there is no debt,
571 there are no relationships. Debt must be allowed to run between groups, for it is this
182 which creates obligations and perpetuates social relationships.[1] As the debt of blood
money mounts, the social relationships between the groups improve. The cessation
of payments and the absence of further demands is final earnest that the relationships
are again normal.

613 The second step in this exposition, therefore, is to attach to homicide between
628 tertiary sections the penalty of vengeance or the payment of blood money, both
621 achieving the same end of bringing about a restoration of peaceful relationships.

682 Between secondary sections, relationships are again different. Ecologically, the
619 areas are distinct. The topography may be dissimilar—sand dunes in one area and
613 low valleys in another; secondly, the soils may differ—sandy soil here and firm valley
[133] bottom soil there; thirdly, while the climatic régime of the two areas may be broadly
similar, since there is marked variability in the aggregate annual rainfall which is
[132] coupled with a high variability from place to place, each secondary section has its
own micro-climate, sufficiently well defined for one area to be well watered in any
given year while a neighbouring area suffers partial drought. These differences affect
[221] productive activities. Seasonal movements are also affected: some secondary sections
move annually over considerable distances and in fixed directions, while members of
a collateral section may move only a few miles and these short moves may vary in
direction from year to year. It is true that minor ecological differences exist between
collateral tertiary sections, but these do not affect the economy and the way of life in
the manner described for secondary sections. Partly because of their territorial extent,
partly because of the larger aggregate population, the secondary sections are more
self-contained, not only ecologically and economically but also in terms of social
relationship. More of the requirements of everyday living can be met within the
territory and span of a secondary section than within those of a tertiary section.
Secondary sections develop a kind of specialization to the extent that in any year
some of them will have more usable natural resources than others, but because these
differences are ephemeral they do not lead to the development of permanent trade
relations. Add to all this the fact that agnates are concentrated in camps on the territory
which belongs to their lineage, and the discreteness of secondary sections is
[582] immediately apparent. Marriage rules make this discreteness potentially, at least, even
more sharply defined, for unlike other 'lineage societies' where exogamy, coupled
with other marriage regulations, compels the dispersion of kin links among lineage

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[1] This point becomes clearer when considered in the general context of debt relationship among the Bedouin. Marriage payments, gift exchanges, hospitality, various forms of help, and so on are all aspects, with blood money, of an intricate and fascinating web of debt relationships.

619 segments, the Bedouin are free to marry within as close a range as the first cousin on
613 either side. Preferential marriage with the father's brother's daughter exists, not
● 582 merely as a sentiment, but with the legal force of permitting a man this choice against
all other men. Before a father arranges the marriage of his daughter he first must seek the permission of his brother's son. Moreover, if a first-parallel cousin is not available, a Bedouin is free to take as a wife any parallel cousin within the minimal lineage. Much weight has been given to the value of exogamy as a device for the definition of groups; parallel-cousin marriage is equally suitable for the purpose—indeed it is better for it has the effect of knitting the members of a local group together as cognates, thereby throwing the group into isolated relief.

613 Consequently, when a homicide occurs between two secondary sections, there is
628 no urgent necessity to make peace, the relationship between them being of a kind
682 that can be controlled and altered to suit the circumstances. It is between these groups
that the argument—if the argument is taken up at all—centres on the circumstances of the killing, every effort being made to show that insult was deliberately added to homicide, that one homicide is to be distinguished from another because a man of great renown was singled out as the avenger's victim, or that in a vengeance killing there was a breach of taboo as well. A debt is always left over, and it is an impelling obligation for the Bedouin to redeem it. They frequently speak of vengeance in this context as 'redeeming the debt'. Again, any homicide between two secondary sections is regarded as one in a series, whether the details or even the name of the victim of the previous homicide is known or not. I recall discussing a double homicide with a close kinsman of the slayer, and the only way he could account for it was by telling me that his kinsman had to kill because his victims were of such and such a group. The feud knows no beginning, and it has no end. It is a form of behaviour associated with a specific structural order, and it is as persistent as the structural order itself; in this sense it is eternal. It was most difficult to get the Bedouin to give accounts of homicides other than those which had occurred over the past fifty years or so, but they invariably claimed that the origin was earlier than this, although they were wholly unaware of the identity of the earlier victims. In any event, their only historical frame of reference is the genealogy; and history, as a chronological sequence of events, has no meaning beyond the founding ancestor of a minimal segment. When they refer events to points on the genealogy superior to this, they are no longer thinking in terms of the temporal order of events, but in terms of what they know to be the contemporary relationships between groups, for the names on the genealogy are names of groups and do not bear a relation to a time scale in any sense. Put in another way, for them a homicide which involves two secondary sections must be a feud, because this is the nature of the relationships between the groups, and there must have been previous killings, otherwise the people involved would not belong to two separate secondary groups.

The relationships which are referred to as feud are of a kind which requires at least a show of hostility whenever the parties happen to meet. Even if they do not actually meet, but are in the vicinity, some sort of demonstration is likely. Thus, several shots were fired at a man riding some distance away from a camp, and although positive identification was difficult at this range, the men of the camp argued it must have been a member of a group with which they were at feud otherwise the passer-by

682 To complete this general statement, two further circumstances are cited by the
602 Bedouin. If a man kills a related person who is not an agnate (it is expressed as killing
the mother's brother) the breach in relationships must be healed as quickly as possible. The convention for dealing with this is that the offender, bound hand and foot, mounted on a horse, is sent to the camp of ' the owner of the blood ', in the company of a holy man, there to make an offer of his life, saying: ' Here is my knife, my life is yours; here is my shroud, my life is yours.' No Bedouin would agree for a moment to undertake this journey if he thought the offer might be accepted. In Bedouin sentiments a life offered in this way cannot be taken. It is the convention which precedes a peace meeting and blood money. Any other way of dealing with the confusion, which spreads as a result of a homicide between cognates, is excluded.

682 Secondly, if a woman is killed, whatever the intersegmentary distance, the homi-
562 cide is said to be accidental, because a man never ' intends ' to kill a woman. Blood-
money arrangements are made as soon as possible, and the wealth—half that of a
613 man—passes to the deceased's father, not to her husband, for a woman's ' bone '
always belongs to her father. Obviously women cannot be allowed to enter into
● [582] feud; since it is demographically compelling (apart from other reasons) for some of
[591] them to marry outside their natal groups, then they might well find themselves resi-
dents in the enemy's camps, if they were to become involved in feuds.

121 This statement of the different means available for the regulation of homicide at
the several orders of tribal segmentation is the view the Bedouin themselves hold of
682 their relationships. An analysis of the facts presented thus far could bring out a
613 number of interesting points with regard to the relativity of morals, the typification
829 of acts by their social context, the significance of the orders of segmentation, and so
619 on. Rather than proceed along these lines, however, it is more urgently necessary
to reflect on the significance of the fact that the arrangement of the material in terms of what is usually called the lineage structure coincides with the Bedouin ordering of the same details. It is, of course, important to note that the account is not based on mere hearsay evidence. Each statement made can be documented from known homicides, and to this extent the model that has been used is consistent with reality. The model, nevertheless, can only be a representation of what a particular people, the Bedouin, conceive their social reality to be; it is a kind of ideology which enables them, without making absurd demands on their credulity, to understand their field of social relationships, and to give particular relationships their *raison d'être*. But, as will be shown, it would be a serious error to mistake such a folk model for sociological analysis. Such an error is difficult to avoid because the Bedouin, when defending their view, are able to cite enough bits and pieces of reality to make their argument con-
121 vincing. The flaw in the reasoning is seen when it can be shown that its consequences
114 are absurd. As an example of what is meant, the statement that feud is attached to
groups at the secondary order of segmentation may be considered. If the statement
613 were true, if each and every secondary section were at feud one with the other (and
619 in a structural sense this ought to be so), then each tribe would be divided into small
829 mutually hostile groups, which completely lacked any possibility of movement, even
578 for pasturing purposes. Presented with this, the Bedouin would argue that this is not
in fact so, because secondary and primary sections are interlinked in many ways. That is, they evoke what to them are contingencies to explain why they are at feud with one

121 These three objections to the lineage theory as a useful model for examining the
613 consequences of homicide are serious enough in themselves, but another objection
562 renders it still less satisfactory. This fourth objection relates to the implication that
114 lineage theory cannot take account of women. Indeed, in some of the accounts of the political organization of lineage societies, the impression is given that they are all-male societies: women belong only to the domestic and kinship realms. In terms of the theory, this must be so. Women, the marriage links they create, the forms of relationships that derive from marriage, the right of men to joke with others by virtue of a link through women, their rights to demand favours of men who are not their agnates, their right to expect contributions to bridewealth or blood money from maternal relatives—all these, and other forms of behaviour, have been dealt with as patterns of behaviour which interfere with or disturb agnation, or that cut
121 across lineage affiliations. Such metaphors can only be justified if it is accepted that
613 precedence must be given to agnation, to what people say they think their lineage relationships to be, and that there is some kind of primacy about what have frequently been called jural rules which constitute the structure, while behaviour which is not governed by these rules is to be relegated to the position of secondary forms having the effect of intruding only. But these secondary forms of behaviour are as impelling, as persisting, and are as much a part of social life as any of the so-called jural rules.
● [582] It is possible to go further than this, and state that in societies where there is a high incidence of marriage among agnates of the local group, as occurs among the Bedouin, jural rules rarely appear in their 'pure' form in behaviour, since, in groups of this sort, each and every person constitutes a bundle of roles by virtue of the fact that he is one of a very complex cognatic group; a particular role, it is true, may take precedence in a particular situation, but all roles are present in each situation and affect behaviour. Precedence can only be given to specific forms of behaviour in relation to situations. There is no such thing as a general primacy with regard to any form. The concept of agnation as the centre of all political problems, disturbed or disrupted by, say, matrilaterality, is as inadequate as saying that the nucleus which pulls all other components into position is matrilaterality with agnation as a disturbing element. In reality there are numerous components present in all situations, which should not be lumped together under such categorizing terms as agnation and matrilaterality, but which combine as separate components in a kaleidoscopic range of clusters.

121 Some of the components of behaviour subsumed under the notion of matrilaterality
613 are briefly given here in order to appreciate more fully the consequence of inter-group
marriage. Of paramount importance is the fact that, in Bedouin sentiment, to kill
682 a relative is as sinful an act as the killing of a close agnate. When such a homicide
674 did occur, during my period of residence among them, the Bedouin response was to
829 assert that the offender was out of his mind—it was inconceivable that he could have
[602] committed the offence otherwise. Their attitude was reminiscent of the horror they display when a man kills his father or a full brother, and represents a much stronger reaction than is manifested when a man kills an agnate of, say, the third or fourth degree. They have every reason to be disturbed by the killing of a mother's brother,
[604] for, whatever personal affections may be involved, a crucial link is threatened. Their reasoning, however, is that relationships with the mother's brother are characteristically easy, that they are not demanding, that there is much joking in them, and that to

613 Among the Bedouin, men are permitted to marry their father's brother's daughter
582 and any other cousin of similar type within the local agnatic group. This means that
121 most agnates will be related in other ways as well. Parallel-cousin marriage has the
effect of diversifying the agnatic group, and creates small nuclei within it, each having its own characteristics and patterns of behaviour with others. Diversification of this kind leads to a differentiation between homicides within the tertiary group.

The Bedouin say that they always marry their parallel cousins, and do not give their daughters to others if they can help it. Census data does not support this view. Nearly as many men find wives outside their agnatic group as within it. Of importance in the present context is the direction taken by these external marriages. Perhaps
121 the most striking feature is that the number of marriages with men of a collateral
582 tertiary group is low, so low that they can be explained by special circumstances.
628 Now collateral tertiary groups whose territories are adjacent experience intense day-
613 to-day relationships. In the context of descent these are the most closely linked
[621] lineages—among older men there may be the recollection of the time when the two
constituted a single community, and when they all lived together in the same summer camp. Common sentiment between them is very strong. The strips of territory they inhabit may be almost identical. Their discreteness lies almost entirely in the possession of separate natural resources, although in some cases pastures are shared. But their social boundaries are nevertheless sharply drawn, for the high incidence of parallel-cousin marriage within them, and the tendency for external links to leap-frog collateral segments, gives them a definition which could not be bettered by exogamy.
121 The basis of their discreteness lies, of course, in the competition that exists between
628 them for natural resources; however much the Bedouin protest that their real enemies
613 are the secondary or primary groups lying some thirty to fifty miles away, when they
wish to enlarge their resources there is little point in attempting to capture a well a
578 long distance away, which cannot be defended, and might be located alongside an
enemy group. They do, it is true, engage in competitive hostilities over land and water situated some distance from their homeland, but when they engage in these activities they do so on behalf of a linked group, albeit with their own interests uppermost. The capture of natural resources for use by a tertiary group can only be achieved by an enlargement of its homeland, and this is only possible by expanding into a neighbour's territory.

121 Another feature of external marriages is that they are not spread among as many
613 groups as in societies where there are exogamous clans, and where other rules of
marriage appear to compel the maximum amount of dispersal. Instead, the external
582 links created through marriage are highly selective, and are thrown out into ecologi-
cally differentiated areas, giving added economic security, or, in the case of date oases, an additional item to the diet at a time of the year when it is sorely needed. Once established these external links are perpetuated through cross-cousin marriages in successive generations. If the link is considered valuable, and relationships develop satisfactorily, other marriage connexions will be woven around the first. Multiplicity gives added strength and durability, not in the mechanical sense of duplication, but of creating a more diverse kin structure, with its greater range of rights and claims, in which links can flourish. While the number of groups linked in marriage are few, the geographical spread is great. Marriage links exist with tertiary sections of colla-

121 teral secondary sections, with collateral primary sections, and long distances away
613 into other tribes. This spread can be interpreted as giving each tertiary group access
● 582 to resources of wide ecological diversity. What is of interest in the present context is not the interpretation of the links but the effect they have on behaviour. Spread means that a group can call for help from a number of differently situated groups.
121 Each one of these links not merely modifies the structural means for settling homi-
613 cide, but converts the homicide into a sociologically quite different sort of act. It can, as the Bedouin like to think, be an act of merit for a man to kill another from a feud-
582 ing secondary section, but there is no merit whatsoever in it if the tertiary section of
578 that secondary section happens to contain affines or maternal relatives; this is a sinful
682 act. The Bedouin themselves recognize this when they add to their structural explanation the rider that they do not feud with cognatic relatives. The difference between their position and a sociological one is that they see this as a contingency not as a persistent necessity; they are able to maintain their position because they see their behaviour as explicable in terms of the simple ossified structure of their genealogical relationships. What they fail to appreciate is that these ' contingencies ' are ecologically, economically, demographically, and politically essential. They are able to maintain their position also, because the model of a lineage structure they use, along with the two riders previously mentioned (see p. 270) affords them a kind of explanation for most occurrences. The argument is attractive both to Bedouin and to anthropologists because it is comprehensive and neat in its logicality. The next stage in the argument is to show that there is a far greater range of possible consequences to a homicide than those summarized in the diagram (see p. 269) and that the additional consequences are related, not to the lineage structure, but to the linkages which have been discussed above.

121 I begin with a review of a homicide which involves two men of the same tertiary
613 section. Bedouin classify all homicides within this range—as they do for any of the
682 structural orders—as undifferentiated, but in each case, different sorts of relatives are concerned in the ensuing hostilities, and the consequences are, therefore, different
829 also. Bedouin say that a man never kills his father or full brother. In the event of a man killing another man acknowledged to be his father, the act itself proves that he cannot possibly be his son. He is said to be illegitimate, thus making his mother an adultress and relieving the males of the agnatic line of the responsibility and the
121 odium. If a maternal uncle of the agnatic group is killed, the offence is almost on a par with that of patricide or fratricide. When, however, the homicide is between two
613 men who are agnatically distant, and not closely related cognatically either, but both
682 are members of the same local agnatic group, what follows will depend largely on the size and stage of development of the group; if it is small, the homicide threatens to wreck it, but if it is large and on the verge of splitting the homicide may be the occasion for split taking place and being recognized publicly by a demand for blood money. Threatened with wreckage, a small group meets a homicide by closing its ranks for self preservation; a large group splits. The same event within the same kind of structural unit results in two quite dissimilar consequences. The reason is clear enough—the two groups are similar only in a general structural way, but sociologically they are not comparable.

When a homicide occurs between tertiary segments the solution, it was said earlier,

The consequences of homicides in which secondary groups are concerned present 121
an even greater variety, for now the span has expanded to include many more groups, 613
with a total population of several thousand people. Groups of this order are spread 682
over a much wider territorial range; some structurally distant groups are neighbours by virtue of their propinquity, while some structurally proximate groups are far removed territorially. Some feuds lie dormant for long periods. Others erupt [578]
frequently. Some homicides between these groups are followed by the 'laying down of the denial'—the feud situation with most acrimony built into it, for one denial, followed by a vengeance killing, is met by a second denial and so on, excluding thereby any chance of a settlement. In other circumstances the offender's group boast that they are responsible for a homicide, thus challenging the victim's group to a show of force. Only the more powerful tertiary groups would venture to do this, and it is only they who could meet a homicide against them with a spectacular show of force, compelling a weaker tertiary group (according to hearsay evidence) to break up and leave its homeland. The modes of killing in homicide differ in character. Some killings have been heinous and offensive in terms of general morality; their purpose is to sting the victim's kin to retaliate or to cause them to suffer general discredit and loss of status. While some parts of secondary segments are at feud, others are not. A homicide between affinally or matrilaterally linked groups, whether they are secondary or primary groups, is settled as quickly and as amicably as possible to prevent turmoil in their relationships. Feud concerns two tertiary sections, not the [578]
opposed secondary sections of which they are parts. Blood money and vengeance is [628]
not the responsibility of secondary sections, but of their respective tertiary sections.

At this point, a further statement concerning the external marriage links of tertiary 121
segments throws further light on the feud. Previously it was stated that the competi-
tion between collateral tertiary groups for natural resources is indicated by a low 613
rate of marriage between them. Their external marriage links reinforce the separation. 582●
One tertiary section, A, takes some of its spouses from section X of a collateral 578
secondary section; A's collateral, B, takes some of its spouses from X's collateral, Y. A may be at feud with Y and B with X. The agnatic links between A and B, and X and Y do not mitigate the severity of the hostility in the two feuds, they exacerbate it. It would be erroneous to think of them as cross-cutting ties which promote peace. Stultified in the development of their hostilities by virtue of their territorial proximity and the sentiment associated with putatively close agnatic connexion, A and B are able to express hostilities indirectly through their linked groups X and Y respectively. During discussions of disputes, homicides, or rival claims to water, whether the disputants meet in the camps or in administrative offices in the villages, men from the matrilateral and affinal groups of the parties directly concerned are also present to do most of the shouting. In some cases I recorded a maternal relative was killed on behalf of an agnatic group to which he did not belong, although the latter accepted the responsibility. In the light of facts of this sort the lineage model obstructs analysis.

I now wish to make a few brief remarks about the relationships between collateral 121
primary sections and paired tribes. Homicide, it was asserted earlier, results in raids 619
and war between groups of these orders of segmentation respectively. Evidence 682
can be adduced to show that both consequences have followed. The case usually 726
cited to demonstrate that a single killing precipitates war between tribes is the

membership of associations and so on. The statuses a Bedouin achieves depend 796
not on an ordered acquisition through the inheritance of roles or election 852
to them, but on his personal manipulation of linkages in his jockeying 88
with others. Rites are minimal because there are few defined statuses an 554
individual can predictably acquire. The equalitarianism of the desert denudes 602
the Bedouin of ritual riches. Complimentarily, rites which do occur are 613
thrown into exaggerated relief by the absence of others, and in their isolation, [557]
become not merely a "passage" but a cataclysmic change. Marriage and 585
burial both comprehend limited fields of relations, but accompanying ceremonies 764
may bring several hundred people together, people who otherwise 796
rarely gather in these numbers to meet one another as kinsmen and neighbours, 602
and it is suggested that the emphasis given to the events dramatises the 182
significance of the changes they produce. In the discussion of the changes
brought about by marriage, the Bedouin view of what is entailed will be
considered first.

The Bedouin View of Marriage

After marriage, the Bedouin argue, a son has a tent of his own, a woman 585
over whom he has authority and soon children to make him a father. Marriage 581
causes split, branching. A new family is created, holding the potential [613]
of a new lineage. The separation is so painful a matter for the father
that he cannot contemplate it, hence his pretence that he has no knowledge of [593]
wedding festivities, and his subsequent attitude that nothing has happened.

Interestingly, there are two other occasions when this attitude is to be 682
observed. When a man kills within his corporate group,[5] he may flee his 613
tribe or he may be compelled to leave; later he is likely to return and, when 621
he does, he is received with a minimum of show. Every attempt is made to
suppress knowledge of the event.

Again, if incest occurs, the memory of it must somehow be suppressed, and 835
it is an ever-present danger. Men, permitted four wives simultaneously and 561
also able to engage in a plurality of marriages through divorce or death of [595]
spouses, may have children showing an age difference of two or three generations.
Thus it comes about that a man may be of an age in relation to his
father's sister which permits them as children to behave as if they were
first paternal cousins. As an adult, the preferred spouse for a man is a [582]
father's brother's daughter. In terms of relationships between adolescents
the situation in which a man is of the same age generation as his father's
sister is fraught with danger. In one such case, between a man and his [684]
father's sister, the male child of the union was put out in the desert to be

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[5] Bedouin are disposed in groups which, in summer, usually constitute a single community, around or near a watering point. The men of this group are interlinked by reference to an ancestor four or five ascending generations, reckoning from the generation of men of about 20 years. When, elsewhere in this chapter reference is made to corporations, it will be to groups of this kind.

561 that young men spend their premarital lives in an environment of unmiti-
602 gated agnatic hostility. Greater substance is given to this view when it is
realised that agnates live together. The residential concentration of agnates
561 in Cyrenaica exceeds 80 per cent. I wish to stress that this figure is based
602 on the universe of the small camp, and the only males included as agnates are
621 those who are consanguinely related. Over 50 such camps were used in
arriving at the figure. Obviously, the figure of agnatic concentration will
vary depending on the universe. If all men who claim to belong to a tribe
of, say, 15,000 souls, who claim that they are agnates in a political sense are
included, then the figure will not be the same as that derived from a small
group where the criterion for inclusion is consanguinity, not mere political
affiliation. It is necessary to make this clear to emphasise that the Cyrenaican
figure is unusually high, and also because the modes of behaviour between
consanguineal and political agnates differ critically. Granted the hostility
[578] built into agnation, and recognising in addition the significance of the high
degree of agnatic concentration, unless there are other factors present in the
situation, life would be intolerably burdensome. Parallel-cousin marriage
comes to the rescue.

•582

Parallel-Cousin Marriage

Among the Bedouin the prohibited degrees of marriage are few. A man
may not marry within a closer range than first paternal or maternal cousin;
he cannot marry a woman of a senior generation, nor a woman known to
be older. He cannot marry the daughters of a woman who has acted as wet
nurse to him or to any of his brothers and sisters. Otherwise he is permitted
to marry any other woman. Marriage with the first paternal cousin is pre-
582 ferred, and is more than a sentiment. A man has a right to his father's
brother's daughter, and before a marriage is arranged with anyone else, the
585 girl's father seeks the opinion of his brother's son. If he neglects to do this,
578 or if he flouts the opinion offered him, he runs the risk of the marriage
being brought to a halt on the very wedding day. I have witnessed this. In
most of the records I possess, it usually happens that the brother's son is
bought off with a few sheep (about five) and some articles of clothing.
Here the brother's son was seizing the occasion to extort from a farmer's
[589] brother wealth which he considered was due him from an earlier inheritance
dispute. Occasionally the intervention is genuinely designed to prevent a
marriage; if the girl refuses to marry her father's brother's son, he can force
582 her into spinsterhood. Men exercise their right to marry their first parallel
cousins. They also marry other parallel cousins. The significance of parallel-
cousin marriage varies with the exact degree of the relationship. First- and,
say, third-parallel cousins are sociologically different in a number of respects,
and in relation to specific problems these differences may assume major
[602] importance. In the present discussion the various degrees have this in
common: that whatever the precise relationship, all parallel cousins are the

daughters of agnates and, in view of the high agnatic concentration, the 582
daughters of agnates who are co-residents as well. Parallel-cousin marriage 602
therefore creates affinity between co-resident agnates.

The rate of parallel-cousin marriage is high, producing such a density of
kinship relationships as to afford a reliable index for defining the agnatic
corporation. As a form of marriage it persists; genealogical records clearly
demonstrate this. Frequency of parallel-cousin marriage taken together
with its persistency, means, above all else, that it makes an agnatic group
a cognatic group as well. The matter is put in this way to suit the general
development of the argument, but it would be a serious error to think that
this means I am giving priority to agnation and that I am considering cogna-
tion as intrusive, or that, in this society, agnation can stand on its own be-
cause it has a kind of absolute significance other forms of relationship do
not possess. Both forms exist in reality.

The great Bu Bakr of Cyrenaica's most celebrated lineage is alleged to have [613]
exhorted his fellow tribesmen to "marry your father's brother's daughters
and then your paternal relatives and your maternal relatives will become
one." Whether he had given the advice or not, the Bedouin, as their society
is constituted, would marry them anyway. The Bedouin form of agnation
without its accompanying parallel-cousin marriage would impose impossible
restrictions, if indeed there is any point in attempting to conceive of a
situation so remote from reality. With parallel-cousin marriage present in the
corporate group, men referred to as agnates are not agnates only; each and [613]
every one of them is the centre of a bundle of roles, each role potentially [554]
as important as the other. It would be false to argue, moreover, that com-
plexities of relationships can be unravelled by analytically separating them,
giving precedence to the agnatic role in an "agnatic" situation, the mother's
brother's role in a domestic situation and so on. An agnate who is also a
mother's brother is never the same, in any situation, as an agnate to whom
one is not otherwise related. The prime significance of parallel-cousin mar-
riage is that it creates a complexity of linkages which almost amount to con- [182]
fusion, thereby maximising the choice available to individuals to meet what-
ever contingencies befall them.

The only area of relationships left relatively undisturbed by parallel-
cousin marriage is the son, father and father's brother triangle. Freed of
the complications stemming from parallel-cousin marriage, agnation can
here approximate its true form. Other complications arise out of marriage. A 582
few are listed here: father and son marry a mother and her daughter; a 583
form of exchange marriage between first parallel-cousins occur; two brothers
marry two sisters; the marriage of two brothers to two sisters is followed, in
the succeeding generation, by the son of one union marrying the daughter
of the other, making this latter a double first parallel-cousin marriage —
both a father's brother's daughter's and a mother's sister's daughter's marriage.
These forms can all occur within a corporate group. No citadel of agnation [613]
can withstand this attack. All forms of marriage combine to break the grip [602]

•582 of agnation on the members of a corporate group and give it a taproot of
583 diversity whence it derives its strength, and which makes of it "the one body,"
613 conspicuous, in comparison with other societies, as the corporate group
602 *par excellence*.

The Sister's Son-Mother's Brother Relationship

128 Previously the mode of relationships associated with agnation and affinity
have been briefly discussed. In order to appreciate the effects of parallel-
cousin marriage, some remarks concerning the sister's son-mother's brother
604 set of relationships must be included here. Bedouin contrast the mother's
[174] brother with the father's brother; their sayings and proverbs afford a
wealth of verbal documentation on the contrast. With the mother's brother
a man enjoys all the freedoms he is denied in his relationships with his father
[831] and father's brother. He is permitted to joke with him; they indulge in
exchanges of obscenities. When the sister's son wishes to marry, he is permitted to discuss the matter with his mother's brother and can urge him to intercede with his father on his behalf. Two men thus related are readily recognised in the camps, because in their acts they are required to show affection by displays of innocent horseplay, pranks or mild practical jokes. Small boys pursue their mother's brother, feign to kick or strike him, and he takes it all in good part.

The external aspects of this behaviour is deceptive. Joking of this sort creates the image in which the relationships are conceived; what is equally striking in it is its compulsiveness. Obviously, mature men are not always in the mood to be teased, but if they are, they must respond appropriately. Their relationships are unmistakably onerous. This remark applies not only to the external forms of their behaviour, but also to the favours a man is
[602] permitted to ask of his mother's brother. A brief amplification will make
the point clear. Demands can be made of agnates, but only in situations of
serious contingency. Day-to-day needs are met, not by appeals to the rights of
agnation, but from the expectations linked to the mother's brother. If these
expectations are withheld, the sister's son may be left in a quandary. In-
604 terestingly, in the records of homicides I gathered, three (in the con-
682 temporary population) were concerned with the killings of mother's broth-
ers by sister's sons. Homicide within this field of relationship is difficult to comprehend unless it is appreciated that expectations are as compulsive in the daily life and the general well-being of people as are the rights and duties associated with agnation.

604 These general remarks apply to the relationships irrespective of the lineage
613 origin of the mother's brother. The similarity ends there, since the nature
of the expectations, their urgency at any given moment and the kind of
favours which are granted vary with the group identity of the mother's
[428] brother. A mother's brother who is a member of ego's corporate group may be
expected to give the sister's son small quantities of flour, favour him in all

121 183 594 621 age depicted in their notion of a family is meaningful. It follows that, since this unit will not be clustered in one tent, but distributed over several, each small community must be so constituted that links people can use to claim the services of others must exist, and that, since claims can be made against various sorts of kinship relationships, each small camp will have predictable kin links. It follows, further, that since age, sex and number of people are significant, a small camp will have a characteristic demographic structure; each tent in a camp will display developmental changes, and particular tents may be shifted from one camp to another, but if a livelihood is to be gained in this semi-desert environment supporting its mixed pastoral-cum-agricultural economy, then at any given time the small camp must have certain fixed features in its composition. The elementary family is subject to far too many vicissitudes to exist on its own. It now remains to demonstrate this general argument by examining the details of one of these small camps.

A Particular Camp Viewed in Detail

621 613 [221] [162] The camp was one of 12 which constitute a minimal tribal section. In genealogical terms its male members were linked through an ancestor five ascending generations from living males of about 20 years of age. Usually, in summer, camps of this sort move to the vicinity of a large watering point; in winter, this larger community breaks up into a number of smaller ones as man and animals move off further south to the pastures. The total living population of the tribal section to which this particular camp belonged was 524.

621 613 ●582 182 Linked patrilineally, its male members were also linked in a plurality of other consanguineal ways. Primarily, this plurality was brought about by parallel-cousin marriage. The incidence of this form of marriage for males of this group was 48 per cent[12] of the gross total of 234, derived from their marriages over three generations; that is, the generation of males entering into marriage, and the generation which has begun to die out are included with the generation of middle-aged males. This means that practically every male is related to others in a number of ways, and it is necessary to point this out now because the details to be given presently will show only the more immediate, but not all, existing connections. Plurality of links, moreover, is not the only consequence. Parallel-cousin marriage is a transmuting agent, creating a diversity of links. Each and every link carries with it specific modes of behaviour, which in turn means that each individual has a wide variety of different claims he can press on his coresidents. Marriage connections also exist with other sections of the same tribe. Their proportion is 28 per cent of the total. Demographically, it

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[12] As a matter of interest, the figure for marriage to the father's brother's daughter is 50 per cent of the figure for parallel-cousin marriage in general, but the consequences of these are beyond the scope of the present discussion.

would be impossible to satisfy all marriage expectations of men within the 621
universe of the minimal tribal section. For this reason alone external links 613
are inevitable and persistent. Also, the small territorial strip such a group 582
claims as a homeland produces an economy which, in this environment, 182
is unstable. Additional security is gained by making connections with other [423]
tribal sections, each with its specific ecological character. Men also marry [433]
into their client groups. The proportion of these for this camp was 9 per cent [619]
of the total. From these links they gain economic advantages, they can
claim services and a client-following is politically significant. Finally, 7
per cent of the total[13] are marriages with women of other tribes, which
again not only reduces the instability of the economy (in that a large tribal
area suffering near-famine conditions has access to areas of markedly different ecology), but also provides political connections for men whose power
ambitions have passed the point of leadership limited to their own tribes. In
one way or another all these interests are manifest in the small camp and
attention is now directed to the latter.

The disposition of people in the camp is represented diagrammatically 621
on the page following. 592

The nucleus of the camp is Tent A. Its owner (1) was a powerful *Shaikh*, [554]
the son of a famous father. His marriage represents a political link with a [619]
group of one of the primary sections of his own tribe. His father died only a [428]
few years before I recorded my census, and the large amount of moveable
property he left had still not been divided among the sons; the owner of the
tent, as eldest brother, still controlled the flocks and herds. Most of his time
he spent away from the camp engaging in political intrigue. His two younger
brothers lived in his tent, but the second (5) would not remain there long
because negotiations for his marriage had been started. His father (2) married a parallel cousin; she died and shortly afterwards he took her sister (3) [582] [587]
in sororal union. When this occurred an amount of bride-wealth was
agreed, but instead of giving any of it to her father, the entire amount was [583]
"put in front of her" (that is, the animals were allowed to remain with her
husband's flock), and these animals she had marked with her brother's
tribal sign to distinguish them from those of her husband. It was widely [428]
known that she was going to leave these animals to her husband's second [562]
son, for although she could not transfer them to a male outside her husband's
corporate group, she could decide who, among his heirs, should inherit.

During my stay in this camp, her brother's son (4) came to it as a 621
temporary resident for a month. Since he was poor, the purpose of his visit 592
was to capture some of his aunt's wealth while she was still alive and the 574
possibility still existed. During his stay he was fed well but did no work. [604]
His kinsmen found his company tiresome, so, to cut short his stay, and after [431]
consulting her nominated heir (5), she gave him three grown goats. Also
when an occasion arose for an animal slaughter, she provided the sheep, and, [231]

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[13] The remainder is made up of marriages to the daughters of men incorporated into the lineages.

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the lavish generosity dispensed by the members of Tent A, and fed far better than would have been possible otherwise.

[574]

The location of Tent C was also determined by a link through women. The only female (8) living in this tent, a middle-aged widow, was the sister of (3) and (6) of Tents A and B respectively. Her teenage son lived with her. They possessed only a few sheep, which were put with the flock of Tent A for shepherding. The son (9) spent some of his time herding for Tent A. With the mother and her son in Tent C were two other kinsmen. One, a poor man (10), was this son's first patrilateral cousin, and they both were the only surviving sons of their respective fathers. He (10) was the main shepherd of Tent A. The third male (11), also poor and nearly blind, was a second patrilateral cousin of both, but his sister was also 11's mother. All occupants of Tent C were almost entirely supported by Tent A. Relieved of the necessity to live off their own resources, the two young men (9 and 10) were afforded the opportunity of building up their flocks for the day when they would be able to negotiate their delayed marriages.

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Tents A, B and C sheltered men who were agnatically closely linked. More important, their grandfathers, three sons in a family of 19 children, were full brothers. The latter's mother's name was used when referring to these three tents as a group. During the past few years, many changes have occurred within it, and the death of the pivotal woman (3) of Tent A might well disperse this small cluster. Further, the nuptials of her heir (5) were anticipated, and this event, itself likely to precipitate division of his father's (2) wealth, might also lead to further residential rearrangements.

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The owner of Tent D, (12), a man in his late thirties, son of a slave mother, was at loggerheads with his father's brother, much more senior in age. The owner's father, one of a family of 24 children, had been a wealthy man and died leaving a substantial herd and a large flock, but he (12) was bereft of most of this wealth by the father's brother. His first successful strike against his uncle was the demand he made for his daughter as a wife. Earlier, when (12) had demanded his father's wealth, his father's brother, who had for years acted as his guardian, replied, "It is in your stomach," (meaning that it had been expended on his upbringing). Later, after the marriage had taken place, when the uncle demanded payment of the bride-wealth his own words were thrown back at him, but this time with the meaning that the bride-wealth had already been paid. While I was resident in this area, the two men met occasionally: each meeting was hostile, for (12) was encouraging his half-brother (13) (also the son of a slave mother) to demand a second daughter as a wife. Included in this tent is a third adult male (14), virtually a pauper, reduced to this state by the same grasping father's brother. His link with (12) was their closeness of relationship (first paternal cousin), together with the fact that all three males (12, 13 and 14) had suffered privations and were allies against the common enemy, their father's brother.

Associated with them for the same reason, was the owner of Tent E (15).

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> I am 45 years old and my eldest brother is 53 years old. I have two younger brothers. When my father died, we four sons inherited the property of our father jointly. I told my older brother to divide the land the way in which he wanted . . . My father had divided his land into four parts before he died. Each part was a separate "farm" so that a son could raise barley or olives, as he liked . . . But my brother told me to make the decision. As it turned out, my youngest brother was the first to make his choice of the four parts. He took his land but we still kept all of our sheep together. One year later, my older brother took his share of the land, but Jabril (the next to the youngest brother) and I remained together, and still remain together. Some men want to be on their own and others do not. Our eldest brother was the first to separate his animals from the collective herd . . . When the decisions were made to divide the land between us, we got the local "holy man" to go around the area with us and to witness the boundaries. This is done so that later if a brother changes his mind, or wants to take different land, the true borders will be known. We recorded them on paper and the "holy man" knows them . . . In matters of inheritance, all sons get equal shares, but in a case where there are ten camels and three sons, then, each gets three camels and the tenth goes to the eldest brother.

428 562 [431] [583] Any property which a female may own, if it is land or livestock, will go to her sons upon her death. In al-Qasr, such property will usually be sheep which a woman may accumulate through gift-giving. In one case, which is unique in al-Qasr, a woman received thirteen camels from her husband at the time of her wedding. (This was not the brideprice, for that goes to the bride's father.) At the time of her death her camels numbered seventy, and they were divided equally among her five sons. Concerning lesser items, such as clothing and jewelry, and also chickens, these are

593 In al-Qasr it is a rare sight to see a father and his young son together, and it is only slightly more common to see the father with the grown son. The second case may simply be a reflection of the division of labor since the son, once grown, takes over the economic tasks of his father.

593 The most important duties of a father toward his
867 son are three: he must teach him generosity, courage and
584 courtesy; he must see that the boy learns the Quran; and he
872 must arrange a good marriage for his son. According to
593 Peters (1960:34), the Cyrenaican Bedouin father must attend
852 to three things for his son, namely: his circumcision, his
[872]
[583] education in the Quran, and his bridewealth when he marries.
In al-Qasr, the Egyptian school teachers have succeeded in
[179] showing the Bedouin that circumcision is a private family
593 affair and not a public ritual. Although all fathers still
852 see to it that their sons are circumcised, the father is no
178 longer responsible for "making a circumcision party." In
[626] fact, the father who does insist on following the old ways
[431] by hiring a dancer and publicly marking his son's rite de
passage, will be ridiculed as one "who only wants to make money from the ritual gift (naquut) given the boy."

593 The son recognizes the rights which the father has over him through a show of respect and obedience. A boy shows deference toward his father by not smoking, singing, or reciting poetry of any kind in his presence. During the

585 Only one of the three weddings was conducted in the
178 traditional way with three nights of dancing previous to the
wedding and a large feast on the wedding day. The Bedouin
say that a man can no longer afford to do things the old way.
584 The procedure of the marriage arrangement begins when the boy
informs his uncle that he wishes to marry. Then the uncle,
• [583] the father and other males of the group meet with the father
of the prospective bride to arrange the marriage, an important
part of which is the establishment of the brideprice (hulwaan
584 or mahr). Before going to see the girl's father, the boy's
*613 father consults with his secondary lineage group, as I have
already mentioned. Then he should wait for a period of
seven days, for the girl's father, "who has heard about the
marriage," must consult with his group and wait for a period
of one week during which time any member of the girl's
584 lineage may claim her. After this time, the ties proposed
[695] by the marriage are ritualized by two preliminary acts:
the writing of the contract (ma'azuum) between the fathers,
and the offering of a lamb by the groom which solemnizes his
intentions and the marriage (dabah fi-l-williyya). After
[431] another waiting period of about two weeks, during which
time the boy buys gifts of clothing and jewelry and presents
them to the girl at her home, the wedding celebration begins.
585 On the day of the wedding, the girl is delivered to the
groom's residence. The girl remains in the groom's tent, or

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582 'Ailit Lazumi, the other lineage, along with 'Ailit Ma'fas, considered to be the most powerful in al-Qasr. In the fourth
[423] case, Abd al-Latif's marriage into 'Ailit Dawlat, this individual owns an olive orchard in Dawlat territory, adjacent to that of Ma'fas, which he purchased from a member of his wife's lineage before their marriage.
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421 In every case, with one exception, marriage ties are intimately related to property relations, cognation with local contiguity. The two groups become politically entwined, and property relations become a basis for authority relations.

*613 All things considered, complementary filiation is as important in Bedouin society as it is in other societies: "The bilateral family is the focal element in the web of
[533] kinship" (Fortes 1953:33). As one Bedouin wedding song puts it: "The bride is the flower of the stem," the stem here symbolizing her tertiary group.

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556 The amount of brideprice which a man is expected to pay will depend upon his status as an "outsider" or an "insider," and his position on the prestige scale which is figured largely in terms of wealth. A man adds to his prestige and reputation when he pays beyond the "going price" to obtain a bride for his son. On the other hand, if a man is an "outsider," he is expected to pay well beyond the normal brideprice for the privilege of marrying into the family, and he receives no additional prestige unless he goes even higher than what is

583 554 556 expected. The price is set by the corporate group but can vary, and usually does, from one tertiary segment to another. The wealthier tertiary segments tend to have higher bride-prices. This is explained by the fact that they occupy a "higher status" on the prestige scale, and also, by the fact that they wish to carefully control and maintain this status.

[435] For instance, "between cousins" of 'Ailit Ma'fas the mahr is fixed at 60 Egyptian pounds, but "a man can pay more out of generosity if he wishes." Hence, a member of the Ma'fas lineage can increase his prestige within and without his family by paying beyond that which is expected of him. In this case, "generosity" is the variable related to a man's place on the scale of prestige. 583 554 556 435 On the other hand, in another "poorer" lineage, 'Ailit Zagharat, the mahr is 30 L.E. to members of the in-group but "the stranger will pay 60 to 80 L.E., according to the father's wealth." The largest and most famous mahr payment in the area was made by the wealthiest man in al-Qasr who paid seven camels (each worth about 150 L.E.) for his son's wife. The highest fixed mahr in al-Qasr was that of Bait Bu Tarram of 'Ailit Lazumi. It was 100 L.E. for members of 'Ailit Lazumi and, accordingly, much more for strangers. This mahr is in contrast to the average for the area which is about 30 L.E. within the secondary group.

586 521 784 Divorce is a forbidden topic of conversation in al-Qasr. Any talk about one's wife, mother, or sister is considered injudicious.

586 judicious. Another issue which enters here is the desire on
829 the part of the individual to maintain his privacy--especially where an infringement of it could result in a change of his tax status. The Bedouins think that it is wise to keep the government uninformed about the exact size of their family.
586 When I first asked a question concerning divorce, I was
829 politely taken aside and told that I do not speak about
123 divorce to a man, and especially when his sons are present.

586 Two cases of divorce took place while I was in the field. In the one, the wife claimed that her husband was impotent. She took this complaint to her father who then confronted the husband with it; the result was a divorce. Although the man denied that he was sterile, this was his second childless marriage and he felt it wise not to contest the case. It becomes very important to know, in the case of Bedouin divorce, which partner cannot meet the requirements of the marriage. If it is the woman, she will return to her father's house and the father must then return the price of mahr (brideprice). If it is the husband, when his wife returns to her father's house he must pay her (not her father, in this case) a sum, called mu'akhkhir al-sadaaq ("the balance of the marriage contract"), which is equal to that of the original mahr. Actually, there are three times when a mahr
[583] price may be paid in al-Qaṡr: the original mahr is paid at
[768] the time of the marriage; the mu'akhkhir al-sadaaq is paid
[595]

586 [583] [768] [595] at the time of divorce (if the husband is in fault), and also at the time of the husband's death; and, _sadaaq al-musaama_ ("price of friendship") is paid to the wife when her husband takes a second, third or fourth wife.

586 158 The second divorce case which happened while I was in al-Qasr involved, what seems to be, an instance of psychotic behavior. A girl, who had married shortly before I arrived in the field, would fall into a deep sleep every time she entered her husband's house. Each time her father would come for her and take her home until she had recovered. But upon her return, three different times, she became ill again. Finally, her father and the husband agreed that this marriage would not work, and the father returned the _mahr_ to the man. This case lasted over the period of almost a year while I lived in al-Qasr. I suggested to the father that perhaps his daughter did not wish to be married to this man but he assured me that "she loved him very much."

586 If the girl's father is dead, so that she cannot return to his house at the time of divorce, she will go to live with the brother who needs her services. 586 587 [593] [583] It then becomes the duty of the brother to make another marriage for his sister, and in the case that he does it becomes his right to claim the _mahr_ for himself. The Bedouins say that virginity, or the lack of it, in the case of the divorced woman is no issue; just so a man knows "she is from a good family."

Still, according to the unofficial estimates,
585 only about ten per cent of all marriages are registered, and these are
656 mainly mixed marriages involving a tribal person and a non-tribal one
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582 or a tribal member who is not living in the area anymore. The reason
619 is that such a spouse, especially when he is the husband, is not under the control of the tribal customs and therefore cannot be forced to fulfill his obligations if he fails to do so. Most of the tribal popula-
[581] tion still feel that marriage is a personal and family affair that should be kept away from the State legal system.

584 Marriage among Awlad Ali is a relatively informal procedure. When
593 a man decides to marry a certain girl, he informs his mother who, in turn, informs his father. The father may have objections to his son's choice of the bride. Such objections may be based on already strained relations between the two families or the questionable reputation of the girl or any member of her family. In such cases, the father tries to dissuade his son from going ahead with the marriage. The father is
[583] usually successful in controlling his son's choice when the latter is dependent on his father for the payment of the bridewealth called "mahr" and for the support of his new household. This is usually the case in the man's first marriage. In subsequent marriages and in the cases where the son has independent means of support for himself and his bride, the father's control of the son's choice is minimal, and asking the father's approval is a matter of formality. In second and subse-
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595 quent marriages, the approval of the older wives is essential. The
584 older wives have no right to object to the husband taking an additional wife, but they have the right to object to the choice on the basis that the new bride is hard to get along with or that there is animosity between her family and the families of the other wives which makes

593 595 cooperation between the wives in household activities difficult. The 584 wives have to have reasonable grounds for their objection to the new [431] bride. But even then, the husband could still marry the woman of his choice, although in this case he has to bring gifts to the other wives as "nasafa," or making-up present.

584 If the family has no objections to the marriage, the proceedings 593 start. The initial proceedings are undertaken by the women on both sides. The groom's mother or a female relative of his mother's generation or older visits the mother of the prospective bride and tells her of her son's intention to marry the latter's daughter. The bride's mother then discusses the matter with the girl's father who has the [429] final say in the matter. If the father is dead, then the authority on giving the girl in marriage goes to her brother or closest male kin in the order specified before. The girl has no say in the matter of marriage and cannot refuse to complete the marriage, although after marriage she can resort to a certain practice which helps her to terminate the marriage without the consent of her guardian, as will be seen later in 584 the chapter. From this moment until the conclusion of the marriage [583] negotiations are done by the men of both families. The first thing to be discussed is the amount of bridewealth, a "mahr." If the two families agree on the marriage, a small ceremony is held. This ceremony is called [779] "el-fatha" in reference to reading the first "sura" of the Koraan known as el-fatha, or "the beginning." The ceremony includes members of the [675] two families and very few friends. After the fatha is read, the agreement is achieved. This is considered as an engagement and means that the girl is spoken for and therefore no other man can ask to marry her.

To break the fatha agreement, the father of the prospective bride

The bride's father
584 did not have to pay kabara, although he held
686 a big feast in which he slaughtered three sheep and invited the groom,
558 his father and a number of his friends and friends of the girl's father
in honor of the groom as a compromise.

583 Before the fatha is read, the two families usually agree on the amount of bridewealth, or "mahr", to be paid by the groom or his father. The amount of bridewealth depends upon a number of criteria, important among which is the relative position of the bride's and groom's families and the degree of relationship that exists between them. The lowest mahr is usually paid in the case of cousin marriages. The amount ranges from 10 to 50 pounds. Sometimes when the groom cannot afford any mahr, he pays only the religiously required sum of 25 Egyptian piasters. This is never the case if the groom and bride are more distantly related. When the groom is an outsider or a member of another tribe, the mahr is usually much higher. Several cases of mahr of more than 2,000 pounds are reported in the area. There was a case in which the mahr reached 10,000 Egyptian pounds ($22,000). The amount of mahr also depends on the beauty of the bride. In the case of the highest known mahr mentioned above, the woman was known to be of great beauty. There
[587] is no distinction made between previously married women and ones married for the first time. In the case above, the woman was married three times before, and the mahr was apparently higher than that paid for her
[602] in her first marriage. Increasing the mahr according to the kinshp distance between the bride and groom reflects the preference of endogamous
582 marriages. The preferred marriage match in the area is that of the patrilateral parallel cousin marriage. The father's brother's son, "ibn 'amm," has an undisputed claim over his cousin, "bint 'amm." Even when they are of incompatible age, or even if the man is married or for

000 agreement and therefore not morally bound to abide by its contents.

582 The lack of serious intentions to marry one's cousin is reflected
in the actual frequency of patrilateral parallel cousin marriage in the
582 area. The following table is taken from the genealogies of five camps
621 in the area of Burg el Arab. The camps belong to different tribal
613 groupings:
619

Agnatic cousins	5
Other cousins	12
Within the bait (other than above)	9
Within the Eila (other than above)	13
Within the tribe (other than above	11
With members of the client tribe	15
With outsiders	9
Total	74

The above table shows that the frequency of patrilateral parallel cousin
marriage is less than eight per cent of the total marriages included in
582 the genealogies of the camps studied. It also shows that the largest
619 frequency of marriage is with a member of a client tribe of Murabiteen.
In the majority of the fifteen cases (eleven cases), it is the woman
who is a member of the Murabiteen tribe while the man is a member of the
Sa'adi tribe. The Murabiteen tribes from which the wives came are not
always the clients of the particular tribal segment to which the husband
belonged. One explanation of the popularity of marriage to the Murabiteen
[583] is that the bridewealth among them is generally less than it is for the
Sa'adi girls. It therefore gives the man the advantage of lower bride-
582 wealth without the lack of choice involved in the cousin marriage. It
is important to bear in mind, however, that the sample given above is
by no means representative of the entire tribal population. Furthermore,
the material presented above was based on the actual marriages at the

582 779 and although they are not considered wrong or sinful, there is a general feeling of distaste among the tribal population to such marriages. They usually attribute this distaste to the fact that if the marriage with the first sister did not work out, there is no reason to expect the marriage with the second to be successful.* Although this might account, in part, for the low rate of cousin marriage in the group when present wives of the individuals are taken into consideration, yet, the effect of that practice should not be exaggerated. For although that prohibition might curb the marriage with the cousin who is the sister of a previous wife, it does not restrict the marriage with another cousin who is a cousin, rather than a sister of the first wife.

584 431 During the period that follows and until the marriage is final, the groom is supposed to bring gifts to the bride. These gifts are usually a wide silver bracelet that is used as an engagement ring. Also gifts of clothes and jewelry are quite customary. Such gifts become the private property of the bride and are to be returned only if the engagement is broken for fault on the part of the bride or any member of her family. In such cases, her father has to return all the gifts his daughter has accepted as well as the expenses that the groom's visitations have cost him.

585 583 779 431 The marriage is affected and finalized by the payment of the bridewealth. In Islamic law the bridewealth is supposed to be paid to the bride herself as a gift and not to her father, which had been a significant departure from the pre-Islamic practice where two types of bridewealth were paid: the sadaqa paid to the father of the bride or her

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[587] * This does not apply to cases where the first wife dies. In such cases, it is not objectionable to marry her sister, although the incidences of sororate are rare among the population.

585 legal guardian and considered a bride price to compensate the father or
583 the legal guardian of the bride. In earlier times the bride received
779 none of the mahr, although she usually got a sadaq or bridal gift for
431 herself. In Islamic Arabia, the mahr and the sadaq became indistinguishable
[178] [171] and were given to the woman and took the form of a legal gift
[178] for affecting the marriage. The Koraan no longer contains the concept
of the purchase of the wife, and the mahr becomes a compensation which
the woman has to claim in all cases. The Koraan demands a bridal gift
for a legal marriage: "And give them whom ye have enjoyed their reward
as a wedding gift" (Sura, iv. 24), and again, "And give the women their
[586] dowries voluntarily" (Sura, iv. 3). According to the Koraan, the mahr
remains the property of the wife and remains her own even if the marriage
is dissolved by divorce. But although it took the form of a gift, the
mahr remained in Islamic law a prerequisite for the legalization of the
marriage. It is only upon the giving of the mahr that the marriage is
considered valid. No marriage is legal, according to the Islamic law,
unless that transfer of the mahr is affected. Mutual consent of the
two parties to forfeit the mahr does not change that rule, and the marriage
58 is considered void. According to Muslim jurisprudence, marriage
675 is a contract ('acd) made betweeen the bridegroom and the bride or her
184 wali or guardian. An essential element in that contract is the mahr.
The jurists themselves are not sure about the nature of the mahr. Some
regard it as practically a purchase money or as an equivalent ('iwad)
for the possession of the woman and the rights over her, so it is like
a price paid in a contract of sale; while other jurists see in the mahr
a legal symbol, a mark of honor and a proper legal security of property
for the woman.

583 Among Awlad Ali the payment of the bridewealth signifies the
[584] completion of the marriage contract. The mahr is not paid to the woman but
583 to her father or closest male kin. Usually the mahr is paid in money.
178 This, however, seems to be a recent phenomenon. Until the turn of the
century, according to informants, the mahr was paid only in sheep and
583 goats. The practice is still followed by a number of tribal segments
178 of Ali Ahmar who occupy the western most part of the area where pasture
184 is more abundant and reliable and where the permanent pasture of the
green mountains of Cyrenaica is close by. Other tribal segments still
insist that at least one-fourth of the mahr should be paid in livestock,
583 but the majority of the people accept money. The main purpose of the
[584] mahr among Awlad Ali is to legalize the marriage contract and to put
[182] emphasis on the reciprocal oblications that the marriage created between
the two families of the bride and the groom. It also works as an
insurance for good behavior on the part of both the husband and the wife.
583 If the husband mistreats his wife or fails to give her the rights legally
593 hers by marriage, he risks the chance of losing the mahr and being forced
586 to divorce her. On the other hand, if the wife fails to behave in the
customary way expected from a wife, the husband could divorce her and
have the right to get back his mahr. This is particularly inconvenient
in cases where all or part of the mahr is paid in livestock, in which
case it becomes part of the father's herd and hard to take away in case
of divorce. It is therefore in the interest of her family to keep the
marriage. In this way their interference in the marriage is checked.
[591] This is especially important among Awlad Ali where, although the
[592] marriage is usually patrilocal, the woman retains membership in her father's
household even after marriage.

593 606 The case persisted for more than two months with no sign that either 557 party was willing to give into the demands of the other. I left the 586 area before any solution to the case was achieved.

[14]

584 578 606 Another relevant case is one which involved a dispute between Hassan Hassanein from the Sanagrah tribe and the father-in-law of his daughter who was also from the same tribe and who lived in the same area. The case started when Hassanein was visited by a friend from the [594] Esheibat tribe in Matruh, an old man of 60 or 70 years. During the night that this guest spent at Hassanein's house, they got to talking about marriage and the fact that although his guest was a wealthy and re- [595] spected man, he had only one wife. After a lengthy talk, it seemed that the old man was convinced that he should have a second wife and asked Hassanein if he knew of a suitable girl to marry. Hassanein sug- 584 583 578 606 gested his daughter's sister-in-law. Hassanein took the prospective groom to the tent of his daughter's father-in-law and discussed the matter with the father of the prospective bride who agreed to marry his daughter to Hassanein's guest if he paid the sume of 200 pounds, in addition to slaughtering a number of goats and presenting him with the [illegible] appropriate presents. When the man agreed to the terms, the fatha was read to signify the agreement between the two parties. Hassanein left the man to spend the night in the camp of his future in-laws. In the morning the groom told the bride's father that he must go to nearby Alexandria to bring the money for the bride price. When he came back late that afternoon, he paid the money and set a date for the wedding the next Thursday and then left for Matruh to prepare for the arrival of the new wife.

593 586 Taking his daughter away from the marital residence is treated as an undisputed right of the father. This is true whether he is justified in his actions or not and whether the girl approves of her father's decision or not. The general view is that the father, having raised his daughter, is entitled to her obedience and that taking her away from her husband, even against her will, is the symbol of authority over her. It also signifies that the girl has someone to look after her, to protect her and prevent the husband or any member of his family from mistreating her. Awlad Ali differentiate, however, between cases in which the father has exercised his right in an arbitrary and unreasonable manner and those in which he has reasonable grounds for his actions. A father is considered justified in taking his daughter away if her husband or members of his family fail to fulfill their obligations towards the wife or members of her family. Mistreatment of the woman (the definition of which will be discussed later), and disrespect to members of her family, or preventing her from visiting her family or them visiting her in the customary specified manner are always justifiable grounds. As a
[681] justifiable action, the father is not obliged to return his daughter until he gets full apologies and any gifts for the woman or himself that he considers as kabara. If the husband refuses to concede to the demands of the father, the latter can force him to divorce her without having to return the bridewealth to the husband. Although the father's right still exists when no justifiable grounds are present, in this case he is required to return his daughter to her husband after a short period. If he refuses,
[681] the husband is entitled to ask for a kabara. He also can divorce his
[583] wife and is entitled to get back his mahr and possible all the marriage expenses. It is this possibility of having to pay back the mahr and

593 586 and expenses to the husband that constitutes the most important check
(583) on the otherwise undisputed right of the father to take away his
daughter.

593 The woman, on the other hand, cannot refuse to go with her father,
562 for this means that she would be disobeying him. A woman who disobeys
586 her father is not worthy of his name. He can cut her off from the
family, which means that she is left without any support or protection.
A woman who is cut off from her family is left vulnerable to her husband
and to society. She will have nobody to defend her or to be responsible
for her actions. The responsibility for the woman's behavior is not
transferred by marriage to the husband or his family.

682 If the woman kills or assaults someone or causes damage to property
683 for which compensation is required, her male kin pays the blood money or
602 613 the compensation on her behalf. It is sometimes stated that if the woman
562 has grown-up sons, they, and not her family, pay for her. Since the
593 children belong to their father's family, it may seem like transfering
the responsibility for the woman's actions to her husband's family. However, in all three cases where this happened, the woman was quite old,
her father was dead, and her brothers were either dead or had moved outside the area and had cut off all relations with the area. She also had
no nephews in the area. In such cases, the sons were the woman's closest
male kin.

682 On the other hand, if the woman is the victim of murder or assault
683 593 for which blood money or compensation is to be paid, the husband is the
562 one to benefit from the situation. To understand why this happens, we
have to consider the contractual nature of marriage among Awlad Ali. It
584 583 has been mentioned earlier that before marriage is final, the prospective

584 husband or his father pays the woman's father the bridewealth, or mahr.
583 In exchange for the mahr, the husband expects his father-in-law to outfit his daughter with such items as rugs, blankets, and a few other household items, like cooking pots, serving dishes, and a metal or wooden chest
[422] to keep her clothes in. These items become the private property of the
wife, but the husband has the right to use them. In addition, the man
581 expects to gain certain rights to the woman. The customary law of Awlad
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585 Ali gives the husband three basic rights over his wife: the right to her sexual services (including the right to bear him children); the right to her labor in domestic activities; and the right to her obedience. Of the three rights, the first is the most exclusive. Not only doesthe husband have a complete monopoly over his wife's present sexual services, but he also has the right, if the girl has never been married before, to be the
[583] first to use such services. If he discovers that she is not a virgin, he
can send her back to her father and get back his mahr.

581 The other two rights are not as exclusive. The husband's right to
585 his wife's domestic labor does not prevent her from occasionally helping
593 out in her father's or brother's household, especially if they live nearby. Finally, the husband's right to be obeyed by his wife is always subordinated to that of her father, who retains the ultimate authority over his daughter.

682 If the woman is killed or injured, the husband is deprived of all
683 or some of her services, depending on the seriousness and the permanence
581 of the injury, and therefore is entitled to compensation. The right of
585
593 avenging the woman's murder remains, however, that of her family, since
she is still a member of that family.

684 613 562 593 [114] 684 [illegible] 682 613 of drastic actions taken in cases of adultery. Of the fourteen cases of adultery that I examined furing my field work, none resulted in the killing of the adulteress, and only three resulted in the murder of her partner. In all three cases where the adulterer was killed, the avenger was the husband; and in all three cases, the husband had to pay the bloodmoney to the murdered man's kin group. His payment of the bloodmoney, among other things, may indicate that the right of the husband to kill the adulterer is not completely accepted among Awlad Ali. All [628] agree, however, that such killings never result in blood feuds because of the shameful circumstances in which the victim dies.

684 126 [124] It was very difficult to obtain any detailed or reliable information about adultery cases. All the above mentioned fourteen cases were gathered from the informants, twelve of which were cases which had already been solved. For the two cases which were still open at the time of the study, information was quite vague. Usually such cases are conducted with a great amount of secrecy, with the involved parties referring to them as cases of theft, or merely by saying that the cases involve women. Only when the adultery leads to the killing of the adulteress or the adulterer are more details publicly known about the case.

684 But while the right to retaliate for the shameful action of an adulterous wife is vague and diffused, the right of the husband for compensation from the adulterer remains clear and undisputed. In this resepct, adultery is treated very much like theft; the adulterer has stolen the husband's exclusive right to his wife's sexual activities. The com- [583] [586] pensation for this offense is estimated at L.E. 20, in addition to the mahr, if the husband decides to divorce his wife as a result of her adultery.

681 558 684 this variation is that committing the adultery within the camp of the husband constitutes a greater humiliation, since it affects his honor among his neighbors. Also, adultery inside the tent of the couple carries with it the possibility of rape, while adultery outside the tent at least implies an element of consent on the part of the wife. The
● [583] penalty in the case of adultery is the return by the wife's father of the mahr and all other expenses of the marriage ceremony and the gifts the husband had presented during the engagement period. This is a further indication that the father of the wife is still responsible for her behavior even after she is married. It is in this respect that the crime of adultery differs from theft. In the case of theft, the
[685] thief has to return twice the amount stolen and in the case of repeated offenders, four times the amount stolen. This is in addition to a certain amount of money as kabara. Yet, in the latter case the kabara is not specified and is subject to the proof by the victim that the theft constituted an insult to him. This insult is assumed in the case of adultery, which makes the kabara in the case of adultery part of the punishment--an integral part of the punishment. The kabara is not among
[613] the collective responsibility of the amar and is paid only by the person involved, unless he is totally unable to pay or refuses to pay. In such
426 593 681 684 558 cases, his closest male kin (his father, son, or brother) pays on his behalf with the understanding that such payment constitutes a debt which should be repaid. The person paying on his behalf in this case can go to his tent and take by force anything of value, such as blankets, utensils, or even sheep and goats, and keep them as pawns until the debt is paid.

581 Marriage does not deprive the woman of some rights of her own.
585 562 The customary law gives the wife three basic rights corresponding to
671 those of the husband's sexual services, domestic work, and obedience.
Corresponding to the first of these, the wife has the right to have a
normal sexual life with her husband. This right, however, is not an ex-
clusive one, since the husband can marry more than one wife. A woman
585 can be divorced from her husband without having to return the mahr if
586 she claims that the husband is unable to perform his s[illegible] duties. In
593 such cases, the marriage is usually dissolved quietly. In certain rare
585 instances, the husband may deny his wife's accusations. If both insist
586 on their stand, one or both may ask to be submitted to "bait el-shana'a,"
593 or house of the dreadful deeds. Reports are extremely vague about the
627 exact procedures involved in this case. Some informants stated that the
married couple would live in a tent without sidewalls so that everybody
could see what goes on inside. Most informants, however, insist that it
merely means that the couple move their tent near that of a respectable
man whose word is believed and honored. This man is supposed to keep a
close watch on the couple's activities, by listening or looking through
holes in the tent. His verdict determines the future of the marriage.
[588] If the wife is justified in her claim, the husband is forced to divorce
[681] her and to forfeit his mahr. If, on the other hand, the verdict is for
[558] the husband, he not only can divorce her and get back the mahr, but is
also entitled to kabara, or compensation, for his injured pride. There
[114] is no case of bait el-shana'a in the area during the time of the field
[178] work, and most people insist that this practice is something of the past
[583] when the mahr was relatively high and was paid in livestock, in which

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593 case its return to the husband would have caused great financial in-
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[114] convenience for the wife's family.

[178] Corresponding to the second right, the husband's right to his
(583) wife's domestic work, is the wife's right to maintenance. The husband
581
585 has to support his wife. This includes providing her and her children
562 with adequate food and proper clothing. If the husband fails to do so
593 because of poverty, sickness, crop failure or unexpected disaster, the
wife's brother or father provides her and her children with the neces-
[586] sary food and clothing. If the husband's failure to fulfill his duties
is due to neglect, the wife can leave him and go to her father or brother
who talks the matter over with the husband who, in turn, either agrees
to their demands or has to divorce his wife and forfeit his mahr.

593 Finally, corresponding to the husband's right to his wife's obedi-
562 ence is the wife's right to fair treatment by her husband. There are a
[779] number of ways in which the wife is mistreated. One is excessive punish-
ment; although the right of the husband to punish his wife is provided in
the Koraan, the punishment must be excessive or severe. Awlad Ali draw
a line between acceptable and severe punishment. A punishment is severe
if it results in something that other people can see or hear. If the
husband insults his wife or her family and others hear the action, or if
he beats her and this results in visible traces, then the punishment is
severe.

593 A wife considers herself mistreated if the husband, when married
595 to more than one, treats any of the other wives better than he treats
562 her. Although the wife cannot deny her husband the right to have ad-
ditional wives, he must give them all equal treatment. This includes

586 562 574 554 husband. In a number of cases the husband was willing to divorce the woman after a promise by the man that she would pay him the mahr when she got married. In most cases, however, the process costs the man a considerable amount of money. Sometimes, when the woman is young and attractive, the man finds it to his advantage to keep her as his wife, since she will cost him no more expenses. On the other hand, the man cannot refuse a woman the right of refuge, since to do this or to deny her the right of hospitality will make him liable to pay kabara if she made the refusal known publicly. On the other hand, it is prestigious to be known in the area as a man to whom women go to be released from their husbands. In fact, a man who acquires a reputation of getting wives released is likely to be sought as mardi in other cases as well.

Due to the nature of his role in mediating, the woman must be careful in selecting the man over whom she throws herself. These considerations are manifested in the following case taken from my field notes. [584] [583] Hadia was forced by her father to marry a man from the same tribe who paid her father L.E. 100 as mahr. She did not want to marry him because she was in love with someone else of whom her father did not approve. One month after she was married, she left the tent and never came back. 586 562 574 554 634 Later, she appeared in the house of Omda Ali, the chief of another tribe, and everyone knew that she had thrown herself on him. She later told me why she had selected Omda Ali and not the Omda of her own tribe. "Because my husband works for the Omda of my own tribe, and I thought he would be biased. Of course, I couldn't have gone to my father; he was the one who forced me to marry that man. Omda Ali is very respected and can support me... He is also rich and is known for releasing wives from their husbands." Omda Ali called the husband in and asked him to divorce

586 562 who forced her to marry the husband, or if she was cut off from the
593 family for some reason or another.

586 From the frequency of women using this right in the area, it
562 seems that no social disapproval is associated with it, nor is there
574 a social stigma attached to women who throw themselves. They seem to
626 find it as easy to find a husband as those women divorced voluntarily
by their husbands or with the help of their fathers. In fact, as was
586 562 mentioned earlier, many of them marry the rich men over whom they
587 throw themselves. As to the amount of mahr paid for their subsequent
[583] marriages, the fact of throwing themselves does not seem to be a factor
[574] in determining the amount of mahr paid. In one of the cases, the woman
threw herself on an 'aqila of one of the Geneishat tribe after her
father refused to help her get a divorce from her husband who had married a second wife without first asking the first wife's permission.
[429] When the Geneishat member succeeded in convincing the husband to divorce his wife, the latter had no place to stay so remained in the
house of her protector who acted as her guardian in place of her father
[583] who had refused to take her back in his home. While staying in the
house of her protector, she got many marriage offers; one of the suitors
offered a mahr of L.E. 4,000 ($10,000), one of the highest mahrs reported in the area. She agreed, and the marriage was affected. This
mahr is about ten times the mahr she got for her first marriage. This
586 562 procedure offers the woman a considerable guarantee of her marital
rights. It also gives her, as far as the ability to dissolve the marriage, a status close to that of her husband. This relative equality
is reflected is reflected in the lack of stigma associated with divorced

173 Fusion of names appears in another context and for similar
178 reasons. Not only are lineal descendants given the name of deceased
551 ancestors, but a man may be given the name of any deceased
613 agnate of his tertiary section. Usually, this is only done
428 when a man passes on property to another who is not his direct
[553] heir. Commonly, this occurs when an agnate is also a mother's
brother, as often happens as a result of parallel cousin marriage, and this mother's brother has no sons of his own. If he has a sister's son, who is also his paternal nephew, he is likely to pass
[183] on his wealth to this nephew. A father, the Bedouin insist, ought
to perform three duties for his sons: attend to their circumcision,
[593] and their education in the Koran, and provide bride-wealth when
[852] they marry. All fathers attend to the circumcision of all their sons;
[871] few provide for the Koranic education of any of their sons; most
bear the burden of marrying off at least one of their sons. The
[583] performance of the latter duty is what makes the continuance
of the deceased's name an obligation, and whoever performs this duty must have his name perpetuated in one male offspring of the union which was brought about with his wealth. Wealth need not take the form of bride-wealth; it can be a legacy willed by a father, maternal uncle of the kind described above, or any other agnate who has died without male issue. Conversely, if a man dies without leaving any property, even his sons might not perpetuate his name, and eventually it will drop out of the genealogy.[10] There are instances of men inheriting the wealth of a number of agnates, using each parcel of wealth to make a new marriage and naming the sons of the various unions after the several dead who had left wealth. The example given below is taken from the genealogy of the Dawwas section of the Magharba tribe. What happened here was that the two lines stemming from Faraj and Sha'aban, after proliferating normally, became extinct. As this happened, Ibrahim, the son of Miftah, began to inherit wealth to which he was not a direct heir; and

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[588] [10] To avoid confusion, it ought to be made clear that this is not ghost marriage. As I understand ghost marriages from Evans-Pritchard's (1951) account, two main conditions must be satisfied: (i) that there should be inherited wealth to make a marriage, and (ii) that the wealth remaining after the ghost marriage has been made is inherited by the ghost children only. In Cyrenaica, wealth thus inherited becomes part of a man's total wealth and is not reserved for a ghost marriage and its issue.

613 his maternal kinsmen to use the land and water facilities of
578 his lineage; his agnates may give ready consent or bicker about
602 it, but when it becomes necessary to clean a well, disputes are
almost certain to break out in the camp between those who argue
that their maternal relatives should not be expected to assist in
its cleaning and those who insist they should as an acknowledgement
of the use they have made of it. In these circumstances
613 maternal links divide agnates. Conversely, if it becomes necessary
602 for some of the same men to use the water and ploughland
of their maternal kin, their agnates are only too pleased that
they are able to do so, because the pressure on their own resources
is relieved. In these circumstances, the maternal link
strengthens the agnatic group. When, to give another instance,
613 blood-money has to be gathered, it is the duty of all agnates to
682 contribute equally, and no member of the group, rich or poor,
can contract out of this obligation without sacrificing his membership
of the group. Payments of blood-money are witness of
the strength of the notion of 'oneness' among agnates, in one
sense, but in so far as they are compulsory, they point also to the
weakness in the relationship. Maternal kin are not directly concerned
in this, but they can and do make contributions. In this
context two aspects of agnation appear, and the value of the
602 maternal link is emphasized. Again, maternal kinsmen are not
428 directly concerned in inheritance disputes, but they are expected
578 to intercede for their sister's sons, who often use their mother's
brother's tribal brand on their own animals. During disputes of
this kind, blame is thrown on to the maternal kinsmen for their
interference in matters which, properly speaking, are not their
613 business. In marriage, however, events take quite a different
582 turn. The responsibility for providing a man with a wife is first
that of the father, and secondly of the members of the tertiary
section; the father takes the initiative, and his agnates assist, not
only in the negotiations, but also in defraying the heavy costs of
the wedding festivities, the various gifts that precede it, and the
604 bride-wealth which follows. The mother's brother is also a key
613 person in all these arrangements. He enters into the negotiations,
585 assists with the entertainment on the wedding day, and makes a
[583] substantial contribution to the bride-wealth. On the wedding day,
there is no kinsman to compare with the mother's brother; a few

weeks later, he is reviled for demanding a long overdue installment of his daughter's bride-wealth. He is the person who can be approached freely, to whom love tales can be told, from whom help can be expected, who gives support in disputes, and who also upbraids, who punishes, who withholds, who acts as a pull-away from the agnatic group. An agnate demands help, and also compels the fulfilment of obligations. An agnate is a man with whom relationships are formal, particularly if he is a senior. He is, too, the person who unfailingly, though perhaps grudgingly, gives help when it is most required; who, regardless of the merits of the case, defends one against external opposition; and who is always available at each life crisis. A kinship link is not to be defined by any one particular mode of behaviour. Each is a cluster of different sorts of behaviour, one form taking precedence in these circumstances, another in other circumstances, and so forth. 604 613 [585] [583] 613 602

The little clusters of kindred can be defined clearly in any of the camps. It is customary among the Bedouin for those who are most closely linked as kindred to pitch their tents close to each other. For example, if a man has two recently married sons, their tents are pitched on either side of his, with the ropes of their tents crossing the ropes of their father's tent. More distantly related kin will be more distantly placed, and here and there, breaks in the continuity of the lines of tents are to be observed, corresponding as a rule to breaks in kinship. Each large camp in this way can be viewed as two or more nuclei of kindred. The camp as a whole is dominantly composed of agnates, but they are disposed in such a way as to show clusterings of varying kinship composition. Characteristically each cluster has a separate name, often a female name which refers to a common mother of the cluster, or of the head of the leading family in it. When these relatively large camps break up with the onset of the rains and disperse to form small camps of five to seven tents for winter pasturing, they will be seen to correspond almost identically with the kin clusters of the larger summer camp. Again, a tertiary segment may have two wells for its own use. In a particular year there may be sufficient water in one of them to meet the needs of the whole group, and its members then live together in one camp; the following year both wells may have to be used, and the camp of the previous summer will split up, roughly half going 613 602 621 [221] [312]

121 kill within this range is, in terms of the general pattern of behaviour, stupid. What is of
613 interest is that such killings do occur. I recorded three instances of men killing the
682 mother's brother in the contemporary population, not to mention many others
674 based on hearsay evidence only. Clearly, the relationship is more than a merely permissive
829 one. The mother's brother may well be the only person who can help in
certain crises, and if he withholds his assistance the sister's son is left in a dilemma.
604 The form of behaviour in which demands are made is, as the Bedouin rightly say,
121 that of asking a favour, but this does not mean that it is any the less urgent than a
613 demand made against agnates. The range of favours is large, and only a few can be
604 detailed here. If a group has insufficient water to meet its needs a man first seeks help
from his mother's brother. The request has a number of aspects to it: it is a test of
[554] the relationship itself; it is a matter of pride and status that a man can 'call' on
another to help his group out of difficulties, it is an assurance that resources other than
those jealously guarded by his agnates are available to him, and if a man is seeking
to increase his power he must have available more than an agnate's share of local
[682] water resources to supply his flocks and herds. When a blood-money payment has to
be made, the mother's brother is expected to come forward—it is his right to give
[584] without being asked. If a man wants a wife, he is not permitted to approach his father
directly, but his mother's brother can put pressure on the father instead. If a man dies
[429] while his eldest son is still a minor, his brother may be required to act as guardian,
and in this role he controls the son's property; disputes frequently break out as a
result, with the son at a considerable disadvantage, for he cannot engage his father's
brother in hostilities—but his mother's brother can do so for him. Whenever men
[422] come to possess animals before the demise of their fathers or when the father's
brother is acting as guardian they mark them with the tribal and personal signs of their
● [583] mothers' brothers. Men have the right to demand contributions for bridewealth
from their agnates if they lack wealth; in practice it comes not from them, but from
the mother's brother. Finally, in certain circumstances, if a man does not have male
heirs, his sister's son might inherit all his wealth.

121 Affinity also carries with it a large number of rights. A poor man may take up
613 residence in the camp of his father-in-law, and be kept by him. The latter may come
to his son-in-law's aid in many of his dealings with his father. Like the mother's
606 brother, the affine is a potential source of water-supply when rain has been insufficient
on the homeland. He also helps with blood money and bridewealth, and he is expected
to aid his daughter and her husband with gifts of food and wool.

121 The details given above by no means exhaust the list of rights a man possesses in
613 his matrilateral and affinal relatives. Obviously, these are not the only forms of
relationship either, and the other forms carry with them yet other claims of various
sorts. Enough detail has been given, however, to make clear the point that local
agnatic groups are so differentiated, and inter-group relationships are so important,
that each aspect of homicide settlement previously described will require further
examination, not in the sense that additional complications must be introduced, but
with the question in mind, is not the structural presentation false? Before beginning
this stage of the argument it is necessary to establish the fact that the links of affinity
and matrilaterality which a group has with another are of a kind which necessitate
their inclusion in an analysis of the arrangements for settling homicides.

Cases

The Meaning of Marriage

581 Until marriage the changes in a man's life have been in the nature of
585 an ordered sequence of development from a child to be cared for — the only
342 time in his life when a father, without inhibition, showers on him his love
[593] and affection — to one who, by degrees, makes an increasing contribution to
a production unit. Marriage necessitates that a man pitch a tent for himself.
With a tent he becomes a potential host and protector of others. The local
idiom for marriage is "to set up a tent." It would be quite improper to use
[196] the verb "to marry" when inquiring whether a marriage has taken place
since this verb also has the meaning of "to have sexual intercourse."
[195] Instead the euphemism, "Have you pitched a tent?" is used. The Arabic word
for a tent in this context is *Bait*. It is not used to refer to a military tent, nor
to the small tent which shelters only a widow. It is reserved for the Bedouin
tent, which usually has a wool top, and, most importantly, holds the promise
of the continuation of life, whether it shelters a newly married couple, a
mature family or young unmarried people. (The word *Bait* represents a
complex concept, and it would be too much of a diversion here to discuss
the various points of its significance. It is essential to understand that its
[778] meaning is not confined to a tent in the physical sense.) Its top has *Baraka*
(divine goodness) in it; the quality of *Haram*, which makes it possible for the
tent to be used as a sanctuary, is associated with it and this quality of *Haram*
extends, moreover, to the ropes of the tent, so that anyone who clutches them
comes under the protection of the owner. In it, the wife must permanently
reside and her husband has the legal right to insist on this. In it too, he
has the legal right of sexual access to a woman, his wife. Any children
[885] born in it he can claim as his own. With the erection of a tent the son
reaches adulthood, and it is in this sense that he can be said to have acquired
a domain of his own.

581 Marriage gives a son greater freedom and less dependence on his father
585 in another sense. A second euphemism used for marriage is "making a
[593] relationship," specifically an affinal one. Relationships between a man and
[195] his father-in-law are diverse and are used in various ways in different
situations. Here, the particular aspect which needs to be stressed is that a man
606 can cajole his father-in-law, and (through his wife) wealth, in the form
425 of animals, may pass from the former to the latter. Reciprocal gifts are passed
556 between affines on certain occasions, but in addition small amounts may
pass which are not connected with the formal occasions of exchanges. Debt
● 583 lies between them. It begins with the initiation of marriage negotiations,
584 when the suitor's kinsmen take a prescribed number of sheep to present to
606 the girl's father if negotiations are successful. They promise to transfer
bride-wealth[*] to the girl's father. A few weeks after the marriage, the hus-

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[191] [*] I use the word "bride-wealth" because it has become so familiar in the literature,
but the only similarity between the *Sahiba* of the Bedouin and the bride-wealth of

band is required to take gifts to his mother-in-law in recognition of the fact 583
that she nourished his wife as an infant (the literal meaning of the word 584
used for this gift is "milk"). A return visit is made and gifts are given to 606
the daughter. When the first child is born an animal is presented by the
affines, and if the child is a male, the gift may be several sheep, or even a 851
few camels if the father-in-law is very wealthy. Formal exchange of gifts 425
continue, but, in addition, informal transfers are made. Moreover, if 606
relations between a man and his father-in-law develop favourably, it is not 606
uncommon for a young husband, during the early years of marriage, to move 591
away from his father and pitch his tent alongside that of his father-in-law. 593
Marriage gives a son affinal relations of his own. Affinity can alleviate the
dead weight of paternal authority.

It is suggested that the crisis the marriage of a son assumes for a father 585
is the shift it entails in the distribution of authority. This is borne out by 561
other details in the marriage ceremony referred to earlier. Ordinarily, young 602
men dare not sing within earshot of their senior agnates. Far from allowing
obscenities, agnates of the ascending generation would not allow even a 533
mention of women to be made by young men, in their presence. In a group [593]
consisting of young men and an agnate, I chanced to use the noun for [123]
woman and immediately my tent was cleared of all but the senior agnate.
At a wedding the young men revel in their lewd songs and shout their [831]
obscenities for all to hear. The senior agnates stand aside and make a show of ignoring the proceedings. And well they may, for each marriage is a challenge to the exclusive authority they have enjoyed; each nuptial tent is an invasion of the domain of which they have been undisputed masters. Marriage is the only occasion when the men of one generation can clap and sing their defiance of an older one, and give warning of the changes which must be accommodated however great the pretence that nothing has happened.

Marriage ceremonies dramatise the clash between adjacent generations 561
over the distribution of certain forms of authority. If this authority is as 602
overwhelming as has been suggested, and if it is so deeply resented, how is it that life is endurable for juniors? Relationships between junior and senior agnates are so restrictive that they almost amount to what Professor Fortes has suggested I view as a form of avoidance relationships. Juniors must always defer, they must obey commands promptly, they serve their seniors, they must accept a lead when it is given and the restrictions on conversations exclude all reference to women, marriage or sex. These are not simply a set of general guides for behaviour, they are rigidly applied rules, deviation from which is countered with rebuke or greater severity. It would appear from this

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many African societies is that wealth is transferred. Obviously, in societies where the 583
rules of exogamy compel a dispersion of links outside a man's own clan, what is 584
involved in this transfer of wealth cannot be sociologically similar to one in which 606
marriage to the first cousin on either side is permitted. 171

daughters of agnates and, in view of the high agnatic concentration, the 582
daughters of agnates who are co-residents as well. Parallel-cousin marriage 602
therefore creates affinity between co-resident agnates.

The rate of parallel-cousin marriage is high, producing such a density of kinship relationships as to afford a reliable index for defining the agnatic corporation. As a form of marriage it persists; genealogical records clearly demonstrate this. Frequency of parallel-cousin marriage taken together with its persistency, means, above all else, that it makes an agnatic group a cognatic group as well. The matter is put in this way to suit the general development of the argument, but it would be a serious error to think that this means I am giving priority to agnation and that I am considering cognation as intrusive, or that, in this society, agnation can stand on its own because it has a kind of absolute significance other forms of relationship do not possess. Both forms exist in reality.

The great Bu Bakr of Cyrenaica's most celebrated lineage is alleged to have [613]
exhorted his fellow tribesmen to "marry your father's brother's daughters and then your paternal relatives and your maternal relatives will become one." Whether he had given the advice or not, the Bedouin, as their society is constituted, would marry them anyway. The Bedouin form of agnation without its accompanying parallel-cousin marriage would impose impossible restrictions, if indeed there is any point in attempting to conceive of a situation so remote from reality. With parallel-cousin marriage present in the
corporate group, men referred to as agnates are not agnates only; each and [613]
every one of them is the centre of a bundle of roles, each role potentially [554]
as important as the other. It would be false to argue, moreover, that complexities of relationships can be unravelled by analytically separating them, giving precedence to the agnatic role in an "agnatic" situation, the mother's brother's role in a domestic situation and so on. An agnate who is also a mother's brother is never the same, in any situation, as an agnate to whom one is not otherwise related. The prime significance of parallel-cousin marriage is that it creates a complexity of linkages which almost amount to con- [182]
fusion, thereby maximising the choice available to individuals to meet whatever contingencies befall them.

The only area of relationships left relatively undisturbed by parallel-cousin marriage is the son, father and father's brother triangle. Freed of the complications stemming from parallel-cousin marriage, agnation can here approximate its true form. Other complications arise out of marriage. A 582
few are listed here: father and son marry a mother and her daughter; a 583 •
form of exchange marriage between first parallel-cousins occur; two brothers marry two sisters; the marriage of two brothers to two sisters is followed, in the succeeding generation, by the son of one union marrying the daughter of the other, making this latter a double first parallel-cousin marriage — both a father's brother's daughter's and a mother's sister's daughter's marriage.
These forms can all occur within a corporate group. No citadel of agnation [613]
can withstand this attack. All forms of marriage combine to break the grip [602]

582 of agnation on the members of a corporate group and give it a taproot of
•583 diversity whence it derives its strength, and which makes of it "the one body,"
613 conspicuous, in comparison with other societies, as the corporate group
602 *par excellence*.

The Sister's Son-Mother's Brother Relationship

128 Previously the mode of relationships associated with agnation and affinity have been briefly discussed. In order to appreciate the effects of parallel-cousin marriage, some remarks concerning the sister's son-mother's brother
604 set of relationships must be included here. Bedouin contrast the mother's
[174] brother with the father's brother; their sayings and proverbs afford a wealth of verbal documentation on the contrast. With the mother's brother a man enjoys all the freedoms he is denied in his relationships with his father
[831] and father's brother. He is permitted to joke with him; they indulge in exchanges of obscenities. When the sister's son wishes to marry, he is permitted to discuss the matter with his mother's brother and can urge him to intercede with his father on his behalf. Two men thus related are readily recognised in the camps, because in their acts they are required to show affection by displays of innocent horseplay, pranks or mild practical jokes. Small boys pursue their mother's brother, feign to kick or strike him, and he takes it all in good part.

The external aspects of this behaviour is deceptive. Joking of this sort creates the image in which the relationships are conceived; what is equally striking in it is its compulsiveness. Obviously, mature men are not always in the mood to be teased, but if they are, they must respond appropriately. Their relationships are unmistakably onerous. This remark applies not only to the external forms of their behaviour, but also to the favours a man is
[602] permitted to ask of his mother's brother. A brief amplification will make the point clear. Demands can be made of agnates, but only in situations of serious contingency. Day-to-day needs are met, not by appeals to the rights of agnation, but from the expectations linked to the mother's brother. If these expectations are withheld, the sister's son may be left in a quandary. In-
604 terestingly, in the records of homicides I gathered, three (in the con-
682 temporary population) were concerned with the killings of mother's brothers by sister's sons. Homicide within this field of relationship is difficult to comprehend unless it is appreciated that expectations are as compulsive in the daily life and the general well-being of people as are the rights and duties associated with agnation.

604 These general remarks apply to the relationships irrespective of the lineage
613 origin of the mother's brother. The similarity ends there, since the nature of the expectations, their urgency at any given moment and the kind of favours which are granted vary with the group identity of the mother's
[428] brother. A mother's brother who is a member of ego's corporate group may be expected to give the sister's son small quantities of flour, favour him in all

would be impossible to satisfy all marriage expectations of men within the 621
universe of the minimal tribal section. For this reason alone external links 613
are inevitable and persistent. Also, the small territorial strip such a group 582
claims as a homeland produces an economy which, in this environment, 182
is unstable. Additional security is gained by making connections with other [423]
tribal sections, each with its specific ecological character. Men also marry [433]
into their client groups. The proportion of these for this camp was 9 per cent [619]
of the total. From these links they gain economic advantages, they can claim services and a client-following is politically significant. Finally, 7 per cent of the total[18] are marriages with women of other tribes, which again not only reduces the instability of the economy (in that a large tribal area suffering near-famine conditions has access to areas of markedly different ecology), but also provides political connections for men whose power ambitions have passed the point of leadership limited to their own tribes. In one way or another all these interests are manifest in the small camp and attention is now directed to the latter.

The disposition of people in the camp is represented diagrammatically 621
on the page following. 592

The nucleus of the camp is Tent A. Its owner (1) was a powerful *Shaikh,* [554]
the son of a famous father. His marriage represents a political link with a [619]
group of one of the primary sections of his own tribe. His father died only a [428]
few years before I recorded my census, and the large amount of moveable property he left had still not been divided among the sons; the owner of the tent, as eldest brother, still controlled the flocks and herds. Most of his time he spent away from the camp engaging in political intrigue. His two younger brothers lived in his tent, but the second (5) would not remain there long
because negotiations for his marriage had been started. His father (2) mar- [582]
ried a parallel cousin; she died and shortly afterwards he took her sister (3) [587]
in sororal union. When this occurred an amount of bride-wealth was
agreed, but instead of giving any of it to her father, the entire amount was [583]
"put in front of her" (that is, the animals were allowed to remain with her husband's flock), and these animals she had marked with her brother's
tribal sign to distinguish them from those of her husband. It was widely [428]
known that she was going to leave these animals to her husband's second [562]
son, for although she could not transfer them to a male outside her husband's corporate group, she could decide who, among his heirs, should inherit.

During my stay in this camp, her brother's son (4) came to it as a 621
temporary resident for a month. Since he was poor, the purpose of his visit 592
was to capture some of his aunt's wealth while she was still alive and the 574
possibility still existed. During his stay he was fed well but did no work. [604]
His kinsmen found his company tiresome, so, to cut short his stay, and after [431]
consulting her nominated heir (5), she gave him three grown goats. Also
when an occasion arose for an animal slaughter, she provided the sheep, and, [231]

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[18] The remainder is made up of marriages to the daughters of men incorporated into the lineages.

621 592 571

the lavish generosity dispensed by the members of Tent A, and fed far better than would have been possible otherwise.

[574]

The location of Tent C was also determined by a link through women. The only female (8) living in this tent, a middle-aged widow, was the sister of (3) and (6) of Tents A and B respectively. Her teenage son lived with her. They possessed only a few sheep, which were put with the flock of Tent A for shepherding. The son (9) spent some of his time herding for Tent A. With the mother and her son in Tent C were two other kinsmen. One, a poor man (10), was this son's first patrilateral cousin, and they both were the only surviving sons of their respective fathers. He (10) was the main shepherd of Tent A. The third male (11), also poor and nearly blind, was a second patrilateral cousin of both, but his sister was also 11's mother. All occupants of Tent C were almost entirely supported by Tent A. Relieved of the necessity to live off their own resources, the two young men (9 and 10) were afforded the opportunity of building up their flocks for the day when they would be able to negotiate their delayed marriages.

621 613 592 571

Tents A, B and C sheltered men who were agnatically closely linked. More important, their grandfathers, three sons in a family of 19 children, were full brothers. The latter's mother's name was used when referring to these three tents as a group. During the past few years, many changes have occurred within it, and the death of the pivotal woman (3) of Tent A might well disperse this small cluster. Further, the nuptials of her heir (5) were anticipated, and this event, itself likely to precipitate division of his father's (2) wealth, might also lead to further residential rearrangements.

621 592 604 578 [582] [428] [583] ●

The owner of Tent D, (12), a man in his late thirties, son of a slave mother, was at loggerheads with his father's brother, much more senior in age. The owner's father, one of a family of 24 children, had been a wealthy man and died leaving a substantial herd and a large flock, but he (12) was bereft of most of this wealth by the father's brother. His first successful strike against his uncle was the demand he made for his daughter as a wife. Earlier, when (12) had demanded his father's wealth, his father's brother, who had for years acted as his guardian, replied, "It is in your stomach," (meaning that it had been expended on his upbringing). Later, after the marriage had taken place, when the uncle demanded payment of the bride-wealth his own words were thrown back at him, but this time with the meaning that the bride-wealth had already been paid. While I was resident in this area, the two men met occasionally: each meeting was hostile, for (12) was encouraging his half-brother (13) (also the son of a slave mother) to demand a second daughter as a wife. Included in this tent is a third adult male (14), virtually a pauper, reduced to this state by the same grasping father's brother. His link with (12) was their closeness of relationship (first [591]
paternal cousin), together with the fact that all three males (12, 13 and 14) had suffered privations and were allies against the common enemy, their father's brother.

Associated with them for the same reason, was the owner of Tent E (15).

593 In al-Qasr it is a rare sight to see a father and his young
son together, and it is only slightly more common to see the
father with the grown son. The second case may simply be a
reflection of the division of labor since the son, once
grown, takes over the economic tasks of his father.

593 The most important duties of a father toward his
867 son are three: he must teach him generosity, courage and
584 courtesy; he must see that the boy learns the Quran; and he
872 must arrange a good marriage for his son. According to
593 Peters (1960:34), the Cyrenaican Bedouin father must attend
852 to three things for his son, namely: his circumcision, his
[872] education in the Quran, and his bridewealth when he marries.
[583] In al-Qasr, the Egyptian school teachers have succeeded in
[177] showing the Bedouin that circumcision is a private family
593 affair and not a public ritual. Although all fathers still
852 see to it that their sons are circumcised, the father is no
178 longer responsible for "making a circumcision party." In
[626] fact, the father who does insist on following the old ways
[431] by hiring a dancer and publicly marking his son's rite de
passage, will be ridiculed as one "who only wants to make
money from the ritual gift (naquut) given the boy."

593 The son recognizes the rights which the father has
over him through a show of respect and obedience. A boy
shows deference toward his father by not smoking, singing,
or reciting poetry of any kind in his presence. During the

593 [591] be kept with the father's flock. Only in the case of a man's owning, or using, a large piece of land in the pasture area of al-Qasr will his son live away from the main part of the naja', i.e., away from his father's tent. The son then serves as his father's shepherd.

593 591 184 In the 'izba sector of al-Qasr, the pattern is generally the same except that the son will be given a room in the house rather than a tent when he marries. Since the land in this area is more scarce and a matter of official ownership, the son is not likely to have his own house during his father's lifetime.

593 584 When the son does marry, the marriage proceedings may be initiated by either the son or the father. But, under no circumstances that I heard of, would the son approach the father with the idea of his marriage; the son should communicate his desire to marry, first of all, to either his father's brother or his mother's brother. As the Bedouins say, "Marriage is an agreement between fathers." What they
593 584 *613 mean is that marriage is an agreement between tertiary groups. A father upon hearing of his son's wish to marry, for the boy's uncle will immediately tell the father, consults with the head of his tertiary group about such a proposed marriage. This is not a formal procedure but, certainly, the father would not go ahead with the marriage without making the matter public. In other words, marriage in al-Qasr is a

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[593]
public corporate affair and not a private one.

The head of the boy's tertiary group then relays the information about the marriage to the heads of the other tertiary segments which make up the secondary group. Again, this is an informal procedure but all corporate representatives must be informed of, and must approve of, the proposed marriage. Thus is the corporate channel of communication kept open and the corporate network of authority relations maintained through a reciprocal exchange of rights and duties. It is, as Fortes (1949:209) has noted, the lineage principle which compels a man to consult and gain the support of his lineage-mates in any matter of importance, or even in trivial matters. Demands are channeled through the corporate lines, "for no jural act takes place except in the framework of the lineage system."

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If the father should not consult the secondary group concerning his son's marriage--he may anticipate objections and consider his son's desires above those of the group--there are sanctions, forms of moral coercion, which can be applied by the group. First, a man may be fined if he goes through with an objectionable marriage; added to this, the man may be denied access to the preferred channels of marriage which exist within the lineage; lastly, dependent upon the gravity of the situation, the man may be threatened with expulsion from the lineage group.

593 The daughter and wife roles are also subject to the dominant role of father in al-Qasr Bedouin society. The father has virtually the right of life and death over his daughter in certain situations. But in no case does he have this right over his wife. The differentiation in right here is again a matter of the authority principle operating within the framework of the lineage system. A man's daughter belongs to his patrilineage or authority group while his wife belongs to the authority group of her father. There is an obvious exception to this statement about Bedouin society, for given the practice of parallel-cousin marriage a man and his wife can belong to the same authority group, the same tertiary group. Even so, only the father has the right of life and death over the girl who is his daughter. The Bedouins say, "The bones of the girl belong to the father." There are two situations in which a father may rightfully put his daughter to death: when she is found guilty of pre-marital intercourse (loss of virginity), or if it is proved that she has had any extra-marital sexual activity. In either case, if the husband were to kill the girl he would be guilty of murder and his group would have to forfeit blood-money or be threatened with retaliation. I heard of no such actual cases.

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● 584 The father's major duty toward his daughter is to provide her with "a good marriage." This, of course, parallels his duty toward his son and emphasizes that a father is con-

593 cerned with his own and his group's status in marriage arange-
•[584] ments. One informant said that a rich man must marry into a
[581] rich group. The Bedouin have a saying which is relevant here:
*[613] "Your bait is equal to the bait into which you marry." Before her marriage the girl's duty toward her father is to respect and obey him. After her marriage "her only duty is that she
[758] must visit him from time to time. If he becomes sick, and he has no wife, she must care for him and nurse him."

593 It was a common sight to see a Bedouin father fondle
834 his daughter of age six years or younger, but beyond this age physical intimacy ceases. The Bedouin say that a father should not kiss or hold on his knee a daughter over the age of eleven. After the girl marries, a definite avoidance custom characterizes the father-daughter role relationship. The Bedouin say that the father will not see the face of his daughter after her marriage. This means that the married daughter remains veiled before her father, and even before her older brothers. This type of avoidance custom is rare by comparison with the cross-cultural data (Driver 1966).

593 A wife obeys her husband concerning all matters: "she does not even leave the house without his permission." A woman may go and complain to her father if her husband does not provide for her, i.e., with food and clothing, or if he unjustly beats her or continually threatens to beat her. On the other hand, if a woman is in the wrong "it is

● 584 A girl has the right to refuse to marry her ibn 'amm.
582 But if she exercises this right, he can actually insure that she remains unmarried for the rest of her life. While I was in the field there were three cases of a girl refusing to marry her cousin. In one, the boy was persuaded into allowing the bint 'amm to marry his rival. In this case, the rival presented the girl's cousin with a sheep and a small cash sum. The Bedouins say that a man will claim his cousin even if he does not wish to marry her. He will wait until someone does wish to marry the girl, and then he will demand a payment from the suitor for the right to marry his cousin. In another case, a man and his daughter of a Marabit tribe came to al-Qasr to plant a small patch of barley during the rainy season. While they were there, the father married the girl off to a member of 'Ailit Ma'fas. The father did this despite the fact that her cousin back in her own territory had made explicit his claim to her. The father, when he returned home,
* [613] [686] was fined 30 L.E. by his lineage, the money going to the girl's cousin as a "expiatory payment." The father could afford to do this considering the large brideprice which he received from 'Ailit Ma'fas, and the fact that he had no other sons or daughters to marry off meant that he need not fear the closure of marriage channels by the group. In the third case, a girl openly refused to marry her cousin because she loved another man. To avoid conflict, her father said that

582 [584] she could marry no man.

Most of the older Bedouins say that bint 'amm marriage
582 578 as it is practiced in the desert is an evil, that it causes
nothing but trouble. They say that if there are bad feelings
between two men they will place claims upon each other's
sister with the intention of preventing the girls from ever
marrying. The younger Bedouins say that "it is better to
marry the bint 'amm than to let a stranger take her." The
[182] claim on the bint 'amm, of course, should be seen as a basis
[571] for social relationships between groups, regardless of any
[586] conflict it may or may not lead to. This is why the Bedouins
say that a man "will never divorce his bint 'amm, because if
he does that means that she is no good." It follows, then,
that if "she is no good" none of her other paternal cousins
will marry her. Implicit here is the reference to the making
[182] and breaking of group ties. Similarly, to regulate and to
maximize kinship ties, a man can claim only one of his
father's brother's daughters. In the case where there is
only one bint 'amm, her eldest cousin has first claim to her.
582 This sometimes causes conflict between brothers as the fol-
578 lowing informant's story indicates.
159

> The father of Salih and Aziz was dead which meant that Aziz, being the elder, would have to furnish the brideprice if Salih were to marry first. In fact, Salih wanted to marry his bint 'amm. Aziz refused him permission to do so: Aziz had first claim to the bint 'amm, and, also, he thought that the brideprice which

585 178 Only one of the three weddings was conducted in the traditional way with three nights of dancing previous to the wedding and a large feast on the wedding day. The Bedouin say that a man can no longer afford to do things the old way. ●584 The procedure of the marriage arrangement begins when the boy informs his uncle that he wishes to marry. Then the uncle, [583] the father and other males of the group meet with the father of the prospective bride to arrange the marriage, an important part of which is the establishment of the brideprice (hulwaan or mahr). 584 *613 Before going to see the girl's father, the boy's father consults with his secondary lineage group, as I have already mentioned. Then he should wait for a period of seven days, for the girl's father, "who has heard about the marriage," must consult with his group and wait for a period of one week during which time any member of the girl's 584 [695] lineage may claim her. After this time, the ties proposed by the marriage are ritualized by two preliminary acts: the writing of the contract (ma'azuum) between the fathers, and the offering of a lamb by the groom which solemnizes his intentions and the marriage (dabah fi-l-williyya). After [431] another waiting period of about two weeks, during which time the boy buys gifts of clothing and jewelry and presents them to the girl at her home, the wedding celebration begins. 585 On the day of the wedding, the girl is delivered to the groom's residence. The girl remains in the groom's tent, or

562 in Bedouin society, that is, the role of wife-daughter. The
593 554 principles of patrilineality and cognation do not work against
182 each other when the girl marries outside her corporate group,
578 nor does her new dual role present a case of role conflict.
562 On the contrary, the wife-daughter role functions to bind to-
593 554 gether two groups which are structurally differentiated by
182 578 the rule of patrilineality. During time of peace, the wife-
*613 daughter acts as a bond-maker by carrying gifts back and
[431] [628] forth between the two groups, often bringing some of her
[594] younger patrilineal relatives back to her husband's house or
tent for short visits. During a time of conflict or war, the
562 593 Bedouins point out, she is the only person who can cross the
554 [726] battle lines unharmed. She is a match-maker as well as a
● [584] peace-maker. Often she influences the selection of mates by
individuals in both her husband's group and her father's
562 group. The Bedouins say that "after the *bint 'amm*, a man
593 should marry his *bint khal* ("mother's brother's daughter")
554 because she is like his *bint 'amm*." Usually, over a period
582 of a few generations, a given direction in marriage is sustained (see Figure 10), and it is one function of this wife-daughter role to accomplish this important political action.

562 The role of wife-daughter, then, may be seen as one
593 important aspect of what Fortes (1953:33) calls, "complemen-
554 tary filiation," the essential mechanism which provides the
*613 182 link between the corporate groups of al-Qasr society and the
kin groups of the parent who does not determine descent.

*613 he was insistent upon his right to have her. She went to
619 578 see the "holy man," al-Sanusi, who lives near al-Qasr. (Al-
582 Sanusi is a descendent of "the Great Sanusi," the founder of
793 al-Sanusiyya, who now lives in Egypt after having been exiled
from Libya.) Al-Sanusi decided to keep the girl at his farm
*613 until he could decide a course of action. One night, the
619 578 girl's cousin secretly came to the Sanusi farm and found her
582 room. The girl was sleeping. The cousin struck a match, the
793 girl awoke and was frightened. She jumped from her bed and
683 began to run, in so doing she fell down a flight of stairs
and suffered a rupture. This was a serious offense which the
cousin had committed, and al-Sanusi decided that he should call
all of the 'awaaqil of the area to inform them of this. In the
meantime, he sent the girl back to her home and the cousin
continued to bother her concerning his rights over her.
• [584] The cousin went so far as to "offer the blood-sacrifice for
her," a stage in the marriage process which signifies that the
union has been consented to by both families. The girl's
father was dead, and her brothers and uncles were unable to
keep the cousin away from the girl. (It may be assumed that
they were conscious of his rights to bint 'amm.) They had
[692] even beaten him once. All of the 'awaaqil of 'Ali Ahmar and
'Ali Abyad, and the Marabtiin in the al-Qasr area came to meet
with al-Sanusi at his farm. He (al-Sanusi) said that they all

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581 are necessary for the validation of the marriage contract. Modern
585 671 legal systems which took as their basis the Islamic law of marriage
675 and the family further required the registration of the marriage contract for the marriage to be legal.

● 584 The request and necessary response forming the marriage are sup-
585 posed to be carried on by the parties involved. However, if either the
429 groom or the bride is not of age, or is mentally unqualified, the trans-
593 action is carried on by his or her guardian, or "wakil." The wakil is
the father, unless he is dead or an invalid, in which case the brothers
[604] become the wakils. If the person has no brothers, then the uncles be-
[184] come the wakil in the order stated. According to certain Sunni sects
in Islam, a woman marrying for the first time is always represented by
her wakil, even if she is of age. The assumption is that a woman who
has never been married does not have the experience that enables her to
enter into any kind of legally binding relationship such as marriage.

585 Following the original Islamic idea, marriage among Awlad Ali is
675 an oral agreement between the groom or his father and the guardian
593 429 (wakil) of the bride-to-be (her father, if alive, or her closest male
[604] kin in the following order: her brothers, her uncles, her grandfather).
585 A religious man is sometimes asked to perform the marriage, although it
792 is not required. Some persons might invite a member of the Murabiteen
[619] tribe or holy men to witness the marriage on the basis that his presence
[778] gives "baraka," or blessing, to the marriage. Before the application of
585 656 the State legal system to the area, marriage contracts were not regis-
177 tered. In recent years, however, and with the increased mobility of
[675] the tribal populations, more and more marriages are being registered in
[634] the administrative districts. Still, according to the unofficial estimates,

Still, according to the unofficial estimates,
585 only about ten per cent of all marriages are registered, and these are
656 177 mainly mixed marriages involving a tribal person and a non-tribal one
582 or a tribal member who is not living in the area anymore. The reason
619 is that such a spouse, especially when he is the husband, is not under
the control of the tribal customs and therefore cannot be forced to fulfill his obligations if he fails to do so. Most of the tribal population
[581] still feel that marriage is a personal and family affair that
should be kept away from the State legal system.

● 584 Marriage among Awlad Ali is a relatively informal procedure. When
593 a man decides to marry a certain girl, he informs his mother who, in
turn, informs his father. The father may have objections to his son's
choice of the bride. Such objections may be based on already strained
relations between the two families or the questionable reputation of
the girl or any member of her family. In such cases, the father tries
to dissuade his son from going ahead with the marriage. The father is
[583] usually successful in controlling his son's choice when the latter is
dependent on his father for the payment of the bridewealth called "mahr"
and for the support of his new household. This is usually the case in
the man's first marriage. In subsequent marriages and in the cases
where the son has independent means of support for himself and his
bride, the father's control of the son's choice is minimal, and asking
the father's approval is a matter of formality. In second and subse-
593 595 quent marriages, the approval of the older wives is essential. The
584 older wives have no right to object to the husband taking an additional
wife, but they have the right to object to the choice on the basis that
the new bride is hard to get along with or that there is animosity between her family and the families of the other wives which makes

593 cooperation between the wives in household activities difficult. The
595
584 wives have to have reasonable grounds for their objection to the new
[431] bride. But even then, the husband could still marry the woman of his
choice, although in this case he has to bring gifts to the other wives
as "nasafa," or making-up present.

584 If the family has no objections to the marriage, the proceedings
593 start. The initial proceedings are undertaken by the women on both
sides. The groom's mother or a female relative of his mother's generation or older visits the mother of the prospective bride and tells her
of her son's intention to marry the latter's daughter. The bride's
mother then discusses the matter with the girl's father who has the
[429] final say in the matter. If the father is dead, then the authority on
giving the girl in marriage goes to her brother or closest male kin in
the order specified before. The girl has no say in the matter of marriage and cannot refuse to complete the marriage, although after marriage
she can resort to a certain practice which helps her to terminate the
marriage without the consent of her guardian, as will be seen later in
584 the chapter. From this moment until the conclusion of the marriage
[583] negotiations are done by the men of both families. The first thing to
be discussed is the amount of bridewealth, a "mahr." If the two families
agree on the marriage, a small ceremony is held. This ceremony is called
[779] "el-fatha" in reference to reading the first "sura" of the Koraan known
as el-fatha, or "the beginning." The ceremony includes members of the
[675] two families and very few friends. After the fatha is read, the agreement
is achieved. This is considered as an engagement and means that the girl
is spoken for and therefore no other man can ask to marry her.

To break the fatha agreement, the father of the prospective bride

584 [686] has to have a good reason. If he breaks it without sufficient reason, he may be liable to pay "kabara," or fine, for insult to the prospective groom and his family. Adequate reasons for breaking the fatha agreement vary from one case to another and include such things as the discovery that the prospective groom or any of his family is of questionable character. This applies to the groom as well as to any member of his immediate family, the implication being that if he has such a person close to him, he is likely to be influenced by him in his treatment of his wife. If, however, the questionable character of the groom or the member of his family was known to the guardian of the bride-to-be before the fatha was read, then to break the agreement is considered unjustifiable. This has been upheld in a number of cases which I recorded during my stay in the area. 584 686 627 One of these cases involved the agreement between a member of the Sanagra tribe in the area of Alamein to marry his daughter to a member of the powerful Bara'sa tribe in Libya. After the fatha was read, a wealthy merchant from Alexandria saw the girl and asked her father to marry her, and the father agreed. To justify his breaking of the fatha agreement, the father claimed that he had discovered that the first prospective groom and his father were involved in smuggling goods across the Libyan borders. In the Mi'ad that was held upon the request of the first groom and his father, the father claimed that the bride's father had known about the smuggling and even participated in the distribution of the smuggled goods. The father of the bride was made to pay the sum of ten pounds as kabara to the first groom and to pay him another ten pounds for the expenses of the ceremony in which he had slaughtered two goats. The settlement was based on the fact that all indications show that he must have known about the smuggling activities

● 584 686 [627] of his future in-law before he agreed that his daughter marry him. So, to break the agreement on the basis of discovering that defect is not permissible and is a kind of behavior not to be encouraged. To encourage such behavior would lead to the waste of time and money and would lead to the disgrace of the fatha as a preliminary agreement.* Permitting the father to break the fatha agreement when discovering an unknown condition related to the prospective groom or his family, is to apply an important principle in the Islamic law with regard to all 686 contractual relations. This principle maintains that any contractual agreement pertains only to the facts and conditions specified at the time of the contract. This implies that the conditions of the contract have to be explicitly stated. A deliberate effort to conceal an undesirable condition has the equivalent effect of specifying the existence of its opposite. Such concealment invalidates the contract and permits the aggrieved party to dissolve the contract on the basis of cheating or unfair deal, or "ghish."

If, on the other hand, no deliberate attempt is made to conceal the undesirable condition at the time of the contract, then there is no basis for dissolving the contract on the basis of cheating or unfair 584 deal. Thus, in the case above, neglecting to mention the fact that the 686 groom and his father were involved in smuggling could not be taken as the basis for unfair or unreasonable behavior on the part of the groom, unless there was proof that they intended to cheat and conceal that fact deliberately, and that they knew that if not concealed, the fact would affect the acceptance of the bride's father to the marriage. All indications of the case above point to the lack of intent to defraud. On the

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* The same rule applies to the breaking of the "fatha" agreement by the groom.

584 686 contrary, there is enough evidence to indicate that the father of the bride by participating in smuggling should have known about that fact, or at least it would not have affected his decision had he known about it. The grounds for unreasonable or unfair behavior is therefore not present in the above case.

If, on the other hand, the condition is specified at the time of the contract which is proven later to be false, then the behavior is [585] considered as unreasonable. An example is the case of Mahdi, who, after reading the fatha to marry a woman from his tribe, was discovered to have had tuberculosis and was forced to forfeit the gifts and other expenses on the basis that he had had the illness for a long time and knew about it, but he deliberately concealed it when he asked to marry the girl. Not all concealed conditions are considered as an adequate basis for the breaking of the fatha. Only conditions are adequate which, had they been known at the time of the agreement, would have made the party's decisions different. One case involved a man who had concealed the fact that he had a wife in Alexandria when he asked to marry a tribal girl. Although the intention to conceal the fact was very evident, for this is the first question that the girl's father or her guardian asks the suitor, yet, breaking the fatha agreement by the girl's father when he discovered the previous marriage was considered as unfair and unreasonable since, had he known about the marriage, it would have made no difference in his decision. The go-betweens disagreed, however, on this. One of them thought that although the concealed condition is by itself not objectionable, yet, the mere act of concealment indicated a bad character on the part of the prospective groom, and that by itself, apart from the concealed condition, is not a good basis for marriage relations. The bride's father did not have to pay kabara, although he held

The bride's father
584 did not have to pay kabara, although he held
686 a big feast in which he slaughtered three sheep and invited the groom,
558 his father and a number of his friends and friends of the girl's father
in honor of the groom as a compromise.

583 Before the fatha is read, the two families usually agree on the
amount of bridewealth, or "mahr", to be paid by the groom or his father.
The amount of bridewealth depends upon a number of criteria, important
among which is the relative position of the bride's and groom's families
and the degree of relationship that exists between them. The lowest
mahr is usually paid in the case of cousin marriages. The amount ranges
from 10 to 50 pounds. Sometimes when the groom cannot afford any mahr,
he pays only the religiously required sum of 25 Egyptian piasters.
This is never the case if the groom and bride are more distantly
related. When the groom is an outsider or a member of another tribe, the
mahr is usually much higher. Several cases of mahr of more than 2,000
pounds are reported in the area. There was a case in which the mahr
reached 10,000 Egyptian pounds ($22,000). The amount of mahr also
depends on the beauty of the bride. In the case of the highest known
mahr mentioned above, the woman was known to be of great beauty. There
[587] is no distinction made between previously married women and ones
married for the first time. In the case above, the woman was married three
times before, and the mahr was apparently higher than that paid for her
[602] in her first marriage. Increasing the mahr according to the kinshp
distance between the bride and groom reflects the preference of
endogamous
582 marriages. The preferred marriage match in the area is that of
the patrilateral parallel cousin marriage. The father's brother's son,
"ibn 'amm," has an undisputed claim over his cousin, "bint 'amm." Even
when they are of incompatible age, or even if the man is married or for

582 779 and although they are not considered wrong or sinful, there is a general feeling of distaste among the tribal population to such marriages. They usually attribute this distaste to the fact that if the marriage with the first sister did not work out, there is no reason to expect the marriage with the second to be successful.* Although this might account, in part, for the low rate of cousin marriage in the group when present wives of the individuals are taken into consideration, yet, the effect of that practice should not be exaggerated. For although that prohibition might curb the marriage with the cousin who is the sister of a previous wife, it does not restrict the marriage with another cousin who is a cousin, rather than a sister of the first wife.

584 431 During the period that follows and until the marriage is final, the groom is supposed to bring gifts to the bride. These gifts are usually a wide silver bracelet that is used as an engagement ring. Also gifts of clothes and jewelry are quite customary. Such gifts become the private property of the bride and are to be returned only if the engagement is broken for fault on the part of the bride or any member of her family. In such cases, her father has to return all the gifts his daughter has accepted as well as the expenses that the groom's visitations have cost him.

585 583 779 431 The marriage is affected and finalized by the payment of the bridewealth. In Islamic law the bridewealth is supposed to be paid to the bride herself as a gift and not to her father, which had been a significant departure from the pre-Islamic practice where two types of bridewealth were paid: the sadaqa paid to the father of the bride or her

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[587] * This does not apply to cases where the first wife dies. In such cases, it is not objectionable to marry her sister, although the incidences of sororate are rare among the population.

583 Among Awlad Ali the payment of the bridewealth signifies the com-
● [584] pletion of the marriage contract. The mahr is not paid to the woman but
583 to her father or closest male kin. Usually the mahr is paid in money.
178 This, however, seems to be a recent phenomenon. Until the turn of the
century, according to informants, the mahr was paid only in sheep and
583 goats. The practice is still followed by a number of tribal segments
178 of Ali Ahmar who occupy the western most part of the area where pasture
184 is more abundant and reliable and where the permanent pasture of the
green mountains of Cyrenaica is close by. Other tribal segments still
insist that at least one-fourth of the mahr should be paid in livestock,
583 but the majority of the people accept money. The main purpose of the
[584] mahr among Awlad Ali is to legalize the marriage contract and to put
[182] emphasis on the reciprocal oblications that the marriage created between
the two families of the bride and the groom. It also works as an in-
surance for good behavior on the part of both the husband and the wife.
583 If the husband mistreats his wife or fails to give her the rights legally
593 hers by marriage, he risks the chance of losing the mahr and being forced
586 to divorce her. On the other hand, if the wife fails to behave in the
customary way expected from a wife, the husband could divorce her and
have the right to get back his mahr. This is particularly inconvenient
in cases where all or part of the mahr is paid in livestock, in which
case it becomes part of the father's herd and hard to take away in case
of divorce. It is therefore in the interest of her family to keep the
marriage. In this way their interference in the marriage is checked.
[591] This is especially important among Awlad Ali where, although the mar-
[592] riage is usually patrilocal, the woman retains membership in her father's
household even after marriage.

593 606 The case persisted for more than two months with no sign that either
557 party was willing to give into the demands of the other. I left the
586 area before any solution to the case was achieved.
[114]

584 Another relevant case is one which involved a dispute between
578 Hassan Hassanein from the Sanagrah tribe and the father-in-law of his
606 daughter who was also from the same tribe and who lived in the same
area. The case started when Hassanein was visited by a friend from the
[594] Zeheibat tribe in Matruh, an old man of 60 or 70 years. During the night
that this guest spent at Hassanein's house, they got to talking about
marriage and the fact that although his guest was a wealthy and re-
[595] spected man, he had only one wife. After a lengthy talk, it seemed
that the old man was convinced that he should have a second wife and
asked Hassanein if he knew of a suitable girl to marry. Hassanein sug-
584 gested his daughter's sister-in-law. Hassanein took the prospective
583 groom to the tent of his daughter's father-in-law and discussed the
578 606 matter with the father of the prospective bride who agreed to marry his
daughter to Hassanein's guest if he paid the sume of 200 pounds, in ad-
dition to slaughtering a number of goats and presenting him with the
[779] appropriate presents. When the man agreed to the terms, the fatha was
read to signify the agreement between the two parties. Hassanein left
the man to spend the night in the camp of his future in-laws. In the
morning the groom told the bride's father that he must go to nearby
Alexandria to bring the money for the bride price. When he came back
late that afternoon, he paid the money and set a date for the wedding
the next Thursday and then left for Matruh to prepare for the arrival
of the new wife.

584 Two days after the groom left, the bride's father (who is at the
578 same time Hassanein's daughter's father-in-law) came to Hassanein and
606 told him that the marriage was called off and that he should send a
686 letter to the groom telling him the news. The reasons given by the
[574] bride's father were that the groom showed improper manners when he
[579] stayed overnight at the camp and that he followed the prospective bride
to the water well to have a close look at her. He gave the money to
Hassanein and asked him to return it to the man in Matruh. Hassanein
was very disappointed and considered this an insult to him, since he
was the mediator in that marriage, and insisted that the bride's father
584 go on with the marriage. When the latter refused, Hassanein went to his
578 daughter and ordered her to leave with him. Her husband was there and
606 could not refuse to let her go with her father, even when Hassanein
686 made it clear that her husband could not have her back unless his father
627 kept his agreement with Hassanein's guest. Elewah, the daughter's hus-
586 band, asked for a mi'ad to discuss the matter with his father-in-law.
The mi'ad was held in Hassanein's house and was attended by Hassanein, his son-in-law, and two people from a different lineage, each selected by one of the disputing parties. Hassanein refused to give any reason for taking his daughter away from her husband except that he was exercising his rights. Eleway, on the other hand, insisted that Hassanein was not justified in his actions and that it was not right to punish him for something that his father did. The two representatives tried to calm both parties and to reach an agreement but were not successful. The mi'ad dissolved with Hassanein not only insisting on keeping his daughter, but also threatening to marry her to a rich man in the area. The case was not solved by the time I left the field.

593 and expenses to the husband that constitutes the most important check
586
(583) on the otherwise undisputed right of the father to take away his
daughter.

593 The woman, on the other hand, cannot refuse to go with her father,
562 for this means that she would be disobeying him. A woman who disobeys
586 her father is not worthy of his name. He can cut her off from the
family, which means that she is left without any support or protection.
A woman who is cut off from her family is left vulnerable to her husband
and to society. She will have nobody to defend her or to be responsible
for her actions. The responsibility for the woman's behavior is not
transferred by marriage to the husband or his family.

682 If the woman kills or assaults someone or causes damage to property
683 for which compensation is required, her male kin pays the blood money or
602 the compensation on her behalf. It is sometimes stated that if the woman
613
562 has grown-up sons, they, and not her family, pay for her. Since the
593 children belong to their father's family, it may seem like transfering
the responsibility for the woman's actions to her husband's family. However, in all three cases where this happened, the woman was quite old,
her father was dead, and her brothers were either dead or had moved outside the area and had cut off all relations with the area. She also had
no nephews in the area. In such cases, the sons were the woman's closest
male kin.

682 On the other hand, if the woman is the victim of murder or assault
683 for which blood money or compensation is to be paid, the husband is the
593
562 one to benefit from the situation. To understand why this happens, we
have to consider the contractual nature of marriage among Awlad Ali. It
584
583 has been mentioned earlier that before marriage is final, the prospective

584 husband or his father pays the woman's father the bridewealth, or mahr.
583 In exchange for the mahr, the husband expects his father-in-law to out-
fit his daughter with such items as rugs, blankets, and a few other house-
hold items, like cooking pots, serving dishes, and a metal or wooden chest
[422] to keep her clothes in. These items become the private property of the
wife, but the husband has the right to use them. In addition, the man
581 expects to gain certain rights to the woman. The customary law of Awlad
671
585 Ali gives the husband three basic rights over his wife: the right to her
sexual services (including the right to bear him children); the right to
her labor in domestic activities; and the right to her obedience. Of the
three rights, the first is the most exclusive. Not only doesthe husband
have a complete monopoly over his wife's present sexual services, but he
also has the right, if the girl has never been married before, to be the
[583] first to use such services. If he discovers that she is not a virgin, he
can send her back to her father and get back his mahr.

581 The other two rights are not as exclusive. The husband's right to
585 his wife's domestic labor does not prevent her from occasionally helping
593 out in her father's or brother's household, especially if they live nearby.
Finally, the husband's right to be obeyed by his wife is always subordin-
ated to that of her father, who retains the ultimate authority over his
daughter.

682 If the woman is killed or injured, the husband is deprived of all
683 or some of her services, depending on the seriousness and the permanence
581 of the injury, and therefore is entitled to compensation. The right of
585
593 avenging the woman's murder remains, however, that of her family, since
she is still a member of that family.

586 husband. In a number of cases the husband was willing to divorce the
562 574 woman after a promise by the man that she would pay him the mahr when
554 she got married. In most cases, however, the process costs the man a considerable amount of money. Sometimes, when the woman is young and attractive, the man finds it to his advantage to keep her as his wife, since she will cost him no more expenses. On the other hand, the man cannot refuse a woman the right of refuge, since to do this or to deny her the right of hospitality will make him liable to pay kabara if she made the refusal known publicly. On the other hand, it is prestigious to be known in the area as a man to whom women go to be released from their husbands. In fact, a man who acquires a reputation of getting wives released is likely to be sought as mardi in other cases as well.

Due to the nature of his role in mediating, the woman must be careful in selecting the man over whom she throws herself. These considerations are manifested in the following case taken from my field notes.
[584] Hadia was forced by her father to marry a man from the same tribe who
[583] paid her father L.E. 100 as mahr. She did not want to marry him because she was in love with someone else of whom her father did not approve. One month after she was married, she left the tent and never came back.
586 Later, she appeared in the house of Omda Ali, the chief of another tribe,
562 and everyone knew that she had thrown herself on him. She later told me
574 554 why she had selected Omda Ali and not the Omda of her own tribe. "Be-
634 cause my husband works for the Omda of my own tribe, and I thought he would be biased. Of course, I couldn't have gone to my father; he was the one who forced me to marry that man. Omda Ali is very respected and can support me... He is also rich and is known for releasing wives from their husbands." Omda Ali called the husband in and asked him to divorce

121 kill within this range is, in terms of the general pattern of behaviour, stupid. What is of
613 interest is that such killings do occur. I recorded three instances of men killing the
682 mother's brother in the contemporary population, not to mention many others
674 based on hearsay evidence only. Clearly, the relationship is more than a merely per-
829 missive one. The mother's brother may well be the only person who can help in
certain crises, and if he withholds his assistance the sister's son is left in a dilemma.
604 The form of behaviour in which demands are made is, as the Bedouin rightly say,
121 that of asking a favour, but this does not mean that it is any the less urgent than a
613 demand made against agnates. The range of favours is large, and only a few can be
604 detailed here. If a group has insufficient water to meet its needs a man first seeks help
from his mother's brother. The request has a number of aspects to it: it is a test of
[554] the relationship itself; it is a matter of pride and status that a man can 'call' on
another to help his group out of difficulties, it is an assurance that resources other than
those jealously guarded by his agnates are available to him, and if a man is seeking
to increase his power he must have available more than an agnate's share of local
[582] water resources to supply his flocks and herds. When a blood-money payment has to
be made, the mother's brother is expected to come forward—it is his right to give
● [584] without being asked. If a man wants a wife, he is not permitted to approach his father
directly, but his mother's brother can put pressure on the father instead. If a man dies
[429] while his eldest son is still a minor, his brother may be required to act as guardian,
and in this role he controls the son's property; disputes frequently break out as a
result, with the son at a considerable disadvantage, for he cannot engage his father's
brother in hostilities—but his mother's brother can do so for him. Whenever men
[422] come to possess animals before the demise of their fathers or when the father's
brother is acting as guardian they mark them with the tribal and personal signs of their
[583] mothers' brothers. Men have the right to demand contributions for bridewealth
from their agnates if they lack wealth; in practice it comes not from them, but from
the mother's brother. Finally, in certain circumstances, if a man does not have male
heirs, his sister's son might inherit all his wealth.

121 Affinity also carries with it a large number of rights. A poor man may take up
613 residence in the camp of his father-in-law, and be kept by him. The latter may come
to his son-in-law's aid in many of his dealings with his father. Like the mother's
606 brother, the affine is a potential source of water-supply when rain has been insufficient
on the homeland. He also helps with blood money and bridewealth, and he is expected
to aid his daughter and her husband with gifts of food and wool.

121 The details given above by no means exhaust the list of rights a man possesses in
his matrilateral and affinal relatives. Obviously, these are not the only forms of
613 relationship either, and the other forms carry with them yet other claims of various
sorts. Enough detail has been given, however, to make clear the point that local
agnatic groups are so differentiated, and inter-group relationships are so important,
that each aspect of homicide settlement previously described will require further
examination, not in the sense that additional complications must be introduced, but
with the question in mind, is not the structural presentation false? Before beginning
this stage of the argument it is necessary to establish the fact that the links of affinity
and matrilaterality which a group has with another are of a kind which necessitate
their inclusion in an analysis of the arrangements for settling homicides.

Cases

584 Prior to the wedding festivities, the
593 father will have participated in negotiations, although even in these he will
have remained silent, leaving an affine, as a rule, to arrange the details with
the girl's father and his kinsmen. The father feigns aloofness from the start
of negotiations until after the wedding celebrations have ended. Before inquiring
into this seemingly odd behaviour, a few further details of marriage
ceremonies need to be mentioned briefly.

585 The bride is carried to the nuptial tent on a camel, seated in a cagelike
342 structure placed on the camel's back, this canopy covered over with carpets
[492] and at least one long blanket — later to be used to divide her tent into male
and female quarters — which constitute part of the goods given to a woman
[988] on marriage. On her arrival, while she is still seated in her canopy, the
camel is led round the tent seven times by a small boy. She then descends
and is hustled into the tent by a number of women who make a show of their
attempts to conceal her from view. Inside the tent the bride is enclosed in
one corner in a kind of cubicle partitioned off by a length of blanket.

585 In the meantime, the groom has affected to escape, but is "caught," while
[533] running away, by his fellows, who "compel" him to return to the nuptial tent,
[831] to the accompaniment of their lewd songs telling of the sexual pleasures
awaiting him. Much of this is horseplay, but the young men carry it out
brazenly and the groom is required to show reluctance to continue with the
ceremonies. His entry into the nuptial tent is marked by an expectant hush
that falls over the crowd of men gathered, as they await the result of the
virginity test the groom is about to perform, which he does by wrapping part
of his toga round one of his fingers to pierce the hymen. Sharp shrieks from
[202] the bride give the signal that the test has been undertaken; not a stir moves
the crowd until evidence of its success has been publicly displayed, which is
given by the groom hoisting the blood-stained portion of the toga through
the corner of the tent on a pole, followed by firing three shots from his rifle.
Jubilantly, the men gathered fire volley after volley from their rifles just over
the nuptial tent, and the seven-day celebrations begin.

585 A full descriptive account of a marriage, or many of the ritual details
589 woven into it need not be given here. What is included is intended to illustrate
[593] certain relationships between father and son, and between one
generation and another. In this connection two further points are appropriate.
[561] First, during the week of festival, young men gather outside the nuptial
[535] tent each night to encourage a maiden in her dancing, clapping their hands
[533] to the point of injury "so that we will have a wife soon." The celebrations
belong to the bachelors, and they are the only ones to engage in the singing
and hand clapping. It is they too who stop the bridal camel on its way to
[538] the nuptial tent to recite obscene rhymes to the bride, and they also shout
[831] their rather dubious consolations to the bride who, during the virginity test,
crying out for her mother, is assured by them that the night holds promise
585 for her which her mother could never extend. The married men, particularly
602 the close senior agnates of the groom, stay away from it all, discussing matters
521 unconnected with the affair.

593 tegral part of "the one body"; events which affect a man in this context lie
613 outside a father's field of jurisdiction. The political authority vested in a
corporation acts to circumscribe the authority of persons in other fields.

Other rights stem from political membership. As a person with a defined position in a lineage corporation, a man has the right to use the natural resources of its territory. His father, although he instructs his son where to plough and when to water the animals, cannot deny him access to wells, pastures and ploughland. Economically, a son is independent to this extent, although his ability to exploit his right to the natural resources is restricted by his father's control of animals. Ultimately, however, this restriction cannot amount to stultification, because a man has the right to
613 demand food. In practice, a poor man staves off hunger with donations from
422 this or that individual, and superficially it appears that he is dependent on
735 the personal charity of his fellowmen. This is not so, for what is implicit is
that the parcels of wealth controlled by individuals are the possessions of the corporation. It is not accidental that poor people do not go hungry. During my entire stay among the Bedouin I never saw one of them beg or
[556] suffer hunger, however marginal the diet of many. Clearly, those with a
surplus can and do use it for personal advantage, but the extent to which they can do so is circumscribed by the legal claims which members of a corporation have on the parcels of moveable property held by each of them.

613 Control over the wealth, whether it be animals or the procreative functions
421 of women, rests, in the final analysis, in a corporation. Inheritance laws
428 specify that women are not legal heirs,[8] and that all male children are
[562] equal heirs. Women do, in fact, come to control property, and it is rare that
wealth is equally divided among male heirs. The precise details of inherit-
[593] ance may partly be decided by a father, but he is limited in his actions. Most
of the time inheritance disputes are not of the kind which require action by the corporate group; a case which occured while I was resident with the Bedouin did, however, invoke immediate action. A man, who had left the desert to live in a village on the plateau, had only one daughter. He made it known that he intended to will his entire property to his daughter. When the news was brought to the camps of his fellow agnates, there was great consternation, because, as became clear in their lengthy discussions, the threat now existed that a substantial parcel of property would be removed from the group, a threat made real by the proposed marriage of the daughter
• [584] to a man of another tribe. The court would have to recognise the daughter's
right to some of the property, and the members of the group reluctantly had to concede that there was little they could do about this, but they had one
[593] action left to them — they decided that her nearest agnate should demand
[584] her in marriage. Usually, the choice of husband for a daughter is a decision

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[771] [8] The Bedouin are Sunni Muslims, and, as Samusi, belong to the Maliki school in
[795] legal matters. According to court law, women are heirs. However, actual Bedouin
[671] practice is contrary to law. For, if women were permitted to inherit, since many marry outside the corporation into which they were born, they could alienate its resources.

613

her father takes, but in certain critical situations he can be relieved of choice 593
if the interests of the group as a whole are at stake. [421]

Political authority is the preserve of a corporation, and its exercise leads [428]
to invasion of a man's authority in the field of domestic relations. This [584]
does not mean, however, that discrete areas of authority do not remain with
the father. In the tent his authority over his son is so overwhelming as to
keep the son in almost complete subordination. The son is referred to as a
slave, and in daily life he has to behave as one. He must obey every command,
for, were he to rebel, he would find little or no support among his
agnates, whatever the extent of the provocation. Retreat from his father is [422]
hardly an alternative, since, while his father is alive, he has no animals of
his own, and to leave camp would only mean that he would have to move
outside his group to seek employment elsewhere as a shepherd. If he did [558]
this he would forfeit status, and almost certainly cut himself off from property [428]
which would fall to him after his father's death. A man who "denies"
his father looses too many privileges for the practice to become widespread.

Caught in this dilemma, a son's predicament is worsened by the fact that 593
he cannot initiate marriage negotiations — to be able to do so requires some 584
animals to offer a girl's father. Through his mother's brother he has the [431]
means of bringing pressure to bear on his father, but the latter can resist for [604]
years. Finally, a marriage is arranged for him. It is difficult to convey the 581
yearning of young Bedouin for marriage. They discuss it among themselves 521
ad nauseam. For the most part their talk is about the sexual aspect of marriage. 831
Premarital sex relations are strictly controlled, and the movements
of each young girl are carefully guarded because, if on the day of her marriage 836
the test shows that she is not a virgin, she not only brings disgrace to [585]
her family, but the marriage may be revoked and her worth as a bride for
another man seriously diminished. Nevertheless premarital relations do [837]
occur, if not between youths and maidens to any extent, between young
men and married women.

The question still remains: why is marriage the occasion of such ebullient 581
celebration? The formal authority a father exercises over his son 593
changes little on marriage. Economically the son is still harnessed to the
father. The latter still shouts his orders at him, and obedience remains
unaltered. Any sign of an independent view on a matter is met with a gruff
rebuff. If the marriage turns out to be disagreeable to the father, he has
the authority — if not always the power — to break it. Marriage does not
mean a change in the general mode of behaviour between the two; the legal
relations remain unaltered, albeit modified in practice, as the married son
matures in age. But marriage does mean the acquisition of rights and status
previously denied a son. Henceforward, he has a domain of his own. This [554]
is high drama, indeed, for although every effort is made to give substance to
the expressed view that "nothing has happened," for the first time in his
life the son has seized publicly, amid the jubilations of his fellows, a status
which hitherto was the possession of the father.

Cases

The Meaning of Marriage

581 Until marriage the changes in a man's life have been in the nature of
585 an ordered sequence of development from a child to be cared for — the only
342 time in his life when a father, without inhibition, showers on him his love
[593] and affection — to one who, by degrees, makes an increasing contribution to
a production unit. Marriage necessitates that a man pitch a tent for himself.
With a tent he becomes a potential host and protector of others. The local
idiom for marriage is "to set up a tent." It would be quite improper to use
[196] the verb "to marry" when inquiring whether a marriage has taken place
since this verb also has the meaning of "to have sexual intercourse." Instead
[195] the euphemism, "Have you pitched a tent?" is used. The Arabic word
for a tent in this context is *Bait*. It is not used to refer to a military tent, nor
to the small tent which shelters only a widow. It is reserved for the Bedouin
tent, which usually has a wool top, and, most importantly, holds the promise
of the continuation of life, whether it shelters a newly married couple, a
mature family or young unmarried people. (The word *Bait* represents a
complex concept, and it would be too much of a diversion here to discuss
the various points of its significance. It is essential to understand that its
[778] meaning is not confined to a tent in the physical sense.) Its top has *Baraka*
(divine goodness) in it; the quality of *Haram*, which makes it possible for the
tent to be used as a sanctuary, is associated with it and this quality of *Haram*
extends, moreover, to the ropes of the tent, so that anyone who clutches them
comes under the protection of the owner. In it, the wife must permanently
reside and her husband has the legal right to insist on this. In it too, he
has the legal right of sexual access to a woman, his wife. Any children
[885] born in it he can claim as his own. With the erection of a tent the son
reaches adulthood, and it is in this sense that he can be said to have acquired
a domain of his own.

581 Marriage gives a son greater freedom and less dependence on his father
585 in another sense. A second euphemism used for marriage is "making a
[593] relationship," specifically an affinal one. Relationships between a man and
[195] his father-in-law are diverse and are used in various ways in different situations.
Here, the particular aspect which needs to be stressed is that a man
606 can cajole his father-in-law, and (through his wife) wealth, in the form
425 of animals, may pass from the former to the latter. Reciprocal gifts are passed
556 between affines on certain occasions, but in addition small amounts may
pass which are not connected with the formal occasions of exchanges. Debt
583 lies between them. It begins with the initiation of marriage negotiations,
● 584 when the suitor's kinsmen take a prescribed number of sheep to present to
606 the girl's father if negotiations are successful. They promise to transfer
bride-wealth[9] to the girl's father. A few weeks after the marriage, the hus-

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[171] [9] I use the word "bride-wealth" because it has become so familiar in the literature,
but the only similarity between the *Sahiba* of the Bedouin and the bride-wealth of

band is required to take gifts to his mother-in-law in recognition of the fact 583
that she nourished his wife as an infant (the literal meaning of the word 584•
used for this gift is "milk"). A return visit is made and gifts are given to 606
the daughter. When the first child is born an animal is presented by the
affines, and if the child is a male, the gift may be several sheep, or even a 851
few camels if the father-in-law is very wealthy. Formal exchange of gifts 425
continue, but, in addition, informal transfers are made. Moreover, if re- 606
lations between a man and his father-in-law develop favourably, it is not un- 606
common for a young husband, during the early years of marriage, to move 591
away from his father and pitch his tent alongside that of his father-in-law. 593
Marriage gives a son affinal relations of his own. Affinity can alleviate the dead weight of paternal authority.

It is suggested that the crisis the marriage of a son assumes for a father 585
is the shift it entails in the distribution of authority. This is borne out by 561
other details in the marriage ceremony referred to earlier. Ordinarily, young 602
men dare not sing within earshot of their senior agnates. Far from allowing 533
obscenities, agnates of the ascending generation would not allow even a
mention of women to be made by young men, in their presence. In a group [593]
consisting of young men and an agnate, I chanced to use the noun for [123]
woman and immediately my tent was cleared of all but the senior agnate.
At a wedding the young men revel in their lewd songs and shout their [831]
obscenities for all to hear. The senior agnates stand aside and make a show of ignoring the proceedings. And well they may, for each marriage is a challenge to the exclusive authority they have enjoyed; each nuptial tent is an invasion of the domain of which they have been undisputed masters. Marriage is the only occasion when the men of one generation can clap and sing their defiance of an older one, and give warning of the changes which must be accommodated however great the pretence that nothing has happened.

Marriage ceremonies dramatise the clash between adjacent generations 561
over the distribution of certain forms of authority. If this authority is as 602
overwhelming as has been suggested, and if it is so deeply resented, how is it that life is endurable for juniors? Relationships between junior and senior agnates are so restrictive that they almost amount to what Professor Fortes has suggested I view as a form of avoidance relationships. Juniors must always defer, they must obey commands promptly, they serve their seniors, they must accept a lead when it is given and the restrictions on conversations exclude all reference to women, marriage or sex. These are not simply a set of general guides for behaviour, they are rigidly applied rules, deviation from which is countered with rebuke or greater severity. It would appear from this

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many African societies is that wealth is transferred. Obviously, in societies where the 583
rules of exogamy compel a dispersion of links outside a man's own clan, what is in- 584
volved in this transfer of wealth cannot be sociologically similar to one in which mar- 606
riage to the first cousin on either side is permitted.
171

593 handling the potential conflict between father and son and the successive generations which they represent; these are mechanisms which preclude intimacy between the father and the son. The social statuses of father and son are not
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852 permitted to overlap by their being participants in, or
585 even present at, festive occasions, such as circumcision
[831] and wedding parties, occasions which are marked by erotic poems and lewd songs. It would be "wrong" for a father to accompany his son to one of these parties. In the one instance that I did observe a father and son together at a wedding party, the Bedouins explained the rare occurrence by pointing out that this was the man's only son, and so he treated him "like a brother."

593
866 The Bedouins of al-Qasr recognize the aloofness of the father from the son and justify it as a training period to prepare the boy for the time when he will be on his own. One young man explained the underlying rationale of the father-son relationship in this way:

> There are different kinds of fathers. One wishes to make his son a man, to make his son self-dependent at an early age. Other fathers destroy the personalities of their sons. For instance, the first type of father gives his son the responsibility of selling something, or buying something, or of supervising a chore in his own place. But the second type of father is usually soft with his son; he doesn't depend on his son due to his young age. He is very cautious with him and will not send him anywhere, and if he does he will ask someone to look after him. Of course, the first type of father is good and the second type is bad.

585 178 Only one of the three weddings was conducted in the traditional way with three nights of dancing previous to the wedding and a large feast on the wedding day. The Bedouin say that a man can no longer afford to do things the old way. 584 The procedure of the marriage arrangement begins when the boy informs his uncle that he wishes to marry. Then the uncle, [583] the father and other males of the group meet with the father of the prospective bride to arrange the marriage, an important part of which is the establishment of the brideprice (hulwaan or mahr). 584 *613 Before going to see the girl's father, the boy's father consults with his secondary lineage group, as I have already mentioned. Then he should wait for a period of seven days, for the girl's father, "who has heard about the marriage," must consult with his group and wait for a period of one week during which time any member of the girl's 584 [695] lineage may claim her. After this time, the ties proposed by the marriage are ritualized by two preliminary acts: the writing of the contract (ma'azuum) between the fathers, and the offering of a lamb by the groom which solemnizes his intentions and the marriage (dabah fi-l-williyya). [431] After another waiting period of about two weeks, during which time the boy buys gifts of clothing and jewelry and presents them to the girl at her home, the wedding celebration begins. 585 On the day of the wedding, the girl is delivered to the groom's residence. The girl remains in the groom's tent, or

585 room, until he arrives for the test of her virginity. The groom "takes blood with his finger," wipes it on the white toga which his bride had been veiled with, and hands it to the older women waiting outside the tent. In the meantime, [792] the two fathers have met with the faqiih ("holy man") who [675] witnesses the agreement on the mahr payment. They read the Fatiha of the Quran together and conclude the marriage contract. The old women, carrying the toga with the virginal blood on it--a symbol of honor to both of the groups concerned with the marriage--parade around the guests' tent showing it, while all the time letting out shrill victory cries (zaghaariid = "trilling cries of joy"). The toga is then pinned-up on the side of the guests' tent for all to 585 see. Animals are slaughtered and the feast begins. The 574 central activity of the feast takes place in the guests' tent, the tent of the male guests. The groom's father, in [576] the traditional role of host, does not sit down to eat with his guests but directs the seating and feeding of them.

585 Should it happen that the girl is not a virgin, the 684 wedding would end on the spot, and the girl would be sent away or killed by her father. My informants said that this has never happened in al-Qasr. One key informant told me that such a thing never happens because the groom would never permit it to be known that "his cousin was not a virgin." In other words, the groom will get the blood from somewhere,

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[684] probably by pricking himself, and will wipe it on the toga.

About two weeks after the wedding, the bride and
585 groom take a lamb or a goat and go to spend a few days with
606
[574] the bride's parents. The Bedouin say that the relationship
between the groom and his in-laws is extremely important.
The man should treat his wife's mother and father as if they
were his own. "When a man's father-in-law and mother-in-law
come to visit him, he must slaughter a lamb for them. He
must respect both of them. Remember, this man and woman are
the grandparents of his children."

585 The marriage, then, is only the first step in the
571 ritualization of new group bonds established between the
182 families of the bride and groom. Bonds are subsequently in-
[574] tensified through a process of visitation, gift-exchange and
[431] sacrifice. The most important factor linking the two groups
[782] is the actual presence of the bride in the midst of her hus-
*[613] band's group, for she remains, in terms of the patrilineal
principle, a member of her father's lineage. This is made
585
*613 perfectly clear by the fact that she is referred to, never
551 by her name but, by the name of her tribal grouping if she is
571 other than 'Aishaibi. If she is of the 'Aishaibat tribe,
182 she will be referred to as bint of so-and-so. Hence the
[193] Bedouins stress the importance of extra-group bonds by re-
ferring to the women in their residence group as al-Qinaishiyya
or al-Kamailiyya, for instance (-iyya is the Arabic feminine
marker).

182 marker).

*613
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●[585] In al-Qasr, if a man's mother is 'Aishaibiiya, he will refer to her as ummi ("my mother"): if she is otherwise, he will refer to her by the tribal tag, i.e. al-Qinaishiyya. A man will also add the name of his mother's tribe, to identify himself with the tribe and to symbolize tribal links, as an appendage to his own full name. The use of the maternal appendage by an individual links him to his mother's tribe through the idea of what Peters (1960:29) has called "the concept of the one womb of maternal origin."

In the case of al-Qasr, this maternal appendage refers to links with the mother's tribe at the primary level (see Figure 9). For instance, two brothers of the Bait Abd al-Malik might wish to differentiate between their maternal origins for some reason or other; one would refer to himself as Yunis Abd al-Malik al-Kamailiyya and, the other as Jabril Abd al-Malik al-Qinaishiyya. This is shown in Figure 9, page 125.

*613
604 Although a person is obviously related to the mother's tribe through the mother, this matrilateral structural relationship is expressed as one between the individual and his mother's brother's tribe. The set of relationships surrounding the sister's son-mother's brother dyad is central to Bedouin political organization; it is the basis for the formation of relations of alliance along cognatic lines. [182]

554 It would be considered "wrong" for the members of
571 this group to present themselves at an al-Qasr wedding party,
[577] [585] or the annual celebration held in honor of a local saint of
[796] the area. When I inquired about the conspicuous absence of
[124] some of my chief informants from such gatherings, I was told
[431] that "they will send their gifts," or that "it is not decent
554 that they come to something such as this." In terms of
571 Bedouin social structure, there are a number of plausible
182 explanations for this "status separation." Fathers should
561 [593] not attend public affairs at which their sons may be "performing,"
i.e., young men should be allowed to play a public role outside the confines of the father-son authority structure. By virtue of the extension of the father role, and its corresponding authoritarian attitude, every member of the elder age-set commands certain rights and obligations which would prevent the free expression that is the hallmark of Bedouin parties. Conversely, and at the more general level, members of the "status group" who wish to remain members of this circle accept certain restrictions on social
[114] intercourse. At the five different Bedouin "parties" which
I attended, there were "elders" present, but none of them could be classified as members of the "status group." Bedouins plainly state that elders should not attend parties, but, on the other hand, they show much more concern and emotion when they say that a member of the "status group" should not "be

CHAPTER V

MARRIAGE: A CONTRACTUAL RELATIONSHIP

593 A survey of all disputes occurring among the eilat Aggary in the
578 last five years shows that more than 70% were disputes over "women,"
the usual phrase referring to cases involving marital relations. Disagreement
over matters arising out of quarrels between husband and wife
or between one of the spouses and his or her in-laws often constitute
593 the basis for these disputes. What seems to make marriage and the
578 family particularly productive of conflict is the fact that although
602 residence is commonly virilocal, and the majority of the women leaving
613 [591] their own families to live with the husband, the woman retains her
membership in her father's family after the marriage, and her agnatic
group keeps an active interest in her, even after she is married. Marriage
then brings face to face the interests of two groups. These interests
affect the relationship between the married couple; and, more
importantly, the relationship between the latter affects the interests
of their respective groups. This, in many instances, leads to direct
conflict between the two groups.

581 The position of the Awlad Ali daraieb with regard to marriage relations
671 is based on the Islamic law with minor modifications to suit the
585 requirements of local life. According to the Muslim law, marriage is
675 a civil contract affected by the request of one party and the agreement
of the other. No witnesses are needed for the legalization of the
marriage, according to some of the Shi'a sects, although the Sunni schools
of Muslim jurisprudence insist that two adult male and two adult females

581 are necessary for the validation of the marriage contract. Modern
585
671 legal systems which took as their basis the Islamic law of marriage
675 and the family further required the registration of the marriage contract for the marriage to be legal.

584 The request and necessary response forming the marriage are sup-
585 posed to be carried on by the parties involved. However, if either the
429 groom or the bride is not of age, or is mentally unqualified, the trans-
593 action is carried on by his or her guardian, or "wakil." The wakil is
the father, unless he is dead or an invalid, in which case the brothers
[604] become the wakils. If the person has no brothers, then the uncles be-
[184] come the wakil in the order stated. According to certain Sunni sects in Islam, a woman marrying for the first time is always represented by her wakil, even if she is of age. The assumption is that a woman who has never been married does not have the experience that enables her to enter into any kind of legally binding relationship such as marriage.

585 Following the original Islamic idea, marriage among Awlad Ali is
675 an oral agreement between the groom or his father and the guardian
593
429 (wakil) of the bride-to-be (her father, if alive, or her closest male
[604] kin in the following order: her brothers, her uncles, her grandfather).
585 A religious man is sometimes asked to perform the marriage, although it
792 is not required. Some persons might invite a member of the Murabiteen
[619] tribe or holy men to witness the marriage on the basis that his presence
[778] gives "baraka," or blessing, to the marriage. Before the application of
585 the State legal system to the area, marriage contracts were not regis-
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177 tered. In recent years, however, and with the increased mobility of
[675] the tribal populations, more and more marriages are being registered in
[634] the administrative districts. Still, according to the unofficial estimates,

Still, according to the unofficial estimates,
585 only about ten per cent of all marriages are registered, and these are
656
177 mainly mixed marriages involving a tribal person and a non-tribal one
582 or a tribal member who is not living in the area anymore. The reason
619 is that such a spouse, especially when he is the husband, is not under
the control of the tribal customs and therefore cannot be forced to fulfill
his obligations if he fails to do so. Most of the tribal population
[581] still feel that marriage is a personal and family affair that
should be kept away from the State legal system.

584 Marriage among Awlad Ali is a relatively informal procedure. When
593 a man decides to marry a certain girl, he informs his mother who, in
turn, informs his father. The father may have objections to his son's
choice of the bride. Such objections may be based on already strained
relations between the two families or the questionable reputation of
the girl or any member of her family. In such cases, the father tries
to dissuade his son from going ahead with the marriage. The father is
[583] usually successful in controlling his son's choice when the latter is
dependent on his father for the payment of the bridewealth called "mahr"
and for the support of his new household. This is usually the case in
the man's first marriage. In subsequent marriages and in the cases
where the son has independent means of support for himself and his
bride, the father's control of the son's choice is minimal, and asking
the father's approval is a matter of formality. In second and subsequent
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595 marriages, the approval of the older wives is essential. The
584 older wives have no right to object to the husband taking an additional
wife, but they have the right to object to the choice on the basis that
the new bride is hard to get along with or that there is animosity between
her family and the families of the other wives which makes

584 686 contrary, there is enough evidence to indicate that the father of the bride by participating in smuggling should have known about that fact, or at least it would not have affected his decision had he known about it. The grounds for unreasonable or unfair behavior is therefore not present in the above case.

If, on the other hand, the condition is specified at the time of the contract which is proven later to be false, then the behavior is [585] considered as unreasonable. An example is the case of Mahdi, who, after reading the fatha to marry a woman from his tribe, was discovered to have had tuberculosis and was forced to forfeit the gifts and other expenses on the basis that he had had the illness for a long time and knew about it, but he deliberately concealed it when he asked to marry the girl. Not all concealed conditions are considered as an adequate basis for the breaking of the fatha. Only conditions are adequate which, had they been known at the time of the agreement, would have made the party's decisions different. One case involved a man who had concealed the fact that he had a wife in Alexandria when he asked to marry a tribal girl. Although the intention to conceal the fact was very evident, for this is the first question that the girl's father or her guardian asks the suitor, yet, breaking the fatha agreement by the girl's father when he discovered the previous marriage was considered as unfair and unreasonable since, had he known about the marriage, it would have made no difference in his decision. The go-betweens disagreed, however, on this. One of them thought that although the concealed condition is by itself not objectionable, yet, the mere act of concealment indicated a bad character on the part of the prospective groom, and that by itself, apart from the concealed condition, is not a good basis for marriage relations. The bride's father did not have to pay kabara, although he held

582 and although they are not considered wrong or sinful, there is a gen-
779 eral feeling of distaste among the tribal population to such marriages. They usually attribute this distaste to the fact that if the marriage with the first sister did not work out, there is no reason to expect the marriage with the second to be successful.* Although this might account, in part, for the low rate of cousin marriage in the group when present wives of the individuals are taken into consideration, yet, the effect of that practice should not be exaggerated. For although that prohibition might curb the marriage with the cousin who is the sister of a previous wife, it does not restrict the marriage with another cousin who is a cousin, rather than a sister of the first wife.

584 During the period that follows and until the marriage is final,
431 the groom is supposed to bring gifts to the bride. These gifts are usually a wide silver bracelet that is used as an engagement ring. Also gifts of clothes and jewelry are quite customary. Such gifts become the private property of the bride and are to be returned only if the engagement is broken for fault on the part of the bride or any member of her family. In such cases, her father has to return all the gifts his daughter has accepted as well as the expenses that the groom's visitations have cost him.

585 The marriage is affected and finalized by the payment of the bride-
583 wealth. In Islamic law the bridewealth is supposed to be paid to the
779 bride herself as a gift and not to her father, which had been a signifi-
431 cant departure from the pre-Islamic practice where two types of bridewealth were paid: the sadaqa paid to the father of the bride or her

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[587] * This does not apply to cases where the first wife dies. In such cases, it is not objectionable to marry her sister, although the incidences of sororate are rare among the population.

585 legal guardian and considered a bride price to compensate the father or
583 the legal guardian of the bride. In earlier times the bride received
779 none of the mahr, although she usually got a sadaq or bridal gift for
431 herself. In Islamic Arabia, the mahr and the sadaq became indistin-
[178] guishable and were given to the woman and took the form of a legal gift
[171] for affecting the marriage. The Koraan no longer contains the concept
[178] of the purchase of the wife, and the mahr becomes a compensation which the woman has to claim in all cases. The Koraan demands a bridal gift for a legal marriage: "And give them whom ye have enjoyed their reward as a wedding gift" (Sura, iv. 24), and again, "And give the women their dowries voluntarily" (Sura, iv. 3).
[586] According to the Koraan, the mahr remains the property of the wife and remains her own even if the marriage is dissolved by divorce. But although it took the form of a gift, the mahr remained in Islamic law a prerequisite for the legalisation of the marriage. It is only upon the giving of the mahr that the marriage is considered valid. No marriage is legal, according to the Islamic law, unless that transfer of the mahr is affected. Mutual consent of the two parties to forfeit the mahr does not change that rule, and the marriage is considered void.
58 According to Muslim jurisprudence, marriage
675 is a contract ('acd) made betweeen the bridegroom and the bride or her
184 wali or guardian. An essential element in that contract is the mahr. The jurists themselves are not sure about the nature of the mahr. Some regard it as practically a purchase money or as an equivalent ('iwad) for the possession of the woman and the rights over her, so it is like a price paid in a contract of sale; while other jurists see in the mahr a legal symbol, a mark of honor and a proper legal security of property for the woman.

584 husband or his father pays the woman's father the bridewealth, or mahr.
583 In exchange for the mahr, the husband expects his father-in-law to outfit his daughter with such items as rugs, blankets, and a few other household items, like cooking pots, serving dishes, and a metal or wooden chest
[422] to keep her clothes in. These items become the private property of the
wife, but the husband has the right to use them. In addition, the man
581 expects to gain certain rights to the woman. The customary law of Awlad
671 585 Ali gives the husband three basic rights over his wife: the right to her sexual services (including the right to bear him children); the right to her labor in domestic activities; and the right to her obedience. Of the three rights, the first is the most exclusive. Not only doesthe husband have a complete monopoly over his wife's present sexual services, but he also has the right, if the girl has never been married before, to be the
[583] first to use such services. If he discovers that she is not a virgin, he can send her back to her father and get back his mahr.

581 The other two rights are not as exclusive. The husband's right to
585 his wife's domestic labor does not prevent her from occasionally helping
593 out in her father's or brother's household, especially if they live nearby. Finally, the husband's right to be obeyed by his wife is always subordinated to that of her father, who retains the ultimate authority over his daughter.

682 If the woman is killed or injured, the husband is deprived of all
683 or some of her services, depending on the seriousness and the permanence
581 585 of the injury, and therefore is entitled to compensation. The right of
593 avenging the woman's murder remains, however, that of her family, since she is still a member of that family.

581 Marriage does not deprive the woman of some rights of her own.
•585 562 The customary law gives the wife three basic rights corresponding to
671 those of the husband's sexual services, domestic work, and obedience.
Corresponding to the first of these, the wife has the right to have a
normal sexual life with her husband. This right, however, is not an ex-
clusive one, since the husband can marry more than one wife. A woman
585 can be divorced from her husband without having to return the mahr if
586 she claims that the husband is unable to perform his sexual duties. In
593 such cases, the marriage is usually dissolved quietly. In certain rare
instances, the husband may deny his wife's accusations. If both insist
585 586 on their stand, one or both may ask to be submitted to "bait el-shana'a,"
593 or house of the dreadful deeds. Reports are extremely vague about the
627 exact procedures involved in this case. Some informants stated that the
married couple would live in a tent without sidewalls so that everybody
could see what goes on inside. Most informants, however, insist that it
merely means that the couple move their tent near that of a respectable
man whose word is believed and honored. This man is supposed to keep a
close watch on the couple's activities, by listening or looking through
holes in the tent. His verdict determines the future of the marriage.
588 If the wife is justified in her claim, the husband is forced to divorce
681 her and to forfeit his mahr. If, on the other hand, the verdict is for
558 the husband, he not only can divorce her and get back the mahr, but is
also entitled to kabara, or compensation, for his injured pride. There
114 is no case of bait el-shana'a in the area during the time of the field
178 work, and most people insist that this practice is something of the past
583 when the mahr was relatively high and was paid in livestock, in which

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586
593 627 case its return to the husband would have caused great financial inconvenience
[114] for the wife's family.

[178] (583) Corresponding to the second right, the husband's right to his
581 wife's domestic work, is the wife's right to maintenance. The husband
585 has to support his wife. This includes providing her and her children
562 with adequate food and proper clothing. If the husband fails to do so
593 because of poverty, sickness, crop failure or unexpected disaster, the
wife's brother or father provides her and her children with the necessary
[586] food and clothing. If the husband's failure to fulfill his duties
is due to neglect, the wife can leave him and go to her father or brother
who talks the matter over with the husband who, in turn, either agrees
to their demands or has to divorce his wife and forfeit his mahr.

593 Finally, corresponding to the husband's right to his wife's obedience
562 is the wife's right to fair treatment by her husband. There are a
[779] number of ways in which the wife is mistreated. One is excessive punishment;
although the right of the husband to punish his wife is provided in
the Koraan, the punishment must be excessive or severe. Awlad Ali draw
a line between acceptable and severe punishment. A punishment is severe
if it results in something that other people can see or hear. If the
husband insults his wife or her family and others hear the action, or if
he beats her and this results in visible traces, then the punishment is
severe.

593 A wife considers herself mistreated if the husband, when married
595 to more than one, treats any of the other wives better than he treats
562 her. Although the wife cannot deny her husband the right to have additional
wives, he must give them all equal treatment. This includes

593 595 providing them with the same kind of food and clothing.* It also includes
562 dividing his time equally between them, spending one night in
each wife's tent. The first wife, being the chief one, has certain
privileges: her tent is the guest house, food is brought to her residence,
and she is the one to divide it among the other wives, and her
house is the place for the husband to stay if he becomes sick and unable
to move every night from one tent to another. Other than the exceptions
given to the first wife, the husband has to treat all his wives equally.

593 Normally, such cases of mistreatment do not result in divorce unless
[586] they are persistent. In most cases, if the wife is mistreated, she
goes to her father's or brother's house or sends for them to come and
593 take her. For the husband to bring her back to his tent, he must pay
431 her "nasafa." This is a gift given by the husband to his wife as an
acknowledgement of guilt and as a form of apology for not giving her
fair treatment. In some cases the nasafa is equal to what the husband
originally paid as mahr.

581 These are some of the rights that marriage gives both men and women
585 in the tribal society of Awlad Ali. These rights, however, are useless
626 unless they are backed by certain means of enforcing them. The husband's
586 rights are guaranteed by his ability to dissolve the marriage at will.
626 593 According to Islamic law, a man can divorce his wife by simply pronouncing
the sentence "I divorce you" in the presence of credible witnesses.
[779] No justification for divorce is demanded from the husband according to
[562] the Koraan. No such privilege is given to the wife. She can obtain a

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* With provision for wives with more children.

613 his maternal kinsmen to use the land and water facilities of
578 his lineage; his agnates may give ready consent or bicker about
602 it, but when it becomes necessary to clean a well, disputes are
almost certain to break out in the camp between those who argue
that their maternal relatives should not be expected to assist in
its cleaning and those who insist they should as an acknowledgement
of the use they have made of it. In these circumstances
613 maternal links divide agnates. Conversely, if it becomes necessary
602 for some of the same men to use the water and ploughland
of their maternal kin, their agnates are only too pleased that
they are able to do so, because the pressure on their own resources
is relieved. In these circumstances, the maternal link
strengthens the agnatic group. When, to give another instance,
613 blood-money has to be gathered, it is the duty of all agnates to
682 contribute equally, and no member of the group, rich or poor,
can contract out of this obligation without sacrificing his membership
of the group. Payments of blood-money are witness of
the strength of the notion of 'oneness' among agnates, in one
sense, but in so far as they are compulsory, they point also to the
weakness in the relationship. Maternal kin are not directly concerned
in this, but they can and do make contributions. In this
context two aspects of agnation appear, and the value of the
602 maternal link is emphasized. Again, maternal kinsmen are not
428 directly concerned in inheritance disputes, but they are expected
578 to intercede for their sister's sons, who often use their mother's
brother's tribal brand on their own animals. During disputes of
this kind, blame is thrown on to the maternal kinsmen for their
interference in matters which, properly speaking, are not their
613 business. In marriage, however, events take quite a different
582 turn. The responsibility for providing a man with a wife is first
that of the father, and secondly of the members of the tertiary
section; the father takes the initiative, and his agnates assist, not
only in the negotiations, but also in defraying the heavy costs of
the wedding festivities, the various gifts that precede it, and the
604 bride-wealth which follows. The mother's brother is also a key
613 person in all these arrangements. He enters into the negotiations,
585 assists with the entertainment on the wedding day, and makes a
[583] substantial contribution to the bride-wealth. On the wedding day,
there is no kinsman to compare with the mother's brother; a few

weeks later, he is reviled for demanding a long overdue instalment 604
of his daughter's bride-wealth. He is the person who can be 613
approached freely, to whom love tales can be told, from whom [585]
help can be expected, who gives support in disputes, and who also [583]
upbraids, who punishes, who withholds, who acts as a pull-away
from the agnatic group. An agnate demands help, and also compels 613
the fulfilment of obligations. An agnate is a man with whom 602
relationships are formal, particularly if he is a senior. He is, too, the person who unfailingly, though perhaps grudgingly, gives help when it is most required; who, regardless of the merits of the case, defends one against external opposition; and who is always available at each life crisis. A kinship link is not to be defined by any one particular mode of behaviour. Each is a cluster of different sorts of behaviour, one form taking precedence in these circumstances, another in other circumstances, and so forth.

The little clusters of kindred can be defined clearly in any of 613
the camps. It is customary among the Bedouin for those who are 602
most closely linked as kindred to pitch their tents close to each 621
other. For example, if a man has two recently married sons, their tents are pitched on either side of his, with the ropes of their tents crossing the ropes of their father's tent. More distantly related kin will be more distantly placed, and here and there, breaks in the continuity of the lines of tents are to be observed, corresponding as a rule to breaks in kinship. Each large camp in this way can be viewed as two or more nuclei of kindred. The camp as a whole is dominantly composed of agnates, but they are disposed in such a way as to show clusterings of varying kinship composition. Characteristically each cluster has a separate name, often a female name which refers to a common mother of
the cluster, or of the head of the leading family in it. When these [221]
relatively large camps break up with the onset of the rains and disperse to form small camps of five to seven tents for winter pasturing, they will be seen to correspond almost identically with
the kin clusters of the larger summer camp. Again, a tertiary segment [312]
may have two wells for its own use. In a particular year there may be sufficient water in one of them to meet the needs of the whole group, and its members then live together in one camp; the following year both wells may have to be used, and the camp of the previous summer will split up, roughly half going

121 613 682 is found in either a vengeance killing or a blood-money agreement which later becomes caught up in a wider set of debt relationships. Records show that this is true in some cases, but in others the blood money is paid in one instalment and immediately. The recognition of a debt and its liquidation among the Bedouin is tantamount to a declaration of hostility, since without a debt the means for smooth-running relationships is lacking. Such a blood-money payment was made between two tertiary groups in the absence of the 'owner of the blood'; when he returned he sought out his brother's killer, and took two lives for one. Subsequently, there was a further blood-money settlement but there remained 'a man left over'. In other circumstances an annual payment, called *sana*', is demanded in addition to the prompt and full payment of the blood money. The attachment of the *sana*' to a settlement is an invidious condition since it is regarded as a fee by those who have to pay it, it is said to lower the status of a group and ' one day, it must be repudiated '.[1] It may, circumstances permitting, serve to cast off all pretence of friendly relationships. It is more likely that it will lead to a further outbreak of hostilities. When I witnessed the payment of the *sana*' the terms in which it was demanded were: ' You have a man on your backs. Are you going to repudiate this or are you going to give me *sana*'? If you repudiate, we must seek vengeance.' The payment, one in a long series, was made on that occasion but there were loud grumblings among the men of the camp against their leader for his acquiescence and one suggested that they terminate the payments forthwith by shooting the claimant. Of the three forms of blood money cited, this latter is the extreme to which groups can go short of open feud. Its opposite is a blood-money payment which is mainly left as a debt, and which is accompanied by the ' gift ' of a wife to the victim's group.[2] The wife is ' given ' as an earnest that the offender's group wishes the full restoration of relationships ruptured by the homicide. There are, therefore, four forms of blood-money payment. The Bedouin view of these is that they are variants of what is, in principle, the same thing. Their view cannot be accepted. Each of the four payments points to diverse kinds of social relationships between groups, and their consequences are wholly disparate. These various kinds of relationships between the tertiary sections of the same secondary section exist because the relationships between all sections cannot possibly be the same if they are more than a pair in number. A secondary section which spans ten tertiary sections is not the same type of unit as one which spans only three. The greater the number of tertiary sections the greater the possible permutations in their relationships. What the Bedouin think of as variations in the form of blood-money
829 payment is related to the complexities that lie behind their simple lineage model. Bedouin can comprehend this complexity only by thinking in terms of a kind of average behaviour, regarding deviations from the average as fortuitous and explicable by the faulty reasoning that ' in this particular case, it just so happened ' that this, that, and the other were part of the situation, failing to appreciate that apparent aberrations are constants to the extent that some sort of specifics occur in all cases. There is no reason why Bedouin reasoning should be followed in sociological analysis.

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[1] See Peters, 1966.

581 585 [2] A marriage is not legal unless at least a promise to hand over wealth has been made beforehand. In the case cited the amount promised would be no more than a token—a sheep or a goat.

Chapter

7

Aspects of the Family Among the Bedouin of Cyrenaica[*]

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Marriage and the Father-Son Relationship

When a marriage takes place among the Bedouin of Cyrenaica, a nuptial 585
tent is set up some distance away from that of the groom's father. There is 593
no particular significance about the nuptial tent itself, but it must be pitched
at a distance so that the father "will not see it" — although, obviously, in a
country of large level plains, it stands out conspicuously. This pretence
that the tent remains unseen by the father is pushed to the point of his denying
any knowledge of what is afoot. A middle-aged or elderly man with a
family adopts a similar attitude to any marriage in which his son participates,
as groom or as guest. An elder, the father of three unmarried sons (one of 535
whom, in his late twenties, was known to be getting impatient about marriage),
when I asked after his eldest son, insisted that he was away with the 831
camels, although the son was conspicuous in a semicircle of young men encouraging
a blindfolded maiden in the movements of her seductive dance
outside a wedding tent in his full view. Prior to the wedding festivities, the

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[*] I wish to express my gratitude to Mr. R. Werbner for reading this essay in manuscript. 128

The information presented is based on 27 months fieldwork carried out during 114
1948 to 1950, among the Cyrenaica Bedouin. I am indebted to the Trustees of the 122
Horniman Studentship Fund, and the Committee for Treasury Studentships in Oriental Languages and Cultures, for making the research financially possible.

Cases

584 Prior to the wedding festivities, the
father will have participated in negotiations, although even in these he will
593 have remained silent, leaving an affine, as a rule, to arrange the details with
the girl's father and his kinsmen. The father feigns aloofness from the start
of negotiations until after the wedding celebrations have ended. Before in-
quiring into this seemingly odd behaviour, a few further details of marriage
ceremonies need to be mentioned briefly.

•585 The bride is carried to the nuptial tent on a camel, seated in a cagelike
342 structure placed on the camel's back, this canopy covered over with carpets
[492] and at least one long blanket — later to be used to divide her tent into male
and female quarters — which constitute part of the goods given to a woman
[788] on marriage. On her arrival, while she is still seated in her canopy, the
camel is led round the tent seven times by a small boy. She then descends
and is hustled into the tent by a number of women who make a show of their
attempts to conceal her from view. Inside the tent the bride is enclosed in
one corner in a kind of cubicle partitioned off by a length of blanket.

585 In the meantime, the groom has affected to escape, but is "caught," while
[533] running away, by his fellows, who "compel" him to return to the nuptial tent,
to the accompaniment of their lewd songs telling of the sexual pleasures
[831] awaiting him. Much of this is horseplay, but the young men carry it out
brazenly and the groom is required to show reluctance to continue with the
ceremonies. His entry into the nuptial tent is marked by an expectant hush
that falls over the crowd of men gathered, as they await the result of the
virginity test the groom is about to perform, which he does by wrapping part
of his toga round one of his fingers to pierce the hymen. Sharp shrieks from
[202] the bride give the signal that the test has been undertaken; not a stir moves
the crowd until evidence of its success has been publicly displayed, which is
given by the groom hoisting the blood-stained portion of the toga through
the corner of the tent on a pole, followed by firing three shots from his rifle.
Jubilantly, the men gathered fire volley after volley from their rifles just over
the nuptial tent, and the seven-day celebrations begin.

585 A full descriptive account of a marriage, or many of the ritual details
589 woven into it need not be given here. What is included is intended to illus-
trate certain relationships between father and son, and between one
[593] generation and another. In this connection two further points are appropri-
[561] ate. First, during the week of festival, young men gather outside the nuptial
[535] tent each night to encourage a maiden in her dancing, clapping their hands
to the point of injury "so that we will have a wife soon." The celebrations
[533] belong to the bachelors, and they are the only ones to engage in the singing
and hand clapping. It is they too who stop the bridal camel on its way to
[538] the nuptial tent to recite obscene rhymes to the bride, and they also shout
[831] their rather dubious consolations to the bride who, during the virginity test,
crying out for her mother, is assured by them that the night holds promise
585 for her which her mother could never extend. The married men, particularly
602 the close senior agnates of the groom, stay away from it all, discussing mat-
ters unconnected with the affair.
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Second, the fiction that nothing has happened, which characterises the 585
father's behavior, does not cease with the termination of the celebrations. 593
Each morning, soon after daybreak and before the camp is astir, the groom
must leave his bride and repair to his father's tent to lie at his father's side
"as he always had done in the past, as if he had not left him." This con-
ventional ruse is followed, not just for the seven days of wedding festivities,
but is continued after the groom has moved back into the camp proper, and
pitched his tent alongside his father's, with the ropes of the two tents crossing.

In matters other than sleeping arrangements, this fiction that "nothing
has happened" is maintained. Marriage does not mean the immediate crea- [592]
tion of a wholly separate domestic unit. Save for the appearance of an ad-
ditional tent, the ordinary run of daytime activities is scarcely altered. To 593
mention perhaps the most important feature of the relationships between 264
father and son, the groom continues to eat with his father. As yet, the son 571
does not use his own bowl,[1] and may not, indeed, do so for several years. 182
The important symbolism of "eating together" or "eating out of the one
bowl," the act of commensality creating a bond of fellowship about which
Robertson Smith[2] wrote so eloquently can only be referred to here in one of
its many aspects. Bedouin themselves stress that eating together is a strong
bond, and the communal meal is always used for this purpose after the
settlement of a dispute, or at the conclusion of a blood-money agreement,
and so on. It is significant also in the sense that those who partake of a
meal accept the authority of the host; he becomes their protector, and a blow [574]
against one of them is struck at him also. Even if the guest is an enemy,[3]
as long as he has eaten from another's bowl his life is safe.

The slaughter of an animal for another person creates a bond which has its 571
roots in the intimate connection between man and his animals. In a very 231
vivid way, the Bedouin view their animals as part of themselves, as part of 264
their *Risiq*, their general wealth, in which their sons are included. It is this 182
mystical association between a man and his animals which distinguishes a
meal consisting of the meat of an animal slaughtered from ones' own flock [574]
or herd from a meal consisting of meat bought from a butcher's shop — often [186]
given by the plateau peoples of Northern Cyrenaica to their guests, but which
the camel-herding Bedouin of the south regard as despicable hospitality. A
slaughtered animal is the food, *par excellence,* which establishes this bond

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[1] When Bedouin take their meals, they eat from large wooden bowls imported from [415]
south of the Sahara. It is a matter of custom that a man does not eat alone unless it is [439]
unavoidable, a custom of such strength, that, when, one day, only an elder, occupying
a tent the ropes of which were crossed with mine, was left in camp, he brought his [123]
bowl into my tent "so that I will be eating with a man."

[2] William Robertson Smith. *The Religion of the Semites.* 3rd ed. London: Macmil- [113]
lan, 1927.

[3] A stranger entering a camp is under no obligation to give his identity. Few do so
until they have partaken of a meal. In the past, the Bedouin claim, the period of [574]
anonymity could last for 40 days, but nowadays, they say they limit it to two only. I [609]
have known strangers enter a camp, receive entertainment, and leave without offering
any specific identity.

Cases

571 between man and man, although the various cereal dishes which constitute
231 their regular meals are said to have a similar effect.
264 The son who continues to eat with his father "as he always had been
182 doing," also continues to accept his authority. Indeed he could do little else
593 at this stage, for he lacks the economic means to cut away. Neither at mar-
585 riage nor after is there any transfer of wealth from father to son. The new
182 tent recently pitched is no more than a dormitory to which the young couple
(425) retire at night. During the daytime the son is still to be seen in his father's
(556) tent, and, in the male quarters, things appear to be much the same as before.
In the female quarters, the only superficial change is the more frequent appearance among the women of one who, before marriage, often sat among them if she had been a close neighbour or a close cousin previously; or of an additional helper if she had come from afar. On the surface things remain "as they always have been," although in fact, a whole set of changes have been initiated.

852 *Rites de passage* are few among the Bedouin. A man's progress in life is
881 ceremonially marked by only four events: his birth, circumcision, marriage
764 and burial. His development into manhood is not marked by clearly defined
stages. About the age of seven, the henna markings on the front of a boy's
858 shirt for protection from the evil eye are not renewed, the cowrie shell stitched
789 to the front of his cap as a kind of talisman against the evil eye is removed
and he is no longer permitted free access to the women's quarters. As he
857 grows older, he will be instructed in goat-herding, and later taught to follow
233 the sheep. In his late teens he will have to undertake the more arduous and
883 responsible task of herding the camels. Coincident with camel-herding, he
233 may be given a gun by his father. Shortly afterwards he must undertake the
[431] stringent test of manhood, a journey to a distant oasis for dates. These
[411] changes are not marked off by a *rite de passage*. The rites a man undergoes
[484] during the course of a lifetime are minimal, and in the sense that they are
[885] concerned with only the basic events in a man's life anywhere (save for
852 circumcision, which is a minor celebration anyway), they are irreducible.
88 Moreover, the rituals which exist do not comprehend the same multiplicity of
776 relationships as rituals which occur in many other African societies.[4] It is
[771] true that the ceremonies referred to in this chapter by no means include
all the Bedouin rituals. It is also true that the events mentioned vary in
[554] elaboration, and in the number of symbols present in them, but they are
not multiplied or reduced for different people.

In this context it is important to stress that we are here dealing with a
[613] lineage society where social differentiation is not built up into differences
[554] of rank, where the roles to which a man succeeds are almost wholly cap-
[602] tured by his kinship relationships with other men and which are sociologically
to be distinguished from the roles a man enters into by acquisition of office,

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[4] See, for example, the elaboration of rituals discussed in M. Gluckman (Ed.), *Essays on the Ritual of Social Relations*. Manchester: University of Manchester Press, 1962.

membership of associations and so on. The statuses a Bedouin achieves depend 796
not on an ordered acquisition through the inheritance of roles or election 852
to them, but on his personal manipulation of linkages in his jockeying 88
with others. Rites are minimal because there are few defined statuses an 554
individual can predictably acquire. The equalitarianism of the desert denudes 602
the Bedouin of ritual riches. Complimentarily, rites which do occur are 613
thrown into exaggerated relief by the absence of others, and in their isolation, [557]
become not merely a "passage" but a cataclysmic change. Marriage and
burial both comprehend limited fields of relations, but accompanying ceremonies 585
may bring several hundred people together, people who otherwise 764
rarely gather in these numbers to meet one another as kinsmen and neighbours, 796
and it is suggested that the emphasis given to the events dramatises the 602
significance of the changes they produce. In the discussion of the changes 182
brought about by marriage, the Bedouin view of what is entailed will be
considered first.

The Bedouin View of Marriage

After marriage, the Bedouin argue, a son has a tent of his own, a woman 585
over whom he has authority and soon children to make him a father. Marriage 581
causes split, branching. A new family is created, holding the potential [613]
of a new lineage. The separation is so painful a matter for the father
that he cannot contemplate it, hence his pretence that he has no knowledge of [593]
wedding festivities, and his subsequent attitude that nothing has happened.

Interestingly, there are two other occasions when this attitude is to be 682
observed. When a man kills within his corporate group,[5] he may flee his 613
tribe or he may be compelled to leave; later he is likely to return and, when 621
he does, he is received with a minimum of show. Every attempt is made to
suppress knowledge of the event.

Again, if incest occurs, the memory of it must somehow be suppressed, and 835
it is an ever-present danger. Men, permitted four wives simultaneously and 561
also able to engage in a plurality of marriages through divorce or death of [595]
spouses, may have children showing an age difference of two or three generations.
Thus it comes about that a man may be of an age in relation to his
father's sister which permits them as children to behave as if they were
first paternal cousins. As an adult, the preferred spouse for a man is a [582]
father's brother's daughter. In terms of relationships between adolescents
the situation in which a man is of the same age generation as his father's
sister is fraught with danger. In one such case, between a man and his [684]
father's sister, the male child of the union was put out in the desert to be

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[5] Bedouin are disposed in groups which, in summer, usually constitute a single community, around or near a watering point. The men of this group are interlinked by reference to an ancestor four or five ascending generations, reckoning from the generation of men of about 20 years. When, elsewhere in this chapter reference is made to corporations, it will be to groups of this kind.

835 devoured by wild animals, the girl was "given"* to a close cousin who had
561 shot his sister. Both now reside with an enemy tribal section. The two acts
684 were equated. They were similar to the extent that both created a situation
which defied institutional resolution. The culprits were exorcised. The girl's lover remains with his group — the odium for the male is incomparably less than for the female, since, while maternity is easy to establish, paternity is frequently shrouded in doubt — and during the months I lived with this particular group, there was never a mention of the affair. It was as if "nothing had happened."

829 If asked why these two events cause such profound distress, the answers
578 the Bedouin give are twofold: they can do nothing about them, and they
cause split. By split in this context they mean split in the lineage; split in
613 the case of homicide because it may lead to a demand for blood-money which
[682] is payable only between corporations, and split in the case of incest because
[684] it causes chaos in relationships. Marriage, in one sense, their reasoning
581 runs, is similar, for it too causes split. Whatever may be the analytic strength
of the arguments that homicide and incest precipitate splitting, the argu-
829 ment that marriage does so is spurious. In what sense can marriage mean
613 split? Bedouin men marry "so that we may beget many sons, to make a big lineage later on." The worst fate that can befall a man as a result of his son's marriage is that he, in later generations, will become the focal point in a series of branching descent lines. The alternative — that his sons remain unmarried — can only mean that his name would disappear through want of successors to carry it on, which is one of the greatest evils which can befall a man, according to Bedouin sentiment: better split than oblivion. If the key to the interpretation of the father's attitude to his son's marriage is not
581 that it causes split, it must lie elsewhere in their relationship. What mar-
585 riage does is alter the distribution of authority between father and son. In
593 order to pursue this, it is necessary first to clarify the types of authority involved, and then assess them in a post-marital situation.

554
The Division of Authority Between the Family and the Corporation

851 Politically, a person's status is determined for him at birth. At this time a man has the right to accept or deny paternity. Denial is tantamount to an accusation of adultery by his wife. In practice, once a wife has given birth to a male child, whatever doubts people may harbour regarding paternity, the husband accepts the child as his. "The boy for the bed," is a saying often heard among the Bedouin; but it remains the husband's prerogative to invest
the child with legitimacy, hence, political status. Only if a husband becomes
[837] aware that he is publicly considered a cuckold, or if he catches his wife and a
lover *in flagrante delicto*, is he at all likely to take action. Otherwise he may

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[585] * A marriage is illegal unless it is accompanied by an agreement to transfer wealth
[581] to the girl's father.

her father takes, but in certain critical situations he can be relieved of choice 613 593
if the interests of the group as a whole are at stake. [421]

Political authority is the preserve of a corporation, and its exercise leads [428]
to invasion of a man's authority in the field of domestic relations. This [584]
does not mean, however, that discrete areas of authority do not remain with
the father. In the tent his authority over his son is so overwhelming as to
keep the son in almost complete subordination. The son is referred to as a
slave, and in daily life he has to behave as one. He must obey every command,
for, were he to rebel, he would find little or no support among his
agnates, whatever the extent of the provocation. Retreat from his father is [422]
hardly an alternative, since, while his father is alive, he has no animals of
his own, and to leave camp would only mean that he would have to move
outside his group to seek employment elsewhere as a shepherd. If he did [558]
this he would forfeit status, and almost certainly cut himself off from property [428]
which would fall to him after his father's death. A man who "denies"
his father looses too many privileges for the practice to become widespread.

Caught in this dilemma, a son's predicament is worsened by the fact that 593
he cannot initiate marriage negotiations — to be able to do so requires some 584
animals to offer a girl's father. Through his mother's brother he has the [431]
means of bringing pressure to bear on his father, but the latter can resist for [604]
years. Finally, a marriage is arranged for him. It is difficult to convey the 581
yearning of young Bedouin for marriage. They discuss it among themselves 521
ad nauseam. For the most part their talk is about the sexual aspect of marriage. 831
Premarital sex relations are strictly controlled, and the movements
of each young girl are carefully guarded because, if on the day of her marriage 836
the test shows that she is not a virgin, she not only brings disgrace to [585]
her family, but the marriage may be revoked and her worth as a bride for
another man seriously diminished. Nevertheless premarital relations do [837]
occur, if not between youths and maidens to any extent, between young
men and married women.

The question still remains: why is marriage the occasion of such ebullient 581
celebration? The formal authority a father exercises over his son 593
changes little on marriage. Economically the son is still harnessed to the
father. The latter still shouts his orders at him, and obedience remains
unaltered. Any sign of an independent view on a matter is met with a gruff
rebuff. If the marriage turns out to be disagreeable to the father, he has
the authority — if not always the power — to break it. Marriage does not
mean a change in the general mode of behaviour between the two; the legal
relations remain unaltered, albeit modified in practice, as the married son
matures in age. But marriage does mean the acquisition of rights and status
previously denied a son. Henceforward, he has a domain of his own. This [554]
is high drama, indeed, for although every effort is made to give substance to
the expressed view that "nothing has happened," for the first time in his
life the son has seized publicly, amid the jubilations of his fellows, a status
which hitherto was the possession of the father.

Cases

The Meaning of Marriage

581 Until marriage the changes in a man's life have been in the nature of
585 an ordered sequence of development from a child to be cared for — the only
342 time in his life when a father, without inhibition, showers on him his love
[593] and affection — to one who, by degrees, makes an increasing contribution to a production unit. Marriage necessitates that a man pitch a tent for himself. With a tent he becomes a potential host and protector of others. The local idiom for marriage is "to set up a tent." It would be quite improper to use
[196] the verb "to marry" when inquiring whether a marriage has taken place since this verb also has the meaning of "to have sexual intercourse."
[195] Instead the euphemism, "Have you pitched a tent?" is used. The Arabic word for a tent in this context is *Bait*. It is not used to refer to a military tent, nor to the small tent which shelters only a widow. It is reserved for the Bedouin tent, which usually has a wool top, and, most importantly, holds the promise of the continuation of life, whether it shelters a newly married couple, a mature family or young unmarried people. (The word *Bait* represents a complex concept, and it would be too much of a diversion here to discuss the various points of its significance. It is essential to understand that its
[778] meaning is not confined to a tent in the physical sense.) Its top has *Baraka* (divine goodness) in it; the quality of *Haram*, which makes it possible for the tent to be used as a sanctuary, is associated with it and this quality of *Haram* extends, moreover, to the ropes of the tent, so that anyone who clutches them comes under the protection of the owner. In it, the wife must permanently reside and her husband has the legal right to insist on this. In it too, he has the legal right of sexual access to a woman, his wife. Any children
[885] born in it he can claim as his own. With the erection of a tent the son reaches adulthood, and it is in this sense that he can be said to have acquired a domain of his own.

581 Marriage gives a son greater freedom and less dependence on his father
585 in another sense. A second euphemism used for marriage is "making a
[593] relationship," specifically an affinal one. Relationships between a man and
[195] his father-in-law are diverse and are used in various ways in different situations. Here, the particular aspect which needs to be stressed is that a man
606 can cajole his father-in-law, and (through his wife) wealth, in the form
425 of animals, may pass from the former to the latter. Reciprocal gifts are passed
556 between affines on certain occasions, but in addition small amounts may pass which are not connected with the formal occasions of exchanges. Debt
583 lies between them. It begins with the initiation of marriage negotiations,
584 when the suitor's kinsmen take a prescribed number of sheep to present to
606 the girl's father if negotiations are successful. They promise to transfer bride-wealth[9] to the girl's father. A few weeks after the marriage, the hus-

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[191] [9] I use the word "bride-wealth" because it has become so familiar in the literature, but the only similarity between the *Sahiba* of the Bedouin and the bride-wealth of

band is required to take gifts to his mother-in-law in recognition of the fact 583
that she nourished his wife as an infant (the literal meaning of the word 584
used for this gift is "milk"). A return visit is made and gifts are given to 606
the daughter. When the first child is born an animal is presented by the
affines, and if the child is a male, the gift may be several sheep, or even a 851
few camels if the father-in-law is very wealthy. Formal exchange of gifts 425
continue, but, in addition, informal transfers are made. Moreover, if relations 606
between a man and his father-in-law develop favourably, it is not uncommon 606
for a young husband, during the early years of marriage, to move 591
away from his father and pitch his tent alongside that of his father-in-law. 593
Marriage gives a son affinal relations of his own. Affinity can alleviate the
dead weight of paternal authority.

It is suggested that the crisis the marriage of a son assumes for a father 585
is the shift it entails in the distribution of authority. This is borne out by 561
other details in the marriage ceremony referred to earlier. Ordinarily, young 602
men dare not sing within earshot of their senior agnates. Far from allowing
obscenities, agnates of the ascending generation would not allow even a 533
mention of women to be made by young men, in their presence. In a group [593]
consisting of young men and an agnate, I chanced to use the noun for [123]
woman and immediately my tent was cleared of all but the senior agnate.
At a wedding the young men revel in their lewd songs and shout their [831]
obscenities for all to hear. The senior agnates stand aside and make a show
of ignoring the proceedings. And well they may, for each marriage is a
challenge to the exclusive authority they have enjoyed; each nuptial tent is
an invasion of the domain of which they have been undisputed masters.
Marriage is the only occasion when the men of one generation can clap and
sing their defiance of an older one, and give warning of the changes which
must be accommodated however great the pretence that nothing has happened.

Marriage ceremonies dramatise the clash between adjacent generations 561
over the distribution of certain forms of authority. If this authority is as 602
overwhelming as has been suggested, and if it is so deeply resented, how is it
that life is endurable for juniors? Relationships between junior and senior
agnates are so restrictive that they almost amount to what Professor Fortes
has suggested I view as a form of avoidance relationships. Juniors must
always defer, they must obey commands promptly, they serve their seniors,
they must accept a lead when it is given and the restrictions on conversations
exclude all reference to women, marriage or sex. These are not simply a set
of general guides for behaviour, they are rigidly applied rules, deviation from
which is countered with rebuke or greater severity. It would appear from this

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many African societies is that wealth is transferred. Obviously, in societies where the 583
rules of exogamy compel a dispersion of links outside a man's own clan, what is involved 584
in this transfer of wealth cannot be sociologically similar to one in which marriage 606
to the first cousin on either side is permitted.
171

561 that young men spend their premarital lives in an environment of unmiti-
602 gated agnatic hostility. Greater substance is given to this view when it is
realised that agnates live together. The residential concentration of agnates
561 in Cyrenaica exceeds 80 per cent. I wish to stress that this figure is based
602 on the universe of the small camp, and the only males included as agnates are
621 those who are consanguinely related. Over 50 such camps were used in
arriving at the figure. Obviously, the figure of agnatic concentration will
vary depending on the universe. If all men who claim to belong to a tribe
of, say, 15,000 souls, who claim that they are agnates in a political sense are
included, then the figure will not be the same as that derived from a small
group where the criterion for inclusion is consanguinity, not mere political
affiliation. It is necessary to make this clear to emphasise that the Cyrenaican
figure is unusually high, and also because the modes of behaviour between
consanguineal and political agnates differ critically. Granted the hostility
[578] built into agnation, and recognising in addition the significance of the high
degree of agnatic concentration, unless there are other factors present in the
situation, life would be intolerably burdensome. Parallel-cousin marriage
comes to the rescue.

Parallel-Cousin Marriage

582 Among the Bedouin the prohibited degrees of marriage are few. A man
may not marry within a closer range than first paternal or maternal cousin;
he cannot marry a woman of a senior generation, nor a woman known to
be older. He cannot marry the daughters of a woman who has acted as wet
nurse to him or to any of his brothers and sisters. Otherwise he is permitted
to marry any other woman. Marriage with the first paternal cousin is pre-
582 ferred, and is more than a sentiment. A man has a right to his father's
brother's daughter, and before a marriage is arranged with anyone else, the
585 girl's father seeks the opinion of his brother's son. If he neglects to do this,
578 or if he flouts the opinion offered him, he runs the risk of the marriage
being brought to a halt on the very wedding day. I have witnessed this. In
most of the records I possess, it usually happens that the brother's son is
bought off with a few sheep (about five) and some articles of clothing.
Here the brother's son was seizing the occasion to extort from a farmer's
brother wealth which he considered was due him from an earlier inheritance
[589] dispute. Occasionally the intervention is genuinely designed to prevent a
marriage; if the girl refuses to marry her father's brother's son, he can force
582 her into spinsterhood. Men exercise their right to marry their first parallel
cousins. They also marry other parallel cousins. The significance of parallel-
cousin marriage varies with the exact degree of the relationship. First- and,
say, third-parallel cousins are sociologically different in a number of respects,
and in relation to specific problems these differences may assume major
[602] importance. In the present discussion the various degrees have this in
common: that whatever the precise relationship, all parallel cousins are the

593 not considered bad for a man to beat his wife." In the case
593 of ill-treatment by the husband, her father may take the
*613 matter to the corporate head. Traditionally, the corporate
[792] head would order the husband to move his tent next to the
tend of the "holy man" or some other third party, so that
he would be dissuaded against such behavior. Another reason
● [586] for this is so that the girl might have witnesses to support
her petition for divorce should the husband continue to beat
her. I heard of no wife-beating while I was in al-Qasr.

595 The Quran states that a man may lawfully take four
[779] wives, but that if he feels he cannot treat each of them
equally, he should take only one (Sura IV:3 and 129). The
Bedouins are conscientious in practicing this rule, though
595 perhaps not for religious reasons. If a man has more than
593 one wife, he must spend an equal amount of time with each.
Conflict between co-wives is lessened by the fact that a man
will have separate tents, or rooms in the case of a house,
for each wife. A man will not buy a dress or a piece of jewelry
for one wife without buying a copy of it for all other wives.
595 On a trip to the Siwa Oasis, I was accompanied by a man who
593 had three wives and wished to bring them a gift of basketry
114 upon his return. He was successful in buying two baskets
which were similar but could not find a comparable third in
[431] the oasis market. In dismay, he made a gift of the baskets
to me and returned with no souvenirs at all. One of my in-

582 [584] she could marry no man.

582 578 Most of the older Bedouins say that bint 'amm marriage as it is practiced in the desert is an evil, that it causes nothing but trouble. They say that if there are bad feelings between two men they will place claims upon each other's sister with the intention of preventing the girls from ever marrying. The younger Bedouins say that "it is better to marry the bint 'amm than to let a stranger take her." The [182] [571] [586] claim on the bint 'amm, of course, should be seen as a basis for social relationships between groups, regardless of any conflict it may or may not lead to. This is why the Bedouins say that a man "will never divorce his bint 'amm, because if he does that means that she is no good." It follows, then, that if "she is no good" none of her other paternal cousins will marry her. Implicit here is the reference to the making and breaking of group ties. [182] Similarly, to regulate and to maximize kinship ties, a man can claim only one of his father's brother's daughters. In the case where there is only one bint 'amm, her eldest cousin has first claim to her. 582 578 159 This sometimes causes conflict between brothers as the following informant's story indicates.

> The father of Salih and Aziz was dead which meant that Aziz, being the elder, would have to furnish the brideprice if Salih were to marry first. In fact, Salih wanted to marry his bint 'amm. Aziz refused him permission to do so: Aziz had first claim to the bint 'amm, and, also, he thought that the brideprice which

583 554 556 expected. The price is set by the corporate group but can vary, and usually does, from one tertiary segment to another. The wealthier tertiary segments tend to have higher brideprices. This is explained by the fact that they occupy a "higher status" on the prestige scale, and also, by the fact that they wish to carefully control and maintain this status.

[435] For instance, "between cousins" of 'Ailit Ma'fas the mahr is fixed at 60 Egyptian pounds, but "a man can pay more out of generosity if he wishes." Hence, a member of the Ma'fas lineage can increase his prestige within and without his family by paying beyond that which is expected of him. In this case, "generosity" is the variable related to a man's place on the scale of prestige. 583 554 556 435 On the other hand, in another "poorer" lineage, 'Ailit Zagharat, the mahr is 30 L.E. to members of the in-group but "the stranger will pay 60 to 80 L.E., according to the father's wealth." The largest and most famous mahr payment in the area was made by the wealthiest man in al-Qasr who paid seven camels (each worth about 150 L.E.) for his son's wife. The highest fixed mahr in al-Qasr was that of Bait Bu Tarram of 'Ailit Lazumi. It was 100 L.E. for members of 'Ailit Lazumi and, accordingly, much more for strangers. This mahr is in contrast to the average for the area which is about 30 L.E. within the secondary group.

586 521 784 Divorce is a forbidden topic of conversation in al-Qasr. Any talk about one's wife, mother, or sister is considered injudicious.

586 judicious. Another issue which enters here is the desire on
829 the part of the individual to maintain his privacy--especially
where an infringement of it could result in a change of his
tax status. The Bedouins think that it is wise to keep the
government uninformed about the exact size of their family.
586 When I first asked a question concerning divorce, I was
829 politely taken aside and told that I do not speak about
123 divorce to a man, and especially when his sons are present.

586 Two cases of divorce took place while I was in the
field. In the one, the wife claimed that her husband was
impotent. She took this complaint to her father who then
confronted the husband with it; the result was a divorce.
Although the man denied that he was sterile, this was his
second childless marriage and he felt it wise not to contest
the case. It becomes very important to know, in the case of
Bedouin divorce, which partner cannot meet the requirements
of the marriage. If it is the woman, she will return to
her father's house and the father must then return the price
of mahr (brideprice). If it is the husband, when his wife
returns to her father's house he must pay her (not her father,
in this case) a sum, called mu'akhkhir al-sadaaq ("the balance
of the marriage contract"), which is equal to that of the
original mahr. Actually, there are three times when a mahr
[583] price may be paid in al-Qasr: the original mahr is paid at
[768] the time of the marriage; the mu'akhkhir al-sadaaq is paid
[595]

586 at the time of divorce (if the husband is in fault), and also
[583] at the time of the husband's death; and, sadaaq al-musaama
[768] ("price of friendship") is paid to the wife when her husband
[595] takes a second, third or fourth wife.

586 The second divorce case which happened while I was
158 in al-Qasr involved, what seems to be, an instance of psychotic behavior. A girl, who had married shortly before I arrived in the field, would fall into a deep sleep every time she entered her husband's house. Each time her father would come for her and take her home until she had recovered. But upon her return, three different times, she became ill again. Finally, her father and the husband agreed that this marriage would not work, and the father returned the mahr to the man. This case lasted over the period of almost a year while I lived in al-Qasr. I suggested to the father that perhaps his daughter did not wish to be married to this man but he assured me that "she loved him very much."

586 If the girl's father is dead, so that she cannot return to his house at the time of divorce, she will go to live with the brother who needs her services. It then be-
586
587 comes the duty of the brother to make another marriage for
[593] his sister, and in the case that he does it becomes his right
[583] to claim the mahr for himself. The Bedouins say that virginity, or the lack of it, in the case of the divorced woman is no issue; just so a man knows "she is from a good family."

•586 851 *613 Naturally, according to the rule of patriliny, all children from a marriage belong to the husband and become members of his lineage. Should divorce occur while a woman is nursing, she will take the child with her and it will be returned after weaning. Sometimes the husband will permit the wife to keep one child--always a girl--in order "to keep her company."

587 The practice of the sororate has been noted. The Bedouins also believe that "a man should marry his brother's widow so that she will have someone to help her with the children." But I have no data on the frequencies of these practices. 12 58 When I gathered my data on marriage, my informants would give me only the name of the tribe or lineage into which a man married, and never did I get the name of a man's wife. [829] (One lineage in al-Qasr, entirely refused to give me data on genealogy or marriage because, as one leader said, "it is not decent to speak of these things with people.") 595 Sororal polygny is forbidden (Quran IV:23), and the Bedouins say that a man cannot marry more than one bint 'amm. 182 [587] Marriage practices, such as sororate and levirate, I interpret as patterns which maintain structural continuity and political advantage. [582] The custom of permitting a man to marry only one of his father's brother's daughters may be seen as a precaution against intensifying authority relations and the degree of segmentation.

671 Implicit in the 'awaiyid is the assumption that the
562 woman is less responsible for her deeds and something of a
weakling. The Bedouins have a proverb which says that "the
devil whispers in the ear of the woman." If a woman slays a
[682] man, intentionally or accidentally, the diiya is considered
671 as for unintentional killing. Where sex offenses are con-
562 cerned, it makes a difference if the act takes place in the
684 man's (i.e. the husband's) tent or in the desert, and, of
course, it makes a difference whether or not it is a case
of rape or adultery. If a man finds another man and his
wife in his dwelling in the act of adultery, he may kill
the man and pay the diiya for unintentional killing. From
this diiya, he deducts the amount of the bride-price and
50 L.E. for trespassing. The fine for rape ranges from
10 L.E. to 100 L.E. On the other hand, if intercourse takes
place with the woman's consent, the fine is only 5 L.E. or
10 L.E. If a virgin is deflowered, the fine will be 100 L.E.,
and the man will have to marry her, paying the bride-price
asked for by the girl's father and going through the normal
procedure for marriage. Where offenses involve unmarried
women, all fines are paid to the father. In cases concerning
married women, fines go to the husband. According to the
[586] Bedouins, it would be a great dishonor to the man's family
[558] if the husband were not to divorce his wife after it becomes
known that she has been promiscuous. They said that if a man

114 The second, rather complex, case occurred while I was
792
562 in the field. Once again, the role of the "holy man" is shown
to operate in cases dealing with women. Shown here also is an
interesting example of the cultural definition of abnormality.

*613 No Date. Case: Quarrel between 'Ailit al-Abaidi ('Ali Abyad)
578 and 'Ailit al-Afrad ('Ali Abyad) over marriage rights. A man
582 from al-Abaidi agreed that his daughter could marry a man but
792 the rest of the *'aiela* did not approve of this marriage. Since
the man could not go to his *'aqila*, who disapproved of the
marriage, he took his problem to a "holy man." The "holy man"
decided that the girl should marry the man she wanted to
marry, but he was afraid that this would cause trouble in the
'aiela. The "holy man" decided to marry the man and woman,
•[586] and then to divorce them for a period of one year so that the
conflict would abate. The girl's father knew of this marriage
but the other members of the *'aiela* did not. After a period
of one year, the groom went to the "holy man" and said: "Decide
anything that I can do, but I must have the girl." The "holy
[681] man" decided to make him pay a *kubaara* (expiation) fee of
[684] 100 L.E. to the girl's *'aiela*, and he married them again.

*613 Date: 1965. Case: Quarrel within a tertiary segment of the
619 Qinaishat tribe concerning marriage rights. A girl from the
578 Qinaishat tribe had refused to marry her paternal cousin, but
582 he was insistent upon his right to have her.

582 time of the study. I have no information about the marital history of [114] the men included in the genealogies. This is particularly important if [586] we realize that the frequency of divorce in the area is quite high and that there is a certain prohibition against ever marrying within a certain degree of relationship of his first wife.

582 779 According to the Koraan, a man is forbidden to marry certain classes of women. Some of these women are permanently prohibited and others are only temporarily so. Marriage is forbidden with what are called the "maharem" (sing. mahram or non-marriageables). They are one's female ascendants and descendants; the former wives of one's ascendants or desendants; one's sister and the female descendants of one's sister and brother; one's paternal and maternal aunts and the sisters and aunts of the ascendants; one's mother-in-law and all female ascendants of one's wife. Marriage with the first cousin and the half-brother's half-sister (from another marriage) is therefore permitted. The second category of [853] forbidden women are those related to the man by nursing. The wet nurse takes the place of the mother, and her relatives are treated as if she was the actual mother of the person in question.

In addition to the above, there is the prohibition of the simultaneous marriage of two women who are related to each other to the extent that had one of them been male and the other female, they would have come to the forbidden degree in marriage. This latter prohibition is not a permanent one and is restricted to the marriage of the two women at the same time. As soon as the marriage with one of them is dissolved, there is no prohibition on marrying the other one. Yet, although aware of the lecense given by the Islamic law to such marriage,

585 legal guardian and considered a bride price to compensate the father or
583 the legal guardian of the bride. In earlier times the bride received
779 none of the mahr, although she usually got a sadaq or bridal gift for
431 [178] herself. In Islamic Arabia, the mahr and the sadaq became indistinguishable
[171] and were given to the woman and took the form of a legal gift
[178] for affecting the marriage. The Koraan no longer contains the concept
of the purchase of the wife, and the mahr becomes a compensation which
the woman has to claim in all cases. The Koraan demands a bridal gift
for a legal marriage: "And give them whom ye have enjoyed their reward
as a wedding gift" (Sura, iv. 24), and again, "And give the women their
[586] dowries voluntarily" (Sura, iv. 3). According to the Koraan, the mahr
remains the property of the wife and remains her own even if the marriage
is dissolved by divorce. But although it took the form of a gift, the
mahr remained in Islamic law a prerequisite for the legalization of the
marriage. It is only upon the giving of the mahr that the marriage is
considered valid. No marriage is legal, according to the Islamic law,
unless that transfer of the mahr is affected. Mutual consent of the
two parties to forfeit the mahr does not change that rule, and the marriage
58 is considered void. According to Muslim jurisprudence, marriage
675 is a contract ('acd) made betweeen the bridegroom and the bride or her
184 wali or guardian. An essential element in that contract is the mahr.
The jurists themselves are not sure about the nature of the mahr. Some
regard it as practically a purchase money or as an equivalent ('iwad)
for the possession of the woman and the rights over her, so it is like
a price paid in a contract of sale; while other jurists see in the mahr
a legal symbol, a mark of honor and a proper legal security of property
for the woman.

583 Among Awlad Ali the payment of the bridewealth signifies the completion
[584] of the marriage contract. The mahr is not paid to the woman but
583 to her father or closest male kin. Usually the mahr is paid in money.
178 This, however, seems to be a recent phenomenon. Until the turn of the
century, according to informants, the mahr was paid only in sheep and
583 goats. The practice is still followed by a number of tribal segments
178 of Ali Ahmar who occupy the western most part of the area where pasture
184 is more abundant and reliable and where the permanent pasture of the
green mountains of Cyrenaica is close by. Other tribal segments still
insist that at least one-fourth of the mahr should be paid in livestock,
583 but the majority of the people accept money. The main purpose of the
[584] mahr among Awlad Ali is to legalize the marriage contract and to put
[182] emphasis on the reciprocal oblications that the marriage created between
the two families of the bride and the groom. It also works as an insurance
for good behavior on the part of both the husband and the wife.
583 If the husband mistreats his wife or fails to give her the rights legally
593 hers by marriage, he risks the chance of losing the mahr and being forced
586 to divorce her. On the other hand, if the wife fails to behave in the
customary way expected from a wife, the husband could divorce her and
have the right to get back his mahr. This is particularly inconvenient
in cases where all or part of the mahr is paid in livestock, in which
case it becomes part of the father's herd and hard to take away in case
of divorce. It is therefore in the interest of her family to keep the
marriage. In this way their interference in the marriage is checked.
[591] This is especially important among Awlad Ali where, although the marriage
[592] is usually patrilocal, the woman retains membership in her father's
household even after marriage.

593 As a girl in her father's household, the woman is under the direct
authority of her father, who is responsible for her. When the father
dies, this responsibility, as well as the authority, goes to her brother
or her closest male kin in the order specified earlier. At marriage the
[591] girl usually moves to live with her husband, and this subjects her to
[606] his control and sometimes to that of his parents, if the couple lives
with them. But the authority of the husband over his wife remains
593 secondary to that of her father. The woman's membership in her father's
574 household does not cease with marriage, and the strength of her relations
to her kin is maintained by their frequent visits to her new residence
and by her occasional visits to them. This right of visitation
593 574 cannot be denied by the husband who not only has to allow such visits,
606 but is also required to treat members of his wife's family, especially
her father, with great respect and hospitality. If the husband fails
[586] to do so, the wife's father can order her to leave her husband and go
back to his household with him.

This point is illustrated by the case of Muftah from the Esheibat tribe in the area of Matruh, whose older daughter is married to Hemeida from the Geneishat segment, which lives in the area of Fokah some 80 miles to the east of Matruh. One winter day in 1965, while passing near the area where his daughter lived, Muftah decided to pay her a visit. When he arrived, her husband was not at home; he was in the market in a nearby town selling sheep. When he came back late that evening, he greeted Muftah with the customary slaughter of a goat and invited the neighbors to the occasion. After dinner Muftah wanted to rest. It was a very hot night, so his son-in-law brought a rug and spread it outside the tent in the cool air. After that he retired to his tent where he spent the night inside.

593 spent the night inside. In the morning Muftah ordered his daughter to
574 pack her clothes because she was to leave with him. He refused to give
606 586 her husband any explanation as to why he was taking his daughter away.
The husband could not prevent him from taking her away because, as he
said, "He is her father and has the right to take her away with him at
any time."

When the wife did not return for two weeks, her husband went to her
father's house to take her, but her father refused to let her go. Hemeida
593 then went to a religious man in the area and asked him to intervene in
574 606 the matter and see why Muftah had taken away his wife. He also asked him
586 to arrange a mi'ad with Muftah to discuss the matter.

627 792 The religious man was selected in this case because he was a close
friend of Muftah and was believed to have influence over him. He was
also known throughout the area to be fair and of sound opinion. It is
important in the cases of disputes that the person selected as a mardi
is known as a wise and fair man. It is only then that he is able to
mediate between the two parties without being accused of taking sides.
792 The religious men, members of the Murabiteen tribes in the area, by their
619 relative position outside the formal tribal organization of the Sa'adi
627 tribes, are the most likely candidates for such activity. Yet, this is
654 not always the case. For this aspect of assumed impartiality is frequently balanced off by the fact that these religious men lack the support of a powerful tribal segment behind them. To be effective, the mardi
has to be respected, not only for his personal qualities, but also for
being a member of a respectable tribal segment whose power lends authority to the mardi's decision. This is not usually the case with the client
000 tribes of Murabiteen. Wealth in many cases is also considered an important

Wealth in many cases is also considered an important
792 requirement for the selection of the mardi. This does not mean that
627 religious men in the area have no role in dispute settlement, for they
554 [556] do. It simply means that the mardi is selected according to a number
of criteria that vary from case to case, and that in some of these
cases sound wisdom and fairness characteristic of religious men are
not enough basis for their selection as mardis. This means that the
religious men have no special mediatory role based on their religious
nature alone. In certain cases religious men offer the best possibility for mediation; in others, a non-religious person might offer a
better chance for settling the dispute. In cases of women seeking
● [586] divorce from their husbands, the wealth of the mediator, more than any-
[556] thing else, seems to determine the selection of the man whom the woman
asks to negotiate on her behalf, a point to which I will return later
in the chapter.

593 The Mi'ad was held in the house of Muftah. Present at the mi'ad
574 were Muftah, his son-in-law, Hemeida, the heads of households in Muftah's
606 camp (one of them was his brother and the other five were members of
586 different tribal segments), my driver (who was a member of the neighbor-
627 ing Sanagrah tribal segment), myself, and the religious man. After the
792 tea was served, the religious man said that the discussion should start. He reminded the gathering that this case is a family one and should not develop into a larger dispute. "After all, the daughter's husband is a son, and the case is actually a misunderstanding between a father and a son and should be viewed in that context." Then he turned to Muftah and said that in that spirit he was asking him why he had taken his daughter away from her husgand. Muftah said that he had taken his daughter away

Muftah said that he had taken his daughter away
593 to punish Hemeida for what he thought was disrespectful behavior. He
574 606 then proceeded to descirbe how Hemeida, after bringing the blanket out
● 586 for Muftah, went inside and spent the night with his wife, defying the
627 basic rule of not showing intimacy in the presence of older people,
792 888 especially the parents or parents-in-law. For, to show such intimacy
is a sign of disrespect. He demanded that Hemeida pay him "kabara"
[681] [558] for his injured pride. The term kabara refers to the adjective "kebir"
(lit. respected or big man). Kabara is the fine paid for belittling
someone by word or deed. Muftah insisted that he would not allow his
daughter to return to her husband until Hemeida had paid that kabara.
Hemeida conceded the fact that intimacy constitutes an insult; but he
insisted that his action did not constitute an act of intimacy with his
wife, but was a matter of convenience and necessity, since he had only
593 two blankets, and the only one left was that inside the tent. Muftah
574 became angry and started shouting at Hemeida, who, in turn, started
606 586 shouting back; it became impossible to follow what was being said.
627 The religious man interfered in the discussion, trying to stop the argument
792 between Muftah and Hemeida. The others attending the mi'ad also
[578] interfered. The religious man and two neighbors took Muftah outside
the tent while Muftah's brother tried to calm Hemeida down. The other
members of the group also calmed Hemeida, reminding him that he was the
younger person and must be more tolerant of older people. They also reminded Hemeida that Muftah was his father-in-law and had the right to take
his daughter away any time he chose. They urged him to "defeat the devil"
[681] and to apologize to his father-in-law and pay him kabara. He seemed
convinced but insisted that all he was going to pay was five pounds and
a goat. Muftahb brother and one of the neighbors then left the tent and

593 went to see Muftah and his company. Half an hour later the religious
574 man came and took Hemeida aside and talked to him in a very low voice,
606 then left the tent again. A few minutes more had passed; everyone re-
586 turned to the tent; Muftah was not angry anymore. The religious man
627
792 read the fatha, or the beginning sura of the Koraan, then said that the
[799] souls were now pure and that Hemeida was considered as a son of Muftah
and that disagreements such as this should not alter the good relations
between the two. He said that the devil had found his way into the souls
of the two people, but now, thanks to God and the good people present,
they both had come back to their senses. Hemeida then rose and went to
where his father-in-law was sitting and shook hands with him. Then he
[681] handed the religious man ten pounds which the latter passed to Muftah
and promised to send him a goat as a gift to his daughter. Muftah left
the tent and went to the tent of the women. When he came back he announced
that a goat had been slaughtered and that everyone was invited to eat.
Everybody then left and Muftah promised to return his daughter to her
husband the following day.

593 While the right of the father to take his daughter away from her
606 husband constitutes a check on the authority of the latter and insures
557 the wife good treatment by her husband and her in-laws, not infrequently
586 that right has been invoked for personal or individual interest on the
part of the woman's father or her closest male kin. Several cases have
[429] been cited in the area where the father or guardian had invoked the right
to force the husband to concede to certain demands of the wife's guardian,
even when the wife objected to those demands or disagreed with her guardian.
One of these is the case of Mabroka who is married to a distant

593 member of the same tribe. At the time that the dispute had occurred she
606 had been married for fifteen years and had four children ranging in age
557
586 from thirteen to two years. The husband possessed a piece of land on the coast where a few olive and fig trees were growing. The husband, Mukheimer, made no use of either the land or the trees. Then, in 1966, the father became employed by the government organization in the area where his daughter and her husband lived and where the land was. He asked his son-in-law to give him the right to use the land for one pound a year. Mukheimer, who at that time worked part-time for the same government organization as a driver, refused. The reason was that his job with the government made it possible for him to apply for a power pump to be installed over the Roman well that existed on the land, and he intended to utilize the land himself. All attempts to convince Hukheimer to let him use the land failed. Then one day Mukheimer came back to his tent to find that his father-in-law had taken his wife and the youngest child and left the other three children with the second wife. The father-in-law told the second wife to inform Mukheimer that if he wanted his wife and child back, he had to think about the land he wanted to take possession of. Mukheimer tried to discuss the matter with his father-in-law, buth the latter refused to see him. After a month there were rumors that the daughter was not happy that her father had taken her away from her husband and children and that she wanted to go back to her family. She asked a number of people to help her, including myself, since her father was one of my informants at that time; but he insisted that the only way Mukheimer could have his wife and child back was by giving him the rights to the land. Mukheimer, on the other hand, threatened to divorce his wife and marry another woman if his father-in-law did not return his wife.

593 606 The case persisted for more than two months with no sign that either
557 party was willing to give into the demands of the other. I left the
586 area before any solution to the case was achieved.
[114]

Another relevant case is one which involved a dispute between
584 578 Hassan Hassanein from the Sanagrah tribe and the father-in-law of his
606 daughter who was also from the same tribe and who lived in the same
area. The case started when Hassanein was visited by a friend from the
[594] Esheibat tribe in Matruh, an old man of 60 or 70 years. During the night
that this guest spent at Hassanein's house, they got to talking about
marriage and the fact that although his guest was a wealthy and respected
[595] man, he had only one wife. After a lengthy talk, it seemed
that the old man was convinced that he should have a second wife and
asked Hassanein if he knew of a suitable girl to marry. Hassanein suggested
584 his daughter's sister-in-law. Hassanein took the prospective
583 groom to the tent of his daughter's father-in-law and discussed the
578 606 matter with the father of the prospective bride who agreed to marry his
daughter to Hassanein's guest if he paid the sume of 200 pounds, in addition
to slaughtering a number of goats and presenting him with the
[999] appropriate presents. When the man agreed to the terms, the fatha was
read to signify the agreement between the two parties. Hassanein left
the man to spend the night in the camp of his future in-laws. In the
morning the groom told the bride's father that he must go to nearby
Alexandria to bring the money for the bride price. When he came back
late that afternoon, he paid the money and set a date for the wedding
the next Thursday and then left for Matruh to prepare for the arrival
of the new wife.

584 Two days after the groom left, the bride's father (who is at the
578 same time Hassanein's daughter's father-in-law) came to Hassanein and
606 686 told him that the marriage was called off and that he should send a
letter to the groom telling him the news. The reasons given by the
[574] bride's father were that the groom showed improper manners when he
[579] stayed overnight at the camp and that he followed the prospective bride
to the water well to have a close look at her. He gave the money to
Hassanein and asked him to return it to the man in Matruh. Hassanein
was very disappointed and considered this an insult to him, since he
was the mediator in that marriage, and insisted that the bride's father
584 go on with the marriage. When the latter refused, Hassanein went to his
578 daughter and ordered her to leave with him. Her husband was there and
606 could not refuse to let her go with her father, even when Hassanein
686 made it clear that her husband could not have her back unless his father
627 586 kept his agreement with Hassanein's guest. Elewah, the daughter's husband, asked for a mi'ad to discuss the matter with his father-in-law. The mi'ad was held in Hassanein's house and was attended by Hassanein, his son-in-law, and two people from a different lineage, each selected by one of the disputing parties. Hassanein refused to give any reason for taking his daughter away from her husband except that he was exercising his rights. Eleway, on the other hand, insisted that Hassanein was not justified in his actions and that it was not right to punish him for something that his father did. The two representatives tried to calm both parties and to reach an agreement but were not successful. The mi'ad dissolved with Hassanein not only insisting on keeping his daughter, but also threatening to marry her to a rich man in the area. The case was not solved by the time I left the field.

593 •586 Taking his daughter away from the marital residence is treated as an undisputed right of the father. This is true whether he is justified in his actions or not and whether the girl approves of her father's decision or not. The general view is that the father, having raised his daughter, is entitled to her obedience and that taking her away from her husband, even against her will, is the symbol of authority over her. It also signifies that the girl has someone to look after her, to protect her and prevent the husband or any member of his family from mistreating her. Awlad Ali differentiate, however, between cases in which the father has exercised his right in an arbitrary and unreasonable manner and those in which he has reasonable grounds for his actions. A father is considered justified in taking his daughter away if her husband or members of his family fail to fulfill their obligations towards the wife or members of her family. Mistreatment of the woman (the definition of which will be discussed later), and disrespect to members of her family, or preventing her from visiting her family or them visiting her in the customary specified manner are always justifiable grounds. As a [681] justifiable action, the father is not obliged to return his daughter until he gets full apologies and any gifts for the woman or himself that he considers as kabara. If the husband refuses to concede to the demands of the father, the latter can force him to divorce her without having to return the bridewealth to the husband. Although the father's right still exists when no justifiable grounds are present, in this case he is required to return his daughter to her husband after a short period. If he refuses, [681] the husband is entitled to ask for a kabara. He also can divorce his [583] wife and is entitled to get back his mahr and possible all the marriage expenses. It is this possibility of having to pay back the mahr and

593 586 and expenses to the husband that constitutes the most important check
(583) on the otherwise undisputed right of the father to take away his
daughter.

593 The woman, on the other hand, cannot refuse to go with her father,
562 for this means that she would be disobeying him. A woman who disobeys
586 her father is not worthy of his name. He can cut her off from the
family, which means that she is left without any support or protection. A woman who is cut off from her family is left vulnerable to her husband and to society. She will have nobody to defend her or to be responsible for her actions. The responsibility for the woman's behavior is not transferred by marriage to the husband or his family.

682 If the woman kills or assaults someone or causes damage to property
683 for which compensation is required, her male kin pays the blood money or
602 613 the compensation on her behalf. It is sometimes stated that if the woman
562 has grown-up sons, they, and not her family, pay for her. Since the
593 children belong to their father's family, it may seem like transfering
the responsibility for the woman's actions to her husband's family. However, in all three cases where this happened, the woman was quite old, her father was dead, and her brothers were either dead or had moved outside the area and had cut off all relations with the area. She also had no nephews in the area. In such cases, the sons were the woman's closest male kin.

682 On the other hand, if the woman is the victim of murder or assault
683 593 for which blood money or compensation is to be paid, the husband is the
562 one to benefit from the situation. To understand why this happens, we
have to consider the contractual nature of marriage among Awlad Ali. It
584 583 has been mentioned earlier that before marriage is final, the prospective

684 of drastic actions taken in cases of adultery. Of the fourteen cases
613 562 of adultery that I examined furing my field work, none resulted in the
593 killing of the adulteress, and only three resulted in the murder of her
[114] partner. In all three cases where the adulterer was killed, the avenger
684 682 was the husband; and in all three cases, the husband had to pay the
613 bloodmoney to the murdered man's kin group. His payment of the blood-
money, among other things, may indicate that the right of the husband
to kill the adulterer is not completely accepted among Awlad Ali. All
[628] agree, however, that such killings never result in blood feuds because
of the shameful circumstances in which the victim dies.

684 It was very difficult to obtain any detailed or reliable information
126 about adultery cases. All the above mentioned fourteen cases were gath-
[124] ered from the informants, twelve of which were cases which had already
been solved. For the two cases which were still open at the time of
the study, information was quite vague. Usually such cases are conducted
with a great amount of secrecy, with the involved parties referring to
them as cases of theft, or merely by saying that the cases involve
women. Only when the adultery leads to the killing of the adulteress
or the adulterer are more details publicly known about the case.

684 But while the right to retaliate for the shameful action of an
adulterous wife is vague and diffused, the right of the husband for com-
pensation from the adulterer remains clear and undisputed. In this re-
sepct, adultery is treated very much like theft; the adulterer has stolen
the husband's exclusive right to his wife's sexual activities. The com-
[583] pensation for this offense is estimated at L.E. 20, in addition to the
[586] mahr, if the husband decides to divorce his wife as a result of her
adultery.

581 Marriage does not deprive the woman of some rights of her own.
585 The customary law gives the wife three basic rights corresponding to
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671 those of the husband's sexual services, domestic work, and obedience.
Corresponding to the first of these, the wife has the right to have a
normal sexual life with her husband. This right, however, is not an exclusive
one, since the husband can marry more than one wife. A woman
585 can be divorced from her husband without having to return the mahr if
586 she claims that the husband is unable to perform his sexual duties. In
593 such cases, the marriage is usually dissolved quietly. In certain rare
instances, the husband may deny his wife's accusations. If both insist
585
586 on their stand, one or both may ask to be submitted to "bait el-shana'a,"
593 or house of the dreadful deeds. Reports are extremely vague about the
627 exact procedures involved in this case. Some informants stated that the
married couple would live in a tent without sidewalls so that everybody
could see what goes on inside. Most informants, however, insist that it
merely means that the couple move their tent near that of a respectable
man whose word is believed and honored. This man is supposed to keep a
close watch on the couple's activities, by listening or looking through
holes in the tent. His verdict determines the future of the marriage.
[583] If the wife is justified in her claim, the husband is forced to divorce
[681] her and to forfeit his mahr. If, on the other hand, the verdict is for
[558] the husband, he not only can divorce her and get back the mahr, but is
also entitled to kabara, or compensation, for his injured pride. There
[114] is no case of bait el-shana'a in the area during the time of the field
[178] work, and most people insist that this practice is something of the past
[583] when the mahr was relatively high and was paid in livestock, in which

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593 case its return to the husband would have caused great financial in-
527 [114] convenience for the wife's family.

[178] (583) Corresponding to the second right, the husband's right to his
581 wife's domestic work, is the wife's right to maintenance. The husband
585 has to support his wife. This includes providing her and her children
562 with adequate food and proper clothing. If the husband fails to do so
593 because of poverty, sickness, crop failure or unexpected disaster, the
wife's brother or father provides her and her children with the neces-
[586] sary food and clothing. If the husband's failure to fulfill his duties
is due to neglect, the wife can leave him and go to her father or brother
who talks the matter over with the husband who, in turn, either agrees
to their demands or has to divorce his wife and forfeit his mahr.

593 Finally, corresponding to the husband's right to his wife's obedi-
562 ence is the wife's right to fair treatment by her husband. There are a
[779] number of ways in which the wife is mistreated. One is excessive punish-
ment; although the right of the husband to punish his wife is provided in
the Koraan, the punishment must be excessive or severe. Awlad Ali draw
a line between acceptable and severe punishment. A punishment is severe
if it results in something that other people can see or hear. If the
husband insults his wife or her family and others hear the action, or if
he beats her and this results in visible traces, then the punishment is
severe.

593 A wife considers herself mistreated if the husband, when married
595 to more than one, treats any of the other wives better than he treats
562 her. Although the wife cannot deny her husband the right to have ad-
ditional wives, he must give them all equal treatment. This includes

593 providing them with the same kind of food and clothing.* It also includes
595 562 dividing his time equally between them, spending one night in
each wife's tent. The first wife, being the chief one, has certain
privileges: her tent is the guest house, food is brought to her residence,
and she is the one to divide it among the other wives, and her
house is the place for the husband to stay if he becomes sick and unable
to move every night from one tent to another. Other than the exceptions
given to the first wife, the husband has to treat all his wives equally.

593 Normally, such cases of mistreatment do not result in divorce unless
● [586] they are persistent. In most cases, if the wife is mistreated, she
goes to her father's or brother's house or sends for them to come and
593 take her. For the husband to bring her back to his tent, he must pay
431 her "nasafa." This is a gift given by the husband to his wife as an
acknowledgement of guilt and as a form of apology for not giving her
fair treatment. In some cases the nasafa is equal to what the husband
originally paid as mahr.

581 These are some of the rights that marriage gives both men and women
585 in the tribal society of Awlad Ali. These rights, however, are useless
626 unless they are backed by certain means of enforcing them. The husband's
586 rights are guaranteed by his ability to dissolve the marriage at will.
626 593 According to Islamic law, a man can divorce his wife by simply pronouncing
the sentence "I divorce you" in the presence of credible witnesses.
[779] No justification for divorce is demanded from the husband according to
[562] the Koraan. No such privilege is given to the wife. She can obtain a

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* With provision for wives with more children.

586 divorce only under specific circumstances in the absence of which the
626
593 husband can force her to live with him. Following the Koraanic rules,
[562] Awlad Ali give men the right to dissolve the marriage at will and with-
[779] out any necessary justification; however, they differentiate between
cases where divorce is justified and those in which it is not. In a
case of justifiable divorce, the husband can take back the mahr and pos-
sibly all other marriage expenses. In the case of unjustifiable divorce,
the husband forfeits his right to regain the mahr. Divorce is justified
whenever one or more of the husband's rights are violated by the wife or
members of her family. Not all degrees of violation are considered as
justification for divorce, however. Only intolerable violations can be
considered as such. In deciding whether or not an act constitutes an
[183] intolerable violation, Awlad Ali judge it against the standard of the
reasonable man, the customary man, and what he would have tolerated in
a similar situation.

586 What constitutes reasonable behavior does not only vary according
183 to the situation and the manner in which the actions are taken, but also
554 with the relative position in the social structure of the parties in-
volved and their initial relations to one another. In the case of di-
vorce, what constitutes grounds for justifiable divorce in one case may
not be sufficient grounds for justifiable divorce in another. In one of
586
183 the cases I witnessed during the year of study, a man who divorced his
554 wife because of her insistence that he buy her meat from the market
511 every day of the week, was forced to forfeit his right to redeem the
[114] mahr on the basis that the wife's actions had not established a basis
for justifiable divorce. In the negotiations that followed, the position
of the husband, as well as that of the family of the wife, were discussed.

586 The husband had a big herd by the standards of the tribe (600 sheep
183 and goats). In addition, he also cultivated a large stretch of the fig
554 land in the coastal area and was making good money. In other words, the
511 husband could afford the standard of living the wife demanded. The other question that was discussed was the actions of the wife herself. She was the daughter of one of the wealthiest members of the same tribe as her husband; and according to the people who knew her, she was used to meat every day of the week. In other cases, similar demands by the wife to have a certain kind of food or to be clothed in certain kinds of material were considered as an intolerable situation, and the husband was justified in his divorcing her and had the right to retrieve his mahr. This was obvious in the case of one of my informants whose wife insisted that every time he went to Alexandria, he bring her silk material for a dress. Since the husband could not afford to meet her demands, her insistence was considered as grounds for the husband. The assessment of reasonable-
586
183 ness on the part of the husband in his divorce action and therefore his
554 right to the mahr paid is frequently influenced by the relative position of the husband and the wife's guardian in the social structure. An influential man who marries his daughter to a poor relative or nephew rarely has to return the mahr.

586 Although women among Awlad Ali are not given the same legal right
562 of divorcing the husband by pronouncing the "dismissal formula," they are given the right of certain customary procedures which in practice give them equal facilities for dissolving the marriage. This is known as the
574 right of the woman to "throw herself." This means that the woman takes all her clothes and sometimes her children and goes to the dwelling of

586 the man she chooses. She informs him before she enters his house that
562 she is the wife of so and so and the daughter of so and so and that she
574 is throwing herself on him to protect her from her husband with whom
she no longer wishes to live. Like the right of refuge, the man cannot
[778] refuse to let her in; and from this moment until her dispute with her
husband is resolved, she is considered as his house guest and is entitled
to all the hospitality a guest receives. If he refuses to extend
[627] that hospitality or refuses to take her in, she can ask for a mi'ad
[681] and is entitled to kabara from him. There has been no reported incidents
in which a man refused that right to a woman. As soon as she settles
down in the host's house, the latter takes immediate measures to find
the husband and to convince him to let his wife go. In doing this, the
man uses all the power of persuasion. The man selected for this purpose
586 is usually a respected man who can put pressure upon the husband. Sometimes
562 574 he has to bribe the husband to release the wife, paying from his
554 own money. The man has to have money, not only to be able to support
[556] the wife during her stay in his house and to bribe the husband, but also
because in certain instances he has to pay the husband the mahr that the
father of the wife had taken in order to free her. The next step after
getting the agreement of the husband to divorce his wife is to contact
the father of the wife or her guardian and convince him to pay the mahr
to the husband. If the father does not agree, or if he is financially
unable to do so, the man on whom the woman has thrown herself is supposed
to pay from his own money. In cases where the woman left the husband to
be married to another man with whom she had had a relationship, the respected
man tries to have the future husband pay the present husband the
mahr he is supposed to pay the woman after she is divorced from her

586 husband. In a number of cases the husband was willing to divorce the
562 574 woman after a promise by the man that she would pay him the mahr when
554 she got married. In most cases, however, the process costs the man a considerable amount of money. Sometimes, when the woman is young and attractive, the man finds it to his advantage to keep her as his wife, since she will cost him no more expenses. On the other hand, the man cannot refuse a woman the right of refuge, since to do this or to deny her the right of hospitality will make him liable to pay kabara if she made the refusal known publicly. On the other hand, it is prestigious to be known in the area as a man to whom women go to be released from their husbands. In fact, a man who acquires a reputation of getting wives released is likely to be sought as mardi in other cases as well.

Due to the nature of his role in mediating, the woman must be careful in selecting the man over whom she throws herself. These considerations are manifested in the following case taken from my field notes.
[584] Hadia was forced by her father to marry a man from the same tribe who
[583] paid her father L.E. 100 as mahr. She did not want to marry him because she was in love with someone else of whom her father did not approve. One month after she was married, she left the tent and never came back.
586 Later, she appeared in the house of Omda Ali, the chief of another tribe,
562 and everyone knew that she had thrown herself on him. She later told me
574 554 why she had selected Omda Ali and not the Omda of her own tribe. "Be-
634 cause my husband works for the Omda of my own tribe, and I thought he would be biased. Of course, I couldn't have gone to my father; he was the one who forced me to marry that man. Omda Ali is very respected and can support me... He is also rich and is known for releasing wives from their husbands." Omda Ali called the husband in and asked him to divorce

586 his wife. The husband agreed but insisted that she pay him L.E. 300
562 574 (this included the mahr and the marriage expenses). The Omda tried to
554 reduce the amount but could not. He then tried to get the father to
634 pay, but the father refused. He had to pay the husband L.E. 200 of
his own money and promised that the rest would be paid when the woman
remarried (it would be paid from the mahr). The husband divorced Haida.
One week later she was married to her lover. I have no information
about whether or not the 100 pounds was paid.

586 In another example, Sabha was forced by her father to marry her
562 cousin (ibn 'amm). She could not live with him, so she threw herself
574 554 on one of the holy men in the area. The holy man convinced the hus-
792 band to divorce Sabha and then went to her father and convinced him to
pay back the mahr to the husband, and the case was settled. People say
[626] that both the husband and the father agreed to the demands of the holy
man because they were afraid of his supernatural curse. Sabha went
back to her father's house.

586 It is obvious from these and similar cases that the success or
562 failure of the procedure depends on the careful selection of the man
593 [554] on whom a woman throws herself. It is also apparent from the above
(574) examples that his right of refuge is resorted to only in cases where the
woman cannot go to her father or to her closest kin to help her get a
divorce because he is either unable or unwilling to help her. A father
is unable to help if the husband is powerful or if he is the woman's
ibn 'amm (father's brother's son) who has, according to the tribal law,
the undisputed right to marry his bint 'amm (father's brother's daughter).
The father is usually unwilling to help his daughter if he is the one

586 562 who forced her to marry the husband, or if she was cut off from the
593 family for some reason or another.

586 From the frequency of women using this right in the area, it
562 seems that no social disapproval is associated with it, nor is there
574 a social stigma attached to women who throw themselves. They seem to
626 find it as easy to find a husband as those women divorced voluntarily
by their husbands or with the help of their fathers. In fact, as was
586 562 mentioned earlier, many of them marry the rich men over whom they
587 throw themselves. As to the amount of mahr paid for their subsequent
[583] marriages, the fact of throwing themselves does not seem to be a factor
[574] in determining the amount of mahr paid. In one of the cases, the woman
threw herself on an 'aqila of one of the Geneishat tribe after her
father refused to help her get a divorce from her husband who had married a second wife without first asking the first wife's permission.
[429] When the Geneishat member succeeded in convincing the husband to divorce his wife, the latter had no place to stay so remained in the
house of her protector who acted as her guardian in place of her father
[583] who had refused to take her back in his home. While staying in the
house of her protector, she got many marriage offers; one of the suitors
offered a mahr of L.E. 4,000 ($10,000), one of the highest mahrs reported in the area. She agreed, and the marriage was affected. This
mahr is about ten times the mahr she got for her first marriage. This
586 562 procedure offers the woman a considerable guarantee of her marital
rights. It also gives her, as far as the ability to dissolve the marriage, a status close to that of her husband. This relative equality
is reflected is reflected in the lack of stigma associated with divorced

586 women in the Western Desert, and that the women usually have no diffi-
562 culty in finding another husband.

586 While the right of "throwing herself" offers the wife some guar-
562 antee of her rights, her main guarantee is derived from the security
593 she gets from retaining membership in her father's family. After the
768 death of the father, the woman's claims extend to the households of her brothers. She acquires in them the same rights she had in her father's household, and the brothers take the responsibility of their father in
[428] protecting and defending their sister. The woman achieves this continuation of support partially through forfeiting her rights of inheritance to her brothers.

562 Awlad Ali recognize the right of the daughters to inherit in their
428 father's estate. They accept the system of inheritance specified in
[799] the Koraan which gives the woman half the share of her brother. In practice, this is usually side-stepped. Only sons inherit their father's
[233] property. The justification given for the non-inheritance of women is
[311] that the main items of inheritance in the Western Desert, livestock and the right of land use, require certain protection and care which are be-
233 yond the culturally defined roles of women. Livestock require moving
562 from one grazing ground to another, almost always crossing tribal lands
428 belonging to various tribal segments, some of whom might be hostile. It also requires the ability to protect the herds from predators and from raids, especially in earlier times. Similarly, land requires preparation and protection against trespassers, especially when the barley is growing.

562 Women, however, are supposed to be compensated by their brothers
428
593 for their shares. But very few would actually ask their brothers for

159 562 the relationship between her and her brothers.

428 Following her action and until the time of the study, they had
593 never visited her and she had never visited them. Her husband took
[237] care of the herd; and the arrangement worked out all right until the
159 562 husband told Fatma one day that he was going to marry a second wife.
593 She refused, but he went ahead with the marriage without her consent.
595 He brought the new wife to live with Fatma in the same tin hut in which
they were living. He started to pay more attention to the new wife and
to neglect Fatma; whenever the latter complained, he beat her. Then,
before one of the religious feasts, he sold two of Fatma's sheep and
bought his new wife a dress and a silver bracelet. When Fatma objected
[164] and they argued, he hit her with a stick on the head; she was hospitalized
for a week with a serious head wound. While in the hospital, she
went to her brothers who lived only two miles away, but they refused to
159 come to her assistance. She then went to sheikh Elewa (the aqila of
562 Bait Asabei) and threw herself on him. He met with the husband and con-
574 vinced him to divorce Fatma. He kept forty sheep of Fatma's herd as com-
593 595 pensation for the mahr he had paid her and the marriage expenses, then
586 took his new wife and moved from Fatma's hut. Fatma then returned and
159 562 managed her financial affairs successfully herself. She managed the
444 store and hired a shepherd to take care of the sheep. At the time of
[233] the present study she was respected by almost everybody in the area, including
members of the local administration. She is known to be reason-
[629] able and of sound opinion, and her store functions as the meeting place
[521] for many of the tribal mi'ads and for casual conversations. She is also
considered as a liason between the tribal population in the area and the
local government administration, and is respected by both sides.

wife he usually chooses a young girl of about twenty years. Chil- 595
dren of the elder wife might be adult, therefore, when the chil- 593
dren of the junior wife are infants. Great emphasis is placed on 561
seniority, particularly among males, but strong emphasis is also
placed on the equality of siblings and their equal legal status.
Between brothers of widely differing ages, there is, then, this
field of potential conflict. From an early date competitive, if not
hostile, relationships develop between the sons of co-wives. Com- 593
petition between half-brothers results not only from their 586
mothers being co-wives: one group might be the sons of a di- 587
vorced wife. The latter situation is often much worse, for the sons
born of the divorced wife are now being fostered by a woman
who is not their mother. A similar condition of things is brought
about when a widower with sons remarries. Yet again, when a
wife grows old and her sons have reached maturity, her husband
may not divorce her formally, but merely 'throw her off his
back'; she will then go to live with her grown sons, while her
husband, in turn, takes a new wife, usually taking up residence
in another camp for a time at least. It would be too much of a
digression here to discuss the inheritance disputes, and the dis-
putes over marriage and bride-wealth, which arise out of these
various circumstances. Suffice it to note that such disputes are [613]
common and affect the alignment of people within a tertiary
segment.

As half-brothers grow to maturity some of them will marry 613
their maternal cross-cousins, and in succeeding generations some 621
of their descendants will do likewise. In this way, a tertiary seg- [582]
ment united by the bond of agnation, will also have within it
smaller groups of kin having different sets of cognatic links. This
group, as a residential unit, shows a very high concentration of
agnates, and the Bedouin say with pride that members of the
camps are always 'one' because of this agnatic bond, and indeed,
the corporate identity of this group is strikingly displayed in
many circumstances. It does not take precedence in all circum- 613
stances, for, built into agnation, with the heavy burden of duties 578
which go with it, are serious stresses and strains which in some 602
circumstances regularly come out into the open. In yet other
circumstances cognatic kinship affiliations appear to be dominant,
causing friction among agnates. A man, for example, may permit

indeed welcome unfaithfulness on his wife's part. If a man is very old, and 554
his wife very young, it is likely that she will entertain lovers; if a man leaves 851
camp for a long absence his wife may not remain chaste. In both cases, if 837
the liaisons lead to the birth of a child, particularly a male, the husband
greets the news with unrestrained enthusiasm — "praise be to God," as their
saying goes. Incapacity[7] to produce offspring, if a husband is convinced of
it, may lead him to delegate a kinsman to serve his wife for procreative purposes:
he has the legal authority, as husband, to do so, and to require his
wife to submit, for the only alternative, if he is not to die without "issue,"
is to "take" a son from his brother and fulfill the obligations towards this
boy required of a pater, namely, attend to his circumcision, provide him with
teaching in the Koran (a duty neglected by most) and give him the wealth
with which to marry.

Granting the acceptance of paternity, whatever the circumstances of conception, 593
a male child, *ipso facto*, accedes to membership of a corporation, and 554
is subject to the authority of that group in a number of matters. In many [851]
situations it would appear that a son is under the father's political control. [613]
At a moot, the son, if he speaks at all, will do so only to corroborate his
father. Discussions among men in a small camp evoke a similar pattern of
behaviour. Until the father becomes senile or dies, a son cannot publicly
pursue an independent course, but he desists by virtue of his relationships
with his father *qua* pater, not because of his father's political power to
coerce. All men of a corporation, in any event, "speak with one word" at [613]
a moot, and a son, by his assent to the common view, also supports his
father; in so doing he yields to the political authority of his corporation, and
not that of his father.

Membership in the corporation invests a man with other privileges and 593
duties. Protection against external enemies comes within the corporation's 613
jurisdiction, although in a particular situation, the father may well be the
person who dispenses it. Complimentarily, if a man commits an offense [681]
against a person not of his group, whatever private thoughts his father may
have about the act, the responsibility lies not on his shoulders but on the
group, and he is compelled to share this responsibility equally with all other
members. For example, if a son commits a homicide the father bears the [682]
same legal responsibility for the act, and is under obligation to contribute the
same share of blood-money as he would be if the act had been perpetrated
by any male of the group other than his son. Even in a narrower field of
relations between father and son the group exercises its authority. Acting
as pater, a man may punish his son, physically or otherwise; he may not
do so to the point of injury, for personal injury comes within the legitimate
sphere of the corporation. A man's "bone" belongs to his group; he is an in-

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[7] Impotency is a special case, because it is dishonourable for a woman to remain [833]
wife to an impotent man. She cannot divorce him, but her father can insist on a [586]
witnessed test of impotency and, if it is proven, the husband is compelled to divorce
her. Barrenness, obviously, is a different matter.

682 charge, which hit Towida at a range of only a few feet,
672 with fatal results.

Farag, who had divorced her two months before,
682 brought a claim for bloodmoney from Korayem; but when
672 the case was heard, Korayem denied that the accident had
695 happened in his tent. The assessors of this first court,
which was held soon after the accident, demanded that
Korayem should swear, backed by twenty-five men (i.e.
half the full number of fifty, as Towida was a woman),
that the accident did not take place in his tent. Then
[671 followed an example of one of the very unsatisfactory
points in Bedouin Law.

Korayem, who was a powerful man belonging to the Gereidat, who were in turn a powerful family, managed to persuade the court to cancel their judgment requiring the oath from himself and his twenty-five backers, and to agree to a settlement whereby he should pay £10 and be absolved from the necessity of taking the oath. The court accepted this agreement, and proceeded to examine the claims to the bloodmoney.

The Moslem Law of Divorce provides that when a man
682 divorces his wife, the decree does not become absolute for
672 three months, in order that it may be ascertained whether
695 the woman be pregnant by her lately divorced husband.
Towida had only been divorced two months before the
671 accident; so the question had to be decided whether Farag
• 586 were legally her husband or not at the time of her death,
for purposes of receiving a share of the bloodmoney. If so,
he should receive one quarter; but there seems to have
been some difference of opinion on this point among the
assessors of the court, and the whole matter was shelved.

682 Seventeen years afterwards, Lataif Farag—then a man
of twenty-one—re-opened the case, claiming his mother's
672 bloodmoney. In support of his claim he produced three
695 witnesses. The first was Farag himself, who was prepared
to swear that he had seen Towida lying dead in the tent of
694 Korayem. The second was Towida's brother, who was

604
582 the exogamous and endogamous mother's brother.

> If the khal is from outside the tribe, we can do no wrong to him if he does no wrong to us. If the khal is a member of the tribe, he is respected; but not like the khal from outside the tribe. The feeling between a man and his khal is much stronger if the khal is from outside the tribe. Within my own 'aiela (secondary group), I respect the maternal uncles of Bait so-and-so as much as I respect the maternal uncles of my own bait (tertiary group).

[829] Ideas and sentiment about the mother's brother as they are related to complementary filiation should be interpreted as having a definite influence on marriage practice and politics in al-Qasr.

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*613 A sample from the marriages of 'Ailit Ma'fas (see Figure 10 below) shows that endogamous marriages are no more frequent than those which function to bring a new member into the corporate group--although the man's spouse never really becomes a member of the lineage. [587] Only five of the seventeen marriages were within the 'aiela, and one of these was a case of sororate which acted to maintain an already established tie. Six of the marriages were with groups not belonging to the Awlad 'Ali tribe. In each of these cases, with the exception of one, the marriage represents the establishment of ties between groups who live in areas contiguous with one another. Four of the marriages shown in Figure 10 were within the primary segment, i.e., with other lineages of al-Qasr; three out of these four were contracted with

[TEXT CONTINUED ON PAGE 133]

586 at the time of divorce (if the husband is in fault), and also
[583] at the time of the husband's death; and, _sadaaq al-musaama_
[768] ("price of friendship") is paid to the wife when her husband
[595] takes a second, third or fourth wife.

586 The second divorce case which happened while I was
158 in al-Qasr involved, what seems to be, an instance of psychotic behavior. A girl, who had married shortly before I arrived in the field, would fall into a deep sleep every time she entered her husband's house. Each time her father would come for her and take her home until she had recovered. But upon her return, three different times, she became ill again. Finally, her father and the husband agreed that this marriage would not work, and the father returned the _mahr_ to the man. This case lasted over the period of almost a year while I lived in al-Qasr. I suggested to the father that perhaps his daughter did not wish to be married to this man but he assured me that "she loved him very much."

586 If the girl's father is dead, so that she cannot return to his house at the time of divorce, she will go to
586 live with the brother who needs her services. It then be-
587 comes the duty of the brother to make another marriage for
[593] his sister, and in the case that he does it becomes his right
[583] to claim the _mahr_ for himself. The Bedouins say that virginity, or the lack of it, in the case of the divorced woman is no issue; just so a man knows "she is from a good family."

586 Naturally, according to the rule of patriliny, all
851 children from a marriage belong to the husband and become
*613 members of his lineage. Should divorce occur while a woman
is nursing, she will take the child with her and it will be
returned after weaning. Sometimes the husband will permit the
wife to keep one child--always a girl--in order "to keep her
company."

•587 The practice of the sororate has been noted. The
Bedouins also believe that "a man should marry his brother's
widow so that she will have someone to help her with the
children." But I have no data on the frequencies of these
12 practices. When I gathered my data on marriage, my informants
58 would give me only the name of the tribe or lineage into which
a man married, and never did I get the name of a man's wife.
[829] (One lineage in al-Qasr, entirely refused to give me data
on genealogy or marriage because, as one leader said, "it is
not decent to speak of these things with people.") Sororal
595 polygny is forbidden (Quran IV:23), and the Bedouins say
that a man cannot marry more than one bint 'amm. Marriage
182 practices, such as sororate and levirate, I interpret as
[587] patterns which maintain structural continuity and political
advantage. The custom of permitting a man to marry only
[582] one of his father's brother's daughters may be seen as a
precaution against intensifying authority relations and the
degree of segmentation.

The bride's father
584 did not have to pay kabara, although he held
686 a big feast in which he slaughtered three sheep and invited the groom,
558 his father and a number of his friends and friends of the girl's father
in honor of the groom as a compromise.

583 Before the fatha is read, the two families usually agree on the amount of bridewealth, or "mahr", to be paid by the groom or his father. The amount of bridewealth depends upon a number of criteria, important among which is the relative position of the bride's and groom's families and the degree of relationship that exists between them. The lowest mahr is usually paid in the case of cousin marriages. The amount ranges from 10 to 50 pounds. Sometimes when the groom cannot afford any mahr, he pays only the religiously required sum of 25 Egyptian piasters. This is never the case if the groom and bride are more distantly related. When the groom is an outsider or a member of another tribe, the mahr is usually much higher. Several cases of mahr of more than 2,000 pounds are reported in the area. There was a case in which the mahr reached 10,000 Egyptian pounds ($22,000). The amount of mahr also depends on the beauty of the bride. In the case of the highest known mahr mentioned above, the woman was known to be of great beauty. There
● [587] is no distinction made between previously married women and ones married for the first time. In the case above, the woman was married three times before, and the mahr was apparently higher than that paid for her
[602] in her first marriage. Increasing the mahr according to the kinshp distance between the bride and groom reflects the preference of endoga-
582 mous marriages. The preferred marriage match in the area is that of the patrilateral parallel cousin marriage. The father's brother's son, "ibn 'amm," has an undisputed claim over his cousin, "bint 'amm." Even when they are of incompatible age, or even if the man is married or for

582 779 and although they are not considered wrong or sinful, there is a general feeling of distaste among the tribal population to such marriages. They usually attribute this distaste to the fact that if the marriage with the first sister did not work out, there is no reason to expect the marriage with the second to be successful.* Although this might account, in part, for the low rate of cousin marriage in the group when present wives of the individuals are taken into consideration, yet, the effect of that practice should not be exaggerated. For although that prohibition might curb the marriage with the cousin who is the sister of a previous wife, it does not restrict the marriage with another cousin who is a cousin, rather than a sister of the first wife.

584 431 During the period that follows and until the marriage is final, the groom is supposed to bring gifts to the bride. These gifts are usually a wide silver bracelet that is used as an engagement ring. Also gifts of clothes and jewelry are quite customary. Such gifts become the private property of the bride and are to be returned only if the engagement is broken for fault on the part of the bride or any member of her family. In such cases, her father has to return all the gifts his daughter has accepted as well as the expenses that the groom's visitations have cost him.

585 583 779 431 The marriage is affected and finalized by the payment of the bridewealth. In Islamic law the bridewealth is supposed to be paid to the bride herself as a gift and not to her father, which had been a significant departure from the pre-Islamic practice where two types of bridewealth were paid: the sadaqa paid to the father of the bride or her

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[587] * This does not apply to cases where the first wife dies. In such cases, it is not objectionable to marry her sister, although the incidences of sororate are rare among the population.

586 who forced her to marry the husband, or if she was cut off from the
562
593 family for some reason or another.

586 From the frequency of women using this right in the area, it
562 seems that no social disapproval is associated with it, nor is there
574 a social stigma attached to women who throw themselves. They seem to
626 find it as easy to find a husband as those women divorced voluntarily
by their husbands or with the help of their fathers. In fact, as was
586 mentioned earlier, many of them marry the rich men over whom they
562
● 587 throw themselves. As to the amount of mahr paid for their subsequent
[583] marriages, the fact of throwing themselves does not seem to be a factor
[594] in determining the amount of mahr paid. In one of the cases, the woman
threw herself on an 'aqila of one of the Geneishat tribe after her
father refused to help her get a divorce from her husband who had married a second wife without first asking the first wife's permission.
[429] When the Geneishat member succeeded in convincing the husband to divorce his wife, the latter had no place to stay so remained in the
house of her protector who acted as her guardian in place of her father
[583] who had refused to take her back in his home. While staying in the
house of her protector, she got many marriage offers; one of the suitors
offered a mahr of L.E. 4,000 ($10,000), one of the highest mahrs reported in the area. She agreed, and the marriage was affected. This
mahr is about ten times the mahr she got for her first marriage. This
586
562 procedure offers the woman a considerable guarantee of her marital
rights. It also gives her, as far as the ability to dissolve the marriage, a status close to that of her husband. This relative equality
is reflected is reflected in the lack of stigma associated with divorced

159 lived. Five years ago the husband died in a mining accident leaving
562 428 Fatma with a ten-month-old boy. By that time, her father had been dis-
593 abled, and her brothers wanted to manage her husband's store on her be-
444 half. Knowing that her brothers were greedy, she refused and insisted
that she take care of the store herself. The brothers objected on the
grounds that it was not customary for a decent woman to be exposed to
the customers in the store. When she insisted, the brothers threatened
her. When the threats did not work, they beat her. After that, she
[625] went to the police station in the area, filed a complaint against her
brothers, and asked for police protection. The police officer in charge
brought the brothers in and warned them that if they interfered with the
store, not only would he arrest them, but he would also use his influ-
ence to get them forced from the irrigation projects where three of them
worked. The threat worked, and they became friendly with their sister,
buying things for the store whenever they went to Alexandria and some-
times helping in the store with her consent when she was on housecalls
159 as a midwife. A year later Fatma was married for the second time to a
562 distant cousin; a few months later her father died. In a family meeting
428 that followed the funeral, Fatma made her announcement that she was claim-
593 233 ing her share of her father's herd. The brothers were angry and tried to
● [587] beat her. But the older members of the bait who were present at the meet-
ing stopped them and told them that Fatma had all the right to claim her
share of the inheritance according to Awlad Ali ways and that there was
[578] nothing that they could do about it. She was characterized in that
meeting as "bint haram" (illegitimate child), an insult used to refer
to those who show selfishness in their kinship obligations. When she
left the camp with her share of the herd, this seemed to have severed

wife he usually chooses a young girl of about twenty years. Children 595
of the elder wife might be adult, therefore, when the children 593
of the junior wife are infants. Great emphasis is placed on 561
seniority, particularly among males, but strong emphasis is also
placed on the equality of siblings and their equal legal status.
Between brothers of widely differing ages, there is, then, this
field of potential conflict. From an early date competitive, if not
hostile, relationships develop between the sons of co-wives. Competition 593
between half-brothers results not only from their 586
mothers being co-wives: one group might be the sons of a divorced 587
wife. The latter situation is often much worse, for the sons
born of the divorced wife are now being fostered by a woman
who is not their mother. A similar condition of things is brought
about when a widower with sons remarries. Yet again, when a
wife grows old and her sons have reached maturity, her husband
may not divorce her formally, but merely 'throw her off his
back'; she will then go to live with her grown sons, while her
husband, in turn, takes a new wife, usually taking up residence
in another camp for a time at least. It would be too much of a
digression here to discuss the inheritance disputes, and the disputes
over marriage and bride-wealth, which arise out of these
various circumstances. Suffice it to note that such disputes are [613]
common and affect the alignment of people within a tertiary
segment.

As half-brothers grow to maturity some of them will marry 613
their maternal cross-cousins, and in succeeding generations some 621
of their descendants will do likewise. In this way, a tertiary segment [582]
united by the bond of agnation, will also have within it
smaller groups of kin having different sets of cognatic links. This
group, as a residential unit, shows a very high concentration of
agnates, and the Bedouin say with pride that members of the
camps are always 'one' because of this agnatic bond, and indeed,
the corporate identity of this group is strikingly displayed in
many circumstances. It does not take precedence in all circumstances, 613
for, built into agnation, with the heavy burden of duties 578
which go with it, are serious stresses and strains which in some 602
circumstances regularly come out into the open. In yet other
circumstances cognatic kinship affiliations appear to be dominant,
causing friction among agnates. A man, for example, may permit

would be impossible to satisfy all marriage expectations of men within the 621
universe of the minimal tribal section. For this reason alone external links 613
are inevitable and persistent. Also, the small territorial strip such a group 582
claims as a homeland produces an economy which, in this environment, 182
is unstable. Additional security is gained by making connections with other [423]
tribal sections, each with its specific ecological character. Men also marry [433]
into their client groups. The proportion of these for this camp was 9 per cent [619]
of the total. From these links they gain economic advantages, they can
claim services and a client-following is politically significant. Finally, 7
per cent of the total[13] are marriages with women of other tribes, which
again not only reduces the instability of the economy (in that a large tribal
area suffering near-famine conditions has access to areas of markedly different
ecology), but also provides political connections for men whose power
ambitions have passed the point of leadership limited to their own tribes. In
one way or another all these interests are manifest in the small camp and
attention is now directed to the latter.

The disposition of people in the camp is represented diagrammatically 621
on the page following. 592

The nucleus of the camp is Tent A. Its owner (1) was a powerful *Shaikh,* [554]
the son of a famous father. His marriage represents a political link with a [619]
group of one of the primary sections of his own tribe. His father died only a [428]
few years before I recorded my census, and the large amount of moveable
property he left had still not been divided among the sons; the owner of the
tent, as eldest brother, still controlled the flocks and herds. Most of his time
he spent away from the camp engaging in political intrigue. His two younger
brothers lived in his tent, but the second (5) would not remain there long
because negotiations for his marriage had been started. His father (2) married [582]
a parallel cousin; she died and shortly afterwards he took her sister (3) [587]
in sororal union. When this occurred an amount of bride-wealth was
agreed, but instead of giving any of it to her father, the entire amount was [583]
"put in front of her" (that is, the animals were allowed to remain with her
husband's flock), and these animals she had marked with her brother's
tribal sign to distinguish them from those of her husband. It was widely [428]
known that she was going to leave these animals to her husband's second [562]
son, for although she could not transfer them to a male outside her husband's
corporate group, she could decide who, among his heirs, should inherit.

During my stay in this camp, her brother's son (4) came to it as a 621
temporary resident for a month. Since he was poor, the purpose of his visit 592
was to capture some of his aunt's wealth while she was still alive and the 574
possibility still existed. During his stay he was fed well but did no work. [604]
His kinsmen found his company tiresome, so, to cut short his stay, and after [431]
consulting her nominated heir (5), she gave him three grown goats. Also
when an occasion arose for an animal slaughter, she provided the sheep, and, [231]

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[13] The remainder is made up of marriages to the daughters of men incorporated into the lineages.

173 Fusion of names appears in another context and for similar
178 reasons. Not only are lineal descendants given the name of de-
551 ceased ancestors, but a man may be given the name of any de-
613 ceased agnate of his tertiary section. Usually, this is only done
428 when a man passes on property to another who is not his direct
[553] heir. Commonly, this occurs when an agnate is also a mother's brother, as often happens as a result of parallel cousin marriage, and this mother's brother has no sons of his own. If he has a sister's son, who is also his paternal nephew, he is likely to pass
[183] on his wealth to this nephew. A father, the Bedouin insist, ought
to perform three duties for his sons: attend to their circumcision,
[593] and their education in the Koran, and provide bride-wealth when
[852] they marry. All fathers attend to the circumcision of all their sons;
[871] few provide for the Koranic education of any of their sons; most
bear the burden of marrying off at least one of their sons. The
[583] performance of the latter duty is what makes the continuance of the deceased's name an obligation, and whoever performs this duty must have his name perpetuated in one male offspring of the union which was brought about with his wealth. Wealth need not take the form of bride-wealth; it can be a legacy willed by a father, maternal uncle of the kind described above, or any other agnate who has died without male issue. Conversely, if a man dies without leaving any property, even his sons might not perpetuate his name, and eventually it will drop out of the genealogy.[10] There are instances of men inheriting the wealth of a number of agnates, using each parcel of wealth to make a new marriage and naming the sons of the various unions after the several dead who had left wealth. The example given below is taken from the genealogy of the Dawwas section of the Magharba tribe. What happened here was that the two lines stemming from Faraj and Sha'aban, after proliferating normally, became extinct. As this happened, Ibrahim, the son of Miftah, began to inherit wealth to which he was not a direct heir; and

[588] [10] To avoid confusion, it ought to be made clear that this is not ghost marriage. As I understand ghost marriages from Evans-Pritchard's (1951) account, two main conditions must be satisfied: (i) that there should be inherited wealth to make a marriage, and (ii) that the wealth remaining after the ghost marriage has been made is inherited by the ghost children only. In Cyrenaica, wealth thus inherited becomes part of a man's total wealth and is not reserved for a ghost marriage and its issue.

Cases

584 Prior to the wedding festivities, the
593 father will have participated in negotiations, although even in these he will
have remained silent, leaving an affine, as a rule, to arrange the details with
the girl's father and his kinsmen. The father feigns aloofness from the start
of negotiations until after the wedding celebrations have ended. Before inquiring into this seemingly odd behaviour, a few further details of marriage
ceremonies need to be mentioned briefly.

585 The bride is carried to the nuptial tent on a camel, seated in a cagelike
342 structure placed on the camel's back, this canopy covered over with carpets
[492] and at least one long blanket — later to be used to divide her tent into male
and female quarters — which constitute part of the goods given to a woman
[788] on marriage. On her arrival, while she is still seated in her canopy, the
camel is led round the tent seven times by a small boy. She then descends
and is hustled into the tent by a number of women who make a show of their
attempts to conceal her from view. Inside the tent the bride is enclosed in
one corner in a kind of cubicle partitioned off by a length of blanket.

585 In the meantime, the groom has affected to escape, but is "caught," while
[533] running away, by his fellows, who "compel" him to return to the nuptial tent,
[831] to the accompaniment of their lewd songs telling of the sexual pleasures
awaiting him. Much of this is horseplay, but the young men carry it out
brazenly and the groom is required to show reluctance to continue with the
ceremonies. His entry into the nuptial tent is marked by an expectant hush
that falls over the crowd of men gathered, as they await the result of the
virginity test the groom is about to perform, which he does by wrapping part
of his toga round one of his fingers to pierce the hymen. Sharp shrieks from
[202] the bride give the signal that the test has been undertaken; not a stir moves
the crowd until evidence of its success has been publicly displayed, which is
given by the groom hoisting the blood-stained portion of the toga through
the corner of the tent on a pole, followed by firing three shots from his rifle.
Jubilantly, the men gathered fire volley after volley from their rifles just over
the nuptial tent, and the seven-day celebrations begin.

585 A full descriptive account of a marriage, or many of the ritual details
589 woven into it need not be given here. What is included is intended to illus-
[593] trate certain relationships between father and son, and between one
[561] generation and another. In this connection two further points are appropri-
ate. First, during the week of festival, young men gather outside the nuptial
[535] tent each night to encourage a maiden in her dancing, clapping their hands
[533] to the point of injury "so that we will have a wife soon." The celebrations
belong to the bachelors, and they are the only ones to engage in the singing
and hand clapping. It is they too who stop the bridal camel on its way to
[538] the nuptial tent to recite obscene rhymes to the bride, and they also shout
[831] their rather dubious consolations to the bride who, during the virginity test,
crying out for her mother, is assured by them that the night holds promise
585 for her which her mother could never extend. The married men, particularly
602 the close senior agnates of the groom, stay away from it all, discussing mat-
521 ters unconnected with the affair.

561 that young men spend their premarital lives in an environment of unmitigated
602 agnatic hostility. Greater substance is given to this view when it is
realised that agnates live together. The residential concentration of agnates
561 in Cyrenaica exceeds 80 per cent. I wish to stress that this figure is based
602 on the universe of the small camp, and the only males included as agnates are
621 those who are consanguinely related. Over 50 such camps were used in
arriving at the figure. Obviously, the figure of agnatic concentration will
vary depending on the universe. If all men who claim to belong to a tribe
of, say, 15,000 souls, who claim that they are agnates in a political sense are
included, then the figure will not be the same as that derived from a small
group where the criterion for inclusion is consanguinity, not mere political
affiliation. It is necessary to make this clear to emphasise that the Cyrenaican
figure is unusually high, and also because the modes of behaviour between
consanguineal and political agnates differ critically. Granted the hostility
[578] built into agnation, and recognising in addition the significance of the high
degree of agnatic concentration, unless there are other factors present in the
situation, life would be intolerably burdensome. Parallel-cousin marriage
comes to the rescue.

582

Parallel-Cousin Marriage

Among the Bedouin the prohibited degrees of marriage are few. A man
may not marry within a closer range than first paternal or maternal cousin;
he cannot marry a woman of a senior generation, nor a woman known to
be older. He cannot marry the daughters of a woman who has acted as wet
nurse to him or to any of his brothers and sisters. Otherwise he is permitted
to marry any other woman. Marriage with the first paternal cousin is preferred,
582 and is more than a sentiment. A man has a right to his father's
brother's daughter, and before a marriage is arranged with anyone else, the
585 girl's father seeks the opinion of his brother's son. If he neglects to do this,
578 or if he flouts the opinion offered him, he runs the risk of the marriage
being brought to a halt on the very wedding day. I have witnessed this. In
most of the records I possess, it usually happens that the brother's son is
bought off with a few sheep (about five) and some articles of clothing.
Here the brother's son was seizing the occasion to extort from a farmer's
•[589] brother wealth which he considered was due him from an earlier inheritance
dispute. Occasionally the intervention is genuinely designed to prevent a
marriage; if the girl refuses to marry her father's brother's son, he can force
582 her into spinsterhood. Men exercise their right to marry their first parallel
cousins. They also marry other parallel cousins. The significance of parallel-cousin
marriage varies with the exact degree of the relationship. First- and,
say, third-parallel cousins are sociologically different in a number of respects,
and in relation to specific problems these differences may assume major
[602] importance. In the present discussion the various degrees have this in
common: that whatever the precise relationship, all parallel cousins are the

593 was with his brother and not his brother's sons. When the
father persisted with his intention to embarrass his nephews,
his sons, as a last alternative, threatened to leave him.
In the face of this threat, the father capitulated.

The rights and duties of the father-son relationship,
although they do not change in sentiment, will change in
content during the lifetime of the father. The main change
[421] in content will be a reflection of a change in property relations.
593 The Bedouin believe that this is the way it ought
577 to be; they say that

> A son must respect and obey his father. The son must do anything that he can to help and please his father. When the son grows up and begins to earn money, he must contribute generously to his father. A son pleases his father by giving him money and helping him to be comfortable.

593 In boyhood and manhood, the father has disposal over his son's
596 labor. As long as a son lives in his father's *naja'* this is
[464] so. One son, who worked for an American oil company in the
desert, regularly turned over his pay check to his father.
It is the father who decides where the son will live, and,
whether or not he will have his own domicile away from the
• [591] main *naja'*. When the son marries and brings his wife to the
naja', he will usually set up his tent next to his father's
tent. The tent is given to the boy by his father. During
593 431 the son's growing-up period, he will be given, as gifts on
various occasions, a sheep or a number of sheep which will
be kept with the father's flock.

593 be kept with the father's flock. Only in the case of a
●[591] man's owning, or using, a large piece of land in the pasture area of al-Qasr will his son live away from the main part of the naja', i.e., away from his father's tent. The son then serves as his father's shepherd.

593 In the 'izba sector of al-Qasr, the pattern is gener-
591 ally the same except that the son will be given a room in
184 the house rather than a tent when he marries. Since the land in this area is more scarce and a matter of official ownership, the son is not likely to have his own house during his father's lifetime.

593 When the son does marry, the marriage proceedings may
584 be initiated by either the son or the father. But, under no circumstances that I heard of, would the son approach the father with the idea of his marriage; the son should communicate his desire to marry, first of all, to either his father's brother or his mother's brother. As the Bedouins
593 say, "Marriage is an agreement between fathers." What they
584 mean is that marriage is an agreement between tertiary groups.
*613 A father upon hearing of his son's wish to marry, for the boy's uncle will immediately tell the father, consults with the head of his tertiary group about such a proposed marriage. This is not a formal procedure but, certainly, the father would not go ahead with the marriage without making the matter public. In other words, marriage in al-Qasr is a

CHAPTER V

MARRIAGE: A CONTRACTUAL RELATIONSHIP

593 A survey of all disputes occurring among the eilat Aggary in the
578 last five years shows that more than 70% were disputes over "women,"
the usual phrase referring to cases involving marital relations. Disagreement over matters arising out of quarrels between husband and wife
or between one of the spouses and his or her in-laws often constitute
593 the basis for these disputes. What seems to make marriage and the
578 family particularly productive of conflict is the fact that although
602 residence is commonly virilocal, and the majority of the women leav-
613 ing their own families to live with the husband, the woman retains her
● [591] membership in her father's family after the marriage, and her agnatic
group keeps an active interest in her, even after she is married. Marriage then brings face to face the interests of two groups. These interests affect the relationship between the married couple; and, more importantly, the relationship between the latter affects the interests of their respective groups. This, in many instances, leads to direct conflict between the two groups.

581 The position of the Awlad Ali daraieb with regard to marriage rela-
671 tions is based on the Islamic law with minor modifications to suit the
585 requirements of local life. According to the Muslim law, marriage is
675 a civil contract affected by the request of one party and the agreement of the other. No witnesses are needed for the legalization of the marriage, according to some of the Shi'a sects, although the Sunni schools of Muslim jurisprudence insist that two adult male and two adult females

583 Among Awlad Ali the payment of the bridewealth signifies the completion
[584] of the marriage contract. The mahr is not paid to the woman but
583 to her father or closest male kin. Usually the mahr is paid in money.
178 This, however, seems to be a recent phenomenon. Until the turn of the
century, according to informants, the mahr was paid only in sheep and
583 goats. The practice is still followed by a number of tribal segments
178 of Ali Ahmar who occupy the western most part of the area where pasture
184 is more abundant and reliable and where the permanent pasture of the
green mountains of Cyrenaica is close by. Other tribal segments still
insist that at least one-fourth of the mahr should be paid in livestock,
583 but the majority of the people accept money. The main purpose of the
[584] mahr among Awlad Ali is to legalize the marriage contract and to put
[182] emphasis on the reciprocal oblications that the marriage created between
the two families of the bride and the groom. It also works as an insurance
for good behavior on the part of both the husband and the wife.
583 If the husband mistreats his wife or fails to give her the rights legally
593 hers by marriage, he risks the chance of losing the mahr and being forced
586 to divorce her. On the other hand, if the wife fails to behave in the
customary way expected from a wife, the husband could divorce her and
have the right to get back his mahr. This is particularly inconvenient
in cases where all or part of the mahr is paid in livestock, in which
case it becomes part of the father's herd and hard to take away in case
of divorce. It is therefore in the interest of her family to keep the
marriage. In this way their interference in the marriage is checked.
● [591] This is especially important among Awlad Ali where, although the marriage
[592] is usually patrilocal, the woman retains membership in her father's
household even after marriage.

593 As a girl in her father's household, the woman is under the direct authority of her father, who is responsible for her. When the father dies, this responsibility, as well as the authority, goes to her brother or her closest male kin in the order specified earlier. At marriage the
[591] girl usually moves to live with her husband, and this subjects her to
[606] his control and sometimes to that of his parents, if the couple lives with them. But the authority of the husband over his wife remains
593 secondary to that of her father. The woman's membership in her father's
574 household does not cease with marriage, and the strength of her relations to her kin is maintained by their frequent visits to her new residence and by her occasional visits to them. This right of visitation
593
574 cannot be denied by the husband who not only has to allow such visits,
606 but is also required to treat members of his wife's family, especially her father, with great respect and hospitality. If the husband fails
[586] to do so, the wife's father can order her to leave her husband and go back to his household with him.

This point is illustrated by the case of Muftah from the Esheibat tribe in the area of Matruh, whose older daughter is married to Hemeida from the Geneishat segment, which lives in the area of Fokah some 80 miles to the east of Matruh. One winter day in 1965, while passing near the area where his daughter lived, Muftah decided to pay her a visit. When he arrived, her husband was not at home; he was in the market in a nearby town selling sheep. When he came back late that evening, he greeted Muftah with the customary slaughter of a goat and invited the neighbors to the occasion. After dinner Muftah wanted to rest. It was a very hot night, so his son-in-law brought a rug and spread it outside the tent in the cool air. After that he retired to his tent where he spent the night inside.

682 To complete this general statement, two further circumstances are cited by the
602 Bedouin. If a man kills a related person who is not an agnate (it is expressed as killing
the mother's brother) the breach in relationships must be healed as quickly as possible.
The convention for dealing with this is that the offender, bound hand and foot,
mounted on a horse, is sent to the camp of 'the owner of the blood', in the company
of a holy man, there to make an offer of his life, saying: 'Here is my knife, my life
is yours; here is my shroud, my life is yours.' No Bedouin would agree for a moment
to undertake this journey if he thought the offer might be accepted. In Bedouin
sentiments a life offered in this way cannot be taken. It is the convention which precedes
a peace meeting and blood money. Any other way of dealing with the confusion,
which spreads as a result of a homicide between cognates, is excluded.

682 Secondly, if a woman is killed, whatever the intersegmentary distance, the homicide
562 is said to be accidental, because a man never 'intends' to kill a woman. Blood-money
arrangements are made as soon as possible, and the wealth—half that of a
613 man—passes to the deceased's father, not to her husband, for a woman's 'bone'
always belongs to her father. Obviously women cannot be allowed to enter into
582 feud; since it is demographically compelling (apart from other reasons) for some of
591 them to marry outside their natal groups, then they might well find themselves residents
in the enemy's camps, if they were to become involved in feuds.

121 This statement of the different means available for the regulation of homicide at
682 the several orders of tribal segmentation is the view the Bedouin themselves hold of
their relationships. An analysis of the facts presented thus far could bring out a
613 number of interesting points with regard to the relativity of morals, the typification
829 of acts by their social context, the significance of the orders of segmentation, and so
619 on. Rather than proceed along these lines, however, it is more urgently necessary
to reflect on the significance of the fact that the arrangement of the material in terms
of what is usually called the lineage structure coincides with the Bedouin ordering
of the same details. It is, of course, important to note that the account is not based
on mere hearsay evidence. Each statement made can be documented from known
homicides, and to this extent the model that has been used is consistent with reality.
The model, nevertheless, can only be a representation of what a particular people,
the Bedouin, conceive their social reality to be; it is a kind of ideology which enables
them, without making absurd demands on their credulity, to understand their field
of social relationships, and to give particular relationships their *raison d'être*. But, as
will be shown, it would be a serious error to mistake such a folk model for sociological
analysis. Such an error is difficult to avoid because the Bedouin, when defending their
view, are able to cite enough bits and pieces of reality to make their argument convincing.
121 The flaw in the reasoning is seen when it can be shown that its consequences
114 are absurd. As an example of what is meant, the statement that feud is attached to
613 groups at the secondary order of segmentation may be considered. If the statement
were true, if each and every secondary section were at feud one with the other (and
619 in a structural sense this ought to be so), then each tribe would be divided into small
829 mutually hostile groups, which completely lacked any possibility of movement, even
578 for pasturing purposes. Presented with this, the Bedouin would argue that this is not
in fact so, because secondary and primary sections are interlinked in many ways. That
is, they evoke what to them are contingencies to explain why they are at feud with one

band is required to take gifts to his mother-in-law in recognition of the fact 583
that she nourished his wife as an infant (the literal meaning of the word 584
used for this gift is "milk"). A return visit is made and gifts are given to 606
the daughter. When the first child is born an animal is presented by the
affines, and if the child is a male, the gift may be several sheep, or even a 851
few camels if the father-in-law is very wealthy. Formal exchange of gifts 425
continue, but, in addition, informal transfers are made. Moreover, if re- 606
lations between a man and his father-in-law develop favourably, it is not un- 606
common for a young husband, during the early years of marriage, to move 591
away from his father and pitch his tent alongside that of his father-in-law. 593
Marriage gives a son affinal relations of his own. Affinity can alleviate the
dead weight of paternal authority.

It is suggested that the crisis the marriage of a son assumes for a father 585
is the shift it entails in the distribution of authority. This is borne out by 561
other details in the marriage ceremony referred to earlier. Ordinarily, young 602
men dare not sing within earshot of their senior agnates. Far from allowing
obscenities, agnates of the ascending generation would not allow even a 533
mention of women to be made by young men, in their presence. In a group [593]
consisting of young men and an agnate, I chanced to use the noun for [123]
woman and immediately my tent was cleared of all but the senior agnate.
At a wedding the young men revel in their lewd songs and shout their [831]
obscenities for all to hear. The senior agnates stand aside and make a show of ignoring the proceedings. And well they may, for each marriage is a challenge to the exclusive authority they have enjoyed; each nuptial tent is an invasion of the domain of which they have been undisputed masters. Marriage is the only occasion when the men of one generation can clap and sing their defiance of an older one, and give warning of the changes which must be accommodated however great the pretence that nothing has happened.

Marriage ceremonies dramatise the clash between adjacent generations 561
over the distribution of certain forms of authority. If this authority is as 602
overwhelming as has been suggested, and if it is so deeply resented, how is it that life is endurable for juniors? Relationships between junior and senior agnates are so restrictive that they almost amount to what Professor Fortes has suggested I view as a form of avoidance relationships. Juniors must always defer, they must obey commands promptly, they serve their seniors, they must accept a lead when it is given and the restrictions on conversations exclude all reference to women, marriage or sex. These are not simply a set of general guides for behaviour, they are rigidly applied rules, deviation from which is countered with rebuke or greater severity. It would appear from this

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many African societies is that wealth is transferred. Obviously, in societies where the 583
rules of exogamy compel a dispersion of links outside a man's own clan, what is in- 584
volved in this transfer of wealth cannot be sociologically similar to one in which mar- 606
riage to the first cousin on either side is permitted. 171

sorts of petty ways, listen to his grumbles about his agnates, interfere on his 604
behalf in petty camp quarrels, shield him from the disciplinarian father and 613
guard his property interests against the predatory father's brother; if the 428
mother's brother dies without heirs, the sister's son can reasonably expect at
least a share of his wealth. When the mother's brother is a member of a
different corporate group, a sister's son cannot possibly expect to inherit
from him in any circumstance.

The mother's brother may reside in a camp too distant to be much effective 604
direct help in day-to-day living. His relative remoteness gives the relationship 591 ●
other possible opportunities, however. Rainfall in the semi-desert area 312
of Cyrenaica is highly variable, both from year to year, and from place to 233
place in any given year. As a result this shallow saucer of a depression may 241
have sufficient rain to supply both the water needs of animals and crops,
while an area a few miles distant will have inadequate water supplies for
either. The mother's brother-sister's son link can mean water for animals and
a crop of barley for both when, in successive years, the resources of one area
or the other are inadequate.

The differences in the relations between men and their mother's brother 604
do not end with a characterisation of their antipodal forms. The demographic
structure of a group may be such that one man may have a number
of mother's brothers, another only one; one man may have to share with
several brothers, another may be an only son. Complications of this sort determine [613]
the precise relationships between men, but however intricate these
may be, each corporate group has its matrilateral links with a group occupying
a slightly different ecological area, and it also has a plurality of matrilateral
connections within it. Further, if a direct connection is not available [603]
to any particular individual he can use an indirect link (e.g. father's mother's
brother or mother's mother's brother) to satisfy his needs.

The Preference for Males

Thus far, the family and the social matrix in which it is embedded has 128
been discussed in general terms, most particularly in reference to several
selected sets of relationships. I wish now to place these relationships in a
more specific setting with a brief discussion of the composition of a small
camp of a group inhabiting the arid areas of central Cyrenaica. When the 829
Bedouin give their views on the structure of the family in Cyrenaica they 594
speak of it as consisting of a pair of spouses and about ten children, mainly 562
males. The emphasis on males is not mere sentiment, overwhelmingly though 858
it favours them against females. Additional males in a family increase the
productive possibilities of a family in the sense that more herdsmen become
available and larger ploughing commitments can be undertaken; an increase
in the number of females has small effect on production since they are precluded
from any direct participation in these activities. Both sexes, ranging
in age from about seven years to mature adulthood, are necessary if a family

583 Among Awlad Ali the payment of the bridewealth signifies the completion
[584] of the marriage contract. The mahr is not paid to the woman but
583 to her father or closest male kin. Usually the mahr is paid in money.
178 This, however, seems to be a recent phenomenon. Until the turn of the
century, according to informants, the mahr was paid only in sheep and
583 goats. The practice is still followed by a number of tribal segments
178 of Ali Ahmar who occupy the western most part of the area where pasture
184 is more abundant and reliable and where the permanent pasture of the
green mountains of Cyrenaica is close by. Other tribal segments still
insist that at least one-fourth of the mahr should be paid in livestock,
583 but the majority of the people accept money. The main purpose of the
[584] mahr among Awlad Ali is to legalize the marriage contract and to put
[182] emphasis on the reciprocal oblications that the marriage created between
the two families of the bride and the groom. It also works as an insurance
for good behavior on the part of both the husband and the wife.
583 If the husband mistreats his wife or fails to give her the rights legally
593 hers by marriage, he risks the chance of losing the mahr and being forced
586 to divorce her. On the other hand, if the wife fails to behave in the
customary way expected from a wife, the husband could divorce her and
have the right to get back his mahr. This is particularly inconvenient
in cases where all or part of the mahr is paid in livestock, in which
case it becomes part of the father's herd and hard to take away in case
of divorce. It is therefore in the interest of her family to keep the
marriage. In this way their interference in the marriage is checked.
[591] This is especially important among Awlad Ali where, although the marriage
[592] is usually patrilocal, the woman retains membership in her father's
household even after marriage.

Second, the fiction that nothing has happened, which characterises the 585
father's behavior, does not cease with the termination of the celebrations. 593
Each morning, soon after daybreak and before the camp is astir, the groom
must leave his bride and repair to his father's tent to lie at his father's side
"as he always had done in the past, as if he had not left him." This conventional
ruse is followed, not just for the seven days of wedding festivities,
but is continued after the groom has moved back into the camp proper, and
pitched his tent alongside his father's, with the ropes of the two tents crossing.

In matters other than sleeping arrangements, this fiction that "nothing
has happened" is maintained. Marriage does not mean the immediate creation [592]
of a wholly separate domestic unit. Save for the appearance of an additional
tent, the ordinary run of daytime activities is scarcely altered. To 593
mention perhaps the most important feature of the relationships between 264
father and son, the groom continues to eat with his father. As yet, the son 571
does not use his own bowl,[1] and may not, indeed, do so for several years. 182
The important symbolism of "eating together" or "eating out of the one
bowl," the act of commensality creating a bond of fellowship about which
Robertson Smith[2] wrote so eloquently can only be referred to here in one of
its many aspects. Bedouin themselves stress that eating together is a strong
bond, and the communal meal is always used for this purpose after the
settlement of a dispute, or at the conclusion of a blood-money agreement,
and so on. It is significant also in the sense that those who partake of a [574]
meal accept the authority of the host; he becomes their protector, and a blow
against one of them is struck at him also. Even if the guest is an enemy,[3]
as long as he has eaten from another's bowl his life is safe.

The slaughter of an animal for another person creates a bond which has its 571
roots in the intimate connection between man and his animals. In a very 231
vivid way, the Bedouin view their animals as part of themselves, as part of 264
their *Risiq*, their general wealth, in which their sons are included. It is this 182
mystical association between a man and his animals which distinguishes a
meal consisting of the meat of an animal slaughtered from ones' own flock [574]
or herd from a meal consisting of meat bought from a butcher's shop — often [186]
given by the plateau peoples of Northern Cyrenaica to their guests, but which
the camel-herding Bedouin of the south regard as despicable hospitality. A
slaughtered animal is the food, *par excellence*, which establishes this bond

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[1] When Bedouin take their meals, they eat from large wooden bowls imported from [415]
south of the Sahara. It is a matter of custom that a man does not eat alone unless it is [439]
unavoidable, a custom of such strength, that, when, one day, only an elder, occupying
a tent the ropes of which were crossed with mine, was left in camp, he brought his [123]
bowl into my tent "so that I will be eating with a man."

[2] William Robertson Smith. *The Religion of the Semites*. 3rd ed. London: Macmillan, 1927. [113]

[3] A stranger entering a camp is under no obligation to give his identity. Few do so
until they have partaken of a meal. In the past, the Bedouin claim, the period of [574]
anonymity could last for 40 days, but nowadays, they say they limit it to two only. I [609]
have known strangers enter a camp, receive entertainment, and leave without offering
any specific identity.

would be impossible to satisfy all marriage expectations of men within the 621
universe of the minimal tribal section. For this reason alone external links 613
are inevitable and persistent. Also, the small territorial strip such a group 582
claims as a homeland produces an economy which, in this environment, 182
is unstable. Additional security is gained by making connections with other [423]
tribal sections, each with its specific ecological character. Men also marry [433]
into their client groups. The proportion of these for this camp was 9 per cent [619]
of the total. From these links they gain economic advantages, they can claim services and a client-following is politically significant. Finally, 7 per cent of the total[13] are marriages with women of other tribes, which again not only reduces the instability of the economy (in that a large tribal area suffering near-famine conditions has access to areas of markedly different ecology), but also provides political connections for men whose power ambitions have passed the point of leadership limited to their own tribes. In one way or another all these interests are manifest in the small camp and attention is now directed to the latter.

The disposition of people in the camp is represented diagrammatically 621
on the page following. 592

The nucleus of the camp is Tent A. Its owner (1) was a powerful *Shaikh*, [554]
the son of a famous father. His marriage represents a political link with a [619]
group of one of the primary sections of his own tribe. His father died only a [428]
few years before I recorded my census, and the large amount of moveable property he left had still not been divided among the sons; the owner of the tent, as eldest brother, still controlled the flocks and herds. Most of his time he spent away from the camp engaging in political intrigue. His two younger brothers lived in his tent, but the second (5) would not remain there long
because negotiations for his marriage had been started. His father (2) mar- [582]
ried a parallel cousin; she died and shortly afterwards he took her sister (3) [587]
in sororal union. When this occurred an amount of bride-wealth was
agreed, but instead of giving any of it to her father, the entire amount was [583]
"put in front of her" (that is, the animals were allowed to remain with her husband's flock), and these animals she had marked with her brother's
tribal sign to distinguish them from those of her husband. It was widely [428]
known that she was going to leave these animals to her husband's second [562]
son, for although she could not transfer them to a male outside her husband's corporate group, she could decide who, among his heirs, should inherit.

During my stay in this camp, her brother's son (4) came to it as a 621
temporary resident for a month. Since he was poor, the purpose of his visit 592
was to capture some of his aunt's wealth while she was still alive and the 574
possibility still existed. During his stay he was fed well but did no work. [604]
His kinsmen found his company tiresome, so, to cut short his stay, and after [431]
consulting her nominated heir (5), she gave him three grown goats. Also
when an occasion arose for an animal slaughter, she provided the sheep, and, [231]

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[13] The remainder is made up of marriages to the daughters of men incorporated into the lineages.

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

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574 since meat is shared by all the people of the camp, her wealth was partly
231 dispersed among her poorer kinsfolk.

621 The location of Tent B was determined by the fact that the wife (6) was
592 the sister of (3) of Tent A. Her husband (7) had moved into the camp a
571 few years earlier as a result of an inheritance quarrel with his elder who
[578] robbed him of his fair share. This husband (7) gained in two ways from
[233] the move. Although poor, he had a small flock of his own, too small to justify its own shepherd, but which he was permitted to include with his sister-in-law's (3) flock for shepherding. If the flock had been larger he would still have had difficulties, because, at some times of the year, save for short occasional visits to camp, the shepherd is with his sheep for several weeks, day and night. He (7) had three sons, still far too young to follow the sheep, but when they become of age to do so, his dependence on Tent A will cease, for then he can begin to gather the small flocks of other kinsmen around his own, his sons can shepherd them all and he can begin to
[574] enjoy the benefits to be derived from dependents. In addition, he enjoyed

the lavish generosity dispensed by the members of Tent A, and fed far better 621 592●
than would have been possible otherwise. 571

The location of Tent C was also determined by a link through women. [574]
The only female (8) living in this tent, a middle-aged widow, was the sister of (3) and (6) of Tents A and B respectively. Her teenage son lived with her. They possessed only a few sheep, which were put with the flock of Tent A for shepherding. The son (9) spent some of his time herding for Tent A. With the mother and her son in Tent C were two other kinsmen. One, a poor man (10), was this son's first patrilateral cousin, and they both were the only surviving sons of their respective fathers. He (10) was the main shepherd of Tent A. The third male (11), also poor and nearly blind, was a second patrilateral cousin of both, but his sister was also 11's mother. All occupants of Tent C were almost entirely supported by Tent A. Relieved of the necessity to live off their own resources, the two young men (9 and 10) were afforded the opportunity of building up their flocks for the day when they would be able to negotiate their delayed marriages.

Tents A, B and C sheltered men who were agnatically closely linked. More 621
important, their grandfathers, three sons in a family of 19 children, were 613
full brothers. The latter's mother's name was used when referring to these 592
three tents as a group. During the past few years, many changes have 571
occurred within it, and the death of the pivotal woman (3) of Tent A might well disperse this small cluster. Further, the nuptials of her heir (5) were anticipated, and this event, itself likely to precipitate division of his father's (2) wealth, might also lead to further residential rearrangements.

The owner of Tent D, (12), a man in his late thirties, son of a slave 621
mother, was at loggerheads with his father's brother, much more senior in age. 592
The owner's father, one of a family of 24 children, had been a wealthy man 604
and died leaving a substantial herd and a large flock, but he (12) was bereft 578
of most of this wealth by the father's brother. His first successful strike
against his uncle was the demand he made for his daughter as a wife. [582]
Earlier, when (12) had demanded his father's wealth, his father's brother, [428]
who had for years acted as his guardian, replied, "It is in your stomach,"
(meaning that it had been expended on his upbringing). Later, after the [583]
marriage had taken place, when the uncle demanded payment of the bride-wealth his own words were thrown back at him, but this time with the meaning that the bride-wealth had already been paid. While I was resident in this area, the two men met occasionally: each meeting was hostile, for (12) was encouraging his half-brother (13) (also the son of a slave mother) to demand a second daughter as a wife. Included in this tent is a third adult male (14), virtually a pauper, reduced to this state by the same grasping father's brother. His link with (12) was their closeness of relationship (first [571]
paternal cousin), together with the fact that all three males (12, 13 and 14) had suffered privations and were allies against the common enemy, their father's brother.

Associated with them for the same reason, was the owner of Tent E (15).

621 Genealogically he was their father's brother, but he was of their same age
•592 generation, and behaved as if he was their agnatic equal. Towards his own
578 brother (16), he behaved as if the latter was his uncle, for he was much his
[604] junior in age and his uncle had virtually brought him up from boyhood.
[428] They had quarrelled bitterly because his brother (16) had given him only
a fraction of his inheritance, which he himself, in turn, should have
[593] shared with his young full brother (not shown on the diagram) but he did
not do so. This youngest brother left (15) for this reason and now resides
621 with (16), his full brother's enemy. Two of the men (14 and 13) of this
592 group of four were the chief herdsmen of the camp, although they were
[233] assisted for short periods by (12) and (15), who also helped tend the
camels in other ways. Their connection with the group centered on Tent
[571] A was a mutual close link to a politically powerful person (not shown on the
genealogies) to whom they are deeply loyal and who, while I was among
them, was actively opposed to the common political enemy of them all (16),
and who in earlier years had challenged the leadership of (2) of Tent A.
There is also the fact that they were all linked within a close range of
[613] agnation. This linkage included, too, the owner of Tent F (17), not in
[602] fact the descendant of the man shown in the diagram — he was the son of
a slave wife; his genitor was a slave, but his mother's master reared him,
freed him and he is now given as his son in the genealogy. He lives with his
wife, of client origin, together with her children from a previous husband,
(18), who divorced her, and his own children. Aging, he no longer acted
as a regular herdsmen, but relieved other men in the camp, and also spent
some time shepherding.

621 The details given of the strands which run through the camp to tie these
571 particular people together are so few that, like the Bedouin plough, they do
no more than scratch the surface, but they are sufficient to permit a few
general statements. The camp, and particularly the precise disposition of
621 its tents, shows a group of males clustered together to share two of the main
571 economic tasks: shepherding and herding. The physically strong adult males
233 of Tents D and E shoulder the burden of herding all the camels of the camp,
462 and the men of Tents B, A and C shepherd all the sheep, with (17) of
Tent F serving both purposes. This number of men allows some to remain
in the camp at all times, to free one of them for a journey to the distant
market when supplies of sugar and tea are necessary, and to enable one or
two men, at short notice, to hurry away on horse or camel to search for
lost animals.[14]

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Economic Determinants of the General Structure of the Camp

574 It is also clear from these details that, given the disparities in wealth
231 (although all men have some wealth), the diet of most is considerably
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431 [14] There is little point in seeking the lost animals themselves in the first instance.
A man travels from camp to camp asking for information, and when he has gathered
[556] his clues, he searches a neighbourhood.

428 the father's property. The egalitarian spirit of the Bedouin
596 inheritance rule functions to maintain the unity of the family,
and, at another level of social complexity, the structural
continuity of the corporate group. Ideally, the surviving
sons will keep intact their father's estate, his land and
animals, and will work it as a unit. And this is generally
596 the case in al-Qasr. On the other hand, there is also the
594 implicit assumption in the structural principle of the
*613 Bedouin segmentary lineage system that each individual will
•183 eventually establish a unit of his own, separate from but
interrelated with, the main household. As a result, there
596 usually develops some division of property and labor among
•593 surviving brothers. Whether or not this division is formally
agreed upon, and, whether or not it is assigned by the father
or the eldest son is largely arbitrary. In some cases, the
father makes such a decision before his death and prepares
his sons for it. The father's concern is that good relations
be maintained between his sons after his death. Just as the
father mediates conflict between his sons during his life,
so he hopes to maintain peace between them after his death.
The Bedouins say that a father should be fair when dealing
with his sons, and that he should never favor one over the
other.

428 Inheritance is determined through the patrilineal
*[613] lineage principle. The Bedouins of al-Qasr claim that they

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554 moral community, we cannot proceed to a discussion of the internal and external systems of political relations.

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[867] As a result of the socialization process, and through relations with other members of the family, an individual comes to recognize that his conduct is measurable by certain standards of, what is considered by the group to be, good and bad, right and wrong. In al-Qasr, such standards are intrinsically correct, or "decent" as the Bedouins say; obedience to the authority representing these standards is interpreted
[596] as a "duty." The authoritative aspect of the role of household head (shaib al-bait), and the moral obligations which it represents, emerge from and reinforce values and structural arrangements central to Bedouin social order, namely, respect for authority and devotion to social groups, the two basic elements of morality defined by Durkheim (Parsons 1937:382-385).

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182 The value placed upon social order, and the structural mechanisms for insuring its realization and extension--kinship, residence and contract--inform an authority structure which ranges between filial piety at the family level and a set of legal norms at the level of the external political system. The fact that the Bedouins of al-Qasr are interested in integrating a larger population into their authority structure means that a common value is operative in the range of it; also that one sphere of authority will tend to merge into another.
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[691] Hence the father-son authority relation has importance for the strength of Bedouin customary law in the desert. The

577 571 181 182 high value placed upon conformity to rules governing authority relations makes Bedouin society of al-Qasr less individualistic than, for instance, the Iatmul of New Guinea who "set no exaggerated value upon extremely orderly behavior" (Bateson 1958:31). Social cohesion in al-Qasr is sustained through what Durkheim called "mechanical solidarity."

593 The Bedouin father is in a disciplinary position over his washuun, his wife (wives) and his children. (The word, washuun, must be of Berber origin for I am unable to trace it in Arabic.) Although the father has the right to beat his washuun, the Bedouins say that he does so "only in rare cases, when it is necessary." During my time in the field I heard of no physical punishment being dealt out by a father.

The dyadic relationship of father and son roles is the focal field of authority in the family. The pattern of behavior in this relationship is marked typically by restraint on the part of the son. The father orders and the son obeys unquestioningly. If the father accidentally uses a taboo
[192] word, such as 'ammar which in standard Arabic means "to fill" but in the Bedouin dialect means "to have sexual intercourse," the son will immediately depart the scene in a high state of embarrassment. In this way, the boy is not only excluded
[561] from gatherings and activities in which his father participates, but he is also made to maintain a respectable social distance from his father's age-set. There are other ways of

593 handling the potential conflict between father and son and the successive generations which they represent; these are mechanisms which preclude intimacy between the father and the son. The social statuses of father and son are not permitted to overlap by their being participants in, or even present at, festive occasions, such as circumcision and wedding parties, occasions which are marked by erotic poems and lewd songs. It would be "wrong" for a father to accompany his son to one of these parties. In the one instance that I did observe a father and son together at a wedding party, the Bedouins explained the rare occurrence by pointing out that this was the man's only son, and so he treated him "like a brother."

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The Bedouins of al-Qasr recognize the aloofness of the father from the son and justify it as a training period to prepare the boy for the time when he will be on his own. One young man explained the underlying rationale of the father-son relationship in this way:

> There are different kinds of fathers. One wishes to make his son a man, to make his son self-dependent at an early age. Other fathers destroy the personalities of their sons. For instance, the first type of father gives his son the responsibility of selling something, or buying something, or of supervising a chore in his own place. But the second type of father is usually soft with his son; he doesn't depend on his son due to his young age. He is very cautious with him and will not send him anywhere, and if he does he will ask someone to look after him. Of course, the first type of father is good and the second type is bad.

593 In al-Qasr it is a rare sight to see a father and his young son together, and it is only slightly more common to see the father with the grown son. The second case may simply be a reflection of the division of labor since the son, once grown, takes over the economic tasks of his father.

593 The most important duties of a father toward his
867 son are three: he must teach him generosity, courage and
584 courtesy; he must see that the boy learns the Quran; and he
872 must arrange a good marriage for his son. According to
593 Peters (1960:34), the Cyrenaican Bedouin father must attend
852 to three things for his son, namely: his circumcision, his
[872] [583] education in the Quran, and his bridewealth when he marries.
In al-Qasr, the Egyptian school teachers have succeeded in
[177] showing the Bedouin that circumcision is a private family
593 affair and not a public ritual. Although all fathers still
852 see to it that their sons are circumcised, the father is no
178 longer responsible for "making a circumcision party." In
[626] fact, the father who does insist on following the old ways
[431] by hiring a dancer and publicly marking his son's rite de passage, will be ridiculed as one "who only wants to make money from the ritual gift (naquut) given the boy."

593 The son recognizes the rights which the father has over him through a show of respect and obedience. A boy shows deference toward his father by not smoking, singing, or reciting poetry of any kind in his presence. During the

593 [207] [177] During the present time when most of the Bedouins own a transistor radio, a son will not even listen to songs or poetry broadcast over the air if his father is within hearing distance. I once witnessed a well-meaning father try unsuccessfully to get his ten year old son to sit down and listen with him to the news on the radio. 593 561 This automatic deference paid to the father is extended to all male elders: the father-son relationship is the model for authority relations between generations. [276] But there are degrees in which the model is applied to behavior; for instance, a boy will not smoke in front of his older brother, his uncles and grandfather, but will feel no uneasiness about smoking in the company of an elder with whom he has no immediate authority relationship.

593 The filial piety which marks the father-son authority relationship is owed to the father until his death. As the son grows older, he may show a little less constraint but he still plays the role of the subordinate. For example, I never saw a son argue with his father over anything during my stay in the field, with one serious exception. One man who had broken off friendly relations with his brother objected to the presence of his brother's sons at the wedding of his own daughter. When he threatened to cause a public scene to embarrass his nephews before the other guests, his own sons defended the right of their cousins to be at their sister's wedding. They told their father that his quarrel

593 was with his brother and not his brother's sons. When the father persisted with his intention to embarrass his nephews, his sons, as a last alternative, threatened to leave him. In the face of this threat, the father capitulated.

The rights and duties of the father-son relationship, although they do not change in sentiment, will change in content during the lifetime of the father. The main change
[421] in content will be a reflection of a change in property re-
593 lations. The Bedouin believe that this is the way it ought
577 to be; they say that

> A son must respect and obey his father. The son must do anything that he can to help and please his father. When the son grows up and begins to earn money, he must contribute generously to his father. A son pleases his father by giving him money and helping him to be comfortable.

593 In boyhood and manhood, the father has disposal over his son's
596 labor. As long as a son lives in his father's naja' this is
[464] so. One son, who worked for an American oil company in the desert, regularly turned over his pay check to his father. It is the father who decides where the son will live, and, whether or not he will have his own domicile away from the
[591] main naja'. When the son marries and brings his wife to the naja', he will usually set up his tent next to his father's tent. The tent is given to the boy by his father. During
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431 the son's growing-up period, he will be given, as gifts on various occasions, a sheep or a number of sheep which will be kept with the father's flock.

593 [591] be kept with the father's flock. Only in the case of a man's owning, or using, a large piece of land in the pasture area of al-Qasr will his son live away from the main part of the naja', i.e., away from his father's tent. The son then serves as his father's shepherd.

593 591 184 In the 'izba sector of al-Qasr, the pattern is generally the same except that the son will be given a room in the house rather than a tent when he marries. Since the land in this area is more scarce and a matter of official ownership, the son is not likely to have his own house during his father's lifetime.

593 584 When the son does marry, the marriage proceedings may be initiated by either the son or the father. But, under no circumstances that I heard of, would the son approach the father with the idea of his marriage; the son should communicate his desire to marry, first of all, to either his father's brother or his mother's brother. As the Bedouins say, "Marriage is an agreement between fathers." What they
593 584 mean is that marriage is an agreement between tertiary groups.
*613 A father upon hearing of his son's wish to marry, for the boy's uncle will immediately tell the father, consults with the head of his tertiary group about such a proposed marriage. This is not a formal procedure but, certainly, the father would not go ahead with the marriage without making the matter public. In other words, marriage in al-Qasr is a

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● [593] public corporate affair and not a private one.

The head of the boy's tertiary group then relays the information about the marriage to the heads of the other tertiary segments which make up the secondary group. Again, this is an informal procedure but all corporate representatives must be informed of, and must approve of, the proposed marriage. Thus is the corporate channel of communication kept open and the corporate network of authority relations maintained through a reciprocal exchange of rights and duties. It is, as Fortes (1949:209) has noted, the lineage principle which compels a man to consult and gain the support of his lineage-mates in any matter of importance, or even in trivial matters. Demands are channeled through the corporate lines, "For no jural act takes place except in the framework of the lineage system."

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[593] If the father should not consult the secondary group concerning his son's marriage--he may anticipate objections and consider his son's desires above those of the group--there are sanctions, forms of moral coercion, which can be applied by the group. First, a man may be fined if he goes through with an objectionable marriage; added to this, the man may be denied access to the preferred channels of marriage which exist within the lineage; lastly, dependent upon the gravity of the situation, the man may be threatened with expulsion from the lineage group.

593 The daughter and wife roles are also subject to the
dominant role of father in al-Qasr Bedouin society. The
father has virtually the right of life and death over his
daughter in certain situations. But in no case does he have
593 this right over his wife. The differentiation in right here
*613 is again a matter of the authority principle operating within
the framework of the lineage system. A man's daughter belongs
[851] to his patrilineage or authority group while his wife belongs
to the authority group of her father. There is an obvious
[582] exception to this statement about Bedouin society, for given
the practice of parallel-cousin marriage a man and his wife
can belong to the same authority group, the same tertiary
593 group. Even so, only the father has the right of life and
death over the girl who is his daughter. The Bedouins say,
"The bones of the girl belong to the father." There are two
593 situations in which a father may rightfully put his daughter
684 to death: when she is found guilty of pre-marital intercourse
(loss of virginity), or if it is proved that she has had any
extra-marital sexual activity. In either case, if the husband
were to kill the girl he would be guilty of murder and his
group would have to forfeit blood-money or be threatened with
retaliation. I heard of no such actual cases.

593 The father's major duty toward his daughter is to
584 provide her with "a good marriage." This, of course, parallels
his duty toward his son and emphasizes that a father is con-

593 [584] [581] *[613] cerned with his own and his group's status in marriage arrangements. One informant said that a rich man must marry into a rich group. The Bedouin have a saying which is relevant here: "Your bait is equal to the bait into which you marry." Before her marriage the girl's duty toward her father is to respect and obey him. After her marriage "her only duty is that she [958] must visit him from time to time. If he becomes sick, and he has no wife, she must care for him and nurse him."

593 834 It was a common sight to see a Bedouin father fondle his daughter of age six years or younger, but beyond this age physical intimacy ceases. The Bedouin say that a father should not kiss or hold on his knee a daughter over the age of eleven. After the girl marries, a definite avoidance custom characterizes the father-daughter role relationship. The Bedouin say that the father will not see the face of his daughter after her marriage. This means that the married daughter remains veiled before her father, and even before her older brothers. This type of avoidance custom is rare by comparison with the cross-cultural data (Driver 1966).

593 A wife obeys her husband concerning all matters: "she does not even leave the house without his permission." A woman may go and complain to her father if her husband does not provide for her, i.e., with food and clothing, or if he unjustly beats her or continually threatens to beat her. On the other hand, if a woman is in the wrong "it is

593 not considered bad for a man to beat his wife." In the case
593 of ill-treatment by the husband, her father may take the
*613 matter to the corporate head. Traditionally, the corporate
[792] head would order the husband to move his tent next to the tend of the "holy man" or some other third party, so that he would be dissuaded against such behavior. Another reason
[586] for this is so that the girl might have witnesses to support her petition for divorce should the husband continue to beat her. I heard of no wife-beating while I was in al-Qasr.

595 The Quran states that a man may lawfully take four
[779] wives, but that if he feels he cannot treat each of them equally, he should take only one (Sura IV:3 and 129). The Bedouins are conscientious in practicing this rule, though
595 perhaps not for religious reasons. If a man has more than
593 one wife, he must spend an equal amount of time with each. Conflict between co-wives is lessened by the fact that a man will have separate tents, or rooms in the case of a house, for each wife. A man will not buy a dress or a piece of jewelry for one wife without buying a copy of it for all other wives.
595 On a trip to the Siwa Oasis, I was accompanied by a man who
593 had three wives and wished to bring them a gift of basketry
114 upon his return. He was successful in buying two baskets which were similar but could not find a comparable third in
[431] the oasis market. In dismay, he made a gift of the baskets to me and returned with no souvenirs at all. One of my in-

One of my in-
595 124 formants, a wealthy man and a poet, said that since he could
not love two women equally he would never take a second wife.
He also said that he was unwilling to give his daughter to a
man who refused to promise him that she would be his only wife.

593 Throughout his life, the father is dominant and his
washuun is subjective. He is the master of his naja' and the
[596] social behavior of his wife and offspring toward him has both
a moral and a pragmatic aspect. They show respect and obed-
[768] ience because "it is the decent thing to do;" further, just
as he provides for their material needs while he is alive,
so the property which he leaves them will sustain them after
428 his death. As we have already noted, in theory, the daughters
[562] inherit one-half of the shares which the sons receive; in
fact, females inherit only if they are the sole survivors of
the male. But the surviving wife, or wives, will take a cash
amount equal to their brideprice from the husband's estate.
The Bedouins say that this price will be paid before any
other inheritance shares are distributed. In addition, the
768 wife has the right to remain in her husband's house or tent,
and it is the duty of the eldest son to look after her. She
may remain at home until death, provided she never brings a
man who may be considered a prospective husband into the
house.

593 The rights and duties involved in the father-washuun
relationship show that the ideal authority structure of the

593 family is a dominant-subjective one. But the rights and duties of the father have no legal sanctions. His authority grows out of the moral and mutual dependence, the common interests and value, which hold the family together. The
593
183
867 authority relations learned in the family become the norms of behavior to be applied by the individual in a wider-scale network of social relations. The son learns the discipline-respect relationship which is the model of behavior between generations. The subjective role which the daughter plays in the father-daughter relationship prepares her for the role of wife.

Marriage and Kinship Relations

582

The parallel-cousin, the father's brother's daughter, is the preferred mate in Bedouin marriage. Parallel-cousin marriage in al-Qasr is more of an ideal than a practice. In fact, parallel-cousin marriage is not practical in the case where social order depends upon the integration of a larger and clearly segmented population. Endogamy of this kind in this type of society works against survival in a double-edged way: economic security through cooperation with a larger group is discouraged, and political security through
171 coalition is undermined. In the Middle East, as elsewhere,
582 cross-cousin marriage is the normative practice which functions "as a counterweight to the tendency of unilineal descent group-

604 538 brother to special place in the social structure states that [539] "Two-thirds of the boy belongs to the khal, and he is like the father: the remaining one-third is divided equally between the father and the khal." The Bedouins are always quick to point out to the stranger, such as I was, that this means there is only one-sixth of the boy which belongs to the father. A clearer case of the ideology of kinship versus [539] descent could not be had. Another proverb has it that "the good which you see in a boy comes from khal khalu ("the maternal uncle of his maternal uncle"). Any kinship relation may be the basis for a new network of social relations by making use of the classificatory principle. The Bedouins [539] exaggerate the status and role of the mother's brother by saying that "when a boy does good or bad, one wants to know the name of his khal not the name of his father." This statement, which favors cognatic links over patrilineal ties, is not true but such an attempt at emphasis indicates that this relationship is something of value in the Bedouin society.

604 In the case of any conflict "between his tribes," the 578 Bedouins say, "the boy must support the tribe of his khal." This, of course, does not mean that the individual should take up arms against his patrilineal corporate group, but 562 that he should seek to mediate the conflict. The political 593 value of conflict avoidance and conflict control is also 554 182 578 conspicuous in the dual role which the mature female plays

562 ● 593 in Bedouin society, that is, the role of wife-daughter. The
554 principles of patrilineality and cognation do not work against
182 each other when the girl marries outside her corporate group,
578 nor does her new dual role present a case of role conflict.
562 593 On the contrary, the wife-daughter role functions to bind to-
554 gether two groups which are structurally differentiated by
182 578 the rule of patrilineality. During time of peace, the wife-
*613 daughter acts as a bond-maker by carrying gifts back and
[431] forth between the two groups, often bringing some of her
[628] younger patrilineal relatives back to her husband's house or
[574] tent for short visits. During a time of conflict or war, the
562 Bedouins point out, she is the only person who can cross the
593 battle lines unharmed. She is a match-maker as well as a
554 [726] peace-maker. Often she influences the selection of mates by
[584] individuals in both her husband's group and her father's
562 group. The Bedouins say that "after the bint 'amm, a man
593 should marry his bint khal ("mother's brother's daughter")
554 because she is like his bint 'amm." Usually, over a period
582 of a few generations, a given direction in marriage is sustained (see Figure 10), and it is one function of this wife-daughter role to accomplish this important political action.

562 The role of wife-daughter, then, may be seen as one
593 important aspect of what Fortes (1953:33) calls, "complemen-
554 *613 tary filiation," the essential mechanism which provides the
182 link between the corporate groups of al-Qasr society and the kin groups of the parent who does not determine descent.

586 [583] [768] [595] at the time of divorce (if the husband is in fault), and also at the time of the husband's death; and, sadaaq al-musaama ("price of friendship") is paid to the wife when her husband takes a second, third or fourth wife.

586 158 The second divorce case which happened while I was in al-Qasr involved, what seems to be, an instance of psychotic behavior. A girl, who had married shortly before I arrived in the field, would fall into a deep sleep every time she entered her husband's house. Each time her father would come for her and take her home until she had recovered. But upon her return, three different times, she became ill again. Finally, her father and the husband agreed that this marriage would not work, and the father returned the mahr to the man. This case lasted over the period of almost a year while I lived in al-Qasr. I suggested to the father that perhaps his daughter did not wish to be married to this man but he assured me that "she loved him very much."

586 If the girl's father is dead, so that she cannot return to his house at the time of divorce, she will go to live with the brother who needs her services. It then be-
586 587 [593] [583] comes the duty of the brother to make another marriage for his sister, and in the case that he does it becomes his right to claim the mahr for himself. The Bedouins say that virginity, or the lack of it, in the case of the divorced woman is no issue; just so a man knows "she is from a good family."

571 *613 •[593] [604] The model of corporate authority structure, i.e., that which makes the corporation-corporate sole relationship meaningful, is the father-son-father's brother triad. The submission of the son in the fundamental dyadic and triadic relationships of Bedouin society is carried over to the, just as axiomatic, relationship between corporate member and corporate sole. Peters (1965:127) is enlightening on this point when he says

[593]
> All men of a corporation, in any event, "speak with one word" at a moot, and a son, by his assent to the common view, also supports his father; in so doing he yields to the political authority of his corporation, and not that of his father.

The structure of authority relations which obtains within and between the groups of al-Qasr, then, is reflected in the idea or concept of _'aqila_. It is meaningful to the Bedouins. The social order which it represents is legitimate because of the moral attribute and obligation which attaches to its symbolization in the political office. At the same time, this focus or office of authority tends to become pivotal for the extension of a sphere of moral judgments and authority relations along with the expansion of social structural relations and promotion of common interests. Easton (1959) has referred to this expansion as "the political community," and Middleton and Tait (1958) as "the jural community." At all levels of society, conflict and consensus take place in terms of certain ideas concerning good and bad, operational

*613
578 the Bedouins. Conflict regulation treats the expressions of
571 social conflict and not its causes.

554 The _'aqila_ regulates conflict between the members of
his tertiary segment, between this group and the other groups
of the secondary unit, and between secondary units of the
tribe. He operates in both the internal and external systems
*613 of authority relations. The _'aqila_ may pre-empt the authority
578 of the _shaib_ in the sphere of familial authority, though, the
•593 Bedouins say, this seldom happens because the son is willing
554
[596] to obey his father. Having been reared in the culture, and
as a future father himself, the son supports the respect-
*613 discipline principle of Bedouin society. But in extreme cases,
578 such as the threat of a father to disown his son, the explicit
593 approval of the _'aqila_, and of all the _'awaaqil_ of the secondary
428 corporate group, is necessary. This is the procedure in all
554 cases of banishment. In one case (which I document below), a
man disinherited his younger brother with the formal approval
of his _'awaaqil_.

*613 The tertiary group in Bedouin society is by definition
682 the blood-vengence group. However, in view of the common
578 values and pragmatic interests of its members, the secondary
[181] group fulfills this function. Traditionally, when revenge
[681] killings were carried out according to the _lex talionis_, it
was usually at the hand of some member of the victim's tertiary
group. In the case of protracted conflict, such as extended

6[illegible]0 to possess the wisdom which it takes to regulate conflict.
*613 Theoretically, as one 'aqila said, conflict should be stopped
578 at the familial level, either by the father or the paternal
•593 [604] uncle, and should never reach the level of the 'aqila. Once
before the 'aqila, conflict assumes new structural poses, or
different orientation in authority relations. Authority here
is differentiated in terms of the context: the father's authority relates to the familial structural level, and beyond this
level the father per se cannot exercise legitimate authority.
*613 The 'aqila, who is responsible for internal order and external
578 relations exercises legitimate authority at each level of the
182 political structure. The authority of the 'aqila is checked
and prevented from growing into naked power in that any single 'aqila must consult with the other 'awaaqil of the secondary segment concerning matters which may concern the structural nature and continuity of the group.

*613 In many respects, the authority structure in al-Qasr
554 corresponds to that defined for the Lugbara of Uganda
571 (Middleton 1960). The structural levels (see Figure 7 above)
171 of 'Ailit Ma'fas (secondary), Bait 'Umar (tertiary), and 'Ait Abd al-Malik (sub-tertiary) are approximately equivalent to Middleton's major, minor, and minimal lineages (1960:7-9). But
[596] whereas among the Lugbara authority roles are purely kinship
roles, i.e., genealogically senior heads are responsible for internal control and representation, among the Bedouins of

685 I was in al-Qasr, and each party to the conflict hired
578 Egyptian lawyers in Marsa Matruh to represent them. As one
648 litigant in this case told me: "The Bedouins prefer to settle
their own land disputes because the government's way of
handling these things costs money and long periods of waiting."

69 The notion of jurisprudence in tribal cultures, in
121 general, seems to be one which concentrates on the restoration
578 of a disturbed balance rather than one concern[illegible]ith formality
and procedure. To a great extent, this is true in the Bedouin
case also. However, the absence of institutionalized ways of
dealing with conflict is more characteristic of the internal
*613 system of political relations. Conflict within the secondary
578 segment, we have noticed, may be regulated at the familial
• [593] level of authority by the shaib, or one acting in his place:
[596] it is hoped by the Bedouins that quarrels never become serious
enough to prompt intervention by the 'aqila. On the other
hand, the 'aqila, as a legitimate representative of his
authority group, will almost always become involved in conflict
regulation falling within the sphere of external political
relations, i.e., conflict between secondary, primary, or tribal
segments.

The 'aqila as the most effective mechanism of social
*613 control has become institutionalized through time in Bedouin
578
182 society. At the interactional level of secondary lineage
group relations, conflict may easily expand into feuding or,

554 It would be considered "wrong" for the members of
571 this group to present themselves at an al-Qasr wedding party,
[577] [585] or the annual celebration held in honor of a local saint of
[796] the area. When I inquired about the conspicuous absence of
[124] some of my chief informants from such gatherings, I was told
[431] that "they will send their gifts," or that "it is not decent
554 that they come to something such as this." In terms of
571 Bedouin social structure, there are a number of plausible
182 explanations for this "status separation." Fathers should
561 [593] not attend public affairs at which their sons may be "per-
forming," i.e., young men should be allowed to play a public
role outside the confines of the father-son authority
structure. By virtue of the extension of the father role,
and its corresponding authoritarian attitude, every member
of the elder age-set commands certain rights and obligations
which would prevent the free expression that is the hallmark
of Bedouin parties. Conversely, and at the more general
level, members of the "status group" who wish to remain
members of this circle accept certain restrictions on social
[114] intercourse. At the five different Bedouin "parties" which
I attended, there were "elders" present, but none of them
could be classified as members of the "status group." Bedouins
plainly state that elders should not attend parties, but, on
the other hand, they show much more concern and emotion when
they say that a member of the "status group" should not "be

613 mainly a declaration that, that particular person is no longer a member
681 of the tribal segment and that his actions should not in any way reflect
upon the tribal segment. The tribal segment referred to is usually the
amar since it is only politically corporate group amoung Awlad Ali. The
procedure is usually undertaken in cases of habitual offenders whose actions
consistently bringing liability to the amar or disgracing it in
relations with other tribal groups in the area. Due to the seriousness
of the procedure (since it leaves the individual without the protection
of his group), it is restricted. First, to announce the barawa of any
of its members the amar has to get the unanimous agreement of all adult
males of the gorup as represented by their Awaqil of their respective
[675] baits. Lately such decisions have to be put in writing. The barawa
● [593] from the amar does not include the man's father, brothers, or sons.
[672] These immediate relatives remain responsible for his actions even if they
desire to detach themselves from such responsibility. This is mainly
maintained not so much for the protection of the repeated offender but
rather for the protection of unsuspecting people who happen to have dealings
with him and who would be protected by the corporate responsibility
of the man's immediate kin. In addition to repeated offenders, the
[626] barawa or the threat of it is used to back the awaqil in their exercise
of persuasion to get members of their baits to agree to their decisions,
expecially those affecting the amar, like the collection of bloodmoney
or the taking of the oath.

A man, on his part, may ask to be given a barawa from his amar. In this case, as shown in the amar papers of Aggary, he has to give good reasons for such a demand. The awaqil of the amar meet and discuss such

613 everything ... his property, his name, and anything he can give him, like
428 the position of the Aqila. This is only natural." While the office of
[562] the Aqila is inherited through the male line, there seems to be no special
regard for seniority. Any son of the Aqila can succeed him in the
position and it is usually left to the Aqila to select the son who is to
613 succeed him. This decision is not usually the subject matter of brotherly
428 rivalry since the position of Aqila is regarded more as a duty than
● 593 as a privilege. There has been only one case in the entire area of the
Western Desert in which such a decision has lead to open fighting between
brothers. "When my father became very old and his eyes bothered him, he
told me that I should become the Aqila and could not say no to him,"
said Shei'eb. "I didn't want to become the Aqila but this was the choice
of my father and I have to obey .... You owe it to your father and family
to carry on his responsibilities the same way you carry his name." It
was patrilineal succession upon which Shei'eb based his case. Most uninterested
parties believe that he and he alone had the legitimate claim
to the position.

613 The importance of patrilineal succession as the basis of the Aqila's
627 authority may be better understood by contrasting it to a closely related
554 position, that of the "mardi". A man within a bait may acquire, by virtue
of personal qualities, a reputation for wisdom and soundness of opinion
which may overshadow that of the Aqila. Such a person becomes known
throughout a certain area as a successful mediator and go-between; and
therefore is called upon to solve disputes not limited to members of his
own bait. He thus acquires an informal position which cuts across a
number of baits and sometimes larger political units.

CHAPTER V

MARRIAGE: A CONTRACTUAL RELATIONSHIP

593 A survey of all disputes occurring among the eilat Aggary in the
578 last five years shows that more than 70% were disputes over "women,"
the usual phrase referring to cases involving marital relations. Disagreement over matters arising out of quarrels between husband and wife
or between one of the spouses and his or her in-laws often constitute
593 the basis for these disputes. What seems to make marriage and the
578 family particularly productive of conflict is the fact that although
602 residence is commonly virilocal, and the majority of the women leav-
613 ing their own families to live with the husband, the woman retains her
[591] membership in her father's family after the marriage, and her agnatic group keeps an active interest in her, even after she is married. Marriage then brings face to face the interests of two groups. These interests affect the relationship between the married couple; and, more importantly, the relationship between the latter affects the interests of their respective groups. This, in many instances, leads to direct conflict between the two groups.

581 The position of the Awlad Ali daraieb with regard to marriage rela-
671 tions is based on the Islamic law with minor modifications to suit the
585 requirements of local life. According to the Muslim law, marriage is
675 a civil contract affected by the request of one party and the agreement of the other. No witnesses are needed for the legalization of the marriage, according to some of the Shi'a sects, although the Sunni schools of Muslim jurisprudence insist that two adult male and two adult females

581 are necessary for the validation of the marriage contract. Modern
585 legal systems which took as their basis the Islamic law of marriage
671
675 and the family further required the registration of the marriage contract for the marriage to be legal.

584 The request and necessary response forming the marriage are sup-
585 posed to be carried on by the parties involved. However, if either the
429 groom or the bride is not of age, or is mentally unqualified, the trans-
● 593 action is carried on by his or her guardian, or "wakil." The wakil is
the father, unless he is dead or an invalid, in which case the brothers
[604] become the wakils. If the person has no brothers, then the uncles be-
[184] come the wakil in the order stated. According to certain Sunni sects
in Islam, a woman marrying for the first time is always represented by
her wakil, even if she is of age. The assumption is that a woman who
has never been married does not have the experience that enables her to
enter into any kind of legally binding relationship such as marriage.

585 Following the original Islamic idea, marriage among Awlad Ali is
675 an oral agreement between the groom or his father and the guardian
593
429 (wakil) of the bride-to-be (her father, if alive, or her closest male
[604] kin in the following order: her brothers, her uncles, her grandfather).
585 A religious man is sometimes asked to perform the marriage, although it
792 is not required. Some persons might invite a member of the Murabiteen
[619] tribe or holy men to witness the marriage on the basis that his presence
[778] gives "baraka," or blessing, to the marriage. Before the application of
585 the State legal system to the area, marriage contracts were not regis-
656
177 tered. In recent years, however, and with the increased mobility of
[675] the tribal populations, more and more marriages are being registered in
[634] the administrative districts. Still, according to the unofficial estimates,

Still, according to the unofficial estimates,
585 only about ten per cent of all marriages are registered, and these are
656 mainly mixed marriages involving a tribal person and a non-tribal one
177 or a tribal member who is not living in the area anymore. The reason
582 is that such a spouse, especially when he is the husband, is not under
619 the control of the tribal customs and therefore cannot be forced to fulfill
his obligations if he fails to do so. Most of the tribal population
[581] still feel that marriage is a personal and family affair that
should be kept away from the State legal system.

584 Marriage among Awlad Ali is a relatively informal procedure. When
593 a man decides to marry a certain girl, he informs his mother who, in
turn, informs his father. The father may have objections to his son's
choice of the bride. Such objections may be based on already strained
relations between the two families or the questionable reputation of
the girl or any member of her family. In such cases, the father tries
to dissuade his son from going ahead with the marriage. The father is
[583] usually successful in controlling his son's choice when the latter is
dependent on his father for the payment of the bridewealth called "mahr"
and for the support of his new household. This is usually the case in
the man's first marriage. In subsequent marriages and in the cases
where the son has independent means of support for himself and his
bride, the father's control of the son's choice is minimal, and asking
the father's approval is a matter of formality. In second and subsequent
593 595 marriages, the approval of the older wives is essential. The
584 older wives have no right to object to the husband taking an additional
wife, but they have the right to object to the choice on the basis that
the new bride is hard to get along with or that there is animosity between
her family and the families of the other wives which makes

593 cooperation between the wives in household activities difficult. The
595 wives have to have reasonable grounds for their objection to the new
584 bride. But even then, the husband could still marry the woman of his
[431] choice, although in this case he has to bring gifts to the other wives
as "nasafa," or making-up present.

584 If the family has no objections to the marriage, the proceedings
593 start. The initial proceedings are undertaken by the women on both
sides. The groom's mother or a female relative of his mother's generation or older visits the mother of the prospective bride and tells her
of her son's intention to marry the latter's daughter. The bride's
mother then discusses the matter with the girl's father who has the
[429] final say in the matter. If the father is dead, then the authority on
giving the girl in marriage goes to her brother or closest male kin in
the order specified before. The girl has no say in the matter of marriage and cannot refuse to complete the marriage, although after marriage
she can resort to a certain practice which helps her to terminate the
marriage without the consent of her guardian, as will be seen later in
584 the chapter. From this moment until the conclusion of the marriage
[583] negotiations are done by the men of both families. The first thing to
be discussed is the amount of bridewealth, a "mahr." If the two families
agree on the marriage, a small ceremony is held. This ceremony is called
[779] "el-fatha" in reference to reading the first "sura" of the Koraan known
as el-fatha, or "the beginning." The ceremony includes members of the
[675] two families and very few friends. After the fatha is read, the agreement
is achieved. This is considered as an engagement and means that the girl
is spoken for and therefore no other man can ask to marry her.

To break the fatha agreement, the father of the prospective bride

583 Among Awlad Ali the payment of the bridewealth signifies the completion
[584] of the marriage contract. The mahr is not paid to the woman but
583 to her father or closest male kin. Usually the mahr is paid in money.
178 This, however, seems to be a recent phenomenon. Until the turn of the
century, according to informants, the mahr was paid only in sheep and
583 goats. The practice is still followed by a number of tribal segments
178 of Ali Ahmar who occupy the western most part of the area where pasture
184 is more abundant and reliable and where the permanent pasture of the
green mountains of Cyrenaica is close by. Other tribal segments still
insist that at least one-fourth of the mahr should be paid in livestock,
583 but the majority of the people accept money. The main purpose of the
[584] mahr among Awlad Ali is to legalize the marriage contract and to put
[182] emphasis on the reciprocal oblications that the marriage created between
the two families of the bride and the groom. It also works as an insurance
for good behavior on the part of both the husband and the wife.
583 If the husband mistreats his wife or fails to give her the rights legally
● 593 hers by marriage, he risks the chance of losing the mahr and being forced
586 to divorce her. On the other hand, if the wife fails to behave in the
customary way expected from a wife, the husband could divorce her and
have the right to get back his mahr. This is particularly inconvenient
in cases where all or part of the mahr is paid in livestock, in which
case it becomes part of the father's herd and hard to take away in case
of divorce. It is therefore in the interest of her family to keep the
marriage. In this way their interference in the marriage is checked.
[591] This is especially important among Awlad Ali where, although the marriage
[592] is usually patrilocal, the woman retains membership in her father's
household even after marriage.

593 As a girl in her father's household, the woman is under the direct
authority of her father, who is responsible for her. When the father
dies, this responsibility, as well as the authority, goes to her brother
or her closest male kin in the order specified earlier. At marriage the
[591] girl usually moves to live with her husband, and this subjects her to
[606] his control and sometimes to that of his parents, if the couple lives
with them. But the authority of the husband over his wife remains
593 secondary to that of her father. The woman's membership in her father's
574 household does not cease with marriage, and the strength of her relations
to her kin is maintained by their frequent visits to her new residence
and by her occasional visits to them. This right of visitation
593 574 cannot be denied by the husband who not only has to allow such visits,
606 but is also required to treat members of his wife's family, especially
her father, with great respect and hospitality. If the husband fails
[586] to do so, the wife's father can order her to leave her husband and go
back to his household with him.

This point is illustrated by the case of Muftah from the Esheibat tribe in the area of Matruh, whose older daughter is married to Hemeida from the Geneishat segment, which lives in the area of Fokah some 80 miles to the east of Matruh. One winter day in 1965, while passing near the area where his daughter lived, Muftah decided to pay her a visit. When he arrived, her husband was not at home; he was in the market in a nearby town selling sheep. When he came back late that evening, he greeted Muftah with the customary slaughter of a goat and invited the neighbors to the occasion. After dinner Muftah wanted to rest. It was a very hot night, so his son-in-law brought a rug and spread it outside the tent in the cool air. After that he retired to his tent where he spent the night inside.

593 spent the night inside. In the morning Muftah ordered his daughter to
574 pack her clothes because she was to leave with him. He refused to give
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586 her husband any explanation as to why he was taking his daughter away.
The husband could not prevent him from taking her away because, as he said, "He is her father and has the right to take her away with him at any time."

When the wife did not return for two weeks, her husband went to her father's house to take her, but her father refused to let her go. Hemeida
593 then went to a religious man in the area and asked him to intervene in
574
606 the matter and see why Muftah had taken away his wife. He also asked him
586 to arrange a mi'ad with Muftah to discuss the matter.
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792 The religious man was selected in this case because he was a close friend of Muftah and was believed to have influence over him. He was also known throughout the area to be fair and of sound opinion. It is important in the cases of disputes that the person selected as a mardi is known as a wise and fair man. It is only then that he is able to mediate between the two parties without being accused of taking sides.
792 The religious men, members of the Murabiteen tribes in the area, by their
619 relative position outside the formal tribal organization of the Sa'adi
627 tribes, are the most likely candidates for such activity. Yet, this is
554 not always the case. For this aspect of assumed impartiality is frequently balanced off by the fact that these religious men lack the support of a powerful tribal segment behind them. To be effective, the mardi has to be respected, not only for his personal qualities, but also for being a member of a respectable tribal segment whose power lends authority to the mardi's decision. This is not usually the case with the client
600 tribes of Murabiteen. Wealth in many cases is also considered an important

Wealth in many cases is also considered an important
792 requirement for the selection of the mardi. This does not mean that
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554 religious men in the area have no role in dispute settlement, for they
[556] do. It simply means that the mardi is selected according to a number
of criteria that vary from case to case, and that in some of these
cases sound wisdom and fairness characteristic of religious men are
not enough basis for their selection as mardis. This means that the
religious men have no special mediatory role based on their religious
nature alone. In certain cases religious men offer the best possibility
for mediation; in others, a non-religious person might offer a
better chance for settling the dispute. In cases of women seeking
[586] divorce from their husbands, the wealth of the mediator, more than anything
[556] else, seems to determine the selection of the man whom the woman
asks to negotiate on her behalf, a point to which I will return later
in the chapter.

593 The Mi'ad was held in the house of Muftah. Present at the mi'ad
574 were Muftah, his son-in-law, Hemeida, the heads of households in Muftah's
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586 camp (one of them was his brother and the other five were members of
627 different tribal segments), my driver (who was a member of the neighboring
792 Sanagrah tribal segment), myself, and the religious man. After the
tea was served, the religious man said that the discussion should start.
He reminded the gathering that this case is a family one and should not
develop into a larger dispute. "After all, the daughter's husband is a
son, and the case is actually a misunderstanding between a father and a
son and should be viewed in that context." Then he turned to Muftah and
said that in that spirit he was asking him why he had taken his daughter
away from her husgand. Muftah said that he had taken his daughter away

Muftah said that he had taken his daughter away
593 574 to punish Hemeida for what he thought was disrespectful behavior. He
606 then proceeded to descirbe how Hemeida, after bringing the blanket out
586 for Muftah, went inside and spent the night with his wife, defying the
627 792 basic rule of not showing intimacy in the presence of older people,
888 especially the parents or parents-in-law. For, to show such intimacy
is a sign of disrespect. He demanded that Hemeida pay him "kabara"
[681] [558] for his injured pride. The term kabara refers to the adjective "kebir"
(lit. respected or big man). Kabara is the fine paid for belittling
someone by word or deed. Muftah insisted that he would not allow his
daughter to return to her husband until Hemeida had paid that kabara.
Hemeida conceded the fact that intimacy constitutes an insult; but he
insisted that his action did not constitute an act of intimacy with his
wife, but was a matter of convenience and necessity, since he had only
593 two blankets, and the only one left was that inside the tent. Muftah
574 became angry and started shouting at Hemeida, who, in turn, started
606 586 shouting back; it became impossible to follow what was being said.
627 The religious man interfered in the discussion, trying to stop the argu-
792 ment between Muftah and Hemeida. The others attending the mi'ad also
[578] interfered. The religious man and two neighbors took Muftah outside
the tent while Muftah's brother tried to calm Hemeida down. The other
members of the group also calmed Hemeida, reminding him that he was the
younger person and must be more tolerant of older people. They also re-
minded Hemeida that Muftah was his father-in-law and had the right to take
his daughter away any time he chose. They urged him to "defeat the devil"
[681] and to apologize to his father-in-law and pay him kabara. He seemed
convinced but insisted that all he was going to pay was five pounds and
a goat. Muftahb brother and one of the neighbors then left the tent and

593 went to see Muftah and his company. Half an hour later the religious
574 man came and took Hemeida aside and talked to him in a very low voice,
606 586 then left the tent again. A few minutes more had passed; everyone re-
627 turned to the tent; Muftah was not angry anymore. The religious man
792 read the fatha, or the beginning sura of the Koraan, then said that the
[779] souls were now pure and that Hemeida was considered as a son of Muftah and that disagreements such as this should not alter the good relations between the two. He said that the devil had found his way into the souls of the two people, but now, thanks to God and the good people present, they both had come back to their senses. Hemeida then rose and went to where his father-in-law was sitting and shook hands with him. Then he
[681] handed the religious man ten pounds which the latter passed to Muftah and promised to send him a goat as a gift to his daughter. Muftah left the tent and went to the tent of the women. When he came back he announced that a goat had been slaughtered and that everyone was invited to eat. Everybody then left and Muftah promised to return his daughter to her husband the following day.

593 While the right of the father to take his daughter away from her
606 husband constitutes a check on the authority of the latter and insures
557 the wife good treatment by her husband and her in-laws, not infrequently
586 that right has been invoked for personal or individual interest on the
[429] part of the woman's father or her closest male kin. Several cases have been cited in the area where the father or guardian had invoked the right to force the husband to concede to certain demands of the wife's guardian, even when the wife objected to those demands or disagreed with her guardian. One of these is the case of Mabroka who is married to a distant

593 606 557 586 member of the same tribe. At the time that the dispute had occurred she had been married for fifteen years and had four children ranging in age from thirteen to two years. The husband possessed a piece of land on the coast where a few olive and fig trees were growing. The husband, Mukheimer, made no use of either the land or the trees. Then, in 1966, the father became employed by the government organization in the area where his daughter and her husband lived and where the land was. He asked his son-in-law to give him the right to use the land for one pound a year. Mukheimer, who at that time worked part-time for the same government organization as a driver, refused. The reason was that his job with the government made it possible for him to apply for a power pump to be installed over the Roman well that existed on the land, and he intended to utilize the land himself. All attempts to convince Hukheimer to let him use the land failed. Then one day Mukheimer came back to his tent to find that his father-in-law had taken his wife and the youngest child and left the other three children with the second wife. The father-in-law told the second wife to inform Mukheimer that if he wanted his wife and child back, he had to think about the land he wanted to take possession of. Mukheimer tried to discuss the matter with his father-in-law, buth the latter refused to see him. After a month there were rumors that the daughter was not happy that her father had taken her away from her husband and children and that she wanted to go back to her family. She asked a number of people to help her, including myself, since her father was one of my informants at that time; but he insisted that the only way Mukheimer could have his wife and child back was by giving him the rights to the land. Mukheimer, on the other hand, threatened to divorce his wife and marry another woman if his father-in-law did not return his wife.

593 606 The case persisted for more than two months with no sign that either
557 party was willing to give into the demands of the other. I left the
586 area before any solution to the case was achieved.
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Another relevant case is one which involved a dispute between
584 578 Hassan Hassanein from the Sanagrah tribe and the father-in-law of his
606 daughter who was also from the same tribe and who lived in the same
area. The case started when Hassanein was visited by a friend from the
[574] Esheibat tribe in Matruh, an old man of 60 or 70 years. During the night
that this guest spent at Hassanein's house, they got to talking about
marriage and the fact that although his guest was a wealthy and re-
[595] spected man, he had only one wife. After a lengthy talk, it seemed
that the old man was convinced that he should have a second wife and
asked Hassanein if he knew of a suitable girl to marry. Hassanein sug-
584 gested his daughter's sister-in-law. Hassanein took the prospective
583 groom to the tent of his daughter's father-in-law and discussed the
578 606 matter with the father of the prospective bride who agreed to marry his
daughter to Hassanein's guest if he paid the sume of 200 pounds, in ad-
dition to slaughtering a number of goats and presenting him with the
[779] appropriate presents. When the man agreed to the terms, the fatha was
read to signify the agreement between the two parties. Hassanein left
the man to spend the night in the camp of his future in-laws. In the
morning the groom told the bride's father that he must go to nearby
Alexandria to bring the money for the bride price. When he came back
late that afternoon, he paid the money and set a date for the wedding
the next Thursday and then left for Matruh to prepare for the arrival
of the new wife.

593 586 Taking his daughter away from the marital residence is treated as an undisputed right of the father. This is true whether he is justified in his actions or not and whether the girl approves of her father's decision or not. The general view is that the father, having raised his daughter, is entitled to her obedience and that taking her away from her husband, even against her will, is the symbol of authority over her. It also signifies that the girl has someone to look after her, to protect her and prevent the husband or any member of his family from mistreating her. Awlad Ali differentiate, however, between cases in which the father has exercised his right in an arbitrary and unreasonable manner and those in which he has reasonable grounds for his actions. A father is considered justified in taking his daughter away if her husband or members of his family fail to fulfill their obligations towards the wife or members of her family. Mistreatment of the woman (the definition of which will be discussed later), and disrespect to members of her family, or preventing her from visiting her family or them visiting her in the customary specified manner are always justifiable grounds. As a [681] justifiable action, the father is not obliged to return his daughter until he gets full apologies and any gifts for the woman or himself that he considers as kabara. If the husband refuses to concede to the demands of the father, the latter can force him to divorce her without having to return the bridewealth to the husband. Although the father's right still exists when no justifiable grounds are present, in this case he is required to return his daughter to her husband after a short period. If he refuses, [681] the husband is entitled to ask for a kabara. He also can divorce his [583] wife and is entitled to get back his mahr and possible all the marriage expenses. It is this possibility of having to pay back the mahr and

593 586 and expenses to the husband that constitutes the most important check
(583) on the otherwise undisputed right of the father to take away his
daughter.

593 The woman, on the other hand, cannot refuse to go with her father,
562 for this means that she would be disobeying him. A woman who disobeys
586 her father is not worthy of his name. He can cut her off from the
family, which means that she is left without any support or protection. A woman who is cut off from her family is left vulnerable to her husband and to society. She will have nobody to defend her or to be responsible for her actions. The responsibility for the woman's behavior is not transferred by marriage to the husband or his family.

682 If the woman kills or assaults someone or causes damage to property
683 for which compensation is required, her male kin pays the blood money or
602 the compensation on her behalf. It is sometimes stated that if the woman
613
562 has grown-up sons, they, and not her family, pay for her. Since the
593 children belong to their father's family, it may seem like transfering
the responsibility for the woman's actions to her husband's family. However, in all three cases where this happened, the woman was quite old, her father was dead, and her brothers were either dead or had moved outside the area and had cut off all relations with the area. She also had no nephews in the area. In such cases, the sons were the woman's closest male kin.

682 On the other hand, if the woman is the victim of murder or assault
683 for which blood money or compensation is to be paid, the husband is the
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562 one to benefit from the situation. To understand why this happens, we
584 have to consider the contractual nature of marriage among Awlad Ali. It
583 has been mentioned earlier that before marriage is final, the prospective

584 husband or his father pays the woman's father the bridewealth, or mahr.
583 In exchange for the mahr, the husband expects his father-in-law to outfit
his daughter with such items as rugs, blankets, and a few other household
items, like cooking pots, serving dishes, and a metal or wooden chest
[422] to keep her clothes in. These items become the private property of the
wife, but the husband has the right to use them. In addition, the man
581 expects to gain certain rights to the woman. The customary law of Awlad
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585 Ali gives the husband three basic rights over his wife: the right to her
sexual services (including the right to bear him children); the right to
her labor in domestic activities; and the right to her obedience. Of the
three rights, the first is the most exclusive. Not only doesthe husband
have a complete monopoly over his wife's present sexual services, but he
also has the right, if the girl has never been married before, to be the
[583] first to use such services. If he discovers that she is not a virgin, he
can send her back to her father and get back his mahr.

581 The other two rights are not as exclusive. The husband's right to
585 his wife's domestic labor does not prevent her from occasionally helping
593 out in her father's or brother's household, especially if they live nearby.
Finally, the husband's right to be obeyed by his wife is always subordinated
to that of her father, who retains the ultimate authority over his
daughter.

682 If the woman is killed or injured, the husband is deprived of all
683 or some of her services, depending on the seriousness and the permanence
581 of the injury, and therefore is entitled to compensation. The right of
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593 avenging the woman's murder remains, however, that of her family, since
she is still a member of that family.

684 The contractual nature of marriage is most clearly manifested in
613 562 the case of the wife's adultery. Since the woman belongs to her ag-
● 593 natic group, her behavior has direct effect on the honor of that group.
It is, therefore, the responsibility of her closest kin to keep an eye on her. If the woman commits adultery, it is her father or her male kin who is supposed to avenge the honor of the family by taking drastic actions, including killing, against the adulteress and/or her partner. But the marriage usually takes the woman away from the close watch of her family and puts her under the supervision of her husband who becomes entrusted with the duty of guarding her, and therefore partially responsible for her action. His responsibility is enhanced by the fact that although the wife's behavior does not affect him or his family, it has a definite effect on the honor and reputation of his children (Abou-Zeid, 1965).

684 The gravest insult that one can direct to a person in the area is
578 to describe his mother of being of disrepute. In their joking relations,
562 593 young men usually refer to eachother's father as being a dog or a theif
[522] or a cheat, but none could refer to the mother. A woman of questionable
reputation affects the reputation of her family in general and her children in particular. Any reference to the mother in the form of an accusation is supposed to be cleaned only by blood. Not only does this apply to the woman's voluntary behavior, but also to her physical and mental
[934] condition. If a woman loses her mind, the news is usually kept a secret,
684 especially by her children. The responsibility for retaliation in the
613 case of adultery, then, is divided between her nearest kinsman and her
562 593 husband. This gives both sides a vague and undetermined right of re-
venge. This division of the right of revenge explains the infrequency

684 of drastic actions taken in cases of adultery. Of the fourteen cases
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562 of adultery that I examined furing my field work, none resulted in the
593 killing of the adulteress, and only three resulted in the murder of her
[14] partner. In all three cases where the adulterer was killed, the avenger
684 was the husband; and in all three cases, the husband had to pay the
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613 bloodmoney to the murdered man's kin group. His payment of the bloodmoney,
among other things, may indicate that the right of the husband
to kill the adulterer is not completely accepted among Awlad Ali. All
[628] agree, however, that such killings never result in blood feuds because
of the shameful circumstances in which the victim dies.

684 It was very difficult to obtain any detailed or reliable information
126 about adultery cases. All the above mentioned fourteen cases were gathered
[124] from the informants, twelve of which were cases which had already
been solved. For the two cases which were still open at the time of
the study, information was quite vague. Usually such cases are conducted
with a great amount of secrecy, with the involved parties referring to
them as cases of theft, or merely by saying that the cases involve
women. Only when the adultery leads to the killing of the adulteress
or the adulterer are more details publicly known about the case.

684 But while the right to retaliate for the shameful action of an
adulterous wife is vague and diffused, the right of the husband for compensation
from the adulterer remains clear and undisputed. In this resepct,
adultery is treated very much like theft; the adulterer has stolen
the husband's exclusive right to his wife's sexual activities. The compensation
[583] for this offense is estimated at L.E. 20, in addition to the
[586] mahr, if the husband decides to divorce his wife as a result of her
adultery.

681 this variation is that committing the adultery within the camp of the
558 husband constitutes a greater humiliation, since it affects his honor
684 among his neighbors. Also, adultery inside the tent of the couple carries
with it the possibility of rape, while adultery outside the tent
at least implies an element of consent on the part of the wife. The
[583] penalty in the case of adultery is the return by the wife's father of
the mahr and all other expenses of the marriage ceremony and the gifts
the husband had presented during the engagement period. This is a
further indication that the father of the wife is still responsible
for her behavior even after she is married. It is in this respect that
the crime of adultery differs from theft. In the case of theft, the
[685] thief has to return twice the amount stolen and in the case of repeated
offenders, four times the amount stolen. This is in addition to a certain
amount of money as kabara. Yet, in the latter case the kabara is
not specified and is subject to the proof by the victim that the theft
constituted an insult to him. This insult is assumed in the case of
adultery, which makes the kabara in the case of adultery part of the
punishment--an integral part of the punishment. The kabara is not among
[613] the collective responsibility of the amar and is paid only by the person
involved, unless he is totally unable to pay or refuses to pay. In such
426 cases, his closest male kin (his father, son, or brother) pays on his
593 behalf with the understanding that such payment constitutes a debt which
681 should be repaid. The person paying on his behalf in this case can go
684 to his tent and take by force anything of value, such as blankets, utensils,
558 or even sheep and goats, and keep them as pawns until the debt is
paid.

581 Marriage does not deprive the woman of some rights of her own.
585 562 The customary law gives the wife three basic rights corresponding to
671 those of the husband's sexual services, domestic work, and obedience.
Corresponding to the first of these, the wife has the right to have a
normal sexual life with her husband. This right, however, is not an ex-
clusive one, since the husband can marry more than one wife. A woman
585 can be divorced from her husband without having to return the mahr if
586 she claims that the husband is unable to perform his sexual duties. In
593 such cases, the marriage is usually dissolved quietly. In certain rare
instances, the husband may deny his wife's accusations. If both insist
585 586 on their stand, one or both may ask to be submitted to "bait el-shana'a,"
593 or house of the dreadful deeds. Reports are extremely vague about the
627 exact procedures involved in this case. Some informants stated that the
married couple would live in a tent without sidewalls so that everybody
could see what goes on inside. Most informants, however, insist that it
merely means that the couple move their tent near that of a respectable
man whose word is believed and honored. This man is supposed to keep a
close watch on the couple's activities, by listening or looking through
holes in the tent. His verdict determines the future of the marriage.
[586] If the wife is justified in her claim, the husband is forced to divorce
[681] her and to forfeit his mahr. If, on the other hand, the verdict is for
[558] the husband, he not only can divorce her and get back the mahr, but is
also entitled to kabara, or compensation, for his injured pride. There
[114] is no case of bait el-shana'a in the area during the time of the field
[178] work, and most people insist that this practice is something of the past
[583] when the mahr was relatively high and was paid in livestock, in which

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593 case its return to the husband would have caused great financial in-
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[114] convenience for the wife's family.

[178]
(583) Corresponding to the second right, the husband's right to his
581 wife's domestic work, is the wife's right to maintenance. The husband
585 has to support his wife. This includes providing her and her children
562 with adequate food and proper clothing. If the husband fails to do so
593 because of poverty, sickness, crop failure or unexpected disaster, the
wife's brother or father provides her and her children with the neces-
[586] sary food and clothing. If the husband's failure to fulfill his duties
is due to neglect, the wife can leave him and go to her father or brother
who talks the matter over with the husband who, in turn, either agrees
to their demands or has to divorce his wife and forfeit his mahr.

593 Finally, corresponding to the husband's right to his wife's obedi-
562 ence is the wife's right to fair treatment by her husband. There are a
[799] number of ways in which the wife is mistreated. One is excessive punish-
ment; although the right of the husband to punish his wife is provided in
the Koraan, the punishment must be excessive or severe. Awlad Ali draw
a line between acceptable and severe punishment. A punishment is severe
if it results in something that other people can see or hear. If the
husband insults his wife or her family and others hear the action, or if
he beats her and this results in visible traces, then the punishment is
severe.

593 A wife considers herself mistreated if the husband, when married
595 to more than one, treats any of the other wives better than he treats
562 her. Although the wife cannot deny her husband the right to have ad-
ditional wives, he must give them all equal treatment. This includes

593 providing them with the same kind of food and clothing.* It also in-
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562 cludes dividing his time equally between them, spending one night in each wife's tent. The first wife, being the chief one, has certain privileges: her tent is the guest house, food is brought to her residence, and she is the one to divide it among the other wives, and her house is the place for the husband to stay if he becomes sick and unable to move every night from one tent to another. Other than the exceptions given to the first wife, the husband has to treat all his wives equally.

593 Normally, such cases of mistreatment do not result in divorce un-
[586] less they are persistent. In most cases, if the wife is mistreated, she goes to her father's or brother's house or sends for them to come and
593 take her. For the husband to bring her back to his tent, he must pay
431 her "nasafa." This is a gift given by the husband to his wife as an acknowledgement of guilt and as a form of apology for not giving her fair treatment. In some cases the nasafa is equal to what the husband originally paid as mahr.

581 These are some of the rights that marriage gives both men and women
585 in the tribal society of Awlad Ali. These rights, however, are useless
626 unless they are backed by certain means of enforcing them. The husband's
586 rights are guaranteed by his ability to dissolve the marriage at will.
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593 According to Islamic law, a man can divorce his wife by simply pronouncing the sentence "I divorce you" in the presence of credible witnesses.
[779] No justification for divorce is demanded from the husband according to
[562] the Koraan. No such privilege is given to the wife. She can obtain a

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* With provision for wives with more children.

586 divorce only under specific circumstances in the absence of which the
626 593 husband can force her to live with him. Following the Koraanic rules,
[562] Awlad Ali give men the right to dissolve the marriage at will and with-
[779] out any necessary justification; however, they differentiate between cases where divorce is justified and those in which it is not. In a case of justifiable divorce, the husband can take back the mahr and possibly all other marriage expenses. In the case of unjustifiable divorce, the husband forfeits his right to regain the mahr. Divorce is justified whenever one or more of the husband's rights are violated by the wife or members of her family. Not all degrees of violation are considered as justification for divorce, however. Only intolerable violations can be considered as such. In deciding whether or not an act constitutes an
[183] intolerable violation, Awlad Ali judge it against the standard of the reasonable man, the customary man, and what he would have tolerated in a similar situation.

586 What constitutes reasonable behavior does not only vary according
183 to the situation and the manner in which the actions are taken, but also
554 with the relative position in the social structure of the parties involved and their initial relations to one another. In the case of divorce, what constitutes grounds for justifiable divorce in one case may not be sufficient grounds for justifiable divorce in another. In one of
586 183 the cases I witnessed during the year of study, a man who divorced his
554 wife because of her insistence that he buy her meat from the market
511 every day of the week, was forced to forfeit his right to redeem the
[114] mahr on the basis that the wife's actions had not established a basis for justifiable divorce. In the negotiations that followed, the position of the husband, as well as that of the family of the wife, were discussed.

586 his wife. The husband agreed but insisted that she pay him L.E. 300
562 (this included the mahr and the marriage expenses). The Omda tried to
574 reduce the amount but could not. He then tried to get the father to
554 pay, but the father refused. He had to pay the husband L.E. 200 of
634 his own money and promised that the rest would be paid when the woman remarried (it would be paid from the mahr). The husband divorced Haida. One week later she was married to her lover. I have no information about whether or not the 100 pounds was paid.

586 In another example, Sabha was forced by her father to marry her
562 cousin (ibn 'ʌmm). She could not live with him, so she threw herself
574 on one of the holy men in the area. The holy man convinced the hus-
554 band to divorce Sabha and then went to her father and convinced him to
792 pay back the mahr to the husband, and the case was settled. People say
(626) that both the husband and the father agreed to the demands of the holy man because they were afraid of his supernatural curse. Sabha went back to her father's house.

586 It is obvious from these and similar cases that the success or
562 failure of the procedure depends on the careful selection of the man
593 on whom a woman throws herself. It is also apparent from the above
(554) examples that his right of refuge is resorted to only in cases where the
(574) woman cannot go to her father or to her closest kin to help her get a divorce because he is either unable or unwilling to help her. A father is unable to help if the husband is powerful or if he is the woman's ibn 'amm (father's brother's son) who has, according to the tribal law, the undisputed right to marry his bint 'amm (father's brother's daughter). The father is usually unwilling to help his daughter if he is the one

586 who forced her to marry the husband, or if she was cut off from the
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● 593 family for some reason or another.

586 From the frequency of women using this right in the area, it
562 seems that no social disapproval is associated with it, nor is there
574 a social stigma attached to women who throw themselves. They seem to
626 find it as easy to find a husband as those women divorced voluntarily
by their husbands or with the help of their fathers. In fact, as was
586 mentioned earlier, many of them marry the rich men over whom they
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587 throw themselves. As to the amount of mahr paid for their subsequent
[583] marriages, the fact of throwing themselves does not seem to be a factor
[574] in determining the amount of mahr paid. In one of the cases, the woman
threw herself on an 'aqila of one of the Geneishat tribe after her
father refused to help her get a divorce from her husband who had mar-
ried a second wife without first asking the first wife's permission.
[429] When the Geneishat member succeeded in convincing the husband to di-
vorce his wife, the latter had no place to stay so remained in the
house of her protector who acted as her guardian in place of her father
[583] who had refused to take her back in his home. While staying in the
house of her protector, she got many marriage offers; one of the suitors
offered a mahr of L.E. 4,000 ($10,000), one of the highest mahrs re-
ported in the area. She agreed, and the marriage was affected. This
mahr is about ten times the mahr she got for her first marriage. This
586 procedure offers the woman a considerable guarantee of her marital
562
rights. It also gives her, as far as the ability to dissolve the mar-
riage, a status close to that of her husband. This relative equality
is reflected is reflected in the lack of stigma associated with divorced

586 women in the Western Desert, and that the women usually have no diffi-
562 culty in finding another husband.

586 While the right of "throwing herself" offers the wife some guar-
562 antee of her rights, her main guarantee is derived from the security
593 she gets from retaining membership in her father's family. After the
768 death of the father, the woman's claims extend to the households of her
brothers. She acquires in them the same rights she had in her father's
household, and the brothers take the responsibility of their father in
[428] protecting and defending their sister. The woman achieves this continu-
ation of support partially through forfeiting her rights of inheritance
to her brothers.

562 Awlad Ali recognize the right of the daughters to inherit in their
428 father's estate. They accept the system of inheritance specified in
[779] the Koraan which gives the woman half the share of her brother. In prac-
tice, this is usually side-stepped. Only sons inherit their father's
[238] property. The justification given for the non-inheritance of women is
[311] that the main items of inheritance in the Western Desert, livestock and
the right of land use, require certain protection and care which are be-
233 yond the culturally defined roles of women. Livestock require moving
562 from one grazing ground to another, almost always crossing tribal lands
428 belonging to various tribal segments, some of whom might be hostile.
It also requires the ability to protect the herds from predators and
from raids, especially in earlier times. Similarly, land requires prep-
aration and protection against trespassers, especially when the barley
is growing.

562 Women, however, are supposed to be compensated by their brothers
428
593 for their shares. But very few would actually ask their brothers for

562 such compensation. In forfeiting her rights of inheritance, a woman
428 secures for herself and her children the continuous support of her
593 kin-group and the protection of her rights. This support was denied
in the few cases I was able to collect in which the woman demanded her
share of inheritance. The following is one of these cases. The material
159 presented is a summary of the life history of Fatma, who at the time of
562 the study, was a shopkeeper managing the small general store she owned
428 593 near the railroad station of Burg el-Arab, some fifty miles west of
[444] Alexandria. She also practiced healing and midwifery on a part-time
[754] basis.

Fatma was the only daughter with four sons of sheikh El-Asi, who
at one time was the aqila of bait Hussein of the Sanagrah tribal segment
[627] in the area. He was also known as a mardi and was frequently sought in
[755] mediation of disputes. He was believed to have supernatural power which
he used to cure people for a certain amount of money. During his life-
[454] time, he had acquired a sizable sum of money which he invested in live-
[233] stock. At the time of his death his herd, which numbered more than 900
[422] sheep and goats, was considered the finest in the area. He had no barley
[423] lands because his camp was deep in the desert, but he had fine grazing
land.

Throughout the area the four sons were known for being arrogant and irresponsible. Three of them were employed by one of the irrigation projects carried on by the government in the area as construction workers; the fourth looked after the herd of his father. All four were known as chasers of women, and they frequently went to Alexandria to visit prostitutes and drink liquor.

[444] Fatma was first married when she was eighteen to a man from Alexandria who had opened a general store in the area where her father

159 562 lived. Five years ago the husband died in a mining accident leaving
428 Fatma with a ten-month-old boy. By that time, her father had been disabled,
593 and her brothers wanted to manage her husband's store on her behalf.
444 Knowing that her brothers were greedy, she refused and insisted
that she take care of the store herself. The brothers objected on the
grounds that it was not customary for a decent woman to be exposed to
the customers in the store. When she insisted, the brothers threatened
her. When the threats did not work, they beat her. After that, she
[625] went to the police station in the area, filed a complaint against her
brothers, and asked for police protection. The police officer in charge
brought the brothers in and warned them that if they interfered with the
store, not only would he arrest them, but he would also use his influence
to get them forced from the irrigation projects where three of them
worked. The threat worked, and they became friendly with their sister,
buying things for the store whenever they went to Alexandria and sometimes
helping in the store with her consent when she was on housecalls
159 as a midwife. A year later Fatma was married for the second time to a
562 distant cousin; a few months later her father died. In a family meeting
428 593 that followed the funeral, Fatma made her announcement that she was claiming
233 her share of her father's herd. The brothers were angry and tried to
[587] beat her. But the older members of the bait who were present at the meeting
stopped them and told them that Fatma had all the right to claim her
share of the inheritance according to Awlad Ali ways and that there was
[578] nothing that they could do about it. She was characterized in that
meeting as "bint haram" (illegitimate child), an insult used to refer
to those who show selfishness in their kinship obligations. When she
left the camp with her share of the herd, this seemed to have severed

159 the relationship between her and her brothers.

562
428 Following her action and until the time of the study, they had
● 593 never visited her and she had never visited them. Her husband took
[237] care of the herd; and the arrangement worked out all right until the
159 husband told Fatma one day that he was going to marry a second wife.
562
593 She refused, but he went ahead with the marriage without her consent.
595 He brought the new wife to live with Fatma in the same tin hut in which
they were living. He started to pay more attention to the new wife and
to neglect Fatma; whenever the latter complained, he beat her. Then,
before one of the religious feasts, he sold two of Fatma's sheep and
bought his new wife a dress and a silver bracelet. When Fatma objected
[164] and they argued, he hit her with a stick on the head; she was hospital-
ized for a week with a serious head wound. While in the hospital, she
went to her brothers who lived only two miles away, but they refused to
159 come to her assistance. She then went to sheikh Elewa (the aqila of
562 Bait Asabei) and threw herself on him. He met with the husband and con-
574 vinced him to divorce Fatma. He kept forty sheep of Fatma's herd as com-
593
595 pensation for the mahr he had paid her and the marriage expenses, then
586 took his new wife and moved from Fatma's hut. Fatma then returned and
159 managed her financial affairs successfully herself. She managed the
562 store and hired a shepherd to take care of the sheep. At the time of
444
[233] the present study she was respected by almost everybody in the area, in-
cluding members of the local administration. She is known to be reason-
[429] able and of sound opinion, and her store functions as the meeting place
[521] for many of the tribal mi'ads and for casual conversations. She is also
considered as a liason between the tribal population in the area and the
local government administration, and is respected by both sides.

159 156 This apparently is not a typical case, nor is Fatma by any means
562 representative of a typical tribal women. It is a case of a marginal
woman who had revolted against the tribal definition of a female role.
[428] She violated the customary ways of her society and claimed her share of
● [593] her father's inheritance; and by doing this, she forfeited her right to
[183] protection by her brothers. She was able to do this because of her mar-
[625] ginality which enabled her to draw upon sources of protection outside
the tribal pattern, the police. It is interesting to note here that by
doing so, she was not totally eliminated or ostracized from her society;
rather, her role was redefined as that of a man, and she was treated
as such.

173 Fusion of names appears in another context and for similar
178 reasons. Not only are lineal descendants given the name of deceased
551 ancestors, but a man may be given the name of any deceased
613 agnate of his tertiary section. Usually, this is only done
428 when a man passes on property to another who is not his direct
[553] heir. Commonly, this occurs when an agnate is also a mother's
brother, as often happens as a result of parallel cousin marriage,
and this mother's brother has no sons of his own. If he has a
sister's son, who is also his paternal nephew, he is likely to pass
on his wealth to this nephew. A father, the Bedouin insist, ought
[183] to perform three duties for his sons: attend to their circumcision,
[593] and their education in the Koran, and provide bride-wealth when
[852] they marry. All fathers attend to the circumcision of all their sons;
few provide for the Koranic education of any of their sons; most
[871] bear the burden of marrying off at least one of their sons. The
[583] performance of the latter duty is what makes the continuance
of the deceased's name an obligation, and whoever performs this
duty must have his name perpetuated in one male offspring of
the union which was brought about with his wealth. Wealth need
not take the form of bride-wealth; it can be a legacy willed by a
father, maternal uncle of the kind described above, or any other
agnate who has died without male issue. Conversely, if a man
dies without leaving any property, even his sons might not perpetuate
his name, and eventually it will drop out of the genealogy.[10]
There are instances of men inheriting the wealth of a
number of agnates, using each parcel of wealth to make a new
marriage and naming the sons of the various unions after the
several dead who had left wealth. The example given below is
taken from the genealogy of the Dawwas section of the Magharba
tribe. What happened here was that the two lines stemming
from Faraj and Sha'aban, after proliferating normally,
became extinct. As this happened, Ibrahim, the son of Miftah,
began to inherit wealth to which he was not a direct heir; and

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[588] [10] To avoid confusion, it ought to be made clear that this is not ghost marriage. As I understand ghost marriages from Evans-Pritchard's (1951) account, two main conditions must be satisfied: (i) that there should be inherited wealth to make a marriage, and (ii) that the wealth remaining after the ghost marriage has been made is inherited by the ghost children only. In Cyrenaica, wealth thus inherited becomes part of a man's total wealth and is not reserved for a ghost marriage and its issue.

582 any summer camp will have descent lines cross linked by the
613 bonds of marriage with parallel cousins, and at the same time
[621] cleaved by the maternal links established by repetitive cross-
cousin marriage to different groups outside the segment. Thus,
in one of its aspects, marriage makes of an agnatic group a group
582 of cognates as well. 'Marry your paternal cousins and both your
613 paternal and maternal relatives will be one,' to quote Bedouin
602 sentiment on the matter. Within this agnatic group, nevertheless,
two other clusters of kin exist—those with maternal connexions
outside. In all, three areas of kinship can be defined,[13] although
all the members of the segment will have the lineage bond of
agnation in common. In normal circumstances, when split does
not threaten the group, the bond of agnation, strengthened by
parallel cousin marriage, takes precedence, although behaviour
is significantly affected by maternal links at any time. There is,
152 in the first instance, great jealousy between co-wives, which is
595 passed on to their children. Each wife has her separate tent, and
593 each is entitled to a strictly equal share of the husband's time
they have in common. This applies similarly to favours he may
grant his wives, and the distribution of his wealth among them.
If, for example, the husband is the owner of a horse, he is re-
quired to tether it outside the tents of his wives in strict rota-
tion; if he retires for the night with one wife, the following night
he must favour the other; if he buys dress material for the one
he must buy a length of identical material for the other; if he
bestows favours on the children of one the children of the other
must be given equal consideration. Many such details are
meticulously observed; but while many are observed most of the
time, it is difficult to observe them all, the whole time. Any
breach of the rules is quickly taken up by the wives, and quarrels
ensue, leading not only to bitterness among the co-wives, but be-
tween the offended wife and her husband, between the children
of both wives, and between the children and their father. Often,
595 when a man has co-wives, there is a marked discrepancy in age
593 between them, for, when an elderly Bedouin marries a second
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[13] The situation is not always as simple as this. Cross-cousin marriage may take more than two directions, and marriage within the segment might bring about great complexity, but the argument put forward above is not seriously affected by neglecting these details here.

wife he usually chooses a young girl of about twenty years. Children 595
of the elder wife might be adult, therefore, when the children 593
of the junior wife are infants. Great emphasis is placed on 561
seniority, particularly among males, but strong emphasis is also
placed on the equality of siblings and their equal legal status.
Between brothers of widely differing ages, there is, then, this
field of potential conflict. From an early date competitive, if not
hostile, relationships develop between the sons of co-wives. Competition 593
between half-brothers results not only from their 586
mothers being co-wives: one group might be the sons of a divorced 587
wife. The latter situation is often much worse, for the sons
born of the divorced wife are now being fostered by a woman
who is not their mother. A similar condition of things is brought
about when a widower with sons remarries. Yet again, when a
wife grows old and her sons have reached maturity, her husband
may not divorce her formally, but merely 'throw her off his
back'; she will then go to live with her grown sons, while her
husband, in turn, takes a new wife, usually taking up residence
in another camp for a time at least. It would be too much of a
digression here to discuss the inheritance disputes, and the disputes
over marriage and bride-wealth, which arise out of these
various circumstances. Suffice it to note that such disputes are [613]
common and affect the alignment of people within a tertiary
segment.

As half-brothers grow to maturity some of them will marry 613
their maternal cross-cousins, and in succeeding generations some 621
of their descendants will do likewise. In this way, a tertiary segment [582]
united by the bond of agnation, will also have within it
smaller groups of kin having different sets of cognatic links. This
group, as a residential unit, shows a very high concentration of
agnates, and the Bedouin say with pride that members of the
camps are always 'one' because of this agnatic bond, and indeed,
the corporate identity of this group is strikingly displayed in
many circumstances. It does not take precedence in all circumstances, 613
for, built into agnation, with the heavy burden of duties 578
which go with it, are serious stresses and strains which in some 602
circumstances regularly come out into the open. In yet other
circumstances cognatic kinship affiliations appear to be dominant,
causing friction among agnates. A man, for example, may permit

Chapter

7

Aspects of the Family Among the Bedouin of Cyrenaica*

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Marriage and the Father-Son Relationship

When a marriage takes place among the Bedouin of Cyrenaica, a nuptial 585
tent is set up some distance away from that of the groom's father. There is 593
no particular significance about the nuptial tent itself, but it must be pitched at a distance so that the father "will not see it" — although, obviously, in a country of large level plains, it stands out conspicuously. This pretence that the tent remains unseen by the father is pushed to the point of his denying any knowledge of what is afoot. A middle-aged or elderly man with a family adopts a similar attitude to any marriage in which his son participates, as groom or as guest. An elder, the father of three unmarried sons (one of [535]
whom, in his late twenties, was known to be getting impatient about marriage), when I asked after his eldest son, insisted that he was away with the [831]
camels, although the son was conspicuous in a semicircle of young men encouraging a blindfolded maiden in the movements of her seductive dance outside a wedding tent in his full view. Prior to the wedding festivities, the

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* I wish to express my gratitude to Mr. R. Werbner for reading this essay in manuscript. 128

The information presented is based on 27 months fieldwork carried out during 114
1948 to 1950, among the Cyrenaica Bedouin. I am indebted to the Trustees of the 122
Horniman Studentship Fund, and the Committee for Treasury Studentships in Oriental Languages and Cultures, for making the research financially possible.

Cases

584 Prior to the wedding festivities, the
father will have participated in negotiations, although even in these he will
• 593 have remained silent, leaving an affine, as a rule, to arrange the details with
the girl's father and his kinsmen. The father feigns aloofness from the start
of negotiations until after the wedding celebrations have ended. Before inquiring into this seemingly odd behaviour, a few further details of marriage
ceremonies need to be mentioned briefly.

585 The bride is carried to the nuptial tent on a camel, seated in a cagelike
342 structure placed on the camel's back, this canopy covered over with carpets
[492] and at least one long blanket — later to be used to divide her tent into male
and female quarters — which constitute part of the goods given to a woman
[788] on marriage. On her arrival, while she is still seated in her canopy, the
camel is led round the tent seven times by a small boy. She then descends
and is hustled into the tent by a number of women who make a show of their
attempts to conceal her from view. Inside the tent the bride is enclosed in
one corner in a kind of cubicle partitioned off by a length of blanket.

585 In the meantime, the groom has affected to escape, but is "caught," while
[533] running away, by his fellows, who "compel" him to return to the nuptial tent,
to the accompaniment of their lewd songs telling of the sexual pleasures
[831] awaiting him. Much of this is horseplay, but the young men carry it out
brazenly and the groom is required to show reluctance to continue with the
ceremonies. His entry into the nuptial tent is marked by an expectant hush
that falls over the crowd of men gathered, as they await the result of the
virginity test the groom is about to perform, which he does by wrapping part
of his toga round one of his fingers to pierce the hymen. Sharp shrieks from
[202] the bride give the signal that the test has been undertaken; not a stir moves
the crowd until evidence of its success has been publicly displayed, which is
given by the groom hoisting the blood-stained portion of the toga through
the corner of the tent on a pole, followed by firing three shots from his rifle.
Jubilantly, the men gathered fire volley after volley from their rifles just over
the nuptial tent, and the seven-day celebrations begin.

585 A full descriptive account of a marriage, or many of the ritual details
589 woven into it need not be given here. What is included is intended to illustrate certain relationships between father and son, and between one
[593] generation and another. In this connection two further points are appropri-
[561] ate. First, during the week of festival, young men gather outside the nuptial
[535] tent each night to encourage a maiden in her dancing, clapping their hands
to the point of injury "so that we will have a wife soon." The celebrations
[533] belong to the bachelors, and they are the only ones to engage in the singing
and hand clapping. It is they too who stop the bridal camel on its way to
[538] the nuptial tent to recite obscene rhymes to the bride, and they also shout
[831] their rather dubious consolations to the bride who, during the virginity test,
crying out for her mother, is assured by them that the night holds promise
585 for her which her mother could never extend. The married men, particularly
602 the close senior agnates of the groom, stay away from it all, discussing mat-
521 ters unconnected with the affair.

Second, the fiction that nothing has happened, which characterises the 585
father's behavior, does not cease with the termination of the celebrations. 593•
Each morning, soon after daybreak and before the camp is astir, the groom
must leave his bride and repair to his father's tent to lie at his father's side
"as he always had done in the past, as if he had not left him." This conventional
ruse is followed, not just for the seven days of wedding festivities,
but is continued after the groom has moved back into the camp proper, and
pitched his tent alongside his father's, with the ropes of the two tents crossing.

In matters other than sleeping arrangements, this fiction that "nothing
has happened" is maintained. Marriage does not mean the immediate crea- [592]
tion of a wholly separate domestic unit. Save for the appearance of an additional
tent, the ordinary run of daytime activities is scarcely altered. To 593
mention perhaps the most important feature of the relationships between 264
father and son, the groom continues to eat with his father. As yet, the son 571
does not use his own bowl,[1] and may not, indeed, do so for several years. 182
The important symbolism of "eating together" or "eating out of the one
bowl," the act of commensality creating a bond of fellowship about which
Robertson Smith[2] wrote so eloquently can only be referred to here in one of
its many aspects. Bedouin themselves stress that eating together is a strong
bond, and the communal meal is always used for this purpose after the
settlement of a dispute, or at the conclusion of a blood-money agreement,
and so on. It is significant also in the sense that those who partake of a [574]
meal accept the authority of the host; he becomes their protector, and a blow
against one of them is struck at him also. Even if the guest is an enemy,[3]
as long as he has eaten from another's bowl his life is safe.

The slaughter of an animal for another person creates a bond which has its 571
roots in the intimate connection between man and his animals. In a very 231
vivid way, the Bedouin view their animals as part of themselves, as part of 264
their *Risiq*, their general wealth, in which their sons are included. It is this 182
mystical association between a man and his animals which distinguishes a
meal consisting of the meat of an animal slaughtered from ones' own flock [574]
or herd from a meal consisting of meat bought from a butcher's shop — often [186]
given by the plateau peoples of Northern Cyrenaica to their guests, but which
the camel-herding Bedouin of the south regard as despicable hospitality. A
slaughtered animal is the food, *par excellence*, which establishes this bond

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[1] When Bedouin take their meals, they eat from large wooden bowls imported from [415]
south of the Sahara. It is a matter of custom that a man does not eat alone unless it is [439]
unavoidable, a custom of such strength, that, when, one day, only an elder, occupying
a tent the ropes of which were crossed with mine, was left in camp, he brought his [123]
bowl into my tent "so that I will be eating with a man."

[2] William Robertson Smith. *The Religion of the Semites*. 3rd ed. London: Macmillan, 1927. [113]

[3] A stranger entering a camp is under no obligation to give his identity. Few do so
until they have partaken of a meal. In the past, the Bedouin claim, the period of [574]
anonymity could last for 40 days, but nowadays, they say they limit it to two only. I [609]
have known strangers enter a camp, receive entertainment, and leave without offering
any specific identity.

571 between man and man, although the various cereal dishes which constitute
231 their regular meals are said to have a similar effect.

264 The son who continues to eat with his father "as he always had been
182 doing," also continues to accept his authority. Indeed he could do little else
● 593 at this stage, for he lacks the economic means to cut away. Neither at mar-
585 riage nor after is there any transfer of wealth from father to son. The new
182 tent recently pitched is no more than a dormitory to which the young couple
[425] retire at night. During the daytime the son is still to be seen in his father's
tent, and, in the male quarters, things appear to be much the same as before.
[556] In the female quarters, the only superficial change is the more frequent appearance among the women of one who, before marriage, often sat among them if she had been a close neighbour or a close cousin previously; or of an additional helper if she had come from afar. On the surface things remain "as they always have been," although in fact, a whole set of changes have been initiated.

852 *Rites de passage* are few among the Bedouin. A man's progress in life is
881 ceremonially marked by only four events: his birth, circumcision, marriage
764 and burial. His development into manhood is not marked by clearly defined
stages. About the age of seven, the henna markings on the front of a boy's
858 shirt for protection from the evil eye are not renewed, the cowrie shell stitched
789 to the front of his cap as a kind of talisman against the evil eye is removed
and he is no longer permitted free access to the women's quarters. As he
857 grows older, he will be instructed in goat-herding, and later taught to follow
233 the sheep. In his late teens he will have to undertake the more arduous and
883 responsible task of herding the camels. Coincident with camel-herding, he
233 may be given a gun by his father. Shortly afterwards he must undertake the
[431] stringent test of manhood, a journey to a distant oasis for dates. These
[411] changes are not marked off by a *rite de passage*. The rites a man undergoes
[484] during the course of a lifetime are minimal, and in the sense that they are
[885] concerned with only the basic events in a man's life anywhere (save for
852 circumcision, which is a minor celebration anyway), they are irreducible.
88 Moreover, the rituals which exist do not comprehend the same multiplicity of
796 relationships as rituals which occur in many other African societies.[4] It is
[771] true that the ceremonies referred to in this chapter by no means include
all the Bedouin rituals. It is also true that the events mentioned vary in
[554] elaboration, and in the number of symbols present in them, but they are
not multiplied or reduced for different people.

In this context it is important to stress that we are here dealing with a
[613] lineage society where social differentiation is not built up into differences
[554] of rank, where the roles to which a man succeeds are almost wholly cap-
[602] tured by his kinship relationships with other men and which are sociologically
to be distinguished from the roles a man enters into by acquisition of office,

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[4] See, for example, the elaboration of rituals discussed in M. Gluckman (Ed.), *Essays on the Ritual of Social Relations*. Manchester: University of Manchester Press, 1962.

membership of associations and so on. The statuses a Bedouin achieves de- 796
pend not on an ordered acquisition through the inheritance of roles or elec- 852
tion to them, but on his personal manipulation of linkages in his jockeying 88
with others. Rites are minimal because there are few defined statuses an 554
individual can predictably acquire. The equalitarianism of the desert denudes 602
the Bedouin of ritual riches. Complimentarily, rites which do occur are 613
thrown into exaggerated relief by the absence of others, and in their isolation, [557]
become not merely a "passage" but a cataclysmic change. Marriage and 585
burial both comprehend limited fields of relations, but accompanying cere- 764
monies may bring several hundred people together, people who otherwise 796
rarely gather in these numbers to meet one another as kinsmen and neigh- 602
bours, and it is suggested that the emphasis given to the events dramatises the 182
significance of the changes they produce. In the discussion of the changes
brought about by marriage, the Bedouin view of what is entailed will be
considered first.

The Bedouin View of Marriage

After marriage, the Bedouin argue, a son has a tent of his own, a woman 585
over whom he has authority and soon children to make him a father. Mar- 581
riage causes split, branching. A new family is created, holding the poten- [613]
tial of a new lineage. The separation is so painful a matter for the father
that he cannot contemplate it, hence his pretence that he has no knowledge of [593]
wedding festivities, and his subsequent attitude that nothing has happened.

Interestingly, there are two other occasions when this attitude is to be 682
observed. When a man kills within his corporate group,[5] he may flee his 613
tribe or he may be compelled to leave; later he is likely to return and, when 621
he does, he is received with a minimum of show. Every attempt is made to
suppress knowledge of the event.

Again, if incest occurs, the memory of it must somehow be suppressed, and 835
it is an ever-present danger. Men, permitted four wives simultaneously and 561
also able to engage in a plurality of marriages through divorce or death of [595]
spouses, may have children showing an age difference of two or three gen-
erations. Thus it comes about that a man may be of an age in relation to his
father's sister which permits them as children to behave as if they were
first paternal cousins. As an adult, the preferred spouse for a man is a [582]
father's brother's daughter. In terms of relationships between adolescents
the situation in which a man is of the same age generation as his father's
sister is fraught with danger. In one such case, between a man and his [684]
father's sister, the male child of the union was put out in the desert to be

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[5] Bedouin are disposed in groups which, in summer, usually constitute a single community, around or near a watering point. The men of this group are interlinked by reference to an ancestor four or five ascending generations, reckoning from the generation of men of about 20 years. When, elsewhere in this chapter reference is made to corporations, it will be to groups of this kind.

835 devoured by wild animals, the girl was "given"[6] to a close cousin who had
561 shot his sister. Both now reside with an enemy tribal section. The two acts
684 were equated. They were similar to the extent that both created a situation
which defied institutional resolution. The culprits were exorcised. The girl's lover remains with his group — the odium for the male is incomparably less than for the female, since, while maternity is easy to establish, paternity is frequently shrouded in doubt — and during the months I lived with this particular group, there was never a mention of the affair. It was as if "nothing had happened."

829 If asked why these two events cause such profound distress, the answers
the Bedouin give are twofold: they can do nothing about them, and they
578 cause split. By split in this context they mean split in the lineage; split in
613 the case of homicide because it may lead to a demand for blood-money which
[682] is payable only between corporations, and split in the case of incest because
[684] it causes chaos in relationships. Marriage, in one sense, their reasoning
581 runs, is similar, for it too causes split. Whatever may be the analytic strength
of the arguments that homicide and incest precipitate splitting, the argu-
829 ment that marriage does so is spurious. In what sense can marriage mean
613 split? Bedouin men marry "so that we may beget many sons, to make a
big lineage later on." The worst fate that can befall a man as a result of his son's marriage is that he, in later generations, will become the focal point in a series of branching descent lines. The alternative — that his sons remain unmarried — can only mean that his name would disappear through want of successors to carry it on, which is one of the greatest evils which can befall a man, according to Bedouin sentiment: better split than oblivion. If the key to the interpretation of the father's attitude to his son's marriage is not
581 that it causes split, it must lie elsewhere in their relationship. What mar-
585 riage does is alter the distribution of authority between father and son. In
•593 order to pursue this, it is necessary first to clarify the types of authority involved, and then assess them in a post-marital situation.

554

The Division of Authority Between the Family and the Corporation

851 Politically, a person's status is determined for him at birth. At this time
a man has the right to accept or deny paternity. Denial is tantamount to an accusation of adultery by his wife. In practice, once a wife has given birth to a male child, whatever doubts people may harbour regarding paternity, the husband accepts the child as his. "The boy for the bed," is a saying often heard among the Bedouin; but it remains the husband's prerogative to invest the child with legitimacy, hence, political status. Only if a husband becomes
[837] aware that he is publicly considered a cuckold, or if he catches his wife and a
lover *in flagrante delicto*, is he at all likely to take action. Otherwise he may

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[585] [581] [6] A marriage is illegal unless it is accompanied by an agreement to transfer wealth to the girl's father.

indeed welcome unfaithfulness on his wife's part. If a man is very old, and 554
his wife very young, it is likely that she will entertain lovers; if a man leaves 851
camp for a long absence his wife may not remain chaste. In both cases, if 837
the liaisons lead to the birth of a child, particularly a male, the husband greets the news with unrestrained enthusiasm — "praise be to God," as their saying goes. Incapacity[7] to produce offspring, if a husband is convinced of it, may lead him to delegate a kinsman to serve his wife for procreative purposes: he has the legal authority, as husband, to do so, and to require his wife to submit, for the only alternative, if he is not to die without "issue," is to "take" a son from his brother and fulfill the obligations towards this boy required of a pater, namely, attend to his circumcision, provide him with teaching in the Koran (a duty neglected by most) and give him the wealth with which to marry.

Granting the acceptance of paternity, whatever the circumstances of con- 593
ception, a male child, *ipso facto*, accedes to membership of a corporation, and 554
is subject to the authority of that group in a number of matters. In many [851]
situations it would appear that a son is under the father's political control. [613]
At a moot, the son, if he speaks at all, will do so only to corroborate his father. Discussions among men in a small camp evoke a similar pattern of behaviour. Until the father becomes senile or dies, a son cannot publicly pursue an independent course, but he desists by virtue of his relationships with his father *qua* pater, not because of his father's political power to
coerce. All men of a corporation, in any event, "speak with one word" at [613]
a moot, and a son, by his assent to the common view, also supports his father; in so doing he yields to the political authority of his corporation, and not that of his father.

Membership in the corporation invests a man with other privileges and 593
duties. Protection against external enemies comes within the corporation's 613
jurisdiction, although in a particular situation, the father may well be the person who dispenses it. Complimentarily, if a man commits an offense [681]
against a person not of his group, whatever private thoughts his father may have about the act, the responsibility lies not on his shoulders but on the group, and he is compelled to share this responsibility equally with all other members. For example, if a son commits a homicide the father bears the [682]
same legal responsibility for the act, and is under obligation to contribute the same share of blood-money as he would be if the act had been perpetrated by any male of the group other than his son. Even in a narrower field of relations between father and son the group exercises its authority. Acting as pater, a man may punish his son, physically or otherwise; he may not do so to the point of injury, for personal injury comes within the legitimate sphere of the corporation. A man's "bone" belongs to his group; he is an in-

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[7] Impotency is a special case, because it is dishonourable for a woman to remain [833]
wife to an impotent man. She cannot divorce him, but her father can insist on a
witnessed test of impotency and, if it is proven, the husband is compelled to divorce [586]
her. Barrenness, obviously, is a different matter.

●593 tegral part of "the one body"; events which affect a man in this context lie
613 outside a father's field of jurisdiction. The political authority vested in a
corporation acts to circumscribe the authority of persons in other fields.

Other rights stem from political membership. As a person with a defined position in a lineage corporation, a man has the right to use the natural resources of its territory. His father, although he instructs his son where to plough and when to water the animals, cannot deny him access to wells, pastures and ploughland. Economically, a son is independent to this extent, although his ability to exploit his right to the natural resources is restricted by his father's control of animals. Ultimately, however, this restriction cannot amount to stultification, because a man has the right to
613 demand food. In practice, a poor man staves off hunger with donations from
422 this or that individual, and superficially it appears that he is dependent on
735 the personal charity of his fellowmen. This is not so, for what is implicit is
that the parcels of wealth controlled by individuals are the possessions of the corporation. It is not accidental that poor people do not go hungry. During my entire stay among the Bedouin I never saw one of them beg or
[556] suffer hunger, however marginal the diet of many. Clearly, those with a
surplus can and do use it for personal advantage, but the extent to which they can do so is circumscribed by the legal claims which members of a corporation have on the parcels of moveable property held by each of them.

613 Control over the wealth, whether it be animals or the procreative functions
421 of women, rests, in the final analysis, in a corporation. Inheritance laws
428 specify that women are not legal heirs,[8] and that all male children are
equal heirs. Women do, in fact, come to control property, and it is rare that
[562] wealth is equally divided among male heirs. The precise details of inherit-
[593] ance may partly be decided by a father, but he is limited in his actions. Most
of the time inheritance disputes are not of the kind which require action by the corporate group; a case which occured while I was resident with the Bedouin did, however, invoke immediate action. A man, who had left the desert to live in a village on the plateau, had only one daughter. He made it known that he intended to will his entire property to his daughter. When the news was brought to the camps of his fellow agnates, there was great consternation, because, as became clear in their lengthy discussions, the threat now existed that a substantial parcel of property would be removed from the group, a threat made real by the proposed marriage of the daughter
[584] to a man of another tribe. The court would have to recognise the daughter's
right to some of the property, and the members of the group reluctantly had to concede that there was little they could do about this, but they had one
[593] action left to them — they decided that her nearest agnate should demand
[584] her in marriage. Usually, the choice of husband for a daughter is a decision

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[771] [8] The Bedouin are Sunni Muslims, and, as Samusi, belong to the Maliki school in
[795] legal matters. According to court law, women are heirs. However, actual Bedouin
[671] practice is contrary to law. For, if women were permitted to inherit, since many marry
outside the corporation into which they were born, they could alienate its resources.

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her father takes, but in certain critical situations he can be relieved of choice 593•
if the interests of the group as a whole are at stake. [421]

Political authority is the preserve of a corporation, and its exercise leads [428]
to invasion of a man's authority in the field of domestic relations. This [584]
does not mean, however, that discrete areas of authority do not remain with
the father. In the tent his authority over his son is so overwhelming as to
keep the son in almost complete subordination. The son is referred to as a
slave, and in daily life he has to behave as one. He must obey every command,
for, were he to rebel, he would find little or no support among his
agnates, whatever the extent of the provocation. Retreat from his father is [422]
hardly an alternative, since, while his father is alive, he has no animals of
his own, and to leave camp would only mean that he would have to move
outside his group to seek employment elsewhere as a shepherd. If he did [558]
this he would forfeit status, and almost certainly cut himself off from property [428]
which would fall to him after his father's death. A man who "denies"
his father looses too many privileges for the practice to become widespread.

Caught in this dilemma, a son's predicament is worsened by the fact that 593
he cannot initiate marriage negotiations — to be able to do so requires some 584
animals to offer a girl's father. Through his mother's brother he has the [431]
means of bringing pressure to bear on his father, but the latter can resist for [604]
years. Finally, a marriage is arranged for him. It is difficult to convey the 581
yearning of young Bedouin for marriage. They discuss it among themselves 521
ad nauseam. For the most part their talk is about the sexual aspect of marriage. 831
Premarital sex relations are strictly controlled, and the movements 836
of each young girl are carefully guarded because, if on the day of her marriage
the test shows that she is not a virgin, she not only brings disgrace to [585]
her family, but the marriage may be revoked and her worth as a bride for
another man seriously diminished. Nevertheless premarital relations do [837]
occur, if not between youths and maidens to any extent, between young
men and married women.

The question still remains: why is marriage the occasion of such ebullient 581
celebration? The formal authority a father exercises over his son 593
changes little on marriage. Economically the son is still harnessed to the
father. The latter still shouts his orders at him, and obedience remains
unaltered. Any sign of an independent view on a matter is met with a gruff
rebuff. If the marriage turns out to be disagreeable to the father, he has
the authority — if not always the power — to break it. Marriage does not
mean a change in the general mode of behaviour between the two; the legal
relations remain unaltered, albeit modified in practice, as the married son
matures in age. But marriage does mean the acquisition of rights and status
previously denied a son. Henceforward, he has a domain of his own. This [554]
is high drama, indeed, for although every effort is made to give substance to
the expressed view that "nothing has happened," for the first time in his
life the son has seized publicly, amid the jubilations of his fellows, a status
which hitherto was the possession of the father.

The Meaning of Marriage

581 Until marriage the changes in a man's life have been in the nature of
585 an ordered sequence of development from a child to be cared for — the only
342 time in his life when a father, without inhibition, showers on him his love
• [593] and affection — to one who, by degrees, makes an increasing contribution to
a production unit. Marriage necessitates that a man pitch a tent for himself.
With a tent he becomes a potential host and protector of others. The local
idiom for marriage is "to set up a tent." It would be quite improper to use
[196] the verb "to marry" when inquiring whether a marriage has taken place
since this verb also has the meaning of "to have sexual intercourse."
[195] Instead the euphemism, "Have you pitched a tent?" is used. The Arabic word
for a tent in this context is *Bait*. It is not used to refer to a military tent, nor
to the small tent which shelters only a widow. It is reserved for the Bedouin
tent, which usually has a wool top, and, most importantly, holds the promise
of the continuation of life, whether it shelters a newly married couple, a
mature family or young unmarried people. (The word *Bait* represents a
complex concept, and it would be too much of a diversion here to discuss
the various points of its significance. It is essential to understand that its
[778] meaning is not confined to a tent in the physical sense.) Its top has *Baraka*
(divine goodness) in it; the quality of *Haram*, which makes it possible for the
tent to be used as a sanctuary, is associated with it and this quality of *Haram*
extends, moreover, to the ropes of the tent, so that anyone who clutches them
comes under the protection of the owner. In it, the wife must permanently
reside and her husband has the legal right to insist on this. In it too, he
has the legal right of sexual access to a woman, his wife. Any children
[885] born in it he can claim as his own. With the erection of a tent the son
reaches adulthood, and it is in this sense that he can be said to have acquired
a domain of his own.

581 Marriage gives a son greater freedom and less dependence on his father
585 in another sense. A second euphemism used for marriage is "making a
[593] relationship," specifically an affinal one. Relationships between a man and
[195] his father-in-law are diverse and are used in various ways in different situations.
Here, the particular aspect which needs to be stressed is that a man
606 can cajole his father-in-law, and (through his wife) wealth, in the form
425 of animals, may pass from the former to the latter. Reciprocal gifts are passed
556 between affines on certain occasions, but in addition small amounts may
pass which are not connected with the formal occasions of exchanges. Debt
583 lies between them. It begins with the initiation of marriage negotiations,
584 when the suitor's kinsmen take a prescribed number of sheep to present to
606 the girl's father if negotiations are successful. They promise to transfer
bride-wealth[*] to the girl's father. A few weeks after the marriage, the hus-

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[171] [*] I use the word "bride-wealth" because it has become so familiar in the literature,
but the only similarity between the *Sahiba* of the Bedouin and the bride-wealth of

band is required to take gifts to his mother-in-law in recognition of the fact 583
that she nourished his wife as an infant (the literal meaning of the word 584
used for this gift is "milk"). A return visit is made and gifts are given to 606
the daughter. When the first child is born an animal is presented by the
affines, and if the child is a male, the gift may be several sheep, or even a 851
few camels if the father-in-law is very wealthy. Formal exchange of gifts 425
continue, but, in addition, informal transfers are made. Moreover, if re- 606
lations between a man and his father-in-law develop favourably, it is not un- 606
common for a young husband, during the early years of marriage, to move 591
away from his father and pitch his tent alongside that of his father-in-law. 593●
Marriage gives a son affinal relations of his own. Affinity can alleviate the
dead weight of paternal authority.

It is suggested that the crisis the marriage of a son assumes for a father 585
is the shift it entails in the distribution of authority. This is borne out by 561
other details in the marriage ceremony referred to earlier. Ordinarily, young 602
men dare not sing within earshot of their senior agnates. Far from allowing
obscenities, agnates of the ascending generation would not allow even a 533
mention of women to be made by young men, in their presence. In a group [593]
consisting of young men and an agnate, I chanced to use the noun for [123]
woman and immediately my tent was cleared of all but the senior agnate.
At a wedding the young men revel in their lewd songs and shout their [831]
obscenities for all to hear. The senior agnates stand aside and make a show of ignoring the proceedings. And well they may, for each marriage is a challenge to the exclusive authority they have enjoyed; each nuptial tent is an invasion of the domain of which they have been undisputed masters. Marriage is the only occasion when the men of one generation can clap and sing their defiance of an older one, and give warning of the changes which must be accommodated however great the pretence that nothing has happened.

Marriage ceremonies dramatise the clash between adjacent generations 561
over the distribution of certain forms of authority. If this authority is as 602
overwhelming as has been suggested, and if it is so deeply resented, how is it that life is endurable for juniors? Relationships between junior and senior agnates are so restrictive that they almost amount to what Professor Fortes has suggested I view as a form of avoidance relationships. Juniors must always defer, they must obey commands promptly, they serve their seniors, they must accept a lead when it is given and the restrictions on conversations exclude all reference to women, marriage or sex. These are not simply a set of general guides for behaviour, they are rigidly applied rules, deviation from which is countered with rebuke or greater severity. It would appear from this

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many African societies is that wealth is transferred. Obviously, in societies where the 583
rules of exogamy compel a dispersion of links outside a man's own clan, what is in- 584
volved in this transfer of wealth cannot be sociologically similar to one in which mar-
riage to the first cousin on either side is permitted. 606
171

462 them or any innate aptitude for them; this insistence is an index of the
424 jealousy with which she is prepared to guard her rights. Each right derived
from this or that small task is an extension of her control over the male.

462 The force and significance of this control is, perhaps, best seen in a
woman's right to cook. At marriage a woman must have at least the minimum
424 of cooking utensils, and one of the rights a man acquires in a woman is
252 that she cooks for him. This is something a man cannot do for himself.
Therefore, when a man ill-treats his wife or threatens her with divorce, she
• [593] can retaliate by refusing to cook, or leave the tent altogether to return to her
father. A man bereft of this service is in a very sorry plight indeed. The
legal dominance of the male, seemingly autocratic, is reduced at every
point by the control a woman exercises through her exclusive right to perform
tasks. The limits to the area of her coercive powers are significant.
562 They are confined almost wholly to domestic relationships. Legally, women
suffer such disabilities that they are almost of the status of minors; in
reality, their day-to-day living is far from intolerable because they are able
to control males over a wide field of relationships.

462 Men, excluded in the main from domestic duties around the tent, perform
424 tasks to which their legal rights are tied. While women have access
231 to wells for water used by human beings, the transport of larger quantities
of water over longer distances, requiring the use of camels, is a task which
falls to the men. Watering of animals is done by men. Only they can
slaughter the animals for food. The meat of an animal slaughtered by a
woman is not "free," in a ritual sense, for human consumption. In an
extremity only, a woman can, in effect, kill an animal, but the knife which
cuts its throat must be held in a male hand, even if it is the hand of a very
462 small boy. The exploitation of the land is also the male prerogative. They
[424] plough and sow the grain; incidental help may be provided by wives working
[241] alongside their husbands during the early part of reaping, but the main
reaping is done entirely by men. Transportation of grain to the mounds is
also carried out by men, and it is they only who have access to the grain
stores when quantities are withdrawn for family use. Sheep-shearing is
[236] carried out entirely by males,[10] the fleeces are stacked by them and the
[432] distribution and sales of these is directed by the male head of the tent.

Additional to these major tasks which males undertake are a number of
minor ones. Men sew strips of cotton together to make clothes for both
sexes. They also make rope of grass, albeit in a desultory sort of way, by
twisting together the strands between the palms of the hands. A number of
[834] other tasks fall to the men by virtue of the fact that the sexes are separated
[342] in the tent by a divider of blanket material, which may be taken down
when only members of the elementary family are about, but which is put

[461] [10] This work is reserved for the younger men and takes the form of a festival during
[533] which lewd songs are sung and poems with obscene themes or references are recited
[538] loudly and within the hearing of elders, in a manner not dissimilar to the behaviour
[831] of bachelors at a wedding.

Cases

621 Genealogically he was their father's brother, but he was of their same age
592 generation, and behaved as if he was their agnatic equal. Towards his own
578 brother (16), he behaved as if the latter was his uncle, for he was much his
[604] junior in age and his uncle had virtually brought him up from boyhood.
They had quarrelled bitterly because his brother (16) had given him only
[428] a fraction of his inheritance, which he himself, in turn, should have
• [593] shared with his young full brother (not shown on the diagram) but he did
not do so. This youngest brother left (15) for this reason and now resides
621 with (16), his full brother's enemy. Two of the men (14 and 13) of this
592 group of four were the chief herdsmen of the camp, although they were
[233] assisted for short periods by (12) and (15), who also helped tend the
camels in other ways. Their connection with the group centered on Tent
[571] A was a mutual close link to a politically powerful person (not shown on the
genealogies) to whom they are deeply loyal and who, while I was among
them, was actively opposed to the common political enemy of them all (16),
and who in earlier years had challenged the leadership of (2) of Tent A.
There is also the fact that they were all linked within a close range of
[613] agnation. This linkage included, too, the owner of Tent F (17), not in
[602] fact the descendant of the man shown in the diagram — he was the son of
a slave wife; his genitor was a slave, but his mother's master reared him,
freed him and he is now given as his son in the genealogy. He lives with his
wife, of client origin, together with her children from a previous husband,
(18), who divorced her, and his own children. Aging, he no longer acted
as a regular herdsmen, but relieved other men in the camp, and also spent
some time shepherding.

621 The details given of the strands which run through the camp to tie these
571 particular people together are so few that, like the Bedouin plough, they do
no more than scratch the surface, but they are sufficient to permit a few
general statements. The camp, and particularly the precise disposition of
621 its tents, shows a group of males clustered together to share two of the main
571 economic tasks: shepherding and herding. The physically strong adult males
233 of Tents D and E shoulder the burden of herding all the camels of the camp,
462 and the men of Tents B, A and C shepherd all the sheep, with (17) of
Tent F serving both purposes. This number of men allows some to remain
in the camp at all times, to free one of them for a journey to the distant
market when supplies of sugar and tea are necessary, and to enable one or
two men, at short notice, to hurry away on horse or camel to search for
lost animals.[14]

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Economic Determinants of the General Structure of the Camp

594 It is also clear from these details that, given the disparities in wealth
231 (although all men have some wealth), the diet of most is considerably
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431
[556]

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[14] There is little point in seeking the lost animals themselves in the first instance. A man travels from camp to camp asking for information, and when he has gathered his clues, he searches a neighbourhood.

428 the father's property. The egalitarian spirit of the Bedouin
596 inheritance rule functions to maintain the unity of the family,
and, at another level of social complexity, the structural
continuity of the corporate group. Ideally, the surviving
sons will keep intact their father's estate, his land and
animals, and will work it as a unit. And this is generally
596 the case in al-Qasr. On the other hand, there is also the
● 594 implicit assumption in the structural principle of the
*613 Bedouin segmentary lineage system that each individual will
183 eventually establish a unit of his own, separate from but
interrelated with, the main household. As a result, there
596 usually develops some division of property and labor among
593 surviving brothers. Whether or not this division is formally
agreed upon, and, whether or not it is assigned by the father
or the eldest son is largely arbitrary. In some cases, the
father makes such a decision before his death and prepares
his sons for it. The father's concern is that good relations
be maintained between his sons after his death. Just as the
father mediates conflict between his sons during his life,
so he hopes to maintain peace between them after his death.
The Bedouins say that a father should be fair when dealing
with his sons, and that he should never favor one over the
other.

428 Inheritance is determined through the patrilineal
*[613] lineage principle. The Bedouins of al-Qasr claim that they

*613 178 177 578 Bedouins, always a minority in Egypt, have been undergoing a transition to peasantry since about 1800. Probably since that time, Bedouin society has been, to use Easton's (1959) emphasis, a "segmentary society" rather than a "segmenting society."

196 Formal Bedouin categories of kinship are confusing; depending upon the situation they use the concepts of bait, 'ait, 'aiela and gabiila interchangeably. The term bait literally means "house," the term bait al-'Arab may mean "the tent" or "the people of the tent." "People of the tent" • [594] may refer to either the nuclear family of one man, or the nuclear families of a man, his brothers and his sons, and [596] [621] their spouses and offspring. In the latter case, the extended family is referred to as the naja'. A naja', or camp, usually consists of three or four tents. The word bait may 196 *613 refer to the tertiary and the sub-tertiary groups, and occasionally one might even refer to the secondary group as a bait when he wishes to emphasize the quality of corporateness. The term 'aiela, literally "family," is the word used most often to designate the secondary lineage segment. The diminutive of this word, i.e. 'ait, usually refers to the sub-tertiary group but it commonly designates the secondary group [619] also. The term gabiila, "tribe," is the only word used for the primary and supra-primary lineage groupings. These are 196 the general Bedouin usages and their frequency will vary not

613 individuals. He settles disputes among them and represents them in their
[627] disputes with outsiders. He is also the spokesman of his Bait in all
matters involving the relationship of the Bait with the other tribal seg-
[682] ments. He is responsible for the collection of the bloodmoney from mem-
bers of his Bait and has the authority to confiscate property of individual
members who refuse to pay their share. When a member is financially unable
to pay his share, the Aqila is expected to pay for him and collect at a
later time when the member is in a position to make such payment.

613 Originally the position of the Aqila was a hereditary one with the
428 position passing from father to son. However, in recent years the rigid-
178 ity of the patrilineal descent as the basis of succession to the position
of the Aqila has been modified radically and other principles of selec-
613 tion have been introduced. The working of the principles underlying the
128 selection of the Aqila will be analyzed in detail in the following chapter
through the close examination of one of the major legal cases which oc-
curred during my stay in the area.

613 Thus each Bait is a division of one of the Eilas and this has its
[423] place in the formal tribal system. It constitutes a group with definite
usufruct rights to land and a formally recognized leadership.

621 But the actual residential units in which Awlad Ali live are not
[613] baits but parts of them in the form of separate camps or "nagei". The
camps constitute the primary communities of Awlad Ali. A camp consists
[594] of a number of tents ranging from four to twelve. Each tent is usually
occupied by one nuclear family of a husband, his wife and children. In
[595] cases of polygynous marriages, each wife usually occupies one tent with
[361] her children. Each camp is separated from the next one by a distance
which ranges from two to ten kilometers.

sorts of petty ways, listen to his grumbles about his agnates, interfere on his 604
behalf in petty camp quarrels, shield him from the disciplinarian father and 613
guard his property interests against the predatory father's brother; if the 428
mother's brother dies without heirs, the sister's son can reasonably expect at
least a share of his wealth. When the mother's brother is a member of a
different corporate group, a sister's son cannot possibly expect to inherit
from him in any circumstance.

The mother's brother may reside in a camp too distant to be much effective 604
direct help in day-to-day living. His relative remoteness gives the relation- 591
ship other possible opportunities, however. Rainfall in the semi-desert area 312
of Cyrenaica is highly variable, both from year to year, and from place to 233
place in any given year. As a result this shallow saucer of a depression may 241
have sufficient rain to supply both the water needs of animals and crops,
while an area a few miles distant will have inadequate water supplies for
either. The mother's brother-sister's son link can mean water for animals and
a crop of barley for both when, in successive years, the resources of one area
or the other are inadequate.

The differences in the relations between men and their mother's brother 604
do not end with a characterisation of their antipodal forms. The demo-
graphic structure of a group may be such that one man may have a number
of mother's brothers, another only one; one man may have to share with
several brothers, another may be an only son. Complications of this sort de-
termine the precise relationships between men, but however intricate these [613]
may be, each corporate group has its matrilateral links with a group occupy-
ing a slightly different ecological area, and it also has a plurality of matri-
lateral connections within it. Further, if a direct connection is not available [603]
to any particular individual he can use an indirect link (e.g. father's mother's
brother or mother's mother's brother) to satisfy his needs.

The Preference for Males

Thus far, the family and the social matrix in which it is embedded has 128
been discussed in general terms, most particularly in reference to several
selected sets of relationships. I wish now to place these relationships in a
more specific setting with a brief discussion of the composition of a small
camp of a group inhabiting the arid areas of central Cyrenaica. When the 829
Bedouin give their views on the structure of the family in Cyrenaica they 594
speak of it as consisting of a pair of spouses and about ten children, mainly
males. The emphasis on males is not mere sentiment, overwhelmingly though 562
it favours them against females. Additional males in a family increase the 858
productive possibilities of a family in the sense that more herdsmen become
available and larger ploughing commitments can be undertaken; an increase
in the number of females has small effect on production since they are pre-
cluded from any direct participation in these activities. Both sexes, ranging
in age from about seven years to mature adulthood, are necessary if a family

829 is to constitute a viable economic unit; and if it is to expand, the number
594 of males must be increased disproportionately compared with females. Since
562 the structure of this "ideal family" (which in the sentiments of the Bedouin
858 is the only family) is based on the division of labour, some details of the
tasks and their allocation among members of a family are included to estimate
the importance of this notional "ideal family."

The Division of Labour, by Sex

462 The tasks women perform are almost entirely associated with the tent.
286 They make the tent top, and the gaily coloured carpets which cover the
sandy ground in the men's quarters. They also weave the material for making
sacks, and nose bags for horses and camels. Throughout the year a
piece of weaving is always on the loom waiting, and while any women of
the tent may take a turn at weaving, the mother decides what is to be made,
462 its pattern and colours and in general directs operations. Women also pitch
342 the tent when the camp is moved; they do so unaided by the men. It is a
task which requires considerable strength and only grown girls and mature
women can assist in this; younger girls scour the vicinity in search of
stones to hold the sides of the tent on the ground after it has been erected.
[356] As soon as pitching is complete, the floor of the tent is brushed clean before
carpets are spread and the few articles of personal belongings placed in
their proper position.

462 Next, brushwood must be fetched in large quantities for fires. Apart
313 from cooking needs and winter warmth, the fire of each tent is in constant
use for preparing the sickly sweet tea, almost the consistency of syrup,
which is drunk several times a day regularly and which is made again for
even the casual visitor. The task of fetching brushwood is performed daily,
and each load takes a few hours of a woman's time to gather and bring back
[412] to the tent. Bushes are uprooted with the aid of a long-handled adze and
piled together, to be carried on her back for the homeward journey. The
load is cumbersome and heavy; only girls in their late teens and mature
women can cope with it.

462 All cooking is done by the women. Most meals consist of cereal dishes of
252 various sorts, so that grinding, using heavy millstones, is a perpetual activity
to satisfy the demands for large quantities of flour. Millstones are
412 bought in the villages. In most small camps there only one or two sets,
so they are passed round from one woman to another. The stones are very
heavy but when they are carried from tent to tent men offer no assistance.

462 Each tent also requires large quantities of water for human consumption.
If the camp is located near a well, water is drawn in small quantities, frequently.
312 Young girls and boys take a donkey to the well, fill a couple of
[492] jerry cans with water, wait for an older sister to load them on the donkey
and then drive the beast back to camp. After a fall of rain, while puddles
of water remain on the ground, mature women make haste to gather the

462

in position immediately anyone else appears at the entrance to the tent.[11] [834] [342]
Women cook, but they do not serve the meal to males, nor are they responsible [264]
for the distribution of meat among them. Parts of an animal are 264
carefully specified, and the various portions distributed at a meal carry 574
with them a great deal of significance. A host can honour, flatter, disappoint 571
or even insult his guest, depending on the precise distribution of meat
he adopts. Designated portions should go to certain kinsmen if they are [602]
present, but this still leaves a wide margin of choice, and a host can use
this choice as part of the many means at his disposal for directing his relationships
with other men. A political link can be forged or another
snapped by the distribution of portions of meat at the commensal meal.

The Bedouin Ideal Type of Family as a Unit of Production

This account of the division of labour is far from inclusive of all the tasks 594
carried out. The details given are only barely sufficient to provide some 183
indication of the necessary composition of a family. Referring again to the [462]
Bedouin sentiments about the matter, it is now possible to give it some
numerical precision. The number of females should be a minimum of
about three, including a mother, a teen-age daughter and a child of about
eight years. Males should number about six: a father, relieved of most [857]
chores to act as director; a son in his middle to late twenties, to plough; a [883]
second son, in his early to middle twenties, to herd the camels; a third, in [462]
his late teens to early twenties, to shepherd the sheep; a fourth, middle to [561]
late teens, to look after the goats; and a younger son to fetch, carry and
run errands about the camp. The family of the ordinary Bedouin, they say, [554]
shows this sex and age distribution, although they recognise that a politically
ambitious man with the wealth to match his aspirations would require more [556]
of both sexes — particularly women, since the burden of entertainment increases
rapidly with a man's climb to power and fame.

Clearly, the basis of Bedouin sentiment concerning family structure is its 121
approximation to an ideal production unit. Some families display the features 183
of this ideal, but even they enjoy the productive benefits of this composition
for a very limited period only. The family, as described above, can only be an 594
ephemeral unit, since the age structure constantly changes, women are removed
by marriage, men move away and death affects it at any point at any
time. The Bedouin family is a fiction in the sense that it can be said to have a
characteristic composition. The mistake they make is to conceive of it as a
particular kinship structure related to production. The substance of what
has been referred to as a fiction is that, if viewed as a productive unit, it
bears close consistency with reality. Freed of the need to examine it in terms [621]
of specifically limited kinship relationships, and no longer anchored to the
inhabitants of a single tent, the distribution of people according to sex and

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[11] This is the general rule. In practice, the use of the divider can indicate an intimacy or distance in relationships, most subtly.

121 age depicted in their notion of a family is meaningful. It follows that, since
183 this unit will not be clustered in one tent, but distributed over several, each
•594 small community must be so constituted that links people can use to claim
621 the services of others must exist, and that, since claims can be made against various sorts of kinship relationships, each small camp will have predictable kin links. It follows, further, that since age, sex and number of people are significant, a small camp will have a characteristic demographic structure; each tent in a camp will display developmental changes, and particular tents may be shifted from one camp to another, but if a livelihood is to be gained in this semi-desert environment supporting its mixed pastoral-cum-agricultural economy, then at any given time the small camp must have certain fixed features in its composition. The elementary family is subject to far too many vicissitudes to exist on its own. It now remains to demonstrate this general argument by examining the details of one of these small camps.

A Particular Camp Viewed in Detail

621 The camp was one of 12 which constitute a minimal tribal section. In
613 genealogical terms its male members were linked through an ancestor five ascending generations from living males of about 20 years of age. Usually,
[221] in summer, camps of this sort move to the vicinity of a large watering point;
in winter, this larger community breaks up into a number of smaller ones
[162] as man and animals move off further south to the pastures. The total living
population of the tribal section to which this particular camp belonged was 524.

621 Linked patrilineally, its male members were also linked in a plurality of
613 other consanguineal ways. Primarily, this plurality was brought about by
582 parallel-cousin marriage. The incidence of this form of marriage for
182 males of this group was 48 per cent[12] of the gross total of 234, derived
from their marriages over three generations; that is, the generation of males entering into marriage, and the generation which has begun to die out are included with the generation of middle-aged males. This means that practically every male is related to others in a number of ways, and it is necessary to point this out now because the details to be given presently will show only the more immediate, but not all, existing connections. Plurality of links, moreover, is not the only consequence. Parallel-cousin marriage is a transmuting agent, creating a diversity of links. Each and every link carries with it specific modes of behaviour, which in turn means that each individual has a wide variety of different claims he can press on his coresidents. Marriage connections also exist with other sections of the same tribe. Their proportion is 28 per cent of the total. Demographically, it

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[12] As a matter of interest, the figure for marriage to the father's brother's daughter is 50 per cent of the figure for parallel-cousin marriage in general, but the consequences of these are beyond the scope of the present discussion.

593 not considered bad for a man to beat his wife." In the case
593 of ill-treatment by the husband, her father may take the
*613 matter to the corporate head. Traditionally, the corporate
[792] head would order the husband to move his tent next to the
tend of the "holy man" or some other third party, so that
he would be dissuaded against such behavior. Another reason
[586] for this is so that the girl might have witnesses to support
her petition for divorce should the husband continue to beat
her. I heard of no wife-beating while I was in al-Qasr.

•595 The Quran states that a man may lawfully take four
[779] wives, but that if he feels he cannot treat each of them
equally, he should take only one (Sura IV:3 and 129). The
Bedouins are conscientious in practicing this rule, though
595 perhaps not for religious reasons. If a man has more than
593 one wife, he must spend an equal amount of time with each.
Conflict between co-wives is lessened by the fact that a man
will have separate tents, or rooms in the case of a house,
for each wife. A man will not buy a dress or a piece of jewelry
for one wife without buying a copy of it for all other wives.
595 On a trip to the Siwa Oasis, I was accompanied by a man who
593 had three wives and wished to bring them a gift of basketry
114 upon his return. He was successful in buying two baskets
which were similar but could not find a comparable third in
[431] the oasis market. In dismay, he made a gift of the baskets
to me and returned with no souvenirs at all. One of my in-

595 124 One of my informants, a wealthy man and a poet, said that since he could not love two women equally he would never take a second wife. He also said that he was unwilling to give his daughter to a man who refused to promise him that she would be his only wife.

593 Throughout his life, the father is dominant and his washuun is subjective. He is the master of his naja' and the [596] social behavior of his wife and offspring toward him has both a moral and a pragmatic aspect. They show respect and obed- [768] ience because "it is the decent thing to do;" further, just as he provides for their material needs while he is alive, so the property which he leaves them will sustain them after 428 his death. As we have already noted, in theory, the daughters [562] inherit one-half of the shares which the sons receive; in fact, females inherit only if they are the sole survivors of the male. But the surviving wife, or wives, will take a cash amount equal to their brideprice from the husband's estate. The Bedouins say that this price will be paid before any other inheritance shares are distributed. In addition, the 768 wife has the right to remain in her husband's house or tent, and it is the duty of the eldest son to look after her. She may remain at home until death, provided she never brings a man who may be considered a prospective husband into the house.

593 The rights and duties involved in the father-washuun relationship show that the ideal authority structure of the

582 (Patai 1962:Ch. 6).

171 The point of this is that most of the Middle East's inhabitants are villagers dependent upon agriculture. The dominant form of marriage is not parallel-cousin marriage. As a matter of fact, marriage may or may not be considered exogamous depending upon the level of segmentation at which one wishes to draw the line for his definition of endogamy. Ayoub (1959) suggests that parallel-cousin marriage be considered only as an extreme expression of an overall preference for endogamy. She found in a sample of 514 marriages from a Syrian village that 9.1 per cent of them were with the parallel-cousin while 63.4 per cent were within the secondary group. She concludes from this that intra-lineage marriage is frequent enough that it cannot be accounted for by random mate selection.

582 In 'Ailit Ma'fas of al-Qasr, out of 197 recorded
162 marriages over a period of five generations the frequency of
*[613] parallel-cousin marriage was 11.1 per cent and marriage within the lineage was 41.6 per cent of the total. Of these 197
•[595] marriages, only 39 were cases of polygny and most of these involved a man taking two wives (see Table 5 below).

582 The confusion over the presence or absence of parallel-
114 cousin marriage in the Middle East is related to the question
196 of whether or not the researcher and the native are talking about the same thing. In Qasr, for instance, the term

[TEXT CONTINUED ON PAGE 116]

586 judicious. Another issue which enters here is the desire on
829 the part of the individual to maintain his privacy--especially where an infringement of it could result in a change of his tax status. The Bedouins think that it is wise to keep the government uninformed about the exact size of their family.
586 When I first asked a question concerning divorce, I was
829 politely taken aside and told that I do not speak about
123 divorce to a man, and especially when his sons are present.

586 Two cases of divorce took place while I was in the field. In the one, the wife claimed that her husband was impotent. She took this complaint to her father who then confronted the husband with it; the result was a divorce. Although the man denied that he was sterile, this was his second childless marriage and he felt it wise not to contest the case. It becomes very important to know, in the case of Bedouin divorce, which partner cannot meet the requirements of the marriage. If it is the woman, she will return to her father's house and the father must then return the price of mahr (brideprice). If it is the husband, when his wife returns to her father's house he must pay her (not her father, in this case) a sum, called mu'akhkhir al-sadaaq ("the balance of the marriage contract"), which is equal to that of the original mahr. Actually, there are three times when a mahr
583 price may be paid in al-Qasr: the original mahr is paid at
768 the time of the marriage; the mu'akhkhir al-sadaaq is paid
595

586 at the time of divorce (if the husband is in fault), and also [583] at the time of the husband's death; and, sadaaq al-musaama [768] ("price of friendship") is paid to the wife when her husband [595] takes a second, third or fourth wife.

586 158 The second divorce case which happened while I was in al-Qasr involved, what seems to be, an instance of psychotic behavior. A girl, who had married shortly before I arrived in the field, would fall into a deep sleep every time she entered her husband's house. Each time her father would come for her and take her home until she had recovered. But upon her return, three different times, she became ill again. Finally, her father and the husband agreed that this marriage would not work, and the father returned the mahr to the man. This case lasted over the period of almost a year while I lived in al-Qasr. I suggested to the father that perhaps his daughter did not wish to be married to this man but he assured me that "she loved him very much."

586 If the girl's father is dead, so that she cannot return to his house at the time of divorce, she will go to live with the brother who needs her services. It then be- 586 587 comes the duty of the brother to make another marriage for [593] his sister, and in the case that he does it becomes his right [583] to claim the mahr for himself. The Bedouins say that virginity, or the lack of it, in the case of the divorced woman is no issue; just so a man knows "she is from a good family."

586 Naturally, according to the rule of patriliny, all
851 children from a marriage belong to the husband and become
* 613 members of his lineage. Should divorce occur while a woman is nursing, she will take the child with her and it will be returned after weaning. Sometimes the husband will permit the wife to keep one child--always a girl--in order "to keep her company."

587 The practice of the sororate has been noted. The Bedouins also believe that "a man should marry his brother's widow so that she will have someone to help her with the children." But I have no data on the frequencies of these
12 practices. When I gathered my data on marriage, my informants
58 would give me only the name of the tribe or lineage into which a man married, and never did I get the name of a man's wife.
[829] (One lineage in al-Qasr, entirely refused to give me data on genealogy or marriage because, as one leader said, "it is not decent to speak of these things with people.") Sororal
•595 polygny is forbidden (Quran IV:23), and the Bedouins say that a man cannot marry more than one bint 'amm. Marriage
182 practices, such as sororate and levirate, I interpret as
[587] patterns which maintain structural continuity and political advantage. The custom of permitting a man to marry only
[582] one of his father's brother's daughters may be seen as a precaution against intensifying authority relations and the degree of segmentation.

156 than the Awlad-'Ali societal level. In the traditional
554 system, his influence and power have been informal, and,
121 although this has been advantageous over against the formal
role of *'aqila*, his political activity was ultimately limited
by this structural differentiation and definition of authority.
[177] In gaining access to the bureaucratic structure of Egyptian
officialdom with its firm allocation of rights and duties,
Hajj 'Ali could operate as an authority within the total authority
structure which has reference to both the internal and external
political relational systems of al-Qasr.

Practical Application

*613 In al-Qasr, the two most influential and powerful
lineages, 'Ailit Lazumi and 'Ailit Ma'fas, each have a
[634] "most powerful *bait*." We have noted that in 'Ailit Lazumi
it is Bait Bu Taram which controls the office of *'umda*: in
*613 'Ailit Ma'fas it is Bait 'Umar which has Hajj 'Ali. Hajj 'Ali
159 is fifty three years old. He has married five times, divorced
581 one wife, and at present has four wives. Whatever his motives
156 for these marriages, at least some of them have obviously
● [595] been made as economic and political moves. A check on his
wives' tribal origins will show this. In each case, Hajj
'Ali's wife is from a lineage which holds land contiguous to
his own property in the *'izba* sector of al-Qasr. The one
exception to this is a marriage contracted to establish ties

156 of them) cater largely to the needs of the lineage in whose
159 territory they are located. They are operated mostly on a
554
443 credit basis. Lineage members, as debtors, feel gratitude
423 but also, and more importantly, loyalty toward their kinsman
472
*[613] and creditor. Hajj 'Ali is the only member of al-Qasr who
[452] owns two shops, and the only Bedouin in the whole Western Desert
who owns three shops. His brother owns a shop in Matruh.
156 Furthermore, the shop in Sallum is in a strategic position on
159 the Libyan border which, coincidentally or not, is a point
554 for importing, and also smuggling, foreign goods into Egypt.
443
439 The possession and utilization of foreign products is definitely
472 a status symbol all over Egypt. Hence, the person in this
area who can control, however slightly, the distribution of
such goods has a lever with which to exact prestige and
favors from the "status group" in al-Qasr who now welcome
these symbols (tobacco, pistols, rifles, radios) and the
bureaucrats of Marsa Matruh who crave them (food goods,
clothing materials, car parts).

156 Besides all this, Hajj 'Ali is involved in a small
159 stone-cutting operation which supplies stones for house
554 building, he cooperates with his three brothers in a well-
[316]
[312] cleaning concern, and contracts government heavy equipment
[427] to build earth dams. The material evidence of his status
[342] is that he is the only man in al-Qasr with two compound-type
● [595] houses (one he built thirteen years ago), and the only man
with four wives.

619 173 Awlad Ali themselves are divided into three major sections: Ahmar (the Reds); Abiad (the Whites); and Senenah. Each of these sections is referred to as "tribe" and sometimes "tribes." The first two major sections, those of Ahmar or the Reds and Abiad (Whites), are named after their mothers, the wives of Ali (founder of Awlad Ali). The Whites are named after their white mother, and the Reds after their Sudanese mother who, owing to her dark complexion, was known as El-Hamra (the red one).

613 114 551 [595] In the past, writers such as Robertson-Smith (1903) have interpreted the reference to female names in patrilineal genealogies as indicating an earlier matrilineal descent. I tend to agree with a more recent writer, E. Peters (1959), who explains the reference to female ancestors by two factors: patrilineal descent and polygyny. According to him, it is a way of distinguishing full brothers from half brothers and a means to show this genealogically. "The concept of the 'one womb', of maternal origin, is a critical one in the context of social cohesion, but it does not deny patriliny; on the contrary, it serves a sense to enforce it. Female names can be used to show a greater notion of cohesion than the mere use of male names, and the significance of a female name . . . is that it is symbol of full brother unity at the highest political level." (p.29).

613 551 173 619 This can be further supported by evidence from my own data which show that reference to female names occur more frequently in charts where tribal names rather than proper names are used. In genealogies using proper names, informants rarely, if ever, trace their descent to an ancestress. But when charts of tribal names are used, it is not

613 uncommon to find reference to female names. This indicates that it is
551 only when the unity of the full brothers becomes politically signifi-
173
619 cant that the name of the mother rather than the name of the father is
● [595] used. This may explain why the occurrence of female names in Awlad Ali
genealogies is not as common as one might expect judging from the fre-
quency of polygynous marriages among the group.


Awlad Mansur
Mutair
'aggary
Gedaidah
Bu-Zewah
El-Hafian
El-Marries
Suliman

Fig. 3. Recognized tribal segments of Awlad Mansur (a segment of Awlad Ali)


Mansur
Bu-Asabei
Bu-Mutair
'aggar
Muhammed
Bu-Zewah
Abdellah
Hussein (Hafian)
Muhammed
Suliman
Muhammed
Suliman

613 individuals. He settles disputes among them and represents them in their
[627] disputes with outsiders. He is also the spokesman of his Bait in all
matters involving the relationship of the Bait with the other tribal seg-
[682] ments. He is responsible for the collection of the bloodmoney from mem-
bers of his Bait and has the authority to confiscate property of individual
members who refuse to pay their share. When a member is financially unable
to pay his share, the Aqila is expected to pay for him and collect at a
later time when the member is in a position to make such payment.

613 Originally the position of the Aqila was a hereditary one with the
428 position passing from father to son. However, in recent years the rigid-
178 ity of the patrilineal descent as the basis of succession to the position
of the Aqila has been modified radically and other principles of selec-
613 tion have been introduced. The working of the principles underlying the
128 selection of the Aqila will be analyzed in detail in the following chapter
through the close examination of one of the major legal cases which oc-
curred during my stay in the area.

613 Thus each Bait is a division of one of the Eilas and this has its
[423] place in the formal tribal system. It constitutes a group with definite
usufruct rights to land and a formally recognized leadership.

621 But the actual residential units in which Awlad Ali live are not
[613] baits but parts of them in the form of separate camps or "nagei". The
camps constitute the primary communities of Awlad Ali. A camp consists
[594] of a number of tents ranging from four to twelve. Each tent is usually
occupied by one nuclear family of a husband, his wife and children. In
[595] cases of polygynous marriages, each wife usually occupies one tent with
[361] her children. Each camp is separated from the next one by a distance
which ranges from two to ten kilometers.

Still, according to the unofficial estimates,
585 only about ten per cent of all marriages are registered, and these are
656 mainly mixed marriages involving a tribal person and a non-tribal one
177
582 or a tribal member who is not living in the area anymore. The reason
619 is that such a spouse, especially when he is the husband, is not under
the control of the tribal customs and therefore cannot be forced to fulfill
his obligations if he fails to do so. Most of the tribal population
[581] still feel that marriage is a personal and family affair that
should be kept away from the State legal system.

584 Marriage among Awlad Ali is a relatively informal procedure. When
593 a man decides to marry a certain girl, he informs his mother who, in
turn, informs his father. The father may have objections to his son's
choice of the bride. Such objections may be based on already strained
relations between the two families or the questionable reputation of
the girl or any member of her family. In such cases, the father tries
to dissuade his son from going ahead with the marriage. The father is
[583] usually successful in controlling his son's choice when the latter is
dependent on his father for the payment of the bridewealth called "mahr"
and for the support of his new household. This is usually the case in
the man's first marriage. In subsequent marriages and in the cases
where the son has independent means of support for himself and his
bride, the father's control of the son's choice is minimal, and asking
the father's approval is a matter of formality. In second and subsequent
593
595 marriages, the approval of the older wives is essential. The
584 older wives have no right to object to the husband taking an additional
wife, but they have the right to object to the choice on the basis that
the new bride is hard to get along with or that there is animosity between
her family and the families of the other wives which makes

593 cooperation between the wives in household activities difficult. The
595
584 wives have to have reasonable grounds for their objection to the new
[431] bride. But even then, the husband could still marry the woman of his
choice, although in this case he has to bring gifts to the other wives
as "nasafa," or making-up present.

584 If the family has no objections to the marriage, the proceedings
593 start. The initial proceedings are undertaken by the women on both
sides. The groom's mother or a female relative of his mother's generation or older visits the mother of the prospective bride and tells her
of her son's intention to marry the latter's daughter. The bride's
mother then discusses the matter with the girl's father who has the
[429] final say in the matter. If the father is dead, then the authority on
giving the girl in marriage goes to her brother or closest male kin in
the order specified before. The girl has no say in the matter of marriage and cannot refuse to complete the marriage, although after marriage
she can resort to a certain practice which helps her to terminate the
marriage without the consent of her guardian, as will be seen later in
584 the chapter. From this moment until the conclusion of the marriage
[583] negotiations are done by the men of both families. The first thing to
be discussed is the amount of bridewealth, a "mahr." If the two families
agree on the marriage, a small ceremony is held. This ceremony is called
[779] "el-fatha" in reference to reading the first "sura" of the Koraan known
as el-fatha, or "the beginning." The ceremony includes members of the
[675] two families and very few friends. After the fatha is read, the agreement
is achieved. This is considered as an engagement and means that the girl
is spoken for and therefore no other man can ask to marry her.

To break the fatha agreement, the father of the prospective bride

593 606 The case persisted for more than two months with no sign that either
557 party was willing to give into the demands of the other. I left the
586 area before any solution to the case was achieved.
[014]

Another relevant case is one which involved a dispute between
584 578 Hassan Hassanein from the Sanagrah tribe and the father-in-law of his
606 daughter who was also from the same tribe and who lived in the same
area. The case started when Hassanein was visited by a friend from the
[574] Esheibat tribe in Matruh, an old man of 60 or 70 years. During the night that this guest spent at Hassanein's house, they got to talking about marriage and the fact that although his guest was a wealthy and re-
[595] spected man, he had only one wife. After a lengthy talk, it seemed that the old man was convinced that he should have a second wife and asked Hassanein if he knew of a suitable girl to marry. Hassanein sug-
584 gested his daughter's sister-in-law. Hassanein took the prospective
583 groom to the tent of his daughter's father-in-law and discussed the
578 606 matter with the father of the prospective bride who agreed to marry his daughter to Hassanein's guest if he paid the sume of 200 pounds, in addition to slaughtering a number of goats and presenting him with the
[779] appropriate presents. When the man agreed to the terms, the fatha was read to signify the agreement between the two parties. Hassanein left the man to spend the night in the camp of his future in-laws. In the morning the groom told the bride's father that he must go to nearby Alexandria to bring the money for the bride price. When he came back late that afternoon, he paid the money and set a date for the wedding the next Thursday and then left for Matruh to prepare for the arrival of the new wife.

585
586
593 case its return to the husband would have caused great financial in-
527
[114] convenience for the wife's family.

[778]
[583] Corresponding to the second right, the husband's right to his
581 wife's domestic work, is the wife's right to maintenance. The husband
585 has to support his wife. This includes providing her and her children
562 with adequate food and proper clothing. If the husband fails to do so
593 because of poverty, sickness, crop failure or unexpected disaster, the
wife's brother or father provides her and her children with the neces-
[586] sary food and clothing. If the husband's failure to fulfill his duties
is due to neglect, the wife can leave him and go to her father or brother
who talks the matter over with the husband who, in turn, either agrees
to their demands or has to divorce his wife and forfeit his mahr.

593 Finally, corresponding to the husband's right to his wife's obedi-
562 ence is the wife's right to fair treatment by her husband. There are a
[779] number of ways in which the wife is mistreated. One is excessive punish-
ment; although the right of the husband to punish his wife is provided in
the Koraan, the punishment must be excessive or severe. Awlad Ali draw
a line between acceptable and severe punishment. A punishment is severe
if it results in something that other people can see or hear. If the
husband insults his wife or her family and others hear the action, or if
he beats her and this results in visible traces, then the punishment is
severe.

593 A wife considers herself mistreated if the husband, when married
595 to more than one, treats any of the other wives better than he treats
562 her. Although the wife cannot deny her husband the right to have ad-
ditional wives, he must give them all equal treatment. This includes

593 providing them with the same kind of food and clothing.* It also includes
595
562 dividing his time equally between them, spending one night in
each wife's tent. The first wife, being the chief one, has certain privileges: her tent is the guest house, food is brought to her residence, and she is the one to divide it among the other wives, and her house is the place for the husband to stay if he becomes sick and unable to move every night from one tent to another. Other than the exceptions given to the first wife, the husband has to treat all his wives equally.

593 Normally, such cases of mistreatment do not result in divorce unless
(586) they are persistent. In most cases, if the wife is mistreated, she
goes to her father's or brother's house or sends for them to come and
593 take her. For the husband to bring her back to his tent, he must pay
431 her "nasafa." This is a gift given by the husband to his wife as an
acknowledgement of guilt and as a form of apology for not giving her fair treatment. In some cases the nasafa is equal to what the husband originally paid as mahr.

581 These are some of the rights that marriage gives both men and women
585 in the tribal society of Awlad Ali. These rights, however, are useless
626 unless they are backed by certain means of enforcing them. The husband's
586 rights are guaranteed by his ability to dissolve the marriage at will.
626
593 According to Islamic law, a man can divorce his wife by simply pronouncing the sentence "I divorce you" in the presence of credible witnesses.
[779] No justification for divorce is demanded from the husband according to
[562] the Koraan. No such privilege is given to the wife. She can obtain a

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* With provision for wives with more children.

159 the relationship between her and her brothers.

562 428 Following her action and until the time of the study, they had
593 never visited her and she had never visited them. Her husband took
[237] care of the herd; and the arrangement worked out all right until the
159 562 husband told Fatma one day that he was going to marry a second wife.
593 She refused, but he went ahead with the marriage without her consent.
● 595 He brought the new wife to live with Fatma in the same tin hut in which
they were living. He started to pay more attention to the new wife and
to neglect Fatma; whenever the latter complained, he beat her. Then,
before one of the religious feasts, he sold two of Fatma's sheep and
bought his new wife a dress and a silver bracelet. When Fatma objected
[164] and they argued, he hit her with a stick on the head; she was hospitalized
for a week with a serious head wound. While in the hospital, she
went to her brothers who lived only two miles away, but they refused to
159 come to her assistance. She then went to sheikh Elewa (the aqila of
562 Bait Asabei) and threw herself on him. He met with the husband and convinced
574 593 him to divorce Fatma. He kept forty sheep of Fatma's herd as compensation
595 for the mahr he had paid her and the marriage expenses, then
586 took his new wife and moved from Fatma's hut. Fatma then returned and
159 562 managed her financial affairs successfully herself. She managed the
444 store and hired a shepherd to take care of the sheep. At the time of
[233] the present study she was respected by almost everybody in the area, including
members of the local administration. She is known to be reasonable
[529] and of sound opinion, and her store functions as the meeting place
[521] for many of the tribal mi'ads and for casual conversations. She is also
considered as a liason between the tribal population in the area and the
local government administration, and is respected by both sides.

He also has more wives than other Bedouin and is usually more cultured and intelligent.[1] 554 [595] ●

The most important of the Shaikhly families of the country, those which represented large tribal divisions vis-à-vis the Turkish Government, the Sanusiya, others sections of their tribe, adjacent tribes, and attached client groups, lost much of their influence with the loss of their stock and the exile of some of their more prominent members during the second Italo-Sanusi war. The authority of these traditional Shaikhly lineages was also undermined by Italian policies, first of recognizing and paying salaries to so many Shaikhs, some of whom were persons of little importance, that the office of Shaikh lost much of its virtue in the eyes of the people, and afterwards of ignoring the Shaikhs altogether. The better known of these Shaikhly families are the house of Bu Bakr bu Hadduth among the Bara'asa, the house of Lataiwish among the Magharba, the house of 'Abdalla among the 'Abaidat, the houses of Kizzih and 'Abbar among the 'Awaqir, the house of Asbali among the 'Arafa, the houses of Suwaikir and 'Ilwani among the 'Abid, the house of Bu Khatara bu Halaiqa among the Hasa, and, in the Sirtica, the most famous house of all, that of Saif al-Nasir among the highly nomadic Aulad Suliman. 554 558 648*

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[1] Op. cit., Pt. II, pp. 39-40.

582 any summer camp will have descent lines cross linked by the
613 bonds of marriage with parallel cousins, and at the same time
[621] cleaved by the maternal links established by repetitive cross-
cousin marriage to different groups outside the segment. Thus,
in one of its aspects, marriage makes of an agnatic group a group
582 of cognates as well. 'Marry your paternal cousins and both your
613 602 paternal and maternal relatives will be one,' to quote Bedouin
sentiment on the matter. Within this agnatic group, nevertheless,
two other clusters of kin exist—those with maternal connexions
outside. In all, three areas of kinship can be defined,[18] although
all the members of the segment will have the lineage bond of
agnation in common. In normal circumstances, when split does
not threaten the group, the bond of agnation, strengthened by
parallel cousin marriage, takes precedence, although behaviour
is significantly affected by maternal links at any time. There is,
152 in the first instance, great jealousy between co-wives, which is
595 passed on to their children. Each wife has her separate tent, and
593 each is entitled to a strictly equal share of the husband's time
they have in common. This applies similarly to favours he may
grant his wives, and the distribution of his wealth among them.
If, for example, the husband is the owner of a horse, he is required to tether it outside the tents of his wives in strict rotation; if he retires for the night with one wife, the following night he must favour the other; if he buys dress material for the one he must buy a length of identical material for the other; if he bestows favours on the children of one the children of the other must be given equal consideration. Many such details are meticulously observed; but while many are observed most of the time, it is difficult to observe them all, the whole time. Any breach of the rules is quickly taken up by the wives, and quarrels ensue, leading not only to bitterness among the co-wives, but between the offended wife and her husband, between the children
595 of both wives, and between the children and their father. Often,
593 when a man has co-wives, there is a marked discrepancy in age
561 between them, for, when an elderly Bedouin marries a second

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[13] The situation is not always as simple as this. Cross-cousin marriage may take more than two directions, and marriage within the segment might bring about great complexity, but the argument put forward above is not seriously affected by neglecting these details here.

wife he usually chooses a young girl of about twenty years. Children 595
of the elder wife might be adult, therefore, when the children 593
of the junior wife are infants. Great emphasis is placed on 561
seniority, particularly among males, but strong emphasis is also
placed on the equality of siblings and their equal legal status.
'Between brothers of widely differing ages, there is, then, this
field of potential conflict. From an early date competitive, if not
hostile, relationships develop between the sons of co-wives. Competition 593
between half-brothers results not only from their 586
mothers being co-wives: one group might be the sons of a divorced
wife. The latter situation is often much worse, for the sons 587
born of the divorced wife are now being fostered by a woman
who is not their mother. A similar condition of things is brought
about when a widower with sons remarries. Yet again, when a
wife grows old and her sons have reached maturity, her husband
may not divorce her formally, but merely 'throw her off his
back'; she will then go to live with her grown sons, while her
husband, in turn, takes a new wife, usually taking up residence
in another camp for a time at least. It would be too much of a
digression here to discuss the inheritance disputes, and the disputes
over marriage and bride-wealth, which arise out of these
various circumstances. Suffice it to note that such disputes are [613]
common and affect the alignment of people within a tertiary
segment.

As half-brothers grow to maturity some of them will marry 613
their maternal cross-cousins, and in succeeding generations some 621
of their descendants will do likewise. In this way, a tertiary segment [582]
united by the bond of agnation, will also have within it
smaller groups of kin having different sets of cognatic links. This
group, as a residential unit, shows a very high concentration of
agnates, and the Bedouin say with pride that members of the
camps are always 'one' because of this agnatic bond, and indeed,
the corporate identity of this group is strikingly displayed in
many circumstances. It does not take precedence in all circumstances, 613
for, built into agnation, with the heavy burden of duties 578
which go with it, are serious stresses and strains which in some 602
circumstances regularly come out into the open. In yet other
circumstances cognatic kinship affiliations appear to be dominant,
causing friction among agnates. A man, for example, may permit

membership of associations and so on. The statuses a Bedouin achieves de- 796
pend not on an ordered acquisition through the inheritance of roles or elec- 852
tion to them, but on his personal manipulation of linkages in his jockeying 88
with others. Rites are minimal because there are few defined statuses an 554
individual can predictably acquire. The equalitarianism of the desert denudes 602
the Bedouin of ritual riches. Complimentarily, rites which do occur are 613
thrown into exaggerated relief by the absence of others, and in their isolation, [557]
become not merely a "passage" but a cataclysmic change. Marriage and
burial both comprehend limited fields of relations, but accompanying cere- 585
monies may bring several hundred people together, people who otherwise 764
rarely gather in these numbers to meet one another as kinsmen and neigh- 796
bours, and it is suggested that the emphasis given to the events dramatises the 602
significance of the changes they produce. In the discussion of the changes 182
brought about by marriage, the Bedouin view of what is entailed will be
considered first.

The Bedouin View of Marriage

After marriage, the Bedouin argue, a son has a tent of his own, a woman 585
over whom he has authority and soon children to make him a father. Mar- 581
riage causes split, branching. A new family is created, holding the poten- [613]
tial of a new lineage. The separation is so painful a matter for the father
that he cannot contemplate it, hence his pretence that he has no knowledge of [593]
wedding festivities, and his subsequent attitude that nothing has happened.

Interestingly, there are two other occasions when this attitude is to be 682
observed. When a man kills within his corporate group,[5] he may flee his 6[illegible]
tribe or he may be compelled to leave; later he is likely to return and, when 621
he does, he is received with a minimum of show. Every attempt is made to
suppress knowledge of the event.

Again, if incest occurs, the memory of it must somehow be suppressed, and 835
it is an ever-present danger. Men, permitted four wives simultaneously and 561
also able to engage in a plurality of marriages through divorce or death of [595]
spouses, may have children showing an age difference of two or three gen-
erations. Thus it comes about that a man may be of an age in relation to his
father's sister which permits them as children to behave as if they were
first paternal cousins. As an adult, the preferred spouse for a man is a [582]
father's brother's daughter. In terms of relationships between adolescents
the situation in which a man is of the same age generation as his father's
sister is fraught with danger. In one such case, between a man and his
father's sister, the male child of the union was put out in the desert to be [684]

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[5] **Bedouin are disposed in groups which, in summer, usually constitute a single community, around or near a watering point. The men of this group are interlinked by reference to an ancestor four or five ascending generations, reckoning from the generation of men of about 20 years. When, elsewhere in this chapter reference is made to corporations, it will be to groups of this kind.**

342 costs to make or buy. In the 'izba sector, most of the Bedouin have a summer tent which they place next to their stone house for the hot months. According to the governmental community
[657] development program, in order to own land and register it properly one must build at least one room upon it. The one-
[735] room house (daar) is not common in al-Qasr: it is a symbol of poverty. The multi-roomed house (duwaar) is common. It is
[333]
[316] built of large pieces of cut sandstone which are quarried in al-Qasr. Those who can afford it build the duwaar and surround
342
556 it with a wall in compound fashion. Only one man in al-Qasr is rich enough to afford two of these compound-type houses. The size and style of a house reflect status. Traditionally,
[184] a man furnished a tent for each wife and for each married son. Although this is still the custom in parts of the desert, in al-Qasr the private room (daar) in a duwaar has replaced the private tent.

596 The basic residential unit is called naja' (literally, "hamlet"). It is composed of the father, his wife (wives), his unmarried children, and married sons and their families. The naja' takes the name of the father who is called the shaib ("elder," literally, "white-haired one") of the group. In the naja', the word of the shaib is law, and the members' chief duty is unquestionable obedience. The average naja' in al-Qasr consists of about three or four houses or tents.

423 society. Private ownership of land with sovereign rights
*[613] [178] over it is now the normal practice in al-Qasr. Rights are
● [596] held by the family head, the shaib. If the family head is
deceased, land tenure rights are held jointly by the sons.

[184] In the area beyond the plateau, in the extreme
*[613] south of al-Qasr, land rights to grazing and water still are
[241] associated with lineages. But here agriculture is impossible.
The type of rights over the land varies with the method by
which it is exploited. The southern and coastal sections of
[433] al-Qasr represent the old and the new, the pastoral traditional
mode of production and the modern agricultural cash economy.
[233] But, as noted, of the total population only a few Bedouins
are actually engaged in pastoralist activities. Hence, tribal
tenure rights, in general, are not overly important at this
time. Not too long ago they were, and many cases in the recent
[671] history of Bedouin customary law relate to conflicts over land
and water in the southern region. The Bedouins say that
[178] traditionally no lineage could use the pasturage or water of
*[613] another without some agreement, usually of long standing,
[233] made beforehand. Now, they say, permission is not needed.
[675] In the old days, these agreements were made between lineage
representatives, not individuals per se. Today, the grass
178 and water in the southern zone are claimed, though not in a
423 legal sense, by the families using them: the rights of
usufruct over the land are closer to rights of sovereignty

178 423 than they were in the past. These conditions reflect a change in social and authority relations.

423 432 In the 'izba sector of al-Qasr, as of 1964, there were two cases of land purchase. In one case, land was sold to an Egyptian, "an outsider" from the Nile Valley. This, of course, could only occur where such a transaction would be upheld by 423 the Egyptian government. Land ownership, when it involves registered land, is absolute. This, to a great extent, works *[613] to lessen the influence of the lineage structure on property 423 relations. The law governing property, whether in traditional 178 or modern al-Qasr, reflects a set of social relationships. 571 When an individual can own property in the absolute sense, rather than with respect to his being a member of a group which enjoys sovereign rights of ownership, then, there has been a change in traditional corporate relations (Herskovits [184] 1952:260). This has definitely been the case for most of al-Qasr, and it is adumbrated in the southern sector where a person's rights over land are nearly absolute. A compar- 423 184 ison of land tenure patterns on the coast and in the southern region reflect not only the contrast between methods of land use, but, also the fact that as land becomes valuable it becomes scarce and land holdings become fragmented (compare Figures 5 and 6).

428 596 When the head of a household dies, his eldest son inherits his authority, but all of the sons share equally in

428 •596 the father's property. The egalitarian spirit of the Bedouin inheritance rule functions to maintain the unity of the family, and, at another level of social complexity, the structural continuity of the corporate group. Ideally, the surviving sons will keep intact their father's estate, his land and animals, and will work it as a unit. And this is generally 596 594 *613 183 the case in al-Qasr. On the other hand, there is also the implicit assumption in the structural principle of the Bedouin segmentary lineage system that each individual will eventually establish a unit of his own, separate from but interrelated with, the main household. As a result, there 596 593 usually develops some division of property and labor among surviving brothers. Whether or not this division is formally agreed upon, and, whether or not it is assigned by the father or the eldest son is largely arbitrary. In some cases, the father makes such a decision before his death and prepares his sons for it. The father's concern is that good relations be maintained between his sons after his death. Just as the father mediates conflict between his sons during his life, so he hopes to maintain peace between them after his death. The Bedouins say that a father should be fair when dealing with his sons, and that he should never favor one over the other.

428 *[613] Inheritance is determined through the patrilineal lineage principle. The Bedouins of al-Qasr claim that they

428 562 inherited by a woman's daughters. The carpets and the tent,
[422] which are woven by women, are not their property to pass on
for they belong to the head of the household, the shaib.

● 596 Economic change in al-Qasr has had its impact at the
177 level of production mode, and, also, it has affected the
178 composition of the basic family structure. One informant,
[124] who is now nineteen years old, remembers growing up in a
household composed of his grandfather, father, father's brothers and their families. Since that time, his father has built another house away from the family home; one uncle has moved to Marsa Matruh and opened a shop there; his youngest uncle has built a house not far from the family home; and one uncle remains with his three wives in the original
182 house. This fission-type process is not uncommon in a seg-
179 mentary society, although as a traditional process, it
*613 represented a mechanism for dealing with ecological pressures.
433 In the modern case, in al-Qasr, the process of fission in the
434 Bedouin social structure proves to be an adaptive mechanism also: the fragmentation of lineage property and relations is a positive condition for the transition to a cash and market economy. Among most of the families of al-Qasr, as market orientation increases brothers begin to economically differentiate their tasks and interests with an eye to individual profits.

*613 Bedouins, always a minority in Egypt, have been undergoing
178 a transition to peasantry since about 1800. Probably since
177
578 that time, Bedouin society has been, to use Easton's (1959)
emphasis, a "segmentary society" rather than a "segmenting
society."

196 Formal Bedouin categories of kinship are confusing;
depending upon the situation they use the concepts of bait,
'ait, 'aiela and gabiila interchangeably. The term bait
literally means "house," the term bait al-'Arab may mean
"the tent" or "the people of the tent." "People of the tent"
[594] may refer to either the nuclear family of one man, or the
nuclear families of a man, his brothers and his sons, and
[596] their spouses and offspring. In the latter case, the ex-
[621] tended family is referred to as the naja'. A naja', or camp,
usually consists of three or four tents. The word bait may
196 refer to the tertiary and the sub-tertiary groups, and oc-
*613 casionally one might even refer to the secondary group as a
bait when he wishes to emphasize the quality of corporateness.
The term 'aiela, literally "family," is the word used most
often to designate the secondary lineage segment. The dim-
inutive of this word, i.e. 'ait, usually refers to the sub-
tertiary group but it commonly designates the secondary group
[619] also. The term gabiila, "tribe," is the only word used for
the primary and supra-primary lineage groupings. These are
196 the general Bedouin usages and their frequency will vary not

121 571 moral community, we cannot proceed to a discussion of the
554 internal and external systems of political relations.

577 As a result of the socialization process, and through
181 relations with other members of the family, an individual
[867] comes to recognize that his conduct is measurable by certain
standards of, what is considered by the group to be, good and
bad, right and wrong. In al-Qasr, such standards are intrinsically correct, or "decent" as the Bedouins say; obedience
to the authority representing these standards is interpreted
as a "duty." The authoritative aspect of the role of household
● [596] head (*shaib al-bait*), and the moral obligations which it represents, emerge from and reinforce values and structural arrangements central to Bedouin social order, namely, respect for
authority and devotion to social groups, the two basic elements
of morality defined by Durkheim (Parsons 1937:382-385).

577 The value placed upon social order, and the structural
571 mechanisms for insuring its realization and extension--kinship,
181 residence and contract--inform an authority structure which
182 ranges between filial piety at the family level and a set of
legal norms at the level of the external political system.
The fact that the Bedouins of al-Qasr are interested in
integrating a larger population into their authority structure
means that a common value is operative in the range of it;
also that one sphere of authority will tend to merge into another.
[593] Hence the father-son authority relation has importance for
[671] the strength of Bedouin customary law in the desert. The

593 was with his brother and not his brother's sons. When the father persisted with his intention to embarrass his nephews, his sons, as a last alternative, threatened to leave him. In the face of this threat, the father capitulated.

The rights and duties of the father-son relationship, although they do not change in sentiment, will change in content during the lifetime of the father. The main change
[421] in content will be a reflection of a change in property re-
593 lations. The Bedouin believe that this is the way it ought
597 to be; they say that

> A son must respect and obey his father. The son must do anything that he can to help and please his father. When the son grows up and begins to earn money, he must contribute generously to his father. A son pleases his father by giving him money and helping him to be comfortable.

593 In boyhood and manhood, the father has disposal over his son's
596 labor. As long as a son lives in his father's naja' this is
[464] so. One son, who worked for an American oil company in the desert, regularly turned over his pay check to his father. It is the father who decides where the son will live, and, whether or not he will have his own domicile away from the
[591] main naja'. When the son marries and brings his wife to the naja', he will usually set up his tent next to his father's tent. The tent is given to the boy by his father. During
593
431 the son's growing-up period, he will be given, as gifts on various occasions, a sheep or a number of sheep which will be kept with the father's flock.

595 124 One of my informants, a wealthy man and a poet, said that since he could not love two women equally he would never take a second wife. He also said that he was unwilling to give his daughter to a man who refused to promise him that she would be his only wife.

593 Throughout his life, the father is dominant and his washuun is subjective. He is the master of his naja' and the [596] social behavior of his wife and offspring toward him has both a moral and a pragmatic aspect. They show respect and obed- [768] ience because "it is the decent thing to do;" further, just as he provides for their material needs while he is alive, so the property which he leaves them will sustain them after 428 his death. As we have already noted, in theory, the daughters [562] inherit one-half of the shares which the sons receive; in fact, females inherit only if they are the sole survivors of the male. But the surviving wife, or wives, will take a cash amount equal to their brideprice from the husband's estate. The Bedouins say that this price will be paid before any other inheritance shares are distributed. In addition, the 768 wife has the right to remain in her husband's house or tent, and it is the duty of the eldest son to look after her. She may remain at home until death, provided she never brings a man who may be considered a prospective husband into the house.

593 The rights and duties involved in the father-washuun relationship show that the ideal authority structure of the

CHAPTER IV

THE STRUCTURE OF AUTHORITY

The 'Aqila as a Political Role

*613 554 ●[596] The role of _'aqila_ is the single specialized role in Bedouin political organization. Although it is possible to differentiate another authority role, that of the _shaib_ (elder), this role is primarily a kinship role and in this sense is not an institutionalized political complex of rights and obligations. The _'aqila_ represents a unique political status in al-Qasr having one incumbent at a time: "The present incumbent is merely a link in a chain of indefinite extent, the temporary custodian of all the properties, powers and privileges which constitute the office" (Smith 1966;117).

*613 554 571 The role of _'aqila_ is instituted at the tertiary structural level of the lineage system. In theory, each tertiary _bait_ has its own _'aqila_. But, in fact, not every tertiary segment is large enough and, therefore, powerful enough to constitute an authority group in the political [128] structure of the lineage. In the next section, we will draw a distinction between authority groups and tertiary groups. The _'aqila_ acts alone in juridical matters concerning his own

*613
578 the Bedouins. Conflict regulation treats the expressions of
571 social conflict and not its causes.

554 The _'aqila_ regulates conflict between the members of
his tertiary segment, between this group and the other groups
of the secondary unit, and between secondary units of the
tribe. He operates in both the internal and external systems
*613 of authority relations. The _'aqila_ may pre-empt the authority
578 of the _shaib_ in the sphere of familial authority, though, the
593 Bedouins say, this seldom happens because the son is willing
554
•[596] to obey his father. Having been reared in the culture, and
as a future father himself, the son supports the respect-
*613 discipline principle of Bedouin society. But in extreme cases,
578 such as the threat of a father to disown his son, the explicit
593 approval of the _'aqila,_ and of all the _'awaaqil_ of the secondary
428 corporate group, is necessary. This is the procedure in all
554 cases of banishment. In one case (which I document below), a
man disinherited his younger brother with the formal approval
of his _'awaaqil_.

*613 The tertiary group in Bedouin society is by definition
682 the blood-vengence group. However, in view of the common
578 values and pragmatic interests of its members, the secondary
[181] group fulfills this function. Traditionally, when revenge
[681] killings were carried out according to the _lex talionis_, it
was usually at the hand of some member of the victim's tertiary
group. In the case of protracted conflict, such as extended

121 Here we are interested in the way in which roles and groups,
554 and a whole structure of authority, operate over a wide area.

In the previous section, I presented the _'aqila_ as a specialized political role in Bedouin political organization. As Radcliffe-Brown (1940:xviii-xxi) has pointed out, in the political analysis of segmentary societies it is necessary to isolate incipient authority roles which function to make decisions concerning rightness and wrongness in disputes and which represent the community, giving voice to public sentiment. The notion of society as a functional system of authority roles and authority groups is clear in Radcliffe-Brown's treatment of politics.

121 Local groups of political significance, i.e., authority
554 groups, are identified by the status position, or office, re-
571 ferred to as _'aqila_. The political relations within a local
*[613] tertiary group, and between it and similar groups of a lineage
and tribe, must be seen as relationships between authority
roles.

554 In the domestic field of political relations, the
●596 authority of the Bedouin _'aqila_ shades into the familial
*613 authority sphere of the household head (_shaib_). The _shaib_,
as senior agnate of his _naja'_, is dominant over the other
males of his tertiary sub-unit, but not to the extent that he
can pre-empt any of their rights as members of the tertiary
[888] corporate group. A _shaib_, by virtue of his age, is supposed
[578] to possess the wisdom which it takes to regulate
conflict.

600 to possess the wisdom which it takes to regulate conflict.
*613 578 593 [604] Theoretically, as one _'aqila_ said, conflict should be stopped at the familial level, either by the father or the paternal uncle, and should never reach the level of the _'aqila_. Once before the _'aqila_, conflict assumes new structural poses, or different orientation in authority relations. Authority here is differentiated in terms of the context: the father's authority relates to the familial structural level, and beyond this level the father _per se_ cannot exercise legitimate authority.
*613 578 182 The _'aqila_, who is responsible for internal order and external relations exercises legitimate authority at each level of the political structure. The authority of the _'aqila_ is checked and prevented from growing into naked power in that any single _'aqila_ must consult with the other _'awaaqil_ of the secondary segment concerning matters which may concern the structural nature and continuity of the group.

*613 559 571 171 In many respects, the authority structure in al-Qasr corresponds to that defined for the Lugbara of Uganda (Middleton 1960). The structural levels (see Figure 7 above) of 'Ailit Ma'fas (secondary), Bait 'Umar (tertiary), and 'Ait Abd al-Malik (sub-tertiary) are approximately equivalent to Middleton's major, minor, and minimal lineages (1960:7-9). But
•[596] whereas among the Lugbara authority roles are purely kinship roles, i.e., genealogically senior heads are responsible for internal control and representation, among the Bedouins of

*613 554 571 171 ●596 al-Qasr there is definite role differentiation between the shaib and the 'aqila. The incumbents of the two roles may have exactly the same genealogical position in the tertiary segment, but they will never have the same social status. There are as many elders as there are households, but there is only one 'aqila for each group. Another difference between the Bedouins and the Lugbara is that in the latter society a kinship role which doubles as an authority role does not occur above the familial (i.e. shaib) level.

*613 554 596 The difference between the shaib and the 'aqila is the distinguishing factor between informal and formal social control. The shaib acts in accordance with the values implied by Bedouin authority structure; the action of the 'aqila is legitimate in the explicit terms of the Bedouin authority structure. These two spheres of political action represent familial and internal (or domestic) levels of authority and authority relations. Legal matters which affect the whole tertiary segment are dealt with at the internal level.

627 596 685 Affairs of a purely personal nature and of lesser importance are dealt with at the familial level of authority. For instance, it happened that the dog of one man killed a neighbor's chicken. No one sent for the 'aqila. They sent for the shaib of the woman who owned the chicken, i.e., they sent for her husband. He spoke to the woman, his wife, to determine the value of the chicken and this price he demanded as compensation

627 from the owner of the dog. If the man had refused to pay the
• 596 price of the chicken, as demanded for settlement, then the
685 next step would have been to inform the appropriate 'aqila
*[613] to bring greater force, and perhaps greater sanctions, to
bear.

*613 Bait 'Umar (Figure 8) is one of the authority groups
571 of al-Qasr, a corporate group represented by a corporate sóle.
682 Both the tertiary corporate group and the corporate sole are referred to, according to the ancient tradition of the Bedouins, as an _'aqila_. This group is a blood-revenge group, and is referred to as _'umraa al-dam_ ("donator of blood"), or _waliiy al-dam_ ("executor of a blood feud"). It is the group which
[681] decides whether or not retaliation will be taken according to _lex talionis_, or if blood-money as compensation for the loss of one of its members is acceptable. The Bedouins say that no amount of money can replace a human life, that blood-money is only a means to prevent the loss of more men. This group, when it functions as _waliiy al-dam_ ("executor of a blood feud"), has the authority to demand retaliation; to waive it entirely; or to demand, along with blood-money, that the guilty party be punished by his _'aqila_. When this group pays or receives blood-money it does so as a partner in the larger corporate group, the secondary segment. The principle of collective responsibility interplays with the other structural principles of Bedouin society. The convergence represents

685 I was in al-Qasr, and each party to the conflict hired
578 Egyptian lawyers in Marsa Matruh to represent them. As one
648 litigant in this case told me: "The Bedouins prefer to settle
their own land disputes because the government's way of
handling these things costs money and long periods of waiting."

69 The notion of jurisprudence in tribal cultures, in
121 general, seems to be one which concentrates on the restoration
578 of a disturbed balance rather than one concerned with formality
and procedure. To a great extent, this is true in the Bedouin
case also. However, the absence of institutionalized ways of
dealing with conflict is more characteristic of the internal
*613 system of political relations. Conflict within the secondary
578 segment, we have noticed, may be regulated at the familial
[593] level of authority by the shaib, or one acting in his place:
• [596] it is hoped by the Bedouins that quarrels never become serious
enough to prompt intervention by the 'aqila. On the other
hand, the 'aqila, as a legitimate representative of his
authority group, will almost always become involved in conflict
regulation falling within the sphere of external political
relations, i.e., conflict between secondary, primary, or tribal
segments.

The 'aqila as the most effective mechanism of social
*613 control has become institutionalized through time in Bedouin
578
182 society. At the interactional level of secondary lineage
group relations, conflict may easily expand into feuding or,

[For additional information on tribal "adoption" wherein peasant groups or even individuals were incorporated into the tribal organization under the Bedouin term iktitab, see Categories 563 and 619. For information on laf, the term used to describe the process in which groups graft themselves onto the genealogical tree of a tribe, see Categories 608 and 619.]

CHAPTER III

KINSHIP AND POLITICAL ORGANIZATION

Principles of Social Structure

*613 The division of Bedouin society into groups is
explained in terms of certain principles of organization, the
most pervasive of these being unilineality or the lineage
*613 principle. According to this structural rule, an individual
619 born into a tertiary lineage segment (see Figure 7)[1] automati-
cally becomes a member of each successive and more inclusive
group represented by the higher levels of segmentation. The
status, rights, and obligations of the individual with respect
to other members of the tribe are in this way determined on
the basis of kinship. An individual gains political status
in the tribe, as a societal unit, only through membership in
a tertiary group. Theoretically, group membership is based
on birth, but there are certain "legal fictions" which
represent exceptions to this rule. In al-Qasr exceptions are
rare, but a few do exist. For instance, there is one case of
● [597] individual adoption, and in another case, a whole tertiary
173 segment was grafted on to a lineage stem. The latter case
*613 happened four generations ago when Taram Mighaiwiz of 'Ailit
619 Lazumi adopted Hajj 'Ali "as his brother." The Bedouins say

597 [1] [See p.77--Analyst]

173 that in those days it was important "to have men to go to
*613 war; Hajj 'Ali came from the Sinai with many men and wrote
619
•599 his name into the books of Lazumi." Today, in the Lazumi
genealogy Hajj 'Ali's name appears as the brother of Taram,
[114] both are claimed as sons of Mighawsiz. This kind of data is
difficult to uncover and I may have missed gathering other
cases of ideological kinship ties.

*613 The specific unilinear principle which operates in
[171] al-Qasr is partrilineality, common to the Middle Eastern
culture area. A corollary principle is the corporate group.
*613 Together, these two rules structure the social world of the
571 individual and effectively define a range of social choices
for him. The individual's social relations and social roles
are relative to the rights and obligations of the people
related to him through his father. In a sense, the social
world for the individual in al-Qasr is his father's group
and its network of relationships with other similar groups;
he would not think of leaving this group of his own free
will though, in reality, he could. The Bedouins believe
[181] that a man cannot be happy if he lives with strangers, i.e.,
[829] outside his corporate group. This value holds up today to
the extent that a man will expect his son to return to the
desert even after his education as a merchant, a government
clerk, or an army officer.

Structural differentiation in al-Qasr is not solely

121 residence, cognatic ties, and contractual relations are all
181 seen to be structurally important in early Arabian society.
621 Structural differentiation into groups is based on the
571 lineage principle and sustained through "the law of blood-
171 revenge." And it is important to note that the *hayy* was
characterized by a structure of authority, it was "guided
in war and on the march by one chief" (Smith 1903:44). The
121 law of blood-revenge as an expression of group rights *in rem*
621 and a system of mutual protection point up the importance of
571 contractual relations in Bedouin society. Whether or not
675 real blood ties are involved, a contract must be present or
there can be no corporate group. Contract legitimizes authority
and provides the basis for the lateral extension of the group;
it is primary though it functions coordinately with a principle
of cognation, residence, adoption, etc. Contractual ties
121 operate outside of kinship at times but will always be validated
621 by it eventually, "for a legal fiction is always adopted to
571 reconcile an act with a principle too firmly established to
675 be simply ignored" (Smith 1903:62). "Blood brothers," in
608 al-Qasr, are defined both biologically and ideologically. As
•597 noted in the case of al-Qasr, there were at least three cases
[602] of contractual adoption in which one individual and two whole
corporate groups "wrote their names into the books of the
'Aishaibat tribe" (*katab jinnsiyya 'Aishaibiyya*). The integration or adoption of elements in al-Qasr takes place on the

121 basis of an agreement "to share the good and the bad" by
621 571 all parties concerned. Once the integration is effected,
675 patrilineal ideology and legal fiction succeed in concealing
608 •597 the jointure.

The concept which derives from ancient Arabia, and
621 which expresses fully the structural principles of Bedouin
571 *613 society is that of *'aqila*. The *'aqila*, in al-Qasr, is the
head of the corporate group, the tertiary unit or *bait*. A
[884] person becomes part of the Bedouin jural body when he reaches
the age of 15, begins to keep the Ramadan fast, and is expected
to pay his share of the blood-money. At this time, a man
621 acquires rights over his corporate lineage-mates and they
571 *613 over him: they claim a share in the indemnity ("blood-
672 money" - *diiya*) of each other, and are under obligation to
[682] contribute equal shares to any *diiya* which becomes due from
the group as a whole. Further, each corporate member is
morally bound to support his lineage-mates by swearing the
oath (*yamiin*) on the behalf of any who are accused of falsehoods
in the course of litigation. All of these rights and
obligations are guaranteed by the presence of an *'aqila*.

*613 The tertiary *bait* is the minimal corporate group.
It usually includes three to five generations of members.
Tertiary units which are descended from a common ancestor
combine through contractual relations into the maximal corporate
group, the secondary unit or *'aiela*. Beyond the secondary level

*613 structural deterioration. Secession, the right to break
571 authority relations, and adoption, the right to contract
675 new authority relations, are rights of the authority group.
681 This can be noted in the "Declaration of *Barawwa*" presented
578 earlier. It was stated in that document that "the reason
● [597] for the coming together of these two parties is in order
to ask the *barawwa* from each other." Further, mention was
made of a "fraternity paper" which would cancel the effects
of the *barawwa*. So, secession can be a means of regulating
[597] conflict, and it can become the basis for a re-integrative
move; that is, an adopted party may decide to secede from its
foster lineage and return to its original lineage, or secondary
group.

*613 Secession, as distinct from segmentary fission as a
571 response to ecological demands, represents a structural
[578] change in authority relations short of distrubing the structure
of the secondary group. In a process of secession, i.e.,
breaking with the secondary group, joining a new secondary
group, and returning to the "blood-brother" group, the fundamental condition of "belonging" is the acceptance of collective
responsibility. This is a most important point. The office
*613 of *'aqila*, the Bedouin charters, and the *raison d'etre* of the
571 corporation revolves about the notion of sharing in the blood-
681 money. This can be shown by an extremely interesting document
675 belonging to 'Ailit Abu Qarasa of al-Qasr. Here the process

613 The two charts show the same unit of Awlad Mansour. The first of
619 the two charts shows the tribal segments in which Eilat Gedaida (a female
173
551 name) appears as one of the segments. When the actual genealogical
chart of one of the living members of that segment was drawn, descent
was traced to Mohammed, the husband of Gedaida, as shown on the second
chart. In this case Gedaida is not a member of Awald Mansour segment.
The unity of the full brothers is emphasized without changing the affiliation
of the segment. It is simply a means of carrying on the patriline
using the mother's name. This is not always the case, however. Examination
of other cases in which the female name was used reveals the fact
that in certain instances using the female name is a means of carrying
on the line of descent through a daughter. This meant incorporating
within the tribal segment a whole group of individuals who otherwise
613 would have belonged to a different patriline. Carrying the line through
619 the daughter in this manner has the same result as adopting her husband
551 unto the tribe. The question then is why wasn't adoption used. Examination
● 597 of the two cases in which this happened indicates that a possible
explanation may be that this occurs whenever the husband is unadoptable.
Adoption is possible whenever a man does not have any tribal affiliation.
613 In one of the two cases the husband belonged to the Gemei'at tribe, a
619 Murabiteen tribe which enjoys a relatively higher status than the
551 other Murabiteen tribes by virtue of their being the original settlers
597
554 of the area and helping the Awald Ali in their fight with the Hanadi,
yet compared to Awlad Ali proper occupies an inferior position. In
this case, relating to the patriline of the mother carried with it a

613 619 551 ● 597 554 definite political advantage. In the second case in which the female name was used, the husband was a member of the Bara'asa tribe of Libya. Although this tribe is one the powerful tribes of Libya, it has no political influence in the Egyptian Western Desert. Changing affiliation carried with it the strong political support of the mother's tribal segment.

619 131 In general the Reds occupy the western half of the coastal area of the Western Desert from the town of Matruh westward to the Libyan border, while the Whites occupy the eastern part which stretches to Alexandria. The Senenah are fairly scattered although their largest concentration is located in the extreme western part overlapping that of the Reds. The territorial division of the area among the three major sections of Awlad Ali is not a strict one. Historical evidence shows that there has been [194] a considerable tribal displacement throughout the area. This displacement occurred mainly during the intratribal war era and during the Second World War when the area was a main battlefield. In general, however, there is a significant relationship between territorial distribution and tribal segmentation, and this is especially true on the higher levels of segmentation than on the lower ones.

619 613 Each of the three sections of the apex of a three-tiered order of segments which, following the native usage, will be called Kabila (tribe), Eila (family), and Bait (house).

619 173 The first order referred to as tribes are structurally equivalent units but of highly variable size. Each of them has its traditional history. Some of these histories are important to the tribe as a whole.

There are, in Cyrenaica, three major status groups among the 619
tribes: the noble or free-born tribesmen (*al-Hurr*), those who 554
have been adopted or grafted on to a tribe (the *Laff*), and the 608
clients (*Marabtin*).

Those who claim to be free-born also claim ownership of the 619
natural resources. The *Laff* do not own these. They are people 608
thought not to have originally been of the lineage of the tribe 621
with which they are resident. They are found sometimes in ones 613
and twos in the camps of the free-born, but sometimes constituting [423]
tertiary groups themselves. Now when such people have resided with their free-born hosts for several years and one of them 619
has married one of the host's daughters, they are grafted to the 608
genealogy at the point of tertiary segmentation, that is, where 613
ambiguity occurs in the genealogy. Obviously, persons thus 621
grafted to the lineage cannot be shown as descendants of one 173
of the living or of the recently dead, remembered perhaps by some of the elders still living. It is equally true to say that they cannot be grafted to the lineage at a point superior to that of the tertiary segments, since this would involve recognition by a number of tertiary groups whose members may know little or nothing about them. When a person enters a new tribe, the only way in which he can do so is to go to live in a camp, and it is the concern of the people of that particular camp whether or not they accept him, since it is they who have to decide whether their resources are sufficient to support a newcomer. Once a man has been accepted as a full member of a tertiary section, membership of superior tribal sections is automatic, although to enter into tribal membership he requires the permission of members of a tertiary section only. To graft at a point superior to the tertiary would be the same as giving a man superior structural status, but without a camp in which to dwell. There is only one place for his incorporation, and that is where the ambiguity in the genealogy permits manipulation to include new lines. In this way the
adoption of a person into a lineage does not offend the sense of [597]
kinship of the receiving group since the point of inclusion is an ancestor about whom little or nothing is known and whose authenticity is frequently doubted by some. What has been referred to as an area of ambiguity is, moreover, something of a jumble of names, and it is not a difficult matter, if a new line has to be

173
*613
601

[P. 78-A]


BRAIK
(BAIT) KAILANI
(BAIT) YUNIS
(BAIT) MUHAMMAD
ABD AL-RAHMAN
ABD AL-HALIM
ABD AL-SALAM
FARAJ
YUNIS
ABD AL-RAHMAN
'ALI
ABD AL-HAMID
ABD AL-'AZIZ
JIBRIL
'UMAR
ABD AL-'AL
ABD AL-MALIK
QASSIM
ABD AL-MALIK
JAD AL-MULA
ABD AL-LATIF
ABD AL-MUNSIF
NAJI
SALIH AL-DIN
ABD AL-NASSIR
KAMAL AL-DIN
YA'QUB

1: Obermeyer E-5 (1964-1965) 1969 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9
'Aishaibat

173
*613
●601


MA'FAS
HASSAN
QASSIM
(BAIT)
'UMAR
BAIT 'UMAR
HANAISH
ABD AL-QADAR
IBRAHIM
MUHAMMAD
'ALI
ABD AL-KHALIQ
SALIH
YUNIS
ABD AL-RAHIM
MUHAMMAD
'ALI
IBRAHIM
SA'AD
'ATIYA
'UMAR
TAHIR
FARAJ
QASSIM
RIZQ
SAFI
ABD ALLAH
NUWAIJI
HAMAD
MAUHI AL-DIN
SA'ID
IBRAHIM
ABD ALLAH
JIBRIL
RIYID
'ISLAIB
ABD AL-KARIM
BAGHI
JAB ALLAH
HIMAIDA
MAS'UD
HASSAN
MUHAMMAD
ABD AL-NASSIF
RAMADAN
FATH ALLAH

[P.78-B]

1: Obermeyer E-5 (1964-1965) 1969 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9
'Aishaibat

173
#613
•601

78


MUSA
HAMAD
(BAIT) FIRJANI
(BAIT) SALAH
HUSSAIN
MAHMUD
ABD AL-RAWAF
MUSA'ID
NASIF
SALIH
ABD AL-KARIM
MANSUR
ABD AL-RAWAF
ABD ALLAH
'ISA
GHAITH

FIGURE 8

GENEALOGY OF BAIT 'UMAR

▲ = 'AQILA

[P. 78-C]

000 kin groups of the parent who does not determine descent. A
182 corollary aspect of the filiation principle in al-Qasr is the
601 602 practice of collaterally extending the term, khal, to include
604 many others besides the real mother's brother. This usage
[114] of classificatory terminology, like that in the case of bint
601 'amm, leads to confusion for the fieldworker. When an in-
604 dividual marries into an outside group, or even within the
561 secondary group, the wife's brother becomes khal not only to
182 the offspring of the marriage, but to all the children (awlad)
at the same generation level as the offspring. All boys of the age of sister's son will refer to his mother's brother as khali ("my mother's brother"). Besides extending the web of kinship, this practice also has the function of uniting age-mates of the local descent group.

604 Throughout this discussion of mother's brother, I
582 have been stressing the fact that the sentiment which a
[829] Bedouin develops toward this person is to be construed as a
political value, i.e., a behavioral disposition relevant to the political process. It is patent then that the sister's son-mother's brother relationship should be more crucial in exogamous marriages, for in these cases cognation becomes the principal mechanism for establishing authority relations and effecting political alliance. In endogamous marriages, cognation complements the other structural principles which define the corporate group, and makes it the corporate group par excellence.

601
*613
582


'Umar Hassan Ma'fas =1. Lazumi of 'Aishaibat
2. Suwaitat of Jumi'at
3. Masamir in Libya
4. Kamailat of 'Ali Ahmar
Abd al-Malik =1. Bait Kailani of Ma'fas
2. Kamailat of 'Ali Ahmar
3. Sister of #1
Yunis=1. FaBrSoDa
2. Jumi'at
Jabril=1. FaBrDa
Ya'qub=1. Lazumi of 'Aishaibat
2. Suwaitat of Jumi'at
Abd al-Latif=1. Harabi
2. Bait Braik of Ma'fas
3. Lazumi
4. Suwaitat of Jumi'at
5. Dawlat of 'Aishaibat

FIGURE 10

Endogamic and Exogamic Marriages in Bait 'Umar of 'Ailit Ma'fas

601
613

BAIT EL ASABEI'


Bakhatrouh
Hamad
Osman
Yunis
El-Safi
Sai'ed
Qudurah
Bu Elewah
El-Sawi
Samsoum
Elewah
Madhi
Embewa
Hamad
Seluma
Kassem
Fathalla
Sinqor
Seluma
Edris
She'ib
Hussein
Hakim
Rabbuh
Besseisi
Rubei'
Fayid

2: Mohsen E.O-5 (1958-1966) 1971 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9
Awlad Ali

APPENDEX I

GLOSSARY OF ARABIC TERMS USED

104
601

Abb	أب	father
'acd	عقد	contract
Akh	أخ	brother
'amar el dam	عمار الدم	unity of blood (vengeance group)
'amd	عمد	intention
'amm	عم	father's brother
'aqila	عاقلة	wise man; leader of a bait
bait	بيت	house
bait el shan'a	بيت الشنعة	house of the dreadful deed
baraka	بركة	blessing
barawa	براوة	to ostracize from membership in a particular group
bint	بنت	daughter
bint 'amm	بنت عم	father's brother's daughter
bint haram	بنت حرام	illegitimate girl
beer sama	بير سما	sky well
diyya	دية	bloodmoney
daraieb	درايب	the tribal laws and customs
'eila	عيلة	family
el-fatha	الفاتحة	the beginning chapter of the Koran; the initial ceremony in the marriage
feddan	فدان	acre
ghish	غش	cheating, or unfair deal
ibn	ابن	son
ibn 'amm	ابن عم	father's brother's son
iktitab	اكتتاب	tribal adoption

104 jad	جد	grandfather
● [601] jaddah	جدة	grandmother
kabara	كبارة	face-saving compensation
kabila	قبيلة	tribe
katl	قتل	killing
khata'	خطأ	by accident
kishk	كشك	dried milk
[601] khal	خال	mother's brother
Koran	قرآن	the Islamic sacred book
mahr	مهر	bridewealth
mardi	مرضي	go-between
maleh	مالح	sour milk
mi'ad	ميعاد	tribal hearing
murabiteen (sing., murabit)	مرابطين (مرابط)	holymen, client tribes
Mustagilleen	مستقلين	independent tribes
nagei'	نجع	camp
nazala	نزالة	refuge
nazzar	نظار	one who assesses the amount of compensation for wounds and bodily injuries
nasafa	نصفة	compensation for a wife
omda	عمدة	a government appointed tribal leader
sayem	صايم	a male who fasts the month of Ramadan, an adult
sadaqa	صدقة	obligatory tribute
sa'adi	سعادي	the original tribes of Awlad Ali
sheikh	شيخ	any tribal leader, or an old man

104 sura	سورة	a chapter in the Koran
Shei'a	شيعة	the unorthodox sector of Muslim practices
Sunni	سني	the orthodox Muslim group
shar	شر	evil
thebeiha	ذبيحة	a sacrifice
● [601] ukht	أخت	sister
umm	أم	mother
watan	وطن	homeland
wakil	وكيل	a legal guardian
zawya	زاوية	a religious center
zena	زنا	adultry

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619
613


AL-HASA
Hawass
AL-QALABTA
Qalbat
Qassam
AL-MUASA
AL-MAHAMDA
AL-SHABARQA
AL-BAKHAYIT
Musa
Muhammad
Shibriq
Bakhit
'At BRAHIM
'At AL-MZATAL
'At AL-SHAUQI
Brahim
Mzatal
Ma'afi
'At AL-SLAILIKH
Zaidan
Mansur
'At BALRABA'I
'At AL-AQTA'
Bt Bu SHNAINIFA
Muhammad
Tahir
Bu Shnainifa
Sultan
Jibrin
Bt BU HAUDHANA
Sultan
Sa'ad
'Umar
Bt WA'AIRA
Balal
Wa'aira
Bt MUHAMMAD
Bt QASHAISH
Bt 'ALI
Muhammad
Qashaish
'Ali
Bu Halaiqa
Salih
Bt BU HALAIQA
Bt GHAIZAN
Bt BRAHIM
Bt MUSTAFA
Bt AL-HABAL
Bu Halaiqa
Ghaizan
Brahim
Mustafa
Husain
'Aqila
Mehemmed
Muhammad
Jibrin
Mustafa
'Abd al-Khaliq
Hamad
Mahmud
Sa'ad
'Abd al-'Azim
'Abd al-Salam
'Abd al-Razaq
'Abdalla
Salih
Mahmud
Mustafa
Ramadan

Names of tribal sections are printed in capital letters.
'At = 'Ailat.
Bt = Bait.

619
613
If reference be made to the accompanying map and genealogical chart it will be seen that the Hasa tribe is made up of three primary sections, the Qalabta, the Shabarqa, and the Bakhayit, distributed in strips running from north to south, which are very typical and give to each section equal condi-

601
173
613
619


SA'ADA
(1)
BARAGHITH
'AQQARA
(2)
BARAGHUTH AL-SGHAIR
JIBARNA
HARABI
'ALI (In Egypt)
TRIBES
(3)
'ABID
'ARIF
'AWAQIR
MAGHARBA
DARSA
HASA
BARA'ASA
'AILAT FAYID
ABAIDAT
(4) PRIMARY
AL-RA'AIDAT
AULAD AL-SHAMAKH
(5) SECONDARY
'ALI
MANSUR
NASR
SUBH
(6) TERTIARY
13
6
4
4
MADHKUR
HAIBA
AL-DAWWAS
UMBARAKA

FIG. 18-1 GENEALOGY 1. The names given in this genealogy are the tribal names in use. All are derivatives of personal names of ancestors, like all tribal names, except for some nicknames (e.g. Baraghith means 'the fleas') and a few which refer to a general location (e.g. the Magharba means the 'Westerners'). [551]

first four descending generations is two. At the fifth level the 173
number increases to four and finally, at the sixth level there 613
characteristically occurs a marked irregularity in the number of 619
descendants forming the founding ancestors of the tertiary sections.

Another feature of the Cyrenaican genealogy is that its 613
branches show an intimate relationship with ecological areas. 619
Thus, the major division into two branches stemming from 13
Sa'ada represents the eastern and western halves of the country 182
with associated and clear differences in ecology. Continuing the line of descent, the Jibarna and Baraghith groups of tribes occupy plain and mountain foot-hills respectively. The two Jibarna tribes in turn occupy two distinct kinds of plain. Following now the division of the Magharba tribe, its two primary sections are divided by a very conspicuous dry valley. The four secondary divisions of the Aulad ash-Shamakh primary section likewise show a relation to ecological boundaries, albeit on a smaller scale than those previously referred to, but none the less important in this more local context. Finally, the unevenly numbered tertiary sections which are derived from these four

as he did so, he entered into a plurality of marriages, begat sons, 173
and replaced those men in the genealogy who had died without 178
heirs. In the following generation the twin process of death and 551
replacement continued. Death removed all the male descendants 613
of Sha'aban and Faraj, and of Ibrahim Bu Miftah's many sons 428
only two, Sharif and Abdallah, were of age to marry at the time of my visits to their camp. Both had enjoyed a plurality of wives, although still young to have done so, and each marriage they contracted took place after the death of one of their kinsmen. The full and intricate details of this interesting genealogy are irrelevant here, since all the example is intended to show is how nine of eleven male names were perpetuated in the genealogy by repeating five of them twice and four of them three times, accounting in all for twenty-two names; and to do this, three men (one of them had died, but the other two were both under forty years of age) married eight wives. All the names in the two lines which have died out have not yet been brought back into the genealogy, but 'Abdallah, the son of Ibrahim, who had already done extremely well in this respect, was confident that soon the obligations towards Musa, Abd al-Rahim, and Sa'ad would be redeemed. 5

Thus the fusion of names not only ensures that names threatened with extinction are perpetuated, but that one person, in the name he bears, can carry the genealogical burden of several other men of that name.

[601]


SA'AID
MIFTAH
SHA'ABAN
FARAJ
IBRAHIM
IBRAHIM
SALIM
SA'AID
BU GHAWIYA
SHA'ABAN
'ABD AL RAHIM
MIFTAH
MUSA
SA'AD
FATALLAH
SHARIF
'ABDALLAH
MIFTAH
SALIM
ZAIDAN
SA'AD
SALAH
SHA'ABAN
SULAIMAN
MUHAMMAD
IBRAHIM
HAMAD
SA'AID
BU GHAWIYA
FARAJ
GHAITH
SALAH

FIG. 18-2 GENEALOGY 2. The names of dead men are underlined.

173 ambiguity surrounding the actual names and their correct posi-
829 tion occurred at about the fifth ascending generation. Whenever
613 this point was reached in the recordings, arguments would flare
551 up over the names to be included or excluded and over the rela-
123 tion of these names to those above and below, with the result
126 that for several people of the same segment there would be several versions of a genealogy which differed only at this one point. An example of this sort is given below from the genealogy of the Nasr section, which shows seven different versions of the arrangement of ancestors round about the fifth ascending generation from the living.

173 The confusion at and around the fifth ascending generation
829 appeared with such regularity in the genealogies that I feel justi-
613 fied in referring to it as 'the area of ambiguity'. It seems likely,
551 moreover, that in any society where the lineage structure is closely tied to the territorial disposition of groups, since the genealogy is so rigid, there needs to be in it somewhere an area of ambiguity if it is to be related to reality. Without this ambiguity, the form of the genealogy is too rigid to comprehend changes which occur. This point in the genealogy came to assume critical significance as the point where adjustments in it are made. Other kinds of evidence point to the same conclusion.

● [601]


(1)
NASR*
UMBARAKA
MADHKUR HAIBA UMBARAKA
SAAID
SAAD
(6)
SAAD
HAIBA MADHKUR MUMEN
(3)
HASAIN
HASAN
MUMAN
BIN NASR
MADHKUR HAIBA
(4)
MADHKUR HAIBA
(7)
HAIBA MADHKUR UMBARAKA
SAAD (2)
MUMEN
UMBARAKA MADHKUR HAIBA

FIG. 18-3 GENEALOGY 3. *There is another section, al-Dawwas, which belongs to this group, but to include this as well would greatly complicate the issue without giving any additional information.

Cases

•601
621
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

621
592
574
231
since meat is shared by all the people of the camp, her wealth was partly dispersed among her poorer kinsfolk.

621
592
571
[578]
[233]
The location of Tent B was determined by the fact that the wife (6) was the sister of (3) of Tent A. Her husband (7) had moved into the camp a few years earlier as a result of an inheritance quarrel with his elder who robbed him of his fair share. This husband (7) gained in two ways from the move. Although poor, he had a small flock of his own, too small to justify its own shepherd, but which he was permitted to include with his sister-in-law's (3) flock for shepherding. If the flock had been larger he would still have had difficulties, because, at some times of the year, save for short occasional visits to camp, the shepherd is with his sheep for several weeks, day and night. He (7) had three sons, still far too young to follow the sheep, but when they become of age to do so, his dependence on Tent A will cease, for then he can begin to gather the small flocks of other kinsmen around his own, his sons can shepherd them all and he can begin to enjoy the benefits to be derived from dependents. In addition, he enjoyed [574]

604 182 war.

604 602 182 The Bedouins of al-Qasr are conscious of the practicality of external kinship ties. The role of mother's brother becomes a significant symbol for the maintenance of these ties. Boys are supposed to respect their khal ("mother's brother") in order "to avoid wars which could end the world." The Bedouins claim vehemently that "no quarrel can happen between me and a member of that tribe because my brother has married into that tribe." [181] They make the value of the mother's brother link very explicit: "Marriage into other tribes makes quarrels impossible."

604 538 There are many Bedouin proverbs pointing to the place of the mother's brother in the social structure. Proverbs, in any culture, trace out areas of behavior which have become important. Kenneth Burke (1957:256) says of proverbs, that they are "strategies for dealing with situations. In so far as situations are typical and recurrent in a given social structure, people develop names for them and strategies for handling them. Another name for strategies might be attitudes." [829] The Bedouins likewise look upon proverbs as templates for behavior. They say that "we should heed proverbs because they are the words of the elders; they are like a white flag which marks the way, and people should not go beyond these flags."

A most common proverb which elevates the mother's

000 kin groups of the parent who does not determine descent. A
182 corollary aspect of the filiation principle in al-Qasr is the
601 602 practice of collaterally extending the term, khal, to include
604 many others besides the real mother's brother. This usage
[114] of classificatory terminology, like that in the case of bint
601 'amm, leads to confusion for the fieldworker. When an in-
604 dividual marries into an outside group, or even within the
561 secondary group, the wife's brother becomes khal not only to
182 the offspring of the marriage, but to all the children (awlad)
at the same generation level as the offspring. All boys of the age of sister's son will refer to his mother's brother as khali ("my mother's brother"). Besides extending the web of kinship, this practice also has the function of uniting age-mates of the local descent group.

604 Throughout this discussion of mother's brother, I
582 have been stressing the fact that the sentiment which a
[829] Bedouin develops toward this person is to be construed as a
political value, i.e., a behavioral disposition relevant to the political process. It is patent then that the sister's son-mother's brother relationship should be more crucial in exogamous marriages, for in these cases cognation becomes the principal mechanism for establishing authority relations and effecting political alliance. In endogamous marriages, cognation complements the other structural principles which define the corporate group, and makes it the corporate group par excellence.

000 par excellence.

604 829 867 The inculcation of political values is part of the socialization process. A Bedouin boy is taught that his khal is a very special person, and one whom he should admire. It is commonplace in al-Qasr to hear small boys matching the exploits and skills of their maternal uncles, bragging and exaggerating about their khal: this one is a great horseman, and that one is a great marksman with the rifle. On the other hand, if the mother's brother is from within the local group, rights and obligations toward him will be structured in terms of other kinship roles which take precedence according to the rule of descent. For instance, in the ideal-typical case of

604 602 582 bint 'amm marriage the mother's brother of sister's son would also be the father's father's brother's son in relation to ego. This would mean, in another way, that ego's mother's

[605] brother is also ego's father's parallel cousin. Male parallel cousins "are like brothers," and so ego would be expected to behave toward this person not as a "mother's brother" but as a "father." Whereas the boy enjoys a certain freedom of expression and comradeship with his exogamous mother's brother, he would have to pay "father-like" respect and obedience to his endogamous mother's brother.

604 582 The crucial importance of the khal, and the political significance of the bonds which this role represents, is made clear in the following statement of an informant who contrasted

The Corporate Group

121 Two key concepts have derived from Radcliffe-Brown's
•602 (1952:32-49) notion of kinship as a reflection of juridicial
*613 relations. Fallers (1956:14), discussing the expression of these concepts in segmentary societies, refers to them as "the lineage principle and its corollary, the corporate lineage group." For Radcliffe-Brown, kinship organization represented social order and this was the basis of societal survival: a social system in order to survive must conform
121 to certain conditions. Adaptive mechanisms, expressed through
602 the institutions of a society, consist of a "network of re-
571 lations between individuals and groups" (1952:43). These social relations represent a collection of rights and implied duties which reside either with an individual or a group. Though reference is made to the place of the individual in society, the idea of the group is central in the theory of Radcliffe-Brown.

121 Most important is the group referred to as "corporation:"
602 a collectivity of individuals "who jointly exercise some right
571 or rights," and who share common interests deriving from resi-
621 dence and kinship (1952:45). The corporation has rights *in rem* over its members; thus, the group imposes certain duties and obligations on other persons with respect to the rights of a particular person who is a member of the corporation. The law of blood-revenge is seen by Radcliffe-Brown to bring out

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602
571
621

this aspect of the corporation clearly.

The concept of the corporation as a sociological construct was first used by Maine (1904). The concept was a central one in the work of Max Weber (1947; 1954). As it was used by Maine, and later by Radcliffe-Brown, the corporation as a collection of rights and duties functioned primarily to maintain structural continuity in society. Weber was concerned mainly with the political aspects of the corporation; this follows from his theoretical and empirical focus on political action and the exercise of authority. The two main elements of the corporate group as a social relationship according to Weber are that it is limited and defined by rules of admission, and that the administration of the group is carried out by functionaries, incumbents of political roles. An explicit structure of authority is the key to Weber's concept of corporate group: "Whether or not a corporate group exists is entirely a matter of the presence of a person in authority, with or without an administration staff" (1947: 145-146). Weber did differentiate analytically the corporate group from the other concept, first defined by Maine (1907: 108-110), the "Corporation sole" or "Public officer." However, he insisted that one could not exist without the other. Any analysis of the structure of authority in society must focus on both of these concepts.

The conditions for the formation of a corporate group

121 are, as Radcliffe-Brown correctly stated, the existence of
602 kinship ties and common residence. But, as Weber noted, the
591 expression of corporation is absent without a structure of
621 authority. The corporate authority structure functions to allot group membership and political status; to formulate and enforce a rule of succession governing the transmission of property and roles; and to define and assign rights and duties of group members toward others. Group rights over members, as rights _in rem_, produce mutual rights for members which entitle them to protection against external enemies. Hence the corporate group is characterized by internal functions which define and control relationships between members, and external functions which identify the group within a given structural context where it has jurisdiction and governs its relations with other elements in this environment. Within this context, the corporate group is representative of any individual member. Both the internal and external functional aspects of the corporate group operate through the office of a specialized role whose incumbent has authoritative and representative powers. This is the role, or office, which Maine referred to as the "Corporation sole," and which Weber later called the _Leiter_ ("chief").

*613 In al-Qasr, the corporate lineage group is composed
621 of agnates who reside together in a _mintaqa_, and who accept
571 as legitimate and morally binding an explicit process of

121 residence, cognatic ties, and contractual relations are all
181 seen to be structurally important in early Arabian society.
621 Structural differentiation into groups is based on the
571 lineage principle and sustained through "the law of blood-
171 revenge." And it is important to note that the *hayy* was
characterized by a structure of authority, it was "guided
in war and on the march by one chief" (Smith 1903:44). The
121 law of blood-revenge as an expression of group rights *in rem*
621 and a system of mutual protection point up the importance of
571 contractual relations in Bedouin society. Whether or not
675 real blood ties are involved, a contract must be present or
there can be no corporate group. Contract legitimizes authority
and provides the basis for the lateral extension of the group;
it is primary though it functions coordinately with a principle
of cognation, residence, adoption, etc. Contractual ties
121 operate outside of kinship at times but will always be validated
621 by it eventually, "for a legal fiction is always adopted to
571 675 reconcile an act with a principle too firmly established to
608 be simply ignored" (Smith 1903:62). "Blood brothers," in
597 al-Qasr, are defined both biologically and ideologically. As
●[602] noted in the case of al-Qasr, there were at least three cases
of contractual adoption in which one individual and two whole
corporate groups "wrote their names into the books of the
'Aishaibat tribe" (*katab jinnsiyya 'Aishaibiyya*). The integration
or adoption of elements in al-Qasr takes place on the

681 property disputes, and I shall briefly discuss this before
695 I proceed to describe Bedouin legal processes. Besides the
784 threat of blood-revenge and fines of money, the individual, or group, who violates the moral and legal norms of Bedouin society may be faced with sanctions of a sacred nature. In
695 any case where clear evidence is lacking, one litigant may request that that other party swear the oath (yamiin Allah) in support of his claim. In all three corporate charters
*613
695 presented earlier in this chapter, those of 'Ailit Ma'fas,
695 'Ailit Lazumi, and 'Ailit Abu Qarasa, support of lineage-mates through the oath was a condition of group membership.
[672] Collective responsibility not only applies in the case of secular things, i.e., sharing the blood-money and the exercise of blood-revenge, but also where the possible curse of God is concerned.

695 When one party to conflict requests that the oath be administered as a means of settling a dispute, the other party will always accept because it is assumed that in this way both litigants "will get their rights." The party taking
695 the oath must be supported by a number of his relatives
•602 ('umraa al-dam) who are willing to risk the consequences, and
*613 who are chosen by the other party. If a man is unable to muster the required number of kinsmen to take the oath, and the number is always relative to the seriousness of the offense of which he is accused, then this is taken as a sign of his untruthfulness and he loses his claim.

695 untruthfulness and he loses his claim. According to the
602 'awaiyid, the number of supporters required in a homicide or
613 wounding case is fifty; in a case involving the rightful
671 ownership of land or a well the required number is twenty-five; in a case of conflicting claims over a camel, five relatives must swear in support of the claimant; and in matters concerning smaller animals, such as sheep, the number of supporters will depend upon the number and price of the animals. But, of course, the number of supporters will always be relative to the size of the groups involved, and so the 'awaiyid is not always followed to the letter of the law.

695 The time and place of the oath is fixed by the 'awaaqil
(692) adjudicating the given case. It is administered either at the tomb of a "holy man," or at the mosque in Marsa Matruh, and always on a Friday, the Muslim Sabbath. There is a standard text to the oath and this is given in the instructions of the
695 'awaaqil to the litigants. The Bedouins, with few exceptions,
784 believe in the effectiveness of the oath of God. The rationale is that no man is willing to lie and suffer the wrath of God. The curse which results from a "bad oath" usually takes the form of an accident or misfortune to the swearer or a member of his family. The Bedouins believe that divine sanction operates not only against the one who makes a bad oath, but also against the one who bears false witness against another and causes him to take the oath.

156 to serve other than what they eat." Hajj 'Ali is not only
159 conscious of social stratification in his society, but he also
554
571 has a great deal of empathy with the less endowed, a pre-
574 requisite of a traditional Bedouin leader and an advantageous
796 one for a modern leader.
123

He is aware of most traditional institutions and how
156 they relate to conditions of modernity. Hajj 'Ali, whose own
159 marriages speak for his political acumen, sees only disadvantages
554
829 in the cousin-right marriage custom of the Bedouins. His
582 interest in getting on with the business of change, so to
speak, has led him to question a basic right contained in the
Bedouin principle of lineage structure and corporate membership.

> A thing which I do not like about our customs is the idea that a man has a right to his uncle's daughter. The man binds his cousin and in the end he might not marry her and will be the cause of her never marrying. He gives himself the authority to decide whom she may or may not marry. If he knows she desires to marry a certain man, he says: "She can marry anyone but not that one."

[562] Here he challenges the traditional right of the individual
male in Bedouin society, favoring the rights of the female.
[177] The emancipation of the female, especially in rights and
[178] duties concerned with the marriage contract, is an element
[562] of the modernization process in Egyptian society and the
Middle East in general.

*613 The *bait*, as a political group, is in part structurally
•602 defined by the corporate principle which states that blood-kin
571
682

613 • 602 571 682 at this lineage level must bear collective responsibility in matters of compensation and blood-revenge. This principle, as we have seen, is extended until the whole _'aiela_ is included in a symbolic expression of corporate group solidarity. In order for this expression to persist, of course, the mechanism, or ideology, of blood-revenge must be maintained. [124] All of my informants, though they disagreed over the details of revenge, insisted that it was the inviolable right of the Arabs. 156 159 554 829 682 But Hajj 'Ali took exception to the practice of blood-revenge for a number of reasons. He said:

> The world changes. Before it was only the _'awaiyid Awlad 'Ali_ and the Border Guards which kept order. The government now enters into the matter of killings. Personally, I do not agree with the custom and the way it operates. In the case of killing, for instance, someone who is not worth anything, and has no brains, kills one from another tribe. Then the tribe of the [178] killer asks for the _nazaala_, and a third party becomes involved. The third party agrees to guard the killer's _bait_ for twelve months and the business of all those involved must stop. A member of the third party's family must accompany each member of the killer's tribe. But even after the twelve months one must live in fear at his own home, for after the twelve months the tribe of the deceased will try to kill the best man in the killer's tribe. How many good ones do we have in one tribe? I have heard that in Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia the deceased man's family has the right to kill the killer only . . . (I then commented that perhaps blood-revenge functions to discourage killing in the desert.) But there are unbalanced people who actually commit murder just to tease their tribe: they have nothing to fear because no one is interested in killing them in retaliation.

In challenging the Arabs' traditional right to blood-revenge, Hajj 'Ali--besides questioning a structural basis of

CHAPTER V

MARRIAGE: A CONTRACTUAL RELATIONSHIP

593 A survey of all disputes occurring among the eilat Aggary in the
578 last five years shows that more than 70% were disputes over "women,"
the usual phrase referring to cases involving marital relations. Dis-
agreement over matters arising out of quarrels between husband and wife
or between one of the spouses and his or her in-laws often constitute
593 the basis for these disputes. What seems to make marriage and the
578 family particularly productive of conflict is the fact that although
● 602 residence is commonly virilocal, and the majority of the women leav-
613 ing their own families to live with the husband, the woman retains her
[591] membership in her father's family after the marriage, and her agnatic
group keeps an active interest in her, even after she is married. Mar-
riage then brings face to face the interests of two groups. These in-
terests affect the relationship between the married couple; and, more
importantly, the relationship between the latter affects the interests
of their respective groups. This, in many instances, leads to direct
conflict between the two groups.

581 The position of the Awlad Ali daraieb with regard to marriage rela-
671 tions is based on the Islamic law with minor modifications to suit the
585 requirements of local life. According to the Muslim law, marriage is
675 a civil contract affected by the request of one party and the agree-
ment of the other. No witnesses are needed for the legalization of the
marriage, according to some of the Shi'a sects, although the Sunni schools
of Muslim jurisprudence insist that two adult male and two adult females

The bride's father
584 686 558 did not have to pay kabara, although he held a big feast in which he slaughtered three sheep and invited the groom, his father and a number of his friends and friends of the girl's father in honor of the groom as a compromise.

583 Before the fatha is read, the two families usually agree on the amount of bridewealth, or "mahr", to be paid by the groom or his father. The amount of bridewealth depends upon a number of criteria, important among which is the relative position of the bride's and groom's families and the degree of relationship that exists between them. The lowest mahr is usually paid in the case of cousin marriages. The amount ranges from 10 to 50 pounds. Sometimes when the groom cannot afford any mahr, he pays only the religiously required sum of 25 Egyptian piasters. This is never the case if the groom and bride are more distantly related. When the groom is an outsider or a member of another tribe, the mahr is usually much higher. Several cases of mahr of more than 2,000 pounds are reported in the area. There was a case in which the mahr reached 10,000 Egyptian pounds ($22,000). The amount of mahr also depends on the beauty of the bride. In the case of the highest known mahr mentioned above, the woman was known to be of great beauty. There
[587] is no distinction made between previously married women and ones married for the first time. In the case above, the woman was married three times before, and the mahr was apparently higher than that paid for her
[602] in her first marriage. Increasing the mahr according to the kinshp distance between the bride and groom reflects the preference of endogamous
582 marriages. The preferred marriage match in the area is that of the patrilateral parallel cousin marriage. The father's brother's son, "ibn 'amm," has an undisputed claim over his cousin, "bint 'amm." Even when they are of incompatible age, or even if the man is married or for

593 586 and expenses to the husband that constitutes the most important check
(583) on the otherwise undisputed right of the father to take away his
daughter.

593 The woman, on the other hand, cannot refuse to go with her father,
562 for this means that she would be disobeying him. A woman who disobeys
586 her father is not worthy of his name. He can cut her off from the
family, which means that she is left without any support or protection.
A woman who is cut off from her family is left vulnerable to her husband
and to society. She will have nobody to defend her or to be responsible
for her actions. The responsibility for the woman's behavior is not
transferred by marriage to the husband or his family.

682 If the woman kills or assaults someone or causes damage to property
683 for which compensation is required, her male kin pays the blood money or
● 602 the compensation on her behalf. It is sometimes stated that if the woman
613 562 has grown-up sons, they, and not her family, pay for her. Since the
593 children belong to their father's family, it may seem like transfering
the responsibility for the woman's actions to her husband's family. However, in all three cases where this happened, the woman was quite old,
her father was dead, and her brothers were either dead or had moved outside the area and had cut off all relations with the area. She also had
no nephews in the area. In such cases, the sons were the woman's closest
male kin.

682 On the other hand, if the woman is the victim of murder or assault
683 for which blood money or compensation is to be paid, the husband is the
593 562 one to benefit from the situation. To understand why this happens, we
have to consider the contractual nature of marriage among Awlad Ali. It
584 583 has been mentioned earlier that before marriage is final, the prospective

619 same time as the Jawazi, by a combination of the 'Awaqir, the
167 Magharba, and the Bara'asa, assisted by the Caramanli rulers of
131 Tripoli, and are now settled in the provinces of Fayum, Bani Suef,
*175 Bahaira, and Minya in Egypt. The Jawazi used to live in the
country now occupied by the 'Awaqir, and they now mostly live
in Minya Province of Egypt and in the Fayum. Another struggle
*[648] which greatly altered the tribal distribution in Cyrenaica was
two wars, the last about 1832, of the Magharba and 'Awaqir,
aided by their Jibarna kinsmen the 'Abid and 'Arafa, against
the tribes which occupied the *barqa* and the remnants of which
now range the littoral of the western Sirtica. These tribes are
known as *al-'Arab al-Gharb*, the Western Arabs.

*175 So, in 1800 the Harabi and Jibarna tribes, which are now in
131 undisputed control of all Cyrenaica outside the towns, occupied
619 only part of the country, mostly the central, and the most
northerly reaches of the western, plateau. The Jibarna were
cut off from the southern steppe by the Fawayid and Jawazi,
the whole of the *barqa* was occupied by *al-'Arab al-Gharb*, and
the eastern part of the plateau by the Aulad 'Ali. The wars by
[726] which they drove out their rivals were long and savagely fought
and many incidents in them still form part of Bedouin tradition.

*175 As a result of these tribal wars the descendants of the Bani
Sulaim invaders of Cyrenaica and the Maghrib thus began to
131 return eastwards with a quota of Berber blood about the end of
167 the seventeenth century and pushed out the tribes they found
619 dwelling in the Western Desert of Egypt and pressed them into
the Delta, where they were absorbed by the *fallahin*. The first
intruders from the west were pushed to the Nile by stronger
tribes coming behind them and these by yet stronger. They
pushed one another like trucks on a siding. The Hanadi pushed
out the Bani 'Una and the Aulad 'Ali pushed out the Hanadi,
being themselves pushed on from behind by the 'Abaidat, and
other Harabi tribes. Besides the migration of whole tribes from
Cyrenaica into Egypt there has taken place an exodus of many
tribal sections and fragments, owing to intertribal fighting, until
to-day there is not a Cyrenaican tribe, or even large section,
which has not some of its members in Egypt, often whole
619 lineages. The Bedouin of Cyrenaica know their kinsmen in
167 Egypt and sometimes when the price of sheep is low in the
● 602 Egyptian markets they leave their animals with them to sell on
439 their behalf when prices rise.

sadaqa, freewill gifts, though if a lodge did not send them its 795*
Shaikh was reminded of his obligations. The lodges dealt with 794
certain trading houses at Banghazi, giving them import orders [431]
against future sales of local produce. [439]

This practice worked well enough during the lifetime of the founder and his sons but, as so often happens in Islamic Orders, later descendants began to demand individual shares in the
wealth of the Order. While Sayyid Ahmad al-Sharif was its 795*
third Head it began to be the custom, a few years before the 794
Italian invasion, to earmark the surplus revenues of particular 602 •
lodges for particular members of the Sanusi family, and these [434]
members became regarded as patrons of the lodges which supplied them and responsible for their supervision. The territories in which the Order was dominant began to fall into spheres of influence controlled by individual members of the family, the allocation of spheres tending to be determined by the maternal kinship of various members with *Ikhwan* families occupying lodges in them. Sayyid Muhammad 'Abid and his brother Sayyid 'Ali al-Khattab had a lien on the *barqa al-baida* and Fazzan, where their maternal relatives the Ashhab family were influential Shaikhs of lodges; Sayyid Safi al-Din on the *barqa al-hamra*, where his maternal kinsmen the Mahajib family were predominant; Sayyid Muhammad Hilal on the Marmarica where his maternal kinsmen of the Sharifian Tursh lineage had considerable influence; and Sayyid Idris and his brother Sayyid al-Rida on the Cyrenaican plateau, where they had maternal ties with the important Bu Saif and Ghumari families. Sayyid Ahmad al-Sharif had a lien on Tripolitania, where lived his maternal kinsmen the powerful Fawatir tribe of Zlitin territory.

The endowments of the Order in Cyrenaica ran into thousands 795*
of hectares.[1] Several lodges had each more than 1,000 hectares 423
attached to them. The fourteen lodges whose lands were technically registered in 1919 by a mixed Italo-Sanusi commission possessed more than 50,000 hectares. The total lands of the Order may well have been more than 200,000 hectares,
or somewhere in the neighbourhood of 500,000 acres. Much of [311]
the land was of use only for grazing, but much was valuable agricultural country on the plateau. Wherever there were

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[1] An *Ettaro* is 10,000 sq. metres or 2·471 acres.

*795 opportunity to worship in a mosque, and that by charity to their
794 lodges they might earn recompense hereafter.

182 Each lodge had its Shaikh, who represented the Head of the
*795 Order. He arbitrated between the Bedouin, led the tribesmen
793 to holy war, acted as intermediary between the tribe or section
and the Turkish administration, dispensed hospitality to travellers, supervised the collection of tithe, directed cultivation of grain and care of stock, dispatched surplus revenues to the Headquarters of the Order, acted as prayer-leader on Fridays, and assisted in preaching and teaching. There were
(794) besides a number of other functionaries among the Brothers:
the Shaikh's deputy, the *imam* to lead the daily prayers and to teach the Koran and canon law, the *mu'allim* to teach reading, writing, and arithmetic in the zawiya school, and perhaps a special *muadhdhin* to call the faithful to prayer, though any of the Brothers could do that.

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*795 In principle, as we have noted, the lands attached to lodges
793 belonged, like the lodges themselves, to the Order, and more
423 particularly to the lodge to which they were donated, and not
to any particular individual or family. In practice certain
*795 Shaikhly families tended to gain an hereditary interest in them.
What happened in the early days of the Order was that a Shaikh
793 was sent by its Head to found a lodge and when it was estab-
423 lished he was translated to a fresh missionary field. Shaikhs
428 of lodges were in this way moved fairly frequently at first, but
● 602 it later became the practice to leave a Shaikh in charge till his
death and then to nominate his successor from among his kinsmen, with the approval of the tribe and on the advice of Shaikhs of neighbouring lodges. What mostly seems to have happened was that the tribal sections concerned asked for a son or brother of the last Shaikh to be appointed director of their lodge and the Head of the Order confirmed their choice. As one Darsi tribesman put it: 'The Shaikh of our zawiya must be a man favoured by the hearts of the people.' In course of time the tendency for the Shaikhship of a lodge to be regarded as hereditary became very marked, it being understood that if there was a suitable candidate from the family already established in the lodge he would be appointed, a view with which the later Heads of the

Order concurred. Thus we find charge of a zawiya continuing 795*
in the hands of a single family to the point at which Muhammad 793
Yahiya bin al-Sanusi bin 'Umar al-Ashhab was appointed by 423
Sayyid Ahmad al-Sharif to succeed his father as Shaikh of Msus 428
at the age of sixteen. Some of these families sent their roots so 602
deep that not only did they obtain what amounted to hereditary rights to a particular lodge, but controlled several lodges. Such were the influential families of Ghumari, Kalili, Farkash, and Ashhab, and the Khattabi families.

Hence we find to-day that many of the lodges are in hereditary charge of a family of Shaikhs who consider that they have a pre-emptive claim to its directorship and to enjoyment of its revenues, a claim backed by tribal opinion and by the acquiescence of the present Head of the Order. Thus the Dardafi family may be said to own the Shahhat lodge, the Isma'ili family to own the Fayidiya lodge, the 'Ammur family to own
the Qafanta lodge, and so on. So much is this the case that [578]
disputes now sometimes arise, as in 1942 at Qafanta and Mirad Mas'ud, between members of a family about which of its members should succeed to the directorship of a lodge and control of its revenues.

This development is not surprising. Poor communications 795*
and the troubled times since 1911 have encouraged local autonomy 793
in the Sanusiya organization. The Shaikh of a lodge 428
brought up his family in it and his sons had no other home than the lodge and no other friends than the Bedouin around it and
the families of Shaikhs in nearby lodges. Tribesmen dislike [178]
change and prefer to have for the Shaikhs of their lodges members of families they know and who share their local
interests. But the tendency towards hereditary succession is 795*
also related to the fundamental lineage structure of the tribes 793
among whom the lodges are distributed, for it is noticeable that
whereas hereditary succession became customary in the Bedouin, 613
or tribal, lodges, it has been by comparison lacking in the urban 428
lodges of Banghazi and Darna and in those oases where tribal [369]
structure has become obscured by village life. This would seem to suggest that *Ikhwan* families tend the more easily to become stabilized as lines of hereditary Shaikhs the more closely they are associated with tribal structure. It is precisely in the most powerful, numerous, and integrated tribal sections that we

*175 save the Italians much labour and danger. The policy had very
*648 limited success, for in practice the Patriots recruited from every
*795 tribe and every section. Bedouin sentiments about kinship and
619 its obligations worked both ways. If it was a duty to avenge a
slain kinsman it was no less a duty to protect and aid a living
[602] kinsman, and the sense of kin and its compelling influence in
[183] conduct, all that is meant by *'asabiya* in Bedouin values, are the
life and the soul of the Romany world.

It took the Italians a long time to realize that the Bedouin mind was not all of one piece but a Joseph's coat of conflicting interests. These interests excluded each other as the social situation evoked one loyalty to the detriment of another and it was, therefore, only in terms of their social structure that the apparent inconsistencies of Bedouin behaviour could be understood. Consequently the Italians were for ever suffering disappointments and accused the Bedouin, with increasing resentment and bitterness as the struggle continued, of disloyalty and treachery. Among the collaborationists, the *mtalyanin*, the Italianized, as the Patriots called them, there was every degree of participation from passivity, the refraining from taking an active part in the resistance, to full co-operation with the Italian army as spies, guides, informers, and administrative officials; but even those guilty of the worst complicity could, especially when some personal tie was involved, do the guerrillas a good turn. Many poor Bedouin near the towns joined the Italian forces as one kind or other of irregulars, police, and friendlies, and as labourers and camelmen, and it was found that these, while drawing Italian pay and rations, did not hesitate to assist the Patriots when an opportunity offered itself. Desertions to the enemy with full equipment were frequent. Italian rifles and ammunition and even pay were often handed over to the guerrillas. After an engagement the ground was left strewn with live ammunition for the guerrillas to glean. Many reported fights between the Patriots and the submitted population were undoubtedly inventions to cover gifts of ammunition, supplied by the Italians, from the Italian-sponsored irregulars to the Patriot bands. These native battalions constituted, in fact, 'a sort of supply depot of men, arms, and ammunition for the Sanusi formations'.[1] Information about Italian troop move-

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[113] [1] 'La pulizia del Gehel Cirenaico', by 'Gadria', *L'Oltremare*, Dec. 1930.

582 any summer camp will have descent lines cross linked by the
613 bonds of marriage with parallel cousins, and at the same time
[621] cleaved by the maternal links established by repetitive cross-cousin
marriage to different groups outside the segment. Thus,
582 in one of its aspects, marriage makes of an agnatic group a group
613 of cognates as well. 'Marry your paternal cousins and both your
602 paternal and maternal relatives will be one,' to quote Bedouin
sentiment on the matter. Within this agnatic group, nevertheless,
two other clusters of kin exist—those with maternal connexions
outside. In all, three areas of kinship can be defined,[13] although
all the members of the segment will have the lineage bond of
agnation in common. In normal circumstances, when split does
not threaten the group, the bond of agnation, strengthened by
parallel cousin marriage, takes precedence, although behaviour
is significantly affected by maternal links at any time. There is,
152 in the first instance, great jealousy between co-wives, which is
595 passed on to their children. Each wife has her separate tent, and
593 each is entitled to a strictly equal share of the husband's time
they have in common. This applies similarly to favours he may
grant his wives, and the distribution of his wealth among them.
If, for example, the husband is the owner of a horse, he is required
to tether it outside the tents of his wives in strict rotation;
if he retires for the night with one wife, the following night
he must favour the other; if he buys dress material for the one
he must buy a length of identical material for the other; if he
bestows favours on the children of one the children of the other
must be given equal consideration. Many such details are
meticulously observed; but while many are observed most of the
time, it is difficult to observe them all, the whole time. Any
breach of the rules is quickly taken up by the wives, and quarrels
ensue, leading not only to bitterness among the co-wives, but between
the offended wife and her husband, between the children
of both wives, and between the children and their father. Often,
595 when a man has co-wives, there is a marked discrepancy in age
593 between them, for, when an elderly Bedouin marries a second
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[13] The situation is not always as simple as this. Cross-cousin marriage may take more than two directions, and marriage within the segment might bring about great complexity, but the argument put forward above is not seriously affected by neglecting these details here.

wife he usually chooses a young girl of about twenty years. Children 595
of the elder wife might be adult, therefore, when the children 593
of the junior wife are infants. Great emphasis is placed on 561
seniority, particularly among males, but strong emphasis is also
placed on the equality of siblings and their equal legal status.
Between brothers of widely differing ages, there is, then, this
field of potential conflict. From an early date competitive, if not
hostile, relationships develop between the sons of co-wives. Competition 593
between half-brothers results not only from their 586
mothers being co-wives: one group might be the sons of a divorced
wife. The latter situation is often much worse, for the sons 587
born of the divorced wife are now being fostered by a woman
who is not their mother. A similar condition of things is brought
about when a widower with sons remarries. Yet again, when a
wife grows old and her sons have reached maturity, her husband
may not divorce her formally, but merely 'throw her off his
back'; she will then go to live with her grown sons, while her
husband, in turn, takes a new wife, usually taking up residence
in another camp for a time at least. It would be too much of a
digression here to discuss the inheritance disputes, and the disputes
over marriage and bride-wealth, which arise out of these
various circumstances. Suffice it to note that such disputes are [613]
common and affect the alignment of people within a tertiary
segment.

As half-brothers grow to maturity some of them will marry 613
their maternal cross-cousins, and in succeeding generations some 621
of their descendants will do likewise. In this way, a tertiary segment [582]
united by the bond of agnation, will also have within it
smaller groups of kin having different sets of cognatic links. This
group, as a residential unit, shows a very high concentration of
agnates, and the Bedouin say with pride that members of the
camps are always 'one' because of this agnatic bond, and indeed,
the corporate identity of this group is strikingly displayed in
many circumstances. It does not take precedence in all circumstances, 613
for, built into agnation, with the heavy burden of duties 578
which go with it, are serious stresses and strains which in some 602 ●
circumstances regularly come out into the open. In yet other
circumstances cognatic kinship affiliations appear to be dominant,
causing friction among agnates. A man, for example, may permit

613 his maternal kinsmen to use the land and water facilities of
578 his lineage; his agnates may give ready consent or bicker about
602 it, but when it becomes necessary to clean a well, disputes are
almost certain to break out in the camp between those who argue
that their maternal relatives should not be expected to assist in
its cleaning and those who insist they should as an acknowledgement
of the use they have made of it. In these circumstances
613 maternal links divide agnates. Conversely, if it becomes necessary
602 for some of the same men to use the water and ploughland
of their maternal kin, their agnates are only too pleased that
they are able to do so, because the pressure on their own resources
is relieved. In these circumstances, the maternal link
strengthens the agnatic group. When, to give another instance,
613 blood-money has to be gathered, it is the duty of all agnates to
682 contribute equally, and no member of the group, rich or poor,
can contract out of this obligation without sacrificing his membership
of the group. Payments of blood-money are witness of
the strength of the notion of 'oneness' among agnates, in one
sense, but in so far as they are compulsory, they point also to the
weakness in the relationship. Maternal kin are not directly concerned
in this, but they can and do make contributions. In this
context two aspects of agnation appear, and the value of the
602 maternal link is emphasized. Again, maternal kinsmen are not
428 directly concerned in inheritance disputes, but they are expected
578 to intercede for their sister's sons, who often use their mother's
brother's tribal brand on their own animals. During disputes of
this kind, blame is thrown on to the maternal kinsmen for their
interference in matters which, properly speaking, are not their
613 business. In marriage, however, events take quite a different
582 turn. The responsibility for providing a man with a wife is first
that of the father, and secondly of the members of the tertiary
section; the father takes the initiative, and his agnates assist, not
only in the negotiations, but also in defraying the heavy costs of
the wedding festivities, the various gifts that precede it, and the
604 bride-wealth which follows. The mother's brother is also a key
613 person in all these arrangements. He enters into the negotiations,
585 assists with the entertainment on the wedding day, and makes a
[583] substantial contribution to the bride-wealth. On the wedding day,
there is no kinsman to compare with the mother's brother; a few

weeks later, he is reviled for demanding a long overdue instalment 604
of his daughter's bride-wealth. He is the person who can be 613
approached freely, to whom love tales can be told, from whom [585]
help can be expected, who gives support in disputes, and who also [583]
upbraids, who punishes, who withholds, who acts as a pull-away
from the agnatic group. An agnate demands help, and also compels 613
the fulfilment of obligations. An agnate is a man with whom 602
relationships are formal, particularly if he is a senior. He is, too,
the person who unfailingly, though perhaps grudgingly, gives
help when it is most required; who, regardless of the merits of the
case, defends one against external opposition; and who is always
available at each life crisis. A kinship link is not to be defined by
any one particular mode of behaviour. Each is a cluster of different
sorts of behaviour, one form taking precedence in these circumstances,
another in other circumstances, and so forth.

The little clusters of kindred can be defined clearly in any of 613
the camps. It is customary among the Bedouin for those who are 602
most closely linked as kindred to pitch their tents close to each 621
other. For example, if a man has two recently married sons, their
tents are pitched on either side of his, with the ropes of their
tents crossing the ropes of their father's tent. More distantly related
kin will be more distantly placed, and here and there,
breaks in the continuity of the lines of tents are to be observed,
corresponding as a rule to breaks in kinship. Each large camp in
this way can be viewed as two or more nuclei of kindred. The
camp as a whole is dominantly composed of agnates, but they
are disposed in such a way as to show clusterings of varying kinship
composition. Characteristically each cluster has a separate
name, often a female name which refers to a common mother of
the cluster, or of the head of the leading family in it. When these [221]
relatively large camps break up with the onset of the rains and
disperse to form small camps of five to seven tents for winter
pasturing, they will be seen to correspond almost identically with
the kin clusters of the larger summer camp. Again, a tertiary segment [312]
may have two wells for its own use. In a particular year
there may be sufficient water in one of them to meet the needs
of the whole group, and its members then live together in one
camp; the following year both wells may have to be used, and
the camp of the previous summer will split up, roughly half going

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to one well, and the remainder to the other. It is usually an easy matter to predict, at least in a general fashion, how the group will divide, as long as the details of kinship are known; the camps will be composed of members of two sets of patri-lines in the tertiary segment, who will also represent two discrete clusters of cognatic kindred. If, therefore, a tertiary group increases in numbers to the point where a split in the lineage is inevitable, here then is the line of split, along a line, that is, of kinship cleavage and lineage differentiation. 'Men make the tribe; women divide it,' is an oft-quoted saying among the Bedouin, but this, like most sayings, tells only part of the truth, as we shall see.

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It is possible to show where on the genealogy change takes place, and it is possible to indicate the lines cleavages will follow, but the proliferation of a lineage does not occur merely because the possibility exists for it to do so. A group must, clearly, break up if the number of its members significantly exceeds that which can be supported by the available natural resources; water is the prime cause of the proliferation of lineages. Granting this, a group remains an undifferentiated corporation until occasion arises when its members, or some of them, can demonstrate unequivocally that they are no longer bound by its conditions of membership. There is a number of occasions when this can be done, some of which are discussed below.

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The test, *par excellence*, of corporate affiliation is the acceptance of the responsibility to pay blood-money. Refusal to accept this is the same as renouncing membership of the group. Individuals are sometimes excluded from membership in this way. There are occasions too, when the payment of blood-money involves renunciation by more than one or two individuals. If membership of a section has increased to the point of splitting, and should a homicide occur within it, one of the kin clusters within the group might demand blood-money from the other. Nothing could make the statement of split clearer than this. The most impelling condition of membership of the tertiary group is that 'we pay as one and receive as one', a condition which, of course, excludes payment within the group. Any two groups between which the demand for blood-money has been made are, therefore, by definition, separate tertiary groups.

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When a member of a group or his wife dies, there are specific

794 were concerned, there was little doubt who was leader—the
554 name of the former was known throughout the land. Now when
the warrior returned from his Egyptian exile, his rival offered
794 him a sheep as a gift. This act was wholly appropriate. Subsequently
554 they continued to compete fiercely, but it soon became
578 clear that the returned warrior was winning the greater support.
[788] In the face of this, the rival, in 1948, decided to break with tradition
by staying away from the annual pilgrimage to the tomb of
[175] the local saint. Instead, he and his followers made their pilgrimage
to a different tomb in the vicinity of their camp, and later
built a low wall round the tomb, whitewashed it, and made it
known that henceforward they would regularly use it for pilgrimages.
[613] The two kinship groups of a tertiary section now had their
[778] separate saint's tomb. Some months later, the rival decided to
794 move with his small group to an area in which they had not previously
554 resided. It is the custom among the Bedouin when they
578 pitch their tents in a place for the first time, that the people of
the neighbourhood should bring them gifts to mark the event.
431 The returned warrior, who had now become a close neighbour
[166] of his rival was obliged, like others, to offer the latter a gift; he
was also obliged to return the gift of a sheep that he had been
given on rejoining his section in 1947. He brought a gift within a
few hours of his rival's arrival, but it was a goat.[14] The rival and
his followers were furious, and the argument that the warrior was
too poor to give more was dismissed summarily. This was the
final insult. The donor, in return, had been given less than he had
presented. The reciprocity of gift exchanges had not only been
arrested, it had been reversed. From then onwards the two groups
made no attempt to conceal their hostility and went their separate
ways.

613 Disputes stemming from circumstances such as these are the
578 occasions which mark the proliferation of groups, although in
all three cases cited, difficulties over water supplies had preceded
the outbreaks of quarrelling.

613 In this discussion of the ways in which proliferation of segments
602 takes place, the emphasis had been put on the tug of war
121 between the interests of people in their agnatic connexions and

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[14] A goat is inferior to a sheep in gift exchanges.

the interests they have in their maternal relatives. Stated thus 613
sharply, this is a distortion of the process. To speak of the prin- 602
ciple of agnation conflicting with the principle of cognation or 121
maternal origin is nonsense, as the facts included in the discussion show. Agnation is not one thing, but many. Within its scope are included such aspects of social organization as succession, status, inheritance, bride-wealth, blood-money, modes of domestic and political behaviour, and so forth; and each of these aspects, the closer we stick to reality, can be broken up into a number of components. The same can be said of cognation and maternal origin. All these principles, so called, are clusters of numerous component parts, which combine, in reality, in a kaleidoscopic number of ways. In one situation a component of one combines with that of another to strengthen it; in a different situation the one component may repel the other; in a third situation, a number of the components in one will combine to exclude those of the other, and so on. If, therefore, an understanding of the way in which lineage proliferation occurs is sought, a view of the process as a conflict between the principle of agnation and the opposing pull of maternal origin is quite erroneous. It is of use in predicting the direction of cleavage to know that within a tertiary group there are also clusters of kin which are defined roughly by maternal links, and this knowledge serves as a rough and ready guide in predicting what the composition of groups, after they have split away from the parent group, will be. If a more precise picture of this composition is desired, other and more complex kinship links and the behaviour which accompanies them must be taken into account. If a still more accurate picture is desired, details of inheritance disputes, debts of bride-wealth, the size of flocks and herds, and the like, must also be taken into consideration. If, finally, one has the opportunity to study groups after they have proliferated, the presence or absence of this or that man can often be explained only in terms of his eye for a pretty girl or a personal preference for neighbours.

The kind of change which has been discussed in this essay is [178]
not difficult to negotiate in genealogical terms. Earlier it was [621]
stressed that within the tertiary tribal sections, although they [173]
are always predominantly agnatic groups, clusters of cognatic [551]

613 kin also exist. Two ways of naming these clusters are adopted—
602 all groups, whether they are elementary families, an odd assort-
121 ment of kindred sharing a common tent for reasons of expedi-
178 ency, or tribal groups, have a name. Sometimes these clusters are
621 named after a prominent living male, or a deceased kinsman of
173 the same kind. Sometimes these little groups are named after a
551 woman, perhaps the grandmother of the group.[15] Thus a small
group of two or three tents will be distinguished from another similar cluster within the camp, and so on for a number of groups, depending on the size of the camp. Most camps, however many tents they contain, have names for progressively inclusive clusters of tents until a twofold named division is reached. Tertiary segments that are forced to split contain therefore two groups with names already attached to them. When a split occurs, the name of the tertiary segment is pushed into the area of ambiguity and the names of what were previously two clusters become the names of two new tertiary segments, with a minimum adjustment in usage and a minor re-shuffle at the tertiary level of segmentation. Names cannot continue to be pushed into this area of the genealogy interminably, otherwise it would gradually expand into a vast pool of names. For a few generations the name dispensed with in this way becomes one of those ancestors about whom there is argument when genealogies are given. In the course of time, name after name is subjected to the process of elision and eventually will cease to be of concern to anyone.

105 I now summarize the main points of the discussion. The evi-
613 dence that has been examined suggests that the mechanical de-
vices of telescoping, fusion of names, and extinction of lines do
173 not affect orders of segmentation superior to that of the tertiary
178 order, and that in conditions of a completely stable population,
[551] these devices alone would suffice to retain the form of the genea-
logical structure. But, it was argued, conditions of complete stability cannot be assumed; the evidence of the present distribution of population among the numerous tertiary groups clearly points to marked fluctuations occurring within these small groups. This being so, proliferation of these groups in some areas at some

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[15] The naming of groups within a tertiary segment is an interesting study in itself, but it would be outside the limits of this discussion to make more than a brief mention of it.

682 To complete this general statement, two further circumstances are cited by the
• 602 Bedouin. If a man kills a related person who is not an agnate (it is expressed as killing the mother's brother) the breach in relationships must be healed as quickly as possible. The convention for dealing with this is that the offender, bound hand and foot, mounted on a horse, is sent to the camp of 'the owner of the blood', in the company of a holy man, there to make an offer of his life, saying: 'Here is my knife, my life is yours; here is my shroud, my life is yours.' No Bedouin would agree for a moment to undertake this journey if he thought the offer might be accepted. In Bedouin sentiments a life offered in this way cannot be taken. It is the convention which precedes a peace meeting and blood money. Any other way of dealing with the confusion, which spreads as a result of a homicide between cognates, is excluded.

682 Secondly, if a woman is killed, whatever the intersegmentary distance, the homi-
562 cide is said to be accidental, because a man never 'intends' to kill a woman. Blood-money arrangements are made as soon as possible, and the wealth—half that of a
613 man—passes to the deceased's father, not to her husband, for a woman's 'bone' always belongs to her father. Obviously women cannot be allowed to enter into
582 feud; since it is demographically compelling (apart from other reasons) for some of
591 them to marry outside their natal groups, then they might well find themselves residents in the enemy's camps, if they were to become involved in feuds.

121 This statement of the different means available for the regulation of homicide at
682 the several orders of tribal segmentation is the view the Bedouin themselves hold of their relationships. An analysis of the facts presented thus far could bring out a
613 number of interesting points with regard to the relativity of morals, the typification
829 of acts by their social context, the significance of the orders of segmentation, and so
619 on. Rather than proceed along these lines, however, it is more urgently necessary to reflect on the significance of the fact that the arrangement of the material in terms of what is usually called the lineage structure coincides with the Bedouin ordering of the same details. It is, of course, important to note that the account is not based on mere hearsay evidence. Each statement made can be documented from known homicides, and to this extent the model that has been used is consistent with reality. The model, nevertheless, can only be a representation of what a particular people, the Bedouin, conceive their social reality to be; it is a kind of ideology which enables them, without making absurd demands on their credulity, to understand their field of social relationships, and to give particular relationships their *raison d'être*. But, as will be shown, it would be a serious error to mistake such a folk model for sociological analysis. Such an error is difficult to avoid because the Bedouin, when defending their view, are able to cite enough bits and pieces of reality to make their argument con-
121 vincing. The flaw in the reasoning is seen when it can be shown that its consequences
114 are absurd. As an example of what is meant, the statement that feud is attached to
613 groups at the secondary order of segmentation may be considered. If the statement were true, if each and every secondary section were at feud one with the other (and
619 in a structural sense this ought to be so), then each tribe would be divided into small
829 mutually hostile groups, which completely lacked any possibility of movement, even
578 for pasturing purposes. Presented with this, the Bedouin would argue that this is not in fact so, because secondary and primary sections are interlinked in many ways. That is, they evoke what to them are contingencies to explain why they are at feud with one

S: Peters E-5 (1948-1950) 1967 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9
Cyrenaica

121 These three objections to the lineage theory as a useful model for examining the
613 consequences of homicide are serious enough in themselves, but another objection
562 renders it still less satisfactory. This fourth objection relates to the implication that
114 lineage theory cannot take account of women. Indeed, in some of the accounts of the
political organization of lineage societies, the impression is given that they are all-male
societies: women belong only to the domestic and kinship realms. In terms of
the theory, this must be so. Women, the marriage links they create, the forms of
relationships that derive from marriage, the right of men to joke with others by
virtue of a link through women, their rights to demand favours of men who are not
their agnates, their right to expect contributions to bridewealth or blood money
from maternal relatives—all these, and other forms of behaviour, have been dealt
with as patterns of behaviour which interfere with or disturb agnation, or that cut
121 across lineage affiliations. Such metaphors can only be justified if it is accepted that
613 precedence must be given to agnation, to what people say they think their lineage
relationships to be, and that there is some kind of primacy about what have frequently
been called jural rules which constitute the structure, while behaviour which is not
governed by these rules is to be relegated to the position of secondary forms having
the effect of intruding only. But these secondary forms of behaviour are as impelling,
as persisting, and are as much a part of social life as any of the so-called jural rules.
[582] It is possible to go further than this, and state that in societies where there is a high
incidence of marriage among agnates of the local group, as occurs among the Bedouin,
jural rules rarely appear in their ' pure ' form in behaviour, since, in groups of this
sort, each and every person constitutes a bundle of roles by virtue of the fact that he
is one of a very complex cognatic group; a particular role, it is true, may take precedence
in a particular situation, but all roles are present in each situation and affect
behaviour. Precedence can only be given to specific forms of behaviour in relation
to situations. There is no such thing as a general primacy with regard to any form.
The concept of agnation as the centre of all political problems, disturbed or disrupted
by, say, matrilaterality, is as inadequate as saying that the nucleus which pulls all other
components into position is matrilaterality with agnation as a disturbing element. In
reality there are numerous components present in all situations, which should not
be lumped together under such categorizing terms as agnation and matrilaterality,
but which combine as separate components in a kaleidoscopic range of clusters.

121 Some of the components of behaviour subsumed under the notion of matrilaterality
613 are briefly given here in order to appreciate more fully the consequence of inter-group
682 marriage. Of paramount importance is the fact that, in Bedouin sentiment, to kill
674 a relative is as sinful an act as the killing of a close agnate. When such a homicide
829 did occur, during my period of residence among them, the Bedouin response was to
assert that the offender was out of his mind—it was inconceivable that he could have
● [602] committed the offence otherwise. Their attitude was reminiscent of the horror they
display when a man kills his father or a full brother, and represents a much stronger
reaction than is manifested when a man kills an agnate of, say, the third or fourth
[604] degree. They have every reason to be disturbed by the killing of a mother's brother,
for, whatever personal affections may be involved, a crucial link is threatened. Their
reasoning, however, is that relationships with the mother's brother are characteristically
easy, that they are not demanding, that there is much joking in them, and that to

121 celebrated war between the 'Abaidat and the Bara 'asa tribes occupying a large part
619 of central and eastern Cyrenaica. This war took place a hundred years ago, so that the
682 evidence is mainly hearsay, but it is significant that when asked for details of the
726 groups taking part the Bedouin make it clear that the entire tribes were not at war—
[173] some sections on both sides are said to have remained on friendly terms. Yet when
121 wars are discussed in a general fashion, the Bedouin insist that tribes confront each
619 other as such. If it is pointed out to them that men might be ranged against their
726 maternal relatives the Bedouin mumble apologetically that they would not kill their
maternal relatives—a lame argument since in the heat of battle men cannot make this
● 602 kind of discrimination. Details of other wars also illustrate the point that only parts
of tribes face each other in strife, for though the stories of past events may be inaccurate there is genealogical evidence to substantiate their claims that certain groups
were linked in the past, and in any case their statements assert that where these links
exist they are not prepared to engage in hostilities. The several parts of each tribe,
121 like the parts of primary and secondary sections, have as many different sorts of
619 relationships as there are groups, and the general statement that tribes are warring
571 units merely obscures the interest there is in their relationships. Tribes, further, lack
the leadership to make war. I repeat that leadership does exist, but not even the
121 greatest leaders, past or present, can rightly be described as leaders of their tribes,
619 using the term in its structural connotation. Literature on the subject gives the
613 impression that there are tribal leaders, because successive administrations have used
554 the tribes and their divisions as a framework for attempting to rule the Bedouin, but
the details of the power domains of individual leaders make it clear that they have
little to do with the ordered divisions of tribes. A leader within part of one tribe may
carry with him tertiary sections of another tribe, and if major hostilities break out
between parts of these tribes, the sections of both which are joined as allies and
related as kinsfolk will not fight against each other, for sections so linked enjoy
stronger connexions than the structurally linked tertiary sections of a very large
[682] secondary section. Consequently the statement that homicide results in tribal war
[114] when the offender and his victim are members of two separate tribes is not merely
incomplete, not merely a simplification, it is wrong.

121 A point which has been implicit throughout the second part of this paper needs
now to be made quite explicit: groups do not come together in their respective
613 structural genealogical orders. During my entire residence in Cyrenaica I did not
571 see a group of agnates larger than a tertiary tribal section assemble for any purpose.
[114] It is true that the occasions when large groups are required to assemble are infrequent.
[648] It is also true that although the British Administration was serving a caretaker role
only, it may have had an affect on the nature of tribal gatherings. Despite this qualification, there were several occasions when I expected tribal groups to assemble in
lineage order if the fusion of sections in relation to like sections has any meaning in
practice. Large groups of men did gather to dispute claims to wells, to argue about
rights to ploughland, and to make peace. In every case that I recorded the agnatically
closest groups of the main participants were absent, while members of genealogically more remote groups were present in strength. This statement applies to gatherings in the camps and in the administrative centres. One of the biggest gatherings I
[628] witnessed assembled in an administrative office in a village near the coast in the

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584 Prior to the wedding festivities, the
593 father will have participated in negotiations, although even in these he will
have remained silent, leaving an affine, as a rule, to arrange the details with
the girl's father and his kinsmen. The father feigns aloofness from the start
of negotiations until after the wedding celebrations have ended. Before inquiring into this seemingly odd behaviour, a few further details of marriage
ceremonies need to be mentioned briefly.

585 The bride is carried to the nuptial tent on a camel, seated in a cagelike
342 structure placed on the camel's back, this canopy covered over with carpets
[492] and at least one long blanket — later to be used to divide her tent into male
and female quarters — which constitute part of the goods given to a woman
[788] on marriage. On her arrival, while she is still seated in her canopy, the
camel is led round the tent seven times by a small boy. She then descends
and is hustled into the tent by a number of women who make a show of their
attempts to conceal her from view. Inside the tent the bride is enclosed in
one corner in a kind of cubicle partitioned off by a length of blanket.

585 In the meantime, the groom has affected to escape, but is "caught," while
[533] running away, by his fellows, who "compel" him to return to the nuptial tent,
to the accompaniment of their lewd songs telling of the sexual pleasures
[831] awaiting him. Much of this is horseplay, but the young men carry it out
brazenly and the groom is required to show reluctance to continue with the
ceremonies. His entry into the nuptial tent is marked by an expectant hush
that falls over the crowd of men gathered, as they await the result of the
virginity test the groom is about to perform, which he does by wrapping part
of his toga round one of his fingers to pierce the hymen. Sharp shrieks from
[202] the bride give the signal that the test has been undertaken; not a stir moves
the crowd until evidence of its success has been publicly displayed, which is
given by the groom hoisting the blood-stained portion of the toga through
the corner of the tent on a pole, followed by firing three shots from his rifle.
Jubilantly, the men gathered fire volley after volley from their rifles just over
the nuptial tent, and the seven-day celebrations begin.

585 A full descriptive account of a marriage, or many of the ritual details
589 woven into it need not be given here. What is included is intended to illus-
[593] trate certain relationships between father and son, and between one
generation and another. In this connection two further points are appropri-
[561] ate. First, during the week of festival, young men gather outside the nuptial
[535] tent each night to encourage a maiden in her dancing, clapping their hands
to the point of injury "so that we will have a wife soon." The celebrations
[533] belong to the bachelors, and they are the only ones to engage in the singing
and hand clapping. It is they too who stop the bridal camel on its way to
[538] the nuptial tent to recite obscene rhymes to the bride, and they also shout
[831] their rather dubious consolations to the bride who, during the virginity test,
crying out for her mother, is assured by them that the night holds promise
585 for her which her mother could never extend. The married men, particularly
● 602 the close senior agnates of the groom, stay away from it all, discussing mat-
521 ters unconnected with the affair.

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571 between man and man, although the various cereal dishes which constitute
231 their regular meals are said to have a similar effect.
264 The son who continues to eat with his father "as he always had been
182 doing," also continues to accept his authority. Indeed he could do little else
593 at this stage, for he lacks the economic means to cut away. Neither at mar-
585 riage nor after is there any transfer of wealth from father to son. The new
182 tent recently pitched is no more than a dormitory to which the young couple
[425] retire at night. During the daytime the son is still to be seen in his father's
tent, and, in the male quarters, things appear to be much the same as before.
[556] In the female quarters, the only superficial change is the more frequent ap-
pearance among the women of one who, before marriage, often sat among
them if she had been a close neighbour or a close cousin previously; or of
an additional helper if she had come from afar. On the surface things re-
main "as they always have been," although in fact, a whole set of changes
have been initiated.

852 *Rites de passage* are few among the Bedouin. A man's progress in life is
881 ceremonially marked by only four events: his birth, circumcision, marriage
764 and burial. His development into manhood is not marked by clearly defined
stages. About the age of seven, the henna markings on the front of a boy's
858 shirt for protection from the evil eye are not renewed, the cowrie shell stitched
789 to the front of his cap as a kind of talisman against the evil eye is removed
857 and he is no longer permitted free access to the women's quarters. As he
233 grows older, he will be instructed in goat-herding, and later taught to follow
the sheep. In his late teens he will have to undertake the more arduous and
883 responsible task of herding the camels. Coincident with camel-herding, he
233 may be given a gun by his father. Shortly afterwards he must undertake the
[431] stringent test of manhood, a journey to a distant oasis for dates. These
[411] changes are not marked off by a *rite de passage*. The rites a man undergoes
[484] during the course of a lifetime are minimal, and in the sense that they are
[885] concerned with only the basic events in a man's life anywhere (save for
852 circumcision, which is a minor celebration anyway), they are irreducible.
88 Moreover, the rituals which exist do not comprehend the same multiplicity of
776 relationships as rituals which occur in many other African societies.[4] It is
[771] true that the ceremonies referred to in this chapter by no means include
all the Bedouin rituals. It is also true that the events mentioned vary in
[554] elaboration, and in the number of symbols present in them, but they are
not multiplied or reduced for different people.

In this context it is important to stress that we are here dealing with a
[613] lineage society where social differentiation is not built up into differences
[554] of rank, where the roles to which a man succeeds are almost wholly cap-
● [602] tured by his kinship relationships with other men and which are sociologically
to be distinguished from the roles a man enters into by acquisition of office,

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[4] See, for example, the elaboration of rituals discussed in M. Gluckman (Ed.), *Essays on the Ritual of Social Relations.* Manchester: University of Manchester Press, 1962.

membership of associations and so on. The statuses a Bedouin achieves depend 796
not on an ordered acquisition through the inheritance of roles or election 852
to them, but on his personal manipulation of linkages in his jockeying 88
with others. Rites are minimal because there are few defined statuses an 554
individual can predictably acquire. The equalitarianism of the desert denudes 602 ●
the Bedouin of ritual riches. Complimentarily, rites which do occur are 613
thrown into exaggerated relief by the absence of others, and in their isolation,
become not merely a "passage" but a cataclysmic change. Marriage and [557]
burial both comprehend limited fields of relations, but accompanying ceremonies 585
may bring several hundred people together, people who otherwise 764
rarely gather in these numbers to meet one another as kinsmen and neighbours, 796
and it is suggested that the emphasis given to the events dramatises the 602
significance of the changes they produce. In the discussion of the changes 182
brought about by marriage, the Bedouin view of what is entailed will be
considered first.

The Bedouin View of Marriage

After marriage, the Bedouin argue, a son has a tent of his own, a woman 585
over whom he has authority and soon children to make him a father. Marriage 581
causes split, branching. A new family is created, holding the potential [613]
of a new lineage. The separation is so painful a matter for the father
that he cannot contemplate it, hence his pretence that he has no knowledge of [593]
wedding festivities, and his subsequent attitude that nothing has happened.

Interestingly, there are two other occasions when this attitude is to be 682
observed. When a man kills within his corporate group,[8] he may flee his 613
tribe or he may be compelled to leave; later he is likely to return and, when 621
he does, he is received with a minimum of show. Every attempt is made to
suppress knowledge of the event.

Again, if incest occurs, the memory of it must somehow be suppressed, and 835
it is an ever-present danger. Men, permitted four wives simultaneously and 561
also able to engage in a plurality of marriages through divorce or death of [595]
spouses, may have children showing an age difference of two or three generations.
Thus it comes about that a man may be of an age in relation to his
father's sister which permits them as children to behave as if they were
first paternal cousins. As an adult, the preferred spouse for a man is a [582]
father's brother's daughter. In terms of relationships between adolescents
the situation in which a man is of the same age generation as his father's
sister is fraught with danger. In one such case, between a man and his [684]
father's sister, the male child of the union was put out in the desert to be

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[8] Bedouin are disposed in groups which, in summer, usually constitute a single community, around or near a watering point. The men of this group are interlinked by reference to an ancestor four or five ascending generations, reckoning from the generation of men of about 20 years. When, elsewhere in this chapter reference is made to corporations, it will be to groups of this kind.

band is required to take gifts to his mother-in-law in recognition of the fact 583
that she nourished his wife as an infant (the literal meaning of the word 584
used for this gift is "milk"). A return visit is made and gifts are given to 606
the daughter. When the first child is born an animal is presented by the
affines, and if the child is a male, the gift may be several sheep, or even a 851
few camels if the father-in-law is very wealthy. Formal exchange of gifts 425
continue, but, in addition, informal transfers are made. Moreover, if re- 606
lations between a man and his father-in-law develop favourably, it is not un- 606
common for a young husband, during the early years of marriage, to move 591
away from his father and pitch his tent alongside that of his father-in-law. 593
Marriage gives a son affinal relations of his own. Affinity can alleviate the
dead weight of paternal authority.

It is suggested that the crisis the marriage of a son assumes for a father 585
is the shift it entails in the distribution of authority. This is borne out by 561
other details in the marriage ceremony referred to earlier. Ordinarily, young 602•
men dare not sing within earshot of their senior agnates. Far from allowing 533
obscenities, agnates of the ascending generation would not allow even a
mention of women to be made by young men, in their presence. In a group [593]
consisting of young men and an agnate, I chanced to use the noun for [123]
woman and immediately my tent was cleared of all but the senior agnate.
At a wedding the young men revel in their lewd songs and shout their [831]
obscenities for all to hear. The senior agnates stand aside and make a show of ignoring the proceedings. And well they may, for each marriage is a challenge to the exclusive authority they have enjoyed; each nuptial tent is an invasion of the domain of which they have been undisputed masters. Marriage is the only occasion when the men of one generation can clap and sing their defiance of an older one, and give warning of the changes which must be accommodated however great the pretence that nothing has happened.

Marriage ceremonies dramatise the clash between adjacent generations 561
over the distribution of certain forms of authority. If this authority is as 602
overwhelming as has been suggested, and if it is so deeply resented, how is it that life is endurable for juniors? Relationships between junior and senior agnates are so restrictive that they almost amount to what Professor Fortes has suggested I view as a form of avoidance relationships. Juniors must always defer, they must obey commands promptly, they serve their seniors, they must accept a lead when it is given and the restrictions on conversations exclude all reference to women, marriage or sex. These are not simply a set of general guides for behaviour, they are rigidly applied rules, deviation from which is countered with rebuke or greater severity. It would appear from this

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many African societies is that wealth is transferred. Obviously, in societies where the 583
rules of exogamy compel a dispersion of links outside a man's own clan, what is in- 584
volved in this transfer of wealth cannot be sociologically similar to one in which mar- 606
riage to the first cousin on either side is permitted.
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561 that young men spend their premarital lives in an environment of unmitigated
602 agnatic hostility. Greater substance is given to this view when it is
realised that agnates live together. The residential concentration of agnates
561 in Cyrenaica exceeds 80 per cent. I wish to stress that this figure is based
602 on the universe of the small camp, and the only males included as agnates are
621 those who are consanguinely related. Over 50 such camps were used in arriving at the figure. Obviously, the figure of agnatic concentration will vary depending on the universe. If all men who claim to belong to a tribe of, say, 15,000 souls, who claim that they are agnates in a political sense are included, then the figure will not be the same as that derived from a small group where the criterion for inclusion is consanguinity, not mere political affiliation. It is necessary to make this clear to emphasise that the Cyrenaican figure is unusually high, and also because the modes of behaviour between consanguineal and political agnates differ critically. Granted the hostility
[578] built into agnation, and recognising in addition the significance of the high degree of agnatic concentration, unless there are other factors present in the situation, life would be intolerably burdensome. Parallel-cousin marriage comes to the rescue.

Parallel-Cousin Marriage

582 Among the Bedouin the prohibited degrees of marriage are few. A man may not marry within a closer range than first paternal or maternal cousin; he cannot marry a woman of a senior generation, nor a woman known to be older. He cannot marry the daughters of a woman who has acted as wet nurse to him or to any of his brothers and sisters. Otherwise he is permitted to marry any other woman. Marriage with the first paternal cousin is
582 preferred, and is more than a sentiment. A man has a right to his father's
585 brother's daughter, and before a marriage is arranged with anyone else, the
578 girl's father seeks the opinion of his brother's son. If he neglects to do this,
or if he flouts the opinion offered him, he runs the risk of the marriage being brought to a halt on the very wedding day. I have witnessed this. In most of the records I possess, it usually happens that the brother's son is bought off with a few sheep (about five) and some articles of clothing. Here the brother's son was seizing the occasion to extort from a farmer's
[589] brother wealth which he considered was due him from an earlier inheritance dispute. Occasionally the intervention is genuinely designed to prevent a marriage; if the girl refuses to marry her father's brother's son, he can force
582 her into spinsterhood. Men exercise their right to marry their first parallel cousins. They also marry other parallel cousins. The significance of parallel-cousin marriage varies with the exact degree of the relationship. First- and, say, third-parallel cousins are sociologically different in a number of respects, and in relation to specific problems these differences may assume major
[602] importance. In the present discussion the various degrees have this in common: that whatever the precise relationship, all parallel cousins are the

daughters of agnates and, in view of the high agnatic concentration, the 582
daughters of agnates who are co-residents as well. Parallel-cousin marriage 602 ●
therefore creates affinity between co-resident agnates.

The rate of parallel-cousin marriage is high, producing such a density of kinship relationships as to afford a reliable index for defining the agnatic corporation. As a form of marriage it persists; genealogical records clearly demonstrate this. Frequency of parallel-cousin marriage taken together with its persistency, means, above all else, that it makes an agnatic group a cognatic group as well. The matter is put in this way to suit the general development of the argument, but it would be a serious error to think that this means I am giving priority to agnation and that I am considering cognation as intrusive, or that, in this society, agnation can stand on its own because it has a kind of absolute significance other forms of relationship do not possess. Both forms exist in reality.

The great Bu Bakr of Cyrenaica's most celebrated lineage is alleged to have [613]
exhorted his fellow tribesmen to "marry your father's brother's daughters
and then your paternal relatives and your maternal relatives will become
one." Whether he had given the advice or not, the Bedouin, as their society
is constituted, would marry them anyway. The Bedouin form of agnation
without its accompanying parallel-cousin marriage would impose impossible
restrictions, if indeed there is any point in attempting to conceive of a
situation so remote from reality. With parallel-cousin marriage present in the
corporate group, men referred to as agnates are not agnates only; each and [613]
every one of them is the centre of a bundle of roles, each role potentially [554]
as important as the other. It would be false to argue, moreover, that complexities
of relationships can be unravelled by analytically separating them,
giving precedence to the agnatic role in an "agnatic" situation, the mother's
brother's role in a domestic situation and so on. An agnate who is also a
mother's brother is never the same, in any situation, as an agnate to whom
one is not otherwise related. The prime significance of parallel-cousin marriage [182]
is that it creates a complexity of linkages which almost amount to confusion,
thereby maximising the choice available to individuals to meet whatever
contingencies befall them.

The only area of relationships left relatively undisturbed by parallel-cousin
marriage is the son, father and father's brother triangle. Freed of
the complications stemming from parallel-cousin marriage, agnation can
here approximate its true form. Other complications arise out of marriage. A 582
few are listed here: father and son marry a mother and her daughter; a 583
form of exchange marriage between first parallel-cousins occur; two brothers
marry two sisters; the marriage of two brothers to two sisters is followed, in
the succeeding generation, by the son of one union marrying the daughter
of the other, making this latter a double first parallel-cousin marriage —
both a father's brother's daughter's and a mother's sister's daughter's marriage.
These forms can all occur within a corporate group. No citadel of agnation [613]
can withstand this attack. All forms of marriage combine to break the grip [602]

582 of agnation on the members of a corporate group and give it a taproot of
583 diversity whence it derives its strength, and which makes of it "the one body,"
613 conspicuous, in comparison with other societies, as the corporate group
• 602 *par excellence*.

The Sister's Son-Mother's Brother Relationship

128 Previously the mode of relationships associated with agnation and affinity
have been briefly discussed. In order to appreciate the effects of parallel-
cousin marriage, some remarks concerning the sister's son-mother's brother
604 set of relationships must be included here. Bedouin contrast the mother's
[174] brother with the father's brother; their sayings and proverbs afford a
wealth of verbal documentation on the contrast. With the mother's brother
a man enjoys all the freedoms he is denied in his relationships with his father
[831] and father's brother. He is permitted to joke with him; [illegible] indulge in
exchanges of obscenities. When the sister's son wishes to marry, he is
permitted to discuss the matter with his mother's brother and can urge him
to intercede with his father on his behalf. Two men thus related are readily
recognised in the camps, because in their acts they are required to show
affection by displays of innocent horseplay, pranks or mild practical jokes.
Small boys pursue their mother's brother, feign to kick or strike him, and he
takes it all in good part.

The external aspects of this behaviour is deceptive. Joking of this sort
creates the image in which the relationships are conceived; what is equally
striking in it is its compulsiveness. Obviously, mature men are not always
in the mood to be teased, but if they are, they must respond appropriately.
Their relationships are unmistakably onerous. This remark applies not only
to the external forms of their behaviour, but also to the favours a man is
[602] permitted to ask of his mother's brother. A brief amplification will make
the point clear. Demands can be made of agnates, but only in situations of
serious contingency. Day-to-day needs are met, not by appeals to the rights of
agnation, but from the expectations linked to the mother's brother. If these
expectations are withheld, the sister's son may be left in a quandary. In-
604 terestingly, in the records of homicides I gathered, three (in the con-
682 temporary population) were concerned with the killings of mother's broth-
ers by sister's sons. Homicide within this field of relationship is difficult
to comprehend unless it is appreciated that expectations are as compulsive
in the daily life and the general well-being of people as are the rights and
duties associated with agnation.

604 These general remarks apply to the relationships irrespective of the lineage
613 origin of the mother's brother. The similarity ends there, since the nature
of the expectations, their urgency at any given moment and the kind of
favours which are granted vary with the group identity of the mother's
[428] brother. A mother's brother who is a member of ego's corporate group may be
expected to give the sister's son small quantities of flour, favour him in all

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in position immediately anyone else appears at the entrance to the tent.[11] [834]
Women cook, but they do not serve the meal to males, nor are they responsible [342]
for the distribution of meat among them. [264]
Parts of an animal are 264
carefully specified, and the various portions distributed at a meal carry 574
with them a great deal of significance. A host can honour, flatter, disappoint 571
or even insult his guest, depending on the precise distribution of meat
he adopts. Designated portions should go to certain kinsmen if they are [602]
present, but this still leaves a wide margin of choice, and a host can use
this choice as part of the many means at his disposal for directing his relationships
with other men. A political link can be forged or another
snapped by the distribution of portions of meat at the commensal meal.

The Bedouin Ideal Type of Family as a Unit of Production

This account of the division of labour is far from inclusive of all the tasks 594
carried out. The details given are only barely sufficient to provide some 183
indication of the necessary composition of a family. Referring again to the [462]
Bedouin sentiments about the matter, it is now possible to give it some
numerical precision. The number of females should be a minimum of
about three, including a mother, a teen-age daughter and a child of about
eight years. Males should number about six: a father, relieved of most [857]
chores to act as director; a son in his middle to late twenties, to plough; a [883]
second son, in his early to middle twenties, to herd the camels; a third, in [462]
his late teens to early twenties, to shepherd the sheep; a fourth, middle to [561]
late teens, to look after the goats; and a younger son to fetch, carry and
run errands about the camp. The family of the ordinary Bedouin, they say, [554]
shows this sex and age distribution, although they recognise that a politically
ambitious man with the wealth to match his aspirations would require more [556]
of both sexes — particularly women, since the burden of entertainment increases
rapidly with a man's climb to power and fame.

Clearly, the basis of Bedouin sentiment concerning family structure is its 121
approximation to an ideal production unit. Some families display the features
of this ideal, but even they enjoy the productive benefits of this composition 183
for a very limited period only. The family, as described above, can only be an 594
ephemeral unit, since the age structure constantly changes, women are removed
by marriage, men move away and death affects it at any point at any
time. The Bedouin family is a fiction in the sense that it can be said to have a
characteristic composition. The mistake they make is to conceive of it as a
particular kinship structure related to production. The substance of what
has been referred to as a fiction is that, if viewed as a productive unit, it
bears close consistency with reality. Freed of the need to examine it in terms
of specifically limited kinship relationships, and no longer anchored to the [621]
inhabitants of a single tent, the distribution of people according to sex and

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[11] This is the general rule. In practice, the use of the divider can indicate an intimacy or distance in relationships, most subtly.

Cases

621 Genealogically he was their father's brother, but he was of their same age
592 generation, and behaved as if he was their agnatic equal. Towards his own
578 brother (16), he behaved as if the latter was his uncle, for he was much his
[604] junior in age and his uncle had virtually brought him up from boyhood.
They had quarrelled bitterly because his brother (16) had given him only
[428] a fraction of his inheritance, which he himself, in turn, should have
[593] shared with his young full brother (not shown on the diagram) but he did
not do so. This youngest brother left (15) for this reason and now resides
621 with (16), his full brother's enemy. Two of the men (14 and 13) of this
592 group of four were the chief herdsmen of the camp, although they were
[233] assisted for short periods by (12) and (15), who also helped tend the
camels in other ways. Their connection with the group centered on Tent
[571] A was a mutual close link to a politically powerful person (not shown on the
genealogies) to whom they are deeply loyal and who, while I was among
them, was actively opposed to the common political enemy of them all (16),
and who in earlier years had challenged the leadership of (2) of Tent A.
There is also the fact that they were all linked within a close range of
[613] agnation. This linkage included, too, the owner of Tent F (17), not in
● [602] fact the descendant of the man shown in the diagram — he was the son of
a slave wife; his genitor was a slave, but his mother's master reared him,
freed him and he is now given as his son in the genealogy. He lives with his
wife, of client origin, together with her children from a previous husband,
(18), who divorced her, and his own children. Aging, he no longer acted
as a regular herdsmen, but relieved other men in the camp, and also spent
some time shepherding.

621 The details given of the strands which run through the camp to tie these
571 particular people together are so few that, like the Bedouin plough, they do
no more than scratch the surface, but they are sufficient to permit a few
general statements. The camp, and particularly the precise disposition of
621 its tents, shows a group of males clustered together to share two of the main
571 economic tasks: shepherding and herding. The physically strong adult males
233 of Tents D and E shoulder the burden of herding all the camels of the camp,
462 and the men of Tents B, A and C shepherd all the sheep, with (17) of
Tent F serving both purposes. This number of men allows some to remain
in the camp at all times, to free one of them for a journey to the distant
market when supplies of sugar and tea are necessary, and to enable one or
two men, at short notice, to hurry away on horse or camel to search for
lost animals.[14]

621 Economic Determinants of the General Structure of the Camp

574 It is also clear from these details that, given the disparities in wealth
231 (although all men have some wealth), the diet of most is considerably
262

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431 [14] There is little point in seeking the lost animals themselves in the first instance.
[556] A man travels from camp to camp asking for information, and when he has gathered
his clues, he searches a neighbourhood.

ameliorated in its protein content, particularly by the generosity of the oc- 621
cupants of the nucleating Tent A. Not that they are the only ones who ever 574
slaughter their animals for food. Others do so, albeit much less frequently. 231
Whoever kills an animal, everyone present in the camp is given a share, and 262
the men always eat in the tent of the donor, sitting around one bowl. Thus, 431
the surplus that builds up at one point is redistributed among those suffering [556]
a shortage, and meat, in a society where the climate and way of life militate against its storage for more than a few days, is more efficiently used. Many other general economic points could be deduced. These general statements could, however, be made of practically any camp, whatever the specific differences.

Affinity and Matrilaterality in the Structure of the Camp

Economic considerations determine the general structure of these small 621
camps, but do not account for the particular people gathered in them. Per- 613
haps one of the most striking features of these camps, which comes out 602
clearly in the one discussed here, is the confined agnatic span which links the males. Lest it be underestimated, I wish to stress the profound significance of this fact. While granting its importance it is equally necessary to stress that the span, potentially, could be considerably reduced; in some camps it is. Many of the closer agnates of the men of this camp are not shown on the genealogy included with the diagram; (7), (15) and (16), for example, all have brothers, (12) has a large number of first paternal cousins and so on. Therefore, this particular cluster of agnates formed for reasons other than agnatic ties. The most direct single thread connecting Tents A, B and C is that which runs through women. Men of many other camps are all linked in this way, directly. Five tents of this camp are connected through a female link to a common ancestress, whose name still defines the group, two ascending generations for one adult male, three from others and four from others. If greater elaboration could have been shown on the genealogy without confusion, additional links through women could have been demonstrated. Affinity and matrilaterality are the prime movers in bringing agnates together as neighbours.

Other Factors Affecting the Structure of the Camp

Other considerations narrow the area in choice of residence. The quest 621
for power where every man entertains hope of achievement where ambitions 571
are not stifled by the rigour of rank and a small amount of wealth provides 554
a basis for a beginning is also a significant factor in considering the composition of camps. The generosity of the people in Tent A was not entirely altruistic. Justly, it had won them repute, but the repute itself was an important aspect of the political power they enjoyed. They also acquired the services of several men to manage their animals, an impossible strain for them alone. And with their shepherds and herdsmen they secured devoted followers. It was hinted in discussing the structure of the camp that changes

sorts of petty ways, listen to his grumbles about his agnates, interfere on his 604
behalf in petty camp quarrels, shield him from the disciplinarian father and 613
guard his property interests against the predatory father's brother; if the 428
mother's brother dies without heirs, the sister's son can reasonably expect at least a share of his wealth. When the mother's brother is a member of a different corporate group, a sister's son cannot possibly expect to inherit from him in any circumstance.

The mother's brother may reside in a camp too distant to be much effective 604
direct help in day-to-day living. His relative remoteness gives the relation- 591
ship other possible opportunities, however. Rainfall in the semi-desert area 312
of Cyrenaica is highly variable, both from year to year, and from place to 233
place in any given year. As a result this shallow saucer of a depression may 241
have sufficient rain to supply both the water needs of animals and crops, while an area a few miles distant will have inadequate water supplies for either. The mother's brother-sister's son link can mean water for animals and a crop of barley for both when, in successive years, the resources of one area or the other are inadequate.

The differences in the relations between men and their mother's brother 604
do not end with a characterisation of their antipodal forms. The demographic structure of a group may be such that one man may have a number of mother's brothers, another only one; one man may have to share with several brothers, another may be an only son. Complications of this sort de- [613]
termine the precise relationships between men, but however intricate these may be, each corporate group has its matrilateral links with a group occupying a slightly different ecological area, and it also has a plurality of matrilateral connections within it. Further, if a direct connection is not available [603]
to any particular individual he can use an indirect link (e.g. father's mother's brother or mother's mother's brother) to satisfy his needs.

The Preference for Males

Thus far, the family and the social matrix in which it is embedded has 128
been discussed in general terms, most particularly in reference to several selected sets of relationships. I wish now to place these relationships in a more specific setting with a brief discussion of the composition of a small camp of a group inhabiting the arid areas of central Cyrenaica. When the 829
Bedouin give their views on the structure of the family in Cyrenaica they 594
speak of it as consisting of a pair of spouses and about ten children, mainly 594
males. The emphasis on males is not mere sentiment, overwhelmingly though 562
it favours them against females. Additional males in a family increase the 858
productive possibilities of a family in the sense that more herdsmen become available and larger ploughing commitments can be undertaken; an increase in the number of females has small effect on production since they are precluded from any direct participation in these activities. Both sexes, ranging in age from about seven years to mature adulthood, are necessary if a family

surface water in jerry cans, bringing them back to the tents, one at a time, 462
on their backs. Clothes are kept clean in the desert, and the women do the [312]
washing. [296]

The care of children from birth until they are a few years old is the responsibility 462
of the woman. Childbirth causes a minimum interruption in the 854
daily sequence of a mother's activities. The child is breastfed if the mother [844]
has milk; if not, a wet nurse is sought or goat milk is substituted. Other [853]
than the time given to feeding it, the infant does not take up much of the
mother's time. It is placed in a hammock slung between the centre poles
of the tent and rocked by the mother as she passes to and fro. If nursing in
illness is required, the mother devotes herself to it; her other tasks must
then be performed by another woman.

As children acquire mobility, and at a time when, perhaps, the mother 855
is pregnant again, they become so fractious one with the other that if help 462
was unavailable the nervous strain could seriously disrupt the normal routine
of work. During the early years of marriage, when daughters are still too 855
young to look after their small brothers and sisters, the grandmother's help 462
in child-rearing is invaluable. Too old for the arduous tasks of the daily 603 •
routine, she may assist in teasing and spinning the raw wool, but it is in her
role as nursemaid that she assumes importance. Children of both sexes
are given the comfort of suckling at her breast, receiving attention and care
for which the young mother could not possibly afford the time.

Caring for children takes up little of a man's time, and is mostly incidental. 462
The woman, on the other hand, devotes relatively little of her 233
time to the animals. She does the milking in spring — of camels, sheep and [234]
goats — but herding is not her responsibility, save for partly tending goats. [857]
Goats, when they are in the vicinity of the camp, are looked after by boys and
girls of about eight to ten years of age. In springtime when they have
dropped their young, or if some of them have to be retained in the camp at
night for various reasons, the woman makes a brushwood enclosure at the
side of the tent and sees the goats safely inside before nightfall.

A catalogue of the tasks for which women are responsible may not seem 462
very impressive; the number of tasks is not excessive, but the persistence of
the routine bends the backs of most women. Paradoxically, any suggestion
that men should take over female tasks would strike them as absurd. Assistance
from one of the same sex is always a welcome relief, but the abrogation
of a particular task by men would be interpreted by women as the loss of a
right. For, in the division of labour, it is not merely that tasks are allocated
between the sexes for expedient reasons, or in consideration of the labour
involved or because tasks which can be performed in the vicinity of the
camp are left to women; division of labour would not make sense on these
grounds, however strong they may be in Bedouin sentiments. Each task which [424]
falls to the lot of woman constitutes a right exclusive to her. Fetching firewood
is not only a chore; it is a woman's prerogative. The insistence that
only a woman can undertake certain tasks has nothing to do with her liking

182 marker).

*613 551 571 [585] In al-Qasr, if a man's mother is 'Aishaibiiya, he will refer to her as umni ("my mother"): if she is otherwise, he will refer to her by the tribal tag, i.e. al-Qinaishiyya. A man will also add the name of his mother's tribe, to identify himself with the tribe and to symbolize tribal links, as an appendage to his own full name. The use of the maternal appendage by an individual links him to his mother's tribe through the idea of what Peters (1960:29) has called "the concept of the one womb of maternal origin."

In the case of al-Qasr, this maternal appendage refers to links with the mother's tribe at the primary level (see Figure 9). For instance, two brothers of the Bait Abd al-Malik might wish to differentiate between their maternal origins for some reason or other; one would refer to himself as Yunis Abd al-Malik al-Kamailiyya and, the other as Jabril Abd al-Malik al-Qinaishiyya. This is shown in Figure 9, page 125.

*613 ● 604 [182] Although a person is obviously related to the mother's tribe through the mother, this matrilateral structural relationship is expressed as one between the individual and his mother's brother's tribe. The set of relationships surrounding the sister's son-mother's brother dyad is central to Bedouin political organization; it is the basis for the formation of relations of alliance along cognatic lines.

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FIGURE 9 - USE OF MATERNAL APPENDAGE OR SUFFIX


WIFE FROM KAMAILAT TRIBE
ABD AL-MALIK
WIFE FROM QINAISHAT TRIBE
YUNIS ABD AL-MALIK AL-KAMAILIYYA
JABRIL ABD AL-MALIK AL-QINAISHIYYA

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The sister's son-mother's brother relationship receives a high degree of attention in al-Qasr. No other kinship relationship except for that between the father and the son is better defined. Peters (1965:135) sees the importance of the sister's son-mother's brother relationship to be based on the need for economic symbiosis. This factor, but also the necessity for political cooperation, probably account for the central significance of this relationship. One chief political value, i.e., one type of behavior valued by the group and [181] relevant to the political process (see LeVine 1960), which [867] Bedouin children learn relates to the desire to avoid con- [865] flict, especially if it concerns their mothers' tribes. Children are taught that any quarrel, however slight at first, could conceivably grow to become a large-scale tribal war.

604
182
war.

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602
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The Bedouins of al-Qasr are conscious of the practicality of external kinship ties. The role of mother's brother becomes a significant symbol for the maintenance of these ties. Boys are supposed to respect their khal ("mother's brother") in order "to avoid wars which could end the world." The Bedouins claim vehemently that "no quarrel can happen between me and a member of that tribe because my brother has married into that tribe." They make the value [181] of the mother's brother link very explicit: "Marriage into other tribes makes quarrels impossible."

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There are many Bedouin proverbs pointing to the place of the mother's brother in the social structure. Proverbs, in any culture, trace out areas of behavior which have become important. Kenneth Burke (1957:256) says of proverbs, that they are "strategies for dealing with situations. In so far as situations are typical and recurrent in a given social structure, people develop names for them and strategies for handling them. Another name for strategies might be attitudes." The Bedouins likewise look upon proverbs as templates for behavior. [829] They say that "we should heed proverbs because they are the words of the elders; they are like a white flag which marks the way, and people should not go beyond these flags."

A most common proverb which elevates the mother's

604 538 brother to special place in the social structure states that [539] "Two-thirds of the boy belongs to the khal, and he is like the father: the remaining one-third is divided equally between the father and the khal." The Bedouins are always quick to point out to the stranger, such as I was, that this means there is only one-sixth of the boy which belongs to the father. A clearer case of the ideology of kinship versus [539] descent could not be had. Another proverb has it that "the good which you see in a boy comes from khal khalu ("the maternal uncle of his maternal uncle"). Any kinship relation may be the basis for a new network of social relations by making use of the classificatory principle. The Bedouins [539] exaggerate the status and role of the mother's brother by saying that "when a boy does good or bad, one wants to know the name of his khal not the name of his father." This statement, which favors cognatic links over patrilineal ties, is not true but such an attempt at emphasis indicates that this relationship is something of value in the Bedouin society.

604 578 In the case of any conflict "between his tribes," the Bedouins say, "the boy must support the tribe of his khal." This, of course, does not mean that the individual should take up arms against his patrilineal corporate group, but that he should seek to mediate the conflict. The political 562 593 554 182 578 value of conflict avoidance and conflict control is also conspicuous in the dual role which the mature female plays

000 kin groups of the parent who does not determine descent. A
182 corollary aspect of the filiation principle in al-Qasr is the
601 602 practice of collaterally extending the term, _khal_, to include
• 604 many others besides the real mother's brother. This usage
[114] of classificatory terminology, like that in the case of _bint_
'amm, leads to confusion for the fieldworker. When an in-
601 604 dividual marries into an outside group, or even within the
561 secondary group, the wife's brother becomes _khal_ not only to
182 the offspring of the marriage, but to all the children (_awlad_)
at the same generation level as the offspring. All boys of
the age of sister's son will refer to his mother's brother
as _khali_ ("my mother's brother"). Besides extending the web
of kinship, this practice also has the function of uniting
age-mates of the local descent group.

604 Throughout this discussion of mother's brother, I
582 have been stressing the fact that the sentiment which a
[829] Bedouin develops toward this person is to be construed as a
political value, i.e., a behavioral disposition relevant to
the political process. It is patent then that the sister's
son-mother's brother relationship should be more crucial in
exogamous marriages, for in these cases cognation becomes the
principal mechanism for establishing authority relations and
effecting political alliance. In endogamous marriages, cog-
nation complements the other structural principles which
define the corporate group, and makes it the corporate group
par excellence.

000 par excellence.

604 829 867 The inculcation of political values is part of the socialization process. A Bedouin boy is taught that his khal is a very special person, and one whom he should admire. It is commonplace in al-Qasr to hear small boys matching the exploits and skills of their maternal uncles, bragging and exaggerating about their khal: this one is a great horseman, and that one is a great marksman with the rifle. On the other hand, if the mother's brother is from within the local group, rights and obligations toward him will be structured in terms of other kinship roles which take precedence according to the rule of descent. For instance, in the ideal-typical case of

604 602 582 [605] bint 'amm marriage the mother's brother of sister's son would also be the father's father's brother's son in relation to ego. This would mean, in another way, that ego's mother's brother is also ego's father's parallel cousin. Male parallel cousins "are like brothers," and so ego would be expected to behave toward this person not as a "mother's brother" but as a "father." Whereas the boy enjoys a certain freedom of expression and comradeship with his exogamous mother's brother, he would have to pay "father-like" respect and obedience to his endogamous mother's brother.

604 582 The crucial importance of the khal, and the political significance of the bonds which this role represents, is made clear in the following statement of an informant who contrasted

●604
582 the exogamous and endogamous mother's brother.

> If the khal is from outside the tribe, we can do no wrong to him if he does no wrong to us. If the khal is a member of the tribe, he is respected; but not like the khal from outside the tribe. The feeling between a man and his khal is much stronger if the khal is from outside the tribe. Within my own 'aiela (secondary group), I respect the maternal uncles of Bait so-and-so as much as I respect the maternal uncles of my own bait (tertiary group).

[829] Ideas and sentiment about the mother's brother as they are related to complementary filiation should be interpreted as having a definite influence on marriage practice and politics in al-Qasr.

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*613 A sample from the marriages of 'Ailit Ma'fas (see Figure 10 below) shows that endogamous marriages are no more frequent than those which function to bring a new member into the corporate group--although the man's spouse never [587] really becomes a member of the lineage. Only five of the seventeen marriages were within the 'aiela, and one of these was a case of sororate which acted to maintain an already established tie. Six of the marriages were with groups not belonging to the Awlad 'Ali tribe. In each of these cases, with the exception of one, the marriage represents the establishment of ties between groups who live in areas contiguous with one another. Four of the marriages shown in Figure 10 were within the primary segment, i.e., with other lineages of al-Qasr; three out of these four were contracted with

[TEXT CONTINUED ON PAGE 133]

571 The model of
*613 corporate authority structure, i.e., that which makes the
[593] corporation-corporate sole relationship meaningful, is the
•[604] father-son-father's brother triad. The submission of the son in the fundamental dyadic and triadic relationships of Bedouin society is carried over to the, just as axiomatic, relationship between corporate member and corporate sole. Peters (1965:127) is enlightening on this point when he says

> [593] All men of a corporation, in any event, "speak with one word" at a moot, and a son, by his assent to the common view, also supports his father; in so doing he yields to the political authority of his corporation, and not that of his father.

The structure of authority relations which obtains within and between the groups of al-Qasr, then, is reflected in the idea or concept of _'aqila_. It is meaningful to the Bedouins. The social order which it represents is legitimate because of the moral attribute and obligation which attaches to its symbolization in the political office. At the same time, this focus or office of authority tends to become pivotal for the extension of a sphere of moral judgments and authority relations along with the expansion of social structural relations and promotion of common interests. Easton (1959) has referred to this expansion as "the political community," and Middleton and Tait (1958) as "the jural community." At all levels of society, conflict and consensus take place in terms of certain ideas concerning good and bad, operational

600 to possess the wisdom which it takes to regulate conflict.
*613 578 593 [604] Theoretically, as one 'aqila said, conflict should be stopped at the familial level, either by the father or the paternal uncle, and should never reach the level of the 'aqila. Once before the 'aqila, conflict assumes new structural poses, or different orientation in authority relations. Authority here is differentiated in terms of the context: the father's authority relates to the familial structural level, and beyond this level the father per se cannot exercise legitimate authority.
*613 578 182 The 'aqila, who is responsible for internal order and external relations exercises legitimate authority at each level of the political structure. The authority of the 'aqila is checked and prevented from growing into naked power in that any single 'aqila must consult with the other 'awaaqil of the secondary segment concerning matters which may concern the structural nature and continuity of the group.

*613 559 571 171 In many respects, the authority structure in al-Qasr corresponds to that defined for the Lugbara of Uganda (Middleton 1960). The structural levels (see Figure 7 above) of 'Ailit Ma'fas (secondary), Bait 'Umar (tertiary), and 'Ait Abd al-Malik (sub-tertiary) are approximately equivalent to Middleton's major, minor, and minimal lineages (1960:7-9). But [596] whereas among the Lugbara authority roles are purely kinship roles, i.e., genealogically senior heads are responsible for internal control and representation, among the Bedouins of

581 are necessary for the validation of the marriage contract. Modern
585 671 legal systems which took as their basis the Islamic law of marriage
675 and the family further required the registration of the marriage contract for the marriage to be legal.

584 The request and necessary response forming the marriage are sup-
585 posed to be carried on by the parties involved. However, if either the
429 groom or the bride is not of age, or is mentally unqualified, the trans-
593 action is carried on by his or her guardian, or "wakil." The wakil is
the father, unless he is dead or an invalid, in which case the brothers
● [604] become the wakils. If the person has no brothers, then the uncles be-
[184] come the wakil in the order stated. According to certain Sunni sects in Islam, a woman marrying for the first time is always represented by her wakil, even if she is of age. The assumption is that a woman who has never been married does not have the experience that enables her to enter into any kind of legally binding relationship such as marriage.

585 Following the original Islamic idea, marriage among Awlad Ali is
675 an oral agreement between the groom or his father and the guardian
593 429 (wakil) of the bride-to-be (her father, if alive, or her closest male
[604] kin in the following order: her brothers, her uncles, her grandfather).
585 A religious man is sometimes asked to perform the marriage, although it
792 is not required. Some persons might invite a member of the Murabiteen
[619] tribe or holy men to witness the marriage on the basis that his presence
[778] gives "baraka," or blessing, to the marriage. Before the application of
585 the State legal system to the area, marriage contracts were not regis-
656 177 tered. In recent years, however, and with the increased mobility of
[675] the tribal populations, more and more marriages are being registered in
[634] the administrative districts. Still, according to the unofficial estimates,

613 his maternal kinsmen to use the land and water facilities of
578 his lineage; his agnates may give ready consent or bicker about
602 it, but when it becomes necessary to clean a well, disputes are
almost certain to break out in the camp between those who argue
that their maternal relatives should not be expected to assist in
its cleaning and those who insist they should as an acknowledgement
of the use they have made of it. In these circumstances
613 maternal links divide agnates. Conversely, if it becomes necessary
602 for some of the same men to use the water and ploughland
of their maternal kin, their agnates are only too pleased that
they are able to do so, because the pressure on their own resources
is relieved. In these circumstances, the maternal link
strengthens the agnatic group. When, to give another instance,
613 blood-money has to be gathered, it is the duty of all agnates to
682 contribute equally, and no member of the group, rich or poor,
can contract out of this obligation without sacrificing his membership
of the group. Payments of blood-money are witness of
the strength of the notion of 'oneness' among agnates, in one
sense, but in so far as they are compulsory, they point also to the
weakness in the relationship. Maternal kin are not directly concerned
in this, but they can and do make contributions. In this
context two aspects of agnation appear, and the value of the
602 maternal link is emphasized. Again, maternal kinsmen are not
428 directly concerned in inheritance disputes, but they are expected
578 to intercede for their sister's sons, who often use their mother's
brother's tribal brand on their own animals. During disputes of
this kind, blame is thrown on to the maternal kinsmen for their
interference in matters which, properly speaking, are not their
613 business. In marriage, however, events take quite a different
582 turn. The responsibility for providing a man with a wife is first
that of the father, and secondly of the members of the tertiary
section; the father takes the initiative, and his agnates assist, not
only in the negotiations, but also in defraying the heavy costs of
the wedding festivities, the various gifts that precede it, and the
604 bride-wealth which follows. The mother's brother is also a key
613 person in all these arrangements. He enters into the negotiations,
585 assists with the entertainment on the wedding day, and makes a
[583] substantial contribution to the bride-wealth. On the wedding day,
there is no kinsman to compare with the mother's brother; a few

weeks later, he is reviled for demanding a long overdue installment 604
of his daughter's bride-wealth. He is the person who can be 613
approached freely, to whom love tales can be told, from whom [585]
help can be expected, who gives support in disputes, and who also [583]
upbraids, who punishes, who withholds, who acts as a pull-away
from the agnatic group. An agnate demands help, and also compels 613
the fulfilment of obligations. An agnate is a man with whom 602
relationships are formal, particularly if he is a senior. He is, too, the person who unfailingly, though perhaps grudgingly, gives help when it is most required; who, regardless of the merits of the case, defends one against external opposition; and who is always available at each life crisis. A kinship link is not to be defined by any one particular mode of behaviour. Each is a cluster of different sorts of behaviour, one form taking precedence in these circumstances, another in other circumstances, and so forth.

The little clusters of kindred can be defined clearly in any of 613
the camps. It is customary among the Bedouin for those who are 602
most closely linked as kindred to pitch their tents close to each 621
other. For example, if a man has two recently married sons, their tents are pitched on either side of his, with the ropes of their tents crossing the ropes of their father's tent. More distantly related kin will be more distantly placed, and here and there, breaks in the continuity of the lines of tents are to be observed, corresponding as a rule to breaks in kinship. Each large camp in this way can be viewed as two or more nuclei of kindred. The camp as a whole is dominantly composed of agnates, but they are disposed in such a way as to show clusterings of varying kinship composition. Characteristically each cluster has a separate name, often a female name which refers to a common mother of
the cluster, or of the head of the leading family in it. When these [221]
relatively large camps break up with the onset of the rains and
disperse to form small camps of five to seven tents for winter pasturing, they will be seen to correspond almost identically with
the kin clusters of the larger summer camp. Again, a tertiary segment [312]
may have two wells for its own use. In a particular year
there may be sufficient water in one of them to meet the needs of the whole group, and its members then live together in one camp; the following year both wells may have to be used, and the camp of the previous summer will split up, roughly half going

121 These three objections to the lineage theory as a useful model for examining the
613 consequences of homicide are serious enough in themselves, but another objection
562 renders it still less satisfactory. This fourth objection relates to the implication that
114 lineage theory cannot take account of women. Indeed, in some of the accounts of the political organization of lineage societies, the impression is given that they are all-male societies: women belong only to the domestic and kinship realms. In terms of the theory, this must be so. Women, the marriage links they create, the forms of relationships that derive from marriage, the right of men to joke with others by virtue of a link through women, their rights to demand favours of men who are not their agnates, their right to expect contributions to bridewealth or blood money from maternal relatives—all these, and other forms of behaviour, have been dealt with as patterns of behaviour which interfere with or disturb agnation, or that cut
121 across lineage affiliations. Such metaphors can only be justified if it is accepted that
613 precedence must be given to agnation, to what people say they think their lineage relationships to be, and that there is some kind of primacy about what have frequently been called jural rules which constitute the structure, while behaviour which is not governed by these rules is to be relegated to the position of secondary forms having the effect of intruding only. But these secondary forms of behaviour are as impelling, as persisting, and are as much a part of social life as any of the so-called jural rules.
[582] It is possible to go further than this, and state that in societies where there is a high incidence of marriage among agnates of the local group, as occurs among the Bedouin, jural rules rarely appear in their 'pure' form in behaviour, since, in groups of this sort, each and every person constitutes a bundle of roles by virtue of the fact that he is one of a very complex cognatic group; a particular role, it is true, may take precedence in a particular situation, but all roles are present in each situation and affect behaviour. Precedence can only be given to specific forms of behaviour in relation to situations. There is no such thing as a general primacy with regard to any form. The concept of agnation as the centre of all political problems, disturbed or disrupted by, say, matrilaterality, is as inadequate as saying that the nucleus which pulls all other components into position is matrilaterality with agnation as a disturbing element. In reality there are numerous components present in all situations, which should not be lumped together under such categorizing terms as agnation and matrilaterality, but which combine as separate components in a kaleidoscopic range of clusters.

121 Some of the components of behaviour subsumed under the notion of matrilaterality
613 are briefly given here in order to appreciate more fully the consequence of inter-group
682 marriage. Of paramount importance is the fact that, in Bedouin sentiment, to kill
674 a relative is as sinful an act as the killing of a close agnate. When such a homicide
829 did occur, during my period of residence among them, the Bedouin response was to
[602] assert that the offender was out of his mind—it was inconceivable that he could have committed the offence otherwise. Their attitude was reminiscent of the horror they display when a man kills his father or a full brother, and represents a much stronger reaction than is manifested when a man kills an agnate of, say, the third or fourth degree. They have every reason to be disturbed by the killing of a mother's brother,
• [604] for, whatever personal affections may be involved, a crucial link is threatened. Their reasoning, however, is that relationships with the mother's brother are characteristically easy, that they are not demanding, that there is much joking in them, and that to

121 kill within this range is, in terms of the general pattern of behaviour, stupid. What is of
613 interest is that such killings do occur. I recorded three instances of men killing the
682 mother's brother in the contemporary population, not to mention many others
674 based on hearsay evidence only. Clearly, the relationship is more than a merely permissive
829 one. The mother's brother may well be the only person who can help in
certain crises, and if he withholds his assistance the sister's son is left in a dilemma.
● 604 The form of behaviour in which demands are made is, as the Bedouin rightly say,
121 that of asking a favour, but this does not mean that it is any the less urgent than a
demand made against agnates. The range of favours is large, and only a few can be
613 detailed here. If a group has insufficient water to meet its needs a man first seeks help
604 from his mother's brother. The request has a number of aspects to it: it is a test of
[554] the relationship itself; it is a matter of pride and status that a man can 'call' on
another to help his group out of difficulties, it is an assurance that resources other than
those jealously guarded by his agnates are available to him, and if a man is seeking
to increase his power he must have available more than an agnate's share of local
[682] water resources to supply his flocks and herds. When a blood-money payment has to
be made, the mother's brother is expected to come forward—it is his right to give
[584] without being asked. If a man wants a wife, he is not permitted to approach his father
directly, but his mother's brother can put pressure on the father instead. If a man dies
[429] while his eldest son is still a minor, his brother may be required to act as guardian,
and in this role he controls the son's property; disputes frequently break out as a
result, with the son at a considerable disadvantage, for he cannot engage his father's
brother in hostilities—but his mother's brother can do so for him. Whenever men
[422] come to possess animals before the demise of their fathers or when the father's
brother is acting as guardian they mark them with the tribal and personal signs of their
[583] mothers' brothers. Men have the right to demand contributions for bridewealth
from their agnates if they lack wealth; in practice it comes not from them, but from
the mother's brother. Finally, in certain circumstances, if a man does not have male
heirs, his sister's son might inherit all his wealth.

121 Affinity also carries with it a large number of rights. A poor man may take up
613 residence in the camp of his father-in-law, and be kept by him. The latter may come
to his son-in-law's aid in many of his dealings with his father. Like the mother's
606 brother, the affine is a potential source of water-supply when rain has been insufficient
on the homeland. He also helps with blood money and bridewealth, and he is expected
to aid his daughter and her husband with gifts of food and wool.

121 The details given above by no means exhaust the list of rights a man possesses in
his matrilateral and affinal relatives. Obviously, these are not the only forms of
613 relationship either, and the other forms carry with them yet other claims of various
sorts. Enough detail has been given, however, to make clear the point that local
agnatic groups are so differentiated, and inter-group relationships are so important,
that each aspect of homicide settlement previously described will require further
examination, not in the sense that additional complications must be introduced, but
with the question in mind, is not the structural presentation false? Before beginning
this stage of the argument it is necessary to establish the fact that the links of affinity
and matrilaterality which a group has with another are of a kind which necessitate
their inclusion in an analysis of the arrangements for settling homicides.

613

her father takes, but in certain critical situations he can be relieved of choice 593
if the interests of the group as a whole are at stake. [421]

Political authority is the preserve of a corporation, and its exercise leads [428]
to invasion of a man's authority in the field of domestic relations. This [584]
does not mean, however, that discrete areas of authority do not remain with
the father. In the tent his authority over his son is so overwhelming as to
keep the son in almost complete subordination. The son is referred to as a
slave, and in daily life he has to behave as one. He must obey every command, for, were he to rebel, he would find little or no support among his
agnates, whatever the extent of the provocation. Retreat from his father is [422]
hardly an alternative, since, while his father is alive, he has no animals of
his own, and to leave camp would only mean that he would have to move
outside his group to seek employment elsewhere as a shepherd. If he did [558]
this he would forfeit status, and almost certainly cut himself off from property [428]
which would fall to him after his father's death. A man who "denies"
his father looses too many privileges for the practice to become widespread.

Caught in this dilemma, a son's predicament is worsened by the fact that 593
he cannot initiate marriage negotiations — to be able to do so requires some 584
animals to offer a girl's father. Through his mother's brother he has the [431]
means of bringing pressure to bear on his father, but the latter can resist for [604]
years. Finally, a marriage is arranged for him. It is difficult to convey the 581
yearning of young Bedouin for marriage. They discuss it among themselves 521
ad nauseam. For the most part their talk is about the sexual aspect of marriage. 831
Premarital sex relations are strictly controlled, and the movements
of each young girl are carefully guarded because, if on the day of her marriage 836
the test shows that she is not a virgin, she not only brings disgrace to [585]
her family, but the marriage may be revoked and her worth as a bride for
another man seriously diminished. Nevertheless premarital relations do [837]
occur, if not between youths and maidens to any extent, between young
men and married women.

The question still remains: why is marriage the occasion of such ebullient 581
celebration? The formal authority a father exercises over his son 593
changes little on marriage. Economically the son is still harnessed to the
father. The latter still shouts his orders at him, and obedience remains
unaltered. Any sign of an independent view on a matter is met with a gruff
rebuff. If the marriage turns out to be disagreeable to the father, he has
the authority — if not always the power — to break it. Marriage does not
mean a change in the general mode of behaviour between the two; the legal
relations remain unaltered, albeit modified in practice, as the married son
matures in age. But marriage does mean the acquisition of rights and status
previously denied a son. Henceforward, he has a domain of his own. This
is high drama, indeed, for although every effort is made to give substance to [554]
the expressed view that "nothing has happened," for the first time in his
life the son has seized publicly, amid the jubilations of his fellows, a status
which hitherto was the possession of the father.

582 of agnation on the members of a corporate group and give it a taproot of
583 diversity whence it derives its strength, and which makes of it "the one body,"
613 conspicuous, in comparison with other societies, as the corporate group
602 *par excellence*.

The Sister's Son-Mother's Brother Relationship

128 Previously the mode of relationships associated with agnation and affinity have been briefly discussed. In order to appreciate the effects of parallel-cousin marriage, some remarks concerning the sister's son-mother's brother
604 set of relationships must be included here. Bedouin contrast the mother's
[174] brother with the father's brother; their sayings and proverbs afford a wealth of verbal documentation on the contrast. With the mother's brother a man enjoys all the freedoms he is denied in his relationships with his father
[831] and father's brother. He is permitted to joke with him; they indulge in exchanges of obscenities. When the sister's son wishes to marry, he is permitted to discuss the matter with his mother's brother and can urge him to intercede with his father on his behalf. Two men thus related are readily recognised in the camps, because in their acts they are required to show affection by displays of innocent horseplay, pranks or mild practical jokes. Small boys pursue their mother's brother, feign to kick or strike him, and he takes it all in good part.

The external aspects of this behaviour is deceptive. Joking of this sort creates the image in which the relationships are conceived; what is equally striking in it is its compulsiveness. Obviously, mature men are not always in the mood to be teased, but if they are, they must respond appropriately. Their relationships are unmistakably onerous. This remark applies not only to the external forms of their behaviour, but also to the favours a man is
[602] permitted to ask of his mother's brother. A brief amplification will make the point clear. Demands can be made of agnates, but only in situations of serious contingency. Day-to-day needs are met, not by appeals to the rights of agnation, but from the expectations linked to the mother's brother. If these expectations are withheld, the sister's son may be left in a quandary. In-
604 terestingly, in the records of homicides I gathered, three (in the con-
682 temporary population) were concerned with the killings of mother's brothers by sister's sons. Homicide within this field of relationship is difficult to comprehend unless it is appreciated that expectations are as compulsive in the daily life and the general well-being of people as are the rights and duties associated with agnation.

604 These general remarks apply to the relationships irrespective of the lineage
613 origin of the mother's brother. The similarity ends there, since the nature of the expectations, their urgency at any given moment and the kind of favours which are granted vary with the group identity of the mother's
[428] brother. A mother's brother who is a member of ego's corporate group may be expected to give the sister's son small quantities of flour, favour him in all

sorts of petty ways, listen to his grumbles about his agnates, interfere on his 604
behalf in petty camp quarrels, shield him from the disciplinarian father and 613
guard his property interests against the predatory father's brother; if the 428
mother's brother dies without heirs, the sister's son can reasonably expect at least a share of his wealth. When the mother's brother is a member of a different corporate group, a sister's son cannot possibly expect to inherit from him in any circumstance.

The mother's brother may reside in a camp too distant to be much effective 604
direct help in day-to-day living. His relative remoteness gives the relationship 591
other possible opportunities, however. Rainfall in the semi-desert area 312
of Cyrenaica is highly variable, both from year to year, and from place to 233
place in any given year. As a result this shallow saucer of a depression may 241
have sufficient rain to supply both the water needs of animals and crops, while an area a few miles distant will have inadequate water supplies for either. The mother's brother-sister's son link can mean water for animals and a crop of barley for both when, in successive years, the resources of one area or the other are inadequate.

The differences in the relations between men and their mother's brother 604
do not end with a characterisation of their antipodal forms. The demographic structure of a group may be such that one man may have a number of mother's brothers, another only one; one man may have to share with several brothers, another may be an only son. Complications of this sort determine
the precise relationships between men, but however intricate these [613]
may be, each corporate group has its matrilateral links with a group occupying a slightly different ecological area, and it also has a plurality of matrilateral connections within it. Further, if a direct connection is not available
to any particular individual he can use an indirect link (e.g. father's mother's [603]
brother or mother's mother's brother) to satisfy his needs.

The Preference for Males

Thus far, the family and the social matrix in which it is embedded has 128
been discussed in general terms, most particularly in reference to several selected sets of relationships. I wish now to place these relationships in a more specific setting with a brief discussion of the composition of a small
camp of a group inhabiting the arid areas of central Cyrenaica. When the 829
Bedouin give their views on the structure of the family in Cyrenaica they 594
speak of it as consisting of a pair of spouses and about ten children, mainly 594
males. The emphasis on males is not mere sentiment, overwhelmingly though 562
it favours them against females. Additional males in a family increase the 858
productive possibilities of a family in the sense that more herdsmen become available and larger ploughing commitments can be undertaken; an increase in the number of females has small effect on production since they are precluded from any direct participation in these activities. Both sexes, ranging in age from about seven years to mature adulthood, are necessary if a family

would be impossible to satisfy all marriage expectations of men within the 621
universe of the minimal tribal section. For this reason alone external links 613
are inevitable and persistent. Also, the small territorial strip such a group 582
claims as a homeland produces an economy which, in this environment, 182
is unstable. Additional security is gained by making connections with other [423]
tribal sections, each with its specific ecological character. Men also marry [433]
into their client groups. The proportion of these for this camp was 9 per cent [619]
of the total. From these links they gain economic advantages, they can claim services and a client-following is politically significant. Finally, 7 per cent of the total[13] are marriages with women of other tribes, which again not only reduces the instability of the economy (in that a large tribal area suffering near-famine conditions has access to areas of markedly different ecology), but also provides political connections for men whose power ambitions have passed the point of leadership limited to their own tribes. In one way or another all these interests are manifest in the small camp and attention is now directed to the latter.

The disposition of people in the camp is represented diagrammatically 621
on the page following. 592

The nucleus of the camp is Tent A. Its owner (1) was a powerful *Shaikh,* [554]
the son of a famous father. His marriage represents a political link with a [6[illegible]]
group of one of the primary sections of his own tribe. His father died only a [428]
few years before I recorded my census, and the large amount of moveable property he left had still not been divided among the sons; the owner of the tent, as eldest brother, still controlled the flocks and herds. Most of his time he spent away from the camp engaging in political intrigue. His two younger brothers lived in his tent, but the second (5) would not remain there long
because negotiations for his marriage had been started. His father (2) married [582]
a parallel cousin; she died and shortly afterwards he took her sister (3) [587]
in sororal union. When this occurred an amount of bride-wealth was
agreed, but instead of giving any of it to her father, the entire amount was [583]
"put in front of her" (that is, the animals were allowed to remain with her husband's flock), and these animals she had marked with her brother's
tribal sign to distinguish them from those of her husband. It was widely [428]
known that she was going to leave these animals to her husband's second [562]
son, for although she could not transfer them to a male outside her husband's corporate group, she could decide who, among his heirs, should inherit.

During my stay in this camp, her brother's son (4) came to it as a 621
temporary resident for a month. Since he was poor, the purpose of his visit 592
was to capture some of his aunt's wealth while she was still alive and the 574
possibility still existed. During his stay he was fed well but did no work. [604]
His kinsmen found his company tiresome, so, to cut short his stay, and after [431]
consulting her nominated heir (5), she gave him three grown goats. Also
when an occasion arose for an animal slaughter, she provided the sheep, and, [231]

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[13] The remainder is made up of marriages to the daughters of men incorporated into the lineages.

the lavish generosity dispensed by the members of Tent A, and fed far better than would have been possible otherwise. 621 592 571

[574] The location of Tent C was also determined by a link through women. The only female (8) living in this tent, a middle-aged widow, was the sister of (3) and (6) of Tents A and B respectively. Her teenage son lived with her. They possessed only a few sheep, which were put with the flock of Tent A for shepherding. The son (9) spent some of his time herding for Tent A. With the mother and her son in Tent C were two other kinsmen. One, a poor man (10), was this son's first patrilateral cousin, and they both were the only surviving sons of their respective fathers. He (10) was the main shepherd of Tent A. The third male (11), also poor and nearly blind, was a second patrilateral cousin of both, but his sister was also 11's mother. All occupants of Tent C were almost entirely supported by Tent A. Relieved of the necessity to live off their own resources, the two young men (9 and 10) were afforded the opportunity of building up their flocks for the day when they would be able to negotiate their delayed marriages.

621 613 592 571 Tents A, B and C sheltered men who were agnatically closely linked. More important, their grandfathers, three sons in a family of 19 children, were full brothers. The latter's mother's name was used when referring to these three tents as a group. During the past few years, many changes have occurred within it, and the death of the pivotal woman (3) of Tent A might well disperse this small cluster. Further, the nuptials of her heir (5) were anticipated, and this event, itself likely to precipitate division of his father's (2) wealth, might also lead to further residential rearrangements.

621 592 604 578 [582] [428] [583] The owner of Tent D, (12), a man in his late thirties, son of a slave mother, was at loggerheads with his father's brother, much more senior in age. The owner's father, one of a family of 24 children, had been a wealthy man and died leaving a substantial herd and a large flock, but he (12) was bereft of most of this wealth by the father's brother. His first successful strike against his uncle was the demand he made for his daughter as a wife. Earlier, when (12) had demanded his father's wealth, his father's brother, who had for years acted as his guardian, replied, "It is in your stomach," (meaning that it had been expended on his upbringing). Later, after the marriage had taken place, when the uncle demanded payment of the bride-wealth his own words were thrown back at him, but this time with the meaning that the bride-wealth had already been paid. While I was resident in this area, the two men met occasionally: each meeting was hostile, for (12) was encouraging his half-brother (13) (also the son of a slave mother) to demand a second daughter as a wife. Included in this tent is a third adult male (14), virtually a pauper, reduced to this state by the same grasping father's brother. His link with (12) was their closeness of relationship (first paternal cousin), together with the fact that all three males (12, 13 and 14) had suffered privations and were allies against the common enemy, their father's brother. [571]

Associated with them for the same reason, was the owner of Tent E (15).

Cases

621 Genealogically he was their father's brother, but he was of their same age
592 generation, and behaved as if he was their agnatic equal. Towards his own
578 brother (16), he behaved as if the latter was his uncle, for he was much his
• [604] junior in age and his uncle had virtually brought him up from boyhood.
They had quarrelled bitterly because his brother (16) had given him only
[428] a fraction of his inheritance, which he himself, in turn, should have
[593] shared with his young full brother (not shown on the diagram) but he did
not do so. This youngest brother left (15) for this reason and now resides
621 with (16), his full brother's enemy. Two of the men (14 and 13) of this
592 group of four were the chief herdsmen of the camp, although they were
[233] assisted for short periods by (12) and (15), who also helped tend the
camels in other ways. Their connection with the group centered on Tent
[571] A was a mutual close link to a politically powerful person (not shown on the
genealogies) to whom they are deeply loyal and who, while I was among
them, was actively opposed to the common political enemy of them all (16),
and who in earlier years had challenged the leadership of (2) of Tent A.
There is also the fact that they were all linked within a close range of
[613] agnation. This linkage included, too, the owner of Tent F (17), not in
[602] fact the descendant of the man shown in the diagram — he was the son of
a slave wife; his genitor was a slave, but his mother's master reared him,
freed him and he is now given as his son in the genealogy. He lives with his
wife, of client origin, together with her children from a previous husband,
(18), who divorced her, and his own children. Aging, he no longer acted
as a regular herdsmen, but relieved other men in the camp, and also spent
some time shepherding.

621 The details given of the strands which run through the camp to tie these
571 particular people together are so few that, like the Bedouin plough, they do
no more than scratch the surface, but they are sufficient to permit a few
general statements. The camp, and particularly the precise disposition of
621 its tents, shows a group of males clustered together to share two of the main
571 economic tasks: shepherding and herding. The physically strong adult males
233 of Tents D and E shoulder the burden of herding all the camels of the camp,
462 and the men of Tents B, A and C shepherd all the sheep, with (17) of
Tent F serving both purposes. This number of men allows some to remain
in the camp at all times, to free one of them for a journey to the distant
market when supplies of sugar and tea are necessary, and to enable one or
two men, at short notice, to hurry away on horse or camel to search for
lost animals.[14]

621

Economic Determinants of the General Structure of the Camp

574 It is also clear from these details that, given the disparities in wealth
231 (although all men have some wealth), the diet of most is considerably

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43 [14] There is little point in seeking the lost animals themselves in the first instance.
[556] A man travels from camp to camp asking for information, and when he has gathered
his clues, he searches a neighbourhood.

000 *par excellence*.

604 The inculcation of political values is part of the
829 socialization process. A Bedouin boy is taught that his *khal*
867 is a very special person, and one whom he should admire. It
is commonplace in al-Qasr to hear small boys matching the
exploits and skills of their maternal uncles, bragging and
exaggerating about their *khal*: this one is a great horseman,
and that one is a great marksman with the rifle. On the other
hand, if the mother's brother is from within the local group,
rights and obligations toward him will be structured in terms
of other kinship roles which take precedence according to the
604 rule of descent. For instance, in the ideal-typical case of
602 *bint 'amm* marriage the mother's brother of sister's son would
582 also be the father's father's brother's son in relation to
ego. This would mean, in another way, that ego's mother's
[605] brother is also ego's father's parallel cousin. Male
parallel cousins "are like brothers," and so ego would be
expected to behave toward this person not as a "mother's
brother" but as a "father." Whereas the boy enjoys a certain
freedom of expression and comradeship with his exogamous
mother's brother, he would have to pay "father-like" respect
and obedience to his endogamous mother's brother.

604 The crucial importance of the *khal*, and the political
582 significance of the bonds which this role represents, is made
clear in the following statement of an informant who contrasted

619 change their structural position only rarely. The latter change
621 sometimes does, however, occur, and there is evidence to show
182 that it does. For example, Agostini (1922–23, p. 323) in his tribal
166 survey, records a section named Barsha as one of the groups stemming
613 from Nasr.[12] In the genealogies I was given, the name did
not appear, and even after some questioning, what information
was known about it was concealed. Some time later the name
[578] cropped up accidentally in conversation, and I was then told that
at one time it had been one of the Nasr groups, but that after a quarrel during a year of water shortage, the Barsha folk went to live with people with whom they had maternal connexions, and in whose territory there was ample water that year, and never returned. The group, a tertiary one, was detached from the tertiary point of segmentation in the genealogies, and tied on to a tertiary group of another tribe in its new homeland.

178 To summarize briefly the argument thus far, the mechanical
173 devices of telescoping, fusion of names, the ejection of those
619 names which cease to be of any social consequence, and the
621 elision of names at or around the fifth ascending generation,
613 taken together point to the importance of the tertiary order of
segmentation in discussing the problem of maintaining the form of the genealogy constant in face of its natural tendency to alter; further, evidence of changes (adoption into a lineage, detachment from it, the inclusion and exclusion of clients) was presented, and this again led to the conclusion that the tertiary point of segmentation is critical in this respect. This being so, the manner
[128] in which change actually occurs, still remains to be shown,
and this is best done, perhaps, by discussing the mode of proliferation of tertiary segments. In order to do this adequately, it is necessary to say something briefly about certain features of Bedouin marriage.

582 Among the Bedouin there exists a preferential form of marriage
605 between a man and his father's brother's daughter. Parallel
cousin marriage of this sort carries with it the exclusive right of a man to this cousin. Without his consent no one else can marry her, and to attempt to do so would be to risk the marriage arrangements being nullified after negotiations had almost been

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[114] [12] Barsha's position is incorrectly given as a sub-group of Haiba; it should be shown as structurally equivalent to Haiba. See also note 11.

concluded. I have been present on occasions when, after both 582
parties have agreed to a marriage and the groom has collected 605 ●
most of the things necessary to present to the bride at the wedding celebrations, the girl's father's brother's son appears and demands the discontinuance of the arrangements; on one occasion, he did not appear until the actual day of the wedding, but was bought off with a cap, a cloak, and the promise of two sheep. The highest incidence for any form of marriage, moreover, is with the patrilineal parallel cousin, although not necessarily with the first cousin.

Parallel cousin marriage of this sort is not, however, the only 582
form practised among the Bedouin. Much of the writing on Bedouin marriage leaves the impression that a solution of the problem of parallel cousin marriage (Murphy & Kasdal 1959) solves all the problems involved in their system of marriage. In addition to this form, there is a number of others; indeed there is another form of preferential marriage among them, which, although it does not have the compulsive character of parallel cousin marriage, is of major importance. I refer to cross-cousin marriage with the mother's brother's daughter. Such a cousin may be, of course, as a result of patrilineal parallel cousin marriage, a patrilineal parallel cousin as well. Such a cousin may be, on the other hand, a woman of another tribal section or of a different tribe altogether. A characteristic form of this marriage is that once it has been initiated, it is perpetuated in successive
generations. Members of one line in a tertiary segment will, 582
therefore, be building up kinship ties through marriage in one 613
particular direction. At the same time, another line, by practising the same form of marriage will be weaving ties in a quite different direction. One direction these marriages could take might be to a tertiary segment of a collateral secondary segment; another might be to a primary segment of the same tribe, and yet another to people living in a date oasis. Only occasionally do marriages occur between collateral tertiary segments, and then there is usually some specific reason. In other words, when men marry outside the limits of their own tertiary segment, they leap-frog adjacent segments and marry into structurally more remote groups.

The result of these two marriage patterns is that the people of [621]

585 [684] probably by pricking himself, and will wipe it on the toga.

585 About two weeks after the wedding, the bride and
• 606 groom take a lamb or a goat and go to spend a few days with
[574] the bride's parents. The Bedouin say that the relationship
between the groom and his in-laws is extremely important.
The man should treat his wife's mother and father as if they
were his own. "When a man's father-in-law and mother-in-law
come to visit him, he must slaughter a lamb for them. He
must respect both of them. Remember, this man and woman are
the grandparents of his children."

585 The marriage, then, is only the first step in the
571 ritualization of new group bonds established between the
182 families of the bride and groom. Bonds are subsequently intensified
[574] through a process of visitation, gift-exchange and
[431] sacrifice. The most important factor linking the two groups
[782] is the actual presence of the bride in the midst of her husband's
*[613] group, for she remains, in terms of the patrilineal
principle, a member of her father's lineage. This is made
585 perfectly clear by the fact that she is referred to, never
*613 by her name but, by the name of her tribal grouping if she is
551 other than 'Aishaibi. If she is of the 'Aishaibat tribe,
571 she will be referred to as bint of so-and-so. Hence the
182 Bedouins stress the importance of extra-group bonds by referring
[193] to the women in their residence group as al-Qinaishiyya
or al-Kamailiyya, for instance (-iyya is the Arabic feminine
marker).

593 As a girl in her father's household, the woman is under the di-
rect authority of her father, who is responsible for her. When the father
dies, this responsibility, as well as the authority, goes to her brother
or her closest male kin in the order specified earlier. At marriage the
[591] girl usually moves to live with her husband, and this subjects her to
[606] his control and sometimes to that of his parents, if the couple lives
with them. But the authority of the husband over his wife remains
593 secondary to that of her father. The woman's membership in her father's
574 household does not cease with marriage, and the strength of her rela-
tions to her kin is maintained by their frequent visits to her new res-
idence and by her occasional visits to them. This right of visitation
593
574 cannot be denied by the husband who not only has to allow such visits,
606 but is also required to treat members of his wife's family, especially
her father, with great respect and hospitality. If the husband fails
[586] to do so, the wife's father can order her to leave her husband and go
back to his household with him.

This point is illustrated by the case of Muftah from the Esheibat tribe in the area of Matruh, whose older daughter is married to Hemeida from the Geneishat segment, which lives in the area of Fokah some 80 miles to the east of Matruh. One winter day in 1965, while passing near the area where his daughter lived, Muftah decided to pay her a visit. When he arrived, her husband was not at home; he was in the market in a nearby town selling sheep. When he came back late that evening, he greeted Muftah with the customary slaughter of a goat and invited the neighbors to the occasion. After dinner Muftah wanted to rest. It was a very hot night, so his son-in-law brought a rug and spread it outside the tent in the cool air. After that he retired to his tent where he spent the night inside.

593 spent the night inside. In the morning Muftah ordered his daughter to
574 pack her clothes because she was to leave with him. He refused to give
606 586 her husband any explanation as to why he was taking his daughter away.
The husband could not prevent him from taking her away because, as he said, "He is her father and has the right to take her away with him at any time."

When the wife did not return for two weeks, her husband went to her father's house to take her, but her father refused to let her go. Hemeida
593 then went to a religious man in the area and asked him to intervene in
574 606 the matter and see why Muftah had taken away his wife. He also asked him
586 to arrange a mi'ad with Muftah to discuss the matter.

627 792 The religious man was selected in this case because he was a close friend of Muftah and was believed to have influence over him. He was also known throughout the area to be fair and of sound opinion. It is important in the cases of disputes that the person selected as a mardi is known as a wise and fair man. It is only then that he is able to mediate between the two parties without being accused of taking sides.
792 The religious men, members of the Murabiteen tribes in the area, by their
619 relative position outside the formal tribal organization of the Sa'adi
627 tribes, are the most likely candidates for such activity. Yet, this is
554 not always the case. For this aspect of assumed impartiality is frequently balanced off by the fact that these religious men lack the support of a powerful tribal segment behind them. To be effective, the mardi has to be respected, not only for his personal qualities, but also for being a member of a respectable tribal segment whose power lends authority to the mardi's decision. This is not usually the case with the client
000 tribes of Murabiteen. Wealth in many cases is also considered an important

Wealth in many cases is also considered an important
792 requirement for the selection of the mardi. This does not mean that
627
554 religious men in the area have no role in dispute settlement, for they
[556] do. It simply means that the mardi is selected according to a number
of criteria that vary from case to case, and that in some of these
cases sound wisdom and fairness characteristic of religious men are
not enough basis for their selection as mardis. This means that the
religious men have no special mediatory role based on their religious
nature alone. In certain cases religious men offer the best possibility
for mediation; in others, a non-religious person might offer a
better chance for settling the dispute. In cases of women seeking
[586] divorce from their husbands, the wealth of the mediator, more than anything
(556) else, seems to determine the selection of the man whom the woman
asks to negotiate on her behalf, a point to which I will return later
in the chapter.

593 The Mi'ad was held in the house of Muftah. Present at the mi'ad
574 were Muftah, his son-in-law, Hemeida, the heads of households in Muftah's
● 606 camp (one of them was his brother and the other five were members of
586
627 different tribal segments), my driver (who was a member of the neighboring
792 Sanagrah tribal segment), myself, and the religious man. After the
tea was served, the religious man said that the discussion should start.
He reminded the gathering that this case is a family one and should not
develop into a larger dispute. "After all, the daughter's husband is a
son, and the case is actually a misunderstanding between a father and a
son and should be viewed in that context." Then he turned to Muftah and
said that in that spirit he was asking him why he had taken his daughter
away from her husgand. Muftah said that he had taken his daughter away

Muftah said that he had taken his daughter away
593 to punish Hemeida for what he thought was disrespectful behavior. He
574 606 then proceeded to descirbe how Hemeida, after bringing the blanket out
586 for Muftah, went inside and spent the night with his wife, defying the
627 792 basic rule of not showing intimacy in the presence of older people,
888 especially the parents or parents-in-law. For, to show such intimacy
is a sign of disrespect. He demanded that Hemeida pay him "kabara"
for his injured pride. The term kabara refers to the adjective "kebir"
[681] (lit. respected or big man). Kabara is the fine paid for belittling
[558] someone by word or deed. Muftah insisted that he would not allow his
daughter to return to her husband until Hemeida had paid that kabara.
Hemeida conceded the fact that intimacy constitutes an insult; but he
insisted that his action did not constitute an act of intimacy with his
wife, but was a matter of convenience and necessity, since he had only
593 two blankets, and the only one left was that inside the tent. Muftah
574 became angry and started shouting at Hemeida, who, in turn, started
606 shouting back; it became impossible to follow what was being said.
586 627 The religious man interfered in the discussion, trying to stop the argu-
792 ment between Muftah and Hemeida. The others attending the mi'ad also
[578] interfered. The religious man and two neighbors took Muftah outside
the tent while Muftah's brother tried to calm Hemeida down. The other
members of the group also calmed Hemeida, reminding him that he was the
younger person and must be more tolerant of older people. They also reminded Hemeida that Muftah was his father-in-law and had the right to take
his daughter away any time he chose. They urged him to "defeat the devil"
[681] and to apologize to his father-in-law and pay him kabara. He seemed
convinced but insisted that all he was going to pay was five pounds and
a goat. Muftahb brother and one of the neighbors then left the tent and

593 went to see Muftah and his company. Half an hour later the religious
574 man came and took Hemeida aside and talked to him in a very low voice,
• 606
586 then left the tent again. A few minutes more had passed; everyone re-
627 turned to the tent; Muftah was not angry anymore. The religious man
792 read the fatha, or the beginning sura of the Koraan, then said that the
[779] souls were now pure and that Hemeida was considered as a son of Muftah
and that disagreements such as this should not alter the good relations
between the two. He said that the devil had found his way into the souls
of the two people, but now, thanks to God and the good people present,
they both had come back to their senses. Hemeida then rose and went to
where his father-in-law was sitting and shook hands with him. Then he
[681] handed the religious man ten pounds which the latter passed to Muftah
and promised to send him a goat as a gift to his daughter. Muftah left
the tent and went to the tent of the women. When he came back he announced
that a goat had been slaughtered and that everyone was invited to eat.
Everybody then left and Muftah promised to return his daughter to her
husband the following day.

593 While the right of the father to take his daughter away from her
606 husband constitutes a check on the authority of the latter and insures
557 the wife good treatment by her husband and her in-laws, not infrequently
586 that right has been invoked for personal or individual interest on the
[429] part of the woman's father or her closest male kin. Several cases have
been cited in the area where the father or guardian had invoked the right
to force the husband to concede to certain demands of the wife's guardian,
even when the wife objected to those demands or disagreed with her guardian. One of these is the case of Mabroka who is married to a distant

593 606 557 586 member of the same tribe. At the time that the dispute had occurred she had been married for fifteen years and had four children ranging in age from thirteen to two years. The husband possessed a piece of land on the coast where a few olive and fig trees were growing. The husband, Mukheimer, made no use of either the land or the trees. Then, in 1966, the father became employed by the government organization in the area where his daughter and her husband lived and where the land was. He asked his son-in-law to give him the right to use the land for one pound a year. Mukheimer, who at that time worked part-time for the same government organization as a driver, refused. The reason was that his job with the government made it possible for him to apply for a power pump to be installed over the Roman well that existed on the land, and he intended to utilize the land himself. All attempts to convince Hukheimer to let him use the land failed. Then one day Mukheimer came back to his tent to find that his father-in-law had taken his wife and the youngest child and left the other three children with the second wife. The father-in-law told the second wife to inform Mukheimer that if he wanted his wife and child back, he had to think about the land he wanted to take possession of. Mukheimer tried to discuss the matter with his father-in-law, buth the latter refused to see him. After a month there were rumors that the daughter was not happy that her father had taken her away from her husband and children and that she wanted to go back to her family. She asked a number of people to help her, including myself, since her father was one of my informants at that time; but he insisted that the only way Mukheimer could have his wife and child back was by giving him the rights to the land. Mukheimer, on the other hand, threatened to divorce his wife and marry another woman if his father-in-law did not return his wife.

593 606 The case persisted for more than two months with no sign that either
557 party was willing to give into the demands of the other. I left the
586 area before any solution to the case was achieved.
[114]

584 Another relevant case is one which involved a dispute between
578 Hassan Hassanein from the Sanagrah tribe and the father-in-law of his
606 daughter who was also from the same tribe and who lived in the same
area. The case started when Hassanein was visited by a friend from the
[574] Esheibat tribe in Matruh, an old man of 60 or 70 years. During the night
that this guest spent at Hassanein's house, they got to talking about
marriage and the fact that although his guest was a wealthy and re-
[595] spected man, he had only one wife. After a lengthy talk, it seemed
that the old man was convinced that he should have a second wife and
asked Hassanein if he knew of a suitable girl to marry. Hassanein sug-
584 gested his daughter's sister-in-law. Hassanein took the prospective
583 groom to the tent of his daughter's father-in-law and discussed the
578 matter with the father of the prospective bride who agreed to marry his
606 daughter to Hassanein's guest if he paid the sume of 200 pounds, in ad-
dition to slaughtering a number of goats and presenting him with the
[779] appropriate presents. When the man agreed to the terms, the fatha was
read to signify the agreement between the two parties. Hassanein left
the man to spend the night in the camp of his future in-laws. In the
morning the groom told the bride's father that he must go to nearby
Alexandria to bring the money for the bride price. When he came back
late that afternoon, he paid the money and set a date for the wedding
the next Thursday and then left for Matruh to prepare for the arrival
of the new wife.

584 Two days after the groom left, the bride's father (who is at the
578 same time Hassanein's daughter's father-in-law) came to Hassanein and
• 606 told him that the marriage was called off and that he should send a
686 letter to the groom telling him the news. The reasons given by the
[574] bride's father were that the groom showed improper manners when he
[579] stayed overnight at the camp and that he followed the prospective bride
to the water well to have a close look at her. He gave the money to
Hassanein and asked him to return it to the man in Matruh. Hassanein
was very disappointed and considered this an insult to him, since he
was the mediator in that marriage, and insisted that the bride's father
584 go on with the marriage. When the latter refused, Hassanein went to his
578 daughter and ordered her to leave with him. Her husband was there and
606 could not refuse to let her go with her father, even when Hassanein
686 made it clear that her husband could not have her back unless his father
627 kept his agreement with Hassanein's guest. Elewah, the daughter's hus-
586 band, asked for a mi'ad to discuss the matter with his father-in-law.
The mi'ad was held in Hassanein's house and was attended by Hassanein,
his son-in-law, and two people from a different lineage, each selected
by one of the disputing parties. Hassanein refused to give any reason
for taking his daughter away from her husband except that he was exercising his rights. Eleway, on the other hand, insisted that Hassanein
was not justified in his actions and that it was not right to punish
him for something that his father did. The two representatives tried
to calm both parties and to reach an agreement but were not successful.
The mi'ad dissolved with Hassanein not only insisting on keeping his
daughter, but also threatening to marry her to a rich man in the area.
The case was not solved by the time I left the field.

121 kill within this range is, in terms of the general pattern of behaviour, stupid. What is of
613 interest is that such killings do occur. I recorded three instances of men killing the
682 mother's brother in the contemporary population, not to mention many others
674 based on hearsay evidence only. Clearly, the relationship is more than a merely per-
829 missive one. The mother's brother may well be the only person who can help in
certain crises, and if he withholds his assistance the sister's son is left in a dilemma.
604 The form of behaviour in which demands are made is, as the Bedouin rightly say,
121 that of asking a favour, but this does not mean that it is any the less urgent than a
613 demand made against agnates. The range of favours is large, and only a few can be
604 detailed here. If a group has insufficient water to meet its needs a man first seeks help
from his mother's brother. The request has a number of aspects to it: it is a test of
[554] the relationship itself; it is a matter of pride and status that a man can 'call' on
another to help his group out of difficulties, it is an assurance that resources other than
those jealously guarded by his agnates are available to him, and if a man is seeking
to increase his power he must have available more than an agnate's share of local
[682] water resources to supply his flocks and herds. When a blood-money payment has to
be made, the mother's brother is expected to come forward—it is his right to give
[584] without being asked. If a man wants a wife, he is not permitted to approach his father
directly, but his mother's brother can put pressure on the father instead. If a man dies
[429] while his eldest son is still a minor, his brother may be required to act as guardian,
and in this role he controls the son's property; disputes frequently break out as a
result, with the son at a considerable disadvantage, for he cannot engage his father's
brother in hostilities—but his mother's brother can do so for him. Whenever men
[422] come to possess animals before the demise of their fathers or when the father's
brother is acting as guardian they mark them with the tribal and personal signs of their
[583] mothers' brothers. Men have the right to demand contributions for bridewealth
from their agnates if they lack wealth; in practice it comes not from them, but from
the mother's brother. Finally, in certain circumstances, if a man does not have male
heirs, his sister's son might inherit all his wealth.

121 Affinity also carries with it a large number of rights. A poor man may take up
613 residence in the camp of his father-in-law, and be kept by him. The latter may come
to his son-in-law's aid in many of his dealings with his father. Like the mother's
606 brother, the affine is a potential source of water-supply when rain has been insufficient
on the homeland. He also helps with blood money and bridewealth, and he is expected
to aid his daughter and her husband with gifts of food and wool.

121 The details given above by no means exhaust the list of rights a man possesses in
613 his matrilateral and affinal relatives. Obviously, these are not the only forms of
relationship either, and the other forms carry with them yet other claims of various
sorts. Enough detail has been given, however, to make clear the point that local
agnatic groups are so differentiated, and inter-group relationships are so important,
that each aspect of homicide settlement previously described will require further
examination, not in the sense that additional complications must be introduced, but
with the question in mind, is not the structural presentation false? Before beginning
this stage of the argument it is necessary to establish the fact that the links of affinity
and matrilaterality which a group has with another are of a kind which necessitate
their inclusion in an analysis of the arrangements for settling homicides.

Cases

The Meaning of Marriage

581 Until marriage the changes in a man's life have been in the nature of
585 an ordered sequence of development from a child to be cared for — the only
342 time in his life when a father, without inhibition, showers on him his love
[593] and affection — to one who, by degrees, makes an increasing contribution to
a production unit. Marriage necessitates that a man pitch a tent for himself.
With a tent he becomes a potential host and protector of others. The local
idiom for marriage is "to set up a tent." It would be quite improper to use
[196] the verb "to marry" when inquiring whether a marriage has taken place
since this verb also has the meaning of "to have sexual intercourse."
[195] Instead the euphemism, "Have you pitched a tent?" is used. The Arabic word
for a tent in this context is *Bait*. It is not used to refer to a military tent, nor
to the small tent which shelters only a widow. It is reserved for the Bedouin
tent, which usually has a wool top, and, most importantly, holds the promise
of the continuation of life, whether it shelters a newly married couple, a
mature family or young unmarried people. (The word *Bait* represents a
complex concept, and it would be too much of a diversion here to discuss
the various points of its significance. It is essential to understand that its
[778] meaning is not confined to a tent in the physical sense.) Its top has *Baraka*
(divine goodness) in it; the quality of *Haram*, which makes it possible for the
tent to be used as a sanctuary, is associated with it and this quality of *Haram*
extends, moreover, to the ropes of the tent, so that anyone who clutches them
comes under the protection of the owner. In it, the wife must permanently
reside and her husband has the legal right to insist on this. In it too, he
has the legal right of sexual access to a woman, his wife. Any children
[885] born in it he can claim as his own. With the erection of a tent the son
reaches adulthood, and it is in this sense that he can be said to have acquired
a domain of his own.

581 Marriage gives a son greater freedom and less dependence on his father
585 in another sense. A second euphemism used for marriage is "making a
[593] relationship," specifically an affinal one. Relationships between a man and
[195] his father-in-law are diverse and are used in various ways in different situations.
Here, the particular aspect which needs to be stressed is that a man
606 can cajole his father-in-law, and (through his wife) wealth, in the form
425 of animals, may pass from the former to the latter. Reciprocal gifts are passed
556 between affines on certain occasions, but in addition small amounts may
pass which are not connected with the formal occasions of exchanges. Debt
583 lies between them. It begins with the initiation of marriage negotiations,
584 when the suitor's kinsmen take a prescribed number of sheep to present to
606 the girl's father if negotiations are successful. They promise to transfer
bride-wealth[9] to the girl's father. A few weeks after the marriage, the hus-

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[171] [9] I use the word "bride-wealth" because it has become so familiar in the literature, but the only similarity between the *Sahiba* of the Bedouin and the bride-wealth of

band is required to take gifts to his mother-in-law in recognition of the fact 583
that she nourished his wife as an infant (the literal meaning of the word 584
used for this gift is "milk"). A return visit is made and gifts are given to 606 •
the daughter. When the first child is born an animal is presented by the
affines, and if the child is a male, the gift may be several sheep, or even a 851
few camels if the father-in-law is very wealthy. Formal exchange of gifts 425
continue, but, in addition, informal transfers are made. Moreover, if re- 606
lations between a man and his father-in-law develop favourably, it is not un- 606
common for a young husband, during the early years of marriage, to move 591
away from his father and pitch his tent alongside that of his father-in-law. 593
Marriage gives a son affinal relations of his own. Affinity can alleviate the
dead weight of paternal authority.

It is suggested that the crisis the marriage of a son assumes for a father 585
is the shift it entails in the distribution of authority. This is borne out by 561
other details in the marriage ceremony referred to earlier. Ordinarily, young 602
men dare not sing within earshot of their senior agnates. Far from allowing 533
obscenities, agnates of the ascending generation would not allow even a
mention of women to be made by young men, in their presence. In a group [593]
consisting of young men and an agnate, I chanced to use the noun for [123)
woman and immediately my tent was cleared of all but the senior agnate.
At a wedding the young men revel in their lewd songs and shout their [831]
obscenities for all to hear. The senior agnates stand aside and make a show
of ignoring the proceedings. And well they may, for each marriage is a
challenge to the exclusive authority they have enjoyed; each nuptial tent is
an invasion of the domain of which they have been undisputed masters.
Marriage is the only occasion when the men of one generation can clap and
sing their defiance of an older one, and give warning of the changes which
must be accommodated however great the pretence that nothing has happened.

Marriage ceremonies dramatise the clash between adjacent generations 561
over the distribution of certain forms of authority. If this authority is as 602
overwhelming as has been suggested, and if it is so deeply resented, how is it that life is endurable for juniors? Relationships between junior and senior agnates are so restrictive that they almost amount to what Professor Fortes has suggested I view as a form of avoidance relationships. Juniors must always defer, they must obey commands promptly, they serve their seniors, they must accept a lead when it is given and the restrictions on conversations exclude all reference to women, marriage or sex. These are not simply a set of general guides for behaviour, they are rigidly applied rules, deviation from which is countered with rebuke or greater severity. It would appear from this

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many African societies is that wealth is transferred. Obviously, in societies where the 583
rules of exogamy compel a dispersion of links outside a man's own clan, what is in- 584
volved in this transfer of wealth cannot be sociologically similar to one in which mar- 606
riage to the first cousin on either side is permitted. 171

619 675 "Jumi'at, Marabtiin (plural of Marabit) of the 'Ali Ahmar."
All Marabit tribes of the Western Desert are affiliated as
* [613] clients with Sa'adi tribes. Further, since the tertiary
group of the Marabtiin functions in the same way as that of
the Sa'adi, it is this group which enters into compacts with
Sa'adi tertiary groups. Traditionally, the Marabit group's
[682] main support activity was to share in the payment of the
blood-money with its Sa'adi protector group. In return, the
Marabit group was given land in the protector's territory
and could depend upon them to contribute to any Marabit
blood debt which might come due. Also, it was considered the
[628] [682] duty of the Sa'adi to revenge the death of a member of his
client group since the Marabit "was weak and could not face a
• [608] tribe." But there is no attempt to construct fictional kinship
links between Sa'adi and Marabit groups.

[672] In al-Qasr today, contractual relations between Sa'adi
and Marabit are still based upon collective responsibility in
the blood-feud. However, since this traditional means of
conflict control is an extremely rare occurrence, the mutual
obligations of the parties are expressed in different forms.
[648] In any conflict between the Bedouins and the Egyptian govern-
ment, the Marabtiin are expected to support their respective
[666] Sa'adi groups. In any modern elections which a Sa'adi might
enter, the Marabit is expected to give him his vote. A few
examples will make clear the relationship between the Sa'adi

121 residence, cognatic ties, and contractual relations are all
181 seen to be structurally important in early Arabian society.
621 Structural differentiation into groups is based on the
571 lineage principle and sustained through "the law of blood-
171 revenge." And it is important to note that the *hayy* was characterized by a structure of authority, it was "guided in war and on the march by one chief" (Smith 1903:44). The
121 law of blood-revenge as an expression of group rights *in rem*
621 and a system of mutual protection point up the importance of
571 contractual relations in Bedouin society. Whether or not
675 real blood ties are involved, a contract must be present or there can be no corporate group. Contract legitimizes authority and provides the basis for the lateral extension of the group; it is primary though it functions coordinately with a principle of cognation, residence, adoption, etc. Contractual ties
121 operate outside of kinship at times but will always be validated
621 by it eventually, "for a legal fiction is always adopted to
571 675 reconcile an act with a principle too firmly established to
608 be simply ignored" (Smith 1903:62). "Blood brothers," in
597 al-Qasr, are defined both biologically and ideologically. As
[602] noted in the case of al-Qasr, there were at least three cases of contractual adoption in which one individual and two whole corporate groups "wrote their names into the books of the 'Aishaibat tribe" (*katab jinnsiyya 'Aishaibiyya*). The integration or adoption of elements in al-Qasr takes place on the

121 621 basis of an agreement "to share the good and the bad" by
571 all parties concerned. Once the integration is effected,
675 patrilineal ideology and legal fiction succeed in concealing
•608 597 the jointure.

The concept which derives from ancient Arabia, and
621 571 which expresses fully the structural principles of Bedouin
*613 society is that of *'aqila*. The *'aqila*, in al-Qasr, is the
head of the corporate group, the tertiary unit or *bait*. A
[884] person becomes part of the Bedouin jural body when he reaches
the age of 15, begins to keep the Ramadan fast, and is expected
to pay his share of the blood-money. At this time, a man
621 571 acquires rights over his corporate lineage-mates and they
*613 over him: they claim a share in the indemnity ("blood-
672 money" - *diiya*) of each other, and are under obligation to
[682] contribute equal shares to any *diiya* which becomes due from
the group as a whole. Further, each corporate member is
morally bound to support his lineage-mates by swearing the
oath (*yamiin*) on the behalf of any who are accused of false-
hoods in the course of litigation. All of these rights and
obligations are guaranteed by the presence of an *'aqila*.

*613 The tertiary *bait* is the minimal corporate group.
It usually includes three to five generations of members.
Tertiary units which are descended from a common ancestor
combine through contractual relations into the maximal corporate
group, the secondary unit or *'aiela*. Beyond the secondary level

619 stretch of tribal territory, move during the rains to the same
613 grazing grounds, use the same wells during the dry season, and
cultivate adjacent strips of arable. The members of a *bait* have
a lively sense of solidarity, and this is most evident in fighting
and feuds. It is their common duty to avenge a slain kinsman
and they share the *diya*, indemnity, should they accept it in
[672] the place of a life. They are jointly responsible for a wrong any
one of them may commit. The smaller *biyut* are often identical
[621] with camps, usually from five to ten tents, in grazing grounds,
and several closely related *biyut* camp near together in the
vicinity of springs and wells in the summer, their combined
camps then amounting sometimes to over a hundred tents.

619 What has been said above about tribal structure applies only
to the free tribes and the larger client tribes living on their own
land. The client tribes which are split up and scattered throughout Cyrenaica are not tribes in a political, but only in an ethnic,
619 sense. It will be found that in any of the main tribes stranger
614 groups, sometimes of client origin, have attached themselves
608 to the clan dominant in the tribal area and through some fiction,
myth, or fraud, have grafted their branch of descent on to the
genealogical tree of this clan. The Bedouin use the word *laf* to
describe this process and they say that kinship established in this
way may become as strong as kinship of blood.

619 The structure of a tribe is expressed in terms of the lineage
system of the clan dominant in its territory, the tribal segments
614 being associated with branches of descent from the ancestor of
613 this clan. The primary tribal sections are identified with lineages
descended from some of this ancestor's descendants in the male
line; the secondary tribal sections are identified with lineages
descended from more of his descendants farther down the line
of descent; and so on till the smallest territorial segments and
the smallest lineages are reached. Thus a lineage considered as
a branch of a clan consists of all those persons who trace their
descent through the male line to a common ancestor, but it can
also be, and in speech often is, conceived of politically as an
agnatic group of this kind together with stranger and *Marabtin*
accretions which occupy its territory and make common cause
with it in disputes with other tribes or segments of the same
tribe.

A simple example is given in illustration of tribal segmentation

The Proliferation of Segments

There are, in Cyrenaica, three major status groups among the 619
tribes: the noble or free-born tribesmen (*al-Hurr*), those who 554
have been adopted or grafted on to a tribe (the *Laff*), and the 608
clients (*Marabtin*).

Those who claim to be free-born also claim ownership of the 619
natural resources. The *Laff* do not own these. They are people 608
thought not to have originally been of the lineage of the tribe 621
with which they are resident. They are found sometimes in ones 613
and twos in the camps of the free-born, but sometimes constitut- [423]
ing tertiary groups themselves. Now when such people have re-
sided with their free-born hosts for several years and one of them 619
has married one of the host's daughters, they are grafted to the 608
genealogy at the point of tertiary segmentation, that is, where 613
ambiguity occurs in the genealogy. Obviously, persons thus 621
grafted to the lineage cannot be shown as descendants of one 173
of the living or of the recently dead, remembered perhaps by some of the elders still living. It is equally true to say that they cannot be grafted to the lineage at a point superior to that of the tertiary segments, since this would involve recognition by a number of tertiary groups whose members may know little or nothing about them. When a person enters a new tribe, the only way in which he can do so is to go to live in a camp, and it is the concern of the people of that particular camp whether or not they accept him, since it is they who have to decide whether their resources are sufficient to support a newcomer. Once a man has been accepted as a full member of a tertiary section, membership of superior tribal sections is automatic, although to enter into tribal membership he requires the permission of members of a tertiary section only. To graft at a point superior to the tertiary would be the same as giving a man superior structural status, but without a camp in which to dwell. There is only one place for his incorporation, and that is where the ambiguity in the genealogy permits manipulation to include new lines. In this way the [597]
adoption of a person into a lineage does not offend the sense of
kinship of the receiving group since the point of inclusion is an ancestor about whom little or nothing is known and whose authenticity is frequently doubted by some. What has been referred to as an area of ambiguity is, moreover, something of a jumble of names, and it is not a difficult matter, if a new line has to be

619 attached somewhere along the line, to attach it to one of these
608 names. Bedouin welcome, as members of their camps, practically
613 anyone who wishes to join, even, in the case of one group, an
621 Italian. The limit to this acceptance of members is, of course, the
173 number of people who can be supported by the local resources.
If people are being admitted freely to membership of a particular
[182] camp, this means that there is a local surplus of land and water,
so that the number of grafts being supported by any particular
section is a useful index of the extent to which the resources are
being used. Conversely, as sometimes happens when grafted elements
become numerous, or when the water supply, for various
reasons, dwindles, it may be necessary to detach a grafted group.
[578] Such action is always the occasion of a violent dispute, usually
over watering rights, and not infrequently fights break out.
Whether or not the grafted group wins, from then onwards it will
be forced to exist as an independent group, and a new tertiary
section will have been born. No matter which of the processes
involving grafts is considered—incorporation or detachment—
both are contained within the framework of the tertiary section,
without any effect on the rest of the structure.

619 The position of the clients, in the context of this discussion, is
not unlike that of the grafts. Briefly, clients are men who are considered
[423] to have originated from a country other than Cyrenaica,
and who for this reason cannot claim rights to land and water—
at least this is the theory, although in some circumstances they
are able to do so successfully. They are of various kinds, but they
are not included in the genealogies given by the free-born. Clients
are found grouped in two main ways. There are some large
groups which constitute tribes in the sense that they display a
genealogical and territorial organization like those of the freeborn,
and are usually to be found flanking the main tribes of the
country on their borders. Some of these are powerful groups and
enjoy considerable independence of action, but whatever their
characteristics they none the less speak of themselves as 'for' or
619 tied to the noble tribe whose territory includes theirs. Further,
the sections of these client tribes have their special ties with
571 tertiary sections of the noble tribes, which are not merely ties of
621 sentiment, but which take the form of valuable mutual help in a
613 number of situations. A whole client tribe, in the sense that it is

●609
571

Libyan Bedouin MT9

[For information on the Bedouin concept of laf in which a stranger group, sometimes of "client tribe" origin, attaches itself to the dominant clan in an area, and through some fiction, myth or fraud grafts their branch of descent on to the genealogical tree of this clan, see Categories 608 and 619.]

*613 619 fictive, has practical political consequences only at the tertiary and secondary levels of segmentation. Most political activity in al-Qasr is the result of either cooperation or conflict between corporate groups the size of Bait 'Umar or 'Ailit Ma'fas. 'Ailit Ma'fas is made up of five structurally replicated political groups such as Bait 'Umar. Toward outsiders, [609] these five groups act as one; they represent a corporate entity before the rest of the tribe. *613 619 554 As a member of 'Ailit Ma'fas, an individual has jural status in the whole tribe. He also has the means and the moral obligation to articulate his interests and to settle his arguments with other members of the tribe. When an individual is involved in an activity which relates to matters of power and authority, he is playing a political role in the political process. The units which make up the internal and external political systems of the 'Aishaibat tribe of al-Qasr are roles. 121 *613 619 554 Roles then are the analytical focus of this study. Of course, I realize that the concrete entities present in al-Qasr are human beings. I only use roles as methodological constructs in order to abstract from, and to understand, Bedouin behavior. By conceptualizing sets of roles as structures, we will be able to understand the internal and external political structures as well as the traditional and modern political structures of Bedouin society. In al-Qasr, these political roles and structures emerge from the more generalized kinship structure

[TEXT CONTINUED ON PAGE 79]

69 been infrequent in al-Qasr. The _'awaaqil_ of al-Qasr and the
648 police of al-Qasr have an agreement that Bedouin problems are
the jurisdiction of the desert leaders, and that the police
will intervene only when their help is requested. The
Bedouins claim that in the 1930's, the Egyptians tried to do
away with Bedouin law but soon discovered their own penal code
•609 to be inoperative in the desert. Against "outsiders," the
69 Bedouin is duty bound to protect his kinsmen, and hence justice
*613 could not be satisfied. One _'aqila_ said that "only the _'awaiyid
Awlad 'Ali_ can maintain order because it stops wars through
682 182 payment of blood-money." If a Bedouin, for some reason or
692 other, takes his case to the police in Matruh, he will be
648 returned to his _'aqila;_ he will be told that they can do
*613 nothing for him without the permission of his _'aqila_. There
are exceptions to this rule which complicate modern Bedouin
692 judicial procedure. For instance, in cases which involve
685 government property, such as olive trees and government-
648 operated water systems, a man may legitimately deal with the
*613 police. In one case in al-Qasr, a man's goats destroyed a
number of his neighbor's olive trees. The police decided that
the owner of the goats should pay the value of the trees. In
another case, a man who had constructed small earth dikes in
such a way that rain water was prevented from flowing onto
his neighbor's land was forced against his will to remove the
obstruction. His neighbor had taken his complaint to the

Second, the fiction that nothing has happened, which characterises the 585
father's behavior, does not cease with the termination of the celebrations. 593
Each morning, soon after daybreak and before the camp is astir, the groom
must leave his bride and repair to his father's tent to lie at his father's side
"as he always had done in the past, as if he had not left him." This conventional
ruse is followed, not just for the seven days of wedding festivities,
but is continued after the groom has moved back into the camp proper, and
pitched his tent alongside his father's, with the ropes of the two tents crossing.

In matters other than sleeping arrangements, this fiction that "nothing
has happened" is maintained. Marriage does not mean the immediate creation [592]
of a wholly separate domestic unit. Save for the appearance of an additional
tent, the ordinary run of daytime activities is scarcely altered. To 593
mention perhaps the most important feature of the relationships between 264
father and son, the groom continues to eat with his father. As yet, the son 571
does not use his own bowl,[1] and may not, indeed, do so for several years. 182
The important symbolism of "eating together" or "eating out of the one
bowl," the act of commensality creating a bond of fellowship about which
Robertson Smith[2] wrote so eloquently can only be referred to here in one of
its many aspects. Bedouin themselves stress that eating together is a strong
bond, and the communal meal is always used for this purpose after the
settlement of a dispute, or at the conclusion of a blood-money agreement,
and so on. It is significant also in the sense that those who partake of a [574]
meal accept the authority of the host; he becomes their protector, and a blow
against one of them is struck at him also. Even if the guest is an enemy,[3]
as long as he has eaten from another's bowl his life is safe.

The slaughter of an animal for another person creates a bond which has its 571
roots in the intimate connection between man and his animals. In a very 231
vivid way, the Bedouin view their animals as part of themselves, as part of 264
their *Risiq*, their general wealth, in which their sons are included. It is this 182
mystical association between a man and his animals which distinguishes a
meal consisting of the meat of an animal slaughtered from ones' own flock [574]
or herd from a meal consisting of meat bought from a butcher's shop — often [186]
given by the plateau peoples of Northern Cyrenaica to their guests, but which
the camel-herding Bedouin of the south regard as despicable hospitality. A
slaughtered animal is the food, *par excellence,* which establishes this bond

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[1] When Bedouin take their meals, they eat from large wooden bowls imported from [415]
south of the Sahara. It is a matter of custom that a man does not eat alone unless it is
unavoidable, a custom of such strength, that, when, one day, only an elder, occupying [439]
a tent the ropes of which were crossed with mine, was left in camp, he brought his [123]
bowl into my tent "so that I will be eating with a man."

[2] William Robertson Smith. *The Religion of the Semites.* 3rd ed. London: Macmillan, 1927. [113]

[3] A stranger entering a camp is under no obligation to give his identity. Few do so
until they have partaken of a meal. In the past, the Bedouin claim, the period of [574]
anonymity could last for 40 days, but nowadays, they say they limit it to two only. I
have known strangers enter a camp, receive entertainment, and leave without offering [609]
any specific identity.

Had the Senussi been successful in the last war, they 175
would no doubt have brought in the 'Ibeidat or the 'Awaqir 619
from Cyrenaica to replace the Awlad 'Ali in Egypt.

At the present day the Awlad 'Ali, especially the eastern 619
sections near the Nile Valley, have almost ceased to be nomadic, 178
and only the old men have memories of their former warlike habits. They suffered considerably during the Great War, but are again becoming prosperous. They now own large comfortable tents, are beginning to build houses and clear out cisterns, and are also said to be increasing in numbers.[1] So civilized have they grown that my guides, one a Sinai Arab and the other an 'Abadi, concurred in calling them "green"—not real desert-worthy Bedouins.

Perhaps as a result of Libyan influence, or more probably 142
the better nurture and climate, they are taller, heavier, stronger, and lighter-complexioned than the lightly built Arabs of
Sinai and Hijaz. Also they are much franker and more 157
straightforward than their shifty and suspicious eastern cousins, 181
and altogether more trustworthy. Their women only veil 562
themselves to strangers, and talk quite naturally and cheerfully 834
to the men of their own tribe. 609

They cultivate as much barley as they can, using a
primitive plough drawn by camels, in the clayey hollows 243
scattered over their very stony limestone desert, but, as the [492]
rainfall is very uncertain, a good crop only occurs every five [132]
or six years. After harvest, they exchange some of their [437]
barley for maize, which the women grind to make bread
as required, and some for dried dates. The seed for next [251]
year is buried in a hole lined with straw and covered with
clay, and a year's forage for the animals is set aside. The [432]
rest of the crop goes to market, and for a short time the [426]
Arab has money to buy clothes for himself and his family
and at utmost need to pay off some of the numerous debts he has inherited from his forefathers. Soon he is reduced again to the clothes he wears, the tent he sleeps in, and his animals grazing in the desert.

They are great breeders of camels and sheep, and a busy 436
traffic in these goes on weekly in the markets of Hammam, 178
'Amriya, and the Beheira. So they have got into the habit [438 433 233]

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[1] At the 1927 census, the Western Desert Arabs, Awlad 'Ali, Jawabis, etc., numbered 38,928 souls exclusive of those settled in Beheira. But Pacho, 100 years ago, estimated them at 38,000 souls. [161]

695 602 613 671 untruthfulness and he loses his claim. According to the _'awaiyid_, the number of supporters required in a homicide or wounding case is fifty; in a case involving the rightful ownership of land or a well the required number is twenty-five; in a case of conflicting claims over a camel, five relatives must swear in support of the claimant; and in matters concerning smaller animals, such as sheep, the number of supporters will depend upon the number and price of the animals. But, of course, the number of supporters will always be relative to the size of the groups involved, and so the _'awaiyid_ is not always followed to the letter of the law.

695 (692) The time and place of the oath is fixed by the _'awaaqil_ adjudicating the given case. It is administered either at the tomb of a "holy man," or at the mosque in Marsa Matruh, and always on a Friday, the Muslim Sabbath. There is a standard text to the oath and this is given in the instructions of the _'awaaqil_ to the litigants. 695 784 The Bedouins, with few exceptions, believe in the effectiveness of the oath of God. The rationale is that no man is willing to lie and suffer the wrath of God. The curse which results from a "bad oath" usually takes the form of an accident or misfortune to the swearer or a member of his family. The Bedouins believe that divine sanction operates not only against the one who makes a bad oath, but also against the one who bears false witness against another and causes him to take the oath.

634 of little significance in the authority structure. Very few
554 people of the al-Qasr area have had any contact with these
634 officers, and very few want any contact. On the other hand,
554 the direction of change in al-Qasr and the bureaucratic growth
178 of the government in the Western Desert makes it likely that
all Bedouins will be drawn into the total authority structure,
and that the roles of *'umda* and *shaikh* will expand. These
roles will not increase in terms of traditional prestige and
status, but they may gain the authority which they do not possess
now. This is in view of the fact that the traditional authority
structure remains relatively intact. The *'umda* and the
shaikh have no traditional basis of authority, so they cannot
make decisions which are morally binding for Bedouins of al-
634 Qasr at this time. It is obvious, of course, that the *'umda*
635 may refer to the Governor, and even the use of governmental
554 force, as the basis of his legitimacy. But this has never
178 happened. The incumbent *'umda* is still a Bedouin, and this
prevents him from challenging the traditional ways. Also,
the Governor is concerned with restricting the *'umda's*
influence not increasing it.

634 I do not mean to imply that there is, or will be, a
613 struggle for power between traditional authority represented
178 by the *'aqila* and modern legal authority represented by the
578 *'umda*. Such a struggle could not actually occur since when,
and if, the *'umda* came to represent authority in a newly

619 Awlad Ali themselves are divided into three major sections: Ahmar
173 (the Reds); Abiad (the Whites); and Senenah. Each of these sections is referred to as "tribe" and sometimes "tribes." The first two major sections, those of Ahmar or the Reds and Abiad (Whites), are named after their mothers, the wives of Ali (founder of Awlad Ali). The Whites are named after their white mother, and the Reds after their Sudanese mother who, owing to her dark complexion, was known as El-Hamra (the red one).

613 In the past, writers such as Robertson-Smith (1903) have inter-
114 preted the reference to female names in patrilineal genealogies as in-
551 dicating an earlier matrilineal descent. I tend to agree with a more
[595] recent writer, E. Peters (1959), who explains the reference to female ancestors by two factors: patrilineal descent and polygyny. According to him, it is a way of distinguishing full brothers from half brothers and a means to show this genealogically. "The concept of the 'one womb', of maternal origin, is a critical one in the context of social cohesion, but it does not deny patriliny; on the contrary, it serves a sense to enforce it. Female names can be used to show a greater notion of cohesion than the mere use of male names, and the significance of a female name . . . is that it is symbol of full brother unity at the highest political level." (p.29).

613 This can be further supported by evidence from my own data which
551 show that reference to female names occur more frequently in charts
173 where tribal names rather than proper names are used. In genealogies
619 using proper names, informants rarely, if ever, trace their descent to an ancestress. But when charts of tribal names are used, it is not

613 uncommon to find reference to female names. This indicates that it is
551 only when the unity of the full brothers becomes politically signifi-
173
619 cant that the name of the mother rather than the name of the father is
[595] used. This may explain why the occurrence of female names in Awlad Ali
genealogies is not as common as one might expect judging from the fre-
quency of polygynous marriages among the group.


Awlad Mansur
Mutair
'aggary
Gedaidah
Bu-Zewah
El-Hafian
El-Marries
Suliman

Fig. 3. Recognized tribal segments of Awlad Mansur (a segment of Awlad Ali)


Mansur
Bu-Asabei
Bu-Mutair
'aggar
Muhammed
Bu-Zewah
Abdellah
Hussein
(Hafian)
Muhammed
Suliman
Muhammed
Suliman

613 The two charts show the same unit of Awlad Mansour. The first of
619 the two charts shows the tribal segments in which Eilat Gedaida (a fe-
173 male name) appears as one of the segments. When the actual genealogical
551 chart of one of the living members of that segment was drawn, descent
was traced to Mohammed, the husband of Gedaida, as shown on the second
chart. In this case Gedaida is not a member of Awald Mansour segment.
The unity of the full brothers is emphasized without changing the affil-
iation of the segment. It is simply a means of carrying on the patriline
using the mother's name. This is not always the case, however. Examin-
ation of other cases in which the female name was used reveals the fact
that in certain instances using the female name is a means of carrying
on the line of descent through a daughter. This meant incorporating
within the tribal segment a whole group of individuals who otherwise
613 would have belonged to a different patriline. Carrying the line through
619 the daughter in this manner has the same result as adopting her husband
551 unto the tribe. The question then is why wasn't adoption used. Examin-
597 ation of the two cases in which this happened indicates that a possible
explanation may be that this occurs whenever the husband is unadoptable.
Adoption is possible whenever a man does not have any tribal affiliation.
613 In one of the two cases the husband belonged to the Gemei'at tribe, a
619 Murabiteen tribe which enjoys a relatively higher status than the
551 other Murabiteen tribes by virtue of their being the original settlers
597 of the area and helping the Awald Ali in their fight with the Hanadi,
554 yet compared to Awlad Ali proper occupies an inferior position. In
this case, relating to the patriline of the mother carried with it a

613 definite political advantage. In the second case in which the female
619 name was used, the husband was a member of the Bara'asa tribe of Libya.
551 Although this tribe is one the powerful tribes of Libya, it has no
597 554 political influence in the Egyptian Western Desert. Changing affiliation carried with it the strong political support of the mother's tribal segment.

619 131 In general the Reds occupy the western half of the coastal area of the Western Desert from the town of Matruh westward to the Libyan border, while the Whites occupy the eastern part which stretches to Alexandria. The Senenah are fairly scattered although their largest concentration is located in the extreme western part overlapping that of the Reds. The territorial division of the area among the three major sections of Awlad Ali is not a strict one. Historical evidence shows that there has been [194] a considerable tribal displacement throughout the area. This displacement occurred mainly during the intratribal war era and during the Second World War when the area was a main battlefield. In general, however, there is a significant relationship between territorial distribution and tribal segmentation, and this is especially true on the higher levels of segmentation than on the lower ones.

619 613 Each of the three sections of the apex of a three-tiered order of segments which, following the native usage, will be called Kabila (tribe), Eila (family), and Bait (house).

619 173 The first order referred to as tribes are structurally equivalent units but of highly variable size. Each of them has its traditional history. Some of these histories are important to the tribe as a whole.

619 groups were expected to help. For these reasons the Sa'adi tribes com-
619 peted and even fought among themselves for the newcoming Murabiteen
721 groups which continued to migrate into the area, escaping the strong
dominance of the Cyrenaica Bedouins..Many of the major tribal wars which
occurred in the area before the turn of the century had as their major
cause the competition over the Murabiteen.

619 As a vassal group the Murabiteen tribes are kept in an inferior
778 position. This inferiority has certain manifestation, the most obvious
184 of which is the deprivation of the Murabiteen of the right of "nazala"
682 or refuge. When a person is killed the killer and his kin unit seek re-
778 fuge at a neutral tribal segment, and for a period of twelve months they
● 613 are safe from the revenge of the victim's kin group. The victim's family
[671] cannot follow them to the refuge place, for to do this is to violate one
of the basic principles of Awlad Ali law. The philosophy behind the rule
of "nazala" is to give time for "the blood to cool off" as one of the in-
formants described it. It also gives the host group a chance to start
immediate negotiations with the victim's group to settle permanently the
dispute. As soon as the murderer's group takes refuge, which is done
either by moving along with their tents and flocks and settling in the
locality of the host group or symbolically by having the head of the
host group send one of his sons or male relatives to pitch his tent in
the locality of the murderer's group, the head of the host group contacts
the victim's group, informs them that he has been chosed by the murderer's
group in accordance with the right of nazala, and asks for their per-
mission to grant his protection to the murderer's group. To ask for the
permission of the victim's group is a matter of formality since, by custom,
they cannot refuse to grant this permission except on one single ground:

682 if the host group is genealogically close enough to the murderer's group
778 as to be themselves part of the vengeance group. As soon as the per-
• 613 mission is granted the head of the host group starts negotiations on behalf of the murderer. Since the basic reason for the nazala is to avoid the direct confrontation between the two opposing groups, the first task of the negotiations is to define which places and markets each group can go to during the year of the nazala. Once this has been agreed upon, the difficult task of settling the dispute begins. The success or failure of the negotiations depends on the skill of the negotiator and the weight his tribal segment has in the area. This makes it of extreme importance for the murderer to select the tribal segment which can affect such a settlement. In cases where the host group is not particularly powerful, the victim's group pretends to agree to a settlement in order to have the murderer and his group leave the locality of the host group and then takes revenge by killing the murderer. This cannot happen when the host group is powerful, since such an action would automatically make the host group enemies of the victim's group.

619 With very few exceptions which will be dealt with later, the right
184 to offer refuge is limited to the Sa'adi tribes. No Murabiteen tribe can
778
682 grant refuge to a murderer, although they themselve can seek refuge at a
Sa'adi tribal segment if one of them is involved in murder.

619 Another less conspicuous manifestation of the inferior position of
184 the Murabiteen relative to the Sa'adi is the fact that the bloodmoney
[682] for the Murabit is two-thirds that for the Sa'adi man. Also, until very
[582] recently, marriage of a Sa'adi to a member of the Murabiteen tribes was
considered by the Sa'adi as a very poor choice and was discouraged.

619 184 174 792 [651] The picture was reversed then with the poor Sa'adi shepherds becoming the masters, acquiring great wealth and prestige because of their fighting ability, and the holymen becoming the shepherds and clients of the Sa'adi fighters. Inthe old inter-tribal wars, the Murabiteen stood a very limited chance so the Sa'adi tribes adopted them and in return for a yearly tribure guaranteed theprotection of the Murabiteen from external aggression.

As time passed, the main difference between the Sa'adi and Murabiteen tended to diminish. One or two outstanding Murabiteen tribes fought their own battles without seeking the protection of the Sa'adi and remained independent, while a few others rose up and fought on with the protector against a common foe (the case of the Gemei'at tribe is an example) and in return were emancipated from the stigma of serfdom and accepted by the Sa'adi as almost equals. Other Murabiteen tribes remained attached to their Sa'adi protector as client groups.

Ibn Khaldoun also saw the inferiority of the Murabiteen tribes as stemming from a mode of tribal relations adapted to inter-tribal warfare (1845).

● 613 The Eila

The Eila represents the next level of tribal segmentation among the
Awlad Ali. The Eila is the most important political unit. Although the
Eila lacks any formally recognized leadership, its importance stems from
the fact that it constitutes the vengeance group or Ámar El-Dam (unity of
613 the blood). This means that it bears a corporate responsibility for the
672 actions of its members. Anyone of its members can be killed in vengence
682 for a homocide committed by any other, and the duty of revenge for any

613 672 682 member falls on all members alike, regardless of the exact genealogical relationship to the victim. When bloodmoney is to be paid, its members pay it as a group, divided among all male adults; and although when they receive it, a bigger portion goes to the nearest agnates of the victim, the remainder is distributed equally among all its members.

613 The genealogical depth of the Eila is usually five generations. This is not always true, however, In certain instances the number of generations intervening between the founder of the Eila and its living members is nine or even ten. Naturally, the more generations the larger the size of the Eila. Sometimes the Eila becomes so numerous that it is [217] hard to keep records of all members who are supposed to share in the payment of the bloodmoney in a specific case. When the size of the Eila reaches this point, one of two things may happen. The first is an attempt to make lists of the members. Many of the Eilas have such lists. This 613 675 is usually accompanied by a tendency toward writing down the specific rules and regulations of the vengeance group. These lists are referred to as Amar papers. They constitute a formal statement of an otherwise informally recognized responsibility of the group for certain actions of its members. The other is a tendency toward the fission of one or more of its constiuent units which, after separation, establishes itself as an independent Amar. The factors underlying this process of fission are discussed in the next chapter.

[539] The following is an example of an Amar paper, that of the Eilat Aggary, which was put into effect in 1954.

IN THE NAME OF GOD THE FORGIVER

● 613 675 539 The following Awaqil (sing. aqila, the leader of a bait) representing the various "buite" (sing. bait, the tribal segment below the level of eila) of the Aggary Family were witnesses to the treaty and their signatures signify their commitment and that of their respective buite to the content of this agreement.

(a list of the various awaqil)

The above signing awaqil agreed unanimously on the content of the document and all the conditions included. No objection by any of the above persons was noted at the meeting.

Article 1:
The content of this document should be kept as a secret of the Aggary Family. It constitutes the Aggary Amar in accordance with the customs and the Daraieb of Awlad Ali. The content of the document should be revealed only at the request of both parties of a dispute which involves a member of the Amar.

Article 2:
[627] Peace should exist between members of the Amar. No secret grudges or open disputes should be permitted between them. In case such an unfortunate situation exists, the other non-involved members of the Amar should intervene between the disputants, try to solve the dispute, and prevent it from damaging the solidarity of the Amar. They should investigate the facts of the case and force the guilty party to compensate his brother (the wronged party) without giving the former a chance to object.

Article 3:
[681] When the Amar is called upon because of obligation involving the payment of money, all the Awaqil should meet and decide the amount of money that should be collected from each Bait of the Aggary Family. It becomes then the responsibility of each Aqila to collect the amount from his Bait.

Article 4:
[681] [885] The share of each Bait is based upon the number of "Sayems", (literally, "fasting males", which is interpreted to mean 15 years of age or over), regardless of whether or not they have a source of income for themselves. The share of those without means of their own is distributed among the other members of the Bait.

613 675 539 [681] [885] Each Aqila is responsible for submitting to the Amar a list of the Sayems in his bait, and this will be the basis for establishing the share of the bait in payment or receipt of the money.

Article 5:

No Aqila can act on any matter involving loss or gain to the Amar without the presence of the other Awaqil of the Amar, unless an urgent matter occurs in which waiting for the rest of the Awaqil might jeopardize the interest of the Amar. In such cases the Awaqil present can act on behalf of the Amar as a whole.

Article 6:

[672] [673] The following acts should not involve the Amar as a whole and the offender is considered individually (or with his own Bait) responsible for them:

1. Theft and cheating.
2. Insult or disrespect of a younger member of the Amar to an older person whether from the Amar or not.
3. Entering someone's tent or home without permission.
4. Seduction of women (including rape and adultery).

[681] In all the above cases the individual has to bear the responsibility for his own actions. For to let the Amar pay for him in such circumstances is to encourage him and other such members of the Amar to commit more of such acts and bring disgrace to the Amar. If the offender is unable to pay for his crime, his nearest male kin should pay for him in accordance with the Awlad Ali Daraieb. Such payments are considered as personal debts which the offender has to pay back as soon as he is financially able.

Article 7:

[627] When an older person does injustice to a younger one, the latter should take his complaint to the Aqila of his own bait. The Aqila in turn should take the matter up with the Aqila of the older man or to all the awaqil of the Amar if the matter is serious enough. The awaqil must assess the facts and prevent the older man from doing any more injustice to the younger man and have the former compensate him for any damage he might have caused the younger man by his actions. If the awaqil fail to do this and if their failure resulted in the younger insulting or hurting the older, his acts become no longer an individual responsibility for which he has to pay alone, and the Amar should pay for him.

Article 8:

[627] No members of the Amar should take sides in disputes involving families or individuals outside the Amar unless the awaqil in the Amar investigate the matter and the reasons for the dispute and decide that the Amar as a whole should be on one side of the dispute or the other.

● 613 Article 9:
675 The Amar should never fight on the side of the wrongdoer, because if it does, it will have to pay with him for his wrongdoings.
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Article 10:

[628] Any dispute or fight involving a member of the Amar and an outsider should be reported to the awaqil in the Amar who are supposed to take the matter up with the other party. If the awaqil are convinced that the outsider is the aggressor or that he is at fault, they should try to make him accede to the demands of the members of the Amar, using all their efforts to convince him and the aqila of his bait. If he refuses, they [619] should call him for a "Miad" (tribal meeting) in which all parties involved should be represented by their respective awaqil.

Article 11:

[563] [619] With regard to "iktitab" (tribal adoption), an outsider wanting to join the Aggary Family or one of its consctiuent buite must be asked first about the reason or reasons for his desire to join. This must be done in order to know what kind of person he is and whether he will become a burden and liability to the Amar. If he proves to be of reputable standing, the aqila of the bait he wants to join can accept him without consultation with the rest of the awaqil. If on the other hand he is found to have grudges against someone or if someone has a financial claim over him, then the aqila of the bait cannot accept him without consultation with the other awaqil in the Amar. If all the awaqil agree to accept him, he is considered like one of the Eilat Aggary, having the same rights and bearing the same responsibilities.

Article 12:

A memberof the Amar who wants to separate himself from the Amar and get a "barawa" has to state his reasons beforehe can be released from the obligations of his membership in the amar. If his request to get the barawa was because of injustice he suffered by the Amar or any of its members, the awaqil have the duty to straighten the injustice and restore his rights. If, on the other hand, his request for the barawa was to avoid paying the Amar, then he cannot be released from his membership unless he pays all of his share, or else he must return all that the Amar has paid him until the time he asked for the barawa.

Article 13:

[695] [693] If one of the Amar is accused of an offense for which he is tried by the legal system of the state, the Amar as a whole share the expenses of hiring an attorney to defend him. This, however, is done after the awaqil are sure (by means of administering the oath) that he is innocent and that the accusation is false.

613 Written agreements such as the above are becoming more common in
625 the area. The need to have the responsibility of the vengeance group
[178] or the Amar recorded and the names of its members listed stems from the
[361] increase in the geographical mobility of individuals and separate households
[464] seeking jobs with the government organizations in the area or with
the various industries in the towns and cities outside the Western Desert.
233 The uncertainty of pastoral nomadism and the delicate balance which exists
178 between pastures, animal population, and human population is pushing an
182 ever-increasing number of people to abandon the way of life which they
had lived for generations. Animals are extremely important to sustain
233 the pastoral life of Awlad Ali. Once the balance between the pasture and
182 the animal population is upset by a draught, a segment of the human population
731 has to make new adjustments. This adjustment is first made by
166 moving with one's flocks to areas in the Delta or in the Cyrenaica region
of Libya. This is a short-term adjustment, however, and cannot be continued
for long periods of time. Pastures in the Delta have to be purchased,
and in most cases the owner of the herd has to sell part of his
[619] herd to feed the rest. The Cyrenaica pasture is very limited and restricted
by the strong tribal control of the Cyrenaica Bedouins, who in
general are not friendly with many of the tribal segments living in the
233 Egyptian Western Desert. If the draught continues beyond a certain time,
731 the individual owner of a herd may find himself forced to sell the herd
464 and seek other modes of subsistence in the form of part-time or full-time
434 employment as a semi-skilled or unskilled worker with the government or
182 industrial organizations. Such jobs are usually viewed as a temporary
source of income to help the individual and his immediate family live

233 731 464 434 182 through a hard year and to help him replace the herd he has lost. In many cases a dry year is followed by another and many of these employed find themselves depending more and more on their income from the jobs. The security of the employment is often compared favorably with the uncertainty of nomadic existence, and many decide to abandon the pastoral life on a more or less permanent basis. But even when one makes such a decision, he usually retains a strong affiliation with his original way of life. ● 613 182 682 He retains an active interest in the affairs of his Amar, especially those from which he can benefit in one way or another. One important gain he might get is through sharing in the receipt of bloodmoney for the killing of any member of the Amar, and having the Amar paid in his behalf. But while asserting their membership in the Amar at the time of such distribution, very few, if any, would show themselves when the membership of the Amar is called upon for the collection of bloodmoney which the Amar has to pay for a murder committed by one of its members. 613 682 578 It is known in the area that members of one bait of the Aggary Amar (Bait Ahmad) have never paid their share of the bloodmoney of the last twenty years, but always claim their share in the distribution of bloodmoney. Many members of that Bait claim that the Bait has long been separated from the Aggary Amar, although this claim is denied by the rest of the Amar as well as by those members of Bait Ahmad who claim their share in the receipt of bloodmoney.

613 675 578 Disputes such as these, which are not limited to the Aggarty, led many Amars to attempt to make comprehensive lists of all members of the Amar and to require a written agreement in case of separation of a given Bait from the Amar.

613 Another factor which led to the need to formalize the rules of the
578 Amar was the increase in the kind of disputes for which there is no pro-
672 vision in the customary law of Awlad Ali. Such disputes arise mainly out
671 of situations which are relatively novel to the area. A large number of
681 these situations involve the relationship between the tribal population and the government authorities recently taking a major part in managing the affairs of the area. There were no rules in Awlad Ali law to guide decisions in cases involving financial liability of a member of the Amar in cases such as confiscation of smuggled goods, destruction of government property, or false testimony leading to the conviction of a fellow tribesman by the government authorities. The list of cases such as these is rapidly increasing. Many members of the Amar refuse to share in the payment of liabilities arising out of such cases on the basis that since no provision has been made in the customary law of Awlad Ali, then the Amar as a whole should not take corporate responsibility for such actions. They assert that corporate responsibility of the Amar is the exception rather than the rule and therefore, where there is no specific rule, the responsibility is an individual one. Others insist that it is the corporate responsibility of the Amar in such matters that maintains the Amar as a group and gives incentives to the members to retain their membership in the Amar, and therefore, should be the rule rather than the exception, covering any form of liability unless individual responsibility is specified.

613 This made it essential to specify in some kind of formal statement
672 which liabilities are to be considered collective for which the Amar has
675 to pay as a corporate unit and which are to remain as individual responsibility. This is done either by listing the cases of individual

613 672 675 responsibility, leaving any other situation a collective responsibility, or by specifying the cases of collective responsibility, implying that all other responsibilities are as a rule individual ones. The Amar paper of the Aggary, for example, chose to list offenses for which the Amar is not responsible, leaving the rest of the liabilities to be covered by the Amar as a whole. This is not always the case. In some papers offenses for which the Amar is responsible are the ones listed leaving the general rule as the non-responsibility of the Amar.

613 671 675 It is in this respect that the Amar papers are considered an important source of legislation. Although the new rules incorporated in an Amar paper start with the limited applicability to members of the Amar, yet, as time passes and as these rules affect the relationship of the Amar members to outsiders, one rule may acquire a wide practice and become part of the customary law itself. An example of the point in
613 671 675 682 question is the rule regulating the payment of the bloodmoney in cases where the murderer is tried by the state courts for the same crime. In cases of arrest of the murderer by the government, only half the bloodmoney is paid and the other half is withheld until the trial is over. If the killer is acquitted by the court, then the other half becomes immediately due for payment. If, on the other hand, as mentioned before, the killer is convicted, half the bloodmoney is postponed until the person completes his sentence and is released unharmed and with his full senses. If he dies in prison or sustains an accident which affects his physical or mental capacities, the rest of the bloodmoney is automatically dropped. This rule was first included in a number of Amar papers, especially those of the Eilat of Awlad Kharouf tribe. In less than twenty years since it

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671 first appeared, the rule has become a practice so common that other Amars
675 find it unnecessary to specify it in their own papers.

682 Another new rule which is in the process of acquiring a great amount
613 of consensus among the tribal population of Awlad Ali is that of the responsibility
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675 of the Amar for the payment of the lawyer's fees for members
[693] of the Amar who are tried by the government (Article 13 of the Aggary
[695] papers). Another less agreed upon rule is that of the responsibility of
613 the Amar for the financial losses caused by the confiscation of smuggled
672 goods or the payment of money for the destruction of government property
675 by a member of the Amar. Where smuggling is an important source of income
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[434] for the group, Amar papers usually include rules making it a corporate
responsibility; other Amar papers, especially those of tribal
segments not deeply involved in smuggling, make it an individual responsibility,
while still others leave it intentionally with no specific
rule, as in the case of the Aggary Amar paper.

613 The Aggary document is a relatively elaborate one. Not all Amar
[675] papers, or at least the ones I had a chance to examine, are as detailed.
[131] Eilat Aggary is the largest Amar in the area of Dera'el Bahari, which
extends from Alexandria 60 miles westward to the town of Alamein. The
613 distinctive characteristics of the Aggary Eila is that it is composed
563 mainly of peasant groups who joined the Aggary by means of tribal adoption.
619 Of the 16 Baits constituting the Aggary Amar, only three are believed
to be Awlad Ali proper. The attractiveness of the Aggary for the
peasant groups seeking to be adopted by the tribal population of the area
may be partly explained in terms of the location of Eilat Aggary in an
area relatively close to the Delta from where these groups usually migrate.

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This makes it possible for those adopted by the tribe to keep in touch with their relatives and friends they left behind in the Delta while enjoying the military exemption gained from their adoption by the Awlad Ali population. It is also believed that Eilat Aggary, made up mostly of peasants themselves, are very lenient in the conditions they put for tribal adoption. Finally, the Eilat Aggary is not among the most powerful tribal segments of Awlad Ali, possibly because of their composition. This assures the adopted peasant groups an equal status not normally obtained if adopted by one of the powerful tribal segments of Awlad Ali.

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[675]
The Amar paper of the Aggary explicitly states some of the basic characteristics of the Amar as a unit in the tribal organization of Awlad Ali. The most distinctive aspect of the Eila or the Amar as a political unit is the absence of any formalized leadership. Although the Amar is viewed by outsiders as a corporate group as far as its legal responsibility in certain cases, from the standpoint of its members, the Amar is no more than the sum total of its constiuent units or Baits. This is shown in the Amar paper of Aggary which states that matters affecting the Amar be decided upon by all the bait represented by their respective leaders, the awaqil. There is no formalized authority above the
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awaqil, although one of the awaqil might acquire a position of informal leadership by virtue of personal or other qualities. He will be considered as a mediator and go-between for the various leaders of the Baits. In the case of the Aggary, Sheihk Selouma, the Aqila of Bait Eweida, has acquired such a leadership among the Eilat Aggary. Although Shiehk Selouma is relatively young, (he is about 40 years old), he has the reputation of getting things done. His Bait is the wealthiest in the

His Bait is the wealthiest in the

● 613 554 627 [556] Aggary and he himself has recently acquired a great amount of wealth, mostly from smuggling goods across the Libyan borders. Because of his position as a Government Sheihk, he is believed to have influencial connections in the government. He is the only member of the Aggary Amar who has a car. He considers himself to be the spokesman of the Aggary Family, and he is known to be able to persuade the reluctant awaqil to conform to decisions made by the rest of the awaqil. In a number of in-

[682] stances he was able to collect bloodmoney from members of the Amar who had previously refused to pay. Some people in the area believe that had it not been for the persuasive abilities of Sheihk Selouma, the Aggary Amar could never have persisted, and it would have long ago been divided into smaller units due to the lack of agreement among its members. The

613 lack of formalized leadership of the Amar or the Eila makes consensus of extreme importance for the Amar. The emphasis on the unity of the Amar

[675] is stated in Article 2 and is implied in a number of other articles in

[578] the Amar paper of Aggary. Disagreement among the awaqil is very rare although not unknown in the area. The relative consensus among the awaqil

613 682 [182] stems from the fact that the Amar as a group has a fairly limited function. Until very recently the only practical function of the Amar was the collection of money to pay for a murder committed by one of its members. Since establishing the innocence or guilt of the accused is not the duty of the Amar, once his guilt has been established, there is no question about

613 682 578 the payment. Disagreements are likely to occur in the case of new circumstances where money has to be paid, since payment in such cases are not yet institutionalized, even when specified in a given Amar paper. This

000 has not yet become a major problem. If any disagreement between the

613 If any disagreement between the
578 responsibility of the majority of the awaqil to persuade the minority to
571 conform to the majority's decision. This is usually done by simple per-
613 sonal persuasion. In certain instances, however, when a particular aqila
554 is known for being troublesome to the Amar, refusing to abide by the ma-
571 578 jority decisions, an attempt may be made by the others to build up pop-
ular support around another person in the Bait which the aqila represents.
If this strategy is successful, it might lead to replacing the aqila by
another who is more abiding to the Amar's decisions. This approach is
more likely to succeed if the aqila is not a popular person in his own
Bait, for if he is popular, any attempt by the other Baits to disqualify
the aqila would be viewed by the members of his Bait as interference in
their own affairs and might lead them to rally even more strongly around
their leader.

613 The other tendency occurring when the size of the Eilat increases
is toward the separation of one or more of its constiuent Baits. Origi-
613 682 nally this was done by merely refusing to share in the payment of blood-
money. If this refusal continued, it was considered as a sign of
[178] separation of the Bait. In recent years this created problems with an
increasing number of individuals claiming separation from the Amar to
avoid the payment of the bloodmoney, while claiming membership when dis-
613 tribution is done. This led many tribal segments to require that the
675 "barawa" or separation of individuals or tribal units from any particular
Amar should be put in writing, after getting the approval of the Amar to
which he belonged. When the approval is given and the separation in put
in writing, it is announced to all other tribal segments. If this is
[672] done, members of the separated tribal segment are not held responsible

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[675]
[672] for the actions of the members of their former Amar, nor is the Amar responsible for theirs.

Units thus separated establish themselves as separate Amars. These units are commonly referred to as Eila, thus retaining the structural label of the higher order of segmentation. This is not always the case, however, and other segments may refer to them as Baits rather than as Eilat. This explains, at least in part, the tendency toward blurring the formal scheme on the next level of segmentation, that is, of the Bait, and may account for the variable meaning of the term Eilat itself.

The Bait

While the Eila or Amar-el-dam is the most important political unit by virtue of being the vengeance group and therefore, the individual's major support group, it is the Bait that constitutes the most visible political unit.

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423 The Bait is the only corporate land-holding group. While the Eila is usually associated with a certain geographical locale which it considers as its homeland or "watan", it rarely, if ever, utilizes this land as a corporate unit. Instead, the land is divided among the various Baits constituting the Eila. The land of the Bait is not divided and each member of the Bait can, at least theoretically, cultivate or graze on any part of it.

613 But the one important characteristic of the Bait which distinguishes it as a political unit is the existence of a formally recognized leadership in the position of the Aqila (lit. wiseman). The Bait is the only structural unit with such formalized leadership. The Aqila is responsible for all members of his own Bait whose number varies from 20 to 60

613 individuals. He settles disputes among them and represents them in their
[627] disputes with outsiders. He is also the spokesman of his Bait in all
matters involving the relationship of the Bait with the other tribal segments.
[682] He is responsible for the collection of the bloodmoney from members
of his Bait and has the authority to confiscate property of individual
members who refuse to pay their share. When a member is financially unable
to pay his share, the Aqila is expected to pay for him and collect at a
later time when the member is in a position to make such payment.

613 Originally the position of the Aqila was a hereditary one with the
428 position passing from father to son. However, in recent years the rigidity
178 of the patrilineal descent as the basis of succession to the position
of the Aqila has been modified radically and other principles of selection
613 have been introduced. The working of the principles underlying the
128 selection of the Aqila will be analyzed in detail in the following chapter
through the close examination of one of the major legal cases which occurred
during my stay in the area.

613 Thus each Bait is a division of one of the Eilas and this has its
[423] place in the formal tribal system. It constitutes a group with definite
usufruct rights to land and a formally recognized leadership.

621 But the actual residential units in which Awlad Ali live are not
[613] baits but parts of them in the form of separate camps or "nagei". The
camps constitute the primary communities of Awlad Ali. A camp consists
[594] of a number of tents ranging from four to twelve. Each tent is usually
occupied by one nuclear family of a husband, his wife and children. In
[595] cases of polygynous marriages, each wife usually occupies one tent with
[361] her children. Each camp is separated from the next one by a distance
which ranges from two to ten kilometers.

621 which ranges from two to ten kilometers. The camp coincides with the
233 herding unit. The herd of the camp is usually grazed as a unit, often
621 by a paid shepherd hired by the members of the camp as a whole. Origi-
233 nally the camp moved as a unit for grazing. This was essential in the
621 era of the tribal warfare and raiding where the security of the herd
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178 and that of the people depended on such collective movement. In a type of organization adapted to periodical movement, the camp offered the optimum sized community: small enough to permit easy movement and large enough to offer the kind of protection which individual families could
621 not have offered. In this era the camp seemed to have been a closely
178 knit group. Many of the informants still remember the time when the
622 camp was under the strong control of the headman who made the major de-
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233 cisions of where and when the camp should move. It was those decisions that determined the safety and the security of the group. The headman had strong authority over members of his camp. Such authority was based mainly on his ability to exercise valid judgments as to whether or not the group should move and the route that it had to take if movement was decided upon. At the present time, and with the diminishing of raiding and tribal warfare in the area, the authority of the headman seems to have diminished along with it. The camp appears at the present time to be mostly a residential unit with minimal leadership and with a rapidly changing composition. Different families join the camp at different times during the year.

621 Although the membership of the camps is drawn from the bait, a camp
613 does not, in terms of its genealogical composition, make up a descent segment of that Bait. The membership of a camp is based on a completely

621 613 different principle from the principle of patrilineal succession characteristic of the bait and all other units on the higher levels of tribal segmentation.

Some of the camps I visited were composed of three patrilines, while others contained individuals belonging to five patrilines. In some camps each tent belonged to a different patriline, some of which did not even belong to the same bait. The composite nature of the camps is particularly clear in the case of what the people in the area called "nagei gheir aseil" or the artificial camp. This kind of camp is usually found near the towns and settled communities of the area. They include one or two tents of individuals belonging to the bait whose land the camp is built one, and who give the camp its name, but the rest of the tents are occupied by individuals from different baits or even tribes and also by
621 outsiders who came to work in the area. Such a camp does not act as a unit for any purpose. It has a rudimentary structure, and is held together by mere physical proximity of its members which stems from the need of "wanas" or togetherness. The composition of the artificial camps is highly changeable with new members joining and others leaving throughout the year. When I joined the camp of Ragi from the Sanagra tribe, it consisted of twelve tents. Four of the twelve tents were occupied by
[563] Sheihk Ragi (two tents for the two wives) and his two married sons, five occupied by members of tribal segments other than Sanagrah, and four by workers who came from Alexandria to work for the government project in the area. One week after I joined the camp another tent was added to
[563] the camp. It belonged to a man from the Geneishat tribe of the Natruh area. He came with his wife to work on the new irrigation project which

621 had started in the area at that time. No special permission was re-
563 quired for the newcomer to join the camp. He only got the permission
of the person whose tent was at the far end of the camp to put his tent
[574] next to it. The first night after the man joined the camp, his next
door neighbor slaughtered a goat in honor of the new member and invited
all members of the camp.

621 Leaving the camp also does not require any permission, although the
622 custom specifies that before one leaves he should inform either his
[576] neighbor or the headman of his time of departure. With the exception of
● [613] cases where the headman of a particular camp is at the same time the
Aqila of the bait, the headman of the camp has no authority over the mem-
622 bers of the camp. He is usually called upon to solve minor problems be-
627 tween brothers or husband and wife, or give his opinion in decisions of
minor importance. "A headman is like a father," said one informant, "we
call him kabir el-nagi (the old man of the camp)." When a member of the
627 613 nagei is involved in a serious dispute with another, the one to handle
the case is the aqila or awaqil to whom the two disputing parties belong.

619 **Group**	**Leadership**	**Identifying aspects**
613 Kabila	None	Client groups attached.
621 Ella	None	Vengeance group, Vaguely defined tribal land ("watan").
Bait	Aqila	Corporate land-holding. Formally recognized leadership.
[622] Nagei	Headman	Residential unit with unsegmented structure.

CHAPTER V

POLITICAL LEADERSHIP AND JUDICIAL PROCESS

69 629 628 One of the most idstinguishing aspects of the legal system of Awlad Ali is the absence of any formalized judicial structure. Disputes are solved mainly through the mechanism of informal mediation rather than through formal hearings of a court during which the facts of each case are presented and judgment based on the facts is passed. This does not mean that formal hearings are not known on the area. For the "Mi'ad" or tribal hearing is a common and very important practice in the tribal proceedings. The Mi'ad, however, is not a tribal court. It is merely a gathering of all interested parties and anyone else who wished to attend, in which the agreement reached behind the scenes by means of negotiations are announced.

628 613 683 [114] The first Mi'ad I attended was held in the house of Sheikh Mughaieb, the Aqila (tribal leader) of bait Mughaieb of the Sanagrah tribal segment in the area of Hammam, 60 miles west of Alexandria. The case that was to be settled at the Mi'iad involved the assaulting of Sheikh Mughaieb ty two younger members of bait Dauoud who lived in a nearby camp. The dispute started when Ali, the youngest brother (14 years old) of the two assailants, found a piece of iron in the desert. Suspecting that it was a mine, he took it away from the camp to the small garden in the backyard of Sheikh Mughaieb's house, surrounded it with dry weeds and set fire to it. The piece of iron was in fact a mine and it exploded, damaging the trees and a window on the Sheikh's property. At the sound of the explosion Sheikh Mughaieb rushed out and found the boy trying to run away from

628 683 • 613 the area. He caught him and slapped him and ordered him not to do it again. After a short while the boy returned with his two older brothers who protested Sheikh Mughaieb's hitting their younger brother. The argument developed into a fight during which the two brothers hit Mughaieb with a heavy stick over his head making him unconscious.

The Mi'ad was held two weeks after the incident. When I arrived at Sheikh Mughaieb's house, the meeting was being held in the guest room in the back of the house. Present at the meeting were Sheikh Mughaieb, his father, two distant relatives of Mughaieb who were visiting the area at the time; Sheikh Mutair, the Aqila of the powerful bait of Mutair located some twenty miles east of Mughaieb; the two assailants, their father who at the same time was the Aqila of their bait, and two neighbors of Sheikh Mughaieb.

[576] For the first half hour or so nothing was said. People were sitting silently except for occasional greetings of "how are you?" and the response of "thank God for everything". Tea was served frequently. Then [779] Sheikh Mutair addressed the gathering and read the "fatha" or the beginning passage of the Qoraan (which appeals to God to show his right ways to the believers and to guide them to wisdom). He then said, "In the blessed presnece of all these honorable guests and with the help of God and his prophet we will clear the hearts of those concerned of the grudges caused by the shameful and unfortunate incident in which the devil has played a major role." Then Sheikh Karim, the Aqila of the bait to which the accused belonged, continued the speech saying that this shameful thing should never have happened and that his sons must [867] have been possessed by the devil to have done it. After all, they have been brought up to respect their elders and especially Sheikh Mughaieb, who was like a second father to him.

628 683 613 [576] who was like a second father to them. He praised Sheikh Mughaieb for being understanding. He then said that Sheikh Mughaieb was very generous and that his sons had come to Mughaieb the day before and kissed the top of his head (an expression of respect for forgiveness). He said that no money, no matter how great, could erase the harm done by his sons but that he had offered to pay Sheikh Mughaieb the sum of 400 pounds as "kabara" or face-saving compensation. (The kabara will be discussed in a forthcoming chapter, but for the time being it is worth noting that the above amount is the maximum for such compensation since it equals the bloodmoney for a man). Then he turned to Sheikh Mughaieb and asked him to accept it in front of the respected guests. Sheikh Mughaieb then spoke for the first time and said that the two boys were like sons to him and that he had no hard feelings toward them anymore, since he believed that young people were sometimes carried away in their actions. He then proceeded to say that in honor of the honorable guests who took the time to attend the hearing he was forfeiting half the amount. At that time a woman brought the food the women were cooking for the gathering, and Sheikh Karim asked Mughaieb, "How about the honor of the good women of the house who have done all the work and cooked all the food? If you ask me, they deserve at least another hundred pounds." Mughaieb said, "All right, fifty pounds for the home of the women, but no more." After that Sheikh Karim paid the amount of a hundred and fifty pounds to Sheikh Mughaieb and shook hands with him. He also shook hands with the two young men who had assaulted him, and the gathering started the dinner and tea.

627 628 Not all Mi'ads in the area proveed with that smoothness. Many of them are characterized by shouting and arguments and frequently no

627 agreement is reached. In fact, later one of the people attending said
628 that my presence made everything run smoothly in that particular Mi'ad
[123] because they felt that they should show me how peaceful Awlad Ali were.
This was mainly supported by my own observation of other Mi'ads, some of
which are described later, where parties were less understanding of one
another and where no forfeiting of any part of the compensation occurs.
This is particularly true when the Mi'ad is held to acknowledge the failure
of the negotiators to reach an acceptable agreement among the parties.
[681] This is also true when one of the parties to a dispute denies the charge
and insists on not paying any kind of compensation. In such cases the
Mi'ad is held to decide upon a different course of action, usually the
administration of the oath, as will be discussed later in the chapter.
[182] Despite its typical nature, the Mi'ad described above exemplifies the
nature of the Mi'ad and its purpose as a process of making public what
has been achieved in private negotiations. No evidence is presented and
evaluated in the Mi'ad, no hearing of witnesses, no passing of judgment
based on the evaluation of the facts of the case. Actually, the facts of
the case are never presented and a person who is not acquainted with them
before hand has no way of learning what the dispute is all about by merely
listening to the discussions of the Mi'ad.

628 The key role in the process of mediation in dispute settlements is
613 done by the Aqila or the leader of the bait. When a dispute occurs between
members of different baits, each party goes to the Aqila of his bait
who takes immediate steps tomeet with the Aqila of the other party and
discuss the matter with him in an attempt to reach a settlement. He acts
as a representative of members of his bait and defends their interests in

628 the settlement achieved. In many such interest is best served by taking
613 into consideration the welfare of the other party to the dispute as well.

613 Reasonableness is an important prerequisite for the success of the
554 Aqila in performing this functions in dispute settlement. This is true
157 whether the Aqila is dealing with disputes between members of his own
bait or between members of his bait and outsiders. But while reasonable-
ness and the personal qualities constitute important assets for the Aqila,
613 they are not the basis of his political authority. Proven abilities are
554 admired but they are, or had been until very recently, irrelevant to the
178 question of succession to the position of Aqila. The structurally signi-
ficant source of the Aqila's authority is patrilineal succession. This
principle has recently been challenged under the impact of social and
economic changes that are taking place in the area. To analyze the role
121 of the Aqila and the source of his authority, I shall utilize, to some
613 extent, Turner's concept of "social drama" by presenting and analyzing a
128 case of dispute whose developmental stages happened over a period of more
than eleven years. The major part of these developments occurred at the
time of the field work and I had a chance to observe at lease part of it.
The case in all its phases offers a rare example of a disturbance that
happened in the social life of a particular tribal segment. It offers
what Turner called "... a limited area of transparency in the otherwise
opaque surface of regular, uneventful social life" (p. 93). The politi-
cal unit involved is that of bait Asabe'i, the largest in size of all
baits in the Aggary Eila. As events of the case unfolded themselves,
some of the important principles of social structure, at least as they
operate at a given point, were revealed.

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EILAT AGGARY AND ITS CONSTIUENT BAITS

BAIT	NUMBER OF ADULT MALES (Sayems)[1]	AQILA
Eweidha (El-Burg)*	28	Ta'eb
Eweidha (El-Alamein)*	31	Selouma
Yusef**	30	Suliman
Helleis	22	Hussein
El-Asabei'	56	Shei'eb
Abdel Hamid*	20	Haj Musa
Risq**	30	Yadem
Afash	25	Nayer
Daghas**	25	Daghash
Bul-Yazid*	21	Haj Shousha
Makhyum**	23	Abdel fattah
Hussein**	17	Masri
El-Ramly**	25	Salem
Rashwan**	30	Rashwan
Attya*	31	Masu'd
Abdella*	22	Abdel Galil

---

[1] Numbers are taken from the Amar list which is used to distribute the amount of bloodmoney on the various baits. An adult male or "sayem" is anyone 15 years of age or older. The word "sayem" means fasting individual and the age of 15 is when a child is forced to observe the duties of fasting.

[885]
[785]
[619]

** Refers to adopted tribal segments (Muktatibeen).

* Baits of doubted origin. Some claim these baits are adopted, while others insist that they are Awlad Ali proper.

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•613

BAIT EL ASABEI'


Bakhatrouh
Hamad
Osman
Yunis
El-Safi
Sai'ed
Qudurah
Bu Elewah
El-Sawi
Samsoum
Elewah
Madhi
Embewa
Hamad
Seluma
Kassem
Fathalla
Sinqor
Seluma
Edris
She'ib
Hussein
Hakim
Rabbuh
Besseisi
Rubei'
Fayid

PHASE I

613 578 682 [464] In September of 1956, Mansur from bait Eweidha of the Aggary Eila, who works as a driver in one of the government projects in the area, went to Alexandria with a friend, a member of the Gemei'at tribe. In one of the bars there, Mansur got drunk and entered into an argument with his friend. The argument turned into a fight during which he hit his friend with a broken bottle. Two days later, the friend died. A settlement was made between Mansur and the victim's family and bloodmoney was established at L. 300.

613 682 683 Two weeks after the above incident, the same person, Mansur, was driving the government car on his regualr duty when he ran over two members of the Sanagrah tribe who were sitting on the side of the road, killing one and breaking the leg of the other. Another settlement was made with the families of the victims. The bloodmoney for the dead man was established at L. 300 and another L. 50 was set as the compensation for the broken leg of the other man.

The total sum of compensations in the two incidents was divided among the sixteen baits constituting the Aggary Amar. The share of each bait was decided in proportion to the number of adult males (sayems) in each. The share of bait Asabei' alone was established at about L. 100.

613 682 683 672 558 As the Aqila of Bait Asabei', Shei'eb was responsible for collecting the money from members of his bait. But for the following six months he was unable to collect from any member of his bait, including Sheikh Hakim, Shei'eb's cousin and the wealthiest person in bait Asabei' and the Aggary Amar as a whole. Most of them gave the execuse that it was a bad year and they had lost most of their herds. When the money was not collected,

613 682 683 672 558 [115] the victims' families sent their representatives to demand that the money be paid. To face the situation, a meeting of all the Awaqil of Eilat Aggary was called and Sheikh Selouma, the Aqila of bait Eweidha, took the responsibility of notifying the other Awaqil. The meeting was held in the tent of Hemeida (my driver and informant) from the Sanagrah tribe. Each bait was represented by its Aqila with the exception of bait Asabei', from which both Shei'eb and Hakim were present. Since bait Asabei' was the only bait which did not submit to its share of the bloodmoney, the discussion centered around the inability of Shei'eb to collect it. In a gesture which he meant to appear as helping out Shei'eb, Hakim offered to pay not only his share but that of all members of bait Asabei', and followed his offer by handing the money to Sheikh Selouma. After this act which was a complete surprise to Shei'eb, Sheikh Slouma, the Aqila of bait Eweidha, suggested that Hakim should be considered as the Aqila of bait Asabei' instead of Shei'eb, who had demonstrated his inability to collect from members of his own bait. He emphasized the fact that he had nothing against Shei'eb who had legitimately acquired his position as Aqila by means of succession. But he insisted that the survival of the Amar depended upon the fulfullment of its financial obligations to outsiders and that Hakim was wealthy and could pay. Shei'eb did not comment and the rest of the Awaqil nodded indicating their agreement with Sheikh Selouma.

[124] The above is the summary of events that happened before I came to the area, and which were told to me by informants including the parties involved. Since most of these events occurred more than ten years ago,

613 it was impossible to verify the actual facts or to know what exactly
682 happened. But since the parties involved are still alive and since these
683 events are closely related to present-day happenings, the case is still
672 alive in the minds of the parties involved as well as those of outsiders-
558 (124) Naturlaly, each party tries to present the facts in such a way as to
613 support his own claims. Shei'eb, for example, insists that Hakim had
682 bribed members of bait Asabei' to refuse to pay their share in order to
683 embarrass him and make him appear as unable to perform his duties as
156 Aqila. "Hakim always had his eyes on becoming the Aqila of bait Asabei',"
558 said Shei'eb, "but he had no business becoming the Aqila, so he had to
make me look bad to the other Awaqil.... He likes to be looked up to as
a big man, but it wouldn't work." While other members of bait Asabei'
deny that Hakim had bribed them, they agree with Shei'eb that Hakim is a
156 dishonest man. In fact, Hakim's reputation is so widespread in the area
551 that it has earned him the nickname of "the thief". The nickname was
788 given to him a few years ago when he went to Mecca for a pilgrimage with
685 another fellow tribesman. The latter told the story that while in Mecca
Hakim had found a purse with two hundred pounds in it. He was supposed
to return the purse to the authorities or it would be considered as
stealing if he kept it. Stealing in Mecca is not only a crime but also
a great sin which makes the holy trip void for the offender. Hakim told
his companion that he had given the purse to the authorities. But later,
on their way back from Mecca, the friend found the purse hidden in Hakim's
luggage. When the story was known in the area, he was referred to as
156 "the thief". Other accounts of Hakim's dishonesty are told throughout
685 the area, including stories of how he acquired his wealth through stealing
439

156 equipment from the government projects and from smuggling sheep and mer-
[685
439] chandise across the Libyan border. Although some of these stories might
be exaggerated, they all point to the fact that Hakim, despite his wealth,
is not the most popular or reputable individual in bait Asabei', and that
although Shei'eb is not a popular individual either, he definitely comes
up the winner in any popularity contest between the two. The question is
156 why Hakim was selected by the Awaqil to replace Shei'eb. The case in-
613 volved more than Shei'eb's inability to collect the money from members of
558
682 his bait. Shei'eb's ineffectiveness seemed to have been taken as an ex-
683 cuse rather than as the direct cause. Many Aqaqil, before Shei'eb, had
failed in collecting money from their own bait without being subject to
direct challenge. What seems to be involved is more than a challenge to
a particular member, Shei'eb. It is a challenge to the whole principle
by which Shei'eb acquired his position as Aqila of bait Asabei': pat-
rilineal succession.

156 Shei'eb is the youngest of four sons of the former Aqila of bait
159 Asabei', Sheikh Elewa. For more than fifty years Sheikh Elewa was the
613 undisputed Aqila of bait Asabei'. He also had considerable influence
463
683 among other tribal segments throughout the whole of the Western Desert
554 by virtue of his position as "nazzar", that is, the expert who assesses
the amount of compensation for wound inflicted in a liable case. The
[428] position of nazzar is a hereditary one and had been handed down from
[779] father to son. The basis for his assessment of wounds are a number of
old books believed to be obtained from Mecca and contain all the judg-
ments of famous Islamic leaders in their assessments of wounds.

[428] Eleven years ago when Sheikh Elewa became blind and too old to

156 exercise his functions, he invited all the important people in the area
159 into a large gathering during which he announced that he was handing the
613 463 sacred books to Shei'eb, who was to become the nazzar and also to succeed
683 him as the Aqila of bait Asabei'. Although at that time Shei'eb was
554 fairly young, twenty-six, nobody questioned Sheikh Elewa's decision.
428 [779] "He is the Aqila," said one informant, "and he has the right to decide
which of his sons is to succeed him. After all, he knows his sons better
than anybody else and knows which one is best for the job." Most people
156 thought that Sheikh Elewa, being still alive and with clear thinking,
159 would help Shei'eb in performing his duties as Aqila. A few months after
613 554 Shei'eb took over his father's position, it became apparent that he was
578 too immature for the job. He tried to use his position to take money
[661] from members of his bait and when they refused to give him any money, he
entered into fights with a number of them. Rumors spread that he took
bribes from the disputing parties who came to him for him to assess the
legal compensation for wounds to raise or lower his estimate. But still
people within bait Asabei' as well as outside it respected Sheikh Elewa's
decision and did not challenge Shei'eb openly. But as time passed the
dissatisfaction with Shei'eb grew. This dissatisfaction came mainly from
members of the Amar who were affected directly by Shei'eb's actions, especially those actions which resulted in the payment of compensation for
wounds inflicted in fights.

PHASE II

439 On the evening of May 16, 1966, two members of the Geneishat tribe of Matruh area came to Burg-el-Arab with a large shipment of smuggled cigarettes to leave with their partner in the area, Hadi, from the

685 The Geneishat selected the tomb of the saint where the oath was to
627 778 be administered. According to the customary law of Awlad Ali, the plain-
695 tiff is the one to decide which saint is to be sought for the taking of
[671] the oath by the defendant. Each saint has his own reputation and some
[776] are said to be more effective in certain kinds of disputes. The saint
selected in this case was Sidi Dmain. Sidi Dmian's tomb is in the
Beheira province some 60 miles east of the area of Burg el-Arab. He is
[732] known to cause the blindness of those who dare to swear falsely by him,
[784] and at least four cases of blindness in the area have been attributed to
[671] false oaths at Sidi Dmain. Also according to the law, it is the plain-
tiff who selects the persons from the defendant's kin unit who are to
685 support him in the oath. Following this rule, the Geneishat, with the
627 help of Hadi, selected the fourteen men from bait Asabei to swear with
695 Rabbu. The number of men that were required in this case was considered
• 613 very conservative. The usual practice in estimating the number of sup-
[803] porters in any case is done by establishing the value of the damage or
compensation and dividing it by ten. The result is the number of men
needed to give the oath. If there were not enough adult males in a given
kinship unit to fulfill the number needed, some or all the men would
have to be sworn twice or three times and each time a person takes the
oath he is considered as a separate person until the number needed is met.

Following this rule, and since the value of the property confiscated in the above case was over three thousand pounds, 300 persons should have been sworn in support of Rabbuh. Since this would have complicated the matter greatly, it was agreed that fifteen men were enough. Taieb gave the justification for limiting the number to 15 that trade and, as

685 such, deviates from the normal pattern of cases dealt with by the cus-
627 tomary law in the conventional way. The men selected by the Geneishat
695 included, in addition to Rabbu and his father Hakim, Shei'eb and his
● 613 three brothers, Hakim's cousin Samsoun and his four brothers and Hakim's
uncle Sheikh Qudura and his sons. The date of the oath was set for June
tenth. Two days before, the two parties involved in the dispute invited
a number of the important people of other tribal segments in the area to
[492] be witnesses to the oath. All involved started to travel to the tomb of
[494] Sidi Dmain, some on donkeys, others by bus or train. At six o'clock on
[497] the morning of the oath everybody gathered in the courtyard outside the
[978] tomb of the saint. The granddaughter of the saint works as a mediator
[987] between the spirit of her grandfather and his followers announced that
[976] the saint was ready for the oath and everybody went inside preparing for
the oath. Before the oath was taken the Geneishat asked Hakim if his son
and the fourteen men they had chosen were present and Hakim said they
were. Since the Geneishat were from a different tribal segment and
lived outside the area, they had no personal knowledge of most of the
men who were to take the oath. Knowing the reputation of Hakim they
[212] asked the men to present their identification cards to check them against
the list they had. At that time Hakim said that some of the men didn't
[947] have identification cards because they had not applied for aid from the
World Food Program. Then the Geneishat demanded that those without cards
should be identified by members of other tribal segments who had come as
witnesses. Hakim refused and then admitted that one of the men was ab-
sent and that he had put another in place of him. But when the Geneishat
learned that the one to be absent was Sheikh Qudura, they insisted that

685 no one else could take his place. They were mainly angry at Hakim's
627 attempt to cheat them and refused Hakim's offer to substitute ten men
695 for Qudura. The temper of the meeting was becoming very tense; then
● 613
[578] Taieb, who was working very hard to achieve a settlement between the
disputants, took the Geneishat aside and tried to convince them to accept another man instead of Qudura. When he found that to be impossible, he asked them to agree to a postponement of the oath until they saw what prevented Qudura from coming as he had promised. The Geneishat agreed to the postponement because of the absence of one of the men to swear.
[671] According to Awlad Ali Daraieb, if one of the individuals to take the
oath fails to show up in the saint's tomb for any reason or if he comes but refuses to take the oath, the whole case for the defense fails, and the judgment is awarded automatically for the plaintiff. In this case the Geneishat were entitled to immediate compensation for their confiscated goods. Nobody knew the reason that led the Geneishat to forfeit their right to immediate compensation and to give Hakim and his son a second chance despite their intense dislike for the latters. Some attribute this to the skill of Taieb and the respect he commands among all tribes. Others believe the Geneishat movement to be a reciprocal act to bait Asabei' as a whole which long ago had one a similar favor for the Geneishat. Still others beliebe it to be a gesture of good will on the part of the Geneishat who needed to retain a good and friendly relationship with the tribal segments on their smuggling route.

No date was set at that time for the oath. The parties as well as
685 the witnesses returned to their houses. Hakim then took Shei'eb and
627 went to visit Qudura to see why he hadn't come to the oath but Qudura
578

685 refused to see them. Later Hakim had Shei'eb spread the rumor that Qudura
627 had taken a bribe from the Geneishat to refuse to take the oath, and the
578 story of an old dispute between Qudura, on the one hand, and both Hakim
[521] and Shei'eb, on the other. This dispute dates back to the time when the
•613 Awaqil of the Aggary Amar decided to replace Shei'eb with Hakim as the
156 Aqila of bait Asabei'. Shortly after the decision of the Aggary Awaqil
554 was publicly known, Qudura was very unhappy and refused to recognize it.
578 His reaction was not out of loyalty to Shei'eb whom he thought was a very unfit person for the position, but it stemmed rather, from a deep resentment of Hakim. According to my information, Qudura's position was met with sympathy by the majority of the people outside the Aggary Amar who share with him the belief that Hakim was a dishonest person who could not be trusted as a representative of bait Asabei'. It was at that time that the stories of Hakim's dishonest dealings were being discussed publicly, mainly by Qudura and members of his camp. At that time many believed that Qudura was the best man for the position of Aqila of bait Asabei' and that he was the only qualified member of that bait. He was the oldest able man in the bait, and although he was poor, yet he was known throughout the area for his honesty and sound decision. In fact many people in the area told me that they believe Qudura to be the only honest member of bait Asabei'. Realizing that Qudura was getting all the attention, Hakim sent his son Rabbu to Qudura with a message that Hakim acknowledged Qudura as the Aqila and that he (Hakim) had neither the time nor the interest in taking the position himself. Hakim also conveyed the view that he would support Qudura if the latter denounced Shei'eb and appointed himself in his place. Qudura agreed and a date

613 was set for a meeting in which Quadra was to announce his decision.
156 Meanwhile, Qudura stopped attacking Hakim and directed his attack to-
554 ward the inadequacy of Shei'eb as the Aqila.
578

The meeting was held two weeks later and all the important people in the area were invited. After dinner was served Qudura announced his agreement with Hakim to become the Aqila of bait Asabei' replacing Shei'eb. Everybody expected Hakim to support Qudura in his claim, but instead Hakim directed his comment to Qudura telling him that there had been a misunderstanding on Qudura's part and that all his message to Qudura was to acknowledge the latter as the Aqila for his own camp alone not for bait Asabei' as a whole as Qudura claimed. This announcement was a surprise to everyone in the meeting since this meant recognizing the camp of Qudura as a separate bait, a result which nobody, including Qudura, had ever anticipated. Qudura was very angry and dissolved the meeting immediately. Ever since that incident, the relationship between
578 Qudura and Hakim has been very unfriendly. Almost all of my informants
156 explained Qudura's failure to show up at the oath as a means of revenge
695 against Hakim who had embarrassed him among the people who attended the
685 meeting. Qudura himself had told me later that the reason for his not
627
[124] coming to the oath was that he was not sure that Rabbu was innocent:

> Rabbu has been known to do these thins (inform the police) and I cannot trust him. I cannot take a false oath and endanger myself for someone like Rabbuh. Besides, Hakim never came to me to discuss the oath like he did with all the others who were to swear with them. If he had brought his son and come to me before I would have been able to tell whether they were lying or not, and If not, I would have sworn with a clear conscience and without fear. The oath is something that one does not take lightly. It involves the supernatural.

613
627 When Qudura refused to see Hakim and Shei'eb, Hakim asked Sheikh
156 Saleh, the Aqila of one of the most powerful baits in the area, to talk
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613 622 to Qudura and to tell him that Hakim wanted to show his respect. This
156 means in everyday parlance that Hakim was willing to pay him money.
[196] Qudura agreed to meet Hakim the following day.

[114] On the day of the meeting, to which I was invited, Hakim arrived
[431] with his son and gifts of three goats, tea and sugar. One of the goats
[574] was slaughtered and supper was prepared for the guests. While the guests were eating, Hakim and Qudura disappeared inside one of the tents for more than an hour. When they finally joined the gathering, Hakim announced that he and Qudura were now brothers and that it was his fault that Qudura was angry because he had accused him of being stupid and misunderstanding the content of the message sent to him after the meeting of the Aggary awawil. "I admit," said Hakim, "that I might have meant at one time and probably said it to sheikh Qudura that I wanted him to be the Aqila of bait Asabei'. Now that I have admitted this, Sheikh Qudura should not have any grudges against me or my son." Then Qudura addressed the gathering and said, in a very cold and dry manner, "I am glad that Hakim has come to this senses and admitted his mistake." The gathering lasted for most of the evening, spent mostly in behind-the-scenes meetings involving Hakim, Qudura and different guests. Then as the last guest left, Shei'eb, who had been inside the tent throughtout the evening came out and said that Hakim was a fool and that Qudura had tricked him into admitting publicly that he had lied and that Qudura still refused to take the oath.

613 619 Qudura's stand created a strong reaction which affected almost all
578 the tribal segments in the area. The case overshadowed any other event
[521] and was the main topic of discussion. The reaction was mixed, however.

613 619 578 156 Other tribal segments outside the Aggary amar supported the position of Qudura, and most took his position to prove their notion about his honesty and the fact that despite his poverty, he could not be bribed. They were also pleased with Qudura's trick which demonstrated Hakim's dishonest 613 578 156 techniques. Within the Aggary amar, the general sentiment was still with Hakim although his confession of cheating Qudura made it difficult to support him openly. They directed their attack against Qudura who in their view violated the solidarity of the amar and even of his bait and showed it as divided and noncohesive. They were also fearful that Qudura's [685] refusal to pay would cause the amar to pay the Geneishat the full compensation for the action of Rabbuh, a sum which, as one said, would put the amar in debt for generations to come. The strongest impact of the events affected bait Asabei'itself and left it one step from complete fission into three distinct groups. Shei'eb, finding the tide turning against Hakim, found a chance to assert his claim to the position of the Aqila, stating openly that he would never forfeit his hereditary right. On the other hand, finding the popularity of Qudura increasing rapidly, he started attacking him verbally and even threatened to beat him. He in- [681] sisted that Qudura and his sons should be excluded from the amar and given the barawa.

613 681 [192] The word "barawa" is derived from the Arabic verb "bara" which means to cure one's self of an illness. It also means to sever social ties with undesirable persons. The term is used among Awlad Ali in a much restfited sense to refer to the process by which a tribal segment detaches itself from any responsibility for the actions of a particular member. It is

●613 681 mainly a declaration that, that particular person is no longer a member of the tribal segment and that his actions should not in any way reflect upon the tribal segment. The tribal segment referred to is usually the amar since it is only politically corporate group amoung Awlad Ali. The procedure is usually undertaken in cases of habitual offenders whose actions consistently bringing liability to the amar or disgracing it in relations with other tribal groups in the area. Due to the seriousness of the procedure (since it leaves the individual without the protection of his group), it is restricted. First, to announce the barawa of any of its members the amar has to get the unanimous agreement of all adult males of the gorup as represented by their Awaqil of their respective [675] baits. Lately such decisions have to be put in writing. The barawa [593] from the amar does not include the man's father, brothers, or sons. [672] These immediate relatives remain responsible for his actions even if they desire to detach themselves from such responsibility. This is mainly maintained not so much for the protection of the repeated offender but rather for the protection of unsuspecting people who happen to have dealings with him and who would be protected by the corporate responsibility of the man's immediate kin. In addition to repeated offenders, the [626] barawa or the threat of it is used to back the awaqil in their exercise of persuasion to get members of their baits to agree to their decisions, expecially those affecting the amar, like the collection of bloodmoney or the taking of the oath.

A man, on his part, may ask to be given a barawa from his amar. In this case, as shown in the amar papers of Aggary, he has to give good reasons for such a demand. The awaqil of the amar meet and discuss such

613 681 a request and examine the reasons behind it in an attempt to remedy them
if possible. They have to be sure first of all that by his request the
person is not avoiding the paymnet of his share in a particular case.
[695] If this is proven to be the case, then no barawa is granted unless the
person pays all his debts to the amar. This, like the amar's barawa of
the individual, has to be put in writing.

613 I left the area a month after the meeting held at Qudura's camp.
578 By the time I left, bait Asabei' was almost in a chaotic situation.
[114] Many thought that the outcome would be in favor of Qudura, who would
emerge from all the happenings as the leader of bait Asabei' as a whole.
Others thought that the only possible outcome was for bait Asabei' to be
divided into two or even three separate units with their own respective
leaders.

Analysis

114 All events of the second phase occurred while I was in the area.
627 Nonetheless I was not able to observe directly all of these events, due
to the nature of the judicial process among Awlad Ali which relies, as
has been mentioned earlier, on informal mediation and influence, rather
than on formal court hearings. Most of the above events happened behind
[124] closed doors and with a great amount of secrecy. For this reason I had
to rely partly on informants' accounts of what exactly had happened between the parties involved.

613 The dispute in its two phases revealed a major weakness in the
627 social structure of the major bait of the Aggary family. As the events
182 of the case unfolded, they shed light on some of the important principles

613 627 182 underlying the authority of the Aqila and the source of his political support. Three such principles were evident in the above case: patrilineal succession, wealth, and social and personal renown.


Ability to deal fairly with disputes involving members of his bait and outsiders
(wisdom and social renown)
Ability to fulfil financial obligations of the bait (wealth)
Patrilineal succession
other tribal groups
'Eila
Bait

613 554 To better understand the importance of the three principles to the authority of the Aqila, it is important to examine the domains within the Aqila normally functions. First, the Aqila is the leader of a certain kinship unit: the bait. Historically, the bait has been the main field of action for the Aqila and from it he draws his main political support. 613 627 554 As the leader of his bait, the Aqila settles disputes among members of his bait and represents the group for political and administrative purposes. His function is to hold the bait together by preventing major disputes between members from leading to the fission of the group into smaller, separate units. He performs his function by exercising authority and/or personal influence to establish long-lasting agreements.

613 In performing his functions within the bait, personal qualities such as
554 wisdom, soundness of ideas, personal persuasiveness are of importance.
[157] But the main basis of his authority is patrilineal succession. The Aqila
[428] has no economic power to speak of. Although many aqila are among the
[556] wealthiest members of their baits, many more are among its poorest. The
nature of the economic process and the pastoral life of Awald Ali is
such that the economic position of the individual is always flucuating.
Nor does the Aqila have any military power at his disposal, or any command of the use of force to back his decisions or to make them binding
[428] upon members of his bait. The main source of compliance to the Aqila's
decisions comes from the knowledge that the Aqila has the authority to
make such decisions and that he has acquired this authority through the
legitimate channel of patrilineal succession.

613 Where membership in formal groups is transmitted by descent, Awlad
428 Ali always choose the patriline. The son of Awlad Ali is regarded as
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[619] Awlad Ali even though his mother might not be from the tribe, while a
woman who marries outside the tribe transmits no rights in the tribe to her children. The importance of agnatic kin is reinforced by an solidary of brothers which is extended laterally to patrilateral cousins. It is also shown in the fact that sons are favored in inheritance usually to the exclusion of daughters. The male line is viewed by Awlad Ali as the natural principle when it comes to anything which is inheritable, whether property or position. In an attempt to defend Shei'eb's position and his right to be the Aqila, one informant told me: "The main purpose that a man has in life is to have sons because it is the son who makes the man live forever. Daughters don't count. A man gives his son

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[562]
everything ... his property, his name, and anything he can give him, like the position of the Aqila. This is only natural." While the office of the Aqila is inherited through the male line, there seems to be no special regard for seniority. Any son of the Aqila can succeed him in the position and it is usually left to the Aqila to select the son who is to succeed him.

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This decision is not usually the subject matter of brotherly rivalry since the position of Aqila is regarded more as a duty than as a privilege. There has been only one case in the entire area of the Western Desert in which such a decision has lead to open fighting between brothers. "When my father became very old and his eyes bothered him, he told me that I should become the Aqila and could not say no to him," said Shei'eb. "I didn't want to become the Aqila but this was the choice of my father and I have to obey .... You owe it to your father and family to carry on his responsibilities the same way you carry his name." It was patrilineal succession upon which Shei'eb based his case. Most uninterested parties believe that he and he alone had the legitimate claim to the position.

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The importance of patrilineal succession as the basis of the Aqila's authority may be better understood by contrasting it to a closely related position, that of the "mardi". A man within a bait may acquire, by virtue of personal qualities, a reputation for wisdom and soundness of opinion which may overshadow that of the Aqila. Such a person becomes known throughout a certain area as a successful mediator and go-between; and therefore is called upon to solve disputes not limited to members of his own bait. He thus acquires an informal position which cuts across a number of baits and sometimes larger political units.

613 The word mardi is derived from the Arabic verb "yardi" which means
627 to accept or agree upon. The mardi therefore is the person who is ac-
554 cepted by one or both parties to a dispute as a mediator. If he is ac-
[192] cepted by only one of the parties, his work is more that of a legal representative of that party. He makes all efforts, using all powers of persuasion to get the other party to concede to the demands of the party he represents. If, on the other hand, he is chosed by both parties to a dispute, he acts as an impartial judge and avoids taking sides in the case. His fame is determined by his ability to achieve permanent, long-lasting settlements. His success in this area depends, in addition to personal qualities, upon the respect he has within his own tribal segment and the weight that tribal segment has among other tribal segments. Similarly, his success and the fame he gets as a mardi may give him considerable influence within the bait. But this influence does not develop
[182] into authority because the mardi in this case does not have an established
[428] basis for the effective maintenance of that authority, in this case, patrilineal succession.

613 The other domain within which the Aqila performs his duties is that
554 of the Eila or the amar. His main function within this area is to repre-
682 sent his bait in matters involving the collection or the distribution of bloodmoney within the vengeance group. Within the amar, the aqila is considered successful insofar as he is able to fulfill his bait's financial obligations to the amar. This ability is in turn determined by his success in collecting money from individual members of his bait and/or his willingness to pay from his own money for those members who are unable or unwilling to pay their share. Where kinship ties are strong, the Aqila

613 usually has no difficulty collecting the individual shares. His own
682 [554] financial ability is rarely called upon. When a member is unable to
[178] pay for any reason, his share is divided among the able members. However,
in recent years this seems to be changing, especially among the baits
closely located to the settled communities or the urban centers. Among
613 these baits individual mobility has increased significantly with a large
178 166 number of younger members either leaving the area for the urban centers
464 or accepting salaried jobs with the government organizations. Among
369 certain baits in the area of Burg el-Arab, for example, the percentage
of adult males engaged in such jobs sometimes reaches sixty percent.
More than thirty-five out of fifty-six males constituting bait Asabei'
have a full-time or part-time job.

613 The individualistic attitudes accompanying the dependency on sal-
178 166 aries and living in towns and cities have their effects on the kinship
464 ties among members of these baits. With the prevalence of the individ-
682 ualistic attitudes among members of a certain bait, they become more
369 reluctant to pay their financial obligations and the Aqila finds it more
and more difficult to rely, for the fulfillment of the bait's financial
obligations, on the willingness of members to pay. His success within
613 554 the domain of the amar becomes more determined by his ability to pay
556 from his own money for those members of his bait who refuse or are un-
682 able to pay. Wealth becomes an important asset for the Aqila's per-
formance of his duties within the amar. When this happens, there seems
to be a certain shift in the source of political support for the Aqila.
613 In a well-integrated bait the popularity (or unopopularity) of the Aqila
554 among the other Awaqil of the amar had very little influence on his

613 position as the leader of the bait. The principle of patrilineal succession
554 is so respected in such baits that it overshadows any other consideration.
613 554 This continues to be the case as long as the kinship ties
428 within the bait remain strong. When the kinship ties in a given bait
178 weaken, the principle of patrilineal succession also weakens. This is
[166] more likely to occur in baits where a relatively large number of the
[464] members leave the area permanently or for a more or less prolonged period
of time, seeking jobs on a part or a full-time basis. Many of these
613 178 members maintain only a minimal contact with their respective baits.
166 They become more reluctant to fulfill their kinship obligations, especially
464 561 when they entail any financial liability. The older members
369 complain about how younger persons are less loyal to their elders and
how selfish they have become. "All they care about is their jobs and
the pleasure they get from the city; they are becoming city people."
Younger members, on the other hand, maintain that their reluctance to
fulfill their kinship obligations stems from their feeling that they
do not get anything in return. "Life is expensive and money is hard to
obtain. I cannot make enough money to support myself and my wife and
children and at the same time pay my cousin's financial debts," said a
member of eilat Asabei', who works as a driver with the Desert Organization
in Alexandria.

613 When this happens, there seems to be a tendency toward shifting the
554 emphasis from the bait to the eila or the amar as the source of the political
[556] support of the Aqila. This is turn makes wealth an important
basis of the Aqila's power. No more can the bait impose an ineffective
Aqila on the amar unless it is ready to back him by their own share of
money. If this is lacking as was the case with Shei'eb, there is nothing

613 554 that prevents the Awaqil of the amar from rallying support around another person.

613 178 554 In the case of the Aggary amar Hakim was their choice as the man to replace the original Aqila. What happened in the Aggary amar could never have happened if bait Asabei' were more cohesive than it was or if the kinship ties "were still strong and durable" as one important member of the Sanagrah tribe commented. "If there was any respect to the forefathers left, Hakim could never have agreed to replace Shei'eb....Nobody would dare take a position from someone who inherited it from his father.... but bait Asabei' is not as it used to be."

613 628 554 The third domain within which the Aqila normally pursues his activities is that of the wide scope of tribal society in the area. The Aqila represents his bait in all matters involving the bait either as a unit or any particular member of it with other tribal segments. When an individual from the bait is involved in a dispute with a member of another tribal segment, the Aqila acts as the legal representative and the attorney of that member trying to achieve a settlement which is not fair for his client but also fair for the other party. To be successful in this area, the Aqila relies on his own personal qualities and persuasive abilities. If the Aqila is known to be fair and honest, a quick and permanent settlement is usually achieved since he is trusted also by the other party. If, on the other hand, he has the reputation of using dishonest techniques, mistrust prevails and achieving a settlement is usually delayed.

Like the domain of the amar, the present field of activities is no major source for the Aqila's political support in the baits where kinship solidarity is strong. His success in solving disputes between members

His success in solving disputes between members
613 628 554 [428] of his baits and outsiders might enhance his prestige within the bait, but it is not a substitute for patrilineal succession as the basis of the Aqila's authority. But in less integrated baits the situation is [627] different. The ineffectiveness of the Aqila in solving disputes may lead members of his bait to seek another man as their representative who would act as a mediator in their behalf. If this continues for a long time the Aqila might find himself with no functions and the new person would become a de facto Aqila.

613 554 622 The Aqila represents the only effective indigenous form of leadership among Awlad Ali at the present time. The camp headman provides another form of leadership on the camp level, but, as mentioned before, the leadership of the headman is very limited and involves minimal 634 622 656 177 authority. In addition to the indigenous leadership represented by the Aqila, there is the superimposed administrative structure of the government representative in the form of the "omda" system introduced into the area by the government decree no. 1187 of 1958. The system of omda or mayorship is essentially that applied to the rural areas of Egypt with certain modifications to fit the tribal organization and the semi-nomadic existence of the populations of the Western Desert. In rural areas, the 622 omda is the administrative head of the village. He is appointed by the [554] [212] [556] government from among the village inhabitants who have certain qualifications with regard to education (must be able at least to read and write), wealth (own at least 5 feddans of land in the area), and sound reputation. As such, the omda system in the rural areas is a territorial system. The omda's authority covers the territory of the village and all individuals living in it regardless of their kinship affiliation.

634 554 619 "The omda or sheikh is both a blessing and a curse to his tribe," said one member of the Aggary 'eila. "He can bring benefits to his tribe, but at the same time, he has to report his own people if one of them breaks the city laws... His position is like that of a double-edged razor."

Most of the people in the area, however, tolerate the negative aspects of the omda's functions as a moderate price for the possible benefits they may get through his position. This is why each tribal segment does its best to be represented by an omda, or at least by a sheikh.

Within his tribal segment he enjoys a great deal of respect. He
does not, by means of position alone, command any power over members of
his group similar to the power the omda of the village has over his
● [613] people. It seems, however, that although the position itself does not
carry with it any power, yet, when the holder of that position is at
the same time a native tribal leader or aqila, it tends to enhance his
position as a tribal leader and to give him more respect among members
of his tribal unit as well as among the rest of the tribal groupings.
634 This may be explained by the fact that the establishment of the omda
554 system in that area did not involve direct interference with the native
619 political system except in a minimal way, mainly to keep the tribal
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657 populations in the area from interfering in the progress of various
613 government projects in the area. As such, the system did not impose
too many demands upon the tribal loyalties of the omdas or sheikhs.
In the relationship between the government and the tribal population,
the balance so far has been in favor of the latter, who, by means of

634 omda representation, are taking from the government much more than
554 they are giving in return. Being the link between his people and
619 the government in such a system gives the aqila a new basis of
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657 political support.
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CHAPTER V

MARRIAGE: A CONTRACTUAL RELATIONSHIP

593 A survey of all disputes occurring among the eilat Aggary in the
578 last five years shows that more than 70% were disputes over "women,"
the usual phrase referring to cases involving marital relations. Disagreement over matters arising out of quarrels between husband and wife
or between one of the spouses and his or her in-laws often constitute
593 the basis for these disputes. What seems to make marriage and the
578 family particularly productive of conflict is the fact that although
602 residence is commonly virilocal, and the majority of the women leav-
• 613 ing their own families to live with the husband, the woman retains her
[591] membership in her father's family after the marriage, and her agnatic
group keeps an active interest in her, even after she is married. Marriage then brings face to face the interests of two groups. These interests affect the relationship between the married couple; and, more importantly, the relationship between the latter affects the interests of their respective groups. This, in many instances, leads to direct conflict between the two groups.

581 The position of the Awlad Ali daraieb with regard to marriage rela-
671 tions is based on the Islamic law with minor modifications to suit the
585 requirements of local life. According to the Muslim law, marriage is
675 a civil contract affected by the request of one party and the agreement of the other. No witnesses are needed for the legalization of the marriage, according to some of the Shi'a sects, although the Sunni schools of Muslim jurisprudence insist that two adult male and two adult females

582 of parley land or a well or to make him a partner in a business or smug-
557 gling activities or even as revenge on his uncle by keeping his daughters
582 unmarried. In 1961 the heads of 25 prominant baits of various tribes
557 in the area of Matruh met and decided that the right of ibn 'amm had
178 become a major problem, and that invoking that right when the man had
● 613 no intention of marrying the girl had resulted in a number of disputes
that became serious over a period of time. They felt that the time was
suitable to revise that right and make it subject to the concept of fair
behavior applicable to other rights. They wrote a new rule which speci-
582 557 fies that the man has the right to prevent his cousin from marrying an
178 outsider or a more distant relative only if he himself intends to marry
613 675 her either in the present or in the reasonable future. If the circum-
stances show that he cannot do so, then he forfeits the right.

[558] To prevent his cousin from marrying another man without a proven
[681] intention on the part of the man to marry her himself in the fore-
seeable future, is considered as an unreasonable behavior for which
ibn 'amm could be liable to pay kabara to his uncle as well as to the
prospective groom. It also denies him the right of taking her away from
[683] her marital residence by force. If he does this, he would be liable to
the compensation for assault. The agreement was signed by the awaqil
and is considered binding as far as the baits they represented are con-
cerned. Other tribal segments in the area refuse to abide by the agree-
ment and consider it as a pretentious departure from the ways of Awlad Ali
which should not be encouraged. Even within the tribal segments involved
in the agreement, there have been reports of individuals who refused to
[629] abide by the agreement. In certain of these latter cases, the ibn 'amm
selected as his mardi a member of a tribal segment not involved in the
agreement and therefore not morally bound to abide by
its contents.

000 agreement and therefore not morally bound to abide by its contents.

582 The lack of serious intentions to marry one's cousin is reflected in the actual frequency of patrilateral parallel cousin marriage in the
582 area. The following table is taken from the genealogies of five camps
621 in the area of Burg el Arab. The camps belong to different tribal
613 groupings:
619

Agnatic cousins	5
Other cousins	12
Within the bait (other than above)	9
Within the Eila (other than above)	13
Within the tribe (other than above	11
With members of the client tribe	15
With outsiders	9
Total	74

The above table shows that the frequency of patrilateral parallel cousin marriage is less than eight per cent of the total marriages included in
582 the genealogies of the camps studied. It also shows that the largest
619 frequency of marriage is with a member of a client tribe of Murabiteen. In the majority of the fifteen cases (eleven cases), it is the woman who is a member of the Murabiteen tribe while the man is a member of the Sa'adi tribe. The Murabiteen tribes from which the wives came are not always the clients of the particular tribal segment to which the husband
[583] belonged. One explanation of the popularity of marriage to the Murabiteen is that the bridewealth among them is generally less than it is for the Sa'adi girls. It therefore gives the man the advantage of lower bride-
582 wealth without the lack of choice involved in the cousin marriage. It is important to bear in mind, however, that the sample given above is by no means representative of the entire tribal population. Furthermore, the material presented above was based on the actual marriages at the

593 586 and expenses to the husband that constitutes the most important check
(583) on the otherwise undisputed right of the father to take away his daughter.

593 The woman, on the other hand, cannot refuse to go with her father,
562 for this means that she would be disobeying him. A woman who disobeys
586 her father is not worthy of his name. He can cut her off from the family, which means that she is left without any support or protection. A woman who is cut off from her family is left vulnerable to her husband and to society. She will have nobody to defend her or to be responsible for her actions. The responsibility for the woman's behavior is not transferred by marriage to the husband or his family.

682 If the woman kills or assaults someone or causes damage to property
683 for which compensation is required, her male kin pays the blood money or
602 the compensation on her behalf. It is sometimes stated that if the woman
613 562 has grown-up sons, they, and not her family, pay for her. Since the
593 children belong to their father's family, it may seem like transfering the responsibility for the woman's actions to her husband's family. However, in all three cases where this happened, the woman was quite old, her father was dead, and her brothers were either dead or had moved outside the area and had cut off all relations with the area. She also had no nephews in the area. In such cases, the sons were the woman's closest male kin.

682 On the other hand, if the woman is the victim of murder or assault
683 593 for which blood money or compensation is to be paid, the husband is the
562 one to benefit from the situation. To understand why this happens, we have to consider the contractual nature of marriage among Awlad Ali. It
584 583 has been mentioned earlier that before marriage is final, the prospective

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593 The contractual nature of marriage is most clearly manifested in the case of the wife's adultery. Since the woman belongs to her agnatic group, her behavior has direct effect on the honor of that group. It is, therefore, the responsibility of her closest kin to keep an eye on her. If the woman commits adultery, it is her father or her male kin who is supposed to avenge the honor of the family by taking drastic actions, including killing, against the adulteress and/or her partner. But the marriage usually takes the woman away from the close watch of her family and puts her under the supervision of her husband who becomes entrusted with the duty of guarding her, and therefore partially responsible for her action. His responsibility is enhanced by the fact that although the wife's behavior does not affect him or his family, it has a definite effect on the honor and reputation of his children (Abou-Zeid, 1965).

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[522] The gravest insult that one can direct to a person in the area is to describe his mother of being of disrepute. In their joking relations, young men usually refer to eachother's father as being a dog or a theif or a cheat, but none could refer to the mother. A woman of questionable reputation affects the reputation of her family in general and her children in particular. Any reference to the mother in the form of an accusation is supposed to be cleaned only by blood. Not only does this apply to the woman's voluntary behavior, but also to her physical and mental condition. If a woman loses her mind, the news is usually kept a secret, especially by her children.

(934)
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593 The responsibility for retaliation in the case of adultery, then, is divided between her nearest kinsman and her husband. This gives both sides a vague and undetermined right of revenge. This division of the right of revenge explains the infrequency

684 of drastic actions taken in cases of adultery. Of the fourteen cases
613 562 of adultery that I examined furing my field work, none resulted in the
593 killing of the adulteress, and only three resulted in the murder of her
[114] partner. In all three cases where the adulterer was killed, the avenger
684 682 was the husband; and in all three cases, the husband had to pay the
613 bloodmoney to the murdered man's kin group. His payment of the bloodmoney,
among other things, may indicate that the right of the husband
to kill the adulterer is not completely accepted among Awlad Ali. All
[628] agree, however, that such killings never result in blood feuds because
of the shameful circumstances in which the victim dies.

684 It was very difficult to obtain any detailed or reliable information
126 about adultery cases. All the above mentioned fourteen cases were gathered
[124] from the informants, twelve of which were cases which had already
been solved. For the two cases which were still open at the time of
the study, information was quite vague. Usually such cases are conducted
with a great amount of secrecy, with the involved parties referring to
them as cases of theft, or merely by saying that the cases involve
women. Only when the adultery leads to the killing of the adulteress
or the adulterer are more details publicly known about the case.

684 But while the right to retaliate for the shameful action of an
adulterous wife is vague and diffused, the right of the husband for compensation
from the adulterer remains clear and undisputed. In this resepct,
adultery is treated very much like theft; the adulterer has stolen
the husband's exclusive right to his wife's sexual activities. The compensation
[583] for this offense is estimated at L.E. 20, in addition to the
[586] mahr, if the husband decides to divorce his wife as a result of her
adultery.

681 this variation is that committing the adultery within the camp of the
558 husband constitutes a greater humiliation, since it affects his honor
684 among his neighbors. Also, adultery inside the tent of the couple carries
with it the possibility of rape, while adultery outside the tent
at least implies an element of consent on the part of the wife. The
[583] penalty in the case of adultery is the return by the wife's father of
the mahr and all other expenses of the marriage ceremony and the gifts
the husband had presented during the engagement period. This is a
further indication that the father of the wife is still responsible
for her behavior even after she is married. It is in this respect that
the crime of adultery differs from theft. In the case of theft, the
[685] thief has to return twice the amount stolen and in the case of repeated
offenders, four times the amount stolen. This is in addition to a certain
amount of money as kabara. Yet, in the latter case the kabara is
not specified and is subject to the proof by the victim that the theft
constituted an insult to him. This insult is assumed in the case of
adultery, which makes the kabara in the case of adultery part of the
punishment--an integral part of the punishment. The kabara is not among
[613] the collective responsibility of the amar and is paid only by the person
involved, unless he is totally unable to pay or refuses to pay. In such
426 cases, his closest male kin (his father, son, or brother) pays on his
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681 behalf with the understanding that such payment constitutes a debt which
684 should be repaid. The person paying on his behalf in this case can go
558 to his tent and take by force anything of value, such as blankets, utensils,
or even sheep and goats, and keep them as pawns until the debt is
paid.

682 person in the crowd. So, Do'ah volunteered to be lowered down
672 to clear the well. He then proceeded to the well, glanced at the
312 bottom of it, and threw a small stone to see if there was any water
left in it. The stone made a faint splash indicating that there were a few inches of water. After that, he examined the rope and the equipment used. Satisfied with everything, he tied the rope around himself and was lowered very slowly and carefully by the crowd at the top of the well. As Do'ah was more than half-way down, the rope broke, and he fell. When the crowd called him, Do'ah answered in a faint voice telling them that he was hurt but that he would be all right. The crowd then looked for a spare rope to lower somebody to get Do'ah but could not find any in a nearby camp. They sent a man to get a rope from the next camp, but by the time a man was lowered to get Do'ah, he was dead; he had drowned in six inches of water.

682 Since the place of the accident was close to the police sta-
672 tion, word got to the officer who, after investigating the case,
[625] ruled it as accidental death. But while the government authorities
[613] were investigating the case, members of the Bait to which Do'ah be-
longed were proceeding with the customary ways of Awlad Ali to claim bloodmoney for their dead kinsman. The idea was that a life had been lost, and that regardless of the police investigation, someone must pay for it. The question was who. Since the well belonged to Hemeida, Do'ah's relatives insisted that he was the one to pay the bloodmoney. Not denying the fact that someone had to pay for the death of Do'ah, Hemeida insisted that the one to pay was the

683
682 feet after that and left." It seems that later the wound got in-
672 fected. Six months after the incident, Selouma was taken to the
[578] hospital with an infected wound, and three days later he died from
that infection. Selouma's son, Ali, demanded that Muftah pay a
full bloodmoney (L.E. 400) for the death of his father, since the
death was directly caused by the wound inflicted by Muftah. Muftah
denied the charges and claimed that the infected wound which caused
683 the death of Selouma was not the one inflicted by the stone. Media-
682 tions continued for some time, and when no agreement was achieved,
672 the aqilas of the two baits to which the parties belonged declared
695 that the decision should be made by the oath which Muftah had to
613 take if he insisted on his claims that the wound was not caused by
his action. Since the case involved the life of a man, Muftah had
to be supported in his oath by fifty-five adult male members of
[671] his 'amar, or 'eila. In accordance with the Daraieb, the selection
[778] was done by members of Selouma's Bait who also selected the tomb of
the saint where the oath would be undertaken. On the date the oath
was to be taken, the disputing parties, as well as all the notables
of friendly tribal segments who were invited to witness the oath,
went to the tomb of the saint. As they started with the procedures,
[784] two of Muftah's cousins who were to support him in the oath and his
uncle refused to swear on the grounds that they were not sure that
Muftah was telling the truth and therefore could not subject them-
selves to the supernatural hazards of taking a false oath. Attempts
by other members who were to support Muftah were made to force the
three men to swear, since their refusal meant that the bloodmoney

683 was to be paid unconditionally and consequently would cost all
682 members of the amar; but all these attempts failed. At this point,
672 there was no doubt on the part of the attending crowd about Muftah's
695
● 613 responsibility for the death of Selouma. The question was, how much
had he to pay. The amount requested by Selouma's son was that for "intentional" killing on the basis that Muftah had willfully thrown the rock knowing that it might harm Selouma, especially considering his age.

683 After long and intensive negotiations with the interested
682 parties, a Mi'ad was set in which it was announced that Muftah had
672 to pay the amount of L.E. 200. In his reasoning, he stipulated
627 that the wound which had caused the death of Selouma, although it
was intentional on the part of Muftah, was inflicted by a stone which in itself is not a lethal weapon, and therefore the death was an unintentional one for which the bloodmoney is customarily estimated at L.E. 300. He also stated that in the excitement that
[845] followed the death of Selouma, Muftah's pregnant wife had lost the
child. The bloodmoney for the still-born infant was estimated at L.E. 100, which was deducted from the amount of bloodmoney that Muftah had to pay.

CASE #3: The Case of the Trespasser

311 This case occurred during the year of the fieldwork which was
423 the second dry year the area experienced. Rain had not fallen ex-
613
[132] cept in a very few places. One of these places was near the small
town of Sidi Barrani in which the land belonging to Yadem and his Bait was found. Yadem had sown his barley which at that time had grown to about five feet high. Surrounding the cultivated land

311 423 613 233 311 619 613 was a large area of grazing land which also belonged to the Bait of Yadem. The area attracted a large number of tribesmen who brought their herds for grazing. One of these was Kuraiem from Awlad Kharouf tribal segment. He brought his wife and child and a herd of more than two hundred sheep and goats. Although it is not proper for one to cultivate the land belonging to another tribal segment, yet, when it comes to grazing land, no such restriction is imposed. Only the permission of the aqila of that tribal segment is required, and even that is granted so automatically that many tribesmen do not bother to ask for such permission. Kuraiem took this permission for granted and pitched his 233 311 578 tent in the grazing land of Yadem and his Bait. Yadem, however, was disturbed because he thought that Kuraiem grazed his flocks in an area very close to his cultivated barley, so close that he feared that the animals might eat the growing barley. When Yadem asked Kuraiem to move a little further and Kuraiem refused, they entered into an argument during which Yadem told him that if he did not move by the following day, he would break his neck. The following morning Yadem went with his brother to see if Kuraiem was still there. Both Yadem and his brother were armed with heavy sticks. As they reached Kuraiem's tent, they hit him with the sticks on [682] the head. Kuraiem fell on the ground, and they kept hitting him until he was dead.

682 672 In due course, Kuraiem's family claimed L.E. 400 bloodmoney for the intentional killing of Kuraiem. Yadem and his family rejected the claim and insisted that the killing was unintentional. The [627] Mi'ad was held, and the two Mardis selected by the two parties

682 672 627 agreed that the sticks were not by nature lethal weapons. The latter, according to the tribal law, are only guns and knives, since they give the victims no chance to defend himself. They ruled the case unintentional killing for which only L.E. 300 should be paid.

682 625 692 Since Yadem and his brother were arrested by the police for their crime, the payment of the bloodmoney was postponed until the case was settled according to the state legal system. Only half of the bloodmoney was paid and the rest was postponed until the case was decided upon by the legal system and Yadem released. 682 672 673 [411] This is obviously a case in which the nature of the killing was decided upon by drawing upon the material aspect of criminal causation. The nature of the weapon used was the major determinant of the crime. Only guns and knives are defined as lethal; all others are non-lethal by nature, although they might cause the death of the victim. Death caused by a non-lethal weapon is considered as unintentional regardless of whether or not the actor intended the results, while death by a lethal weapon, even without the intention of killing, is classified as intentional killing, as appears in the following case.

CASE #4: The Case of the Threatened Tribesman

● 613 628 For more than five years Bait El-Mawi from the Sheibat tribe had been in a continuous state of feud with Bait El-Asi from the Gemeiat tribe. One night, during a Khamasein sand storm when visability was extremely low, Abd-el-Galil from Bait El-Mawi heard a noise outside his tent, and the dogs were barking indicating that a stranger was there. Being sure that someone was approaching

613 628 the tent and fearing that he might have been a member of the feuding Bait intending to harm him or members of his family, Galil took his gun and went outside to see who was there. He called on the person to identify himself. When he got no answer, he warned him that unless he identify himself, he (Galil) would fire his gun in the air as a warning. After a short period of no 613 628 682 response, Galil fired his gun in the air. A moment later, Galil heard a cry coming from the direction of a small hill at the side of the tent. When Galil went there, he found Salem, a member of a neighboring camp, lying on the ground with a bullet wound in his stomach. He told Galil that his wife was sick and that he had come to borrow Galil's donkey to take her to the doctor in the nearby medical center. He had taken the short cut to Galil's tent when he was hit by the bullet which Galil had fired in the air. Galil took his wounded neighbor to the medical center, but Salem died before they reached it.

682 672 627 673 The Mi'ad was held, and Galil and his family had to pay L.E. 400 to the victim's kin group. The amount was that specified for intentional killing, since the wound that caused the death was inflicted by a lethal weapon.

CASE #5: The Case of the Startled Shepherd

233 [464] [619] [312] This case involves Idris, a poor member of the Sheresat tribal segment. He earned his living by working as a hired shepherd for 'Awwad from Bait Ibrahim in the area of Gharbaniat. During the dry season, each shepherd takes his flocks to the water wells near the coast and leaves them there for three or four hours to get their fill of drinking water. That afternoon, Idris, waiting for the

233 animals to drink, sat on the edge of the well with his feet in the
cool water of the pool completely absorbed in his thoughts amidst
the quiet surroundings. Passing by the pool at that time was Mahdi
233 576 from a neighboring tribal segment. Seeing Idris (whom he had not
165 known), he shouted the customary greeting, "Peace on you." Startled
by the voice of Mahdi, Idris lost his balance and fell in the deep
water of the pool. Mahdi rushed to help him, but the water was too
deep, and Idris drowned. Feeling sorry for Idris, Mahdi took the
flock and went back to the camp of Idris where he informed the
682 latter's wife of what had happened. A few days later, Mahdi was
627 paid a visit by Sheikh Elewa, the aqila of Bait Asabei' and known
[613] mardi in the area who informed Mahdi that the family of Idris was
demanding the payment of the sum of L.E. 300 for the death of their
682 relative. A Mi'ad was set for the following week. In that Mi'ad,
627 and after Mahdi admitted that it was his greeting that had startled
672 613 Idris and caused him to fall in the well, the two Mardis representing the two parties agreed that the payment of the sum of three
hundred pounds was in order and that Mahdi and his amar must pay it
to the victim's family as soon as possible. At first, Mahdi seemed
to accept the judgment of the two Mardis, especially when both were
prominant members of some of the influential tribal segments in the
area. But Mahdi was a poor man, and his amar was very small in number, which made the payment of the bloodmoney almost impossible.
682 Although appeal in the ordinary legal sense does not exist in such
627 a system like that of Awlad Ali, where no judgment is forced upon
672 695 any of the disputing parties, and where the pronouncement of the

682 settlement is usually made after the parties have agreed to it,
627 yet, in certain instances where one of the parties later feels that
672 the settlement was not just or that he was coerced into accepting
695 it, he may ask for a second Mi'ad during which new procedures start
in the case. In the present case, although Mahdi had originally
accepted the judgment of the awaqil, as time passed and he real-
ized that he was unable to pay the bloodmoney, he started to ques-
682 tion the feasibility of the settlement. He discussed the matter
672 with Sheikh Suliman el-Gerery from the Murabiteen tribe of Gerera,
695 a tribe whose members are feared throughout the area for the belief
554 that they have certain supernatural powers. Sheikh Suliman himself
792 is highly respected, and people believe that after his death he will
[776] become "wali" or a saint. After hearing Mahdi's complaint, Sheikh
Suliman told him that the settlement was unjust and told him that he
would do something about it. The following Thursday, Sheikh Suliman
called on Mahdi and asked him to bring his donkey and follow him.
They rode to a small desert town called Bahig where the local market
● 613 is held every Thursday. On market day, the awaqil of various tribal
517 segments usually gather in front of the general store in the town
571 drinking tea and chatting until their sons or the younger members
443 576 of their families sell the sheep and buy the necessary items. Every-
one passing by the gathering is expected to greet the gathering, get-
ting off his donkey as a sign of respect to the prominent people.
[689] Failure to greet a fellow tribesman is considered a serious offense
liable to a fine of more than L. 50 and ten goats in certain cases.
[673] It is considered a very serious crime. One informant once told me,
000

000 own home." The following morning a Mi'ad was called for by the two
627
613 aqila who achieved the first settlement, and in it, Mahdi was re-
682 leased from his obligation to pay the bloodmoney, although he was
695 asked to pay the sum of fifty pounds to the widow of the deceased
as a gesture of friendship.

CASE #6: The Case of the Careless Guest

574 The present case involved Ali from the Geneishat tribe who
682 lives in the desert town of Matruh where he has a general store.
He goes on frequent visits to Alexandria to get supplies for his
store. On one of these trips he passed by the camp of 'Awad from
a different tribal segment. Hungry and tired, Ali decided to spend
the night at the camp and continue his trip the following morning.
He went to the first tent in the camp which happened to be that
of 'Awad, who welcomed him and ordered his wife to prepare dinner
for the guest. He then invited other members of the camp to have
tea with the guest as a gesture of hospitality. When Ali sat down
to eat, he took off his shoes, and put his rifle against a pile of
rugs and blankets behind him. As the group was chatting, a goat
belonging to one of the invited neighbors entered the tent where
the men were sitting. Afraid that it might soil the carpets which
he had put out for the guest, Awad chased the goat out of the tent.
On its way out, the goat touched the guest's gun which fired, killing Hussein, the brother-in-law of one of the neighbors.

682 The local authorities were notified of the incident, but after
627 conducting a preliminary investigation, they filed the case as accidental death. The tribal proceedings continued, however. After

105 The judicial process among Awlad Ali of the Western Desert of
Egypt has been dealt with in the context of political organization of
105 the group. The main feature of the political organization of Awlad Ali
613 is the absence of centralized leadership. The only formally recognized
leadership is that of the aqila, the leader of the bait tribal segment.
105 The sources of the aqila's authority derive from a number of sources,
613 one of which is his judicial role. It is through him that disputes involving
627 members of his bait are solved. The process by which he performs
this crucial function is that of informal mediation in which both
the personal qualities of the aqila, as well as the weight of his tribal
segment, play an important role. This is especially important in a society
[692] with no court system or formal hearing and where durability of any
settlement depends on its being accepted by the parties involved.

105 The main aim of the judicial process is to affect reconciliation of
182 the parties and to restore a certain degree of social order and cohesion
627 that was disrupted by the dispute. The need to restore the social order
[619] and to maintain friendly relations between tribal members is a response
to certain aspects of the natural and social environment in which the
105 group finds itself. Natural resources in the area are very meager, and
182 subsistence activities require that the tribesmen constantly move with
619
233 their herds for pasture throughout an area already divided among the
various tribal segments. Since the place and nature of pasture differ
from one year to the next, the identity of the specific tribal unit which
would be sought for help varies correspondingly. This creates a general
feeling of dependency that characterizes the social relations in the area.

sections of a tribe may be opposed to one another they regard 619 themselves as an undivided group in opposition to neighbouring tribes, and are so regarded by their neighbours. Thus a Qalbati is only a Qalbati in Hasa country. In 'Abaidat or Bara'asa country he is a Hasi. Likewise a Darsi or an 'Abidi in contrast to members of other tribes regards the whole of the Darsa or the 'Abid as his people, his tribal brothers.

Each tribe in this commonly accepted sense has its *watan*, its 619 homeland, its soil, its arable, its pastures, and its wells; and 421 each has its camel-brand which is also carved on the tomb- [764] stones of its dead. The tribal lands are vested in the tribe, which has residual rights in them. They cannot, therefore, be alienated to other tribes without the consent of the whole tribe. A tribe 619 is conceived of as a huge family descended from a common 614 ancestor, from whom the tribe generally takes its name. Hence its segments can be figured either as a series of political sections or as genealogical branches of a clan.

A tribe is divided into several, generally two or three, 619 primary divisions, or sub-tribes, which own well-defined portions 613 of the tribal territory, in most cases running in strips unbroken by intrusive elements. These primary divisions are of the same pattern as the tribe of which they form part. Each division has its *watan*, which its members own and defend collectively. They believe that they are descended from a common ancestor, who is generally a son of the ancestor of the tribe. Primary tribal divisions split into secondary divisions, and secondary divisions into tertiary divisions, and so on. Each of the smaller divisions is a replica of the larger ones and has the same preferential and exclusive rights in its lands, an encroachment on which by another division will lead to fighting. Each has within the tribal brand its special lineage markings. The members of each division also consider that they are descended from a common ancestor who, in his turn, is descended from the ancestor of the larger division of which they form a section. The further the sub-division the more the resultant groups take on the complexion of kinship aggregates, rather than of political aggregates.

These kinship aggregates or extended family groups are the basic units of tribal life. They are called *biyut* (sing. *bait*). The [423] tribe may be the residual owner of land and water but the *biyut* are the owners in use. Their members live in the same

619 stretch of tribal territory, move during the rains to the same
613 grazing grounds, use the same wells during the dry season, and
cultivate adjacent strips of arable. The members of a *bait* have
a lively sense of solidarity, and this is most evident in fighting
and feuds. It is their common duty to avenge a slain kinsman
and they share the *diya*, indemnity, should they accept it in
[672] the place of a life. They are jointly responsible for a wrong any
one of them may commit. The smaller *biyut* are often identical
[621] with camps, usually from five to ten tents, in grazing grounds,
and several closely related *biyut* camp near together in the
vicinity of springs and wells in the summer, their combined
camps then amounting sometimes to over a hundred tents.

619 What has been said above about tribal structure applies only
to the free tribes and the larger client tribes living on their own
land. The client tribes which are split up and scattered throughout
Cyrenaica are not tribes in a political, but only in an ethnic,
619 sense. It will be found that in any of the main tribes stranger
614 groups, sometimes of client origin, have attached themselves
608 to the clan dominant in the tribal area and through some fiction,
myth, or fraud, have grafted their branch of descent on to the
genealogical tree of this clan. The Bedouin use the word *laf* to
describe this process and they say that kinship established in this
way may become as strong as kinship of blood.

619 The structure of a tribe is expressed in terms of the lineage
614 system of the clan dominant in its territory, the tribal segments
being associated with branches of descent from the ancestor of
613 this clan. The primary tribal sections are identified with lineages
descended from some of this ancestor's descendants in the male line; the secondary tribal sections are identified with lineages descended from more of his descendants farther down the line of descent; and so on till the smallest territorial segments and the smallest lineages are reached. Thus a lineage considered as a branch of a clan consists of all those persons who trace their descent through the male line to a common ancestor, but it can also be, and in speech often is, conceived of politically as an agnatic group of this kind together with stranger and *Marabtin* accretions which occupy its territory and make common cause with it in disputes with other tribes or segments of the same tribe.

A simple example is given in illustration of tribal segmentation

and of the consistency between lineages of a clan and segments 619
of a tribe. In explanation of it a few words must first be said 614
about the terms *qabila*, *'aila*, and *bait*. *Qabila* is the word 613
generally used to denote a tribe or primary tribal division.


AL-DARSA
MASAMIR
MARABTIN
AL-SHABARQA
AL-BAKHAYIT
AL-QALABTA
Balrabat
Al-Shahth
Al-Mahamda
At Brahim
At al-Mzatal
AL-MUASA
Al-Aqta
AL-BARA'ASA
AL 'ABAIDAT
'AILAT FAYID
Tribal Boundaries
1st. Subdivision
2nd. Subdivision
3rd. Subdivision
Al-Aqta 4th. Subdivision
Sanusiya Zawiya:-
Built
Not completed
Marabout Tomb
Scale
0 1 2 3 4 kms.

102
131
619
778
795*
613

The Divisions of the Hasa Tribe.

'*Ailat* are the lineages into which a clan is divided and hence 619
the sections of a tribe of various sizes in which these lineages are 614
found and after which they take their names. *Biyut* are small 613
lineages, or extended families, with a depth of five or six generations from the present day to their founders. It must be noted, however, that all these terms are relative and are used in a more or less comprehensive sense according to the context.

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619
613


AL-HASA
Hawass
AL-QALABTA
Qalbat
Qassam
'AL-MUASA
AL-MAHAMDA
AL-SHABARQA
AL-BAKHAYIT
Musa
Muhammad
Shibriq
Bakhit
'At BRAHIM
'At AL-MZATAL
'At AL-SHAUQI
Brahim
Mzatal
Ma'afi
'At AL-SLAILIKH
Zaidan
Mansur
'At BALRABA'I
'At AL-AQTA'
Bt Bu SHNAINIFA
Muhammad
Tahir
Bu Shnainifa
Sultan
Jibrin
Bt BU HAUDHANA
Sultan
Sa'ad
'Umar
Bt WA'AIRA
Balal
Wa'aira
Bt MUHAMMAD
Bt QASHAISH
Bt 'ALI
Muhammad
Qashaish
'Ali
Bu Halaiqa
Salih
Bt BU HALAIQA
Bt GHAIZAN
Bt BRAHIM
Bt MUSTAFA
Bt AL-HABAL
Bu Halaiqa
Ghaizan
Brahim
Mustafa
Husain
'Aqila
Mehemmed
Muhammad
Jibrin
Mustafa
'Abd al-Khaliq
Hamad
Mahmud
Sa'ad
'Abd al-'Azim
'Abd al-Salam
'Abd al-Razaq
'Abdalla
Salih
Mahmud
Mustafa
Ramadan

Names of tribal sections are printed in capital letters.
'At = 'Ailat.
Bt = Bait.

619
613
If reference be made to the accompanying map and genealogical chart it will be seen that the Hasa tribe is made up of three primary sections, the Qalabta, the Shabarqa, and the Bakhayit, distributed in strips running from north to south, which are very typical and give to each section equal con-

tions of soil, water, and grazing. We trace the segmentation of 619 the Qalabta alone and see that it has two divisions, the Muasa 613 and the Mahamda. We follow the line of Muhammad alone and note that it splits into three lineages, *'Ailat* Brahim, *'Ailat* al-Mzatal, and *'Ailat* al-Shauqi (there is dispute, arising from quarrels over land, about the legitimacy of this branch). From Mzatal descend the three minor *'ailat*, al-Slailikh, al-Aqta', and Balraba'i. Following only the first line we note that *'Ailat* al-Shlailikh then divides into the various *biyut* shown on the chart, al-Habal, Mustafa, Brahim, &c., the male membership of only one of which, *bait* al-Habal, is presented in the genealogy. Where the name of an *'aila* or *bait* is different from that of its founder, it almost invariably means that the founder's nickname has been used, the Cyrenaican Bedouin having a partiality for nicknames.

Each section of a tribe, from the smallest to the largest, has 619 its Shaikh or Shaikhs. The tribal system, typical of segmentary 554 structures everywhere, is a system of balanced opposition between tribes and tribal sections from the largest to the smallest divisions, and there cannot therefore be any single authority in a tribe. Authority is distributed at every point of the tribal structure and political leadership is limited to situations in which a tribe or a segment of it acts corporately. With a tribe this only happens in war or in dealings with an outside authority which for its own purposes recognizes the tribe as an administrative unit. There cannot, obviously, be any absolute [643] authority vested in a single Shaikh of a tribe when the fundamental principle of tribal structure is opposition between its [671] segments, and in such segmentary systems there is no state and no government as we understand these institutions; and criminal law is absent and civil law exists only in a very rudimentary form. Consequently the exact status of a Shaikh can 554 only be defined in terms of a complicated network of kinship ties and structural relations. It is only necessary here to emphasize that his social position is unformalized and that he must in no sense be regarded as a ruler or administrator. Bedouin respect their Shaikhs, but they do not regard them as superiors. Rather their influence and wealth are considered as capital to be drawn on for the benefit of whoever is in need of them. So long as a Shaikhly family can keep their prestige,

554 derived from the strength of their section, their wealth, their traditional place in Bedouin society, and the character of their leading members, so long only are they regarded as Shaikhs of whatever the grade may be.

554 619 [642] In recording his impressions of the Aulad 'Ali tribe the generous and unfortunate Pacho gives an excellent picture of the Bedouin Shaikh's position in tribal society. He says that it is difficult to discover any government in their society, which might be called aristocratic, though it is such in form rather than in substance. The precarious authority of the Shaikhs rests not on force but on the renown and esteem they enjoy in the tribe. 554 619 *648 He adds that at the time of his visit it had become customary, after Muhammad 'Ali Pasha had broken the tribe, for the Shaikhs to get their titles confirmed by the Pasha of Egypt but that when they returned to their camps with the robes of honour bestowed on them by the Pasha of Egypt, these garments, far from adding to their prestige and making them objects of regard, excited derision and aversion unless the backing of the tribe had preceded the approval of the Pasha.[1]

554 613 The Italian lawyer Savarese has also written an illuminating description of the status of a Cyrenaican Bedouin Shaikh. Each *bait* and each *'aila* has its Shaikh, chosen for his age and wisdom or for his prowess, though the Shaikhship is generally [556] hereditary in certain families. A Shaikh receives obedience and respect from his dependants but ought to be rich because the demands of hospitality are considerable. He takes a leading part in the settlement of disputes and must have the tact necessary to maintain the unity of the group in opposition to other groups of the same order. He represents his group in relations with these other groups and in the larger group of which it forms part. In matters in which his group as a whole is concerned he takes the advice of the Shaikhs of its divisions. He commands the men of the group in war and he collects the tribute due from 554 the group to the Government. Nevertheless, a Bedouin Shaikh, however large the group he represents, lives and dresses like his fellow Bedouin, though, being rich, his tent may be larger than most and he has more horses and they are more richly appointed.

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[1] J. R. Pacho, *Relation d'un Voyage dans la Marmarique, la Cyrénaïque et les Oasis d'Audjelah et de Maradèh*, 1827, p. 67.

of Cyrenaica.[1] The Bedouin remember with gratitude, as I have 771
often heard them declare, the moral and cultural benefits 797
brought to them by the Order. If they have fallen from the low 793
religious and literary standards to which the Sanusiya raised a 795*
fraction of them it is due to the virtual extinction of its teaching office during their long struggle with the Italians.

II

The Bedouin the Grand Sanusi found in Cyrenaica were not 771
only Muslims but also inveterate devotees of saints, the 792
Marabtin (sing. *Marabat*) or Marabouts, as they are called in 793
European accounts of North Africa, and the Grand Sanusi was 776
in the long tradition of these holy men. Therefore, although I 778
have touched on the matter in Chapter I, I need not excuse myself for treating it again in its Cyrenaican context, for Bedouin attachment to the Sanusiya springs from their personal devotion to the Grand Sanusi and his family, and not the other way round, and the Grand Sanusi derived his sanctity, and thereby his power, from the fact that he was a Marabout. The Bedouin are familiar with saints and ignorant of Orders. To them the Grand Sanusi was a saint and wonderworker, and a man with *baraka*, an ample measure of God's grace which flowed through him to ordinary folk; but there was nothing extraordinary about him. They knew his kind of old. When he died his tomb became a shrine, the largest and richest in Cyrenaica it is true, but only one among very many, dating from the Companions of the Prophet Muhammad, through the Martyrs who were killed fighting for the faith in Cyrenaica, to the pious and learned
men of yesterday and the day before. His successors, by their [613] ●
kinship with him, and in virtue of their spiritual legacy from him, became heirs to his *baraka*; and so, to a lesser degree, have the heirs of the other religious teachers who came to Cyrenaica from the west, who died and were buried there, and whose descendants are the ***Marabtin bil baraka*** lineages of to-day. The authority the Grand Sanusi had over the Bedouin of Arabia and North Africa can be parallelled by the careers of many holy

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[1] Giuseppe Macaluso, *Turchi, Senussi e Italiani in Libia*, 1930, p. 32; Giglio, op. cit., p. 22; and Arcangelo Ghisleri (quoting Andrea Pedretti), *Tripolitania e Cirenaica dal Mediterraneo al Sahara*, 1912, p. 132. [13]

771 men in North Africa whose families still retain much wealth and
792 influence. It was this Marabout status of the Grand Sanusi in
793 the eyes of the Bedouin which won him their respect: it was the
776 organization of the Sanusiya Order, an organization the earlier
778 Marabouts did not have, which enabled him to turn this respect
into a theocracy.

*175 There is more than one explanation of the origin of the word
792 '*Marabat*'. That generally accepted is that it derives from the
root RBT, to bind, and hence from '*ribat*', a fortified convent,
619 inhabited by warrior-monks, found on the marches of Islam in
[192] its early days of expansion by arms. The word later became
attached to the tribes which settled in Andalousia under the
leadership of the Saharan tribe of the Sanhaja and was corrupted
into the European 'Almoravides'. After the fall of the Sanhaja
dynasty in the twelfth century part of the *Marabtin* tribes fell
back into central and southern Morocco, whence many individuals
moved eastwards. Some settled in Cyrenaica,
generally on their return from the pilgrimage to Mecca, and
their fanaticism, asceticism, ability to read and write, and thaumaturgic
powers, impressed the simple Bedouin, who accepted
them as holy men and magicians and used them to write charms,
to perform religious rites, and to act as mediators in intertribal
• [613] disputes. Sometimes, as we have seen, these men
founded lineages which, dwelling under the shadow of their
saintly forbears, became nuclei of social agglomerations which
have developed in course of time into tribal groups, thus taking
the shape of the tribal society in which they lived. The word
[192] '*Marabtin*' thus came to mean holy men (and their tombs) and
then, in addition, tribes tracing their descent, or supposed
descent, from these holy men and also, finally, in Cyrenaica,
tribes who are clients of the great *Sa'adi* tribes which own the
earth and water.

778 Some of the better known of the Cyrenaican saints, but by
776 no means all, have gleaming white cupolas, supported by four
792 walls, erected over their tombs, and inside the walls is a *tub*, a
wooden box, over the grave, and this is covered with coloured cloth on which are inscribed passages from the Koran. Inside also are often a few pages from sacred books, occasionally a few small coins given by the local Bedouin, and any property, such as tents or ploughs, the Bedouin have wished to deposit in a

Marabouts of the kind I have described were still coming to 792
Cyrenaica from the west up to the time when the Grand Sanusi 793
began his preaching in the country. Two of them whom he 795*
found there, already living among the Bedouin, the one on the
western and the other on the eastern part of the plateau, teaching
them and settling their disputes, became his followers: Sidi
Ahmad bin 'Abdalla al-Sakkuri, a late arrival from the west
whose descendants became Shaikhs of the zawiya of al-Marj,
and Sidi al-Martadi Farkash, of an old *Marabtin* family of
Cyrenaica, whose descendants became Shaikhs of the lodges at
Umm al-Razam, Bishara, and Martuba. But the great majority
of the Grand Sanusi's helpers were men who had come with him
from the west, chiefly from Algeria. Other *Ikhwan* families, [613]
mostly of the Khattabi lineage, of which the Sanusi family are
a branch, came later, also from Algeria, in the time of Sayyid
al-Mahdi. To the Bedouin they were all Marabouts and when [778]
they had in their lifetimes a reputation for piety or learning
their tombs in the Sanusiya lodges in which they resided became
places of cult like those of their forerunners all over Cyrenaica.
But unlike the earlier Marabouts these Sanusiya Brothers were
not only holy men. They were also members of a fraternity, of
an organization. The Sanusiya Order was thus not only heir 795*
to the accumulated capital of the Marabouts, but was able to 182
exploit it as a corporation. It incorporated a number of isolated
cults into a single wider cult, fractionized, it is true, by tribal
particularisms, but, all the same, brought under a common
organization. Each lodge of the Order was a cult centre, but it
was something more: it was part of a general cult directed
through the lodges towards the Head of the Order. The tribes 619
of Cyrenaica became through the Order linked from above in a 182
common, if loose, organization under a single, sacred, Head. 795*
This was possible only because a tribal system already existed 793
uniting the different tribes, in spite of their feuds and enmities,
into a society which, though lacking political unity, rested on
common sentiments, a common way of life, and a common
lineage structure.

What gave stability to this new relationship between the [648]*
Bedouin tribes and the Sanusiya Order, turning the sacred Head
into a secular leader and the religious organization into a
government, and changed a loose federation of tribes into a

Order concurred. Thus we find charge of a zawiya continuing 795*
in the hands of a single family to the point at which Muhammad 793
Yahiya bin al-Sanusi bin 'Umar al-Ashhab was appointed by 423
Sayyid Ahmad al-Sharif to succeed his father as Shaikh of Msus 428
at the age of sixteen. Some of these families sent their roots so 602
deep that not only did they obtain what amounted to hereditary rights to a particular lodge, but controlled several lodges. Such were the influential families of Ghumari, Kalili, Farkash, and Ashhab, and the Khattabi families.

Hence we find to-day that many of the lodges are in hereditary charge of a family of Shaikhs who consider that they have a pre-emptive claim to its directorship and to enjoyment of its revenues, a claim backed by tribal opinion and by the acquiescence of the present Head of the Order. Thus the Dardafi family may be said to own the Shahhat lodge, the Isma'ili family to own the Fayidiya lodge, the 'Ammur family to own
the Qafanta lodge, and so on. So much is this the case that [578]
disputes now sometimes arise, as in 1942 at Qafanta and Mirad
Mas'ud, between members of a family about which of its members should succeed to the directorship of a lodge and control of its revenues.

This development is not surprising. Poor communications 795*
and the troubled times since 1911 have encouraged local auto- 793
nomy in the Sanusiya organization. The Shaikh of a lodge 428
brought up his family in it and his sons had no other home than the lodge and no other friends than the Bedouin around it and
the families of Shaikhs in nearby lodges. Tribesmen dislike [178]
change and prefer to have for the Shaikhs of their lodges
members of families they know and who share their local
interests. But the tendency towards hereditary succession is 795*
also related to the fundamental lineage structure of the tribes 793
among whom the lodges are distributed, for it is noticeable that
whereas hereditary succession became customary in the Bedouin, 613 ●
or tribal, lodges, it has been by comparison lacking in the urban 428
lodges of Banghazi and Darna and in those oases where tribal [369]
structure has become obscured by village life. This would seem to suggest that *Ikhwan* families tend the more easily to become stabilized as lines of hereditary Shaikhs the more closely they are associated with tribal structure. It is precisely in the most powerful, numerous, and integrated tribal sections that we

*795 find hereditary transmission of Shaikhship of lodges most
793 accentuated, such as the Bara'asa-Tamia section (al-Zawiya
● 613 al-Baida), the 'Awaqir-Sdaidi section (Msus zawiya), and the
428 'Abaidat-Ghaith section (Tart zawiya). In the same way the
[792] earlier Marabouts became, as has been noted, founders of
lineages which were on the pattern of the branches of the Bedouin clans among whom they lived, and attached to them.

*795 Also it must be remembered that the lodges were tribal
institutions built by the local Bedouin so that they might
778 participate in the *baraka* of Sayyid Muhammad bin 'Ali al-
793 Sanusi. They participated in it through the Shaikhs of their
619 zawiyas who received their *baraka* direct from the hands of the
182 Grand Sanusi himself, or from the hands of son Sayyid al-Mahdi, and passed it on to their sons. This *baraka* belonged to the tribe, or tribal section, which built a lodge just as the *shaukha*, the secular Shaikhship of the tribe, or tribal section, belonged to it and had to be kept in it. In both the continuity of family succession had to be maintained, unless there were good reasons for acting otherwise. Thus each tribal section emphasized its autonomy in its hereditary line of religious Shaikhs, through whom the *baraka* of the founder of the Order was transmitted to them, whilst proclaiming its membership of a tribal federation with common allegiance to the Head of the Order.

*795 As I have pointed out when speaking of the sacred *Marabtin*
793 tribes of Cyrenaica, it was customary for the descendants of a
778 Marabout to reside near his tomb. I have further mentioned
that the Shaikh of a Sanusiya lodge, who is also called a *Mara-*
[776] *bat* by the Bedouin, might, if he had during life a reputation for piety, rather easily gained in Islam, be venerated as a saint when he was dead and his tomb become a shrine. This is another reason why Shaikhly families have tended to become hereditary directors of lodges.

*795 Just as almost all the Marabouts of Cyrenaica were foreigners
793 from the west, so were almost all the Shaikhs of the Sanusiya
554 lodges. The Dardafi and Isma'ili families came from Tripoli-
[167] tania, the Ghumari family from Morocco, the 'Ammur, Bu
Jibali, and Khattab families came from Algeria, and so on. As a class they enjoyed, and still enjoy, a reputation for sanctity among the Bedouin on account of their knowledge of the Koran

account of the Italian invasion of Tripolitania. Realizing that 175* they were helpless without Sanusiya support not only in the 648* Sahara but also in Libya, since they would not be able without 795* command of the sea to reinforce their garrisons there, the Turks showed themselves anxious to win over Sayyid Ahmad al-Sharif by also conferring on him new privileges. In 1910 the Governor of Banghazi proposed to make him a monthly grant of 4,000 Piastres, and the Governor of Tripoli sent a telegram in cipher to his representatives in various parts of Tripolitania asking them whether they thought the Sanusiya Order powerful enough to warrant additional privileges, which was apparently the view of Istanbul. His representatives, judging by its lesser influence in Tripolitania, where it never gained the unanimous support it received in Cyrenaica, reported that in their opinion the political importance of the Order had been exaggerated.[1]

Such of these events as were known to Italian observers shortly before and in the early stages of their war with Turkey 175* led them to false conclusions because the complexity of Arab 648* sentiments was not appreciated. The structure of Bedouin 181 society is such that whatever the size of the group a man con- 186 siders himself to belong to in any situation, he is in virtue of his 619 loyalty to it opposed to other groups of like order in the tribal structure. He is loyal to his *bait* against other *biyut*, to his *'aila* [613] against other *'ailat*, and to his *qabila* against other *qabail*. Nevertheless, he has a strong feeling of communion with all the Bedouin of his country, regardless of their tribal affiliations, in common opposition to the towns. But Bedouin and citizen are both Arab and they made common cause against the Turks, especially when the activities of the 'Young Turks' forced Turk and Arab into rival camps. But even Arab and Turk shared wider loyalties in their regard—unequal, it is true, but still shared—for the Sultanate and for Islam and they reacted in spontaneous accord against threats from Christian Powers, the French advance in the Sahara and the Italian invasion of Libya. Against Christians and Europeans Arabs and Turks were no longer Arabs and Turks but Muslims, just as against the Turks Bedouin and citizens were no longer Bedouin and citizens but Arabs, and against the towns tribesmen were no longer members of different tribes but a Bedouin community.

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[1] Macaluso, op. cit., pp. 88–90, and Serra, op. cit., p. 37.

EMRYS PETERS

18. *The Proliferation of Segments in the Lineage of the Bedouin of Cyrenaica* [*Libya*][1]

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128 In this article I do not propose to discuss the genealogies of the Cyrenaican Bedouin in full, but only such aspects of them as are strictly relevant to an understanding of their process of growth. Many other aspects of these genealogies will be referred to, and indeed, some of the arguments put forward will presume an acceptance of views which cannot be developed adequately in this article. A fuller and more general account of Cyrenaican genealogies is in preparation, and, until this is published, there is no alternative to the somewhat dogmatic statements about them which appear in the introductory part of this article.

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[173] The Bedouin of Cyrenaica claim that they are all descendants of a unique ancestress, Sa'ada. Writers in the past (e.g. Robertson-Smith 1903) have considered the occurrence of female names in patrilineal genealogies as evidence of an earlier and matrilineal mode of descent. A more satisfactory explanation of the occurrence of female names is to be found in the combination of two facts: descent in the patriline, whether or

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128 Reprinted by permission of the author and the Council from the *Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute*, Vol. 90, pp. 29–53, 1960.

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128 [1] My field work among the Cyrenaican Bedouin was made possible by an award from the Emslie Horniman Fund and a later award from the Treasury Committee for Studentships in Oriental Languages and Cultures. I wish here to express my indebtedness to both committees for their generosity. Much of the work I have done on genealogies was included in a thesis presented for the degree of D.Phil. at Oxford University in 1951. The ideas included in this thesis I developed more systematically in a course of lectures on the Bedouin which I gave at Manchester University during the session 1953–54. I subsequently read papers around the problems discussed in this paper at Oxford and Cambridge Universities. I am grateful to Professor Gluckman for reading this article in manuscript, and for the numerous discussions I have had with him on problems relating to lineage organization.

174 not male names are used, is assumed; and secondly that the
613 Bedouin are polygamous. If, then, half-brother differentiation
551 or full sibling unity is to be shown genealogically, the obvious
562 way in which this can be done is to use a maternal name in the
genealogy. Thus, in the Cyrenaican genealogy, a number of tribal groups will be shown as sons of a particular father. If dif-
182 ferentiation of these groups needs to be shown, this can be ef-
613 fected by clustering the groups round, say, two female names
551 (the names of the respective mothers) thereby making the two
562 clusters of groups stand in the relationship of paternal half
brothers. The concept of the 'one womb', of maternal origin, is a critical one in the context of social cohesion, but it does not deny patriliny; on the contrary, it serves in a sense to reinforce it. Female names can be used to show a greater notion of cohesion than the mere use of male names, and the significance of a female name placed at the apex of the Cyrenaican genealogy is that it is the symbol of full brother unity at the highest political level.

173 The founding ancestress Sa'ada is credited with two sons, who
613 in turn are considered to be the founding ancestors of the two
largest groups of tribes in Cyrenaica. Each of these sons is said
619 to have begottten two sons, as shown on the accompanying
genealogy. The next generation shows a total of nine names, and these nine ancestors are considered to be the founding ancestors of the nine noble tribes of Cyrenaica.[2] Continuing the line of descent of one of these tribes—the Magharba—the same pattern of segmentation repeats itself: the tribe is divided into two primary sections having ar-Ra'aid and ash-Shamakh as the respective founding ancestors. Ash-Shamakh is said to have had four sons, and these are the founding ancestors of four secondary sections. These latter four are credited with a varying number of sons, as shown in the genealogy (Fig. 18-1).

One feature of the Cyrenaican genealogy immediately stands out from this brief description: the uniformity in the number of segments at the various levels of segmentation. Along the line of descent from Sa'ada to Nasr, the number of sons shown in the

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[162] [2] One of these, the 'Ailat Fayid, now only numbers about 150 souls, and although it is given the structural position of a tribe in the genealogy, it scarcely merits this distinction in practice.

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
SA'ADA
(1)
BARAGHITH
'AQQARA
(2)
BARAGHUTH AL-SGHAIR
JIBARNA
HARABI
'ALI (In Egypt)
TRIBES
(3)
'ABID
'ARIF
'AWAQIR
MAGHARBA
DARSA
HASA
BARA'ASA
'AILAT FAYID
ABAIDAT
(4) PRIMARY
AL-RA'AIDAT
AULAD AL-SHAMAKH
(5) SECONDARY
'ALI
MANSUR
NASR
SUBH
(6) TERTIARY
13
6
4
4
MADHKUR
HAIBA
AL-DAWWAS
UMBARAKA

FIG. 18-1 GENEALOGY 1. The names given in this genealogy are the tribal names in use. All are derivatives of personal names of ancestors, like all tribal names, except for some nicknames (e.g. Baraghith means 'the fleas') and a few which refer to a general location (e.g. the Magharba means the 'Westerners'). [551]

first four descending generations is two. At the fifth level the 173
number increases to four and finally, at the sixth level there 613
characteristically occurs a marked irregularity in the number of 619
descendants forming the founding ancestors of the tertiary sections.

Another feature of the Cyrenaican genealogy is that its 613
branches show an intimate relationship with ecological areas. 619
Thus, the major division into two branches stemming from 13
Sa'ada represents the eastern and western halves of the country 182
with associated and clear differences in ecology. Continuing the line of descent, the Jibarna and Baraghith groups of tribes occupy plain and mountain foot-hills respectively. The two Jibarna tribes in turn occupy two distinct kinds of plain. Following now the division of the Magharba tribe, its two primary sections are divided by a very conspicuous dry valley. The four secondary divisions of the Aulad ash-Shamakh primary section likewise show a relation to ecological boundaries, albeit on a smaller scale than those previously referred to, but none the less important in this more local context. Finally, the unevenly numbered tertiary sections which are derived from these four

613 619 13 182

secondary sections, in their very unevenness, show a more sensitive relation to more detailed ecological differences.

At all levels of segmentation, therefore, a high degree of consistency between the ecological divisions of the country and the genealogical divisions can be shown. Indeed the relationship is so close that it is tempting to consider the contemporary pattern of things as the only one possible. What historical evidence [167] exists is against such a view being taken. It is known that tribes have been displaced in the past, some of them or sections of them having been pushed out into Egypt, and others having altered their position. This being so, there obviously cannot be any finality about the present distribution of tribes in relation to the ecological divisions of the country. Rather, the existing pattern is one of a number of possible permutations. Again, as the relation between groups of people to their environment becomes progressively sensitive with the decrease in the size and order of the group, then the more unstable will be the relationship between the two. Conversely the greater the size and order of the group the more persistent will be its relationship to the ecology. In other words, the major ecological divisions are more fundamental in their effect on the way of life and the economy of people, whereas the more detailed ecological differences between, say, tertiary sections have a relatively minor effect. The [233] [433] ecological differences between the wooded plateau area with its cow and goat herding economy, and the arid semi-desert area with its camel and sheep herding economy has a much more profound effect on the general way of life, and is a more persistent division, than that which exists between two tertiary sections where the differences may only be in topographical details.

While therefore, the division of people into groups of various sorts is not permanently fixed in relation to ecological divisions, there is always an intimate relationship between the two which is progressively more enduring as the order of the structural segment increases. Yet even this statement of the relationship, guarded as it is, does not suffice, for the pattern and distribution of tribes and their sections at any given moment are not only a function of ecology, but they are also the result of a number of other complex factors which may be operating to reinforce or to

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complicate the more direct relationship of the distribution of groups of people to the ecology.[3] 619 [13] [182]

The Cyrenaican genealogy, then, is a conceptualization of a hierarchy[4] of ordered territorial segments. The groups stemming from the ancestor at the third order of segmentation are referred to as tribes, and each tribe is the apex of a three-tiered order of segments, which, following customary practice, are referred to as primary, secondary, and tertiary. The latter, the tertiary segment, 621 represents the group of people who, for a period of six to eight 613 months, gather together and live in what, for all intents and purposes, is a single discrete residential group.[5] This tertiary group is also the smallest political group. It has its own homeland, with its [423] water supplies, pastures, and ploughland. In this homeland live most of its members. It is a lineage *segment, and most of the* agnates of this segment live on their own homeland.[6] It is also the [682] vengeance group, which means that any one of its members can [628] be killed in vengeance for a homicide committed by any other, and that the obligation to exact vengeance falls on all members alike, regardless of relationship to the victim. Likewise, its members pay blood money as a group, and although when they receive it, a bigger portion goes to the nearest agnate of the victim, the remainder is distributed equally among all its members. The number of generations which supervene between the founding ancestor of a tertiary segment and the living is usually four or five, but there is little consistency in this number. Some tertiary

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[3] This part of the discussion is necessarily brief, but further amplification will appear in two subsequent articles now in preparation, one of which is concerned with a general treatment of Cyrenaican genealogies, and the other with a discussion of the effects of ecology on the social organization of the Bedouin. [114]

[4] I use the word hierarchy here since, although segments of any order display many like features, the orders represent distinct and progressively more embracing interests, and these differences are of such consequence that to consider one order of groups as a facsimile of a superior or inferior order can only lead to confusion. A tertiary group, that is to say, may possess many of the characteristics of a secondary group, but the one is a fundamentally different sort of group from the other, as I shall show in my forthcoming article on the feud. (cf. Smith, M. G. 1956.) [128]

[5] This statement does not apply to the Darsa and the Hasa tribes, two of the plateau tribes in Cyrenaica. The statements in this article are confined almost exclusively to the camel herders of the semi-desert. [619] [128]

[6] This, admittedly, is too general a statement to make about such an important issue, but I would prefer to leave its documentation and precision for an article on the analysis of the composition of Bedouin camps.

613 segments show a lineage depth of three generations, while others
621 show as many as six. No special importance is attached by the
Bedouin to this number, although some writers claim that a depth
of five generations is of particular significance among other Arab
621 tribes.[7] Normally, in speaking of the vengeance group, the Bed-
628 ouin refer to the name of the ancestor of a tertiary tribal section.
613 Any one claiming membership of this group, regardless of his
682 precise generational relation to the offender or the victim is immediately and equally involved with its other members. When speaking of the group as such, the Bedouin refer to it as 'those who have agreed on the blood', and use the phrase *'amara dam* to refer to it. Blood money does not pass between its members, and political division does not occur within it.

621 These small tertiary sections of tribes, then, are small residen-
613 tial groups. Their population varies from one group to another,
[162] but most of them have a total population of 150 to 200 souls.
Successive generations—at least according to the Bedouin view—add to these numbers, and also increase progressively the number of generations in their genealogies. Substantial increases of population would, of course, constitute a pressure on local resources, on the water available in the particular well of a group, on the amount of land available for ploughing, and on the pastures for animals at the end of the rainy season. Again, if each generation is to be added to the existing genealogy, this would necessitate a realignment of structural relationships with each succeeding generation. The discussion that follows is an
128 examination of the ways in which adjustments are made to
621 maintain an equilibrium between the population of a group and
613 the carrying capacity of the land on which its members live, and
of the ways in which the genealogical structure is able to persist in the face of various contingencies which threaten it.

A beginning might be made by indicating the processes at work to keep the form of the genealogy fairly fixed when there is an absence of population pressure on resources. The first problem is the simple one of describing the mechanics of manipula-

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[171] [7] e.g. Burkhardt (1831), speaks of the *Khomse*, the five generation group, as very widespread among Arabs. G. W. Murray also reports the use of the word *Khomsa* among the Arabs of the Sinai desert to designate the blood-vengeance group, but the term used by the Aulad 'Ali tribe, the cousins and Egyptian neighbours of the Cyrenaican Bedouin, he gives as *Awlia'-ed-dam* (which simply means 'blood kindred').

621
tion which enable the genealogy to remain constant in length 613
and fixed in form despite its dynamic content. 128

One of the main processes at work in foreshortening gene- 173
alogies is that referred to by Evans-Pritchard as telescoping.[8] 178
This process is also a characteristic feature of the Cyrenaican
genealogy, although its effects, to be discussed presently, differ 613
conspicuously. The way in which telescoping works in the 551
Cyrenaican genealogy is that several male names come to be omitted in the genealogy below the name of the founding ancestor of the tertiary group. Usually, the form in which this occurs it that the name of a famous tribesman, and particularly his nickname if he has one, is retained along with the personal names of his lineal descendants in successive generations. The example given below is taken from the genealogy of the Haiba tertiary section of the Magharba tribe:



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[8] 'It is evident, moreover, that since the minimal lineage consists of four or five actual steps in ascent, there has been telescoping of the agnatic line from the founder of the minimal lineage further up the line of ascent to the founder of the clan, for the founder of the minimal lineage was himself the extremity of another minimal lineage which has, by increase in generations, become the minor lineage, and so on' (Fortes & Evans-Pritchard 1940, p. 199). Since Evans-Pritchard first wrote on the telescoping of genealogies among the Nuer, other anthropologists have discussed the process in various systems. Fortes, Richards, Laura Bohannan, Cunnison, and Mitchell in their writings on the Tallensi, Bemba, the Tiv, the Luapula people, and the Yao respectively are notable examples . . . As the mode of manipulation of Bedouin genealogies is marginal to my present problem, the main comparison is not with these works but with Evans-Pritchard's earlier work on the Nuer, because the Bedouin and Nuer lineage system have more in common than either have with the other systems, excepting possibly the Tiv. (171)

173 178 • 613 551 The line shows five male names in all. The eldest surviving members of this line is Sa'aid, who almost invariably is referred to, not by his personal name, but as Bu Shliby,[9] and on the infrequent occasions when his personal name is used it is followed by Bu Shliby and not by his father's name, which is the more common practice. Again, Abdul Qadar, when his father is not about, is called Bu Shliby, and when it is necessary to give him his personal name Bu Shliby is added, except among his more intimate family kindred, when only his personal name would be used. Likewise, his son Yunis carries Bu Shliby in addition to his personal name and is sometimes even referred to as Bu Shliby only. Abdul Qadar had never known his grandfather, was aware however of his existence in the past, but did not feel it necessary to use his name, and whatever obligation he might have felt to keep the memory of his grandfather alive, he fulfilled it when he named his son after him. Many of the older members of the group are also aware of the lineal connexions between Bu Shliby and Yunis, even though they use this knowledge in a genealogical context only, but many of the younger men of the group do not know these details. It is clear that when the boy Yunis grows to old age, three names in this line will have ceased to be used.

This practice of adding to a personal name the name of a deceased ancestor making one the son of the other, is pushed to the extent of carrying forward through the generations a nickname which referred to some peculiar characteristic of the ancestor, but which has little relation to the present bearer. Thus the ancestor whose name has been retained might have been nicknamed 'The Lame One' or 'The Squint-Eyed One' because he suffered either of these personal defects; or he might have been nicknamed 'The Old One' because he lived to a ripe old age. Such nicknames might later be carried by men who are not lame, nor squint-eyed, nor old, while the names of the intervening ancestors are dropped in normal use.

Another process is at work, which needs to be distinguished from telescoping, for although the results in genealogical terms are similar, Bedouin view it in quite a different light. This is the
[553] process of fusing names. It is common practice among the Bed-

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[193] [9] The prefix *Bu* is used by the Bedouin to mean 'son of.'

ouin—and, for that matter, Arabs in other lands—to name a boy 173
after a deceased relative. Rarely is a boy named after his father, 178
unless the father's death occurs before the boy is born, in which 613
circumstance, the new-born boy would certainly take his father's 551
name. A much more common form of this practice is to name a [553]
boy after his grandfather, assuming the latter to be dead. The eldest son usually accepts this responsibility, but it by no means falls invariably to him. There is a number of reasons for this, but they need not concern us here, since they are of no relevance to the general argument. What is of concern at present is that one name in the genealogy might represent the fusion of several other similar names. When circumstances permit, an individual's line might run as follows: Muhammad—'Ali—Muhammad—'Ali—Muhammad. It is true that the man himself and those closely related to him might know full well that there are three men named Muhammad and two named 'Ali, but it would not be considered irregular if only one Muhammad and one 'Ali were given in the genealogy. A mature man, giving his genealogy, omitted his father's name, Ibrahim. When asked about the omission, he insisted that he had given it, and when he was told that the name Ibrahim given by him was intended to refer to his young son, he impatiently dismissed the matter with the observation that having given the name Ibrahim once, it mattered little whether it had been put in the position of his son or father. Pointing to his son he added, 'There is my father, Ibrahim. He has taken my father's position, has he not?'

By the fusion of names, several persons drop out of the genealogy, and by and by, the line comes to be shortened. It also has the effect of giving a person's name a weighting which otherwise it would not possess. In a sense, a young son named after a father is not merely a son but a father and possibly a great-grandfather also. The young boy becomes the contemporary carrier of the personalities of those of similar name who have preceded him, while the behaviour of the living towards him is, in virtue of this, affected in a number of details. A man who had named his son in this way, explained the matter thus: 'He is my son, but also my father because he has his name. I cannot beat him for it would be like beating my father. When he grows up and I grow old, he will look after me as if I were his son.'

173 Fusion of names appears in another context and for similar
178 reasons. Not only are lineal descendants given the name of de-
551 ceased ancestors, but a man may be given the name of any de-
613 ceased agnate of his tertiary section. Usually, this is only done
428 when a man passes on property to another who is not his direct
[553] heir. Commonly, this occurs when an agnate is also a mother's
brother, as often happens as a result of parallel cousin marriage,
and this mother's brother has no sons of his own. If he has a
sister's son, who is also his paternal nephew, he is likely to pass
[183] on his wealth to this nephew. A father, the Bedouin insist, ought
to perform three duties for his sons: attend to their circumcision,
[593] and their education in the Koran, and provide bride-wealth when
[852] they marry. All fathers attend to the circumcision of all their sons;
[871] few provide for the Koranic education of any of their sons; most
bear the burden of marrying off at least one of their sons. The
[583] performance of the latter duty is what makes the continuance
of the deceased's name an obligation, and whoever performs this duty must have his name perpetuated in one male offspring of the union which was brought about with his wealth. Wealth need not take the form of bride-wealth; it can be a legacy willed by a father, maternal uncle of the kind described above, or any other agnate who has died without male issue. Conversely, if a man dies without leaving any property, even his sons might not perpetuate his name, and eventually it will drop out of the genealogy.[10] There are instances of men inheriting the wealth of a number of agnates, using each parcel of wealth to make a new marriage and naming the sons of the various unions after the several dead who had left wealth. The example given below is taken from the genealogy of the Dawwas section of the Magharba tribe. What happened here was that the two lines stemming from Faraj and Sha'aban, after proliferating normally, became extinct. As this happened, Ibrahim, the son of Miftah, began to inherit wealth to which he was not a direct heir; and

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[588] [10] To avoid confusion, it ought to be made clear that this is not ghost marriage. As I understand ghost marriages from Evans-Pritchard's (1951) account, two main conditions must be satisfied: (i) that there should be inherited wealth to make a marriage, and (ii) that the wealth remaining after the ghost marriage has been made is inherited by the ghost children only. In Cyrenaica, wealth thus inherited becomes part of a man's total wealth and is not reserved for a ghost marriage and its issue.

as he did so, he entered into a plurality of marriages, begat sons, 173
and replaced those men in the genealogy who had died without 178
heirs. In the following generation the twin process of death and 551
replacement continued. Death removed all the male descendants 613
of Sha'aban and Faraj, and of Ibrahim Bu Miftah's many sons 428
only two, Sharif and Abdallah, were of age to marry at the time of my visits to their camp. Both had enjoyed a plurality of wives, although still young to have done so, and each marriage they contracted took place after the death of one of their kinsmen. The full and intricate details of this interesting genealogy are irrelevant here, since all the example is intended to show is how nine of eleven male names were perpetuated in the genealogy by repeating five of them twice and four of them three times, accounting in all for twenty-two names; and to do this, three men (one of them had died, but the other two were both under forty years of age) married eight wives. All the names in the two lines which have died out have not yet been brought back into the genealogy, but 'Abdallah, the son of Ibrahim, who had already done extremely well in this respect, was confident that soon the obligations towards Musa, Abd al-Rahim, and Sa'ad would be redeemed.

Thus the fusion of names not only ensures that names threatened with extinction are perpetuated, but that one person, in the name he bears, can carry the genealogical burden of several other men of that name.

[601]


SA'AID
MIFTAH
SHA'ABAN
FARAJ
IBRAHIM
IBRAHIM
SALIM
SA'AID
BU GHAWIYA
SHA'ABAN
'ABD AL RAHIM
MIFTAH
MUSA
SA'AD
FATALLAH
SHARIF
'ABDALLAH
MIFTAH
SALIM
ZAIDAN
SA'AD
SALAH
SHA'ABAN
SULAIMAN
MUHAMMAD
IBRAHIM
HAMAD
SA'AID
BU GHAWIYA
FARAJ
GHAITH
SALAH

FIG. 18-2 GENEALOGY 2. The names of dead men are underlined.

173 Telescoping of names, and fusion of names, taken together,
178 can account for the fixity of the genealogy to a large extent. In
551 addition, lines which showed every sign of normal development
613 at one time, have petered out completely, even after they have
sometimes assumed the status of tertiary segments. Conditions
173 under which this is likely to happen are not difficult to envisage.
178 If hearsay evidence is correct, disease, when it strikes in the
551 desert, might rage in a camp like wild fire, bringing death to
613 many, but not spreading to other camps, because the camps are
731 so far apart. Even in springtime when men and beasts are together
361 in the pastures, and the larger summer camp has split into
four or five smaller ones, the distance between camps may still be
[221] a few miles. In summer, when camps are concentrated on the
large watering points, the distances between them are considerably
more. Disease, therefore, does not spread from camp to camp
as rapidly as one might expect in such primitive conditions of
living. In 1949 a number of men of a small camp died within a
[761] few days of each other. Bedouin opinion attributed these deaths
to an allegedly false oath sworn by the deceased a year earlier.
[784] Medical opinion ascribed them to filth in a well which the deceased
had been cleaning before their illness. In any event, a
thriving line of a lineage was wiped off the genealogy. The portion
173 of the Dawwas genealogy shown on this page shows a
178 similar process at work. Again, to give another example, the Nasr
613 section of the Magharba tribe once included six tertiary sections,
not four as are now given. Two of these six sections are now represented by only four men of whom two are too old and decrepit to have heirs any longer, and are unmarried in any case; a third, whose wife has long passed child-bearing age, had two sons, but both died before marriage; and the fourth, a very poor and old man, has only one daughter, and is a widower. Three of the four now live with their collateral tribal section, Madhkur, and count themselves members of this group. That they once belonged to two different groups might have passed unnoticed were it not that two elders of the Madhkur section insisted that they should be correctly placed and their entire genealogies be recorded. The younger men argued that although they were aware that the two groups named Farjiani and al-Khadhar at one time

existed, it was pointless giving them separate status any longer; 173
they were content to give the three men separate lines of a few 178
613



generations, and then to tag them on to Madhkur, the founding ancestor of the segment.

Telescoping, fusion of names, and the extinction of lines are three ways in which the general fixed shape of the genealogy is retained. These three processes are only sufficient, however, in special circumstances, but before discussing these circumstances one further general condition relating to these processes must be made explicit. All three affect the genealogy within the tertiary 173
segments only, and do not affect it at any of the more superior 178
orders of segmentation. There is not a shred of evidence from 613
contemporary Cyrenaican genealogies to show that telescoping or 621
fusion occurs except within the tertiary segment, within that group, in other words, where precise genealogical links are known and can be specified, and within that small group which for most part of the year constitutes a single settlement. It is possible that groups of structurally superior levels to the tertiary have become extinct, in the way that tertiary lines have petered out. There is no definite evidence to support this, and from the analysis of Cyrenaican genealogies in general it seems that when any group is threatened with extinction—and this in turn means that fewer and fewer people will be using the same land and water facilities—there is a definite tendency for the lineage rump to fuse with a collateral lineage (and in so doing fuse their resources with those of the adopting lineage), or for a numerically more powerful lineage group to take it over by force. The number of tertiary segments spanned by a secondary segment, therefore, increases or decreases according to the circumstances; so that a secondary segment, numerically strong in its tertiary segments to-day, may become considerably weaker in future, and the numerically weak secondary section of to-day may proliferate its segments substantially in the future. Short of a significant de-

173 cline in the total population of a tribe, then, the extinction of
178 lines does not affect any order of segmentation superior to the
613 tertiary. In this respect, the Cyrenaican genealogy differs fundamentally
621 from those collected from the Nuer by Evans-Pritchard.
In the quotation from his work on Nuer genealogies (1951), he
[171] asserts that telescoping occurs 'from the founder of the minimal
lineage further up the line of ascent to the founder of the clan'. This major difference has serious implications for any discussion of lineage proliferation, but these must be left until the conditions under which proliferation is likely to occur have been analysed.

178 While it is true that the processes discussed are of importance
in retaining the general shape of the genealogy, what is assumed
613 so far is that the Cyrenaican population has been stable over long
621 periods. Stability of population is not an unreasonable assumption
161 to make for a people who live on the margin of subsistence
182 in a country where extended periods of drought are not infrequent,
[173] though seldom leading, it is true, to actual famine conditions,
[731] but producing periodic and local food and water shortages.
Disease, following quickly in the trail of shortage, it can be assumed, kept the relationship of total population to the natural resources fairly constant. What evidence there is does not support
[726] even this very general assumption, since it is known that there
have been large-scale tribal wars in the past, and a certain
[167] amount of movement of tribes, some being displaced and others
pushed eastwards into Egypt. Unless these shifts were caused by increases in the aggregate population and the consequent pressure on land and water, it is difficult to account for them. This consideration of possible overall increases in population in the past poses interesting problems related to lineage structure which cannot be adequately treated here. For the moment it is proposed to neglect possible increases in the total population during past periods in the history of Cyrenaica. The historical depth of the view now to be discussed is about seventy years, and for this period I have no evidence of any large-scale increases in population. It is reasonable, therefore, to assume a general stability of
population for this period. But the vagaries of the Cyrenaican
[132] climate are such that, in a given year, one area might be well
drenched with rain, giving excellent pastures for animals and good crops, while a nearby territorial strip might suffer a partial

178
drought giving insufficient pastures and poor crops. Good or bad 613
crops, poor or abundant pasture, in turn mean a higher or lower 621
milk yield from the animals and better or worse living conditions 161
for human beings. Such factors as these may well, over a number 182
of years, lead to unevenness in the distribution of population [132]
throughout the tertiary sections. Whatever the cause, the genealogies
show that the population of the numerous tertiary sections [173]
is unequal. Some are numerically so weak that they have to join a collateral section. Others are numerically so strong that their natural resources are insufficient to meet the needs of all their members. It was these latter segments which were in the process of splitting, and which in some cases have already done
so. The next task, then, is to demonstrate where, on the genealogy, [128]
proliferation is effected.

We have seen that in Nuer genealogies segments proliferate at 173
all orders of segmentation. Here, the process is a continuous one, 171
beginning at any point in time within the minimal lineage and 613
progressing upwards to the apex of lineage bifurcation. As particular 551
names become significant within the minimal segment, they are retained and become a permanent addition to the genealogy. In order to include these successively additional names, names of ascending ancestors are shunted further and further into the genealogical past, until presumably the effect is felt at the topmost limit of the genealogy, when the names here are pushed out of the genealogical framework altogether, and forgotten for ever. More than this, the upward shift in names at each and every point in the genealogical line means also a consequent re-ordering of structural relationships, at all levels in the
system. One vital difference between Nuer and Bedouin societies 173
which may partly, at least, account for the different genealogical 178
processes at work among them is that the Nuer, when they were 613
studied by Evans-Pritchard, were expanding territorially, and [171]
that continuous proliferation of segments throughout the structure
was the mode of dealing with a situation of expansion. The [648]
Bedouin, on the other hand, had suffered twenty years of terrible privation at the hands of the Italians, during which period thousands of them died in battle and in concentration camps, were shot up in their camps from the air, or died from want, before I went to live among them. Although I must confess that I now

Although I must confess that I now
173 find it difficult to accept Evans-Pritchard's view of genealogical
178 growth and development as stated for the Nuer, it was the view
613 I originally held with regard to Bedouin genealogies. Indeed,
551 thinking in genealogical terms only, it appears inevitable that the
114 addition of successive generations can only mean the lengthening
of the genealogy, or, if the length is to remain constant, extrusion of ancestral names must take place at the apex of the genealogy. If this view is to be accepted, several other conclusions must be accepted with it. The genealogy, as far as it goes at least, is an accurate record of descent—some names may have been lopped off at the top, but otherwise the genealogy represents a faithful statement of succession. Again, if successive generations are to be added to the genealogy, then its base must continually expand laterally. From what is known of contemporary Bedouin genealogies, there is no evidence which leads to the supposition that their base is progressively widening. With regard to the authenticity of the names in the genealogy, above the point of tertiary segmentation, I hope to show in a subsequent article on Bedouin genealogies in general, that names above the tertiary point of segmentation have remained fixed for very long periods of time, and that they bear slight relation to the passage of generations over the last century at least; moreover, in this article I hope to demonstrate that what manipulation of the genealogy takes place does not affect more than about four or five ascending generations from the living.

121 Part of the difficulty in a study of this sort lies in the strong
173 temptation to think of the genealogy *per se*, even though it is
613 readily admitted that it has a value in itself for the Bedouin. Yet
even in these terms the genealogy must always represent an ordered grouping of people, and these people live on strips of territory. The starting point of the analysis then ought to begin with the territorial ordering of groups of people. The relation of groups of people to land, moreover, is determined by the carrying capacity of that land, and it is this prerequisite which is the main variable in discussing genealogical manipulation, and not the
[182] other way about. The main landmarks of the Cyrenaican ecology
are fixed points which cannot be manipulated to fit in with the
genealogy; it is the genealogy which must be altered to comprehend the distribution of people in their ecological setting.

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619
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If, moreover, the view of a genealogy as a continually expanding line of descent is to be accepted, it must be accepted also that large structural units, even in conditions of population stability, are to experience a continuous re-ordering of their structural relationships. In practice, what this means is that a tribe of, say 20,000 souls cease to be tribesmen of a named tribe and instead all become members of an almost identical group but with a different name. To take an example from the genealogy given [162] on page 365: the Magharba tribe shown there has a total population of some 13,000 souls. If proliferation affected the topmost limits of this tribe, the apical name disappears and presumably the name of one of the primary sections is to be substituted. That is, half the tribe would have to take on the lineage name of their opposed primary section. The only alternative to the use of the name of a primary segment as a substitute for the abandoned tribal name is the acceptance by 13,000 people of a totally new name, which is most unlikely.

It is reasonable to assume therefore, that the genealogy, in its general form, is fixed for long periods of time at least. This still leaves the problem of how and where adjustments are made to face the contingencies of birth and death, of the succession of generations, and of the irregular increases and decreases of population among the tertiary segments. An important clue lies in the number of segments which appear at the various orders of segmentation. From Sa'ada, the founding ancestress, in the line which runs to Nasr, each ancestor is shown as having a pair of sons for four orders of segmentation. At the fifth generation from Sa'ada—this is now the secondary order of segmentation within the tribe—the number of sons increases to four. Not all tribes will show the same number of sons at each generation as the Magharba—some, for example, might show three instead of two at the primary order—but what is true of all tribes is that there is evident consistency in the number down to and including the fifth generation from Sa'ada; if, that is to say, one of a tribe's primary segments is divided into three secondary sections, the other one or two, as the case may be, will be divided likewise. Throughout the tribes in Cyrenaica, then, segmentation of orders superior to the tertiary segments shows a pronounced consistency in their numbers.

613 At the next level of segmentation (this now being the tertiary
619 order in any given tribe) the number of segments which appear
621 is conspicuously irregular. For the Magharba tribe, the four secondary segments, 'Ali, Mansur, Subh and Nasr are divided into thirteen, six, four, and four segments respectively. Similar irregularity appears in other tribes.[11] The pattern of the genealogy is always one of regularity in the number of segments at all points in it except for the point of tertiary segmentation where conspicuous irregularity becomes immediately evident. Since these
613 segments constitute the summer camps of the Bedouin, this is not
619 surprising, for these small groups will show greater susceptibility
621 to details of local water supplies, pasturing facilities, ploughland
133 areas, and topographical features than would the numerically
182 larger and structurally superior groups occupying larger areas of
131 territories of greater ecological importance. If we follow the line
from Sa'ada to Nasr again, the bifurcation at the first order of segmentation is consistent with the division of the country into the permanently green high altitudes of the plateau, and the extended low-lying plain area of the western half of the country.
[134] Between the territory of the Magharba tribe ('The White Plain') and that of its neighbour tribe, the 'Awaqir ('The Red Plain'), there is a major soil difference, which is such a conspicuous feature of the landscape, and so sharply defined, that one is almost aware when one has crossed the tribal boundary. Within the Magharba tribe, a prominent dry river valley cuts the territory in two, the landscape to the west of it being characteristically serrated, making travel in an east-west direction difficult, while to the east the landscape is much more docile and undulating. The four sections of the ash-Shamakh branch again represent four quite distinct areas. The territory of one section is almost conterminous with the narrow belt of sand dunes along the coast; the territory of another is a block of rough and tumbled land in the west; the territory of a third, in the centre, is made up of a few low-lying shallow valleys; and the territory of the fourth,

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[114] [11] It is necessary here to warn the reader that, brilliant an ethnographer as Agostini undoubtedly was, his grouping of tribal sections is not always correct. I had his book (Agostini 1922–23) with me in the field and checked his tribal survey. I found that at several important points his ordering of the segments was incorrect. I should add that the differences between Agostini and myself are not due to the kind of changes discussed in this article.

stretching across to the village of Ajadabiya in the east, topples 613
in undulations away into the flat expanses of the desert to the 619
south. At all these points of segmentation, the territories occupied 621
by the various sections are large and roughly defined, and 133
the population aggregates supported on these territories run from 182
over a thousand at one end to tens of thousands at the upper 131
limits. The tertiary sections are numerically much smaller, some
of them numbering as few as a hundred souls in all, and the
territories to which they are attached are correspondingly
smaller. The relationship between the numbers in this order of
section, and the precise amount of water available in the local
wells is an intimate one. If the population of one of these groups
increases, or if the number of animals rises, or if the springs show
a decline in the volume of water they give forth, or if the winter
rainfall has allowed the storage in wells of only a small quantity
of water, a rearrangement of the group must be effected. A significant
alteration of any one of these components must mean
that the local group must split to enable a new adjustment to be
made in the relationship of man and animals to water.

Whatever changes occur within groups of any size, since the 173
genealogy embraces the entire population, these must appear on 178
the genealogy in some way or other. Now a genealogy is as rigid 829
a framework, as fixed and final a pattern of grouping, as can be 613
imagined. The impression that they are thus rigid and fixed, except 551
for the addition of successive generations, is strengthened
by the way in which the Bedouin use them. From their young
boys to their old men, the Bedouin are expert genealogists, and
the names of ancestors, for one reason or another, are never far
from their lips. Names are kept alive by constant use, since all [571]
references to inter-group relationships must be in terms of these
names. More than this, the Bedouin were proud to the point of 173
boastfulness of their genealogical knowledge, and, wherever I 829
travelled, the first request I had to comply with was to take down
a large portion of a tribal genealogy. In recording their endless 613
genealogies, one feature about them came to assume increasing 551
interest; while there was remarkable unanimity with regard to 123
most of the names given, there was one point of marked ambiguity—at 126
the tertiary level of segmentation. I recorded genealogies
in four tribes on an extensive scale, and in each tribe

173 ambiguity surrounding the actual names and their correct posi-
829 tion occurred at about the fifth ascending generation. Whenever
613 this point was reached in the recordings, arguments would flare
551 up over the names to be included or excluded and over the rela-
123 tion of these names to those above and below, with the result
126 that for several people of the same segment there would be sev-
eral versions of a genealogy which differed only at this one point.
An example of this sort is given below from the genealogy of the
Nasr section, which shows seven different versions of the arrange-
ment of ancestors round about the fifth ascending generation
from the living.

173 The confusion at and around the fifth ascending generation
829 appeared with such regularity in the genealogies that I feel justi-
613 fied in referring to it as 'the area of ambiguity'. It seems likely,
551 moreover, that in any society where the lineage structure is
closely tied to the territorial disposition of groups, since the genealogy is so rigid, there needs to be in it somewhere an area of ambiguity if it is to be related to reality. Without this ambiguity, the form of the genealogy is too rigid to comprehend changes which occur. This point in the genealogy came to assume critical significance as the point where adjustments in it are made. Other kinds of evidence point to the same conclusion.

[601]


(1)
NASR*
UMBARAKA
HAIBA
MADHKUR
MUMEN
BIN NASR
MADHKUR
HAIBA
UMBARAKA
(3)
SA'AID
HASAIN
MADHKUR
HAIBA
(4)
SA'AID
(6)
HASAN
MADHKUR
HAIBA
SA'AD
MUMAN
(7)
HAIBA
MADHKUR
UMBARAKA
SA'AD
(2)
MUMEN
UMBARAKA
MADHKUR
HAIBA

FIG. 18-3 GENEALOGY 3. *There is another section, al-Dawwas, which belongs to this group, but to include this as well would greatly complicate the issue without giving any additional information.

The Proliferation of Segments

There are, in Cyrenaica, three major status groups among the 619
tribes: the noble or free-born tribesmen (*al-Hurr*), those who 554
have been adopted or grafted on to a tribe (the *Laff*), and the 608
clients (*Marabtin*).

Those who claim to be free-born also claim ownership of the 619
natural resources. The *Laff* do not own these. They are people 608
thought not to have originally been of the lineage of the tribe 621
with which they are resident. They are found sometimes in ones 613
and twos in the camps of the free-born, but sometimes constitut- [423]
ing tertiary groups themselves. Now when such people have re-
sided with their free-born hosts for several years and one of them 619
has married one of the host's daughters, they are grafted to the 608
genealogy at the point of tertiary segmentation, that is, where 613
ambiguity occurs in the genealogy. Obviously, persons thus 621
grafted to the lineage cannot be shown as descendants of one 173
of the living or of the recently dead, remembered perhaps by
some of the elders still living. It is equally true to say that they
cannot be grafted to the lineage at a point superior to that of
the tertiary segments, since this would involve recognition by a
number of tertiary groups whose members may know little or
nothing about them. When a person enters a new tribe, the only
way in which he can do so is to go to live in a camp, and it is the
concern of the people of that particular camp whether or not they
accept him, since it is they who have to decide whether their
resources are sufficient to support a newcomer. Once a man has
been accepted as a full member of a tertiary section, membership
of superior tribal sections is automatic, although to enter into
tribal membership he requires the permission of members of a
tertiary section only. To graft at a point superior to the tertiary
would be the same as giving a man superior structural status, but
without a camp in which to dwell. There is only one place for
his incorporation, and that is where the ambiguity in the gene-
alogy permits manipulation to include new lines. In this way the [597]
adoption of a person into a lineage does not offend the sense of
kinship of the receiving group since the point of inclusion is an
ancestor about whom little or nothing is known and whose au-
thenticity is frequently doubted by some. What has been referred
to as an area of ambiguity is, moreover, something of a jumble of
names, and it is not a difficult matter, if a new line has to be

619 attached somewhere along the line, to attach it to one of these
608 names. Bedouin welcome, as members of their camps, practically
613 anyone who wishes to join, even, in the case of one group, an
621 Italian. The limit to this acceptance of members is, of course, the
173 number of people who can be supported by the local resources.
If people are being admitted freely to membership of a particular
[182] camp, this means that there is a local surplus of land and water,
so that the number of grafts being supported by any particular section is a useful index of the extent to which the resources are being used. Conversely, as sometimes happens when grafted elements become numerous, or when the water supply, for various reasons, dwindles, it may be necessary to detach a grafted group.
[578] Such action is always the occasion of a violent dispute, usually
over watering rights, and not infrequently fights break out. Whether or not the grafted group wins, from then onwards it will be forced to exist as an independent group, and a new tertiary section will have been born. No matter which of the processes involving grafts is considered—incorporation or detachment—both are contained within the framework of the tertiary section, without any effect on the rest of the structure.

619 The position of the clients, in the context of this discussion, is
not unlike that of the grafts. Briefly, clients are men who are con-
[423] sidered to have originated from a country other than Cyrenaica,
and who for this reason cannot claim rights to land and water—at least this is the theory, although in some circumstances they are able to do so successfully. They are of various kinds, but they are not included in the genealogies given by the free-born. Clients are found grouped in two main ways. There are some large groups which constitute tribes in the sense that they display a genealogical and territorial organization like those of the free-born, and are usually to be found flanking the main tribes of the country on their borders. Some of these are powerful groups and enjoy considerable independence of action, but whatever their characteristics they none the less speak of themselves as 'for' or
619 tied to the noble tribe whose territory includes theirs. Further,
571 the sections of these client tribes have their special ties with
621 tertiary sections of the noble tribes, which are not merely ties of
621 sentiment, but which take the form of valuable mutual help in a
613 number of situations. A whole client tribe, in the sense that it is

occupying territory which cannot be said to belong to any particular 619
section of their noble patron tribe, is tied to the patron 571
tribe as such. Yet it is through the small tertiary segments that 621
these ties are made effective. In this sense, a client tribe is a combination 613
of small groups of people each group having specific
relationships with defined tertiary sections, and participating in
the tribe of their patrons through these relationships.

Secondly, clients are found distributed in small groups, sometimes 619
no more than one or two men, but often in clusters large 621
enough to compose a small camp. Practically all tertiary sections 613
of the noble tribes have some clients either living with them or
sharing their resources. While clients continue to reside with a 619
particular tertiary section, it is the members of the latter who are 621
responsible for them and vice versa. If, for example, one of the 613
clients commits a homicide, the gathering of blood-money is the 672
responsibility of the noble tertiary section to which he is attached, [682]
and vengeance can be exacted on any member of the
noble section. In other circumstances, when the offender is a
nobleman, then the clients of his group are the first to be approached
for blood-money. Tied in this way to a particular 619
tertiary section, they are not, however, compelled to reside with 621
its members permanently. On the contrary, they may be forced 182
to move. If, for example, there is a pressure on local water supplies, 166
the first to feel it are the clients. Annually, they supplicate 613
for the use of water, and if their patrons decide that there is insufficient to meet all needs, the request is refused, albeit reluctantly. Clients constitute a socially mobile group; they are the pawns in the annual readjustment of men to their resources. Whenever they move, they pass on to another tertiary section, which may be a collateral section of the one they have left or structurally far removed from it, but as soon as they leave one, their duties and obligations cease and are taken up anew with another structurally like group. It is because their attachment is to a tertiary section, and not to one of superior order, that they can be as socially mobile as they are, which in turn facilitates a more efficient adjustment to the ecological situation from year to year.

Small groups of clients move frequently, groups of adopted people less frequently, and groups composed of the free-born

619 change their structural position only rarely. The latter change
621 sometimes does, however, occur, and there is evidence to show
182 that it does. For example, Agostini (1922–23, p. 323) in his tribal
166 survey, records a section named Barsha as one of the groups stemming
613 from Nasr.[12] In the genealogies I was given, the name did
not appear, and even after some questioning, what information
was known about it was concealed. Some time later the name
[578] cropped up accidentally in conversation, and I was then told that
at one time it had been one of the Nasr groups, but that after a
quarrel during a year of water shortage, the Barsha folk went
to live with people with whom they had maternal connexions,
and in whose territory there was ample water that year, and
never returned. The group, a tertiary one, was detached from the
tertiary point of segmentation in the genealogies, and tied on to
a tertiary group of another tribe in its new homeland.

178 To summarize briefly the argument thus far, the mechanical
173 devices of telescoping, fusion of names, the ejection of those
619 names which cease to be of any social consequence, and the
621 elision of names at or around the fifth ascending generation,
621 taken together point to the importance of the tertiary order of
613 segmentation in discussing the problem of maintaining the form
of the genealogy constant in face of its natural tendency to alter;
further, evidence of changes (adoption into a lineage, detachment
from it, the inclusion and exclusion of clients) was presented,
and this again led to the conclusion that the tertiary point
of segmentation is critical in this respect. This being so, the manner
[128] in which change actually occurs, still remains to be shown,
and this is best done, perhaps, by discussing the mode of proliferation
of tertiary segments. In order to do this adequately, it
is necessary to say something briefly about certain features of
Bedouin marriage.

582 Among the Bedouin there exists a preferential form of marriage
605 between a man and his father's brother's daughter. Parallel
cousin marriage of this sort carries with it the exclusive right of
a man to this cousin. Without his consent no one else can marry
her, and to attempt to do so would be to risk the marriage arrangements
being nullified after negotiations had almost been

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[114] [12] Barsha's position is incorrectly given as a sub-group of Haiba; it should
be shown as structurally equivalent to Haiba. See also note 11.

concluded. I have been present on occasions when, after both parties have agreed to a marriage and the groom has collected most of the things necessary to present to the bride at the wedding celebrations, the girl's father's brother's son appears and demands the discontinuance of the arrangements; on one occasion, he did not appear until the actual day of the wedding, but was bought off with a cap, a cloak, and the promise of two sheep. The highest incidence for any form of marriage, moreover, is with the patrilineal parallel cousin, although not necessarily with the first cousin. 582 605

Parallel cousin marriage of this sort is not, however, the only form practised among the Bedouin. Much of the writing on Bedouin marriage leaves the impression that a solution of the problem of parallel cousin marriage (Murphy & Kasdal 1959) solves all the problems involved in their system of marriage. In addition to this form, there is a number of others; indeed there is another form of preferential marriage among them, which, although it does not have the compulsive character of parallel cousin marriage, is of major importance. I refer to cross-cousin marriage with the mother's brother's daughter. Such a cousin may be, of course, as a result of patrilineal parallel cousin marriage, a patrilineal parallel cousin as well. Such a cousin may be, on the other hand, a woman of another tribal section or of a different tribe altogether. A characteristic form of this marriage is that once it has been initiated, it is perpetuated in successive generations. Members of one line in a tertiary segment will, therefore, be building up kinship ties through marriage in one particular direction. At the same time, another line, by practising the same form of marriage will be weaving ties in a quite different direction. One direction these marriages could take might be to a tertiary segment of a collateral secondary segment; another might be to a primary segment of the same tribe, and yet another to people living in a date oasis. Only occasionally do marriages occur between collateral tertiary segments, and then there is usually some specific reason. In other words, when men marry outside the limits of their own tertiary segment, they leap-frog adjacent segments and marry into structurally more remote groups. 582 582 613

The result of these two marriage patterns is that the people of [621]

582 any summer camp will have descent lines cross linked by the
● 613 bonds of marriage with parallel cousins, and at the same time
[621] cleaved by the maternal links established by repetitive cross-
cousin marriage to different groups outside the segment. Thus,
in one of its aspects, marriage makes of an agnatic group a group
582 of cognates as well. 'Marry your paternal cousins and both your
613 paternal and maternal relatives will be one,' to quote Bedouin
602 sentiment on the matter. Within this agnatic group, nevertheless,
two other clusters of kin exist—those with maternal connexions
outside. In all, three areas of kinship can be defined,[13] although
all the members of the segment will have the lineage bond of
agnation in common. In normal circumstances, when split does
not threaten the group, the bond of agnation, strengthened by
parallel cousin marriage, takes precedence, although behaviour
is significantly affected by maternal links at any time. There is,
152 in the first instance, great jealousy between co-wives, which is
595 passed on to their children. Each wife has her separate tent, and
593 each is entitled to a strictly equal share of the husband's time
they have in common. This applies similarly to favours he may
grant his wives, and the distribution of his wealth among them.
If, for example, the husband is the owner of a horse, he is required to tether it outside the tents of his wives in strict rotation; if he retires for the night with one wife, the following night
he must favour the other; if he buys dress material for the one
he must buy a length of identical material for the other; if he
bestows favours on the children of one the children of the other
must be given equal consideration. Many such details are
meticulously observed; but while many are observed most of the
time, it is difficult to observe them all, the whole time. Any
breach of the rules is quickly taken up by the wives, and quarrels
ensue, leading not only to bitterness among the co-wives, but between the offended wife and her husband, between the children
of both wives, and between the children and their father. Often,
595 when a man has co-wives, there is a marked discrepancy in age
593 between them, for, when an elderly Bedouin marries a second
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[13] The situation is not always as simple as this. Cross-cousin marriage may take more than two directions, and marriage within the segment might bring about great complexity, but the argument put forward above is not seriously affected by neglecting these details here.

wife he usually chooses a young girl of about twenty years. Chil- 595
dren of the elder wife might be adult, therefore, when the chil- 593
dren of the junior wife are infants. Great emphasis is placed on 561
seniority, particularly among males, but strong emphasis is also placed on the equality of siblings and their equal legal status. Between brothers of widely differing ages, there is, then, this field of potential conflict. From an early date competitive, if not hostile, relationships develop between the sons of co-wives. Com- 593
petition between half-brothers results not only from their 586
mothers being co-wives: one group might be the sons of a di- 587
vorced wife. The latter situation is often much worse, for the sons born of the divorced wife are now being fostered by a woman who is not their mother. A similar condition of things is brought about when a widower with sons remarries. Yet again, when a wife grows old and her sons have reached maturity, her husband may not divorce her formally, but merely 'throw her off his back'; she will then go to live with her grown sons, while her husband, in turn, takes a new wife, usually taking up residence in another camp for a time at least. It would be too much of a digression here to discuss the inheritance disputes, and the disputes over marriage and bride-wealth, which arise out of these various circumstances. Suffice it to note that such disputes are [613]
common and affect the alignment of people within a tertiary segment.

As half-brothers grow to maturity some of them will marry 613
their maternal cross-cousins, and in succeeding generations some 621
of their descendants will do likewise. In this way, a tertiary seg- [582]
ment united by the bond of agnation, will also have within it smaller groups of kin having different sets of cognatic links. This group, as a residential unit, shows a very high concentration of agnates, and the Bedouin say with pride that members of the camps are always 'one' because of this agnatic bond, and indeed, the corporate identity of this group is strikingly displayed in many circumstances. It does not take precedence in all circum- 613
stances, for, built into agnation, with the heavy burden of duties 578
which go with it, are serious stresses and strains which in some 602
circumstances regularly come out into the open. In yet other circumstances cognatic kinship affiliations appear to be dominant, causing friction among agnates. A man, for example, may permit

613 his maternal kinsmen to use the land and water facilities of
578 his lineage; his agnates may give ready consent or bicker about
602 it, but when it becomes necessary to clean a well, disputes are
almost certain to break out in the camp between those who argue
that their maternal relatives should not be expected to assist in
its cleaning and those who insist they should as an acknowledge-
ment of the use they have made of it. In these circumstances
613 maternal links divide agnates. Conversely, if it becomes neces-
602 sary for some of the same men to use the water and ploughland
of their maternal kin, their agnates are only too pleased that
they are able to do so, because the pressure on their own re-
sources is relieved. In these circumstances, the maternal link
strengthens the agnatic group. When, to give another instance,
613 blood-money has to be gathered, it is the duty of all agnates to
682 contribute equally, and no member of the group, rich or poor,
can contract out of this obligation without sacrificing his mem-
bership of the group. Payments of blood-money are witness of
the strength of the notion of 'oneness' among agnates, in one
sense, but in so far as they are compulsory, they point also to the
weakness in the relationship. Maternal kin are not directly con-
cerned in this, but they can and do make contributions. In this
context two aspects of agnation appear, and the value of the
602 maternal link is emphasized. Again, maternal kinsmen are not
428 directly concerned in inheritance disputes, but they are expected
578 to intercede for their sister's sons, who often use their mother's
brother's tribal brand on their own animals. During disputes of
this kind, blame is thrown on to the maternal kinsmen for their
interference in matters which, properly speaking, are not their
613 business. In marriage, however, events take quite a different
582 turn. The responsibility for providing a man with a wife is first
that of the father, and secondly of the members of the tertiary
section; the father takes the initiative, and his agnates assist, not
only in the negotiations, but also in defraying the heavy costs of
the wedding festivities, the various gifts that precede it, and the
604 bride-wealth which follows. The mother's brother is also a key
613 person in all these arrangements. He enters into the negotiations,
585 assists with the entertainment on the wedding day, and makes a
[583] substantial contribution to the bride-wealth. On the wedding day,
there is no kinsman to compare with the mother's brother; a few

weeks later, he is reviled for demanding a long overdue installment 604
of his daughter's bride-wealth. He is the person who can be 613
approached freely, to whom love tales can be told, from whom [585]
help can be expected, who gives support in disputes, and who also [583]
upbraids, who punishes, who withholds, who acts as a pull-away
from the agnatic group. An agnate demands help, and also compels 613
the fulfilment of obligations. An agnate is a man with whom 602
relationships are formal, particularly if he is a senior. He is, too,
the person who unfailingly, though perhaps grudgingly, gives
help when it is most required; who, regardless of the merits of the
case, defends one against external opposition; and who is always
available at each life crisis. A kinship link is not to be defined by
any one particular mode of behaviour. Each is a cluster of different
sorts of behaviour, one form taking precedence in these circumstances,
another in other circumstances, and so forth.

The little clusters of kindred can be defined clearly in any of 613
the camps. It is customary among the Bedouin for those who are 602
most closely linked as kindred to pitch their tents close to each 621
other. For example, if a man has two recently married sons, their
tents are pitched on either side of his, with the ropes of their
tents crossing the ropes of their father's tent. More distantly related
kin will be more distantly placed, and here and there,
breaks in the continuity of the lines of tents are to be observed,
corresponding as a rule to breaks in kinship. Each large camp in
this way can be viewed as two or more nuclei of kindred. The
camp as a whole is dominantly composed of agnates, but they
are disposed in such a way as to show clusterings of varying kinship
composition. Characteristically each cluster has a separate
name, often a female name which refers to a common mother of
the cluster, or of the head of the leading family in it. When these [221]
relatively large camps break up with the onset of the rains and
disperse to form small camps of five to seven tents for winter
pasturing, they will be seen to correspond almost identically with
the kin clusters of the larger summer camp. Again, a tertiary segment [312]
may have two wells for its own use. In a particular year
there may be sufficient water in one of them to meet the needs
of the whole group, and its members then live together in one
camp; the following year both wells may have to be used, and
the camp of the previous summer will split up, roughly half going

613 to one well, and the remainder to the other. It is usually an easy
621 matter to predict, at least in a general fashion, how the group
602 will divide, as long as the details of kinship are known; the camps
[312] will be composed of members of two sets of patri-lines in the
tertiary segment, who will also represent two discrete clusters of cognatic kindred. If, therefore, a tertiary group increases in numbers to the point where a split in the lineage is inevitable, here then is the line of split, along a line, that is, of kinship cleavage and lineage differentiation. 'Men make the tribe; women divide it,' is an oft-quoted saying among the Bedouin; but this, like most sayings, tells only part of the truth, as we shall see.

613 It is possible to show where on the genealogy change takes
621 place, and it is possible to indicate the lines cleavages will follow,
but the proliferation of a lineage does not occur merely because the possibility exists for it to do so. A group must, clearly, break up if the number of its members significantly exceeds that which can be supported by the available natural resources; water is the prime cause of the proliferation of lineages. Granting this, a group remains an undifferentiated corporation until occasion arises when its members, or some of them, can demonstrate unequivocally that they are no longer bound by its conditions of membership. There is a number of occasions when this can be done, some of which are discussed below.

The test, *par excellence,* of corporate affiliation is the accept-
613 ance of the responsibility to pay blood-money. Refusal to accept
621 this is the same as renouncing membership of the group. Individ-
672 uals are sometimes excluded from membership in this way. There
682 are occasions too, when the payment of blood-money involves
renunciation by more than one or two individuals. If membership of a section has increased to the point of splitting, and should a homicide occur within it, one of the kin clusters within the group might demand blood-money from the other. Nothing could make the statement of split clearer than this. The most impelling condition of membership of the tertiary group is that 'we pay as one and receive as one', a condition which, of course, excludes payment within the group. Any two groups between which the demand for blood-money has been made are, therefore, by definition, separate tertiary groups.

613 When a member of a group or his wife dies, there are specific
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days on which kin of various sorts should attend the mourning 613
ceremonies, which extend over a period of a week. Allowance is 621
made for those who may be away temporarily, although they are 765
expected to hasten to the mourning camp as quickly as possible.
Agnatic kin are expected not only to be present on the appro- 613
priate day, but are required to offer gifts consistent with their 621
relationship to the bereaved; agnates of the tertiary segment are 765
expected to offer a sheep, while some cognates ought to bring a 431
goat and others a quantity of sugar and tea. At one funeral in a camp where I was resident, soon after the death occurred, the main concern of its inhabitants was whether or not certain men of their section would attend the mourning rites and bring appropriate gifts with them. These men lived at the time in another camp a few miles away, as they had been doing for several years past. They did not come when they were expected, and when they finally arrived at the end of the week they brought with them gifts of sugar and tea only—gifts which were totally inappropriate for agnates of the group. They were, in fact, now no longer members of it, and my neighbours were able to tell me, 'They have branched off from us. We will never live together again.' The lineage had proliferated and this was the first occasion for showing it.

Wide-spread in Cyrenaica is a cult of saints. The number of 794
saints' tombs varies from tribe to tribe, there being fewer among 776
the camel herders of the semi-desert than among the cow- 778
herding, almost sedentary, folk of the plateau area. Whatever [788]
the number, the members of the group that venerates a particular
saint make an annual pilgrimage to his tomb, and sometimes
more frequent pilgrimages are made. In one area there were two 794
men, accepted by their respective kin groups as leaders, who vied 554
against each other for the leadership of their section. One of them [648]
had been a famous warrior during the Italian wars and, after being injured, fled to Egypt where he lived for seventeen years, until he returned to his homeland in 1947. The other had also fought against the Italians, failed to win renown, was a captive for a time, later released, and subsequently appointed leader of his section by the Italian authorities. The first, during his period of exile, had become impoverished. The second during his years of freedom had prospered. As far as their personalities

794 were concerned, there was little doubt who was leader—the
554 name of the former was known throughout the land. Now when
794 the warrior returned from his Egyptian exile, his rival offered
him a sheep as a gift. This act was wholly appropriate. Subse-
554 quently they continued to compete fiercely, but it soon became
578 clear that the returned warrior was winning the greater support.
[788] In the face of this, the rival, in 1948, decided to break with tradi-
tion by staying away from the annual pilgrimage to the tomb of
[175] the local saint. Instead, he and his followers made their pilgrim-
age to a different tomb in the vicinity of their camp, and later
built a low wall round the tomb, whitewashed it, and made it
known that henceforward they would regularly use it for pilgrim-
[613] ages. The two kinship groups of a tertiary section now had their
[778] separate saint's tomb. Some months later, the rival decided to
794 move with his small group to an area in which they had not pre-
554 viously resided. It is the custom among the Bedouin when they
pitch their tents in a place for the first time, that the people of
578 the neighbourhood should bring them gifts to mark the event.
431 The returned warrior, who had now become a close neighbour
[166] of his rival was obliged, like others, to offer the latter a gift; he
was also obliged to return the gift of a sheep that he had been
given on rejoining his section in 1947. He brought a gift within a
few hours of his rival's arrival, but it was a goat.[14] The rival and
his followers were furious, and the argument that the warrior was
too poor to give more was dismissed summarily. This was the
final insult. The donor, in return, had been given less than he had
presented. The reciprocity of gift exchanges had not only been
arrested, it had been reversed. From then onwards the two groups
made no attempt to conceal their hostility and went their sepa-
rate ways.

613 Disputes stemming from circumstances such as these are the
578 occasions which mark the proliferation of groups, although in
all three cases cited, difficulties over water supplies had pre-
ceded the outbreaks of quarrelling.

613 In this discussion of the ways in which proliferation of seg-
602 ments takes place, the emphasis had been put on the tug of war
121 between the interests of people in their agnatic connexions and

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[14] A goat is inferior to a sheep in gift exchanges.

the interests they have in their maternal relatives. Stated thus 613 sharply, this is a distortion of the process. To speak of the prin- 602 ciple of agnation conflicting with the principle of cognation or 121 maternal origin is nonsense, as the facts included in the discussion show. Agnation is not one thing, but many. Within its scope are included such aspects of social organization as succession, status, inheritance, bride-wealth, blood-money, modes of domestic and political behaviour, and so forth; and each of these aspects, the closer we stick to reality, can be broken up into a number of components. The same can be said of cognation and maternal origin. All these principles, so called, are clusters of numerous component parts, which combine, in reality, in a kaleidoscopic number of ways. In one situation a component of one combines with that of another to strengthen it; in a different situation the one component may repel the other; in a third situation, a number of the components in one will combine to exclude those of the other, and so on. If, therefore, an understanding of the way in which lineage proliferation occurs is sought, a view of the process as a conflict between the principle of agnation and the opposing pull of maternal origin is quite erroneous. It is of use in predicting the direction of cleavage to know that within a tertiary group there are also clusters of kin which are defined roughly by maternal links, and this knowledge serves as a rough and ready guide in predicting what the composition of groups, after they have split away from the parent group, will be. If a more precise picture of this composition is desired, other and more complex kinship links and the behaviour which accompanies them must be taken into account. If a still more accurate picture is desired, details of inheritance disputes, debts of bridewealth, the size of flocks and herds, and the like, must also be taken into consideration. If, finally, one has the opportunity to study groups after they have proliferated, the presence or absence of this or that man can often be explained only in terms of his eye for a pretty girl or a personal preference for neighbours.

The kind of change which has been discussed in this essay is [178] not difficult to negotiate in genealogical terms. Earlier it was [621] stressed that within the tertiary tribal sections, although they [173] are always predominantly agnatic groups, clusters of cognatic [551]

613 kin also exist. Two ways of naming these clusters are adopted—
602 all groups, whether they are elementary families, an odd assort-
121 ment of kindred sharing a common tent for reasons of expedi-
178 ency, or tribal groups, have a name. Sometimes these clusters are
621 named after a prominent living male, or a deceased kinsman of
173 the same kind. Sometimes these little groups are named after a
551 woman, perhaps the grandmother of the group.[15] Thus a small group of two or three tents will be distinguished from another similar cluster within the camp, and so on for a number of groups, depending on the size of the camp. Most camps, however many tents they contain, have names for progressively inclusive clusters of tents until a twofold named division is reached. Tertiary segments that are forced to split contain therefore two groups with names already attached to them. When a split occurs, the name of the tertiary segment is pushed into the area of ambiguity and the names of what were previously two clusters become the names of two new tertiary segments, with a minimum adjustment in usage and a minor re-shuffle at the tertiary level of segmentation. Names cannot continue to be pushed into this area of the genealogy interminably, otherwise it would gradually expand into a vast pool of names. For a few generations the name dispensed with in this way becomes one of those ancestors about whom there is argument when genealogies are given. In the course of time, name after name is subjected to the process of elision and eventually will cease to be of concern to anyone.

105 I now summarize the main points of the discussion. The evi-
613 dence that has been examined suggests that the mechanical de-
vices of telescoping, fusion of names, and extinction of lines do
173 not affect orders of segmentation superior to that of the tertiary
178 order, and that in conditions of a completely stable population,
[551] these devices alone would suffice to retain the form of the genealogical structure. But, it was argued, conditions of complete stability cannot be assumed; the evidence of the present distribution of population among the numerous tertiary groups clearly points to marked fluctuations occurring within these small groups. This being so, proliferation of these groups in some areas at some

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[15] The naming of groups within a tertiary segment is an interesting study in itself, but it would be outside the limits of this discussion to make more than a brief mention of it.

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times, must follow, and conversely, while proliferation takes place here, combination will be taking place elsewhere as the population of groups decreases. The condition which compels proliferation is the alteration in the relationship of man and animals to the natural resources; and when this alteration builds up to an acute pressure on water and land, one group of a divided segment must move off to seek water elsewhere.

The next task was to demonstrate where this kind of change occurred on the genealogy. The sudden irregularity in the number of segments at the tertiary order, compared with the uniformity at others, provided a clue. Other evidence also pointed to this as a significant order in this context: there is ambiguity displayed with regard to the identity and positioning of ancestors here; members adopted into a lineage are grafted on to it here; clients are attached to tertiary sections; groups of noblemen, when they are detached and move off to another tribe, break away at this point. This is where change occurs, but, it was agreed, in understanding the way in which it takes place, certain forms of marriage have to be taken into account. Particular emphasis was placed on cross-cousin marriage with the mother's brother's daughter, and to women outside the tertiary segment, since the effect of these forms of marriage is to produce two or more clusters of cognatic kindred in camps largely composed of agnates, and to emphasize the line of cleavage in a lineage segment. So that when, therefore, a split occurs, the line it takes is predetermined. Proliferation, even when necessary, does not finally come about, however, until an occasion permits the separation of groups to be demonstrated by a violation of the conditions of membership of a group. Details of three such occasions were offered: the demand for blood-money between agnates who previously had constituted a politically undivided section; behaviour contrary to the demands of agnatic kinship in attendance and gift-giving at funerals; and failure to participate in a pilgrimage to the saint's tomb of a particular section. But another query [551] remained: how are the newly formed groups named? It was seen that names already in daily use by the small group of people concerned came to assume a new significance, while the name which had previously spanned them all is disregarded and pushed into the area of ambiguity whence later it is elided altogether.

105 Change due to the normal and inevitable process of proliferation
613 is thus managed within the structural limits of the tertiary section
173 without disturbing any of the superior orders in the system. The
178 latter remain fixed over long periods, but the tertiary sections of
a particular secondary action may be reduced in number over a few generations while another secondary section may show a corresponding increase in the number of its segments.

121 By combining the various factors involved in change, it is pos-
178 sible to understand the details of lineage proliferation, or at least
to travel along a well signposted road. In the light of this analy-
613 sis, moreover, it is unnecessary to assume a stable population in
161 each and every segment over long periods; the mechanisms of
readjustment allow for substantial irregularities and fluctuations in population. It is possible that they are also sufficient to contain significant increases in the aggregate population. They could almost certainly control minor fluctuations, but it is seriously doubted whether a population increase sufficient to produce a country-wide and acute water shortage could be met merely by the proliferation of tertiary lineage segments. But to deal with this problem other aspects of the Bedouin genealogy and details of Cyrenaican history, which have necessarily been omitted from this discussion, would have to be taken into account, and this is best left for another article.

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SOME STRUCTURAL ASPECTS OF THE FEUD AMONG THE CAMEL-HERDING BEDOUIN OF CYRENAICA[1]

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WHEN a Bedouin kills another in Cyrenaica, one of a number of consequences 682
ensues. According to the Bedouin, the particular consequence is determined by 571
the genealogical positions of the persons or groups concerned. In the first part of 829
this article an analysis of the disturbances in social relationships precipitated by 128
homicide is made, using a lineage model as a framework. In this part of the discussion
the arrangement of the information corresponds closely to the view the
Bedouin give of their relationships. Additional information is then presented to show [613] ●
that this lineage model neither covers several important areas of social relationships
nor enables an accurate prediction of events to be made. This raises the issue: can the 121
comprehensive power of the model be increased by complicating it, or does complexity 613
destroy its utility? The argument advanced is that the lineage model is not a 571
sociological one, but that it is a frame of reference used by a particular people to
give them a common-sense kind of understanding of their social relationships. For
sociological purposes this means that the lineage model, with its supporting theoretical [128]
presuppositions, must perforce be abandoned. In the latter part of this article
some of the implications of adopting this position are discussed. Particular stress is [578]

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[1] This study is based on field-work in Cyrenaica carried out over a period of twenty-seven months from January 1948 to December 1950. The field-work was made possible by the award of a Horniman Studentship and of a Treasury Senior Studentship in Oriental Languages and Cultures. I wish to express my thanks to both awarding bodies. The paper was presented in its first form to a seminar at Manchester University. Modified versions were read at Oxford and Cambridge and at University College London in 1963. In a Manchester seminar, Professor W. J. M. Mackenzie raised issues which led me to reconsider my mode of analysis. Professor Ely Devons read a draft of the article, and offered valuable suggestions.
I also wish to thank Professor Gluckman for the 12
many profitable discussions we have had on the
institution of the feud. My interest in the feud stems [114] ←
directly from Evans-Pritchard's work on the institution among the Nuer. I am most grateful to him for his help and encouragement while I was pursuing my researches. Finally, anyone writing on the feud must acknowledge the contribution made to its understanding by Dr. Elizabeth Colson.

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121 given to the feud, for this is one of the few societies in which it occurs.[1] What is
613 meant here by a state of feud is a set of relationships between two tribal groups which
578 are characterized by hostility whenever two or more of their members meet. These
591 hostilities are of a sort which cannot be terminated; feud is not a matter of a group
121 indulging in hostilities here at one moment and there the next, but a sequence of
619 hostilities which, as far as the contemporary Bedouin are concerned at least, know
578 no beginning and are insoluble. Feud and the other forms of relationships to be
[591] discussed presently are to be understood, in part, by reference to the ordered divisions
of the tribes. It is necessary at the outset, therefore, to give a brief statement about
the tribal organization; other details will be included as they become relevant.

619 There are nine noble tribes in Cyrenaica whose members are referred to as freemen.
621 These tribes see themselves as divided into three genealogical orders of sections:
primary, secondary, and tertiary. The tertiary tribal sections correspond to the camps
613 which cluster around the larger watering points during the drought season, May to
[132] November. Such camps consist of clusters of smaller camps in which the concentration
of agnatically related males is over 80 per cent. Within the latter kinship links
are known, so that these agnates are consanguinely related as well as politically
[162] united. The populations of most tertiary groups vary from about 200 to 700 or so,
but a group ceases to be viable if the number of male adults drops much below fifty.
Political division is absent from these tertiary groups, regardless of their precise
size, for, whatever may be the condition of developing local lineages, the acceptance
of a common name carries with it full political responsibility incumbent equally on
[423] all their members. Each of these tertiary sections, moreover, has its own watering
point, ploughland, and pastures; each has its own *watan* or homeland. This statement
is true of all tribal sections of whatever order of segmentation. In other words, the
tribes and their sections correspond to an ordered division of the territory.

619 Names of tribal sections are the same as those given in the genealogies. Both tribe
613 and lineage are identically ordered. Lineages develop, and split at the tertiary order
of segmentation,[2] and, *a fortiori*, the process is the same for the tertiary tribal sections.
Split, in other words, occurs where relationships are most intense.

621 The summer community which constitutes a tertiary section, breaks up once the
221 rains begin in November or December. At this time of the year water is readily
available in the numerous small cisterns, there is pasture in plenty, and the animals
are giving milk. These combined reasons lead the larger summer camp to divide
into smaller camps of some five to ten tents. The latter are separated one from the
other by short distances—a mile or so—but together form a cluster in that they are
621 territorially distinguishable from a neighbouring and similar group of camps. Tertiary
311 sections are discrete also in the sense that all the major necessities of daily living
are available within their several territories. Each controls its own natural resources,
and these resources are the same for all the camel-herding groups—in any given year
one may have more of a particular commodity than another, but the difference is in

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[171] [1] Evans-Pritchard, 1940. The feud might have been present among the Nuer. Exogamy and the other rules of marriage which obtain among them create a dispersion of ties, which superficially appears to militate against a condition of feud. But a dispersal of ties does not mean that they necessarily act as a pressure for peace. Moreover, the exogamous links may link limited numbers of groups only, leaving others with sufficient discreteness to pursue feuding relationships as they are described in this paper.

[2] See Peters, 1959.

degree and is ephemeral, so that the opportunity for the development of trade rela- 621
tions is absent.[1] Save for straying animals, a section has no urgent need to seek 311
relationships with others, as long as the rainfall is sufficient to permit the exploitation [619]
of local resources.

The tertiary section is also regarded as the corporate group *par excellence*, in which 621
'the one word does for all'. Corporate identity is conceptualized as 'one bone' 613 ●
or 'one body'. An offence against one of its members is held to be an offence
against all; if one of its members is killed 'we all lose blood'. When one of its mem- [682]
bers commits homicide the responsibility falls on all equally. Blood money, when
received, is shared by all save for a special portion reserved for the 'owner of the [672]
blood', the nearest agnate of the victim. In opposite circumstances, all adult males accept the responsibility of contributing an equal share to the blood money. Rules of membership, simple in their brevity, express graphically this corporate identity: 'You must strike with us and be struck with us; you must pay with us and receive with us.' The group also bears a name, and there is never any doubt about the affiliation of any tribesman. That group of men—known as the *'amarā dam*—who are agreed on the obligation to exact vengeance, to pay blood money when necessary, to engage in common defence, and to accept the possibility of death in vengeance, is a fixed and clear-cut group, not one whose membership has to be calculated by reference to degrees of kinship in regard to a specific situation, as appears to be the case among other peoples.

Homicide within the *'amarā dam* brings about an impasse in relationships. A blood- 621
money payment is out of the question since the acceptance of blood money by one 613
part of a tertiary section from another of its parts is tantamount to a statement of 682
split. Only in conditions where relationships within the lineage have developed to the
point of political severance is it anticipated that a blood-money payment may be 627
demanded; but this problem is not the same as that at present under discussion.
Bedouin say that blood money cannot pass within the *'amarā dam* for those making [829]
the payment would be the persons receiving it. This is spurious reasoning, since the 'owner of the blood' is awarded more than any other members of the group as it is, and arrangements could obviously be made to pay him separately. Blood money is out of the question because it distinguishes relationships between people as belonging to two distinct political communities, and not because of any difficulty of distribution.
In Bedouin thinking, an injury to 'the one body' is an injury to all its parts. Blood- [829]
money payments by members of a corporation to one or more of its members is a contradiction in terms. In the same way vengeance is also excluded, for this merely doubles the original loss. A reprisal exacted in hot blood is always a possibility, but this is not referred to as *thār*, vengeance. Even if, at a later date, the closest kinsman of the victim should slay the offender, the act would not be referred to as *thār* and any connexion with earlier homicides would be denied.

Stultified in the field of political action, there is little else that can be done. Expul- 682
sion is a possible course of action—and expulsion has occurred. Records show, however, that exile is almost invariably voluntary.[2] Moreover, exile is terminated as

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[1] Many sections trade fleeces for dates with the folk of distant oases, but the sections do not trade among themselves.

[2] I recorded one case of a man who was expelled from his group and the tribes around were warned that the rules of sanctuary were not to apply to him. He is said to have died from grief and hunger. The reason given for such drastic action is that he killed [438] ←

682 a rule by the return of the offender to his camp after the lapse of a number of years.
A man who had already killed six people killed a seventh, his first paternal cousin.
He and his brothers fled the tribe; he died in exile and it was not until some thirty
[123] years later that his brother and nephew returned. Another man, who had killed his
first paternal cousin, used my entry into a camp as the occasion for his re-entry,
pitching his tent rope on rope with mine, and mine in turn was rope on rope with
the tent of the camp's shaikh.[1]

621 An effort is always made to hush up the matter when a homicide occurs within a
682 tertiary section. It is for this reason that the name of the victim is not perpetuated.
• 613 Normally it is an obligation to perpetuate the names of the deceased, especially when
[551] they have been killed in homicide, but in the circumstances now being discussed the
name is suppressed. As one man expressed the general sentiments, stretching out his toga in front of him: 'Look at the hole in my toga; it would be better without it, but what can I do? Make it bigger? It is better to cover it up.' Any penal action taken against the offender could only enlarge the wound he had already opened. The notion of corporate identity is so strong that it eliminates the use of penal action against one of its members for the greatest offence of all. While overtly every effort is made to expunge the memory of a homicide of the sort described above, the Bedouin are most articulate in their views about the offender. He is referred to as one who 'defecates in the tent' thus likening him to an animal, for no human being would do this. Other expletives used in reference to him are: one who 'destroys the lineage', who 'corrupts the family'; he is one who 'brings confusion', who 'provokes God' and causes 'the evil of leprosy to eat into relationships'. Their feelings about the offender, who 'commits robbery internally', are summed up in the word *fitna*. This, in its Cyrenaican use, corresponds closely to the notion of sin as it is used in the Old Testament; in the sense, that is to say, of an act which causes an impasse in relationships, which creates chaos among a small group of related people, and produces internal calamity. And this is indeed the situation brought about by such homicide among the Bedouin. Flowing blood, they are wont to say, can only be staunched by blood (i.e. a vengeance killing), but if a man kills within a close agnatic range the corporate body continues to bleed. Nothing can be done. The group is left helpless, and this is sin.

The first step in this exposition, therefore, is to attach to homicide within a tertiary section the notion of its being *fitna*, carrying with it voluntary and temporary expulsion.

682 A homicide which involves two collateral tertiary sections is a different matter
628 altogether, for now the parties constitute two discrete political groups. Political
621 machinery can be set in motion to deal with the breach in relationships, and conse-
quently a homicide of this sort does not pose the dilemma which is created when it
613 occurs within a politically undivided group. Not only do agnates of two collateral
tertiary sections behave towards each other as two groups of people, but the nature
of their relationships is fundamentally different from those obtaining between mem-

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682 a first cousin in cold blood because of a dispute between them over the ownership of a new-born kid. Although this was the only reason given by the Bedouin other considerations were involved—the victim was said to have been a fine person, and his killer a constant trouble maker, and so on.

[1] See for comparison Robertson Smith, 1903. The tent is an area of sanctuary, and this extends to include the ropes also.

bers of an undivided group. It is erroneous to suppose that because the different 621 orders of sections are homologous in their structural aspects they do not differ; they 613 do, because the interests associated with the various orders are different.[1] 628

Collateral tertiary segments are associated with different tracts of territory. Each [682] has its own watering rights as a group, and although groups may share a grain store, [423] it is divided on group lines. Members of these different groups do not gather together in summer to form a single community, though at some of the very big watering points they are near each other. Social relationships between them are, however, intense. Visits are frequent. They meet to exchange news, or to inquire after the [574] sick. They exchange greetings during the major festivals, and members of one group attend the funerals and weddings of the others, taking gifts. They also meet at the grain stores. Herdsmen, as they pursue straying animals, wander freely in their neighbours' territory. Relationships of this sort, some of them urgently necessary for survival, do not permit the feuding relationships to be described presently. Permanent hostility which characterizes the feud would seriously disrupt everyday economic activities, limit the pastoral movements of the Bedouin beyond endurance, and sever lines of communication which they always strive to keep open.

A homicide, when it involves two collateral tertiary groups must, therefore, be 621 resolved quickly. This can be effected in two ways. Vengeance may be exacted immediately. 613 This is always referred to as a vengeance killing or *thār*, and is to be distinguished 628 from a superficially similar act within a tertiary group, since *thār* carries 682 with it the implication that it is premeditated. A *thār* between two tertiary sections is considered to be the best way of settling the affair and, after an appropriate lapse of time, a peace meeting is held at which it is accepted that the killings have cancelled each other out. The deliberations at this meeting are followed by a meal at which all present 'eat around the one bowl'; the meal over, they all pray together. A life had been taken for a life and the way is now open for the restoration of normal peaceful relationships. Vengeance needs to be distinguished from feud, for while retaliatory killings provide the propulsive force in the feud a vengeance killing may be the means whereby a settlement of hostilities is made possible.

An end to hostilities may also be brought about by a promise to pay blood money 621 or *diya*, and its acceptance by the victim's group. Arrangements for blood-money 613 discussions are made by a category of persons known as *marabtin bi'l baraka*, or 628 ' clients of the goodness ', men who, by virtue of descent and origin, stand outside the descent lines of the noble tribes, and who are accredited with divine goodness. 682 They tend the sick, write amulets, and are always present at a peace meeting to give 792 it the weight of their baraka. Soon after the homicide has occurred they act as intermediaries to bring the hostile groups together at a peace meeting.[2] Ostensibly, the 621 first part of the proceedings at these meetings is to settle the amount of the blood 613 money, and how and when it is to be paid. Agreement on these counts will have been 628 reached, however, before the large peace gathering is assembled, for there is a gener- 682

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[1] This statement requires more documentation than I am able to give to it in this paper, but the descriptive details given hereafter give it some substance. See also Smith, 1956.

[2] It is necessary to add here that these clients do not assume coercive powers. They are granted the power to curse, but the curse that is feared is the curse of their dead when an oath is given at a saint's tomb. When they know that groups wish to make peace they assist as messengers in bringing people together, but they do not use their power to curse as a pressure.

621 ally recognized amount of blood money to compensate a homicide. The wrangling
613 that goes on at the meeting is of a conventional kind, and it is known in advance that
628 several distinguished guests present will supplicate for a reduction of the amount
682 demanded by the victim's group, until the amount generally accepted as appropriate
is reached. Such haggling makes it possible for the victim's surviving agnates to
maintain the fiction that they yielded only under the strongest pressure from the desert
[264] leaders and holy men. The main importance of the meeting is that the two hostile
groups are brought together again for the first time, that the cleavage between them has been narrowed sufficiently to permit them to eat round one bowl, and that, by virtue of this commensal meal, the way is now open for the restoration of normal relationships. Subsequently there may be another killing, which, in the mind of the perpetrator, is connected with the earlier death of a kinsman, but it is not publicly recognized as one in a series of killings, or even as a vengeance killing; it is regarded as unique, and the method of dealing with it is on the basis of this fiction. Feud is not permitted between two collateral tertiary sections, for although the pattern of homicide may be similar to that of a feud, the two are never equated. There is good reason for this, since, whatever the similarity in pattern, the social relationships between the groups involved are radically different; each homicide involving tertiary sections is regarded as a unique event, and the relationships between times are friendly, whereas in feud relationships are permanently hostile and need not be otherwise for social, economic, or religious purposes.

Blood money when it brings peace brings it because payment is made only in part. It is never regarded as a payment for the life of a man, to be dissipated wantonly. ' The owner of the blood ' should marry a wife with it to beget children (one son to be named after the victim) or to buy camels to provide for a future marriage, or to buy a horse to be used to ride in bringing vengeance. Sufficient is paid to cover either of the first two alternatives; as far as my records go the third alternative is romanticism. At the peace meeting the offender's group does not promise to pay the total amount in one sum. An initial instalment is promised after the next lambing season or barley harvest. When the time comes it can be argued that the sheep dropped a disappointingly small number of lambs, or that the barley harvest did not fulfil expectations. If there is room for negotiation over the initial payment, the permitted manœuvring over subsequent payments is much greater. Promises made at the peace meeting relating to these subsequent payments do not specify the exact amount of each; the statement is no more definite than that the remainder should be paid over the following three to five years. Consequently when the second payment falls due, the offender's group can argue more cogently that their circumstances do not permit even a reduced payment, for the payment of the previous year was substantial and they have not yet recovered from this outlay. ' The owner of the blood ' is pressed to consider this, and to accept only a fraction of the wealth he had come to collect. The argument is cumulative, and can be used to excuse the rapidly decreasing payments of each successive year, until there comes a time when attempts to collect payments are discontinued. The arguments about the payments bear no relationship to the wealth possessed by a group. During the annual hagglings, and while members of the offender's group are declaring their straitened circumstances as an excuse for the small amount offered, the ' owner of the blood ' knows full well that two or three

621 613 hundred of their sheep are grazing in the neighbourhood. This is beside the point.
628 What is important is that the offender's group is showing a desire to remain on
friendly terms, and members of the victim's group are doing likewise by accepting
682 reduced amounts. Compared with what the payments should be, after four years they
621 are trivial and soon cease altogether. Blood money, if it is to achieve the purpose of
restoring peaceful relationships, must work in this way among the Bedouin, for, as
613 they view the matter, a single payment of the full amount would only terminate
628 relationships. There would be no further obligations to hold them together. The
682 payment of a debt in full means only one thing—hostility. Where there is no debt,
571 there are no relationships. Debt must be allowed to run between groups, for it is this
182 which creates obligations and perpetuates social relationships.[1] As the debt of blood
money mounts, the social relationships between the groups improve. The cessation
of payments and the absence of further demands is final earnest that the relationships
are again normal.

613 The second step in this exposition, therefore, is to attach to homicide between
628 tertiary sections the penalty of vengeance or the payment of blood money, both
621 achieving the same end of bringing about a restoration of peaceful relationships.

682 Between secondary sections, relationships are again different. Ecologically, the
619 areas are distinct. The topography may be dissimilar—sand dunes in one area and
613 low valleys in another; secondly, the soils may differ—sandy soil here and firm valley
[133] bottom soil there; thirdly, while the climatic régime of the two areas may be broadly
[132] similar, since there is marked variability in the aggregate annual rainfall which is
coupled with a high variability from place to place, each secondary section has its
own micro-climate, sufficiently well defined for one area to be well watered in any
given year while a neighbouring area suffers partial drought. These differences affect
[221] productive activities. Seasonal movements are also affected: some secondary sections
move annually over considerable distances and in fixed directions, while members of a collateral section may move only a few miles and these short moves may vary in direction from year to year. It is true that minor ecological differences exist between collateral tertiary sections, but these do not affect the economy and the way of life in the manner described for secondary sections. Partly because of their territorial extent, partly because of the larger aggregate population, the secondary sections are more self-contained, not only ecologically and economically but also in terms of social relationship. More of the requirements of everyday living can be met within the territory and span of a secondary section than within those of a tertiary section. Secondary sections develop a kind of specialization to the extent that in any year some of them will have more usable natural resources than others, but because these differences are ephemeral they do not lead to the development of permanent trade relations. Add to all this the fact that agnates are concentrated in camps on the territory which belongs to their lineage, and the discreteness of secondary sections is
[582] immediately apparent. Marriage rules make this discreteness potentially, at least, even
more sharply defined, for unlike other 'lineage societies' where exogamy, coupled with other marriage regulations, compels the dispersion of kin links among lineage

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[1] This point becomes clearer when considered in the general context of debt relationship among the Bedouin. Marriage payments, gift exchanges, hospitality, various forms of help, and so on are all aspects, with blood money, of an intricate and fascinating web of debt relationships.

619 segments, the Bedouin are free to marry within as close a range as the first cousin on
613 either side. Preferential marriage with the father's brother's daughter exists, not
582 merely as a sentiment, but with the legal force of permitting a man this choice against all other men. Before a father arranges the marriage of his daughter he first must seek the permission of his brother's son. Moreover, if a first-parallel cousin is not available, a Bedouin is free to take as a wife any parallel cousin within the minimal lineage. Much weight has been given to the value of exogamy as a device for the definition of groups; parallel-cousin marriage is equally suitable for the purpose—indeed it is better for it has the effect of knitting the members of a local group together as cognates, thereby throwing the group into isolated relief.

613 Consequently, when a homicide occurs between two secondary sections, there is
628 no urgent necessity to make peace, the relationship between them being of a kind
682 that can be controlled and altered to suit the circumstances. It is between these groups that the argument—if the argument is taken up at all—centres on the circumstances of the killing, every effort being made to show that insult was deliberately added to homicide, that one homicide is to be distinguished from another because a man of great renown was singled out as the avenger's victim, or that in a vengeance killing there was a breach of taboo as well. A debt is always left over, and it is an impelling obligation for the Bedouin to redeem it. They frequently speak of vengeance in this context as ' redeeming the debt '. Again, any homicide between two secondary sections is regarded as one in a series, whether the details or even the name of the victim of the previous homicide is known or not. I recall discussing a double homicide with a close kinsman of the slayer, and the only way he could account for it was by telling me that his kinsman had to kill because his victims were of such and such a group. The feud knows no beginning, and it has no end. It is a form of behaviour associated with a specific structural order, and it is as persistent as the structural order itself; in this sense it is eternal. It was most difficult to get the Bedouin to give accounts of homicides other than those which had occurred over the past fifty years or so, but they invariably claimed that the origin was earlier than this, although they were wholly unaware of the identity of the earlier victims. In any event, their only historical frame of reference is the genealogy; and history, as a chronological sequence of events, has no meaning beyond the founding ancestor of a minimal segment. When they refer events to points on the genealogy superior to this, they are no longer thinking in terms of the temporal order of events, but in terms of what they know to be the contemporary relationships between groups, for the names on the genealogy are names of groups and do not bear a relation to a time scale in any sense. Put in another way, for them a homicide which involves two secondary sections must be a feud, because this is the nature of the relationships between the groups, and there must have been previous killings, otherwise the people involved would not belong to two separate secondary groups.

The relationships which are referred to as feud are of a kind which requires at least a show of hostility whenever the parties happen to meet. Even if they do not actually meet, but are in the vicinity, some sort of demonstration is likely. Thus, several shots were fired at a man riding some distance away from a camp, and although positive identification was difficult at this range, the men of the camp argued it must have been a member of a group with which they were at feud otherwise the passer-by

would have dropped in on the camp. In another situation, two men entered a shop 613
in a market-place; inside sat two men of a feuding group who, instead of retreating 628
hastily, greeted those who had just entered, and the latter returned the greeting with 682
blows on the head from the butts of their rifles. Markets in Cyrenaica are recognized [443]
to be places of peace. In their actions the two offenders not only injured two others [683]
but also broke a taboo in a public place. The victim's group now had to avenge not
only the injury but the insult that the breach of taboo carried with it, as well. In
most feud relationships this is characteristic. It is never a matter of a simple homicide,
but of killing a man at the entrance to his tent, between the centre poles of his tent,
or taking the life of a minor, or an elder too old to carry arms and so on. Each successive
killing ensures that the hostile relationships will be perpetuated.

The third step in this exposition, therefore, is the association of a state of feud with the secondary order of segmentation.

When the relationships between the structurally superior primary tribal sections 619
are examined, the arguments against the necessity for peace are stronger than in the
case of secondary sections. Relationships between them are few and irregular. Only
occasionally do members of these groups meet, and then often accidentally; very
many men of collateral primary sections are complete strangers one to the other.
If a homicide occurs between two primary sections it is unlikely that any attempt to 619
open negotiations will be made. The offender's camp may be raided by a *ghazi* 682
recruited from the victim's kinsmen. There would be no question of these primary [721]
sections going to war. On a raid firearms may be used, but the action is limited to a
strike-and-run affair. If the issue is joined and members of both sides are ranged [726]
against each other they fight with sticks to avoid large-scale slaughter: warfare must
not be allowed within the tribe. Wars belong to intertribal relationships. For one of 175
these wars, apart from hearsay evidence, some records exist. These tell of a war 619
which took place during the period 1860 to 1865, in which there were planned campaigns, 726
the organization of fighters into groups, and provisions for a labour force
in the home territory, large enough to produce sufficient food to maintain an army
in the field. During this war several hundred people were killed.

At this point, it is possible to summarize the stages in this exposition of the 619
Bedouin view in diagrammatic form.
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

682 To complete this general statement, two further circumstances are cited by the
602 Bedouin. If a man kills a related person who is not an agnate (it is expressed as killing
the mother's brother) the breach in relationships must be healed as quickly as possible.
The convention for dealing with this is that the offender, bound hand and foot,
mounted on a horse, is sent to the camp of ' the owner of the blood ', in the company
of a holy man, there to make an offer of his life, saying: ' Here is my knife, my life
is yours; here is my shroud, my life is yours.' No Bedouin would agree for a moment
to undertake this journey if he thought the offer might be accepted. In Bedouin
sentiments a life offered in this way cannot be taken. It is the convention which precedes
a peace meeting and blood money. Any other way of dealing with the confusion,
which spreads as a result of a homicide between cognates, is excluded.

682 Secondly, if a woman is killed, whatever the intersegmentary distance, the homicide
562 is said to be accidental, because a man never ' intends ' to kill a woman. Blood-money
arrangements are made as soon as possible, and the wealth—half that of a
● 613 man—passes to the deceased's father, not to her husband, for a woman's ' bone '
always belongs to her father. Obviously women cannot be allowed to enter into
[582 feud; since it is demographically compelling (apart from other reasons) for some of
[591 them to marry outside their natal groups, then they might well find themselves residents
in the enemy's camps, if they were to become involved in feuds.

121 This statement of the different means available for the regulation of homicide at
682 the several orders of tribal segmentation is the view the Bedouin themselves hold of
their relationships. An analysis of the facts presented thus far could bring out a
613 number of interesting points with regard to the relativity of morals, the typification
829 of acts by their social context, the significance of the orders of segmentation, and so
619 on. Rather than proceed along these lines, however, it is more urgently necessary
to reflect on the significance of the fact that the arrangement of the material in terms
of what is usually called the lineage structure coincides with the Bedouin ordering
of the same details. It is, of course, important to note that the account is not based
on mere hearsay evidence. Each statement made can be documented from known
homicides, and to this extent the model that has been used is consistent with reality.
The model, nevertheless, can only be a representation of what a particular people,
the Bedouin, conceive their social reality to be; it is a kind of ideology which enables
them, without making absurd demands on their credulity, to understand their field
of social relationships, and to give particular relationships their *raison d'être*. But, as
will be shown, it would be a serious error to mistake such a folk model for sociological
analysis. Such an error is difficult to avoid because the Bedouin, when defending their
view, are able to cite enough bits and pieces of reality to make their argument convincing.
121 The flaw in the reasoning is seen when it can be shown that its consequences
114 are absurd. As an example of what is meant, the statement that feud is attached to
groups at the secondary order of segmentation may be considered. If the statement
613 were true, if each and every secondary section were at feud one with the other (and
619 in a structural sense this ought to be so), then each tribe would be divided into small
829 mutually hostile groups, which completely lacked any possibility of movement, even
578 for pasturing purposes. Presented with this, the Bedouin would argue that this is not
in fact so, because secondary and primary sections are interlinked in many ways. That
is, they evoke what to them are contingencies to explain why they are at feud with one

121 part of a secondary section but not with another. Once contingencies are permitted
●613 to enter in, the lineage model ceases to be of use, for what is implied is that at all
114 times some parts of sections structurally situated for feuding do not in fact feud.
[619] Other facts can be adduced to show that the structural view is inadequate but, before
[829] proceeding to examine these, some general objections to the lineage theory need to
[578] be raised. In the first instance, the corner stone in the theory of lineage systems is that
they consist of parts which are in balanced opposition. It is no accident that the idiom generally used in discussing the segmentation of a lineage system is that segments bifurcate. Indeed bifurcation is necessary if lineage theory is to make sense, because if at any order there are more than two segments, then combinations can occur which are not comprehended by the theory. In the Cyrenaican lineage the number of segments at the tertiary order is haphazard, in some cases as few as two but in others as many as a dozen or so. Where there are many segments at this order it is rather pointless to speak in terms of balanced opposition. Moreover, at the secondary order of segmentation the number of segments are fairly consistent throughout the tribes, but they number more than two in all of them. It is also a fact that combinations occur and, moreover, these may be between the tertiary segments of two ' opposed ' secondary segments.

121 Secondly, in lineage theory groups come together to constitute larger segments in
613 opposition to like segments. Yet in lineage societies there is a lack of instituted
571 authority, there are no chiefs distributed throughout the land as heads of segments
622 of the hierarchical orders. This being so, then it is not possible for all the sections of,
say, a secondary section to come together; there is no one to command the action.
114 In fact, sections combine in Cyrenaica, but not in the way they should according to the
lineage structure. In order to discuss this adequately, a lengthy diversion into an analysis of the distribution of power would be necessary. The matter must rest here with the admittedly somewhat dogmatic assertion that there are men who wield power over groups of varying populations, and that the extent of their domains cannot be understood by reference to orders in the lineage. Perhaps it is for this reason—because, that is to say, lineage theory effectively blocks the exercise—that relatively little has been written about the problem of leadership in these societies.

121 Thirdly, all segments should be fairly equal in numbers of people and economic
613 resources, if the theory of lineage were to have substance in reality. In Cyrenaica
114 the population of one tertiary segment may be three times or more that of another.
[621] Both may be structurally equal in the sense that they are named groups segmenting
as a pair of brothers from a common father. As political groups, however, this equality has little meaning. Further, with regard to economic resources, some sections possess several wells and a territory of such extent that it straddles two or even more of what might be called micro-ecological areas. With marked preponderance in numbers and superiority of resources, some groups have grown into dominance, and the evidence points to the existence of this dominance in the past also. However, ' like ' sections may appear on a lineage chart, in political action there is conspicuous
[619] disparity. Each tribe possesses one tertiary section or more with a claim to be the
owners of the ' Golden Stirrup '; these are large tertiary groups with relatively plenti-
[621] ful resources, with allies in other groups, and, in sum, with the power to terrorize
other tribal groups.

121 These three objections to the lineage theory as a useful model for examining the
613 consequences of homicide are serious enough in themselves, but another objection
562 renders it still less satisfactory. This fourth objection relates to the implication that
114 lineage theory cannot take account of women. Indeed, in some of the accounts of the
political organization of lineage societies, the impression is given that they are all-male
societies: women belong only to the domestic and kinship realms. In terms of
the theory, this must be so. Women, the marriage links they create, the forms of
relationships that derive from marriage, the right of men to joke with others by
virtue of a link through women, their rights to demand favours of men who are not
their agnates, their right to expect contributions to bridewealth or blood money
from maternal relatives—all these, and other forms of behaviour, have been dealt
with as patterns of behaviour which interfere with or disturb agnation, or that cut
121 across lineage affiliations. Such metaphors can only be justified if it is accepted that
613 precedence must be given to agnation, to what people say they think their lineage
relationships to be, and that there is some kind of primacy about what have frequently
been called jural rules which constitute the structure, while behaviour which is not
governed by these rules is to be relegated to the position of secondary forms having
the effect of intruding only. But these secondary forms of behaviour are as impelling,
as persisting, and are as much a part of social life as any of the so-called jural rules.
[582] It is possible to go further than this, and state that in societies where there is a high
incidence of marriage among agnates of the local group, as occurs among the Bedouin,
jural rules rarely appear in their 'pure' form in behaviour, since, in groups of this
sort, each and every person constitutes a bundle of roles by virtue of the fact that he
is one of a very complex cognatic group; a particular role, it is true, may take precedence
in a particular situation, but all roles are present in each situation and affect
behaviour. Precedence can only be given to specific forms of behaviour in relation
to situations. There is no such thing as a general primacy with regard to any form.
The concept of agnation as the centre of all political problems, disturbed or disrupted
by, say, matrilaterality, is as inadequate as saying that the nucleus which pulls all other
components into position is matrilaterality with agnation as a disturbing element. In
reality there are numerous components present in all situations, which should not
be lumped together under such categorizing terms as agnation and matrilaterality,
but which combine as separate components in a kaleidoscopic range of clusters.

121 Some of the components of behaviour subsumed under the notion of matrilaterality
613 are briefly given here in order to appreciate more fully the consequence of inter-group
marriage. Of paramount importance is the fact that, in Bedouin sentiment, to kill
682 a relative is as sinful an act as the killing of a close agnate. When such a homicide
674 did occur, during my period of residence among them, the Bedouin response was to
829 assert that the offender was out of his mind—it was inconceivable that he could have
[602] committed the offence otherwise. Their attitude was reminiscent of the horror they
display when a man kills his father or a full brother, and represents a much stronger
reaction than is manifested when a man kills an agnate of, say, the third or fourth
[604] degree. They have every reason to be disturbed by the killing of a mother's brother,
for, whatever personal affections may be involved, a crucial link is threatened. Their
reasoning, however, is that relationships with the mother's brother are characteristically
easy, that they are not demanding, that there is much joking in them, and that to

121 kill within this range is, in terms of the general pattern of behaviour, stupid. What is of
• 613 interest is that such killings do occur. I recorded three instances of men killing the
682 mother's brother in the contemporary population, not to mention many others
674 based on hearsay evidence only. Clearly, the relationship is more than a merely per-
829 missive one. The mother's brother may well be the only person who can help in
certain crises, and if he withholds his assistance the sister's son is left in a dilemma.
604 The form of behaviour in which demands are made is, as the Bedouin rightly say,
121 that of asking a favour, but this does not mean that it is any the less urgent than a
613 demand made against agnates. The range of favours is large, and only a few can be
604 detailed here. If a group has insufficient water to meet its needs a man first seeks help
from his mother's brother. The request has a number of aspects to it: it is a test of
[554] the relationship itself; it is a matter of pride and status that a man can 'call' on
another to help his group out of difficulties, it is an assurance that resources other than
those jealously guarded by his agnates are available to him, and if a man is seeking
to increase his power he must have available more than an agnate's share of local
[682] water resources to supply his flocks and herds. When a blood-money payment has to
be made, the mother's brother is expected to come forward—it is his right to give
[584] without being asked. If a man wants a wife, he is not permitted to approach his father
directly, but his mother's brother can put pressure on the father instead. If a man dies
[429] while his eldest son is still a minor, his brother may be required to act as guardian,
and in this role he controls the son's property; disputes frequently break out as a
result, with the son at a considerable disadvantage, for he cannot engage his father's
brother in hostilities—but his mother's brother can do so for him. Whenever men
[422] come to possess animals before the demise of their fathers or when the father's
brother is acting as guardian they mark them with the tribal and personal signs of their
[583] mothers' brothers. Men have the right to demand contributions for bridewealth
from their agnates if they lack wealth; in practice it comes not from them, but from
the mother's brother. Finally, in certain circumstances, if a man does not have male
heirs, his sister's son might inherit all his wealth.

121 Affinity also carries with it a large number of rights. A poor man may take up
613 residence in the camp of his father-in-law, and be kept by him. The latter may come
606 to his son-in-law's aid in many of his dealings with his father. Like the mother's
brother, the affine is a potential source of water-supply when rain has been insufficient
on the homeland. He also helps with blood money and bridewealth, and he is expected
to aid his daughter and her husband with gifts of food and wool.

121 The details given above by no means exhaust the list of rights a man possesses in
613 his matrilateral and affinal relatives. Obviously, these are not the only forms of
relationship either, and the other forms carry with them yet other claims of various
sorts. Enough detail has been given, however, to make clear the point that local
agnatic groups are so differentiated, and inter-group relationships are so important,
that each aspect of homicide settlement previously described will require further
examination, not in the sense that additional complications must be introduced, but
with the question in mind, is not the structural presentation false? Before beginning
this stage of the argument it is necessary to establish the fact that the links of affinity
and matrilaterality which a group has with another are of a kind which necessitate
their inclusion in an analysis of the arrangements for settling homicides.

•613 Among the Bedouin, men are permitted to marry their father's brother's daughter
582 and any other cousin of similar type within the local agnatic group. This means that
121 most agnates will be related in other ways as well. Parallel-cousin marriage has the
effect of diversifying the agnatic group, and creates small nuclei within it, each having
its own characteristics and patterns of behaviour with others. Diversification of this
kind leads to a differentiation between homicides within the tertiary group.

The Bedouin say that they always marry their parallel cousins, and do not give their
daughters to others if they can help it. Census data does not support this view. Nearly
as many men find wives outside their agnatic group as within it. Of importance
in the present context is the direction taken by these external marriages. Perhaps
121 the most striking feature is that the number of marriages with men of a collateral
582 tertiary group is low, so low that they can be explained by special circumstances.
628 Now collateral tertiary groups whose territories are adjacent experience intense day-to-day
613 relationships. In the context of descent these are the most closely linked
[621] lineages—among older men there may be the recollection of the time when the two
constituted a single community, and when they all lived together in the same summer
camp. Common sentiment between them is very strong. The strips of territory they
inhabit may be almost identical. Their discreteness lies almost entirely in the possession
of separate natural resources, although in some cases pastures are shared.
But their social boundaries are nevertheless sharply drawn, for the high incidence of
parallel-cousin marriage within them, and the tendency for external links to leap-frog
collateral segments, gives them a definition which could not be bettered by exogamy.
121 The basis of their discreteness lies, of course, in the competition that exists between
628 them for natural resources; however much the Bedouin protest that their real enemies
613 are the secondary or primary groups lying some thirty to fifty miles away, when they
wish to enlarge their resources there is little point in attempting to capture a well a
578 long distance away, which cannot be defended, and might be located alongside an
enemy group. They do, it is true, engage in competitive hostilities over land and
water situated some distance from their homeland, but when they engage in these
activities they do so on behalf of a linked group, albeit with their own interests
uppermost. The capture of natural resources for use by a tertiary group can only be
achieved by an enlargement of its homeland, and this is only possible by expanding
into a neighbour's territory.

121 Another feature of external marriages is that they are not spread among as many
613 groups as in societies where there are exogamous clans, and where other rules of
marriage appear to compel the maximum amount of dispersal. Instead, the external
582 links created through marriage are highly selective, and are thrown out into ecologically
differentiated areas, giving added economic security, or, in the case of date oases,
an additional item to the diet at a time of the year when it is sorely needed. Once
established these external links are perpetuated through cross-cousin marriages in
successive generations. If the link is considered valuable, and relationships develop
satisfactorily, other marriage connexions will be woven around the first. Multiplicity
gives added strength and durability, not in the mechanical sense of duplication, but of
creating a more diverse kin structure, with its greater range of rights and claims, in
which links can flourish. While the number of groups linked in marriage are few,
the geographical spread is great. Marriage links exist with tertiary sections of colla-

121 teral secondary sections, with collateral primary sections, and long distances away
613 into other tribes. This spread can be interpreted as giving each tertiary group access
582 to resources of wide ecological diversity. What is of interest in the present context is not the interpretation of the links but the effect they have on behaviour. Spread means that a group can call for help from a number of differently situated groups.
121 Each one of these links not merely modifies the structural means for settling homi-
613 cide, but converts the homicide into a sociologically quite different sort of act. It can,
582 as the Bedouin like to think, be an act of merit for a man to kill another from a feud-
578 ing secondary section, but there is no merit whatsoever in it if the tertiary section of
682 that secondary section happens to contain affines or maternal relatives; this is a sinful act. The Bedouin themselves recognize this when they add to their structural explanation the rider that they do not feud with cognatic relatives. The difference between their position and a sociological one is that they see this as a contingency not as a persistent necessity; they are able to maintain their position because they see their behaviour as explicable in terms of the simple ossified structure of their genealogical relationships. What they fail to appreciate is that these ' contingencies ' are ecologically, economically, demographically, and politically essential. They are able to maintain their position also, because the model of a lineage structure they use, along with the two riders previously mentioned (see p. 270) affords them a kind of explanation for most occurrences. The argument is attractive both to Bedouin and to anthropologists because it is comprehensive and neat in its logicality. The next stage in the argument is to show that there is a far greater range of possible consequences to a homicide than those summarized in the diagram (see p. 269) and that the additional consequences are related, not to the lineage structure, but to the linkages which have been discussed above.

121 I begin with a review of a homicide which involves two men of the same tertiary
613 section. Bedouin classify all homicides within this range—as they do for any of the
682 structural orders—as undifferentiated, but in each case, different sorts of relatives
829 are concerned in the ensuing hostilities, and the consequences are, therefore, different also. Bedouin say that a man never kills his father or full brother. In the event of a man killing another man acknowledged to be his father, the act itself proves that he cannot possibly be his son. He is said to be illegitimate, thus making his mother an adultress and relieving the males of the agnatic line of the responsibility and the
121 odium. If a maternal uncle of the agnatic group is killed, the offence is almost on a
613 par with that of patricide or fratricide. When, however, the homicide is between two
682 men who are agnatically distant, and not closely related cognatically either, but both are members of the same local agnatic group, what follows will depend largely on the size and stage of development of the group; if it is small, the homicide threatens to wreck it, but if it is large and on the verge of splitting the homicide may be the occasion for split taking place and being recognized publicly by a demand for blood money. Threatened with wreckage, a small group meets a homicide by closing its ranks for self preservation; a large group splits. The same event within the same kind of structural unit results in two quite dissimilar consequences. The reason is clear enough—the two groups are similar only in a general structural way, but sociologically they are not comparable.

When a homicide occurs between tertiary segments the solution, it was said earlier,

121 613 682 is found in either a vengeance killing or a blood-money agreement which later becomes caught up in a wider set of debt relationships. Records show that this is true in some cases, but in others the blood money is paid in one instalment and immediately. The recognition of a debt and its liquidation among the Bedouin is tantamount to a declaration of hostility, since without a debt the means for smooth-running relationships is lacking. Such a blood-money payment was made between two tertiary groups in the absence of the 'owner of the blood'; when he returned he sought out his brother's killer, and took two lives for one. Subsequently, there was a further blood-money settlement but there remained 'a man left over'. In other circumstances an annual payment, called *sana'*, is demanded in addition to the prompt and full payment of the blood money. The attachment of the *sana'* to a settlement is an invidious condition since it is regarded as a fee by those who have to pay it, it is said to lower the status of a group and ' one day, it must be repudiated '.[1] It may, circumstances permitting, serve to cast off all pretence of friendly relationships. It is more likely that it will lead to a further outbreak of hostilities. When I witnessed the payment of the *sana'* the terms in which it was demanded were: ' You have a man on your backs. Are you going to repudiate this or are you going to give me *sana'*? If you repudiate, we must seek vengeance.' The payment, one in a long series, was made on that occasion but there were loud grumblings among the men of the camp against their leader for his acquiescence and one suggested that they terminate the payments forthwith by shooting the claimant. Of the three forms of blood money cited, this latter is the extreme to which groups can go short of open feud. Its opposite is a blood-money payment which is mainly left as a debt, and which is accompanied by the ' gift ' of a wife to the victim's group.[2] The wife is ' given ' as an earnest that the offender's group wishes the full restoration of relationships ruptured by the homicide. There are, therefore, four forms of blood-money payment. The Bedouin view of these is that they are variants of what is, in principle, the same thing. Their view cannot be accepted. Each of the four payments points to diverse kinds of social relationships between groups, and their consequences are wholly disparate. These various kinds of relationships between the tertiary sections of the same secondary section exist because the relationships between all sections cannot possibly be the same if they are more than a pair in number. A secondary section which spans ten tertiary sections is not the same type of unit as one which spans only three. The greater the number of tertiary sections the greater the possible permutations in their relationships. What the Bedouin think of as variations in the form of blood-money
829 payment is related to the complexities that lie behind their simple lineage model. Bedouin can comprehend this complexity only by thinking in terms of a kind of average behaviour, regarding deviations from the average as fortuitous and explicable by the faulty reasoning that ' in this particular case, it just so happened ' that this, that, and the other were part of the situation, failing to appreciate that apparent aberrations are constants to the extent that some sort of specifics occur in all cases. There is no reason why Bedouin reasoning should be followed in sociological analysis.

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[1] See Peters, 1966.

581 585 [2] A marriage is not legal unless at least a promise to hand over wealth has been made beforehand. In the case cited the amount promised would be no more than a token—a sheep or a goat.

The consequences of homicides in which secondary groups are concerned present 121
an even greater variety, for now the span has expanded to include many more groups, 613
with a total population of several thousand people. Groups of this order are spread 682
over a much wider territorial range; some structurally distant groups are neighbours
by virtue of their propinquity, while some structurally proximate groups are far
removed territorially. Some feuds lie dormant for long periods. Others erupt [578]
frequently. Some homicides between these groups are followed by the 'laying down
of the denial '—the feud situation with most acrimony built into it, for one denial,
followed by a vengeance killing, is met by a second denial and so on, excluding thereby
any chance of a settlement. In other circumstances the offender's group boast that
they are responsible for a homicide, thus challenging the victim's group to a show
of force. Only the more powerful tertiary groups would venture to do this, and it is
only they who could meet a homicide against them with a spectacular show of force,
compelling a weaker tertiary group (according to hearsay evidence) to break up and
leave its homeland. The modes of killing in homicide differ in character. Some killings
have been heinous and offensive in terms of general morality; their purpose is to
sting the victim's kin to retaliate or to cause them to suffer general discredit and loss
of status. While some parts of secondary segments are at feud, others are not.
A homicide between affinally or matrilaterally linked groups, whether they are
secondary or primary groups, is settled as quickly and as amicably as possible to
prevent turmoil in their relationships. Feud concerns two tertiary sections, not the [578]
opposed secondary sections of which they are parts. Blood money and vengeance is [628]
not the responsibility of secondary sections, but of their respective tertiary sections.

At this point, a further statement concerning the external marriage links of tertiary 121
segments throws further light on the feud. Previously it was stated that the competition 613
between collateral tertiary groups for natural resources is indicated by a low 582
rate of marriage between them. Their external marriage links reinforce the separation. 578
One tertiary section, A, takes some of its spouses from section X of a collateral
secondary section; A's collateral, B, takes some of its spouses from X's collateral, Y.
A may be at feud with Y and B with X. The agnatic links between A and B, and X
and Y do not mitigate the severity of the hostility in the two feuds, they exacerbate
it. It would be erroneous to think of them as cross-cutting ties which promote peace.
Stultified in the development of their hostilities by virtue of their territorial proximity
and the sentiment associated with putatively close agnatic connexion, A and B are
able to express hostilities indirectly through their linked groups X and Y respectively.
During discussions of disputes, homicides, or rival claims to water, whether the disputants
meet in the camps or in administrative offices in the villages, men from the
matrilateral and affinal groups of the parties directly concerned are also present to do
most of the shouting. In some cases I recorded a maternal relative was killed on
behalf of an agnatic group to which he did not belong, although the latter accepted
the responsibility. In the light of facts of this sort the lineage model obstructs analysis.

I now wish to make a few brief remarks about the relationships between collateral 121
primary sections and paired tribes. Homicide, it was asserted earlier, results in raids 619
and war between groups of these orders of segmentation respectively. Evidence 682
can be adduced to show that both consequences have followed. The case usually 726
cited to demonstrate that a single killing precipitates war between tribes is the

121 celebrated war between the 'Abaidat and the Bara 'asa tribes occupying a large part
619 of central and eastern Cyrenaica. This war took place a hundred years ago, so that the
682 evidence is mainly hearsay, but it is significant that when asked for details of the
726 groups taking part the Bedouin make it clear that the entire tribes were not at war—
[173] some sections on both sides are said to have remained on friendly terms. Yet when
121 wars are discussed in a general fashion, the Bedouin insist that tribes confront each
619 other as such. If it is pointed out to them that men might be ranged against their
726 maternal relatives the Bedouin mumble apologetically that they would not kill their
602 maternal relatives—a lame argument since in the heat of battle men cannot make this
kind of discrimination. Details of other wars also illustrate the point that only parts
of tribes face each other in strife, for though the stories of past events may be inaccurate
there is genealogical evidence to substantiate their claims that certain groups
were linked in the past, and in any case their statements assert that where these links
exist they are not prepared to engage in hostilities. The several parts of each tribe,
121 like the parts of primary and secondary sections, have as many different sorts of
619 relationships as there are groups, and the general statement that tribes are warring
571 units merely obscures the interest there is in their relationships. Tribes, further, lack
the leadership to make war. I repeat that leadership does exist, but not even the
121 greatest leaders, past or present, can rightly be described as leaders of their tribes,
619 using the term in its structural connotation. Literature on the subject gives the
•613 impression that there are tribal leaders, because successive administrations have used
554 the tribes and their divisions as a framework for attempting to rule the Bedouin, but
the details of the power domains of individual leaders make it clear that they have
little to do with the ordered divisions of tribes. A leader within part of one tribe may
carry with him tertiary sections of another tribe, and if major hostilities break out
between parts of these tribes, the sections of both which are joined as allies and
related as kinsfolk will not fight against each other, for sections so linked enjoy
stronger connexions than the structurally linked tertiary sections of a very large
[682] secondary section. Consequently the statement that homicide results in tribal war
[114] when the offender and his victim are members of two separate tribes is not merely
incomplete, not merely a simplification, it is wrong.

121 A point which has been implicit throughout the second part of this paper needs
613 now to be made quite explicit: groups do not come together in their respective
571 structural genealogical orders. During my entire residence in Cyrenaica I did not
see a group of agnates larger than a tertiary tribal section assemble for any purpose.
[114] It is true that the occasions when large groups are required to assemble are infrequent.
[648] It is also true that although the British Administration was serving a caretaker role
only, it may have had an affect on the nature of tribal gatherings. Despite this qualification,
there were several occasions when I expected tribal groups to assemble in
lineage order if the fusion of sections in relation to like sections has any meaning in
practice. Large groups of men did gather to dispute claims to wells, to argue about
rights to ploughland, and to make peace. In every case that I recorded the agnatically
closest groups of the main participants were absent, while members of genealogically
more remote groups were present in strength. This statement applies to gatherings
in the camps and in the administrative centres. One of the biggest gatherings I
[628] witnessed assembled in an administrative office in a village near the coast in the

south-west of the country. Most members of the two tertiary groups directly con- 121
cerned in the dispute were present. The agnates of the collaterally linked groups of 613
the principals were unrepresented; indeed collaterals of one of the principals made 571
it quite explicit that they were opposed to their genealogical allies and considered 628
their perusal of the matter tiresome. The bulk of the crowd present was made up
of men linked to the principals in a variety of different and non-agnatic ways, and it
was they who provided most of the argument once the issue had been opened. It 121
follows, therefore, that an analysis of political organization and behaviour in Cyrena- 613
ica which is based on lineage theory leads to a gross misrepresentation. For, what 114
I am arguing is not that the lineage model in its rarefied state is too simple, not that
additional facts must be injected into it to complicate it, but that it does not provide
an admissible basis for analysis.[1] The complication of something that is founded in
error can only lead to complicated error, however many facts of real life are intro-
duced in an attempt to give it substance. The Bedouin conception of their social
relationships in terms of a genealogical ordering of groups is a fact of their social [829]
life, and in relation to some problems it is an important fact. My objection to the use
which has been made of a people's ideology of their relationships is that it has been
elevated from its status as a component of social life to such a position of universal
dominance in all sets of social relationships that 'every sociological problem', as
Fortes writes of the Tallensi, 'hinges on the lineage system'.[2]

If the ordering of groups within the frame of the Bedouin genealogy is abandoned 121
as a basis for analysis, it does not follow that the only remaining view is that of small 613
groups of people distributed throughout the country enjoying relationships merely 571
as units. Regularity in relationships does exist, it is urgently necessary, and it per- 578
sists; but this regularity is not consistent with a lineage model. Ultimately, feud is a
violent form of hostility between corporations which has its source in the competition
for proprietory rights in land and water. This competition makes it necessary for
groups to combine to prevent the encroachments of others in similar combinations
and also to expand their resources whenever the opportunity arises. The significant
groups in a discussion of the feud are these power groups, and it is their composition,
the shifting alliances within them, the growth and diminution in the power of tertiary

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[1] Dr. Paul Bohannan has distinguished in his writings between what he calls folk systems and analytical systems. The distinction, as he sees it, is set out clearly in the statement 'a certain field of Nuer relationships is explained by Nuer in terms of an agnatic genealogy. This is the folk system. The same field is explained, in English, by Professor Evans-Pritchard, as a lineage system based on the principle of segmental opposition. This is an analytical system' (Bohannan, 1957, p. 5). What is the difference? Is it only a difference of language? Bohannan's analytical statement is little more than a generalisation of what is in the folk system. An analytical system, in his hands, is a sophistication of a folk system, for it is the latter which provides him with his analytical framework. The act of creativity on the part of the social anthropologist about which he writes (Bohannan, 1963, p. 14) is the revealing of a folk system through analysis. But he does not
depart from the framework set by informants—the 121
agnatic genealogy is the lineage, and the fission and
fusion of parts, the opposition of like segments and 613
so on is explained by informants in different lan- 114
guages as adequately as it is explained by social
anthropologists in English. Bohannan's viewpoint 171
is made clearer, perhaps, in his discussion on the arrangement of facts relating to Tiv law. Here he considers what he should do once he has elicited all the facts, and he argues against setting them out as an arrangement of the procedural law of Tiv courts because, 'The error would be that the arrangement is not part of *the Tiv way of looking at it*, and hence would be false' (Bohannan, 1957, p. 69. Italics mine). Why? The Tiv are not the social anthropologists. Is the test of an analytical model its consistency with a folk comprehension?

[2] Fortes, 1945, p. 30.

121 sections constituting the combinations which makes the facts of feud intelligible.
613 Furthermore, several different types of power structures exist which serve the different
[571] interests of the people composing them, and these are interlinked in combinations
[578] of superior span. But the formation of these structures and the modes in which they
combine are quite unlike the articulations in a lineage system. Characteristically, the
segments in a lineage system are conceived of as building up hierarchically to span
what is spoken of as a total society, the apex of the system affording a spectacular and
fixed definition of its boundaries. Had I been using this concept in this paper the
[173] founding ancestress of the nine Cyrenaican tribes, Sa'ada as named by the Bedouin,
would have served this purpose and would have been given inappropriate prominence.
121 The views presented here have the consequences of retreating from a concept
184 of a total society. The people to whom the facts given are related are the camel-herding
233 tribes only. Some of them have relations of many kinds with the cow-herding
folk who inhabit the northern plateau area, and these relations are also significant
619 for the analysis of a wide range of problems; genealogically both cow and camel
herders are seen as part of a single structure, but the differences between them with
regard to their economy, the size, composition, and distribution of their residential
units, their political and ritual life is so great that to conceive of them as a single social
121 structure is not useful. Moreover, the far western tribal sections have relationships
619 of such urgency with their neighbours in Tripolitania (who are excluded from Cyrenaican
genealogies) that to cut off these relationships as lying outside Cyrenaican society
would be quite unwarranted. The same can be said of the relationships of the tribal
sections in the eastern part of Cyrenaica with their genealogical cousins, the Aulad
'Ali of Egypt, who, although residing across a national border, are closely linked to
some of the Cyrenaican Bedouin. Some tribes also have to rely on the people of the
southern oases for an item of diet and an outlet for surplus wool, and the net of kinship
is spread out to include them. In these cases they come into contact with other
[177] ethnic groups such as Berbers and Tibu, and through the oases they extend their lines
of communication southwards to Wadai, Chad, and Bornu. As an indication of the
effectiveness of these links, it is only necessary to add that people inhabiting Cyrenaica
make periodic and regular visits to these far southern places, and that in 1948 a
shaikh, living near Ajadabiya in south-western Cyrenaica, collected blood-money
contributions from kinsmen in Wadai. A single structure cannot possibly include,
for analytical purposes, these sorts of relationships.

121 Finally, it must be stressed that the facts given here refer to the period 1948 to
114 1950. Since then oil has been discovered in large quantities near the territory of a
[315] tribe where I spent most of my time while resident in the country, and where there
was one tin shack in 1950 there is now a modern port with roads extending southwards
from it into the wilderness. I see no reason to assume that social relations as
I observed them are present today or that they were the same at any time in the past
175 either. Before the advent of the Sanusi Order in the early eighteen-forties, it is known
795 that one lineage at least was dominantly powerful and that its leader tyrannized a
613 large part of Central Cyrenaica.[1] His descendants constituted a powerful group in

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[1] Smith and Porcher, 1864. These two archaeologists met this leader and continued their archaeological researches around Cirene only with his goodwill, although the site is not on the territory of his tribe as I knew it in 1950. They also speak of him as inhabiting a castle which also lies outside the

1950, but his kind of tyranny was absent from the Cyrenaica of that period. From the 795
mid-nineteenth century until the Italian invasion of 1911, the Sanusi Order established 175
itself, spread its lodges throughout the tribes and in other more remote lands [613]
until it became what Evans-Pritchard speaks of as a theocratic empire.[1] The lodges [778]
served as areas of sanctuary and their staffs adjudicated disputes. Leaders of the [793]
Order had the power to coerce and the Bedouin obeyed. They obeyed out of personal
regard for some of them in 1950, but the religious authority previously used by the
leaders had given way to the political power they now exercised as functionaries in
a state system. In the meantime, the country had been ravaged by the long Italo-Sanusi [648]
wars. Throughout the nineteen-thirties after suffering terrible privations and reduction in numbers through slaughter in war, death in concentration camps, and exile, the Bedouin were ruled by the Italians. During the Second World War the armies of three major contestants fought their battles where the Bedouin now tend their flocks and herds. After the war they were left to fend for themselves, with a minimum of administrative interference.

In the light of all this the conception of an equilibrium system is of little heuristic 121
value, still less its derivative concept of a repetitive system. This does not mean, however, that an account of part of the social life of the Bedouin as it existed in 1950 must be nothing more than a disconnected piece of history, unrelated to a prior state of things and wholly useless for the understanding of the contemporary oil-producing cum mixed pastoral–agricultural economy. It would be little more than a piece of social historiography if the analysis was based on the concept of a total social structure of functionally interconnected parts, forming what Leach describes as 'a delicately balanced mechanism rather like the various parts of a wrist watch'.[2] Such a viewpoint would effectively exclude any possible comprehension of changes save those present as part of the dynamics of a system; its only answer to change is an account of a different system. If, instead, attention is focused on the analysis of a field of components arranged in a specific fashion to meet the interests of men at a particular time, it then becomes possible to see how a shift in their positions, the addition of new components, or the elimination of others produces this or that effect. It can make intelligible what has gone before, and if the future cannot be anticipated it can be demarcated within rough limits.

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modern territory of his tribe. See also Hamilton, 1856.

[1] Evans-Pritchard, 1949. In this book a brilliant account is given of the development of the Order, and how it came to unify and provide centralized political leadership for the tribes. [175] [795] [613]

[2] Leach, 1961, p. 6.

571 between man and man, although the various cereal dishes which constitute
231 their regular meals are said to have a similar effect.
264 The son who continues to eat with his father "as he always had been
182 doing," also continues to accept his authority. Indeed he could do little else
593 at this stage, for he lacks the economic means to cut away. Neither at marriage
585 nor after is there any transfer of wealth from father to son. The new
182 tent recently pitched is no more than a dormitory to which the young couple
[425] retire at night. During the daytime the son is still to be seen in his father's
[556] tent, and, in the male quarters, things appear to be much the same as before.
In the female quarters, the only superficial change is the more frequent appearance
among the women of one who, before marriage, often sat among
them if she had been a close neighbour or a close cousin previously; or of
an additional helper if she had come from afar. On the surface things remain
"as they always have been," although in fact, a whole set of changes
have been initiated.

852 *Rites de passage* are few among the Bedouin. A man's progress in life is
881 ceremonially marked by only four events: his birth, circumcision, marriage
764 and burial. His development into manhood is not marked by clearly defined
stages. About the age of seven, the henna markings on the front of a boy's
858 shirt for protection from the evil eye are not renewed, the cowrie shell stitched
789 to the front of his cap as a kind of talisman against the evil eye is removed
and he is no longer permitted free access to the women's quarters. As he
857 grows older, he will be instructed in goat-herding, and later taught to follow
233 the sheep. In his late teens he will have to undertake the more arduous and
883 responsible task of herding the camels. Coincident with camel-herding, he
233 may be given a gun by his father. Shortly afterwards he must undertake the
[431] stringent test of manhood, a journey to a distant oasis for dates. These
[411] changes are not marked off by a *rite de passage.* The rites a man undergoes
[484] during the course of a lifetime are minimal, and in the sense that they are
[885] concerned with only the basic events in a man's life anywhere (save for
852 circumcision, which is a minor celebration anyway), they are irreducible.
88 Moreover, the rituals which exist do not comprehend the same multiplicity of
796 relationships as rituals which occur in many other African societies.[4] It is
[171] true that the ceremonies referred to in this chapter by no means include
all the Bedouin rituals. It is also true that the events mentioned vary in
[554] elaboration, and in the number of symbols present in them, but they are
not multiplied or reduced for different people.

In this context it is important to stress that we are here dealing with a
[613] lineage society where social differentiation is not built up into differences
[554] of rank, where the roles to which a man succeeds are almost wholly captured
[602] by his kinship relationships with other men and which are sociologically
to be distinguished from the roles a man enters into by acquisition of office,

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[4] See, for example, the elaboration of rituals discussed in M. Gluckman (Ed.), *Essays on the Ritual of Social Relations.* Manchester: University of Manchester Press, 1962.

membership of associations and so on. The statuses a Bedouin achieves de- 796
pend not on an ordered acquisition through the inheritance of roles or elec- 852
tion to them, but on his personal manipulation of linkages in his jockeying 88
with others. Rites are minimal because there are few defined statuses an 554
individual can predictably acquire. The equalitarianism of the desert denudes 602
the Bedouin of ritual riches. Complimentarily, rites which do occur are 613
thrown into exaggerated relief by the absence of others, and in their isolation, [557]
become not merely a "passage" but a cataclysmic change. Marriage and
burial both comprehend limited fields of relations, but accompanying cere- 585
monies may bring several hundred people together, people who otherwise 764
rarely gather in these numbers to meet one another as kinsmen and neigh- 796
bours, and it is suggested that the emphasis given to the events dramatises the 602
significance of the changes they produce. In the discussion of the changes 182
brought about by marriage, the Bedouin view of what is entailed will be
considered first.

The Bedouin View of Marriage

After marriage, the Bedouin argue, a son has a tent of his own, a woman 585
over whom he has authority and soon children to make him a father. Mar- 581
riage causes split, branching. A new family is created, holding the poten- [613]
tial of a new lineage. The separation is so painful a matter for the father
that he cannot contemplate it, hence his pretence that he has no knowledge of [593]
wedding festivities, and his subsequent attitude that nothing has happened.

Interestingly, there are two other occasions when this attitude is to be 682
observed. When a man kills within his corporate group,[5] he may flee his 613
tribe or he may be compelled to leave; later he is likely to return and, when 621
he does, he is received with a minimum of show. Every attempt is made to
suppress knowledge of the event.

Again, if incest occurs, the memory of it must somehow be suppressed, and 835
it is an ever-present danger. Men, permitted four wives simultaneously and 561
also able to engage in a plurality of marriages through divorce or death of [595]
spouses, may have children showing an age difference of two or three generations. Thus it comes about that a man may be of an age in relation to his father's sister which permits them as children to behave as if they were
first paternal cousins. As an adult, the preferred spouse for a man is a [582]
father's brother's daughter. In terms of relationships between adolescents
the situation in which a man is of the same age generation as his father's
sister is fraught with danger. In one such case, between a man and his [684]
father's sister, the male child of the union was put out in the desert to be

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[5] Bedouin are disposed in groups which, in summer, usually constitute a single community, around or near a watering point. The men of this group are interlinked by reference to an ancestor four or five ascending generations, reckoning from the generation of men of about 20 years. When, elsewhere in this chapter reference is made to corporations, it will be to groups of this kind.

835 devoured by wild animals, the girl was "given"[6] to a close cousin who had
561 shot his sister. Both now reside with an enemy tribal section. The two acts
684 were equated. They were similar to the extent that both created a situation which defied institutional resolution. The culprits were exorcised. The girl's lover remains with his group — the odium for the male is incomparably less than for the female, since, while maternity is easy to establish, paternity is frequently shrouded in doubt — and during the months I lived with this particular group, there was never a mention of the affair. It was as if "nothing had happened."

829 If asked why these two events cause such profound distress, the answers
the Bedouin give are twofold: they can do nothing about them, and they
578 cause split. By split in this context they mean split in the lineage; split in
613 the case of homicide because it may lead to a demand for blood-money which
[682] is payable only between corporations, and split in the case of incest because
[684] it causes chaos in relationships. Marriage, in one sense, their reasoning
581 runs, is similar, for it too causes split. Whatever may be the analytic strength
829 of the arguments that homicide and incest precipitate splitting, the argument
that marriage does so is spurious. In what sense can marriage mean
613 split? Bedouin men marry "so that we may beget many sons, to make a big lineage later on." The worst fate that can befall a man as a result of his son's marriage is that he, in later generations, will become the focal point in a series of branching descent lines. The alternative — that his sons remain unmarried — can only mean that his name would disappear through want of successors to carry it on, which is one of the greatest evils which can befall a man, according to Bedouin sentiment: better split than oblivion. If the key to the interpretation of the father's attitude to his son's marriage is not
581 that it causes split, it must lie elsewhere in their relationship. What mar-
585 riage does is alter the distribution of authority between father and son. In
593 order to pursue this, it is necessary first to clarify the types of authority involved, and then assess them in a post-marital situation.

554
The Division of Authority Between the Family and the Corporation

851 Politically, a person's status is determined for him at birth. At this time a man has the right to accept or deny paternity. Denial is tantamount to an accusation of adultery by his wife. In practice, once a wife has given birth to a male child, whatever doubts people may harbour regarding paternity, the husband accepts the child as his. "The boy for the bed," is a saying often heard among the Bedouin; but it remains the husband's prerogative to invest
[837] the child with legitimacy, hence, political status. Only if a husband becomes aware that he is publicly considered a cuckold, or if he catches his wife and a lover *in flagrante delicto*, is he at all likely to take action. Otherwise he may

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[585]
[581] **[6] A marriage is illegal unless it is accompanied by an agreement to transfer wealth to the girl's father.**

indeed welcome unfaithfulness on his wife's part. If a man is very old, and 554
his wife very young, it is likely that she will entertain lovers; if a man leaves 851
camp for a long absence his wife may not remain chaste. In both cases, if 837
the liaisons lead to the birth of a child, particularly a male, the husband
greets the news with unrestrained enthusiasm — "praise be to God," as their
saying goes. Incapacity[7] to produce offspring, if a husband is convinced of
it, may lead him to delegate a kinsman to serve his wife for procreative purposes:
he has the legal authority, as husband, to do so, and to require his
wife to submit, for the only alternative, if he is not to die without "issue,"
is to "take" a son from his brother and fulfill the obligations towards this
boy required of a pater, namely, attend to his circumcision, provide him with
teaching in the Koran (a duty neglected by most) and give him the wealth
with which to marry.

Granting the acceptance of paternity, whatever the circumstances of con- 593
ception, a male child, *ipso facto,* accedes to membership of a corporation, and 554
is subject to the authority of that group in a number of matters. In many [851]
situations it would appear that a son is under the father's political control. [613]
At a moot, the son, if he speaks at all, will do so only to corroborate his
father. Discussions among men in a small camp evoke a similar pattern of
behaviour. Until the father becomes senile or dies, a son cannot publicly
pursue an independent course, but he desists by virtue of his relationships
with his father *qua* pater, not because of his father's political power to
coerce. All men of a corporation, in any event, "speak with one word" at [613]
a moot, and a son, by his assent to the common view, also supports his
father; in so doing he yields to the political authority of his corporation, and
not that of his father.

Membership in the corporation invests a man with other privileges and 593
duties. Protection against external enemies comes within the corporation's 613
jurisdiction, although in a particular situation, the father may well be the
person who dispenses it. Complimentarily, if a man commits an offense [681]
against a person not of his group, whatever private thoughts his father may
have about the act, the responsibility lies not on his shoulders but on the
group, and he is compelled to share this responsibility equally with all other
members. For example, if a son commits a homicide the father bears the [682]
same legal responsibility for the act, and is under obligation to contribute the
same share of blood-money as he would be if the act had been perpetrated
by any male of the group other than his son. Even in a narrower field of
relations between father and son the group exercises its authority. Acting
as pater, a man may punish his son, physically or otherwise; he may not
do so to the point of injury, for personal injury comes within the legitimate
sphere of the corporation. A man's "bone" belongs to his group; he is an in-

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[7] Impotency is a special case, because it is dishonourable for a woman to remain [833]
wife to an impotent man. She cannot divorce him, but her father can insist on a
witnessed test of impotency and, if it is proven, the husband is compelled to divorce [586]
her. **Barrenness, obviously, is a different matter.**

593 tegral part of "the one body"; events which affect a man in this context lie
•613 outside a father's field of jurisdiction. The political authority vested in a
corporation acts to circumscribe the authority of persons in other fields.

Other rights stem from political membership. As a person with a defined position in a lineage corporation, a man has the right to use the natural resources of its territory. His father, although he instructs his son where to plough and when to water the animals, cannot deny him access to wells, pastures and ploughland. Economically, a son is independent to this extent, although his ability to exploit his right to the natural resources is restricted by his father's control of animals. Ultimately, however, this restriction cannot amount to stultification, because a man has the right to
613 demand food. In practice, a poor man staves off hunger with donations from
422 this or that individual, and superficially it appears that he is dependent on
735 the personal charity of his fellowmen. This is not so, for what is implicit is
that the parcels of wealth controlled by individuals are the possessions of the corporation. It is not accidental that poor people do not go hungry. During my entire stay among the Bedouin I never saw one of them beg or
[556] suffer hunger, however marginal the diet of many. Clearly, those with a
surplus can and do use it for personal advantage, but the extent to which they can do so is circumscribed by the legal claims which members of a corporation have on the parcels of moveable property held by each of them.

613 Control over the wealth, whether it be animals or the procreative functions
421 of women, rests, in the final analysis, in a corporation. Inheritance laws
428 specify that women are not legal heirs,[8] and that all male children are
[562] equal heirs. Women do, in fact, come to control property, and it is rare that
wealth is equally divided among male heirs. The precise details of inherit-
[593] ance may partly be decided by a father, but he is limited in his actions. Most
of the time inheritance disputes are not of the kind which require action by the corporate group; a case which occured while I was resident with the Bedouin did, however, invoke immediate action. A man, who had left the desert to live in a village on the plateau, had only one daughter. He made it known that he intended to will his entire property to his daughter. When the news was brought to the camps of his fellow agnates, there was great consternation, because, as became clear in their lengthy discussions, the threat now existed that a substantial parcel of property would be removed from the group, a threat made real by the proposed marriage of the daughter
[584] to a man of another tribe. The court would have to recognise the daughter's
right to some of the property, and the members of the group reluctantly had to concede that there was little they could do about this, but they had one
[593] action left to them — they decided that her nearest agnate should demand
[584] her in marriage. Usually, the choice of husband for a daughter is a decision

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[771] [8] The Bedouin are Sunni Muslims, and, as Samusi, belong to the Maliki school in
[795] legal matters. According to court law, women are heirs. However, actual Bedouin
practice is contrary to law. For, if women were permitted to inherit, since many marry
[671] outside the corporation into which they were born, they could alienate its resources.

613

her father takes, but in certain critical situations he can be relieved of choice 593
if the interests of the group as a whole are at stake. [421]

Political authority is the preserve of a corporation, and its exercise leads [428]
to invasion of a man's authority in the field of domestic relations. This [584]
does not mean, however, that discrete areas of authority do not remain with
the father. In the tent his authority over his son is so overwhelming as to
keep the son in almost complete subordination. The son is referred to as a
slave, and in daily life he has to behave as one. He must obey every command,
for, were he to rebel, he would find little or no support among his
agnates, whatever the extent of the provocation. Retreat from his father is
hardly an alternative, since, while his father is alive, he has no animals of [422]
his own, and to leave camp would only mean that he would have to move
outside his group to seek employment elsewhere as a shepherd. If he did [558]
this he would forfeit status, and almost certainly cut himself off from property [428]
which would fall to him after his father's death. A man who "denies"
his father looses too many privileges for the practice to become widespread.

Caught in this dilemma, a son's predicament is worsened by the fact that 593
he cannot initiate marriage negotiations — to be able to do so requires some 584
animals to offer a girl's father. Through his mother's brother he has the [431]
means of bringing pressure to bear on his father, but the latter can resist for [604]
years. Finally, a marriage is arranged for him. It is difficult to convey the 581
yearning of young Bedouin for marriage. They discuss it among themselves 521
ad nauseam. For the most part their talk is about the sexual aspect of marriage. 831
Premarital sex relations are strictly controlled, and the movements
of each young girl are carefully guarded because, if on the day of her marriage 836
the test shows that she is not a virgin, she not only brings disgrace to [585]
her family, but the marriage may be revoked and her worth as a bride for
another man seriously diminished. Nevertheless premarital relations do [837]
occur, if not between youths and maidens to any extent, between young
men and married women.

The question still remains: why is marriage the occasion of such ebullient 581
celebration? The formal authority a father exercises over his son 593
changes little on marriage. Economically the son is still harnessed to the
father. The latter still shouts his orders at him, and obedience remains
unaltered. Any sign of an independent view on a matter is met with a gruff
rebuff. If the marriage turns out to be disagreeable to the father, he has
the authority — if not always the power — to break it. Marriage does not
mean a change in the general mode of behaviour between the two; the legal
relations remain unaltered, albeit modified in practice, as the married son
matures in age. But marriage does mean the acquisition of rights and status
previously denied a son. Henceforward, he has a domain of his own. This [554]
is high drama, indeed, for although every effort is made to give substance to
the expressed view that "nothing has happened," for the first time in his
life the son has seized publicly, amid the jubilations of his fellows, a status
which hitherto was the possession of the father.

daughters of agnates and, in view of the high agnatic concentration, the 582 daughters of agnates who are co-residents as well. Parallel-cousin marriage 602 therefore creates affinity between co-resident agnates.

The rate of parallel-cousin marriage is high, producing such a density of kinship relationships as to afford a reliable index for defining the agnatic corporation. As a form of marriage it persists; genealogical records clearly demonstrate this. Frequency of parallel-cousin marriage taken together with its persistency, means, above all else, that it makes an agnatic group a cognatic group as well. The matter is put in this way to suit the general development of the argument, but it would be a serious error to think that this means I am giving priority to agnation and that I am considering cognation as intrusive, or that, in this society, agnation can stand on its own because it has a kind of absolute significance other forms of relationship do not possess. Both forms exist in reality.

The great Bu Bakr of Cyrenaica's most celebrated lineage is alleged to have [613] exhorted his fellow tribesmen to "marry your father's brother's daughters and then your paternal relatives and your maternal relatives will become one." Whether he had given the advice or not, the Bedouin, as their society is constituted, would marry them anyway. The Bedouin form of agnation without its accompanying parallel-cousin marriage would impose impossible restrictions, if indeed there is any point in attempting to conceive of a situation so remote from reality. With parallel-cousin marriage present in the corporate group, men referred to as agnates are not agnates only; each and [613] every one of them is the centre of a bundle of roles, each role potentially [554] as important as the other. It would be false to argue, moreover, that complexities of relationships can be unravelled by analytically separating them, giving precedence to the agnatic role in an "agnatic" situation, the mother's brother's role in a domestic situation and so on. An agnate who is also a mother's brother is never the same, in any situation, as an agnate to whom one is not otherwise related. The prime significance of parallel-cousin marriage is that it creates a complexity of linkages which almost amount to con- [182] fusion, thereby maximising the choice available to individuals to meet whatever contingencies befall them.

The only area of relationships left relatively undisturbed by parallel-cousin marriage is the son, father and father's brother triangle. Freed of the complications stemming from parallel-cousin marriage, agnation can here approximate its true form. Other complications arise out of marriage. A 582 few are listed here: father and son marry a mother and her daughter; a 583 form of exchange marriage between first parallel-cousins occur; two brothers marry two sisters; the marriage of two brothers to two sisters is followed, in the succeeding generation, by the son of one union marrying the daughter of the other, making this latter a double first parallel-cousin marriage — both a father's brother's daughter's and a mother's sister's daughter's marriage. These forms can all occur within a corporate group. No citadel of agnation [613] can withstand this attack. All forms of marriage combine to break the grip [602]

582 of agnation on the members of a corporate group and give it a taproot of 583 diversity whence it derives its strength, and which makes of it "the one body," •613 conspicuous, in comparison with other societies, as the corporate group 602 *par excellence*.

The Sister's Son-Mother's Brother Relationship

128 Previously the mode of relationships associated with agnation and affinity have been briefly discussed. In order to appreciate the effects of parallel-cousin marriage, some remarks concerning the sister's son-mother's brother 604 set of relationships must be included here. Bedouin contrast the mother's [174] brother with the father's brother; their sayings and proverbs afford a wealth of verbal documentation on the contrast. With the mother's brother a man enjoys all the freedoms he is denied in his relationships with his father [831] and father's brother. He is permitted to joke with him; they indulge in exchanges of obscenities. When the sister's son wishes to marry, he is permitted to discuss the matter with his mother's brother and can urge him to intercede with his father on his behalf. Two men thus related are readily recognised in the camps, because in their acts they are required to show affection by displays of innocent horseplay, pranks or mild practical jokes. Small boys pursue their mother's brother, feign to kick or strike him, and he takes it all in good part.

The external aspects of this behaviour is deceptive. Joking of this sort creates the image in which the relationships are conceived; what is equally striking in it is its compulsiveness. Obviously, mature men are not always in the mood to be teased, but if they are, they must respond appropriately. Their relationships are unmistakably onerous. This remark applies not only to the external forms of their behaviour, but also to the favours a man is [602] permitted to ask of his mother's brother. A brief amplification will make the point clear. Demands can be made of agnates, but only in situations of serious contingency. Day-to-day needs are met, not by appeals to the rights of agnation, but from the expectations linked to the mother's brother. If these expectations are withheld, the sister's son may be left in a quandary. 604 Interestingly, in the records of homicides I gathered, three (in the 682 contemporary population) were concerned with the killings of mother's brothers by sister's sons. Homicide within this field of relationship is difficult to comprehend unless it is appreciated that expectations are as compulsive in the daily life and the general well-being of people as are the rights and duties associated with agnation.

604 These general remarks apply to the relationships irrespective of the lineage 613 origin of the mother's brother. The similarity ends there, since the nature of the expectations, their urgency at any given moment and the kind of favours which are granted vary with the group identity of the mother's [428] brother. A mother's brother who is a member of ego's corporate group may be expected to give the sister's son small quantities of flour, favour him in all

sorts of petty ways, listen to his grumbles about his agnates, interfere on his 604
behalf in petty camp quarrels, shield him from the disciplinarian father and 613•
guard his property interests against the predatory father's brother; if the 428
mother's brother dies without heirs, the sister's son can reasonably expect at least a share of his wealth. When the mother's brother is a member of a different corporate group, a sister's son cannot possibly expect to inherit from him in any circumstance.

The mother's brother may reside in a camp too distant to be much effective 604
direct help in day-to-day living. His relative remoteness gives the relation- 591
ship other possible opportunities, however. Rainfall in the semi-desert area 312
of Cyrenaica is highly variable, both from year to year, and from place to 233
place in any given year. As a result this shallow saucer of a depression may 241
have sufficient rain to supply both the water needs of animals and crops, while an area a few miles distant will have inadequate water supplies for either. The mother's brother-sister's son link can mean water for animals and a crop of barley for both when, in successive years, the resources of one area or the other are inadequate.

The differences in the relations between men and their mother's brother 604
do not end with a characterisation of their antipodal forms. The demographic structure of a group may be such that one man may have a number of mother's brothers, another only one; one man may have to share with
several brothers, another may be an only son. Complications of this sort de- [613]
termine the precise relationships between men, but however intricate these may be, each corporate group has its matrilateral links with a group occupying a slightly different ecological area, and it also has a plurality of matri-
lateral connections within it. Further, if a direct connection is not available [603]
to any particular individual he can use an indirect link (e.g. father's mother's brother or mother's mother's brother) to satisfy his needs.

The Preference for Males

Thus far, the family and the social matrix in which it is embedded has 128
been discussed in general terms, most particularly in reference to several selected sets of relationships. I wish now to place these relationships in a more specific setting with a brief discussion of the composition of a small
camp of a group inhabiting the arid areas of central Cyrenaica. When the 829
Bedouin give their views on the structure of the family in Cyrenaica they 594
speak of it as consisting of a pair of spouses and about ten children, mainly 591
males. The emphasis on males is not mere sentiment, overwhelmingly though 562
it favours them against females. Additional males in a family increase the 858
productive possibilities of a family in the sense that more herdsmen become available and larger ploughing commitments can be undertaken; an increase in the number of females has small effect on production since they are precluded from any direct participation in these activities. Both sexes, ranging in age from about seven years to mature adulthood, are necessary if a family

121 age depicted in their notion of a family is meaningful. It follows that, since
183 this unit will not be clustered in one tent, but distributed over several, each
594 small community must be so constituted that links people can use to claim
621 the services of others must exist, and that, since claims can be made against
various sorts of kinship relationships, each small camp will have predictable kin links. It follows, further, that since age, sex and number of people are significant, a small camp will have a characteristic demographic structure; each tent in a camp will display developmental changes, and particular tents may be shifted from one camp to another, but if a livelihood is to be gained in this semi-desert environment supporting its mixed pastoral-cum-agricultural economy, then at any given time the small camp must have certain fixed features in its composition. The elementary family is subject to far too many vicissitudes to exist on its own. It now remains to demonstrate this general argument by examining the details of one of these small camps.

A Particular Camp Viewed in Detail

621 The camp was one of 12 which constitute a minimal tribal section. In
●613 genealogical terms its male members were linked through an ancestor five
ascending generations from living males of about 20 years of age. Usually,
[221] in summer, camps of this sort move to the vicinity of a large watering point;
in winter, this larger community breaks up into a number of smaller ones
as man and animals move off further south to the pastures. The total living
[[162] population of the tribal section to which this particular camp belonged was
524.

621 Linked patrilineally, its male members were also linked in a plurality of
other consanguineal ways. Primarily, this plurality was brought about by
613 parallel-cousin marriage. The incidence of this form of marriage for
582 males of this group was 48 per cent[12] of the gross total of 234, derived
182 from their marriages over three generations; that is, the generation of males
entering into marriage, and the generation which has begun to die out are included with the generation of middle-aged males. This means that practically every male is related to others in a number of ways, and it is necessary to point this out now because the details to be given presently will show only the more immediate, but not all, existing connections. Plurality of links, moreover, is not the only consequence. Parallel-cousin marriage is a transmuting agent, creating a diversity of links. Each and every link carries with it specific modes of behaviour, which in turn means that each individual has a wide variety of different claims he can press on his co-residents. Marriage connections also exist with other sections of the same tribe. Their proportion is 28 per cent of the total. Demographically, it

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[12] As a matter of interest, the figure for marriage to the father's brother's daughter is 50 per cent of the figure for parallel-cousin marriage in general, but the consequences of these are beyond the scope of the present discussion.

would be impossible to satisfy all marriage expectations of men within the 621
universe of the minimal tribal section. For this reason alone external links 613●
are inevitable and persistent. Also, the small territorial strip such a group 582
claims as a homeland produces an economy which, in this environment, 182
is unstable. Additional security is gained by making connections with other [423]
tribal sections, each with its specific ecological character. Men also marry [433]
into their client groups. The proportion of these for this camp was 9 per cent [619]
of the total. From these links they gain economic advantages, they can
claim services and a client-following is politically significant. Finally, 7
per cent of the total[18] are marriages with women of other tribes, which
again not only reduces the instability of the economy (in that a large tribal
area suffering near-famine conditions has access to areas of markedly different ecology), but also provides political connections for men whose power
ambitions have passed the point of leadership limited to their own tribes. In
one way or another all these interests are manifest in the small camp and
attention is now directed to the latter.

The disposition of people in the camp is represented diagrammatically 621
on the page following. 592

The nucleus of the camp is Tent A. Its owner (1) was a powerful *Shaikh*, [554]
the son of a famous father. His marriage represents a political link with a [619]
group of one of the primary sections of his own tribe. His father died only a [428]
few years before I recorded my census, and the large amount of moveable
property he left had still not been divided among the sons; the owner of the
tent, as eldest brother, still controlled the flocks and herds. Most of his time
he spent away from the camp engaging in political intrigue. His two younger
brothers lived in his tent, but the second (5) would not remain there long
because negotiations for his marriage had been started. His father (2) married a parallel cousin; she died and shortly afterwards he took her sister (3) [582] [587]
in sororal union. When this occurred an amount of bride-wealth was
agreed, but instead of giving any of it to her father, the entire amount was [583]
"put in front of her" (that is, the animals were allowed to remain with her
husband's flock), and these animals she had marked with her brother's
tribal sign to distinguish them from those of her husband. It was widely [428]
known that she was going to leave these animals to her husband's second [562]
son, for although she could not transfer them to a male outside her husband's
corporate group, she could decide who, among his heirs, should inherit.

During my stay in this camp, her brother's son (4) came to it as a 621
temporary resident for a month. Since he was poor, the purpose of his visit 592
was to capture some of his aunt's wealth while she was still alive and the 574
possibility still existed. During his stay he was fed well but did no work. [604]
His kinsmen found his company tiresome, so, to cut short his stay, and after [431]
consulting her nominated heir (5), she gave him three grown goats. Also
when an occasion arose for an animal slaughter, she provided the sheep, and, [231]

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[18] The remainder is made up of marriages to the daughters of men incorporated into the lineages.

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•613



621
592
574 since meat is shared by all the people of the camp, her wealth was partly
231 dispersed among her poorer kinsfolk.

621 The location of Tent B was determined by the fact that the wife (6) was
592 the sister of (3) of Tent A. Her husband (7) had moved into the camp a
571 few years earlier as a result of an inheritance quarrel with his elder who
[578] robbed him of his fair share. This husband (7) gained in two ways from
[233] the move. Although poor, he had a small flock of his own, too small to justify its own shepherd, but which he was permitted to include with his sister-in-law's (3) flock for shepherding. If the flock had been larger he would still have had difficulties, because, at some times of the year, save for short occasional visits to camp, the shepherd is with his sheep for several weeks, day and night. He (7) had three sons, still far too young to follow the sheep, but when they become of age to do so, his dependence on Tent A will cease, for then he can begin to gather the small flocks of other kinsmen around his own, his sons can shepherd them all and he can begin to
[574] enjoy the benefits to be derived from dependents. In addition, he enjoyed

the lavish generosity dispensed by the members of Tent A, and fed far better 621
than would have been possible otherwise. 592

The location of Tent C was also determined by a link through women. 571 [574]
The only female (8) living in this tent, a middle-aged widow, was the sister of (3) and (6) of Tents A and B respectively. Her teenage son lived with her. They possessed only a few sheep, which were put with the flock of Tent A for shepherding. The son (9) spent some of his time herding for Tent A. With the mother and her son in Tent C were two other kinsmen. One, a poor man (10), was this son's first patrilateral cousin, and they both were the only surviving sons of their respective fathers. He (10) was the main shepherd of Tent A. The third male (11), also poor and nearly blind, was a second patrilateral cousin of both, but his sister was also 11's mother. All occupants of Tent C were almost entirely supported by Tent A. Relieved of the necessity to live off their own resources, the two young men (9 and 10) were afforded the opportunity of building up their flocks for the day when they would be able to negotiate their delayed marriages.

Tents A, B and C sheltered men who were agnatically closely linked. More 621
important, their grandfathers, three sons in a family of 19 children, were 613
full brothers. The latter's mother's name was used when referring to these 592
three tents as a group. During the past few years, many changes have 571
occurred within it, and the death of the pivotal woman (3) of Tent A might well disperse this small cluster. Further, the nuptials of her heir (5) were anticipated, and this event, itself likely to precipitate division of his father's (2) wealth, might also lead to further residential rearrangements.

The owner of Tent D, (12), a man in his late thirties, son of a slave 621
mother, was at loggerheads with his father's brother, much more senior in age. 592
The owner's father, one of a family of 24 children, had been a wealthy man 604
and died leaving a substantial herd and a large flock, but he (12) was bereft 578
of most of this wealth by the father's brother. His first successful strike
against his uncle was the demand he made for his daughter as a wife. [582]
Earlier, when (12) had demanded his father's wealth, his father's brother, [428]
who had for years acted as his guardian, replied, "It is in your stomach,"
(meaning that it had been expended on his upbringing). Later, after the [583]
marriage had taken place, when the uncle demanded payment of the bride-wealth his own words were thrown back at him, but this time with the meaning that the bride-wealth had already been paid. While I was resident in this area, the two men met occasionally: each meeting was hostile, for (12) was encouraging his half-brother (13) (also the son of a slave mother) to demand a second daughter as a wife. Included in this tent is a third adult male (14), virtually a pauper, reduced to this state by the same grasping father's brother. His link with (12) was their closeness of relationship (first [571]
paternal cousin), together with the fact that all three males (12, 13 and 14) had suffered privations and were allies against the common enemy, their father's brother.

Associated with them for the same reason, was the owner of Tent E (15).

Cases

621 Genealogically he was their father's brother, but he was of their same age
592 generation, and behaved as if he was their agnatic equal. Towards his own
578 brother (16), he behaved as if the latter was his uncle, for he was much his
[604] junior in age and his uncle had virtually brought him up from boyhood.
They had quarrelled bitterly because his brother (16) had given him only
[428 a fraction of his inheritance, which he himself, in turn, should have
593] shared with his young full brother (not shown on the diagram) but he did
not do so. This youngest brother left (15) for this reason and now resides
621 with (16), his full brother's enemy. Two of the men (14 and 13) of this
592 group of four were the chief herdsmen of the camp, although they were
[233] assisted for short periods by (12) and (15), who also helped tend the
camels in other ways. Their connection with the group centered on Tent
[571] A was a mutual close link to a politically powerful person (not shown on the
genealogies) to whom they are deeply loyal and who, while I was among
them, was actively opposed to the common political enemy of them all (16),
and who in earlier years had challenged the leadership of (2) of Tent A.
● [613 There is also the fact that they were all linked within a close range of
613] agnation. This linkage included, too, the owner of Tent F (17), not in
[602] fact the descendant of the man shown in the diagram — he was the son of
a slave wife; his genitor was a slave, but his mother's master reared him,
freed him and he is now given as his son in the genealogy. He lives with his
wife, of client origin, together with her children from a previous husband,
(18), who divorced her, and his own children. Aging, he no longer acted
as a regular herdsmen, but relieved other men in the camp, and also spent
some time shepherding.

621 The details given of the strands which run through the camp to tie these
571 particular people together are so few that, like the Bedouin plough, they do
no more than scratch the surface, but they are sufficient to permit a few
general statements. The camp, and particularly the precise disposition of
621 its tents, shows a group of males clustered together to share two of the main
571 economic tasks: shepherding and herding. The physically strong adult males
233 of Tents D and E shoulder the burden of herding all the camels of the camp,
462 and the men of Tents B, A and C shepherd all the sheep, with (17) of
Tent F serving both purposes. This number of men allows some to remain
in the camp at all times, to free one of them for a journey to the distant
market when supplies of sugar and tea are necessary, and to enable one or
two men, at short notice, to hurry away on horse or camel to search for
lost animals.[14]

621

Economic Determinants of the General Structure of the Camp

574 It is also clear from these details that, given the disparities in wealth
231 (although all men have some wealth), the diet of most is considerably
262

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43 [14] There is little point in seeking the lost animals themselves in the first instance.
A man travels from camp to camp asking for information, and when he has gathered
[556] his clues, he searches a neighbourhood.

ameliorated in its protein content, particularly by the generosity of the oc- 621
cupants of the nucleating Tent A. Not that they are the only ones who ever 574
slaughter their animals for food. Others do so, albeit much less frequently. 231
Whoever kills an animal, everyone present in the camp is given a share, and 262
the men always eat in the tent of the donor, sitting around one bowl. Thus, 431
the surplus that builds up at one point is redistributed among those suffering [556]
a shortage, and meat, in a society where the climate and way of life militate against its storage for more than a few days, is more efficiently used. Many other general economic points could be deduced. These general statements could, however, be made of practically any camp, whatever the specific differences.

Affinity and Matrilaterality in the Structure of the Camp

Economic considerations determine the general structure of these small 621
camps, but do not account for the particular people gathered in them. Per- 613 •
haps one of the most striking features of these camps, which comes out 602
clearly in the one discussed here, is the confined agnatic span which links the males. Lest it be underestimated, I wish to stress the profound significance of this fact. While granting its importance it is equally necessary to stress that the span, potentially, could be considerably reduced; in some camps it is. Many of the closer agnates of the men of this camp are not shown on the genealogy included with the diagram; (7), (15) and (16), for example, all have brothers, (12) has a large number of first paternal cousins and so on. Therefore, this particular cluster of agnates formed for reasons other than agnatic ties. The most direct single thread connecting Tents A, B and C is that which runs through women. Men of many other camps are all linked in this way, directly. Five tents of this camp are connected through a female link to a common ancestress, whose name still defines the group, two ascending generations for one adult male, three from others and four from others. If greater elaboration could have been shown on the genealogy without confusion, additional links through women could have been demonstrated. Affinity and matrilaterality are the prime movers in bringing agnates together as neighbours.

Other Factors Affecting the Structure of the Camp

Other considerations narrow the area in choice of residence. The quest 621
for power where every man entertains hope of achievement where ambitions 571
are not stifled by the rigour of rank and a small amount of wealth provides 554
a basis for a beginning is also a significant factor in considering the composition of camps. The generosity of the people in Tent A was not entirely altruistic. Justly, it had won them repute, but the repute itself was an important aspect of the political power they enjoyed. They also acquired the services of several men to manage their animals, an impossible strain for them alone. And with their shepherds and herdsmen they secured devoted followers. It was hinted in discussing the structure of the camp that changes

sections of a tribe may be opposed to one another they regard 619
themselves as an undivided group in opposition to neighbouring tribes, and are so regarded by their neighbours. Thus a Qalbati is only a Qalbati in Hasa country. In 'Abaidat or Bara'asa country he is a Hasi. Likewise a Darsi or an 'Abidi in contrast to members of other tribes regards the whole of the Darsa or the 'Abid as his people, his tribal brothers.

Each tribe in this commonly accepted sense has its *watan*, its 619
homeland, its soil, its arable, its pastures, and its wells; and 421
each has its camel-brand which is also carved on the tomb- [764]
stones of its dead. The tribal lands are vested in the tribe, which has residual rights in them. They cannot, therefore, be alienated to other tribes without the consent of the whole tribe. A tribe 619
is conceived of as a huge family descended from a common 614
ancestor, from whom the tribe generally takes its name. Hence its segments can be figured either as a series of political sections or as genealogical branches of a clan.

A tribe is divided into several, generally two or three, 619
primary divisions, or sub-tribes, which own well-defined portions 613
of the tribal territory, in most cases running in strips unbroken by intrusive elements. These primary divisions are of the same pattern as the tribe of which they form part. Each division has its *watan*, which its members own and defend collectively. They believe that they are descended from a common ancestor, who is generally a son of the ancestor of the tribe. Primary tribal divisions split into secondary divisions, and secondary divisions into tertiary divisions, and so on. Each of the smaller divisions is a replica of the larger ones and has the same preferential and exclusive rights in its lands, an encroachment on which by another division will lead to fighting. Each has within the tribal brand its special lineage markings. The members of each division also consider that they are descended from a common ancestor who, in his turn, is descended from the ancestor of the larger division of which they form a section. The further the sub-division the more the resultant groups take on the complexion of kinship aggregates, rather than of political aggregates.

These kinship aggregates or extended family groups are the basic units of tribal life. They are called *biyut* (sing. *bait*). The [423]
tribe may be the residual owner of land and water but the
biyut are the owners in use. Their members live in the same

619 stretch of tribal territory, move during the rains to the same
613 grazing grounds, use the same wells during the dry season, and
cultivate adjacent strips of arable. The members of a *bait* have
a lively sense of solidarity, and this is most evident in fighting
and feuds. It is their common duty to avenge a slain kinsman
and they share the *diya*, indemnity, should they accept it in
[672] the place of a life. They are jointly responsible for a wrong any
one of them may commit. The smaller *biyut* are often identical
[621] with camps, usually from five to ten tents, in grazing grounds,
and several closely related *biyut* camp near together in the
vicinity of springs and wells in the summer, their combined
camps then amounting sometimes to over a hundred tents.

619 What has been said above about tribal structure applies only
to the free tribes and the larger client tribes living on their own
land. The client tribes which are split up and scattered through-
out Cyrenaica are not tribes in a political, but only in an ethnic,
619 sense. It will be found that in any of the main tribes stranger
614 groups, sometimes of client origin, have attached themselves
608 to the clan dominant in the tribal area and through some fiction,
myth, or fraud, have grafted their branch of descent on to the
genealogical tree of this clan. The Bedouin use the word *laf* to
describe this process and they say that kinship established in this
way may become as strong as kinship of blood.

619 The structure of a tribe is expressed in terms of the lineage
system of the clan dominant in its territory, the tribal segments
614 being associated with branches of descent from the ancestor of
613 this clan. The primary tribal sections are identified with lineages
descended from some of this ancestor's descendants in the male
line; the secondary tribal sections are identified with lineages
descended from more of his descendants farther down the line
of descent; and so on till the smallest territorial segments and
the smallest lineages are reached. Thus a lineage considered as
a branch of a clan consists of all those persons who trace their
descent through the male line to a common ancestor, but it can
also be, and in speech often is, conceived of politically as an
agnatic group of this kind together with stranger and *Marabtin*
accretions which occupy its territory and make common cause
with it in disputes with other tribes or segments of the same
tribe.

A simple example is given in illustration of tribal segmentation

and of the consistency between lineages of a clan and segments 619
of a tribe. In explanation of it a few words must first be said 614
about the terms *qabila*, *'aila*, and *bait*. *Qabila* is the word 613
generally used to denote a tribe or primary tribal division.


AL-DARSA
MASAMIR
MARABTIN
AL-SHABARQA
AL-QALABTA
Bal'abat
Al-Slailih
Al-Mahamda
At Brahim
At al-Mzatal
AL-MUASA
Al-Aqta
AL-BAKHAYIT
AL-BARA'ASA
AL 'ABAIDAT
'AILAT FAYID
Tribal Boundaries
1st Subdivision
2nd Subdivision
3rd Subdivision
Al-Aqta 4th Subdivision
Sanusiya Zawiya:-
■ Built ▭ Not completed
x Marabout Tomb
Scale
0 1 2 3 4 kms.

102
131
619
778
795*
613

The Divisions of the Hasa Tribe.

'Ailat are the lineages into which a clan is divided and hence 619
the sections of a tribe of various sizes in which these lineages are 614
found and after which they take their names. *Biyut* are small 613
lineages, or extended families, with a depth of five or six generations from the present day to their founders. It must be noted, however, that all these terms are relative and are used in a more or less comprehensive sense according to the context.

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[For information on the political role of the omda (umda) as a representative of the more powerful and numerous tribal segments within an administrative district, see Category 634.]

175 with one move, the Caliph sent these Bedouins into battle in order to enforce authority in his western Berber provinces. This order set in motion the great "Hilali invasion." The tribesmen of Banu Hilal and Banu Sulaim literally slashed their way across eastern North Africa laying waste to towns and fields as they went (Ibn Khaldun 1925:29; Brockelmann 1939: 204).

175
648 The Arab Bedouins recruited Berbers as they went, especially in Libya. Between the years 1052 and 1054, these marauding nomads sacked the rich agricultural lands of Tripolitania and Tunisia, lands which had been in production since the time of the Romans (Mahdi 1964:21). The Banu Sulaim, according to Ibn Khaldun (1925:136), concentrated their action in an area from Alexandria to Tripolitania. It was over this region, which includes Cyrenaica in eastern Libya, that they established their rule. Ibn Khaldun states that the two tribes agreed to divide the conquered territory between them, the eastern lands going to the Banu Sulaim and the western lands to the Banu
175 Hilal (1925:33-34). Such a division of territorial rights in
571 Arab Bedouin society is representative of a set of authority
182 relationships. Differentiation in the locus of authority,
*[613] whether it be horizontal or hierarchical, is a method of maintaining political order among segments of the lineage structure.

175 Evans-Pritchard states that the Cyrenaican Bedouins
114 are descendants of the Banu Sulaim and represent an admixture
619

175 between the Bedouin and the Berbers (1954:46-47). G. W.
114 Murray informs us that the Bedouins of the Egyptian Western
●619 Desert themselves believe this to be the case (1935:33, 247).
I agree that the Cyrenaican Bedouin are the descendants of
the Banu Sulaim; nevertheless, and despite what Murray says,
my informants (when they knew) claimed to be descendants of the
Banu Hilal. They refer to their ancestress, Sa'ada, as
al-Hilaliyya, "she of the Banu Hilal."

175 Data concerning the Awlad 'Ali migratory history are
167 insufficient for a satisfactory reconstruction of the process.
As we have noted, there were two invasions of North Africa by
the Arabs. The first, about 643 A.D., was a shock wave from
the Arab conquest of Egypt in which the Arabs defeated the
Luwata Berbers who were living in eastern Libya. The second
invasion, in the 11th century, took place at the hands of the
Banu Hilal and Banu Sulaim and penetrated into the North
African countryside. As a result, the Banu Salaim tribe
settled in Cyrenaica where they intermingled with the Luwata
Berbers. That part of Cyrenaica which they claimed as their
[103] territory they called the Jabal Akhdar (i.e. "Green Mountain"),
a plateau region set back from the coast. The Bedouins of
al-Qasr refer to the Jabal Akhdar as their original homeland
(see Figure 1).

We hear nothing more of the Banu Salaim until the 17th
century. At this time, segments of the tribe began drifting

175 eastward toward the Nile Valley. It is not possible to
167 determine the exact conditions associated with this migration, but they probably parallel later movements which are connected with tribal conflicts over land and water rights. In 1689, Bedouins from Libya raided Egyptian oases in the Western Desert (Murray 1935:29). From this date on, for a period of some forty years, records show a continual movement of Bedouins out of Libya into Egypt. Some groups went as far as the Nile Valley and were eventually assimilated into the peasant population there. Tribal movements at the end of the 17th century involved whole tribes and also tribal sections and fragments. Thus in some cases, authority relations arising from territorial bonds were dissipated; but in other cases, political ties were strung across the Libyan Desert from Cyrenaica to the Nile Valley. "Today there is not a Cyrenaican tribe, or even large section, which has not some of its members in Egypt, often whole lineages" (Evans-Pritchard 1954:49-50).

175 Evans-Pritchard's study of the Sanusi, valuable for
619 its analysis of Italian colonial records, shows that the
726 Awlad 'Ali were driven from Cyrenaica by its sister tribe,
167 [648] the Harabi, with the help of the Turkish rulers of Libya. This took place, he says, about 150 years ago. When the Awlad 'Ali arrived in Egypt, they found the Hanadi tribe already there. In a chain of conflicts, the Hanadi had displaced the Banu'Una, forcing them into the Nile Valley:

175 then came the Awlad 'Ali.

619 Around the year 1800, the Awlad 'Ali were able to
726 defeat the Hanadi with the help of another Cyrenaican tribe
167 dwelling in the area, the Jumi'at. The Jumi'at were a vassal
tribe who changed their allegiance from the Hanadi to the
Awlad 'Ali after this war. The Hanadi, as the Banu'Una
before them, were forced into the Nile Valley. Today, they
[131] live in Sharqiyya Province and are no longer distinguishable
from the peasant population.

175 According to Evans-Pritchard, the Awlad 'Ali were still
619 in possession of eastern Cyrenaica in 1800. Then there occurred
726 "long and savagely fought" wars ending with the expulsion of
114 the Awlad 'Ali. But this time schedule seems unlikely since
the Awlad 'Ali were already at war with the Hanadi when
175 Napoleon landed near Alexandria in 1798. The Bedouin war has
648 been amusingly described by the French historian Lacroix (in
181 Murray 1935:30) who accompanied the Napoleonic expedition:

> At five o'clock, the first Bedouin were seen on the flank of the army, and shortly afterwards one saw four or five hundred; it was the tribe of Henady, the fiercest Arabs of these deserts. They were almost naked, swarthy, and lean; their horses seemed wornout hacks; save for the helmet, it was Don Quixote as represented in the engravings ...if these five hundred Arabs had been Mamelukes, they would have been able to obtain a great success at this first moment, when the soldiers' imaginations were alert and ready to receive any impression, but these Arabs were as cowardly as the Mamelukes, who had charged an hour before, were brave.

175 According to Murray, on July fourth "thirty Sheikhs of the
648 Hanadi, the Awlad 'Ali, and the Beni'Una made their peace
with the new power" (1935:30).

175 The version of history provided by my informants is
186 no radical departure from these facts. But there are a few
124 differing aspects which represent ethnocentric highlights on
(648) history. For instance, the Bedouins of al-Qasr have a few
stories which exaggerate the fact that the Harabi needed the
cooperation of the Turkish rulers to defeat the Awlad 'Ali
and to force them out of Cyrenaica. Also, the Bedouins point
out, the Jumi'at tribe begged the Awlad 'Ali to come and
rescue them from the oppression of the Hanadi.

175 Shortly after 1800, Muhammad 'Ali, the Ottoman
•619 viceroy, drove the French from Egypt and supported the Hanadi
648 against the Awlad 'Ali. The Egytian ruler felt that political
control over the Awlad 'Ali would insure the security of the
whole desert, and especially Egypt's western frontier with
Libya. Despite the alliance between the Hanadi and Muhammed
'Ali's forces, the outcome was a temporary victory for the
Awlad 'Ali. This event actually set the stage for a transformation of Bedouin tribal society.

175 After the defeat of the Hanadi and the Pasha's troops,
648 the Awlad 'Ali were given preferential treatment by Muhammed
'Ali. He wisely secured the Hanadi tribe in Sharqiyya Province.
Then he granted the Awlad 'Ali, by right of usufruct, the

175 648 posts were established there, and Marsa Matruh became the capital town. The Western Desert was administered by British officers who had under their command a garrison of Egyptian soldiers. Their assignment was to secure the colonial borders. This task included keeping the Awlad 'Ali within the boundaries of Egypt. The policy of the British provincial government was to avoid interfering with the Bedouin process of law and conflict regulation unless it threatened the peace and security [124] of the desert. My informants said that the British interfered with Bedouin justice only under the threat of large-scale tribal warfare.

175 795 [619] The political relationship which the Bedouins of the Awlad 'Ali tribe had with the Sanusi Order of Islam in Libya was historically not so important compared to that of the other Cyrenaican tribes. The Sanusi Order, classified as a Sufi *tariiqa* ("mystic order"), was actually quite orthodox in its attitudes and practices. This is a function of the socio-religious conditions of its origin during the 18th-19th century revival of orthodoxy in Islamic Arabia (Gibb 1955: [793] 127-145). Muhammad bin 'Ali al-Sanusi founded his order, al-Sanusiyya, near Mecca around the year 1837. The Sanusi doctrine may be considered orthodox, or secularly oriented, in that it rejects the fundamental goal of Sufism, mystical union with God.

The Sanusi Order, from the very beginning, strove for a return to pure Islam. It made its greatest headway among


SA'ADA
JIBARNA
AQAQRA
BANI SALLAM
BARAGHUTH
'AWAQIR
'ARAIBAT
MAGHARBA
JAWAZI
FAWAYID
HARABI
AWLAD 'ALI
SHARAI'
HANADI
BAHAJA
BANI 'UNA

THE GENEALOGY OF THE CYRENAICAN BEDOUIN

FIGURE 2

131 view it, the Western Desert is the *watan*
●619 ("homeland") of the Awlad 'Ali tribe, and is subdivided into
631 tribal zones each referred to as a *mintaqa*. *Mintagit al-Qasr*
is part of *mintaqit qabilit 'Aishaibat* (i.e. "the area of
al-Qasr" is part of "the territory of the 'Aishaibat tribe").
131 Each tribal *mintaqa* is further broken down into contiguous
619 parcels of land belonging to lineages, and these are also
*613 referred to as *mintaqa*; for instance, there is *mintaqa*
631
[423] *'ailit Ma'fas*, i.e. "the territory of the Ma'fas family."
In the al-Qasr segmentary lineage society, genealogical ties and local ties are coincidental. The boundaries of al-Qasr are defined by the agnatic lines of the 'Aishaibat tribe and include the *sahil* and *sha'ir wi mar'a* zones.

361 To the Egyptians, a *qarya* ("village") is a nucleated
631 cluster of permanent dwellings with some degree of social
integration: al-Qasr is a *qarya* for administrative matters. The Bedouins, who think in terms of kin-based residence groups, tribal boundaries, and political and economic symbiotic relations, see the Egyptian *qarya* as only a sector of al-Qasr. They refer to this sector as the *'izba*, i.e., "farm" or "rural settlement." The *'izba* is land fertile enough to support a secure and sedentary life. "The *'izba*," the Bedouins say, "is the seed of the *madiina*" (city).

[[21]] For my own purposes, the Bedouin sense of al-Qasr is
the more useful concept. Al-Qasr is all of the territory of
[[131]] the 'Aishaibat tribe. Situated at 31°N and 27°E, al-Qasr is

History of Settlement in al-Qasr

173 The settlement of al-Qasr took place about 200 years
[166] ago when the Awlad 'Ali first came to the area from Cyrenaica.
[175] No historical documentation for this period exists. The
173 various versions which the Bedouins offer are both vague and
*613 ethnocentric with reference to lineage. A point of consensus
[712] is that the zone was first claimed by Abu Mahjuba who built a large fort (qasr = "fort" or "castle") near the coast. The Bedouins say that Abu Mahjuba settled in the area of al-Qasr because "he knew good land when he saw it." He belonged to no one lineage, "he was 'Aishaibi only." All of the lineages of al-Qasr claim that their ancestors came with Abu Mahjuba and settled on the land at that time. Abu Mahjuba has been mythologized: he belongs to all of al-Qasr, a symbol of local group solidarity and fraternal equality.

173 Al-Qasr represents the end of nomadic life for the
361 'Aishaibat tribe. According to the Bedouins, each tribe and
[198] lineage took that part of al-Qasr which it preferred. If the members of the segment wanted to grow vegetables, they took land on the coast; if they preferred the "old way of life," they set up their tents in the sha'ir wi mar'a area and raised sheep. "Everything was fine," they say, "there were no land registration laws--a man was free." Al-Qasr was settled
● [619] "after the wars" (with the Hanadi), and it was only then that the Awlad 'Ali broke up into tribes. The 'Aishaibat took the

474 661 474 619 of the needs of their tribesmen; that, in fact, the patronage system is relative to the traditional situation. Unavoidably, the al-Qasr cooperative society is dominated by one tribe: 107 of its members are from the 'Aishaibat, while only 32 are from other tribes. This relationship between traditional and modern structures is common throughout the Western Desert. When a new cooperative is organized within the boundaries of a certain tribal mintaqa, members of the local tribe will resign from other cooperatives to join "their own." Thus, when a new cooperative was founded in Marsa Matruh, twenty members of the Jum'iat tribe left the al-Qasr branch to join the new chapter which catered largely to the needs of the Jum'iat in the town.

474 747 433 177 The World Food Program of the Food and Agriculture Organization (F.A.O.) of the United Nations operates through the cooperative society. It has had an impact on the economy of the Bedouins of al-Qasr. In 1963, this organization, with the cooperation of the U.A.R. government, proposed to stabilize economic conditions in the Western Desert by providing 4,000 Bedouin families (20,000 persons) with enough food and fodder to help them through the three dry summer months. The program was designed to encourage mixed and settled farming through the reclamation of 20,000 acres of arid desert land, while its range improvement project was to furnish pasturage for 500,000 sheep throughout the Northwestern Coastal Zone. In al-Qasr,

241 407 434 433 when planted in large quantities. The southern zone of al-Qasr is best suited for these crops, and the tractor is necessary for a successful crop.

407 474 [427] Tractors are rented through the cooperative society. Local cooperative officers are responsible for seeing that all members share in the use of the tractor. But, in fact, officers and their closer relatives monopolize the tractors. The government [654] has allotted to the al-Qasr cooperative five tractors. They feel that it would jeopardize the whole program of economic reform if they were to dictate the way in which the tractors are to be used. 407 619 474 Consequently, the tractor, like the rations of foodstuffs, has become a pawn in tribal power plays. In one case, not in al-Qasr, a tractor-driver who was a member of the 'Ali Abyad tribe insisted that members of the 'Ali Ahmar tribe pay him a 50 piaster "tip" to have their fields plowed. Because of situations such as these, most Bedouins prefer that cooperative membership coincide with local group membership. It is better, they say, if the 'Aishaibat of al-Qasr have their own cooperative because they know how to handle problems among themselves. The government, during this transitional period, seems to agree.

407 One reason that tractors are monopolized by a small group is that there are not enough of the machines to handle the plowing. Of the five tractors in al-Qasr, seldom were more than two working simultaneously. Often, this was a result of

CHAPTER III

KINSHIP AND POLITICAL ORGANIZATION

Principles of Social Structure

*613 The division of Bedouin society into groups is
explained in terms of certain principles of organization, the
most pervasive of these being unilineality or the lineage
*613 principle. According to this structural rule, an individual
• 619 born into a tertiary lineage segment (see Figure 7)[1] automatically
becomes a member of each successive and more inclusive
group represented by the higher levels of segmentation. The
status, rights, and obligations of the individual with respect
to other members of the tribe are in this way determined on
the basis of kinship. An individual gains political status
in the tribe, as a societal unit, only through membership in
a tertiary group. Theoretically, group membership is based
on birth, but there are certain "legal fictions" which
represent exceptions to this rule. In al-Qasr exceptions are
rare, but a few do exist. For instance, there is one case of
[597] individual adoption, and in another case, a whole tertiary
173 segment was grafted on to a lineage stem. The latter case
*613 happened four generations ago when Taram Mighaiwiz of 'Ailit
619 Lazumi adopted Hajj 'Ali "as his brother." The Bedouins say
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[1] [See p.77--Analyst.]

173 that in those days it was important "to have men to go to
*613 war; Hajj 'Ali came from the Sinai with many men and wrote
•619
597 his name into the books of Lazumi." Today, in the Lazumi genealogy Hajj 'Ali's name appears as the brother of Taram,
[114] both are claimed as sons of Mighawsiz. This kind of data is difficult to uncover and I may have missed gathering other cases of ideological kinship ties.

*613 The specific unilinear principle which operates in
[171] al-Qasr is partrilineality, common to the Middle Eastern culture area. A corollary principle is the corporate group.
*613
571 Together, these two rules structure the social world of the individual and effectively define a range of social choices for him. The individual's social relations and social roles are relative to the rights and obligations of the people related to him through his father. In a sense, the social world for the individual in al-Qasr is his father's group and its network of relationships with other similar groups; he would not think of leaving this group of his own free will though, in reality, he could. The Bedouins believe
[181] that a man cannot be happy if he lives with strangers, i.e.,
[829] outside his corporate group. This value holds up today to the extent that a man will expect his son to return to the desert even after his education as a merchant, a government clerk, or an army officer.

Structural differentiation in al-Qasr is not solely

121 *613 554 571 of political relations. The structural differentiation between them relates to certain specifics of role differentiation and articulation, and corporate goals. Different roles function differently in different spheres of politics. This is clear when we consider that the two structural aspects of corporate group politics serve the double purpose of insuring local autonomy while promoting integration into the larger lineage segments. This I will cover more thoroughly in the next chapter. Most of the discussion here deals with social structure and, in particular, the internal elements of the corporate group.

*613 ●619 In the total societal context, the tertiary segment is pivotal for the conceptualization of two models: the Bedouin's model of his tribal system, and the observer's model of a segmentary lineage system. Both of these constructs are shown in Figure 7.[1] Both genealogical models can be completed by the addition of Figures 2, 3, and 8, extending the systems both horizontally and vertically.

Theoretically, all of the levels of the Awlad 'Ali tribal system constitute a political community, i.e., the various segments shown in Figure 3 regulate and maintain relations with each other through complementary opposition (Fallers 1963). But in fact, political action of any functional significance rarely occurs beyond the secondary lineage level. In terms of the structural principles, agnation, real or

[1], [See p. 77--Analyst]

*613 •619 fictive, has practical political consequences only at the tertiary and secondary levels of segmentation. Most political activity in al-Qasr is the result of either cooperation or conflict between corporate groups the size of Bait 'Umar or 'Ailit Ma'fas. 'Ailit Ma'fas is made up of five structurally replicated political groups such as Bait 'Umar. Toward out- [609] siders, these five groups act as one; they represent a corporate entity before the rest of the tribe. As a member of 'Ailit *613 619 554 Ma'fas, an individual has jural status in the whole tribe. He also has the means and the moral obligation to articulate his interests and to settle his arguments with other members of the tribe. When an individual is involved in an activity which relates to matters of power and authority, he is playing a political role in the political process. The units which make up the internal and external political systems of the 'Aishaibat tribe of al-Qasr are roles. Roles then are the 121 *613 619 554 analytical focus of this study. Of course, I realize that the concrete entities present in al-Qasr are human beings. I only use roles as methodological constructs in order to abstract from, and to understand, Bedouin behavior. By conceptualizing sets of roles as structures, we will be able to understand the internal and external political structures as well as the traditional and modern political structures of Bedouin society. In al-Qasr, these political roles and structures emerge from the more generalized kinship structure

[TEXT CONTINUED ON PAGE 79]

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#619


SA'ADA
(1) 'AQAR
TRIBE (2) AWLAD 'ALI
TRIBE (3) 'ALI AHMAR
PRIMARY (4) 'AISHAIBAT
SECONDARY (5) 'AILIT MA'FAS
TERTIARY (6) BAIT 'UMAR
(7) BAIT ('AIT) ABD AL-MALIK

FIGURE 7

GENERATIONS AND TERMINOLOGY OF TRIBAL STRUCTURE

121
*613
•619
554 and are related to the organizational principles mentioned above.

619 The Awlad 'Ali represent a cultural entity whose membership is defined in patrilineal terms. Cutlurally, and genealogically, they are related to the Cyrenaican Bedouin but distinct from the Egyptians of the Nile Valley. The political system of the Awlad 'Ali can be extended to include Cyrenaicans "as Bedouins" but it can only interact with the Egyptians "as foreigners." This means that the Awlad 'Ali possess common roles, structures, and cultural institutions which can articulate with those of the Cyrenaican Bedouin. In the case of the Egyptians, however, social interaction calls forth new cultural categories and new structural elements in Bedouin society. This is the basis of political change in al-Qasr. Role differentiation and ideological replacement are taking place vis a vis the nation-state: the traditional political structure of the Bedouins is adapting to the Egyptian political environment. In the language of the "politics of modernization," this process is referred to as "politicization" or "political socialization." We shall deal with this process in later chapters.

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The principles which relate the Bedouins of al-Qasr to other Bedouins of the Western Desert and Libya are the organizational principles of kinship, residence, and contract; but the principle which relates them to the Egyptian state is

•619 177 [121] the bureaucratic principle. Here we are concerned with the traditional situation.

619 *613 571 The 'Aishaibi Bedouins of al-Qasr are a residence• group. Each sub-group of the tribe, i.e., the secondary and tertiary units, is assigned their own territory (mintaqa). Kinship and residence are the primary determinants of group differentiation; agnates who dwell together represent concrete authority structures, or political groups. This follows from the fact that patterns of political action, or what we call political structures, most often deal with the exercise of legitimate authority--as opposed to power. Power relations do occur and when present complicate the situation. In al-Qasr, power relations and structures emerge when the principle of cognation or contracted alliance form groups which crosscut the effectiveness of local, agnatic political structures. But, in al-Qasr, as in most societies, political action usually takes the form of the exercise of authority (Southall 1965:120).

173 114 *613 571 The genealogical map as an idological charter argues against the formation of power relations. Genealogical relations represent a set of social relations each replete with definite rights and obligations. Fallers (1956) has noted the tendency in segmentary lineage societies to cast all authority relations in a unilinear genealogical mould. The

*613 829 173 571 Bedouin visualize their world, extending from Alexandria to

*613 Libya, as a territorially segmented one corresponding to the
829 lineage divisions of the tribe. They say that every Bedouin
173 knows the owner of each centimeter of this world. Not only
571 does the genealogy represent a set of property relations, it
also represents and upholds a set of authority relations. In
*613 Cyrenaica also (Peters 1960), the Bedouin genealogical map
173 corresponds to the distribution of groups on the ground.
571 Kinship relations as social relations in Bedouin society may
be properly interpreted as property relations between groups.
Property relations as part of the Bedouin world view are an
essential premise upon which the social and political order
rests, although it is not the only premise.

•619 The 'Aishaibat are identified with the al-Qasr portion
*613 of the Awlad 'Ali homeland. The 'Aishaibi segments are
separate and contiguous on the ground. Figure 3a[1] shows the
correspondence between the 'Aishaibi genealogical and territorial divisions at the secondary lineage level of segmentation.

121 That kinship as an organizing principle in segmentary
*613 societies cannot be considered apart from local contiguity
is an old and well-known fact. Sir Henry Maine (1917:76-79)
in analyzing the evolution of "political ideas" noted the
interrelationship between "the principle of local contiguity"
and the central principle of the "connexion in blood," how
they combine to become "the condition of community in political

[1] [See p. 66--Analyst]

121 *613 functions." The political system as a structure with reference to the territorial principle and descent system is the unit which the political analyst seeks to understand. To do so, he must concentrate his attention upon the local descent group, the corporate group (Fortes and Evans-Pritchard 1940:11; Leach 1954:128). Structural analysis in terms of functional group differentiation is preliminary to political content and political role analysis (Smith 1966:113-129). The objective 121 of this chapter is to define the basic political unit in Bedouin society and the set of authority relations which characterize it. We are looking for, what Maine referred to as, the "Corporation" and its "Public Officer" or "Corporation sole."

[128] The rest of this chapter is a discussion of the internal domestic structure of authority and the complex of values and beliefs which the Bedouins of al-Qasr express about a desired social order in terms of their principles of organization. Associative relationships based on kinship, residence and contract are morally supportive and hence authoritative; they structure as well as reflect a world order. Such relationships validate traditional authority and contribute to a system of social control.

•619 Lineage Structure and Formal Categories

Not all residents of al-Qasr are members of the Awlad

619 [613] 'Ali tribe. There is one lineage, the Sulwatiyya shown in Figure 7a, which does not claim descent from Sa'ada and hence are no relations of the Awlad 'Ali Bedouin. Nor are any serious ideological claims for tribal membership provided by them or their Awlad 'Ali neighbors. The first social differentiation found in al-Qasr, then, is between those who belong to the Sa'adi tribes and those of the Marabit tribes. In terms of Bedouin social ideal types, the Sa'adi tribesmen are warriors, known for their courage and generosity; the Marabit tribesmen are weak and dependent on the protection [992] which the Sa'adi offers them. The Marabit tends to specialize in the role of "holy man." The dichotamy here is a reflection [171] of the structural differentiation, common to North Africa, between sacred and secular tribes, or client and protector tribes.

619 173 539 The Sa'adi-Marabit division in al-Qasr is defined geographically, in name, and in Bedouin tradition and myth. Here is the way in which the Marabit "holy man" of al-Qasr conceives of the difference between the two types and its origin:

> They are brothers and there is no difference. The Sa'adi is always one step in front of the Marabit, he handles things for the Marabit and helps him. In political matters the Sa'adi is more advanced . . . When the Marabit is in trouble, the Sa'adi will defend him. They are two different groups because the Sa'adi are from one mother. Once Sa'ada was riding in a caravan through the desert.

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> Her riding booth struck a tree and she found herself stranded there in the tree; her camel had gone and the rest of the caravan noticed nothing and continued on. Then a Marabit passed by and saw her there. He helped her down and they later married. She already had three sons to a former husband: Ali Ahmar, Ali Abyad and Sinaina. The Marabit also had children from another marriage. He was very rich and they could afford to live together. One day thieves began to harrass the man, but when the three Sa'adi sons offered him their help he told them not to bother with the thieves, that they would go away. But they did not, and they continued to harrass the man for a long time. The three sons were still very young at this time. When they grew up they asked the Marabit for arms and horses with which to fight off the thieves. They received them and succeeded in driving off the thieves. The Marabit was very happy and offered the three sons one-half of his wealth, and he was very rich. The sons refused this generous offer saying to the Marabit that they were no different from his other sons and would take only one-tenth of his wealth.

619 The differentiation between the Sa'adi and Marabit has structural consequences only in that it defines psychological types and tends to assign them to certain roles in society. By his [181] psychological make-up, the Marabit, who is weak and retiring, is unfit for the tasks which the Sa'adi undertakes, i.e., war, trade, and politics. It is, nevertheless, expected that the Marabit will act as a support mechanism for the secular operations of the Sa'adi. Usually, this support takes the form of financial contributions.

619
675 Each Marabit group is related through contractual agreement to a Sa'adi group. For instance, the Sulwatiyya lineage of al-Qasr are members of the Jumi'at tribe, a Marabit tribe; when identifying themselves they will say

•619 675 "Jumi'at, Marabtiin (plural of Marabit) of the 'Ali Ahmar." All Marabit tribes of the Western Desert are affiliated as *[613] clients with Sa'adi tribes. Further, since the tertiary group of the Marabtiin functions in the same way as that of the Sa'adi, it is this group which enters into compacts with Sa'adi tertiary groups. Traditionally, the Marabit group's [682] main support activity was to share in the payment of the blood-money with its Sa'adi protector group. In return, the Marabit group was given land in the protector's territory and could depend upon them to contribute to any Marabit blood debt which might come due. [628] [682] Also, it was considered the duty of the Sa'adi to revenge the death of a member of his client group since the Marabit "was weak and could not face a tribe." [608] But there is no attempt to construct fictional kinship links between Sa'adi and Marabit groups.

[672] In al-Qasr today, contractual relations between Sa'adi and Marabit are still based upon collective responsibility in the blood-feud. However, since this traditional means of conflict control is an extremely rare occurrence, the mutual obligations of the parties are expressed in different forms. [648] In any conflict between the Bedouins and the Egyptian government, the Marabtiin are expected to support their respective [666] Sa'adi groups. In any modern elections which a Sa'adi might enter, the Marabit is expected to give him his vote. A few examples will make clear the relationship between the Sa'adi

•619 675 and the Marabit.

The Qit'an tribe, based partly in Libya and partly *[613] in Egypt, is a tribe in the same sense that the Awlad 'Ali is one, i.e., at the secondary level of the lineage system. [166] [175] This tribe moved into Egypt sometime around 1900. The Bedouins of al-Qasr estimate that "50% of the Qit'an are with Ali Ahmar, 30% with Sinaina, and 20% with Ali Abyad." 619 675 578 In 1956, certain events occurred in Libya which brought about a declaration of independence from Sa'adi domination by the Qit'an in that country. The Qit'an felt that their numbers were sufficiently large enough that they should represent themselves in the Libyan parliament. In other words, the Marabtiin were no longer willing to settle for the traditional social categories and role structures allotted to them. After these events in Libya, some members of the Qit'an came to Egypt and informed their brothers about the formation of the tribe as a separate entity, and convinced the Egyptian Qit'an to do the same--which they did.

The Bedouins say that the Governor of Marsa Matruh encouraged the Qit'an tribe to increase their numbers in the area after he learned of their desire to be free from Sa'adi domination. There had been a small number of Qit'an in the town of Marsa Matruh. This number quickly grew in size and political strength so that it could challenge the power of the 'Ali Ahmar who are considered the dominant tribe in this

619 675 578 area of the Western Desert. And, according to the Governor of the province, it is the 'Aishaibat of al-Qasr who are the most powerful of the three primary segments of the 'Ali Ahmar; for example, they have succeeded in sending their 'umda (chief) to the National Assembly in Cairo. In fact, it was over the [666] election of the 'umda in 1964 that the split between the Marabit Qit'an and the Sa'adi Ali Ahmar became an open one and produced political rumblings among the tribes. This case makes explicit the relationship between the two types of tribes in the Western Desert, and gives an important instance of the operation of structural principles in defining groups and group relations.

619 675 666 578 During the national elections of 1964, it was the traditional duty of the Marabit to vote for his affiliated Sa'adi candidate. Since the Qit'an are allied in a client-protector relationship with the Ali Ahmar, all of the Marabtiin of this tribe should have given their votes to the 'umda of the 'Aishaibat who was seeking office to the National Assembly. But, instead, the Qit'an ran a candidate of their own--largely at the urging of the Governor, it is said. But, despite this Marabit opposition, the 'Aishaibat were successful in getting their 'umda elected. Furthermore, 619 675 578 626 the 'Aishaibat said that this rebellion of the Marabtiin could not go unpunished, that reprisals would be taken. The type of sanction which the 'Aishaibat directed against the

•619 Qit'an is one which is employed in both the internal and
675 the external systems of political relations: it is an or-
598 ganized sanction taken by the corporate representatives
626 against socially disapproved behavior. Against the Marabtiin,
619 it involved a closure of group affiliation and protective
675
578 alliance usually obtainable through affinal ties. The Qit'an
*613 were prohibited from marrying into the 'Aishaibat primary
626 segment. The sanction was tested while I was in the field.
582

> In March of 1965, 'Umda Ziyad of the Qit'an contracted a marriage for his son with one of the secondary groups of the 'Aishaibat. He went through all of the marriage preliminaries and paid a brideprice of 70 E.L. (Egyptian pounds). But afterwards, the girl's family, following the advice of the 'Aishaibi corporate heads, returned the brideprice and refused his offer. The 'Umda of the Qit'an then went to talk to the brothers of the girl (for her father was dead) and told them that he would pay a brideprice of 1000 E.L. "but I want the girl." He paid them part of the brideprice (for they had agreed in the face of this unusual offer) and sent a car to pick up the girl. The arrangement did not succeed, for the paternal cousin of the girl who, according to Bedouin custom and tradition, had a prior claim on her, stopped the car at gunpoint. The corporate heads had told the cousin that this was his right, and in this case, his duty. Then the corporate heads of the 'Aishaibat called a council, and the members met with the brothers of the girl. They told the brothers: "You know what happened at the time of the election. 'Umda Ziyad is 'Ali Ahmar and he should have voted for our _'umda_, but he tricked us." The brothers refused to be persuaded by the tribal leaders. They said that if anyone from the 'Aishaibat would pay them more than 1000 E.L., they would give their sister to him. The leaders warned the brothers that if they went through with this marriage they would each be fined 200 E.L. Finally, and after this meeting, the leaders went to 'Umda Ziyad himself with the threat, that were he to go through with this marriage "all of the 'Aishaibat will begin to fight you." The _'umda_

> •619 could not afford to risk such large scale conflict
> 675 and so he withdrew his offer of marriage to the
> 578 brothers. After this, as a display of authority and
> *613 an attempt to maintain something of the alliance
> 626 between their group and the Qit'an, the 'Aishaibi
> 582 leaders made the public announcement that the girl
> could marry anyone else, but not the son of 'Umda
> Ziyad.

619 The various sets of authority relations operative in the al-
675 Qasr area are obvious from this account, but they will be
*613 better defined as the discussion proceeds. Here, I only
wanted to make clear that the relationship between Sa'adi
and Marabit is one based upon contract and local contiguity,
and reinforced by cognation. There is no unilinear basis
for the relationship and no attempt to fit it into a "unilinear
[582] genealogical mould." The structural differentiation between
Sa'adi and Marabit seems to reflect a dominant-subjective
relationship, in the sense discussed by Weber (1947) and
Southall (1956), but its possible class overtones are played
down by the fact that there are normally no objections to
[851] intermarrying between groups. The Bedouin of al-Qasr say,
"what is the difference, the children from such a marriage
will be Sa'adi anyhow?"

619 The Sa'adi-Marabit differentiation is relatively
*613 unimportant for a study of al-Qasr itself, since the Marabit
number is so small--one lineage consisting of five brothers
and their families. The contrast between Sa'adi and Marabit,
secular and sacred tribes, becomes more important for a

•619 *613 study of the whole Western Desert, or in an analysis of contemporary politics in Marsa Matruh.

The Bedouins of al-Qasr are, in this study, the 'Aishaibat of the 'Ali Ahmar of the Awlad 'Ali tribe. [191] The Bedouin tribal unit throughout the Middle East is described as a segmentary lineage system. Something of the meaning of this concept has already been made clear in our discussion of the structural principles of Bedouin society. This type [114] of society has been adequately analyzed by Evans-Pritchard (1940), Fortes (1945 and 1949), Smith (1956), Middleton and Tait (1958), and Peters (1960). My own ideas about the segmentary lineage society as it functions in al-Qasr derive from these sources.

*613 571 [642] Politically, the 'Aishaibat of al-Qasr are a stateless society; they have no centralized political institution. The lineage system is the structural framework for social and political relations. The basis of government, i.e., the regulation of authority relations, is the balanced protraction of corporate groups which support institutional uniformities in the form of similar organization, ideology and procedure (Smith 1956). Although the various groupings of the segmentary system can be analytically identified, and each grouping thinks of itself as a distinct group, in actuality, it is difficult to define the groups because of the way in which each fuses into lesser or greater differentiated units in one

*613 situation or another (Middleton and Tait 1958:11). The most
571 effective approach to understanding the segmentary society,
121 in view of this dynamic situation, is to isolate the function-
*613
571 ally significant unit and to analyze its social and political
relations (Fortes 1945). This is what I attempted to do in
my study of the 'Aishaibat of al-Qasr.

*613 In al-Qasr, the secondary segment, i.e., 'Ailit Ma'fas, is the basic unit of the social structure. This statement must be qualified seeing that this unit consists of a balanced opposition of smaller tertiary segments, and action at the secondary level is a resultant of political consensus at the tertiary level. However, the ties which emerge from descent, residence, marriage, and contract are highly moral and utilitarian ones; with reference to tribal politics, we can state that corporate action is consensual and most functional at the secondary segment level. We may consider this group, in terms of two levels of corporateness, the basic unit of 'Aishaibat political structure.

*613 All of the segmentary groups of the 'Aishaibat are
●619 bound together by the same patrilineal principle; they all
trace descent to 'Ali the son of Sa'ada. This principle also links them to the "noble tribes" of Cyrenaica who claim descent from this same ancestress. This principle is the genealogical and ideological basis of a man's claiming to be "Sa'adi," or "Awlad 'Ali," or "Aishaibi," etc. In theory,

•619 the segmentary system is considered by the Bedouins to be a
*613 monolithic unit: "The Awlad 'Ali are one." But, as with all
other segmentary lineage systems, in al-Qasr levels of segmentation
reflect degrees of corporateness.

*613 Furthermore, the ideology of structural unity dissolves
•178 before the empirical evidence of fission and fusion, processes
619 characteristic of the segmentary society in general. These
processes are not common in al-Qasr during the present time.
But they must have been in the past, because the segments
which Murray (1935) names as making up the Ali Ahmar include
only one of those which currently comprise the tribe. The
[578] only admission of fission which I could obtain from my informants
was that, at one time, 'Ailit Ma'fas was a tertiary
[124] segment of 'Ailit Lazumi (see Figure 3). I received this
information from a number of my key informants so that it can
be accepted despite a denial to the contrary by some of my
other informants. There is no empirical link below the
secondary level to be discovered in the genealogical maps
of these two groups; kinship ties have been manipulated to
coincide with ideological claims. The fact that these two
lineages are now the wealthiest and most powerful in the al-Qasr
area may be an indication that economic and political
motivations undermined the unity of 'Ailit Lazumi in the
*613 past. We shall have occasion to return to this opposition
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578 between the Lazumi and the Ma'fas when we discuss political

*613 Bedouins, always a minority in Egypt, have been undergoing
178 a transition to peasantry since about 1800. Probably since
177
578 that time, Bedouin society has been, to use Easton's (1959)
emphasis, a "segmentary society" rather than a "segmenting
society."

196 Formal Bedouin categories of kinship are confusing;
depending upon the situation they use the concepts of bait,
'ait, 'aiela and qabiila interchangeably. The term bait
literally means "house," the term bait al-'Arab may mean
"the tent" or "the people of the tent." "People of the tent"
[594] may refer to either the nuclear family of one man, or the
nuclear families of a man, his brothers and his sons, and
[596] their spouses and offspring. In the latter case, the extended
[621] family is referred to as the naja'. A naja', or camp,
usually consists of three or four tents. The word bait may
196 refer to the tertiary and the sub-tertiary groups, and oc-
*613 casionally one might even refer to the secondary group as a
bait when he wishes to emphasize the quality of corporateness.
The term 'aiela, literally "family," is the word used most
often to designate the secondary lineage segment. The diminutive
of this word, i.e. 'ait, usually refers to the sub-
tertiary group but it commonly designates the secondary group
•[619] also. The term qabiila, "tribe," is the only word used for
the primary and supra-primary lineage groupings. These are
196 the general Bedouin usages and their frequency will vary not

*613 He must pay the *diiya* with the shares which he collects from
682 the others. It makes no difference if the *'aqila* must pay
554 with his own money. He is responsible for this matter before
571 the whole tribe."

*613 The collection of the *diiya* is only one aspect of the
554 process of conflict regulation, but it stands out as the funda-
682 mental manifestation of the office of *'aqila*. In the course
[692] of office, an *'aqila* will spend much more time arbitrating
disputes, but it is his responsibility concerning blood-money
which defines his position and his jurisdiction as corporate
682 ones. During the present period in al-Qasr, the practice of
178 blood-revenge has all but disappeared as a mechanism of social
[626] control. Nevertheless, the possibility of its happening is
not too remote. The payment of blood-money is the alternative
• [619] to blood-revenge, and blood-revenge is a condition for all-out
[721] tribal warfare--something which the Bedouins look upon with
[829] horror. One informant once likened a primary-level war between
the 'Aishaibat and the Kamailat (should it ever occur) to
*613 "the end of the world." The *'aqila* as a representative of a
682 group can prevent war by preventing reciprocal homicides: by
554 presenting his share of the blood-money he regulates conflict
578 and promotes integration. The blood-money is usually paid
over a period of from one to two years. In this case, the
[571] notion of "debt" represents a contingent, institutionalized
social relationship for the purpose of maintaining political
order.

*613 675 571 539

6. every member of the tribe who submits a complaint without first consulting his 'aqila, (i.e. who goes to the government before the 'aqila),

7. every member of the tribe shall back the members of his bait against an opponent without right,

8. every member of the tribe who has proved against him the showing of sympathy toward another tribe knowing that this tribe is antagonistic to his own tribe,

9. every member of the tribe who has proved against him that he helped a relative in payment or in a quarrel against his brother.

we signed this document and declare that these customs are valid from the date of today and everyone who disobeys them pays a dhabiiha ("lamb") and 10 L.E. without any objection if any of the items of the above items is proven against him.

Date: August 8, 1953
The 'awaaqil (signatures or stamps):
Abd al-Ruwaf (Bait Firjani)
Hussain 'Umar (Bait 'Umar)
Shi'ath Abd al-Hadi (deceased, Bait Braik)
'Atiya 'Umran (Bait Kailani)
Khalid Idris (Bait Muhammad)

114 •619 675 *613 In the rawaabit, or contract, just noted the term "tribe" refers to the secondary segment ('aiela). Murray (1935:315n) has also pointed to an instance of the Bedouins' use, in a formal document, of the word qabiila ("tribe") when reference to "some smaller division, such as 'eila is clearly meant."

675 681 [183] *[613] Through the rawaabit norms are expressed and action is oriented with respect to them. If it is otherwise, sanctions may be brought to bear to insure conformity to norms. The minimal sanction which the 'aqila may impose is the dhabiiha

619 *613 571 [671] The boundaries of the Bedouin political community may be defined so as to include all of those authority groups which operate in accordance with the recognized legal code of the Western Desert. This code is referred to as *'awaiyid Awlad 'Ali*, i.e. "the customs of the sons of 'Ali." The members of the Awlad 'Ali tribe identify with each other as a group. They recognize their common heritage and speak of "the Awlad 'Ali as one." But more importantly, the Awlad 'Ali represents a political community because they are "prepared to regulate their differences by means of decisions accepted as binding because they are made in accordance with shared political norms and structures" (Easton 1959:229). Recalling the discussion of familial authority and internal and external systems of authority relations, we may think of the Bedouin political community as a composite of authority or jural groups "within which there are a moral obligation and a means ultimately to settle disputes peaceably" (Middleton and Tait 1959:9).

*613 571 681 628 626 In al-Qasr, political order and the articulation of political relations between secondary corporate groups depend upon something besides structural and ideological uniformities. Although blood-revenge and feuding do not take place at the internal system of authority relations, they are common means of controlling the distribution of authority and power between secondary units. Though these mechanisms or sanctions are considered "the right of the Arabs," since they do threaten [671]

*613
571 peace and security in the desert they are discouraged by
681 means of the moral and legal norms expressed in the *'awaiyid*,
628 or law of the Bedouins.
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Conflict regulation between secondary groups is the
*613 function of the *'awaaqil* who act as legitimate representatives
571 in terms of the *rawaabit*, and as legitimate judges and decision-
578 makers in terms of the *'awaiyid*. Not all conflict in the external political system is, in terms of our structural levels, between secondary authority groups, but seldom is any group larger than the secondary unit mobilized for political
*619 action. In other words, even where we note that conflict is
*613 between two primary units, i.e., the 'Aishaibat and the
571 Kamailat, there is probably, in fact, political action taking
578 place between two secondary groups within the respective primary groups. However, there always exists the very real possibility that greater conflict will be generated involving primary and even tribal units.

128 In the next section of this chapter, I will discuss Bedouin law and sanctions within the framework of the lineage structure and the authority levels at which they operate. The following section will further illustrate the legitimacy and dynamics of authority and structure in Bedouin society.

*613 ultimately, all-out warfare: the role of 'aqila is most
578 critical at this level. Abou-Zeid (1966:259) has suggested
182 an explanation for the delicate balance of political relations
which exists between secondary lineage groups. He thinks that

> [577) . . . in the segmentary society of the Bedouin of the Western Desert . . . honour has played, and still plays, a most vital role in the field of social control, besides providing an effective code of morality . . . A slight offence inflicted against a lineage . . . is taken as an unfavorable humiliation requiring immediate retaliation to wipe out the shame, regain honour, and restore the same relations as formerly between the groups.

682 Homicide and wounding cases, which usually develop over con-
683 flicting claims to land or water rights, are most prone to
578 lead to grand-scale conflict. Thus the 'aqila will always
*613 mediate and adjudicate these cases whereas he will not
necessarily intervene in those cases involving tertiary groups where appeals to moral solidarity and kinship unity may succeed in restoring relations. It is difficult to muster evidence for this contention since conflict between tertiary groups is more of a private matter than it is public, and, once settled, such conflict is not likely to be discussed, or even admitted.

*613 Most of my details on conflict regulation and the
578 judicial process in al-Qasr involve political action between
•619 secondary or primary groups, eighteen of the twenty-two cases
681 in fact. Of the nine cases dealing with personal injury (eight

*613
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681 cases of homicide and one case of wounding) one was at the tribal level; three at the primary level; three at the secondary level; and two at the tertiary level. Of the thirteen cases dealing with property rights over land, water, or women, none took place at the tribal level; four were at the primary level; seven at the secondary level; and one at the tertiary level. One case dealing with marriage rights took place within a tertiary segment and concerned the legitimacy of a man to claim his bint 'amm. Twelve of the twenty-two cases occurred within the 'Aishabat tribe. Of the ten cases of conflict involving units from outside the 'Aishaibat, six cases were between primary units, three cases were between secondary units, and one case involved the 'Ali Ahmar with the Harabi of Libya.

In almost every case involving primary units and tribal units, the two opposing authority groups were actually secondary groups who had the backing of their primary groupings. The case in which the 'Ali Ahmar mobilized to deal with a problem in Libya probably represents an atypical case in history. It is unlikely that tribal groups of this size [648] could mobilize in time of war or peace, and in this particular case the good international relations of Egypt and Libya were at stake.

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681 There is another realm of sanctions which can be invoked in cases concerning homicide, wounding, theft, and

128 what happened; some of them are my translations of legal docu-
68] ments which informants permitted me to see; a few of the cases
[124] happened while I was in the field and represent my reporting
[114] of what happened. I have arbitrarily divided the cases into
those involving personal injury and those concerning property
rights. In each case, I indicate at which level of the authority
structure the conflict and settlement has taken place.

Legal Cases Pertaining to Personal Injury

578 Two cases of killing have been discussed previously.
681 Below are a number of cases dealing with personal injury which
occurred in the external political system at the various levels
of segmentation. The first three cases involve conflict
*[613] between secondary lineage segments of the 'Aishaibat tribe;
•[619] the next two cases take place at the primary and sub-tribal
[648] levels, but note that secondary segments are the actual function-
ing units involved; the final case, an unusual one, deals with
conflict with "foreigners" at the tribal level. Note that the
*[613] 'aqila as a corporate representative is active in these cases.
[182] The third case presented below is a translation of an actual
[778] document showing how the nazaala (discussed above) functions
as a formal mechanism of conflict regulation.

578 Hafiyan killed three members of the Zallat. This feud lasted
*613 over a period of 25 years. It happened one time that an
682 *'aqila* of 'Ailit Zallat was walking in the desert and stopped
578 for a visit at a *naja'*, the owners of which he did not know.
574 He soon discovered that "he was in front of the Hafiyan them-
*613
682 selves." He tried to conceal his own identity, intending to
eat the meal which they offered him and then escape in the dark. But the Hafiyan soon discovered that one from the Zallat was their guest. They told him that they would send men of their tribe with him to give him safe conduct through the desert. They also said that they wished to get together and make peace. Then they made peace, and its conditions were made through the *'awaaqil*. No *diiya* was transferred because each had killed an equal number of men. Then members of the two groups lived together for two or three days and made a feast, they slaughtered sheep and the problem was over. This problem came to an end in 1938.

578 The next case, dealing with wounding, is presented in
682 the form of two documents. It is valuable for the way in
*613 which it illustrates the judicial process and ritual sanction.
•[619] Note that in the first document the case seems to concern two
primary segments, i.e., the 'Aishaibat and the Kamailat, but the second document, the "Day of Oath," clearly indicates that the parties involved are 'Ailit Ma'fas ('Aishaibat) and 'Ailit Mahatha (Kamailat), two secondary groups.

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578 that they had received their rights in this case. And
*613 the two parties are satisfied by this according to the
692 witnesses present.
539 Signatures or seals of four witnesses.
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578 The next case represents the only time in the memory
682 of informants that all of the 'awaaqil of the 'Ali Ahmar met
*613 to intervene in a case of conflict. This case is extremely
692 unusual because it may be the only time in Awlad 'Ali history
571
•619 that political mobilization of this scale has taken place. As
noted, political action, in war or peace, usually involves
[177] only secondary segments. In view of this, the case probably
[648] reflects an instance of social change: the Egyptian government,
anxious to maintain good relations with Libya, encouraged and
facilitated the settlement of this dispute by furnishing
transportation and cutting administrative red tape so that
the 'awaaqil of the 'Ali Ahmar could handle this case in a
most expeditious way. Here is a case where Bedouin traditional
[182] political structures function adequately in the modern situation.
Note here also that, in certain circumstances, the diiya payment
can be divided symbolically and specifically to place guilt and
to indicate the seriousness of a crime.

619 Date: 1963. Case: Quarrel between the tribe of 'Ali Ahmar
682 (Egypt) and the Harabi (Libya) concerning murder. A young
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*613 boy of 'Ailit X was visiting his sister in Libya. He learned
[685]

● 619 that one old man kept a large sum of money at home. One day
*613 the boy went to beg a watermelon from the old man, but really
682 he went to learn the layout of the man's house. In the night,
578 the boy returned to the man's house and demanded his money.
[685] The man refused saying that he had no money. The boy stabbed
the old man to death. The boy then went to his sister's
house and washed the blood from his hands, and had the girl
clean the blood from his robe. The police came to the sister's
house in search of the boy, but he was hiding in a cave nearby.
The police asked the sister: "Where is your brother, he has
killed your mother?" The girl was horrified and told the
police where they could find her brother.

*613 All of the _'awaaqil_ of the 'Ali Ahmar met at the farm of
619 'Umda Ibrahim. There were forty-one _'awaaqil_ plus 'Umda Ibra-
571 him. They proceeded to Libya by bus, and took forty sheep
682 with them as a _kubaara_. In Libya, they met with officials of
578 the Libyan government and the _'awaaqil_ of the Harabi tribe.
682 The Harabi asked for a _diiya_ of 3000 L.E. The blood-money
578 asked for was extra high for two reasons: a young man had
619 killed an elder; and, the murder was connected with in-
*613 tentional theft. After discussing the crime, the Harabi
[685] reduced the price to 700 L.E. They did this out of respect
for the 'Ali Ahmar who had come so far, and who had paid money
for the sugar and tea. All of the 'Ali Ahmar contributed to

682 578 ● 619 *613 the diiya: the Qinaishat paid 50 L.E., the Kamailat paid 50 L.E., but the 'Aishaibat, the tribe of the killer paid 600 L.E. Of the 600 L.E. paid by the 'Aishaibat it was distributed as follows: 'Ailit Lazumi and "Ailit Ma'fas each paid 100 L.E. because they are rich; 'Ailit Dawlat paid only 30 L.E. because they are poor, and each pays according to their means. The 'aiela of the killer, although they are poor, had to pay 70 L.E., and the bait of the killer had to pay 300 L.E. All paid according to their means, except the killer's bait. This was a special case, it never happened before and will never happen again and this is why the killer's bait had to pay more. The killer's bait was very poor, so what they did not have they had to beg from the richer families of the tribe.

Legal Cases Pertaining to Property Rights

423 *613 In general, property in al-Qasr is owned either by an individual or by a tertiary group; seldom, in these days, is property held by the secondary lineage group. 423 *613 182 [671] If we followed classic segmentary lineage theory, seeing that the tribal political structure and the 'awaiyid are still functionally intact, we might suppose that land and water possession are rights in usufruct and not of ownership. The Bedouins themselves insist that the rights to land and water are rights of ownership. They state that all of the lineage-owned land, with few exceptions, was parcelled out to tertiary groups a

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Date: 12 October 1954. There came to us (i.e. the 'awaqil) on this day, Khalid Idris of al-'Aishaibat and Yunis Abd al-Nabi of al-Kamailat. The reason for their coming is a quarrel over land rights at Wadi al-Hijnaiya. And we put distinct markers between the land of the two parties, the first, Khalid Idris, and the second, Yunis Abd al-Nabi. And the boundary passes by the distinct markers; the first is the wadi marker, the second to the sea and beside the tree, and the final marker we put east of Halima well. This is a decision between the two parties in the presence of the following witnesses:

Signatures or seals of five men.

●619
578
[671]

The case given below indicates, by the use of two documents, the process of conflict settlement involving two secondary segments of al-Qasr, one Sa'adi and one Marabit. 'Ailit al-Sulwatiyya, though genealogically not members of the Awlad 'Ali and holders of a client or vassal status in traditional times, are within the jurisdiction of the 'awaiyid Awlad 'Ali. They claim their rights under it by virtue of the fact of their residence in al-Qasr. The power of ritual sanction is clearly illustrated by this case.

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Date: 30 July 1964, Marsa Matruh. First Party: Shaikh Khalid Za'aluk al-Sulwatiyya and four relatives. Second Party: Khalid Idris of 'Ailit Ma'fas and three relatives. They are present. The cause of these two parties coming together is a quarrel over a well named Halima. Since the choice to swear the oath has been made by the two parties, Khalid Idris, the second party, will swear the oath supported by twenty-four members of his 'umraa al-dam ("blood group") to

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578 be chosen by Shaikh Khalid Za'aluk, the first party. The text
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691 of the oath which Khalid Idris will swear is: "By the truth
● 619 of the owner of this tomb (maqaam), and this book of God, I
695 swear that you (i.e. the 'Ailit Sulwatiyya represented by
[539] Shaikh Khalid Za'aluk) have neither work of hand nor a
grandfather's stake in this well." If any of the oath-takers are missing on the day of the oath, the well will be owned Khalid Za'aluk. And if they swear the oath, the well will be owned by 'Ailit Ma'fas.

The date of the oath will be the first Friday of month nine,
[778] 1964. The oath will be taken at the shrine of Sidi 'Awam, and
the swearing will deal with the well only. For the land which is west of the well belongs to Khalid Za'aluk and his family, and the land to the east of the well belongs to Khalid Idris and his family. And the water which is west of the well belongs to Khalid Za'aluk. The two parties agreed to this. (Each party, and five witnesses, i.e. rajal khair, for each party, signed the document.)

423 Date: 30 July 1964. I, Khalid Za'aluk, have decided to cancel
619 the oath which was supposed to have been sworn on 9 September
578 1964 at the shrine of Sidi Awam. Khalid Idris and the oath-
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[695] takers were present and were stopped from taking the oath.
And the well named al-Halima which was the cause of the quarrel

423 (nizaa's) belongs to Khalid Idris and his brothers. This
•619
578 happened with the satisfaction of both tribes, and this re-
691 nunciation of claim is valid from today. This paper concerning the ownership of land around the well is valid from today also. And this happened between the parties: (Signatures or stamps of both parties concerned.)

(There appeared the signatures of twenty-three of the twenty-four men who were to have sworn the oath.)

Only twenty-three oath-takers were present: 30 July 1964. I, Shaikh Khalid Za'aluk, agree on the signatures of only twenty-three oath-takers. (Signature of Khalid Za'aluk.)

648 We have mentioned that the _'awaiyid_ prevails in al-
671 Qasr, but have also noted that where the security of the
578 desert is threatened the government is likely to intervene. The government enters tribal conflict in al-Qasr with the tacit approval of the Bedouins. As one informant remarked: "The _'awaiyid_ is the best way to handle problems, but the police will handle what the _'awaiyid_ cannot."

423 _Date: 1964_. Case: Quarrel between al-Afrad ('Ali Abyad) and
691 'Aishaibat ('Ali Ahmar) over water rights. Many members of
578 both tribes took part in this conflict. The government had
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648 to intervene: they formed a peace committee made up of all
*[613] the _'awaaqil_ of both tribes and the _'umda_ and _shaikh_ from
[634] each tribe.

423 each tribe. It was decided that the water which flows through
691 the wadi after the rains should be divided equally between the
578 two tribes, and that no one should be stopped from using the
•619
648 water. Had not the government intervened in this conflict,
and had not they collected all of the weapons from the Bedouins,
this problem would have resulted in the death of many men and
even greater problems.

674 Theft is condemned by the Bedouins: "Everything in
685 the desert is loose. We must punish the thief quickly and
[682] severely." It is a fact that the man who goes to steal and
accidentally kills in the act will have judged against him
[829] the full diiya, i.e., the amount for intentional killing. On
the other hand, the people of al-Qasr insist that "Bedouins do
[671] not steal." But legal norms exist to sanction violations against
cultural ideals. The following case shows how social and ritual
sanctions operate to enforce ideals.

619 Date: 1964. Case: Quarrel between the tribe of Kamailat and
578 the tribe of 'Aishaibat over the theft of 16 L.E. Muhammad of
685 'Ailit Ma'fas was accused of stealing 16 L.E. which belonged
*613 to Ahmad of 'Ailit Idris, Kamailat. The theft occurred while
the two were residing at a hotel in Marsa Matruh. There were
twenty other persons in the hotel that night. The accused
said: "I did not take anything."

•619

578 said: "I did not take anything." The _'awaaqil_ of both parties
685 met and told the accused: "If you have anything give it to
*613 us; if you do not have anything then swear the oath to this
695 fact." Members of 'Ailit Ma'fas said that the boy was innocent
[571] and told the _'awaaqil_ that the boy should have his rights
[692] according to the _'awaiyid_ (i.e. he should be allowed to swear
the oath to establish his innocence). The boy accused of the
theft, his father, and two other members of 'Ailit Ma'fas
selected by the accusers swore the oath and the problem was
619 over. Two months later, the accuser from the Kamailat lost
578 his eye in an accident, because swearing the oath has con-
685
695 sequences for both parties. A bad oath will work against the
784 one who makes it; there will be a curse upon him, his children,
and his money. And the bad effects of an oath will also work
against the one who falsely accuses another making him swear
the oath.

582 The final two cases deal with marriage rights. The
562 first illustrates a number of things which I have touched on
*613 in the previous discussion of marriage: that a man may choose
792 to ignore the jural structures of the lineage group where the
desires of his offspring are concerned; that the female is
not the totally subjugated person which one might expect to
find in the strongly patrilineal Bedouin society; and that the
role of "holy man" functions in the marital area of authority
relations.

114 The second, rather complex, case occurred while I was
792 in the field. Once again, the role of the "holy man" is shown
562 to operate in cases dealing with women. Shown here also is an interesting example of the cultural definition of abnormality.

*613 No Date. Case: Quarrel between 'Ailit al-Abaidi ('Ali Abyad)
578 and 'Ailit al-Afrad ('Ali Abyad) over marriage rights. A man
582 from al-Abaidi agreed that his daughter could marry a man but
792 the rest of the 'aiela did not approve of this marriage. Since the man could not go to his 'aqila, who disapproved of the marriage, he took his problem to a "holy man." The "holy man" decided that the girl should marry the man she wanted to marry, but he was afraid that this would cause trouble in the
[586] 'aiela. The "holy man" decided to marry the man and woman,
and then to divorce them for a period of one year so that the conflict would abate. The girl's father knew of this marriage but the other members of the 'aiela did not. After a period of one year, the groom went to the "holy man" and said: "Decide
[681] anything that I can do, but I must have the girl." The "holy
[684] man" decided to make him pay a kubaara (expiation) fee of
100 L.E. to the girl's 'aiela, and he married them again.

*613 Date: 1965. Case: Quarrel within a tertiary segment of the
•619 Qinaishat tribe concerning marriage rights. A girl from the
578 Qinaishat tribe had refused to marry her paternal cousin, but
582 he was insistent upon his right to have her.

*613 he was insistent upon his right to have her. She went to
•619 see the "holy man," al-Sanusi, who lives near al-Qasr. (Al-
578
582 Sanusi is a descendent of "the Great Sanusi," the founder of
793 al-Sanusiyya, who now lives in Egypt after having been exiled
from Libya.) Al-Sanusi decided to keep the girl at his farm
*613 until he could decide a course of action. One night, the
619 girl's cousin secretly came to the Sanusi farm and found her
578
582 room. The girl was sleeping. The cousin struck a match, the
793 girl awoke and was frightened. She jumped from her bed and
683 began to run, in so doing she fell down a flight of stairs
and suffered a rupture. This was a serious offense which the
cousin had committed, and al-Sanusi decided that he should call
all of the _'awaaqil_ of the area to inform them of this. In the
meantime, he sent the girl back to her home and the cousin
continued to bother her concerning his rights over her.
[584] The cousin went so far as to "offer the blood-sacrifice for
her," a stage in the marriage process which signifies that the
union has been consented to by both families. The girl's
father was dead, and her brothers and uncles were unable to
keep the cousin away from the girl. (It may be assumed that
they were conscious of his rights to _bint 'amm_.) They had
even beaten him once. All of the _'awaaqil_ of 'Ali Ahmar and
[692] 'Ali Abyad, and the Marabtiin in the al-Qasr area came to meet
with al-Sanusi at his farm. He (al-Sanusi) said that they all

*613 must come because he, himself, was a Libyan and a member of
● 619 no tribe in Egypt. Al-Sanusi's petition was two-fold: he
578 said the cousin should be punished for violating his right of
582 privacy and property, and the question concerning the cousin's
793 right to the girl should be settled. The 'awaaqil decided
683 692 that al-Sanusi should be awarded a kubaara of 1000 L.E. from
the tribes of the area, and that the girl should be permitted
to marry no man of the Qinaishat tribe. Al-Sanusi refused to
accept the kubaara, and this was the correct thing to do since
the kubaara, especially a large one, is only offered ritualistically. The 'awaaqil took note of the cousin's rights to his
bint 'amm: they said that since the girl refused to marry him
it would not be right if she married anyone else from the tribe.
*613 Furthermore, the 'awaaqil, on the basis of the cousin's behavior
619 in this matter, decided that the cousin was insane and should
734 be committed to an asylum. They informed the police in Marsa
[648] Matruh of this diagnosis and decision, and the police came and
transported the boy to the mental hospital in Cairo where he
is today. The uncles of the boy signed the papers which committed him.

554 of the Bedouin attitude, or lack of it, toward religion.
792 Since the time of Muhammad, the Bedouins have been considered
771 notoriously bad Muslims. Today, the Bedouins tend to joke
about their lack of zeal, and often point out that "holy
•619 men" are not to be trusted.[2] This is seen in Sa'adi behavior
771 toward the Marabtin tribes who are their vassals. Theoretically,
792 the Marabtin who trace descent to the Prophet and might be
554 [778] considered "sacred Tribes" should be respected by the "secular"
Sa'adi tribes. But the Sa'adi of al-Qasr tend to deride the
554 Marabit. For instance, the "holy man" of al-Qasr, 'Amm Salih,
792 is a Marabit and well-known for his ability to successfully
627 mediate in conflict situations. But one informant, pointing
619 out this gift which 'Amm Salih possesses, said: "Amm Salih
is a good man, he is not a Marabit." But 'Amm Salih identifies
himself as a "rajal saalih" and a "Marabit"; he sees no role
conflict here.

771 The Bedouins also joke about the manner in which they
[522] practice the "pillars of Islam." Especially, they make light
of the fact that they are irregular in mosque attendance.
They say, with a slight smile, "we pray in the desert." A
[124] common way for an interview to end was by an informant rising
and saying: "Now I must wash for prayers." This happened

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[184] [2] Professor Abou-Zeid also notes this trait in his study of the Bedouin near Sallum, on the Libyan border (1966:248).

554
178
[792] you for your cloak, you would have immediately given it to him. God was pleased with them at that time."

This notion of changing foci of authority and power cannot be divorced from the related political phenomena of the tendency toward legitimacy and the role institutionalization process. 128 In the next chapter, I will attempt to show how such a conceptual framework can be utilized in an analysis of culture and political change.

Modern Legal Roles

634
554
[648]
[177] The roles of 'umda and shaikh were created and imposed upon the Bedouins by Muhammad 'Ali sometime during the early part of the nineteenth century in order to facilitate administration, maintain security in the desert, and protect the Western frontier.

[619] Both of these roles are representative offices at the primary level of the tribal structure. The 'Aishaibat have an 'umda and a shaikh who reside in Marsa Matruh and work in close relation with the Governor. In terms of a chain of command, these offices receive demands which may originate either with the Governor in Matruh or with Bedouins in al-Qasr. But these offices are subservient to both the Governor and the Bedouins since no decision-making powers of any consequence resides with them. [571] [635] With reference to the two authority structures, the Egyptian and the Bedouin, the 'umda and the

635 population of the whole Western Desert, and representatives
[648] of the Egyptian government employees working in the province.
[634] The Bedouin representatives appointed to this council need
not be an *'umda* or a *shaikh*, although they may be. The
oldest Bedouin member of the council, who happens to be an
'umda, told me that "the Governor picks the men who he feels
understand the problems of the people."

635 The Governor himself thinks that every Bedouin on
124 his council is an *'aqila*. He replied to my question about
*613 the criteria for membership on the *Majlis al-Muhafza*: "I
am using a new selection system. Rather than choose the
'umda or *shaikh*, I choose the *'aqila*. Every man on the
council is an *'aqila*, and the number is determined by the
population of the area . . . But I appoint more men from the
● [619] 'Ali Ahmar (see Figures 3 and 7)[1] than from other tribes.
This is because they are more numerous, and they are near
Matruh where I am able to contact them immediately. The
'Ali Ahmar are represented by six men and the other tribes
by just three men."

156 Hajj 'Ali is one of these six men and the only member
159 of the Council who resides in al-Qasr. I attended and ob-
554 served the December meeting of the Council. The Governor
635 sat at the head of a long table with the Egyptian representa-
648 tives on either side of him. At the other end of the table
[114] sat the Bedouin representatives, Hajj 'Ali among them. Purely

[1] [See pp. 65 & 77 respectively--Analyst]

> 156 There is another objection which I have concerning
> 159 our customs. I mean the case of elections. For
> 554 instance, one from the 'Aishaibat and one from the
> 829 Sanagra, of the 'Ali Abyad, are nominated. Then,
> 666 each man must vote for the one from his own tribe.
> He must vote for the 'Aishaibi even if the other is the better man. But, we should consider that the best man is the man with the best qualifications. 'Umda Ibrahim, for instance, knows how to greet an official or a minister, but he does not know the *'awaiyid* nor the problems of the Bedouins. His brother (who will probably be the next *'umda*)is a good man and is educated, but he does not know the *'awaiyid* either.

829 This view contrasts sharply with the traditional stand
666 of most Bedouins in al-Qasr, including the members of the "status group." For instance, one *'aqila* voiced what is a prevalent opinion when he said:

> [619] If a man chooses to become a political candidate
> [186] against a Bedouin, he must understand that the members of the tribe should and would vote for their *'umda* because he is a member of their own tribe. Even if a man is crazy and his opponent has the highest college degree, the Bedouins must vote for the man from their own tribe.

156 Hajj 'Ali is modern in his evaluation of the political
159 situation here: a politician should know the problems of his
554 constituents rather than follow principles based on traditional
178 relationships. His motive is not to promote the *'awaiyid* as
177 a good way of life, for we know he does not think this to be
829 [671] the case. Instead, Hajj 'Ali believes that in order to help
the Bedouins through a period of change one must know what they are changing from. Through his negative appraisal of

CHAPTER II

ECOLOGY AND HISTORY

619 Awlad Ali are a number of Arabic-speaking semi-nomadic tribes of
101 sheep and goat herders who inhabit the northern part of the Western
162 Desert of Egypt. The total population of Awlad Ali, according to the
1965 preliminary census, was about 100,000 inhabitants. This estimate is, however, very tentative and fluctuates from one year to the
next, depending on the circumstances of the pasture in the area. The
131 area they occupy consists of the narrow strip of fertile land which extends along the Mediterranean coast from near Alexandria in the east
some 350 miles westward to the UAR-Libyan border town of Sallum, and
132 varying in width from ten to thirty miles. Vegetation in the area de-
133 pends on rainfall, supplemented by a number of artesian wells. The
rainy season extends from November to March, but the rain is extremely
erratic in nature, varying from one year to another and from one place
to the next. Draught has been experienced every three to four years,
one of them being experienced at the time of the study. The water situ-
312 ation is further aggravated by the low technological level of the people
[181] which prevents them from making the best use of the available rain water.
There have been some attempts made to store as much of the rain water
as possible, but these attempts are usually made by individuals and in
too crude and primitive a way to prevent most of the water from being
lost by seepage or by evaporation. The most commonly used method of
water preservation in the area is digging cisterns in the ground. But
most of these cisterns are too shallow to keep large amounts of water.
Some deeper wells are found in the area and are called "beer sama"

423 311 many generations a recognized right by the Egyptian government to use the land for grazing and cultivation, and the tribal concept is that the land belongs to the tribe.

The concept is true with regard to wells and cisterns. But legally speaking, land belongs to the state, and the tribal populations in the area have only the right of usufruct. This does not mean that the land is exploited jointly by all members of one tribe or tribal segment, or that a man can cultivate or graze his flocks in any part he chooses, for there is a certain correlation between the right of usufruct and the distribution of the tribes in the area on the one hand, and the inner tribal segmentation on the other. Although land is not [556] an object of ownership in itself, and wealth is not spoken of in terms of land, yet, the distinction between ownership and usufruct in the 423 area is sometimes very hard to draw. Each tribal segment has its name 311 associated with a specific area of land which it regards as its own ● 619 and whose boundaries it defends against other tribal segments. The tribal segment whose name is associated with a certain locality not only has the right to use the land, but this right is also vested in it to the exclusion of other segments. Within such an area, each subsegment has the right to a portion of the land to the exclusion of the other subsegments. While individual members of the tribal segments know the land belonging to their tribal segments, their right is not associated with a specific patch within the total area. Individuals usually cultivate different patches within that total area as the need may arise; but one cannot cultivate a patch in an area belonging to another tribal segment except under certain conditions. This does not mean that the individual cannot claim the right to a specific patch, for not only

423 can he do this, but he can also sell that right. The right to sell the
311 share of the tribal land has recently become recognized in the Western
• 619 Desert, and the usufruct right is being treated in the same way as ownership.

423 While the boundaries of the cultivable land belonging to the tribe
311 are guarded, when it comes to grazing land, the boundaries are not so
619 much enforced. The tribes of the Western Desert of Egypt are quite tol-
233 erant in allowing members of other tribal segments to graze their flocks wherever grazing lands are available. Everyone from any tribe can graze his flocks in areas that offer better pasture. But in doing so, he does not have the right to use the wells and cisterns of the tribal segment.
[312] Water is scarce and valuable. Cisterns are owned by the tribal segments,
[432] and if an outsider wants to use the water, he has to buy it from the owner for the whole season for a sum ranging between $100-$180.

423 In 1958, with the extension of the Mariut irrigation project, a
656 Desert Land Possession Law was enacted and came into force in 1960. This law restates the right of the government to the ownership of the land, and therefore does not recognize the tribal possessions of the land, even when they have made certain improvements in it, such as planting trees or digging wells. However, it gave the right of the occupants of a certain area of land to request either the purchase of the land or its lease for a period not exceeding nine years, granted that such is made within one year of the passing of the law. Failing to do so within one year, the government will either remove the plants and buildings, or confiscate them without compensation.

423 656 The above law met with opposition from the tribal population in the area. As a result of this opposition, a new law was enacted in 1964 (Law #100). Although this later law eliminated some of the shortcomings of the previous one, it is not itself without disadvantages. The 1964 law recognizes the Bedouins' right of ownership only in areas where the fairly permanent trees were planted before 1958. Rain-fed areas cultivated from season to season are excluded. The new law also provides for the sale and transfer of land. Any person can purchase up to 50 feddans (acres) provided that he can develop it into an economic enterprise. The law also provides for the distribution of arable lands in such a way as to permit each head of household to own 10 feddans and to be provided with water possibilities. The price of this kind of land is to be paid over a period of 30 years. Settlers are encouraged and helped in planting trees and building dikes. So far, 8,600 feddans irrigated by windmills have been pssessed by members of Awlad Ali tribes, [312] and titles to their holdings are being issued.

233 423 656 With regard to grazing lands, no legislation has yet been issued, and the government feels that at this stage of development, it is essential to start educating and inducing the tribal population of the Western Desert in initiating and implementing new programs for preventing overgrazing and controlling the number of flocks.

The Group

•619 The name Awlad Ali covers a number of ethnically distinct groups. In addition to Awlad Ali proper (the descendents of Ali), referred to as the Sa'adi, it includes a number of Murabiteen (holy men) tribes who are attached to various segments of Awlad Ali and occupy an inferior political position. The name also includes various peasant

619 [563] The name also includes various peasant groups and individuals who migrated from the Nile valley and who were incorporated into the tribal organization by a system of tribal adoption called "Iktitab." Most of these peasant groups came to the desert [701] to avoid military drafting by becoming part of Awlad Ali, who, until [554] 1947, were exempted from serving in the Egyptian army. Although groups and individuals thus adopted become part of the pedigrees of the adopting tribal segments and are supposed to enjoy equal status, yet, insofar as their origin is still remembered, they are looked down upon by the Sa'adi and occupy a position somewhere between that of Awlad Ali Sa'adi and that of the Murabiteen.

619 173 The Sa'adi tribes consider themselves to be the descendants of a certain Aqqar Ben Sa'ada or Aqqar El-Sherif, a descendant of Bani Suleim, who settled in Cyrenaica in the Fifth Century. Although they claim to [144] be of pure Arab ancestory, all sources agree that a considerable amount of mixture between Arab and indigenous Berber populations took place during the period they have been in North Africa.



Fig. 1. The Sa'adi Tribes

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* The exact relationship of the Gemeiat tribe to the Sa'adi tribes is not exactly known. Many informants, as well as accounts of earlier travelers in the area, assert that descent from Hkadiga, a sister of Ali and Harb, and therefore are cousins of Awlad Ali. Others, especially members of Sa'adi tribes, themselves, deny any genealogical

619 Until two centuries ago Awlad Ali lived in eastern Cyrenaica.
173 After the death of Aqqar, his two sons, Ali (founder of Awlad Ali) and
Harb (founder of Harabi tribe on chart), competed for the leadership of
619 the tribe. This competition involved their respective tribes in a
173 bitter war which existed for more than fifty years. In one of the major
726 battles between the two tribal segments, the Harabi segment with help
[648] from the Caramanli rules of Tripoli were able to defeat Awlad Ali and
to drive them eastward across the Libyan-Egyptian borders into the Egyptian Western Desert. This happened about 150 years ago. At that time, the area was occupied by the Hanadi, a warlike cousin of Awlad Ali, who had established a system of dominance over the Murabiteen tribes who are believed to be the original inhabitants of the desert. The area also was inhabited by the Gemeiat tribe, which, although believed to have Murabiteen status, yet were not treated as clients of the powerful Hanadi, as were the other Murabiteen tribes in the area. With the help from the Murabiteen, Awlad Ali were able to defeat the Hanadi and to drive them eastward into the Nile Delta, where they settle now as cultivators.

619 During the rule of Muhammad Ali (1815-1848), the warlike Awlad
175 Ali were frequently used by the government to subdue the tribal upris-
648 ings in the Delta and other parts of Egypt, and to hold the Mamlukes
in check. There was no organized army in Egypt at that time except for a few remnants of the Turkish soldiers. The tribal population of Awlad Ali agreed to supply Muhammad Ali with fighting men on the condition that they would be provided with food and arms and also exempted

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[619] connection to Gemeiat and insist that they are a Murabiteen tribe who ac-
[173] quired their relatively higher status through their assistance to Awlad Ali during their fight with the Harabi.

619 from forced labor in government projects and released from the pay-
175 ment of taxes. The government agreed to these demands, and on their
648 part, Awlad Ali helped Muhammad Ali extensively in his military expedition in Syria and Arabia and were a major factor in the battle of 1815 at Bissel where he succeeded in breaking Wahabi power. They also helped his son, Ismeal, in his expedition to the Sudan.

Later, when the Egyptian army was organized, the government ex-
[701] empted Awlad Ali and other tribal groups which helped in the military conquests from military service, but required them to undertake the guarding of the desert roads and the frontiers of Egypt. Also, in
[423] exchange for their previous services, they were given the right to use the land of the Western Desert and left the question of its distribution among the various tribal segments to the native tribal leaders.
619 Finally, in 1832, Awlad Ali were granted a form of legal and political
175 autonomy whereby the government acknowledged the tribal legal and
648
642 judicial system as the means to settle disputes between members of the tribe. The government also recognized the authority of the native tribal leaders and allowed the tribal populations to be governed by their own native system of leadership.

This political autonomy of Awlad Ali existed until 1947. Although their usefulness to the government had long ceased to exist, they had continued to enjoy the privileges they had obtained earlier. This was partly due to the fact that the various governments that came after Muhammad Ali showed no interest in the area occupied by Awlad Ali. There were no taxable lands in the area, no natural resources of any promise, and the tribal population did not present any particular prob-
000 lem to attract the attention of the government. There was some smuggling

CHAPTER III

TRIBAL ORGANIZATION

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In discussing the tribal organization of Awlad Ali two modes of analysis are employed. One is a structural form of analysis in which emphasis is on the hierarchy of groups and subgroups by which the tribesmen order themselves. This view of the system is an outside one regarding all smaller units as parts of a delimited whole: Awlad Ali. The other mode of analysis involves the description of some of these groups in terms of the processes by which they emerge and maintain themselves.

The first problem one encounters in pursuing the first kind of analysis is that of definition of the tribal boundaries. It has been mentioned earlier that the name Awlad Ali includes a number of groups of different ethnic backgrounds. Some of these have been incorporated into the tribe by the system of tribal adoption known as "Iktitab." Such groups consider themselves as Awlad Ali and are considered as such by Awlad Ali proper as well as by outsiders. Other groups such as the Murabiteen are not thus incorporated into the tribe; and although they consider themselves to be Awlad Ali, they are not viewed as such by Awlad Ali themselves who prefer to keep the position of the Murabiteen distinct as an inferior group. On the other hand, many Awlad Ali have moved outside the area of the Western Desert and have become settled cultivators on the banks of the Nile. These retain a vague and remote genetic connection to the name Awlad Ali.

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619
[167]

To avoid this problem, it is best to define the tribe by political rather than by ethnic criterion. There is no paramount chief of the

There is no paramount chief of the
121 tribe at the present time; yet, the unifying force is the recognition
●619 by the group of the tribal law, the Daraieb, as a binding set of rules
671
[643] and as the regulator of behavior within the area. In these terms,
Awlad Ali are a clearly delimited group, and it is in terms of the
jurisdiction of these rules that Awlad Ali are treated as a unit for
administrative purposes by the Egyptian government. Viewed this
way, Awlad Ali will be defined as those who recognize and abide by
the Daraieb or the customary law. This includes the Murabiteen tribes
[563] as well as all those who became part of the tribal organization of
Awlad Ali by means of Iktitab. Since the territorial jurisdiction of
the Daraieb is limited to the Western Desert of Egypt, those groups
and individuals of Awlad Ali origin who have moved on a permanent basis
from the area will be excluded from the group. Groups and individuals
who live in the area but are not part of the tribal organization of
Awlad Ali are not subject to the Daraieb.

619 Awlad Ali of the Western Desert of Egypt are an offshoot of the
173 Cyrenaica tribes who in turn believe themselves to be the descendants
of a unique ancestress Sa'ada.


Syrenaica tribes
Sa'ad
Baraghuth
'Aggar
El-Saghir
Jibran
Harb
Ali
Tribe
Abiad
Ahmar
Senenah
Tribe
Awlad Kharouf
Awlad Mansur
El-Sanagrah
'Eila
El-'aggary
Gedeidah
Bu-Mutair
Bait ('Eila)
El-Asabei
Yousef
'afash
Helleis
Daghash
Bait
Semeida
Yunis
Makhum
Hussein

619
173 Awlad Ali themselves are divided into three major sections: Ahmar (the Reds); Abiad (the Whites); and Senenah. Each of these sections is referred to as "tribe" and sometimes "tribes." The first two major sections, those of Ahmar or the Reds and Abiad (Whites), are named after their mothers, the wives of Ali (founder of Awlad Ali). The Whites are named after their white mother, and the Reds after their Sudanese mother who, owing to her dark complexion, was known as El-Hamra (the red one).

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[595] In the past, writers such as Robertson-Smith (1903) have interpreted the reference to female names in patrilineal genealogies as indicating an earlier matrilineal descent. I tend to agree with a more recent writer, E. Peters (1959), who explains the reference to female ancestors by two factors: patrilineal descent and polygyny. According to him, it is a way of distinguishing full brothers from half brothers and a means to show this genealogically. "The concept of the 'one womb', of maternal origin, is a critical one in the context of social cohesion, but it does not deny patriliny; on the contrary, it serves a sense to enforce it. Female names can be used to show a greater notion of cohesion than the mere use of male names, and the significance of a female name . . . is that it is symbol of full brother unity at the highest political level." (p.29).

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619 This can be further supported by evidence from my own data which show that reference to female names occur more frequently in charts where tribal names rather than proper names are used. In genealogies using proper names, informants rarely, if ever, trace their descent to an ancestress. But when charts of tribal names are used, it is not

613 uncommon to find reference to female names. This indicates that it is
551 only when the unity of the full brothers becomes politically signifi-
173
• 619 cant that the name of the mother rather than the name of the father is
[595] used. This may explain why the occurrence of female names in Awlad Ali
genealogies is not as common as one might expect judging from the frequency of polygynous marriages among the group.


Awlad Mansur
Mutair
'aggary
Gedaidah
Bu-Zewah
El-Hafian
El-Marries
Suliman

Fig. 3. Recognized tribal segments of Awlad Mansur (a segment of Awlad Ali)


Mansur
Bu-Asabei
Bu-Mutair
'aggar
Muhammed
Bu-Zewah
Abdellah
Hussein (Hafian)
Muhammed
Suliman
Muhammed
Suliman

613 The two charts show the same unit of Awlad Mansour. The first of
619 the two charts shows the tribal segments in which Eilat Gedaida (a female
173
551 name) appears as one of the segments. When the actual genealogical
chart of one of the living members of that segment was drawn, descent
was traced to Mohammed, the husband of Gedaida, as shown on the second
chart. In this case Gedaida is not a member of Awald Mansour segment.
The unity of the full brothers is emphasized without changing the affiliation
of the segment. It is simply a means of carrying on the patriline
using the mother's name. This is not always the case, however. Examination
of other cases in which the female name was used reveals the fact
that in certain instances using the female name is a means of carrying
on the line of descent through a daughter. This meant incorporating
within the tribal segment a whole group of individuals who otherwise
would have belonged to a different patriline. Carrying the line through
613
619 the daughter in this manner has the same result as adopting her husband
551 unto the tribe. The question then is why wasn't adoption used. Examination
597 of the two cases in which this happened indicates that a possible
explanation may be that this occurs whenever the husband is unadoptable.
Adoption is possible whenever a man does not have any tribal affiliation.
613 In one of the two cases the husband belonged to the Gemei'at tribe, a
619 Murabiteen tribe which enjoys a relatively higher status than the
551 other Murabiteen tribes by virtue of their being the original settlers
597
554 of the area and helping the Awald Ali in their fight with the Hanadi,
yet compared to Awlad Ali proper occupies an inferior position. In
this case, relating to the patriline of the mother carried with it a

613 definite political advantage. In the second case in which the female
619 name was used, the husband was a member of the Bara'asa tribe of Libya.
551 Although this tribe is one the powerful tribes of Libya, it has no
599
554 political influence in the Egyptian Western Desert. Changing affiliation carried with it the strong political support of the mother's tribal segment.

619
131 In general the Reds occupy the western half of the coastal area of the Western Desert from the town of Matruh westward to the Libyan border, while the Whites occupy the eastern part which stretches to Alexandria. The Senenah are fairly scattered although their largest concentration is located in the extreme western part overlapping that of the Reds. The territorial division of the area among the three major sections of Awlad Ali is not a strict one. Historical evidence shows that there has been
[174] a considerable tribal displacement throughout the area. This displacement occurred mainly during the intratribal war era and during the Second World War when the area was a main battlefield. In general, however, there is a significant relationship between territorial distribution and tribal segmentation, and this is especially true on the higher levels of segmentation than on the lower ones.

619
613 Each of the three sections of the apex of a three-tiered order of segments which, following the native usage, will be called Kabila (tribe), Eila (family), and Bait (house).

619
173 The first order referred to as tribes are structurally equivalent units but of highly variable size. Each of them has its traditional history. Some of these histories are important to the tribe as a whole.

•619 [173] Such traditions differentiate between these segments which otherwise occupy an equivalent position in the formal system.

This level of segmentation has no particular political significance except that it is at this level that the client tribes of Murabiteen are attached. People in the area differentiate between Awlad Ali proper, who are called the Sa'adi, and the Murabiteen tribes. Murabiteen tribes occupy a special position which tends to complicate the formal analysis of the tribal organization of the Awlad Ali. The Murabiteen are a number of tribes of varying sizes and origin which are attached to the Sa'adi tribes as their vassals or clients. They exhibit the same principles of tribal organization as the Sa'adi tribes escept that they have no common origin similar to that of the latter groups.

619 173 The original division of the Murabiteen tribes among the Sa'adi was made in the famous meeting at El-Haqfa in which the division of land was also made and the Awlad Ali law was first enacted. The number of client groups attached to each Sa'adi tribe reflects the relative prestige and power of thatparticular tribe at the time of the meeting. Having a re- 619 173 651 latively large number of client tribes meant, in addition to prestige of the patron tribe, large financial support. Until half a century ago this financial support was in the form of an obligatory tribute or "sadaqa" which the client tribes had to pay. This tribute is no longer [178] [431] mandatory, but the client groups are still expected to present members of their patron tribes with gifts on occasions such as weddings, funerals 619 or feasts of the tribal saint. Large vassal groups also meant support in fights. Although the client groups did not constitute part of the vengeance group of their Sa'adi, when the Sa'adi tribe fought, their client

619 groups were expected to help. For these reasons the Sa'adi tribes com-
619 peted and even fought among themselves for the newcoming Murabiteen
721 groups which continued to migrate into the area, escaping the strong
dominance of the Cyrenaica Bedouins..Many of the major tribal wars which
occurred in the area before the turn of the century had as their major
cause the competition over the Murabiteen.

619 As a vassal group the Murabiteen tribes are kept in an inferior
778 position. This inferiority has certain manifestation, the most obvious
184 of which is the deprivation of the Murabiteen of the right of "nazala"
682 or refuge. When a person is killed the killer and his kin unit seek re-
778 fuge at a neutral tribal segment, and for a period of twelve months they
613 are safe from the revenge of the victim's kin group. The victim's family
[671] cannot follow them to the refuge place, for to do this is to violate one
of the basic principles of Awlad Ali law. The philosophy behind the rule of "nazala" is to give time for "the blood to cool off" as one of the informants described it. It also gives the host group a chance to start immediate negotiations with the victim's group to settle permanently the dispute. As soon as the murderer's group takes refuge, which is done either by moving along with their tents and flocks and settling in the locality of the host group or symbolically by having the head of the host group send one of his sons or male relatives to pitch his tent in the locality of the murderer's group, the head of the host group contacts the victim's group, informs them that he has been chosed by the murderer's group in accordance with the right of nazala, and asks for their permission to grant his protection to the murderer's group. To ask for the permission of the victim's group is a matter of formality since, by custom, they cannot refuse to grant this permission except on one single ground:

682 778 617 if the host group is genealogically close enough to the murderer's group as to be themselves part of the vengeance group. As soon as the permission is granted the head of the host group starts negotiations on behalf of the murderer. Since the basic reason for the nazala is to avoid the direct confrontation between the two opposing groups, the first task of the negotiations is to define which places and markets each group can go to during the year of the nazala. Once this has been agreed upon, the difficult task of settling the dispute begins. The success or failure of the negotiations depends on the skill of the negotiator and the weight his tribal segment has in the area. This makes it of extreme importance for the murderer to select the tribal segment which can affect such a settlement. In cases where the host group is not particularly powerful, the victim's group pretends to agree to a settlement in order to have the murderer and his group leave the locality of the host group and then takes revenge by killing the murderer. This cannot happen when the host group is powerful, since such an action would automatically make the host group enemies of the victim's group.

● 619 184 778 682 With very few exceptions which will be dealt with later, the right to offer refuge is limited to the Sa'adi tribes. No Murabiteen tribe can grant refuge to a murderer, although they themselve can seek refuge at a Sa'adi tribal segment if one of them is involved in murder.

619 184 [682] [582] Another less conspicuous manifestation of the inferior position of the Murabiteen relative to the Sa'adi is the fact that the bloodmoney for the Murabit is two-thirds that for the Sa'adi man. Also, until very recently, marriage of a Sa'adi to a member of the Murabiteen tribes was considered by the Sa'adi as a very poor choice and was discouraged.

619 184 178 582 In recent years this has changed, however. The increased importance of wealth in the recently introduced money economy relaxed the endogamous tendency that was characteristic of the Sa'adi tribes.

619 184 In discussing the position of the Murabiteen tribes it is worth noting that not all the Murabiteen tribes in the area occupy the same position. Some enjoy relatively higher positions than the others. Actually, there are two kinds of Murabiteen in the area: Mustaqillen (independent Murabiteen); and the dependent Murabiteen. The latter are further subdivided into Murabiteen bil-baraka (with the blessing); and Murabiteen bil-sadaqa (with the tribute). The only independent Murabiteen in the area is the Gemei'at tribe. These are the original settlers
[173] of the area. Because of their help to Awlad Ali against the Hanadi, the latter were defeated and Awlad Ali were able to occupy the Western Desert. For their part the Gemei'at tribe was granted its independence by Awlad Ali and were given one-third of the total area as their homeland (watan).
619 184 778 682 In theory, the Gemei'at tribe occupies the same position and has the same rights as the Sa'adi tribes, including the right to offer their protection which is denied to all other client groups. In practice, however, this seems to be of no practical value. None of my informants could remember a single case in which a murderer has taken refuge at a segment
619 778 184 682 629 628 of the Gemei'at tribe. The importance of the nazala is not merely to be safe from the pursuit of the victim's group but rather to provide the mediators who undertake the crucial task of negotiation on behalf of the murderer and his gorup. It is the ability to settle the dispute on a permanent basis that offers the actual long-lasting protection, even after the time of the nazala expires. To be successful in his pursuit,

619 the negotiator has to have behind him the full weight of his tribal segment.
778 Since the origin of the Gemei'at tribe as a Murabiteen tribe is
184 well known, any negotiator has to rely almost entirely upon his own skill
682 to affect any settlement; even if he is able to affect such a settlement,
627
628 there is no guarantee that it will be permanent.

619 The Murabiteen bil-baraka and Murabiteen bil-sadaqa occupy the same
792 position as vassal groups. The only difference between the two is that
the first, the religious men, are much more respected than the latter.
They are feared by the other tribes because of the belief that they have
direct contact with the religious and spiritual world and can harm those
who dare to offend them in one way or another. Because of this factor
[627] and of their neutral position with regard to the rest of the tribes, they
[628] play an important role in mediation and dispute settlement.

619 The origin of inferiority of the Murabiteen tribes in general is
184 hard to account for. Kenneth (1925) believes that hundreds of years ago
174 the Murabiteen were essentially the holymen. They learned to read and
792 write the Qoraan and grouped themselves around the "zawias' which were
the centers of learning and religion. While indulging in their religious
practices their flocks ere grazed miles away in the open desert under the
charge of the Sa'adi shepherds, who originally were the poor paid workers
of the Murabiteen. These shepherds, living out in the open, were busy
fighting away the raiders attempting to steal their flocks. As time
passed the Sa'adi shepherds became not only tough fighters but also wealthy.
This latter end was achieved partly as a result of successful raids on
neighboring tribes. Later when the Sa'adi planned a large raid, they entrusted
their flocks to the Murabiteen, who by that time had become dependent
upon the Sa'adi for their protection from the raids of other tribes.

619 The picture was reversed then with the poor Sa'adi shepherds becoming
184 the masters, acquiring great wealth and prestige because of their fight-
174
792 ing ability, and the holymen becoming the shepherds and clients of the
Sa'adi fighters. Inthe old inter-tribal wars, the Murabiteen stood a
[651] very limited chance so the Sa'adi tribes adopted them and in return for
a yearly tribure guaranteed theprotection of the Murabiteen from external aggression.

As time passed, the main difference between the Sa'adi and Murabiteen tended to diminish. One or two outstanding Murabiteen tribes fought their own battles without seeking the protection of the Sa'adi and remained independent, while a few others rose up and fought on with the protector against a common foe (the case of the Gemei'at tribe is an example) and in return were emancipated from the stigma of serfdom and accepted by the Sa'adi as almost equals. Other Murabiteen tribes remained attached to their Sa'adi protector as client groups.

Ibn Khaldoun also saw the inferiority of the Murabiteen tribes as stemming from a mode of tribal relations adapted to inter-tribal warfare (1845).

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613 The Eila

The Eila represents the next level of tribal segmentation among the
Awlad Ali. The Eila is the most important political unit. Although the
Eila lacks any formally recognized leadership, its importance stems from
the fact that it constitutes the vengeance group or Amar El-Dam (unity of
613 the blood). This means that it bears a corporate responsibility for the
672 actions of its members. Anyone of its members can be killed in vengence
682 for a homocide committed by any other, and the duty of revenge for any

613 Article 9:

675 The Amar should never fight on the side of the wrongdoer, because if it does, it will have to pay with him for his wrongdoings.
539

Article 10:

[628] Any dispute or fight involving a member of the Amar and an outsider should be reported to the awaqil in the Amar who are supposed to take the matter up with the other party. If the awaqil are convinced that the outsider is the aggressor or that he is at fault, they should try to make him accede to the demands of the members of the Amar, using all their efforts to convince him and the aqila of his bait. If he refuses, they [619] should call him for a "Miad" (tribal meeting) in which all parties involved should be represented by their respective awaqil.

Article 11:

[563] [619] With regard to "iktitab" (tribal adoption), an outsider wanting to join the Aggary Family or one of its constiuent buite must be asked first about the reason ~~or~~ reasons for his desire to join. This must be done in order to know what kind of person he is and whether he will become a burden and liability to the Amar. If he proves to be of reputable standing, the aqila of the bait he wants to join can accept him without consultation with the rest of the awaqil. If on the other hand he is found to have grudges against someone or if someone has a financial claim over him, then the aqila of the bait cannot accept him without consultation with the other awaqil in the Amar. If all the awaqil agree to accept him, he is considered like one of the Eilat Aggary, having the same rights and bearing the same responsibilities.

Article 12:

A memberof the Amar who wants to separate himself from the Amar and get a "barawa" has to state his reasons beforehe can be released from the obligations of his membership in the amar. If his request to get the barawa was because of injustice he suffered by the Amar or any of its members, the awaqil have the duty to straighten the injustice and restore his rights. If, on the other hand, his request for the barawa was to avoid paying the Amar, then he cannot be released from his membership unless he pays all of his share, or else he must return all that the Amar has paid him until the time he asked for the barawa.

Article 13:

[695] [693] If one of the Amar is accused of an offense for which he is tried by the legal system of the state, the Amar as a whole share the expenses of hiring an attorney to defend him. This, however, is done after the awaqil are sure (by means of administering the oath) that he is innocent and that the accusation is false.

613 Written agreements such as the above are becoming more common in
675 the area. The need to have the responsibility of the vengeance group
[178] or the Amar recorded and the names of its members listed stems from the
[361] increase in the geographical mobility of individuals and separate households
[464] seeking jobs with the government organizations in the area or with
the various industries in the towns and cities outside the Western Desert.
233 The uncertainty of pastoral nomadism and the delicate balance which exists
178 between pastures, animal population, and human population is pushing an
182 ever-increasing number of people to abandon the way of life which they
had lived for generations. Animals are extremely important to sustain
233 the pastoral life of Awlad Ali. Once the balance between the pasture and
182 the animal population is upset by a draught, a segment of the human population
731 has to make new adjustments. This adjustment is first made by
166 moving with one's flocks to areas in the Delta or in the Cyrenaica region
of Libya. This is a short-term adjustment, however, and cannot be continued
for long periods of time. Pastures in the Delta have to be purchased,
and in most cases the owner of the herd has to sell part of his
● [619] herd to feed the rest. The Cyrenaica pasture is very limited and restricted
by the strong tribal control of the Cyrenaica Bedouins, who in
general are not friendly with many of the tribal segments living in the
233 Egyptian Western Desert. If the draught continues beyond a certain time,
731 the individual owner of a herd may find himself forced to sell the herd
464 and seek other modes of subsistence in the form of part-time or full-time
434 employment as a semi-skilled or unskilled worker with the government or
182 industrial organizations. Such jobs are usually viewed as a temporary
source of income to help the individual and his immediate family live

613 671 first appeared, the rule has become a practice so common that other Amars
675 find it unnecessary to specify it in their own papers.

682 Another new rule which is in the process of acquiring a great amount
613 of consensus among the tribal population of Awlad Ali is that of the responsibility
672 of the Amar for the payment of the lawyer's fees for members
675 [693] of the Amar who are tried by the government (Article 13 of the Aggary
[695] papers). Another less agreed upon rule is that of the responsibility of
613 the Amar for the financial losses caused by the confiscation of smuggled
672 goods or the payment of money for the destruction of government property
675 439 by a member of the Amar. Where smuggling is an important source of income
[434] for the group, Amar papers usually include rules making it a corporate responsibility; other Amar papers, especially those of tribal segments not deeply involved in smuggling, make it an individual responsibility, while still others leave it intentionally with no specific rule, as in the case of the Aggary Amar paper.

613 The Aggary document is a relatively elaborate one. Not all Amar
[675] papers, or at least the ones I had a chance to examine, are as detailed.
[131] Eilat Aggary is the largest Amar in the area of Dera'el Bahari, which extends from Alexandria 60 miles westward to the town of Alamein. The
613 distinctive characteristics of the Aggary Eila is that it is composed
563 mainly of peasant groups who joined the Aggary by means of tribal adoption.
619 Of the 16 Baits constituting the Aggary Amar, only three are believed to be Awlad Ali proper. The attractiveness of the Aggary for the peasant groups seeking to be adopted by the tribal population of the area may be partly explained in terms of the location of Eilat Aggary in an area relatively close to the Delta from where these groups usually migrate.

613 563 619 This makes it possible for those adopted by the tribe to keep in touch with their relatives and friends they left behind in the Delta while enjoying the military exemption gained from their adoption by the Awlad Ali population. It is also believed that Eilat Aggary, made up mostly of peasants themselves, are very lenient in the conditions they put for tribal adoption. Finally, the Eilat Aggary is not among the most powerful tribal segments of Awlad Ali, possibly because of their composition. This assures the adopted peasant groups an equal status not normally obtained if adopted by one of the powerful tribal segments of Awlad Ali.

613 [675] The Amar paper of the Aggary explicitly states some of the basic characteristics of the Amar as a unit in the tribal organization of Awlad Ali. The most distinctive aspect of the Eila or the Amar as a political unit is the absence of any formalized leadership. Although the Amar is viewed by outsiders as a corporate group as far as its legal responsibility in certain cases, from the standpoint of its members, the Amar is no more than the sum total of its constiuent units or Baits. This is shown in the Amar paper of Aggary which states that matters affecting the Amar be decided upon by all the bait represented by their respective leaders, the awaqil. There is no formalized authority above the 613 554 627 awaqil, although one of the awaqil might acquire a position of informal leadership by virtue of personal or other qualities. He will be considered as a mediator and go-between for the various leaders of the Baits. In the case of the Aggary, Sheihk Selouma, the Aqila of Bait Eweida, has acquired such a leadership among the Eilat Aggary. Although Shiehk Selouma is relatively young, (he is about 40 years old), he has the reputation of getting things done. His Bait is the wealthiest in the

621 had started in the area at that time. No special permission was re-
563 quired for the newcomer to join the camp. He only got the permission
of the person whose tent was at the far end of the camp to put his tent
[574] next to it. The first night after the man joined the camp, his next
door neighbor slaughtered a goat in honor of the new member and invited
all members of the camp.

621 Leaving the camp also does not require any permission, although the
622 custom specifies that before one leaves he should inform either his
[576] neighbor or the headman of his time of departure. With the exception of
[613] cases where the headman of a particular camp is at the same time the
Aqila of the bait, the headman of the camp has no authority over the mem-
622 bers of the camp. He is usually called upon to solve minor problems be-
627 tween brothers or husband and wife, or give his opinion in decisions of
minor importance. "A headman is like a father," said one informant, "we
call him kabir el-nagi (the old man of the camp)." When a member of the
627
613 nagei is involved in a serious dispute with another, the one to handle
the case is the aqila or awaqil to whom the two disputing parties belong.

● 619 Group	Leadership	Identifying aspects
613 Kabila 621	None	Client groups attached.
Eila	None	Vengeance group, Vaguely defined tribal land ("watan").
Bait	Aqila	Corporate land-holding. Formally recognized leadership.
[622] Nagei	Headman	Residential unit with unsegmented structure.

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EILAT AGGARY AND ITS CONSTIUENT BAITS

BAIT	NUMBER OF ADULT MALES (Sayems)[1]	AQILA
Eweidha (El-Burg)*	28	Ta'eb
Eweidha (El-Alamein)*	31	Selouma
Yusef**	30	Suliman
Helleis	22	Hussein
El-Asabei'	56	Shei'eb
Abdel Hamid*	20	Haj Musa
Risq**	30	Yadem
Afash	25	Nayer
Daghas**	25	Daghash
Bul-Yazid*	21	Haj Shousha
Makhyum**	23	Abdel fattah
Hussein**	17	Masri
El-Ramly**	25	Salem
Rashwan**	30	Rashwan
Attya*	31	Masu'd
Abdella*	22	Abdel Galil

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[1] Numbers are taken from the Amar list which is used to distribute the amount of bloodmoney on the various baits. An adult male or "sayem" is anyone 15 years of age or older. The word "sayem" means fasting individual and the age of 15 is when a child is forced to observe the duties of fasting.

** Refers to adopted tribal segments (Muktatibeen).
* Baits of doubted origin. Some claim these baits are adopted, while others insist that they are Awlad Ali proper.

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613 627 156 [196] to Qudura and to tell him that Hakim wanted to show his respect. This means in everyday parlance that Hakim was willing to pay him money. Qudura agreed to meet Hakim the following day.

[114] [431] [574] On the day of the meeting, to which I was invited, Hakim arrived with his son and gifts of three goats, tea and sugar. One of the goats was slaughtered and supper was prepared for the guests. While the guests were eating, Hakim and Qudura disappeared inside one of the tents for more than an hour. When they finally joined the gathering, Hakim announced that he and Qudura were now brothers and that it was his fault that Qudura was angry because he had accused him of being stupid and misunderstanding the content of the message sent to him after the meeting of the Aggary awawil. "I admit," said Hakim, "that I might have meant at one time and probably said it to sheikh Qudura that I wanted him to be the Aqila of bait Asabei'. Now that I have admitted this, Sheikh Qudura should not have any grudges against me or my son." Then Qudura addressed the gathering and said, in a very cold and dry manner, "I am glad that Hakim has come to this senses and admitted his mistake." The gathering lasted for most of the evening, spent mostly in behind-the-scenes meetings involving Hakim, Qudura and different guests. Then as the last guest left, Shei'eb, who had been inside the tent throughtout the evening came out and said that Hakim was a fool and that Qudura had tricked him into admitting publicly that he had lied and that Qudura still refused to take the oath.

613 619 578 [521] Qudura's stand created a strong reaction which affected almost all the tribal segments in the area. The case overshadowed any other event and was the main topic of discussion. The reaction was mixed, however.

613 ●619 578 156 Other tribal segments outside the Aggary amar supported the position of Qudura, and most took his position to prove their notion about his honesty and the fact that despite his poverty, he could not be bribed. They were also pleased with Qudura's trick which demonstrated Hakim's dishonest 613 578 156 techniques. Within the Aggary amar, the general sentiment was still with Hakim although his confession of cheating Qudura made it difficult to support him openly. They directed their attack against Qudura who in their view violated the solidarity of the amar and even of his bait and showed it as divided and noncohesive. They were also fearful that Qudura's [685] refusal to pay would cause the amar to pay the Geneishat the full compensation for the action of Rabbuh, a sum which, as one said, would put the amar in debt for generations to come. The strongest impact of the events affected bait Asabei'itself and left it one step from complete fission into three distinct groups. Shei'eb, finding the tide turning against Hakim, found a chance to assert his claim to the position of the Aqila, stating openly that he would never forfeit his hereditary right. On the other hand, finding the popularity of Qudura increasing rapidly, he started attacking him verbally and even threatened to beat him. He in- [681] sisted that Qudura and his sons should be excluded from the amar and given the barawa.

613 681 [192] The word "barawa" is derived from the Arabic verb "bara" which means to cure one's self of an illness. It also means to sever social ties with undesirable persons. The term is used among Awlad Ali in a much restrited sense to refer to the process by which a tribal segment detaches itself from any responsibility for the actions of a particular member. It is

613 554 [157] [428] [556] In performing his functions within the bait, personal qualities such as wisdom, soundness of ideas, personal persuasiveness are of importance. But the main basis of his authority is patrilineal succession. The Aqila has no economic power to speak of. Although many aqila are among the wealthiest members of their baits, many more are among its poorest. The nature of the economic process and the pastoral life of Awald Ali is such that the economic position of the individual is always flucuating. Nor does the Aqila have any military power at his disposal, or any command of the use of force to back his decisions or to make them binding
[428] upon members of his bait. The main source of compliance to the Aqila's decisions comes from the knowledge that the Aqila has the authority to make such decisions and that he has acquired this authority through the legitimate channel of patrilineal succession.

613 428 562 [619] Where membership in formal groups is transmitted by descent, Awlad Ali always choose the patriline. The son of Awlad Ali is regarded as Awlad Ali even though his mother might not be from the tribe, while a woman who marries outside the tribe transmits no rights in the tribe to her children. The importance of agnatic kin is reinforced by an solidary of brothers which is extended laterally to patrilateral cousins. It is also shown in the fact that sons are favored in inheritance usually to the exclusion of daughters. The male line is viewed by Awlad Ali as the natural principle when it comes to anything which is inheritable, whether property or position. In an attempt to defend Shei'eb's position and his right to be the Aqila, one informant told me: "The main purpose that a man has in life is to have sons because it is the son who makes the man live forever. Daughters don't count. A man gives his son

795 Because of their religious position which put
175 them outside the tribal structure, the leaders of the zawyas played a
627 significant role in mediation and settling disputes between various tri-
793 bal segments. At their disposal was their ability to ostracize anyone
[626] who did not abide by their decision from the zawyas, which meant depriv-
ing him from all the benefits, social as well as religious, that member-
ship in the zawyas offered.

795 After the First World War when the British replaced the Turks as
175 governors of the area, the zawyas were closed and the religious leaders
177 ordered to leave. The zoning established by the zawyas existed, however,
[648]
[631] and was used as the basis for the redistricting of the area. Police
[625] stations replaced the religious centers. From the standpoint of the tri-
619 bal population itself, the districts have no psychological or political
634
[495] reality. The zawyas were originally established in the areas of tribal
[361] concentrations. But the area itself did not have any political identity.
The only reality from the standpoint of the inhabitants was the tribal
reality and affiliation which cut across many of these districts. Many
of the tribal segments inhabiting one district were and still are hostile
177 to one another. To transform the zones into administrative districts and
634 to establish one office of leadership for the whole district was to im-
619 pose a political unity nonexistent among the tribal segments inhabiting
[622] the district. To avoid this difficulty, the government supplemented the
territorial principle of the omda system in the rural area with the prin-
ciple of tribal representation and came up with a system which seems to
suite the situation in the Western Desert. For each of the districts,
a list of all tribal segments which habitually occupy the area and whose
tribal land is located within the district, is made. The most powerful

554 The most powerful
177 and numerous segments are then represented by the omda, and the lesser
634 ones are represented by a sheikh. Unlike the system in the rural areas
619 where the sheikh is a subordinate to the omda, the sheikh in the Western
[622] Desert does not occupy the same position. Instead he has the same functions and occupies, with regard to his tribal segment, the same position the omda occupies with regard to his. He does not take orders from the omda and has direct relations with the administration. Sheikhs and omdas from one district are supposed to meet periodically in the police station and discuss with the police officer in charge of the station matters concerning the district and their own tribal groups. The only difference between the omda and the sheikh in the Western Desert seems to be the label of the office. The label itself carries a certain amount of prestige to the tribal segment represented by the omda, since it is an acknowledgement by the government of its importance. This is why many of the tribal segments try to be represented by an omda rather than by a sheikh. In certain districts where two or more strong tribal segments compete for the honor of being represented by an omda, the district may have two or more omdas representing the strong tribal segments and a number of sheikhs representing the lesser tribal groups in the district. Not every tribal segment in a district is represented by an omda or even a sheikh, however. Very small tribal segments may join together and have one sheikh, while others may agree to be represented by one of the larger segment's sheikh or omda.

634 Obviously, the number of omdas and sheikhs differ from one district
554 to another depending on the number of important tribal segments in each.
619
657 There is no specific rule whereby a certain tribal segment is considered

634 by the government to be significant enough to be represented. This matter
554 is left almost entirely to the ability of members of a given tribal seg-
•619 ment to convince the authorities that their group is sizable enough to
657 give them the right of omda, or at least sheikh's representation. A seg-
ment represented by a sheikh may later ask for an omda because of the
prestige involved. It is worth noting in this respect that the various
tribal segments in the area are eager to be represented in the govern-
ment administrative structure. Gaining prestige among the other tribal
segments is only one motive for such eagerness. Unlike the omda in the
[622] rural areas who functions mainly as a representative of the government
to the village, the omda or sheikh in the Western Desert is a represen-
tative of the people to the government. This is not a theoretical diff-
erence but involves a real difference in the relation of the government
and the omda, on the one hand, and between the latter and the people
622 his represnets, on the other. The omda in the village is a symbol of
554 authority to his people. He is the undisputed ruler of the village. His
657 authority is backed by his ability to mobilize and use the force put at
his diposal by the government, in the implementation of his decisions.
Since he is appointed by the government and not elected by the people,
he does not have to rely on his popularity to hold or maintain office.
His main concern is to please the government, rather than the people of
the village to whom he is merely a symbol of authority. There is very
little that the village omda can bring to his people form the outside,
while he has to implement government policies, collect taxation, appre-
hend criminals, all tasks which the villagers are not eager to have done.

634 The situation is quite different in the Western Desert. Although
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657 it is the government, represented by the province council, which makes
554 the final decision in appointing the omda or sheikh, yet this appoint-
● 619 ment is made on the basis of nominations given by the gribal segment
635 or segments which he would represent. Since the tribal segment usually
nominates one person, the decision of the council is limited to the
examination of the credentials of the nominee and to see if he meets the
basic requirements of the law. If a certain nominee is rejected by the
council, a very rare occurrence, the matter goes back to the tribal
segment to make another nomination. In practice, then, the omda of the
Western Desert is elected by the people and the appointment by the govern-
ment of the omda is significant only in cases where the omda is to repre-
sent more than one small tribal segment and each nominates one. Here the
council has to choose between the various nominaees and appoints the best
634 qualified. Unlike the omda of the village, the tribal omda is a real re-
554 presentative of his people. Despite the fact that he becomes part of a
657
619 governmental structure, his basic function is to look after the interest
[622] of his tribal group. Or, as one informant put it, "The omda is the ser-
vant of the people." In many cases the best interest of the tribal segment
is served through full cooperation of the omda with the government. So
far there seems to be very little conflict between the interest of the
tribal populations and that of the government. There is very little in
[651] the area that the government demands or needs. There is no taxable land
to speak of. There are only a few acres of barley land and even these
634 are minimally taxed. The main responsibility of the omda to the govern-
554
657 ment is to report births and deaths and give a yearly list of young men

634 554 619 "The omda or sheikh is both a blessing and a curse to his tribe," said one member of the Aggary 'eila. "He can bring benefits to his tribe, but at the same time, he has to report his own people if one of them breaks the city laws... His position is like that of a double-edged razor."

Most of the people in the area, however, tolerate the negative aspects of the omda's functions as a moderate price for the possible benefits they may get through his position. This is why each tribal segment does its best to be represented by an omda, or at least by a sheikh.

Within his tribal segment he enjoys a great deal of respect. He does not, by means of position alone, command any power over members of his group similar to the power the omda of the village has over his people. [613] It seems, however, that although the position itself does not carry with it any power, yet, when the holder of that position is at the same time a native tribal leader or aqila, it tends to enhance his position as a tribal leader and to give him more respect among members of his tribal unit as well as among the rest of the tribal groupings. 634 554 619 182 657 613 This may be explained by the fact that the establishment of the omda system in that area did not involve direct interference with the native political system except in a minimal way, mainly to keep the tribal populations in the area from interfering in the progress of various government projects in the area. As such, the system did not impose too many demands upon the tribal loyalties of the omdas or sheikhs. In the relationship between the government and the tribal population, the balance so far has been in favor of the latter, who, by means of

634 omda representation, are taking from the government much more than
554
619 they are giving in return. Being the link between his people and
182 the government in such a system gives the aqila a new basis of
657 political support.
613

581 are necessary for the validation of the marriage contract. Modern
585 671 legal systems which took as their basis the Islamic law of marriage
675 and the family further required the registration of the marriage con-
tract for the marriage to be legal.

584 The request and necessary response forming the marriage are sup-
585 posed to be carried on by the parties involved. However, if either the
429 groom or the bride is not of age, or is mentally unqualified, the trans-
593 action is carried on by his or her guardian, or "wakil." The wakil is
the father, unless he is dead or an invalid, in which case the brothers
[604] become the wakils. If the person has no brothers, then the uncles be-
[184] come the wakil in the order stated. According to certain Sunni sects
in Islam, a woman marrying for the first time is always represented by
her wakil, even if she is of age. The assumption is that a woman who
has never been married does not have the experience that enables her to
enter into any kind of legally binding relationship such as marriage.

585 Following the original Islamic idea, marriage among Awlad Ali is
675 an oral agreement between the groom or his father and the guardian
593 429 (wakil) of the bride-to-be (her father, if alive, or her closest male
[604] kin in the following order: her brothers, her uncles, her grandfather).
585 A religious man is sometimes asked to perform the marriage, although it
792 is not required. Some persons might invite a member of the Murabiteen
[619] tribe or holy men to witness the marriage on the basis that his presence
[778] gives "baraka," or blessing, to the marriage. Before the application of
585 656 the State legal system to the area, marriage contracts were not regis-
177 tered. In recent years, however, and with the increased mobility of
[675] the tribal populations, more and more marriages are being registered in
[634] the administrative districts. Still, according to the unofficial estimates,

Still, according to the unofficial estimates,
585 only about ten per cent of all marriages are registered, and these are
656 177 mainly mixed marriages involving a tribal person and a non-tribal one
582 or a tribal member who is not living in the area anymore. The reason
619 is that such a spouse, especially when he is the husband, is not under
the control of the tribal customs and therefore cannot be forced to fulfill
his obligations if he fails to do so. Most of the tribal population
[581] still feel that marriage is a personal and family affair that
should be kept away from the State legal system.

584 Marriage among Awlad Ali is a relatively informal procedure. When
593 a man decides to marry a certain girl, he informs his mother who, in
turn, informs his father. The father may have objections to his son's
choice of the bride. Such objections may be based on already strained
relations between the two families or the questionable reputation of
the girl or any member of her family. In such cases, the father tries
to dissuade his son from going ahead with the marriage. The father is
[583] usually successful in controlling his son's choice when the latter is
dependent on his father for the payment of the bridewealth called "mahr"
and for the support of his new household. This is usually the case in
the man's first marriage. In subsequent marriages and in the cases
where the son has independent means of support for himself and his
bride, the father's control of the son's choice is minimal, and asking
the father's approval is a matter of formality. In second and subsequent
593 595 marriages, the approval of the older wives is essential. The
584 older wives have no right to object to the husband taking an additional
wife, but they have the right to object to the choice on the basis that
the new bride is hard to get along with or that there is animosity between
her family and the families of the other wives which makes

000 agreement and therefore not morally bound to abide by its contents.

582 The lack of serious intentions to marry one's cousin is reflected
in the actual frequency of patrilateral parallel cousin marriage in the
582 area. The following table is taken from the genealogies of five camps
621 in the area of Burg el Arab. The camps belong to different tribal
613 groupings:
619

Agnatic cousins	5
Other cousins	12
Within the bait (other than above)	9
Within the Eila (other than above)	13
Within the tribe (other than above	11
With members of the client tribe	15
With outsiders	9
Total	74

The above table shows that the frequency of patrilateral parallel cousin
marriage is less than eight per cent of the total marriages included in
582 the genealogies of the camps studied. It also shows that the largest
619 frequency of marriage is with a member of a client tribe of Murabiteen.
In the majority of the fifteen cases (eleven cases), it is the woman
who is a member of the Murabiteen tribe while the man is a member of the
Sa'adi tribe. The Murabiteen tribes from which the wives came are not
always the clients of the particular tribal segment to which the husband
[583] belonged. One explanation of the popularity of marriage to the Murabiteen
is that the bridewealth among them is generally less than it is for the
Sa'adi girls. It therefore gives the man the advantage of lower bride-
582 wealth without the lack of choice involved in the cousin marriage. It
is important to bear in mind, however, that the sample given above is
by no means representative of the entire tribal population. Furthermore,
the material presented above was based on the actual marriages at the

593 spent the night inside. In the morning Muftah ordered his daughter to
574 pack her clothes because she was to leave with him. He refused to give
606
586 her husband any explanation as to why he was taking his daughter away.
The husband could not prevent him from taking her away because, as he
said, "He is her father and has the right to take her away with him at
any time."

When the wife did not return for two weeks, her husband went to her
father's house to take her, but her father refused to let her go. Hemeida
593 then went to a religious man in the area and asked him to intervene in
574
606 the matter and see why Muftah had taken away his wife. He also asked him
586 to arrange a mi'ad with Muftah to discuss the matter.

627
792 The religious man was selected in this case because he was a close
friend of Muftah and was believed to have influence over him. He was
also known throughout the area to be fair and of sound opinion. It is
important in the cases of disputes that the person selected as a mardi
is known as a wise and fair man. It is only then that he is able to
mediate between the two parties without being accused of taking sides.
792 The religious men, members of the Murabiteen tribes in the area, by their
619 relative position outside the formal tribal organization of the Sa'adi
627 tribes, are the most likely candidates for such activity. Yet, this is
554 not always the case. For this aspect of assumed impartiality is frequently balanced off by the fact that these religious men lack the support of a powerful tribal segment behind them. To be effective, the mardi has to be respected, not only for his personal qualities, but also for being a member of a respectable tribal segment whose power lends authority to the mardi's decision. This is not usually the case with the client
000 tribes of Murabiteen. Wealth in many cases is also considered an important

CHAPTER VI

HOMICIDE AND BODILY INJURIES

Part 1: Homicide

579 Fighting is quite common among Awlad Ali. Many of these fights
involve a large number of individuals and result in many casualties
579 and sometimes even deaths. Fighting is considered "shar," or evil,
673 for according to Awlad Ali, it threatens the social cohesion which is
182 highly valued in the area. Yet, although undesirable, fighting and
[682] even homicide are not considered a crime against society and sometimes
are viewed as necessary to safeguard individual and collective rights
in the absence of an established authority which could protect these
[177] rights. Although this absence of an authority is remedied now by the
[692] introduction of state administrative justice, this has not yet achieved
enough efficiency and recognition to replace the old tribal system.

619 In the tribal system, there is no concept of individual punishment
681 inflicted upon the suspect. There is no recognized authority to inflict
692 it. The mardi or the 'aqila who performs the function of dispute settle-
[627] ment in the case of homicide has no power to pass or inflict any punish-
ment. His role is restricted to mediation between the two parties involved
682 as was earlier mentioned. Homicide, like all other wrongs among Awlad Ali,
673 are private wrongs affecting the individual or a group of individuals.
[182] The main purpose of the tribal proceedings in the case of homicide is to
restore some form of harmony and order among the group. This harmony is
sometimes restored by killing the murderer or any member of his vengeance
682 group, or amar. Feuds may result from such killing, and a few instances
628 of feuds have, in fact, been recorded in the area (although not in the

682 last two decades). But a feud in the form of extensive, long-term kill-
628 ing between two groups is very rare among Awlad Ali. The principle of
life for life upon which a feud operates would rarely lead to a permanent
settlement or peace, even when the sense of revenge is satisfied for the
682 moment. Among the group, this form of permanent settlement is more likely
to be achieved through the payment of bloodmoney, or "diyya." The pay-
ment of the diyya is based on the assumption that the group has lost,
in the deceased, an economic asset. It has been deprived of his ser-
vices, both in supporting his immediate family and in the collective
activities of his amar. This is illustrated in the distribution of the
bloodmoney. Only half of the bloodmoney is paid to the immediate fam-
ily of the victim, the other half being divided equally among adult
males of his amar or vengeance group. This is intended not only to
satisfy their sense of indignation and curb their desire for revenge,
but also to insure that when the time comes to share in the payment of
the bloodmoney, they will pay.

628 The cessation of feuds in the area seems to coincide with the cessa-
● 619 tion of inter-tribal and intra-tribal warfare. During the era of tribal
726 warfare, the killing of a tribesman meant the loss in the fighting power
178 of his tribal segment, and feuding, with its emphasis on life for life,
had the purpose of restoring the balance in fighting power among the
[682] groups involved. Monetary compensations were not known in the area dur-
ing that time, according to the informants' accounts, but they were usu-
ally restricted to cases where either the victim or the killer was a
178 non-tribal person. With the cessation of tribal warfare, the death of
682 a tribal member became more an economic, rather than a political, loss,
619
726

178 682 and compensation became more and more accepted in settling murder cases
[619] among the tribal population. Bloodmoney, or diyya," was established
[729] among compensations for injury in general. This scale of compensation
682 is based on the amount of loss of normal activities the injury caused
the victim with death being the total loss of such activities. The
compensation for homocide is estimated at L.E.400 for intentional kill-
682 ing, and L.E. 300, for unintentional killing. Although reference here
673 is made to "intention," the assessment of that intention and its defini-
672 tion are quite different from the general usage of that term among modern
jurists. Among modern jurists, the term refers to a state of mind which implies that the offender willfully and knowingly committed the prohibited act. This means, first, that the person is able to recognize the nature of his act and to distinguish between right and wrong. Secondly, it means that the person was in a position to choose between committing the act and not committing it and took the former path. According to this view, individuals under temporary or permanent insanity, children under the legal age (the definition of which varies from one legal system to another), non-human beings and objects are not capable of having criminal intent, since they are incapable of having a will of their own. Similarly, individuals who are capable of having a will but, because of certain circumstances their freedom of choice was impaired, cannot also have intentions. Intention, then, in the modern legal conception is a psychological quality that connects the offender with the prohibited result or results. It is this psychological connection that differentiates in modern legal systems between murder and manslaughter, between attempted murder and simple assault, between first and second degree murder, and between justifiable

311 was a large area of grazing land which also belonged to the Bait
423 613 of Yadem. The area attracted a large number of tribesmen who
233 brought their herds for grazing. One of these was Kuraiem from
311 Awlad Kharouf tribal segment. He brought his wife and child and
● 619 613 a herd of more than two hundred sheep and goats. Although it is
not proper for one to cultivate the land belonging to another
tribal segment, yet, when it comes to grazing land, no restriction is imposed. Only the permission of the aqila of that
tribal segment is required, and even that is granted so automatically that many tribesmen do not bother to ask for permission. Kuraiem took this permission for granted and pitched his
233 tent in the grazing land of Yadem and his Bait. Yadem, however,
311 was disturbed because he thought that Kuraiem grazed his flocks in
578 an area very close to his cultivated barley, so close that he feared
that the animals might eat the growing barley. When Yadem asked
Kuraiem to move a little further and Kuraiem refused, they entered
into an argument during which Yadem told him that if he did not
move by the following day, he would break his neck. The following
morning Yadem went with his brother to see if Kuraiem was still
there. Both Yadem and his brother were armed with heavy sticks.
As they reached Kuraiem's tent, they hit him with the sticks on
[682] the head. Kuraiem fell on the ground, and they kept hitting him
until he was dead.

682 In due course, Kuraiem's family claimed L.E. 400 bloodmoney
672 for the intentional killing of Kuraiem. Yadem and his family rejected the claim and insisted that the killing was unintentional. The
[627] Mi'ad was held, and the two Mardis selected by the two parties

613 628 the tent and fearing that he might have been a member of the feuding Bait intending to harm him or members of his family, Galil took his gun and went outside to see who was there. He called on the person to identify himself. When he got no answer, he warned him that unless he identify himself, he (Galil) would fire his gun in the air as a warning. After a short period of no 613 628 682 response, Galil fired his gun in the air. A moment later, Galil heard a cry coming from the direction of a small hill at the side of the tent. When Galil went there, he found Salem, a member of a neighboring camp, lying on the ground with a bullet wound in his stomach. He told Galil that his wife was sick and that he had come to borrow Galil's donkey to take her to the doctor in the nearby medical center. He had taken the short cut to Galil's tent when he was hit by the bullet which Galil had fired in the air. Galil took his wounded neighbor to the medical center, but Salem died before they reached it.

682 672 627 673 The Mi'ad was held, and Galil and his family had to pay L.E. 400 to the victim's kin group. The amount was that specified for intentional killing, since the wound that caused the death was inflicted by a lethal weapon.

CASE #5: The Case of the Startled Shepherd

233 [464] [519] [312] This case involves Idris, a poor member of the Sheresat tribal segment. He earned his living by working as a hired shepherd for 'Awwad from Bait Ibrahim in the area of Gharbaniat. During the dry season, each shepherd takes his flocks to the water wells near the coast and leaves them there for three or four hours to get their fill of drinking water. That afternoon, Idris, waiting for the

683
435

If the two lips are cut off:	L. 400
just the lower lip	L. 300
just the upper lip	L. 200
Visible piercing of the lips	L. 50
The tongue: if results in total loss of speech	L. 400
Partial loss of speech is measured in proportion to that total loss.	
All the teeth	L. 400
Each tooth'	L. 50
Testicles: if cut off	L. 400
The entire genitals	L. 800
The breasts:	
of a nubile woman	L. 200
of an old woman	L. 100

683 As in the case of homicide, the above scale of compensation works
only as a basis for compromise rather than as a definite or exact fine.
683 To assess the amount of injury and therefore the category of compensation,
629 the victim and his group, as well as a representative of the offender,
463 have to take the injured person to the "nazzar" who examines him and de-
fines the kind of injury sustained. The nazzar is usually a member of
[619] one of the Murabiteen tribes who is known to possess a number of shari's
books specifying the injuries and the amount of compensation required in
each case. Before he assesses the wounds, both parties have to swear that
[465] they will accept his judgment, and they pay him a token fee that varies
according to the ability to pay and the position of the parties involved.
683 The amount of money estimated by the nazzar is not necessarily the final
amount of money paid. For, as in the case of homicide, it is subject to
deductions in honor of various members who attend the meeting in which

105 The judicial process among Awlad Ali of the Western Desert of
Egypt has been dealt with in the context of political organization of
105 the group. The main feature of the political organization of Awlad Ali
613 is the absence of centralized leadership. The only formally recognized
leadership is that of the aqila, the leader of the bait tribal segment.
105 The sources of the aqila's authority derive from a number of sources,
613 one of which is his judicial role. It is through him that disputes involving
627 members of his bait are solved. The process by which he performs
this crucial function is that of informal mediation in which both
the personal qualities of the aqila, as well as the weight of his tribal
[692] segment, play an important role. This is especially important in a society
with no court system or formal hearing and where durability of any
settlement depends on its being accepted by the parties involved.

105 The main aim of the judicial process is to affect reconciliation of
182 the parties and to restore a certain degree of social order and cohesion
627 that was disrupted by the dispute. The need to restore the social order
[619] and to maintain friendly relations between tribal members is a response
to certain aspects of the natural and social environment in which the
105 group finds itself. Natural resources in the area are very meager, and
182 subsistence activities require that the tribesmen constantly move with
619 233 their herds for pasture throughout an area already divided among the
various tribal segments. Since the place and nature of pasture differ
from one year to the next, the identity of the specific tribal unit which
would be sought for help varies correspondingly. This creates a general
feeling of dependency that characterizes the social relations in the area.

2: Mohsen E.O-5 (1958-1966) 1971 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9
Awlad Ali

APPENDEX II


MEDITERRANEAN SEA
البحر الأبيض المتوسط
الاسكندرية
ALEXANDRIA
LIBYA
ليبيا
SENENAH
MAHDI
OGNA
KATTA
YARBOU
GENEITSHAT
AWLAD KHARUF
'ETAIRT
جميعات
GEMEIAT
اولاد خروف
AWLAD KHAROUF
سنافره
SANAGRA
قطايفه
HATAIFA
جميعات
GEMEIAT
سمالوس
SAMALOUS
عقارى
AGGARY
شهيبات
SHEHEIBAT
AGGAR
ASWRET
جوابيس
GWABIS
صريحات
SEREIHAT
AWLAD 'ALI
أولاد علي
QATTARA DEPRESSION
القطارة
SIWA OASIS
قبائل البدو
وخريطة طرق الساحل الشمالي
BEDWIN TRIBES
&. ROAD MAP OF NORTH COAST
REFERENCE
علامات

102
131
619
491
361
133

KEY

102 1. al-'Arq
133 2. al-'Arqub
3. Asqafa
131 4. Aujila
361 5. al-'Azziyyat
6. Banghazi
● 619 7. Bishara
8. Dariyana
9. Darna
10. al-Fayidiya
11. al-Hamama
12. al-Haniya
13. al-Huwaiz
14. Jaghbub
15. Janzur
16. al-Jarfan
17. al-Jikharra
18. Khashm Rzaiq
19. al-Libba
20. al-Makhili
21. Mara
22. Marada
23. al-Marassas
24. Maraziq
25. al-Marj
26. Martuba
27. Mirad Mas'ud
28. Msus
29. al-Naufiliya
30. al-Nayyan
31. Qafanta
32. Qarabarbi
33. al-Qasrain
34. al-Qasur
35. al-Qatafiya
36. Shahhat
37. al-Tailimun
38. Talmaitha
39. Tart
40. Taukra
41. Umm Hafain
42. Umm al-Razam
43. Umm Rukba
44. Umm al-Shakhanab
45. al-Zawiya al-Baida


Banghazi
Suluq
Al-Naufiliya
Ajdabiya
AL MAGHARBA
WADI AL-FARIGH
Marada
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THE CHI

[facing p. 34, A]

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
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AL-'ABID
AL-BARA'ASA
'AILAT FAYID
Marsa Susa
Al-Qubba
Al-Qaiqab
Khuwalan
Marawa
Taknis
Jardas Al 'Abid
Abyar
'Akrama
A B A I D A T
Al-Burdi Sulaiman
Al-Sallum
Bir Hakaim
WADI AL-MRA
FAWAKHIR
ZUWAYA
AL-AWAJILA
Jikharra
Aujila
Jalo
AL-MAJABRA
Jaghbub
Contours in metres
Tribal boundaries
Towns
Place names
Zawiyas
Scale
0 10 20 50 80 110 kms.

EF TRIBES OF CYRENAICA (after De Agostini)

[facing P. 34, B]

Those of the *barqa* plain may never camp on the plateau but 221
they move freely between grazing grounds, permanent water 233
supplies, and ploughland.

Of the plateau tribes, the Darsa, the ʻArafa, most of the Hasa, 221
and a number of ʻAbaidat and ʻAwaqir sections remain there 233
throughout the year. The Bedouin met with wandering about 619
in the southern grazing grounds after the rains are the ʻAbaidat Ghaith, ʻAwakla, and Shahin, some of the Hasa Shabarqa and Bakhayit, the whole of the small *ʻAilat* Fayid tribe, large numbers of Baraʻasa Husain, Tamiya, and Masaʻid, ʻAbid Mansur and Jabar, ʻAwaqir Sdaidi and Brahim, and numerous small client groups more or less affiliated to these tribal sections. The nomadic sections are generally richer than the others in sheep and camels, and are also more vigorous, independent, and warlike. Politically, they are the leading sections of the tribes to which they belong. The foremost Shaikhs of the ʻAbaidat, Hasa, Baraʻasa, ʻAbid, ʻAwaqir, and Magharba are all to be found during the rains farther away in the steppe than most of their fellow-tribesmen.

The move southwards starts in December after the barley 221
has been sown, or part of a group may take the animals south 233
while the rest finish the ploughing. Most of these semi-nomads [243]
return to the plateau in May, when water becomes scarce, but some, including some of the most powerful elements, remain to the south of it permanently. There are many advantages in this annual move to the south. Rain falls and the grasses spring up in advance of the plateau, and grazing is more abundant and of a better quality. On the other hand, the grasses of the plateau and its southern slopes are still green when the desert grasses, except in specially favoured depressions, are withered. By their annual oscillation the Bedouin thus give their animals the best grazing at all seasons of the year. Sheep mostly lamb round about November, which is the month in which new grasses spring up in the *barr*, so that the move southwards gives the sheep the richest grazing at a time when they need it most; and the warmer conditions prevailing
in the south suit the lambs. At the same time, the Bedouin in [262]
southern grazing grounds are compelled to live very largely on
milk food, and the combination of rich pastures with the dropping of their young by sheep, goats, and camels, enables them to live on the country to a great extent.

565 Arabian ways. In Egypt necessity has slowly subjugated the
167 exiles to the peasant yoke. They long resisted but, like the
Bedouin nomads coming from the Sinai Peninsula, had in the
end to submit or perish. The absence of a substantial peasantry
in Cyrenaica is one of the characteristics which most distinguish
it from the Arab societies of Palestine, Syria, Iraq, Egypt, and
565 the Maghrib. The peasant can be dominated. He is fixed to the
earth and can be made to surrender it and till it for others. The
Cyrenaican Bedouin is fixed to no place and cannot be forced to
565 sell his birthright by bad seasons or intimidation. This has
meant that there have not been in Cyrenaica any social enclaves
632 attached to the towns through which the towns and administrative
centres could lord it over the Bedouin. Outside the towns
*[648] all is Bedouin and the Turkish Administration, and afterwards
• [619] the Italian Administration, found that they could not get a
grip on the Bedouin of Cyrenaica as they could on the peasantry
of Tripolitania.

632 Nevertheless the towns and the Turkish, and later the Italian,
*648 Administration in them affected the tribal system by acting as
619 a pull on those tribal segments which lived nearest to them, so
that the tribes which lay between the towns and the steppe
were attracted towards one or other of these poles. The political
structure of Cyrenaica as a whole exercised in this way a significant
influence on the segmentary tribal system.

IV

619 The Bedouin who became followers of the Sanusiya Order
178 and whose country and way of life I have described are divided
into tribes and tribal sections owning different tracts of the
[793] country. This tribal system existed in Cyrenaica long before
the Grand Sanusi preached there and it continued to exist after
*[795] his grandson Sayyid Muhammad Idris had fled the country
and the Sanusiya Order had been abolished and its lodges
destroyed by the Italians. It is the fundamental structure of
Bedouin society which the Sulaimid tribes brought with them
from Arabia.

619 The Bedouin of Cyrenaica are Arabs. The Arabian tribes
101 who conquered the country and settled in it mixed with the
144 indigenous Berbers, as is evident in their physical features to-

day, but even ethnically the Bedouin are more Arabian than 619
the people of Egypt, the Sudan, and Tripolitania, while 101
culturally they are as completely Arab as any people in the [144]
world, proud Tamim and Quraish not excepted. In essentials
their language is that of the Hilalian invasion of the eleventh 197
century and no foreign language competes with it. The Berber-speakers [191]
are a handful in the distant oasis of Aujila, and even
there they are bilingual, and the insignificant fractions of Jews
and Cretans in the towns speak Arabic, the Cretans being
Muslims as well. The Italian immigrants left the country of 619
their own accord during the late war. Thus the obstacles to [167]
complete Arabization in the Maghrib (Tripolitania, Tunisia,
Algeria, and Morocco), a Berber culture, large Jewish colonies,
and European colonization are to-day all absent in Cyrenaica.
In all essential matters also the Bedouin of Cyrenaica [184]
are like Bedouin tribesmen elsewhere in the Arab world: they
have the same tented, pastoral, way of life, the same social
organization, the same laws and customs and manners, and the
same values.

The people of Cyrenaica are linked to the classical Arab 177
world of the east, to Egypt and the Jazirat al-'Arab (Arabia,
Palestine, Iraq, and Syria) rather than to the Maghrib; to the
sacred towns of Islam and to Umayyad Damascus, 'Abbasid
Baghdad, and Fatimid Cairo. More particularly they are linked
to Egypt, with which their country has had political ties from
the earliest times, and which is their natural market. The [133]
desert comes down to the sea at the Gulf of Sirte and separates
Cyrenaica from Tripolitania and these two countries have
always gone each its own way. Cyrenaica was linked to Graeco-Egypt,
Tripolitania to Phoenician Carthage. Cyrenaica went
with Byzantium, Tripolitania with Rome. Indeed, as Despois
says: 'The Greater Syrtis is without dispute one of the most
decided frontiers, natural and human, to be found anywhere in
the world.'[1]

During the last few decades this separation has been brought [195]
into relief again by the rise of the Sanusiya Order, for whereas
almost to a man the Cyrenaicans follow the Order politically,
the Tripolitanians, except for the Bedouin tribes, have shown a
lively animosity towards it. Moreover tribal ties between the 619

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[1] Op. cit., p. 45.

619 two countries are weak. On the other hand, Cyrenaican tribes and tribal sections, notably the Aulad 'Ali tribe, speaking the same dialect and with the same customs as their cousins still in Cyrenaica, stretch unbroken from al-Sallum to Alexandria, and are also numerous in the Bahaira province of Egypt and in the Fayum. The Cyrenaican Arabs form to-day numerically by far the most important Bedouin element in Egypt, and apart from those who have remained tented there, there are many who have settled on the land.

*175 619 In its general outline the history of the Arab conquest of Cyrenaica is well known. 'Amr ibn al-'As, during the Caliphate of 'Umar, conquered Syria and Egypt and in 643 overran Cyrenaica, then occupied by Berber tribes and under the nominal rule of Byzantium. He met with little resistance, and within seventy years the whole of North Africa, from Sinai to the Atlantic, was in Muslim hands. It seems, however, that the original conquerors only settled as garrisons in the coastal towns, and neither controlled the hinterland nor had any considerable ethnic influence on its Berber peoples. Bedouin settlement on a big scale and the complete Arabization of the indigenous Berber population took place from 1050 or 1051 in the famous Hilalian migration.

*175 167 619 The Bani Sulaim and the Bani Hilal came originally from Nadj. They are of Mudarid stock, the Bani Sulaim being the senior branch. They passed into Upper Egypt as a result of the check to the Carmathian movement in Arabia, in which they were involved, and settled there; but they were inclined to be troublesome in a country little suited to their traditional way of life, so during the reign of the Fatimid Caliph al-Mustansir, his Vizier encouraged them to reconquer Tripoli and Tunis from the Berbers, who had again asserted their independence. Arab historians have compared their migration to that of locusts or wolves. The Bani Hilal passed westwards into Tripolitania and Tunisia, where many Bedouin tribes claim descent from them to-day. The Bani Sulaim mostly settled in Cyrenaica. It must be added that the nobility and the historical exploits of their forbears are for the most part unknown to the Bedouin of Cyrenaica.

619 The present-day descendants of the Bani Sulaim are spread from Egypt to Tunisia. Those of Cyrenaica are divided into

two main branches, the Jibarna and the Harabi. The Jibarna 619
tribes are 'Awaqir, Magharba (some list the 'Araibat section of this tribe separately), 'Abid, and 'Arafa. The Harabi tribes are 'Abaidat, Hasa, *'Ailat* Fayid, Bara'asa, and Darsa. These tribes are shown on the diagram below, which presents them as tribes and not in the genealogical fiction of proper names. Strictly speaking, the Bara'asa should not appear on this chart since it is only one section of this tribe, the Aulad Hamad, who are true Harabi. However, it has become customary to class them as Harabi.



Attention is drawn to other names on this chart. The Aulad 619
'Ali, who have a fraternal relationship to the Harabi, about a 167
century and a half ago lived in eastern Cyrenaica, but were 131
compelled to migrate to Egypt by pressure from the Harabi, 175*
who received support from the Caramanli rulers of Tripoli. To-day they occupy the Mediterranean littoral from al-Sallum to Alexandria. Another branch of the Aqaqra, the Sharai', who migrated to Egypt, have become *fallahin* and are now found only as scattered families. When the Aulad 'Ali entered Egypt they found the Hanadi in possession of part of their present-day territory and drove them out of it. These Hanadi are now settled in the Sharqiya Province of Egypt. As will be noted from the chart, they belong to the Bani Sallam branch of the *Sa'adi* family of tribes. The Hanadi had previously dispossessed their brothers the Bani 'Una and this tribe is now completely absorbed in the *fallahin* population of Lower Egypt. A third fraternal branch of the Bani Sallam, the Bahaja, were also expelled from the Bahaira and are now settled in the Sharqiya and Gharbiya Provinces of Egypt. Of the Jibarna group, the Fawayid used to occupy the part of the plateau and plain now occupied by the Hasa, the Bara'asa, and the 'Abid. They were driven out of their country early in the nineteenth century, at the

619 same time as the Jawazi, by a combination of the 'Awaqir, the
167 Magharba, and the Bara'asa, assisted by the Caramanli rulers of
131 Tripoli, and are now settled in the provinces of Fayum, Bani Suef,
Bahaira, and Minya in Egypt. The Jawazi used to live in the
*175 country now occupied by the 'Awaqir, and they now mostly live
in Minya Province of Egypt and in the Fayum. Another struggle
which greatly altered the tribal distribution in Cyrenaica was
*[648] two wars, the last about 1832, of the Magharba and 'Awaqir,
aided by their Jibarna kinsmen the 'Abid and 'Arafa, against
the tribes which occupied the *barqa* and the remnants of which
now range the littoral of the western Sirtica. These tribes are
known as *al-'Arab al-Gharb*, the Western Arabs.

*175 So, in 1800 the Harabi and Jibarna tribes, which are now in
131 undisputed control of all Cyrenaica outside the towns, occupied
only part of the country, mostly the central, and the most
619 northerly reaches of the western, plateau. The Jibarna were
cut off from the southern steppe by the Fawayid and Jawazi,
the whole of the *barqa* was occupied by *al-'Arab al-Gharb*, and
the eastern part of the plateau by the Aulad 'Ali. The wars by
[726] which they drove out their rivals were long and savagely fought
and many incidents in them still form part of Bedouin tradition.

As a result of these tribal wars the descendants of the Bani
*175 Sulaim invaders of Cyrenaica and the Maghrib thus began to
131 return eastwards with a quota of Berber blood about the end of
167 the seventeenth century and pushed out the tribes they found
619 dwelling in the Western Desert of Egypt and pressed them into
the Delta, where they were absorbed by the *fallahin*. The first
intruders from the west were pushed to the Nile by stronger
tribes coming behind them and these by yet stronger. They
pushed one another like trucks on a siding. The Hanadi pushed
out the Bani 'Una and the Aulad 'Ali pushed out the Hanadi,
being themselves pushed on from behind by the 'Abaidat and
other Harabi tribes. Besides the migration of whole tribes from
Cyrenaica into Egypt there has taken place an exodus of many
tribal sections and fragments, owing to intertribal fighting, until
to-day there is not a Cyrenaican tribe, or even large section,
which has not some of its members in Egypt, often whole
619 lineages. The Bedouin of Cyrenaica know their kinsmen in
167 Egypt and sometimes when the price of sheep is low in the
602 Egyptian markets they leave their animals with them to sell on
439 their behalf when prices rise.

their behalf when prices rise. There are said to be 30,000 619
'Harabi' alone, excluding the Bara'asa, in Egypt, most of them 167
in the Fayum, while the Aulad 'Ali and their client aggregates 162
number nearly 40,000.[1]

V

The Arabs of Cyrenaica distinguish between those tribes which 619
are *Sa'adi* and those which are *Marabtin*. The *Sa'adi* tribes are so called after Sa'ada of the Bani Sulaim, their ancestress. They are those nine tribes who hold the country by right of conquest: the 'Abaidat, the Hasa, the *'Ailat* Fayid, the Aulad Hamad (Bara'asa), the Darsa, the 'Abid, the 'Arafa, the 'Awaqir, and the Magharba. The *Marabtin* tribes use the earth and water by grace of the *Sa'adi* tribes of whom they are to a greater or lesser degree clients. Savarese says that their status in Turkish times lay between that of clients of ancient Roman law and that of serfs of the glebe in western Europe in the Middle Ages.[2] The Sanusiya did much to lessen the difference in status between free and client tribes in Cyrenaica and to-day the larger groups of *Marabtin*, although they may in theory live on *Sa'adi* land, do in fact live independently and pay no fees to the owners of the land. Sometimes violent disputes, and even wars, have broken out between free tribes and their clients, such as the famous battles between the 'Awaqir and the Shahaibat. Moreover, one has only to note that the predominance of the leading sections of some free tribes is due to the support of powerful client fractions to realize that, though the clients may be considered not to have the full status of a noble Arab tribe, the relationship between them and the owners of the country is often
one of mutual dependence. Thus the leading section of the [162]
powerful Bara'asa tribe is the *'Ailat* Hadduth which in De Agostini's lists numbers 2,520 persons, of whom only 630 are true Bara'asa, the remainder being clients; and the leading section of the 'Awaqir, the *'Ailat* Suliman, counts 1,200 clients out of a total of 1,940. Where the relationship is one of mutual dependence the two tribes are expected to help each other in the payment of blood-money.

The client tribes are of different categories to which corre-

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[1] G. W. Murray, *Sons of Ishmael*, 1935, pp. 277 and 296.

[2] Op. cit., p. 56.

619 spond different social statuses. Some are classed as *Marabtin
bil baraka, 'client tribes with the blessing' or *Marabtin al-Fatha*,
619 'client tribes of the prayer', and they often claim to be Sharifs.
778 These 'sacred' tribes, such as the Aulad al-Shaikh and most of

102
619
361
131


TUNISIA
Tarabulus
Masallata
Misurata
Al-Rujban
Al-Qal'a
AL-AMAMRA
Al-Haraba
Bani Walid
AL-MASHASHIA
Mizda
AL-RUJBAN
AL-HARABA
URFALLA
AULAD BUSAIF
Sinawin
Ghadamis
Darj
Al-Tabaqa
Sirt
AL-QADHADHFA
Al-Naufiliya
AL-ZINTAN
AL-MAGHARBA
AL ZAWIYA
AL-MAQARHA
RIYAH
AL-JAMA'AT
SULIMAN
Saukna
Hun
Waddan
AL-HARABA
Zalla
AULAD
Al-Fuqha
Birqin
AL-HUTMAN
AL-HASAUNA
Sabha
Tamassa
Ghudwa
Umm Al-Aranab
Zuwila
Murzuq
Taghaghan
Dlaim
Wau Al-Kabir
Wau Al-Namus
Ghath
Al-Qatrun
AL-HARABA → Names of Tribes
Al-Haraba → Sanusiya Zawiyas
Boundary Lines
Scale
0 50 100 150 200 400 kms.

The Chief Sanusi Bedouin Tribes of Tripolitania.

619 the Masamir and Farjan, live among the *Sa'adi* as equals in
778 virtue of the prestige they derive from their descent, or supposed descent, from saints, though the free tribes do not regard
[173] them as quite like themselves. Their ancestors are almost invariably believed to have come from the west, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, or Tripolitania. This move of pious men to

the east began in the middle of the thirteenth century and has 619 lasted to the present day. 778 It is intimately bound up with the pilgrimage to the sacred towns of Islam. [173] Round these pious men and round their tombs gathered for sanctuary the simple [788] and oppressed, and from these and from the children of the holy men have sprung the *Marabtin bil baraka* tribes. 619 The other client tribes have no sacred associations and are known as 651 *Marabtin al-sadqan* because they pay *sadaqa*, a fee, to a free tribe for protection and for the privilege of using the earth and water. Some small broken-up fragments of this category on the plateau, such as the 'Awwama, Alauna, Hasanna, and some of the Qat'an and Sa'it, even to-day have a very inferior social position and are forced to make payments to, and to perform services for, the free tribes among whom they live. 619 Other tribes of this second category live, as already mentioned, on territory which is to all intents and purposes their own and have long since ceased to pay a fee. This is especially the case to the east, in 'Abaidat tribal territory, where such client tribes as the Minifa, Qat'an, Taraki, and Huta live with independent status. In the west also the Fawakhir and Zuwaya are too powerful and warlike to accept overlordship. Also, the more nomadic groups in Cyrenaica are mostly client tribes and, like all nomads, resent any control or authority. Whatever the free tribes may say about them, they regard themselves as independent.

The provenance of the *Sa'adi* tribes and of some of the 619 *Marabtin* tribes is shown together with the distribution of the 162 Sanusiya lodges on the map facing page 35, and the approximate numbers of these tribes, and of a few others not shown on the map, are listed below.

Sa'adi	
al-'Abaidat	30,450
al-'Awaqir	27,500
al-Bara'asa	21,000
al-Darsa	18,850
al-Magharba	13,000
al-'Arafa	9,300
al-'Abid	6,850
al-Hasa	6,500
'Ailat Fayid	100
Marabtin	
al-Qat'an	5,850
al-'Awwama	3,800
al-Zuwaya	3,700
al-Shwa'ir	3,400
al-Fawakhir	3,300
al-Sa'it	2,900
al-Majabra	2,500
al-Minifa	2,500
al-Masamir	2,400
al-Awajila	2,300
Aulad al-Shaikh	1,650
al-'Aqail	1,400
al-Shahaibat	1,350
al-Sarahna	1,250
al-Qabail	1,150
al-Huta	1,150

● 619 The figures for the free tribes include attached client groups, 162 for the principal of which estimates are also given separately. [127] The figures are taken from Col. De Agostini's monograph. The provenance of the chief Bedouin tribes of Tripolitania and of the fringes of Fazzan who are Sanusi, or sympathetic to the Sanusiya, is shown likewise in relation to the distribution of Sanusiya lodges, on the map on page 52.

VI

619 Although there were in the past intertribal wars and feuds [671] which have lasted into the present time, and in spite of the [574] difference in status between free and client tribes, there were laws of the tents which gave every Bedouin the freedom of the whole country, and there was much coming and going between the tribes and exchange of hospitality, especially in the grazing grounds where sections with distinct territories on the plateau shared common pasturage to the south of it, and where the necessities of Bedouin life, watering at wells in transit, the crossing of another tribe's territory on the way to markets, the pursuit of straying camels, and the need to sow where rain fell, imposed a recognition of individual rights without regard to tribal affiliations or social status. Had it not been so, the Grand [793] Sanusi could not have built on the tribal system his inclusive organization, for there would have been no foundations in *[795] culture, social structure, and sentiment, on which to build.

128 My inclinations as an anthropologist are to discuss at some length the tribal and kinship systems and the life of the tents, 619 but I refrain from giving more than a bare outline of the tribal system, and I neglect altogether kinship and the life of the tents, because, however interesting detail about these matters might be to the ethnologist, a knowledge of them is, I think, unnecessary for an understanding of the development of the Sanusiya Order in Cyrenaica. I discuss the structure of the Cyrenaican tribe therefore only in so far as it is relevant to this general theme.[1]

619 Use of the term 'tribe' in Cyrenaica, even if it be restricted to the big free tribes, is always to some extent arbitrary for the political structure is highly segmentary. Nevertheless, though

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[1] For a more general account see Savarese, op. cit., Pt. II, *passim*.

sections of a tribe may be opposed to one another they regard themselves as an undivided group in opposition to neighbouring tribes, and are so regarded by their neighbours. Thus a Qalbati is only a Qalbati in Hasa country. In 'Abaidat or Bara'asa country he is a Hasi. Likewise a Darsi or an 'Abidi in contrast to members of other tribes regards the whole of the Darsa or the 'Abid as his people, his tribal brothers. 619

Each tribe in this commonly accepted sense has its *watan*, its homeland, its soil, its arable, its pastures, and its wells; and each has its camel-brand which is also carved on the tombstones of its dead. The tribal lands are vested in the tribe, which has residual rights in them. They cannot, therefore, be alienated to other tribes without the consent of the whole tribe. A tribe is conceived of as a huge family descended from a common ancestor, from whom the tribe generally takes its name. Hence its segments can be figured either as a series of political sections or as genealogical branches of a clan. 619 421 [764] 619 614

A tribe is divided into several, generally two or three, primary divisions, or sub-tribes, which own well-defined portions of the tribal territory, in most cases running in strips unbroken by intrusive elements. These primary divisions are of the same pattern as the tribe of which they form part. Each division has its *watan*, which its members own and defend collectively. They believe that they are descended from a common ancestor, who is generally a son of the ancestor of the tribe. Primary tribal divisions split into secondary divisions, and secondary divisions into tertiary divisions, and so on. Each of the smaller divisions is a replica of the larger ones and has the same preferential and exclusive rights in its lands, an encroachment on which by another division will lead to fighting. Each has within the tribal brand its special lineage markings. The members of each division also consider that they are descended from a common ancestor who, in his turn, is descended from the ancestor of the larger division of which they form a section. The further the sub-division the more the resultant groups take on the complexion of kinship aggregates, rather than of political aggregates. 619 613

These kinship aggregates or extended family groups are the basic units of tribal life. They are called *biyut* (sing. *bait*). The tribe may be the residual owner of land and water but the *biyut* are the owners in use. Their members live in the same [423]

619 stretch of tribal territory, move during the rains to the same
613 grazing grounds, use the same wells during the dry season, and
cultivate adjacent strips of arable. The members of a *bait* have
a lively sense of solidarity, and this is most evident in fighting
and feuds. It is their common duty to avenge a slain kinsman
and they share the *diya*, indemnity, should they accept it in
[672] the place of a life. They are jointly responsible for a wrong any
one of them may commit. The smaller *biyut* are often identical
[621] with camps, usually from five to ten tents, in grazing grounds,
and several closely related *biyut* camp near together in the
vicinity of springs and wells in the summer, their combined
camps then amounting sometimes to over a hundred tents.

619 What has been said above about tribal structure applies only
to the free tribes and the larger client tribes living on their own
land. The client tribes which are split up and scattered throughout
Cyrenaica are not tribes in a political, but only in an ethnic,
619 sense. It will be found that in any of the main tribes stranger
614 groups, sometimes of client origin, have attached themselves
608 to the clan dominant in the tribal area and through some fiction,
myth, or fraud, have grafted their branch of descent on to the
genealogical tree of this clan. The Bedouin use the word *laf* to
describe this process and they say that kinship established in this
way may become as strong as kinship of blood.

619 The structure of a tribe is expressed in terms of the lineage
system of the clan dominant in its territory, the tribal segments
614 being associated with branches of descent from the ancestor of
613 this clan. The primary tribal sections are identified with lineages
descended from some of this ancestor's descendants in the male
line; the secondary tribal sections are identified with lineages
descended from more of his descendants farther down the line
of descent; and so on till the smallest territorial segments and
the smallest lineages are reached. Thus a lineage considered as
a branch of a clan consists of all those persons who trace their
descent through the male line to a common ancestor, but it can
also be, and in speech often is, conceived of politically as an
agnatic group of this kind together with stranger and *Marabtin*
accretions which occupy its territory and make common cause
with it in disputes with other tribes or segments of the same
tribe.

A simple example is given in illustration of tribal segmentation

and of the consistency between lineages of a clan and segments 619
of a tribe. In explanation of it a few words must first be said 614
about the terms *qabila*, *'aila*, and *bait*. *Qabila* is the word 613
generally used to denote a tribe or primary tribal division.


AL-DARSA
MASAMIR
MARABTIN
AL-SHAHABA
AL-BAKHAYIT
Balrabat
Al-Shahhib
AL-QALABTA
Al-Mahamda
At Brahim
At al-Hzatal
AL-MUASA
Al-Aqta
BARQA
AL-BARA'ASA
AL 'ABAIDAT
'AILAT FAYID
Tribal Boundaries
1st. Subdivision
2nd Subdivision
3rd. Subdivision
Al-Aqta 4th Subdivision
Sanusiya Zawiya:–
Built
Not completed
Marabout Tomb
Scale
0
1
2
3
4 kms.

102
131
619
778
795*
613

The Divisions of the Hasa Tribe.

'Ailat are the lineages into which a clan is divided and hence 619
the sections of a tribe of various sizes in which these lineages are 614
found and after which they take their names. *Biyut* are small 613
lineages, or extended families, with a depth of five or six generations from the present day to their founders. It must be noted, however, that all these terms are relative and are used in a more or less comprehensive sense according to the context.

601
● 619
613


AL-HASA
Hawass
AL-QALABTA
Qalbat
Qassam
AL-MUASA
AL-MAHAMDA
AL-SHABARQA
AL-BAKHAYIT
Musa
Muhammad
Shibriq
Bakhit
'At BRAHIM
'At AL-MZATAL
'At AL-SHAUQI
Brahim
Mzatal
Ma'afi
'At AL-SLAILIKH
Zaidan
Mansur
'At BALRABA'I
'At AL-AQTA'
Bt Bu SHNAINIFA
Muhammad
Tahir
Bu Shnainifa
Sultan
Jibrin
Bt BU HAUDHANA
Sultan
Sa'ad
'Umar
Bt WA'AIRA
Wa'aira
Balal
Bt MUHAMMAD
Bt QASHAISH
Bt 'ALI
Muhammad
Qashaish
'Ali
Bu Halaiqa
Salih
Bt BU HALAIQA
Bt GHAIZAN
Bt BRAHIM
Bt MUSTAFA
Bt AL-HABAL
Bu Halaiqa
Ghaizan
Brahim
Mustafa
Husain
'Aqila
Mehemmed
Muhammad
Jibrin
Mustafa
'Abd al-Khaliq
Hamad
Mahmud
Sa'ad
'Abd al-'Azim
'Abd al-Salam
'Abd al-Razaq
'Abdalla
Salih
Mahmud
Mustafa
Ramadan

Names of tribal sections are printed in capital letters.
'*At* = '*Ailat*.
Bt = *Bait*.

619
613
If reference be made to the accompanying map and genealogical chart it will be seen that the Hasa tribe is made up of three primary sections, the Qalabta, the Shabarqa, and the Bakhayit, distributed in strips running from north to south, which are very typical and give to each section equal condi-

tions of soil, water, and grazing. We trace the segmentation of 619
the Qalabta alone and see that it has two divisions, the Muasa 613
and the Mahamda. We follow the line of Muhammad alone and
note that it splits into three lineages, *'Ailat* Brahim, *'Ailat* al-Mzatal, and *'Ailat* al-Shauqi (there is dispute, arising from
quarrels over land, about the legitimacy of this branch). From
Mzatal descend the three minor *'ailat*, al-Slailikh, al-Aqta', and
Balraba'i. Following only the first line we note that *'Ailat*
al-Shlailikh then divides into the various *biyut* shown on the
chart, al-Habal, Mustafa, Brahim, &c., the male membership of
only one of which, *bait* al-Habal, is presented in the genealogy.
Where the name of an *'aila* or *bait* is different from that of its
founder, it almost invariably means that the founder's nickname has been used, the Cyrenaican Bedouin having a partiality
for nicknames.

Each section of a tribe, from the smallest to the largest, has 619
its Shaikh or Shaikhs. The tribal system, typical of segmentary 554
structures everywhere, is a system of balanced opposition
between tribes and tribal sections from the largest to the
smallest divisions, and there cannot therefore be any single
authority in a tribe. Authority is distributed at every point of
the tribal structure and political leadership is limited to situations in which a tribe or a segment of it acts corporately. With
a tribe this only happens in war or in dealings with an outside
authority which for its own purposes recognizes the tribe as an
administrative unit. There cannot, obviously, be any absolute [643]
authority vested in a single Shaikh of a tribe when the fundamental principle of tribal structure is opposition between its [671]
segments, and in such segmentary systems there is no state and
no government as we understand these institutions; and
criminal law is absent and civil law exists only in a very rudimentary form. Consequently the exact status of a Shaikh can 554
only be defined in terms of a complicated network of kinship
ties and structural relations. It is only necessary here to
emphasize that his social position is unformalized and that he
must in no sense be regarded as a ruler or administrator.
Bedouin respect their Shaikhs, but they do not regard them as
superiors. Rather their influence and wealth are considered as
capital to be drawn on for the benefit of whoever is in need of
them. So long as a Shaikhly family can keep their prestige,

554 derived from the strength of their section, their wealth, their traditional place in Bedouin society, and the character of their leading members, so long only are they regarded as Shaikhs of whatever the grade may be.

554 ● 619 [642] In recording his impressions of the Aulad 'Ali tribe the generous and unfortunate Pacho gives an excellent picture of the Bedouin Shaikh's position in tribal society. He says that it is difficult to discover any government in their society, which might be called aristocratic, though it is such in form rather than in substance. The precarious authority of the Shaikhs rests not on force but on the renown and esteem they enjoy in the tribe. 554 619 *648 He adds that at the time of his visit it had become customary, after Muhammad 'Ali Pasha had broken the tribe, for the Shaikhs to get their titles confirmed by the Pasha of Egypt but that when they returned to their camps with the robes of honour bestowed on them by the Pasha of Egypt, these garments, far from adding to their prestige and making them objects of regard, excited derision and aversion unless the backing of the tribe had preceded the approval of the Pasha.[1]

554 613 [556] The Italian lawyer Savarese has also written an illuminating description of the status of a Cyrenaican Bedouin Shaikh. Each *bait* and each *'aila* has its Shaikh, chosen for his age and wisdom or for his prowess, though the Shaikhship is generally hereditary in certain families. A Shaikh receives obedience and respect from his dependants but ought to be rich because the demands of hospitality are considerable. He takes a leading part in the settlement of disputes and must have the tact necessary to maintain the unity of the group in opposition to other groups of the same order. He represents his group in relations with these other groups and in the larger group of which it forms part. In matters in which his group as a whole is concerned he takes the advice of the Shaikhs of its divisions. He commands the men of the group in war and he collects the tribute due from the group to the Government. 554 Nevertheless, a Bedouin Shaikh, however large the group he represents, lives and dresses like his fellow Bedouin, though, being rich, his tent may be larger than most and he has more horses and they are more richly appointed.

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[1] J. R. Pacho, *Relation d'un Voyage dans la Marmarique, la Cyrénaïque et les Oasis d'Audjelah et de Maradèh*, 1827, p. 67.

[P.62]

CHAPTER III

THE SANUSIYA AND THE TRIBES

I

793 WHEN the Grand Sanusi came to preach in Cyrenaica he found
619 the kind of society I have outlined: a congeries of tribes without law or effective government, for the Turks had little control
over the interior, but with like values and habits and a community of life which crossed tribal boundaries. The Bedouin to
[181] whom he preached were simple people living the austere and
monotonous life of the tents, with that savage character which
has been so often portrayed, but also with those noble qualities
which have seldom failed to evoke admiration from those who
have lived among them. They were profoundly ignorant about
[177] the outside world and also—which is what touched the heart of
[797] the Grand Sanusi—about the faith of their fathers, and to this
matter I must now return, since the Sanusiya was a missionary
Order and can only be understood as such.

771 Though the Bedouin professed Islam before the Grand Sanusi
influenced them by his teaching, they were almost totally
[797] ignorant of its doctrinal content, rites, or ritual and moral
duties, and it is safe to assume that they did not obey its precepts. It is safe to assume this because even to-day, after a
century of Sanusiya instruction, the Bedouin perform their
religious duties in a very perfunctory way, if at all, and when
Muslim law is at variance with tribal custom they follow tribal
custom. In saying that they are lax, I do not suggest that they
[186] are not very sincere, Muslims. They are proud of being Muslims
and consider themselves greatly superior to Christians, while
they are contemptuous of Jews. Nevertheless, though they
would not belittle, the Cyrenaican Bedouin feel no embarrassment at neglecting, the duties obligatory on every Muslim.
The Confession of Faith is known to all and implicitly accepted
by all. It imposes no irksome restrictions or tiresome duties.
But they almost completely neglect—I speak of the more
[782] nomadic sections whom I know best, but it is probably true of
most Cyrenaican Bedouin—their daily prayers, a duty which is

771 men in North Africa whose families still retain much wealth and
792 influence. It was this Marabout status of the Grand Sanusi in
793 the eyes of the Bedouin which won him their respect: it was the
776 organization of the Sanusiya Order, an organization the earlier
778 Marabouts did not have, which enabled him to turn this respect
into a theocracy.

*175 There is more than one explanation of the origin of the word
792 '*Marabat*'. That generally accepted is that it derives from the
root RBT, to bind, and hence from '*ribat*', a fortified convent,
● 619 inhabited by warrior-monks, found on the marches of Islam in
[192] its early days of expansion by arms. The word later became
attached to the tribes which settled in Andalousia under the
leadership of the Saharan tribe of the Sanhaja and was corrupted
into the European 'Almoravides'. After the fall of the Sanhaja
dynasty in the twelfth century part of the *Marabtin* tribes fell
back into central and southern Morocco, whence many individuals
moved eastwards. Some settled in Cyrenaica,
generally on their return from the pilgrimage to Mecca, and
their fanaticism, asceticism, ability to read and write, and thaumaturgic
powers, impressed the simple Bedouin, who accepted
them as holy men and magicians and used them to write charms,
to perform religious rites, and to act as mediators in intertribal
[613] disputes. Sometimes, as we have seen, these men
founded lineages which, dwelling under the shadow of their
saintly forbears, became nuclei of social agglomerations which
have developed in course of time into tribal groups, thus taking
the shape of the tribal society in which they lived. The word
[192] '*Marabtin*' thus came to mean holy men (and their tombs) and
then, in addition, tribes tracing their descent, or supposed
descent, from these holy men and also, finally, in Cyrenaica,
tribes who are clients of the great *Sa'adi* tribes which own the
earth and water.

778 Some of the better known of the Cyrenaican saints, but by
776 no means all, have gleaming white cupolas, supported by four
walls, erected over their tombs, and inside the walls is a *tub*, a
792 wooden box, over the grave, and this is covered with coloured
cloth on which are inscribed passages from the Koran. Inside
also are often a few pages from sacred books, occasionally a few
small coins given by the local Bedouin, and any property, such
as tents or ploughs, the Bedouin have wished to deposit in a

safe place when on seasonal moves. Often a shrine, sometimes 778
the shrine of a very famous saint, is no more than a wall of 776
stones, with perhaps a stick, with pieces of cloth tied to it, 792
erected over the grave, and this is the usual form in the steppe
grazing-grounds. There are generally cemeteries around the [764]
tombs.

All these shrines are visited by the Bedouin from time to time,
when they are passing by or when they have some request to
make of the holy man. Many of them are cult centres, an annual [796]
ceremony, one of the chief events of the Bedouin year, being [619]
held at them; and when they are near the border between tribes,
or between tribal sections, this is an occasion for intertribal, or
intersectional, gatherings. There is no saint whose tomb is much [789]
visited by the Bedouin who has not performed miracles, some [755]
of them very remarkable miracles, and there is probably none
who has not at some time or other cured the sick or given an heir.

The tombs of these holy men, Sidi this, Sidi that, and Sidi
the other, are found in profusion over the whole of inhabited
Cyrenaica. The historically best known are those of Sidi Rafa',
one of the Companions of the Prophet, near al-Zawiya al-Baida
on the plateau, of Sidi 'Abdalla, one of the Prophet's standard-bearers,
in the oasis of Aujila, and of the founder of the Sanusiya
Order, Sidi Muhammad bin 'Ali al-Sanusi, at Jaghbub oasis.
The shrines belong to the tribes and tribal sections in whose [619]
earth the Marabouts are buried and the Marabouts are looked [423]
upon as tribal and sub-tribal patrons. Like the Sanusiya Order,
they have become part of tribal life.

I have earlier reproduced Col. De Agostini's map of the Hasa 778
tribe to serve as an example of the territorial distribution of 619
lineages. The same map serves to illustrate the distribution of 792
shrines in a tribal territory. It can be seen from this map, which 776
shows only the best-known Marabout tombs, that all the different sections of the tribe have their shrines, and I would draw attention to an interesting feature of the distribution which I have also noted in other tribal areas: how often these sacred spots are near a tribal boundary, or near the boundary between one tribal section and another. This may not be pure chance, for the Marabouts in their lifetimes were regarded as standing outside the tribal system, to which indeed, being foreigners from the west, they did not belong, and their chief political role was

778 to act as mediators between tribes and between one tribal
• 619 section and another. Even to-day their tombs are regarded as
792 neutral points, as it were, and are often the place chosen for a
776 meeting between the Shaikhs of one tribe, or tribal section, and
those of an adjacent tribe, or section, when some matter has to be settled between them. It has sometimes happened also that when two tribes have disputed the ownership of territory, they have settled the dispute by allotting it to a Marabout, which means to his descendants, so that one then finds a *Marabtin* strip between two *Sa'adi* tribes or tribal sections. One of the best examples of this is the strip of country owned by the Aulad al-Shaikh tribe between the 'Awaqir and the 'Abid and 'Arafa tribal domains. In the same way tribes made gifts of disputed wells to dead saints. Where a *Marabtin* tribe has grown out of a Marabout family they will be found living in the area around their tombs. Thus the Aulad al-Shaikh territory spreads out from Sidi Mahiyus, part of the Masamir live near Sidi Nuh, the Mshaitat live around Sidi al-Mshaiti, and the Qat'an live near Sidi Hashim and Sidi Suliman al-Tair.

792 So, long centuries before the Grand Sanusi began his mission
776 in Cyrenaica, the Bedouin were used to the sight of an *'alim*, a
212 learned man—for anyone who can read and write is a learned
man to the Bedouin—coming from the west to heal their
554 children and beasts, break droughts, write talismans, and teach
them the beliefs and law of Islam. Such a man was also a *muhakkam*, one who arbitrated in their disputes and said the *fatiha* at their settlements and undertakings ~~to make them~~ binding. He could arbitrate ~~among them~~ because he was not of them. ~~He was not~~ like them a tented son of the steppe, though his descendants may have learned to live as such, but a *Marabat*, a man who follows religion and not the rains. The Bedouin of Cyrenaica owe much to these holy men, for, ignorant and superstitious though they may have been, they taught the tribesmen to respect learning and religion and kept those twin lights burning, even if dimly, through centuries. The Bedouin do not forget them, or to say a prayer for them, when they pass ~~their tombs~~; and they have given the freedom of their earth
[182] and water to their descendants. Without these forerunners the
Grand Sanusi could not have planted his Order in the country.
* [795] It is planted in their bones.

Marabouts of the kind I have described were still coming to 792
Cyrenaica from the west up to the time when the Grand Sanusi 793
began his preaching in the country. Two of them whom he 795*
found there already living among the Bedouin, the one on the
western and the other on the eastern part of the plateau, teaching
them and settling their disputes, became his followers: Sidi
Ahmad bin 'Abdalla al-Sakkuri, a late arrival from the west
whose descendants became Shaikhs of the zawiya of al-Marj,
and Sidi al-Martadi Farkash, of an old *Marabtin* family of
Cyrenaica, whose descendants became Shaikhs of the lodges at
Umm al-Razam, Bishara, and Martuba. But the great majority
of the Grand Sanusi's helpers were men who had come with him
from the west, chiefly from Algeria. Other *Ikhwan* families, [613]
mostly of the Khattabi lineage, of which the Sanusi family are
a branch, came later, also from Algeria, in the time of Sayyid
al-Mahdi. To the Bedouin they were all Marabouts and when
they had in their lifetimes a reputation for piety or learning [778]
their tombs in the Sanusiya lodges in which they resided became
places of cult like those of their forerunners all over Cyrenaica.
But unlike the earlier Marabouts these Sanusiya Brothers were
not only holy men. They were also members of a fraternity, of
an organization. The Sanusiya Order was thus not only heir 795*
to the accumulated capital of the Marabouts, but was able to 182
exploit it as a corporation. It incorporated a number of isolated
cults into a single wider cult, fractionized, it is true, by tribal
particularisms, but, all the same, brought under a common
organization. Each lodge of the Order was a cult centre, but it
was something more: it was part of a general cult directed
through the lodges towards the Head of the Order. The tribes 619 ●
of Cyrenaica became through the Order linked from above in a 182
common, if loose, organization under a single, sacred, Head. 795*
This was possible only because a tribal system already existed
uniting the different tribes, in spite of their feuds and enmities, 793
into a society which, though lacking political unity, rested on
common sentiments, a common way of life, and a common
lineage structure.

What gave stability to this new relationship between the [648]*
Bedouin tribes and the Sanusiya Order, turning the sacred Head
into a secular leader and the religious organization into a
government, and changed a loose federation of tribes into a

619

182 nation, was common hostility to outside interference, an ingre-
*795 dient supplied in measured quantities by the Turks and copiously
793 by the Italians.

*[648]

III

The rudiments of Islam which the Grand Sanusi found in
Cyrenaica made his teachings acceptable, delivered as they were
without embellishments, to the Bedouin of the country, and
the Marabout tradition which he also found there made him
[578] personally acceptable to them. His chief difficulty must have
been the rivalries between tribe and tribe and between tribal
section and tribal section down to the smallest sections. This
[361] difficulty was overcome by transferring the centre of the Order
to desert oases, where it could not become identified with any
particular tribe, and by distributing its lodges impartially
throughout the tribal territories.

*795 Of the forty-five zawiyas belonging to the tribes of Cyrenaica
793 proper (including al-Naufiliya and excluding the Kufra lodges)
probably twenty-one were founded before 1860 or during the
*175 lifetime of the Grand Sanusi, twenty-two during the lifetime of
Sayyid al-Mahdi, and two when Sayyid Ahmad al-Sharif was
Head of the Order.

*795 A high proportion of the lodges of the Order in the time of the
361 Grand Sanusi were along the line of oases on the 29th parallel,
[175] for to the lodges of the Cyrenaican oases on that line must be
added those in the oases of the Sirtica, Zalla, Saukna, Hun, and
Waddan, all founded round about 1855, and probably that in
al-Fuqha also. Lodges were early planted in the oases partly on
account of their importance as caravanserai and trading centres,
partly because the oases-folk were more tractable than the
Bedouin, and partly because the stability of these centres gave
greater opportunity for corporate religious life. The Sanusiya
certainly made a deeper religious impression on the peoples of
the oases than on the Bedouin.

*795 It will have been noticed also how few of the Sanusiya lodges
632 were founded in the towns of North Africa. There are no lodges
361 in the towns of Egypt and though the Order counts many
[175] followers in the towns of Cyrenaica and is politically dominant
in them it has only one zawiya in each, Banghazi, Darna, and
al-Marj; and that at Banghazi, the capital of the country, was

only founded about 1870. The Sanusiya lodge in Tripoli town 795*
was not built till 1882. It must, however, be remembered that in 361
Turkish times Banghazi and Darna were little more than villages 632
and al-Marj only a military post and that, as already explained, [175]*
their inhabitants were foreigners, either Jews or immigrants
from Tripolitanian towns who were generally affiliated already to
other Orders. Moreover, the Turkish administration functioned 795*
from these centres, and that alone would have prevented the 361
Grand Sanusi from making them the headquarters of his 632
mission. There could not be two governments in one large 648*
village, especially as the Grand Sanusi disapproved of the
Turks and they were suspicious of him. Also the presence of the
Turkish Government in the towns ensured order and some, even
if very small, opportunities for education and religious instruction
and services, and Sayyid Muhammad bin 'Ali al-Sanusi had
settled in Cyrenaica with the express purpose of reviving the
faith and raising the culture of the totally illiterate and almost
heathen Bedouin, whose contact with the towns was negligible.
The social functions carried out by the Sanusiya lodges in 795*
Cyrenaica were more consistent with settlement among wild
tribesmen than among peaceful citizens. Propaganda of the
faith, educational work, cultivation of gardens, settlement of
disputes, provision of shelter, hospitality, and security to
travellers, and of refuge for the pursued, the weak, and the
oppressed are all functions especially appropriate to tribal and
barbarous conditions of life

The Order was based on the tribes and not on the towns. The 795*
lodges were founded by tribes or tribal sections and the tribes 619
or their sections regarded them as tribal institutions. Al-Qasur
zawiya was not just a lodge of the Order in 'Abid tribal territory.
It was the 'Abid zawiya; just as al-Marj was the 'Arafa
zawiya, Shahhat the Hasa zawiya, and so on. The tribal system
and the Sanusiya organization interpenetrated. The Sanusiya
gave to the tribes a national symbol and the tribes participated
in it through their lodges. It was the combination of a common [182]
organization with representation that allowed for tribal allegiances
and rivalries which provided the Order with sure
foundations.

So much was the Sanusiya organization based on the tribal
system that the distribution of the lodges may be said to

*795 have reflected tribal segmentation, mirroring lines of cleavage
• 619 between tribes and between tribal sections. The Sanusiya organization was fractionized along these fissures. The distribution of lodges among the 8 *Sa'adi* tribes was Hasa, 1; 'Ailat Fayid, 1; Bara'asa, 1 (a second lodge, al-Nayyan, was little more than a grain store attached to al-Zawiya al-Baida); 'Abid, 1; 'Arafa, 1; Magharba, 2; 'Awaqir, 6; Darsa, 9; and 'Abaidat, 14. There were 17 lodges among the Aulad 'Ali tribe in Egypt and for the Aulad Suliman with their attached tribes in the Sirtica only one, Sirt, if we exclude the lodges in the Sirtican oases. This uneven distribution may be related in part to the location of trade routes, harbours, springs, concentration of summer wells, and so forth, but it was undoubtedly due chiefly to variations in tribal cohesion. The more cohesive tribes had a single lodge, or, in the case of the Magharba, 2 lodges. The very cantonized Darsa tribe, whose lack of solidarity was largely due to their very broken country and the oecological self-sufficiency of their sections, each of which was more or less stable in its own territory, had no less than 9 lodges. The ethnically heterogeneous, widely dispersed, and structurally confused 'Awaqir tribe had 6 lodges, and the 'Abaidat tribe, which showed even less unity of sentiment and action, had 9 lodges. The most broken up tribe of all, the tribe in which the sections were most intermixed, and the tribe which displayed the minimum of political cohesion, was the Aulad 'Ali of Egypt, which had 17 lodges.

[578] Among the Hasa, who possessed only the Shahhat lodge, in the territory of the Shabarqa section, though on the edge of the territory of the Qalabta section, rivalry between these two sections led to the foundation of a lodge at Marsa Susa, where the Order still claims the endowments, but a sense of tribal unity in the end prevailed and the project was abandoned. Likewise in the leading Tamia section of the Bara'asa tribe the rivalry between its two principal sub-sections, the Hadduth, in whose territory was the al-Baida lodge, and the Jilghaf, led to the Jilghaf marking out with a low wall the site of a new zawiya in the *silk* al-Hamama in the southern steppe country; but, here again, the lodge was never built. The location of al-Qatafiya and al-Naufiliya corresponded to a traditional jealousy between the Shamakh and the Ra'idat sections of the Magharba

tribe. In the oasis of Jalu, where there was not the same tribal 795* solidarity as in the neighbouring oases of Aujila and al-Jikharra, 619 ● the two lodges were almost next door to each other. This was because the oasis was split into two opposed villages, each occupying about half of it with a strip of waste ground in between. A similar lack of unity in the Egyptian oasis of Siwa accounts for the building of several Sanusiya lodges there.

IV

Starting from the foundation of al-Zawiya al-Baida in 1843 [175]* the Order spread itself throughout Cyrenaica until it embraced in its network of lodges the entire tribal system of the country. It seeded itself, as it were, in the crevasses between tribes and between tribal sections, and its points of growth were thus also the points of convergence in tribal and lineage structure.

A tribal zawiya seems generally to have been founded in the 795* following manner. A tribe or tribal section saw with envy that 793 a neighbouring tribe or section had a zawiya. They sent a 619 deputation to the Head of the Order and asked him for a Shaikh to teach their children, cater for their religious needs, settle their disputes, and so forth. The Head of the Order granted them their request and sent them a Shaikh chosen from among the learned and pious men who surrounded him at Jaghbub. The Shaikh probably took with him one or two companions, *Ikhwan*, Brothers of the Order, to help him start the new lodge which the tribesmen built in the most favoured spot in their territory. Simple structures though these zawiyas were, they took many years to complete, being added to when further accommodation was required, in the leisurely Arab way. Most [172] of them were built on Graeco-Roman foundations so that the tribesmen who constructed them found stone ready to hand.

Through the kindness of Shaikh Muhammad al-Tayyib al- 175* Ashhab I have seen the letter sent in 1855 by al-Sayyid Muham- 795* mad Ibn 'Ali al-Sanusi al-Khattabi al-Hasani al-Idrisi to his 793 virtuous sons, some of the Shaikhs of the Sdaidi section of the 'Awaqir tribe, about the building of the zawiya of Msus. He says that he is sending to them Brothers to construct the buildings and that he has instructed them to build an annex which he can use as a resthouse when he visits the zawiya, though this

*795 find hereditary transmission of Shaikhship of lodges most
793 accentuated, such as the Bara'asa-Tamia section (al-Zawiya
613 al-Baida), the 'Awaqir-Sdaidi section (Msus zawiya), and the
428 'Abaidat-Ghaith section (Tart zawiya). In the same way the
[792] earlier Marabouts became, as has been noted, founders of
lineages which were on the pattern of the branches of the
Bedouin clans among whom they lived, and attached to them.

*795 Also it must be remembered that the lodges were tribal
778 institutions built by the local Bedouin so that they might
participate in the *baraka* of Sayyid Muhammad bin 'Ali al-
793 Sanusi. They participated in it through the Shaikhs of their
● 619 zawiyas who received their *baraka* direct from the hands of the
182 Grand Sanusi himself, or from the hands of son Sayyid al-
Mahdi, and passed it on to their sons. This *baraka* belonged to
the tribe, or tribal section, which built a lodge just as the
shaukha, the secular Shaikhship of the tribe, or tribal section,
belonged to it and had to be kept in it. In both the continuity
of family succession had to be maintained, unless there were
good reasons for acting otherwise. Thus each tribal section
emphasized its autonomy in its hereditary line of religious
Shaikhs, through whom the *baraka* of the founder of the Order
was transmitted to them, whilst proclaiming its membership of
a tribal federation with common allegiance to the Head of the
Order.

*795 As I have pointed out when speaking of the sacred *Marabtin*
793 tribes of Cyrenaica, it was customary for the descendants of a
778 Marabout to reside near his tomb. I have further mentioned
that the Shaikh of a Sanusiya lodge, who is also called a *Marabat*
[776] by the Bedouin, might, if he had during life a reputation for
piety, rather easily gained in Islam, be venerated as a saint
when he was dead and his tomb become a shrine. This is
another reason why Shaikhly families have tended to become
hereditary directors of lodges.

*795 Just as almost all the Marabouts of Cyrenaica were foreigners
793 from the west, so were almost all the Shaikhs of the Sanusiya
554 lodges. The Dardafi and Isma'ili families came from Tripolitania,
[167] the Ghumari family from Morocco, the 'Ammur, Bu
Jibali, and Khattab families came from Algeria, and so on. As
a class they enjoyed, and still enjoy, a reputation for sanctity
among the Bedouin on account of their knowledge of the Koran

*175 them a reprimand on the double count of decrease in revenue
*648 and lack of security. It was essential, therefore, to get the
651 Bedouin to pay their taxes without making too much trouble about doing so. To this end the Turkish administrative organiza-
*175 tion was largely directed. In 1879 the *Vilayet* of Banghazi was, in matters of civil administration, finally separated from that of
*648 Tripoli and in 1888 became an autonomous *sanjaq* directly
631 dependent on Istanbul. It was governed by a *mutasarrif* nominated by, and directly responsible to, the Central Government. On him depended all the officials of the Administration, though the chief among them were appointed by the Imperial Government. The senior officials were usually Turks. The
*175 country was divided for administrative purposes into a number
*648 of districts, each under a *qaimaqam*, except that of Banghazi,
634 which came directly under the Governor himself; and all except the Aujila-Jalu and Kufra districts were further divided into
*175 sub-districts under mudirs. These districts and sub-districts followed tribal divisions and subdivisions as any administra-
*648 tion in Cyrenaica must do, since the tribes and their sections
634 are the fundamental social departments of the country. Hence
● 619 sections of a nomadic tribe might be residing at any time in a sub-district different to that to which they were administratively attached, and even in a different district.

*175 In his direction of the affairs of the administration, finances, and police, the Governor was assisted by an administrative
*648 council composed of the chief accountant, the secretary, the
631 qadi, the mufti, and four elected members from the local population. Each *qaimaqam*, nominated by the Imperial Government, had an administrative council similarly composed. The mudirs, nominated by the Imperial Government on the proposal of the Governor, had no council established by statute but co-opted tribal Shaikhs when they wanted their advice or co-operation. In the towns there was a representative, called *mukhtar*, elected by the property-owning citizens for each ward, and at Banghazi and Darna there were urban councils of a simple kind.

*175 It was the mudir in charge of a sub-district who had direct dealings with the Bedouin tribes and the lodges of the Sanusiya
*648 Order. In 1911, just before the Italian invasion, there were six
634 districts including Kufra, which came nominally under the

Turkish administration in 1910, and the Banghazi district, 175*
which came directly under the Governor of Cyrenaica for 648*
administration. Attached to each district were the sub-districts 634
shown in the list below,[1] in which the tribes attached to each sub-district are also given. The Bara'asa came under Banghazi, although they lived well to the east, for political reasons, the tribe being exceptionally rebellious.[2]

175*
648*
634
619 ●

Districts	*Sub-districts*	*Tribes*
Banghazi (directly dependent on the Governor)	Suluq Qaminis Barsis Sidi Khalifa	'Awaqir
	Slanta	Bara'asa
al-Marj	al-Marj	'Arafa and 'Abid
	al-Haniya	Darsa
Darna	al-Sallum Tubruq al-Banba al-Qubba	'Abaidat
	Shahhat	Hasa
Ajadabiya	Marsa Braiqa	Magharba
Aujila and Jalu	—	Awajila and Majabra
Kufra	—	—

The administration was very slapdash by European standards. 175*
Indeed, Shaikh Muhammad 'Uthman says darkly: 'There is at 648*
Banghazi no organization, political, administrative, or financial. 631
I say no more about this matter: it will be understood why.'[3] This was, of course, an exaggeration, for however simple the administration may have been, and perhaps for that reason, it worked—with a good deal of grumbling it is true, but without undue conflict. Revenue was collected and would have exceeded 175*
the cost of the very cheap administration of the country if the 648*
proceeds of some taxes had not been sent to Istanbul. Much of 651
this revenue came from import and export duties, but the bulk 634
of it was derived from taxes on herds and a tenth of the harvest in kind, the collection of which was in the hands of the mudirs. It was the task of these mudirs, who were generally literate

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[1] *Notizie relative al Sangiacato della Cirenaica e alle Mudirie dipendenti dal Mutassarifato di Bengasi* (Ufficio Politico Militare), 1913. [113]

[2] Fabrizio Serra, *Italia e Senussia*, 1933, p. 17; idem in *La Cirenaica*, 1922–3, p. 182.

[3] Op. cit., pp. 59–60.

*648 Arabs, to assess and collect taxes, to maintain security, and to
651 control the few police allotted to them. In this task they
634 expected co-operation from the local Shaikhs of the tribal
● [619] sections and the Shaikhs of the Sanusiya lodges.

[793] It is remarkable that the Bedouin paid any taxes at all, for
the mudirs had not sufficient force at their command, nor had
the Governor at Banghazi, to compel the Bedouin to pay if they
were determined not to do so. The mudir of Slanta had only 50
[701] to 60 soldiers in his sub-district and the Bara'asa whom he
[625] administered could have annihilated this force with ease, as
could the 'Awaqir the 50 soldiers and the handful of police
*175 stationed at Suluq. That taxes were collected at all, and all the
more that they were collected without constant disturbance, is
*648 to be accounted for partly by the recognition by the Shaikhs of
651 the tribal sections, with whom the mudirs were careful to keep
634 on good personal terms, that there was a moral obligation to
619 pay them; but there were also sanctions if they were not paid.
If the Shaikh of a tribal section did not collect the taxes due
from that section, he was held responsible and action could be
taken against him personally. The mudir, accompanied by a
small armed force, went a round of the tribal sections attached
to his sub-district each year, generally in springtime, and sent
out other tax-collecting parties in other directions. Sometimes
special tax commissions appointed by the Governor also toured
the country. A favourite device was for such parties to quarter
themselves in the camp of a recalcitrant Shaikh and to reside
there as his guests, for the soldiers and police carried few provisions,
till the tax was paid. The Shaikhs, on the other hand,
were made partners in the undertaking by, besides investment
with an official robe and status, receiving a percentage of the
taxes collected, the mudir himself also taking a percentage.
Moreover, each Shaikh whose section paid the tax was determined
that the other sections should not escape paying as well. A
Shaikh was able to divide up the assessment on his section
among the minor Shaikhs, and the minor Shaikhs among yet
smaller ones. It was in the interest of each Shaikh to see that
the smaller ones did not escape their share and leave him with
the responsibility for a deficit. Responsibility was in this way
*175 passed down the tribal structure. On the whole the system
*648 worked well and the Turkish officials and the Bedouin did not
651

get on badly together. Each understood the other. Also there 175*
was much elasticity in the taxes which appealed to the Bedouin, 648*
who prefer to pay a heavy tax one year and lightly or not at all 651
another year, rather than to pay a regular and inevitable tax.
The assessments were seldom revised and often had little relation
to the capacity of a tribal section to pay. The result was
that taxes were always in arrears and in some years, or for
some sections, remitted altogether. Those sections nearest the
Turkish posts paid the more easily because they were the more
vulnerable. Some of the more nomadic Bedouin escaped payment
altogether, or at any rate for years at a stretch. It is, I
think, safe to assume that the taxes actually collected over a
number of years were light. Otherwise the Bedouin would not
have paid them.

Perhaps the chief reason why taxes were collected without 175*
constant rebellion was the support given to the administration 648*
in this matter by the Sanusiya. The Turks held the coastal 651
towns and a few inland posts outside which their direct control 795*
of the country was restricted to those Bedouin who lived a
fairly stable life in the immediate vicinity of these centres. The
rest of the country was left to the Sanusiya and its own devices,
though, as we have seen, the Turks sent occasional patrols into
the interior. Sporadically, without much enthusiasm or perseverance, 175*
the Administration at one time tried to extend its 648*
effective control into the hinterland by nominating to official 651
posts, and giving arms and money to, selected tribal chiefs, such 795*
as the Shaikhly families of Hadduth, Lataiwish, and Saif al-Nasir. 793
Bu Bakr bin Hadduth of the Bara'asa was made 619
qaimaqam of al-Qaiqab, where he had a castle; 'Ali Lataiwish 634
of the Magharba was made *qaimaqam* of Sirt, where he, also,
had a castle; and the fierce old warrior chieftain of the Aulad
Suliman, Saif al-Nasir, was made mudir of Bu Njaim. This
procedure resulted in brigandage rather than in good administration
and was in the main discarded. Instead the mudirs worked
directly through the Shaikhs of the tribal sections and, especially
when dealing with intertribal and intersectional affairs, through
the Shaikhs of the Sanusiya zawiyas. Some of the older notables
of Banghazi have told me that the Pasha, as the Governor was
often called, would never have succeeded in collecting taxes
among the Bedouin had it not been for the co-operation of the

*175 Heads of the Sanusiya lodges, who often accompanied the mudirs
*648 and tax commissions to the Shaikhs of the tribal sections
651 attached to their lodges. It was to the common interest of the
*795 Turkish Administration and of the Sanusiya that there should
793 be order, security, justice, and trade in the country, and they
[619] co-operated to maintain them.
[634]

The Turkish officials did their utmost to remain on good terms with the Sanusiya Shaikhs and to this end, and doubtless also because they found no difficulty in accepting, as educated men, its exalted teachings, some of them affiliated themselves to the Order. Membership of it gave them prestige in the eyes of the Bedouin as great, if not greater, than their official status gave them. Likewise the more prosperous merchants who had deal-
[556] ings with the Bedouin tribes or sent caravans to the Sahara and Sudan found it advisable to be received into the Order. It is for this reason that in all the towns of Libya we find a small body of the richer and more cultured citizens ascribed to the Order, while the common people belong to other or no Orders.[1]

*175 But though the administration of Cyrenaica might be called
at this period a Turco-Sanusi condominium there was an under-
*648 current of jealousy on both sides which occasionally gave rise
651 to open conflict. A sure occasion was any effort on the part of
*795 the Administration to tax the Sanusiya estates. Although these had been exempted from taxation by the Sultan's firman, the local administration made rare and unsuccessful efforts to exact taxation on them. When in 1908 they tried to tax the crops of the Sanusiya holdings a tribal meeting, attended by 150 Shaikhs headed by 'Umar bu Rqaia of the Darsa tribe, met at the zawiya of al-Haniya and decided not to pay any more tribute to the Turkish Government till it revoked the tax. The Government then dropped the matter, though the trouble continued till 1910. Earlier, the Governor Ahmad Pasha Zuhadi (1904–5), acting on instructions from Istanbul, had tried to impose a tax on the crops of tribesmen and zawiyas alike. The Bedouin round al-Marj had thereupon attacked a Turkish detachment charged with collecting the tax and sent them back to Banghazi stripped of everything they possessed. The outcome was that the Governor was relieved of his office.

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[1] Capt. Emilio Canevari, *Zauie ed Ichuan Senussiti della Tripolitania*, 1917, *passim*.

The Sanusiya thus used the Turks to buttress its position in 175*
its dealings with the tribes, and combined with the tribes to 648*
resist any encroachments on its prerogatives by the Turkish 795*
Government. It was in the interests of both Administration 619 •
and Order that the tribes should not get out of hand, and it was in the interests of tribes and Order that the Administration should not become too powerful. The Sanusiya acquired from its central position between the other two parties a pre-eminence in the interior which led to the tribal system becoming already in Turkish times a proto-state with an embryonic government of its own. The tribes first began to see themselves as a nation through the Sanusiya's relations with the Turkish Administration. They were all 'Sanusi' *vis-à-vis* the Administration.

Ultimately it was the tribes who called the tune to both the Turkish Government and the Sanusiya Order. It would have taken a well-equipped army to have subdued them had they made a united revolt, and the Governor had only a meagre force at his disposal and could have had little hope of receiving much assistance from Istanbul. The Order had only moral weapons and though the tribal Shaikhs received its instructions with respect and every sign of acquiescence they did not necessarily act on them. Both Administration and Order were therefore compelled to compromise in their dealings with the tribes, who were, as Bedouin always are, at heart opposed to any interference and restriction. A typical situation of the latter days of Turkish rule was that described to me by the Banghazi notable 'Umar al-Kakhiya, at one time a member of the Ottoman House of Representatives. He was sent by the Governor of Cyrenaica to make agreements with the tribes in the eastern and western wings of the country by which they should refrain from cutting the Government's telegraph wires, a Bedouin habit which was later to irritate the Italian authorities and during the late war British Signals. I mention two further
incidents in illustration of Turco-Bedouin relations. About 175*
1895 forty members of the Tamiya section of the Bara'asa tribe 648*
jointly killed a tax-collector, a certain 'Abd al-Rahman al- 651
Katib, for, among other affronts, having taxed the client tribes 795*
directly instead of through their *Sa'adi* overlords. They then 682
fled to the Marmarica, from where they treated with the Turkish
Authorities for a settlement by payment of 13,000 Riyal, or 619
thirteen times the usual blood money, to the dead man's son.

account of the Italian invasion of Tripolitania. Realizing that 175*
they were helpless without Sanusiya support not only in the 648*
Sahara but also in Libya, since they would not be able without 795*
command of the sea to reinforce their garrisons there, the Turks showed themselves anxious to win over Sayyid Ahmad al-Sharif by also conferring on him new privileges. In 1910 the Governor of Banghazi proposed to make him a monthly grant of 4,000 Piastres, and the Governor of Tripoli sent a telegram in cipher to his representatives in various parts of Tripolitania asking them whether they thought the Sanusiya Order powerful enough to warrant additional privileges, which was apparently the view of Istanbul. His representatives, judging by its lesser influence in Tripolitania, where it never gained the unanimous support it received in Cyrenaica, reported that in their opinion the political importance of the Order had been exaggerated.[1]

Such of these events as were known to Italian observers
shortly before and in the early stages of their war with Turkey 175*
led them to false conclusions because the complexity of Arab 648*
sentiments was not appreciated. The structure of Bedouin 181
society is such that whatever the size of the group a man con- 186
siders himself to belong to in any situation, he is in virtue of his 619
loyalty to it opposed to other groups of like order in the tribal
structure. He is loyal to his *bait* against other *biyut*, to his *'aila* [613]
against other *'ailat*, and to his *qabila* against other *qabail*. Nevertheless, he has a strong feeling of communion with all the Bedouin of his country, regardless of their tribal affiliations, in common opposition to the towns. But Bedouin and citizen are both Arab and they made common cause against the Turks, especially when the activities of the 'Young Turks' forced Turk and Arab into rival camps. But even Arab and Turk shared wider loyalties in their regard—unequal, it is true, but still shared—for the Sultanate and for Islam and they reacted in spontaneous accord against threats from Christian Powers, the French advance in the Sahara and the Italian invasion of Libya. Against Christians and Europeans Arabs and Turks were no longer Arabs and Turks but Muslims, just as against the Turks Bedouin and citizens were no longer Bedouin and citizens but Arabs, and against the towns tribesmen were no longer members of different tribes but a Bedouin community.

[1] Macaluso, op. cit., pp. 88–90, and Serra, op. cit., p. 37.

CHAPTER V

THE FIRST ITALO-SANUSI WAR (1911–17)

I

128 I HAVE given an account of the conditions in which the Sanusiya
*795 took root in Cyrenaica and of the circumstances which favoured
its growth. I now describe how its Bedouin followers, under
*648 its leadership, resisted Italian aggression during two wars, from
*175 1911 to 1917 and from 1923 to 1932, and finally lost their
independence and suffered Italian domination until relieved by
British arms in 1942. It will be seen how the long struggle
accentuated the political functions of the Sanusiya in a manner
I indicate forthwith.

121 For segmentary structures of the kind we find among the
182 Bedouin of Cyrenaica to develop rudimentary governmental,
or statal, organs it would seem necessary that for a long period
*648 of time all the segments of the society should find themselves
in common opposition to some outside force. It is not merely
that such opposition fuses the segments in corporate action. A
new form of political structure which includes the enemy comes
into existence and necessitates a new orientation of political
values. In a segmentary system each segment sees itself as a
unity in opposition to an opposed segment of the same size and
kind; so when all the segments come into a corporate relation of
opposition to some political group outside them which has a
different kind of political structure and belongs to a different
political system they tend to see themselves as a unity *vis-à-vis*
this group and as a unity on the same structural model as itself.
[177] The small Bedouin society of Cyrenaica in this way slowly took
on the political form of the European countries into the orbit
of which it was drawn. It could only enter into structural relations with the states of Europe on the model of the European
state.

*175 When the Italians invaded the country and the Turks made
*648 peace the tribes continued their resistance in the name of the
Sanusiya. In their social system tribe was balanced against
*795 tribe and tribal section against tribal section. It was the
● 619 Sanusiya which gave to all the tribes and their sections a com-

mon symbol which stood for their common interests. Faced 175*
with amorphous, but seemingly ineradicable, opposition from 648*
the Bedouin the Italians more and more directed their hostility 795*
to the Sanusiya Order as a tangible head to the resistance which 619 ●
could be destroyed. Failing to crush opposition they were forced
to come to terms with it, but they could not come to terms with [793]
a tribal system—only with an organization and through a
person, the Head of the Order, who could speak for that
organization and for the tribes which it represented. Both in
fighting the tribes and in trying to come to terms with them,
the Italians thus threw the Sanusiya organization into political
relief, and the *tariqa*, the religious Order, began to speak of
itself as a *hakuma*, government. The peace negotiations, therefore,
centred round a contradiction. The Italians attempted to 175*
exact recognition of sovereignty and this implied recognition of 648*
the right of the Head of the Order to surrender sovereignty,
which he could do only if he were in a position analogous to 728
that of the Head of the Italian State, a status the Italians would 795*
not concede. Nevertheless they were compelled, in order to 793
establish relations with the tribes, to grant the Head of the 554
Order the title of Amir, and implicitly to recognize him as not
only the Shaikh of a religious Order, but the Head of a political
organization. As will be seen, the dilemma led to much equivocation
and finally to a second Italo-Sanusi war. In this
second war the Sanusiya was entirely destroyed as an organization,
political, economic, and religious. It persisted nevertheless
as a sentiment, and the Head of the Order in exile in Egypt still
retained the allegiance of the Bedouin who saw in his freedom
the hope of their own.

When the last European war broke out and Cyrenaica became 175*
a battlefield of first importance it was in the interests of each 648*
side to ensure that the local population would be favourable
to it. The Italians, having destroyed the Order, the one 795*
organization through which they might have made effective
propaganda among the Bedouin, were confronted in the country
with an unimpressionable mass of sullen resentment which
could in no way be influenced to their advantage. The British,
on the other hand, who sought to rouse the Bedouin to renewed [793]
rebellion, at any rate up to the point at which they gave what [554]
assistance to British arms they were capable of, had a ready

as well as religious functionaries. The Italians seem to have been under the impression that they could exclude the Sultan's secular authority while admitting the Caliph's spiritual authority in Libya. This was a singular error, because the functions of the Caliph of Islam were not of a sacerdotal order at all, but entirely political. Hence, as Macaluso justly observes, by the Treaty of Losanna 'sovereignty in Libya was divided for some years between Italy and Turkey'.[1] 175* 648*

The Turks withdrew their forces from Tripolitania under the terms of the treaty and opposition in that country was soon overcome, except for sporadic resistance in the *qibla*, the Sirtica, and Fazzan, in which parts Sanusiya influence was strong. The peace made very little difference to the military situation in Cyrenaica, partly because the Turkish garrisons remained behind to provide a disciplined core to the tribal resistance, and partly because the Bedouin tribes, who gave bulk to the resistance, had in the Sanusiya Order a common organization and leadership lacking in Tripolitania, where every tribe and every prominent tribal Shaikh acted independently and internal dissensions showed themselves as soon as the integrating presence of the Turkish army was withdrawn. 175* 648* 795* [619]

The Turkish soldiers who remained in Cyrenaica were drawn from every part of the Ottoman Empire—Albanians, Kurds, Syrians, Iraqis, Circassians, Anatolians, Macedonians, and Thracians—and were practically mercenaries who lived by the sword. Slovenly though they were, they were fine fighters and frugal as well, being content to campaign on rice, potatoes, bread, and an occasional helping of meat; and in Enver Bey they had an inspiring leader. Enver, being a regular soldier, was, however, anxious to return to Turkey to take part in the fighting in the Balkans. Before departing for the Bulgarian front and handing over his command in Cyrenaica to 'Aziz al-Masri he paid a visit to Sayyid Ahmad al-Sharif at Jaghbub, making a remarkable trip to the oasis in the only motor-car the Turco-Arab forces possessed. According to local statements the Sayyid, who had arrived at Jaghbub from Kufra in September 1912, had already declared that he would not be partner to a peace, so he required no persuading when Enver asked him in the name of the Sultan Muhammad V to carry on the struggle 175* 648* mechanized surface vehicles and aeroplanes unknown in 1911. 175* By the end of 1926 they had some 20,000 men in the field, 648* mostly native troops, while after the opening round of the 795* campaign the Sanusi probably seldom had more than 1,000 men on operational service at any one time. It was estimated that in 1923 they could put into the field 2,000 men armed with modern rifles and a few machine-guns and artillery pieces, and that in addition there were some 3,000 to 4,000 rifles among the tribes. With this superiority in mobility, fire, and numbers, the Italians were able, as in the first war, to push heavy columns in any direction they chose and to seize and fortify any point they pleased. Therefore, what is often called 'organized resistance' broke down very early in the campaign, if there can be [726] said to have been such at any time, and gave way to guerrilla warfare in which sentries, advanced posts, supply convoys, and communications were subjected to sniping, raids, ambushes, and sabotage. Consequently the war was made up of a succession of small, and often unrelated, incidents in different parts of the country. Italian operational and intelligence reports and Bedouin stories about these hundreds of fights and skirmishes are not easily arranged into a coherent picture. The hundreds of bits and pieces are all very much alike in size and shape and colour, and the guide of any clear pattern is lacking. To attempt, therefore, to construct from them a complete mosaic of events would be a task alike arduous for the writer and confusing and unprofitable for the reader; and I shall not endeavour to do more than sketch the development of the campaign. It would, I think, be of assistance to the reader were I first to mention some very general features of the fighting, which are, indeed, features of guerrilla warfare always and everywhere.

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[1] Giuseppe Macaluso, *Fascismo e Colonie*, 1930, p. 7.

II

The war, which was waged with increasing bitterness as the [632] years went by, was not against all the Arabs of Cyrenaica, but only against the Bedouin, for the townsmen played no active part in the resistance, though they sympathized with it. Also, [619] among the Bedouin, whilst there was no one who could be fairly labelled pro-Italian there were many persons, and even whole tribal sections, who remained passive, chiefly because of their

*175 vulnerability: the Baraghtha and other northern 'Awaqir
*648 sections, the 'Arafa, the Hasa, some of the Darsa, and a large
*795 part of the 'Abaidat. Most of these pacific sections, the least
● 619 nomadic of the Bedouin, had a long history of intercourse with the urban population and the Turkish administration, and when Italian officials took the place of Turkish officials contact was early resumed. They tended to look northwards to the coast. The other sections, more nomadic, warlike, and powerful, and further removed from settled centres, looked southwards to the desert: the Aulad Suliman, the Magharba, the southern 'Awaqir, the Bara'asa, most of the 'Abid, the *'Ailat* Fayid, and the southern and eastern 'Abaidat. Beyond striking distance by horse patrols, these hardy wanderers of the steppe, whose history was nothing more than a long record of tribal wars, had paid scant attention to the Turks, had refused in the first Italian war to make terms, had disdainfully turned their backs on the intruder during the ensuing years of peace, and were now to offer a stubborn resistance to renewed aggression. The structural polarity exemplified in the tendency of some tribal sections to be drawn into the political orbit of the Administration while others remained politically aloof from it was earlier referred to. It corresponded to the well-known division between the *saf al-bahr*, the coastal party, and the *saf al-fauqi*, the interior party, of Tripolitania and to a political dichotomy found in some form in all countries where nomads are the social hinterland of peasants or citizens. In Cyrenaica it took the form of a pull in opposite directions by the Turkish (and afterwards Italian) Administration with its centre of attraction at Banghazi and the Sanusiya with its centre of attraction in the desert.

The more peaceful and sedentary sections early ceased to fight the Italians in the first war, and in the period between the two wars put up little outward resistance to Italian penetration. In appearance, at any rate, they had accepted Italian supervision. This was, in fact, the issue during those years: the Italians seeking to draw these sections deeper into their sphere of influence through trade and administrative liaison, and the Sanusiya seeking in its own interests to pull them back from the Government and to eliminate Italian propaganda among them. When war broke out again the Italians had the advantage, denied to them in 1911, of being in occupation of all the principal

3:Evans-Pritchard E-4, 5 (1942-1944) 1949 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9
(1837-1942) Sanusi

centres of the country. They believed that they had the further 175*
advantage of having, by incessant propaganda and subsidies, 648*
weakened Sanusiya influence among the Bedouin around the 795*
towns and posts. Consequently, with optimism scarcely sustained by the facts, they regarded these sections as allies against 619
those which openly supported the Sanusiya. The coastal sections did, as the Italians expected, remain outside the war or, as the Italians called it, the rebellion, and they were, therefore, known as the *sottomessi* in contrast to the *ribelli*, the sections which resisted, and whom I shall speak of by the fitter term 'Patriots', having an objection to the language of colonial imperialism by which an honourable attempt to defend home and property against foreign aggression is labelled rebellion. They called themselves the *muhafiziya*.

It was Italian policy to deal with the collaborationist, or supposedly collaborationist, Bedouin as friends and to create between them and the Patriots a state of permanent feud. The Patriots expected the submitted sections to give them asylum when hard pressed, and to supply them with food and other requirements, and if they did not receive what they wanted, they took it by force. The Italians could not allow the Patriots to use the submitted districts as bases of operation and supply and had, therefore, for both prestige and security, either by constant patrolling to protect the submitted population from reprisals or to supply them with arms for their own protection. Both were perilous expedients. The patrols to be effective had to be highly mobile and therefore small and vulnerable to guerrilla tactics. The arms might, and did, find their way to the Patriots, the Italians becoming themselves one of the main sources of supply to their enemies. They hoped, however, that if they armed the submitted population they might, since they were Bedouin, be expected to defend their own stock against Patriot requisitioning, which the Italians called brigandage and the Patriots called payment of religious dues. It was believed that a state of civil war would necessarily result from the manifold feuds which would have to be prosecuted by bereaved families on both sides in accordance with the Bedouin law of vengeance. It was proposed to make 'furrows of blood' ('*solci di sangue*') between tribe and tribe, and between tribal section and tribal section, across which the Bedouin might exterminate each other and

*175 save the Italians much labour and danger. The policy had very
*648 limited success, for in practice the Patriots recruited from every
*795 tribe and every section. Bedouin sentiments about kinship and
• 619 its obligations worked both ways. If it was a duty to avenge a
slain kinsman it was no less a duty to protect and aid a living
[602] kinsman, and the sense of kin and its compelling influence in
[183] conduct, all that is meant by *'asabiya* in Bedouin values, are the
life and the soul of the Romany world.

It took the Italians a long time to realize that the Bedouin mind was not all of one piece but a Joseph's coat of conflicting interests. These interests excluded each other as the social situation evoked one loyalty to the detriment of another and it was, therefore, only in terms of their social structure that the apparent inconsistencies of Bedouin behaviour could be understood. Consequently the Italians were for ever suffering disappointments and accused the Bedouin, with increasing resentment and bitterness as the struggle continued, of disloyalty and treachery. Among the collaborationists, the *mtalyanin*, the Italianized, as the Patriots called them, there was every degree of participation from passivity, the refraining from taking an active part in the resistance, to full co-operation with the Italian army as spies, guides, informers, and administrative officials; but even those guilty of the worst complicity could, especially when some personal tie was involved, do the guerrillas a good turn. Many poor Bedouin near the towns joined the Italian forces as one kind or other of irregulars, police, and friendlies, and as labourers and camelmen, and it was found that these, while drawing Italian pay and rations, did not hesitate to assist the Patriots when an opportunity offered itself. Desertions to the enemy with full equipment were frequent. Italian rifles and ammunition and even pay were often handed over to the guerrillas. After an engagement the ground was left strewn with live ammunition for the guerrillas to glean. Many reported fights between the Patriots and the submitted population were undoubtedly inventions to cover gifts of ammunition, supplied by the Italians, from the Italian-sponsored irregulars to the Patriot bands. These native battalions constituted, in fact, 'a sort of supply depot of men, arms, and ammunition for the Sanusi formations'.[1] Information about Italian troop move-

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[113] [1] 'La pulizia del Gebel Cirenaico', by 'Gadria', *L'Oltremare*, Dec. 1930.

3:Evans-Pritchard E-4, 5 (1942-1944) 1949 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9
(1837-1942) Sanusi

ments and plans was soon passed on to the guerrilla bands, for 175*
Sidi 'Umar al-Mukhtar had agents in every Italian post. Those 648*
sottomessi who were armed and paid by the Italians to protect 795*
their territories against Patriot foraging expeditions would be 619 •
found among the Patriot casualties after skirmishes with Italian patrols. The submitted population, it was discovered, allowed their horses to graze far from their camps so that the Patriots could borrow them for operational purposes. The Patriots sold their animals in Italian and Egyptian markets through their submitted kinsmen, and Italian efforts to keep track of such transactions through tribal markings were, as might be supposed, unavailing. So useful, indeed, was a submitted population to the Patriots that the tribal Shaikhs sometimes arranged among themselves who among them should submit and who take the field. Even most of the Cyrenaican officials in the Italian administration did what was consistent with their safety to help their own people against their employers. Their faith unfaithful kept them falsely true. In the end the Italians came to the conclusion that they could trust no Cyrenaican, least of all a Cyrenaican Bedouin. The hearts of all were with their fighting fellow countrymen and fellow Muslims. The *sottomessi* and *ribelli* alike were all Bedouin, jealous of each other and hostile to tribes other than their own, but united by blood and a common way of life—one faith, one speech, one law. All regarded the Italians as foreigners whom one may serve but not love. 'The entire population thus took part directly or indirectly in the rebellion', wrote Graziani.[1]

The lot of the submitted sections was unenviable. They were compelled to live near Italian posts and their areas of sowing and pasturing were severely restricted. Their camps were subjected to constant inspections. Hostages were taken. Horses were confiscated. If it was discovered that they had dealings of any kind with their kinsmen in the Patriot bands they were heavily fined in animals and cereals, their camps were burnt, they were imprisoned, and sometimes shot. On the other hand,
if they did not supply the Patriots with victuals or if they [651]
refused to pay taxes in support of the resistance they were subjected to punitive operations by the guerrillas. Suffering from Italian interference and Patriot levies and from punitive action

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[1] Op. cit., p. 60.

*175 *648 *795 by both sides, many came to the conclusion that they were better off fighting in the Patriot bands than living under Italian protection.

619 That all Cyrenaica was hard hostile rock beneath the shallowest covering of local collaboration is shown by the fact that the guerrillas kept up their numbers till the end of the war in spite of the slaughter of many times the number of men engaged at any one time in operations. Whenever a man fell there was another to take his place. Apart from the connivance of the whole Bedouin population at Patriot activities it was not easy for the Italians to tell the difference between a Bedouin who was a guerrilla and a Bedouin who belonged to one of the submitted sections. The guerrillas had no uniforms and when defeated had only to disperse and hide their rifles to become harmless shepherds. The Italians found that killed and captured guerrillas all possessed Italian identity cards issued to them when in camps in the guise of *sottomessi*. The Italians were thus victualling directly the forces opposed to them, for any holder of one of their cards could draw Italian rations. I have myself met Bedouin ex-guerrillas who, wounded in a fight, went to Italian hospitals for treatment, pretending to have been shot by the guerrillas while defending their flocks.

Italian writers who themselves experienced at first hand the sense of insecurity and the feeling, slowly mounting to a conviction, that their efforts to win over the Bedouin by bribes were as vain as their hopes of a speedy conquest, have described the situation of disillusionment in which their despondency was born. Biagio Pace writes that there did not exist, in reality, submitted and rebels, the entire population of Cyrenaica being under the control of the leaders of the rebellion, thus constituting a demographic, political, and financial whole, which maintained a force in the field. The *sottomessi* were regularly [651] taxed to provide the guerrilla bands with food, arms, ammunition, clothes, money, and all the other requirements of war and life, and no-one escaped this levy. Pastoral nomads, urban merchants, agriculturists, even the police irregulars, made their contributions to maintain the rebellion. Even the tribal Shaikhs who received subsidies from the Government gave a tithe to 'Umar al-Mukhtar. The entire country was a capillary system of roots which fed from their hidden depths the visible foliage

of resistance. It was useless to try to destroy this plant of the 175*
resistance by striking at its visible foliage, for when the fighting 648*
bands were hard pressed, they dispersed and resided among 795*
the *sottomessi* for repose, recuperation, and refitting.[1] Serra, 619 •
looking back across the years of struggle, with their mixture of compromise and ruthlessness, optimism and disillusionment, tells the same sombre story. The implacable hostility of the Arabs to their Christian conquerors was as formless as it was ineradicable. Everybody and everything were against the invaders, but in a flaccid and crumbling opposition which inhibited a precise reaction. The enemy, he complains, habitually withdrew from the struggle. The environment offered nothing to the Italians and everything to the Bedouin, whose culture was unexacting and unpretentious. The Shaikhs had authority only so long as they opposed the Italians, and if they co-operated with them they lost it and could only regain it at Italian expense. The population was unstable, adventurous, and accustomed to such privations that they did not recognize the limits of resistance to the hardships of war. In one thing alone there was constancy and reality, the hatred they had for their Christian conquerors, which persisted in spite of all appearances and all protestations of friendship.[2] When Graziani took charge of the operations in 1930 he likened the Cyrenaican situation to 'a poisoned organism which sets up, on one point of the body, a purulent bube. The bube in this case was the fighting band of 'Umar al-Mukhtar, resulting from an entire infected situation.'[3]

In this semi-darkness of suspicion and uncertainty, this twilight of confidence, when every human being was a foe, the friend behind no less than the enemy in front, every thicket an ambush, and every crag and boss a sniper's nest, the campaign became distorted to unreality. It was a fantastic shadow-show in which dozens of unrelated episodes were thrown at the same time on to a gigantic screen.

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[1] 'La pacificazione della Cirenaica', *Rivista delle Colonie Italiane*, 1932, p. 330. [113]

[2] Op. cit., pp. 152-3. See also 'Che cosa è il Gebel Cirenaico', by the same writer, in *L'Oltremare*, May 1928.

[3] Op. cit., p. 64.

III

*175 What gave the Bedouin the courage to endure the hardships
*648 and bereavements of the struggle? Certainly those two great
*795 sentiments, patriotism and religion. I have said that the first
Italo-Sanusi war began as a war against Turkey and slowly became transformed into a war against the Sanusiya. The war against the Sanusiya also became transformed slowly into a simple struggle of the Bedouin for survival, for their lands and their freedom to live their ancient way of life; and in this struggle they felt themselves, in spite of all their cleavages and feuds, to be at one against the intruder. Beneath the surface of political expressions the issue was the same in both wars: whether the Italians could deprive the Bedouin of their lands and colonize them. Whether the Bedouin fought in the name of the Sultan or of the Sanusiya, or just fought, they always realized, from the first days of the struggle, that the issue was their right to live by their own laws in their own land. In the first war the outer bark of Turkish administration was stripped.
[619] In the second war the inner bark of Sanusiya organization was
ripped off, leaving bare beneath it the hard wood of the tribal
system.

*175 The war also, as wars have a way of doing, bared the religious
*648 content in the struggle. The Caliph had declared a religious war,
*795 but when the Caliphate no longer counted in Cyrenaica, or
721 indeed anywhere else, the war continued to be fought in the
798 name of a religious Order. With the destruction of the Sanusiya
619 it still went on in the name of religion. It then became simply
a war of Muslims to defend their faith against a Christian Power. Deep love of home and deep love of God nourished each other. In fighting for their lands and herds the Bedouin were fortified by the knowledge that they fought also for their faith. Without due appreciation of the religious feelings involved in the resistance it would, I think, be impossible to understand how it went on for so long against such overwhelming odds or how the tribes, with a long history of feuds dividing them, co-operated as much as they did under Sanusiya guidance.

*175 From their experiences in the first war the Italians had learned
*648 to expect that they would be more strongly resisted in Cyrenaica
*795
619

than in Tripolitania, and they had learned the reason for this: 175*
'Inasmuch as in Cyrenaica the opposition to our rule was not 648*
fractionized and enfeebled by the personal ambitions and 795*
rivalries of numerous chiefs, but was retrenched and assembled 619 •
around a single will, the Sanusiya, which manipulated it as it pleased.'[1] They started the war afresh in 1923 with this conclusion firmly fixed in their minds: *delenda est Sanusiya.* But they still believed, not understanding the place of the Order in tribal life, that the attachment of the Bedouin to it was superficial, that it was some kind of parasitic growth which could be cut out of the tribal system. They further believed that their incessant propaganda had already undermined the hold of the Order on the Bedouin.

The Sanusi family, as will be seen, played an inconspicuous 175*
and inglorious part in the resistance. Italian writers confess 648*
surprise that the Bedouin should have continued to show 795*
devotion to persons whose character displayed so few of those 793
qualities Bedouin admire. The Bedouin may indeed have 554
expected a higher standard of conduct than some members of the family lived up to, but they did not suppose that they would distinguish themselves as military leaders. They knew that the descendants of the Grand Sanusi had been brought up in the oases to a sedentary and bookish life and not in the hard way of their own children and that they were unsuited to the frugal and exhausting life of a guerrilla. Their duty, in most cases little in evidence in fulfilment, was to pursue holiness and learning that their presence among the people might bring down on them God's blessing. In the eyes of the Bedouin they lacked in full measure the manly qualities of courage and endurance that Bedouin demand in their own folk, but they were credited with the scholarship and sanctity of the religious, which Bedouin admire in their spiritual guides rather than seek to emulate in their own lives. Italian writers sometimes refer to a member of the family accompanying the guerrilla bands, as did Sayyid al-Hasan and Sayyid Saddiq, as having the role of a standard (*insegna*), a word which well describes their peculiar position in the resistance. Where in a man the qualities of *marabat*, holy man, and of *mujahid*, fighter for the faith, were combined, as in Sayyid Ahmad al-Sharif and Sidi 'Umar al-Mukhtar, the

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[1] Agostino Gaibi, *Storia delle Colonie Italiane*, 1934, p. 344.

*175 Bedouin followed them at great sacrifice. They were combined
*648 in many of the Sanusiya Brothers.

*795 The Shaikhs and Brothers of the Order, with few exceptions,
793 played a prominent part in the war, both in the field and by
554 keeping the Bedouin, submitted and unsubmitted alike, in a
ferment. The Italian soldiers and administrators constantly
*175 complained that whenever the Bedouin were tiring of the
*648 struggle the Brothers of the Order urged them to continue it.
● 619 It was their example and exhortations which made it something
793 more than the usual piecemeal resistance of a barbarous people
794 to colonial conquest or more than a succession of raids of the
kind Bedouin have enjoyed for so many centuries. Their participation
*795 made it both a national and a religious movement. It
did much also to establish the Sanusiya in the hearts of the
Bedouin. Some of the best-known names of the resistance, like
Salih Lataiwish, 'Abd al-Hamid al-'Abbar, Saifat and Muhammad
bu Farwa, Husain al-Juwaifi, Brahim al-Fallah, Fadil al-Mahashash,
and Qtait bu Musa, were those of Bedouin Shaikhs,
but most of the leading figures were Sanusiya *Ikhwan*, men like
'Umar al-Mukhtar, Yusif bu Rahil, Khalid al-Humri, Sharif
al-Mailud, 'Abd al-Qadir Farkash, Fadil bu 'Umar, Salih al-'Awwami,
and Muhammad bu Najwa al-Masmari.

*175 The indomitable Sidi 'Umar al-Mukhtar was the soul of the
*648 resistance and the struggle is always associated with his name
as similar struggles against French aggression in Algeria and
*795 Morocco are associated with the names of 'Abd al-Qadir and
793 'Abd al-Karim. Sidi 'Umar, 'our irreducible enemy, the faithful
159 and able servant of Idris, the heart and soul of the Cyrenaican
rebellion', as Graziani called him,[1] was that rare combination
of Bedouin and Sanusiya Shaikh. He was born about 1862 of
the '*Ailat* Farhan of the Braidan section of the Minifa tribe of
the Marmarica and was educated first at the Sanusiya school
at Janzur and afterwards at Jaghbub. He was nominated by
Sayyid Ahmad al-Sharif Shaikh of al-Qasur lodge among the
stubborn 'Abid tribe but only performed his duties there for
two years before being summoned to Kufra to serve against the
French in the Wadai. He returned to al-Qasur about 1906 and
later took a prominent part in the first Italo-Sanusi war and in
obstructing Italian penetration in the years of peace which

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[1] Op. cit., p. 235.

followed it. In 1923, when he was called to take the foremost 175*
part in the struggle, he was already over sixty years of age. 648*
He was a simple man, religious, courageous, contemptuous of 795*
worldly honours and success, and with singular tenacity and 793
powers of physical endurance. It may well be true that, as is 159
reported, Sayyid al-Mahdi said 'If we had ten men like 'Umar we would not need any more'.

IV

All the *adwar*, or guerrilla bands, on the plateau came under 175*
Sidi 'Umar's command and he signed himself *al-Naib al-'Amm*, 648*
the Representative-General (of the Sanusiya). Each Bedouin 795*
tribe, as in Enver's day, maintained its own guerrilla band, some 793
100 to 300 men strong. Towards the end of the war the guerrillas 701
never numbered, all told, more than 600 to 700. Only a certain 619 ●
number of men could maintain themselves on the country and move through it with speed and secrecy. As in other guerrilla wars, the actual fighting was done by small bands of enthusiasts, whose success nevertheless depended on the goodwill of the whole population. The bands suffered very heavy casualties, but were maintained at strength by a constant stream of adventurous spirits from submitted and unsubmitted sections alike. Though each band was named after a tribe and its members were chiefly recruited from that tribe and fought in its territory, they were not entirely recruited from it and they might fight anywhere. In each tribal band there were a good number of volunteers from other tribes and a sprinkling of *Ikhwan*, Sudanese, and Tripolitanians. The 'Awaqir and Magharba had separate bands while the other tribal bands usually fought in pairs, Hasa–'Abaidat, Bara'asa–Darsa, and 'Abid–'Arafa. A Misuratan contingent formed a small band of its own which greatly distinguished itself in the fighting. Each band had a simple organization: a commander, a *qaimaqam* for civil affairs, a qadi for religious and legal purposes, a commissariat agent, and a number of officers, some of whom had been trained
in Turkish regular units. Sidi 'Umar maintained discipline in [703]
the bands, and acts of pillage or personal vendetta were severely punished. Those of the guerrillas who possessed horses rode
them. The rest went on foot. Each band had its Sanusi flag. [186]

3:Evans-Pritchard E-4, 5 (1942-1944) 1949 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9
(1837-1942) Sanusi

*175 When things were quiet members of a band would have their
*648 families and herds with them and live in their own tents, but
*795 when pressed they left their women and children and beasts in
701 the tents of the submitted population and the only non-
619 combatants in their camps would then be a few female cooks.
[722] Before the end of the war many of the Patriots, including Sidi
'Umar, had sent their families to Egypt so that they could act
more freely.

*175 There was also a general administration for all the bands and
*648 this came directly under Sidi 'Umar. They maintained inter-
*795 communication and worked to a common strategy. Guerrilla
793 headquarters had also to arrange for the collection of a tithe
701 from the entire population to help pay for the expenses of the
619 campaign. Throughout the war Sidi 'Umar's tax-collectors were
[651] taking tithes from the submitted population, not always with-
out trouble, and were giving written receipts for the payments.
The tithe paid by each tribe went to support its own band. Sidi
[705] 'Umar had also to arrange for caravans to bring supplies from
Egypt, and to supervise their distribution to the armed forces
and the payment of customs dues on what went to the civilian
population. Sidi 'Umar also kept up correspondence with
Sayyid Idris and Sanusi elements and sympathizers in Egypt.

*175 The guerrilla bands were in constant contact with the enemy.
*648 One of the most striking features of the campaign was the
*795 frequency of the fighting. At some point or other on the plateau
a skirmish or larger engagement took place every few days for nearly nine years during the spring and summer months. In the account of the campaign which follows I mention but few of these fights, those which had exceptional importance for the campaign as a whole or as examples of the scale of the fighting. The few mentioned are therefore no indication of the amount of fighting. Its frequency may be judged by Gen. Graziani's statement that in the final year of the war, when resistance, compared with earlier years, was feeble and sporadic, there took place 53 engagements (*combattimenti*) and 210 skirmishes (*conflitti*).[1]

This incessant fighting cannot, as I have already said, be described in the language of text-book logistics in terms of manœuvring, objectives, and battles. Indeed, the Italians had

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[1] *Rivista delle Colonie Italiane*, vol. vi (I), 1932, pp. 52–3.

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Italians to occupy it on 21 April, the Birthday of Rome. This 648*
proved to be less favourable an augury than was hoped, for 795*
early in June two of their columns advancing from Ajadabiya [701]
on Marsa al-Braiqa were almost annihilated by Magharba
tribesmen.

Their experience in the *barqa* taught the Italians afresh the lesson of 1911 to 1915, that against Bedouin unwieldy columns advancing without concealment in a direct line on definite and fixed objectives could lead to little more than skirmishes, for the enemy was too wise to become involved in decisive action and mobile enough to avoid it; so they adopted the new tactics of making surprise raids by mechanized units on the Bedouin encampments, slaughtering man and beast indiscriminately, and destroying the grain stores. In these raids, on what in a non-colonial war would be regarded as the civilian population, the purpose was to kill as many of the Bedouin as possible, striking terror into the hearts of the shepherd folk of Cyrenaica. When the rains came and mechanized transport could no longer be used, the camps were bombed and machine-gunned from the air. The Bedouin suffered greatly from this persistent strafing, the Italian estimate of their losses—I must repeat that Italian [727]
figures are highly suspect—from [illegible] March to 3 September 1923 being 800 killed, 230 captured, and 1,000 wounded, besides about 700 camels and 22,000 sheep killed or confiscated. These losses were incurred only in the western part of Cyrenaica, for during the opening phase the rest of the country was quiet, except for minor skirmishes between Sidi 'Umar and the Italians in the Marmarica. At the end of the year the Sanusi [701]
forces had retired to country where they were less vulnerable, roughly to south and east of the line al-Braiqa–al-Qatafiya–Msus, with infiltrations everywhere along it towards the Italian posts.

The ease with which they had entered Ajadabiya and had 175*
raided and overcome resistance in the *barqa* generally had misled 648*
the Italians into believing that they would encounter little 795*
resistance elsewhere. They were further misled by the number 619 ●
of submissions they received at the commencement of the campaign: by the end of May 1923, 10,380 in the Ajadabiya zone, 3,417 in the Banghazi zone, and 7,000 in the zone of al-Marj; a total of 20,797 with 6,028 tents and more than 10,000

*175 *648 *795 ● 619 head of livestock, on which fines were levied for having taken part in the resistance. These submissions were from the less warlike Bedouin, those within easy reach of administrative centres, who had been taken by surprise and overwhelmed by the size of the Italian forces and their mechanized equipment, especially their planes, against the indiscriminate bombing and machine-gunning of which they had neither protection nor reply. They lacked the forest covering of the plateau tribes and the desert wastes into which the tribes of the Sirtica could retire. Moreover, the Italians had not yet realized that submission to protect families and herds did not exclude help in men, supplies, and intelligence to the fighting bands which continued resistance in country better suited to guerrilla warfare. The quietness of the plateau also deceived them. The Bedouin, unlike themselves, did not have an army ready to hand which could be sent into action at a moment's notice. It took the plateau tribes time to grasp what was happening and to form guerrilla groups. It also took the leaders of the Bedouin, both tribal Shaikhs and zawiya Shaikhs, time to accommodate themselves to Sayyid Idris's defection and vacillation, which seriously affected morale in Cyrenaica and Tripolitania and caused much coming and going between Cairo and the battlefields.

As the war entered its second phase in 1924–5 it soon became evident that neither the ponderous spectacular movements nor the mechanized raids on the camps which had been used in the flat *barqa* country were suited to the rugged and wooded plateau. The campaign rapidly assumed the character of guerrilla warfare, some of the features of which I have already outlined, with its tedious record of countless skirmishes and surprises. When the operational season opened in March 1924 the advanced Italian dispositions were on the west–east line al-Shlaidima–al-Abyar–Sidi Salim–Taknis–Marawa–Slanta–al-Fayidiya–Khawalan–al-Makhili. [901] The Sanusi 'regular army', mixed with tribal volunteers from the Magharba and southern 'Awaqir, was still unbeaten under al-Qazza in the eastern Sirtica between Ajadabiya and the Wadi al-Farigh. The tribal guerrilla bands under Sidi 'Umar were mostly on the southern slopes of the central plateau. They were chiefly recruited from the Bara'asa, 'Abid, and 'Awaqir tribes which had from the earliest days of the Italian occupation of Cyrenaica shown themselves most hostile to

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penetration, though they were assisted by contingents from the 648*
Darsa, Hasa, and 'Abaidat. 795*

In the fighting between March and June of 1924 the Italians 619●
reckoned that about 600 men of the 'Abid, Bara'asa, and [701]
northern 'Awaqir had been killed and 25,000 head of their live- [727]
stock had been captured. In the summer and autumn at least another 250 were killed and about 1,500 camels and 17,000 sheep and goats captured. In spite of these, what were to them very heavy, casualties, the Bedouin continued to harass Italian posts and communications. Salih Lataiwish with his Magharba tribesmen menaced Ajadabiya; Abu al-Qasim al-Zintani with an 'Awaqir band threatened the advanced Italian bases at al-Abyar, al-Rajma, and Banina; Sidi 'Umar with the 'Abid tribal band contained the posts in the al-Marj sector, and detachments under his lieutenant 'Ali bu Rahayyim operated against communications between al-Marj and Talmaitha; Husain Juwaifi's Bara'asa band worried the garrisons at al-Zawiya al-Baida, al-Fayidiya, and Slanta; and Qtait bu Musa with his Hasa and 'Abaidat volunteers was camped opposite Khawalan. Behind these detachments were the camps of the Bedouin who had not submitted, even in appearance, in the *sirwal*, the *barqa al-baida*, and along the southern slopes of the plateau everywhere. The Italians found it necessary to pause to consolidate gains of territory and to carry out a reorganization of their operational units.

Sidi 'Umar's strategy at the time, both as Commander of the 175*
'Abid band and as Commander-in-Chief of all the guerrilla forces 648*
on the plateau, was to hold its southern slopes. Their rugged 795*
desolation prevented the use of mechanized forces against him 701
and gave him tactical superiority over foot and horse patrols. From the slopes he was able both to menace the Italian posts and communications on the plateau and to cover the families of his fighting men in their camps to the south of it. The Italian answer to these tactics was obvious. They could not prevent guerrilla bands from circulating on the plateau in the cover of forest and deep ravines, but they had by this time established themselves in sufficient strength on the margin of the plateau, and had gained sufficient experience in the handling of mechanized patrols to attack the camps of non-combatants in the flat steppe country to the south. These camps were easily

*175 Teruzzi soon discovered that matters appeared in a different
*648 light to those in charge of the operations in Cyrenaica from that
in which they appeared to those sitting on committees at Rome.
*795 In spite of all their successes, their occupation of the main strongholds of the country, and the submission of the greater number of the tribal sections, the Italians of all ranks were far from happy. The enemy was still protean and ubiquitous. It was like fighting mosquitoes. They have to be killed one by one and there are always a few left. Next sunset they are back again in the same numbers as before. Italian difficulties were
*175 increased by the absence of any single policy towards the tribal
*648 sections taking no open part in the struggle. Teruzzi found in
the five Commissariats five different formulas of political action.[1]
*795 In the Banghazi district the submitted Bedouin were placed
● 619 under strict surveillance, being organized into armed groups to defend their property against guerrilla raids. This separated them from the Patriots but meant entrusting to the Bedouin a function rightly belonging to the Government. In the Barce (al-Marj) district, on the other hand, relations between the submitted and the guerrillas were tolerated. This enabled the Italians to make propaganda in the Patriot camps, but it still more effectively allowed the Patriots to incite the submitted to further resistance or to exact from them tribute as the price of tranquillity. In the Cirene (Shahhat) district the Hasa tribe had submitted and was concentrated in the cages (*reticolati*) of Marsa Susa and Shahhat. In the Darna and Marmarica districts the 'Abaidat tribesmen, who had submitted as early as 1915–16 and had remained peaceful since the renewal of hostilities in 1923, thereby relieving the Italians of the necessity of sending a large body of troops to eastern Cyrenaica, were becoming restless and were purchasing quiet by payment of tribute in money, provisions, and volunteers to Sidi 'Umar. Taking all in all, there was lacking in the submitted districts good administration, effective propaganda, and adequate force to back decisions.

*175 Teruzzi also found that, although almost unbroken success
*648 had been reported month by month in every part of the country
ever since the war began, even as late as the middle of 1927 the
*795 Italians had little real control beyond the immediate vicinity

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[1] Op. cit., p. 37.

*175 situation which had developed there in 1915 seemed likely to
*648 develop again. Concerted operations from Cyrenaica and
Tripolitania were, therefore, planned. To facilitate them from
*795 the Cyrenaican side the Italian line was advanced in March 1927 from Qaminis–Tailimun–Suluq–al-Shlaidima to Ajadabiya–Sawunnu–Msus; and Teruzzi, always an advocate of combining political with military action, decided to try what

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

The Italian conquest of Cyrenaica.

diplomacy could do to ease the task of the soldiers. He had
[793] some success, with the aid of the treacherous Sanusiya Shaikh
Sharif al-Ghariyani, in that he was able to arrange a meeting in
[619] June in the *barqa al-baida* with a number of tribal Shaikhs and to persuade 13 of those belonging to the Magharba Shammakh to make submission. This pacification of the Magharba near Ajadabiya, indispensable to operations in the Sirtica, had an immediate result in the uncontested occupation of al-Qatafiya towards the end of September and of al-'Aqaila a few days later. Sayyid Saddiq al-Rida collected a small force to the south of the Wadi al-Farigh to prevent a further advance but neither he nor his father, a man lacking both vigour and spirit, had the character of the Bedouin and both were wavering. The son entered into correspondence with the Italians and the father

*175 *648 rather than of capital. For these and for political reasons the plan was abandoned and Balbo decreed in 1939 that only the Bedouin might own herds for nomadic pastoralism. This excluded both Italian colonists and urban merchants and left most of the southern slopes of the plateau, the steppe at their termination and on the *barqa*, and Cyrenaica's two arid wings, the Marmarica and the Sirtica, to those Bedouin who preferred to continue their ancient shepherds' way of life.

*175 *648 ● 619 The loss of their best land could not by itself disrupt the social life of the Bedouin. It was necessary at the same time to destroy their social organization. As a first step in this direction an attempt was made to undermine the influence of the tribal Shaikhs. In the early days of their partial occupation of Cyrenaica the Italians continued, because they had no choice, the Turkish administrative divisions and their policy of consultation with the Shaikhs, confining the duties of Italian officials to inspection and advice, though native participation was illusory.[1] This policy was carried to excess in the Basic Law of 1919 which gave extensive powers to a local Parliament of representatives elected from the tribes and urban centres with ex-officio and nominated members who were not to exceed in number a sixth of the elected members. For administrative purposes the Shaikhs of each sub-tribe and the Shaikh al-Mashayakh of each tribe were recognized as such by decree. By official recognition as tribal Shaikhs of large numbers of men of no great importance in tribal life the status of Shaikh was lowered in the eyes of the Bedouin, and official subsidies to these Shaikhs occasioned much rancour between individuals and sections.

The Fascists revoked the Law of 1919 and reversed the tribal policy of the liberal period. Administration was in future to be as direct as could be—straightforward military rule of a beaten people without use of intermediaries and without tribal co-operation through their leaders. Graziani told his audience at the Fascist Institute of Culture: 'Direct rule will not be an empty phrase, because chiefs and sub-chiefs are going to be abolished; I have withdrawn them from circulation.' He went on to say: 'They will be replaced by old battalion N.C.O.s (*graduati*) made worthy of such employment by services

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[1] Mondaini, op. cit., p. 327.

rendered in fighting faithfully for Italy.' On this point Balbo, 175*
who replaced Graziani, was equally emphatic: 'Chiefs do not 648*
exist any more—there are only citizens with equality of duties 619 ●
and rights.'[1] Tribal Shaikhs, therefore, were not asked to advise
the Government or to co-operate with it in any official capacity
and the subsidies they had received in the pre-Fascist and early
Fascist periods were withdrawn. Cyrenaica under the Fascists
was administered by decrees issued by a Governor directly
responsible to the Minister for the Colonies at Rome. Under the [646]
Organic Law of 1927 a General Council with very limited
advisory functions was allowed for, and Arabs chosen from the
notables of the sedentary population and Shaikhs of the Bedouin
tribes could be nominated to sit on it by the Minister for the
Colonies on the recommendation of the Governor. Its constitutional
importance was nil, because it never came into operation.
It was replaced by the Law-Decree of 1934, by which 175*
Tripolitania and Cyrenaica became a single colony with the 648*
seat of its administration at Tripoli. The new colony was divided 631
into four commissariats (Tripoli, Misurata, Bengasi, and Derna) 619
and a military territory of the Sahara. Each commissariat came
under a Prefect and was divided into administrative sections:
departments, residencies, and districts, all under Italian officials.
It was recognized that the Bedouin were divided into tribes and
sub-tribes. At the head of each was a Shaikh chosen in accordance
with tribal custom and nominated by the Head of a
commissariat. The Shaikh of a tribe was personally responsible
to the competent Italian authority for order and security within
the tribal territory. His functions and powers were those
accorded him by tribal custom. The Shaikhs of the sub-tribes
came under his control and had within their sub-tribal areas
functions analogous to his. All that this meant was that certain
tribal Shaikhs were recognized as such in so far as they were held
responsible for any shortcomings of the Bedouin, but were
accorded no privileges and had no representation. Consultative
councils, where allowed for, were composed of administrative
officials. So long as the Bedouin obeyed the Government and 175*
submitted to whatever curtailments of their freedom and rights 648*
it chose to enact, they could stew in their own juice until the 619

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[1] Italo Balbo, *La Politica Sociale Fascista verso gli Arabi della Libia*, 1938. [113]

*175 *648 Italians had more leisure to devote to breaking up tribal life altogether.

[619] The final decree of the Fascists affecting Arab status was issued in 1939. It incorporated Tripolitania and Cyrenaica within the Kingdom of Italy, and to quiet any dismay this might cause among the Effendiya of the towns it offered them certain privileges, mostly nominal. The decree in no way affected the Bedouin. Indeed very little of the unceasing flow of legislation which poured from the Italian bureaucrats and lawyers in the form of Laws, Royal-Decrees, Royal-Law-Decrees, Ministerial Decrees, and Governatorial Decrees affected the Bedouin. The vast majority of these rules and regulations in no way touched their lives and they remained in blissful ignorance of their content. They had little or no money, they settled their own cases with the aid of their Shaikhs and religious teachers, they made their own trading arrangements, they provided their own labour, and so on. Where a law affected them it could often be eluded or circumvented. As the Bedouin [181] themselves say, '*Sama' min gher ta'a*', 'To hear without obeying', is one of their chief characteristics. The Italians in any case, sitting comfortably in their offices and entirely out of touch with the people, relied on their Cyrenaican police and minor officials to report breaches of regulations, and if they did not choose to do so, the law became a dead letter. Also it cannot be assumed that because there were regulations great efforts were always made to enforce them. 'The gap between the letter of the law and daily practice, wide in all countries, becomes an abyss in Italy.'[1]

With all their regulations and petty interference the Italians were most careful not to offend Arab opinion in religious matters. From the moment of their invasion of Libya they vociferated their respect for Arab custom, culture, and religion. Thus the Minister Bertolini said to the Arabs in a discourse at Tripoli in 1914: 'We will respect your religion and your customs; we know the splendour with which your civilization has already illumined the world and we do not intend in any way to threaten it. . . .'[2] The Italians prided themselves on their Islamic policy and claimed that as a result of it and of their justice and of their

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[1] James Meenan, *The Italian Corporative System*, 1944, p. 340.

[2] Mondaini, op. cit., pp. 327–8.

their rights in it, and this presented no more difficulty to the 175*
lawyers than the discovery of a formula to cover confiscation of 648*
the Sanusiya properties had done. 167

Ancient rights in the lands of Cyrenaica rested with the 175*
Sa'adi tribes and whatever tribal fragments they permitted to 648*
reside there by grace. Disputes about ownership had been 423
settled either by war or through discussion between the groups 619 ●
concerned in them, sometimes with the aid of Turkish officials [795]
or Marabouts, particularly of the Shaikhs of Sanusiya lodges [578]
after the Order had become established in the country. In 1858 the Ottoman Government, under pressure of Western ideas, promulgated a land code in all parts of the empire, and to put it into effect in Cyrenaica the Governor, Khalil Sami Pasha (1863–8), appointed a committee which declared the lands round Banghazi and Darna to be for the use of these towns and the rest of the country for the use of the tribes in occupation of it, except for barren hills and deserts which, like woods and roads, were regarded as the natural demesne of the State. The tribal boundaries of to-day were finally fixed by this committee, though the fixing of them was less an adjudication than a recording of existing conditions.

The new Turkish land code operated in the towns and just outside them and was not applied to tribal lands and grazing grounds, and the tribes were not asked to acquire a title to their lands by registration of them. This would have been an impossible task, and the Turks were in any case too wise to meddle with Bedouin lands, knowing that the Bedouin would not have consented to change or interference of any kind. Nevertheless the State claimed all tribal lands not bearing buildings or plantations as *miri*, public demesne, and from a legal point of view it was in virtue of this absolute and residuary ownership that it taxed the tribal occupiers and users of the land. This was a legal formalism which made no difference to anyone since the Government had neither the wish nor the power to exploit the lands and accepted that the tribes had rights of use, the *tassaruf*, in them in perpetuity. The Italian Land Registry, created in 1913 on the basis of the Turkish registers, followed Turkish practice in this matter, classing tribal lands as State demesne in which the occupiers had rights of use, and also in allowing tribal disputes to be settled by tribal custom, which

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the Italians called *Sa'adi* law. In 1923 the Land Registry, which had hitherto restricted its attention to urban properties, took the first steps towards an assessment of tribal lands and by the end of 1932 had registered in the name of the Colony 120,790 hectares, a large part of which was already marked for colonial settlement. The lands were acquired by 'natural right' (9,124 Ha.), by purchase, expropriation, and renunciation (43,441 Ha.), and by confiscation of Sanusiya estates (62,225 Ha.) and of properties of persons fighting in patriot bands and classed as rebels against the State (6,000 Ha.). However, expropriation for purposes of public utility and purchase were found to be slow, expensive, inadequate, and, in the political circumstances, inopportune methods of acquiring land for colonial settlement. Both also led to most complicated disputes about the distribution of the compensation in a country where every member of a tribe had preemptive rights of some degree in all its lands. In 1928 a new system was therefore adopted. The State in virtue of its supreme authority asked the owners of the lands considered useful to the State to renounce their rights in them. Compensation was to be divided equally among the various participants in the *tassaruf.*

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No action of the kind allowed for in the new decrees was, or could be, taken till the Bedouin had been subdued. It would have been useless to attempt to register the lands of the Bedouin in the name of the State on those parts of the plateau in which the guerrillas still operated freely, and to have attempted to register them in the submitted areas would merely have driven the population to renewed revolt. Action does not seem to have been taken till 1935–6 and it was then taken in a form which is said to have disgusted even some of the lawyers. Proclamations covering the lands required for colonial settlement were drawn up and it was stated in them that the particular lands to which each referred were State property and that if no objection were raised by a certain date they would be registered in the name of the State. The proclamations were published by being fixed to official notice-boards in the Land Department and municipalities, but they were not published on the lands concerned, or anywhere near them, so that the Bedouin, even had they any idea of what the procedure was, and even could they have read the proclamations, did not in

174 613 551 562 not male names are used, is assumed; and secondly that the Bedouin are polygamous. If, then, half-brother differentiation or full sibling unity is to be shown genealogically, the obvious way in which this can be done is to use a maternal name in the genealogy. Thus, in the Cyrenaican genealogy, a number of tribal groups will be shown as sons of a particular father. If differentiation of these groups needs to be shown, this can be effected by clustering the groups round, say, two female names (the names of the respective mothers) thereby making the two clusters of groups stand in the relationship of paternal half brothers. The concept of the 'one womb', of maternal origin, is a critical one in the context of social cohesion, but it does not deny patriliny; on the contrary, it serves in a sense to reinforce it. Female names can be used to show a greater notion of cohesion than the mere use of male names, and the significance of a female name placed at the apex of the Cyrenaican genealogy is that it is the symbol of full brother unity at the highest political level.

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173 613 619 The founding ancestress Sa'ada is credited with two sons, who in turn are considered to be the founding ancestors of the two largest groups of tribes in Cyrenaica. Each of these sons is said to have begottten two sons, as shown on the accompanying genealogy. The next generation shows a total of nine names, and these nine ancestors are considered to be the founding ancestors of the nine noble tribes of Cyrenaica.[2] Continuing the line of descent of one of these tribes—the Magharba—the same pattern of segmentation repeats itself: the tribe is divided into two primary sections having ar-Ra'aid and ash-Shamakh as the respective founding ancestors. Ash-Shamakh is said to have had four sons, and these are the founding ancestors of four secondary sections. These latter four are credited with a varying number of sons, as shown in the genealogy (Fig. 18-1).

One feature of the Cyrenaican genealogy immediately stands out from this brief description: the uniformity in the number of segments at the various levels of segmentation. Along the line of descent from Sa'ada to Nasr, the number of sons shown in the

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[162] [2] One of these, the 'Ailat Fayid, now only numbers about 150 souls, and although it is given the structural position of a tribe in the genealogy, it scarcely merits this distinction in practice.

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
SA'ADA
(1)
BARAGHITH
'AQQARA
(2)
BARAGHUTH AL-SGHAIR
JIBARNA
HARABI
'ALI
(In Egypt)
TRIBES
(3)
'ABID
'ARIF
'AWAQIR
MAGHARBA
DARSA
HASA
BARA'ASA
'AILAT FAYID
ABAIDAT
(4) PRIMARY
AL-RA'AIDAT
AULAD AL-SHAMAKH
(5) SECONDARY
'ALI
MANSUR
NASR
SUBH
(6) TERTIARY
13
6
4
4
MADHKUR
HAIBA
AL-DAWWAS
UMBARAKA

FIG. 18-1 GENEALOGY 1. The names given in this genealogy are the tribal names in use. All are derivatives of personal names of ancestors, like all tribal names, except for some nicknames (e.g. Baraghith means 'the fleas') and a few which refer to a general location (e.g. the Magharba means the 'Westerners'). [551]

first four descending generations is two. At the fifth level the number increases to four and finally, at the sixth level there characteristically occurs a marked irregularity in the number of descendants forming the founding ancestors of the tertiary sections. 173 613 619

Another feature of the Cyrenaican genealogy is that its branches show an intimate relationship with ecological areas. Thus, the major division into two branches stemming from Sa'ada represents the eastern and western halves of the country with associated and clear differences in ecology. Continuing the line of descent, the Jibarna and Baraghith groups of tribes occupy plain and mountain foot-hills respectively. The two Jibarna tribes in turn occupy two distinct kinds of plain. Following now the division of the Magharba tribe, its two primary sections are divided by a very conspicuous dry valley. The four secondary divisions of the Aulad ash-Shamakh primary section likewise show a relation to ecological boundaries, albeit on a smaller scale than those previously referred to, but none the less important in this more local context. Finally, the unevenly numbered tertiary sections which are derived from these four 613 619 13 182

613
619 secondary sections, in their very unevenness, show a more sensitive
13 relation to more detailed ecological differences.

182 At all levels of segmentation, therefore, a high degree of consistency between the ecological divisions of the country and the genealogical divisions can be shown. Indeed the relationship is so close that it is tempting to consider the contemporary pattern of things as the only one possible. What historical evidence [167] exists is against such a view being taken. It is known that tribes have been displaced in the past, some of them or sections of them having been pushed out into Egypt, and others having altered their position. This being so, there obviously cannot be any finality about the present distribution of tribes in relation to the ecological divisions of the country. Rather, the existing pattern is one of a number of possible permutations. Again, as the relation between groups of people to their environment becomes progressively sensitive with the decrease in the size and order of the group, then the more unstable will be the relationship between the two. Conversely the greater the size and order of the group the more persistent will be its relationship to the ecology. In other words, the major ecological divisions are more fundamental in their effect on the way of life and the economy of people, whereas the more detailed ecological differences between, say, tertiary sections have a relatively minor effect. The [233] [433] ecological differences between the wooded plateau area with its cow and goat herding economy, and the arid semi-desert area with its camel and sheep herding economy has a much more profound effect on the general way of life, and is a more persistent division, than that which exists between two tertiary sections where the differences may only be in topographical details.

While therefore, the division of people into groups of various sorts is not permanently fixed in relation to ecological divisions, there is always an intimate relationship between the two which is progressively more enduring as the order of the structural segment increases. Yet even this statement of the relationship, guarded as it is, does not suffice, for the pattern and distribution of tribes and their sections at any given moment are not only a function of ecology, but they are also the result of a number of other complex factors which may be operating to reinforce or to

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[182]

complicate the more direct relationship of the distribution of groups of people to the ecology.[3]

The Cyrenaican genealogy, then, is a conceptualization of a hierarchy[4] of ordered territorial segments. The groups stemming from the ancestor at the third order of segmentation are referred to as tribes, and each tribe is the apex of a three-tiered order of segments, which, following customary practice, are referred to as primary, secondary, and tertiary. The latter, the tertiary segment, 621 represents the group of people who, for a period of six to eight 613 months, gather together and live in what, for all intents and purposes, is a single discrete residential group.[5] This tertiary group is also the smallest political group. It has its own homeland, with its [423] water supplies, pastures, and ploughland. In this homeland live most of its members. It is a lineage segment, and most of the agnates of this segment live on their own homeland.[6] It is also the [682] vengeance group, which means that any one of its members can [628] be killed in vengeance for a homicide committed by any other, and that the obligation to exact vengeance falls on all members alike, regardless of relationship to the victim. Likewise, its members pay blood money as a group, and although when they receive it, a bigger portion goes to the nearest agnate of the victim, the remainder is distributed equally among all its members. The number of generations which supervene between the founding ancestor of a tertiary segment and the living is usually four or five, but there is little consistency in this number. Some tertiary

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[3] This part of the discussion is necessarily brief, but further amplification will appear in two subsequent articles now in preparation, one of which is concerned with a general treatment of Cyrenaican genealogies, and the other with a discussion of the effects of ecology on the social organization of the Bedouin. [114]

[4] I use the word hierarchy here since, although segments of any order display many like features, the orders represent distinct and progressively more embracing interests, and these differences are of such consequence that to consider one order of groups as a facsimile of a superior or inferior order can only lead to confusion. A tertiary group, that is to say, may possess many of the characteristics of a secondary group, but the one is a fundamentally different sort of group from the other, as I shall show in my forthcoming article on the feud. (cf. Smith, M. G. 1956.) [128]

[5] This statement does not apply to the Darsa and the Hasa tribes, two of [619] the plateau tribes in Cyrenaica. The statements in this article are confined [128] almost exclusively to the camel herders of the semi-desert.

[6] This, admittedly, is too general a statement to make about such an important issue, but I would prefer to leave its documentation and precision for an article on the analysis of the composition of Bedouin camps.

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If, moreover, the view of a genealogy as a continually expanding line of descent is to be accepted, it must be accepted also that large structural units, even in conditions of population stability, are to experience a continuous re-ordering of their structural relationships. In practice, what this means is that a tribe of, say 20,000 souls cease to be tribesmen of a named tribe and instead all become members of an almost identical group but with a different name. To take an example from the genealogy given [162] on page 365: the Magharba tribe shown there has a total population of some 13,000 souls. If proliferation affected the topmost limits of this tribe, the apical name disappears and presumably the name of one of the primary sections is to be substituted. That is, half the tribe would have to take on the lineage name of their opposed primary section. The only alternative to the use of the name of a primary segment as a substitute for the abandoned tribal name is the acceptance by 13,000 people of a totally new name, which is most unlikely.

It is reasonable to assume therefore, that the genealogy, in its general form, is fixed for long periods of time at least. This still leaves the problem of how and where adjustments are made to face the contingencies of birth and death, of the succession of generations, and of the irregular increases and decreases of population among the tertiary segments. An important clue lies in the number of segments which appear at the various orders of segmentation. From Sa'ada, the founding ancestress, in the line which runs to Nasr, each ancestor is shown as having a pair of sons for four orders of segmentation. At the fifth generation from Sa'ada—this is now the secondary order of segmentation within the tribe—the number of sons increases to four. Not all tribes will show the same number of sons at each generation as the Magharba—some, for example, might show three instead of two at the primary order—but what is true of all tribes is that there is evident consistency in the number down to and including the fifth generation from Sa'ada; if, that is to say, one of a tribe's primary segments is divided into three secondary sections, the other one or two, as the case may be, will be divided likewise. Throughout the tribes in Cyrenaica, then, segmentation of orders superior to the tertiary segments shows a pronounced consistency in their numbers.

613 At the next level of segmentation (this now being the tertiary
619 order in any given tribe) the number of segments which appear
621 is conspicuously irregular. For the Magharba tribe, the four secondary segments, 'Ali, Mansur, Subh and Nasr are divided into
thirteen, six, four, and four segments respectively. Similar irregularity appears in other tribes.[11] The pattern of the genealogy
is always one of regularity in the number of segments at all points
in it except for the point of tertiary segmentation where conspicuous irregularity becomes immediately evident. Since these
613 segments constitute the summer camps of the Bedouin, this is not
619 surprising, for these small groups will show greater susceptibility
621 to details of local water supplies, pasturing facilities, ploughland
133 areas, and topographical features than would the numerically
larger and structurally superior groups occupying larger areas of
182 territories of greater ecological importance. If we follow the line
131 from Sa'ada to Nasr again, the bifurcation at the first order of
segmentation is consistent with the division of the country into
the permanently green high altitudes of the plateau, and the extended low-lying plain area of the western half of the country.
[134] Between the territory of the Magharba tribe ('The White Plain')
and that of its neighbour tribe, the 'Awaqir ('The Red Plain'),
there is a major soil difference, which is such a conspicuous feature of the landscape, and so sharply defined, that one is almost
aware when one has crossed the tribal boundary. Within the
Magharba tribe, a prominent dry river valley cuts the territory
in two, the landscape to the west of it being characteristically
serrated, making travel in an east-west direction difficult, while
to the east the landscape is much more docile and undulating.
The four sections of the ash-Shamakh branch again represent
four quite distinct areas. The territory of one section is almost
conterminous with the narrow belt of sand dunes along the coast;
the territory of another is a block of rough and tumbled land in
the west; the territory of a third, in the centre, is made up of a
few low-lying shallow valleys; and the territory of the fourth,

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[114] [11] It is necessary here to warn the reader that, brilliant an ethnographer as Agostini undoubtedly was, his grouping of tribal sections is not always correct. I had his book (Agostini 1922–23) with me in the field and checked his tribal survey. I found that at several important points his ordering of the segments was incorrect. I should add that the differences between Agostini and myself are not due to the kind of changes discussed in this article.

stretching across to the village of Ajadabiya in the east, topples 613
in undulations away into the flat expanses of the desert to the 619
south. At all these points of segmentation, the territories occupied 621
by the various sections are large and roughly defined, and 133
the population aggregates supported on these territories run from 182
over a thousand at one end to tens of thousands at the upper 131
limits. The tertiary sections are numerically much smaller, some
of them numbering as few as a hundred souls in all, and the
territories to which they are attached are correspondingly
smaller. The relationship between the numbers in this order of
section, and the precise amount of water available in the local
wells is an intimate one. If the population of one of these groups
increases, or if the number of animals rises, or if the springs show
a decline in the volume of water they give forth, or if the winter
rainfall has allowed the storage in wells of only a small quantity
of water, a rearrangement of the group must be effected. A significant
alteration of any one of these components must mean
that the local group must split to enable a new adjustment to be
made in the relationship of man and animals to water.

Whatever changes occur within groups of any size, since the 173
genealogy embraces the entire population, these must appear on 178
the genealogy in some way or other. Now a genealogy is as rigid 829
a framework, as fixed and final a pattern of grouping, as can be 613
imagined. The impression that they are thus rigid and fixed, except 551
for the addition of successive generations, is strengthened
by the way in which the Bedouin use them. From their young
boys to their old men, the Bedouin are expert genealogists, and
the names of ancestors, for one reason or another, are never far
from their lips. Names are kept alive by constant use, since all [571]
references to inter-group relationships must be in terms of these
names. More than this, the Bedouin were proud to the point of 173
boastfulness of their genealogical knowledge, and, wherever I 829
travelled, the first request I had to comply with was to take down 613
a large portion of a tribal genealogy. In recording their endless 551
genealogies, one feature about them came to assume increasing 123
interest; while there was remarkable unanimity with regard to 126
most of the names given, there was one point of marked ambiguity—at
the tertiary level of segmentation. I recorded genealogies
in four tribes on an extensive scale, and in each tribe

There are, in Cyrenaica, three major status groups among the 619
tribes: the noble or free-born tribesmen (*al-Hurr*), those who 554
have been adopted or grafted on to a tribe (the *Laff*), and the 608
clients (*Marabtin*).

Those who claim to be free-born also claim ownership of the 619
natural resources. The *Laff* do not own these. They are people 608
thought not to have originally been of the lineage of the tribe 621
with which they are resident. They are found sometimes in ones 613
and twos in the camps of the free-born, but sometimes constituting [423]
tertiary groups themselves. Now when such people have resided 619
with their free-born hosts for several years and one of them 608
has married one of the host's daughters, they are grafted to the 613
genealogy at the point of tertiary segmentation, that is, where 621
ambiguity occurs in the genealogy. Obviously, persons thus 173
grafted to the lineage cannot be shown as descendants of one
of the living or of the recently dead, remembered perhaps by
some of the elders still living. It is equally true to say that they
cannot be grafted to the lineage at a point superior to that of
the tertiary segments, since this would involve recognition by a
number of tertiary groups whose members may know little or
nothing about them. When a person enters a new tribe, the only
way in which he can do so is to go to live in a camp, and it is the
concern of the people of that particular camp whether or not they
accept him, since it is they who have to decide whether their
resources are sufficient to support a newcomer. Once a man has
been accepted as a full member of a tertiary section, membership
of superior tribal sections is automatic, although to enter into
tribal membership he requires the permission of members of a
tertiary section only. To graft at a point superior to the tertiary
would be the same as giving a man superior structural status, but
without a camp in which to dwell. There is only one place for
his incorporation, and that is where the ambiguity in the genealogy
permits manipulation to include new lines. In this way the [597]
adoption of a person into a lineage does not offend the sense of
kinship of the receiving group since the point of inclusion is an
ancestor about whom little or nothing is known and whose authenticity
is frequently doubted by some. What has been referred
to as an area of ambiguity is, moreover, something of a jumble of
names, and it is not a difficult matter, if a new line has to be

619 attached somewhere along the line, to attach it to one of these
608 names. Bedouin welcome, as members of their camps, practically
613 anyone who wishes to join, even, in the case of one group, an
621 Italian. The limit to this acceptance of members is, of course, the
173 number of people who can be supported by the local resources.
If people are being admitted freely to membership of a particular
[182] camp, this means that there is a local surplus of land and water,
so that the number of grafts being supported by any particular section is a useful index of the extent to which the resources are being used. Conversely, as sometimes happens when grafted elements become numerous, or when the water supply, for various reasons, dwindles, it may be necessary to detach a grafted group.
[578] Such action is always the occasion of a violent dispute, usually
over watering rights, and not infrequently fights break out. Whether or not the grafted group wins, from then onwards it will be forced to exist as an independent group, and a new tertiary section will have been born. No matter which of the processes involving grafts is considered—incorporation or detachment—both are contained within the framework of the tertiary section, without any effect on the rest of the structure.

619 The position of the clients, in the context of this discussion, is
not unlike that of the grafts. Briefly, clients are men who are con-
[423] sidered to have originated from a country other than Cyrenaica,
and who for this reason cannot claim rights to land and water—at least this is the theory, although in some circumstances they are able to do so successfully. They are of various kinds, but they are not included in the genealogies given by the free-born. Clients are found grouped in two main ways. There are some large groups which constitute tribes in the sense that they display a genealogical and territorial organization like those of the free-born, and are usually to be found flanking the main tribes of the country on their borders. Some of these are powerful groups and enjoy considerable independence of action, but whatever their characteristics they none the less speak of themselves as 'for' or tied to the noble tribe whose territory includes theirs. Further,
619 the sections of these client tribes have their special ties with
571 tertiary sections of the noble tribes, which are not merely ties of
621 sentiment, but which take the form of valuable mutual help in a
613 number of situations. A whole client tribe, in the sense that it is

occupying territory which cannot be said to belong to any par- 619
ticular section of their noble patron tribe, is tied to the patron 571
tribe as such. Yet it is through the small tertiary segments that 621
these ties are made effective. In this sense, a client tribe is a com- 613
bination of small groups of people each group having specific
relationships with defined tertiary sections, and participating in
the tribe of their patrons through these relationships.

Secondly, clients are found distributed in small groups, some- 619
times no more than one or two men, but often in clusters large 621
enough to compose a small camp. Practically all tertiary sections 613
of the noble tribes have some clients either living with them or
sharing their resources. While clients continue to reside with a 619
particular tertiary section, it is the members of the latter who are 621
responsible for them and vice versa. If, for example, one of the 613
clients commits a homicide, the gathering of blood-money is the 672
responsibility of the noble tertiary section to which he is at- [682]
tached, and vengeance can be exacted on any member of the
noble section. In other circumstances, when the offender is a
nobleman, then the clients of his group are the first to be ap-
proached for blood-money. Tied in this way to a particular 619
tertiary section, they are not, however, compelled to reside with 621
its members permanently. On the contrary, they may be forced 182
to move. If, for example, there is a pressure on local water sup- 166
plies, the first to feel it are the clients. Annually, they supplicate 613
for the use of water, and if their patrons decide that there is insufficient to meet all needs, the request is refused, albeit reluctantly. Clients constitute a socially mobile group; they are the pawns in the annual readjustment of men to their resources. Whenever they move, they pass on to another tertiary section, which may be a collateral section of the one they have left or structurally far removed from it, but as soon as they leave one, their duties and obligations cease and are taken up anew with another structurally like group. It is because their attachment is to a tertiary section, and not to one of superior order, that they can be as socially mobile as they are, which in turn facilitates a more efficient adjustment to the ecological situation from year to year.

Small groups of clients move frequently, groups of adopted people less frequently, and groups composed of the free-born

619 change their structural position only rarely. The latter change
621 sometimes does, however, occur, and there is evidence to show
182 that it does. For example, Agostini (1922–23, p. 323) in his tribal
survey, records a section named Barsha as one of the groups stem-
166 ming from Nasr.[12] In the genealogies I was given, the name did
613 not appear, and even after some questioning, what information
was known about it was concealed. Some time later the name
[578] cropped up accidentally in conversation, and I was then told that
at one time it had been one of the Nasr groups, but that after a
quarrel during a year of water shortage, the Barsha folk went
to live with people with whom they had maternal connexions,
and in whose territory there was ample water that year, and
never returned. The group, a tertiary one, was detached from the
tertiary point of segmentation in the genealogies, and tied on to
a tertiary group of another tribe in its new homeland.

To summarize briefly the argument thus far, the mechanical
178 devices of telescoping, fusion of names, the ejection of those
173 names which cease to be of any social consequence, and the
619 elision of names at or around the fifth ascending generation,
621 taken together point to the importance of the tertiary order of
613 segmentation in discussing the problem of maintaining the form
of the genealogy constant in face of its natural tendency to alter;
further, evidence of changes (adoption into a lineage, detach-
ment from it, the inclusion and exclusion of clients) was pre-
sented, and this again led to the conclusion that the tertiary point
of segmentation is critical in this respect. This being so, the man-
[128] ner in which change actually occurs, still remains to be shown,
and this is best done, perhaps, by discussing the mode of pro-
liferation of tertiary segments. In order to do this adequately, it
is necessary to say something briefly about certain features of
Bedouin marriage.

Among the Bedouin there exists a preferential form of marriage
582 between a man and his father's brother's daughter. Parallel
605 cousin marriage of this sort carries with it the exclusive right of
a man to this cousin. Without his consent no one else can marry
her, and to attempt to do so would be to risk the marriage ar-
rangements being nullified after negotiations had almost been

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[114] [12] Barsha's position is incorrectly given as a sub-group of Haiba; it should be shown as structurally equivalent to Haiba. See also note 11.

121 given to the feud, for this is one of the few societies in which it occurs.[1] What is
613 meant here by a state of feud is a set of relationships between two tribal groups which
578 are characterized by hostility whenever two or more of their members meet. These
591 hostilities are of a sort which cannot be terminated; feud is not a matter of a group
121 indulging in hostilities here at one moment and there the next, but a sequence of
619 hostilities which, as far as the contemporary Bedouin are concerned at least, know
578 no beginning and are insoluble. Feud and the other forms of relationships to be
[591] discussed presently are to be understood, in part, by reference to the ordered divisions
of the tribes. It is necessary at the outset, therefore, to give a brief statement about
the tribal organization; other details will be included as they become relevant.

619 There are nine noble tribes in Cyrenaica whose members are referred to as freemen.
621 These tribes see themselves as divided into three genealogical orders of sections:
primary, secondary, and tertiary. The tertiary tribal sections correspond to the camps
613 which cluster around the larger watering points during the drought season, May to
[132] November. Such camps consist of clusters of smaller camps in which the concentration of agnatically related males is over 80 per cent. Within the latter kinship links
are known, so that these agnates are consanguinely related as well as politically
[162] united. The populations of most tertiary groups vary from about 200 to 700 or so,
but a group ceases to be viable if the number of male adults drops much below fifty.
Political division is absent from these tertiary groups, regardless of their precise
size, for, whatever may be the condition of developing local lineages, the acceptance
of a common name carries with it full political responsibility incumbent equally on
[423] all their members. Each of these tertiary sections, moreover, has its own watering
point, ploughland, and pastures; each has its own *watan* or homeland. This statement
is true of all tribal sections of whatever order of segmentation. In other words, the
tribes and their sections correspond to an ordered division of the territory.

619 Names of tribal sections are the same as those given in the genealogies. Both tribe
613 and lineage are identically ordered. Lineages develop, and split at the tertiary order
of segmentation,[2] and, *a fortiori*, the process is the same for the tertiary tribal sections.
Split, in other words, occurs where relationships are most intense.

621 The summer community which constitutes a tertiary section, breaks up once the
221 rains begin in November or December. At this time of the year water is readily
available in the numerous small cisterns, there is pasture in plenty, and the animals
are giving milk. These combined reasons lead the larger summer camp to divide
into smaller camps of some five to ten tents. The latter are separated one from the
other by short distances—a mile or so—but together form a cluster in that they are
621 territorially distinguishable from a neighbouring and similar group of camps. Ter-
311 tiary sections are discrete also in the sense that all the major necessities of daily living
are available within their several territories. Each controls its own natural resources,
and these resources are the same for all the camel-herding groups—in any given year
one may have more of a particular commodity than another, but the difference is in

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[171] [1] Evans-Pritchard, 1940. The feud might have been present among the Nuer. Exogamy and the other rules of marriage which obtain among them create a dispersion of ties, which superficially appears to militate against a condition of feud. But a dispersal of ties does not mean that they necessarily act as a pressure for peace. Moreover, the exogamous links may link limited numbers of groups only, leaving others with sufficient discreteness to pursue feuding relationships as they are described in this paper.

[2] See Peters, 1959.

degree and is ephemeral, so that the opportunity for the development of trade relations is absent.[1] Save for straying animals, a section has no urgent need to seek relationships with others, as long as the rainfall is sufficient to permit the exploitation of local resources. 621 311 [619]

The tertiary section is also regarded as the corporate group *par excellence*, in which 'the one word does for all'. Corporate identity is conceptualized as 'one bone' or 'one body'. An offence against one of its members is held to be an offence against all; if one of its members is killed 'we all lose blood'. When one of its members commits homicide the responsibility falls on all equally. Blood money, when received, is shared by all save for a special portion reserved for the 'owner of the blood', the nearest agnate of the victim. In opposite circumstances, all adult males accept the responsibility of contributing an equal share to the blood money. Rules of membership, simple in their brevity, express graphically this corporate identity: 'You must strike with us and be struck with us; you must pay with us and receive with us.' The group also bears a name, and there is never any doubt about the affiliation of any tribesman. That group of men—known as the *'amarā dam*—who are agreed on the obligation to exact vengeance, to pay blood money when necessary, to engage in common defence, and to accept the possibility of death in vengeance, is a fixed and clear-cut group, not one whose membership has to be calculated by reference to degrees of kinship in regard to a specific situation, as appears to be the case among other peoples. 621 613 [682] [672]

Homicide within the *'amarā dam* brings about an impasse in relationships. A blood-money payment is out of the question since the acceptance of blood money by one part of a tertiary section from another of its parts is tantamount to a statement of split. Only in conditions where relationships within the lineage have developed to the point of political severance is it anticipated that a blood-money payment may be demanded; but this problem is not the same as that at present under discussion. Bedouin say that blood money cannot pass within the *'amarā dam* for those making the payment would be the persons receiving it. This is spurious reasoning, since the 'owner of the blood' is awarded more than any other members of the group as it is, and arrangements could obviously be made to pay him separately. Blood money is out of the question because it distinguishes relationships between people as belonging to two distinct political communities, and not because of any difficulty of distribution. In Bedouin thinking, an injury to 'the one body' is an injury to all its parts. Blood-money payments by members of a corporation to one or more of its members is a contradiction in terms. In the same way vengeance is also excluded, for this merely doubles the original loss. A reprisal exacted in hot blood is always a possibility, but this is not referred to as *thār*, vengeance. Even if, at a later date, the closest kinsman of the victim should slay the offender, the act would not be referred to as *thār* and any connexion with earlier homicides would be denied. 621 613 682 627 [829] [829]

Stultified in the field of political action, there is little else that can be done. Expulsion is a possible course of action—and expulsion has occurred. Records show, however, that exile is almost invariably voluntary.[2] Moreover, exile is terminated as 682

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[1] Many sections trade fleeces for dates with the folk of distant oases, but the sections do not trade among themselves.

[2] I recorded one case of a man who was expelled from his group and the tribes around were warned that the rules of sanctuary were not to apply to him. He is said to have died from grief and hunger. The reason given for such drastic action is that he killed [438]

621 hundred of their sheep are grazing in the neighbourhood. This is beside the point.
613 What is important is that the offender's group is showing a desire to remain on
628 friendly terms, and members of the victim's group are doing likewise by accepting
682 reduced amounts. Compared with what the payments should be, after four years they
are trivial and soon cease altogether. Blood money, if it is to achieve the purpose of
621 restoring peaceful relationships, must work in this way among the Bedouin, for, as
613 they view the matter, a single payment of the full amount would only terminate
628 relationships. There would be no further obligations to hold them together. The
682 payment of a debt in full means only one thing—hostility. Where there is no debt,
571 there are no relationships. Debt must be allowed to run between groups, for it is this
182 which creates obligations and perpetuates social relationships.[1] As the debt of blood
money mounts, the social relationships between the groups improve. The cessation
of payments and the absence of further demands is final earnest that the relationships
are again normal.

613 The second step in this exposition, therefore, is to attach to homicide between
628 tertiary sections the penalty of vengeance or the payment of blood money, both
621 achieving the same end of bringing about a restoration of peaceful relationships.

682 Between secondary sections, relationships are again different. Ecologically, the
619 areas are distinct. The topography may be dissimilar—sand dunes in one area and
613 low valleys in another; secondly, the soils may differ—sandy soil here and firm valley
[133] bottom soil there; thirdly, while the climatic régime of the two areas may be broadly
similar, since there is marked variability in the aggregate annual rainfall which is
[132] coupled with a high variability from place to place, each secondary section has its
own micro-climate, sufficiently well defined for one area to be well watered in any
given year while a neighbouring area suffers partial drought. These differences affect
[221] productive activities. Seasonal movements are also affected: some secondary sections
move annually over considerable distances and in fixed directions, while members of
a collateral section may move only a few miles and these short moves may vary in
direction from year to year. It is true that minor ecological differences exist between
collateral tertiary sections, but these do not affect the economy and the way of life in
the manner described for secondary sections. Partly because of their territorial extent,
partly because of the larger aggregate population, the secondary sections are more
self-contained, not only ecologically and economically but also in terms of social
relationship. More of the requirements of everyday living can be met within the
territory and span of a secondary section than within those of a tertiary section.
Secondary sections develop a kind of specialization to the extent that in any year
some of them will have more usable natural resources than others, but because these
differences are ephemeral they do not lead to the development of permanent trade
relations. Add to all this the fact that agnates are concentrated in camps on the territory which belongs to their lineage, and the discreteness of secondary sections is
[582] immediately apparent. Marriage rules make this discreteness potentially, at least, even
more sharply defined, for unlike other 'lineage societies' where exogamy, coupled
with other marriage regulations, compels the dispersion of kin links among lineage

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[1] This point becomes clearer when considered in the general context of debt relationship among the Bedouin. Marriage payments, gift exchanges, hospitality, various forms of help, and so on are all aspects, with blood money, of an intricate and fascinating web of debt relationships.

619 segments, the Bedouin are free to marry within as close a range as the first cousin on
613 either side. Preferential marriage with the father's brother's daughter exists, not
582 merely as a sentiment, but with the legal force of permitting a man this choice against all other men. Before a father arranges the marriage of his daughter he first must seek the permission of his brother's son. Moreover, if a first-parallel cousin is not available, a Bedouin is free to take as a wife any parallel cousin within the minimal lineage. Much weight has been given to the value of exogamy as a device for the definition of groups; parallel-cousin marriage is equally suitable for the purpose—indeed it is better for it has the effect of knitting the members of a local group together as cognates, thereby throwing the group into isolated relief.

613 Consequently, when a homicide occurs between two secondary sections, there is
628 no urgent necessity to make peace, the relationship between them being of a kind
682 that can be controlled and altered to suit the circumstances. It is between these groups that the argument—if the argument is taken up at all—centres on the circumstances of the killing, every effort being made to show that insult was deliberately added to homicide, that one homicide is to be distinguished from another because a man of great renown was singled out as the avenger's victim, or that in a vengeance killing there was a breach of taboo as well. A debt is always left over, and it is an impelling obligation for the Bedouin to redeem it. They frequently speak of vengeance in this context as 'redeeming the debt'. Again, any homicide between two secondary sections is regarded as one in a series, whether the details or even the name of the victim of the previous homicide is known or not. I recall discussing a double homicide with a close kinsman of the slayer, and the only way he could account for it was by telling me that his kinsman had to kill because his victims were of such and such a group. The feud knows no beginning, and it has no end. It is a form of behaviour associated with a specific structural order, and it is as persistent as the structural order itself; in this sense it is eternal. It was most difficult to get the Bedouin to give accounts of homicides other than those which had occurred over the past fifty years or so, but they invariably claimed that the origin was earlier than this, although they were wholly unaware of the identity of the earlier victims. In any event, their only historical frame of reference is the genealogy; and history, as a chronological sequence of events, has no meaning beyond the founding ancestor of a minimal segment. When they refer events to points on the genealogy superior to this, they are no longer thinking in terms of the temporal order of events, but in terms of what they know to be the contemporary relationships between groups, for the names on the genealogy are names of groups and do not bear a relation to a time scale in any sense. Put in another way, for them a homicide which involves two secondary sections must be a feud, because this is the nature of the relationships between the groups, and there must have been previous killings, otherwise the people involved would not belong to two separate secondary groups.

The relationships which are referred to as feud are of a kind which requires at least a show of hostility whenever the parties happen to meet. Even if they do not actually meet, but are in the vicinity, some sort of demonstration is likely. Thus, several shots were fired at a man riding some distance away from a camp, and although positive identification was difficult at this range, the men of the camp argued it must have been a member of a group with which they were at feud otherwise the passer-by

would have dropped in on the camp. In another situation, two men entered a shop 613
in a market-place; inside sat two men of a feuding group who, instead of retreating 628
hastily, greeted those who had just entered, and the latter returned the greeting with 682
blows on the head from the butts of their rifles. Markets in Cyrenaica are recognized
to be places of peace. In their actions the two offenders not only injured two others [443]
but also broke a taboo in a public place. The victim's group now had to avenge not [683]
only the injury but the insult that the breach of taboo carried with it, as well. In most feud relationships this is characteristic. It is never a matter of a simple homicide, but of killing a man at the entrance to his tent, between the centre poles of his tent, or taking the life of a minor, or an elder too old to carry arms and so on. Each successive killing ensures that the hostile relationships will be perpetuated.

The third step in this exposition, therefore, is the association of a state of feud with the secondary order of segmentation.

When the relationships between the structurally superior primary tribal sections 619
are examined, the arguments against the necessity for peace are stronger than in the
case of secondary sections. Relationships between them are few and irregular. Only
occasionally do members of these groups meet, and then often accidentally; very
many men of collateral primary sections are complete strangers one to the other.
If a homicide occurs between two primary sections it is unlikely that any attempt to 619
open negotiations will be made. The offender's camp may be raided by a *ghazi* 682
recruited from the victim's kinsmen. There would be no question of these primary [721]
sections going to war. On a raid firearms may be used, but the action is limited to a
strike-and-run affair. If the issue is joined and members of both sides are ranged [726]
against each other they fight with sticks to avoid large-scale slaughter: warfare must
not be allowed within the tribe. Wars belong to intertribal relationships. For one of 175
these wars, apart from hearsay evidence, some records exist. These tell of a war 619
which took place during the period 1860 to 1865, in which there were planned cam- 726
paigns, the organization of fighters into groups, and provisions for a labour force
in the home territory, large enough to produce sufficient food to maintain an army
in the field. During this war several hundred people were killed.

At this point, it is possible to summarize the stages in this exposition of the 619
Bedouin view in diagrammatic form.

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

682 To complete this general statement, two further circumstances are cited by the
602 Bedouin. If a man kills a related person who is not an agnate (it is expressed as killing the mother's brother) the breach in relationships must be healed as quickly as possible. The convention for dealing with this is that the offender, bound hand and foot, mounted on a horse, is sent to the camp of 'the owner of the blood', in the company of a holy man, there to make an offer of his life, saying: 'Here is my knife, my life is yours; here is my shroud, my life is yours.' No Bedouin would agree for a moment to undertake this journey if he thought the offer might be accepted. In Bedouin sentiments a life offered in this way cannot be taken. It is the convention which precedes a peace meeting and blood money. Any other way of dealing with the confusion, which spreads as a result of a homicide between cognates, is excluded.

682 Secondly, if a woman is killed, whatever the intersegmentary distance, the homicide
562 is said to be accidental, because a man never 'intends' to kill a woman. Blood-money arrangements are made as soon as possible, and the wealth—half that of a
613 man—passes to the deceased's father, not to her husband, for a woman's 'bone' always belongs to her father. Obviously women cannot be allowed to enter into
[582] feud; since it is demographically compelling (apart from other reasons) for some of
[591] them to marry outside their natal groups, then they might well find themselves residents in the enemy's camps, if they were to become involved in feuds.

121 This statement of the different means available for the regulation of homicide at the several orders of tribal segmentation is the view the Bedouin themselves hold of
682 their relationships. An analysis of the facts presented thus far could bring out a
613 number of interesting points with regard to the relativity of morals, the typification
829 of acts by their social context, the significance of the orders of segmentation, and so
619 on. Rather than proceed along these lines, however, it is more urgently necessary to reflect on the significance of the fact that the arrangement of the material in terms of what is usually called the lineage structure coincides with the Bedouin ordering of the same details. It is, of course, important to note that the account is not based on mere hearsay evidence. Each statement made can be documented from known homicides, and to this extent the model that has been used is consistent with reality. The model, nevertheless, can only be a representation of what a particular people, the Bedouin, conceive their social reality to be; it is a kind of ideology which enables them, without making absurd demands on their credulity, to understand their field of social relationships, and to give particular relationships their *raison d'être*. But, as will be shown, it would be a serious error to mistake such a folk model for sociological analysis. Such an error is difficult to avoid because the Bedouin, when defending their view, are able to cite enough bits and pieces of reality to make their argument convincing.
121 The flaw in the reasoning is seen when it can be shown that its consequences
114 are absurd. As an example of what is meant, the statement that feud is attached to groups at the secondary order of segmentation may be considered. If the statement
613 were true, if each and every secondary section were at feud one with the other (and
619 in a structural sense this ought to be so), then each tribe would be divided into small
829 mutually hostile groups, which completely lacked any possibility of movement, even
578 for pasturing purposes. Presented with this, the Bedouin would argue that this is not in fact so, because secondary and primary sections are interlinked in many ways. That is, they evoke what to them are contingencies to explain why they are at feud with one

121 part of a secondary section but not with another. Once contingencies are permitted
613 to enter in, the lineage model ceases to be of use, for what is implied is that at all
114 times some parts of sections structurally situated for feuding do not in fact feud.
● [619] Other facts can be adduced to show that the structural view is inadequate but, before
[829] proceeding to examine these, some general objections to the lineage theory need to
[578] be raised. In the first instance, the corner stone in the theory of lineage systems is that they consist of parts which are in balanced opposition. It is no accident that the idiom generally used in discussing the segmentation of a lineage system is that segments bifurcate. Indeed bifurcation is necessary if lineage theory is to make sense, because if at any order there are more than two segments, then combinations can occur which are not comprehended by the theory. In the Cyrenaican lineage the number of segments at the tertiary order is haphazard, in some cases as few as two but in others as many as a dozen or so. Where there are many segments at this order it is rather pointless to speak in terms of balanced opposition. Moreover, at the secondary order of segmentation the number of segments are fairly consistent throughout the tribes, but they number more than two in all of them. It is also a fact that combinations occur and, moreover, these may be between the tertiary segments of two ' opposed ' secondary segments.

121 Secondly, in lineage theory groups come together to constitute larger segments in
613 opposition to like segments. Yet in lineage societies there is a lack of instituted
authority, there are no chiefs distributed throughout the land as heads of segments
571 of the hierarchical orders. This being so, then it is not possible for all the sections of,
622 say, a secondary section to come together; there is no one to command the action.
114 In fact, sections combine in Cyrenaica, but not in the way they should according to the lineage structure. In order to discuss this adequately, a lengthy diversion into analysis of the distribution of power would be necessary. The matter must rest here with the admittedly somewhat dogmatic assertion that there are men who wield power over groups of varying populations, and that the extent of their domains cannot be understood by reference to orders in the lineage. Perhaps it is for this reason—because, that is to say, lineage theory effectively blocks the exercise—that relatively little has been written about the problem of leadership in these societies.

121 Thirdly, all segments should be fairly equal in numbers of people and economic
613 resources, if the theory of lineage were to have substance in reality. In Cyrenaica
114 the population of one tertiary segment may be three times or more that of another.
[621] Both may be structurally equal in the sense that they are named groups segmenting as a pair of brothers from a common father. As political groups, however, this equality has little meaning. Further, with regard to economic resources, some sections possess several wells and a territory of such extent that it straddles two or even more of what might be called micro-ecological areas. With marked preponderance in numbers and superiority of resources, some groups have grown into dominance, and the evidence points to the existence of this dominance in the past also. However, ' like ' sections may appear on a lineage chart, in political action there is conspicuous
[619] disparity. Each tribe possesses one tertiary section or more with a claim to be the
[621] owners of the ' Golden Stirrup '; these are large tertiary groups with relatively plentiful resources, with allies in other groups, and, in sum, with the power to terrorize other tribal groups.

The consequences of homicides in which secondary groups are concerned present 121
an even greater variety, for now the span has expanded to include many more groups, 613
with a total population of several thousand people. Groups of this order are spread 682
over a much wider territorial range; some structurally distant groups are neighbours by virtue of their propinquity, while some structurally proximate groups are far removed territorially. Some feuds lie dormant for long periods. Others erupt [578]
frequently. Some homicides between these groups are followed by the 'laying down of the denial'—the feud situation with most acrimony built into it, for one denial, followed by a vengeance killing, is met by a second denial and so on, excluding thereby any chance of a settlement. In other circumstances the offender's group boast that they are responsible for a homicide, thus challenging the victim's group to a show of force. Only the more powerful tertiary groups would venture to do this, and it is only they who could meet a homicide against them with a spectacular show of force, compelling a weaker tertiary group (according to hearsay evidence) to break up and leave its homeland. The modes of killing in homicide differ in character. Some killings have been heinous and offensive in terms of general morality; their purpose is to sting the victim's kin to retaliate or to cause them to suffer general discredit and loss of status. While some parts of secondary segments are at feud, others are not. A homicide between affinally or matrilaterally linked groups, whether they are secondary or primary groups, is settled as quickly and as amicably as possible to
prevent turmoil in their relationships. Feud concerns two tertiary sections, not the [578]
opposed secondary sections of which they are parts. Blood money and vengeance is [628]
not the responsibility of secondary sections, but of their respective tertiary sections.

At this point, a further statement concerning the external marriage links of tertiary 121
segments throws further light on the feud. Previously it was stated that the competi-
tion between collateral tertiary groups for natural resources is indicated by a low 613
rate of marriage between them. Their external marriage links reinforce the separation. 582
One tertiary section, A, takes some of its spouses from section X of a collateral 578
secondary section; A's collateral, B, takes some of its spouses from X's collateral, Y. A may be at feud with Y and B with X. The agnatic links between A and B, and X and Y do not mitigate the severity of the hostility in the two feuds, they exacerbate it. It would be erroneous to think of them as cross-cutting ties which promote peace. Stultified in the development of their hostilities by virtue of their territorial proximity and the sentiment associated with putatively close agnatic connexion, A and B are able to express hostilities indirectly through their linked groups X and Y respectively. During discussions of disputes, homicides, or rival claims to water, whether the disputants meet in the camps or in administrative offices in the villages, men from the matrilateral and affinal groups of the parties directly concerned are also present to do most of the shouting. In some cases I recorded a maternal relative was killed on behalf of an agnatic group to which he did not belong, although the latter accepted the responsibility. In the light of facts of this sort the lineage model obstructs analysis.

I now wish to make a few brief remarks about the relationships between collateral 121
primary sections and paired tribes. Homicide, it was asserted earlier, results in raids 619
and war between groups of these orders of segmentation respectively. Evidence 682
can be adduced to show that both consequences have followed. The case usually 726
cited to demonstrate that a single killing precipitates war between tribes is the

121 celebrated war between the 'Abaidat and the Bara 'asa tribes occupying a large part
• 619 of central and eastern Cyrenaica. This war took place a hundred years ago, so that the
682 evidence is mainly hearsay, but it is significant that when asked for details of the
726 groups taking part the Bedouin make it clear that the entire tribes were not at war—
[173] some sections on both sides are said to have remained on friendly terms. Yet when
121 wars are discussed in a general fashion, the Bedouin insist that tribes confront each
619 other as such. If it is pointed out to them that men might be ranged against their
maternal relatives the Bedouin mumble apologetically that they would not kill their
726 maternal relatives—a lame argument since in the heat of battle men cannot make this
602 kind of discrimination. Details of other wars also illustrate the point that only parts
of tribes face each other in strife, for though the stories of past events may be inaccurate
there is genealogical evidence to substantiate their claims that certain groups
were linked in the past, and in any case their statements assert that where these links
exist they are not prepared to engage in hostilities. The several parts of each tribe,
121 like the parts of primary and secondary sections, have as many different sorts of
619 relationships as there are groups, and the general statement that tribes are warring
571 units merely obscures the interest there is in their relationships. Tribes, further, lack
the leadership to make war. I repeat that leadership does exist, but not even the
121 greatest leaders, past or present, can rightly be described as leaders of their tribes,
619 using the term in its structural connotation. Literature on the subject gives the
613 impression that there are tribal leaders, because successive administrations have used
554 the tribes and their divisions as a framework for attempting to rule the Bedouin, but
the details of the power domains of individual leaders make it clear that they have
little to do with the ordered divisions of tribes. A leader within part of one tribe may
carry with him tertiary sections of another tribe, and if major hostilities break out
between parts of these tribes, the sections of both which are joined as allies and
related as kinsfolk will not fight against each other, for sections so linked enjoy
stronger connexions than the structurally linked tertiary sections of a very large
[682] secondary section. Consequently the statement that homicide results in tribal war
[114] when the offender and his victim are members of two separate tribes is not merely
incomplete, not merely a simplification, it is wrong.

121 A point which has been implicit throughout the second part of this paper needs
now to be made quite explicit: groups do not come together in their respective
613 structural genealogical orders. During my entire residence in Cyrenaica I did not
571 see a group of agnates larger than a tertiary tribal section assemble for any purpose.
[114] It is true that the occasions when large groups are required to assemble are infrequent.
[648] It is also true that although the British Administration was serving a caretaker role
only, it may have had an affect on the nature of tribal gatherings. Despite this qualification,
there were several occasions when I expected tribal groups to assemble in
lineage order if the fusion of sections in relation to like sections has any meaning in
practice. Large groups of men did gather to dispute claims to wells, to argue about
rights to ploughland, and to make peace. In every case that I recorded the agnatically
closest groups of the main participants were absent, while members of genealogically
more remote groups were present in strength. This statement applies to gatherings
in the camps and in the administrative centres. One of the biggest gatherings I
[628] witnessed assembled in an administrative office in a village near the coast in the

121 sections constituting the combinations which makes the facts of feud intelligible.
613 Furthermore, several different types of power structures exist which serve the different
[571] interests of the people composing them, and these are interlinked in combinations
[578] of superior span. But the formation of these structures and the modes in which they
combine are quite unlike the articulations in a lineage system. Characteristically, the
segments in a lineage system are conceived of as building up hierarchically to span
what is spoken of as a total society, the apex of the system affording a spectacular and
fixed definition of its boundaries. Had I been using this concept in this paper the
[173] founding ancestress of the nine Cyrenaican tribes, Sa'ada as named by the Bedouin,
would have served this purpose and would have been given inappropriate prominence.
121 The views presented here have the consequences of retreating from a concept
184 of a total society. The people to whom the facts given are related are the camel-herding
tribes only. Some of them have relations of many kinds with the cow-herding
233 folk who inhabit the northern plateau area, and these relations are also significant
619 for the analysis of a wide range of problems; genealogically both cow and camel
herders are seen as part of a single structure, but the differences between them with
regard to their economy, the size, composition, and distribution of their residential
units, their political and ritual life is so great that to conceive of them as a single social
121 structure is not useful. Moreover, the far western tribal sections have relationships
619 of such urgency with their neighbours in Tripolitania (who are excluded from Cyrenaican
genealogies) that to cut off these relationships as lying outside Cyrenaican society
would be quite unwarranted. The same can be said of the relationships of the tribal
sections in the eastern part of Cyrenaica with their genealogical cousins, the Aulad
'Ali of Egypt, who, although residing across a national border, are closely linked to
some of the Cyrenaican Bedouin. Some tribes also have to rely on the people of the
southern oases for an item of diet and an outlet for surplus wool, and the net of kinship
[177] is spread out to include them. In these cases they come into contact with other
ethnic groups such as Berbers and Tibu, and through the oases they extend their lines
of communication southwards to Wadai, Chad, and Bornu. As an indication of the
effectiveness of these links, it is only necessary to add that people inhabiting Cyrenaica
make periodic and regular visits to these far southern places, and that in 1948 a
shaikh, living near Ajadabiya in south-western Cyrenaica, collected blood-money
contributions from kinsmen in Wadai. A single structure cannot possibly include,
for analytical purposes, these sorts of relationships.

121 Finally, it must be stressed that the facts given here refer to the period 1948 to
114 1950. Since then oil has been discovered in large quantities near the territory of a
[315] tribe where I spent most of my time while resident in the country, and where there
was one tin shack in 1950 there is now a modern port with roads extending southwards
from it into the wilderness. I see no reason to assume that social relations as
I observed them are present today or that they were the same at any time in the past
175 either. Before the advent of the Sanusi Order in the early eighteen-forties, it is known
795 that one lineage at least was dominantly powerful and that its leader tyrannized a
613 large part of Central Cyrenaica.[1] His descendants constituted a powerful group in

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[1] Smith and Porcher, 1864. These two archaeologists met this leader and continued their archaeological researches around Cirene only with his goodwill, although the site is not on the territory of his tribe as I knew it in 1950. They also speak of him as inhabiting a castle which also lies outside the

621 613 582 182 [423] [433] [619]

would be impossible to satisfy all marriage expectations of men within the universe of the minimal tribal section. For this reason alone external links are inevitable and persistent. Also, the small territorial strip such a group claims as a homeland produces an economy which, in this environment, is unstable. Additional security is gained by making connections with other tribal sections, each with its specific ecological character. Men also marry into their client groups. The proportion of these for this camp was 9 per cent of the total. From these links they gain economic advantages, they can claim services and a client-following is politically significant. Finally, 7 per cent of the total[18] are marriages with women of other tribes, which again not only reduces the instability of the economy (in that a large tribal area suffering near-famine conditions has access to areas of markedly different ecology), but also provides political connections for men whose power ambitions have passed the point of leadership limited to their own tribes. In one way or another all these interests are manifest in the small camp and attention is now directed to the latter.

621 592

The disposition of people in the camp is represented diagrammatically on the page following.

[554] [619] [428]

The nucleus of the camp is Tent A. Its owner (1) was a powerful *Shaikh*, the son of a famous father. His marriage represents a political link with a group of one of the primary sections of his own tribe. His father died only a few years before I recorded my census, and the large amount of moveable property he left had still not been divided among the sons; the owner of the tent, as eldest brother, still controlled the flocks and herds. Most of his time he spent away from the camp engaging in political intrigue. His two younger brothers lived in his tent, but the second (5) would not remain there long because negotiations for his marriage had been started. [582] [587] [583] His father (2) married a parallel cousin; she died and shortly afterwards he took her sister (3) in sororal union. When this occurred an amount of bride-wealth was agreed, but instead of giving any of it to her father, the entire amount was "put in front of her" (that is, the animals were allowed to remain with her husband's flock), and these animals she had marked with her brother's tribal sign to distinguish them from those of her husband. [428] [562] It was widely known that she was going to leave these animals to her husband's second son, for although she could not transfer them to a male outside her husband's corporate group, she could decide who, among his heirs, should inherit.

621 592 579 [604] [431] [231]

During my stay in this camp, her brother's son (4) came to it as a temporary resident for a month. Since he was poor, the purpose of his visit was to capture some of his aunt's wealth while she was still alive and the possibility still existed. During his stay he was fed well but did no work. His kinsmen found his company tiresome, so, to cut short his stay, and after consulting her nominated heir (5), she gave him three grown goats. Also when an occasion arose for an animal slaughter, she provided the sheep, and,

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[18] The remainder is made up of marriages to the daughters of men incorporated into the lineages.

000 fiction, but it is interesting to read that, even in Ibn Khaldun's day, these Tuareg were known as "The Veiled Ones".

175 The first Arab expedition to North Africa began in 643, two years after the conquest of Egypt, when 'Amr ibn el-'Asi invaded Cyrenaica and received the submission of the Luwata Berbers, whom he found in occupation of that country. Forty years later the conquerors had reached the Atlantic, but these early Moslem invaders mostly settled in the towns and left the open country to the Berbers. Their influence on the nomadic population was therefore trifling, and to-day need not be taken into account.

175
619 The eleventh century irruption from the east of the wild Bedouin tribes of Beni Hilal and Beni Suleim, who continued their nomadic existence after their conquest of the country, was one of the decisive factors in moulding the character of the present-day population ; a religious upheaval among the Berbers of Senegal the other. The Beni Hilal have indeed disappeared, but to-day all the independent tribes of Western Egypt, the Sa'adi, claim descent from the Beni Suleim, while their vassals all have the same title, Murabitin, as the adherents of the religious movement referred to above. Some historical explanation now becomes necessary and, since the vassals probably represent the aboriginal population more closely, we will first consider the Murabitin.

In the early days of Islam, volunteers constantly thronged to all the fighting fronts where the faith was being spread by the sword among the heathen. These were nicknamed *El-Murabitin*, which meant "pickets", from the *ribat* or outposts (lit. "horse-lines") in which they lived.

But in the eleventh century a violent religious movement among the Messufa and Lamtuna sections of the Sanhaja Tuareg appropriated the name to its followers, just as eight hundred year later the fanatics of the Eastern Sudan were known as *the* Dervishes of their time. Both upheavals began with a prophet on an island, and both spread northwards with terrifying rapidity. Yet the *Murabitin* of the Senegal were far more successful than their rivals on the Nile, and their title reached the height of its fame when a line of their kings, whose name the Spaniards corrupted to "Almoravides", ruled over Andalusia till 1156.

Yet just as the original *Murabitin* were gaining their

first successes in Senegal, the Beni Hilal and the Beni Suleim 175 619 were being despatched by the Caliph Mustansir billah against Mu'izz ibn Badis, his rebellious viceroy in Tripoli. They sang of their conquest : [539]

> "Great was the king, son of Badis, a mighty man of war !
> Yet we routed his thirty thousand men !
> We were but three thousand, yet the victory was ours, and ours the spoil !
> Their hearts were as water, not a man was in their ranks !
> We routed them and they fled far and wide !"

These Beni Hilal, now extinct, are famous wherever Arabic is spoken for the exploits of their legendary hero Abu Zeid, while the Beni Suleim had helped the Prophet at the battle of Hunein, and are said by Hogarth to be the ancestors of the great modern tribe of Harb.[1]

The confusion of these two invasions caused the races of North Africa to become inextricably mixed. Both Arabs and Berbers spent their lives in the desert herding their flocks, and both were warlike. So it is natural that the intermarriages of a few generations should have made one people of them, and it is also natural that the conquered should claim relationship with the conquerors and not vice versa. But this aspiration of the Berbers has flooded their genealogies with so many lies that it is difficult to disentangle the truth.

The descendants of the original colonists, much mixed [792] with Berber blood, still preserve their title of Murabitin, though no longer living in *ribat*, which soon lost their military character and were turned into *Zawia* " monasteries ", where the more peacefully inclined of the sect retired for religious teaching and contemplation. Later, when the *ribat* came to be deserted, the peaceful Murabitin, ill-fitted by their monastic habits for the resumption of an active nomadic life, sank into dependence on their warlike brethren the Sa'adi, and, among a primitive race, dependence means inferiority. Thus in Arabia any tribe that pays tribute to another [186] is despised as Hiteim. And so the once proud title of " Murabitin " has simply come to mean " vassal " and nothing more.

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[1] *History of Arabia*, 38.

● 619 The independent Sa'adi tribes fall into four groups :

1. The Jawazi, Fawayid, and Rammah, all of common origin with the 'Awaqir of Cyrenaica.
2. The Harabi and Bar'asa, both of common origin with the 'Ibeidat of Cyrenaica.
3. The Hanadi, and
4. The Awlad 'Ali.

[173] The original ancestor whom these Sa'adi all claim is one Abu Dib, said to be of Suleim descent.

175 This sheikh was a real personage and a contemporary
554 of Ibn Khaldun (who died in A.D. 1406). He was sheikh
of the Beni Ja'afir, and a man of great importance in Barka,
619 the very place that the four tribes inhabited for centuries before
they came to Egypt. Also the period of fifteen or sixteen
generations, which the modern Bedouin assert to separate them
from Abu Dib, agrees with this chronology well enough.[1]

619 Some are found to assert that their title of Sa'adi " helping "
is derived from an ancestress called Sa'ada, the wife of Abu
[173] Dib, or, according to a hostile account, of a Jew called Yana.
But the real explanation of the term has already been given
above.

619 At the present day a sort of feudal system prevails both
in Egypt and Cyrenaica, by which families are *mrabit*,[2] or
651 vassal families, not tribes to tribes ; thus the Qat'an tribe of
Murabitin is divided, one part vassal to a family of Awlad
'Ali el-Ahmar, another to the Sinaqra, and a third to the
Sinana. For a tribute called " alms ", which by hereditary
obligation each Mrabit family must pay, the Sa'adi family
to which it is attached is bound to afford the Mrabit family
protection in all minor difficulties of life, such as robbery
by another family of Sa'adi, etc.

Thus a " Mrabit " family by paying tribute can herd its flocks in peace, calling upon the Sa'adi to see that justice is done them, but they are bound to join the Sa'adi to fight with them in any serious conflict with other tribes.

Among the " Mrabit " tribes of the present day are the Jumei'at, Qat'an, and Awlad Suleiman, all claiming as common ancestor one Ka'b, and feudal relations are maintained to this day in the desert between the last two and the Sa'adi, though they are relaxed in the cultivation. 619 651

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[1] The pedigrees of which these Western Bedouin are so proud can only be trusted so far back as the individual whose name a subdivision has adopted, such as Kharûf in the Awlad Kharûf pedigree. Taking them separately, the pedigrees will be found to dovetail into each other up to that point, but beyond it things become problematical.

[2] Sing. of " Murabitin ".

The Jumei'at, who used to be "Murabitin" to the Beni 'Una, are now nominally so to the Awlad 'Ali, but are not required to pay tribute. Other tribes, such as the Jawabis and 'Awarma, are in an intermediate stage between the Sa'adi and the Murabitin. The Awlad 'Abd es-Sallam, the Samalus ed-Diminat, and perhaps the Fawakhir, call themselves "Murabitin bil Baraka", a priestly caste which, in Tripoli, used to receive special privileges from the Turkish Government. 619 [778]

Though the Sa'adi tribes despise the Murabitin as serfs, they respect them for their piety and resort to them for the writing of charms. [186]

While the Murabitin tribes generally may be suspected to contain more Libyan blood than the Sa'adi, there are other tribes such as the 'Amayim, the Jahama, and the Tarhuna, who have come to Egypt from further west than any of the above, and who seem to be quite definitely "Berber", though, of course, none of them will admit it. These are known euphemistically as 'Arab el-Gharb.

Even some of the Juheina, settled east of the Nile in Sharqiya, are scorned by Klippel as "d'origine berbère, se pretendant section d'une tribu d'Arabie".[1]

Awlad 'Ali.—This tribe, by far the most important of the Western Bedouin, occupies with its vassals the whole north coast of Egypt from Salum to Alexandria. Like the others, they claim descent from the Beni Suleim, alleging their ancestor 'Ali, son of 'Aqar, to be a grandson of that Dib, or Abu Dib, mentioned by Ibn Khaldun. Their enemies, however, allege that he was a Jew. "When the Arabs occupied the north coast of Africa, there was a notable, a Jew, who owned property at Saqiet el-Hamra in Morocco. This man welcomed and entertained the Arab sheikh Ez-Zanati. He became very popular with the sheikh, who gave him his daughter named Sa'ada, on condition that he embraced Islam before the marriage contract was made out."[2] Another version calls the Jew Yana, and says that he had two daughters. Of these Sa'ada was the [131] 619 173

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[1] E. Klippel, "Etudes sur le folklore Bédouin de l'Egypte," *Bull. Soc. Khédiv. de Géogr.*, vii, 10, Cairo, 1911. [113]

[2] From information collected by Muhammad Bey Wasfi.

619 ancestress of the Awlad 'Ali and Hind of the Hanadi. (The
173 Hanadi call their ancestress Hind, the daughter of Sallam.)
These obvious fabrications only mean that their conventional genealogy is not believed outside the tribe. But the Awlad 'Ali themselves all agree that 'Ali was the son of 'Aqar bin Dib.

175 They are now a composite tribe made up of the descendants
of 'Ali's three sons, and various fragments of broken tribes.
619 The Awlad 'Ali lived for a long time in the "Green Mountain"
of Cyrenaica, and about 150 years ago began to drift eastwards, called into Egypt by the Jumei'at to aid them against the Hanadi, who, with their subtribes, were then in possession not only of the north coast but were also settled all over the Beheira.

175 After the departure of the French in 1801, a firman was
619 addressed to the sheikhs of the Hanadi, Afrad (a division
of the Awlad 'Ali), Jumei'at, Beni 'Una, and other Arabs
648 resident in Beheira, confirming them in their territories, but
threatening them with expulsion and fine if they misbehaved themselves.[1]

By 1808, the Hanadi seem to have been quite driven out by the Awlad 'Ali, for in that year they bought their peace with Muhammad 'Ali and asked for the restitution of their lands in Beheira. The Pasha agreed to this and sent troops under Shahin Bey to chase the Awlad 'Ali out again. The Awlad 'Ali responded by offering 100,000 "tallaris" to be allowed to remain in the lands of the Hanadi—an offer which Muhammad 'Ali accepted. When they failed to pay up, troops were again sent to aid the Hanadi against them, but this combined force was completely defeated by the Awlad 'Ali near Hosh 'Isa.[2]

Of the events of 1810, Jabarti says :

> "During his stay at Alexandria, he (Muhammad Ali) gave safe conduct to the chiefs of the Bedouins of the tribe of Awlad Ali who lived in the province of Beheira, and by this ruse enticed them to him ; but hardly had they arrived than he had them arrested, claimed large sums from them, and sent his soldiers to carry off their cattle ; their wives and their children were dishonoured. He then gave them robes of honour."[3]

Finally he exiled the Hanadi to Sharqiya, then a desert, and gave the Awlad 'Ali their lands on the coast and in Beheira.

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[1] Jabarti, vii, 78–80.

[2] Jabarti, viii, 171 and 179–180.

[3] Jabarti, viii, 300.

Had the Senussi been successful in the last war, they 175
would no doubt have brought in the 'Ibeidat or the 'Awaqir 619
from Cyrenaica to replace the Awlad 'Ali in Egypt.

At the present day the Awlad 'Ali, especially the eastern 619
sections near the Nile Valley, have almost ceased to be nomadic, 178
and only the old men have memories of their former warlike
habits. They suffered considerably during the Great War,
but are again becoming prosperous. They now own large
comfortable tents, are beginning to build houses and clear
out cisterns, and are also said to be increasing in numbers.[1]
So civilized have they grown that my guides, one a Sinai
Arab and the other an 'Abadi, concurred in calling them
"green"—not real desert-worthy Bedouins.

Perhaps as a result of Libyan influence, or more probably 142
the better nurture and climate, they are taller, heavier, stronger,
and lighter-complexioned than the lightly built Arabs of
Sinai and Hijaz. Also they are much franker and more 157
straightforward than their shifty and suspicious eastern cousins, 181
and altogether more trustworthy. Their women only veil 562
themselves to strangers, and talk quite naturally and cheerfully 834
to the men of their own tribe. 609

They cultivate as much barley as they can, using a 243
primitive plough drawn by camels, in the clayey hollows [492]
scattered over their very stony limestone desert, but, as the [132]
rainfall is very uncertain, a good crop only occurs every five
or six years. After harvest, they exchange some of their [437]
barley for maize, which the women grind to make bread
as required, and some for dried dates. The seed for next [251]
year is buried in a hole lined with straw and covered with
clay, and a year's forage for the animals is set aside. The [432]
rest of the crop goes to market, and for a short time the [426]
Arab has money to buy clothes for himself and his family
and at utmost need to pay off some of the numerous debts he
has inherited from his forefathers. Soon he is reduced again
to the clothes he wears, the tent he sleeps in, and his animals
grazing in the desert.

They are great breeders of camels and sheep, and a busy 436
traffic in these goes on weekly in the markets of Hammam, 178 [438]
'Amriya, and the Beheira. So they have got into the habit [433] [233]

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[1] At the 1927 census, the Western Desert Arabs, Awlad 'Ali, Jawabis, etc., numbered 38,928 souls exclusive of those settled in Beheira. But Pacho, 100 years ago, estimated them at 38,000 souls. [161]

436 of thinking in money, and they reckon blood-money in cash
178 (£300) and not in camels, as Bedouin should.

484 The more adventurous make, annually, long and waterless journeys to the oases of Siwa and Bahariya to remove the date
245 crop, and, after their own wants are provided for, a good profit usually results from the sale of the remainder.

181 An Egyptian critic, who should know them only too well,[1] calls them "haughty, independent, and untrustworthy in character. They are dull and so abnormally lazy that they have no desire whatever to do more than they learnt (when young)". But he puts this down to the nature of the country; less generous critics ascribe the nature of the country to them!

173 Besides the descendants from 'Ali's three sons, 'Ali el-
● 619 Abyad, 'Ali el-Ahmar, and Sineina, a large section called Sinaqra reckons its descent from Sinqir, a mysterious white man who was wrecked and washed up on the coast near Salum some time in the seventeenth century.[2] These are the true Awlad 'Ali, whose sections live mingled together in the most intricate fashion. Among them live also the Jumei'at, who invited them into the country, and various families of other *murabitin*, such as Qat'an, Awlad Suleiman, Hawara, Habun, etc.
619 To distinguish themselves from their vassals, the Awlad 'Ali call themselves *hurr* free, and the *murabitin* are divided into various grades, according as they pay tribute or not.

The Awlad 'Ali are divided into three main divisions, with section (*badanat*) and subsections (*'eilat*) as follows. Some of these are so numerous that they practically constitute fresh tribes of their own.

I. Awlad Kharuf

[173] These are the descendants of 'Ali el-Abyad ("The White"), the eldest son of 'Ali bin 'Aqar bin Dib, and are subdivided again into:

	Section.	*Subsections.*
(1)	'Eilet Bu Hindi	'Eilet Bu Zayyana, 'Eilet Bahiya, 'Eilet Da'ud
(2)	'Eilet Bu Diya	'Eilet Ibrahim, 'Eilet Jereisat
(3)	Awlad Mansur	El-Afrad, El-Tawa'il, 'Eilet 'Abd Allah

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[1] Muhammad Bey Wasfi, for many years Inspector at Borg el-'Arab.

[2] Their sheikh told Hamilton in 1853, there were seven generations between him and Sinqir.

(Sinaqra)

The Sinaqra, or descendants of Sinqir, are also reckoned among the descendants of Ali the White, "because Sinqir married his daughter Khadija." They include:— 619 173

(4)	Afrad	Maghawra
(5)	Azayim	'Eilet el-Abdi, Muwamna
(6)	'Eilet Eleura	'Eilet Jeballa, 'Eilet Omar, 'Eilet Harun, 'Eilet Ajarma, 'Eilet Tahir.

II.

The descendants of 'Ali bin 'Aqar's second son, 'Ali el-Ahmar ("The Red") are:—

(1)	'Esheibat	'Eilet ed-Dawi, 'Eilet el-Azraq, El-Wassafa, 'El-Lazumi
(2)	Kimeilat	'Eilet el-Hajj Muhammad, El-Maharsa, 'El-Khadayij
(3)	Jineishat[1]	'Eilet el-Majduba, Es-Samayil, Tabak

III. Sinana

The Sinana are the descendants of Sineina, the third son of Ali bin 'Aqar bin Dib. They include:—

(1)	Mahafid	'Eilet Etman, 'Eilet el-Hammama, 'Eilet esh-Shimla
(2)	Arawa	'Eilet ez-Zireiriya, 'Eilet el-Ghazulat
(3)	Qatifa	'Eilet Nasralla, 'Eilet-Omar, Esh-Shawalha.
(4)	Ijna	

Jawabis.—The nomadic Jawabis (sing. Jibusi) are for the most part still settled in and around the Wadi Natrun, where General Andreossy found them in Napoleon's time. He calls them: 619 175 [131]

> "A hospitable tribe who lead a shepherd's life and encamp there every winter with their flocks. They are employed during this time carrying Natrun and prickly reeds; they also have some traffic in dates, which they fetch in caravans from Sioua in the Ammonian Oasis; it is a journey of twelve to fifteen days. These Arabs are *marabouths*, or peaceful people."[2]

He goes on to say they never make war, and only take up arms to defend themselves. In his time the tribe was composed of about 2,000 men, and possessed 60 horses. A little [162] [231] [162]

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[1] Kennett gives the three subdivisions of the Jineishat as Madi, Samayil, and Jabr.

[2] *Memoirs Relative to Egypt*, 288.

619 [175] [162] later Wilkinson estimated them at about 400 men near El Terrana and the Wadi Natrun.

At the present day they are still reckoned *Murabitin*, but, like the Jumei'at, are sufficiently independent not to have to [439] pay tribute. They share with the Awlad 'Ali in the date traffic with Bahariya Oasis, where the produce of the village of Mandisha is reserved for them, and that from Bawitti for the Awlad 'Ali.

619 682 181 Kennett notes (p. 54) that they demand £400 for blood-money instead of £300, the usual price in the Western Desert, and alludes (p. 67) to :

> "The free and easy way in which the Gawabees tribe near the Wadi Natrun pack up their summer tents and leave them in situ while they themselves trek off with their winter tents into the open desert for the winter grazing is indicative of this code of honesty prevailing among them."

142 619 On page 101, he calls them "nearly all very small men, with strangely similar features and characteristics running through all the families of the tribe".

619 173 Bramly has collected three pedigrees of the tribe all going back to Sheikh 'Abd el-Jawad el-Kassar. They state that they are an offshoot from the Qadadfa, and about 500 years ago left Saqiet el-Hamra in Morocco to settle in Egypt.

As a reward for "settling some affairs in the Wadi Natrun", Muhammad 'Ali Pasha granted them the usual Bedouin privilege of exemption from military service. There are small colonies of them elsewhere among the Awlad Ali, while others are settled in the cultivated provinces of Giza, Beheira, Menufiya, and Gharbiya.

Jumei'at.—This tribe, possibly a remnant of the original Libyan inhabitants of Mariut, is of quite respectable antiquity, for Ibn Khaldun includes the Jumei'at as a subtribe of "Beni 'Ali", themselves an offshoot from Beni Suleim. Whether his "Beni 'Ali" are the same as the modern Awlad 'Ali may be questioned, yet it is a reasonable assumption, for the exchange of the words "Beni" and "Awlad" in tribal names can be paralleled elsewhere.

The Jumei'at all agree that their remote ancestor, whom they share with the Awlad Suleiman and the Qat'an, was called Ka'b, and a Ka'b indeed appears in the pedigree ascribed

to Dib by Ibn Khaldun, who calls Dib a descendant of 619 ●
Ka'b, the great-grandson of Suleim.[1] If this be true, the 173
Jumei'at must be an elder branch than any of the Sa'adi tribes, among whom the Awlad 'Ali are included. But in actual fact, the Awlad 'Ali do not consider the Jumei'at as of Sa'adi origin, that is, descendants of Abu Dib and his wife Sa'ada, but despise them as Murabitin or vassals, though they pay no tribute.

All this may be interpreted to mean that they are among the oldest inhabitants of Western Egypt. They have been in Egypt "seven hundred years" according to one of their sheikhs, Sa'ad Bey el-Masri, and a pedigree given me by another, Sheikh 'Ilwani Suleiman, who lives near Sidi 'Abd el-Rahman, runs :



The Jumei'at of Mariut are all descended from El-Ashtar, while the offspring of the other five sons are settled in Beheira, Gharbiya, and at Ramla near Alexandria.

It is, of course, possible that their eponymous ancestor, 619
Jumei'a, was an Arab of Beni Suleim descent, who returned to 173
Egypt from the "Green Mountain", soon after the Beni Suleim 174
invasion, and whose descendants became Murabitin by forming themselves into a religious community. But such religious fervour is not a Bedouin characteristic, but smacks rather of the fanaticism of the recently-converted, so I suspect the Jumei'at, in spite of their descent from Ka'b, to be mainly a remnant of the earlier Libyan population of the coast.

Prior to the arrival of the Awlad 'Ali, they were "Mrabit" 619
to the Beni 'Una, and engaged in constant conflict with the 175
Hanadi. Upon the rout and annihilation of the Beni 'Una, 726
the Jumei'at were stirred up to revolt against the Hanadi 792
by one of their holy men called Baqush. Outraged by their

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[1] The more ignorant Awlad Suleiman have forgotten Ka'b's paternity, and confused him with the famous Arab poet Ka'b ibn Zuheir. See p. 287 for their version. And yet another Jumei'i version gives as their ancestor the Saint Ka'b el Ahbar.

[2] The "Friends" of the Prophet.

● 619 oppression, he gathered his people and delivered a fiery
175 denunciation of his religion, during which he smashed his
726 rosary into pieces and mixed it with his horse's fodder;
792 Baqush then invited their kinsmen (?) the Awlad 'Ali, to
come over from the "Green Mountain" and help them. To entice the Awlad 'Ali, he is said to have sent them samples of salt desert water and Nile water sweetened with sugar to illustrate the difference between the hardships of the desert and the comforts of the Rif.[1]

619 As recounted earlier, the Awlad 'Ali completely routed the
175 Hanadi and their allies, and drove them from the desert.
726 In the division of the conquered territory, the Jumei'at
received a third, and, although they were still considered Murabitin, were released from the payment of tribute. They
[131] now live intermingled with the free sections of the Awlad
'Ali, all along the north coast of Egypt, and are numerous in Beheira, especially near Abu Hummus.

619 *Samalus.*—The Samalus are found scattered among the
[131] Awlad 'Ali on the northern coast and stranded among many
of the Egyptian provinces. They once possessed a head sheikh Abu Sala at Minya, and colonies are recorded from Faiyum, Beheira, Menufiya, Gharbiya, and Sharqiya. An
[175] old paper from the Recruiting Department gives from
[162] seventeen villages in the Faiyum 775 mounted Samalus
and 1,400 on foot, possessing 1,760 camels and 11,400
[231] sheep. Two important groups of wells, both called "Sawani
[312] es-Samalus" exist on the north coast, one about 50 kilometres east of Salum, and the other 20 kilometres south of Dhab'a.

[173] They say they came to Egypt, 400 strong, about 200
years ago, from the Wadi Samalus in the Jebel Akhdar, and their ancestor twelve generations ago was Nasr el-Hasani, of course an "Arab from Beni Suleim".

[175] In the *Description de l'Egypte*, P. D. Martin relates how
[726] in 1800 the Samalus of Faiyum were raided by a party of
Ferjan, 200 strong, from Beheira.

619 *Shiheibat.*—These are a "Mrabit" tribe from the west with
186 an unenviable reputation, living near the Wadi Natrun.
Sayed Idris, the former Senussi leader, says of them: "Most

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[1] Dumreicher, 16. This is probably the "Sheik Abdall Gawyal Bagooshi" who wrote to Sir Sydney Smith in March, 1801, warning him of the approach of the French from Damanhur. Wilson, *History of the British Expedition in Egypt*, 371. (Rif = cultivated area.)

herds have a black goat or two—such are the Shiheibat." 619 [186] They are families of shepherds scattered amongst the Sa'adi families, and must not be confused with the 'Esheibat section of the Awlad 'Ali.

Dumreicher (pp. 52–7) gives a lively account of a [175]
quarrel between the Jawabis and the Shiheibat. [598]

[For information on the adwar or guerrilla bands which functioned as a military unit in the Italo-Sanusi wars, see Category 701.]

162 true numbers. As recipients of aid programs, their rations
114 are based upon the number of members per family. For these
[657] purposes, they are anxious to present as high a population
figure as possible. They exaggerate their livestock count in
order to receive more fodder, and, at other times, underestimate
their numbers to escape taxes.

162 For purposes of this study, the Bedouin population of
161 al-Qasr is about 1,500 to 3,000. Most of this population lives
361 on the coastal area and in the cultivable wadi areas. The
remainder is scattered south of the plateau region, near the
•621 desert proper. The 'izba sector of al-Qasr may be described
*613 as a nucleated cluster or settlement, but due to the nature
of the Bedouin segmentary lineage system, with its relatively
autonomous kin-based residence groups, this sector lacks the
usual degree of social interaction and integration associated
621 with the village or hamlet. The 'izba might be described as a
*613 multi-nucleated settlement or cluster. Each lineage has its
423 own mintaqa. Each mintaqa usually has a small dry-goods store
631 owned and operated by a lineage member and catering chiefly
443 to his own lineage-mates. Water and land in the 'izba sector
423 are individually owned. In the barley-pasture area, rights
*613
621 and privileges of ownership are vested in the corporate group,
even though the Bedouins and the government claim that tribally
423 owned land is illegal. All land boundaries, whether a mintaqa
or an individual's plot, are well-marked and well-known. The

*613 Bedouins, always a minority in Egypt, have been undergoing
178 a transition to peasantry since about 1800. Probably since
177
578 that time, Bedouin society has been, to use Easton's (1959)
emphasis, a "segmentary society" rather than a "segmenting
society."

196 Formal Bedouin categories of kinship are confusing;
depending upon the situation they use the concepts of *bait*,
'ait, *'aiela* and *qabiila* interchangeably. The term *bait*
literally means "house," the term *bait al-'Arab* may mean
"the tent" or "the people of the tent." "People of the tent"
[594] may refer to either the nuclear family of one man, or the
nuclear families of a man, his brothers and his sons, and
[596] their spouses and offspring. In the latter case, the ex-
●[621] tended family is referred to as the *naja'*. A *naja'*, or camp,
196 usually consists of three or four tents. The word *bait* may
*613 refer to the tertiary and the sub-tertiary groups, and oc-
casionally one might even refer to the secondary group as a
bait when he wishes to emphasize the quality of corporateness.
The term *'aiela*, literally "family," is the word used most
often to designate the secondary lineage segment. The dim-
inutive of this word, i.e. *'ait*, usually refers to the sub-
tertiary group but it commonly designates the secondary group
[619] also. The term *qabiila*, "tribe," is the only word used for
the primary and supra-primary lineage groupings. These are
196 the general Bedouin usages and their frequency will vary not

The Corporate Group

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Two key concepts have derived from Radcliffe-Brown's (1952:32-49) notion of kinship as a reflection of juridicial relations. Fallers (1956:14), discussing the expression of these concepts in segmentary societies, refers to them as "the lineage principle and its corollary, the corporate lineage group." For Radcliffe-Brown, kinship organization represented social order and this was the basis of societal survival: a social system in order to survive must conform to certain conditions. Adaptive mechanisms, expressed through the institutions of a society, consist of a "network of relations between individuals and groups" (1952:43). These social relations represent a collection of rights and implied duties which reside either with an individual or a group. Though reference is made to the place of the individual in society, the idea of the group is central in the theory of Radcliffe-Brown.

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Most important is the group referred to as "corporation:" a collectivity of individuals "who jointly exercise some right or rights," and who share common interests deriving from residence and kinship (1952:45). The corporation has rights in rem over its members; thus, the group imposes certain duties and obligations on other persons with respect to the rights of a particular person who is a member of the corporation. The law of blood-revenge is seen by Radcliffe-Brown to bring out

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this aspect of the corporation clearly.

The concept of the corporation as a sociological construct was first used by Maine (1904). The concept was a central one in the work of Max Weber (1947; 1954). As it was used by Maine, and later by Radcliffe-Brown, the corporation as a collection of rights and duties functioned primarily to maintain struetural continuity in society. Weber was concerned mainly with the political aspects of the corporation; this follows from his theoretical and empirical focus on political action and the exercise of authority. The two main elements of the corporate group as a social relationship according to Weber are that it is limited and defined by rules of admission, and that the administration of the group is carried out by functionaries, incumbents of political roles. An explicit structure of authority is the key to Weber's concept of corporate group: "Whether or not a corporate group exists is entirely a matter of the presence of a person in authority, with or without an administration staff" (1947: 145-146). Weber did differentiate analytically the corporate group from the other concept, first defined by Maine (1907: 108-110), the "Corporation sole" or "Public officer." However, he insisted that one could not exist without the other. Any analysis of the structure of authority in society must focus on both of these concepts.

The conditions for the formation of a corporate group

121 are, as Radcliffe-Brown correctly stated, the existence of
602 kinship ties and common residence. But, as Weber noted, the
571 expression of corporation is absent without a structure of
•621 authority. The corporate authority structure functions to allot group membership and political status; to formulate and enforce a rule of succession governing the transmission of property and roles; and to define and assign rights and duties of group members toward others. Group rights over members, as rights in rem, produce mutual rights for members which entitle them to protection against external enemies. Hence the corporate group is characterized by internal functions which define and control relationships between members, and external functions which identify the group within a given structural context where it has jurisdiction and governs its relations with other elements in this environment. Within this context, the corporate group is representative of any individual member. Both the internal and external functional aspects of the corporate group operate through the office of a specialized role whose incumbent has authoritative and representative powers. This is the role, or office, which Maine referred to as the "Corporation sole," and which Weber later called the Leiter ("chief").

*613 In al-Qasr, the corporate lineage group is composed
621 of agnates who reside together in a mintaqa, and who accept
571 as legitimate and morally binding an explicit process of

*613 •621 571 decision-making which allocates values in society. This process orders the internal and external political relations of corporation members. The corporate office which acts to regulate internal affairs, and to represent the group in external affairs is a unique status in al-Qasr having only one incumbent at a time. In Bedouin society, then, the corporation is to be considered distinct from the corporate sole (Smith 1966).

621 626 571 [183] The corporate group, although based on common interests and values, is not an integrated body simply in terms of consensus. Coercion also maintains corporate relationships. Consensus derives from the code of the group (Nadel 1951: 161), a set of common ideals. But in practice, the group must exert coercive pressures, sanctions, against individual behavior which threatens the welfare of the collectivity. Coercion may be seen as a necessary condition for what Durkheim called "mechanical solidarity." In al-Qasr, as in most societies, the desire for conformity to norms predicates coercive measures; coercion and consensus derive from the same cause, i.e., the requirement of some degree of integration. 621 571 182 [121] The corporate group and its authority structure is the mechanism which insures, through political means, the necessary degree of integration for the survival of al-Qasr society. In order to understand the phenomenon of social change occurring in al-Qasr, politics as an aspect of culture

621 should be thought of as an adaptive mechanism. This will help
571 182 us to understand two structural features of the Bedouin politi-
121 cal system: the establishment of cognatic alliances and the
differentiation of political roles. In tradition and modernity,
the integration and the survival of the Bedouin social system
have depended upon the proliferation of these features.

121 It is quite obvious that "a corporation can only form
621 itself on the basis of a common interest" (Radcliffe-Brown
571 1952:45); that any social relationship, or political group
[626] is characterized by both "pragmatic contents" and "moral
aspects;" and that "political sentiments" as part of the
group's moral and legal norms are enforcible by secular
sanctions brought to bear on individuals or groups (Fortes
121 and Evans-Pritchard 1940:20). But the discovery of what
underlies a "common interest," "moral aspect," and "political
sentiment" is a subtle problem which varies from culture to
culture. It deals with what Weber referred to as "problems
of meaning," and ultimately, the legitimation of the normative
system. What makes morality and sentiments meaningful and
sanctions legitimate is a value, a connecting element between
the social and cultural systems, "the constitutive symbolism
which grounds the identity and solidarity of the community"
(Parsons 1966:17). It is unlikely that such a value will
ever be obvious, no matter how essential it is, because

> 121 a tradition is not a mere observed fact like an existing custom . . .; it is an idea which expresses a value judgment. A certain way of acting is regarded as right; a certain order or arrangement is held desirable. The maintenance of the tradition is the assertion of this judgment (Radin 1935:63).

121 For al-Qasr, I have traced social ideas, social action,
181 and social order to a central traditional value which promotes
621 group consciousness, solidarity, and corporateness. Such a
571 value does not derive from Islam, for Bedouin tradition
171 preceded Islamic tradition, and much of the latter derives from the former. According to Robertson Smith (1903:26-62), the structurally significant unit in pre-Islamic Arabia was the hayy: "a collection of people of the same blood" who lived together and fought together. But, that which actually bound the members with a sense of corporateness to the hayy was the law of blood-revenge. For Smith, the key element in the Bedouin corporate group was the existence of a covenant of blood responsibility. The group was bound by a compact of mutual responsibility, the group had rights in rem over its members, and within the group there could be no blood-feud. Around this idea of mutual responsibility revolve the traditional values which are the basis of corporate grouping in Bedouin society: "The greater part of the traditions of the Arabs turns on blood-revenge and war . . . " (Smith 1903:26).

Smith developed his analysis of Arabian society in terms of certain structural principles: patrilineal ideology,

121 residence, cognatic ties, and contractual relations are all
181 seen to be structurally important in early Arabian society.
•621 571 Structural differentiation into groups is based on the
171 lineage principle and sustained through "the law of blood-
revenge." And it is important to note that the *hayy* was
characterized by a structure of authority, it was "guided
in war and on the march by one chief" (Smith 1903:44). The
121 law of blood-revenge as an expression of group rights *in rem*
621 and a system of mutual protection point up the importance of
571 contractual relations in Bedouin society. Whether or not
675 real blood ties are involved, a contract must be present or
there can be no corporate group. Contract legitimizes authority
and provides the basis for the lateral extension of the group;
it is primary though it functions coordinately with a principle
of cognation, residence, adoption, etc. Contractual ties
121 operate outside of kinship at times but will always be validated
621 by it eventually, "for a legal fiction is always adopted to
571 reconcile an act with a principle too firmly established to
675 608 be simply ignored" (Smith 1903:62). "Blood brothers," in
597 al-Qasr, are defined both biologically and ideologically. As
[602] noted in the case of al-Qasr, there were at least three cases
of contractual adoption in which one individual and two whole
corporate groups "wrote their names into the books of the
'Aishaibat tribe" (*katab jinnsiyya 'Aishaibiyya*). The integra-
tion or adoption of elements in al-Qasr takes place on the

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•621 basis of an agreement "to share the good and the bad" by
571 all parties concerned. Once the integration is effected,
675 patrilineal ideology and legal fiction succeed in concealing
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597 the jointure.

The concept which derives from ancient Arabia, and
621 which expresses fully the structural principles of Bedouin
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*613 society is that of *'aqila*. The *'aqila*, in al-Qasr, is the
head of the corporate group, the tertiary unit or *bait*. A
[884] person becomes part of the Bedouin jural body when he reaches
the age of 15, begins to keep the Ramadan fast, and is expected
to pay his share of the blood-money. At this time, a man
621 acquires rights over his corporate lineage-mates and they
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*613 over him: they claim a share in the indemnity ("blood-
672 money" - *diiya*) of each other, and are under obligation to
[682] contribute equal shares to any *diiya* which becomes due from
the group as a whole. Further, each corporate member is
morally bound to support his lineage-mates by swearing the
oath (*yamiin*) on the behalf of any who are accused of falsehoods in the course of litigation. All of these rights and
obligations are guaranteed by the presence of an *'aqila*.

*613 The tertiary *bait* is the minimal corporate group.
It usually includes three to five generations of members.
Tertiary units which are descended from a common ancestor
combine through contractual relations into the maximal corporate
group, the secondary unit or *'aiela*. Beyond the secondary level

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Yet, even when the problem of role definition was solved, it was still difficult to follow closely all aspects and phases of any particular dispute. This was mainly the result of the semi-nomadic nature of the population. In settled communities, the anthropologist usually finds himself in the midst of the social life of the community. He might not be a part of it, but at least a major portion of it is happening around him. In the case of nomadic or semi-nomadic populations, the situation is different. There were no large tribal concentrations in the area. The [621] largest residential unit was the camp, and it consisted of no more than thirteen tents which changed in composition quite rapidly. In one camp, out of the thirteen tents which were there when I joined, only six remained unchanged by the time I left three months later. Originally I had planned to stay in the small village of El-Hammam, which was believed to be in the tribal route of the major tribal segment in the area. It took [487] me only a few weeks to realize that the tribal segments did not follow any definite migratory route, and for more than four weeks I saw nothing of the life of the group more than the few individuals who came occasionally to the small settlement to buy tea or sugar, or to catch the train to Alexandria. It was then that I decided to leave the settlement and live with the camp. My stay in the camp was very insightful as far as information about the daily activities of the camp members and the relationship between the camp and other tribal segments in the area. But the camp was a very small group and fairly isolated. Besides, there was no way of knowing how typical that camp was to the other camps in the area. I finally decided that the best strategy was to live with a number of camps in the surrounding area for relatively short periods of time, making my base of operation a relatively settled camp in close proximity to a number of other camps.

613 individuals. He settles disputes among them and represents them in their
[627] disputes with outsiders. He is also the spokesman of his Bait in all
matters involving the relationship of the Bait with the other tribal seg-
[682] ments. He is responsible for the collection of the bloodmoney from mem-
bers of his Bait and has the authority to confiscate property of individual
members who refuse to pay their share. When a member is financially unable
to pay his share, the Aqila is expected to pay for him and collect at a
later time when the member is in a position to make such payment.

613 Originally the position of the Aqila was a hereditary one with the
428 position passing from father to son. However, in recent years the rigid-
178 ity of the patrilineal descent as the basis of succession to the position
of the Aqila has been modified radically and other principles of selec-
613 tion have been introduced. The working of the principles underlying the
128 selection of the Aqila will be analyzed in detail in the following chapter
through the close examination of one of the major legal cases which oc-
curred during my stay in the area.

613 Thus each Bait is a division of one of the Eilas and this has its
[423] place in the formal tribal system. It constitutes a group with definite
usufruct rights to land and a formally recognized leadership.

• 621 But the actual residential units in which Awlad Ali live are not
[613] baits but parts of them in the form of separate camps or "nagei". The
camps constitute the primary communities of Awlad Ali. A camp consists
[594] of a number of tents ranging from four to twelve. Each tent is usually
occupied by one nuclear family of a husband, his wife and children. In
[595] cases of polygynous marriages, each wife usually occupies one tent with
[361] her children. Each camp is separated from the next one by a distance
which ranges from two to ten kilometers.

621 which ranges from two to ten kilometers. The camp coincides with the
233 herding unit. The herd of the camp is usually grazed as a unit, often
621 by a paid shepherd hired by the members of the camp as a whole. Origi-
233 621 nally the camp moved as a unit for grazing. This was essential in the
361 era of the tribal warfare and raiding where the security of the herd
178 and that of the people depended on such collective movement. In a type
of organization adapted to periodical movement, the camp offered the
optimum sized community: small enough to permit easy movement and large
enough to offer the kind of protection which individual families could
621 not have offered. In this era the camp seemed to have been a closely
178 knit group. Many of the informants still remember the time when the
622 361 camp was under the strong control of the headman who made the major de-
233 cisions of where and when the camp should move. It was those decisions
that determined the safety and the security of the group. The headman
had strong authority over members of his camp. Such authority was based
mainly on his ability to exercise valid judgments as to whether or not
the group should move and the route that it had to take if movement was
decided upon. At the present time, and with the diminishing of raiding
and tribal warfare in the area, the authority of the headman seems to
have diminished along with it. The camp appears at the present time to
be mostly a residential unit with minimal leadership and with a rapidly
changing composition. Different families join the camp at different
times during the year.

621 Although the membership of the camps is drawn from the bait, a camp
613 does not, in terms of its genealogical composition, make up a descent
segment of that Bait. The membership of a camp is based on a completely

●621 different principle from the principle of patrilineal succession charac-
613 teristic of the bait and all other units on the higher levels of tribal
segmentation.

Some of the camps I visited were composed of three patrilines, while
others contained individuals belonging to five patrilines. In some camps
each tent belonged to a different patriline, some of which did not even
belong to the same bait. The composite nature of the camps is partic-
ularly clear in the case of what the people in the area called "nagei
gheir aseil" or the artificial camp. This kind of camp is usually found
near the towns and settled communities of the area. They include one or
two tents of individuals belonging to the bait whose land the camp is
built one, and who give the camp its name, but the rest of the tents are
occupied by individuals from different baits or even tribes and also by
621 outsiders who came to work in the area. Such a camp does not act as a
unit for any purpose. It has a rudimentary structure, and is held to-
gether by mere physical proximity of its members which stems from the
need of "wanas" or togetherness. The composition of the artificial camps
is highly changeable with new members joining and others leaving through-
out the year. When I joined the camp of Ragi from the Sanagra tribe, it
consisted of twelve tents. Four of the twelve tents were occupied by
[563] Sheihk Ragi (two tents for the two wives) and his two married sons, five
occupied by members of tribal segments other than Sanagrah, and four by
workers who came from Alexandria to work for the government project in
the area. One week after I joined the camp another tent was added to
[563] the camp. It belonged to a man from the Geneishat tribe of the Natruh
area. He came with his wife to work on the new irrigation project which

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621 which ranges from two to ten kilometers. The camp coincides with the
233 herding unit. The herd of the camp is usually grazed as a unit, often
621 by a paid shepherd hired by the members of the camp as a whole. Origi-
233 nally the camp moved as a unit for grazing. This was essential in the
621 era of the tribal warfare and raiding where the security of the herd
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621 not have offered. In this era the camp seemed to have been a closely
178 knit group. Many of the informants still remember the time when the
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233 cisions of where and when the camp should move. It was those decisions
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613 does not, in terms of its genealogical composition, make up a descent
segment of that Bait. The membership of a camp is based on a completely

621 had started in the area at that time. No special permission was re-
563 quired for the newcomer to join the camp. He only got the permission
of the person whose tent was at the far end of the camp to put his tent
[574] next to it. The first night after the man joined the camp, his next
door neighbor slaughtered a goat in honor of the new member and invited
all members of the camp.

621 Leaving the camp also does not require any permission, although the
622 custom specifies that before one leaves he should inform either his
[576] neighbor or the headman of his time of departure. With the exception of
[613] cases where the headman of a particular camp is at the same time the
Aqila of the bait, the headman of the camp has no authority over the mem-
622 bers of the camp. He is usually called upon to solve minor problems be-
627 tween brothers or husband and wife, or give his opinion in decisions of
minor importance. "A headman is like a father," said one informant, "we
call him kabir el-nagi (the old man of the camp)." When a member of the
627 613 nagei is involved in a serious dispute with another, the one to handle
the case is the aqila or awaqil to whom the two disputing parties belong.

619 Group	Leadership	Identifying aspects
613 Kabila	None	Client groups attached.
621 Eila	None	Vengeance group, Vaguely defined tribal land ("watan").
Bait	Aqila	Corporate land-holding. Formally recognized leadership.
[622] Nagei	Headman	Residential unit with unsegmented structure.

175 residence of the Pasha to a garden; and that the town possessed
632 only one machine for grinding corn.[1] The population increased
considerably in the last decades of Turkish rule, reaching the
175 figure of 16,500 in 1911.[2] In 1922 the population was 22,740,
162 the great majority of whom were Arabs from the Maghrib,
632 though some were immigrants into the town from the more
sedentary Bedouin of the neighbourhood. It included also over
2,000 *qulaughla*, descendants of Turkish officials and troops and
Arab women, and a large number of *shawashna*, descendants of
Arab men and Negresses, with a sprinkling of *'abid*, full-blooded Negroes. There were also about 3,000 Jews and about
3,600 Europeans, almost all Italians. These elements, except
for the Italians who left during the late war, are found in all
the towns of Cyrenaica. There are also a few Cretans, the
remnant of a small community exiled by the Italians.

Darna stands on the site of the Greek town of Darnis, from which the Arab name is presumably derived. It seems that it continued to be occupied throughout the Arab period, but was given new life through the settlement there of Muslim refugees from Spain at the end of the fifteenth century. According to tradition, towards the end of the seventeenth century the town was developed by a certain Muhammad Bey who organized irrigation and other public works there. The population was much increased by the settlement of merchants from the coastal towns of Tripolitania and of other countries of the Maghrib, either by direct migration or from Banghazi. When Della Cella
[731] visited the town in 1816 the population had been reduced by
pestilence from 7,000 to 500.[3] In 1911 it was about 9,500[4] and in 1922 it was about 9,700 (not counting Italians) of whom 250 were Jews and the rest Muslims.

Al-Marj, the Italian Barce, was the site of the ancient city of Barke, famous in Greek times and to Arab historians of the first centuries after the Arab conquest of Cyrenaica. It fell into decay after the Hilalian invasion and was only a heap of ruins till 1842, when the Turkish administration built a fort there, a Sanusiya zawiya being constructed shortly afterwards. In 1922
175 the population, of very mixed origins, was 1,540. The other
632 centres in Cyrenaica are no more than villages around admini-
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[1] Op. cit., pp. 52 and 59.

[2] Coro, op. cit., p. 99.

[3] Op. cit., p. 177.

[4] Coro, op. cit., p. 102.

strative posts and contain not more than a few hundred persons. 175
Shahhat and Tubruq had been Turkish posts before the Italians 632
made them administrative centres. Taukra and Talmaitha had 621
been Sanusiya lodges. Suluq and Qaminis were Italian
creations. Marsa Susa (Apollonia) was first occupied by Cretan
refugees during the Turco-Greek war of 1897. Ajadabiya, the
town of which the Arab historian al-Bakri of the eleventh
century spoke in such glowing terms, had ceased to be a settled
centre until the Turks made it an administrative post. During [648]*
the period of truce between the Sanusi and the Italians from
1917 to 1922 it became the seat of the Sanusi Amir, Sayyid
Mahammad Idris, and afterwards an Italian administrative and
commercial centre.

It has been noted that almost all the townsmen of Cyrenaica 632
are immigrants from the west, from Morocco to Tripolitania, 162
and the Bedouin regard them as foreigners and often with some 369
distaste, especially the Tripolitanian immigrants. It is true [186]
that there is a small element of Bedouin origin in the towns,
for the more stable and poorer Bedouin living near towns sometimes drift into them; but when they do so their descendants soon lose their links with the tents and their tribal status. The road to town life is a way along which there is no return, for the townsmen are not only foreigners, but their food, their speech, their dress, their manners, their interests, their loyalties, and in general their way of life and their sentiments, are different. The Bedouin visit the towns from time to time, but they do not feel at home in them, and they do not look at home in them either. In a town one can spot a Bedouin at a glance by his appearance, his step, his dignity, his naivety, and his loud voice, which sometimes startles the shopkeeper with whom he disputes a price.

The road to the towns is not only a way along which there is 632
no return, but is a one-way track. A Bedouin can become a 369
citizen, but a citizen can never become a Bedouin. He cannot 641
live the life of the tents. Hence the Bedouin say that while it is always bad for a Bedouin girl to marry a townsman, it is possible for her to adapt herself to urban life, but it is out of the question for a Bedouin to marry a townsman's daughter, for it is impossible for her to become a daughter of the tents.

The *bwadi*, Bedouin, and the *hadur*, citizens, are separate

619 stretch of tribal territory, move during the rains to the same
613 grazing grounds, use the same wells during the dry season, and
cultivate adjacent strips of arable. The members of a *bait* have
a lively sense of solidarity, and this is most evident in fighting
and feuds. It is their common duty to avenge a slain kinsman
and they share the *diya*, indemnity, should they accept it in
[672] the place of a life. They are jointly responsible for a wrong any
one of them may commit. The smaller *biyut* are often identical
[621] with camps, usually from five to ten tents, in grazing grounds,
and several closely related *biyut* camp near together in the
vicinity of springs and wells in the summer, their combined
camps then amounting sometimes to over a hundred tents.

619 What has been said above about tribal structure applies only
to the free tribes and the larger client tribes living on their own
land. The client tribes which are split up and scattered throughout
Cyrenaica are not tribes in a political, but only in an ethnic,
619 sense. It will be found that in any of the main tribes stranger
614 groups, sometimes of client origin, have attached themselves
608 to the clan dominant in the tribal area and through some fiction,
myth, or fraud, have grafted their branch of descent on to the
genealogical tree of this clan. The Bedouin use the word *laf* to
describe this process and they say that kinship established in this
way may become as strong as kinship of blood.

619 The structure of a tribe is expressed in terms of the lineage
system of the clan dominant in its territory, the tribal segments
614 being associated with branches of descent from the ancestor of
613 this clan. The primary tribal sections are identified with lineages descended from some of this ancestor's descendants in the male line; the secondary tribal sections are identified with lineages descended from more of his descendants farther down the line of descent; and so on till the smallest territorial segments and the smallest lineages are reached. Thus a lineage considered as a branch of a clan consists of all those persons who trace their descent through the male line to a common ancestor, but it can also be, and in speech often is, conceived of politically as an agnatic group of this kind together with stranger and *Marabtin* accretions which occupy its territory and make common cause with it in disputes with other tribes or segments of the same tribe.

A simple example is given in illustration of tribal segmentation

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complicate the more direct relationship of the distribution of 619
groups of people to the ecology.[3] [13]
[182]

The Cyrenaican genealogy, then, is a conceptualization of a hierarchy[4] of ordered territorial segments. The groups stemming from the ancestor at the third order of segmentation are referred to as tribes, and each tribe is the apex of a three-tiered order of segments, which, following customary practice, are referred to as primary, secondary, and tertiary. The latter, the tertiary segment, 621
represents the group of people who, for a period of six to eight 613
months, gather together and live in what, for all intents and purposes, is a single discrete residential group.[5] This tertiary group is also the smallest political group. It has its own homeland, with its [423]
water supplies, pastures, and ploughland. In this homeland live most of its members. It is a lineage segment, and most of the agnates of this segment live on their own homeland.[6] It is also the [682]
vengeance group, which means that any one of its members can [628]
be killed in vengeance for a homicide committed by any other, and that the obligation to exact vengeance falls on all members alike, regardless of relationship to the victim. Likewise, its members pay blood money as a group, and although when they receive it, a bigger portion goes to the nearest agnate of the victim, the remainder is distributed equally among all its members. The number of generations which supervene between the founding ancestor of a tertiary segment and the living is usually four or five, but there is little consistency in this number. Some tertiary

[3] This part of the discussion is necessarily brief, but further amplification will appear in two subsequent articles now in preparation, one of which is concerned with a general treatment of Cyrenaican genealogies, and the other with a discussion of the effects of ecology on the social organization of the Bedouin. [114]

[4] I use the word hierarchy here since, although segments of any order display many like features, the orders represent distinct and progressively more embracing interests, and these differences are of such consequence that to consider one order of groups as a facsimile of a superior or inferior order can only lead to confusion. A tertiary group, that is to say, may possess many of the characteristics of a secondary group, but the one is a fundamentally different sort of group from the other, as I shall show in my forthcoming article on the feud. (cf. Smith, M. G. 1956.) [128]

[5] This statement does not apply to the Darsa and the Hasa tribes, two of the plateau tribes in Cyrenaica. The statements in this article are confined almost exclusively to the camel herders of the semi-desert. [619]
[128]

[6] This, admittedly, is too general a statement to make about such an important issue, but I would prefer to leave its documentation and precision for an article on the analysis of the composition of Bedouin camps.

613 segments show a lineage depth of three generations, while others
621 show as many as six. No special importance is attached by the
Bedouin to this number, although some writers claim that a depth
of five generations is of particular significance among other Arab
621 tribes.[7] Normally, in speaking of the vengeance group, the Bedouin
628 refer to the name of the ancestor of a tertiary tribal section.
613 Any one claiming membership of this group, regardless of his
682 precise generational relation to the offender or the victim is immediately
and equally involved with its other members. When
speaking of the group as such, the Bedouin refer to it as 'those
who have agreed on the blood', and use the phrase *'amara dam*
to refer to it. Blood money does not pass between its members,
and political division does not occur within it.

621 These small tertiary sections of tribes, then, are small residential
613 groups. Their population varies from one group to another,
[162] but most of them have a total population of 150 to 200 souls.
Successive generations—at least according to the Bedouin view
—add to these numbers, and also increase progressively the
number of generations in their genealogies. Substantial increases
of population would, of course, constitute a pressure on local
resources, on the water available in the particular well of a
group, on the amount of land available for ploughing, and on
the pastures for animals at the end of the rainy season. Again,
if each generation is to be added to the existing genealogy, this
would necessitate a realignment of structural relationships with
each succeeding generation. The discussion that follows is an
128 examination of the ways in which adjustments are made to
621 maintain an equilibrium between the population of a group and
613 the carrying capacity of the land on which its members live, and
of the ways in which the genealogical structure is able to persist
in the face of various contingencies which threaten it.

A beginning might be made by indicating the processes at work to keep the form of the genealogy fairly fixed when there is an absence of population pressure on resources. The first problem is the simple one of describing the mechanics of manipula-

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[171] [7] e.g. Burkhardt (1831), speaks of the *Khomse*, the five generation group,
as very widespread among Arabs. G. W. Murray also reports the use of the word *Khomsa* among the Arabs of the Sinai desert to designate the blood-vengeance group, but the term used by the Aulad 'Ali tribe, the cousins and Egyptian neighbours of the Cyrenaican Bedouin, he gives as *Awlia'-ed-dam* (which simply means 'blood kindred').

621
tion which enable the genealogy to remain constant in length 613
and fixed in form despite its dynamic content. 128

One of the main processes at work in foreshortening genealogies is that referred to by Evans-Pritchard as telescoping.[8] 173 178
This process is also a characteristic feature of the Cyrenaican 613
genealogy, although its effects, to be discussed presently, differ
conspicuously. 551 The way in which telescoping works in the Cyrenaican genealogy is that several male names come to be omitted in the genealogy below the name of the founding ancestor of the tertiary group. Usually, the form in which this occurs it that the name of a famous tribesman, and particularly his nickname if he has one, is retained along with the personal names of his lineal descendants in successive generations. The example given below is taken from the genealogy of the Haiba tertiary section of the Magharba tribe:



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[8] 'It is evident, moreover, that since the minimal lineage consists of four or five actual steps in ascent, there has been telescoping of the agnatic line from the founder of the minimal lineage further up the line of ascent to the founder of the clan, for the founder of the minimal lineage was himself the extremity of another minimal lineage which has, by increase in generations, become the minor lineage, and so on' (Fortes & Evans-Pritchard 1940, p. 199). Since Evans-Pritchard first wrote on the telescoping of genealogies (171) among the Nuer, other anthropologists have discussed the process in various systems. Fortes, Richards, Laura Bohannan, Cunnison, and Mitchell in their writings on the Tallensi, Bemba, the Tiv, the Luapula people, and the Yao respectively are notable examples . . . As the mode of manipulation of Bedouin genealogies is marginal to my present problem, the main comparison is not with these works but with Evans-Pritchard's earlier work on the Nuer, because the Bedouin and Nuer lineage system have more in common than either have with the other systems, excepting possibly the Tiv.

existed, it was pointless giving them separate status any longer; 173
they were content to give the three men separate lines of a few 178
613
generations, and then to tag them on to Madhkur, the founding ancestor of the segment.



Telescoping, fusion of names, and the extinction of lines are three ways in which the general fixed shape of the genealogy is retained. These three processes are only sufficient, however, in special circumstances, but before discussing these circumstances one further general condition relating to these processes must be
made explicit. All three affect the genealogy within the tertiary 173
segments only, and do not affect it at any of the more superior 178
orders of segmentation. There is not a shred of evidence from 613
contemporary Cyrenaican genealogies to show that telescoping or 621
fusion occurs except within the tertiary segment, within that group, in other words, where precise genealogical links are known and can be specified, and within that small group which for most part of the year constitutes a single settlement. It is possible that groups of structurally superior levels to the tertiary have become extinct, in the way that tertiary lines have petered out. There is no definite evidence to support this, and from the analysis of Cyrenaican genealogies in general it seems that when any group is threatened with extinction—and this in turn means that fewer and fewer people will be using the same land and water facilities—there is a definite tendency for the lineage rump to fuse with a collateral lineage (and in so doing fuse their resources with those of the adopting lineage), or for a numerically more powerful lineage group to take it over by force. The number of tertiary segments spanned by a secondary segment, therefore, increases or decreases according to the circumstances; so that a secondary segment, numerically strong in its tertiary segments to-day, may become considerably weaker in future, and the numerically weak secondary section of to-day may proliferate its segments substantially in the future. Short of a significant de-

173 cline in the total population of a tribe, then, the extinction of
178 lines does not affect any order of segmentation superior to the
613 tertiary. In this respect, the Cyrenaican genealogy differs funda-
621 mentally from those collected from the Nuer by Evans-Pritchard.
In the quotation from his work on Nuer genealogies (1951), he
[171] asserts that telescoping occurs 'from the founder of the minimal
lineage further up the line of ascent to the founder of the clan'.
This major difference has serious implications for any discussion
of lineage proliferation, but these must be left until the conditions
under which proliferation is likely to occur have been analysed.

178 While it is true that the processes discussed are of importance
613 in retaining the general shape of the genealogy, what is assumed
so far is that the Cyrenaican population has been stable over long
621 periods. Stability of population is not an unreasonable assump-
161 tion to make for a people who live on the margin of subsistence
182 in a country where extended periods of drought are not infre-
[173] quent, though seldom leading, it is true, to actual famine condi-
[731] tions, but producing periodic and local food and water shortages.
Disease, following quickly in the trail of shortage, it can be as-
sumed, kept the relationship of total population to the natural
resources fairly constant. What evidence there is does not support
[726] even this very general assumption, since it is known that there
have been large-scale tribal wars in the past, and a certain
[167] amount of movement of tribes, some being displaced and others
pushed eastwards into Egypt. Unless these shifts were caused by
increases in the aggregate population and the consequent pres-
sure on land and water, it is difficult to account for them. This
consideration of possible overall increases in population in the
past poses interesting problems related to lineage structure which
cannot be adequately treated here. For the moment it is proposed
to neglect possible increases in the total population during past
periods in the history of Cyrenaica. The historical depth of the
view now to be discussed is about seventy years, and for this
period I have no evidence of any large-scale increases in popula-
tion. It is reasonable, therefore, to assume a general stability of
[132] population for this period. But the vagaries of the Cyrenaican
climate are such that, in a given year, one area might be well
drenched with rain, giving excellent pastures for animals and
good crops, while a nearby territorial strip might suffer a partial

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drought giving insufficient pastures and poor crops. Good or bad 613
crops, poor or abundant pasture, in turn mean a higher or lower 621
milk yield from the animals and better or worse living conditions 161
for human beings. Such factors as these may well, over a number 182
of years, lead to unevenness in the distribution of population [132]
throughout the tertiary sections. Whatever the cause, the genealogies
show that the population of the numerous tertiary sections [173]
is unequal. Some are numerically so weak that they have to
join a collateral section. Others are numerically so strong that
their natural resources are insufficient to meet the needs of all
their members. It was these latter segments which were in the
process of splitting, and which in some cases have already done
so. The next task, then, is to demonstrate where, on the genealogy, [128]
proliferation is effected.

We have seen that in Nuer genealogies segments proliferate at 173
all orders of segmentation. Here, the process is a continuous one, 171
beginning at any point in time within the minimal lineage and 613
progressing upwards to the apex of lineage bifurcation. As particular 551
names become significant within the minimal segment,
they are retained and become a permanent addition to the genealogy.
In order to include these successively additional names,
names of ascending ancestors are shunted further and further
into the genealogical past, until presumably the effect is felt at
the topmost limit of the genealogy, when the names here are
pushed out of the genealogical framework altogether, and forgotten
for ever. More than this, the upward shift in names at
each and every point in the genealogical line means also a consequent
re-ordering of structural relationships, at all levels in the
system. One vital difference between Nuer and Bedouin societies 173
which may partly, at least, account for the different genealogical 178
processes at work among them is that the Nuer, when they were 613
studied by Evans-Pritchard, were expanding territorially, and [171]
that continuous proliferation of segments throughout the structure
was the mode of dealing with a situation of expansion. The [648]
Bedouin, on the other hand, had suffered twenty years of terrible
privation at the hands of the Italians, during which period thousands
of them died in battle and in concentration camps, were
shot up in their camps from the air, or died from want, before I
went to live among them. Although I must confess that I now

613 At the next level of segmentation (this now being the tertiary
619 order in any given tribe) the number of segments which appear
621 is conspicuously irregular. For the Magharba tribe, the four secondary segments, 'Ali, Mansur, Subh and Nasr are divided into thirteen, six, four, and four segments respectively. Similar irregularity appears in other tribes.[11] The pattern of the genealogy is always one of regularity in the number of segments at all points in it except for the point of tertiary segmentation where conspicuous irregularity becomes immediately evident. Since these
613 segments constitute the summer camps of the Bedouin, this is not
619 surprising, for these small groups will show greater susceptibility
621 to details of local water supplies, pasturing facilities, ploughland
133 areas, and topographical features than would the numerically larger and structurally superior groups occupying larger areas of
182 territories of greater ecological importance. If we follow the line
131 from Sa'ada to Nasr again, the bifurcation at the first order of segmentation is consistent with the division of the country into the permanently green high altitudes of the plateau, and the extended low-lying plain area of the western half of the country.
[134] Between the territory of the Magharba tribe ('The White Plain') and that of its neighbour tribe, the 'Awaqir ('The Red Plain'), there is a major soil difference, which is such a conspicuous feature of the landscape, and so sharply defined, that one is almost aware when one has crossed the tribal boundary. Within the Magharba tribe, a prominent dry river valley cuts the territory in two, the landscape to the west of it being characteristically serrated, making travel in an east-west direction difficult, while to the east the landscape is much more docile and undulating. The four sections of the ash-Shamakh branch again represent four quite distinct areas. The territory of one section is almost conterminous with the narrow belt of sand dunes along the coast; the territory of another is a block of rough and tumbled land in the west; the territory of a third, in the centre, is made up of a few low-lying shallow valleys; and the territory of the fourth,

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[114] [11] It is necessary here to warn the reader that, brilliant an ethnographer as Agostini undoubtedly was, his grouping of tribal sections is not always correct. I had his book (Agostini 1922–23) with me in the field and checked his tribal survey. I found that at several important points his ordering of the segments was incorrect. I should add that the differences between Agostini and myself are not due to the kind of changes discussed in this article.

stretching across to the village of Ajadabiya in the east, topples 613
in undulations away into the flat expanses of the desert to the 619
south. At all these points of segmentation, the territories occu- 621
pied by the various sections are large and roughly defined, and 133
the population aggregates supported on these territories run from 182
over a thousand at one end to tens of thousands at the upper 131
limits. The tertiary sections are numerically much smaller, some
of them numbering as few as a hundred souls in all, and the
territories to which they are attached are correspondingly
smaller. The relationship between the numbers in this order of
section, and the precise amount of water available in the local
wells is an intimate one. If the population of one of these groups
increases, or if the number of animals rises, or if the springs show
a decline in the volume of water they give forth, or if the winter
rainfall has allowed the storage in wells of only a small quantity 5
of water, a rearrangement of the group must be effected. A sig-
nificant alteration of any one of these components must mean
that the local group must split to enable a new adjustment to be
made in the relationship of man and animals to water.

Whatever changes occur within groups of any size, since the 173
genealogy embraces the entire population, these must appear on 178
the genealogy in some way or other. Now a genealogy is as rigid 829
a framework, as fixed and final a pattern of grouping, as can be 613
imagined. The impression that they are thus rigid and fixed, ex- 551
cept for the addition of successive generations, is strengthened
by the way in which the Bedouin use them. From their young
boys to their old men, the Bedouin are expert genealogists, and
the names of ancestors, for one reason or another, are never far
from their lips. Names are kept alive by constant use, since all [571]
references to inter-group relationships must be in terms of these
names. More than this, the Bedouin were proud to the point of 173
boastfulness of their genealogical knowledge, and, wherever I 829
travelled, the first request I had to comply with was to take down 613
a large portion of a tribal genealogy. In recording their endless 551
genealogies, one feature about them came to assume increasing 123
interest; while there was remarkable unanimity with regard to 126
most of the names given, there was one point of marked am-
biguity—at the tertiary level of segmentation. I recorded geneal-
ogies in four tribes on an extensive scale, and in each tribe

There are, in Cyrenaica, three major status groups among the 619
tribes: the noble or free-born tribesmen (*al-Hurr*), those who 554
have been adopted or grafted on to a tribe (the *Laff*), and the 608
clients (*Marabtin*).

Those who claim to be free-born also claim ownership of the 619
natural resources. The *Laff* do not own these. They are people 608
thought not to have originally been of the lineage of the tribe 621
with which they are resident. They are found sometimes in ones 613
and twos in the camps of the free-born, but sometimes constituting [423]
tertiary groups themselves. Now when such people have resided
with their free-born hosts for several years and one of them 619
has married one of the host's daughters, they are grafted to the 608
genealogy at the point of tertiary segmentation, that is, where 613
ambiguity occurs in the genealogy. Obviously, persons thus 621
grafted to the lineage cannot be shown as descendants of one 173
of the living or of the recently dead, remembered perhaps by
some of the elders still living. It is equally true to say that they
cannot be grafted to the lineage at a point superior to that of
the tertiary segments, since this would involve recognition by a
number of tertiary groups whose members may know little or
nothing about them. When a person enters a new tribe, the only
way in which he can do so is to go to live in a camp, and it is the
concern of the people of that particular camp whether or not they
accept him, since it is they who have to decide whether their
resources are sufficient to support a newcomer. Once a man has
been accepted as a full member of a tertiary section, membership
of superior tribal sections is automatic, although to enter into
tribal membership he requires the permission of members of a
tertiary section only. To graft at a point superior to the tertiary
would be the same as giving a man superior structural status, but
without a camp in which to dwell. There is only one place for
his incorporation, and that is where the ambiguity in the genealogy
permits manipulation to include new lines. In this way the [597]
adoption of a person into a lineage does not offend the sense of
kinship of the receiving group since the point of inclusion is an
ancestor about whom little or nothing is known and whose authenticity
is frequently doubted by some. What has been referred
to as an area of ambiguity is, moreover, something of a jumble of
names, and it is not a difficult matter, if a new line has to be

619 attached somewhere along the line, to attach it to one of these
608 names. Bedouin welcome, as members of their camps, practically
613 anyone who wishes to join, even, in the case of one group, an
621 Italian. The limit to this acceptance of members is, of course, the
173 number of people who can be supported by the local resources.
If people are being admitted freely to membership of a particular
[182] camp, this means that there is a local surplus of land and water,
so that the number of grafts being supported by any particular
section is a useful index of the extent to which the resources are
being used. Conversely, as sometimes happens when grafted elements
become numerous, or when the water supply, for various
reasons, dwindles, it may be necessary to detach a grafted group.
[578] Such action is always the occasion of a violent dispute, usually
over watering rights, and not infrequently fights break out.
Whether or not the grafted group wins, from then onwards it will
be forced to exist as an independent group, and a new tertiary
section will have been born. No matter which of the processes
involving grafts is considered—incorporation or detachment—
both are contained within the framework of the tertiary section,
without any effect on the rest of the structure.

619 The position of the clients, in the context of this discussion, is
not unlike that of the grafts. Briefly, clients are men who are considered
[423] to have originated from a country other than Cyrenaica,
and who for this reason cannot claim rights to land and water—
at least this is the theory, although in some circumstances they
are able to do so successfully. They are of various kinds, but they
are not included in the genealogies given by the free-born. Clients
are found grouped in two main ways. There are some large
groups which constitute tribes in the sense that they display a
genealogical and territorial organization like those of the freeborn,
and are usually to be found flanking the main tribes of the
country on their borders. Some of these are powerful groups and
enjoy considerable independence of action, but whatever their
characteristics they none the less speak of themselves as 'for' or
tied to the noble tribe whose territory includes theirs. Further,
619 the sections of these client tribes have their special ties with
571 tertiary sections of the noble tribes, which are not merely ties of
621 sentiment, but which take the form of valuable mutual help in a
613 number of situations. A whole client tribe, in the sense that it is

occupying territory which cannot be said to belong to any particular 619
section of their noble patron tribe, is tied to the patron 571
tribe as such. Yet it is through the small tertiary segments that 621 •
these ties are made effective. In this sense, a client tribe is a combination 613
of small groups of people each group having specific relationships with defined tertiary sections, and participating in the tribe of their patrons through these relationships.

Secondly, clients are found distributed in small groups, sometimes 619
no more than one or two men, but often in clusters large 621
enough to compose a small camp. Practically all tertiary sections 613
of the noble tribes have some clients either living with them or
sharing their resources. While clients continue to reside with a 619
particular tertiary section, it is the members of the latter who are 621
responsible for them and vice versa. If, for example, one of the 613
clients commits a homicide, the gathering of blood-money is the 672
responsibility of the noble tertiary section to which he is attached, [682]
and vengeance can be exacted on any member of the noble section. In other circumstances, when the offender is a nobleman, then the clients of his group are the first to be approached
for blood-money. Tied in this way to a particular 619
tertiary section, they are not, however, compelled to reside with 621
its members permanently. On the contrary, they may be forced 182
to move. If, for example, there is a pressure on local water supplies, 166
the first to feel it are the clients. Annually, they supplicate 613
for the use of water, and if their patrons decide that there is insufficient to meet all needs, the request is refused, albeit reluctantly. Clients constitute a socially mobile group; they are the pawns in the annual readjustment of men to their resources. Whenever they move, they pass on to another tertiary section, which may be a collateral section of the one they have left or structurally far removed from it, but as soon as they leave one, their duties and obligations cease and are taken up anew with another structurally like group. It is because their attachment is to a tertiary section, and not to one of superior order, that they can be as socially mobile as they are, which in turn facilitates a more efficient adjustment to the ecological situation from year to year.

Small groups of clients move frequently, groups of adopted people less frequently, and groups composed of the free-born

619 change their structural position only rarely. The latter change
621 sometimes does, however, occur, and there is evidence to show
182 that it does. For example, Agostini (1922–23, p. 323) in his tribal
166 survey, records a section named Barsha as one of the groups stemming
613 from Nasr.[12] In the genealogies I was given, the name did not appear, and even after some questioning, what information was known about it was concealed. Some time later the name
[578] cropped up accidentally in conversation, and I was then told that at one time it had been one of the Nasr groups, but that after a quarrel during a year of water shortage, the Barsha folk went to live with people with whom they had maternal connexions, and in whose territory there was ample water that year, and never returned. The group, a tertiary one, was detached from the tertiary point of segmentation in the genealogies, and tied on to a tertiary group of another tribe in its new homeland.

178 To summarize briefly the argument thus far, the mechanical
173 devices of telescoping, fusion of names, the ejection of those
619 names which cease to be of any social consequence, and the
621 elision of names at or around the fifth ascending generation,
taken together point to the importance of the tertiary order of
613 segmentation in discussing the problem of maintaining the form of the genealogy constant in face of its natural tendency to alter; further, evidence of changes (adoption into a lineage, detachment from it, the inclusion and exclusion of clients) was presented, and this again led to the conclusion that the tertiary point of segmentation is critical in this respect. This being so, the manner
[128] in which change actually occurs, still remains to be shown, and this is best done, perhaps, by discussing the mode of proliferation of tertiary segments. In order to do this adequately, it is necessary to say something briefly about certain features of Bedouin marriage.

582 Among the Bedouin there exists a preferential form of marriage
605 between a man and his father's brother's daughter. Parallel cousin marriage of this sort carries with it the exclusive right of a man to this cousin. Without his consent no one else can marry her, and to attempt to do so would be to risk the marriage arrangements being nullified after negotiations had almost been

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[114] [12] Barsha's position is incorrectly given as a sub-group of Haiba; it should be shown as structurally equivalent to Haiba. See also note 11.

concluded. I have been present on occasions when, after both parties have agreed to a marriage and the groom has collected most of the things necessary to present to the bride at the wedding celebrations, the girl's father's brother's son appears and demands the discontinuance of the arrangements; on one occasion, he did not appear until the actual day of the wedding, but was bought off with a cap, a cloak, and the promise of two sheep. The highest incidence for any form of marriage, moreover, is with the patrilineal parallel cousin, although not necessarily with the first cousin. 582 605

Parallel cousin marriage of this sort is not, however, the only form practised among the Bedouin. Much of the writing on Bedouin marriage leaves the impression that a solution of the problem of parallel cousin marriage (Murphy & Kasdal 1959) solves all the problems involved in their system of marriage. In addition to this form, there is a number of others; indeed there is another form of preferential marriage among them, which, although it does not have the compulsive character of parallel cousin marriage, is of major importance. I refer to cross-cousin marriage with the mother's brother's daughter. Such a cousin may be, of course, as a result of patrilineal parallel cousin marriage, a patrilineal parallel cousin as well. Such a cousin may be, on the other hand, a woman of another tribal section or of a different tribe altogether. A characteristic form of this marriage is that once it has been initiated, it is perpetuated in successive generations. Members of one line in a tertiary segment will, therefore, be building up kinship ties through marriage in one particular direction. At the same time, another line, by practising the same form of marriage will be weaving ties in a quite different direction. One direction these marriages could take might be to a tertiary segment of a collateral secondary segment; another might be to a primary segment of the same tribe, and yet another to people living in a date oasis. Only occasionally do marriages occur between collateral tertiary segments, and then there is usually some specific reason. In other words, when men marry outside the limits of their own tertiary segment, they leap-frog adjacent segments and marry into structurally more remote groups. 582 582 613

The result of these two marriage patterns is that the people of [621]

582 any summer camp will have descent lines cross linked by the
613 bonds of marriage with parallel cousins, and at the same time
•[621] cleaved by the maternal links established by repetitive cross-cousin
marriage to different groups outside the segment. Thus,
582 in one of its aspects, marriage makes of an agnatic group a group
613 of cognates as well. 'Marry your paternal cousins and both your
602 paternal and maternal relatives will be one,' to quote Bedouin
sentiment on the matter. Within this agnatic group, nevertheless,
two other clusters of kin exist—those with maternal connexions
outside. In all, three areas of kinship can be defined,[13] although
all the members of the segment will have the lineage bond of
agnation in common. In normal circumstances, when split does
not threaten the group, the bond of agnation, strengthened by
parallel cousin marriage, takes precedence, although behaviour
is significantly affected by maternal links at any time. There is,
152 in the first instance, great jealousy between co-wives, which is
595 passed on to their children. Each wife has her separate tent, and
593 each is entitled to a strictly equal share of the husband's time
they have in common. This applies similarly to favours he may
grant his wives, and the distribution of his wealth among them.
If, for example, the husband is the owner of a horse, he is required
to tether it outside the tents of his wives in strict rotation;
if he retires for the night with one wife, the following night
he must favour the other; if he buys dress material for the one
he must buy a length of identical material for the other; if he
bestows favours on the children of one the children of the other
must be given equal consideration. Many such details are
meticulously observed; but while many are observed most of the
time, it is difficult to observe them all, the whole time. Any
breach of the rules is quickly taken up by the wives, and quarrels
ensue, leading not only to bitterness among the co-wives, but between
the offended wife and her husband, between the children
595 of both wives, and between the children and their father. Often,
593 when a man has co-wives, there is a marked discrepancy in age
561 between them, for, when an elderly Bedouin marries a second

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[13] The situation is not always as simple as this. Cross-cousin marriage may take more than two directions, and marriage within the segment might bring about great complexity, but the argument put forward above is not seriously affected by neglecting these details here.

wife he usually chooses a young girl of about twenty years. Children 595
of the elder wife might be adult, therefore, when the children 593
of the junior wife are infants. Great emphasis is placed on 561
seniority, particularly among males, but strong emphasis is also
placed on the equality of siblings and their equal legal status.
Between brothers of widely differing ages, there is, then, this
field of potential conflict. From an early date competitive, if not
hostile, relationships develop between the sons of co-wives. Competition 593
between half-brothers results not only from their 586
mothers being co-wives: one group might be the sons of a divorced
wife. The latter situation is often much worse, for the sons 587
born of the divorced wife are now being fostered by a woman
who is not their mother. A similar condition of things is brought
about when a widower with sons remarries. Yet again, when a
wife grows old and her sons have reached maturity, her husband
may not divorce her formally, but merely 'throw her off his
back'; she will then go to live with her grown sons, while her
husband, in turn, takes a new wife, usually taking up residence
in another camp for a time at least. It would be too much of a
digression here to discuss the inheritance disputes, and the disputes
over marriage and bride-wealth, which arise out of these
various circumstances. Suffice it to note that such disputes are [613]
common and affect the alignment of people within a tertiary
segment.

As half-brothers grow to maturity some of them will marry 613
their maternal cross-cousins, and in succeeding generations some 621 •
of their descendants will do likewise. In this way, a tertiary segment [582]
united by the bond of agnation, will also have within it
smaller groups of kin having different sets of cognatic links. This
group, as a residential unit, shows a very high concentration of
agnates, and the Bedouin say with pride that members of the
camps are always 'one' because of this agnatic bond, and indeed,
the corporate identity of this group is strikingly displayed in
many circumstances. It does not take precedence in all circumstances, 613
for, built into agnation, with the heavy burden of duties 578
which go with it, are serious stresses and strains which in some 602
circumstances regularly come out into the open. In yet other
circumstances cognatic kinship affiliations appear to be dominant,
causing friction among agnates. A man, for example, may permit

weeks later, he is reviled for demanding a long overdue instalment 604
of his daughter's bride-wealth. He is the person who can be 613
approached freely, to whom love tales can be told, from whom [585]
help can be expected, who gives support in disputes, and who also [583]
upbraids, who punishes, who withholds, who acts as a pull-away
from the agnatic group. An agnate demands help, and also compels 613
the fulfilment of obligations. An agnate is a man with whom 602
relationships are formal; particularly if he is a senior. He is, too,
the person who unfailingly, though perhaps grudgingly, gives
help when it is most required; who, regardless of the merits of the
case, defends one against external opposition; and who is always
available at each life crisis. A kinship link is not to be defined by
any one particular mode of behaviour. Each is a cluster of different
sorts of behaviour, one form taking precedence in these circumstances,
another in other circumstances, and so forth.

The little clusters of kindred can be defined clearly in any of 613
the camps. It is customary among the Bedouin for those who are 602
most closely linked as kindred to pitch their tents close to each 621
other. For example, if a man has two recently married sons, their
tents are pitched on either side of his, with the ropes of their
tents crossing the ropes of their father's tent. More distantly related
kin will be more distantly placed, and here and there,
breaks in the continuity of the lines of tents are to be observed,
corresponding as a rule to breaks in kinship. Each large camp in
this way can be viewed as two or more nuclei of kindred. The
camp as a whole is dominantly composed of agnates, but they
are disposed in such a way as to show clusterings of varying kinship
composition. Characteristically each cluster has a separate
name, often a female name which refers to a common mother of
the cluster, or of the head of the leading family in it. When these [221]
relatively large camps break up with the onset of the rains and
disperse to form small camps of five to seven tents for winter
pasturing, they will be seen to correspond almost identically with
the kin clusters of the larger summer camp. Again, a tertiary segment [312]
may have two wells for its own use. In a particular year
there may be sufficient water in one of them to meet the needs
of the whole group, and its members then live together in one
camp; the following year both wells may have to be used, and
the camp of the previous summer will split up, roughly half going

613 621 602 [312] to one well, and the remainder to the other. It is usually an easy matter to predict, at least in a general fashion, how the group will divide, as long as the details of kinship are known; the camps will be composed of members of two sets of patri-lines in the tertiary segment, who will also represent two discrete clusters of cognatic kindred. If, therefore, a tertiary group increases in numbers to the point where a split in the lineage is inevitable, here then is the line of split, along a line, that is, of kinship cleavage and lineage differentiation. 'Men make the tribe; women divide it,' is an oft-quoted saying among the Bedouin, but this, like most sayings, tells only part of the truth, as we shall see.

613 621 It is possible to show where on the genealogy change takes place, and it is possible to indicate the lines cleavages will follow, but the proliferation of a lineage does not occur merely because the possibility exists for it to do so. A group must, clearly, break up if the number of its members significantly exceeds that which can be supported by the available natural resources; water is the prime cause of the proliferation of lineages. Granting this, a group remains an undifferentiated corporation until occasion arises when its members, or some of them, can demonstrate unequivocally that they are no longer bound by its conditions of membership. There is a number of occasions when this can be done, some of which are discussed below.

613 621 672 682 The test, *par excellence*, of corporate affiliation is the acceptance of the responsibility to pay blood-money. Refusal to accept this is the same as renouncing membership of the group. Individuals are sometimes excluded from membership in this way. There are occasions too, when the payment of blood-money involves renunciation by more than one or two individuals. If membership of a section has increased to the point of splitting, and should a homicide occur within it, one of the kin clusters within the group might demand blood-money from the other. Nothing could make the statement of split clearer than this. The most impelling condition of membership of the tertiary group is that 'we pay as one and receive as one', a condition which, of course, excludes payment within the group. Any two groups between which the demand for blood-money has been made are, therefore, by definition, separate tertiary groups.

613 621 765 When a member of a group or his wife dies, there are specific

days on which kin of various sorts should attend the mourning 613
ceremonies, which extend over a period of a week. Allowance is 621
made for those who may be away temporarily, although they are 765
expected to hasten to the mourning camp as quickly as possible.
Agnatic kin are expected not only to be present on the appropriate 613
day, but are required to offer gifts consistent with their 621
relationship to the bereaved; agnates of the tertiary segment are 765
expected to offer a sheep, while some cognates ought to bring a 431
goat and others a quantity of sugar and tea. At one funeral in a
camp where I was resident, soon after the death occurred, the
main concern of its inhabitants was whether or not certain men
of their section would attend the mourning rites and bring
appropriate gifts with them. These men lived at the time in
another camp a few miles away, as they had been doing for
several years past. They did not come when they were expected,
and when they finally arrived at the end of the week they brought
with them gifts of sugar and tea only—gifts which were totally
inappropriate for agnates of the group. They were, in fact,
now no longer members of it, and my neighbours were able to
tell me, 'They have branched off from us. We will never live together
again.' The lineage had proliferated and this was the first
occasion for showing it.

Wide-spread in Cyrenaica is a cult of saints. The number of 794
saints' tombs varies from tribe to tribe, there being fewer among 776
the camel herders of the semi-desert than among the cow- 778
herding, almost sedentary, folk of the plateau area. Whatever [788]
the number, the members of the group that venerates a particular
saint make an annual pilgrimage to his tomb, and sometimes
more frequent pilgrimages are made. In one area there were two 794
men, accepted by their respective kin groups as leaders, who vied 554
against each other for the leadership of their section. One of them [648]
had been a famous warrior during the Italian wars and, after
being injured, fled to Egypt where he lived for seventeen years,
until he returned to his homeland in 1947. The other had also
fought against the Italians, failed to win renown, was a captive
for a time, later released, and subsequently appointed leader of
his section by the Italian authorities. The first, during his period
of exile, had become impoverished. The second during his
years of freedom had prospered. As far as their personalities

the interests they have in their maternal relatives. Stated thus 613
sharply, this is a distortion of the process. To speak of the prin- 602
ciple of agnation conflicting with the principle of cognation or 121
maternal origin is nonsense, as the facts included in the discussion show. Agnation is not one thing, but many. Within its scope are included such aspects of social organization as succession, status, inheritance, bride-wealth, blood-money, modes of domestic and political behaviour, and so forth; and each of these aspects, the closer we stick to reality, can be broken up into a number of components. The same can be said of cognation and maternal origin. All these principles, so called, are clusters of numerous component parts, which combine, in reality, in a kaleidoscopic number of ways. In one situation a component of one combines with that of another to strengthen it; in a different situation the one component may repel the other; in a third situation, a number of the components in one will combine to exclude those of the other, and so on. If, therefore, an understanding of the way in which lineage proliferation occurs is sought, a view of the process as a conflict between the principle of agnation and the opposing pull of maternal origin is quite erroneous. It is of use in predicting the direction of cleavage to know that within a tertiary group there are also clusters of kin which are defined roughly by maternal links, and this knowledge serves as a rough and ready guide in predicting what the composition of groups, after they have split away from the parent group, will be. If a more precise picture of this composition is desired, other and more complex kinship links and the behaviour which accompanies them must be taken into account. If a still more accurate picture is desired, details of inheritance disputes, debts of bride-wealth, the size of flocks and herds, and the like, must also be taken into consideration. If, finally, one has the opportunity to study groups after they have proliferated, the presence or absence of this or that man can often be explained only in terms of his eye for a pretty girl or a personal preference for neighbours.

The kind of change which has been discussed in this essay is [178]
not difficult to negotiate in genealogical terms. Earlier it was
stressed that within the tertiary tribal sections, although they [621]
are always predominantly agnatic groups, clusters of cognatic [173]
[551]

613 kin also exist. Two ways of naming these clusters are adopted—
602 all groups, whether they are elementary families, an odd assort-
121 ment of kindred sharing a common tent for reasons of expediency,
178 or tribal groups, have a name. Sometimes these clusters are
621 named after a prominent living male, or a deceased kinsman of
173 the same kind. Sometimes these little groups are named after a
551 woman, perhaps the grandmother of the group.[15] Thus a small group of two or three tents will be distinguished from another similar cluster within the camp, and so on for a number of groups, depending on the size of the camp. Most camps, however many tents they contain, have names for progressively inclusive clusters of tents until a twofold named division is reached. Tertiary segments that are forced to split contain therefore two groups with names already attached to them. When a split occurs, the name of the tertiary segment is pushed into the area of ambiguity and the names of what were previously two clusters become the names of two new tertiary segments, with a minimum adjustment in usage and a minor re-shuffle at the tertiary level of segmentation. Names cannot continue to be pushed into this area of the genealogy interminably, otherwise it would gradually expand into a vast pool of names. For a few generations the name dispensed with in this way becomes one of those ancestors about whom there is argument when genealogies are given. In the course of time, name after name is subjected to the process of elision and eventually will cease to be of concern to anyone.

105 I now summarize the main points of the discussion. The evi-
613 dence that has been examined suggests that the mechanical devices
173 of telescoping, fusion of names, and extinction of lines do not affect orders of segmentation superior to that of the tertiary
178 order, and that in conditions of a completely stable population,
[551] these devices alone would suffice to retain the form of the genealogical structure. But, it was argued, conditions of complete stability cannot be assumed; the evidence of the present distribution of population among the numerous tertiary groups clearly points to marked fluctuations occurring within these small groups. This being so, proliferation of these groups in some areas at some

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[15] The naming of groups within a tertiary segment is an interesting study in itself, but it would be outside the limits of this discussion to make more than a brief mention of it.

121 given to the feud, for this is one of the few societies in which it occurs.[1] What is
613 meant here by a state of feud is a set of relationships between two tribal groups which
578 are characterized by hostility whenever two or more of their members meet. These
591 hostilities are of a sort which cannot be terminated; feud is not a matter of a group
121 indulging in hostilities here at one moment and there the next, but a sequence of
619 hostilities which, as far as the contemporary Bedouin are concerned at least, know
578 no beginning and are insoluble. Feud and the other forms of relationships to be
[591] discussed presently are to be understood, in part, by reference to the ordered divisions
of the tribes. It is necessary at the outset, therefore, to give a brief statement about
the tribal organization; other details will be included as they become relevant.

619 There are nine noble tribes in Cyrenaica whose members are referred to as freemen.
621 These tribes see themselves as divided into three genealogical orders of sections:
primary, secondary, and tertiary. The tertiary tribal sections correspond to the camps
613 which cluster around the larger watering points during the drought season, May to
[132] November. Such camps consist of clusters of smaller camps in which the concentration of agnatically related males is over 80 per cent. Within the latter kinship links
are known, so that these agnates are consanguinely related as well as politically
[162] united. The populations of most tertiary groups vary from about 200 to 700 or so,
but a group ceases to be viable if the number of male adults drops much below fifty.
Political division is absent from these tertiary groups, regardless of their precise
size, for, whatever may be the condition of developing local lineages, the acceptance
of a common name carries with it full political responsibility incumbent equally on
[423] all their members. Each of these tertiary sections, moreover, has its own watering
point, ploughland, and pastures; each has its own *watan* or homeland. This statement
is true of all tribal sections of whatever order of segmentation. In other words, the
tribes and their sections correspond to an ordered division of the territory.

619 Names of tribal sections are the same as those given in the genealogies. Both tribe
613 and lineage are identically ordered. Lineages develop, and split at the tertiary order
of segmentation,[2] and, *a fortiori*, the process is the same for the tertiary tribal sections.
Split, in other words, occurs where relationships are most intense.

621 The summer community which constitutes a tertiary section, breaks up once the
221 rains begin in November or December. At this time of the year water is readily
available in the numerous small cisterns, there is pasture in plenty, and the animals
are giving milk. These combined reasons lead the larger summer camp to divide
into smaller camps of some five to ten tents. The latter are separated one from the
other by short distances—a mile or so—but together form a cluster in that they are
621 territorially distinguishable from a neighbouring and similar group of camps. Tertiary sections are discrete also in the sense that all the major necessities of daily living
311 are available within their several territories. Each controls its own natural resources,
and these resources are the same for all the camel-herding groups—in any given year
one may have more of a particular commodity than another, but the difference is in

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[171] [1] Evans-Pritchard, 1940. The feud might have been present among the Nuer. Exogamy and the other rules of marriage which obtain among them create a dispersion of ties, which superficially appears to militate against a condition of feud. But a dispersal of ties does not mean that they necessarily act as a pressure for peace. Moreover, the exogamous links may link limited numbers of groups only, leaving others with sufficient discreteness to pursue feuding relationships as they are described in this paper.

[2] See Peters, 1959.

degree and is ephemeral, so that the opportunity for the development of trade rela- 621
tions is absent.[1] Save for straying animals, a section has no urgent need to seek 311
relationships with others, as long as the rainfall is sufficient to permit the exploitation [619]
of local resources.

The tertiary section is also regarded as the corporate group *par excellence*, in which 621
'the one word does for all'. Corporate identity is conceptualized as 'one bone'
or 'one body'. An offence against one of its members is held to be an offence 613
against all; if one of its members is killed 'we all lose blood'. When one of its mem-
bers commits homicide the responsibility falls on all equally. Blood money, when [682]
received, is shared by all save for a special portion reserved for the 'owner of the [272]
blood', the nearest agnate of the victim. In opposite circumstances, all adult males
accept the responsibility of contributing an equal share to the blood money. Rules
of membership, simple in their brevity, express graphically this corporate identity:
'You must strike with us and be struck with us; you must pay with us and receive
with us.' The group also bears a name, and there is never any doubt about the
affiliation of any tribesman. That group of men—known as the *'amarā dam*—who are
agreed on the obligation to exact vengeance, to pay blood money when necessary,
to engage in common defence, and to accept the possibility of death in vengeance,
is a fixed and clear-cut group, not one whose membership has to be calculated by
reference to degrees of kinship in regard to a specific situation, as appears to be the
case among other peoples.

Homicide within the *'amarā dam* brings about an impasse in relationships. A blood- 621
money payment is out of the question since the acceptance of blood money by one 613
part of a tertiary section from another of its parts is tantamount to a statement of 682
split. Only in conditions where relationships within the lineage have developed to the 627
point of political severance is it anticipated that a blood-money payment may be
demanded; but this problem is not the same as that at present under discussion.
Bedouin say that blood money cannot pass within the *'amarā dam* for those making [829]
the payment would be the persons receiving it. This is spurious reasoning, since the
'owner of the blood' is awarded more than any other members of the group as it is,
and arrangements could obviously be made to pay him separately. Blood money is
out of the question because it distinguishes relationships between people as belonging
to two distinct political communities, and not because of any difficulty of distribution.
In Bedouin thinking, an injury to 'the one body' is an injury to all its parts. Blood- [829]
money payments by members of a corporation to one or more of its members is a
contradiction in terms. In the same way vengeance is also excluded, for this merely
doubles the original loss. A reprisal exacted in hot blood is always a possibility, but
this is not referred to as *thār*, vengeance. Even if, at a later date, the closest kinsman
of the victim should slay the offender, the act would not be referred to as *thār* and any
connexion with earlier homicides would be denied.

Stultified in the field of political action, there is little else that can be done. Expul- 682
sion is a possible course of action—and expulsion has occurred. Records show,
however, that exile is almost invariably voluntary.[2] Moreover, exile is terminated as

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[1] Many sections trade fleeces for dates with the folk of distant oases, but the sections do not trade among themselves.

[2] I recorded one case of a man who was expelled from his group and the tribes around were warned that the rules of sanctuary were not to apply to him. He is said to have died from grief and hunger. The reason given for such drastic action is that he killed [438]

682 a rule by the return of the offender to his camp after the lapse of a number of years. A man who had already killed six people killed a seventh, his first paternal cousin. He and his brothers fled the tribe; he died in exile and it was not until some thirty [123] years later that his brother and nephew returned. Another man, who had killed his first paternal cousin, used my entry into a camp as the occasion for his re-entry, pitching his tent rope on rope with mine, and mine in turn was rope on rope with the tent of the camp's shaikh.[1]

621 An effort is always made to hush up the matter when a homicide occurs within a 682 tertiary section. It is for this reason that the name of the victim is not perpetuated. 613 Normally it is an obligation to perpetuate the names of the deceased, especially when [551] they have been killed in homicide, but in the circumstances now being discussed the name is suppressed. As one man expressed the general sentiments, stretching out his toga in front of him: 'Look at the hole in my toga; it would be better without it, but what can I do? Make it bigger? It is better to cover it up.' Any penal action taken against the offender could only enlarge the wound he had already opened. The notion of corporate identity is so strong that it eliminates the use of penal action against one of its members for the greatest offence of all. While overtly every effort is made to expunge the memory of a homicide of the sort described above, the Bedouin are most articulate in their views about the offender. He is referred to as one who 'defecates in the tent' thus likening him to an animal, for no human being would do this. Other expletives used in reference to him are: one who 'destroys the lineage', who 'corrupts the family'; he is one who 'brings confusion', who 'provokes God' and causes 'the evil of leprosy to eat into relationships'. Their feelings about the offender, who 'commits robbery internally', are summed up in the word *fitna*. This, in its Cyrenaican use, corresponds closely to the notion of sin as it is used in the Old Testament; in the sense, that is to say, of an act which causes an impasse in relationships, which creates chaos among a small group of related people, and produces internal calamity. And this is indeed the situation brought about by such homicide among the Bedouin. Flowing blood, they are wont to say, can only be staunched by blood (i.e. a vengeance killing), but if a man kills within a close agnatic range the corporate body continues to bleed. Nothing can be done. The group is left helpless, and this is sin.

The first step in this exposition, therefore, is to attach to homicide within a tertiary section the notion of its being *fitna*, carrying with it voluntary and temporary expulsion.

682 A homicide which involves two collateral tertiary sections is a different matter 628 altogether, for now the parties constitute two discrete political groups. Political machinery can be set in motion to deal with the breach in relationships, and conse- 621 quently a homicide of this sort does not pose the dilemma which is created when it 613 occurs within a politically undivided group. Not only do agnates of two collateral tertiary sections behave towards each other as two groups of people, but the nature of their relationships is fundamentally different from those obtaining between mem-

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682 a first cousin in cold blood because of a dispute between them over the ownership of a new-born kid. Although this was the only reason given by the Bedouin other considerations were involved—the victim was said to have been a fine person, and his killer a constant trouble maker, and so on.

[1] See for comparison Robertson Smith, 1903. The tent is an area of sanctuary, and this extends to include the ropes also.

bers of an undivided group. It is erroneous to suppose that because the different 621
orders of sections are homologous in their structural aspects they do not differ; they 613
do, because the interests associated with the various orders are different.[1] 628

Collateral tertiary segments are associated with different tracts of territory. Each [682]
has its own watering rights as a group, and although groups may share a grain store, [423]
it is divided on group lines. Members of these different groups do not gather together
in summer to form a single community, though at some of the very big watering
points they are near each other. Social relationships between them are, however,
intense. Visits are frequent. They meet to exchange news, or to inquire after the [574]
sick. They exchange greetings during the major festivals, and members of one group
attend the funerals and weddings of the others, taking gifts. They also meet at the
grain stores. Herdsmen, as they pursue straying animals, wander freely in their neighbours'
territory. Relationships of this sort, some of them urgently necessary for
survival, do not permit the feuding relationships to be described presently. Permanent
hostility which characterizes the feud would seriously disrupt everyday economic
activities, limit the pastoral movements of the Bedouin beyond endurance, and sever
lines of communication which they always strive to keep open.

A homicide, when it involves two collateral tertiary groups must, therefore, be 621
resolved quickly. This can be effected in two ways. Vengeance may be exacted immediately. 613
This is always referred to as a vengeance killing or *thār*, and is to be distinguished 628
from a superficially similar act within a tertiary group, since *thār* carries 682
with it the implication that it is premeditated. A *thār* between two tertiary sections
is considered to be the best way of settling the affair and, after an appropriate lapse
of time, a peace meeting is held at which it is accepted that the killings have cancelled
each other out. The deliberations at this meeting are followed by a meal at which all
present 'eat around the one bowl'; the meal over, they all pray together. A life had
been taken for a life and the way is now open for the restoration of normal peaceful
relationships. Vengeance needs to be distinguished from feud, for while retaliatory
killings provide the propulsive force in the feud a vengeance killing may be the means
whereby a settlement of hostilities is made possible.

An end to hostilities may also be brought about by a promise to pay blood money 621
or *diya*, and its acceptance by the victim's group. Arrangements for blood-money 613
discussions are made by a category of persons known as *marabtin bi'l baraka*, or 628
'clients of the goodness', men who, by virtue of descent and origin, stand outside 682
the descent lines of the noble tribes, and who are accredited with divine goodness. 792
They tend the sick, write amulets, and are always present at a peace meeting to give
it the weight of their baraka. Soon after the homicide has occurred they act as intermediaries
to bring the hostile groups together at a peace meeting.[2] Ostensibly, the 621
first part of the proceedings at these meetings is to settle the amount of the blood 613
money, and how and when it is to be paid. Agreement on these counts will have been 628
reached, however, before the large peace gathering is assembled, for there is a gener- 682

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[1] This statement requires more documentation than I am able to give to it in this paper, but the descriptive details given hereafter give it some substance. See also Smith, 1956.

[2] It is necessary to add here that these clients do not assume coercive powers. They are granted the power to curse, but the curse that is feared is the curse of their dead when an oath is given at a saint's tomb. When they know that groups wish to make peace they assist as messengers in bringing people together, but they do not use their power to curse as a pressure.

5: Peters E-5 (1948-1950) 1967 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9
Cyrenaica

621 ally recognized amount of blood money to compensate a homicide. The wrangling
613 that goes on at the meeting is of a conventional kind, and it is known in advance that
628 several distinguished guests present will supplicate for a reduction of the amount
682 demanded by the victim's group, until the amount generally accepted as appropriate
is reached. Such haggling makes it possible for the victim's surviving agnates to
maintain the fiction that they yielded only under the strongest pressure from the desert
[264] leaders and holy men. The main importance of the meeting is that the two hostile
groups are brought together again for the first time, that the cleavage between them has been narrowed sufficiently to permit them to eat round one bowl, and that, by virtue of this commensal meal, the way is now open for the restoration of normal relationships. Subsequently there may be another killing, which, in the mind of the perpetrator, is connected with the earlier death of a kinsman, but it is not publicly recognized as one in a series of killings, or even as a vengeance killing; it is regarded as unique, and the method of dealing with it is on the basis of this fiction. Feud is not permitted between two collateral tertiary sections, for although the pattern of homicide may be similar to that of a feud, the two are never equated. There is good reason for this, since, whatever the similarity in pattern, the social relationships between the groups involved are radically different; each homicide involving tertiary sections is regarded as a unique event, and the relationships between times are friendly, whereas in feud relationships are permanently hostile and need not be otherwise for social, economic, or religious purposes.

Blood money when it brings peace brings it because payment is made only in part. It is never regarded as a payment for the life of a man, to be dissipated wantonly. 'The owner of the blood' should marry a wife with it to beget children (one son to be named after the victim) or to buy camels to provide for a future marriage, or to buy a horse to be used to ride in bringing vengeance. Sufficient is paid to cover either of the first two alternatives; as far as my records go the third alternative is romanticism. At the peace meeting the offender's group does not promise to pay the total amount in one sum. An initial instalment is promised after the next lambing season or barley harvest. When the time comes it can be argued that the sheep dropped a disappointingly small number of lambs, or that the barley harvest did not fulfil expectations. If there is room for negotiation over the initial payment, the permitted manœuvring over subsequent payments is much greater. Promises made at the peace meeting relating to these subsequent payments do not specify the exact amount of each; the statement is no more definite than that the remainder should be paid over the following three to five years. Consequently when the second payment falls due, the offender's group can argue more cogently that their circumstances do not permit even a reduced payment, for the payment of the previous year was substantial and they have not yet recovered from this outlay. 'The owner of the blood' is pressed to consider this, and to accept only a fraction of the wealth he had come to collect. The argument is cumulative, and can be used to excuse the rapidly decreasing payments of each successive year, until there comes a time when attempts to collect payments are discontinued. The arguments about the payments bear no relationship to the wealth possessed by a group. During the annual hagglings, and while members of the offender's group are declaring their straitened circumstances as an excuse for the small amount offered, the 'owner of the blood' knows full well that two or three

621 hundred of their sheep are grazing in the neighbourhood. This is beside the point.
613 What is important is that the offender's group is showing a desire to remain on
628 friendly terms, and members of the victim's group are doing likewise by accepting
682 reduced amounts. Compared with what the payments should be, after four years they
are trivial and soon cease altogether. Blood money, if it is to achieve the purpose of
621 restoring peaceful relationships, must work in this way among the Bedouin, for, as
613 they view the matter, a single payment of the full amount would only terminate
628 relationships. There would be no further obligations to hold them together. The
682 payment of a debt in full means only one thing—hostility. Where there is no debt,
571 there are no relationships. Debt must be allowed to run between groups, for it is this
182 which creates obligations and perpetuates social relationships.[1] As the debt of blood
money mounts, the social relationships between the groups improve. The cessation
of payments and the absence of further demands is final earnest that the relationships
are again normal.

613 The second step in this exposition, therefore, is to attach to homicide between
628 tertiary sections the penalty of vengeance or the payment of blood money, both
621 achieving the same end of bringing about a restoration of peaceful relationships.

682 Between secondary sections, relationships are again different. Ecologically, the
619 areas are distinct. The topography may be dissimilar—sand dunes in one area and
613 low valleys in another; secondly, the soils may differ—sandy soil here and firm valley
[133] bottom soil there; thirdly, while the climatic régime of the two areas may be broadly
similar, since there is marked variability in the aggregate annual rainfall which is
[132] coupled with a high variability from place to place, each secondary section has its
own micro-climate, sufficiently well defined for one area to be well watered in any
given year while a neighbouring area suffers partial drought. These differences affect
[221] productive activities. Seasonal movements are also affected: some secondary sections
move annually over considerable distances and in fixed directions, while members of
a collateral section may move only a few miles and these short moves may vary in
direction from year to year. It is true that minor ecological differences exist between
collateral tertiary sections, but these do not affect the economy and the way of life in
the manner described for secondary sections. Partly because of their territorial extent,
partly because of the larger aggregate population, the secondary sections are more
self-contained, not only ecologically and economically but also in terms of social
relationship. More of the requirements of everyday living can be met within the
territory and span of a secondary section than within those of a tertiary section.
Secondary sections develop a kind of specialization to the extent that in any year
some of them will have more usable natural resources than others, but because these
differences are ephemeral they do not lead to the development of permanent trade
relations. Add to all this the fact that agnates are concentrated in camps on the territory which belongs to their lineage, and the discreteness of secondary sections is
[582] immediately apparent. Marriage rules make this discreteness potentially, at least, even
more sharply defined, for unlike other 'lineage societies' where exogamy, coupled
with other marriage regulations, compels the dispersion of kin links among lineage

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[1] This point becomes clearer when considered in the general context of debt relationship among the Bedouin. Marriage payments, gift exchanges, hospitality, various forms of help, and so on are all aspects, with blood money, of an intricate and fascinating web of debt relationships.

121 part of a secondary section but not with another. Once contingencies are permitted
613 to enter in, the lineage model ceases to be of use, for what is implied is that at all
114 times some parts of sections structurally situated for feuding do not in fact feud.
[619] Other facts can be adduced to show that the structural view is inadequate but, before
[829] proceeding to examine these, some general objections to the lineage theory need to
[578] be raised. In the first instance, the corner stone in the theory of lineage systems is that they consist of parts which are in balanced opposition. It is no accident that the idiom generally used in discussing the segmentation of a lineage system is that segments bifurcate. Indeed bifurcation is necessary if lineage theory is to make sense, because if at any order there are more than two segments, then combinations can occur which are not comprehended by the theory. In the Cyrenaican lineage the number of segments at the tertiary order is haphazard, in some cases as few as two but in others as many as a dozen or so. Where there are many segments at this order it is rather pointless to speak in terms of balanced opposition. Moreover, at the secondary order of segmentation the number of segments are fairly consistent throughout the tribes, but they number more than two in all of them. It is also a fact that combinations occur and, moreover, these may be between the tertiary segments of two ' opposed ' secondary segments.

121 Secondly, in lineage theory groups come together to constitute larger segments in
613 opposition to like segments. Yet in lineage societies there is a lack of instituted
authority, there are no chiefs distributed throughout the land as heads of segments
571 of the hierarchical orders. This being so, then it is not possible for all the sections of,
622 say, a secondary section to come together; there is no one to command the action.
114 In fact, sections combine in Cyrenaica, but not in the way they should according to the lineage structure. In order to discuss this adequately, a lengthy diversion into an analysis of the distribution of power would be necessary. The matter must rest here with the admittedly somewhat dogmatic assertion that there are men who wield power over groups of varying populations, and that the extent of their domains cannot be understood by reference to orders in the lineage. Perhaps it is for this reason—because, that is to say, lineage theory effectively blocks the exercise—that relatively little has been written about the problem of leadership in these societies.

121 Thirdly, all segments should be fairly equal in numbers of people and economic
613 resources, if the theory of lineage were to have substance in reality. In Cyrenaica
114 the population of one tertiary segment may be three times or more that of another.
● [621] Both may be structurally equal in the sense that they are named groups segmenting as a pair of brothers from a common father. As political groups, however, this equality has little meaning. Further, with regard to economic resources, some sections possess several wells and a territory of such extent that it straddles two or even more of what might be called micro-ecological areas. With marked preponderance in numbers and superiority of resources, some groups have grown into dominance, and the evidence points to the existence of this dominance in the past also. However, ' like ' sections may appear on a lineage chart, in political action there is conspicuous
[619] disparity. Each tribe possesses one tertiary section or more with a claim to be the
[621] owners of the ' Golden Stirrup '; these are large tertiary groups with relatively plentiful resources, with allies in other groups, and, in sum, with the power to terrorize other tribal groups.

613 Among the Bedouin, men are permitted to marry their father's brother's daughter
582 and any other cousin of similar type within the local agnatic group. This means that
121 most agnates will be related in other ways as well. Parallel-cousin marriage has the
effect of diversifying the agnatic group, and creates small nuclei within it, each having
its own characteristics and patterns of behaviour with others. Diversification of this
kind leads to a differentiation between homicides within the tertiary group.

The Bedouin say that they always marry their parallel cousins, and do not give their
daughters to others if they can help it. Census data does not support this view. Nearly
as many men find wives outside their agnatic group as within it. Of importance
in the present context is the direction taken by these external marriages. Perhaps
121 the most striking feature is that the number of marriages with men of a collateral
582 tertiary group is low, so low that they can be explained by special circumstances.
628 Now collateral tertiary groups whose territories are adjacent experience intense day-
613 to-day relationships. In the context of descent these are the most closely linked
● [621] lineages—among older men there may be the recollection of the time when the two
constituted a single community, and when they all lived together in the same summer
camp. Common sentiment between them is very strong. The strips of territory they
inhabit may be almost identical. Their discreteness lies almost entirely in the possession
of separate natural resources, although in some cases pastures are shared.
But their social boundaries are nevertheless sharply drawn, for the high incidence of
parallel-cousin marriage within them, and the tendency for external links to leap-frog
collateral segments, gives them a definition which could not be bettered by exogamy.
121 The basis of their discreteness lies, of course, in the competition that exists between
628 them for natural resources; however much the Bedouin protest that their real enemies
613 are the secondary or primary groups lying some thirty to fifty miles away, when they
578 wish to enlarge their resources there is little point in attempting to capture a well a
long distance away, which cannot be defended, and might be located alongside an
enemy group. They do, it is true, engage in competitive hostilities over land and
water situated some distance from their homeland, but when they engage in these
activities they do so on behalf of a linked group, albeit with their own interests
uppermost. The capture of natural resources for use by a tertiary group can only be
achieved by an enlargement of its homeland, and this is only possible by expanding
into a neighbour's territory.

121 Another feature of external marriages is that they are not spread among as many
613 groups as in societies where there are exogamous clans, and where other rules of
582 marriage appear to compel the maximum amount of dispersal. Instead, the external
links created through marriage are highly selective, and are thrown out into ecologically
differentiated areas, giving added economic security, or, in the case of date oases,
an additional item to the diet at a time of the year when it is sorely needed. Once
established these external links are perpetuated through cross-cousin marriages in
successive generations. If the link is considered valuable, and relationships develop
satisfactorily, other marriage connexions will be woven around the first. Multiplicity
gives added strength and durability, not in the mechanical sense of duplication, but of
creating a more diverse kin structure, with its greater range of rights and claims, in
which links can flourish. While the number of groups linked in marriage are few,
the geographical spread is great. Marriage links exist with tertiary sections of colla-

membership of associations and so on. The statuses a Bedouin achieves 796
depend not on an ordered acquisition through the inheritance of roles or 852
election to them, but on his personal manipulation of linkages in his jockeying 88
with others. Rites are minimal because there are few defined statuses an 554
individual can predictably acquire. The equalitarianism of the desert denudes 602
the Bedouin of ritual riches. Complimentarily, rites which do occur are 613
thrown into exaggerated relief by the absence of others, and in their isolation, [557]
become not merely a "passage" but a cataclysmic change. Marriage and 585
burial both comprehend limited fields of relations, but accompanying 764
ceremonies may bring several hundred people together, people who otherwise 796
rarely gather in these numbers to meet one another as kinsmen and 602
neighbours, and it is suggested that the emphasis given to the events dramatises the 182
significance of the changes they produce. In the discussion of the changes brought about by marriage, the Bedouin view of what is entailed will be considered first.

The Bedouin View of Marriage

After marriage, the Bedouin argue, a son has a tent of his own, a woman 585
over whom he has authority and soon children to make him a father. 581
Marriage causes split, branching. A new family is created, holding the [613]
potential of a new lineage. The separation is so painful a matter for the father [593]
that he cannot contemplate it, hence his pretence that he has no knowledge of
wedding festivities, and his subsequent attitude that nothing has happened.

Interestingly, there are two other occasions when this attitude is to be 682
observed. When a man kills within his corporate group,[5] he may flee his 613
tribe or he may be compelled to leave; later he is likely to return and, when 627
he does, he is received with a minimum of show. Every attempt is made to suppress knowledge of the event.

Again, if incest occurs, the memory of it must somehow be suppressed, and 835
it is an ever-present danger. Men, permitted four wives simultaneously and 561
also able to engage in a plurality of marriages through divorce or death of [595]
spouses, may have children showing an age difference of two or three generations. Thus it comes about that a man may be of an age in relation to his father's sister which permits them as children to behave as if they were
first paternal cousins. As an adult, the preferred spouse for a man is a [582]
father's brother's daughter. In terms of relationships between adolescents the situation in which a man is of the same age generation as his father's
sister is fraught with danger. In one such case, between a man and his [684]
father's sister, the male child of the union was put out in the desert to be

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[5] Bedouin are disposed in groups which, in summer, usually constitute a single community, around or near a watering point. The men of this group are interlinked by reference to an ancestor four or five ascending generations, reckoning from the generation of men of about 20 years. When, elsewhere in this chapter reference is made to corporations, it will be to groups of this kind.

561 that young men spend their premarital lives in an environment of unmiti-
602 gated agnatic hostility. Greater substance is given to this view when it is
realised that agnates live together. The residential concentration of agnates
561 in Cyrenaica exceeds 80 per cent. I wish to stress that this figure is based
602 on the universe of the small camp, and the only males included as agnates are
•621 those who are consanguinely related. Over 50 such camps were used in
arriving at the figure. Obviously, the figure of agnatic concentration will
vary depending on the universe. If all men who claim to belong to a tribe
of, say, 15,000 souls, who claim that they are agnates in a political sense are
included, then the figure will not be the same as that derived from a small
group where the criterion for inclusion is consanguinity, not mere political
affiliation. It is necessary to make this clear to emphasise that the Cyrenaican
figure is unusually high, and also because the modes of behaviour between
consanguineal and political agnates differ critically. Granted the hostility
[578] built into agnation, and recognising in addition the significance of the high
degree of agnatic concentration, unless there are other factors present in the
situation, life would be intolerably burdensome. Parallel-cousin marriage
comes to the rescue.

Parallel-Cousin Marriage

582 Among the Bedouin the prohibited degrees of marriage are few. A man
may not marry within a closer range than first paternal or maternal cousin;
he cannot marry a woman of a senior generation, nor a woman known to
be older. He cannot marry the daughters of a woman who has acted as wet
nurse to him or to any of his brothers and sisters. Otherwise he is permitted
to marry any other woman. Marriage with the first paternal cousin is pre-
582 ferred, and is more than a sentiment. A man has a right to his father's
582 brother's daughter, and before a marriage is arranged with anyone else, the
585 girl's father seeks the opinion of his brother's son. If he neglects to do this,
578 or if he flouts the opinion offered him, he runs the risk of the marriage
being brought to a halt on the very wedding day. I have witnessed this. In
most of the records I possess, it usually happens that the brother's son is
bought off with a few sheep (about five) and some articles of clothing.
Here the brother's son was seizing the occasion to extort from a farmer's
brother wealth which he considered was due him from an earlier inheritance
[589] dispute. Occasionally the intervention is genuinely designed to prevent a
marriage; if the girl refuses to marry her father's brother's son, he can force
582 her into spinsterhood. Men exercise their right to marry their first parallel
cousins. They also marry other parallel cousins. The significance of parallel-
cousin marriage varies with the exact degree of the relationship. First- and,
say, third-parallel cousins are sociologically different in a number of respects,
and in relation to specific problems these differences may assume major
[602] importance. In the present discussion the various degrees have this in
common: that whatever the precise relationship, all parallel cousins are the

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in position immediately anyone else appears at the entrance to the tent.[11] [834] [342] Women cook, but they do not serve the meal to males, nor are they responsible for the distribution of meat among them. [264] Parts of an animal are carefully specified, and the various portions distributed at a meal carry with them a great deal of significance. 264 574 A host can honour, flatter, disappoint or even insult his guest, depending on the precise distribution of meat he adopts. 571 Designated portions should go to certain kinsmen if they are present, but this still leaves a wide margin of choice, and a host can use this choice as part of the many means at his disposal for directing his relationships with other men. [602] A political link can be forged or another snapped by the distribution of portions of meat at the commensal meal.

The Bedouin Ideal Type of Family as a Unit of Production

This account of the division of labour is far from inclusive of all the tasks carried out. 594 The details given are only barely sufficient to provide some indication of the necessary composition of a family. 183 [462] Referring again to the Bedouin sentiments about the matter, it is now possible to give it some numerical precision. The number of females should be a minimum of about three, including a mother, a teen-age daughter and a child of about eight years. Males should number about six: a father, relieved of most chores to act as director; [857] [883] a son in his middle to late twenties, to plough; a second son, in his early to middle twenties, to herd the camels; [462] a third, in his late teens to early twenties, to shepherd the sheep; [561] a fourth, middle to late teens, to look after the goats; and a younger son to fetch, carry and run errands about the camp. The family of the ordinary Bedouin, they say, shows this sex and age distribution, [554] [556] although they recognise that a politically ambitious man with the wealth to match his aspirations would require more of both sexes — particularly women, since the burden of entertainment increases rapidly with a man's climb to power and fame.

Clearly, the basis of Bedouin sentiment concerning family structure is its approximation to an ideal production unit. 121 183 Some families display the features of this ideal, but even they enjoy the productive benefits of this composition for a very limited period only. 594 The family, as described above, can only be an ephemeral unit, since the age structure constantly changes, women are removed by marriage, men move away and death affects it at any point at any time. The Bedouin family is a fiction in the sense that it can be said to have a characteristic composition. The mistake they make is to conceive of it as a particular kinship structure related to production. The substance of what has been referred to as a fiction is that, if viewed as a productive unit, it bears close consistency with reality. Freed of the need to examine it in terms of specifically limited kinship relationships, [621] and no longer anchored to the inhabitants of a single tent, the distribution of people according to sex and

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[11] This is the general rule. In practice, the use of the divider can indicate an intimacy or distance in relationships, most subtly.

121 age depicted in their notion of a family is meaningful. It follows that, since
183 this unit will not be clustered in one tent, but distributed over several, each
594 small community must be so constituted that links people can use to claim
•621 the services of others must exist, and that, since claims can be made against various sorts of kinship relationships, each small camp will have predictable kin links. It follows, further, that since age, sex and number of people are significant, a small camp will have a characteristic demographic structure; each tent in a camp will display developmental changes, and particular tents may be shifted from one camp to another, but if a livelihood is to be gained in this semi-desert environment supporting its mixed pastoral-cum-agricultural economy, then at any given time the small camp must have certain fixed features in its composition. The elementary family is subject to far too many vicissitudes to exist on its own. It now remains to demonstrate this general argument by examining the details of one of these small camps.

A Particular Camp Viewed in Detail

621 The camp was one of 12 which constitute a minimal tribal section. In
613 genealogical terms its male members were linked through an ancestor five ascending generations from living males of about 20 years of age. Usually,
[221] in summer, camps of this sort move to the vicinity of a large watering point; in winter, this larger community breaks up into a number of smaller ones as man and animals move off further south to the pastures. The total living
[162] population of the tribal section to which this particular camp belonged was 524.

621 Linked patrilineally, its male members were also linked in a plurality of
613 other consanguineal ways. Primarily, this plurality was brought about by
582 parallel-cousin marriage. The incidence of this form of marriage for males of this group was 48 per cent[12] of the gross total of 234, derived
182 from their marriages over three generations; that is, the generation of males entering into marriage, and the generation which has begun to die out are included with the generation of middle-aged males. This means that practically every male is related to others in a number of ways, and it is necessary to point this out now because the details to be given presently will show only the more immediate, but not all, existing connections. Plurality of links, moreover, is not the only consequence. Parallel-cousin marriage is a transmuting agent, creating a diversity of links. Each and every link carries with it specific modes of behaviour, which in turn means that each individual has a wide variety of different claims he can press on his coresidents. Marriage connections also exist with other sections of the same tribe. Their proportion is 28 per cent of the total. Demographically, it

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[12] As a matter of interest, the figure for marriage to the father's brother's daughter is 50 per cent of the figure for parallel-cousin marriage in general, but the consequences of these are beyond the scope of the present discussion.

would be impossible to satisfy all marriage expectations of men within the 621 ●
universe of the minimal tribal section. For this reason alone external links 613
are inevitable and persistent. Also, the small territorial strip such a group 582
claims as a homeland produces an economy which, in this environment, 182
is unstable. Additional security is gained by making connections with other [423]
tribal sections, each with its specific ecological character. Men also marry [433]
into their client groups. The proportion of these for this camp was 9 per cent [619]
of the total. From these links they gain economic advantages, they can
claim services and a client-following is politically significant. Finally, 7
per cent of the total[13] are marriages with women of other tribes, which
again not only reduces the instability of the economy (in that a large tribal
area suffering near-famine conditions has access to areas of markedly dif-
ferent ecology), but also provides political connections for men whose power
ambitions have passed the point of leadership limited to their own tribes. In
one way or another all these interests are manifest in the small camp and
attention is now directed to the latter.

The disposition of people in the camp is represented diagrammatically 621
on the page following. 592

The nucleus of the camp is Tent A. Its owner (1) was a powerful *Shaikh*, [554]
the son of a famous father. His marriage represents a political link with a [619]
group of one of the primary sections of his own tribe. His father died only a [428]
few years before I recorded my census, and the large amount of moveable
property he left had still not been divided among the sons; the owner of the
tent, as eldest brother, still controlled the flocks and herds. Most of his time
he spent away from the camp engaging in political intrigue. His two younger
brothers lived in his tent, but the second (5) would not remain there long
because negotiations for his marriage had been started. His father (2) mar- [582]
ried a parallel cousin; she died and shortly afterwards he took her sister (3) [587]
in sororal union. When this occurred an amount of bride-wealth was
agreed, but instead of giving any of it to her father, the entire amount was [583]
"put in front of her" (that is, the animals were allowed to remain with her
husband's flock), and these animals she had marked with her brother's
tribal sign to distinguish them from those of her husband. It was widely [428]
known that she was going to leave these animals to her husband's second [562]
son, for although she could not transfer them to a male outside her husband's
corporate group, she could decide who, among his heirs, should inherit.

During my stay in this camp, her brother's son (4) came to it as a 621
temporary resident for a month. Since he was poor, the purpose of his visit 592
was to capture some of his aunt's wealth while she was still alive and the 574
possibility still existed. During his stay he was fed well but did no work. [604]
His kinsmen found his company tiresome, so, to cut short his stay, and after [431]
consulting her nominated heir (5), she gave him three grown goats. Also
when an occasion arose for an animal slaughter, she provided the sheep, and, [231]

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[13] The remainder is made up of marriages to the daughters of men incorporated into the lineages.

Cases

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

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574 since meat is shared by all the people of the camp, her wealth was partly
231 dispersed among her poorer kinsfolk.

621 The location of Tent B was determined by the fact that the wife (6) was
592 the sister of (3) of Tent A. Her husband (7) had moved into the camp a
571 few years earlier as a result of an inheritance quarrel with his elder who
[578] robbed him of his fair share. This husband (7) gained in two ways from
[233] the move. Although poor, he had a small flock of his own, too small to
justify its own shepherd, but which he was permitted to include with his
sister-in-law's (3) flock for shepherding. If the flock had been larger he
would still have had difficulties, because, at some times of the year, save for
short occasional visits to camp, the shepherd is with his sheep for several
weeks, day and night. He (7) had three sons, still far too young to follow
the sheep, but when they become of age to do so, his dependence on Tent
A will cease, for then he can begin to gather the small flocks of other kinsmen
around his own, his sons can shepherd them all and he can begin to
[574] enjoy the benefits to be derived from dependents. In addition, he enjoyed

the lavish generosity dispensed by the members of Tent A, and fed far better 621 than would have been possible otherwise. 592

571 The location of Tent C was also determined by a link through women. [574] The only female (8) living in this tent, a middle-aged widow, was the sister of (3) and (6) of Tents A and B respectively. Her teenage son lived with her. They possessed only a few sheep, which were put with the flock of Tent A for shepherding. The son (9) spent some of his time herding for Tent A. With the mother and her son in Tent C were two other kinsmen. One, a poor man (10), was this son's first patrilateral cousin, and they both were the only surviving sons of their respective fathers. He (10) was the main shepherd of Tent A. The third male (11), also poor and nearly blind, was a second patrilateral cousin of both, but his sister was also 11's mother. All occupants of Tent C were almost entirely supported by Tent A. Relieved of the necessity to live off their own resources, the two young men (9 and 10) were afforded the opportunity of building up their flocks for the day when they would be able to negotiate their delayed marriages.

Tents A, B and C sheltered men who were agnatically closely linked. More 621 important, their grandfathers, three sons in a family of 19 children, were 613 full brothers. The latter's mother's name was used when referring to these 592 three tents as a group. During the past few years, many changes have 571 occurred within it, and the death of the pivotal woman (3) of Tent A might well disperse this small cluster. Further, the nuptials of her heir (5) were anticipated, and this event, itself likely to precipitate division of his father's (2) wealth, might also lead to further residential rearrangements.

The owner of Tent D, (12), a man in his late thirties, son of a slave 621 mother, was at loggerheads with his father's brother, much more senior in age. 592 The owner's father, one of a family of 24 children, had been a wealthy man 604 and died leaving a substantial herd and a large flock, but he (12) was bereft 578 of most of this wealth by the father's brother. His first successful strike against his uncle was the demand he made for his daughter as a wife. [582] Earlier, when (12) had demanded his father's wealth, his father's brother, [428] who had for years acted as his guardian, replied, "It is in your stomach," (meaning that it had been expended on his upbringing). Later, after the [583] marriage had taken place, when the uncle demanded payment of the bride-wealth his own words were thrown back at him, but this time with the meaning that the bride-wealth had already been paid. While I was resident in this area, the two men met occasionally: each meeting was hostile, for (12) was encouraging his half-brother (13) (also the son of a slave mother) to demand a second daughter as a wife. Included in this tent is a third adult male (14), virtually a pauper, reduced to this state by the same grasping father's brother. His link with (12) was their closeness of relationship (first [571] paternal cousin), together with the fact that all three males (12, 13 and 14) had suffered privations and were allies against the common enemy, their father's brother.

Associated with them for the same reason, was the owner of Tent E (15).

Cases

● 621 Genealogically he was their father's brother, but he was of their same age
592 generation, and behaved as if he was their agnatic equal. Towards his own
578 brother (16), he behaved as if the latter was his uncle, for he was much his
[604] junior in age and his uncle had virtually brought him up from boyhood.
[428 They had quarrelled bitterly because his brother (16) had given him only
a fraction of his inheritance, which he himself, in turn, should have
[593] shared with his young full brother (not shown on the diagram) but he did
not do so. This youngest brother left (15) for this reason and now resides
621 with (16), his full brother's enemy. Two of the men (14 and 13) of this
592 group of four were the chief herdsmen of the camp, although they were
[233] assisted for short periods by (12) and (15), who also helped tend the
[571] camels in other ways. Their connection with the group centered on Tent
A was a mutual close link to a politically powerful person (not shown on the
genealogies) to whom they are deeply loyal and who, while I was among
them, was actively opposed to the common political enemy of them all (16),
and who in earlier years had challenged the leadership of (2) of Tent A.
[613] There is also the fact that they were all linked within a close range of
agnation. This linkage included, too, the owner of Tent F (17), not in
[602] fact the descendant of the man shown in the diagram — he was the son of
a slave wife; his genitor was a slave, but his mother's master reared him,
freed him and he is now given as his son in the genealogy. He lives with his
wife, of client origin, together with her children from a previous husband,
(18), who divorced her, and his own children. Aging, he no longer acted
as a regular herdsmen, but relieved other men in the camp, and also spent
some time shepherding.

621 The details given of the strands which run through the camp to tie these
571 particular people together are so few that, like the Bedouin plough, they do
no more than scratch the surface, but they are sufficient to permit a few
general statements. The camp, and particularly the precise disposition of
621 its tents, shows a group of males clustered together to share two of the main
571 economic tasks: shepherding and herding. The physically strong adult males
233 of Tents D and E shoulder the burden of herding all the camels of the camp,
462 and the men of Tents B, A and C shepherd all the sheep, with (17) of
Tent F serving both purposes. This number of men allows some to remain
in the camp at all times, to free one of them for a journey to the distant
market when supplies of sugar and tea are necessary, and to enable one or
two men, at short notice, to hurry away on horse or camel to search for
lost animals.[14]

621 Economic Determinants of the General Structure of the Camp

574 It is also clear from these details that, given the disparities in wealth
231 (although all men have some wealth), the diet of most is considerably
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43 [14] There is little point in seeking the lost animals themselves in the first instance.
[556] A man travels from camp to camp asking for information, and when he has gathered
his clues, he searches a neighbourhood.

ameliorated in its protein content, particularly by the generosity of the oc- 621
cupants of the nucleating Tent A. Not that they are the only ones who ever 574
slaughter their animals for food. Others do so, albeit much less frequently. 231
Whoever kills an animal, everyone present in the camp is given a share, and 262
the men always eat in the tent of the donor, sitting around one bowl. Thus, 431
the surplus that builds up at one point is redistributed among those suffering [556]
a shortage, and meat, in a society where the climate and way of life militate against its storage for more than a few days, is more efficiently used. Many other general economic points could be deduced. These general statements could, however, be made of practically any camp, whatever the specific differences.

Affinity and Matrilaterality in the Structure of the Camp

Economic considerations determine the general structure of these small 621
camps, but do not account for the particular people gathered in them. Per- 613
haps one of the most striking features of these camps, which comes out 602
clearly in the one discussed here, is the confined agnatic span which links the males. Lest it be underestimated, I wish to stress the profound significance of this fact. While granting its importance it is equally necessary to stress that the span, potentially, could be considerably reduced; in some camps it is. Many of the closer agnates of the men of this camp are not shown on the genealogy included with the diagram; (7), (15) and (16), for example, all have brothers, (12) has a large number of first paternal cousins and so on. Therefore, this particular cluster of agnates formed for reasons other than agnatic ties. The most direct single thread connecting Tents A, B and C is that which runs through women. Men of many other camps are all linked in this way, directly. Five tents of this camp are connected through a female link to a common ancestress, whose name still defines the group, two ascending generations for one adult male, three from others and four from others. If greater elaboration could have been shown on the genealogy without confusion, additional links through women could have been demonstrated. Affinity and matrilaterality are the prime movers in bringing agnates together as neighbours.

Other Factors Affecting the Structure of the Camp

Other considerations narrow the area in choice of residence. The quest 621
for power where every man entertains hope of achievement where ambitions 571
are not stifled by the rigour of rank and a small amount of wealth provides 554
a basis for a beginning is also a significant factor in considering the composition of camps. The generosity of the people in Tent A was not entirely altruistic. Justly, it had won them repute, but the repute itself was an important aspect of the political power they enjoyed. They also acquired the services of several men to manage their animals, an impossible strain for them alone. And with their shepherds and herdsmen they secured devoted followers. It was hinted in discussing the structure of the camp that changes

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•621 were imminent, because the marriages of two of the men were anticipated, 57 two others harboured more distant hopes and boys in all the tents would soon [554] be youths. The composition of this camp, caught at a moment in time, was a function of the age and sex distribution of its inhabitants. All camps show regularities in their structure, but their content is dynamic. Certain general features persist, but the alignments of people undergo change with [128] equal persistency. What priority is given to each of these considerations, which component occupies the nucleating centre for others, will depend on the problem under analysis, for while I have stressed that this or that is important, I do not wish to suggest that any single factor has an absolute importance compared with others, except in relation to a specific problem.

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CHAPTER VII

BLOODMONEY—WESTERN DESERT

000 Payment in Cash—Agreements to pay—Reprisals discouraged—Patricide—Detective Work—Death from Fright—Public Aversion—The twelve-year-old Bill—Informers—Ali Abu Bukr's Cistern—The Broken Rope—Found Drowned—Three Months' Hard Labour—Whose Rope?—Payment—The Old Man who fell off the Wall—The Clutches of the Police—A Well-conceived Lie—Ibrahim's Broken Leg—Ali's Cunning—The Fiasco at the Tomb—Reductions in Payment—The Dead Baby—Amateur Lawyers—The Two Shepherds and the Trespasser—Stick or Stone?—Legal Arguments—Travelling Allowance—Misappropriation—Chaos—Mirtah buys Sheep, while the Sayed buy Dates—The Clash—£300—Abdel Kerim and his Cousin—The Boys Fight—Result of pointing a Gun—Dirty Fingers—Serve him Right—The Two Married Sisters—A Gun Accident—Poor Towida—Successful Bluffing.

682 IN the Western Desert the laws of bloodmoney differ
[171] considerably from those of Sinai, the former being of
African origin and the latter of Arabian. The Western
[435] Bedouin regard the price of a man as £300, irrespective of
[562] the market price of a camel; and the value of a woman's
life as normally £150, or half that of a man.

682 In the absence of satisfactory evidence in a case of
murder, if the oath be employed to decide the issue, fifty
695 men will swear for a man's life, and twenty-five in a case
562 involving the life of a woman. (NOTE. In some tribes
these numbers are increased to fifty-five and twenty-seven
respectively.)

682 As regards the payment and acceptance of bloodmoney,
621 this is almost invariably by agreement between the families,
and it is often difficult for an outsider to see any rhyme or

reason in three families of one tribe paying together, while 682
the fourth is independent. Sometimes this is caused by 621
geographical separation, at other times by personal animosity or jealousy.

The main difference between the rules of the Western 682
Desert and Sinai is that in the West reprisals taken at the 171
discretion of an aggrieved individual are not recognised as [670]
lawful, and are distinctly discouraged. Generally speaking, [181]
the Western Bedou is a very much more prosperous and law-abiding person than the Sinai Arab, although at the same time he retains his charm as a primitive and independent being. Occasionally a dastardly murder takes 682
place, but public opinion is very strong not only against the 674
murderer personally, but against all the members of his [626]
family, who automatically share his unpopularity.

In the spring of 1920 an old man, reputed to possess considerable wealth, both in camels and sheep and also in gold buried in the ground, was returning about mid-day from market riding his donkey, and one of his numerous grown-up sons was walking on foot beside him. After going four or five miles in the open desert, the old man got off his donkey, and told his son to ride for a little way while he walked. The son suddenly attacked his old father and hit him with the heavy stick he was carrying; and the poor old man died almost at once with a broken skull. There was nobody about, and the son dragged his father's body about a hundred yards, and threw it down an old dried-up cistern; then, mounting his donkey, he rode home to dinner.

That afternoon the local sheikh was told of the old man's disappearance, and as he had seen father and son leaving the market together, he had his suspicions. He traced their footsteps, picking up the tracks of a heavily laden donkey and one man walking, from near the entrance to the market place. Then, following along carefully on these tracks, he saw where the old man had dismounted. Then he saw a spot of blood and the place where the

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Libyan Bedouin MT9

[Information on the Grand Sanusi of the Bedouin of Cyrenaica, religious head of the Sanusiya Order, will be found in Category 793.]

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Libyan Bedouin MT9

[For general information on the functional role and status of the shaikh (or shaikhs), see Category 554; for specific information on their political functions as representatives of district tribal segments, see Category 634; for information on their roles as heads of their respective kin groups, see pertinent 61 Categories; information on their roles as religious leaders will be found in Category 793.]

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Libyan Bedouin MT9

[For information on the political role of the *omda* (*umda*) as a representative of the more powerful and numerous tribal segments within an administrative district, see Category 634.]

621 which ranges from two to ten kilometers. The camp coincides with the
233 herding unit. The herd of the camp is usually grazed as a unit, often
621 by a paid shepherd hired by the members of the camp as a whole. Origi-
233 nally the camp moved as a unit for grazing. This was essential in the
621 era of the tribal warfare and raiding where the security of the herd
361 178 and that of the people depended on such collective movement. In a type
of organization adapted to periodical movement, the camp offered the
optimum sized community: small enough to permit easy movement and large
enough to offer the kind of protection which individual families could
621 not have offered. In this era the camp seemed to have been a closely
178 knit group. Many of the informants still remember the time when the
622 361 camp was under the strong control of the headman who made the major de-
233 cisions of where and when the camp should move. It was those decisions
that determined the safety and the security of the group. The headman
had strong authority over members of his camp. Such authority was based
mainly on his ability to exercise valid judgments as to whether or not
the group should move and the route that it had to take if movement was
decided upon. At the present time, and with the diminishing of raiding
and tribal warfare in the area, the authority of the headman seems to
have diminished along with it. The camp appears at the present time to
be mostly a residential unit with minimal leadership and with a rapidly
changing composition. Different families join the camp at different
times during the year.

621 Although the membership of the camps is drawn from the bait, a camp
613 does not, in terms of its genealogical composition, make up a descent
segment of that Bait. The membership of a camp is based on a completely

621 563 had started in the area at that time. No special permission was required for the newcomer to join the camp. He only got the permission of the person whose tent was at the far end of the camp to put his tent
[574] next to it. The first night after the man joined the camp, his next door neighbor slaughtered a goat in honor of the new member and invited all members of the camp.

621 Leaving the camp also does not require any permission, although the
● 622 custom specifies that before one leaves he should inform either his
[576] neighbor or the headman of his time of departure. With the exception of
[613] cases where the headman of a particular camp is at the same time the Aqila of the bait, the headman of the camp has no authority over the mem-
622 627 bers of the camp. He is usually called upon to solve minor problems between brothers or husband and wife, or give his opinion in decisions of minor importance. "A headman is like a father," said one informant, "we call him kabir el-nagi (the old man of the camp)." When a member of the
627 613 nagei is involved in a serious dispute with another, the one to handle the case is the aqila or awaqil to whom the two disputing parties belong.

619 Group	Leadership	Identifying aspects
613 Kabila	None	Client groups attached.
621 Eila	None	Vengeance group, Vaguely defined tribal land ("watan").
Bait	Aqila	Corporate land-holding. Formally recognized leadership.
[622] Nagei	Headman	Residential unit with unsegmented structure.

His success in solving disputes between members
613 of his baits and outsiders might enhance his prestige within the bait,
628
554 but it is not a substitute for patrilineal succession as the basis of
[428] the Aqila's authority. But in less integrated baits the situation is
[627] different. The ineffectiveness of the Aqila in solving disputes may
lead members of his bait to seek another man as their representative who
would act as a mediator in their behalf. If this continues for a long
time the Aqila might find himself with no functions and the new person
would become a de facto Aqila.

613 The Aqila represents the only effective indigenous form of leader-
554 ship among Awlad Ali at the present time. The camp headman provides
622 another form of leadership on the camp level, but, as mentioned before,
the leadership of the headman is very limited and involves minimal
634 authority. In addition to the indigenous leadership represented by the
622 Aqila, there is the superimposed administrative structure of the govern-
656 ment representative in the form of the "omda" system introduced into the
177 area by the government decree no. 1187 of 1958. The system of omda or
mayorship is essentially that applied to the rural areas of Egypt with
certain modifications to fit the tribal organization and the semi-nomadic
existence of the populations of the Western Desert. In rural areas, the
622 omda is the administrative head of the village. He is appointed by the
[554] government from among the village inhabitants who have certain qualifi-
[212] cations with regard to education (must be able at least to read and
[556] write), wealth (own at least 5 feddans of land in the area), and sound
reputation. As such, the omda system in the rural areas is a territorial
system. The omda's authority covers the territory of the village and
all individuals living in it regardless of their kinship affiliation.

622 His main function is to manage the affairs of the village, apprehend
554 criminals, report and register births and deaths, collect taxes and represent the government in all matters involving the relationship between the government and his village. Because of his position as the
[661] representative of the govrernment, he usually enjoys a considerable amount of power which, over the years, many omdas have used it to obtain personal benefits.

361 In 1958 the committee appointed for the examination of the possibility
631 of applying the system to Awlad Ali noticed that villages in the sense of a compact settlement similar to that existing in the rural area simply do not exist in the Western Desert region. There are a few settled communities in the area but they are scattered homes or a few stores. These communities have no identifiable boundaries or administrative
631 existence. The area as a whole is divided into ten administrative
634 districts, each having a police station. These districts correspond
[625] to the old Senusia Zawyas which played an important role in
[795] maintaining order in the era until the First World War. Until that time
[175] the area was divided into fourteen zones each of which was under the
795 jurisdiction of one of the zawyas. The zawyas were mainly religious
175 centers, or shrines, inhabited and directed by a member of the Senusi
[793] order of Cyrenaica. The role of the head of the zawya was to teach the Qoraan and spread the teachings of the Senusi order. One of the ways
[794] the zawyas attracted followers was through distribution of food and clothing to those who joined it. The zawyas also provided places of
[798] refuge for those who needed protection since no one could force his way into the sacred zawyas. Because of their religious position which put

795 Because of their religious position which put
175 them outside the tribal structure, the leaders of the zawyas played a
627 significant role in mediation and settling disputes between various tribal
793 segments. At their disposal was their ability to ostracize anyone
[626] who did not abide by their decision from the zawyas, which meant depriving
him from all the benefits, social as well as religious, that membership
in the zawyas offered.

795 After the First World War when the British replaced the Turks as
175 governors of the area, the zawyas were closed and the religious leaders
177 [648] ordered to leave. The zoning established by the zawyas existed, however,
[631] and was used as the basis for the redistricting of the area. Police
[625] stations replaced the religious centers. From the standpoint of the tribal
619 634 population itself, the districts have no psychological or political
[795] reality. The zawyas were originally established in the areas of tribal
[361] concentrations. But the area itself did not have any political identity.
The only reality from the standpoint of the inhabitants was the tribal
reality and affiliation which cut across many of these districts. Many
of the tribal segments inhabiting one district were and still are hostile
177 to one another. To transform the zones into administrative districts and
634 to establish one office of leadership for the whole district was to impose
619 a political unity nonexistent among the tribal segments inhabiting
[622] the district. To avoid this difficulty, the government supplemented the
territorial principle of the omda system in the rural area with the principle
of tribal representation and came up with a system which seems to
suite the situation in the Western Desert. For each of the districts,
a list of all tribal segments which habitually occupy the area and whose
tribal land is located within the district, is made. The most powerful

554 The most powerful
177 and numerous segments are then represented by the omda, and the lesser
634 ones are represented by a sheikh. Unlike the system in the rural areas
619 where the sheikh is a subordinate to the omda, the sheikh in the Western
[622] Desert does not occupy the same position. Instead he has the same functions and occupies, with regard to his tribal segment, the same position the omda occupies with regard to his. He does not take orders from the omda and has direct relations with the administration. Sheikhs and omdas from one district are supposed to meet periodically in the police station and discuss with the police officer in charge of the station matters concerning the district and their own tribal groups. The only difference between the omda and the sheikh in the Western Desert seems to be the label of the office. The label itself carries a certain amount of prestige to the tribal segment represented by the omda, since it is an acknowledgement by the government of its importance. This is why many of the tribal segments try to be represented by an omda rather than by a sheikh. In certain districts where two or more strong tribal segments compete for the honor of being represented by an omda, the district may have two or more omdas representing the strong tribal segments and a number of sheikhs representing the lesser tribal groups in the district. Not every tribal segment in a district is represented by an omda or even a sheikh, however. Very small tribal segments may join together and have one sheikh, while others may agree to be represented by one of the larger segment's sheikh or omda.

634 Obviously, the number of omdas and sheikhs differ from one district
554 to another depending on the number of important tribal segments in each.
619
657 There is no specific rule whereby a certain tribal segment is considered

634 554 619 657 by the government to be significant enough to be represented. This matter is left almost entirely to the ability of members of a given tribal segment to convince the authorities that their group is sizable enough to give them the right of omda, or at least sheikh's representation. A segment represented by a sheikh may later ask for an omda because of the prestige involved. It is worth noting in this respect that the various tribal segments in the area are eager to be represented in the government administrative structure. Gaining prestige among the other tribal segments is only one motive for such eagerness. [622] Unlike the omda in the rural areas who functions mainly as a representative of the government to the village, the omda or sheikh in the Western Desert is a representative of the people to the government. This is not a theoretical difference but involves a real difference in the relation of the government and the omda, on the one hand, and between the latter and the people his represnets, on the other. 622 554 657 The omda in the village is a symbol of authority to his people. He is the undisputed ruler of the village. His authority is backed by his ability to mobilize and use the force put at his diposal by the government, in the implementation of his decisions. Since he is appointed by the government and not elected by the people, he does not have to rely on his popularity to hold or maintain office. His main concern is to please the government, rather than the people of the village to whom he is merely a symbol of authority. There is very little that the village omda can bring to his people form the outside, while he has to implement government policies, collect taxation, apprehend criminals, all tasks which the villagers are not eager to have done.

634 666 The situation is quite different in the Western Desert. Although
657 it is the government, represented by the province council, which makes
554 the final decision in appointing the omda or sheikh, yet this appointment
619 is made on the basis of nominations given by the gribal segment
635 or segments which he would represent. Since the tribal segment usually
nominates one person, the decision of the council is limited to the
examination of the credentials of the nominee and to see if he meets the
basic requirements of the law. If a certain nominee is rejected by the
council, a very rare occurrence, the matter goes back to the tribal
segment to make another nomination. In practice, then, the omda of the
Western Desert is elected by the people and the appointment by the government
of the omda is significant only in cases where the omda is to represent
more than one small tribal segment and each nominates one. Here the
council has to choose between the various nominaees and appoints the best
634 qualified. Unlike the omda of the village, the tribal omda is a real representative
554 657 of his people. Despite the fact that he becomes part of a
619 governmental structure, his basic function is to look after the interest
[622] of his tribal group. Or, as one informant put it, "The omda is the servant
of the people." In many cases the best interest of the tribal segment
is served through full cooperation of the omda with the government. So
far there seems to be very little conflict between the interest of the
tribal populations and that of the government. There is very little in
[651] the area that the government demands or needs. There is no taxable land
to speak of. There are only a few acres of barley land and even these
634 554 are minimally taxed. The main responsibility of the omda to the government
657 is to report births and deaths and give a yearly list of young men

121 part of a secondary section but not with another. Once contingencies are permitted
613 to enter in, the lineage model ceases to be of use, for what is implied is that at all
114 times some parts of sections structurally situated for feuding do not in fact feud.
[619] Other facts can be adduced to show that the structural view is inadequate but, before
[829] proceeding to examine these, some general objections to the lineage theory need to
[578] be raised. In the first instance, the corner stone in the theory of lineage systems is that they consist of parts which are in balanced opposition. It is no accident that the idiom generally used in discussing the segmentation of a lineage system is that segments bifurcate. Indeed bifurcation is necessary if lineage theory is to make sense, because if at any order there are more than two segments, then combinations can occur which are not comprehended by the theory. In the Cyrenaican lineage the number of segments at the tertiary order is haphazard, in some cases as few as two but in others as many as a dozen or so. Where there are many segments at this order it is rather pointless to speak in terms of balanced opposition. Moreover, at the secondary order of segmentation the number of segments are fairly consistent throughout the tribes, but they number more than two in all of them. It is also a fact that combinations occur and, moreover, these may be between the tertiary segments of two 'opposed' secondary segments.

121 Secondly, in lineage theory groups come together to constitute larger segments in
613 opposition to like segments. Yet in lineage societies there is a lack of instituted
571 authority, there are no chiefs distributed throughout the land as heads of segments
of the hierarchical orders. This being so, then it is not possible for all the sections of,
•622 say, a secondary section to come together; there is no one to command the action.
114 In fact, sections combine in Cyrenaica, but not in the way they should according to the lineage structure. In order to discuss this adequately, a lengthy diversion into an analysis of the distribution of power would be necessary. The matter must rest here with the admittedly somewhat dogmatic assertion that there are men who wield power over groups of varying populations, and that the extent of their domains cannot be understood by reference to orders in the lineage. Perhaps it is for this reason—because, that is to say, lineage theory effectively blocks the exercise—that relatively little has been written about the problem of leadership in these societies.

121 Thirdly, all segments should be fairly equal in numbers of people and economic
613 resources, if the theory of lineage were to have substance in reality. In Cyrenaica
114 the population of one tertiary segment may be three times or more that of another.
[621] Both may be structurally equal in the sense that they are named groups segmenting
as a pair of brothers from a common father. As political groups, however, this equality has little meaning. Further, with regard to economic resources, some sections possess several wells and a territory of such extent that it straddles two or even more of what might be called micro-ecological areas. With marked preponderance in numbers and superiority of resources, some groups have grown into dominance, and the evidence points to the existence of this dominance in the past also. However, 'like' sections may appear on a lineage chart, in political action there is conspicuous
[619] disparity. Each tribe possesses one tertiary section or more with a claim to be the
[621] owners of the 'Golden Stirrup'; these are large tertiary groups with relatively plentiful resources, with allies in other groups, and, in sum, with the power to terrorize other tribal groups.

of modesty and walks naked in the streets. Some may even find it easier to accept the risk of penalty for stealing than the social sanctions for violating the norms of modesty. 121 114 671 681

But although the notion of absolute vs. relative compulsion is arbitrary and artificial as a criterion for defining legal rules, yet Allen is close to another related and widespread criterion of legal sanctions, that is, the idea of the "use of force." Hoebel maintains that "the really fundamental sine qua non of law in any society - primitive or civilized - is the legitimate use of physical coercion.... The law has teeth, teeth that can bite if need be..." (1961a:26) Pound defines law as "social control through the systematic application of the forces of a politically organized society" (1910-11:591). This definition has later been adopted by Radcliffe-Brown (1940) who considers the obligations imposed upon the individual but for which there is no sanction backed by the use or the possibility of use of physical force as merely a matter of social conventions or custom but not law.

It is evident, then, that those who used the concept of "coercion" as the basis for their distinction of law needed a further specification of the concept. For, as Hoebel has noticed, "There are as many forms of coercion as there are forms of power...and only certain methods and forms are legal" (1961:26). He states that coercion by gangsters is not legal coercion; neither is the parents' physical coercion if it is extreme in form. The essential element in legal coercion according to Hoebel, is "the general social acceptance of the application of physical power, threat or, in fact, by a privileged party, for a legitimate cause, in a legitimate way, and at a legitimate time." The privilege of applying physical force constitutes, according to Hoebel, the official element in law. The person who is recognized as having the right to exercise force is the symbol of authority. This does not mean that he has to be an official or a holder 121 114 671 681 625

of any permanent office; it is any person who is exercising the legiti- 121
mate use of force. Simple as the above argument might seem, it really 114
offers very little in refining our conception of legal sanctions. For we 671
are still left with the question of how a person acquires the right to 681
exercise the physical force. What gives his action the legitimacy that 625
is otherwise lacking in other forms of coercion? In trying to deal with 121
this problem anthropologists resorted to a concept that is used by the 114
analytical jurists, that is, the court. There is a basic difference, how- 671
ever, between the anthropologists' view of the court and that of the ana- 692
lytical jurists. The latter see the court as the ultimate source of law:
court creates the law. Anthropologists, on the other hand, tend to use the
court as the source of law but as a criterion of its existence. An example
of such views is Max Radin who maintained that the infallible test "for
recognizing whether an imagined course of conduct is lawful or unlawful...
is to submit the question to the judgment of a court" (1938:1145).

Anthropologists differed among themselves, however, on what constitutes 121
a court. While Radcliffe-Brown (1940) insists that it must be a body of 114
people acting on behalf of the community as a whole and therefore does not 671
exist in all societies, Hoebel (1961), on the other hand, extends the con- 692
cept to include the diffused public opinion or sentiment of the people in 626
a given society as a kind of court that gives legitimation to the use of 625
force by individuals or groups in the absence of a recognized body acting
on behalf of the community. He sees a court in cases of self-help where
the aggrieved party or his kinsmen carry on the procedures of redress
without the intervention of a third party. He maintained that if the pro-
cedures are right, there will be "at least the compulsion of recognized
'legal' procedure, though the ultimate court may be the 'bar of public
opinion'" (1961:25).

439 Aggary Eila. When they arrived with the cigarettes, Hadi was not at his tent; he was in the market of the nearby town selling sheep. They left the cigarettes and left for Alexandria to arrange for their distribution. In Alexandria they met Rabbuh Hakim, the son of Hakim, who married a girl from Alexandria and lived there. He made his income from buying smuggled goods at wholesale prices and selling them at a profit. When he met the two members of the Geneishat tribe and learned from them about the shipment they left at Hadi's place, he wanted to buy it. But they refused on the grounds that Hadi had already contacted someone and that all they could do was to give the first option to that individual. Two
439 hours after the conversation between Rabbuh Hakim and the Geneishat, the
●625 police officer on duty at the station of Burg el-Arab received an anonymous call from Alexandria informing him that a shipment of smuggled cigarettes worth more than three thousand pounds was hidden in Hadi's olive mill (which was not in use at that time). The call was overheard by a member of the Sanagrah tribe who works as a detective with the police. He tried to warn Hadi of the police raid but it was too late. The officer found the cigarettes in Hadi's olive mill in the exact place where the informant said they would be. The cigarettes were confiscated and Hadi was arrested and later released when the officer didn't find enough evidence to prove that he knew about the shipment or that it belonged to him.

685 The confiscation of the cigarettes enraged both Hadi and his part-
627 ners. They went to Sheikh Ta'ib, the Aqila of bait Eweidha to which Hadi
578 belonged. They told him about their conversation with Rabbu in Alexandria and said that they thought he was the one who informed the police about the shipment. Ta'ib said that Rabbu must have done this because of old

622 554 His main function is to manage the affairs of the village, apprehend criminals, report and register births and deaths, collect taxes and represent the government in all matters involving the relationship between the government and his village. Because of his position as the [661] representative of the govrernment, he usually enjoys a considerable amount of power which, over the years, many omdas have used it to obtain personal benefits.

361 631 In 1958 the committee appointed for the examination of the possibility of applying the system to Awlad Ali noticed that villages in the sense of a compact settlement similar to that existing in the rural area simply do not exist in the Western Desert region. There are a few settled communities in the area but they are scattered homes or a few stores. These communities have no identifiable boundaries or administrative existence. 631 634 The area as a whole is divided into ten administrative districts, each having a police station. [625] [795] [175] These districts correspond to the old Senusia Zawyas which played an important role in maintaining order in the era until the First World War. Until that time the area was divided into fourteen zones each of which was under the jurisdiction of one of the zawyas. 795 175 The zawyas were mainly religious centers, or shrines, inhabited and directed by a member of the Senusi order of Cyrenaica. [793] The role of the head of the zawya was to teach the Qoraan and spread the teachings of the Senusi order. [794] One of the ways the zawyas attracted followers was through distribution of food and clothing to those who joined it. [778] The zawyas also provided places of refuge for those who needed protection since no one could force his way into the sacred zawyas. Because of their religious position which put

795 Because of their religious position which put
175 them outside the tribal structure, the leaders of the zawyas played a
627 significant role in mediation and settling disputes between various tri-
793 bal segments. At their disposal was their ability to ostracize anyone
[626] who did not abide by their decision from the zawyas, which meant depriving him from all the benefits, social as well as religious, that membership in the zawyas offered.

795 After the First World War when the British replaced the Turks as
175 governors of the area, the zawyas were closed and the religious leaders
177 ordered to leave. The zoning established by the zawyas existed, however,
[648]
[631] and was used as the basis for the redistricting of the area. Police
● [625] stations replaced the religious centers. From the standpoint of the tri-
619 bal population itself, the districts have no psychological or political
634
[795] reality. The zawyas were originally established in the areas of tribal
[361] concentrations. But the area itself did not have any political identity. The only reality from the standpoint of the inhabitants was the tribal reality and affiliation which cut across many of these districts. Many of the tribal segments inhabiting one district were and still are hostile
177 to one another. To transform the zones into administrative districts and
634 to establish one office of leadership for the whole district was to im-
619 pose a political unity nonexistent among the tribal segments inhabiting
[622] the district. To avoid this difficulty, the government supplemented the territorial principle of the omda system in the rural area with the principle of tribal representation and came up with a system which seems to suite the situation in the Western Desert. For each of the districts, a list of all tribal segments which habitually occupy the area and whose tribal land is located within the district, is made. The most powerful

634 government." But due to the nature of the representation and the spe-
554 cific relation of the government to the area, the position of the omda
657 does not pose serious demands upon the loyalty of the omda to his tribal
[578] group.

634 Because of the omda's ability to bring benefits to his tribal seg-
554 ment from the government, the ability to manipulate the administrative
657 officials is the most important basis for the nomination of a given
666 individual for the position of the omda. "The omda is one who can speak city talk and knows how to deal with the government officials." Age is not important; young people know more about city ways than old people. "A man may be a cheat, but as long as he can get our things done, he is the best man for the job...of course, we don't want to nominate someone with a bad reputation who may blacken our face in front of everybody. However, if he has a bad reputation the council would not approve his appointment...he just has to be someone who can get things done..."

159 . Muftah Mughaieb, the sheikh of the Sanagrah tribal segment in the
634 district of Haman, described the circumstances of his nomination as
554 follows:

> 657 Before the former sheikh of that tribal segment died (he
> 666
> 578 was Muftah's uncle), one member of the group got into an argu-
> 625 ment with the police officer in charge of the police station in the district. The tribesman insulted the police officer who insisted on arresting him. Rumors also had it that the police officer was using his authority to reduce the share of the tribal segment in the government aid which was badly needed during that particular year. Sheikh Muftah, whose father is the Aqila of

159 bait Mughaieb of the Sanagrah tribe, went to the officer and apologized
634 to him on behalf of the whole group and invited him to a
554 657 lavish dinner party. The charges against the tribesman were soon
666 dropped, and it was concluded that it was because of the way Muftah
[578] [625] had handled the situation. Since that incident, Muftah has been
known as an expert in handling the government officials. One year
later, the sheikh of the tribal segment died, and a meeting was
held during which the important members of the Sanagrah tribal
segment in the district decided to nominate Muftah for the position
of the sheikh, vacant by the death of his uncle. Muftah, who
was attending the meeting, was asked to accept the nomination, and
he agreed. "...I accepted the nomination reluctantly." Muftah
later told me, "I did not really want to become the sheikh. The
159 634 position does not bring any personal benefit, and it involves a
554 lot of responsibility. The sheikh has to act as an attorney for
657 his tribe, represent it to the government and competes with other
sheikhs to bring his people things that the other sheikhs cannot
get for theirs, like more membership in the cooperative units or
in the socialist union. And what does he get in return? Nothing...
not even the gratitude of his people. To them, he is a servant of
the tribe, and his duty is to look after its interest. If he
doesn't, then everybody is quick to criticize him. I had to accept
the nomination because I felt it was my duty to do so and not
to embarrass the awaqil and the important people of the tribe who
[465] put their confidence in me. As far as the government, all I get is
six pounds a month."

159 lived. Five years ago the husband died in a mining accident leaving
562 Fatma with a ten-month-old boy. By that time, her father had been dis-
428 593 abled, and her brothers wanted to manage her husband's store on her be-
444 half. Knowing that her brothers were greedy, she refused and insisted
that she take care of the store herself. The brothers objected on the
grounds that it was not customary for a decent woman to be exposed to
the customers in the store. When she insisted, the brothers threatened
her. When the threats did not work, they beat her. After that, she
[625] went to the police station in the area, filed a complaint against her
brothers, and asked for police protection. The police officer in charge
brought the brothers in and warned them that if they interfered with the
store, not only would he arrest them, but he would also use his influ-
ence to get them forced from the irrigation projects where three of them
worked. The threat worked, and they became friendly with their sister,
buying things for the store whenever they went to Alexandria and some-
times helping in the store with her consent when she was on housecalls
159 as a midwife. A year later Fatma was married for the second time to a
562 distant cousin; a few months later her father died. In a family meeting
428 that followed the funeral, Fatma made her announcement that she was claim-
593 233 ing her share of her father's herd. The brothers were angry and tried to
[587] beat her. But the older members of the bait who were present at the meet-
ing stopped them and told them that Fatma had all the right to claim her
share of the inheritance according to Awlad Ali ways and that there was
[578] nothing that they could do about it. She was characterized in that
meeting as "bint haram" (illegitimate child), an insult used to refer
to those who show selfishness in their kinship obligations. When she
left the camp with her share of the herd, this seemed to have severed

159 156 This apparently is not a typical case, nor is Fatma by any means
562 representative of a typical tribal women. It is a case of a marginal
woman who had revolted against the tribal definition of a female role.
[428] She violated the customary ways of her society and claimed her share of
[593] her father's inheritance; and by doing this, she forfeited her right to
[183] protection by her brothers. She was able to do this because of her mar-
[625] ginality which enabled her to draw upon sources of protection outside
the tribal pattern, the police. It is interesting to note here that by
doing so, she was not totally eliminated or ostracized from her society;
rather, her role was redefined as that of a man, and she was treated
as such.

682 person in the crowd. So, Do'ah volunteered to be lowered down
672 to clear the well. He then proceeded to the well, glanced at the
312 bottom of it, and threw a small stone to see if there was any water left in it. The stone made a faint splash indicating that there were a few inches of water. After that, he examined the rope and the equipment used. Satisfied with everything, he tied the rope around himself and was lowered very slowly and carefully by the crowd at the top of the well. As Do'ah was more than half-way down, the rope broke, and he fell. When the crowd called him, Do'ah answered in a faint voice telling them that he was hurt but that he would be all right. The crowd then looked for a spare rope to lower somebody to get Do'ah but could not find any in a nearby camp. They sent a man to get a rope from the next camp, but by the time a man was lowered to get Do'ah, he was dead; he had drowned in six inches of water.

682 Since the place of the accident was close to the police sta-
672 tion, word got to the officer who, after investigating the case,
•[625] ruled it as accidental death. But while the government authorities
[613] were investigating the case, members of the Bait to which Do'ah belonged were proceeding with the customary ways of Awlad Ali to claim bloodmoney for their dead kinsman. The idea was that a life had been lost, and that regardless of the police investigation, someone must pay for it. The question was who. Since the well belonged to Hemeida, Do'ah's relatives insisted that he was the one to pay the bloodmoney. Not denying the fact that someone had to pay for the death of Do'ah, Hemeida insisted that the one to pay was the

682 agreed that the sticks were not by nature lethal weapons. The
672 latter, according to the tribal law, are only guns and knives,
627 since they give the victims no chance to defend himself. They
ruled the case unintentional killing for which only L.E. 300
should be paid.

682 Since Yadem and his brother were arrested by the police for
● 625 their crime, the payment of the bloodmoney was postponed until
692 the case was settled according to the state legal system. Only
half of the bloodmoney was paid and the rest was postponed until
the case was decided upon by the legal system and Yadem released.
682 This is obviously a case in which the nature of the killing was
672 decided upon by drawing upon the material aspect of criminal
673 causation. The nature of the weapon used was the major determinant
[411] of the crime. Only guns and knives are defined as lethal; all
others are non-lethal by nature, although they might cause the
death of the victim. Death caused by a non-lethal weapon is considered as unintentional regardless of whether or not the actor intended the results, while death by a lethal weapon, even without the intention of killing, is classified as intentional killing, as appears in the following case.

CASE #4: The Case of the Threatened Tribesman

613 For more than five years Bait El-Mawi from the Sheibat tribe
628 had been in a continuous state of feud with Bait El-ʿAsi from the
Gemeiat tribe. One night, during a Khamasein sand storm when visability was extremely low, Abd-el-Galil from Bait El-Mawi heard a noise outside his tent, and the dogs were barking indicating that a stranger was there. Being sure that someone was approaching

*175 Arabs, to assess and collect taxes, to maintain security, and to
*648 control the few police allotted to them. In this task they
651 expected co-operation from the local Shaikhs of the tribal
634 sections and the Shaikhs of the Sanusiya lodges.

[619] It is remarkable that the Bedouin paid any taxes at all, for
[793] the mudirs had not sufficient force at their command, nor had
the Governor at Banghazi, to compel the Bedouin to pay if they
were determined not to do so. The mudir of Slanta had only 50
[701] to 60 soldiers in his sub-district and the Bara'asa whom he
administered could have annihilated this force with ease, as
● [625] could the 'Awaqir the 50 soldiers and the handful of police
stationed at Suluq. That taxes were collected at all, and all the
*175 more that they were collected without constant disturbance, is
*648 to be accounted for partly by the recognition by the Shaikhs of
651 the tribal sections, with whom the mudirs were careful to keep
634 on good personal terms, that there was a moral obligation to
619 pay them; but there were also sanctions if they were not paid.
If the Shaikh of a tribal section did not collect the taxes due
from that section, he was held responsible and action could be
taken against him personally. The mudir, accompanied by a
small armed force, went a round of the tribal sections attached
to his sub-district each year, generally in springtime, and sent
out other tax-collecting parties in other directions. Sometimes
special tax commissions appointed by the Governor also toured
the country. A favourite device was for such parties to quarter
themselves in the camp of a recalcitrant Shaikh and to reside
there as his guests, for the soldiers and police carried few provisions,
till the tax was paid. The Shaikhs, on the other hand,
were made partners in the undertaking by, besides investment
with an official robe and status, receiving a percentage of the
taxes collected, the mudir himself also taking a percentage.
Moreover, each Shaikh whose section paid the tax was determined
that the other sections should not escape paying as well. A
Shaikh was able to divide up the assessment on his section
among the minor Shaikhs, and the minor Shaikhs among yet
smaller ones. It was in the interest of each Shaikh to see that
the smaller ones did not escape their share and leave him with
the responsibility for a deficit. Responsibility was in this way
*175 passed down the tribal structure. On the whole the system
*648 worked well and the Turkish officials and the Bedouin did not
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619 area of the Western Desert. And, according to the Governor
675 of the province, it is the 'Aishaibat of al-Qasr who are the
578 most powerful of the three primary segments of the 'Ali Ahmar;
for example, they have succeeded in sending their _'umda_ (chief)
to the National Assembly in Cairo. In fact, it was over the
[666] election of the _'umda_ in 1964 that the split between the
Marabit Qit'an and the Sa'adi Ali Ahmar became an open one
and produced political rumblings among the tribes. This case
makes explicit the relationship between the two types of
tribes in the Western Desert, and gives an important instance
of the operation of structural principles in defining groups
and group relations.

619 During the national elections of 1964, it was the
675 traditional duty of the Marabit to vote for his affiliated
666 Sa'adi candidate. Since the Qit'an are allied in a client-
578 protector relationship with the Ali Ahmar, all of the
Marabtiin of this tribe should have given their votes to
the _'umda_ of the 'Aishaibat who was seeking office to the
National Assembly. But, instead, the Qit'an ran a candidate
of their own--largely at the urging of the Governor, it is
said. But, despite this Marabit opposition, the 'Aishaibat
were successful in getting their _'umda_ elected. Furthermore,
619 the 'Aishaibat said that this rebellion of the Marabtiin
675 could not go unpunished, that reprisals would be taken. The
578 type of sanction which the 'Aishaibat directed against the
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619 Qit'an is one which is employed in both the internal and
675 the external systems of political relations: it is an or-
598 ganized sanction taken by the corporate representatives
•626 against socially disapproved behavior. Against the Marabtiin,
619 it involved a closure of group affiliation and protective
675 578 alliance usually obtainable through affinal ties. The Qit'an
*613 were prohibited from marrying into the 'Aishaibat primary
626 segment. The sanction was tested while I was in the field.
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> In March of 1965, 'Umda Ziyad of the Qit'an contracted a marriage for his son with one of the secondary groups of the 'Aishaibat. He went through all of the marriage preliminaries and paid a brideprice of 70 E.L. (Egyptian pounds). But afterwards, the girl's family, following the advice of the 'Aishaibi corporate heads, returned the brideprice and refused his offer. The 'Umda of the Qit'an then went to talk to the brothers of the girl (for her father was dead) and told them that he would pay a brideprice of 1000 E.L. "but I want the girl." He paid them part of the brideprice (for they had agreed in the face of this unusual offer) and sent a car to pick up the girl. The arrangement did not succeed, for the paternal cousin of the girl who, according to Bedouin custom and tradition, had a prior claim on her, stopped the car at gunpoint. The corporate heads had told the cousin that this was his right, and in this case, his duty. Then the corporate heads of the 'Aishaibat called a council, and the members met with the brothers of the girl. They told the brothers: "You know what happened at the time of the election. 'Umda Ziyad is 'Ali Ahmar and he should have voted for our _'umda_, but he tricked us." The brothers refused to be persuaded by the tribal leaders. They said that if anyone from the 'Aishaibat would pay them more than 1000 E.L., they would give their sister to him. The leaders warned the brothers that if they went through with this marriage they would each be fined 200 E.L. Finally, and after this meeting, the leaders went to 'Umda Ziyad himself with the threat, that were he to go through with this marriage "all of the 'Aishaibat will begin to fight you." The _'umda_

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> 675 could not afford to risk such large scale conflict
> 578 and so he withdrew his offer of marriage to the
> brothers. After this, as a display of authority and
> *613 an attempt to maintain something of the alliance
> between their group and the Qit'an, the 'Aishaibi
> ● 626 leaders made the public announcement that the girl
> 582 could marry anyone else, but not the son of 'Umda
> Ziyad.

619 The various sets of authority relations operative in the al-
675 Qasr area are obvious from this account, but they will be
*613 better defined as the discussion proceeds. Here, I only
wanted to make clear that the relationship between Sa'adi
and Marabit is one based upon contract and local contiguity,
and reinforced by cognation. There is no unilinear basis
for the relationship and no attempt to fit it into a "unilinear
[582] genealogical mould." The structural differentiation between
Sa'adi and Marabit seems to reflect a dominant-subjective
relationship, in the sense discussed by Weber (1947) and
Southall (1956), but its possible class overtones are played
down by the fact that there are normally no objections to
[851] intermarrying between groups. The Bedouin of al-Qasr say,
"what is the difference, the children from such a marriage
will be Sa'adi anyhow?"

619 The Sa'adi-Marabit differentiation is relatively
*613 unimportant for a study of al-Qasr itself, since the Marabit
number is so small--one lineage consisting of five brothers
and their families. The contrast between Sa'adi and Marabit,
secular and sacred tribes, becomes more important for a

593 In al-Qasr it is a rare sight to see a father and his young son together, and it is only slightly more common to see the father with the grown son. The second case may simply be a reflection of the division of labor since the son, once grown, takes over the economic tasks of his father.

593 The most important duties of a father toward his
867 son are three:. he must teach him generosity, courage and
584 courtesy; he must see that the boy learns the Quran; and he
872 must arrange a good marriage for his son. According to
593 Peters (1960:34), the Cyrenaican Bedouin father must attend
852 to three things for his son, namely: his circumcision, his
[872] [583] education in the Quran, and his bridewealth when he marries.
In al-Qasr, the Egyptian school teachers have succeeded in
[179] showing the Bedouin that circumcision is a private family
593 affair and not a public ritual. Although all fathers still
852 see to it that their sons are circumcised, the father is no
178 longer responsible for "making a circumcision party." In
● [626] fact, the father who does insist on following the old ways
[431] by hiring a dancer and publicly marking his son's rite de
passage, will be ridiculed as one "who only wants to make
money from the ritual gift (naquut) given the boy."

593 The son recognizes the rights which the father has over him through a show of respect and obedience. A boy shows deference toward his father by not smoking, singing, or reciting poetry of any kind in his presence. During the

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public corporate affair and not a private one.

The head of the boy's tertiary group then relays the information about the marriage to the heads of the other tertiary segments which make up the secondary group. Again, this is an informal procedure but all corporate representatives must be informed of, and must approve of, the proposed marriage. Thus is the corporate channel of communication kept open and the corporate network of authority relations maintained through a reciprocal exchange of rights and duties. It is, as Fortes (1949:209) has noted, the lineage principle which compels a man to consult and gain the support of his lineage-mates in any matter of importance, or even in trivial matters. Demands are channeled through the corporate lines, "for no jural act takes place except in the framework of the lineage system."

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If the father should not consult the secondary group concerning his son's marriage--he may anticipate objections and consider his son's desires above those of the group--there are sanctions, forms of moral coercion, which can be applied by the group. First, a man may be fined if he goes through with an objectionable marriage; added to this, the man may be denied access to the preferred channels of marriage which exist within the lineage; lastly, dependent upon the gravity of the situation, the man may be threatened with expulsion from the lineage group.

*613 decision-making which allocates values in society. This
621 process orders the internal and external political relations
571 of corporation members. The corporate office which acts to regulate internal affairs, and to represent the group in external affairs is a unique status in al-Qasr having only one incumbent at a time. In Bedouin society, then, the corporation is to be considered distinct from the corporate sole (Smith 1966).

621 The corporate group, although based on common interests
626 and values, is not an integrated body simply in terms of
571 consensus. Coercion also maintains corporate relationships.
[183] Consensus derives from the code of the group (Nadel 1951: 161), a set of common ideals. But in practice, the group must exert coercive pressures, sanctions, against individual behavior which threatens the welfare of the collectivity. Coercion may be seen as a necessary condition for what Durkheim called "mechanical solidarity." In al-Qasr, as in most societies, the desire for conformity to norms predicates coercive measures; coercion and consensus derive from the same cause, i.e., the requirement of some degree of integra-
621 tion. The corporate group and its authority structure is the
571 mechanism which insures, through political means, the neces-
182 sary degree of integration for the survival of al-Qasr
(121) society. In order to understand the phenomenon of social change occurring in al-Qasr, politics as an aspect of culture

621 should be thought of as an adaptive mechanism. This will help
571 us to understand two structural features of the Bedouin political
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121 system: the establishment of cognatic alliances and the
differentiation of political roles. In tradition and modernity,
the integration and the survival of the Bedouin social system
have depended upon the proliferation of these features.

121 It is quite obvious that "a corporation can only form
621 itself on the basis of a common interest" (Radcliffe-Brown
571 1952:45); that any social relationship, or political group
•[626] is characterized by both "pragmatic contents" and "moral
aspects;" and that "political sentiments" as part of the
group's moral and legal norms are enforcible by secular
sanctions brought to bear on individuals or groups (Fortes
121 and Evans-Pritchard 1940:20). But the discovery of what
underlies a "common interest," "moral aspect," and "political
sentiment" is a subtle problem which varies from culture to
culture. It deals with what Weber referred to as "problems
of meaning," and ultimately, the legitimation of the normative
system. What makes morality and sentiments meaningful and
sanctions legitimate is a value, a connecting element between
the social and cultural systems, "the constitutive symbolism
which grounds the identity and solidarity of the community"
(Parsons 1966:17). It is unlikely that such a value will
ever be obvious, no matter how essential it is, because

*613 concepts of what is desirable and undesirable. "Every structural
571 arrangement," Raymond Firth has said, "has its moral
attributes of obligation" (1961:212). This is most essential
in an uncentralized system, such as that of al-Qasr, where
no institutions exist outside of the corporate group for the
introduction of new principles of organization and association.

181 Among the Bedouins, the conceptualization of an authority
578 structure in the role of _'aqila_ relates to the high value which
577 they place upon a peaceful and orderly world. Children in al-Qasr
*[613] are taught that one of their serious duties in life is
[571] to mediate conflicts, especially, when they are potentially
[554] situations which may lead to protracted conflict. And, in a
segmentary society where a member's status links him to many
different groups in differing degrees of importance, all
quarrels are potential group wars. The Bedouin child knows
that his elders, and God, want him to follow "the path of the
good" (_tariiq al-khair_). Mainly, this involves helping others
to follow "the path of the good" by "bringing them back together"
when they are in conflict. When two individuals
quarrel and refuse to return to "the path of the good," this
brings _'aib_ ("shame") to each of the persons. When two individuals
*[613] quarrel, setting off a group conflict, this brings
_'ar_ ("shame") to the respective corporate groups of the individuals
•[626] (Abou-Zeid 1966). Against individuals who persist
[784] in the ways which cause _'aib_ to himself, or _'ar_ to his group,

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certain sanctions of both a secular and sacred nature may be imposed: expulsion from the group and the curse of God are ultimate coercive interventions in the process of conflict regulation.

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The role of 'aqila presents the corporate group as "one person" in opposition to other similarly defined groups. Thus, Fortes says (1953:25), "the way a lineage system works depends on the kind of legal institutions found in the society," and this is a function of its political organization. The Bedouin political organization is characterized by two aspects: the internal political system, and the external political system. Both systems are regulated by the same values and norms. Authority relations within the corporate level are founded on values inculcated in the socialization process, and prescribe political behavior for all who come under the jurisdiction of the respective 'aqila. Authority relations outside the corporate level are conducted through the 'aqila. This political role as a functional part of the lineage structure operates in terms of kinship values; politics at the external level are characterized by no new principles.

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Politics in al-Qasr, and elsewhere for that matter, is a process of problem-solving and conflict regulation between individuals and groups. Political action occurs at different levels of the lineage structure, and each is demarcated as a focus or sphere of authority. But all authority stems from

*613 He must pay the diiya with the shares which he collects from
682 the others. It makes no difference if the 'aqila must pay
554 with his own money. He is responsible for this matter before
571 the whole tribe."

*613 The collection of the diiya is only one aspect of the
554 process of conflict regulation, but it stands out as the funda-
682 mental manifestation of the office of 'aqila. In the course
[692] of office, an 'aqila will spend much more time arbitrating
disputes, but it is his responsibility concerning blood-money
which defines his position and his jurisdiction as corporate
682 ones. During the present period in al-Qasr, the practice of
178 blood-revenge has all but disappeared as a mechanism of social
● [626] control. Nevertheless, the possibility of its happening is
not too remote. The payment of blood-money is the alternative
[619] to blood-revenge, and blood-revenge is a condition for all-out
[721] tribal warfare--something which the Bedouins look upon with
[829] horror. One informant once likened a primary-level war between
the 'Aishaibat and the Kamailat (should it ever occur) to
*613 "the end of the world." The 'aqila as a representative of a
682 group can prevent war by preventing reciprocal homicides: by
554 presenting his share of the blood-money he regulates conflict
578 and promotes integration. The blood-money is usually paid
over a period of from one to two years. In this case, the
[571] notion of "debt" represents a contingent, institutionalized
social relationship for the purpose of maintaining political
order.

619 *613 571 [671] The boundaries of the Bedouin political community may be defined so as to include all of those authority groups which operate in accordance with the recognized legal code of the Western Desert. This code is referred to as 'awaiyid Awlad 'Ali, i.e. "the customs of the sons of 'Ali." The members of the Awlad 'Ali tribe identify with each other as a group. They recognize their common heritage and speak of "the Awlad 'Ali as one." But more importantly, the Awlad 'Ali represents a political community because they are "prepared to regulate their differences by means of decisions accepted as binding because they are made in accordance with shared political norms and structures" (Easton 1959:229). Recalling the discussion of familial authority and internal and external systems of authority relations, we may think of the Bedouin political community as a composite of authority or jural groups "within which there are a moral obligation and a means ultimately to settle disputes peaceably" (Middleton and Tait 1959:9).

*613 571 681 628 •626 [671] In al-Qasr, political order and the articulation of political relations between secondary corporate groups depend upon something besides structural and ideological uniformities. Although blood-revenge and feuding do not take place at the internal system of authority relations, they are common means of controlling the distribution of authority and power between secondary units. Though these mechanisms or sanctions are considered "the right of the Arabs," since they do threaten

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571 peace and security in the desert they are discouraged by
681 means of the moral and legal norms expressed in the *'awaiyid*,
628 or law of the Bedouins.
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671 Conflict regulation between secondary groups is the
*613 function of the *'awaaqil* who act as legitimate representatives
571 in terms of the *rawaabit*, and as legitimate judges and decision-
578 makers in terms of the *'awaiyid*. Not all conflict in the
external political system is, in terms of our structural
levels, between secondary authority groups, but seldom is
any group larger than the secondary unit mobilized for political
619 action. In other words, even where we note that conflict is
*613 between two primary units, i.e., the 'Aishaibat and the
571 Kamailat, there is probably, in fact, political action taking
578 place between two secondary groups within the respective primary groups. However, there always exists the very real possibility that greater conflict will be generated involving primary and even tribal units.

128 In the next section of this chapter, I will discuss Bedouin law and sanctions within the framework of the lineage structure and the authority levels at which they operate. The following section will further illustrate the legitimacy and dynamics of authority and structure in Bedouin society.

*613 682 impossible within the corporate group. Middleton and Tait (1958:19) have generalized on this point, and Wagner (1940: 218) has been very explicit: "When a breach of law occurs within a given group (lineage, sub-clan, or clan) and the nature of the offence is such that it affects those interests which are specific to the group and not further divisible, a restoration of the breach by compensation is obviously impossible, as it would necessitate the splitting of the group into two units . . . " The Bedouins avoid division in [672] such cases by holding the whole secondary group responsible for the *diiya*, and usually the share of the *diiya* which would be forthcoming from the killed man's tertiary segment is excluded from the total payment. It seems that either the Bedouins represent an atypical case, or Africanists have failed to make a sharp and analytical difference between the blood-vengeance grouping and the group which actually shares in the paying and receiving of blood money.

671 [682] [626] Bedouin law and political order, then, center on the institution of blood-revenge or retaliation. The payment of compensation as a prevention of blood-feud is a central concern of the *'awaiyid Awlad 'Ali*. Murray (1935:313-328) presents a Bedouin legal document "signed with the seals of twenty-two *sheikhs* testifying to the accuracy of the code" which set forth the main tenets of the *'awaiyid* of the Western Desert. I checked the contents of this document with

695 below will show how a "bad oath" can work directly on the
784 false witness.

784 Divine sanctions enter into other aspects of the
626 Bedouin judicial process and function to maintain social
626 control in al-Qasr. If we can speak of a standard, or
681 minimal sanction, in Bedouin law it would be the dhabiiha
and 10 L.E. In any case, however small the offence might
be, the litigant found to be in the wrong will have this
judgment made against him. But in almost every case "the
[788] party who takes his rights" will refuse the dhabiiha and
[272] 10 L.E. and insist instead upon a ritual three cups of tea.
An individual refuses the dhabiiha as an act of brotherhood
and thanksgiving that the quarrel has been settled. The
Bedouins point out the practical factor that very few men
in al-Qasr can afford to part with even one lamb. On the
626 other hand, in more serious cases, such as homicide, which
681 occur in the external sphere of political relations and
682 threaten to disintegrate the political community, the parties
264 involved will actually eat a whole meal together. In this
case, the dhabiiha is accepted, for the act of commensality
is deemed necessary for reconciliation.

626 But whether or not conflict is concluded by a simple
182 ritual or a large feast, the prevailing mood is one of
771 gratitude that the secular bonds of brotherhood and a pre-
ordained sacred order have been maintained. The Bedouin

626 process of conflict regulation is ritually sanctioned and
182 the political order sacralized in a public way at the con-
771 clusion of litigation when the parties involved and the
'aqila read the *Fatiha* (the first *sura* of the Quran). For
671 the Bedouins, the *'awaiyid* is the enactment of the word of
771 God, and the man who follows the *'awaiyid* follows the command-
771 ments of God. One *'aqila* speaking of the final authority which
776 directs Bedouin society said this:
577

> God knows all things. God made the world and gave man a brain with which to think. Therefore, he gave man two choices: the good, and the bad. If a man follows the good, he does not steal, kill, or lie. God gave us Muhammad the Messenger, and he taught the ignorant to follow the word of God. You are an educated man, and so you must choose the good path and follow it. I do not read but I follow the Quran.

577 It follows, then, that "the good man" represents an
183 important Bedouin cultural ideal which is legitimated by
771 reference to the sacred. The practice of this ideal leads
[829] to "the good society." Another *'aqila*, in reply to my
question concerning the definition of a "good man," answered:

> A good man should follow God, and through this he will be a perfect man because such a man could make no mistakes. You could find no better person than this. The good man fasts, prays, makes the pilgrimage, and helps the poor. He avoids stealing and lying; these are the most important things to avoid . . . All men aim to do good. Some men think that they are doing good, but they cannot tell good from bad: this is the origin of badness . . . A man aims to do good so that the Arabs will thank him for it. The Arabs (i.e. the man's fellow Bedouins) will say that he is doing good and that he is following the good path.

121 681 692 648 first, the government may enter into conflict cases which are judged to be out of control and involving the larger tribal units; secondly, litigants, whether exercising internal or external political relations, have the right to take their case to a rajal khair. Both exceptions represent informal [626] processes of social control in al-Qasr; the first case rarely happens, and the second case seems to occur quite frequently but no recordings of the settlement are made.

681 121 Sanctions in the Bedouin legal system conform to what Radcliffe-Brown referred to as secondary sanctions: "These are concerned with the actions of persons or groups in their effects upon other persons or groups" (1952:209). Also, it [671] would seem that Bedouin law is one of private delicts as opposed to a law of public delicts:

> [692] In the procedure of a law of private delicts a person or a body of persons that has suffered some injury, loss or damage by infringement of recognized rights appeals to a constituted judicial authority, who declares some other person or body of persons within the community to be responsible and rules that the defendant shall give satisfaction to the plaintiff, such satisfaction frequently taking the form of the payment of an indemnity or damages. A private delict is thus an action which is subject to what may be called a restitutive sanction (Radcliffe-Brown 1952:213).

681 675 671 In Bedouin society, delicts are private since they involve individuals or lineage groups, but the restitutive sanctions to which they give rise are backed by communal consensus expressed through public approval in general, and by the twin

121 external system, however, the law recognizes retaliation, a
681 682 life for a life. Still, even in this case, Bedouin values
[182] expressed through the _'awaiyid_ try to avert bloodshed and
[671] feuding by showing "the good path" and providing the means
for settlement through compensation.

Just as the Bedouin accepts the _'awaiyid_ as a set of
681 682 of ideals calculated to regulate conflict, he paradoxically
182 claims the right to impose retaliatory sanctions as a just
[671] conclusion to conflict. One Bedouin said that the greatest
[673] sin which a man or group can commit is to accept the _diiya_
and then take his blood-revenge and return the money. Presumably, a person or group commits no outrage if they refuse
the _diiya_ with the understanding that blood-revenge will be
• [626] taken. In al-Qasr, retaliation and the _'awaiyid_ are mechanisms
[671] of social control and dispute settlement. A political office
* [613] exists, i.e. the _'aqila_ which functions over the total range
[692] of political action, and the process of adjudication and
compensation in the form of indemnity payment represents an
institutionalized alternative to retaliation. In all cases
of dispute, ritual or religious sanctions back up social
[776] sanctions. God is a third party to all conflict, and this is
[695] made manifest in the reading of the _Fatiha_ or the oath-taking
128 ceremony. In order to describe how authority and sanctions
68 operate in Bedouin society, a number of examples are presented
[124] below. Some of the cases are the statements of informants about
[114]

of any permanent office; it is any person who is exercising the legitimate 121
use of force. Simple as the above argument might seem, it really 114
offers very little in refining our conception of legal sanctions. For we 671
are still left with the question of how a person acquires the right to 681
exercise the physical force. What gives his action the legitimacy that 625
is otherwise lacking in other forms of coercion? In trying to deal with 121
this problem anthropologists resorted to a concept that is used by the 114
analytical jurists, that is, the court. There is a basic difference, however, 671
between the anthropologists' view of the court and that of the ana- 692
lytical jurists. The latter see the court as the ultimate source of law: court creates the law. Anthropologists, on the other hand, tend to use the court as the source of law but as a criterion of its existence. An example of such views is Max Radin who maintained that the infallible test "for recognizing whether an imagined course of conduct is lawful or unlawful... is to submit the question to the judgment of a court" (1938:1145).

Anthropologists differed among themselves, however, on what constitutes 121
a court. While Radcliffe-Brown (1940) insists that it must be a body of 114
people acting on behalf of the community as a whole and therefore does not 671
exist in all societies, Hoebel (1961), on the other hand, extends the con- 692 626
cept to include the diffused public opinion or sentiment of the people in 625
a given society as a kind of court that gives legitimation to the use of force by individuals or groups in the absence of a recognized body acting on behalf of the community. He sees a court in cases of self-help where the aggrieved party or his kinsmen carry on the procedures of redress without the intervention of a third party. He maintained that if the procedures are right, there will be "at least the compulsion of recognized 'legal' procedure, though the ultimate court may be the 'bar of public opinion'" (1961:25).

The concept of the court has been prominent in the writings of several 121
other anthropologists besides Radcliffe-Brown and Hoebel. Bohannan 114
(1957, 1964, 1965), Redfield (1964) and Pospisil (1958) all imply the 671
existence of a court of some kind or another as the identifying mark of 692
the existence of legal rules. In his attempt to distinguish between law
and custom, Gluckman thought of law to exist "as a series of acceptable
judgments of rightdoing and wrongdoing in particular cases" (1955:262).
Custom and other social observances function as corpus juris and as such
a basis for the judgment of where the behavior of one of the litigants in
a case is reasonable or unreasonable, lawful or unlawful. As such, custom
is a source of law, but not law itself. It becomes law when drawn upon in
passing judgment in a given case. In commenting on a passage on the Nuer 121
by Evans-Pritchard, Gluckman made it clear what he meant by the court. 114
"This passage shows that even in a society where 'self-help' is the enforcing 671 626
sanction, people judge situations of dispute in terms of rights 692
and duties, and wrongs....Therefore, it seems fair to say that among the 171
Nuer, though they have no courts, there is a process of judgment by mediators
and ordinary people in which custom and morality as part of the corpus
juris constitute 'sources of law' for particular decisions" (1955a:263).

The importance of the above passage from Gluckman is his distinction 121
between the concept of the court and the judicial process, a distinction 114
lacking in the writing of most other anthropologists dealing with the 671
study of law. Failure to distinguish the two aspects of the legal system
resulted in confusing a basic societal process with one of the mechanisms
through which the goals of that process achieved in certain societies.
In its broadest sense, the judicial process refers to the ways disputes [692]
are settled within society. Since didsputes arise out of the very nature [626]
of social interaction, some form of dispute settlement is found in all [627]
societies.

The form which the process of dispute settlement takes differs from 121
one society to another. In certain societies disputes are settled through 627
a process of informal mediation undertaken by go-betweens; in others it 692
is by means of self-help; still in others, it is by way of court. In 695
societies with courts the process of dispute settlements is undertaken by
judges who "take and assess the evidence, examine what they regard as the
facts, and come to a decision in favor of one party rather than another"
(Gluckman 1965:183).

Within a given society, disputes are settled in accordance with a set 121
of principles that reflect the basic goals and values of that society. As 627
long as the settlement of a particular dispute proceeds according to these 626
principles, the settlement is supported by the public opinion of that 671
society. This is true whether the process is carried on b y means of informal 692 182
mediations or through a court system. It is this public opinion as the
expression of the basic societal values and not the court as a special
mechanism that gives legitimation to the judicial decisions. To equate opinion [114]
with the court as Hoebel (1961) did, or to look at the court as the ultimate
source of legitimation as did Radcliffe-Brown (1940) and others (Redfield
1964, Bohannan 1965), is to create an unnecessary confusion which tends to
undermine meaningful cross-cultural comparisons. Whatever the differences 121
among anthropologists with regard to the definition of the court, their 127
main interest in the concept so far has been as a tool for the definition 671
of law. The interest in the concept gave rise to a methodological approach 114
which came to characterize the literature in legal anthropology, namely,
the case-study approach, cases having been utilized in a number of ways
by legal anthropologists. In their book on the Cheyenne, Llewellyn and
Hoebel (1941) introduced the analysis of "the trouble case." This was
followed by a number of studies utilizing the case study method either to

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mainly a declaration that, that particular person is no longer a member of the tribal segment and that his actions should not in any way reflect upon the tribal segment. The tribal segment referred to is usually the amar since it is only politically corporate group amoung Awlad Ali. The procedure is usually undertaken in cases of habitual offenders whose actions consistently bringing liability to the amar or disgracing it in relations with other tribal groups in the area. Due to the seriousness of the procedure (since it leaves the individual without the protection of his group), it is restricted. First, to announce the barawa of any of its members the amar has to get the unanimous agreement of all adult males of the gorup as represented by their Awaqil of their respective [675] baits. Lately such decisions have to be put in writing. The barawa [593] from the amar does not include the man's father, brothers, or sons. [672] These immediate relatives remain responsible for his actions even if they desire to detach themselves from such responsibility. This is mainly maintained not so much for the protection of the repeated offender but rather for the protection of unsuspecting people who happen to have dealings with him and who would be protected by the corporate responsibility of the man's immediate kin. In addition to repeated offenders, the [626] barawa or the threat of it is used to back the awaqil in their exercise of persuasion to get members of their baits to agree to their decisions, expecially those affecting the amar, like the collection of bloodmoney or the taking of the oath.

A man, on his part, may ask to be given a barawa from his amar. In this case, as shown in the amar papers of Aggary, he has to give good reasons for such a demand. The awaqil of the amar meet and discuss such

795 Because of their religious position which put
175 them outside the tribal structure, the leaders of the zawyas played a
627 significant role in mediation and settling disputes between various tri-
793 bal segments. At their disposal was their ability to ostracize anyone
● [626] who did not abide by their decision from the zawyas, which meant depriv-
ing him from all the benefits, social as well as religious, that member-
ship in the zawyas offered.

795 After the First World War when the British replaced the Turks as
175 governors of the area, the zawyas were closed and the religious leaders
177 ordered to leave. The zoning established by the zawyas existed, however,
[648] and was used as the basis for the redistricting of the area. Police
[631] stations replaced the religious centers. From the standpoint of the tri-
[625] 619 634 bal population itself, the districts have no psychological or political
[795] reality. The zawyas were originally established in the areas of tribal
[361] concentrations. But the area itself did not have any political identity.
The only reality from the standpoint of the inhabitants was the tribal
reality and affiliation which cut across many of these districts. Many
of the tribal segments inhabiting one district were and still are hostile
177 to one another. To transform the zones into administrative districts and
634 to establish one office of leadership for the whole district was to im-
619 pose a political unity nonexistent among the tribal segments inhabiting
[622] the district. To avoid this difficulty, the government supplemented the
territorial principle of the omda system in the rural area with the prin-
ciple of tribal representation and came up with a system which seems to
suite the situation in the Western Desert. For each of the districts,
a list of all tribal segments which habitually occupy the area and whose
tribal land is located within the district, is made. The most powerful

593 595 providing them with the same kind of food and clothing.* It also in-
562 cludes dividing his time equally between them, spending one night in
each wife's tent. The first wife, being the chief one, has certain
privileges: her tent is the guest house, food is brought to her resi-
dence, and she is the one to divide it among the other wives, and her
house is the place for the husband to stay if he becomes sick and unable
to move every night from one tent to another. Other than the exceptions
given to the first wife, the husband has to treat all his wives equally.

593 Normally, such cases of mistreatment do not result in divorce un-
[586] less they are persistent. In most cases, if the wife is mistreated, she
goes to her father's or brother's house or sends for them to come and
593 take her. For the husband to bring her back to his tent, he must pay
431 her "nasafa." This is a gift given by the husband to his wife as an
acknowledgement of guilt and as a form of apology for not giving her
fair treatment. In some cases the nasafa is equal to what the husband
originally paid as mahr.

581 These are some of the rights that marriage gives both men and women
585 in the tribal society of Awlad Ali. These rights, however, are useless
626 unless they are backed by certain means of enforcing them. The husband's
586 rights are guaranteed by his ability to dissolve the marriage at will.
626 593 According to Islamic law, a man can divorce his wife by simply pronounc-
ing the sentence "I divorce you" in the presence of credible witnesses.
[779] No justification for divorce is demanded from the husband according to
[562] the Koraan. No such privilege is given to the wife. She can obtain a

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* With provision for wives with more children.

586 divorce only under specific circumstances in the absence of which the
626
593 husband can force her to live with him. Following the Koraanic rules,
[562] Awlad Ali give men the right to dissolve the marriage at will and with-
[779] out any necessary justification; however, they differentiate between cases where divorce is justified and those in which it is not. In a case of justifiable divorce, the husband can take back the mahr and possibly all other marriage expenses. In the case of unjustifiable divorce, the husband forfeits his right to regain the mahr. Divorce is justified whenever one or more of the husband's rights are violated by the wife or members of her family. Not all degrees of violation are considered as justification for divorce, however. Only intolerable violations can be considered as such. In deciding whether or not an act constitutes an
[183] intolerable violation, Awlad Ali judge it against the standard of the reasonable man, the customary man, and what he would have tolerated in a similar situation.

586 What constitutes reasonable behavior does not only vary according
183 to the situation and the manner in which the actions are taken, but also
554 with the relative position in the social structure of the parties involved and their initial relations to one another. In the case of divorce, what constitutes grounds for justifiable divorce in one case may not be sufficient grounds for justifiable divorce in another. In one of
586
183 the cases I witnessed during the year of study, a man who divorced his
554 wife because of her insistence that he buy her meat from the market
511 every day of the week, was forced to forfeit his right to redeem the
[114] mahr on the basis that the wife's actions had not established a basis for justifiable divorce. In the negotiations that followed, the position of the husband, as well as that of the family of the wife, were discussed.

586 his wife. The husband agreed but insisted that she pay him L.E. 300
562 574 (this included the mahr and the marriage expenses). The Omda tried to
554 reduce the amount but could not. He then tried to get the father to
634 pay, but the father refused. He had to pay the husband L.E. 200 of
his own money and promised that the rest would be paid when the woman remarried (it would be paid from the mahr). The husband divorced Haida. One week later she was married to her lover. I have no information about whether or not the 100 pounds was paid.

586 In another example, Sabha was forced by her father to marry her
562 cousin (ibn 'amm). She could not live with him, so she threw herself
574 554 on one of the holy men in the area. The holy man convinced the hus-
792 band to divorce Sabha and then went to her father and convinced him to
pay back the mahr to the husband, and the case was settled. People say
● [626] that both the husband and the father agreed to the demands of the holy
man because they were afraid of his supernatural curse. Sabha went back to her father's house.

586 It is obvious from these and similar cases that the success or
562 failure of the procedure depends on the careful selection of the man
593 on whom a woman throws herself. It is also apparent from the above
(554) (574) examples that his right of refuge is resorted to only in cases where the
woman cannot go to her father or to her closest kin to help her get a divorce because he is either unable or unwilling to help her. A father is unable to help if the husband is powerful or if he is the woman's ibn 'amm (father's brother's son) who has, according to the tribal law, the undisputed right to marry his bint 'amm (father's brother's daughter). The father is usually unwilling to help his daughter if he is the one

586 who forced her to marry the husband, or if she was cut off from the
562
593 family for some reason or another.

586 From the frequency of women using this right in the area, it
562 seems that no social disapproval is associated with it, nor is there
574 a social stigma attached to women who throw themselves. They seem to
626 find it as easy to find a husband as those women divorced voluntarily
by their husbands or with the help of their fathers. In fact, as was
586
562 mentioned earlier, many of them marry the rich men over whom they
587 throw themselves. As to the amount of mahr paid for their subsequent
[583] marriages, the fact of throwing themselves does not seem to be a factor
[579] in determining the amount of mahr paid. In one of the cases, the woman
threw herself on an 'aqila of one of the Geneishat tribe after her
father refused to help her get a divorce from her husband who had married a second wife without first asking the first wife's permission.
[429] When the Geneishat member succeeded in convincing the husband to divorce his wife, the latter had no place to stay so remained in the
house of her protector who acted as her guardian in place of her father
[583] who had refused to take her back in his home. While staying in the
house of her protector, she got many marriage offers; one of the suitors
offered a mahr of L.E. 4,000 ($10,000), one of the highest mahrs reported in the area. She agreed, and the marriage was affected. This
mahr is about ten times the mahr she got for her first marriage. This
586
562 procedure offers the woman a considerable guarantee of her marital
rights. It also gives her, as far as the ability to dissolve the marriage, a status close to that of her husband. This relative equality
is reflected is reflected in the lack of stigma associated with divorced

600 the role of the victim in initiating the act of the offender. In the
684 682 case of the adulterous wife (Case #7), the intention of the husband to
672 kill the wife's lover was clear from the evidence; yet, the husband's
kin group never attempted to take refuge, and the victim's group was
eager to settle the case with the least amount of publicity. On the
682 672 other hand, killing in circumstances that offend the tribal standards
183 of chivalry, like killing from ambush or during the night, are the most
difficult to solve and pose the greatest chance for retaliation.

682 Although the traditional amount of compensation is not determined
672 by the actual intentions of the killer, but rather by assumed intentions
[673] as deducted from the type of weapon used in causing death, yet, the final
amount paid is usually determined by such intention. The actual intention works as the basis for bargaining between the victim's kin and the kin of the killer. Kin of the victim of an intentional killing are less likely to agree to any reduction of the amount, and with the threat of retaliation or revenge present, the killer's kin are bargaining from a weaker point. This is not the case in unintentional killings or where the victim's behavior instigated the reaction of the killer. In such cases, the victim's group is more willing to accept a lesser amount of compensation, and the killer's group, while not in a good bargaining position, at least are not under the threat of revenge. And since they do not resort to the right of refuge, their daily activities are not disrupted. In this case, they could sustain the bargaining activities for a relatively longer period of time. Also, there is usually a strong
[626] pressure on the victim's group to accept reduced compensation in the
case of unintentional killing from the rest of the tribal members. If

682 they refuse to accept reduced compensation, they are viewed as unreason-
672 able by the rest of the groups in the area. One way in which such pres-
[626] sure is brought to bear upon the victim's acceptance of reduced compansation
682 is in the mi'ad, or the public hearing, in which the settlement achieved
672
627 is announced. The common practice is for the killer's group to agree to pay the full amount specified by the traditional scale for compensation (L.E. 400 for killing with a lethal weapon and L.E. 300 for killing with a non-lethal weapon). Then, in the final mi'ad in which such agreement is achieved, a number of important members of non-involved tribal segments are invited to the mi'ad. During the mi'ad and immediately following the announcement that a settlement has been achieved and that the kin group of the killer has agreed to pay the traditional bloodmoney, the mardi or any one of the attendants to the mi'ad asks the victim's group to defer part of the payment in honor of important members of the tribal segments pres-
682 ent at the meeting. Sometimes a portion of the payment is forfeited in
672 honor of the tent or the women of the household who prepared the food or even for the blessing of one of the saints in the area. In the case of the curious neighbor (Case #2) above, out of the original amount specified for the death by non-lethal weapon estimated as L.E. 300, only L.E. 100 was actually given to the victim's kin group. In addition to the L.E. 100 deducted because of the death of the unborn infant of the offender, another hundred pounds was deducted in honor of certain important members who attended the gathering.
[683] It is interesting to note that the L.E. 100 is compensation for the loss of the use of a leg in the formal scale of compensations for injuries as will be shown shortly. No such reduction in the amount of bloodmoney was done in the case of the trespasser where

reason in three families of one tribe paying together, while 682
the fourth is independent. Sometimes this is caused by 621
geographical separation, at other times by personal animosity or jealousy.

The main difference between the rules of the Western 682
Desert and Sinai is that in the West reprisals taken at the 171
discretion of an aggrieved individual are not recognised as [670]
lawful, and are distinctly discouraged. Generally speaking, [181]
the Western Bedou is a very much more prosperous and
law-abiding person than the Sinai Arab, although at the
same time he retains his charm as a primitive and independent being. Occasionally a dastardly murder takes 682
place, but public opinion is very strong not only against the 674
murderer personally, but against all the members of his [626] •
family, who automatically share his unpopularity.

In the spring of 1920 an old man, reputed to possess considerable wealth, both in camels and sheep and also in gold buried in the ground, was returning about mid-day from market riding his donkey, and one of his numerous grown-up sons was walking on foot beside him. After going four or five miles in the open desert, the old man got off his donkey, and told his son to ride for a little way while he walked. The son suddenly attacked his old father and hit him with the heavy stick he was carrying; and the poor old man died almost at once with a broken skull. There was nobody about, and the son dragged his father's body about a hundred yards, and threw it down an old dried-up cistern; then, mounting his donkey, he rode home to dinner.

That afternoon the local sheikh was told of the old man's disappearance, and as he had seen father and son leaving the market together, he had his suspicions. He traced their footsteps, picking up the tracks of a heavily laden donkey and one man walking, from near the entrance to the market place. Then, following along carefully on these tracks, he saw where the old man had dismounted. Then he saw a spot of blood and the place where the

682 674 body had been dragged. He followed the footsteps of the son as far as the cistern, where he again saw a tiny spot of fresh blood on one of the stones. From that point donkey-tracks led straight to the son's tent.

By nightfall the son was securely lodged in the police post; and local public opinion was seething with fury, firstly at such a dastardly deed committed presumably for the sake of the old man's money, and secondly because it reflected untold discredit on the rest of the tribe. The murderer, who was a big powerful man of about thirty standing nearly six feet in height, lay in prison awaiting trial. After a few days he was admitted to hospital, where he completely collapsed and died of fright a fortnight later.

[203] Rumours then began to spread that possibly the murderer had only acted in accordance with the wishes of his brothers, who were all conspiring to get rid of the old man, in order that they might share out his possessions. This could not be proved, and appeared unlikely from the
[626] evidence. However, public feeling against the whole family ran so high that it was feared that more horrors might follow; but although no open action was taken against the family, no opportunity was missed of having a dig at them in some way or another.

682 674 691 626 686 [672] A very wealthy sheep merchant, who was a distant connection of the family, and heartily ashamed of them, brought an action for debt against one of the murderer's brothers. He produced an I.O.U. for £2 dated twelve years before and signed by the murdered man, claiming (according to custom) that the son now in court as defendant had inherited his father's liabilities together with his assets.

This sheep merchant was known personally to the writer, who was also aware that a month previously he had made a profit of £900 on a very clever bit of dealing in the West. The collection, after an interval of twelve years, of this paltry debt of £2, owing from the deceased father

of the present defendant seemed—for a really wealthy 682
man—to be pointless and futile. The merchant anticipated 674
this objection by hastening to add that the receipt of the 691
actual cash did not interest him in the least; but that he 626
had been wondering how he could shew his disapproval of 686
the defendant's family in some way, and had gone carefully
through all his old papers and receipts with this end in
view, and had triumphantly discovered the bill of debt
now produced in court.

Bedouin Law and custom sometimes accept right to 671
bloodmoney in all sorts of circumstances, when other law 672
would recognise no claim. For example, the principle is 682
accepted that a life lost in prison must be paid for by the
informers whose information resulted in the imprisonment
of the deceased. It is entirely immaterial whether the
information so given to the police was wilfully false or
intentionally misleading, or whether it was merely subsequently
found to be incorrect. Even if the information
had been true and correct in every detail, the informer is
still blood-guilty from the Ourfi standpoint, although in
actual practice any such claims for bloodmoney would
probably be considerably modified.

Other claims for bloodmoney are also recognised occasionally,
in cases of obvious accidental death, or death by
misadventure or Act of God, when the interpreters of
Bedouin Law cannot get away from the main principle
that a life lost must be paid for. The difficulty in these [695]
cases is to determine who shall pay for it; and the lawsuits
usually end in a clever compromise, in which their essential
principles are duly observed, but their judgments are mitigated
and modified by leniency and commonsense. The
following example, which occurred recently in Mariut,
will illustrate this.

A certain Arab called Ali Abu Bukr had inherited from 671
his father large cultivation rights in the desert; and in the 672
middle of this land was an old cistern for the collection of 682
rain water. It had not been used for years, and was silted 312

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Libyan Bedouin MT9

[For general information on the payment of blood-money in retribution for homicide, see Category 682.]

692 police and not to his *'aqila*. This was a serious case because
685 the police were forced to imprison the dike-builder for two
648 days before he would agree to their demands. The two men involved
*613 in the conflict were from different lineages, and it
soon became necessary for Bedouin justice to intervene even
after the matter had been settled by the police. The
'awaaqil of each man met, along with other notables of the
tribe, and investigated the area where the dikes had been;
they listened to witnesses and tried to calculate the amount
of water which each man should receive. In the end, the
decision of the police was upheld.

692 Although, ideally, litigation should be instigated
691 through the office of the *'aqila*, alternatives do exist. As
*613 noted in discussing the values of Bedouin society, it is the
[577] moral obligation of each and every person to moderate between
conflicting parties; any one conflict situation may be moderated
by many well-meaning parties. Or, if a person suspects
prejudice on the part of his own *'aqila*, he may choose to take
•627 his claim to another *'aqila*, or third party. The notion of a
554 third party to a conflict, when it does not refer to the *'aqila*
692 or a close kinsman who may act as an arbitrator, has reference
to a non-institutionalized role in al-Qasr. This role-holder,
the Bedouins call *rajal khair* ("good man") or *qawaal al-khair*
("the speaker of the good").

"Role differentiation implies organization" (Levy

554 1952:165), and the role rajal khair along with the other roles
•627 concerned with political action, the 'aqila, shaikh, and 'umda,
692 represent political organization in al-Qasr. Although the
role of rajal khair is not institutionalized to the same
degree that the others are, we shall see in the next chapter
that it is an important one for an understanding of power relations in al-Qasr. All of these roles carry with them some
type of right to make binding decisions in matters regarding
conflict regulation. That is, an individual should take his
*[613] claims to the 'aqila, but may take them to any of the other
political specialists. In any of the cases, the litigants
concerned become bound by the decision of the third party.
*[613] But only at the hand of the 'aqila can a decision be made
[695] which will effect a whole group, i.e., only an 'aqila can
[682] give judgment against a corporation for the blood-money in a
case of homicide (Schacht 1953:328).

691 If, however, blood-money is not an immediate concern,
692 the litigants may utilize any and all of the political roles
*613 available in the judicial system. A statement from one of my
554 informants, an 'aqila, is useful here.

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> The bait is made up of thirty or fourty men, and there is one most important man (rajal kabiir), the 'aqila. The 'aqila puts an end to problems, he sees who deserves this and who deserves that. Problems must be settled. It happened five or six years ago that I and my paternal cousins quarreled over land at Wadi Raml. I went to the police station and complained to the shaikh of the 'Aishaibat. I asked him to choose a person to judge

> 691 between me and my cousins, according to Bedouin law
> 692 (yinafth al-'awaiyid bainaana). I went to the shaikh
> *613 because my cousins did not agree that we go to the
> 554 'aqila right away. We agreed that the shaikh would
> •627 choose the third party, and the judgment would be
> binding on both of us. The shaikh chose Bu Halaiqa as
> the third party, and Bu Halaiqa chose three others as
> consultants. (Two of the three were rajal khair, and
> the other was an 'aqila.) The judgment was that my
> cousins were in the wrong. They were fined 10 L.E.
> and a dhabiiha("blood sacrifice"). 'Ali intervened and
> did not allow my cousins to pay the fine. He had them
> write a paper stating, that if they resume this quarrel
> in the future they must pay the fine plus another 10 L.E.
> fine. (Hajj 'Ali is a rajal khair.)

695 Sometimes the Egyptian police must be brought into a judicial
648 affair to insure the execution of a judgment. In one case,
696 an individual in al-Qasr did not accept the decision of his
'aqila; his 'aqila wrote the decision on paper and sent him to another 'aqila. The second 'aqila agreed with the first, but the man also refused this decision. The second 'aqila wrote his decision on paper and sent it to the shaikh of the 'Aishaibat in Matruh. The shaikh summoned the culprit and sent him to the police station. Finally, the police were able to convince the man to pay his fine, and also his expiation fee to his own 'aqila. My informant said that this was a minor affair, and that had it been a serious offense committed by the man he would have been threatened with expulsion from the corporate group.

*613 As the corporate sole, the 'aqila has political authority
554 which is legitimate and morally binding on all who wish to
571 maintain their status in the group and tribe. Any individual

*613 554 al-Qasr there is definite role differentiation between the
571 *shaib* and the *'aqila*. The incumbents of the two roles may
171 have exactly the same genealogical position in the tertiary
596 segment, but they will never have the same social status.
There are as many elders as there are households, but there
is only one *'aqila* for each group. Another difference between
the Bedouins and the Lugbara is that in the latter society a
kinship role which doubles as an authority role does not
occur above the familial (i.e. *shaib*) level.

*613 The difference between the *shaib* and the *'aqila* is
554 the distinguishing factor between informal and formal social
596 control. The *shaib* acts in accordance with the values implied
by Bedouin authority structure: the action of the *'aqila* is
legitimate in the explicit terms of the Bedouin authority
structure. These two spheres of political action represent
familial and internal (or domestic) levels of authority and
authority relations. Legal matters which affect the whole
tertiary segment are dealt with at the internal level.
*627 Affairs of a purely personal nature and of lesser importance
596 are dealt with at the familial level of authority. For in-
685 stance, it happened that the dog of one man killed a neighbor's
chicken. No one sent for the *'aqila*. They sent for the *shaib*
of the woman who owned the chicken, i.e., they sent for her
husband. He spoke to the woman, his wife, to determine the
value of the chicken and this price he demanded as compensation

627 from the owner of the dog. If the man had refused to pay the
596 price of the chicken, as demanded for settlement, then the
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*[613] next step would have been to inform the appropriate _'aqila_
to bring greater force, and perhaps greater sanctions, to
bear.

*613 Bait 'Umar (Figure 8) is one of the authority groups
571 of al-Qasr, a corporate group represented by a corporate sole.
682 Both the tertiary corporate group and the corporate sole are
referred to, according to the ancient tradition of the Bedouins,
as an _'aqila_. This group is a blood-revenge group, and is
referred to as _'umraa al-dam_ ("donator of blood"), or _waliiy
al-dam_ ("executor of a blood feud"). It is the group which
[681] decides whether or not retaliation will be taken according
to _lex talionis_, or if blood-money as compensation for the
loss of one of its members is acceptable. The Bedouins say
that no amount of money can replace a human life, that blood-money is only a means to prevent the loss of more men. This
group, when it functions as _waliiy al-dam_ ("executor of a
blood feud"), has the authority to demand retaliation; to
waive it entirely; or to demand, along with blood-money, that
the guilty party be punished by his _'aqila_. When this group
pays or receives blood-money it does so as a partner in the
larger corporate group, the secondary segment. The principle
of collective responsibility interplays with the other structural principles of Bedouin society. The convergence represents

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Since Bedouin law, and not Egyptian law, still prevails in al-Qasr, personal injury cases must be expedited according to the 'awaiyid lest the greater sanctions embodied in the principle of self-help follow. Sanctioned fines for death and bodily injury are standardized in al-Qasr and in the whole Western Desert. One informant, a rajal khair ("good man") who sometimes adjudicated quarrels, possessed an authoritative paper which listed the injury and ensuing fine prevailing in al-Qasr when I was in the field. Below are the contents of this paper. The comments in parentheses were made by the man as I translated the paper: they were offered as the rationale behind Bedouin law.

L.E. 400 - for inflicting an injury upon a person which renders him sterile.
400 - for the intentional death of a man with a gun or knife.
400 - for causing the loss of a man's nose, ("Because to cut up a man's nose is to make him ugly.")
400 - for causing the loss of a man's eyes, 200 L.E. for each eye, ("Because without eyes a man can do nothing.")
400 - for causing the loss of a man's ears, 200 L.E. for each ear, ("Because a deaf man cannot work.")
300 - for the death of a man if caused by beating with sticks or stones, ("This is unintentional, for if you really wanted to kill the man you would use a better weapon.")
200 - for the intentional death of a woman with a gun or knife.
150 - for the loss of a hand.
150 - for the loss of a leg.
10 - for the loss of a front tooth, ("Because it is bad for a man's appearange.")
5 - for the loss of a rear tooth.

577 According to this 'aqila, the "good man" is the "good Muslim"
771 who observes the pillars of Islam (fasting, praying, making
183 the pilgrimage, and alms-giving). Also, the "good man" does
not steal or lie, and this leads, importantly enough, to social
accord.

121 In light of the preceding discussion of authority and
681 law, we can now offer a description of the Bedouin judicial
process in action. Southall (1956:121-151) has drawn the
121 distinction between internal and external delicts on the
681 bases of kinds of sanctions rendered, and whether or not
114 chiefly authority mediates conflict. Such a distinction can
be only partially applied in the case of the Bedouins of the
Western Desert. The kind of sanctions operating in the internal
political system do differ from those applied in the external
political system, though not to the same degree which is true
121 of Southall's Alurland. On the other hand, since Bedouin
681 society, lacking political centralization, cannot be character-
692 ized as a segmentary state with distinct spheres of authority
642 at successive levels of the lineage structure, the intervention
or non-intervention of chiefly adjudication and decision-
making cannot serve as a basis for differentiating political
* [613] action. Rather, the lone political office of the 'aqila
● [627] involves itself in all arbitration which cannot be successfully
concluded by the mechanism of familial authority. There are
[648] just two exceptions which apply to this latter statement:

554 tional symbol of wealth. A comparison of wealth between
571 the "status group" and "other members" of al-Qasr, and the
556 picture of stratification which emerges, are shown on Table 6.

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TABLE 6

COMPARATIVE DATA ON SOCIO-ECONOMIC STRATIFICATION IN AL-QASR[1]

Average Per Person	Status Group	Others
OLIVE - trees	661	86
SHEEP - head	402	30
LAND - acres	91	5

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•627
*613 One most important way of accruing "status honor" in al-Qasr is by acting the part of the third party in conflict situations. The role of the third party represents an effective and acceptable way of bypassing formal litigation through the
[778] office of *'aqila*. For instance, by mediating through the process of *nazaala*, the third party prevents feuds.

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[114]
[128] [1] This data is both approximate and partial. Some data are excellent and completely reliable, others are not so dependable. Factors which could conceivably change the picture here presented would be a count of land and animals outside al-Qasr which would be extremely difficult to obtain. Also, some land is not in the name of the owner but in the names of relatives. Of all the data, land data is the most unreliable. Nevertheless, the addition of new data, I feel, would only serve to substantiate the picture of socio-economic stratification shown here.

554 571 •627 *[613] process of nazaala, the third party prevents feuds. In this sense, the third party is a legitimate moral and political influence, but not formalized to the degree as that of the 'aqila. A discussion of the authority structure in al-Qasr, then, requires that the allocation of authoritative action in terms of the loci, or roles, of political influence be designated.

[792] The central place of the third party role in the Bedouin political structure is manifested in the many laudable terms which refer to it: rajal khair ("good man") is the most general and often used referent; rajal saalih ("pious man") refers almost always to a "holy man," a specialized role in al-Qasr; quwaal al-khair ("the speaker of good"); and fa'aal al-khair or 'amaal al-khair ("the doer of good"). The latter three roles are approximately equivalent to that of rajal khair, though some informants argued that rajal khair is especially designated because he mediates quarrels while the fa'aal al-khair or 'amaal al-khair help a man when he is in financial difficulties.

554 571 627 *613 182 The functioning of the third party in conflict mediation is formal to the degree that two parties agree on his intervention and to abide by his decision; but the structuring of the third party is informal by comparison with the institutionalized role of 'aqila. However, the existence of the third party role, and its various expressions in al-Qasr

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571 politics, and the fact that it is differentiated from the
627 role of _'aqila_, are the bases for conceptualizing a structural
*613
[182] division of political duties and authority distribution.

554 Role differentiation in the authority structure may be
571 discussed from two points of view: the degree of difference between authoritative decision-making roles and the other roles, and, the way in which one authoritative role differs from another. These refer to the different degrees of specialization characterized by any one role as compared to another. I have already discussed the way in which the role of _'aqila_ differs from other social roles (such as the kinship roles)
[128] in the authority structure of al-Qasr. In the following discussion, I focus on role differentiation in the non-institutionalized aspect of the authority structure, on power and influence.

Societies differ from culture to culture in the complexity of role differentiation. Within any one culture it
554 may differ from social domain to social domain. The political
571 system in al-Qasr is from this point of view structurally
627 simple, the assignment of duties in the traditional authority
*[613] structure being divided between the _'aqila_ and the third party. What legitimate influence is possessed by the third party is derivative from the "status honor" of its members. The
[792] exception to this is the _rajal saalih_ who derives his power or influence as a result of his special relationship with God.

554 Thus within the "status group" a difference exists between
571 those members whose power might be considered "secular" (i.e.
• 627 the rajal khair), and those whose power might be considered
"sacred" (i.e. the rajal saalih). Their right to mediate
and to overseer the execution of decisions binding on parties
to conflict derives from this status. In a way, authority
role patterns may be seen to overlap, and the "status group"
impinges on the legitimate authority of the 'aqila by virtue
of the fact that they are, for one reason or another, his
status equals inside and outside the political structure.

554 This structural division of political duties for
571 dealing with conflict corresponds to Eisenstadt's (1965:30)
182 differentiation of roles in terms of degrees of instituional-
*613 ization. The role of 'aqila is present and enduring in each
tertiary authority group. There is an incumbent who can be
pointed out. His rights and privileges are circumscribed,
and his duties and obligations are well defined: the power
of the 'aqila role is limited by the very fact that it is
554 institutionalized. The role of the third party, or the
571 mediator in Bedouin society, is less institutionalized, and
182 627 therefore, less structured and less confining with respect to
the kind and amount of influence which the role-player might
exert.

The role of the rajal khair, and this implies reference to all third parties, carries with it power. When power is

When power is
554 institutionalized, such as it is in the role of _'aqila_, it
571 becomes authority. This is the Weberian notion of power and
182 *[613] authority which has been used by Bohannan (1958) for an
analysis of, what he refers to as, "extra-processual events."
"Extra-processual events" refers to the operation of power in
everyday social relationships, whenever some people make
others do what they want them to do. In other words, possessors of "status honor" are also possessors of power, and,
I would claim, by virtue of this, such people are recruited
into decision-making roles. Not only do members of the
"status group" manipulate others in everyday dyadic social
relationships, but, more importantly, in the context of conflict control they are able to dominate in political triadic
relationships. Furthermore, since they are not structurally
bound in their decision-making role, i.e., they operate across
group and lineage lines, they accrue even more power and widen
their power-base or support structure. What is highlighted in
this kind of political role analysis is the fact that different
individuals play the game of power politcs in various ways,
(128) and with varying degrees of success. In the next chapter,
I will bring out this very point by presenting a case study
of one such role-player.

554 When we contrast the roles of _'aqila_ and _rajal khair_,
571 we are defining a political role-set. In an attempt to dif-
*613 •627 ferentiate between the two roles further than we already have,

554 571 *613 •627 and to clarify the concept of political role structure for al-Qasr, we may make the useful analytical distinction between an "arbitrator" and a "mediator." George Simmel (Wolff 1950), in his discussion of the sociological significance of the third element, i.e. "the triad," notes the important difference between the "mediator" who only guides "the process of coming to terms," and the "arbitrator" who "ends up by taking sides" (1950:146-149). In the process of mediation, the termination of conflict is in the hands of the parties themselves, and there is no final authority to which one may appeal. In the process of arbitration, the *'aqila* may, after deciding that mediation has been unsuccessful, impose his will over the wills of the litigants and appeal to the *rawaabit* as the final authority. The mediator attempts to reduce "will" to "understanding" (Simmel 1950:148). Mediation may be considered an initial stage of most Bedouin judicial processes; thus the mediating and arbitrating attributes of political authority are not always separate, as in the role of *'aqila*. In so far as the regulation of conflict is a political mechanism for the reduction of strain, then ". . . the existence of the third element serves the perpetuation of the group" (1950:152).

554 571 627 The *rajal khair* and the "status group" in al-Qasr have much in common with Evans-Pritchard's *tut* role in Nuer society (1940:178-18[illegible]).

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> A tut in this rather wide sense of 'man of good standing,' or 'social leader' is usually a scion of an important lineage, the head of his own family, and master of his homestead and herd . . . (His) authority is never formalized. He has no defined status (i.e. specifically delimited position), powers, or sphere of leadership . . . Beyond his domestic groups a tut has authority in his village only in the sense that he takes a prominent part in questions of procedure and other discussions.

The non-institutionalized third party role in al-Qasr has power and influence in political affairs, and this condition arises from certain structural features and economic facts about Bedouin society. In a word, outside the lone formal role of 'aqila, a person's political influence is directly related to the traditional influence which attaches to his family, or to his economic status. In all cases, the person of "good" family and sufficient wealth has a high status on the social prestige scale of al-Qasr. The people who have high esteem do not have prescribed roles to play in al-Qasr, but their roles are indeed important. Furthermore, the rajal khair role can be just as important as any political role which is prescribed, and it may even become more important.

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Besides the 'aqila and the third party, there exists two external but related roles which form part of the total system of Bedouin authority. The roles of 'umda and shaikh represent institutionalized offices. They function, however, more as structural aspects of the Egyptian governmental authority structure. Of course, no complete separation between the two structures can be claimed. It is recognized

554 571 177 that these officers, as representatives of the Bedouin, must figure in both structures. Therefore, we must understand and explain the relationship between the two sets of roles extant in the Bedouin total political structure, one set pertaining to the traditional authority structure and the other to the relatively new legal authority structure of the nation state.

554 571 The one factor common to all Bedouins in politically influential roles is that they possess a high degree of "status honor," and thus belong to the "status group" of al-Qasr. The "status group" is responsible for political order in al-Qasr and the political links which it maintains with other systems, Bedouin and Egyptian. Bedouins say that responsible action in conflict control belongs to one who knows how to give a man his rights while maintaining the honor of both parties; at the ideal level, it is the duty of all to do this. The fact that the power group and "the rich" comprise two coterminous groups is accidental and even incidental to the Bedouins. In theory, there could be a person of low economic status but who would belong to the "status group" simply as a result of his ability to mediate. *[613] [177] The authority of the _'aqila_ and the governmental offices of _'umda_ and _shaikh_ are legitimate only where formal litigation is concerned. Beyond this, they may have influence, not • [627] legitimate authority, and in this case, they switch roles and operate as a _rajal khair_.

554 571 and operate as a *rajal khair*.

There are two primary types of political roles in al-
554 Qasr, the traditional and the modern legal. Modern legal
571 political roles have been decreed from above by the government.
177 *613 The traditional roles of *'aqila* and "third party" represent
[627] autochthonous roles emerging from Bedouin social and cultural
structures. Bedouin traditional roles correspond to Weber's
ideal-type "traditional authority" which is based upon
"piety for what actually, allegedly, or presumably has always
existed" (Gerth and Mills 1946:296). The role of *'aqila* is
"traditional" rather than "legal" despite its fully institution-
alized status. The relatively modern roles of *'umda* and
shaikh are what I term here "legal"; these offices are not,
nor did any of my informants consider them to be, roles
natural in the Bedouin political system. The legitimacy of
these roles stems from, what Weber called, "legal authority"
in which "submission . . . is based upon an impersonal bond
to the generally defined and functional duty of office".
[627] (1946:299). In this case, the norms to which conformity is
demanded are not those espoused by the *'aqila* or the "third
party," but are established by national governmental decrees
and regulations.

128 In the remaining part of this chapter, the attempt is to show two things which I consider essential to an understanding of Bedouin political structure and a perspective of

128 Bedouin culture change: how the Bedouins perceive their authority structure, and how political authorities relate to members of the political system.

Traditional Roles

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627 The authority and role of the 'aqila has been discussed so that I can devote attention to the "third party" roles in this section. No formalized document exists to stipulate the rights and duties of the "third party," such as exists for the 'aqila in the form of the rawaabit al-'awaaqil. Nevertheless, Bedouin litigants have certain expectations of a rajal khair when he mediates in a case of conflict. Before a rajal khair agrees to take part in the judicial process, the disputants make it explicit that they will accept his decision as final and binding. Such an agreement is not put into writing. On the other hand, a rajal khair can intervene into a dispute on his own. In so doing, he may gain in prestige relative to the manner and degree of success with which he handles the problem. By saving face for both parties in the quarrel, by cajoling an ingratiating attitude from both parties, the rajal khair may reinforce or augment his "status honor" and his local following.

*[613] A person occupying the office of 'aqila can participate in the process of conflict regulation as a rajal khair. We noted that this is a case of role-switching. It is conceivable

554 571 627 *613 then that the 'aqila can increase his prestige and status beyond the limits of his formal role. When he does take the role of rajal khair, he does so only in conflict cases involving two lineages other than his own. Where any member of his own lineage is concerned, an incumbent 'aqila cannot be considered a neutral "third party" which is a prerequisite of this role. This factor constitutes a limit on the power of the 'aqila.

One 'aqila explained the relationship between the rajal khair and 'aqila roles in this way: "The two are equal. The 'aqila is responsible for one bait, but the rajal khair solves any problem in any place, for any bait. He goes to them or they come to him. I am, for instance, responsible for the members of Bait 'Umar, but it is quite possible that any other bait can ask for my advice in a problem. And so I go as a rajal khair."

In a general sense, the office of the 'aqila represents an ideal, while the real aspects of conflict regulation in al-Qasr center around the role of the "third party." In fact, many of the cases formally handled by the 'aqila afterwards undergo readjustment, as it were, by a rajal khair. 554 571 627 This is done by the rajal khair's suggesting a "more reasonable" settlement which is agreeable to both sides. For example, in a case of conflict over water rights the following was reported: "The 'awaqil passed the judgement that they should pay a

554 dhabiiha and 10 L.E. But Hajj 'Ali intervened and did not
571 let them pay the fine. Instead, he had them write a paper
•627 declaring that should they reopen this matter, they would
have to pay the old fine plus a new fine of the same amount." Simmel (Wolff 1950) notes that the mediator saves group unity through his "intellectuality," but that he is also an exploiter of the situation. It is obvious that Hajj 'Ali could have increased his "status honor" in the eyes of both parties to this conflict. The rajal khair who is facile enough to salvage the honor of both parties in a dispute increases his chances for future mediation and, hence, the chance to further augment his "status honor." The minimal fine involved in most of Bedouin litigation indicates a concern, not with punishment per se, but with "taking one's rights" and lawful share of honor. Social harmony is viewed in terms of an equitable distribution of honor. The power which a rajal khair has over litigants, which derives from his status in the social structure, contributes to this social harmony necessary for the persistence of the community.

554 The Bedouins say that one goes to the rajal khair,
571 or rajal salih, because he knows that he will "get his
627 rights." Litigation is entered into with the understanding
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[691] that neither party will emerge a "loser." On the other hand,
*[613] the 'agila, who is expected to be dispassionate and totally
objective, must rule on the rightness or wrongness of an act;

554 hence the rajal khair represents a face-saving mechanicsm
571 and an alternative which is needed. The rajal khair may even
• 627 violate group norms in acting to restore the balance of
[829] honor: he may lie with intent to deceive, behavior which at
* [613] any other time would be considered "wrong" by the Bedouin.
[577] An informant said that

> [539] the real rajal khair is a man who goes to men in a quarrel and asks them to be on good terms and to avoid the devil. He uses good judgement in quarrels. In this case, he may even have to lie. He goes to both parties and listens to them insult each other, but when he returns he tells each that the other is a good man and wishes to settle the quarrel. He tells them: 'Do not let the devil interfere.' He tells each that the other wants his friendship.

554 I pursued the detail that a rajal khair may lie to restore
571 peace, since other informants had made a point of this. My
577 informant then explained:
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> [539] I don't want to commit myself because no one knows if the rajal khair is really lying; the men at the time of the quarrel do not know that he is lying. Not all men are rajal khair: there are only a few. The rajal khair puts himself in trouble to help others, therefore, the people do not want to harm him (by thinking ill of him). The rajal khair must be a good man and help others, and he always speaks the truth. He lies but he is doing good, and the people do not want to harm him. When the rajal khair lies, a man does not lose his rights. A man tells the rajal khair this; he tells him that he does not want to lose his rights, and he does not care what he says as long as he does not lose his rights.

554 571 *613 ●627 [539] One 'aqila, who is famous for the sharpness of his tongue in dealing with litigants, was explicit about the authority of the rajal khair as compared to his own in matters of conflict regulation:

> Both are one (i.e. the 'aqila and the rajal khair), for the rajal khair can also finish a problem. The rajal khair tries to solve the problem, but only the 'aqila judges (yahkum). The rajal khair worries about the feelings of the two men involved, but the 'aqila cares only about justice and what is right . . . The rajal khair does not want the two men to lose one another. It is a friendly way to solve problems.

554 571 627 829 *613 Bedouins of low status in al-Qasr who are economically linked to the rajal khair in what resembles a patron-client relationship permit this fact to influence their own interpretation of the authority structure. A common view of the 'aqila's formal authority indicates that the Bedouins themselves are conscious of a structural comparison of political roles, but not of the underlying economic conditioners at work.

> [539] There are good men and there are bad men: the rajal khair is the opposite of a bad man. The rajal khair is not responsible for his group, but the 'aqila is. The 'aqila is chosen from among the elders of the bait so that he is not always a good man. But when they want a man to solve problems, they get him from among the rajal khair. The 'aqila is responsible before the 'umda and shaikh, and he is responsible for collecting and receiving the diya.

554 571 627 182 The rajal khair represents a vital element in Bedouin society. He is a symbol of security, the man to whom one

554 turns in times of need dealing with financial and personal
571 problems. In view of the value stress which the Bedouins
•627 182 place upon generosity, manifest in the redistributive system
[181] of the lineage, the wealth of the rajal khair is the wealth
[556] of the community. Wealth divides, not only possessors from non-possessors, but also, seekers after security from power seekers. It is as Peters (1965:145) has noted in Cyrenaica: generosity, not being entirely altruistic, wins repute and repute is an important aspect of political power.

554 In an interview concerning the justice of blood-
682 revenge, there was general agreement that if a man kills
627 intentionally, then blood-revenge must be taken by the
*613 murdered man's bait against someone in the murderer's aiela.
829 But one prominent man (a rajal khair) protested that "the best man in the killer's family must not be harmed." This statement generated a rather heated debate. One man said: "The best man should be killed for this is right in the Bedouin type of justice." (This comment was made by a man who is the 'aqila of a low-status lineage in al-Qasr.) The first speaker's reply to the protest was this:

> Nevertheless, it all depends upon the character of the best man . . . if he is evil and on bad terms with your family, then he will be the first one to be killed. But if he is a good man, then you kill the murderer himself . . . You must never kill a rajal khair because he may do good in the future.
> [178] In the old days, the killing started right away, and all problems were big ones: today there is negotiation--people are improving.

554 One *'aqila* claimed that the *rajal khair* is a person
•627 who shares in his own authority and presides when he is
*613 away, but he separated the "rights" of the two roles. The
[779] *'aqila* is able to force two parties in conflict to read the
[578] *Fatiha,* the first *sura* of the Quran, in order to terminate
the problem; this is beyond the rights of the *rajal khair* whose
influence is not directly supported by sacred sanctions. But
[784] the role of *rajal khair* does have its "sacred" aspects, for
all Bedouins know that "you should never harm a *rajal khair*
or God will punish you for this." I never heard this same
thing said about the *'aqila*.

554 Historically, it was perhaps the case that the *rajal*
627 *khair* was the person of high status who represented the authority
*613 of an absent *'aqila*. The role never became institutionalized
182 but functioned as a support and substitute role in a structure
dominated by that of the *'aqila*. In a segmentary society
627 where the various structures exist in opposition to one
628 another, it is important that an institution, such as a third
182 non-partisan element, exists to facilitate communication
578 between parties for the purposes of conflict regulation.
Besides the *rajal khair*, an example of this would be the
traditional case of the wife from an outside tribe who alone
was permitted freedom of passage between the two warring
parties. Her purpose, it was assumed, was that of peace-making.

554 571 ● 627 The rajal khair, then, is a broker in social relationships, a manipulator of loyalties. As a member of the "status group," he can afford to spend time and money in courting his fellow tribesmen, and, as a result, can accrue prestige and loyalty. This role, like that of the 'aqila, is a secular [681] one. The sanctions which it controls are as economical as those of the 'aqila's are political. In this sense, they are differentiated from the role of rajal saalih whose sanctions are sacred in nature.

554 792 [178] The traditional role which we define as that of the rajal saalih, "the holy man," was probably much more important in the past than it is today. In al-Qasr, there are only two rajal saalih who share in traditional power: the one is a resident of al-Qasr proper, and the other, a member of the prestigious Sanusi family, lives near Marsa Matruh.

The rajal saalih of al-Qasr, i.e. the local "holy man," is assured of status because he is an ashraf, one who claims descent from the family of the Prophet. He is also a [561] member of the elder age-set, and while he is not rich, he cannot be considered poor. Though the "holy man" al-Sanusi [793] lives near Matruh, he participates in the authority structure of al-Qasr and is a member of the "status group." He is sometimes referred to as rajal saalih kabir, "a great holy man," by virtue of his Sanusi heritage.

[771] The relative unimportance of this role as compared to that of the rajal khair in conflict regulation is a function

554 of the Bedouin attitude, or lack of it, toward religion.
792 Since the time of Muhammad, the Bedouins have been considered
771 notoriously bad Muslims. Today, the Bedouins tend to joke
about their lack of zeal, and often point out that "holy
619 men" are not to be trusted.[2] This is seen in Sa'adi behavior
771 toward the Marabtin tribes who are their vassals. Theoretically,
792 the Marabtin who trace descent to the Prophet and might be
554 considered "sacred Tribes" should be respected by the "secular"
[778] Sa'adi tribes. But the Sa'adi of al-Qasr tend to deride the
554 Marabit. For instance, the "holy man" of al-Qasr, 'Amm Salih,
792 is a Marabit and well-known for his ability to successfully
627 mediate in conflict situations. But one informant, pointing
619 out this gift which 'Amm Salih possesses, said: "Amm Salih
is a good man, he is not a Marabit." But 'Amm Salih identifies
himself as a "rajal saalih" and a "Marabit"; he sees no role
conflict here.

771 The Bedouins also joke about the manner in which they
[522] practice the "pillars of Islam." Especially, they make light
of the fact that they are irregular in mosque attendance.
They say, with a slight smile, "we pray in the desert." A
[124] common way for an interview to end was by an informant rising
and saying: "Now I must wash for prayers." This happened

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[184] [2] Professor Abou-Zeid also notes this trait in his study of the Bedouin near Sallum, on the Libyan border (1966:248).

554 It is interesting to note that Hajj 'Ali is one of the most
[571] powerful members of the "status group" in al-Qasr. He is
[178] also a leading proponent of social change and a critic of
the old way of life which includes belief in magic. One can
[792] see how 'Amm Salih's influence and status might work in other
areas of social action.

554 Although it is conceivable that a *rajal salih* can
792 be asked to intervene in any type of conflict, it is more
●627 likely that he will preside at cases involving marriage and
[695] divorce. The *rajal saalih* may also be asked to serve as a
[691] witness or consultant in litigation cases. The Bedouins
*[613] point out that the "holy man," like the *rajal khair*, is apt
[829] to be more trustworthy than the formal authority, the *'aqila*.

> Sanusi is a good man and the people should listen to him. He is a *rajal khair*, a *rajal saalih*, not an *'aqila*. He is better than an *'aqila*--he is our brother. He is much better than the *'umda* because he never changes the truth. The *'umda* may go and accuse me wrongly to the government but Sanusi would never do this.

554 It is, of course, difficult to decide whether Sanusi's
792 charisma stems from the fact that he is a *rajal salih*, or the
facts of his wealth and family. Most probably it is a little of both, the sacred as well as the secular. 'Amm Salih, on the other hand, is neither wealthy nor from a particularly prestigious family by economic standards of al-Qasr: he derives his influence and status from the sacred aspects of

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his role.

The people of al-Qasr identify 'Amm Salih as the "holy man" in the area. In my interviews, when I asked for the name of a party, besides the 'aqila, who solves the Bedouins' problems, the answer was either Hajj 'Ali, the rajal khair, or "the Jaraira family." (This refers to 'Amm Salih and his brother.) When I asked for the name of a man who could tell me "how the Bedouin should act," the only name mentioned was that of 'Amm Salih.

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'Amm Salih says that he solves many problems, not all of which deal with marriage and divorce. He claimed that he could settle conflicts over land and water. Just as a man may choose to go to the rajal khair, so also might he go to the rajal salih. Often enough, the selection of a "third party" will be determined by his propinquity. One 'aqila told me: "Salih Jaraira is a good man . . . If two men wish to accept Jaraira's decision, and if he lives near them, it is all right. If Jaraira cannot solve the problem, then they will return to the 'aqila. The 'aqila can solve it or he can call in other 'awaqil who can solve it."

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When I asked 'Amm Salih for case studies of problems which he has handled, he said that he would not reveal them because they are private affairs. He was willing, however, to describe the method in which he solves a problem.

> 554 Suppose the donkey of A (a man present at the interview)
> 792 gets into the barley of B (another man present). This is
> actually a serious matter since it could conceivably lead
> •627 to a big fight between A's 'aiela and B's 'aiela. First,
> I separate them and make each go to his home. Then I
> get A's three brothers (his father is dead), we take a
> [779] dhabiiha (lamb) and go to B's place and all eat together.
> After the meal, we read the Fatiha (opening sura of the
> Quran) together to show that all is forgiven. After the
> Fatiha has been read no trouble will start because this
> is done in the presence of the Jaraira.

[784] He explained that reading the Fatiha in bad faith would bring
the same curse from God that a bad oath would bring. He also
*[613] claimed that only he and the 'aqila have the authority to
command men to read the Fatiha.

554 'Amm Salih says that he uses the 'awaiyid as a guide
792 in solving problems, and that it is necessary because
627 "quarrels spread like fire, it is like fire; they spread to
671 killing and war." He was the only person in al-Qasr who
554 tried to conceptualize the difference between the 'awaiyid
792 Awlad 'Ali and the Sharii'a. 'Amm Salih said that it is
627 wrong to lie, according to both the secular and the sacred
671 authority codes: "One who lies exceeds the word of God,
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577 and God will punish him for this. No one can know how this
[784] punishment will take place, only God will know this . . .
Sometimes a car goes off the road and people will say that it
is the punishment of God. But you never know because the
punishment of God comes in the after-life." I asked him:
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792 "If this is so, why may the rajal khair lie in trying to
627 settle quarrels?" He replied:
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> Lying is bad (haram), but this is "the lie of a peace-maker" (kadhib musaalih). For instance, if you have a quarrel with Yunis here, then I have words with both of you. I use different words with each of you. I use different words than those which you used in the quarrel--I use good words. This is to bring you two together again. Maybe I see that you are going to kill, or I hear bad words from you; I do not go and tell him what you said.

'Amm Salih said that it is his "duty" to mediate disputes, and that he never hesitates "because God will reward me later." He did not want the quarrels to grow into wars. He also bases his pleas for conciliation upon moral discoure, the method used by the other traditional authorities.[3] 'Amm Salih said that in trying to solve a problem, "I give priority to the elder. I go to the younger man and tell him that he should make peace with the elder because no one cares more for him than his antagonist, and that he really cares more for his antagonist than for any other." The rajal saalih mediates but does not arbitrate: he attempts to redress the balance of good relations but does not impose judgements.

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This approach to conflict regulation is not that of the 'aqila in his formal role, but it is similar to what the rajal khair would use. The main procedural difference between the two informal roles (i.e. rajal khair and rajal saalih) is that, in each case, the rajal saalih reads the Fatiha with

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[114] [3] The approach which I used in my interviews with 'Amm Salih derives from the work of John Ladd as presented in his book, The Structure of a Moral Code, 1957.

554 792 •627 *613 779 the disputants. As noted, the rajal saalih shares this right with the 'aqila. The rajal khair does not have recourse to this mechanism which amounts to divine approval of the binding decision of the "third party." 'Amm Salih in his discussion of the Bedouin moral code corroborated this point: "Any 'aqila can read the Fatiha. In this way, he and the two parties involved terminate the quarrel. This is a way to show that all agree on the settlement. Originally, only the rajal saalih did this, but now the 'awaaqil do it in all cases." It would be interesting to know if in Cyrenaica both roles perform this function or if it belongs only to the role of rajal salih.

554 184 627 792 *613 I cannot generalize concerning this role for the whole of the Western Desert. Sayyid al-Sanusi and 'Amm Salih seem to be special men. On the other hand, the 'aqila and the rajal khair are roles which we would expect to find all over the desert, and in Libya also. The 'aqila is the focus of institutionalized traditional authority structure, and the rajal khair and "status group" represent the power structure. 554 121 This attempt to differentiate between authority and power is essentially one which deals with the more general problem of leadership. Any study of the structure of authority must have reference to the notion of leadership. Role analysis seems the best method of dealing with leaders and their functions. Role analysis together with the conceptualization of institution as a process is an adequate way of dealing with the tendency

634 no coincidence, then, that the present *'umda* and *shaikh* are
*613 the sons of the former *'umda* and *shaikh*. This reveals not
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428 only the structural rules of succession, but also indicates
[578] that "social honor," and thus power, still resides with these
families.

[178] It is important to note that since the time of their
inception, these roles have not changed *'aiela* or even *bait*
in al-Qasr. When the former *'umda* from 'Ailit Lazumi died,
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*613 his eldest son petitioned to the *'awaaqil* of the 'Aishaibat
666 that he be approved to succeed to his father's position.
428 The *'awaaqil* met and made their decision. One *'aqila* who
571 was present at the election said: "The office of *'umda* should
stay in the Lazumi family since the father was *'umda*. The
'awaaqil agreed on the son. But the son will be accepted to
follow his father only if he is good. If he is not good, the
'awaaqil will find a new *bait*." Although the Bedouins speak
of "the *'awaaqil*" electing the *'umda*, it must be remembered
that it is the "status group" which makes the decision, and
that the *'awaaqil* are only part of this group. The names of
[629] the men who elected the present *'umda* include less *'awaaqil*
and more *rajal khair*.

114 Before I arrived in the field, the present acting
634 *'umda* of the 'Aishaibat tribe was elected to the national
666 parliament to represent the province of Marsa Matruh. The
election of his replacement was not scheduled to take place

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structured situation the traditional authority structure would have disappeared from the scene.

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But, there is a struggle for authority recognition going on in al-Qasr. It is related to the change from the old basis of traditional authority to a new basis of legal authority. At the heart of this struggle is the role of the _rajal khair_. The _rajal khair_ has a firm public basis for establishing himself in an authoritative and representative role. Traditionally, the _rajal khair_ has faced inward and outward: he has used his ascribed position on the al-Qasr prestige scale to augment his status and influence, and, at the same time, his economic rationality has oriented him toward Marsa Matruh. [648] In the present stage of culture change, the _rajal khair_ is in a position to combine his ascribed and achieved attributes to gain entrance to a new reference group, the Egyptian bureaucracy. This offers him a new kind of prestige as well as affording him new opportunities for power, and even authority, over his fellow Bedouins.

The _rajal khair_, in view of his movement between the old and new in Egypt, maintains a _tertium quid_ status in two camps. While he has one foot in the traditional community because of his role in conflict regulation and the manipulation of traditional values, the _rajal khair_ also has a foot in the

178 modern camp. He has been able to enter into dialogue with
554 modernizing agents because his intra-tribal "status honor"
● 627 renders him public recognition at the institutional level, and because his worldly style of life allows him to, in part, identify with a modern reference group.

554 The *'aqila* and the *'umda* might be seen as the two
178 extremes of a temporary and emerging authority structure for
634 the Bedouin of al-Qasr: the traditional authority bound to
*613 the old moral order, and the modern legal authority identified wholly with an, as of yet, outside political and moral order.
[627] Ideally, it seems that only the *rajal khair*, who is neither an *'aqila* nor an *'umda*, is in the structural and ideological position to assume leadership and to guide the Bedouins during this period of culture change.

121 and political connections," with nation-oriented persons who operate at a national socio-cultural level of integration (1956:1075-1076).

Clifford Geertz (1960) has also examined the role of a "cultural broker" in Indonesia as an instance of "a vigorous, imaginative regional leadership, able to play a cultural middleman role between peasant and metropolitan life, and so create an effective juncture between traditional cultural patterns and modern ones" (1960:229). In the case of the Mexican "broker" described by Wolf, the major means of consolidating and obtaining power both at the regional and the national levels were through political channels. In the case of the Indonesian "broker," both religious and political channels are the means by which the local Muslim teacher, or kijaji, has obtained power: traditionally, he was a specialist in communication of Islam to the countryside, and today he has taken on the role of local party leader (Geertz 1960:230).

121 554 629 557 In al-Qasr, the rajal khair seems to be the Bedouin counterpart of the Mexican and Indonesian "broker." With a firm economic base in the local community, and with his ability to adopt new patterns of public behavior, i.e., "he knows how to speak to the Governor and public officials," the role of rajal khair provides the means for one to move upwards through political channels (Wolf 1956:1071). Within the context of a newly emerging authority system based upon the

121 structural principle of bureaucracy, the rajal khair lacking
554 legitimacy in the traditional lineage-based system may en-
627 visage an authoritative role and increased chances to "improve
557 his status through the judicious manipulation of social ties."

121 Leadership studies in the context of cultural change,
554 such as those which deal with "broker" types, have important
178 implications for a more general and fundamental theoretical
problem: the role of the individual in culture and society. Radin, as early as 1927, Redfield (1960), Geertz (1960), Fallers (1964), and Mead (1964) have spoken of "primitive philosophers," "the hinge group," "the cultural brokers," "the new men," and "the evolutionary clusters." All terms have direct reference to role types constructed from the observation of individuals possessed of the ability and creativity to offer new ideas and methods of dealing with the pressing cultural problems of their times. The unitary goal of all these researchers was to understand culture change through a focus on the way in which the individual manipulates his cultural resources.

121 I would maintain that, especially in political analysis, the approach and focus of the researcher is directly related to his ontologic position concerning the concepts of culture and human nature. That is to say, whether or not the researcher believes that "man has no choice in life, that culture determines his behavior," then he will or will not find it relevant

121 tradition" and "the little tradition." The "little tradition"
refers to peasant or folk culture, and the "great tradition"
to a specialized and systematized body of thought which is, in
most cases, esoteric, written, related to religion, and the
property of an intellectual group (1960:40-59; 1962:302). Of
course, Redfield's notion of a "literati" does not apply in
the Bedouin case. But in an earlier work (1953:44) Redfield
drew attention to the more general concept of "intelligentsia"
which further refines the scope and types of leadership.
Redfield refers to "the member of the intelligentsia . . .
(who) belongs to two worlds, not one; he is a marginal man."
He then goes on to differentiate between the "literati" type
and the "intelligentsia" type, stating that the former type
uses literacy to carry on the sacred tradition while the
member of the "intelligentsia" may use literacy "to admit
121 the ways of the world outside." While the rajal khair does
554 not become the representative of the great and sacred tradition
627 of Islam, he does utilize the bureaucratic means at hand to
177 admit the outside world into al-Qasr. The rajal khair may be
[571] considered a member of an "intelligentsia."

121 Gustave von Grunebaum (1962) has used Redfield's model of cultural dynamics to understand change and social mobility in the Arab World with special reference to Egypt. The author, an Islamicist, states that the "great tradition" of orthodox Islam in contrast to popular Islam is recognized as "the more

121 the values of a non-membership group in order to "find readier
177 acceptance by that group and make an earlier adjustment to
571 it" (Merton 1957:265). In a relatively closed society such as
181 al-Qasr, when those who qualify for membership in other
reference groups are able to do more than merely aspire, when
they actually anticipate and adjust their behavior to a type
of status consciously desired, the local authority and social
structures are likely to be transformed.

121 We can generalize from the literature on social
571 stratification that the hierarchial structure characteristic
554 of traditional societies carries with it a relationship of
mutual obligation. The "inferior" owes rent, respect, loyalty,
obedience, etc., while the "superior" owes, in return, pro-
tection, advice, help in emergency, action in conflict regula-
tion, representation in extralocal matters, etc. (Hagen 1962:
121 55-86; Parsons 1953: 108). In al-Qasr, the *'aqila* fulfills
554 only one of the functions of the "superior," that which deals
* [613] with conflict regulation. The *rajal khair* role, as I have
• [627] developed it, may function in full capacity as a "superior."
121 The *rajal khair* dominates the internal system through power
554 derived from rank on the prestige scale: he is prominent in
627 the external system as member and representative of a new
power structure based on national and political consciousness.
Traditionally, *rajal khair*-dominance was not by force but
through influence and prestige: in the new situation, with a

121 fully organized government behind the role, the element of
554 force may enter into the *rajal khair* style of domination.
•627 Thus far, the *'umda* and the *shaikh* roles have functioned
[634] through the traditional roles of the *'aqila* and the *rajal*
*[613] *khair*, that is, the "status group." In the future, this pattern
[178] may change. It is also possible that new roles will emerge. This is what I wish to explore.

121 The "status group" of al-Qasr operating with a sense
571 of identity with a modern reference group deem themselves
554 responsible for making decisions on the behalf of "the people"
[177] or "the Bedouin." Members of the "status group" would occasionally dress in Western clothes; they would hunt gazelle for sport; they owned the few autos there were in the area; and a few partook of alcoholic beverages. Their rights and obligations in social relations are still relatively stable and depend on the ascribed values of al-Qasr Bedouin society, but one can detect the start of a power struggle within the group. It is a competitive desire for social mobility and is stated in terms of the achieved attributes considered important by the reference group to which they aspire, the Egyptian society. For example, one sometimes heard the complaint from various members of the "status group" that the Governor was not giving proper recognition to those "who understood the ways of the Bedouin," and "those who could speak for the Bedouin."

156 with four wives. It is not hard to understand why the people
159 of al-Qasr consider Hajj 'Ali a *rajal khair* *par excellence*.
554 •627 For instance, when I asked one man if he could give me some
124 examples of court cases, he replied: "The one who is not an
'aqila pays no attention to anything save getting food for
his children. The *rajal khair* has money and men (a reference
to the "old days" when a person needed cohorts for battle),
and so he always pays instead of us. He lends us money and
helps us in doing anything, like Hajj 'Ali does." In another
124 interview, one man showed great respect for Hajj 'Ali's tradi-
156 159 tional status and modern ability to deal with the outside
554 world by giving him the honorific title of "*shaikh*," and
439 showing that the Bedouins of al-Qasr put their trust in him:
472 "When the olive merchants come from Alexandria, they go to
245 Shaikh 'Ali, someone who knows about olives. They ask him
what kind of olives al-Qasr has. He shows the merchants, and
they say: 'I will give you so much for them.' They make an
agreement, and Hajj 'Ali collects the olives and gets the
price for them."

156 In terms of local politics, I would guess, but do
159 not have data to prove, that Hajj 'Ali was the third party
554 [627] most frequently referred to in seeking a termination of
[114] conflict. He was commonly asked to participate in these
matters not only by the disputants themselves but also by
the *'aqila* or other third party presiding. He was sometimes

The concept of the court has been prominent in the writings of sev- 121
eral other anthropologists besides Radcliffe-Brown and Hoebel. Bohannan 114
(1957, 1964, 1965), Redfield (1964) and Pospisil (1958) all imply the 671 692
existence of a court of some kind or another as the identifying mark of
the existence of legal rules. In his attempt to distinguish between law
and custom, Gluckman thought of law to exist "as a series of acceptable
judgments of rightdoing and wrongdoing in particular cases" (1955:262).
Custom and other social observances function as corpus juris and as such
a basis for the judgment of where the behavior of one of the litigants in
a case is reasonable or unreasonable, lawful or unlawful. As such, custom
is a source of law, but not law itself. It becomes law when drawn upon in
passing judgment in a given case. In commenting on a passage on the Nuer 121
by Evans-Pritchard, Gluckman made it clear what he meant by the court. 114
"This passage shows that even in a society where 'self-help' is the en- 671 626
forcing sanction, people judge situations of dispute in terms of rights 692
and duties, and wrongs....Therefore, it seems fair to say that among the 171
Nuer, though they have no courts, there is a process of judgment by media-
tors and ordinary people in which custom and morality as part of the corpus
juris constitute 'sources of law' for particular decisions" (1955a:263).

The importance of the above passage from Gluckman is his distinction 121
between the concept of the court and the judicial process, a distinction 114 671
lacking in the writing of most other anthropologists dealing with the
study of law. Failure to distinguish the two aspects of the legal system
resulted in confusing a basic societal process with one of the mechanisms
through which the goals of that process achieved in certain societies.
In its broadest sense, the judicial process refers to the ways disputes [692]
are settled within society. Since didsputes arise out of the very nature [626]
of social interaction, some form of dispute settlement is found in all [627]
societies.

The form which the process of dispute settlement takes differs from 121
one society to another. In certain societies disputes are settled through 627
a process of informal mediation undertaken by go-betweens; in others it 692
is by means of self-help; still in others, it is by way of court. In 695
societies with courts the process of dispute settlements is undertaken by
judges who "take and assess the evidence, examine what they regard as the
facts, and come to a decision in favor of one party rather than another"
(Gluckman 1965:183).

Within a given society, disputes are settled in accordance with a set 121
of principles that reflect the basic goals and values of that society. As 627
long as the settlement of a particular dispute proceeds according to these 626 671
principles, the settlement is supported by the public opinion of that 692
society. This is true whether the process is carried on b y means of informal 182
mediations or through a court system. It is this public opinion as the
expression of the basic societal values and not the court as a special
mechanism that gives legitimation to the judicial decisions. To equate opinion [114]
with the court as Hoebel (1961) did, or to look at the court as the ultimate
source of legitimation as did Radcliffe-Brown (1940) and others (Redfield
1964, Bohannan 1965), is to create an unnecessary confusion which tends to
undermine meaningful cross-cultural comparisons. Whatever the differences 121
among anthropologists with regard to the definition of the court, their 127
main interest in the concept so far has been as a tool for the definition 671
of law. The interest in the concept gave rise to a methodological approach 114
which came to characterize the literature in legal anthropology, namely,
the case-study approach, cases having been utilized in a number of ways
by legal anthropologists. In their book on the Cheyenne, Llewellyn and
Hoebel (1941) introduced the analysis of "the trouble case." This was
followed by a number of studies utilizing the case study method either to

document statements concerning the substantive law of the society studied, 121
or to abstract and elucidate that law. An example of the first technique 127
is Howell's analysis of the Nuer court decisions (1954) where he collected 671
a large number of court cases, cla-sified them and abstracted the substantive 114
aspect of the native law. Gluckman's study of the Lozi (1955) represents
the second technique. Smith and Roberts used the same method of
case analysis to abstract certain principles of the Zuni law (1954), and
Nader utilized it in her study of the Zapotecan law (1964). The list of
those who utilized the case-study approach is quite extensive, and the
range of the societies they studied is quite varied. But most of them
share the interest in the substantive rather than in the procedural aspect
of the law.

When referring to the procedural aspect of the law one should keep 121
in mind the difference between the technical and the abstract components 671
of procedural law. The first refers to the activities and steps involved [627]
in the settlement of disputes in the society as well as the person or body [692]
undertaking the responsibility of such settlement. The second involves a 121
number of abstract principles reflecting the values of the society with regard 181
to the goals of the judicial process, and which the judicial persons 671
use as a guide in achieving a settlement or in passing a judgment of one 114
kind or another. These are the bases of judicial reasoning. Although
judicial reasoning represents one of the most interesting and important
aspects of the judicial process, it attracted very little attention among
legal anthropologists. With the exception of Gluckman and his analysis
of the concept of "reasonable man" among the Lozi (1955a), no significant
work has been done in this area. In dealing with the concept of the reasonable
man, Gluckman was more interested in discovering universals in laws
than in the process of judicial reasoning as such. He implied that an

element of reasonableness is a universal principle in any judicial logic. 121
Nadel reacts to Gluckman's implication of the universality of the concept 181
suggesting that it is valid only in certain contexts, and that the cases 671
reported by Gluckman from which he abstracted that concept are minor ones. 114
Nadel maintained that the principle seems inadequate in major crimes such as homicide, witchcraft or assault. "If I am right, the Lozi would, in these situations, discard their guiding fiction of 'reasonable man' for the sharper dichotomy of things simply lawful and unlawful, permitted and forbidden" (1956:162).

METHODOLOGY

One of the characteristics of legal anthropology is the absence of a 121
coherent body of theory that could be utilized in the analysis and inter- 124
pretation of the ethnographic data. What do exist, however, in the area of the ethnography of law are a variety of what may be called "tools of analysis." These are mainly methods and orientations which help to direct the researcher's attention to a certain area of behavior which describes best the phenomenon under study. Their main purpose is to help the researcher isolate particular portions of the phenomenon he is studying and as such enables him to conceptualize the problem. A number of these tools have been employed in the present study. One of these tools is Turner's "social drama" which was employed in the analysis of the political leadership and the judicial process. Since this approach depends upon the intimate knowledge of the sequential development of a given case, or cases, over a period of time, it was quite difficult to employ it in more than that particular context. As will be apparent in the later chapters, the judicial
process among the group is highly informal. Most of the disputes are settled [627]
by means of mediation which is done behind the scene and with a great deal of secrecy.

from the process of dispute settlement; and the semi-nomadic nature of 114
the population in the area. 123

The reliance on the case-study method and especially that of Turner's 114
"social drama" which requires extensive and detailed knowledge of the 123
sequential development of a number of cases over a long period of time 124
proved to be a major task in a society where disputes are settled not in 627
formal hearings, but by means of informal mediation and behind the scene 578
negotiations. These activities covered a large area, and were shrouded in a great deal of secrecy. The assumption is that the parties involved in the dispute should be given the privacy and chance to arrive at an acceptable settlement without being conscious of or influenced by the opinion of non-interested parties. The public hearing, or the mi'ad, loves the announcement of the agreement arrived at in private. As will be seen later, very little factual information about the dispute is discussed in the mi'ad. No record is kept of either the discussion in the mi'ad or the preceding negotiations. The process of dispute settlement is, then, highly decentralized. To be able to follow one particular dispute involves the constant reliance on informants not only to acquaint the anthropologist with the places of negotiations, but also to fill the gaps in the information about the process of negotiation itself.

As a woman anthropologist, I found myself at a disadvantage in a 114
society where women were excluded from public participation. It is true 123
that from the very beginning of the field work I was never cast into the 562
role of the native woman, yet, my position as a woman posed a certain number of problems. When I first arrived in the area, I made a deliberate effort not to identify with the native women. When it was suggested to me that the relatively short skirts I wore were not practical for riding donkeys

or walking in the strong winds characteristic of the area, and that the 114
floor-length native dress would be more appropriate, I refused the advice 123
for fear of being identified in the minds of the people with the natives, 562
and thus being treated in the same way. The possibility of being identified with native women was not very strong, because from the very beginning I did not act like one. I did things and talked about things that native women had never done or talked about. I drove a car, read, and wrote, and talked about national and local politics. More important than that though, to the tribal population, was that I was a member of the bar association of Egypt, and that I had practiced law for a year in Cairo. Every time I was introduced, the fact that I was an attorney was made evident. This gave legitimacy to my interest in studying the tribal legal system, and in many ways they were flattered than an attorney, especially a woman city attorney, would be interested in their law. Yet, in native clothes or not, in the native female role or not, I was still a woman, and as such I was not part
of any serious activity, especially those of dispute settlement. My mere 114
presence in any part of the dispute settlement made the gathering seem some- 123
how less serious. At the beginning of the field work a deliberate effort 562
was made to keep me from knowing anything about the whereabouts of the nego- 627
tiations or what was going on. I had to bribe men, women and children to [[24]]
tell me where the negotiations were taking place and who they involved, and then appear on the scene uninvited. This condition lasted for about two months. At that time the news of my presence in the area spread around, and I had attended many of the negotiations that men became less conscious of my presence. In fact, some even asked me to attend the meetings where some parts of the negotiations were conducted and give them my opinion as to the fairness of the settlement.

Yet, even when the problem of role definition was solved, it was still difficult to follow closely all aspects and phases of any particular dispute. This was mainly the result of the semi-nomadic nature of the population. In settled communities, the anthropologist usually finds himself in the midst of the social life of the community. He might not be a part of it, but at least a major portion of it is happening around him. In the case of nomadic or semi-nomadic populations, the situation is different. There were no large tribal concentrations in the area. The largest residential unit was the camp, and it consisted of no more than thirteen tents which changed in composition quite rapidly. In one camp, out of the thirteen tents which were there when I joined, only six remained unchanged by the time I left three months later. Originally I had planned to stay in the small village of El-Hammam, which was believed to be in the tribal route of the major tribal segment in the area. It took me only a few weeks to realize that the tribal segments did not follow any definite migratory route, and for more than four weeks I saw nothing of the life of the group more than the few individuals who came occasionally to the small settlement to buy tea or sugar, or to catch the train to Alexandria. It was then that I decided to leave the settlement and live with the camp. My stay in the camp was very insightful as far as information about the daily activities of the camp members and the relationship between the camp and other tribal segments in the area. But the camp was a very small group and fairly isolated. Besides, there was no way of knowing how typical that camp was to the other camps in the area. I finally decided that the best strategy was to live with a number of camps in the surrounding area for relatively short periods of time, making my base of operation a relatively settled camp in close proximity to a number of other camps.

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657 modern court system may be viewed as a form of appeal to the tribal
692 177 justice. One has to be careful, however, in calling such a procedure
178 an appeal, since the tribal proceedings have no relevance in the court
proceedings.

69 The duality is more serious in criminal cases. When an act is de-
681 fined as illegal by both the tribal and modern law, persons committing
177 it come automatically under the jurisdiction of both laws. As long as
such acts remain unknown to the police, the duality of procedures is
not undertaken. This is possible in minor cases of assault or theft or
adultery. But in major cases, such as homocide or serious assault re-
sulting in the serious injury of a tribal member, it is difficult to
keep the news a secret from the authorities. The funeral proceedings
in the former cases and the medical attention needed in the latter cases
● [627] are hard to conceal. Besides, serious cases start a whole series of
[521] mediations and go-betweens which always become the general knowledge
in the entire area and the subject of conversation among the people.
When the authorities know about such cases, they have to take immediate
action to bring the offender to trial, even when the government authori-
ties know that the tribal proceedings are being conducted in the case.
Some attempts are made by both the tribal law and the modern law to mini-
mize the effect of that duality. It is common that when the district
attorney knows that a certain criminal case has been successfully solved
according to the tribal proceedings, to ask for the minimum penalty for
the offense. On the side of the tribal proceedings, once the case has
been solved, the witnesses needed to testify for the prosecutor are in-
structed by their fellow tribesmen to refrain from giving the information

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184 In recent years this has changed, however. The increased importance
178 of wealth in the recently introduced money economy relaxed the en-
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dogamous tendency that was characteristic of the Sa'adi tribes.

619 In discussing the position of the Murabiteen tribes it is worth
184 noting that not all the Murabiteen tribes in the area occupy the same
position. Some enjoy relatively higher positions than the others. Actually, there are two kinds of Murabiteen in the area: Mustaqillen (independent Murabiteen); and the dependent Murabiteen. The latter are further subdivided into Murabiteen bil-baraka (with the blessing); and Murabiteen bil-sadaqa (with the tribute). The only independent Murabiteen in the area is the Gemei'at tribe. These are the original settlers
[173] of the area. Because of their help to Awlad Ali against the Hanadi, the
latter were defeated and Awlad Ali were able to occupy the Western Desert. For their part the Gemei'at tribe was granted its independence by Awlad Ali and were given one-third of the total area as their homeland (watan).
619 In theory, the Gemei'at tribe occupies the same position and has the same
184 rights as the Sa'adi tribes, including the right to offer their protec-
778 tion which is denied to all other client groups. In practice, however,
682
this seems to be of no practical value. None of my informants could remember a single case in which a murderer has taken refuge at a segment
619 of the Gemei'at tribe. The importance of the nazala is not merely to be
778 safe from the pursuit of the victim's group but rather to provide the
184 mediators who undertake the crucial task of negotiation on behalf of the
682 murderer and his gorup. It is the ability to settle the dispute on a
● 627
628 permanent basis that offers the actual long-lasting protection, even
after the time of the nazala expires. To be successful in his pursuit,

619 778 the negotiator has to have behind him the full weight of his tribal se-
184 gment. Since the origin of the Gemei'at tribe as a Murabiteen tribe is
682 well known, any negotiator has to rely almost entirely upon his own skill
● 627 628 to affect any settlement; even if he is able to affect such a settlement,
there is no guarantee that it will be permanent.

619 The Murabiteen bil-baraka and Murabiteen bil-sadaqa occupy the same
792 position as vassal groups. The only difference between the two is that
the first, the religious men, are much more respected than the latter.
They are feared by the other tribes because of the belief that they have
direct contact with the religious and spiritual world and can harm those
who dare to offend them in one way or another. Because of this factor
[627] and of their neutral position with regard to the rest of the tribes, they
[628] play an important role in mediation and dispute settlement.

619 The origin of inferiority of the Murabiteen tribes in general is
184 hard to account for. Kenneth (1925) believes that hundreds of years ago
174 the Murabiteen were essentially the holymen. They learned to read and
792 write the Qoraan and grouped themselves around the "zawias' which were
the centers of learning and religion. While indulging in their religious
practices their flocks ere grazed miles away in the open desert under the
charge of the Sa'adi shepherds, who originally were the poor paid workers
of the Murabiteen. These shepherds, living out in the open, were busy
fighting away the raiders attempting to steal their flocks. As time
passed the Sa'adi shepherds became not only tough fighters but also wealthy.
This latter end was achieved partly as a result of successful raids on
neighboring tribes. Later when the Sa'adi planned a large raid, they entrusted their flocks to the Murabiteen, who by that time had become dependent upon the Sa'adi for their protection from the raids of other tribes.

IN THE NAME OF GOD THE FORGIVER

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The following Awaqil (sing. aqila, the leader of a bait) representing the various "buite" (sing. bait, the tribal segment below the level of eila) of the Aggary Family were witnesses to the treaty and their signatures signify their commitment and that of their respective buite to the content of this agreement.

(a list of the various awaqil)

The above signing awaqil agreed unanimously on the content of the document and all the conditions included. No objection by any of the above persons was noted at the meeting.

Article 1:

The content of this document should be kept as a secret of the Aggary Family. It constitutes the Aggary Amar in accordance with the customs and the Daraieb of Awlad Ali. The content of the document should be revealed only at the request of both parties of a dispute which involves a member of the Amar.

Article 2:

629 Peace should exist between members of the Amar. No secret grudges or open disputes should be permitted between them. In case such an unfortunate situation exists, the other non-involved members of the Amar should intervene between the disputants, try to solve the dispute, and prevent it from damaging the solidarity of the Amar. They should investigate the facts of the case and force the guilty party to compensate his brother (the wronged party) without giving the former a chance to object.

Article 3:

681 When the Amar is called upon because of obligation involving the payment of money, all the Awaqil should meet and decide the amount of money that should be collected from each Bait of the Aggary Family. It becomes then the responsibility of each Aqila to collect the amount from his Bait.

Article 4:

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The share of each Bait is based upon the number of "Sayems", (literally, "fasting males", which is interpreted to mean 15 years of age or over), regardless of whether or not they have a source of income for themselves. The share of those without means of their own is distributed among the other members of the Bait.

613 675 539 [681] [885] Each Aqila is responsible for submitting to the Amar a list of the Sayems in his bait, and this will be the basis for establishing the share of the bait in payment or receipt of the money.

Article 5:

No Aqila can act on any matter involving loss or gain to the Amar without the presence of the other Awaqil of the Amar, unless an urgent matter occurs in which waiting for the rest of the Awaqil might jeopardize the interest of the Amar. In such cases the Awaqil present can act on behalf of the Amar as a whole.

Article 6:

[672] [673] The following acts should not involve the Amar as a whole and the offender is considered individually (or with his own Bait) responsible for them:

1. Theft and cheating.
2. Insult or disrespect of a younger member of the Amar to an older person whether from the Amar or not.
3. Entering someone's tent or home without permission.
4. Seduction of women (including rape and adultery).

[681] In all the above cases the individual has to bear the responsibility for his own actions. For to let the Amar pay for him in such circumstances is to encourage him and other such members of the Amar to commit more of such acts and bring disgrace to the Amar. If the offender is unable to pay for his crime, his nearest male kin should pay for him in accordance with the Awlad Ali Daraieb. Such payments are considered as personal debts which the offender has to pay back as soon as he is financially able.

Article 7:

● [627] When an older person does injustice to a younger one, the latter should take his complaint to the Aqila of his own bait. The Aqila in turn should take the matter up with the Aqila of the older man or to all the awaqil of the Amar if the matter is serious enough. The awaqil must assess the facts and prevent the older man from doing any more injustice to the younger man and have the former compensate him for any damage he might have caused the younger man by his actions. If the awaqil fail to do this and if their failure resulted in the younger insulting or hurting the older, his acts become no longer an individual responsibility for which he has to pay alone, and the Amar should pay for him.

Article 8:

[627] No members of the Amar should take sides in disputes involving families or individuals outside the Amar unless the awaqil in the Amar investigate the matter and the reasons for the dispute and decide that the Amar as a whole should be on one side of the dispute or the other.

613 This makes it possible for those adopted by the tribe to keep in touch
563 with their relatives and friends they left behind in the Delta while en-
619 joying the military exemption gained from their adoption by the Awlad Ali
population. It is also believed that Eilat Aggary, made up mostly of peasants themselves, are very lenient in the conditions they put for tribal adoption. Finally, the Eilat Aggary is not among the most powerful tribal segments of Awlad Ali, possibly because of their composition. This assures the adopted peasant groups an equal status not normally obtained if adopted by one of the powerful tribal segments of Awlad Ali.

613 The Amar paper of the Aggary explicitly states some of the basic
[675] characteristics of the Amar as a unit in the tribal organization of
Awlad Ali. The most distinctive aspect of the Eila or the Amar as a political unit is the absence of any formalized leadership. Although the Amar is viewed by outsiders as a corporate group as far as its legal responsibility in certain cases, from the standpoint of its members, the Amar is no more than the sum total of its constiuent units or Baits. This is shown in the Amar paper of Aggary which states that matters affecting the Amar be decided upon by all the bait represented by their respective leaders, the awaqil. There is no formalized authority above the
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554 awaqil, although one of the awaqil might acquire a position of informal
● 627 leadership by virtue of personal or other qualities. He will be con-
sidered as a mediator and go-between for the various leaders of the Baits. In the case of the Aggary, Sheihk Selouma, the Aqila of Bait Eweida, has acquired such a leadership among the Eilat Aggary. Although Shiehk Selouma is relatively young, (he is about 40 years old), he has the reputation of getting things done. His Bait is the wealthiest in the

His Bait is the wealthiest in the
613 Aggary and he himself has recently acquired a great amount of wealth,
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• 627 mostly from smuggling goods across the Libyan borders. Because of his
[556] position as a Government Sheihk, he is believed to have influencial con-
nections in the government. He is the only member of the Aggary Amar
who has a car. He considers himself to be the spokesman of the Aggary
Family, and he is known to be able to persuade the reluctant awaqil to
conform to decisions made by the rest of the awaqil. In a number of in-
[682] stances he was able to collect bloodmoney from members of the Amar who
had previously refused to pay. Some people in the area believe that had
it not been for the persuasive abilities of Sheihk Selouma, the Aggary
Amar could never have persisted, and it would have long ago been divided
into smaller units due to the lack of agreement among its members. The
613 lack of formalized leadership of the Amar or the Eila makes consensus of
extreme importance for the Amar. The emphasis on the unity of the Amar
[675] is stated in Article 2 and is implied in a number of other articles in
[578] the Amar paper of Aggary. Disagreement among the awaqil is very rare al-
613 though not unknown in the area. The relative consensus among the awaqil
682 stems from the fact that the Amar as a group has a fairly limited function.
[182] Until very recently the only practical function of the Amar was the collec-
tion of money to pay for a murder committed by one of its members. Since
establishing the innocence or guilt of the accused is not the duty of the
Amar, once his guilt has been established, there is no question about
613 the payment. Disagreements are likely to occur in the case of new circum-
682 stances where money has to be paid, since payment in such cases are not
578 yet institutionalized, even when specified in a given Amar paper. This
000 has not yet become a major problem. If any disagreement between the

613 individuals. He settles disputes among them and represents them in their
[627] disputes with outsiders. He is also the spokesman of his Bait in all
matters involving the relationship of the Bait with the other tribal segments.
[682] He is responsible for the collection of the bloodmoney from members
of his Bait and has the authority to confiscate property of individual
members who refuse to pay their share. When a member is financially unable
to pay his share, the Aqila is expected to pay for him and collect at a
later time when the member is in a position to make such payment.

613 Originally the position of the Aqila was a hereditary one with the
428 position passing from father to son. However, in recent years the rigidity
178 of the patrilineal descent as the basis of succession to the position
of the Aqila has been modified radically and other principles of selection
613 have been introduced. The working of the principles underlying the
128 selection of the Aqila will be analyzed in detail in the following chapter
through the close examination of one of the major legal cases which occurred
during my stay in the area.

613 Thus each Bait is a division of one of the Eilas and this has its
[423] place in the formal tribal system. It constitutes a group with definite
usufruct rights to land and a formally recognized leadership.

621 But the actual residential units in which Awlad Ali live are not
[613] baits but parts of them in the form of separate camps or "nagei". The
camps constitute the primary communities of Awlad Ali. A camp consists
[594] of a number of tents ranging from four to twelve. Each tent is usually
occupied by one nuclear family of a husband, his wife and children. In
[595] cases of polygynous marriages, each wife usually occupies one tent with
[361] her children. Each camp is separated from the next one by a distance
which ranges from two to ten kilometers.

621 had started in the area at that time. No special permission was re-
563 quired for the newcomer to join the camp. He only got the permission
of the person whose tent was at the far end of the camp to put his tent
[574] next to it. The first night after the man joined the camp, his next
door neighbor slaughtered a goat in honor of the new member and invited
all members of the camp.

621 Leaving the camp also does not require any permission, although the
622 custom specifies that before one leaves he should inform either his
[576] neighbor or the headman of his time of departure. With the exception of
[613] cases where the headman of a particular camp is at the same time the
Aqila of the bait, the headman of the camp has no authority over the mem-
622 bers of the camp. He is usually called upon to solve minor problems be-
627 tween brothers or husband and wife, or give his opinion in decisions of
minor importance. "A headman is like a father," said one informant, "we
call him kabir el-nagi (the old man of the camp)." When a member of the
627 nagei is involved in a serious dispute with another, the one to handle
613 the case is the aqila or awaqil to whom the two disputing parties belong.

619 Group	Leadership	Identifying aspects
613 Kabila	None	Client groups attached.
621 Eila	None	Vengeance group, Vaguely defined tribal land ("watan").
Bait	Aqila	Corporate land-holding. Formally recognized leadership.
[622] Nagei	Headman	Residential unit with unsegmented structure.

CHAPTER V

POLITICAL LEADERSHIP AND JUDICIAL PROCESS

69 627 628 One of the most idstinguishing aspects of the legal system of Awlad Ali is the absence of any formalized judicial structure. Disputes are solved mainly through the mechanism of informal mediation rather than through formal hearings of a court during which the facts of each case are presented and judgment based on the facts is passed. This does not mean that formal hearings are not known on the area. For the "Mi'ad" or tribal hearing is a common and very important practice in the tribal proceedings. The Mi'ad, however, is not a tribal court. It is merely a gathering of all interested parties and anyone else who wished to attend, in which the agreement reached behind the scenes by means of negotiations are announced.

628 613 683 [114] The first Mi'ad I attended was held in the house of Sheikh Mughaieb, the Aqila (tribal leader) of bait Mughaieb of the Sanagrah tribal segment in the area of Hammam, 60 miles west of Alexandria. The case that was to be settled at the Mi'iad involved the assaulting of Sheikh Mughaieb ty two younger members of bait Dauoud who lived in a nearby camp. The dispute started when Ali, the youngest brother (14 years old) of the two assailants, found a piece of iron in the desert. Suspecting that it was a mine, he took it away from the camp to the small garden in the backyard of Sheikh Mughaieb's house, surrounded it with dry weeds and set fire to it. The piece of iron was in fact a mine and it exploded, damaging the trees and a window on the Sheikh's property. At the sound of the explosion Sheikh Mughaieb rushed out and found the boy trying to run away from

628 683 613 [576] who was like a second father to them. He praised Sheikh Mughaieb for being understanding. He then said that Sheikh Mughaieb was very generous and that his sons had come to Mughaieb the day before and kissed the top of his head (an expression of respect for forgiveness). He said that no money, no matter how great, could erase the harm done by his sons but that he had offered to pay Sheikh Mughaieb the sum of 400 pounds as "kabara" or face-saving compensation. (The kabara will be discussed in a forthcoming chapter, but for the time being it is worth noting that the above amount is the maximum for such compensation since it equals the bloodmoney for a man). Then he turned to Sheikh Mughaieb and asked him to accept it in front of the respected guests. Sheikh Mughaieb then spoke for the first time and said that the two boys were like sons to him and that he had no hard feelings toward them anymore, since he believed that young people were sometimes carried away in their actions. He then proceeded to say that in honor of the honorable guests who took the time to attend the hearing he was forfeiting half the amount. At that time a woman brought the food the women were cooking for the gathering, and Sheikh Karim asked Mughaieb, "How about the honor of the good women of the house who have done all the work and cooked all the food? If you ask me, they deserve at least another hundred pounds." Mughaieb said, "All right, fifty pounds for the home of the women, but no more." After that Sheikh Karim paid the amount of a hundred and fifty pounds to Sheikh Mughaieb and shook hands with him. He also shook hands with the two young men who had assaulted him, and the gathering started the dinner and tea.

● 627 628 Not all Mi'ads in the area proveed with that smoothness. Many of them are characterized by shouting and arguments and frequently no

● 627 628 [123] agreement is reached. In fact, later one of the people attending said that my presence made everything run smoothly in that particular Mi'ad because they felt that they should show me how peaceful Awlad Ali were. This was mainly supported by my own observation of other Mi'ads, some of which are described later, where parties were less understanding of one another and where no forfeiting of any part of the compensation occurs. This is particularly true when the Mi'ad is held to acknowledge the failure of the negotiators to reach an acceptable agreement among the parties. [681] This is also true when one of the parties to a dispute denies the charge and insists on not paying any kind of compensation. In such cases the Mi'ad is held to decide upon a different course of action, usually the administration of the oath, as will be discussed later in the chapter. [182] Despite its typical nature, the Mi'ad described above exemplifies the nature of the Mi'ad and its purpose as a process of making public what has been achieved in private negotiations. No evidence is presented and evaluated in the Mi'ad, no hearing of witnesses, no passing of judgment based on the evaluation of the facts of the case. Actually, the facts of the case are never presented and a person who is not acquainted with them before hand has no way of learning what the dispute is all about by merely listening to the discussions of the Mi'ad.

628 613 The key role in the process of mediation in dispute settlements is done by the Aqila or the leader of the bait. When a dispute occurs between members of different baits, each party goes to the Aqila of his bait who takes immediate steps tomeet with the Aqila of the other party and discuss the matter with him in an attempt to reach a settlement. He acts as a representative of members of his bait and defends their interests in

439 Aggary Eila. When they arrived with the cigarettes, Hadi was not at his
tent; he was in the market of the nearby town selling sheep. They left
the cigarettes and left for Alexandria to arrange for their distribution.
In Alexandria they met Rabbuh Hakim, the son of Hakim, who married a
girl from Alexandria and lived there. He made his income from buying
smuggled goods at wholesale prices and selling them at a profit. When
he met the two members of the Geneishat tribe and learned from them about
the shipment they left at Hadi's place, he wanted to buy it. But they
refused on the grounds that Hadi had already contacted someone and that
all they could do was to give the first option to that individual. Two
439 hours after the conversation between Rabbuh Hakim and the Geneishat, the
625 police officer on duty at the station of Burg el-Arab received an anonymous call from Alexandria informing him that a shipment of smuggled cigarettes worth more than three thousand pounds was hidden in Hadi's olive
mill (which was not in use at that time). The call was overheard by a
member of the Sanagrah tribe who works as a detective with the police.
He tried to warn Hadi of the police raid but it was too late. The officer
found the cigarettes in Hadi's olive mill in the exact place where the informant said they would be. The cigarettes were confiscated and Hadi was
arrested and later released when the officer didn't find enough evidence
to prove that he knew about the shipment or that it belonged to him.

685 The confiscation of the cigarettes enraged both Hadi and his part-
627 ners. They went to Sheikh Ta'ib, the Aqila of bait Eweidha to which Hadi
578 belonged. They told him about their conversation with Rabbu in Alexandria
and said that they thought he was the one who informed the police about
the shipment. Ta'ib said that Rabbu must have done this because of old

685 grudges that he had against Ta'ib when the latter dissolved the partner-
● 627 ship which had existed between them for more than ten years, because of
578 Rabbu's attempt to cheat Taieb in dividing the profit gained from smug-
gling goods. They asked Sheikh Ta'ib to be their mediator to Sheikh
Hakim and his son. Ta'ib went to Hakim himself and informed him of the
accusations directed against his son and asked to arrange for a "Mi'ad"
or legal hearing. Hakim agreed and told Taieb that his son accepted
Taieb as a mardi and would abide by whatever decision he made. After
that both parties to the dispute wrote specifying their agreement on Taieb
as a mardi and all signed it. (It is not customary to write the agree-
ment on the mardi but Taieb insisted on that on the grounds that he did
not trust Hakim or his son and that several times they had backed down
on their promises). The Mi'ad was held and all interested parties attend-
ed. It lasted only half an hour, most of it spect drinking tea. Nobody
presented his case or any facts related to it since both parties had
apparently discussed it earlier with Taieb. The only one to speak was
Sheikh Taieb. He stated that Hadi and his partners believed that Rabbu
had informed the police which caused them to loose merchandise worth
685 more than three thousand pounds. He also said that the accusation had
627 been denied by Hakim on behalf of his son, after having his son swear by
578 the Qoraan that he hadn't informed the police. Then in the traditional
695 phrase, Taieb said, "I therefore follow the Awlad Ali Daraieb and make
[671) the judgment to the oath. Rabbu will have to take the oath supported by
fourteen male members of his bait to be selected by the Geneishat." He
added that he had discussed the matter with both parties before announc-
ing it and that both had agreed to it.

685 627 The Geneishat selected the tomb of the saint where the oath was to
778 be administered. According to the customary law of Awlad Ali, the plain-
695 tiff is the one to decide which saint is to be sought for the taking of
[671] the oath by the defendant. Each saint has his own reputation and some
[776] are said to be more effective in certain kinds of disputes. The saint
selected in this case was Sidi Dmain. Sidi Dmian's tomb is in the
Beheira province some 60 miles east of the area of Burg el-Arab. He is
[732] known to cause the blindness of those who dare to swear falsely by him,
[784] and at least four cases of blindness in the area have been attributed to
[671] false oaths at Sidi Dmain. Also according to the law, it is the plain-
tiff who selects the persons from the defendant's kin unit who are to
685 support him in the oath. Following this rule, the Geneishat, with the
627 help of Hadi, selected the fourteen men from bait Asabei to swear with
695 Rabbu. The number of men that were required in this case was considered
613 very conservative. The usual practice in estimating the number of sup-
[803] porters in any case is done by establishing the value of the damage or
compensation and dividing it by ten. The result is the number of men
needed to give the oath. If there were not enough adult males in a given
kinship unit to fulfill the number needed, some or all the men would
have to be sworn twice or three times and each time a person takes the
oath he is considered as a separate person until the number needed is met.

Following this rule, and since the value of the property confiscated in the above case was over three thousand pounds, 300 persons should have been sworn in support of Rabbuh. Since this would have complicated the matter greatly, it was agreed that fifteen men were enough. Taieb gave the justification for limiting the number to 15 that trade and, as

685 such, deviates from the normal pattern of cases dealt with by the cus-
● 627 tomary law in the conventional way. The men selected by the Geneishat
695 included, in addition to Rabbu and his father Hakim, Shei'eb and his
613 three brothers, Hakim's cousin Samsoun and his four brothers and Hakim's
uncle Sheikh Qudura and his sons. The date of the oath was set for June
tenth. Two days before, the two parties involved in the dispute invited
a number of the important people of other tribal segments in the area to
[492] be witnesses to the oath. All involved started to travel to the tomb of
[494] Sidi Dmain, some on donkeys, others by bus or train. At six o'clock on
[497] the morning of the oath everybody gathered in the courtyard outside the
[778] tomb of the saint. The granddaughter of the saint works as a mediator
[787] between the spirit of her grandfather and his followers announced that
[776] the saint was ready for the oath and everybody went inside preparing for
the oath. Before the oath was taken the Geneishat asked Hakim if his son
and the fourteen men they had chosen were present and Hakim said they
were. Since the Geneishat were from a different tribal segment and
lived outside the area, they had no personal knowledge of most of the
[212] men who were to take the oath. Knowing the reputation of Hakim they
asked the men to present their identification cards to check them against
[747] the list they had. At that time Hakim said that some of the men didn't
have identification cards because they had not applied for aid from the
World Food Program. Then the Geneishat demanded that those without cards
should be identified by members of other tribal segments who had come as
witnesses. Hakim refused and then admitted that one of the men was absent and that he had put another in place of him. But when the Geneishat
learned that the one to be absent was Sheikh Qudura, they insisted that

685 627 695 613 [578] no one else could take his place. They were mainly angry at Hakim's attempt to cheat them and refused Hakim's offer to substitute ten men for Qudura. The temper of the meeting was becoming very tense; then Taieb, who was working very hard to achieve a settlement between the disputants, took the Geneishat aside and tried to convince them to accept another man instead of Qudura. When he found that to be impossible, he asked them to agree to a postponement of the oath until they saw what prevented Qudura from coming as he had promised. The Geneishat agreed to the postponement because of the absence of one of the men to swear. [671] According to Awlad Ali Daraieb, if one of the individuals to take the oath fails to show up in the saint's tomb for any reason or if he comes but refuses to take the oath, the whole case for the defense fails, and the judgment is awarded automatically for the plaintiff. In this case the Geneishat were entitled to immediate compensation for their confiscated goods. Nobody knew the reason that led the Geneishat to forfeit their right to immediate compensation and to give Hakim and his son a second chance despite their intense dislike for the latters. Some attribute this to the skill of Taieb and the respect he commands among all tribes. Others believe the Geneishat movement to be a reciprocal act to bait Asabei' as a whole which long ago had one a similar favor for the Geneishat. Still others beliebe it to be a gesture of good will on the part of the Geneishat who needed to retain a good and friendly relationship with the tribal segments on their smuggling route.

No date was set at that time for the oath. The parties as well as 685 627 578 the witnesses returned to their houses. Hakim then took Shei'eb and went to visit Qudura to see why he hadn't come to the oath but Qudura

685 refused to see them. Later Hakim had Shei'eb spread the rumor that Qudura
627 had taken a bribe from the Geneishat to refuse to take the oath, and the
578
[521] story of an old dispute between Qudura, on the one hand, and both Hakim
and Shei'eb, on the other. This dispute dates back to the time when the
613
156 Awaqil of the Aggary Amar decided to replace Shei'eb with Hakim as the
554 Aqila of bait Asabei'. Shortly after the decision of the Aggary Awaqil
578 was publicly known, Qudura was very unhappy and refused to recognize it. His reaction was not out of loyalty to Shei'eb whom he thought was a very unfit person for the position, but it stemmed rather, from a deep resentment of Hakim. According to my information, Qudura's position was met with sympathy by the majority of the people outside the Aggary Amar who share with him the belief that Hakim was a dishonest person who could not be trusted as a representative of bait Asabei'. It was at that time that the stories of Hakim's dishonest dealings were being discussed publicly, mainly by Qudura and members of his camp. At that time many believed that Qudura was the best man for the position of Aqila of bait Asabei' and that he was the only qualified member of that bait. He was the oldest able man in the bait, and although he was poor, yet he was known throughout the area for his honesty and sound decision. In fact many people in the area told me that they believe Qudura to be the only honest member of bait Asabei'. Realizing that Qudura was getting all the attention, Hakim sent his son Rabbu to Qudura with a message that Hakim acknowledged Qudura as the Aqila and that he (Hakim) had neither the time nor the interest in taking the position himself. Hakim also conveyed the view that he would support Qudura if the latter denounced Shei'eb and appointed himself in his place. Qudura agreed and a date

613 156 was set for a meeting in which Quadra was to announce his decision.
554 Meanwhile, Qudura stopped attacking Hakim and directed his attack to-
578 ward the inadequacy of Shei'eb as the Aqila.

The meeting was held two weeks later and all the important people in the area were invited. After dinner was served Qudura announced his agreement with Hakim to become the Aqila of bait Asabei' replacing Shei'eb. Everybody expected Hakim to support Qudura in his claim, but instead Hakim directed his comment to Qudura telling him that there had been a misunderstanding on Qudura's part and that all his message to Qudura was to acknowledge the latter as the Aqila for his own camp alone not for bait Asabei' as a whole as Qudura claimed. This announcement was a surprise to everyone in the meeting since this meant recognizing the camp of Qudura as a separate bait, a result which nobody, including Qudura, had ever anticipated. Qudura was very angry and dissolved the meeting immediately. Ever since that incident, the relationship between
578 Qudura and Hakim has been very unfriendly. Almost all of my informants
156 explained Qudura's failure to show up at the oath as a means of revenge
695 against Hakim who had embarrassed him among the people who attended the
685 627 meeting. Qudura himself had told me later that the reason for his not
[124] coming to the oath was that he was not sure that Rabbu was innocent:

> Rabbu has been known to do these thins (inform the police) and I cannot trust him. I cannot take a false oath and endanger myself for someone like Rabbuh. Besides, Hakim never came to me to discuss the oath like he did with all the others who were to swear with them. If he had brought his son and come to me before I would have been able to tell whether they were lying or not, and If not, I would have sworn with a clear conscience and without fear. The oath is something that one does not take lightly. It involves the supernatural.

613 627 When Qudura refused to see Hakim and Shei'eb, Hakim asked Sheikh
156 196 Saleh, the Aqila of one of the most powerful baits in the area, to talk

613
629 to Qudura and to tell him that Hakim wanted to show his respect. This
156 means in everyday parlance that Hakim was willing to pay him money.
[196] Qudura agreed to meet Hakim the following day.

[114] On the day of the meeting, to which I was invited, Hakim arrived
[431] with his son and gifts of three goats, tea and sugar. One of the goats
[574] was slaughtered and supper was prepared for the guests. While the guests were eating, Hakim and Qudura disappeared inside one of the tents for more than an hour. When they finally joined the gathering, Hakim announced that he and Qudura were now brothers and that it was his fault that Qudura was angry because he had accused him of being stupid and misunderstanding the content of the message sent to him after the meeting of the Aggary awawil. "I admit," said Hakim, "that I might have meant at one time and probably said it to sheikh Qudura that I wanted him to be the Aqila of bait Asabei'. Now that I have admitted this, Sheikh Qudura should not have any grudges against me or my son." Then Qudura addressed the gathering and said, in a very cold and dry manner, "I am glad that Hakim has come to this senses and admitted his mistake." The gathering lasted for most of the evening, spent mostly in behind-the-scenes meetings involving Hakim, Qudura and different guests. Then as the last guest left, Shei'eb, who had been inside the tent throughtout the evening came out and said that Hakim was a fool and that Qudura had tricked him into admitting publicly that he had lied and that Qudura still refused to take the oath.

613 Qudura's stand created a strong reaction which affected almost all
619 the tribal segments in the area. The case overshadowed any other event
578
[521] and was the main topic of discussion. The reaction was mixed, however.

613 a request and examine the reasons behind it in an attempt to remedy them
681 if possible. They have to be sure first of all that by his request the
person is not avoiding the paymnet of his share in a particular case.
[695] If this is proven to be the case, then no barawa is granted unless the
person pays all his debts to the amar. This, like the amar's barawa of
the individual, has to be put in writing.

613 I left the area a month after the meeting held at Qudura's camp.
578 By the time I left, bait Asabei' was almost in a chaotic situation.
[114] Many thought that the outcome would be in favor of Qudura, who would
emerge from all the happenings as the leader of bait Asabei' as a whole.
Others thought that the only possible outcome was for bait Asabei' to be
divided into two or even three separate units with their own respective
leaders.

Analysis

114 All events of the second phase occurred while I was in the area.
•627 Nonetheless I was not able to observe directly all of these events, due
to the nature of the judicial process among Awlad Ali which relies, as
has been mentioned earlier, on informal mediation and influence, rather
than on formal court hearings. Most of the above events happened behind
[124] closed doors and with a great amount of secrecy. For this reason I had
to rely partly on informants' accounts of what exactly had happened between the parties involved.

613 The dispute in its two phases revealed a major weakness in the
627 social structure of the major bait of the Aggary family. As the events
182 of the case unfolded, they shed light on some of the important principles

613 627 182 underlying the authority of the Aqila and the source of his political support. Three such principles were evident in the above case: patrilineal succession, wealth, and social and personal renown.


Ability to deal fairly with disputes involving members of his bait and outsiders
(wisdom and social renown)
Ability to fulfil financial obligations of the bait (wealth)
Patrilineal succession
other tribal groups
'Eila
Bait

613 554 To better understand the importance of the three principles to the authority of the Aqila, it is important to examine the domains within the Aqila normally functions. First, the Aqila is the leader of a certain kinship unit: the bait. Historically, the bait has been the main field of action for the Aqila and from it he draws his main political support. 613 627 554 As the leader of his bait, the Aqila settles disputes among members of his bait and represents the group for political and administrative purposes. His function is to hold the bait together by preventing major disputes between members from leading to the fission of the group into smaller, separate units. He performs his function by exercising authority and/or personal influence to establish long-lasting agreements.

613 428 [562] everything ... his property, his name, and anything he can give him, like the position of the Aqila. This is only natural." While the office of the Aqila is inherited through the male line, there seems to be no special regard for seniority. Any son of the Aqila can succeed him in the position and it is usually left to the Aqila to select the son who is to 613 428 593 succeed him. This decision is not usually the subject matter of brotherly rivalry since the position of Aqila is regarded more as a duty than as a privilege. There has been only one case in the entire area of the Western Desert in which such a decision has lead to open fighting between brothers. "When my father became very old and his eyes bothered him, he told me that I should become the Aqila and could not say no to him," said Shei'eb. "I didn't want to become the Aqila but this was the choice of my father and I have to obey .... You owe it to your father and family to carry on his responsibilities the same way you carry his name." It was patrilineal succession upon which Shei'eb based his case. Most uninterested parties believe that he and he alone had the legitimate claim to the position.

613 627 554 The importance of patrilineal succession as the basis of the Aqila's authority may be better understood by contrasting it to a closely related position, that of the "mardi". A man within a bait may acquire, by virtue of personal qualities, a reputation for wisdom and soundness of opinion which may overshadow that of the Aqila. Such a person becomes known throughout a certain area as a successful mediator and go-between; and therefore is called upon to solve disputes not limited to members of his own bait. He thus acquires an informal position which cuts across a number of baits and sometimes larger political units.

613 627 554 [192] The word mardi is derived from the Arabic verb "yardi" which means to accept or agree upon. The mardi therefore is the person who is accepted by one or both parties to a dispute as a mediator. If he is accepted by only one of the parties, his work is more that of a legal representative of that party. He makes all efforts, using all powers of persuasion to get the other party to concede to the demands of the party he represents. If, on the other hand, he is chosed by both parties to a dispute, he acts as an impartial judge and avoids taking sides in the case. His fame is determined by his ability to achieve permanent, long-lasting settlements. His success in this area depends, in addition to personal qualities, upon the respect he has within his own tribal segment and the weight that tribal segment has among other tribal segments. Similarly, his success and the fame he gets as a mardi may give him considerable influence within the bait. [182] [428] But this influence does not develop into authority because the mardi in this case does not have an established basis for the effective maintenance of that authority, in this case, patrilineal succession.

613 554 682 The other domain within which the Aqila performs his duties is that of the Eila or the amar. His main function within this area is to represent his bait in matters involving the collection or the distribution of bloodmoney within the vengeance group. Within the amar, the aqila is considered successful insofar as he is able to fulfill his bait's financial obligations to the amar. This ability is in turn determined by his success in collecting money from individual members of his bait and/or his willingness to pay from his own money for those members who are unable or unwilling to pay their share. Where kinship ties are strong, the Aqila

His success in solving disputes between members
613 of his baits and outsiders might enhance his prestige within the bait,
628
554 but it is not a substitute for patrilineal succession as the basis of
[428] the Aqila's authority. But in less integrated baits the situation is
● [627] different. The ineffectiveness of the Aqila in solving disputes may
lead members of his bait to seek another man as their representative who
would act as a mediator in their behalf. If this continues for a long
time the Aqila might find himself with no functions and the new person
would become a de facto Aqila.

613 The Aqila represents the only effective indigenous form of leader-
554 ship among Awlad Ali at the present time. The camp headman provides
622 another form of leadership on the camp level, but, as mentioned before,
the leadership of the headman is very limited and involves minimal
634 authority. In addition to the indigenous leadership represented by the
622 Aqila, there is the superimposed administrative structure of the govern-
656 ment representative in the form of the "omda" system introduced into the
177 area by the government decree no. 1187 of 1958. The system of omda or
mayorship is essentially that applied to the rural areas of Egypt with
certain modifications to fit the tribal organization and the semi-nomadic
existence of the populations of the Western Desert. In rural areas, the
622 omda is the administrative head of the village. He is appointed by the
[554] government from among the village inhabitants who have certain qualifi-
[212] cations with regard to education (must be able at least to read and
[556] write), wealth (own at least 5 feddans of land in the area), and sound
reputation. As such, the omda system in the rural areas is a territorial
system. The omda's authority covers the territory of the village and
all individuals living in it regardless of their kinship affiliation.

795 Because of their religious position which put
175 them outside the tribal structure, the leaders of the zawyas played a
● 627 significant role in mediation and settling disputes between various tri-
793 bal segments. At their disposal was their ability to ostracize anyone
[626] who did not abide by their decision from the zawyas, which meant depriv-
ing him from all the benefits, social as well as religious, that member-
ship in the zawyas offered.

795 After the First World War when the British replaced the Turks as
175 governors of the area, the zawyas were closed and the religious leaders
177 ordered to leave. The zoning established by the zawyas existed, however,
[648] and was used as the basis for the redistricting of the area. Police
[631] stations replaced the religious centers. From the standpoint of the tri-
[625] bal population itself, the districts have no psychological or political
619 634 reality. The zawyas were originally established in the areas of tribal
[795] [361] concentrations. But the area itself did not have any political identity.
The only reality from the standpoint of the inhabitants was the tribal
reality and affiliation which cut across many of these districts. Many
of the tribal segments inhabiting one district were and still are hostile
177 to one another. To transform the zones into administrative districts and
634 to establish one office of leadership for the whole district was to im-
619 pose a political unity nonexistent among the tribal segments inhabiting
[622] the district. To avoid this difficulty, the government supplemented the
territorial principle of the omda system in the rural area with the prin-
ciple of tribal representation and came up with a system which seems to
suite the situation in the Western Desert. For each of the districts,
a list of all tribal segments which habitually occupy the area and whose
tribal land is located within the district, is made. The most powerful

584 has to have a good reason. If he breaks it without sufficient reason, [686] he may be liable to pay "kabara," or fine, for insult to the prospective groom and his family. Adequate reasons for breaking the fatha agreement vary from one case to another and include such things as the discovery that the prospective groom or any of his family is of questionable character. This applies to the groom as well as to any member of his immediate family, the implication being that if he has such a person close to him, he is likely to be influenced by him in his treatment of his wife. If, however, the questionable character of the groom or the member of his family was known to the guardian of the bride-to-be before the fatha was read, then to break the agreement is considered unjustifiable. This has been upheld in a number of cases which I recorded 584 during my stay in the area. One of these cases involved the agreement 686 between a member of the Sanagra tribe in the area of Alamein to marry 627 his daughter to a member of the powerful Bara'sa tribe in Libya. After the fatha was read, a wealthy merchant from Alexandria saw the girl and asked her father to marry her, and the father agreed. To justify his breaking of the fatha agreement, the father claimed that he had discovered that the first prospective groom and his father were involved in smuggling goods across the Libyan borders. In the Mi'ad that was held upon the request of the first groom and his father, the father claimed that the bride's father had known about the smuggling and even participated in the distribution of the smuggled goods. The father of the bride was made to pay the sum of ten pounds as kabara to the first groom and to pay him another ten pounds for the expenses of the ceremony in which he had slaughtered two goats. The settlement was based on the fact that all indications show that he must have known about the smuggling activities

584 of his future in-law before he agreed that his daughter marry him.
686 ● [627] So, to break the agreement on the basis of discovering that defect is not permissible and is a kind of behavior not to be encouraged. To encourage such behavior would lead to the waste of time and money and would lead to the disgrace of the fatha as a preliminary agreement.* Permitting the father to break the fatha agreement when discovering an unknown condition related to the prospective groom or his family, is to apply an important principle in the Islamic law with regard to all
686 contractual relations. This principle maintains that any contractual agreement pertains only to the facts and conditions specified at the time of the contract. This implies that the conditions of the contract have to be explicitly stated. A deliberate effort to conceal an undesirable condition has the equivalent effect of specifying the existence of its opposite. Such concealment invalidates the contract and permits the aggrieved party to dissolve the contract on the basis of cheating or unfair deal, or "ghish."

If, on the other hand, no deliberate attempt is made to conceal the undesirable condition at the time of the contract, then there is no basis for dissolving the contract on the basis of cheating or unfair
584 deal. Thus, in the case above, neglecting to mention the fact that the
686 groom and his father were involved in smuggling could not be taken as the basis for unfair or unreasonable behavior on the part of the groom, unless there was proof that they intended to cheat and conceal that fact deliberately, and that they knew that if not concealed, the fact would affect the acceptance of the bride's father to the marriage. All indications of the case above point to the lack of intent to defraud. On the

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* The same rule applies to the breaking of the "fatha" agreement by the groom.

582 of parley land or a well or to make him a partner in a business or smug-
557 gling activities or even as revenge on his uncle by keeping his daughters
582 unmarried. In 1961 the heads of 25 prominant baits of various tribes
557 in the area of Matruh met and decided that the right of ibn 'amm had
178 become a major problem, and that invoking that right when the man had
613 no intention of marrying the girl had resulted in a number of disputes
that became serious over a period of time. They felt that the time was
suitable to revise that right and make it subject to the concept of fair
behavior applicable to other rights. They wrote a new rule which speci-
582 fies that the man has the right to prevent his cousin from marrying an
557 outsider or a more distant relative only if he himself intends to marry
178 her either in the present or in the reasonable future. If the circum-
613
675 stances show that he cannot do so, then he forfeits the right.

[558] To prevent his cousin from marrying another man without a proven
[681] intention on the part of the man to marry her himself in the fore-
seeable future, is considered as an unreasonable behavior for which
ibn 'amm could be liable to pay kabara to his uncle as well as to the
prospective groom. It also denies him the right of taking her away from
[683] her marital residence by force. If he does this, he would be liable to
the compensation for assault. The agreement was signed by the awaqil
and is considered binding as far as the baits they represented are con-
cerned. Other tribal segments in the area refuse to abide by the agree-
ment and consider it as a pretentious departure from the ways of Awlad Ali
which should not be encouraged. Even within the tribal segments involved
in the agreement, there have been reports of individuals who refused to
● [629] abide by the agreement. In certain of these latter cases, the ibn 'amm
selected as his mardi a member of a tribal segment not involved in the
agreement and therefore not morally bound to abide by
its contents.

593 spent the night inside. In the morning Muftah ordered his daughter to
574 pack her clothes because she was to leave with him. He refused to give
606 586 her husband any explanation as to why he was taking his daughter away.
The husband could not prevent him from taking her away because, as he said, "He is her father and has the right to take her away with him at any time."

When the wife did not return for two weeks, her husband went to her father's house to take her, but her father refused to let her go. Hemeida
593 574 then went to a religious man in the area and asked him to intervene in
606 the matter and see why Muftah had taken away his wife. He also asked him
586 to arrange a mi'ad with Muftah to discuss the matter.

• 627 792 The religious man was selected in this case because he was a close friend of Muftah and was believed to have influence over him. He was also known throughout the area to be fair and of sound opinion. It is important in the cases of disputes that the person selected as a mardi is known as a wise and fair man. It is only then that he is able to mediate between the two parties without being accused of taking sides.
792 The religious men, members of the Murabiteen tribes in the area, by their
619 relative position outside the formal tribal organization of the Sa'adi
627 tribes, are the most likely candidates for such activity. Yet, this is
554 not always the case. For this aspect of assumed impartiality is frequently balanced off by the fact that these religious men lack the support of a powerful tribal segment behind them. To be effective, the mardi has to be respected, not only for his personal qualities, but also for being a member of a respectable tribal segment whose power lends authority to the mardi's decision. This is not usually the case with the client
000 tribes of Murabiteen. Wealth in many cases is also considered an important

Wealth in many cases is also considered an important
792 requirement for the selection of the mardi. This does not mean that
627
554 religious men in the area have no role in dispute settlement, for they
[556] do. It simply means that the mardi is selected according to a number of criteria that vary from case to case, and that in some of these cases sound wisdom and fairness characteristic of religious men are not enough basis for their selection as mardis. This means that the religious men have no special mediatory role based on their religious nature alone. In certain cases religious men offer the best possibility for mediation; in others, a non-religious person might offer a
better chance for settling the dispute. In cases of women seeking
[586] divorce from their husbands, the wealth of the mediator, more than any-
(556) thing else, seems to determine the selection of the man whom the woman asks to negotiate on her behalf, a point to which I will return later in the chapter.

593 The Mi'ad was held in the house of Muftah. Present at the mi'ad
574 were Muftah, his son-in-law, Hemeida, the heads of households in Muftah's
606
camp (one of them was his brother and the other five were members of
586
627 different tribal segments), my driver (who was a member of the neighbor-
792 ing Sanagrah tribal segment), myself, and the religious man. After the tea was served, the religious man said that the discussion should start. He reminded the gathering that this case is a family one and should not develop into a larger dispute. "After all, the daughter's husband is a son, and the case is actually a misunderstanding between a father and a son and should be viewed in that context." Then he turned to Muftah and said that in that spirit he was asking him why he had taken his daughter away from her husgand. Muftah said that he had taken his daughter away

Muftah said that he had taken his daughter away
593 574 to punish Hemeida for what he thought was disrespectful behavior. He
606 then proceeded to descirbe how Hemeida, after bringing the blanket out
586 for Muftah, went inside and spent the night with his wife, defying the
627 basic rule of not showing intimacy in the presence of older people,
792 888 especially the parents or parents-in-law. For, to show such intimacy
is a sign of disrespect. He demanded that Hemeida pay him "kabara"
[681] for his injured pride. The term kabara refers to the adjective "kebir"
[558] (lit. respected or big man). Kabara is the fine paid for belittling
someone by word or deed. Muftah insisted that he would not allow his
daughter to return to her husband until Hemeida had paid that kabara.
Hemeida conceded the fact that intimacy constitutes an insult; but he
insisted that his action did not constitute an act of intimacy with his
wife, but was a matter of convenience and necessity, since he had only
593 two blankets, and the only one left was that inside the tent. Muftah
574 became angry and started shouting at Hemeida, who, in turn, started
606 586 shouting back; it became impossible to follow what was being said.
627 The religious man interfered in the discussion, trying to stop the argu-
792 ment between Muftah and Hemeida. The others attending the mi'ad also
[578] interfered. The religious man and two neighbors took Muftah outside
the tent while Muftah's brother tried to calm Hemeida down. The other
members of the group also calmed Hemeida, reminding him that he was the
younger person and must be more tolerant of older people. They also reminded Hemeida that Muftah was his father-in-law and had the right to take
his daughter away any time he chose. They urged him to "defeat the devil"
[681] and to apologize to his father-in-law and pay him kabara. He seemed
convinced but insisted that all he was going to pay was five pounds and
a goat. Muftahb brother and one of the neighbors then left the tent and

593 went to see Muftah and his company. Half an hour later the religious
574 man came and took Hemeida aside and talked to him in a very low voice,
606 then left the tent again. A few minutes more had passed; everyone re-
586
627 turned to the tent; Muftah was not angry anymore. The religious man
792 read the fatha, or the beginning sura of the Koraan, then said that the
[779] souls were now pure and that Hemeida was considered as a son of Muftah and that disagreements such as this should not alter the good relations between the two. He said that the devil had found his way into the souls of the two people, but now, thanks to God and the good people present, they both had come back to their senses. Hemeida then rose and went to where his father-in-law was sitting and shook hands with him. Then he
[681] handed the religious man ten pounds which the latter passed to Muftah and promised to send him a goat as a gift to his daughter. Muftah left the tent and went to the tent of the women. When he came back he announced that a goat had been slaughtered and that everyone was invited to eat. Everybody then left and Muftah promised to return his daughter to her husband the following day.

593 While the right of the father to take his daughter away from her
606 husband constitutes a check on the authority of the latter and insures
557 the wife good treatment by her husband and her in-laws, not infrequently
586 that right has been invoked for personal or individual interest on the
[429] part of the woman's father or her closest male kin. Several cases have been cited in the area where the father or guardian had invoked the right to force the husband to concede to certain demands of the wife's guardian, even when the wife objected to those demands or disagreed with her guardian. One of these is the case of Mabroka who is married to a distant

584 Two days after the groom left, the bride's father (who is at the
578 same time Hassanein's daughter's father-in-law) came to Hassanein and
606 told him that the marriage was called off and that he should send a
686 letter to the groom telling him the news. The reasons given by the
[574] bride's father were that the groom showed improper manners when he
[579] stayed overnight at the camp and that he followed the prospective bride
to the water well to have a close look at her. He gave the money to
Hassanein and asked him to return it to the man in Matruh. Hassanein
was very disappointed and considered this an insult to him, since he
was the mediator in that marriage, and insisted that the bride's father
584 go on with the marriage. When the latter refused, Hassanein went to his
578 daughter and ordered her to leave with him. Her husband was there and
606 could not refuse to let her go with her father, even when Hassanein
686 made it clear that her husband could not have her back unless his father
627
586 kept his agreement with Hassanein's guest. Elewah, the daughter's husband, asked for a mi'ad to discuss the matter with his father-in-law. The mi'ad was held in Hassanein's house and was attended by Hassanein, his son-in-law, and two people from a different lineage, each selected by one of the disputing parties. Hassanein refused to give any reason for taking his daughter away from her husband except that he was exercising his rights. Eleway, on the other hand, insisted that Hassanein was not justified in his actions and that it was not right to punish him for something that his father did. The two representatives tried to calm both parties and to reach an agreement but were not successful. The mi'ad dissolved with Hassanein not only insisting on keeping his daughter, but also threatening to marry her to a rich man in the area. The case was not solved by the time I left the field.

581 Marriage does not deprive the woman of some rights of her own.
585 562 The customary law gives the wife three basic rights corresponding to
671 those of the husband's sexual services, domestic work, and obedience.
Corresponding to the first of these, the wife has the right to have a
normal sexual life with her husband. This right, however, is not an ex-
clusive one, since the husband can marry more than one wife. A woman
585 can be divorced from her husband without having to return the mahr if
586 she claims that the husband is unable to perform his sexual duties. In
593 such cases, the marriage is usually dissolved quietly. In certain rare
585 instances, the husband may deny his wife's accusations. If both insist
586 on their stand, one or both may ask to be submitted to "bait el-shana'a,"
593 or house of the dreadful deeds. Reports are extremely vague about the
627 exact procedures involved in this case. Some informants stated that the
married couple would live in a tent without sidewalls so that everybody
could see what goes on inside. Most informants, however, insist that it
merely means that the couple move their tent near that of a respectable
man whose word is believed and honored. This man is supposed to keep a
close watch on the couple's activities, by listening or looking through
holes in the tent. His verdict determines the future of the marriage.
[586] If the wife is justified in her claim, the husband is forced to divorce
[681] her and to forfeit his mahr. If, on the other hand, the verdict is for
[558] the husband, he not only can divorce her and get back the mahr, but is
also entitled to kabara, or compensation, for his injured pride. There
[114] is no case of bait el-shana'a in the area during the time of the field
[178] work, and most people insist that this practice is something of the past
[583] when the mahr was relatively high and was paid in livestock, in which

585 586 593 627 [114] [178] [583] case its return to the husband would have caused great financial inconvenience for the wife's family.

Corresponding to the second right, the husband's right to his
581 wife's domestic work, is the wife's right to maintenance. The husband
585 has to support his wife. This includes providing her and her children
562 with adequate food and proper clothing. If the husband fails to do so
593 because of poverty, sickness, crop failure or unexpected disaster, the wife's brother or father provides her and her children with the neces-
[586] sary food and clothing. If the husband's failure to fulfill his duties is due to neglect, the wife can leave him and go to her father or brother who talks the matter over with the husband who, in turn, either agrees to their demands or has to divorce his wife and forfeit his mahr.

593 Finally, corresponding to the husband's right to his wife's obedi-
562 ence is the wife's right to fair treatment by her husband. There are a
[779] number of ways in which the wife is mistreated. One is excessive punishment; although the right of the husband to punish his wife is provided in the Koraan, the punishment must be excessive or severe. Awlad Ali draw a line between acceptable and severe punishment. A punishment is severe if it results in something that other people can see or hear. If the husband insults his wife or her family and others hear the action, or if he beats her and this results in visible traces, then the punishment is severe.

593 A wife considers herself mistreated if the husband, when married
595 to more than one, treats any of the other wives better than he treats
562 her. Although the wife cannot deny her husband the right to have additional wives, he must give them all equal treatment. This includes

586 562 574 the man she chooses. She informs him before she enters his house that she is the wife of so and so and the daughter of so and so and that she is throwing herself on him to protect her from her husband with whom she no longer wishes to live. Like the right of refuge, the man cannot [778] refuse to let her in; and from this moment until her dispute with her husband is resolved, she is considered as his house guest and is entitled to all the hospitality a guest receives. If he refuses to extend [627] that hospitality or refuses to take her in, she can ask for a mi'ad [681] and is entitled to kabara from him. There has been no reported incidents in which a man refused that right to a woman. As soon as she settles down in the host's house, the latter takes immediate measures to find the husband and to convince him to let his wife go. In doing this, the man uses all the power of persuasion. The man selected for this purpose 586 562 is usually a respected man who can put pressure upon the husband. Some574 times he has to bribe the husband to release the wife, paying from his 554 own money. The man has to have money, not only to be able to support [556] the wife during her stay in his house and to bribe the husband, but also because in certain instances he has to pay the husband the mahr that the father of the wife had taken in order to free her. The next step after getting the agreement of the husband to divorce his wife is to contact the father of the wife or her guardian and convince him to pay the mahr to the husband. If the father does not agree, or if he is financially unable to do so, the man on whom the woman has thrown herself is supposed to pay from his own money. In cases where the woman left the husband to be married to another man with whom she had had a relationship, the respected man tries to have the future husband pay the present husband the mahr he is supposed to pay the woman after she is divorced from her

562 such compensation. In forfeiting her rights of inheritance, a woman
428 secures for herself and her children the continuous support of her
593 kin-group and the protection of her rights. This support was denied in the few cases I was able to collect in which the woman demanded her share of inheritance. The following is one of these cases. The material
159 presented is a summary of the life history of Fatma, who at the time of
562 the study, was a shopkeeper managing the small general store she owned
428 near the railroad station of Burg el-Arab, some fifty miles west of
593 [444] Alexandria. She also practiced healing and midwifery on a part-time
[759] basis.

Fatma was the only daughter with four sons of sheikh El-Asi, who at one time was the aqila of bait Hussein of the Sanagrah tribal segment
[627] in the area. He was also known as a mardi and was frequently sought in
[755] mediation of disputes. He was believed to have supernatural power which he used to cure people for a certain amount of money. During his life-
[454] time, he had acquired a sizable sum of money which he invested in live-
[233] stock. At the time of his death his herd, which numbered more than 900
[422] sheep and goats, was considered the finest in the area. He had no barley
[423] lands because his camp was deep in the desert, but he had fine grazing land.

Throughout the area the four sons were known for being arrogant and irresponsible. Three of them were employed by one of the irrigation projects carried on by the government in the area as construction workers; the fourth looked after the herd of his father. All four were known as chasers of women, and they frequently went to Alexandria to visit prostitutes and drink liquor.

[444) Fatma was first married when she was eighteen to a man from Alexandria who had opened a general store in the area where her father

159 the relationship between her and her brothers.
562
428 Following her action and until the time of the study, they had
593 never visited her and she had never visited them. Her husband took
[233] care of the herd; and the arrangement worked out all right until the
159 husband told Fatma one day that he was going to marry a second wife.
562
593 She refused, but he went ahead with the marriage without her consent.
595 He brought the new wife to live with Fatma in the same tin hut in which
they were living. He started to pay more attention to the new wife and
to neglect Fatma; whenever the latter complained, he beat her. Then,
before one of the religious feasts, he sold two of Fatma's sheep and
bought his new wife a dress and a silver bracelet. When Fatma objected
[164] and they argued, he hit her with a stick on the head; she was hospitalized for a week with a serious head wound. While in the hospital, she
went to her brothers who lived only two miles away, but they refused to
159 come to her assistance. She then went to sheikh Elewa (the aqila of
562 Bait Asabei) and threw herself on him. He met with the husband and con-
594 vinced him to divorce Fatma. He kept forty sheep of Fatma's herd as com-
593
595 pensation for the mahr he had paid her and the marriage expenses, then
586 took his new wife and moved from Fatma's hut. Fatma then returned and
159 managed her financial affairs successfully herself. She managed the
562 store and hired a shepherd to take care of the sheep. At the time of
444
[233] the present study she was respected by almost everybody in the area, including members of the local administration. She is known to be reason-
[229] able and of sound opinion, and her store functions as the meeting place
[521] for many of the tribal mi'ads and for casual conversations. She is also
considered as a liason between the tribal population in the area and the
local government administration, and is respected by both sides.

CHAPTER VI

HOMICIDE AND BODILY INJURIES

Part 1: Homicide

579 Fighting is quite common among Awlad Ali. Many of these fights
involve a large number of individuals and result in many casualties
579 and sometimes even deaths. Fighting is considered "shar," or evil,
673 for according to Awlad Ali, it threatens the social cohesion which is
182 highly valued in the area. Yet, although undesirable, fighting and
[682] even homicide are not considered a crime against society and sometimes
are viewed as necessary to safeguard individual and collective rights
in the absence of an established authority which could protect these
rights. Although this absence of an authority is remedied now by the
[177] [692] introduction of state administrative justice, this has not yet achieved
enough efficiency and recognition to replace the old tribal system.

619 In the tribal system, there is no concept of individual punishment
681 inflicted upon the suspect. There is no recognized authority to inflict
692 it. The mardi or the 'aqila who performs the function of dispute settle-
[627] ment in the case of homicide has no power to pass or inflict any punish-
ment. His role is restricted to mediation between the two parties involved
682 as was earlier mentioned. Homicide, like all other wrongs among Awlad Ali,
673 are private wrongs affecting the individual or a group of individuals.
[182] The main purpose of the tribal proceedings in the case of homicide is to
restore some form of harmony and order among the group. This harmony is
sometimes restored by killing the murderer or any member of his vengeance
682 group, or amar. Feuds may result from such killing, and a few instances
628 of feuds have, in fact, been recorded in the area (although not in the

682 owner of the rope, since it was the broken rope that had caused
672 the death of Do'ah. The case stayed unsolved for more than two
months, a record for dispatching of criminal cases in the area.
682 In the final Mi'ad, the main question was whether or not the owner
672 of the rope was responsible for the death of Do'ah, and therefore
627 liable for the payment of the bloodmoney. After extensive negotiations with the parties involved, Sheikh Selouma, the aqila of Hemeida's Bait, who had also been accepted by Do'ah's family as the Mardi in the case, convened the Mi'ad and announced the settle-
682 ment. His announcement came after reading certain passages of the
672 Koran and reminding the parties that they were all members of Awlad
627 Ali and therefore brothers. He stressed the necessity of all bro-
695 thers having clear hearts toward one another and not allowing worldly disputes to leave any impurities among friends. He then came to the conclusion that there were two things responsible for the death of Do'ah. The first was Hemeida's decision to clear the well, for had it not been for that decision, the accident would not have happened. The second thing responsible was the rope whose breaking was the direct cause of the death. The responsibility here applies only to the rope and not to the owner of that rope. The reason Sheikh Selouma gave for not holding the owner responsible for the death of Do'ah was that the rope by itself is not a lethal weapon for which the owner has to exercise a great deal of caution in lending it. To make the owner responsible for the death of Do'ah would, according to Sheikh Selouma, discourage anyone from lending anything to his neighbor for fear of becoming liable for any harm it might cause.

682 "...It means that I will never lend my cooking pot to my neighbor
672 lest his child trip over it and I would be asked to pay his blood-
627 money."
695

So, the bloodmoney was divided into two sections, one to be paid by Hemeida, and the other to be the responsibility of the rope, which meant that the victim's relatives only took home half of the bloodmoney.

683 CASE #2: The Case of the Curious Neighbor

682 This is the case of 66-year-old Selouma whose barley land
578 bordered that of Muftah, a distant member of the same tribe. A
672 small area of rocky land separated the two areas. Throughout the time that Muftah was preparing his land for barley cultivation, Selouma used to sit on the dividing rocks, observing his neighbor work on his land and making jokes about the amount of time and effort Muftah was putting into his land, especially when it looked like a dry year, anyway, and no barley would be cultivated. For more than a week Muftah tolerated his neighbor's remarks. "I always said to myself, 'Don't follow the devil... He is an old man and doesn't know what he is saying.' But that day I could not take it any longer. My wife and children were sick, and I didn't have any money to bring them medicine or even food. I wanted to finish preparing the land because it looked like it was going to rain that day. I went to the area I was working on when Selouma started his jokes. I was mad. I took a small stone and threw it at him to scare him and make him stop. The stone hit his leg. It was a small stone, and I didn't think it would harm him. Actually, he stood on his

683 was to be paid unconditionally and consequently would cost all
682 members of the amar; but all these attempts failed. At this point,
672 there was no doubt on the part of the attending crowd about Muftah's
695 responsibility for the death of Selouma. The question was, how much
613 had he to pay. The amount requested by Selouma's son was that for "intentional" killing on the basis that Muftah had willfully thrown the rock knowing that it might harm Selouma, especially considering his age.

683 After long and intensive negotiations with the interested
682 parties, a Mi'ad was set in which it was announced that Muftah had
672 to pay the amount of L.E. 200. In his reasoning, he stipulated
•627 that the wound which had caused the death of Selouma, although it was intentional on the part of Muftah, was inflicted by a stone which in itself is not a lethal weapon, and therefore the death was an unintentional one for which the bloodmoney is customarily estimated at L.E. 300. He also stated that in the excitement that
[845] followed the death of Selouma, Muftah's pregnant wife had lost the child. The bloodmoney for the still-born infant was estimated at L.E. 100, which was deducted from the amount of bloodmoney that Muftah had to pay.

CASE #3: The Case of the Trespasser

311 This case occurred during the year of the fieldwork which was
423 the second dry year the area experienced. Rain had not fallen ex-
613 cept in a very few places. One of these places was near the small
[132] town of Sidi Barrani in which the land belonging to Yadem and his Bait was found. Yadem had sown his barley which at that time had grown to about five feet high. Surrounding the cultivated land

311 423 was a large area of grazing land which also belonged to the Bait
613 of Yadem. The area attracted a large number of tribesmen who
233 brought their herds for grazing. One of these was Kuraiem from
311 Awlad Kharouf tribal segment. He brought his wife and child and
619 613 a herd of more than two hundred sheep and goats. Although it is
not proper for one to cultivate the land belonging to another
tribal segment, yet, when it comes to grazing land, no such restriction is imposed. Only the permission of the aqila of that
tribal segment is required, and even that is granted so automatically that many tribesmen do not bother to ask for such permission. Kuraiem took this permission for granted and pitched his
233 tent in the grazing land of Yadem and his Bait. Yadem, however,
311 was disturbed because he thought that Kuraiem grazed his flocks in
578 an area very close to his cultivated barley, so close that he feared
that the animals might eat the growing barley. When Yadem asked
Kuraiem to move a little further and Kuraiem refused, they entered
into an argument during which Yadem told him that if he did not
move by the following day, he would break his neck. The following
morning Yadem went with his brother to see if Kuraiem was still
there. Both Yadem and his brother were armed with heavy sticks.
As they reached Kuraiem's tent, they hit him with the sticks on
[682] the head. Kuraiem fell on the ground, and they kept hitting him
until he was dead.

682 In due course, Kuraiem's family claimed L.E. 400 bloodmoney
672 for the intentional killing of Kuraiem. Yadem and his family rejected the claim and insisted that the killing was unintentional. The
[627] Mi'ad was held, and the two Mardis selected by the two parties

682 agreed that the sticks were not by nature lethal weapons. The
672 latter, according to the tribal law, are only guns and knives,
627 since they give the victims no chance to defend himself. They
ruled the case unintentional killing for which only L.E. 300
should be paid.

682 Since Yadem and his brother were arrested by the police for
625 their crime, the payment of the bloodmoney was postponed until
692 the case was settled according to the state legal system. Only
half of the bloodmoney was paid and the rest was postponed until
the case was decided upon by the legal system and Yadem released.
682 This is obviously a case in which the nature of the killing was
672 decided upon by drawing upon the material aspect of criminal
673 causation. The nature of the weapon used was the major determinant
[411] of the crime. Only guns and knives are defined as lethal; all
others are non-lethal by nature, although they might cause the
death of the victim. Death caused by a non-lethal weapon is considered as unintentional regardless of whether or not the actor intended the results, while death by a lethal weapon, even without the intention of killing, is classified as intentional killing, as appears in the following case.

CASE #4: The Case of the Threatened Tribesman

613 For more than five years Bait El-Mawi from the Sheibat tribe
628 had been in a continuous state of feud with Bait El-Asi from the
Gemeiat tribe. One night, during a Khamasein sand storm when visability was extremely low, Abd-el-Galil from Bait El-Mawi heard a noise outside his tent, and the dogs were barking indicating that a stranger was there. Being sure that someone was approaching

613 the tent and fearing that he might have been a member of the
628 feuding Bait intending to harm him or members of his family,
Galil took his gun and went outside to see who was there. He
called on the person to identify himself. When he got no answer,
he warned him that unless he identify himself, he (Galil) would
fire his gun in the air as a warning. After a short period of no
613 response, Galil fired his gun in the air. A moment later, Galil
628 heard a cry coming from the direction of a small hill at the side
682 of the tent. When Galil went there, he found Salem, a member of
a neighboring camp, lying on the ground with a bullet wound in his
stomach. He told Galil that his wife was sick and that he had
come to borrow Galil's donkey to take her to the doctor in the
nearby medical center. He had taken the short cut to Galil's tent
when he was hit by the bullet which Galil had fired in the air.
Galil took his wounded neighbor to the medical center, but Salem
died before they reached it.

682 The Mi'ad was held, and Galil and his family had to pay L.E. 400
672 to the victim's kin group. The amount was that specified for in-
627 tentional killing, since the wound that caused the death was in-
673 flicted by a lethal weapon.

CASE #5: The Case of the Startled Shepherd

233 This case involves Idris, a poor member of the Sheresat tribal
[464] segment. He earned his living by working as a hired shepherd for
[219] 'Awwad from Bait Ibrahim in the area of Gharbaniat. During the dry
[312] season, each shepherd takes his flocks to the water wells near the
coast and leaves them there for three or four hours to get their
fill of drinking water. That afternoon, Idris, waiting for the

233 animals to drink, sat on the edge of the well with his feet in the
cool water of the pool completely absorbed in his thoughts amidst
the quiet surroundings. Passing by the pool at that time was Mahdi
233 576 from a neighboring tribal segment. Seeing Idris (whom he had not
165 known), he shouted the customary greeting, "Peace on you." Startled
by the voice of Mahdi, Idris lost his balance and fell in the deep
water of the pool. Mahdi rushed to help him, but the water was too
deep, and Idris drowned. Feeling sorry for Idris, Mahdi took the
flock and went back to the camp of Idris where he informed the
682 latter's wife of what had happened. A few days later, Mahdi was
● 627 paid a visit by Sheikh Elewa, the aqila of Bait Asabei' and known
[613] mardi in the area who informed Mahdi that the family of Idris was
demanding the payment of the sum of L.E. 300 for the death of their
682 relative. A Mi'ad was set for the following week. In that Mi'ad,
627 and after Mahdi admitted that it was his greeting that had startled
672 Idris and caused him to fall in the well, the two Mardis representing
613 the two parties agreed that the payment of the sum of three
hundred pounds was in order and that Mahdi and his amar must pay it
to the victim's family as soon as possible. At first, Mahdi seemed
to accept the judgment of the two Mardis, especially when both were
prominant members of some of the influential tribal segments in the
area. But Mahdi was a poor man, and his amar was very small in number,
which made the payment of the bloodmoney almost impossible.
682 Although appeal in the ordinary legal sense does not exist in such
627 a system like that of Awlad Ali, where no judgment is forced upon
672 695 any of the disputing parties, and where the pronouncement of the

682 settlement is usually made after the parties have agreed to it,
627 yet, in certain instances where one of the parties later feels that
672 the settlement was not just or that he was coerced into accepting
695 it, he may ask for a second Mi'ad during which new procedures start
in the case. In the present case, although Mahdi had originally
accepted the judgment of the awaqil, as time passed and he real-
ized that he was unable to pay the bloodmoney, he started to ques-
tion the feasibility of the settlement. He discussed the matter
682 672 with Sheikh Suliman el-Gerery from the Murabiteen tribe of Gerera,
695 a tribe whose members are feared throughout the area for the belief
554 that they have certain supernatural powers. Sheikh Suliman himself
792 [776] is highly respected, and people believe that after his death he will
become "wali" or a saint. After hearing Mahdi's complaint, Sheikh
Suliman told him that the settlement was unjust and told him that he
would do something about it. The following Thursday, Sheikh Suliman
called on Mahdi and asked him to bring his donkey and follow him.
They rode to a small desert town called Bahig where the local market
613 is held every Thursday. On market day, the awaqil of various tribal
517 segments usually gather in front of the general store in the town
571 drinking tea and chatting until their sons or the younger members
443 576 of their families sell the sheep and buy the necessary items. Every-
one passing by the gathering is expected to greet the gathering, get-
ting off his donkey as a sign of respect to the prominent people.
[689] Failure to greet a fellow tribesman is considered a serious offense
liable to a fine of more than L. 50 and ten goats in certain cases.
[673] It is considered a very serious crime. One informant once told me,
000

124 One informant once told me,
576 "If you don't greet me, this means that you hate me, and if you
829 hate me, there is no limit to the kind of harm you can do me and
my family. One who hates you can kill you, and none can walk safely anywhere if he fears that he will be killed."

682 As Sheikh Suliman and Mahdi reached the general store, every-
689 one was gathering there as usual, including the two awaqil who
672 695 were involved in the original settlement. Sheikh Suliman told
554 Mahdi not to dismount his donkey and not to say the customary
792 greeting as they passed by the gathering. When they passed the
576 gathering, everyone stood to greet Sheikh Suliman who ignored them and left with Mahdi. No one believed that Sheikh Suliman, who should be the guard of the tribal tradition, should commit such an unforgivable violation of the norms of the people. The next morning
682 the whole area was talking about a big Mi'ad to "take the right"
689 from Sheikh Suliman and Mahdi, who had insulted the gathering. The
672 695 Mi'ad was held a week after the incident. During the Mi'ad, Sheikh
554 Suliman was asked to explain his behavior, and his answer was, "How
792 do you want me to greet all those people who were sitting in front
576 of the store? There were more than thirty men in that gathering,
627 and I was afraid that if I said the customary greeting, I might have startled some of them causing them to harm themselves, leaving me with the payment of so many bloodmoneys." Immediately, the attendants of the Mi'ad knew what Sheikh Suliman was referring to, and that his action was to prove that the settlement reached in the case of Mahdi was wrong and that it set a very dangerous precedent which would cause people to avoid greeting one another, "and hatred will prevail among brothers and nobody will be safe in his own home."

000 627 613 682 695 own home." The following morning a Mi'ad was called for by the two aqila who achieved the first settlement, and in it, Mahdi was released from his obligation to pay the bloodmoney, although he was asked to pay the sum of fifty pounds to the widow of the deceased as a gesture of friendship.

CASE #6: The Case of the Careless Guest

574 682 The present case involved Ali from the Geneishat tribe who lives in the desert town of Matruh where he has a general store. He goes on frequent visits to Alexandria to get supplies for his store. On one of these trips he passed by the camp of 'Awad from a different tribal segment. Hungry and tired, Ali decided to spend the night at the camp and continue his trip the following morning. He went to the first tent in the camp which happened to be that of 'Awad, who welcomed him and ordered his wife to prepare dinner for the guest. He then invited other members of the camp to have tea with the guest as a gesture of hospitality. When Ali sat down to eat, he took off his shoes, and put his rifle against a pile of rugs and blankets behind him. As the group was chatting, a goat belonging to one of the invited neighbors entered the tent where the men were sitting. Afraid that it might soil the carpets which he had put out for the guest, Awad chased the goat out of the tent. On its way out, the goat touched the guest's gun which fired, killing Hussein, the brother-in-law of one of the neighbors.

682 627 The local authorities were notified of the incident, but after conducting a preliminary investigation, they filed the case as accidental death. The tribal proceedings continued, however. After

682 627 negotiations between the parties involved were conducted by their respective awaqil, a Mi'ad was set, and the settlement was announced. 682 672 627 According to the terms of the settlement, three factors contributed to the death of Hussein: the goat, whose activity was directly related to the death by causing the gun to fire; the host, who had chased the goat, causing it to run over the gun and fire it; and the guest, without whose negligence in leaving the gun loaded the accident would not have happened. The bloodmoney was divided into three equal parts, one of which was to be paid by Awad, the host, the other to be paid by Ali, the owner of the gun, and the third part to be attributed to the responsibility of the goat and therefore would not be paid.

CASE #7: The Case of the Adulterous Wife

684 For more than a year, rumors spread in the area of Burg El-Arab that Ghenewa's wife was having an affair with Goma'h, a friend of her husband and a member of a nearby camp. Ghenewa was operating a small store and was also involved in smuggling goods from Libya; both required him to be away frequently and for fairly extensive periods of time. According to the rumors, as soon as he left, his wife would put a white cloth on the laundry line as a sign indicating to Goma'h that the husband had left and therefore the former could come and visit her. When the husband heard the rumors, he was furious and decided to test his wife. He pretended that he was going to Alexandria as usual, went to the train station, waited until the train had left, and then returned to his tent. As he entered the tent, he found his wife and his friend in a compromising situation. Before [682] he could do anything, the friend grabbed a kitchen knife and attacked

682 they refuse to accept reduced compensation, they are viewed as unreason-
672 able by the rest of the groups in the area. One way in which such pres-
[626] sure is brought to bear upon the victim's acceptance of reduced compansation
682 672 is in the mi'ad, or the public hearing, in which the settlement achieved
627 is announced. The common practice is for the killer's group to agree to pay the full amount specified by the traditional scale for compensation (L.E. 400 for killing with a lethal weapon and L.E. 300 for killing with a non-lethal weapon). Then, in the final mi'ad in which such agreement is achieved, a number of important members of non-involved tribal segments are invited to the mi'ad. During the mi'ad and immediately following the announcement that a settlement has been achieved and that the kin group of the killer has agreed to pay the traditional bloodmoney, the mardi or any one of the attendants to the mi'ad asks the victim's group to defer part of the payment in honor of important members of the tribal segments pres-
682 ent at the meeting. Sometimes a portion of the payment is forfeited in
672 honor of the tent or the women of the household who prepared the food or even for the blessing of one of the saints in the area. In the case of the curious neighbor (Case #2) above, out of the original amount specified for the death by non-lethal weapon estimated as L.E. 300, only L.E. 100 was actually given to the victim's kin group. In addition to the L.E. 100 deducted because of the death of the unborn infant of the offender, another hundred pounds was deducted in honor of certain important members
[683] who attended the gathering. It is interesting to note that the L.E. 100 is compensation for the loss of the use of a leg in the formal scale of compensations for injuries as will be shown shortly. No such reduction in the amount of bloodmoney was done in the case of the trespasser where

683 owner. This means that an element of neglect has to be proven on the part
672 of the owner of either a lethal weapon or a dangerous animal before he
231 is held responsible for the fdamage they cause. But whether dangerous or not, the role of such objects or animals, in causing the death or injury of the victim, is taken into consideration in assessing the exact amount to be paid as compensation.

682 In assessing the intention and consequently the amount of the tradi-
672 tional bloodmoney to be paid, the behavior of the offender is judged according to a traditional standard of reasonableness. In the case of the curious neighbor, Muftah, in his attempt to evade the payment of the full bloodmoney, presented an elaborate account of his neighbor's actions including the provocative statements that the latter had said, the jokes, and even the insults he had directed against Muftah. His attempt was to show that throwing a small rock at his neighbor was not an unreasonable behavior considering the provocations of that neighbor whose behavior was itself unreasonable. Although the victim's behavior was unreasonable, the response of Muftah to the provocations of his neighbor was also considered as unreasonable. He could have followed the traditional means of asking a third party to interfere and prevent the neighbor from continuing his insults. Instead, Muftah took the direct and unreasonable response which eventually led to the death of Selouma. It is that element of reasonableness that led to the reversal of the original settlement
682 in the case of the startled shepherd (Case #4). When considering
672 a certain behavior in the context of reasonableness, the mediators draw
627 not only upon the immediate facts of the case under consideration, but also upon the careful inquiry into the long history of interrelations

682 between the parties involved. The relative position of both the of-
672 fender and the victim and their relationship to one another is taken
● 627 into account. What is reasonable behavior in one case may not be so in another. Pst disputes are taken as indications of the present situation, although they may not be directly related to the present dispute.

672 It is possible to say, then, that Awlad Ali recognize two types of
673 intentions: an assumed intention deducted from certain material aspects of the act itself, like the type of weapon used in causing the death of the victim, and an actual intention which is quite similar to that utilized in modern jurisprudence in the sense that it pertains to a state of mind on the part of the offender that connects him in a special way with the prohibited results. The assumed intention works to set the initial guide for the traditional scale of bloodmoney. It sets the basis upon which compromise could be achieved. Actual intention, on the other hand, determines the actual course the specific case takes as well as the final amount of money paid as a settlement.

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435

If the two lips are cut off:	L. 400
just the lower lip	L. 300
just the upper lip	L. 200
Visible piercing of the lips	L. 50
The tongue: if results in total loss of speech	L. 400
Partial loss of speech is measured in proportion to that total loss.	
All the teeth	L. 400
Each tooth	L. 50
Testicles: if cut off	L. 400
The entire genitals	L. 800
The breasts:	
of a nubile woman	L. 200
of an old woman	L. 100

683 As in the case of homicide, the above scale of compensation works
only as a basis for compromise rather than as a definite or exact fine.
683 To assess the amount of injury and therefore the category of compensation,
627 the victim and his group, as well as a representative of the offender,
463 have to take the injured person to the "nazzar" who examines him and defines the kind of injury sustained. The nazzar is usually a member of
[619] one of the Murabiteen tribes who is known to possess a number of shari's
books specifying the injuries and the amount of compensation required in
each case. Before he assesses the wounds, both parties have to swear that
[465] they will accept his judgment, and they pay him a token fee that varies
according to the ability to pay and the position of the parties involved.
683 The amount of money estimated by the nazzar is not necessarily the final
amount of money paid. For, as in the case of homicide, it is subject to
deductions in honor of various members who attend the meeting in which

105 The judicial process among Awlad Ali of the Western Desert of
Egypt has been dealt with in the context of political organization of
105 the group. The main feature of the political organization of Awlad Ali
613 is the absence of centralized leadership. The only formally recognized
leadership is that of the aqila, the leader of the bait tribal segment.
105 The sources of the aqila's authority derive from a number of sources,
613 one of which is his judicial role. It is through him that disputes in-
● 627 volving members of his bait are solved. The process by which he per-
forms this crucial function is that of informal mediation in which both
the personal qualities of the aqila, as well as the weight of his tribal
[692] segment, play an important role. This is especially important in a so-
ciety with no court system or formal hearing and where durability of any
settlement depends on its being accepted by the parties involved.

105 The main aim of the judicial process is to affect reconciliation of
182 the parties and to restore a certain degree of social order and cohesion
627 that was disrupted by the dispute. The need to restore the social order
[619] and to maintain friendly relations between tribal members is a response
to certain aspects of the natural and social environment in which the
105 group finds itself. Natural resources in the area are very meager, and
182 subsistence activities require that the tribesmen constantly move with
619 their herds for pasture throughout an area already divided among the
233 various tribal segments. Since the place and nature of pasture differ
from one year to the next, the identity of the specific tribal unit which
would be sought for help varies correspondingly. This creates a general
feeling of dependency that characterizes the social relations in the area.

105 On the other hand, there is always a feeling of rivalry and hostility
598 between the different tribal segments which goes back to the era of
571 tribal warfare. Thus, the social relations among the tribal population
are characterized by a certain amount of ambivalence which is hidden be-
hind a facade of formality in the way tribal members treat one another
105 in day-to-day activities. There are certain rules of etiquette describ-
571 ing the way members of the same tribal segment should behave toward one
576 another and toward other tribesmen and outsiders. Failure to abide by
[681] these rules may subject the violator to a symbolic fine of a goat or a
[574] sheep slaughtered for a feast to which everyone is invited. These feasts,
[182] or dinners as they are called, have various functions, the most important
105 of which is the integrative one. In an area where the population is usu-
571 ally dispersed, these dinners offer an opportunity to the tribesmen who
574 happen to be in the area at the time of the feast to attend, where they
182 eat, meet other tribesmen, and exchange information about what is happen-
ing in other parts of the area. It is from such dinners that the tribes-
men get to know about the available pastures, about the prices of sheep
and goats in different markets, and about who is doing what and where.
The occasion also signifies the restoration of the violator of the rules
to the social life of the group and the reinforcement of those rules.
105 This is also true with the tribal meetings, or mi'ad, which are held to
627 announce settlements in more serious cases. It is on this basis that
182 681 the mi'ad should not be considered as a tribal court. It is more of a
574 social occasion where food and drinks are served and where parties in-
volved and all those invited by them talk about everything except the
[681] dispute itself. In certain instances, the financial settlement agreed
upon in the informal mediation is exaggerated when announced in the mi'ad

105 so that part of it may be reduced in honor of some prominent members
629 who are attending the meeting. When part of the financial agreement is
182
681 reduced in honor of a person, this creates an obligation on the part of
554 that person to reciprocate in a similar situation when one arises. This
creates an active interest in the settlement on the part of individuals who otherwise are not involved, and insures the durability of the settlement. The social cohesion is maintained.

105 The need to keep friendly relations with all tribesmen is reflected
571 in the judicial process in its procedural aspect, as well as in judicial
578
627 reasoning, that is, the logic according to which facts in certain cases
182 are assessed. With regard to procedures, there is an emphasis on avoiding face-to-face confrontations between the disputing parties until an agreement has been reached by means of the mediators. Only then is it that the parties see and talk to one another. This is especially true in serious cases such as homicide or serious assault where face-to-face confrontation is likely to lead to more hostilities.

105 The emphasis on reconciliation may explain, at least in part, the in-
571 formality of the judicial process. Leaving the process of dispute settle-
627 ment informal gives it a measure of flexibility which permits the treatment
182 of each case as unique without being tied down by rigid formal rules. This does not mean, however, that there are no rules to be followed, or that there is no place for legal precedents. It simply means that the rules are very general and that the legal precedents are used merely as a guide in solving similar cases. The main guide remains, however, the desire to achieve a successful settlement that satisfies all parties. It is only through achieving such successful settlements that the social order is maintained and the tribal cohesion is secured.

degree and is ephemeral, so that the opportunity for the development of trade relations is absent.[1] Save for straying animals, a section has no urgent need to seek 621 311
relationships with others, as long as the rainfall is sufficient to permit the exploitation [619]
of local resources.

The tertiary section is also regarded as the corporate group *par excellence*, in which 621
'the one word does for all'. Corporate identity is conceptualized as 'one bone' 613
or 'one body'. An offence against one of its members is held to be an offence
against all; if one of its members is killed 'we all lose blood'. When one of its members commits homicide the responsibility falls on all equally. Blood money, when [682
received, is shared by all save for a special portion reserved for the 'owner of the 672]
blood', the nearest agnate of the victim. In opposite circumstances, all adult males accept the responsibility of contributing an equal share to the blood money. Rules of membership, simple in their brevity, express graphically this corporate identity: 'You must strike with us and be struck with us; you must pay with us and receive with us.' The group also bears a name, and there is never any doubt about the affiliation of any tribesman. That group of men—known as the *'amarā dam*—who are agreed on the obligation to exact vengeance, to pay blood money when necessary, to engage in common defence, and to accept the possibility of death in vengeance, is a fixed and clear-cut group, not one whose membership has to be calculated by reference to degrees of kinship in regard to a specific situation, as appears to be the case among other peoples.

Homicide within the *'amarā dam* brings about an impasse in relationships. A blood- 621
money payment is out of the question since the acceptance of blood money by one 613
part of a tertiary section from another of its parts is tantamount to a statement of 682
split. Only in conditions where relationships within the lineage have developed to the
point of political severance is it anticipated that a blood-money payment may be 627 ●
demanded; but this problem is not the same as that at present under discussion.
Bedouin say that blood money cannot pass within the *'amarā dam* for those making [829]
the payment would be the persons receiving it. This is spurious reasoning, since the 'owner of the blood' is awarded more than any other members of the group as it is, and arrangements could obviously be made to pay him separately. Blood money is out of the question because it distinguishes relationships between people as belonging to two distinct political communities, and not because of any difficulty of distribution.
In Bedouin thinking, an injury to 'the one body' is an injury to all its parts. Blood- [829]
money payments by members of a corporation to one or more of its members is a contradiction in terms. In the same way vengeance is also excluded, for this merely doubles the original loss. A reprisal exacted in hot blood is always a possibility, but this is not referred to as *thār*, vengeance. Even if, at a later date, the closest kinsman of the victim should slay the offender, the act would not be referred to as *thār* and any connexion with earlier homicides would be denied.

Stultified in the field of political action, there is little else that can be done. Expul- 682
sion is a possible course of action—and expulsion has occurred. Records show, however, that exile is almost invariably voluntary.[2] Moreover, exile is terminated as

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[1] Many sections trade fleeces for dates with the folk of distant oases, but the sections do not trade among themselves.

[2] I recorded one case of a man who was expelled from his group and the tribes around were warned [438] ←
that the rules of sanctuary were not to apply to him. He is said to have died from grief and hunger. The reason given for such drastic action is that he killed

would have dropped in on the camp. In another situation, two men entered a shop 613
in a market-place; inside sat two men of a feuding group who, instead of retreating 628
hastily, greeted those who had just entered, and the latter returned the greeting with 682
blows on the head from the butts of their rifles. Markets in Cyrenaica are recognized [443]
to be places of peace. In their actions the two offenders not only injured two others
but also broke a taboo in a public place. The victim's group now had to avenge not [683]
only the injury but the insult that the breach of taboo carried with it, as well. In most feud relationships this is characteristic. It is never a matter of a simple homicide, but of killing a man at the entrance to his tent, between the centre poles of his tent, or taking the life of a minor, or an elder too old to carry arms and so on. Each successive killing ensures that the hostile relationships will be perpetuated.

The third step in this exposition, therefore, is the association of a state of feud with the secondary order of segmentation.

When the relationships between the structurally superior primary tribal sections 619
are examined, the arguments against the necessity for peace are stronger than in the case of secondary sections. Relationships between them are few and irregular. Only occasionally do members of these groups meet, and then often accidentally; very many men of collateral primary sections are complete strangers one to the other.
If a homicide occurs between two primary sections it is unlikely that any attempt to 619
open negotiations will be made. The offender's camp may be raided by a *ghazi* 682
recruited from the victim's kinsmen. There would be no question of these primary [721]
sections going to war. On a raid firearms may be used, but the action is limited to a
strike-and-run affair. If the issue is joined and members of both sides are ranged [726]
against each other they fight with sticks to avoid large-scale slaughter: warfare must
not be allowed within the tribe. Wars belong to intertribal relationships. For one of 175
these wars, apart from hearsay evidence, some records exist. These tell of a war 619
which took place during the period 1860 to 1865, in which there were planned cam- 726
paigns, the organization of fighters into groups, and provisions for a labour force in the home territory, large enough to produce sufficient food to maintain an army in the field. During this war several hundred people were killed.

At this point, it is possible to summarize the stages in this exposition of the 619
Bedouin view in diagrammatic form.

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

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● 628
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Libyan Bedouin MT9

[For general information on the payment of blood-money in retribution for homicide, see Category 682.]

● 628
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Libyan Bedouin MT9

[For the role of the marabouts as arbitrators in the settling of disputes between tribal groups, see Categories 619 and 792.]

619 675 "Jumi'at, Marabtiin (plural of Marabit) of the 'Ali Ahmar."
All Marabit tribes of the Western Desert are affiliated as
* [613] clients with Sa'adi tribes. Further, since the tertiary
group of the Marabtiin functions in the same way as that of
the Sa'adi, it is this group which enters into compacts with
Sa'adi tertiary groups. Traditionally, the Marabit group's
[682] main support activity was to share in the payment of the
blood-money with its Sa'adi protector group. In return, the
Marabit group was given land in the protector's territory
and could depend upon them to contribute to any Marabit
blood debt which might come due. Also, it was considered the
• [628] [682] duty of the Sa'adi to revenge the death of a member of his
client group since the Marabit "was weak and could not face a
[608] tribe." But there is no attempt to construct fictional kinship
links between Sa'adi and Marabit groups.

[672] In al-Qasr today, contractual relations between Sa'adi
and Marabit are still based upon collective responsibility in
the blood-feud. However, since this traditional means of
conflict control is an extremely rare occurrence, the mutual
obligations of the parties are expressed in different forms.
[648] In any conflict between the Bedouins and the Egyptian government, the Marabtiin are expected to support their respective
[666] Sa'adi groups. In any modern elections which a Sa'adi might
enter, the Marabit is expected to give him his vote. A few
examples will make clear the relationship between the Sa'adi

562 in Bedouin society, that is, the role of wife-daughter. The
593 554 principles of patrilineality and cognation do not work against
182 each other when the girl marries outside her corporate group,
578 nor does her new dual role present a case of role conflict.
562 On the contrary, the wife-daughter role functions to bind to-
593 554 gether two groups which are structurally differentiated by
182 578 the rule of patrilineality. During time of peace, the wife-
*613 daughter acts as a bond-maker by carrying gifts back and
[431] forth between the two groups, often bringing some of her
● [628] [574] younger patrilineal relatives back to her husband's house or
562 tent for short visits. During a time of conflict or war, the
593 Bedouins point out, she is the only person who can cross the
554 battle lines unharmed. She is a match-maker as well as a
[726] peace-maker. Often she influences the selection of mates by
[584] individuals in both her husband's group and her father's
562 group. The Bedouins say that "after the *bint 'amm*, a man
593 should marry his *bint khal* ("mother's brother's daughter")
554 because she is like his *bint 'amm*." Usually, over a period
582 of a few generations, a given direction in marriage is sustained (see Figure 10), and it is one function of this wife-daughter role to accomplish this important political action.

562 The role of wife-daughter, then, may be seen as one
593 important aspect of what Fortes (1953:33) calls, "complemen-
554 tary filiation," the essential mechanism which provides the
*613 182 link between the corporate groups of al-Qasr society and the kin groups of the parent who does not determine descent.

619 *613 571 [671] The boundaries of the Bedouin political community may be defined so as to include all of those authority groups which operate in accordance with the recognized legal code of the Western Desert. This code is referred to as _'awaiyid Awlad 'Ali_, i.e. "the customs of the sons of 'Ali." The members of the Awlad 'Ali tribe identify with each other as a group. They recognize their common heritage and speak of "the Awlad 'Ali as one." But more importantly, the Awlad 'Ali represents a political community because they are "prepared to regulate their differences by means of decisions accepted as binding because they are made in accordance with shared political norms and structures" (Easton 1959:229). Recalling the discussion of familial authority and internal and external systems of authority relations, we may think of the Bedouin political community as a composite of authority or jural groups "within which there are a moral obligation and a means ultimately to settle disputes peaceably" (Middleton and Tait 1959:9).

*613 571 681 628 626 In al-Qasr, political order and the articulation of political relations between secondary corporate groups depend upon something besides structural and ideological uniformities. Although blood-revenge and feuding do not take place at the internal system of authority relations, they are common means of controlling the distribution of authority and power between secondary units. Though these mechanisms or sanctions are
[671] considered "the right of the Arabs," since they do threaten

*613 571 peace and security in the desert they are discouraged by
681 means of the moral and legal norms expressed in the _'awaiyid_,
•628 or law of the Bedouins.

626 671 Conflict regulation between secondary groups is the
*613 function of the _'awaaqil_ who act as legitimate representatives
571 in terms of the _rawaabit_, and as legitimate judges and decision-
578 makers in terms of the _'awaiyid_. Not all conflict in the
external political system is, in terms of our structural
levels, between secondary authority groups, but seldom is
any group larger than the secondary unit mobilized for political
619 action. In other words, even where we note that conflict is
*613 between two primary units, i.e., the 'Aishaibat and the
571 Kamailat, there is probably, in fact, political action taking
578 place between two secondary groups within the respective primary groups. However, there always exists the very real possibility that greater conflict will be generated involving primary and even tribal units.

128 In the next section of this chapter, I will discuss Bedouin law and sanctions within the framework of the lineage structure and the authority levels at which they operate. The following section will further illustrate the legitimacy and dynamics of authority and structure in Bedouin society.

554 One *'aqila* claimed that the *rajal khair* is a person
627 who shares in his own authority and presides when he is
*613 away, but he separated the "rights" of the two roles. The
[779] *'aqila* is able to force two parties in conflict to read the
[578] *Fatiha*, the first *sura* of the Quran, in order to terminate
the problem; this is beyond the rights of the *rajal khair* whose
influence is not directly supported by sacred sanctions. But
[784] the role of *rajal khair* does have its "sacred" aspects, for
all Bedouins know that "you should never harm a *rajal khair*
or God will punish you for this." I never heard this same
thing said about the *'aqila*.

554 Historically, it was perhaps the case that the *rajal*
627 *khair* was the person of high status who represented the authority
*613 of an absent *'aqila*. The role never became institutionalized
182 but functioned as a support and substitute role in a structure
dominated by that of the *'aqila*. In a segmentary society
627 where the various structures exist in opposition to one
•628 another, it is important that an institution, such as a third
182 non-partisan element, exists to facilitate communication
578 between parties for the purposes of conflict regulation.
Besides the *rajal khair*, an example of this would be the
traditional case of the wife from an outside tribe who alone
was permitted freedom of passage between the two warring
parties. Her purpose, it was assumed, was that of peace-making.

619 184 In recent years this has changed, however. The increased importance
178 of wealth in the recently introduced money economy relaxed the endogamous
582 tendency that was characteristic of the Sa'adi tribes.

619 In discussing the position of the Murabiteen tribes it is worth
184 noting that not all the Murabiteen tribes in the area occupy the same
position. Some enjoy relatively higher positions than the others. Actually,
there are two kinds of Murabiteen in the area: Mustaqillen (independent
Murabiteen); and the dependent Murabiteen. The latter are
further subdivided into Murabiteen bil-baraka (with the blessing); and
Murabiteen bil-sadaqa (with the tribute). The only independent Murabiteen
in the area is the Gemei'at tribe. These are the original settlers
[173] of the area. Because of their help to Awlad Ali against the Hanadi, the
latter were defeated and Awlad Ali were able to occupy the Western Desert.
For their part the Gemei'at tribe was granted its independence by Awlad
Ali and were given one-third of the total area as their homeland (watan).
619 In theory, the Gemei'at tribe occupies the same position and has the same
184 rights as the Sa'adi tribes, including the right to offer their protection
778 which is denied to all other client groups. In practice, however,
682 this seems to be of no practical value. None of my informants could remember
a single case in which a murderer has taken refuge at a segment
619 of the Gemei'at tribe. The importance of the nazala is not merely to be
778 safe from the pursuit of the victim's group but rather to provide the
184 mediators who undertake the crucial task of negotiation on behalf of the
682 murderer and his gorup. It is the ability to settle the dispute on a
629 628 permanent basis that offers the actual long-lasting protection, even
after the time of the nazala expires. To be successful in his pursuit,

619 the negotiator has to have behind him the full weight of his tribal se-
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184 gment. Since the origin of the Gemei'at tribe as a Murabiteen tribe is
682 well known, any negotiator has to rely almost entirely upon his own skill
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628 to affect any settlement; even if he is able to affect such a settlement,
there is no guarantee that it will be permanent.

619 The Murabiteen bil-baraka and Murabiteen bil-sadaqa occupy the same
792 position as vassal groups. The only difference between the two is that
the first, the religious men, are much more respected than the latter.
They are feared by the other tribes because of the belief that they have
direct contact with the religious and spiritual world and can harm those
who dare to offend them in one way or another. Because of this factor
[627] and of their neutral position with regard to the rest of the tribes, they
[628] play an important role in mediation and dispute settlement.

619 The origin of inferiority of the Murabiteen tribes in general is
184 hard to account for. Kenneth (1925) believes that hundreds of years ago
174 the Murabiteen were essentially the holymen. They learned to read and
792 write the Qoraan and grouped themselves around the "zawias' which were
the centers of learning and religion. While indulging in their religious practices their flocks ere grazed miles away in the open desert under the charge of the Sa'adi shepherds, who originally were the poor paid workers of the Murabiteen. These shepherds, living out in the open, were busy fighting away the raiders attempting to steal their flocks. As time passed the Sa'adi shepherds became not only tough fighters but also wealthy. This latter end was achieved partly as a result of successful raids on neighboring tribes. Later when the Sa'adi planned a large raid, they entrusted their flocks to the Murabiteen, who by that time had become dependent upon the Sa'adi for their protection from the raids of other tribes.

613 Article 9:

675 The Amar should never fight on the side of the wrongdoer, because if it does, it will have to pay with him for his wrongdoings.

539

Article 10:

[628] Any dispute or fight involving a member of the Amar and an outsider should be reported to the awaqil in the Amar who are supposed to take the matter up with the other party. If the awaqil are convinced that the outsider is the aggressor or that he is at fault, they should try to make him accede to the demands of the members of the Amar, using all their efforts to convince him and the aqila of his bait. [619] If he refuses, they should call him for a "Miad" (tribal meeting) in which all parties involved should be represented by their respective awaqil.

Article 11:

[563] [619] With regard to "iktitab" (tribal adoption), an outsider wanting to join the Aggary Family or one of its constiuent buite must be asked first about the reason or reasons for his desire to join. This must be done in order to know what kind of person he is and whether he will become a burden and liability to the Amar. If he proves to be of reputable standing, the aqila of the bait he wants to join can accept him without consultation with the rest of the awaqil. If on the other hand he is found to have grudges against someone or if someone has a financial claim over him, then the aqila of the bait cannot accept him without consultation with the other awaqil in the Amar. If all the awaqil agree to accept him, he is considered like one of the Eilat Aggary, having the same rights and bearing the same responsibilities.

Article 12:

A memberof the Amar who wants to separate himself from the Amar and get a "barawa" has to state his reasons beforehe can be released from the obligations of his membership in the amar. If his request to get the barawa was because of injustice he suffered by the Amar or any of its members, the awaqil have the duty to straighten the injustice and restore his rights. If, on the other hand, his request for the barawa was to avoid paying the Amar, then he cannot be released from his membership unless he pays all of his share, or else he must return all that the Amar has paid him until the time he asked for the barawa.

Article 13:

[695] [693] If one of the Amar is accused of an offense for which he is tried by the legal system of the state, the Amar as a whole share the expenses of hiring an attorney to defend him. This, however, is done after the awaqil are sure (by means of administering the oath) that he is innocent and that the accusation is false.

CHAPTER V

POLITICAL LEADERSHIP AND JUDICIAL PROCESS

69 One of the most idstinguishing aspects of the legal system of Awlad
629 ● 628 Ali is the absence of any formalized judicial structure. Disputes are solved mainly through the mechanism of informal mediation rather than through formal hearings of a court during which the facts of each case are presented and judgment based on the facts is passed. This does not mean that formal hearings are not known on the area. For the "Mi'ad" or tribal hearing is a common and very important practice in the tribal proceedings. The Mi'ad, however, is not a tribal court. It is merely a gathering of all interested parties and anyone else who wished to attend, in which the agreement reached behind the scenes by means of negotiations are announced.

628 The first Mi'ad I attended was held in the house of Sheikh Mughaieb,
613 the Aqila (tribal leader) of bait Mughaieb of the Sanagrah tribal segment
683 in the area of Hammam, 60 miles west of Alexandria. The case that was to
[114] be settled at the Mi'iad involved the assaulting of Sheikh Mughaieb ty
two younger members of bait Dauoud who lived in a nearby camp. The dispute started when Ali, the youngest brother (14 years old) of the two assailants, found a piece of iron in the desert. Suspecting that it was a mine, he took it away from the camp to the small garden in the backyard of Sheikh Mughaieb's house, surrounded it with dry weeds and set fire to it. The piece of iron was in fact a mine and it exploded, damaging the trees and a window on the Sheikh's property. At the sound of the explosion Sheikh Mughaieb rushed out and found the boy trying to run away from

628 683 613 the area. He caught him and slapped him and ordered him not to do it again. After a short while the boy returned with his two older brothers who protested Sheikh Mughaieb's hitting their younger brother. The argument developed into a fight during which the two brothers hit Mughaieb with a heavy stick over his head making him unconscious.

The Mi'ad was held two weeks after the incident. When I arrived at Sheikh Mughaieb's house, the meeting was being held in the guest room in the back of the house. Present at the meeting were Sheikh Mughaieb, his father, two distant relatives of Mughaieb who were visiting the area at the time; Sheikh Mutair, the Aqila of the powerful bait of Mutair located some twenty miles east of Mughaieb; the two assailants, their father who at the same time was the Aqila of their bait, and two neighbors of Sheikh Mughaieb.

[576] For the first half hour or so nothing was said. People were sitting silently except for occasional greetings of "how are you?" and the response of "thank God for everything". Tea was served frequently. Then [979] Sheikh Mutair addressed the gathering and read the "fatha" or the beginning passage of the Qoraan (which appeals to God to show his right ways to the believers and to guide them to wisdom). He then said, "In the blessed presnece of all these honorable guests and with the help of God and his prophet we will clear the hearts of those concerned of the grudges caused by the shameful and unfortunate incident in which the devil has played a major role." Then Sheikh Karim, the Aqila of the bait to which the accused belonged, continued the speech saying that this shameful thing should never have happened and that his sons must [867] have been possessed by the devil to have done it. After all, they have been brought up to respect their elders and especially Sheikh Mughaieb, who was like a second father to him.

628 683 613 [576] who was like a second father to them. He praised Sheikh Mughaieb for being understanding. He then said that Sheikh Mughaieb was very generous and that his sons had come to Mughaieb the day before and kissed the top of his head (an expression of respect for forgiveness). He said that no money, no matter how great, could erase the harm done by his sons but that he had offered to pay Sheikh Mughaieb the sum of 400 pounds as "kabara" or face-saving compensation. (The kabara will be discussed in a forthcoming chapter, but for the time being it is worth noting that the above amount is the maximum for such compensation since it equals the bloodmoney for a man). Then he turned to Sheikh Mughaieb and asked him to accept it in front of the respected guests. Sheikh Mughaieb then spoke for the first time and said that the two boys were like sons to him and that he had no hard feelings toward them anymore, since he believed that young people were sometimes carried away in their actions. He then proceeded to say that in honor of the honorable guests who took the time to attend the hearing he was forfeiting half the amount. At that time a woman brought the food the women were cooking for the gathering, and Sheikh Karim asked Mughaieb, "How about the honor of the good women of the house who have done all the work and cooked all the food? If you ask me, they deserve at least another hundred pounds." Mughaieb said, "All right, fifty pounds for the home of the women, but no more." After that Sheikh Karim paid the amount of a hundred and fifty pounds to Sheikh Mughaieb and shook hands with him. He also shook hands with the two young men who had assaulted him, and the gathering started the dinner and tea.

627 628 Not all Mi'ads in the area proveed with that smoothness. Many of them are characterized by shouting and arguments and frequently no

627 628 [123] agreement is reached. In fact, later one of the people attending said that my presence made everything run smoothly in that particular Mi'ad because they felt that they should show me how peaceful Awlad Ali were. This was mainly supported by my own observation of other Mi'ads, some of which are described later, where parties were less understanding of one another and where no forfeiting of any part of the compensation occurs. This is particularly true when the Mi'ad is held to acknowledge the failure of the negotiators to reach an acceptable agreement among the parties.
[681] This is also true when one of the parties to a dispute denies the charge and insists on not paying any kind of compensation. In such cases the Mi'ad is held to decide upon a different course of action, usually the administration of the oath, as will be discussed later in the chapter.
[182] Despite its typical nature, the Mi'ad described above exemplifies the nature of the Mi'ad and its purpose as a process of making public what has been achieved in private negotiations. No evidence is presented and evaluated in the Mi'ad, no hearing of witnesses, no passing of judgment based on the evaluation of the facts of the case. Actually, the facts of the case are never presented and a person who is not acquainted with them before hand has no way of learning what the dispute is all about by merely listening to the discussions of the Mi'ad.

628 613 The key role in the process of mediation in dispute settlements is done by the Aqila or the leader of the bait. When a dispute occurs between members of different baits, each party goes to the Aqila of his bait who takes immediate steps tomeet with the Aqila of the other party and discuss the matter with him in an attempt to re[illegible] a settlement. He acts as a representative of members of his bait and defends their interests in

628 the settlement achieved. In many such interest is best served by taking
613 into consideration the welfare of the other party to the dispute as well.

613 Reasonableness is an important prerequisite for the success of the
554 Aqila in performing this functions in dispute settlement. This is true
157 whether the Aqila is dealing with disputes between members of his own
bait or between members of his bait and outsiders. But while reasonable-
ness and the personal qualities constitute important assets for the Aqila,
613 they are not the basis of his political authority. Proven abilities are
554 admired but they are, or had been until very recently, irrelevant to the
178 question of succession to the position of Aqila. The structurally signi-
ficant source of the Aqila's authority is patrilineal succession. This
principle has recently been challenged under the impact of social and
economic changes that are taking place in the area. To analyze the role
121 of the Aqila and the source of his authority, I shall utilize, to some
613 extent, Turner's concept of "social drama" by presenting and analyzing a
128 case of dispute whose developmental stages happened over a period of more
than eleven years. The major part of these developments occurred at the
time of the field work and I had a chance to observe at lease part of it.
The case in all its phases offers a rare example of a disturbance that
happened in the social life of a particular tribal segment. It offers
what Turner called "... a limited area of transparency in the otherwise
opaque surface of regular, uneventful social life" (p. 93). The politi-
cal unit involved is that of bait Asabe'i, the largest in size of all
baits in the Aggary Eila. As events of the case unfolded themselves,
some of the important principles of social structure, at least as they
operate at a given point, were revealed.

613 554 that prevents the Awaqil of the amar from rallying support around another person.

613 178 554 In the case of the Aggary amar Hakim was their choice as the man to replace the original Aqila. What happened in the Aggary amar could never have happened if bait Asabei' were more cohesive than it was or if the kinship ties "were still strong and durable" as one important member of the Sanagrah tribe commented. "If there was any respect to the forefathers left, Hakim could never have agreed to replace Shei'eb....Nobody would dare take a position from someone who inherited it from his father.... but bait Asabei' is not as it used to be."

613 628 554 The third domain within which the Aqila normally pursues his activities is that of the wide scope of tribal society in the area. The Aqila represents his bait in all matters involving the bait either as a unit or any particular member of it with other tribal segments. When an individual from the bait is involved in a dispute with a member of another tribal segment, the Aqila acts as the legal representative and the attorney of that member trying to achieve a settlement which is not fair for his client but also fair for the other party. To be successful in this area, the Aqila relies on his own personal qualities and persuasive abilities. If the Aqila is known to be fair and honest, a quick and permanent settlement is usually achieved since he is trusted also by the other party. If, on the other hand, he has the reputation of using dishonest techniques, mistrust prevails and achieving a settlement is usually delayed.

Like the domain of the amar, the present field of activities is no major source for the Aqila's political support in the baits where kinship solidarity is strong. His success in solving disputes between members

His success in solving disputes between members
613 of his baits and outsiders might enhance his prestige within the bait,
628 554 but it is not a substitute for patrilineal succession as the basis of
[428] the Aqila's authority. But in less integrated baits the situation is
[627] different. The ineffectiveness of the Aqila in solving disputes may
lead members of his bait to seek another man as their representative who
would act as a mediator in their behalf. If this continues for a long
time the Aqila might find himself with no functions and the new person
would become a de facto Aqila.

613 The Aqila represents the only effective indigenous form of leader-
554 ship among Awlad Ali at the present time. The camp headman provides
622 another form of leadership on the camp level, but, as mentioned before,
the leadership of the headman is very limited and involves minimal
634 authority. In addition to the indigenous leadership represented by the
622 Aqila, there is the superimposed administrative structure of the govern-
656 ment representative in the form of the "omda" system introduced into the
177 area by the government decree no. 1187 of 1958. The system of omda or
mayorship is essentially that applied to the rural areas of Egypt with
certain modifications to fit the tribal organization and the semi-nomadic
existence of the populations of the Western Desert. In rural areas, the
622 omda is the administrative head of the village. He is appointed by the
[554] government from among the village inhabitants who have certain qualifi-
[212] cations with regard to education (must be able at least to read and
[556] write), wealth (own at least 5 feddans of land in the area), and sound
reputation. As such, the omda system in the rural areas is a territorial
system. The omda's authority covers the territory of the village and
all individuals living in it regardless of their kinship affiliation.

684 of drastic actions taken in cases of adultery. Of the fourteen cases
613 562 of adultery that I examined furing my field work, none resulted in the
593 killing of the adulteress, and only three resulted in the murder of her
[114] partner. In all three cases where the adulterer was killed, the avenger
684 682 was the husband; and in all three cases, the husband had to pay the
613 bloodmoney to the murdered man's kin group. His payment of the blood-
money, among other things, may indicate that the right of the husband
to kill the adulterer is not completely accepted among Awlad Ali. All
[628] agree, however, that such killings never result in blood feuds because
of the shameful circumstances in which the victim dies.

684 It was very difficult to obtain any detailed or reliable information
126 about adultery cases. All the above mentioned fourteen cases were gath-
[124] ered from the informants, twelve of which were cases which had already been solved. For the two cases which were still open at the time of the study, information was quite vague. Usually such cases are conducted with a great amount of secrecy, with the involved parties referring to them as cases of theft, or merely by saying that the cases involve women. Only when the adultery leads to the killing of the adulteress or the adulterer are more details publicly known about the case.

684 But while the right to retaliate for the shameful action of an adulterous wife is vague and diffused, the right of the husband for compensation from the adulterer remains clear and undisputed. In this resepct, adultery is treated very much like theft; the adulterer has stolen the husband's exclusive right to his wife's sexual activities. The com-
[583] pensation for this offense is estimated at L.E. 20, in addition to the
[586] mahr, if the husband decides to divorce his wife as a result of her
adultery.

CHAPTER VI

HOMICIDE AND BODILY INJURIES

Part 1: Homicide

579 Fighting is quite common among Awlad Ali. Many of these fights
involve a large number of individuals and result in many casualties
579 and sometimes even deaths. Fighting is considered "shar," or evil,
673 for according to Awlad Ali, it threatens the social cohesion which is
182 highly valued in the area. Yet, although undesirable, fighting and
[682] even homicide are not considered a crime against society and sometimes
are viewed as necessary to safeguard individual and collective rights
in the absence of an established authority which could protect these
rights. Although this absence of an authority is remedied now by the
[177] introduction of state administrative justice, this has not yet achieved
[692] enough efficiency and recognition to replace the old tribal system.

619 In the tribal system, there is no concept of individual punishment
681 inflicted upon the suspect. There is no recognized authority to inflict
692 it. The mardi or the 'aqila who performs the function of dispute settle-
[629] ment in the case of homicide has no power to pass or inflict any punishment. His role is restricted to mediation between the two parties involved
682 as was earlier mentioned. Homicide, like all other wrongs among Awlad Ali,
673 are private wrongs affecting the individual or a group of individuals.
[182] The main purpose of the tribal proceedings in the case of homicide is to
restore some form of harmony and order among the group. This harmony is
sometimes restored by killing the murderer or any member of his vengeance
682 group, or amar. Feuds may result from such killing, and a few instances
628 of feuds have, in fact, been recorded in the area (although not in the

682 628 last two decades). But a feud in the form of extensive, long-term killing between two groups is very rare among Awlad Ali. The principle of life for life upon which a feud operates would rarely lead to a permanent settlement or peace, even when the sense of revenge is satisfied for the moment. 682 Among the group, this form of permanent settlement is more likely to be achieved through the payment of bloodmoney, or "diyya." The payment of the diyya is based on the assumption that the group has lost, in the deceased, an economic asset. It has been deprived of his services, both in supporting his immediate family and in the collective activities of his amar. This is illustrated in the distribution of the bloodmoney. Only half of the bloodmoney is paid to the immediate family of the victim, the other half being divided equally among adult males of his amar or vengeance group. This is intended not only to satisfy their sense of indignation and curb their desire for revenge, but also to insure that when the time comes to share in the payment of the bloodmoney, they will pay.

628 619 726 178 The cessation of feuds in the area seems to coincide with the cessation of inter-tribal and intra-tribal warfare. During the era of tribal warfare, the killing of a tribesman meant the loss in the fighting power of his tribal segment, and feuding, with its emphasis on life for life, had the purpose of restoring the balance in fighting power among the groups involved. [682] Monetary compensations were not known in the area during that time, according to the informants' accounts, but they were usually restricted to cases where either the victim or the killer was a non-tribal person. 178 682 619 726 With the cessation of tribal warfare, the death of a tribal member became more an economic, rather than a political, loss,

682 agreed that the sticks were not by nature lethal weapons. The
672 latter, according to the tribal law, are only guns and knives,
627 since they give the victims no chance to defend himself. They
ruled the case unintentional killing for which only L.E. 300
should be paid.

682 Since Yadem and his brother were arrested by the police for
625 their crime, the payment of the bloodmoney was postponed until
692 the case was settled according to the state legal system. Only
half of the bloodmoney was paid and the rest was postponed until
the case was decided upon by the legal system and Yadem released.
682 This is obviously a case in which the nature of the killing was
672 decided upon by drawing upon the material aspect of criminal
673 causation. The nature of the weapon used was the major determinant
[411] of the crime. Only guns and knives are defined as lethal; all
others are non-lethal by nature, although they might cause the
death of the victim. Death caused by a non-lethal weapon is considered as unintentional regardless of whether or not the actor
intended the results, while death by a lethal weapon, even without
the intention of killing, is classified as intentional killing, as
appears in the following case.

CASE #4: The Case of the Threatened Tribesman

613 For more than five years Bait El-Mawi from the Sheibat tribe
628 had been in a continuous state of feud with Bait El-Asi from the
Gemeiat tribe. One night, during a Khamasein sand storm when visability was extremely low, Abd-el-Galil from Bait El-Mawi heard a
noise outside his tent, and the dogs were barking indicating that
a stranger was there. Being sure that someone was approaching

613 the tent and fearing that he might have been a member of the
628 feuding Bait intending to harm him or members of his family,
Galil took his gun and went outside to see who was there. He
called on the person to identify himself. When he got no answer,
he warned him that unless he identify himself, he (Galil) would
fire his gun in the air as a warning. After a short period of no
613 response, Galil fired his gun in the air. A moment later, Galil
628 heard a cry coming from the direction of a small hill at the side
682 of the tent. When Galil went there, he found Salem, a member of
a neighboring camp, lying on the ground with a bullet wound in his
stomach. He told Galil that his wife was sick and that he had
come to borrow Galil's donkey to take her to the doctor in the
nearby medical center. He had taken the short cut to Galil's tent
when he was hit by the bullet which Galil had fired in the air.
Galil took his wounded neighbor to the medical center, but Salem
died before they reached it.

682 The Mi'ad was held, and Galil and his family had to pay L.E. 400
672 to the victim's kin group. The amount was that specified for in-
627 tentional killing, since the wound that caused the death was in-
673 flicted by a lethal weapon.

CASE #5: The Case of the Startled Shepherd

233 This case involves Idris, a poor member of the Sheresat tribal
[464] segment. He earned his living by working as a hired shepherd for
[219] 'Awwad from Bait Ibrahim in the area of Gharbaniat. During the dry
[312] season, each shepherd takes his flocks to the water wells near the
coast and leaves them there for three or four hours to get their
fill of drinking water. That afternoon, Idris, waiting for the

*795

*175 provocation, did the same in Cyrenaica, the Order had no
[159] choice but to resist.

[793] But though it was attacks from the outside which destroyed
*[648] the theocratic empire of the Sanusiya, it may be considered
doubtful whether in any case such extensive territories could
have been maintained under single direction. The economic
and political organization of the Order was crude, even when
elaborated in the days of Sayyid al-Mahdi in response to
increased trading activities and to the need of maintaining
peace in the petty and barbarous states that had come under
its influence. Its administrative machinery was at no time
adequate for effective control over such wide domains, with
their poor communications and their manifold tribal, racial,
[578] and cultural divergencies. To these weaknesses must be added,
after Sayyid al-Mahdi's death, personal rivalries within the
Sanusi family on the lines of which cracks began to appear in
the loose empire, and it is probable that even if it had not been
attacked by the Powers of Europe it would have broken up
into a number of principalities, or spheres of religious influence,
ruled by various members of the family. It might indeed be
*[648] possible to sustain the thesis that it was the Italian occupation
[182] of Libya which prevented the complete break-up of the Order
by rallying the outraged sentiment of the Bedouin to its side as
the symbol of their common resistance to conquest and alien
rule.

The administrative organization of the Order in the time of
Sayyid al-Mahdi was simple indeed. Each lodge of the Order
[794] lived on its own revenues, derived from endowments, tithes,
contributions of money, goods, transport, and labour, and sent
its surplus to Jaghbub and Kufra for the maintenance of the
University and of the Sanusi family and for the general purposes
of the Order. The Shaikh of each lodge arbitrated in disputes
● [628] in the district in which it was situated and could generally
wield spiritual sanctions sufficiently weighty to compel
acceptance of his awards. The Shaikh of a lodge was appointed
by the head of the Order and was responsible to him. There
was, however, so little centralized planning that new lodges
seem occasionally to have been founded by the initiative of
influential families without the head of the Order hearing of the
new foundation till its completion. In the more distant parts

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complicate the more direct relationship of the distribution of 619 groups of people to the ecology.[3] [13 182]

The Cyrenaican genealogy, then, is a conceptualization of a hierarchy[4] of ordered territorial segments. The groups stemming from the ancestor at the third order of segmentation are referred to as tribes, and each tribe is the apex of a three-tiered order of segments, which, following customary practice, are referred to as primary, secondary, and tertiary. The latter, the tertiary segment, 621 represents the group of people who, for a period of six to eight 613 months, gather together and live in what, for all intents and purposes, is a single discrete residential group.[5] This tertiary group is also the smallest political group. It has its own homeland, with its [423] water supplies, pastures, and ploughland. In this homeland live most of its members. It is a lineage segment, and most of the agnates of this segment live on their own homeland.[6] It is also the [682 vengeance group, which means that any one of its members can be killed in vengeance for a homicide committed by any other, 628] and that the obligation to exact vengeance falls on all members alike, regardless of relationship to the victim. Likewise, its members pay blood money as a group, and although when they receive it, a bigger portion goes to the nearest agnate of the victim, the remainder is distributed equally among all its members. The number of generations which supervene between the founding ancestor of a tertiary segment and the living is usually four or five, but there is little consistency in this number. Some tertiary

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[3] This part of the discussion is necessarily brief, but further amplification will appear in two subsequent articles now in preparation, one of which is concerned with a general treatment of Cyrenaican genealogies, and the other with a discussion of the effects of ecology on the social organization of the Bedouin. [114]

[4] I use the word hierarchy here since, although segments of any order display many like features, the orders represent distinct and progressively more embracing interests, and these differences are of such consequence that to consider one order of groups as a facsimile of a superior or inferior order can only lead to confusion. A tertiary group, that is to say, may possess many of the characteristics of a secondary group, but the one is a fundamentally different sort of group from the other, as I shall show in my forthcoming article on the feud. (cf. Smith, M. G. 1956.) [128]

[5] This statement does not apply to the Darsa and the Hasa tribes, two of the plateau tribes in Cyrenaica. The statements in this article are confined almost exclusively to the camel herders of the semi-desert. [619] [128]

[6] This, admittedly, is too general a statement to make about such an important issue, but I would prefer to leave its documentation and precision for an article on the analysis of the composition of Bedouin camps.

613 segments show a lineage depth of three generations, while others
621 show as many as six. No special importance is attached by the
Bedouin to this number, although some writers claim that a depth
of five generations is of particular significance among other Arab
621 tribes.[7] Normally, in speaking of the vengeance group, the Bed-
628 ouin refer to the name of the ancestor of a tertiary tribal section.
613 Any one claiming membership of this group, regardless of his
682 precise generational relation to the offender or the victim is immediately and equally involved with its other members. When speaking of the group as such, the Bedouin refer to it as 'those who have agreed on the blood', and use the phrase *'amara dam* to refer to it. Blood money does not pass between its members, and political division does not occur within it.

621 These small tertiary sections of tribes, then, are small residen-
613 tial groups. Their population varies from one group to another,
[162] but most of them have a total population of 150 to 200 souls. Successive generations—at least according to the Bedouin view—add to these numbers, and also increase progressively the number of generations in their genealogies. Substantial increases of population would, of course, constitute a pressure on local resources, on the water available in the particular well of a group, on the amount of land available for ploughing, and on the pastures for animals at the end of the rainy season. Again, if each generation is to be added to the existing genealogy, this would necessitate a realignment of structural relationships with each succeeding generation. The discussion that follows is an
128 examination of the ways in which adjustments are made to
621 maintain an equilibrium between the population of a group and
613 the carrying capacity of the land on which its members live, and of the ways in which the genealogical structure is able to persist in the face of various contingencies which threaten it.

A beginning might be made by indicating the processes at work to keep the form of the genealogy fairly fixed when there is an absence of population pressure on resources. The first problem is the simple one of describing the mechanics of manipula-

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[171] [7] e.g. Burkhardt (1831), speaks of the *Khomse*, the five generation group, as very widespread among Arabs. G. W. Murray also reports the use of the word *Khomsa* among the Arabs of the Sinai desert to designate the blood-vengeance group, but the term used by the Aulad 'Ali tribe, the cousins and Egyptian neighbours of the Cyrenaican Bedouin, he gives as *Awlia'-ed-dam* (which simply means 'blood kindred').

682 a rule by the return of the offender to his camp after the lapse of a number of years.
A man who had already killed six people killed a seventh, his first paternal cousin.
He and his brothers fled the tribe; he died in exile and it was not until some thirty
[123] years later that his brother and nephew returned. Another man, who had killed his
first paternal cousin, used my entry into a camp as the occasion for his re-entry,
pitching his tent rope on rope with mine, and mine in turn was rope on rope with
the tent of the camp's shaikh.[1]

621 An effort is always made to hush up the matter when a homicide occurs within a
682 tertiary section. It is for this reason that the name of the victim is not perpetuated.
613 Normally it is an obligation to perpetuate the names of the deceased, especially when
[551] they have been killed in homicide, but in the circumstances now being discussed the
name is suppressed. As one man expressed the general sentiments, stretching out his toga in front of him: 'Look at the hole in my toga; it would be better without it, but what can I do? Make it bigger? It is better to cover it up.' Any penal action taken against the offender could only enlarge the wound he had already opened. The notion of corporate identity is so strong that it eliminates the use of penal action against one of its members for the greatest offence of all. While overtly every effort is made to expunge the memory of a homicide of the sort described above, the Bedouin are most articulate in their views about the offender. He is referred to as one who 'defecates in the tent' thus likening him to an animal, for no human being would do this. Other expletives used in reference to him are: one who 'destroys the lineage', who 'corrupts the family'; he is one who 'brings confusion', who 'provokes God' and causes 'the evil of leprosy to eat into relationships'. Their feelings about the offender, who 'commits robbery internally', are summed up in the word *fitna*. This, in its Cyrenaican use, corresponds closely to the notion of sin as it is used in the Old Testament; in the sense, that is to say, of an act which causes an impasse in relationships, which creates chaos among a small group of related people, and produces internal calamity. And this is indeed the situation brought about by such homicide among the Bedouin. Flowing blood, they are wont to say, can only be staunched by blood (i.e. a vengeance killing), but if a man kills within a close agnatic range the corporate body continues to bleed. Nothing can be done. The group is left helpless, and this is sin.

The first step in this exposition, therefore, is to attach to homicide within a tertiary section the notion of its being *fitna*, carrying with it voluntary and temporary expulsion.

682 A homicide which involves two collateral tertiary sections is a different matter
•628 altogether, for now the parties constitute two discrete political groups. Political
621 machinery can be set in motion to deal with the breach in relationships, and conse-
613 quently a homicide of this sort does not pose the dilemma which is created when it occurs within a politically undivided group. Not only do agnates of two collateral tertiary sections behave towards each other as two groups of people, but the nature of their relationships is fundamentally different from those obtaining between mem-

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682 a first cousin in cold blood because of a dispute between them over the ownership of a new-born kid. Although this was the only reason given by the Bedouin other considerations were involved—the victim was said to have been a fine person, and his killer a constant trouble maker, and so on.

[1] See for comparison Robertson Smith, 1903. The tent is an area of sanctuary, and this extends to include the ropes also.

bers of an undivided group. It is erroneous to suppose that because the different 621
orders of sections are homologous in their structural aspects they do not differ; they 613
do, because the interests associated with the various orders are different.[1] 628

Collateral tertiary segments are associated with different tracts of territory. Each [682]
has its own watering rights as a group, and although groups may share a grain store, [423]
it is divided on group lines. Members of these different groups do not gather together
in summer to form a single community, though at some of the very big watering
points they are near each other. Social relationships between them are, however,
intense. Visits are frequent. They meet to exchange news, or to inquire after the [574]
sick. They exchange greetings during the major festivals, and members of one group
attend the funerals and weddings of the others, taking gifts. They also meet at the
grain stores. Herdsmen, as they pursue straying animals, wander freely in their neighbours'
territory. Relationships of this sort, some of them urgently necessary for
survival, do not permit the feuding relationships to be described presently. Permanent
hostility which characterizes the feud would seriously disrupt everyday economic
activities, limit the pastoral movements of the Bedouin beyond endurance, and sever
lines of communication which they always strive to keep open.

A homicide, when it involves two collateral tertiary groups must, therefore, be 621
resolved quickly. This can be effected in two ways. Vengeance may be exacted immediately. 613
This is always referred to as a vengeance killing or *thār*, and is to be distinguished 628
from a superficially similar act within a tertiary group, since *thār* carries 682
with it the implication that it is premeditated. A *thār* between two tertiary sections
is considered to be the best way of settling the affair and, after an appropriate lapse
of time, a peace meeting is held at which it is accepted that the killings have cancelled
each other out. The deliberations at this meeting are followed by a meal at which all
present 'eat around the one bowl'; the meal over, they all pray together. A life had
been taken for a life and the way is now open for the restoration of normal peaceful
relationships. Vengeance needs to be distinguished from feud, for while retaliatory
killings provide the propulsive force in the feud a vengeance killing may be the means
whereby a settlement of hostilities is made possible.

An end to hostilities may also be brought about by a promise to pay blood money 621
or *diya*, and its acceptance by the victim's group. Arrangements for blood-money 613
discussions are made by a category of persons known as *marabtin bi'l baraka*, or 628
'clients of the goodness', men who, by virtue of descent and origin, stand outside
the descent lines of the noble tribes, and who are accredited with divine goodness. 682
They tend the sick, write amulets, and are always present at a peace meeting to give 792
it the weight of their baraka. Soon after the homicide has occurred they act as intermediaries
to bring the hostile groups together at a peace meeting.[2] Ostensibly, the 621
first part of the proceedings at these meetings is to settle the amount of the blood 613
money, and how and when it is to be paid. Agreement on these counts will have been 628
reached, however, before the large peace gathering is assembled, for there is a gener- 682

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[1] This statement requires more documentation than I am able to give to it in this paper, but the descriptive details given hereafter give it some substance. See also Smith, 1956.

[2] It is necessary to add here that these clients do not assume coercive powers. They are granted the power to curse, but the curse that is feared is the curse of their dead when an oath is given at a saint's tomb. When they know that groups wish to make peace they assist as messengers in bringing people together, but they do not use their power to curse as a pressure.

621 ally recognized amount of blood money to compensate a homicide. The wrangling
613 that goes on at the meeting is of a conventional kind, and it is known in advance that
● 628 several distinguished guests present will supplicate for a reduction of the amount
682 demanded by the victim's group, until the amount generally accepted as appropriate
is reached. Such haggling makes it possible for the victim's surviving agnates to
maintain the fiction that they yielded only under the strongest pressure from the desert
[264] leaders and holy men. The main importance of the meeting is that the two hostile
groups are brought together again for the first time, that the cleavage between them has been narrowed sufficiently to permit them to eat round one bowl, and that, by virtue of this commensal meal, the way is now open for the restoration of normal relationships. Subsequently there may be another killing, which, in the mind of the perpetrator, is connected with the earlier death of a kinsman, but it is not publicly recognized as one in a series of killings, or even as a vengeance killing; it is regarded as unique, and the method of dealing with it is on the basis of this fiction. Feud is not permitted between two collateral tertiary sections, for although the pattern of homicide may be similar to that of a feud, the two are never equated. There is good reason for this, since, whatever the similarity in pattern, the social relationships between the groups involved are radically different; each homicide involving tertiary sections is regarded as a unique event, and the relationships between times are friendly, whereas in feud relationships are permanently hostile and need not be otherwise for social, economic, or religious purposes.

Blood money when it brings peace brings it because payment is made only in part. It is never regarded as a payment for the life of a man, to be dissipated wantonly. 'The owner of the blood' should marry a wife with it to beget children (one son to be named after the victim) or to buy camels to provide for a future marriage, or to buy a horse to be used to ride in bringing vengeance. Sufficient is paid to cover either of the first two alternatives; as far as my records go the third alternative is romanticism. At the peace meeting the offender's group does not promise to pay the total amount in one sum. An initial instalment is promised after the next lambing season or barley harvest. When the time comes it can be argued that the sheep dropped a disappointingly small number of lambs, or that the barley harvest did not fulfil expectations. If there is room for negotiation over the initial payment, the permitted manœuvring over subsequent payments is much greater. Promises made at the peace meeting relating to these subsequent payments do not specify the exact amount of each; the statement is no more definite than that the remainder should be paid over the following three to five years. Consequently when the second payment falls due, the offender's group can argue more cogently that their circumstances do not permit even a reduced payment, for the payment of the previous year was substantial and they have not yet recovered from this outlay. 'The owner of the blood' is pressed to consider this, and to accept only a fraction of the wealth he had come to collect. The argument is cumulative, and can be used to excuse the rapidly decreasing payments of each successive year, until there comes a time when attempts to collect payments are discontinued. The arguments about the payments bear no relationship to the wealth possessed by a group. During the annual hagglings, and while members of the offender's group are declaring their straitened circumstances as an excuse for the small amount offered, the 'owner of the blood' knows full well that two or three

621 613 hundred of their sheep are grazing in the neighbourhood. This is beside the point. What is important is that the offender's group is showing a desire to remain on 628 friendly terms, and members of the victim's group are doing likewise by accepting 682 reduced amounts. Compared with what the payments should be, after four years they are trivial and soon cease altogether. Blood money, if it is to achieve the purpose of 621 restoring peaceful relationships, must work in this way among the Bedouin, for, as 613 they view the matter, a single payment of the full amount would only terminate 628 relationships. There would be no further obligations to hold them together. The 682 payment of a debt in full means only one thing—hostility. Where there is no debt, 571 there are no relationships. Debt must be allowed to run between groups, for it is this 182 which creates obligations and perpetuates social relationships.[1] As the debt of blood money mounts, the social relationships between the groups improve. The cessation of payments and the absence of further demands is final earnest that the relationships are again normal.

613 The second step in this exposition, therefore, is to attach to homicide between 628 tertiary sections the penalty of vengeance or the payment of blood money, both 621 achieving the same end of bringing about a restoration of peaceful relationships.

682 Between secondary sections, relationships are again different. Ecologically, the 619 areas are distinct. The topography may be dissimilar—sand dunes in one area and 613 low valleys in another; secondly, the soils may differ—sandy soil here and firm valley [133] bottom soil there; thirdly, while the climatic régime of the two areas may be broadly similar, since there is marked variability in the aggregate annual rainfall which is [132] coupled with a high variability from place to place, each secondary section has its own micro-climate, sufficiently well defined for one area to be well watered in any given year while a neighbouring area suffers partial drought. These differences affect [221] productive activities. Seasonal movements are also affected: some secondary sections move annually over considerable distances and in fixed directions, while members of a collateral section may move only a few miles and these short moves may vary in direction from year to year. It is true that minor ecological differences exist between collateral tertiary sections, but these do not affect the economy and the way of life in the manner described for secondary sections. Partly because of their territorial extent, partly because of the larger aggregate population, the secondary sections are more self-contained, not only ecologically and economically but also in terms of social relationship. More of the requirements of everyday living can be met within the territory and span of a secondary section than within those of a tertiary section. Secondary sections develop a kind of specialization to the extent that in any year some of them will have more usable natural resources than others, but because these differences are ephemeral they do not lead to the development of permanent trade relations. Add to all this the fact that agnates are concentrated in camps on the territory which belongs to their lineage, and the discreteness of secondary sections is [582] immediately apparent. Marriage rules make this discreteness potentially, at least, even more sharply defined, for unlike other 'lineage societies' where exogamy, coupled with other marriage regulations, compels the dispersion of kin links among lineage

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[1] This point becomes clearer when considered in the general context of debt relationship among the Bedouin. Marriage payments, gift exchanges, hospitality, various forms of help, and so on are all aspects, with blood money, of an intricate and fascinating web of debt relationships.

619 613 582 segments, the Bedouin are free to marry within as close a range as the first cousin on either side. Preferential marriage with the father's brother's daughter exists, not merely as a sentiment, but with the legal force of permitting a man this choice against all other men. Before a father arranges the marriage of his daughter he first must seek the permission of his brother's son. Moreover, if a first-parallel cousin is not available, a Bedouin is free to take as a wife any parallel cousin within the minimal lineage. Much weight has been given to the value of exogamy as a device for the definition of groups; parallel-cousin marriage is equally suitable for the purpose—indeed it is better for it has the effect of knitting the members of a local group together as cognates, thereby throwing the group into isolated relief.

613 628 682 Consequently, when a homicide occurs between two secondary sections, there is no urgent necessity to make peace, the relationship between them being of a kind that can be controlled and altered to suit the circumstances. It is between these groups that the argument—if the argument is taken up at all—centres on the circumstances of the killing, every effort being made to show that insult was deliberately added to homicide, that one homicide is to be distinguished from another because a man of great renown was singled out as the avenger's victim, or that in a vengeance killing there was a breach of taboo as well. A debt is always left over, and it is an impelling obligation for the Bedouin to redeem it. They frequently speak of vengeance in this context as 'redeeming the debt'. Again, any homicide between two secondary sections is regarded as one in a series, whether the details or even the name of the victim of the previous homicide is known or not. I recall discussing a double homicide with a close kinsman of the slayer, and the only way he could account for it was by telling me that his kinsman had to kill because his victims were of such and such a group. The feud knows no beginning, and it has no end. It is a form of behaviour associated with a specific structural order, and it is as persistent as the structural order itself; in this sense it is eternal. It was most difficult to get the Bedouin to give accounts of homicides other than those which had occurred over the past fifty years or so, but they invariably claimed that the origin was earlier than this, although they were wholly unaware of the identity of the earlier victims. In any event, their only historical frame of reference is the genealogy; and history, as a chronological sequence of events, has no meaning beyond the founding ancestor of a minimal segment. When they refer events to points on the genealogy superior to this, they are no longer thinking in terms of the temporal order of events, but in terms of what they know to be the contemporary relationships between groups, for the names on the genealogy are names of groups and do not bear a relation to a time scale in any sense. Put in another way, for them a homicide which involves two secondary sections must be a feud, because this is the nature of the relationships between the groups, and there must have been previous killings, otherwise the people involved would not belong to two separate secondary groups.

The relationships which are referred to as feud are of a kind which requires at least a show of hostility whenever the parties happen to meet. Even if they do not actually meet, but are in the vicinity, some sort of demonstration is likely. Thus, several shots were fired at a man riding some distance away from a camp, and although positive identification was difficult at this range, the men of the camp argued it must have been a member of a group with which they were at feud otherwise the passer-by

would have dropped in on the camp. In another situation, two men entered a shop 613
in a market-place; inside sat two men of a feuding group who, instead of retreating 628•
hastily, greeted those who had just entered, and the latter returned the greeting with 682
blows on the head from the butts of their rifles. Markets in Cyrenaica are recognized
to be places of peace. In their actions the two offenders not only injured two others [443]
but also broke a taboo in a public place. The victim's group now had to avenge not [683]
only the injury but the insult that the breach of taboo carried with it, as well. In most feud relationships this is characteristic. It is never a matter of a simple homicide, but of killing a man at the entrance to his tent, between the centre poles of his tent, or taking the life of a minor, or an elder too old to carry arms and so on. Each successive killing ensures that the hostile relationships will be perpetuated.

The third step in this exposition, therefore, is the association of a state of feud with the secondary order of segmentation.

When the relationships between the structurally superior primary tribal sections 619
are examined, the arguments against the necessity for peace are stronger than in the case of secondary sections. Relationships between them are few and irregular. Only occasionally do members of these groups meet, and then often accidentally; very many men of collateral primary sections are complete strangers one to the other.
If a homicide occurs between two primary sections it is unlikely that any attempt to 619
open negotiations will be made. The offender's camp may be raided by a *ghazi* 682
recruited from the victim's kinsmen. There would be no question of these primary [721]
sections going to war. On a raid firearms may be used, but the action is limited to a
strike-and-run affair. If the issue is joined and members of both sides are ranged [726]
against each other they fight with sticks to avoid large-scale slaughter: warfare must
not be allowed within the tribe. Wars belong to intertribal relationships. For one of 175
these wars, apart from hearsay evidence, some records exist. These tell of a war 619
which took place during the period 1860 to 1865, in which there were planned cam- 726
paigns, the organization of fighters into groups, and provisions for a labour force in the home territory, large enough to produce sufficient food to maintain an army in the field. During this war several hundred people were killed.

At this point, it is possible to summarize the stages in this exposition of the 619
Bedouin view in diagrammatic form.
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

613 Among the Bedouin, men are permitted to marry their father's brother's daughter
582 and any other cousin of similar type within the local agnatic group. This means that
121 most agnates will be related in other ways as well. Parallel-cousin marriage has the
effect of diversifying the agnatic group, and creates small nuclei within it, each having its own characteristics and patterns of behaviour with others. Diversification of this kind leads to a differentiation between homicides within the tertiary group.

The Bedouin say that they always marry their parallel cousins, and do not give their daughters to others if they can help it. Census data does not support this view. Nearly as many men find wives outside their agnatic group as within it. Of importance in the present context is the direction taken by these external marriages. Perhaps
121 the most striking feature is that the number of marriages with men of a collateral
582 tertiary group is low, so low that they can be explained by special circumstances.
• 628 Now collateral tertiary groups whose territories are adjacent experience intense day-
613 to-day relationships. In the context of descent these are the most closely linked
[621] lineages—among older men there may be the recollection of the time when the two
constituted a single community, and when they all lived together in the same summer camp. Common sentiment between them is very strong. The strips of territory they inhabit may be almost identical. Their discreteness lies almost entirely in the possession of separate natural resources, although in some cases pastures are shared. But their social boundaries are nevertheless sharply drawn, for the high incidence of parallel-cousin marriage within them, and the tendency for external links to leap-frog collateral segments, gives them a definition which could not be bettered by exogamy.
121 The basis of their discreteness lies, of course, in the competition that exists between
628 them for natural resources; however much the Bedouin protest that their real enemies
613 are the secondary or primary groups lying some thirty to fifty miles away, when they
wish to enlarge their resources there is little point in attempting to capture a well a
578 long distance away, which cannot be defended, and might be located alongside an
enemy group. They do, it is true, engage in competitive hostilities over land and water situated some distance from their homeland, but when they engage in these activities they do so on behalf of a linked group, albeit with their own interests uppermost. The capture of natural resources for use by a tertiary group can only be achieved by an enlargement of its homeland, and this is only possible by expanding into a neighbour's territory.

121 Another feature of external marriages is that they are not spread among as many
613 groups as in societies where there are exogamous clans, and where other rules of
marriage appear to compel the maximum amount of dispersal. Instead, the external
582 links created through marriage are highly selective, and are thrown out into ecologi-
cally differentiated areas, giving added economic security, or, in the case of date oases, an additional item to the diet at a time of the year when it is sorely needed. Once established these external links are perpetuated through cross-cousin marriages in successive generations. If the link is considered valuable, and relationships develop satisfactorily, other marriage connexions will be woven around the first. Multiplicity gives added strength and durability, not in the mechanical sense of duplication, but of creating a more diverse kin structure, with its greater range of rights and claims, in which links can flourish. While the number of groups linked in marriage are few, the geographical spread is great. Marriage links exist with tertiary sections of colla

The consequences of homicides in which secondary groups are concerned present 121
an even greater variety, for now the span has expanded to include many more groups, 613
with a total population of several thousand people. Groups of this order are spread 682
over a much wider territorial range; some structurally distant groups are neighbours
by virtue of their propinquity, while some structurally proximate groups are far
removed territorially. Some feuds lie dormant for long periods. Others erupt [578]
frequently. Some homicides between these groups are followed by the 'laying down
of the denial'—the feud situation with most acrimony built into it, for one denial,
followed by a vengeance killing, is met by a second denial and so on, excluding thereby
any chance of a settlement. In other circumstances the offender's group boast that
they are responsible for a homicide, thus challenging the victim's group to a show
of force. Only the more powerful tertiary groups would venture to do this, and it is
only they who could meet a homicide against them with a spectacular show of force,
compelling a weaker tertiary group (according to hearsay evidence) to break up and
leave its homeland. The modes of killing in homicide differ in character. Some killings
have been heinous and offensive in terms of general morality; their purpose is to
sting the victim's kin to retaliate or to cause them to suffer general discredit and loss
of status. While some parts of secondary segments are at feud, others are not.
A homicide between affinally or matrilaterally linked groups, whether they are
secondary or primary groups, is settled as quickly and as amicably as possible to
prevent turmoil in their relationships. Feud concerns two tertiary sections, not the [578]
opposed secondary sections of which they are parts. Blood money and vengeance is [628]
not the responsibility of secondary sections, but of their respective tertiary sections.

At this point, a further statement concerning the external marriage links of tertiary 121
segments throws further light on the feud. Previously it was stated that the competition
between collateral tertiary groups for natural resources is indicated by a low 613
rate of marriage between them. Their external marriage links reinforce the separation. 582
One tertiary section, A, takes some of its spouses from section X of a collateral 578
secondary section; A's collateral, B, takes some of its spouses from X's collateral, Y.
A may be at feud with Y and B with X. The agnatic links between A and B, and X
and Y do not mitigate the severity of the hostility in the two feuds, they exacerbate
it. It would be erroneous to think of them as cross-cutting ties which promote peace.
Stultified in the development of their hostilities by virtue of their territorial proximity
and the sentiment associated with putatively close agnatic connexion, A and B are
able to express hostilities indirectly through their linked groups X and Y respectively.
During discussions of disputes, homicides, or rival claims to water, whether the disputants
meet in the camps or in administrative offices in the villages, men from the
matrilateral and affinal groups of the parties directly concerned are also present to do
most of the shouting. In some cases I recorded a maternal relative was killed on
behalf of an agnatic group to which he did not belong, although the latter accepted
the responsibility. In the light of facts of this sort the lineage model obstructs analysis.

I now wish to make a few brief remarks about the relationships between collateral 121
primary sections and paired tribes. Homicide, it was asserted earlier, results in raids 619
and war between groups of these orders of segmentation respectively. Evidence 682
can be adduced to show that both consequences have followed. The case usually 726
cited to demonstrate that a single killing precipitates war between tribes is the

121 celebrated war between the 'Abaidat and the Bara 'asa tribes occupying a large part
619 of central and eastern Cyrenaica. This war took place a hundred years ago, so that the
682 evidence is mainly hearsay, but it is significant that when asked for details of the
726 groups taking part the Bedouin make it clear that the entire tribes were not at war—
[173] some sections on both sides are said to have remained on friendly terms. Yet when
121 wars are discussed in a general fashion, the Bedouin insist that tribes confront each
619 other as such. If it is pointed out to them that men might be ranged against their
726 maternal relatives the Bedouin mumble apologetically that they would not kill their
maternal relatives—a lame argument since in the heat of battle men cannot make this
602 kind of discrimination. Details of other wars also illustrate the point that only parts
of tribes face each other in strife, for though the stories of past events may be inaccurate
there is genealogical evidence to substantiate their claims that certain groups
were linked in the past, and in any case their statements assert that where these links
exist they are not prepared to engage in hostilities. The several parts of each tribe,
121 like the parts of primary and secondary sections, have as many different sorts of
619 relationships as there are groups, and the general statement that tribes are warring
571 units merely obscures the interest there is in their relationships. Tribes, further, lack
the leadership to make war. I repeat that leadership does exist, but not even the
121 greatest leaders, past or present, can rightly be described as leaders of their tribes,
619 using the term in its structural connotation. Literature on the subject gives the
613 impression that there are tribal leaders, because successive administrations have used
554 the tribes and their divisions as a framework for attempting to rule the Bedouin, but
the details of the power domains of individual leaders make it clear that they have
little to do with the ordered divisions of tribes. A leader within part of one tribe may
carry with him tertiary sections of another tribe, and if major hostilities break out
between parts of these tribes, the sections of both which are joined as allies and
related as kinsfolk will not fight against each other, for sections so linked enjoy
stronger connexions than the structurally linked tertiary sections of a very large
[682] secondary section. Consequently the statement that homicide results in tribal war
[114] when the offender and his victim are members of two separate tribes is not merely
incomplete, not merely a simplification, it is wrong.

121 A point which has been implicit throughout the second part of this paper needs
now to be made quite explicit: groups do not come together in their respective
613 structural genealogical orders. During my entire residence in Cyrenaica I did not
571 see a group of agnates larger than a tertiary tribal section assemble for any purpose.
[114] It is true that the occasions when large groups are required to assemble are infrequent.
[648] It is also true that although the British Administration was serving a caretaker role
only, it may have had an affect on the nature of tribal gatherings. Despite this qualification,
there were several occasions when I expected tribal groups to assemble in
lineage order if the fusion of sections in relation to like sections has any meaning in
practice. Large groups of men did gather to dispute claims to wells, to argue about
rights to ploughland, and to make peace. In every case that I recorded the agnatically
closest groups of the main participants were absent, while members of genealogically
more remote groups were present in strength. This statement applies to gatherings
in the camps and in the administrative centres. One of the biggest gatherings I
[628] witnessed assembled in an administrative office in a village near the coast in the

south-west of the country. Most members of the two tertiary groups directly concerned 121
in the dispute were present. The agnates of the collaterally linked groups of 613
the principals were unrepresented; indeed collaterals of one of the principals made 571
it quite explicit that they were opposed to their genealogical allies and considered 628●
their perusal of the matter tiresome. The bulk of the crowd present was made up
of men linked to the principals in a variety of different and non-agnatic ways, and it
was they who provided most of the argument once the issue had been opened. It 121
follows, therefore, that an analysis of political organization and behaviour in Cyrenaica 613
which is based on lineage theory leads to a gross misrepresentation. For, what 114
I am arguing is not that the lineage model in its rarefied state is too simple, not that
additional facts must be injected into it to complicate it, but that it does not provide
an admissible basis for analysis.[1] The complication of something that is founded in
error can only lead to complicated error, however many facts of real life are introduced
in an attempt to give it substance. The Bedouin conception of their social
relationships in terms of a genealogical ordering of groups is a fact of their social [829]
life, and in relation to some problems it is an important fact. My objection to the use
which has been made of a people's ideology of their relationships is that it has been
elevated from its status as a component of social life to such a position of universal
dominance in all sets of social relationships that 'every sociological problem', as
Fortes writes of the Tallensi, 'hinges on the lineage system'.[2]

If the ordering of groups within the frame of the Bedouin genealogy is abandoned 121
as a basis for analysis, it does not follow that the only remaining view is that of small 613
groups of people distributed throughout the country enjoying relationships merely 571
as units. Regularity in relationships does exist, it is urgently necessary, and it persists; 578
but this regularity is not consistent with a lineage model. Ultimately, feud is a
violent form of hostility between corporations which has its source in the competition
for proprietory rights in land and water. This competition makes it necessary for
groups to combine to prevent the encroachments of others in similar combinations
and also to expand their resources whenever the opportunity arises. The significant
groups in a discussion of the feud are these power groups, and it is their composition,
the shifting alliances within them, the growth and diminution in the power of tertiary

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[1] Dr. Paul Bohannan has distinguished in his writings between what he calls folk systems and analytical systems. The distinction, as he sees it, is set out clearly in the statement 'a certain field of Nuer relationships is explained by Nuer in terms of an agnatic genealogy. This is the folk system. The same field is explained, in English, by Professor Evans-Pritchard, as a lineage system based on the principle of segmental opposition. This is an analytical system' (Bohannan, 1957, p. 5). What is the difference? Is it only a difference of language? Bohannan's analytical statement is little more than a generalisation of what is in the folk system. An analytical system, in his hands, is a sophistication of a folk system, for it is the latter which provides him with his analytical framework. The act of creativity on the part of the social anthropologist about which he writes (Bohannan, 1963, p. 14) is the revealing of a folk system through analysis. But he does not
depart from the framework set by informants—the 121
agnatic genealogy is the lineage, and the fission and 613
fusion of parts, the opposition of like segments and 114
so on is explained by informants in different languages 171
as adequately as it is explained by social anthropologists in English. Bohannan's viewpoint is made clearer, perhaps, in his discussion on the arrangement of facts relating to Tiv law. Here he considers what he should do once he has elicited all the facts, and he argues against setting them out as an arrangement of the procedural law of Tiv courts because, 'The error would be that the arrangement is not part of *the Tiv way of looking at it*, and hence would be false' (Bohannan, 1957, p. 69. Italics mine). Why? The Tiv are not the social anthropologists. Is the test of an analytical model its consistency with a folk comprehension?

[2] Fortes, 1945, p. 30.

the different families. A year later the Gottaan brought 682
up the case again, acknowledging the receipt of £50 from 672
the Magai, but protesting that they had still not received 693
anything from the Nefoofa. On an enquiry being held, 695
a representative collection of infuriated members of the
Nefoofa family came to court, protesting that Abd el Gelil had already collected their payments, and that if he had not handed over the money, their responsibility at any rate had ended for the moment.

It subsequently transpired, when Abd el Gelil was with difficulty got hold of and brought to court, that he had collected about £50, but claimed this sum as his own
personal travelling expenses for collection. Then followed [685]
another lawsuit, in which the Nefoofa family sued their
self-appointed lawyer for mis-appropriation of tribal funds. The details of this new case, and those of the original suit, were then re-capitulated and muddled up together, to the complete bewilderment of the writer and the entire satisfaction of the Bedouin assessors.

Mention has been made of the extra £100 (£400 instead 682
of £300) usually paid among the Gawabees tribe as the 672
price of a life. It seems, however, as though there are ex-
ceptions to this rule; and the following case seems to shew [435]
that the payment of "Sanaa" depends on a variety of circumstances.

A family called Sirdani had had a bloodfeud with another 682
family of the Gawabees called Sayed, one of the former 628 ●
having killed one of the latter some fifty years ago. The 672
two families had been living in totally different districts, and for years had not come into contact with each other, and so the feud had been allowed to continue.

In the spring of 1921 a man of the first family, about forty-five years old, called Mirtah el Sirdani, left the Wadi Natrun for the Nile Valley to buy some sheep from the Fellaheen, taking with him his old mother and a small boy, to help him bring them back across the desert to the luscious grazing in the wadi swamps. He arrived at the

682 Cultivation, bought his sheep, and started off westwards
628 to the wadi.

672 By a sheer coincidence, four men of the other family had left their camping ground a fortnight before, and had gone south on their yearly pilgrimage to Baharia Oasis to bring back dates. On leaving the oasis, they had later arrived at the wadi, watered their camels, and pushed on northwards to their camping ground. About one and a half days' trek north of the wadi, about half an hour before sunset, they saw in the distance a cloud of dust advancing towards them, out of which gradually emerged a flock of sheep, an old woman, a man, and a small boy.

According to the subsequent evidence of the mother, her son Mirtah drove his sheep unconcernedly, not noticing with the rays of the setting sun in his eyes who was with the approaching camels. When they drew near he called out the usual greeting, "Peace be upon you"; but instead of the stereotyped reply, two of the camelmen suddenly leapt from their camels with heavy sticks in their hands, and rushed at Mirtah. The old mother and the small boy began to run away, while the frightened sheep scattered in all directions. Mirtah was entirely unprepared for any assault, and before he realised what was happening, he had received two thundering blows on his skull from the two men, who immediately afterwards remounted, and rode away.

Mirtah fell stunned; and as soon as his assailants had gone, his mother and the boy ran to his assistance. After a few minutes Mirtah staggered to his feet in a dazed sort of way, cursed his aggressors, whom he had recognised as belonging to the Sayed family, and said that he would be able to continue slowly. He managed with the help of his mother and the boy to cover two or three miles, but was overcome by pain and loss of blood, and again collapsed. His mother with the sheep remained by his side, and sent off the boy to the Wadi to get assistance to bring him in. Fortunately, after running a few miles, the boy came across some

members of a neutral family with grazing camels, and with 682
their help Mirtah was fetched in to the Wadi unconscious. 628

The case was reported to the police, but a few hours
after his arrival in the Wadi Mirtah quietly died. The 672
post-mortem examination revealed a skull cracked right across, with severe cerebral haemorrhage. In due course the Sirdani family claimed £400 bloodmoney from the Sayed family, according to the custom among the Gawabees tribe. This time, however, an exception was made. The sheikhs decided that the ordinary bloodmoney of £300 only should be paid by the Sayed to the Sirdani family, £100 in money and £200 in kind, divided into six yearly instalments of £50 each.

They also added a rider to the effect that they were not awarding Sanaa under the circumstances, as there was no proof of intent to kill, and that weapons such as guns or knives (which would imply premeditation) were not used. The presumption was that the Sayed family, though obviously intending to cause grievous bodily harm, did not intend to kill Mirtah. The fact that he died of his wounds automatically warranted the award of £300 as bloodmoney, but did not constitute sufficient justification for the imposition of the extra £100 as Sanaa.

In Common Law it is not always easy for the uninitiated 671
to understand the legal value of a threat, or what proportion 683
of the punishment for the completed action is due for a mere threat. It was singularly pleasing, therefore, to find a striking instance of a threat to shoot, and to see the attitude of the Bedouin court towards this particular offence.

An Arab called Abd el Kerim was tolerably well-to-do, 233
and owned several camels, a mare, fair-sized flocks of 685
sheep and goats, and certain cultivation rights; and he had two sons aged about sixteen and eighteen respectively. His cousin, Abd el Salam, who lived half a mile away, had four sons of ages ranging from fifteen to twenty, but he was considerably poorer in this world's goods. Abd el Kerim's sons took their camels out to graze, and inadvertently

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Libyan Bedouin MT9

[For information on the political role of the omda (umda) as a representative of the more powerful and numerous tribal segments within an administrative district, see Category 634.]

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Libyan Bedouin MT9

[Information on the Grand Sanusi of the Bedouin of Cyrenaica, religious head of the Sanusiya Order, will be found in Category 793.]

175 bat from al-Qasr joined the Sanusi army. The importance of
795 their contribution to the Sanusi effort is vague, even though
648 most of my informants claimed that their fathers "fought the
British." Some of the al-Qasr activity was on a part-time
[124] basis. One informant, whose father was the paramount leader
of the 'Aishaibat tribe in 1916, told me that his father
"used to take his rifle and ride out every morning to join
the troops of Sayyid Ahmad al-Sharif (the grandson of
al-Sanusi al-kabiir), and there he would kill many British
soldiers. Then he would come home again at night." There
was at least one group of al-Qasr Bedouins who joined the
Sanusi in Libya before the start of the war. After the end
of the fighting, this group returned to Egypt and asked to be
pardoned by the British. They appealed to the Governor of
Marsa Matruh that there should be no reprisals taken against
them since the Turks had actually forced them to fight for the
Sanusi. The British Governor, who was fluent in the Bedouin
dialect and considered a great man by the Bedouins, replied
to them in the form of a famous Bedouin proverb: "The ropes
can be stretched far enough for forgiveness."

175 Traditionally, the Bedouins of the Marsa Matruh area
177 were held in check by an officially created political structure
554 which dated from the time of Muhammad 'Ali. This structure
•631 depended upon two political roles for the control of the
648 Awlad 'Ali, the 'umda and the shaikh, neither of which had
previously existed in the Bedouin authority system.

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Historically, the modern aspect of role differentiation and political specialization began with the appointment of Mitkhatri 'Adam at Sidi Barrani, west of Marsa Matruh. This was under Muhammad 'Ali Pasha. The new role was that of 'umda, the same term used for the village leader in the Valley of the Nile. The first Bedouin 'umda died in 1909. At this time, under the British, another political role was instituted. This new role, that of shaikh, was a kind of vice-'umda position. The son of the first shaikh is now about 80 years old [115] and still lives in Marsa Matruh. (He was my chief informant for Bedouin history.) During this early period, there were few government officials in the desert, and, according to my informant, "there was need for only a few 'umdas and shaikhs. But later there was a need for more and more. The job of these men in those times was to work for the Egyptians in their dealings with the Bedouins of the desert." The number of incumbents in the offices of 'umda and shaikh increased as the political needs of the British grew.

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According to the Bedouins, the British administration did not arrive in the desert until about 1914. Up until that time, matters were in the hands of the Egyptians who governed the desert province for the colonial government. When the British arrived in Marsa Matruh, the opening of World War I was at hand. The Bedouins say, quite proudly, that the British knew of their sympathy for, and cooperation with, the Sanusi against the Italians in Cyrenaica.

175 Sanusi against the Italians in Cyrenaica. "When the British
648 reached Matruh, they jailed all of the 'umdas and shaikhs
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631 (two 'umdas and five shaikhs, at that time). Then they chose
new leaders, from the families of the old leaders, to work
with them." But, "these men did not fight with the British,
they only acted as their guides in dealing with the Bedouins
of the desert. When the old leaders were released from jail,
they returned to their positions of political office. While
they were in jail, their replacements had only helped the
[178] British with supplies." Apparently, the British saw the need
of maintaining the continuity of the Bedouin authority structure.

175 Data on the condition of the Bedouins of the Western
648 Desert between the two world wars are absent. The Bedouins
say that they lived with no trouble, or any help, from the
Egyptians. The Bedouins have no fond memories of their
experiences during World War II. They first heard of the war
in 1940 when the Italians marched into Western Desert from
Libya. The Germans occupied al-Qasr from May to October of
1942, when the famous General Rommel had his headquarters at
Marsa Matruh. The British had told the Bedouins, in 1940,
that they should flee the Italians, and that unless they did
175 they would be held responsible for their actions. Most of the
648 people of al-Qasr agreed to go to refugee camps at Amriyya
722 near Alexandria for the duration of the war.
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[556] Some of the Bedouins refused to leave for Amriyya.

131 view it, the Western Desert is the *watan*
619 ("homeland") of the Awlad 'Ali tribe, and is subdivided into
● 631 tribal zones each referred to as a *mintaqa*. *Mintaqit al-Qasr*
is part of *mintaqit qabilit 'Aishaibat* (i.e. "the area of
al-Qasr" is part of "the territory of the 'Aishaibat tribe").
131 Each tribal *mintaqa* is further broken down into contiguous
619 parcels of land belonging to lineages, and these are also
*613 referred to as *mintaqa*; for instance, there is *mintaqa*
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[423] *'ailit Ma'fas*, i.e. "the territory of the Ma'fas family."
In the al-Qasr segmentary lineage society, genealogical
ties and local ties are coincidental. The boundaries of
al-Qasr are defined by the agnatic lines of the 'Aishaibat
tribe and include the *sahil* and *sha'ir wi mar'a* zones.

361 To the Egyptians, a *qarya* ("village") is a nucleated
631 cluster of permanent dwellings with some degree of social
integration: al-Qasr is a *qarya* for administrative matters.
The Bedouins, who think in terms of kin-based residence groups,
tribal boundaries, and political and economic symbiotic relations,
see the Egyptian *qarya* as only a sector of al-Qasr.
They refer to this sector as the *'izba*, i.e., "farm" or "rural
settlement." The *'izba* is land fertile enough to support a
secure and sedentary life. "The *'izba*," the Bedouins say,
"is the seed of the *madiina*" (city).

[121] For my own purposes, the Bedouin sense of al-Qasr is
the more useful concept. Al-Qasr is all of the territory of
[131] the 'Aishaibat tribe. Situated at 31°N and 27°E, al-Qasr is

361 directly on the Mediterranean coast. The _'izba_ sector is
631 just 14 kilometers due west of Marsa Matruh, and about 300
131 kilometers due west of the coastal city of Alexandria.

161 In 1960, the population of the whole Western Desert
162 was 98,000, the majority being of Bedouin stock. Considering
that Egypt is a country with a 2 - 1/2 per cent rise in birth
rate per year, the desert population would have been about
127,000 in 1965 when I was in the field. The town of Marsa
Matruh, which is the capital of the Province of Matruh
(formerly the Western Desert Province) has a population of
about 7,000. With increasing economic and political concern
for the desert provinces and the oases, this number should
continue to rise.

131 _Mintaqit al-Qasr_ (see Figure 4)[1] is an area which
measures about six kilometers from east to west along the sea,
and about ten to fifteen kilometers on a north-south line
extending into the desert as far as the Libyan plateau. The
162 population of al-Qasr is less easy to determine. In 1960,
al-Qasr, by official count, consisted of 225 families, 595
males and 749 females, or a total of 1344 souls. Al-Qasr, as
[631] the Bedouins define it, includes the _qarya_ and six other demographic
sections separately defined by the Egyptian government.
The population of this al-Qasr is 2,996, 1,287 males and 1,709
[114] females. There is reason to doubt any census figures of the
al-Qasr area because the Bedouins are reluctant to reveal their

[1] [See p. 67--Analyst]

162 true numbers. As recipients of aid programs, their rations
114 are based upon the number of members per family. For these
[657] purposes, they are anxious to present as high a population
figure as possible. They exaggerate their livestock count in
order to receive more fodder, and, at other times, underestimate
their numbers to escape taxes.

162 For purposes of this study, the Bedouin population of
161 al-Qasr is about 1,500 to 3,000. Most of this population lives
361 on the coastal area and in the cultivable *wadi* areas. The
remainder is scattered south of the plateau region, near the
621 desert proper. The *'izba* sector of al-Qasr may be described
*613 as a nucleated cluster or settlement, but due to the nature
of the Bedouin segmentary lineage system, with its relatively
autonomous kin-based residence groups, this sector lacks the
usual degree of social interaction and integration associated
621 with the village or hamlet. The *'izba* might be described as a
*613 multi-nucleated settlement or cluster. Each lineage has its
423 own *mintaqa*. Each *mintaqa* usually has a small dry-goods store
•631 owned and operated by a lineage member and catering chiefly
443 to his own lineage-mates. Water and land in the *'izba* sector
423 are individually owned. In the barley-pasture area, rights
*613 621 and privileges of ownership are vested in the corporate group,
even though the Bedouins and the government claim that tribally
423 owned land is illegal. All land boundaries, whether a *mintaqa*
or an individual's plot, are well-marked and well-known. The

622 His main function is to manage the affairs of the village, apprehend
554 crininals, report and register births and deaths, collect taxes and
represent the government in all matters involving the relationship between
the government and his village. Because of his position as the
[661] representative of the govrernment, he usually enjoys a considerable
amount of power which, over the years, many omdas have used it to obtain
personal benefits.

361 In 1958 the committee appointed for the examination of the possibility
● 631 of applying the system to Awlad Ali noticed that villages in the
sense of a compact settlement similar to that existing in the rural area
simply do not exist in the Western Desert region. There are a few
settled communities in the area but they are scattered homes or a few
stores. These communities have no identifiable boundaries or administrative
631 existence. The area as a whole is divided into ten administrative
634 districts, each having a police station. These districts correspond
[625] to the old Senusia Zawyas which played an important role in
[795] maintaining order in the era until the First World War. Until that time
[175]
the area was divided into fourteen zones each of which was under the
795 jurisdiction of one of the zawyas. The zawyas were mainly religious
175 centers, or shrines, inhabited and directed by a member of the Senusi
[793] order of Cyrenaica. The role of the head of the zawya was to teach the
Qoraan and spread the teachings of the Senusi order. One of the ways
[794] the zawyas attracted followers was through distribution of food and
clothing to those who joined it. The zawyas also provided places of
[798] refuge for those who needed protection since no one could force his way
into the sacred zawyas. Because of their religious position which put

795 Because of their religious position which put
175 them outside the tribal structure, the leaders of the zawyas played a
627 significant role in mediation and settling disputes between various tribal
793 segments. At their disposal was their ability to ostracize anyone
[626] who did not abide by their decision from the zawyas, which meant depriving
him from all the benefits, social as well as religious, that membership
in the zawyas offered.

795 After the First World War when the British replaced the Turks as
175 governors of the area, the zawyas were closed and the religious leaders
177 ordered to leave. The zoning established by the zawyas existed, however,
[648] [631] and was used as the basis for the redistricting of the area. Police
[625] stations replaced the religious centers. From the standpoint of the tribal
619 634 population itself, the districts have no psychological or political
[795] reality. The zawyas were originally established in the areas of tribal
[361] concentrations. But the area itself did not have any political identity.
The only reality from the standpoint of the inhabitants was the tribal
reality and affiliation which cut across many of these districts. Many
of the tribal segments inhabiting one district were and still are hostile
177 to one another. To transform the zones into administrative districts and
634 to establish one office of leadership for the whole district was to impose
619 a political unity nonexistent among the tribal segments inhabiting
[622] the district. To avoid this difficulty, the government supplemented the
territorial principle of the omda system in the rural area with the principle
of tribal representation and came up with a system which seems to
suite the situation in the Western Desert. For each of the districts,
a list of all tribal segments which habitually occupy the area and whose
tribal land is located within the district, is made. The most powerful

*175 them a reprimand on the double count of decrease in revenue
*648 and lack of security. It was essential, therefore, to get the
651 Bedouin to pay their taxes without making too much trouble
about doing so. To this end the Turkish administrative organiza-
*175 tion was largely directed. In 1879 the *Vilayet* of Banghazi was,
in matters of civil administration, finally separated from that of
*648 Tripoli and in 1888 became an autonomous *sanjaq* directly
● 631 dependent on Istanbul. It was governed by a *mutasarrif*
nominated by, and directly responsible to, the Central Govern-
ment. On him depended all the officials of the Administration,
though the chief among them were appointed by the Imperial
Government. The senior officials were usually Turks. The
*175 country was divided for administrative purposes into a number
*648 of districts, each under a *qaimaqam*, except that of Banghazi,
634 which came directly under the Governor himself; and all except
the Aujila-Jalu and Kufra districts were further divided into
*175 sub-districts under mudirs. These districts and sub-districts
*648 followed tribal divisions and subdivisions as any administra-
tion in Cyrenaica must do, since the tribes and their sections
634 are the fundamental social departments of the country. Hence
619 sections of a nomadic tribe might be residing at any time in a
sub-district different to that to which they were administra-
tively attached, and even in a different district.

*175 In his direction of the affairs of the administration, finances,
and police, the Governor was assisted by an administrative
*648 council composed of the chief accountant, the secretary, the
631 qadi, the mufti, and four elected members from the local popula-
tion. Each *qaimaqam*, nominated by the Imperial Government,
had an administrative council similarly composed. The mudirs,
nominated by the Imperial Government on the proposal of the
Governor, had no council established by statute but co-opted
tribal Shaikhs when they wanted their advice or co-operation.
In the towns there was a representative, called *mukhtar*,
elected by the property-owning citizens for each ward, and at
Banghazi and Darna there were urban councils of a simple
kind.

*175 It was the mudir in charge of a sub-district who had direct
dealings with the Bedouin tribes and the lodges of the Sanusiya
*648 Order. In 1911, just before the Italian invasion, there were six
634 districts including Kufra, which came nominally under the

Turkish administration in 1910, and the Banghazi district, 175*
which came directly under the Governor of Cyrenaica for 648*
administration. Attached to each district were the sub-districts 634
shown in the list below,[1] in which the tribes attached to each sub-district are also given. The Bara'asa came under Banghazi, although they lived well to the east, for political reasons, the tribe being exceptionally rebellious.[2]

Districts	*Sub-districts*	*Tribes*
Banghazi (directly dependent on the Governor)	Suluq Qaminis Barsis Sidi Khalifa	'Awaqir
	Slanta	**Bara'asa**
al-Marj	al-Marj	'Arafa and 'Abid
	al-Haniya	Darsa
Darna	al-Sallum Tubruq al-Banba al-Qubba	'Abaidat
	Shahhat	Hasa
Ajadabiya	Marsa Braiqa	Magharba
Aujila and Jalu	—	Awajila and Majabra
Kufra	—	—

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The administration was very slapdash by European standards. 175*
Indeed, Shaikh Muhammad 'Uthman says darkly: 'There is at 648*
Banghazi no organization, political, administrative, or financial. 631 •
I say no more about this matter: it will be understood why.'[3] This was, of course, an exaggeration, for however simple the administration may have been, and perhaps for that reason, it worked—with a good deal of grumbling it is true, but without undue conflict. Revenue was collected and would have exceeded 175*
the cost of the very cheap administration of the country if the 648*
proceeds of some taxes had not been sent to Istanbul. Much of 651
this revenue came from import and export duties, but the bulk 634
of it was derived from taxes on herds and a tenth of the harvest in kind, the collection of which was in the hands of the mudirs. It was the task of these mudirs, who were generally literate

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[1] *Notizie relative al Sangiacato della Cirenaica e alle Mudirie dipendenti dal Mutassarifato di Bengasi* (Ufficio Politico Militare), 1913. [113]

[2] Fabrizio Serra, *Italia e Senussia*, 1933, p. 17; idem in *La Cirenaica*, 1922–3, p. 182.

[3] Op. cit., pp. 59–60.

*175 hold their posts. In 1919 they began to establish civil govern-
*648 ment in the territory under their control and to extend their
influence farther afield. On 31 October of that year Cyrenaica
*175 was given a constitution similar to that given to Tripolitania,
*648 and its parliament first met in April 1921 under the unlikely
642 presidency of Sayyid Safi al-Din, the old enemy of the Italians
[646] in the Sirtica. The tribesmen, of course, elected their own
Shaikhs. It held altogether five sessions up to March 1923, when it was closed down. From the Italian point of view the best that could be said for the constitution was that it implied a tacit acceptance of sovereignty and that a parliament brought their officials into personal touch with tribal leaders. Writers of the Fascist period, when the Wilsonian sentiments which inspired the Libyan constitutions were regarded with disfavour, strongly criticized the Government of the day for granting them. Thus Gaibi says that they were bound to bear evil fruit and that 'the Government thought to present itself as a magnanimous conqueror, and the Libyans thought it a beaten coward'.[1] The Bedouin certainly distrusted and despised the Italians and cared as little for their authority in Cyrenaica as their brothers cared for it in Tripolitania. About 100 of their Shaikhs met at Ajadabiya, where they issued a manifesto declaring that, constitution or no constitution, they would not tolerate the Italians outside the coastal towns, and there only as traders. To this insult the Government lamely responded by opening new
*175 conversations. After long discussions between the Colonial
*648 Governor, Giacomo de Martino, and 'Umar Pasha al-Kakhiya,
*795 representing Sayyid Idris, and an exploratory visit by Sayyid
al-Rida to Rome, it was agreed that the *modus vivendi* of 'Akrama should be superseded by a new pact, the Accord of al-Rajma of 25 October 1920.

*175 By this new agreement Sayyid Idris was given the hereditary
*648 title of 'Sanusi Amir' with the honorific address of Highness
*795 and was created Head of the autonomous administration of the
oases of Jaghbub, Aujila, Jalu, and Kufra, with the right of
631 using Ajadabiya as the seat of his administration. He was
793 granted a personal monthly allowance of L. 63,000 (on the day
[434] of the signing of the accord the Lira was 92 to the Pound

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[1] Agostino Gaibi, *Manuale di Storia politico-militare delle Colonie Italiane*, 1928, p. 531.

Sterling) and was allowed his own flag, the first place of honour 175*
after the Governor on official occasions, a salute of guns on 648*
official visits, and the use of an official steamer. Sums of money 795*
amounting to L. 93,000 were to be paid in monthly allowances 631
to members of his family. In addition the Government under- 793
took to pay the police and military necessary to maintain order [434]
within the area under the Amir's administrative control, and a further L. 2,600,000 to meet the Amir's general expenses, of which L. 300,000 was to be in gold, and half this sum, including the gold portion, was to be paid on the signing of the accord and the other half on the suppression of the armed Sanusi camps. The Italians also subsidized tribal Shaikhs and zawiya Shaikhs and they paid stipends to the Members of Parliament. Notables, zawiya officials, qadis, scribes, chiefs of irregular bands, political counsellors, and informers, were all on the Italian pay-roll. The Italians were, in fact, bribing the whole country to keep quiet. The Italian Government further undertook to act in agreement with the Amir in making appointments to posts within the territory entrusted to his administration; recognized his right to move about freely; permitted the oases to send representatives to the local parliament; allowed the population to keep their arms; and guaranteed exemption of the Sanusiya lands from taxation. It specifically and solemnly declared that it had no intention of expropriating Arab lands, privately or collectively owned, or endowments of the Order, in favour of colonists. On his side the Sayyid promised to aid the Government in the application of the new constitution; to suppress within eight months the camps and posts and other Sanusi organizations of a political, administrative, or military character in the territory not entrusted to his administration; to keep his army to 1,000 men, subject to increase by mutual agreement; to encourage trade and communications; and not to tax the population other than by collection of religious tithes without coercion.

It was felt by the Italian Government that though in this new pact it had to make considerable concessions it had gained in return a more definite acceptance of its claim to sovereignty over the whole of Cyrenaica, which was henceforth divided into two zones, Cyrenaica proper under direct Italian administration and the oases under Sanusiya administration. The Sanusiya,

*175 as well as Italy, had been forced to compromise. Critics of the
*648 Fascist period were later to complain that the pact was a blow
• 631 to Italian prestige in that it virtually recognized 'the existence
*795 of two distinct Governments',[1] and Macaluso goes so far as to
793 say that the making of the Sayyid into an Amir 'was the ratification of the undisputed sovereignty of the Sanusiya in Cyrenaica'.[2] Even those who defended the agreement had to admit that the Order was not being treated as a purely religious body, but as a politico-religious fraternity and that there was, therefore, doubt about what its relations with the Italian Government were supposed to be. 'Amir' to the Italians meant Honorary Prince but it had a very different sense to the Arabs. It was, moreover, uncertain whether a seat at Ajadabiya implied that the warlike Magharba tribe of the *barqa* and the Sirtica came within the Sayyid's political orbit or not. On the whole one can say that the Sayyid, or rather the Amir, as we can now call him, bargained autonomy of the oases and the hinterland for his armed camps and administrative posts on the plateau. As he did not, in fact, disband these he may be said to have had the better of the bargain. After the Accord of al-Rajma was signed the Amir visited Rome.

The accord was supplemented by a further agreement known as *Sistemazione definitiva delle zauie* of 16 August 1921 by which nomination, suspension, and transfer of Shaikhs of Sanusiya lodges were to be in the hands of the Amir, but he had to give notice of these acts to the Government, and he promised to remove Shaikhs who embittered relations between the Government and the people. The Government undertook to pay the
[434] Shaikhs of lodges (in two categories of L. 900 and L. 600 a
[728] month), to hand back to the Order all lodges in its occupation, except those being used as forts, and to pay the sum of L. 500,000 as indemnity for lodges destroyed during the war.[3]

IV

The Italians pretended afterwards that 'Umar al-Kakhiya, who closely followed political events in Italy, had in bad faith, believing that the Socialists were in the ascendant and that

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[1] Agostino Gaibi, op. cit., p. 463.

[2] Macaluso, op. cit., p. 102.

[3] *L'Occupazione di Cufra*, 1931, pp. 62-3. On 16 August 1921 the Lira was 84 to the Pound Sterling.

Italy would therefore withdraw from her colonial adventure, 175*
advised the Amir to sign the Accord of al-Rajma in the hope 648*
that he would not have to carry out its terms. He was later to 631 •
spend over 16 years in exile in Italy for his alleged duplicity. 795*
The Italians did not at this time charge the Amir with more 793
than weakness when, after the stipulated eight months had [712]
passed, he had failed to carry out the terms of the accord, especially
in the matter of the armed Sanusi camps.

These camps were supply points garrisoned by the remnants 175*
of the Sanusi army of 1917. Through them and from them the 648*
Sanusiya was exercising political control over the country and 712
administering the tribes. The chief camps in 1917 were Ajada- 631
biya, al-Shlaidima, Marawa, Khawalan, al-Abyar, Taknis, and 795*
'Akrama. Each was under a *qaimaqam* and had its com- 701
mandant of troops, its qadi for judicial proceedings, and its tithe collectors who collected from the Bedouin a tax on crops and flocks. With the development of the political functions of the Order alms had been transformed into taxes. Ajadabiya and al-Shlaidima had as their *nazir*, inspector, 'Ali Pasha al-'Abdiya. Al-Abyar and Taknis came under Sidi 'Umar al-Mukhtar, and Marawa, Khawalan, and 'Akrama came under Sayyid Safi al-Din.

When asked why these camps had not been broken up the 175*
Amir said that the accord had been very badly received by the 648*
Bedouin and that were it to be enforced hastily serious dis- 712
turbances might ensue. He counselled caution. In addition to 701
the continuance of the armed camps in defiance of the accord, 795*
the Italians also complained of concerted passive resistance, 793
on the part of the Shaikhs of Sanusiya lodges and the Shaikhs 631
of tribes, to collaboration with their officials; but either because [668]
they were not yet ready to use force or because they were convinced that the Amir was unable to dictate to his followers, and probably for both reasons, they continued to temporize.

By the further Accord of Bu Mariyam of 11 November 1921 175*
the dissolution of the armed camps was confirmed, but it was 648*
agreed that until the Italians had strengthened their admini- 712
strative control and political influence in the country the still- 701
existing Sanusi camps should be held jointly. There were to 631
be four so-called '*Campi Misti*', at al-Abyar, Taknis, Slanta, 795*
and 'Akrama, manned by Italian and Sanusi troops in the

*175 proportion of 5 to 4, each controlled by its own representa-
*648 tive. To these four was later added a fifth camp, al-Makhili,
712 so that the Italians might establish themselves at an important
701 watering-place of the southern nomads.

● 631 The new arrangement was fantastic. Two forces, each under
*795 its own officers and flag, each opposed to the other in every particular, were jointly responsible for the security and welfare of the country. What made it even more absurd in the eyes of later Fascist critics was the fact that the Sanusi soldiers in these camps received their rations and pay from the Italian Government they did everything to flout. It was, moreover, an admission on the part of the Italians that they were unable to enforce the accords they signed with the Amir if the Bedouin did not intend to carry out their terms, and that they could not establish themselves in the country unless the Sanusiya was ready
*175 to allow them to do so. All that apologists for this new accord
*648 have been able to say in defence of it was that the Italian
631 Government had by this time realized that nothing was in any
*795 case likely to come of all these agreements and in the end only signed it in order that, while formally respecting it, they might have time and opportunity to establish their authority among the tribes, particularly among the 'Awaqir, the western Darsa, the Bara'asa, and the 'Abaidat. The Rome Government, not wanting to increase its troubles by starting a new war in Cyrenaica, imposed a policy of appeasement on its restless Colonial Government. It was bad enough to have to face the anarchy in Tripolitania, and there was always a danger that if the situation in Cyrenaica deteriorated Sayyid Ahmad might return to raise again the standard of revolt. Sayyid Idris might be weak and at times difficult, but he was at least pacific. The harassed Governor was therefore instructed that he would have to continue the battle of words till it became feasible to open real hostilities. However, the Italian Government were mistaken in believing that the new accord would allow them to increase their influence in the country, for the Sanusiya, through its representatives in the 'Mixed Camps', came between the tribes and the Italians. It is generally admitted by Italian commentators that after Bu Mariyam the Government was only apparently in the ascendancy politically, while in fact the administration of the whole country outside the towns continued

in the hands of the Order. Nevertheless, the Rome Government 175*
at the time thought, or pretended to think, that the develop- 648*
ment of events was in their favour and that their propaganda 795*
was rapidly costing the Amir and his family their popularity 631 ●
in the country. They constantly, as the Bedouin say when speaking of this period, pushed a stick under the pot to keep it hot till they wanted it to boil over.

The situation at this time in Cyrenaica could not, in any case, 175*
have lasted for long. It became clear to all, even before the 648*
Fascists gained control in October 1922, that hostilities would 793
sooner or later break out again and matters were being brought 795*
to a head by the Amir's attitude on the Tripolitanian issue. The Arabs of Tripolitania, finding themselves in difficulties, sought to extend their front against the Italians by reaching an agreement with the Sanusi, with whom in the past their relations, as we have seen, had not always been cordial. Their leaders held a meeting, at which Sanusi representatives from Cyrenaica were present, at Sirt at the end of 1921 which carried the decisions of the Assembly of Ghariyan a step farther by sending a deputation to Sayyid Idris at Ajadabiya in April 1922 to offer him the Amirate of all Libya. The Sayyid refused to commit himself one way or the other, for he was aware that the Tripolitanian notables who made him the offer had for the most part little regard for his person or for his Order and were merely trying to create a diversion which might draw off some of the Italian forces operating against them. To have replied 'Yes' would have brought him into conflict with Italy. To have replied 'No' would have alienated from him those Tripolitanian Arabs who genuinely sympathized with the Sanusiya. Faced with this dilemma he pleaded ill health early in 1922 and requested the Italian Government to permit him to visit Egypt for two years for rest and treatment. He also, according to Giglio,[1] made the strange request that Sayyid Ahmad be allowed to return to Cyrenaica. Both requests were refused. So was his offer, repeatedly made, to mediate between Italy and the Arabs of Tripolitania, and he was informed, in more forcible terms than he had been accustomed to expect from the Colonial Government, that any interference on his part in the affairs of Tripolitania would be considered a breach of the

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[1] Giglio, op. cit., p. 98.

rendered in fighting faithfully for Italy.' On this point Balbo, 175*
who replaced Graziani, was equally emphatic: 'Chiefs do not 648*
exist any more—there are only citizens with equality of duties 619
and rights.'[1] Tribal Shaikhs, therefore, were not asked to advise the Government or to co-operate with it in any official capacity and the subsidies they had received in the pre-Fascist and early Fascist periods were withdrawn. Cyrenaica under the Fascists was administered by decrees issued by a Governor directly responsible to the Minister for the Colonies at Rome. Under the [646]
Organic Law of 1927 a General Council with very limited advisory functions was allowed for, and Arabs chosen from the notables of the sedentary population and Shaikhs of the Bedouin tribes could be nominated to sit on it by the Minister for the Colonies on the recommendation of the Governor. Its constitutional importance was nil, because it never came into operation. It was replaced by the Law-Decree of 1934, by which 175*
Tripolitania and Cyrenaica became a single colony with the 648*
seat of its administration at Tripoli. The new colony was divided 631
into four commissariats (Tripoli, Misurata, Bengasi, and Derna) 619
and a military territory of the Sahara. Each commissariat came under a Prefect and was divided into administrative sections: departments, residencies, and districts, all under Italian officials. It was recognized that the Bedouin were divided into tribes and sub-tribes. At the head of each was a Shaikh chosen in accordance with tribal custom and nominated by the Head of a commissariat. The Shaikh of a tribe was personally responsible to the competent Italian authority for order and security within the tribal territory. His functions and powers were those accorded him by tribal custom. The Shaikhs of the sub-tribes came under his control and had within their sub-tribal areas functions analogous to his. All that this meant was that certain tribal Shaikhs were recognized as such in so far as they were held responsible for any shortcomings of the Bedouin, but were accorded no privileges and had no representation. Consultative councils, where allowed for, were composed of administrative officials. So long as the Bedouin obeyed the Government and 175*
submitted to whatever curtailments of their freedom and rights 648*
it chose to enact, they could stew in their own juice until the 619

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[1] Italo Balbo, *La Politica Sociale Fascista verso gli Arabi della Libia*, 1938. [113]

571
632

Libyan Bedouin MT9

[For information on the role of the Arab "elite," groups of townsmen from Banghazi and Darna of mixed ethnic backgrounds, who functioned as administrators under Italian rule, see Category 563.]

of the more independent client tribes. In other words, all the 161
Bedouin of Cyrenaica are nomadic in some degree, some more 162
and some less, and Col. De Agostini rightly stresses that 114
whether they move much or little they all have the same characteristics when compared to peasants and townsmen.[1] They are all *bwadi*, as the Cyrenaican dialect has it, people of the tents, and they see themselves as a single people against the *hadur*, the citizens.

I have so far said nothing of the towns of Cyrenaica or of 632
their inhabitants. They play a minor part in this story, which is about the Bedouin, but they cannot be entirely left out of it on account of their economic and political relations with the Bedouin, so I take this opportunity to give a brief account of them.[2]

Banghazi, which is supposed to be called after the saint Sidi 175
Ghazi, buried in the town, is on the site of the classical Berenice. 632
It is believed that after the disappearance of the Graeco-Roman community the site was unoccupied till the fifteenth century, when it was reoccupied by immigrants from the mercantile communities of the Tripolitanian coast, among whom Misuratans, both Muslims and Jews, preponderated in numbers and wealth. The Genoese Della Cella, who passed [162]
through the fly-infested town in 1817–18, in the time of the Caramanlis, says that it then contained about 5,000 inhabitants, [441]
at least half of whom were Jews.[3] Shaikh Muhammad 'Uthman al-Hashaishi, who was in the town in 1896, says that the [167]
greater part of the traders were immigrants from Sfax and the [114]
Island of Jerba—he was himself a Tunisian and often tended to exaggerate Tunisian influence—with some Greeks and a few Italians. 'As to the Turks, they do not give themselves to trade.' At this time Banghazi was a very simple, mostly mud-and-rubble, town, and the learned Shaikh makes a point of telling us that there were no posts or telegraphs, nor even a railway, save a line of three kilometres joining the official

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[1] Ibid., pp. 32–3.

[2] The historical information is chiefly derived from Agostini, ibid., pp. 413–43.

[3] Paolo Della Cella, *Narrative of an Expedition from Tripoli in Barbary to the Western Frontier of Egypt in 1817*, 1822, pp. 194–5. (First published in 1819.) F. W. and H. W. Beechey (*Proceedings of the Expedition to explore the Northern Coast of Africa from Tripoly Eastward in 1821 and 1822*, 1828, p. 299) [113] consider Della Cella's estimate too high. Theirs is 2,000.

175 residence of the Pasha to a garden; and that the town possessed
632 only one machine for grinding corn.[1] The population increased
considerably in the last decades of Turkish rule, reaching the
175 figure of 16,500 in 1911.[2] In 1922 the population was 22,740,
162 the great majority of whom were Arabs from the Maghrib,
632 though some were immigrants into the town from the more
sedentary Bedouin of the neighbourhood. It included also over
2,000 *qulaughla*, descendants of Turkish officials and troops and
Arab women, and a large number of *shawashna*, descendants of
Arab men and Negresses, with a sprinkling of *'abid*, full-blooded
Negroes. There were also about 3,000 Jews and about
3,600 Europeans, almost all Italians. These elements, except
for the Italians who left during the late war, are found in all
the towns of Cyrenaica. There are also a few Cretans, the
remnant of a small community exiled by the Italians.

Darna stands on the site of the Greek town of Darnis, from
which the Arab name is presumably derived. It seems that it
continued to be occupied throughout the Arab period, but was
given new life through the settlement there of Muslim refugees
from Spain at the end of the fifteenth century. According to
tradition, towards the end of the seventeenth century the town
was developed by a certain Muhammad Bey who organized
irrigation and other public works there. The population was
much increased by the settlement of merchants from the coastal
towns of Tripolitania and of other countries of the Maghrib,
either by direct migration or from Banghazi. When Della Cella
[731] visited the town in 1816 the population had been reduced by
pestilence from 7,000 to 500.[3] In 1911 it was about 9,500[4] and
in 1922 it was about 9,700 (not counting Italians) of whom 250
were Jews and the rest Muslims.

Al-Marj, the Italian Barce, was the site of the ancient city of
Barke, famous in Greek times and to Arab historians of the
first centuries after the Arab conquest of Cyrenaica. It fell into
decay after the Hilalian invasion and was only a heap of ruins
till 1842, when the Turkish administration built a fort there, a
Sanusiya zawiya being constructed shortly afterwards. In 1922
175 the population, of very mixed origins, was 1,540. The other
632 centres in Cyrenaica are no more than villages around admini-

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621 [1] Op. cit., pp. 52 and 59.

[2] Coro, op. cit., p. 99.

[3] Op. cit., p. 177.

[4] Coro, op. cit., p. 102.

strative posts and contain not more than a few hundred persons. 175
Shahhat and Tubruq had been Turkish posts before the Italians 632
made them administrative centres. Taukra and Talmaitha had 621
been Sanusiya lodges. Suluq and Qaminis were Italian
creations. Marsa Susa (Apollonia) was first occupied by Cretan
refugees during the Turco-Greek war of 1897. Ajadabiya, the
town of which the Arab historian al-Bakri of the eleventh
century spoke in such glowing terms, had ceased to be a settled
centre until the Turks made it an administrative post. During [648]*
the period of truce between the Sanusi and the Italians from
1917 to 1922 it became the seat of the Sanusi Amir, Sayyid
Mahammad Idris, and afterwards an Italian administrative and
commercial centre.

It has been noted that almost all the townsmen of Cyrenaica 632
are immigrants from the west, from Morocco to Tripolitania, 162
and the Bedouin regard them as foreigners and often with some 369
distaste, especially the Tripolitanian immigrants. It is true [186]
that there is a small element of Bedouin origin in the towns, for the more stable and poorer Bedouin living near towns sometimes drift into them; but when they do so their descendants soon lose their links with the tents and their tribal status. The road to town life is a way along which there is no return, for the townsmen are not only foreigners, but their food, their speech, their dress, their manners, their interests, their loyalties, and in general their way of life and their sentiments, are different. The Bedouin visit the towns from time to time, but they do not feel at home in them, and they do not look at home in them either. In a town one can spot a Bedouin at a glance by his appearance, his step, his dignity, his naivety, and his loud voice, which sometimes startles the shopkeeper with whom he disputes a price.

The road to the towns is not only a way along which there is 632
no return, but is a one-way track. A Bedouin can become a 369
citizen, but a citizen can never become a Bedouin. He cannot 641
live the life of the tents. Hence the Bedouin say that while it is always bad for a Bedouin girl to marry a townsman, it is possible for her to adapt herself to urban life, but it is out of the question for a Bedouin to marry a townsman's daughter, for it is impossible for her to become a daughter of the tents.

The *bwadi*, Bedouin, and the *hadur*, citizens, are separate

632 communities. They are strangers to each other who meet but
369 do not mix. There is a barrier between them and each distrusts
641 the other. Nevertheless there is a measure of economic interdependence
between them, and the tribes and the towns affect
each other politically. In Turkish times the urban population,
632 which, as we have seen, was small and contained a high proportion
439 of Jews, was engaged in trade and domestic industries.
438 The townsmen bought from the Bedouin animals, hides, wool,
clarified butter, honey, beeswax, and ostrich feathers (ostriches
369 were still hunted in the southern steppe in those days), and they
supplied the Bedouin with those things he required but could
not, or would not, make for himself: tea, sugar, rice, cloth,
horseshoes, musket balls, flints, gunpowder, and earthenware.
The urban craftsmen also made leather goods, manufactured
salt from sea water, and conducted trade and exchange. Imports
came by sea from Tripoli, Marseilles, London, Malta, Alexandria,
and Crete, and overland from Alexandria.

But the townsmen of Cyrenaica never dominated the country
as they dominate most of the Arab lands, where through usury,
intimidation, monopoly of trade, and influence in the administration
and the courts they have reduced the countryman to
the position of landless labourer or *métayage* serf. There was
nothing in the Bedouin way of life which gave an opening to the
usurer. Moreover, the towns had no monopoly of trade for, if
necessary, the Bedouin could, since they were self-supporting
in necessities, either go without urban supplies or obtain them
overland from Egypt, as they showed during their war with the
[565] Italians. Consequently there were no rich landowning families
living in the towns at the expense of the country-side, no aghas,
beys, and pashas; and an educated middle class hardly existed
outside the small official circle and lacked both wealth and
influence. In general it may be said that in Cyrenaica the towns
were not parasites on the country, but had their proper functions
as trading centres and suppliers of the needs of the Bedouin
population. The markets were free, not tied to town societies.

632 Nor could the Bedouin be coerced by force or law. The tribes
*648 were largely inaccessible and they were stronger than the towns,
369 even with the administration behind them. The Bedouin were
not afraid of the Turkish Administration, which sat very lightly
on their shoulders, and they did not use the courts. The

The Turkish Administration was centred in the towns but operated, 632
as will be explained later, through the contacts of its local 648*
officials, who were generally Arabs of the country, with the lead- 571
ing tribal Shaikhs, with whom they made friends. These officials 369
were townsmen or sons of Bedouin who had received an urban
education and they acted as links between the citizen com-
munities and the Bedouin. Through Bedouin relations with
town merchants and officials what was happening in the world
outside Cyrenaica percolated to the most distant tents. Another 795*
channel of political and cultural infiltration was the network of 571
Sanusiya lodges. The Shaikh of the Sanusiya lodge at Banghazi 648*
was regarded as the ambassador of the head of the Order to the 177
Governor of Cyrenaica and he was chosen for qualities which 632
fitted him for this role. He was consulted by the Governor on 793
matters in which the tribes were involved, and through him 369
and the Brothers of the lodges of the towns news of the outside
world reached the Head of the Order in the distant oasis of
Kufra and the Heads of the local lodges, whose relations with
the Bedouin in their localities were intimate. Thus, as will be
seen, the Bedouin had a general idea of what the revolution of
the 'Young Turks' meant and were aware of the impending crisis
long before the Italian attack on their country was delivered.
But though maintaining communications with the towns, 632
neither the tribal Shaikhs nor the Sanusiya allowed themselves 571
to be subordinated to them or identified themselves with urban 795
interests. The Bedouin Shaikh did not, like the Syrian land- 369
owner, feel any need to have a town house, and the Sanusiya
ever remained a country and Bedouin Order and directed its
affairs from the desert.

Town and country kept apart, with the towns dependent on 632
the country and not the country on the towns, because there 369
was in Cyrenaica no client peasantry bound by debt, need of 565
protection, and trade monopoly to the towns. The Bedouin
did not settle on the land where they would be an easy prey to
the usurer, overseer, and tax collector. Those who were defeated [167]
in the great tribal wars of the past and in the inter-tribal and
inter-sectional fighting of more recent times migrated to Egypt
and settled there as *fallahin*, and not in Cyrenaica. In Cyrenaica 565
there is not the spur of adverse climatic conditions or the lash 167
of land shortage to drive them to depart from their ancient

565 167 Arabian ways. In Egypt necessity has slowly subjugated the exiles to the peasant yoke. They long resisted but, like the Bedouin nomads coming from the Sinai Peninsula, had in the end to submit or perish. The absence of a substantial peasantry in Cyrenaica is one of the characteristics which most distinguish it from the Arab societies of Palestine, Syria, Iraq, Egypt, and 565 the Maghrib. The peasant can be dominated. He is fixed to the earth and can be made to surrender it and till it for others. The Cyrenaican Bedouin is fixed to no place and cannot be forced to 565 sell his birthright by bad seasons or intimidation. This has meant that there have not been in Cyrenaica any social enclaves ● 632 attached to the towns through which the towns and administrative centres could lord it over the Bedouin. Outside the towns *[648] [619] all is Bedouin and the Turkish Administration, and afterwards the Italian Administration, found that they could not get a grip on the Bedouin of Cyrenaica as they could on the peasantry of Tripolitania.

632 *648 619 Nevertheless the towns and the Turkish, and later the Italian, Administration in them affected the tribal system by acting as a pull on those tribal segments which lived nearest to them, so that the tribes which lay between the towns and the steppe were attracted towards one or other of these poles. The political structure of Cyrenaica as a whole exercised in this way a significant influence on the segmentary tribal system.

IV

619 178 The Bedouin who became followers of the Sanusiya Order and whose country and way of life I have described are divided into tribes and tribal sections owning different tracts of the [793] *[795] country. This tribal system existed in Cyrenaica long before the Grand Sanusi preached there and it continued to exist after his grandson Sayyid Muhammad Idris had fled the country and the Sanusiya Order had been abolished and its lodges destroyed by the Italians. It is the fundamental structure of Bedouin society which the Sulaimid tribes brought with them from Arabia.

619 101 144 The Bedouin of Cyrenaica are Arabs. The Arabian tribes who conquered the country and settled in it mixed with the indigenous Berbers, as is evident in their physical features to-

619

182 nation, was common hostility to outside interference, an ingre-
*795 dient supplied in measured quantities by the Turks and copiously
993 by the Italians.
*[648]

III

The rudiments of Islam which the Grand Sanusi found in
Cyrenaica made his teachings acceptable, delivered as they were
without embellishments, to the Bedouin of the country, and
the Marabout tradition which he also found there made him
personally acceptable to them. His chief difficulty must have
[578] been the rivalries between tribe and tribe and between tribal
section and tribal section down to the smallest sections. This
[361] difficulty was overcome by transferring the centre of the Order
to desert oases, where it could not become identified with any
particular tribe, and by distributing its lodges impartially
throughout the tribal territories.

*795 Of the forty-five zawiyas belonging to the tribes of Cyrenaica
793 proper (including al-Naufiliya and excluding the Kufra lodges)
*175 probably twenty-one were founded before 1860 or during the
lifetime of the Grand Sanusi, twenty-two during the lifetime of
Sayyid al-Mahdi, and two when Sayyid Ahmad al-Sharif was
Head of the Order.

*795 A high proportion of the lodges of the Order in the time of the
361 Grand Sanusi were along the line of oases on the 29th parallel,
[175] for to the lodges of the Cyrenaican oases on that line must be
added those in the oases of the Sirtica, Zalla, Saukna, Hun, and
Waddan, all founded round about 1855, and probably that in
al-Fuqha also. Lodges were early planted in the oases partly on
account of their importance as caravanserai and trading centres,
partly because the oases-folk were more tractable than the
Bedouin, and partly because the stability of these centres gave
greater opportunity for corporate religious life. The Sanusiya
certainly made a deeper religious impression on the peoples of
the oases than on the Bedouin.

*795 It will have been noticed also how few of the Sanusiya lodges
632 were founded in the towns of North Africa. There are no lodges
361 in the towns of Egypt and though the Order counts many
[175] followers in the towns of Cyrenaica and is politically dominant
in them it has only one zawiya in each, Banghazi, Darna, and
al-Marj; and that at Banghazi, the capital of the country, was

only founded about 1870. The Sanusiya lodge in Tripoli town 795*
was not built till 1882. It must, however, be remembered that in 361
Turkish times Banghazi and Darna were little more than villages 632
and al-Marj only a military post and that, as already explained, [175]*
their inhabitants were foreigners, either Jews or immigrants
from Tripolitanian towns who were generally affiliated already to
other Orders. Moreover, the Turkish administration functioned 795*
from these centres, and that alone would have prevented the 361
Grand Sanusi from making them the headquarters of his 632
mission. There could not be two governments in one large 648*
village, especially as the Grand Sanusi disapproved of the
Turks and they were suspicious of him. Also the presence of the
Turkish Government in the towns ensured order and some, even
if very small, opportunities for education and religious instruction
and services, and Sayyid Muhammad bin 'Ali al-Sanusi had
settled in Cyrenaica with the express purpose of reviving the
faith and raising the culture of the totally illiterate and almost
heathen Bedouin, whose contact with the towns was negligible.
The social functions carried out by the Sanusiya lodges in 795*
Cyrenaica were more consistent with settlement among wild
tribesmen than among peaceful citizens. Propaganda of the
faith, educational work, cultivation of gardens, settlement of
disputes, provision of shelter, hospitality, and security to
travellers, and of refuge for the pursued, the weak, and the
oppressed are all functions especially appropriate to tribal and
barbarous conditions of life

The Order was based on the tribes and not on the towns. The 795*
lodges were founded by tribes or tribal sections and the tribes 619
or their sections regarded them as tribal institutions. Al-Qasur
zawiya was not just a lodge of the Order in 'Abid tribal territory.
It was the 'Abid zawiya; just as al-Marj was the 'Arafa
zawiya, Shahhat the Hasa zawiya, and so on. The tribal system
and the Sanusiya organization interpenetrated. The Sanusiya
gave to the tribes a national symbol and the tribes participated
in it through their lodges. It was the combination of a common [182]
organization with representation that allowed for tribal allegiances
and rivalries which provided the Order with sure
foundations.

So much was the Sanusiya organization based on the tribal
system that the distribution of the lodges may be said to

3:Evans-Pritchard E-4,5 (1942-1944) 1949 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9
(1837-1942)
Sanusi

795*
632

LODGES OF ORDERS OTHER THAN THE SANUSIYA IN CYRENAICA IN 1942

Townships	*'Arusiya*	*'Isawiya*	*Rifa'iya*	*Qadiriya*	*Madaniya*	*Sa'adiya*	*Tayyibiya*	*'Azuziya*	*Total*
Banghazi	11	5	2	2	—	1	—	1	22
Darna	4	5	1	1	1	—	2	—	14
Al-Marj	1	1	—	—	—	1	—	—	3
Ajadabiya	1	1	—	—	1	—	—	—	3
Marsa Susa	1	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	2
Tubruq	1	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	2
Talmaitha	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	1
Taukra	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1
Burdi Suliman	1	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	2
Suluq	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1
Bedouin									
Aulad al-Shaikh	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1
TOTALS	23	16	3	3	2	2	2	1	52

(The lodge at Marsa Susa listed as 'Isawiya is shared by this Order and the Rifa'iya. Under *Bedouin* is listed the only lodge outside towns at the present time. The lodgeless 'Azuziya community at Banghazi is included.)

mechanized surface vehicles and aeroplanes unknown in 1911. 175*
By the end of 1926 they had some 20,000 men in the field, 648*
mostly native troops, while after the opening round of the 795*
campaign the Sanusi probably seldom had more than 1,000 men on operational service at any one time. It was estimated that in 1923 they could put into the field 2,000 men armed with modern rifles and a few machine-guns and artillery pieces, and that in addition there were some 3,000 to 4,000 rifles among the tribes. With this superiority in mobility, fire, and numbers, the Italians were able, as in the first war, to push heavy columns in any direction they chose and to seize and fortify any point they pleased. Therefore, what is often called 'organized resistance' broke down very early in the campaign, if there can be said to have been such at any time, and gave way to guerrilla warfare in which sentries, advanced posts, supply convoys, and communications were subjected to sniping, raids, ambushes, and sabotage. Consequently the war was made up of a succession of small, and often unrelated, incidents in different parts of the country. Italian operational and intelligence reports and Bedouin stories about these hundreds of fights and skirmishes are not easily arranged into a coherent picture. The hundreds of bits and pieces are all very much alike in size and shape and colour, and the guide of any clear pattern is lacking. To attempt, therefore, to construct from them a complete mosaic of events would be a task alike arduous for the writer and confusing and unprofitable for the reader; and I shall not endeavour to do more than sketch the development of the campaign. It would, I think, be of assistance to the reader were I first to mention some very general features of the fighting, which are, indeed, features of guerrilla warfare always and everywhere. [726]

II

The war, which was waged with increasing bitterness as the years went by, was not against all the Arabs of Cyrenaica, but only against the Bedouin, for the townsmen played no active part in the resistance, though they sympathized with it. Also, among the Bedouin, whilst there was no one who could be fairly labelled pro-Italian there were many persons, and even whole tribal sections, who remained passive, chiefly because of their [632] [619]

423 (nizaa'a) belongs to Khalid Idris and his brothers. This
619 happened with the satisfaction of both tribes, and this re-
578 nunciation of claim is valid from today. This paper concern-
691 ing the ownership of land around the well is valid from today also. And this happened between the parties: (Signatures or stamps of both parties concerned.)

(There appeared the signatures of twenty-three of the twenty-four men who were to have sworn the oath.)

Only twenty-three oath-takers were present: 30 July 1964.
I, Shaikh Khalid Za'aluk, agree on the signatures of only twenty-three oath-takers. (Signature of Khalid Za'aluk.)

648 We have mentioned that the 'awaiyid prevails in al-
671 Qasr, but have also noted that where the security of the
578 desert is threatened the government is likely to intervene. The government enters tribal conflict in al-Qasr with the tacit approval of the Bedouins. As one informant remarked: "The 'awaiyid is the best way to handle problems, but the police will handle what the 'awaiyid cannot."

423 Date: 1964. Case: Quarrel between al-Afrad ('Ali Abyad) and
691 'Aishaibat ('Ali Ahmar) over water rights. Many members of
578 both tribes took part in this conflict. The government had
619 to intervene: they formed a peace committee made up of all
648 the 'awaaqil of both tribes and the 'umda and shaikh from
*[613] each tribe.
•[634]

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[171]

> A tut in this rather wide sense of 'man of good standing,' or 'social leader' is usually a scion of an important lineage, the head of his own family, and master of his homestead and herd . . . (His) authority is never formalized. He has no defined status (i.e. specifically delimited position), powers, or sphere of leadership . . . Beyond his domestic groups a tut has authority in his village only in the sense that he takes a prominent part in questions of procedure and other discussions.

The non-institutionalized third party role in al-Qasr has power and influence in political affairs, and this condition arises from certain structural features and economic facts about Bedouin society. In a word, outside the lone formal role of _'aqila_, a person's political influence is directly related to the traditional influence which attaches to his family, or to his economic status. In all cases, the person of "good" family and sufficient wealth has a high status on the social prestige scale of al-Qasr. The people who have high esteem do not have prescribed roles to play in al-Qasr but their roles are indeed important. Furthermore, the _rajal khair_ role can be just as important as any political role which is prescribed, and it may even become more important.

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[634]

Besides the _'aqila_ and the third party, there exists two external but related roles which form part of the total system of Bedouin authority. The roles of _'umda_ and _shaikh_ represent institutionalized offices. They function, however, more as structural aspects of the Egyptian governmental authority structure. Of course, no complete separation between the two structures can be claimed. It is recognized

554 you for your cloak, you would have immediately given it to
178 him. God was pleased with them at that time."
[792]

This notion of changing foci of authority and power cannot be divorced from the related political phenomena of the tendency toward legitimacy and the role institutionalization
128 process. In the next chapter, I will attempt to show how such a conceptual framework can be utilized in an analysis of culture and political change.

Modern Legal Roles

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The roles of _'umda_ and _shaikh_ were created and imposed upon the Bedouins by Muhammad 'Ali sometime during the early part of the nineteenth century in order to facilitate administration, maintain security in the desert, and protect the Western frontier.

[619] Both of these roles are representative offices at the primary level of the tribal structure. The 'Aishaibat have an _'umda_ and a _shaikh_ who reside in Marsa Matruh and work in close relation with the Governor. In terms of a chain of command, these offices receive demands which may originate either with the Governor in Matruh or with Bedouins in al-Qasr. But these offices are subservient to both the Governor and the Bedouins since no decision-making powers of any consequence
[571] resides with them. With reference to the two authority
[635] structures, the Egyptian and the Bedouin, the _'umda_ and the

634 _shaikh_ are administrators, not executives, in the service of
554 the Governor and the "status group" of al-Qasr. Nevertheless,
[571] under the influence of the bureaucratic principle, as a new
[635] structural principle in Bedouin society, these offices could conceivably become seats of power.[4]

634 The _'umda_ and _shaikh_ are described as "elective" offices
554 by the Bedouins but, in fact, they are appointive just like
666 the office of _'aqila_. Theoretically, every man has a vote
571 but, actually, only the members of the "status group" vote. Paradoxically, perhaps, the Bedouins stress two major qualifications for these offices: the _'umda_ and the _shaikh_ must be men "who know the needs of the Bedouin of the desert, and know how to talk to the Governor"; and, "they must be men who do nothing without the permission of the _'awaaqil_ (i.e. without the permission of the "status group" who elected the _'aqila_ in the first place).

634 The two offices are not equal in prestige and status
554 neither in the eyes of the Bedouins or of the Egyptians. The office of _shaikh_ is the lesser office. It amounts to a clerical post, and the _shaikh_ really functions as an assistant

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[635] [4] The Governor, who is of Bedouin origin, has already recognized this potential and has moved to eliminate the possibility of a more powerful _'umda_ representing a more powerful "status group." When I left the field, the Governor was in the process of drawing up new ground rules for electing the _'umda_ and the _shaikh_ which would call for public elections on a "one man, one vote" basis.

634 to the *'umda*. Both offices are for a life-term, only being
554 terminated by bad behavior or senility. At the expiration
634 of an incumbent's term, the "status group" meets in al-Qasr
571 to decide upon his replacement. The name of a "nominee"
635 is passed on to the Governor who is expected to approve the
666 Bedouins' selection of a representative to the government.
It is this "status group"-controlled process which the
[178] Governor seeks to change. Since these are officially held
[177] offices in the U.A.R. governmental structure, he feels that
elections to fill their vacancies should be a public affair.
Naturally, he will exercise more influence over the naming
of candidates in this way, and the Bedouins perceive this as
a challenge to the traditional structure of leadership and
control of external relations.

634 The offices of *'umda* and *shaikh* are even more heredi-
*613 tary than that of *'aqila*, which theoretically should not be
666 the case. By definition, the role of *'aqila* is functional at
[428] the *bait* level, and so the recruitment pool of candidates
for this office is inherently limited. By comparison, the
offices of *'umda* and *shaikh* should go to the "best men" in
the tribe, and, therefore, the recruitment pool should be
634 tribal-wide. But, in fact, these two offices are considered
*613 "the property" of the wealthiest lineages in the al-Qasr area.
666 There is a traditional rationale behind this fact: there is
428 the structural necessity for, and conscious practice of, an
[571]

634 asymmetrical power relationship between commoners and "status
*613 group" which maintains political order. The Bedouins say of
666 the *'umda's* office, as they did of the *'aqila*, "if the son is
428 worthy of the office, then he should take his father's place."
[571] Such a statement is usually qualified by noting that if the son does not possess the qualifications of the office, of course, he will not succeed. This is not simply a case of power politics, there is more to it. Behind the inheritance of the *'umda* and *shaikh* office is a logical concern and attempt to sustain a balance of political and social relations.

The "inheritance" of the *'aqila's* office is explained by showing that the candidates for the office are limited to the brothers and sons of the incumbent, the former *'aqila*. The offices of *'umda* and *shaikh*, in contrast, have a recruitment pool which includes, potentially, every man at the primary tribal level, the 'Aishaibat. The rule of succession, where the modern legal roles are concerned, is a mechanism for maintaining, what is considered by most Bedouins to be, the legitimate distribution of power in al-Qasr. Once the roles
634 of *'umda* and *shaikh* have been "captured" by a *bait*, for
*613 political power resides at the tertiary level of the lineage
666
428 structure, any attempt to change the distribution or locus
578 of power will be culturally transformed into a threat to the honor, not of the individual, but of his *bait* and *'aiela*. And this is a basis for conflict in Bedouin society. It is

• 634 no coincidence, then, that the present 'umda and shaikh are
*613 the sons of the former 'umda and shaikh. This reveals not
666 only the structural rules of succession, but also indicates
428 [578] that "social honor," and thus power, still resides with these
families.

It is important to note that since the time of their
[178] inception, these roles have not changed 'aiela or even bait
634 in al-Qasr. When the former 'umda from 'Ailit Lazumi died,
*613 his eldest son petitioned to the 'awaaqil of the 'Aishaibat
666 that he be approved to succeed to his father's position.
428 The 'awaaqil met and made their decision. One 'aqila who
571 was present at the election said: "The office of 'umda should
stay in the Lazumi family since the father was 'umda. The
'awaaqil agreed on the son. But the son will be accepted to
follow his father only if he is good. If he is not good, the
'awaaqil will find a new bait." Although the Bedouins speak
of "the 'awaaqil" electing the 'umda, it must be remembered
that it is the "status group" which makes the decision, and
that the 'awaaqil are only part of this group. The names of
[627] the men who elected the present 'umda include less 'awaaqil
and more rajal khair.

114 Before I arrived in the field, the present acting
634 'umda of the 'Aishaibat tribe was elected to the national
666 parliament to represent the province of Marsa Matruh. The
election of his replacement was not scheduled to take place

114 until sometime after my departure from the field.[5] Never-
•634 666 theless, before I left the field I discussed the pending
114 election with some of my informants and members of the
634 "status group." The interviews reveal that the "status
666 group" still intends to dominate the area of power relations
124 829 with the government. As one informant said: "The present
*[613] *'umda* and the one before him were from Bait Bu Taram of
'Ailit Lazumi, and the next one will be from Bu Taram also."

634 The tenacity of traditional politics and the influence
571 of the "status group" are reflected in the affairs surrounding
666 the election of a new incumbent to the office of *'umda*. In
this situation, all Bedouins become concerned more with the
distribution of power than with the actual person who will
124 fill the authority role. One informant, an *'aqila*, gave
*613 indication that formal authorities support the "status group"
634 and the distribution of power which they represent and maintain.

> 571 666 Mustafa, the brother of the *'umda*, takes his place while he is in Cairo attending Parliament. The *'umda* told me that he was going to ask the *'awaaqil to* sacrifice (i.e. slaughter a lamb) and write a paper making Mustafa the new *'umda*. (Here I told the informant that I had spoken with Mustafa about this, and he told me that he did not want to be the *'umda*).
> Even if Mustafa does not want to be the *'umda*, the *'awaaqil* will force him to accept . . . It should remain in the same family, it would be a shame if the office went to another family. Mustafa's father and brother were *'umdas* before him. If the office left the family,

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[5] Technically, the 'Aishaibat were without an *'umda* while I was in the field. However, he spent enough time in Matruh that he was able to carry on his duties until his successor could be named.

> 124 If the office left the family,
> *613 all of the lineages would be fighting over it . . . The
> •634 job should stay in Bait Bu Taram; if this is impossible,
> 571 then it should stay in 'Ailit Lazumi. In any case, the
> 666 'awaaqil will decide.

578 A change in the present locus of legal authority in
634 the Bedouin-Egyptian government structural relationship
178 would amount to a re-structuring process, and could lead to
121 serious conflict. In the very least, it would call for a clear explanation and new statement of social reality since it would challenge what is, and "has always been " a legitimate distribution of power and political order.

634 The office of the shaikh is not a potential power-
554 base by comparison with the office of 'umda. The shaikh, rather than being in direct communication with the Governor, executes the official orders made known to the 'umda. As an administrator, he takes care of issuing drivers' licenses, notifies men of their military draft status, etc. The government sees this as a necessary post because of the difficulty of contacting Bedouins deep in the desert. In one sense, the shaikh's office is becoming less functional as the Bedouin move in from the desert and begin to take part in the national society, but in another sense it is becoming more functional as bureaucracy and red tape become increasingly complex. But the shaikh remains in the shadow of the 'umda. He never substitutes for the 'umda, for this would infringe on the rightful power of the 'umda's family; when the 'umda is absent,

634 his brother sits in his place.

554 The present shaikh is a member of 'Ailit Ma'fas, and
634 this is to offset the fact that the office of 'umda is in
*613 'Ailit Lazumi. It reflects the need to distribute official
554 power and to symbolize the real power structure. Historically,
the Lazumi were more powerful than the Ma'fas. These two
lineages are the largest, wealthiest, and most influential
in al-Qasr and among the 'Aishaibat. When the present
[666] shaikh's father decided to retire due to old age, he requested
[571] that his son be allowed to take up his role. The 'awaagil
of the 'Aishaibat in al-Qasr approved this "nomination" and
[556] the son was "elected." It is a fact that the shaikh's father
is the richest man among the members of the 'Ailit Ma'fas
and that the 'umda's father was the richest man of 'Ailit
Lazumi.

571 Power groups tend to interact so as to enhance not
*613 the official authority structure but the political status quo
582 (Peters 1967:279). This explains a practice of the "status
group" which Max Weber referred to as "connubism," the tendency
of the members of this group to exchange women among themselves.
*613 In Figure 10,[1] the marriages of 'Ait Abd al-Malik of Bait 'Umar
582 of 'Ailit Ma'fas show that out of seventeen marriages only
four of these were within the 'Aishaibat, and that three out
of four of these marriages were with 'Ailit Lazumi. Even
more impressive is the information obtained from considering

[1] [See p. 132--Analyst]

*613 582 all of the marriages in the history of 'Ailit Ma'fas (see Table 1).[1] From a total of 197 marriages, 33 were within the 'Aishaibat tribe. Of these 33 marriages with the other lineages of al-Qasr (see Figure 3 for the lineages of al-Qasr), 2 were with 'Ailit Abu Qarasa, and 2 with 'Ailit Zallat, 4 each were with 'Ailit Zagharat, 'Ailit Dawlat, and 'Ailit Shraif, but 17, or just over 50 per cent, were with 'Ailit Lazumi.

●634 554 For the time being, the offices of *'umda* and *shaikh* seem to be modern symbols of the traditional power structure rather than loci of real power, though this does not preclude their becoming so in the future. But for the present, these roles are considered "not of the people, not of the desert, they belong to the government." Here is the way one *'aqila* explained it:

634 554 *613

> The *'umda* is higher in the government but the *'aqila* is the responsible one in the *'aiela*. The *shaikh* has nothing to do with *'awaqil*, he only makes contact between them and the government . . . The *'umda* gets the request from the government and asks the *'awaqil* to handle the situation, but he does not tell them how to do it . . . The *'umda* and *shaikh* go to meetings with the Governor, then they tell the *'awaqil* about the matters discussed. There is no direct contact between the Governor and the *'awaqil* . . . The *'umda* comes to the *'awaqil* concerning general problems . . . If the Arabs need something from the government, they go to the *'umda*. They tell him to go and tell the Governor what they want . . . The *'umda* represents them and he does good in this. God only knows if he is doing a good job. If he is not it will show in the next election.

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634 554 From the standpoint of the political system of al-Qasr, we might conclude that the *'umda* and *shaikh* are roles

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[1] [This should read Table 5. See p.115--Analyst]

634 of little significance in the authority structure. Very few
554 people of the al-Qasr area have had any contact with these
634 officers, and very few want any contact. On the other hand,
554 the direction of change in al-Qasr and the bureaucratic growth
178 of the government in the Western Desert makes it likely that all Bedouins will be drawn into the total authority structure, and that the roles of 'umda and shaikh will expand. These roles will not increase in terms of traditional prestige and status, but they may gain the authority which they do not possess now. This is in view of the fact that the traditional authority structure remains relatively intact. The 'umda and the shaikh have no traditional basis of authority, so they cannot make decisions which are morally binding for Bedouins of al-Qasr at this time. It is obvious, of course, that the 'umda
634
635 may refer to the Governor, and even the use of governmental
554 force, as the basis of his legitimacy. But this has never
178 happened. The incumbent 'umda is still a Bedouin, and this prevents him from challenging the traditional ways. Also, the Governor is concerned with restricting the 'umda's influence not increasing it.

634 I do not mean to imply that there is, or will be, a
613 struggle for power between traditional authority represented
178 by the 'aqila and modern legal authority represented by the
578 'umda. Such a struggle could not actually occur since when, and if, the 'umda came to represent authority in a newly

634
*613 structured situation the traditional authority structure
178 578 would have disappeared from the scene.

But, there is a struggle for authority recognition
178 554 going on in al-Qasr. It is related to the change from the
627 old basis of traditional authority to a new basis of legal authority. At the heart of this struggle is the role of the rajal khair. The rajal khair has a firm public basis for establishing himself in an authoritative and representative role. Traditionally, the rajal khair has faced inward and outward: he has used his ascribed position on the al-Qasr prestige scale to augment his status and influence, and, at the same time, his economic rationality has oriented him
[648] toward Marsa Matruh. In the present stage of culture change, the rajal khair is in a position to combine his ascribed and achieved attributes to gain entrance to a new reference group, the Egyptian bureaucracy. This offers him a new kind of prestige as well as affording him new opportunities for power, and even authority, over his fellow Bedouins.

The rajal khair, in view of his movement between the old and new in Egypt, maintains a tertium quid status in two camps. While he has one foot in the traditional community because of his role in conflict regulation and the manipulation of traditional values, the rajal khair also has a foot in the

178 modern camp. He has been able to enter into dialogue with
554 modernizing agents because his intra-tribal "status honor"
627 renders him public recognition at the institutional level,
and because his worldly style of life allows him to, in part, identify with a modern reference group.

554 The *'aqila* and the *'umda* might be seen as the two
178 extremes of a temporary and emerging authority structure for
•634 the Bedouin of al-Qasr: the traditional authority bound to
*613 the old moral order, and the modern legal authority identified
wholly with an, as of yet, outside political and moral order.
[627] Ideally, it seems that only the *rajal khair*, who is neither an
'aqila nor an *'umda*, is in the structural and ideological position to assume leadership and to guide the Bedouins during this period of culture change.

121 fully organized government behind the role, the element of
554 force may enter into the *rajal khair* style of domination.
627 Thus far, the *'umda* and the *shaikh* roles have functioned
•[634] through the traditional roles of the *'aqila* and the *rajal*
*[613] *khair*, that is, the "status group." In the future, this pattern
[178] may change. It is also possible that new roles will emerge.
This is what I wish to explore.

121 The "status group" of al-Qasr operating with a sense
571 of identity with a modern reference group deem themselves
554 responsible for making decisions on the behalf of "the people"
or "the Bedouin." Members of the "status group" would
[177] occasionally dress in Western clothes; they would hunt gazelle
for sport; they owned the few autos there were in the area; and a few partook of alcoholic beverages. Their rights and obligations in social relations are still relatively stable and depend on the ascribed values of al-Qasr Bedouin society, but one can detect the start of a power struggle within the group. It is a competitive desire for social mobility and is stated in terms of the achieved attributes considered important by the reference group to which they aspire, the Egyptian society. For example, one sometimes heard the complaint from various members of the "status group" that the Governor was not giving proper recognition to those "who understood the ways of the Bedouin," and "those who could speak for the Bedouin."

156 than the Awlad 'Ali societal level. In the traditional
554 system, his influence and power have been informal, and,
121 although this has been advantageous over against the formal
role of 'aqila, his political activity was ultimately limited
by this structural differentiation and definition of authority.
[177] In gaining access to the bureaucratic structure of Egyptian
officialdom with its firm allocation of rights and duties,
Hajj 'Ali could operate as an authority within the total authority
structure which has reference to both the internal and external
political relational systems of al-Qasr.

Practical Application

*613 In al-Qasr, the two most influential and powerful
lineages, 'Ailit Lazumi and 'Ailit Ma'fas, each have a
●[634] "most powerful bait." We have noted that in 'Ailit Lazumi
it is Bait Bu Taram which controls the office of 'umda: in
*613 'Ailit Ma'fas it is Bait 'Umar which has Hajj 'Ali. Hajj 'Ali
159 is fifty three years old. He has married five times, divorced
581 one wife, and at present has four wives. Whatever his motives
156 for these marriages, at least some of them have obviously
[595] been made as economic and political moves. A check on his
wives' tribal origins will show this. In each case, Hajj
'Ali's wife is from a lineage which holds land contiguous to
his own property in the 'izba sector of al-Qasr. The one
exception to this is a marriage contracted to establish ties

156 He was sometimes
159 asked to sit-in as a witness for important contractual
554 matters. Note that in the rawaabit al-'awaaqil of Bait
675 Shafaila of 'Ailit Lazumi (presented in Chapter Four),
Hajj 'Ali who is neither from 'Ailit Lazumi nor an 'aqila
was present to sign and validate this document.

156 Hajj 'Ali, then, operates in the micropolitical
159 system and the traditional authority structure of al-Qasr.
554 But what is just as important, he has secured a firm foothold in the modern bureaucratic structure of the near-by town. He straddles both camps. The Governor of Marsa Matruh
635 was an important aid to my understanding of Hajj 'Ali's
634 role as "broker." The Governor claimed that the British
156
159 first introduced the roles of 'umda and shaikh; they did this
554 to "control the Bedouin" and to "get the men out of the tents."
124 He explained in his own way what he considered to be the
[648] structural differentiation of political roles in al-Qasr.

> Let me tell you, these fellows are very clever. They have an 'umda . . . he comes to my office and says: "I want this and this." I say, "No." Then he goes back to the 'awaqil and tells them that, and then these fellows begin to think in what way they can get what they want. But the 'umda is nothing; it is the
> *[613] 'aqila whom the Bedouins listen to and love . . . The 'umda is elected (at this time) by the Bedouins. They put forward a man who hesitates, one who can say yes or no . . . But there is a real leader for the people, this is a man such as Hajj 'Ali, here is a man the Bedouins love.

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635 The Governor said that Hajj 'Ali speaks well and
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159 thinks well. Twice in the interview the Governor said that
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*[613]

635 population of the whole Western Desert, and representatives
[648] of the Egyptian government employees working in the province.
• [634] The Bedouin representatives appointed to this council need
not be an *'umda* or a *shaikh*, although they may be. The
oldest Bedouin member of the council, who happens to be an
'umda, told me that "the Governor picks the men who he feels
understand the problems of the people."

635 The Governor himself thinks that every Bedouin on
124 his council is an *'aqila*. He replied to my question about
*613 the criteria for membership on the *Majlis al-Muhafza*: "I
am using a new selection system. Rather than choose the
'umda or *shaikh*, I choose the *'aqila*. Every man on the
council is an *'aqila*, and the number is determined by the
population of the area . . . But I appoint more men from the
[619] 'Ali Ahmar (see Figures 3 and 7)[1] than from other tribes.
This is because they are more numerous, and they are near
Matruh where I am able to contact them immediately. The
'Ali Ahmar are represented by six men and the other tribes
by just three men."

156 Hajj 'Ali is one of these six men and the only member
159 of the Council who resides in al-Qasr. I attended and ob-
554 served the December meeting of the Council. The Governor
635 sat at the head of a long table with the Egyptian representa-
648 tives on either side of him. At the other end of the table
[114] sat the Bedouin representatives, Hajj 'Ali among them. Purely

[1] [See pp. 65 & 77 respectively--Analyst]

156 by the secretary of the cooperative society who requested
159 that the government furnish bus service between Matruh and
554 al-Qasr. The Governor thought this a good idea and said he
635 would inquire into the matter.
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156 As the Governor suggested that the meeting be adjourned,
159 Hajj 'Ali stood up, faced the Governor and began another of
554 his formal speeches in the rich tradition of Arabic; it was
635 the best Arabic I had heard spoken in the desert. This speech
177 was for the benefit of all present, Bedouins and officials
537 alike. Hajj 'Ali made no requests but simply thanked the
Governor for honoring al-Qasr with his presence. In this
short well-prepared tribute, he said:

> We feel the efforts of the government and we can scarcely imagine or dream of this development. For instance, we were living in tents and now only five per cent remain in tents while the remainder are in houses. We were dressed simply, but now we are dressed in poplin material. Those who could afford one set of clothes now can afford two. Thanks be to God, all this is due to Jamal Abd al-Nasser.

156 It is significant, of course, that smiles once again
159 played on the faces of the Governor's entourage and nothing
554 but admiration on the faces of the Bedouins. As Hajj 'Ali
635 spoke he did not face the Governor directly but turned aside,
537 speaking both to him and the Bedouins--Hajj 'Ali, the Bedouin,
had been sitting on the ground before the Governor. The
[634] *'umda* and *shaikh* had accompanied the Governor on his tour

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159 and they sat on chairs inside the tent. I returned to
554 Marsa Matruh in the *'umda's* car (1964 Ford, highly polished)
635 537 with the *'umda* and the *shaikh*. They openly joked about Hajj
[634] 'Ali and his manner of presentation; they repeated some of
[122] his "stilted" phrases and laughed. Hajj 'Ali gave last year's
[522] reception speech also. This is because, his son says, Hajj
'Ali is considered a fine speaker by the Bedouins of al-Qasr.

121 We can see how these details carry larger implications
177 within the context of political and social structures under-
178 going change. It is the stuff which the anthropologist finds
important for an understanding of the process of change.

156 If I have established thus far that Hajj 'Ali is
159 politically active and representative in both the traditional
554 and the modern systems, then the attempt is now to prove that
177 he consciously seeks to change the traditional in the direction
178 of the modern for political and moral reasons, and for social
and personal reasons.

156 Hajj 'Ali, when he spoke with me, inevitably came
159 around to the subject of international politics, whether this
554 was the question of Israel or the image which America's racial
177 problems presented. Hajj 'Ali was the only man from the whole
178 Marsa Matruh area who was neither *shaikh* nor *'umda* to attend
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829 the nomination of Jamal Abd al-Nasser in January of 1965. In
[571] all of this, I detect a move on the part of Hajj 'Ali to
identify himself with an Egyptian reference group and to

156 undertaken to transform his rajal khair role into an authority
159 which transcends the bounds of the local community. During
554 my talks with him, he never once insinuated that the people
829 of al-Qasr, nor even the 'Aishaibat or 'Ali Ahmar (terms
178 he rarely ever used), owe anything to a larger entity or
community known as "the Bedouin" or "the Awlad 'Ali."
If Hajj 'Ali is to legitimate his own authority in a new
political system, he must, at the same time, show the Bedouins
the legitimacy of the new political community. The Bedouins
829 must feel a moral commitment toward the new national political
178 community or else it has no meaning or authority. Most of the
177 Bedouins of al-Qasr still take it for granted that the allocation of political values and distribution of power in terms of
traditional and modern legal roles will be carried over into
the modern community and its politics. Hence, if anyone should
•[634] go on to Cairo to represent the Bedouin of the Western Desert,
[648] naturally it should be the 'umda or the shaikh "who knew how
to deal with the Egyptians." The majority of the people of
the al-Qasr area see change coming but do not conceptualize
it as any threat to the traditional authority structure.

156 Hajj 'Ali anticipates the change as fundamental
159 enough to require a new sense of identity. I think this is
554 evident in the following statement in which he takes issue
829 with the traditional way of doing things and appears to be
178 preparing himself for a role in the readjustment process.
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tional style of Bedouin hospitality--"as we used to do in Cyrenaica"--and spent a total of 50 L.E. for the welcoming ceremony. "This money was from his own pocket," as the Bedouins of al-Qasr complained after it was learned that the vice-President would not visit Matruh after all. As a matter of fact, all of the Bedouin leaders who had been invited to the reception by Hajj 'Ali refused to eat the food, for they said that it had not been prepared for them. [576] This act was taken as a show of respect for Hajj 'Ali and anger with bureaucrats.

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Hajj 'Ali is the representative of al-Qasr to the Arab Socialist Union which meets in Marsa Matruh and has cell meetings in al-Qasr. The socialist cell in al-Qasr meets about three times a month. When I asked why Hajj 'Ali [124] was the man chosen to represent all of al-Qasr at section meetings of the Union, the reply was: "Because he is a member [635] of the Majlis al-Muhafza." There was one section meeting of the Union in Matruh while I was in the field. The theme of the meeting was "The Meaning of Socialism." Hajj 'Ali attended this meeting.

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In sum, it seems not too far afield to say that Hajj 'Ali is prepared to take over the leadership of the Bedouins in a much more sophisticated manner than one could possibly expect from the traditional style of politics. Hajj 'Ali's ● [634] comments about the 'umda and the 'umda's probable successor

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imply that he feels they are not really equipped to represent their traditional constituency. Hajj 'Ali, as everyone in al-Qasr knows, is traditional and modern at the same time. It seems that he has only alienated those whom he threatens and those who are a threat to him, i.e., the _'umda_ and the _shaikh_.

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He may not be educated, but he knows the _'awaiyid_; at the same time he stresses the fact that his son will have the education which he never had. Empathy is a primary trait of the charismatic leader and the "cultural broker" who seeks to manipulate social relations. No one could explain to me why Hajj 'Ali did not have an education while his brother (who is only three years younger) and other members of the "status group" do read and write. He perhaps only became concerned in the period of change. Hajj 'Ali, the "cultural broker," is more politically conscious and creative within the context of two worlds in change.

657 full-time employment with the government projects in the area and
[178] settle in fairly permanent houses near the place of work.
[464]

657 With the movement toward settling down, the relative legal and
701 political autonomy which Awlad Ali once enjoyed is breaking down. This
642 was reflected first in the loss of military exemption. In 1947, the
draft law was applied to all tribal populations in Egypt, including
Awlad Ali. The application is not seriously enforced, however, due
to the fact that births are still not recorded in the area. In 1954,
657 the "omda" or mayorship system practiced in the rural areas of Egypt
● 634 was extended to the Western Desert with certain modifications to fit
177 the tribal organization of populations in the area. This put a strain
on the native system of leadership, a point which will be covered in
657 later chapters. Finally, and along with the extension of the omda sys-
692 tem, the jurisdiction of the legal system of the state was extended
177 over the area. This resulted in a duality in the judicial process.
178 The tribal law, with its traditional tribal mediators, is still functioning side by side with the modern court system of the state law. In many cases, especially in criminal cases, the individual is tried under both systems, and sometimes receives two different judgments for the same offense. Various efforts are being made to minimize the effects of this duality. In civil cases, the problem does not seem serious, since it is the parties themselves, or one of them, who voluntarily bring the case to the attention of the legal authorities. Therefore, they can choose between the traditional legal system and the modern courts of law. So far, civil cases are brought to the modern court system only when the native procedures fail to achieve a settlement. As such, the

His success in solving disputes between members
613 of his baits and outsiders might enhance his prestige within the bait,
628 554 but it is not a substitute for patrilineal succession as the basis of
[428] the Aqila's authority. But in less integrated baits the situation is
[627] different. The ineffectiveness of the Aqila in solving disputes may
lead members of his bait to seek another man as their representative who
would act as a mediator in their behalf. If this continues for a long
time the Aqila might find himself with no functions and the new person
would become a de facto Aqila.

613 The Aqila represents the only effective indigenous form of leader-
554 ship among Awlad Ali at the present time. The camp headman provides
622 another form of leadership on the camp level, but, as mentioned before,
the leadership of the headman is very limited and involves minimal
634 authority. In addition to the indigenous leadership represented by the
622 Aqila, there is the superimposed administrative structure of the govern-
656 ment representative in the form of the "omda" system introduced into the
177 area by the government decree no. 1187 of 1958. The system of omda or
mayorship is essentially that applied to the rural areas of Egypt with
certain modifications to fit the tribal organization and the semi-nomadic
existence of the populations of the Western Desert. In rural areas, the
622 omda is the administrative head of the village. He is appointed by the
[554] government from among the village inhabitants who have certain qualifi-
[212] cations with regard to education (must be able at least to read and
[556] write), wealth (own at least 5 feddans of land in the area), and sound
reputation. As such, the omda system in the rural areas is a territorial
system. The omda's authority covers the territory of the village and
all individuals living in it regardless of their kinship affiliation.

622 His main function is to manage the affairs of the village, apprehend
554 criminals, report and register births and deaths, collect taxes and
represent the government in all matters involving the relationship be-
tween the government and his village. Because of his position as the
[661] representative of the govrernment, he usually enjoys a considerable
amount of power which, over the years, many omdas have used it to obtain
personal benefits.

361 In 1958 the committee appointed for the examination of the possi-
631 bility of applying the system to Awlad Ali noticed that villages in the
sense of a compact settlement similar to that existing in the rural area
simply do not exist in the Western Desert region. There are a few
settled communities in the area but they are scattered homes or a few
stores. These communities have no identifiable boundaries or adminis-
631 trative existence. The area as a whole is divided into ten adminis-
634 trative districts, each having a police station. These districts cor-
[625] respond to the old Senusia Zawyas which played an important role in
[795] maintaining order in the era until the First World War. Until that time
[175] the area was divided into fourteen zones each of which was under the
795 jurisdiction of one of the zawyas. The zawyas were mainly religious
175 centers, or shrines, inhabited and directed by a member of the Senusi
[793] order of Cyrenaica. The role of the head of the zawya was to teach the
Qoraan and spread the teachings of the Senusi order. One of the ways
[794] the zawyas attracted followers was through distribution of food and
clothing to those who joined it. The zawyas also provided places of
[798] refuge for those who needed protection since no one could force his way
into the sacred zawyas. Because of their religious position which put

795 Because of their religious position which put
175 them outside the tribal structure, the leaders of the zawyas played a
627 significant role in mediation and settling disputes between various tribal
793 segments. At their disposal was their ability to ostracize anyone
[626] who did not abide by their decision from the zawyas, which meant depriving
him from all the benefits, social as well as religious, that membership
in the zawyas offered.

795 After the First World War when the British replaced the Turks as
175 governors of the area, the zawyas were closed and the religious leaders
177 ordered to leave. The zoning established by the zawyas existed, however,
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[631] and was used as the basis for the redistricting of the area. Police
[625] stations replaced the religious centers. From the standpoint of the tribal
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634 population itself, the districts have no psychological or political
[795] reality. The zawyas were originally established in the areas of tribal
[361] concentrations. But the area itself did not have any political identity.
The only reality from the standpoint of the inhabitants was the tribal
reality and affiliation which cut across many of these districts. Many
of the tribal segments inhabiting one district were and still are hostile
177 to one another. To transform the zones into administrative districts and
634 to establish one office of leadership for the whole district was to impose
619 a political unity nonexistent among the tribal segments inhabiting
[622] the district. To avoid this difficulty, the government supplemented the
territorial principle of the omda system in the rural area with the principle
of tribal representation and came up with a system which seems to
suite the situation in the Western Desert. For each of the districts,
a list of all tribal segments which habitually occupy the area and whose
tribal land is located within the district, is made. The most powerful

554 177 634 619 [622] The most powerful and numerous segments are then represented by the omda, and the lesser ones are represented by a sheikh. Unlike the system in the rural areas where the sheikh is a subordinate to the omda, the sheikh in the Western Desert does not occupy the same position. Instead he has the same functions and occupies, with regard to his tribal segment, the same position the omda occupies with regard to his. He does not take orders from the omda and has direct relations with the administration. Sheikhs and omdas from one district are supposed to meet periodically in the police station and discuss with the police officer in charge of the station matters concerning the district and their own tribal groups. The only difference between the omda and the sheikh in the Western Desert seems to be the label of the office. The label itself carries a certain amount of prestige to the tribal segment represented by the omda, since it is an acknowledgement by the government of its importance. This is why many of the tribal segments try to be represented by an omda rather than by a sheikh. In certain districts where two or more strong tribal segments compete for the honor of being represented by an omda, the district may have two or more omdas representing the strong tribal segments and a number of sheikhs representing the lesser tribal groups in the district. Not every tribal segment in a district is represented by an omda or even a sheikh, however. Very small tribal segments may join together and have one sheikh, while others may agree to be represented by one of the larger segment's sheikh or omda.

634 554 619 657 Obviously, the number of omdas and sheikhs differ from one district to another depending on the number of important tribal segments in each. There is no specific rule whereby a certain tribal segment is considered

634 by the government to be significant enough to be represented. This matter
554 is left almost entirely to the ability of members of a given tribal segment
619 to convince the authorities that their group is sizable enough to
657 give them the right of omda, or at least sheikh's representation. A segment
represented by a sheikh may later ask for an omda because of the
prestige involved. It is worth noting in this respect that the various
tribal segments in the area are eager to be represented in the government
administrative structure. Gaining prestige among the other tribal
segments is only one motive for such eagerness. Unlika the omda in the
[622] rural areas who functions mainly as a representative of the government
to the village, the omda or sheikh in the Western Desert is a representative
of the people to the government. This is not a theoretical difference
but involves a real difference in the relation of the government
and the omda, on the one hand, and between the latter and the people
622 his represnets, on the other. The omda in the village is a symbol of
554 authority to his people. He is the undisputed ruler of the village. His
657 authority is backed by his ability to mobilize and use the force put at
his diposal by the government, in the implementation of his decisions.
Since he is appointed by the government and not elected by the people,
he does not have to rely on his popularity to hold or maintain office.
His main concern is to please the government, rather than the people of
the village to whom he is merely a symbol of authority. There is very
little that the village omda can bring to his people form the outside,
while he has to implement government policies, collect taxation, apprehend
criminals, all tasks which the villagers are not eager to have done.

634 The situation is quite different in the Western Desert. Although
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657 it is the government, represented by the province council, which makes
554 the final decision in appointing the omda or sheikh, yet this appointment
619 is made on the basis of nominations given by the gribal segment
635 or segments which he would represent. Since the tribal segment usually
nominates one person, the decision of the council is limited to the
examination of the credentials of the nominee and to see if he meets the
basic requirements of the law. If a certain nominee is rejected by the
council, a very rare occurrence, the matter goes back to the tribal
segment to make another nomination. In practice, then, the omda of the
Western Desert is elected by the people and the appointment by the government
of the omda is significant only in cases where the omda is to represent
more than one small tribal segment and each nominates one. Here the
council has to choose between the various nominaees and appoints the best
634 qualified. Unlike the omda of the village, the tribal omda is a real representative
554 of his people. Despite the fact that he becomes part of a
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619 governmental structure, his basic function is to look after the interest
[622] of his tribal group. Or, as one informant put it, "The omda is the servant
of the people." In many cases the best interest of the tribal segment
is served through full cooperation of the omda with the government. So
far there seems to be very little conflict between the interest of the
tribal populations and that of the government. There is very little in
[651] the area that the government demands or needs. There is no taxable land
to speak of. There are only a few acres of barley land and even these
634 are minimally taxed. The main responsibility of the omda to the government
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657 is to report births and deaths and give a yearly list of young men

634 who reach the age of military service. He is also supposed to report
554 the presence of any fugitive or crininal in his district and report
657 crimes accurring in that district and which involve members of the tribal segment he represents.

634 The first two duties of the omda to the government do not involve
554 any conflict of interest. Unlike the rural areas where sons are
657 considered a very important economic asset to their parents, and therefore,
562 there is a general resentment of military service which takes the sons
701 away and deprives the parents of their important work around the fields,
178 Awlad Ali look at military service as an opportunity to have their sons go to the city, obtain guaranteed payment, and escape the hardship of nomadic existence. Economic activities
[233] in the area do not require the cooperation of a large number of individuals, and most of the grazing of animals is done either by a paid shepherd or by one of the grown-up sons. Although there still exists an
[183] ideology which values having many sons, yet with the cessation of hostilities between the tribal segments, their presence in the area has lost its
[464] value. Many of the younger generation are seeking jobs with the government projects in the area or in the city. Neither one is easy to find. Joining the army is increasingly considered as an easy alternative.

634 The omda's function which seems to involve some conflicting loyalties
554 is that of reporting crimes involving members of his tribal segment. But
657 even this does not pose a serious problem as it might seem. Almost all
674 minor crimes committed against property or persons as well as all civil disputes are left to be handled by the tribal proceedings. The duties of the omda are limited to reporting the cases of murder and serious assault

1 On the basis of one percent of the yearly yield.

634 which result in permanent bodily harm. Reporting such cases is a fairly
554 minor proceeding since such cases come to the knowledge of the authori-
657 ties through other channels, mainly from talks involved in the mediation
674 [743] for the bloodmoney or from the hospital to which serious assault cases are usually taken. Besides, reporting a crime does not mean convicting the offender. This latter depends on evidence which, in case the dispute has been settled by tribal proceedings, is hard for the police authorities to find.

634 While the government demands do not impose serious conflicts of
554 loyalty on the part of the omda, if successful, his position with the
657 government can bring to his tribal segments great benefits. These benefits are usually in the form of various social and economic aids including fodder for the animals and food and clothing for the people during the dry years. Other benefits including providing the tribal population with olive trees and helping them clear many of the old Roman wells and establishing wind mills for nominal fees. Not everyone in the area can have such benefits. Some do not even know they exist. A successful omda could manipulate the administration to get as many benefits for
[871] his tribal segment as possible.. Some successful omdas were able to have
[474] the government build schools in their districts, establish cooperative units to market local products such as wool, sheep, and olive oil.

634 This should not lead us, however, to conclude that the position of
554 the omda in the Western Desert does not involve any kind of conflicting
657 loyalty or that he is always supported by his people or even trusted by
578 them. One informant said that the omda of his biat is "...government man, not ours....He would sell us all if this pleases his masters in the

634 government." But due to the nature of the representation and the spe-
554 cific relation of the government to the area, the position of the omda
657 does not pose serious demands upon the loyalty of the omda to his tribal
[578] group.

634 Because of the omda's ability to bring benefits to his tribal seg-
554 ment from the government, the ability to manipulate the administrative
657 officials is the most important basis for the nomination of a given
666 individual for the position of the omda. "The omda is one who can speak city talk and knows how to deal with the government officials." Age is not important; young people know more about city ways than old people. "A man may be a cheat, but as long as he can get our things done, he is the best man for the job...of course, we don't want to nominate someone with a bad reputation who may blacken our face in front of everybody. However, if he has a bad reputation the council would not approve his appointment...he just has to be someone who can get things done..."

159 Muftah Mughaieb, the sheikh of the Sanagrah tribal segment in the
634 district of Heman, described the circumstances of his nomination as
554 follows:

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> 666 Before the former sheikh of that tribal segment died (he
> 578 was Muftah's uncle), one member of the group got into an argu-
> 625 ment with the police officer in charge of the police station in the district. The tribesman insulted the police officer who insisted on arresting him. Rumors also had it that the police officer was using his authority to reduce the share of the tribal segment in the government aid which was badly needed during that particular year. Sheikh Muftah, whose father is the Aqila of

159 bait Mughaieb of the Sanagrah tribe, went to the officer and apologized
634 554 to him on behalf of the whole group and invited him to a
657 lavish dinner party. The charges against the tribesman were soon
666 dropped, and it was concluded that it was because of the way Muftah
[578] [625] had handled the situation. Since that incident, Muftah has been
known as an expert in handling the government officials. One year
later, the sheikh of the tribal segment died, and a meeting was
held during which the important members of the Sanagrah tribal
segment in the district decided to nominate Muftah for the position
of the sheikh, vacant by the death of his uncle. Muftah, who
was attending the meeting, was asked to accept the nomination, and
he agreed. "...I accepted the nomination reluctantly." Muftah
later told me, "I did not really want to become the sheikh. The
159 634 position does not bring any personal benefit, and it involves a
554 lot of responsibility. The sheikh has to act as an attorney for
657 his tribe, represent it to the government and competes with other
sheikhs to bring his people things that the other sheikhs cannot
get for theirs, like more membership in the cooperative units or
in the socialist union. And what does he get in return? Nothing...
not even the gratitude of his people. To them, he is a servant of
the tribe, and his duty is to look after its interest. If he
doesn't, then everybody is quick to criticize him. I had to accept
the nomination because I felt it was my duty to do so and not
to embarrass the awaqil and the important people of the tribe who
[465] put their confidence in me. As far as the government, all I get is
six pounds a month."

634 554 619 "The omda or sheikh is both a blessing and a curse to his tribe," said one member of the Aggary 'eila. "He can bring benefits to his tribe, but at the same time, he has to report his own people if one of them breaks the city laws... His position is like that of a double-edged razor."

Most of the people in the area, however, tolerate the negative aspects of the omda's functions as a moderate price for the possible benefits they may get through his position. This is why each tribal segment does its best to be represented by an omda, or at least by a sheikh.

Within his tribal segment he enjoys a great deal of respect. He does not, by means of position alone, command any power over members of his group similar to the power the omda of the village has over his [613] people. It seems, however, that although the position itself does not carry with it any power, yet, when the holder of that position is at the same time a native tribal leader or aqila, it tends to enhance his position as a tribal leader and to give him more respect among members of his tribal unit as well as among the rest of the tribal groupings. 634 554 619 182 657 613 This may be explained by the fact that the establishment of the omda system in that area did not involve direct interference with the native political system except in a minimal way, mainly to keep the tribal populations in the area from interfering in the progress of various government projects in the area. As such, the system did not impose too many demands upon the tribal loyalties of the omdas or sheikhs. In the relationship between the government and the tribal population, the balance so far has been in favor of the latter, who, by means of

634 omda representation, are taking from the government much more than
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619 they are giving in return. Being the link between his people and
182 the government in such a system gives the aqila a new basis of
657 political support.
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581 are necessary for the validation of the marriage contract. Modern
585 671 legal systems which took as their basis the Islamic law of marriage
675 and the family further required the registration of the marriage con-
tract for the marriage to be legal.

584 The request and necessary response forming the marriage are sup-
585 posed to be carried on by the parties involved. However, if either the
429 groom or the bride is not of age, or is mentally unqualified, the trans-
593 action is carried on by his or her guardian, or "wakil." The wakil is
the father, unless he is dead or an invalid, in which case the brothers
[604] become the wakils. If the person has no brothers, then the uncles be-
[184] come the wakil in the order stated. According to certain Sunni sects
in Islam, a woman marrying for the first time is always represented by
her wakil, even if she is of age. The assumption is that a woman who
has never been married does not have the experience that enables her to
enter into any kind of legally binding relationship such as marriage.

585 Following the original Islamic idea, marriage among Awlad Ali is
675 an oral agreement between the groom or his father and the guardian
593 429 (wakil) of the bride-to-be (her father, if alive, or her closest male
[604] kin in the following order: her brothers, her uncles, her grandfather).
585 A religious man is sometimes asked to perform the marriage, although it
792 is not required. Some persons might invite a member of the Murabiteen
[619] tribe or holy men to witness the marriage on the basis that his presence
[778] gives "baraka," or blessing, to the marriage. Before the application of
585 the State legal system to the area, marriage contracts were not regis-
656 177 tered. In recent years, however, and with the increased mobility of
[675] the tribal populations, more and more marriages are being registered in
[634] the administrative districts. Still, according to the unofficial estimates,

586 husband. In a number of cases the husband was willing to divorce the
562 574 woman after a promise by the man that she would pay him the mahr when
554 she got married. In most cases, however, the process costs the man a considerable amount of money. Sometimes, when the woman is young and attractive, the man finds it to his advantage to keep her as his wife, since she will cost him no more expenses. On the other hand, the man cannot refuse a woman the right of refuge, since to do this or to deny her the right of hospitality will make him liable to pay kabara if she made the refusal known publicly. On the other hand, it is prestigious to be known in the area as a man to whom women go to be released from their husbands. In fact, a man who acquires a reputation of getting wives released is likely to be sought as mardi in other cases as well.

Due to the nature of his role in mediating, the woman must be careful in selecting the man over whom she throws herself. These considerations are manifested in the following case taken from my field notes.
[584] Hadia was forced by her father to marry a man from the same tribe who
[583] paid her father L.E. 100 as mahr. She did not want to marry him because she was in love with someone else of whom her father did not approve. One month after she was married, she left the tent and never came back.
586 Later, she appeared in the house of Omda Ali, the chief of another tribe,
562 and everyone knew that she had thrown herself on him. She later told me
574 554 why she had selected Omda Ali and not the Omda of her own tribe. "Be-
● 634 cause my husband works for the Omda of my own tribe, and I thought he would be biased. Of course, I couldn't have gone to my father; he was the one who forced me to marry that man. Omda Ali is very respected and can support me... He is also rich and is known for releasing wives from their husbands." Omda Ali called the husband in and asked him to divorce

586 his wife. The husband agreed but insisted that she pay him L.E. 300
562
574 (this included the mahr and the marriage expenses). The Omda tried to
554 reduce the amount but could not. He then tried to get the father to
634 pay, but the father refused. He had to pay the husband L.E. 200 of
his own money and promised that the rest would be paid when the woman
remarried (it would be paid from the mahr). The husband divorced Haida.
One week later she was married to her lover. I have no information
about whether or not the 100 pounds was paid.

586 In another example, Sabha was forced by her father to marry her
562 cousin (ibn 'amm). She could not live with him, so she threw herself
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554 on one of the holy men in the area. The holy man convinced the hus-
792 band to divorce Sabha and then went to her father and convinced him to
pay back the mahr to the husband, and the case was settled. People say
[626] that both the husband and the father agreed to the demands of the holy
man because they were afraid of his supernatural curse. Sabha went
back to her father's house.

586 It is obvious from these and similar cases that the success or
562 failure of the procedure depends on the careful selection of the man
593 on whom a woman throws herself. It is also apparent from the above
[554]
[574] examples that his right of refuge is resorted to only in cases where the
woman cannot go to her father or to her closest kin to help her get a
divorce because he is either unable or unwilling to help her. A father
is unable to help if the husband is powerful or if he is the woman's
ibn 'amm (father's brother's son) who has, according to the tribal law,
the undisputed right to marry his bint 'amm (father's brother's daughter).
The father is usually unwilling to help his daughter if he is the one

*175 them a reprimand on the double count of decrease in revenue
*648 and lack of security. It was essential, therefore, to get the
651 Bedouin to pay their taxes without making too much trouble
about doing so. To this end the Turkish administrative organization
*175 was largely directed. In 1879 the *Vilayet* of Banghazi was,
in matters of civil administration, finally separated from that of
*648 Tripoli and in 1888 became an autonomous *sanjaq* directly
631 dependent on Istanbul. It was governed by a *mutasarrif*
nominated by, and directly responsible to, the Central Government.
On him depended all the officials of the Administration,
though the chief among them were appointed by the Imperial
Government. The senior officials were usually Turks. The
*175 country was divided for administrative purposes into a number
*648 of districts, each under a *qaimaqam*, except that of Banghazi,
634 which came directly under the Governor himself; and all except
the Aujila-Jalu and Kufra districts were further divided into
*175 sub-districts under mudirs. These districts and sub-districts
followed tribal divisions and subdivisions as any administration
*648 in Cyrenaica must do, since the tribes and their sections
634 are the fundamental social departments of the country. Hence
619 sections of a nomadic tribe might be residing at any time in a
sub-district different to that to which they were administratively
attached, and even in a different district.

*175 In his direction of the affairs of the administration, finances,
and police, the Governor was assisted by an administrative
*648 council composed of the chief accountant, the secretary, the
631 qadi, the mufti, and four elected members from the local population.
Each *qaimaqam*, nominated by the Imperial Government,
had an administrative council similarly composed. The mudirs,
nominated by the Imperial Government on the proposal of the
Governor, had no council established by statute but co-opted
tribal Shaikhs when they wanted their advice or co-operation.
In the towns there was a representative, called *mukhtar*,
elected by the property-owning citizens for each ward, and at
Banghazi and Darna there were urban councils of a simple
kind.

*175 It was the mudir in charge of a sub-district who had direct
dealings with the Bedouin tribes and the lodges of the Sanusiya
*648 Order. In 1911, just before the Italian invasion, there were six
634 districts including Kufra, which came nominally under the

Turkish administration in 1910, and the Banghazi district, which came directly under the Governor of Cyrenaica for administration. Attached to each district were the sub-districts shown in the list below,[1] in which the tribes attached to each sub-district are also given. The Bara'asa came under Banghazi, although they lived well to the east, for political reasons, the tribe being exceptionally rebellious.[2]

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Districts	*Sub-districts*	*Tribes*
Banghazi (directly dependent on the Governor)	Suluq Qaminis Barsis Sidi Khalifa	'Awaqir
	Slanta	Bara'asa
al-Marj	al-Marj	'Arafa and 'Abid
	al-Haniya	Darsa
Darna	al-Sallum Tubruq al-Banba al-Qubba	'Abaidat
	Shahhat	Hasa
Ajadabiya	Marsa Braiqa	Magharba
Aujila and Jalu	—	Awajila and Majabra
Kufra	—	—

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The administration was very slapdash by European standards. Indeed, Shaikh Muhammad 'Uthman says darkly: 'There is at Banghazi no organization, political, administrative, or financial. I say no more about this matter: it will be understood why.'[3] This was, of course, an exaggeration, for however simple the administration may have been, and perhaps for that reason, it worked—with a good deal of grumbling it is true, but without undue conflict. Revenue was collected and would have exceeded the cost of the very cheap administration of the country if the proceeds of some taxes had not been sent to Istanbul. Much of this revenue came from import and export duties, but the bulk of it was derived from taxes on herds and a tenth of the harvest in kind, the collection of which was in the hands of the mudirs. It was the task of these mudirs, who were generally literate

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[1] *Notizie relative al Sangiacato della Cirenaica e alle Mudirie dipendenti dal Mutassarifato di Bengasi* (Ufficio Politico Militare), 1913.

[2] Fabrizio Serra, *Italia e Senussia*, 1933, p. 17; idem in *La Cirenaica*, 1922-3, p. 182.

[3] Op. cit., pp. 59-60.

*648 Arabs, to assess and collect taxes, to maintain security, and to
651 control the few police allotted to them. In this task they
● 634 expected co-operation from the local Shaikhs of the tribal
[619] sections and the Shaikhs of the Sanusiya lodges.

[793] It is remarkable that the Bedouin paid any taxes at all, for
the mudirs had not sufficient force at their command, nor had
the Governor at Banghazi, to compel the Bedouin to pay if they
were determined not to do so. The mudir of Slanta had only 50
[701] to 60 soldiers in his sub-district and the Bara'asa whom he
[625] administered could have annihilated this force with ease, as
could the 'Awaqir the 50 soldiers and the handful of police
*175 stationed at Suluq. That taxes were collected at all, and all the
*648 more that they were collected without constant disturbance, is
to be accounted for partly by the recognition by the Shaikhs of
651 the tribal sections, with whom the mudirs were careful to keep
634 on good personal terms, that there was a moral obligation to
619 pay them; but there were also sanctions if they were not paid.
If the Shaikh of a tribal section did not collect the taxes due
from that section, he was held responsible and action could be
taken against him personally. The mudir, accompanied by a
small armed force, went a round of the tribal sections attached
to his sub-district each year, generally in springtime, and sent
out other tax-collecting parties in other directions. Sometimes
special tax commissions appointed by the Governor also toured
the country. A favourite device was for such parties to quarter
themselves in the camp of a recalcitrant Shaikh and to reside
there as his guests, for the soldiers and police carried few provisions, till the tax was paid. The Shaikhs, on the other hand,
were made partners in the undertaking by, besides investment
with an official robe and status, receiving a percentage of the
taxes collected, the mudir himself also taking a percentage.
Moreover, each Shaikh whose section paid the tax was determined
that the other sections should not escape paying as well. A
Shaikh was able to divide up the assessment on his section
among the minor Shaikhs, and the minor Shaikhs among yet
smaller ones. It was in the interest of each Shaikh to see that
the smaller ones did not escape their share and leave him with
the responsibility for a deficit. Responsibility was in this way
*175 passed down the tribal structure. On the whole the system
*648 worked well and the Turkish officials and the Bedouin did not
651

get on badly together. Each understood the other. Also there 175*
was much elasticity in the taxes which appealed to the Bedouin, 648*
who prefer to pay a heavy tax one year and lightly or not at all 651
another year, rather than to pay a regular and inevitable tax. The assessments were seldom revised and often had little relation to the capacity of a tribal section to pay. The result was that taxes were always in arrears and in some years, or for some sections, remitted altogether. Those sections nearest the Turkish posts paid the more easily because they were the more vulnerable. Some of the more nomadic Bedouin escaped payment altogether, or at any rate for years at a stretch. It is, I think, safe to assume that the taxes actually collected over a number of years were light. Otherwise the Bedouin would not have paid them.

Perhaps the chief reason why taxes were collected without 175*
constant rebellion was the support given to the administration 648*
in this matter by the Sanusiya. The Turks held the coastal 651
towns and a few inland posts outside which their direct control 795*
of the country was restricted to those Bedouin who lived a fairly stable life in the immediate vicinity of these centres. The rest of the country was left to the Sanusiya and its own devices, though, as we have seen, the Turks sent occasional patrols into
the interior. Sporadically, without much enthusiasm or per- 175*
severance, the Administration at one time tried to extend its
effective control into the hinterland by nominating to official 648*
posts, and giving arms and money to, selected tribal chiefs, such 651
as the Shaikhly families of Hadduth, Lataiwish, and Saif al- 795*
Nasir. Bu Bakr bin Hadduth of the Bara'asa was made 793
qaimaqam of al-Qaiqab, where he had a castle; 'Ali Lataiwish 619
of the Magharba was made *qaimaqam* of Sirt, where he, also, 634
had a castle; and the fierce old warrior chieftain of the Aulad Suliman, Saif al-Nasir, was made mudir of Bu Njaim. This procedure resulted in brigandage rather than in good administration and was in the main discarded. Instead the mudirs worked directly through the Shaikhs of the tribal sections and, especially when dealing with intertribal and intersectional affairs, through the Shaikhs of the Sanusiya zawiyas. Some of the older notables of Banghazi have told me that the Pasha, as the Governor was often called, would never have succeeded in collecting taxes among the Bedouin had it not been for the co-operation of the

*175 *648 651 *795 293 [619] [634] Heads of the Sanusiya lodges, who often accompanied the mudirs and tax commissions to the Shaikhs of the tribal sections attached to their lodges. It was to the common interest of the Turkish Administration and of the Sanusiya that there should be order, security, justice, and trade in the country, and they co-operated to maintain them.

The Turkish officials did their utmost to remain on good terms with the Sanusiya Shaikhs and to this end, and doubtless also because they found no difficulty in accepting, as educated men, its exalted teachings, some of them affiliated themselves to the Order. Membership of it gave them prestige in the eyes of the Bedouin as great, if not greater, than their official status gave them. Likewise the more prosperous merchants who had dealings with the Bedouin tribes or sent caravans to the Sahara and [556] Sudan found it advisable to be received into the Order. It is for this reason that in all the towns of Libya we find a small body of the richer and more cultured citizens ascribed to the Order, while the common people belong to other or no Orders.[1]

*175 *648 651 *795 But though the administration of Cyrenaica might be called at this period a Turco-Sanusi condominium there was an undercurrent of jealousy on both sides which occasionally gave rise to open conflict. A sure occasion was any effort on the part of the Administration to tax the Sanusiya estates. Although these had been exempted from taxation by the Sultan's firman, the local administration made rare and unsuccessful efforts to exact taxation on them. When in 1908 they tried to tax the crops of the Sanusiya holdings a tribal meeting, attended by 150 Shaikhs headed by 'Umar bu Rqaia of the Darsa tribe, met at the zawiya of al-Haniya and decided not to pay any more tribute to the Turkish Government till it revoked the tax. The Government then dropped the matter, though the trouble continued till 1910. Earlier, the Governor Ahmad Pasha Zuhadi (1904–5), acting on instructions from Istanbul, had tried to impose a tax on the crops of tribesmen and zawiyas alike. The Bedouin round al-Marj had thereupon attacked a Turkish detachment charged with collecting the tax and sent them back to Banghazi stripped of everything they possessed. The outcome was that the Governor was relieved of his office.

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[1] Capt. Emilio Canevari, *Zauie ed Ichuan Senussiti della Tripolitania*, 1917, *passim*.

554 178 [792] you for your cloak, you would have immediately given it to him. God was pleased with them at that time."

This notion of changing foci of authority and power cannot be divorced from the related political phenomena of the tendency toward legitimacy and the role institutionalization
128 process. In the next chapter, I will attempt to show how such a conceptual framework can be utilized in an analysis of culture and political change.

Modern Legal Roles

634 554 [648] [177] The roles of _'umda_ and _shaikh_ were created and imposed upon the Bedouins by Muhammad 'Ali sometime during the early part of the nineteenth century in order to facilitate administration, maintain security in the desert, and protect the Western frontier.

[619] Both of these roles are representative offices at the primary level of the tribal structure. The 'Aishaibat have an _'umda_ and a _shaikh_ who reside in Marsa Matruh and work in close relation with the Governor. In terms of a chain of command, these offices receive demands which may originate either with the Governor in Matruh or with Bedouins in al-Qasr. But these offices are subservient to both the Governor and the Bedouins since no decision-making powers of any consequence
[571] resides with them. With reference to the two authority
[635] structures, the Egyptian and the Bedouin, the _'umda_ and the

634 554 [571] [635] shaikh are administrators, not executives, in the service of the Governor and the "status group" of al-Qasr. Nevertheless, under the influence of the bureaucratic principle, as a new structural principle in Bedouin society, these offices could conceivably become seats of power.[4]

634 554 666 571 The 'umda and shaikh are described as "elective" offices by the Bedouins but, in fact, they are appointive just like the office of 'aqila. Theoretically, every man has a vote but, actually, only the members of the "status group" vote. Paradoxically, perhaps, the Bedouins stress two major qualifications for these offices: the 'umda and the shaikh must be men "who know the needs of the Bedouin of the desert, and know how to talk to the Governor"; and, "they must be men who do nothing without the permission of the 'awaaqil (i.e. without the permission of the "status group" who elected the 'aqila in the first place).

634 554 The two offices are not equal in prestige and status neither in the eyes of the Bedouins or of the Egyptians. The office of shaikh is the lesser office. It amounts to a clerical post, and the shaikh really functions as an assistant

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[635] [4] The Governor, who is of Bedouin origin, has already recognized this potential and has moved to eliminate the possibility of a more powerful 'umda representing a more powerful "status group." When I left the field, the Governor was in the process of drawing up new ground rules for electing the 'umda and the shaikh which would call for public elections on a "one man, one vote" basis.

634 to the 'umda. Both offices are for a life-term, only being
554 terminated by bad behavior or senility. At the expiration
634 of an incumbent's term, the "status group" meets in al-Qasr
571 to decide upon his replacement. The name of a "nominee"
•635 is passed on to the Governor who is expected to approve the
666 Bedouins' selection of a representative to the government.
It is this "status group"-controlled process which the
[178] Governor seeks to change. Since these are officially held
[177] offices in the U.A.R. governmental structure, he feels that
elections to fill their vacancies should be a public affair.
Naturally, he will exercise more influence over the naming
of candidates in this way, and the Bedouins perceive this as
a challenge to the traditional structure of leadership and
control of external relations.

634 The offices of 'umda and shaikh are even more heredi-
*613 tary than that of 'aqila, which theoretically should not be
666 the case. By definition, the role of 'aqila is functional at
[428] the bait level, and so the recruitment pool of candidates
for this office is inherently limited. By comparison, the
offices of 'umda and shaikh should go to the "best men" in
the tribe, and, therefore, the recruitment pool should be
634 tribal-wide. But, in fact, these two offices are considered
*613 "the property" of the wealthiest lineages in the al-Qasr area.
666 There is a traditional rationale behind this fact: there is
428 the structural necessity for, and conscious practice of, an
[571]

*613 all of the marriages in the history of 'Ailit Ma'fas (see
582 Table 1).[1] From a total of 197 marriages, 33 were within the
'Aishaibat tribe. Of these 33 marriages with the other lineages
of al-Qasr (see Figure 3 for the lineages of al-Qasr), 2 were
with 'Ailit Abu Qarasa, and 2 with 'Ailit Zallat, 4 each were
with 'Ailit Zagharat, 'Ailit Dawlat, and 'Ailit Shraif, but
17, or just over 50 per cent, were with 'Ailit Lazumi.

634 For the time being, the offices of _'umda_ and _shaikh_
554 seem to be modern symbols of the traditional power structure
rather than loci of real power, though this does not preclude
their becoming so in the future. But for the present, these
roles are considered "not of the people, not of the desert,
634 they belong to the government." Here is the way one _'aqila_
554 explained it:
*613

> The _'umda_ is higher in the government but the _'aqila_ is the responsible one in the _'aiela_. The _shaikh_ has nothing to do with _'awaqil_, he only makes contact between them and the government . . . The _'umda_ gets the request from the government and asks the _'awaqil_ to handle the situation, but he does not tell them how
> 634 to do it . . . The _'umda_ and _shaikh_ go to meetings with
> •635 the Governor, then they tell the _'awaqil_ about the
> matters discussed. There is no direct contact between
> *613 the Governor and the _'awaqil_ . . . The _'umda_
> comes to the _'awaqil_ concerning general problems . . .
> 554 If the Arabs need something from the government, they go to the _'umda_. They tell him to go and tell the Governor what they want . . . The _'umda_ represents them and he does good in this. God only knows if he is doing a good job. If he is not it will show in the next election.

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554 From the standpoint of the political system of al-Qasr, we might conclude that the _'umda_ and _shaikh_ are roles

[1] [This should read Table 5. See p.115--Analyst]

634 of little significance in the authority structure. Very few
554 people of the al-Qasr area have had any contact with these
634 officers, and very few want any contact. On the other hand,
554 the direction of change in al-Qasr and the bureaucratic growth
178 of the government in the Western Desert makes it likely that
all Bedouins will be drawn into the total authority structure,
and that the roles of _'umda_ and _shaikh_ will expand. These
roles will not increase in terms of traditional prestige and
status, but they may gain the authority which they do not possess
now. This is in view of the fact that the traditional authority
structure remains relatively intact. The _'umda_ and the
shaikh have no traditional basis of authority, so they cannot
make decisions which are morally binding for Bedouins of al-
634 Qasr at this time. It is obvious, of course, that the _'umda_
●635 may refer to the Governor, and even the use of governmental
554 force, as the basis of his legitimacy. But this has never
178 happened. The incumbent _'umda_ is still a Bedouin, and this
prevents him from challenging the traditional ways. Also,
the Governor is concerned with restricting the _'umda's_
influence not increasing it.

634 I do not mean to imply that there is, or will be, a
613 struggle for power between traditional authority represented
178 by the _'agila_ and modern legal authority represented by the
578 _'umda_. Such a struggle could not actually occur since when,
and if, the _'umda_ came to represent authority in a newly

156 He was sometimes
asked to sit-in as a witness for important contractual
159
554 matters. Note that in the *rawaabit al-'awaaqil* of Bait
675 Shafaila of 'Ailit Lazumi (presented in Chapter Four),
Hajj 'Ali who is neither from 'Ailit Lazumi nor an *'aqila*
was present to sign and validate this document.

156 Hajj 'Ali, then, operates in the micropolitical
159 system and the traditional authority structure of al-Qasr.
554 But what is just as important, he has secured a firm foothold in the modern bureaucratic structure of the near-by
town. He straddles both camps. The Governor of Marsa Matruh
•635 was an important aid to my understanding of Hajj 'Ali's
634 role as "broker." The Governor claimed that the British
156
159 first introduced the roles of *'umda* and *shaikh*; they did this
554 to "control the Bedouin" and to"get the men out of the tents."
124
[648] He explained in his own way what he considered to be the
structural differentiation of political roles in al-Qasr.

> Let me tell you, these fellows are very clever. They have an *'umda* . . . he comes to my office and says: "I want this and this." I say, "No." Then he goes back to the *'awaqil* and tells them that, and then these fellows begin to think in what way they can get what they want. But the *'umda* is nothing; it is the
> *[613] *'aqila* whom the Bedouins listen to and love . . . The *'umda* is elected (at this time) by the Bedouins. They put forward a man who hesitates, one who can say yes or no . . . But there is a real leader for the people, this is a man such as Hajj 'Ali, here is a man the Bedouins love.

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635 The Governor said that Hajj 'Ali speaks well and
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159 thinks well. Twice in the interview the Governor said that
554
*[613]

•635 Hajj 'Ali "became an _'aqila_ by his way of life." Of course,
156 159 the fact is that Hajj 'Ali is not an _'aqila_ at all. Although
554 I feel that the Governor should understand the Bedouin authority
*[613] structure, he is not alone in his misconceptions. The chief
156 agricultural engineer for the G.D.D.O., who works very closely
159 with the Bedouins of al-Qasr, also thought that Hajj 'Ali
554 was the _'aqila_ of Bait 'Umar in 'Ailit Ma'fas. Furthermore,
*613 and most impressive of all, one _'aqila_ in 'Ailit Dawlat and
his four sons all thought that Hajj 'Ali was the _'aqila_ of
Bait 'Umar. There is more here than just ignorance of
Bedouin society on the part of officials, and disinterest
on the part of the Dawlat _'aqila_. There is good reason for
these different parties to mistake Hajj 'Ali as a key
traditional "authority," or spokesman for his corporate group.
It seems clear that in their respective dealings they must
have encountered Hajj 'Ali in some kind of representative
capacity. The _'aqila_ who insisted that Hajj 'Ali was an
'aqila, even after I pointed out that he was not, lived
outside the _'izba_ sector and hence mistook an important
rajal khair for an _'aqila_. The Governor understandably
mistook the most influential man in al-Qasr as an _'aqila_.

635 There are other traits which qualify Hajj 'Ali as
648 the singular leader of the Bedouins. A few years back, the
[554] [156] Governor of Marsa Matruh formed a Governor's Council
[159] (_Majlis al-Muhafza_) made up of representatives of the Bedouin

•635 population of the whole Western Desert, and representatives
[648] of the Egyptian government employees working in the province.
[634] The Bedouin representatives appointed to this council need
not be an _'umda_ or a _shaikh_, although they may be. The
oldest Bedouin member of the council, who happens to be an
'umda, told me that "the Governor picks the men who he feels
understand the problems of the people."

635 The Governor himself thinks that every Bedouin on
124 his council is an _'aqila_. He replied to my question about
*613 the criteria for membership on the _Majlis al-Muhafza_: "I
am using a new selection system. Rather than choose the
'umda or _shaikh_, I choose the _'aqila_. Every man on the
council is an _'aqila_, and the number is determined by the
population of the area . . . But I appoint more men from the
[619] 'Ali Ahmar (see Figures 3 and 7)[1] than from other tribes.
This is because they are more numerous, and they are near
Matruh where I am able to contact them immediately. The
'Ali Ahmar are represented by six men and the other tribes
by just three men."

156 Hajj 'Ali is one of these six men and the only member
159 of the Council who resides in al-Qasr. I attended and ob-
554 served the December meeting of the Council. The Governor
635 sat at the head of a long table with the Egyptian representa-
648 tives on either side of him. At the other end of the table
[114] sat the Bedouin representatives, Hajj 'Ali among them. Purely

[1], [See pp. 65 & 77 respectively--Analyst]

156 administrative business took up most of the time at the
159 meeting, and only the Governor and the Egyptians took part
554 in the discussion. At the conclusion of the meeting, the
635 Governor asked if any present had comments to make. Hajj
648 [871] 'Ali rose, and delivered a formal and well-prepared speech
[537] on the inadequacies of the educational facilities in Matruh.
He noted that the Governor had promised the Bedouins that if
they sent their sons in from the desert for secondary schooling,
their material needs would be taken care of, but that in fact
the Governor had not kept his promise for there was not enough
space and beds for the boys. The Governor apologized for this
condition and said he was trying to correct it. I noted that
a few Egyptians found something amusing about this incident,
but that all of the Bedouins present were serious and nodded
in agreement with the points made by Hajj 'Ali.

156 We should note that Hajj 'Ali was the only Bedouin to
159 speak up at the meeting, that he spoke in the formal, tradi-
554 tional manner, and that he showed concern for the real problems
635 of the Bedouins. Hajj 'Ali is careful to protect his identity
as a Bedouin, and in this he differs from the *'umda* and
most of the "status group."

121 In situations of induced change, the cultural problems
156 involved differ in their conception and immediacy as defined
159 554 by the agents and the recipients of change. Hajj 'Ali, who
177 635 is both an agent and a recipient of change, is intimate with

121 the problems of the Bedouins of al-Qasr. He knows how to
156
159 phrase them, and his place on the Majlis al-Muhafza gives
554 him the right and the opportunity to air them. This is the
•635 role of the "cultural broker." Before the meeting of the
177 council, Hajj 'Ali had gathered a group of the men from al-Qasr and they had talked about which demands should be presented to the Governor. This is purely a political process which Hajj 'Ali manipulates. The formulation and presentation
[48] of demands became, in the hands of Hajj 'Ali, "inputs" into the Egyptian political system with the hope that they will materialize as "outputs" and the satisfaction of needs - to use the terminology of David Easton's "systems analysis" (1965b).

156 On another occasion, Hajj 'Ali demonstrated his
159 status and political leadership and the fact that he has
554 assumed the position of spokesman for the Bedouin of al-Qasr
635 during this period of change. Once each year the Governor
177 makes a tour of al-Qasr to inspect the school, the cooperative building, the government experimental farm, and the area in general. After the inspection tour, he holds a reception in a ceremonial tent set up for the occasion. At this time, he states his evaluations and opinions, distributes some clothing material to the poorer families of the area, and asks for suggestions from the Bedouins who sit on the ground before the tent. The only suggestion forthcoming from the Bedouins was

156 by the secretary of the cooperative society who requested
159 that the government furnish bus service between Matruh and
554 al-Qasr. The Governor thought this a good idea and said he
635 would inquire into the matter.
177

156 As the Governor suggested that the meeting be adjourned,
159 Hajj 'Ali stood up, faced the Governor and began another of
554 his formal speeches in the rich tradition of Arabic; it was
635 the best Arabic I had heard spoken in the desert. This speech
177 537 was for the benefit of all present, Bedouins and officials
alike. Hajj 'Ali made no requests but simply thanked the
Governor for honoring al-Qasr with his presence. In this
short well-prepared tribute, he said:

> We feel the efforts of the government and we can scarcely imagine or dream of this development. For instance, we were living in tents and now only five per cent remain in tents while the remainder are in houses. We were dressed simply, but now we are dressed in poplin material. Those who could afford one set of clothes now can afford two. Thanks be to God, all this is due to Jamal Abd al-Nasser.

156 It is significant, of course, that smiles once again
159 played on the faces of the Governor's entourage and nothing
554 635 but admiration on the faces of the Bedouins. As Hajj 'Ali
537 spoke he did not face the Governor directly but turned aside,
speaking both to him and the Bedouins--Hajj 'Ali, the Bedouin,
had been sitting on the ground before the Governor. The
[634] *'umda* and *shaikh* had accompanied the Governor on his tour

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159 and they sat on chairs inside the tent. I returned to
554 Marsa Matruh in the 'umda's car (1964 Ford, highly polished)
535 537 with the 'umda and the shaikh. They openly joked about Hajj
[634] 'Ali and his manner of presentation; they repeated some of
[122] his "stilted" phrases and laughed. Hajj 'Ali gave last year's
[522] reception speech also. This is because, his son says, Hajj
'Ali is considered a fine speaker by the Bedouins of al-Qasr.

121 We can see how these details carry larger implications
177 within the context of political and social structures under-
178 going change. It is the stuff which the anthropologist finds
important for an understanding of the process of change.

156 If I have established thus far that Hajj 'Ali is
159 politically active and representative in both the traditional
554 and the modern systems, then the attempt is now to prove that
177 he consciously seeks to change the traditional in the direction
178 of the modern for political and moral reasons, and for social
and personal reasons.

156 Hajj 'Ali, when he spoke with me, inevitably came
159 around to the subject of international politics, whether this
554 was the question of Israel or the image which America's racial
177 problems presented. Hajj 'Ali was the only man from the whole
178 Marsa Matruh area who was neither shaikh nor 'umda to attend
124 829 the nomination of Jamal Abd al-Nasser in January of 1965. In
[571] all of this, I detect a move on the part of Hajj 'Ali to
identify himself with an Egyptian reference group and to

156 159 554 829 574 648 tional style of Bedouin hospitality--"as we used to do in Cyrenaica"--and spent a total of 50 L.E. for the welcoming ceremony. "This money was from his own pocket," as the Bedouins of al-Qasr complained after it was learned that the vice-President would not visit Matruh after all. As a matter of fact, all of the Bedouin leaders who had been invited to the reception by Hajj 'Ali refused to eat the food, for they said that it had not been prepared for them. [576] This act was taken as a show of respect for Hajj 'Ali and anger with bureaucrats.

156 159 554 648 668 [124] [635] Hajj 'Ali is the representative of al-Qasr to the Arab Socialist Union which meets in Marsa Matruh and has cell meetings in al-Qasr. The socialist cell in al-Qasr meets about three times a month. When I asked why Hajj 'Ali was the man chosen to represent all of al-Qasr at section meetings of the Union, the reply was: "Because he is a member of the Majlis al-Muhafza." There was one section meeting of the Union in Matruh while I was in the field. The theme of the meeting was "The Meaning of Socialism." Hajj 'Ali attended this meeting.

156 159 554 [634] In sum, it seems not too far afield to say that Hajj 'Ali is prepared to take over the leadership of the Bedouins in a much more sophisticated manner than one could possibly expect from the traditional style of politics. Hajj 'Ali's comments about the 'umda and the 'umda's probable successor

634 666 The situation is quite different in the Western Desert. Although
657 it is the government, represented by the province council, which makes
554 the final decision in appointing the omda or sheikh, yet this appoint-
619 ment is made on the basis of nominations given by the gribal segment
635 or segments which he would represent. Since the tribal segment usually
nominates one person, the decision of the council is limited to the
examination of the credentials of the nominee and to see if he meets the
basic requirements of the law. If a certain nominee is rejected by the
council, a very rare occurrence, the matter goes back to the tribal
segment to make another nomination. In practice, then, the omda of the
Western Desert is elected by the people and the appointment by the govern-
ment of the omda is significant only in cases where the omda is to repre-
sent more than one small tribal segment and each nominates one. Here the
council has to choose between the various nominaees and appoints the best
634 qualified. Unlike the omda of the village, the tribal omda is a real re-
554 657 presentative of his people. Despite the fact that he becomes part of a
619 governmental structure, his basic function is to look after the interest
[622] of his tribal group. Or, as one informant put it, "The omda is the ser-
vant of the people." In many cases the best interest of the tribal segment
is served through full cooperation of the omda with the government. So
far there seems to be very little conflict between the interest of the
tribal populations and that of the government. There is very little in
[651] the area that the government demands or needs. There is no taxable land
to speak of. There are only a few acres of barley land and even these
634 554 are minimally taxed. The main responsibility of the omda to the govern-
657 ment is to report births and deaths and give a yearly list of young men

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829 respect the Sanusi family they, nevertheless, wear their religion lightly. An informant, speaking of the merits and demerits of the conservative Muslim Brethern Association, said that "you should never listen to a holy man, for he will lead you straight to hell!" [576] [778] But upon meeting any member of the Sanusi family, all Bedouins greet him by kissing his hand. Besides a show of deference, this ritual act, in theory, transfers baraka from al-Sanusi to the layman.

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641 The citizenship exemptions granted the Bedouins by Muhammad 'Ali have been rescinded by Abd al-Nasser. This has been one aspect of his program to imbue the Bedouin with political consciousness and promote participation in the nation-state. The Bedouins say that this is the way it should be: they want the right to own land and to accept the responsibility of defending the homeland. [651] But they still do not pay land taxes, and they feel justified in this because the desert "is very poor soil, and not like that of the Nile." Nor do they always heed the call to military duty, though they insist that they do.

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423 Egyptian land reform laws would be impractical, or impossible to apply, in al-Qasr. In the Nile Valley, such laws were necessary. The majority of the Egyptian peasants can survive on less than one acre of land, and farms of under five acres comprise 44 per cent of the agricultural land area in the Nile Valley (Warriner 1962:204). Plots this

671 182 648 the Bedouins, the government soon discovered their own error, for they were unable to effectively manage group and tribal political relations: "They (the government) found out that they could not solve murders in the desert. They would arrest the killer but the trouble continued between families (i.e. feuding went on). There were more killings instead of less, and, finally, the government asked us to return to the _'awaiyid_ because it alone can solve murders in the desert." I was unable to document the claim that the government had "abolished" the _'awaiyid_ in 1933, but a number of officials who worked at the Governor's Office in Marsa Matruh said that it was true.

671 641 577 571 554 In al-Qasr, and in the Western Desert in general, adherence to law and political order rests upon the conviction that each individual and territorial group have guaranteed rights which are related to honor and property. A violation of any single man's honor or property may easily be interpreted, according to the principle of collective responsibility, as an offense against the rights of a group. And in this sense, legal and moral violations in Bedouin society are relative to the structure of interrelations, and they must be regulated with reference to the various levels of the authority structure.

181 641 578 571 Bedouins place a high value on political order, but also on the idea that political order can only be guaranteed through a man's willingness "not to allow another to take any

181 of his rights;" a man should be courageous enough to fight
•641 for what belongs to him and his family. These values, which
578 571 become political values in a tribal context, coupled with the
idea of self-help make for a political order which is ultimately
based upon the law of blood-revenge and feud. At least this
is the case where the external system of authority relations
578 is concerned. But force as the ultimate mechanism for the
571 establishment of political order is better considered an
182 extreme, and only one of the mechanisms used by the Bedouins
in the process of conflict regulation. The attempt is to
establish a balance of rights, concerning honor and property,
and not to go beyond another's boundaries lest he retaliate.
Force, as a coercive institution, can never be the sole basis
of political structure, as Schapera has shown in the case of
the Bergdama and Bushmen (1956:211-221). Thus the Bedouins
[681] say blood-revenge would be impossible within the secondary
*[613] corporate group; relations this important cannot be based
[682] upon force. In the case of homicide within this group compensation is immediately forthcoming.

571 Also, it has been pointed out that self-help and
672 collective responsibility do not operate indiscriminately.
*613 That is, an individual cannot depend upon the backing of
[578] his group irrespective of his own motivations in a particular
situation which calls for retaliation or threatened the group
with retaliation. Individual responsibility figures in cases

strative posts and contain not more than a few hundred persons. 175
Shahhat and Tubruq had been Turkish posts before the Italians 632
made them administrative centres. Taukra and Talmaitha had 621
been Sanusiya lodges. Suluq and Qaminis were Italian creations. Marsa Susa (Apollonia) was first occupied by Cretan refugees during the Turco-Greek war of 1897. Ajadabiya, the town of which the Arab historian al-Bakri of the eleventh century spoke in such glowing terms, had ceased to be a settled
centre until the Turks made it an administrative post. During [648]*
the period of truce between the Sanusi and the Italians from 1917 to 1922 it became the seat of the Sanusi Amir, Sayyid Mahammad Idris, and afterwards an Italian administrative and commercial centre.

It has been noted that almost all the townsmen of Cyrenaica 632
are immigrants from the west, from Morocco to Tripolitania, 162
and the Bedouin regard them as foreigners and often with some 369
distaste, especially the Tripolitanian immigrants. It is true [186]
that there is a small element of Bedouin origin in the towns, for the more stable and poorer Bedouin living near towns sometimes drift into them; but when they do so their descendants soon lose their links with the tents and their tribal status. The road to town life is a way along which there is no return, for the townsmen are not only foreigners, but their food, their speech, their dress, their manners, their interests, their loyalties, and in general their way of life and their sentiments, are different. The Bedouin visit the towns from time to time, but they do not feel at home in them, and they do not look at home in them either. In a town one can spot a Bedouin at a glance by his appearance, his step, his dignity, his naivety, and his loud voice, which sometimes startles the shopkeeper with whom he disputes a price.

The road to the towns is not only a way along which there is 632
no return, but is a one-way track. A Bedouin can become a 369
citizen, but a citizen can never become a Bedouin. He cannot 641
live the life of the tents. Hence the Bedouin say that while it is always bad for a Bedouin girl to marry a townsman, it is possible for her to adapt herself to urban life, but it is out of the question for a Bedouin to marry a townsman's daughter, for it is impossible for her to become a daughter of the tents.

The *bwadi*, Bedouin, and the *hadur*, citizens, are separate

632 communities. They are strangers to each other who meet but
369 do not mix. There is a barrier between them and each distrusts
• 641 the other. Nevertheless there is a measure of economic interdependence
between them, and the tribes and the towns affect
each other politically. In Turkish times the urban population,
632 which, as we have seen, was small and contained a high proportion
439 of Jews, was engaged in trade and domestic industries.
438 The townsmen bought from the Bedouin animals, hides, wool,
clarified butter, honey, beeswax, and ostrich feathers (ostriches
369 were still hunted in the southern steppe in those days), and they
supplied the Bedouin with those things he required but could
not, or would not, make for himself: tea, sugar, rice, cloth,
horseshoes, musket balls, flints, gunpowder, and earthenware.
The urban craftsmen also made leather goods, manufactured
salt from sea water, and conducted trade and exchange. Imports
came by sea from Tripoli, Marseilles, London, Malta, Alexandria,
and Crete, and overland from Alexandria.

But the townsmen of Cyrenaica never dominated the country
as they dominate most of the Arab lands, where through usury,
intimidation, monopoly of trade, and influence in the administration
and the courts they have reduced the countryman to
the position of landless labourer or *métayage* serf. There was
nothing in the Bedouin way of life which gave an opening to the
usurer. Moreover, the towns had no monopoly of trade for, if
necessary, the Bedouin could, since they were self-supporting
in necessities, either go without urban supplies or obtain them
overland from Egypt, as they showed during their war with the
Italians. Consequently there were no rich landowning families
[565] living in the towns at the expense of the country-side, no aghas,
beys, and pashas; and an educated middle class hardly existed
outside the small official circle and lacked both wealth and
influence. In general it may be said that in Cyrenaica the towns
were not parasites on the country, but had their proper functions
as trading centres and suppliers of the needs of the Bedouin
population. The markets were free, not tied to town societies.

632 Nor could the Bedouin be coerced by force or law. The tribes
*648 were largely inaccessible and they were stronger than the towns,
369 even with the administration behind them. The Bedouin were
not afraid of the Turkish Administration, which sat very lightly
on their shoulders, and they did not use the courts. The

175 648 [167] first caused misgivings in Rome and afterwards led to the destruction of the Italian armies in North Africa and their ejection from the continent. A sullen Arab population in Cyrenaica and Tripolitania and a hostile Arab and Muslim world were, in view of the coming storm, so clearly contrary to Italian interests that a more conciliatory policy, at any rate in words, was adopted and Balbo was entrusted with the difficult task of putting it in effect against a background of slaughter and repression. Once again the Italians had waited too long.

III

The ups and downs of Italian fortunes in Cyrenaica and in the world are reflected in the various decrees which defined the juridical status of the Arabs. In giving a brief account of these decrees it must be kept in mind that whilst they referred to the whole Arab population they really affected only the Arabs of the towns, and even in the towns only those few persons, mostly officials, who actively collaborated with the Italians; and that till 1932 the Italians had no certain or complete control outside the towns.

175 648 641 At the beginning of the first Italo-Sanusi war the Arabs were in law Turkish subjects. By a Royal Decree of 5 November 1911, Tripolitania and Cyrenaica were declared to be under the full sovereignty of the Kingdom of Italy. The status of the Cyrenaican Arabs was fixed by the Royal Decree of 6 April 1913, which declared all born in the country, wherever resident, to be *sudditi italiani*, provided they were not Italian citizens or foreign citizens or subjects. They retained their Muslim personal law, but were subject in other respects to whatever regulations the Italians saw fit to impose on them. They were permitted to hold posts in the armed forces and administration of the colony, and persons desirous of acquiring Italian citizenship might apply for it if they possessed residential qualifications, though by taking it they became subject to Italian personal law. These early decrees were more in the nature of administrative than constitutional law. A constitution, in the continental sense, was promulgated in 1919 after the Italians had signed a truce with the Sanusi.

The agreements entered into with the Sanusi between 1917

and 1922 and the efforts made by the Italians during those years 175*
to build up a democratic system of government in Cyrenaica 648*
were, as we have seen, largely due to defeatism and political 641 ●
unrest at home, but they sprang also from a genuine belief in peace and Wilsonian principles among the men at that time in power in Italy. It is possible that the local Governor, Giacomo de Martino, also believed in them. Early in his term of office the Royal Decree of 31 October 1919, called the *Legge Fondamentale per la Cirenaica*, was promulgated. The natives of the country who were not *cittadini italiani metropolitani* were defined as *cittadini italiani* and thus received status equal to that of Italians, but not identical with it, because the Arabs kept their Muslim personal law. They also enjoyed guarantees of personal liberty, inviolability of domicile and property, the right to compete in military and civil careers and professions, even in the Kingdom of Italy, electoral rights (a local Parliament was set up at Banghazi), the right of petition to the National Parliament, and rights of sojourn and emigration. Respect of religion and local custom was guaranteed, liberty of the press and right of meeting were recognized, citizens could not be conscripted for military service, no fiscal tribute could be imposed which was not the same for all or without consent of the local Parliament, revenue from taxes was to be used for Cyrenaican purposes exclusively, the Arabic language was compulsory in the teaching of certain subjects in the schools and in certain official publications, and no precepts contrary to Islam were to be taught. In general, all the inhabitants of Cyrenaica, whether Arab or Italian, were equal before the law. An adult Arab could acquire metropolitan citizenship if he fulfilled certain conditions. The decree revoked the earlier one of 6 April 1913 relating to Italian subjects, and other decrees and laws, though not formally abrogated, seem to have lapsed by substitution save in so far as some of the administrative machinery created by them remained of necessity in operation.

This basic law of 1919 was as unwise as it was generous. The Bedouin may have enjoyed the elections, but to have formally handed over the country to the Arabs was detrimental to Italian prestige, for it was a confession that the Italians were unable to control it themselves. Moreover, the Chamber of Deputies, which was to the Bedouin a glorified *mi'ad*, or Shaikhs' gathering, *175 *648 • 641 was expected to run the country with machinery with which they were totally unacquainted. Arabs being what they are, and circumstances being what they were in 1919, the constitution could hardly have been other than a failure. Indeed it is not surprising that Fascist writers later poured scorn on these well-meant efforts of pluto-democracy.[1] They were particularly shocked by the grant of Italian citizenship to the Arabs, especially as these same Arabs were exempted from compulsory military service. Under Federzoni, the first Fascist Minister for the Colonies, policy was in this matter, as in others, completely reversed. All agreements with the Sanusi were, as has been noted, torn up, and into the waste-paper basket with them went the local Parliament and the constitution of 1919. In its place was issued by the Royal Decree of 26 June 1927 the *Legge Organica per l'Amministrazione della Tripolitania e della Cirenaica.* In a sense this was a new, and Fascist, constitution though its constitutional content was subordinated to its administrative and judicial content. By it the Arabs ceased to be *cittadini italiani* and became *cittadini italiani libici*, they lost the right to free exercise of military and civil careers outside the colonies, electoral rights (parliament had in any case been abolished), the right to petition to the National Parliament, &c., and there was no mention of the liberty of the press, of the right of meeting, of freedom from military conscription, and of the protection of the Arabic language in public instruction. In general, the Arabs were no longer equal with the Italians before the law. Metropolitan citizenship might still be asked for under certain conditions. Application of this decree was several times postponed and it appears never to have come into operation.

*175 *648 Bedouin resistance in both Tripolitania and Cyrenaica still caused the Italians much trouble even as late as 1929 and on both military and political grounds it was deemed advisable to place the two countries under single direction. This was done by the Royal Decree of 24 January 1929 which placed the two colonies under Pietro Badoglio and by the Royal Decree of 3 December 1934, *Ordinamento Organico per l'Amministrazione della Libia*, which, as described in the last section, divided the single colony into four provincial commissariats and a mili-

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[1] Alberto Stern, 'Il nuovo Ordinamento Fondamentale della Tripolitania e della Cirenaica', *Rivista delle Colonie Italiane*, 1934, p. 1027.

tary command of the Sahara. The other Articles of the 1934 175* decree were designed chiefly to meet the new conditions arising, 648* or likely to arise, from colonization by nationals. In no important respect did it alter the status of the Arab population or what rights it still possessed. In the first enthusiasm of turning Libya into a metropolitan colony the Arabs were of secondary interest to those who made the laws.

In view of the coming struggle between the powers of Europe, 175* already seen by Mussolini to be inevitable, the Italian Govern- 648* ment considered it advisable to pay more attention to the feel- 167 ings of its colonists and native peoples. To encourage the colonists already in the country and those about to join them from Italy a Royal Decree was promulgated on 9 January 1939 declaring Libya to be an integral part of the Kingdom of Italy, its four provinces becoming the ninety-seventh, ninety-eighth, ninety-ninth, and hundredth provinces of the Kingdom. The military status of the Libyan Sahara remained unchanged. The colonists no longer had to feel that they had left their fatherland for inhospitable shores. The *Colonia* had become *Terra Italiana*. The *Quarta Sponda*, Italy's Fourth Shore, had become a political fact. At the same time, to quiet any uneasi- 175* ness which the incorporation of their country in the Kingdom of 648* Italy might create among those educated Arabs whose services 641• the Italians needed, and to implement the promise Mussolini 563 had made during his tour of Libya in 1937 that he would remember the part played by Libyan volunteers in the Ethiopian campaign, the Decree offered the Arabs a new special citizenship which took the place of the right of acquiring metropolitan citizenship allowed in the earlier decrees and now abrogated. That the Italians had attached importance to the partial assimilation of a small *élite* of natives is shown by the retention of the right of acquiring metropolitan citizenship through all the decrees and laws, from the invasion of Libya in 1911 till the present decree, in both pre-Fascist and Fascist times. It had been found, however, that the Arabs had not availed themselves of the privilege. Employees of the administration could not feel that any advantages they might derive from it could compensate them for loss of status before the religious courts in matters of personal law, a loss considered shameful even by whole-hearted collaborators. Also, the new special citizenship,

*175 *cittadinanza italiana speciale*, was more in accordance with
*648 Balbo's policy of parallel development than acquisition of
641 metropolitan citizenship.

563 The new special citizenship could be acquired, without prejudice to Muslim personal law, by persons who had reached the age of eighteen, provided they had a good record and had in some way or other served the State or could read and write Italian. The status carried with it certain privileges: the right to bear arms, the right to be inscribed in the Arab Blackshirt Organization, the right to a military career in Libyan units (now withdrawn from other Libyans), the right to become mayor in Arab communities and adviser in mixed Italo-Arab communities, and the right to come under the *Ordinamento sindacale-corporativo*, an ordinance by which the Fascist guild system had been adapted to suit colonial conditions, and to take some part in the activities of these guilds. These rights could be exercised only in Italian African territories and no Arab could, in any case, occupy posts or practise professions which would necessitate Italians serving under him.

The reception of the new decree by the colonists and by Arab employees of the Administration was enthusiastic. It may be doubted, however, whether the sentiments expressed by the mudirs, the qadis, and some of the richer merchants, in the telegrams of thanks they sent to Mussolini and Balbo were felt. It was tacitly assumed to be a condition of continued employment that special citizenship should be applied for. The first batch of diplomas included ninety Cyrenaican names, almost all of native officials and government pensioners of the urban centres: the decree could not have been of the slightest interest to the Bedouin. Conscription for military service followed shortly afterwards. Of their bounty the Italians had given to the Arabs of Cyrenaica a *Patria, l'Italia Fascista*, and they were expected to show their gratitude by fighting for it. On 10 June 1940 Italy entered the war on the side of Germany.

Thus in 1911 the Arabs of Cyrenaica became enemy subjects and were afterwards declared to be Italian subjects. In 1919 they became Italian citizens. When the Italians renewed operations against them in 1923 those who resisted were declared to be *ribelli*. Under the Fascists they lost the Italian citizenship they had been granted under the democratic régime of 1919 and

became instead Italian-Libyan citizens. In 1939 they were 175*
granted the privilege of applying, if they had the necessary 648*
qualifications, for a special Italian citizenship, a status half-way 641
between that of the ordinary Arab of the country and that of 563
the Italian colonists. There were, therefore, in Cyrenaica in 1940 three categories of citizenship, that of the *cittadini metropolitani*, Italian settlers and officials, that of the *cittadini italiani speciali*, a small intermediate urban class of educated Arab officials, and that of the *cittadini italiani libici* (*musulmani*), which comprised almost the entire native population of the country. These changes in the civil status of the Arabs were to a considerable extent a response to the development of the
political situation in Cyrenaica itself. The Royal Decree of 175*
1913 was an optimistic anticipation of easy victory; the Royal 648*
Decree of 1919 was an acknowledgement of political and 641
military failure; the Royal Decree of 1927 was a sign that apathy and compromise had given way to determination to fight the Bedouin if necessary, and even by preference, to the point of extermination; the Royal Decree of 1934 marked the end of all resistance and envisaged the settlement of Italian colonists on the best lands of the country; and the Royal Decree of 1939 signalled the realization of this programme and at the same time made a bid for co-operation of the Arab intelligentsia. But to an equal extent the changes in civil status were determined by political events in Italy and in Europe. The Royal Decree of 1913 was a plain colonial declaration such as any European Power would have made in similar circumstances. In 1919 Italian politics were defeatist, demagogic, socialist, and internationalist, and the Royal Decree of that year was a stew of these ingredients. The Royal Decrees of 1927 and 1934 were typical Fascist pieces of legislation with emphasis on State requirements rather than on citizenship and the rights of the individual, and showed a strong bias towards bureaucratic centralization and hypertrophy. The Royal Decree of 1939 bore the stamp of empire.

IV

The Bedouin were altogether unimpressed either by Italian 175*
propaganda or by their social services, and they did not believe 648*
in their promises of future benefits. *'Bukra al-'id'*, 'The feast

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*613 study of the whole Western Desert, or in an analysis of contemporary politics in Marsa Matruh.

The Bedouins of al-Qasr are, in this study, the 'Aishaibat of the 'Ali Ahmar of the Awlad 'Ali tribe. The

[171] Bedouin tribal unit throughout the Middle East is described as a segmentary lineage system. Something of the meaning of this concept has already been made clear in our discussion of the structural principles of Bedouin society. This type

[114] of society has been adequately analyzed by Evans-Pritchard (1940), Fortes (1945 and 1949), Smith (1956), Middleton and Tait (1958), and Peters (1960). My own ideas about the segmentary lineage society as it functions in al-Qasr derive from these sources.

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•[642] Politically, the 'Aishaibat of al-Qasr are a stateless society; they have no centralized political institution. The lineage system is the structural framework for social and political relations. The basis of government, i.e., the regulation of authority relations, is the balanced protraction of corporate groups which support institutional uniformities in the form of similar organization, ideology and procedure (Smith 1956). Although the various groupings of the segmentary system can be analytically identified, and each grouping thinks of itself as a distinct group, in actuality, it is difficult to define the groups because of the way in which each fuses into lesser or greater differentiated units in one

577 According to this _'aqila_, the "good man" is the "good Muslim"
771 who observes the pillars of Islam (fasting, praying, making
183 the pilgrimage, and alms-giving). Also, the "good man" does
not steal or lie, and this leads, importantly enough, to social
accord.

121 In light of the preceding discussion of authority and
681 law, we can now offer a description of the Bedouin judicial
process in action. Southall (1956:121-151) has drawn the
121 distinction between internal and external delicts on the
681 bases of kinds of sanctions rendered, and whether or not
114 chiefly authority mediates conflict. Such a distinction can
be only partially applied in the case of the Bedouins of the
Western Desert. The kind of sanctions operating in the internal
political system do differ from those applied in the external
political system, though not to the same degree which is true
121 of Southall's Alurland. On the other hand, since Bedouin
681 society, lacking political centralization, cannot be character-
692 ized as a segmentary state with distinct spheres of authority
●[642] at successive levels of the lineage structure, the intervention
or non-intervention of chiefly adjudication and decision-
making cannot serve as a basis for differentiating political
* [613] action. Rather, the lone political office of the _'aqila_
[627] involves itself in all arbitration which cannot be successfully
concluded by the mechanism of familial authority. There are
[648] just two exceptions which apply to this latter statement:

619 from forced labor in government projects and released from the pay-
175 ment of taxes. The government agreed to these demands, and on their
648 part, Awlad Ali helped Muhammad Ali extensively in his military expe-
dition in Syria and Arabia and were a major factor in the battle of
1815 at Bissel where he succeeded in breaking Wahabi power. They also
helped his son, Ismeal, in his expedition to the Sudan.

Later, when the Egyptian army was organized, the government ex-
[701] empted Awlad Ali and other tribal groups which helped in the military
conquests from military service, but required them to undertake the
guarding of the desert roads and the frontiers of Egypt. Also, in
[423] exchange for their previous services, they were given the right to use
the land of the Western Desert and left the question of its distribu-
tion among the various tribal segments to the native tribal leaders.
619 Finally, in 1832, Awlad Ali were granted a form of legal and political
175 autonomy whereby the government acknowledged the tribal legal and
648 judicial system as the means to settle disputes between members of the
642 tribe. The government also recognized the authority of the native tribal
leaders and allowed the tribal populations to be governed by their own
native system of leadership.

This political autonomy of Awlad Ali existed until 1947. Although their usefulness to the government had long ceased to exist, they had continued to enjoy the privileges they had obtained earlier. This was partly due to the fact that the various governments that came after Muhammad Ali showed no interest in the area occupied by Awlad Ali. There were no taxable lands in the area, no natural resources of any promise, and the tribal population did not present any particular prob-
000 lem to attract the attention of the government. There was some smuggling

657 [178] full-time employment with the government projects in the area and
[464] settle in fairly permanent houses near the place of work.

657 With the movement toward settling down, the relative legal and
701 political autonomy which Awlad Ali once enjoyed is breaking down. This
642 was reflected first in the loss of military exemption. In 1947, the
draft law was applied to all tribal populations in Egypt, including
Awlad Ali. The application is not seriously enforced, however, due
to the fact that births are still not recorded in the area. In 1954,
657 the "omda" or mayorship system practiced in the rural areas of Egypt
634 was extended to the Western Desert with certain modifications to fit
177 the tribal organization of populations in the area. This put a strain
on the native system of leadership, a point which will be covered in
657 later chapters. Finally, and along with the extension of the omda sys-
692 tem, the jurisdiction of the legal system of the state was extended
177 over the area. This resulted in a duality in the judicial process.
178 The tribal law, with its traditional tribal mediators, is still functioning side by side with the modern court system of the state law. In many cases, especially in criminal cases, the individual is tried under both systems, and sometimes receives two different judgments for the same offense. Various efforts are being made to minimize the effects of this duality. In civil cases, the problem does not seem serious, since it is the parties themselves, or one of them, who voluntarily bring the case to the attention of the legal authorities. Therefore, they can choose between the traditional legal system and the modern courts of law. So far, civil cases are brought to the modern court system only when the native procedures fail to achieve a settlement. As such, the

554 derived from the strength of their section, their wealth, their traditional place in Bedouin society, and the character of their leading members, so long only are they regarded as Shaikhs of whatever the grade may be.

554 In recording his impressions of the Aulad 'Ali tribe the
generous and unfortunate Pacho gives an excellent picture of
619 the Bedouin Shaikh's position in tribal society. He says that it
[642] is difficult to discover any government in their society, which
might be called aristocratic, though it is such in form rather
than in substance. The precarious authority of the Shaikhs
rests not on force but on the renown and esteem they enjoy in
554 the tribe. He adds that at the time of his visit it had become
619 customary, after Muhammad 'Ali Pasha had broken the
tribe, for the Shaikhs to get their titles confirmed by the
*648 Pasha of Egypt but that when they returned to their camps
with the robes of honour bestowed on them by the Pasha of
Egypt, these garments, far from adding to their prestige and
making them objects of regard, excited derision and aversion
unless the backing of the tribe had preceded the approval of
the Pasha.[1]

554 The Italian lawyer Savarese has also written an illuminating
613 description of the status of a Cyrenaican Bedouin Shaikh. Each
bait and each *'aila* has its Shaikh, chosen for his age and
wisdom or for his prowess, though the Shaikhship is generally
[556] hereditary in certain families. A Shaikh receives obedience and
respect from his dependants but ought to be rich because the
demands of hospitality are considerable. He takes a leading part
in the settlement of disputes and must have the tact necessary
to maintain the unity of the group in opposition to other groups
of the same order. He represents his group in relations with
these other groups and in the larger group of which it forms part.
In matters in which his group as a whole is concerned he takes
the advice of the Shaikhs of its divisions. He commands the
men of the group in war and he collects the tribute due from
554 the group to the Government. Nevertheless, a Bedouin Shaikh,
however large the group he represents, lives and dresses like his
fellow Bedouin, though, being rich, his tent may be larger than
most and he has more horses and they are more richly appointed.

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[1] J. R. Pacho, *Relation d'un Voyage dans la Marmarique, la Cyrénaïque et les Oasis d'Audjelah et de Maradèh*, 1827, p. 67.

reconquer Tripolitania and Cyrenaica, but they lacked the will 175*
to action. Instead, they vacillated between threats of force on 648*
the one side and appeasements and diplomatic surrenders on
the other.

Considerable reinforcements were indeed sent to Tripolitania, [728]
but when there were assembled there 80,000 men ready for the
reconquest of the country, the Government signed with the
Arab leaders the humiliating pourparlers of Kallet al-Zaituna
in the spring of 1919. The agreement was supplemented on 175*
1 June 1919 by a constitution giving to the Arabs a parliament, 648*
Italian citizenship, exemption from taxation, &c. The Arabs 642●
were more than ever convinced of Italian impotence. In theory,
an Arab republic, the *Jumhuriya al-Trabulsiya*, founded in the
previous year under Turco-Germanic influence, now ruled the
country through its Committee of Reform at Misurata under
the leadership of Ramadan al-Shtaiwi. In fact, there was little
order of any kind. Quarrels broke out between tribes and [578]
between tribal leaders, anyone powerful enough set himself up
as overlord of his district, the Arabs raided the Berbers, outside the narrow coastal region held by their troops Italian
officials were little more than consular agents, and when Italian
forces took part in Arab disputes they did so rather as mercenaries or allies than as rulers of a colony responsible for peace
and security in it. Meanwhile the Committee of Reform made 175*
preparations to achieve the complete independence of Tripolitania from Italian rule by securing agreement in principle to a 648*
Tripolitanian Amirate from an assembly of notables at Ghariyan
in November 1921. The deputation which carried this resolution to Rome, though it received no official encouragement,
found much support among Communists, Socialists, and troublemakers of all kinds. Its leader, Muhammad Khalid al-Qarqani,
went on to attend the Muslim Revolutionary Congress in
Moscow. Such a state of affairs could not last, and in the midst
of it Count Giuseppe Volpi was nominated Governor of Tripolitania. He was an energetic man prepared to act on his own
responsibility, and by March 1922 he had recaptured Misurata
and the whole coastal region between that town and Tunisia
and had commenced operations in the Sirtica.

During this period there was peace in Cyrenaica, the fruit of
the Accord of 'Akrama. At first the Italians did no more than

*175 hold their posts. In 1919 they began to establish civil government
*648 in the territory under their control and to extend their
influence farther afield. On 31 October of that year Cyrenaica
*175 was given a constitution similar to that given to Tripolitania,
*648 and its parliament first met in April 1921 under the unlikely
● 642 presidency of Sayyid Safi al-Din, the old enemy of the Italians
[646] in the Sirtica. The tribesmen, of course, elected their own
Shaikhs. It held altogether five sessions up to March 1923,
when it was closed down. From the Italian point of view the
best that could be said for the constitution was that it implied
a tacit acceptance of sovereignty and that a parliament brought
their officials into personal touch with tribal leaders. Writers
of the Fascist period, when the Wilsonian sentiments which
inspired the Libyan constitutions were regarded with disfavour,
strongly criticized the Government of the day for granting them.
Thus Gaibi says that they were bound to bear evil fruit and that
'the Government thought to present itself as a magnanimous
conqueror, and the Libyans thought it a beaten coward'.[1] The
Bedouin certainly distrusted and despised the Italians and cared
as little for their authority in Cyrenaica as their brothers cared
for it in Tripolitania. About 100 of their Shaikhs met at
Ajadabiya, where they issued a manifesto declaring that, constitution
or no constitution, they would not tolerate the Italians
outside the coastal towns, and there only as traders. To
this insult the Government lamely responded by opening new
*175 conversations. After long discussions between the Colonial
*648 Governor, Giacomo de Martino, and 'Umar Pasha al-Kakhiya,
*795 representing Sayyid Idris, and an exploratory visit by Sayyid
al-Rida to Rome, it was agreed that the *modus vivendi* of
'Akrama should be superseded by a new pact, the Accord of
al-Rajma of 25 October 1920.

*175 By this new agreement Sayyid Idris was given the hereditary
*648 title of 'Sanusi Amir' with the honorific address of Highness
*795 and was created Head of the autonomous administration of the
oases of Jaghbub, Aujila, Jalu, and Kufra, with the right of
631 using Ajadabiya as the seat of his administration. He was
793 granted a personal monthly allowance of L. 63,000 (on the day
[434] of the signing of the accord the Lira was 92 to the Pound

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[1] Agostino Gaibi, *Manuale di Storia politico-militare delle Colonie Italiane*, 1928, p. 531.

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Libyan Bedouin MT9

[Information on the Grand Sanusi of the Bedouin of Cyrenaica, religious head of the Sanusiya Order, will be found in Category 793.]

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Libyan Bedouin MT9

[For information on the political role of the omda (umda) as a representative of the more powerful and numerous tribal segments within an administrative district, see Category 634.]

There is no paramount chief of the
121 tribe at the present time; yet, the unifying force is the recognition
619 by the group of the tribal law, the Daraieb, as a binding set of rules
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● [643] and as the regulator of behavior within the area. In these terms, Awlad Ali are a clearly delimited group, and it is in terms of the jurisdiction of these rules that Awlad Ali are treated as a unit for administrative purposes by the Egyptian government. Viewed this way, Awlad Ali will be defined as those who recognize and abide by the Daraieb or the customary law. This includes the Murabiteen tribes
[563] as well as all those who became part of the tribal organization of Awlad Ali by means of Iktitab. Since the territorial jurisdiction of the Daraieb is limited to the Western Desert of Egypt, those groups and individuals of Awlad Ali origin who have moved on a permanent basis from the area will be excluded from the group. Groups and individuals who live in the area but are not part of the tribal organization of Awlad Ali are not subject to the Daraieb.

619 Awlad Ali of the Western Desert of Egypt are an offshoot of the
173 Cyrenaica tribes who in turn believe themselves to be the descendants of a unique ancestress Sa'ada.


Syrenaica tribes
Sa'ad
Baraghuth
'Aggar
El-Saghir
Jibran
Harb
Ali
Tribe
Abiad
Ahmar
Senenah
Tribe
Awlad Kharouf
Awlad Mansur
El-Sanagrah
'Eila
El-'aggary
Gedeidah
Bu-Mutair
Bait ('Eila)
El-Asabei
Yousef
'afash
Helleis
Daghash
Bait
Semeida
Yunis
Makhum
Hussein

tions of soil, water, and grazing. We trace the segmentation of 619
the Qalabta alone and see that it has two divisions, the Muasa 613
and the Mahamda. We follow the line of Muhammad alone and note that it splits into three lineages, *‘Ailat* Brahim, *‘Ailat* al-Mzatal, and *‘Ailat* al-Shauqi (there is dispute, arising from quarrels over land, about the legitimacy of this branch). From Mzatal descend the three minor *‘ailat*, al-Slailikh, al-Aqta‘, and Balraba‘i. Following only the first line we note that *‘Ailat* al-Shlailikh then divides into the various *biyut* shown on the chart, al-Habal, Mustafa, Brahim, &c., the male membership of only one of which, *bait* al-Habal, is presented in the genealogy. Where the name of an *‘aila* or *bait* is different from that of its founder, it almost invariably means that the founder's nickname has been used, the Cyrenaican Bedouin having a partiality for nicknames.

Each section of a tribe, from the smallest to the largest, has 619
its Shaikh or Shaikhs. The tribal system, typical of segmentary 554
structures everywhere, is a system of balanced opposition between tribes and tribal sections from the largest to the smallest divisions, and there cannot therefore be any single authority in a tribe. Authority is distributed at every point of the tribal structure and political leadership is limited to situations in which a tribe or a segment of it acts corporately. With a tribe this only happens in war or in dealings with an outside authority which for its own purposes recognizes the tribe as an
administrative unit. There cannot, obviously, be any absolute [643]
authority vested in a single Shaikh of a tribe when the funda-
mental principle of tribal structure is opposition between its [671]
segments, and in such segmentary systems there is no state and no government as we understand these institutions; and criminal law is absent and civil law exists only in a very rudimentary form. Consequently the exact status of a Shaikh can 554
only be defined in terms of a complicated network of kinship ties and structural relations. It is only necessary here to emphasize that his social position is unformalized and that he must in no sense be regarded as a ruler or administrator. Bedouin respect their Shaikhs, but they do not regard them as superiors. Rather their influence and wealth are considered as capital to be drawn on for the benefit of whoever is in need of them. So long as a Shaikhly family can keep their prestige,

*175 hold their posts. In 1919 they began to establish civil government
*648 in the territory under their control and to extend their
influence farther afield. On 31 October of that year Cyrenaica
*175 was given a constitution similar to that given to Tripolitania,
*648 and its parliament first met in April 1921 under the unlikely
642 presidency of Sayyid Safi al-Din, the old enemy of the Italians
[646] in the Sirtica. The tribesmen, of course, elected their own
Shaikhs. It held altogether five sessions up to March 1923, when it was closed down. From the Italian point of view the best that could be said for the constitution was that it implied a tacit acceptance of sovereignty and that a parliament brought their officials into personal touch with tribal le[illegible]. Writers of the Fascist period, when the Wilsonian sentiments which inspired the Libyan constitutions were regarded with disfavour, strongly criticized the Government of the day for granting them. Thus Gaibi says that they were bound to bear evil fruit and that 'the Government thought to present itself as a magnanimous conqueror, and the Libyans thought it a beaten coward'.[1] The Bedouin certainly distrusted and despised the Italians and cared as little for their authority in Cyrenaica as their brothers cared for it in Tripolitania. About 100 of their Shaikhs met at Ajadabiya, where they issued a manifesto declaring that, constitution or no constitution, they would not tolerate the Italians outside the coastal towns, and there only as traders. To this insult the Government lamely responded by opening new
*175 conversations. After long discussions between the Colonial
*648 Governor, Giacomo de Martino, and 'Umar Pasha al-Kakhiya,
*795 representing Sayyid Idris, and an exploratory visit by Sayyid
al-Rida to Rome, it was agreed that the *modus vivendi* of 'Akrama should be superseded by a new pact, the Accord of al-Rajma of 25 October 1920.

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*648 title of 'Sanusi Amir' with the honorific address of Highness
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[1] Agostino Gaibi, *Manuale di Storia politico-militare delle Colonie Italiane*, 1928, p. 531.

rendered in fighting faithfully for Italy.' On this point Balbo, 175*
who replaced Graziani, was equally emphatic: 'Chiefs do not 648*
exist any more—there are only citizens with equality of duties 619
and rights.'[1] Tribal Shaikhs, therefore, were not asked to advise
the Government or to co-operate with it in any official capacity
and the subsidies they had received in the pre-Fascist and early
Fascist periods were withdrawn. Cyrenaica under the Fascists
was administered by decrees issued by a Governor directly
responsible to the Minister for the Colonies at Rome. Under the [646] ●
Organic Law of 1927 a General Council with very limited
advisory functions was allowed for, and Arabs chosen from the
notables of the sedentary population and Shaikhs of the Bedouin
tribes could be nominated to sit on it by the Minister for the
Colonies on the recommendation of the Governor. Its
constitutional importance was nil, because it never came into
operation. It was replaced by the Law-Decree of 1934, by which 175*
Tripolitania and Cyrenaica became a single colony with the 648*
seat of its administration at Tripoli. The new colony was divided 631
into four commissariats (Tripoli, Misurata, Bengasi, and Derna) 619
and a military territory of the Sahara. Each commissariat came
under a Prefect and was divided into administrative sections:
departments, residencies, and districts, all under Italian officials.
It was recognized that the Bedouin were divided into tribes and
sub-tribes. At the head of each was a Shaikh chosen in
accordance with tribal custom and nominated by the Head of a
commissariat. The Shaikh of a tribe was personally responsible
to the competent Italian authority for order and security within
the tribal territory. His functions and powers were those
accorded him by tribal custom. The Shaikhs of the sub-tribes
came under his control and had within their sub-tribal areas
functions analogous to his. All that this meant was that certain
tribal Shaikhs were recognized as such in so far as they were held
responsible for any shortcomings of the Bedouin, but were
accorded no privileges and had no representation. Consultative
councils, where allowed for, were composed of administrative
officials. So long as the Bedouin obeyed the Government and 175*
submitted to whatever curtailments of their freedom and rights 648*
it chose to enact, they could stew in their own juice until the 619

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[1] Italo Balbo, *La Politica Sociale Fascista verso gli Arabi della Libia*, 1938. [113]

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[For the role of the marabouts as arbitrators in the settling of disputes between tribal groups, see Categories 619 and 792.]

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Libyan Bedouin MT9

[Information on the relationship of the omda and shaikh in their respective roles as district representatives of tribal segments to the Egyptian government will be found in Category 657.]

175 with one move, the Caliph sent these Bedouins into battle in order to enforce authority in his western Berber provinces. This order set in motion the great "Hilali invasion." The tribesmen of Banu Hilal and Banu Sulaim literally slashed their way across eastern North Africa laying waste to towns and fields as they went (Ibn Khaldun 1925:29; Brockelmann 1939: 204).

175 The Arab Bedouins recruited Berbers as they went, ● 648 especially in Libya. Between the years 1052 and 1054, these marauding nomads sacked the rich agricultural lands of Tripolitania and Tunisia, lands which had been in production since the time of the Romans (Mahdi 1964:21). The Banu Sulaim, according to Ibn Khaldun (1925:136), concentrated their action in an area from Alexandria to Tripolitania. It was over this region, which includes Cyrenaica in eastern Libya, that they established their rule. Ibn Khaldun states that the two tribes agreed to divide the conquered territory between them, the eastern lands going to the Banu Sulaim and the western lands to the Banu 175 Hilal (1925:33-34). Such a division of territorial rights in 571 Arab Bedouin society is representative of a set of authority 182 relationships. Differentiation in the locus of authority, *[613] whether it be horizontal or hierarchical, is a method of maintaining political order among segments of the lineage structure.

175 Evans-Pritchard states that the Cyrenaican Bedouins 114 619 are descendants of the Banu Sulaim and represent an admixture

175 167 eastward toward the Nile Valley. It is not possible to determine the exact conditions associated with this migration, but they probably parallel later movements which are connected with tribal conflicts over land and water rights. In 1689, Bedouins from Libya raided Egyptian oases in the Western Desert (Murray 1935:29). From this date on, for a period of some forty years, records show a continual movement of Bedouins out of Libya into Egypt. Some groups went as far as the Nile Valley and were eventually assimilated into the peasant population there. Tribal movements at the end of the 17th century involved whole tribes and also tribal sections and fragments. Thus in some cases, authority relations arising from territorial bonds were dissipated; but in other cases, political ties were strung across the Libyan Desert from Cyrenaica to the Nile Valley. "Today there is not a Cyrenaican tribe, or even large section, which has not some of its members in Egypt, often whole lineages" (Evans-Pritchard 1954:49-50).

175 619 726 167 [648] Evans-Pritchard's study of the Sanusi, valuable for its analysis of Italian colonial records, shows that the Awlad 'Ali were driven from Cyrenaica by its sister tribe, the Harabi, with the help of the Turkish rulers of Libya. This took place, he says, about 150 years ago. When the Awlad 'Ali arrived in Egypt, they found the Hanadi tribe already there. In a chain of conflicts, the Hanadi had displaced the Banu'Una, forcing them into the Nile Valley:

175 then came the Awlad 'Ali.

619 Around the year 1800, the Awlad 'Ali were able to
726 defeat the Hanadi with the help of another Cyrenaican tribe
167 dwelling in the area, the Jumi'at. The Jumi'at were a vassal
tribe who changed their allegiance from the Hanadi to the
Awlad 'Ali after this war. The Hanadi, as the Banu'Una
before them, were forced into the Nile Valley. Today, they
[131] live in Sharqiyya Province and are no longer distinguishable
from the peasant population.

175 According to Evans-Pritchard, the Awlad 'Ali were still
619 in possession of eastern Cyrenaica in 1800. Then there occurred
726 "long and savagely fought" wars ending with the expulsion of
114 the Awlad 'Ali. But this time schedule seems unlikely since
the Awlad 'Ali were already at war with the Hanadi when
175 Napoleon landed near Alexandria in 1798. The Bedouin war has
648 been amusingly described by the French historian Lacroix (in
181 Murray 1935:30) who accompanied the Napoleonic expedition:

> At five o'clock, the first Bedouin were seen on the flank of the army, and shortly afterwards one saw four or five hundred; it was the tribe of Henady, the fiercest Arabs of these deserts. They were almost naked, swarthy, and lean; their horses seemed wornout hacks; save for the helmet, it was Don Quixote as represented in the engravings ...if these five hundred Arabs had been Mamelukes, they would have been able to obtain a great success at this first moment, when the soldiers' imaginations were alert and ready to receive any impression, but these Arabs were as cowardly as the Mamelukes, who had charged an hour before, were brave.

175 648 According to Murray, on July fourth "thirty Sheikhs of the Hanadi, the Awlad 'Ali, and the Beni'Una made their peace with the new power" (1935:30).

175 186 124 (648) The version of history provided by my informants is no radical departure from these facts. But there are a few differing aspects which represent ethnocentric highlights on history. For instance, the Bedouins of al-Qasr have a few stories which exaggerate the fact that the Harabi needed the cooperation of the Turkish rulers to defeat the Awlad 'Ali and to force them out of Cyrenaica. Also, the Bedouins point out, the Jumi'at tribe begged the Awlad 'Ali to come and rescue them from the oppression of the Hanadi.

175 619 648 Shortly after 1800, Muhammad 'Ali, the Ottoman viceroy, drove the French from Egypt and supported the Hanadi against the Awlad 'Ali. The Egytian ruler felt that political control over the Awlad 'Ali would insure the security of the whole desert, and especially Egypt's western frontier with Libya. Despite the alliance between the Hanadi and Muhammed 'Ali's forces, the outcome was a temporary victory for the Awlad 'Ali. This event actually set the stage for a transformation of Bedouin tribal society.

175 648 After the defeat of the Hanadi and the Pasha's troops, the Awlad 'Ali were given preferential treatment by Muhammed 'Ali. He wisely secured the Hanadi tribe in Sharqiyya Province. Then he granted the Awlad 'Ali, by right of usufruct, the

175 territory of the whole Western Desert. They were also
648 exempted from land taxes, military duty, and forced labor on
[651] the irrigation projects of the Nile River. In return for these privileges, the Bedouins were expected to guard the frontiers of Egypt and to furnish warriors for the expeditionary forces of Muhammed 'Ali. The Pasha, who was in the process of carving out his own empire independent of the Ottomans, needed warriors, a role which traditionally excluded the fallahin of the Nile Valley. Bedouin horsemen from the Western Desert fought with Muhammad 'Ali in his Wahhabi campaign of 1815 in Arabia. They also aided the Pasha's son, Ismail, in the conquest of the Sudan.

Muhammad 'Ali instituted the practice of granting to the Bedouin leaders land in the rich Nile Valley. He made it explicit that the leaders were to dwell upon this land: their role, as it was officially stated, was to provide a liaison between the Pasha and the tribes. In fact, the leaders were hostages. By controlling them, Muhammad 'Ali was able to exert proper pressure on the Bedouins when and where it was needed (Baer 1957:84-98).

175 Bedouins did not pay land taxes, but neither did they
648 "own" the land; they simply had the right of usufruct. The
651 law stated that only those who paid land taxes had the right
423 to purchase and own their land. But along with ownership of land came the onerous responsibilities of corvée labor on the

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423 Nile dikes and military conscription. The term "Bedouin" came to mean, as it was defined by the government of Egypt, one who did not legally own land and hence was not subject to forced labor or military service. On this basis, the Director [162] of Recruiting Office in a 1904 census distinguished three kinds of Bedouin (Murray 1935:31):

290,095 - settled and living in their own farm colonies
240,880 - living among the fallahin
70,472 - real Bedouin or nomads

601,447

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648 By the end of the 19th century, Bedouin society had undergone a great deal of change. Politically, the Bedouins were subordinates in a dominant-subjective authority relationship with the central regime of the Nile Valley. As a result of external political control, nomadism was curtailed and the Bedouins were forced to settle on the land to raise what few crops they could. These new political and economic conditions are the major aspects of the sedentarization process. Bedouin dependence on the central authority of Egypt and their reliance on horticulture increased with time. Nor did the entry of Britain into Egypt in 1882 change the material and social condition of the Bedouin.

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648 The British, in the style of the politics of colonialism, reorganized the administrative structure of Egypt. The Western Desert was given the status of a province; command

175 648 posts were established there, and Marsa Matruh became the capital town. The Western Desert was administered by British officers who had under their command a garrison of Egyptian soldiers. Their assignment was to secure the colonial borders. This task included keeping the Awlad 'Ali within the boundaries of Egypt. The policy of the British provincial government was to avoid interfering with the Bedouin process of law and conflict regulation unless it threatened the peace and security [124] of the desert. My informants said that the British interfered with Bedouin justice only under the threat of large-scale tribal warfare.

175 795 [619] The political relationship which the Bedouins of the Awlad 'Ali tribe had with the Sanusi Order of Islam in Libya was historically not so important compared to that of the other Cyrenaican tribes. The Sanusi Order, classified as a Sufi tariiqa ("mystic order"), was actually quite orthodox in its attitudes and practices. This is a function of the socio-religious conditions of its origin during the 18th-19th century revival of orthodoxy in Islamic Arabia (Gibb 1955: [793] 127-145). Muhammad bin 'Ali al-Sanusi founded his order, al-Sanusiyya, near Mecca around the year 1837. The Sanusi doctrine may be considered orthodox, or secularly oriented, in that it rejects the fundamental goal of Sufism, mystical union with God.

The Sanusi Order, from the very beginning, strove for a return to pure Islam. It made its greatest headway among

175 the Bedouins of the Hijaz area. This Sanusi success aroused
795 the jealousy and animosities of the orthodox _'ulama_ ("clergy")
[798] of the Mecca area. Al-Sanusi was forced to flee the Arabian
[793] peninsula, and in 1843 he founded his first _zawiya_ ("lodge"),
[346] _al-zawiya_ _al-baida_, in Cyrenaica. The Sanusi doctrine was as
acceptable to the Bedouins of Cyrenaica as it had been to the
[793] tribes of the Hijaz. The person and teachings of _al-Sanusi_
al-kabir ("the grand Sanusi"), as he came to be known, fit
into the "holy man" religious tradition of Cyrenaica and even
spread beyond into the Sudan and Lake Chad area. The Order
showed primary concern for the people of the desert: the
[793] Sanusi _shaikh_ ("holy man") cared for the poor, and the _zawiya_
[346] [485] became rest stops, storehouses, and religious centers where
[794] Bedouin children were taught their Quranic lessons. Through
175 the _zawiya_, the Sanusiyya became a political and economic
795 integrating factor in the desert, and al-Sanusi became the
346 182 legitimate authority of the Bedouins. The _zawiya_ became a
[793] very important part of the traditional desert economic system.
Today one _zawiya_ remains near al-Qasr but it is scarcely used.
The Bedouins say: "Before, when Alexandria was far away by
camel, we could get what we wanted at the _zawiya_. Now that we
have trucks and trains no one goes to the _zawiya_."

175 The fortunes of the Bedouin became linked with those
795 of the Order. When the Sanusi became involved in full-scale
648 conflict with the Italian colonial power, the Bedouins bore

175 the brunt of the war. With Bedouin warriors, the Sanusiyya
795 religious order became a political force for the Italians to
648 reckon with.

From 1911 until the start of the world war in 1914, the Sanusi Bedouin army fought the Italians in the desert and harrassed them in the coastal area. In November, 1914, the Turks entered the war on the side of the Germans, and in May, 1915, Italy joined the Allies. As a result of the declaration of alliances and the expansion of the war, the Sanusi army was sent into Egypt against the British. This move brought the Awlad 'Ali into contact with the Sanusi army. Before this, they had had little involvement in the war. This relative inactivity of the Awlad 'Ali can hardly be explained by the notion that they were "an unwarlike peoples," as Evans-Pritchard (1954:127) has characterized them. The Awlad 'Ali were not in the mainstream of Sanusi war activities in Libya. Also, the British exerted a great deal of control over them in contrast to that which the Italians were able to gain over the Cyrenaican Bedouin.

In 1915, the Sanusi army captured the British Libyan outpost at Sallum, and in January of 1916 they were threatening the town of Marsa Matruh. But within a month's time, by the end of February 1916, the British had routed the Sanusi army, and the following month had retaken Sallum.

During the Marsa Matruh campaign, some of the 'Aishai-

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bat from al-Qasr joined the Sanusi army. The importance of their contribution to the Sanusi effort is vague, even though most of my informants claimed that their fathers "fought the British." Some of the al-Qasr activity was on a part-time basis. [124] One informant, whose father was the paramount leader of the 'Aishaibat tribe in 1916, told me that his father "used to take his rifle and ride out every morning to join the troops of Sayyid Ahmad al-Sharif (the grandson of al-Sanusi al-kabiir), and there he would kill many British soldiers. Then he would come home again at night." There was at least one group of al-Qasr Bedouins who joined the Sanusi in Libya before the start of the war. After the end of the fighting, this group returned to Egypt and asked to be pardoned by the British. They appealed to the Governor of Marsa Matruh that there should be no reprisals taken against them since the Turks had actually forced them to fight for the Sanusi. The British Governor, who was fluent in the Bedouin dialect and considered a great man by the Bedouins, replied to them in the form of a famous Bedouin proverb: "The ropes can be stretched far enough for forgiveness."

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Traditionally, the Bedouins of the Marsa Matruh area were held in check by an officially created political structure which dated from the time of Muhammad 'Ali. This structure depended upon two political roles for the control of the Awlad 'Ali, the 'umda and the shaikh, neither of which had previously existed in the Bedouin authority system.

175 177 554 631 •648 Historically, the modern aspect of role differentiation and political specialization began with the appointment of Mitkhatri 'Adam at Sidi Barrani, west of Marsa Matruh. This was under Muhammad 'Ali Pasha. The new role was that of _'umda_, the same term used for the village leader in the Valley of the Nile. The first Bedouin _'umda_ died in 1909. At this time, under the British, another political role was instituted. This new role, that of _shaikh_, was a kind of vice-_'umda_ position. The son of the first _shaikh_ is now about 80 years old [115] and still lives in Marsa Matruh. (He was my chief informant for Bedouin history.) During this early period, there were few government officials in the desert, and, according to my informant, "there was need for only a few _'umdas_ and _shaikhs_. But later there was a need for more and more. The job of these men in those times was to work for the Egyptians in their dealings with the Bedouins of the desert." The number of incumbents in the offices of _'umda_ and _shaikh_ increased as the political needs of the British grew.

175 648 According to the Bedouins, the British administration did not arrive in the desert until about 1914. Up until that time, matters were in the hands of the Egyptians who governed the desert province for the colonial government. When the British arrived in Marsa Matruh, the opening of World War I was at hand. The Bedouins say, quite proudly, that the British knew of their sympathy for, and cooperation with, the Sanusi against the Italians in Cyrenaica.

175 Sanusi against the Italians in Cyrenaica. "When the British
•648 reached Matruh, they jailed all of the _'umdas_ and _shaikhs_
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631 (two _'umdas_ and five _shaikhs_, at that time). Then they chose new leaders, from the families of the old leaders, to work with them." But, "these men did not fight with the British, they only acted as their guides in dealing with the Bedouins of the desert. When the old leaders were released from jail, they returned to their positions of political office. While they were in jail, their replacements had only helped the
[178] British with supplies." Apparently, the British saw the need
of maintaining the continuity of the Bedouin authority structure.

175 Data on the condition of the Bedouins of the Western
648 Desert between the two world wars are absent. The Bedouins say that they lived with no trouble, or any help, from the Egyptians. The Bedouins have no fond memories of their experiences during World War II. They first heard of the war in 1940 when the Italians marched into Western Desert from Libya. The Germans occupied al-Qasr from May to October of 1942, when the famous General Rommel had his headquarters at Marsa Matruh. The British had told the Bedouins, in 1940, that they should flee the Italians, and that unless they did
175 they would be held responsible for their actions. Most of the
648 people of al-Qasr agreed to go to refugee camps at Amriyya
722 near Alexandria for the duration of the war.

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[556] Some of the Bedouins refused to leave for Amriyya.

175 These were the wealthy group who had large numbers of sheep
•648 and camels. In fact, most of the animals taken east to
722 Amriyya died on the way or were expropriated by the British.
556 'Umran Kailani, "who owned one thousand camels" and was the
166 shaikh of the 'Ali Ahmar section of the Awlad 'Ali at the time,
refused to go to Amriyya. The Bedouins say that he was treated
very well by the Germans who asked him to form a local government
and promised him all the help and supplies that he
needed. It is difficult to obtain figures on how many Bedouins
made the migration to the Nile Valley and how many remained
[162] behind in the Al-Qasr area. One informant told me that before
the war there were about 80,000 members of the Awlad 'Ali in
the Western Desert and that out of this number, about 30,000
remained behind.

175 Those who sought refuge at Amriyya returned to the
648 al-Qasr area at the end of 1942 after the defeat of the Germans
727 at al-Alamain. They found things greatly changed. Before the
war, there had been about twenty buildings in the al-Qasr area
and most of these were bombed out by the air war. The loss of
animals and the damage to the land made the resumption of
normal life quite difficult for the Bedouins. Underneath,
the land was literally a bed of anti-tank and anti-personnel
mines left by the advance and retreat of three different
armies. This restricted Bedouin travel and everyday food-
648 getting activities. This condition, which still exists, has
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648 727 important effects on contemporary al-Qasr. There remain about 11 million land mines in the ground between Marsa Matruh and 648 727 165 164 Sallum. Accidents connected with these mines take one thousand Bedouin lives every year, and cause about 10,000 injuries annually. (Reported in al-Ahram, January, 1965). This danger limits the areas in which the Bedouins can use the tractor, and, as a result, a great deal of the coastal land must be plowed by hand. In al-Qasr, physical disfigurements resulting from mine mishaps were quite common, and most families have had members killed in this way. In one al-Qasr lineage, 'Ailit Ma'fas, there have been sixteen men killed by mines since 1943.

Change and Present Attitudes

648 177 Political and economic changes, begun at the turn of the century, have continued into the present. The Bedouins of al-Qasr have been increasingly drawn into the political and economic life of the Egyptian national community. They have come to depend upon the national market for their products and upon governmental agricultural subsidies for their security. The net result of this process has been a sedentary Bedouin society which is not quite tribal and not quite peasant. Al-Qasr has this in-between quality--what Fallers (1961) has called the *tertium quid* quality.

[829] It is difficult to gauge the feelings of the Bedouins of al-Qasr about the social changes taking place. They complain

● 648 about the lack of concern shown toward the Bedouins throughout
177 the history of their relations with the Nile Valley: they
829 complain that the Egyptians have no right to take over the desert and order their lives for them. They say that "the Egyptians know nothing about the desert"; that "they do not know how to live in the desert and should take our advice on these things."* "They (the Egyptians) have given us nothing, we had all of this before they came. Jamal Abd al-Nasser did not invent socialism (ishtarikiyya): the Bedouins have always had it. We have always shared and taken care of one another." The Egyptians are still "outsiders" to the Bedouins. They are referred to as "fallahin" or "peasants."

Interestingly enough, the Bedouins include President Nasser in their own in-group. They insist, in a half-serious way, that he is of the Awlad 'Ali because he is originally from Upper Egypt. One can compare the roles of Nasser and the Grand Sanusi in some ways. Both leaders made special
[778] efforts to bring the Bedouins into a new community, to share their "good fortune" with them; also, both leaders are considered to be possessors of charisma, or baraka ("blessing") by the Bedouins. One may hear unkind remarks about "holy men" or "government officials," but never about Nasser or the al-Sanusi family. One Bedouin said: "Jamal Abd al-Nasser works hard and tries to do good for the people, but his officials are
000 very lazy and do not care about us." While the Bedouins

While the Bedouins

795 771 respect the Sanusi family they, nevertheless, wear their
829 religion lightly. An informant, speaking of the merits and demerits of the conservative Muslim Brethern Association, said that "you should never listen to a holy man, for he will lead
[576] [778] you straight to hell!" But upon meeting any member of the
Sanusi family, all Bedouins greet him by kissing his hand.
Besides a show of deference, this ritual act, in theory, transfers baraka from al-Sanusi to the layman.

● 648 The citizenship exemptions granted the Bedouins by
641 Muhammad 'Ali have been rescinded by Abd al-Nasser. This has been one aspect of his program to imbue the Bedouin with political consciousness and promote participation in the nation-state. The Bedouins say that this is the way it should be: they want the right to own land and to accept the
[651] responsibility of defending the homeland. But they still do
not pay land taxes, and they feel justified in this because the desert "is very poor soil, and not like that of the Nile." Nor do they always heed the call to military duty, though they insist that they do.

648 Egyptian land reform laws would be impractical, or
177 impossible to apply, in al-Qasr. In the Nile Valley, such
423 laws were necessary. The majority of the Egyptian peasants can survive on less than one acre of land, and farms of under five acres comprise 44 per cent of the agricultural land area in the Nile Valley (Warriner 1962:204). Plots this

648 177 423 size in the barley and pasture area of al-Qasr would not permit a subsistence level economy. Just as important is the political implication of any attempt at large-scale land reform in al-Qasr. The pattern of land distribution in al-Qasr reflects an intimate relationship between the structural principles of Bedouin society, especially the lineage system and territoriality. (In a later chapter we will discuss this relationship.) The ramifications of land reform would amount to a structural rearrangement of al-Qasr society and would make redistribution of land difficult to administer, or even to imagine. A reorganization of property relations is, in effect, a basic change in the authority structure. Therefore, the Bedouins want no part of land reform. There is a law which forbids the ownership of "more than 100 feddans (one feddan=one acre) of agricultural land. This shall also apply to barren and desert land."[1] One of my informants, a [115] large landowner, claims that this "law only applies to the Nile Valley where there is plenty of water. If the government wants the Bedouins to abide by that law then they must take care of us. I would gladly trade this land (which was considerably more than 100 feddans) for 100 feddans in the Nile Valley." The traditional tribal structure of Bedouin society

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[1] "Decree for the Amendment of the Agrarian Reform Law in the Southern Region," Department of Information, Cairo, July 25, 1961.

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[423] makes the welfare aspects of "Arab Socialism" meaningful, but the Bedouins of al-Qasr feel that they are already practicing "Socialists."

The Bedouins feel that the programs of the government are insufficient: the desert is extra harsh and aid should compensate for this. On the other hand, the Egyptians who administer the aid programs claim that the Bedouins do not differentiate between "giving cooperation" and "receiving aid." [181] Agricultural advisers complain that the Bedouins are lazy. One agronomist whose job it was to teach the Bedouins how to cultivate the olive tree said that they did not want to learn: "They want us to plant the trees, water them and care for them, harvest the olives, and then they will take them to the market and sell them!" This statement is typical. The [186] Bedouins reply: "The Egyptians did not teach us how to grow the olive. Our fathers planted the olive here long before they came into the desert." The Bedouins feel that the Egyptians should follow their advice concerning the use and control of water in the desert; that if they did the olive [186] would flourish and life would be easier. "The Egyptians," they say, "are lazy and cannot keep up with our requests for more seedlings. They cannot furnish us with what we need to improve our lives. All we hear is: 'tomorrow, tomorrow'!"

[241] The Bedouins do not understand the methods of modern hydrology and agronomy. They see no reason for the experimenta-

648 tions and innovations in agriculture which the Egyptians bring
177 to the desert. On the other hand, the Bedouins do not get
241 the modern materials which they need to increase the production
of their land. This is most serious when it comes to heavy
farm machinery, such as tractors, and the spare parts to keep
it functioning. Furthermore, seldom did a man in al-Qasr
receive the number of olive seedlings that he requested. This
invariably led to bitterness between Bedouins and Egyptians.
648 Most of the Bedouins believe that the desert is a difficult
177 (wihsha) life, and they favor change. They want to know, for
instance, why an American would leave home to live such a life.
[114] At a Governor's Council meeting which I attended, the Bedouin
representative from al-Qasr did not protest government interference. He complained that the Governor was not furnishing the materials and facilities which the Bedouin needed if he was to become "modern" and "educated." The Bedouins' major complaint about the Egyptians is not that they are trying to change the desert, but that they are not changing it fast enough!

*613 in farming, and he found this land "good for raising mint and
423 vegetables." To the southeast of the *'izba*, the lineages of
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241 Lazumi and Ma'fas found the land suitable for barley and
[312] grazing. This area is rain-fed. There are no wells and so
vegetable crops are not possible here. The members of these
lineages say that their ancestors were "real" Bedouins in
Cyrenaica, and did not wish to become farmers in Egypt. It
*613 is interesting to note that the Lazumi and Ma'fas are the
182 richest lineages in all of al-Qasr. They were, perhaps, better
184
241 able to maintain the traditional style of life which all of
the Bedouins claim is "the best." But all Bedouins of al-Qasr
depend to some degree upon horticulture or arboriculture.
[231] And most families own a few sheep or goats. Both Lazumi and
Ma'fas garden in their coastal sections, and Shraif members own
sheep.

656 Land registration has a history in the Western Desert.
423 The government attempted it a number of times, but with little
success until 1959 when the General Desert Development Organization
(GDDO) undertook its program of land reclamation. But the
361 Bedouins were settled long before this. In al-Qasr, the Bedouins
342 began to erect permanent stone dwellings on the land about the
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time of the First World War. In the Matruh area, elder informants
agree that before 1914 the Bedouins lived in tents outside the
361 town area. When the British came, they began to move into town.
•648 Many of the Bedouins built houses in Matruh between the years

361 1925 and 1930 because, as they point out, the British
648 administration provided employment for "the poor Bedouin."
361 The wealthier Bedouins who owned camels and large numbers of
556 sheep remained in the desert. Just the reverse is happening
178 at the present time. The rich men who see the advantages in
business, and the comforts which Matruh offers, can also
afford the change of residence or the maintenance of two
residences.

175 In 1922, the Egyptian government first registered land
423 in al-Qasr. At this time, they sanctioned the tribal division
657 of territory which existed. There was no attempt to force
political integration upon the Bedouins. Egypt has never had
a nomad problem as have other Middle Eastern countries. The
history of Egypt is essentially the history of the Nile Valley.
Consequently, it is not odd that we find no mention of the
Awlad 'Ali in the historical record. The Bedouins of the
Western Desert were resigned to their place in the desert, and
the central government saw no particular advantage or disadvantage
in this.

423 Concern for the Bedouin minority in Egypt emerged only
648 with nationalistic programs of modernization. In 1954, the
Fourth United Nations Social Welfare Seminar for Arab States
in the Middle East convened in Baghdad. From this meeting
came some general recommendations for dealing with the problems
of the Bedouin. The major proposal was calculated to transform

423 the structure of both the nomadic and the sedentary tribe:
648 "Settlement should take place on the basis of granting each individual capable of working in agriculture a piece of land, the area to be fixed by the state, calculated to ensure the raising of his living standard and to enable him to support himself and his legal dependents on condition that he start cultivation of the land. When distributing the land, care should be taken that a family be settled on a single piece of land composed of the total of the plots granted to its members, the family being composed of relatives to the first grandfather" (Abu-Zeid n.d.).

From this point, each Arab country dealt with the problem of the nomad in its own way, some effectively and others
423 not so effectively. Not until 1958 did Egypt make a formal
657 effort to integrate the Bedouins of the Western Desert into
656 the national society. And it was not until 1960 that the so-called "Desert Law" of 1958 (U.A.R. Law Number 124) was activated and enforced. The most important provision of this law followed the plan formulated at the Baghdad conference: "There is no recognition of tribal possession of land which is considered as belonging to the State, and whenever a family develops and plants on a holding, this gives it the right, if approved, to the issue ot a title to it by the government." Law Number 124 also provided that land occupied by buildings or orchards before 1957 can be owned by the occupants at a low

245 blossoms of the tree are stripped away by these winds before
177 the fruit can mature.

178 Traditional values affect the Bedouins' perception of
517 their new life. Men are fond of gathering for their ritual
272 three cups of mint tea and recalling "the good old days." In
[829] those days, they say, men only had to ride, shoot, and drink
233 tea. In the past, there was a great deal of security in
178 owning animals which are not as dependent on the rains as
422 is agriculture. During a year of bad rains, a Bedouin could
233 always move his flock to Libya or to the Nile Valley: "When
731 we have a bad year, we take our animals to the grass of our
166 relatives. When they have a bad year, they come here." In
169 the drought year of 1960, 20,000 Egyptian Bedouins migrated
to Libya in search of pasturage. This caused an international
[648] conflict and King Idris of Libya, for a short time, closed the
border to Bedouins. The conflict was finally resolved, and
the Bedouins were given permission to use the pastures of
Cyrenaica. None of the Bedouins of al-Qasr were involved in
this movement.

233 The Bedouins who have settled in the 'izba sector of
al-Qasr also prefer to keep some sheep. The security which
they represent is worth the time and expense of maintaining
233 them and paying a shepherd to look after them. The Bedouins,
178 in the past, paid their shepherds one sheep for every ten
465 sheep that he tended. Payment was made twice a year. Today,

[619 675] "Jumi'at, Marabtiin (plural of Marabit) of the 'Ali Ahmar."
All Marabit tribes of the Western Desert are affiliated as
* [613] clients with Sa'adi tribes. Further, since the tertiary
group of the Marabtiin functions in the same way as that of
the Sa'adi, it is this group which enters into compacts with
Sa'adi tertiary groups. Traditionally, the Marabit group's
[682] main support activity was to share in the payment of the
blood-money with its Sa'adi protector group. In return, the
Marabit group was given land in the protector's territory
and could depend upon them to contribute to any Marabit
blood debt which might come due. Also, it was considered the
[628] [682] duty of the Sa'adi to revenge the death of a member of his
client group since the Marabit "was weak and could not face a
[608] tribe." But there is no attempt to construct fictional kinship
links between Sa'adi and Marabit groups.

[672] In al-Qasr today, contractual relations between Sa'adi
and Marabit are still based upon collective responsibility in
the blood-feud. However, since this traditional means of
conflict control is an extremely rare occurrence, the mutual
obligations of the parties are expressed in different forms.
• [648] In any conflict between the Bedouins and the Egyptian government, the Marabtiin are expected to support their respective
[666] Sa'adi groups. In any modern elections which a Sa'adi might
enter, the Marabit is expected to give him his vote. A few
examples will make clear the relationship between the Sa'adi

*613 554 on paper in triplicate, one copy going to each litigant and
69 a third copy to the chief of police of the Marsa Matruh sector.
[671] In practice, though, a copy usually goes to the litigants, but
[178] not to the chief of police (who had not a single Bedouin court
case in his files).

*613 As is not the case in Islamic law, in Bedouin customary
695 law the decision of the judge may be appealed. The system of
692 appeals may even function at the level of familial authority,
[671] i.e., the son may, in theory, appeal a ruling by his own
father. The Bedouins insist that this is an important right
of every man. In the situation where a man wishes to appeal
a decision of his own *'aqila*, he will generally take his claim
to another *'aqila* of his secondary group. When an appeal is
to be made, it is done with the permission of the *'aqila* who
rendered the original decision. The one who appeals his case
does so with the understanding that the decision returned by
the court of appeal will be final and binding. Further, if
[681] the court of appeal concurs with the findings of the original
court, the plaintiff pays a double fine (twice the original
fine), and also pays his own *'aqila* an expiation fee (*kubaara*).

69 The Egyptians have preferred to leave the Bedouins of
● 648 al-Qasr to settle their own disputes except in the more serious
[682] criminal matters. Police from Matruh will enter homicide cases
[685] and those conflicts over property rights which threaten to
explode into tribal warfare. But these types of conflict have

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•648 been infrequent in al-Qasr. The *'awaaqil* of al-Qasr and the
police of al-Qasr have an agreement that Bedouin problems are
the jurisdiction of the desert leaders, and that the police
will intervene only when their help is requested. The
Bedouins claim that in the 1930's, the Egyptians tried to do
away with Bedouin law but soon discovered their own penal code
609 to be inoperative in the desert. Against "outsiders," the
69 Bedouin is duty bound to protect his kinsmen, and hence justice
could not be satisfied. One *'aqila* said that "only the *'awaiyid*
*613 *Awlad 'Ali* can maintain order because it stops wars through
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182 payment of blood-money." If a Bedouin, for some reason or
other, takes his case to the police in Matruh, he will be
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648 returned to his *'aqila;* he will be told that they can do
*613 nothing for him without the permission of his *'aqila*. There
are exceptions to this rule which complicate modern Bedouin
692 judicial procedure. For instance, in cases which involve
685 government property, such as olive trees and government-
648 operated water systems, a man may legitimately deal with the
*613 police. In one case in al-Qasr, a man's goats destroyed a
number of his neighbor's olive trees. The police decided that
the owner of the goats should pay the value of the trees. In
another case, a man who had constructed small earth dikes in
such a way that rain water was prevented from flowing onto
his neighbor's land was forced against his will to remove the
obstruction. His neighbor had taken his complaint to the

692 police and not to his _'aqila_. This was a serious case because
685 the police were forced to imprison the dike-builder for two
•648 days before he would agree to their demands. The two men in-
*613 volved in the conflict were from different lineages, and it
soon became necessary for Bedouin justice to intervene even after the matter had been settled by the police. The _'awaaqil_ of each man met, along with other notables of the tribe, and investigated the area where the dikes had been; they listened to witnesses and tried to calculate the amount of water which each man should receive. In the end, the decision of the police was upheld.

692 Although, ideally, litigation should be instigated
691 through the office of the _'aqila_, alternatives do exist. As
*613 noted in discussing the values of Bedouin society, it is the
[577] moral obligation of each and every person to moderate between
conflicting parties; any one conflict situation may be moderated by many well-meaning parties. Or, if a person suspects prejudice on the part of his own _'aqila_, he may choose to take
627 his claim to another _'aqila_, or third party. The notion of a
554 third party to a conflict, when it does not refer to the _'aqila_
692 or a close kinsman who may act as an arbitrator, has reference
to a non-institutionalized role in al-Qasr. This role-holder, the Bedouins call _rajal khair_ ("good man") or _qawaal al-khair_ ("the speaker of the good").

"Role differentiation implies organization" (Levy

691 692 *613 554 627 between me and my cousins, according to Bedouin law (yinafth al-'awaiyid bainaana). I went to the shaikh because my cousins did not agree that we go to the 'aqila right away. We agreed that the shaikh would choose the third party, and the judgment would be binding on both of us. The shaikh chose Bu Halaiqa as the third party, and Bu Halaiqa chose three others as consultants. (Two of the three were rajal khair, and the other was an 'aqila.) The judgment was that my cousins were in the wrong. They were fined 10 L.E. and a dhabiiha("blood sacrifice"). 'Ali intervened and did not allow my cousins to pay the fine. He had them write a paper stating, that if they resume this quarrel in the future they must pay the fine plus another 10 L.E. fine. (Hajj 'Ali is a rajal khair.)

695 •648 696 Sometimes the Egyptian police must be brought into a judicial affair to insure the execution of a judgment. In one case, an individual in al-Qasr did not accept the decision of his 'aqila; his 'aqila wrote the decision on paper and sent him to another 'aqila. The second 'aqila agreed with the first, but the man also refused this decision. The second 'aqila wrote his decision on paper and sent it to the shaikh of the 'Aishaibat in Matruh. The shaikh summoned the culprit and sent him to the police station. Finally, the police were able to convince the man to pay his fine, and also his expiation fee to his own 'aqila. My informant said that this was a minor affair, and that had it been a serious offense committed by the man he would have been threatened with expulsion from the corporate group.

*613 554 571 As the corporate sole, the 'aqila has political authority which is legitimate and morally binding on all who wish to maintain their status in the group and tribe. Any individual

175 for legal interpretation. For instance: "We are also told
671 by Yahya that (the Caliph) Mu'awiya ibn Sufian said that a
177 wound on the body should be assessed at half the value of
671 that wound on the head or face" (1935:324). Maliki law,
177 derived in large part from the Bedouin traditions of Arabia,
may be seen to characterize the legal norms of the tribal-based
social structure in the Western Desert. The Bedouins of al-
[428] Qasr themselves claim that they are within the bounds of
[562] Islamic Law when they deny the female the right to inherit,
though they do have other, and more secular, justifications
for the practice.

671 As we have already noted, in the above quote from the
182 "holy man" of al-Qasr, the Bedouins feel that the 'awaiyid
•648 can succeed where governmental law will fail. They say that
"the government does not understand the problems of the Bedouins," that "government troops cannot function in the desert." They feel that they need the 'awaiyid for the sake of political order itself: "If the Bedouins did not have the 'awaiyid, they would eat each other. The 'awaiyid is so important that a man who commits a wrong in town will lie to the government, and then dutifully return to the tribe for Bedouin justice."

[656] In 1933, the government "abolished" the 'awaiyid
and insisted that the Bedouins settle their difference in the civil courts in accord with Egyptian law. According to

671 the Bedouins, the government soon discovered their own error,
182 for they were unable to effectively manage group and tribal
•648 political relations: "They (the government) found out that they could not solve murders in the desert. They would arrest the killer but the trouble continued between families (i.e. feuding went on). There were more killings instead of less, and, finally, the government asked us to return to the 'awaiyid because it alone can solve murders in the desert." I was unable to document the claim that the government had "abolished" the 'awaiyid in 1933, but a number of officials who worked at the Governor's Office in Marsa Matruh said that it was true.

671 In al-Qasr, and in the Western Desert in general,
641 adherence to law and political order rests upon the conviction
577 that each individual and territorial group have guaranteed
571 rights which are related to honor and property. A violation
554 of any single man's honor or property may easily be interpreted, according to the principle of collective responsibility, as an offense against the rights of a group. And in this sense, legal and moral violations in Bedouin society are relative to the structure of interrelations, and they must be regulated with reference to the various levels of the authority structure.

181 Bedouins place a high value on political order, but
641 also on the idea that political order can only be guaranteed
578 through a man's willingness "not to allow another to take any
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671 They said that if a man
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684 insisted on keeping a promiscuous wife, his family would
681 "write a barawwa aginst him." I heard of no sex offenses in
[114] al-Qasr while I was there.

671 The penalty for stealing, according to the 'awaiyid,
685 is that the thief shall pay compensation, by himself, in the
amount of four times the value of the stolen object. On the
*[613] other hand, if the thief is a poor man, he will pay thrice the
value of the stolen object and the remaining fourth will be
paid by his lineage.

671 The 'awaiyid recognizes the territorial claims of the
685 lineage. Disputes arising over conflicting claims to land
*613 and wells are handled at Bedouin courts in much the same way
578 as personal injury cases are, with one exception. Usually, a
[554] larger number of elders and rajal khair will be consulted in
an advisory capacity by the 'awaaqil handling the case. The
'awaaqil consider the specific history of a particular piece
of land or well (for instance, each well is known by its own
name), and determine the ownership in accordance with the
testimony of elders and individuals of high social status.
Most of the problems over land and water rights in al-Qasr
have reference to what is still considered lineage-owned
685 territory in the barley-and-pasture sector. In the 'izba
578 sector, conflict over land ownership rights, since they are
•648 rights which are registered with the government, is settled
in the Egyptian court of law. Only one such case came up while

685 I was in al-Qasr, and each party to the conflict hired
578 Egyptian lawyers in Marsa Matruh to represent them. As one
•648 litigant in this case told me: "The Bedouins prefer to settle
their own land disputes because the government's way of
handling these things costs money and long periods of waiting."

69 The notion of jurisprudence in tribal cultures, in
121 general, seems to be one which concentrates on the restoration
578 of a disturbed balance rather than one concerned with formality
and procedure. To a great extent, this is true in the Bedouin
case also. However, the absence of institutionalized ways of
dealing with conflict is more characteristic of the internal
*613 system of political relations. Conflict within the secondary
578 segment, we have noticed, may be regulated at the familial
[593] level of authority by the shaib, or one acting in his place:
[596] it is hoped by the Bedouins that quarrels never become serious
enough to prompt intervention by the 'aqila. On the other
hand, the 'aqila, as a legitimate representative of his
authority group, will almost always become involved in conflict
regulation falling within the sphere of external political
relations, i.e., conflict between secondary, primary, or tribal
segments.

The 'aqila as the most effective mechanism of social
*613 control has become institutionalized through time in Bedouin
578 society. At the interactional level of secondary lineage
182 group relations, conflict may easily expand into feuding or,

*613 cases of homicide and one case of wounding) one was at the
578 tribal level; three at the primary level; three at the
619 secondary level; and two at the tertiary level. Of the
681 thirteen cases dealing with property rights over land, water, or women, none took place at the tribal level; four were at the primary level; seven at the secondary level; and one at the tertiary level. One case dealing with marriage rights took place within a tertiary segment and concerned the legitimacy of a man to claim his bint 'amm. Twelve of the twenty-two cases occurred within the 'Aishabat tribe. Of the ten cases of conflict involving units from outside the 'Aishaibat, six cases were between primary units, three cases were between secondary units, and one case involved the 'Ali Ahmar with the Harabi of Libya.

In almost every case involving primary units and tribal units, the two opposing authority groups were actually secondary groups who had the backing of their primary groupings. The case in which the 'Ali Ahmar mobilized to deal with a problem in Libya probably represents an atypical case in history. It is unlikely that tribal groups of this size
• [648] could mobilize in time of war or peace, and in this particular case the good international relations of Egypt and Libya were at stake.

784 There is another realm of sanctions which can be in-
695 voked in cases concerning homicide, wounding, theft, and
681

577 According to this _'aqila_, the "good man" is the "good Muslim"
771 who observes the pillars of Islam (fasting, praying, making
183 the pilgrimage, and alms-giving). Also, the "good man" does
not steal or lie, and this leads, importantly enough, to social
accord.

121 In light of the preceding discussion of authority and
681 law, we can now offer a description of the Bedouin judicial
process in action. Southall (1956:121-151) has drawn the
121 distinction between internal and external delicts on the
681 bases of kinds of sanctions rendered, and whether or not
114 chiefly authority mediates conflict. Such a distinction can
be only partially applied in the case of the Bedouins of the
Western Desert. The kind of sanctions operating in the internal
political system do differ from those applied in the external
political system, though not to the same degree which is true
121 of Southall's Alurland. On the other hand, since Bedouin
681 society, lacking political centralization, cannot be character-
692 ized as a segmentary state with distinct spheres of authority
842 at successive levels of the lineage structure, the intervention
or non-intervention of chiefly adjudication and decision-
making cannot serve as a basis for differentiating political
* [613] action. Rather, the lone political office of the _'aqila_
[627] involves itself in all arbitration which cannot be successfully
concluded by the mechanism of familial authority. There are
● [648] just two exceptions which apply to this latter statement:

121 first, the government may enter into conflict cases which
681 are judged to be out of control and involving the larger tribal
692 units; secondly, litigants, whether exercising internal or
• 648 external political relations, have the right to take their
[626] case to a rajal khair. Both exceptions represent informal
processes of social control in al-Qasr: the first case rarely
happens, and the second case seems to occur quite frequently
but no recordings of the settlement are made.

681 Sanctions in the Bedouin legal system conform to what
121 Radcliffe-Brown referred to as secondary sanctions: "These
are concerned with the actions of persons or groups in their
effects upon other persons or groups" (1952:209). Also, it
(671) would seem that Bedouin law is one of private delicts as
opposed to a law of public delicts:

> [692] In the procedure of a law of private delicts a person or a body of persons that has suffered some injury, loss or damage by infringement of recognized rights appeals to a constituted judicial authority, who declares some other person or body of persons within the community to be responsible and rules that the defendant shall give satisfaction to the plaintiff, such satisfaction frequently taking the form of the payment of an indemnity or damages. A private delict is thus an action which is subject to what may be called a restitutive sanction (Radcliffe-Brown 1952:213).

681 In Bedouin society, delicts are private since they involve
675 individuals or lineage groups, but the restitutive sanctions
671 to which they give rise are backed by communal consensus expressed through public approval in general, and by the twin

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68 what happened; some of them are my translations of legal documents
[124] which informants permitted me to see; a few of the cases
[114] happened while I was in the field and represent my reporting
of what happened. I have arbitrarily divided the cases into
those involving personal injury and those concerning property
rights. In each case, I indicate at which level of the authority
structure the conflict and settlement has taken place.

Legal Cases Pertaining to Personal Injury

578
681 Two cases of killing have been discussed previously.
Below are a number of cases dealing with personal injury which
occurred in the external political system at the various levels
of segmentation. The first three cases involve conflict
*[613] between secondary lineage segments of the 'Aishaibat tribe;
[619] the next two cases take place at the primary and sub-tribal
•[648] levels, but note that secondary segments are the actual functioning
units involved; the final case, an unusual one, deals with
conflict with "foreigners" at the tribal level. Note that the
*[613] '*aqila* as a corporate representative is active in these cases.
[182] The third case presented below is a translation of an actual
[778] document showing how the *nazaala* (discussed above) functions
as a formal mechanism of conflict regulation.

683
578 that they had received their rights in this case. And
*613 the two parties are satisfied by this according to the
692 witnesses present.

539 Signatures or seals of four witnesses.
695

578 The next case represents the only time in the memory
682 of informants that all of the 'awaaqil of the 'Ali Ahmar met
*613 to intervene in a case of conflict. This case is extremely
692 unusual because it may be the only time in Awlad 'Ali history
571 that political mobilization of this scale has taken place. As
619 noted, political action, in war or peace, usually involves
[177] only secondary segments. In view of this, the case probably
●[648] reflects an instance of social change: the Egyptian government,
anxious to maintain good relations with Libya, encouraged and
facilitated the settlement of this dispute by furnishing
transportation and cutting administrative red tape so that
the 'awaaqil of the 'Ali Ahmar could handle this case in a
most expeditious way. Here is a case where Bedouin traditional
[182] political structures function adequately in the modern situation.
Note here also that, in certain circumstances, the diiya payment
can be divided symbolically and specifically to place guilt and
to indicate the seriousness of a crime.

619 Date: 1963. Case: Quarrel between the tribe of 'Ali Ahmar
682 (Egypt) and the Harabi (Libya) concerning murder. A young
578
*613 boy of 'Ailit X was visiting his sister in Libya. He learned
[685]

423 (_nizaa'a_) belongs to Khalid Idris and his brothers. This
619
578 happened with the satisfaction of both tribes, and this re-
691 nunciation of claim is valid from today. This paper concerning the ownership of land around the well is valid from today also. And this happened between the parties: (Signatures or stamps of both parties concerned.)

(There appeared the signatures of twenty-three of the twenty-four men who were to have sworn the oath.)

Only twenty-three oath-takers were present: 30 July 1964. I, Shaikh Khalid Za'aluk, agree on the signatures of only twenty-three oath-takers. (Signature of Khalid Za'aluk.)

• 648 We have mentioned that the _'awaiyid_ prevails in al-
671 Qasr, but have also noted that where the security of the
578 desert is threatened the government is likely to intervene. The government enters tribal conflict in al-Qasr with the tacit approval of the Bedouins. As one informant remarked: "The _'awaiyid_ is the best way to handle problems, but the police will handle what the _'awaiyid_ cannot."

423 _Date: 1964_. Case: Quarrel between al-Afrad ('Ali Abyad) and
691 'Aishaibat ('Ali Ahmar) over water rights. Many members of
578 both tribes took part in this conflict. The government had
619
648 to intervene: they formed a peace committee made up of all
*[613] the _'awaaqil_ of both tribes and the _'umda_ and _shaikh_ from
[634] each tribe.

423 each tribe. It was decided that the water which flows through
691 the *wadi* after the rains should be divided equally between the
578 two tribes, and that no one should be stopped from using the
619 water. Had not the government intervened in this conflict,
●648 and had not they collected all of the weapons from the Bedouins, this problem would have resulted in the death of many men and even greater problems.

674 Theft is condemned by the Bedouins: "Everything in
685 the desert is loose. We must punish the thief quickly and severely." It is a fact that the man who goes to steal and
[682] accidentally kills in the act will have judged against him
[829] the full *diiya*, i.e., the amount for intentional killing. On the other hand, the people of al-Qasr insist that "Bedouins do
[671] not steal." But legal norms exist to sanction violations against cultural ideals. The following case shows how social and ritual sanctions operate to enforce ideals.

619 Date: 1964. Case: Quarrel between the tribe of Kamailat and
578 the tribe of 'Aishaibat over the theft of 16 L.E. Muhammad of
685 'Ailit Ma'fas was accused of stealing 16 L.E. which belonged
*613 to Ahmad of 'Ailit Idris, Kamailat. The theft occurred while the two were residing at a hotel in Marsa Matruh. There were twenty other persons in the hotel that night. The accused said: "I did not take anything."

*613 must come because he, himself, was a Libyan and a member of
619 no tribe in Egypt. Al-Sanusi's petition was two-fold: he
578 said the cousin should be punished for violating his right of
582 793 privacy and property, and the question concerning the cousin's
683 right to the girl should be settled. The *'awaaqil* decided
692 that al-Sanusi should be awarded a *kubaara* of 1000 L.E. from
the tribes of the area, and that the girl should be permitted
to marry no man of the Qinaishat tribe. Al-Sanusi refused to
accept the *kubaara*, and this was the correct thing to do since
the *kubaara*, especially a large one, is only offered ritualistically. The *'awaaqil* took note of the cousin's rights to his
bint 'amm: they said that since the girl refused to marry him
it would not be right if she married anyone else from the tribe.
*613 Furthermore, the *'awaaqil*, on the basis of the cousin's behavior
619 in this matter, decided that the cousin was insane and should
734 be committed to an asylum. They informed the police in Marsa
• [648] Matruh of this diagnosis and decision, and the police came and
transported the boy to the mental hospital in Cairo where he
is today. The uncles of the boy signed the papers which committed him.

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[792] you for your cloak, you would have immediately given it to him. God was pleased with them at that time."

This notion of changing foci of authority and power cannot be divorced from the related political phenomena of the tendency toward legitimacy and the role institutionalization

128 process. In the next chapter, I will attempt to show how such a conceptual framework can be utilized in an analysis of culture and political change.

Modern Legal Roles

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[648]
[177] The roles of 'umda and shaikh were created and imposed upon the Bedouins by Muhammad 'Ali sometime during the early part of the nineteenth century in order to facilitate administration, maintain security in the desert, and protect the Western frontier.

[619] Both of these roles are representative offices at the primary level of the tribal structure. The 'Aishaibat have an 'umda and a shaikh who reside in Marsa Matruh and work in close relation with the Governor. In terms of a chain of command, these offices receive demands which may originate either with the Governor in Matruh or with Bedouins in al-Qasr. But these offices are subservient to both the Governor and the Bedouins since no decision-making powers of any consequence resides with them.

[591]
[635] With reference to the two authority structures, the Egyptian and the Bedouin, the 'umda and the

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structured situation the traditional authority structure would have disappeared from the scene.

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But, there is a struggle for authority recognition going on in al-Qasr. It is related to the change from the old basis of traditional authority to a new basis of legal authority. At the heart of this struggle is the role of the rajal khair. The rajal khair has a firm public basis for establishing himself in an authoritative and representative role. Traditionally, the rajal khair has faced inward and outward: he has used his ascribed position on the al-Qasr prestige scale to augment his status and influence, and, at the same time, his economic rationality has oriented him toward Marsa Matruh. In the present stage of culture change, ● [648] the rajal khair is in a position to combine his ascribed and achieved attributes to gain entrance to a new reference group, the Egyptian bureaucracy. This offers him a new kind of prestige as well as affording him new opportunities for power, and even authority, over his fellow Bedouins.

The rajal khair, in view of his movement between the old and new in Egypt, maintains a tertium quid status in two camps. While he has one foot in the traditional community because of his role in conflict regulation and the manipulation of traditional values, the rajal khair also has a foot in the

156 He was sometimes
159 asked to sit-in as a witness for important contractual
554 matters. Note that in the rawaabit al-'awaaqil of Bait
675 Shafaila of 'Ailit Lazumi (presented in Chapter Four),
Hajj 'Ali who is neither from 'Ailit Lazumi nor an 'aqila
was present to sign and validate this document.

156 Hajj 'Ali, then, operates in the micropolitical
159 system and the traditional authority structure of al-Qasr.
554 But what is just as important, he has secured a firm foothold in the modern bureaucratic structure of the near-by
town. He straddles both camps. The Governor of Marsa Matruh
635 was an important aid to my understanding of Hajj 'Ali's
634 156 role as "broker." The Governor claimed that the British
159 first introduced the roles of 'umda and shaikh; they did this
554 to "control the Bedouin" and to "get the men out of the tents."
124 He explained in his own way what he considered to be the
●[648] structural differentiation of political roles in al-Qasr.

> Let me tell you, these fellows are very clever. They have an 'umda . . . he comes to my office and says: "I want this and this." I say, "No." Then he goes back to the 'awaqil and tells them that, and then these fellows begin to think in what way they can get what they want. But the 'umda is nothing; it is the
> *[613] 'aqila whom the Bedouins listen to and love . . . The 'umda is elected (at this time) by the Bedouins. They put forward a man who hesitates, one who can say yes or no . . . But there is a real leader for the people, this is a man such as Hajj 'Ali, here is a man the Bedouins love.

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635 The Governor said that Hajj 'Ali speaks well and
156 159 thinks well. Twice in the interview the Governor said that
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*[613]

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635 Hajj 'Ali "became an _'aqila_ by his way of life." Of course,
156 159 the fact is that Hajj 'Ali is not an _'aqila_ at all. Although
554 I feel that the Governor should understand the Bedouin authority
*[613] structure, he is not alone in his misconceptions. The chief
156 agricultural engineer for the G.D.D.O., who works very closely
159 with the Bedouins of al-Qasr, also thought that Hajj 'Ali
554 was the _'aqila_ of Bait 'Umar in 'Ailit Ma'fas. Furthermore,
*613 and most impressive of all, one _'aqila_ in 'Ailit Dawlat and
his four sons all thought that Hajj 'Ali was the _'aqila_ of
Bait 'Umar. There is more here than just ignorance of
Bedouin society on the part of officials, and disinterest
on the part of the Dawlat _'aqila_. There is good reason for
these different parties to mistake Hajj 'Ali as a key
traditional "authority," or spokesman for his corporate group.
It seems clear that in their respective dealings they must
have encountered Hajj 'Ali in some kind of representative
capacity. The _'aqila_ who insisted that Hajj 'Ali was an
'aqila, even after I pointed out that he was not, lived
outside the _'izba_ sector and hence mistook an important
rajal khair for an _'aqila_. The Governor understandably
mistook the most influential man in al-Qasr as an _'aqila_.

635 There are other traits which qualify Hajj 'Ali as
*648 the singular leader of the Bedouins. A few years back, the
[554] [156] Governor of Marsa Matruh formed a Governor's Council
[159] (_Majlis al-Muhafza_) made up of representatives of the Bedouin

635 population of the whole Western Desert, and representatives
•[648] of the Egyptian government employees working in the province.
[634] The Bedouin representatives appointed to this council need
not be an *'umda* or a *shaikh*, although they may be. The
oldest Bedouin member of the council, who happens to be an
'umda, told me that "the Governor picks the men who he feels
understand the problems of the people."

635 The Governor himself thinks that every Bedouin on
124 his council is an *'aqila*. He replied to my question about
*613 the criteria for membership on the *Majlis al-Muhafza*: "I
am using a new selection system. Rather than choose the
'umda or *shaikh*, I choose the *'aqila*. Every man on the
council is an *'aqila*, and the number is determined by the
population of the area . . . But I appoint more men from the
[619] 'Ali Ahmar (see Figures 3 and 7)[1] than from other tribes.
This is because they are more numerous, and they are near
Matruh where I am able to contact them immediately. The
'Ali Ahmar are represented by six men and the other tribes
by just three men."

156 Hajj 'Ali is one of these six men and the only member
159 of the Council who resides in al-Qasr. I attended and ob-
554 served the December meeting of the Council. The Governor
635 sat at the head of a long table with the Egyptian representa-
648 tives on either side of him. At the other end of the table
[114] sat the Bedouin representatives, Hajj 'Ali among them. Purely

[1] [See pp. 65 & 77 respectively--Analyst]

156 administrative business took up most of the time at the
159 meeting, and only the Governor and the Egyptians took part
554 in the discussion. At the conclusion of the meeting, the
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● 648 Governor asked if any present had comments to make. Hajj
[871] 'Ali rose, and delivered a formal and well-prepared speech
[537] on the inadequacies of the educational facilities in Matruh.
He noted that the Governor had promised the Bedouins that if they sent their sons in from the desert for secondary schooling, their material needs would be taken care of, but that in fact the Governor had not kept his promise for there was not enough space and beds for the boys. The Governor apologized for this condition and said he was trying to correct it. I noted that a few Egyptians found something amusing about this incident, but that all of the Bedouins present were serious and nodded in agreement with the points made by Hajj 'Ali.

156 We should note that Hajj 'Ali was the only Bedouin to
159 speak up at the meeting, that he spoke in the formal, tradi-
554 tional manner, and that he showed concern for the real problems
635 of the Bedouins. Hajj 'Ali is careful to protect his identity
as a Bedouin, and in this he differs from the _'umda_ and most of the "status group."

121 In situations of induced change, the cultural problems
156 involved differ in their conception and immediacy as defined
159 by the agents and the recipients of change. Hajj 'Ali, who
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177 is both an agent and a recipient of change, is intimate with
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121 156 159 554 635 177 the problems of the Bedouins of al-Qasr. He knows how to phrase them, and his place on the Majlis al-Muhafza gives him the right and the opportunity to air them. This is the role of the "cultural broker." Before the meeting of the council, Hajj 'Ali had gathered a group of the men from al-Qasr and they had talked about which demands should be presented to the Governor. This is purely a political process which Hajj 'Ali manipulates. The formulation and presentation •[648] of demands became, in the hands of Hajj 'Ali, "inputs" into the Egyptian political system with the hope that they will materialize as "outputs" and the satisfaction of needs - to use the terminology of David Easton's "systems analysis" (1965b).

156 159 554 635 177 On another occasion, Hajj 'Ali demonstrated his status and political leadership and the fact that he has assumed the position of spokesman for the Bedouin of al-Qasr during this period of change. Once each year the Governor makes a tour of al-Qasr to inspect the school, the cooperative building, the government experimental farm, and the area in general. After the inspection tour, he holds a reception in a ceremonial tent set up for the occasion. At this time, he states his evaluations and opinions, distributes some clothing material to the poorer families of the area, and asks for suggestions from the Bedouins who sit on the ground before the tent. The only suggestion forthcoming from the Bedouins was

156 159 554 829 178 undertaken to transform his rajal khair role into an authority which transcends the bounds of the local community. During my talks with him, he never once insinuated that the people of al-Qasr, nor even the 'Aishaibat or 'Ali Ahmar (terms he rarely ever used), owe anything to a larger entity or community known as "the Bedouin" or "the Awlad 'Ali."
If Hajj 'Ali is to legitimate his own authority in a new political system, he must, at the same time, show the Bedouins the legitimacy of the new political community. The Bedouins 829 178 177 must feel a moral commitment toward the new national political community or else it has no meaning or authority. Most of the Bedouins of al-Qasr still take it for granted that the allocation of political values and distribution of power in terms of traditional and modern legal roles will be carried over into the modern community and its politics. Hence, if anyone should [634] [648] go on to Cairo to represent the Bedouin of the Western Desert, naturally it should be the 'umda or the shaikh "who knew how to deal with the Egyptians." The majority of the people of the al-Qasr area see change coming but do not conceptualize it as any threat to the traditional authority structure.

156 159 554 829 178 177 Hajj 'Ali anticipates the change as fundamental enough to require a new sense of identity. I think this is evident in the following statement in which he takes issue with the traditional way of doing things and appears to be preparing himself for a role in the readjustment process.

156 imply that one cannot be educated and know the 'awaiyid at
159 the same time--the attitude of a self-made man. Hajj 'Ali
554 realizes his marginal position between the new and the old,
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177 and his attitude concerning change through education seems
to be that of an unselfish leader. Elaborating further on
156 the role of education, Hajj 'Ali showed insight into some of
159 the psychological aspects underlying social change:

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> 177 As I said before, the people here are realistic about
> 829 change. There are now only about three or four of
> 871 us who send our sons to study at the university, the rest of the people are waiting to see what these boys will amount to. The other day, one of our educated boys, an officer in the army, came to visit al-Qasr. All of the women are now hoping to see their sons become as successful as this. This is exactly like the first time we cultivated olives in the desert: the Bedouins mocked those who planted the olive. After the olive began to show profits, everyone regretted that they did not cultivate it. Time is changing, and the people are changing. Education is the basis of everything in any nation. Now the agricultural engineer directs me, telling me what to do and how to do it . . . and before 1952 (pre-Nassar regime) they knew nothing about us and we had nothing.

156 As culture and social change proceeds in al-Qasr, it
159 is evident that Hajj 'Ali and the national political community
554 are becoming legitimate authorities in the eyes of the Bedouins.
829 This is indicated by the following event. One month before
574 I left the field, the first vice-President of the Republic was
648 expected to visit the province of Marsa Matruh, and al-Qasr
was named as one of the places which he would tour. Hajj
'Ali took it upon himself to set up three tents in the tradi-

156 tional style of Bedouin hospitality--"as we used to do in
159 Cyrenaica"--and spent a total of 50 L.E. for the welcoming
554 ceremony. "This money was from his own pocket," as the
829 Bedouins of al-Qasr complained after it was learned that
574 the vice-President would not visit Matruh after all. As
●648 a matter of fact, all of the Bedouin leaders who had been
invited to the reception by Hajj 'Ali refused to eat the
food, for they said that it had not been prepared for them.
[576] This act was taken as a show of respect for Hajj 'Ali and
anger with bureaucrats.

156 Hajj 'Ali is the representative of al-Qasr to the
159 Arab Socialist Union which meets in Marsa Matruh and has
554 cell meetings in al-Qasr. The socialist cell in al-Qasr
648 meets about three times a month. When I asked why Hajj 'Ali
668 was the man chosen to represent all of al-Qasr at section
[124] meetings of the Union, the reply was: "Because he is a member
[635] of the *Majlis al-Muhafza*." There was one section meeting
of the Union in Matruh while I was in the field. The theme
of the meeting was "The Meaning of Socialism." Hajj 'Ali
attended this meeting.

156 In sum, it seems not too far afield to say that Hajj
159 'Ali is prepared to take over the leadership of the Bedouins
554 in a much more sophisticated manner than one could possibly
expect from the traditional style of politics. Hajj 'Ali's
[634] comments about the *'umda* and the *'umda*'s probable successor

619 Until two centuries ago Awlad Ali lived in eastern Cyrenaica.
173 After the death of Aqqar, his two sons, Ali (founder of Awlad Ali) and
Harb (founder of Harabi tribe on chart), competed for the leadership of
619 the tribe. This competition involved their respective tribes in a
173 bitter war which existed for more than fifty years. In one of the major
726 battles between the two tribal segments, the Harabi segment with help
[648] from the Caramanli rules of Tripoli were able to defeat Awlad Ali and
to drive them eastward across the Libyan-Egyptian borders into the
Egyptian Western Desert. This happened about 150 years ago. At that
time, the area was occupied by the Hanadi, a warlike cousin of Awlad
Ali, who had established a system of dominance over the Murabiteen
tribes who are believed to be the original inhabitants of the desert.
The area also was inhabited by the Gemeiat tribe, which, although believed to have Murabiteen status, yet were not treated as clients of
the powerful Hanadi, as were the other Murabiteen tribes in the area.
With the help from the Murabiteen, Awlad Ali were able to defeat the
Hanadi and to drive them eastward into the Nile Delta, where they
settle now as cultivators.

619 During the rule of Muhammad Ali (1815-1848), the warlike Awlad
175 Ali were frequently used by the government to subdue the tribal upris-
648 ings in the Delta and other parts of Egypt, and to hold the Mamlukes
in check. There was no organized army in Egypt at that time except for
a few remnants of the Turkish soldiers. The tribal population of
Awlad Ali agreed to supply Muhammad Ali with fighting men on the condition that they would be provided with food and arms and also exempted

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[619 173] connection to Gemeiat and insist that they are a Murabiteen tribe who acquired their relatively higher status through their assistance to Awlad Ali during their fight with the Harabi.

619 from forced labor in government projects and released from the pay-
175 ment of taxes. The government agreed to these demands, and on their
648 part, Awlad Ali helped Muhammad Ali extensively in his military expedition in Syria and Arabia and were a major factor in the battle of 1815 at Bissel where he succeeded in breaking Wahabi power. They also helped his son, Ismeal, in his expedition to the Sudan.

Later, when the Egyptian army was organized, the government ex-
[701] empted Awlad Ali and other tribal groups which helped in the military conquests from military service, but required them to undertake the guarding of the desert roads and the frontiers of Egypt. Also, in
[423] exchange for their previous services, they were given the right to use the land of the Western Desert and left the question of its distribution among the various tribal segments to the native tribal leaders.
619 Finally, in 1832, Awlad Ali were granted a form of legal and political
175 autonomy whereby the government acknowledged the tribal legal and
648
642 judicial system as the means to settle disputes between members of the tribe. The government also recognized the authority of the native tribal leaders and allowed the tribal populations to be governed by their own native system of leadership.

This political autonomy of Awlad Ali existed until 1947. Although their usefulness to the government had long ceased to exist, they had continued to enjoy the privileges they had obtained earlier. This was partly due to the fact that the various governments that came after Muhammad Ali showed no interest in the area occupied by Awlad Ali. There were no taxable lands in the area, no natural resources of any promise, and the tribal population did not present any particular prob-
000 lem to attract the attention of the government. There was some smuggling

There was some smuggling
439 of goods across the Libyan border, but this smuggling was done on a
● 648 very small scale. Before the Egyptian government imposed restrictions
on imports, the prices of the goods in the Libyan market were close to
their prices on the Egyptian market. Except for a very few items which
were not found on the Egyptian market, smuggling goods from Libya offered
653 a very limited financial gain to the smugglers. In recent years, this
situation has changed, however. With population increase in Egypt
threatening disaster, and with the cultivable land in the valley reaching
its maximum productivity, the attention of the government was drawn to
the fertile yet dry land of the northern strip of the Western Desert as
a possible means of expanding the cultivated area. A number of projects
are taking place at the present time under the land reclamation act. The
most important of these projects is the Eastern Mariut project which is
directed toward the irrigation of the lands of the Western Desert
through the channelling of the flood waters of the Nile into a network
of canals covering an extensive area of the northern strip of the Western
315 Desert. Also, recently, oil has been discovered in the area, and since
457 the end of the Second World War, the area has been a major attraction
for tourists.

439 More important is the increase in traffic of smuggled goods from
[651] Libya. Custom restrictions on imported goods to Egypt have created a
[656] scarcity of American and British manufactured goods which raised their
price on the Egyptian market and made smuggling a profitable activity.
An opposite-direction smuggling of sheep and goats from Egypt to Libya
[315] created a great shortage in the Egyptian meat market. Before the discovery of oil in Libya, the Western Desert area supplied the Egyptian

795 Because of their religious position which put
175 them outside the tribal structure, the leaders of the zawyas played a
627 significant role in mediation and settling disputes between various tri-
793 bal segments. At their disposal was their ability to ostracize anyone
[626] who did not abide by their decision from the zawyas, which meant depriv-
ing him from all the benefits, social as well as religious, that member-
ship in the zawyas offered.

795 After the First World War when the British replaced the Turks as
175 governors of the area, the zawyas were closed and the religious leaders
177 ordered to leave. The zoning established by the zawyas existed, however,
[648] and was used as the basis for the redistricting of the area. Police
[631] stations replaced the religious centers. From the standpoint of the tri-
[625] bal population itself, the districts have no psychological or political
619 634 reality. The zawyas were originally established in the areas of tribal
[795] [361] concentrations. But the area itself did not have any political identity.
The only reality from the standpoint of the inhabitants was the tribal
reality and affiliation which cut across many of these districts. Many
of the tribal segments inhabiting one district were and still are hostile
177 to one another. To transform the zones into administrative districts and
634 to establish one office of leadership for the whole district was to im-
619 pose a political unity nonexistent among the tribal segments inhabiting
[622] the district. To avoid this difficulty, the government supplemented the
territorial principle of the omda system in the rural area with the prin-
ciple of tribal representation and came up with a system which seems to
suite the situation in the Western Desert. For each of the districts,
a list of all tribal segments which habitually occupy the area and whose
tribal land is located within the district, is made. The most powerful

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[For information on the relationship of the Sanusi Order with other foreign powers, notably the Turkish and Italian governments, see Category 116, pp. 14-15, 22-23, 26-28, 37, 43-46, 50, 60-61, 63, 69-71, 83-84, 87, and 90-229.]

*795 into the Order ordinary members. This is done simply by the
[793] two persons concerned shaking hands and reciting the *fatiha*,
the opening verse of the Koran, together. These categories can
hardly be regarded as grades and I can cite the authority of
Sayyid Muhammad Idris to support the opinion that they have
never meant more than that some persons were recognized as
more learned than others and therefore better qualified to recite
the longer and more advanced religious exercises.

II

*795 The Grand Sanusi's desire to create around him a society
793 living the life of primitive Islam and his missionary zeal gave an
impression, enhanced by the austerity of his Bedouin followers
and the remoteness of the Sahara, of excessive puritanism and
fanaticism; and some writers have compared the Sanusi move-
ment to the Wahhabi movement on account of these supposed
114 traits. Duveyrier's account,[1] used very uncritically by other
*795 writers, is largely to be blamed for the exaggerated stories of
● 648 the secrecy, puritanism, fanaticism, power, and numbers of
the Order that were current at the end of the last century and
in the first decade of the present century and which much
prejudiced it in the eyes of European Powers with interests in
North Africa. With Duveyrier it was an axiom that any fool-
hardy European who got himself killed in North and Central
Africa had been assassinated by Sanusi agents and that any
setback to French interests was due to their propaganda.

*795 It is true that the Grand Sanusi, like the founder of the
793 Wahhabi movement, aimed at restoring what he conceived to
be the original society of the Prophet. Neither was peculiar in
784 doing so, for every Muslim preacher must have the same aim.
114 The Grand Sanusi forbad the drinking of alcohol and the taking
[273] of snuff and at first, though not absolutely, smoking. But all
[276] Muslims are forbidden alcohol and many who are neither
Sanusi nor Wahhabi think that smoking is best avoided. It is
[272] untrue, as has been asserted, that the Sanusi are forbidden
coffee. The Bedouin of Libya do not drink coffee, only tea, in

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[1] H. Duveyrier, *La Confrérie Musulmane de Sidi Mohammed ben 'Alî es Senoûsî et son Domaine géographique en l'Année 1300 de l'Hégire = 1883 de notre ère*, 1884.

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[167]

first caused misgivings in Rome and afterwards led to the destruction of the Italian armies in North Africa and their ejection from the continent. A sullen Arab population in Cyrenaica and Tripolitania and a hostile Arab and Muslim world were, in view of the coming storm, so clearly contrary to Italian interests that a more conciliatory policy, at any rate in words, was adopted and Balbo was entrusted with the difficult task of putting it in effect against a background of slaughter and repression. Once again the Italians had waited too long.

III

The ups and downs of Italian fortunes in Cyrenaica and in the world are reflected in the various decrees which defined the juridical status of the Arabs. In giving a brief account of these decrees it must be kept in mind that whilst they referred to the whole Arab population they really affected only the Arabs of the towns, and even in the towns only those few persons, mostly officials, who actively collaborated with the Italians; and that till 1932 the Italians had no certain or complete control outside the towns.

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At the beginning of the first Italo-Sanusi war the Arabs were in law Turkish subjects. By a Royal Decree of 5 November 1911, Tripolitania and Cyrenaica were declared to be under the full sovereignty of the Kingdom of Italy. The status of the Cyrenaican Arabs was fixed by the Royal Decree of 6 April 1913, which declared all born in the country, wherever resident, to be *sudditi italiani*, provided they were not Italian citizens or foreign citizens or subjects. They retained their Muslim personal law, but were subject in other respects to whatever regulations the Italians saw fit to impose on them. They were permitted to hold posts in the armed forces and administration of the colony, and persons desirous of acquiring Italian citizenship might apply for it if they possessed residential qualifications, though by taking it they became subject to Italian personal law. These early decrees were more in the nature of administrative than constitutional law. A constitution, in the continental sense, was promulgated in 1919 after the Italians had signed a truce with the Sanusi.

The agreements entered into with the Sanusi between 1917

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drought giving insufficient pastures and poor crops. Good or bad 613
crops, poor or abundant pasture, in turn mean a higher or lower 621
milk yield from the animals and better or worse living conditions 161
for human beings. Such factors as these may well, over a number 182
of years, lead to unevenness in the distribution of population [132]
throughout the tertiary sections. Whatever the cause, the gene-
alogies show that the population of the numerous tertiary sec- [173]
tions is unequal. Some are numerically so weak that they have to
join a collateral section. Others are numerically so strong that
their natural resources are insufficient to meet the needs of all
their members. It was these latter segments which were in the
process of splitting, and which in some cases have already done
so. The next task, then, is to demonstrate where, on the geneal- [128]
ogy, proliferation is effected.

We have seen that in Nuer genealogies segments proliferate at 173
all orders of segmentation. Here, the process is a continuous one, 177
beginning at any point in time within the minimal lineage and 613
progressing upwards to the apex of lineage bifurcation. As par- 551
ticular names become significant within the minimal segment,
they are retained and become a permanent addition to the gene-
alogy. In order to include these successively additional names,
names of ascending ancestors are shunted further and further
into the genealogical past, until presumably the effect is felt at
the topmost limit of the genealogy, when the names here are
pushed out of the genealogical framework altogether, and for-
gotten for ever. More than this, the upward shift in names at
each and every point in the genealogical line means also a con-
sequent re-ordering of structural relationships, at all levels in the
system. One vital difference between Nuer and Bedouin societies 173
which may partly, at least, account for the different genealogical 178
processes at work among them is that the Nuer, when they were 613
studied by Evans-Pritchard, were expanding territorially, and [171]
that continuous proliferation of segments throughout the struc-
ture was the mode of dealing with a situation of expansion. The [648]
Bedouin, on the other hand, had suffered twenty years of terrible
privation at the hands of the Italians, during which period thou-
sands of them died in battle and in concentration camps, were
shot up in their camps from the air, or died from want, before I
went to live among them. Although I must confess that I now

days on which kin of various sorts should attend the mourning 613
ceremonies, which extend over a period of a week. Allowance is 621
made for those who may be away temporarily, although they are 765
expected to hasten to the mourning camp as quickly as possible.
Agnatic kin are expected not only to be present on the appro- 613
priate day, but are required to offer gifts consistent with their 621
relationship to the bereaved; agnates of the tertiary segment are 765
expected to offer a sheep, while some cognates ought to bring a 431
goat and others a quantity of sugar and tea. At one funeral in a camp where I was resident, soon after the death occurred, the main concern of its inhabitants was whether or not certain men of their section would attend the mourning rites and bring appropriate gifts with them. These men lived at the time in another camp a few miles away, as they had been doing for several years past. They did not come when they were expected, and when they finally arrived at the end of the week they brought with them gifts of sugar and tea only—gifts which were totally inappropriate for agnates of the group. They were, in fact, now no longer members of it, and my neighbours were able to tell me, 'They have branched off from us. We will never live together again.' The lineage had proliferated and this was the first occasion for showing it.

Wide-spread in Cyrenaica is a cult of saints. The number of 794
saints' tombs varies from tribe to tribe, there being fewer among 776
the camel herders of the semi-desert than among the cow- 778
herding, almost sedentary, folk of the plateau area. Whatever [788]
the number, the members of the group that venerates a particular
saint make an annual pilgrimage to his tomb, and sometimes
more frequent pilgrimages are made. In one area there were two 794
men, accepted by their respective kin groups as leaders, who vied 554
against each other for the leadership of their section. One of them
had been a famous warrior during the Italian wars and, after [648]
being injured, fled to Egypt where he lived for seventeen years, until he returned to his homeland in 1947. The other had also fought against the Italians, failed to win renown, was a captive for a time, later released, and subsequently appointed leader of his section by the Italian authorities. The first, during his period of exile, had become impoverished. The second during his years of freedom had prospered. As far as their personalities

121 celebrated war between the 'Abaidat and the Bara 'asa tribes occupying a large part
619 of central and eastern Cyrenaica. This war took place a hundred years ago, so that the
682 evidence is mainly hearsay, but it is significant that when asked for details of the
726 groups taking part the Bedouin make it clear that the entire tribes were not at war—
[173] some sections on both sides are said to have remained on friendly terms. Yet when
121 wars are discussed in a general fashion, the Bedouin insist that tribes confront each
619 other as such. If it is pointed out to them that men might be ranged against their
726 maternal relatives the Bedouin mumble apologetically that they would not kill their maternal relatives—a lame argument since in the heat of battle men cannot make this
602 kind of discrimination. Details of other wars also illustrate the point that only parts of tribes face each other in strife, for though the stories of past events may be inaccurate there is genealogical evidence to substantiate their claims that certain groups were linked in the past, and in any case their statements assert that where these links exist they are not prepared to engage in hostilities. The several parts of each tribe,
121 like the parts of primary and secondary sections, have as many different sorts of
619 relationships as there are groups, and the general statement that tribes are warring
571 units merely obscures the interest there is in their relationships. Tribes, further, lack the leadership to make war. I repeat that leadership does exist, but not even the
121 greatest leaders, past or present, can rightly be described as leaders of their tribes,
619 using the term in its structural connotation. Literature on the subject gives the
613 impression that there are tribal leaders, because successive administrations have used
554 the tribes and their divisions as a framework for attempting to rule the Bedouin, but the details of the power domains of individual leaders make it clear that they have little to do with the ordered divisions of tribes. A leader within part of one tribe may carry with him tertiary sections of another tribe, and if major hostilities break out between parts of these tribes, the sections of both which are joined as allies and related as kinsfolk will not fight against each other, for sections so linked enjoy stronger connexions than the structurally linked tertiary sections of a very large
[682] secondary section. Consequently the statement that homicide results in tribal war
[114] when the offender and his victim are members of two separate tribes is not merely incomplete, not merely a simplification, it is wrong.

121 A point which has been implicit throughout the second part of this paper needs now to be made quite explicit: groups do not come together in their respective
613 structural genealogical orders. During my entire residence in Cyrenaica I did not
571 see a group of agnates larger than a tertiary tribal section assemble for any purpose.
[114] It is true that the occasions when large groups are required to assemble are infrequent.
[648] It is also true that although the British Administration was serving a caretaker role only, it may have had an affect on the nature of tribal gatherings. Despite this qualification, there were several occasions when I expected tribal groups to assemble in lineage order if the fusion of sections in relation to like sections has any meaning in practice. Large groups of men did gather to dispute claims to wells, to argue about rights to ploughland, and to make peace. In every case that I recorded the agnatically closest groups of the main participants were absent, while members of genealogically more remote groups were present in strength. This statement applies to gatherings in the camps and in the administrative centres. One of the biggest gatherings I
[628] witnessed assembled in an administrative office in a village near the coast in the

1950, but his kind of tyranny was absent from the Cyrenaica of that period. From the 795
mid-nineteenth century until the Italian invasion of 1911, the Sanusi Order estab- 175
lished itself, spread its lodges throughout the tribes and in other more remote lands [613]
until it became what Evans-Pritchard speaks of as a theocratic empire.[1] The lodges [778]
served as areas of sanctuary and their staffs adjudicated disputes. Leaders of the [793]
Order had the power to coerce and the Bedouin obeyed. They obeyed out of personal regard for some of them in 1950, but the religious authority previously used by the leaders had given way to the political power they now exercised as functionaries in a state system. In the meantime, the country had been ravaged by the long Italo- [648]
Sanusi wars. Throughout the nineteen-thirties after suffering terrible privations and reduction in numbers through slaughter in war, death in concentration camps, and exile, the Bedouin were ruled by the Italians. During the Second World War the armies of three major contestants fought their battles where the Bedouin now tend their flocks and herds. After the war they were left to fend for themselves, with a minimum of administrative interference.

In the light of all this the conception of an equilibrium system is of little heuristic 121
value, still less its derivative concept of a repetitive system. This does not mean, however, that an account of part of the social life of the Bedouin as it existed in 1950 must be nothing more than a disconnected piece of history, unrelated to a prior state of things and wholly useless for the understanding of the contemporary oil-producing cum mixed pastoral-agricultural economy. It would be little more than a piece of social historiography if the analysis was based on the concept of a total social structure of functionally interconnected parts, forming what Leach describes as 'a delicately balanced mechanism rather like the various parts of a wrist watch'.[2] Such a viewpoint would effectively exclude any possible comprehension of changes save those present as part of the dynamics of a system; its only answer to change is an account of a different system. If, instead, attention is focused on the analysis of a field of components arranged in a specific fashion to meet the interests of men at a particular time, it then becomes possible to see how a shift in their positions, the addition of new components, or the elimination of others produces this or that effect. It can make intelligible what has gone before, and if the future cannot be anticipated it can be demarcated within rough limits.

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modern territory of his tribe. See also Hamilton, 1856.

[1] Evans-Pritchard, 1949. In this book a brilliant account is given of the development of the Order, and how it came to unify and provide centralized political leadership for the tribes.

[2] Leach, 1961, p. 6.

682 time the case was re-opened, after a further interval of some
672 years since the second judgment. By this time nearly all
695 the assessors and witnesses of the first Court were dead,
694 rumours had been spread that the gun belonged to a stranger
who had left his gun in Korayem's tent, and should therefore pay his share of the bloodmoney, and so on.

The Gereidat family again succeeded in confusing the case, and in prejudicing the issue in their favour; and the third court gave the following decision, to the disgust of interested followers of this rather remarkable lawsuit. They decided that no evidence existed to shew what happened in Korayem's tent, and that no oath was necessary, maintaining that in the absence of any proof whatsoever Farag had no claim. They further ordered a new distribution of the reduced scale of bloodmoney proposed, whereupon the proceedings became completely involved and absolutely unintelligible.

682 The above events point out unmistakably the weak
672 spots in the Ourfi system. Korayem's family were strong,
and on two occasions were successful in evading just de-
695 cisions against them; while the weak family with a strong case had to see justice perverted.

695 When the considered judgment of an Ourfi Court
182 receives authority for prompt and immediate execution
from the Government and the police, the Ourfi system is
● 648 probably the nearest possible approach to the ideal, consistent with the conditions prevailing. But it is an undeniable fact, which must be faced, that without the moral backing of the Civil Power behind the judgments of the Bedouin Courts, miscarriages of justice are possible, and do actually take place.

619 ancestress of the Awlad 'Ali and Hind of the Hanadi. (The
173 Hanadi call their ancestress Hind, the daughter of Sallam.)
These obvious fabrications only mean that their conventional
genealogy is not believed outside the tribe. But the Awlad
'Ali themselves all agree that 'Ali was the son of 'Aqar bin Dib.

175 They are now a composite tribe made up of the descendants
of 'Ali's three sons, and various fragments of broken tribes.
619 The Awlad 'Ali lived for a long time in the "Green Mountain"
of Cyrenaica, and about 150 years ago began to drift eastwards,
called into Egypt by the Jumei'at to aid them against the
Hanadi, who, with their subtribes, were then in possession not
only of the north coast but were also settled all over the Beheira.

175 After the departure of the French in 1801, a firman was
619 addressed to the sheikhs of the Hanadi, Afrad (a division
of the Awlad 'Ali), Jumei'at, Beni 'Una, and other Arabs
● 648 resident in Beheira, confirming them in their territories, but
threatening them with expulsion and fine if they misbehaved
themselves.[1]

By 1808, the Hanadi seem to have been quite driven out by the Awlad 'Ali, for in that year they bought their peace with Muhammad 'Ali and asked for the restitution of their lands in Beheira. The Pasha agreed to this and sent troops under Shahin Bey to chase the Awlad 'Ali out again. The Awlad 'Ali responded by offering 100,000 "tallaris" to be allowed to remain in the lands of the Hanadi—an offer which Muhammad Ali accepted. When they failed to pay up, troops were again sent to aid the Hanadi against them, but this combined force was completely defeated by the Awlad 'Ali near Hosh 'Isa.[2]

Of the events of 1810, Jabarti says:

> "During his stay at Alexandria, he (Muhammad Ali) gave safe conduct to the chiefs of the Bedouins of the tribe of Awlad Ali who lived in the province of Beheira, and by this ruse enticed them to him; but hardly had they arrived than he had them arrested, claimed large sums from them, and sent his soldiers to carry off their cattle; their wives and their children were dishonoured. He then gave them robes of honour."[3]

Finally he exiled the Hanadi to Sharqiya, then a desert, and gave the Awlad 'Ali their lands on the coast and in Beheira.

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[1] Jabarti, vii, 78–80.

[2] Jabarti, viii, 171 and 179–180.

[3] Jabarti, viii, 300.

175 territory of the whole Western Desert. They were also
648 exempted from land taxes, military duty, and forced labor on
[651] the irrigation projects of the Nile River. In return for these privileges, the Bedouins were expected to guard the frontiers of Egypt and to furnish warriors for the expeditionary forces of Muhammed 'Ali. The Pasha, who was in the process of carving out his own empire independent of the Ottomans, needed warriors, a role which traditionally excluded the _fallahin_ of the Nile Valley. Bedouin horsemen from the Western Desert fought with Muhammad 'Ali in his Wahhabi campaign of 1815 in Arabia. They also aided the Pasha's son, Ismail, in the conquest of the Sudan.

Muhammad 'Ali instituted the practice of granting to the Bedouin leaders land in the rich Nile Valley. He made it explicit that the leaders were to dwell upon this land: their role, as it was officially stated, was to provide a liaison between the Pasha and the tribes. In fact, the leaders were hostages. By controlling them, Muhammad 'Ali was able to exert proper pressure on the Bedouins when and where it was needed (Baer 1957:84-98).

175 Bedouins did not pay land taxes, but neither did they
648 "own" the land; they simply had the right of usufruct. The
651 law stated that only those who paid land taxes had the right
423 to purchase and own their land. But along with ownership of land came the onerous responsibilities of corvée labor on the

175 Nile dikes and military conscription. The term "Bedouin"
648 came to mean, as it was defined by the government of Egypt,
651 one who did not legally own land and hence was not subject to
423 forced labor or military service. On this basis, the Director
[162] of Recruiting Office in a 1904 census distinguished three kinds
of Bedouin (Murray 1935:31):

290,095 - settled and living in their own farm colonies
240,880 - living among the fallahin
70,472 - real Bedouin or nomads

601,447

175 177 648 By the end of the 19th century, Bedouin society had undergone a great deal of change. Politically, the Bedouins were subordinates in a dominant-subjective authority relationship with the central regime of the Nile Valley. As a result of external political control, nomadism was curtailed and the Bedouins were forced to settle on the land to raise what few crops they could. These new political and economic conditions are the major aspects of the sedentarization process. Bedouin dependence on the central authority of Egypt and their reliance on horticulture increased with time. Nor did the entry of Britain into Egypt in 1882 change the material and social condition of the Bedouin.

175 648 The British, in the style of the politics of colonialism, reorganized the administrative structure of Egypt. The Western Desert was given the status of a province; command

While the Bedouins

795 771 829 respect the Sanusi family they, nevertheless, wear their religion lightly. An informant, speaking of the merits and demerits of the conservative Muslim Brethern Association, said that "you should never listen to a holy man, for he will lead you straight to hell!" But upon meeting any member of the [576] [778] Sanusi family, all Bedouins greet him by kissing his hand. Besides a show of deference, this ritual act, in theory, transfers baraka from al-Sanusi to the layman.

648 641 The citizenship exemptions granted the Bedouins by Muhammad 'Ali have been rescinded by Abd al-Nasser. This has been one aspect of his program to imbue the Bedouin with political consciousness and promote participation in the nation-state. The Bedouins say that this is the way it should be: they want the right to own land and to accept the responsibility of defending the homeland. But they still do ● [651] not pay land taxes, and they feel justified in this because the desert "is very poor soil, and not like that of the Nile." Nor do they always heed the call to military duty, though they insist that they do.

648 177 423 Egyptian land reform laws would be impractical, or impossible to apply, in al-Qasr. In the Nile Valley, such laws were necessary. The majority of the Egyptian peasants can survive on less than one acre of land, and farms of under five acres comprise 44 per cent of the agricultural land area in the Nile Valley (Warriner 1962:204). Plots this

There was some smuggling

439 648 of goods across the Libyan border, but this smuggling was done on a very small scale. Before the Egyptian government imposed restrictions on imports, the prices of the goods in the Libyan market were close to their prices on the Egyptian market. Except for a very few items which were not found on the Egyptian market, smuggling goods from Libya offered 653 a very limited financial gain to the smugglers. In recent years, this situation has changed, however. With population increase in Egypt threatening disaster, and with the cultivable land in the valley reaching its maximum productivity, the attention of the government was drawn to the fertile yet dry land of the northern strip of the Western Desert as a possible means of expanding the cultivated area. A number of projects are taking place at the present time under the land reclamation act. The most important of these projects is the Eastern Mariut project which is directed toward the irrigation of the lands of the Western Desert through the channelling of the flood waters of the Nile into a network of canals covering an extensive area of the northern strip of the Western 315 457 Desert. Also, recently, oil has been discovered in the area, and since the end of the Second World War, the area has been a major attraction for tourists.

439 More important is the increase in traffic of smuggled goods from [651] [656] Libya. Custom restrictions on imported goods to Egypt have created a scarcity of American and British manufactured goods which raised their price on the Egyptian market and made smuggling a profitable activity. An opposite-direction smuggling of sheep and goats from Egypt to Libya [315] created a great shortage in the Egyptian meat market. Before the discovery of oil in Libya, the Western Desert area supplied the Egyptian

619 [173] Such traditions differentiate between these segments which otherwise occupy an equivalent position in the formal system.

This level of segmentation has no particular political significance except that it is at this level that the client tribes of Murabiteen are attached. People in the area differentiate between Awlad Ali proper, who are called the Sa'adi, and the Murabiteen tribes. Murabiteen tribes occupy a special position which tends to complicate the formal analysis of the tribal organization of the Awlad Ali. The Murabiteen are a number of tribes of varying sizes and origin which are attached to the Sa'adi tribes as their vassals or clients. They exhibit the same principles of tribal organization as the Sa'adi tribes escept that they have no common origin similar to that of the latter groups.

619 173 The original division of the Murabiteen tribes among the Sa'adi was made in the famous meeting at El-Haqfa in which the division of land was also made and the Awlad Ali law was first enacted. The number of client groups attached to each Sa'adi tribe reflects the relative prestige and power of thatparticular tribe at the time of the meeting. Having a re-
619 173 latively large number of client tribes meant, in addition to prestige of
651 the patron tribe, large financial support. Until half a century ago this financial support was in the form of an obligatory tribute or "sadaqa" which the client tribes had to pay. This tribute is no longer
[178] [431] mandatory, but the client groups are still expected to present members of their patron tribes with gifts on occasions such as weddings, funerals
619 or feasts of the tribal saint. Large vassal groups also meant support in fights. Although the client groups did not constitute part of the vengeance group of their Sa'adi, when the Sa'adi tribe fought, their client

619 184 174 792 The picture was reversed then with the poor Sa'adi shepherds becoming the masters, acquiring great wealth and prestige because of their fighting ability, and the holymen becoming the shepherds and clients of the Sa'adi fighters. Inthe old inter-tribal wars, the Murabiteen stood a ● [651] very limited chance so the Sa'adi tribes adopted them and in return for a yearly tribure guaranteed theprotection of the Murabiteen from external aggression.

As time passed, the main difference between the Sa'adi and Murabiteen tended to diminish. One or two outstanding Murabiteen tribes fought their own battles without seeking the protection of the Sa'adi and remained independent, while a few others rose up and fought on with the protector against a common foe (the case of the Gemei'at tribe is an example) and in return were emancipated from the stigma of serfdom and accepted by the Sa'adi as almost equals. Other Murabiteen tribes remained attached to their Sa'adi protector as client groups.

Ibn Khaldoun also saw the inferiority of the Murabiteen tribes as stemming from a mode of tribal relations adapted to inter-tribal warfare (1845).

613 The Eila

The Eila represents the next level of tribal segmentation among the Awlad Ali. The Eila is the most important political unit. Although the Eila lacks any formally recognized leadership, its importance stems from the fact that it constitutes the vengeance group or Amar El-Dam (unity of 613 672 682 the blood). This means that it bears a corporate responsibility for the actions of its members. Anyone of its members can be killed in vengence for a homocide committed by any other, and the duty of revenge for any

634 666 The situation is quite different in the Western Desert. Although
657 it is the government, represented by the province council, which makes
554 the final decision in appointing the omda or sheikh, yet this appointment
619 is made on the basis of nominations given by the gribal segment
635 or segments which he would represent. Since the tribal segment usually
nominates one person, the decision of the council is limited to the
examination of the credentials of the nominee and to see if he meets the
basic requirements of the law. If a certain nominee is rejected by the
council, a very rare occurrence, the matter goes back to the tribal
segment to make another nomination. In practice, then, the omda of the
Western Desert is elected by the people and the appointment by the government
of the omda is significant only in cases where the omda is to represent
more than one small tribal segment and each nominates one. Here the
council has to choose between the various nominaees and appoints the b[illegible]
634 qualified. Unlike the omda of the village, the tribal omda is a real representative
554 657 of his people. Despite the fact that he becomes part of a
619 governmental structure, his basic function is to look after the interest
[622] of his tribal group. Or, as one informant put it, "The omda is the servant
of the people." In many cases the best interest of the tribal segment
is served through full cooperation of the omda with the government. So
far there seems to be very little conflict between the interest of the
tribal populations and that of the government. There is very little in
[651] the area that the government demands or needs. There is no taxable land
to speak of. There are only a few acres of barley land and even these
634 554 are minimally taxed. The main responsibility of the omda to the government
657 is to report births and deaths and give a yearly list of young men

the east began in the middle of the thirteenth century and has 619
lasted to the present day. It is intimately bound up with the 778
pilgrimage to the sacred towns of Islam. Round these pious [173]
men and round their tombs gathered for sanctuary the simple [788]
and oppressed, and from these and from the children of the
holy men have sprung the *Marabtin bil baraka* tribes. The other 619
client tribes have no sacred associations and are known as 651
Marabtin al-sadqan because they pay *sadaqa*, a fee, to a free tribe for protection and for the privilege of using the earth and water. Some small broken-up fragments of this category on the plateau, such as the 'Awwama, Alauna, Hasanna, and some of the Qat'an and Sa'it, even to-day have a very inferior social position and are forced to make payments to, and to perform
services for, the free tribes among whom they live. Other 619
tribes of this second category live, as already mentioned, on territory which is to all intents and purposes their own and have long since ceased to pay a fee. This is especially the case to the east, in 'Abaidat tribal territory, where such client tribes as the Minifa, Qat'an, Taraki, and Huta live with independent status. In the west also the Fawakhir and Zuwaya are too powerful and warlike to accept overlordship. Also, the more nomadic groups in Cyrenaica are mostly client tribes and, like all nomads, resent any control or authority. Whatever the free tribes may say about them, they regard themselves as independent.

The provenance of the *Sa'adi* tribes and of some of the 619
Marabtin tribes is shown together with the distribution of the 162
Sanusiya lodges on the map facing page 35, and the approximate numbers of these tribes, and of a few others not shown on the map, are listed below.

Sa'adi		al-Zuwaya	3,700
al-'Abaidat	30,450	al-Shwa'ir	3,400
al-'Awaqir	27,500	al-Fawakhir	3,300
al-Bara'asa	21,000	al-Sa'it	2,900
al-Darsa	18,850	al-Majabra	2,500
al-Magharba	13,000	al-Minifa	2,500
al-'Arafa	9,300	al-Masamir	2,400
al-'Abid	6,850	al-Awajila	2,300
al-Hasa	6,500	Aulad al-Shaikh	1,650
'Ailat Fayid	100	al-'Aqail	1,400
		al-Shahaibat	1,350
Marabtin		al-Sarahna	1,250
al-Qat'an	5,850	al-Qabail	1,150
al-'Awwama	3,800	al-Huta	1,150

tion were compelled to pay taxes and furnish supplies, and how 175*
forty-five of the Shaikhs of the Jawazi tribe were treacherously 648*
murdered and many of their followers massacred.[1] Generally,
however, it may be said that Cyrenaica has no history, other
than Bedouin traditions of inter-tribal wars, from 1051 to 1835,
in which year the Turks regained control of Libya from the
Caramanlis. On their return they instituted a more systematic
administration than had been exercised during their earlier
occupation.

The Turks returned to Cyrenaica about the time the Grand 175*
Sanusi first visited the country and eight years after their 648*
reoccupation he founded his first zawiya on the plateau. As 795*
the Sanusiya Order gained the confidence of the Bedouin and [793]
became accepted as their spokesmen, it was necessary for the
Ottoman authorities to take it into consideration in their dealings
with the tribes of the interior. The Order made it possible 175*
for the different tribes to express themselves politically as a 648*
unit for the first time in their relations with the outside world. 182
The tribes provided the Order with a social system, and the 795*
Order gave to that system a political organization at a time
when it was beginning to be brought into more direct contact
with political forces outside tribal society.

The Sanusiya is known to have been given a Charter about 175*
1856 by Sultan ‘Abd al-Majid I. His firman was brought from 648*
Istanbul by Sidi ‘Abd al-Rahim al-Maghbub, later Shaikh of 795*
the Sanusiya zawiya at Banghazi, who had been sent to Istanbul [793]
for the purpose and had the utmost difficulty, as was often the
case with visitors to the Ottoman capital, in obtaining an
audience with the Sultan. Whatever other privileges the firman [794]
conferred on the Order—I have not seen the document—it
certainly exempted its properties from taxation and permitted [651]
it to collect a religious tithe from its followers. A second firman
was issued later by Sultan ‘Abd al-Majid’s brother, Sultan ‘Abd
al-‘Aziz, and was brought from Istanbul to the Governor of
Tripoli by Sidi Abu al-Qasim al-‘Isawi, ‘Abd al-Rahim’s successor
in the Banghazi lodge. There is in the Land Registry at
Banghazi a letter from the Governor of Tripoli to the Governor
of Banghazi giving the essence of this firman. It confirms the [778]
privileges granted by the earlier firman and adds to them that

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[1] Op. cit., *passim* and p. 220 seq.

The local Turkish officials were content for the most part to 175*
sit in the towns, many of them no doubt regretting that they 648*
had ever been sent to Cyrenaica, where their salaries were low 795*
and often in arrears, and to let the Sanusiya control the interior so long as taxes were paid and no overt act was committed against the Sultan's authority which might bring them to the notice of the Court; and the Central Government for its part was quite prepared to forget that Cyrenaica formed part of the Sultan's dominions so long as there was peace there and it sent annual tribute to Istanbul. The Turks were indifferent otherwise to what happened in Libya, which was a poor province, particularly the Cyrenaican part of it, where their administration was even less efficient than in Tripolitania, where it was happy-go-lucky enough. They had quite enough troubles elsewhere without alienating to no purpose a powerful Islamic Order and the warlike Bedouin who supported it. They therefore left
the Sanusiya to perform many of the functions of government [651]
in the interior—education, justice, the maintenance of security, [794]
and even to some extent the collection of taxes, though in the matter of tribute there were difficulties, for Bedouin do not willingly pay taxes to anyone, and since they already paid a tithe to the Sanusiya, with a grace which contrasted with their reluctance to pay taxes to the Turkish Administration, they
were disinclined to pay twice. When any question arose which 175*
required direct contact between the Head of the Order and the 648*
local Governor it was established through the Shaikh of the 793
lodge at Banghazi, or a special messenger was sent from Jaghbub
or Kufra to the Turkish Governor at Banghazi, or he sent a 795*
messenger to the Head of the Order in his oasis seat. From time to time the Central Government sent an envoy to the Head of the Order with gifts and instructions to report on what was going on in the Sahara, and on such occasions he was received handsomely and returned with the blessings of the *Shaikh al-Tariqa* on the Sultan. Sometimes, as we have seen, the Head of the Order sent a deputation to Istanbul.

The payment of taxes and the maintenance of peace and com- 175*
munications, the only two functions of government the Turkish 648*
officials bothered their heads about, were intimately connected. 651
Minor quarrels among the Bedouin themselves little interested them, but armed resistance to taxation was certain to earn

*175 them a reprimand on the double count of decrease in revenue
*648 and lack of security. It was essential, therefore, to get the
651 Bedouin to pay their taxes without making too much trouble
about doing so. To this end the Turkish administrative organization
*175 was largely directed. In 1879 the *Vilayet* of Banghazi was,
*648 in matters of civil administration, finally separated from that of
Tripoli and in 1888 became an autonomous *sanjaq* directly
631 dependent on Istanbul. It was governed by a *mutasarrif*
nominated by, and directly responsible to, the Central Government.
On him depended all the officials of the Administration,
though the chief among them were appointed by the Imperial
Government. The senior officials were usually Turks. The
*175 country was divided for administrative purposes into a number
*648 of districts, each under a *qaimaqam*, except that of Banghazi,
634 which came directly under the Governor himself; and all except
the Aujila-Jalu and Kufra districts were further divided into
*175 sub-districts under mudirs. These districts and sub-districts
followed tribal divisions and subdivisions as any administration
*648 in Cyrenaica must do, since the tribes and their sections
634 are the fundamental social departments of the country. Hence
619 sections of a nomadic tribe might be residing at any time in a
sub-district different to that to which they were administratively
attached, and even in a different district.

*175 In his direction of the affairs of the administration, finances,
and police, the Governor was assisted by an administrative
*648 council composed of the chief accountant, the secretary, the
631 qadi, the mufti, and four elected members from the local population.
Each *qaimaqam*, nominated by the Imperial Government,
had an administrative council similarly composed. The mudirs,
nominated by the Imperial Government on the proposal of the
Governor, had no council established by statute but co-opted
tribal Shaikhs when they wanted their advice or co-operation.
In the towns there was a representative, called *mukhtar*,
elected by the property-owning citizens for each ward, and at
Banghazi and Darna there were urban councils of a simple
kind.

*175 It was the mudir in charge of a sub-district who had direct
dealings with the Bedouin tribes and the lodges of the Sanusiya
*648 Order. In 1911, just before the Italian invasion, there were six
634 districts including Kufra, which came nominally under the

Turkish administration in 1910, and the Banghazi district, 175*
which came directly under the Governor of Cyrenaica for 648*
administration. Attached to each district were the sub-districts 634
shown in the list below,[1] in which the tribes attached to each sub-district are also given. The Bara'asa came under Banghazi, although they lived well to the east, for political reasons, the tribe being exceptionally rebellious.[2]

175*
648*
634
619

Districts	*Sub-districts*	*Tribes*
Banghazi (directly dependent on the Governor)	Suluq Qaminis Barsis Sidi Khalifa	'Awaqir
	Slanta	Bara'asa
al-Marj	al-Marj	'Arafa and 'Abid
	al-Haniya	Darsa
Darna	al-Sallum Tubruq al-Banba al-Qubba	'Abaidat
	Shahhat	Hasa
Ajadabiya	Marsa Braiqa	Magharba
Aujila and Jalu	—	Awajila and Majabra
Kufra	—	—

The administration was very slapdash by European standards. 175*
Indeed, Shaikh Muhammad 'Uthman says darkly: 'There is at 648*
Banghazi no organization, political, administrative, or financial. 631
I say no more about this matter: it will be understood why.'[3] This was, of course, an exaggeration, for however simple the administration may have been, and perhaps for that reason, it worked—with a good deal of grumbling it is true, but without undue conflict. Revenue was collected and would have exceeded 175*
the cost of the very cheap administration of the country if the 648*
proceeds of some taxes had not been sent to Istanbul. Much of 651
this revenue came from import and export duties, but the bulk 634
of it was derived from taxes on herds and a tenth of the harvest in kind, the collection of which was in the hands of the mudirs. It was the task of these mudirs, who were generally literate

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[1] *Notizie relative al Sangiacato della Cirenaica e alle Mudirie dipendenti dal Mutassarifato di Bengasi* (Ufficio Politico Militare), 1913. [113]

[2] Fabrizio Serra, *Italia e Senussia*, 1933, p. 17; idem in *La Cirenaica*, 1922–3, p. 182.

[3] Op. cit., pp. 59–60.

3:Evans-Pritchard E-4, 5 (1942-1944) 1949 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9
(1837-1942) Sanusi

*175 Arabs, to assess and collect taxes, to maintain security, and to
*648 control the few police allotted to them. In this task they
● 651 expected co-operation from the local Shaikhs of the tribal
634 sections and the Shaikhs of the Sanusiya lodges.
[619]
[793]

It is remarkable that the Bedouin paid any taxes at all, for the mudirs had not sufficient force at their command, nor had the Governor at Banghazi, to compel the Bedouin to pay if they were determined not to do so. The mudir of Slanta had only 50
[701] to 60 soldiers in his sub-district and the Bara'asa whom he
[625] administered could have annihilated this force with ease, as
could the 'Awaqir the 50 soldiers and the handful of police
*175 stationed at Suluq. That taxes were collected at all, and all the
*648 more that they were collected without constant disturbance, is
to be accounted for partly by the recognition by the Shaikhs of
651 the tribal sections, with whom the mudirs were careful to keep
634 on good personal terms, that there was a moral obligation to
619 pay them; but there were also sanctions if they were not paid. If the Shaikh of a tribal section did not collect the taxes due from that section, he was held responsible and action could be taken against him personally. The mudir, accompanied by a small armed force, went a round of the tribal sections attached to his sub-district each year, generally in springtime, and sent out other tax-collecting parties in other directions. Sometimes special tax commissions appointed by the Governor also toured the country. A favourite device was for such parties to quarter themselves in the camp of a recalcitrant Shaikh and to reside there as his guests, for the soldiers and police carried few provisions, till the tax was paid. The Shaikhs, on the other hand, were made partners in the undertaking by, besides investment with an official robe and status, receiving a percentage of the taxes collected, the mudir himself also taking a percentage. Moreover, each Shaikh whose section paid the tax was determined that the other sections should not escape paying as well. A Shaikh was able to divide up the assessment on his section among the minor Shaikhs, and the minor Shaikhs among yet smaller ones. It was in the interest of each Shaikh to see that the smaller ones did not escape their share and leave him with the responsibility for a deficit. Responsibility was in this way
*175 passed down the tribal structure. On the whole the system
*648 worked well and the Turkish officials and the Bedouin did not
651

get on badly together. Each understood the other. Also there 175*
was much elasticity in the taxes which appealed to the Bedouin, 648*
who prefer to pay a heavy tax one year and lightly or not at all 651
another year, rather than to pay a regular and inevitable tax.
The assessments were seldom revised and often had little relation to the capacity of a tribal section to pay. The result was that taxes were always in arrears and in some years, or for some sections, remitted altogether. Those sections nearest the Turkish posts paid the more easily because they were the more vulnerable. Some of the more nomadic Bedouin escaped payment altogether, or at any rate for years at a stretch. It is, I think, safe to assume that the taxes actually collected over a number of years were light. Otherwise the Bedouin would not have paid them.

Perhaps the chief reason why taxes were collected without 175*
constant rebellion was the support given to the administration 648*
in this matter by the Sanusiya. The Turks held the coastal 651
towns and a few inland posts outside which their direct control 795*
of the country was restricted to those Bedouin who lived a fairly stable life in the immediate vicinity of these centres. The rest of the country was left to the Sanusiya and its own devices, though, as we have seen, the Turks sent occasional patrols into the interior. Sporadically, without much enthusiasm or per- 175*
severance, the Administration at one time tried to extend its 648*
effective control into the hinterland by nominating to official 651
posts, and giving arms and money to, selected tribal chiefs, such 795*
as the Shaikhly families of Hadduth, Lataiwish, and Saif al- 793
Nasir. Bu Bakr bin Hadduth of the Bara'asa was made 619
qaimaqam of al-Qaiqab, where he had a castle; 'Ali Lataiwish 634
of the Magharba was made *qaimaqam* of Sirt, where he, also, had a castle; and the fierce old warrior chieftain of the Aulad Suliman, Saif al-Nasir, was made mudir of Bu Njaim. This procedure resulted in brigandage rather than in good administration and was in the main discarded. Instead the mudirs worked directly through the Shaikhs of the tribal sections and, especially when dealing with intertribal and intersectional affairs, through the Shaikhs of the Sanusiya zawiyas. Some of the older notables of Banghazi have told me that the Pasha, as the Governor was often called, would never have succeeded in collecting taxes among the Bedouin had it not been for the co-operation of the

*175 *648 •651 *795 293 [619] [634] Heads of the Sanusiya lodges, who often accompanied the mudirs and tax commissions to the Shaikhs of the tribal sections attached to their lodges. It was to the common interest of the Turkish Administration and of the Sanusiya that there should be order, security, justice, and trade in the country, and they co-operated to maintain them.

The Turkish officials did their utmost to remain on good terms with the Sanusiya Shaikhs and to this end, and doubtless also because they found no difficulty in accepting, as educated men, its exalted teachings, some of them affiliated themselves to the Order. Membership of it gave them prestige in the eyes of the Bedouin as great, if not greater, than their official status gave them. Likewise the more prosperous merchants who had dealings [556] with the Bedouin tribes or sent caravans to the Sahara and Sudan found it advisable to be received into the Order. It is for this reason that in all the towns of Libya we find a small body of the richer and more cultured citizens ascribed to the Order, while the common people belong to other or no Orders.[1]

*175 *648 651 *795 But though the administration of Cyrenaica might be called at this period a Turco-Sanusi condominium there was an undercurrent of jealousy on both sides which occasionally gave rise to open conflict. A sure occasion was any effort on the part of the Administration to tax the Sanusiya estates. Although these had been exempted from taxation by the Sultan's firman, the local administration made rare and unsuccessful efforts to exact taxation on them. When in 1908 they tried to tax the crops of the Sanusiya holdings a tribal meeting, attended by 150 Shaikhs headed by 'Umar bu Rqaia of the Darsa tribe, met at the zawiya of al-Haniya and decided not to pay any more tribute to the Turkish Government till it revoked the tax. The Government then dropped the matter, though the trouble continued till 1910. Earlier, the Governor Ahmad Pasha Zuhadi (1904-5), acting on instructions from Istanbul, had tried to impose a tax on the crops of tribesmen and zawiyas alike. The Bedouin round al-Marj had thereupon attacked a Turkish detachment charged with collecting the tax and sent them back to Banghazi stripped of everything they possessed. The outcome was that the Governor was relieved of his office.

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[1] Capt. Emilio Canevari, *Zauie ed Ichuan Senussiti della Tripolitania*, 1917, *passim*.

The Sanusiya thus used the Turks to buttress its position in 175*
its dealings with the tribes, and combined with the tribes to 648*
resist any encroachments on its prerogatives by the Turkish 795*
Government. It was in the interests of both Administration 619
and Order that the tribes should not get out of hand, and it was in the interests of tribes and Order that the Administration should not become too powerful. The Sanusiya acquired from its central position between the other two parties a pre-eminence in the interior which led to the tribal system becoming already in Turkish times a proto-state with an embryonic government of its own. The tribes first began to see themselves as a nation through the Sanusiya's relations with the Turkish Administration. They were all 'Sanusi' *vis-à-vis* the Administration.

Ultimately it was the tribes who called the tune to both the Turkish Government and the Sanusiya Order. It would have taken a well-equipped army to have subdued them had they made a united revolt, and the Governor had only a meagre force at his disposal and could have had little hope of receiving much assistance from Istanbul. The Order had only moral weapons and though the tribal Shaikhs received its instructions with respect and every sign of acquiescence they did not necessarily act on them. Both Administration and Order were therefore compelled to compromise in their dealings with the tribes, who were, as Bedouin always are, at heart opposed to any interference and restriction. A typical situation of the latter days of Turkish rule was that described to me by the Banghazi notable 'Umar al-Kakhiya, at one time a member of the Ottoman House of Representatives. He was sent by the Governor of Cyrenaica to make agreements with the tribes in the eastern and western wings of the country by which they should refrain from cutting the Government's telegraph wires, a Bedouin habit which was later to irritate the Italian authorities and during the late war British Signals. I mention two further
incidents in illustration of Turco-Bedouin relations. About 175*
1895 forty members of the Tamiya section of the Bara'asa tribe 648*
jointly killed a tax-collector, a certain 'Abd al-Rahman al- 651•
Katib, for, among other affronts, having taxed the client tribes 795*
directly instead of through their *Sa'adi* overlords. They then 682
fled to the Marmarica, from where they treated with the Turkish
Authorities for a settlement by payment of 13,000 Riyal, or 619
thirteen times the usual blood money, to the dead man's son.

ments and plans was soon passed on to the guerrilla bands, for 175*
Sidi 'Umar al-Mukhtar had agents in every Italian post. Those 648*
sottomessi who were armed and paid by the Italians to protect 795*
their territories against Patriot foraging expeditions would be 619
found among the Patriot casualties after skirmishes with Italian patrols. The submitted population, it was discovered, allowed their horses to graze far from their camps so that the Patriots could borrow them for operational purposes. The Patriots sold their animals in Italian and Egyptian markets through their submitted kinsmen, and Italian efforts to keep track of such transactions through tribal markings were, as might be supposed, unavailing. So useful, indeed, was a submitted population to the Patriots that the tribal Shaikhs sometimes arranged among themselves who among them should submit and who take the field. Even most of the Cyrenaican officials in the Italian administration did what was consistent with their safety to help their own people against their employers. Their faith unfaithful kept them falsely true. In the end the Italians came to the conclusion that they could trust no Cyrenaican, least of all a Cyrenaican Bedouin. The hearts of all were with their fighting fellow countrymen and fellow Muslims. The *sottomessi* and *ribelli* alike were all Bedouin, jealous of each other and hostile to tribes other than their own, but united by blood and a common way of life—one faith, one speech, one law. All regarded the Italians as foreigners whom one may serve but not love. 'The entire population thus took part directly or indirectly in the rebellion', wrote Graziani.[1]

The lot of the submitted sections was unenviable. They were compelled to live near Italian posts and their areas of sowing and pasturing were severely restricted. Their camps were subjected to constant inspections. Hostages were taken. Horses were confiscated. If it was discovered that they had dealings of any kind with their kinsmen in the Patriot bands they were heavily fined in animals and cereals, their camps were burnt, they were imprisoned, and sometimes shot. On the other hand, [651]
if they did not supply the Patriots with victuals or if they refused to pay taxes in support of the resistance they were subjected to punitive operations by the guerrillas. Suffering from Italian interference and Patriot levies and from punitive action

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[1] Op. cit., p. 60.

*175 by both sides, many came to the conclusion that they were better
*648 off fighting in the Patriot bands than living under Italian
*795 protection.

619 That all Cyrenaica was hard hostile rock beneath the shallowest covering of local collaboration is shown by the fact that the guerrillas kept up their numbers till the end of the war in spite of the slaughter of many times the number of men engaged at any one time in operations. Whenever a man fell there was another to take his place. Apart from the connivance of the whole Bedouin population at Patriot activities it was not easy for the Italians to tell the difference between a Bedouin who was a guerrilla and a Bedouin who belonged to one of the submitted sections. The guerrillas had no uniforms and when defeated had only to disperse and hide their rifles to become harmless shepherds. The Italians found that killed and captured guerrillas all possessed Italian identity cards issued to them when in camps in the guise of *sottomessi*. The Italians were thus victualling directly the forces opposed to them, for any holder of one of their cards could draw Italian rations. I have myself met Bedouin ex-guerrillas who, wounded in a fight, went to Italian hospitals for treatment, pretending to have been shot by the guerrillas while defending their flocks.

Italian writers who themselves experienced at first hand the sense of insecurity and the feeling, slowly mounting to a conviction, that their efforts to win over the Bedouin by bribes were as vain as their hopes of a speedy conquest, have described the situation of disillusionment in which their despondency was born. Biagio Pace writes that there did not exist, in reality, submitted and rebels, the entire population of Cyrenaica being under the control of the leaders of the rebellion, thus constituting a demographic, political, and financial whole, which maintained a force in the field. The *sottomessi* were regularly
[651] taxed to provide the guerrilla bands with food, arms, ammunition, clothes, money, and all the other requirements of war and life, and no-one escaped this levy. Pastoral nomads, urban merchants, agriculturists, even the police irregulars, made their contributions to maintain the rebellion. Even the tribal Shaikhs who received subsidies from the Government gave a tithe to 'Umar al-Mukhtar. The entire country was a capillary system of roots which fed from their hidden depths the visible foliage

*175 When things were quiet members of a band would have their
*648 families and herds with them and live in their own tents, but
*795 when pressed they left their women and children and beasts in
701 the tents of the submitted population and the only non-
619 combatants in their camps would then be a few female cooks.
[722] Before the end of the war many of the Patriots, including Sidi
'Umar, had sent their families to Egypt so that they could act
more freely.

*175 There was also a general administration for all the bands and
*648 this came directly under Sidi 'Umar. They maintained inter-
*795 communication and worked to a common strategy. Guerrilla
793 headquarters had also to arrange for the collection of a tithe
701 from the entire population to help pay for the expenses of the
619 campaign. Throughout the war Sidi 'Umar's tax-collectors were
[651] taking tithes from the submitted population, not always with-
● out trouble, and were giving written receipts for the payments.
The tithe paid by each tribe went to support its own band. Sidi
[705] 'Umar had also to arrange for caravans to bring supplies from
Egypt, and to supervise their distribution to the armed forces
and the payment of customs dues on what went to the civilian
population. Sidi 'Umar also kept up correspondence with
Sayyid Idris and Sanusi elements and sympathizers in Egypt.

*175 The guerrilla bands were in constant contact with the enemy.
*648 One of the most striking features of the campaign was the
frequency of the fighting. At some point or other on the plateau
*795 a skirmish or larger engagement took place every few days for
nearly nine years during the spring and summer months. In the account of the campaign which follows I mention but few of these fights, those which had exceptional importance for the campaign as a whole or as examples of the scale of the fighting. The few mentioned are therefore no indication of the amount of fighting. Its frequency may be judged by Gen. Graziani's statement that in the final year of the war, when resistance, compared with earlier years, was feeble and sporadic, there took place 53 engagements (*combattimenti*) and 210 skirmishes (*conflitti*).[1]

This incessant fighting cannot, as I have already said, be described in the language of text-book logistics in terms of manœuvring, objectives, and battles. Indeed, the Italians had

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[1] *Rivista delle Colonie Italiane*, vol. vi (I), 1932, pp. 52–3.

619 The independent Sa'adi tribes fall into four groups :

1. The Jawazi, Fawayid, and Rammah, all of common origin with the 'Awaqir of Cyrenaica.
2. The Harabi and Bar'asa, both of common origin with the 'Ibeidat of Cyrenaica.
3. The Hanadi, and
4. The Awlad 'Ali

[173] The original ancestor whom these Sa'adi all claim is one Abu Dib, said to be of Suleim descent.

175 554 619 This sheikh was a real personage and a contemporary of Ibn Khaldun (who died in A.D. 1406). He was sheikh of the Beni Ja'afir, and a man of great importance in Barka, the very place that the four tribes inhabited for centuries before they came to Egypt. Also the period of fifteen or sixteen generations, which the modern Bedouin assert to separate them from Abu Dib, agrees with this chronology well enough.[1]

619 [173] Some are found to assert that their title of Sa'adi "helping" is derived from an ancestress called Sa'ada, the wife of Abu Dib, or, according to a hostile account, of a Jew called Yana. But the real explanation of the term has already been given above.

619 651 At the present day a sort of feudal system prevails both in Egypt and Cyrenaica, by which families are *mrabit*,[2] or vassal families, not tribes to tribes ; thus the Qat'an tribe of Murabitin is divided, one part vassal to a family of Awlad 'Ali el-Ahmar, another to the Sinaqra, and a third to the Sinana. For a tribute called "alms", which by hereditary obligation each Mrabit family must pay, the Sa'adi family to which it is attached is bound to afford the Mrabit family protection in all minor difficulties of life, such as robbery by another family of Sa'adi, etc.

Thus a "Mrabit" family by paying tribute can herd its flocks in peace, calling upon the Sa'adi to see that justice is done them, but they are bound to join the Sa'adi to fight with them in any serious conflict with other tribes.

Among the "Mrabit" tribes of the present day are the Jumei'at, Qat'an, and Awlad Suleiman, all claiming as common ancestor one Ka'b, and feudal relations are maintained to this day in the desert between the last two 619 651 and the Sa'adi, though they are relaxed in the cultivation.

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[1] The pedigrees of which these Western Bedouin are so proud can only be trusted so far back as the individual whose name a subdivision has adopted, such as Kharûf in the Awlad Kharûf pedigree. Taking them separately, the pedigrees will be found to dovetail into each other up to that point, but beyond it things become problematical.

[2] Sing. of "Murabitin".

The Jumei'at, who used to be "Murabitin" to the Beni 'Una, are now nominally so to the Awlad 'Ali, but are not required to pay tribute. Other tribes, such as the 619 Jawabis and 'Awarma, are in an intermediate stage between the Sa'adi and the Murabitin. The Awlad 'Abd es-Sallam, [778] the Samalus ed-Diminat, and perhaps the Fawakhir, call themselves "Murabitin bil Baraka", a priestly caste which, in Tripoli, used to receive special privileges from the Turkish Government.

Though the Sa'adi tribes despise the Murabitin as serfs, [186] they respect them for their piety and resort to them for the writing of charms.

While the Murabitin tribes generally may be suspected to contain more Libyan blood than the Sa'adi, there are other tribes such as the 'Amayim, the Jahama, and the Tarhuna, who have come to Egypt from further west than any of the above, and who seem to be quite definitely "Berber", though, of course, none of them will admit it. These are known euphemistically as 'Arab el-Gharb.

Even some of the Juheina, settled east of the Nile in Sharqiya, are scorned by Klippel as "d'origine berbère, se pretendant section d'une tribu d'Arabie".[1]

Awlad 'Ali.—This tribe, by far the most important of [131] the Western Bedouin, occupies with its vassals the whole north coast of Egypt from Salum to Alexandria. Like the 619 others, they claim descent from the Beni Suleim, alleging 173 their ancestor 'Ali, son of 'Aqar, to be a grandson of that Dib, or Abu Dib, mentioned by Ibn Khaldun. Their enemies, however, allege that he was a Jew. "When the Arabs occupied the north coast of Africa, there was a notable, a Jew, who owned property at Saqiet el-Hamra in Morocco. This man welcomed and entertained the Arab sheikh Ez-Zanati. He became very popular with the sheikh, who gave him his daughter named Sa'ada, on condition that he embraced Islam before the marriage contract was made out."[2] Another version calls the Jew Yana, and says that he had two daughters. Of these Sa'ada was the

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[1] E. Klippel, "Etudes sur le folklore Bédouin de l'Egypte," *Bull. Soc. Khédiv. de Géogr.*, vii, 10, Cairo, 1911. [113]

[2] From information collected by Muhammad Bey Wasfi.

423 657 656 cost payable over a period of thirty years. As pointed out by Professor Abu-Zeid (n.d.), this law is welcomed in part because the garden area to which it really applies (the garden area in al-Qasr would be the 'izba sector) is not considered "tribal territory" or lineage-owned as are the barley and pasture regions.

•653 177 *613 Governmental activity growing out of the "Desert Law" has been an important catalyst for social, economic and political change. All of these aspects of change had repercussions on the lineage system and the authority structure of the Bedouins. In 1959, the government entered al-Qasr with the goal of revitalizing and reorganizing the hydraulic system of the area. The revival of the Roman water system, especially the network of cisterns covering the southern region of al-Qasr, and, on the coast, the restoration of the well system and underground galleries, the drilling of new wells and the intensification of olive farming have all led to a levelling of economic differentiation between lineages and between individuals.

657 177 474 In 1956, the Egyptian government passed the Cooperative Law (U.A.R. Law Number 217) establishing agricultural cooperative societies throughout the country. But not until 1959 did this law have any impact on the tribes of the Western Desert. [433] Generally, the cooperative society has served as a primary and successful agent of social change in the desert. It has

312 (literally, sky-wells, to indicate that they are dug to receive and
[172] preserve rain water). Most of these are ancient Roman pools which were
claimed either by the government or by individuals, and are put into
[653] use again to store rain water. Recently, the government has erected a
number of dams to preserve the rain water in exceptionally good years
from flowing into the sea. All this, however, is not enough to provide
the tribal population in the area with a permanent supply of water because of the limited capacity of the cisterns and the pools and the
scarcity of rain and its erratic nature. Recent attempts have been
made to tap the underground water in some parts of the area. A large
number of wells were sunk, especially along the coast.

433 The economy of Awlad Ali is based on livestock husbandry, supple-
221 mented by occasional cultivation of barley. Owing largely to the variation in the amount of rainfall, the sources of food in the area have the
important characteristic that the place and amount of their occurrence
vary from one year to the next. Throughout most of the area, the tribal
populations are concerned predominantly with warding off shortages in
the food supply by moving with their flocks to areas where grazing lands
are available.

233 Awlad Ali keep a variety of domestic animals, the most important
of which, from the economic point of view, are sheep and goats. The
[433] economy of Awlad Ali is based on the utilization of the products of
[237] these two animals. These products are milk, meat, wool, and hides.
[262] Milk and its products constitute the basic element of the people's
[272] diet. Milk is never consumed fresh. It is always made into sour milk
272
252 (maleh), kishk (dried milk), or butter.

There was some smuggling
439 of goods across the Libyan border, but this smuggling was done on a
648 very small scale. Before the Egyptian government imposed restrictions
on imports, the prices of the goods in the Libyan market were close to
their prices on the Egyptian market. Except for a very few items which
were not found on the Egyptian market, smuggling goods from Libya offered
● 653 a very limited financial gain to the smugglers. In recent years, this
situation has changed, however. With population increase in Egypt
threatening disaster, and with the cultivable land in the valley reaching
its maximum productivity, the attention of the government was drawn to
the fertile yet dry land of the northern strip of the Western Desert as
a possible means of expanding the cultivated area. A number of projects
are taking place at the present time under the land reclamation act. The
most important of these projects is the Eastern Mariut project which is
directed toward the irrigation of the lands of the Western Desert
through the channelling of the flood waters of the Nile into a network
of canals covering an extensive area of the northern strip of the Western
315 Desert. Also, recently, oil has been discovered in the area, and since
457 the end of the Second World War, the area has been a major attraction
for tourists.

439 More important is the increase in traffic of smuggled goods from
[651] Libya. Custom restrictions on imported goods to Egypt have created a
[656] scarcity of American and British manufactured goods which raised their
price on the Egyptian market and made smuggling a profitable activity.
An opposite-direction smuggling of sheep and goats from Egypt to Libya
[315] created a great shortage in the Egyptian meat market. Before the discovery of oil in Libya, the Western Desert area supplied the Egyptian

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433 furnish staples for local consumption and more cash crops for
241 the Marsa Matruh market. Matruh is dependent upon these
311 vegetable goods from al-Qasr, to the extent that the Governor
434 has forbidden the Bedouins to truck their goods to the higher
443 [656] priced market in Alexandria.

•654 The success of arboriculture in al-Qasr has been the
245 result of a well-organized reclamation program in this area
177 by the government. The relatively good supply of fresh water
433 and the proximity of a large market town has made al-Qasr an
atypical case in the government's attempt to transform the
desert pastoral economy. Since 1960, the government's program
has met with a great deal of success. Such results have, of
course, induced the Bedouins of al-Qasr to accept change,
and have further enhanced the future of the program. The
figures below show, as of 1964, the plant distribution of
orchards in the _'izba_ of al-Qasr, and indicate the measure
of success attained by the governmental reclamation program.

The environmental conditions of al-Qasr are particularly
well-suited for the olive tree: the olive has been the basis
of the economic transformation of al-Qasr. The Bedouins tend
to play down the government's role in developing olive arbori-
culture in the al-Qasr area. But before 1960, only the very
[556] wealthy men could afford to deal in the olive market, since it
involves a great initial financial risk. Hence, prior to the
entry of the government's program, there were 2,743 olive trees

TABLE 1

ARBORICULTURE IN AL-QASR, 1964

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Plant	Acres	Plants Distributed	Successful Plants
Olive	947	40,399	32,488 (80%)
Almond	57	2,570	1,752 (67%)
Fig	66	10,537	(experimental stage)
Grape	.5	512	512 (100%)
Peach	2.5	804	200 (20%)

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433
[556]

in al-Qasr, and these were distributed among only 27 men. Most of these men also owned large numbers of sheep.

In 1960, the government began planting olive trees on the registered land of individuals living in the *'izba* sector. This plan also involved instructing the Bedouins in the care of the tree: an individual who had traditionally depended on the rains now had to learn irrigation farming. This aspect of the program, learning modern "water discipline," was a source of conflict for the Bedouin with his pastoralist outlook on life. The olive tree must be watered twice weekly. The Bedouins say that this made them feel like "peasants." The Bedouins were also apprehensive over the fact that the olive tree did not bear its first fruit, i.e., the first cash

654 245 177 433 [747] crop, until five to seven years after planting. To alleviate the difficulties of this period of apprehension, which the Governor of the desert province refers to as "the dangerous period," the United Nations F.A.O. aid program was designed and put into operation in al-Qasr.

654 245 177 433 435 A Bedouin may purchase an olive seedling from the government for the price of two piasters (about six cents). This same seedling costs the government 26 piasters. Once through "the dangerous period," a Bedouin can expect a yield of 120 to 150 kilos of olives from one tree. Olives sell for about 15 piasters per kilo. Or, at a cost of 5 piasters per kilo, the olives can be converted into oil. One ton of olives will render about 23 per cent oil. Olive oil is now considered a luxury item in Egypt, and the market price is very high. But only the Bedouin with a large harvest of olives finds it profitable to sell his product on the oil market. These conditions have made many Bedouins willing to convert from horticulture and sedentary pastoralism to arboriculture.

654 245 177 Between 1960 and 1964, the government reclamation program has planted a total of 9,514 olive trees on land registered to 124 individuals. The average distribution of trees, about seventy-six per man, is indicative of one of the problems related to change in al-Qasr and about which we have spoken earlier. Most of the trees have gone to men who, before

654 245 177 1960, were olive tree owners. One individual, who owned 400 trees before the reclamation program, now owns 1,400 trees. His increase has not all been at government expense, but a large share of it has been. Of the 9,514 trees planted by the government, 4,666 of them have been planted in the barley and wadi area to the south; 4,848 in the garden area on the coast. [312] In the southern sector, a Bedouin who owns at least ten acres of land may have the government drill a well and erect a windmill pump on his property. For this, he pays [452] 350 Egyptian pounds (approximately $1,000.00) over a thirty-year period. The Bedouin is willing to undertake this contract, and also to take land out of barley production, because he sees the future security of the olive market. Because of this, also, he is willing to agree on land boundaries and to register his land with the government.

657 Economic transition would not be possible, nor could the Bedouins afford to hazard it, were it not for government welfare payments in the form of staple products. These rations stabilize the mixed economy of the al-Qasr while promoting a shift to a fuller dependence on agriculture. 657 474 Of the thirteen cooperative societies in the Matruh area, al-Qasr is the largest and has been designated as a pilot project for the whole Western Desert. Al-Qasr garners the largest share of government aid, and, consequently, is heavily dependent upon it. The table below shows the amount of aid given monthly to

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TABLE 2

AID PER MONTH TO THIRTEEN COOPERATIVE SOCIETIES OF MATRUH AREA, 1963

	No. of Families	Beef	Fish	Oil	Cheese	Tea	Powdered Milk
al-Qasr Aid:	308 (1344)*	1008	604	604	1209	201	1209
Total Aid:	627 (3134)*	2350	1410	1410	2826	470	2820

*Number of Persons

al-Qasr during the year 1963. This amount is compared with the total amount of aid given to all thirteen cooperatives in the area.

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During this period, 1960 to 1964, the government has succeeded in stabilizing the pastoral sector of the economy. The Bedouins are given barley and cottonseed-oil cakes as fodder for their animals. Consequently, they must depend upon their own barley crop only to a minimal degree. There are 144,804 sheep in the Marsa Matruh area, as of 1963. In al-Qasr, 332 men own 9,958 sheep, about 30 sheep per man. One sheep requires a kilogram of barley and six kilograms of cottonseed [474] cake per month. The table below shows the amount of fodder distributed to al-Qasr and the whole Matruh sector, in 1963, through the cooperative societies.

TABLE 3

FODDER DISTRIBUTED IN MATRUH SECTOR, 1963

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	No. of Sheep	Kg. of Barley	Kg. of Cottonseed Cakes
al-Qasr	9,958	85,392	56,928
Total Distribution	144,804	1,303,236	868,824

the cooperative societies.

243 Barley is the important staple in al-Qasr: it is used for bread and fodder. About one-half of the Bedouins plant barley on a small scale. The wealthy individuals who own large flocks of sheep plant up to 100 acres of barley. Barley is planted in October and harvested at the end of April. Two methods of cultivation are used: plowing and seeding takes place either before the rains, i.e., the _'afiir_ system, or, after the rains, i.e., the _haraati_ system. After harvesting, [251] the grain is threshed and stored in two-meter deep pits (_matmuura_). Grain stored in this fashion can be preserved for three years.

244 The main vegetables raised in al-Qasr are onions, radishes, peppers, and mint. Mint is the only dependable cash crop of those mentioned. It is used by the Bedouins [263] [272] in tea, and tea drinking is a ceremony which takes place at all times of the day in the desert.

241 when planted in large quantities. The southern zone of al-Qasr
407
434 is best suited for these crops, and the tractor is necessary
433 for a successful crop.

407 Tractors are rented through the cooperative society.
474 Local cooperative officers are responsible for seeing that all
[427] members share in the use of the tractor. But, in fact, officers
and their closer relatives monopolize the tractors. The gov-
[654] ernment has allotted to the al-Qasr cooperative five tractors.
They feel that it would jeopardize the whole program of economic
reform if they were to dictate the way in which the tractors
407 are to be used. Consequently, the tractor, like the rations
619 of foodstuffs, has become a pawn in tribal power plays. In
474 one case, not in al-Qasr, a tractor-driver who was a member of
the 'Ali Abyad tribe insisted that members of the 'Ali Ahmar
tribe pay him a 50 piaster "tip" to have their fields plowed.
Because of situations such as these, most Bedouins prefer that
cooperative membership coincide with local group membership.
It is better, they say, if the 'Aishaibat of al-Qasr have
their own cooperative because they know how to handle problems
among themselves. The government, during this transitional
period, seems to agree.

407 One reason that tractors are monopolized by a small group is that there are not enough of the machines to handle the plowing. Of the five tractors in al-Qasr, seldom were more than two working simultaneously. Often, this was a result of

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407 the lack of spare parts. Three of the tractors were Russian-built, and two were Egyptian made. The Bedouins say that the Russian tractors are the better.

407 In 1964, the Western Desert received its heaviest
241 rainfall since 1947. To take advantage of this, local govern-
• 654 ment officials of the reclamation project requested an additional
[132] fifty tractors for plowing on the coastal zone. They received
only six additional tractors. In that year, the thirty-nine
tractors used in the entire Western Desert were able to plow
15,240 acres of land. During this period of economic change,
731 a bad barley crop causes a fodder shortage for the animals,
233
[654] and seldom is the aid program able to compensate for this.
[166] Consequently, there is a need to ship sheep to the Nile Valley,
or to seek permission to take them to the pastures of Cyrenaica.
Both situations create tremendous difficulties for both the
Bedouins and the government. A third alternative for the
[432] Bedouin is to buy barley on the black-market. In doing this,
[435] he must pay six times the normal cost of grain, and risk
reprisals.

177 Prior to 1960, change in al-Qasr might be characterized
657 as a steady and endogenous process of sedentarization. It had
been taking place for about a century and a half. Exogenous change, social and economic, may be identified with the desire of the government to reclaim land in al-Qasr for agricultural use, and to integrate the Bedouin into the national economy.

439 market with more than one-third of its lamb meat. The other two-
[315] thirds of the lamb market was supplied from the Sudan, the Delta, and
[315] from Libya. Oil industry in Libya attracted a large number of the young
[178] tribal members in Libya, who had originally undertaken the main task of
[464] sheep pastoralism. As a result, the population of sheep and goats in
Libya dropped sharply. Not only did the Libyan market become unable
to supply the Egyptian market, but it was also unable to support itself
and was forced to pay high prices for the Western Desert sheep and goats.
[457] The price became even more attractive after the devaluation of the
Egyptian pound which gave higher value to the Libyan currency, and
hence, the price of sheep. In the last decade, the number of smuggled
sheep reached a point where it created a great shortage of lamb meat in
Egypt. All government attempts to stop smuggling activities in either
direction have failed.

657 All these factors attracted the attention of the government to the
area and its people. The need to control the tribal population became
evident. But since it is difficult, if not impossible, to control a
population which is constantly on the move, the first step the govern-
ment took to control the tribal population was to settle them in perman-
ent villages. A number of projects are underway. The aims of these
● [654] projects are to increase the cultivated land and to improve the pastures
[137] by introducing new and highly nutritive pasture plants in areas where
agriculture is not feasible. Attempts have also been made to promote
local crafts and industries. The intentional efforts of the government
[178] to settle the tribal population is supplemented by the gradual drift of
[464] many tribesmen, especially the younger generation, to seek part-time or

423 boundary marker is usually a pile of stones, a tree, a wadi,
or, a line recorded on paper by two parties and given to a
third to hold in case of future differences of opinion.

342 In the extreme southern pastoral zone, there were few
361 permanent houses but with new government land registration
[656] laws the number is increasing. The settlement pattern in this
area might be characterized as a scattered homestead type,
"homesteads" being defined as tents or houses whose location
is permanent. Tents are seldom, if ever, moved these days even
[657] during a heavy rainy season. This is because barley production
has increased, and, mainly because government aid programs
supply fodder for the sheep. Bedouin shepherds in the pasture
area change dwelling places, but only to move their tents from
their winter protective hiding places out into the open for the
springtime, or to move from their tent into the stone house
for the cold, rainy winter. In either case, no real change in
location is involved.

342 The tent is called bait al-'Arab ("house of the Arabs").
There are two types: the bait al-saif ("summer house"), and
the bait al-rabi'a ("spring house"). The summer tent, made of
"gunny" and flour sacks sewn together, is for protection from
the sun. The spring tent is the real Bedouin tent. It is
[286] woven from the wool of the sheep and camel hair, and is used
[237] during the winter. Most Bedouin now say that they cannot afford
[435] the 125 Egyptian pounds (1 pound = $2.80) which the bait al-rabi'a
costs to make or buy.

173 land along the coast: "This land was free, and the man who
[361] planted on it owned it. We call this (method of claiming land)
[425] *wad'a-l-id* ("laying on of the hand," i.e. seizure). There was
[423] plenty of freedom in those days. A man could farm or keep
animals." Planting and caring for the land is not novel to
the Bedouins of al-Qasr.

423 The Bedouins claim that the pattern of land distribution
425 established during the time of Abu Mahjuba prevails today.
•656 Further, they say that these rules will never change, no matter
[178] what laws come out of Cairo: "Land registration can mean nothing
where the tribes are concerned, for no Bedouin would be willing
to take the land of another Bedouin. The government forces us
to register our land so that it can be stated in the newspaper that they are giving the Bedouins land."

*613 The relationship between ecology and lineage territory
423 is not striking, such as in the case of the Cyrenaican Bedouins
182 of Libya (Peters 1960). In most cases, lineage territories run
on a north-south line cross-cutting the coastal garden and
southern pastoral zones. Hence, lineage territories are, generally, ecologically similar rather than contrasted. However,
*613 there are exceptions. 'Ailit Shraif lineage (see Figure 3a
423 below), at the western end of al-Qasr's *'izba* sector, settled
182 there "because of the abundance of underground water in this
241 [312] area: the ground is rocky here and the water comes out fresh
[361] like the Nile." Their founder, Sayyid Shraif, "specialized"

*613 423 182 241 [312] in farming, and he found this land "good for raising mint and vegetables." To the southeast of the *'izba*, the lineages of Lazumi and Ma'fas found the land suitable for barley and grazing. This area is rain-fed. There are no wells and so vegetable crops are not possible here. The members of these lineages say that their ancestors were "real" Bedouins in Cyrenaica, and did not wish to become farmers in Egypt. It *613 182 184 241 is interesting to note that the Lazumi and Ma'fas are the richest lineages in all of al-Qasr. They were, perhaps, better able to maintain the traditional style of life which all of the Bedouins claim is "the best." But all Bedouins of al-Qasr depend to some degree upon horticulture or arboriculture. [231] And most families own a few sheep or goats. Both Lazumi and Ma'fas garden in their coastal sections, and Shraif members own sheep.

•656 423 Land registration has a history in the Western Desert. The government attempted it a number of times, but with little success until 1959 when the General Desert Development Organization (GDDO) undertook its program of land reclamation. But the 361 342 178 Bedouins were settled long before this. In al-Qasr, the Bedouins began to erect permanent stone dwellings on the land about the time of the First World War. In the Matruh area, elder informants agree that before 1914 the Bedouins lived in tents outside the 361 648 town area. When the British came, they began to move into town. Many of the Bedouins built houses in Matruh between the years

423 the structure of both the nomadic and the sedentary tribe:
648 "Settlement should take place on the basis of granting each individual capable of working in agriculture a piece of land, the area to be fixed by the state, calculated to ensure the raising of his living standard and to enable him to support himself and his legal dependents on condition that he start cultivation of the land. When distributing the land, care should be taken that a family be settled on a single piece of land composed of the total of the plots granted to its members, the family being composed of relatives to the first grandfather" (Abu-Zeid n.d.).

From this point, each Arab country dealt with the problem of the nomad in its own way, some effectively and others
423 not so effectively. Not until 1958 did Egypt make a formal
657 effort to integrate the Bedouins of the Western Desert into
● 656 the national society. And it was not until 1960 that the so-called "Desert Law" of 1958 (U.A.R. Law Number 124) was activated and enforced. The most important provision of this law followed the plan formulated at the Baghdad conference: "There is no recognition of tribal possession of land which is considered as belonging to the State, and whenever a family develops and plants on a holding, this gives it the right, if approved, to the issue ot a title to it by the government." Law Number 124 also provided that land occupied by buildings or orchards before 1957 can be owned by the occupants at a low

423 cost payable over a period of thirty years. As pointed out
657 by Professor Abu-Zeid (n.d.), this law is welcomed in part
• 656 because the garden area to which it really applies (the garden area in al-Qasr would be the 'izba sector) is not considered "tribal territory" or lineage-owned as are the barley and pasture regions.

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175 for legal interpretation. For instance: "We are also told
671 by Yahya that (the Caliph) Mu'awiya ibn Sufian said that a
177 wound on the body should be assessed at half the value of
that wound on the head or face" (1935:324). Maliki law,
671 177 derived in large part from the Bedouin traditions of Arabia,
may be seen to characterize the legal norms of the tribal-based
social structure in the Western Desert. The Bedouins of al-
[428] Qasr themselves claim that they are within the bounds of
[562] Islamic Law when they deny the female the right to inherit,
though they do have other, and more secular, justifications
for the practice.

671 As we have already noted, in the above quote from the
182 "holy man" of al-Qasr, the Bedouins feel that the *'awaiyid*
648 can succeed where governmental law will fail. They say that
"the government does not understand the problems of the
Bedouins," that "government troops cannot function in the
desert." They feel that they need the *'awaiyid* for the sake
of political order itself: "If the Bedouins did not have
the *'awaiyid*, they would eat each other. The *'awaiyid* is so
important that a man who commits a wrong in town will lie
to the government, and then dutifully return to the tribe for
Bedouin justice."

•[656] In 1933, the government "abolished" the *'awaiyid*
and insisted that the Bedouins settle their difference in
the civil courts in accord with Egyptian law. According to

423 can he do this, but he can also sell that right. The right to sell the
311 share of the tribal land has recently become recognized in the Western
619 Desert, and the usufruct right is being treated in the same way as
ownership.

423
311 While the boundaries of the cultivable land belonging to the tribe
are guarded, when it comes to grazing land, the boundaries are not so
619 much enforced. The tribes of the Western Desert of Egypt are quite tol-
233 erant in allowing members of other tribal segments to graze their flocks
wherever grazing lands are available. Everyone from any tribe can graze
his flocks in areas that offer better pasture. But in doing so, he does
not have the right to use the wells and cisterns of the tribal segment.
[312] Water is scarce and valuable. Cisterns are owned by the tribal segments,
[432] and if an outsider wants to use the water, he has to buy it from the
owner for the whole season for a sum ranging between $100-$180.

423 In 1958, with the extension of the Mariut irrigation project, a
● 656 Desert Land Possession Law was enacted and came into force in 1960.
This law restates the right of the government to the ownership of the
land, and therefore does not recognize the tribal possessions of the
land, even when they have made certain improvements in it, such as
planting trees or digging wells. However, it gave the right of the
occupants of a certain area of land to request either the purchase of
the land or its lease for a period not exceeding nine years, granted
that such is made within one year of the passing of the law. Failing
to do so within one year, the government will either remove the plants
and buildings, or confiscate them without compensation.

423 656 The above law met with opposition from the tribal population in the area. As a result of this opposition, a new law was enacted in 1964 (Law #100). Although this later law eliminated some of the shortcomings of the previous one, it is not itself without disadvantages. The 1964 law recognizes the Bedouins' right of ownership only in areas where the fairly permanent trees were planted before 1958. Rain-fed areas cultivated from season to season are excluded. The new law also provides for the sale and transfer of land. Any person can purchase up to 50 feddans (acres) provided that he can develop it into an economic enterprise. The law also provides for the distribution of arable lands in such a way as to permit each head of household to own 10 feddans and to be provided with water possibilities. The price of this kind of land is to be paid over a period of 30 years. Settlers are encouraged and helped in planting trees and building dikes. So far, 8,600 feddans irrigated by windmills have been pssessed by members of Awlad Ali tribes, and titles to their holdings are being issued. [312]

233 423 656 With regard to grazing lands, no legislation has yet been issued, and the government feels that at this stage of development, it is essential to start educating and inducing the tribal population of the Western Desert in initiating and implementing new programs for preventing overgrazing and controlling the number of flocks.

The Group

619 The name Awlad Ali covers a number of ethnically distinct groups. In addition to Awlad Ali proper (the descendents of Ali), referred to as the Sa'adi, it includes a number of Murabiteen (holy men) tribes who are attached to various segments of Awlad Ali and occupy an inferior political position. The name also includes various peasant

There was some smuggling
439 of goods across the Libyan border, but this smuggling was done on a
648 very small scale. Before the Egyptian government imposed restrictions
on imports, the prices of the goods in the Libyan market were close to
their prices on the Egyptian market. Except for a very few items which
were not found on the Egyptian market, smuggling goods from Libya offered
653 a very limited financial gain to the smugglers. In recent years, this
situation has changed, however. With population increase in Egypt
threatening disaster, and with the cultivable land in the valley reaching
its maximum productivity, the attention of the government was drawn to
the fertile yet dry land of the northern strip of the Western Desert as
a possible means of expanding the cultivated area. A number of projects
are taking place at the present time under the land reclamation act. The
most important of these projects is the Eastern Mariut project which is
directed toward the irrigation of the lands of the Western Desert
through the channelling of the flood waters of the Nile into a network
of canals covering an extensive area of the northern strip of the Western
315 Desert. Also, recently, oil has been discovered in the area, and since
457 the end of the Second World War, the area has been a major attraction
for tourists.

439 More important is the increase in traffic of smuggled goods from
[651] Libya. Custom restrictions on imported goods to Egypt have created a
[656] scarcity of American and British manufactured goods which raised their
price on the Egyptian market and made smuggling a profitable activity.
An opposite-direction smuggling of sheep and goats from Egypt to Libya
[315] created a great shortage in the Egyptian meat market. Before the discovery of oil in Libya, the Western Desert area supplied the Egyptian

613 His success in solving disputes between members
628 of his baits and outsiders might enhance his prestige within the bait,
554 but it is not a substitute for patrilineal succession as the basis of
[428] the Aqila's authority. But in less integrated baits the situation is
[627] different. The ineffectiveness of the Aqila in solving disputes may
lead members of his bait to seek another man as their representative who
would act as a mediator in their behalf. If this continues for a long
time the Aqila might find himself with no functions and the new person
would become a de facto Aqila.

613 The Aqila represents the only effective indigenous form of leader-
554 ship among Awlad Ali at the present time. The camp headman provides
622 another form of leadership on the camp level, but, as mentioned before,
the leadership of the headman is very limited and involves minimal
634 authority. In addition to the indigenous leadership represented by the
622 Aqila, there is the superimposed administrative structure of the govern-
● 656 ment representative in the form of the "omda" system introduced into the
177 area by the government decree no. 1187 of 1958. The system of omda or
mayorship is essentially that applied to the rural areas of Egypt with
certain modifications to fit the tribal organization and the semi-nomadic
existence of the populations of the Western Desert. In rural areas, the
622 omda is the administrative head of the village. He is appointed by the
[554] government from among the village inhabitants who have certain qualifi-
[212] cations with regard to education (must be able at least to read and
[556] write), wealth (own at least 5 feddans of land in the area), and sound
reputation. As such, the omda system in the rural areas is a territorial
system. The omda's authority covers the territory of the village and
all individuals living in it regardless of their kinship affiliation.

581 are necessary for the validation of the marriage contract. Modern
585 671 legal systems which took as their basis the Islamic law of marriage
675 and the family further required the registration of the marriage contract for the marriage to be legal.

584 The request and necessary response forming the marriage are sup-
585 posed to be carried on by the parties involved. However, if either the
429 groom or the bride is not of age, or is mentally unqualified, the trans-
593 action is carried on by his or her guardian, or "wakil." The wakil is
the father, unless he is dead or an invalid, in which case the brothers
[604] become the wakils. If the person has no brothers, then the uncles be-
[184] come the wakil in the order stated. According to certain Sunni sects
in Islam, a woman marrying for the first time is always represented by her wakil, even if she is of age. The assumption is that a woman who has never been married does not have the experience that enables her to enter into any kind of legally binding relationship such as marriage.

585 Following the original Islamic idea, marriage among Awlad Ali is
675 an oral agreement between the groom or his father and the guardian
593 429 (wakil) of the bride-to-be (her father, if alive, or her closest male
[604] kin in the following order: her brothers, her uncles, her grandfather).
585 A religious man is sometimes asked to perform the marriage, although it
792 is not required. Some persons might invite a member of the Murabiteen
[619] tribe or holy men to witness the marriage on the basis that his presence
[778] gives "baraka," or blessing, to the marriage. Before the application of
585 the State legal system to the area, marriage contracts were not regis-
656 177 tered. In recent years, however, and with the increased mobility of
[675] the tribal populations, more and more marriages are being registered in
[634] the administrative districts. Still, according to the unofficial estimates,

Still, according to the unofficial estimates,
585 only about ten per cent of all marriages are registered, and these are
656 177 mainly mixed marriages involving a tribal person and a non-tribal one
582 or a tribal member who is not living in the area anymore. The reason
619 is that such a spouse, especially when he is the husband, is not under
the control of the tribal customs and therefore cannot be forced to fulfill his obligations if he fails to do so. Most of the tribal population
[581] still feel that marriage is a personal and family affair that should be kept away from the State legal system.

584 593 Marriage among Awlad Ali is a relatively informal procedure. When a man decides to marry a certain girl, he informs his mother who, in turn, informs his father. The father may have objections to his son's choice of the bride. Such objections may be based on already strained relations between the two families or the questionable reputation of the girl or any member of her family. In such cases, the father tries to dissuade his son from going ahead with the marriage. The father is
[583] usually successful in controlling his son's choice when the latter is dependent on his father for the payment of the bridewealth called "mahr" and for the support of his new household. This is usually the case in the man's first marriage. In subsequent marriages and in the cases where the son has independent means of support for himself and his bride, the father's control of the son's choice is minimal, and asking the father's approval is a matter of formality. In second and subse-
593 595 quent marriages, the approval of the older wives is essential. The
584 older wives have no right to object to the husband taking an additional wife, but they have the right to object to the choice on the basis that the new bride is hard to get along with or that there is animosity between her family and the families of the other wives which makes

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Libyan Bedouin MT9

[For information on the establishment of schools and medical clinics in Libya by the Italian government for the benefit of the Bedouins, see Categories 175 and 648.]

162 true numbers. As recipients of aid programs, their rations
114 are based upon the number of members per family. For these
•[657] purposes, they are anxious to present as high a population
figure as possible. They exaggerate their livestock count in
order to receive more fodder, and, at other times, underestimate
their numbers to escape taxes.

162 For purposes of this study, the Bedouin population of
161 al-Qasr is about 1,500 to 3,000. Most of this population lives
361 on the coastal area and in the cultivable wadi areas. The
remainder is scattered south of the plateau region, near the
621 desert proper. The 'izba sector of al-Qasr may be described
*613 as a nucleated cluster or settlement, but due to the nature
of the Bedouin segmentary lineage system, with its relatively
autonomous kin-based residence groups, this sector lacks the
usual degree of social interaction and integration associated
621 with the village or hamlet. The 'izba might be described as a
multi-nucleated settlement or cluster. Each lineage has its
*613
423 own mintaqa. Each mintaqa usually has a small dry-goods store
631 owned and operated by a lineage member and catering chiefly
443 to his own lineage-mates. Water and land in the 'izba sector
423 are individually owned. In the barley-pasture area, rights
*613
621 and privileges of ownership are vested in the corporate group,
even though the Bedouins and the government claim that tribally
423 owned land is illegal. All land boundaries, whether a mintaqa
or an individual's plot, are well-marked and well-known. The

423 boundary marker is usually a pile of stones, a tree, a wadi, or, a line recorded on paper by two parties and given to a third to hold in case of future differences of opinion.

342 361 [656] In the extreme southern pastoral zone, there were few permanent houses but with new government land registration laws the number is increasing. The settlement pattern in this area might be characterized as a scattered homestead type, "homesteads" being defined as tents or houses whose location is permanent. Tents are seldom, if ever, moved these days even during a heavy rainy season. [657] This is because barley production has increased, and, mainly because government aid programs supply fodder for the sheep. Bedouin shepherds in the pasture area change dwelling places, but only to move their tents from their winter protective hiding places out into the open for the springtime, or to move from their tent into the stone house for the cold, rainy winter. In either case, no real change in location is involved.

342 The tent is called bait al-'Arab ("house of the Arabs"). There are two types: the bait al-saif ("summer house"), and the bait al-rabi'a ("spring house"). The summer tent, made of "gunny" and flour sacks sewn together, is for protection from the sun. The spring tent is the real Bedouin tent. [286] [237] [435] It is woven from the wool of the sheep and camel hair, and is used during the winter. Most Bedouin now say that they cannot afford the 125 Egyptian pounds (1 pound = $2.80) which the bait al-rabi'a costs to make or buy.

342 costs to make or buy. In the 'izba sector, most of the Bedouin have a summer tent which they place next to their stone house for the hot months. According to the governmental community [657] development program, in order to own land and register it properly one must build at least one room upon it. The one-[735] room house (daar) is not common in al-Qasr: it is a symbol of poverty. The multi-roomed house (duwaar) is common. It is [333] built of large pieces of cut sandstone which are quarried in [316] al-Qasr. Those who can afford it build the duwaar and surround 342 556 it with a wall in compound fashion. Only one man in al-Qasr is rich enough to afford two of these compound-type houses. The size and style of a house reflect status. Traditionally, [184] a man furnished a tent for each wife and for each married son. Although this is still the custom in parts of the desert, in al-Qasr the private room (daar) in a duwaar has replaced the private tent.

596 The basic residential unit is called naja' (literally, "hamlet"). It is composed of the father, his wife (wives), his unmarried children, and married sons and their families. The naja' takes the name of the father who is called the shaib ("elder," literally, "white-haired one") of the group. In the naja', the word of the shaib is law, and the members' chief duty is unquestionable obedience. The average naja' in al-Qasr consists of about three or four houses or tents.

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1925 and 1930 because, as they point out, the British administration provided employment for "the poor Bedouin."

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The wealthier Bedouins who owned camels and large numbers of sheep remained in the desert. Just the reverse is happening at the present time. The rich men who see the advantages in business, and the comforts which Matruh offers, can also afford the change of residence or the maintenance of two residences.

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In 1922, the Egyptian government first registered land in al-Qasr. At this time, they sanctioned the tribal division of territory which existed. There was no attempt to force political integration upon the Bedouins. Egypt has never had a nomad problem as have other Middle Eastern countries. The history of Egypt is essentially the history of the Nile Valley. Consequently, it is not odd that we find no mention of the Awlad 'Ali in the historical record. The Bedouins of the Western Desert were resigned to their place in the desert, and the central government saw no particular advantage or disadvantage in this.

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Concern for the Bedouin minority in Egypt emerged only with nationalistic programs of modernization. In 1954, the Fourth United Nations Social Welfare Seminar for Arab States in the Middle East convened in Baghdad. From this meeting came some general recommendations for dealing with the problems of the Bedouin. The major proposal was calculated to transform

423 648 the structure of both the nomadic and the sedentary tribe: "Settlement should take place on the basis of granting each individual capable of working in agriculture a piece of land, the area to be fixed by the state, calculated to ensure the raising of his living standard and to enable him to support himself and his legal dependents on condition that he start cultivation of the land. When distributing the land, care should be taken that a family be settled on a single piece of land composed of the total of the plots granted to its members, the family being composed of relatives to the first grandfather" (Abu-Zeid n.d.).

From this point, each Arab country dealt with the problem of the nomad in its own way, some effectively and others
423 not so effectively. Not until 1958 did Egypt make a formal
657 effort to integrate the Bedouins of the Western Desert into
656 the national society. And it was not until 1960 that the so-called "Desert Law" of 1958 (U.A.R. Law Number 124) was activated and enforced. The most important provision of this law followed the plan formulated at the Baghdad conference: "There is no recognition of tribal possession of land which is considered as belonging to the State, and whenever a family develops and plants on a holding, this gives it the right, if approved, to the issue ot a title to it by the government." Law Number 124 also provided that land occupied by buildings or orchards before 1957 can be owned by the occupants at a low

423 •657 656 cost payable over a period of thirty years. As pointed out by Professor Abu-Zeid (n.d.), this law is welcomed in part because the garden area to which it really applies (the garden area in al-Qasr would be the 'izba sector) is not considered "tribal territory" or lineage-owned as are the barley and pasture regions.

653 177 *613 Governmental activity growing out of the "Desert Law" has been an important catalyst for social, economic and political change. All of these aspects of change had repercussions on the lineage system and the authority structure of the Bedouins. In 1959, the government entered al-Qasr with the goal of revitalizing and reorganizing the hydraulic system of the area. The revival of the Roman water system, especially the network of cisterns covering the southern region of al-Qasr, and, on the coast, the restoration of the well system and underground galleries, the drilling of new wells and the intensification of olive farming have all led to a levelling of economic differentiation between lineages and between individuals.

657 177 474 In 1956, the Egyptian government passed the Cooperative Law (U.A.R. Law Number 217) establishing agricultural cooperative societies throughout the country. But not until 1959 did this law have any impact on the tribes of the Western Desert. [433] Generally, the cooperative society has served as a primary and successful agent of social change in the desert. It has

657 sanctioned the direction of economic development from a
177 pastoral to a market-oriented, agricultural mode of production.
474 Land reclamation and development projects administered by the
433 cooperatives encourage the Bedouins to produce cash crops.
In this way, Al-Qasr is being drawn into the national economy.
Price changes and seasonal commodity preferences in the Nile
Valley now affect the economy of al-Qasr. The generation of a
[181] cash economy has created a competitive spirit and a degree of
individual independence which cuts across tribal loyalty and
affiliations. The cooperative society, in this manner, tends
to be a "social equalizer."

657 But economic transformation as the intended goal of the
177 Cooperative Law is far from being an accomplished fact. Al-
178 Qasr is still a traditional Bedouin society in the sense that
474 the lineage structure is the framework in which economic and
*613 social relations take place. Because the cooperative society,
as a new basis for association, threatens the dominance of the
lineage principle, it has become the focal point for a struggle
between the old and new.

The major problem encountered by the government officials
657 in this program is that the cooperative society, as a central
177 agent for the dispensation of aid products, becomes a pawn in
474 tribal power politics. The government, forced to rely upon the
661 prestigious and wealthy men for the initiation of an innovative
435 program, found itself unable to prevent profiteering and the

657 sale of goods on the black-market. Tribal leaders, or members
177 of a "status group," in whose hands the operation of the
474 cooperative society had been placed, confiscated more than
661 [435] their share of food and fodder and resold it either in the
Nile Valley or to their own tribesmen for whom it had originally
been intended. The government could not really prosecute the
guilty parties for fear of jeopardizing the entire program.
Nor could they convince the cheated tribesmen that they had
been treated unfairly by their leaders. For one thing, the
[673] Bedouins did not consider that their leaders were committing
a wrong; furthermore, any Bedouin who would go to the government
to inform on another Bedouin would be subjected to a
[577] trial by Bedouin justice. It is still the traditional codes
of Bedouin law and honor, and not the modern judiciary system,
which prevail in al-Qasr.

474 The cooperative society in al-Qasr is one of thirteen
in the general area of Marsa Matruh. It began with a membership
of twenty-five, twenty-two of these were from the 'Aishaibat
tribe. Today, the enrollment is 139 official, and another 195
"unofficial" members. The unofficial members represent unregistered
branches of the al-Qasr cooperative. The Bedouins
[735] explain that they cannot allow any members of the tribe to go
hungry, and, therefore, they will distribute food to all those
who need it (Zein, n.d.). This, of course, shows that those
[661] cooperative officers who do profiteer are not entirely oblivious

654 245 177 1960, were olive tree owners. One individual, who owned 400 trees before the reclamation program, now owns 1,400 trees. His increase has not all been at government expense, but a large share of it has been. Of the 9,514 trees planted by the government, 4,666 of them have been planted in the barley and wadi area to the south; 4,848 in the garden area on the coast. [312] In the southern sector, a Bedouin who owns at least ten acres of land may have the government drill a well and erect a windmill pump on his property. For this, he pays [452] 350 Egyptian pounds (approximately $1,000.00) over a thirty-year period. The Bedouin is willing to undertake this contract, and also to take land out of barley production, because he sees the future security of the olive market. Because of this, also, he is willing to agree on land boundaries and to register his land with the government.

•657 Economic transition would not be possible, nor could the Bedouins afford to hazard it, were it not for government welfare payments in the form of staple products. These rations stabilize the mixed economy of the al-Qasr while promoting a shift to a fuller dependence on agriculture. 657 474 Of the thirteen cooperative societies in the Matruh area, al-Qasr is the largest and has been designated as a pilot project for the whole Western Desert. Al-Qasr garners the largest share of government aid, and, consequently, is heavily dependent upon it. The table below shows the amount of aid given monthly to

TABLE 2

AID PER MONTH TO THIRTEEN COOPERATIVE SOCIETIES OF MATRUH AREA, 1963

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	No. of Families	Beef	Fish	Oil	Cheese	Tea	Powdered Milk
al-Qasr Aid:	308 (1344)*	1008	604	604	1209	201	1209
Total Aid:	627 (3134)*	2350	1410	1410	2826	470	2820

*Number of Persons

al-Qasr during the year 1963. This amount is compared with the total amount of aid given to all thirteen cooperatives in the area.

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During this period, 1960 to 1964, the government has succeeded in stabilizing the pastoral sector of the economy. The Bedouins are given barley and cottonseed-oil cakes as fodder for their animals. Consequently, they must depend upon their own barley crop only to a minimal degree. There are 144,804 sheep in the Marsa Matruh area, as of 1963. In al-Qasr, 332 men own 9,958 sheep, about 30 sheep per man. One sheep requires a kilogram of barley and six kilograms of cottonseed [474] cake per month. The table below shows the amount of fodder distributed to al-Qasr and the whole Matruh sector, in 1963, through the cooperative societies.

407 the lack of spare parts. Three of the tractors were Russian-built, and two were Egyptian made. The Bedouins say that the Russian tractors are the better.

407 241 654 [132] In 1964, the Western Desert received its heaviest rainfall since 1947. To take advantage of this, local government officials of the reclamation project requested an additional fifty tractors for plowing on the coastal zone. They received only six additional tractors. In that year, the thirty-nine tractors used in the entire Western Desert were able to plow 15,240 acres of land. During this period of economic change, 731 233 [654] [166] a bad barley crop causes a fodder shortage for the animals, and seldom is the aid program able to compensate for this. Consequently, there is a need to ship sheep to the Nile Valley, or to seek permission to take them to the pastures of Cyrenaica. Both situations create tremendous difficulties for both the Bedouins and the government. [432] [435] A third alternative for the Bedouin is to buy barley on the black-market. In doing this, he must pay six times the normal cost of grain, and risk reprisals.

177 ● 657 Prior to 1960, change in al-Qasr might be characterized as a steady and endogenous process of sedentarization. It had been taking place for about a century and a half. Exogenous change, social and economic, may be identified with the desire of the government to reclaim land in al-Qasr for agricultural use, and to integrate the Bedouin into the national economy.

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657 This program cannot be divorced from the fundamental political aim of the government which is to make the Bedouins politically-conscious participants in the Egyptian political community. The reform program, which has been only outlined here, has had ramifying effects on the Bedouin traditional systems, especially the political, and that is a major concern of this study. Changes in one structure of society are apt to have repercussions in other structures. This seems particularly the case where the economic and political structures are concerned. Economic change has been a background to political structural change in al-Qasr. Political change is historical in al-Qasr, but it has been accelerated in the period starting with 1960. For these reasons, we are interested in both the traditional and the modern systems.

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434 Change will continue to occur in al-Qasr. This is because the advantages of cash crops and a market economy are obvious to the Bedouin. He can even have more of what has been traditionally valued if he is successful in the modern market system. He can buy a sheep for 10 L.E.; a goat for [435] 8 L.E.; a horse for 90 L.E.; a camel for 150 L.E.; and a fine spring tent for 125 L.E.. A Bedouin knows that he must, as an individual, register his land, build a stone house on it (which costs about 100 L.E.), and learn the technique of irrigation farming. All of the Bedouins of al-Qasr are to some degree willing to do this for the ma'isha simha which it

"modern industrial society," it was not easy work. This, despite the 114
fact that there was no language barrier, seeing that I spoke the same 114 122
language of the group, or rather they spoke my native language; I had 123
no problems of introduction because I had worked in the area and become
acquainted with a number of the tribal members in 1958. When I went to
the field, I then sought out these old friends who introduced me to other
members of the group.

At the beginning, I made a deliberate effort to avoid associating 114
with the government officials who worked in the area, even though they were 123 177
quite willing to help and seemed to have an intimate knowledge of the people
in the area. I had thought that any identification with the government
would put me in a suspicious situation as far as the tribal groups were concerned,
and thus prevent me from having good rapport with them. Later, however, [657]
I realized that the relationship between the government officials in
the area and the tribal population was extremely good, and they always looked
to the government as a source of aid and support to them. There was no conflict
of interest between the state administration and the tribal groups. In
fact, people accepted me more readily whenever they knew that I had worked
for the Egyptian government. This later developed into a time-consuming and
disappointing experience when many of the tribal members came to me asking
for help getting employment in the government projects in the area, or to
have their sons accepted in certain government schools, or to get some
favored treatment from the government relief organizations.

The difficulty I encountered in my field work stemmed from the interplay 114
of three major factors: the reliance on the case study method which 123
necessitates the intimate knowledge of the events, facts, and parties involved
in each case; being a female anthropologist in a society where
women by definition are barred from public participation and particularly

439 market with more than one-third of its lamb meat. The other two-
[315] thirds of the lamb market was supplied from the Sudan, the Delta, and
[315] from Libya. Oil industry in Libya attracted a large number of the young
[178] tribal members in Libya, who had originally undertaken the main task of
[464] sheep pastoralism. As a result, the population of sheep and goats in
Libya dropped sharply. Not only did the Libyan market become unable
to supply the Egyptian market, but it was also unable to support itself
and was forced to pay high prices for the Western Desert sheep and goats.
[457] The price became even more attractive after the devaluation of the
Egyptian pound which gave higher value to the Libyan currency, and
hence, the price of sheep. In the last decade, the number of smuggled
sheep reached a point where it created a great shortage of lamb meat in
Egypt. All government attempts to stop smuggling activities in either
direction have failed.

● 657 All these factors attracted the attention of the government to the
area and its people. The need to control the tribal population became
evident. But since it is difficult, if not impossible, to control a
population which is constantly on the move, the first step the govern-
ment took to control the tribal population was to settle them in perman-
ent villages. A number of projects are underway. The aims of these
[654] projects are to increase the cultivated land and to improve the pastures
[137] by introducing new and highly nutritive pasture plants in areas where
agriculture is not feasible. Attempts have also been made to promote
local crafts and industries. The intentional efforts of the government
[178] to settle the tribal population is supplemented by the gradual drift of
[464] many tribesmen, especially the younger generation, to seek part-time or

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657 full-time employment with the government projects in the area and
[178] [464] settle in fairly permanent houses near the place of work.

657 With the movement toward settling down, the relative legal and
701 political autonomy which Awlad Ali once enjoyed is breaking down. This
642 was reflected first in the loss of military exemption. In 1947, the
draft law was applied to all tribal populations in Egypt, including
Awlad Ali. The application is not seriously enforced, however, due
to the fact that births are still not recorded in the area. In 1954,
657 the "omda" or mayorship system practiced in the rural areas of Egypt
634 was extended to the Western Desert with certain modifications to fit
177 the tribal organization of populations in the area. This put a strain
on the native system of leadership, a point which will be covered in
657 later chapters. Finally, and along with the extension of the omda sys-
692 tem, the jurisdiction of the legal system of the state was extended
177 over the area. This resulted in a duality in the judicial process.
178 The tribal law, with its traditional tribal mediators, is still functioning side by side with the modern court system of the state law. In many cases, especially in criminal cases, the individual is tried under both systems, and sometimes receives two different judgments for the same offense. Various efforts are being made to minimize the effects of this duality. In civil cases, the problem does not seem serious, since it is the parties themselves, or one of them, who voluntarily bring the case to the attention of the legal authorities. Therefore, they can choose between the traditional legal system and the modern courts of law. So far, civil cases are brought to the modern court system only when the native procedures fail to achieve a settlement. As such, the

657 modern court system may be viewed as a form of appeal to the tribal
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177 justice. One has to be careful, however, in calling such a procedure
178 an appeal, since the tribal proceedings have no relevance in the court
proceedings.

69 The duality is more serious in criminal cases. When an act is defined
681 as illegal by both the tribal and modern law, persons committing
177 it come automatically under the jurisdiction of both laws. As long as
such acts remain unknown to the police, the duality of procedures is
not undertaken. This is possible in minor cases of assault or theft of
adultery. But in major cases, such as homocide or serious assault resulting
in the serious injury of a tribal member, it is difficult to
keep the news a secret from the authorities. The funeral proceedings
in the former cases and the medical attention needed in the latter cases
[627] are hard to conceal. Besides, serious cases start a whole series of
[521] mediations and go-betweens which always become the general knowledge
in the entire area and the subject of conversation among the people.
When the authorities know about such cases, they have to take immediate
action to bring the offender to trial, even when the government authorities
know that the tribal proceedings are being conducted in the case.
Some attempts are made by both the tribal law and the modern law to minimize
the effect of that duality. It is common that when the district
attorney knows that a certain criminal case has been successfully solved
according to the tribal proceedings, to ask for the minimum penalty for
the offense. On the side of the tribal proceedings, once the case has
been solved, the witnesses needed to testify for the prosecutor are instructed
by their fellow tribesmen to refrain from giving the information

554 177 634 619 [622] The most powerful and numerous segments are then represented by the omda, and the lesser ones are represented by a sheikh. Unlike the system in the rural areas where the sheikh is a subordinate to the omda, the sheikh in the Western Desert does not occupy the same position. Instead he has the same functions and occupies, with regard to his tribal segment, the same position the omda occupies with regard to his. He does not take orders from the omda and has direct relations with the administration. Sheikhs and omdas from one district are supposed to meet periodically in the police station and discuss with the police officer in charge of the station matters concerning the district and their own tribal groups. The only difference between the omda and the sheikh in the Western Desert seems to be the label of the office. The label itself carries a certain amount of prestige to the tribal segment represented by the omda, since it is an acknowledgement by the government of its importance. This is why many of the tribal segments try to be represented by an omda rather than by a sheikh. In certain districts where two or more strong tribal segments compete for the honor of being represented by an omda, the district may have two or more omdas representing the strong tribal segments and a number of sheikhs representing the lesser tribal groups in the district. Not every tribal segment in a district is represented by an omda or even a sheikh, however. Very small tribal segments may join together and have one sheikh, while others may agree to be represented by one of the larger segment's sheikh or omda.

634 554 619 657 Obviously, the number of omdas and sheikhs differ from one district to another depending on the number of important tribal segments in each. There is no specific rule whereby a certain tribal segment is considered

634 554 619 657 by the government to be significant enough to be represented. This matter is left almost entirely to the ability of members of a given tribal segment to convince the authorities that their group is sizable enough to give them the right of omda, or at least sheikh's representation. A segment represented by a sheikh may later ask for an omda because of the prestige involved. It is worth noting in this respect that the various tribal segments in the area are eager to be represented in the government administrative structure. Gaining prestige among the other tribal segments is only one motive for such eagerness. [622] Unlike the omda in the rural areas who functions mainly as a representative of the government to the village, the omda or sheikh in the Western Desert is a representative of the people to the government. This is not a theoretical difference but involves a real difference in the relation of the government and the omda, on the one hand, and between the latter and the people his represnets, on the other. 622 554 657 The omda in the village is a symbol of authority to his people. He is the undisputed ruler of the village. His authority is backed by his ability to mobilize and use the force put at his diposal by the government, in the implementation of his decisions. Since he is appointed by the government and not elected by the people, he does not have to rely on his popularity to hold or maintain office. His main concern is to please the government, rather than the people of the village to whom he is merely a symbol of authority. There is very little that the village omda can bring to his people form the outside, while he has to implement government policies, collect taxation, apprehend criminals, all tasks which the villagers are not eager to have done.

634 666 The situation is quite different in the Western Desert. Although
657 it is the government, represented by the province council, which makes
554 the final decision in appointing the omda or sheikh, yet this appoint-
619 ment is made on the basis of nominations given by the gribal segment
635 or segments which he would represent. Since the tribal segment usually
nominates one person, the decision of the council is limited to the
examination of the credentials of the nominee and to see if he meets the
basic requirements of the law. If a certain nominee is rejected by the
council, a very rare occurrence, the matter goes back to the tribal
segment to make another nomination. In practice, then, the omda of the
Western Desert is elected by the people and the appointment by the govern-
ment of the omda is significant only in cases where the omda is to repre-
sent more than one small tribal segment and each nominates one. Here the
council has to choose between the various nominaees and appoints the best
634 qualified. Unlike the omda of the village, the tribal omda is a real re-
554 657 presentative of his people. Despite the fact that he becomes part of a
619 governmental structure, his basic function is to look after the interest
[622] of his tribal group. Or, as one informant put it, "The omda is the ser-
vant of the people." In many cases the best interest of the tribal segment
is served through full cooperation of the omda with the government. So
far there seems to be very little conflict between the interest of the
tribal populations and that of the government. There is very little in
[651] the area that the government demands or needs. There is no taxable land
to speak of. There are only a few acres of barley land and even these
634 554 are minimally taxed. The main responsibility of the omda to the govern-
657 ment is to report births and deaths and give a yearly list of young men

634 554 657 who reach the age of military service. He is also supposed to report the presence of any fugitive or crininal in his district and report crimes accurring in that district and which involve members of the tribal segment he represents.

634 554 657 562 701 178 The first two duties of the omda to the government do not involve any conflict of interest. Unlike the rural areas where sons are considered a very important economic asset to their parents, and therefore, there is a general resentment of military service which takes the sons away and deprives the parents of their important work around the fields, Awlad Ali look at military service as an opportunity to have their sons go to the city, obtain guaranteed payment, and escape the hardship of nomadic existence. Economic activities [233] in the area do not require the cooperation of a large number of individuals, and most of the grazing of animals is done either by a paid shepherd or by one of the grown-up sons. Although there still exists an [183] ideology which values having many sons, yet with the cessation of hostilities between the tribal segments, their presence in the area has lost its [464] value. Many of the younger generation are seeking jobs with the government projects in the area or in the city. Neither one is easy to find. Joining the army is increasingly considered as an easy alternative.

634 554 657 674 The omda's function which seems to involve some conflicting loyalties is that of reporting crimes involving members of his tribal segment. But even this does not pose a serious problem as it might seem. Almost all minor crimes committed against property or persons as well as all civil disputes are left to be handled by the tribal proceedings. The duties of the omda are limited to reporting the cases of murder and serious assault

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1 On the basis of one percent of the yearly yield.

634 which result in permanent bodily harm. Reporting such cases is a fairly
554 minor proceeding since such cases come to the knowledge of the authori-
• 657 ties through other channels, mainly from talks involved in the mediation
674 for the bloodmoney or from the hospital to which serious assault cases
[743] are usually taken. Besides, reporting a crime does not mean convicting the offender. This latter depends on evidence which, in case the dispute has been settled by tribal proceedings, is hard for the police authorities to find.

634 While the government demands do not impose serious conflicts of
554 loyalty on the part of the omda, if successful, his position with the
657 government can bring to his tribal segments great benefits. These benefits are usually in the form of various social and economic aids including fodder for the animals and food and clothing for the people during the dry years. Other benefits including providing the tribal population with olive trees and helping them clear many of the old Roman wells and establishing wind mills for nominal fees. Not everyone in the area can have such benefits. Some do not even know they exist. A successful omda could manipulate the administration to get as many benefits for
[871] his tribal segment as possible.. Some successful omdas were able to have
[474] the government build schools in their districts, establish cooperative units to market local products such as wool, sheep, and olive oil.

634 This should not lead us, however, to conclude that the position of
554 the omda in the Western Desert does not involve any kind of conflicting
657 loyalty or that he is always supported by his people or even trusted by
578 them. One informant said that the omda of his biat is "...government man, not ours....He would sell us all if this pleases his masters in the

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government." But due to the nature of the representation and the specific relation of the government to the area, the position of the omda does not pose serious demands upon the loyalty of the omda to his tribal group.

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Because of the omda's ability to bring benefits to his tribal segment from the government, the ability to manipulate the administrative officials is the most important basis for the nomination of a given individual for the position of the omda. "The omda is one who can speak city talk and knows how to deal with the government officials." Age is not important; young people know more about city ways than old people. "A man may be a cheat, but as long as he can get our things done, he is the best man for the job...of course, we don't want to nominate someone with a bad reputation who may blacken our face in front of everybody. However, if he has a bad reputation the council would not approve his appointment...he just has to be someone who can get things done..."

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Muftah Mughaieb, the sheikh of the Sanagrah tribal segment in the district of Haman, described the circumstances of his nomination as follows:

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> Before the former sheikh of that tribal segment died (he was Muftah's uncle), one member of the group got into an argument with the police officer in charge of the police station in the district. The tribesman insulted the police officer who insisted on arresting him. Rumors also had it that the police officer was using his authority to reduce the share of the tribal segment in the government aid which was badly needed during that particular year. Sheikh Muftah, whose father is the Aqila of

159 bait Mughaieb of the Sanagrah tribe, went to the officer and apologized
634 to him on behalf of the whole group and invited him to a
● 657 lavish dinner party. The charges against the tribesman were soon
666 dropped, and it was concluded that it was because of the way Muftah
[578] [625] had handled the situation. Since that incident, Muftah has been
known as an expert in handling the government officials. One year
later, the sheikh of the tribal segment died, and a meeting was
held during which the important members of the Sanagrah tribal
segment in the district decided to nominate Muftah for the position
of the sheikh, vacant by the death of his uncle. Muftah, who
was attending the meeting, was asked to accept the nomination, and
he agreed. "...I accepted the nomination reluctantly." Muftah
later told me, "I did not really want to become the sheikh. The
159 position does not bring any personal benefit, and it involves a
634 554 lot of responsibility. The sheikh has to act as an attorney for
657 his tribe, represent it to the government and competes with other
sheikhs to bring his people things that the other sheikhs cannot
get for theirs, like more membership in the cooperative units or
in the socialist union. And what does he get in return? Nothing...
not even the gratitude of his people. To them, he is a servant of
the tribe, and his duty is to look after its interest. If he
doesn't, then everybody is quick to criticize him. I had to accept
the nomination because I felt it was my duty to do so and not
to embarrass the awaqil and the important people of the tribe who
[465] put their confidence in me. As far as the government, all I get is
six pounds a month."

634 "The omda or sheikh is both a blessing and a curse to his tribe,"
554 said one member of the Aggary 'eila. "He can bring benefits to his
619 tribe, but at the same time, he has to report his own people if one of
them breaks the city laws.... His position is like that of a double-edged razor."

Most of the people in the area, however, tolerate the negative aspects of the omda's functions as a moderate price for the possible benefits they may get through his position. This is why each tribal segment does its best to be represented by an omda, or at least by a sheikh.

Within his tribal segment he enjoys a great deal of respect. He does not, by means of position alone, command any power over members of his group similar to the power the omda of the village has over his
[613] people. It seems, however, that although the position itself does not
carry with it any power, yet, when the holder of that position is at the same time a native tribal leader or aqila, it tends to enhance his position as a tribal leader and to give him more respect among members of his tribal unit as well as among the rest of the tribal groupings.
634 This may be explained by the fact that the establishment of the omda
554 system in that area did not involve direct interference with the native
619 political system except in a minimal way, mainly to keep the tribal
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● 657 populations in the area from interfering in the progress of various
613 government projects in the area. As such, the system did not impose
too many demands upon the tribal loyalties of the omdas or sheikhs. In the relationship between the government and the tribal population, the balance so far has been in favor of the latter, who, by means of

634 omda representation, are taking from the government much more than
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619 they are giving in return. Being the link between his people and
182 the government in such a system gives the aqila a new basis of
● 657 political support.
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THE SEDENTARIZATION OF NOMADS IN THE WESTERN DESERT OF EGYPT

A. M. Abou-Zeid

178 Much attention has been paid in the last few years, in both Egyptian and international circles, to the question of settling the nomads of the Western 657 Desert of Egypt. A number of institutions (e.g. the Cairo Institute for Desert Research and the Departments of Sociology and Social Anthropology in the Egyptian universities) and some government departments (e.g. the Department of Desert Irrigation, of the Ministry of Public Works) have combined their efforts to study the economic and social situation of the semi-nomadic clans and the possibility of creating new sedentary agricultural communities to replace the present nomadic and semi-nomadic groups whose economy is based on the rearing of livestock in general, and of sheep in particular. It is the purpose of this paper to give a brief account of the main projects of sedentarization suggested by the authorities concerned in Egypt, and to outline their expected effects upon the economic system and modes of living, and also to indicate the repercussions they may eventually have on the whole social structure of the semi-nomadic clans. Apart from the planned projects, there is a marked and growing tendency among these people, especially the younger 178 generation, to abandon the traditional way of life and to settle down. This 166 tendency is generally stimulated by the changing social conditions. The tremendous hardships and the insecurity of the nomadic life, which is entirely dependent on rains, and the increasing social and cultural contacts with the urban communities in the Delta are the main factors influencing this change of social conditions, thus accentuating what may be described as a spontaneous and natural drift to settled life. Thus, an acute decline in the amount of rainfall, which is a frequent phenomenon in the Western Desert, and the consequent drought, famine and death of large numbers of animals will drive men to search for a more stable means of living in which they can find the security that is lacking in the nomadic way of life. The introduction of modern education and the establishment of schools in the larger villages have played a great role in changing the outlook of the people and in discrediting the traditional nomadic values. The advent of the railway and the improvement of other means of transport and communication have encouraged contacts with the Delta, and more particularly with Alexandria. As a result, an increasing number of young men migrate every year to Alexandria and get themselves paid jobs there. Trade and commercial transactions have also been increased with the Delta. New trade centres (e.g. El-Hammam, El-Dab'aa and Mersa Matrouh) have grown up along the railway line at the key stations. The most important of these centres is perhaps El-Hammam, which is the largest cattle market in the Western Desert. Small food stores and cafés and restaurants owned by 'native' people have been opened at these centres and in the larger

bad years the returns may be so poor that grain and flour have to be sent from 105
the Delta to avert famine. The failure of the crop may also compel whole 243
clan-segments to migrate with their animals to the Delta. In this respect, 311
the semi-nomadic clans of the Western Desert represent a real burden on
the national economy of Egypt.

Livestock husbandry, which is by far the most important and highly valued 105
occupation, is itself subject to the variability and the erratic nature of rainfall, 231
since it is the rain which determines the abundance of herbage and, consequently, the number of animals reared. Pasture land is found mainly to the south of the cultivated land. Sometimes, the fallow patches among the barley fields are also covered with grass and other pasture plants suitable for grazing. Pasture plants usually persist between December and May; during the summer, the land becomes arid hard desert with only few dispersed patches of dry grass. The grazing season *par excellence* is from November to April, during which period barley stands in the fields. After the first showers of November, barley is sown and the young men soon move with their flocks to the pastures, leaving the older people to look after the fields. As the dry season advances, the flocks are moved northwards to the cultivated lands so as to be nearer to fodder and to water-holes. Thus, the movements of the herders are rhythmic and regulated by the division of the year into two major seasons: the wet season and the dry season. The wet season is the period of plenty during which the animals are well fed; the dry season is the period of starvation for the flocks which must then rely on such fodder as barley straw and on the drying grass. Any movements of animals that may take place during that season are carried out on a very limited scale. In exceptionally bad years the people are compelled to dispose of their animals, or at least of a large part of the flocks, or they may send them away to their friends and relatives who may be living near vegetation. Sometimes, the herdsmen find themselves compelled to cross the frontiers to Cyrenaica for pasture.

We can see then from this brief account to what extent the water situation 105
is responsible for determining the modes of living in the desert and for channelling human activities and imposing certain limitations on these activities. Development projects and sedentarization schemes planned for the Western Desert and its inhabitants must, therefore, give a great deal of importance to the question of water and its availability. In fact, most of the contemplated projects envisage the possibility of better exploitation of the existing water supplies as well as the tapping of potential resources.

Rightly or wrongly, it is generally assumed in Egypt that nomadism and 178
semi-nomadism represent a phase of deterioration which is no longer compa- 312
tible with the actualities of modern life and therefore should be abolished.
For, apart from the fact that it is responsible for the hardships and insecurity 657
suffered by the desert dwellers and the consequent ill effects on the national economy, especially in bad years, nomadism as practised in the Western Desert and under the prevailing circumstances is wasteful and destructive. Vast stretches of land which could be reclaimed at little cost and cultivated intensively are simply left for grazing without any serious endeavour to make better use of them. Under the contemplated sedentarization projects it is intended to increase the cultivated area, to improve the pastures by introducing new pasture plants of higher nutritive value in areas where agriculture is not

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178 practicable, to tap unused resources, to develop the existing primitive crafts
and to establish new industries. The question of water is the corner-stone of
312 all these projects. Subterranean water has been tapped from the ancient Roman
657 wells, and about 120 artesian wells have been sunk lately along the coast. A number of water cisterns have been constructed, and others are under construction, to preserve the rain-water for irrigation. Special attention has been paid in this regard to the western part of the coastal zone where the amount of rainfall exceeds that falling in the eastern parts. An example is the Wadi-el-Kharrouba cistern near Mersa Matrouh which will prevent large amounts of rain-water from being lost in the sands or in the sea, and store it for use during the dry season. All the water thus obtained will certainly help to extend the area sown with barley, especially in the El-Dab'aa zone; besides providing the more settled people with what they require to keep their fig trees and olive groves. The abundance of water may also encourage the introduction of new plants and trees which need a more stable and constant supply of water.

178 A few examples may serve to illustrate further the general policy adopted
with regard to the problem of sedentarization of the Bedouin clans, and the
657 steps taken to put the policy into effect.

The first example we shall consider is the Wadi-el-Natrun project which concerns the exploitation of the natural resources of the area so as to allow the establishement of new industries and the extension of the cultivated area, which in turn may eventually encourage the people to change to agriculture or industry, i.e. to a sedentary life. The *wadi* is an extended depression which lies some 22 metres below sea-level. The south-eastern end of the depression is 80 kilometres from Cairo, while the northern end is about 85 kilometres from Alexandria. A number of shallow salt lakes cover about half its total area, and some of these lakes become dry during the summer. The *wadi* is known as a rich source of salt and natron (sodium carbonate). Also a certain reed called *halfa* grows there and is used by the inhabitants of the area for the making of rough mats. The depression has always been regarded as a grazing ground for sheep and goats, so that only 25 *feddans*[1] were cultivated in 1952. According to the project, the extraction of salt and soda was put under government supervision. Subterranean water was tapped in a number of places and by the end of 1957 more than one thousand *feddans* were brought under the plough. Serious efforts were also made to introduce the cultivation of fruit, olives and dates as well as vegetables. Much attention was also given to the question of improving the production of animals by introducing different methods of breeding, and encouraging the inhabitants of the area to change over to the improved breeds which are superior to the local animals. This was met at first with much reluctance and resistance, but there are signs that the people are beginning to appreciate the benefit of owning the improved breeds. A factory for the manufacture of carpets and rugs has also been established by the government. A considerable proportion of the raw wool required for the industry is obtained from local sources, and the relatively small production finds a ready market in the larger cities of the Delta. The point of particular interest for us here is that all the unskilled labour employed in this industry as well as in the extraction of salt and sodium is recruited from the local population. Those workers have become accustomed to a settled life, so that when the season of extraction is over and work is temporarily suspended they do

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[1] A *feddan* = 1 038 acres.

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not take up herding animals but rather prefer to engage in agriculture, either as paid workers at the government research farm where fruit and vegetables are grown, or cultivating small patches of barley for their own consumption. Paid jobs in the factory or in the extraction industry and on the farm are very attractive to the young men. Fruit and vegetables are grown, for research purposes, in a large area of the reclaimed land. It is understood, however, that this land will be sold to the people to be exploited by them; and it is hoped that development of such farms will lead to the introduction of a canned food industry. Thus, the ultimate aim of the project is to encourage people to adopt a settled sedentary life by setting up new industries which depend mainly on the agricultural products of the area. The distribution of the arable lands will serve as an additional means of attaining this objective. All the lands of the desert are considered the exclusive property of the State, with only the right of usufruct conceded to the people. The people themselves know this only too well, although they may speak about 'their' fields and 'their' grazing-grounds and they are quite willing to settle down and to practise intensive agriculture if they are given the right to possess the land.

The main features of the Wadi-el-Natrun project repeat themselves in the Qattara Depression project which, besides its other objectives, is designed to bring about the sedentarization of the nomads by industrialization as well as by the enlarging of the cultivated area. The project is still under consideration; but from what is already known about it, it seems that the starting-point will be the digging of a long canal connecting the Mediterranean at the village of El-Alamein with the depression which lies 10 kilometres to the south of the coast. This step will be taken with the purpose of transforming a part of the depression into a large lake covering an area of about 14,000 square kilometres. The lowest point in the depression is 134 metres below sea-level; thus, it is expected that the sea water will rush towards the depression at some 600 cubic feet per second. The force of the rushing water could be used as motive power for factories in the area and as a means of generating the electric power necessary for industries to be established. As in the case of the Wadi-el-Natrun project, all the labour needed for these industries will be recruited locally. In addition, the creation of this vast artificial lake will temper the heat of the area and it is expected that as a result of the perpetual evaporation from the lake large amounts of rain will fall there, thus making possible the cultivation of vast stretches of land. It will certainly take a very long time for the lake to be completely filled up with sea-water. Experts estimate, for example, that it will need about 40 years for the water-level to reach 70 metres below sea-level, and about 150 years for it to reach 50 metres below sea-level. Some 1,300 years should pass before the depression itself is entirely filled up with salt deposits as a result of evaporation.

Lastly, the Ras-el-Hikma project endeavours to deal with the same problem but from a different angle. Unlike the Wadi-el-Natrun and the Qattara Depression projects which are concerned with industrialization and increasing the cultivated lands as means of encouraging sedentarization, the Ras-el-Hikma project is designed, to achieve that end by improving the grazing potentialities of the Western Desert in general and the Fuka-Ras-el-Hikma region in particular; and also by rationalizing the use of pasture-grounds. The logic that lies behind the project is as follows: The excessive misuse of the pasture plants and uncontrolled grazing in the desert have caused aridity and consequently obliged the people to adopt a nomadic life in search of

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pasture. Therefore, if pasture grasses could be developed and grazing practices could be organized, it would then be easy to bring the herders to a form of sedentary life in which they could practise animal husbandry in certain specific areas all the year round, without any need for transhumance or for seasonal migrations or movements. It is thought that the long-term results of the project will be both an increase in livestock production and a greater interest in the land and in intensive agriculture—a feature which hardly exists among the nomads. Ras-el-Hikma, a small village on the coast mid-way between Alexandria and Sollum, has been chosen as a suitable place for a pilot project. A research station has been established there and the whole project has been placed under the sponsorship of the Desert Institute of Cairo.

An area of about 7500 *feddans* was selected and fenced round for the pilot project. Intensive research has been carried out to develop species of palatable pasture grass which can stand the drought and summer heat and other local conditions. Considerable areas have been resown and kept under close observation. Selected breeds of animals have been imported and placed under observation both for the study of grazing management and in order to determine to what extent these breeds can be used in improving the local breeds. Much attention has been given to the problem of developing the underground water supplies; a number of wells have been sunk and wind-pumps have been erected on some of them. Efforts have also been made to introduce the cultivation of fruits and vegetables and to encourage the local inhabitants to adopt them as part of their normal diet.

So much for the development of the natural resources and grazing management in the area. But if the Bedouins are to settle down and make best use of these improved conditions, they should also be provided with suitable housing for new type of existence. A section of the land put aside for the pilot project was divided into plots on each of which was built a 'model' house designed to meet all the requirements of the Bedouin in his new life. Each dwelling has its own small garden where vegetables and fruit can be grown for private consumption, and its own animal byre. Wells provided with wind-pumps have also been constructed to provide the settlers with water for daily use and for the irrigation of their gardens.

From the purely technical point of view, the pilot project has shown good and encouraging results; and there is every reason to believe that the main project will be equally successful if it is handled with the same determination and seriousness. But it may be too early to give any definite opinion about the sociological results that can be expected. The people have not yet shown any real interest in what is going on around them, in spite of the laborious and continuous efforts made by the staff of the research station to stimulate this interest.

From these examples, two main points may be singled out for special notice:

1. Most of the projects tend to encourage sedentarization at the expense of animal husbandry; or at least they do not give enough consideration to this vital question. The only exception to this is, perhaps the Ras-el-Hikma project. This policy may prove, in the end, to be harmful to livestock production and may have the effect of depleting the animal wealth of the region. Industrialization and the agricultural development of the arable areas in the desert, important as they may be as means of bringing about sedentarization, should not divert interest from long-range development schemes.

2. It may prove impossible for all the claims put forward for the sedentarization projects to be be fulfilled unless the people are entitled to own the lands they cultivate. Besides giving the inhabitants a new feeling of security, this would attach them permanently to their fields, and thus incite them to give due attention to cultivation. Land-holding is considered to be the determining factor in the process of establishing sedentary life in the desert. 178 657

Reactions to the proposed sedentarization projects vary widely, from indifference, reluctance and resentment to the absolute acceptance of them together with the changes which they may be expected to bring about. The kind of reaction depends mainly on the benefits that may be gained, or the losses that may be suffered, as a result of the realization of these projects. Thus, the semi-nomads who usually spend a considerable part of the year near towns and the larger villages such as Mersa Matrouh and El-Dab'aa and who thus have some idea of the significance and the privileges of settled life react favourably in general and welcome the sedentarization projects. Similar reactions may be found among the groups who have been accustomed to wage labour and who have thus tasted the advantages which money can offer. On the other hand, the more nomadic clans, especially those inhabiting the southern and the western parts of the desert, are forthright in expressing their deep resentment and indignation concerning the new projects. This is more obvious among the nomadic groups which live near the Egyptian-Libyan borders and who thus have grazing interests in Cyrenaica as well. For them sedentarization means the loss of these interests. Tribal chiefs also express dismay at the projects and the impending changes. Their doubts and resentment spring from their fear of losing their authority over the tribesmen, if the clans and the nomadic groups are sedentarizated and thus brought under the control of the local administration. 178

There is no doubt that the realization of these projects will cut deep into the structure of the traditional Bedouin community. The creation of new industrial and trade centres, the drift to agriculture and industry and to paid jobs, the increase in contacts with the Delta and especially with Alexandria, the greater amounts of cash in the hands of the people as a result of all these developments, and lastly the emergence of individual or private ownership of land as a result of new land legislation will lead to a growing sense of individuality and of economic independence among the younger generation. These individualistic tendencies may have some disruptive effects on both the traditional patterns of social relationships and the total social structure. Being economically independent of the lineage or the larger kin-groups, the young men will be able to free themselves from the authority of their elders, which may lead in the end to the breaking down of the whole traditional structure.

Perhaps the system which will be affected more deeply by these new trends is the kinship system, around which revolves all social and political life in the desert. The core of this system is the co-operation of a large number of agnatic kin constituting one corporate economic unit in which the personality of the individual is entirely submerged by group interests. The economic independence of the individual members and the consequent trend towards separation will lead to the shrinkage of this kin-group and to the disappearance of lineages and larger lineage-segments. Thus, the corporate units based on kinship relations will be limited in size and most of them will take the form of the

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Libyan Bedouin MT9

[For information on the establishment of schools and medical clinics in Libya by the Italian government for the benefit of the Bedouins, see Categories 175 and 648.]

657 sanctioned the direction of economic development from a
177 pastoral to a market-oriented, agricultural mode of production.
474 433 Land reclamation and development projects administered by the
cooperatives encourage the Bedouins to produce cash crops.
In this way, Al-Qasr is being drawn into the national economy.
Price changes and seasonal commodity preferences in the Nile
Valley now affect the economy of al-Qasr. The generation of a
[181] cash economy has created a competitive spirit and a degree of
individual independence which cuts across tribal loyalty and
affiliations. The cooperative society, in this manner, tends
to be a "social equalizer."

657 But economic transformation as the intended goal of the
177 Cooperative Law is far from being an accomplished fact. Al-
178 Qasr is still a traditional Bedouin society in the sense that
474 the lineage structure is the framework in which economic and
*613 social relations take place. Because the cooperative society,
as a new basis for association, threatens the dominance of the
lineage principle, it has become the focal point for a struggle
between the old and new.

657 The major problem encountered by the government officials
177 in this program is that the cooperative society, as a central
474 agent for the dispensation of aid products, becomes a pawn in
•661 tribal power politics. The government, forced to rely upon the
435 prestigious and wealthy men for the initiation of an innovative
program, found itself unable to prevent profiteering and the

657 sale of goods on the black-market. Tribal leaders, or members
177 of a "status group," in whose hands the operation of the
474 cooperative society had been placed, confiscated more than
661 [435] their share of food and fodder and resold it either in the
Nile Valley or to their own tribesmen for whom it had originally
been intended. The government could not really prosecute the
guilty parties for fear of jeopardizing the entire program.
Nor could they convince the cheated tribesmen that they had
been treated unfairly by their leaders. For one thing, the
[673] Bedouins did not consider that their leaders were committing
a wrong; furthermore, any Bedouin who would go to the government to inform on another Bedouin would be subjected to a
[577] trial by Bedouin justice. It is still the traditional codes
of Bedouin law and honor, and not the modern judiciary system,
which prevail in al-Qasr.

474 The cooperative society in al-Qasr is one of thirteen
in the general area of Marsa Matruh. It began with a membership of twenty-five, twenty-two of these were from the 'Aishaibat
tribe. Today, the enrollment is 139 official, and another 195
"unofficial" members. The unofficial members represent unregistered branches of the al-Qasr cooperative. The Bedouins
[735] explain that they cannot allow any members of the tribe to go
hungry, and, therefore, they will distribute food to all those
[661] who need it (Zein, n.d.). This, of course, shows that those
cooperative officers who do profiteer are not entirely oblivious

474 of the needs of their tribesmen; that, in fact, the patronage
661 system is relative to the traditional situation. Unavoidably,
474 the al-Qasr cooperative society is dominated by one tribe:
619 107 of its members are from the 'Aishaibat, while only 32 are
from other tribes. This relationship between traditional and modern structures is common throughout the Western Desert. When a new cooperative is organized within the boundaries of a certain tribal mintaqa, members of the local tribe will resign from other cooperatives to join "their own." Thus, when a new cooperative was founded in Marsa Matruh, twenty members of the Jum'iat tribe left the al-Qasr branch to join the new chapter which catered largely to the needs of the Jum'iat in the town.

474 The World Food Program of the Food and Agriculture
747 Organization (F.A.O.) of the United Nations operates through
433 the cooperative society. It has had an impact on the economy
177 of the Bedouins of al-Qasr. In 1963, this organization, with
the cooperation of the U.A.R. government, proposed to stabilize economic conditions in the Western Desert by providing 4,000 Bedouin families (20,000 persons) with enough food and fodder to help them through the three dry summer months. The program was designed to encourage mixed and settled farming through the reclamation of 20,000 acres of arid desert land, while its range improvement project was to furnish pasturage for 500,000 sheep throughout the Northwestern Coastal Zone. In al-Qasr,

156 exercise his functions, he invited all the important people in the area
159 into a large gathering during which he announced that he was handing the
613 463 sacred books to Shei'eb, who was to become the nazzar and also to succeed
683 him as the Aqila of bait Asabei'. Although at that time Shei'eb was
554 fairly young, twenty-six, nobody questioned Sheikh Elewa's decision.
428 (579) "He is the Aqila," said one informant, "and he has the right to decide
which of his sons is to succeed him. After all, he knows his sons better
than anybody else and knows which one is best for the job." Most people
156 thought that Sheikh Elewa, being still alive and with clear thinking,
159 613 would help Shei'eb in performing his duties as Aqila. A few months after
554 Shei'eb took over his father's position, it became apparent that he was
578 too immature for the job. He tried to use his position to take money
● [661] from members of his bait and when they refused to give him any money, he
entered into fights with a number of them. Rumors spread that he took
bribes from the disputing parties who came to him for him to assess the
legal compensation for wounds to raise or lower his estimate. But still
people within bait Asabei' as well as outside it respected Sheikh Elewa's
decision and did not challenge Shei'eb openly. But as time passed the
dissatisfaction with Shei'eb grew. This dissatisfaction came mainly from
members of the Amar who were affected directly by Shei'eb's actions, especially those actions which resulted in the payment of compensation for
wounds inflicted in fights.

PHASE II

439 On the evening of May 16, 1966, two members of the Geneishat tribe of Matruh area came to Burg-el-Arab with a large shipment of smuggled cigarettes to leave with their partner in the area, Hadi, from the

622 His main function is to manage the affairs of the village, apprehend
554 criminals, report and register births and deaths, collect taxes and
represent the government in all matters involving the relationship between
the government and his village. Because of his position as the
[661] representative of the govrernment, he usually enjoys a considerable
amount of power which, over the years, many omdas have used it to obtain
personal benefits.

361 In 1958 the committee appointed for the examination of the possibility
631 of applying the system to Awlad Ali noticed that vil[illegible] in the
sense of a compact settlement similar to that existing in the rural area
simply do not exist in the Western Desert region. There are a few
settled communities in the area but they are scattered homes or a few
stores. These communities have no identifiable boundaries or administrative
631 existence. The area as a whole is divided into ten administrative
634 districts, each having a police station. These districts correspond
[625] to the old Senusia Zawyas which played an important role in
[795] maintaining order in the era until the First World War. Until that time
[175] the area was divided into fourteen zones each of which was under the
795 jurisdiction of one of the zawyas. The zawyas were mainly religious
175 centers, or shrines, inhabited and directed by a member of the Senusi
[793] order of Cyrenaica. The role of the head of the zawya was to teach the
Qoraan and spread the teachings of the Senusi order. One of the ways
[794] the zawyas attracted followers was through distribution of food and
clothing to those who joined it. The zawyas also provided places of
[798] refuge for those who needed protection since no one could force his way
into the sacred zawyas. Because of their religious position which put

619 675 "Jumi'at, Marabtiin (plural of Marabit) of the 'Ali Ahmar." All Marabit tribes of the Western Desert are affiliated as * [613] clients with Sa'adi tribes. Further, since the tertiary group of the Marabtiin functions in the same way as that of the Sa'adi, it is this group which enters into compacts with Sa'adi tertiary groups. Traditionally, the Marabit group's [682] main support activity was to share in the payment of the blood-money with its Sa'adi protector group. In return, the Marabit group was given land in the protector's territory and could depend upon them to contribute to any Marabit blood debt which might come due. Also, it was considered the [628] [682] duty of the Sa'adi to revenge the death of a member of his client group since the Marabit "was weak and could not face a tribe." But there is no attempt to construct fictional kinship [608] links between Sa'adi and Marabit groups.

[672] In al-Qasr today, contractual relations between Sa'adi and Marabit are still based upon collective responsibility in the blood-feud. However, since this traditional means of conflict control is an extremely rare occurrence, the mutual obligations of the parties are expressed in different forms. [648] In any conflict between the Bedouins and the Egyptian government, the Marabtiin are expected to support their respective ● [666] Sa'adi groups. In any modern elections which a Sa'adi might enter, the Marabit is expected to give him his vote. A few examples will make clear the relationship between the Sa'adi

619 675 578 area of the Western Desert. And, according to the Governor of the province, it is the 'Aishaibat of al-Qasr who are the most powerful of the three primary segments of the 'Ali Ahmar; for example, they have succeeded in sending their 'umda (chief) to the National Assembly in Cairo. In fact, it was over the [666] election of the 'umda in 1964 that the split between the Marabit Qit'an and the Sa'adi Ali Ahmar became an open one and produced political rumblings among the tribes. This case makes explicit the relationship between the two types of tribes in the Western Desert, and gives an important instance of the operation of structural principles in defining groups and group relations.

619 675 666 578 During the national elections of 1964, it was the traditional duty of the Marabit to vote for his affiliated Sa'adi candidate. Since the Qit'an are allied in a client-protector relationship with the Ali Ahmar, all of the Marabtiin of this tribe should have given their votes to the 'umda of the 'Aishaibat who was seeking office to the National Assembly. But, instead, the Qit'an ran a candidate of their own--largely at the urging of the Governor, it is said. But, despite this Marabit opposition, the 'Aishaibat were successful in getting their 'umda elected. Furthermore, 619 675 578 626 the 'Aishaibat said that this rebellion of the Marabtiin could not go unpunished, that reprisals would be taken. The type of sanction which the 'Aishaibat directed against the

*613 of lineage segmentation, ties based upon any of the structural principles may obtain, but they are not ritually legitimated by the principle of blood responsibility. A functional corporate group cannot be defined beyond the secondary level. The Bedouins of al-Qasr make an explicit distinction between a group which is 'asaba and one which is not. The term 'asaba derives from the verb, "to bind," and is translated as "paternal relations" or "agnates." The tertiary and secondary segments are considered to be 'asaba. Only these segments can be represented by an 'aqila.

•[666] *613 196 174 682 The 'aqila, the focus of authority in the corporate tertiary group, is an elected head. The concept of 'aqila is itself an expression which entails mutual support and collective responsibility: the concept of 'aqila is equivalent to that of corporate group. Wehr (1961) translates the word 'aqila as "a clan committed by unwritten law of the Bedouins to pay bloodwite for each of its members." In pre-Islamic Arabia, the 'aqila must have been "the juristic personality" (Weber 1954:157). In early Islamic Arabia, we know the penal codes of the ancient schools of law came to differentiate between the offender (i.e. the individual) and the 'aqila (i.e. the group) concerning the payment of blood-money. During Umayyad times, the 'aqila was the group listed on the diwaan (account books), and was considered a tribal grouping of some order which was responsible for paying the diiya

*613 682 feuds or war, secondary groups, and even whole tribes, became
578 involved. If the tertiary group is in the structural sense
*613 a blood-revenge group, the *'aqila* is the corporate sole of the
554 blood-revenge corporation: an important function of the
682 *'aqila's* office derives from this. The *'aqila* is responsible
578 for the collection and distribution of the blood-money. It
is this specific authoritative function of the office which
is the necessary condition for the existence of a corporate
group. If there is no *'aqila* to collect blood-money, then a
kinship segment is not a corporation and it will merge into
another group headed by an *'aqila* in order to realize collective
benefits.

*613 Bait Braik of 'Ailit Ma'fas (see Figure 8) had no
554 *'aqila* while I was in the field. Their *'aqila* had recently
died and his office had not yet been filled. The person who
● [666] would succeed to the office was known by all, but still his
election or formal appointment did not take place. In other
*613 words, the office of *'aqila* will remain vacant until conflict
554 578 and the need to regulate it force an election. The Bedouins
were pleased about the vacant *'aqila* office in Bait Braik:
"Thank God that it is vacant. When it is necessary, we will
meet and name an *'aqila*." Any of the *'awaaqil* of the lineage
[682] can mediate conflict, but no *'aqila* is willing to take the
responsibility of collecting the blood-money from another man's
bait.

6[illegible]0 order.

*613 The *'aqila* is elected by the elders of the secondary
554 lineage group. The election usually takes place when these
•666 men are gathered for some festive occasion, such as a wedding.
[578] The name of the man chosen to succeed to the political office
will not be made public until it is absolutely necessary, i.e.,
in the case of conflict within the man's *bait*, or more especially,
in the case where blood-money is due. According to the Bedouins,
the only qualification for the office of *'aqila* is wisdom--
*613 the ability to arbitrate disputes. On the other hand, it is
554 implicit that the *'aqila* be a member of the "status group."
556 Prestige commands respect and obedience, and prestige in
al-Qasr usually comes with wealth. In general, the *'aqila* is
an elder, i.e., one with wisdom, and a member of a wealthy
and influential family.

*613 Technically, the *'aqila-ship* is not inherited, but
554 succession tends in this direction. An *'aqila* must "speak the
[428] good and show men how to follow the path of the good." Not
all men have the ability to do this, and, the Bedouins say,
it is natural that such a great gift resides with a particular
family "because the son learns from the father." All of the
'awaaqil in al-Qasr claim that they knew how to settle disputes
before they became *'awaaqil*. If they had not, they would not
[428] have been worthy of the office. Actually, the choice of an
'aqila is a restricted one: the office may pass, according to

*613 554 428 •[666] the unilineal rule, only to the son or the brother of the former 'aqila. In Bait 'Umar, for instance, the office went from father to son to brother (see Figure 8). The election amounts to a choice between the son or the brother, and partiality is usually shown towards the eldest of the two candidates.

*613 554 687 The 'aqila's term of office may be terminated by the members of the bait. Such an action may be the result of ineffectiveness due to old age, or it may stem from a violation of the norms of the office by the incumbent. Two cases of an 'aqila being impeached were reported to me. One, which did not take place in al-Qasr, was brought about when the 'aqila was accused of taking a bribe, and favoring one party to the conflict over the other. The second case, which happened about fifteen years ago in al-Qasr, involved an 'aqila from 'Ailit Ma'fas. This man informed Egyptian officials that his fellow tribesmen were storing guns and ammunition beyond the quantity permitted by national security laws. Not only was this man removed from his 'aqila-ship, but he was also expelled from his tertiary segment, and hence the tribe. *613 554 But, in most cases, term of office is ended by death or senility. The Bedouins say: "An 'aqila will be removed if he can no longer solve problems; if he says bad things about his tribe; if he is too old, or too lazy; in other terms, if he is not a good man, he is removed."

634 554 [571] [635] shaikh are administrators, not executives, in the service of the Governor and the "status group" of al-Qasr. Nevertheless, under the influence of the bureaucratic principle, as a new structural principle in Bedouin society, these offices could conceivably become seats of power.[4]

634 554 ●666 571 The 'umda and shaikh are described as "elective" offices by the Bedouins but, in fact, they are appointive just like the office of 'aqila. Theoretically, every man has a vote but, actually, only the members of the "status group" vote. Paradoxically, perhaps, the Bedouins stress two major qualifications for these offices: the 'umda and the shaikh must be men "who know the needs of the Bedouin of the desert, and know how to talk to the Governor"; and, "they must be men who do nothing without the permission of the 'awaaqil (i.e. without the permission of the "status group" who elected the 'aqila in the first place).

634 554 The two offices are not equal in prestige and status neither in the eyes of the Bedouins or of the Egyptians. The office of shaikh is the lesser office. It amounts to a clerical post, and the shaikh really functions as an assistant

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[635] [4] The Governor, who is of Bedouin origin, has already recognized this potential and has moved to eliminate the possibility of a more powerful 'umda representing a more powerful "status group." When I left the field, the Governor was in the process of drawing up new ground rules for electing the 'umda and the shaikh which would call for public elections on a "one man, one vote" basis.

634 to the *'umda*. Both offices are for a life-term, only being
554 terminated by bad behavior or senility. At the expiration
634 of an incumbent's term, the "status group" meets in al-Qasr
571 to decide upon his replacement. The name of a "nominee"
635 is passed on to the Governor who is expected to approve the
*666 Bedouins' selection of a representative to the government.
It is this "status group"-controlled process which the
[178] Governor seeks to change. Since these are officially held
[177] offices in the U.A.R. governmental structure, he feels that
elections to fill their vacancies should be a public affair.
Naturally, he will exercise more influence over the naming
of candidates in this way, and the Bedouins perceive this as
a challenge to the traditional structure of leadership and
control of external relations.

634 The offices of *'umda* and *shaikh* are even more heredi-
*613 tary than that of *'aqila*, which theoretically should not be
666 the case. By definition, the role of *'aqila* is functional at
[428] the *bait* level, and so the recruitment pool of candidates
for this office is inherently limited. By comparison, the
offices of *'umda* and *shaikh* should go to the "best men" in
the tribe, and, therefore, the recruitment pool should be
634 tribal-wide. But, in fact, these two offices are considered
*613 "the property" of the wealthiest lineages in the al-Qasr area.
666 There is a traditional rationale behind this fact: there is
428 the structural necessity for, and conscious practice of, an
[571]

634 asymmetrical power relationship between commoners and "status
*613 group" which maintains political order. The Bedouins say of
• 666 the 'umda's office, as they did of the 'aqila, "if the son is
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[571] worthy of the office, then he should take his father's place."
Such a statement is usually qualified by noting that if the son does not possess the qualifications of the office, of course, he will not succeed. This is not simply a case of power politics, there is more to it. Behind the inheritance of the 'umda and shaikh office is a logical concern and attempt to sustain a balance of political and social relations.

The "inheritance" of the 'aqila's office is explained by showing that the candidates for the office are limited to the brothers and sons of the incumbent, the former 'aqila. The offices of 'umda and shaikh, in contrast, have a recruitment pool which includes, potentially, every man at the primary tribal level, the 'Aishaibat. The rule of succession, where the modern legal roles are concerned, is a mechanism for maintaining, what is considered by most Bedouins to be, the
634 legitimate distribution of power in al-Qasr. Once the roles
*613 of 'umda and shaikh have been "captured" by a bait, for
666 political power resides at the tertiary level of the lineage
428 structure, any attempt to change the distribution or locus
578 of power will be culturally transformed into a threat to the
honor, not of the individual, but of his bait and 'aiela. And this is a basis for conflict in Bedouin society. It is

634 no coincidence, then, that the present 'umda and shaikh are
*613 the sons of the former 'umda and shaikh. This reveals not
• 666 only the structural rules of succession, but also indicates
428 [578] that "social honor," and thus power, still resides with these
families.

It is important to note that since the time of their
[178] inception, these roles have not changed 'aiela or even bait
in al-Qasr. When the former 'umda from 'Ailit Lazumi died,
634 *613 his eldest son petitioned to the 'awaaqil of the 'Aishaibat
666 that he be approved to succeed to his father's position.
428 The 'awaaqil met and made their decision. One 'aqila who
571 was present at the election said: "The office of 'umda should
stay in the Lazumi family since the father was 'umda. The
'awaaqil agreed on the son. But the son will be accepted to
follow his father only if he is good. If he is not good, the
'awaaqil will find a new bait." Although the Bedouins speak
of "the 'awaaqil" electing the 'umda, it must be remembered
that it is the "status group" which makes the decision, and
that the 'awaaqil are only part of this group. The names of
[627] the men who elected the present 'umda include less 'awaaqil
and more rajal khair.

114 Before I arrived in the field, the present acting
634 'umda of the 'Aishaibat tribe was elected to the national
666 parliament to represent the province of Marsa Matruh. The
election of his replacement was not scheduled to take place

114 634 until sometime after my departure from the field.[5] Never-
•666 theless, before I left the field I discussed the pending
114 election with some of my informants and members of the
634 "status group." The interviews reveal that the "status
666 group" still intends to dominate the area of power relations
124 829 with the government. As one informant said: "The present
*[613] _'umda_ and the one before him were from Bait Bu Taram of
'Ailit Lazumi, and the next one will be from Bu Taram also."

634 The tenacity of traditional politics and the influence
571 of the "status group" are reflected in the affairs surrounding
666 the election of a new incumbent to the office of _'umda_. In
this situation, all Bedouins become concerned more with the
distribution of power than with the actual person who will
124 fill the authority role. One informant, an _'aqila_, gave
*613 indication that formal authorities support the "status group"
634 and the distribution of power which they represent and maintain.

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> Mustafa, the brother of the _'umda_, takes his place while he is in Cairo attending Parliament. The _'umda_ told me that he was going to ask the _'awaaqil to_ sacrifice (i.e. slaughter a lamb) and write a paper making Mustafa the new _'umda_. (Here I told the informant that I had spoken with Mustafa about this, and he told me that he did not want to be the _'umda_).
> Even if Mustafa does not want to be the _'umda_, the _'awaaqil_ will force him to accept . . . It should remain in the same family, it would be a shame if the office went to another family. Mustafa's father and brother were _'umdas_ before him. If the office left the family,

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[5] Technically, the 'Aishaibat were without an _'umda_ while I was in the field. However, he spent enough time in Matruh that he was able to carry on his duties until his successor could be named.

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> If the office left the family, all of the lineages would be fighting over it . . . The job should stay in Bait Bu Taram; if this is impossible, then it should stay in 'Ailit Lazumi. In any case, the 'awaaqil will decide.

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A change in the present locus of legal authority in the Bedouin-Egyptian government structural relationship would amount to a re-structuring process, and could lead to serious conflict. In the very least, it would call for a clear explanation and new statement of social reality since it would challenge what is, and "has always been," a legitimate distribution of power and political order.

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The office of the shaikh is not a potential power-base by comparison with the office of 'umda. The shaikh, rather than being in direct communication with the Governor, executes the official orders made known to the 'umda. As an administrator, he takes care of issuing drivers' licenses, notifies men of their military draft status, etc. The government sees this as a necessary post because of the difficulty of contacting Bedouins deep in the desert. In one sense, the shaikh's office is becoming less functional as the Bedouin move in from the desert and begin to take part in the national society, but in another sense it is becoming more functional as bureaucracy and red tape become increasingly complex. But the shaikh remains in the shadow of the 'umda. He never substitutes for the 'umda, for this would infringe on the rightful power of the 'umda's family; when the 'umda is absent,

634 his brother sits in his place.
554

The present *shaikh* is a member of 'Ailit Ma'fas, and
634 this is to offset the fact that the office of *'umda* is in
*613 'Ailit Lazumi. It reflects the need to distribute official
554 power and to symbolize the real power structure. Historically,
the Lazumi were more powerful than the Ma'fas. These two
lineages are the largest, wealthiest, and most influential
in al-Qasr and among the 'Aishaibat. When the present
●[666] *shaikh's* father decided to retire due to old age, he requested
[571] that his son be allowed to take up his role. The *'awaaqil*
of the 'Aishaibat in al-Qasr approved this "nomination" and
[556] the son was "elected." It is a fact that the *shaikh's* father
is the richest man among the members of the 'Ailit Ma'fas
and that the *'umda's* father was the richest man of 'Ailit
Lazumi.

571 Power groups tend to interact so as to enhance not
*613 the official authority structure but the political *status quo*
582 (Peters 1967:279). This explains a practice of the "status
group" which Max Weber referred to as "connubism," the tendency
of the members of this group to exchange women among themselves.
*613 In Figure 10,[1] the marriages of 'Ait Abd al-Malik of Bait 'Umar
582 of 'Ailit Ma'fas show that out of seventeen marriages only
four of these were within the 'Aishaibat, and that three out
of four of these marriages were with 'Ailit Lazumi. Even
more impressive is the information obtained from considering

[1] [See p. 132--Analyst]

156 159 554 829 •666

> There is another objection which I have concerning our customs. I mean the case of elections. For instance, one from the 'Aishaibat and one from the Sanagra, of the 'Ali Abyad, are nominated. Then, each man must vote for the one from his own tribe. He must vote for the 'Aishaibi even if the other is the better man. But, we should consider that the best man is the man with the best qualifications. 'Umda Ibrahim, for instance, knows how to greet an official or a minister, but he does not know the _'awaiyid_ nor the problems of the Bedouins. His brother (who will probably be the next _'umda_) is a good man and is educated, but he does not know the _'awaiyid_ either.

829 666 This view contrasts sharply with the traditional stand of most Bedouins in al-Qasr, including the members of the "status group." For instance, one _'aqila_ voiced what is a prevalent opinion when he said:

[619 186]

> If a man chooses to become a political candidate against a Bedouin, he must understand that the members of the tribe should and would vote for their _'umda_ because he is a member of their own tribe. Even if a man is crazy and his opponent has the highest college degree, the Bedouins must vote for the man from their own tribe.

156 159 554 178 177 829 [671] Hajj 'Ali is modern in his evaluation of the political situation here: a politician should know the problems of his constituents rather than follow principles based on traditional relationships. His motive is not to promote the _'awaiyid_ as a good way of life, for we know he does not think this to be the case. Instead, Hajj 'Ali believes that in order to help the Bedouins through a period of change one must know what they are changing from. Through his negative appraisal of

634 The situation is quite different in the Western Desert. Although
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657 it is the government, represented by the province council, which makes
554 the final decision in appointing the omda or sheikh, yet this appoint-
619 ment is made on the basis of nominations given by the gribal segment
635 or segments which he would represent. Since the tribal segment usually
nominates one person, the decision of the council is limited to the
examination of the credentials of the nominee and to see if he meets the
basic requirements of the law. If a certain nominee is rejected by the
council, a very rare occurrence, the matter goes back to the tribal
segment to make another nomination. In practice, then, the omda of the
Western Desert is elected by the people and the appointment by the govern-
ment of the omda is significant only in cases where the omda is to repre-
sent more than one small tribal segment and each nominates one. Here the
council has to choose between the various nominaees and appoints the best
634 qualified. Unlike the omda of the village, the tribal omda is a real re-
554
657 presentative of his people. Despite the fact that he becomes part of a
619 governmental structure, his basic function is to look after the interest
[622] of his tribal group. Or, as one informant put it, "The omda is the ser-
vant of the people." In many cases the best interest of the tribal segment
is served through full cooperation of the omda with the government. So
far there seems to be very little conflict between the interest of the
tribal populations and that of the government. There is very little in
[651] the area that the government demands or needs. There is no taxable land
to speak of. There are only a few acres of barley land and even these
634 are minimally taxed. The main responsibility of the omda to the govern-
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657 ment is to report births and deaths and give a yearly list of young men

634 government." But due to the nature of the representation and the specific
554 relation of the government to the area, the position of the omda
657 does not pose serious demands upon the loyalty of the omda to his tribal
[578] group.

634 Because of the omda's ability to bring benefits to his tribal segment
554 from the government, the ability to manipulate the administrative
657 officials is the most important basis for the nomination of a given
● 666 individual for the position of the omda. "The omda is one who can speak city talk and knows how to deal with the government officials." Age is not important; young people know more about city ways than old people. "A man may be a cheat, but as long as he can get our things done, he is the best man for the job...of course, we don't want to nominate someone with a bad reputation who may blacken our face in front of everybody. However, if he has a bad reputation the council would not approve his appointment...he just has to be someone who can get things done..."

159 Muftah Mughaieb, the sheikh of the Sanagrah tribal segment in the
634 district of Haman, described the circumstances of his nomination as
554 follows:

> 657 Before the former sheikh of that tribal segment died (he
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> 578 was Muftah's uncle), one member of the group got into an argument
> 625 with the police officer in charge of the police station in the district. The tribesman insulted the police officer who insisted on arresting him. Rumors also had it that the police officer was using his authority to reduce the share of the tribal segment in the government aid which was badly needed during that particular year. Sheikh Muftah, whose father is the Aqila of

159 bait Mughaieb of the Sanagrah tribe, went to the officer and apologized
634 to him on behalf of the whole group and invited him to a
554 lavish dinner party. The charges against the tribesman were soon
657 ● 666 dropped, and it was concluded that it was because of the way Muftah
[578] [625] had handled the situation. Since that incident, Muftah has been known as an expert in handling the government officials. One year later, the sheikh of the tribal segment died, and a meeting was held during which the important members of the Sanagrah tribal segment in the district decided to nominate Muftah for the position of the sheikh, vacant by the death of his uncle. Muftah, who was attending the meeting, was asked to accept the nomination, and he agreed. "...I accepted the nomination reluctantly." Muftah later told me, "I did not really want to become the sheikh. The
159 position does not bring any personal benefit, and it involves a
634 lot of responsibility. The sheikh has to act as an attorney for
554 657 his tribe, represent it to the government and competes with other sheikhs to bring his people things that the other sheikhs cannot get for theirs, like more membership in the cooperative units or in the socialist union. And what does he get in return? Nothing... not even the gratitude of his people. To them, he is a servant of the tribe, and his duty is to look after its interest. If he doesn't, then everybody is quick to criticize him. I had to accept the nomination because I felt it was my duty to do so and not to embarrass the awaqil and the important people of the tribe who
[465] put their confidence in me. As far as the government, all I get is six pounds a month."

156 tional style of Bedouin hospitality--"as we used to do in
159 Cyrenaica"--and spent a total of 50 L.E. for the welcoming
554 ceremony. "This money was from his own pocket," as the
829 Bedouins of al-Qasr complained after it was learned that
574 the vice-President would not visit Matruh after all. As
648 a matter of fact, all of the Bedouin leaders who had been
invited to the reception by Hajj 'Ali refused to eat the
food, for they said that it had not been prepared for them.
[576] This act was taken as a show of respect for Hajj 'Ali and
anger with bureaucrats.

156 Hajj 'Ali is the representative of al-Qasr to the
159 Arab Socialist Union which meets in Marsa Matruh and has
554 cell meetings in al-Qasr. The socialist cell in al-Qasr
648 meets about three times a month. When I asked why Hajj 'Ali
●668 was the man chosen to represent all of al-Qasr at section
[124] meetings of the Union, the reply was: "Because he is a member
[635] of the Majlis al-Muhafza." There was one section meeting
of the Union in Matruh while I was in the field. The theme
of the meeting was "The Meaning of Socialism." Hajj 'Ali
attended this meeting.

156 In sum, it seems not too far afield to say that Hajj
159 'Ali is prepared to take over the leadership of the Bedouins
554 in a much more sophisticated manner than one could possibly
expect from the traditional style of politics. Hajj 'Ali's
[634] comments about the 'umda and the 'umda's probable successor

*795 of a people to live according to their own traditions and institutions.
182 To-day this desire is expressed in the political language
177 of nationalism. In the past it was expressed in religious move-
171 ments. Arab nationalism is not a new phenomenon. Only its
• [668] dress is new.

*795 As will be seen in the chapters which follow, conditions in
Cyrenaica were particularly favourable to the growth of a
182 politico-religious movement such as the Sanusiya became. It was cut off by deserts from neighbouring countries, it had a homogeneous population, it had a tribal system which embraced common traditions and a strong feeling of community of blood, the country was not dominated by the towns, and the Turkish administration exercised very little control over the interior. It was, as will be seen, the tribal system of the Bedouin which furnished the Order with its political foundations just as it was the tribesmen of the country whose hardiness and courage enabled it to stand up to the succession of defeats it had to endure.

*795 The reasons for the political success of the Sanusiya Order in
793 Cyrenaica will appear in the course of this account, and here I
wish to draw attention to one of them only. It has been said
182 that its rites and teachings were, like the Bedouin character,
[792] austere without being fanatical, and that it tolerated the cult
[798] of saints to which the Bedouin were accustomed, the Grand
Sanusi becoming, in fact, a kind of national saint; but it must be added that the acceptability of its teachings and the fact that the Grand Sanusi could at once be placed by the Bedouin in the familiar category of *Marabtin*, holy men coming to preach and settle in Cyrenaica from the west, cannot alone account for the remarkable success of the Sanusiya movement. The Bedouin of Cyrenaica had heard similar teachings before from similar teachers and had paid them the same degree of attention as they paid to the Grand Sanusi, but these earlier missionaries won only a personal and local following for themselves and their descendants, whereas the Grand Sanusi established himself and his family as leaders of a national movement, a position they have now held for three generations.
[792] Leaving aside the remarkable personality of the Grand Sanusi
[798] and without here discussing whether the time at which he
taught was particularly favourable to the growth of the move-

*795 182 and political boundaries, help to keep the Islamic world together against the impact of western civilization and imperialism. A member of the Qadiriya or Rifa'iya Orders can wander from lodge to lodge from China to the Atlantic. A member of the Madaniya is received as a brother if he goes to Maknas, Istanbul, or Mecca. An 'Isawi or 'Arusi finds lodges of his Order all over North Africa, obeying the same rules, bearing the same banner, using the same books of devotion, performing the same ritual, and bound by a common brotherhood. These Orders, therefore, are not unimportant in shaping and propagating a common opinion and feeling among Muslims about any question of the day which affects Islam.

*795 369 182 [668] But in a narrower political sense they have little importance, even in the urban centres. They are too weak and poor to act as cells in a movement of a political kind, for they show, as René Brunel says of the 'Isawiya, 'lack of unity of direction' and 'absolute lack of cohesion'[1] In Cyrenaica the Sanusiya alone has been capable of becoming a political movement and hence of all the Orders alone aroused the suspicion of Istanbul and the hostility of Rome. We may inquire, therefore, what it is which has distinguished the Sanusiya from the other Orders in the country. [186] As we have noted earlier, the fakiristic exhibitions of some of the Orders, so dear to the common man in the towns, were uncongenial, even repellent, to the Bedouin, who, in any case, had no affection for the townsmen and for things emanating from the towns. Also the Bedouin, socially and morally secure in their tribal and kinship systems, felt no need for further associations. Their need was for some authority lying outside their segmentary tribal system which could compose intertribal and intersectional disputes and bind the tribes and tribal sections together within an organization and under a common symbol. [579] Hence, while the urban lodges were clubs—and this was the status of the Sanusiya lodges in the towns as much as it was that of the lodges of the other Orders—the Sanusiya lodges in the country-side were political, administrative, and economic, as well as religious and educational, centres. The urban lodges followed the social pattern in urban communities generally. Corporate life was narrowed to small quarters, single streets, a few houses, outside which people belonged, it is true, to a

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[1] *Essai sur la Confrérie religieuse des 'Aïssâoua au Maroc*, 1926, p. 53.

Italy would therefore withdraw from her colonial adventure, 175*
advised the Amir to sign the Accord of al-Rajma in the hope 648*
that he would not have to carry out its terms. He was later to 631
spend over 16 years in exile in Italy for his alleged duplicity. 795*
The Italians did not at this time charge the Amir with more 793
than weakness when, after the stipulated eight months had [712]
passed, he had failed to carry out the terms of the accord, especially
in the matter of the armed Sanusi camps.

These camps were supply points garrisoned by the remnants 175*
of the Sanusi army of 1917. Through them and from them the 648*
Sanusiya was exercising political control over the country and 712
administering the tribes. The chief camps in 1917 were Ajada- 631
biya, al-Shlaidima, Marawa, Khawalan, al-Abyar, Taknis, and 795*
'Akrama. Each was under a *qaimaqam* and had its com- 701
mandant of troops, its qadi for judicial proceedings, and its
tithe collectors who collected from the Bedouin a tax on crops
and flocks. With the development of the political functions of
the Order alms had been transformed into taxes. Ajadabiya and
al-Shlaidima had as their *nazir*, inspector, 'Ali Pasha al-'Abdiya.
Al-Abyar and Taknis came under Sidi 'Umar al-Mukhtar, and
Marawa, Khawalan, and 'Akrama came under Sayyid Safi
al-Din.

When asked why these camps had not been broken up the 175*
Amir said that the accord had been very badly received by the 648*
Bedouin and that were it to be enforced hastily serious dis- 712
turbances might ensue. He counselled caution. In addition to 701
the continuance of the armed camps in defiance of the accord, 795*
the Italians also complained of concerted passive resistance, 793
on the part of the Shaikhs of Sanusiya lodges and the Shaikhs 631
of tribes, to collaboration with their officials; but either because [668] ●
they were not yet ready to use force or because they were con-
vinced that the Amir was unable to dictate to his followers,
and probably for both reasons, they continued to temporize.

By the further Accord of Bu Mariyam of 11 November 1921 175*
the dissolution of the armed camps was confirmed, but it was 648*
agreed that until the Italians had strengthened their admini- 712
strative control and political influence in the country the still- 701
existing Sanusi camps should be held jointly. There were to 631
be four so-called '*Campi Misti*', at al-Abyar, Taknis, Slanta, 795*
and 'Akrama, manned by Italian and Sanusi troops in the

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Order was 'not a true and proper State but something very similar'.[1] We have seen how these political functions were further developed under the rule of Sayyid al-Mahdi and how under the rule of Sayyid Ahmad al-Sharif what may justly be called an embryonic State came into being. The Head of the Order was by this time less the religious Head of an Islamic fraternity than the leading representative of a nascent nationalism which became increasingly conscious of itself in the long struggle against the Italians under Sanusiya leadership. In this struggle the Order became more and more a political organization which directed, administratively, economically, and militarily, the entire Bedouin population, and morally the entire population of Cyrenaica, Bedouin and townsmen alike, against the common enemy. When truce was made in 1917, whatever the Italians and British may have asserted to the contrary, they had, in fact, to treat with Sayyid Idris not only as the Head of a religious Order, but also as the Head of a political organization which represented, and alone represented, the political aspirations of a people. As events turned out, the Italians, by destroying the Sanusiya organization, cut out the intervening structure of lodges and Shaikhs and made more evident the political status of the Head of the Order.

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What has happened during the century which has passed since the first Brothers of the Order began to build the lodge and till the soil at what is now al-Zawiya al-Baida must be viewed in relation to Bedouin tribal structure. A man coming from outside and with religious authority established himself as Head of the acephalous Bedouin society of Cyrenaica, and circumstances in which that whole society was forced to act for a long period of time against external enemies transformed his religious fraternity into a political organization. The Sanusiya Order from the first identified itself with the Bedouin and laboured to bring about tribal unity under its aegis. Under Turkish rule nationalist tendencies, as distinct from, and overriding, tribal loyalties, were latent, and the role of the Sanusiya within the frame of the Ottoman Empire was still predominantly religious rather than political; but when the Italians sought to subjugate the Bedouin their resistance, in the very clear moral issue presented to them, manifested itself

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[1] Op. cit., p. 11.

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as a nationalist movement, with a corresponding effect on the 175*
character of the Sanusiya Order and on the status of its Head. 648*
The final stage in the transformation of a religious revival into 795*
a political movement was brought about by the clash of Euro- 793
pean arms. Amid the roar of planes and guns the Bedouin learnt [668] ●
to see themselves more clearly as a single people, the Sanusi of
Cyrenaica, in a wider world, and came to be regarded as such by
those engaged in the struggle.

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671 Libyan Bedouin MT9

[For information on the barawwa, the act of banishing from the group, as a form of legal document, see Categories 675 and 681.]

423 society. Private ownership of land with sovereign rights
*[613] over it is now the normal practice in al-Qasr. Rights are
[178] held by the family head, the shaib. If the family head is
[596] deceased, land tenure rights are held jointly by the sons.

In the area beyond the plateau, in the extreme
[184] south of al-Qasr, land rights to grazing and water still are
*[613] associated with lineages. But here agriculture is impossible.
[241] The type of rights over the land varies with the method by
which it is exploited. The southern and coastal sections of
[433] al-Qasr represent the old and the new, the pastoral traditional
mode of production and the modern agricultural cash economy.
[233] But, as noted, of the total population only a few Bedouins
are actually engaged in pastoralist activities. Hence, tribal
tenure rights, in general, are not overly important at this
time. Not too long ago they were, and many cases in the recent
•[671] history of Bedouin customary law relate to conflicts over land
and water in the southern region. The Bedouins say that
[178] traditionally no lineage could use the pasturage or water of
*[613] another without some agreement, usually of long standing,
[233] made beforehand. Now, they say, permission is not needed.
[675] In the old days, these agreements were made between lineage
representatives, not individuals per se. Today, the grass
178 and water in the southern zone are claimed, though not in a
423 legal sense, by the families using them: the rights of
usufruct over the land are closer to rights of sovereignty

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moral community, we cannot proceed to a discussion of the internal and external systems of political relations.

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As a result of the socialization process, and through relations with other members of the family, an individual comes to recognize that his conduct is measurable by certain standards of, what is considered by the group to be, good and bad, right and wrong. In al-Qasr, such standards are intrinsically correct, or "decent" as the Bedouins say; obedience to the authority representing these standards is interpreted as a "duty." [596] The authoritative aspect of the role of household head (shaib al-bait), and the moral obligations which it represents, emerge from and reinforce values and structural arrangements central to Bedouin social order, namely, respect for authority and devotion to social groups, the two basic elements of morality defined by Durkheim (Parsons 1937:382-385).

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The value placed upon social order, and the structural mechanisms for insuring its realization and extension--kinship, residence and contract--inform an authority structure which ranges between filial piety at the family level and a set of legal norms at the level of the external political system. The fact that the Bedouins of al-Qasr are interested in integrating a larger population into their authority structure means that a common value is operative in the range of it; also that one sphere of authority will tend to merge into another.
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Hence the father-son authority relation has importance for the strength of Bedouin customary law in the desert. The

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and, the individual has been socially conditioned to prefer his father's brother's daughter.

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All of these explanations are as plausible as they are obvious. They are, in fact, the same explanations which the Bedouins themselves offer for their marriage ideal. But one cannot help noticing that the explanations offered actually concern an ideal in Bedouin social behavior, and not a practice. Theories showing the logic of parallel-cousin marriage are placed along side the fact that this type of marriage is statistically atypical.

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If, as Islamic Law decrees, the daughter did inherit some share of her father's property, then parallel-cousin marriage as an attempt to keep land in the tertiary group would be logical. But we know that usually the sons inherit all of the father's property, Islamic Law to the contrary (Levy 1957:245-246). In this case, parallel-cousin marriage can only be seen as an ideal which functions side by side with the other ideal of a girl's right to inherit.

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Barth (1954), and Murphy and Kasdan (1959) have stressed the political advantages which attach to parallel-cousin marriage in the context of factional struggle. The general idea is that political differentiation between collateral branches of the lineage structure is intensified and political autonomy enhanced by the practice of turning affinal bonds inward. Parallel-cousin marriage then has the opposite

*613 segment. He acts in concert with other 'awaaqil (plural of
554 'aqila) of the tertiary segments of his secondary group when
571 lineage matters call for decision-making at this level.
*613 Tertiary segments are replicate groups descended from one
571 ancestor, they operate with a common ideology pursuant of
183 common interests and goals. As we shall see, this common
675 ideology is expressed in a kind of code, or contract, which all members of the group swear to uphold and abide by according to the principle of blood responsibility. Tertiary codes in
[181] al-Qasr are a reflection and an affirmation of a wider system of values and norms which bind the Bedouins of the Western Desert together into a political system. This wider normative
● [671] system is expressed in the customary legal system of the Bedouins known as 'awaiyid Awlad 'Ali ("the customs of the Awlad 'Ali tribe").

*613 The primary duty attached to the office of 'aqila is
578 the regulation of conflict. It is worth noting here that
571 conflict regulation is not equivalent to conflict resolution.
554 The latter process carries with it the intimation that the causes of conflict have been treated and resolved, that conflict has been eliminated. Nothing could be further from the truth in a segmentary society where the various segments actually constitute conflict groups; consequently, conflict between groups or individuals who represent groups may be contained but never forgotten. Conflict is an ongoing process among

*613
554 Conflict regulation, in the formal sense, is the
578 province of the *'aqila*. All complaints should be taken before
692 the *'aqila*. In al-Qasr, every individual has certain rights, and when any of these rights are infringed upon he may demand a redress of wrongs: he demands his rights, or exercises *haqq al-'Arab* ("the right of the Arabs"). The *haqq al-'Arab* is opposed to the *haqq Allah*, "the right of God," which concerns crimes against religion (i.e., wine-drinking, apostasy). The dichotamy represents private claims over against the claims of a religious state which is characteristic of Islamic society.
[688] In al-Qasr, crimes against religion have never occurred, and if they did they would be handled in Marsa Matruh by the local *shaikh* ("holy man").

*613 The litigation process is initiated when an individual
554 appears before his *'aqila* with a claim, and the statement: "I
69 do not wish so-and-so to take any of my rights." The *'aqila* first attempts to persuade each party "to return to the path of the good," to come together and to cease quarreling. This type of moral persuasion is preliminary to a full court-hearing in which both parties will appear with witnesses before their respective *'awaaqil*, and other "third parties" who aid the *'awaaqil* in their decision. The decision reached by the court is morally binding upon both parties. According to recent
• [671]
[178] innovation in Bedouin customary law, the details of the litigation and the decision reached by the court are to be recorded

*613 554 69 [671] [178] on paper in triplicate, one copy going to each litigant and a third copy to the chief of police of the Marsa Matruh sector. In practice, though, a copy usually goes to the litigants, but not to the chief of police (who had not a single Bedouin court case in his files).

*613 695 692 [671] As is not the case in Islamic law, in Bedouin customary law the decision of the judge may be appealed. The system of appeals may even function at the level of familial authority, i.e., the son may, in theory, appeal a ruling by his own father. The Bedouins insist that this is an important right of every man. In the situation where a man wishes to appeal a decision of his own _'aqila_, he will generally take his claim to another _'aqila_ of his secondary group. When an appeal is to be made, it is done with the permission of the _'aqila_ who rendered the original decision. The one who appeals his case does so with the understanding that the decision returned by the court of appeal will be final and binding. Further, if [681] the court of appeal concurs with the findings of the original court, the plaintiff pays a double fine (twice the original fine), and also pays his own _'aqila_ an expiation fee (_kubaara_).

69 648 [682] [685] The Egyptians have preferred to leave the Bedouins of al-Qasr to settle their own disputes except in the more serious criminal matters. Police from Matruh will enter homicide cases and those conflicts over property rights which threaten to explode into tribal warfare. But these types of conflict have

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The boundaries of the Bedouin political community may be defined so as to include all of those authority groups which operate in accordance with the recognized legal code of the Western Desert. This code is referred to as 'awaiyid Awlad 'Ali, i.e. "the customs of the sons of 'Ali." The members of the Awlad 'Ali tribe identify with each other as a group. They recognize their common heritage and speak of "the Awlad 'Ali as one." But more importantly, the Awlad 'Ali represents a political community because they are "prepared to regulate their differences by means of decisions accepted as binding because they are made in accordance with shared political norms and structures" (Easton 1959:229). Recalling the discussion of familial authority and internal and external systems of authority relations, we may think of the Bedouin political community as a composite of authority or jural groups "within which there are a moral obligation and a means ultimately to settle disputes peaceably" (Middleton and Tait 1959:9).

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In al-Qasr, political order and the articulation of political relations between secondary corporate groups depend upon something besides structural and ideological uniformities. Although blood-revenge and feuding do not take place at the internal system of authority relations, they are common means of controlling the distribution of authority and power between secondary units. Though these mechanisms or sanctions are

[671]

considered "the right of the Arabs," since they do threaten

*613
571 peace and security in the desert they are discouraged by
681 means of the moral and legal norms expressed in the _'awaiyid_,
628 or law of the Bedouins.
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•671 Conflict regulation between secondary groups is the
*613 function of the _'awaaqil_ who act as legitimate representatives
571 in terms of the _rawaabit_, and as legitimate judges and decision-
578 makers in terms of the _'awaiyid_. Not all conflict in the external political system is, in terms of our structural levels, between secondary authority groups, but seldom is any group larger than the secondary unit mobilized for political
619 action. In other words, even where we note that conflict is
*613 between two primary units, i.e., the 'Aishaibat and the
571 Kamailat, there is probably, in fact, political action taking
578 place between two secondary groups within the respective primary groups. However, there always exists the very real possibility that greater conflict will be generated involving primary and even tribal units.

128 In the next section of this chapter, I will discuss Bedouin law and sanctions within the framework of the lineage structure and the authority levels at which they operate. The following section will further illustrate the legitimacy and dynamics of authority and structure in Bedouin society.

Law and Political Order: 'Awaiyid Awlad 'Ali

671 [792] A "holy man" in al-Qasr, who has intimate knowledge of both the Quran and Bedouin law, has this to say on the subject of the 'awaiyid Awlad 'Ali:

> 671 171 The Sharii'a (Islamic Law) was given by God, and it guides man concerning what is good and what is bad: it is for all Muslims. The 'awaiyid was made by man for the Bedouins: it is for settling problems and evaluating damages. The 'awaiyid is natural, made by man and the Awlad 'Ali for settling the problems of the Bedouins. It is different from the Sharii'a. The Awlad 'Ali made the 'awaiyid, not the ashraaf ("holy men"); but the "holy men" approved it. The 'awaiyid agrees with the Sharii'a, but not in everything for it is not from the Sharii'a. Shari'it Muhammad ("the law of the Prophet") is one thing and the 'awaiyid is another. The Sharii'a says an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth, and a life for a life: the 'awaiyid also says an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth, and a life for a life, but in a different way: the 'awaiyid involves money. The 'awaiyid judges a situation; the dhabiiha ("blood sacrifice," usually a lamb as an expiatory fee) and the fine are paid and the problem is solved . . . The 'aqila is better than the government for settling problems in the desert. [672] The government may put a man in prison, and if he dies there you will be responsible to his father and brothers. There is a more liberal judgment here in al-Qasr, and God prefers that we settle our problems through peace . . . [673] If a man dies in prison, it is no sin before God but the Bedouins consider it a sin.

671 At the present time, the customary law of the Awlad 'Ali prevails in al-Qasr, and, I suspect, this body of legal and moral norms will be the basis for Bedouin social and political action for some time in the future. In any case, it furnishes us with a base-line from which any future studies of social

671 change in al-Qasr must proceed.

671 Bedouin law should be considered within its historical
177 context, especially as it has reference to the Maliki school
of Islamic Law. The Maliki school, or "rite," (madhhab) of
law is considered to be the most conservative interpretation
of the doctrine of the Prophet Muhammad. Therefore, the
Maliki school is thought to reflect the society and tribal
traditions of pre-Islamic Arabia more dependably than any of
671 the other three schools of law. For instance, the Maliki
177 school, in the domain of family law, stresses the importance
428 and the primacy of agnate rights and claims. This is especially
so in matters of inheritance: the law states that
in the absence of agnate heirs the property of the deceased
passes, not to female survivors but, to the central treasury
[562] of the State. This single legal aspect helps us to understand
the Bedouin practice of disallowing the female to
inherit and should be a consideration in any study of Bedouin
succession rules.

175 Maliki Law was introduced into North Africa during
671 the ninth century, and became the official legal doctrine of
177 the Berber dynasties. It was first taught in this part of
the world, probably, by Yahya ibn Yahya, a student of Malik
ibn Anas, the founder of the school. Murray (1935:313)
presents a valuable legal document from the Western Desert
in which the name "Yahya" is frequently cited as the authority

175 for legal interpretation. For instance: "We are also told
●671 by Yahya that (the Caliph) Mu'awiya ibn Sufian said that a
177 wound on the body should be assessed at half the value of
that wound on the head or face" (1935:324). Maliki law,
671 177 derived in large part from the Bedouin traditions of Arabia,
may be seen to characterize the legal norms of the tribal-based
social structure in the Western Desert. The Bedouins of al-
[428] Qasr themselves claim that they are within the bounds of
[562] Islamic Law when they deny the female the right to inherit,
though they do have other, and more secular, justifications
for the practice.

671 As we have already noted, in the above quote from the
182 "holy man" of al-Qasr, the Bedouins feel that the _'awaiyid_
648 can succeed where governmental law will fail. They say that
"the government does not understand the problems of the
Bedouins," that "government troops cannot function in the
desert." They feel that they need the _'awaiyid_ for the sake
of political order itself: "If the Bedouins did not have
the _'awaiyid_, they would eat each other. The _'awaiyid_ is so
important that a man who commits a wrong in town will lie
to the government, and then dutifully return to the tribe for
Bedouin justice."

[656] In 1933, the government "abolished" the _'awaiyid_
and insisted that the Bedouins settle their difference in
the civil courts in accord with Egyptian law. According to

•671 the Bedouins, the government soon discovered their own error,
182 for they were unable to effectively manage group and tribal
648 political relations: "They (the government) found out that
they could not solve murders in the desert. They would arrest the killer but the trouble continued between families (i.e. feuding went on). There were more killings instead of less, and, finally, the government asked us to return to the 'awaiyid because it alone can solve murders in the desert." I was unable to document the claim that the government had "abolished" the 'awaiyid in 1933, but a number of officials who worked at the Governor's Office in Marsa Matruh said that it was true.

671 In al-Qasr, and in the Western Desert in general,
641 adherence to law and political order rests upon the conviction
577 that each individual and territorial group have guaranteed
571 rights which are related to honor and property. A violation
554 of any single man's honor or property may easily be interpreted, according to the principle of collective responsibility, as an offense against the rights of a group. And in this sense, legal and moral violations in Bedouin society are relative to the structure of interrelations, and they must be regulated with reference to the various levels of the authority structure.

181 Bedouins place a high value on political order, but
641 also on the idea that political order can only be guaranteed
578 through a man's willingness "not to allow another to take any
571

*613 682 impossible within the corporate group. Middleton and Tait (1958:19) have generalized on this point, and Wagner (1940: 218) has been very explicit: "When a breach of law occurs within a given group (lineage, sub-clan, or clan) and the nature of the offence is such that it affects those interests which are specific to the group and not further divisible, a restoration of the breach by compensation is obviously impossible, as it would necessitate the splitting of the group into two units . . . " The Bedouins avoid division in [672] such cases by holding the whole secondary group responsible for the _diiya_, and usually the share of the _diiya_ which would be forthcoming from the killed man's tertiary segment is excluded from the total payment. It seems that either the Bedouins represent an atypical case, or Africanists have failed to make a sharp and analytical difference between the blood-vengeance grouping and the group which actually shares in the paying and receiving of blood money.

•671 [682] [626] Bedouin law and political order, then, center on the institution of blood-revenge or retaliation. The payment of compensation as a prevention of blood-feud is a central concern of the _'awaiyid Awlad 'Ali_. Murray (1935:313-328) presents a Bedouin legal document "signed with the seals of twenty-two _sheikhs_ testifying to the accuracy of the code" which set forth the main tenets of the _'awaiyid_ of the Western Desert. I checked the contents of this document with

671 I checked the contents of this document with
[124] my own informants who agreed that it was authentic and
represented the _'awaiyid_ as it should be practiced. Almost
[682] the whole of the _'awaiyid_ refers to the circumstances surrounding the occurrence of killing and the payment of the
[128] _diiya_. The case studies which I present below reflect the
'awaiyid as it was practiced in 1935.

682 Blood-money is calculated relative to three things:
whether or not a killing was premeditated or accidental; the
sex of the victim; and whether or not the victim was a freeman
or a slave. The full _diiya_ is paid in the case of intentional
killing, and three-fourths of this amount is due in the case
[562] of accidental killing. The _diiya_ for a woman is one-half
that for a man whether or not the killing is intentional.
[567] There are no slaves in al-Qasr, only their descendents who
are now freemen. In the case where a pregnant woman is killed,
the foetus will be examined and should it prove to be a male
then the full _diiya_ will be due.

578 An important mechanism for conflict regulation in
682 the Western Desert is the _nazaala_, i.e., "the act of taking
*613 refuge." If a killing is committed, the killer immediately
778 seeks protection by going to the residence of a neutral third
party. The third party, who may or may not be an _'agila_, and
his lineage give protection to the whole tertiary segment of
the killer. This may involve the actual relocation of the
killer's _bait_ to the residence of the protecting group for

682 683 671 Since Bedouin law, and not Egyptian law, still prevails in al-Qasr, personal injury cases must be expedited according to the 'awaiyid lest the greater sanctions embodied in the principle of self-help follow. Sanctioned fines for death and bodily injury are standardized in al-Qasr and in the whole Western Desert. [124] [627] One informant, a rajal khair ("good man") who sometimes adjudicated quarrels, possessed an authoritative paper which listed the injury and ensuing fine prevailing in al-Qasr when I was in the field. Below are the contents of this paper. The comments in parentheses were made by the man as I translated the paper: they were offered as the rationale behind Bedouin law.

L.E. 400	- for inflicting an injury upon a person which renders him sterile.
400	- for the intentional death of a man with a gun or knife.
400	- for causing the loss of a man's nose, ("Because to cut up a man's nose is to make him ugly.")
400	- for causing the loss of a man's eyes, 200 L.E. for each eye, ("Because without eyes a man can do nothing.")
400	- for causing the loss of a man's ears, 200 L.E. for each ear, ("Because a deaf man cannot work.")
300	- for the death of a man if caused by beating with sticks or stones, ("This is unintentional, for if you really wanted to kill the man you would use a better weapon.")
200	- for the intentional death of a woman with a gun or knife.
150	- for the loss of a hand.
150	- for the loss of a leg.
10	- for the loss of a front tooth, ("Because it is bad for a man's appearange.")
5	- for the loss of a rear tooth.

671
562 Implicit in the 'awaiyid is the assumption that the woman is less responsible for her deeds and something of a weakling. The Bedouins have a proverb which says that "the devil whispers in the ear of the woman." If a woman slays a
[682] man, intentionally or accidentally, the diiya is considered
671 as for unintentional killing. Where sex offenses are con-
562 cerned, it makes a difference if the act takes place in the
684 man's (i.e. the husband's) tent or in the desert, and, of course, it makes a difference whether or not it is a case of rape or adultery. If a man finds another man and his wife in his dwelling in the act of adultery, he may kill the man and pay the diiya for unintentional killing. From this diiya, he deducts the amount of the bride-price and 50 L.E. for trespassing. The fine for rape ranges from 10 L.E. to 100 L.E. On the other hand, if intercourse takes place with the woman's consent, the fine is only 5 L.E. or 10 L.E. If a virgin is deflowered, the fine will be 100 L.E., and the man will have to marry her, paying the bride-price asked for by the girl's father and going through the normal procedure for marriage. Where offenses involve unmarried women, all fines are paid to the father. In cases concerning married women, fines go to the husband. According to the
[586] Bedouins, it would be a great dishonor to the man's family
[558] if the husband were not to divorce his wife after it becomes known that she has been promiscuous. They said that if a man

•671 562 They said that if a man
684 insisted on keeping a promiscuous wife, his family would
681 "write a barawwa aginst him." I heard of no sex offenses in
[114] al-Qasr while I was there.

671 The penalty for stealing, according to the 'awaiyid,
685 is that the thief shall pay compensation, by himself, in the
amount of four times the value of the stolen object. On the
*[613] other hand, if the thief is a poor man, he will pay thrice the
value of the stolen object and the remaining fourth will be
paid by his lineage.

671 The 'awaiyid recognizes the territorial claims of the
685 lineage. Disputes arising over conflicting claims to land
*613 and wells are handled at Bedouin courts in much the same way
578 as personal injury cases are, with one exception. Usually, a
[554] larger number of elders and rajal khair will be consulted in
an advisory capacity by the 'awaaqil handling the case. The
'awaaqil consider the specific history of a particular piece
of land or well (for instance, each well is known by its own
name), and determine the ownership in accordance with the
testimony of elders and individuals of high social status.
Most of the problems over land and water rights in al-Qasr
have reference to what is still considered lineage-owned
685 territory in the barley-and-pasture sector. In the 'izba
578 sector, conflict over land ownership rights, since they are
648 rights which are registered with the government, is settled
in the Egyptian court of law. Only one such case came up while

695 untruthfulness and he loses his claim. According to the
602 'awaiyid, the number of supporters required in a homicide or
613 wounding case is fifty; in a case involving the rightful
•671 ownership of land or a well the required number is twenty-five; in a case of conflicting claims over a camel, five relatives must swear in support of the claimant; and in matters concerning smaller animals, such as sheep, the number of supporters will depend upon the number and price of the animals. But, of course, the number of supporters will always be relative to the size of the groups involved, and so the 'awaiyid is not always followed to the letter of the law.

695 The time and place of the oath is fixed by the 'awaaqil
(692) adjudicating the given case. It is administered either at the tomb of a "holy man," or at the mosque in Marsa Matruh, and always on a Friday, the Muslim Sabbath. There is a standard text to the oath and this is given in the instructions of the
695 'awaaqil to the litigants. The Bedouins, with few exceptions,
784 believe in the effectiveness of the oath of God. The rationale is that no man is willing to lie and suffer the wrath of God. The curse which results from a "bad oath" usually takes the form of an accident or misfortune to the swearer or a member of his family. The Bedouins believe that divine sanction operates not only against the one who makes a bad oath, but also against the one who bears false witness against another and causes him to take the oath.

626 process of conflict regulation is ritually sanctioned and
182 the political order sacralized in a public way at the con-
771 clusion of litigation when the parties involved and the
'aqila read the *Fatiha* (the first *sura* of the Quran). For
671 the Bedouins, the *'awaiyid* is the enactment of the word of
771 God, and the man who follows the *'awaiyid* follows the command-
771 ments of God. One *'aqila* speaking of the final authority which
776 directs Bedouin society said this:
577

> God knows all things. God made the world and gave man a brain with which to think. Therefore, he gave man two choices: the good, and the bad. If a man follows the good, he does not steal, kill, or lie. God gave us Muhammad the Messenger, and he taught the ignorant to follow the word of God. You are an educated man, and so you must choose the good path and follow it. I do not read but I follow the Quran.

577 It follows, then, that "the good man" represents an
183 important Bedouin cultural ideal which is legitimated by
771 reference to the sacred. The practice of this ideal leads
[829] to "the good society." Another *'aqila*, in reply to my
question concerning the definition of a "good man," answered:

> A good man should follow God, and through this he will be a perfect man because such a man could make no mistakes. You could find no better person than this. The good man fasts, prays, makes the pilgrimage, and helps the poor. He avoids stealing and lying; these are the most important things to avoid . . . All men aim to do good. Some men think that they are doing good, but they cannot tell good from bad: this is the origin of badness . . . A man aims to do good so that the Arabs will thank him for it. The Arabs (i.e. the man's fellow Bedouins) will say that he is doing good and that he is following the good path.

121 681 692 648 first, the government may enter into conflict cases which are judged to be out of control and involving the larger tribal units; secondly, litigants, whether exercising internal or external political relations, have the right to take their case to a rajal khair. [626] Both exceptions represent informal processes of social control in al-Qasr; the first case rarely happens, and the second case seems to occur quite frequently but no recordings of the settlement are made.

681 121 Sanctions in the Bedouin legal system conform to what Radcliffe-Brown referred to as secondary sanctions: "These are concerned with the actions of persons or groups in their effects upon other persons or groups" (1952:209). Also, it ● [671] would seem that Bedouin law is one of private delicts as opposed to a law of public delicts:

> [692] In the procedure of a law of private delicts a person or a body of persons that has suffered some injury, loss or damage by infringement of recognized rights appeals to a constituted judicial authority, who declares some other person or body of persons within the community to be responsible and rules that the defendant shall give satisfaction to the plaintiff, such satisfaction frequently taking the form of the payment of an indemnity or damages. A private delict is thus an action which is subject to what may be called a restitutive sanction (Radcliffe-Brown 1952:213).

681 675 671 In Bedouin society, delicts are private since they involve individuals or lineage groups, but the restitutive sanctions to which they give rise are backed by communal consensus expressed through public approval in general, and by the twin

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675 charters of Bedouin society, the *rawaabit al-'awaaqil* and
● 671 the *'awaiyid Awlad 'Ali*. Again, following Radcliffe-Brown
121 (1952:212-219), sanctions expressed in al-Qasr may be considered
681 civil as opposed to criminal sanctions since, even in
682 the case of intentional homicide, the emphasis is upon restitution
182 and the restoration of the "good society" rather than
[671] upon punishment. The Bedouin legal system is one which deals
with private delicts, and which depends upon secondary social
sanctions and ritual sanctions for the arbitration and settlement of disputes.

121 Since neither a dichotamy between private and public
681 delicts nor a differential distribution of authority at the
various levels of the lineage structure obtain in the uncentralized
political system of the Bedouins, political action and
type of sanction will be described in terms of whether or not
they occur in the internal political system of the secondary
or domestic group, or in the external system where interaction
between secondary, primary, or tribal segments takes place.

The most striking difference between the two systems
of political action rests with the fact that the *lex talionis*,
retaliation regulated by custom, does not operate within the
121 secondary group. In the two cases of killing between tertiary
681 groups of 'Ailit Ma'fas and 'Ailit Lazumi already given, compensation
682 was immediately paid: the incidents were both
* [613] settled and "forgotten." In conflict situations arising in the

121 external system, however, the law recognizes retaliation, a
681 life for a life. Still, even in this case, Bedouin values
682 [182] expressed through the _'awaiyid_ try to avert bloodshed and
• [671] feuding by showing "the good path" and providing the means
for settlement through compensation.

681 Just as the Bedouin accepts the _'awaiyid_ as a set of
682 of ideals calculated to regulate conflict, he paradoxically
182 claims the right to impose retaliatory sanctions as a just
[671] conclusion to conflict. One Bedouin said that the greatest
[673] sin which a man or group can commit is to accept the _diiya_
and then take his blood-revenge and return the money. Presumably,
a person or group commits no outrage if they refuse
the _diiya_ with the understanding that blood-revenge will be
[626] taken. In al-Qasr, retaliation and the _'awaiyid_ are mechanisms
[671] of social control and dispute settlement. A political office
* [613] exists, i.e. the _'aqila_ which functions over the total range
[692] of political action, and the process of adjudication and
compensation in the form of indemnity payment represents an
institutionalized alternative to retaliation. In all cases
of dispute, ritual or religious sanctions back up social
[776] sanctions. God is a third party to all conflict, and this is
[695] made manifest in the reading of the _Fatiha_ or the oath-taking
128 ceremony. In order to describe how authority and sanctions
68 operate in Bedouin society, a number of examples are presented
[124] below. Some of the cases are the statements of informants about
[114]

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the diiya: the Qinaishat paid 50 L.E., the Kamailat paid 50 L.E., but the 'Aishaibat, the tribe of the killer paid 600 L.E. Of the 600 L.E. paid by the 'Aishaibat it was distributed as follows: 'Ailit Lazumi and "Ailit Ma'fas each paid 100 L.E. because they are rich; 'Ailit Dawlat paid only 30 L.E. because they are poor, and each pays according to their means. The 'aiela of the killer, although they are poor, had to pay 70 L.E., and the bait of the killer had to pay 300 L.E. All paid according to their means, except the killer's bait. This was a special case, it never happened before and will never happen again and this is why the killer's bait had to pay more. The killer's bait was very poor, so what they did not have they had to beg from the richer families of the tribe.

Legal Cases Pertaining to Property Rights

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*613
In general, property in al-Qasr is owned either by an individual or by a tertiary group; seldom, in these days, is property held by the secondary lineage group. 423 *613 182 ●[671] If we followed classic segmentary lineage theory, seeing that the tribal political structure and the 'awaiyid are still functionally intact, we might suppose that land and water possession are rights in usufruct and not of ownership. The Bedouins themselves insist that the rights to land and water are rights of ownership. They state that all of the lineage-owned land, with few exceptions, was parcelled out to tertiary groups a

423 Date: 12 October 1954. There came to us (i.e. the 'awaqil)
691 on this day, Khalid Idris of al-'Aishaibat and Yunis Abd
578 al-Nabi of al-Kamailat. The reason for their coming is a
*613 quarrel over land rights at Wadi al-Hijnaiya. And we put
[539] distinct markers between the land of the two parties, the
first, Khalid Idris, and the second, Yunis Abd al-Nabi.
And the boundary passes by the distinct markers; the
first is the wadi marker, the second to the sea and beside
the tree, and the final marker we put east of Halima well.
This is a decision between the two parties in the presence
of the following witnesses:

Signatures or seals of five men.

619 The case given below indicates, by the use of two
578 documents, the process of conflict settlement involving two
secondary segments of al-Qasr, one Sa'adi and one Marabit.
•[671] 'Ailit al-Sulwatiyya, though genealogically not members of the
Awlad 'Ali and holders of a client or vassal status in traditional times, are within the jurisdiction of the 'awaiyid Awlad 'Ali. They claim their rights under it by virtue of the fact of their residence in al-Qasr. The power of ritual sanction is clearly illustrated by this case.

578 Date: 30 July 1964, Marsa Matruh. First Party: Shaikh
685 Khalid Za'aluk al-Sulwatiyya and four relatives. Second
691 Party: Khalid Idris of 'Ailit Ma'fas and three relatives.
619 They are present. The cause of these two parties coming to-
423 gether is a quarrel over a well named Halima. Since the choice
[695] to swear the oath has been made by the two parties, Khalid
Idris, the second party, will swear the oath supported by
twenty-four members of his 'umraa al-dam ("blood group") to

423 (nizaa'a) belongs to Khalid Idris and his brothers. This
619 happened with the satisfaction of both tribes, and this re-
578 nunciation of claim is valid from today. This paper concern-
691 ing the ownership of land around the well is valid from today also. And this happened between the parties: (Signatures or stamps of both parties concerned.)

(There appeared the signatures of twenty-three of the twenty-four men who were to have sworn the oath.)

Only twenty-three oath-takers were present: 30 July 1964. I, Shaikh Khalid Za'aluk, agree on the signatures of only twenty-three oath-takers. (Signature of Khalid Za'aluk.)

648 We have mentioned that the 'awaiyid prevails in al-
•671 Qasr, but have also noted that where the security of the
578 desert is threatened the government is likely to intervene. The government enters tribal conflict in al-Qasr with the tacit approval of the Bedouins. As one informant remarked: "The 'awaiyid is the best way to handle problems, but the police will handle what the 'awaiyid cannot."

423 Date: 1964. Case: Quarrel between al-Afrad ('Ali Abyad) and
691 'Aishaibat ('Ali Ahmar) over water rights. Many members of
578 both tribes took part in this conflict. The government had
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648 to intervene: they formed a peace committee made up of all
*[613] the 'awaaqil of both tribes and the 'umda and shaikh from
[634] each tribe.

423 691 578 619 648 each tribe. It was decided that the water which flows through the wadi after the rains should be divided equally between the two tribes, and that no one should be stopped from using the water. Had not the government intervened in this conflict, and had not they collected all of the weapons from the Bedouins, this problem would have resulted in the death of many men and even greater problems.

674 685 Theft is condemned by the Bedouins: "Everything in the desert is loose. We must punish the thief quickly and severely." It is a fact that the man who goes to steal and [682] accidentally kills in the act will have judged against him [829] the full diiya, i.e., the amount for intentional killing. On the other hand, the people of al-Qasr insist that "Bedouins do ● [671] not steal." But legal norms exist to sanction violations against cultural ideals. The following case shows how social and ritual sanctions operate to enforce ideals.

619 578 685 *613 Date: 1964. Case: Quarrel between the tribe of Kamailat and the tribe of 'Aishaibat over the theft of 16 L.E. Muhammad of 'Ailit Ma'fas was accused of stealing 16 L.E. which belonged to Ahmad of 'Ailit Idris, Kamailat. The theft occurred while the two were residing at a hotel in Marsa Matruh. There were twenty other persons in the hotel that night. The accused said: "I did not take anything."

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Suppose the donkey of A (a man present at the interview) gets into the barley of B (another man present). This is actually a serious matter since it could conceivably lead to a big fight between A's 'aiela and B's 'aiela. First, I separate them and make each go to his home. Then I get A's three brothers (his father is dead), we take a dhabiiha (lamb) and go to B's place and all eat together. After the meal, we read the Fatiha (opening sura of the Quran) together to show that all is forgiven. After the Fatiha has been read no trouble will start because this is done in the presence of the Jaraira.

[784] He explained that reading the Fatiha in bad faith would bring the same curse from God that a bad oath would bring. He also *[613] claimed that only he and the 'aqila have the authority to command men to read the Fatiha.

554 'Amm Salih says that he uses the 'awaiyid as a guide
792 in solving problems, and that it is necessary because
627 "quarrels spread like fire, it is like fire; they spread to
•671 killing and war." He was the only person in al-Qasr who
554 tried to conceptualize the difference between the 'awaiyid
792 Awlad 'Ali and the Sharii'a. 'Amm Salih said that it is
627 wrong to lie, according to both the secular and the sacred
671 authority codes: "One who lies exceeds the word of God,
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577 and God will punish him for this. No one can know how this
[784] punishment will take place, only God will know this . . . Sometimes a car goes off the road and people will say that it is the punishment of God. But you never know because the
554 punishment of God comes in the after-life." I asked him:
792 "If this is so, why may the rajal khair lie in trying to
627 settle quarrels?" He replied:
577

156 the group--in effect questions a great deal about the whole
159 traditional authority structure. Blood-revenge functions as
554 a deterrent to social disorder in that it represents an
829 automatic mechanism for restoring a balance of good relations
682 [182] in the society. Actually, Hajj 'Ali exaggerated to make a
point when he spoke of the existence of "unbalanced people."
682 A person would indeed be "unbalanced" who did not take into
672 consideration the repercussions of his acts with respect to
*613 the personal danger and the dishonor and shame it would bring
to his 'aiela and bait. Although the 'aiela members are
willing to share in the blood money for accidental or unpremeditated killings, it is wrong to suppose that the Bedouins
do not attempt to weigh the justifiability and culpability
• [671] in matters of killing. The very existence of the 'awaiyid
Awlad 'Ali argues against this. Obviously, the dichotomy made
between killing in the 'awaiyid, i.e., intentional and accidental,
and the concomitant gradation in compensation points to some
kind of reasonable consideration in cases of killing.

156 Hajj 'Ali is discontent with yet another aspect of
159 the traditional authority structure. He questions the logic
554 and authority represented in the oath as a sacred sanction.
695 This says something about the degree of secularization which
829 Hajj 'Ali has undergone. Although he does not say so, he
apparently favors a more secular and logical procedure for
determining a man's guilt or innocence.

> 156 159 554 829 666
> There is another objection which I have concerning our customs. I mean the case of elections. For instance, one from the 'Aishaibat and one from the Sanagra, of the 'Ali Abyad, are nominated. Then, each man must vote for the one from his own tribe. He must vote for the 'Aishaibi even if the other is the better man. But, we should consider that the best man is the man with the best qualifications. 'Umda Ibrahim, for instance, knows how to greet an official or a minister, but he does not know the *'awaiyid* nor the problems of the Bedouins. His brother (who will probably be the next *'umda*) is a good man and is educated, but he does not know the *'awaiyid* either.

829 666 This view contrasts sharply with the traditional stand of most Bedouins in al-Qasr, including the members of the "status group." For instance, one *'aqila* voiced what is a prevalent opinion when he said:

> [619] [186]
> If a man chooses to become a political candidate against a Bedouin, he must understand that the members of the tribe should and would vote for their *'umda* because he is a member of their own tribe. Even if a man is crazy and his opponent has the highest college degree, the Bedouins must vote for the man from their own tribe.

156 159 554 178 177 829 [671] Hajj 'Ali is modern in his evaluation of the political situation here: a politician should know the problems of his constituents rather than follow principles based on traditional relationships. His motive is not to promote the *'awaiyid* as a good way of life, for we know he does not think this to be the case. Instead, Hajj 'Ali believes that in order to help the Bedouins through a period of change one must know what they are changing from. Through his negative appraisal of

2: Mohsen E,O-5 (1958-1966) 1971 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9
Awlad Ali

ABSTRACT

THE QUEST FOR ORDER AMONG AWLAD ALI OF THE WESTERN DESERT OF EGYPT

By

Safia K. Mohsen

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● [671]

The study deals with the ways in which disputes are settled within a tribal society with no contralized authority. One way these disputes are settled is through the application of a set of formal rules known as "the daraieb" or the tribal ways. These rules are kept in force through an elaborate, yet informal, judicial process in which the local political leaders play a key role.

The main focus of the study is not the rules themselves, but rather the ways they are implemented. More specifically, the study examines the ways in which judicial reasoning is related to certain realities of the social and political life of the group. Using mainly the case-study method, this relationship is examined.

The first part of the thesis provides an account of the historical and ecological features of the groups total context of action. This is followed by a rather detailed analysis of the tribal organization of the group. In dealing with the tribal organization two modes of analysis are employed. A structural form of analysis which focuses on the hierarchy of groups and subgroups by which the tribal members order themselves; and a description of these groups in terms of the processes through which they are maintained. In this context, special

[Introductory, P. V]

Chapter I

THEORETICAL BACKGROUND

The Comparative Studies of Law

This study is based on field work carried out among Awlad Ali, of the Western Desert of Egypt, between August 1965 and August 1966. The study deals with the processes by which order is maintained within a tribal society with no centralized authority. One way that order is maintained is through the application of a set of formal rules known to the people of the area as "the daraieb" or the tribal ways. These rules are kept in force by an elaborate, yet informal, judicial process in which the tribal political leaders play the most important part. 121 [114] 121 671

The main focus of the study is not the rules themselves but rather the ways in which they are implemented, or the judicial process. More specifically, the study deals with the ways in which the process of dispute settlement is related to certain realities of the social and political life of the group.

Concern with the legal systems of non-literate societies has been an interest of anthropologists since the classical monographs of the nineteenth century (Maine 1861, 1871; and Fustel de Coulanges 1864), directed the attention of anthropologists to the laws of ancient civilizations. Those monographs were followed at a later date by the work of anthropologists such as Malinowski (1926), Hogbin (1934), and Schapera (1938). In more recent years most anthropological work on legal systems has been done in Africa. Most notable among these are Gluckman's treatise on the Barotse of Northern Rhodesia (1955, 1963), Bohannan's account of the Tiv of Nigeria (1957), and Howell on the Nuer Law (1954). Other studies of primitive law 121 114 671

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in other parts of the world include Llewellyn and Hoebel on the Cheyenne (1941), Pospisil's analysis of the Kapauku Papuan la (Pospisil 1958), Smith and Roberts' description of the Zuni law (1954) and Laura Nader's work on Zapotec law.

Despite this interest in the comparative study of legal institution among anthropologists, yet the fields of legal anthropology still lacks a coherent body of theory to bear upon the analysis of the institutions described. The theoretical questions represented in most of these writings seem to center around two main problems: the problem of definition, and that of methodology. With regard to the problem of definitions the various writers seem to be influenced by one or the other of two main schools of jurisprudence: the analytical school and the sociological school. The analytical school flourished in the late nineteenth century following the writings of its leader, John Austin, the British jurist. According to the analytical school law is a set of rules imposed upon society by a sovereign will. The picture is that of a supreme authority standing high above society and issuing its command downwards. This supreme authority is the creator and the ultimate source of law. These views are exemplified in Austin's famous definition of law as "a rule laid down for the guidance of an intelligent being by an intelligent being having the power over him" (1885: 316-7). Since the will of that political superior has to be exact, the only way to express it, according to Austin, is by means of legislation. According to the views of this school, the existence of a supreme authority is a prerequisite to the existence of law. Any social rules of observances existing before or without the issuing authority are not considered law. This excludes from being law rules which were not enacted such as the British common law, as well as all forms of primitive customary law.

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Later, members of the analytical school shifted the emphasis of their definition of law from its enactment by a supreme authority to its enforcement by that authority. Salmond defined law by reference to a court. Law, according to him, is "the body of principles recognized and applied by the state in the administration of justice" (1946:41). Gray, another member, went even further to deny the name, law, to a statute until it has been used as a basis of decision by the court (1921:82). Similarly, Diamond, who has contributed to the study and appreciation of 'primitive' law, hardly goes beyond arguing that societies without courts have no laws (Diamond 1935).

The influence of the analytical school on the anthropological writings on law is reflected in two ways. In the first place, it led some writers to maintain that since primitive societies lacked a supreme authority in the Austinian sense, they had no rules that may be called 'legal' and that among these societies "custom is the King" (Seagel 1941:iii). In the second place, the concept of the court as stated by members of the analytical school seems to influence to a greater or lesser degree the definition of law by many anthropologists, a point which will be discussed later in the chapter.

The sociological school of jurisprudence came as a reaction against limitations inherent in the analytical school with its glorification of the supreme will. According to the views of this school, law develops within society of its own vitality. It is not an artificial creation of a supreme will but is spontaneous and independent of any formal authority. These views do not exclude the notion of enforcement of law by a supreme authority which becomes necessary as the society reaches a certain level of complexity, but unlike the analytical school, the supreme authority in the latter case is not the creator of law but a creation of it.

The movement was led by Von Saveigny, the French jurist who viewed law as a rule existing for the purpose of regulating the actions of the

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individual in the interest of the whole community (1937). He regarded law as one of the many factors of the morphology of society. Roscoe Pound continued that tradition in his famous article, "The Scope and Purpose of Sociological Jurisprudence" (1910-11), in which he viewed law as "one side of the process of social control...a task or great series of tasks of social engineering." The purpose of law, according to Pound, is to eliminate friction and waste in the satisfaction of the human needs (1910-11;591-619).

To turn from jurists to anthropologists, we find the list of those who subscribe to the sociological view quite extensive. To try to enumerate them would be a very lengthy endeavor. Malinowski states that law and order arise out of the very process which they govern. He sees laws as existing in all human societies and attributes the failure of the analytical jurists to perceive the existence of legal systems among primitive societies to the faulty habit of identifying the legal system with the person or organ possessing the power to make laws and enforce them. He defined law as a body of binding obligations, regarded as a right by one party and acknowledged as a duty by the other, kept in force by a special mechanism of reciprocity and publicity inherent in the structure of their society" (1926:58). Radcliffe-Brown (1933), Lewellyn and Hoebel (1941), Hoebel (1961), Bohannan (1957) and Gluckman (1955, 1965) to give examples, all view law as an aspect of the society independent of any sovereign in the Austinian sense. This does not mean that they all agree in their definition of law. For they exhibit a considerable difference in their views. The difference, however, does not stem from their view of the sociological rather than the formal nature of law, but in their attempt to separate law from other aspects of social life of the group.

The main difficulty with the sociological view of law is that it does not provide a reliable criteria by which one can differentiate between that

aspect of the social life that one may call law and other aspects. This does not pose any problem for those who use the concept of law in a very wide and general sense to man "the totality of people's culture" (Hartland 1924:191). But for later writers, who tend to take a more or less restricted view of law, the problem was there. Malinowski states that the rules of law in primitive society stand out from other social norms in that they are felt and regarded as "obligation of one party and the rightful claim of another." This, of course, gives law a very broad definition and does not really help in distinguishing law from non-law. 121 114 671

One of the most commonly used criterion is that of a "sanction" behind the legal norms. But the mere fact that legal norms have sanctions behind them does not help in drawing the line between them and other norms since all norms are backed by sanctions of some kind or another. It is the kind of sanction, then, not just any sanction, that differentiates law from non-law. In other words, there are classes of sanctions that may be called "legal sanctions." For Malinowski, the loss of reciprocal relations in primitive society constituted the sufficient basis for the legal sanctions (1934). Allen (1958) maintained that legal sanctions are "completely compulsory." "No one is under an absolute compulsion to visit the barber or to wear garments " (1958:59), while, on the other hand, members of the society are under an absolute compulsion not to steal or take the life of another person. Like Malinowski's notion of the loss of reciprocal relations, Allen's concept of "absoluteness" as the basis of legal sanctions is not adequate. For even under the modern legal system, were the penalty for stealing or murder specific and clear, the individual is not under an "absolute" compulsion not to steal or kill. He still can, and the mere existence of the penal institution in modern societies is a living proof that many do violate the legal norms if they are willing to take the risk of such violation, the same risk the person takes who violates the norm 121 114 671 681

of modesty and walks naked in the streets. Some may even find it easier to accept the risk of penalty for stealing than the social sanctions for violating the norms of modesty.

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But although the notion of absolute vs. relative compulsion is arbitrary and artificial as a criterion for defining legal rules, yet Allen is close to another related and widespread criterion of legal sanctions, that is, the idea of the "use of force." Hoebel maintains that "the really fundamental sine qua non of law in any society - primitive or civilized - is the legitimate use of physical coercion.... The law has teeth, teeth that can bite if need be..." (1961a:26) Pound defines law as "social control through the systematic application of the forces of a politically organized society" (1910-11:591). This definition has later been adopted by Radcliffe-Brown (1940) who considers the obligations imposed upon the individual but for which there is no sanction backed by the use or the possibility of use of physical force as merely a matter of social conventions or custom but not law.

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It is evident, then, that those who used the concept of "coercion" as the basis for their distinction of law needed a further specification of the concept. For, as Hoebel has noticed, "There are as many forms of coercion as there are forms of power...and only certain methods and forms are legal" (1961:26). He states that coercion by gangsters is not legal coercion; neither is the parents' physical coercion if it is extreme in form. The essential element in legal coercion according to Hoebel, is "the general social acceptance of the application of physical power, threat or, in fact, by a privileged party, for a legitimate cause, in a legitimate way, and at a legitimate time." The privilege of applying physical force constitutes, according to Hoebel, the official element in law. The person who is recognized as having the right to exercise force is the symbol of authority. This does not mean that he has to be an official or a holder

of any permanent office; it is any person who is exercising the legitimate 121 114
use of force. Simple as the above argument might seem, it really 671
offers very little in refining our conception of legal sanctions. For we 681
are still left with the question of how a person acquires the right to 625
exercise the physical force. What gives his action the legitimacy that
is otherwise lacking in other forms of coercion? In trying to deal with 121
this problem anthropologists resorted to a concept that is used by the 114
analytical jurists, that is, the court. There is a basic difference, however, 671
between the anthropologists' view of the court and that of the analytical 692
jurists. The latter see the court as the ultimate source of law:
court creates the law. Anthropologists, on the other hand, tend to use the
court as the source of law but as a criterion of its existence. An example
of such views is Max Radin who maintained that the infallible test "for
recognizing whether an imagined course of conduct is lawful or unlawful...
is to submit the question to the judgment of a court" (1938:1145).

Anthropologists differed among themselves, however, on what constitutes 121
a court. While Radcliffe-Brown (1940) insists that it must be a body of 114
people acting on behalf of the community as a whole and therefore does not 671
exist in all societies, Hoebel (1961), on the other hand, extends the concept 692
to include the diffused public opinion or sentiment of the people in 626
a given society as a kind of court that gives legitimation to the use of 625
force by individuals or groups in the absence of a recognized body acting
on behalf of the community. He sees a court in cases of self-help where
the aggrieved party or his kinsmen carry on the procedures of redress
without the intervention of a third party. He maintained that if the procedures
are right, there will be "at least the compulsion of recognized
'legal' procedure, though the ultimate court may be the 'bar of public
opinion'" (1961:25).

The concept of the court has been prominent in the writings of sev- 121
eral other anthropologists besides Radcliffe-Brown and Hoebel. Bohannan 114
(1957, 1964, 1965), Redfield (1964) and Pospisil (1958) all imply the 671
existence of a court of some kind or another as the identifying mark of 692
the existence of legal rules. In his attempt to distinguish between law and custom, Gluckman thought of law to exist "as a series of acceptable judgments of rightdoing and wrongdoing in particular cases" (1955:262). Custom and other social observances function as corpus juris and as such a basis for the judgment of where the behavior of one of the litigants in a case is reasonable or unreasonable, lawful or unlawful. As such, custom is a source of law, but not law itself. It becomes law when drawn upon in
passing judgment in a given case. In commenting on a passage on the Nuer 121
by Evans-Pritchard, Gluckman made it clear what he meant by the court. 114
"This passage shows that even in a society where 'self-help' is the en- 671
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forcing sanction, people judge situations of dispute in terms of rights 692
and duties, and wrongs....Therefore, it seems fair to say that among the 171
Nuer, though they have no courts, there is a process of judgment by mediators and ordinary people in which custom and morality as part of the corpus juris constitute 'sources of law' for particular decisions" (1955a:263).

The importance of the above passage from Gluckman is his distinction 121
between the concept of the court and the judicial process, a distinction 114
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lacking in the writing of most other anthropologists dealing with the study of law. Failure to distinguish the two aspects of the legal system resulted in confusing a basic societal process with one of the mechanisms through which the goals of that process achieved in certain societies.
In its broadest sense, the judicial process refers to the ways disputes [692]
are settled within society. Since didsputes arise out of the very nature [626]
of social interaction, some form of dispute settlement is found in all [627]
societies.

The form which the process of dispute settlement takes differs from 121
one society to another. In certain societies disputes are settled through 627
a process of informal mediation undertaken by go-betweens; in others it 692
is by means of self-help; still in others, it is by way of court. In so- 695
cieties with courts the process of dispute settlements is undertaken by
judges who "take and assess the evidence, examine what they regard as the
facts, and come to a decision in favor of one party rather than another"
(Gluckman 1965:183).

Within a given society, disputes are settled in accordance with a set 121
of principles that reflect the basic goals and values of that society. As 627
long as the settlement of a particular dispute proceeds according to these 626
principles, the settlement is supported by the public opinion of that so- 671
ciety. This is true whether the process is carried on by means of informal 692
mediations or through a court system. It is this public opinion as the ex- 182
pression of the basic societal values and not the court as a special mechan-
ism that gives legitimation to the judicial decisions. To equate opinion [114]
with the court as Hoebel (1961) did, or to look at the court as the ultimate
source of legitimation as did Radcliffe-Brown (1940) and others (Redfield
1964, Bohannan 1965), is to create an unnecessary confusion which tends to
undermine meaningful cross-cultural comparisons. Whatever the differences 121
among anthropologists with regard to the definition of the court, their 127
main interest in the concept so far has been as a tool for the definition 671
of law. The interest in the concept gave rise to a methodological approach 114
which came to characterize the literature in legal anthropology, namely,
the case-study approach, cases having been utilized in a number of ways
by legal anthropologists. In their book on the Cheyenne, Llewellyn and
Hoebel (1941) introduced the analysis of "the trouble case." This was
followed by a number of studies utilizing the case study method either to

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document statements concerning the substantive law of the society studied, or to abstract and elucidate that law. An example of the first technique is Howell's analysis of the Nuer court decisions (1954) where he collected a large number of court cases, cla-sified them and abstracted the substantive aspect of the native law. Gluckman's study of the Lozi (1955) represents the second technique. Smith and Roberts used the same method of case analysis to abstract certain principles of the Zuni law (1954), and Nader utilized it in her study of the Zapotecan law (1964). The list of those who utilized the case-study approach is quite extensive, and the range of the societies they studied is quite varied. But most of them share the interest in the substantive rather than in the procedural aspect of the law.

121 671 [627] [692] 121 181 671 114

When referring to the procedural aspect of the law one should keep in mind the difference between the technical and the abstract components of procedural law. The first refers to the activities and steps involved in the settlement of disputes in the society as well as the person or body undertaking the responsibility of such settlement. The second involves a number of abstract principles reflecting the values of the society with regard to the goals of the judicial process, and which the judicial persons use as a guide in achieving a settlement or in passing a judgment of one kind or another. These are the bases of judicial reasoning. Although judicial reasoning represents one of the most interesting and important aspects of the judicial process, it attracted very little attention among legal anthropologists. With the exception of Gluckman and his analysis of the concept of "reasonable man" among the Lozi (1955a), no significant work has been done in this area. In dealing with the concept of the reasonable man, Gluckman was more interested in discovering universals in laws than in the process of judicial reasoning as such. He implied that an

element of reasonableness is a universal principle in any judicial logic. 121 181 671 114
Nadel reacts to Gluckman's implication of the universality of the concept suggesting that it is valid only in certain contexts, and that the cases reported by Gluckman from which he abstracted that concept are minor ones. Nadel maintained that the principle seems inadequate in major crimes such as homicide, witchcraft or assault. "If I am right, the Lozi would, in these situations, discard their guiding fiction of 'reasonable man' for the sharper dichotomy of things simply lawful and unlawful, permitted and forbidden" (1956:162).

METHODOLOGY

One of the characteristics of legal anthropology is the absence of a coherent body of theory that could be utilized in the analysis and interpretation of the ethnographic data. 121 124
What do exist, however, in the area of the ethnography of law are a variety of what may be called "tools of analysis." These are mainly methods and orientations which help to direct the researcher's attention to a certain area of behavior which describes best the phenomenon under study. Their main purpose is to help the researcher isolate particular portions of the phenomenon he is studying and as such enables him to conceptualize the problem. A number of these tools have been employed in the present study. One of these tools is Turner's "social drama" which was employed in the analysis of the political leadership and the judicial process. Since this approach depends upon the intimate knowledge of the sequential development of a given case, or cases, over a period of time, it was quite difficult to employ it in more than that particular context. As will be apparent in the later chapters, the judicial process among the group is highly informal. Most of the disputes are settled [627] by means of mediation which is done behind the scene and with a great deal of secrecy.

There is no paramount chief of the 121 tribe at the present time; yet, the unifying force is the recognition 619 by the group of the tribal law, the Daraieb, as a binding set of rules •671 [643] and as the regulator of behavior within the area. In these terms, Awlad Ali are a clearly delimited group, and it is in terms of the jurisdiction of these rules that Awlad Ali are treated as a unit for administrative purposes by the Egyptian government. Viewed this way, Awlad Ali will be defined as those who recognize and abide by the Daraieb or the customary law. This includes the Murabiteen tribes [563] as well as all those who became part of the tribal organization of Awlad Ali by means of Iktitab. Since the territorial jurisdiction of the Daraieb is limited to the Western Desert of Egypt, those groups and individuals of Awlad Ali origin who have moved on a permanent basis from the area will be excluded from the group. Groups and individuals who live in the area but are not part of the tribal organization of Awlad Ali are not subject to the Daraieb.

619 173 Awlad Ali of the Western Desert of Egypt are an offshoot of the Cyrenaica tribes who in turn believe themselves to be the descendants of a unique ancestress Sa'ada.


Syrenaica tribes
Sa'ad
Baraghuth
'Aggar
El-Saghir
Jibran
Harb
Ali
Tribe
Abiad
Ahmar
Senenah
Tribe
Awlad Kharouf
Awlad Mansur
El-Sanagrah
'Eila
El-'aggary
Gedeidah
Bu-Mutair
Bait ('Eila)
El-Asabei
Yousef
'afash
Helleis
Daghash
Bait
Semeida
Yunis
Makhum
Hussein

619 groups were expected to help. For these reasons the Sa'adi tribes com-
619 peted and even fought among themselves for the newcoming Murabiteen
721 groups which continued to migrate into the area, escaping the strong dominance of the Cyrenaica Bedouins..Many of the major tribal wars which occurred in the area before the turn of the century had as their major cause the competition over the Murabiteen.

619 As a vassal group the Murabiteen tribes are kept in an inferior
778 position. This inferiority has certain manifestation, the most obvious
184 of which is the deprivation of the Murabiteen of the right of "nazala"
682 or refuge. When a person is killed the killer and his kin unit seek re-
778 fuge at a neutral tribal segment, and for a period of twelve months they
613 are safe from the revenge of the victim's kin group. The victim's family
● [871] cannot follow them to the refuge place, for to do this is to violate one of the basic principles of Awlad Ali law. The philosophy behind the rule of "nazala" is to give time for "the blood to cool off" as one of the informants described it. It also gives the host group a chance to start immediate negotiations with the victim's group to settle permanently the dispute. As soon as the murderer's group takes refuge, which is done either by moving along with their tents and flocks and settling in the locality of the host group or symbolically by having the head of the host group send one of his sons or male relatives to pitch his tent in the locality of the murderer's group, the head of the host group contacts the victim's group, informs them that he has been chosed by the murderer's group in accordance with the right of nazala, and asks for their permission to grant his protection to the murderer's group. To ask for the permission of the victim's group is a matter of formality since, by custom, they cannot refuse to grant this permission except on one single ground:

613 578 672 671 681 Another factor which led to the need to formalize the rules of the Amar was the increase in the kind of disputes for which there is no provision in the customary law of Awlad Ali. Such disputes arise mainly out of situations which are relatively novel to the area. A large number of these situations involve the relationship between the tribal population and the government authorities recently taking a major part in managing the affairs of the area. There were no rules in Awlad Ali law to guide decisions in cases involving financial liability of a member of the Amar in cases such as confiscation of smuggled goods, destruction of government property, or false testimony leading to the conviction of a fellow tribesman by the government authorities. The list of cases such as these is rapidly increasing. Many members of the Amar refuse to share in the payment of liabilities arising out of such cases on the basis that since no provision has been made in the customary law of Awlad Ali, then the Amar as a whole should not take corporate responsibility for such actions. They assert that corporate responsibility of the Amar is the exception rather than the rule and therefore, where there is no specific rule, the responsibility is an individual one. Others insist that it is the corporate responsibility of the Amar in such matters that maintains the Amar as a group and gives incentives to the members to retain their membership in the Amar, and therefore, should be the rule rather than the exception, covering any form of liability unless individual responsibility is specified.

613 672 675 This made it essential to specify in some kind of formal statement which liabilities are to be considered collective for which the Amar has to pay as a corporate unit and which are to remain as individual responsibility. This is done either by listing the cases of individual

613 672 675 responsibility, leaving any other situation a collective responsibility, or by specifying the cases of collective responsibility, implying that all other responsibilities are as a rule individual ones. The Amar paper of the Aggary, for example, chose to list offenses for which the Amar is not responsible, leaving the rest of the liabilities to be covered by the Amar as a whole. This is not always the case. In some papers offenses for which the Amar is responsible are the ones listed leaving the general rule as the non-responsibility of the Amar.

613 671 675 It is in this respect that the Amar papers are considered an important source of legislation. Although the new rules incorporated in an Amar paper start with the limited applicability to members of the Amar, yet, as time passes and as these rules affect the relationship of the Amar members to outsiders, one rule may acquire a wide practice and become part of the customary law itself. An example of the point in 613 671 675 682 question is the rule regulating the payment of the bloodmoney in cases where the murderer is tried by the state courts for the same crime. In cases of arrest of the murderer by the government, only half the bloodmoney is paid and the other half is withheld until the trial is over. If the killer is acquitted by the court, then the other half becomes immediately due for payment. If, on the other hand, as mentioned before, the killer is convicted, half the bloodmoney is postponed until the person completes his sentence and is released unharmed and with his full senses. If he dies in prison or sustains an accident which affects his physical or mental capacities, the rest of the bloodmoney is automatically dropped. This rule was first included in a number of Amar papers, especially those of the Eilat of Awlad Kharouf tribe. In less than twenty years since it

613 671 675 first appeared, the rule has become a practice so common that other Amars find it unnecessary to specify it in their own papers.

682 Another new rule which is in the process of acquiring a great amount
613 672 675 [693] [695] of consensus among the tribal population of Awlad Ali is that of the responsibility of the Amar for the payment of the lawyer's fees for members of the Amar who are tried by the government (Article 13 of the Aggary papers). Another less agreed upon rule is that of the responsibility of
613 672 675 439 [434] the Amar for the financial losses caused by the confiscation of smuggled goods or the payment of money for the destruction of government property by a member of the Amar. Where smuggling is an important source of income for the group, Amar papers usually include rules making it a corporate responsibility; other Amar papers, especially those of tribal segments not deeply involved in smuggling, make it an individual responsibility, while still others leave it intentionally with no specific rule, as in the case of the Aggary Amar paper.

613 [675] [131] The Aggary document is a relatively elaborate one. Not all Amar papers, or at least the ones I had a chance to examine, are as detailed. Eilat Aggary is the largest Amar in the area of Dera'el Bahari, which extends from Alexandria 60 miles westward to the town of Alamein. The
613 563 619 distinctive characteristics of the Aggary Eila is that it is composed mainly of peasant groups who joined the Aggary by means of tribal adoption. Of the 16 Baits constituting the Aggary Amar, only three are believed to be Awlad Ali proper. The attractiveness of the Aggary for the peasant groups seeking to be adopted by the tribal population of the area may be partly explained in terms of the location of Eilat Aggary in an area relatively close to the Delta from where these groups usually migrate.

685 grudges that he had against Ta'ib when the latter dissolved the partner-
627 ship which had existed between them for more than ten years, because of
578 Rabbu's attempt to cheat Taieb in dividing the profit gained from smug-
gling goods. They asked Sheikh Ta'ib to be their mediator to Sheikh
Hakim and his son. Ta'ib went to Hakim himself and informed him of the
accusations directed against his son and asked to arrange for a "Mi'ad"
or legal hearing. Hakim agreed and told Taieb that his son accepted
Taieb as a mardi and would abide by whatever decision he made. After
that both parties to the dispute wrote specifying their agreement on Taieb
as a mardi and all signed it. (It is not customary to write the agree-
ment on the mardi but Taieb insisted on that on the grounds that he did
not trust Hakim or his son and that several times they had backed down
on their promises). The Mi'ad was held and all interested parties attend-
ed. It lasted only half an hour, most of it spect drinking tea. Nobody
presented his case or any facts related to it since both parties had
apparently discussed it earlier with Taieb. The only one to speak was
Sheikh Taieb. He stated that Hadi and his partners believed that Rabbu
had informed the police which caused them to loose merchandise worth
685 more than three thousand pounds. He also said that the accusation had
627 been denied by Hakim on behalf of his son, after having his son swear by
578 the Qoraan that he hadn't informed the police. Then in the traditional
695 phrase, Taieb said, "I therefore follow the Awlad Ali Daraieb and make
[671] the judgment to the oath. Rabbu will have to take the oath supported by
fourteen male members of his bait to be selected by the Geneishat." He
added that he had discussed the matter with both parties before announc-
ing it and that both had agreed to it.

685 The Geneishat selected the tomb of the saint where the oath was to
627 be administered. According to the customary law of Awlad Ali, the plain-
778 tiff is the one to decide which saint is to be sought for the taking of
695 the oath by the defendant. Each saint has his own reputation and some
[671] [776] are said to be more effective in certain kinds of disputes. The saint selected in this case was Sidi Dmain. Sidi Dmian's tomb is in the Beheira province some 60 miles east of the area of Burg el-Arab. He is
[732] known to cause the blindness of those who dare to swear falsely by him,
[784] and at least four cases of blindness in the area have been attributed to
[671] false oaths at Sidi Dmain. Also according to the law, it is the plaintiff who selects the persons from the defendant's kin unit who are to
685 support him in the oath. Following this rule, the Geneishat, with the
627 help of Hadi, selected the fourteen men from bait Asabei to swear with
695 Rabbu. The number of men that were required in this case was considered
613 very conservative. The usual practice in estimating the number of sup-
[803] porters in any case is done by establishing the value of the damage or compensation and dividing it by ten. The result is the number of men needed to give the oath. If there were not enough adult males in a given kinship unit to fulfill the number needed, some or all the men would have to be sworn twice or three times and each time a person takes the oath he is considered as a separate person until the number needed is met.

Following this rule, and since the value of the property confiscated in the above case was over three thousand pounds, 300 persons should have been sworn in support of Rabbuh. Since this would have complicated the matter greatly, it was agreed that fifteen men were enough. Taieb gave the justification for limiting the number to 15 that trade and, as

685 no one else could take his place. They were mainly angry at Hakim's
627 attempt to cheat them and refused Hakim's offer to substitute ten men
695 for Qudura. The temper of the meeting was becoming very tense; then
613 [578] Taieb, who was working very hard to achieve a settlement between the
disputants, took the Geneishat aside and tried to convince them to accept another man instead of Qudura. When he found that to be impossible, he asked them to agree to a postponement of the oath until they saw what prevented Qudura from coming as he had promised. The Geneishat agreed to the postponement because of the absence of one of the men to swear.
● [671] According to Awlad Ali Daraieb, if one of the individuals to take the oath fails to show up in the saint's tomb for any reason or if he comes but refuses to take the oath, the whole case for the defense fails, and the judgment is awarded automatically for the plaintiff. In this case the Geneishat were entitled to immediate compensation for their confiscated goods. Nobody knew the reason that led the Geneishat to forfeit their right to immediate compensation and to give Hakim and his son a second chance despite their intense dislike for the latters. Some attribute this to the skill of Taieb and the respect he commands among all tribes. Others believe the Geneishat movement to be a reciprocal act to bait Asabei' as a whole which long ago had one a similar favor for the Geneishat. Still others beliebe it to be a gesture of good will on the part of the Geneishat who needed to retain a good and friendly relationship with the tribal segments on their smuggling route.

No date was set at that time for the oath. The parties as well as
685 the witnesses returned to their houses. Hakim then took Shei'eb and
627 went to visit Qudura to see why he hadn't come to the oath but Qudura
578

CHAPTER V

MARRIAGE: A CONTRACTUAL RELATIONSHIP

593 A survey of all disputes occurring among the eilat Aggary in the
578 last five years shows that more than 70% were disputes over "women,"
the usual phrase referring to cases involving marital relations. Disagreement
over matters arising out of quarrels between husband and wife
or between one of the spouses and his or her in-laws often constitute
593 the basis for these disputes. What seems to make marriage and the
578 family particularly productive of conflict is the fact that although
602 residence is commonly virilocal, and the majority of the women leaving
613 their own families to live with the husband, the woman retains her
[591] membership in her father's family after the marriage, and her agnatic
group keeps an active interest in her, even after she is married. Marriage
then brings face to face the interests of two groups. These interests
affect the relationship between the married couple; and, more
importantly, the relationship between the latter affects the interests
of their respective groups. This, in many instances, leads to direct
conflict between the two groups.

581 The position of the Awlad Ali daraieb with regard to marriage relations
671 is based on the Islamic law with minor modifications to suit the
585 requirements of local life. According to the Muslim law, marriage is
675 a civil contract affected by the request of one party and the agreement
of the other. No witnesses are needed for the legalization of the
marriage, according to some of the Shi'a sects, although the Sunni schools
of Muslim jurisprudence insist that two adult male and two adult females

581 are necessary for the validation of the marriage contract. Modern
585 671 legal systems which took as their basis the Islamic law of marriage
675 and the family further required the registration of the marriage contract for the marriage to be legal.

584 The request and necessary response forming the marriage are sup-
585 posed to be carried on by the parties involved. However, if either the
429 groom or the bride is not of age, or is mentally unqualified, the trans-
593 action is carried on by his or her guardian, or "wakil." The wakil is
the father, unless he is dead or an invalid, in which case the brothers
[604] become the wakils. If the person has no brothers, then the uncles be-
[184] come the wakil in the order stated. According to certain Sunni sects
in Islam, a woman marrying for the first time is always represented by
her wakil, even if she is of age. The assumption is that a woman who
has never been married does not have the experience that enables her to
enter into any kind of legally binding relationship such as marriage.

585 Following the original Islamic idea, marriage among Awlad Ali is
675 593 an oral agreement between the groom or his father and the guardian
429 (wakil) of the bride-to-be (her father, if alive, or her closest male
[604] kin in the following order: her brothers, her uncles, her grandfather).
585 A religious man is sometimes asked to perform the marriage, although it
792 is not required. Some persons might invite a member of the Murabiteen
[619] tribe or holy men to witness the marriage on the basis that his presence
[778] gives "baraka," or blessing, to the marriage. Before the application of
585 656 the State legal system to the area, marriage contracts were not regis-
177 tered. In recent years, however, and with the increased mobility of
[675] the tribal populations, more and more marriages are being registered in
[634] the administrative districts. Still, according to the unofficial estimates,

584 husband or his father pays the woman's father the bridewealth, or mahr.
583 In exchange for the mahr, the husband expects his father-in-law to out-
fit his daughter with such items as rugs, blankets, and a few other house-
hold items, like cooking pots, serving dishes, and a metal or wooden chest
[422] to keep her clothes in. These items become the private property of the
wife, but the husband has the right to use them. In addition, the man
581 expects to gain certain rights to the woman. The customary law of Awlad
671
585 Ali gives the husband three basic rights over his wife: the right to her
sexual services (including the right to bear him children); the right to
her labor in domestic activities; and the right to her obedience. Of the
three rights, the first is the most exclusive. Not only doesthe husband
have a complete monopoly over his wife's present sexual services, but he
also has the right, if the girl has never been married before, to be the
[583] first to use such services. If he discovers that she is not a virgin, he
can send her back to her father and get back his mahr.

581 The other two rights are not as exclusive. The husband's right to
585 his wife's domestic labor does not prevent her from occasionally helping
593 out in her father's or brother's household, especially if they live nearby.
Finally, the husband's right to be obeyed by his wife is always subordin-
ated to that of her father, who retains the ultimate authority over his
daughter.

682 If the woman is killed or injured, the husband is deprived of all
683 or some of her services, depending on the seriousness and the permanence
581 of the injury, and therefore is entitled to compensation. The right of
585
593 avenging the woman's murder remains, however, that of her family, since
she is still a member of that family.

581 Marriage does not deprive the woman of some rights of her own.
585 The customary law gives the wife three basic rights corresponding to
562
671 those of the husband's sexual services, domestic work, and obedience.
Corresponding to the first of these, the wife has the right to have a
normal sexual life with her husband. This right, however, is not an exclusive one, since the husband can marry more than one wife. A woman
585 can be divorced from her husband without having to return the mahr if
586 she claims that the husband is unable to perform his sexual duties. In
593 such cases, the marriage is usually dissolved quietly. In certain rare
instances, the husband may deny his wife's accusations. If both insist
585
586 on their stand, one or both may ask to be submitted to "bait el-shana'a,"
593 or house of the dreadful deeds. Reports are extremely vague about the
627 exact procedures involved in this case. Some informants stated that the
married couple would live in a tent without sidewalls so that everybody
could see what goes on inside. Most informants, however, insist that it
merely means that the couple move their tent near that of a respectable
man whose word is believed and honored. This man is supposed to keep a
close watch on the couple's activities, by listening or looking through
holes in the tent. His verdict determines the future of the marriage.
[588] If the wife is justified in her claim, the husband is forced to divorce
[681] her and to forfeit his mahr. If, on the other hand, the verdict is for
[558] the husband, he not only can divorce her and get back the mahr, but is
also entitled to kabara, or compensation, for his injured pride. There
[114] is no case of bait el-shana'a in the area during the time of the field
[178] work, and most people insist that this practice is something of the past
[583] when the mahr was relatively high and was paid in livestock, in which

683
682 feet after that and left." It seems that later the wound got in-
672 fected. Six months after the incident, Selouma was taken to the
[578] hospital with an infected wound, and three days later he died from
that infection. Selouma's son, Ali, demanded that Muftah pay a
full bloodmoney (L.E. 400) for the death of his father, since the
death was directly caused by the wound inflicted by Muftah. Muftah
denied the charges and claimed that the infected wound which caused
683 the death of Selouma was not the one inflicted by the stone. Media-
682 tions continued for some time, and when no agreement was achieved,
672 the aqilas of the two baits to which the parties belonged declared
695 that the decision should be made by the oath which Muftah had to
613 take if he insisted on his claims that the wound was not caused by
his action. Since the case involved the life of a man, Muftah had
to be supported in his oath by fifty-five adult male members of
[671] his 'amar, or 'eila. In accordance with the Daraieb, the selection
[778] was done by members of Selouma's Bait who also selected the tomb of
the saint where the oath would be undertaken. On the date the oath
was to be taken, the disputing parties, as well as all the notables
of friendly tribal segments who were invited to witness the oath,
went to the tomb of the saint. As they started with the procedures,
[784] two of Muftah's cousins who were to support him in the oath and his
uncle refused to swear on the grounds that they were not sure that
Muftah was telling the truth and therefore could not subject themselves to the supernatural hazards of taking a false oath. Attempts
by other members who were to support Muftah were made to force the
three men to swear, since their refusal meant that the bloodmoney

684 682 the husband, who reached for his gun and fired at Goma'h. Three days later the latter died in the hospital from the gun wound.

684 682 672 The case was investigated by the police and brought to trial, but the case was dismissed as justifiable homocide by reason of self defense. The tribal proceedings, however, required Ghenewa to pay the bloodmoney for intentional homocide, since the weapon used was a gun. Out of the L. 400 bloodmoney, the sum of L. 20 kabara for committing adultery with the wife was deducted. None had questioned the right of Ghenewa to kill Goma'h in the process of defending himself.

671 672 In his essay on "The Early History of Malice Aforethought" in English law, Maitland discussed the "utter incompetence of ancient law to take note of the mental elements of a crime" (1911:327). This statement seems to apply to certain aspects of the tribal law of Awlad Ali. If one causes the death of another, even accidentally, he is liable to compensation. 671 672 171 This attribute is not restricted to Awlad Ali law, for it has been documented by a number of other studies. Peristiany found this to be the case among the Potok (1954), and Dundas documented it among the Kikuyu (1921). In his analysis of injury and liability among the Barotse, Gluckman maintained that "whatever the motivation of the killer or the circumstances surrounding the deed, bloodmoney has to be paid if a member of one grouping of kinsmen was killed by a member of some other group. The mental element seems to be irrelevant. What is important is that "murder" is committed within social relationships where blood compensation is due (1963:205). Similarly, Howell gives us one of the most comprehensive accounts of the Nuer "rule of law" and

671 672 the irrelevance of intention in establishing liabilities for homocide
171 or injuries (1954).

672 The neglect of intention in assessing liability in cases of homo-
682 cide is evident in the cases presented above (Cases 1,2,4,5 and 6), where compensation was paid although there was no intention established on the part of the offender.

Awlad Ali use the Arabic word "katl" to refer to any killing. This
[192] is different from the word "mut" which means death by natural causes.
They further differentiate between "katl 'amd," or intentional killing
682 and "katl khata," or unintentional killing. Although reference here is
672 made to "intention," yet, from the above cases it is evident that the
673 basis of establishing that intention is from the type of weapon used in
effecting the death of the victim. Intentional killings are those caused
[411] by a lethal weapon. Lethal weapons are defined as guns or knives.
Death caused by a non-lethal weapon, no matter what the intentions of the offender, is defined as non-intentional, even when the circumstances of the act indicates the actual existence of an intention on the part of the offender to cause the death of the victim (as in Case #3 above). The assumption is that the use of lethal weapons, such as daggers or guns, implies intention and possibly a certain degree of premeditation, since these weapons have no other important use. Moreover, the probability of death by a lethal weapon is much greater than from other non-lethal weapons. These give the victim a chance to defend himself, a chance which he does not have in the cases of killing with a gun or dagger. In other words, Awlad Ali, in assessing responsibility for homocide, "operate with a legalistic psychology in which intention is is presumed from action" (Gluckman, 1963:207).

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672 In practice, Awlad Ali do look at actual circumstances to assess the intention of the offender. Although compensation is always required, the readiness of the victim's kin group to accept a financial settlement and the final amount to be paid in a given situation is affected by the presence or absence of an intention on behalf of the offender. In assessing the actual intention of the offender in each case, the mediators rely on the circumstances of the crime as well as on the past history of the relationships between the offender and the victim. Although this actual intention of the offender does not change the payment of bloodmoney, the deceased's kin are more agreeable to the acceptance of the financial settlement if the killing is unintentional than if it is intentional and the possibility of revenge is much less imminent. Unintentional killing, regardless of the weapon used never results in blood feuds. The possibility, on the other hand, is much greater in the cases where the circumstances of the offense indicate an intention on the part of the killer to take the life of the victim. It is for this reason that the right of [778] nazala, or refuge, discussed in an earlier chapter, is resorted to only in the case of intentional killing. Of all the cases described in the chapter only in the case of the trespasser did the killers' kin group seek refuge by moving to another area where they were protected until the dispute was solved by another neutral tribal segment. It is important to note that killing in the above case was not done by a lethal weapon but by sticks, and as such was defined by the tribal law as "unintentional" as far as the formal amount of compensation required was concerned. Not all cases where the intention of the offender to kill [671] the victim is clear carried with it the threat of revenge. The tribal law takes into consideration certain mitigating circumstances, such as the role of the victim in initiating the act of the offender.

682 672 although the weapon used was not lethal and therefore was classified as an unintentional killing, yet the nature of the crime and the obvious intention on the part of the killers made reduced payment difficult to achieve.

Another way of reducing liability and the amount of money paid in cases of unintentional killing is by taking into consideration all the intervening variables that contributed to the death of the victim and asking them to share the blame. The working of this principle is illustrated in the case of the broken rope where the rope was assigned half the responsibility for the death of the victim. It is also present in the case of the careless guest where the responsibility was divided three ways with the host paying one third, the owner of the gun paying another third, and the goat sharing the responsibility for the rest of the bloodmoney. It is interesting to note the difference in the responsibility to the owner of the gun in the above case and the owner of the rope in the case of the broken rope. The owner of the rope was not held responsible for the death caused by his rope, the same way the owner of the goat in the case of the careless guest was not held responsible for the actions of the animal. Both the goat and the rope are not dangerous things by themselves for which a certain degree of care in handling is required. If such normally harmless things cause injury or death to a person, the owner is not held responsible.

682 672 41 67 [574] The situation is quite different in the case of the gun and the responsibility of its owner. By nature, the gun is a weapon of death, and for that reason the tribal law has required certain precautions in its use or handling. Among such precautions is the requirement that a guest,

682 672 411 671 594 as soon as he settles in the host's place, should unload the gun. In addition to reducing the possibility of the gun being accidentally fired and harming someone, this act expressed the trust of the guest in his host and signifies the ability of the latter to protect his guest against any harm. A person visiting another does not need his gun for protection and therefore must unload it. If the owner of the gun fails to take this 682 672 411 customary precaution and leaves his gun loaded, and because of that failure the gun causes the death or injury of a person or even damage to property, the owner is held responsible for that result. The same rule applies to other deadly weapons, such as knives or daggers, as well as to animals 683 672 231 which are dangerous by nature, such as dogs. Each tent in the area has a dog. Starting the first weeks in the puppy's life, he is trained to guard the tent and to bark at the approach of any stranger. It is also trained to attack any intruder who comes within fifty yards of the tent unless accompanied by a member of the tent. When one goes to visit another, he usually stays away from the tent until someone from the tent hears the dog barking and comes out to get the guest. Most dogs would not attack a person as long as he is the safe fifty yards away from the tent. Occasionally, a dog goes behond the safe distance and bites an individual passing by or a guest waiting to be let inside the tent. If the injured person is able to prove, usually by taking the oath, that he was more than fifty yards away from the tent at the time he was attacked by the dog, the dog's owner is liable to the victim for the injury inflicted by the dog. If, on the other hand, evidence shows that the victim was bitten by the dog while being less than fifty yards away from the tent, then there is no responsibility on the part of the dog's

619 The figures for the free tribes include attached client groups,
162 for the principal of which estimates are also given separately.
[127] The figures are taken from Col. De Agostini's monograph. The
provenance of the chief Bedouin tribes of Tripolitania and of
the fringes of Fazzan who are Sanusi, or sympathetic to the
Sanusiya, is shown, likewise in relation to the distribution of
Sanusiya lodges, on the map on page 52.

VI

619 Although there were in the past intertribal wars and feuds
[671] which have lasted into the present time, and in spite of the
[574] difference in status between free and client tribes, there were
laws of the tents which gave every Bedouin the freedom of the
whole country, and there was much coming and going between
the tribes and exchange of hospitality, especially in the grazing
grounds where sections with distinct territories on the plateau
shared common pasturage to the south of it, and where the
necessities of Bedouin life, watering at wells in transit, the crossing
of another tribe's territory on the way to markets, the
pursuit of straying camels, and the need to sow where rain fell,
imposed a recognition of individual rights without regard to
tribal affiliations or social status. Had it not been so, the Grand
[793] Sanusi could not have built on the tribal system his inclusive
organization, for there would have been no foundations in
* [795] culture, social structure, and sentiment, on which to build.

My inclinations as an anthropologist are to discuss at some
128 length the tribal and kinship systems and the life of the tents,
619 but I refrain from giving more than a bare outline of the tribal
system, and I neglect altogether kinship and the life of the tents,
because, however interesting detail about these matters might
be to the ethnologist, a knowledge of them is, I think, unnecessary
for an understanding of the development of the
Sanusiya Order in Cyrenaica. I discuss the structure of the
Cyrenaican tribe therefore only in so far as it is relevant to this
general theme.[1]

619 Use of the term 'tribe' in Cyrenaica, even if it be restricted
to the big free tribes, is always to some extent arbitrary for the
political structure is highly segmentary. Nevertheless, though

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[1] For a more general account see Savarese, op. cit., Pt. II, *passim*.

tions of soil, water, and grazing. We trace the segmentation of 619
the Qalabta alone and see that it has two divisions, the Muasa 613
and the Mahamda. We follow the line of Muhammad alone and
note that it splits into three lineages, *'Ailat* Brahim, *'Ailat* al-Mzatal,
and *'Ailat* al-Shauqi (there is dispute, arising from
quarrels over land, about the legitimacy of this branch). From
Mzatal descend the three minor *'ailat*, al-Slailikh, al-Aqta', and
Balraba'i. Following only the first line we note that *'Ailat*
al-Shlailikh then divides into the various *biyut* shown on the
chart, al-Habal, Mustafa, Brahim, &c., the male membership of
only one of which, *bait* al-Habal, is presented in the genealogy.
Where the name of an *'aila* or *bait* is different from that of its
founder, it almost invariably means that the founder's nickname
has been used, the Cyrenaican Bedouin having a partiality
for nicknames.

Each section of a tribe, from the smallest to the largest, has 619
its Shaikh or Shaikhs. The tribal system, typical of segmentary 554
structures everywhere, is a system of balanced opposition
between tribes and tribal sections from the largest to the
smallest divisions, and there cannot therefore be any single
authority in a tribe. Authority is distributed at every point of
the tribal structure and political leadership is limited to situations
in which a tribe or a segment of it acts corporately. With
a tribe this only happens in war or in dealings with an outside
authority which for its own purposes recognizes the tribe as an
administrative unit. There cannot, obviously, be any absolute [643]
authority vested in a single Shaikh of a tribe when the fundamental [671] •
principle of tribal structure is opposition between its
segments, and in such segmentary systems there is no state and
no government as we understand these institutions; and
criminal law is absent and civil law exists only in a very rudimentary
form. Consequently the exact status of a Shaikh can 554
only be defined in terms of a complicated network of kinship
ties and structural relations. It is only necessary here to
emphasize that his social position is unformalized and that he
must in no sense be regarded as a ruler or administrator.
Bedouin respect their Shaikhs, but they do not regard them as
superiors. Rather their influence and wealth are considered as
capital to be drawn on for the benefit of whoever is in need of
them. So long as a Shaikhly family can keep their prestige,

593 613 tegral part of "the one body"; events which affect a man in this context lie outside a father's field of jurisdiction. The political authority vested in a corporation acts to circumscribe the authority of persons in other fields.

Other rights stem from political membership. As a person with a defined position in a lineage corporation, a man has the right to use the natural resources of its territory. His father, although he instructs his son where to plough and when to water the animals, cannot deny him access to wells, pastures and ploughland. Economically, a son is independent to this extent, although his ability to exploit his right to the natural resources is restricted by his father's control of animals. Ultimately, however, this restriction cannot amount to stultification, because a man has the right to 613 demand food. In practice, a poor man staves off hunger with donations from 422 this or that individual, and superficially it appears that he is dependent on 735 the personal charity of his fellowmen. This is not so, for what is implicit is that the parcels of wealth controlled by individuals are the possessions of the corporation. It is not accidental that poor people do not go hungry. During my entire stay among the Bedouin I never saw one of them beg or [556] suffer hunger, however marginal the diet of many. Clearly, those with a surplus can and do use it for personal advantage, but the extent to which they can do so is circumscribed by the legal claims which members of a corporation have on the parcels of moveable property held by each of them.

613 Control over the wealth, whether it be animals or the procreative functions 421 of women, rests, in the final analysis, in a corporation. Inheritance laws 428 specify that women are not legal heirs,[8] and that all male children are [562] equal heirs. Women do, in fact, come to control property, and it is rare that wealth is equally divided among male heirs. The precise details of inherit- [593] ance may partly be decided by a father, but he is limited in his actions. Most of the time inheritance disputes are not of the kind which require action by the corporate group; a case which occured while I was resident with the Bedouin did, however, invoke immediate action. A man, who had left the desert to live in a village on the plateau, had only one daughter. He made it known that he intended to will his entire property to his daughter. When the news was brought to the camps of his fellow agnates, there was great consternation, because, as became clear in their lengthy discussions, the threat now existed that a substantial parcel of property would be removed from the group, a threat made real by the proposed marriage of the daughter [584] to a man of another tribe. The court would have to recognise the daughter's right to some of the property, and the members of the group reluctantly had to concede that there was little they could do about this, but they had one [593] action left to them — they decided that her nearest agnate should demand [584] her in marriage. Usually, the choice of husband for a daughter is a decision

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[771] [8] The Bedouin are Sunni Muslims, and, as Samusi, belong to the Maliki school in [795] legal matters. According to court law, women are heirs. However, actual Bedouin practice is contrary to law. For, if women were permitted to inherit, since many marry [671] outside the corporation into which they were born, they could alienate its resources.

reason in three families of one tribe paying together, while 682
the fourth is independent. Sometimes this is caused by 621
geographical separation, at other times by personal animosity or jealousy.

The main difference between the rules of the Western 682
Desert and Sinai is that in the West reprisals taken at the 171
discretion of an aggrieved individual are not recognised as [670]
lawful, and are distinctly discouraged. Generally speaking, [181]
the Western Bedou is a very much more prosperous and law-abiding person than the Sinai Arab, although at the same time he retains his charm as a primitive and inde-
pendent being. Occasionally a dastardly murder takes 682
place, but public opinion is very strong not only against the 674
murderer personally, but against all the members of his [626]
family, who automatically share his unpopularity.

In the spring of 1920 an old man, reputed to possess considerable wealth, both in camels and sheep and also in gold buried in the ground, was returning about mid-day from market riding his donkey, and one of his numerous grown-up sons was walking on foot beside him. After going four or five miles in the open desert, the old man got off his donkey, and told his son to ride for a little way while he walked. The son suddenly attacked his old father and hit him with the heavy stick he was carrying; and the poor old man died almost at once with a broken skull. There was nobody about, and the son dragged his father's body about a hundred yards, and threw it down an old dried-up cistern; then, mounting his donkey, he rode home to dinner.

That afternoon the local sheikh was told of the old man's disappearance, and as he had seen father and son leaving the market together, he had his suspicions. He traced their footsteps, picking up the tracks of a heavily laden donkey and one man walking, from near the entrance to the market place. Then, following along carefully on these tracks, he saw where the old man had dismounted. Then he saw a spot of blood and the place where the

of the present defendant seemed—for a really wealthy 682
man—to be pointless and futile. The merchant anticipated 674
this objection by hastening to add that the receipt of the 691
actual cash did not interest him in the least; but that he 626
had been wondering how he could shew his disapproval of 686
the defendant's family in some way, and had gone carefully through all his old papers and receipts with this end in view, and had triumphantly discovered the bill of debt now produced in court.

Bedouin Law and custom sometimes accept right to 671
bloodmoney in all sorts of circumstances, when other law 672
would recognise no claim. For example, the principle is 682
accepted that a life lost in prison must be paid for by the informers whose information resulted in the imprisonment of the deceased. It is entirely immaterial whether the information so given to the police was wilfully false or intentionally misleading, or whether it was merely subsequently found to be incorrect. Even if the information had been true and correct in every detail, the informer is still blood-guilty from the Ourfi standpoint, although in actual practice any such claims for bloodmoney would probably be considerably modified.

Other claims for bloodmoney are also recognised occasionally, in cases of obvious accidental death, or death by misadventure or Act of God, when the interpreters of Bedouin Law cannot get away from the main principle that a life lost must be paid for. The difficulty in these
cases is to determine who shall pay for it; and the lawsuits [695]
usually end in a clever compromise, in which their essential principles are duly observed, but their judgments are mitigated and modified by leniency and commonsense. The following example, which occurred recently in Mariut, will illustrate this.

A certain Arab called Ali Abu Bukr had inherited from 671
his father large cultivation rights in the desert; and in the 672
middle of this land was an old cistern for the collection of 682
rain water. It had not been used for years, and was silted 312

671 up with drift sand; and as it was some miles from the
672 nearest permanent water supply, the owner of the cistern
682 decided that it was well worth clearing out, with a view
to catching and conserving the next rainfall.

312 Accordingly he summoned all his kinsfolk, and propounded his proposition, to which they agreed. Other Arabs occupying neighbouring rights suggested that it was a very good idea, probably with a view to a simplified water supply for themselves.

671 An Arab from the neighbouring tribe called Ahmed
672 had frequently acted as shepherd and odd-job man for
682 Ali; and it happened that, when Ali and all his kinsfolk
were assembled at the cistern, Ahmed chanced to be passing. Ali hailed him, and asked him to come and lend a hand. So Ahmed joined the crowd at the well, and assisted in getting ready the ropes and other tackle to be used.

[312] The cistern, constructed after the usual Roman pattern, was about forty feet deep, fifteen feet in diameter for the first twenty feet or so, and from there narrowed down to six or seven feet, with footholes cut in the side for the last half. One of Ali's relatives had agreed to be let down with ropes and to start cleaning out the mud and sand from the bottom. However, when the rope had been tied round his middle, and he was just going to be swung in mid-air and lowered to the ledge at half-way, his nerve suddenly failed him, and he refused to start.

Subsequent evidence was confused at this point as to exactly what happened; but it seems that one of the crowd noticed Ahmed standing with the rest, and remarked that he had had considerable experience in well digging, and suggested that he should go down. Accordingly Ahmed flung a stone down the well, and a faint splash at the bottom indicated that there were a few inches of water in it. He then organised a sort of tug-of-war among the men standing by, to test the strength of the rope. Satisfied on this point, he had the rope tied round him, and he was

lowered very slowly and carefully by the crowd at the top. 671
Here again it is difficult to ascertain exactly what happened, 672
as the evidence was again contradictory. Apparently, when
Ahmed reached the ledge at half-way, he fumbled about 682
in the dim light for the foot holes; and just at this psychological moment the rope broke.

The ten men holding the rope at the top collapsed one on the top of another; but when they had recovered their presence of mind, they shouted down to Ahmed, to ask if he were all right. A faint voice from the bowels of the earth replied that he had fallen heavily on a stone and had had a nasty knock, but that he would be all right in a few minutes.

They then produced a spare rope for another man to go down and get Ahmed up; but they discovered that the only one they had to hand was too short by several feet. A man was sent post-haste on a pony to get another rope from the encampment a mile or so away, and when he returned after a quarter of an hour, volunteers were quickly forthcoming to go down and retrieve Ahmed. On reaching the bottom they found that the unfortunate man, either stunned by the fall or overcome by foul air, had collapsed flat on the bottom of the well, and had been drowned in six inches of water. They hauled his body up to the surface, and Ali, terrified that he might be held in some way responsible, counselled all present to bury the dead
man then and there, and to say nothing about it. However, [123]
news quickly spreads; and the same day an informer came to the police post and reported the matter, and Ali was arrested and subsequently sentenced to three months' imprisonment with labour by the present writer, for failure
to notify a death under unusual circumstances. (Inci- [177]
dentally this did not constitute an offence under Bedouin Law, but was a contravention of the Police Code and was punished as such. Hence the apparent interference in a purely Bedouin concern.)

While Ali was still serving his sentence, Ahmed's rela- [694]

•671 tives lost no time in taking legal proceedings at the Ourfi
672 court to claim bloodmoney from the owner of the cistern;
682 and on Ali's release from prison a very long and excessively
694 tedious lawsuit began.

The principle that a life had been lost and must be paid for was accepted without question by the court from the outset, in spite of the police enquiry, which is the local equivalent of a coroner's inquest. The enquiry had established beyond any shadow of doubt that death had been caused by misadventure, and that Ali was absolutely innocent, not only of any intent to kill, but also of any negligence whatsoever. Any other coroner's jury in the world would have returned a verdict of accidental death, expressed sympathy with the relatives, and absolved all concerned from blame; and there the matter would have ended.

671 Ali, who had already undergone three months in durance
672 vile—which, to a wandering child of the desert, must be
682 particularly galling—so far forgot any tribal instruction he
might have had as to repudiate vigorously any responsibility either for the accident or for the restitution of the death in the form of bloodmoney. His family also, who would naturally have to share the payment, did their best to confound the issue by lodging a counter claim. They protested that the actual rope that broke was not theirs, but belonged to a third party, and that neighbouring tribes, who had approved of the project and who stood to benefit by the cistern when it was cleaned out, were conjointly responsible with themselves for any payment due.

The case dragged on unsatisfactorily for some months; the neighbouring tribes swore that no agreement existed whereby they should benefit by the cistern when completed; the question of the ownership of the rope was dropped; and eventually Ali and his family were ordered to pay a reduced scale of bloodmoney to the family of the deceased.

683 Sometimes these bloodmoney cases, so far from being
672 dramatic or nauseating, are actually rather amusing.

members of a neutral family with grazing camels, and with 682
their help Mirtah was fetched in to the Wadi unconscious. 628

The case was reported to the police, but a few hours
after his arrival in the Wadi Mirtah quietly died. The 672
post-mortem examination revealed a skull cracked right across, with severe cerebral haemorrhage. In due course the Sirdani family claimed £400 bloodmoney from the Sayed family, according to the custom among the Gawabees tribe. This time, however, an exception was made. The sheikhs decided that the ordinary bloodmoney of £300 only should be paid by the Sayed to the Sirdani family, £100 in money and £200 in kind, divided into six yearly instalments of £50 each.

They also added a rider to the effect that they were not awarding Sanaa under the circumstances, as there was no proof of intent to kill, and that weapons such as guns or knives (which would imply premeditation) were not used. The presumption was that the Sayed family, though obviously intending to cause grievous bodily harm, did not intend to kill Mirtah. The fact that he died of his wounds automatically warranted the award of £300 as bloodmoney, but did not constitute sufficient justification for the imposition of the extra £100 as Sanaa.

In Common Law it is not always easy for the uninitiated 671
to understand the legal value of a threat, or what proportion 683
of the punishment for the completed action is due for a mere threat. It was singularly pleasing, therefore, to find a striking instance of a threat to shoot, and to see the attitude of the Bedouin court towards this particular offence.

An Arab called Abd el Kerim was tolerably well-to-do, 233
and owned several camels, a mare, fair-sized flocks of
sheep and goats, and certain cultivation rights; and he had 685
two sons aged about sixteen and eighteen respectively. His cousin, Abd el Salam, who lived half a mile away, had four sons of ages ranging from fifteen to twenty, but he was considerably poorer in this world's goods. Abd el Kerim's sons took their camels out to graze, and inadvertently

682 charge, which hit Towida at a range of only a few feet,
672 with fatal results.

Farag, who had divorced her two months before,
682 brought a claim for bloodmoney from Korayem; but when
672 the case was heard, Korayem denied that the accident had
695 happened in his tent. The assessors of this first court,
which was held soon after the accident, demanded that
Korayem should swear, backed by twenty-five men (i.e.
half the full number of fifty, as Towida was a woman),
that the accident did not take place in his tent. Then
• [671] followed an example of one of the very unsatisfactory
points in Bedouin Law.

Korayem, who was a powerful man belonging to the Gereidat, who were in turn a powerful family, managed to persuade the court to cancel their judgment requiring the oath from himself and his twenty-five backers, and to agree to a settlement whereby he should pay £10 and be absolved from the necessity of taking the oath. The court accepted this agreement, and proceeded to examine the claims to the bloodmoney.

The Moslem Law of Divorce provides that when a man
682 divorces his wife, the decree does not become absolute for
672 three months, in order that it may be ascertained whether
695 the woman be pregnant by her lately divorced husband.
Towida had only been divorced two months before the
691 accident; so the question had to be decided whether Farag
586 were legally her husband or not at the time of her death,
for purposes of receiving a share of the bloodmoney. If so,
he should receive one quarter; but there seems to have
been some difference of opinion on this point among the
assessors of the court, and the whole matter was shelved.

Seventeen years afterwards, Lataif Farag—then a man
682 of twenty-one—re-opened the case, claiming his mother's
672 bloodmoney. In support of his claim he produced three
695 witnesses. The first was Farag himself, who was prepared
to swear that he had seen Towida lying dead in the tent of
694 Korayem. The second was Towida's brother, who was

619 675 "Jumi'at, Marabtiin (plural of Marabit) of the 'Ali Ahmar." All Marabit tribes of the Western Desert are affiliated as * [613] clients with Sa'adi tribes. Further, since the tertiary group of the Marabtiin functions in the same way as that of the Sa'adi, it is this group which enters into compacts with Sa'adi tertiary groups. Traditionally, the Marabit group's [682] main support activity was to share in the payment of the blood-money with its Sa'adi protector group. In return, the Marabit group was given land in the protector's territory and could depend upon them to contribute to any Marabit blood debt which might come due. Also, it was considered the [628] [682] duty of the Sa'adi to revenge the death of a member of his client group since the Marabit "was weak and could not face a tribe." [608] But there is no attempt to construct fictional kinship links between Sa'adi and Marabit groups.

• [672] In al-Qasr today, contractual relations between Sa'adi and Marabit are still based upon collective responsibility in the blood-feud. However, since this traditional means of conflict control is an extremely rare occurrence, the mutual obligations of the parties are expressed in different forms. [648] In any conflict between the Bedouins and the Egyptian government, the Marabtiin are expected to support their respective [666] Sa'adi groups. In any modern elections which a Sa'adi might enter, the Marabit is expected to give him his vote. A few examples will make clear the relationship between the Sa'adi

121 621 basis of an agreement "to share the good and the bad" by
571 all parties concerned. Once the integration is effected,
675 patrilineal ideology and legal fiction succeed in concealing
608 597 the jointure.

621 The concept which derives from ancient Arabia, and
571 which expresses fully the structural principles of Bedouin
*613 society is that of _'aqila_. The _'aqila_, in al-Qasr, is the
head of the corporate group, the tertiary unit or _bait_. A
[884] person becomes part of the Bedouin jural body when he reaches
the age of 15, begins to keep the Ramadan fast, and is expected
to pay his share of the blood-money. At this time, a man
621 571 acquires rights over his corporate lineage-mates and they
*613 over him: they claim a share in the indemnity ("blood-
•672 money" - _diiya_) of each other, and are under obligation to
[682] contribute equal shares to any _diiya_ which becomes due from
the group as a whole. Further, each corporate member is
morally bound to support his lineage-mates by swearing the
oath (_yamiin_) on the behalf of any who are accused of falsehoods in the course of litigation. All of these rights and
obligations are guaranteed by the presence of an _'aqila_.

*613 The tertiary _bait_ is the minimal corporate group.
It usually includes three to five generations of members.
Tertiary units which are descended from a common ancestor
combine through contractual relations into the maximal corporate
group, the secondary unit or _'aiela_. Beyond the secondary level

Law and Political Order: 'Awaiyid Awlad 'Ali

671 [792] A "holy man" in al-Qasr, who has intimate knowledge of both the Quran and Bedouin law, has this to say on the subject of the 'awaiyid Awlad 'Ali:

> 671 171 The Sharii'a (Islamic Law) was given by God, and it
> guides man concerning what is good and what is bad:
> it is for all Muslims. The 'awaiyid was made by man
> for the Bedouins: it is for settling problems and
> evaluating damages. The 'awaiyid is natural, made
> by man and the Awlad 'Ali for settling the problems
> of the Bedouins. It is different from the Sharii'a.
> The Awlad 'Ali made the 'awaiyid, not the ashraaf
> ("holy men"); but the "holy men" approved it. The
> 'awaiyid agrees with the Sharii'a, but not in every-
> thing for it is not from the Sharii'a. Shari'it
> Muhammad ("the law of the Prophet") is one thing
> and the 'awaiyid is another. The Sharii'a says an
> eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth, and a life for
> a life: the 'awaiyid also says an eye for an eye,
> a tooth for a tooth, and a life for a life, but in a
> different way: the 'awaiyid involves money. The
> 'awaiyid judges a situation; the dhabiiha ("blood
> sacrifice," usually a lamb as an expiatory fee)
> and the fine are paid and the problem is solved . . .
> The 'aqila is better than the government for settling
> [672] problems in the desert. The government may put a man
> in prison, and if he dies there you will be responsible
> to his father and brothers. There is a more liberal
> judgment here in al-Qasr, and God prefers that we
> [673] settle our problems through peace . . . If a man dies
> in prison, it is no sin before God but the Bedouins
> consider it a sin.

671 At the present time, the customary law of the Awlad 'Ali prevails in al-Qasr, and, I suspect, this body of legal and moral norms will be the basis for Bedouin social and political action for some time in the future. In any case, it furnishes us with a base-line from which any future studies of social

181 of his rights;" a man should be courageous enough to fight
641 for what belongs to him and his family. These values, which
578 become political values in a tribal context, coupled with the
571 idea of self-help make for a political order which is ultimately
based upon the law of blood-revenge and feud. At least this
is the case where the external system of authority relations
578 is concerned. But force as the ultimate mechanism for the
571 establishment of political order is better considered an
182 extreme, and only one of the mechanisms used by the Bedouins
in the process of conflict regulation. The attempt is to
establish a balance of rights, concerning honor and property,
and not to go beyond another's boundaries lest he retaliate.
Force, as a coercive institution, can never be the sole basis
of political structure, as Schapera has shown in the case of
the Bergdama and Bushmen (1956:211-221). Thus the Bedouins
[681] say blood-revenge would be impossible within the secondary
* [613] corporate group; relations this important cannot be based
[682] upon force. In the case of homicide within this group compensation is immediately forthcoming.

571 Also, it has been pointed out that self-help and
•672 collective responsibility do not operate indiscriminately.
*613 That is, an individual cannot depend upon the backing of
[578] his group irrespective of his own motivations in a particular
situation which calls for retaliation or threatened the group
with retaliation. Individual responsibility figures in cases

571 *672 other than those dealing with blood-revenge too. For instance,
*613 in matters concerning personal debts incurred, the group is
571 not responsible for the individual. The Bedouins say that if
672 *613 a man has the money he must repay his debts: if he does not
426 have the money, then he must ask a rich relative to pay his
debts for him. He is then in debt to his relative and, out
of respect for him, should not borrow money or go into debt
[558] again. If he does, he will bring dishonor (*'ar*) to his
[681] family and they will, ultimately, banish him. There was dis-
682 agreement among my informants as to whether or not they
*613 should contribute to a *diiya* which was compensation for an
829 intentional slaying. Some said that they would not question
124 the motives of their kinsman who has killed because "we are
together in the good and the bad, and I must pay for him
just as he must pay for me." But others held the opinion,
which I feel was a prevailing one, that one must take into
account the justifiability of the killing. This seems to
have been the case in the past, for the Bedouins say that
traditionally the *bait* of the killer had to pay one-half
of the *diiya*.

*613 All things political somehow relate to the payment
682 of blood-money. We have seen that the essential function
681 of the *'aqila*, and even the condition of his taking office,
182 refers to the responsibility of collecting the *diiya* from
571 the members of his group. The criterion of being a member

*613 682 impossible within the corporate group. Middleton and Tait (1958:19) have generalized on this point, and Wagner (1940: 218) has been very explicit: "When a breach of law occurs within a given group (lineage, sub-clan, or clan) and the nature of the offence is such that it affects those interests which are specific to the group and not further divisible, a restoration of the breach by compensation is obviously impossible, as it would necessitate the splitting of the group into two units . . . " The Bedouins avoid division in ●[672] such cases by holding the whole secondary group responsible for the diiya, and usually the share of the diiya which would be forthcoming from the killed man's tertiary segment is excluded from the total payment. It seems that either the Bedouins represent an atypical case, or Africanists have failed to make a sharp and analytical difference between the blood-vengeance grouping and the group which actually shares in the paying and receiving of blood money.

671 [682] [626] Bedouin law and political order, then, center on the institution of blood-revenge or retaliation. The payment of compensation as a prevention of blood-feud is a central concern of the 'awaiyid Awlad 'Ali. Murray (1935:313-328) presents a Bedouin legal document "signed with the seals of twenty-two sheikhs testifying to the accuracy of the code" which set forth the main tenets of the 'awaiyid of the Western Desert. I checked the contents of this document with

681 property disputes, and I shall briefly discuss this before
695 I proceed to describe Bedouin legal processes. Besides the
784 threat of blood-revenge and fines of money, the individual, or group, who violates the moral and legal norms of Bedouin society may be faced with sanctions of a sacred nature. In
695 any case where clear evidence is lacking, one litigant may request that that other party swear the oath (yamiin Allah)
*613 in support of his claim. In all three corporate charters
695 presented earlier in this chapter, those of 'Ailit Ma'fas,
695 'Ailit Lazumi, and 'Ailit Abu Qarasa, support of lineage-mates through the oath was a condition of group membership.
●[672] Collective responsibility not only applies in the case of secular things, i.e., sharing the blood-money and the exercise of blood-revenge, but also where the possible curse of God is concerned.

695 When one party to conflict requests that the oath be administered as a means of settling a dispute, the other party will always accept because it is assumed that in this way both litigants "will get their rights." The party taking
695 the oath must be supported by a number of his relatives
602 ('umraa al-dam) who are willing to risk the consequences, and
*613 who are chosen by the other party. If a man is unable to muster the required number of kinsmen to take the oath, and the number is always relative to the seriousness of the offense of which he is accused, then this is taken as a sign of his untruthfulness and he loses his claim.

156 the group--in effect questions a great deal about the whole
159 traditional authority structure. Blood-revenge functions as
554 829 a deterrent to social disorder in that it represents an
682 automatic mechanism for restoring a balance of good relations
[182] in the society. Actually, Hajj 'Ali exaggerated to make a
point when he spoke of the existence of "unbalanced people."
682 A person would indeed be "unbalanced" who did not take into
●672 consideration the repercussions of his acts with respect to
*613 the personal danger and the dishonor and shame it would bring
to his *'aiela* and *bait*. Although the *'aiela* members are
willing to share in the blood money for accidental or unpremeditated killings, it is wrong to suppose that the Bedouins
do not attempt to weigh the justifiability and culpability
[671] in matters of killing. The very existence of the *'awaiyid
Awlad 'Ali* argues against this. Obviously, the dichotomy made
between killing in the *'awaiyid*, i.e., intentional and accidental,
and the concomitant gradation in compensation points to some
kind of reasonable consideration in cases of killing.

156 Hajj 'Ali is discontent with yet another aspect of
159 the traditional authority structure. He questions the logic
554 and authority represented in the oath as a sacred sanction.
695 This says something about the degree of secularization which
829 Hajj 'Ali has undergone. Although he does not say so, he
apparently favors a more secular and logical procedure for
determining a man's guilt or innocence.

619 The picture was reversed then with the poor Sa'adi shepherds becoming
184 the masters, acquiring great wealth and prestige because of their fight-
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792 ing ability, and the holymen becoming the shepherds and clients of the
Sa'adi fighters. Inthe old inter-tribal wars, the Murabiteen stood a
[651] very limited chance so the Sa'adi tribes adopted them and in return for
a yearly tribure guaranteed theprotection of the Murabiteen from external aggression.

As time passed, the main difference between the Sa'adi and Murabiteen tended to diminish. One or two outstanding Murabiteen tribes fought their own battles without seeking the protection of the Sa'adi and remained independent, while a few others rose up and fought on with the protector against a common foe (the case of the Gemei'at tribe is an example) and in return were emancipated from the stigma of serfdom and accepted by the Sa'adi as almost equals. Other Murabiteen tribes remained attached to their Sa'adi protector as client groups.

Ibn Khaldoun also saw the inferiority of the Murabiteeh tribes as stemming from a mode of tribal relations adapted to inter-tribal warfare (1845).

613 The Eila

The Eila represents the next level of tribal segmentation among the Awlad Ali. The Eila is the most important political unit. Although the Eila lacks any formally recognized leadership, its importance stems from the fact that it constitutes the vengeance group or Amar El-Dam (unity of
613 the blood). This means that it bears a corporate responsibility for the
672 actions of its members. Anyone of its members can be killed in vengence
682 for a homocide committed by any other, and the duty of revenge for any

613 672 682 member falls on all members alike, regardless of the exact genealogical relationship to the victim. When bloodmoney is to be paid, its members pay it as a group, divided among all male adults; and although when they receive it, a bigger portion goes to the nearest agnates of the victim, the remainder is distributed equally among all its members.

613 The genealogical depth of the Eila is usually five generations. This is not always true, however, In certain instances the number of generations intervening between the founder of the Eila and its living members is nine or even ten. Naturally, the more generations the larger the size of the Eila. Sometimes the Eila becomes so numerous that it is [217] hard to keep records of all members who are supposed to share in the payment of the bloodmoney in a specific case. When the size of the Eila reaches this point, one of two things may happen. The first is an attempt to make lists of the members. Many of the Eilas have such lists. This 613 675 is usually accompanied by a tendency toward writing down the specific rules and regulations of the vengeance group. These lists are referred to as Amar papers. They constitute a formal statement of an otherwise informally recognized responsibility of the group for certain actions of its members. The other is a tendency toward the fission of one or more of its constiuent units which, after separation, establishes itself as an independent Amar. The factors underlying this process of fission are discussed in the next chapter.

[539] The following is an example of an Amar paper, that of the Eilat Aggary, which was put into effect in 1954.

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675 539 [681] Each Aqila is responsible for submitting to the Amar a list of the Sayems in his bait, and this will be the basis for establishing the share of the bait in payment or receipt of the money.

[885] **Article 5:**

No Aqila can act on any matter involving loss or gain to the Amar without the presence of the other Awaqil of the Amar, unless an urgent matter occurs in which waiting for the rest of the Awaqil might jeopardize the interest of the Amar. In such cases the Awaqil present can act on behalf of the Amar as a whole.

Article 6:

• [672] [673] The following acts should not involve the Amar as a whole and the offender is considered individually (or with his own Bait) responsible for them:

1. Theft and cheating.
2. Insult or disrespect of a younger member of the Amar to an older person whether from the Amar or not.
3. Entering someone's tent or home without permission.
4. Seduction of women (including rape and adultery).

[681] In all the above cases the individual has to bear the responsibility for his own actions. For to let the Amar pay for him in such circumstances is to encourage him and other such members of the Amar to commit more of such acts and bring disgrace to the Amar. If the offender is unable to pay for his crime, his nearest male kin should pay for him in accordance with the Awlad Ali Daraieb. Such payments are considered as personal debts which the offender has to pay back as soon as he is financially able.

Article 7:

[627] When an older person does injustice to a younger one, the latter should take his complaint to the Aqila of his own bait. The Aqila in turn should take the matter up with the Aqila of the older man or to all the awaqil of the Amar if the matter is serious enough. The awaqil must assess the facts and prevent the older man from doing any more injustice to the younger man and have the former compensate him for any damage he might have caused the younger man by his actions. If the awaqil fail to do this and if their failure resulted in the younger insulting or hurting the older, his acts become no longer an individual responsibility for which he has to pay alone, and the Amar should pay for him.

Article 8:

[627] No members of the Amar should take sides in disputes involving families or individuals outside the Amar unless the awaqil in the Amar investigate the matter and the reasons for the dispute and decide that the Amar as a whole should be on one side of the dispute or the other.

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Another factor which led to the need to formalize the rules of the Amar was the increase in the kind of disputes for which there is no provision in the customary law of Awlad Ali. Such disputes arise mainly out of situations which are relatively novel to the area. A large number of these situations involve the relationship between the tribal population and the government authorities recently taking a major part in managing the affairs of the area. There were no rules in Awlad Ali law to guide decisions in cases involving financial liability of a member of the Amar in cases such as confiscation of smuggled goods, destruction of government property, or false testimony leading to the conviction of a fellow tribesman by the government authorities. The list of cases such as these is rapidly increasing. Many members of the Amar refuse to share in the payment of liabilities arising out of such cases on the basis that since no provision has been made in the customary law of Awlad Ali, then the Amar as a whole should not take corporate responsibility for such actions. They assert that corporate responsibility of the Amar is the exception rather than the rule and therefore, where there is no specific rule, the responsibility is an individual one. Others insist that it is the corporate responsibility of the Amar in such matters that maintains the Amar as a group and gives incentives to the members to retain their membership in the Amar, and therefore, should be the rule rather than the exception, covering any form of liability unless individual responsibility is specified.

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This made it essential to specify in some kind of formal statement which liabilities are to be considered collective for which the Amar has to pay as a corporate unit and which are to remain as individual responsibility. This is done either by listing the cases of individual

613 responsibility, leaving any other situation a collective responsibility,
672 or by specifying the cases of collective responsibility, implying that
675 all other responsibilities are as a rule individual ones. The Amar paper of the Aggary, for example, chose to list offenses for which the Amar is not responsible, leaving the rest of the liabilities to be covered by the Amar as a whole. This is not always the case. In some papers offenses for which the Amar is responsible are the ones listed leaving the general rule as the non-responsibility of the Amar.

613 It is in this respect that the Amar papers are considered an im-
671 portant source of legislation. Although the new rules incorporated in
675 an Amar paper start with the limited applicability to members of the Amar, yet, as time passes and as these rules affect the relationship of the Amar members to outsiders, one rule may acquire a wide practice and become part of the customary law itself. An example of the point in
613 question is the rule regulating the payment of the bloodmoney in cases
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675 where the murderer is tried by the state courts for the same crime. In
682 cases of arrest of the murderer by the government, only half the bloodmoney is paid and the other half is withheld until the trial is over. If the killer is acquitted by the court, then the other half becomes immediately due for payment. If, on the other hand, as mentioned before, the killer is convicted, half the bloodmoney is postponed until the person completes his sentence and is released unharmed and with his full senses. If he dies in prison or sustains an accident which affects his physical or mental capacities, the rest of the bloodmoney is automatically dropped. This rule was first included in a number of Amar papers, especially those of the Eilat of Awlad Kharouf tribe. In less than twenty years since it

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671 first appeared, the rule has become a practice so common that other Amars
675 find it unnecessary to specify it in their own papers.

682 Another new rule which is in the process of acquiring a great amount
613 of consensus among the tribal population of Awlad Ali is that of the re-
● 672 sponsibility of the Amar for the payment of the lawyer's fees for members
675 of the Amar who are tried by the government (Article 13 of the Aggary
[693] papers). Another less agreed upon rule is that of the responsibility of
[695] the Amar for the financial losses caused by the confiscation of smuggled
613 goods or the payment of money for the destruction of government property
672 by a member of the Amar. Where smuggling is an important source of in-
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439 come for the group, Amar papers usually include rules making it a cor-
[434] porate responsibility; other Amar papers, especially those of tribal
segments not deeply involved in smuggling, make it an individual responsibility, while still others leave it intentionally with no specific rule, as in the case of the Aggary Amar paper.

613 The Aggary document is a relatively elaborate one. Not all Amar
[675] papers, or at least the ones I had a chance to examine, are as detailed.
[131] Eilat Aggary is the largest Amar in the area of Dera'el Bahari, which
extends from Alexandria 60 miles westward to the town of Alamein. The
613 distinctive characteristics of the Aggary Eila is that it is composed
563 mainly of peasant groups who joined the Aggary by means of tribal adop-
619 tion. Of the 16 Baits constituting the Aggary Amar, only three are believed to be Awlad Ali proper. The attractiveness of the Aggary for the peasant groups seeking to be adopted by the tribal population of the area may be partly explained in terms of the location of Eilat Aggary in an area relatively close to the Delta from where these groups usually migrate.

613 If any disagreement between the
578 responsibility of the majority of the awaqil to persuade the minority to
571 conform to the majority's decision. This is usually done by simple per-
613 sonal persuasion. In certain instances, however, when a particular aqila
554 is known for being troublesome to the Amar, refusing to abide by the ma-
571 578 jority decisions, an attempt may be made by the others to build up pop-
ular support around another person in the Bait which the aqila represents.
If this strategy is successful, it might lead to replacing the aqila by
another who is more abiding to the Amar's decisions. This approach is
more likely to succeed if the aqila is not a popular person in his own
Bait, for if he is popular, any attempt by the other Baits to disqualify
the aqila would be viewed by the members of his Bait as interference in
their own affairs and might lead them to rally even more strongly around
their leader.

613 The other tendency occurring when the size of the Eilat increases
is toward the separation of one or more of its constiuent Baits. Origi-
613 682 nally this was done by merely refusing to share in the payment of blood-
money. If this refusal continued, it was considered as a sign of
[178] separation of the Bait. In recent years this created problems with an
increasing number of individuals claiming separation from the Amar to
avoid the payment of the bloodmoney, while claiming membership when dis-
613 tribution is done. This led many tribal segments to require that the
675 "barawa" or separation of individuals or tribal units from any particular
Amar should be put in writing, after getting the approval of the Amar to
which he belonged. When the approval is given and the separation in put
in writing, it is announced to all other tribal segments. If this is
[672] done, members of the separated tribal segment are not held responsible

613 [675] [672] for the actions of the members of their former Amar, nor is the Amar responsible for theirs.

Units thus separated establish themselves as separate Amars. These units are commonly referred to as Eila, thus retaining the structural label of the higher order of segmentation. This is not always the case, however, and other segments may refer to them as Baits rather than as Eilat. This explains, at least in part, the tendency toward blurring the formal scheme on the next level of segmentation, that is, of the Bait, and may account for the variable meaning of the term Eilat itself.

The Bait

While the Eila or Amar-el-dam is the most important political unit by virtue of being the vengeance group and therefore, the individual's major support group, it is the Bait that constitutes the most visible political unit.

613 423 The Bait is the only corporate land-holding group. While the Eila is usually associated with a certain geographical locale which it considers as its homeland or "watan", it rarely, if ever, utilizes this land as a corporate unit. Instead, the land is divided among the various Baits constituting the Eila. The land of the Bait is not divided and each member of the Bait can, at least theoretically, cultivate or graze on any part of it.

613 But the one important characteristic of the Bait which distinguishes it as a political unit is the existence of a formally recognized leadership in the position of the Aqila (lit. wiseman). The Bait is the only structural unit with such formalized leadership. The Aqila is responsible for all members of his own Bait whose number varies from 20 to 60

PHASE I

613 578 682 [464] In September of 1956, Mansur from bait Eweidha of the Aggary Eila, who works as a driver in one of the government projects in the area, went to Alexandria with a friend, a member of the Gemei'at tribe. In one of the bars there, Mansur got drunk and entered into an argument with his friend. The argument turned into a fight during which he hit his friend with a broken bottle. Two days later, the friend died. A settlement was made between Mansur and the victim's family and bloodmoney was established at L. 300.

613 682 683 Two weeks after the above incident, the same person, Mansur, was driving the government car on his regualr duty when he ran over two members of the Sanagrah tribe who were sitting on the side of the road, killing one and breaking the leg of the other. Another settlement was made with the families of the victims. The bloodmoney for the dead man was established at L. 300 and another L. 50 was set as the compensation for the broken leg of the other man.

The total sum of compensations in the two incidents was divided among the sixteen baits constituting the Aggary Amar. The share of each bait was decided in proportion to the number of adult males (sayems) in each. The share of bait Asabei' alone was established at about L. 100.

613 682 683 672 558 As the Aqila of Bait Asabei', Shei'eb was responsible for collecting the money from members of his bait. But for the following six months he was unable to collect from any member of his bait, including Sheikh Hakim, Shei'eb's cousin and the wealthiest person in bait Asabei' and the Aggary Amar as a whole. Most of them gave the execuse that it was a bad year and they had lost most of their herds. When the money was not collected,

613 the victims' families sent their representatives to demand that the money
682 be paid. To face the situation, a meeting of all the Awaqil of Eilat
683 Aggary was called and Sheikh Selouma, the Aqila of bait Eweidha, took the
672 responsibility of notifying the other Awaqil. The meeting was held in
558 the tent of Hemeida (my driver and informant) from the Sanagrah tribe.
[115] Each bait was represented by its Aqila with the exception of bait Asabei', from which both Shei'eb and Hakim were present. Since bait Asabei' was the only bait which did not submit to its share of the bloodmoney, the discussion centered around the inability of Shei'eb to collect it. In a gesture which he meant to appear as helping out Shei'eb, Hakim offered to pay not only his share but that of all members of bait Asabei', and followed his offer by handing the money to Sheikh Selouma. After this act which was a complete surprise to Shei'eb, Sheikh Slouma, the Aqila of bait Eweidha, suggested that Hakim should be considered as the Aqila of bait Asabei' instead of Shei'eb, who had demonstrated his inability to collect from members of his own bait. He emphasized the fact that he had nothing against Shei'eb who had legitimately acquired his position as Aqila by means of succession. But he insisted that the survival of the Amar depended upon the fulfullment of its financial obligations to outsiders and that Hakim was wealthy and could pay. Shei'eb did not comment and the rest of the Awaqil nodded indicating their agreement with Sheikh Selouma.

[124] The above is the summary of events that happened before I came to the area, and which were told to me by informants including the parties involved. Since most of these events occurred more than ten years ago,

613 682 it was impossible to verify the actual facts or to know what exactly
683 happened. But since the parties involved are still alive and since these
672 events are closely related to present-day happenings, the case is still
558 alive in the minds of the parties involved as well as those of outsiders-
(124) Naturlaly, each party tries to present the facts in such a way as to
613 682 support his own claims. Shei'eb, for example, insists that Hakim had
683 bribed members of bait Asabei' to refuse to pay their share in order to
156 embarrass him and make him appear as unable to perform his duties as
558 Aqila. "Hakim always had his eyes on becoming the Aqila of bait Asabei'," said Shei'eb, "but he had no business becoming the Aqila, so he had to make me look bad to the other Awaqil.... He likes to be looked up to as a big man, but it wouldn't work." While other members of bait Asabei' deny that Hakim had bribed them, they agree with Shei'eb that Hakim is a
156 dishonest man. In fact, Hakim's reputation is so widespread in the area
551 that it has earned him the nickname of "the thief". The nickname was
788 given to him a few years ago when he went to Mecca for a pilgrimage with
685 another fellow tribesman. The latter told the story that while in Mecca Hakim had found a purse with two hundred pounds in it. He was supposed to return the purse to the authorities or it would be considered as stealing if he kept it. Stealing in Mecca is not only a crime but also a great sin which makes the holy trip void for the offender. Hakim told his companion that he had given the purse to the authorities. But later, on their way back from Mecca, the friend found the purse hidden in Hakim's luggage. When the story was known in the area, he was referred to as
156 "the thief". Other accounts of Hakim's dishonesty are told throughout
685 the area, including stories of how he acquired his wealth through stealing
439

613 681 mainly a declaration that, that particular person is no longer a member of the tribal segment and that his actions should not in any way reflect upon the tribal segment. The tribal segment referred to is usually the amar since it is only politically corporate group amoung Awlad Ali. The procedure is usually undertaken in cases of habitual offenders whose actions consistently bringing liability to the amar or disgracing it in relations with other tribal groups in the area. Due to the seriousness of the procedure (since it leaves the individual without the protection of his group), it is restricted. First, to announce the barawa of any of its members the amar has to get the unanimous agreement of all adult males of the gorup as represented by their Awaqil of their respective [675] baits. Lately such decisions have to be put in writing. The barawa [593] from the amar does not include the man's father, brothers, or sons. [672] These immediate relatives remain responsible for his actions even if they desire to detach themselves from such responsibility. This is mainly maintained not so much for the protection of the repeated offender but rather for the protection of unsuspecting people who happen to have dealings with him and who would be protected by the corporate responsibility of the man's immediate kin. In addition to repeated offenders, the [626] barawa or the threat of it is used to back the awaqil in their exercise of persuasion to get members of their baits to agree to their decisions, expecially those affecting the amar, like the collection of bloodmoney or the taking of the oath.

A man, on his part, may ask to be given a barawa from his amar. In this case, as shown in the amar papers of Aggary, he has to give good reasons for such a demand. The awaqil of the amar meet and discuss such

178 682 and compensation became more and more accepted in settling murder cases
[619] among the tribal population. Bloodmoney, or diyya," was established
[729] among compensations for injury in general. This scale of compensation
682 is based on the amount of loss of normal activities the injury caused
the victim with death being the total loss of such activities. The
compensation for homocide is estimated at L.E.400 for intentional killing,
682 and L.E. 300, for unintentional killing. Although reference here
673 is made to "intention," the assessment of that intention and its definition
672 are quite different from the general usage of that term among modern
jurists. Among modern jurists, the term refers to a state of mind which
implies that the offender willfully and knowingly committed the prohibited
act. This means, first, that the person is able to recognize the nature
of his act and to distinguish between right and wrong. Secondly, it means
that the person was in a position to choose between committing the act
and not committing it and took the former path. According to this view,
individuals under temporary or permanent insanity, children under the
legal age (the definition of which varies from one legal system to another),
non-human beings and objects are not capable of having criminal intent,
since they are incapable of having a will of their own. Similarly, individuals
who are capable of having a will but, because of certain circumstances
their freedom of choice was impaired, cannot also have intentions.
Intention, then, in the modern legal conception is a psychological quality
that connects the offender with the prohibited result or results. It
is this psychological connection that differentiates in modern legal systems
between murder and manslaughter, between attempted murder and simple
assault, between first and second degree murder, and between justifiable

682 and unjustifiable homicide. To examine responsibility in homicide
●672 among Awlad Ali and their definition of "intentional" and "non-
673 intentional" killing, let us first present some of the cases collected
from the area.

CASE #1: The Case of the Broken Rope

682 This is one of the classical cases which is told throughout
672 the entire area. There is some slight variation in the way it is
312 told, but all accounts refer to the fact that Hemeida from the
[184] 'Esheibat tribe inherited the right to use a large area of tribal
[428] land in which there was an old Roman well not used for a long period of time and which was full of sand. One day he invited the awaqil of his tribal segment, as well as his neighbors, to consult them on how to clear the well, since without it the land was almost useless. They all decided it was a good idea and offered their help. On the day the well was to be cleared, they all gathered around the well. Among those present was Do'ah, a poor member of the 'Esheibat tribe who worked as a paid shepherd for Hemeida. He was watching from a distance when Hemeida called upon him to give a hand. The well, like all Roman wells in the area, is about fifty feet deep and fifteen feet in diameter, and narrows as one goes down the well. To be cleared, someone has to be lowered by a rope to the bottom of the well to dig up the sand. Hemeida's cousin, Ali, agreed to go down, and the gathering looked for a sturdy rope which they found at one of Hemeida's neighbors. As the group was tying Ali to the rope, Hemeida suggested that Ali was too heavy for the rope and that it would be a good idea if a slimmer man did the job. At this point, everybody looked at Do'ah, since he was the thinnest

682 672 312 person in the crowd. So, Do'ah volunteered to be lowered down to clear the well. He then proceeded to the well, glanced at the bottom of it, and threw a small stone to see if there was any water left in it. The stone made a faint splash indicating that there were a few inches of water. After that, he examined the rope and the equipment used. Satisfied with everything, he tied the rope around himself and was lowered very slowly and carefully by the crowd at the top of the well. As Do'ah was more than half-way down, the rope broke, and he fell. When the crowd called him, Do'ah answered in a faint voice telling them that he was hurt but that he would be all right. The crowd then looked for a spare rope to lower somebody to get Do'ah but could not find any in a nearby camp. They sent a man to get a rope from the next camp, but by the time a man was lowered to get Do'ah, he was dead; he had drowned in six inches of water.

682 672 [625] [613] Since the place of the accident was close to the police station, word got to the officer who, after investigating the case, ruled it as accidental death. But while the government authorities were investigating the case, members of the Bait to which Do'ah belonged were proceeding with the customary ways of Awlad Ali to claim bloodmoney for their dead kinsman. The idea was that a life had been lost, and that regardless of the police investigation, someone must pay for it. The question was who. Since the well belonged to Hemeida, Do'ah's relatives insisted that he was the one to pay the bloodmoney. Not denying the fact that someone had to pay for the death of Do'ah, Hemeida insisted that the one to pay was the

682 owner of the rope, since it was the broken rope that had caused
672 the death of Do'ah. The case stayed unsolved for more than two
months, a record for dispatching of criminal cases in the area.
682 In the final Mi'ad, the main question was whether or not the owner
672 of the rope was responsible for the death of Do'ah, and therefore
627 liable for the payment of the bloodmoney. After extensive nego-
tiations with the parties involved, Sheikh Selouma, the aqila of
Hemeida's Bait, who had also been accepted by Do'ah's family as
the Mardi in the case, convened the Mi'ad and announced the settle-
682 ment. His announcement came after reading certain passages of the
672 Koran and reminding the parties that they were all members of Awlad
627 Ali and therefore brothers. He stressed the necessity of all bro-
695 thers having clear hearts toward one another and not allowing worldly
disputes to leave any impurities among friends. He then came to the
conclusion that there were two things responsible for the death of
Do'ah. The first was Hemeida's decision to clear the well, for had
it not been for that decision, the accident would not have happened.
The second thing responsible was the rope whose breaking was the
direct cause of the death. The responsibility here applies only to
the rope and not to the owner of that rope. The reason Sheikh Selouma
gave for not holding the owner responsible for the death of Do'ah
was that the rope by itself is not a lethal weapon for which the
owner has to exercise a great deal of caution in lending it. To
make the owner responsible for the death of Do'ah would, according
to Sheikh Selouma, discourage anyone from lending anything to his
neighbor for fear of becoming liable for any harm it might cause.

682 672 627 695 "...It means that I will never lend my cooking pot to my neighbor lest his child trip over it and I would be asked to pay his bloodmoney."

So, the bloodmoney was divided into two sections, one to be paid by Hemeida, and the other to be the responsibility of the rope, which meant that the victim's relatives only took home half of the bloodmoney.

683 CASE #2: The Case of the Curious Neighbor

682 578 672 This is the case of 66-year-old Selouma whose barley land bordered that of Muftah, a distant member of the same tribe. A small area of rocky land separated the two areas. Throughout the time that Muftah was preparing his land for barley cultivation, Selouma used to sit on the dividing rocks, observing his neighbor work on his land and making jokes about the amount of time and effort Muftah was putting into his land, especially when it looked like a dry year, anyway, and no barley would be cultivated. For more than a week Muftah tolerated his neighbor's remarks. "I always said to myself, 'Don't follow the devil... He is an old man and doesn't know what he is saying.' But that day I could not take it any longer. My wife and children were sick, and I didn't have any money to bring them medicine or even food. I wanted to finish preparing the land because it looked like it was going to rain that day. I went to the area I was working on when Selouma started his jokes. I was mad. I took a small stone and threw it at him to scare him and make him stop. The stone hit his leg. It was a small stone, and I didn't think it would harm him. Actually, he stood on his

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682 feet after that and left." It seems that later the wound got in-
672 fected. Six months after the incident, Selouma was taken to the
[578] hospital with an infected wound, and three days later he died from that infection. Selouma's son, Ali, demanded that Muftah pay a full bloodmoney (L.E. 400) for the death of his father, since the death was directly caused by the wound inflicted by Muftah. Muftah denied the charges and claimed that the infected wound which caused
683 the death of Selouma was not the one inflicted by the stone. Media-
682 tions continued for some time, and when no agreement was achieved,
672 the aqilas of the two baits to which the parties belonged declared
695 that the decision should be made by the oath which Muftah had to
613 take if he insisted on his claims that the wound was not caused by his action. Since the case involved the life of a man, Muftah had to be supported in his oath by fifty-five adult male members of
[691] his 'amar, or 'eila. In accordance with the Daraieb, the selection
[778] was done by members of Selouma's Bait who also selected the tomb of the saint where the oath would be undertaken. On the date the oath was to be taken, the disputing parties, as well as all the notables of friendly tribal segments who were invited to witness the oath, went to the tomb of the saint. As they started with the procedures,
[784] two of Muftah's cousins who were to support him in the oath and his uncle refused to swear on the grounds that they were not sure that Muftah was telling the truth and therefore could not subject themselves to the supernatural hazards of taking a false oath. Attempts by other members who were to support Muftah were made to force the three men to swear, since their refusal meant that the bloodmoney

683 was to be paid unconditionally and consequently would cost all
682 members of the amar; but all these attempts failed. At this point,
672 there was no doubt on the part of the attending crowd about Muftah's
695 responsibility for the death of Selouma. The question was, how much
613 had he to pay. The amount requested by Selouma's son was that for "intentional" killing on the basis that Muftah had willfully thrown the rock knowing that it might harm Selouma, especially considering his age.

683 After long and intensive negotiations with the interested
682 parties, a Mi'ad was set in which it was announced that Muftah had
672 to pay the amount of L.E. 200. In his reasoning, he stipulated
627 that the wound which had caused the death of Selouma, although it was intentional on the part of Muftah, was inflicted by a stone which in itself is not a lethal weapon, and therefore the death was an unintentional one for which the bloodmoney is customarily estimated at L.E. 300. He also stated that in the excitement that
[845] followed the death of Selouma, Muftah's pregnant wife had lost the child. The bloodmoney for the still-born infant was estimated at L.E. 100, which was deducted from the amount of bloodmoney that Muftah had to pay.

CASE #3: The Case of the Trespasser

311 This case occurred during the year of the fieldwork which was
423 the second dry year the area experienced. Rain had not fallen ex-
613
[132] cept in a very few places. One of these places was near the small town of Sidi Barrani in which the land belonging to Yadem and his Bait was found. Yadem had sown his barley which at that time had grown to about five feet high. Surrounding the cultivated land

311 was a large area of grazing land which also belonged to the Bait
423
613 of Yadem. The area attracted a large number of tribesmen who
233 brought their herds for grazing. One of these was Kuraiem from
311 Awlad Kharouf tribal segment. He brought his wife and child and
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613 a herd of more than two hundred sheep and goats. Although it is
not proper for one to cultivate the land belonging to another
tribal segment, yet, when it comes to grazing land, no such restriction is imposed. Only the permission of the aqila of that
tribal segment is required, and even that is granted so automatically that many tribesmen do not bother to ask for such permission. Kuraiem took this permission for granted and pitched his
233 tent in the grazing land of Yadem and his Bait. Yadem, however,
311 was disturbed because he thought that Kuraiem grazed his flocks in
578 an area very close to his cultivated barley, so close that he feared
that the animals might eat the growing barley. When Yadem asked
Kuraiem to move a little further and Kuraiem refused, they entered
into an argument during which Yadem told him that if he did not
move by the following day, he would break his neck. The following
morning Yadem went with his brother to see if Kuraiem was still
there. Both Yadem and his brother were armed with heavy sticks.
As they reached Kuraiem's tent, they hit him with the sticks on
[682] the head. Kuraiem fell on the ground, and they kept hitting him
until he was dead.

682 In due course, Kuraiem's family claimed L.E. 400 bloodmoney
672 for the intentional killing of Kuraiem. Yadem and his family rejected the claim and insisted that the killing was unintentional. The
[627] Mi'ad was held, and the two Mardis selected by the two parties

682 agreed that the sticks were not by nature lethal weapons. The
672 latter, according to the tribal law, are only guns and knives,
627 since they give the victims no chance to defend himself. They
ruled the case unintentional killing for which only L.E. 300
should be paid.

682 Since Yadem and his brother were arrested by the police for
625 their crime, the payment of the bloodmoney was postponed until
692 the case was settled according to the state legal system. Only
half of the bloodmoney was paid and the rest was postponed until
the case was decided upon by the legal system and Yadem released.
682 This is obviously a case in which the nature of the killing was
672 decided upon by drawing upon the material aspect of criminal
673 causation. The nature of the weapon used was the major determinant
[411] of the crime. Only guns and knives are defined as lethal; all
others are non-lethal by nature, although they might cause the
death of the victim. Death caused by a non-lethal weapon is considered as unintentional regardless of whether or not the actor intended the results, while death by a lethal weapon, even without the intention of killing, is classified as intentional killing, as appears in the following case.

CASE #4: The Case of the Threatened Tribesman

613 For more than five years Bait El-Mawi from the Sheibat tribe
628 had been in a continuous state of feud with Bait El-Asi from the
Gemeiat tribe. One night, during a Khamasein sand storm when visability was extremely low, Abd-el-Galil from Bait El-Mawi heard a noise outside his tent, and the dogs were barking indicating that a stranger was there. Being sure that someone was approaching

613 the tent and fearing that he might have been a member of the
628 feuding Bait intending to harm him or members of his family,
Galil took his gun and went outside to see who was there. He
called on the person to identify himself. When he got no answer,
he warned him that unless he identify himself, he (Galil) would
fire his gun in the air as a warning. After a short period of no
613 response, Galil fired his gun in the air. A moment later, Galil
628 heard a cry coming from the direction of a small hill at the side
682 of the tent. When Galil went there, he found Salem, a member of
a neighboring camp, lying on the ground with a bullet wound in his
stomach. He told Galil that his wife was sick and that he had
come to borrow Galil's donkey to take her to the doctor in the
nearby medical center. He had taken the short cut to Galil's tent
when he was hit by the bullet which Galil had fired in the air.
Galil took his wounded neighbor to the medical center, but Salem
died before they reached it.

682 The Mi'ad was held, and Galil and his family had to pay L.E. 400
● 672 to the victim's kin group. The amount was that specified for
627 intentional killing, since the wound that caused the death was
673 inflicted by a lethal weapon.

CASE #5: The Case of the Startled Shepherd

233 This case involves Idris, a poor member of the Sheresat tribal
[464] segment. He earned his living by working as a hired shepherd for
[619] 'Awwad from Bait Ibrahim in the area of Gharbaniat. During the dry
[312] season, each shepherd takes his flocks to the water wells near the
coast and leaves them there for three or four hours to get their
fill of drinking water. That afternoon, Idris, waiting for the

233 animals to drink, sat on the edge of the well with his feet in the
cool water of the pool completely absorbed in his thoughts amidst
233 the quiet surroundings. Passing by the pool at that time was Mahdi
576 from a neighboring tribal segment. Seeing Idris (whom he had not
165 known), he shouted the customary greeting, "Peace on you." Startled
by the voice of Mahdi, Idris lost his balance and fell in the deep
water of the pool. Mahdi rushed to help him, but the water was too
deep, and Idris drowned. Feeling sorry for Idris, Mahdi took the
flock and went back to the camp of Idris where he informed the
682 latter's wife of what had happened. A few days later, Mahdi was
627 paid a visit by Sheikh Elewa, the aqila of Bait Asabei' and known
[613] mardi in the area who informed Mahdi that the family of Idris was
demanding the payment of the sum of L.E. 300 for the death of their
682 relative. A Mi'ad was set for the following week. In that Mi'ad,
627 and after Mahdi admitted that it was his greeting that had startled
672 Idris and caused him to fall in the well, the two Mardis represent-
613 ing the two parties agreed that the payment of the sum of three
hundred pounds was in order and that Mahdi and his amar must pay it
to the victim's family as soon as possible. At first, Mahdi seemed
to accept the judgment of the two Mardis, especially when both were
prominant members of some of the influential tribal segments in the
area. But Mahdi was a poor man, and his amar was very small in num-
ber, which made the payment of the bloodmoney almost impossible.
682 Although appeal in the ordinary legal sense does not exist in such
627 672 a system like that of Awlad Ali, where no judgment is forced upon
695 any of the disputing parties, and where the pronouncement of the

682 settlement is usually made after the parties have agreed to it,
627 yet, in certain instances where one of the parties later feels that
● 672 the settlement was not just or that he was coerced into accepting
695 it, he may ask for a second Mi'ad during which new procedures start
in the case. In the present case, although Mahdi had originally
accepted the judgment of the awaqil, as time passed and he realized that he was unable to pay the bloodmoney, he started to question
682 the feasibility of the settlement. He discussed the matter
672 with Sheikh Suliman el-Gerery from the Murabiteen tribe of Gerera,
695 a tribe whose members are feared throughout the area for the belief
554 that they have certain supernatural powers. Sheikh Suliman himself
792 is highly respected, and people believe that after his death he will
[776] become "wali" or a saint. After hearing Mahdi's complaint, Sheikh
Suliman told him that the settlement was unjust and told him that he
would do something about it. The following Thursday, Sheikh Suliman
called on Mahdi and asked him to bring his donkey and follow him.
They rode to a small desert town called Bahig where the local market
613 is held every Thursday. On market day, the awaqil of various tribal
517 segments usually gather in front of the general store in the town
571 drinking tea and chatting until their sons or the younger members
443 576 of their families sell the sheep and buy the necessary items. Everyone passing by the gathering is expected to greet the gathering, getting off his donkey as a sign of respect to the prominent people.
[689] Failure to greet a fellow tribesman is considered a serious offense
liable to a fine of more than L. 50 and ten goats in certain cases.
[673] 000 It is considered a very serious crime. One informant once told me,

124 One informant once told me,
576 "If you don't greet me, this means that you hate me, and if you
829 hate me, there is no limit to the kind of harm you can do me and
my family. One who hates you can kill you, and none can walk
safely anywhere if he fears that he will be killed."

682 As Sheikh Suliman and Mahdi reached the general store, every-
689 one was gathering there as usual, including the two awaqil who
672 were involved in the original settlement. Sheikh Suliman told
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554 Mahdi not to dismount his donkey and not to say the customary
792 greeting as they passed by the gathering. When they passed the
576 gathering, everyone stood to greet Sheikh Suliman who ignored them
and left with Mahdi. No one believed that Sheikh Suliman, who
should be the guard of the tribal tradition, should commit such an
unforgivable violation of the norms of the people. The next morn-
682 ing the whole area was talking about a big Mi'ad to "take the right"
689 from Sheikh Suliman and Mahdi, who had insulted the gathering. The
672 Mi'ad was held a week after the incident. During the Mi'ad, Sheikh
695
554 Suliman was asked to explain his behavior, and his answer was, "How
792 do you want me to greet all those people who were sitting in front
576 of the store? There were more than thirty men in that gathering,
627 and I was afraid that if I said the customary greeting, I might
have startled some of them causing them to harm themselves, leaving
me with the payment of so many bloodmoneys." Immediately, the
attendants of the Mi'ad knew what Sheikh Suliman was referring to,
and that his action was to prove that the settlement reached in
the case of Mahdi was wrong and that it set a very dangerous prece-
dent which would cause people to avoid greeting one another, "and
hatred will prevail among brothers and nobody will be safe in his
own home."

682 627 negotiations between the parties involved were conducted by their respective awaqil, a Mi'ad was set, and the settlement was announced. 682 672 627 According to the terms of the settlement, three factors contributed to the death of Hussein: the goat, whose activity was directly related to the death by causing the gun to fire; the host, who had chased the goat, causing it to run over the gun and fire it; and the guest, without whose negligence in leaving the gun loaded the accident would not have happened. The bloodmoney was divided into three equal parts, one of which was to be paid by Awad, the host, the other to be paid by Ali, the owner of the gun, and the third part to be attributed to the responsibility of the goat and therefore would not be paid.

CASE #7: The Case of the Adulterous Wife

684 For more than a year, rumors spread in the area of Burg El-Arab that Ghenewa's wife was having an affair with Goma'h, a friend of her husband and a member of a nearby camp. Ghenewa was operating a small store and was also involved in smuggling goods from Libya; both required him to be away frequently and for fairly extensive periods of time. According to the rumors, as soon as he left, his wife would put a white cloth on the laundry line as a sign indicating to Goma'h that the husband had left and therefore the former could come and visit her. When the husband heard the rumors, he was furious and decided to test his wife. He pretended that he was going to Alexandria as usual, went to the train station, waited until the train had left, and then returned to his tent. As he entered the tent, he found his wife and his friend in a compromising situation. Before [682] he could do anything, the friend grabbed a kitchen knife and attacked

684 682 the husband, who reached for his gun and fired at Goma'h. Three
days later the latter died in the hospital from the gun wound.

684 The case was investigated by the police and brought to trial,
682 but the case was dismissed as justifiable homocide by reason of
• 672 self defense. The tribal proceedings, however, required Ghenewa to pay the bloodmoney for intentional homocide, since the weapon used was a gun. Out of the L. 400 bloodmoney, the sum of L. 20 kabara for committing adultery with the wife was deducted. None had questioned the right of Ghenewa to kill Goma'h in the process of defending himself.

671 In his essay on "The Early History of Malice Aforethought" in
672 English law, Maitland discussed the "utter incompetence of ancient law to take note of the mental elements of a crime" (1911:327). This statement seems to apply to certain aspects of the tribal law of Awlad Ali. If one causes the death of another, even accidentally, he is liable to
671 compensation. This attribute is not restricted to Awlad Ali law, for
672 it has been documented by a number of other studies. Peristiany found
171 this to be the case among the Potok (1954), and Dundas documented it among the Kikuyu (1921). In his analysis of injury and liability among the Barotse, Gluckman maintained that "whatever the motivation of the killer or the circumstances surrounding the deed, bloodmoney has to be paid if a member of one grouping of kinsmen was killed by a member of some other group. The mental element seems to be irrelevant. What is important is that "murder" is committed within social relationships where blood compensation is due (1963:205). Similarly, Howell gives us one of the most comprehensive accounts of the Nuer "rule of law" and

671
672 the irrelevance of intention in establishing liabilities for homocide
171 or injuries (1954).

672 The neglect of intention in assessing liability in cases of homo-
682 cide is evident in the cases presented above (Cases 1,2,4,5 and 6), where compensation was paid although there was no intention established on the part of the offender.

[192] Awlad Ali use the Arabic word "katl" to refer to any killing. This is different from the word "mut" which means death by natural causes. They further differentiate between "katl 'amd," or intentional killing
682 and "katl khata," or unintentional killing. Although reference here is
672 made to "intention," yet, from the above cases it is evident that the
673 basis of establishing that intention is from the type of weapon used in effecting the death of the victim. Intentional killings are those caused
[411] by a lethal weapon. Lethal weapons are defined as guns or knives. Death caused by a non-lethal weapon, no matter what the intentions of the offender, is defined as non-intentional, even when the circumstances of the act indicates the actual existence of an intention on the part of the offender to cause the death of the victim (as in Case #3 above). The assumption is that the use of lethal weapons, such as daggers or guns, implies intention and possibly a certain degree of premeditation, since these weapons have no other important use. Moreover, the probability of death by a lethal weapon is much greater than from other non-lethal weapons. These give the victim a chance to defend himself, a chance which he does mot have in the cases of killing with a gun or dagger. In other words, Awlad Ali, in assessing responsibility for homocide, "operate with a legalistic psychology in which intention is is presumed from action" (Gluckman, 1963:207).

682 •672 In practice, Awlad Ali do look at actual circumstances to assess the intention of the offender. Although compensation is always required, the readiness of the victim's kin group to accept a financial settlement and the final amount to be paid in a given situation is affected by the presence or absence of an intention on behalf of the offender. In assessing the actual intention of the offender in each case, the mediators rely on the circumstances of the crime as well as on the past history of the relationships between the offender and the victim. Although this actual intention of the offender does not change the payment of bloodmoney, the deceased's kin are more agreeable to the acceptance of the financial settlement if the killing is unintentional than if it is intentional and the possibility of revenge is much less imminent. Unintentional killing, regardless of the weapon used never results in blood feuds. The possibility, on the other hand, is much greater in the cases where the circumstances of the offense indicate an intention on the part of the killer to take the life of the victim. It is for this reason that the right of [778] nazala, or refuge, discussed in an earlier chapter, is resorted to only in the case of intentional killing. Of all the cases described in the chapter only in the case of the trespasser did the killers' kin group seek refuge by moving to another area where they were protected until the dispute was solved by another neutral tribal segment. It is important to note that killing in the above case was not done by a lethal weapon but by sticks, and as such was defined by the tribal law as "unintentional" as far as the formal amount of compensation required was concerned. Not all cases where the intention of the offender to kill [671] the victim is clear carried with it the threat of revenge. The tribal law takes into consideration certain mitigating circumstances, such as the role of the victim in initiating the act of the offender.

000 the role of the victim in initiating the act of the offender. In the 684 case of the adulterous wife (Case #7), the intention of the husband to 682 kill the wife's lover was clear from the evidence; yet, the husband's 672 kin group never attempted to take refuge, and the victim's group was eager to settle the case with the least amount of publicity. On the 682 other hand, killing in circumstances that offend the tribal standards 672 of chivalry, like killing from ambush or during the night, are the most 183 difficult to solve and pose the greatest chance for retaliation.

682 672 [673] Although the traditional amount of compensation is not determined by the actual intentions of the killer, but rather by assumed intentions as deducted from the type of weapon used in causing death, yet, the final amount paid is usually determined by such intention. The actual intention works as the basis for bargaining between the victim's kin and the kin of the killer. Kin of the victim of an intentional killing are less likely to agree to any reduction of the amount, and with the threat of retaliation or revenge present, the killer's kin are bargaining from a weaker point. This is not the case in unintentional killings or where the victim's behavior instigated the reaction of the killer. In such cases, the victim's group is more willing to accept a lesser amount of compensation, and the killer's group, while not in a good bargaining position, at least are not under the threat of revenge. And since they do not resort to the right of refuge, their daily activities are not disrupted. In this case, they could sustain the bargaining activities for a relatively longer period of time. Also, there is usually a strong [626] pressure on the victim's group to accept reduced compensation in the case of unintentional killing from the rest of the tribal members. If

682 they refuse to accept reduced compensation, they are viewed as unreason-
672 able by the rest of the groups in the area. One way in which such pres-
[626] sure is brought to bear upon the victim's acceptance of reduced compansation
682 is in the mi'ad, or the public hearing, in which the settlement achieved
672
627 is announced. The common practice is for the killer's group to agree to
pay the full amount specified by the traditional scale for compensation
(L.E. 400 for killing with a lethal weapon and L.E. 300 for killing with
a non-lethal weapon). Then, in the final mi'ad in which such agreement
is achieved, a number of important members of non-involved tribal segments
are invited to the mi'ad. During the mi'ad and immediately following the
announcement that a settlement has been achieved and that the kin group of
the killer has agreed to pay the traditional bloodmoney, the mardi or any
one of the attendants to the mi'ad asks the victim's group to defer part
of the payment in honor of important members of the tribal segments pres-
682 ent at the meeting. Sometimes a portion of the payment is forfeited in
672 honor of the tent or the women of the household who prepared the food or
even for the blessing of one of the saints in the area. In the case of
the curious neighbor (Case #2) above, out of the original amount specified
for the death by non-lethal weapon estimated as L.E. 300, only L.E. 100
was actually given to the victim's kin group. In addition to the L.E. 100
deducted because of the death of the unborn infant of the offender, an-
other hundred pounds was deducted in honor of certain important members
who attended the gathering. It is interesting to note that the L.E. 100
[683] is compensation for the loss of the use of a leg in the formal scale of
compensations for injuries as will be shown shortly. No such reduction
in the amount of bloodmoney was done in the case of the trespasser where

682 672 although the weapon used was not lethal and therefore was classified as an unintentional killing, yet the nature of the crime and the obvious intention on the part of the killers made reduced payment difficult to achieve.

Another way of reducing liability and the amount of money paid in cases of unintentional killing is by taking into consideration all the intervening variables that contributed to the death of the victim and asking them to share the blame. The working of this principle is illustrated in the case of the broken rope where the rope was assigned half the responsibility for the death of the victim. It is also present in the case of the careless guest where the responsibility was divided three ways with the host paying one third, the owner of the gun paying another third, and the goat sharing the responsibility for the rest of the bloodmoney. It is interesting to note the difference in the responsibility to the owner of the gun in the above case and the owner of the rope in the case of the broken rope. The owner of the rope was not held responsible for the death caused by his rope, the same way the owner of the goat in the case of the careless guest was not held responsible for the actions of the animal. Both the goat and the rope are not dangerous things by themselves for which a certain degree of care in handling is required. If such normally harmless things cause injury or death to a person, the owner is not held responsible.

682 672 41 67 [574] The situation is quite different in the case of the gun and the responsibility of its owner. By nature, the gun is a weapon of death, and for that reason the tribal law has required certain precautions in its use or handling. Among such precautions is the requirement that a guest,

682 672 as soon as he settles in the host's place, should unload the gun. In
411 addition to reducing the possibility of the gun being accidentally fired
671 and harming someone, this act expressed the trust of the guest in his
594 host and signifies the ability of the latter to protect his guest against
any harm. A person visiting another does not need his gun for protection
682 and therefore must unload it. If the owner of the gun fails to take this
672 customary precaution and leaves his gun loaded, and because of that fail-
411 ure the gun causes the death or injury of a person or even damage to property, the owner is held responsible for that result. The same rule applies
to other deadly weapons, such as knives or daggers, as well as to animals
683 which are dangerous by nature, such as dogs. Each tent in the area has a
672 231 dog. Starting the first weeks in the puppy's life, he is trained to
guard the tent and to bark at the approach of any stranger. It is also
trained to attack any intruder who comes within fifty yards of the tent
unless accompanied by a member of the tent. When one goes to visit another, he usually stays away from the tent until someone from the tent
hears the dog barking and comes out to get the guest. Most dogs would
not attack a person as long as he is the safe fifty yards away from the
tent. Occasionally, a dog goes behond the safe distance and bites an
individual passing by or a guest waiting to be let inside the tent. If
the injured person is able to prove, usually by taking the oath, that
he was more than fifty yards away from the tent at the time he was attacked by the dog, the dog's owner is liable to the victim for the injury inflicted by the dog. If, on the other hand, evidence shows that
the victim was bitten by the dog while being less than fifty yards away
from the tent, then there is no responsibility on the part of the dog's

683 owner. This means that an element of neglect has to be proven on the part
672 of the owner of either a lethal weapon or a dangerous animal before he
231 is held responsible for the fdamage they cause. But whether dangerous or not, the role of such objects or animals, in causing the death or injury of the victim, is taken into consideration in assessing the exact amount to be paid as compensation.

682 In assessing the intention and consequently the amount of the tradi-
672 tional bloodmoney to be paid, the behavior of the offender is judged according to a traditional standard of reasonableness. In the case of the curious neighbor, Muftah, in his attempt to evade the payment of the full bloodmoney, presented an elaborate account of his neighbor's actions including the provocative statements that the latter had said, the jokes, and even the insults he had directed against Muftah. His attempt was to show that throwing a small rock at his neighbor was not an unreasonable behavior considering the provocations of that neighbor whose behavior was itself unreasonable. Although the victim's behavior was unreasonable, the response of Muftah to the provocations of his neighbor was also considered as unreasonable. He could have followed the traditional means of asking a third party to interfere and prevent the neighbor from continuing his insults. Instead, Muftah took the direct and unreasonable response which eventually led to the death of Selouma. It is that element of reasonableness that led to the reversal of the original settle-
682 ment in the case of the startled shepherd (Case #4). When considering
672 a certain behavior in the context of reasonableness, the mediators draw
627 not only upon the immediate facts of the case under consideration, but
also upon the careful inquiry into the long history of interrelations

682 672 627 between the parties involved. The relative position of both the offender and the victim and their relationship to one another is taken into account. What is reasonable behavior in one case may not be so in another. Pst disputes are taken as indications of the present situation, although they may not be directly related to the present dispute.

672 673 It is possible to say, then, that Awlad Ali recognize two types of intentions: an assumed intention deducted from certain material aspects of the act itself, like the type of weapon used in causing the death of the victim, and an actual intention which is quite similar to that utilized in modern jurisprudence in the sense that it pertains to a state of mind on the part of the offender that connects him in a special way with the prohibited results. The assumed intention works to set the initial guide for the traditional scale of bloodmoney. It sets the basis upon which compromise could be achieved. Actual intention, on the other hand, determines the actual course the specific case takes as well as the final amount of money paid as a settlement.

683 the settlement is announced. This deduction is determined by the same
683 factors involved in the case of homicide, such as the relationship be-
672 tween the parties involved and the presence or absence of an intention on the part of the offender to cause bodily harm to the victim, as well as the role the victim played in provoking the actions that led to his
683 injury. Injuries sustained during a fight are not as serious as injur-
672 ies sustained by ambushing the victim. In the latter case, the victim
673 had no chance to defend himself. Also, the number of people involved in the actions that led to the injury enter as a variable. If more than one individual attacks a victim, it is considered more serious than a man-to-man fight.

619 stretch of tribal territory, move during the rains to the same
613 grazing grounds, use the same wells during the dry season, and
cultivate adjacent strips of arable. The members of a *bait* have
a lively sense of solidarity, and this is most evident in fighting
and feuds. It is their common duty to avenge a slain kinsman
and they share the *diya*, indemnity, should they accept it in
[672] the place of a life. They are jointly responsible for a wrong any
one of them may commit. The smaller *biyut* are often identical
[621] with camps, usually from five to ten tents, in grazing grounds,
and several closely related *biyut* camp near together in the
vicinity of springs and wells in the summer, their combined
camps then amounting sometimes to over a hundred tents.

619 What has been said above about tribal structure applies only
to the free tribes and the larger client tribes living on their own
land. The client tribes which are split up and scattered throughout
Cyrenaica are not tribes in a political, but only in an ethnic,
619 sense. It will be found that in any of the main tribes stranger
614 groups, sometimes of client origin, have attached themselves
608 to the clan dominant in the tribal area and through some fiction,
myth, or fraud, have grafted their branch of descent on to the
genealogical tree of this clan. The Bedouin use the word *laf* to
describe this process and they say that kinship established in this
way may become as strong as kinship of blood.

619 The structure of a tribe is expressed in terms of the lineage
system of the clan dominant in its territory, the tribal segments
614 being associated with branches of descent from the ancestor of
613 this clan. The primary tribal sections are identified with lineages
descended from some of this ancestor's descendants in the male
line; the secondary tribal sections are identified with lineages descended from more of his descendants farther down the line of descent; and so on till the smallest territorial segments and the smallest lineages are reached. Thus a lineage considered as a branch of a clan consists of all those persons who trace their descent through the male line to a common ancestor, but it can also be, and in speech often is, conceived of politically as an agnatic group of this kind together with stranger and *Marabtin* accretions which occupy its territory and make common cause with it in disputes with other tribes or segments of the same tribe.

A simple example is given in illustration of tribal segmentation

degree and is ephemeral, so that the opportunity for the development of trade rela- 621
tions is absent.[1] Save for straying animals, a section has no urgent need to seek 311
relationships with others, as long as the rainfall is sufficient to permit the exploitation [619]
of local resources.

The tertiary section is also regarded as the corporate group *par excellence*, in which 621
'the one word does for all'. Corporate identity is conceptualized as 'one bone' 613
or 'one body'. An offence against one of its members is held to be an offence
against all; if one of its members is killed 'we all lose blood'. When one of its mem- [682]
bers commits homicide the responsibility falls on all equally. Blood money, when [672] ●
received, is shared by all save for a special portion reserved for the 'owner of the
blood', the nearest agnate of the victim. In opposite circumstances, all adult males accept the responsibility of contributing an equal share to the blood money. Rules of membership, simple in their brevity, express graphically this corporate identity: 'You must strike with us and be struck with us; you must pay with us and receive with us.' The group also bears a name, and there is never any doubt about the affiliation of any tribesman. That group of men—known as the *'amarā dam*—who are agreed on the obligation to exact vengeance, to pay blood money when necessary, to engage in common defence, and to accept the possibility of death in vengeance, is a fixed and clear-cut group, not one whose membership has to be calculated by reference to degrees of kinship in regard to a specific situation, as appears to be the case among other peoples.

Homicide within the *'amarā dam* brings about an impasse in relationships. A blood- 621
money payment is out of the question since the acceptance of blood money by one 613
part of a tertiary section from another of its parts is tantamount to a statement of 682
split. Only in conditions where relationships within the lineage have developed to the 682
point of political severance is it anticipated that a blood-money payment may be 627
demanded; but this problem is not the same as that at present under discussion.
Bedouin say that blood money cannot pass within the *'amarā dam* for those making [829]
the payment would be the persons receiving it. This is spurious reasoning, since the
'owner of the blood' is awarded more than any other members of the group as it is, and arrangements could obviously be made to pay him separately. Blood money is out of the question because it distinguishes relationships between people as belonging to two distinct political communities, and not because of any difficulty of distribution.
In Bedouin thinking, an injury to 'the one body' is an injury to all its parts. Blood- [829]
money payments by members of a corporation to one or more of its members is a
contradiction in terms. In the same way vengeance is also excluded, for this merely doubles the original loss. A reprisal exacted in hot blood is always a possibility, but this is not referred to as *thār*, vengeance. Even if, at a later date, the closest kinsman of the victim should slay the offender, the act would not be referred to as *thār* and any connexion with earlier homicides would be denied.

Stultified in the field of political action, there is little else that can be done. Expul- 682
sion is a possible course of action—and expulsion has occurred. Records show, however, that exile is almost invariably voluntary.[2] Moreover, exile is terminated as

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[1] Many sections trade fleeces for dates with the folk of distant oases, but the sections do not trade among themselves.

[2] I recorded one case of a man who was expelled from his group and the tribes around were warned that the rules of sanctuary were not to apply to him. [438] ←
He is said to have died from grief and hunger. The reason given for such drastic action is that he killed

682 body had been dragged. He followed the footsteps of the
674 son as far as the cistern, where he again saw a tiny spot of
fresh blood on one of the stones. From that point donkey-
tracks led straight to the son's tent.

By nightfall the son was securely lodged in the police post; and local public opinion was seething with fury, firstly at such a dastardly deed committed presumably for the sake of the old man's money, and secondly because it reflected untold discredit on the rest of the tribe. The murderer, who was a big powerful man of about thirty standing nearly six feet in height, lay in prison awaiting trial. After a few days he was admitted to hospital, where he completely collapsed and died of fright a fortnight later.

[203] Rumours then began to spread that possibly the mur-
derer had only acted in accordance with the wishes of his
brothers, who were all conspiring to get rid of the old man,
in order that they might share out his possessions. This
could not be proved, and appeared unlikely from the
[626] evidence. However, public feeling against the whole family
ran so high that it was feared that more horrors might
follow; but although no open action was taken against the
family, no opportunity was missed of having a dig at them
in some way or another.

682 A very wealthy sheep merchant, who was a distant
674 connection of the family, and heartily ashamed of them,
691 brought an action for debt against one of the murderer's
626 brothers. He produced an I.O.U. for £2 dated twelve
686 years before and signed by the murdered man, claiming
(according to custom) that the son now in court as de-
fendant had inherited his father's liabilities together with
• [672] his assets.

This sheep merchant was known personally to the writer, who was also aware that a month previously he had made a profit of £900 on a very clever bit of dealing in the West. The collection, after an interval of twelve years, of this paltry debt of £2, owing from the deceased father

of the present defendant seemed—for a really wealthy 682
man—to be pointless and futile. The merchant anticipated 674
this objection by hastening to add that the receipt of the 691
actual cash did not interest him in the least; but that he 626
had been wondering how he could shew his disapproval of 686
the defendant's family in some way, and had gone carefully through all his old papers and receipts with this end in view, and had triumphantly discovered the bill of debt now produced in court.

Bedouin Law and custom sometimes accept right to 671
bloodmoney in all sorts of circumstances, when other law 672
would recognise no claim. For example, the principle is 682
accepted that a life lost in prison must be paid for by the informers whose information resulted in the imprisonment of the deceased. It is entirely immaterial whether the information so given to the police was wilfully false or intentionally misleading, or whether it was merely subsequently found to be incorrect. Even if the information had been true and correct in every detail, the informer is still blood-guilty from the Ourfi standpoint, although in actual practice any such claims for bloodmoney would probably be considerably modified.

Other claims for bloodmoney are also recognised occasionally, in cases of obvious accidental death, or death by misadventure or Act of God, when the interpreters of Bedouin Law cannot get away from the main principle that a life lost must be paid for. The difficulty in these
cases is to determine who shall pay for it; and the lawsuits [695]
usually end in a clever compromise, in which their essential principles are duly observed, but their judgments are mitigated and modified by leniency and commonsense. The following example, which occurred recently in Mariut, will illustrate this.

A certain Arab called Ali Abu Bukr had inherited from 671
his father large cultivation rights in the desert; and in the 672
middle of this land was an old cistern for the collection of 682
rain water. It had not been used for years, and was silted 312

8: Kennett G-5 (ca. 1921) 1925 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9

671 up with drift sand; and as it was some miles from the
•672 nearest permanent water supply, the owner of the cistern
682 decided that it was well worth clearing out, with a view
to catching and conserving the next rainfall.

312 Accordingly he summoned all his kinsfolk, and propounded his proposition, to which they agreed. Other Arabs occupying neighbouring rights suggested that it was a very good idea, probably with a view to a simplified water supply for themselves.

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An Arab from the neighbouring tribe called Ahmed had frequently acted as shepherd and odd-job man for Ali; and it happened that, when Ali and all his kinsfolk were assembled at the cistern, Ahmed chanced to be passing. Ali hailed him, and asked him to come and lend a hand. So Ahmed joined the crowd at the well, and assisted in getting ready the ropes and other tackle to be used.

[312] The cistern, constructed after the usual Roman pattern, was about forty feet deep, fifteen feet in diameter for the first twenty feet or so, and from there narrowed down to six or seven feet, with footholes cut in the side for the last half. One of Ali's relatives had agreed to be let down with ropes and to start cleaning out the mud and sand from the bottom. However, when the rope had been tied round his middle, and he was just going to be swung in mid-air and lowered to the ledge at half-way, his nerve suddenly failed him, and he refused to start.

Subsequent evidence was confused at this point as to exactly what happened; but it seems that one of the crowd noticed Ahmed standing with the rest, and remarked that he had had considerable experience in well digging, and suggested that he should go down. Accordingly Ahmed flung a stone down the well, and a faint splash at the bottom indicated that there were a few inches of water in it. He then organised a sort of tug-of-war among the men standing by, to test the strength of the rope. Satisfied on this point, he had the rope tied round him, and he was

lowered very slowly and carefully by the crowd at the top. 671
Here again it is difficult to ascertain exactly what happened, 672•
as the evidence was again contradictory. Apparently, when
Ahmed reached the ledge at half-way, he fumbled about 682
in the dim light for the foot holes; and just at this psychological moment the rope broke.

The ten men holding the rope at the top collapsed one on the top of another; but when they had recovered their presence of mind, they shouted down to Ahmed, to ask if he were all right. A faint voice from the bowels of the earth replied that he had fallen heavily on a stone and had had a nasty knock, but that he would be all right in a few minutes.

They then produced a spare rope for another man to go down and get Ahmed up; but they discovered that the only one they had to hand was too short by several feet. A man was sent post-haste on a pony to get another rope from the encampment a mile or so away, and when he returned after a quarter of an hour, volunteers were quickly forthcoming to go down and retrieve Ahmed. On reaching the bottom they found that the unfortunate man, either stunned by the fall or overcome by foul air, had collapsed flat on the bottom of the well, and had been drowned in six inches of water. They hauled his body up to the surface, and Ali, terrified that he might be held in some way responsible, counselled all present to bury the dead
man then and there, and to say nothing about it. However, [123]
news quickly spreads; and the same day an informer came
to the police post and reported the matter, and Ali was arrested and subsequently sentenced to three months' imprisonment with labour by the present writer, for failure
to notify a death under unusual circumstances. (Incidentally this did not constitute an offence under Bedouin [177]
Law, but was a contravention of the Police Code and was punished as such. Hence the apparent interference in a purely Bedouin concern.)

While Ali was still serving his sentence, Ahmed's rela- [694]

671 672 682 694 tives lost no time in taking legal proceedings at the Ourfi court to claim bloodmoney from the owner of the cistern; and on Ali's release from prison a very long and excessively tedious lawsuit began.

The principle that a life had been lost and must be paid for was accepted without question by the court from the outset, in spite of the police enquiry, which is the local equivalent of a coroner's inquest. The enquiry had established beyond any shadow of doubt that death had been caused by misadventure, and that Ali was absolutely innocent, not only of any intent to kill, but also of any negligence whatsoever. Any other coroner's jury in the world would have returned a verdict of accidental death, expressed sympathy with the relatives, and absolved all concerned from blame; and there the matter would have ended.

671 672 682 Ali, who had already undergone three months in durance vile—which, to a wandering child of the desert, must be particularly galling—so far forgot any tribal instruction he might have had as to repudiate vigorously any responsibility either for the accident or for the restitution of the death in the form of bloodmoney. His family also, who would naturally have to share the payment, did their best to confound the issue by lodging a counter claim. They protested that the actual rope that broke was not theirs, but belonged to a third party, and that neighbouring tribes, who had approved of the project and who stood to benefit by the cistern when it was cleaned out, were conjointly responsible with themselves for any payment due.

The case dragged on unsatisfactorily for some months; the neighbouring tribes swore that no agreement existed whereby they should benefit by the cistern when completed; the question of the ownership of the rope was dropped; and eventually Ali and his family were ordered to pay a reduced scale of bloodmoney to the family of the deceased.

683 672 Sometimes these bloodmoney cases, so far from being dramatic or nauseating, are actually rather amusing.

BLOODMONEY—WESTERN DESERT 67 672

The plaintiff was an Arab called Salem Ibrahim, who 683
brought an action against a man of another family of his [694]
tribe called Ali. The plaint was as follows. Seven years
ago Salem's father Ibrahim, a man then about sixty years
old, was sitting on a wall near a patch of cultivation belonging to Ali, and watching Ali working on his land.
Some dispute arose between them; and, angered at something that Ibrahim had said, Ali picked up a large stone
and flung it at Ibrahim. The impact broke the old man's 683
leg; the case was reported to the police; Ali was arrested 682
and imprisoned; and Ibrahim was taken to hospital, where
he shortly afterwards died. Ali was thus left in prison, 672
and the case could not be proceeded with from the Ourfi
standpoint until he came out. On his release, therefore,
the case was to be brought up for settlement, and the 683
plaintiff to claim bloodmoney for his father's death. 682

Meanwhile, however, plaintiff related how his own 694
family had wanted to get the case cleared up and how Ali's 672
family had also approached them with the idea of extracting Ali from the clutches of the police, so that the case could be tried by an Ourfi court, and a judgment which would be intelligible and acceptable to both parties could be given by their own sheikhs.

Accordingly they agreed together that the plaintiff's family should go to the police, declare that the whole case was a mistake from beginning to end, and that the old man Ibrahim had fallen off the wall, and that nobody had thrown a stone at him. A document to this effect was drawn up, signed and sealed by the notables of Ibrahim's family, and solemnly presented to the police. The evidence seemed so genuine that Ali was released from prison, with implied apologies for wrongful arrest. On his release from prison Ali saw his opportunity, and by some means obtained possession of this document signed by Ibrahim's family.

When the case first came up for trial by Ourfi court, Ali denied throwing the stone, repudiated all responsibility

•622

683 in the case, and produced this document signed by Ibrahim's
682 family to the effect that Ibrahim *fell* off the wall and broke
his leg. How then could he possibly be implicated in the
694 case?

The assessors of the court went carefully into all the
683 evidence and eventually agreed that the matter should be
682 decided by the oath. They demanded that Ali, backed by
672 twenty-five men of his own tribe, chosen by Ibrahim's
family as men of their word, should swear on the tomb
695 of Sidi Shar el Ruh the following oath: "By Allah the Great and by the Truth of this Holy Sheikh, I swear that I neither threw a stone at Ibrahim, nor broke his leg." They further decreed that if Ali himself, or any one of the twenty-five men chosen to back him in his oath, failed or refused to swear as required, the case for the defence would be null and void, and that bloodmoney would be required in full from Ali's family.

On the date appointed two or three sheikhs of the court were detailed to go to the tomb, to meet the defendant with his twenty-five backers, and to supervise the taking of the oath. The parties duly arrived; but when the oath was just about to be taken, three men of Ali's backers refused to swear, declaring that on the contrary they were ready to swear, if required, that Ali *had* thrown the stone, and was responsible for Ibrahim's death. The case for the defence thus fell to the ground, and the parties were warned to appear at a future date, when the case would be completed. At the next meeting of the court, Ali's liability to pay bloodmoney was accepted in principle, but there were divergencies of opinion as to the amount to be paid. Then followed a delightful example of casuistry typical of the Bedou mind.

The assessors of the court felt that, in the first instance, Ali had never intended to kill poor old Ibrahim, and that his crime fell very far short of intentional homicide. Also, it had happened seven years before, and, all said and done, time had healed most of whatever ill-feeling there ever

had been. Besides, Ibrahim was an old man when it 683
happened, and he would have to have died before very 682
long in any case. Moreover, the sheikhs in their heart of 672
hearts considerably admired the acumen displayed by Ali
in getting hold of that document. So they decided privately 695
among themselves that on the whole half the full bloodmoney, or £150, would meet the case. On no account, however, could they give in open court the above reasons for lessening the sum to be paid. They proceeded to listen patiently to more evidence, and eventually gave their considered judgment as follows:

"Defendant Ali is required to pay the full bloodmoney of £300. *But* in view of the fact that, when the police came to Ali's tent to arrest him seven years ago, in the excitement and commotion caused by the police patrol, Ali's wife gave birth to a premature boy child, and that this boy subsequently died, therefore the sum of £100 will be deducted from the total to be paid, for the sake of the dead baby. Also, as it cannot be proved conclusively that Ibrahim died simply and solely as the result of the stone thrown at his leg, and as it may be conceivably possible that other external causes contributed to his death, for this reason, therefore, another sum of £50 will be deducted. Hence the amount to be paid is £150, of which £50 must be paid after this coming barley harvest, with a similar sum after the two following harvests."

Amateur lawyers are not popular, and more often than 682
not darken counsel without understanding.

An Arab called Salem had some land, and he employed 672
two men of the Hawita tribe as shepherds and harvesters. [693]
One of these men was from the Nefoofa family of the Hawita, and the other was from a family called the Magai. These two shepherds worked peacefully together, and their respective families were friendly, until one day an Arab of the Gottaan tribe called Yadam Saadi drove his flocks and his animals on to Salem's land, and began to pitch his tents. These two shepherds saw this going on from afar, and

682 came up to drive him and his animals away. Yadam re-
672 fused to move, and threatened violence if they attempted to eject him forcibly. So the two shepherds, who were responsible to their employer for the land, went for him simultaneously—the Nefoofa shepherd with a thick stick, which he brought down with all his force on Yadam's head, and the Magai with a large stone, which he hurled as hard as he could, and which caught Yadam in the chest over the heart. Yadam received both these blows simultaneously, collapsed on to the ground in a crumpled heap, and died soon afterwards.

682 Yadam's family then brought an action against the
672 Nefoofa and Magai families conjointly, claiming blood-
693 money. The Nefoofa produced an amateur barrister of
695 their own family called Abd el Gelil, who proved (entirely to his own satisfaction) that many minor assaults were continually taking place, when people were hit on the head without death following immediately as the result of the blow. He therefore contended that it must have been the blow from the stone thrown by the Magai which had really killed him. The Magai adopted a similar line of argument, and the case remained at a standstill for nearly two years.

Eventually the court effected a compromise, and awarded the bloodmoney, to be paid equally by the Nefoofa and the Magai in three yearly instalments of £50 each. The Magai paid up their £50, and the Nefoofa barrister—a particularly bumptious individual from the Nile Valley—lodged a protest against the decision, claiming that the court was not properly constituted and was not competent, that the sheikhs were biassed, and a hundred and one reasons why the Nefoofa should not contribute their share.

He was eventually made to understand that the Nefoofa would have to pay, and that if there were any more trouble from him, his own property would be seized as part-payment. Accordingly Abd el Gelil travelled round the Nefoofa encampments, ostensibly to collect sums due from

the different families. A year later the Gottaan brought 682
up the case again, acknowledging the receipt of £50 from 672
the Magai, but protesting that they had still not received 693
anything from the Nefoofa. On an enquiry being held, 695
a representative collection of infuriated members of the
Nefoofa family came to court, protesting that Abd el Gelil had already collected their payments, and that if he had not handed over the money, their responsibility at any rate had ended for the moment.

It subsequently transpired, when Abd el Gelil was with difficulty got hold of and brought to court, that he had collected about £50, but claimed this sum as his own
personal travelling expenses for collection. Then followed [685]
another lawsuit, in which the Nefoofa family sued their
self-appointed lawyer for mis-appropriation of tribal funds. The details of this new case, and those of the original suit, were then re-capitulated and muddled up together, to the complete bewilderment of the writer and the entire satisfaction of the Bedouin assessors.

Mention has been made of the extra £100 (£400 instead 682
of £300) usually paid among the Gawabees tribe as the 672
price of a life. It seems, however, as though there are exceptions to this rule; and the following case seems to shew [435]
that the payment of "Sanaa" depends on a variety of circumstances.

A family called Sirdani had had a bloodfeud with another 682
family of the Gawabees called Sayed, one of the former 628
having killed one of the latter some fifty years ago. The 672
two families had been living in totally different districts, and for years had not come into contact with each other, and so the feud had been allowed to continue.

In the spring of 1921 a man of the first family, about forty-five years old, called Mirtah el Sirdani, left the Wadi Natrun for the Nile Valley to buy some sheep from the Fellaheen, taking with him his old mother and a small boy, to help him bring them back across the desert to the luscious grazing in the wadi swamps. He arrived at the

682 Cultivation, bought his sheep, and started off westwards
628 to the wadi.

•672 By a sheer coincidence, four men of the other family had left their camping ground a fortnight before, and had gone south on their yearly pilgrimage to Baharia Oasis to bring back dates. On leaving the oasis, they had later arrived at the wadi, watered their camels, and pushed on northwards to their camping ground. About one and a half days' trek north of the wadi, about half an hour before sunset, they saw in the distance a cloud of dust advancing towards them, out of which gradually emerged a flock of sheep, an old woman, a man, and a small boy.

According to the subsequent evidence of the mother, her son Mirtah drove his sheep unconcernedly, not noticing with the rays of the setting sun in his eyes who was with the approaching camels. When they drew near he called out the usual greeting, "Peace be upon you"; but instead of the stereotyped reply, two of the camelmen suddenly leapt from their camels with heavy sticks in their hands, and rushed at Mirtah. The old mother and the small boy began to run away, while the frightened sheep scattered in all directions. Mirtah was entirely unprepared for any assault, and before he realised what was happening, he had received two thundering blows on his skull from the two men, who immediately afterwards remounted, and rode away.

Mirtah fell stunned; and as soon as his assailants had gone, his mother and the boy ran to his assistance. After a few minutes Mirtah staggered to his feet in a dazed sort of way, cursed his aggressors, whom he had recognised as belonging to the Sayed family, and said that he would be able to continue slowly. He managed with the help of his mother and the boy to cover two or three miles, but was overcome by pain and loss of blood, and again collapsed. His mother with the sheep remained by his side, and sent off the boy to the Wadi to get assistance to bring him in. Fortunately, after running a few miles, the boy came across some

members of a neutral family with grazing camels, and with 682
their help Mirtah was fetched in to the Wadi unconscious. 628

The case was reported to the police, but a few hours 672
after his arrival in the Wadi Mirtah quietly died. The post-mortem examination revealed a skull cracked right across, with severe cerebral haemorrhage. In due course the Sirdani family claimed £400 bloodmoney from the Sayed family, according to the custom among the Gawabees tribe. This time, however, an exception was made. The sheikhs decided that the ordinary bloodmoney of £300 only should be paid by the Sayed to the Sirdani family, £100 in money and £200 in kind, divided into six yearly instalments of £50 each.

They also added a rider to the effect that they were not awarding Sanaa under the circumstances, as there was no proof of intent to kill, and that weapons such as guns or knives (which would imply premeditation) were not used. The presumption was that the Sayed family, though obviously intending to cause grievous bodily harm, did not intend to kill Mirtah. The fact that he died of his wounds automatically warranted the award of £300 as bloodmoney, but did not constitute sufficient justification for the imposition of the extra £100 as Sanaa.

In Common Law it is not always easy for the uninitiated 671
to understand the legal value of a threat, or what proportion 683
of the punishment for the completed action is due for a mere threat. It was singularly pleasing, therefore, to find a striking instance of a threat to shoot, and to see the attitude of the Bedouin court towards this particular offence.

An Arab called Abd el Kerim was tolerably well-to-do, 233
and owned several camels, a mare, fair-sized flocks of 685
sheep and goats, and certain cultivation rights; and he had two sons aged about sixteen and eighteen respectively. His cousin, Abd el Salam, who lived half a mile away, had four sons of ages ranging from fifteen to twenty, but he was considerably poorer in this world's goods. Abd el Kerim's sons took their camels out to graze, and inadvertently

233 wandered over the boundary of Abd el Salam's grazing
685 rights. The juvenile members of Abd el Salam's family
[578] came out from their tents in a body, to drive off their intruding second cousins with their camels. An altercation ensued, and the excitement grew; and eventually a pitched battle with sticks and stones began among the lads.

683 One of Abd el Kerim's sons, leaving his brother to hold on for a moment, ran back the half mile to call his father, who returned with him to the scene of the fight carrying his gun. On arrival at the camels, Abd el Salam's sons set on him in a body. Abd el Kerim pointed his gun at one of them and took aim; whereupon one of the other family from behind laid him low with a blow on the top of his head, sufficient to fell an ox.

[114] Abd el Kerim was carried back to his tent, where the writer witnessed the horrible sight of sympathetic but homicidal relatives pawing his open wound with their filthy fingers. A large hole had been knocked in the side of his head, and portions of brain were visible. After some
[694] months of surgical treatment Abd el Kerim came out of hospital; and, as the blow was reported to have affected his reason, a case was brought on his behalf by some of his relatives, claiming damages from the family of Abd el
[682] Salam. However, before the case was fully completed, Abd el Kerim was taken ill, was re-admitted to hospital, and died. The case therefore became one of bloodmoney, and was dealt with in the usual way.

683 The interesting point about the case, however, lies in
682 the decision of the court, when the first claim for damages
695 was brought up. A very strong line was adopted by the
672 sheikhs, and in the opinion of the court the wounds received by Abd el Kerim were only what he might reasonably expect. They maintained that, after the way in which he had behaved, he was lucky to have got off as lightly as he did. The sheikhs protested that he ought never to have gone out from his tent, and mixed himself up in a fight between a lot of boys. If he had any authority at all, he

should have called a meeting with Abd el Salam, discussed 683
the position sensibly with him, and then the two of them 682
should have beaten all the boys soundly. Secondly, he ought 695
never to have taken his gun with him, which was as stupid 672
as it was dangerous. The fact that Abd el Kerim himself
knew that it was not loaded made not the slightest difference to the case, as the boys did not, and could not, know whether it was loaded or not. As one of the sheikhs expressed it, "If you point a gun at me, loaded or unloaded, I'm not going to risk it. So if I retaliate by braining you, then that's your fault—not mine!"

As compared with some of the customs obtaining among 682
the Sinai Arabs, the following case among the Aulad Ali 171
in the Western Desert is illuminating, and will be quoted
in full. The question of who is "chief mourner" of the
deceased, and who draws the largest share in a bloodmoney
case varies considerably between the tribes of Arab and
Berber origin. Among the Aulad Ali a woman killed is [562]
automatically half the value of a man, whereas among the [435]
Arabs the value of a woman depends on a variety of conditions.

A man called Idris had two daughters, Towida and 682
Beida. Beida married a man called Korayem Shushan of 672
the Gereidat tribe, and Towida married Farag Gueida of the Mowalik tribe. A son had been born to Towida and Farag called Lataif Farag; and when Lataif was about four years old, his parents quarrelled about some trifling matter, and Farag divorced Towida. Two months after this, Towida went to spend a day or two with her sister Beida and Korayem, and it was while sitting alone in their tent that the accident happened which was the cause of this lawsuit. It seems that Korayem had left a loaded gun tied up with cord to the roof of the tent, suspended from the poles. While Towida was sitting there, a sudden gust of wind got up, and shook the tent violently. As the tent rocked in the wind, the gun came tumbling down on to a wooden chest between the poles; the impact fired the

682 charge, which hit Towida at a range of only a few feet,
• 672 with fatal results.

Farag, who had divorced her two months before,
682 brought a claim for bloodmoney from Korayem; but when
672 the case was heard, Korayem denied that the accident had
695 happened in his tent. The assessors of this first court, which was held soon after the accident, demanded that Korayem should swear, backed by twenty-five men (i.e. half the full number of fifty, as Towida was a woman),
that the accident did not take place in his tent. Then
[671 followed an example of one of the very unsatisfactory
points in Bedouin Law.

Korayem, who was a powerful man belonging to the Gereidat, who were in turn a powerful family, managed to persuade the court to cancel their judgment requiring the oath from himself and his twenty-five backers, and to agree to a settlement whereby he should pay £10 and be absolved from the necessity of taking the oath. The court accepted this agreement, and proceeded to examine the claims to the bloodmoney.

682 The Moslem Law of Divorce provides that when a man
divorces his wife, the decree does not become absolute for
672 three months, in order that it may be ascertained whether
695 the woman be pregnant by her lately divorced husband.
671 Towida had only been divorced two months before the
accident; so the question had to be decided whether Farag
586 were legally her husband or not at the time of her death, for purposes of receiving a share of the bloodmoney. If so, he should receive one quarter; but there seems to have been some difference of opinion on this point among the assessors of the court, and the whole matter was shelved.

682 Seventeen years afterwards, Lataif Farag—then a man
of twenty-one—re-opened the case, claiming his mother's
672 bloodmoney. In support of his claim he produced three
695 witnesses. The first was Farag himself, who was prepared
694 to swear that he had seen Towida lying dead in the tent of
Korayem. The second was Towida's brother, who was

8: Kennett G-5 (ca. 1921) 1925 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9

prepared to swear that he had been called in; and had seen his sister dying in a pool of blood in Korayem's tent. The third was a stranger who had been passing at the time of the accident, had heard the shot, had gone into Korayem's tent, and had seen Towida lying on the floor in a dying condition. The newly-constituted court probed this evidence, without actually demanding the oath from these three witnesses, and arrived at the following conclusions: 682 672 695 694

1. That the facts of the case were common knowledge, and were as Lataif claimed.
2. That Korayem never really intended to swear that the accident did *not* happen in his tent, but had succeeded in bluffing the previous Court. This was made possible by the fact that Korayem's family were strong, and Farag's were weak.
3. That half the price of a man—i.e. £150—should be the bloodmoney in this case, provided that Farag could produce satisfactory evidence on oath that:
   (*a*) the gun belonged to Korayem,
   (*b*) the accident took place in Korayem's tent.
4. In the event of these conditions being met, Lataif Farag should receive five-sixths of the £150; and, provided that they swore the above oath backed by four others, Towida's father and mother (if alive) should receive the remaining one-sixth.

Generally speaking, this judgment appeals to an outside observer as eminently sensible and just; and if only the matter had been left at that, and the judgment had been enforced, all would have been well. Unfortunately, however, various influences again crept in to interfere with the decision of this second court. The accident had then happened about eighteen years before; the first court had been bluffed by Korayem; after an interval of seventeen years the second court gave their very reasonable judgment; and then for some reason unexplained the case was again shelved, and the judgment not executed. For the third

682 time the case was re-opened, after a further interval of some
672 years since the second judgment. By this time nearly all
695 the assessors and witnesses of the first Court were dead,
694 rumours had been spread that the gun belonged to a stranger
who had left his gun in Korayem's tent, and should therefore pay his share of the bloodmoney, and so on.

The Gereidat family again succeeded in confusing the case, and in prejudicing the issue in their favour; and the third court gave the following decision, to the disgust of interested followers of this rather remarkable lawsuit. They decided that no evidence existed to shew what happened in Korayem's tent, and that no oath was necessary, maintaining that in the absence of any proof whatsoever Farag had no claim. They further ordered a new distribution of the reduced scale of bloodmoney proposed, whereupon the proceedings became completely involved and absolutely unintelligible.

682 The above events point out unmistakably the weak
672 spots in the Ourfi system. Korayem's family were strong,
and on two occasions were successful in evading just de-
695 cisions against them; while the weak family with a strong case had to see justice perverted.

695 When the considered judgment of an Ourfi Court
182 receives authority for prompt and immediate execution
from the Government and the police, the Ourfi system is
648 probably the nearest possible approach to the ideal, consistent with the conditions prevailing. But it is an undeniable fact, which must be faced, that without the moral backing of the Civil Power behind the judgments of the Bedouin Courts, miscarriages of justice are possible, and do actually take place.

65[illegible] sale of goods on the black-market. Tribal leaders, or members
177 of a "status group," in whose hands the operation of the
474 cooperative society had been placed, confiscated more than
661 [435] their share of food and fodder and resold it either in the
Nile Valley or to their own tribesmen for whom it had originally
been intended. The government could not really prosecute the
guilty parties for fear of jeopardizing the entire program.
Nor could they convince the cheated tribesmen that they had
been treated unfairly by their leaders. For one thing, the
• [673] Bedouins did not consider that their leaders were committing
a wrong; furthermore, any Bedouin who would go to the govern-
ment to inform on another Bedouin would be subjected to a
[577] trial by Bedouin justice. It is still the traditional codes
of Bedouin law and honor, and not the modern judiciary system,
which prevail in al-Qasr.

474 The cooperative society in al-Qasr is one of thirteen
in the general area of Marsa Matruh. It began with a member-
ship of twenty-five, twenty-two of these were from the 'Aishaibat
tribe. Today, the enrollment is 139 official, and another 195
"unofficial" members. The unofficial members represent un-
registered branches of the al-Qasr cooperative. The Bedouins
[735] explain that they cannot allow any members of the tribe to go
hungry, and, therefore, they will distribute food to all those
who need it (Zein, n.d.). This, of course, shows that those
[661] cooperative officers who do profiteer are not entirely oblivious

Law and Political Order: 'Awaiyid Awlad 'Ali

671 [792] A "holy man" in al-Qasr, who has intimate knowledge of both the Quran and Bedouin law, has this to say on the subject of the 'awaiyid Awlad 'Ali:

> 671 171 The Sharii'a (Islamic Law) was given by God, and it guides man concerning what is good and what is bad: it is for all Muslims. The 'awaiyid was made by man for the Bedouins: it is for settling problems and evaluating damages. The 'awaiyid is natural, made by man and the Awlad 'Ali for settling the problems of the Bedouins. It is different from the Sharii'a. The Awlad 'Ali made the 'awaiyid, not the ashraaf ("holy men"); but the "holy men" approved it. The 'awaiyid agrees with the Sharii'a, but not in everything for it is not from the Sharii'a. Shari'it Muhammad ("the law of the Prophet") is one thing and the 'awaiyid is another. The Sharii'a says an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth, and a life for a life: the 'awaiyid also says an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth, and a life for a life, but in a different way: the 'awaiyid involves money. The 'awaiyid judges a situation; the dhabiiha ("blood sacrifice," usually a lamb as an expiatory fee) and the fine are paid and the problem is solved . . . The 'aqila is better than the government for settling problems in the desert. [672] The government may put a man in prison, and if he dies there you will be responsible to his father and brothers. There is a more liberal judgment here in al-Qasr, and God prefers that we settle our problems through peace . . . [673] If a man dies in prison, it is no sin before God but the Bedouins consider it a sin.

671 At the present time, the customary law of the Awlad 'Ali prevails in al-Qasr, and, I suspect, this body of legal and moral norms will be the basis for Bedouin social and political action for some time in the future. In any case, it furnishes us with a base-line from which any future studies of social

121 external system, however, the law recognizes retaliation, a
681 life for a life. Still, even in this case, Bedouin values
682 expressed through the 'awaiyid try to avert bloodshed and
[182] feuding by showing "the good path" and providing the means
[671] for settlement through compensation.

681 Just as the Bedouin accepts the 'awaiyid as a set of
682 of ideals calculated to regulate conflict, he paradoxically
182 claims the right to impose retaliatory sanctions as a just
[671] conclusion to conflict. One Bedouin said that the greatest
[673] sin which a man or group can commit is to accept the diiya
and then take his blood-revenge and return the money. Presumably, a person or group commits no outrage if they refuse
the diiya with the understanding that blood-revenge will be
[626] taken. In al-Qasr, retaliation and the 'awaiyid are mechanisms
[671] of social control and dispute settlement. A political office
* [613] exists, i.e. the 'aqila which functions over the total range
[692] of political action, and the process of adjudication and
compensation in the form of indemnity payment represents an
institutionalized alternative to retaliation. In all cases
of dispute, ritual or religious sanctions back up social
[776] sanctions. God is a third party to all conflict, and this is
[695] made manifest in the reading of the Fatiha or the oath-taking
128 ceremony. In order to describe how authority and sanctions
68 operate in Bedouin society, a number of examples are presented
[124] below. Some of the cases are the statements of informants about
[114]

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675
539
[681]
[885]

Each Aqila is responsible for submitting to the Amar a list of the Sayems in his bait, and this will be the basis for establishing the share of the bait in payment or receipt of the money.

Article 5:

No Aqila can act on any matter involving loss or gain to the Amar without the presence of the other Awaqil of the Amar, unless an urgent matter occurs in which waiting for the rest of the Awaqil might jeopardize the interest of the Amar. In such cases the Awaqil present can act on behalf of the Amar as a whole.

Article 6:

[672]
[673]

The following acts should not involve the Amar as a whole and the offender is considered individually (or with his own Bait) responsible for them:

1. Theft and cheating.
2. Insult or disrespect of a younger member of the Amar to an older person whether from the Amar or not.
3. Entering someone's tent or home without permission.
4. Seduction of women (including rape and adultery).

[681] In all the above cases the individual has to bear the responsibility for his own actions. For to let the Amar pay for him in such circumstances is to encourage him and other such members of the Amar to commit more of such acts and bring disgrace to the Amar. If the offender is unable to pay for his crime, his nearest male kin should pay for him in accordance with the Awlad Ali Daraleb. Such payments are considered as personal debts which the offender has to pay back as soon as he is financially able.

Article 7:

[627] When an older person does injustice to a younger one, the latter should take his complaint to the Aqila of his own bait. The Aqila in turn should take the matter up with the Aqila of the older man or to all the awaqil of the Amar if the matter is serious enough. The awaqil must assess the facts and prevent the older man from doing any more injustice to the younger man and have the former compensate him for any damage he might have caused the younger man by his actions. If the awaqil fail to do this and if their failure resulted in the younger insulting or hurting the older, his acts become no longer an individual responsibility for which he has to pay alone, and the Amar should pay for him.

Article 8:

[627] No members of the Amar should take sides in disputes involving families or individuals outside the Amar unless the awaqil in the Amar investigate the matter and the reasons for the dispute and decide that the Amar as a whole should be on one side of the dispute or the other.

CHAPTER VI

HOMICIDE AND BODILY INJURIES

Part 1: Homicide

579 Fighting is quite common among Awlad Ali. Many of these fights
involve a large number of individuals and result in many casualties
579 and sometimes even deaths. Fighting is considered "shar," or evil,
• 673 for according to Awlad Ali, it threatens the social cohesion which is
182 highly valued in the area. Yet, although undesirable, fighting and
[682] even homicide are not considered a crime against society and sometimes
are viewed as necessary to safeguard individual and collective rights
in the absence of an established authority which could protect these
[177] rights. Although this absence of an authority is remedied now by the
[692] introduction of state administrative justice, this has not yet achieved
enough efficiency and recognition to replace the old tribal system.

619 In the tribal system, there is no concept of individual punishment
681 inflicted upon the suspect. There is no recognized authority to inflict
692 it. The mardi or the 'aqila who performs the function of dispute settle-
[629] ment in the case of homicide has no power to pass or inflict any punish-
ment. His role is restricted to mediation between the two parties involved
682 as was earlier mentioned. Homicide, like all other wrongs among Awlad Ali,
673 are private wrongs affecting the individual or a group of individuals.
[182] The main purpose of the tribal proceedings in the case of homicide is to
restore some form of harmony and order among the group. This harmony is
sometimes restored by killing the murderer or any member of his vengeance
682 group, or amar. Feuds may result from such killing, and a few instances
628 of feuds have, in fact, been recorded in the area (although not in the

178 and compensation became more and more accepted in settling murder cases
682 [619] among the tribal population. Bloodmoney, or diyya," was established
[728] among compensations for injury in general. This scale of compensation
682 is based on the amount of loss of normal activities the injury caused
the victim with death being the total loss of such activities. The
compensation for homocide is estimated at L.E.400 for intentional kill-
682 ing, and L.E. 300, for unintentional killing. Although reference here
673 is made to "intention," the assessment of that intention and its defini-
672 tion are quite different from the general usage of that term among modern
jurists. Among modern jurists, the term refers to a state of mind which implies that the offender willfully and knowingly committed the prohibited act. This means, first, that the person is able to recognize the nature of his act and to distinguish between right and wrong. Secondly, it means that the person was in a position to choose between committing the act and not committing it and took the former path. According to this view, individuals under temporary or permanent insanity, children under the legal age (the definition of which varies from one legal system to another), non-human beings and objects are not capable of having criminal intent, since they are incapable of having a will of their own. Similarly, individuals who are capable of having a will but, because of certain circumstances their freedom of choice was impaired, cannot also have intentions. Intention, then, in the modern legal conception is a psychological quality that connects the offender with the prohibited result or results. It is this psychological connection that differentiates in modern legal systems between murder and manslaughter, between attempted murder and simple assault, between first and second degree murder, and between justifiable

682 672 •673 and unjustifiable homicide. To examine responsibility in homicide among Awlad Ali and their definition of "intentional" and "non-intentional" killing, let us first present some of the cases collected from the area.

CASE #1: The Case of the Broken Rope

682 672 312 [184] [428] This is one of the classical cases which is told throughout the entire area. There is some slight variation in the way it is told, but all accounts refer to the fact that Hemeida from the 'Esheibat tribe inherited the right to use a large area of tribal land in which there was an old Roman well not used for a long period of time and which was full of sand. One day he invited the awaqil of his tribal segment, as well as his neighbors, to consult them on how to clear the well, since without it the land was almost useless. They all decided it was a good idea and offered their help. On the day the well was to be cleared, they all gathered around the well. Among those present was Do'ah, a poor member of the 'Esheibat tribe who worked as a paid shepherd for Hemeida. He was watching from a distance when Hemeida called upon him to give a hand. The well, like all Roman wells in the area, is about fifty feet deep and fifteen feet in diameter, and narrows as one goes down the well. To be cleared, someone has to be lowered by a rope to the bottom of the well to dig up the sand. Hemeida's cousin, Ali, agreed to go down, and the gathering looked for a sturdy rope which they found at one of Hemeida's neighbors. As the group was tying Ali to the rope, Hemeida suggested that Ali was too heavy for the rope and that it would be a good idea if a slimmer man did the job. At this point, everybody looked at Do'ah, since he was the thinnest

682 agreed that the sticks were not by nature lethal weapons. The
672 latter, according to the tribal law, are only guns and knives,
627 since they give the victims no chance to defend himself. They
ruled the case unintentional killing for which only L.E. 300
should be paid.

682 Since Yadem and his brother were arrested by the police for
625 their crime, the payment of the bloodmoney was postponed until
692 the case was settled according to the state legal system. Only
half of the bloodmoney was paid and the rest was postponed until
the case was decided upon by the legal system and Yadem released.
682 This is obviously a case in which the nature of the killing was
672 decided upon by drawing upon the material aspect of criminal
● 673 causation. The nature of the weapon used was the major determinant
[411] of the crime. Only guns and knives are defined as lethal; all
others are non-lethal by nature, although they might cause the
death of the victim. Death caused by a non-lethal weapon is considered as unintentional regardless of whether or not the actor intended the results, while death by a lethal weapon, even without the intention of killing, is classified as intentional killing, as appears in the following case.

CASE #4: The Case of the Threatened Tribesman

613 For more than five years Bait El-Mawi from the Sheibat tribe
628 had been in a continuous state of feud with Bait El-Asi from the
Gemeiat tribe. One night, during a Khamasein sand storm when visability was extremely low, Abd-el-Galil from Bait El-Mawi heard a noise outside his tent, and the dogs were barking indicating that a stranger was there. Being sure that someone was approaching

613 the tent and fearing that he might have been a member of the
628 feuding Bait intending to harm him or members of his family,
Galil took his gun and went outside to see who was there. He
called on the person to identify himself. When he got no answer,
he warned him that unless he identify himself, he (Galil) would
fire his gun in the air as a warning. After a short period of no
613 response, Galil fired his gun in the air. A moment later, Galil
628 heard a cry coming from the direction of a small hill at the side
682 of the tent. When Galil went there, he found Salem, a member of
a neighboring camp, lying on the ground with a bullet wound in his
stomach. He told Galil that his wife was sick and that he had
come to borrow Galil's donkey to take her to the doctor in the
nearby medical center. He had taken the short cut to Galil's tent
when he was hit by the bullet which Galil had fired in the air.
Galil took his wounded neighbor to the medical center, but Salem
died before they reached it.

682 The Mi'ad was held, and Galil and his family had to pay L.E. 400
672 to the victim's kin group. The amount was that specified for in-
627 tentional killing, since the wound that caused the death was in-
● 673 flicted by a lethal weapon.

CASE #5: The Case of the Startled Shepherd

233 This case involves Idris, a poor member of the Sheresat tribal
[464] segment. He earned his living by working as a hired shepherd for
[619] 'Awwad from Bait Ibrahim in the area of Gharbaniat. During the dry
[312] season, each shepherd takes his flocks to the water wells near the
coast and leaves them there for three or four hours to get their
fill of drinking water. That afternoon, Idris, waiting for the

682 settlement is usually made after the parties have agreed to it,
627 yet, in certain instances where one of the parties later feels that
672 the settlement was not just or that he was coerced into accepting
695 it, he may ask for a second Mi'ad during which new procedures start
in the case. In the present case, although Mahdi had originally
accepted the judgment of the awaqil, as time passed and he realized
that he was unable to pay the bloodmoney, he started to question
682 the feasibility of the settlement. He discussed the matter
672 with Sheikh Suliman el-Gerery from the Murabiteen tribe of Gerera,
695 a tribe whose members are feared throughout the area for the belief
554 792 that they have certain supernatural powers. Sheikh Suliman himself
[776] is highly respected, and people believe that after his death he will
become "wali" or a saint. After hearing Mahdi's complaint, Sheikh
Suliman told him that the settlement was unjust and told him that he
would do something about it. The following Thursday, Sheikh Suliman
called on Mahdi and asked him to bring his donkey and follow him.
They rode to a small desert town called Bahig where the local market
613 is held every Thursday. On market day, the awaqil of various tribal
517 segments usually gather in front of the general store in the town
571 443 drinking tea and chatting until their sons or the younger members
576 of their families sell the sheep and buy the necessary items. Everyone
passing by the gathering is expected to greet the gathering, getting
off his donkey as a sign of respect to the prominent people.
[689] Failure to greet a fellow tribesman is considered a serious offense
liable to a fine of more than L. 50 and ten goats in certain cases.
• [673] 000 It is considered a very serious crime. One informant once told me,

671
672 the irrelevance of intention in establishing liabilities for homocide
171 or injuries (1954).

672 The neglect of intention in assessing liability in cases of homo-
682 cide is evident in the cases presented above (Cases 1,2,4,5 and 6),
where compensation was paid although there was no intention established
on the part of the offender.

Awlad Ali use the Arabic word "katl" to refer to any killing. This
[192] is different from the word "mut" which means death by natural causes.
They further differentiate between "katl 'amd," or intentional killing
682 and "katl khata," or unintentional killing. Although reference here is
672 made to "intention," yet, from the above cases it is evident that the
673 basis of establishing that intention is from the type of weapon used in
effecting the death of the victim. Intentional killings are those caused
[411] by a lethal weapon. Lethal weapons are defined as guns or knives.
Death caused by a non-lethal weapon, no matter what the intentions of the offender, is defined as non-intentional, even when the circumstances of the act indicates the actual existence of an intention on the part of the offender to cause the death of the victim (as in Case #3 above). The assumption is that the use of lethal weapons, such as daggers or guns, implies intention and possibly a certain degree of premeditation, since these weapons have no other important use. Moreover, the probability of death by a lethal weapon is much greater than from other non-lethal weapons. These give the victim a chance to defend himself, a chance which he does not have in the cases of killing with a gun or dagger. In other words, Awlad Ali, in assessing responsibility for homocide, "operate with a legalistic psychology in which intention is is presumed from action" (Gluckman, 1963:207).

000 the role of the victim in initiating the act of the offender. In the
684 682 case of the adulterous wife (Case #7), the intention of the husband to
672 kill the wife's lover was clear from the evidence; yet, the husband's
kin group never attempted to take refuge, and the victim's group was
eager to settle the case with the least amount of publicity. On the
682 672 other hand, killing in circumstances that offend the tribal standards
183 of chivalry, like killing from ambush or during the night, are the most
difficult to solve and pose the greatest chance for retaliation.

682 Although the traditional amount of compensation is not determined
672 by the actual intentions of the killer, but rather by assumed intentions
[673] as deducted from the type of weapon used in causing death, yet, the final
amount paid is usually determined by such intention. The actual intention works as the basis for bargaining between the victim's kin and the kin of the killer. Kin of the victim of an intentional killing are less likely to agree to any reduction of the amount, and with the threat of retaliation or revenge present, the killer's kin are bargaining from a weaker point. This is not the case in unintentional killings or where the victim's behavior instigated the reaction of the killer. In such cases, the victim's group is more willing to accept a lesser amount of compensation, and the killer's group, while not in a good bargaining position, at least are not under the threat of revenge. And since they do not resort to the right of refuge, their daily activities are not disrupted. In this case, they could sustain the bargaining activities for a relatively longer period of time. Also, there is usually a strong
[626] pressure on the victim's group to accept reduced compensation in the
case of unintentional killing from the rest of the tribal members. If

682 672 627 between the parties involved. The relative position of both the offender and the victim and their relationship to one another is taken into account. What is reasonable behavior in one case may not be so in another. Pst disputes are taken as indications of the present situation, although they may not be directly related to the present dispute.

672 673 It is possible to say, then, that Awlad Ali recognize two types of intentions: an assumed intention deducted from certain material aspects of the act itself, like the type of weapon used in causing the death of the victim, and an actual intention which is quite similar to that utilized in modern jurisprudence in the sense that it pertains to a state of mind on the part of the offender that connects him in a special way with the prohibited results. The assumed intention works to set the initial guide for the traditional scale of bloodmoney. It sets the basis upon which compromise could be achieved. Actual intention, on the other hand, determines the actual course the specific case takes as well as the final amount of money paid as a settlement.

683 the settlement is announced. This deduction is determined by the same
683 factors involved in the case of homicide, such as the relationship between
672 the parties involved and the presence or absence of an intention
on the part of the offender to cause bodily harm to the victim, as well
as the role the victim played in provoking the actions that led to his
683 injury. Injuries sustained during a fight are not as serious as injuries
672 sustained by ambushing the victim. In the latter case, the victim
673 had no chance to defend himself. Also, the number of people involved in
the actions that led to the injury enter as a variable. If more than one
individual attacks a victim, it is considered more serious than a man-to-man
fight.

423 each tribe. It was decided that the water which flows through
691 the wadi after the rains should be divided equally between the
578 two tribes, and that no one should be stopped from using the
619
648 water. Had not the government intervened in this conflict, and had not they collected all of the weapons from the Bedouins, this problem would have resulted in the death of many men and even greater problems.

● 674 Theft is condemned by the Bedouins: "Everything in
685 the desert is loose. We must punish the thief quickly and severely." It is a fact that the man who goes to steal and
[682] accidentally kills in the act will have judged against him
[829] the full diiya, i.e., the amount for intentional killing. On the other hand, the people of al-Qasr insist that "Bedouins do
[671] not steal." But legal norms exist to sanction violations against cultural ideals. The following case shows how social and ritual sanctions operate to enforce ideals.

619 Date: 1964. Case: Quarrel between the tribe of Kamailat and
578 the tribe of 'Aishaibat over the theft of 16 L.E. Muhammad of
685 'Ailit Ma'fas was accused of stealing 16 L.E. which belonged
*613 to Ahmad of 'Ailit Idris, Kamailat. The theft occurred while the two were residing at a hotel in Marsa Matruh. There were twenty other persons in the hotel that night. The accused said: "I did not take anything."

634 who reach the age of military service. He is also supposed to report
554 the presence of any fugitive or crininal in his district and report
657 crimes accurring in that district and which involve members of the tribal
segment he represents.

634 The first two duties of the omda to the government do not involve
554 any conflict of interest. Unlike the rural areas where sons are considered
657 a very important economic asset to their parents, and therefore,
562
701 there is a general resentment of military service which takes the sons
178 away and deprives the parents of their important work around the fields,
Awlad Ali look at military service as an opportunity to have their sons go to the city, obtain guaranteed payment, and escape the hardship of nomadic existence. Economic activities
[233] in the area do not require the cooperation of a large number of individuals, and most of the grazing of animals is done either by a paid shepherd or by one of the grown-up sons. Although there still exists an
[183] ideology which values having many sons, yet with the cessation of hostilities between the tribal segments, their presence in the area has lost its
[464] value. Many of the younger generation are seeking jobs with the government projects in the area or in the city. Neither one is easy to find. Joining the army is increasingly considered as an easy alternative.

634 The omda's function which seems to involve some conflicting loyalties
554 is that of reporting crimes involving members of his tribal segment. But
657 even this does not pose a serious problem as it might seem. Almost all
674 minor crimes committed against property or persons as well as all civil disputes are left to be handled by the tribal proceedings. The duties of the omda are limited to reporting the cases of murder and serious assault

1 On the basis of one percent of the yearly yield.

634 554 657 674 [743] which result in permanent bodily harm. Reporting such cases is a fairly minor proceeding since such cases come to the knowledge of the authorities through other channels, mainly from talks involved in the mediation for the bloodmoney or from the hospital to which serious assault cases are usually taken. Besides, reporting a crime does not mean convicting the offender. This latter depends on evidence which, in case the dispute has been settled by tribal proceedings, is hard for the police authorities to find.

634 554 657 While the government demands do not impose serious conflicts of loyalty on the part of the omda, if successful, his position with the government can bring to his tribal segments great benefits. These benefits are usually in the form of various social and economic aids including fodder for the animals and food and clothing for the people during the dry years. Other benefits including providing the tribal population with olive trees and helping them clear many of the old Roman wells and establishing wind mills for nominal fees. Not everyone in the area can have such benefits. Some do not even know they exist. A successful omda could manipulate the administration to get as many benefits for [871] [474] his tribal segment as possible.. Some successful omdas were able to have the government build schools in their districts, establish cooperative units to market local products such as wool, sheep, and olive oil.

634 554 657 578 This should not lead us, however, to conclude that the position of the omda in the Western Desert does not involve any kind of conflicting loyalty or that he is always supported by his people or even trusted by them. One informant said that the omda of his biat is "...government man, not ours....He would sell us all if this pleases his masters in the

121 These three objections to the lineage theory as a useful model for examining the
613 consequences of homicide are serious enough in themselves, but another objection
562 renders it still less satisfactory. This fourth objection relates to the implication that
114 lineage theory cannot take account of women. Indeed, in some of the accounts of the political organization of lineage societies, the impression is given that they are all-male societies: women belong only to the domestic and kinship realms. In terms of the theory, this must be so. Women, the marriage links they create, the forms of relationships that derive from marriage, the right of men to joke with others by virtue of a link through women, their rights to demand favours of men who are not their agnates, their right to expect contributions to bridewealth or blood money from maternal relatives—all these, and other forms of behaviour, have been dealt with as patterns of behaviour which interfere with or disturb agnation, or that cut
121 across lineage affiliations. Such metaphors can only be justified if it is accepted that
613 precedence must be given to agnation, to what people say they think their lineage
relationships to be, and that there is some kind of primacy about what have frequently been called jural rules which constitute the structure, while behaviour which is not governed by these rules is to be relegated to the position of secondary forms having the effect of intruding only. But these secondary forms of behaviour are as impelling, as persisting, and are as much a part of social life as any of the so-called jural rules.
[582] It is possible to go further than this, and state that in societies where there is a high incidence of marriage among agnates of the local group, as occurs among the Bedouin, jural rules rarely appear in their 'pure' form in behaviour, since, in groups of this sort, each and every person constitutes a bundle of roles by virtue of the fact that he is one of a very complex cognatic group; a particular role, it is true, may take precedence in a particular situation, but all roles are present in each situation and affect behaviour. Precedence can only be given to specific forms of behaviour in relation to situations. There is no such thing as a general primacy with regard to any form. The concept of agnation as the centre of all political problems, disturbed or disrupted by, say, matrilaterality, is as inadequate as saying that the nucleus which pulls all other components into position is matrilaterality with agnation as a disturbing element. In reality there are numerous components present in all situations, which should not be lumped together under such categorizing terms as agnation and matrilaterality, but which combine as separate components in a kaleidoscopic range of clusters.

121 Some of the components of behaviour subsumed under the notion of matrilaterality
613 are briefly given here in order to appreciate more fully the consequence of inter-group
682 marriage. Of paramount importance is the fact that, in Bedouin sentiment, to kill
a relative is as sinful an act as the killing of a close agnate. When such a homicide
• 674 did occur, during my period of residence among them, the Bedouin response was to
829 assert that the offender was out of his mind—it was inconceivable that he could have
[602] committed the offence otherwise. Their attitude was reminiscent of the horror they
display when a man kills his father or a full brother, and represents a much stronger
reaction than is manifested when a man kills an agnate of, say, the third or fourth
degree. They have every reason to be disturbed by the killing of a mother's brother,
[604] for, whatever personal affections may be involved, a crucial link is threatened. Their
reasoning, however, is that relationships with the mother's brother are characteristically easy, that they are not demanding, that there is much joking in them, and that to

121 kill within this range is, in terms of the general pattern of behaviour, stupid. What is of
613 interest is that such killings do occur. I recorded three instances of men killing the
682 mother's brother in the contemporary population, not to mention many others
674 based on hearsay evidence only. Clearly, the relationship is more than a merely permissive
829 one. The mother's brother may well be the only person who can help in
certain crises, and if he withholds his assistance the sister's son is left in a dilemma.
604 The form of behaviour in which demands are made is, as the Bedouin rightly say,
121 that of asking a favour, but this does not mean that it is any the less urgent than a
613 demand made against agnates. The range of favours is large, and only a few can be
604 detailed here. If a group has insufficient water to meet its needs a man first seeks help
from his mother's brother. The request has a number of aspects to it: it is a test of
[554] the relationship itself; it is a matter of pride and status that a man can 'call' on
another to help his group out of difficulties, it is an assurance that resources other than
those jealously guarded by his agnates are available to him, and if a man is seeking
to increase his power he must have available more than an agnate's share of local
[682] water resources to supply his flocks and herds. When a blood-money payment has to
be made, the mother's brother is expected to come forward—it is his right to give
[584] without being asked. If a man wants a wife, he is not permitted to approach his father
directly, but his mother's brother can put pressure on the father instead. If a man dies
[429] while his eldest son is still a minor, his brother may be required to act as guardian,
and in this role he controls the son's property; disputes frequently break out as a
result, with the son at a considerable disadvantage, for he cannot engage his father's
[422] brother in hostilities—but his mother's brother can do so for him. Whenever men
come to possess animals before the demise of their fathers or when the father's
brother is acting as guardian they mark them with the tribal and personal signs of their
[583] mothers' brothers. Men have the right to demand contributions for bridewealth
from their agnates if they lack wealth; in practice it comes not from them, but from
the mother's brother. Finally, in certain circumstances, if a man does not have male
heirs, his sister's son might inherit all his wealth.

121 Affinity also carries with it a large number of rights. A poor man may take up
613 residence in the camp of his father-in-law, and be kept by him. The latter may come
606 to his son-in-law's aid in many of his dealings with his father. Like the mother's
brother, the affine is a potential source of water-supply when rain has been insufficient
on the homeland. He also helps with blood money and bridewealth, and he is expected
to aid his daughter and her husband with gifts of food and wool.

121 The details given above by no means exhaust the list of rights a man possesses in
613 his matrilateral and affinal relatives. Obviously, these are not the only forms of
relationship either, and the other forms carry with them yet other claims of various
sorts. Enough detail has been given, however, to make clear the point that local
agnatic groups are so differentiated, and inter-group relationships are so important,
that each aspect of homicide settlement previously described will require further
examination, not in the sense that additional complications must be introduced, but
with the question in mind, is not the structural presentation false? Before beginning
this stage of the argument it is necessary to establish the fact that the links of affinity
and matrilaterality which a group has with another are of a kind which necessitate
their inclusion in an analysis of the arrangements for settling homicides.

reason in three families of one tribe paying together, while 682
the fourth is independent. Sometimes this is caused by 621
geographical separation, at other times by personal animosity
or jealousy.

The main difference between the rules of the Western 682
Desert and Sinai is that in the West reprisals taken at the 171
discretion of an aggrieved individual are not recognised as [670]
lawful, and are distinctly discouraged. Generally speaking, [181]
the Western Bedou is a very much more prosperous and
law-abiding person than the Sinai Arab, although at the
same time he retains his charm as a primitive and independent
being. Occasionally a dastardly murder takes 682
place, but public opinion is very strong not only against the 674
murderer personally, but against all the members of his [626]
family, who automatically share his unpopularity.

In the spring of 1920 an old man, reputed to possess considerable wealth, both in camels and sheep and also in gold buried in the ground, was returning about mid-day from market riding his donkey, and one of his numerous grown-up sons was walking on foot beside him. After going four or five miles in the open desert, the old man got off his donkey, and told his son to ride for a little way while he walked. The son suddenly attacked his old father and hit him with the heavy stick he was carrying; and the poor old man died almost at once with a broken skull. There was nobody about, and the son dragged his father's body about a hundred yards, and threw it down an old dried-up cistern; then, mounting his donkey, he rode home to dinner.

That afternoon the local sheikh was told of the old man's disappearance, and as he had seen father and son leaving the market together, he had his suspicions. He traced their footsteps, picking up the tracks of a heavily laden donkey and one man walking, from near the entrance to the market place. Then, following along carefully on these tracks, he saw where the old man had dismounted. Then he saw a spot of blood and the place where the

682 body had been dragged. He followed the footsteps of the
674 son as far as the cistern, where he again saw a tiny spot of fresh blood on one of the stones. From that point donkey-tracks led straight to the son's tent.

By nightfall the son was securely lodged in the police post; and local public opinion was seething with fury, firstly at such a dastardly deed committed presumably for the sake of the old man's money, and secondly because it reflected untold discredit on the rest of the tribe. The murderer, who was a big powerful man of about thirty standing nearly six feet in height, lay in prison awaiting trial. After a few days he was admitted to hospital, where he completely collapsed and died of fright a fortnight later.

[203] Rumours then began to spread that possibly the murderer had only acted in accordance with the wishes of his brothers, who were all conspiring to get rid of the old man, in order that they might share out his possessions. This could not be proved, and appeared unlikely from the
[626] evidence. However, public feeling against the whole family ran so high that it was feared that more horrors might follow; but although no open action was taken against the family, no opportunity was missed of having a dig at them in some way or another.

682 A very wealthy sheep merchant, who was a distant
674 connection of the family, and heartily ashamed of them,
brought an action for debt against one of the murderer's
691 brothers. He produced an I.O.U. for £2 dated twelve
626 years before and signed by the murdered man, claiming
(according to custom) that the son now in court as de-
686 fendant had inherited his father's liabilities together with
[672] his assets.

This sheep merchant was known personally to the writer, who was also aware that a month previously he had made a profit of £900 on a very clever bit of dealing in the West. The collection, after an interval of twelve years, of this paltry debt of £2, owing from the deceased father

of the present defendant seemed—for a really wealthy 682
man—to be pointless and futile. The merchant anticipated 674
this objection by hastening to add that the receipt of the 691
actual cash did not interest him in the least; but that he 626
had been wondering how he could shew his disapproval of 686
the defendant's family in some way, and had gone carefully through all his old papers and receipts with this end in view, and had triumphantly discovered the bill of debt now produced in court.

Bedouin Law and custom sometimes accept right to 671
bloodmoney in all sorts of circumstances, when other law 672
would recognise no claim. For example, the principle is 682
accepted that a life lost in prison must be paid for by the informers whose information resulted in the imprisonment of the deceased. It is entirely immaterial whether the information so given to the police was wilfully false or intentionally misleading, or whether it was merely subsequently found to be incorrect. Even if the information had been true and correct in every detail, the informer is still blood-guilty from the Ourfi standpoint, although in actual practice any such claims for bloodmoney would probably be considerably modified.

Other claims for bloodmoney are also recognised occasionally, in cases of obvious accidental death, or death by misadventure or Act of God, when the interpreters of Bedouin Law cannot get away from the main principle
that a life lost must be paid for. The difficulty in these [695]
cases is to determine who shall pay for it; and the lawsuits
usually end in a clever compromise, in which their essential principles are duly observed, but their judgments are mitigated and modified by leniency and commonsense. The following example, which occurred recently in Mariut, will illustrate this.

A certain Arab called Ali Abu Bukr had inherited from 671
his father large cultivation rights in the desert; and in the 672
middle of this land was an old cistern for the collection of 682
rain water. It had not been used for years, and was silted 312

423 society. Private ownership of land with sovereign rights
*[613] [178] over it is now the normal practice in al-Qasr. Rights are
[596] held by the family head, the *shaib*. If the family head is
deceased, land tenure rights are held jointly by the sons.

[184] In the area beyond the plateau, in the extreme
*[613] south of al-Qasr, land rights to grazing and water still are
[241] associated with lineages. But here agriculture is impossible.
The type of rights over the land varies with the method by
which it is exploited. The southern and coastal sections of
[433] al-Qasr represent the old and the new, the pastoral traditional
mode of production and the modern agricultural cash economy.
[233] But, as noted, of the total population only a few Bedouins
are actually engaged in pastoralist activities. Hence, tribal
tenure rights, in general, are not overly important at this
time. Not too long ago they were, and many cases in the recent
[671] history of Bedouin customary law relate to conflicts over land
and water in the southern region. The Bedouins say that
[178] traditionally no lineage could use the pasturage or water of
*[613] another without some agreement, usually of long standing,
[233] made beforehand. Now, they say, permission is not needed.
●[675] In the old days, these agreements were made between lineage
representatives, not individuals per se. Today, the grass
178 and water in the southern zone are claimed, though not in a
423 legal sense, by the families using them: the rights of
usufruct over the land are closer to rights of sovereignty

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> Her riding booth struck a tree and she found herself stranded there in the tree; her camel had gone and the rest of the caravan noticed nothing and continued on. Then a Marabit passed by and saw her there. He helped her down and they later married. She already had three sons to a former husband: Ali Ahmar, Ali Abyad and Sinaina. The Marabit also had children from another marriage. He was very rich and they could afford to live together. One day thieves began to harrass the man, but when the three Sa'adi sons offered him their help he told them not to bother with the thieves, that they would go away. But they did not, and they continued to harrass the man for a long time. The three sons were still very young at this time. When they grew up they asked the Marabit for arms and horses with which to fight off the thieves. They received them and succeeded in driving off the thieves. The Marabit was very happy and offered the three sons one-half of his wealth, and he was very rich. The sons refused this generous offer saying to the Marabit that they were no different from his other sons and would take only one-tenth of his wealth.

619 The differentiation between the Sa'adi and Marabit has structural consequences only in that it defines psychological types and tends to assign them to certain roles in society. By his [181] psychological make-up, the Marabit, who is weak and retiring, is unfit for the tasks which the Sa'adi undertakes, i.e., war, trade, and politics. It is, nevertheless, expected that the Marabit will act as a support mechanism for the secular operations of the Sa'adi. Usually, this support takes the form of financial contributions.

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675 Each Marabit group is related through contractual agreement to a Sa'adi group. For instance, the Sulwatiyya lineage of al-Qasr are members of the Jumi'at tribe, a Marabit tribe; when identifying themselves they will say

619 •675 "Jumi'at, Marabtiin (plural of Marabit) of the 'Ali Ahmar."
All Marabit tribes of the Western Desert are affiliated as
*[613] clients with Sa'adi tribes. Further, since the tertiary
group of the Marabtiin functions in the same way as that of
the Sa'adi, it is this group which enters into compacts with
Sa'adi tertiary groups. Traditionally, the Marabit group's
[682] main support activity was to share in the payment of the
blood-money with its Sa'adi protector group. In return, the
Marabit group was given land in the protector's territory
and could depend upon them to contribute to any Marabit
blood debt which might come due. Also, it was considered the
[628] [682] duty of the Sa'adi to revenge the death of a member of his
client group since the Marabit "was weak and could not face a
[608] tribe." But there is no attempt to construct fictional kinship
links between Sa'adi and Marabit groups.

[672] In al-Qasr today, contractual relations between Sa'adi
and Marabit are still based upon collective responsibility in
the blood-feud. However, since this traditional means of
conflict control is an extremely rare occurrence, the mutual
obligations of the parties are expressed in different forms.
[648] In any conflict between the Bedouins and the Egyptian government, the Marabtiin are expected to support their respective
[666] Sa'adi groups. In any modern elections which a Sa'adi might
enter, the Marabit is expected to give him his vote. A few
examples will make clear the relationship between the Sa'adi

619
675 and the Marabit.

*[613] The Qit'an tribe, based partly in Libya and partly in Egypt, is a tribe in the same sense that the Awlad 'Ali is one, i.e., at the secondary level of the lineage system.
[166]
[175] This tribe moved into Egypt sometime around 1900. The Bedouins of al-Qasr estimate that "50% of the Qit'an are with Ali Ahmar,.30% with Sinaina, and 20% with Ali Abyad."
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578 In 1956, certain events occurred in Libya which brought about a declaration of independence from Sa'adi domination by the Qit'an in that country. The Qit'an felt that their numbers were sufficiently large enough that they should represent themselves in the Libyan parliament. In other words, the Marabtiin were no longer willing to settle for the traditional social categories and role structures allotted to them. After these events in Libya, some members of the Qit'an came to Egypt and informed their brothers about the formation of the tribe as a separate entity, and convinced the Egyptian Qit'an to do the same--which they did.

The Bedouins say that the Governor of Marsa Matruh encouraged the Qit'an tribe to increase their numbers in the area after he learned of their desire to be free from Sa'adi domination. There had been a small number of Qit'an in the town of Marsa Matruh. This number quickly grew in size and political strength so that it could challenge the power of the 'Ali Ahmar who are considered the dominant tribe in this

619 675 578 area of the Western Desert. And, according to the Governor of the province, it is the 'Aishaibat of al-Qasr who are the most powerful of the three primary segments of the 'Ali Ahmar; for example, they have succeeded in sending their 'umda (chief) to the National Assembly in Cairo. In fact, it was over the [666] election of the 'umda in 1964 that the split between the Marabit Qit'an and the Sa'adi Ali Ahmar became an open one and produced political rumblings among the tribes. This case makes explicit the relationship between the two types of tribes in the Western Desert, and gives an important instance of the operation of structural principles in defining groups and group relations.

619 675 666 578 During the national elections of 1964, it was the traditional duty of the Marabit to vote for his affiliated Sa'adi candidate. Since the Qit'an are allied in a client-protector relationship with the Ali Ahmar, all of the Marabtiin of this tribe should have given their votes to the 'umda of the 'Aishaibat who was seeking office to the National Assembly. But, instead, the Qit'an ran a candidate of their own--largely at the urging of the Governor, it is said. But, despite this Marabit opposition, the 'Aishaibat were successful in getting their 'umda elected. Furthermore, 619 675 578 626 the 'Aishaibat said that this rebellion of the Marabtiin could not go unpunished, that reprisals would be taken. The type of sanction which the 'Aishaibat directed against the

619 Qit'an is one which is employed in both the internal and
•675 the external systems of political relations: it is an or-
578 ganized sanction taken by the corporate representatives
626 against socially disapproved behavior. Against the Marabtiin,
619 it involved a closure of group affiliation and protective
675 alliance usually obtainable through affinal ties. The Qit'an
578 were prohibited from marrying into the 'Aishaibat primary
*613 segment. The sanction was tested while I was in the field.
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> In March of 1965, 'Umda Ziyad of the Qit'an contracted a marriage for his son with one of the secondary groups of the 'Aishaibat. He went through all of the marriage preliminaries and paid a brideprice of 70 E.L. (Egyptian pounds). But afterwards, the girl's family, following the advice of the 'Aishaibi corporate heads, returned the brideprice and refused his offer. The 'Umda of the Qit'an then went to talk to the brothers of the girl (for her father was dead) and told them that he would pay a brideprice of 1000 E.L. "but I want the girl." He paid them part of the brideprice (for they had agreed in the face of this unusual offer) and sent a car to pick up the girl. The arrangement did not succeed, for the paternal cousin of the girl who, according to Bedouin custom and tradition, had a prior claim on her, stopped the car at gunpoint. The corporate heads had told the cousin that this was his right, and in this case, his duty. Then the corporate heads of the 'Aishaibat called a council, and the members met with the brothers of the girl. They told the brothers: "You know what happened at the time of the election. 'Umda Ziyad is 'Ali Ahmar and he should have voted for our _'umda_, but he tricked us." The brothers refused to be persuaded by the tribal leaders. They said that if anyone from the 'Aishaibat would pay them more than 1000 E.L., they would give their sister to him. The leaders warned the brothers that if they went through with this marriage they would each be fined 200 E.L. Finally, and after this meeting, the leaders went to 'Umda Ziyad himself with the threat, that were he to go through with this marriage "all of the 'Aishaibat will begin to fight you." The _'umda_

> 619
> •675 could not afford to risk such large scale conflict
> 578 and so he withdrew his offer of marriage to the
> brothers. After this, as a display of authority and
> *613 an attempt to maintain something of the alliance
> between their group and the Qit'an, the 'Aishaibi
> 626 leaders made the public announcement that the girl
> 582 could marry anyone else, but not the son of 'Umda
> Ziyad.

619 The various sets of authority relations operative in the al-
675 Qasr area are obvious from this account, but they will be
*613 better defined as the discussion proceeds. Here, I only wanted to make clear that the relationship between Sa'adi and Marabit is one based upon contract and local contiguity, and reinforced by cognation. There is no unilinear basis for the relationship and no attempt to fit it into a "unilinear
[582] genealogical mould." The structural differentiation between
Sa'adi and Marabit seems to reflect a dominant-subjective relationship, in the sense discussed by Weber (1947) and Southall (1956), but its possible class overtones are played down by the fact that there are normally no objections to
[851] intermarrying between groups. The Bedouin of al-Qasr say,
"what is the difference, the children from such a marriage will be Sa'adi anyhow?"

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*613 The Sa'adi-Marabit differentiation is relatively unimportant for a study of al-Qasr itself, since the Marabit number is so small--one lineage consisting of five brothers and their families. The contrast between Sa'adi and Marabit, secular and sacred tribes, becomes more important for a

585 Only one of the three weddings was conducted in the
178 traditional way with three nights of dancing previous to the
wedding and a large feast on the wedding day. The Bedouin
say that a man can no longer afford to do things the old way.
584 The procedure of the marriage arrangement begins when the boy
informs his uncle that he wishes to marry. Then the uncle,
[583] the father and other males of the group meet with the father
of the prospective bride to arrange the marriage, an important
part of which is the establishment of the brideprice (hulwaan
584 or mahr). Before going to see the girl's father, the boy's
*613 father consults with his secondary lineage group, as I have
already mentioned. Then he should wait for a period of
seven days, for the girl's father, "who has heard about the
marriage," must consult with his group and wait for a period
of one week during which time any member of the girl's
584 lineage may claim her. After this time, the ties proposed
●[695] by the marriage are ritualized by two preliminary acts:
the writing of the contract (ma'azuum) between the fathers,
and the offering of a lamb by the groom which solemnizes his
intentions and the marriage (dabah fi-l-williyya). After
[431] another waiting period of about two weeks, during which
time the boy buys gifts of clothing and jewelry and presents
them to the girl at her home, the wedding celebration begins.
585 On the day of the wedding, the girl is delivered to the
groom's residence. The girl remains in the groom's tent, or

585 room, until he arrives for the test of her virginity. The groom "takes blood with his finger," wipes it on the white toga which his bride had been veiled with, and hands it to the older women waiting outside the tent. In the meantime, [792] the two fathers have met with the faqiih ("holy man") who [675] witnesses the agreement on the mahr payment. They read the Fatiha of the Quran together and conclude the marriage contract. The old women, carrying the toga with the virginal blood on it--a symbol of honor to both of the groups concerned with the marriage--parade around the guests' tent showing it, while all the time letting out shrill victory cries (zaghaariid = "trilling cries of joy"). The toga is then pinned-up on the side of the guests' tent for all to
585 see. Animals are slaughtered and the feast begins. The
574 central activity of the feast takes place in the guests' tent, the tent of the male guests. The groom's father, in [576] the traditional role of host, does not sit down to eat with his guests but directs the seating and feeding of them.

585 Should it happen that the girl is not a virgin, the
684 wedding would end on the spot, and the girl would be sent away or killed by her father. My informants said that this has never happened in al-Qasr. One key informant told me that such a thing never happens because the groom would never permit it to be known that "his cousin was not a virgin." In other words, the groom will get the blood from somewhere,

121 residence, cognatic ties, and contractual relations are all
181 seen to be structurally important in early Arabian society.
621 Structural differentiation into groups is based on the
571 171 lineage principle and sustained through "the law of blood-revenge." And it is important to note that the *hayy* was characterized by a structure of authority, it was "guided in war and on the march by one chief" (Smith 1903:44). The
121 law of blood-revenge as an expression of group rights *in rem*
621 and a system of mutual protection point up the importance of
571 contractual relations in Bedouin society. Whether or not
675 real blood ties are involved, a contract must be present or there can be no corporate group. Contract legitimizes authority and provides the basis for the lateral extension of the group; it is primary though it functions coordinately with a principle of cognation, residence, adoption, etc. Contractual ties
121 operate outside of kinship at times but will always be validated
621 by it eventually, "for a legal fiction is always adopted to
571 675 reconcile an act with a principle too firmly established to
608 be simply ignored" (Smith 1903:62). "Blood brothers," in
599 al-Qasr, are defined both biologically and ideologically. As
[602] noted in the case of al-Qasr, there were at least three cases of contractual adoption in which one individual and two whole corporate groups "wrote their names into the books of the 'Aishaibat tribe" (*katab jinnsiyya 'Aishaibiyya*). The integration or adoption of elements in al-Qasr takes place on the

121 basis of an agreement "to share the good and the bad" by
621 571 all parties concerned. Once the integration is effected,
•675 patrilineal ideology and legal fiction succeed in concealing
608 597 the jointure.

621 The concept which derives from ancient Arabia, and
571 which expresses fully the structural principles of Bedouin
*613 society is that of *'aqila*. The *'aqila*, in al-Qasr, is the
head of the corporate group, the tertiary unit or *bait*. A
[884] person becomes part of the Bedouin jural body when he reaches
the age of 15, begins to keep the Ramadan fast, and is expected
to pay his share of the blood-money. At this time, a man
621 acquires rights over his corporate lineage-mates and they
571 over him: they claim a share in the indemnity ("blood-
*613 672 money" - *diiya*) of each other, and are under obligation to
[682] contribute equal shares to any *diiya* which becomes due from
the group as a whole. Further, each corporate member is
morally bound to support his lineage-mates by swearing the
oath (*yamiin*) on the behalf of any who are accused of falsehoods in the course of litigation. All of these rights and
obligations are guaranteed by the presence of an *'aqila*.

*613 The tertiary *bait* is the minimal corporate group.
It usually includes three to five generations of members.
Tertiary units which are descended from a common ancestor
combine through contractual relations into the maximal corporate
group, the secondary unit or *'aiela*. Beyond the secondary level

*613 554 571 segment. He acts in concert with other 'awaaqil (plural of 'aqila) of the tertiary segments of his secondary group when lineage matters call for decision-making at this level. *613 571 183 ●675 Tertiary segments are replicate groups descended from one ancestor, they operate with a common ideology pursuant of common interests and goals. As we shall see, this common ideology is expressed in a kind of code, or contract, which all members of the group swear to uphold and abide by according to the principle of blood responsibility. Tertiary codes in [181] al-Qasr are a reflection and an affirmation of a wider system of values and norms which bind the Bedouins of the Western Desert together into a political system. This wider normative [671] system is expressed in the customary legal system of the Bedouins known as 'awaiyid Awlad 'Ali ("the customs of the Awlad 'Ali tribe").

*613 578 571 554 The primary duty attached to the office of 'aqila is the regulation of conflict. It is worth noting here that conflict regulation is not equivalent to conflict resolution. The latter process carries with it the intimation that the causes of conflict have been treated and resolved, that conflict has been eliminated. Nothing could be further from the truth in a segmentary society where the various segments actually constitute conflict groups; consequently, conflict between groups or individuals who represent groups may be contained but never forgotten. Conflict is an ongoing process among

*613 554 571 or whole tertiary group may be expelled from the lineage group, or if they so desire, they may resign their status in the group. In either case, and both cases rarely occur, the permission and approval of the 'aqila are required. Or, I should say, the approval of the 'awaaqil is required, for both cases represent structural changes which affect the juristic personality and constitution of the maximal corporation. The legitimacy of the 'aqila and the whole political structure are tied up together. Social structure and authority roles are both objects of legitimacy, as Easton (1965:278-301) says, and hence the legitimacy of the 'aqila in al-Qasr flows from the structural legitimacy of a segmentary political system. Thus in al-Qasr, politics operates through authority groups in opposition to one another, each represented by an authority role. An 'aqila once told me that "the tribe of the 'aqila gives him the authority to judge between its members." Another 'aqila said that "the 'awaaqil are bound [675] by a contract (rawaabit) to perform their duty on behalf of their bait." The rawaabit ("bonds") we will discuss in the next section.

Spheres and Focus of Authority

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Authority, as it is used in this study, refers to the Weberian notion of "imperative control" (Herrschaft); that is, "the probability that a command with a given specific

*613 571 178 have noted previously, informants very definitely disagreed over the matter; by looking at the two genealogies one is unable to say one way or the other. The process of fission and fusion in the form of secession and adoption is another instance of genealogical manipulation through patrilineal ideology. In this case, patrilineal ideology also may succeed in concealing real biological links in favor of political relations. We shall see below how secession and adoption actually function in Bedouin society.

*613 •675 554 571 We have said that the authority of the _'aqila_ is legitimate at each structural level. The Bedouins of al-Qasr often legitimate the authority of the _'aqila_ in writing, and, at the same time, make an explicit statement of social compact which outlines the pragmatic and moral values of the corporate group. The corporate charter in al-Qasr is a document of self-interest which defines expectations and consequences for corporate members: it governs the conduct of members in situations relevant to internal order, and gives the _'aqila_ powers of representation in external affairs. The charter is a [181] reflection of the high value the Bedouins place upon security and order, and is a condition for a legal system of wider scope. *613 675 571 Max Weber (1947:120) has expressed the idea of social relationship as contract so well that it is worthwhile to quote him extensively here.

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> The meaningful content which remains relatively constant in a social relationship is capable of formulation in terms of maxims which the parties concerned expect to be adhered to by their partners . . . The more rational in relation to values or to given ends the action is, the more is this likely to be the case . . . The meaning of a social relationship may be agreed upon by mutual consent. This implies that the parties make promises covering their future behavior, whether toward each other or toward third persons. In such cases each party then normally counts, so far as he acts rationally, in some degree on the fact that the other will orient his action to the meaning of the agreement as he (the first actor) understands it . . . But in part also they are motivated each by the value to him of his "duty" to adhere to the agreement in the sense in which he understands it.

The idea of "duty" makes collective responsibility meaningful, and the authority of "the third party," or _'aqila_, legitimate.

The ties which bind the corporate group may be defined in terms of the structural principles of kinship and residence. But these ties must be affirmed and further defined by contractual obligations which inform an authority structure. Further, the legitimacy of authority relations beyond the tertiary level is based mainly upon contractual alliance. The relationship between contract and the other structural principles is a mutually reinforcing one. Kinship and residence alone cannot be the basis for the existence of a corporate group. The Bedouins of the Western Desert in their statements of contractual alliance not only proclaim the conditions for brotherhood, but, also, the consequences for those who do not meet these conditions. A Bedouin, or a whole corporate tertiary

*613 segment, may choose to belong to, or to secede from, the
675 larger corporate group. This element of choice helps to define
571 the authority of the corporate sole. Authority is illegitimate, i.e. it is mere power, when control is exercised against the will of the subjects (Weber 1947).

Above, I have said that authority is legitimated beyond the tertiary level, i.e., at the secondary level, through contractual alliance. By that I mean the same agreement on values is replicated by the authority groups of the lineage. The five authority groups of 'Ailit Ma'fas are bound together by what the Bedouins call "the bonds of the _'awaaqil_" (_rawaabit al-'awaaqil_). Below I present a number of examples of the _rawaabit_ from al-Qasr. Then I continue on to show the nature of the corporate group, and the dynamics of structure and authority in Bedouin society.

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BONDS BETWEEN THE 'AWAAQIL OF 'AILIT MA'FAS

1. Every member of the tribe who has proved against him an intrigue concerning the _'aiela_,
2. every member of the tribe who claims against his brother a case which has no basis,
3. every member of the tribe who shifts a border of the borders of a land from one place to another place,
4. every _'aqila_ is responsible for his followers and must present each with the right direction if he does not convince him first (i.e. if he fails at moral discourse, he must arrange the court session),
5. every member of the tribe who departs from the opinion of his _'aqila_ and who follows the wrong and erroneous

*613 6. every member of the tribe who submits a complaint
•675 without first consulting his 'aqila, (i.e. who
571 goes to the government before the 'aqila),

539 7. every member of the tribe shall back the members of
his bait against an opponent without right,

8. every member of the tribe who has proved against him the showing of sympathy toward another tribe knowing that this tribe is antagonistic to his own tribe,

9. every member of the tribe who has proved against him that he helped a relative in payment or in a quarrel against his brother.

we signed this document and declare that these customs are valid from the date of today and everyone who disobeys them pays a dhabiiha ("lamb") and 10 L.E. without any objection if any of the items of the above items is proven against him.

Date: August 8, 1953
The 'awaaqil (signatures or stamps):
Abd al-Ruwaf (Bait Firjani)
Hussain 'Umar (Bait 'Umar)
Shi'ath Abd al-Hadi (deceased, Bait Braik)
'Atiya 'Umran (Bait Kailani)
Khalid Idris (Bait Muhammad)

114 In the rawaabit, or contract, just noted the term
619 "tribe" refers to the secondary segment ('aiela). Murray
675 (1935:315n) has also pointed to an instance of the Bedouins'
*613 use, in a formal document, of the word qabiila ("tribe") when reference to "some smaller division, such as 'eila is clearly meant."

675 Through the rawaabit norms are expressed and action
681 is oriented with respect to them. If it is otherwise, sanctions
[183] may be brought to bear to insure conformity to norms. The
*613 minimal sanction which the 'aqila may impose is the dhabiiha

675 681 *613 ("blood sacrifice") and a fine of 10 L.E. The most serious sanction which the group, through the 'aqila, can administer is banishment. In this case, the decision "to wash one's hands of another" may originate with the 'aqila but must be executed by the next of kin, or the process can originate with the next of kin and be carried out with the approval of the 'awaaqil. In any case, it is an ultimate negative sanction which ranks with blood-revenge in degree of seriousness, since social and political status is withdrawn from the person. A banished person is no longer protected in accordance with the principle of collective responsibility, and his group may no longer demand blood-money for his life. 675 *613 571 681 The charter of 'Ailit Lazumi presented below is similar in most respects to that of 'Ailit Ma'fas with the exception that it makes provision for the barawwa, the act of banishing from the group. The document was issued in four copies to each of the 'awaaqil of Lazumi. Note that in both charters thus far shown, not only are the individuals of the group bound by the rules but, also, the 'aqila comes under the rule of law.

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BONDS BETWEEN MEMBERS OF 'AILIT LAZUMI AL-'AISHAIBAT, (Wednesday, January 19, 1952)

In the name of God the Merciful and Compassionate

In the presence of 'Umran Kailani, Hajj 'Ali, the 'awaaqil and individuals of Bait Bu Jafaila who signed below, this agreement took place and the 'awaaqil of this 'aiela are:

•675 1 - Hajj Salah Bu Jafaila, 'aqila of Bait Bu Halaiqa
*613 2 - Kuraim Juhami, 'aqila of Bait Uthman
3 - Ruwaf Jadalla, 'aqila of Bait Jadella
571 4 - Muftah Tahir, 'aqila of Bait Tahir

681 539 Every *'aqila* is responsible for his family whether conconcerning the occurrence of problems, and collecting money from his family, or other matters. Every person who rejects the opinion of the *'aqila*, or reports to the government without the consent of the *'aqila* will be subjected to a fine of 10 L.E. and a *dabiha* according to the *'awaiyid.* And every person who delays in carrying out the decisions of the *'aqila* and all that he indicates will also be subject to the same fine. And also, any one who delays in swearing the oath or in supporting his family, and in so doing loses the interest which belongs to the *'aiela*, he will be subject to the same fine. Any of the *'awaaqil* who cause the loss of any right of the rights of the members of the *'aiela* will also be subject to the same fine. And any member who makes false claims against any of the other members of the *'aiela* is subject to the same fine. And any *'aqila* or member from the members of the *'aiela* who has proven against him an intrigue, or a quarrel, or prejudice between him and his brother or paternal cousin is subject to the same fine. He is also subject to the same fine who has proven against him prejudice in favor of another party against his paternal cousins, that is to say, the members of this *'aiela*. And every *'aqila* or individual who delays in signing and accepting these bonds, or in executing them, is considered an outsider by this *'aiela* and the *'aiela* will not be responsible for him in the future, and this will be considered a *barawwa* for him from the *'aiela*.

This was issued in four copies to the *'awaaqil*, and all previous bonds are cancelled from this date and are no longer effective.

Signatures and stamps of *'awaaqil* and witnesses.

675 681 The *barawwa* (literally: "the act of putting outside") is a formal procedure, formal enough to entail having the process notarized as a legal document according to Egyptian civil law. The Bedouins say that the legal document of *barawwa* is "to show that we have washed our hands of the

675 culprit, and are no longer responsible for his acts." The
681 barawwa is not only the imposition of a most severe sanction
675 by the group, but it is also the withdrawal of all positive
681 sanctions which would apply to an individual as a member of
571 the group. The withdrawal of sanctions means the withdrawal
of the right of reciprocity; consequently, the banished no
longer comes under the rule of succession, and he has no
[421] rights over either persons or things. The banished may claim
no property of the property of the group other than that which
he takes with him, and he may claim no women from the group.
675 The barawwa, naturally enough, is uncommon in al-Qasr. The
681 last occurred in 1957, the declaration of which is reproduced
below.

DECLARATION OF BARAWWA

Law Office of Abd al-Rahman Marsa Matruh	50 milleme tax stamp

On this date the following came: Kuraim Juhami of the 'Aishaibat on behalf of himself and his paternal uncle, and their 'umda, the first party. And there also came Sa'ad Uthman on behalf of himself and his children, the second party. The reason for the coming together of these two parties is in order to ask the barawwa from each other. Since they have all agreed by their own will without any force or ill feeling that the two parties shall not be responsible for each other's actions, it is a valid agreement that can never be rejected. No one from either of the parties is responsible to the other in supporting oaths, in paying for wounds, or in paying blood-revenge (diya), and no one from either party involved in barawwa will take girls from the other. This barawwa became a dividing line between the two parties, and if later there appears a fraternity paper, the barawwa will be cancelled and be to no avail. This paper is signed

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by us and by the below mentioned witnesses to be used when it is necessary. This barawwa was issued in two copies at the hand of each of the two parties to be used in time of necessity.

Approving what is included,	Approving what is included
the first party,	the second party
Kuraim Juhami (stamp)	Sa'ad Uthman (stamp)

Witness to this:
Abd al-Rahman, the lawyer
Date: September 24, 1957

STAMP OF MINISTRY OF WAR
BORDER GUARDS
MATRUH SECTOR

Signatures or stamps of eight witnesses.

1 - Copy to Marsa Maṭruh Police Station
2 - Copy at the hand of the first party
3 - Copy at the hand of the second party

Seen and the original must be kept in the files of the administration of complaints, and a copy must be delivered to each of the two parties.

Signed: Colonel Ahmad Sa'ad
Marsa Matruh Police Station

Date: October 12, 1957

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The rawaabit in Bedouin society is essentially a charter at the tertiary level, but it structures relations at the secondary level. At the tertiary level, the charter functions to establish group boundaries and identity, and to
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express the conditions for membership. Group solidarity and maintenance at the tertiary level is a necessary condition for structural continuity of the larger secondary corporation: the lineage persists through these groups with replicate
060 functions, structures, and a common ancestor. That the

*613 public obligations to temper private interests. This temper-
*613 ing process in Bedouin society is effected through the agree-
571 ment, or bonds, between the 'awaaqil of the secondary group
•675 as representatives of the members of the tertiary groups.
The 'aqila and the members of a tertiary group submit to structural arrangements of organization and procedure at the secondary level of interest and authority. All this is symbolized in the duplicate copies of the rawaabit and the name of the "famous" ancestor.

*613 I do not underestimate the importance of the tertiary
571 segment. I realize that internal order at this level is what prevents anarchy at the secondary level. And I do not mean to imply that integration is necessarily any greater at the tertiary level than at the secondary level--it may or it may
*613 not be the case. Conflict is more difficult to detect at the
571 tertiary level than at the secondary level due to the practical
578 value which the Bedouins place upon stable relations between brothers and immediate relatives. But conflict does take place, and the Bedouins do attempt to regulate it at this level.

*613 The Bedouins say that blood-revenge and the feud
682 cannot possibly operate at the tertiary level. On the other hand, homicide does occur "between brothers." We have already described the case of manslaughter in 'Ailit Ma'fas and the manner in which it was dealt with: no retaliation would have

*613 682 been justified in this case since the killing was accidental. In another case of killing which occurred between tertiary units of the same secondary group, we see what happens in the case of intentional killing. This case of murder in 'Ailit Lazumi is interesting and valuable because it illustrates the dynamics of authority relations within the secondary segment, and the degree to which authority relations are manageable without a resulting structural change.

*613 682 571 ●675

> In 1959, a rearrangement of authority relations took place within 'Ailit Lazumi: Bait A and Bait B agreed that they would be collectively responsible for each other, and Bait C and Bait D made a similar compact. The compacts involved the sharing of diiya and kubaara (expiation) payments. Shortly after 1959, Bait A and Bait C quarreled, and the result of the litigation was that the 'awaagil ordered Bait A to pay a kubaara of 20 L.E. to Bait C. Bait B, as the partner of Bait A, decided to pay 10 L.E. of the kubaara and Bait A paid the other 10 L.E. But Bait D protested this sharing of the kubaara saying that Bait B is a third brother and, as such, should act as a quwaal al-kahair ("a speaker of good"); that no brother should take sides against the others. As a result of this incident, the split between the two groups (A-B and C-D) became deeper. Afterwards, one group would not contribute to the diiya involving members of the other group even if it concerned external conflict with other secondary groups. This division in 'Ailit Lazumi was finally ended in 1960 when a member of Bait A killed a member of Bait B--the killing was within the same contractual alliance. At this time, the whole lineage decided to forget its differences and, all together, paid Bait B its diiya.

*613 578 [681] Ideally, conflict should not be permitted to threaten the structural continuity of the secondary corporation, but it happens. Usually, however, safety mechanisms such as the barawwa and the right to secede are effective enough to prevent structural deterioration.

*613 structural deterioration. Secession, the right to break
571 authority relations, and adoption, the right to contract
•675 new authority relations, are rights of the authority group.
681 This can be noted in the "Declaration of Barawwa" presented
578 earlier. It was stated in that document that "the reason
[597] for the coming together of these two parties is in order
to ask the barawwa from each other." Further, mention was
made of a "fraternity paper" which would cancel the effects
of the barawwa. So, secession can be a means of regulating
[597] conflict, and it can become the basis for a re-integrative
move; that is, an adopted party may decide to secede from its
foster lineage and return to its original lineage, or secondary
group.

*613 Secession, as distinct from segmentary fission as a
571 response to ecological demands, represents a structural
[578] change in authority relations short of distrubing the structure
of the secondary group. In a process of secession, i.e.,
breaking with the secondary group, joining a new secondary
group, and returning to the "blood-brother" group, the fundamental condition of "belonging" is the acceptance of collective
responsibility. This is a most important point. The office
*613 of 'aqila, the Bedouin charters, and the raison d'etre of the
571 corporation revolves about the notion of sharing in the blood-
681
675 money. This can be shown by an extremely interesting document
belonging to 'Ailit Abu Qarasa of al-Qasr. Here the process

*613 of secession, and the nature of the collective responsibility
571 principle in Bedouin society are made clear. The occasion of
681 the writing of this document was the issuance of a "fraternity
•675 paper."

*613 BONDS BETWEEN MEMBERS OF 'AILIT ABU QARASA

571 Thanks to God alone and nothing survives but His
681 kingdom, praise and peace to Him Who will never
539 have a Prophet who is greater than Himself.

675 It came into our hands on 10 Shawal 1363 (September 9, 1944), the _'awaaqil_ of 'Ailit Abu Qarasa of the 'Aishaibat; and the reason for their coming together is in order to merge 'Ailit Abu Qula with the other _buyuut_ as they were in the past. And this is in accordance with the agreement of all the parties to this paper. By the free will of all it became, as of this day, that all of the mentioned _buyuut_ will be connected with the other _buyuut_ in receiving and giving. But all blood-money of the mentioned _buyuut_ which was due before the date 3 Shawal 1361, that is to say all debts for past offences, they and their former relatives will be responsible for. After this date, which is 3 Shawal 1361, each of the mentioned _buyuut_ will share the good and the bad equally. And the _'awaiyid_ which the mentioned _buyuut_ agreed upon are the following:

1 - First, he who intentionally beats his brother in the _'aiela_ will pay by himself and no one from the _'aiela_ will pay anything with him.

2 - But the offense which takes place within the _'aiela_, the fine for it will be distributed in such a way that the first half of the payment will go to the offended _bait_ and the second half will be distributed among all of the mentioned _buyuut_.

3 - The offense which happens to the _'aiela_ from an outside party, half of the payment goes to the _'aiela_ and the second half to the offended _bait_.

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4 - The thief from the mentioned buyuut will be responsible for himself alone, and his relatives in blood (i.e. his bait) will be responsible for him.

5 - The one who is known to lie under oath from the mentioned buyuut, everyone who supports him must be a blood-relative from his bait.

6 - The one who delays paying the share which is requested by the 'aiela, his rich relative will pay.

7 - The one who asks for a barawwa from the 'aiela will pay what is asked for, and at the same time will also pay 20 L.E. barawwa fee for every man who fasts.

8 - The one who supports his relative from some other 'aiela against his paternal cousin will be required to pay 10 L.E. as a fine.

Signatures or stamps of the 'awaaqil of 'Ailit Abu Qarasa, and the 'awaaqil of 'Ailit Ghriba (who are the former relatives of Bait Abu Qula, the reconciled bait).

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[675]

Every point of the above rawaabit shows the moral and political significance of the secondary group in the Bedouin community. Membership in a secondary compound authority group entitles one to political status without which the individual could not survive. The Bedouin community shares certain activities, relationships, and goals so that the aims of any individual can be achieved only by participation in social action with others: this the Bedouins have in common with every other human community (Firth 1951:41). Specifically, in considering society in terms of authority roles and authority groups, we are interested in the political community in which the Bedouins participate.

681 property disputes, and I shall briefly discuss this before
695 I proceed to describe Bedouin legal processes. Besides the
784 threat of blood-revenge and fines of money, the individual,
or group, who violates the moral and legal norms of Bedouin
society may be faced with sanctions of a sacred nature. In
695 any case where clear evidence is lacking, one litigant may
request that that other party swear the oath (yamiin Allah)
*613 in support of his claim. In all three corporate charters
695 presented earlier in this chapter, those of 'Ailit Ma'fas,
675 'Ailit Lazumi, and 'Ailit Abu Qarasa, support of lineage-
mates through the oath was a condition of group membership.
[672] Collective responsibility not only applies in the case of
secular things, i.e., sharing the blood-money and the
exercise of blood-revenge, but also where the possible curse
of God is concerned.

695 When one party to conflict requests that the oath be
administered as a means of settling a dispute, the other
party will always accept because it is assumed that in this
way both litigants "will get their rights." The party taking
695 the oath must be supported by a number of his relatives
602 ('umraa al-dam) who are willing to risk the consequences, and
*613 who are chosen by the other party. If a man is unable to
muster the required number of kinsmen to take the oath, and
the number is always relative to the seriousness of the offense
of which he is accused, then this is taken as a sign of his
untruthfulness and he loses his claim.

121 first, the government may enter into conflict cases which
681 are judged to be out of control and involving the larger tribal
692 units; secondly, litigants, whether exercising internal or
648 external political relations, have the right to take their
case to a rajal khair. Both exceptions represent informal
[626] processes of social control in al-Qasr; the first case rarely
happens, and the second case seems to occur quite frequently
but no recordings of the settlement are made.

681 Sanctions in the Bedouin legal system conform to what
121 Radcliffe-Brown referred to as secondary sanctions: "These
are concerned with the actions of persons or groups in their
effects upon other persons or groups" (1952:209). Also, it
[671] would seem that Bedouin law is one of private delicts as
opposed to a law of public delicts:

> [692] In the procedure of a law of private delicts a person or a body of persons that has suffered some injury, loss or damage by infringement of recognized rights appeals to a constituted judicial authority, who declares some other person or body of persons within the community to be responsible and rules that the defendant shall give satisfaction to the plaintiff, such satisfaction frequently taking the form of the payment of an indemnity or damages. A private delict is thus an action which is subject to what may be called a restitutive sanction (Radcliffe-Brown 1952:213).

681 In Bedouin society, delicts are private since they involve
•675 individuals or lineage groups, but the restitutive sanctions
671 to which they give rise are backed by communal consensus expressed through public approval in general, and by the twin

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•675 charters of Bedouin society, the *rawaabit al-'awaaqil* and
671 the *'awaiyid Awlad 'Ali*. Again, following Radcliffe-Brown
121 (1952:212-219), sanctions expressed in al-Qasr may be considered
681 civil as opposed to criminal sanctions since, even in
682 the case of intentional homicide, the emphasis is upon restitution
182 and the restoration of the "good society" rather than
[671] upon punishment. The Bedouin legal system is one which deals
with private dělicts, and which depends upon secondary social
sanctions and ritual sanctions for the arbitration and settlement
of disputes.

121 Since neither a dichotamy between private and public
681 delicts nor a differential distribution of authority at the
various levels of the lineage structure obtain in the uncentralized
political system of the Bedouins, political action and
type of sanction will be described in terms of whether or not
they occur in the internal political system of the secondary
or domestic group, or in the external system where interaction
between secondary, primary, or tribal segments takes place.

The most striking difference between the two systems
of political action rests with the fact that the *lex talionis*,
retaliation regulated by custom, does not operate within the
121 secondary group. In the two cases of killing between tertiary
681 groups of 'Ailit Ma'fas and 'Ailit Lazumi already given, compensation
682 was immediately paid: the incidents were both
*[613] settled and "forgotten." In conflict situations arising in the

691 that 'Ait Idris take the oath as proof that the well was
685
*613 owned by them. Upon the decision of the _'awaaqil_, however,
578 'Ait 'Umran refused to allow 'Ait Idris to swear the oath
692 "because we are all one family." This means, as one _'aqila_
695 actually stated at the conclusion of the case, that "'Ait
Idris is indebted to 'Ait 'Umran."

423 The following two cases which occur in the external
•675 system of political relations, one within the 'Aishaibat
*613 territory and the other dealing with land rights in the
territory between two primary authority groups, indicate the
formal aspect of Bedouin adjudication in establishing contracts.

[539] Date: 12 August 1963. A Contract of Agreement on Land Rights.

Agreement and satisfaction took place between Hussain Karim al-Dawlat of al-'Aishaibat and Khalid Idris al-Ma'fas of al-'Aishaibat, the first and second party. And the reason for this agreement is that each of the two parties own cultivable land at Ras Wadi Madwar. The two parties wish to make a dividing line between this linear piece of land and to declare the borders. The two parties agreed on the following: first, the beginning of the border extends from the eastern side at south Ras Raqabit al-Shumar to the western side at Hatiyid and is shown by stone markers; secondly, this line should be established from the east to the west, and this is a dividing line between the two parties and was executed by them and with their satisfaction; thirdly, whoever rejects or modifies this line will be responsible in front of law and the _'awaiyid Awlad 'Ali_; each party is responsible for his children and relatives as to their actions regarding this line which is the subject of the agreement; fifthly, this contract of agreement which defines the borders between the two parties was issued in two copies, a copy to each party to use when it is needed.

Signatures or seals of seven men.

156 He was sometimes
159 asked to sit-in as a witness for important contractual
554 matters. Note that in the *rawaabit al-'awaaqil* of Bait
•675 Shafaila of 'Ailit Lazumi (presented in Chapter Four),
Hajj 'Ali who is neither from 'Ailit Lazumi nor an *'aqila*
was present to sign and validate this document.

156 Hajj 'Ali, then, operates in the micropolitical
159 system and the traditional authority structure of al-Qasr.
554 But what is just as important, he has secured a firm foothold in the modern bureaucratic structure of the near-by
town. He straddles both camps. The Governor of Marsa Matruh
635 was an important aid to my understanding of Hajj 'Ali's
634 role as "broker." The Governor claimed that the British
156 first introduced the roles of *'umda* and *shaikh*; they did this
159 to "control the Bedouin" and to "get the men out of the tents."
554 He explained in his own way what he considered to be the
124 structural differentiation of political roles in al-Qasr.
[648]

> Let me tell you, these fellows are very clever. They have an *'umda* . . . he comes to my office and says: "I want this and this." I say, "No." Then he goes back to the *'awaqil* and tells them that, and then these fellows begin to think in what way they can get what they want. But the *'umda* is nothing; it is the
> *[613] *'aqila* whom the Bedouins listen to and love . . . The *'umda* is elected (at this time) by the Bedouins. They put forward a man who hesitates, one who can say yes or no . . . But there is a real leader for the people, this is a man such as Hajj 'Ali, here is a man the Bedouins love.

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635 The Governor said that Hajj 'Ali speaks well and
156 thinks well. Twice in the interview the Governor said that
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*[613]

613 member falls on all members alike, regardless of the exact genealogical
672 relationship to the victim. When bloodmoney is to be paid, its members
682 pay it as a group, divided among all male adults; and although when they
receive it, a bigger portion goes to the nearest agnates of the victim,
the remainder is distributed equally among all its members.

613 The genealogical depth of the Eila is usually five generations.
This is not always true, however, In certain instances the number of
generations intervening between the founder of the Eila and its living
members is nine or even ten. Naturally, the more generations the larger
the size of the Eila. Sometimes the Eila becomes so numerous that it is
[217] hard to keep records of all members who are supposed to share in the pay-
ment of the bloodmoney in a specific case. When the size of the Eila
reaches this point, one of two things may happen. The first is an attempt
to make lists of the members. Many of the Eilas have such lists. This
613 is usually accompanied by a tendency toward writing down the specific
● 675 rules and regulations of the vengeance group. These lists are referred
to as Amar papers. They constitute a formal statement of an otherwise
informally recognized responsibility of the group for certain actions of
its members. The other is a tendency toward the fission of one or more
of its constiuent units which, after separation, establishes itself as
an independent Amar. The factors underlying this process of fission are
discussed in the next chapter.

[539] The following is an example of an Amar paper, that of the Eilat
Aggary, which was put into effect in 1954.

IN THE NAME OF GOD THE FORGIVER

613 675 539 The following Awaqil (sing. aqila, the leader of a bait) representing the various "buite" (sing. bait, the tribal segment below the level of eila) of the Aggary Family were witnesses to the treaty and their signatures signify their commitment and that of their respective buite to the content of this agreement.

(a list of the various awaqil)

The above signing awaqil agreed unanimously on the content of the document and all the conditions included. No objection by any of the above persons was noted at the meeting.

Article 1:

The content of this document should be kept as a secret of the Aggary Family. It constitutes the Aggary Amar in accordance with the customs and the Daraieb of Awlad Ali. The content of the document should be revealed only at the request of both parties of a dispute which involves a member of the Amar.

Article 2:

[627] Peace should exist between members of the Amar. No secret grudges or open disputes should be permitted between them. In case such an unfortunate situation exists, the other non-involved members of the Amar should intervene between the disputants, try to solve the dispute, and prevent it from damaging the solidarity of the Amar. They should investigate the facts of the case and force the guilty party to compensate his brother (the wronged party) without giving the former a chance to object.

Article 3:

[681] When the Amar is called upon because of obligation involving the payment of money, all the Awaqil should meet and decide the amount of money that should be collected from each Bait of the Aggary Family. It becomes then the responsibility of each Aqila to collect the amount from his Bait.

Article 4:

[681] [885] The share of each Bait is based upon the number of "Sayems", (literally, "fasting males", which is interpreted to mean 15 years of age or over), regardless of whether or not they have a source of income for themselves. The share of those without means of their own is distributed among the other members of the Bait.

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675 539 [681] Each Aqila is responsible for submitting to the Amar a list of the Sayems in his bait, and this will be the basis for establishing the share of the bait in payment or receipt of the money.

[885] Article 5:

No Aqila can act on any matter involving loss or gain to the Amar without the presence of the other Awaqil of the Amar, unless an urgent matter occurs in which waiting for the rest of the Awaqil might jeopardize the interest of the Amar. In such cases the Awaqil present can act on behalf of the Amar as a whole.

Article 6:

[672] [673] The following acts should not involve the Amar as a whole and the offender is considered individually (or with his own Bait) responsible for them:

1. Theft and cheating.
2. Insult or disrespect of a younger member of the Amar to an older person whether from the Amar or not.
3. Entering someone's tent or home without permission.
4. Seduction of women (including rape and adultery).

[681] In all the above cases the individual has to bear the responsibility for his own actions. For to let the Amar pay for him in such circumstances is to encourage him and other such members of the Amar to commit more of such acts and bring disgrace to the Amar. If the offender is unable to pay for his crime, his nearest male kin should pay for him in accordance with the Awlad-Ali Daraieb. Such payments are considered as personal debts which the offender has to pay back as soon as he is financially able.

Article 7:

[627] When an older person does injustice to a younger one, the latter should take his complaint to the Aqila of his own bait. The Aqila in turn should take the matter up with the Aqila of the older man or to all the awaqil of the Amar if the matter is serious enough. The awaqil must assess the facts and prevent the older man from doing any more injustice to the younger man and have the former compensate him for any damage he might have caused the younger man by his actions. If the awaqil fail to do this and if their failure resulted in the younger insulting or hurting the older, his acts become no longer an individual responsibility for which he has to pay alone, and the Amar should pay for him.

Article 8:

[627] No members of the Amar should take sides in disputes involving families or individuals outside the Amar unless the awaqil in the Amar investigate the matter and the reasons for the dispute and decide that the Amar as a whole should be on one side of the dispute or the other.

613 **Article 9:**

675 The Amar should never fight on the side of the wrongdoer, because if it does, it will have to pay with him for his wrongdoings.

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Article 10:

[628] Any dispute or fight involving a member of the Amar and an outsider should be reported to the awaqil in the Amar who are supposed to take the matter up with the other party. If the awaqil are convinced that the outsider is the aggressor or that he is at fault, they should try to make him accede to the demands of the members of the Amar, using all their efforts to convince him and the aqila of his bait. If he refuses, they [619] should call him for a "Miad" (tribal meeting) in which all parties involved should be represented by their respective awaqil.

Article 11:

[563] [619] With regard to "iktitab" (tribal adoption), an outsider wanting to join the Aggary Family or one of its constiuent buite must be asked first about the reason or reasons for his desire to join. This must be done in order to know what kind of person he is and whether he will become a burden and liability to the Amar. If he proves to be of reputable standing, the aqila of the bait he wants to join can accept him without consultation with the rest of the awaqil. If on the other hand he is found to have grudges against someone or if someone has a financial claim over him, then the aqila of the bait cannot accept him without consultation with the other awaqil in the Amar. If all the awaqil agree to accept him, he is considered like one of the Eilat Aggary, having the same rights and bearing the same responsibilities.

Article 12:

A memberof the Amar who wants to separate himself from the Amar and get a "barawa" has to state his reasons beforehe can be released from the obligations of his membership in the amar. If his request to get the barawa was because of injustice he suffered by the Amar or any of its members, the awaqil have the duty to straighten the injustice and restore his rights. If, on the other hand, his request for the barawa was to avoid paying the Amar, then he cannot be released from his membership unless he pays all of his share, or else he must return all that the Amar has paid him until the time he asked for the barawa.

Article 13:

[695] [693] If one of the Amar is accused of an offense for which he is tried by the legal system of the state, the Amar as a whole share the expenses of hiring an attorney to defend him. This, however, is done after the awaqil are sure (by means of administering the oath) that he is innocent and that the accusation is false.

613 Written agreements such as the above are becoming more common in
675 the area. The need to have the responsibility of the vengeance group
[178] or the Amar recorded and the names of its members listed stems from the
[361] increase in the geographical mobility of individuals and separate households
[464] seeking jobs with the government organizations in the area or with
the various industries in the towns and cities outside the Western Desert.
233 The uncertainty of pastoral nomadism and the delicate balance which exists
178 between pastures, animal population, and human population is pushing an
182 ever-increasing number of people to abandon the way of life which they
had lived for generations. Animals are extremely important to sustain
233 the pastoral life of Awlad Ali. Once the balance between the pasture and
182 the animal population is upset by a draught, a segment of the human population
731 has to make new adjustments. This adjustment is first made by
166 moving with one's flocks to areas in the Delta or in the Cyrenaica region
of Libya. This is a short-term adjustment, however, and cannot be continued
for long periods of time. Pastures in the Delta have to be purchased,
and in most cases the owner of the herd has to sell part of his
[619] herd to feed the rest. The Cyrenaica pasture is very limited and restricted
by the strong tribal control of the Cyrenaica Bedouins, who in
general are not friendly with many of the tribal segments living in the
233 Egyptian Western Desert. If the draught continues beyond a certain time,
731 the individual owner of a herd may find himself forced to sell the herd
464 and seek other modes of subsistence in the form of part-time or full-time
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182 employment as a semi-skilled or unskilled worker with the government or
industrial organizations. Such jobs are usually viewed as a temporary
source of income to help the individual and his immediate family live

233 through a hard year and to help him replace the herd he has lost. In
731 many cases a dry year is followed by another and many of these employed
464 434 find themselves depending more and more on their income from the jobs.
182 The security of the employment is often compared favorably with the
uncertainty of nomadic existence, and many decide to abandon the pastoral
life on a more or less permanent basis. But even when one makes such a
decision, he usually retains a strong affiliation with his original way
613 of life. He retains an active interest in the affairs of his Amar,
182 especially those from which he can benefit in one way or another. One
682 important gain he might get is through sharing in the receipt of bloodmoney
for the killing of any member of the Amar, and having the Amar paid in
his behalf. But while asserting their membership in the Amar at the time
of such distribution, very few, if any, would show themselves when the
membership of the Amar is called upon for the collection of bloodmoney
which the Amar has to pay for a murder committed by one of its members.
613 It is known in the area that members of one bait of the Aggary Amar (Bait
682 Ahmad) have never paid their share of the bloodmoney of the last twenty
578 years, but always claim their share in the distribution of bloodmoney.
Many members of that Bait claim that the Bait has long been separated from
the Aggary Amar, although this claim is denied by the rest of the Amar as
well as by those members of Bait Ahmad who claim their share in the
receipt of bloodmoney.

613 Disputes such as these, which are not limited to the Aggarty, led
● 675 many Amars to attempt to make comprehensive lists of all members of the
578 Amar and to require a written agreement in case of separation of a given
Bait from the Amar.

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Another factor which led to the need to formalize the rules of the Amar was the increase in the kind of disputes for which there is no provision in the customary law of Awlad Ali. Such disputes arise mainly out of situations which are relatively novel to the area. A large number of these situations involve the relationship between the tribal population and the government authorities recently taking a major part in managing the affairs of the area. There were no rules in Awlad Ali law to guide decisions in cases involving financial liability of a member of the Amar in cases such as confiscation of smuggled goods, destruction of government property, or false testimony leading to the conviction of a fellow tribesman by the government authorities. The list of cases such as these is rapidly increasing. Many members of the Amar refuse to share in the payment of liabilities arising out of such cases on the basis that since no provision has been made in the customary law of Awlad Ali, then the Amar as a whole should not take corporate responsibility for such actions. They assert that corporate responsibility of the Amar is the exception rather than the rule and therefore, where there is no specific rule, the responsibility is an individual one. Others insist that it is the corporate responsibility of the Amar in such matters that maintains the Amar as a group and gives incentives to the members to retain their membership in the Amar, and therefore, should be the rule rather than the exception, covering any form of liability unless individual responsibility is specified.

613 672 675

This made it essential to specify in some kind of formal statement which liabilities are to be considered collective for which the Amar has to pay as a corporate unit and which are to remain as individual responsibility. This is done either by listing the cases of individual

613 responsibility, leaving any other situation a collective responsibility,
672 or by specifying the cases of collective responsibility, implying that
675 all other responsibilities are as a rule individual ones. The Amar paper of the Aggary, for example, chose to list offenses for which the Amar is not responsible, leaving the rest of the liabilities to be covered by the Amar as a whole. This is not always the case. In some papers offenses for which the Amar is responsible are the ones listed leaving the general rule as the non-responsibility of the Amar.

613 It is in this respect that the Amar papers are considered an im-
671 portant source of legislation. Although the new rules incorporated in
675 an Amar paper start with the limited applicability to members of the Amar, yet, as time passes and as these rules affect the relationship of the Amar members to outsiders, one rule may acquire a wide practice and become part of the customary law itself. An example of the point in
613 question is the rule regulating the payment of the bloodmoney in cases
671 where the murderer is tried by the state courts for the same crime. In
675
682 cases of arrest of the murderer by the government, only half the bloodmoney is paid and the other half is withheld until the trial is over. If the killer is acquitted by the court, then the other half becomes immediately due for payment. If, on the other hand, as mentioned before, the killer is convicted, half the bloodmoney is postponed until the person completes his sentence and is released unharmed and with his full senses. If he dies in prison or sustains an accident which affects his physical or mental capacities, the rest of the bloodmoney is automatically dropped. This rule was first included in a number of Amar papers, especially those of the Eilat of Awlad Kharouf tribe. In less than twenty years since it

613 This makes it possible for those adopted by the tribe to keep in touch
563 with their relatives and friends they left behind in the Delta while en-
619 joying the military exemption gained from their adoption by the Awlad Ali population. It is also believed that Eilat Aggary, made up mostly of peasants themselves, are very lenient in the conditions they put for tribal adoption. Finally, the Eilat Aggary is not among the most powerful tribal segments of Awlad Ali, possibly because of their composition. This assures the adopted peasant groups an equal status not normally obtained if adopted by one of the powerful tribal segments of Awlad Ali.

613 The Amar paper of the Aggary explicitly states some of the basic
● [675] characteristics of the Amar as a unit in the tribal organization of
Awlad Ali. The most distinctive aspect of the Eila or the Amar as a political unit is the absence of any formalized leadership. Although the Amar is viewed by outsiders as a corporate group as far as its legal responsibility in certain cases, from the standpoint of its members, the Amar is no more than the sum total of its constiuent units or Baits. This is shown in the Amar paper of Aggary which states that matters affecting the Amar be decided upon by all the bait represented by their respec-
613 tive leaders, the awaqil. There is no formalized authority above the
554 awaqil, although one of the awaqil might acquire a position of informal
627 leadership by virtue of personal or other qualities. He will be con-
sidered as a mediator and go-between for the various leaders of the Baits. In the case of the Aggary, Sheihk Selouma, the Aqila of Bait Eweida, has acquired such a leadership among the Eilat Aggary. Although Shiehk Selouma is relatively young, (he is about 40 years old), he has the reputation of getting things done. His Bait is the wealthiest in the

613 His Bait is the wealthiest in the
554 Aggary and he himself has recently acquired a great amount of wealth,
627 mostly from smuggling goods across the Libyan borders. Because of his
[556] position as a Government Sheihk, he is believed to have influencial con-
nections in the government. He is the only member of the Aggary Amar
who has a car. He considers himself to be the spokesman of the Aggary
Family, and he is known to be able to persuade the reluctant awaqil to
conform to decisions made by the rest of the awaqil. In a number of in-
[682] stances he was able to collect bloodmoney from members of the Amar who
had previously refused to pay. Some people in the area believe that had
it not been for the persuasive abilities of Sheihk Selouma, the Aggary
Amar could never have persisted, and it would have long ago been divided
into smaller units due to the lack of agreement among its members. The
613 lack of formalized leadership of the Amar or the Eila makes consensus of
extreme importance for the Amar. The emphasis on the unity of the Amar
[675] is stated in Article 2 and is implied in a number of other articles in
[578] the Amar paper of Aggary. Disagreement among the awaqil is very rare al-
613 though not unknown in the area. The relative consensus among the awaqil
682 stems from the fact that the Amar as a group has a fairly limited function.
[182] Until very recently the only practical function of the Amar was the collec-
tion of money to pay for a murder committed by one of its members. Since
establishing the innocence or guilt of the accused is not the duty of the
Amar, once his guilt has been established, there is no question about
613 the payment. Disagreements are likely to occur in the case of new circum-
682 stances where money has to be paid, since payment in such cases are not
578 yet institutionalized, even when specified in a given Amar paper. This
000 has not yet become a major problem. If any disagreement between the

613 If any disagreement between the
578 responsibility of the majority of the awaqil to persuade the minority to
571 conform to the majority's decision. This is usually done by simple personal
613 persuasion. In certain instances, however, when a particular aqila
554 is known for being troublesome to the Amar, refusing to abide by the majority
571 decisions, an attempt may be made by the others to build up popular
578 support around another person in the Bait which the aqila represents.
If this strategy is successful, it might lead to replacing the aqila by
another who is more abiding to the Amar's decisions. This approach is
more likely to succeed if the aqila is not a popular person in his own
Bait, for if he is popular, any attempt by the other Baits to disqualify
the aqila would be viewed by the members of his Bait as interference in
their own affairs and might lead them to rally even more strongly around
their leader.

613 The other tendency occurring when the size of the Eilat increases
is toward the separation of one or more of its constiuent Baits. Originally
613 this was done by merely refusing to share in the payment of bloodmoney.
682 If this refusal continued, it was considered as a sign of
[178] separation of the Bait. In recent years this created problems with an
increasing number of individuals claiming separation from the Amar to
avoid the payment of the bloodmoney, while claiming membership when distribution
613 is done. This led many tribal segments to require that the
● 675 "barawa" or separation of individuals or tribal units from any particular
Amar should be put in writing, after getting the approval of the Amar to
which he belonged. When the approval is given and the separation in put
in writing, it is announced to all other tribal segments. If this is
[672] done, members of the separated tribal segment are not held responsible

613 [675] [672] for the actions of the members of their former Amar, nor is the Amar responsible for theirs.

Units thus separated establish themselves as separate Amars. These units are commonly referred to as Eila, thus retaining the structural label of the higher order of segmentation. This is not always the case, however, and other segments may refer to them as Baits rather than as Eilat. This explains, at least in part, the tendency toward blurring the formal scheme on the next level of segmentation, that is, of the Bait, and may account for the variable meaning of the term Eilat itself.

The Bait

While the Eila or Amar-el-dam is the most important political unit by virtue of being the vengeance group and therefore, the individual's major support group, it is the Bait that constitutes the most visible political unit.

613 423 The Bait is the only corporate land-holding group. While the Eila is usually associated with a certain geographical locale which it considers as its homeland or "watan", it rarely, if ever, utilizes this land as a corporate unit. Instead, the land is divided among the various Baits constituting the Eila. The land of the Bait is not divided and each member of the Bait can, at least theoretically, cultivate or graze on any part of it.

613 But the one important characteristic of the Bait which distinguishes it as a political unit is the existence of a formally recognized leadership in the position of the Aqila (lit. wiseman). The Bait is the only structural unit with such formalized leadership. The Aqila is responsible for all members of his own Bait whose number varies from 20 to 60

613 mainly a declaration that, that particular person is no longer a member
681 of the tribal segment and that his actions should not in any way reflect
upon the tribal segment. The tribal segment referred to is usually the
amar since it is only politically corporate group amoung Awlad Ali. The
procedure is usually undertaken in cases of habitual offenders whose ac-
tions consistently bringing liability to the amar or disgracing it in
relations with other tribal groups in the area. Due to the seriousness
of the procedure (since it leaves the individual without the protection
of his group), it is restricted. First, to announce the barawa of any
of its members the amar has to get the unanimous agreement of all adult
males of the gorup as represented by their Awaqil of their respective
[675] baits. Lately such decisions have to be put in writing. The barawa
[593] from the amar does not include the man's father, brothers, or sons.
[672] These immediate relatives remain responsible for his actions even if they
desire to detach themselves from such responsibility. This is mainly
maintained not so much for the protection of the repeated offender but
rather for the protection of unsuspecting people who happen to have deal-
ings with him and who would be protected by the corporate responsibility
of the man's immediate kin. In addition to repeated offenders, the
[626] barawa or the threat of it is used to back the awaqil in their exercise
of persuasion to get members of their baits to agree to their decisions,
expecially those affecting the amar, like the collection of bloodmoney
or the taking of the oath.

A man, on his part, may ask to be given a barawa from his amar. In this case, as shown in the amar papers of Aggary, he has to give good reasons for such a demand. The awaqil of the amar meet and discuss such

613 a request and examine the reasons behind it in an attempt to remedy them
681 if possible. They have to be sure first of all that by his request the
person is not avoiding the paymnet of his share in a particular case.
[695] If this is proven to be the case, then no barawa is granted unless the
person pays all his debts to the amar. This, like the amar's barawa of
the individual, has to be put in writing.

613 I left the area a month after the meeting held at Qudura's camp.
578 By the time I left, bait Asabei' was almost in a chaotic situation.
[114] Many thought that the outcome would be in favor of Qudura, who would
emerge from all the happenings as the leader of bait Asabei' as a whole.
Others thought that the only possible outcome was for bait Asabei' to be
divided into two or even three separate units with their own respective
leaders.

Analysis

114 All events of the second phase occurred while I was in the area.
627 Nonetheless I was not able to observe directly all of these events, due
to the nature of the judicial process among Awlad Ali which relies, as
has been mentioned earlier, on informal mediation and influence, rather
than on formal court hearings. Most of the above events happened behind
[124] closed doors and with a great amount of secrecy. For this reason I had
to rely partly on informants' accounts of what exactly had happened between the parties involved.

613 The dispute in its two phases revealed a major weakness in the
627 social structure of the major bait of the Aggary family. As the events
182 of the case unfolded, they shed light on some of the important principles

581 are necessary for the validation of the marriage contract. Modern
585 legal systems which took as their basis the Islamic law of marriage
671 675 and the family further required the registration of the marriage contract for the marriage to be legal.

584 The request and necessary response forming the marriage are sup-
585 posed to be carried on by the parties involved. However, if either the
429 groom or the bride is not of age, or is mentally unqualified, the trans-
593 action is carried on by his or her guardian, or "wakil." The wakil is
the father, unless he is dead or an invalid, in which case the brothers
[604] become the wakils. If the person has no brothers, then the uncles be-
[184] come the wakil in the order stated. According to certain Sunni sects
in Islam, a woman marrying for the first time is always represented by
her wakil, even if she is of age. The assumption is that a woman who
has never been married does not have the experience that enables her to
enter into any kind of legally binding relationship such as marriage.

585 Following the original Islamic idea, marriage among Awlad Ali is
675 an oral agreement between the groom or his father and the guardian
593 429 (wakil) of the bride-to-be (her father, if alive, or her closest male
[604] kin in the following order: her brothers, her uncles, her grandfather).
585 A religious man is sometimes asked to perform the marriage, although it
792 is not required. Some persons might invite a member of the Murabiteen
[619] tribe or holy men to witness the marriage on the basis that his presence
[778] gives "baraka," or blessing, to the marriage. Before the application of
585 the State legal system to the area, marriage contracts were not regis-
656 177 tered. In recent years, however, and with the increased mobility of
[675] the tribal populations, more and more marriages are being registered in
[634] the administrative districts. Still, according to the unofficial estimates,

582 of parley land or a well or to make him a partner in a business or smuggling
557 activities or even as revenge on his uncle by keeping his daughters
582 unmarried. In 1961 the heads of 25 prominant baits of various tribes
557 in the area of Matruh met and decided that the right of ibn 'amm had
178 become a major problem, and that invoking that right when the man had
613 no intention of marrying the girl had resulted in a number of disputes
that became serious over a period of time. They felt that the time was
suitable to revise that right and make it subject to the concept of fair
behavior applicable to other rights. They wrote a new rule which speci-
582 fies that the man has the right to prevent his cousin from marrying an
557 178 outsider or a more distant relative only if he himself intends to marry
613 her either in the present or in the reasonable future. If the circum-
675 stances show that he cannot do so, then he forfeits the right.

[558] To prevent his cousin from marrying another man without a proven
[681] intention on the part of the man to marry her himself in the foreseeable
future, is considered as an unreasonable behavior for which
ibn 'amm could be liable to pay kabara to his uncle as well as to the
prospective groom. It also denies him the right of taking her away from
[683] her marital residence by force. If he does this, he would be liable to
the compensation for assault. The agreement was signed by the awaqil
and is considered binding as far as the baits they represented are concerned.
Other tribal segments in the area refuse to abide by the agreement
and consider it as a pretentious departure from the ways of Awlad Ali
which should not be encouraged. Even within the tribal segments involved
in the agreement, there have been reports of individuals who refused to
[629] abide by the agreement. In certain of these latter cases, the ibn 'amm
selected as his mardi a member of a tribal segment not involved in the
agreement and therefore not morally bound to abide by
its contents.

585 legal guardian and considered a bride price to compensate the father or
583 the legal guardian of the bride. In earlier times the bride received
779 none of the mahr, although she usually got a sadaq or bridal gift for
431 [178] herself. In Islamic Arabia, the mahr and the sadaq became indistinguishable
[171] and were given to the woman and took the form of a legal gift
for affecting the marriage. The Koraan no longer contains the concept
[178] of the purchase of the wife, and the mahr becomes a compensation which
the woman has to claim in all cases. The Koraan demands a bridal gift
for a legal marriage: "And give them whom ye have enjoyed their reward
as a wedding gift" (Sura, iv. 24), and again, "And give the women their
dowries voluntarily" (Sura, iv. 3). According to the Koraan, the mahr
[586] remains the property of the wife and remains her own even if the marriage
is dissolved by divorce. But although it took the form of a gift, the
mahr remained in Islamic law a prerequisite for the legalization of the
marriage. It is only upon the giving of the mahr that the marriage is
considered valid. No marriage is legal, according to the Islamic law,
unless that transfer of the mahr is affected. Mutual consent of the
two parties to forfeit the mahr does not change that rule, and the marriage
58 is considered void. According to Muslim jurisprudence, marriage
675 is a contract ('acd) made betweeen the bridegroom and the bride or her
184 wali or guardian. An essential element in that contract is the mahr.
The jurists themselves are not sure about the nature of the mahr. Some
regard it as practically a purchase money or as an equivalent ('iwad)
for the possession of the woman and the rights over her, so it is like
a price paid in a contract of sale; while other jurists see in the mahr
a legal symbol, a mark of honor and a proper legal security of property
for the woman.

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Libyan Bedouin MT9

[For general information on the payment of blood-money in retribution for homicide, see Category 682.]

*613
578 the Bedouins. Conflict regulation treats the expressions of
571 social conflict and not its causes.

554 The 'aqila regulates conflict between the members of
his tertiary segment, between this group and the other groups
of the secondary unit, and between secondary units of the
tribe. He operates in both the internal and external systems
*613 of authority relations. The 'aqila may pre-empt the authority
578 of the shaib in the sphere of familial authority, though the
593 Bedouins say, this seldom happens because the son is willing
554
[596] to obey his father. Having been reared in the culture, and
as a future father himself, the son supports the respect-
*613 discipline principle of Bedouin society. But in extreme cases,
578 such as the threat of a father to disown his son, the explicit
593 approval of the 'aqila, and of all the 'awaaqil of the secondary
428 corporate group, is necessary. This is the procedure in all
554 cases of banishment. In one case (which I document below), a
man disinherited his younger brother with the formal approval
of his 'awaaqil.

*613 The tertiary group in Bedouin society is by definition
682 the blood-vengence group. However, in view of the common
578 values and pragmatic interests of its members, the secondary
[181] group fulfills this function. Traditionally, when revenge
•[681] killings were carried out according to the lex talionis, it
was usually at the hand of some member of the victim's tertiary
group. In the case of protracted conflict, such as extended

*613
554 on paper in triplicate, one copy going to each litigant and
69 a third copy to the chief of police of the Marsa Matruh sector.
[671] In practice, though, a copy usually goes to the litigants, but
[178] not to the chief of police (who had not a single Bedouin court
case in his files).

*613 As is not the case in Islamic law, in Bedouin customary
695 law the decision of the judge may be appealed. The system of
692 appeals may even function at the level of familial authority,
[671] i.e., the son may, in theory, appeal a ruling by his own
father. The Bedouins insist that this is an important right
of every man. In the situation where a man wishes to appeal
a decision of his own 'aqila, he will generally take his claim
to another 'aqila of his secondary group. When an appeal is
to be made, it is done with the permission of the 'aqila who
rendered the original decision. The one who appeals his case
does so with the understanding that the decision returned by
the court of appeal will be final and binding. Further, if
● [681] the court of appeal concurs with the findings of the original
court, the plaintiff pays a double fine (twice the original
fine), and also pays his own 'aqila an expiation fee (kubaara).

69 The Egyptians have preferred to leave the Bedouins of
648 al-Qasr to settle their own disputes except in the more serious
[682] criminal matters. Police from Matruh will enter homicide cases
[685] and those conflicts over property rights which threaten to
explode into tribal warfare. But these types of conflict have

627 596 685 *[613] from the owner of the dog. If the man had refused to pay the price of the chicken, as demanded for settlement, then the next step would have been to inform the appropriate 'aqila to bring greater force, and perhaps greater sanctions, to bear.

*613 571 682 Bait 'Umar (Figure 8) is one of the authority groups of al-Qasr, a corporate group represented by a corporate sole. Both the tertiary corporate group and the corporate sole are referred to, according to the ancient tradition of the Bedouins, as an 'aqila. This group is a blood-revenge group, and is referred to as 'umraa al-dam ("donator of blood"), or waliiy al-dam ("executor of a blood feud"). It is the group which ●[681] decides whether or not retaliation will be taken according to lex talionis, or if blood-money as compensation for the loss of one of its members is acceptable. The Bedouins say that no amount of money can replace a human life, that blood-money is only a means to prevent the loss of more men. This group, when it functions as waliiy al-dam ("executor of a blood feud"), has the authority to demand retaliation; to waive it entirely; or to demand, along with blood-money, that the guilty party be punished by his 'aqila. When this group pays or receives blood-money it does so as a partner in the larger corporate group, the secondary segment. The principle of collective responsibility interplays with the other structural principles of Bedouin society. The convergence represents

*613 6. every member of the tribe who submits a complaint
675 without first consulting his _'aqila_, (i.e. who
571 goes to the government before the _'aqila_),

539 7. every member of the tribe shall back the members of his _bait_ against an opponent without right,

8. every member of the tribe who has proved against him the showing of sympathy toward another tribe knowing that this tribe is antagonistic to his own tribe,

9. every member of the tribe who has proved against him that he helped a relative in payment or in a quarrel against his brother.

we signed this document and declare that these customs are valid from the date of today and everyone who disobeys them pays a _dhabiiha_ ("lamb") and 10 L.E. without any objection if any of the items of the above items is proven against him.

Date: August 8, 1953
The _'awaaqil_ (signatures or stamps):
Abd al-Ruwaf (Bait Firjani)
Hussain 'Umar (Bait 'Umar)
Shi'ath Abd al-Hadi (deceased, Bait Braik)
'Atiya 'Umran (Bait Kailani)
Khalid Idris (Bait Muhammad)

114 In the _rawaabit_, or contract, just noted the term
619 "tribe" refers to the secondary segment (_'aiela_). Murray
675
*613 (1935:315n) has also pointed to an instance of the Bedouins'
use, in a formal document, of the word _qabiila_ ("tribe") when
reference to "some smaller division, such as _'eila_ is clearly
meant."

675 Through the _rawaabit_ norms are expressed and action
•681 is oriented with respect to them. If it is otherwise, sanctions
[183] may be brought to bear to insure conformity to norms. The
*613 minimal sanction which the _'aqila_ may impose is the _dhabiiha_

675 •681 *613 ("blood sacrifice") and a fine of 10 L.E. The most serious sanction which the group, through the 'aqila, can administer is banishment. In this case, the decision "to wash one's hands of another" may originate with the 'aqila but must be executed by the next of kin, or the process can originate with the next of kin and be carried out with the approval of the 'awaaqil. In any case, it is an ultimate negative sanction which ranks with blood-revenge in degree of seriousness, since social and political status is withdrawn from the person. A banished person is no longer protected in accordance with the principle of collective responsibility, and his group may no longer demand blood-money for his life. 675 *613 571 681 The charter of 'Ailit Lazumi presented below is similar in most respects to that of 'Ailit Ma'fas with the exception that it makes provision for the barawwa, the act of banishing from the group. The document was issued in four copies to each of the 'awaaqil of Lazumi. Note that in both charters thus far shown, not only are the individuals of the group bound by the rules but also, the 'aqila comes under the rule of law.

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BONDS BETWEEN MEMBERS OF 'AILIT LAZUMI AL-'AISHAIBAT, (Wednesday, January 19, 1952)

In the name of God the Merciful and Compassionate

In the presence of 'Umran Kailani, Hajj 'Ali, the 'awaaqil and individuals of Bait Bu Jafaila who signed below, this agreement took place and the 'awaaqil of this 'aiela are:

675 1 - Hajj Salah Bu Jafaila, 'aqila of Bait Bu Halaiqa
*613 2 - Kuraim Juhami, 'aqila of Bait Uthman
571 3 - Ruwaf Jadalla, 'aqila of Bait Jadella
4 - Muftah Tahir, 'aqila of Bait Tahir

•681 539 Every _'aqila_ is responsible for his family whether conconcerning the occurrence of problems, and collecting money from his family, or other matters. Every person who rejects the opinion of the _'aqila_, or reports to the government without the consent of the _'aqila_ will be subjected to a fine of 10 L.E. and a _dabiha_ according to the _'awaiyid._ And every person who delays in carrying out the decisions of the _'aqila_ and all that he indicates will also be subject to the same fine. And also, any one who delays in swearing the oath or in supporting his family, and in so doing loses the interest which belongs to the _'aiela_, he will be subject to the same fine. Any of the _'awaaqil_ who cause the loss of any right of the rights of the members of the _'aiela_ will also be subject to the same fine. And any member who makes false claims against any of the other members of the _'aiela_ is subject to the same fine. And any _'aqila_ or member from the members of the _'aiela_ who has proven against him an intrigue, or a quarrel, or prejudice between him and his brother or paternal cousin is subject to the same fine. He is also subject to the same fine who has proven against him prejudice in favor of another party against his paternal cousins, that is to say, the members of this _'aiela_. And every _'aqila_ or individual who delays in signing and accepting these bonds, or in executing them, is considered an outsider by this _'aiela_ and the _'aiela_ will not be responsible for him in the future, and this will be considered a _barawwa_ for him from the _'aiela_.

This was issued in four copies to the _'awaaqil_, and all previous bonds are cancelled from this date and are no longer effective.

Signatures and stamps of _'awaaqil_ and witnesses.

675 681 The _barawwa_ (literally: "the act of putting outside") is a formal procedure, formal enough to entail having the process notarized as a legal document according to Egyptian civil law. The Bedouins say that the legal document of _barawwa_ is "to show that we have washed our hands of the

675 culprit, and are no longer responsible for his acts." The
681 barawwa is not only the imposition of a most severe sanction
675 by the group, but it is also the withdrawal of all positive
681 sanctions which would apply to an individual as a member of
571 the group. The withdrawal of sanctions means the withdrawal
of the right of reciprocity; consequently, the banished no
longer comes under the rule of succession, and he has no
[421] rights over either persons or things. The banished may claim
no property of the property of the group other than that which
he takes with him, and he may claim no women from the group.
675 The barawwa, naturally enough, is uncommon in al-Qasr. The
681 last occurred in 1957, the declaration of which is reproduced
below.

DECLARATION OF BARAWWA

Law Office of Abd al-Rahman Marsa Matruh	50 milleme tax stamp

On this date the following came: Kuraim Juhami of the 'Aishaibat on behalf of himself and his paternal uncle, and their 'umda, the first party. And there also came Sa'ad Uthman on behalf of himself and his children, the second party. The reason for the coming together of these two parties is in order to ask the barawwa from each other. Since they have all agreed by their own will without any force or ill feeling that the two parties shall not be responsible for each other's actions, it is a valid agreement that can never be rejected. No one from either of the parties is responsible to the other in supporting oaths, in paying for wounds, or in paying blood-revenge (diya), and no one from either party involved in barawwa will take girls from the other. This barawwa became a dividing line between the two parties, and if later there appears a fraternity paper, the barawwa will be cancelled and be to no avail. This paper is signed

675
681 by us and by the below mentioned witnesses to be used when it is necessary. This barawwa was issued in two copies at the hand of each of the two parties to be used in time of necessity.

Approving what is included, the first party, Kuraim Juhami (stamp)	Approving what is included the second party Sa'ad Uthman (stamp)

Witness to this:
Abd al-Rahman, the lawyer
Date: September 24, 1957

STAMP OF MINISTRY OF WAR
BORDER GUARDS
MATRUH SECTOR

Signatures or stamps of eight witnesses.

1 - Copy to Marsa Matruh Police Station
2 - Copy at the hand of the first party
3 - Copy at the hand of the second party

Seen and the original must be kept in the files of the administration of complaints, and a copy must be delivered to each of the two parties.

Signed: Colonel Ahmad Sa'ad
Marsa Matruh Police Station

Date: October 12, 1957

*613
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571 The rawaabit in Bedouin society is essentially a charter at the tertiary level, but it structures relations at the secondary level. At the tertiary level, the charter functions to establish group boundaries and identity, and to
*613 express the conditions for membership. Group solidarity and
571 maintenance at the tertiary level is a necessary condition for structural continuity of the larger secondary corporation: the lineage persists through these groups with replicate
060 functions, structures, and a common ancestor. That the

*613 been justified in this case since the killing was accidental.
682 In another case of killing which occurred between tertiary
units of the same secondary group, we see what happens in the
*613 case of intentional killing. This case of murder in 'Ailit
682 Lazumi is interesting and valuable because it illustrates
571 the dynamics of authority relations within the secondary
segment, and the degree to which authority relations are
manageable without a resulting structural change.

> *613 In 1959, a rearrangement of authority relations took
> 682 place within 'Ailit Lazumi: Bait A and Bait B agreed
> 571 that they would be collectively responsible for each
> 675 other, and Bait C and Bait D made a similar compact.
> The compacts involved the sharing of diiya and kubaara (expiation) payments. Shortly after 1959, Bait A and Bait C quarreled, and the result of the litigation was that the 'awaaqil ordered Bait A to pay a kubaara of 20 L.E. to Bait C. Bait B, as the partner of Bait A, decided to pay 10 L.E. of the kubaara and Bait A paid the other 10 L.E. But Bait D protested this sharing of the kubaara saying that Bait B is a third brother and, as such, should act as a quwaal al-kahair ("a speaker of good"); that no brother should take sides against the others. As a result of this incident, the split between the two groups (A-B and C-D) became deeper. Afterwards, one group would not contribute to the diiya involving members of the other group even if it concerned external conflict with other secondary groups. This division in 'Ailit Lazumi was finally ended in 1960 when a member of Bait A killed a member of Bait B--the killing was within the same contractual alliance. At this time, the whole lineage decided to forget its differences and, all together, paid Bait B its diiya.

*613 Ideally, conflict should not be permitted to threaten
578 the structural continuity of the secondary corporation, but it
• [681] happens. Usually, however, safety mechanisms such as the
barawwa and the right to secede are effective enough to prevent
structural deterioration.

*613 structural deterioration. Secession, the right to break
571 authority relations, and adoption, the right to contract
675 new authority relations, are rights of the authority group.
•681 This can be noted in the "Declaration of *Barawwa*" presented
578 earlier. It was stated in that document that "the reason
[597] for the coming together of these two parties is in order
to ask the *barawwa* from each other." Further, mention was
made of a "fraternity paper" which would cancel the effects
of the *barawwa*. So, secession can be a means of regulating
[597] conflict, and it can become the basis for a re-integrative
move; that is, an adopted party may decide to secede from its
foster lineage and return to its original lineage, or secondary
group.

*613 Secession, as distinct from segmentary fission as a
571 response to ecological demands, represents a structural
[578] change in authority relations short of distrubing the structure
of the secondary group. In a process of secession, i.e.,
breaking with the secondary group, joining a new secondary
group, and returning to the "blood-brother" group, the fundamental condition of "belonging" is the acceptance of collective
responsibility. This is a most important point. The office
*613 of *'aqila*, the Bedouin charters, and the *raison d'etre* of the
571 corporation revolves about the notion of sharing in the blood-
681 money. This can be shown by an extremely interesting document
675 belonging to 'Ailit Abu Qarasa of al-Qasr. Here the process

*613 of secession, and the nature of the collective responsibility
571 principle in Bedouin society are made clear. The occasion of
681 the writing of this document was the issuance of a "fraternity
675 paper."

BONDS BETWEEN MEMBERS OF 'AILIT ABU QARASA

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Thanks to God alone and nothing survives but His kingdom, praise and peace to Him Who will never have a Prophet who is greater than Himself.

It came into our hands on 10 Shawal 1363 (September 9, 1944), the _'awaaqil_ of 'Ailit Abu Qarasa of the 'Aishaibat; and the reason for their coming together is in order to merge 'Ailit Abu Qula with the other _buyuut_ as they were in the past. And this is in accordance with the agreement of all the parties to this paper. By the free will of all it became, as of this day, that all of the mentioned _buyuut_ will be connected with the other _buyuut_ in receiving and giving. But all blood-money of the mentioned _buyuut_ which was due before the date 3 Shawal 1361, that is to say all debts for past offences, they and their former relatives will be responsible for. After this date, which is 3 Shawal 1361, each of the mentioned _buyuut_ will share the good and the bad equally. And the _'awaiyid_ which the mentioned _buyuut_ agreed upon are the following:

1 - First, he who intentionally beats his brother in the _'aiela_ will pay by himself and no one from the _'aiela_ will pay anything with him.

2 - But the offense which takes place within the _'aiela_, the fine for it will be distributed in such a way that the first half of the payment will go to the offended _bait_ and the second half will be distributed among all of the mentioned _buyuut_.

3 - The offense which happens to the _'aiela_ from an outside party, half of the payment goes to the _'aiela_ and the second half to the offended _bait_.

*613 571 •681 4 - The thief from the mentioned buyuut will be responsible for himself alone, and his relatives in blood (i.e. his bait) will be responsible for him.

539 675 5 - The one who is known to lie under oath from the mentioned buyuut, everyone who supports him must be a blood-relative from his bait.

6 - The one who delays paying the share which is requested by the 'aiela, his rich relative will pay.

7 - The one who asks for a barawwa from the 'aiela will pay what is asked for, and at the same time will also pay 20 L.E. barawwa fee for every man who fasts.

8 - The one who supports his relative from some other 'aiela against his paternal cousin will be required to pay 10 L.E. as a fine.

Signatures or stamps of the 'awaaqil of 'Ailit Abu Qarasa, and the 'awaaqil of 'Ailit Ghriba (who are the former relatives of Bait Abu Qula, the reconciled bait).

*613 554 571 [675] Every point of the above rawaabit shows the moral and political significance of the secondary group in the Bedouin community. Membership in a secondary compound authority group entitles one to political status without which the individual could not survive. The Bedouin community shares certain activities, relationships, and goals so that the aims of any individual can be achieved only by participation in social action with others: this the Bedouins have in common with every other human community (Firth 1951:41). Specifically, in considering society in terms of authority roles and authority groups, we are interested in the political community in which the Bedouins participate.

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[671] The boundaries of the Bedouin political community may be defined so as to include all of those authority groups which operate in accordance with the recognized legal code of the Western Desert. This code is referred to as 'awaiyid Awlad 'Ali, i.e. "the customs of the sons of 'Ali." The members of the Awlad 'Ali tribe identify with each other as a group. They recognize their common heritage and speak of "the Awlad 'Ali as one." But more importantly, the Awlad 'Ali represents a political community because they are "prepared to regulate their differences by means of decisions accepted as binding because they are made in accordance with shared political norms and structures" (Easton 1959:229). Recalling the discussion of familial authority and internal and external systems of authority relations, we may think of the Bedouin political community as a composite of authority or jural groups "within which there are a moral obligation and a means ultimately to settle disputes peaceably" (Middleton and Tait 1959:9).

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626 In al-Qasr, political order and the articulation of political relations between secondary corporate groups depend upon something besides structural and ideological uniformities. Although blood-revenge and feuding do not take place at the internal system of authority relations, they are common means of controlling the distribution of authority and power between

[671] secondary units. Though these mechanisms or sanctions are considered "the right of the Arabs," since they do threaten

*613
571 peace and security in the desert they are discouraged by
● 681 means of the moral and legal norms expressed in the _'awaiyid_,
628 or law of the Bedouins.
626
671 Conflict regulation between secondary groups is the
*613 function of the _'awaaqil_ who act as legitimate representatives
571 in terms of the _rawaabit_, and as legitimate judges and decision-
578 makers in terms of the _'awaiyid_. Not all conflict in the
external political system is, in terms of our structural
levels, between secondary authority groups, but seldom is
any group larger than the secondary unit mobilized for political
619 action. In other words, even where we note that conflict is
*613 between two primary units, i.e., the 'Aishaibat and the
571 Kamailat, there is probably, in fact, political action taking
578 place between two secondary groups within the respective pri-
mary groups. However, there always exists the very real pos-
sibility that greater conflict will be generated involving
primary and even tribal units.

128 In the next section of this chapter, I will discuss
Bedouin law and sanctions within the framework of the lineage
structure and the authority levels at which they operate.
The following section will further illustrate the legitimacy
and dynamics of authority and structure in Bedouin society.

181 of his rights;" a man should be courageous enough to fight
641 for what belongs to him and his family. These values, which
578 become political values in a tribal context, coupled with the
571 idea of self-help make for a political order which is ultimately
based upon the law of blood-revenge and feud. At least this
is the case where the external system of authority relations
578 is concerned. But force as the ultimate mechanism for the
571 establishment of political order is better considered an
182 extreme, and only one of the mechanisms used by the Bedouins
in the process of conflict regulation. The attempt is to
establish a balance of rights, concerning honor and property,
and not to go beyond another's boundaries lest he retaliate.
Force, as a coercive institution, can never be the sole basis
of political structure, as Schapera has shown in the case of
the Bergdama and Bushmen (1956:211-221). Thus the Bedouins
• [681] say blood-revenge would be impossible within the secondary
* [613] corporate group; relations this important cannot be based
[682] upon force. In the case of homicide within this group compensation is immediately forthcoming.

571 Also, it has been pointed out that self-help and
672 collective responsibility do not operate indiscriminately.
*613 That is, an individual cannot depend upon the backing of
[578] his group irrespective of his own motivations in a particular
situation which calls for retaliation or threatened the group
with retaliation. Individual responsibility figures in cases

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672 other than those dealing with blood-revenge too. For instance,
*613 in matters concerning personal debts incurred, the group is
571 not responsible for the individual. The Bedouins say that if
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*613 a man has the money he must repay his debts: if he does not
426 have the money, then he must ask a rich relative to pay his
debts for him. He is then in debt to his relative and, out
of respect for him, should not borrow money or go into debt
[558] again. If he does, he will bring dishonor ('ar) to his
• [681] family and they will, ultimately, banish him. There was disagreement
682 among my informants as to whether or not they
*613 should contribute to a diiya which was compensation for an
829 intentional slaying. Some said that they would not question
124 the motives of their kinsman who has killed because "we are
together in the good and the bad, and I must pay for him
just as he must pay for me." But others held the opinion,
which I feel was a prevailing one, that one must take into
account the justifiability of the killing. This seems to
have been the case in the past, for the Bedouins say that
traditionally the bait of the killer had to pay one-half
of the diiya.

*613 All things political somehow relate to the payment
682 of blood-money. We have seen that the essential function
681 of the 'aqila, and even the condition of his taking office,
182
571 refers to the responsibility of collecting the diiya from
the members of his group. The criterion of being a member

*613 of the group, of joining a new group, or of becoming a man,
682 all refer to the notion of sharing in the payment of the diiya.
•681 All obligations and sanctions which carry the force of law in
182 Bedouin society also are directly related to compensation and
571 retaliation. Weber (1954:110) has stated the general case: "The wergilt debt as set by the judge was the most ancient debt and all forms of obligation have derived from it."
[171] Evans-Pritchard (1940:171) has stated the particular case: ". . . Nuer law, in so far as it applies to a study of political relations, must be treated in connexion with the blood-feud." The blood-feud and the diiya are institutions by which authority groups interact and political order is main-
681 tained. Blood-revenge, or the threat that it may take place
578 and spread, is a most serious sanction in the Bedouin political
682 system. Of the twenty-two cases of conflict in al-Qasr about which I have good details, nine of these deal with homicide or attempted homicide, and thirteen involve quarrels over rights to land, water, and women which could have led to violence had not arbitration succeeded. In fact, seven of the nine cases of personal injury began over property rights.

*613 Rules regarding the diiya in Bedouin society apply
682 at all levels of the lineage structure. This seems important to note for it points up an unusual degree of autonomous authority at the tertiary level. Research on segmentary societies has often stressed the fact that compensation is

671
562 They said that if a man
684 insisted on keeping a promiscuous wife, his family would
•681 "write a *barawwa* aginst him." I heard of no sex offenses in
[114] al-Qasr while I was there.

671 The penalty for stealing, according to the *'awaiyid*,
685 is that the thief shall pay compensation, by himself, in the
amount of four times the value of the stolen object. On the
*[613] other hand, if the thief is a poor man, he will pay thrice the
value of the stolen object and the remaining fourth will be
paid by his lineage.

671 The *'awaiyid* recognizes the territorial claims of the
685 lineage. Disputes arising over conflicting claims to land
*613 and wells are handled at Bedouin courts in much the same way
578 as personal injury cases are, with one exception. Usually, a
[554] larger number of elders and *rajal khair* will be consulted in
an advisory capacity by the *'awaaqil* handling the case. The
'awaaqil consider the specific history of a particular piece
of land or well (for instance, each well is known by its own
name), and determine the ownership in accordance with the
testimony of elders and individuals of high social status.
Most of the problems over land and water rights in al-Qasr
have reference to what is still considered lineage-owned
685 territory in the barley-and-pasture sector. In the *'izba*
578 sector, conflict over land ownership rights, since they are
648 rights which are registered with the government, is settled
in the Egyptian court of law. Only one such case came up while

*613 578 182 ultimately, all-out warfare: the role of 'aqila is most critical at this level. Abou-Zeid (1966:259) has suggested an explanation for the delicate balance of political relations which exists between secondary lineage groups. He thinks that

[577]
> . . . in the segmentary society of the Bedouin of the Western Desert . . . honour has played, and still plays, a most vital role in the field of social control, besides providing an effective code of morality . . . A slight offence inflicted against a lineage . . . is taken as an unfavorable humiliation requiring immediate retaliation to wipe out the shame, regain honour, and restore the same relations as formerly between the groups.

682 683 578 *613 Homicide and wounding cases, which usually develop over conflicting claims to land or water rights, are most prone to lead to grand-scale conflict. Thus the 'aqila will always mediate and adjudicate these cases whereas he will not necessarily intervene in those cases involving tertiary groups where appeals to moral solidarity and kinship unity may succeed in restoring relations. It is difficult to muster evidence for this contention since conflict between tertiary groups is more of a private matter than it is public, and, once settled, such conflict is not likely to be discussed, or even admitted.

*613 578 619 ●681 Most of my details on conflict regulation and the judicial process in al-Qasr involve political action between secondary or primary groups, eighteen of the twenty-two cases in fact. Of the nine cases dealing with personal injury (eight

*613 578 619 681 cases of homicide and one case of wounding) one was at the tribal level; three at the primary level; three at the secondary level; and two at the tertiary level. Of the thirteen cases dealing with property rights over land, water, or women, none took place at the tribal level; four were at the primary level; seven at the secondary level; and one at the tertiary level. One case dealing with marriage rights took place within a tertiary segment and concerned the legitimacy of a man to claim his bint 'amm. Twelve of the twenty-two cases occurred within the 'Aishabat tribe. Of the ten cases of conflict involving units from outside the 'Aishaibat, six cases were between primary units, three cases were between secondary units, and one case involved the 'Ali Ahmar with the Harabi of Libya.

In almost every case involving primary units and tribal units, the two opposing authority groups were actually secondary groups who had the backing of their primary groupings. The case in which the 'Ali Ahmar mobilized to deal with a problem in Libya probably represents an atypical case in history. It is unlikely that tribal groups of this size [648] could mobilize in time of war or peace, and in this particular case the good international relations of Egypt and Libya were at stake.

784 695 681 There is another realm of sanctions which can be invoked in cases concerning homicide, wounding, theft, and

•681 695 784 property disputes, and I shall briefly discuss this before I proceed to describe Bedouin legal processes. Besides the threat of blood-revenge and fines of money, the individual, or group, who violates the moral and legal norms of Bedouin society may be faced with sanctions of a sacred nature. 695 In any case where clear evidence is lacking, one litigant may request that that other party swear the oath (yamiin Allah) in support of his claim. *613 695 695 In all three corporate charters presented earlier in this chapter, those of 'Ailit Ma'fas, 'Ailit Lazumi, and 'Ailit Abu Qarasa, support of lineage-mates through the oath was a condition of group membership. [692] Collective responsibility not only applies in the case of secular things, i.e., sharing the blood-money and the exercise of blood-revenge, but also where the possible curse of God is concerned.

695 When one party to conflict requests that the oath be administered as a means of settling a dispute, the other party will always accept because it is assumed that in this way both litigants "will get their rights." 695 602 *613 The party taking the oath must be supported by a number of his relatives ('umraa al-dam) who are willing to risk the consequences, and who are chosen by the other party. If a man is unable to muster the required number of kinsmen to take the oath, and the number is always relative to the seriousness of the offense of which he is accused, then this is taken as a sign of his untruthfulness and he loses his claim.

695 below will show how a "bad oath" can work directly on the
784 false witness.

784 Divine sanctions enter into other aspects of the
626 Bedouin judicial process and function to maintain social
626 control in al-Qasr. If we can speak of a standard, or
681 minimal sanction, in Bedouin law it would be the dhabiiha
and 10 L.E. In any case, however small the offence might
be, the litigant found to be in the wrong will have this
judgment made against him. But in almost every case "the
[788] party who takes his rights" will refuse the dhabiiha and
[272] 10 L.E. and insist instead upon a ritual three cups of tea.
An individual refuses the dhabiiha as an act of brotherhood
and thanksgiving that the quarrel has been settled. The
Bedouins point out the practical factor that very few men
in al-Qasr can afford to part with even one lamb. On the
626 other hand, in more serious cases, such as homicide, which
681 occur in the external sphere of political relations and
682 threaten to disintegrate the political community, the parties
264 involved will actually eat a whole meal together. In this
case, the dhabiiha is accepted, for the act of commensality
is deemed necessary for reconciliation.

626 But whether or not conflict is concluded by a simple
182 ritual or a large feast, the prevailing mood is one of
771 gratitude that the secular bonds of brotherhood and a pre-
ordained sacred order have been maintained. The Bedouin

577 According to this _'aqila_, the "good man" is the "good Muslim"
771 who observes the pillars of Islam (fasting, praying, making
183 the pilgrimage, and alms-giving). Also, the "good man" does
not steal or lie, and this leads, importantly enough, to social
accord.

121 In light of the preceding discussion of authority and
681 law, we can now offer a description of the Bedouin judicial
process in action. Southall (1956:121-151) has drawn the
121 distinction between internal and external delicts on the
681 bases of kinds of sanctions rendered, and whether or not
114 chiefly authority mediates conflict. Such a distinction can
be only partially applied in the case of the Bedouins of the
Western Desert. The kind of sanctions operating in the internal
political system do differ from those applied in the external
political system, though not to the same degree which is true
121 of Southall's Alurland. On the other hand, since Bedouin
681 society, lacking political centralization, cannot be character-
692 ized as a segmentary state with distinct spheres of authority
[642] at successive levels of the lineage structure, the intervention
or non-intervention of chiefly adjudication and decision-
making cannot serve as a basis for differentiating political
* [613] action. Rather, the lone political office of the _'aqila_
[627] involves itself in all arbitration which cannot be successfully
concluded by the mechanism of familial authority. There are
[648] just two exceptions which apply to this latter statement:

121 681 692 648 first, the government may enter into conflict cases which are judged to be out of control and involving the larger tribal units; secondly, litigants, whether exercising internal or external political relations, have the right to take their case to a rajal khair. [626] Both exceptions represent informal processes of social control in al-Qasr: the first case rarely happens, and the second case seems to occur quite frequently but no recordings of the settlement are made.

681 121 Sanctions in the Bedouin legal system conform to what Radcliffe-Brown referred to as secondary sanctions: "These are concerned with the actions of persons or groups in their effects upon other persons or groups" (1952:209). Also, it [671] would seem that Bedouin law is one of private delicts as opposed to a law of public delicts:

[692]

> In the procedure of a law of private delicts a person or a body of persons that has suffered some injury, loss or damage by infringement of recognized rights appeals to a constituted judicial authority, who declares some other person or body of persons within the community to be responsible and rules that the defendant shall give satisfaction to the plaintiff, such satisfaction frequently taking the form of the payment of an indemnity or damages. A private delict is thus an action which is subject to what may be called a restitutive sanction (Radcliffe-Brown 1952:213).

681 675 671 In Bedouin society, delicts are private since they involve individuals or lineage groups, but the restitutive sanctions to which they give rise are backed by communal consensus expressed through public approval in general, and by the twin

● 681
675 charters of Bedouin society, the rawaabit al-'awaaqil and
671 the 'awaiyid Awlad 'Ali. Again, following Radcliffe-Brown
121 (1952:212-219), sanctions expressed in al-Qasr may be considered
681 civil as opposed to criminal sanctions since, even in
682 the case of intentional homicide, the emphasis is upon restitution
182 and the restoration of the "good society" rather than
[671] upon punishment. The Bedouin legal system is one which deals
with private delicts, and which depends upon secondary social
sanctions and ritual sanctions for the arbitration and settlement of disputes.

121 Since neither a dichotamy between private and public
681 delicts nor a differential distribution of authority at the
various levels of the lineage structure obtain in the uncentralized political system of the Bedouins, political action and type of sanction will be described in terms of whether or not they occur in the internal political system of the secondary or domestic group, or in the external system where interaction between secondary, primary, or tribal segments takes place.

The most striking difference between the two systems
of political action rests with the fact that the lex talionis,
retaliation regulated by custom, does not operate within the
121 secondary group. In the two cases of killing between tertiary
681 groups of 'Ailit Ma'fas and 'Ailit Lazumi already given, compensation
682 was immediately paid: the incidents were both
* [613] settled and "forgotten." In conflict situations arising in the

121 external system, however, the law recognizes retaliation, a
•681 life for a life. Still, even in this case, Bedouin values
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[182] expressed through the *'awaiyid* try to avert bloodshed and
[671] feuding by showing "the good path" and providing the means
for settlement through compensation.

681
682 of ideals calculated to regulate conflict, he paradoxically
182 claims the right to impose retaliatory sanctions as a just
[671] conclusion to conflict. One Bedouin said that the greatest
[673] sin which a man or group can commit is to accept the *diiya*
and then take his blood-revenge and return the money. Presumably, a person or group commits no outrage if they refuse
the *diiya* with the understanding that blood-revenge will be
[626] taken. In al-Qasr, retaliation and the *'awaiyid* are mechanisms
[671] of social control and dispute settlement. A political office
*[613] exists, i.e. the *'aqila* which functions over the total range
[692] of political action, and the process of adjudication and
compensation in the form of indemnity payment represents an
institutionalized alternative to retaliation. In all cases
of dispute, ritual or religious sanctions back up social
[776] sanctions. God is a third party to all conflict, and this is
[695] made manifest in the reading of the *Fatiha* or the oath-taking
128 ceremony. In order to describe how authority and sanctions
681 operate in Bedouin society, a number of examples are presented
[124] below. Some of the cases are the statements of informants about
[114]

Just as the Bedouin accepts the *'awaiyid* as a set of

• 128 68 what happened; some of them are my translations of legal docu-
[124] ments which informants permitted me to see; a few of the cases
[114] happened while I was in the field and represent my reporting
of what happened. I have arbitrarily divided the cases into
those involving personal injury and those concerning property
rights. In each case, I indicate at which level of the authority
structure the conflict and settlement has taken place.

Legal Cases Pertaining to Personal Injury

578 Two cases of killing have been discussed previously.
681 Below are a number of cases dealing with personal injury which
occurred in the external political system at the various levels
of segmentation. The first three cases involve conflict
* [613] between secondary lineage segments of the 'Aishaibat tribe;
[619] the next two cases take place at the primary and sub-tribal
[648] levels, but note that secondary segments are the actual function-
ing units involved; the final case, an unusual one, deals with
conflict with "foreigners" at the tribal level. Note that the
* [613] 'aqila as a corporate representative is active in these cases.
[182] The third case presented below is a translation of an actual
[778] document showing how the nazaala (discussed above) functions
as a formal mechanism of conflict regulation.

114 The second, rather complex, case occurred while I was
792
562 in the field. Once again, the role of the "holy man" is shown
to operate in cases dealing with women. Shown here also is an
interesting example of the cultural definition of abnormality.

*613 No Date. Case: Quarrel between 'Ailit al-Abaidi ('Ali Abyad)
578 and 'Ailit al-Afrad ('Ali Abyad) over marriage rights. A man
582 from al-Abaidi agreed that his daughter could marry a man but
792 the rest of the 'aiela did not approve of this marriage. Since
the man could not go to his 'aqila, who disapproved of the
marriage, he took his problem to a "holy man." The "holy man"
decided that the girl should marry the man she wanted to
marry, but he was afraid that this would cause trouble in the
[586] 'aiela. The "holy man" decided to marry the man and woman,
and then to divorce them for a period of one year so that the
conflict would abate. The girl's father knew of this marriage
but the other members of the 'aiela did not. After a period
of one year, the groom went to the "holy man" and said: "Decide
anything that I can do, but I must have the girl." The "holy
• [681] man" decided to make him pay a kubaara (expiation) fee of
[684] 100 L.E. to the girl's 'aiela, and he married them again.

*613 Date: 1965. Case: Quarrel within a tertiary segment of the
619 Qinaishat tribe concerning marriage rights. A girl from the
578 Qinaishat tribe had refused to marry her paternal cousin, but
582 he was insistent upon his right to have her.

554 The rajal khair, then, is a broker in social relation-
571 ships, a manipulator of loyalties. As a member of the "status
627 group," he can afford to spend time and money in courting his
fellow tribesmen, and, as a result, can accrue prestige and
loyalty. This role, like that of the 'aqila, is a secular
[681] one. The sanctions which it controls are as economical as
those of the 'aqila's are political. In this sense, they
are differentiated from the role of rajal saalih whose
sanctions are sacred in nature.

554 The traditional role which we define as that of the
792 rajal saalih, "the holy man," was probably much more important
[178] in the past than it is today. In al-Qasr, there are only two
rajal saalih who share in traditional power: the one is a
resident of al-Qasr proper, and the other, a member of the
prestigious Sanusi family, lives near Marsa Matruh.

The rajal saalih of al-Qasr, i.e. the local "holy
man," is assured of status because he is an ashraf, one who
claims descent from the family of the Prophet. He is also a
[561] member of the elder age-set, and while he is not rich, he
cannot be considered poor. Though the "holy man" al-Sanusi
[793] lives near Matruh, he participates in the authority structure
of al-Qasr and is a member of the "status group." He is
sometimes referred to as rajal saalih kabir, "a great holy
man," by virtue of his Sanusi heritage.

[771] The relative unimportance of this role as compared
to that of the rajal khair in conflict regulation is a function

aspect of the social life that one may call law and other aspects. This does not pose any problem for those who use the concept of law in a very wide and general sense to man "the totality of people's culture" (Hartland 1924:191). But for later writers, who tend to take a more or less restricted view of law, the problem was there. Malinowski states that the rules of law in primitive society stand out from other social norms in that they are felt and regarded as "obligation of one party and the rightful claim of another." This, of course, gives law a very broad definition and does not really help in distinguishing law from non-law. 121 114 671

One of the most commonly used criterion is that of a "sanction" behind the legal norms. But the mere fact that legal norms have sanctions behind them does not help in drawing the line between them and other norms since all norms are backed by sanctions of some kind or another. It is the kind of sanction, then, not just any sanction, that differentiates law from non-law. In other words, there are classes of sanctions that may be called "legal sanctions." For Malinowski, the loss of reciprocal relations in primitive society constituted the sufficient basis for the legal sanctions (1934). Allen (1958) maintained that legal sanctions are "completely compulsory." "No one is under an absolute compulsion to visit the barber or to wear garments " (1958:59), while, on the other hand, members of the society are under an absolute compulsion not to steal or take the life of another person. Like Malinowski's notion of the loss of reciprocal relations, Allen's concept of "absoluteness" as the basis of legal sanctions is not adequate. For even under the modern legal system, were the penalty for stealing or murder specific and clear, the individual is not under an "absolute" compulsion not to steal or kill. He still can, and the mere existence of the penal institution in modern societies is a living proof that many do violate the legal norms if they are willing to take the risk of such violation, the same risk the person takes who violates the norm 121 114 671 681

of modesty and walks naked in the streets. Some may even find it easier to 121
accept the risk of penalty for stealing than the social sanctions for violat- 114 671
ing the norms of modesty. 681

But although the notion of absolute vs. relative compulsion is arbitrary and artificial as a criterion for defining legal rules, yet Allen is close to another related and widespread criterion of legal sanctions, that is, the idea of the "use of force." Hoebel maintains that "the really fundamental *sine qua non* of law in any society - primitive or civilized - is the legitimate use of physical coercion.... The law has teeth, teeth that [illegible] bite if need be..." (1961a:26) Pound defines law as "social control through the systematic application of the forces of a politically organized society" (1910-11:591). This definition has later been adopted by Radcliffe-Brown (1940) who considers the obligations imposed upon the individual but for which there is no sanction backed by the use or the possibility of use of physical force as merely a matter of social conventions or custom but not law.

It is evident, then, that those who used the concept of "coercion" 121
as the basis for their distinction of law needed a further specification 114
of the concept. For, as Hoebel has noticed, "There are as many forms of 671
coercion as there are forms of power...and only certain methods and forms 681
are legal" (1961:26). He states that coercion by gangsters is not legal 625
coercion; neither is the parents' physical coercion if it is extreme in form. The essential element in legal coercion according to Hoebel, is "the general social acceptance of the application of physical power, threat or, in fact, by a privileged party, for a legitimate cause, in a legitimate way, and at a legitimate time." The privilege of applying physical force constitutes, according to Hoebel, the official element in law. The person who is recognized as having the right to exercise force is the symbol of authority. This does not mean that he has to be an official or a holder

of any permanent office; it is any person who is exercising the legitimate 121
use of force. Simple as the above argument might seem, it really 114
offers very little in refining our conception of legal sanctions. For we 671
are still left with the question of how a person acquires the right to 681
exercise the physical force. 625
What gives his action the legitimacy that
is otherwise lacking in other forms of coercion? In trying to deal with 121
this problem anthropologists resorted to a concept that is used by the 114
analytical jurists, that is, the court. There is a basic difference, 671
however, between the anthropologists' view of the court and that of the 692
analytical jurists. The latter see the court as the ultimate source of law:
court creates the law. Anthropologists, on the other hand, tend to use the
court as the source of law but as a criterion of its existence. An example
of such views is Max Radin who maintained that the infallible test "for
recognizing whether an imagined course of conduct is lawful or unlawful...
is to submit the question to the judgment of a court" (1938:1145).

Anthropologists differed among themselves, however, on what constitutes 121
a court. While Radcliffe-Brown (1940) insists that it must be a body of 114
people acting on behalf of the community as a whole and therefore does not 671
exist in all societies, Hoebel (1961), on the other hand, extends the 692
concept to include the diffused public opinion or sentiment of the people in 626
a given society as a kind of court that gives legitimation to the use of 625
force by individuals or groups in the absence of a recognized body acting
on behalf of the community. He sees a court in cases of self-help where
the aggrieved party or his kinsmen carry on the procedures of redress
without the intervention of a third party. He maintained that if the procedures
are right, there will be "at least the compulsion of recognized
'legal' procedure, though the ultimate court may be the 'bar of public
opinion'" (1961:25).

657 692 177 178 modern court system may be viewed as a form of appeal to the tribal justice. One has to be careful, however, in calling such a procedure an appeal, since the tribal proceedings have no relevance in the court proceedings.

69 681 177 The duality is more serious in criminal cases. When an act is defined as illegal by both the tribal and modern law, persons committing it come automatically under the jurisdiction of both laws. As long as such acts remain unknown to the police, the duality of procedures is not undertaken. This is possible in minor cases of assault or theft or adultery. But in major cases, such as homocide or serious assault resulting in the serious injury of a tribal member, it is difficult to keep the news a secret from the authorities. The funeral proceedings in the former cases and the medical attention needed in the latter cases [627] [521] are hard to conceal. Besides, serious cases start a whole series of mediations and go-betweens which always become the general knowledge in the entire area and the subject of conversation among the people. When the authorities know about such cases, they have to take immediate action to bring the offender to trial, even when the government authorities know that the tribal proceedings are being conducted in the case. Some attempts are made by both the tribal law and the modern law to minimize the effect of that duality. It is common that when the district attorney knows that a certain criminal case has been successfully solved according to the tribal proceedings, to ask for the minimum penalty for the offense. On the side of the tribal proceedings, once the case has been solved, the witnesses needed to testify for the prosecutor are instructed by their fellow tribesmen to refrain from giving the information

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required for the indictment of the offender according to the modern legal system. If this is not possible and the offender is sentenced by the government court, only half the tribal settlement is paid, and the rest is postponed pending the release of the offender. If the offender is executed or he dies in prison, then the unpaid part of the settlement is dropped.

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675
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[681]
[885]

Each Aqila is responsible for submitting to the Amar a list of the Sayems in his bait, and this will be the basis for establishing the share of the bait in payment or receipt of the money.

Article 5:

No Aqila can act on any matter involving loss or gain to the Amar without the presence of the other Awaqil of the Amar, unless an urgent matter occurs in which waiting for the rest of the Awaqil might jeopardize the interest of the Amar. In such cases the Awaqil present can act on behalf of the Amar as a whole.

Article 6:

[672]
[673]
The following acts should not involve the Amar as a whole and the offender is considered individually (or with his own Bait) responsible for them:

1. Theft and cheating.
2. Insult or disrespect of a younger member of the Amar to an older person whether from the Amar or not.
3. Entering someone's tent or home without permission.
4. Seduction of women (including rape and adultery).

[681] In all the above cases the individual has to bear the responsibility for his own actions. For to let the Amar pay for him in such circumstances is to encourage him and other such members of the Amar to commit more of such acts and bring disgrace to the Amar. If the offender is unable to pay for his crime, his nearest male kin should pay for him in accordance with the Awlad Ali Daraieb. Such payments are considered as personal debts which the offender has to pay back as soon as he is financially able.

Article 7:

[627] When an older person does injustice to a younger one, the latter should take his complaint to the Aqila of his own bait. The Aqila in turn should take the matter up with the Aqila of the older man or to all the awaqil of the Amar if the matter is serious enough. The awaqil must assess the facts and prevent the older man from doing any more injustice to the younger man and have the former compensate him for any damage he might have caused the younger man by his actions. If the awaqil fail to do this and if their failure resulted in the younger insulting or hurting the older, his acts become no longer an individual responsibility for which he has to pay alone, and the Amar should pay for him.

Article 8:

[627] No members of the Amar should take sides in disputes involving families or individuals outside the Amar unless the awaqil in the Amar investigate the matter and the reasons for the dispute and decide that the Amar as a whole should be on one side of the dispute or the other.

613 Another factor which led to the need to formalize the rules of the
578 Amar was the increase in the kind of disputes for which there is no pro-
672 vision in the customary law of Awlad Ali. Such disputes arise mainly out
671 of situations which are relatively novel to the area. A large number of
681 these situations involve the relationship between the tribal population and the government authorities recently taking a major part in managing the affairs of the area. There were no rules in Awlad Ali law to guide decisions in cases involving financial liability of a member of the Amar in cases such as confiscation of smuggled goods, destruction of government property, or false testimony leading to the conviction of a fellow tribesman by the government authorities. The list of cases such as these is rapidly increasing. Many members of the Amar refuse to share in the payment of liabilities arising out of such cases on the basis that since no provision has been made in the customary law of Awlad Ali, then the Amar as a whole should not take corporate responsibility for such actions. They assert that corporate responsibility of the Amar is the exception rather than the rule and therefore, where there is no specific rule, the responsibility is an individual one. Others insist that it is the corporate responsibility of the Amar in such matters that maintains the Amar as a group and gives incentives to the members to retain their membership in the Amar, and therefore, should be the rule rather than the exception, covering any form of liability unless individual responsibility is specified.

613 This made it essential to specify in some kind of formal statement
672 which liabilities are to be considered collective for which the Amar has
675 to pay as a corporate unit and which are to remain as individual responsibility. This is done either by listing the cases of individual

613 Other tribal segments outside the Aggary amar supported the position of
619 Qudura, and most took his position to prove their notion about his hon-
578 esty and the fact that despite his poverty, he could not be bribed. They
156 were also pleased with Qudura's trick which demonstrated Hakim's dishonest
613 techniques. Within the Aggary amar, the general sentiment was still with
578 Hakim although his confession of cheating Qudura made it difficult to
156 support him openly. They directed their attack against Qudura who in
their view violated the solidarity of the amar and even of his bait and
showed it as divided and noncohesive. They were also fearful that Qudura's
[685] refusal to pay would cause the amar to pay the Geneishat the full compen-
sation for the action of Rabbuh, a sum which, as one said, would put the
amar in debt for generations to come. The strongest impact of the events
affected bait Asabei'itself and left it one step from complete fission
into three distinct groups. Shei'eb, finding the tide turning against
Hakim, found a chance to assert his claim to the position of the Aqila,
stating openly that he would never forfeit his hereditary right. On the
other hand, finding the popularity of Qudura increasing rapidly, he
started attacking him verbally and even threatened to beat him. He in-
[681] sisted that Qudura and his sons should be excluded from the amar and
given the barawa.

613 The word "barawa" is derived from the Arabic verb "bara" which means to
681 cure one's self of an illness. It also means to sever social ties with
[192] undesirable persons. The term is used among Awlad Ali in a much restrited
sense to refer to the process by which a tribal segment detaches itself
from any responsibility for the actions of a particular member. It is

613 mainly a declaration that, that particular person is no longer a member
681 of the tribal segment and that his actions should not in any way reflect
upon the tribal segment. The tribal segment referred to is usually the
amar since it is only politically corporate group amoung Awlad Ali. The
procedure is usually undertaken in cases of habitual offenders whose ac-
tions consistently bringing liability to the amar or disgracing it in
relations with other tribal groups in the area. Due to the seriousness
of the procedure (since it leaves the individual without the protection
of his group), it is restricted. First, to announce the barawa of any
of its members the amar has to get the unanimous agreement of all adult
males of the gorup as represented by their Awaqil of their respective
[675] baits. Lately such decisions have to be put in writing. The barawa
[593] from the amar does not include the man's father, brothers, or sons.
[672] These immediate relatives remain responsible for his actions even if they
desire to detach themselves from such responsibility. This is mainly
maintained not so much for the protection of the repeated offender but
rather for the protection of unsuspecting people who happen to have deal-
ings with him and who would be protected by the corporate responsibility
of the man's immediate kin. In addition to repeated offenders, the
[626] barawa or the threat of it is used to back the awaqil in their exercise
of persuasion to get members of their baits to agree to their decisions,
expecially those affecting the amar, like the collection of bloodmoney
or the taking of the oath.

A man, on his part, may ask to be given a barawa from his amar. In this case, as shown in the amar papers of Aggary, he has to give good reasons for such a demand. The awaqil of the amar meet and discuss such

582 of parley land or a well or to make him a partner in a business or smuggling
557 activities or even as revenge on his uncle by keeping his daughters
582 unmarried. In 1961 the heads of 25 prominant baits of various tribes
557 in the area of Matruh met and decided that the right of ibn 'amm had
178 become a major problem, and that invoking that right when the man had
613 no intention of marrying the girl had resulted in a number of disputes
that became serious over a period of time. They felt that the time was
suitable to revise that right and make it subject to the concept of fair
582 behavior applicable to other rights. They wrote a new rule which specifies
557 that the man has the right to prevent his cousin from marrying an
178 outsider or a more distant relative only if he himself intends to marry
613 675 her either in the present or in the reasonable future. If the circumstances
show that he cannot do so, then he forfeits the right.

[558] To prevent his cousin from marrying another man without a proven
[681] intention on the part of the man to marry her himself in the foreseeable
future, is considered as an unreasonable behavior for which
ibn 'amm could be liable to pay kabara to his uncle as well as to the
prospective groom. It also denies him the right of taking her away from
[683] her marital residence by force. If he does this, he would be liable to
the compensation for assault. The agreement was signed by the awaqil
and is considered binding as far as the baits they represented are concerned.
Other tribal segments in the area refuse to abide by the agreement
and consider it as a pretentious departure from the ways of Awlad Ali
which should not be encouraged. Even within the tribal segments involved
in the agreement, there have been reports of individuals who refused to
[629] abide by the agreement. In certain of these latter cases, the ibn 'amm
selected as his mardi a member of a tribal segment not involved in the
agreement and therefore not morally bound to abide by
its contents.

593 went to see Muftah and his company. Half an hour later the religious
574 man came and took Hemeida aside and talked to him in a very low voice,
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586 then left the tent again. A few minutes more had passed; everyone re-
629 turned to the tent; Muftah was not angry anymore. The religious man
792 read the fatha, or the beginning sura of the Koraan, then said that the
[779] souls were now pure and that Hemeida was considered as a son of Muftah
and that disagreements such as this should not alter the good relations
between the two. He said that the devil had found his way into the souls
of the two people, but now, thanks to God and the good people present,
they both had come back to their senses. Hemeida then rose and went to
where his father-in-law was sitting and shook hands with him. Then he
[581] handed the religious man ten pounds which the latter passed to Muftah
and promised to send him a goat as a gift to his daughter. Muftah left
the tent and went to the tent of the women. When he came back he announced
that a goat had been slaughtered and that everyone was invited to eat.
Everybody then left and Muftah promised to return his daughter to her
husband the following day.

593 While the right of the father to take his daughter away from her
606 husband constitutes a check on the authority of the latter and insures
557 the wife good treatment by her husband and her in-laws, not infrequently
586 that right has been invoked for personal or individual interest on the
part of the woman's father or her closest male kin. Several cases have
[429] been cited in the area where the father or guardian had invoked the right
to force the husband to concede to certain demands of the wife's guardian,
even when the wife objected to those demands or disagreed with her guard-
ian. One of these is the case of Mabroka who is married to a distant

593 586 Taking his daughter away from the marital residence is treated
as an undisputed right of the father. This is true whether he is
justified in his actions or not and whether the girl approves of her
father's decision or not. The general view is that the father, having
raised his daughter, is entitled to her obedience and that taking her
away from her husband, even against her will, is the symbol of authority
over her. It also signifies that the girl has someone to look after her,
to protect her and prevent the husband or any member of his family from
mistreating her. Awlad Ali differentiate, however, between cases in
which the father has exercised his right in an arbitrary and unreasonable
manner and those in which he has reasonable grounds for his actions. A
father is considered justified in taking his daughter away if her husband
or members of his family fail to fulfill their obligations towards
the wife or members of her family. Mistreatment of the woman (the definition
of which will be discussed later), and disrespect to members of her
family, or preventing her from visiting her family or them visiting her
in the customary specified manner are always justifiable grounds. As a
[681] justifiable action, the father is not obliged to return his daughter until
he gets full apologies and any gifts for the woman or himself that he considers
as kabara. If the husband refuses to concede to the demands of the
father, the latter can force him to divorce her without having to return
the bridewealth to the husband. Although the father's right still exists
when no justifiable grounds are present, in this case he is required to
return his daughter to her husband after a short period. If he refuses,
[681] the husband is entitled to ask for a kabara. He also can divorce his
[583] wife and is entitled to get back his mahr and possible all the marriage
expenses. It is this possibility of having to pay back the mahr and

681 this variation is that committing the adultery within the camp of the
558 husband constitutes a greater humiliation, since it affects his honor
684 among his neighbors. Also, adultery inside the tent of the couple carries with it the possibility of rape, while adultery outside the tent at least implies an element of consent on the part of the wife. The
[583] penalty in the case of adultery is the return by the wife's father of the mahr and all other expenses of the marriage ceremony and the gifts the husband had presented during the engagement period. This is a further indication that the father of the wife is still responsible for her behavior even after she is married. It is in this respect that the crime of adultery differs from theft. In the case of theft, the
[685] thief has to return twice the amount stolen and in the case of repeated offenders, four times the amount stolen. This is in addition to a certain amount of money as kabara. Yet, in the latter case the kabara is not specified and is subject to the proof by the victim that the theft constituted an insult to him. This insult is assumed in the case of adultery, which makes the kabara in the case of adultery part of the punishment--an integral part of the punishment. The kabara is not among
[613] the collective responsibility of the amar and is paid only by the person involved, unless he is totally unable to pay or refuses to pay. In such
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593 cases, his closest male kin (his father, son, or brother) pays on his
681 behalf with the understanding that such payment constitutes a debt which
684 should be repaid. The person paying on his behalf in this case can go
558 to his tent and take by force anything of value, such as blankets, utensils, or even sheep and goats, and keep them as pawns until the debt is paid.

586 the man she chooses. She informs him before she enters his house that
562 she is the wife of so and so and the daughter of so and so and that she
574 is throwing herself on him to protect her from her husband with whom
[778] she no longer wishes to live. Like the right of refuge, the man cannot refuse to let her in; and from this moment until her dispute with her husband is resolved, she is considered as his house guest and is entitled to all the hospitality a guest receives. If he refuses to
[627] extend that hospitality or refuses to take her in, she can ask for a mi'ad
[681] and is entitled to kabara from him. There has been no reported incidents in which a man refused that right to a woman. As soon as she settles down in the host's house, the latter takes immediate measures to find the husband and to convince him to let his wife go. In doing this, the man uses all the power of persuasion. The man selected for this purpose
586 is usually a respected man who can put pressure upon the husband. Some-
562 574 times he has to bribe the husband to release the wife, paying from his
554 own money. The man has to have money, not only to be able to support
[556] the wife during her stay in his house and to bribe the husband, but also because in certain instances he has to pay the husband the mahr that the father of the wife had taken in order to free her. The next step after getting the agreement of the husband to divorce his wife is to contact the father of the wife or her guardian and convince him to pay the mahr to the husband. If the father does not agree, or if he is financially unable to do so, the man on whom the woman has thrown herself is supposed to pay from his own money. In cases where the woman left the husband to be married to another man with whom she had had a relationship, the respected man tries to have the future husband pay the present husband the mahr he is supposed to pay the woman after she is divorced from her

CHAPTER VI

HOMICIDE AND BODILY INJURIES

Part 1: Homicide

579 Fighting is quite common among Awlad Ali. Many of these fights
involve a large number of individuals and result in many casualties
579 and sometimes even deaths. Fighting is considered "shar," or evil,
673 for according to Awlad Ali, it threatens the social cohesion which is
182 highly valued in the area. Yet, although undesirable, fighting and
[682] even homicide are not considered a crime against society and sometimes
are viewed as necessary to safeguard individual and collective rights
in the absence of an established authority which could protect these
[177] rights. Although this absence of an authority is remedied now by the
[692] introduction of state administrative justice, this has not yet achieved
enough efficiency and recognition to replace the old tribal system.

619 In ~~the~~ tribal system, there is no concept of individual punishment
681 inflicted upon the suspect. There is no recognized authority to inflict
692 it. The mardi or the 'aqila who performs the function of dispute settle-
[627] ment in the case of homicide has no power to pass or inflict any punish-
ment. His role is restricted to mediation between the two parties involved
682 as was earlier mentioned. Homicide, like all other wrongs among Awlad Ali,
673 are private wrongs affecting the individual or a group of individuals.
[182] The main purpose of the tribal proceedings in the case of homicide is to
restore some form of harmony and order among the group. This harmony is
sometimes restored by killing the murderer or any member of his vengeance
682 group, or amar. Feuds may result from such killing, and a few instances
628 of feuds have, in fact, been recorded in the area (although not in the

105 On the other hand, there is always a feeling of rivalry and hostility
598 between the different tribal segments which goes back to the era of
571 tribal warfare. Thus, the social relations among the tribal population
are characterized by a certain amount of ambivalence which is hidden
behind a facade of formality in the way tribal members treat one another
105 in day-to-day activities. There are certain rules of etiquette describing
571 the way members of the same tribal segment should behave toward one
576 another and toward other tribesmen and outsiders. Failure to abide by
[589] these rules may subject the violator to a symbolic fine of a goat or a
[594] sheep slaughtered for a feast to which everyone is invited. These feasts,
[182] or dinners as they are called, have various functions, the most important
105 of which is the integrative one. In an area where the population is
571 usually dispersed, these dinners offer an opportunity to the tribesmen who
574 happen to be in the area at the time of the feast to attend, where they
182 eat, meet other tribesmen, and exchange information about what is happening
in other parts of the area. It is from such dinners that the tribesmen
get to know about the available pastures, about the prices of sheep
and goats in different markets, and about who is doing what and where.
The occasion also signifies the restoration of the violator of the rules
to the social life of the group and the reinforcement of those rules.
105 This is also true with the tribal meetings, or mi'ad, which are held to
627 announce settlements in more serious cases. It is on this basis that
182 [illegible] the mi'ad should not be considered as a tribal court. It is more of a
[574] social occasion where food and drinks are served and where parties
involved and all those invited by them talk about everything except the
[589] dispute itself. In certain instances, the financial settlement agreed
upon in the informal mediation is exaggerated when announced in the mi'ad

105 so that part of it may be reduced in honor of some prominent members
629 who are attending the meeting. When part of the financial agreement is
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681 reduced in honor of a person, this creates an obligation on the part of
554 that person to reciprocate in a similar situation when one arises. This creates an active interest in the settlement on the part of individuals who otherwise are not involved, and insures the durability of the settlement. The social cohesion is maintained.

105 The need to keep friendly relations with all tribesmen is reflected
571 in the judicial process in its procedural aspect, as well as in judicial
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627 reasoning, that is, the logic according to which facts in certain cases
182 are assessed. With regard to procedures, there is an emphasis on avoiding face-to-face confrontations between the disputing parties until an agreement has been reached by means of the mediators. Only then is it that the parties see and talk to one another. This is especially true in serious cases such as homicide or serious assault where face-to-face confrontation is likely to lead to more hostilities.

105 The emphasis on reconciliation may explain, at least in part, the in-
571 formality of the judicial process. Leaving the process of dispute settle-
627 ment informal gives it a measure of flexibility which permits the treatment
182 of each case as unique without being tied down by rigid formal rules. This does not mean, however, that there are no rules to be followed, or that there is no place for legal precedents. It simply means that the rules are very general and that the legal precedents are used merely as a guide in solving similar cases. The main guide remains, however, the desire to achieve a successful settlement that satisfies all parties. It is only through achieving such successful settlements that the social order is maintained and the tribal cohesion is secured.

would have dropped in on the camp. In another situation, two men entered a shop 613
in a market-place; inside sat two men of a feuding group who, instead of retreating 628
hastily, greeted those who had just entered, and the latter returned the greeting with 682
blows on the head from the butts of their rifles. Markets in Cyrenaica are recognized [443]
to be places of peace. In their actions the two offenders not only injured two others [683]
but also broke a taboo in a public place. The victim's group now had to avenge not
only the injury but the insult that the breach of taboo carried with it, as well. In most feud relationships this is characteristic. It is never a matter of a simple homicide, but of killing a man at the entrance to his tent, between the centre poles of his tent, or taking the life of a minor, or an elder too old to carry arms and so on. Each successive killing ensures that the hostile relationships will be perpetuated.

The third step in this exposition, therefore, is the association of a state of feud with the secondary order of segmentation.

When the relationships between the structurally superior primary tribal sections 619
are examined, the arguments against the necessity for peace are stronger than in the
case of secondary sections. Relationships between them are few and irregular. Only
occasionally do members of these groups meet, and then often accidentally; very
many men of collateral primary sections are complete strangers one to the other.
If a homicide occurs between two primary sections it is unlikely that any attempt to 619
open negotiations will be made. The offender's camp may be raided by a *ghazi* 682
recruited from the victim's kinsmen. There would be no question of these primary [721]
sections going to war. On a raid firearms may be used, but the action is limited to a
strike-and-run affair. If the issue is joined and members of both sides are ranged [726]
against each other they fight with sticks to avoid large-scale slaughter: warfare must
not be allowed within the tribe. Wars belong to intertribal relationships. For one of 175
these wars, apart from hearsay evidence, some records exist. These tell of a war 619
which took place during the period 1860 to 1865, in which there were planned campaigns, 726
the organization of fighters into groups, and provisions for a labour force
in the home territory, large enough to produce sufficient food to maintain an army
in the field. During this war several hundred people were killed.

At this point, it is possible to summarize the stages in this exposition of the 619
Bedouin view in diagrammatic form.
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

indeed welcome unfaithfulness on his wife's part. If a man is very old, and 554
his wife very young, it is likely that she will entertain lovers; if a man leaves 851
camp for a long absence his wife may not remain chaste. In both cases, if 837
the liaisons lead to the birth of a child, particularly a male, the husband
greets the news with unrestrained enthusiasm — "praise be to God," as their
saying goes. Incapacity[7] to produce offspring, if a husband is convinced of
it, may lead him to delegate a kinsman to serve his wife for procreative pur-
poses: he has the legal authority, as husband, to do so, and to require his
wife to submit, for the only alternative, if he is not to die without "issue,"
is to "take" a son from his brother and fulfill the obligations towards this
boy required of a pater, namely, attend to his circumcision, provide him with
teaching in the Koran (a duty neglected by most) and give him the wealth
with which to marry.

Granting the acceptance of paternity, whatever the circumstances of con- 593
ception, a male child, *ipso facto*, acceeds to membership of a corporation, and 554
is subject to the authority of that group in a number of matters. In many [851]
situations it would appear that a son is under the father's political control. [613]
At a moot, the son, if he speaks at all, will do so only to corroborate his
father. Discussions among men in a small camp evoke a similar pattern of
behaviour. Until the father becomes senile or dies, a son cannot publicly
pursue an independent course, but he desists by virtue of his relationships
with his father *qua* pater, not because of his father's political power to
coerce. All men of a corporation, in any event, "speak with one word" at [613]
a moot, and a son, by his assent to the common view, also supports his
father; in so doing he yields to the political authority of his corporation, and
not that of his father.

Membership in the corporation invests a man with other privileges and 593
duties. Protection against external enemies comes within the corporation's 613
jurisdiction, although in a particular situation, the father may well be the
person who dispenses it. Complimentarily, if a man commits an offense
against a person not of his group, whatever private thoughts his father may [681] ●
have about the act, the responsibility lies not on his shoulders but on the
group, and he is compelled to share this responsibility equally with all other
members. For example, if a son commits a homicide the father bears the [682]
same legal responsibility for the act, and is under obligation to contribute the
same share of blood-money as he would be if the act had been perpetrated
by any male of the group other than his son. Even in a narrower field of
relations between father and son the group exercises its authority. Acting
as pater, a man may punish his son, physically or otherwise; he may not
do so to the point of injury, for personal injury comes within the legitimate
sphere of the corporation. A man's "bone" belongs to his group; he is an in-

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[7] Impotency is a special case, because it is dishonourable for a woman to remain
wife to an impotent man. She cannot divorce him, but her father can insist on a [833]
witnessed test of impotency and, if it is proven, the husband is compelled to divorce [586]
her. Barrenness, obviously, is a different matter.

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675 "Jumi'at, Marabtiin (plural of Marabit) of the 'Ali Ahmar." All Marabit tribes of the Western Desert are affiliated as
* [613] clients with Sa'adi tribes. Further, since the tertiary group of the Marabtiin functions in the same way as that of the Sa'adi, it is this group which enters into compacts with Sa'adi tertiary groups. Traditionally, the Marabit group's
• [682] main support activity was to share in the payment of the blood-money with its Sa'adi protector group. In return, the Marabit group was given land in the protector's territory and could depend upon them to contribute to any Marabit blood debt which might come due. Also, it was considered the
[628]
[682] duty of the Sa'adi to revenge the death of a member of his client group since the Marabit "was weak and could not face a
[608] tribe." But there is no attempt to construct fictional kinship links between Sa'adi and Marabit groups.

[672] In al-Qasr today, contractual relations between Sa'adi and Marabit are still based upon collective responsibility in the blood-feud. However, since this traditional means of conflict control is an extremely rare occurrence, the mutual obligations of the parties are expressed in different forms.
[648] In any conflict between the Bedouins and the Egyptian government, the Marabtiin are expected to support their respective
[666] Sa'adi groups. In any modern elections which a Sa'adi might enter, the Marabit is expected to give him his vote. A few examples will make clear the relationship between the Sa'adi

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621 basis of an agreement "to share the good and the bad" by
571 all parties concerned. Once the integration is effected,
675 patrilineal ideology and legal fiction succeed in concealing
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597 the jointure.

The concept which derives from ancient Arabia, and
621 which expresses fully the structural principles of Bedouin
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*613 society is that of *'aqila*. The *'aqila*, in al-Qasr, is the
head of the corporate group, the tertiary unit or *bait*. A
[884] person becomes part of the Bedouin jural body when he reaches
the age of 15, begins to keep the Ramadan fast, and is expected
to pay his share of the blood-money. At this time, a man
621 acquires rights over his corporate lineage-mates and they
571
*613 over him: they claim a share in the indemnity ("blood-
672 money" - *diiya*) of each other, and are under obligation to
•[682] contribute equal shares to any *diiya* which becomes due from
the group as a whole. Further, each corporate member is
morally bound to support his lineage-mates by swearing the
oath (*yamiin*) on the behalf of any who are accused of falsehoods in the course of litigation. All of these rights and obligations are guaranteed by the presence of an *'aqila*.

*613 The tertiary *bait* is the minimal corporate group. It usually includes three to five generations of members. Tertiary units which are descended from a common ancestor combine through contractual relations into the maximal corporate group, the secondary unit or *'aiela*. Beyond the secondary level

*613 of lineage segmentation, ties based upon any of the structural principles may obtain, but they are not ritually legitimated by the principle of blood responsibility. A functional corporate group cannot be defined beyond the secondary level. The Bedouins of al-Qasr make an explicit distinction between a group which is *'asaba* and one which is not. The term *'asaba* derives from the verb, "to bind," and is translated as "paternal relations" or "agnates." The tertiary and secondary segments are considered to be *'asaba*. Only these segments can be represented by an *'aqila*.

[666] *613 196 174 •682 The *'aqila*, the focus of authority in the corporate tertiary group, is an elected head. The concept of *'aqila* is itself an expression which entails mutual support and collective responsibility: the concept of *'aqila* is equivalent to that of corporate group. Wehr (1961) translates the word *'aqila* as "a clan committed by unwritten law of the Bedouins to pay bloodwite for each of its members." In pre-Islamic Arabia, the *'aqila* must have been "the juristic personality" (Weber 1954:157). In early Islamic Arabia, we know the penal codes of the ancient schools of law came to differentiate between the offender (i.e. the individual) and the *'aqila* (i.e. the group) concerning the payment of blood-money. During Umayyad times, the *'aqila* was the group listed on the *diwaan* (account books), and was considered a tribal grouping of some order which was responsible for paying the *diiya*

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*613 196 174 682 (Schacht 1953:207).

So, in pre-Islamic Arabia and later, the _'aqila_ and not the culprit was responsible for payment of the _diya_ or for retaliation. And the _'aqila_, which means every single corporate member, risked its life in the face of retaliation from without. According to Islamic law, only the killer may be retaliated upon. But in pre-Islamic Arabia and in al-Qasr, any member of the killer's corporate group may be revenged upon. The Bedouins say that revenge should be taken upon the best man of the family, for this will cause the most damage. Both the legal schools of Madina (Maliki) and Kufa recognized the principle of self-help, or collective responsibility, for payment or retaliation in cases of homicide and wounding. And, according to Coulson (1964:49), "they both called the group which shoulders the burden the _'aqila_."

*613 The _'aqila_ in al-Qasr, which is an uncentralized system, is a corporate sole and a political office. It functions both in internal domestic (i.e. within the tertiary segment) authority relations, and at the level of external authority relations. The _'aqila_ is a symbol of his corporation and, as such, speaks for its members in matters of social regulation and the enforcement of political decisions growing out of conflict situations. Political order in al-Qasr depends [571] upon the values inculcated and the type of authority exercised within the corporate group (Southall 1956:27). The model of

*613
578 the Bedouins. Conflict regulation treats the expressions of
571 social conflict and not its causes.

554 The *'aqila* regulates conflict between the members of
his tertiary segment, between this group and the other groups
of the secondary unit, and between secondary units of the
tribe. He operates in both the internal and external systems
*613 of authority relations. The *'aqila* may pre-empt the authority
578 of the *shaib* in the sphere of familial authority, though, the
593 Bedouins say, this seldom happens because the son is willing
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[596] to obey his father. Having been reared in the culture, and
as a future father himself, the son supports the respect-
*613 discipline principle of Bedouin society. But in extreme cases,
578 such as the threat of a father to disown his son, the explicit
593 approval of the *'aqila*, and of all the *'awaaqil* of the secondary
428 corporate group, is necessary. This is the procedure in all
554 cases of banishment. In one case (which I document below), a
man disinherited his younger brother with the formal approval
of his *'awaaqil*.

*613 The tertiary group in Bedouin society is by definition
●682 the blood-vengence group. However, in view of the common
578 values and pragmatic interests of its members, the secondary
[181] group fulfills this function. Traditionally, when revenge
[681] killings were carried out according to the *lex talionis*, it
was usually at the hand of some member of the victim's tertiary
group. In the case of protracted conflict, such as extended

*613 feuds or war, secondary groups, and even whole tribes, became
●682 578 involved. If the tertiary group is in the structural sense
*613 a blood-revenge group, the *'aqila* is the corporate sole of the
554 blood-revenge corporation: an important function of the
682 *'aqila's* office derives from this. The *'aqila* is responsible
578 for the collection and distribution of the blood-money. It
is this specific authoritative function of the office which
is the necessary condition for the existence of a corporate
group. If there is no *'aqila* to collect blood-money, then a
kinship segment is not a corporation and it will merge into
another group headed by an *'aqila* in order to realize collective
benefits.

*613 Bait Braik of 'Ailit Ma'fas (see Figure 8) had no
554 *'aqila* while I was in the field. Their *'aqila* had recently
died and his office had not yet been filled. The person who
[666] would succeed to the office was known by all, but still his
election or formal appointment did not take place. In other
*613 words, the office of *'aqila* will remain vacant until conflict
554 and the need to regulate it force an election. The Bedouins
578 were pleased about the vacant *'aqila* office in Bait Braik:
"Thank God that it is vacant. When it is necessary, we will
meet and name an *'aqila*." Any of the *'awaaqil* of the lineage
[682] can mediate conflict, but no *'aqila* is willing to take the
responsibility of collecting the blood-money from another man's
bait.

*613 •682 435 436 178 [571] Each member of the corporate group contributes an equal share to the blood-money due in a compensation case. The blood-price for intentional killing is presently set at 400 L.E. In the olden days, the blood-price was 100 camels. If a man had no camels, he was expected to contribute his share in cash, the value to be assessed at current market prices. Eventually, cash came to replace camels altogether in [231] the exchange of blood-money. This reflects the growing unimportance of the camel in the Western Desert. Today, there [556] is only one man in al-Qasr who may be considered a "camel owner," and he is the richest man in the area. Since at least 1935 the blood-price has been met with cash.

*613 682 554 571 When it has been decided that the right of blood-revenge as a retaliatory measure is to be waived, the _'aqila_ must go to each member of the group for his share of the blood-money. Each _'aqila_ of the secondary group does this, and together their collections make up the 400 L.E. blood price. For instance, if there happens to be 400 men in a secondary lineage group, then the share which each contributes will be 1 L.E. The _'aqila_ must account for his own group's share even if this means making up deficiencies from his own pocket. It is for this reason that the _'aqila_ "should be rich." Though the _'awaagil_ of al-Qasr are generally members of the "status group," this is not always the case. Hussain, the man destined to become the _'aqila_ of Bait Braik, was comparatively poor. He admitted to this fact, and said that for this reason he was reluctant to become an _'aqila_: "The _'aqila_ is responsible for his _bait_.

*613 He must pay the *diiya* with the shares which he collects from
•682 the others. It makes no difference if the *'aqila* must pay
554 with his own money. He is responsible for this matter before
571 the whole tribe."

*613 The collection of the *diiya* is only one aspect of the
554 process of conflict regulation, but it stands out as the funda-
682 mental manifestation of the office of *'aqila*. In the course
[692] of office, an *'aqila* will spend much more time arbitrating
disputes, but it is his responsibility concerning blood-money
which defines his position and his jurisdiction as corporate
682 ones. During the present period in al-Qasr, the practice of
178 blood-revenge has all but disappeared as a mechanism of social
[626] control. Nevertheless, the possibility of its happening is
not too remote. The payment of blood-money is the alternative
[619] to blood-revenge, and blood-revenge is a condition for all-out
[721] tribal warfare--something which the Bedouins look upon with
[829] horror. One informant once likened a primary-level war between
the 'Aishaibat and the Kamailat (should it ever occur) to
*613 "the end of the world." The *'aqila* as a representative of a
682 group can prevent war by preventing reciprocal homicides: by
554 presenting his share of the blood-money he regulates conflict
578 and promotes integration. The blood-money is usually paid
over a period of from one to two years. In this case, the
[571] notion of "debt" represents a contingent, institutionalized
social relationship for the purpose of maintaining political
order.

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554 on paper in triplicate, one copy going to each litigant and
69 a third copy to the chief of police of the Marsa Matruh sector.
[671] In practice, though, a copy usually goes to the litigants, but
[178] not to the chief of police (who had not a single Bedouin court
case in his files).

*613 As is not the case in Islamic law, in Bedouin customary
695 law the decision of the judge may be appealed. The system of
692 appeals may even function at the level of familial authority,
[671] i.e., the son may, in theory, appeal a ruling by his own
father. The Bedouins insist that this is an important right
of every man. In the situation where a man wishes to appeal
a decision of his own _'aqila_, he will generally take his claim
to another _'aqila_ of his secondary group. When an appeal is
to be made, it is done with the permission of the _'aqila_ who
rendered the original decision. The one who appeals his case
does so with the understanding that the decision returned by
the court of appeal will be final and binding. Further, if
[681] the court of appeal concurs with the findings of the original
court, the plaintiff pays a double fine (twice the original
fine), and also pays his own _'aqila_ an expiation fee (_kubaara_).

69 The Egyptians have preferred to leave the Bedouins of
648 al-Qasr to settle their own disputes except in the more serious
[682] criminal matters. Police from Matruh will enter homicide cases
[685] and those conflicts over property rights which threaten to
explode into tribal warfare. But these types of conflict have

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648 been infrequent in al-Qasr. The _'awaaqil_ of al-Qasr and the police of al-Qasr have an agreement that Bedouin problems are the jurisdiction of the desert leaders, and that the police will intervene only when their help is requested. The Bedouins claim that in the 1930's, the Egyptians tried to do away with Bedouin law but soon discovered their own penal code to be inoperative in the desert.
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69 Against "outsiders," the Bedouin is duty bound to protect his kinsmen, and hence justice could not be satisfied. One _'aqila_ said that "only the _'awaiyid Awlad 'Ali_ can maintain order because it stops wars through payment of blood-money."
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*613 If a Bedouin, for some reason or other, takes his case to the police in Matruh, he will be returned to his _'aqila_; he will be told that they can do nothing for him without the permission of his _'aqila_. There are exceptions to this rule which complicate modern Bedouin judicial procedure.
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*613 For instance, in cases which involve government property, such as olive trees and government-operated water systems, a man may legitimately deal with the police. In one case in al-Qasr, a man's goats destroyed a number of his neighbor's olive trees. The police decided that the owner of the goats should pay the value of the trees. In another case, a man who had constructed small earth dikes in such a way that rain water was prevented from flowing onto his neighbor's land was forced against his will to remove the obstruction. His neighbor had taken his complaint to the

554 627 692 1952:165), and the role rajal khair along with the other roles concerned with political action, the 'aqila, shaikh, and 'umda, represent political organization in al-Qasr. Although the role of rajal khair is not institutionalized to the same degree that the others are, we shall see in the next chapter that it is an important one for an understanding of power relations in al-Qasr. All of these roles carry with them some type of right to make binding decisions in matters regarding conflict regulation. That is, an individual should take his *[613] claims to the 'aqila, but may take them to any of the other political specialists. In any of the cases, the litigants concerned become bound by the decision of the third party. *[613] [695] [682] But only at the hand of the 'aqila can a decision be made which will effect a whole group, i.e., only an 'aqila can give judgment against a corporation for the blood-money in a case of homicide (Schacht 1953:328).

691 692 *613 554 627 [124] If, however, blood-money is not an immediate concern, the litigants may utilize any and all of the political roles available in the judicial system. A statement from one of my informants, an 'aqila, is useful here.

> The bait is made up of thirty or fourty men, and there is one most important man (rajal kabiir), the 'aqila. The 'aqila puts an end to problems, he sees who deserves this and who deserves that. Problems must be settled. It happened five or six years ago that I and my paternal cousins quarreled over land at Wadi Raml. I went to the police station and complained to the shaikh of the 'Aishaibat. I asked him to choose a person to judge

627 596 685 *[613] from the owner of the dog. If the man had refused to pay the price of the chicken, as demanded for settlement, then the next step would have been to inform the appropriate _'aqila_ to bring greater force, and perhaps greater sanctions, to bear.

*613 571 •682 Bait 'Umar (Figure 8) is one of the authority groups of al-Qasr, a corporate group represented by a corporate sole. Both the tertiary corporate group and the corporate sole are referred to, according to the ancient tradition of the Bedouins, as an _'aqila_. This group is a blood-revenge group, and is referred to as _'umraa al-dam_ ("donator of blood"), or _waliiy al-dam_ ("executor of a blood feud"). It is the group which [681] decides whether or not retaliation will be taken according to _lex talionis_, or if blood-money as compensation for the loss of one of its members is acceptable. The Bedouins say that no amount of money can replace a human life, that blood-money is only a means to prevent the loss of more men. This group, when it functions as _waliiy al-dam_ ("executor of a blood feud"), has the authority to demand retaliation; to waive it entirely; or to demand, along with blood-money, that the guilty party be punished by his _'aqila_. When this group pays or receives blood-money it does so as a partner in the larger corporate group, the secondary segment. The principle of collective responsibility interplays with the other structural principles of Bedouin society. The convergence represents

*613 571 •682 [182] the conversion of small authority groups into larger ones. Political order depends upon this convergence of principles and the affirmation of the values and institutions which the principles imply. In turn, the resulting political organization helps to maintain the "body of interconnected moral and legal norms" (Fortes and Evans-Pritchard 1940:20).

When blood-money is paid out, all of the tertiary groups contribute an equal share. When blood-money is received, the group of the killed man receives one-half of the diiya and the remainder is divided equally among the members of the secondary group. The distribution of blood-money was explained as follows:

> The one-half of the diiya which goes to the murdered man's bait belongs to his sons. If the man was not married and had no sons, then the money goes to his brothers or those closely related to him (bi-dam), like his uncles or paternal cousins. If the man was married and had only daughters, and they had no brothers, these females can claim the diiya only if they are married to someone in the tribe. (Here the word tribe refers to the secondary lineage group.) If they are married to someone from outside the tribe, the female will take no money because her husband will not contribute to the next diiya in the tribe.

This is the ideal situation. But blood-money distribution is relative to the level at which conflict takes place, i.e., depending upon the nature of the relationship between the authority groups concerned. For instance, it means a great deal if the groups concerned are of the same secondary segment.

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In 1947, party A of Bait 'Umar, 'Ailit Ma'fas accidentally shot party B of Bait Muhammad, 'Ailit Ma'fas. Since both parties were of the same family, _'awaaqil_ from 'Ailit Lazumi, a third party, were called to adjudicate. The _'awaaqil_ decided that a _diiya_ of 400 L.E. should be paid to Bait Muhammad. Of the 400 L.E. _diiya_, Bait 'Umar was to pay 200 L.E. and the rest of the secondary group, with the exception of Bait Muhammad, was to pay 200 L.E. The brother of the killed man said that they would accept the 200 L.E. from Bait 'Umar, but would take only 100 L.E. from the rest of the family. The 300 L.E. _diiya_ then went to the brothers of the killed man who had no sons and whose father was deceased. The _diiya_ was paid in one week's time.

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Although I have tended to use the terms tertiary segment and corporate group interchangeably, the two are not structurally synonymous. Not every tertiary segment is a corporate group or authority group. Just as tertiary corporate groups combine into larger secondary corporate groups so do tertiary groups which lack size and property, i.e., political power, ally themselves together under one _'aqila_ to form corporate authority groups. Subsumed under the secondary segmental heading of 'Ailit Ma'fas (see Figure 8) are eleven structurally separate tertiary segments, but the corporate authority structure of 'Ailit Ma'fas includes only five groups. Thus there are only five politically significant authority groups, or _'awaaqil_, which represent 'Ailit Ma'fas to the outside world. Six of the tertiary segments are numerically small enough that they have found it politically advantageous to consolidate "in sharing the good and the bad." The combination of tertiary segments into authority groups is as follows:

*613 public obligations to temper private interests. This temper-
*613 ing process in Bedouin society is effected through the agree-
571 ment, or bonds, between the 'awaaqil of the secondary group
675 as representatives of the members of the tertiary groups.
The 'aqila and the members of a tertiary group submit to
structural arrangements of organization and procedure at
the secondary level of interest and authority. All this is
symbolized in the duplicate copies of the rawaabit and the
name of the "famous" ancestor.

*613 I do not underestimate the importance of the tertiary
571 segment. I realize that internal order at this level is what
prevents anarchy at the secondary level. And I do not mean
to imply that integration is necessarily any greater at the
tertiary level than at the secondary level--it may or it may
*613 not be the case. Conflict is more difficult to detect at the
571 tertiary level than at the secondary level due to the practical
578 value which the Bedouins place upon stable relations between
brothers and immediate relatives. But conflict does take
place, and the Bedouins do attempt to regulate it at this
level.

*613 The Bedouins say that blood-revenge and the feud
•682 cannot possibly operate at the tertiary level. On the other
hand, homicide does occur "between brothers." We have already
described the case of manslaughter in 'Ailit Ma'fas and the
manner in which it was dealt with: no retaliation would have

*613 been justified in this case since the killing was accidental.
• 682 In another case of killing which occurred between tertiary
units of the same secondary group, we see what happens in the
*613 case of intentional killing. This case of murder in 'Ailit
682 Lazumi is interesting and valuable because it illustrates
571 the dynamics of authority relations within the secondary
segment, and the degree to which authority relations are
manageable without a resulting structural change.

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> In 1959, a rearrangement of authority relations took place within 'Ailit Lazumi: Bait A and Bait B agreed that they would be collectively responsible for each other, and Bait C and Bait D made a similar compact. The compacts involved the sharing of diiya and kubaara (expiation) payments. Shortly after 1959, Bait A and Bait C quarreled, and the result of the litigation was that the 'awaaqil ordered Bait A to pay a kubaara of 20 L.E. to Bait C. Bait B, as the partner of Bait A, decided to pay 10 L.E. of the kubaara and Bait A paid the other 10 L.E. But Bait D protested this sharing of the kubaara saying that Bait B is a third brother and, as such, should act as a quwaal al-kahair ("a speaker of good"); that no brother should take sides against the others. As a result of this incident, the split between the two groups (A-B and C-D) became deeper. Afterwards, one group would not contribute to the diiya involving members of the other group even if it concerned external conflict with other secondary groups. This division in 'Ailit Lazumi was finally ended in 1960 when a member of Bait A killed a member of Bait B--the killing was within the same contractual alliance. At this time, the whole lineage decided to forget its differences and, all together, paid Bait B its diiya.

*613 Ideally, conflict should not be permitted to threaten
578 the structural continuity of the secondary corporation, but it
[681] happens. Usually, however, safety mechanisms such as the
barawwa and the right to secede are effective enough to prevent
structural deterioration.

181 of his rights;" a man should be courageous enough to fight
641 for what belongs to him and his family. These values, which
578 become political values in a tribal context, coupled with the
571 idea of self-help make for a political order which is ultimately
based upon the law of blood-revenge and feud. At least this
is the case where the external system of authority relations
578 is concerned. But force as the ultimate mechanism for the
571 establishment of political order is better considered an
182 extreme, and only one of the mechanisms used by the Bedouins
in the process of conflict regulation. The attempt is to
establish a balance of rights, concerning honor and property,
and not to go beyond another's boundaries lest he retaliate.
Force, as a coercive institution, can never be the sole basis
of political structure, as Schapera has shown in the case of
the Bergdama and Bushmen (1956:211-221). Thus the Bedouins
[681] say blood-revenge would be impossible within the secondary
* [613] corporate group; relations this important cannot be based
• [682] upon force. In the case of homicide within this group compensation is immediately forthcoming.

571 Also, it has been pointed out that self-help and
672 collective responsibility do not operate indiscriminately.
*613 That is, an individual cannot depend upon the backing of
[578] his group irrespective of his own motivations in a particular
situation which calls for retaliation or threatened the group
with retaliation. Individual responsibility figures in cases

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672 other than those dealing with blood-revenge too. For instance,
*613 in matters concerning personal debts incurred, the group is
571 not responsible for the individual. The Bedouins say that if
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*613 a man has the money he must repay his debts: if he does not
426 have the money, then he must ask a rich relative to pay his
debts for him. He is then in debt to his relative and, out
of respect for him, should not borrow money or go into debt
[558] again. If he does, he will bring dishonor (*'ar*) to his
[681] family and they will, ultimately, banish him. There was dis-
•682 agreement among my informants as to whether or not they
*613 should contribute to a *diiya* which was compensation for an
829 intentional slaying. Some said that they would not question
124 the motives of their kinsman who has killed because "we are
together in the good and the bad, and I must pay for him
just as he must pay for me." But others held the opinion,
which I feel was a prevailing one, that one must take into
account the justifiability of the killing. This seems to
have been the case in the past, for the Bedouins say that
traditionally the *bait* of the killer had to pay one-half
of the *diiya*.

*613 All things political somehow relate to the payment
682 of blood-money. We have seen that the essential function
681 of the *'aqila*, and even the condition of his taking office,
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571 refers to the responsibility of collecting the *diiya* from
the members of his group. The criterion of being a member

*613 of the group, of joining a new group, or of becoming a man,
•682 all refer to the notion of sharing in the payment of the diiya.
681 All obligations and sanctions which carry the force of law in
182 Bedouin society also are directly related to compensation and
571 retaliation. Weber (1954:110) has stated the general case:
"The wergilt debt as set by the judge was the most ancient
debt and all forms of obligation have derived from it."
[171] Evans-Pritchard (1940:171) has stated the particular case:
" . . . Nuer law, in so far as it applies to a study of
political relations, must be treated in connexion with the
blood-feud." The blood-feud and the diiya are institutions by
which authority groups interact and political order is maintained.
681 Blood-revenge, or the threat that it may take place
578 and spread, is a most serious sanction in the Bedouin political
682 system. Of the twenty-two cases of conflict in al-Qasr about
which I have good details, nine of these deal with homicide
or attempted homicide, and thirteen involve quarrels over
rights to land, water, and women which could have led to
violence had not arbitration succeeded. In fact, seven of
the nine cases of personal injury began over property rights.

*613 Rules regarding the diiya in Bedouin society apply
682 at all levels of the lineage structure. This seems important
to note for it points up an unusual degree of autonomous
authority at the tertiary level. Research on segmentary
societies has often stressed the fact that compensation is

*613 impossible within the corporate group. Middleton and Tait
682 (1958:19) have generalized on this point, and Wagner (1940:218) has been very explicit: "When a breach of law occurs within a given group (lineage, sub-clan, or clan) and the nature of the offence is such that it affects those interests which are specific to the group and not further divisible, a restoration of the breach by compensation is obviously impossible, as it would necessitate the splitting of the group into two units . . . " The Bedouins avoid division in
[672] such cases by holding the whole secondary group responsible for the diiya, and usually the share of the diiya which would be forthcoming from the killed man's tertiary segment is excluded from the total payment. It seems that either the Bedouins represent an atypical case, or Africanists have failed to make a sharp and analytical difference between the blood-vengeance grouping and the group which actually shares in the paying and receiving of blood money.

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Bedouin law and political order, then, center on the institution of blood-revenge or retaliation. The payment of compensation as a prevention of blood-feud is a central concern of the 'awaiyid Awlad 'Ali. Murray (1935:313-328) presents a Bedouin legal document "signed with the seals of twenty-two sheikhs testifying to the accuracy of the code" which set forth the main tenets of the 'awaiyid of the Western Desert. I checked the contents of this document with

671 I checked the contents of this document with
[124] my own informants who agreed that it was authentic and
represented the *'awaiyid* as it should be practiced. Almost
• [682] the whole of the *'awaiyid* refers to the circumstances surrounding the occurrence of killing and the payment of the
[128] *diiya*. The case studies which I present below reflect the
'awaiyid as it was practiced in 1935.

682 Blood-money is calculated relative to three things:
whether or not a killing was premeditated or accidental; the
sex of the victim; and whether or not the victim was a freeman
or a slave. The full *diiya* is paid in the case of intentional
killing, and three-fourths of this amount is due in the case
[562] of accidental killing. The *diiya* for a woman is one-half
that for a man whether or not the killing is intentional.
[567] There are no slaves in al-Qasr, only their descendents who
are now freemen. In the case where a pregnant woman is killed,
the foetus will be examined and should it prove to be a male
then the full *diiya* will be due.

578 An important mechanism for conflict regulation in
682 the Western Desert is the *nazaala*, i.e., "the act of taking
*613 refuge." If a killing is committed, the killer immediately
778 seeks protection by going to the residence of a neutral third
party. The third party, who may or may not be an *'aqila*, and
his lineage give protection to the whole tertiary segment of
the killer. This may involve the actual relocation of the
killer's *bait* to the residence of the protecting group for

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the period of one year. During the period of sanctuary, it is hoped that two things will happen: that the killed man's group will be placated and agree to compensation rather than retaliation as a means of conflict regulation; and, that over this period of one year the killer's family will pay the diiya.

The practice of nazaala is one means of differentiating between internal and external political relations. Killing between tertiary groups of the same secondary lineage would never be mediated by the nazaala, rather, compensation would immediately be paid and the matter settled--or at least never again mentioned. The Bedouins believe that killings at any level should be forgotten for fear that hostile feelings, or even feuding, will re-emerge. This excerpt from my field notes shows this.

> Hajj Sabr asked if I would take him in the jeep to Ras Abu Laha. As we passed Umm al-Rakham, the territory of 'Ailit Amarik (Marabtiin affiliated with 'Ali Abyad) west of al-Qasr, he told me about a feud which took place there five years ago. The quarrel began, as most do, over the rights to a piece of land: 'Ailit Amarik and a lineage of the Qinaishat tribe both laid claim to a strip of land between their territories. One man from the Qinaishat was killed, and, in revenge, the Qinaishat killed three men and wounded four from 'Ait Amarik. The government intervened to stop the killing. It became settled when the 'awaaqil met at the zawiya of Umm al-Rakham. They ate together and resumed brotherly relations. Since Hajj Sabr was one of the third parties involved in this settlement, I asked him if I might read his copy of the document on this case. He replied: "Shame, shame! If you begin to ask about this case, it may start all over again. There are still bad feelings between the two tribes."

*613 778 182 •682 The *nazaala* as a regulatory mechanism functions only between secondary segments. This indicates that blood-revenge as a negative sanction is operative only in the external system of political relations. Political relations at this level, where the feeling of corporateness is relatively lacking, are in delicate balance. Therefore, once conflict is successfully mediated and the injury redressed, it is best forgotten, for it is unlikely that either party feels their rights have been completely restored.

683 Sanctions against personal injury, besides killing, are dealt out in terms of fines, the fines being figured as proportions of the *diiya*. Every part of the body has a price on it: the Bedouins say, "*Banu Adam kill-i-filuus*" ("The sons of Adam are all money"). A proportion of the *diiya* is due for injury to any of the following parts of the body: the beard, hair on the head and the nape of the neck, and eyelashes; wounds to any part of the body; fractures and dislocations of bones; the tongue and the teeth; the testicles and the breasts; and the loss of mind. Bodily injuries are [463] evaluated by a considered expert, the *nathaara* ("the keen-eyed one"). [305] If the services of a *nathaara* become necessary in al-Qasr, the barber in Marsa Matruh (the same person who performs most of the Bedouins' circumcisions) fills the role. [178] But the Bedouins say, "Now that we are educated we are able to make our own evaluations."

682 683 671 Since Bedouin law, and not Egyptian law, still prevails in al-Qasr, personal injury cases must be expedited according to the 'awaiyid lest the greater sanctions embodied in the principle of self-help follow. Sanctioned fines for death and bodily injury are standardized in al-Qasr and in the [124] [627] whole Western Desert. One informant, a rajal khair ("good man") who sometimes adjudicated quarrels, possessed an authoritative paper which listed the injury and ensuing fine prevailing in al-Qasr when I was in the field. Below are the contents of this paper. The comments in parentheses were made by the man as I translated the paper: they were offered as the rationale behind Bedouin law.

L.E. 400 - for inflicting an injury upon a person which renders him sterile.
400 - for the intentional death of a man with a gun or knife.
400 - for causing the loss of a man's nose, ("Because to cut up a man's nose is to make him ugly.")
400 - for causing the loss of a man's eyes, 200 L.E. for each eye, ("Because without eyes a man can do nothing.")
400 - for causing the loss of a man's ears, 200 L.E. for each ear, ("Because a deaf man cannot work.")
300 - for the death of a man if caused by beating with sticks or stones, ("This is unintentional, for if you really wanted to kill the man you would use a better weapon.")
200 - for the intentional death of a woman with a gun or knife.
150 - for the loss of a hand.
150 - for the loss of a leg.
10 - for the loss of a front tooth, ("Because it is bad for a man's appearange.")
5 - for the loss of a rear tooth.

671 562 Implicit in the 'awaiyid is the assumption that the woman is less responsible for her deeds and something of a weakling. The Bedouins have a proverb which says that "the devil whispers in the ear of the woman." If a woman slays a [682] man, intentionally or accidentally, the diiya is considered 671 as for unintentional killing. Where sex offenses are con- 562 cerned, it makes a difference if the act takes place in the 684 man's (i.e. the husband's) tent or in the desert, and, of course, it makes a difference whether or not it is a case of rape or adultery. If a man finds another man and his wife in his dwelling in the act of adultery, he may kill the man and pay the diiya for unintentional killing. From this diiya, he deducts the amount of the bride-price and 50 L.E. for trespassing. The fine for rape ranges from 10 L.E. to 100 L.E. On the other hand, if intercourse takes place with the woman's consent, the fine is only 5 L.E. or 10 L.E. If a virgin is deflowered, the fine will be 100 L.E., and the man will have to marry her, paying the bride-price asked for by the girl's father and going through the normal procedure for marriage. Where offenses involve unmarried women, all fines are paid to the father. In cases concerning married women, fines go to the husband. According to the [586] Bedouins, it would be a great dishonor to the man's family [558] if the husband were not to divorce his wife after it becomes known that she has been promiscuous. They said that if a man

*613 ultimately, all-out warfare: the role of _'aqila_ is most
578 critical at this level. Abou-Zeid (1966:259) has suggested
182 an explanation for the delicate balance of political relations which exists between secondary lineage groups. He thinks that

> [579] . . . in the segmentary society of the Bedouin of the Western Desert . . . honour has played, and still plays, a most vital role in the field of social control, besides providing an effective code of morality . . . A slight offence inflicted against a lineage . . . is taken as an unfavorable humiliation requiring immediate retaliation to wipe out the shame, regain honour, and restore the same relations as formerly between the groups.

●682 Homicide and wounding cases, which usually develop over con-
683 flicting claims to land or water rights, are most prone to
578 lead to grand-scale conflict. Thus the _'aqila_ will always
*613 mediate and adjudicate these cases whereas he will not necessarily intervene in those cases involving tertiary groups where appeals to moral solidarity and kinship unity may succeed in restoring relations. It is difficult to muster evidence for this contention since conflict between tertiary groups is more of a private matter than it is public, and, once settled, such conflict is not likely to be discussed, or even admitted.

*613 Most of my details on conflict regulation and the
578 judicial process in al-Qasr involve political action between
619 secondary or primary groups, eighteen of the twenty-two cases
681 in fact. Of the nine cases dealing with personal injury (eight

695 below will show how a "bad oath" can work directly on the
784 false witness.

784 Divine sanctions enter into other aspects of the
626 Bedouin judicial process and function to maintain social
626 control in al-Qasr. If we can speak of a standard, or
681 minimal sanction, in Bedouin law it would be the dhabiiha
and 10 L.E. In any case, however small the offence might
be, the litigant found to be in the wrong will have this
judgment made against him. But in almost every case "the
788 party who takes his rights" will refuse the dhabiiha and
292 10 L.E. and insist instead upon a ritual three cups of tea.
An individual refuses the dhabiiha as an act of brotherhood
and thanksgiving that the quarrel has been settled. The
Bedouins point out the practical factor that very few men
in al-Qasr can afford to part with even one lamb. On the
626 other hand, in more serious cases, such as homicide, which
681 occur in the external sphere of political relations and
682 threaten to disintegrate the political community, the parties
264 involved will actually eat a whole meal together. In this
case, the dhabiiha is accepted, for the act of commensality
is deemed necessary for reconciliation.

626 But whether or not conflict is concluded by a simple
182 ritual or a large feast, the prevailing mood is one of
771 gratitude that the secular bonds of brotherhood and a pre-
ordained sacred order have been maintained. The Bedouin

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675 charters of Bedouin society, the rawaabit al-'awaaqil and
671 the 'awaiyid Awlad 'Ali. Again, following Radcliffe-Brown
121 (1952:212-219), sanctions expressed in al-Qasr may be considered
681 civil as opposed to criminal sanctions since, even in
•682 the case of intentional homicide, the emphasis is upon restitution
182 and the restoration of the "good society" rather than
[671] upon punishment. The Bedouin legal system is one which deals
with private delicts, and which depends upon secondary social
sanctions and ritual sanctions for the arbitration and settlement
of disputes.

121 Since neither a dichotomy between private and public
681 delicts nor a differential distribution of authority at the
various levels of the lineage structure obtain in the uncentralized
political system of the Bedouins, political action and
type of sanction will be described in terms of whether or not
they occur in the internal political system of the secondary
or domestic group, or in the external system where interaction
between secondary, primary, or tribal segments takes place.

The most striking difference between the two systems
of political action rests with the fact that the lex talionis,
retaliation regulated by custom, does not operate within the
121 secondary group. In the two cases of killing between tertiary
681 groups of 'Ailit Ma'fas and 'Ailit Lazumi already given, compensation
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* [613] was immediately paid: the incidents were both
settled and "forgotten." In conflict situations arising in the

121 external system, however, the law recognizes retaliation, a
681 life for a life. Still, even in this case, Bedouin values
• 682 expressed through the *'awaiyid* try to avert bloodshed and
[182] [671] feuding by showing "the good path" and providing the means
for settlement through compensation.

681 Just as the Bedouin accepts the *'awaiyid* as a set
682 of ideals calculated to regulate conflict, he paradoxically
182 claims the right to impose retaliatory sanctions as a just
[671] conclusion to conflict. One Bedouin said that the greatest
[673] sin which a man or group can commit is to accept the *diiya*
and then take his blood-revenge and return the money. Presumably, a person or group commits no outrage if they refuse
the *diiya* with the understanding that blood-revenge will be
[626] taken. In al-Qasr, retaliation and the *'awaiyid* are mechanisms
[671] of social control and dispute settlement. A political office
* [613] exists, i.e. the *'aqila* which functions over the total range
[692] of political action, and the process of adjudication and
compensation in the form of indemnity payment represents an
institutionalized alternative to retaliation. In all cases
of dispute, ritual or religious sanctions back up social
[776] sanctions. God is a third party to all conflict, and this is
[695] made manifest in the reading of the *Fatiha* or the oath-taking
128 ceremony. In order to describe how authority and sanctions
68 operate in Bedouin society, a number of examples are presented
[124] below. Some of the cases are the statements of informants about
[114]

578 *613 ●682 Date: 1947. Case: Quarrel between 'Ailit Dawlat and 'Ailit Zagharat of the 'Aishaibat concerning murder. The quarrel began over the ownership of land. Members of the Dawlat assaulted a member of the Zagharat but he did not die. Then members of the Zagharat killed a member of the Dawlat in revenge for the beating. Many 'awaaqil from the
[571] [692] tribe came to judge this case. They told the Dawlat and the Zagharat: "Shame on you, you are of one tribe." The decision of the 'awaaqil was made according to the 'awaiyid Awlad 'Ali. A diiya of 400 L.E. was judged against 'Ailit Zagharat. The diiya was collected from all of the members of the Zagharat, and it was paid over the period of three years. The diiya was divided into two parts: one-half went to the sons of the killed man, and the other half went to the 'aiela.

Date: 1946. Case: Quarrel between 'Ailit Dawlat and 'Ailit Zagharat concerning murder. The conflict began when a member of the Dawlat argued with the Zagharat about a piece of land. One night when the man from the Dawlat and his father were on their way home some members of the Zagharat ambushed and killed the father. They did not bother the son because he was only a
[571] [692] boy. The 'awaaqil settled the case, and the Zagharat paid a 400 L.E. diiya. In 1959, after all those years, the son and
[683] his uncle ambushed the man from the Zagharat who had shot the father; they shot him four times. The man did not die but his leg was paralyzed and he lost the sight in one eye. The

578 *613 •682 683 Dawlat, on the decision of the _'awaagil_, paid a 200 L.E. _diiya_ for the leg and the eye. After this, the two families resumed friendly relations.

[539] In the Name of God the Merciful,
It is the day, 28 Muharram 1382, the same as 1 July 1962. This agreement took place between the following parties: 'Ailit Abu Qarasa and 'Ailit al-Zallat. The reason for this agreement is the quarrel which happened on Wednesday, 24 Muharram, and 27 June. Out of this quarrel resulted the death of the late Juwaida Abd al-Salam. This agreement is made in the presence of the _'awaqil_ of the two parties and with their full approval (also present was Hajj 'Ali, an important _rajal khair_ about whom we will have more to say). The offending group, namely 'Ailit al-Zallat, will go to live with Hajj Sabr Hamad al-Dawlat at Ras Abu Laha area, according to the way of the _nazala_ among the Awlad 'Ali. 'Ailit al-Zallat may walk between Wadi Umm al-Shitan and Wadi al-Hawari on the west side, the sea on the north side, and the borders of the Qinaishat land on the southern side without a _nazil_ (i.e. one from the protecting party). And if they go out from these mentioned borders, they must be accompanied by one from 'Ailit Dawlat. And if they go beyond the mentioned borders, without a _nazil_, no one from the protecting party has a right to stop them. And if any from the other party offends them within the mentioned borders, then 'Ailit Abu Qarasa will be subject to whatever is decided against them in accordance with the _'awaiyid Awlad 'Ali_. This agreement was made and signed in the presence of the _'awaqil_ of the Abu Qarasa, and the period of _nazala_ will be one year beginning the date of today. We hope for the help of God.

Signatures or seals of eleven men.
Signature and approval of Marsa Matruh Police Office
Dated: 1 July 1962

578 *613 682 _Date: 1919_. Case: Quarrel between 'Ailit Zallat ('Aishaibat, 'Ali Ahmar) and 'Ailit Hafiyan (Awlad Kharuf, 'Ali Abyad) concerning murder. The problem began over the ownership of a well. Three men from the Hafiyan were killed, and in revenge the

578 Hafiyan killed three members of the Zallat. This feud lasted
*613 over a period of 25 years. It happened one time that an
•682 *'aqila* of 'Ailit Zallat was walking in the desert and stopped
578 for a visit at a *naja'*, the owners of which he did not know.
574 He soon discovered that "he was in front of the Hafiyan them-
*613 selves." He tried to conceal his own identity, intending to
682 eat the meal which they offered him and then escape in the dark. But the Hafiyan soon discovered that one from the Zallat was their guest. They told him that they would send men of their tribe with him to give him safe conduct through the desert. They also said that they wished to get together and make peace. Then they made peace, and its conditions were made through the *'awaaqil*. No *diiya* was transferred because each had killed an equal number of men. Then members of the two groups lived together for two or three days and made a feast, they slaughtered sheep and the problem was over. This problem came to an end in 1938.

578 The next case, dealing with wounding, is presented in
682 the form of two documents. It is valuable for the way in
*613 which it illustrates the judicial process and ritual sanction.
[619] Note that in the first document the case seems to concern two primary segments, i.e., the 'Aishaibat and the Kamailat, but the second document, the "Day of Oath," clearly indicates that the parties involved are 'Ailit Ma'fas ('Aishaibat) and 'Ailit Mahatha (Kamailat), two secondary groups.

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578 that they had received their rights in this case. And
*613 the two parties are satisfied by this according to the
692 witnesses present.

539 Signatures or seals of four witnesses.
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578 The next case represents the only time in the memory
●682 of informants that all of the _'awaaqil_ of the 'Ali Ahmar met
*613 to intervene in a case of conflict. This case is extremely
692 unusual because it may be the only time in Awlad 'Ali history
571 that political mobilization of this scale has taken place. As
619 noted, political action, in war or peace, usually involves
[177] only secondary segments. In view of this, the case probably
[648] reflects an instance of social change: the Egyptian government,
anxious to maintain good relations with Libya, encouraged and
facilitated the settlement of this dispute by furnishing
transportation and cutting administrative red tape so that
the _'awaaqil_ of the 'Ali Ahmar could handle this case in a
most expeditious way. Here is a case where Bedouin traditional
[182] political structures function adequately in the modern situation.
Note here also that, in certain circumstances, the _diiya_ payment
can be divided symbolically and specifically to place guilt and
to indicate the seriousness of a crime.

619 _Date: 1963_. Case: Quarrel between the tribe of 'Ali Ahmar
682 (Egypt) and the Harabi (Libya) concerning murder. A young
578 boy of 'Ailit X was visiting his sister in Libya. He learned
*613
[685]

619 that one old man kept a large sum of money at home. One day
*613 the boy went to beg a watermelon from the old man, but really
682 he went to learn the layout of the man's house. In the night,
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[685] the boy returned to the man's house and demanded his money.
The man refused saying that he had no money. The boy stabbed
the old man to death. The boy then went to his sister's
house and washed the blood from his hands, and had the girl
clean the blood from his robe. The police came to the sister's
house in search of the boy, but he was hiding in a cave nearby.
The police asked the sister: "Where is your brother, he has
killed your mother?" The girl was horrified and told the
police where they could find her brother.

*613 All of the _'awaaqil_ of the 'Ali Ahmar met at the farm of
619 'Umda Ibrahim. There were forty-one _'awaaqil_ plus 'Umda Ibra-
571 him. They proceeded to Libya by bus, and took forty sheep
682
578 with them as a _kubaara_. In Libya, they met with officials of
the Libyan government and the _'awaaqil_ of the Harabi tribe.
682 The Harabi asked for a _diiya_ of 3000 L.E. The blood-money
578 asked for was extra high for two reasons: a young man had
619 killed an elder; and, the murder was connected with in-
*613 tentional theft. After discussing the crime, the Harabi
[685] reduced the price to 700 L.E. They did this out of respect
for the 'Ali Ahmar who had come so far, and who had paid money
for the sugar and tea. All of the 'Ali Ahmar contributed to

682 578 619 *613 the diiya: the Qinaishat paid 50 L.E., the Kamailat paid 50 L.E., but the 'Aishaibat, the tribe of the killer paid 600 L.E. Of the 600 L.E. paid by the 'Aishaibat it was distributed as follows: 'Ailit Lazumi and "Ailit Ma'fas each paid 100 L.E. because they are rich; 'Ailit Dawlat paid only 30 L.E. because they are poor, and each pays according to their means. The 'aiela of the killer, although they are poor, had to pay 70 L.E., and the bait of the killer had to pay 300 L.E. All paid according to their means, except the killer's bait. This was a special case, it never happened before and will never happen again and this is why the killer's bait had to pay more. The killer's bait was very poor, so what they did not have they had to beg from the richer families of the tribe.

Legal Cases Pertaining to Property Rights

423 *613 In general, property in al-Qasr is owned either by an individual or by a tertiary group; seldom, in these days, is property held by the secondary lineage group. 423 *613 182 [671] If we followed classic segmentary lineage theory, seeing that the tribal political structure and the 'awaiyid are still functionally intact, we might suppose that land and water possession are rights in usufruct and not of ownership. The Bedouins themselves insist that the rights to land and water are rights of ownership. They state that all of the lineage-owned land, with few exceptions, was parcelled out to tertiary groups a

423 each tribe. It was decided that the water which flows through
691 the _wadi_ after the rains should be divided equally between the
578 two tribes, and that no one should be stopped from using the
619 water. Had not the government intervened in this conflict,
648 and had not they collected all of the weapons from the Bedouins, this problem would have resulted in the death of many men and even greater problems.

674 Theft is condemned by the Bedouins: "Everything in
685 the desert is loose. We must punish the thief quickly and
severely." It is a fact that the man who goes to steal and
● [682] accidentally kills in the act will have judged against him
[829] the full _diiya_, i.e., the amount for intentional killing. On
the other hand, the people of al-Qasr insist that "Bedouins do
[671] not steal." But legal norms exist to sanction violations against
cultural ideals. The following case shows how social and ritual sanctions operate to enforce ideals.

619 _Date: 1964_. Case: Quarrel between the tribe of Kamailat and
578 the tribe of 'Aishaibat over the theft of 16 L.E. Muhammad of
685 'Ailit Ma'fas was accused of stealing 16 L.E. which belonged
*613 to Ahmad of 'Ailit Idris, Kamailat. The theft occurred while
the two were residing at a hotel in Marsa Matruh. There were twenty other persons in the hotel that night. The accused said: "I did not take anything."

554 turns in times of need dealing with financial and personal
571 problems. In view of the value stress which the Bedouins
627 place upon generosity, manifest in the redistributive system
182 of the lineage, the wealth of the rajal khair is the wealth
[181] of the community. Wealth divides, not only possessors from
[556] non-possessors, but also, seekers after security from power
seekers. It is as Peters (1965:145) has noted in Cyrenaica:
generosity, not being entirely altruistic, wins repute and
repute is an important aspect of political power.

554 In an interview concerning the justice of blood-
•682 revenge, there was general agreement that if a man kills
627 intentionally, then blood-revenge must be taken by the
*613 murdered man's bait against someone in the murderer's aiela.
829 But one prominent man (a rajal khair) protested that "the
best man in the killer's family must not be harmed." This
statement generated a rather heated debate. One man said:
"The best man should be killed for this is right in the
Bedouin type of justice." (This comment was made by a man
who is the 'aqila of a low-status lineage in al-Qasr.) The
first speaker's reply to the protest was this:

> Nevertheless, it all depends upon the character of the best man . . . if he is evil and on bad terms with your family, then he will be the first one to be killed. But if he is a good man, then you kill the murderer himself . . . You must never kill a rajal khair because he may do good in the future.
> [178] In the old days, the killing started right away, and all problems were big ones: today there is negotiation--people are improving.

*613 at this lineage level must bear collective responsibility in
602 matters of compensation and blood-revenge. This principle,
571 as we have seen, is extended until the whole *'aiela* is in-
•682 cluded in a symbolic expression of corporate group solidarity.
In order for this expression to persist, of course, the
mechanism, or ideology, of blood-revenge must be maintained.
[124] All of my informants, though they disagreed over the details
of revenge, insisted that it was the inviolable right of the
156 Arabs. But Hajj 'Ali took exception to the practice of blood-
159 revenge for a number of reasons. He said:
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> The world changes. Before it was only the *'awaiyid Awlad 'Ali* and the Border Guards which kept order. The government now enters into the matter of killings. Personally, I do not agree with the custom and the way it operates. In the case of killing, for instance, someone who is not worth anything, and has no brains, kills one from another tribe. Then the tribe of the [778] killer asks for the *nazaala*, and a third party becomes involved. The third party agrees to guard the killer's *bait* for twelve months and the business of all those involved must stop. A member of the third party's family must accompany each member of the killer's tribe. But even after the twelve months one must live in fear at his own home, for after the twelve months the tribe of the deceased will try to kill the best man in the killer's tribe. How many good ones do we have in one tribe? I have heard that in Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia the deceased man's family has the right to kill the killer only . . . (I then commented that perhaps blood-revenge functions to discourage killing in the desert.) But there are unbalanced people who actually commit murder just to tease their tribe: they have nothing to fear because no one is interested in killing them in retaliation.

In challenging the Arabs' traditional right to blood-revenge, Hajj 'Ali--besides questioning a structural basis of

156 the group--in effect questions a great deal about the whole
159 traditional authority structure. Blood-revenge functions as
554 a deterrent to social disorder in that it represents an
829 ●682 automatic mechanism for restoring a balance of good relations
[182] in the society. Actually, Hajj 'Ali exaggerated to make a
point when he spoke of the existence of "unbalanced people."
682 A person would indeed be "unbalanced" who did not take into
672 consideration the repercussions of his acts with respect to
*613 the personal danger and the dishonor and shame it would bring
to his *'aiela* and *bait*. Although the *'aiela* members are
willing to share in the blood money for accidental or unpremeditated killings, it is wrong to suppose that the Bedouins
do not attempt to weigh the justifiability and culpability
[671] in matters of killing. The very existence of the *'awaiyid
Awlad 'Ali* argues against this. Obviously, the dichotomy made
between killing in the *'awaiyid*, i.e., intentional and accidental,
and the concomitant gradation in compensation points to some
kind of reasonable consideration in cases of killing.

156 Hajj 'Ali is discontent with yet another aspect of
159 the traditional authority structure. He questions the logic
554 and authority represented in the oath as a sacred sanction.
695 This says something about the degree of secularization which
829 Hajj 'Ali has undergone. Although he does not say so, he
apparently favors a more secular and logical procedure for
determining a man's guilt or innocence.

619 groups were expected to help. For these reasons the Sa'adi tribes com-
619 peted and even fought among themselves for the newcoming Murabiteen
721 groups which continued to migrate into the area, escaping the strong dominance of the Cyrenaica Bedouins..Many of the major tribal wars which occurred in the area before the turn of the century had as their major cause the competition over the Murabiteen.

619 As a vassal group the Murabiteen tribes are kept in an inferior
778 position. This inferiority has certain manifestation, the most obvious
184 of which is the deprivation of the Murabiteen of the right of "nazala"
● 682 or refuge. When a person is killed the killer and his kin unit seek re-
778 fuge at a neutral tribal segment, and for a period of twelve months they
613 are safe from the revenge of the victim's kin group. The victim's family
[671] cannot follow them to the refuge place, for to do this is to violate one of the basic principles of Awlad Ali law. The philosophy behind the rule of "nazala" is to give time for "the blood to cool off" as one of the informants described it. It also gives the host group a chance to start immediate negotiations with the victim's group to settle permanently the dispute. As soon as the murderer's group takes refuge, which is done either by moving along with their tents and flocks and settling in the locality of the host group or symbolically by having the head of the host group send one of his sons or male relatives to pitch his tent in the locality of the murderer's group, the head of the host group contacts the victim's group, informs them that he has been chosed by the murderer's group in accordance with the right of nazala, and asks for their permission to grant his protection to the murderer's group. To ask for the permission of the victim's group is a matter of formality since, by custom, they cannot refuse to grant this permission except on one single ground:

682 778 613 if the host group is genealogically close enough to the murderer's group as to be themselves part of the vengeance group. As soon as the permission is granted the head of the host group starts negotiations on behalf of the murderer. Since the basic reason for the nazala is to avoid the direct confrontation between the two opposing groups, the first task of the negotiations is to define which places and markets each group can go to during the year of the nazala. Once this has been agreed upon, the difficult task of settling the dispute begins. The success or failure of the negotiations depends on the skill of the negotiator and the weight his tribal segment has in the area. This makes it of extreme importance for the murderer to select the tribal segment which can affect such a settlement. In cases where the host group is not particularly powerful, the victim's group pretends to agree to a settlement in order to have the murderer and his group leave the locality of the host group and then takes revenge by killing the murderer. This cannot happen when the host group is powerful, since such an action would automatically make the host group enemies of the victim's group.

619 184 778 682 With very few exceptions which will be dealt with later, the right to offer refuge is limited to the Sa'adi tribes. No Murabiteen tribe can grant refuge to a murderer, although they themselve can seek refuge at a Sa'adi tribal segment if one of them is involved in murder.

619 184 [682] [582] Another less conspicuous manifestation of the inferior position of the Murabiteen relative to the Sa'adi is the fact that the bloodmoney for the Murabit is two-thirds that for the Sa'adi man. Also, until very recently, marriage of a Sa'adi to a member of the Murabiteen tribes was considered by the Sa'adi as a very poor choice and was discouraged.

619
184 In recent years this has changed, however. The increased importance
178 of wealth in the recently introduced money economy relaxed the endogamous
582 tendency that was characteristic of the Sa'adi tribes.

619 In discussing the position of the Murabiteen tribes it is worth
184 noting that not all the Murabiteen tribes in the area occupy the same
position. Some enjoy relatively higher positions than the others. Actually,
there are two kinds of Murabiteen in the area: [illegible]illen (independent
Murabiteen); and the dependent Murabiteen. The latter are
further subdivided into Murabiteen bil-baraka (with the blessing); and
Murabiteen bil-sadaqa (with the tribute). The only independent Murabiteen
in the area is the Gemei'at tribe. These are the original settlers
[173] of the area. Because of their help to Awlad Ali against the Hanadi, the
latter were defeated and Awlad Ali were able to occupy the Western Desert.
For their part the Gemei'at tribe was granted its independence by Awlad
Ali and were given one-third of the total area as their homeland (watan).
619 In theory, the Gemei'at tribe occupies the same position and has the same
184 rights as the Sa'adi tribes, including the right to offer their protection
778 which is denied to all other client groups. In practice, however,
682 this seems to be of no practical value. None of my informants could remember
a single case in which a murderer has taken refuge at a segment
619 of the Gemei'at tribe. The importance of the nazala is not merely to be
778 safe from the pursuit of the victim's group but rather to provide the
184 mediators who undertake the crucial task of negotiation on behalf of the
682
629 murderer and his gorup. It is the ability to settle the dispute on a
628 permanent basis that offers the actual long-lasting protection, even
after the time of the nazala expires. To be successful in his pursuit,

619 the negotiator has to have behind him the full weight of his tribal se-
778
184 gment. Since the origin of the Gemei'at tribe as a Murabiteen tribe is
682 well known, any negotiator has to rely almost entirely upon his own skill
627
628 to affect any settlement; even if he is able to affect such a settlement,
there is no guarantee that it will be permanent.

619 The Murabiteen bil-baraka and Murabiteen bil-sadaqa occupy the same
792 position as vassal groups. The only difference between the two is that
the first, the religious men, are much more respected than the latter.
They are feared by the other tribes because of the belief that they have
direct contact with the religious and spiritual world and can harm those
who dare to offend them in one way or another. Because of this factor
[627] and of their neutral position with regard to the rest of the tribes, they
[628] play an important role in mediation and dispute settlement.

619 The origin of inferiority of the Murabiteen tribes in general is
184 hard to account for. Kenneth (1925) believes that hundreds of years ago
174 the Murabiteen were essentially the holymen. They learned to read and
792 write the Qoraan and grouped themselves around the "zawias' which were
the centers of learning and religion. While indulging in their religious
practices their flocks ere grazed miles away in the open desert under the
charge of the Sa'adi shepherds, who originally were the poor paid workers
of the Murabiteen. These shepherds, living out in the open, were busy
fighting away the raiders attempting to steal their flocks. As time
passed the Sa'adi shepherds became not only tough fighters but also wealthy.
This latter end was achieved partly as a result of successful raids on
neighboring tribes. Later when the Sa'adi planned a large raid, they entrusted their flocks to the Murabiteen, who by that time had become dependent upon the Sa'adi for their protection from the raids of other tribes.

619 The picture was reversed then with the poor Sa'adi shepherds becoming
184 the masters, acquiring great wealth and prestige because of their fight-
174 ing ability, and the holymen becoming the shepherds and clients of the
792 Sa'adi fighters. Inthe old inter-tribal wars, the Murabiteen stood a
[651] very limited chance so the Sa'adi tribes adopted them and in return for
a yearly tribure guaranteed theprotection of the Murabiteen from external aggression.

As time passed, the main difference between the Sa'adi and Murabiteen tended to diminish. One or two outstanding Murabiteen tribes fought their own battles without seeking the protection of the Sa'adi and remained independent, while a few others rose up and fought on with the protector against a common foe (the case of the Gemei'at tribe is an example) and in return were emancipated from the stigma of serfdom and accepted by the Sa'adi as almost equals. Other Murabiteen tribes remained attached to their Sa'adi protector as client groups.

Ibn Khaldoun also saw the inferiority of the Murabiteen tribes as stemming from a mode of tribal relations adapted to inter-tribal warfare (1845).

613 The Eila

The Eila represents the next level of tribal segmentation among the Awlad Ali. The Eila is the most important political unit. Although the Eila lacks any formally recognized leadership, its importance stems from the fact that it constitutes the vengeance group or Ámar El-Dam (unity of
613 the blood). This means that it bears a corporate responsibility for the
672 actions of its members. Anyone of its members can be killed in vengence
•682 for a homocide committed by any other, and the duty of revenge for any

613 672 682 member falls on all members alike, regardless of the exact genealogical relationship to the victim. When bloodmoney is to be paid, its members pay it as a group, divided among all male adults; and although when they receive it, a bigger portion goes to the nearest agnates of the victim, the remainder is distributed equally among all its members.

613 The genealogical depth of the Eila is usually five generations. This is not always true, however, In certain instances the number of generations intervening between the founder of the Eila and its living members is nine or even ten. Naturally, the more generations the larger the size of the Eila. Sometimes the Eila becomes so numerous that it is [217] hard to keep records of all members who are supposed to share in the payment of the bloodmoney in a specific case. When the size of the Eila reaches this point, one of two things may happen. The first is an attempt to make lists of the members. Many of the Eilas have such lists. This 613 675 is usually accompanied by a tendency toward writing down the specific rules and regulations of the vengeance group. These lists are referred to as Amar papers. They constitute a formal statement of an otherwise informally recognized responsibility of the group for certain actions of its members. The other is a tendency toward the fission of one or more of its constiuent units which, after separation, establishes itself as an independent Amar. The factors underlying this process of fission are discussed in the next chapter.

[539] The following is an example of an Amar paper, that of the Eilat Aggary, which was put into effect in 1954.

233 through a hard year and to help him replace the herd he has lost. In
731 many cases a dry year is followed by another and many of these employed
464 find themselves depending more and more on their income from the jobs.
434
182 The security of the employment is often compared favorably with the un-
certainty of nomadic existence, and many decide to abandon the pastoral
life on a more or less permanent basis. But even when one makes such a
decision, he usually retains a strong affiliation with his original way
613 of life. He retains an active interest in the affairs of his Amar, es-
182 pecially those from which he can benefit in one way or another. One im-
● 682 portant gain he might get is through sharing in the receipt of bloodmoney
for the killing of any member of the Amar, and having the Amar paid in
his behalf. But while asserting their membership in the Amar at the time
of such distribution, very few, if any, would show themselves when the
membership of the Amar is called upon for the collection of bloodmoney
which the Amar has to pay for a murder committed by one of its members.
613 It is known in the area that members of one bait of the Aggary Amar (Bait
682 Ahmad) have never paid their share of the bloodmoney of the last twenty
578 years, but always claim their share in the distribution of bloodmoney.
Many members of that Bait claim that the Bait has long been separated from
the Aggary Amar, although this claim is denied by the rest of the Amar as
well as by those members of Bait Ahmad who claim their share in the re-
ceipt of bloodmoney.

613 Disputes such as these, which are not limited to the Aggarty, led
675 many Amars to attempt to make comprehensive lists of all members of the
578 Amar and to require a written agreement in case of separation of a given
Bait from the Amar.

613 responsibility, leaving any other situation a collective responsibility,
672 or by specifying the cases of collective responsibility, implying that
675 all other responsibilities are as a rule individual ones. The Amar paper of the Aggary, for example, chose to list offenses for which the Amar is not responsible, leaving the rest of the liabilities to be covered by the Amar as a whole. This is not always the case. In some papers offenses for which the Amar is responsible are the ones listed leaving the general rule as the non-responsibility of the Amar.

613 It is in this respect that the Amar papers are considered an im-
671 portant source of legislation. Although the new rules incorporated in
675 an Amar paper start with the limited applicability to members of the Amar, yet, as time passes and as these rules affect the relationship of the Amar members to outsiders, one rule may acquire a wide practice and
613 become part of the customary law itself. An example of the point in
671 question is the rule regulating the payment of the bloodmoney in cases
675 where the murderer is tried by the state courts for the same crime. In
682 cases of arrest of the murderer by the government, only half the bloodmoney is paid and the other half is withheld until the trial is over. If the killer is acquitted by the court, then the other half becomes immediately due for payment. If, on the other hand, as mentioned before, the killer is convicted, half the bloodmoney is postponed until the person completes his sentence and is released unharmed and with his full senses. If he dies in prison or sustains an accident which affects his physical or mental capacities, the rest of the bloodmoney is automatically dropped. This rule was first included in a number of Amar papers, especially those of the Eilat of Awlad Kharouf tribe. In less than twenty years since it

613 671 first appeared, the rule has become a practice so common that other Amars
675 find it unnecessary to specify it in their own papers.

• 682 Another new rule which is in the process of acquiring a great amount
613 of consensus among the tribal population of Awlad Ali is that of the re-
672 675 sponsibility of the Amar for the payment of the lawyer's fees for members
[693] of the Amar who are tried by the government (Article 13 of the Aggary
[695] papers). Another less agreed upon rule is that of the responsibility of
613 the Amar for the financial losses caused by the confiscation of smuggled
672 675 goods or the payment of money for the destruction of government property
439 by a member of the Amar. Where smuggling is an important source of in-
[434] come for the group, Amar papers usually include rules making it a corporate responsibility; other Amar papers, especially those of tribal segments not deeply involved in smuggling, make it an individual responsibility, while still others leave it intentionally with no specific rule, as in the case of the Aggary Amar paper.

613 The Aggary document is a relatively elaborate one. Not all Amar
[675] papers, or at least the ones I had a chance to examine, are as detailed.
[131] Eilat Aggary is the largest Amar in the area of Dera'el Bahari, which extends from Alexandria 60 miles westward to the town of Alamein. The
613 distinctive characteristics of the Aggary Eila is that it is composed
563 mainly of peasant groups who joined the Aggary by means of tribal adop-
619 tion. Of the 16 Baits constituting the Aggary Amar, only three are believed to be Awlad Ali proper. The attractiveness of the Aggary for the peasant groups seeking to be adopted by the tribal population of the area may be partly explained in terms of the location of Eilat Aggary in an area relatively close to the Delta from where these groups usually migrate.

His Bait is the wealthiest in the
613 554 Aggary and he himself has recently acquired a great amount of wealth,
627 mostly from smuggling goods across the Libyan borders. Because of his
[556] position as a Government Sheihk, he is believed to have influencial con-
nections in the government. He is the only member of the Aggary Amar
who has a car. He considers himself to be the spokesman of the Aggary
Family, and he is known to be able to persuade the reluctant awaqil to
conform to decisions made by the rest of the awaqil. In a number of in-
[682] stances he was able to collect bloodmoney from members of the Amar who
had previously refused to pay. Some people in the area believe that had
it not been for the persuasive abilities of Sheihk Selouma, the Aggary
Amar could never have persisted, and it would have long ago been divided
into smaller units due to the lack of agreement among its members. The
613 lack of formalized leadership of the Amar or the Eila makes consensus of
extreme importance for the Amar. The emphasis on the unity of the Amar
[675] is stated in Article 2 and is implied in a number of other articles in
[578] the Amar paper of Aggary. Disagreement among the awaqil is very rare al-
613 though not unknown in the area. The relative consensus among the awaqil
682 stems from the fact that the Amar as a group has a fairly limited function.
[182] Until very recently the only practical function of the Amar was the collec-
tion of money to pay for a murder committed by one of its members. Since
establishing the innocence or guilt of the accused is not the duty of the
Amar, once his guilt has been established, there is no question about
613 the payment. Disagreements are likely to occur in the case of new circum-
682 stances where money has to be paid, since payment in such cases are not
578 yet institutionalized, even when specified in a given Amar paper. This
000 has not yet become a major problem. If any disagreement between the

613 If any disagreement between the
578 responsibility of the majority of the awaqil to persuade the minority to
571 conform to the majority's decision. This is usually done by simple per-
613 sonal persuasion. In certain instances, however, when a particular aqila
554 is known for being troublesome to the Amar, refusing to abide by the ma-
571
578 jority decisions, an attempt may be made by the others to build up popular support around another person in the Bait which the aqila represents. If this strategy is successful, it might lead to replacing the aqila by another who is more abiding to the Amar's decisions. This approach is more likely to succeed if the aqila is not a popular person in his own Bait, for if he is popular, any attempt by the other Baits to disqualify the aqila would be viewed by the members of his Bait as interference in their own affairs and might lead them to rally even more strongly around their leader.

613 The other tendency occurring when the size of the Eilat increases
is toward the separation of one or more of its constiuent Baits. Origi-
613 nally this was done by merely refusing to share in the payment of blood-
682 money. If this refusal continued, it was considered as a sign of
[178] separation of the Bait. In recent years this created problems with an
increasing number of individuals claiming separation from the Amar to
avoid the payment of the bloodmoney, while claiming membership when dis-
613 tribution is done. This led many tribal segments to require that the
675 "barawa" or separation of individuals or tribal units from any particular
Amar should be put in writing, after getting the approval of the Amar to
which he belonged. When the approval is given and the separation in put
in writing, it is announced to all other tribal segments. If this is
[672] done, members of the separated tribal segment are not held responsible

613 individuals. He settles disputes among them and represents them in their
[627] disputes with outsiders. He is also the spokesman of his Bait in all
matters involving the relationship of the Bait with the other tribal seg-
[682] ments. He is responsible for the collection of the bloodmoney from mem-
bers of his Bait and has the authority to confiscate property of individual
members who refuse to pay their share. When a member is financially unable
to pay his share, the Aqila is expected to pay for him and collect at a
later time when the member is in a position to make such payment.

613 Originally the position of the Aqila was a hereditary one with the
428 position passing from father to son. However, in recent years the rigid-
178 ity of the patrilineal descent as the basis of succession to the position
of the Aqila has been modified radically and other principles of selec-
613 tion have been introduced. The working of the principles underlying the
128 selection of the Aqila will be analyzed in detail in the following chapter
through the close examination of one of the major legal cases which oc-
curred during my stay in the area.

613 Thus each Bait is a division of one of the Eilas and this has its
[423] place in the formal tribal system. It constitutes a group with definite
usufruct rights to land and a formally recognized leadership.

621 But the actual residential units in which Awlad Ali live are not
[613] baits but parts of them in the form of separate camps or "nagei". The
camps constitute the primary communities of Awlad Ali. A camp consists
[594] of a number of tents ranging from four to twelve. Each tent is usually
occupied by one nuclear family of a husband, his wife and children. In
[595] cases of polygynous marriages, each wife usually occupies one tent with
[361] her children. Each camp is separated from the next one by a distance
which ranges from two to ten kilometers.

PHASE I

613 578 682 [464] In September of 1956, Mansur from bait Eweidha of the Aggary Eila, who works as a driver in one of the government projects in the area, went to Alexandria with a friend, a member of the Gemei'at tribe. In one of the bars there, Mansur got drunk and entered into an argument with his friend. The argument turned into a fight during which he hit his friend with a broken bottle. Two days later, the friend died. A settlement was made between Mansur and the victim's family and bloodmoney was established at L. 300.

613 682 683 Two weeks after the above incident, the same person, Mansur, was driving the government car on his regualr duty when he ran over two members of the Sanagrah tribe who were sitting on the side of the road, killing one and breaking the leg of the other. Another settlement was made with the families of the victims. The bloodmoney for the dead man was established at L. 300 and another L. 50 was set as the compensation for the broken leg of the other man.

The total sum of compensations in the two incidents was divided among the sixteen baits constituting the Aggary Amar. The share of each bait was decided in proportion to the number of adult males (sayems) in each. The share of bait Asabei' alone was established at about L. 100.

613 682 683 672 558 As the Aqila of Bait Asabei', Shei'eb was responsible for collecting the money from members of his bait. But for the following six months he was unable to collect from any member of his bait, including Sheikh Hakim, Shei'eb's cousin and the wealthiest person in bait Asabei' and the Aggary Amar as a whole. Most of them gave the execuse that it was a bad year and they had lost most of their herds. When the money was not collected,

613 the victims' families sent their representatives to demand that the money
682 be paid. To face the situation, a meeting of all the Awaqil of Eilat
683 Aggary was called and Sheikh Selouma, the Aqila of bait Eweidha, took the
672 responsibility of notifying the other Awaqil. The meeting was held in
558 [115] the tent of Hemeida (my driver and informant) from the Sanagrah tribe. Each bait was represented by its Aqila with the exception of bait Asabei', from which both Shei'eb and Hakim were present. Since bait Asabei' was the only bait which did not submit to its share of the bloodmoney, the discussion centered around the inability of Shei'eb to collect it. In a gesture which he meant to appear as helping out Shei'eb, Hakim offered to pay not only his share but that of all members of bait Asabei', and followed his offer by handing the money to Sheikh Selouma. After this act which was a complete surprise to Shei'eb, Sheikh Slouma, the Aqila of bait Eweidha, suggested that Hakim should be considered as the Aqila of bait Asabei' instead of Shei'eb, who had demonstrated his inability to collect from members of his own bait. He emphasized the fact that he had nothing against Shei'eb who had legitimately acquired his position as Aqila by means of succession. But he insisted that the survival of the Amar depended upon the fulfullment of its financial obligations to outsiders and that Hakim was wealthy and could pay. Shei'eb did not comment and the rest of the Awaqil nodded indicating their agreement with Sheikh Selouma.

[124] The above is the summary of events that happened before I came to the area, and which were told to me by informants including the parties involved. Since most of these events occurred more than ten years ago,

613 682 it was impossible to verify the actual facts or to know what exactly
683 happened. But since the parties involved are still alive and since these
672 events are closely related to present-day happenings, the case is still
558 alive in the minds of the parties involved as well as those of outsiders-
(124) Naturlaly, each party tries to present the facts in such a way as to
613 682 support his own claims. Shei'eb, for example, insists that Hakim had
683 bribed members of bait Asabei' to refuse to pay their share in order to
156 embarrass him and make him appear as unable to perform his duties as
558 Aqila. "Hakim always had his eyes on becoming the Aqila of bait Asabei'," said Shei'eb, "but he had no business becoming the Aqila, so he had to make me look bad to the other Awaqil.... He likes to be looked up to as a big man, but it wouldn't work." While other members of bait Asabei' deny that Hakim had bribed them, they agree with Shei'eb that Hakim is a
156 dishonest man. In fact, Hakim's reputation is so widespread in the area
551 that it has earned him the nickname of "the thief". The nickname was
788 given to him a few years ago when he went to Mecca for a pilgrimage with
685 another fellow tribesman. The latter told the story that while in Mecca Hakim had found a purse with two hundred pounds in it. He was supposed to return the purse to the authorities or it would be considered as stealing if he kept it. Stealing in Mecca is not only a crime but also a great sin which makes the holy trip void for the offender. Hakim told his companion that he had given the purse to the authorities. But later, on their way back from Mecca, the friend found the purse hidden in Hakim's luggage. When the story was known in the area, he was referred to as
156 "the thief". Other accounts of Hakim's dishonesty are told throughout
685 the area, including stories of how he acquired his wealth through stealing
439

156 equipment from the government projects and from smuggling sheep and mer-
[685]
[439] chandise across the Libyan border. Although some of these stories might
be exaggerated, they all point to the fact that Hakim, despite his wealth,
is not the most popular or reputable individual in bait Asabei', and that
although Shei'eb is not a popular individual either, he definitely comes
up the winner in any popularity contest between the two. The question is
156 why Hakim was selected by the Awaqil to replace Shei'eb. The case in-
613 volved more than Shei'eb's inability to collect the money from members of
558
682 his bait. Shei'eb's ineffectiveness seemed to have been taken as an ex-
683 cuse rather than as the direct cause. Many Aqaqil, before Shei'eb, had
failed in collecting money from their own bait without being subject to
direct challenge. What seems to be involved is more than a challenge to
a particular member, Shei'eb. It is a challenge to the whole principle
by which Shei'eb acquired his position as Aqila of bait Asabei': pat-
rilineal succession.

156 Shei'eb is the youngest of four sons of the former Aqila of bait
159 Asabei', Sheikh Elewa. For more than fifty years Sheikh Elewa was the
613 undisputed Aqila of bait Asabei'. He also had considerable influence
463
683 among other tribal segments throughout the whole of the Western Desert
554 by virtue of his position as "nazzar", that is, the expert who assesses
the amount of compensation for wound inflicted in a liable case. The
[428] position of nazzar is a hereditary one and had been handed down from
[779] father to son. The basis for his assessment of wounds are a number of
old books believed to be obtained from Mecca and contain all the judg-
ments of famous Islamic leaders in their assessments of wounds.

[428] Eleven years ago when Sheikh Elewa became blind and too old to

613 627 554 [192] The word mardi is derived from the Arabic verb "yardi" which means to accept or agree upon. The mardi therefore is the person who is accepted by one or both parties to a dispute as a mediator. If he is accepted by only one of the parties, his work is more that of a legal representative of that party. He makes all efforts, using all powers of persuasion to get the other party to concede to the demands of the party he represents. If, on the other hand, he is chosed by both parties to a dispute, he acts as an impartial judge and avoids taking sides in the case. His fame is determined by his ability to achieve permanent, long-lasting settlements. His success in this area depends, in addition to personal qualities, upon the respect he has within his own tribal segment and the weight that tribal segment has among other tribal segments. Similarly, his success and the fame he gets as a mardi may give him considerable influence within the bait. But this influence does not develop [182] [428] into authority because the mardi in this case does not have an established basis for the effective maintenance of that authority, in this case, patrilineal succession.

613 554 ● 682 The other domain within which the Aqila performs his duties is that of the Eila or the amar. His main function within this area is to represent his bait in matters involving the collection or the distribution of bloodmoney within the vengeance group. Within the amar, the aqila is considered successful insofar as he is able to fulfill his bait's financial obligations to the amar. This ability is in turn determined by his success in collecting money from individual members of his bait and/or his willingness to pay from his own money for those members who are unable or unwilling to pay their share. Where kinship ties are strong, the Aqila

613 682 [554] [178] usually has no difficulty collecting the individual shares. His own financial ability is rarely called upon. When a member is unable to pay for any reason, his share is divided among the able members. However, in recent years this seems to be changing, especially among the baits closely located to the settled communities or the urban centers. Among 613 178 166 464 369 these baits individual mobility has increased significantly with a large number of younger members either leaving the area for the urban centers or accepting salaried jobs with the government organizations. Among certain baits in the area of Burg el-Arab, for example, the percentage of adult males engaged in such jobs sometimes reaches sixty percent. More than thirty-five out of fifty-six males constituting bait Asabei' have a full-time or part-time job.

613 178 166 464 682 369 The individualistic attitudes accompanying the dependency on salaries and living in towns and cities have their effects on the kinship ties among members of these baits. With the prevalence of the individualistic attitudes among members of a certain bait, they become more reluctant to pay their financial obligations and the Aqila finds it more and more difficult to rely, for the fulfillment of the bait's financial obligations, on the willingness of members to pay. His success within 613 554 556 682 the domain of the amar becomes more determined by his ability to pay from his own money for those members of his bait who refuse or are unable to pay. Wealth becomes an important asset for the Aqila's performance of his duties within the amar. When this happens, there seems to be a certain shift in the source of political support for the Aqila. 613 554 In a well-integrated bait the popularity (or unpopularity) of the Aqila among the other Awaqil of the amar had very little influence on his

582 some reason or other cannot marry his cousin, he still has that legal
claim on his cousin. She cannot marry another man without the consent
582 of her cousin. He has the right to forcibly take her away and even
682 kill her or her husband in protection of his right. Although in the
few cases where this had happened in the past, the groom had to pay full
blood money. Such killing, however, was considered as justified and
never resulted in retaliation or feuds among the tribal segments involved.

582 However, it is difficult to call cousin marriage among the group
124 "preferential" marriage. In a limited quantitative study I asked 35 tribal members who have unmarried daughters over the age of 12 the following question: "If you had your choice, to whom would you give your daughter in marriage: your brother's son or another man who is wealthier or more respected?" Twenty-six said they would rather have their daughters married to someone other than their nephews. The reasons given were that their nephews did not make enough money to either pay her a good mahr or to support her without outside help. The nine who preferred to marry their daughters to their nephews emphasized the fact that the girl's cousin is likely to look after her interests and take care of her more than the outsider "who may not fear God in his treatment of my daughter," as one of the respondents to the questionnaire expressed it. They also said that their nephew is more under their control than the outsider. They further maintained that a person is likely to know his nephew more than he knows an outsider or a more distant relative. One of the informants put it, "Even if my nephew is a cheat, at least I know that this is all that is wrong with him." All thirty-five informants felt that they were obliged to give their daughters in marriage

593 and expenses to the husband that constitutes the most important check
586 on the otherwise undisputed right of the father to take away his
(583) daughter.

593 The woman, on the other hand, cannot refuse to go with her father,
562 for this means that she would be disobeying him. A woman who disobeys
586 her father is not worthy of his name. He can cut her off from the
family, which means that she is left without any support or protection.
A woman who is cut off from her family is left vulnerable to her husband
and to society. She will have nobody to defend her or to be responsible
for her actions. The responsibility for the woman's behavior is not
transferred by marriage to the husband or his family.

682 If the woman kills or assaults someone or causes damage to property
683 for which compensation is required, her male kin pays the blood money or
602 the compensation on her behalf. It is sometimes stated that if the woman
613 has grown-up sons, they, and not her family, pay for her. Since the
562 children belong to their father's family, it may seem like transfering
593 the responsibility for the woman's actions to her husband's family. However, in all three cases where this happened, the woman was quite old,
her father was dead, and her brothers were either dead or had moved outside the area and had cut off all relations with the area. She also had
no nephews in the area. In such cases, the sons were the woman's closest
male kin.

682 On the other hand, if the woman is the victim of murder or assault
683 for which blood money or compensation is to be paid, the husband is the
593 one to benefit from the situation. To understand why this happens, we
562 have to consider the contractual nature of marriage among Awlad Ali. It
584 has been mentioned earlier that before marriage is final, the prospective
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584 husband or his father pays the woman's father the bridewealth, or mahr.
583 In exchange for the mahr, the husband expects his father-in-law to out-
fit his daughter with such items as rugs, blankets, and a few other house-
hold items, like cooking pots, serving dishes, and a metal or wooden chest
[422] to keep her clothes in. These items become the private property of the
wife, but the husband has the right to use them. In addition, the man
581 expects to gain certain rights to the woman. The customary law of Awlad
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585 Ali gives the husband three basic rights over his wife: the right to her
sexual services (including the right to bear him children); the right to
her labor in domestic activities; and the right to her obedience. Of the
three rights, the first is the most exclusive. Not only doesthe husband
have a complete monopoly over his wife's present sexual services, but he
also has the right, if the girl has never been married before, to be the
[583] first to use such services. If he discovers that she is not a virgin, he
can send her back to her father and get back his mahr.

581 The other two rights are not as exclusive. The husband's right to
585 his wife's domestic labor does not prevent her from occasionally helping
593 out in her father's or brother's household, especially if they live nearby.
Finally, the husband's right to be obeyed by his wife is always subordinated to that of her father, who retains the ultimate authority over his
daughter.

682 If the woman is killed or injured, the husband is deprived of all
683 or some of her services, depending on the seriousness and the permanence
581 of the injury, and therefore is entitled to compensation. The right of
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593 avenging the woman's murder remains, however, that of her family, since
she is still a member of that family.

684 of drastic actions taken in cases of adultery. Of the fourteen cases
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562 of adultery that I examined furing my field work, none resulted in the
593 killing of the adulteress, and only three resulted in the murder of her
[114] partner. In all three cases where the adulterer was killed, the avenger
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684 was the husband; and in all three cases, the husband had to pay the
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613 bloodmoney to the murdered man's kin group. His payment of the blood-
money, among other things, may indicate that the right of the husband
to kill the adulterer is not completely accepted among Awlad Ali. All
[628] agree, however, that such killings never result in blood feuds because
of the shameful circumstances in which the victim dies.

684 It was very difficult to obtain any detailed or reliable information
126 about adultery cases. All the above mentioned fourteen cases were gath-
[124] ered from the informants, twelve of which were cases which had already
been solved. For the two cases which were still open at the time of
the study, information was quite vague. Usually such cases are conducted
with a great amount of secrecy, with the involved parties referring to
them as cases of theft, or merely by saying that the cases involve
women. Only when the adultery leads to the killing of the adulteress
or the adulterer are more details publicly known about the case.

684 But while the right to retaliate for the shameful action of an
adulterous wife is vague and diffused, the right of the husband for com-
pensation from the adulterer remains clear and undisputed. In this re-
sepct, adultery is treated very much like theft; the adulterer has stolen
the husband's exclusive right to his wife's sexual activities. The com-
[583] pensation for this offense is estimated at L.E. 20, in addition to the
[586] mahr, if the husband decides to divorce his wife as a result of her
adultery.

CHAPTER VI

HOMICIDE AND BODILY INJURIES

Part 1: Homicide

579 Fighting is quite common among Awlad Ali. Many of these fights
involve a large number of individuals and result in many casualties
579 and sometimes even deaths. Fighting is considered "shar," or evil,
673 for according to Awlad Ali, it threatens the social cohesion which is
182 highly valued in the area. Yet, although undesirable, fighting and
• [682] even homicide are not considered a crime against society and sometimes
are viewed as necessary to safeguard individual and collective rights
in the absence of an established authority which could protect these
[177] rights. Although this absence of an authority is remedied now by the
[692] introduction of state administrative justice, this has not yet achieved
enough efficiency and recognition to replace the old tribal system.

619 In the tribal system, there is no concept of individual punishment
681 inflicted upon the suspect. There is no recognized authority to inflict
692 it. The mardi or the 'aqila who performs the function of dispute settle-
[627] ment in the case of homicide has no power to pass or inflict any punishment. His role is restricted to mediation between the two parties involved
682 as was earlier mentioned. Homicide, like all other wrongs among Awlad Ali,
673 are private wrongs affecting the individual or a group of individuals.
[182] The main purpose of the tribal proceedings in the case of homicide is to
restore some form of harmony and order among the group. This harmony is
sometimes restored by killing the murderer or any member of his vengeance
682 group, or amar. Feuds may result from such killing, and a few instances
628 of feuds have, in fact, been recorded in the area (although not in the

682 last two decades). But a feud in the form of extensive, long-term killing
628 between two groups is very rare among Awlad Ali. The principle of
life for life upon which a feud operates would rarely lead to a permanent
settlement or peace, even when the sense of revenge is satisfied for the
682 moment. Among the group, this form of permanent settlement is more likely
to be achieved through the payment of bloodmoney, or "diyya." The payment
of the diyya is based on the assumption that the group has lost,
in the deceased, an economic asset. It has been deprived of his services,
both in supporting his immediate family and in the collective
activities of his amar. This is illustrated in the distribution of the
bloodmoney. Only half of the bloodmoney is paid to the immediate family
of the victim, the other half being divided equally among adult
males of his amar or vengeance group. This is intended not only to
satisfy their sense of indignation and curb their desire for revenge,
but also to insure that when the time comes to share in the payment of
the bloodmoney, they will pay.

628 The cessation of feuds in the area seems to coincide with the cessation
619 of inter-tribal and intra-tribal warfare. During the era of tribal
726 warfare, the killing of a tribesman meant the loss in the fighting power
178 of his tribal segment, and feuding, with its emphasis on life for life,
had the purpose of restoring the balance in fighting power among the
[682] groups involved. Monetary compensations were not known in the area during
that time, according to the informants' accounts, but they were usually
restricted to cases where either the victim or the killer was a
178 non-tribal person. With the cessation of tribal warfare, the death of
682 a tribal member became more an economic, rather than a political, loss,
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178 and compensation became more and more accepted in settling murder cases
682 [619] among the tribal population. Bloodmoney, or diyya," was established
[726] among compensations for injury in general. This scale of compensation
682 is based on the amount of loss of normal activities the injury caused
the victim with death being the total loss of such activities. The
compensation for homocide is estimated at L.E.400 for intentional kill-
682 ing, and L.E. 300, for unintentional killing. Although reference here
673 is made to "intention," the assessment of that intention and its defini-
672 tion are quite different from the general usage of that term among modern
jurists. Among modern jurists, the term refers to a state of mind which implies that the offender willfully and knowingly committed the prohibited act. This means, first, that the person is able to recognize the nature of his act and to distinguish between right and wrong. Secondly, it means that the person was in a position to choose between committing the act and not committing it and took the former path. According to this view, individuals under temporary or permanent insanity, children under the legal age (the definition of which varies from one legal system to another), non-human beings and objects are not capable of having criminal intent, since they are incapable of having a will of their own. Similarly, individuals who are capable of having a will but, because of certain circumstances their freedom of choice was impaired, cannot also have intentions. Intention, then, in the modern legal conception is a psychological quality that connects the offender with the prohibited result or results. It is this psychological connection that differentiates in modern legal systems between murder and manslaughter, between attempted murder and simple assault, between first and second degree murder, and between justifiable

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and unjustifiable homicide. To examine responsibility in homicide among Awlad Ali and their definition of "intentional" and "non-intentional" killing, let us first present some of the cases collected from the area.

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CASE #1: The Case of the Broken Rope

This is one of the classical cases which is told throughout the entire area. There is some slight variation in the way it is told, but all accounts refer to the fact that Hemeida from the 'Esheibat tribe inherited the right to use a large area of tribal land in which there was an old Roman well not used for a long period of time and which was full of sand. One day he invited the awaqil of his tribal segment, as well as his neighbors, to consult them on how to clear the well, since without it the land was almost useless. They all decided it was a good idea and offered their help. On the day the well was to be cleared, they all gathered around the well. Among those present was Do'ah, a poor member of the 'Esheibat tribe who worked as a paid shepherd for Hemeida. He was watching from a distance when Hemeida called upon him to give a hand. The well, like all Roman wells in the area, is about fifty feet deep and fifteen feet in diameter, and narrows as one goes down the well. To be cleared, someone has to be lowered by a rope to the bottom of the well to dig up the sand. Hemeida's cousin, Ali, agreed to go down, and the gathering looked for a sturdy rope which they found at one of Hemeida's neighbors. As the group was tying Ali to the rope, Hemeida suggested that Ali was too heavy for the rope and that it would be a good idea if a slimmer man did the job. At this point, everybody looked at Do'ah, since he was the thinnest

682 672 312 person in the crowd. So, Do'ah volunteered to be lowered down to clear the well. He then proceeded to the well, glanced at the bottom of it, and threw a small stone to see if there was any water left in it. The stone made a faint splash indicating that there were a few inches of water. After that, he examined the rope and the equipment used. Satisfied with everything, he tied the rope around himself and was lowered very slowly and carefully by the crowd at the top of the well. As Do'ah was more than half-way down, the rope broke, and he fell. When the crowd called him, Do'ah answered in a faint voice telling them that he was hurt but that he would be all right. The crowd then looked for a spare rope to lower somebody to get Do'ah but could not find any in a nearby camp. They sent a man to get a rope from the next camp, but by the time a man was lowered to get Do'ah, he was dead; he had drowned in six inches of water.

682 672 [625] [613] Since the place of the accident was close to the police station, word got to the officer who, after investigating the case, ruled it as accidental death. But while the government authorities were investigating the case, members of the Bait to which Do'ah belonged were proceeding with the customary ways of Awlad Ali to claim bloodmoney for their dead kinsman. The idea was that a life had been lost, and that regardless of the police investigation, someone must pay for it. The question was who. Since the well belonged to Hemeida, Do'ah's relatives insisted that he was the one to pay the bloodmoney. Not denying the fact that someone had to pay for the death of Do'ah, Hemeida insisted that the one to pay was the

682 owner of the rope, since it was the broken rope that had caused
672 the death of Do'ah. The case stayed unsolved for more than two
months, a record for dispatching of criminal cases in the area.
682 In the final Mi'ad, the main question was whether or not the owner
672 of the rope was responsible for the death of Do'ah, and therefore
627 liable for the payment of the bloodmoney. After extensive nego-
tiations with the parties involved, Sheikh Selouma, the aqila of
Hemeida's Bait, who had also been accepted by Do'ah's family as
the Mardi in the case, convened the Mi'ad and announced the settle-
682 ment. His announcement came after reading certain passages of the
672 Koran and reminding the parties that they were all members of Awlad
627 Ali and therefore brothers. He stressed the necessity of all bro-
695 thers having clear hearts toward one another and not allowing worldly
disputes to leave any impurities among friends. He then came to the
conclusion that there were two things responsible for the death of
Do'ah. The first was Hemeida's decision to clear the well, for had
it not been for that decision, the accident would not have happened.
The second thing responsible was the rope whose breaking was the
direct cause of the death. The responsibility here applies only to
the rope and not to the owner of that rope. The reason Sheikh Selouma
gave for not holding the owner responsible for the death of Do'ah
was that the rope by itself is not a lethal weapon for which the
owner has to exercise a great deal of caution in lending it. To
make the owner responsible for the death of Do'ah would, according
to Sheikh Selouma, discourage anyone from lending anything to his
neighbor for fear of becoming liable for any harm it might cause.

682 672 627 695 "...It means that I will never lend my cooking pot to my neighbor lest his child trip over it and I would be asked to pay his bloodmoney."

So, the bloodmoney was divided into two sections, one to be paid by Hemeida, and the other to be the responsibility of the rope, which meant that the victim's relatives only took home half of the bloodmoney.

683 CASE #2: The Case of the Curious Neighbor

682 578 672 This is the case of 66-year-old Selouma whose barley land bordered that of Muftah, a distant member of the same tribe. A small area of rocky land separated the two areas. Throughout the time that Muftah was preparing his land for barley cultivation, Selouma used to sit on the dividing rocks, observing his neighbor work on his land and making jokes about the amount of time and effort Muftah was putting into his land, especially when it looked like a dry year, anyway, and no barley would be cultivated. For more than a week Muftah tolerated his neighbor's remarks. "I always said to myself, 'Don't follow the devil... He is an old man and doesn't know what he is saying.' But that day I could not take it any longer. My wife and children were sick, and I didn't have any money to bring them medicine or even food. I wanted to finish preparing the land because it looked like it was going to rain that day. I went to the area I was working on when Selouma started his jokes. I was mad. I took a small stone and threw it at him to scare him and make him stop. The stone hit his leg. It was a small stone, and I didn't think it would harm him. Actually, he stood on his

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682 feet after that and left." It seems that later the wound got in-
672 fected. Six months after the incident, Selouma was taken to the
[578] hospital with an infected wound, and three days later he died from that infection. Selouma's son, Ali, demanded that Muftah pay a full bloodmoney (L.E. 400) for the death of his father, since the death was directly caused by the wound inflicted by Muftah. Muftah denied the charges and claimed that the infected wound which caused
683 the death of Selouma was not the one inflicted by the stone. Media-
682 tions continued for some time, and when no agreement was achieved,
672 the aqilas of the two baits to which the parties belonged declared
695 that the decision should be made by the oath which Muftah had to
613 take if he insisted on his claims that the wound was not caused by his action. Since the case involved the life of a man, Muftah had to be supported in his oath by fifty-five adult male members of
[671] his 'amar, or 'eila. In accordance with the Daraieb, the selection
[778] was done by members of Selouma's Bait who also selected the tomb of the saint where the oath would be undertaken. On the date the oath was to be taken, the disputing parties, as well as all the notables of friendly tribal segments who were invited to witness the oath, went to the tomb of the saint. As they started with the procedures,
[784] two of Muftah's cousins who were to support him in the oath and his uncle refused to swear on the grounds that they were not sure that Muftah was telling the truth and therefore could not subject themselves to the supernatural hazards of taking a false oath. Attempts by other members who were to support Muftah were made to force the three men to swear, since their refusal meant that the bloodmoney

683 682 672 695 613 was to be paid unconditionally and consequently would cost all members of the amar; but all these attempts failed. At this point, there was no doubt on the part of the attending crowd about Muftah's responsibility for the death of Selouma. The question was, how much had he to pay. The amount requested by Selouma's son was that for "intentional" killing on the basis that Muftah had willfully thrown the rock knowing that it might harm Selouma, especially considering his age.

683 682 672 627 After long and intensive negotiations with the interested parties, a Mi'ad was set in which it was announced that Muftah had to pay the amount of L.E. 200. In his reasoning, he stipulated that the wound which had caused the death of Selouma, although it was intentional on the part of Muftah, was inflicted by a stone which in itself is not a lethal weapon, and therefore the death was an unintentional one for which the bloodmoney is customarily estimated at L.E. 300. He also stated that in the excitement that [845] followed the death of Selouma, Muftah's pregnant wife had lost the child. The bloodmoney for the still-born infant was estimated at L.E. 100, which was deducted from the amount of bloodmoney that Muftah had to pay.

CASE #3: The Case of the Trespasser

311 423 613 [132] This case occurred during the year of the fieldwork which was the second dry year the area experienced. Rain had not fallen except in a very few places. One of these places was near the small town of Sidi Barrani in which the land belonging to Yadem and his Bait was found. Yadem had sown his barley which at that time had grown to about five feet high. Surrounding the cultivated land

311 423 was a large area of grazing land which also belonged to the Bait
613 of Yadem. The area attracted a large number of tribesmen who
233 brought their herds for grazing. One of these was Kuraiem from
311 619 Awlad Kharouf tribal segment. He brought his wife and child and
613 a herd of more than two hundred sheep and goats. Although it is
not proper for one to cultivate the land belonging to another
tribal segment, yet, when it comes to grazing land, no such
restriction is imposed. Only the permission of the aqila of that
tribal segment is required, and even that is granted so
automatically that many tribesmen do not bother to ask for such
permission. Kuraiem took this permission for granted and pitched his
233 tent in the grazing land of Yadem and his Bait. Yadem, however,
311 was disturbed because he thought that Kuraiem grazed his flocks in
578 an area very close to his cultivated barley, so close that he feared
that the animals might eat the growing barley. When Yadem asked
Kuraiem to move a little further and Kuraiem refused, they entered
into an argument during which Yadem told him that if he did not
move by the following day, he would break his neck. The following
morning Yadem went with his brother to see if Kuraiem was still
there. Both Yadem and his brother were armed with heavy sticks.
As they reached Kuraiem's tent, they hit him with the sticks on
● [682] the head. Kuraiem fell on the ground, and they kept hitting him
until he was dead.

682 In due course, Kuraiem's family claimed L.E. 400 bloodmoney
672 for the intentional killing of Kuraiem. Yadem and his family
[627] rejected the claim and insisted that the killing was unintentional. The
Mi'ad was held, and the two Mardis selected by the two parties

682 agreed that the sticks were not by nature lethal weapons. The
672 latter, according to the tribal law, are only guns and knives,
627 since they give the victims no chance to defend himself. They
ruled the case unintentional killing for which only L.E. 300
should be paid.

682 Since Yadem and his brother were arrested by the police for
625 their crime, the payment of the bloodmoney was postponed until
692 the case was settled according to the state legal system. Only
half of the bloodmoney was paid and the rest was postponed until
the case was decided upon by the legal system and Yadem released.
682 This is obviously a case in which the nature of the killing was
672 decided upon by drawing upon the material aspect of criminal
673 causation. The nature of the weapon used was the major determinant
[411] of the crime. Only guns and knives are defined as lethal; all
others are non-lethal by nature, although they might cause the
death of the victim. Death caused by a non-lethal weapon is considered as unintentional, regardless of whether or not the actor
intended the results, while death by a lethal weapon, even without
the intention of killing, is classified as intentional killing, as
appears in the following case.

CASE #4: The Case of the Threatened Tribesman

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628 For more than five years Bait El-Mawi from the Sheibat tribe
had been in a continuous state of feud with Bait El-Asi from the
Gemeiat tribe. One night, during a Khamasein sand storm when visability was extremely low, Abd-el-Galil from Bait El-Mawi heard a
noise outside his tent, and the dogs were barking indicating that
a stranger was there. Being sure that someone was approaching

613 628 the tent and fearing that he might have been a member of the feuding Bait intending to harm him or members of his family, Galil took his gun and went outside to see who was there. He called on the person to identify himself. When he got no answer, he warned him that unless he identify himself, he (Galil) would fire his gun in the air as a warning. After a short period of no
613 628 682 response, Galil fired his gun in the air. A moment later, Galil heard a cry coming from the direction of a small hill at the side of the tent. When Galil went there, he found Salem, a member of a neighboring camp, lying on the ground with a bullet wound in his stomach. He told Galil that his wife was sick and that he had come to borrow Galil's donkey to take her to the doctor in the nearby medical center. He had taken the short cut to Galil's tent when he was hit by the bullet which Galil had fired in the air. Galil took his wounded neighbor to the medical center, but Salem died before they reached it.

682 672 627 673 The Mi'ad was held, and Galil and his family had to pay L.E. 400 to the victim's kin group. The amount was that specified for intentional killing, since the wound that caused the death was inflicted by a lethal weapon.

CASE #5: The Case of the Startled Shepherd

233 [464] [619] [312] This case involves Idris, a poor member of the Sheresat tribal segment. He earned his living by working as a hired shepherd for 'Awwad from Bait Ibrahim in the area of Gharbaniat. During the dry season, each shepherd takes his flocks to the water wells near the coast and leaves them there for three or four hours to get their fill of drinking water. That afternoon, Idris, waiting for the

233 animals to drink, sat on the edge of the well with his feet in the
cool water of the pool completely absorbed in his thoughts amidst
the quiet surroundings. Passing by the pool at that time was Mahdi
233 576 from a neighboring tribal segment. Seeing Idris (whom he had not
165 known), he shouted the customary greeting, "Peace on you." Startled
by the voice of Mahdi, Idris lost his balance and fell in the deep
water of the pool. Mahdi rushed to help him, but the water was too
deep, and Idris drowned. Feeling sorry for Idris, Mahdi took the
flock and went back to the camp of Idris where he informed the
latter's wife of what had happened. A few days later, Mahdi was
● 682 627 paid a visit by Sheikh Elewa, the aqila of Bait Asabei' and known
[613] mardi in the area who informed Mahdi that the family of Idris was
demanding the payment of the sum of L.E. 300 for the death of their
682 relative. A Mi'ad was set for the following week. In that Mi'ad,
627 and after Mahdi admitted that it was his greeting that had startled
672 613 Idris and caused him to fall in the well, the two Mardis representing
the two parties agreed that the payment of the sum of three
hundred pounds was in order and that Mahdi and his amar must pay it
to the victim's family as soon as possible. At first, Mahdi seemed
to accept the judgment of the two Mardis, especially when both were
prominant members of some of the influential tribal segments in the
area. But Mahdi was a poor man, and his amar was very small in number,
which made the payment of the bloodmoney almost impossible.
682 Although appeal in the ordinary legal sense does not exist in such
627 a system like that of Awlad Ali, where no judgment is forced upon
672 695 any of the disputing parties, and where the pronouncement of the

682 settlement is usually made after the parties have agreed to it,
627 yet, in certain instances where one of the parties later feels that
672 the settlement was not just or that he was coerced into accepting
695 it, he may ask for a second Mi'ad during which new procedures start
in the case. In the present case, although Mahdi had originally
accepted the judgment of the awaqil, as time passed and he real-
ized that he was unable to pay the bloodmoney, he started to ques-
tion the feasibility of the settlement. He discussed the matter
682 672 with Sheikh Suliman el-Gerery from the Murabiteen tribe of Gerera,
695 a tribe whose members are feared throughout the area for the belief
554 that they have certain supernatural powers. Sheikh Suliman himself
792 [776] is highly respected, and people believe that after his death he will
become "wali" or a saint. After hearing Mahdi's complaint, Sheikh
Suliman told him that the settlement was unjust and told him that he
would do something about it. The following Thursday, Sheikh Suliman
called on Mahdi and asked him to bring his donkey and follow him.
They rode to a small desert town called Bahig where the local market
613 is held every Thursday. On market day, the awaqil of various tribal
517 segments usually gather in front of the general store in the town
571 drinking tea and chatting until their sons or the younger members
443 576 of their families sell the sheep and buy the necessary items. Every-
one passing by the gathering is expected to greet the gathering, get-
ting off his donkey as a sign of respect to the prominent people.
[689] Failure to greet a fellow tribesman is considered a serious offense
liable to a fine of more than L. 50 and ten goats in certain cases.
[673] It is considered a very serious crime. One informant once told me,
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124 One informant once told me,
576 "If you don't greet me, this means that you hate me, and if you
829 hate me, there is no limit to the kind of harm you can do me and
my family. One who hates you can kill you, and none can walk
safely anywhere if he fears that he will be killed."

682 As Sheikh Suliman and Mahdi reached the general store, every-
689 one was gathering there as usual, including the two awaqil who
672 were involved in the original settlement. Sheikh Suliman told
695 554 Mahdi not to dismount his donkey and not to say the customary
792 greeting as they passed by the gathering. When they passed the
576 gathering, everyone stood to greet Sheikh Suliman who ignored them
and left with Mahdi. No one believed that Sheikh Suliman, who
should be the guard of the tribal tradition, should commit such an
unforgivable violation of the norms of the people. The next morn-
682 ing the whole area was talking about a big Mi'ad to "take the right"
689 from Sheikh Suliman and Mahdi, who had insulted the gathering. The
672 Mi'ad was held a week after the incident. During the Mi'ad, Sheikh
695 554 Suliman was asked to explain his behavior, and his answer was, "How
792 do you want me to greet all those people who were sitting in front
576 of the store? There were more than thirty men in that gathering,
627 and I was afraid that if I said the customary greeting, I might
have startled some of them causing them to harm themselves, leaving
me with the payment of so many bloodmoneys." Immediately, the
attendants of the Mi'ad knew what Sheikh Suliman was referring to,
and that his action was to prove that the settlement reached in
the case of Mahdi was wrong and that it set a very dangerous prece-
dent which would cause people to avoid greeting one another, "and
hatred will prevail among brothers and nobody will be safe in his
own home."

000 627 613 682 695 own home." The following morning a Mi'ad was called for by the two aqila who achieved the first settlement, and in it, Mahdi was released from his obligation to pay the bloodmoney, although he was asked to pay the sum of fifty pounds to the widow of the deceased as a gesture of friendship.

CASE #6: The Case of the Careless Guest

574 682 The present case involved Ali from the Geneishat tribe who lives in the desert town of Matruh where he has a general store. He goes on frequent visits to Alexandria to get supplies for his store. On one of these trips he passed by the camp of 'Awad from a different tribal segment. Hungry and tired, Ali decided to spend the night at the camp and continue his trip the following morning. He went to the first tent in the camp which happened to be that of 'Awad, who welcomed him and ordered his wife to prepare dinner for the guest. He then invited other members of the camp to have tea with the guest as a gesture of hospitality. When Ali sat down to eat, he took off his shoes, and put his rifle against a pile of rugs and blankets behind him. As the group was chatting, a goat belonging to one of the invited neighbors entered the tent where the men were sitting. Afraid that it might soil the carpets which he had put out for the guest, Awad chased the goat out of the tent. On its way out, the goat touched the guest's gun which fired, killing Hussein, the brother-in-law of one of the neighbors.

682 627 The local authorities were notified of the incident, but after conducting a preliminary investigation, they filed the case as accidental death. The tribal proceedings continued, however. After

● 682 negotiations between the parties involved were conducted by their
627 respective awaqil, a Mi'ad was set, and the settlement was an-
682 nounced. According to the terms of the settlement, three factors
672 contributed to the death of Hussein: the goat, whose activity was
627 directly related to the death by causing the gun to fire; the host, who had chased the goat, causing it to run over the gun and fire it; and the guest, without whose negligence in leaving the gun loaded the accident would not have happened. The bloodmoney was divided into three equal parts, one of which was to be paid by Awad, the host, the other to be paid by Ali, the owner of the gun, and the third part to be attributed to the responsibility of the goat and therefore would not be paid.

CASE #7: The Case of the Adulterous Wife

684 For more than a year, rumors spread in the area of Burg El-Arab that Ghenewa's wife was having an affair with Goma'h, a friend of her husband and a member of a nearby camp. Ghenewa was operating a small store and was also involved in smuggling goods from Libya; both required him to be away frequently and for fairly extensive periods of time. According to the rumors, as soon as he left, his wife would put a white cloth on the laundry line as a sign indicating to Goma'h that the husband had left and therefore the former could come and visit her. When the husband heard the rumors, he was furious and decided to test his wife. He pretended that he was going to Alexandria as usual, went to the train station, waited until the train had left, and then returned to his tent. As he entered the tent, he found his wife and his friend in a compromising situation. Before
[682] he could do anything, the friend grabbed a kitchen knife and attacked

684 682 the husband, who reached for his gun and fired at Goma'h. Three days later the latter died in the hospital from the gun wound.

684 682 672 The case was investigated by the police and brought to trial, but the case was dismissed as justifiable homocide by reason of self defense. The tribal proceedings, however, required Ghenewa to pay the bloodmoney for intentional homocide, since the weapon used was a gun. Out of the L. 400 bloodmoney, the sum of L. 20 kabara for committing adultery with the wife was deducted. None had questioned the right of Ghenewa to kill Goma'h in the process of defending himself.

671 672 In his essay on "The Early History of Malice Aforethought" in English law, Maitland discussed the "utter incompetence of ancient law to take note of the mental elements of a crime" (1911:327). This statement seems to apply to certain aspects of the tribal law of Awlad Ali. If one causes the death of another, even accidentally, he is liable to compensation. 671 672 171 This attribute is not restricted to Awlad Ali law, for it has been documented by a number of other studies. Peristiany found this to be the case among the Potok (1954), and Dundas documented it among the Kikuyu (1921). In his analysis of injury and liability among the Barotse, Gluckman maintained that "whatever the motivation of the killer or the circumstances surrounding the deed, bloodmoney has to be paid if a member of one grouping of kinsmen was killed by a member of some other group. The mental element seems to be irrelevant. What is important is that "murder" is committed within social relationships where blood compensation is due (1963:205). Similarly, Howell gives us one of the most comprehensive accounts of the Nuer "rule of law" and

671 672 171 the irrelevance of intention in establishing liabilities for homocide or injuries (1954).

672 682 The neglect of intention in assessing liability in cases of homocide is evident in the cases presented above (Cases 1,2,4,5 and 6), where compensation was paid although there was no intention established on the part of the offender.

[192] Awlad Ali use the Arabic word "katl" to refer to any killing. This is different from the word "mut" which means death by natural causes. They further differentiate between "katl 'amd," or intentional killing
682 and "katl khata," or unintentional killing. Although reference here is
672 made to "intention," yet, from the above cases it is evident that the
673 basis of establishing that intention is from the type of weapon used in effecting the death of the victim. Intentional killings are those caused
[411] by a lethal weapon. Lethal weapons are defined as guns or knives. Death caused by a non-lethal weapon, no matter what the intentions of the offender, is defined as non-intentional, even when the circumstances of the act indicates the actual existence of an intention on the part of the offender to cause the death of the victim (as in Case #3 above). The assumption is that the use of lethal weapons, such as daggers or guns, implies intention and possibly a certain degree of premeditation, since these weapons have no other important use. Moreover, the probability of death by a lethal weapon is much greater than from other non-lethal weapons. These give the victim a chance to defend himself, a chance which he does not have in the cases of killing with a gun or dagger. In other words, Awlad Ali, in assessing responsibility for homocide, "operate with a legalistic psychology in which intention is is presumed from action" (Gluckman, 1963:207).

682 672 In practice, Awlad Ali do look at actual circumstances to assess the intention of the offender. Although compensation is always required, the readiness of the victim's kin group to accept a financial settlement and the final amount to be paid in a given situation is affected by the presence or absence of an intention on behalf of the offender. In assessing the actual intention of the offender in each case, the mediators rely on the circumstances of the crime as well as on the past history of the relationships between the offender and the victim. Although this actual intention of the offender does not change the payment of bloodmoney, the deceased's kin are more agreeable to the acceptance of the financial settlement if the killing is unintentional than if it is intentional and the possibility of revenge is much less imminent. Unintentional killing, regardless of the weapon used never results in blood feuds. The possibility, on the other hand, is much greater in the cases where the circumstances of the offense indicate an intention on the part of the killer to take the life of the victim. It is for this reason that the right of
[978] nazala, or refuge, discussed in an earlier chapter, is resorted to only in the case of intentional killing. Of all the cases described in the chapter only in the case of the trespasser did the killers' kin group seek refuge by moving to another area where they were protected until the dispute was solved by another neutral tribal segment. It is important to note that killing in the above case was not done by a lethal weapon but by sticks, and as such was defined by the tribal law as "unintentional" as far as the formal amount of compensation required was concerned. Not all cases where the intention of the offender to kill
[671] the victim is clear carried with it the threat of revenge. The tribal law takes into consideration certain mitigating circumstances, such as the role of the victim in initiating the act of the offender.

000 the role of the victim in initiating the act of the offender. In the
684 682 case of the adulterous wife (Case #7), the intention of the husband to
672 kill the wife's lover was clear from the evidence; yet, the husband's
kin group never attempted to take refuge, and the victim's group was
eager to settle the case with the least amount of publicity. On the
682 672 other hand, killing in circumstances that offend the tribal standards
183 of chivalry, like killing from ambush or during the night, are the most
difficult to solve and pose the greatest chance for retaliation.

682 Although the traditional amount of compensation is not determined
672 by the actual intentions of the killer, but rather by assumed intentions
[673] as deducted from the type of weapon used in causing death, yet, the final
amount paid is usually determined by such intention. The actual intention works as the basis for bargaining between the victim's kin and the kin of the killer. Kin of the victim of an intentional killing are less likely to agree to any reduction of the amount, and with the threat of retaliation or revenge present, the killer's kin are bargaining from a weaker point. This is not the case in unintentional killings or where the victim's behavior instigated the reaction of the killer. In such cases, the victim's group is more willing to accept a lesser amount of compensation, and the killer's group, while not in a good bargaining position, at least are not under the threat of revenge. And since they do not resort to the right of refuge, their daily activities are not disrupted. In this case, they could sustain the bargaining activities for a relatively longer period of time. Also, there is usually a strong
[626] pressure on the victim's group to accept reduced compensation in the
case of unintentional killing from the rest of the tribal members. If

682 they refuse to accept reduced compensation, they are viewed as unreason-
672 able by the rest of the groups in the area. One way in which such pres-
[626] sure is brought to bear upon the victim's acceptance of reduced compansation
682 is in the mi'ad, or the public hearing, in which the settlement achieved
672
627 is announced. The common practice is for the killer's group to agree to
pay the full amount specified by the traditional scale for compensation
(L.E. 400 for killing with a lethal weapon and L.E. 300 for killing with
a non-lethal weapon). Then, in the final mi'ad in which such agreement
is achieved, a number of important members of non-involved tribal segments
are invited to the mi'ad. During the mi'ad and immediately following the
announcement that a settlement has been achieved and that the kin group of
the killer has agreed to pay the traditional bloodmoney, the mardi or any
one of the attendants to the mi'ad asks the victim's group to defer part
of the payment in honor of important members of the tribal segments pres-
682 ent at the meeting. Sometimes a portion of the payment is forfeited in
672 honor of the tent or the women of the household who prepared the food or
even for the blessing of one of the saints in the area. In the case of
the curious neighbor (Case #2) above, out of the original amount specified
for the death by non-lethal weapon estimated as L.E. 300, only L.E. 100
was actually given to the victim's kin group. In addition to the L.E. 100
deducted because of the death of the unborn infant of the offender, an-
other hundred pounds was deducted in honor of certain important members
[683] who attended the gathering. It is interesting to note that the L.E. 100
is compensation for the loss of the use of a leg in the formal scale of
compensations for injuries as will be shown shortly. No such reduction
in the amount of bloodmoney was done in the case of the trespasser where

682 672 although the weapon used was not lethal and therefore was classified as an unintentional killing, yet the nature of the crime and the obvious intention on the part of the killers made reduced payment difficult to achieve.

Another way of reducing liability and the amount of money paid in cases of unintentional killing is by taking into consideration all the intervening variables that contributed to the death of the victim and asking them to share the blame. The working of this principle is illustrated in the case of the broken rope where the rope was assigned half the responsibility for the death of the victim. It is also present in the case of the careless guest where the responsibility was divided three ways with the host paying one third, the owner of the gun paying another third, and the goat sharing the responsibility for the rest of the bloodmoney. It is interesting to note the difference in the responsibility to the owner of the gun in the above case and the owner of the rope in the case of the broken rope. The owner of the rope was not held responsible for the death caused by his rope, the same way the owner of the goat in the case of the careless guest was not held responsible for the actions of the animal. Both the goat and the rope are not dangerous things by themselves for which a certain degree of care in handling is required. If such normally harmless things cause injury or death to a person, the owner is not held responsible.

682 672 41 67 594 The situation is quite different in the case of the gun and the responsibility of its owner. By nature, the gun is a weapon of death, and for that reason the tribal law has required certain precautions in its use or handling. Among such precautions is the requirement that a guest,

682 as soon as he settles in the host's place, should unload the gun. In
672 411 addition to reducing the possibility of the gun being accidentally fired
671 and harming someone, this act expressed the trust of the guest in his
594 host and signifies the ability of the latter to protect his guest against
any harm. A person visiting another does not need his gun for protection
682 and therefore must unload it. If the owner of the gun fails to take this
672 customary precaution and leaves his gun loaded, and because of that fail-
411 ure the gun causes the death or injury of a person or even damage to property, the owner is held responsible for that result. The same rule applies to other deadly weapons, such as knives or daggers, as well as to animals
683 which are dangerous by nature, such as dogs. Each tent in the area has a
672 231 dog. Starting the first weeks in the puppy's life, he is trained to guard the tent and to bark at the approach of any stranger. It is also trained to attack any intruder who comes within fifty yards of the tent unless accompanied by a member of the tent. When one goes to visit another, he usually stays away from the tent until someone from the tent hears the dog barking and comes out to get the guest. Most dogs would not attack a person as long as he is the safe fifty yards away from the tent. Occasionally, a dog goes behond the safe distance and bites an individual passing by or a guest waiting to be let inside the tent. If the injured person is able to prove, usually by taking the oath, that he was more than fifty yards away from the tent at the time he was attacked by the dog, the dog's owner is liable to the victim for the injury inflicted by the dog. If, on the other hand, evidence shows that the victim was bitten by the dog while being less than fifty yards away from the tent, then there is no responsibility on the part of the dog's

682 between the parties involved. The relative position of both the of-
672 fender and the victim and their relationship to one another is taken
627 into account. What is reasonable behavior in one case may not be so in another. Pat disputes are taken as indications of the present situation, although they may not be directly related to the present dispute.

672 It is possible to say, then, that Awlad Ali recognize two types of
673 intentions: an assumed intention deducted from certain material aspects of the act itself, like the type of weapon used in causing the death of the victim, and an actual intention which is quite similar to that utilized in modern jurisprudence in the sense that it pertains to a state of mind on the part of the offender that connects him in a special way with the prohibited results. The assumed intention works to set the initial guide for the traditional scale of bloodmoney. It sets the basis upon which compromise could be achieved. Actual intention, on the other hand, determines the actual course the specific case takes as well as the final amount of money paid as a settlement.

The Sanusiya thus used the Turks to buttress its position in 175*
its dealings with the tribes, and combined with the tribes to 648*
resist any encroachments on its prerogatives by the Turkish 795*
Government. It was in the interests of both Administration 619
and Order that the tribes should not get out of hand, and it was in the interests of tribes and Order that the Administration should not become too powerful. The Sanusiya acquired from its central position between the other two parties a pre-eminence in the interior which led to the tribal system becoming already in Turkish times a proto-state with an embryonic government of its own. The tribes first began to see themselves as a nation through the Sanusiya's relations with the Turkish Administration. They were all 'Sanusi' *vis-à-vis* the Administration.

Ultimately it was the tribes who called the tune to both the Turkish Government and the Sanusiya Order. It would have taken a well-equipped army to have subdued them had they made a united revolt, and the Governor had only a meagre force at his disposal and could have had little hope of receiving much assistance from Istanbul. The Order had only moral weapons and though the tribal Shaikhs received its instructions with respect and every sign of acquiescence they did not necessarily act on them. Both Administration and Order were therefore compelled to compromise in their dealings with the tribes, who were, as Bedouin always are, at heart opposed to any interference and restriction. A typical situation of the latter days of Turkish rule was that described to me by the Banghazi notable 'Umar al-Kakhiya, at one time a member of the Ottoman House of Representatives. He was sent by the Governor of Cyrenaica to make agreements with the tribes in the eastern and western wings of the country by which they should refrain from cutting the Government's telegraph wires, a Bedouin habit which was later to irritate the Italian authorities and during the late war British Signals. I mention two further
incidents in illustration of Turco-Bedouin relations. About 175*
1895 forty members of the Tamiya section of the Bara'asa tribe 648*
jointly killed a tax-collector, a certain 'Abd al-Rahman al- 651
Katib, for, among other affronts, having taxed the client tribes 795*
directly instead of through their *Sa'adi* overlords. They then 682 ●
fled to the Marmarica, from where they treated with the Turkish
Authorities for a settlement by payment of 13,000 Riyal, or 619
thirteen times the usual blood money, to the dead man's son.

occupying territory which cannot be said to belong to any par- 619
ticular section of their noble patron tribe, is tied to the patron 57
tribe as such. Yet it is through the small tertiary segments that 621
these ties are made effective. In this sense, a client tribe is a com- 613
bination of small groups of people each group having specific
relationships with defined tertiary sections, and participating in
the tribe of their patrons through these relationships.

Secondly, clients are found distributed in small groups, some- 619
times no more than one or two men, but often in clusters large 621
enough to compose a small camp. Practically all tertiary sections 613
of the noble tribes have some clients either living with them or
sharing their resources. While clients continue to reside with a 619
particular tertiary section, it is the members of the latter who are 621
responsible for them and vice versa. If, for example, one of the 613
clients commits a homicide, the gathering of blood-money is the 672
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tached, and vengeance can be exacted on any member of the
noble section. In other circumstances, when the offender is a
nobleman, then the clients of his group are the first to be ap-
proached for blood-money. Tied in this way to a particular 619
tertiary section, they are not, however, compelled to reside with 621
its members permanently. On the contrary, they may be forced 182
to move. If, for example, there is a pressure on local water sup- 166
plies, the first to feel it are the clients. Annually, they supplicate 613
for the use of water, and if their patrons decide that there is in-
sufficient to meet all needs, the request is refused, albeit reluctantly. Clients constitute a socially mobile group; they are the pawns in the annual readjustment of men to their resources. Whenever they move, they pass on to another tertiary section, which may be a collateral section of the one they have left or structurally far removed from it, but as soon as they leave one, their duties and obligations cease and are taken up anew with another structurally like group. It is because their attachment is to a tertiary section, and not to one of superior order, that they can be as socially mobile as they are, which in turn facilitates a more efficient adjustment to the ecological situation from year to year.

Small groups of clients move frequently, groups of adopted people less frequently, and groups composed of the free-born

613 to one well, and the remainder to the other. It is usually an easy
621 matter to predict, at least in a general fashion, how the group
602 will divide, as long as the details of kinship are known; the camps
[312] will be composed of members of two sets of patri-lines in the
tertiary segment, who will also represent two discrete clusters of cognatic kindred. If, therefore, a tertiary group increases in numbers to the point where a split in the lineage is inevitable, here then is the line of split, along a line, that is, of kinship cleavage and lineage differentiation. 'Men make the tribe; women divide it,' is an oft-quoted saying among the Bedouin, but this, like most sayings, tells only part of the truth, as we shall see.

613 It is possible to show where on the genealogy change takes
621 place, and it is possible to indicate the lines cleavages will follow,
but the proliferation of a lineage does not occur merely because the possibility exists for it to do so. A group must, clearly, break up if the number of its members significantly exceeds that which can be supported by the available natural resources; water is the prime cause of the proliferation of lineages. Granting this, a group remains an undifferentiated corporation until occasion arises when its members, or some of them, can demonstrate unequivocally that they are no longer bound by its conditions of membership. There is a number of occasions when this can be done, some of which are discussed below.

613 The test, *par excellence*, of corporate affiliation is the accept-
ance of the responsibility to pay blood-money. Refusal to accept
621 this is the same as renouncing membership of the group. Individ-
672 uals are sometimes excluded from membership in this way. There
682 are occasions too, when the payment of blood-money involves
renunciation by more than one or two individuals. If membership of a section has increased to the point of splitting, and should a homicide occur within it, one of the kin clusters within the group might demand blood-money from the other. Nothing could make the statement of split clearer than this. The most impelling condition of membership of the tertiary group is that 'we pay as one and receive as one', a condition which, of course, excludes payment within the group. Any two groups between which the demand for blood-money has been made are, therefore, by definition, separate tertiary groups.

613 When a member of a group or his wife dies, there are specific
621
965

613

complicate the more direct relationship of the distribution of 619
groups of people to the ecology.[3] [13] [182]

The Cyrenaican genealogy, then, is a conceptualization of a hierarchy[4] of ordered territorial segments. The groups stemming from the ancestor at the third order of segmentation are referred to as tribes, and each tribe is the apex of a three-tiered order of segments, which, following customary practice, are referred to as primary, secondary, and tertiary. The latter, the tertiary segment, 621
represents the group of people who, for a period of six to eight 613
months, gather together and live in what, for all intents and purposes, is a single discrete residential group.[5] This tertiary group is also the smallest political group. It has its own homeland, with its [423]
water supplies, pastures, and ploughland. In this homeland live most of its members. It is a lineage segment, and most of the agnates of this segment live on their own homeland.[6] It is also the [682]
vengeance group, which means that any one of its members can [628]
be killed in vengeance for a homicide committed by any other, and that the obligation to exact vengeance falls on all members alike, regardless of relationship to the victim. Likewise, its members pay blood money as a group, and although when they receive it, a bigger portion goes to the nearest agnate of the victim, the remainder is distributed equally among all its members. The number of generations which supervene between the founding ancestor of a tertiary segment and the living is usually four or five, but there is little consistency in this number. Some tertiary

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[3] This part of the discussion is necessarily brief, but further amplification will appear in two subsequent articles now in preparation, one of which is [114]
concerned with a general treatment of Cyrenaican genealogies, and the other with a discussion of the effects of ecology on the social organization of the Bedouin.

[4] I use the word hierarchy here since, although segments of any order display many like features, the orders represent distinct and progressively more [128]
embracing interests, and these differences are of such consequence that to consider one order of groups as a facsimile of a superior or inferior order can only lead to confusion. A tertiary group, that is to say, may possess many of the characteristics of a secondary group, but the one is a fundamentally different sort of group from the other, as I shall show in my forthcoming article on the feud. (cf. Smith, M. G. 1956.)

[5] This statement does not apply to the Darsa and the Hasa tribes, two of [619]
the plateau tribes in Cyrenaica. The statements in this article are confined [128]
almost exclusively to the camel herders of the semi-desert.

[6] This, admittedly, is too general a statement to make about such an important issue, but I would prefer to leave its documentation and precision for an article on the analysis of the composition of Bedouin camps.

613 segments show a lineage depth of three generations, while others
621 show as many as six. No special importance is attached by the
Bedouin to this number, although some writers claim that a depth
of five generations is of particular significance among other Arab
621 tribes.[7] Normally, in speaking of the vengeance group, the Bedouin
628 refer to the name of the ancestor of a tertiary tribal section.
613 Any one claiming membership of this group, regardless of his
682 precise generational relation to the offender or the victim is immediately
and equally involved with its other members. When
speaking of the group as such, the Bedouin refer to it as 'those
who have agreed on the blood', and use the phrase *'amara dam*
to refer to it. Blood money does not pass between its members,
and political division does not occur within it.

621 These small tertiary sections of tribes, then, are small residential
613 groups. Their population varies from one group to another,
[162] but most of them have a total population of 150 to 200 souls.
Successive generations—at least according to the Bedouin view—add to these numbers, and also increase progressively the number of generations in their genealogies. Substantial increases of population would, of course, constitute a pressure on local resources, on the water available in the particular well of a group, on the amount of land available for ploughing, and on the pastures for animals at the end of the rainy season. Again, if each generation is to be added to the existing genealogy, this would necessitate a realignment of structural relationships with each succeeding generation. The discussion that follows is an
128 examination of the ways in which adjustments are made to
621 maintain an equilibrium between the population of a group and
613 the carrying capacity of the land on which its members live, and
of the ways in which the genealogical structure is able to persist
in the face of various contingencies which threaten it.

A beginning might be made by indicating the processes at work to keep the form of the genealogy fairly fixed when there is an absence of population pressure on resources. The first problem is the simple one of describing the mechanics of manipula-

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[171] [7] e.g. Burkhardt (1831), speaks of the *Khomse*, the five generation group, as very widespread among Arabs. G. W. Murray also reports the use of the word *Khomsa* among the Arabs of the Sinai desert to designate the blood-vengeance group, but the term used by the Aulad 'Ali tribe, the cousins and Egyptian neighbours of the Cyrenaican Bedouin, he gives as *Awlia'-ed-dam* (which simply means 'blood kindred').

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ticular section of their noble patron tribe, is tied to the patron 571
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for the use of water, and if their patrons decide that there is insufficient to meet all needs, the request is refused, albeit reluctantly. Clients constitute a socially mobile group; they are the pawns in the annual readjustment of men to their resources. Whenever they move, they pass on to another tertiary section, which may be a collateral section of the one they have left or structurally far removed from it, but as soon as they leave one, their duties and obligations cease and are taken up anew with another structurally like group. It is because their attachment is to a tertiary section, and not to one of superior order, that they can be as socially mobile as they are, which in turn facilitates a more efficient adjustment to the ecological situation from year to year.

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613 his maternal kinsmen to use the land and water facilities of
578 his lineage; his agnates may give ready consent or bicker about
602 it, but when it becomes necessary to clean a well, disputes are
almost certain to break out in the camp between those who argue
that their maternal relatives should not be expected to assist in
its cleaning and those who insist they should as an acknowledgement
of the use they have made of it. In these circumstances
613 maternal links divide agnates. Conversely, if it becomes necessary
602 for some of the same men to use the water and ploughland
of their maternal kin, their agnates are only too pleased that
they are able to do so, because the pressure on their own resources
is relieved. In these circumstances, the maternal link
strengthens the agnatic group. When, to give another instance,
613 blood-money has to be gathered, it is the duty of all agnates to
682 contribute equally, and no member of the group, rich or poor,
can contract out of this obligation without sacrificing his membership
of the group. Payments of blood-money are witness of
the strength of the notion of 'oneness' among agnates, in one
sense, but in so far as they are compulsory, they point also to the
weakness in the relationship. Maternal kin are not directly concerned
in this, but they can and do make contributions. In this
context two aspects of agnation appear, and the value of the
602 maternal link is emphasized. Again, maternal kinsmen are not
428 directly concerned in inheritance disputes, but they are expected
578 to intercede for their sister's sons, who often use their mother's
brother's tribal brand on their own animals. During disputes of
this kind, blame is thrown on to the maternal kinsmen for their
interference in matters which, properly speaking, are not their
613 business. In marriage, however, events take quite a different
582 turn. The responsibility for providing a man with a wife is first
that of the father, and secondly of the members of the tertiary
section; the father takes the initiative, and his agnates assist, not
only in the negotiations, but also in defraying the heavy costs of
the wedding festivities, the various gifts that precede it, and the
604 bride-wealth which follows. The mother's brother is also a key
613 person in all these arrangements. He enters into the negotiations,
585 assists with the entertainment on the wedding day, and makes a
[583] substantial contribution to the bride-wealth. On the wedding day,
there is no kinsman to compare with the mother's brother; a few

613 to one well, and the remainder to the other. It is usually an easy
621 matter to predict, at least in a general fashion, how the group
602 will divide, as long as the details of kinship are known; the camps
[312] will be composed of members of two sets of patri-lines in the
tertiary segment, who will also represent two discrete clusters of cognatic kindred. If, therefore, a tertiary group increases in numbers to the point where a split in the lineage is inevitable, here then is the line of split, along a line, that is, of kinship cleavage and lineage differentiation. 'Men make the tribe; women divide it,' is an oft-quoted saying among the Bedouin, but this, like most sayings, tells only part of the truth, as we shall see.

613 It is possible to show where on the genealogy change takes
621 place, and it is possible to indicate the lines cleavages will follow,
but the proliferation of a lineage does not occur merely because the possibility exists for it to do so. A group must, clearly, break up if the number of its members significantly exceeds that which can be supported by the available natural resources; water is the prime cause of the proliferation of lineages. Granting this, a group remains an undifferentiated corporation until occasion arises when its members, or some of them, can demonstrate unequivocally that they are no longer bound by its conditions of membership. There is a number of occasions when this can be done, some of which are discussed below.

613 The test, *par excellence*, of corporate affiliation is the accept-
ance of the responsibility to pay blood-money. Refusal to accept
621 this is the same as renouncing membership of the group. Individ-
672 uals are sometimes excluded from membership in this way. There
682 are occasions too, when the payment of blood-money involves
renunciation by more than one or two individuals. If membership of a section has increased to the point of splitting, and should a homicide occur within it, one of the kin clusters within the group might demand blood-money from the other. Nothing could make the statement of split clearer than this. The most impelling condition of membership of the tertiary group is that 'we pay as one and receive as one', a condition which, of course, excludes payment within the group. Any two groups between which the demand for blood-money has been made are, therefore, by definition, separate tertiary groups.

613
621 When a member of a group or his wife dies, there are specific
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SOME STRUCTURAL ASPECTS OF THE FEUD AMONG THE CAMEL-HERDING BEDOUIN OF CYRENAICA[1]

E. L. PETERS

WHEN a Bedouin kills another in Cyrenaica, one of a number of consequences 682 ●
ensues. According to the Bedouin, the particular consequence is determined by 571
the genealogical positions of the persons or groups concerned. In the first part of 829
this article an analysis of the disturbances in social relationships precipitated by 128
homicide is made, using a lineage model as a framework. In this part of the dis-
cussion the arrangement of the information corresponds closely to the view the
Bedouin give of their relationships. Additional information is then presented to show [613]
that this lineage model neither covers several important areas of social relationships
nor enables an accurate prediction of events to be made. This raises the issue: can the 121
comprehensive power of the model be increased by complicating it, or does com- 613
plexity destroy its utility? The argument advanced is that the lineage model is not a 571
sociological one, but that it is a frame of reference used by a particular people to
give them a common-sense kind of understanding of their social relationships. For
sociological purposes this means that the lineage model, with its supporting theoreti-
cal presuppositions, must perforce be abandoned. In the latter part of this article [128]
some of the implications of adopting this position are discussed. Particular stress is [578]

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[1] This study is based on field-work in Cyrenaica carried out over a period of twenty-seven months from January 1948 to December 1950. The field-work was made possible by the award of a Horniman Studentship and of a Treasury Senior Studentship in Oriental Languages and Cultures. I wish to express my thanks to both awarding bodies. The paper was presented in its first form to a seminar at Manchester University. Modified versions were read at Oxford and Cambridge and at University College London in 1963. In a Manchester seminar, Professor W. J. M. Mackenzie raised issues which led me to reconsider my mode of analysis. Professor Ely Devons read a draft of the article, and offered valuable suggestions.
I also wish to thank Professor Gluckman for the 12
many profitable discussions we have had on the
institution of the feud. My interest in the feud stems [114]
directly from Evans-Pritchard's work on the institu-
tion among the Nuer. I am most grateful to him ←
for his help and encouragement while I was pursuing my researches. Finally, anyone writing on the feud must acknowledge the contribution made to its understanding by Dr. Elizabeth Colson.

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degree and is ephemeral, so that the opportunity for the development of trade relations 621
is absent.[1] Save for straying animals, a section has no urgent need to seek 311
relationships with others, as long as the rainfall is sufficient to permit the exploitation [619]
of local resources.

The tertiary section is also regarded as the corporate group *par excellence*, in which 621
‘ the one word does for all ’. Corporate identity is conceptualized as ‘ one bone ’ 613
or ‘ one body ’. An offence against one of its members is held to be an offence
against all; if one of its members is killed ‘ we all lose blood ’. When one of its members [682]
commits homicide the responsibility falls on all equally. Blood money, when
received, is shared by all save for a special portion reserved for the ‘ owner of the [672]
blood ’, the nearest agnate of the victim. In opposite circumstances, all adult males accept the responsibility of contributing an equal share to the blood money. Rules of membership, simple in their brevity, express graphically this corporate identity: ‘ You must strike with us and be struck with us; you must pay with us and receive with us.’ The group also bears a name, and there is never any doubt about the affiliation of any tribesman. That group of men—known as the *'amarā dam*—who are agreed on the obligation to exact vengeance, to pay blood money when necessary, to engage in common defence, and to accept the possibility of death in vengeance, is a fixed and clear-cut group, not one whose membership has to be calculated by reference to degrees of kinship in regard to a specific situation, as appears to be the case among other peoples.

Homicide within the *'amarā dam* brings about an impasse in relationships. A blood- 621
money payment is out of the question since the acceptance of blood money by one 613
part of a tertiary section from another of its parts is tantamount to a statement of 682
split. Only in conditions where relationships within the lineage have developed to the 627
point of political severance is it anticipated that a blood-money payment may be
demanded; but this problem is not the same as that at present under discussion.
Bedouin say that blood money cannot pass within the *'amarā dam* for those making [829]
the payment would be the persons receiving it. This is spurious reasoning, since the
‘ owner of the blood ’ is awarded more than any other members of the group as it is, and arrangements could obviously be made to pay him separately. Blood money is out of the question because it distinguishes relationships between people as belonging to two distinct political communities, and not because of any difficulty of distribution.
In Bedouin thinking, an injury to ‘ the one body ’ is an injury to all its parts. Blood-money [829]
payments by members of a corporation to one or more of its members is a
contradiction in terms. In the same way vengeance is also excluded, for this merely doubles the original loss. A reprisal exacted in hot blood is always a possibility, but this is not referred to as *thār*, vengeance. Even if, at a later date, the closest kinsman of the victim should slay the offender, the act would not be referred to as *thār* and any connexion with earlier homicides would be denied.

Stultified in the field of political action, there is little else that can be done. Expulsion 682
is a possible course of action—and expulsion has occurred. Records show, however, that exile is almost invariably voluntary.[2] Moreover, exile is terminated as

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[1] Many sections trade fleeces for dates with the folk of distant oases, but the sections do not trade among themselves.

[2] I recorded one case of a man who was expelled from his group and the tribes around were warned that the rules of sanctuary were not to apply to him. [438]
He is said to have died from grief and hunger. The reason given for such drastic action is that he killed

682 a rule by the return of the offender to his camp after the lapse of a number of years. A man who had already killed six people killed a seventh, his first paternal cousin. He and his brothers fled the tribe; he died in exile and it was not until some thirty
[123] years later that his brother and nephew returned. Another man, who had killed his first paternal cousin, used my entry into a camp as the occasion for his re-entry, pitching his tent rope on rope with mine, and mine in turn was rope on rope with the tent of the camp's shaikh.[1]

621 An effort is always made to hush up the matter when a homicide occurs within a
682 tertiary section. It is for this reason that the name of the victim is not perpetuated.
613 Normally it is an obligation to perpetuate the names of the deceased, especially when
[551] they have been killed in homicide, but in the circumstances now being discussed the name is suppressed. As one man expressed the general sentiments, stretching out his toga in front of him: 'Look at the hole in my toga; it would be better without it, but what can I do? Make it bigger? It is better to cover it up.' Any penal action taken against the offender could only enlarge the wound he had already opened. The notion of corporate identity is so strong that it eliminates the use of penal action against one of its members for the greatest offence of all. While overtly every effort is made to expunge the memory of a homicide of the sort described above, the Bedouin are most articulate in their views about the offender. He is referred to as one who 'defecates in the tent' thus likening him to an animal, for no human being would do this. Other expletives used in reference to him are: one who 'destroys the lineage', who 'corrupts the family'; he is one who 'brings confusion', who 'provokes God' and causes 'the evil of leprosy to eat into relationships'. Their feelings about the offender, who 'commits robbery internally', are summed up in the word *fitna*. This, in its Cyrenaican use, corresponds closely to the notion of sin as it is used in the Old Testament; in the sense, that is to say, of an act which causes an impasse in relationships, which creates chaos among a small group of related people, and produces internal calamity. And this is indeed the situation brought about by such homicide among the Bedouin. Flowing blood, they are wont to say, can only be staunched by blood (i.e. a vengeance killing), but if a man kills within a close agnatic range the corporate body continues to bleed. Nothing can be done. The group is left helpless, and this is sin.

The first step in this exposition, therefore, is to attach to homicide within a tertiary section the notion of its being *fitna*, carrying with it voluntary and temporary expulsion.

682 A homicide which involves two collateral tertiary sections is a different matter
628 altogether, for now the parties constitute two discrete political groups. Political
621 machinery can be set in motion to deal with the breach in relationships, and conse-
613 quently a homicide of this sort does not pose the dilemma which is created when it occurs within a politically undivided group. Not only do agnates of two collateral tertiary sections behave towards each other as two groups of people, but the nature of their relationships is fundamentally different from those obtaining between mem-

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682 a first cousin in cold blood because of a dispute between them over the ownership of a new-born kid. Although this was the only reason given by the Bedouin other considerations were involved—the victim was said to have been a fine person, and his killer a constant trouble maker, and so on.

[1] See for comparison Robertson Smith, 1903. The tent is an area of sanctuary, and this extends to include the ropes also.

bers of an undivided group. It is erroneous to suppose that because the different 621
orders of sections are homologous in their structural aspects they do not differ; they 613
do, because the interests associated with the various orders are different.[1] 628

Collateral tertiary segments are associated with different tracts of territory. Each [682]
has its own watering rights as a group, and although groups may share a grain store, [423]
it is divided on group lines. Members of these different groups do not gather together in summer to form a single community, though at some of the very big watering points they are near each other. Social relationships between them are, however, intense. Visits are frequent. They meet to exchange news, or to inquire after the [574]
sick. They exchange greetings during the major festivals, and members of one group attend the funerals and weddings of the others, taking gifts. They also meet at the grain stores. Herdsmen, as they pursue straying animals, wander freely in their neighbours' territory. Relationships of this sort, some of them urgently necessary for survival, do not permit the feuding relationships to be described presently. Permanent hostility which characterizes the feud would seriously disrupt everyday economic activities, limit the pastoral movements of the Bedouin beyond endurance, and sever lines of communication which they always strive to keep open.

A homicide, when it involves two collateral tertiary groups must, therefore, be 621
resolved quickly. This can be effected in two ways. Vengeance may be exacted im- 613
mediately. This is always referred to as a vengeance killing or *thār*, and is to be dis- 628
tinguished from a superficially similar act within a tertiary group, since *thār* carries 682
with it the implication that it is premeditated. A *thār* between two tertiary sections is considered to be the best way of settling the affair and, after an appropriate lapse of time, a peace meeting is held at which it is accepted that the killings have cancelled each other out. The deliberations at this meeting are followed by a meal at which all present 'eat around the one bowl'; the meal over, they all pray together. A life had been taken for a life and the way is now open for the restoration of normal peaceful relationships. Vengeance needs to be distinguished from feud, for while retaliatory killings provide the propulsive force in the feud a vengeance killing may be the means whereby a settlement of hostilities is made possible.

An end to hostilities may also be brought about by a promise to pay blood money 621
or *diya*, and its acceptance by the victim's group. Arrangements for blood-money 613
discussions are made by a category of persons known as *marabtin bi'l baraka*, or 628
'clients of the goodness', men who, by virtue of descent and origin, stand outside
the descent lines of the noble tribes, and who are accredited with divine goodness. 682
They tend the sick, write amulets, and are always present at a peace meeting to give 792
it the weight of their baraka. Soon after the homicide has occurred they act as intermediaries to bring the hostile groups together at a peace meeting.[2] Ostensibly, the 621
first part of the proceedings at these meetings is to settle the amount of the blood 613
money, and how and when it is to be paid. Agreement on these counts will have been 628
reached, however, before the large peace gathering is assembled, for there is a gener- 682

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[1] This statement requires more documentation than I am able to give to it in this paper, but the descriptive details given hereafter give it some substance. See also Smith, 1956.

[2] It is necessary to add here that these clients do not assume coercive powers. They are granted the power to curse, but the curse that is feared is the curse of their dead when an oath is given at a saint's tomb. When they know that groups wish to make peace they assist as messengers in bringing people together, but they do not use their power to curse as a pressure.

621 ally recognized amount of blood money to compensate a homicide. The wrangling
613 that goes on at the meeting is of a conventional kind, and it is known in advance that
628 several distinguished guests present will supplicate for a reduction of the amount
● 682 demanded by the victim's group, until the amount generally accepted as appropriate
is reached. Such haggling makes it possible for the victim's surviving agnates to
maintain the fiction that they yielded only under the strongest pressure from the desert
[264] leaders and holy men. The main importance of the meeting is that the two hostile
groups are brought together again for the first time, that the cleavage between them has been narrowed sufficiently to permit them to eat round one bowl, and that, by virtue of this commensal meal, the way is now open for the restoration of normal relationships. Subsequently there may be another killing, which, in the mind of the perpetrator, is connected with the earlier death of a kinsman, but it is not publicly recognized as one in a series of killings, or even as a vengeance killing; it is regarded as unique, and the method of dealing with it is on the basis of this fiction. Feud is not permitted between two collateral tertiary sections, for although the pattern of homicide may be similar to that of a feud, the two are never equated. There is good reason for this, since, whatever the similarity in pattern, the social relationships between the groups involved are radically different; each homicide involving tertiary sections is regarded as a unique event, and the relationships between times are friendly, whereas in feud relationships are permanently hostile and need not be otherwise for social, economic, or religious purposes.

Blood money when it brings peace brings it because payment is made only in part. It is never regarded as a payment for the life of a man, to be dissipated wantonly. ' The owner of the blood ' should marry a wife with it to beget children (one son to be named after the victim) or to buy camels to provide for a future marriage, or to buy a horse to be used to ride in bringing vengeance. Sufficient is paid to cover either of the first two alternatives; as far as my records go the third alternative is romanticism. At the peace meeting the offender's group does not promise to pay the total amount in one sum. An initial instalment is promised after the next lambing season or barley harvest. When the time comes it can be argued that the sheep dropped a disappointingly small number of lambs, or that the barley harvest did not fulfil expectations. If there is room for negotiation over the initial payment, the permitted manœuvring over subsequent payments is much greater. Promises made at the peace meeting relating to these subsequent payments do not specify the exact amount of each; the statement is no more definite than that the remainder should be paid over the following three to five years. Consequently when the second payment falls due, the offender's group can argue more cogently that their circumstances do not permit even a reduced payment, for the payment of the previous year was substantial and they have not yet recovered from this outlay. ' The owner of the blood ' is pressed to consider this, and to accept only a fraction of the wealth he had come to collect. The argument is cumulative, and can be used to excuse the rapidly decreasing payments of each successive year, until there comes a time when attempts to collect payments are discontinued. The arguments about the payments bear no relationship to the wealth possessed by a group. During the annual hagglings, and while members of the offender's group are declaring their straitened circumstances as an excuse for the small amount offered, the ' owner of the blood ' knows full well that two or three

621 hundred of their sheep are grazing in the neighbourhood. This is beside the point.
613 What is important is that the offender's group is showing a desire to remain on
628 friendly terms, and members of the victim's group are doing likewise by accepting
682 reduced amounts. Compared with what the payments should be, after four years they
are trivial and soon cease altogether. Blood money, if it is to achieve the purpose of
621 restoring peaceful relationships, must work in this way among the Bedouin, for, as
613 they view the matter, a single payment of the full amount would only terminate
628 relationships. There would be no further obligations to hold them together. The
682 payment of a debt in full means only one thing—hostility. Where there is no debt,
571 there are no relationships. Debt must be allowed to run between groups, for it is this
182 which creates obligations and perpetuates social relationships.[1] As the debt of blood
money mounts, the social relationships between the groups improve. The cessation
of payments and the absence of further demands is final earnest that the relationships
are again normal.

613 The second step in this exposition, therefore, is to attach to homicide between
628 tertiary sections the penalty of vengeance or the payment of blood money, both
621 achieving the same end of bringing about a restoration of peaceful relationships.

682 Between secondary sections, relationships are again different. Ecologically, the
619 areas are distinct. The topography may be dissimilar—sand dunes in one area and
613 low valleys in another; secondly, the soils may differ—sandy soil here and firm valley
[133] bottom soil there; thirdly, while the climatic régime of the two areas may be broadly
similar, since there is marked variability in the aggregate annual rainfall which is
[132] coupled with a high variability from place to place, each secondary section has its
own micro-climate, sufficiently well defined for one area to be well watered in any
given year while a neighbouring area suffers partial drought. These differences affect
[221] productive activities. Seasonal movements are also affected: some secondary sections
move annually over considerable distances and in fixed directions, while members of
a collateral section may move only a few miles and these short moves may vary in
direction from year to year. It is true that minor ecological differences exist between
collateral tertiary sections, but these do not affect the economy and the way of life in
the manner described for secondary sections. Partly because of their territorial extent,
partly because of the larger aggregate population, the secondary sections are more
self-contained, not only ecologically and economically but also in terms of social
relationship. More of the requirements of everyday living can be met within the
territory and span of a secondary section than within those of a tertiary section.
Secondary sections develop a kind of specialization to the extent that in any year
some of them will have more usable natural resources than others, but because these
differences are ephemeral they do not lead to the development of permanent trade
relations. Add to all this the fact that agnates are concentrated in camps on the territory which belongs to their lineage, and the discreteness of secondary sections is
[582] immediately apparent. Marriage rules make this discreteness potentially, at least, even
more sharply defined, for unlike other ' lineage societies ' where exogamy, coupled
with other marriage regulations, compels the dispersion of kin links among lineage

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[1] This point becomes clearer when considered in the general context of debt relationship among the Bedouin. Marriage payments, gift exchanges, hospitality, various forms of help, and so on are all aspects, with blood money, of an intricate and fascinating web of debt relationships.

619 segments, the Bedouin are free to marry within as close a range as the first cousin on
613 either side. Preferential marriage with the father's brother's daughter exists, not
582 merely as a sentiment, but with the legal force of permitting a man this choice against all other men. Before a father arranges the marriage of his daughter he first must seek the permission of his brother's son. Moreover, if a first-parallel cousin is not available, a Bedouin is free to take as a wife any parallel cousin within the minimal lineage. Much weight has been given to the value of exogamy as a device for the definition of groups; parallel-cousin marriage is equally suitable for the purpose—indeed it is better for it has the effect of knitting the members of a local group together as cognates, thereby throwing the group into isolated relief.

613 Consequently, when a homicide occurs between two secondary sections, there is
628 no urgent necessity to make peace, the relationship between them being of a kind
682 that can be controlled and altered to suit the circumstances. It is between these groups that the argument—if the argument is taken up at all—centres on the circumstances of the killing, every effort being made to show that insult was deliberately added to homicide, that one homicide is to be distinguished from another because a man of great renown was singled out as the avenger's victim, or that in a vengeance killing there was a breach of taboo as well. A debt is always left over, and it is an impelling obligation for the Bedouin to redeem it. They frequently speak of vengeance in this context as 'redeeming the debt'. Again, any homicide between two secondary sections is regarded as one in a series, whether the details or even the name of the victim of the previous homicide is known or not. I recall discussing a double homicide with a close kinsman of the slayer, and the only way he could account for it was by telling me that his kinsman had to kill because his victims were of such and such a group. The feud knows no beginning, and it has no end. It is a form of behaviour associated with a specific structural order, and it is as persistent as the structural order itself; in this sense it is eternal. It was most difficult to get the Bedouin to give accounts of homicides other than those which had occurred over the past fifty years or so, but they invariably claimed that the origin was earlier than this, although they were wholly unaware of the identity of the earlier victims. In any event, their only historical frame of reference is the genealogy; and history, as a chronological sequence of events, has no meaning beyond the founding ancestor of a minimal segment. When they refer events to points on the genealogy superior to this, they are no longer thinking in terms of the temporal order of events, but in terms of what they know to be the contemporary relationships between groups, for the names on the genealogy are names of groups and do not bear a relation to a time scale in any sense. Put in another way, for them a homicide which involves two secondary sections must be a feud, because this is the nature of the relationships between the groups, and there must have been previous killings, otherwise the people involved would not belong to two separate secondary groups.

The relationships which are referred to as feud are of a kind which requires at least a show of hostility whenever the parties happen to meet. Even if they do not actually meet, but are in the vicinity, some sort of demonstration is likely. Thus, several shots were fired at a man riding some distance away from a camp, and although positive identification was difficult at this range, the men of the camp argued it must have been a member of a group with which they were at feud otherwise the passer-by

would have dropped in on the camp. In another situation, two men entered a shop 613
in a market-place; inside sat two men of a feuding group who, instead of retreating 628
hastily, greeted those who had just entered, and the latter returned the greeting with 682
blows on the head from the butts of their rifles. Markets in Cyrenaica are recognized
to be places of peace. In their actions the two offenders not only injured two others [443]
but also broke a taboo in a public place. The victim's group now had to avenge not [683]
only the injury but the insult that the breach of taboo carried with it, as well. In
most feud relationships this is characteristic. It is never a matter of a simple homicide,
but of killing a man at the entrance to his tent, between the centre poles of his tent,
or taking the life of a minor, or an elder too old to carry arms and so on. Each successive
killing ensures that the hostile relationships will be perpetuated.

The third step in this exposition, therefore, is the association of a state of feud with the secondary order of segmentation.

When the relationships between the structurally superior primary tribal sections 619
are examined, the arguments against the necessity for peace are stronger than in the
case of secondary sections. Relationships between them are few and irregular. Only
occasionally do members of these groups meet, and then often accidentally; very
many men of collateral primary sections are complete strangers one to the other.
If a homicide occurs between two primary sections it is unlikely that any attempt to 619
open negotiations will be made. The offender's camp may be raided by a *ghazi* 682
recruited from the victim's kinsmen. There would be no question of these primary [721]
sections going to war. On a raid firearms may be used, but the action is limited to a
strike-and-run affair. If the issue is joined and members of both sides are ranged
against each other they fight with sticks to avoid large-scale slaughter: warfare must [726]
not be allowed within the tribe. Wars belong to intertribal relationships. For one of 175
these wars, apart from hearsay evidence, some records exist. These tell of a war 619
which took place during the period 1860 to 1865, in which there were planned campaigns, 726
the organization of fighters into groups, and provisions for a labour force
in the home territory, large enough to produce sufficient food to maintain an army
in the field. During this war several hundred people were killed.

At this point, it is possible to summarize the stages in this exposition of the 619
Bedouin view in diagrammatic form. 726

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

682 To complete this general statement, two further circumstances are cited by the
602 Bedouin. If a man kills a related person who is not an agnate (it is expressed as killing
the mother's brother) the breach in relationships must be healed as quickly as possible.
The convention for dealing with this is that the offender, bound hand and foot,
mounted on a horse, is sent to the camp of ' the owner of the blood ', in the company
of a holy man, there to make an offer of his life, saying: ' Here is my knife, my life
is yours; here is my shroud, my life is yours.' No Bedouin would agree for a moment
to undertake this journey if he thought the offer might be accepted. In Bedouin
sentiments a life offered in this way cannot be taken. It is the convention which precedes
a peace meeting and blood money. Any other way of dealing with the confusion,
which spreads as a result of a homicide between cognates, is excluded.

682 Secondly, if a woman is killed, whatever the intersegmentary distance, the homicide
562 is said to be accidental, because a man never ' intends ' to kill a woman. Blood-money
arrangements are made as soon as possible, and the wealth—half that of a
613 man—passes to the deceased's father, not to her husband, for a woman's ' bone '
always belongs to her father. Obviously women cannot be allowed to enter into
582 feud; since it is demographically compelling (apart from other reasons) for some of
591 them to marry outside their natal groups, then they might well find themselves residents
in the enemy's camps, if they were to become involved in feuds.

121 This statement of the different means available for the regulation of homicide at
682 the several orders of tribal segmentation is the view the Bedouin themselves hold of
their relationships. An analysis of the facts presented thus far could bring out a
613 number of interesting points with regard to the relativity of morals, the typification
829 of acts by their social context, the significance of the orders of segmentation, and so
619 on. Rather than proceed along these lines, however, it is more urgently necessary
to reflect on the significance of the fact that the arrangement of the material in terms
of what is usually called the lineage structure coincides with the Bedouin ordering
of the same details. It is, of course, important to note that the account is not based
on mere hearsay evidence. Each statement made can be documented from known
homicides, and to this extent the model that has been used is consistent with reality.
The model, nevertheless, can only be a representation of what a particular people,
the Bedouin, conceive their social reality to be; it is a kind of ideology which enables
them, without making absurd demands on their credulity, to understand their field
of social relationships, and to give particular relationships their *raison d'être*. But, as
will be shown, it would be a serious error to mistake such a folk model for sociological
analysis. Such an error is difficult to avoid because the Bedouin, when defending their
view, are able to cite enough bits and pieces of reality to make their argument convincing.
121 The flaw in the reasoning is seen when it can be shown that its consequences
114 are absurd. As an example of what is meant, the statement that feud is attached to
613 groups at the secondary order of segmentation may be considered. If the statement
were true, if each and every secondary section were at feud one with the other (and
619 in a structural sense this ought to be so), then each tribe would be divided into small
829 mutually hostile groups, which completely lacked any possibility of movement, even
578 for pasturing purposes. Presented with this, the Bedouin would argue that this is not
in fact so, because secondary and primary sections are interlinked in many ways. That
is, they evoke what to them are contingencies to explain why they are at feud with one

121 These three objections to the lineage theory as a useful model for examining the
613 consequences of homicide are serious enough in themselves, but another objection
562 renders it still less satisfactory. This fourth objection relates to the implication that
114 lineage theory cannot take account of women. Indeed, in some of the accounts of the political organization of lineage societies, the impression is given that they are all-male societies: women belong only to the domestic and kinship realms. In terms of the theory, this must be so. Women, the marriage links they create, the forms of relationships that derive from marriage, the right of men to joke with others by virtue of a link through women, their rights to demand favours of men who are not their agnates, their right to expect contributions to bridewealth or blood money from maternal relatives—all these, and other forms of behaviour, have been dealt with as patterns of behaviour which interfere with or disturb agnation, or that cut
121 across lineage affiliations. Such metaphors can only be justified if it is accepted that
613 precedence must be given to agnation, to what people say they think their lineage relationships to be, and that there is some kind of primacy about what have frequently been called jural rules which constitute the structure, while behaviour which is not governed by these rules is to be relegated to the position of secondary forms having the effect of intruding only. But these secondary forms of behaviour are as impelling, as persisting, and are as much a part of social life as any of the so-called jural rules.
[582] It is possible to go further than this, and state that in societies where there is a high incidence of marriage among agnates of the local group, as occurs among the Bedouin, jural rules rarely appear in their ' pure ' form in behaviour, since, in groups of this sort, each and every person constitutes a bundle of roles by virtue of the fact that he is one of a very complex cognatic group; a particular role, it is true, may take precedence in a particular situation, but all roles are present in each situation and affect behaviour. Precedence can only be given to specific forms of behaviour in relation to situations. There is no such thing as a general primacy with regard to any form. The concept of agnation as the centre of all political problems, disturbed or disrupted by, say, matrilaterality, is as inadequate as saying that the nucleus which pulls all other components into position is matrilaterality with agnation as a disturbing element. In reality there are numerous components present in all situations, which should not be lumped together under such categorizing terms as agnation and matrilaterality, but which combine as separate components in a kaleidoscopic range of clusters.

121 Some of the components of behaviour subsumed under the notion of matrilaterality
613 are briefly given here in order to appreciate more fully the consequence of inter-group
682 marriage. Of paramount importance is the fact that, in Bedouin sentiment, to kill
674 a relative is as sinful an act as the killing of a close agnate. When such a homicide
829 did occur, during my period of residence among them, the Bedouin response was to assert that the offender was out of his mind—it was inconceivable that he could have
[602] committed the offence otherwise. Their attitude was reminiscent of the horror they display when a man kills his father or a full brother, and represents a much stronger reaction than is manifested when a man kills an agnate of, say, the third or fourth degree. They have every reason to be disturbed by the killing of a mother's brother,
[604] for, whatever personal affections may be involved, a crucial link is threatened. Their reasoning, however, is that relationships with the mother's brother are characteristically easy, that they are not demanding, that there is much joking in them, and that to

121 kill within this range is, in terms of the general pattern of behaviour, stupid. What is of
613 interest is that such killings do occur. I recorded three instances of men killing the
• 682 mother's brother in the contemporary population, not to mention many others
674 based on hearsay evidence only. Clearly, the relationship is more than a merely per-
829 missive one. The mother's brother may well be the only person who can help in
certain crises, and if he withholds his assistance the sister's son is left in a dilemma.
604 The form of behaviour in which demands are made is, as the Bedouin rightly say,
121 that of asking a favour, but this does not mean that it is any the less urgent than a
613 demand made against agnates. The range of favours is large, and only a few can be
604 detailed here. If a group has insufficient water to meet its needs a man first seeks help
from his mother's brother. The request has a number of aspects to it: it is a test of
[554] the relationship itself; it is a matter of pride and status that a man can 'call' on
another to help his group out of difficulties, it is an assurance that resources other than
those jealously guarded by his agnates are available to him, and if a man is seeking
to increase his power he must have available more than an agnate's share of local
[682] water resources to supply his flocks and herds. When a blood-money payment has to
be made, the mother's brother is expected to come forward—it is his right to give
[584] without being asked. If a man wants a wife, he is not permitted to approach his father
directly, but his mother's brother can put pressure on the father instead. If a man dies
[429] while his eldest son is still a minor, his brother may be required to act as guardian,
and in this role he controls the son's property; disputes frequently break out as a
result, with the son at a considerable disadvantage, for he cannot engage his father's
[422] brother in hostilities—but his mother's brother can do so for him. Whenever men
come to possess animals before the demise of their fathers or when the father's
brother is acting as guardian they mark them with the tribal and personal signs of their
[583] mothers' brothers. Men have the right to demand contributions for bridewealth
from their agnates if they lack wealth; in practice it comes not from them, but from
the mother's brother. Finally, in certain circumstances, if a man does not have male
heirs, his sister's son might inherit all his wealth.

121 Affinity also carries with it a large number of rights. A poor man may take up
613 residence in the camp of his father-in-law, and be kept by him. The latter may come
to his son-in-law's aid in many of his dealings with his father. Like the mother's
606 brother, the affine is a potential source of water-supply when rain has been insufficient
on the homeland. He also helps with blood money and bridewealth, and he is expected
to aid his daughter and her husband with gifts of food and wool.

121 The details given above by no means exhaust the list of rights a man possesses in
613 his matrilateral and affinal relatives. Obviously, these are not the only forms of
relationship either, and the other forms carry with them yet other claims of various
sorts. Enough detail has been given, however, to make clear the point that local
agnatic groups are so differentiated, and inter-group relationships are so important,
that each aspect of homicide settlement previously described will require further
examination, not in the sense that additional complications must be introduced, but
with the question in mind, is not the structural presentation false? Before beginning
this stage of the argument it is necessary to establish the fact that the links of affinity
and matrilaterality which a group has with another are of a kind which necessitate
their inclusion in an analysis of the arrangements for settling homicides.

121 teral secondary sections, with collateral primary sections, and long distances away
613 into other tribes. This spread can be interpreted as giving each tertiary group access
582 to resources of wide ecological diversity. What is of interest in the present context
is not the interpretation ~~of~~ the links but the effect they have on behaviour. Spread
means that a group can call for help from a number of differently situated groups.
121 Each one of these links not merely modifies the structural means for settling homi-
613 cide, but converts the homicide into a sociologically quite different sort of act. It can,
582 as the Bedouin like to think, be an act of merit for a man to kill another from a feud-
578 ing secondary section, but there is no merit whatsoever in it if the tertiary section of
682 that secondary section happens to contain affines or maternal relatives; this is a sinful
act. The Bedouin themselves recognize this when they add to their structural explanation the rider that they do not feud with cognatic relatives. The difference between their position and a sociological one is that they see this as a contingency not as a persistent necessity; they are able to maintain their position because they see their behaviour as explicable in terms of the simple ossified structure of their genealogical relationships. What they fail to appreciate is that these ' contingencies ' are ecologically, economically, demographically, and politically essential. They are able to maintain their position also, because the model of a lineage structure they use, along with the two riders previously mentioned (see p. 270) affords them a kind of explanation for most occurrences. The argument is attractive both to Bedouin and to anthropologists because it is comprehensive and neat in its logicality. The next stage in the argument is to show that there is a far greater range of possible consequences to a homicide than those summarized in the diagram (see p. 269) and that the additional consequences are related, not to the lineage structure, but to the linkages which have been discussed above.

121 I begin with a review of a homicide which involves two men of the same tertiary
613 section. Bedouin classify all homicides within this range—as they do for any of the
682 structural orders—as undifferentiated, but in each case, different sorts of relatives
829 are concerned in the ensuing hostilities, and the consequences are, therefore, different
also. Bedouin say that a man never kills his father or full brother. In the event of a man killing another man acknowledged to be his father, the act itself proves that he cannot possibly be his son. He is said to be illegitimate, thus making his mother an adultress and relieving the males of the agnatic line of the responsibility and the
121 odium. If a maternal uncle of the agnatic group is killed, the offence is almost on a
613 par with that of patricide or fratricide. When, however, the homicide is between two
men who are agnatically distant, and not closely related cognatically either, but both
682 are members of the same local agnatic group, what follows will depend largely on the
size and stage of development of the group; if it is small, the homicide threatens to wreck it, but if it is large and on the verge of splitting the homicide may be the occasion for split taking place and being recognized publicly by a demand for blood money. Threatened with wreckage, a small group meets a homicide by closing its ranks for self preservation; a large group splits. The same event within the same kind of structural unit results in two quite dissimilar consequences. The reason is clear enough—the two groups are similar only in a general structural way, but sociologically they are not comparable.

When a homicide occurs between tertiary segments the solution, it was said earlier,

121 613 682 is found in either a vengeance killing or a blood-money agreement which later becomes caught up in a wider set of debt relationships. Records show that this is true in some cases, but in others the blood money is paid in one instalment and immediately. The recognition of a debt and its liquidation among the Bedouin is tantamount to a declaration of hostility, since without a debt the means for smooth-running relationships is lacking. Such a blood-money payment was made between two tertiary groups in the absence of the 'owner of the blood'; when he returned he sought out his brother's killer, and took two lives for one. Subsequently, there was a further blood-money settlement but there remained 'a man left over'. In other circumstances an annual payment, called *sana'*, is demanded in addition to the prompt and full payment of the blood money. The attachment of the *sana'* to a settlement is an invidious condition since it is regarded as a fee by those who have to pay it, it is said to lower the status of a group and 'one day, it must be repudiated'.[1] It may, circumstances permitting, serve to cast off all pretence of friendly relationships. It is more likely that it will lead to a further outbreak of hostilities. When I witnessed the payment of the *sana'* the terms in which it was demanded were: 'You have a man on your backs. Are you going to repudiate this or are you going to give me *sana'*? If you repudiate, we must seek vengeance.' The payment, one in a long series, was made on that occasion but there were loud grumblings among the men of the camp against their leader for his acquiescence and one suggested that they terminate the payments forthwith by shooting the claimant. Of the three forms of blood money cited, this latter is the extreme to which groups can go short of open feud. Its opposite is a blood-money payment which is mainly left as a debt, and which is accompanied by the 'gift' of a wife to the victim's group.[2] The wife is 'given' as an earnest that the offender's group wishes the full restoration of relationships ruptured by the homicide. There are, therefore, four forms of blood-money payment. The Bedouin view of these is that they are variants of what is, in principle, the same thing. Their view cannot be accepted. Each of the four payments points to diverse kinds of social relationships between groups, and their consequences are wholly disparate. These various kinds of relationships between the tertiary sections of the same secondary section exist because the relationships between all sections cannot possibly be the same if they are more than a pair in number. A secondary section which spans ten tertiary sections is not the same type of unit as one which spans only three. The greater the number of tertiary sections the greater the possible permutations in their relationships. What the Bedouin think of as variations in the form of blood-money
[829] payment is related to the complexities that lie behind their simple lineage model. Bedouin can comprehend this complexity only by thinking in terms of a kind of average behaviour, regarding deviations from the average as fortuitous and explicable by the faulty reasoning that 'in this particular case, it just so happened' that this, that, and the other were part of the situation, failing to appreciate that apparent aberrations are constants to the extent that some sort of specifics occur in all cases. There is no reason why Bedouin reasoning should be followed in sociological analysis.

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[1] See Peters, 1966.

[581] [585] [2] A marriage is not legal unless at least a promise to hand over wealth has been made beforehand. In the case cited the amount promised would be no more than a token—a sheep or a goat.

The consequences of homicides in which secondary groups are concerned present 121
an even greater variety, for now the span has expanded to include many more groups, 613
with a total population of several thousand people. Groups of this order are spread 682
over a much wider territorial range; some structurally distant groups are neighbours
by virtue of their propinquity, while some structurally proximate groups are far
removed territorially. Some feuds lie dormant for long periods. Others erupt [578]
frequently. Some homicides between these groups are followed by the 'laying down
of the denial '—the feud situation with most acrimony built into it, for one denial,
followed by a vengeance killing, is met by a second denial and so on, excluding thereby
any chance of a settlement. In other circumstances the offender's group boast that
they are responsible for a homicide, thus challenging the victim's group to a show
of force. Only the more powerful tertiary groups would venture to do this, and it is
only they who could meet a homicide against them with a spectacular show of force,
compelling a weaker tertiary group (according to hearsay evidence) to break up and
leave its homeland. The modes of killing in homicide differ in character. Some killings
have been heinous and offensive in terms of general morality; their purpose is to
sting the victim's kin to retaliate or to cause them to suffer general discredit and loss
of status. While some parts of secondary segments are at feud, others are not.
A homicide between affinally or matrilaterally linked groups, whether they are
secondary or primary groups, is settled as quickly and as amicably as possible to
prevent turmoil in their relationships. Feud concerns two tertiary sections, not the [578]
opposed secondary sections of which they are parts. Blood money and vengeance is [628]
not the responsibility of secondary sections, but of their respective tertiary sections.

At this point, a further statement concerning the external marriage links of tertiary
segments throws further light on the feud. Previously it was stated that the competition 121
between collateral tertiary groups for natural resources is indicated by a low 613
rate of marriage between them. Their external marriage links reinforce the separation. 582
One tertiary section, A, takes some of its spouses from section X of a collateral 578
secondary section; A's collateral, B, takes some of its spouses from X's collateral, Y.
A may be at feud with Y and B with X. The agnatic links between A and B, and X
and Y do not mitigate the severity of the hostility in the two feuds, they exacerbate
it. It would be erroneous to think of them as cross-cutting ties which promote peace.
Stultified in the development of their hostilities by virtue of their territorial proximity
and the sentiment associated with putatively close agnatic connexion, A and B are
able to express hostilities indirectly through their linked groups X and Y respectively.
During discussions of disputes, homicides, or rival claims to water, whether the disputants
meet in the camps or in administrative offices in the villages, men from the
matrilateral and affinal groups of the parties directly concerned are also present to do
most of the shouting. In some cases I recorded a maternal relative was killed on
behalf of an agnatic group to which he did not belong, although the latter accepted
the responsibility. In the light of facts of this sort the lineage model obstructs analysis.

I now wish to make a few brief remarks about the relationships between collateral 121
primary sections and paired tribes. Homicide, it was asserted earlier, results in raids 619
and war between groups of these orders of segmentation respectively. Evidence 682
can be adduced to show that both consequences have followed. The case usually 726
cited to demonstrate that a single killing precipitates war between tribes is the

121 celebrated war between the 'Abaidat and the Bara 'asa tribes occupying a large part
619 of central and eastern Cyrenaica. This war took place a hundred years ago, so that the
682 evidence is mainly hearsay, but it is significant that when asked for details of the
726 groups taking part the Bedouin make it clear that the entire tribes were not at war—
[173] some sections on both sides are said to have remained on friendly terms. Yet when
121 wars are discussed in a general fashion, the Bedouin insist that tribes confront each
619 other as such. If it is pointed out to them that men might be ranged against their
726 maternal relatives the Bedouin mumble apologetically that they would not kill their
602 maternal relatives—a lame argument since in the heat of battle men cannot make this
kind of discrimination. Details of other wars also illustrate the point that only parts
of tribes face each other in strife, for though the stories of past events may be inaccurate
there is genealogical evidence to substantiate their claims that certain groups
were linked in the past, and in any case their statements assert that where these links
exist they are not prepared to engage in hostilities. The several parts of each tribe,
121 like the parts of primary and secondary sections, have as many different sorts of
619 relationships as there are groups, and the general statement that tribes are warring
571 units merely obscures the interest there is in their relationships. Tribes, further, lack
the leadership to make war. I repeat that leadership does exist, but not even the
121 greatest leaders, past or present, can rightly be described as leaders of their tribes,
619 using the term in its structural connotation. Literature on the subject gives the
613 impression that there are tribal leaders, because successive administrations have used
554 the tribes and their divisions as a framework for attempting to rule the Bedouin, but
the details of the power domains of individual leaders make it clear that they have
little to do with the ordered divisions of tribes. A leader within part of one tribe may
carry with him tertiary sections of another tribe, and if major hostilities break out
between parts of these tribes, the sections of both which are joined as allies and
related as kinsfolk will not fight against each other, for sections so linked enjoy
stronger connexions than the structurally linked tertiary sections of a very large
[682] secondary section. Consequently the statement that homicide results in tribal war
[114] when the offender and his victim are members of two separate tribes is not merely
incomplete, not merely a simplification, it is wrong.

121 A point which has been implicit throughout the second part of this paper needs
613 now to be made quite explicit: groups do not come together in their respective
571 structural genealogical orders. During my entire residence in Cyrenaica I did not
[114] see a group of agnates larger than a tertiary tribal section assemble for any purpose.
It is true that the occasions when large groups are required to assemble are infrequent.
[648] It is also true that although the British Administration was serving a caretaker role
only, it may have had an affect on the nature of tribal gatherings. Despite this qualification,
there were several occasions when I expected tribal groups to assemble in
lineage order if the fusion of sections in relation to like sections has any meaning in
practice. Large groups of men did gather to dispute claims to wells, to argue about
rights to ploughland, and to make peace. In every case that I recorded the agnatically
closest groups of the main participants were absent, while members of genealogically
more remote groups were present in strength. This statement applies to gatherings
[628] in the camps and in the administrative centres. One of the biggest gatherings I
witnessed assembled in an administrative office in a village near the coast in the

membership of associations and so on. The statuses a Bedouin achieves depend 796
not on an ordered acquisition through the inheritance of roles or election 852
to them, but on his personal manipulation of linkages in his jockeying 88
with others. Rites are minimal because there are few defined statuses an 554
individual can predictably acquire. The equalitarianism of the desert denudes 602
the Bedouin of ritual riches. Complimentarily, rites which do occur are 613
thrown into exaggerated relief by the absence of others, and in their isolation, [557]
become not merely a "passage" but a cataclysmic change. Marriage and
burial both comprehend limited fields of relations, but accompanying ceremonies 585
may bring several hundred people together, people who otherwise 764
rarely gather in these numbers to meet one another as kinsmen and neighbours, 796
and it is suggested that the emphasis given to the events dramatises the 602
significance of the changes they produce. In the discussion of the changes 182
brought about by marriage, the Bedouin view of what is entailed will be
considered first.

The Bedouin View of Marriage

After marriage, the Bedouin argue, a son has a tent of his own, a woman 585
over whom he has authority and soon children to make him a father. Marriage 581
causes split, branching. A new family is created, holding the potential [613]
of a new lineage. The separation is so painful a matter for the father
that he cannot contemplate it, hence his pretence that he has no knowledge of [593]
wedding festivities, and his subsequent attitude that nothing has happened.

Interestingly, there are two other occasions when this attitude is to be 682
observed. When a man kills within his corporate group,[5] he may flee his 613
tribe or he may be compelled to leave; later he is likely to return and, when 621
he does, he is received with a minimum of show. Every attempt is made to
suppress knowledge of the event.

Again, if incest occurs, the memory of it must somehow be suppressed, and 835
it is an ever-present danger. Men, permitted four wives simultaneously and 561
also able to engage in a plurality of marriages through divorce or death of [595]
spouses, may have children showing an age difference of two or three generations.
Thus it comes about that a man may be of an age in relation to his
father's sister which permits them as children to behave as if they were
first paternal cousins. As an adult, the preferred spouse for a man is a [582]
father's brother's daughter. In terms of relationships between adolescents
the situation in which a man is of the same age generation as his father's
sister is fraught with danger. In one such case, between a man and his [684]
father's sister, the male child of the union was put out in the desert to be

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[5] Bedouin are disposed in groups which, in summer, usually constitute a single community, around or near a watering point. The men of this group are interlinked by reference to an ancestor four or five ascending generations, reckoning from the generation of men of about 20 years. When, elsewhere in this chapter reference is made to corporations, it will be to groups of this kind.

835 devoured by wild animals, the girl was "given"[6] to a close cousin who had
561 shot his sister. Both now reside with an enemy tribal section. The two acts
684 were equated. They were similar to the extent that both created a situation
which defied institutional resolution. The culprits were exorcised. The
girl's lover remains with his group — the odium for the male is incomparably
less than for the female, since, while maternity is easy to establish, paternity
is frequently shrouded in doubt — and during the months I lived with this
particular group, there was never a mention of the affair. It was as if "nothing had happened."

829 If asked why these two events cause such profound distress, the answers
the Bedouin give are twofold: they can do nothing about them, and they
578 cause split. By split in this context they mean split in the lineage; split in
613 the case of homicide because it may lead to a demand for blood-money which
[682] is payable only between corporations, and split in the case of incest because
[684] it causes chaos in relationships. Marriage, in one sense, their reasoning
581 runs, is similar, for it too causes split. Whatever may be the analytic strength
829 of the arguments that homicide and incest precipitate splitting, the argument that marriage does so is spurious. In what sense can marriage mean
613 split? Bedouin men marry "so that we may beget many sons, to make a
big lineage later on." The worst fate that can befall a man as a result of his
son's marriage is that he, in later generations, will become the focal point in
a series of branching descent lines. The alternative — that his sons remain
unmarried — can only mean that his name would disappear through want of
successors to carry it on, which is one of the greatest evils which can befall
a man, according to Bedouin sentiment: better split than oblivion. If the
key to the interpretation of the father's attitude to his son's marriage is not
581 that it causes split, it must lie elsewhere in their relationship. What mar-
585 riage does is alter the distribution of authority between father and son. In
593 order to pursue this, it is necessary first to clarify the types of authority involved, and then assess them in a post-marital situation.

554
The Division of Authority Between the Family and the Corporation

851 Politically, a person's status is determined for him at birth. At this time a man has the right to accept or deny paternity. Denial is tantamount to an accusation of adultery by his wife. In practice, once a wife has given birth to a male child, whatever doubts people may harbour regarding paternity, the husband accepts the child as his. "The boy for the bed," is a saying often heard among the Bedouin; but it remains the husband's prerogative to invest
[837] the child with legitimacy, hence, political status. Only if a husband becomes aware that he is publicly considered a cuckold, or if he catches his wife and a lover *in flagrante delicto*, is he at all likely to take action. Otherwise he may

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[585] [581] [6] A marriage is illegal unless it is accompanied by an agreement to transfer wealth to the girl's father.

indeed welcome unfaithfulness on his wife's part. If a man is very old, and 554
his wife very young, it is likely that she will entertain lovers; if a man leaves 851
camp for a long absence his wife may not remain chaste. In both cases, if 837
the liaisons lead to the birth of a child, particularly a male, the husband greets the news with unrestrained enthusiasm — "praise be to God," as their saying goes. Incapacity[7] to produce offspring, if a husband is convinced of it, may lead him to delegate a kinsman to serve his wife for procreative purposes: he has the legal authority, as husband, to do so, and to require his wife to submit, for the only alternative, if he is not to die without "issue," is to "take" a son from his brother and fulfill the obligations towards this boy required of a pater, namely, attend to his circumcision, provide him with teaching in the Koran (a duty neglected by most) and give him the wealth with which to marry.

Granting the acceptance of paternity, whatever the circumstances of con- 593
ception, a male child, *ipso facto,* acceeds to membership of a corporation, and 554
is subject to the authority of that group in a number of matters. In many [851]
situations it would appear that a son is under the father's political control. [613]
At a moot, the son, if he speaks at all, will do so only to corroborate his father. Discussions among men in a small camp evoke a similar pattern of behaviour. Until the father becomes senile or dies, a son cannot publicly pursue an independent course, but he desists by virtue of his relationships with his father *qua* pater, not because of his father's political power to coerce. All men of a corporation, in any event, "speak with one word" at [613]
a moot, and a son, by his assent to the common view, also supports his father; in so doing he yields to the political authority of his corporation, and not that of his father.

Membership in the corporation invests a man with other privileges and 593
duties. Protection against external enemies comes within the corporation's 613
jurisdiction, although in a particular situation, the father may well be the person who dispenses it. Complimentarily, if a man commits an offense [681]
against a person not of his group, whatever private thoughts his father may have about the act, the responsibility lies not on his shoulders but on the group, and he is compelled to share this responsibility equally with all other members. For example, if a son commits a homicide the father bears the [682]
same legal responsibility for the act, and is under obligation to contribute the same share of blood-money as he would be if the act had been perpetrated by any male of the group other than his son. Even in a narrower field of relations between father and son the group exercises its authority. Acting as pater, a man may punish his son, physically or otherwise; he may not do so to the point of injury, for personal injury comes within the legitimate sphere of the corporation. A man's "bone" belongs to his group; he is an in-

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[7] Impotency is a special case, because it is dishonourable for a woman to remain [833]
wife to an impotent man. She cannot divorce him, but her father can insist on a witnessed test of impotency and, if it is proven, the husband is compelled to divorce [586]
her. Barrenness, obviously, is a different matter.

582 583 613 602 of agnation on the members of a corporate group and give it a taproot of diversity whence it derives its strength, and which makes of it "the one body," conspicuous, in comparison with other societies, as the corporate group *par excellence*.

The Sister's Son-Mother's Brother Relationship

128 Previously the mode of relationships associated with agnation and affinity have been briefly discussed. In order to appreciate the effects of parallel-cousin marriage, some remarks concerning the sister's son-mother's brother set of relationships must be included here. 604 [174] Bedouin contrast the mother's brother with the father's brother; their sayings and proverbs afford a wealth of verbal documentation on the contrast. With the mother's brother a man enjoys all the freedoms he is denied in his relationships with his father and father's brother. [831] He is permitted to joke with him; they indulge in exchanges of obscenities. When the sister's son wishes to marry, he is permitted to discuss the matter with his mother's brother and can urge him to intercede with his father on his behalf. Two men thus related are readily recognised in the camps, because in their acts they are required to show affection by displays of innocent horseplay, pranks or mild practical jokes. Small boys pursue their mother's brother, feign to kick or strike him, and he takes it all in good part.

The external aspects of this behaviour is deceptive. Joking of this sort creates the image in which the relationships are conceived; what is equally striking in it is its compulsiveness. Obviously, mature men are not always in the mood to be teased, but if they are, they must respond appropriately. Their relationships are unmistakably onerous. This remark applies not only to the external forms of their behaviour, but also to the favours a man is [602] permitted to ask of his mother's brother. A brief amplification will make the point clear. Demands can be made of agnates, but only in situations of serious contingency. Day-to-day needs are met, not by appeals to the rights of agnation, but from the expectations linked to the mother's brother. If these expectations are withheld, the sister's son may be left in a quandary. 604 •682 Interestingly, in the records of homicides I gathered, three (in the contemporary population) were concerned with the killings of mother's brothers by sister's sons. Homicide within this field of relationship is difficult to comprehend unless it is appreciated that expectations are as compulsive in the daily life and the general well-being of people as are the rights and duties associated with agnation.

604 613 These general remarks apply to the relationships irrespective of the lineage origin of the mother's brother. The similarity ends there, since the nature of the expectations, their urgency at any given moment and the kind of favours which are granted vary with the group identity of the mother's [428] brother. A mother's brother who is a member of ego's corporate group may be expected to give the sister's son small quantities of flour, favour him in all

CHAPTER VII

BLOODMONEY—WESTERN DESERT

000 Payment in Cash—Agreements to pay—Reprisals discouraged—Patricide—Detective Work—Death from Fright—Public Aversion—The twelve-year-old Bill—Informers—Ali Abu Bukr's Cistern—The Broken Rope—Found Drowned—Three Months' Hard Labour—Whose Rope?—Payment—The Old Man who fell off the Wall—The Clutches of the Police—A Well-conceived Lie—Ibrahim's Broken Leg—Ali's Cunning—The Fiasco at the Tomb—Reductions in Payment—The Dead Baby—Amateur Lawyers—The Two Shepherds and the Trespasser—Stick or Stone?—Legal Arguments—Travelling Allowance—Misappropriation—Chaos—Mirtah buys Sheep, while the Sayed buy Dates—The Clash—£300—Abdel Kerim and his Cousin—The Boys Fight—Result of pointing a Gun—Dirty Fingers—Serve him Right—The Two Married Sisters—A Gun Accident—Poor Towida—Successful Bluffing.

● 682 IN the Western Desert the laws of bloodmoney differ
[171] considerably from those of Sinai, the former being of
African origin and the latter of Arabian. The Western
[435] Bedouin regard the price of a man as £300, irrespective of
[562] the market price of a camel; and the value of a woman's
life as normally £150, or half that of a man.

682 In the absence of satisfactory evidence in a case of
695 murder, if the oath be employed to decide the issue, fifty
men will swear for a man's life, and twenty-five in a case
562 involving the life of a woman. (NOTE. In some tribes
these numbers are increased to fifty-five and twenty-seven
respectively.)

682 As regards the payment and acceptance of bloodmoney,
621 this is almost invariably by agreement between the families,
and it is often difficult for an outsider to see any rhyme or

8: Kennett G-5 (ca. 1921) 1925 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9

reason in three families of one tribe paying together, while 682
the fourth is independent. Sometimes this is caused by 621
geographical separation, at other times by personal animosity or jealousy.

The main difference between the rules of the Western 682
Desert and Sinai is that in the West reprisals taken at the 171
discretion of an aggrieved individual are not recognised as [671]
lawful, and are distinctly discouraged. Generally speaking, [181]
the Western Bedou is a very much more prosperous and law-abiding person than the Sinai Arab, although at the same time he retains his charm as a primitive and independent being. Occasionally a dastardly murder takes 682
place, but public opinion is very strong not only against the 674
murderer personally, but against all the members of his [626]
family, who automatically share his unpopularity.

In the spring of 1920 an old man, reputed to possess considerable wealth, both in camels and sheep and also in gold buried in the ground, was returning about mid-day from market riding his donkey, and one of his numerous grown-up sons was walking on foot beside him. After going four or five miles in the open desert, the old man got off his donkey, and told his son to ride for a little way while he walked. The son suddenly attacked his old father and hit him with the heavy stick he was carrying; and the poor old man died almost at once with a broken skull. There was nobody about, and the son dragged his father's body about a hundred yards, and threw it down an old dried-up cistern; then, mounting his donkey, he rode home to dinner.

That afternoon the local sheikh was told of the old man's disappearance; and as he had seen father and son leaving the market together, he had his suspicions. He traced their footsteps, picking up the tracks of a heavily laden donkey and one man walking, from near the entrance to the market place. Then, following along carefully on these tracks, he saw where the old man had dismounted. Then he saw a spot of blood and the place where the

682 body had been dragged. He followed the footsteps of the
674 son as far as the cistern, where he again saw a tiny spot of fresh blood on one of the stones. From that point donkey-tracks led straight to the son's tent.

By nightfall the son was securely lodged in the police post; and local public opinion was seething with fury, firstly at such a dastardly deed committed presumably for the sake of the old man's money, and secondly because it reflected untold discredit on the rest of the tribe. The murderer, who was a big powerful man of about thirty standing nearly six feet in height, lay in prison awaiting trial. After a few days he was admitted to hospital, where he completely collapsed and died of fright a fortnight later.

[203] Rumours then began to spread that possibly the murderer had only acted in accordance with the wishes of his brothers, who were all conspiring to get rid of the old man, in order that they might share out his possessions. This could not be proved, and appeared unlikely from the
[626] evidence. However, public feeling against the whole family ran so high that it was feared that more horrors might follow; but although no open action was taken against the family, no opportunity was missed of having a dig at them in some way or another.

682 A very wealthy sheep merchant, who was a distant
674 connection of the family, and heartily ashamed of them,
691 brought an action for debt against one of the murderer's
626 brothers. He produced an I.O.U. for £2 dated twelve
686 years before and signed by the murdered man, claiming
[672] (according to custom) that the son now in court as defendant had inherited his father's liabilities together with his assets.

This sheep merchant was known personally to the writer, who was also aware that a month previously he had made a profit of £900 on a very clever bit of dealing in the West. The collection, after an interval of twelve years, of this paltry debt of £2, owing from the deceased father

of the present defendant seemed—for a really wealthy 682
man—to be pointless and futile. The merchant anticipated 674
this objection by hastening to add that the receipt of the 691
actual cash did not interest him in the least; but that he 626
had been wondering how he could shew his disapproval of 686
the defendant's family in some way, and had gone carefully through all his old papers and receipts with this end in view; and had triumphantly discovered the bill of debt now produced in court.

Bedouin Law and custom sometimes accept right to 671
bloodmoney in all sorts of circumstances, when other law 672
would recognise no claim. For example, the principle is 682
accepted that a life lost in prison must be paid for by the informers whose information resulted in the imprisonment of the deceased. It is entirely immaterial whether the information so given to the police was wilfully false or intentionally misleading, or whether it was merely subsequently found to be incorrect. Even if the information had been true and correct in every detail, the informer is still blood-guilty from the Ourfi standpoint, although in actual practice any such claims for bloodmoney would probably be considerably modified.

Other claims for bloodmoney are also recognised occasionally, in cases of obvious accidental death, or death by misadventure or Act of God, when the interpreters of Bedouin Law cannot get away from the main principle that a life lost must be paid for. The difficulty in these [695]
cases is to determine who shall pay for it; and the lawsuits usually end in a clever compromise, in which their essential principles are duly observed, but their judgments are mitigated and modified by leniency and commonsense. The following example, which occurred recently in Mariut, will illustrate this.

A certain Arab called Ali Abû Bukr had inherited from 671
his father large cultivation rights in the desert; and in the 672
middle of this land was an old cistern for the collection of 682
rain water. It had not been used for years, and was silted 312

8: Kennett G-5 (ca. 1921) 1925 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9

671 up with drift sand; and as it was some miles from the
672 nearest permanent water supply, the owner of the cistern
•682 decided that it was well worth clearing out, with a view
to catching and conserving the next rainfall.

312 Accordingly he summoned all his kinsfolk, and propounded his proposition, to which they agreed. Other Arabs occupying neighbouring rights suggested that it was a very good idea, probably with a view to a simplified water supply for themselves.

671 An Arab from the neighbouring tribe called Ahmed
had frequently acted as shepherd and odd-job man for
672 Ali; and it happened that, when Ali and all his kinsfolk
682 were assembled at the cistern, Ahmed chanced to be
passing. Ali hailed him, and asked him to come and lend a hand. So Ahmed joined the crowd at the well, and assisted in getting ready the ropes and other tackle to be used.

[312] The cistern, constructed after the usual Roman pattern, was about forty feet deep, fifteen feet in diameter for the first twenty feet or so, and from there narrowed down to six or seven feet, with footholes cut in the side for the last half. One of Ali's relatives had agreed to be let down with ropes and to start cleaning out the mud and sand from the bottom. However, when the rope had been tied round his middle, and he was just going to be swung in mid-air and lowered to the ledge at half-way, his nerve suddenly failed him, and he refused to start.

Subsequent evidence was confused at this point as to exactly what happened; but it seems that one of the crowd noticed Ahmed standing with the rest, and remarked that he had had considerable experience in well digging, and suggested that he should go down. Accordingly Ahmed flung a stone down the well, and a faint splash at the bottom indicated that there were a few inches of water in it. He then organised a sort of tug-of-war among the men standing by, to test the strength of the rope. Satisfied on this point, he had the rope tied round him, and he was

lowered very slowly and carefully by the crowd at the top. 671
Here again it is difficult to ascertain exactly what happened, 672
as the evidence was again contradictory. Apparently, when
Ahmed reached the ledge at half-way, he fumbled about 682
in the dim light for the foot holes; and just at this psycho-
logical moment the rope broke.

The ten men holding the rope at the top collapsed one on the top of another; but when they had recovered their presence of mind, they shouted down to Ahmed, to ask if he were all right. A faint voice from the bowels of the earth replied that he had fallen heavily on a stone and had had a nasty knock, but that he would be all right in a few minutes.

They then produced a spare rope for another man to
go down and get Ahmed up; but they discovered that the
only one they had to hand was too short by several feet.
A man was sent post-haste on a pony to get another rope
from the encampment a mile or so away, and when he
returned after a quarter of an hour, volunteers were quickly
forthcoming to go down and retrieve Ahmed. On reaching
the bottom they found that the unfortunate man, either
stunned by the fall or overcome by foul air, had collapsed
flat on the bottom of the well, and had been drowned in
six inches of water. They hauled his body up to the
surface, and Ali, terrified that he might be held in some
way responsible, counselled all present to bury the dead
man then and there, and to say nothing about it. However, [123]
news quickly spreads; and the same day an informer came
to the police post and reported the matter, and Ali was
arrested and subsequently sentenced to three months' im-
prisonment with labour by the present writer, for failure
to notify a death under unusual circumstances. (Inci- [177]
dentally this did not constitute an offence under Bedouin
Law, but was a contravention of the Police Code and was
punished as such. Hence the apparent interference in a
purely Bedouin concern.)

While Ali was still serving his sentence, Ahmed's rela- [694]

671 tives lost no time in taking legal proceedings at the Ourfi
672 court to claim bloodmoney from the owner of the cistern;
•682 and on Ali's release from prison a very long and excessively
694 tedious lawsuit began.

The principle that a life had been lost and must be paid for was accepted without question by the court from the outset, in spite of the police enquiry, which is the local equivalent of a coroner's inquest. The enquiry had established beyond any shadow of doubt that death had been caused by misadventure, and that Ali was absolutely innocent, not only of any intent to kill, but also of any negligence whatsoever. Any other coroner's jury in the world would have returned a verdict of accidental death, expressed sympathy with the relatives, and absolved all concerned from blame; and there the matter would have ended.

671 Ali, who had already undergone three months in durance
672 vile—which, to a wandering child of the desert, must be
682 particularly galling—so far forgot any tribal instruction he
might have had as to repudiate vigorously any responsibility either for the accident or for the restitution of the death in the form of bloodmoney. His family also, who would naturally have to share the payment, did their best to confound the issue by lodging a counter claim. They protested that the actual rope that broke was not theirs, but belonged to a third party, and that neighbouring tribes, who had approved of the project and who stood to benefit by the cistern when it was cleaned out, were conjointly responsible with themselves for any payment due.

The case dragged on unsatisfactorily for some months; the neighbouring tribes swore that no agreement existed whereby they should benefit by the cistern when completed; the question of the ownership of the rope was dropped; and eventually Ali and his family were ordered to pay a reduced scale of bloodmoney to the family of the deceased.

683 Sometimes these bloodmoney cases, so far from being
672 dramatic or nauseating, are actually rather amusing.

8: Kennett G-5 (ca. 1921) 1925 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9

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The plaintiff was an Arab called Salem Ibrahim, who 683
brought an action against a man of another family of his [694]
tribe called Ali. The plaint was as follows. Seven years
ago Salem's father Ibrahim, a man then about sixty years
old, was sitting on a wall near a patch of cultivation belonging to Ali, and watching Ali working on his land.
Some dispute arose between them; and, angered at something that Ibrahim had said, Ali picked up a large stone
and flung it at Ibrahim. The impact broke the old man's 683
leg; the case was reported to the police; Ali was arrested 682
and imprisoned; and Ibrahim was taken to hospital, where
he shortly afterwards died. Ali was thus left in prison, 672
and the case could not be proceeded with from the Ourfi
standpoint until he came out. On his release, therefore,
the case was to be brought up for settlement, and the 683
plaintiff to claim bloodmoney for his father's death. 682

Meanwhile, however, plaintiff related how his own 694
family had wanted to get the case cleared up and how Ali's 672
family had also approached them with the idea of extracting Ali from the clutches of the police, so that the case could be tried by an Ourfi court, and a judgment which would be intelligible and acceptable to both parties could be given by their own sheikhs.

Accordingly they agreed together that the plaintiff's family should go to the police, declare that the whole case was a mistake from beginning to end, and that the old man Ibrahim had fallen off the wall, and that nobody had thrown a stone at him. A document to this effect was drawn up, signed and sealed by the notables of Ibrahim's family, and solemnly presented to the police. The evidence seemed so genuine that Ali was released from prison, with implied apologies for wrongful arrest. On his release from prison Ali saw his opportunity, and by some means obtained possession of this document signed by Ibrahim's family.

When the case first came up for trial by Ourfi court, Ali denied throwing the stone, repudiated all responsibility

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672
683 in the case, and produced this document signed by Ibrahim's
• 682 family to the effect that Ibrahim *fell* off the wall and broke
his leg. How then could he possibly be implicated in the
694 case?

The assessors of the court went carefully into all the
683 evidence and eventually agreed that the matter should be
682 decided by the oath. They demanded that Ali, backed by
672 twenty-five men of his own tribe, chosen by Ibrahim's
family as men of their word, should swear on the tomb
695 of Sidi Shar el Ruh the following oath: "By Allah the Great and by the Truth of this Holy Sheikh, I swear that I neither threw a stone at Ibrahim, nor broke his leg." They further decreed that if Ali himself, or any one of the twenty-five men chosen to back him in his oath, failed or refused to swear as required, the case for the defence would be null and void, and that bloodmoney would be required in full from Ali's family.

On the date appointed two or three sheikhs of the court were detailed to go to the tomb, to meet the defendant with his twenty-five backers, and to supervise the taking of the oath. The parties duly arrived; but when the oath was just about to be taken, three men of Ali's backers refused to swear, declaring that on the contrary they were ready to swear, if required, that Ali *had* thrown the stone, and was responsible for Ibrahim's death. The case for the defence thus fell to the ground, and the parties were warned to appear at a future date, when the case would be completed. At the next meeting of the court, Ali's liability to pay bloodmoney was accepted in principle, but there were divergencies of opinion as to the amount to be paid. Then followed a delightful example of casuistry typical of the Bedou mind.

The assessors of the court felt that, in the first instance, Ali had never intended to kill poor old Ibrahim, and that his crime fell very far short of intentional homicide. Also, it had happened seven years before, and, all said and done, time had healed most of whatever ill-feeling there ever

had been. Besides, Ibrahim was an old man when it 683
happened, and he would have to have died before very 682
long in any case. Moreover, the sheikhs in their heart of 672
hearts considerably admired the acumen displayed by Ali
in getting hold of that document. So they decided privately 695
among themselves that on the whole half the full bloodmoney, or £150, would meet the case. On no account, however, could they give in open court the above reasons for lessening the sum to be paid. They proceeded to listen patiently to more evidence, and eventually gave their considered judgment as follows:

"Defendant Ali is required to pay the full bloodmoney of £300. *But* in view of the fact that, when the police came to Ali's tent to arrest him seven years ago, in the excitement and commotion caused by the police patrol, Ali's wife gave birth to a premature boy child, and that this boy subsequently died, therefore the sum of £100 will be deducted from the total to be paid, for the sake of the dead baby. Also, as it cannot be proved conclusively that Ibrahim died simply and solely as the result of the stone thrown at his leg, and as it may be conceivably possible that other external causes contributed to his death, for this reason, therefore, another sum of £50 will be deducted. Hence the amount to be paid is £150, of which £50 must be paid after this coming barley harvest, with a similar sum after the two following harvests."

Amateur lawyers are not popular, and more often than 682
not darken counsel without understanding.

An Arab called Salem had some land, and he employed 672
two men of the Hawita tribe as shepherds and harvesters. [693]
One of these men was from the Nefoofa family of the Hawita, and the other was from a family called the Magai. These two shepherds worked peacefully together, and their respective families were friendly, until one day an Arab of the Gottaan tribe called Yadam Saadi drove his flocks and his animals on to Salem's land, and began to pitch his tents. These two shepherds saw this going on from afar, and

682 672 came up to drive him and his animals away. Yadam refused to move, and threatened violence if they attempted to eject him forcibly. So the two shepherds, who were responsible to their employer for the land, went for him simultaneously—the Nefoofa shepherd with a thick stick, which he brought down with all his force on Yadam's head, and the Magai with a large stone, which he hurled as hard as he could, and which caught Yadam in the chest over the heart. Yadam received both these blows simultaneously, collapsed on to the ground in a crumpled heap, and died soon afterwards.

682 672 693 695 Yadam's family then brought an action against the Nefoofa and Magai families conjointly, claiming bloodmoney. The Nefoofa produced an amateur barrister of their own family called Abd el Gelil, who proved (entirely to his own satisfaction) that many minor assaults were continually taking place, when people were hit on the head without death following immediately as the result of the blow. He therefore contended that it must have been the blow from the stone thrown by the Magai which had really killed him. The Magai adopted a similar line of argument, and the case remained at a standstill for nearly two years.

Eventually the court effected a compromise, and awarded the bloodmoney, to be paid equally by the Nefoofa and the Magai in three yearly instalments of £50 each. The Magai paid up their £50, and the Nefoofa barrister—a particularly bumptious individual from the Nile Valley—lodged a protest against the decision, claiming that the court was not properly constituted and was not competent, that the sheikhs were biassed, and a hundred and one reasons why the Nefoofa should not contribute their share.

He was eventually made to understand that the Nefoofa would have to pay, and that if there were any more trouble from him, his own property would be seized as part-payment. Accordingly Abd el Gelil travelled round the Nefoofa encampments, ostensibly to collect sums due from

the different families. A year later the Gottaan brought 682
up the case again, acknowledging the receipt of £50 from 672
the Magai, but protesting that they had still not received 693
anything from the Nefoofa. On an enquiry being held,
a representative collection of infuriated members of the 695
Nefoofa family came to court, protesting that Abd el Gelil
had already collected their payments, and that if he had not
handed over the money, their responsibility at any rate had
ended for the moment.

It subsequently transpired, when Abd el Gelil was with
difficulty got hold of and brought to court, that he had
collected about £50, but claimed this sum as his own
personal travelling expenses for collection. Then followed [685]
another lawsuit, in which the Nefoofa family sued their
self-appointed lawyer for mis-appropriation of tribal funds.
The details of this new case, and those of the original suit,
were then re-capitulated and muddled up together, to the
complete bewilderment of the writer and the entire satisfaction
of the Bedouin assessors.

Mention has been made of the extra £100 (£400 instead 682
of £300) usually paid among the Gawabees tribe as the 672
price of a life. It seems, however, as though there are exceptions
to this rule; and the following case seems to shew [435]
that the payment of "Sanaa" depends on a variety of
circumstances.

A family called Sirdani had had a bloodfeud with another 682
family of the Gawabees called Sayed, one of the former 628
having killed one of the latter some fifty years ago. The
two families had been living in totally different districts, 672
and for years had not come into contact with each other,
and so the feud had been allowed to continue.

In the spring of 1921 a man of the first family, about forty-five years old, called Mirtah el Sirdani, left the Wadi Natrun for the Nile Valley to buy some sheep from the Fellaheen, taking with him his old mother and a small boy, to help him bring them back across the desert to the luscious grazing in the wadi swamps. He arrived at the

682 Cultivation, bought his sheep, and started off westwards
628 to the wadi.

672 By a sheer coincidence, four men of the other family had left their camping ground a fortnight before, and had gone south on their yearly pilgrimage to Baharia Oasis to bring back dates. On leaving the oasis, they had later arrived at the wadi, watered their camels, and pushed on northwards to their camping ground. About one and a half days' trek north of the wadi, about half an hour before sunset, they saw in the distance a cloud of dust advancing towards them, out of which gradually emerged a flock of sheep, an old woman, a man, and a small boy.

According to the subsequent evidence of the mother, her son Mirtah drove his sheep unconcernedly, not noticing with the rays of the setting sun in his eyes who was with the approaching camels. When they drew near he called out the usual greeting, "Peace be upon you"; but instead of the stereotyped reply, two of the camelmen suddenly leapt from their camels with heavy sticks in their hands, and rushed at Mirtah. The old mother and the small boy began to run away, while the frightened sheep scattered in all directions. Mirtah was entirely unprepared for any assault, and before he realised what was happening, he had received two thundering blows on his skull from the two men, who immediately afterwards remounted, and rode away.

Mirtah fell stunned; and as soon as his assailants had gone, his mother and the boy ran to his assistance. After a few minutes Mirtah staggered to his feet in a dazed sort of way, cursed his aggressors, whom he had recognised as belonging to the Sayed family, and said that he would be able to continue slowly. He managed with the help of his mother and the boy to cover two or three miles, but was overcome by pain and loss of blood, and again collapsed. His mother with the sheep remained by his side, and sent off the boy to the Wadi to get assistance to bring him in. Fortunately, after running a few miles, the boy came across some

members of a neutral family with grazing camels, and with 682
their help Mirtah was fetched in to the Wadi unconscious. 628

The case was reported to the police, but a few hours
after his arrival in the Wadi Mirtah quietly died. The 672
post-mortem examination revealed a skull cracked right across, with severe cerebral haemorrhage. In due course the Sirdani family claimed £400 bloodmoney from the Sayed family, according to the custom among the Gawabees tribe. This time, however, an exception was made. The sheikhs decided that the ordinary bloodmoney of £300 only should be paid by the Sayed to the Sirdani family, £100 in money and £200 in kind, divided into six yearly instalments of £50 each.

They also added a rider to the effect that they were not awarding Sanaa under the circumstances, as there was no proof of intent to kill, and that weapons such as guns or knives (which would imply premeditation) were not used. The presumption was that the Sayed family, though obviously intending to cause grievous bodily harm, did not intend to kill Mirtah. The fact that he died of his wounds automatically warranted the award of £300 as bloodmoney, but did not constitute sufficient justification for the imposition of the extra £100 as Sanaa.

In Common Law it is not always easy for the uninitiated 671
to understand the legal value of a threat, or what proportion 683
of the punishment for the completed action is due for a mere threat. It was singularly pleasing, therefore, to find a striking instance of a threat to shoot, and to see the attitude of the Bedouin court towards this particular offence.

An Arab called Abd el Kerim was tolerably well-to-do, 233
and owned several camels, a mare, fair-sized flocks of 685
sheep and goats, and certain cultivation rights; and he had two sons aged about sixteen and eighteen respectively. His cousin, Abd el Salam, who lived half a mile away, had four sons of ages ranging from fifteen to twenty, but he was considerably poorer in this world's goods. Abd el Kerim's sons took their camels out to graze, and inadvertently

233 wandered over the boundary of Abd el Salam's grazing
685 rights. The juvenile members of Abd el Salam's family
[578] came out from their tents in a body, to drive off their
intruding second cousins with their camels. An altercation
ensued, and the excitement grew; and eventually a pitched
battle with sticks and stones began among the lads.

683 One of Abd el Kerim's sons, leaving his brother to hold
on for a moment, ran back the half mile to call his father,
who returned with him to the scene of the fight carrying
his gun. On arrival at the camels, Abd el Salam's sons
set on him in a body. Abd el Kerim pointed his gun at
one of them and took aim; whereupon one of the other
family from behind laid him low with a blow on the top
of his head, sufficient to fell an ox.

Abd el Kerim was carried back to his tent, where the
[114] writer witnessed the horrible sight of sympathetic but
homicidal relatives pawing his open wound with their filthy
fingers. A large hole had been knocked in the side of his
head, and portions of brain were visible. After some
months of surgical treatment Abd el Kerim came out of
[694] hospital; and, as the blow was reported to have affected
his reason, a case was brought on his behalf by some of his
relatives, claiming damages from the family of Abd el
Salam. However, before the case was fully completed,
[682] Abd el Kerim was taken ill, was re-admitted to hospital,
and died. The case therefore became one of bloodmoney,
and was dealt with in the usual way.

683 The interesting point about the case, however, lies in
the decision of the court, when the first claim for damages
682 was brought up. A very strong line was adopted by the
695 sheikhs, and in the opinion of the court the wounds re-
672 ceived by Abd el Kerim were only what he might reason-
ably expect. They maintained that, after the way in which
he had behaved, he was lucky to have got off as lightly as
he did. The sheikhs protested that he ought never to have
gone out from his tent, and mixed himself up in a fight
between a lot of boys. If he had any authority at all, he

should have called a meeting with Abd el Salam, discussed 683
the position sensibly with him, and then the two of them 682
should have beaten all the boys soundly. Secondly, he ought 695
never to have taken his gun with him, which was as stupid 672
as it was dangerous. The fact that Abd el Kerim himself knew that it was not loaded made not the slightest difference to the case, as the boys did not, and could not, know whether it was loaded or not. As one of the sheikhs expressed it, "If you point a gun at me, loaded or unloaded, I'm not going to risk it. So if I retaliate by braining you, then that's your fault—not mine!"

As compared with some of the customs obtaining among 682
the Sinai Arabs, the following case among the Aulad Ali 171
in the Western Desert is illuminating, and will be quoted in full. The question of who is "chief mourner" of the deceased, and who draws the largest share in a bloodmoney case varies considerably between the tribes of Arab and
Berber origin. Among the Aulad Ali a woman killed is [562]
automatically half the value of a man, whereas among the [435]
Arabs the value of a woman depends on a variety of conditions.

A man called Idris had two daughters, Towida and 682
Beida. Beida married a man called Korayem Shushan of 672
the Gereidat tribe, and Towida married Farag Gueida of the Mowalik tribe. A son had been born to Towida and Farag called Lataif Farag; and when Lataif was about four years old, his parents quarrelled about some trifling matter, and Farag divorced Towida. Two months after this, Towida went to spend a day or two with her sister Beida and Korayem, and it was while sitting alone in their tent that the accident happened which was the cause of this lawsuit. It seems that Korayem had left a loaded gun tied up with cord to the roof of the tent, suspended from the poles. While Towida was sitting there, a sudden gust of wind got up, and shook the tent violently. As the tent rocked in the wind, the gun came tumbling down on to a wooden chest between the poles; the impact fired the

682 charge, which hit Towida at a range of only a few feet,
672 with fatal results.

Farag, who had divorced her two months before,
682 brought a claim for bloodmoney from Korayem; but when
672 the case was heard, Korayem denied that the accident had
695 happened in his tent. The assessors of this first court,
which was held soon after the accident, demanded that
Korayem should swear, backed by twenty-five men (i.e.
half the full number of fifty, as Towida was a woman),
that the accident did not take place in his tent. Then
[671 followed an example of one of the very unsatisfactory
points in Bedouin Law.

Korayem, who was a powerful man belonging to the Gereidat, who were in turn a powerful family, managed to persuade the court to cancel their judgment requiring the oath from himself and his twenty-five backers, and to agree to a settlement whereby he should pay £10 and be absolved from the necessity of taking the oath. The court accepted this agreement, and proceeded to examine the claims to the bloodmoney.

682 The Moslem Law of Divorce provides that when a man
682 divorces his wife, the decree does not become absolute for
672 three months, in order that it may be ascertained whether
695 the woman be pregnant by her lately divorced husband.
Towida had only been divorced two months before the
671 accident; so the question had to be decided whether Farag
586 were legally her husband or not at the time of her death,
for purposes of receiving a share of the bloodmoney. If so,
he should receive one quarter; but there seems to have
been some difference of opinion on this point among the
assessors of the court, and the whole matter was shelved.

682 Seventeen years afterwards, Lataif Farag—then a man
682 of twenty-one—re-opened the case, claiming his mother's
672 bloodmoney. In support of his claim he produced three
695 witnesses. The first was Farag himself, who was prepared
to swear that he had seen Towida lying dead in the tent of
694 Korayem. The second was Towida's brother, who was

prepared to swear that he had been called in; and had seen 682
his sister dying in a pool of blood in Korayem's tent. The 672
third was a stranger who had been passing at the time of
the accident, had heard the shot, had gone into Korayem's 695
tent, and had seen Towida lying on the floor in a dying 694
condition. The newly-constituted court probed this evidence, without actually demanding the oath from these three witnesses, and arrived at the following conclusions:

1. That the facts of the case were common knowledge, and were as Lataif claimed.
2. That Korayem never really intended to swear that the accident did *not* happen in his tent, but had succeeded in bluffing the previous Court. This was made possible by the fact that Korayem's family were strong, and Farag's were weak.
3. That half the price of a man—i.e. £150—should be the bloodmoney in this case, provided that Farag could produce satisfactory evidence on oath that:
    - (*a*) the gun belonged to Korayem,
    - (*b*) the accident took place in Korayem's tent.
4. In the event of these conditions being met, Lataif Farag should receive five-sixths of the £150; and, provided that they swore the above oath backed by four others, Towida's father and mother (if alive) should receive the remaining one-sixth.

Generally speaking, this judgment appeals to an outside observer as eminently sensible and just; and if only the matter had been left at that, and the judgment had been enforced, all would have been well. Unfortunately, however, various influences again crept in to interfere with the decision of this second court. The accident had then happened about eighteen years before; the first court had been bluffed by Korayem; after an interval of seventeen years the second court gave their very reasonable judgment; and then for some reason unexplained the case was again shelved, and the judgment not executed. For the third

682 time the case was re-opened, after a further interval of some
672 years since the second judgment. By this time nearly all
695 the assessors and witnesses of the first Court were dead,
694 rumours had been spread that the gun belonged to a stranger
who had left his gun in Korayem's tent, and should therefore pay his share of the bloodmoney, and so on.

The Gereidat family again succeeded in confusing the case, and in prejudicing the issue in their favour; and the third court gave the following decision, to the disgust of interested followers of this rather remarkable lawsuit. They decided that no evidence existed to shew what happened in Korayem's tent, and that no oath was necessary, maintaining that in the absence of any proof whatsoever Farag had no claim. They further ordered a new distribution of the reduced scale of bloodmoney proposed, whereupon the proceedings became completely involved and absolutely unintelligible.

682 The above events point out unmistakably the weak
672 spots in the Ourfi system. Korayem's family were strong,
and on two occasions were successful in evading just de-
695 cisions against them; while the weak family with a strong case had to see justice perverted.

695 When the considered judgment of an Ourfi Court
182 receives authority for prompt and immediate execution
from the Government and the police, the Ourfi system is
648 probably the nearest possible approach to the ideal, consistent with the conditions prevailing. But it is an undeniable fact, which must be faced, that without the moral backing of the Civil Power behind the judgments of the Bedouin Courts, miscarriages of justice are possible, and do actually take place.

619 [175] [162] later Wilkinson estimated them at about 400 men near El Terrana and the Wadi Natrun.

At the present day they are still reckoned *Murabitin*, but, like the Jumei'at, are sufficiently independent not to have to [439] pay tribute. They share with the Awlad 'Ali in the date traffic with Bahariya Oasis, where the produce of the village of Mandisha is reserved for them, and that from Bawitti for the Awlad 'Ali.

619 682 181 Kennett notes (p. 54) that they demand £400 for blood-money instead of £300, the usual price in the Western Desert, and alludes (p. 67) to:

> "The free and easy way in which the Gawabees tribe near the Wadi Natrun pack up their summer tents and leave them in situ while they themselves trek off with their winter tents into the open desert for the winter grazing is indicative of this code of honesty prevailing among them."

142 619 On page 101, he calls them "nearly all very small men, with strangely similar features and characteristics running through all the families of the tribe".

619 173 Bramly has collected three pedigrees of the tribe all going back to Sheikh 'Abd el-Jawad el-Kassar. They state that they are an offshoot from the Qadadfa, and about 500 years ago left Saqiet el-Hamra in Morocco to settle in Egypt.

As a reward for "settling some affairs in the Wadi Natrun", Muhammad 'Ali Pasha granted them the usual Bedouin privilege of exemption from military service. There are small colonies of them elsewhere among the Awlad Ali, while others are settled in the cultivated provinces of Giza, Beheira, Menufiya, and Gharbiya.

Jumei'at.—This tribe, possibly a remnant of the original Libyan inhabitants of Mariut, is of quite respectable antiquity, for Ibn Khaldun includes the Jumei'at as a subtribe of "Beni 'Ali", themselves an offshoot from Beni Suleim. Whether his "Beni 'Ali" are the same as the modern Awlad 'Ali may be questioned, yet it is a reasonable assumption, for the exchange of the words "Beni" and "Awlad" in tribal names can be paralleled elsewhere.

The Jumei'at all agree that their remote ancestor, whom they share with the Awlad Suleiman and the Qat'an, was called Ka'b, and a Ka'b indeed appears in the pedigree ascribed

*613 778 182 •682 The nazaala as a regulatory mechanism functions only between secondary segments. This indicates that blood-revenge as a negative sanction is operative only in the external system of political relations. Political relations at this level, where the feeling of corporateness is relatively lacking, are in delicate balance. Therefore, once conflict is successfully mediated and the injury redressed, it is best forgotten, for it is unlikely that either party feels their rights have been completely restored.

• 683 Sanctions against personal injury, besides killing, are dealt out in terms of fines, the fines being figured as proportions of the diiya. Every part of the body has a price on it: the Bedouins say, "Banu Adam kill-i-filuus" ("The sons of Adam are all money"). A proportion of the diiya is due for injury to any of the following parts of the body: the beard, hair on the head and the nape of the neck, and eyelashes; wounds to any part of the body; fractures and dislocations of bones; the tongue and the teeth; the testicles and the breasts; and the loss of mind. Bodily injuries are [463] evaluated by a considered expert, the nathaara ("the keen-[305] eyed one"). If the services of a nathaara become necessary in al-Qasr, the barber in Marsa Matruh (the same person who performs most of the Bedouins' circumcisions) fills the role. [178] But the Bedouins say, "Now that we are educated we are able to make our own evaluations."

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Since Bedouin law, and not Egyptian law, still prevails in al-Qasr, personal injury cases must be expedited according to the 'awaiyid lest the greater sanctions embodied in the principle of self-help follow. Sanctioned fines for death and bodily injury are standardized in al-Qasr and in the whole Western Desert. [124] [627] One informant, a rajal khair ("good man") who sometimes adjudicated quarrels, possessed an authoritative paper which listed the injury and ensuing fine prevailing in al-Qasr when I was in the field. Below are the contents of this paper. The comments in parentheses were made by the man as I translated the paper: they were offered as the rationale behind Bedouin law.

L.E. 400 - for inflicting an injury upon a person which renders him sterile.
400 - for the intentional death of a man with a gun or knife.
400 - for causing the loss of a man's nose, ("Because to cut up a man's nose is to make him ugly.")
400 - for causing the loss of a man's eyes, 200 L.E. for each eye, ("Because without eyes a man can do nothing.")
400 - for causing the loss of a man's ears, 200 L.E. for each ear, ("Because a deaf man cannot work.")
300 - for the death of a man if caused by beating with sticks or stones, ("This is unintentional, for if you really wanted to kill the man you would use a better weapon.")
200 - for the intentional death of a woman with a gun or knife.
150 - for the loss of a hand.
150 - for the loss of a leg.
10 - for the loss of a front tooth, ("Because it is bad for a man's appearange.")
5 - for the loss of a rear tooth.

*613 578 182 ultimately, all-out warfare: the role of 'aqila is most critical at this level. Abou-Zeid (1966:259) has suggested an explanation for the delicate balance of political relations which exists between secondary lineage groups. He thinks that

> [577] . . . in the segmentary society of the Bedouin of the Western Desert . . . honour has played, and still plays, a most vital role in the field of social control, besides providing an effective code of morality . . . A slight offence inflicted against a lineage . . . is taken as an unfavorable humiliation requiring immediate retaliation to wipe out the shame, regain honour, and restore the same relations as formerly between the groups.

682 •683 578 *613 Homicide and wounding cases, which usually develop over conflicting claims to land or water rights, are most prone to lead to grand-scale conflict. Thus the 'aqila will always mediate and adjudicate these cases whereas he will not necessarily intervene in those cases involving tertiary groups where appeals to moral solidarity and kinship unity may succeed in restoring relations. It is difficult to muster evidence for this contention since conflict between tertiary groups is more of a private matter than it is public, and, once settled, such conflict is not likely to be discussed, or even admitted.

*613 578 619 681 Most of my details on conflict regulation and the judicial process in al-Qasr involve political action between secondary or primary groups, eighteen of the twenty-two cases in fact. Of the nine cases dealing with personal injury (eight

578 Date: 1947. Case: Quarrel between 'Ailit Dawlat and
*613 'Ailit Zagharat of the 'Aishaibat concerning murder. The
682 quarrel began over the ownership of land. Members of the
Dawlat assaulted a member of the Zagharat but he did not
die. Then members of the Zagharat killed a member of the
[571] Dawlat in revenge for the beating. Many 'awaaqil from the
[692] tribe came to judge this case. They told the Dawlat and the
Zagharat: "Shame on you, you are of one tribe." The decision
of the 'awaaqil was made according to the 'awaiyid Awlad 'Ali.
A diiya of 400 L.E. was judged against 'Ailit Zagharat. The
diiya was collected from all of the members of the Zagharat,
and it was paid over the period of three years. The diiya
was divided into two parts: one-half went to the sons of the
killed man, and the other half went to the 'aiela.

Date: 1946. Case: Quarrel between 'Ailit Dawlat and 'Ailit
Zagharat concerning murder. The conflict began when a member
of the Dawlat argued with the Zagharat about a piece of land.
One night when the man from the Dawlat and his father were on
their way home some members of the Zagharat ambushed and killed
the father. They did not bother the son because he was only a
[571] boy. The 'awaaqil settled the case, and the Zagharat paid a
[692] 400 L.E. diiya. In 1959, after all those years, the son and
• [683] his uncle ambushed the man from the Zagharat who had shot the
father; they shot him four times. The man did not die but his
leg was paralyzed and he lost the sight in one eye. The

578 *613 682 •683 Dawlat, on the decision of the 'awaqil, paid a 200 L.E. diiya for the leg and the eye. After this, the two families resumed friendly relations.

[539] In the Name of God the Merciful,
It is the day, 28 Muharram 1382, the same as 1 July 1962. This agreement took place between the following parties: 'Ailit Abu Qarasa and 'Ailit al-Zallat. The reason for this agreement is the quarrel which happened on Wednesday, 24 Muharram, and 27 June. Out of this quarrel resulted the death of the late Juwaida Abd al-Salam. This agreement is made in the presence of the 'awaqil of the two parties and with their full approval (also present was Hajj 'Ali, an important rajal khair about whom we will have more to say). The offending group, namely 'Ailit al-Zallat, will go to live with Hajj Sabr Hamad al-Dawlat at Ras Abu Laha area, according to the way of the nazala among the Awlad 'Ali. 'Ailit al-Zallat may walk between Wadi Umm al-Shitan and Wadi al-Hawari on the west side, the sea on the north side, and the borders of the Qinaishat land on the southern side without a nazil (i.e. one from the protecting party). And if they go out from these mentioned borders, they must be accompanied by one from 'Ailit Dawlat. And if they go beyond the mentioned borders, without a nazil, no one from the protecting party has a right to stop them. And if any from the other party offends them within the mentioned borders, then 'Ailit Abu Qarasa will be subject to whatever is decided against them in accordance with the 'awaiyid Awlad 'Ali. This agreement was made and signed in the presence of the 'awaqil of the Abu Qarasa, and the period of nazala will be one year beginning the date of today. We hope for the help of God.

Signatures or seals of eleven men.
Signature and approval of Marsa Matruh Police Office
Dated: 1 July 1962

578 *613 682 Date: 1919. Case: Quarrel between 'Ailit Zallat ('Aishaibat, 'Ali Ahmar) and 'Ailit Hafiyan (Awlad Kharuf, 'Ali Abyad) concerning murder. The problem began over the ownership of a well. Three men from the Hafiyan were killed, and in revenge the

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Date: 24 January 1946 Marsa Matruh	1st Party: 'Awaqil of so-called Harun Abd al-Zain of al-Kamailat
	2nd Party: 'Awaqil of so-called Hamad Idris of al-'Aishaibat

Both parties, the first and the second, met before the 'awaaqil and witnesses to solve the prevailing problem between them concerning the wounding of so-called Harun Abd al-Zain who claims that this wound is from Hamad Idris. In the presence of the 'awaaqil all agreed that Hamad Idris should swear the oath and be supported by the below named. And the text of the oath which they will say, is: "By the truth (i.e. haqq, which also refers to a divine attribute) of the owner of this shrine, I swear that this bullet which hurt Harun is neither from me nor do I know who shot the bullet at the time of his injury." And a number of sixteen men must support him at the shrine of Sidi Yunis al-Jaraira on the date of Friday, the 29th of Saffar, 1946. And if any does not present himself for the oath, then the wounds which are present in Harun Abd al-Zain will be from the 'Aishaibat tribe. And if all swear this oath, the two parties will be even with each other. After this, none of them will hold anything against the other. This was issued in the presence of all of their 'awaaqil and with their satisfaction without any force or ill-will.

(On the original document is presented a list of the sixteen men from the lineage of Ma'fas of the 'Aishaibat who were chosen by the Kamailat to support Hamad Idris in the Oath.)

All of the seventeen above mentioned (including Hamad Idris) must be present at the shrine of Sidi Yunis al-Jaraira on the day Friday, 29 Saffar, in order to swear the oath, and this is what took place at the hand of witnesses, and God is the best witness.

Signatures or seals of all 'awaaqil who were present.

Day of the Oath:

It is on the day Friday, the last of the blessed month of Saffar, 1946. The 'Ailit Ma'fas of al-'Aishaibat, and with them 'Ailit al-Mahatha of al-Kamailat, came in order to swear the oath at the shrine of Shaikh Yunis al-Jaraira. And they swore this oath and the Kamailat became reconciled

578 that they had received their rights in this case. And
*613 the two parties are satisfied by this according to the
692 witnesses present.

539 Signatures or seals of four witnesses.
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578 The next case represents the only time in the memory
682 of informants that all of the 'awaaqil of the 'Ali Ahmar met
*613 to intervene in a case of conflict. This case is extremely
692 unusual because it may be the only time in Awlad 'Ali history
571 that political mobilization of this scale has taken place. As
619 noted, political action, in war or peace, usually involves
[177] only secondary segments. In view of this, the case probably
[648] reflects an instance of social change: the Egyptian government,
anxious to maintain good relations with Libya, encouraged and
facilitated the settlement of this dispute by furnishing
transportation and cutting administrative red tape so that
the 'awaaqil of the 'Ali Ahmar could handle this case in a
most expeditious way. Here is a case where Bedouin traditional
[182] political structures function adequately in the modern situation.
Note here also that, in certain circumstances, the diiya payment
can be divided symbolically and specifically to place guilt and
to indicate the seriousness of a crime.

619 Date: 1963. Case: Quarrel between the tribe of 'Ali Ahmar
682 (Egypt) and the Harabi (Libya) concerning murder. A young
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*613 boy of 'Ailit X was visiting his sister in Libya. He learned
[685]

*613 he was insistent upon his right to have her. She went to
619 578 see the "holy man," al-Sanusi, who lives near al-Qasr. (Al-
582 Sanusi is a descendent of "the Great Sanusi," the founder of
793 al-Sanusiyya, who now lives in Egypt after having been exiled
from Libya.) Al-Sanusi decided to keep the girl at his farm
*613 until he could decide a course of action. One night, the
619 girl's cousin secretly came to the Sanusi farm and found her
578 582 room. The girl was sleeping. The cousin struck a match, the
793 girl awoke and was frightened. She jumped from her bed and
●683 began to run, in so doing she fell down a flight of stairs
and suffered a rupture. This was a serious offense which the
cousin had committed, and al-Sanusi decided that he should call
all of the _'awaaqil_ of the area to inform them of this. In the
meantime, he sent the girl back to her home and the cousin
continued to bother her concerning his rights over her.

[584] The cousin went so far as to "offer the blood-sacrifice for
her," a stage in the marriage process which signifies that the
union has been consented to by both families. The girl's
father was dead, and her brothers and uncles were unable to
keep the cousin away from the girl. (It may be assumed that
they were conscious of his rights to _bint 'amm_.) They had
[692] even beaten him once. All of the _'awaaqil_ of 'Ali Ahmar and
'Ali Abyad, and the Marabtiin in the al-Qasr area came to meet
with al-Sanusi at his farm. He (al-Sanusi) said that they all

*613 must come because he, himself, was a Libyan and a member of
619 no tribe in Egypt. Al-Sanusi's petition was two-fold: he
578 said the cousin should be punished for violating his right of
582 privacy and property, and the question concerning the cousin's
793 right to the girl should be settled. The _'awaaqil_ decided
•683 that al-Sanusi should be awarded a _kubaara_ of 1000 L.E. from
692 the tribes of the area, and that the girl should be permitted to marry no man of the Qinaishat tribe. Al-Sanusi refused to accept the _kubaara_, and this was the correct thing to do since the _kubaara_, especially a large one, is only offered ritualistically. The _'awaaqil_ took note of the cousin's rights to his _bint 'amm_: they said that since the girl refused to marry him it would not be right if she married anyone else from the tribe.

*613 Furthermore, the _'awaaqil_, on the basis of the cousin's behavior
619 in this matter, decided that the cousin was insane and should
734 be committed to an asylum. They informed the police in Marsa
[648] Matruh of this diagnosis and decision, and the police came and transported the boy to the mental hospital in Cairo where he is today. The uncles of the boy signed the papers which committed him.

CHAPTER V

POLITICAL LEADERSHIP AND JUDICIAL PROCESS

69 629 628 One of the most idstinguishing aspects of the legal system of Awlad Ali is the absence of any formalized judicial structure. Disputes are solved mainly through the mechanism of informal mediation rather than through formal hearings of a court during which the facts of each case are presented and judgment based on the facts is passed. This does not mean that formal hearings are not known on the area. For the "Mi'ad" or tribal hearing is a common and very important practice in the tribal proceedings. The Mi'ad, however, is not a tribal court. It is merely a gathering of all interested parties and anyone else who wished to attend, in which the agreement reached behind the scenes by means of negotiations are announced.

628 613 ● 683 [114] The first Mi'ad I attended was held in the house of Sheikh Mughaieb, the Aqila (tribal leader) of bait Mughaieb of the Sanagrah tribal segment in the area of Hammam, 60 miles west of Alexandria. The case that was to be settled at the Mi'iad involved the assaulting of Sheikh Mughaieb ty two younger members of bait Dauoud who lived in a nearby camp. The dispute started when Ali, the youngest brother (14 years old) of the two assailants, found a piece of iron in the desert. Suspecting that it was a mine, he took it away from the camp to the small garden in the backyard of Sheikh Mughaieb's house, surrounded it with dry weeds and set fire to it. The piece of iron was in fact a mine and it exploded, damaging the trees and a window on the Sheikh's property. At the sound of the explosion Sheikh Mughaieb rushed out and found the boy trying to run away from

628 683 613 the area. He caught him and slapped him and ordered him not to do it again. After a short while the boy returned with his two older brothers who protested Sheikh Mughaieb's hitting their younger brother. The argument developed into a fight during which the two brothers hit Mughaieb with a heavy stick over his head making him unconscious.

The Mi'ad was held two weeks after the incident. When I arrived at Sheikh Mughaieb's house, the meeting was being held in the guest room in the back of the house. Present at the meeting were Sheikh Mughaieb, his father, two distant relatives of Mughaieb who were visiting the area at the time; Sheikh Mutair, the Aqila of the powerful bait of Mutair located some twenty miles east of Mughaieb; the two assailants, their father who at the same time was the Aqila of their bait, and two neighbors of Sheikh Mughaieb.

For the first half hour or so nothing was said. People were sitting [576] silently except for occasional greetings of "how are you?" and the response of "thank God for everything". Tea was served frequently. Then [779] Sheikh Mutair addressed the gathering and read the "fatha" or the beginning passage of the Qoraan (which appeals to God to show his right ways to the believers and to guide them to wisdom). He then said, "In the blessed presnece of all these honorable guests and with the help of God and his prophet we will clear the hearts of those concerned of the grudges caused by the shameful and unfortunate incident in which the devil has played a major role." Then Sheikh Karim, the Aqila of the bait to which the accused belonged, continued the speech saying that this shameful thing should never have happened and that his sons must [867] have been possessed by the devil to have done it. After all, they have been brought up to respect their elders and especially Sheikh Mughaieb, who was like a second father to him.

628 who was like a second father to them. He praised Sheikh Mughaieb for be-
683 ing understanding. He then said that Sheikh Mughaieb was very generous
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[576] and that his sons had come to Mughaieb the day before and kissed the top of his head (an expression of respect for forgiveness). He said that no money, no matter how great, could erase the harm done by his sons but that he had offered to pay Sheikh Mughaieb the sum of 400 pounds as "kabara" or face-saving compensation. (The kabara will be discussed in a forthcoming chapter, but for the time being it is worth noting that the above amount is the maximum for such compensation since it equals the bloodmoney for a man). Then he turned to Sheikh Mughaieb and asked him to accept it in front of the respected guests. Sheikh Mughaieb then spoke for the first time and said that the two boys were like sons to him and that he had no hard feelings toward them anymore, since he believed that young people were sometimes carried away in their actions. He then proceeded to say that in honor of the honorable guests who took the time to attend the hearing he was forfeiting half the amount. At that time a woman brought the food the women were cooking for the gathering, and Sheikh Karim asked Mughaieb, "How about the honor of the good women of the house who have done all the work and cooked all the food? If you ask me, they deserve at least another hundred pounds." Mughaieb said, "All right, fifty pounds for the home of the women, but no more." After that Sheikh Karim paid the amount of a hundred and fifty pounds to Sheikh Mughaieb and shook hands with him. He also shook hands with the two young men who had assaulted him, and the gathering started the dinner and tea.

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628 Not all Mi'ads in the area proveed with that smoothness. Many of them are characterized by shouting and arguments and frequently no

PHASE I

613 578 682 [464] In September of 1956, Mansur from bait Eweidha of the Aggary Eila, who works as a driver in one of the government projects in the area, went to Alexandria with a friend, a member of the Gemei'at tribe. In one of the bars there, Mansur got drunk and entered into an argument with his friend. The argument turned into a fight during which he hit his friend with a broken bottle. Two days later, the friend died. A settlement was made between Mansur and the victim's family and bloodmoney was established at L. 300.

613 682 ● 683 Two weeks after the above incident, the same person, Mansur, was driving the government car on his regualr duty when he ran over two members of the Sanagrah tribe who were sitting on the side of the road, killing one and breaking the leg of the other. Another settlement was made with the families of the victims. The bloodmoney for the dead man was established at L. 300 and another L. 50 was set as the compensation for the broken leg of the other man.

* The total sum of compensations in the two incidents was divided among the sixteen baits constituting the Aggary Amar. The share of each bait was decided in proportion to the number of adult males (sayems) in each. The share of bait Asabei' alone was established at about L. 100.

613 682 683 672 558 As the Aqila of Bait Asabei', Shei'eb was responsible for collecting the money from members of his bait. But for the following six months he was unable to collect from any member of his bait, including Sheikh Hakim, Shei'eb's cousin and the wealthiest person in bait Asabei' and the Aggary Amar as a whole. Most of them gave the execuse that it was a bad year and they had lost most of their herds. When the money was not collected,

613 682 683 672 558 [115] the victims' families sent their representatives to demand that the money be paid. To face the situation, a meeting of all the Awaqil of Eilat Aggary was called and Sheikh Selouma, the Aqila of bait Eweidha, took the responsibility of notifying the other Awaqil. The meeting was held in the tent of Hemeida (my driver and informant) from the Sanagrah tribe. Each bait was represented by its Aqila with the exception of bait Asabei', from which both Shei'eb and Hakim were present. Since bait Asabei' was the only bait which did not submit to its share of the bloodmoney, the discussion centered around the inability of Shei'eb to collect it. In a gesture which he meant to appear as helping out Shei'eb, Hakim offered to pay not only his share but that of all members of bait Asabei', and followed his offer by handing the money to Sheikh Selouma. After this act which was a complete surprise to Shei'eb, Sheikh Slouma, the Aqila of bait Eweidha, suggested that Hakim should be considered as the Aqila of bait Asabei' instead of Shei'eb, who had demonstrated his inability to collect from members of his own bait. He emphasized the fact that he had nothing against Shei'eb who had legitimately acquired his position as Aqila by means of succession. But he insisted that the survival of the Amar depended upon the fulfullment of its financial obligations to outsiders and that Hakim was wealthy and could pay. Shei'eb did not comment and the rest of the Awaqil nodded indicating their agreement with Sheikh Selouma.

[124] The above is the summary of events that happened before I came to the area, and which were told to me by informants including the parties involved. Since most of these events occurred more than ten years ago,

613 682 it was impossible to verify the actual facts or to know what exactly
683 happened. But since the parties involved are still alive and since these
672 events are closely related to present-day happenings, the case is still
558 alive in the minds of the parties involved as well as those of outsiders-
(124) Naturlaly, each party tries to present the facts in such a way as to
613 682 support his own claims. Shei'eb, for example, insists that Hakim had
683 bribed members of bait Asabei' to refuse to pay their share in order to
156 embarrass him and make him appear as unable to perform his duties as
558 Aqila. "Hakim always had his eyes on becoming the Aqila of bait Asabei',"
said Shei'eb, "but he had no business becoming the Aqila, so he had to
make me look bad to the other Awaqil.... He likes to be looked up to as
a big man, but it wouldn't work." While other members of bait Asabei'
deny that Hakim had bribed them, they agree with Shei'eb that Hakim is a
156 dishonest man. In fact, Hakim's reputation is so widespread in the area
551 that it has earned him the nickname of "the thief". The nickname was
788 given to him a few years ago when he went to Mecca for a pilgrimage with
-685 another fellow tribesman. The latter told the story that while in Mecca
Hakim had found a purse with two hundred pounds in it. He was supposed
to return the purse to the authorities or it would be considered as
stealing if he kept it. Stealing in Mecca is not only a crime but also
a great sin which makes the holy trip void for the offender. Hakim told
his companion that he had given the purse to the authorities. But later,
on their way back from Mecca, the friend found the purse hidden in Hakim's
luggage. When the story was known in the area, he was referred to as
156 "the thief". Other accounts of Hakim's dishonesty are told throughout
685 the area, including stories of how he acquired his wealth through stealing
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156 [685] equipment from the government projects and from smuggling sheep and mer-
[439] chandise across the Libyan border. Although some of these stories might
be exaggerated, they all point to the fact that Hakim, despite his wealth,
is not the most popular or reputable individual in bait Asabei', and that
although Shei'eb is not a popular individual either, he definitely comes
up the winner in any popularity contest between the two. The question is
156 why Hakim was selected by the Awaqil to replace Shei'eb. The case in-
613 volved more than Shei'eb's inability to collect the money from members of
558 682 his bait. Shei'eb's ineffectiveness seemed to have been taken as an ex-
● 683 cuse rather than as the direct cause. Many Aqaqil, before Shei'eb, had
failed in collecting money from their own bait without being subject to
direct challenge. What seems to be involved is more than a challenge to
a particular member, Shei'eb. It is a challenge to the whole principle
by which Shei'eb acquired his position as Aqila of bait Asabei': pat-
rilineal succession.

156 Shei'eb is the youngest of four sons of the former Aqila of bait
159 Asabei', Sheikh Elewa. For more than fifty years Sheikh Elewa was the
613 463 undisputed Aqila of bait Asabei'. He also had considerable influence
683 among other tribal segments throughout the whole of the Western Desert
554 by virtue of his position as "nazzar", that is, the expert who assesses
the amount of compensation for wound inflicted in a liable case. The
[428] position of nazzar is a hereditary one and had been handed down from
[779] father to son. The basis for his assessment of wounds are a number of
old books believed to be obtained from Mecca and contain all the judg-
ments of famous Islamic leaders in their assessments of wounds.

[428] Eleven years ago when Sheikh Elewa became blind and too old to

156 exercise his functions, he invited all the important people in the area
159 into a large gathering during which he announced that he was handing the
613 sacred books to Shei'eb, who was to become the nazzar and also to succeed
683 him as the Aqila of bait Asabei'. Although at that time Shei'eb was
554 fairly young, twenty-six, nobody questioned Sheikh Elewa's decision.
428
(579) "He is the Aqila," said one informant, "and he has the right to decide
which of his sons is to succeed him. After all, he knows his sons better
than anybody else and knows which one is best for the job." Most people
156 thought that Sheikh Elewa, being still alive and with clear thinking,
159 would help Shei'eb in performing his duties as Aqila. A few months after
613
554 Shei'eb took over his father's position, it became apparent that he was
578 too immature for the job. He tried to use his position to take money
[661] from members of his bait and when they refused to give him any money, he
entered into fights with a number of them. Rumors spread that he took
bribes from the disputing parties who came to him for him to assess the
legal compensation for wounds to raise or lower his estimate. But still
people within bait Asabei' as well as outside it respected Sheikh Elewa's
decision and did not challenge Shei'eb openly. But as time passed the
dissatisfaction with Shei'eb grew. This dissatisfaction came mainly from
members of the Amar who were affected directly by Shei'eb's actions, especially those actions which resulted in the payment of compensation for
wounds inflicted in fights.

PHASE II

439 On the evening of May 16, 1966, two members of the Geneishat tribe of Matruh area came to Burg-el-Arab with a large shipment of smuggled cigarettes to leave with their partner in the area, Hadi, from the

582 of parley land or a well or to make him a partner in a business or smuggling
557 activities or even as revenge on his uncle by keeping his daughters
582 unmarried. In 1961 the heads of 25 prominant baits of various tribes
557 in the area of Matruh met and decided that the right of ibn 'amm had
178 become a major problem, and that invoking that right when the man had
613 no intention of marrying the girl had resulted in a number of disputes
that became serious over a period of time. They felt that the time was
suitable to revise that right and make it subject to the concept of fair
behavior applicable to other rights. They wrote a new rule which speci-
582 557 fies that the man has the right to prevent his cousin from marrying an
178 outsider or a more distant relative only if he himself intends to marry
613 675 her either in the present or in the reasonable future. If the circumstances
show that he cannot do so, then he forfeits the right.

To prevent his cousin from marrying another man without a proven
[558] [681] intention on the part of the man to marry her himself in the foreseeable
future, is considered as an unreasonable behavior for which
ibn 'amm could be liable to pay kabara to his uncle as well as to the
prospective groom. It also denies him the right of taking her away from
[683] her marital residence by force. If he does this, he would be liable to
the compensation for assault. The agreement was signed by the awaqil
and is considered binding as far as the baits they represented are concerned.
Other tribal segments in the area refuse to abide by the agreement
and consider it as a pretentious departure from the ways of Awlad Ali
which should not be encouraged. Even within the tribal segments involved
in the agreement, there have been reports of individuals who refused to
[629] abide by the agreement. In certain of these latter cases, the ibn 'amm
selected as his mardi a member of a tribal segment not involved in the
agreement and therefore not morally bound to abide by
its contents.

593 586 and expenses to the husband that constitutes the most important check
(583) on the otherwise undisputed right of the father to take away his
daughter.

593 The woman, on the other hand, cannot refuse to go with her father,
562 for this means that she would be disobeying him. A woman who disobeys
586 her father is not worthy of his name. He can cut her off from the
family, which means that she is left without any support or protection.
A woman who is cut off from her family is left vulnerable to her husband
and to society. She will have nobody to defend her or to be responsible
for her actions. The responsibility for the woman's behavior is not
transferred by marriage to the husband or his family.

682 If the woman kills or assaults someone or causes damage to property
683 for which compensation is required, her male kin pays the blood money or
602 the compensation on her behalf. It is sometimes stated that if the woman
613 562 has grown-up sons, they, and not her family, pay for her. Since the
593 children belong to their father's family, it may seem like transfering
the responsibility for the woman's actions to her husband's family. However,
in all three cases where this happened, the woman was quite old,
her father was dead, and her brothers were either dead or had moved outside
the area and had cut off all relations with the area. She also had
no nephews in the area. In such cases, the sons were the woman's closest
male kin.

682 On the other hand, if the woman is the victim of murder or assault
683 for which blood money or compensation is to be paid, the husband is the
593 562 one to benefit from the situation. To understand why this happens, we
have to consider the contractual nature of marriage among Awlad Ali. It
584 583 has been mentioned earlier that before marriage is final, the prospective

584 husband or his father pays the woman's father the bridewealth, or mahr.
583 In exchange for the mahr, the husband expects his father-in-law to outfit his daughter with such items as rugs, blankets, and a few other household items, like cooking pots, serving dishes, and a metal or wooden chest
[422] to keep her clothes in. These items become the private property of the wife, but the husband has the right to use them. In addition, the man
581 expects to gain certain rights to the woman. The customary law of Awlad
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585 Ali gives the husband three basic rights over his wife: the right to her sexual services (including the right to bear him children); the right to her labor in domestic activities; and the right to her obedience. Of the three rights, the first is the most exclusive. Not only doesthe husband have a complete monopoly over his wife's present sexual services, but he also has the right, if the girl has never been married before, to be the
[583] first to use such services. If he discovers that she is not a virgin, he can send her back to her father and get back his mahr.

581 The other two rights are not as exclusive. The husband's right to
585 his wife's domestic labor does not prevent her from occasionally helping
593 out in her father's or brother's household, especially if they live nearby. Finally, the husband's right to be obeyed by his wife is always subordinated to that of her father, who retains the ultimate authority over his daughter.

682 If the woman is killed or injured, the husband is deprived of all
683 or some of her services, depending on the seriousness and the permanence
581 of the injury, and therefore is entitled to compensation. The right of
585
593 avenging the woman's murder remains, however, that of her family, since she is still a member of that family.

682 "...It means that I will never lend my cooking pot to my neighbor
672 lest his child trip over it and I would be asked to pay his blood-
627
695 money."

So, the bloodmoney was divided into two sections, one to be paid by Hemeida, and the other to be the responsibility of the rope, which meant that the victim's relatives only took home half of the bloodmoney.

683 CASE #2: The Case of the Curious Neighbor

682 This is the case of 66-year-old Selouma whose barley land
578 bordered that of Muftah, a distant member of the same tribe. A
672 small area of rocky land separated the two areas. Throughout the time that Muftah was preparing his land for barley cultivation, Selouma used to sit on the dividing rocks, observing his neighbor work on his land and making jokes about the amount of time and effort Muftah was putting into his land, especially when it looked like a dry year, anyway, and no barley would be cultivated. For more than a week Muftah tolerated his neighbor's remarks. "I always said to myself, 'Don't follow the devil... He is an old man and doesn't know what he is saying.' But that day I could not take it any longer. My wife and children were sick, and I didn't have any money to bring them medicine or even food. I wanted to finish preparing the land because it looked like it was going to rain that day. I went to the area I was working on when Selouma started his jokes. I was mad. I took a small stone and threw it at him to scare him and make him stop. The stone hit his leg. It was a small stone, and I didn't think it would harm him. Actually, he stood on his

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682 feet after that and left." It seems that later the wound got infected.
672 Six months after the incident, Selouma was taken to the
[578] hospital with an infected wound, and three days later he died from
that infection. Selouma's son, Ali, demanded that Muftah pay a
full bloodmoney (L.E. 400) for the death of his father, since the
death was directly caused by the wound inflicted by Muftah. Muftah
denied the charges and claimed that the infected wound which caused
683 the death of Selouma was not the one inflicted by the stone. Mediations
682 continued for some time, and when no agreement was achieved,
672 the aqilas of the two baits to which the parties belonged declared
695 that the decision should be made by the oath which Muftah had to
613 take if he insisted on his claims that the wound was not caused by
his action. Since the case involved the life of a man, Muftah had
to be supported in his oath by fifty-five adult male members of
[671] his 'amar, or 'eila. In accordance with the Daraieb, the selection
[778] was done by members of Selouma's Bait who also selected the tomb of
the saint where the oath would be undertaken. On the date the oath
was to be taken, the disputing parties, as well as all the notables
of friendly tribal segments who were invited to witness the oath,
went to the tomb of the saint. As they started with the procedures,
[784] two of Muftah's cousins who were to support him in the oath and his
uncle refused to swear on the grounds that they were not sure that
Muftah was telling the truth and therefore could not subject themselves
to the supernatural hazards of taking a false oath. Attempts
by other members who were to support Muftah were made to force the
three men to swear, since their refusal meant that the bloodmoney

683 682 672 695 613 was to be paid unconditionally and consequently would cost all members of the amar; but all these attempts failed. At this point, there was no doubt on the part of the attending crowd about Muftah's responsibility for the death of Selouma. The question was, how much had he to pay. The amount requested by Selouma's son was that for "intentional" killing on the basis that Muftah had willfully thrown the rock knowing that it might harm Selouma, especially considering his age.

683 682 672 627 After long and intensive negotiations with the interested parties, a Mi'ad was set in which it was announced that Muftah had to pay the amount of L.E. 200. In his reasoning, he stipulated that the wound which had caused the death of Selouma, although it was intentional on the part of Muftah, was inflicted by a stone which in itself is not a lethal weapon, and therefore the death was an unintentional one for which the bloodmoney is customarily estimated at L.E. 300. He also stated that in the excitement that [845] followed the death of Selouma, Muftah's pregnant wife had lost the child. The bloodmoney for the still-born infant was estimated at L.E. 100, which was deducted from the amount of bloodmoney that Muftah had to pay.

CASE #3: The Case of the Trespasser

311 423 613 [132] This case occurred during the year of the fieldwork which was the second dry year the area experienced. Rain had not fallen except in a very few places. One of these places was near the small town of Sidi Barrani in which the land belonging to Yadem and his Bait was found. Yadem had sown his barley which at that time had grown to about five feet high. Surrounding the cultivated land

682 they refuse to accept reduced compensation, they are viewed as unreason-
672 able by the rest of the groups in the area. One way in which such pres-
[626] sure is brought to bear upon the victim's acceptance of reduced compansation
682 672 is in the mi'ad, or the public hearing, in which the settlement achieved
627 is announced. The common practice is for the killer's group to agree to
pay the full amount specified by the traditional scale for compensation
(L.E. 400 for killing with a lethal weapon and L.E. 300 for killing with
a non-lethal weapon). Then, in the final mi'ad in which such agreement
is achieved, a number of important members of non-involved tribal segments
are invited to the mi'ad. During the mi'ad and immediately following the
announcement that a settlement has been achieved and that the kin group of
the killer has agreed to pay the traditional bloodmoney, the mardi or any
one of the attendants to the mi'ad asks the victim's group to defer part
of the payment in honor of important members of the tribal segments pres-
682 ent at the meeting. Sometimes a portion of the payment is forfeited in
672 honor of the tent or the women of the household who prepared the food or
even for the blessing of one of the saints in the area. In the case of
the curious neighbor (Case #2) above, out of the original amount specified
for the death by non-lethal weapon estimated as L.E. 300, only L.E. 100
was actually given to the victim's kin group. In addition to the L.E. 100
deducted because of the death of the unborn infant of the offender, an-
other hundred pounds was deducted in honor of certain important members
who attended the gathering. It is interesting to note that the L.E. 100
● [683] is compensation for the loss of the use of a leg in the formal scale of
compensations for injuries as will be shown shortly. No such reduction
in the amount of bloodmoney was done in the case of the trespasser where

682 672 411 691 594 as soon as he settles in the host's place, should unload the gun. In addition to reducing the possibility of the gun being accidentally fired and harming someone, this act expressed the trust of the guest in his host and signifies the ability of the latter to protect his guest against any harm. A person visiting another does not need his gun for protection and therefore must unload it. 682 672 411 If the owner of the gun fails to take this customary precaution and leaves his gun loaded, and because of that failure the gun causes the death or injury of a person or even damage to property, the owner is held responsible for that result. The same rule applies to other deadly weapons, such as knives or daggers, as well as to animals 683 672 231 which are dangerous by nature, such as dogs. Each tent in the area has a dog. Starting the first weeks in the puppy's life, he is trained to guard the tent and to bark at the approach of any stranger. It is also trained to attack any intruder who comes within fifty yards of the tent unless accompanied by a member of the tent. When one goes to visit another, he usually stays away from the tent until someone from the tent hears the dog barking and comes out to get the guest. Most dogs would not attack a person as long as he is the safe fifty yards away from the tent. Occasionally, a dog goes behond the safe distance and b ites an individual passing by or a guest waiting to be let inside the tent. If the injured person is able to prove, usually by taking the oath, that he was more than fifty yards away from the tent at the time he was attacked by the dog, the dog's owner is liable to the victim for the injury inflicted by the dog. If, on the other hand, evidence shows that the victim was bitten by the dog while being less than fifty yards away from the tent, then there is no responsibility on the part of the dog's

683 672 231 owner. This means that an element of neglect has to be proven on the part of the owner of either a lethal weapon or a dangerous animal before he is held responsible for the fdamage they cause. But whether dangerous or not, the role of such objects or animals, in causing the death or injury of the victim, is taken into consideration in assessing the exact amount to be paid as compensation.

682 672 In assessing the intention and consequently the amount of the traditional bloodmoney to be paid, the behavior of the offender is judged according to a traditional standard of reasonableness. In the case of the curious neighbor, Muftah, in his attempt to evade the payment of the full bloodmoney, presented an elaborate account of his neighbor's actions including the provocative statements that the latter had said, the jokes, and even the insults he had directed against Muftah. His attempt was to show that throwing a small rock at his neighbor was not an unreasonable behavior considering the provocations of that neighbor whose behavior was itself unreasonable. Although the victim's behavior was unreasonable, the response of Muftah to the provocations of his neighbor was also considered as unreasonable. He could have followed the traditional means of asking a third party to interfere and prevent the neighbor from continuing his insults. Instead, Muftah took the direct and unreasonable response which eventually led to the death of Selouma. It is that element of reasonableness that led to the reversal of the original settlement in the case of the startled shepherd (Case #4). 682 672 627 When considering a certain behavior in the context of reasonableness, the mediators draw not only upon the immediate facts of the case under consideration, but also upon the careful inquiry into the long history of interrelations

Part 2: Bodily Injuries

683 Awlad Ali recognize compensation for all sorts of bodily injuries sustained intentionally or accidentally. An elaborate scale of compensations is set as a basis for compromise. The basic principle involved is that an injury should be met by compensation in direct ratio to its severity, and the severity is assessed by the extent of a man's disability. Disability, in turn, is measured by the extent to which a man is prevented from participating in the communal activities which enable him to defend and maintain himself and his family according to the customary standards they are used to. It is a collective, as well as an individual, concern. A head injury or an injury to the hand may amount to a very serious defect if the person is unable to cultivate the barley fields or move with the herds for grazing or holding a gun to defend his family and group against an intruder who intends to do him harm. Death is considered the maximum disability, as are other injuries that take the person totally out of the collective activities, as in the case of injury
683 resulting in paralysis or blindness. All other injuries are compensated
435 by a fraction of the bloodmoney for homicide or L.E. 400.

Scale of Compensation for Bodily Injuries

El damiah Sughra (a small wound which does not cut the skin)	L. 3
El damiah kubrah (a small wound which cuts the skin)	L. 6
El fakhera (a wound which cuts the skin and reaches the flesh under it)	L. 12
El badi'a (a wound which cuts the flesh on both sides)	L. 25
El mutifah (severe cuts to the flesh)	L. 30

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El malta (a wound which cuts the skin and flesh and reaches the fat next to the bone)	L. 35
El muwadiha (a wound which cuts the skin, the flesh and the fat next to the bone and leaves the latter exposed)	L. 50
El hashima (skull fracture)	L. 100
El munkala (a head injury in which a piece of skull is removed)	L. 150
El maimuma (a head wound that causes permanent brain damage)	L. 400
Damage to the head hair:	
if permanently damaged	L. 100
if grew back without damage	L. 20
(The above rule applies to the hair of the beard, mustache and eyelashes.)	
Fracture of the hand: for each finger	L. 50
Fracture of the arm: for each bone	L. 50
Fracture of the leg: for each bone	L. 100
Broken ribs (unspecified number)	L. 100
Fracture of the foot	L. 100
Paralysis or severance of the fingers: each joint (except those of the thumb)	L. 33
Paralysis or severance of the thumb: each joint	L. 50
Loss of two ears	L. 400
Loss of one ear	L. 200
If hearing is impared, the defect is measured in relationship to the total utility of the ears, and compensation is estimated accordingly.	
Complete loss of the eyesight	L. 400
Partial loss: to be assessed in proportion of that loss to the total utility.	
Nose: if totally cut off	L. 400
Piercing the nostrils	L. 100

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If the two lips are cut cff:	L. 400
just the lower lip	L. 300
just the upper lip	L. 200
Visible piercing of the lips	L. 50
The tongue: if results in total loss of speech	L. 400

Partial loss of speech is measured in proportion to that total loss.

All the teeth	L. 400
Each tooth	L. 50
Testicles: if cut off	L. 400
The entire genitals	L. 800
The breasts:	
of a nubile woman	L. 200
of an old woman	L. 100

683 As in the case of homicide, the above scale of compensation works only as a basis for compromise rather than as a definite or exact fine. 683 To assess the amount of injury and therefore the category of compensation, 629 the victim and his group, as well as a representative of the offender, 463 have to take the injured person to the "nazzar" who examines him and defines the kind of injury sustained. The nazzar is usually a member of [619] one of the Murabiteen tribes who is known to possess a number of shari's books specifying the injuries and the amount of compensation required in each case. Before he assesses the wounds, both parties have to swear that [465] they will accept his judgment, and they pay him a token fee that varies according to the ability to pay and the position of the parties involved. 683 The amount of money estimated by the nazzar is not necessarily the final amount of money paid. For, as in the case of homicide, it is subject to deductions in honor of various members who attend the meeting in which

683 the settlement is announced. This deduction is determined by the same
683 factors involved in the case of homicide, such as the relationship between
672 the parties involved and the presence or absence of an intention
on the part of the offender to cause bodily harm to the victim, as well
as the role the victim played in provoking the actions that led to his
683 injury. Injuries sustained during a fight are not as serious as injuries
672 sustained by ambushing the victim. In the latter case, the victim
673 had no chance to defend himself. Also, the number of people involved in
the actions that led to the injury enter as a variable. If more than one
individual attacks a victim, it is considered more serious than a man-to-man fight.

would have dropped in on the camp. In another situation, two men entered a shop 613
in a market-place; inside sat two men of a feuding group who, instead of retreating 628
hastily, greeted those who had just entered, and the latter returned the greeting with 682
blows on the head from the butts of their rifles. Markets in Cyrenaica are recognized [443]
to be places of peace. In their actions the two offenders not only injured two others
but also broke a taboo in a public place. The victim's group now had to avenge not [683]
only the injury but the insult that the breach of taboo carried with it, as well. In
most feud relationships this is characteristic. It is never a matter of a simple homicide,
but of killing a man at the entrance to his tent, between the centre poles of his tent,
or taking the life of a minor, or an elder too old to carry arms and so on. Each successive
killing ensures that the hostile relationships will be perpetuated.

The third step in this exposition, therefore, is the association of a state of feud with the secondary order of segmentation.

When the relationships between the structurally superior primary tribal sections 619
are examined, the arguments against the necessity for peace are stronger than in the
case of secondary sections. Relationships between them are few and irregular. Only
occasionally do members of these groups meet, and then often accidentally; very
many men of collateral primary sections are complete strangers one to the other.
If a homicide occurs between two primary sections it is unlikely that any attempt to 619
open negotiations will be made. The offender's camp may be raided by a *ghazi* 682
recruited from the victim's kinsmen. There would be no question of these primary [721]
sections going to war. On a raid firearms may be used, but the action is limited to a
strike-and-run affair. If the issue is joined and members of both sides are ranged [726]
against each other they fight with sticks to avoid large-scale slaughter: warfare must
not be allowed within the tribe. Wars belong to intertribal relationships. For one of 175
these wars, apart from hearsay evidence, some records exist. These tell of a war 619
which took place during the period 1860 to 1865, in which there were planned cam- 726
paigns, the organization of fighters into groups, and provisions for a labour force
in the home territory, large enough to produce sufficient food to maintain an army
in the field. During this war several hundred people were killed.

At this point, it is possible to summarize the stages in this exposition of the 619
Bedouin view in diagrammatic form. 726

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

671 tives lost no time in taking legal proceedings at the Ourfi
672 court to claim bloodmoney from the owner of the cistern;
682 and on Ali's release from prison a very long and excessively
694 tedious lawsuit began.

The principle that a life had been lost and must be paid for was accepted without question by the court from the outset, in spite of the police enquiry, which is the local equivalent of a coroner's inquest. The enquiry had established beyond any shadow of doubt that death had been caused by misadventure, and that Ali was absolutely innocent, not only of any intent to kill, but also of any negligence whatsoever. Any other coroner's jury in the world would have returned a verdict of accidental death, expressed sympathy with the relatives, and absolved all concerned from blame; and there the matter would have ended.

671 Ali, who had already undergone three months in durance
672 vile—which, to a wandering child of the desert, must be
particularly galling—so far forgot any tribal instruction he
682 might have had as to repudiate vigorously any responsibility either for the accident or for the restitution of the death in the form of bloodmoney. His family also, who would naturally have to share the payment, did their best to confound the issue by lodging a counter claim. They protested that the actual rope that broke was not theirs, but belonged to a third party, and that neighbouring tribes, who had approved of the project and who stood to benefit by the cistern when it was cleaned out, were conjointly responsible with themselves for any payment due.

The case dragged on unsatisfactorily for some months; the neighbouring tribes swore that no agreement existed whereby they should benefit by the cistern when completed; the question of the ownership of the rope was dropped; and eventually Ali and his family were ordered to pay a reduced scale of bloodmoney to the family of the deceased.

683 Sometimes these bloodmoney cases, so far from being
672 dramatic or nauseating, are actually rather amusing.

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The plaintiff was an Arab called Salem Ibrahim, who 683
brought an action against a man of another family of his [694]
tribe called Ali. The plaint was as follows. Seven years
ago Salem's father Ibrahim, a man then about sixty years
old, was sitting on a wall near a patch of cultivation belonging
to Ali, and watching Ali working on his land.
Some dispute arose between them; and, angered at something
that Ibrahim had said, Ali picked up a large stone
and flung it at Ibrahim. The impact broke the old man's 683
leg; the case was reported to the police; Ali was arrested 682
and imprisoned; and Ibrahim was taken to hospital, where 672
he shortly afterwards died. Ali was thus left in prison,
and the case could not be proceeded with from the Ourfi
standpoint until he came out. On his release, therefore, 683
the case was to be brought up for settlement, and the 682
plaintiff to claim bloodmoney for his father's death.

Meanwhile, however, plaintiff related how his own 694
family had wanted to get the case cleared up and how Ali's 672
family had also approached them with the idea of extracting
Ali from the clutches of the police, so that the
case could be tried by an Ourfi court, and a judgment
which would be intelligible and acceptable to both parties
could be given by their own sheikhs.

Accordingly they agreed together that the plaintiff's family should go to the police, declare that the whole case was a mistake from beginning to end, and that the old man Ibrahim had fallen off the wall, and that nobody had thrown a stone at him. A document to this effect was drawn up, signed and sealed by the notables of Ibrahim's family, and solemnly presented to the police. The evidence seemed so genuine that Ali was released from prison, with implied apologies for wrongful arrest. On his release from prison Ali saw his opportunity, and by some means obtained possession of this document signed by Ibrahim's family.

When the case first came up for trial by Ourfi court, Ali denied throwing the stone, repudiated all responsibility

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683 in the case, and produced this document signed by Ibrahim's
682 family to the effect that Ibrahim *fell* off the wall and broke
694 his leg. How then could he possibly be implicated in the
case?

The assessors of the court went carefully into all the
683 evidence and eventually agreed that the matter should be
682 decided by the oath. They demanded that Ali, backed by
672 twenty-five men of his own tribe, chosen by Ibrahim's
695 family as men of their word, should swear on the tomb
of Sidi Shar el Ruh the following oath: "By Allah the Great and by the Truth of this Holy Sheikh, I swear that I neither threw a stone at Ibrahim, nor broke his leg." They further decreed that if Ali himself, or any one of the twenty-five men chosen to back him in his oath, failed or refused to swear as required, the case for the defence would be null and void, and that bloodmoney would be required in full from Ali's family.

On the date appointed two or three sheikhs of the court were detailed to go to the tomb, to meet the defendant with his twenty-five backers, and to supervise the taking of the oath. The parties duly arrived; but when the oath was just about to be taken, three men of Ali's backers refused to swear, declaring that on the contrary they were ready to swear, if required, that Ali *had* thrown the stone, and was responsible for Ibrahim's death. The case for the defence thus fell to the ground, and the parties were warned to appear at a future date, when the case would be completed. At the next meeting of the court, Ali's liability to pay bloodmoney was accepted in principle, but there were divergencies of opinion as to the amount to be paid. Then followed a delightful example of casuistry typical of the Bedou mind.

The assessors of the court felt that, in the first instance, Ali had never intended to kill poor old Ibrahim, and that his crime fell very far short of intentional homicide. Also, it had happened seven years before, and, all said and done, time had healed most of whatever ill-feeling there ever

had been. Besides, Ibrahim was an old man when it 683
happened, and he would have to have died before very 682
long in any case. Moreover, the sheikhs in their heart of 672
hearts considerably admired the acumen displayed by Ali
in getting hold of that document. So they decided privately 695
among themselves that on the whole half the full blood-money, or £150, would meet the case. On no account, however, could they give in open court the above reasons for lessening the sum to be paid. They proceeded to listen patiently to more evidence, and eventually gave their considered judgment as follows:

"Defendant Ali is required to pay the full bloodmoney of £300. *But* in view of the fact that, when the police came to Ali's tent to arrest him seven years ago, in the excitement and commotion caused by the police patrol, Ali's wife gave birth to a premature boy child, and that this boy subsequently died, therefore the sum of £100 will be deducted from the total to be paid, for the sake of the dead baby. Also, as it cannot be proved conclusively that Ibrahim died simply and solely as the result of the stone thrown at his leg, and as it may be conceivably possible that other external causes contributed to his death, for this reason, therefore, another sum of £50 will be deducted. Hence the amount to be paid is £150, of which £50 must be paid after this coming barley harvest, with a similar sum after the two following harvests."

Amateur lawyers are not popular, and more often than 682
not darken counsel without understanding.

An Arab called Salem had some land, and he employed 672
two men of the Hawita tribe as shepherds and harvesters. 693
One of these men was from the Nefoofa family of the
Hawita, and the other was from a family called the Magai. These two shepherds worked peacefully together, and their respective families were friendly, until one day an Arab of the Gottaan tribe called Yadam Saadi drove his flocks and his animals on to Salem's land, and began to pitch his tents. These two shepherds saw this going on from afar, and

members of a neutral family with grazing camels, and with 682
their help Mirtah was fetched in to the Wadi unconscious. 628

The case was reported to the police, but a few hours
after his arrival in the Wadi Mirtah quietly died. The 672
post-mortem examination revealed a skull cracked right across, with severe cerebral haemorrhage. In due course the Sirdani family claimed £400 bloodmoney from the Sayed family, according to the custom among the Gawabees tribe. This time, however, an exception was made. The sheikhs decided that the ordinary bloodmoney of £300 only should be paid by the Sayed to the Sirdani family, £100 in money and £200 in kind, divided into six yearly instalments of £50 each.

They also added a rider to the effect that they were not awarding Sanaa under the circumstances, as there was no proof of intent to kill, and that weapons such as guns or knives (which would imply premeditation) were not used. The presumption was that the Sayed family, though obviously intending to cause grievous bodily harm, did not intend to kill Mirtah. The fact that he died of his wounds automatically warranted the award of £300 as bloodmoney, but did not constitute sufficient justification for the imposition of the extra £100 as Sanaa.

In Common Law it is not always easy for the uninitiated 671
to understand the legal value of a threat, or what proportion 683
of the punishment for the completed action is due for a mere threat. It was singularly pleasing, therefore, to find a striking instance of a threat to shoot, and to see the attitude of the Bedouin court towards this particular offence.

An Arab called Abd el Kerim was tolerably well-to-do, 233
and owned several camels, a mare, fair-sized flocks of 685
sheep and goats, and certain cultivation rights; and he had two sons aged about sixteen and eighteen respectively. His cousin, Abd el Salam, who lived half a mile away, had four sons of ages ranging from fifteen to twenty, but he was considerably poorer in this world's goods. Abd el Kerim's sons took their camels out to graze, and inadvertently

233 wandered over the boundary of Abd el Salam's grazing
685 rights. The juvenile members of Abd el Salam's family
[578] came out from their tents in a body, to drive off their
intruding second cousins with their camels. An altercation
ensued, and the excitement grew; and eventually a pitched
battle with sticks and stones began among the lads.

• 683 One of Abd el Kerim's sons, leaving his brother to hold
on for a moment, ran back the half mile to call his father,
who returned with him to the scene of the fight carrying
his gun. On arrival at the camels, Abd el Salam's sons
set on him in a body. Abd el Kerim pointed his gun at
one of them and took aim; whereupon one of the other
family from behind laid him low with a blow on the top
of his head, sufficient to fell an ox.

[114] Abd el Kerim was carried back to his tent, where the
writer witnessed the horrible sight of sympathetic but
homicidal relatives pawing his open wound with their filthy
fingers. A large hole had been knocked in the side of his
head, and portions of brain were visible. After some
[694] months of surgical treatment Abd el Kerim came out of
hospital; and, as the blow was reported to have affected
his reason, a case was brought on his behalf by some of his
relatives, claiming damages from the family of Abd el
[682] Salam. However, before the case was fully completed,
Abd el Kerim was taken ill, was re-admitted to hospital,
and died. The case therefore became one of bloodmoney,
and was dealt with in the usual way.

683 The interesting point about the case, however, lies in
682 the decision of the court, when the first claim for damages
695 was brought up. A very strong line was adopted by the
672 sheikhs, and in the opinion of the court the wounds received by Abd el Kerim were only what he might reasonably expect. They maintained that, after the way in which
he had behaved, he was lucky to have got off as lightly as
he did. The sheikhs protested that he ought never to have
gone out from his tent, and mixed himself up in a fight
between a lot of boys. If he had any authority at all, he

should have called a meeting with Abd el Salam, discussed 683
the position sensibly with him, and then the two of them 682
should have beaten all the boys soundly. Secondly, he ought 695
never to have taken his gun with him, which was as stupid 672
as it was dangerous. The fact that Abd el Kerim himself knew that it was not loaded made not the slightest difference to the case, as the boys did not, and could not, know whether it was loaded or not. As one of the sheikhs expressed it, "If you point a gun at me, loaded or unloaded, I'm not going to risk it. So if I retaliate by braining you, then that's your fault—not mine!"

As compared with some of the customs obtaining among 682
the Sinai Arabs, the following case among the Aulad Ali 171
in the Western Desert is illuminating, and will be quoted in full. The question of who is "chief mourner" of the deceased, and who draws the largest share in a bloodmoney case varies considerably between the tribes of Arab and
Berber origin. Among the Aulad Ali a woman killed is [562]
automatically half the value of a man, whereas among the [435]
Arabs the value of a woman depends on a variety of conditions.

A man called Idris had two daughters, Towida and 682
Beida. Beida married a man called Korayem Shushan of 672
the Gereidat tribe, and Towida married Farag Gueida of the Mowalik tribe. A son had been born to Towida and Farag called Lataif Farag; and when Lataif was about four years old, his parents quarrelled about some trifling matter, and Farag divorced Towida. Two months after this, Towida went to spend a day or two with her sister Beida and Korayem, and it was while sitting alone in their tent that the accident happened which was the cause of this lawsuit. It seems that Korayem had left a loaded gun tied up with cord to the roof of the tent, suspended from the poles. While Towida was sitting there, a sudden gust of wind got up, and shook the tent violently. As the tent rocked in the wind, the gun came tumbling down on to a wooden chest between the poles; the impact fired the

593 The daughter and wife roles are also subject to the
dominant role of father in al-Qasr Bedouin society. The
father has virtually the right of life and death over his
daughter in certain situations. But in no case does he have
593 this right over his wife. The differentiation in right here
*613 is again a matter of the authority principle operating within
the framework of the lineage system. A man's daughter belongs
[851] to his patrilineage or authority group while his wife belongs
to the authority group of her father. There is an obvious
[582] exception to this statement about Bedouin society, for given
the practice of parallel-cousin marriage a man and his wife
can belong to the same authority group, the same tertiary
593 group. Even so, only the father has the right of life and
death over the girl who is his daughter. The Bedouins say,
"The bones of the girl belong to the father." There are two
593 situations in which a father may rightfully put his daughter
● 684 to death: when she is found guilty of pre-marital intercourse
(loss of virginity), or if it is proved that she has had any
extra-marital sexual activity. In either case, if the husband
were to kill the girl he would be guilty of murder and his
group would have to forfeit blood-money or be threatened with
retaliation. I heard of no such actual cases.

593 The father's major duty toward his daughter is to
584 provide her with "a good marriage." This, of course, parallels
his duty toward his son and emphasizes that a father is con-

585 room, until he arrives for the test of her virginity. The groom "takes blood with his finger," wipes it on the white toga which his bride had been veiled with, and hands it to the older women waiting outside the tent. In the meantime,
[792] the two fathers have met with the faqiih ("holy man") who
[675] witnesses the agreement on the mahr payment. They read the Fatiha of the Quran together and conclude the marriage contract. The old women, carrying the toga with the virginal blood on it--a symbol of honor to both of the groups concerned with the marriage--parade around the guests' tent showing it, while all the time letting out shrill victory cries (zaghaariid = "trilling cries of joy"). The toga is then pinned-up on the side of the guests' tent for all to
585 see. Animals are slaughtered and the feast begins. The
574 central activity of the feast takes place in the guests' tent, the tent of the male guests. The groom's father, in
[576] the traditional role of host, does not sit down to eat with his guests but directs the seating and feeding of them.

585 Should it happen that the girl is not a virgin, the
684 wedding would end on the spot, and the girl would be sent away or killed by her father. My informants said that this has never happened in al-Qasr. One key informant told me that such a thing never happens because the groom would never permit it to be known that "his cousin was not a virgin." In other words, the groom will get the blood from somewhere,

585 ● [684] probably by pricking himself, and will wipe it on the toga.

About two weeks after the wedding, the bride and
585 groom take a lamb or a goat and go to spend a few days with
606 [574] the bride's parents. The Bedouin say that the relationship
between the groom and his in-laws is extremely important.
The man should treat his wife's mother and father as if they
were his own. "When a man's father-in-law and mother-in-law
come to visit him, he must slaughter a lamb for them. He
must respect both of them. Remember, this man and woman are
the grandparents of his children."

585 The marriage, then, is only the first step in the
571 ritualization of new group bonds established between the
182 families of the bride and groom. Bonds are subsequently in-
[574] tensified through a process of visitation, gift-exchange and
[431] sacrifice. The most important factor linking the two groups
[782] is the actual presence of the bride in the midst of her hus-
*[613] band's group, for she remains, in terms of the patrilineal
principle, a member of her father's lineage. This is made
585 *613 perfectly clear by the fact that she is referred to, never
551 by her name but, by the name of her tribal grouping if she is
571 other than 'Aishaibi. If she is of the 'Aishaibat tribe,
182 she will be referred to as bint of so-and-so. Hence the
[193] Bedouins stress the importance of extra-group bonds by re-
ferring to the women in their residence group as al-Qinaishiyya
or al-Kamailiyya, for instance (-iyya is the Arabic feminine
marker).

671 Implicit in the 'awaiyid is the assumption that the
562 woman is less responsible for her deeds and something of a
weakling. The Bedouins have a proverb which says that "the
devil whispers in the ear of the woman." If a woman slays a
[682] man, intentionally or accidentally, the diiya is considered
671 as for unintentional killing. Where sex offenses are con-
562 cerned, it makes a difference if the act takes place in the
●684 man's (i.e. the husband's) tent or in the desert, and, of
course, it makes a difference whether or not it is a case
of rape or adultery. If a man finds another man and his
wife in his dwelling in the act of adultery, he may kill
the man and pay the diiya for unintentional killing. From
this diiya, he deducts the amount of the bride-price and
50 L.E. for trespassing. The fine for rape ranges from
10 L.E. to 100 L.E. On the other hand, if intercourse takes
place with the woman's consent, the fine is only 5 L.E. or
10 L.E. If a virgin is deflowered, the fine will be 100 L.E.,
and the man will have to marry her, paying the bride-price
asked for by the girl's father and going through the normal
procedure for marriage. Where offenses involve unmarried
women, all fines are paid to the father. In cases concerning
married women, fines go to the husband. According to the
[586] Bedouins, it would be a great dishonor to the man's family
[558] if the husband were not to divorce his wife after it becomes
known that she has been promiscuous. They said that if a man

671 562 They said that if a man
684 insisted on keeping a promiscuous wife, his family would
681 "write a barawwa aginst him." I heard of no sex offenses in
[114] al-Qasr while I was there.

671 The penalty for stealing, according to the 'awaiyid,
685 is that the thief shall pay compensation, by himself, in the
amount of four times the value of the stolen object. On the
*[613] other hand, if the thief is a poor man, he will pay thrice the
value of the stolen object and the remaining fourth will be
paid by his lineage.

671 The 'awaiyid recognizes the territorial claims of the
685 lineage. Disputes arising over conflicting claims to land
*613 and wells are handled at Bedouin courts in much the same way
578 as personal injury cases are, with one exception. Usually, a
[554] larger number of elders and rajal khair will be consulted in
an advisory capacity by the 'awaaqil handling the case. The
'awaaqil consider the specific history of a particular piece
of land or well (for instance, each well is known by its own
name), and determine the ownership in accordance with the
testimony of elders and individuals of high social status.
Most of the problems over land and water rights in al-Qasr
have reference to what is still considered lineage-owned
685 territory in the barley-and-pasture sector. In the 'izba
578 sector, conflict over land ownership rights, since they are
648 rights which are registered with the government, is settled
in the Egyptian court of law. Only one such case came up while

114 The second, rather complex, case occurred while I was
792 in the field. Once again, the role of the "holy man" is shown
562 to operate in cases dealing with women. Shown here also is an interesting example of the cultural definition of abnormality.

*613 No Date. Case: Quarrel between 'Ailit al-Abaidi ('Ali Abyad)
578 and 'Ailit al-Afrad ('Ali Abyad) over marriage rights. A man
582 from al-Abaidi agreed that his daughter could marry a man but
792 the rest of the _'aiela_ did not approve of this marriage. Since the man could not go to his _'aqila_, who disapproved of the marriage, he took his problem to a "holy man." The "holy man" decided that the girl should marry the man she wanted to marry, but he was afraid that this would cause trouble in the _'aiela_. The "holy man" decided to marry the man and woman,
[586] and then to divorce them for a period of one year so that the conflict would abate. The girl's father knew of this marriage but the other members of the _'aiela_ did not. After a period of one year, the groom went to the "holy man" and said: "Decide anything that I can do, but I must have the girl." The "holy
[681] man" decided to make him pay a _kubaara_ (expiation) fee of
● [684] 100 L.E. to the girl's _'aiela_, and he married them again.

*613 Date: 1965. Case: Quarrel within a tertiary segment of the
619 Qinaishat tribe concerning marriage rights. A girl from the
578 Qinaishat tribe had refused to marry her paternal cousin, but
582 he was insistent upon his right to have her.

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The contractual nature of marriage is most clearly manifested in the case of the wife's adultery. Since the woman belongs to her agnatic group, her behavior has direct effect on the honor of that group. It is, therefore, the responsibility of her closest kin to keep an eye on her. If the woman commits adultery, it is her father or her male kin who is supposed to avenge the honor of the family by taking drastic actions, including killing, against the adulteress and/or her partner. But the marriage usually takes the woman away from the close watch of her family and puts her under the supervision of her husband who becomes entrusted with the duty of guarding her, and therefore partially responsible for her action. His responsibility is enhanced by the fact that although the wife's behavior does not affect him or his family, it has a definite effect on the honor and reputation of his children (Abou-Zeid, 1965).

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The gravest insult that one can direct to a person in the area is to describe his mother of being of disrepute. In their joking relations, young men usually refer to eachother's father as being a dog or a theif or a cheat, but none could refer to the mother. A woman of questionable reputation affects the reputation of her family in general and her children in particular. Any reference to the mother in the form of an accusation is supposed to be cleaned only by blood. Not only does this apply to the woman's voluntary behavior, but also to her physical and mental
[034]
condition. If a woman loses her mind, the news is usually kept a secret,
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especially by her children. The responsibility for retaliation in the case of adultery, then, is divided between her nearest kinsman and her husband. This gives both sides a vague and undetermined right of revenge. This division of the right of revenge explains the infrequency

684 of drastic actions taken in cases of adultery. Of the fourteen cases
613 562 of adultery that I examined furing my field work, none resulted in the
593 killing of the adulteress, and only three resulted in the murder of her
[141] partner. In all three cases where the adulterer was killed, the avenger
684 682 was the husband; and in all three cases, the husband had to pay the
613 bloodmoney to the murdered man's kin group. His payment of the bloodmoney,
among other things, may indicate that the right of the husband
to kill the adulterer is not completely accepted among Awlad Ali. All
[628] agree, however, that such killings never result in blood feuds because
of the shameful circumstances in which the victim dies.

684 It was very difficult to obtain any detailed or reliable information
126 about adultery cases. All the above mentioned fourteen cases were gathered
[124] from the informants, twelve of which were cases which had already
been solved. For the two cases which were still open at the time of
the study, information was quite vague. Usually such cases are conducted
with a great amount of secrecy, with the involved parties referring to
them as cases of theft, or merely by saying that the cases involve
women. Only when the adultery leads to the killing of the adulteress
or the adulterer are more details publicly known about the case.

684 But while the right to retaliate for the shameful action of an
adulterous wife is vague and diffused, the right of the husband for compensation
from the adulterer remains clear and undisputed. In this resepct,
adultery is treated very much like theft; the adulterer has stolen
the husband's exclusive right to his wife's sexual activities. The compensation
[583] pensation for this offense is estimated at L.E. 20, in addition to the
[586] mahr, if the husband decides to divorce his wife as a result of her
adultery.

681 The ten pounds paid to the husband in this case is considered as
558 a kabara for the husband's injured pride. The kabara is one of the
● [684] vaguest and least determined fines in the tribal law. As a face-saving
device, it varies from one case to another. It is determined in each
case by the seriousness of the insult, the publicity of that insult
(insults in a public place require a much larger kabara than insults
[561] in a private place). The relative age of the insulted and the offender
is also taken into consideration in assessing the kabara. If the insulted is older than the offender, the kabara is much higher than if the
situation were reversed. In fact, in the last case the insulted might
[554] not be able to collect any kabara at all. The relative status of the
two parties is also a factor. A member of a Murabiteen tribe who insults
a Sa'adi is likely to be charged with a larger kabara than the reverse
situation. The amount of kabara is left for the bargaining of the two
parties and their representatives and varies greatly from one case to
another. As such, the kabara is not exactly a fine or an independent
punishment. In most of the cases it is an additional punishment added
to a regular one. It is hard to imagine a crime in which the victim is
not considered in one way or another insulted or belittled. The only
681 specified kabara that I found in the tribal law was in the case of adul-
558 tery. The kabara in that case is the same regardless of the relative
684 position of the people involved. The kabara differs, however, according
to a standardized set of circumstances surrounding the place in which the
adultery is committed. Adultery committed in the husband's tent requires
kabara of the maximum L.E. 20; adultery within the camp of the husband
but outside his tent can bring a kabara of only L.E. 10, while adultery
committed outside the camp brings a mere L.E. 5. The justification for

681 558 684 this variation is that committing the adultery within the camp of the husband constitutes a greater humiliation, since it affects his honor among his neighbors. Also, adultery inside the tent of the couple carries with it the possibility of rape, while adultery outside the tent at least implies an element of consent on the part of the wife. The [583] penalty in the case of adultery is the return by the wife's father of the mahr and all other expenses of the marriage ceremony and the gifts the husband had presented during the engagement period. This is a further indication that the father of the wife is still responsible for her behavior even after she is married. It is in this respect that the crime of adultery differs from theft. In the case of theft, the [685] thief has to return twice the amount stolen and in the case of repeated offenders, four times the amount stolen. This is in addition to a certain amount of money as kabara. Yet, in the latter case the kabara is not specified and is subject to the proof by the victim that the theft constituted an insult to him. This insult is assumed in the case of adultery, which makes the kabara in the case of adultery part of the punishment--an integral part of the punishment. The kabara is not among [613] the collective responsibility of the amar and is paid only by the person involved, unless he is totally unable to pay or refuses to pay. In such 426 593 cases, his closest male kin (his father, son, or brother) pays on his 681 behalf with the understanding that such payment constitutes a debt which 684 should be repaid. The person paying on his behalf in this case can go 558 to his tent and take by force anything of value, such as blankets, utensils, or even sheep and goats, and keep them as pawns until the debt is paid.

682 627 negotiations between the parties involved were conducted by their
respective awaqil, a Mi'ad was set, and the settlement was an-
682 672 627 nounced. According to the terms of the settlement, three factors
contributed to the death of Hussein: the goat, whose activity was
directly related to the death by causing the gun to fire; the host,
who had chased the goat, causing it to run over the gun and fire it;
and the guest, without whose negligence in leaving the gun loaded
the accident would not have happened. The bloodmoney was divided
into three equal parts, one of which was to be paid by Awad, the
host, the other to be paid by Ali, the owner of the gun, and the
third part to be attributed to the responsibility of the goat and
therefore would not be paid.

CASE #7: The Case of the Adulterous Wife

● 684 For more than a year, rumors spread in the area of Burg El-Arab
that Ghenewa's wife was having an affair with Goma'h, a friend of
her husband and a member of a nearby camp. Ghenewa was operating a
small store and was also involved in smuggling goods from Libya; both
required him to be away frequently and for fairly extensive periods
of time. According to the rumors, as soon as he left, his wife
would put a white cloth on the laundry line as a sign indicating
to Goma'h that the husband had left and therefore the former could
come and visit her. When the husband heard the rumors, he was furious
and decided to test his wife. He pretended that he was going to
Alexandria as usual, went to the train station, waited until the train
had left, and then returned to his tent. As he entered the tent, he
found his wife and his friend in a compromising situation. Before
[682] he could do anything, the friend grabbed a kitchen knife and attacked

684 the husband, who reached for his gun and fired at Goma'h. Three
682 days later the latter died in the hospital from the gun wound.

684 The case was investigated by the police and brought to trial,
682 but the case was dismissed as justifiable homocide by reason of
672 self defense. The tribal proceedings, however, required Ghenewa
to pay the bloodmoney for intentional homocide, since the weapon
used was a gun. Out of the L. 400 bloodmoney, the sum of L. 20
kabara for committing adultery with the wife was deducted. None
had questioned the right of Ghenewa to kill Goma'h in the process
of defending himself.

671 In his essay on "The Early History of Malice Aforethought" in
672 English law, Maitland discussed the "utter incompetence of ancient law
to take note of the mental elements of a crime" (1911:327). This statement seems to apply to certain aspects of the tribal law of Awlad Ali.
If one causes the death of another, even accidentally, he is liable to
671 compensation. This attribute is not restricted to Awlad Ali law, for
672 it has been documented by a number of other studies. Peristiany found
471 this to be the case among the Potok (1954), and Dundas documented it
among the Kikuyu (1921). In his analysis of injury and liability among the Barotse, Gluckman maintained that "whatever the motivation of the killer or the circumstances surrounding the deed, bloodmoney has to be paid if a member of one grouping of kinsmen was killed by a member of some other group. The mental element seems to be irrelevant. What is important is that "murder" is committed within social relationships where blood compensation is due (1963:205). Similarly, Howell gives us one of the most comprehensive accounts of the Nuer "rule of law" and

600 the role of the victim in initiating the act of the offender. In the
684 682 case of the adulterous wife (Case #7), the intention of the husband to
672 kill the wife's lover was clear from the evidence; yet, the husband's
kin group never attempted to take refuge, and the victim's group was
eager to settle the case with the least amount of publicity. On the
682 other hand, killing in circumstances that offend the tribal standards
672 183 of chivalry, like killing from ambush or during the night, are the most
difficult to solve and pose the greatest chance for retaliation.

682 Although the traditional amount of compensation is not determined
672 by the actual intentions of the killer, but rather by assumed intentions
[673] as deducted from the type of weapon used in causing death, yet, the final
amount paid is usually determined by such intention. The actual intention works as the basis for bargaining between the victim's kin and the
kin of the killer. Kin of the victim of an intentional killing are less
likely to agree to any reduction of the amount, and with the threat of
retaliation or revenge present, the killer's kin are bargaining from a
weaker point. This is not the case in unintentional killings or where
the victim's behavior instigated the reaction of the killer. In such
cases, the victim's group is more willing to accept a lesser amount of
compensation, and the killer's group, while not in a good bargaining
position, at least are not under the threat of revenge. And since they
do not resort to the right of refuge, their daily activities are not
disrupted. In this case, they could sustain the bargaining activities
for a relatively longer period of time. Also, there is usually a strong
[626] pressure on the victim's group to accept reduced compensation in the
case of unintentional killing from the rest of the tribal members. If

membership of associations and so on. The statuses a Bedouin achieves de- 796
pend not on an ordered acquisition through the inheritance of roles or elec- 852
tion to them, but on his personal manipulation of linkages in his jockeying 88
with others. Rites are minimal because there are few defined statuses an 554
individual can predictably acquire. The equalitarianism of the desert denudes 602
the Bedouin of ritual riches. Complimentarily, rites which do occur are 613
thrown into exaggerated relief by the absence of others, and in their isolation, [557]
become not merely a "passage" but a cataclysmic change. Marriage and
burial both comprehend limited fields of relations, but accompanying cere- 585
monies may bring several hundred people together, people who otherwise 764
rarely gather in these numbers to meet one another as kinsmen and neigh- 796
bours, and it is suggested that the emphasis given to the events dramatises the 602
significance of the changes they produce. In the discussion of the changes 182
brought about by marriage, the Bedouin view of what is entailed will be
considered first.

The Bedouin View of Marriage

After marriage, the Bedouin argue, a son has a tent of his own, a woman 585
over whom he has authority and soon children to make him a father. Mar- 581
riage causes split, branching. A new family is created, holding the poten- [613]
tial of a new lineage. The separation is so painful a matter for the father
that he cannot contemplate it, hence his pretence that he has no knowledge of [593]
wedding festivities, and his subsequent attitude that nothing has happened.

Interestingly, there are two other occasions when this attitude is to be 682
observed. When a man kills within his corporate group,[5] he may flee his 613
tribe or he may be compelled to leave; later he is likely to return and, when 621
he does, he is received with a minimum of show. Every attempt is made to
suppress knowledge of the event.

Again, if incest occurs, the memory of it must somehow be suppressed, and 835
it is an ever-present danger. Men, permitted four wives simultaneously and 561
also able to engage in a plurality of marriages through divorce or death of [595]
spouses, may have children showing an age difference of two or three gen-
erations. Thus it comes about that a man may be of an age in relation to his
father's sister which permits them as children to behave as if they were
first paternal cousins. As an adult, the preferred spouse for a man is a [582]
father's brother's daughter. In terms of relationships between adolescents
the situation in which a man is of the same age generation as his father's
sister is fraught with danger. In one such case, between a man and his [684] •
father's sister, the male child of the union was put out in the desert to be

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[5] Bedouin are disposed in groups which, in summer, usually constitute a single community, around or near a watering point. The men of this group are interlinked by reference to an ancestor four or five ascending generations, reckoning from the generation of men of about 20 years. When, elsewhere in this chapter reference is made to corporations, it will be to groups of this kind.

835 devoured by wild animals, the girl was "given"* to a close cousin who had
561 shot his sister. Both now reside with an enemy tribal section. The two acts
● 684 were equated. They were similar to the extent that both created a situation
which defied institutional resolution. The culprits were exorcised. The girl's lover remains with his group — the odium for the male is incomparably less than for the female, since, while maternity is easy to establish, paternity is frequently shrouded in doubt — and during the months I lived with this particular group, there was never a mention of the affair. It was as if "nothing had happened."

829 If asked why these two events cause such profound distress, the answers
578 the Bedouin give are twofold: they can do nothing about them, and they
613 cause split. By split in this context they mean split in the lineage; split in
[682] the case of homicide because it may lead to a demand for blood-money which
[684] is payable only between corporations, and split in the case of incest because
581 it causes chaos in relationships. Marriage, in one sense, their reasoning
829 runs, is similar, for it too causes split. Whatever may be the analytic strength
613 of the arguments that homicide and incest precipitate splitting, the argument that marriage does so is spurious. In what sense can marriage mean split? Bedouin men marry "so that we may beget many sons, to make a big lineage later on." The worst fate that can befall a man as a result of his son's marriage is that he, in later generations, will become the focal point in a series of branching descent lines. The alternative — that his sons remain unmarried — can only mean that his name would disappear through want of successors to carry it on, which is one of the greatest evils which can befall a man, according to Bedouin sentiment: better split than oblivion. If the key to the interpretation of the father's attitude to his son's marriage is not
581 that it causes split, it must lie elsewhere in their relationship. What mar-
585 riage does is alter the distribution of authority between father and son. In
593 order to pursue this, it is necessary first to clarify the types of authority involved, and then assess them in a post-marital situation.

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The Division of Authority Between the Family and the Corporation

851 Politically, a person's status is determined for him at birth. At this time a man has the right to accept or deny paternity. Denial is tantamount to an accusation of adultery by his wife. In practice, once a wife has given birth to a male child, whatever doubts people may harbour regarding paternity, the husband accepts the child as his. "The boy for the bed," is a saying often heard among the Bedouin; but it remains the husband's prerogative to invest
[837] the child with legitimacy, hence, political status. Only if a husband becomes aware that he is publicly considered a cuckold, or if he catches his wife and a lover *in flagrante delicto*, is he at all likely to take action. Otherwise he may

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[585]
[581] * A marriage is illegal unless it is accompanied by an agreement to transfer wealth to the girl's father.

*613
554 on paper in triplicate, one copy going to each litigant and
69 a third copy to the chief of police of the Marsa Matruh sector.
[671] In practice, though, a copy usually goes to the litigants, but
[178] not to the chief of police (who had not a single Bedouin court
case in his files).

*613 As is not the case in Islamic law, in Bedouin customary
695 law the decision of the judge may be appealed. The system of
692 appeals may even function at the level of familial authority,
[671] i.e., the son may, in theory, appeal a ruling by his own
father. The Bedouins insist that this is an important right
of every man. In the situation where a man wishes to appeal
a decision of his own _'aqila_, he will generally take his claim
to another _'aqila_ of his secondary group. When an appeal is
to be made, it is done with the permission of the _'aqila_ who
rendered the original decision. The one who appeals his case
does so with the understanding that the decision returned by
the court of appeal will be final and binding. Further, if
[681] the court of appeal concurs with the findings of the original
court, the plaintiff pays a double fine (twice the original
fine), and also pays his own _'aqila_ an expiation fee (_kubaara_).

69 The Egyptians have preferred to leave the Bedouins of
648 al-Qasr to settle their own disputes except in the more serious
[682] criminal matters. Police from Matruh will enter homicide cases
[685] and those conflicts over property rights which threaten to
explode into tribal warfare. But these types of conflict have

69 648 been infrequent in al-Qasr. The *'awaaqil* of al-Qasr and the
police of al-Qasr have an agreement that Bedouin problems are
the jurisdiction of the desert leaders, and that the police
will intervene only when their help is requested. The
Bedouins claim that in the 1930's, the Egyptians tried to do
away with Bedouin law but soon discovered their own penal code
609 to be inoperative in the desert. Against "outsiders," the
69 Bedouin is duty bound to protect his kinsmen, and hence justice
*613 could not be satisfied. One *'aqila* said that "only the *'awaiyid*
682 *Awlad 'Ali* can maintain order because it stops wars through
182 payment of blood-money." If a Bedouin, for some reason or
692 other, takes his case to the police in Matruh, he will be
648 returned to his *'aqila;* he will be told that they can do
*613 nothing for him without the permission of his *'aqila*. There
are exceptions to this rule which complicate modern Bedouin
692 judicial procedure. For instance, in cases which involve
•685 government property, such as olive trees and government-
648 operated water systems, a man may legitimately deal with the
*613 police. In one case in al-Qasr, a man's goats destroyed a
number of his neighbor's olive trees. The police decided that
the owner of the goats should pay the value of the trees. In
another case, a man who had constructed small earth dikes in
such a way that rain water was prevented from flowing onto
his neighbor's land was forced against his will to remove the
obstruction. His neighbor had taken his complaint to the

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police and not to his _'aqila_. This was a serious case because the police were forced to imprison the dike-builder for two days before he would agree to their demands. The two men involved in the conflict were from different lineages, and it soon became necessary for Bedouin justice to intervene even after the matter had been settled by the police. The _'awaaqil_ of each man met, along with other notables of the tribe, and investigated the area where the dikes had been; they listened to witnesses and tried to calculate the amount of water which each man should receive. In the end, the decision of the police was upheld.

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Although, ideally, litigation should be instigated through the office of the _'aqila_, alternatives do exist. As noted in discussing the values of Bedouin society, it is the moral obligation of each and every person to moderate between conflicting parties; any one conflict situation may be moderated by many well-meaning parties. Or, if a person suspects prejudice on the part of his own _'aqila_, he may choose to take
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his claim to another _'aqila_, or third party. The notion of a third party to a conflict, when it does not refer to the _'aqila_ or a close kinsman who may act as an arbitrator, has reference to a non-institutionalized role in al-Qasr. This role-holder, the Bedouins call _rajal khair_ ("good man") or _qawaal al-khair_ ("the speaker of the good").

"Role differentiation implies organization" (Levy

*613
554 al-Qasr there is definite role differentiation between the
571 *shaib* and the *'aqila*. The incumbents of the two roles may
171 have exactly the same genealogical position in the tertiary
596 segment, but they will never have the same social status.
There are as many elders as there are households, but there is only one *'aqila* for each group. Another difference between the Bedouins and the Lugbara is that in the latter society a kinship role which doubles as an authority role does not occur above the familial (i.e. *shaib*) level.

*613 The difference between the *shaib* and the *'aqila* is
554 the distinguishing factor between informal and formal social
596 control. The *shaib* acts in accordance with the values implied by Bedouin authority structure: the action of the *'aqila* is legitimate in the explicit terms of the Bedouin authority structure. These two spheres of political action represent familial and internal (or domestic) levels of authority and authority relations. Legal matters which affect the whole tertiary segment are dealt with at the internal level.
627 Affairs of a purely personal nature and of lesser importance
596 are dealt with at the familial level of authority. For in-
685 stance, it happened that the dog of one man killed a neighbor's chicken. No one sent for the *'aqila*. They sent for the *shaib* of the woman who owned the chicken, i.e., they sent for her husband. He spoke to the woman, his wife, to determine the value of the chicken and this price he demanded as compensation

627 596 ●685 *[613] from the owner of the dog. If the man had refused to pay the price of the chicken, as demanded for settlement, then the next step would have been to inform the appropriate _'aqila_ to bring greater force, and perhaps greater sanctions, to bear.

*613 571 682 Bait 'Umar (Figure 8) is one of the authority groups of al-Qasr, a corporate group represented by a corporate sole. Both the tertiary corporate group and the corporate sole are referred to, according to the ancient tradition of the Bedouins, as an _'aqila_. This group is a blood-revenge group, and is referred to as _'umraa al-dam_ ("donator of blood"), or _waliiy al-dam_ ("executor of a blood feud"). It is the group which [681] decides whether or not retaliation will be taken according to _lex talionis_, or if blood-money as compensation for the loss of one of its members is acceptable. The Bedouins say that no amount of money can replace a human life, that blood-money is only a means to prevent the loss of more men. This group, when it functions as _waliiy al-dam_ ("executor of a blood feud"), has the authority to demand retaliation; to waive it entirely; or to demand, along with blood-money, that the guilty party be punished by his _'aqila_. When this group pays or receives blood-money it does so as a partner in the larger corporate group, the secondary segment. The principle of collective responsibility interplays with the other structural principles of Bedouin society. The convergence represents

671 562 They said that if a man
684 insisted on keeping a promiscuous wife, his family would
681 "write a barawwa aginst him." I heard of no sex offenses in
[114] al-Qasr while I was there.

671 The penalty for stealing, according to the 'awaiyid,
● 685 is that the thief shall pay compensation, by himself, in the
amount of four times the value of the stolen object. On the
* [613] other hand, if the thief is a poor man, he will pay thrice the
value of the stolen object and the remaining fourth will be
paid by his lineage.

671 The 'awaiyid recognizes the territorial claims of the
685 lineage. Disputes arising over conflicting claims to land
*613 and wells are handled at Bedouin courts in much the same way
578 as personal injury cases are, with one exception. Usually, a
[554] larger number of elders and rajal khair will be consulted in
an advisory capacity by the 'awaaqil handling the case. The
'awaaqil consider the specific history of a particular piece
of land or well (for instance, each well is known by its own
name), and determine the ownership in accordance with the
testimony of elders and individuals of high social status.
Most of the problems over land and water rights in al-Qasr
have reference to what is still considered lineage-owned
685 territory in the barley-and-pasture sector. In the 'izba
578 sector, conflict over land ownership rights, since they are
648 rights which are registered with the government, is settled
in the Egyptian court of law. Only one such case came up while

*685 I was in al-Qasr, and each party to the conflict hired
578 Egyptian lawyers in Marsa Matruh to represent them. As one
648 litigant in this case told me: "The Bedouins prefer to settle
their own land disputes because the government's way of
handling these things costs money and long periods of waiting."

69 The notion of jurisprudence in tribal cultures, in
121 general, seems to be one which concentrates on the restoration
578 of a disturbed balance rather than one concerned with formality
and procedure. To a great extent, this is true in the Bedouin
case also. However, the absence of institutionalized ways of
dealing with conflict is more characteristic of the internal
*613 system of political relations. Conflict within the secondary
578 segment, we have noticed, may be regulated at the familial
[593] level of authority by the shaib, or one acting in his place:
[596] it is hoped by the Bedouins that quarrels never become serious
enough to prompt intervention by the _'aqila_. On the other
hand, the _'aqila_, as a legitimate representative of his
authority group, will almost always become involved in conflict
regulation falling within the sphere of external political
relations, i.e., conflict between secondary, primary, or tribal
segments.

The _'aqila_ as the most effective mechanism of social
*613 control has become institutionalized through time in Bedouin
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182 society. At the interactional level of secondary lineage
group relations, conflict may easily expand into feuding or,

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578 that they had received their rights in this case. And
*613 the two parties are satisfied by this according to the
692 witnesses present.

539 Signatures or seals of four witnesses.
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578 The next case represents the only time in the memory
682 of informants that all of the 'awaaqil of the 'Ali Ahmar met
*613 to intervene in a case of conflict. This case is extremely
692 unusual because it may be the only time in Awlad 'Ali history
571 that political mobilization of this scale has taken place. As
619 noted, political action, in war or peace, usually involves
[177] only secondary segments. In view of this, the case probably
[648] reflects an instance of social change: the Egyptian government,
anxious to maintain good relations with Libya, encouraged and
facilitated the settlement of this dispute by furnishing
transportation and cutting administrative red tape so that
the 'awaaqil of the 'Ali Ahmar could handle this case in a
most expeditious way. Here is a case where Bedouin traditional
[182] political structures function adequately in the modern situation.
Note here also that, in certain circumstances, the diiya payment
can be divided symbolically and specifically to place guilt and
to indicate the seriousness of a crime.

619 Date: 1963. Case: Quarrel between the tribe of 'Ali Ahmar
682 (Egypt) and the Harabi (Libya) concerning murder. A young
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*613 boy of 'Ailit X was visiting his sister in Libya. He learned
•[685]

619 that one old man kept a large sum of money at home. One day
*613 the boy went to beg a watermelon from the old man, but really
682 he went to learn the layout of the man's house. In the night,
578 ● [685] the boy returned to the man's house and demanded his money.
The man refused saying that he had no money. The boy stabbed the old man to death. The boy then went to his sister's house and washed the blood from his hands, and had the girl clean the blood from his robe. The police came to the sister's house in search of the boy, but he was hiding in a cave nearby. The police asked the sister: "Where is your brother, he has killed your mother?" The girl was horrified and told the police where they could find her brother.

*613 All of the _'awaaqil_ of the 'Ali Ahmar met at the farm of
619 'Umda Ibrahim. There were forty-one _'awaaqil_ plus 'Umda Ibrahim.
571 They proceeded to Libya by bus, and took forty sheep
682 578 with them as a _kubaara_. In Libya, they met with officials of
the Libyan government and the _'awaaqil_ of the Harabi tribe.
682 The Harabi asked for a _diiya_ of 3000 L.E. The blood-money
578 asked for was extra high for two reasons: a young man had
619 killed an elder; and, the murder was connected with intentional
*613 [685] theft. After discussing the crime, the Harabi
reduced the price to 700 L.E. They did this out of respect for the 'Ali Ahmar who had come so far, and who had paid money for the sugar and tea. All of the 'Ali Ahmar contributed to

423 *613 182 [691] long time ago. This seems to be supported by the evidence shown below, for often conflict over land and water rights is represented by litigation between individuals and not groups.

422 562 *613 I have arbitrarily assigned to the classification of property rights the rights over women. I have done this because a man acquires such rights as a member of a lineage jural group and secures them with the backing of public opinion and the _'awaiyid_. Also, though a man in al-Qasr does not "own" his wife, he does have the legal rights to certain things related to her: he has the right to her sexual favors, and the right to claim her offspring for his own lineage.

• 685 695 Settlement in cases dealing with the infringement of property rights, if they do not lead to personal injury cases, will usually be concluded by arbitration or oath-taking, either of which brings the two parties into agreement.

691 685 *613 578 692 [695] _Date: 1964_. Case: Quarrel between Bait 'Umran and Bait Idris of 'Ailit Ma'fas over the ownership of a well. The _'awaaqil_ sent for the two parties involved, and they met on Wednesday, market day. And the _'awaaqil_ told the two parties: "This is a shame (_'aib_), you must be friends because you are from the same tribe." The _'awaaqil_ knew "from past history and from truthful elders" that the well belonged to 'Ait Idris. The _'awaaqil_ made 'Ait 'Umran change their minds about their claim to the well. Before the litigation 'Ait 'Umran had insisted

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that 'Ait Idris take the oath as proof that the well was owned by them. Upon the decision of the 'awaaqil, however, 'Ait 'Umran refused to allow 'Ait Idris to swear the oath "because we are all one family." This means, as one 'aqila actually stated at the conclusion of the case, that " 'Ait Idris is indebted to 'Ait 'Umran."

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The following two cases which occur in the external system of political relations, one within the 'Aishaibat territory and the other dealing with land rights in the territory between two primary authority groups, indicate the formal aspect of Bedouin adjudication in establishing contracts.

[539]

Date: 12 August 1963. A Contract of Agreement on Land Rights.
Agreement and satisfaction took place between Hussain Karim al-Dawlat of al-'Aishaibat and Khalid Idris al-Ma'fas of al-'Aishaibat, the first and second party. And the reason for this agreement is that each of the two parties own cultivable land at Ras Wadi Madwar. The two parties wish to make a dividing line between this linear piece of land and to declare the borders. The two parties agreed on the following: first, the beginning of the border extends from the eastern side at south Ras Raqabit al-Shumar to the western side at Hatiyid and is shown by stone markers; secondly, this line should be established from the east to the west, and this is a dividing line between the two parties and was executed by them and with their satisfaction; thirdly, whoever rejects or modifies this line will be responsible in front of law and the 'awaiyid Awlad 'Ali; each party is responsible for his children and relatives as to their actions regarding this line which is the subject of the agreement; fifthly, this contract of agreement which defines the borders between the two parties was issued in two copies, a copy to each party to use when it is needed.

Signatures or seals of seven men.

423 Date: 12 October 1954. There came to us (i.e. the *'awaqil*)
691 on this day, Khalid Idris of al-'Aishaibat and Yunis Abd
578 al-Nabi of al-Kamailat. The reason for their coming is a
*613 quarrel over land rights at Wadi al-Hijnaiya. And we put
[539] distinct markers between the land of the two parties, the
first, Khalid Idris, and the second, Yunis Abd al-Nabi. And the boundary passes by the distinct markers; the first is the *wadi* marker, the second to the sea and beside the tree, and the final marker we put east of Halima well. This is a decision between the two parties in the presence of the following witnesses:

Signatures or seals of five men.

619 The case given below indicates, by the use of two
578 documents, the process of conflict settlement involving two
secondary segments of al-Qasr, one Sa'adi and one Marabit.
[671] 'Ailit al-Sulwatiyya, though genealogically not members of the
Awlad 'Ali and holders of a client or vassal status in traditional times, are within the jurisdiction of the *'awaiyid* Awlad 'Ali. They claim their rights under it by virtue of the fact of their residence in al-Qasr. The power of ritual sanction is clearly illustrated by this case.

578 Date: 30 July 1964, Marsa Matruh. First Party: Shaikh
●685 Khalid Za'aluk al-Sulwatiyya and four relatives. Second
691 Party: Khalid Idris of 'Ailit Ma'fas and three relatives.
619 They are present. The cause of these two parties coming to-
423 gether is a quarrel over a well named Halima. Since the choice
[695] to swear the oath has been made by the two parties, Khalid
Idris, the second party, will swear the oath supported by twenty-four members of his *'umraa al-dam* ("blood group") to

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578 be chosen by Shaikh Khalid Za'aluk, the first party. The text
685 of the oath which Khalid Idris will swear is: "By the truth
691 of the owner of this tomb (maqaam), and this book of God, I
619 swear that you (i.e. the 'Ailit Sulwatiyya represented by
695 Shaikh Khalid Za'aluk) have neither work of hand nor a
[539] grandfather's stake in this well." If any of the oath-takers are missing on the day of the oath, the well will be owned Khalid Za'aluk. And if they swear the oath, the well will be owned by 'Ailit Ma'fas.

The date of the oath will be the first Friday of month nine,
[778] 1964. The oath will be taken at the shrine of Sidi 'Awam, and the swearing will deal with the well only. For the land which is west of the well belongs to Khalid Za'aluk and his family, and the land to the east of the well belongs to Khalid Idris and his family. And the water which is west of the well belongs to Khalid Za'aluk. The two parties agreed to this. (Each party, and five witnesses, i.e. rajal khair, for each party, signed the document.)

423 Date: 30 July 1964. I, Khalid Za'aluk, have decided to cancel
619 the oath which was supposed to have been sworn on 9 September
578 1964 at the shrine of Sidi Awam. Khalid Idris and the oath-
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[695] takers were present and were stopped from taking the oath. And the well named al-Halima which was the cause of the quarrel

423 each tribe. It was decided that the water which flows through
691 the *wadi* after the rains should be divided equally between the
578 two tribes, and that no one should be stopped from using the
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648 water. Had not the government intervened in this conflict,
and had not they collected all of the weapons from the Bedouins,
this problem would have resulted in the death of many men and
even greater problems.

674 Theft is condemned by the Bedouins: "Everything in
• 685 the desert is loose. We must punish the thief quickly and
severely." It is a fact that the man who goes to steal and
[682] accidentally kills in the act will have judged against him
[829] the full *diiya*, i.e., the amount for intentional killing. On
the other hand, the people of al-Qasr insist that "Bedouins do
[671] not steal." But legal norms exist to sanction violations against
cultural ideals. The following case shows how social and ritual
sanctions operate to enforce ideals.

619 Date: 1964. Case: Quarrel between the tribe of Kamailat and
578 the tribe of 'Aishaibat over the theft of 16 L.E. Muhammad of
685 'Ailit Ma'fas was accused of stealing 16 L.E. which belonged
*613 to Ahmad of 'Ailit Idris, Kamailat. The theft occurred while
the two were residing at a hotel in Marsa Matruh. There were
twenty other persons in the hotel that night. The accused
said: "I did not take anything."

619
578 said: "I did not take anything." The _'awaaqil_ of both parties
•685 met and told the accused: "If you have anything give it to
*613
695 us; if you do not have anything then swear the oath to this
[571] fact." Members of 'Ailit Ma'fas said that the boy was innocent
[692] and told the _'awaaqil_ that the boy should have his rights according to the _'awaiyid_ (i.e. he should be allowed to swear the oath to establish his innocence). The boy accused of the theft, his father, and two other members of 'Ailit Ma'fas selected by the accusers swore the oath and the problem was
619 over. Two months later, the accuser from the Kamailat lost
578 his eye in an accident, because swearing the oath has con-
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695 sequences for both parties. A bad oath will work against the
784 one who makes it; there will be a curse upon him, his children, and his money. And the bad effects of an oath will also work against the one who falsely accuses another making him swear the oath.

582 The final two cases deal with marriage rights. The
562 first illustrates a number of things which I have touched on
*613 in the previous discussion of marriage: that a man may choose
792 to ignore the jural structures of the lineage group where the desires of his offspring are concerned; that the female is not the totally subjugated person which one might expect to find in the strongly patrilineal Bedouin society; and that the role of "holy man" functions in the marital area of authority relations.

613 682 it was impossible to verify the actual facts or to know what exactly
683 happened. But since the parties involved are still alive and since these
672 events are closely related to present-day happenings, the case is still
558 (124) alive in the minds of the parties involved as well as those of outsiders-
Naturlaly, each party tries to present the facts in such a way as to
613 682 support his own claims. Shei'eb, for example, insists that Hakim had
683 bribed members of bait Asabei' to refuse to pay their share in order to
156 embarrass him and make him appear as unable to perform his duties as
558 Aqila. "Hakim always had his eyes on becoming the Aqila of bait Asabei'," said Shei'eb, "but he had no business becoming the Aqila, so he had to make me look bad to the other Awaqil.... He likes to be looked up to as a big man, but it wouldn't work." While other members of bait Asabei' deny that Hakim had bribed them, they agree with Shei'eb that Hakim is a
156 dishonest man. In fact, Hakim's reputation is so widespread in the area
551 that it has earned him the nickname of "the thief". The nickname was
788 given to him a few years ago when he went to Mecca for a pilgrimage with
● 685 another fellow tribesman. The latter told the story that while in Mecca Hakim had found a purse with two hundred pounds in it. He was supposed to return the purse to the authorities or it would be considered as stealing if he kept it. Stealing in Mecca is not only a crime but also a great sin which makes the holy trip void for the offender. Hakim told his companion that he had given the purse to the authorities. But later, on their way back from Mecca, the friend found the purse hidden in Hakim's luggage. When the story was known in the area, he was referred to as
156 "the thief". Other accounts of Hakim's dishonesty are told throughout
685 439 the area, including stories of how he acquired his wealth through stealing

156 [685] equipment from the government projects and from smuggling sheep and merchandise
[439] across the Libyan border. Although some of these stories might
be exaggerated, they all point to the fact that Hakim, despite his wealth,
is not the most popular or reputable individual in bait Asabei', and that
although Shei'eb is not a popular individual either, he definitely comes
up the winner in any popularity contest between the two. The question is
156 why Hakim was selected by the Awaqil to replace Shei'eb. The case involved
613 more than Shei'eb's inability to collect the money [illegible] members of
558 682 his bait. Shei'eb's ineffectiveness seemed to have been taken as an excuse
683 rather than as the direct cause. Many Aqaqil, before Shei'eb, had
failed in collecting money from their own bait without being subject to
direct challenge. What seems to be involved is more than a challenge to
a particular member, Shei'eb. It is a challenge to the whole principle
by which Shei'eb acquired his position as Aqila of bait Asabei': patrilineal
succession.

156 Shei'eb is the youngest of four sons of the former Aqila of bait
159 Asabei', Sheikh Elewa. For more than fifty years Sheikh Elewa was the
613 undisputed Aqila of bait Asabei'. He also had considerable influence
463 683 among other tribal segments throughout the whole of the Western Desert
554 by virtue of his position as "nazzar", that is, the expert who assesses
the amount of compensation for wound inflicted in a liable case. The
[428] position of nazzar is a hereditary one and had been handed down from
[779] father to son. The basis for his assessment of wounds are a number of
old books believed to be obtained from Mecca and contain all the judgments
of famous Islamic leaders in their assessments of wounds.

[428] Eleven years ago when Sheikh Elewa became blind and too old to

439 Aggary Eila. When they arrived with the cigarettes, Hadi was not at his tent; he was in the market of the nearby town selling sheep. They left the cigarettes and left for Alexandria to arrange for their distribution. In Alexandria they met Rabbuh Hakim, the son of Hakim, who married a girl from Alexandria and lived there. He made his income from buying smuggled goods at wholesale prices and selling them at a profit. When he met the two members of the Geneishat tribe and learned from them about the shipment they left at Hadi's place, he wanted to buy it. But they refused on the grounds that Hadi had already contacted someone and that all they could do was to give the first option to that individual. Two
439 625 hours after the conversation between Rabbuh Hakim and the Geneishat, the police officer on duty at the station of Burg el-Arab received an anonymous call from Alexandria informing him that a shipment of smuggled cigarettes worth more than three thousand pounds was hidden in Hadi's olive mill (which was not in use at that time). The call was overheard by a member of the Sanagrah tribe who works as a detective with the police. He tried to warn Hadi of the police raid but it was too late. The officer found the cigarettes in Hadi's olive mill in the exact place where the informant said they would be. The cigarettes were confiscated and Hadi was arrested and later released when the officer didn't find enough evidence to prove that he knew about the shipment or that it belonged to him.

685 627 578 The confiscation of the cigarettes enraged both Hadi and his partners. They went to Sheikh Ta'ib, the Aqila of bait Eweidha to which Hadi belonged. They told him about their conversation with Rabbu in Alexandria and said that they thought he was the one who informed the police about the shipment. Ta'ib said that Rabbu must have done this because of old

685 The Geneishat selected the tomb of the saint where the oath was to
627 be administered. According to the customary law of Awlad Ali, the plain-
778 tiff is the one to decide which saint is to be sought for the taking of
695 the oath by the defendant. Each saint has his own reputation and some
[671] are said to be more effective in certain kinds of disputes. The saint
[776] selected in this case was Sidi Dmain. Sidi Dmian's tomb is in the
Beheira province some 60 miles east of the area of Burg el-Arab. He is
[732] known to cause the blindness of those who dare to swear falsely by him,
[784] and at least four cases of blindness in the area have been attributed to
[671] false oaths at Sidi Dmain. Also according to the law, it is the plain-
tiff who selects the persons from the defendant's kin unit who are to
685 support him in the oath. Following this rule, the Geneishat, with the
627 help of Hadi, selected the fourteen men from bait Asabei to swear with
695 Rabbu. The number of men that were required in this case was considered
613 very conservative. The usual practice in estimating the number of sup-
[803] porters in any case is done by establishing the value of the damage or
compensation and dividing it by ten. The result is the number of men
needed to give the oath. If there were not enough adult males in a given
kinship unit to fulfill the number needed, some or all the men would
have to be sworn twice or three times and each time a person takes the
oath he is considered as a separate person until the number needed is met.

Following this rule, and since the value of the property confiscated in the above case was over three thousand pounds, 300 persons should have been sworn in support of Rabbuh. Since this would have complicated the matter greatly, it was agreed that fifteen men were enough. Taieb gave the justification for limiting the number to 15 that trade and, as

685 such, deviates from the normal pattern of cases dealt with by the cus-
627 tomary law in the conventional way. The men selected by the Geneishat
695 included, in addition to Rabbu and his father Hakim, Shei'eb and his
613 three brothers, Hakim's cousin Samsoun and his four brothers and Hakim's
uncle Sheikh Qudura and his sons. The date of the oath was set for June
tenth. Two days before, the two parties involved in the dispute invited
a number of the important people of other tribal segments in the area to
[492] be witnesses to the oath. All involved started to travel to the tomb of
[494] Sidi Dmain, some on donkeys, others by bus or train. At six o'clock on
[497] the morning of the oath everybody gathered in the courtyard outside the
[778] tomb of the saint. The granddaughter of the saint works as a mediator
[787] between the spirit of her grandfather and his followers announced that
[776] the saint was ready for the oath and everybody went inside preparing for
the oath. Before the oath was taken the Geneishat asked Hakim if his son
and the fourteen men they had chosen were present and Hakim said they
were. Since the Geneishat were from a different tribal segment and
lived outside the area, they had no personal knowledge of most of the
[212] men who were to take the oath. Knowing the reputation of Hakim they
asked the men to present their identification cards to check them against
[747] the list they had. At that time Hakim said that some of the men didn't
have identification cards because they had not applied for aid from the
World Food Program. Then the Geneishat demanded that those without cards
should be identified by members of other tribal segments who had come as
witnesses. Hakim refused and then admitted that one of the men was ab-
sent and that he had put another in place of him. But when the Geneishat
learned that the one to be absent was Sheikh Qudura, they insisted that

685 627 695 613 [578] no one else could take his place. They were mainly angry at Hakim's attempt to cheat them and refused Hakim's offer to substitute ten men for Qudura. The temper of the meeting was becoming very tense; then Taieb, who was working very hard to achieve a settlement between the disputants, took the Geneishat aside and tried to convince them to accept another man instead of Qudura. When he found that to be impossible, he asked them to agree to a postponement of the oath until they saw what prevented Qudura from coming as he had promised. The Geneishat agreed to the postponement because of the absence of one of the men to swear. [671] According to Awlad Ali Daraieb, if one of the individuals to take the oath fails to show up in the saint's tomb for any reason or if he comes but refuses to take the oath, the whole case for the defense fails, and the judgment is awarded automatically for the plaintiff. In this case the Geneishat were entitled to immediate compensation for their confiscated goods. Nobody knew the reason that led the Geneishat to forfeit their right to immediate compensation and to give Hakim and his son a second chance despite their intense dislike for the latters. Some attribute this to the skill of Taieb and the respect he commands among all tribes. Others believe the Geneishat movement to be a reciprocal act to bait Asabei' as a whole which long ago had one a similar favor for the Geneishat. Still others beliebe it to be a gesture of good will on the part of the Geneishat who needed to retain a good and friendly relationship with the tribal segments on their smuggling route.

No date was set at that time for the oath. The parties as well as 685 627 578 the witnesses returned to their houses. Hakim then took Shei'eb and went to visit Qudura to see why he hadn't come to the oath but Qudura

685 refused to see them. Later Hakim had Shei'eb spread the rumor that Qudura
627 had taken a bribe from the Geneishat to refuse to take the oath, and the
578 [521] story of an old dispute between Qudura, on the one hand, and both Hakim
and Shei'eb, on the other. This dispute dates back to the time when the
613 156 Awaqil of the Aggary Amar decided to replace Shei'eb with Hakim as the
554 Aqila of bait Asabei'. Shortly after the decision of the Aggary Awaqil
578 was publicly known, Qudura was very unhappy and refused to recognize it.
His reaction was not out of loyalty to Shei'eb whom he thought was a very unfit person for the position, but it stemmed rather, from a deep resentment of Hakim. According to my information, Qudura's position was met with sympathy by the majority of the people outside the Aggary Amar who share with him the belief that Hakim was a dishonest person who could not be trusted as a representative of bait Asabei'. It was at that time that the stories of Hakim's dishonest dealings were being discussed publicly, mainly by Qudura and members of his camp. At that time many believed that Qudura was the best man for the position of Aqila of bait Asabei' and that he was the only qualified member of that bait. He was the oldest able man in the bait, and although he was poor, yet he was known throughout the area for his honesty and sound decision. In fact many people in the area told me that they believe Qudura to be the only honest member of bait Asabei'. Realizing that Qudura was getting all the attention, Hakim sent his son Rabbu to Qudura with a message that Hakim acknowledged Qudura as the Aqila and that he (Hakim) had neither the time nor the interest in taking the position himself. Hakim also conveyed the view that he would support Qudura if the latter denounced Shei'eb and appointed himself in his place. Qudura agreed and a date

613 was set for a meeting in which Quadra was to announce his decision.
156 Meanwhile, Qudura stopped attacking Hakim and directed his attack to-
554 ward the inadequacy of Shei'eb as the Aqila.
578

The meeting was held two weeks later and all the important people in the area were invited. After dinner was served Qudura announced his agreement with Hakim to become the Aqila of bait Asabei' replacing Shei'eb. Everybody expected Hakim to support Qudura in his claim, but instead Hakim directed his comment to Qudura telling him that there had been a misunderstanding on Qudura's part and that all his message to Qudura was to acknowledge the latter as the Aqila for his own camp alone not for bait Asabei' as a whole as Qudura claimed. This announcement was a surprise to everyone in the meeting since this meant recognizing the camp of Qudura as a separate bait, a result which nobody, including Qudura, had ever anticipated. Qudura was very angry and dissolved the meeting immediately. Ever since that incident, the relationship between
578 Qudura and Hakim has been very unfriendly. Almost all of my informants
156 explained Qudura's failure to show up at the oath as a means of revenge
695 against Hakim who had embarrassed him among the people who attended the
685 627 meeting. Qudura himself had told me later that the reason for his not
[124] coming to the oath was that he was not sure that Rabbu was innocent:

> Rabbu has been known to do these thins (inform the police) and I cannot trust him. I cannot take a false oath and endanger myself for someone like Rabbuh. Besides, Hakim never came to me to discuss the oath like he did with all the others who were to swear with them. If he had brought his son and come to me before I would have been able to tell whether they were lying or not, and If not, I would have sworn with a clear conscience and without fear. The oath is something that one does not take lightly. It involves the supernatural.

613
627 When Qudura refused to see Hakim and Shei'eb, Hakim asked Sheikh
156 Saleh, the Aqila of one of the most powerful baits in the area, to talk
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613 Other tribal segments outside the Aggary amar supported the position of
619 578 Qudura, and most took his position to prove their notion about his honesty
156 and the fact that despite his poverty, he could not be bribed. They
were also pleased with Qudura's trick which demonstrated Hakim's dishonest
613 techniques. Within the Aggary amar, the general sentiment was still with
578 Hakim although his confession of cheating Qudura made it difficult to
156 support him openly. They directed their attack against Qudura who in
their view violated the solidarity of the amar and even of his bait and
showed it as divided and noncohesive. They were also fearful that Qudura's
● [685] refusal to pay would cause the amar to pay the Geneishat the full compensation
for the action of Rabbuh, a sum which, as one said, would put the
amar in debt for generations to come. The strongest impact of the events
affected bait Asabei'itself and left it one step from complete fission
into three distinct groups. Shei'eb, finding the tide turning against
Hakim, found a chance to assert his claim to the position of the Aqila,
stating openly that he would never forfeit his hereditary right. On the
other hand, finding the popularity of Qudura increasing rapidly, he
started attacking him verbally and even threatened to beat him. He insisted
[681] that Qudura and his sons should be excluded from the amar and
given the barawa.

613 The word "barawa" is derived from the Arabic verb "bara" which means to
681 cure one's self of an illness. It also means to sever social ties with
[192] undesirable persons. The term is used among Awlad Ali in a much restrited
sense to refer to the process by which a tribal segment detaches itself
from any responsibility for the actions of a particular member. It is

681 this variation is that committing the adultery within the camp of the 558 husband constitutes a greater humiliation, since it affects his honor 684 among his neighbors. Also, adultery inside the tent of the couple carries with it the possibility of rape, while adultery outside the tent at least implies an element of consent on the part of the wife. The [583] penalty in the case of adultery is the return by the wife's father of the mahr and all other expenses of the marriage ceremony and the gifts the husband had presented during the engagement period. This is a further indication that the father of the wife is still responsible for her behavior even after she is married. It is in this respect that the crime of adultery differs from theft. In the case of theft, the [685] thief has to return twice the amount stolen and in the case of repeated offenders, four times the amount stolen. This is in addition to a certain amount of money as kabara. Yet, in the latter case the kabara is not specified and is subject to the proof by the victim that the theft constituted an insult to him. This insult is assumed in the case of adultery, which makes the kabara in the case of adultery part of the punishment--an integral part of the punishment. The kabara is not among [613] the collective responsibility of the amar and is paid only by the person involved, unless he is totally unable to pay or refuses to pay. In such 426 593 cases, his closest male kin (his father, son, or brother) pays on his 681 behalf with the understanding that such payment constitutes a debt which 684 should be repaid. The person paying on his behalf in this case can go 558 to his tent and take by force anything of value, such as blankets, utensils, or even sheep and goats, and keep them as pawns until the debt is paid.

the different families. A year later the Gottaan brought 682
up the case again, acknowledging the receipt of £50 from 672
the Magai, but protesting that they had still not received 693
anything from the Nefoofa. On an enquiry being held, 695
a representative collection of infuriated members of the Nefoofa family came to court, protesting that Abd el Gelil had already collected their payments, and that if he had not handed over the money, their responsibility at any rate had ended for the moment.

It subsequently transpired, when Abd el Gelil was with difficulty got hold of and brought to court, that he had collected about £50, but claimed this sum as his own
personal travelling expenses for collection. Then followed [685]
another lawsuit, in which the Nefoofa family sued their self-appointed lawyer for mis-appropriation of tribal funds. The details of this new case, and those of the original suit, were then re-capitulated and muddled up together, to the complete bewilderment of the writer and the entire satisfaction of the Bedouin assessors.

Mention has been made of the extra £100 (£400 instead 682
of £300) usually paid among the Gawabees tribe as the 672
price of a life. It seems, however, as though there are exceptions to this rule; and the following case seems to shew [435]
that the payment of "Sanaa" depends on a variety of circumstances.

A family called Sirdani had had a bloodfeud with another 682
family of the Gawabees called Sayed, one of the former 628
having killed one of the latter some fifty years ago. The 672
two families had been living in totally different districts, and for years had not come into contact with each other, and so the feud had been allowed to continue.

In the spring of 1921 a man of the first family, about forty-five years old, called Mirtah el Sirdani, left the Wadi Natrun for the Nile Valley to buy some sheep from the Fellaheen, taking with him his old mother and a small boy, to help him bring them back across the desert to the luscious grazing in the wadi swamps. He arrived at the

members of a neutral family with grazing camels, and with 682 their help Mirtah was fetched in to the Wadi unconscious. 628

The case was reported to the police, but a few hours 672 after his arrival in the Wadi Mirtah quietly died. The post-mortem examination revealed a skull cracked right across, with severe cerebral haemorrhage. In due course the Sirdani family claimed £400 bloodmoney from the Sayed family, according to the custom among the Gawabees tribe. This time, however, an exception was made. The sheikhs decided that the ordinary bloodmoney of £300 only should be paid by the Sayed to the Sirdani family, £100 in money and £200 in kind, divided into six yearly instalments of £50 each.

They also added a rider to the effect that they were not awarding Sanaa under the circumstances, as there was no proof of intent to kill, and that weapons such as guns or knives (which would imply premeditation) were not used. The presumption was that the Sayed family, though obviously intending to cause grievous bodily harm, did not intend to kill Mirtah. The fact that he died of his wounds automatically warranted the award of £300 as bloodmoney, but did not constitute sufficient justification for the imposition of the extra £100 as Sanaa.

In Common Law it is not always easy for the uninitiated 671 to understand the legal value of a threat, or what proportion 683 of the punishment for the completed action is due for a mere threat. It was singularly pleasing, therefore, to find a striking instance of a threat to shoot, and to see the attitude of the Bedouin court towards this particular offence.

An Arab called Abd el Kerim was tolerably well-to-do, 233 and owned several camels, a mare, fair-sized flocks of 685 sheep and goats, and certain cultivation rights; and he had two sons aged about sixteen and eighteen respectively. His cousin, Abd el Salam, who lived half a mile away, had four sons of ages ranging from fifteen to twenty, but he was considerably poorer in this world's goods. Abd el Kerim's sons took their camels out to graze, and inadvertently

233 wandered over the boundary of Abd el Salam's grazing
685 rights. The juvenile members of Abd el Salam's family
[578] came out from their tents in a body, to drive off their
intruding second cousins with their camels. An altercation
ensued, and the excitement grew; and eventually a pitched
battle with sticks and stones began among the lads.

683 One of Abd el Kerim's sons, leaving his brother to hold
on for a moment, ran back the half mile to call his father,
who returned with him to the scene of the fight carrying
his gun. On arrival at the camels, Abd el Salam's sons
set on him in a body. Abd el Kerim pointed his gun at
one of them and took aim; whereupon one of the other
family from behind laid him low with a blow on the top
of his head, sufficient to fell an ox.

[114] Abd el Kerim was carried back to his tent, where the
writer witnessed the horrible sight of sympathetic but
homicidal relatives pawing his open wound with their filthy
fingers. A large hole had been knocked in the side of his
head, and portions of brain were visible. After some
[694] months of surgical treatment Abd el Kerim came out of
hospital; and, as the blow was reported to have affected
his reason, a case was brought on his behalf by some of his
relatives, claiming damages from the family of Abd el
[682] Salam. However, before the case was fully completed,
Abd el Kerim was taken ill, was re-admitted to hospital,
and died. The case therefore became one of bloodmoney,
and was dealt with in the usual way.

683 The interesting point about the case, however, lies in
the decision of the court, when the first claim for damages
682 was brought up. A very strong line was adopted by the
695 sheikhs, and in the opinion of the court the wounds received
672 by Abd el Kerim were only what he might reasonably
expect. They maintained that, after the way in which
he had behaved, he was lucky to have got off as lightly as
he did. The sheikhs protested that he ought never to have
gone out from his tent, and mixed himself up in a fight
between a lot of boys. If he had any authority at all, he

584 582 A girl has the right to refuse to marry her ibn 'amm. But if she exercises this right, he can actually insure that she remains unmarried for the rest of her life. While I was in the field there were three cases of a girl refusing to marry her cousin. In one, the boy was persuaded into allowing the bint 'amm to marry his rival. In this case, the rival presented the girl's cousin with a sheep and a small cash sum. The Bedouins say that a man will claim his cousin even if he does not wish to marry her. He will wait until someone does wish to marry the girl, and then he will demand a payment from the suitor for the right to marry his cousin. In another case, a man and his daughter of a Marabit tribe came to al-Qasr to plant a small patch of barley during the rainy season. While they were there, the father married the girl off to a member of 'Ailit Ma'fas. The father did this despite the fact that her cousin back in her own territory had made explicit his claim to her. *[613] ●[686] The father, when he returned home, was fined 30 L.E. by his lineage, the money going to the girl's cousin as a "expiatory payment." The father could afford to do this considering the large brideprice which he received from 'Ailit Ma'fas, and the fact that he had no other sons or daughters to marry off meant that he need not fear the closure of marriage channels by the group. In the third case, a girl openly refused to marry her cousin because she loved another man. To avoid conflict, her father said that

584 has to have a good reason. If he breaks it without sufficient reason, [686] he may be liable to pay "kabara," or fine, for insult to the prospective groom and his family. Adequate reasons for breaking the fatha agreement vary from one case to another and include such things as the discovery that the prospective groom or any of his family is of questionable character. This applies to the groom as well as to any member of his immediate family, the implication being that if he has such a person close to him, he is likely to be influenced by him in his treatment of his wife. If, however, the questionable character of the groom or the member of his family was known to the guardian of the bride-to-be before the fatha was read, then to break the agreement is considered unjustifiable. This has been upheld in a number of cases which I recorded during my stay in the area. One of these cases involved the agreement
584
686 between a member of the Sanagra tribe in the area of Alamein to marry
627 his daughter to a member of the powerful Bara'sa tribe in Libya. After the fatha was read, a wealthy merchant from Alexandria saw the girl and asked her father to marry her, and the father agreed. To justify his breaking of the fatha agreement, the father claimed that he had discovered that the first prospective groom and his father were involved in smuggling goods across the Libyan borders. In the Mi'ad that was held upon the request of the first groom and his father, the father claimed that the bride's father had known about the smuggling and even participated in the distribution of the smuggled goods. The father of the bride was made to pay the sum of ten pounds as kabara to the first groom and to pay him another ten pounds for the expenses of the ceremony in which he had slaughtered two goats. The settlement was based on the fact that all indications show that he must have known about the smuggling activities

584 of his future in-law before he agreed that his daughter marry him.
• 686
[627] So, to break the agreement on the basis of discovering that defect is
not permissible and is a kind of behavior not to be encouraged. To
encourage such behavior would lead to the waste of time and money and
would lead to the disgrace of the fatha as a preliminary agreement.*
Permitting the father to break the fatha agreement when discovering an
unknown condition related to the prospective groom or his family, is
to apply an important principle in the Islamic law with regard to all
686 contractual relations. This principle maintains that any contractual
agreement pertains only to the facts and conditions specified at the time
of the contract. This implies that the conditions of the contract have
to be explicitly stated. A deliberate effort to conceal an undesirable
condition has the equivalent effect of specifying the existence of its
opposite. Such concealment invalidates the contract and permits the
aggrieved party to dissolve the contract on the basis of cheating or
unfair deal, or "ghish."

If, on the other hand, no deliberate attempt is made to conceal
the undesirable condition at the time of the contract, then there is no
basis for dissolving the contract on the basis of cheating or unfair
584 deal. Thus, in the case above, neglecting to mention the fact that the
686 groom and his father were involved in smuggling could not be taken as
the basis for unfair or unreasonable behavior on the part of the groom,
unless there was proof that they intended to cheat and conceal that fact
deliberately, and that they knew that if not concealed, the fact would
affect the acceptance of the bride's father to the marriage. All indications
of the case above point to the lack of [illegible]tent to defraud. On the

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* The same rule applies to the breaking of the "fatha" agreement by the groom.

584 contrary, there is enough evidence to indicate that the father of the
686 bride by participating in smuggling should have known about that fact, or at least it would not have affected his decision had he known about it. The grounds for unreasonable or unfair behavior is therefore not present in the above case.

If, on the other hand, the condition is specified at the time of the contract which is proven later to be false, then the behavior is
[585] considered as unreasonable. An example is the case of Mahdi, who, after reading the fatha to marry a woman from his tribe, was discovered to have had tuberculosis and was forced to forfeit the gifts and other expenses on the basis that he had had the illness for a long time and knew about it, but he deliberately concealed it when he asked to marry the girl. Not all concealed conditions are considered as an adequate basis for the breaking of the fatha. Only conditions are adequate which, had they been known at the time of the agreement, would have made the party's decisions different. One case involved a man who had concealed the fact that he had a wife in Alexandria when he asked to marry a tribal girl. Although the intention to conceal the fact was very evident, for this is the first question that the girl's father or her guardian asks the suitor, yet, breaking the fatha agreement by the girl's father when he discovered the previous marriage was considered as unfair and unreasonable since, had he known about the marriage, it would have made no difference in his decision. The go-betweens disagreed, however, on this. One of them thought that although the concealed condition is by itself not objectionable, yet, the mere act of concealment indicated a bad character on the part of the prospective groom, and that by itself, apart from the concealed condition, is not a good basis for marriage relations. The bride's father did not have to pay kabara, although he held

The bride's father
584 did not have to pay kabara, although he held
686 a big feast in which he slaughtered three sheep and invited the groom,
558 his father and a number of his friends and friends of the girl's father
in honor of the groom as a compromise.

583 Before the fatha is read, the two families usually agree on the
amount of bridewealth, or "mahr", to be paid by the groom or his father.
The amount of bridewealth depends upon a number of criteria, important
among which is the relative position of the bride's and groom's families
and the degree of relationship that exists between them. The lowest
mahr is usually paid in the case of cousin marriages. The amount ranges
from 10 to 50 pounds. Sometimes when the groom cannot afford any mahr,
he pays only the religiously required sum of 25 Egyptian piasters.
This is never the case if the groom and bride are more distantly related.
When the groom is an outsider or a member of another tribe, the
mahr is usually much higher. Several cases of mahr of more than 2,000
pounds are reported in the area. There was a case in which the mahr
reached 10,000 Egyptian pounds ($22,000). The amount of mahr also depends
on the beauty of the bride. In the case of the highest known
mahr mentioned above, the woman was known to be of great beauty. There
[587] is no distinction made between previously married women and ones married
for the first time. In the case above, the woman was married three
times before, and the mahr was apparently higher than that paid for her
[602] in her first marriage. Increasing the mahr according to the kinshp
distance between the bride and groom reflects the preference of endogamous
582 marriages. The preferred marriage match in the area is that of
the patrilateral parallel cousin marriage. The father's brother's son,
"ibn 'amm," has an undisputed claim over his cousin, "bint 'amm." Even
when they are of incompatible age, or even if the man is married or for

584 Two days after the groom left, the bride's father (who is at the
578
606 same time Hassanein's daughter's father-in-law) came to Hassanein and
● 686 told him that the marriage was called off and that he should send a
letter to the groom telling him the news. The reasons given by the
[574] bride's father were that the groom showed improper manners when he
[579] stayed overnight at the camp and that he followed the prospective bride
to the water well to have a close look at her. He gave the money to
Hassanein and asked him to return it to the man in Matruh. Hassanein
was very disappointed and considered this an insult to him, since he
was the mediator in that marriage, and insisted that the bride's father
584 go on with the marriage. When the latter refused, Hassanein went to his
578 daughter and ordered her to leave with him. Her husband was there and
606 could not refuse to let her go with her father, even when Hassanein
686
627 made it clear that her husband could not have her back unless his father
586 kept his agreement with Hassanein's guest. Elewah, the daughter's husband, asked for a mi'ad to discuss the matter with his father-in-law.
The mi'ad was held in Hassanein's house and was attended by Hassanein,
his son-in-law, and two people from a different lineage, each selected
by one of the disputing parties. Hassanein refused to give any reason
for taking his daughter away from her husband except that he was exercising his rights. Eleway, on the other hand, insisted that Hassanein
was not justified in his actions and that it was not right to punish
him for something that his father did. The two representatives tried
to calm both parties and to reach an agreement but were not successful.
The mi'ad dissolved with Hassanein not only insisting on keeping his
daughter, but also threatening to marry her to a rich man in the area.
The case was not solved by the time I left the field.

682 674 body had been dragged. He followed the footsteps of the son as far as the cistern, where he again saw a tiny spot of fresh blood on one of the stones. From that point donkey-tracks led straight to the son's tent.

By nightfall the son was securely lodged in the police post; and local public opinion was seething with fury, firstly at such a dastardly deed committed presumably for the sake of the old man's money, and secondly because it reflected untold discredit on the rest of the tribe. The murderer, who was a big powerful man of about thirty standing nearly six feet in height, lay in prison awaiting trial. After a few days he was admitted to hospital, where he completely collapsed and died of fright a fortnight later.

[203] Rumours then began to spread that possibly the murderer had only acted in accordance with the wishes of his brothers, who were all conspiring to get rid of the old man, in order that they might share out his possessions. This could not be proved, and appeared unlikely from the [626] evidence. However, public feeling against the whole family ran so high that it was feared that more horrors might follow; but although no open action was taken against the family, no opportunity was missed of having a dig at them in some way or another.

682 674 691 626 • 686 [672] A very wealthy sheep merchant, who was a distant connection of the family, and heartily ashamed of them, brought an action for debt against one of the murderer's brothers. He produced an I.O.U. for £2 dated twelve years before and signed by the murdered man, claiming (according to custom) that the son now in court as defendant had inherited his father's liabilities together with his assets.

This sheep merchant was known personally to the writer, who was also aware that a month previously he had made a profit of £900 on a very clever bit of dealing in the West. The collection, after an interval of twelve years, of this paltry debt of £2, owing from the deceased father

of the present defendant seemed—for a really wealthy 682
man—to be pointless and futile. The merchant anticipated 674
this objection by hastening to add that the receipt of the 691
actual cash did not interest him in the least; but that he 626
had been wondering how he could shew his disapproval of 686 •
the defendant's family in some way, and had gone carefully
through all his old papers and receipts with this end in
view, and had triumphantly discovered the bill of debt
now produced in court.

Bedouin Law and custom sometimes accept right to 671
bloodmoney in all sorts of circumstances, when other law 672
would recognise no claim. For example, the principle is 682
accepted that a life lost in prison must be paid for by the
informers whose information resulted in the imprisonment
of the deceased. It is entirely immaterial whether the
information so given to the police was wilfully false or
intentionally misleading, or whether it was merely subsequently found to be incorrect. Even if the information
had been true and correct in every detail, the informer is
still blood-guilty from the Ourfi standpoint, although in
actual practice any such claims for bloodmoney would
probably be considerably modified.

Other claims for bloodmoney are also recognised occasionally, in cases of obvious accidental death, or death by
misadventure or Act of God, when the interpreters of
Bedouin Law cannot get away from the main principle
that a life lost must be paid for. The difficulty in these
cases is to determine who shall pay for it; and the lawsuits [695]
usually end in a clever compromise, in which their essential
principles are duly observed, but their judgments are mitigated and modified by leniency and commonsense. The
following example, which occurred recently in Mariut,
will illustrate this.

A certain Arab called Ali Abu Bukr had inherited from 671
his father large cultivation rights in the desert; and in the 672
middle of this land was an old cistern for the collection of 682
rain water. It had not been used for years, and was silted 312

*613 the unilineal rule, only to the son or the brother of the
554 former '_aqila_. In Bait 'Umar, for instance, the office went
428 from father to son to brother (see Figure 8). The election
[666] amounts to a choice between the son or the brother, and
partiality is usually shown towards the eldest of the two
candidates.

The _'aqila's_ term of office may be terminated by the
members of the _bait_. Such an action may be the result of
*613 ineffectiveness due to old age, or it may stem from a violation
554 of the norms of the office by the incumbent. Two cases of an
●687 _'aqila_ being impeached were reported to me. One, which did not take place in al-Qasr, was brought about when the _'aqila_ was accused of taking a bribe, and favoring one party to the conflict over the other. The second case, which happened about fifteen years ago in al-Qasr, involved an _'aqila_ from 'Ailit Ma'fas. This man informed Egyptian officials that his fellow tribesmen were storing guns and ammunition beyond the quantity permitted by national security laws. Not only was this man removed from his _'aqila-ship_, but he was also expelled
*613 from his tertiary segment, and hence the tribe. But, in most
554 cases, term of office is ended by death or senility. The
Bedouins say: "An _'aqila_ will be removed if he can no longer solve problems; if he says bad things about his tribe; if he is too old, or too lazy; in other terms, if he is not a good man, he is removed."

*613 Conflict regulation, in the formal sense, is the
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578 province of the _'aqila_. All complaints should be taken before
692 the _'aqila_. In al-Qasr, every individual has certain rights,
and when any of these rights are infringed upon he may demand
a redress of wrongs: he demands his rights, or exercises
haqq al-'Arab ("the right of the Arabs"). The _haqq al-'Arab_
is opposed to the _haqq Allah_, "the right of God," which
concerns crimes against religion (i.e., wine-drinking, apostasy).
The dichotamy represents private claims over against the claims
of a religious state which is characteristic of Islamic society.
[688] In al-Qasr, crimes against religion have never occurred, and
if they did they would be handled in Marsa Matruh by the local
shaikh ("holy man").

*613 The litigation process is initiated when an individual
554 appears before his _'aqila_ with a claim, and the statement: "I
69 do not wish so-and-so to take any of my rights." The _'aqila_
first attempts to persuade each party "to return to the path
of the good," to come together and to cease quarreling. This
type of moral persuasion is preliminary to a full court-hearing
in which both parties will appear with witnesses before their
respective _'awaaqil_, and other "third parties" who aid the
'awaaqil in their decision. The decision reached by the court
[671] is morally binding upon both parties. According to recent
[178] innovation in Bedouin customary law, the details of the litigation and the decision reached by the court are to be recorded

682 settlement is usually made after the parties have agreed to it,
627 yet, in certain instances where one of the parties later feels that
672 the settlement was not just or that he was coerced into accepting
695 it, he may ask for a second Mi'ad during which new procedures start in the case. In the present case, although Mahdi had originally accepted the judgment of the awaqil, as time passed and he realized that he was unable to pay the bloodmoney, he started to question the feasibility of the settlement. He discussed the matter
682 672 with Sheikh Suliman el-Gerery from the Murabiteen tribe of Gerera,
695 a tribe whose members are feared throughout the area for the belief
554 792 that they have certain supernatural powers. Sheikh Suliman himself
[776] is highly respected, and people believe that after his death he will become "wali" or a saint. After hearing Mahdi's complaint, Sheikh Suliman told him that the settlement was unjust and told him that he would do something about it. The following Thursday, Sheikh Suliman called on Mahdi and asked him to bring his donkey and follow him. They rode to a small desert town called Bahig where the local market
613 is held every Thursday. On market day, the awaqil of various tribal
517 segments usually gather in front of the general store in the town
571 443 drinking tea and chatting until their sons or the younger members
576 of their families sell the sheep and buy the necessary items. Everyone passing by the gathering is expected to greet the gathering, getting off his donkey as a sign of respect to the prominent people.
● [689] Failure to greet a fellow tribesman is considered a serious offense liable to a fine of more than L. 50 and ten goats in certain cases.
[673] 000 It is considered a very serious crime. One informant once told me,

124 One informant once told me,
576 "If you don't greet me, this means that you hate me, and if you
829 hate me, there is no limit to the kind of harm you can do me and
my family. One who hates you can kill you, and none can walk
safely anywhere if he fears that he will be killed."

682 As Sheikh Suliman and Mahdi reached the general store, every-
689 one was gathering there as usual, including the two awaqil who
672 were involved in the original settlement. Sheikh Suliman told
695 554 Mahdi not to dismount his donkey and not to say the customary
792 greeting as they passed by the gathering. When they passed the
576 gathering, everyone stood to greet Sheikh Suliman who ignored them
and left with Mahdi. No one believed that Sheikh Suliman, who
should be the guard of the tribal tradition, should commit such an
unforgivable violation of the norms of the people. The next morn-
682 ing the whole area was talking about a big Mi'ad to "take the right"
689 from Sheikh Suliman and Mahdi, who had insulted the gathering. The
672 Mi'ad was held a week after the incident. During the Mi'ad, Sheikh
695 554 Suliman was asked to explain his behavior, and his answer was, "How
792 do you want me to greet all those people who were sitting in front
576 of the store? There were more than thirty men in that gathering,
627 and I was afraid that if I said the customary greeting, I might
have startled some of them causing them to harm themselves, leaving
me with the payment of so many bloodmoneys." Immediately, the
attendants of the Mi'ad knew what Sheikh Suliman was referring to,
and that his action was to prove that the settlement reached in
the case of Mahdi was wrong and that it set a very dangerous prece-
dent which would cause people to avoid greeting one another, "and
hatred will prevail among brothers and nobody will be safe in his
own home."

105 On the other hand, there is always a feeling of rivalry and hostility
598 between the different tribal segments which goes back to the era of
571 tribal warfare. Thus, the social relations among the tribal population
are characterized by a certain amount of ambivalence which is hidden behind
a facade of formality in the way tribal members treat one another
105 in day-to-day activities. There are certain rules of etiquette describing
571 the way members of the same tribal segment should behave toward one
576 another and toward other tribesmen and outsiders. Failure to abide by
● [689] these rules may subject the violator to a symbolic fine of a goat or a
[574] sheep slaughtered for a feast to which everyone is invited. These feasts,
[182] or dinners as they are called, have various functions, the most important
105 of which is the integrative one. In an area where the population is usually
571 dispersed, these dinners offer an opportunity to the tribesmen who
574 happen to be in the area at the time of the feast to attend, where they
182 eat, meet other tribesmen, and exchange information about what is happening
in other parts of the area. It is from such dinners that the tribesmen
get to know about the available pastures, about the prices of sheep
and goats in different markets, and about who is doing what and where.
The occasion also signifies the restoration of the violator of the rules
to the social life of the group and the reinforcement of those rules.
105 This is also true with the tribal meetings, or mi'ad, which are held to
627 announce settlements in more serious cases. It is on this basis that
182 [illegible] the mi'ad should not be considered as a tribal court. It is more of a
[574] social occasion where food and drinks are served and where parties involved
and all those invited by them talk about everything except the
[589] dispute itself. In certain instances, the financial settlement agreed
upon in the informal mediation is exaggerated when announced in the mi'ad

*613 554 578 692 Conflict regulation, in the formal sense, is the province of the _'aqila_. All complaints should be taken before the _'aqila_. In al-Qasr, every individual has certain rights, and when any of these rights are infringed upon he may demand a redress of wrongs: he demands his rights, or exercises _haqq al-'Arab_ ("the right of the Arabs"). The _haqq al-'Arab_ is opposed to the _haqq Allah_, "the right of God," which concerns crimes against religion (i.e., wine-drinking, apostasy). The dichotamy represents private claims over against the claims of a religious state which is characteristic of Islamic society. [688] In al-Qasr, crimes against religion have never occurred, and if they did they would be handled in Marsa Matruh by the local _shaikh_ ("holy man").

*613 554 •69 The litigation process is initiated when an individual appears before his _'aqila_ with a claim, and the statement: "I do not wish so-and-so to take any of my rights." The _'aqila_ first attempts to persuade each party "to return to the path of the good," to come together and to cease quarreling. This type of moral persuasion is preliminary to a full court-hearing in which both parties will appear with witnesses before their respective _'awaaqil_, and other "third parties" who aid the _'awaaqil_ in their decision. The decision reached by the court is morally binding upon both parties. [671] [178] According to recent innovation in Bedouin customary law, the details of the litigation and the decision reached by the court are to be recorded

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554 on paper in triplicate, one copy going to each litigant and
● 69 a third copy to the chief of police of the Marsa Matruh sector.
[671] In practice, though, a copy usually goes to the litigants, but
[178] not to the chief of police (who had not a single Bedouin court
case in his files).

*613 As is not the case in Islamic law, in Bedouin customary
695 law the decision of the judge may be appealed. The system of
692 appeals may even function at the level of familial authority,
[671] i.e., the son may, in theory, appeal a ruling by his own
father. The Bedouins insist that this is an important right of every man. In the situation where a man wishes to appeal a decision of his own _'aqila_, he will generally take his claim to another _'aqila_ of his secondary group. When an appeal is to be made, it is done with the permission of the _'aqila_ who rendered the original decision. The one who appeals his case does so with the understanding that the decision returned by the court of appeal will be final and binding. Further, if
[681] the court of appeal concurs with the findings of the original
court, the plaintiff pays a double fine (twice the original fine), and also pays his own _'aqila_ an expiation fee (_kubaara_).

69 The Egyptians have preferred to leave the Bedouins of
648 al-Qasr to settle their own disputes except in the more serious
[682] criminal matters. Police from Matruh will enter homicide cases
[685] and those conflicts over property rights which threaten to
explode into tribal warfare. But these types of conflict have

•69 648 been infrequent in al-Qasr. The _'awaaqil_ of al-Qasr and the
police of al-Qasr have an agreement that Bedouin problems are
the jurisdiction of the desert leaders, and that the police
will intervene only when their help is requested. The
Bedouins claim that in the 1930's, the Egyptians tried to do
away with Bedouin law but soon discovered their own penal code
609 to be inoperative in the desert. Against "outsiders," the
69 Bedouin is duty bound to protect his kinsmen, and hence justice
*613 could not be satisfied. One _'aqila_ said that "only the _'awaiyid_
682 _Awlad 'Ali_ can maintain order because it stops wars through
182 payment of blood-money." If a Bedouin, for some reason or
692 other, takes his case to the police in Matruh, he will be
648 returned to his _'aqila_; he will be told that they can do
*613 nothing for him without the permission of his _'aqila_. There
are exceptions to this rule which complicate modern Bedouin
692 judicial procedure. For instance, in cases which involve
685 government property, such as olive trees and government-
648 operated water systems, a man may legitimately deal with the
*613 police. In one case in al-Qasr, a man's goats destroyed a
number of his neighbor's olive trees. The police decided that
the owner of the goats should pay the value of the trees. In
another case, a man who had constructed small earth dikes in
such a way that rain water was prevented from flowing onto
his neighbor's land was forced against his will to remove the
obstruction. His neighbor had taken his complaint to the

685 I was in al-Qasr, and each party to the conflict hired
578 Egyptian lawyers in Marsa Matruh to represent them. As one
648 litigant in this case told me: "The Bedouins prefer to settle their own land disputes because the government's way of handling these things costs money and long periods of waiting."

•69 The notion of jurisprudence in tribal cultures, in
121 general, seems to be one which concentrates on the restoration
578 of a disturbed balance rather than one concerned with formality and procedure. To a great extent, this is true in the Bedouin case also. However, the absence of institutionalized ways of dealing with conflict is more characteristic of the internal
*613 system of political relations. Conflict within the secondary
578 segment, we have noticed, may be regulated at the familial
[593] level of authority by the shaib, or one acting in his place:
[596] it is hoped by the Bedouins that quarrels never become serious enough to prompt intervention by the 'aqila. On the other hand, the 'aqila, as a legitimate representative of his authority group, will almost always become involved in conflict regulation falling within the sphere of external political relations, i.e., conflict between secondary, primary, or tribal segments.

The 'aqila as the most effective mechanism of social
*613 control has become institutionalized through time in Bedouin
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182 society. At the interactional level of secondary lineage group relations, conflict may easily expand into feuding or,

657 modern court system may be viewed as a form of appeal to the tribal
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177 justice. One has to be careful, however, in calling such a procedure
178 an appeal, since the tribal proceedings have no relevance in the court
proceedings.

69 The duality is more serious in criminal cases. When an act is de-
681 fined as illegal by both the tribal and modern law, persons committing
177 it come automatically under the jurisdiction of both laws. As long as
such acts remain unknown to the police, the duality of procedures is
not undertaken. This is possible in minor cases of assault or theft or
adultery. But in major cases, such as homocide or serious assault re-
sulting in the serious injury of a tribal member, it is difficult to
keep the news a secret from the authorities. The funeral proceedings
in the former cases and the medical attention needed in the latter cases
[627] are hard to conceal. Besides, serious cases start a whole series of
[521] mediations and go-betweens which always become the general knowledge
in the entire area and the subject of conversation among the people.
When the authorities know about such cases, they have to take immediate action to bring the offender to trial, even when the government authorities know that the tribal proceedings are being conducted in the case. Some attempts are made by both the tribal law and the modern law to minimize the effect of that duality. It is common that when the district attorney knows that a certain criminal case has been successfully solved according to the tribal proceedings, to ask for the minimum penalty for the offense. On the side of the tribal proceedings, once the case has been solved, the witnesses needed to testify for the prosecutor are instructed by their fellow tribesmen to refrain from giving the information

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681 required for the indictment of the offender according to the modern
177 legal system. If this is not possible and the offender is sentenced by the government court, only half the tribal settlement is paid, and the rest is postponed pending the release of the offender. If the offender is executed or he dies in prison, then the unpaid part of the settlement is dropped.

CHAPTER V

POLITICAL LEADERSHIP AND JUDICIAL PROCESS

69 627 628 One of the most idstinguishing aspects of the legal system of Awlad Ali is the absence of any formalized judicial structure. Disputes are solved mainly through the mechanism of informal mediation rather than through formal hearings of a court during which the facts of each case are presented and judgment based on the facts is passed. This does not mean that formal hearings are not known on the area. For the "Mi'ad" or tribal hearing is a common and very important practice in the tribal proceedings. The Mi'ad, however, is not a tribal court. It is merely a gathering of all interested parties and anyone else who wished to attend, in which the agreement reached behind the scenes by means of negotiations are announced.

628 613 683 [114] The first Mi'ad I attended was held in the house of Sheikh Mughaieb, the Aqila (tribal leader) of bait Mughaieb of the Sanagrah tribal segment in the area of Hammam, 60 miles west of Alexandria. The case that was to be settled at the Mi'iad involved the assaulting of Sheikh Mughaieb ty two younger members of bait Dauoud who lived in a nearby camp. The dispute started when Ali, the youngest brother (14 years old) of the two assailants, found a piece of iron in the desert. Suspecting that it was a mine, he took it away from the camp to the small garden in the backyard of Sheikh Mughaieb's house, surrounded it with dry weeds and set fire to it. The piece of iron was in fact a mine and it exploded, damaging the trees and a window on the Sheikh's property. At the sound of the explosion Sheikh Mughaieb rushed out and found the boy trying to run away from

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police and not to his 'aqila. This was a serious case because the police were forced to imprison the dike-builder for two days before he would agree to their demands. The two men involved in the conflict were from different lineages, and it soon became necessary for Bedouin justice to intervene even after the matter had been settled by the police. The 'awaaqil of each man met, along with other notables of the tribe, and investigated the area where the dikes had been; they listened to witnesses and tried to calculate the amount of water which each man should receive. In the end, the decision of the police was upheld.

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Although, ideally, litigation should be instigated through the office of the 'aqila, alternatives do exist. As noted in discussing the values of Bedouin society, it is the moral obligation of each and every person to moderate between conflicting parties; any one conflict situation may be moderated by many well-meaning parties. Or, if a person suspects prejudice on the part of his own 'aqila, he may choose to take his claim to another 'aqila, or third party.
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The notion of a third party to a conflict, when it does not refer to the 'aqila or a close kinsman who may act as an arbitrator, has reference to a non-institutionalized role in al-Qasr. This role-holder, the Bedouins call rajal khair ("good man") or qawaal al-khair ("the speaker of the good").

"Role differentiation implies organization" (Levy

554 1952:165), and the role rajal khair along with the other roles
627 concerned with political action, the 'aqila, shaikh, and 'umda,
692 represent political organization in al-Qasr. Although the
role of rajal khair is not institutionalized to the same
degree that the others are, we shall see in the next chapter
that it is an important one for an understanding of power relations in al-Qasr. All of these roles carry with them some
type of right to make binding decisions in matters regarding
conflict regulation. That is, an individual should take his
*[613] claims to the 'aqila, but may take them to any of the other
political specialists. In any of the cases, the litigants
concerned become bound by the decision of the third party.
*[613] But only at the hand of the 'aqila can a decision be made
[695] which will effect a whole group, i.e., only an 'aqila can
[682] give judgment against a corporation for the blood-money in a
case of homicide (Schacht 1953:328).

•691 If, however, blood-money is not an immediate concern,
692 the litigants may utilize any and all of the political roles
*613 available in the judicial system. A statement from one of my
554 informants, an 'aqila, is useful here.

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> The bait is made up of thirty or fourty men, and there is one most important man (rajal kabiir), the 'aqila. The 'aqila puts an end to problems, he sees who deserves this and who deserves that. Problems must be settled. It happened five or six years ago that I and my paternal cousins quarreled over land at Wadi Raml. I went to the police station and complained to the shaikh of the 'Aishaibat. I asked him to choose a person to judge

•691 between me and my cousins, according to Bedouin law
692 (yinafth al-'awaiyid bainaana). I went to the shaikh
because my cousins did not agree that we go to the
*613 'aqila right away. We agreed that the shaikh would
554 choose the third party, and the judgment would be
627 binding on both of us. The shaikh chose Bu Halaiqa as
the third party, and Bu Halaiqa chose three others as
consultants. (Two of the three were rajal khair, and
the other was an 'aqila.) The judgment was that my
cousins were in the wrong. They were fined 10 L.E.
and a dhabiiha("blood sacrifice"). 'Ali intervened and
did not allow my cousins to pay the fine. He had them
write a paper stating, that if they resume this quarrel
in the future they must pay the fine plus another 10 L.E.
fine. (Hajj 'Ali is a rajal khair.)

695 Sometimes the Egyptian police must be brought into a judicial
648 affair to insure the execution of a judgment. In one case,
696 an individual in al-Qasr did not accept the decision of his
'aqila; his 'aqila wrote the decision on paper and sent him to another 'aqila. The second 'aqila agreed with the first, but the man also refused this decision. The second 'aqila wrote his decision on paper and sent it to the shaikh of the 'Aishaibat in Matruh. The shaikh summoned the culprit and sent him to the police station. Finally, the police were able to convince the man to pay his fine, and also his expiation fee to his own 'aqila. My informant said that this was a minor affair, and that had it been a serious offense committed by the man he would have been threatened with expulsion from the corporate group.

*613 As the corporate sole, the 'aqila has political authority
554 which is legitimate and morally binding on all who wish to
571 maintain their status in the group and tribe. Any individual

423 *613 182 [691] long time ago. This seems to be supported by the evidence shown below, for often conflict over land and water rights is represented by litigation between individuals and not groups.

422 562 *613 I have arbitrarily assigned to the classification of property rights the rights over women. I have done this because a man acquires such rights as a member of a lineage jural group and secures them with the backing of public opinion and the 'awaiyid. Also, though a man in al-Qasr does not "own" his wife, he does have the legal rights to certain things related to her: he has the right to her sexual favors, and the right to claim her offspring for his own lineage.

685 695 Settlement in cases dealing with the infringement of property rights, if they do not lead to personal injury cases, will usually be concluded by arbitration or oath-taking, either of which brings the two parties into agreement.

691 685 *613 578 692 Date: 1964. Case: Quarrel between Bait 'Umran and Bait Idris of 'Ailit Ma'fas over the ownership of a well. The 'awaaqil sent for the two parties involved, and they met on Wednesday, market day. And the 'awaaqil told the two parties: "This is a shame ('aib), you must be friends because you are from the same tribe." The 'awaaqil knew "from past history and from truthful elders" that the well belonged to 'Ait Idris. The 'awaaqil made 'Ait 'Umran change their minds about their claim [695] to the well. Before the litigation 'Ait 'Umran had insisted

691 685 *613 578 692 695 that 'Ait Idris take the oath as proof that the well was owned by them. Upon the decision of the 'awaaqil, however, 'Ait 'Umran refused to allow 'Ait Idris to swear the oath "because we are all one family." This means, as one 'aqila actually stated at the conclusion of the case, that " 'Ait Idris is indebted to 'Ait 'Umran."

423 675 *613 The following two cases which occur in the external system of political relations, one within the 'Aishaibat territory and the other dealing with land rights in the territory between two primary authority groups, indicate the formal aspect of Bedouin adjudication in establishing contracts.

[539] Date: 12 August 1963. A Contract of Agreement on Land Rights.
Agreement and satisfaction took place between Hussain Karim al-Dawlat of al-'Aishaibat and Khalid Idris al-Ma'fas of al-'Aishaibat, the first and second party. And the reason for this agreement is that each of the two parties own cultivable land at Ras Wadi Madwar. The two parties wish to make a dividing line between this linear piece of land and to declare the borders. The two parties agreed on the following: first, the beginning of the border extends from the eastern side at south Ras Raqabit al-Shumar to the western side at Hatiyid and is shown by stone markers; secondly, this line should be established from the east to the west, and this is a dividing line between the two parties and was executed by them and with their satisfaction; thirdly, whoever rejects or modifies this line will be responsible in front of law and the 'awaiyid Awlad 'Ali; each party is responsible for his children and relatives as to their actions regarding this line which is the subject of the agreement; fifthly, this contract of agreement which defines the borders between the two parties was issued in two copies, a copy to each party to use when it is needed.

Signatures or seals of seven men.

423 Date: 12 October 1954. There came to us (i.e. the 'awaqil)
●691 on this day, Khalid Idris of al-'Aishaibat and Yunis Abd
578 al-Nabi of al-Kamailat. The reason for their coming is a
*613 quarrel over land rights at Wadi al-Hijnaiya. And we put
[539] distinct markers between the land of the two parties, the
first, Khalid Idris, and the second, Yunis Abd al-Nabi.
And the boundary passes by the distinct markers; the
first is the wadi marker, the second to the sea and beside
the tree, and the final marker we put east of Halima well.
This is a decision between the two parties in the presence
of the following witnesses:

Signatures or seals of five men.

619 The case given below indicates, by the use of two
578 documents, the process of conflict settlement involving two
secondary segments of al-Qasr, one Sa'adi and one Marabit.
'Ailit al-Sulwatiyya, though genealogically not members of the
[671] Awlad 'Ali and holders of a client or vassal status in traditional times, are within the jurisdiction of the 'awaiyid Awlad 'Ali. They claim their rights under it by virtue of the fact of their residence in al-Qasr. The power of ritual sanction is clearly illustrated by this case.

578 Date: 30 July 1964, Marsa Matruh. First Party: Shaikh
685 Khalid Za'aluk al-Sulwatiyya and four relatives. Second
691 Party: Khalid Idris of 'Ailit Ma'fas and three relatives.
619 They are present. The cause of these two parties coming to-
423 gether is a quarrel over a well named Halima. Since the choice
[695] to swear the oath has been made by the two parties, Khalid
Idris, the second party, will swear the oath supported by
twenty-four members of his 'umraa al-dam ("blood group") to

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578 be chosen by Shaikh Khalid Za'aluk, the first party. The text
685
•691 of the oath which Khalid Idris will swear is: "By the truth
619 of the owner of this tomb (maqaam), and this book of God, I
695 swear that you (i.e. the 'Ailit Sulwatiyya represented by
[539] Shaikh Khalid Za'aluk) have neither work of hand nor a
grandfather's stake in this well." If any of the oath-takers
are missing on the day of the oath, the well will be owned
Khalid Za'aluk. And if they swear the oath, the well will be
owned by 'Ailit Ma'fas.

The date of the oath will be the first Friday of month nine,
[778] 1964. The oath will be taken at the shrine of Sidi 'Awam, and
the swearing will deal with the well only. For the land which
is west of the well belongs to Khalid Za'aluk and his family,
and the land to the east of the well belongs to Khalid Idris
and his family. And the water which is west of the well
belongs to Khalid Za'aluk. The two parties agreed to this.
(Each party, and five witnesses, i.e. rajal khair, for each
party, signed the document.)

423 Date: 30 July 1964. I, Khalid Za'aluk, have decided to cancel
619 the oath which was supposed to have been sworn on 9 September
578 1964 at the shrine of Sidi Awam. Khalid Idris and the oath-
691
[695] takers were present and were stopped from taking the oath.
And the well named al-Halima which was the cause of the quarrel

423 (nizaa'a) belongs to Khalid Idris and his brothers. This
619 happened with the satisfaction of both tribes, and this re-
578
●691 nunciation of claim is valid from today. This paper concerning the ownership of land around the well is valid from today also. And this happened between the parties: (Signatures or stamps of both parties concerned.)

(There appeared the signatures of twenty-three of the twenty-four men who were to have sworn the oath.)

Only twenty-three oath-takers were present: 30 July 1964.

I, Shaikh Khalid Za'aluk, agree on the signatures of only twenty-three oath-takers. (Signature of Khalid Za'aluk.)

648 We have mentioned that the _'awaiyid_ prevails in al-
671 Qasr, but have also noted that where the security of the
578 desert is threatened the government is likely to intervene. The government enters tribal conflict in al-Qasr with the tacit approval of the Bedouins. As one informant remarked: "The _'awaiyid_ is the best way to handle problems, but the police will handle what the _'awaiyid_ cannot."

423 _Date: 1964_. Case: Quarrel between al-Afrad ('Ali Abyad) and
691 'Aishaibat ('Ali Ahmar) over water rights. Many members of
578 both tribes took part in this conflict. The government had
619
648 to intervene: they formed a peace committee made up of all
*[613] the _'awaaqil_ of both tribes and the _'umda_ and _shaikh_ from
[634] each tribe.

423 each tribe. It was decided that the water which flows through
•691 the *wadi* after the rains should be divided equally between the
578 two tribes, and that no one should be stopped from using the
619
648 water. Had not the government intervened in this conflict, and had not they collected all of the weapons from the Bedouins, this problem would have resulted in the death of many men and even greater problems.

674 Theft is condemned by the Bedouins: "Everything in
685 the desert is loose. We must punish the thief quickly and severely." It is a fact that the man who goes to steal and
[682] accidentally kills in the act will have judged against him
[829] the full *diiya*, i.e., the amount for intentional killing. On the other hand, the people of al-Qasr insist that "Bedouins do
[671] not steal." But legal norms exist to sanction violations against cultural ideals. The following case shows how social and ritual sanctions operate to enforce ideals.

619 Date: 1964. Case: Quarrel between the tribe of Kamailat and
578 the tribe of 'Aishaibat over the theft of 16 L.E. Muhammad of
685 'Ailit Ma'fas was accused of stealing 16 L.E. which belonged
*613 to Ahmad of 'Ailit Idris, Kamailat. The theft occurred while the two were residing at a hotel in Marsa Matruh. There were twenty other persons in the hotel that night. The accused said: "I did not take anything."

554 dhabiiha and 10 L.E. But Hajj 'Ali intervened and did not
571 let them pay the fine. Instead, he had them write a paper
627 declaring that should they reopen this matter, they would
have to pay the old fine plus a new fine of the same amount.". Simmel (Wolff 1950) notes that the mediator saves group unity through his "intellectuality," but that he is also an exploiter of the situation. It is obvious that Hajj 'Ali could have increased his "status honor" in the eyes of both parties to this conflict. The rajal khair who is facile enough to salvage the honor of both parties in a dispute increases his chances for future mediation and, hence, the chance to further augment his "status honor." The minimal fine involved in most of Bedouin litigation indicates a concern, not with punishment per se, but with "taking one's rights" and lawful share of honor. Social harmony is viewed in terms of an equitable distribution of honor. The power which a rajal khair has over litigants, which derives from his status in the social structure, contributes to this social harmony necessary for the persistence of the community.

554 The Bedouins say that one goes to the rajal khair,
571 or rajal salih, because he knows that he will "get his
627
829 rights." Litigation is entered into with the understanding
●[691] that neither party will emerge a "loser." On the other hand,
*[613] the 'aqila, who is expected to be dispassionate and totally
objective, must rule on the rightness or wrongness of an act;

554 [571] [178] It is interesting to note that Hajj 'Ali is one of the most powerful members of the "status group" in al-Qasr. He is also a leading proponent of social change and a critic of the old way of life which includes belief in magic. [792] One can see how 'Amm Salih's influence and status might work in other areas of social action.

554 792 627 [695] ● [691] * [613] [829] Although it is conceivable that a rajal salih can be asked to intervene in any type of conflict, it is more likely that he will preside at cases involving marriage and divorce. The rajal saalih may also be asked to serve as a witness or consultant in litigation cases. The Bedouins point out that the "holy man," like the rajal khair, is apt to be more trustworthy than the formal authority, the 'aqila.

> Sanusi is a good man and the people should listen to him. He is a rajal khair, a rajal saalih, not an 'aqila. He is better than an 'aqila--he is our brother. He is much better than the 'umda because he never changes the truth. The 'umda may go and accuse me wrongly to the government but Sanusi would never do this.

554 792 It is, of course, difficult to decide whether Sanusi's charisma stems from the fact that he is a rajal salih, or the facts of his wealth and family. Most probably it is a little of both, the sacred as well as the secular. 'Amm Salih, on the other hand, is neither wealthy nor from a particularly prestigious family by economic standards of al-Qasr: he derives his influence and status from the sacred aspects of

682 body had been dragged. He followed the footsteps of the
674 son as far as the cistern, where he again saw a tiny spot of
fresh blood on one of the stones. From that point donkey-tracks led straight to the son's tent.

By nightfall the son was securely lodged in the police post; and local public opinion was seething with fury, firstly at such a dastardly deed committed presumably for the sake of the old man's money, and secondly because it reflected untold discredit on the rest of the tribe. The murderer, who was a big powerful man of about thirty standing nearly six feet in height, lay in prison awaiting trial. After a few days he was admitted to hospital, where he completely collapsed and died of fright a fortnight later.

[203] Rumours then began to spread that possibly the murderer had only acted in accordance with the wishes of his
brothers, who were all conspiring to get rid of the old man, in order that they might share out his possessions. This could not be proved, and appeared unlikely from the
[626] evidence. However, public feeling against the whole family ran so high that it was feared that more horrors might follow; but although no open action was taken against the family, no opportunity was missed of having a dig at them in some way or another.

682 A very wealthy sheep merchant, who was a distant
674 connection of the family, and heartily ashamed of them,
674 brought an action for debt against one of the murderer's
691 brothers. He produced an I.O.U. for £2 dated twelve
626 years before and signed by the murdered man, claiming
686 (according to custom) that the son now in court as de-
fendant had inherited his father's liabilities together with
[672] his assets.

This sheep merchant was known personally to the writer, who was also aware that a month previously he had made a profit of £900 on a very clever bit of dealing in the West. The collection, after an interval of twelve years, of this paltry debt of £2, owing from the deceased father

of the present defendant seemed—for a really wealthy 682
man—to be pointless and futile. The merchant anticipated 674
this objection by hastening to add that the receipt of the 691•
actual cash did not interest him in the least; but that he 626
had been wondering how he could shew his disapproval of 686
the defendant's family in some way, and had gone carefully through all his old papers and receipts with this end in view, and had triumphantly discovered the bill of debt now produced in court.

Bedouin Law and custom sometimes accept right to 671
bloodmoney in all sorts of circumstances, when other law 672
would recognise no claim. For example, the principle is 682
accepted that a life lost in prison must be paid for by the informers whose information resulted in the imprisonment of the deceased. It is entirely immaterial whether the information so given to the police was wilfully false or intentionally misleading, or whether it was merely subsequently found to be incorrect. Even if the information had been true and correct in every detail, the informer is still blood-guilty from the Ourfi standpoint, although in actual practice any such claims for bloodmoney would probably be considerably modified.

Other claims for bloodmoney are also recognised occasionally, in cases of obvious accidental death, or death by misadventure or Act of God, when the interpreters of Bedouin Law cannot get away from the main principle that a life lost must be paid for. The difficulty in these
cases is to determine who shall pay for it; and the lawsuits [695]
usually end in a clever compromise, in which their essential principles are duly observed, but their judgments are mitigated and modified by leniency and commonsense. The following example, which occurred recently in Mariut, will illustrate this.

A certain Arab called Ali Abu Bukr had inherited from 671
his father large cultivation rights in the desert; and in the 672
middle of this land was an old cistern for the collection of 682
rain water. It had not been used for years, and was silted 312

[For information on informalized mechanisms for adjusting and applying sanctions within the community and between communities, see Categories 627 and 628.]

*613 He must pay the *diiya* with the shares which he collects from
682 the others. It makes no difference if the *'aqila* must pay
554 with his own money. He is responsible for this matter before
571 the whole tribe."

*613 The collection of the *diiya* is only one aspect of the
554 process of conflict regulation, but it stands out as the fundamental
682 manifestation of the office of *'aqila*. In the course
● [692] of office, an *'aqila* will spend much more time arbitrating
disputes, but it is his responsibility concerning blood-money
which defines his position and his jurisdiction as corporate
682 ones. During the present period in al-Qasr, the practice of
178 blood-revenge has all but disappeared as a mechanism of social
[626] control. Nevertheless, the possibility of its happening is
not too remote. The payment of blood-money is the alternative
[619] to blood-revenge, and blood-revenge is a condition for all-out
[721] tribal warfare--something which the Bedouins look upon with
[829] horror. One informant once likened a primary-level war between
the 'Aishaibat and the Kamailat (should it ever occur) to
*613 "the end of the world." The *'aqila* as a representative of a
682 group can prevent war by preventing reciprocal homicides: by
554 presenting his share of the blood-money he regulates conflict
578 and promotes integration. The blood-money is usually paid
over a period of from one to two years. In this case, the
[571] notion of "debt" represents a contingent, institutionalized
social relationship for the purpose of maintaining political
order.

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•692 Conflict regulation, in the formal sense, is the province of the *'aqila*. All complaints should be taken before the *'aqila*. In al-Qasr, every individual has certain rights, and when any of these rights are infringed upon he may demand a redress of wrongs: he demands his rights, or exercises *haqq al-'Arab* ("the right of the Arabs"). The *haqq al-'Arab* is opposed to the *haqq Allah*, "the right of God," which concerns crimes against religion (i.e., wine-drinking, apostasy). The dichotamy represents private claims over against the claims of a religious state which is characteristic of Islamic society. [688] In al-Qasr, crimes against religion have never occurred, and if they did they would be handled in Marsa Matruh by the local *shaikh* ("holy man").

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69 The litigation process is initiated when an individual appears before his *'aqila* with a claim, and the statement: "I do not wish so-and-so to take any of my rights." The *'aqila* first attempts to persuade each party "to return to the path of the good," to come together and to cease quarreling. This type of moral persuasion is preliminary to a full court-hearing in which both parties will appear with witnesses before their respective *'awaaqil*, and other "third parties" who aid the *'awaaqil* in their decision. The decision reached by the court is morally binding upon both parties. [671] [178] According to recent innovation in Bedouin customary law, the details of the litigation and the decision reached by the court are to be recorded

*613 on paper in triplicate, one copy going to each litigant and
554 a third copy to the chief of police of the Marsa Matruh sector.
69 In practice, though, a copy usually goes to the litigants, but
[671] not to the chief of police (who had not a single Bedouin court
[178] case in his files).

*613 As is not the case in Islamic law, in Bedouin customary
695 law the decision of the judge may be appealed. The system of
•692 appeals may even function at the level of familial authority,
[671] i.e., the son may, in theory, appeal a ruling by his own
father. The Bedouins insist that this is an important right of every man. In the situation where a man wishes to appeal a decision of his own _'aqila_, he will generally take his claim to another _'aqila_ of his secondary group. When an appeal is to be made, it is done with the permission of the _'aqila_ who rendered the original decision. The one who appeals his case does so with the understanding that the decision returned by the court of appeal will be final and binding. Further, if
[681] the court of appeal concurs with the findings of the original
court, the plaintiff pays a double fine (twice the original fine), and also pays his own _'aqila_ an expiation fee (_kubaara_).

69 The Egyptians have preferred to leave the Bedouins of
648 al-Qasr to settle their own disputes except in the more serious
[682] criminal matters. Police from Matruh will enter homicide cases
[685] and those conflicts over property rights which threaten to
explode into tribal warfare. But these types of conflict have

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648 been infrequent in al-Qasr. The *'awaagil* of al-Qasr and the
police of al-Qasr have an agreement that Bedouin problems are
the jurisdiction of the desert leaders, and that the police
will intervene only when their help is requested. The
Bedouins claim that in the 1930's, the Egyptians tried to do
away with Bedouin law but soon discovered their own penal code
to be inoperative in the desert. Against "outsiders," the
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69 Bedouin is duty bound to protect his kinsmen, and hence justice
could not be satisfied. One *'aqila* said that "only the *'awaiyid*
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682 *Awlad 'Ali* can maintain order because it stops wars through
182 payment of blood-money." If a Bedouin, for some reason or
•692 other, takes his case to the police in Matruh, he will be
648 returned to his *'aqila*; he will be told that they can do
*613 nothing for him without the permission of his *'aqila*. There
are exceptions to this rule which complicate modern Bedouin
692 judicial procedure. For instance, in cases which involve
685 government property, such as olive trees and government-
648 operated water systems, a man may legitimately deal with the
*613 police. In one case in al-Qasr, a man's goats destroyed a
number of his neighbor's olive trees. The police decided that
the owner of the goats should pay the value of the trees. In
another case, a man who had constructed small earth dikes in
such a way that rain water was prevented from flowing onto
his neighbor's land was forced against his will to remove the
obstruction. His neighbor had taken his complaint to the

• 692 685 648 *613 police and not to his 'aqila. This was a serious case because the police were forced to imprison the dike-builder for two days before he would agree to their demands. The two men involved in the conflict were from different lineages, and it soon became necessary for Bedouin justice to intervene even after the matter had been settled by the police. The 'awaaqil of each man met, along with other notables of the tribe, and investigated the area where the dikes had been; they listened to witnesses and tried to calculate the amount of water which each man should receive. In the end, the decision of the police was upheld.

692 691 *613 [577] Although, ideally, litigation should be instigated through the office of the 'aqila, alternatives do exist. As noted in discussing the values of Bedouin society, it is the moral obligation of each and every person to moderate between conflicting parties; any one conflict situation may be moderated by many well-meaning parties. Or, if a person suspects prejudice on the part of his own 'aqila, he may choose to take 627 554 692 his claim to another 'aqila, or third party. The notion of a third party to a conflict, when it does not refer to the 'aqila or a close kinsman who may act as an arbitrator, has reference to a non-institutionalized role in al-Qasr. This role-holder, the Bedouins call rajal khair ("good man") or qawaal al-khair ("the speaker of the good").

"Role differentiation implies organization" (Levy

554 1952:165), and the role *rajal khair* along with the other roles
627 concerned with political action, the *'aqila*, *shaikh*, and *'umda*,
•692 represent political organization in al-Qasr. Although the
role of *rajal khair* is not institutionalized to the same
degree that the others are, we shall see in the next chapter
that it is an important one for an understanding of power relations in al-Qasr. All of these roles carry with them some
type of right to make binding decisions in matters regarding
conflict regulation. That is, an individual should take his
*[613] claims to the *'aqila*, but may take them to any of the other
political specialists. In any of the cases, the litigants
concerned become bound by the decision of the third party.
*[613] But only at the hand of the *'aqila* can a decision be made
[695] which will effect a whole group, i.e., only an *'aqila* can
[682] give judgment against a corporation for the blood-money in a
case of homicide (Schacht 1953:328).

691 If, however, blood-money is not an immediate concern,
692 the litigants may utilize any and all of the political roles
*613 available in the judicial system. A statement from one of my
554 informants, an *'aqila*, is useful here.
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> The *bait* is made up of thirty or fourty men, and there is one most important man (*rajal kabiir*), the *'aqila*. The *'aqila* puts an end to problems, he sees who deserves this and who deserves that. Problems must be settled. It happened five or six years ago that I and my paternal cousins quarreled over land at Wadi Raml. I went to the police station and complained to the *shaikh* of the 'Aishaibat. I asked him to choose a person to judge

> 691 between me and my cousins, according to Bedouin law
> •692 (yinafth al-'awaiyid bainaana). I went to the shaikh
> *613 because my cousins did not agree that we go to the
> 554 'aqila right away. We agreed that the shaikh would
> 627 choose the third party, and the judgment would be binding on both of us. The shaikh chose Bu Halaiqa as the third party, and Bu Halaiqa chose three others as consultants. (Two of the three were rajal khair, and the other was an 'aqila.) The judgment was that my cousins were in the wrong. They were fined 10 L.E. and a dhabiiha("blood sacrifice"). 'Ali intervened and did not allow my cousins to pay the fine. He had them write a paper stating, that if they resume this quarrel in the future they must pay the fine plus another 10 L.E. fine. (Hajj 'Ali is a rajal khair.)

695 Sometimes the Egyptian police must be brought into a judicial
648 affair to insure the execution of a judgment. In one case,
696 an individual in al-Qasr did not accept the decision of his 'aqila; his 'aqila wrote the decision on paper and sent him to another 'aqila. The second 'aqila agreed with the first, but the man also refused this decision. The second 'aqila wrote his decision on paper and sent it to the shaikh of the 'Aishaibat in Matruh. The shaikh summoned the culprit and sent him to the police station. Finally, the police were able to convince the man to pay his fine, and also his expiation fee to his own 'aqila. My informant said that this was a minor affair, and that had it been a serious offense committed by the man he would have been threatened with expulsion from the corporate group.

*613 As the corporate sole, the 'aqila has political authority
554 which is legitimate and morally binding on all who wish to
571 maintain their status in the group and tribe. Any individual

695 untruthfulness and he loses his claim. According to the
602 'awaiyid, the number of supporters required in a homicide or
613 wounding case is fifty; in a case involving the rightful
671 ownership of land or a well the required number is twenty-five; in a case of conflicting claims over a camel, five relatives must swear in support of the claimant; and in matters concerning smaller animals, such as sheep, the number of supporters will depend upon the number and price of the animals. But, of course, the number of supporters will always be relative to the size of the groups involved, and so the 'awaiyid is not always followed to the letter of the law.

695 The time and place of the oath is fixed by the 'awaaqil
(692) adjudicating the given case. It is administered either at the tomb of a "holy man," or at the mosque in Marsa Matruh, and always on a Friday, the Muslim Sabbath. There is a standard text to the oath and this is given in the instructions of the
695 'awaaqil to the litigants. The Bedouins, with few exceptions,
784 believe in the effectiveness of the oath of God. The rationale is that no man is willing to lie and suffer the wrath of God. The curse which results from a "bad oath" usually takes the form of an accident or misfortune to the swearer or a member of his family. The Bedouins believe that divine sanction operates not only against the one who makes a bad oath, but also against the one who bears false witness against another and causes him to take the oath.

577 According to this 'aqila, the "good man" is the "good Muslim"
771 who observes the pillars of Islam (fasting, praying, making
183 the pilgrimage, and alms-giving). Also, the "good man" does
not steal or lie, and this leads, importantly enough, to social
accord.

121 In light of the preceding discussion of authority and
681 law, we can now offer a description of the Bedouin judicial
process in action. Southall (1956:121-151) has drawn the
121 distinction between internal and external delicts on the
681 bases of kinds of sanctions rendered, and whether or not
114 chiefly authority mediates conflict. Such a distinction can
be only partially applied in the case of the Bedouins of the
Western Desert. The kind of sanctions operating in the internal
political system do differ from those applied in the external
political system, though not to the same degree which is true
121 of Southall's Alurland. On the other hand, since Bedouin
681 society, lacking political centralization, cannot be character-
•692 ized as a segmentary state with distinct spheres of authority
[642] at successive levels of the lineage structure, the intervention
or non-intervention of chiefly adjudication and decision-
making cannot serve as a basis for differentiating political
* [613] action. Rather, the lone political office of the 'aqila
[627] involves itself in all arbitration which cannot be successfully
concluded by the mechanism of familial authority. There are
[648] just two exceptions which apply to this latter statement:

121 first, the government may enter into conflict cases which
681 are judged to be out of control and involving the larger tribal
692 units; secondly, litigants, whether exercising internal or
648 external political relations, have the right to take their
case to a rajal khair. Both exceptions represent informal
[626] processes of social control in al-Qasr; the first case rarely
happens, and the second case seems to occur quite frequently
but no recordings of the settlement are made.

681 Sanctions in the Bedouin legal system conform to what
121 Radcliffe-Brown referred to as secondary sanctions: "These
are concerned with the actions of persons or groups in their
effects upon other persons or groups" (1952:209). Also, it
[671] would seem that Bedouin law is one of private delicts as
opposed to a law of public delicts:

> [692] In the procedure of a law of private delicts a person or a body of persons that has suffered some injury, loss or damage by infringement of recognized rights appeals to a constituted judicial authority, who declares some other person or body of persons within the community to be responsible and rules that the defendant shall give satisfaction to the plaintiff, such satisfaction frequently taking the form of the payment of an indemnity or damages. A private delict is thus an action which is subject to what may be called a restitutive sanction (Radcliffe-Brown 1952:213).

681 In Bedouin society, delicts are private since they involve
675 individuals or lineage groups, but the restitutive sanctions
671 to which they give rise are backed by communal consensus ex-
pressed through public approval in general, and by the twin

121 external system, however, the law recognizes retaliation, a
681 life for a life. Still, even in this case, Bedouin values
682 [182] expressed through the *'awaiyid* try to avert bloodshed and
[671] feuding by showing "the good path" and providing the means
for settlement through compensation.

681 Just as the Bedouin accepts the *'awaiyid* as a set of
682 of ideals calculated to regulate conflict, he paradoxically
182 claims the right to impose retaliatory sanctions as a just
[671] conclusion to conflict. One Bedouin said that the greatest
[673] sin which a man or group can commit is to accept the *diiya*
and then take his blood-revenge and return the money. Presumably, a person or group commits no outrage if they refuse
the *diiya* with the understanding that blood-revenge will be
[626] taken. In al-Qasr, retaliation and the *'awaiyid* are mechanisms
[671] of social control and dispute settlement. A political office
* [613] exists, i.e. the *'aqila* which functions over the total range
● [692] of political action, and the process of adjudication and
compensation in the form of indemnity payment represents an
institutionalized alternative to retaliation. In all cases
of dispute, ritual or religious sanctions back up social
[776] sanctions. God is a third party to all conflict, and this is
[695] made manifest in the reading of the *Fatiha* or the oath-taking
128 ceremony. In order to describe how authority and sanctions
68 operate in Bedouin society, a number of examples are presented
[124] below. Some of the cases are the statements of informants about
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Date: 1947. Case: Quarrel between 'Ailit Dawlat and 'Ailit Zagharat of the 'Aishaibat concerning murder. The quarrel began over the ownership of land. Members of the Dawlat assaulted a member of the Zagharat but he did not die. Then members of the Zagharat killed a member of the Dawlat in revenge for the beating. Many 'awaaqil from the tribe came to judge this case. They told the Dawlat and the Zagharat: "Shame on you, you are of one tribe." The decision of the 'awaaqil was made according to the 'awaiyid Awlad 'Ali. A diiya of 400 L.E. was judged against 'Ailit Zagharat. The diiya was collected from all of the members of the Zagharat, and it was paid over the period of three years. The diiya was divided into two parts: one-half went to the sons of the killed man, and the other half went to the 'aiela.

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Date: 1946. Case: Quarrel between 'Ailit Dawlat and 'Ailit Zagharat concerning murder. The conflict began when a member of the Dawlat argued with the Zagharat about a piece of land. One night when the man from the Dawlat and his father were on their way home some members of the Zagharat ambushed and killed the father. They did not bother the son because he was only a boy. The 'awaaqil settled the case, and the Zagharat paid a 400 L.E. diiya. In 1959, after all those years, the son and his uncle ambushed the man from the Zagharat who had shot the father; they shot him four times. The man did not die but his leg was paralyzed and he lost the sight in one eye. The

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Date: 24 January 1946
Marsa Matruh

1st Party: 'Awaqil of so-called Harun Abd al-Zain of al-Kamailat

2nd Party: 'Awaqil of so-called Hamad Idris of al-'Aishaibat

Both parties, the first and the second, met before the 'awaaqil and witnesses to solve the prevailing problem between them concerning the wounding of so-called Harun Abd al-Zain who claims that this wound is from Hamad Idris. In the presence of the 'awaaqil all agreed that Hamad Idris should swear the oath and be supported by the below named. And the text of the oath which they will say, is: "By the truth (i.e. haqq, which also refers to a divine attribute) of the owner of this shrine, I swear that this bullet which hurt Harun is neither from me nor do I know who shot the bullet at the time of his injury." And a number of sixteen men must support him at the shrine of Sidi Yunis al-Jaraira on the date of Friday, the 29th of Saffar, 1946. And if any does not present himself for the oath, then the wounds which are present in Harun Abd al-Zain will be from the 'Aishaibat tribe. And if all swear this oath, the two parties will be even with each other. After this, none of them will hold anything against the other. This was issued in the presence of all of their 'awaaqil and with their satisfaction without any force or ill-will.

(On the original document is presented a list of the sixteen men from the lineage of Ma'fas of the 'Aishaibat who were chosen by the Kamailat to support Hamad Idris in the Oath.)

All of the seventeen above mentioned (including Hamad Idris) must be present at the shrine of Sidi Yunis al-Jaraira on the day Friday, 29 Saffar, in order to swear the oath, and this is what took place at the hand of witnesses, and God is the best witness.

Signatures or seals of all 'awaaqil who were present.

Day of the Oath:

It is on the day Friday, the last of the blessed month of Saffar, 1946. The 'Ailit Ma'fas of al-'Aishaibat, and with them 'Ailit al-Mahatha of al-Kamailat, came in order to swear the oath at the shrine of Shaikh Yunis al-Jaraira. And they swore this oath and the Kamailat became reconciled

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that they had received their rights in this case. And the two parties are satisfied by this according to the witnesses present.

Signatures or seals of four witnesses.

578 The next case represents the only time in the memory
682 of informants that all of the _'awaaqil_ of the 'Ali Ahmar met
*613 to intervene in a case of conflict. This case is extremely
692 unusual because it may be the only time in Awlad 'Ali history
571 that political mobilization of this scale has taken place. As
619 noted, political action, in war or peace, usually involves
[177] only secondary segments. In view of this, the case probably
[648] reflects an instance of social change: the Egyptian government, anxious to maintain good relations with Libya, encouraged and facilitated the settlement of this dispute by furnishing transportation and cutting administrative red tape so that the _'awaaqil_ of the 'Ali Ahmar could handle this case in a
[182] most expeditious way. Here is a case where Bedouin traditional political structures function adequately in the modern situation. Note here also that, in certain circumstances, the _diiya_ payment can be divided symbolically and specifically to place guilt and to indicate the seriousness of a crime.

619 _Date: 1963_. Case: Quarrel between the tribe of 'Ali Ahmar
682 (Egypt) and the Harabi (Libya) concerning murder. A young
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*613 boy of 'Ailit X was visiting his sister in Libya. He learned
[685]

423 long time ago. This seems to be supported by the evidence
*613 shown below, for often conflict over land and water rights is
182 represented by litigation between individuals and not groups.
[691]

422 I have arbitrarily assigned to the classification of
562 property rights the rights over women. I have done this
*613 because a man acquires such rights as a member of a lineage
jural group and secures them with the backing of public opinion and the _'awaiyid_. Also, though a man in al-Qasr does not "own" his wife, he does have the legal rights to certain things related to her: he has the right to her sexual favors, and the right to claim her offspring for his own lineage.

685 Settlement in cases dealing with the infringement of
695 property rights, if they do not lead to personal injury cases, will usually be concluded by arbitration or oath-taking, either of which brings the two parties into agreement.

691 Date: 1964. Case: Quarrel between Bait 'Umran and Bait Idris
685 of 'Ailit Ma'fas over the ownership of a well. The _'awaaqil_
*613 sent for the two parties involved, and they met on Wednesday,
578 market day. And the _'awaaqil_ told the two parties: "This is
•692 a shame (_'aib_), you must be friends because you are from the
same tribe." The _'awaaqil_ knew "from past history and from
truthful elders" that the well belonged to 'Ait Idris. The
'awaaqil made 'Ait 'Umran change their minds about their claim
[695] to the well. Before the litigation 'Ait 'Umran had insisted

691 that 'Ait Idris take the oath as proof that the well was
685 owned by them. Upon the decision of the *'awaaqil*, however,
*613 'Ait 'Umran refused to allow 'Ait Idris to swear the oath
•692 "because we are all one family." This means, as one *'aqila*
695 actually stated at the conclusion of the case, that " 'Ait Idris is indebted to 'Ait 'Umran."

423 The following two cases which occur in the external
675 system of political relations, one within the 'Aishaibat
*613 territory and the other dealing with land rights in the territory between two primary authority groups, indicate the formal aspect of Bedouin adjudication in establishing contracts.

[539] *Date: 12 August 1963.* *A Contract of Agreement on Land Rights.*

> Agreement and satisfaction took place between Hussain Karim al-Dawlah of al-'Aishaibat and Khalid Idris al-Ma'fas of al-'Aishaibat, the first and second party. And the reason for this agreement is that each of the two parties own cultivable land at Ras Wadi Madwar. The two parties wish to make a dividing line between this linear piece of land and to declare the borders. The two parties agreed on the following: first, the beginning of the border extends from the eastern side at south Ras Raqabit al-Shumar to the western side at Hatiyid and is shown by stone markers; secondly, this line should be established from the east to the west, and this is a dividing line between the two parties and was executed by them and with their satisfaction; thirdly, whoever rejects or modifies this line will be responsible in front of law and the *'awaiyid Awlad 'Ali*; each party is responsible for his children and relatives as to their actions regarding this line which is the subject of the agreement; fifthly, this contract of agreement which defines the borders between the two parties was issued in two copies, a copy to each party to use when it is needed.
>
> Signatures or seals of seven men.

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578 said: "I did not take anything." The 'awaaqil of both parties
685 met and told the accused: "If you have anything give it to
*613 us; if you do not have anything then swear the oath to this
695 [571] fact." Members of 'Ailit Ma'fas said that the boy was innocent
[692] and told the 'awaaqil that the boy should have his rights
according to the 'awaiyid (i.e. he should be allowed to swear
the oath to establish his innocence). The boy accused of the
theft, his father, and two other members of 'Ailit Ma'fas
selected by the accusers swore the oath and the problem was
619 over. Two months later, the accuser from the Kamailat lost
578 his eye in an accident, because swearing the oath has con-
685 sequences for both parties. A bad oath will work against the
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784 one who makes it; there will be a curse upon him, his children,
and his money. And the bad effects of an oath will also work
against the one who falsely accuses another making him swear
the oath.

582 The final two cases deal with marriage rights. The
562 first illustrates a number of things which I have touched on
*613 in the previous discussion of marriage: that a man may choose
792 to ignore the jural structures of the lineage group where the
desires of his offspring are concerned; that the female is
not the totally subjugated person which one might expect to
find in the strongly patrilineal Bedouin society; and that the
role of "holy man" functions in the marital area of authority
relations.

*613 he was insistent upon his right to have her. She went to
619 see the "holy man," al-Sanusi, who lives near al-Qasr. (Al-
578 582 Sanusi is a descendent of "the Great Sanusi," the founder of
793 al-Sanusiyya, who now lives in Egypt after having been exiled
from Libya.) Al-Sanusi decided to keep the girl at his farm
*613 until he could decide a course of action. One night, the
619 girl's cousin secretly came to the Sanusi farm and found her
578 582 room. The girl was sleeping. The cousin struck a match, the
793 girl awoke and was frightened. She jumped from her bed and
683 began to run, in so doing she fell down a flight of stairs
and suffered a rupture. This was a serious offense which the
cousin had committed, and al-Sanusi decided that he should call
all of the _'awaaqil_ of the area to inform them of this. In the
meantime, he sent the girl back to her home and the cousin
continued to bother her concerning his rights over her.

[584] The cousin went so far as to "offer the blood-sacrifice for
her," a stage in the marriage process which signifies that the
union has been consented to by both families. The girl's
father was dead, and her brothers and uncles were unable to
keep the cousin away from the girl. (It may be assumed that
they were conscious of his rights to _bint 'amm_.) They had
even beaten him once. All of the _'awaaqil_ of 'Ali Ahmar and
● [692] 'Ali Abyad, and the Marabtiin in the al-Qasr area came to meet
with al-Sanusi at his farm. He (al-Sanusi) said that they all

*613 must come because he, himself, was a Libyan and a member of
619 no tribe in Egypt. Al-Sanusi's petition was two-fold: he
578 said the cousin should be punished for violating his right of
582 privacy and property, and the question concerning the cousin's
793 right to the girl should be settled. The *'awaaqil* decided
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●692 that al-Sanusi should be awarded a *kubaara* of 1000 L.E. from
the tribes of the area, and that the girl should be permitted
to marry no man of the Qinaishat tribe. Al-Sanusi refused to
accept the *kubaara*, and this was the correct thing to do since
the *kubaara*, especially a large one, is only offered ritualistically. The *'awaaqil* took note of the cousin's rights to his
bint 'amm: they said that since the girl refused to marry him
it would not be right if she married anyone else from the tribe.
*613 Furthermore, the *'awaaqil*, on the basis of the cousin's behavior
619 in this matter, decided that the cousin was insane and should
734 be committed to an asylum. They informed the police in Marsa
[648] Matruh of this diagnosis and decision, and the police came and
transported the boy to the mental hospital in Cairo where he
is today. The uncles of the boy signed the papers which committed him.

of any permanent office; it is any person who is exercising the legiti- 121
mate use of force. Simple as the above argument might seem, it really 114
offers very little in refining our conception of legal sanctions. For we 671
are still left with the question of how a person acquires the right to 681
exercise the physical force. What gives his action the legitimacy that 625
is otherwise lacking in other forms of coercion? In trying to deal with 121
this problem anthropologists resorted to a concept that is used by the 114
analytical jurists, that is, the court. There is a basic difference, how- 671
ever, between the anthropologists' view of the court and that of the ana- 692
lytical jurists. The latter see the court as the ultimate source of law:
court creates the law. Anthropologists, on the other hand, tend to use the
court as the source of law but as a criterion of its existence. An example
of such views is Max Radin who maintained that the infallible test "for
recognizing whether an imagined course of conduct is lawful or unlawful...
is to submit the question to the judgment of a court" (1938:1145).

Anthropologists differed among themselves, however, on what constitutes 121
a court. While Radcliffe-Brown (1940) insists that it must be a body of 114
people acting on behalf of the community as a whole and therefore does not 671
exist in all societies, Hoebel (1961), on the other hand, extends the con- 692
cept to include the diffused public opinion or sentiment of the people in 626
a given society as a kind of court that gives legitimation to the use of 625
force by individuals or groups in the absence of a recognized body acting
on behalf of the community. He sees a court in cases of self-help where
the aggrieved party or his kinsmen carry on the procedures of redress
without the intervention of a third party. He maintained that if the pro-
cedures are right, there will be "at least the compulsion of recognized
'legal' procedure, though the ultimate court may be the 'bar of public
opinion'" (1961:25).

The concept of the court has been prominent in the writings of sev- 121
eral other anthropologists besides Radcliffe-Brown and Hoebel. Bohannan 114
(1957, 1964, 1965), Redfield (1964) and Pospisil (1958) all imply the 671
existence of a court of some kind or another as the identifying mark of 692
the existence of legal rules. In his attempt to distinguish between law
and custom, Gluckman thought of law to exist "as a series of acceptable
judgments of rightdoing and wrongdoing in particular cases" (1955:262).
Custom and other social observances function as corpus juris and as such
a basis for the judgment of where the behavior of one of the litigants in
a case is reasonable or unreasonable, lawful or unlawful. As such, custom
is a source of law, but not law itself. It becomes law when drawn upon in
passing judgment in a given case. In commenting on a passage on the Nuer 121
by Evans-Pritchard, Gluckman made it clear what he meant by the court. 114
"This passage shows that even in a society where 'self-help' is the en- 671
forcing sanction, people judge situations of dispute in terms of rights 626
and duties, and wrongs....Therefore, it seems fair to say that among the 692
Nuer, though they have no courts, there is a process of judgment by media- 171
tors and ordinary people in which custom and morality as part of the corpus
juris constitute 'sources of law' for particular decisions" (1955a:263).

The importance of the above passage from Gluckman is his distinction 121
between the concept of the court and the judicial process, a distinction 114
lacking in the writing of most other anthropologists dealing with the 671
study of law. Failure to distinguish the two aspects of the legal system
resulted in confusing a basic societal process with one of the mechanisms
through which the goals of that process achieved in certain societies.
In its broadest sense, the judicial process refers to the ways disputes [692]
are settled within society. Since didsputes arise out of the very nature [626]
of social interaction, some form of dispute settlement is found in all [627]
societies.

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The form which the process of dispute settlement takes differs from one society to another. In certain societies disputes are settled through a process of informal mediation undertaken by go-betweens; in others it is by means of self-help; still in others, it is by way of court. In societies with courts the process of dispute settlements is undertaken by judges who "take and assess the evidence, examine what they regard as the facts, and come to a decision in favor of one party rather than another" (Gluckman 1965:183).

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Within a given society, disputes are settled in accordance with a set of principles that reflect the basic goals and values of that society. As long as the settlement of a particular dispute proceeds according to these principles, the settlement is supported by the public opinion of that society. This is true whether the process is carried on b y means of informal mediations or through a court system. It is this public opinion as the expression of the basic societal values and not the court as a special mechanism that gives legitimation to the judicial decisions. [114] To equate opinion with the court as Hoebel (1961) did, or to look at the court as the ultimate source of legitimation as did Radcliffe-Brown (1940) and others (Redfield 1964, Bohannan 1965), is to create an unnecessary confusion which tends to undermine meaningful cross-cultural comparisons. 121 127 671 114 Whatever the differences among anthropologists with regard to the definition of the court, their main interest in the concept so far has been as a tool for the definition of law. The interest in the concept gave rise to a methodological approach which came to characterize the literature in legal anthropology, namely, the case-study approach, cases having been utilized in a number of ways by legal anthropologists. In their book on the Cheyenne, Llewellyn and Hoebel (1941) introduced the analysis of "the trouble case." This was followed by a number of studies utilizing the case study method either to

document statements concerning the substantive law of the society studied, 121
or to abstract and elucidate that law. An example of the first technique 127
is Howell's analysis of the Nuer court decisions (1954) where he collected 671
a large number of court cases, cla-sified them and abstracted the substan- 114
tive aspect of the native law. Gluckman's study of the Lozi (1955) repre-
sents the second technique. Smith and Roberts used the same method of
case analysis to abstract certain principles of the Zuni law (1954), and
Nader utilized it in her study of the Zapotecan law (1964). The list of
those who utilized the case-study approach is quite extensive, and the
range of the societies they studied is quite varied. But most of them
share the interest in the substantive rather than in the procedural aspect
of the law.

When referring to the procedural aspect of the law one should keep 121
in mind the difference between the technical and the abstract components 671
of procedural law. The first refers to the activities and steps involved [627]
in the settlement of disputes in the society as well as the person or body [692]
undertaking the responsibility of such settlement. The second involves a 121
number of abstract principles reflecting the values of the society with re- 181
gard to the goals of the judicial process, and which the judicial persons 671
use as a guide in achieving a settlement or in passing a judgment of one 114
kind or another. These are the bases of judicial reasoning. Although
judicial reasoning represents one of the most interesting and important
aspects of the judicial process, it attracted very little attention among
legal anthropologists. With the exception of Gluckman and his analysis
of the concept of "reasonable man" among the Lozi (1955a), no significant
work has been done in this area. In dealing with the concept of the reason-
able man, Gluckman was more interested in discovering universals in laws
than in the process of judicial reasoning as such. He implied that an

657 full-time employment with the government projects in the area and
[178] [464] settle in fairly permanent houses near the place of work.

657 With the movement toward settling down, the relative legal and
701 political autonomy which Awlad Ali once enjoyed is breaking down. This
642 was reflected first in the loss of military exemption. In 1947, the
draft law was applied to all tribal populations in Egypt, including
Awlad Ali. The application is not seriously enforced, however, due
to the fact that births are still not recorded in the area. In 1954,
657 the "omda" or mayorship system practiced in the rural areas of Egypt
634 was extended to the Western Desert with certain modifications to fit
177 the tribal organization of populations in the area. This put a strain
on the native system of leadership, a point which will be covered in
657 later chapters. Finally, and along with the extension of the omda system,
692 the jurisdiction of the legal system of the state was extended
177 over the area. This resulted in a duality in the judicial process.
178 The tribal law, with its traditional tribal mediators, is still functioning
side by side with the modern court system of the state law. In
many cases, especially in criminal cases, the individual is tried under
both systems, and sometimes receives two different judgments for the
same offense. Various efforts are being made to minimize the effects
of this duality. In civil cases, the problem does not seem serious,
since it is the parties themselves, or one of them, who voluntarily
bring the case to the attention of the legal authorities. Therefore,
they can choose between the traditional legal system and the modern courts
of law. So far, civil cases are brought to the modern court system only
when the native procedures fail to achieve a settlement. As such, the

657 692 177 178 modern court system may be viewed as a form of appeal to the tribal justice. One has to be careful, however, in calling such a procedure an appeal, since the tribal proceedings have no relevance in the court proceedings.

69 681 177 The duality is more serious in criminal cases. When an act is defined as illegal by both the tribal and modern law, persons committing it come automatically under the jurisdiction of both laws. As long as such acts remain unknown to the police, the duality of procedures is not undertaken. This is possible in minor cases of assault or theft or adultery. But in major cases, such as homocide or serious assault resulting in the serious injury of a tribal member, it is difficult to keep the news a secret from the authorities. The funeral proceedings in the former cases and the medical attention needed in the latter cases [627] [521] are hard to conceal. Besides, serious cases start a whole series of mediations and go-betweens which always become the general knowledge in the entire area and the subject of conversation among the people. When the authorities know about such cases, they have to take immediate action to bring the offender to trial, even when the government authorities know that the tribal proceedings are being conducted in the case. Some attempts are made by both the tribal law and the modern law to minimize the effect of that duality. It is common that when the district attorney knows that a certain criminal case has been successfully solved according to the tribal proceedings, to ask for the minimum penalty for the offense. On the side of the tribal proceedings, once the case has been solved, the witnesses needed to testify for the prosecutor are instructed by their fellow tribesmen to refrain from giving the information

CHAPTER VI

HOMICIDE AND BODILY INJURIES

Part 1: Homicide

579 Fighting is quite common among Awlad Ali. Many of these fights
involve a large number of individuals and result in many casualties
579 and sometimes even deaths. Fighting is considered "shar," or evil,
673 for according to Awlad Ali, it threatens the social cohesion which is
182 highly valued in the area. Yet, although undesirable, fighting and
[682] even homicide are not considered a crime against society and sometimes
are viewed as necessary to safeguard individual and collective rights
in the absence of an established authority which could protect these
[177] rights. Although this absence of an authority is remedied now by the
[692] introduction of state administrative justice, this has not yet achieved
enough efficiency and recognition to replace the old tribal system.

619 In the tribal system, there is no concept of individual punishment
681 inflicted upon the suspect. There is no recognized authority to inflict
692 it. The mardi or the 'aqila who performs the function of dispute settle-
[627] ment in the case of homicide has no power to pass or inflict any punish-
ment. His role is restricted to mediation between the two parties involved
682 as was earlier mentioned. Homicide, like all other wrongs among Awlad Ali,
673 are private wrongs affecting the individual or a group of individuals.
[182] The main purpose of the tribal proceedings in the case of homicide is to
restore some form of harmony and order among the group. This harmony is
sometimes restored by killing the murderer or any member of his vengeance
682 group, or amar. Feuds may result from such killing, and a few instances
628 of feuds have, in fact, been recorded in the area (although not in the

682 agreed that the sticks were not by nature lethal weapons. The
672 latter, according to the tribal law, are only guns and knives,
627 since they give the victims no chance to defend himself. They
ruled the case unintentional killing for which only L.E. 300
should be paid.

682 Since Yadem and his brother were arrested by the police for
625 their crime, the payment of the bloodmoney was postponed until
692 the case was settled according to the state legal system. Only
half of the bloodmoney was paid and the rest was postponed until
the case was decided upon by the legal system and Yadem released.
682 This is obviously a case in which the nature of the killing was
672 decided upon by drawing upon the material aspect of criminal
673 causation. The nature of the weapon used was the major determinant
[411] of the crime. Only guns and knives are defined as lethal; all
others are non-lethal by nature, although they might cause the
death of the victim. Death caused by a non-lethal weapon is considered as unintentional regardless of whether or not the actor intended the results, while death by a lethal weapon, even without the intention of killing, is classified as intentional killing, as appears in the following case.

CASE #4: The Case of the Threatened Tribesman

613 For more than five years Bait El-Mawi from the Sheibat tribe
628 had been in a continuous state of feud with Bait El-Asi from the
Gemeiat tribe. One night, during a Khamasein sand storm when visability was extremely low, Abd-el-Galil from Bait El-Mawi heard a noise outside his tent, and the dogs were barking indicating that a stranger was there. Being sure that someone was approaching

105 The judicial process among Awlad Ali of the Western Desert of
Egypt has been dealt with in the context of political organization of
105 the group. The main feature of the political organization of Awlad Ali
613 is the absence of centralized leadership. The only formally recognized
leadership is that of the aqila, the leader of the bait tribal segment.
105 The sources of the aqila's authority derive from a number of sources,
613 one of which is his judicial role. It is through him that disputes involving
627 members of his bait are solved. The process by which he performs
this crucial function is that of informal mediation in which both
the personal qualities of the aqila, as well as the weight of his tribal
[692] segment, play an important role. This is especially important in a society
with no court system or formal hearing and where durability of any
settlement depends on its being accepted by the parties involved.

105 The main aim of the judicial process is to affect reconciliation of
182 the parties and to restore a certain degree of social order and cohesion
627 that was disrupted by the dispute. The need to restore the social order
[619] and to maintain friendly relations between tribal members is a response
to certain aspects of the natural and social environment in which the
105 group finds itself. Natural resources in the area are very meager, and
182 subsistence activities require that the tribesmen constantly move with
619 233 their herds for pasture throughout an area already divided among the
various tribal segments. Since the place and nature of pasture differ
from one year to the next, the identity of the specific tribal unit which
would be sought for help varies correspondingly. This creates a general
feeling of dependency that characterizes the social relations in the area.

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Article 9:

The Amar should never fight on the side of the wrongdoer, because if it does, it will have to pay with him for his wrongdoings.

Article 10:

[628] Any dispute or fight involving a member of the Amar and an outsider should be reported to the awaqil in the Amar who are supposed to take the matter up with the other party. If the awaqil are convinced that the outsider is the aggressor or that he is at fault, they should try to make him accede to the demands of the members of the Amar, using all their efforts to convince him and the aqila of his bait. If he refuses, they [619] should call him for a "Miad" (tribal meeting) in which all parties involved should be represented by their respective awaqil.

Article 11:

[563] [619] With regard to "iktitab" (tribal adoption), an outsider wanting to join the Aggary Family or one of its constiuent buite must be asked first about the reason or reasons for his desire to join. This must be done in order to know what kind of person he is and whether he will become a burden and liability to the Amar. If he proves to be of reputable standing, the aqila of the bait he wants to join can accept him without consultation with the rest of the awaqil. If on the other hand he is found to have grudges against someone or if someone has a financial claim over him, then the aqila of the bait cannot accept him without consultation with the other awaqil in the Amar. If all the awaqil agree to accept him, he is considered like one of the Eilat Aggary, having the same rights and bearing the same responsibilities.

Article 12:

A memberof the Amar who wants to separate himself from the Amar and get a "barawa" has to state his reasons beforehe can be released from the obligations of his membership in the amar. If his request to get the barawa was because of injustice he suffered by the Amar or any of its members, the awaqil have the duty to straighten the injustice and restore his rights. If, on the other hand, his request for the barawa was to avoid paying the Amar, then he cannot be released from his membership unless he pays all of his share, or else he must return all that the Amar has paid him until the time he asked for the barawa.

Article 13:

[695] [693] If one of the Amar is accused of an offense for which he is tried by the legal system of the state, the Amar as a whole share the expenses of hiring an attorney to defend him. This, however, is done after the awaqil are sure (by means of administering the oath) that he is innocent and that the accusation is false.

613 671 first appeared, the rule has become a practice so common that other Amars
675 682 find it unnecessary to specify it in their own papers.

Another new rule which is in the process of acquiring a great amount
613 672 of consensus among the tribal population of Awlad Ali is that of the re-
675 sponsibility of the Amar for the payment of the lawyer's fees for members
● [693] of the Amar who are tried by the government (Article 13 of the Aggary
[695] papers). Another less agreed upon rule is that of the responsibility of
613 the Amar for the financial losses caused by the confiscation of smuggled
672 675 goods or the payment of money for the destruction of government property
439 by a member of the Amar. Where smuggling is an important source of in-
[434] come for the group, Amar papers usually include rules making it a corporate responsibility; other Amar papers, especially those of tribal segments not deeply involved in smuggling, make it an individual responsibility, while still others leave it intentionally with no specific rule, as in the case of the Aggary Amar paper.

613 The Aggary document is a relatively elaborate one. Not all Amar
[675] papers, or at least the ones I had a chance to examine, are as detailed.
[131] Eilat Aggary is the largest Amar in the area of Dera'el Bahari, which
extends from Alexandria 60 miles westward to the town of Alamein. The
613 distinctive characteristics of the Aggary Eila is that it is composed
563 mainly of peasant groups who joined the Aggary by means of tribal adop-
619 tion. Of the 16 Baits constituting the Aggary Amar, only three are believed to be Awlad Ali proper. The attractiveness of the Aggary for the peasant groups seeking to be adopted by the tribal population of the area may be partly explained in terms of the location of Eilat Aggary in an area relatively close to the Delta from where these groups usually migrate.

had been. Besides, Ibrahim was an old man when it 683
happened, and he would have to have died before very 682
long in any case. Moreover, the sheikhs in their heart of 672
hearts considerably admired the acumen displayed by Ali
in getting hold of that document. So they decided privately 695
among themselves that on the whole half the full bloodmoney, or £150, would meet the case. On no account, however, could they give in open court the above reasons for lessening the sum to be paid. They proceeded to listen patiently to more evidence, and eventually gave their considered judgment as follows:

"Defendant Ali is required to pay the full bloodmoney of £300. *But* in view of the fact that, when the police came to Ali's tent to arrest him seven years ago, in the excitement and commotion caused by the police patrol, Ali's wife gave birth to a premature boy child, and that this boy subsequently died, therefore the sum of £100 will be deducted from the total to be paid, for the sake of the dead baby. Also, as it cannot be proved conclusively that Ibrahim died simply and solely as the result of the stone thrown at his leg, and as it may be conceivably possible that other external causes contributed to his death, for this reason, therefore, another sum of £50 will be deducted. Hence the amount to be paid is £150, of which £50 must be paid after this coming barley harvest, with a similar sum after the two following harvests."

Amateur lawyers are not popular, and more often than 682
not darken counsel without understanding.

An Arab called Salem had some land, and he employed 672
two men of the Hawita tribe as shepherds and harvesters. [693]
One of these men was from the Nefoofa family of the Hawita, and the other was from a family called the Magai. These two shepherds worked peacefully together, and their respective families were friendly, until one day an Arab of the Gottaan tribe called Yadam Saadi drove his flocks and his animals on to Salem's land, and began to pitch his tents. These two shepherds saw this going on from afar, and

682 came up to drive him and his animals away. Yadam re-
672 fused to move, and threatened violence if they attempted
to eject him forcibly. So the two shepherds, who were responsible to their employer for the land, went for him simultaneously—the Nefoofa shepherd with a thick stick, which he brought down with all his force on Yadam's head, and the Magai with a large stone, which he hurled as hard as he could, and which caught Yadam in the chest over the heart. Yadam received both these blows simultaneously, collapsed on to the ground in a crumpled heap, and died soon afterwards.

682 Yadam's family then brought an action against the
672 Nefoofa and Magai families conjointly, claiming blood-
693 money. The Nefoofa produced an amateur barrister of
695 their own family called Abd el Gelil, who proved (entirely
to his own satisfaction) that many minor assaults were continually taking place, when people were hit on the head without death following immediately as the result of the blow. He therefore contended that it must have been the blow from the stone thrown by the Magai which had really killed him. The Magai adopted a similar line of argument, and the case remained at a standstill for nearly two years.

Eventually the court effected a compromise, and awarded the bloodmoney, to be paid equally by the Nefoofa and the Magai in three yearly instalments of £50 each. The Magai paid up their £50, and the Nefoofa barrister—a particularly bumptious individual from the Nile Valley—lodged a protest against the decision, claiming that the court was not properly constituted and was not competent, that the sheikhs were biassed, and a hundred and one reasons why the Nefoofa should not contribute their share.

He was eventually made to understand that the Nefoofa would have to pay, and that if there were any more trouble from him, his own property would be seized as part-payment. Accordingly Abd el Gelil travelled round the Nefoofa encampments, ostensibly to collect sums due from

the different families. A year later the Gottaan brought 682
up the case again, acknowledging the receipt of £50 from 672
the Magai, but protesting that they had still not received 693
anything from the Nefoofa. On an enquiry being held,
a representative collection of infuriated members of the 695
Nefoofa family came to court, protesting that Abd el Gelil had already collected their payments, and that if he had not handed over the money, their responsibility at any rate had ended for the moment.

It subsequently transpired, when Abd el Gelil was with
difficulty got hold of and brought to court, that he had
collected about £50, but claimed this sum as his own
personal travelling expenses for collection. Then followed [685]
another lawsuit, in which the Nefoofa family sued their
self-appointed lawyer for mis-appropriation of tribal funds. The details of this new case, and those of the original suit, were then re-capitulated and muddled up together, to the complete bewilderment of the writer and the entire satisfaction of the Bedouin assessors.

Mention has been made of the extra £100 (£400 instead 682
of £300) usually paid among the Gawabees tribe as the
price of a life. It seems, however, as though there are 672
exceptions to this rule; and the following case seems to shew [435]
that the payment of "Sanaa" depends on a variety of circumstances.

A family called Sirdani had had a bloodfeud with another 682
family of the Gawabees called Sayed, one of the former 628
having killed one of the latter some fifty years ago. The
two families had been living in totally different districts, 672
and for years had not come into contact with each other, and so the feud had been allowed to continue.

In the spring of 1921 a man of the first family, about forty-five years old, called Mirtah el Sirdani, left the Wadi Natrun for the Nile Valley to buy some sheep from the Fellaheen, taking with him his old mother and a small boy, to help him bring them back across the desert to the luscious grazing in the wadi swamps. He arrived at the

lowered very slowly and carefully by the crowd at the top. 671
Here again it is difficult to ascertain exactly what happened, 672
as the evidence was again contradictory. Apparently, when 682
Ahmed reached the ledge at half-way, he fumbled about in the dim light for the foot holes; and just at this psychological moment the rope broke.

The ten men holding the rope at the top collapsed one on the top of another; but when they had recovered their presence of mind, they shouted down to Ahmed, to ask if he were all right. A faint voice from the bowels of the earth replied that he had fallen heavily on a stone and had had a nasty knock, but that he would be all right in a few minutes.

They then produced a spare rope for another man to go down and get Ahmed up; but they discovered that the only one they had to hand was too short by several feet. A man was sent post-haste on a pony to get another rope from the encampment a mile or so away, and when he returned after a quarter of an hour, volunteers were quickly forthcoming to go down and retrieve Ahmed. On reaching the bottom they found that the unfortunate man, either stunned by the fall or overcome by foul air, had collapsed flat on the bottom of the well, and had been drowned in six inches of water. They hauled his body up to the surface, and Ali, terrified that he might be held in some way responsible, counselled all present to bury the dead man then and there, and to say nothing about it. However, [123]
news quickly spreads; and the same day an informer came to the police post and reported the matter, and Ali was arrested and subsequently sentenced to three months' imprisonment with labour by the present writer, for failure to notify a death under unusual circumstances. (Incidentally this did not constitute an offence under Bedouin [177]
Law, but was a contravention of the Police Code and was punished as such. Hence the apparent interference in a purely Bedouin concern.)

While Ali was still serving his sentence, Ahmed's rela- [694]

671 tives lost no time in taking legal proceedings at the Ourfi
672 court to claim bloodmoney from the owner of the cistern;
682 and on Ali's release from prison a very long and excessively
694 tedious lawsuit began.

The principle that a life had been lost and must be paid for was accepted without question by the court from the outset, in spite of the police enquiry, which is the local equivalent of a coroner's inquest. The enquiry had established beyond any shadow of doubt that death had been caused by misadventure, and that Ali was absolutely innocent, not only of any intent to kill, but also of any negligence whatsoever. Any other coroner's jury in the world would have returned a verdict of accidental death, expressed sympathy with the relatives, and absolved all concerned from blame; and there the matter would have ended.

671 Ali, who had already undergone three months in durance
672 vile—which, to a wandering child of the desert, must be particularly galling—so far forgot any tribal instruction he
682 might have had as to repudiate vigorously any responsibility either for the accident or for the restitution of the death in the form of bloodmoney. His family also, who would naturally have to share the payment, did their best to confound the issue by lodging a counter claim. They protested that the actual rope that broke was not theirs, but belonged to a third party, and that neighbouring tribes, who had approved of the project and who stood to benefit by the cistern when it was cleaned out, were conjointly responsible with themselves for any payment due.

The case dragged on unsatisfactorily for some months; the neighbouring tribes swore that no agreement existed whereby they should benefit by the cistern when completed; the question of the ownership of the rope was dropped; and eventually Ali and his family were ordered to pay a reduced scale of bloodmoney to the family of the deceased.

683 Sometimes these bloodmoney cases, so far from being
672 dramatic or nauseating, are actually rather amusing.

672

The plaintiff was an Arab called Salem Ibrahim, who 683
brought an action against a man of another family of his [694]
tribe called Ali. The plaint was as follows. Seven years
ago Salem's father Ibrahim, a man then about sixty years
old, was sitting on a wall near a patch of cultivation be-
longing to Ali, and watching Ali working on his land.
Some dispute arose between them; and, angered at some-
thing that Ibrahim had said, Ali picked up a large stone
and flung it at Ibrahim. The impact broke the old man's 683
leg; the case was reported to the police; Ali was arrested 682
and imprisoned; and Ibrahim was taken to hospital, where
he shortly afterwards died. Ali was thus left in prison, 672
and the case could not be proceeded with from the Ourfi
standpoint until he came out. On his release, therefore, 683
the case was to be brought up for settlement, and the
plaintiff to claim bloodmoney for his father's death. 682

Meanwhile, however, plaintiff related how his own 694
family had wanted to get the case cleared up and how Ali's 672
family had also approached them with the idea of extracting Ali from the clutches of the police, so that the case could be tried by an Ourfi court, and a judgment which would be intelligible and acceptable to both parties could be given by their own sheikhs.

Accordingly they agreed together that the plaintiff's family should go to the police, declare that the whole case was a mistake from beginning to end, and that the old man Ibrahim had fallen off the wall, and that nobody had thrown a stone at him. A document to this effect was drawn up, signed and sealed by the notables of Ibrahim's family, and solemnly presented to the police. The evidence seemed so genuine that Ali was released from prison, with implied apologies for wrongful arrest. On his release from prison Ali saw his opportunity, and by some means obtained possession of this document signed by Ibrahim's family.

When the case first came up for trial by Ourfi court, Ali denied throwing the stone, repudiated all responsibility

683 in the case, and produced this document signed by Ibrahim's
682 family to the effect that Ibrahim *fell* off the wall and broke
his leg. How then could he possibly be implicated in the
•694 case?

The assessors of the court went carefully into all the
683 evidence and eventually agreed that the matter should be
682 decided by the oath. They demanded that Ali, backed by
672 twenty-five men of his own tribe, chosen by Ibrahim's
family as men of their word, should swear on the tomb
695 of Sidi Shar el Ruh the following oath: "By Allah the Great and by the Truth of this Holy Sheikh, I swear that I neither threw a stone at Ibrahim, nor broke his leg." They further decreed that if Ali himself, or any one of the twenty-five men chosen to back him in his oath, failed or refused to swear as required, the case for the defence would be null and void, and that bloodmoney would be required in full from Ali's family.

On the date appointed two or three sheikhs of the court were detailed to go to the tomb, to meet the defendant with his twenty-five backers, and to supervise the taking of the oath. The parties duly arrived; but when the oath was just about to be taken, three men of Ali's backers refused to swear, declaring that on the contrary they were ready to swear, if required, that Ali *had* thrown the stone, and was responsible for Ibrahim's death. The case for the defence thus fell to the ground, and the parties were warned to appear at a future date, when the case would be completed. At the next meeting of the court, Ali's liability to pay bloodmoney was accepted in principle, but there were divergencies of opinion as to the amount to be paid. Then followed a delightful example of casuistry typical of the Bedou mind.

The assessors of the court felt that, in the first instance, Ali had never intended to kill poor old Ibrahim, and that his crime fell very far short of intentional homicide. Also, it had happened seven years before, and, all said and done, time had healed most of whatever ill-feeling there ever

233 wandered over the boundary of Abd el Salam's grazing
685 rights. The juvenile members of Abd el Salam's family
[578] came out from their tents in a body, to drive off their
intruding second cousins with their camels. An altercation ensued, and the excitement grew; and eventually a pitched battle with sticks and stones began among the lads.

683 One of Abd el Kerim's sons, leaving his brother to hold
on for a moment, ran back the half mile to call his father, who returned with him to the scene of the fight carrying his gun. On arrival at the camels, Abd el Salam's sons set on him in a body. Abd el Kerim pointed his gun at one of them and took aim; whereupon one of the other family from behind laid him low with a blow on the top of his head, sufficient to fell an ox.

[114] Abd el Kerim was carried back to his tent, where the
writer witnessed the horrible sight of sympathetic but homicidal relatives pawing his open wound with their filthy fingers. A large hole had been knocked in the side of his head, and portions of brain were visible. After some months of surgical treatment Abd el Kerim came out of
[694] hospital; and, as the blow was reported to have affected his reason, a case was brought on his behalf by some of his relatives, claiming damages from the family of Abd el Salam. However, before the case was fully completed,
[682] Abd el Kerim was taken ill, was re-admitted to hospital, and died. The case therefore became one of bloodmoney, and was dealt with in the usual way.

683 The interesting point about the case, however, lies in
682 the decision of the court, when the first claim for damages
695 was brought up. A very strong line was adopted by the
672 sheikhs, and in the opinion of the court the wounds received by Abd el Kerim were only what he might reasonably expect. They maintained that, after the way in which he had behaved, he was lucky to have got off as lightly as he did. The sheikhs protested that he ought never to have gone out from his tent, and mixed himself up in a fight between a lot of boys. If he had any authority at all, he

682 charge, which hit Towida at a range of only a few feet,
672 with fatal results.

Farag, who had divorced her two months before,
682 brought a claim for bloodmoney from Korayem; but when
672 the case was heard, Korayem denied that the accident had
695 happened in his tent. The assessors of this first court,
which was held soon after the accident, demanded that
Korayem should swear, backed by twenty-five men (i.e.
half the full number of fifty, as Towida was a woman),
that the accident did not take place in his tent. Then
[671 followed an example of one of the very unsatisfactory
points in Bedouin Law.

Korayem, who was a powerful man belonging to the Gereidat, who were in turn a powerful family, managed to persuade the court to cancel their judgment requiring the oath from himself and his twenty-five backers, and to agree to a settlement whereby he should pay £10 and be absolved from the necessity of taking the oath. The court accepted this agreement, and proceeded to examine the claims to the bloodmoney.

The Moslem Law of Divorce provides that when a man
682 divorces his wife, the decree does not become absolute for
672 three months, in order that it may be ascertained whether
695 the woman be pregnant by her lately divorced husband.
Towida had only been divorced two months before the
671 accident; so the question had to be decided whether Farag
586 were legally her husband or not at the time of her death,
for purposes of receiving a share of the bloodmoney. If so,
he should receive one quarter; but there seems to have
been some difference of opinion on this point among the
assessors of the court, and the whole matter was shelved.

682 Seventeen years afterwards, Lataif Farag—then a man
of twenty-one—re-opened the case, claiming his mother's
672 bloodmoney. In support of his claim he produced three
695 witnesses. The first was Farag himself, who was prepared
to swear that he had seen Towida lying dead in the tent of
• 694 Korayem. The second was Towida's brother, who was

prepared to swear that he had been called in; and had seen 682
his sister dying in a pool of blood in Korayem's tent. The 672
third was a stranger who had been passing at the time of
the accident, had heard the shot, had gone into Korayem's 695
tent, and had seen Towida lying on the floor in a dying 694
condition. The newly-constituted court probed this evidence, without actually demanding the oath from these three witnesses, and arrived at the following conclusions:

1. That the facts of the case were common knowledge, and were as Lataif claimed.
2. That Korayem never really intended to swear that the accident did *not* happen in his tent, but had succeeded in bluffing the previous Court. This was made possible by the fact that Korayem's family were strong, and Farag's were weak.
3. That half the price of a man—i.e. £150—should be the bloodmoney in this case, provided that Farag could produce satisfactory evidence on oath that:
   - (*a*) the gun belonged to Korayem,
   - (*b*) the accident took place in Korayem's tent.
4. In the event of these conditions being met, Lataif Farag should receive five-sixths of the £150; and, provided that they swore the above oath backed by four others, Towida's father and mother (if alive) should receive the remaining one-sixth.

Generally speaking, this judgment appeals to an outside observer as eminently sensible and just; and if only the matter had been left at that, and the judgment had been enforced, all would have been well. Unfortunately, however, various influences again crept in to interfere with the decision of this second court. The accident had then happened about eighteen years before; the first court had been bluffed by Korayem; after an interval of seventeen years the second court gave their very reasonable judgment; and then for some reason unexplained the case was again shelved, and the judgment not executed. For the third

682 time the case was re-opened, after a further interval of some
672 years since the second judgment. By this time nearly all
695 the assessors and witnesses of the first Court were dead,
694 rumours had been spread that the gun belonged to a stranger
who had left his gun in Korayem's tent, and should therefore pay his share of the bloodmoney, and so on.

The Gereidat family again succeeded in confusing the case, and in prejudicing the issue in their favour; and the third court gave the following decision, to the disgust of interested followers of this rather remarkable lawsuit. They decided that no evidence existed to shew what happened in Korayem's tent, and that no oath was necessary, maintaining that in the absence of any proof whatsoever Farag had no claim. They further ordered a new distribution of the reduced scale of bloodmoney proposed, whereupon the proceedings became completely involved and absolutely unintelligible.

682 The above events point out unmistakably the weak
672 spots in the Ourfi system. Korayem's family were strong,
and on two occasions were successful in evading just de-
695 cisions against them; while the weak family with a strong
case had to see justice perverted.

695 When the considered judgment of an Ourfi Court
182 receives authority for prompt and immediate execution
from the Government and the police, the Ourfi system is
648 probably the nearest possible approach to the ideal, consistent with the conditions prevailing. But it is an undeniable fact, which must be faced, that without the moral backing of the Civil Power behind the judgments of the Bedouin Courts, miscarriages of justice are possible, and do actually take place.

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Libyan Bedouin MT9

[For the role of the marabouts as arbitrators in the settling of disputes between tribal groups, see Categories 619 and 792.]

*613
554 on paper in triplicate, one copy going to each litigant and
69 a third copy to the chief of police of the Marsa Matruh sector.
[671] In practice, though, a copy usually goes to the litigants, but
[178] not to the chief of police (who had not a single Bedouin court case in his files).

*613 As is not the case in Islamic law, in Bedouin customary
695 law the decision of the judge may be appealed. The system of
692 appeals may even function at the level of familial authority,
[671] i.e., the son may, in theory, appeal a ruling by his own father. The Bedouins insist that this is an important right of every man. In the situation where a man wishes to appeal a decision of his own _'aqila_, he will generally take his claim to another _'aqila_ of his secondary group. When an appeal is to be made, it is done with the permission of the _'aqila_ who rendered the original decision. The one who appeals his case does so with the understanding that the decision returned by the court of appeal will be final and binding. Further, if
[681] the court of appeal concurs with the findings of the original court, the plaintiff pays a double fine (twice the original fine), and also pays his own _'aqila_ an expiation fee (_kubaara_).

69 The Egyptians have preferred to leave the Bedouins of
648 al-Qasr to settle their own disputes except in the more serious
[682] criminal matters. Police from Matruh will enter homicide cases
[685] and those conflicts over property rights which threaten to explode into tribal warfare. But these types of conflict have

554 1952:165), and the role rajal khair along with the other roles
627 concerned with political action, the 'aqila, shaikh, and 'umda,
692 represent political organization in al-Qasr. Although the role of rajal khair is not institutionalized to the same degree that the others are, we shall see in the next chapter that it is an important one for an understanding of power relations in al-Qasr. All of these roles carry with them some type of right to make binding decisions in matters regarding conflict regulation. That is, an individual should take his
*[613] claims to the 'aqila, but may take them to any of the other political specialists. In any of the cases, the litigants concerned become bound by the decision of the third party.
*[613] But only at the hand of the 'aqila can a decision be made
●[695] which will effect a whole group, i.e., only an 'aqila can
[682] give judgment against a corporation for the blood-money in a case of homicide (Schacht 1953:328).

691 If, however, blood-money is not an immediate concern,
692 the litigants may utilize any and all of the political roles
*613 available in the judicial system. A statement from one of my
554 informants, an 'aqila, is useful here.
627

[124]

> The bait is made up of thirty or fourty men, and there is one most important man (rajal kabiir), the 'aqila. The 'aqila puts an end to problems, he sees who deserves this and who deserves that. Problems must be settled. It happened five or six years ago that I and my paternal cousins quarreled over land at Wadi Raml. I went to the police station and complained to the shaikh of the 'Aishaibat. I asked him to choose a person to judge

> 691 between me and my cousins, according to Bedouin law
> 692 (yinafth al-'awaiyid bainaana). I went to the shaikh
> *613 because my cousins did not agree that we go to the
> 554 'aqila right away. We agreed that the shaikh would
> 627 choose the third party, and the judgment would be
> binding on both of us. The shaikh chose Bu Halaiqa as the third party, and Bu Halaiqa chose three others as consultants. (Two of the three were rajal khair, and the other was an 'aqila.) The judgment was that my cousins were in the wrong. They were fined 10 L.E. and a dhabiiha("blood sacrifice"). 'Ali intervened and did not allow my cousins to pay the fine. He had them write a paper stating, that if they resume this quarrel in the future they must pay the fine plus another 10 L.E. fine. (Hajj 'Ali is a rajal khair.)

695 Sometimes the Egyptian police must be brought into a judicial
648 affair to insure the execution of a judgment. In one case,
696 an individual in al-Qasr did not accept the decision of his 'aqila; his 'aqila wrote the decision on paper and sent him to another 'aqila. The second 'aqila agreed with the first, but the man also refused this decision. The second 'aqila wrote his decision on paper and sent it to the shaikh of the 'Aishaibat in Matruh. The shaikh summoned the culprit and sent him to the police station. Finally, the police were able to convince the man to pay his fine, and also his expiation fee to his own 'aqila. My informant said that this was a minor affair, and that had it been a serious offense committed by the man he would have been threatened with expulsion from the corporate group.

*613 As the corporate sole, the 'aqila has political authority
554 which is legitimate and morally binding on all who wish to
571 maintain their status in the group and tribe. Any individual

*613 578 619 681 cases of homicide and one case of wounding) one was at the tribal level; three at the primary level; three at the secondary level; and two at the tertiary level. Of the thirteen cases dealing with property rights over land, water, or women, none took place at the tribal level; four were at the primary level, seven at the secondary level; and one at the tertiary level. One case dealing with marriage rights took place within a tertiary segment and concerned the legitimacy of a man to claim his bint 'amm. Twelve of the twenty-two cases occurred within the 'Aishabat tribe. Of the ten cases of conflict involving units from outside the 'Aishaibat, six cases were between primary units, three cases were between secondary units, and one case involved the 'Ali Ahmar with the Harabi of Libya.

In almost every case involving primary units and tribal units, the two opposing authority groups were actually secondary groups who had the backing of their primary groupings. The case in which the 'Ali Ahmar mobilized to deal with a problem in Libya probably represents an atypical case in history. It is unlikely that tribal groups of this size [648] could mobilize in time of war or peace, and in this particular case the good international relations of Egypt and Libya were at stake.

784 695 681 There is another realm of sanctions which can be invoked in cases concerning homicide, wounding, theft, and

681 property disputes, and I shall briefly discuss this before
• 695 I proceed to describe Bedouin legal processes. Besides the
784 threat of blood-revenge and fines of money, the individual, or group, who violates the moral and legal norms of Bedouin society may be faced with sanctions of a sacred nature. In
695 any case where clear evidence is lacking, one litigant may request that that other party swear the oath (yamiin Allah)
*613 in support of his claim. In all three corporate charters
695 presented earlier in this chapter, those of 'Ailit Ma'fas,
695 'Ailit Lazumi, and 'Ailit Abu Qarasa, support of lineagemates through the oath was a condition of group membership.
[692] Collective responsibility not only applies in the case of secular things, i.e., sharing the blood-money and the exercise of blood-revenge, but also where the possible curse of God is concerned.

695 When one party to conflict requests that the oath be administered as a means of settling a dispute, the other party will always accept because it is assumed that in this way both litigants "will get their rights." The party taking
695 the oath must be supported by a number of his relatives
602 ('umraa al-dam) who are willing to risk the consequences, and
*613 who are chosen by the other party. If a man is unable to muster the required number of kinsmen to take the oath, and the number is always relative to the seriousness of the offense of which he is accused, then this is taken as a sign of his untruthfulness and he loses his claim.

695 602 613 671 untruthfulness and he loses his claim. According to the 'awaiyid, the number of supporters required in a homicide or wounding case is fifty; in a case involving the rightful ownership of land or a well the required number is twenty-five; in a case of conflicting claims over a camel, five relatives must swear in support of the claimant; and in matters concerning smaller animals, such as sheep, the number of supporters will depend upon the number and price of the animals. But, of course, the number of supporters will always be relative to the size of the groups involved, and so the 'awaiyid is not always followed to the letter of the law.

695 (692) The time and place of the oath is fixed by the 'awaaqil adjudicating the given case. It is administered either at the tomb of a "holy man," or at the mosque in Marsa Matruh, and always on a Friday, the Muslim Sabbath. There is a standard text to the oath and this is given in the instructions of the 'awaaqil to the litigants. 695 784 The Bedouins, with few exceptions, believe in the effectiveness of the oath of God. The rationale is that no man is willing to lie and suffer the wrath of God. The curse which results from a "bad oath" usually takes the form of an accident or misfortune to the swearer or a member of his family. The Bedouins believe that divine sanction operates not only against the one who makes a bad oath, but also against the one who bears false witness against another and causes him to take the oath.

• 695 784 124 The following excerpt from my field notes concerning Bedouin law will show the earnestness with which informants upheld the function of the oath as a legal sanction.

> I know that you want to find out whether or not the oath will prove the guilt or innocence of a person. Well, it will. First of all, if a man is known to be a liar, those of his relatives who are supposed to support him will refuse to swear the oath. And, if they do take the oath and know that the person is lying, then definitely something bad will happen to both him and them. I will give you a case which will prove what I say. Years ago, there was a quarrel between an 'aiela of Awlad Kharuf ('Ali Abyad) and 'Ailit Abu Qarasa of the 'Aishaibat over the rightful ownership of a Roman well in the desert. The well originally belonged to our family (i.e. 'Ailit Abu Qarasa). The Abu Qarasa requested that the oath be used to settle the matter, and that twenty-five of the Awlad Kharuf swear that the well belonged to them. They swore the oath and the case was finished: the well went to the Awlad Kharuf. The Abu Qarasa could say nothing more since the oath had been taken. But listen to this: within one month's time of taking the oath, seven of the twenty-five Awlad Kharuf swearers were buried. At the present time, only three of the original swearers are still living. One of these three begot only girls, and when these girls married all of their marriages ended in divorce. Another of the three survivors has a son who lost an eye and an arm in an accident. And the third man, he has not married yet. Some of these men who died were very young at the age of death. You see, if I steal 10 L.E. and swear that I did not, then God will punish me ten-fold. God's punishment may strike my animals, my family, or my money; God will take his vengeance through these three means. You should always remember that the life of one man is worth one-hundred wells.

695 784 *[613] The man who swears the oath places himself and his group in ritual danger. The above description of the oath and its possible consequences show that the Bedouins believe divine punishment can work indirectly. One case-study presented

695 below will show how a "bad oath" can work directly on the
784 false witness.

784 Divine sanctions enter into other aspects of the
626 Bedouin judicial process and function to maintain social
626 control in al-Qasr. If we can speak of a standard, or
681 minimal sanction, in Bedouin law it would be the dhabiiha
and 10 L.E. In any case, however small the offence might
be, the litigant found to be in the wrong will have this
judgment made against him. But in almost every case "the
[788 party who takes his rights" will refuse the dhabiiha and
292] 10 L.E. and insist instead upon a ritual three cups of tea.
An individual refuses the dhabiiha as an act of brotherhood
and thanksgiving that the quarrel has been settled. The
Bedouins point out the practical factor that very few men
in al-Qasr can afford to part with even one lamb. On the
626 other hand, in more serious cases, such as homicide, which
681 occur in the external sphere of political relations and
682 threaten to disintegrate the political community, the parties
264 involved will actually eat a whole meal together. In this
case, the dhabiiha is accepted, for the act of commensality
is deemed necessary for reconciliation.

626 But whether or not conflict is concluded by a simple
182 ritual or a large feast, the prevailing mood is one of
771 gratitude that the secular bonds of brotherhood and a pre-
ordained sacred order have been maintained. The Bedouin

121 external system, however, the law recognizes retaliation, a
681 life for a life. Still, even in this case, Bedouin values
682 expressed through the *'awaiyid* try to avert bloodshed and
[182] feuding by showing "the good path" and providing the means
[671] for settlement through compensation.

Just as the Bedouin accepts the *'awaiyid* as a set of
681
682 of ideals calculated to regulate conflict, he paradoxically
182 claims the right to impose retaliatory sanctions as a just
[671] conclusion to conflict. One Bedouin said that the greatest
[673] sin which a man or group can commit is to accept the *diiya*
and then take his blood-revenge and return the money. Presumably,
a person or group commits no outrage if they refuse
the *diiya* with the understanding that blood-revenge will be
[626] taken. In al-Qasr, retaliation and the *'awaiyid* are mechanisms
[671] of social control and dispute settlement. A political office
* [613] exists, i.e. the *'aqila* which functions over the total range
[692] of political action, and the process of adjudication and
compensation in the form of indemnity payment represents an
institutionalized alternative to retaliation. In all cases
of dispute, ritual or religious sanctions back up social
[776] sanctions. God is a third party to all conflict, and this is
• [695] made manifest in the reading of the *Fatiha* or the oath-taking
128 ceremony. In order to describe how authority and sanctions
681 operate in Bedouin society, a number of examples are presented
[124] below. Some of the cases are the statements of informants about
[114]

Date: 24 January 1946
Marsa Matruh

1st Party: 'Awaqil of so-called Harun Abd al-Zain of al-Kamailat

2nd Party: 'Awaqil of so-called Hamad Idris of al-'Aishaibat

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Both parties, the first and the second, met before the 'awaaqil and witnesses to solve the prevailing problem between them concerning the wounding of so-called Harun Abd al-Zain who claims that this wound is from Hamad Idris. In the presence of the 'awaaqil all agreed that Hamad Idris should swear the oath and be supported by the below named. And the text of the oath which they will say, is: "By the truth (i.e. haqq, which also refers to a divine attribute) of the owner of this shrine, I swear that this bullet which hurt Harun is neither from me nor do I know who shot the bullet at the time of his injury." And a number of sixteen men must support him at the shrine of Sidi Yunis al-Jaraira on the date of Friday, the 29th of Saffar, 1946. And if any does not present himself for the oath, then the wounds which are present in Harun Abd al-Zain will be from the 'Aishaibat tribe. And if all swear this oath, the two parties will be even with each other. After this, none of them will hold anything against the other. This was issued in the presence of all of their 'awaaqil and with their satisfaction without any force or ill-will.

(On the original document is presented a list of the sixteen men from the lineage of Ma'fas of the 'Aishaibat who were chosen by the Kamailat to support Hamad Idris in the Oath.)

All of the seventeen above mentioned (including Hamad Idris) must be present at the shrine of Sidi Yunis al-Jaraira on the day Friday, 29 Saffar, in order to swear the oath, and this is what took place at the hand of witnesses, and God is the best witness.

Signatures or seals of all 'awaaqil who were present.

Day of the Oath:

It is on the day Friday, the last of the blessed month of Saffar, 1946. The 'Ailit Ma'fas of al-'Aishaibat, and with them 'Ailit al-Mahatha of al-Kamailat, came in order to swear the oath at the shrine of Shaikh Yunis al-Jaraira. And they swore this oath and the Kamailat became reconciled

683 578 *613 692 539 •695

that they had received their rights in this case. And the two parties are satisfied by this according to the witnesses present.

Signatures or seals of four witnesses.

578 682 *613 692 571 619 [177] [648] [182]

The next case represents the only time in the memory of informants that all of the 'awaaqil of the 'Ali Ahmar met to intervene in a case of conflict. This case is extremely unusual because it may be the only time in Awlad 'Ali history that political mobilization of this scale has taken place. As noted, political action, in war or peace, usually involves only secondary segments. In view of this, the case probably reflects an instance of social change: the Egyptian government, anxious to maintain good relations with Libya, encouraged and facilitated the settlement of this dispute by furnishing transportation and cutting administrative red tape so that the 'awaaqil of the 'Ali Ahmar could handle this case in a most expeditious way. Here is a case where Bedouin traditional political structures function adequately in the modern situation. Note here also that, in certain circumstances, the diiya payment can be divided symbolically and specifically to place guilt and to indicate the seriousness of a crime.

619 682 578 *613 [685]

Date: 1963. Case: Quarrel between the tribe of 'Ali Ahmar (Egypt) and the Harabi (Libya) concerning murder. A young boy of 'Ailit X was visiting his sister in Libya. He learned

423 long time ago. This seems to be supported by the evidence
*613 shown below, for often conflict over land and water rights is
182
[691] represented by litigation between individuals and not groups.

422 I have arbitrarily assigned to the classification of
562 property rights the rights over women. I have done this
*613 because a man acquires such rights as a member of a lineage
jural group and secures them with the backing of public opinion and the 'awaiyid. Also, though a man in al-Qasr does not "own" his wife, he does have the legal rights to certain things related to her: he has the right to her sexual favors, and the right to claim her offspring for his own lineage.

685 Settlement in cases dealing with the infringement of
•695 property rights, if they do not lead to personal injury cases,
will usually be concluded by arbitration or oath-taking, either of which brings the two parties into agreement.

691 Date: 1964. Case: Quarrel between Bait 'Umran and Bait Idris
685 of 'Ailit Ma'fas over the ownership of a well. The 'awaaqil
*613 sent for the two parties involved, and they met on Wednesday,
578 market day. And the 'awaaqil told the two parties: "This is
692 a shame ('aib), you must be friends because you are from the
same tribe." The 'awaaqil knew "from past history and from truthful elders" that the well belonged to 'Ait Idris. The 'awaaqil made 'Ait 'Umran change their minds about their claim
[695] to the well. Before the litigation 'Ait 'Umran had insisted

691 that 'Ait Idris take the oath as proof that the well was
685 owned by them. Upon the decision of the *'awaaqil*, however,
*613 'Ait 'Umran refused to allow 'Ait Idris to swear the oath
578 "because we are all one family." This means, as one *'aqila*
692 actually stated at the conclusion of the case, that " 'Ait
•695 Idris is indebted to 'Ait 'Umran."

423 The following two cases which occur in the external
675 system of political relations, one within the 'Aishaibat
*613 territory and the other dealing with land rights in the
territory between two primary authority groups, indicate the
formal aspect of Bedouin adjudication in establishing contracts.

[539] *Date: 12 August 1963*. *A Contract of Agreement on Land Rights*.
Agreement and satisfaction took place between Hussain Karim al-Dawlat of al-'Aishaibat and Khalid Idris al-Ma'fas of al-'Aishaibat, the first and second party. And the reason for this agreement is that each of the two parties own cultivable land at Ras Wadi Madwar. The two parties wish to make a dividing line between this linear piece of land and to declare the borders. The two parties agreed on the following: first, the beginning of the border extends from the eastern side at south Ras Raqabit al-Shumar to the western side at Hatiyid and is shown by stone markers; secondly, this line should be established from the east to the west, and this is a dividing line between the two parties and was executed by them and with their satisfaction; thirdly, whoever rejects or modifies this line will be responsible in front of law and the *'awaiyid Awlad 'Ali*; each party is responsible for his children and relatives as to their actions regarding this line which is the subject of the agreement; fifthly, this contract of agreement which defines the borders between the two parties was issued in two copies, a copy to each party to use when it is needed.

Signatures or seals of seven men.

423 Date: 12 October 1954. There came to us (i.e. the 'awaqil)
691 on this day, Khalid Idris of al-'Aishaibat and Yunis Abd
578 al-Nabi of al-Kamailat. The reason for their coming is a
*613 quarrel over land rights at Wadi al-Hijnaiya. And we put
[539] distinct markers between the land of the two parties, the
first, Khalid Idris, and the second, Yunis Abd al-Nabi.
And the boundary passes by the distinct markers; the
first is the wadi marker, the second to the sea and beside
the tree, and the final marker we put east of Halima well.
This is a decision between the two parties in the presence
of the following witnesses:

Signatures or seals of five men.

619 The case given below indicates, by the use of two
578 documents, the process of conflict settlement involving two
secondary segments of al-Qasr, one Sa'adi and one Marabit.
[671] 'Ailit al-Sulwatiyya, though genealogically not members of the
Awlad 'Ali and holders of a client or vassal status in traditional times, are within the jurisdiction of the 'awaiyid
Awlad 'Ali. They claim their rights under it by virtue of the
fact of their residence in al-Qasr. The power of ritual
sanction is clearly illustrated by this case.

578 Date: 30 July 1964, Marsa Matruh. First Party: Shaikh
685 Khalid Za'aluk al-Sulwatiyya and four relatives. Second
691 Party: Khalid Idris of 'Ailit Ma'fas and three relatives.
619 They are present. The cause of these two parties coming to-
423 gether is a quarrel over a well named Halima. Since the choice
•[695] to swear the oath has been made by the two parties, Khalid
Idris, the second party, will swear the oath supported by
twenty-four members of his 'umraa al-dam ("blood group") to

423 578 685 691 619 695 [539] be chosen by Shaikh Khalid Za'aluk, the first party. The text of the oath which Khalid Idris will swear is: "By the truth of the owner of this tomb (maqaam), and this book of God, I swear that you (i.e. the 'Ailit Sulwatiyya represented by Shaikh Khalid Za'aluk) have neither work of hand nor a grandfather's stake in this well." If any of the oath-takers are missing on the day of the oath, the well will be owned Khalid Za'aluk. And if they swear the oath, the well will be owned by 'Ailit Ma'fas.

[778] The date of the oath will be the first Friday of month nine, 1964. The oath will be taken at the shrine of Sidi 'Awam, and the swearing will deal with the well only. For the land which is west of the well belongs to Khalid Za'aluk and his family, and the land to the east of the well belongs to Khalid Idris and his family. And the water which is west of the well belongs to Khalid Za'aluk. The two parties agreed to this. (Each party, and five witnesses, i.e. rajal khair, for each party, signed the document.)

423 619 578 691 [695] Date: 30 July 1964. I, Khalid Za'aluk, have decided to cancel the oath which was supposed to have been sworn on 9 September 1964 at the shrine of Sidi Awam. Khalid Idris and the oath-takers were present and were stopped from taking the oath. And the well named al-Halima which was the cause of the quarrel

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578 said: "I did not take anything." The _'awaaqil_ of both parties
685 met and told the accused: "If you have anything give it to
*613 us; if you do not have anything then swear the oath to this
•695
[571] fact." Members of 'Ailit Ma'fas said that the boy was innocent
[692] and told the _'awaaqil_ that the boy should have his rights
according to the _'awaiyid_ (i.e. he should be allowed to swear
the oath to establish his innocence). The boy accused of the
theft, his father, and two other members of 'Ailit Ma'fas
selected by the accusers swore the oath and the problem was
619 over. Two months later, the accuser from the Kamailat lost
578 his eye in an accident, because swearing the oath has con-
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695 sequences for both parties. A bad oath will work against the
784 one who makes it; there will be a curse upon him, his children,
and his money. And the bad effects of an oath will also work
against the one who falsely accuses another making him swear
the oath.

582 The final two cases deal with marriage rights. The
562 first illustrates a number of things which I have touched on
*613 in the previous discussion of marriage: that a man may choose
792 to ignore the jural structures of the lineage group where the
desires of his offspring are concerned; that the female is
not the totally subjugated person which one might expect to
find in the strongly patrilineal Bedouin society; and that the
role of "holy man" functions in the marital area of authority
relations.

554 [571] [178] [792] It is interesting to note that Hajj 'Ali is one of the most powerful members of the "status group" in al-Qasr. He is also a leading proponent of social change and a critic of the old way of life which includes belief in magic. One can see how 'Amm Salih's influence and status might work in other areas of social action.

554 792 627 •[695] [691] *[613] [829] Although it is conceivable that a *rajal salih* can be asked to intervene in any type of conflict, it is more likely that he will preside at cases involving marriage and divorce. The *rajal saalih* may also be asked to serve as a witness or consultant in litigation cases. The Bedouins point out that the "holy man," like the *rajal khair*, is apt to be more trustworthy than the formal authority, the *'aqila*.

> Sanusi is a good man and the people should listen to him. He is a *rajal khair*, a *rajal saalih*, not an *'aqila*. He is better than an *'aqila*--he is our brother. He is much better than the *'umda* because he never changes the truth. The *'umda* may go and accuse me wrongly to the government but Sanusi would never do this.

554 792 It is, of course, difficult to decide whether Sanusi's charisma stems from the fact that he is a *rajal salih*, or the facts of his wealth and family. Most probably it is a little of both, the sacred as well as the secular. 'Amm Salih, on the other hand, is neither wealthy nor from a particularly prestigious family by economic standards of al-Qasr: he derives his influence and status from the sacred aspects of

156 the group--in effect questions a great deal about the whole
159 traditional authority structure. Blood-revenge functions as
554 a deterrent to social disorder in that it represents an
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682 automatic mechanism for restoring a balance of good relations
[182] in the society. Actually, Hajj 'Ali exaggerated to make a
point when he spoke of the existence of "unbalanced people."
682 A person would indeed be "unbalanced" who did not take into
672 consideration the repercussions of his acts with respect to
*613 the personal danger and the dishonor and shame it would bring
to his _'aiela_ and _bait_. Although the _'aiela_ members are
willing to share in the blood money for accidental or unpremeditated killings, it is wrong to suppose that the Bedouins
do not attempt to weigh the justifiability and culpability
[671] in matters of killing. The very existence of the _'awaiyid
Awlad 'Ali_ argues against this. Obviously, the dichotomy made
between killing in the _'awaiyid_, i.e., intentional and accidental,
and the concomitant gradation in compensation points to some
kind of reasonable consideration in cases of killing.

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159 Hajj 'Ali is discontent with yet another aspect of
the traditional authority structure. He questions the logic
554 and authority represented in the oath as a sacred sanction.
•695 This says something about the degree of secularization which
829 Hajj 'Ali has undergone. Although he does not say so, he
apparently favors a more secular and logical procedure for
determining a man's guilt or innocence.

> 156 Another thing which I do not like about our old ways
> 159 is the idea of swearing the oath. For instance, if
> 554 I steal 1,000 L.E. from you, then you will accuse
> •695 me. The 'aqila will then come to me and say: "If
> 829 you did not steal the money, swear the oath." Some
> of my family will support me in this, swearing that
> I did not steal the money. The swearing of the oath
> will take place at a tomb, in the presence of the
> Quran. This tomb belongs to a dead man, and they
> tell you that he is a saint. First of all, the thief
> will swear the oath and then they will believe him;
> and, secondly, what is the sense of swearing in front
> of a dead body?

[784] Hajj 'Ali made no mention of God or of the Bedouin belief that misfortune will be visited upon the one who swears the oath in bad faith. There is an Arabic proverb which Hajj 'Ali repeated here which says in effect that "the thief will always swear."

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Hajj 'Ali actively challenges the traditional basis of the Bedouin moral and political community. Striving to do away with prescribed cousin-right in marriage and the mechanisms of blood-revenge and the oath as means of supporting law and order in al-Qasr is a course which we might expect from an Egyptian official who seeks to integrate the Bedouins into national society. And, in fact, these are all customs which the Governor believes must eventually be eradicated. It is not surprising that Hajj 'Ali's son believes that "it is not civilized" to lay claim to his cousin for, like his father, he also is redefining morality vis a vis "civilization."

It appears obvious in all that he says, including his comments at the Governor's reception, that Hajj 'Ali has

The form which the process of dispute settlement takes differs from 121
one society to another. In certain societies disputes are settled through 627
a process of informal mediation undertaken by go-betweens; in others it 692
is by means of self-help; still in others, it is by way of court. In so- 695
cieties with courts the process of dispute settlements is undertaken by
judges who "take and assess the evidence, examine what they regard as the
facts, and come to a decision in favor of one party rather than another"
(Gluckman 1965:183).

Within a given society, disputes are settled in accordance with a set 121
of principles that reflect the basic goals and values of that society. As 627
long as the settlement of a particular dispute proceeds according to these 626
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principles, the settlement is supported by the public opinion of that so- 692
ciety. This is true whether the process is carried on by means of informal 182
mediations or through a court system. It is this public opinion as the ex-
pression of the basic societal values and not the court as a special mechan-
ism that gives legitimation to the judicial decisions. To equate opinion [114]
with the court as Hoebel (1961) did, or to look at the court as the ultimate
source of legitimation as did Radcliffe-Brown (1940) and others (Redfield
1964, Bohannan 1965), is to create an unnecessary confusion which tends to
undermine meaningful cross-cultural comparisons. Whatever the differences 121
among anthropologists with regard to the definition of the court, their 127
main interest in the concept so far has been as a tool for the definition 671
of law. The interest in the concept gave rise to a methodological approach 114
which came to characterize the literature in legal anthropology, namely,
the case-study approach, cases having been utilized in a number of ways
by legal anthropologists. In their book on the Cheyenne, Llewellyn and
Hoebel (1941) introduced the analysis of "the trouble case." This was
followed by a number of studies utilizing the case study method either to

613 675 539 Article 9:

The Amar should never fight on the side of the wrongdoer, because if it does, it will have to pay with him for his wrongdoings.

Article 10:

[628] Any dispute or fight involving a member of the Amar and an outsider should be reported to the awaqil in the Amar who are supposed to take the matter up with the other party. If the awaqil are convinced that the outsider is the aggressor or that he is at fault, they should try to make him accede to the demands of the members of the Amar, using all their efforts to convince him and the aqila of his bait. If he refuses, they [619] should call him for a "Miad" (tribal meeting) in which all parties involved should be represented by their respective awaqil.

Article 11:

[563] [619] With regard to "iktitab" (tribal adoption), an outsider wanting to join the Aggary Family or one of its constiuent buite must be asked first about the reason or reasons for his desire to join. This must be done in order to know what kind of person he is and whether he will become a burden and liability to the Amar. If he proves to be of reputable standing, the aqila of the bait he wants to join can accept him without consultation with the rest of the awaqil. If on the other hand he is found to have grudges against someone or if someone has a financial claim over him, then the aqila of the bait cannot accept him without consultation with the other awaqil in the Amar. If all the awaqil agree to accept him, he is considered like one of the Eilat Aggary, having the same rights and bearing the same responsibilities.

Article 12:

A memberof the Amar who wants to separate himself from the Amar and get a "barawa" has to state his reasons beforehe can be released from the obligations of his membership in the amar. If his request to get the barawa was because of injustice he suffered by the Amar or any of its members, the awaqil have the duty to straighten the injustice and restore his rights. If, on the other hand, his request for the barawa was to avoid paying the Amar, then he cannot be released from his membership unless he pays all of his share, or else he must return all that the Amar has paid him until the time he asked for the barawa.

Article 13:

● [695] [693] If one of the Amar is accused of an offense for which he is tried by the legal system of the state, the Amar as a whole share the expenses of hiring an attorney to defend him. This, however, is done after the awaqil are sure (by means of administering the oath) that he is innocent and that the accusation is false.

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671 first appeared, the rule has become a practice so common that other Amars
675 find it unnecessary to specify it in their own papers.

682 Another new rule which is in the process of acquiring a great amount
613 of consensus among the tribal population of Awlad Ali is that of the re-
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675 sponsibility of the Amar for the payment of the lawyer's fees for members
[693] of the Amar who are tried by the government (Article 13 of the Aggary
● [695] papers). Another less agreed upon rule is that of the responsibility of
613 the Amar for the financial losses caused by the confiscation of smuggled
672 goods or the payment of money for the destruction of government property
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439 by a member of the Amar. Where smuggling is an important source of in-
[434] come for the group, Amar papers usually include rules making it a corporate responsibility; other Amar papers, especially those of tribal segments not deeply involved in smuggling, make it an individual responsibility, while still others leave it intentionally with no specific rule, as in the case of the Aggary Amar paper.

613 The Aggary document is a relatively elaborate one. Not all Amar
[675] papers, or at least the ones I had a chance to examine, are as detailed.
[131] Eilat Aggary is the largest Amar in the area of Dera'el Bahari, which extends from Alexandria 60 miles westward to the town of Alamein. The
613 distinctive characteristics of the Aggary Eila is that it is composed
563 mainly of peasant groups who joined the Aggary by means of tribal adop-
619 tion. Of the 16 Baits constituting the Aggary Amar, only three are believed to be Awlad Ali proper. The attractiveness of the Aggary for the peasant groups seeking to be adopted by the tribal population of the area may be partly explained in terms of the location of Eilat Aggary in an area relatively close to the Delta from where these groups usually migrate.

685 grudges that he had against Ta'ib when the latter dissolved the partner-
627 ship which had existed between them for more than ten years, because of
578 Rabbu's attempt to cheat Taieb in dividing the profit gained from smug-
gling goods. They asked Sheikh Ta'ib to be their mediator to Sheikh
Hakim and his son. Ta'ib went to Hakim himself and informed him of the
accusations directed against his son and asked to arrange for a "Mi'ad"
or legal hearing. Hakim agreed and told Taieb that his son accepted
Taieb as a mardi and would abide by whatever decision he made. After
that both parties to the dispute wrote specifying their agreement on Taieb
as a mardi and all signed it. (It is not customary to write the agree-
ment on the mardi but Taieb insisted on that on the grounds that he did
not trust Hakim or his son and that several times they had backed down
on their promises). The Mi'ad was held and all interested parties attend-
ed. It lasted only half an hour, most of it spect drinking tea. Nobody
presented his case or any facts related to it since both parties had
apparently discussed it earlier with Taieb. The only one to speak was
Sheikh Taieb. He stated that Hadi and his partners believed that Rabbu
had informed the police which caused them to loose merchandise worth
685 more than three thousand pounds. He also said that the accusation had
627 been denied by Hakim on behalf of his son, after having his son swear by
578 the Qoraan that he hadn't informed the police. Then in the traditional
● 695 phrase, Taieb said, "I therefore follow the Awlad Ali Daraieb and make
[671] the judgment to the oath. Rabbu will have to take the oath supported by
fourteen male members of his bait to be selected by the Geneishat." He
added that he had discussed the matter with both parties before announc-
ing it and that both had agreed to it.

685 627 The Geneishat selected the tomb of the saint where the oath was to
778 be administered. According to the customary law of Awlad Ali, the plaintiff
695 is the one to decide which saint is to be sought for the taking of
[671] the oath by the defendant. Each saint has his own reputation and some
[776] are said to be more effective in certain kinds of disputes. The saint
selected in this case was Sidi Dmain. Sidi Dmian's tomb is in the
Beheira province some 60 miles east of the area of Burg el-Arab. He is
[732] known to cause the blindness of those who dare to swear falsely by him,
[784] and at least four cases of blindness in the area have been attributed to
[671] false oaths at Sidi Dmain. Also according to the law, it is the plaintiff
who selects the persons from the defendant's kin unit who are to
685 support him in the oath. Following this rule, the Geneishat, with the
627 help of Hadi, selected the fourteen men from bait Asabei to swear with
695 Rabbu. The number of men that were required in this case was considered
613 very conservative. The usual practice in estimating the number of supporters
[803] in any case is done by establishing the value of the damage or
compensation and dividing it by ten. The result is the number of men
needed to give the oath. If there were not enough adult males in a given
kinship unit to fulfill the number needed, some or all the men would
have to be sworn twice or three times and each time a person takes the
oath he is considered as a separate person until the number needed is met.

Following this rule, and since the value of the property confiscated in the above case was over three thousand pounds, 300 persons should have been sworn in support of Rabbuh. Since this would have complicated the matter greatly, it was agreed that fifteen men were enough. Taieb gave the justification for limiting the number to 15 that trade and, as

685 such, deviates from the normal pattern of cases dealt with by the cus-
627 tomary law in the conventional way. The men selected by the Geneishat
695 included, in addition to Rabbu and his father Hakim, Shei'eb and his
613 three brothers, Hakim's cousin Samsoun and his four brothers and Hakim's
uncle Sheikh Qudura and his sons. The date of the oath was set for June
tenth. Two days before, the two parties involved in the dispute invited
a number of the important people of other tribal segments in the area to
[492] be witnesses to the oath. All involved started to travel to the tomb of
[494] Sidi Dmain, some on donkeys, others by bus or train. At six o'clock on
[497] the morning of the oath everybody gathered in the courtyard outside the
[778] tomb of the saint. The granddaughter of the saint works as a mediator
[787] between the spirit of her grandfather and his followers announced that
[776] the saint was ready for the oath and everybody went inside preparing for
the oath. Before the oath was taken the Geneishat asked Hakim if his son
and the fourteen men they had chosen were present and Hakim said they
were. Since the Geneishat were from a different tribal segment and
lived outside the area, they had no personal knowledge of most of the
men who were to take the oath. Knowing the reputation of Hakim they
[212] asked the men to present their identification cards to check them against
[747] the list they had. At that time Hakim said that some of the men didn't
have identification cards because they had not applied for aid from the
World Food Program. Then the Geneishat demanded that those without cards
should be identified by members of other tribal segments who had come as
witnesses. Hakim refused and then admitted that one of the men was ab-
sent and that he had put another in place of him. But when the Geneishat
learned that the one to be absent was Sheikh Qudura, they insisted that

685 no one else could take his place. They were mainly angry at Hakim's
627 attempt to cheat them and refused Hakim's offer to substitute ten men
695 for Qudura. The temper of the meeting was becoming very tense; then
[578] Taieb, who was working very hard to achieve a settlement between the disputants, took the Geneishat aside and tried to convince them to accept another man instead of Qudura. When he found that to be impossible, he asked them to agree to a postponement of the oath until they saw what prevented Qudura from coming as he had promised. The Geneishat agreed to the postponement because of the absence of one of the men to swear.
[691] According to Awlad Ali Daraieb, if one of the individuals to take the oath fails to show up in the saint's tomb for any reason or if he comes but refuses to take the oath, the whole case for the defense fails, and the judgment is awarded automatically for the plaintiff. In this case the Geneishat were entitled to immediate compensation for their confiscated goods. Nobody knew the reason that led the Geneishat to forfeit their right to immediate compensation and to give Hakim and his son a second chance despite their intense dislike for the latters. Some attribute this to the skill of Taieb and the respect he commands among all tribes. Others believe the Geneishat movement to be a reciprocal act to bait Asabei' as a whole which long ago had one a similar favor for the Geneishat. Still others beliebe it to be a gesture of good will on the part of the Geneishat who needed to retain a good and friendly relationship with the tribal segments on their smuggling route.

No date was set at that time for the oath. The parties as well as
685 the witnesses returned to their houses. Hakim then took Shei'eb and
627 went to visit Qudura to see why he hadn't come to the oath but Qudura
578

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613 was set for a meeting in which Quadra was to announce his decision.
156 Meanwhile, Qudura stopped attacking Hakim and directed his attack to-
554 ward the inadequacy of Shei'eb as the Aqila.
578

The meeting was held two weeks later and all the important people in the area were invited. After dinner was served Qudura announced his agreement with Hakim to become the Aqila of bait Asabei' replacing Shei'eb. Everybody expected Hakim to support Qudura in his claim, but instead Hakim directed his comment to Qudura telling him that there had been a misunderstanding on Qudura's part and that all his message to Qudura was to acknowledge the latter as the Aqila for his own camp alone not for bait Asabei' as a whole as Qudura claimed. This announcement was a surprise to everyone in the meeting since this meant recognizing the camp of Qudura as a separate bait, a result which nobody, including Qudura, had ever anticipated. Qudura was very angry and dissolved the meeting immediately. Ever since that incident, the relationship between
578 Qudura and Hakim has been very unfriendly. Almost all of my informants
156 explained Qudura's failure to show up at the oath as a means of revenge
● 695 against Hakim who had embarrassed him among the people who attended the
685
627 meeting. Qudura himself had told me later that the reason for his not
[124] coming to the oath was that he was not sure that Rabbu was innocent:

> Rabbu has been known to do these thins (inform the police) and I cannot trust him. I cannot take a false oath and endanger myself for someone like Rabbuh. Besides, Hakim never came to me to discuss the oath like he did with all the others who were to swear with them. If he had brought his son and come to me before I would have been able to tell whether they were lying or not, and If not, I would have sworn with a clear conscience and without fear. The oath is something that one does not take lightly. It involves the supernatural.

613
627 When Qudura refused to see Hakim and Shei'eb, Hakim asked Sheikh
156 Saleh, the Aqila of one of the most powerful baits in the area, to talk
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682 owner of the rope, since it was the broken rope that had caused
672 the death of Do'ah. The case stayed unsolved for more than two
months, a record for dispatching of criminal cases in the area.
682 In the final Mi'ad, the main question was whether or not the owner
672 of the rope was responsible for the death of Do'ah, and therefore
627 liable for the payment of the bloodmoney. After extensive negotiations
with the parties involved, Sheikh Selouma, the aqila of
Hemeida's Bait, who had also been accepted by Do'ah's family as
the Mardi in the case, convened the Mi'ad and announced the settlement.
682 His announcement came after reading certain passages of the
672 Koran and reminding the parties that they were all members of Awlad
627 Ali and therefore brothers. He stressed the necessity of all brothers
•695 having clear hearts toward one another and not allowing worldly
disputes to leave any impurities among friends. He then came to the
conclusion that there were two things responsible for the death of
Do'ah. The first was Hemeida's decision to clear the well, for had
it not been for that decision, the accident would not have happened.
The second thing responsible was the rope whose breaking was the
direct cause of the death. The responsibility here applies only to
the rope and not to the owner of that rope. The reason Sheikh Selouma
gave for not holding the owner responsible for the death of Do'ah
was that the rope by itself is not a lethal weapon for which the
owner has to exercise a great deal of caution in lending it. To
make the owner responsible for the death of Do'ah would, according
to Sheikh Selouma, discourage anyone from lending anything to his
neighbor for fear of becoming liable for any harm it might cause.

682 "...It means that I will never lend my cooking pot to my neighbor
672 lest his child trip over it and I would be asked to pay his blood-
627
695 money."

So, the bloodmoney was divided into two sections, one to be paid by Hemeida, and the other to be the responsibility of the rope, which meant that the victim's relatives only took home half of the bloodmoney.

683 CASE #2: The Case of the Curious Neighbor

682 This is the case of 66-year-old Selouma whose barley land
578 bordered that of Muftah, a distant member of the same tribe. A
672 small area of rocky land separated the two areas. Throughout the time that Muftah was preparing his land for barley cultivation, Selouma used to sit on the dividing rocks, observing his neighbor work on his land and making jokes about the amount of time and effort Muftah was putting into his land, especially when it looked like a dry year, anyway, and no barley would be cultivated. For more than a week Muftah tolerated his neighbor's remarks. "I always said to myself, 'Don't follow the devil... He is an old man and doesn't know what he is saying.' But that day I could not take it any longer. My wife and children were sick, and I didn't have any money to bring them medicine or even food. I wanted to finish preparing the land because it looked like it was going to rain that day. I went to the area I was working on when Selouma started his jokes. I was mad. I took a small stone and threw it at him to scare him and make him stop. The stone hit his leg. It was a small stone, and I didn't think it would harm him. Actually, he stood on his

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682 feet after that and left." It seems that later the wound got in-
672 fected. Six months after the incident, Selouma was taken to the
[578] hospital with an infected wound, and three days later he died from
that infection. Selouma's son, Ali, demanded that Muftah pay a
full bloodmoney (L.E. 400) for the death of his father, since the
death was directly caused by the wound inflicted by Muftah. Muftah
denied the charges and claimed that the infected wound which caused
683 the death of Selouma was not the one inflicted by the stone. Media-
682 tions continued for some time, and when no agreement was achieved,
672 the aqilas of the two baits to which the parties belonged declared
695 that the decision should be made by the oath which Muftah had to
613 take if he insisted on his claims that the wound was not caused by
his action. Since the case involved the life of a man, Muftah had
to be supported in his oath by fifty-five adult male members of
[671] his 'amar, or 'eila. In accordance with the Daraieb, the selection
[778] was done by members of Selouma's Bait who also selected the tomb of
the saint where the oath would be undertaken. On the date the oath
was to be taken, the disputing parties, as well as all the notables
of friendly tribal segments who were invited to witness the oath,
went to the tomb of the saint. As they started with the procedures,
[784] two of Muftah's cousins who were to support him in the oath and his
uncle refused to swear on the grounds that they were not sure that
Muftah was telling the truth and therefore could not subject them-
selves to the supernatural hazards of taking a false oath. Attempts
by other members who were to support Muftah were made to force the
three men to swear, since their refusal meant that the bloodmoney

683 was to be paid unconditionally and consequently would cost all
682 members of the amar; but all these attempts failed. At this point,
672 there was no doubt on the part of the attending crowd about Muftah's
695 responsibility for the death of Selouma. The question was, how much
613 had he to pay. The amount requested by Selouma's son was that for "intentional" killing on the basis that Muftah had willfully thrown the rock knowing that it might harm Selouma, especially considering his age.

683 After long and intensive negotiations with the interested
682 parties, a Mi'ad was set in which it was announced that Muftah had
672 to pay the amount of L.E. 200. In his reasoning, he stipulated
627 that the wound which had caused the death of Selouma, although it was intentional on the part of Muftah, was inflicted by a stone which in itself is not a lethal weapon, and therefore the death was an unintentional one for which the bloodmoney is customarily estimated at L.E. 300. He also stated that in the excitement that
[845] followed the death of Selouma, Muftah's pregnant wife had lost the child. The bloodmoney for the still-born infant was estimated at L.E. 100, which was deducted from the amount of bloodmoney that Muftah had to pay.

CASE #3: The Case of the Trespasser

311 This case occurred during the year of the fieldwork which was
423 the second dry year the area experienced. Rain had not fallen ex-
613 cept in a very few places. One of these places was near the small
[132] town of Sidi Barrani in which the land belonging to Yadem and his Bait was found. Yadem had sown his barley which at that time had grown to about five feet high. Surrounding the cultivated land

233 animals to drink, sat on the edge of the well with his feet in the
cool water of the pool completely absorbed in his thoughts amidst
233 the quiet surroundings. Passing by the pool at that time was Mahdi
576 from a neighboring tribal segment. Seeing Idris (whom he had not
165 known), he shouted the customary greeting, "Peace on you." Startled
by the voice of Mahdi, Idris lost his balance and fell in the deep
water of the pool. Mahdi rushed to help him, but the water was too
deep, and Idris drowned. Feeling sorry for Idris, Mahdi took the
flock and went back to the camp of Idris where he informed the
682 latter's wife of what had happened. A few days later, Mahdi was
627 paid a visit by Sheikh Elewa, the aqila of Bait Asabei' and known
[613] mardi in the area who informed Mahdi that the family of Idris was
demanding the payment of the sum of L.E. 300 for the death of their
682 relative. A Mi'ad was set for the following week. In that Mi'ad,
627 and after Mahdi admitted that it was his greeting that had startled
672 Idris and caused him to fall in the well, the two Mardis representing
613 the two parties agreed that the payment of the sum of three
hundred pounds was in order and that Mahdi and his amar must pay it
to the victim's family as soon as possible. At first, Mahdi seemed
to accept the judgment of the two Mardis, especially when both were
prominant members of some of the influential tribal segments in the
area. But Mahdi was a poor man, and his amar was very small in number,
which made the payment of the bloodmoney almost impossible.
682 Although appeal in the ordinary legal sense does not exist in such
627 a system like that of Awlad Ali, where no judgment is forced upon
672
695 any of the disputing parties, and where the pronouncement of the

124 One informant once told me,
576 "If you don't greet me, this means that you hate me, and if you
829 hate me, there is no limit to the kind of harm you can do me and my family. One who hates you can kill you, and none can walk safely anywhere if he fears that he will be killed."

682 As Sheikh Suliman and Mahdi reached the general store, everyone
689 was gathering there as usual, including the two awaqil who
672 695 were involved in the original settlement. Sheikh Suliman told
554 Mahdi not to dismount his donkey and not to say the customary
792 greeting as they passed by the gathering. When they passed the
576 gathering, everyone stood to greet Sheikh Suliman who ignored them and left with Mahdi. No one believed that Sheikh Suliman, who should be the guard of the tribal tradition, should commit such an unforgivable violation of the norms of the people. The next
682 morning the whole area was talking about a big Mi'ad to "take the right"
689 from Sheikh Suliman and Mahdi, who had insulted the gathering. The
672 Mi'ad was held a week after the incident. During the Mi'ad, Sheikh
695 554 Suliman was asked to explain his behavior, and his answer was, "How
792 do you want me to greet all those people who were sitting in front
576 of the store? There were more than thirty men in that gathering,
627 and I was afraid that if I said the customary greeting, I might have startled some of them causing them to harm themselves, leaving me with the payment of so many bloodmoneys." Immediately, the attendants of the Mi'ad knew what Sheikh Suliman was referring to, and that his action was to prove that the settlement reached in the case of Mahdi was wrong and that it set a very dangerous precedent which would cause people to avoid greeting one another, "and hatred will prevail among brothers and nobody will be safe in his own home."

000 own home." The following morning a Mi'ad was called for by the two
627 aqila who achieved the first settlement, and in it, Mahdi was re-
613 leased from his obligation to pay the bloodmoney, although he was
682 asked to pay the sum of fifty pounds to the widow of the deceased
675 as a gesture of friendship.

CASE #6: The Case of the Careless Guest

574 The present case involved Ali from the Geneishat tribe who
682 lives in the desert town of Matruh where he has a general store. He goes on frequent visits to Alexandria to get supplies for his store. On one of these trips he passed by the camp of 'Awad from a different tribal segment. Hungry and tired, Ali decided to spend the night at the camp and continue his trip the following morning. He went to the first tent in the camp which happened to be that of 'Awad, who welcomed him and ordered his wife to prepare dinner for the guest. He then invited other members of the camp to have tea with the guest as a gesture of hospitality. When Ali sat down to eat, he took off his shoes, and put his rifle against a pile of rugs and blankets behind him. As the group was chatting, a goat belonging to one of the invited neighbors entered the tent where the men were sitting. Afraid that it might soil the carpets which he had put out for the guest, Awad chased the goat out of the tent. On its way out, the goat touched the guest's gun which fired, killing Hussein, the brother-in-law of one of the neighbors.

682 The local authorities were notified of the incident, but after
627 conducting a preliminary investigation, they filed the case as accidental death. The tribal proceedings continued, however. After

CHAPTER VII

BLOODMONEY—WESTERN DESERT

000 Payment in Cash—Agreements to pay—Reprisals discouraged—Patricide—Detective Work—Death from Fright—Public Aversion—The twelve-year-old Bill—Informers—Ali Abu Bukr's Cistern—The Broken Rope—Found Drowned—Three Months' Hard Labour—Whose Rope?—Payment—The Old Man who fell off the Wall—The Clutches of the Police—A Well-conceived Lie—Ibrahim's Broken Leg—Ali's Cunning—The Fiasco at the Tomb—Reductions in Payment—The Dead Baby—Amateur Lawyers—The Two Shepherds and the Trespasser—Stick or Stone?—Legal Arguments—Travelling Allowance—Misappropriation—Chaos—Mirtah buys Sheep, while the Sayed buy Dates—The Clash—£300—Abdel Kerim and his Cousin—The Boys Fight—Result of pointing a Gun—Dirty Fingers—Serve him Right—The Two Married Sisters—A Gun Accident—Poor Towida—Successful Bluffing.

682 IN the Western Desert the laws of bloodmoney differ
[171] considerably from those of Sinai, the former being of
African origin and the latter of Arabian. The Western
[435] Bedouin regard the price of a man as £300, irrespective of
[562] the market price of a camel; and the value of a woman's
life as normally £150, or half that of a man.

682 In the absence of satisfactory evidence in a case of
• 695 murder, if the oath be employed to decide the issue, fifty
men will swear for a man's life, and twenty-five in a case
562 involving the life of a woman. (NOTE. In some tribes
these numbers are increased to fifty-five and twenty-seven
respectively.)

682 As regards the payment and acceptance of bloodmoney,
621 this is almost invariably by agreement between the families,
and it is often difficult for an outsider to see any rhyme or

of the present defendant seemed—for a really wealthy 682
man—to be pointless and futile. The merchant anticipated 674
this objection by hastening to add that the receipt of the 691
actual cash did not interest him in the least; but that he 626
had been wondering how he could shew his disapproval of 686
the defendant's family in some way, and had gone carefully through all his old papers and receipts with this end in view, and had triumphantly discovered the bill of debt now produced in court.

Bedouin Law and custom sometimes accept right to 671
bloodmoney in all sorts of circumstances, when other law 672
would recognise no claim. For example, the principle is 682
accepted that a life lost in prison must be paid for by the informers whose information resulted in the imprisonment of the deceased. It is entirely immaterial whether the information so given to the police was wilfully false or intentionally misleading, or whether it was merely subsequently found to be incorrect. Even if the information had been true and correct in every detail, the informer is still blood-guilty from the Ourfi standpoint, although in actual practice any such claims for bloodmoney would probably be considerably modified.

Other claims for bloodmoney are also recognised occasionally, in cases of obvious accidental death, or death by misadventure or Act of God, when the interpreters of Bedouin Law cannot get away from the main principle
that a life lost must be paid for. The difficulty in these [695]
cases is to determine who shall pay for it; and the lawsuits usually end in a clever compromise, in which their essential principles are duly observed, but their judgments are mitigated and modified by leniency and commonsense. The following example, which occurred recently in Mariut, will illustrate this.

A certain Arab called Ali Abu Bukr had inherited from 671
his father large cultivation rights in the desert; and in the 672
middle of this land was an old cistern for the collection of 682
rain water. It had not been used for years, and was silted 312

8: Kennett G-5 (ca. 1921) 1925 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9

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683 in the case, and produced this document signed by Ibrahim's
682 family to the effect that Ibrahim *fell* off the wall and broke
his leg. How then could he possibly be implicated in the
694 case?

The assessors of the court went carefully into all the
683 evidence and eventually agreed that the matter should be
682 decided by the oath. They demanded that Ali, backed by
672 twenty-five men of his own tribe, chosen by Ibrahim's
family as men of their word, should swear on the tomb
• 695 of Sidi Shar el Ruh the following oath: "By Allah the Great and by the Truth of this Holy Sheikh, I swear that I neither threw a stone at Ibrahim, nor broke his leg." They further decreed that if Ali himself, or any one of the twenty-five men chosen to back him in his oath, failed or refused to swear as required, the case for the defence would be null and void, and that bloodmoney would be required in full from Ali's family.

On the date appointed two or three sheikhs of the court were detailed to go to the tomb, to meet the defendant with his twenty-five backers, and to supervise the taking of the oath. The parties duly arrived; but when the oath was just about to be taken, three men of Ali's backers refused to swear, declaring that on the contrary they were ready to swear, if required, that Ali *had* thrown the stone, and was responsible for Ibrahim's death. The case for the defence thus fell to the ground, and the parties were warned to appear at a future date, when the case would be completed. At the next meeting of the court, Ali's liability to pay bloodmoney was accepted in principle, but there were divergencies of opinion as to the amount to be paid. Then followed a delightful example of casuistry typical of the Bedou mind.

The assessors of the court felt that, in the first instance, Ali had never intended to kill poor old Ibrahim, and that his crime fell very far short of intentional homicide. Also, it had happened seven years before, and, all said and done, time had healed most of whatever ill-feeling there ever

had been. Besides, Ibrahim was an old man when it 683
happened, and he would have to have died before very 682
long in any case. Moreover, the sheikhs in their heart of 672
hearts considerably admired the acumen displayed by Ali 695•
in getting hold of that document. So they decided privately among themselves that on the whole half the full bloodmoney, or £150, would meet the case. On no account, however, could they give in open court the above reasons for lessening the sum to be paid. They proceeded to listen patiently to more evidence, and eventually gave their considered judgment as follows:

"Defendant Ali is required to pay the full bloodmoney of £300. *But* in view of the fact that, when the police came to Ali's tent to arrest him seven years ago, in the excitement and commotion caused by the police patrol, Ali's wife gave birth to a premature boy child, and that this boy subsequently died, therefore the sum of £100 will be deducted from the total to be paid, for the sake of the dead baby. Also, as it cannot be proved conclusively that Ibrahim died simply and solely as the result of the stone thrown at his leg, and as it may be conceivably possible that other external causes contributed to his death, for this reason, therefore, another sum of £50 will be deducted. Hence the amount to be paid is £150, of which £50 must be paid after this coming barley harvest, with a similar sum after the two following harvests."

Amateur lawyers are not popular, and more often than 682
not darken counsel without understanding.

An Arab called Salem had some land, and he employed 672
two men of the Hawita tribe as shepherds and harvesters. [693]
One of these men was from the Nefoofa family of the Hawita, and the other was from a family called the Magai. These two shepherds worked peacefully together, and their respective families were friendly, until one day an Arab of the Gottaan tribe called Yadam Saadi drove his flocks and his animals on to Salem's land, and began to pitch his tents. These two shepherds saw this going on from afar, and

682 came up to drive him and his animals away. Yadam re-
672 fused to move, and threatened violence if they attempted
to eject him forcibly. So the two shepherds, who were responsible to their employer for the land, went for him simultaneously—the Nefoofa shepherd with a thick stick, which he brought down with all his force on Yadam's head, and the Magai with a large stone, which he hurled as hard as he could, and which caught Yadam in the chest over the heart. Yadam received both these blows simultaneously, collapsed on to the ground in a crumpled heap, and died soon afterwards.

682 Yadam's family then brought an action against the
672 Nefoofa and Magai families conjointly, claiming blood-
693 money. The Nefoofa produced an amateur barrister of
•695 their own family called Abd el Gelil, who proved (entirely
to his own satisfaction) that many minor assaults were continually taking place, when people were hit on the head without death following immediately as the result of the blow. He therefore contended that it must have been the blow from the stone thrown by the Magai which had really killed him. The Magai adopted a similar line of argument, and the case remained at a standstill for nearly two years.

Eventually the court effected a compromise, and awarded the bloodmoney, to be paid equally by the Nefoofa and the Magai in three yearly instalments of £50 each. The Magai paid up their £50, and the Nefoofa barrister—a particularly bumptious individual from the Nile Valley—lodged a protest against the decision, claiming that the court was not properly constituted and was not competent, that the sheikhs were biassed, and a hundred and one reasons why the Nefoofa should not contribute their share.

He was eventually made to understand that the Nefoofa would have to pay, and that if there were any more trouble from him, his own property would be seized as part-payment. Accordingly Abd el Gelil travelled round the Nefoofa encampments, ostensibly to collect sums due from

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the different families. A year later the Gottaan brought 682
up the case again, acknowledging the receipt of £50 from 672
the Magai, but protesting that they had still not received 693
anything from the Nefoofa. On an enquiry being held,
a representative collection of infuriated members of the 695 •
Nefoofa family came to court, protesting that Abd el Gelil had already collected their payments, and that if he had not handed over the money, their responsibility at any rate had ended for the moment.

It subsequently transpired, when Abd el Gelil was with difficulty got hold of and brought to court, that he had collected about £50, but claimed this sum as his own
personal travelling expenses for collection. Then followed [685]
another lawsuit, in which the Nefoofa family sued their
self-appointed lawyer for mis-appropriation of tribal funds. The details of this new case, and those of the original suit, were then re-capitulated and muddled up together, to the complete bewilderment of the writer and the entire satisfaction of the Bedouin assessors.

Mention has been made of the extra £100 (£400 instead 682
of £300) usually paid among the Gawabees tribe as the 672
price of a life. It seems, however, as though there are ex-
ceptions to this rule; and the following case seems to shew [435]
that the payment of "Sanaa" depends on a variety of circumstances.

A family called Sirdani had had a bloodfeud with another 682
family of the Gawabees called Sayed, one of the former 628
having killed one of the latter some fifty years ago. The
two families had been living in totally different districts, 672
and for years had not come into contact with each other, and so the feud had been allowed to continue.

In the spring of 1921 a man of the first family, about forty-five years old, called Mirtah el Sirdani, left the Wadi Natrun for the Nile Valley to buy some sheep from the Fellaheen, taking with him his old mother and a small boy, to help him bring them back across the desert to the luscious grazing in the wadi swamps. He arrived at the

233 wandered over the boundary of Abd el Salam's grazing
685 rights. The juvenile members of Abd el Salam's family
[578] came out from their tents in a body, to drive off their
intruding second cousins with their camels. An altercation ensued, and the excitement grew; and eventually a pitched battle with sticks and stones began among the lads.

683 One of Abd el Kerim's sons, leaving his brother to hold on for a moment, ran back the half mile to call his father, who returned with him to the scene of the fight carrying his gun. On arrival at the camels, Abd el Salam's sons set on him in a body. Abd el Kerim pointed his gun at one of them and took aim; whereupon one of the other family from behind laid him low with a blow on the top of his head, sufficient to fell an ox.

[114] Abd el Kerim was carried back to his tent, where the writer witnessed the horrible sight of sympathetic but homicidal relatives pawing his open wound with their filthy fingers. A large hole had been knocked in the side of his head, and portions of brain were visible. After some
[694] months of surgical treatment Abd el Kerim came out of hospital; and, as the blow was reported to have affected his reason, a case was brought on his behalf by some of his relatives, claiming damages from the family of Abd el
[682] Salam. However, before the case was fully completed, Abd el Kerim was taken ill, was re-admitted to hospital, and died. The case therefore became one of bloodmoney, and was dealt with in the usual way.

683 The interesting point about the case, however, lies in
682 the decision of the court, when the first claim for damages
695 was brought up. A very strong line was adopted by the
672 sheikhs, and in the opinion of the court the wounds received by Abd el Kerim were only what he might reasonably expect. They maintained that, after the way in which he had behaved, he was lucky to have got off as lightly as he did. The sheikhs protested that he ought never to have gone out from his tent, and mixed himself up in a fight between a lot of boys. If he had any authority at all, he

should have called a meeting with Abd el Salam, discussed 683
the position sensibly with him, and then the two of them 682
should have beaten all the boys soundly. Secondly, he ought 695
never to have taken his gun with him, which was as stupid 672
as it was dangerous. The fact that Abd el Kerim himself knew that it was not loaded made not the slightest difference to the case, as the boys did not, and could not, know whether it was loaded or not. As one of the sheikhs expressed it, "If you point a gun at me, loaded or unloaded, I'm not going to risk it. So if I retaliate by braining you, then that's your fault—not mine!"

As compared with some of the customs obtaining among 682
the Sinai Arabs, the following case among the Aulad Ali 171
in the Western Desert is illuminating, and will be quoted in full. The question of who is "chief mourner" of the deceased, and who draws the largest share in a bloodmoney case varies considerably between the tribes of Arab and
Berber origin. Among the Aulad Ali a woman killed is [562]
automatically half the value of a man, whereas among the [435]
Arabs the value of a woman depends on a variety of conditions.

A man called Idris had two daughters, Towida and 682
Beida. Beida married a man called Korayem Shushan of 672
the Gereidat tribe, and Towida married Farag Gueida of the Mowalik tribe. A son had been born to Towida and Farag called Lataif Farag; and when Lataif was about four years old, his parents quarrelled about some trifling matter, and Farag divorced Towida. Two months after this, Towida went to spend a day or two with her sister Beida and Korayem, and it was while sitting alone in their tent that the accident happened which was the cause of this lawsuit. It seems that Korayem had left a loaded gun tied up with cord to the roof of the tent, suspended from the poles. While Towida was sitting there, a sudden gust of wind got up, and shook the tent violently. As the tent rocked in the wind, the gun came tumbling down on to a wooden chest between the poles; the impact fired the

682 charge, which hit Towida at a range of only a few feet,
672 with fatal results.

Farag, who had divorced her two months before,
682 brought a claim for bloodmoney from Korayem; but when
672 the case was heard, Korayem denied that the accident had
• 695 happened in his tent. The assessors of this first court,
which was held soon after the accident, demanded that
Korayem should swear, backed by twenty-five men (i.e.
half the full number of fifty, as Towida was a woman),
that the accident did not take place in his tent. Then
[671] followed an example of one of the very unsatisfactory
points in Bedouin Law.

Korayem, who was a powerful man belonging to the Gereidat, who were in turn a powerful family, managed to persuade the court to cancel their judgment requiring the oath from himself and his twenty-five backers, and to agree to a settlement whereby he should pay £10 and be absolved from the necessity of taking the oath. The court accepted this agreement, and proceeded to examine the claims to the bloodmoney.

The Moslem Law of Divorce provides that when a man
682 divorces his wife, the decree does not become absolute for
672 three months, in order that it may be ascertained whether
695 the woman be pregnant by her lately divorced husband.
Towida had only been divorced two months before the
671 accident; so the question had to be decided whether Farag
586 were legally her husband or not at the time of her death,
for purposes of receiving a share of the bloodmoney. If so,
he should receive one quarter; but there seems to have
been some difference of opinion on this point among the
assessors of the court, and the whole matter was shelved.

682 Seventeen years afterwards, Lataif Farag—then a man
of twenty-one—re-opened the case, claiming his mother's
672 bloodmoney. In support of his claim he produced three
695 witnesses. The first was Farag himself, who was prepared
to swear that he had seen Towida lying dead in the tent of
694 Korayem. The second was Towida's brother, who was

prepared to swear that he had been called in; and had seen 682
his sister dying in a pool of blood in Korayem's tent. The 672
third was a stranger who had been passing at the time of
the accident, had heard the shot, had gone into Korayem's 695•
tent, and had seen Towida lying on the floor in a dying 694
condition. The newly-constituted court probed this evidence, without actually demanding the oath from these three witnesses, and arrived at the following conclusions:

1. That the facts of the case were common knowledge, and were as Lataif claimed.
2. That Korayem never really intended to swear that the accident did *not* happen in his tent, but had succeeded in bluffing the previous Court. This was made possible by the fact that Korayem's family were strong, and Farag's were weak.
3. That half the price of a man—i.e. £150—should be the bloodmoney in this case, provided that Farag could produce satisfactory evidence on oath that:
    (*a*) the gun belonged to Korayem,
    (*b*) the accident took place in Korayem's tent.
4. In the event of these conditions being met, Lataif Farag should receive five-sixths of the £150; and, provided that they swore the above oath backed by four others, Towida's father and mother (if alive) should receive the remaining one-sixth.

Generally speaking, this judgment appeals to an outside observer as eminently sensible and just; and if only the matter had been left at that, and the judgment had been enforced, all would have been well. Unfortunately, however, various influences again crept in to interfere with the decision of this second court. The accident had then happened about eighteen years before; the first court had been bluffed by Korayem; after an interval of seventeen years the second court gave their very reasonable judgment; and then for some reason unexplained the case was again shelved, and the judgment not executed. For the third

682 time the case was re-opened, after a further interval of some
672 years since the second judgment. By this time nearly all
695 the assessors and witnesses of the first Court were dead,
694 rumours had been spread that the gun belonged to a stranger
who had left his gun in Korayem's tent, and should therefore pay his share of the bloodmoney, and so on.

The Gereidat family again succeeded in confusing the case, and in prejudicing the issue in their favour; and the third court gave the following decision, to the disgust of interested followers of this rather remarkable lawsuit. They decided that no evidence existed to shew what happened in Korayem's tent, and that no oath was necessary, maintaining that in the absence of any proof whatsoever Farag had no claim. They further ordered a new distribution of the reduced scale of bloodmoney proposed, whereupon the proceedings became completely involved and absolutely unintelligible.

682 The above events point out unmistakably the weak
672 spots in the Ourfi system. Korayem's family were strong,
and on two occasions were successful in evading just de-
695 cisions against them; while the weak family with a strong case had to see justice perverted.

695 When the considered judgment of an Ourfi Court
182 receives authority for prompt and immediate execution
from the Government and the police, the Ourfi system is
648 probably the nearest possible approach to the ideal, consistent with the conditions prevailing. But it is an undeniable fact, which must be faced, that without the moral backing of the Civil Power behind the judgments of the Bedouin Courts, miscarriages of justice are possible, and do actually take place.

> 691 between me and my cousins, according to Bedouin law
> 692 (yinafth al-'awaiyid bainaana). I went to the shaikh
> because my cousins did not agree that we go to the
> *613 'aqila right away. We agreed that the shaikh would
> choose the third party, and the judgment would be
> 554 binding on both of us. The shaikh chose Bu Halaiqa as
> 629 the third party, and Bu Halaiqa chose three others as
> consultants. (Two of the three were rajal khair, and
> the other was an 'aqila.) The judgment was that my
> cousins were in the wrong. They were fined 10 L.E.
> and a dhabiiha("blood sacrifice"). 'Ali intervened and
> did not allow my cousins to pay the fine. He had them
> write a paper stating, that if they resume this quarrel
> in the future they must pay the fine plus another 10 L.E.
> fine. (Hajj 'Ali is a rajal khair.)

695 Sometimes the Egyptian police must be brought into a judicial
648 affair to insure the execution of a judgment. In one case,
•696 an individual in al-Qasr did not accept the decision of his
'aqila; his 'aqila wrote the decision on paper and sent him to another 'aqila. The second 'aqila agreed with the first, but the man also refused this decision. The second 'aqila wrote his decision on paper and sent it to the shaikh of the 'Aishaibat in Matruh. The shaikh summoned the culprit and sent him to the police station. Finally, the police were able to convince the man to pay his fine, and also his expiation fee to his own 'aqila. My informant said that this was a minor affair, and that had it been a serious offense committed by the man he would have been threatened with expulsion from the corporate group.

*613 As the corporate sole, the 'aqila has political authority
554 which is legitimate and morally binding on all who wish to
571 maintain their status in the group and tribe. Any individual

619 The name also includes various peasant [563] groups and individuals who migrated from the Nile valley and who were incorporated into the tribal organization by a system of tribal adoption called "Iktitab." Most of these peasant groups came to the desert [701] to avoid military drafting by becoming part of Awlad Ali, who, until [554] 1947, were exempted from serving in the Egyptian army. Although groups and individuals thus adopted become part of the pedigrees of the adopting tribal segments and are supposed to enjoy equal status, yet, insofar as their origin is still remembered, they are looked down upon by the Sa'adi and occupy a position somewhere between that of Awlad Ali Sa'adi and that of the Murabiteen.

619 173 The Sa'adi tribes consider themselves to be the descendants of a certain Aqqar Ben Sa'ada or Aqqar El-Sherif, a descendant of Bani Suleim, who settled in Cyrenaica in the Fifth Century. Although they claim to [144] be of pure Arab ancestory, all sources agree that a considerable amount of mixture between Arab and indigenous Berber populations took place during the period they have been in North Africa.

[missing in copy provided --Analyst]



Fig. 1. The Sa'adi Tribes

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* The exact relationship of the Gemeiat tribe to the Sa'adi tribes is not exactly known. Many informants, as well as accounts of earlier travelers in the area, assert that descent from Hkadiga, a sister of Ali and Harb, and therefore are cousins of Awlad Ali. Others, especially members of Sa'adi tribes, themselves, deny any genealogical

619 from forced labor in government projects and released from the payment
175 of taxes. The government agreed to these demands, and on their
648 part, Awlad Ali helped Muhammad Ali extensively in his military expedition
in Syria and Arabia and were a major factor in the battle of
1815 at Bissel where he succeeded in breaking Wahabi power. They also
helped his son, Ismeal, in his expedition to the Sudan.

● [701] Later, when the Egyptian army was organized, the government exempted
Awlad Ali and other tribal groups which helped in the military
conquests from military service, but required them to undertake the
guarding of the desert roads and the frontiers of Egypt. Also, in
[423] exchange for their previous services, they were given the right to use
the land of the Western Desert and left the question of its distribution
among the various tribal segments to the native tribal leaders.
619 Finally, in 1832, Awlad Ali were granted a form of legal and political
175 autonomy whereby the government acknowledged the tribal legal and
648 642 judicial system as the means to settle disputes between members of the
tribe. The government also recognized the authority of the native tribal
leaders and allowed the tribal populations to be governed by their own
native system of leadership.

This political autonomy of Awlad Ali existed until 1947. Although
their usefulness to the government had long ceased to exist, they had
continued to enjoy the privileges they had obtained earlier. This was
partly due to the fact that the various governments that came after
Muhammad Ali showed no interest in the area occupied by Awlad Ali.
There were no taxable lands in the area, no natural resources of any
promise, and the tribal population did not present any particular problem
000 to attract the attention of the government. There was some smuggling

657 full-time employment with the government projects in the area and
[178] settle in fairly permanent houses near the place of work.
[464]

657 With the movement toward settling down, the relative legal and
701 political autonomy which Awlad Ali once enjoyed is breaking down. This
642 was reflected first in the loss of military exemption. In 1947, the
draft law was applied to all tribal populations in Egypt, including
Awlad Ali. The application is not seriously enforced, however, due
to the fact that births are still not recorded in the area. In 1954,
657 the "omda" or mayorship system practiced in the rural areas of Egypt
634 was extended to the Western Desert with certain modifications to fit
177 the tribal organization of populations in the area. This put a strain
on the native system of leadership, a point which will be covered in
657 later chapters. Finally, and along with the extension of the omda system,
692 the jurisdiction of the legal system of the state was extended
177 over the area. This resulted in a duality in the judicial process.
178 The tribal law, with its traditional tribal mediators, is still functioning side by side with the modern court system of the state law. In many cases, especially in criminal cases, the individual is tried under both systems, and sometimes receives two different judgments for the same offense. Various efforts are being made to minimize the effects of this duality. In civil cases, the problem does not seem serious, since it is the parties themselves, or one of them, who voluntarily bring the case to the attention of the legal authorities. Therefore, they can choose between the traditional legal system and the modern courts of law. So far, civil cases are brought to the modern court system only when the native procedures fail to achieve a settlement. As such, the

634 who reach the age of military service. He is also supposed to report
554 the presence of any fugitive or crininal in his district and report
657 crimes accurring in that district and which involve members of the tribal
segment he represents.

634 The first two duties of the omda to the government do not involve
554 any conflict of interest. Unlike the rural areas where sons are con-
657 sidered a very important economic asset to their parents, and therefore,
562 there is a general resentment of military service which takes the sons
● 701
178 away and deprives the parents of their important work around the fields,
Awlad Ali look at military service as an opportunity to have their sons go to the city, obtain guaranteed payment, and escape the hardship of nomadic existence. Economic activities
[233] in the area do not require the cooperation of a large number of individuals, and most of the grazing of animals is done either by a paid shepherd or by one of the grown-up sons. Although there still exists an
[183] ideology which values having many sons, yet with the cessation of hostilities between the tribal segments, their presence in the area has lost its
[464] value. Many of the younger generation are seeking jobs with the government projects in the area or in the city. Neither one is easy to find. Joining the army is increasingly considered as an easy alternative.

634 The omda's function which seems to involve some conflicting loyalties
554 is that of reporting crimes involving members of his tribal segment. But
657 even this does not pose a serious problem as it might seem. Almost all
674 minor crimes committed against property or persons as well as all civil disputes are left to be handled by the tribal proceedings. The duties of the omda are limited to reporting the cases of murder and serious assault

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1 On the basis of one percent of the yearly yield.

*175 Arabs, to assess and collect taxes, to maintain security, and to
*648 control the few police allotted to them. In this task they
651 expected co-operation from the local Shaikhs of the tribal
634 sections and the Shaikhs of the Sanusiya lodges.

[619] It is remarkable that the Bedouin paid any taxes at all, for
[793] the mudirs had not sufficient force at their command, nor had
the Governor at Banghazi, to compel the Bedouin to pay if they
were determined not to do so. The mudir of Slanta had only 50
[701] to 60 soldiers in his sub-district and the Bara‘asa whom he
[625] administered could have annihilated this force with ease, as
could the ‘Awaqir the 50 soldiers and the handful of police
*175 stationed at Suluq. That taxes were collected at all, and all the
more that they were collected without constant disturbance, is
*648 to be accounted for partly by the recognition by the Shaikhs of
651 the tribal sections, with whom the mudirs were careful to keep
634 on good personal terms, that there was a moral obligation to
619 pay them; but there were also sanctions if they were not paid.
If the Shaikh of a tribal section did not collect the taxes due from that section, he was held responsible and action could be taken against him personally. The mudir, accompanied by a small armed force, went a round of the tribal sections attached to his sub-district each year, generally in springtime, and sent out other tax-collecting parties in other directions. Sometimes special tax commissions appointed by the Governor also toured the country. A favourite device was for such parties to quarter themselves in the camp of a recalcitrant Shaikh and to reside there as his guests, for the soldiers and police carried few provisions, till the tax was paid. The Shaikhs, on the other hand, were made partners in the undertaking by, besides investment with an official robe and status, receiving a percentage of the taxes collected, the mudir himself also taking a percentage. Moreover, each Shaikh whose section paid the tax was determined that the other sections should not escape paying as well. A Shaikh was able to divide up the assessment on his section among the minor Shaikhs, and the minor Shaikhs among yet smaller ones. It was in the interest of each Shaikh to see that the smaller ones did not escape their share and leave him with the responsibility for a deficit. Responsibility was in this way
*175 passed down the tribal structure. On the whole the system
*648 worked well and the Turkish officials and the Bedouin did not
651

175* 648* 795* 793

the Sayyid's wishes in this matter, both to uphold the Sayyid's prestige among his own people and to make him keep to his promises, particularly about the Allied prisoners and the Turkish officers, under threat of closing the port should he recant. There were in Cyrenaica still many Turkish officers urging the Bedouin to continue the struggle and Sayyid Idris had promised to round them up should al-Sallum be opened to trade. The question of the Turks was bound up with the al-Sallum issue because, as the Sayyid pointed out, Turkey had kept his people supplied by submarine, and while the Allies continued their blockade he could not afford to break with her.

175* 648* 701 795*

Another problem was the immediate dispersal of the Sanusi fighting bands, or 'dors' (*adwar*), on which the Italian delegates insisted. It would have been foolish for the Sayyid to have disbanded his forces while discussions were proceeding, since it was their presence in the field which compelled the Allies to negotiate. He urged that it would be useless for him to agree to the dispersal of the bands, because they had no intention of dispersing and he had no means of forcing them to do so. The only result would be the loss of his prestige among his followers, who would say that he had become 'Italianized'. These bands continued to be a bone of contention between the Sanusi and the Italians for the next six years, and the issue was only settled by the military subjugation of the whole of Cyrenaica in 1932.

175* 648* 795*

It was a question of importance to the Italians, because the answer to it was also the answer to what they regarded as the fundamental question of sovereignty. On this point the Sayyid was unyielding. He argued that his family, like the Arab princes of Arabia, had never accepted such demands as the Italians made, even from the Turks, fellow Muslims ruled by the Caliph of Islam; and he insisted that the British, who had everywhere shown themselves to be friends to the Arabs, should not press those of Cyrenaica to accept Italian sovereignty, which was the issue of the war and could only be imposed on a defeated people. The British regarded the question of sovereignty as a theoretical one and could not understand why the Italians attached so much importance to it.

Col. Talbot thought they should be content with the occupation of the ports and other centres, as the British were in Egypt,

Italy would therefore withdraw from her colonial adventure, 175*
advised the Amir to sign the Accord of al-Rajma in the hope 648*
that he would not have to carry out its terms. He was later to 631
spend over 16 years in exile in Italy for his alleged duplicity. 795*
The Italians did not at this time charge the Amir with more 793
than weakness when, after the stipulated eight months had [712]
passed, he had failed to carry out the terms of the accord, especially
in the matter of the armed Sanusi camps.

These camps were supply points garrisoned by the remnants 175*
of the Sanusi army of 1917. Through them and from them the 648*
Sanusiya was exercising political control over the country and 712
administering the tribes. The chief camps in 1917 were Ajada- 631
biya, al-Shlaidima, Marawa, Khawalan, al-Abyar, Taknis, and 795*
'Akrama. Each was under a *qaimaqam* and had its com- 701
mandant of troops, its qadi for judicial proceedings, and its tithe collectors who collected from the Bedouin a tax on crops and flocks. With the development of the political functions of the Order alms had been transformed into taxes. Ajadabiya and al-Shlaidima had as their *nazir*, inspector, 'Ali Pasha al-'Abdiya. Al-Abyar and Taknis came under Sidi 'Umar al-Mukhtar, and Marawa, Khawalan, and 'Akrama came under Sayyid Safi al-Din.

When asked why these camps had not been broken up the 175*
Amir said that the accord had been very badly received by the 648*
Bedouin and that were it to be enforced hastily serious dis- 712
turbances might ensue. He counselled caution. In addition to 701
the continuance of the armed camps in defiance of the accord, 795*
the Italians also complained of concerted passive resistance, 793
on the part of the Shaikhs of Sanusiya lodges and the Shaikhs 631
of tribes, to collaboration with their officials; but either because [668]
they were not yet ready to use force or because they were convinced that the Amir was unable to dictate to his followers, and probably for both reasons, they continued to temporize.

By the further Accord of Bu Mariyam of 11 November 1921 175*
the dissolution of the armed camps was confirmed, but it was 648*
agreed that until the Italians had strengthened their admini- 712
strative control and political influence in the country the still- 701
existing Sanusi camps should be held jointly. There were to 631
be four so-called '*Campi Misti*', at al-Abyar, Taknis, Slanta, 795*
and 'Akrama, manned by Italian and Sanusi troops in the

*175 proportion of 5 to 4, each controlled by its own representative.
*648 To these four was later added a fifth camp, al-Makhili,
712 so that the Italians might establish themselves at an important
● 701 watering-place of the southern nomads.

631 The new arrangement was fantastic. Two forces, each under
*795 its own officers and flag, each opposed to the other in every
particular, were jointly responsible for the security and welfare
of the country. What made it even more absurd in the eyes of
later Fascist critics was the fact that the Sanusi soldiers in these
camps received their rations and pay from the Italian Government
they did everything to flout. It was, moreover, an admission
on the part of the Italians that they were unable to enforce
the accords they signed with the Amir if the Bedouin did not
intend to carry out their terms, and that they could not establish
themselves in the country unless the Sanusiya was ready
*175 to allow them to do so. All that apologists for this new accord
*648 have been able to say in defence of it was that the Italian
631 Government had by this time realized that nothing was in any
*795 case likely to come of all these agreements and in the end only
signed it in order that, while formally respecting it, they might have time and opportunity to establish their authority among the tribes, particularly among the 'Awaqir, the western Darsa, the Bara'asa, and the 'Abaidat. The Rome Government, not wanting to increase its troubles by starting a new war in Cyrenaica, imposed a policy of appeasement on its restless Colonial Government. It was bad enough to have to face the anarchy in Tripolitania, and there was always a danger that if the situation in Cyrenaica deteriorated Sayyid Ahmad might return to raise again the standard of revolt. Sayyid Idris might be weak and at times difficult, but he was at least pacific. The harassed Governor was therefore instructed that he would have to continue the battle of words till it became feasible to open real hostilities. However, the Italian Government were mistaken in believing that the new accord would allow them to increase their influence in the country, for the Sanusiya, through its representatives in the 'Mixed Camps', came between the tribes and the Italians. It is generally admitted by Italian commentators that after Bu Mariyam the Government was only apparently in the ascendancy politically, while in fact the administration of the whole country outside the towns continued

*175 *648 *795 793 Accord of al-Rajma. But the Italians were not yet ready to break with him finally, not wishing to compromise the operations they were carrying out in Tripolitania. They therefore started new discussions, conducted in person by Amendola, the Minister for the Colonies, who, on his return to Italy, expressed satisfaction with the talks and confidence in the Amir, neither of which he could have felt. In Mondaini's opinion the Government's policy of continuing to treat with the Sanusiya at so late a stage was consistent and, in the circumstances, wise, for it was believed that the greed for lucre and honours so unashamedly displayed by members of the Amir's family would bring them into disrepute among the Arabs, while the Government would be able to organize under its administration the zone of the plateau nearest its coastal bases and thus prepare for its penetration into the interior. In defence of Amendola's policy, later subjected to much criticism,[1] Mondaini further observes that the Fascist Government itself delayed action till the spring of 1923 when the Tripolitanian rebellion had been crushed.[2]

Concessions certainly did not lessen tension. The Italians [712] [701] [182] felt that the Sanusiya was using the 'Mixed Camps' as a medium for anti-Italian propaganda, as indeed they were, not only through their official representatives in the camps but also through persons not officially recognized, such as the Sanusiya Shaikhs 'Umar al-Mukhtar, Salih al-'Awwami, and Khalid al-Humri; and they suspected that Shaikh 'Abd al-Aziz al-'Isawi had been sent by the Amir into the Misurata region to act as his liaison with the insurgents there. The Amir had selected for his personal advisers the most recalcitrant of the zawiya Shaikhs. They further accused the Order of responsibility for certain incidents which happened in the late summer of 1922: an attack on an Italian postal car near al-Zawiya al-Baida and the firing of some Italian property at al-Zuwaitina. Rome, said to have been misled by 'Umar Pasha al-Kakhiya, blamed the local government for these incidents and appointed a new Governor who made a further, and as it turned out final, gesture of conciliation by paying to the Amir the remainder of the money owing to him under the Accord of al-Rajma. But nothing could brake the wheels now. Already in August the Committee elected

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[1] Giglio, op. cit., p. 99.

[2] Mondaini, op. cit., p. 475.

followed it. In 1923, when he was called to take the foremost 175*
part in the struggle, he was already over sixty years of age. 648*
He was a simple man, religious, courageous, contemptuous of 795*
worldly honours and success, and with singular tenacity and 793
powers of physical endurance. It may well be true that, as is 159
reported, Sayyid al-Mahdi said 'If we had ten men like ‘Umar
we would not need any more'.

IV

All the *adwar*, or guerrilla bands, on the plateau came under 175*
Sidi ‘Umar's command and he signed himself *al-Naib al-‘Amm*, 648*
the Representative-General (of the Sanusiya). Each Bedouin 795*
tribe, as in Enver's day, maintained its own guerrilla band, some 793
100 to 300 men strong. Towards the end of the war the guerrillas 701 ●
never numbered, all told, more than 600 to 700. Only a certain 619
number of men could maintain themselves on the country and move through it with speed and secrecy. As in other guerrilla wars, the actual fighting was done by small bands of enthusiasts, whose success nevertheless depended on the goodwill of the whole population. The bands suffered very heavy casualties, but were maintained at strength by a constant stream of adventurous spirits from submitted and unsubmitted sections alike. Though each band was named after a tribe and its members were chiefly recruited from that tribe and fought in its territory, they were not entirely recruited from it and they might fight anywhere. In each tribal band there were a good number of volunteers from other tribes and a sprinkling of *Ikhwan*, Sudanese, and Tripolitanians. The ‘Awaqir and Magharba had separate bands while the other tribal bands usually fought in pairs, Hasa–‘Abaidat, Bara‘asa–Darsa, and ‘Abid–‘Arafa. A Misuratan contingent formed a small band of its own which greatly distinguished itself in the fighting. Each band had a simple organization: a commander, a *qaimaqam* for civil affairs, a qadi for religious and legal purposes, a commissariat agent, and a number of officers, some of whom had been trained
in Turkish regular units. Sidi ‘Umar maintained discipline in [703]
the bands, and acts of pillage or personal vendetta were severely punished. Those of the guerrillas who possessed horses rode
them. The rest went on foot. Each band had its Sanusi flag. [186]

*175 When things were quiet members of a band would have their
*648 families and herds with them and live in their own tents, but
*795 when pressed they left their women and children and beasts in
701 the tents of the submitted population and the only non-
619 combatants in their camps would then be a few female cooks.
[722] Before the end of the war many of the Patriots, including Sidi
'Umar, had sent their families to Egypt so that they could act
more freely.

*175 There was also a general administration for all the bands and
*648 this came directly under Sidi 'Umar. They maintained inter-
*795 communication and worked to a common strategy. Guerrilla
793 headquarters had also to arrange for the collection of a tithe
701 from the entire population to help pay for the expenses of the
619 campaign. Throughout the war Sidi 'Umar's tax-collectors were
[651] taking tithes from the submitted population, not always with-
out trouble, and were giving written receipts for the payments.
The tithe paid by each tribe went to support its own band. Sidi
[705] 'Umar had also to arrange for caravans to bring supplies from
Egypt, and to supervise their distribution to the armed forces
and the payment of customs dues on what went to the civilian
population. Sidi 'Umar also kept up correspondence with
Sayyid Idris and Sanusi elements and sympathizers in Egypt.

*175 The guerrilla bands were in constant contact with the enemy.
*648 One of the most striking features of the campaign was the
*795 frequency of the fighting. At some point or other on the plateau
a skirmish or larger engagement took place every few days for
nearly nine years during the spring and summer months. In
the account of the campaign which follows I mention but few
of these fights, those which had exceptional importance for the
campaign as a whole or as examples of the scale of the fighting.
The few mentioned are therefore no indication of the amount of
fighting. Its frequency may be judged by Gen. Graziani's statement that in the final year of the war, when resistance, compared with earlier years, was feeble and sporadic, there took place 53 engagements (*combattimenti*) and 210 skirmishes (*conflitti*).[1]

This incessant fighting cannot, as I have already said, be described in the language of text-book logistics in terms of manœuvring, objectives, and battles. Indeed, the Italians had

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[1] *Rivista delle Colonie Italiane*, vol. vi (I), 1932, pp. 52–3.

to adapt themselves to the kind of fighting which seldom fails 175*
to upset the orthodox military mind. Text-book strategy does 648*
not apply to an enemy who wanders at will over a country with 795*
which he is familiar from birth, among a friendly people ready to provide him with exact intelligence, and in small mobile bands; and whose strategy is little more than the guerrilla imperatives—strike suddenly, strike incessantly, strike hard, get out quick. An army can only be manœuvred to inflict defeats on the enemy and to destroy his armed forces when he has an opposing army which can be brought to decisive engagements. The Italians were fighting a people, not an army, and a people can only be defeated by total imprisonment or extermination.

If the Bedouin had had anything which could clearly have
been isolated as 'armed forces', these could easily have been
destroyed by Italian superiority in men and machines. But [701]
they had nothing which could, properly speaking, be called an army, and they had no lines which could be pierced or turned and no strongholds which could be taken or in which troops could be contained. Against Bedouin it was of little profit to occupy towns and villages, for they retired to less accessible regions or circulated gaily between the Italian garrisons. Control of the roads and ports was also of little benefit. Roads were [439]
meaningless to the Bedouin and they were independent of over-
seas trade since they could live on the country for immediate [705]
necessities and obtain from Egypt what few additional supplies
they required to carry on the war. To ease the supply problem,
as well as to be of maximum nuisance to the Italian garrisons [701]
and convoys, the guerrilla bands were kept as small and mobile as possible. Their smallness and mobility confused the slow and unwieldy Italian columns. If the columns split up they were liable to be surrounded by concerted action of the bands and annihilated, whereas if they kept together, the cost of formation was the loss of speed and surprise. There seemed to be no enemy forces to fight, yet attack was incessant. There were no fixed points of opposition. It was indefinite and disseminated.

Even when contact could be established with the guerrilla bands and they could be defeated, as they often were, their defeat could not be turned into more than a temporary rout, for there was no highly organized tactical system to be upset,

*175 *648 *795 lished on their own account, and the Italians considered illegally, a camp at Khawalan of about 100 men and a number of small posts, shown on the map, with about 15 to 30 men in each. Their headquarters force was at Ajadabiya.

As stated at the end of the last chapter, Gen. Bongiovanni seized the 'Mixed Camps' on 6 March 1923. Though this day may be regarded as the date of the recommencement of hostilities

[102] [712] [701]



Distribution of Sanusi forces in March 1923.

in Cyrenaica, the first operational phase proper was a drive to the south of Banghazi. The country there offered fewer difficulties to mechanized movement in the grand style than the plateau country, and it was near the main Italian base. The objective was the little village of Ajadabiya, the Sanusi seat of government and military headquarters, called grandiloquently by Bongiovanni after its capture the '*Roccaforte della Senussia*'.[1] The Italians seem to have believed that they had only to take it for resistance to collapse everywhere, much as it had collapsed in Old Tripolitania after the chief centres had been occupied. [701] The Sanusi forces, under their Commander, Qajja bin 'Abdalla, a Qur'ani of Tibesti, were unable to defend the village against so large and well-equipped a column, and after they had been worsted in several fights they retired, leaving the jubilant

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[1] *Proclama alle popolazioni*, 1923, p. 5.

Italians to occupy it on 21 April, the Birthday of Rome. This 175*
proved to be less favourable an augury than was hoped, for 648*
early in June two of their columns advancing from Ajadabiya 795*
on Marsa al-Braiqa were almost annihilated by Magharba [701]
tribesmen.

Their experience in the *barqa* taught the Italians afresh the lesson of 1911 to 1915, that against Bedouin unwieldy columns advancing without concealment in a direct line on definite and fixed objectives could lead to little more than skirmishes, for the enemy was too wise to become involved in decisive action and mobile enough to avoid it; so they adopted the new tactics of making surprise raids by mechanized units on the Bedouin encampments, slaughtering man and beast indiscriminately, and destroying the grain stores. In these raids, on what in a non-colonial war would be regarded as the civilian population, the purpose was to kill as many of the Bedouin as possible, striking terror into the hearts of the shepherd folk of Cyrenaica. When the rains came and mechanized transport could no longer be used, the camps were bombed and machine-gunned from the air. The Bedouin suffered greatly from this persistent strafing, the
Italian estimate of their losses—I must repeat that Italian
figures are highly suspect—from 6 March to 3 September 1923 [727]
being 800 killed, 230 captured, and 1,000 wounded, besides about 700 camels and 22,000 sheep killed or confiscated. These losses were incurred only in the western part of Cyrenaica, for during the opening phase the rest of the country was quiet, except for minor skirmishes between Sidi 'Umar and the
Italians in the Marmarica. At the end of the year the Sanusi
forces had retired to country where they were less vulner- [701]
able, roughly to south and east of the line al-Braiqa-al-Qatafiya-Msus, with infiltrations everywhere along it towards the Italian posts.

The ease with which they had entered Ajadabiya and had 175*
raided and overcome resistance in the *barqa* generally had misled 648*
the Italians into believing that they would encounter little 795*
resistance elsewhere. They were further misled by the number 619
of submissions they received at the commencement of the campaign: by the end of May 1923, 10,380 in the Ajadabiya zone, 3,417 in the Banghazi zone, and 7,000 in the zone of al-Marj; a total of 20,797 with 6,028 tents and more than 10,000

*175 head of livestock, on which fines were levied for having taken
*648 part in the resistance. These submissions were from the less
*795 warlike Bedouin, those within easy reach of administrative
619 centres, who had been taken ~~by~~ surprise and overwhelmed by the size of the Italian forces and their mechanized equipment, especially their planes, against the indiscriminate bombing and machine-gunning of which they had neither protection nor reply. They lacked the forest covering of the plateau tribes and the desert wastes into which the tribes of the Sirtica could retire. Moreover, the Italians had not yet realized that submission to protect families and herds did not exclude help in men, supplies, and intelligence to the fighting bands which continued resistance in country better suited to guerrilla warfare. The quietness of the plateau also deceived them. The Bedouin, unlike themselves, did not have an army ready to hand which could be sent into action at a moment's notice. It took the plateau tribes time to grasp what was happening and to form guerrilla groups. It also took the leaders of the Bedouin, both tribal Shaikhs and zawiya Shaikhs, time to accommodate themselves to Sayyid Idris's defection and vacillation, which seriously affected morale in Cyrenaica and Tripolitania and caused much coming and going between Cairo and the battlefields.

As the war entered its second phase in 1924–5 it soon became evident that neither the ponderous spectacular movements nor the mechanized raids on the camps which had been used in the flat *barqa* country were suited to the rugged and wooded plateau. The campaign rapidly assumed the character of guerrilla warfare, some of the features of which I have already outlined, with its tedious record of countless skirmishes and surprises. When the operational season opened in March 1924 the advanced Italian dispositions were on the west–east line al-Shlaidima–al-Abyar–Sidi Salim–Taknis–Marawa–Slanta–al-Fayidiya–Khawalan–al-
[901] Makhili. The Sanusi 'regular army', mixed with tribal volunteers from the Magharba and southern 'Awaqir, was still unbeaten under al-Qazza in the eastern Sirtica between Ajadabiya and the Wadi al-Farigh. The tribal guerrilla bands under Sidi 'Umar were mostly on the southern slopes of the central plateau. They were chiefly recruited from the Bara'asa, 'Abid, and 'Awaqir tribes which had from the earliest days of the Italian occupation of Cyrenaica shown themselves most hostile to

penetration, though they were assisted by contingents from the 175*
Darsa, Hasa, and 'Abaidat. 648*

In the fighting between March and June of 1924 the Italians 795*
reckoned that about 600 men of the 'Abid, Bara'asa, and 619
northern 'Awaqir had been killed and 25,000 head of their live- [701]
stock had been captured. [727] In the summer and autumn at least another 250 were killed and about 1,500 camels and 17,000 sheep and goats captured. In spite of these, what were to them very heavy, casualties, the Bedouin continued to harass Italian posts and communications. Salih Lataiwish with his Magharba tribesmen menaced Ajadabiya; Abu al-Qasim al-Zintani with an 'Awaqir band threatened the advanced Italian bases at al-Abyar, al-Rajma, and Banina; Sidi 'Umar with the 'Abid tribal band contained the posts in the al-Marj sector, and detachments under his lieutenant 'Ali bu Rahayyim operated against communications between al-Marj and Talmaitha; Husain Juwaifi's Bara'asa band worried the garrisons at al-Zawiya al-Baida, al-Fayidiya, and Slanta; and Qtait bu Musa with his Hasa and 'Abaidat volunteers was camped opposite Khawalan. Behind these detachments were the camps of the Bedouin who had not submitted, even in appearance, in the *sirwal*, the *barqa al-baida*, and along the southern slopes of the plateau everywhere. The Italians found it necessary to pause to consolidate gains of territory and to carry out a reorganization of their operational units.

Sidi 'Umar's strategy at the time, both as Commander of the 175*
'Abid band and as Commander-in-Chief of all the guerrilla forces 648*
on the plateau, was to hold its southern slopes. Their rugged 795*
desolation prevented the use of mechanized forces against him 701
and gave him tactical superiority over foot and horse patrols. From the slopes he was able both to menace the Italian posts and communications on the plateau and to cover the families of his fighting men in their camps to the south of it. The Italian answer to these tactics was obvious. They could not prevent guerrilla bands from circulating on the plateau in the cover of forest and deep ravines, but they had by this time established themselves in sufficient strength on the margin of the plateau, and had gained sufficient experience in the handling of mechanized patrols to attack the camps of non-combatants in the flat steppe country to the south. These camps were easily

*175 spotted by planes and either bombed or machine-gunned from
*648 the air or destroyed by armoured cars.

*795 As a result of the operations in 1924 and the spring of 1925
● 701 the Bedouin bands were pressed eastwards away from the main Italian bases at Banghazi and al-Marj. However, Italian control of much of the country from which they claimed to have driven the Patriots was less secure than the disposition of their advance posts suggests, for the guerrilla bands continued to operate in it. Nevertheless they were now able to mass men in these posts in such numbers, and to equip and supply them so well, that a Patriot attack on them had small chance of success. Sidi 'Umar had therefore to fall back on such operations as could be conducted by his small guerrilla bands, now deprived of any secure bases, mostly in and from the thick forest country to the south of the watershed between Marawa and al-Qaiqab and in the broken country of the Wadi al-Kuf area, where they had protection from air-reconnaissance and mechanized patrols and the advantage of superior intelligence and knowledge of the terrain.

*175 The Italians had to adapt their tactics anew to the kind of
*648 warfare most favourable to the enemy. Gen. Mombelli's new
operational plan was to establish a line of forts to act as *perni*
*795 *di manovra* from which the whole country could be ceaselessly patrolled to prevent the Patriot bands from massing against any point, to destroy their herds and crops, and to keep them constantly on the run. The main concentrations for these operations were al-Abyar, al-Marj, and Shahhat. The plan at first appeared to give the desired results but as time went on it gave less satisfaction. It was found that while it allowed the troops greater freedom of movement it was they, and not the Patriots, whose strength was worn out and finally exhausted. The Bedouin countered the new measures by attacking the smaller Italian patrols and dispersing before the larger. They solved
[705] the supply problem by living on the country, exacting food from the submitted sections, in whose country they also quartered their families, sowed their crops, and pastured their herds, so that the Italian patrols did not know what belonged to the *sottomessi* and what to the *ribelli* and they could only destroy the crops and beasts of the Patriots if they destroyed at the same time the crops and beasts of the quiescent part of

Shaikhs met at Alexandria and informed the British Ambassador 175*
in Cairo that they recognized Sayyid Idris as their Amir and that 648*
he could speak on their behalf. At a second meeting of these 795*
Shaikhs in Cairo on 9 August 1940, after Italy had declared war, [793]
it was decided to form a Libyan force to co-operate with the British army in the Western Desert. Though some of the Tripolitanian notables refused to associate themselves with this offer, wishing to make a separate offer on their own account, it was gladly accepted by the British authorities, and the British-Arab Force, later known as the Libyan Arab Force, was recruited from among the Sanusi exiles in Egypt and later also from Sanusi prisoners of war, who had taken the first opportunity of surrendering to the British. It was officered by British and Arabs, including some of the veterans of the Italo-Sanusi wars, and at its maximum strength consisted of five battalions and a depot. The force was not trained and equipped for the kind of fighting which took place in the Western Desert, but it performed useful ancillary duties to which Mr. Eden paid a tribute in the House of Commons on 8 January 1942, when he declared that His Majesty's Government was determined that the Sanusi should not come again under Italian domination. It took part in the first and subsequent occupations of Cyrenaica by British troops, and two battalions served in the defence of Tubruq in
1941. The little Sanusi army fought under its own flag and Arab [701] ●
commissions in it were in the name of the Amir. The Bedouin of Cyrenaica also rendered services to the British army as guides and agents and in assisting escaped prisoners of war and men detached from their units during our two withdrawals to Egypt. They gave further assistance by their eager co-operation with the three British Military Administrations of their country, although those who were known to have rendered the British special assistance were shot by the Italians on our withdrawals.

When in 1943 Sayyid Idris visited Cyrenaica for the first time 175*
since his hurried departure from it in 1922 and was received 648*
with wild enthusiasm by the whole country, it was just a century 795*
after his grandfather had founded his first zawiya in it. During 793
that century the Sanusiya Order had seen many changes and had itself changed. Even in the Grand Sanusi's time it had some political functions. The best Italian historian of the Order, Carlo Giglio, could write that at the death of its founder the

charge the enemy, who was armed with the most modern 175*
equipment and generally entrenched. They charged on horseback, 648*
firing wildly, wherever they might come across him, without any regard to danger, terrain, or odds. The Turkish officers had great difficulty in the early days of the campaign in restraining these impetuous cavaliers, but Turkish tact, the example of the disciplined Turkish troops, and the disastrous results of their own impetuosity soon taught them to act with greater caution, though not the patience necessary in the professional
soldier. Realizing that the war might be protracted, Enver 175*
tried to make the Bedouin volunteers feel that they were as 648*
much part of the army of resistance as the Turkish regulars 702 ●
and to give them some military training, in however random a fashion. He chose 300 young Bedouin of the principal families of tribal Shaikhs from among the volunteers and gave them training at his camp at al-Zahir al-Ahmar, some 20 km. to the south-west of Darna. They were given arms and uniforms sent from Turkey, were housed in Turkish army tents, and received Turkish pay. This small Bedouin contingent, trained under Turkish regular officers and N.C.O.'s, took part in the fighting in 1912 and proved to be a valuable adjunct to the slender Turkish forces. When trained some of them were put in charge of the training of the *Mahafiziya*, the Bedouin irregulars, of whom
there were about 2,000 at Enver's camp. Besides the irregulars, 175*
who resided on and off at the Turkish camp, all the Bedouin 648*
for many miles round could be relied on to join in the fray whenever the Italians ventured to move from entrenched and
fortified positions. Most of the Bedouin were armed, but their [411]
rifles were of a very old make, mostly old one-round Greek pieces. When Enver received his irregular and scanty supplies from Turkey he distributed a small number of Turkish rifles among them. Later they equipped themselves with Italian rifles taken in fights, and they had a ready source of ammunition in every Italian column. The irregulars occasionally received largesse from Enver but for the most part paid themselves in loot.

Enver looked yet farther ahead. In June 1912 he selected 175*
365 boys, mostly from among the sons of the Bedouin Shaikhs, 648*
and sent them to Istanbul to be educated for posts in the 702
Cyrenaican army and administration. The first thirty to be

*175 commissioned were later sent to al-Sallum to join Sayyid
*648 Ahmad al-Sharif before the outbreak of war in Europe in 1914.
• 702 Six months later another seven were sent to Cyrenaica but were captured *en route* by a French warship. Many of these lads later distinguished themselves in Asia Minor in the wars there which followed the 1914–1918 war in Europe, and remained in Turkey for good.

IV

*175 The Italian plan in Cyrenaica was to advance simultaneously
*648 from Banghazi in the west and Darna in the east, gripping the central plateau between pincer columns and bringing the enemy to decisive engagements. In the Banghazi zone a column advanced on 28 November 1911 on the suburbs of Sidi Khalifa and al-Kwaifiya. But the Italian forces in and around Banghazi still only had superiority within the range of their naval guns. They were on the defensive and the Turco-Arab force at Banina had the initiative. On 12 March 1912 the Turco-Arabs made a big general attack on Banghazi. This was a blunder which cost them dear. The official Italian account says that they left about 1,000 corpses on the field; but it must be said here, and in reference to all reports of enemy forces and casualties quoted elsewhere in this book, that Italian figures must be treated with reserve. The occupation of Banghazi was now extended to about 8 km. around the town and fortified on that arc. While the Italians sat behind these fortifications at Banghazi with the Turco-Arab force besieging them from Banina, the progress made in the Darna sector was even more disappointing. The town is backed almost immediately by the plateau to which access is difficult owing to the steepness of the incline. Finding the terrain too difficult for an offensive, the Italians remained in the town, with the country around it in undisputed control of their enemies. The fighting which took place on the periphery of the Italian defences was a struggle for control of the Wadi Darna, which supplies the town with most of its water. On the night of 11 to 12 February, Enver Bey launched an attack on the town, but failed to take it, and by July a new girdle of defensive works had been thrown around it, within which the Italians continued to be besieged by the Turco-Arabs, estimated at 8,000 to 12,000 armed men. On 17 September took place a

followed it. In 1923, when he was called to take the foremost 175*
part in the struggle, he was already over sixty years of age. 648*
He was a simple man, religious, courageous, contemptuous of 795*
worldly honours and success, and with singular tenacity and 793
powers of physical endurance. It may well be true that, as is 159
reported, Sayyid al-Mahdi said 'If we had ten men like 'Umar we would not need any more'.

IV

All the *adwar*, or guerrilla bands, on the plateau came under 175*
Sidi 'Umar's command and he signed himself *al-Naib al-'Amm*, 648*
the Representative-General (of the Sanusiya). Each Bedouin 795*
tribe, as in Enver's day, maintained its own guerrilla band, some 793
100 to 300 men strong. Towards the end of the war the guerrillas 701
never numbered, all told, more than 600 to 700. Only a certain 619
number of men could maintain themselves on the country and move through it with speed and secrecy. As in other guerrilla wars, the actual fighting was done by small bands of enthusiasts, whose success nevertheless depended on the goodwill of the whole population. The bands suffered very heavy casualties, but were maintained at strength by a constant stream of adventurous spirits from submitted and unsubmitted sections alike. Though each band was named after a tribe and its members were chiefly recruited from that tribe and fought in its territory, they were not entirely recruited from it and they might fight anywhere. In each tribal band there were a good number of volunteers from other tribes and a sprinkling of *Ikhwan*, Sudanese, and Tripolitanians. The 'Awaqir and Magharba had separate bands while the other tribal bands usually fought in pairs, Hasa–'Abaidat, Bara'asa–Darsa, and 'Abid–'Arafa. A Misuratan contingent formed a small band of its own which greatly distinguished itself in the fighting. Each band had a simple organization: a commander, a *qaimaqam* for civil affairs, a qadi for religious and legal purposes, a commissariat agent, and a number of officers, some of whom had been trained
in Turkish regular units. Sidi 'Umar maintained discipline in [703]
the bands, and acts of pillage or personal vendetta were severely punished. Those of the guerrillas who possessed horses rode
them. The rest went on foot. Each band had its Sanusi flag. [186]

*175 When things were quiet members of a band would have their
*648 families and herds with them and live in their own tents, but
*795 when pressed they left their women and children and beasts in
701 the tents of the submitted population and the only non-
619 combatants in their camps would then be a few female cooks.
[722] Before the end of the war many of the Patriots, including Sidi
'Umar, had sent their families to Egypt so that they could act
more freely.

*175 There was also a general administration for all the bands and
*648 this came directly under Sidi 'Umar. They maintained inter-
*795 communication and worked to a common strategy. Guerrilla
793 headquarters had also to arrange for the collection of a tithe
701 from the entire population to help pay for the expenses of the
619 campaign. Throughout the war Sidi 'Umar's tax-collectors were
[651] taking tithes from the submitted population, not always without trouble, and were giving written receipts for the payments.
The tithe paid by each tribe went to support its own band. Sidi
• [705] 'Umar had also to arrange for caravans to bring supplies from
Egypt, and to supervise their distribution to the armed forces
and the payment of customs dues on what went to the civilian
population. Sidi 'Umar also kept up correspondence with
Sayyid Idris and Sanusi elements and sympathizers in Egypt.

The guerrilla bands were in constant contact with the enemy.
*175 One of the most striking features of the campaign was the
*648 frequency of the fighting. At some point or other on the plateau
*795 a skirmish or larger engagement took place every few days for nearly nine years during the spring and summer months. In the account of the campaign which follows I mention but few of these fights, those which had exceptional importance for the campaign as a whole or as examples of the scale of the fighting. The few mentioned are therefore no indication of the amount of fighting. Its frequency may be judged by Gen. Graziani's statement that in the final year of the war, when resistance, compared with earlier years, was feeble and sporadic, there took place 53 engagements (*combattimenti*) and 210 skirmishes (*conflitti*).[1]

This incessant fighting cannot, as I have already said, be described in the language of text-book logistics in terms of manœuvring, objectives, and battles. Indeed, the Italians had

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[1] *Rivista delle Colonie Italiane*, vol. vi (I), 1932, pp. 52–3.

to adapt themselves to the kind of fighting which seldom fails 175*
to upset the orthodox military mind. Text-book strategy does 648*
not apply to an enemy who wanders at will over a country with 795*
which he is familiar from birth, among a friendly people ready to provide him with exact intelligence, and in small mobile bands; and whose strategy is little more than the guerrilla imperatives—strike suddenly, strike incessantly, strike hard, get out quick. An army can only be manœuvred to inflict defeats on the enemy and to destroy his armed forces when he has an opposing army which can be brought to decisive engagements. The Italians were fighting a people, not an army, and a people can only be defeated by total imprisonment or extermination.

If the Bedouin had had anything which could clearly have
been isolated as 'armed forces', these could easily have been
destroyed by Italian superiority in men and machines. But [701]
they had nothing which could, properly speaking, be called an
army, and they had no lines which could be pierced or turned
and no strongholds which could be taken or in which troops
could be contained. Against Bedouin it was of little profit to
occupy towns and villages, for they retired to less accessible
regions or circulated gaily between the Italian garrisons. Con-
trol of the roads and ports was also of little benefit. Roads were [439]
meaningless to the Bedouin and they were independent of over- [905]
seas trade since they could live on the country for immediate
necessities and obtain from Egypt what few additional supplies
they required to carry on the war. To ease the supply problem, [701]
as well as to be of maximum nuisance to the Italian garrisons
and convoys, the guerrilla bands were kept as small and mobile
as possible. Their smallness and mobility confused the slow and
unwieldy Italian columns. If the columns split up they were
liable to be surrounded by concerted action of the bands and
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*175 to take over the command, Sidi 'Umar had, in spite of almost
*648 invariable defeats, kept the initiative. Mobility, knowledge of
*795 the country, and daring still enabled his men, worn out though
they were by long years of hardship and hunger, to strike where they would, keeping Italian posts, patrols, and convoys always on the alert. Graziani now closed on them from both the plateau and the steppe country to the south. All the earths were stopped. The view-halloo was given wherever they broke. Flight to Egypt alone could save them, and this they would not take.

Graziani was determined to wrest the initiative from the guerrillas. He reorganized his forces for the last round in the '*guerra senza quartiere*' into small mobile patrols to keep the whole of the forest country under surveillance and to attack the enemy wherever they met him, giving him no rest. To prevent the guerrillas from obtaining supplies and reinforcements from the civilian population he disarmed the tribesmen, confiscating from them thousands of rifles and millions of rounds of ammunition, and made possession of arms a capital offence. He instituted the '*tribunale volante*', a military court flown from point to point to try, and execute, all who had dealings of any kind with the guerrillas. He reduced the Libyan units by more than two-thirds, with the intention of disbanding them altogether later. In the meanwhile he distributed among the 750 Libyans retained in service rifles of a different calibre from rifles in Patriot hands to prevent leakage of ammunition. At the same time he closed the Sanusiya lodges, confiscated their estates, and exiled their Shaikhs to the Island of Ustica. He also much improved the communications of the colony, thereby easing his supply problem and economizing man-power.

*175 It may be doubted whether all these measures would have
*648 been effective if he had not also started his immense concentra-
*795 tion camps for the entire tribal population of Cyrenaica, about
whose feelings the General had no illusions. In taking this step
727 the Italians were doing no more than others had done before
them and have done after them, for an army fighting guerrillas
is fighting an entire population. The first concentrations of
● [705] January 1930 were found to be too near the area of military
operations, for the prisoners, in spite of close surveillance, still
managed to supply the guerrillas with some of their requirements;

so most of the Bedouin were removed to the *barqa al-baida* and 175*
the Sirtica. In this bleak country were herded in the smallest 648*
camps possible 80,000 men, women, and children, and 600,000 795*
beasts, in the summer of 1930. Hunger, disease, and broken 727
hearts took a heavy toll of the imprisoned population. Bedouin [705]
die in a cage. Loss of livestock was also great, for the beasts had insufficient grazing near the camps on which to support life, and the herds, already decimated in the fighting, were almost wiped out by the camps.

The guerrillas thus found themselves cut off from local sources 175*
of supply and forced more and more to rely on Egypt for the 648*
bare necessities of life and of war. For years a considerable part 795*
of their supplies had come from there, paid for by Bedouin 705
produce, money raised by customs charges, and funds collected throughout the Arab and Muslim world. Supplies came through the port of al-Sallum, and the Egyptian Frontiers Administration must have closed its eyes to supplies going into Cyrenaica as tightly as to refugees going out of it. The Marmarica had been declared by the Italians a military zone, its people being removed to concentration camps, and the closed frontier was patrolled by armoured cars and planes with instructions to destroy any caravans they spotted, but, in spite of these precautions, supplies continued to reach the Patriots. Graziani therefore decided to run a line of barbed-wire entanglement from the sea to Jaghbub and into the dunes to the south of it, a distance of over 300 km. The work was completed early in September 1931 and control along the wire was operated through
fortified posts, a telephone system, and aviation camps. Perhaps 175*
nothing shows more clearly the slow imprisonment of the people 648*
of Cyrenaica than the use of barbed wire on an ever-increasing 795*
scale to imprison them in concentration camps within their [727]
country and to shut them off from the outside world: in 1922–3 the Italians spent only 27,000 Lire on barbed wire in Cyrenaica but by 1930–1 they could boast of spending 14,111,000 Lire.[1]

In spite of all Graziani's energy and threats Sidi 'Umar and his men would neither surrender nor flee the country. In 1930 the bands of the Bara'asa, 'Abid, and Hasa-'Abaidat were still harassing Italian detachments and raiding the herds of those who had submitted. Nevertheless, Italian activities had now

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[1] *La Nuova Italia d'Oltremare*, 1933–4, vol. i, p. 239.

History of Settlement in al-Qasr

173 The settlement of al-Qasr took place about 200 years
[166] ago when the Awlad 'Ali first came to the area from Cyrenaica.
[175] No historical documentation for this period exists. The
173 various versions which the Bedouins offer are both vague and
*613 ethnocentric with reference to lineage. A point of consensus
•[712] is that the zone was first claimed by Abu Mahjuba who built
a large fort (qasr = "fort" or "castle") near the coast. The
Bedouins say that Abu Mahjuba settled in the area of al-Qasr
because "he knew good land when he saw it." He belonged to
no one lineage, "he was 'Aishaibi only." All of the lineages
of al-Qasr claim that their ancestors came with Abu Mahjuba
and settled on the land at that time. Abu Mahjuba has been
mythologized: he belongs to all of al-Qasr, a symbol of
local group solidarity and fraternal equality.

173 Al-Qasr represents the end of nomadic life for the
361 'Aishaibat tribe. According to the Bedouins, each tribe and
[198] lineage took that part of al-Qasr which it preferred. If the
members of the segment wanted to grow vegetables, they took
land on the coast; if they preferred the "old way of life,"
they set up their tents in the sha'ir wi mar'a area and raised
sheep. "Everything was fine," they say, "there were no land
registration laws--a man was free." Al-Qasr was settled
[619] "after the wars" (with the Hanadi), and it was only then that
the Awlad 'Ali broke up into tribes. The 'Aishaibat took the

Italy would therefore withdraw from her colonial adventure, 175*
advised the Amir to sign the Accord of al-Rajma in the hope 648*
that he would not have to carry out its terms. He was later to 631
spend over 16 years in exile in Italy for his alleged duplicity. 795*
The Italians did not at this time charge the Amir with more 793
than weakness when, after the stipulated eight months had [712]
passed, he had failed to carry out the terms of the accord, especially
in the matter of the armed Sanusi camps.

These camps were supply points garrisoned by the remnants 175*
of the Sanusi army of 1917. Through them and from them the 648*
Sanusiya was exercising political control over the country and 712
administering the tribes. The chief camps in 1917 were Ajada- 631
biya, al-Shlaidima, Marawa, Khawalan, al-Abyar, Taknis, and 795*
'Akrama. Each was under a *qaimaqam* and had its com- 701
mandant of troops, its qadi for judicial proceedings, and its
tithe collectors who collected from the Bedouin a tax on crops
and flocks. With the development of the political functions of
the Order alms had been transformed into taxes. Ajadabiya and
al-Shlaidima had as their *nazir*, inspector, 'Ali Pasha al-'Abdiya.
Al-Abyar and Taknis came under Sidi 'Umar al-Mukhtar, and
Marawa, Khawalan, and 'Akrama came under Sayyid Safi
al-Din.

When asked why these camps had not been broken up the 175*
Amir said that the accord had been very badly received by the 648*
Bedouin and that were it to be enforced hastily serious dis- 712
turbances might ensue. He counselled caution. In addition to 701
the continuance of the armed camps in defiance of the accord, 795*
the Italians also complained of concerted passive resistance, 793
on the part of the Shaikhs of Sanusiya lodges and the Shaikhs 631
of tribes, to collaboration with their officials; but either because [668]
they were not yet ready to use force or because they were con-
vinced that the Amir was unable to dictate to his followers,
and probably for both reasons, they continued to temporize.

By the further Accord of Bu Mariyam of 11 November 1921 175*
the dissolution of the armed camps was confirmed, but it was 648*
agreed that until the Italians had strengthened their admini- 712
strative control and political influence in the country the still- 701
existing Sanusi camps should be held jointly. There were to 631
be four so-called '*Campi Misti*', at al-Abyar, Taknis, Slanta, 795*
and 'Akrama, manned by Italian and Sanusi troops in the

*175 proportion of 5 to 4, each controlled by its own representa-
*648 tive. To these four was later added a fifth camp, al-Makhili,
• 712 so that the Italians might establish themselves at an important
701 watering-place of the southern nomads.

631 The new arrangement was fantastic. Two forces, each under
*795 its own officers and flag, each opposed to the other in every particular, were jointly responsible for the security and welfare of the country. What made it even more absurd in the eyes of later Fascist critics was the fact that the Sanusi soldiers in these camps received their rations and pay from the Italian Government they did everything to flout. It was, moreover, an admission on the part of the Italians that they were unable to enforce the accords they signed with the Amir if the Bedouin did not intend to carry out their terms, and that they could not establish themselves in the country unless the Sanusiya was ready
*175 to allow them to do so. All that apologists for this new accord
*648 have been able to say in defence of it was that the Italian
• 631 Government had by this time realized that nothing was in any
*795 case likely to come of all these agreements and in the end only signed it in order that, while formally respecting it, they might have time and opportunity to establish their authority among the tribes, particularly among the 'Awaqir, the western Darsa, the Bara'asa, and the 'Abaidat. The Rome Government, not wanting to increase its troubles by starting a new war in Cyrenaica, imposed a policy of appeasement on its restless Colonial Government. It was bad enough to have to face the anarchy in Tripolitania, and there was always a danger that if the situation in Cyrenaica deteriorated Sayyid Ahmad might return to raise again the standard of revolt. Sayyid Idris might be weak and at times difficult, but he was at least pacific. The harassed Governor was therefore instructed that he would have to continue the battle of words till it became feasible to open real hostilities. However, the Italian Government were mistaken in believing that the new accord would allow them to increase their influence in the country, for the Sanusiya, through its representatives in the 'Mixed Camps', came between the tribes and the Italians. It is generally admitted by Italian commentators that after Bu Mariyam the Government was only apparently in the ascendancy politically, while in fact the administration of the whole country outside the towns continued

*175 Accord of al-Rajma. But the Italians were not yet ready to
*648 break with him finally, not wishing to compromise the opera-
*795 tions they were carrying out in Tripolitania. They therefore
793 started new discussions, conducted in person by Amendola, the Minister for the Colonies, who, on his return to Italy, expressed satisfaction with the talks and confidence in the Amir, neither of which he could have felt. In Mondaini's opinion the Government's policy of continuing to treat with the Sanusiya at so late a stage was consistent and, in the circumstances, wise, for it was believed that the greed for lucre and honours so unashamedly displayed by members of the Amir's family would bring them into disrepute among the Arabs, while the Government would be able to organize under its administration the zone of the plateau nearest its coastal bases and thus prepare for its penetration into the interior. In defence of Amendola's policy, later subjected to much criticism,[1] Mondaini further observes that the Fascist Government itself delayed action till the spring of 1923 when the Tripolitanian rebellion had been crushed.[2]

Concessions certainly did not lessen tension. The Italians
712 felt that the Sanusiya was using the 'Mixed Camps' as a medium
701 for anti-Italian propaganda, as indeed they were, not only
182 through their official representatives in the camps but also
through persons not officially recognized, such as the Sanusiya Shaikhs 'Umar al-Mukhtar, Salih al-'Awwami, and Khalid al-Humri; and they suspected that Shaikh 'Abd al-Aziz al-'Isawi had been sent by the Amir into the Misurata region to act as his liaison with the insurgents there. The Amir had selected for his personal advisers the most recalcitrant of the zawiya Shaikhs. They further accused the Order of responsibility for certain incidents which happened in the late summer of 1922: an attack on an Italian postal car near al-Zawiya al-Baida and the firing of some Italian property at al-Zuwaitina. Rome, said to have been misled by 'Umar Pasha al-Kakhiya, blamed the local government for these incidents and appointed a new Governor who made a further, and as it turned out final, gesture of conciliation by paying to the Amir the remainder of the money owing to him under the Accord of al-Rajma. But nothing could brake the wheels now. Already in August the Committee elected

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[1] Giglio, op. cit., p. 99.

[2] Mondaini, op. cit., p. 475.

*175 *648 *795 lished on their own account, and the Italians considered illegally, a camp at Khawalan of about 100 men and a number of small posts, shown on the map, with about 15 to 30 men in each. Their headquarters force was at Ajadabiya.

As stated at the end of the last chapter, Gen. Bongiovanni seized the 'Mixed Camps' on 6 March 1923. Though this day may be regarded as the date of the recommencement of hostilities in Cyrenaica, the first operational phase proper was a drive to the south of Banghazi. The country there offered fewer difficulties to mechanized movement in the grand style than the plateau country, and it was near the main Italian base. The objective was the little village of Ajadabiya, the Sanusi seat of government and military headquarters, called grandiloquently by Bongiovanni after its capture the '*Roccaforte della Senussia*'.[1] The Italians seem to have believed that they had only to take it for resistance to collapse everywhere, much as it had collapsed in Old Tripolitania after the chief centres had been occupied. [701] The Sanusi forces, under their Commander, Qajja bin 'Abdalla, a Qur'ani of Tibesti, were unable to defend the village against so large and well-equipped a column, and after they had been worsted in several fights they retired, leaving the jubilant

[102] [712] [701]



Distribution of Sanusi forces in March 1923.

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[1] *Proclama alle popolazioni*, 1923, p. 5.

*613 He must pay the diiya with the shares which he collects from
682 the others. It makes no difference if the 'aqila must pay
554 with his own money. He is responsible for this matter before
571 the whole tribe."

*613 The collection of the diiya is only one aspect of the
554 process of conflict regulation, but it stands out as the funda-
682 mental manifestation of the office of 'aqila. In the course
[692] of office, an 'aqila will spend much more time arbitrating
disputes, but it is his responsibility concerning blood-money
which defines his position and his jurisdiction as corporate
682 ones. During the present period in al-Qasr, the practice of
178 blood-revenge has all but disappeared as a mechanism of social
[626] control. Nevertheless, the possibility of its happening is
not too remote. The payment of blood-money is the alternative
[619] to blood-revenge, and blood-revenge is a condition for all-out
● [721] tribal warfare--something which the Bedouins look upon with
[829] horror. One informant once likened a primary-level war between
the 'Aishaibat and the Kamailat (should it ever occur) to
*613 "the end of the world." The 'aqila as a representative of a
682 group can prevent war by preventing reciprocal homicides: by
554 presenting his share of the blood-money he regulates conflict
578 and promotes integration. The blood-money is usually paid
over a period of from one to two years. In this case, the
[571] notion of "debt" represents a contingent, institutionalized
social relationship for the purpose of maintaining political
order.

619 groups were expected to help. For these reasons the Sa'adi tribes com-
619 peted and even fought among themselves for the newcoming Murabiteen
721 groups which continued to migrate into the area, escaping the strong
dominance of the Cyrenaica Bedouins..Many of the major tribal wars which occurred in the area before the turn of the century had as their major cause the competition over the Murabiteen.

619 As a vassal group the Murabiteen tribes are kept in an inferior
778 position. This inferiority has certain manifestation, the most obvious
184 of which is the deprivation of the Murabiteen of the right of "nazala"
682 or refuge. When a person is killed the killer and his kin unit seek re-
778 fuge at a neutral tribal segment, and for a period of twelve months they
613 are safe from the revenge of the victim's kin group. The victim's family
[671] cannot follow them to the refuge place, for to do this is to violate one
of the basic principles of Awlad Ali law. The philosophy behind the rule of "nazala" is to give time for "the blood to cool off" as one of the informants described it. It also gives the host group a chance to start immediate negotiations with the victim's group to settle permanently the dispute. As soon as the murderer's group takes refuge, which is done either by moving along with their tents and flocks and settling in the locality of the host group or symbolically by having the head of the host group send one of his sons or male relatives to pitch his tent in the locality of the murderer's group, the head of the host group contacts the victim's group, informs them that he has been chosed by the murderer's group in accordance with the right of nazala, and asks for their permission to grant his protection to the murderer's group. To ask for the permission of the victim's group is a matter of formality since, by custom, they cannot refuse to grant this permission except on one single ground:

III

*175 *648 *795 What gave the Bedouin the courage to endure the hardships and bereavements of the struggle? Certainly those two great sentiments, patriotism and religion. I have said that the first Italo-Sanusi war began as a war against Turkey and slowly became transformed into a war against the Sanusiya. The war against the Sanusiya also became transformed slowly into a simple struggle of the Bedouin for survival, for their lands and their freedom to live their ancient way of life; and in this struggle they felt themselves, in spite of all their cleavages and feuds, to be at one against the intruder. Beneath the surface of political expressions the issue was the same in both wars: whether the Italians could deprive the Bedouin of their lands and colonize them. Whether the Bedouin fought in the name of the Sultan or of the Sanusiya, or just fought, they always realized, from the first days of the struggle, that the issue was their right to live by their own laws in their own land. In the first war the outer bark of Turkish administration was stripped. [619] In the second war the inner bark of Sanusiya organization was ripped off, leaving bare beneath it the hard wood of the tribal system.

*175 *648 *795 • 721 798 619 The war also, as wars have a way of doing, bared the religious content in the struggle. The Caliph had declared a religious war, but when the Caliphate no longer counted in Cyrenaica, or indeed anywhere else, the war continued to be fought in the name of a religious Order. With the destruction of the Sanusiya it still went on in the name of religion. It then became simply a war of Muslims to defend their faith against a Christian Power. Deep love of home and deep love of God nourished each other. In fighting for their lands and herds the Bedouin were fortified by the knowledge that they fought also for their faith. Without due appreciation of the religious feelings involved in the resistance it would, I think, be impossible to understand how it went on for so long against such overwhelming odds or how the tribes, with a long history of feuds dividing them, co-operated as much as they did under Sanusiya guidance.

*175 *648 *795 619 From their experiences in the first war the Italians had learned to expect that they would be more strongly resisted in Cyrenaica

would have dropped in on the camp. In another situation, two men entered a shop 613
in a market-place; inside sat two men of a feuding group who, instead of retreating 628
hastily, greeted those who had just entered, and the latter returned the greeting with 682
blows on the head from the butts of their rifles. Markets in Cyrenaica are recognized [443
to be places of peace. In their actions the two offenders not only injured two others 443]
but also broke a taboo in a public place. The victim's group now had to avenge not [683]
only the injury but the insult that the breach of taboo carried with it, as well. In
most feud relationships this is characteristic. It is never a matter of a simple homicide,
but of killing a man at the entrance to his tent, between the centre poles of his tent,
or taking the life of a minor, or an elder too old to carry arms and so on. Each successive killing ensures that the hostile relationships will be perpetuated.

The third step in this exposition, therefore, is the association of a state of feud with the secondary order of segmentation.

When the relationships between the structurally superior primary tribal sections 619
are examined, the arguments against the necessity for peace are stronger than in the
case of secondary sections. Relationships between them are few and irregular. Only
occasionally do members of these groups meet, and then often accidentally; very
many men of collateral primary sections are complete strangers one to the other.
If a homicide occurs between two primary sections it is unlikely that any attempt to 619
open negotiations will be made. The offender's camp may be raided by a *ghazi* 682
recruited from the victim's kinsmen. There would be no question of these primary [721] ●
sections going to war. On a raid firearms may be used, but the action is limited to a
strike-and-run affair. If the issue is joined and members of both sides are ranged [726]
against each other they fight with sticks to avoid large-scale slaughter: warfare must
not be allowed within the tribe. Wars belong to intertribal relationships. For one of 175
these wars, apart from hearsay evidence, some records exist. These tell of a war 619
which took place during the period 1860 to 1865, in which there were planned cam- 726
paigns, the organization of fighters into groups, and provisions for a labour force
in the home territory, large enough to produce sufficient food to maintain an army
in the field. During this war several hundred people were killed.

At this point, it is possible to summarize the stages in this exposition of the 619
Bedouin view in diagrammatic form.

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

175 Sanusi against the Italians in Cyrenaica. "When the British
648 reached Matruh, they jailed all of the 'umdas and shaikhs
554
631 (two 'umdas and five shaikhs, at that time). Then they chose
new leaders, from the families of the old leaders, to work with them." But, "these men did not fight with the British, they only acted as their guides in dealing with the Bedouins of the desert. When the old leaders were released from jail, they returned to their positions of political office. While they were in jail, their replacements had only helped the
[178] British with supplies." Apparently, the British saw the need
of maintaining the continuity of the Bedouin authority structure.

175 Data on the condition of the Bedouins of the Western
648 Desert between the two world wars are absent. The Bedouins
say that they lived with no trouble, or any help, from the Egyptians. The Bedouins have no fond memories of their experiences during World War II. They first heard of the war in 1940 when the Italians marched into Western Desert from Libya. The Germans occupied al-Qasr from May to October of 1942, when the famous General Rommel had his headquarters at Marsa Matruh. The British had told the Bedouins, in 1940, that they should flee the Italians, and that unless they did
175 they would be held responsible for their actions. Most of the
648 people of al-Qasr agreed to go to refugee camps at Amriyya
•722 near Alexandria for the duration of the war.

166
[556] Some of the Bedouins refused to leave for Amriyya.

175 These were the wealthy group who had large numbers of sheep
648 and camels. In fact, most of the animals taken east to
•722 Amriyya died on the way or were expropriated by the British.
556 166 'Umran Kailani, "who owned one thousand camels" and was the
shaikh of the 'Ali Ahmar section of the Awlad 'Ali at the time,
refused to go to Amriyya. The Bedouins say that he was treated
very well by the Germans who asked him to form a local government
and promised him all the help and supplies that he
needed. It is difficult to obtain figures on how many Bedouins
made the migration to the Nile Valley and how many remained
[162] behind in the Al-Qasr area. One informant told me that before
the war there were about 80,000 members of the Awlad 'Ali in
the Western Desert and that out of this number, about 30,000
remained behind.

175 Those who sought refuge at Amriyya returned to the
648 al-Qasr area at the end of 1942 after the defeat of the Germans
727 at al-Alamain. They found things greatly changed. Before the
war, there had been about twenty buildings in the al-Qasr area
and most of these were bombed out by the air war. The loss of
animals and the damage to the land made the resumption of
normal life quite difficult for the Bedouins. Underneath,
the land was literally a bed of anti-tank and anti-personnel
mines left by the advance and retreat of three different
armies. This restricted Bedouin travel and everyday food-
648 727 getting activities. This condition, which still exists, has

*175 When things were quiet members of a band would have their
*648 families and herds with them and live in their own tents, but
*795 when pressed they left their women and children and beasts in
701 the tents of the submitted population and the only non-
619 combatants in their camps would then be a few female cooks.
[722] Before the end of the war many of the Patriots, including Sidi
'Umar, had sent their families to Egypt so that they could act
more freely.

*175 There was also a general administration for all the bands and
*648 this came directly under Sidi 'Umar. They maintained inter-
*795 communication and worked to a common strategy. Guerrilla
793 headquarters had also to arrange for the collection of a tithe
701 from the entire population to help pay for the expenses of the
619 campaign. Throughout the war Sidi 'Umar's tax-collectors were
[651] taking tithes from the submitted population, not always with-
out trouble, and were giving written receipts for the payments.
The tithe paid by each tribe went to support its own band. Sidi
[705] 'Umar had also to arrange for caravans to bring supplies from
Egypt, and to supervise their distribution to the armed forces
and the payment of customs dues on what went to the civilian
population. Sidi 'Umar also kept up correspondence with
Sayyid Idris and Sanusi elements and sympathizers in Egypt.

*175 The guerrilla bands were in constant contact with the enemy.
*648 One of the most striking features of the campaign was the
*795 frequency of the fighting. At some point or other on the plateau
a skirmish or larger engagement took place every few days for nearly nine years during the spring and summer months. In the account of the campaign which follows I mention but few of these fights, those which had exceptional importance for the campaign as a whole or as examples of the scale of the fighting. The few mentioned are therefore no indication of the amount of fighting. Its frequency may be judged by Gen. Graziani's statement that in the final year of the war, when resistance, compared with earlier years, was feeble and sporadic, there took place 53 engagements (*combattimenti*) and 210 skirmishes (*conflitti*).[1]

This incessant fighting cannot, as I have already said, be described in the language of text-book logistics in terms of manœuvring, objectives, and battles. Indeed, the Italians had

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[1] *Rivista delle Colonie Italiane*, vol. vi (I), 1932, pp. 52–3.

common effort to reconstruct the life of the country. The first 175*
object of the Government was now to increase the Bedouin 648*
population, not to destroy it, for the country could never be
prosperous in its present depopulated state. At least 20,000 [722]
refugees had taken refuge during the war in Egypt and elsewhere [727]
and they could not be expected to return unless a more
conciliatory policy were pursued.

Selected Arab officials were attached to the Italian Consulates 175*
in Egypt to do propaganda among the refugees, and those who 648*
returned were given food, clothing, and beasts. This policy met 727
with some success. In Egypt, where most of the refugees lived, the Bedouin were faced with the choice between becoming wage-earners or leading a gipsy life on the edge of the cultivations. The temptation to return to their country, where they were used to a life of freedom and plenty, was too great for many of them, in spite of Italian occupation. It was, as they say, *yakhtar akhaf al-dararain*, the choice of the lighter of two evils. Between 5,000
and 10,000 must have returned by the middle of 1940. Besides [728]
a general amnesty to induce the refugees to return, pardon was granted to almost all political prisoners, and by 1939 only a very few remained in jail or enforced exile. Instructions were given for this fact to be made widely known to neutralize anti-Italian propaganda in Arab countries.

It was possible to adopt a milder policy because the Bedouin 175*
had been disarmed and were unable to cause further trouble. 648*
It had long been recognized that while they possessed arms 728
they would use them against the Italians if given an opportunity. As early as August 1912, in the very premature *Norme Sommarie* for Political Officers, it was stressed that the Bedouin regard rifles as essential as horses and that no amount of persuasion would make them part with either, especially as 'there is not an Arab in the country who, in asking himself why we have come, does not reply to himself and to others, "To take our lands, our beasts, our women" '. Because of the strong feelings of the Bedouin on an issue which touched their manhood no very determined attempt was made to disarm those tribal sections which submitted to the Italians till the second Italo-Sanusi war was well advanced, and it was not till Graziani was made Vice-Governor in March 1930 that total disarmament of the civilian population was aimed at.

[For information on the warfare of the Sanusi, particularly in reference to the Italian-Sanusi wars, see Category 648.]

175 eastward toward the Nile Valley. It is not possible to
167 determine the exact conditions associated with this migration,
but they probably parallel later movements which are connected with tribal conflicts over land and water rights. In 1689, Bedouins from Libya raided Egyptian oases in the Western Desert (Murray 1935:29). From this date on, for a period of some forty years, records show a continual movement of Bedouins out of Libya into Egypt. Some groups went as far as the Nile Valley and were eventually assimilated into the peasant population there. Tribal movements at the end of the 17th century involved whole tribes and also tribal sections and fragments. Thus in some cases, authority relations arising from territorial bonds were dissipated; but in other cases, political ties were strung across the Libyan Desert from Cyrenaica to the Nile Valley. "Today there is not a Cyrenaican tribe, or even large section, which has not some of its members in Egypt, often whole lineages" (Evans-Pritchard 1954:49-50).

175 Evans-Pritchard's study of the Sanusi, valuable for
619 its analysis of Italian colonial records, shows that the
726 Awlad 'Ali were driven from Cyrenaica by its sister tribe,
167 [648] the Harabi, with the help of the Turkish rulers of Libya.
This took place, he says, about 150 years ago. When the Awlad 'Ali arrived in Egypt, they found the Hanadi tribe already there. In a chain of conflicts, the Hanadi had displaced the Banu'Una, forcing them into the Nile Valley:

175 then came the Awlad 'Ali.

619 Around the year 1800, the Awlad 'Ali were able to
•726 defeat the Hanadi with the help of another Cyrenaican tribe
167 dwelling in the area, the Jumi'at. The Jumi'at were a vassal
tribe who changed their allegiance from the Hanadi to the
Awlad 'Ali after this war. The Hanadi, as the Banu'Una
before them, were forced into the Nile Valley. Today, they
[131] live in Sharqiyya Province and are no longer distinguishable
from the peasant population.

175 According to Evans-Pritchard, the Awlad 'Ali were still
619 in possession of eastern Cyrenaica in 1800. Then there occurred
726 "long and savagely fought" wars ending with the expulsion of
114 the Awlad 'Ali. But this time schedule seems unlikely since
the Awlad 'Ali were already at war with the Hanadi when
175 Napoleon landed near Alexandria in 1798. The Bedouin war has
648 been amusingly described by the French historian Lacroix (in
181 Murray 1935:30) who accompanied the Napoleonic expedition:

> At five o'clock, the first Bedouin were seen on the flank of the army, and shortly afterwards one saw four or five hundred; it was the tribe of Henady, the fiercest Arabs of these deserts. They were almost naked, swarthy, and lean; their horses seemed wornout hacks; save for the helmet, it was Don Quixote as represented in the engravings ...if these five hundred Arabs had been Mamelukes, they would have been able to obtain a great success at this first moment, when the soldiers' imaginations were alert and ready to receive any impression, but these Arabs were as cowardly as the Mamelukes, who had charged an hour before, were brave.

562 593 in Bedouin society, that is, the role of wife-daughter. The
554 principles of patrilineality and cognation do not work against
182 each other when the girl marries outside her corporate group,
578 nor does her new dual role present a case of role conflict.
562 593 On the contrary, the wife-daughter role functions to bind to-
554 gether two groups which are structurally differentiated by
182 578 the rule of patrilineality. During time of peace, the wife-
*613 daughter acts as a bond-maker by carrying gifts back and
[431] [628] forth between the two groups, often bringing some of her
[574] younger patrilineal relatives back to her husband's house or
562 tent for short visits. During a time of conflict or war, the
593 Bedouins point out, she is the only person who can cross the
554 battle lines unharmed. She is a match-maker as well as a
●[726] [584] peace-maker. Often she influences the selection of mates by
individuals in both her husband's group and her father's
562 group. The Bedouins say that "after the bint 'amm, a man
593 should marry his bint khal ("mother's brother's daughter")
554 because she is like his bint 'amm." Usually, over a period
582 of a few generations, a given direction in marriage is sustained (see Figure 10), and it is one function of this wife-daughter role to accomplish this important political action.

562 The role of wife-daughter, then, may be seen as one
593 important aspect of what Fortes (1953:33) calls, "complemen-
554 *613 tary filiation," the essential mechanism which provides the
182 link between the corporate groups of al-Qasr society and the
kin groups of the parent who does not determine descent.

619 Until two centuries ago Awlad Ali lived in eastern Cyrenaica.
173 After the death of Aqqar, his two sons, Ali (founder of Awlad Ali) and
Harb (founder of Harabi tribe on chart), competed for the leadership of
619 the tribe. This competition involved their respective tribes in a
173 bitter war which existed for more than fifty years. In one of the major
• 726 battles between the two tribal segments, the Harabi segment with help
[648] from the Caramanli rules of Tripoli were able to defeat Awlad Ali and
to drive them eastward across the Libyan-Egyptian borders into the
Egyptian Western Desert. This happened about 150 years ago. At that
time, the area was occupied by the Hanadi, a warlike cousin of Awlad
Ali, who had established a system of dominance over the Murabiteen
tribes who are believed to be the original inhabitants of the desert.
The area also was inhabited by the Gemeiat tribe, which, although believed to have Murabiteen status, yet were not treated as clients of
the powerful Hanadi, as were the other Murabiteen tribes in the area.
With the help from the Murabiteen, Awlad Ali were able to defeat the
Hanadi and to drive them eastward into the Nile Delta, where they
settle now as cultivators.

619 During the rule of Muhammad Ali (1815-1848), the warlike Awlad
175 Ali were frequently used by the government to subdue the tribal uprisings in the Delta and other parts of Egypt, and to hold the Mamlukes
648 in check. There was no organized army in Egypt at that time except for
a few remnants of the Turkish soldiers. The tribal population of
Awlad Ali agreed to supply Muhammad Ali with fighting men on the condition that they would be provided with food and arms and also exempted

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[619] [173] connection to Gemeiat and insist that they are a Murabiteen tribe who acquired their relatively higher status through their assistance to Awlad Ali during their fight with the Harabi.

682 last two decades). But a feud in the form of extensive, long-term kill-
628 ing between two groups is very rare among Awlad Ali. The principle of
life for life upon which a feud operates would rarely lead to a permanent
settlement or peace, even when the sense of revenge is satisfied for the
682 moment. Among the group, this form of permanent settlement is more likely
to be achieved through the payment of bloodmoney, or "diyya." The pay-
ment of the diyya is based on the assumption that the group has lost,
in the deceased, an economic asset. It has been deprived of his ser-
vices, both in supporting his immediate family and in the collective
activities of his amar. This is illustrated in the distribution of the
bloodmoney. Only half of the bloodmoney is paid to the immediate fam-
ily of the victim, the other half being divided equally among adult
males of his amar or vengeance group. This is intended not only to
satisfy their sense of indignation and curb their desire for revenge,
but also to insure that when the time comes to share in the payment of
the bloodmoney, they will pay.

628 The cessation of feuds in the area seems to coincide with the cessa-
619 tion of inter-tribal and intra-tribal warfare. During the era of tribal
● 726 warfare, the killing of a tribesman meant the loss in the fighting power
178 of his tribal segment, and feuding, with its emphasis on life for life,
had the purpose of restoring the balance in fighting power among the
[682] groups involved. Monetary compensations were not known in the area dur-
ing that time, according to the informants' accounts, but they were usu-
ally restricted to cases where either the victim or the killer was a
178 non-tribal person. With the cessation of tribal warfare, the death of
682 a tribal member became more an economic, rather than a political, loss,
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178 682 and compensation became more and more accepted in settling murder cases [619] among the tribal population. Bloodmoney, or diyya," was established [726] among compensations for injury in general. This scale of compensation 682 is based on the amount of loss of normal activities the injury caused the victim with death being the total loss of such activities. The compensation for homocide is estimated at L.E.400 for intentional killing, 682 and L.E. 300, for unintentional killing. Although reference here 673 is made to "intention," the assessment of that intention and its defini- 672 tion are quite different from the general usage of that term among modern jurists. Among modern jurists, the term refers to a state of mind which implies that the offender willfully and knowingly committed the prohibited act. This means, first, that the person is able to recognize the nature of his act and to distinguish between right and wrong. Secondly, it means that the person was in a position to choose between committing the act and not committing it and took the former path. According to this view, individuals under temporary or permanent insanity, children under the legal age (the definition of which varies from one legal system to another), non-human beings and objects are not capable of having criminal intent, since they are incapable of having a will of their own. Similarly, individuals who are capable of having a will but, because of certain circumstances their freedom of choice was impaired, cannot also have intentions. Intention, then, in the modern legal conception is a psychological quality that connects the offender with the prohibited result or results. It is this psychological connection that differentiates in modern legal systems between murder and manslaughter, between attempted murder and simple assault, between first and second degree murder, and between justifiable

619 same time as the Jawazi, by a combination of the 'Awaqir, the
167 Magharba, and the Bara'asa, assisted by the Caramanli rulers of
131 Tripoli, and are now settled in the provinces of Fayum, Bani Suef,
*175 Bahaira, and Minya in Egypt. The Jawazi used to live in the
country now occupied by the 'Awaqir, and they now mostly live
in Minya Province of Egypt and in the Fayum. Another struggle
*[648] which greatly altered the tribal distribution in Cyrenaica was
two wars, the last about 1832, of the Magharba and 'Awaqir,
aided by their Jibarna kinsmen the 'Abid and 'Arafa, against
the tribes which occupied the *barqa* and the remnants of which
now range the littoral of the western Sirtica. These tribes are
known as *al-'Arab al-Gharb*, the Western Arabs.

*175 So, in 1800 the Harabi and Jibarna tribes, which are now in
131 undisputed control of all Cyrenaica outside the towns, occupied
only part of the country, mostly the central, and the most
619 northerly reaches of the western, plateau. The Jibarna were
cut off from the southern steppe by the Fawayid and Jawazi,
the whole of the *barqa* was occupied by *al-'Arab al-Gharb*, and
the eastern part of the plateau by the Aulad 'Ali. The wars by
● [726] which they drove out their rivals were long and savagely fought
and many incidents in them still form part of Bedouin tradition.

*175 As a result of these tribal wars the descendants of the Bani
Sulaim invaders of Cyrenaica and the Maghrib thus began to
131 return eastwards with a quota of Berber blood about the end of
167 the seventeenth century and pushed out the tribes they found
619 dwelling in the Western Desert of Egypt and pressed them into
the Delta, where they were absorbed by the *fallahin*. The first
intruders from the west were pushed to the Nile by stronger
tribes coming behind them and these by yet stronger. They
pushed one another like trucks on a siding. The Hanadi pushed
out the Bani 'Una and the Aulad 'Ali pushed out the Hanadi,
being themselves pushed on from behind by the 'Abaidat and
other Harabi tribes. Besides the migration of whole tribes from
Cyrenaica into Egypt there has taken place an exodus of many
tribal sections and fragments, owing to intertribal fighting, until
to-day there is not a Cyrenaican tribe, or even large section,
which has not some of its members in Egypt, often whole
619 lineages. The Bedouin of Cyrenaica know their kinsmen in
167 Egypt and sometimes when the price of sheep is low in the
602 Egyptian markets they leave their animals with them to sell on
439 their behalf when prices rise.

mechanized surface vehicles and aeroplanes unknown in 1911. 175*
By the end of 1926 they had some 20,000 men in the field, 648*
mostly native troops, while after the opening round of the 795*
campaign the Sanusi probably seldom had more than 1,000 men
on operational service at any one time. It was estimated that
in 1923 they could put into the field 2,000 men armed with
modern rifles and a few machine-guns and artillery pieces, and
that in addition there were some 3,000 to 4,000 rifles among the
tribes. With this superiority in mobility, fire, and numbers,
the Italians were able, as in the first war, to push heavy columns
in any direction they chose and to seize and fortify any point
they pleased. Therefore, what is often called 'organized resis- [726]
tance' broke down very early in the campaign, if there can be
said to have been such at any time, and gave way to guerrilla
warfare in which sentries, advanced posts, supply convoys, and
communications were subjected to sniping, raids, ambushes, and
sabotage. Consequently the war was made up of a succession
of small, and often unrelated, incidents in different parts of
the country. Italian operational and intelligence reports and
Bedouin stories about these hundreds of fights and skirmishes
are not easily arranged into a coherent picture. The hundreds
of bits and pieces are all very much alike in size and shape and
colour, and the guide of any clear pattern is lacking. To attempt,
therefore, to construct from them a complete mosaic of events
would be a task alike arduous for the writer and confusing and
unprofitable for the reader; and I shall not endeavour to do
more than sketch the development of the campaign. It would,
I think, be of assistance to the reader were I first to mention
some very general features of the fighting, which are, indeed,
features of guerrilla warfare always and everywhere.

II

The war, which was waged with increasing bitterness as the [632]
years went by, was not against all the Arabs of Cyrenaica, but
only against the Bedouin, for the townsmen played no active
part in the resistance, though they sympathized with it. Also, [619]
among the Bedouin, whilst there was no one who could be fairly
labelled pro-Italian there were many persons, and even whole
tribal sections, who remained passive, chiefly because of their

173 cline in the total population of a tribe, then, the extinction of
178 lines does not affect any order of segmentation superior to the
613 tertiary. In this respect, the Cyrenaican genealogy differs fundamentally
621 from those collected from the Nuer by Evans-Pritchard.
In the quotation from his work on Nuer genealogies (1951), he
[171] asserts that telescoping occurs 'from the founder of the minimal
lineage further up the line of ascent to the founder of the clan'.
This major difference has serious implications for any discussion
of lineage proliferation, but these must be left until the conditions
under which proliferation is likely to occur have been analysed.

178 While it is true that the processes discussed are of importance
in retaining the general shape of the genealogy, what is assumed
613 so far is that the Cyrenaican population has been stable over long
621 periods. Stability of population is not an unreasonable assumption
161 to make for a people who live on the margin of subsistence
182 in a country where extended periods of drought are not infrequent,
[173] though seldom leading, it is true, to actual famine conditions,
[731] but producing periodic and local food and water shortages.
Disease, following quickly in the trail of shortage, it can be assumed,
kept the relationship of total population to the natural
resources fairly constant. What evidence there is does not support
[726] even this very general assumption, since it is known that there
have been large-scale tribal wars in the past, and a certain
[167] amount of movement of tribes, some being displaced and others
pushed eastwards into Egypt. Unless these shifts were caused by
increases in the aggregate population and the consequent pressure
on land and water, it is difficult to account for them. This
consideration of possible overall increases in population in the
past poses interesting problems related to lineage structure which
cannot be adequately treated here. For the moment it is proposed
to neglect possible increases in the total population during past
periods in the history of Cyrenaica. The historical depth of the
view now to be discussed is about seventy years, and for this
period I have no evidence of any large-scale increases in population.
It is reasonable, therefore, to assume a general stability of
[132] population for this period. But the vagaries of the Cyrenaican
climate are such that, in a given year, one area might be well
drenched with rain, giving excellent pastures for animals and
good crops, while a nearby territorial strip might suffer a partial

would have dropped in on the camp. In another situation, two men entered a shop 613
in a market-place; inside sat two men of a feuding group who, instead of retreating 628
hastily, greeted those who had just entered, and the latter returned the greeting with 682
blows on the head from the butts of their rifles. Markets in Cyrenaica are recognized
to be places of peace. In their actions the two offenders not only injured two others [443]
but also broke a taboo in a public place. The victim's group now had to avenge not [683]
only the injury but the insult that the breach of taboo carried with it, as well. In most feud relationships this is characteristic. It is never a matter of a simple homicide, but of killing a man at the entrance to his tent, between the centre poles of his tent, or taking the life of a minor, or an elder too old to carry arms and so on. Each successive killing ensures that the hostile relationships will be perpetuated.

The third step in this exposition, therefore, is the association of a state of feud with the secondary order of segmentation.

When the relationships between the structurally superior primary tribal sections 619
are examined, the arguments against the necessity for peace are stronger than in the case of secondary sections. Relationships between them are few and irregular. Only occasionally do members of these groups meet, and then often accidentally; very many men of collateral primary sections are complete strangers one to the other.
If a homicide occurs between two primary sections it is unlikely that any attempt to 619
open negotiations will be made. The offender's camp may be raided by a *ghazi* 682
recruited from the victim's kinsmen. There would be no question of these primary [721]
sections going to war. On a raid firearms may be used, but the action is limited to a
strike-and-run affair. If the issue is joined and members of both sides are ranged [726]
against each other they fight with sticks to avoid large-scale slaughter: warfare must
not be allowed within the tribe. Wars belong to intertribal relationships. For one of 175
these wars, apart from hearsay evidence, some records exist. These tell of a war 619
which took place during the period 1860 to 1865, in which there were planned cam- 726
paigns, the organization of fighters into groups, and provisions for a labour force in the home territory, large enough to produce sufficient food to maintain an army in the field. During this war several hundred people were killed.

At this point, it is possible to summarize the stages in this exposition of the 619
Bedouin view in diagrammatic form.

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

The consequences of homicides in which secondary groups are concerned present 121
an even greater variety, for now the span has expanded to include many more groups, 613
with a total population of several thousand people. Groups of this order are spread 682
over a much wider territorial range; some structurally distant groups are neighbours
by virtue of their propinquity, while some structurally proximate groups are far
removed territorially. Some feuds lie dormant for long periods. Others erupt [578]
frequently. Some homicides between these groups are followed by the 'laying down
of the denial '—the feud situation with most acrimony built into it, for one denial,
followed by a vengeance killing, is met by a second denial and so on, excluding thereby
any chance of a settlement. In other circumstances the offender's group boast that
they are responsible for a homicide, thus challenging the victim's group to a show
of force. Only the more powerful tertiary groups would venture to do this, and it is
only they who could meet a homicide against them with a spectacular show of force,
compelling a weaker tertiary group (according to hearsay evidence) to break up and
leave its homeland. The modes of killing in homicide differ in character. Some killings
have been heinous and offensive in terms of general morality; their purpose is to
sting the victim's kin to retaliate or to cause them to suffer general discredit and loss
of status. While some parts of secondary segments are at feud, others are not.
A homicide between affinally or matrilaterally linked groups, whether they are
secondary or primary groups, is settled as quickly and as amicably as possible to
prevent turmoil in their relationships. Feud concerns two tertiary sections, not the [578]
opposed secondary sections of which they are parts. Blood money and vengeance is [628]
not the responsibility of secondary sections, but of their respective tertiary sections.

At this point, a further statement concerning the external marriage links of tertiary 121
segments throws further light on the feud. Previously it was stated that the competi- 613
tion between collateral tertiary groups for natural resources is indicated by a low
rate of marriage between them. Their external marriage links reinforce the separation. 582
One tertiary section, A, takes some of its spouses from section X of a collateral 578
secondary section; A's collateral, B, takes some of its spouses from X's collateral, Y.
A may be at feud with Y and B with X. The agnatic links between A and B, and X
and Y do not mitigate the severity of the hostility in the two feuds, they exacerbate
it. It would be erroneous to think of them as cross-cutting ties which promote peace.
Stultified in the development of their hostilities by virtue of their territorial proximity
and the sentiment associated with putatively close agnatic connexion, A and B are
able to express hostilities indirectly through their linked groups X and Y respectively.
During discussions of disputes, homicides, or rival claims to water, whether the disputants
meet in the camps or in administrative offices in the villages, men from the
matrilateral and affinal groups of the parties directly concerned are also present to do
most of the shouting. In some cases I recorded a maternal relative was killed on
behalf of an agnatic group to which he did not belong, although the latter accepted
the responsibility. In the light of facts of this sort the lineage model obstructs analysis.

I now wish to make a few brief remarks about the relationships between collateral 121
primary sections and paired tribes. Homicide, it was asserted earlier, results in raids 619
and war between groups of these orders of segmentation respectively. Evidence 682
can be adduced to show that both consequences have followed. The case usually 726
cited to demonstrate that a single killing precipitates war between tribes is the

121 celebrated war between the 'Abaidat and the Bara 'asa tribes occupying a large part
619 of central and eastern Cyrenaica. This war took place a hundred years ago, so that the
682 evidence is mainly hearsay, but it is significant that when asked for details of the
726 groups taking part the Bedouin make it clear that the entire tribes were not at war—
[173] some sections on both sides are said to have remained on friendly terms. Yet when
121 wars are discussed in a general fashion, the Bedouin insist that tribes confront each
619 other as such. If it is pointed out to them that men might be ranged against their
726 maternal relatives the Bedouin mumble apologetically that they would not kill their
maternal relatives—a lame argument since in the heat of battle men cannot make this
602 kind of discrimination. Details of other wars also illustrate the point that only parts
of tribes face each other in strife, for though the stories of past events may be inaccurate
there is genealogical evidence to substantiate their claims that certain groups
were linked in the past, and in any case their statements assert that where these links
exist they are not prepared to engage in hostilities. The several parts of each tribe,
121 like the parts of primary and secondary sections, have as many different sorts of
619 relationships as there are groups, and the general statement that tribes are warring
571 units merely obscures the interest there is in their relationships. Tribes, further, lack
the leadership to make war. I repeat that leadership does exist, but not even the
121 greatest leaders, past or present, can rightly be described as leaders of their tribes,
619 using the term in its structural connotation. Literature on the subject gives the
613 impression that there are tribal leaders, because successive administrations have used
554 the tribes and their divisions as a framework for attempting to rule the Bedouin, but
the details of the power domains of individual leaders make it clear that they have
little to do with the ordered divisions of tribes. A leader within part of one tribe may
carry with him tertiary sections of another tribe, and if major hostilities break out
between parts of these tribes, the sections of both which are joined as allies and
related as kinsfolk will not fight against each other, for sections so linked enjoy
stronger connexions than the structurally linked tertiary sections of a very large
[682] secondary section. Consequently the statement that homicide results in tribal war
[114] when the offender and his victim are members of two separate tribes is not merely
incomplete, not merely a simplification, it is wrong.

121 A point which has been implicit throughout the second part of this paper needs
613 now to be made quite explicit: groups do not come together in their respective
structural genealogical orders. During my entire residence in Cyrenaica I did not
571 see a group of agnates larger than a tertiary tribal section assemble for any purpose.
[114] It is true that the occasions when large groups are required to assemble are infrequent.
[648] It is also true that although the British Administration was serving a caretaker role
only, it may have had an affect on the nature of tribal gatherings. Despite this qualification,
there were several occasions when I expected tribal groups to assemble in
lineage order if the fusion of sections in relation to like sections has any meaning in
practice. Large groups of men did gather to dispute claims to wells, to argue about
rights to ploughland, and to make peace. In every case that I recorded the agnatically
closest groups of the main participants were absent, while members of genealogically
more remote groups were present in strength. This statement applies to gatherings
[628] in the camps and in the administrative centres. One of the biggest gatherings I
witnessed assembled in an administrative office in a village near the coast in the

to Dib by Ibn Khaldun, who calls Dib a descendant of 619
Ka'b, the great-grandson of Suleim.[1] If this be true, the 173
Jumei'at must be an elder branch than any of the Sa'adi tribes, among whom the Awlad 'Ali are included. But in actual fact, the Awlad 'Ali do not consider the Jumei'at as of Sa'adi origin, that is, descendants of Abu Dib and his wife Sa'ada, but despise them as Murabitin or vassals, though they pay no tribute.

All this may be interpreted to mean that they are among the oldest inhabitants of Western Egypt. They have been in Egypt "seven hundred years" according to one of their sheikhs, Sa'ad Bey el-Masri, and a pedigree given me by another, Sheikh 'Ilwani Suleiman, who lives near Sidi 'Abd el-Rahman, runs :



The Jumei'at of Mariut are all descended from El-Ashtar, while the offspring of the other five sons are settled in Beheira, Gharbiya, and at Ramla near Alexandria.

It is, of course, possible that their eponymous ancestor, 619
Jumei'a, was an Arab of Beni Suleim descent, who returned to 173
Egypt from the "Green Mountain", soon after the Beni Suleim 174
invasion, and whose descendants became Murabitin by forming themselves into a religious community. But such religious fervour is not a Bedouin characteristic, but smacks rather of the fanaticism of the recently-converted, so I suspect the Jumei'at, in spite of their descent from Ka'b, to be mainly a remnant of the earlier Libyan population of the coast.

Prior to the arrival of the Awlad 'Ali, they were "Mrabit" 619
to the Beni 'Una, and engaged in constant conflict with the 175
Hanadi. Upon the rout and annihilation of the Beni 'Una, 726
the Jumei'at were stirred up to revolt against the Hanadi 792
by one of their holy men called Baqush. Outraged by their

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[1] The more ignorant Awlad Suleiman have forgotten Ka'b's paternity, and confused him with the famous Arab poet Ka'b ibn Zuheir. See p. 287 for their version. And yet another Jumei'i version gives as their ancestor the Saint Ka'b el Ahbar.

[2] The "Friends" of the Prophet.

619 oppression, he gathered his people and delivered a fiery
175 denunciation of his religion, during which he smashed his
726 rosary into pieces and mixed it with his horse's fodder;
792 Baqush then invited their kinsmen (?) the Awlad 'Ali, to
come over from the "Green Mountain" and help them. To entice the Awlad 'Ali, he is said to have sent them samples of salt desert water and Nile water sweetened with sugar to illustrate the difference between the hardships of the desert and the comforts of the Rif.[1]

619 As recounted earlier, the Awlad 'Ali completely routed the
175 Hanadi and their allies, and drove them from the desert.
726 In the division of the conquered territory, the Jumei'at
received a third, and, although they were still considered Murabitin, were released from the payment of tribute. They
[131] now live intermingled with the free sections of the Awlad
'Ali, all along the north coast of Egypt, and are numerous in Beheira, especially near Abu Hummus.

619 *Samalus.*—The Samalus are found scattered among the
[131] Awlad 'Ali on the northern coast and stranded among many
of the Egyptian provinces. They once possessed a head sheikh Abu Sala at Minya, and colonies are recorded from Faiyum, Beheira, Menufiya, Gharbiya, and Sharqiya. An
[175] old paper from the Recruiting Department gives from
[162] seventeen villages in the Faiyum 775 mounted Samalus
[231] and 1,400 on foot, possessing 1,760 camels and 11,400
sheep. Two important groups of wells, both called "Sawani
[312] es-Samalus" exist on the north coast, one about 50 kilo-
metres east of Salum, and the other 20 kilometres south of Dhab'a.

[173] They say they came to Egypt, 400 strong, about 200
years ago, from the Wadi Samalus in the Jebel Akhdar, and their ancestor twelve generations ago was Nasr el-Hasani, of course an "Arab from Beni Suleim".

[175] In the *Description de l'Egypte*, P. D. Martin relates how
[726] in 1800 the Samalus of Faiyum were raided by a party of
Ferjan, 200 strong, from Beheira.

619 *Shiheibat.*—These are a "Mrabit" tribe from the west with
186 an unenviable reputation, living near the Wadi Natrun.
Sayed Idris, the former Senussi leader, says of them: "Most

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[1] Dumreicher, 16. This is probably the "Sheik Abdall Gawyal Bagooshi" who wrote to Sir Sydney Smith in March, 1801, warning him of the approach of the French from Damanhur. Wilson, *History of the British Expedition in Egypt*, 371. (Rif = cultivated area.)

175 These were the wealthy group who had large numbers of sheep
648 and camels. In fact, most of the animals taken east to
722 Amriyya died on the way or were expropriated by the British.
556 'Umran Kailani, "who owned one thousand camels" and was the
166 *shaikh* of the 'Ali Ahmar section of the Awlad 'Ali at the time, refused to go to Amriyya. The Bedouins say that he was treated very well by the Germans who asked him to form a local government and promised him all the help and supplies that he needed. It is difficult to obtain figures on how many Bedouins made the migration to the Nile Valley and how many remained
[162] behind in the Al-Qasr area. One informant told me that before the war there were about 80,000 members of the Awlad 'Ali in the Western Desert and that out of this number, about 30,000 remained behind.

175 Those who sought refuge at Amriyya returned to the
648 al-Qasr area at the end of 1942 after the defeat of the Germans
727 at al-Alamain. They found things greatly changed. Before the war, there had been about twenty buildings in the al-Qasr area and most of these were bombed out by the air war. The loss of animals and the damage to the land made the resumption of normal life quite difficult for the Bedouins. Underneath, the land was literally a bed of anti-tank and anti-personnel mines left by the advance and retreat of three different armies. This restricted Bedouin travel and everyday food-
648 getting activities. This condition, which still exists, has
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648 727 important effects on contemporary al-Qasr. There remain about 11 million land mines in the ground between Marsa Matruh and Sallum. 648 727 165 164 Accidents connected with these mines take one thousand Bedouin lives every year, and cause about 10,000 injuries annually. (Reported in al-Ahram, January, 1965). This danger limits the areas in which the Bedouins can use the tractor, and, as a result, a great deal of the coastal land must be plowed by hand. In al-Qasr, physical disfigurements resulting from mine mishaps were quite common, and most families have had members killed in this way. In one al-Qasr lineage, 'Ailit Ma'fas, there have been sixteen men killed by mines since 1943.

Change and Present Attitudes

648 177 Political and economic changes, begun at the turn of the century, have continued into the present. The Bedouins of al-Qasr have been increasingly drawn into the political and economic life of the Egyptian national community. They have come to depend upon the national market for their products and upon governmental agricultural subsidies for their security. The net result of this process has been a sedentary Bedouin society which is not quite tribal and not quite peasant. Al-Qasr has this in-between quality--what Fallers (1961) has called the _tertium quid_ quality.

[829] It is difficult to gauge the feelings of the Bedouins of al-Qasr about the social changes taking place. They complain

Italians to occupy it on 21 April, the Birthday of Rome. This 175*
proved to be less favourable an augury than was hoped, for 648*
early in June two of their columns advancing from Ajadabiya 795*
on Marsa al-Braiqa were almost annihilated by Magharba [701]
tribesmen.

Their experience in the *barqa* taught the Italians afresh the lesson of 1911 to 1915, that against Bedouin unwieldy columns advancing without concealment in a direct line on definite and fixed objectives could lead to little more than skirmishes, for the enemy was too wise to become involved in decisive action and mobile enough to avoid it; so they adopted the new tactics of making surprise raids by mechanized units on the Bedouin encampments, slaughtering man and beast indiscriminately, and destroying the grain stores. In these raids, on what in a non-colonial war would be regarded as the civilian population, the purpose was to kill as many of the Bedouin as possible, striking terror into the hearts of the shepherd folk of Cyrenaica. When the rains came and mechanized transport could no longer be used, the camps were bombed and machine-gunned from the air. The Bedouin suffered greatly from this persistent strafing, the
Italian estimate of their losses—I must repeat that Italian [727]
figures are highly suspect—from 6 March to 3 September 1923
being 800 killed, 230 captured, and 1,000 wounded, besides about 700 camels and 22,000 sheep killed or confiscated. These losses were incurred only in the western part of Cyrenaica, for during the opening phase the rest of the country was quiet, except for minor skirmishes between Sidi 'Umar and the
Italians in the Marmarica. At the end of the year the Sanusi [701]
forces had retired to country where they were less vulnerable, roughly to south and east of the line al-Braiqa–al-Qatafiya–Msus, with infiltrations everywhere along it towards the Italian posts.

The ease with which they had entered Ajadabiya and had 175*
raided and overcome resistance in the *barqa* generally had misled 648*
the Italians into believing that they would encounter little 795*
resistance elsewhere. They were further misled by the number 619
of submissions they received at the commencement of the campaign: by the end of May 1923, 10,380 in the Ajadabiya zone, 3,417 in the Banghazi zone, and 7,000 in the zone of al-Marj; a total of 20,797 with 6,028 tents and more than 10,000

175* 648* 795*

penetration, though they were assisted by contingents from the Darsa, Hasa, and 'Abaidat.

619 [701] [727]

In the fighting between March and June of 1924 the Italians reckoned that about 600 men of the 'Abid, Bara'asa, and northern 'Awaqir had been killed and 25,000 head of their livestock had been captured. In the summer and autumn at least another 250 were killed and about 1,500 camels and 17,000 sheep and goats captured. In spite of these, what were to them very heavy, casualties, the Bedouin continued to harass Italian posts and communications. Salih Lataiwish with his Magharba tribesmen menaced Ajadabiya; Abu al-Qasim al-Zintani with an 'Awaqir band threatened the advanced Italian bases at al-Abyar, al-Rajma, and Banina; Sidi 'Umar with the 'Abid tribal band contained the posts in the al-Marj sector, and detachments under his lieutenant 'Ali bu Rahayyim operated against communications between al-Marj and Talmaitha; Husain Juwaifi's Bara'asa band worried the garrisons at al-Zawiya al-Baida, al-Fayidiya, and Slanta; and Qtait bu Musa with his Hasa and 'Abaidat volunteers was camped opposite Khawalan. Behind these detachments were the camps of the Bedouin who had not submitted, even in appearance, in the *sirwal*, the *barqa al-baida*, and along the southern slopes of the plateau everywhere. The Italians found it necessary to pause to consolidate gains of territory and to carry out a reorganization of their operational units.

175* 648* 795* 701

Sidi 'Umar's strategy at the time, both as Commander of the 'Abid band and as Commander-in-Chief of all the guerrilla forces on the plateau, was to hold its southern slopes. Their rugged desolation prevented the use of mechanized forces against him and gave him tactical superiority over foot and horse patrols. From the slopes he was able both to menace the Italian posts and communications on the plateau and to cover the families of his fighting men in their camps to the south of it. The Italian answer to these tactics was obvious. They could not prevent guerrilla bands from circulating on the plateau in the cover of forest and deep ravines, but they had by this time established themselves in sufficient strength on the margin of the plateau, and had gained sufficient experience in the handling of mechanized patrols to attack the camps of non-combatants in the flat steppe country to the south. These camps were easily

the population, thereby irritating them into renewed rebellion. 175*
The net result was that while the Italians could prevent the 648*
Bedouin bands from massing, the Bedouin could make them pay 795*
too high a price for dispersing, and without dispersing they could not ensure mobility. Mombelli's plan was found to be too costly and fatiguing for the rather meagre results obtained.

Early in 1926 occurred a spectacular interlude which focused attention away from the plateau. The Italians sent an imposing column to take the little oasis of Jaghbub, the historic seat of the Sanusiya Order and the burial-place of its founder. The column met with no opposition and the oasis was surrendered by the Shaikh of the zawiya there, Husain al-Susi, on 7 February. Once again the Italians were jubilant and hoped that their troubles had ended, believing that the capture of the sacred city of the Sanusiya would so adversely affect Sidi 'Umar's prestige that his followers would forthwith desert him. These hopes showed great lack of understanding of the Bedouin mind. In fact, the expedition to Jaghbub, though it showed technical ability, had no strategic significance and was politically a disappointment.

So convinced had the Italians been that Sidi 'Umar would attempt to save Jaghbub that they conducted at the same time a vigorous offensive on the plateau intended as a diversion to prevent him using part of his meagre forces for the purpose. The beasts and crops of the Patriots were systematically destroyed where they were found in the area of guerrilla operations. Italian figures for Patriot losses in the ensuing engagements were 303 killed and 100 horses, 2,300 camels, and more [727] ●
than 30,000 sheep and goats either killed or captured. Their own losses were 3 officers, 25 Italian O.R.s and 24 native troops. In spite of Patriot losses, doubtless magnified by those who reported them, Rome was not satisfied with the achievements of the Military Governor Mombelli and he was replaced at the end of 1926 by Gen. Teruzzi, a good Fascist who had earlier seen service in Tripolitania. Indeed, some indication of the dissatisfaction felt by the Fascist hierarchy at the inability of their Governors to break the resistance of a few Bedouin may be judged by the fact that there was a succession of no less than five of these between 1923 and 1933: Bongiovanni, Mombelli, Teruzzi, Siciliani, and Graziani.

of their forts. In the bend of the Sirtica they occupied only 175*
Ajadabiya, joined by a corridor to the little port of al-Zuwaitina. 648*
Farther to the north they held a territory running from the 795*
coast to the line Qaminis–Suluq–al-Shlaidima–al-Rajma–al-Abyar–Jardis al-'Abid–Taknis–al-Gharib–Talmaitha. There was a gap between this territory and the tract of country held farther to the east, running from the coast at Marsa Susa to the line al-Zawiya al-Baida–Slanta–Jardis al-Jarrari–al-Fayidiya–Bilqis–Khawalan–al-Qaiqab. This gap, the Wadi al-Kuf area, was entirely in guerrilla hands and necessitated communication by sea between Banghazi and Darna. In the Darna and Tubruq districts Italian control was uncertain, and political rather than military.[1] The people there were quiet only because the Italians left them alone. Moreover, in the spring of 1927, when Teruzzi's first campaigning season began, the Patriots still had, according to Italian records, some 1,000 men in the eastern Sirtica, some 1,600, about a quarter of whom were horsed, on the plateau, and about 100 in the Marmarica. However, these estimates were almost certainly magnified to excuse failure, and although the war dragged on for many more months the issue, if ever in doubt, was decided during Teruzzi's term of office in 1927 and 1928. His plan to hasten the end of the war was twofold: to clear the Wadi al-Kuf area of guerrillas and to clean up the Sirtica.

Local actions began their usual seasonal run in the spring of 1927 and included one of the rare Italian defeats in a hard fight at al-Rahaiba, to the south of al-Marj, on 28 March, in which they lost 6 officers and 306 native troops. Otherwise Sidi 'Umar's men suffered heavily, especially in two encounters with the Italian forces in the middle of July, and their consequent dispersal enabled Teruzzi to carry out his plan of combing the Wadi al-Kuf area, where deep ravines and dense undergrowth had always given the guerrillas a refuge when hard pressed, and by so doing to link up the western (Banghazi and al-Marj) and eastern (Shahhat and Darna) sectors. This was accomplished during the summer and considerably eased Italian communications. During an 80 days' campaign the Patriots lost, according
to Teruzzi, 1,296 dead, 2,844 camels and 5,000 sheep slaughtered, (727)
and 842 camels, 18,000 sheep, 172 head of cattle, and 26 horses

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[1] Op. cit., pp. 43 seq.

*175 captured, against 2 Italian officers, 5 airmen, and 61 native
*648 troops dead. The 'Abid and Bara'asa, the two tribes which
*795 from the beginning were the most tenacious supporters of Sidi
[727] 'Umar, were the most severely hit. The 1927 summer campaign
left the Patriots dispersed and they had now clearly lost the initiative in the more open country. They still held out, however, in the more broken and wooded area of the *jashsha* in the neighbourhood of Bir Qandula, Shnaishan, and the Wadi Mahajja, and to the south of Jardis al-'Abid, where they could more easily escape detection from the air and disperse before superior forces. Here Sidi 'Umar reorganized his guerrilla bands. His difficulties and casualties were becoming formidable. Indeed, in the summer of 1928 Teruzzi could speak with some justice of the war on the plateau as large-scale police action. In evidence of his success in the work of pacification he cites that between May 1927 and February 1929 he recovered 3,755 rifles from the Bedouin. Fighting still went on, it is true, and raids against the submitted sections, particularly against the Hasa tribe, even became fiercer, but the area of guerrilla activities was more restricted. On the last day of March 1928 the Patriots suffered
[727] an unusually severe defeat in the southern steppe country, in which they lost 200 dead, 70 prisoners, and 1,500 camels and
[728] 20 horses killed. Sidi 'Umar was forced, for the first time, to make contact with the Italians and treat with them for a truce.

The development of operations in Tripolitania had pointed
*175 to greater co-ordination between the forces attempting to crush
*648 Arab resistance in that country and those attempting the same
*795 in Cyrenaica, so at the end of 1928 the two colonies were placed
728 under the single direction of Badoglio, and early in 1929 Teruzzi
was replaced in Cyrenaica by Siciliani with the rank of Vice-Governor. Badoglio marked his appointment with a flamboyant proclamation offering the Arabs the choice between unconditional surrender and extermination. Its tone defeated its end, if peace was its end, though Italian writers assume that it influenced Sidi 'Umar in making his approach to the Italians in June 1929, together with the noted guerrilla leader Sidi Fadil bu 'Umar and Sayyid al-Hasan al-Rida, a boy of the Sanusi family who accompanied the guerrilla forces on the plateau. A truce was agreed to by both sides and continued for five months while negotiations for peace dragged on. The Arab and Italian

accounts of these negotiations are very different and in many 175*
particulars contradictory. Graziani's account is certainly 648*
tendentious and I see no reason to doubt the Arab statements 795*
that Sidi 'Umar would not sign terms unless they were witnessed 728
by observers from Egypt and Tunisia and agreed to by Sayyid Idris. As he was thus claiming to be the representative of the Head of a sovereign State the Italians would not agree to these conditions and discussions broke down. The Italians, however, prevailed on the boy al-Hasan to sign an agreement in their favour, and greatly to his own personal advantage, at Banghazi. This agreement was at once repudiated by Sidi 'Umar, and Sayyid al-Hasan deserted him, followed by most of the Bara'asa-Darsa band, which Sidi 'Umar's followers nicknamed 'The Army of Flour', chiding them for selling themselves for rations. Fighting 175*
ing broke out again in November and on 8 January 1930 Sayyid 648*
al-Hasan's followers, who had been kept under supervision, 795*
resisted the Italian attempt to disarm them and 80 of them were killed while another 100, including the Sayyid, surrendered. Ten days later Sidi 'Umar's own force was beaten on the Wadi Mahajja, he himself being wounded and barely escaping with his life. From February 1929 the Patriots had lost another 800 [727]
men killed, 2,000 camels, and a vast number of sheep and goats. About 2,000 Bedouin had fled with their animals and goods into Egypt. Against these losses the Italians had lost only 6 officers, 6 other nationals, and 102 native troops.

VI

It is here necessary to leave Sidi 'Umar fighting his desperate guerrilla fight on the plateau to note developments in the Sirtica, which Teruzzi had decided to clean up in 1927. After their drive on Ajadabiya at the commencement of hostilities in 1923 the Italians had been content to sit in the village, leaving the Bedouin in control of the country around it. But operations in Tripolitania had drawn Italian forces slowly farther away from their coastal bases towards the south and east and were now being held up because the Tripolitanian elements which still resisted were able to retire into the Sirtica and its hinterland, where they were difficult to contact and could rely on recruits and supplies from their Cyrenaican kinsmen. The

*175 *648 *795 to take over the command, Sidi 'Umar had, in spite of almost invariable defeats, kept the initiative. Mobility, knowledge of the country, and daring still enabled his men, worn out though they were by long years of hardship and hunger, to strike where they would, keeping Italian posts, patrols, and convoys always on the alert. Graziani now closed on them from both the plateau and the steppe country to the south. All the earths were stopped. The view-halloo was given wherever they broke. Flight to Egypt alone could save them, and this they would not take.

Graziani was determined to wrest the initiative from the guerrillas. He reorganized his forces for the last round in the '*guerra senza quartiere*' into small mobile patrols to keep the whole of the forest country under surveillance and to attack the enemy wherever they met him, giving him no rest. To prevent the guerrillas from obtaining supplies and reinforcements from the civilian population he disarmed the tribesmen, confiscating from them thousands of rifles and millions of rounds of ammunition, and made possession of arms a capital offence. He instituted the '*tribunale volante*', a military court flown from point to point to try, and execute, all who had dealings of any kind with the guerrillas. He reduced the Libyan units by more than two-thirds, with the intention of disbanding them altogether later. In the meanwhile he distributed among the 750 Libyans retained in service rifles of a different calibre from rifles in Patriot hands to prevent leakage of ammunition. At the same time he closed the Sanusiya lodges, confiscated their estates, and exiled their Shaikhs to the Island of Ustica. He also much improved the communications of the colony, thereby easing his supply problem and economizing man-power.

*175 *648 *795 ● 727 It may be doubted whether all these measures would have been effective if he had not also started his immense concentration camps for the entire tribal population of Cyrenaica, about whose feelings the General had no illusions. In taking this step the Italians were doing no more than others had done before them and have done after them, for an army fighting guerrillas is fighting an entire population. The first concentrations of [705] January 1930 were found to be too near the area of military operations, for the prisoners, in spite of close surveillance, still managed to supply the guerrillas with some of their requirements;

so most of the Bedouin were removed to the *barqa al-baida* and 175*
the Sirtica. In this bleak country were herded in the smallest 648*
camps possible 80,000 men, women, and children, and 600,000 795*
beasts, in the summer of 1930. Hunger, disease, and broken 727*
hearts took a heavy toll of the imprisoned population. Bedouin [705]
die in a cage. Loss of livestock was also great, for the beasts had insufficient grazing near the camps on which to support life, and the herds, already decimated in the fighting, were almost wiped out by the camps.

The guerrillas thus found themselves cut off from local sources 175*
of supply and forced more and more to rely on Egypt for the 648*
bare necessities of life and of war. For years a considerable part 795*
of their supplies had come from there, paid for by Bedouin 705
produce, money raised by customs charges, and funds collected throughout the Arab and Muslim world. Supplies came through the port of al-Sallum, and the Egyptian Frontiers Administration must have closed its eyes to supplies going into Cyrenaica as tightly as to refugees going out of it. The Marmarica had been declared by the Italians a military zone, its people being removed to concentration camps, and the closed frontier was patrolled by armoured cars and planes with instructions to destroy any caravans they spotted, but, in spite of these precautions, supplies continued to reach the Patriots. Graziani therefore decided to run a line of barbed-wire entanglement from the sea to Jaghbub and into the dunes to the south of it, a distance of over 300 km. The work was completed early in September 1931 and control along the wire was operated through
fortified posts, a telephone system, and aviation camps. Perhaps 175*
nothing shows more clearly the slow imprisonment of the people 648*
of Cyrenaica than the use of barbed wire on an ever-increasing 795*
scale to imprison them in concentration camps within their [727]
country and to shut them off from the outside world: in 1922–3 the Italians spent only 27,000 Lire on barbed wire in Cyrenaica but by 1930–1 they could boast of spending 14,111,000 Lire.[1]

In spite of all Graziani's energy and threats Sidi 'Umar and his men would neither surrender nor flee the country. In 1930 the bands of the Bara'asa, 'Abid, and Hasa-'Abaidat were still harassing Italian detachments and raiding the herds of those who had submitted. Nevertheless, Italian activities had now

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[1] *La Nuova Italia d'Oltremare*, 1933–4, vol. i, p. 239.

common effort to reconstruct the life of the country. The first 175*
object of the Government was now to increase the Bedouin 648*
population, not to destroy it, for the country could never be
prosperous in its present depopulated state. At least 20,000 [722]
refugees had taken refuge during the war in Egypt and else- [727]
where and they could not be expected to return unless a more
conciliatory policy were pursued.

Selected Arab officials were attached to the Italian Consulates 175*
in Egypt to do propaganda among the refugees, and those who 648*
returned were given food, clothing, and beasts. This policy met 727
with some success. In Egypt, where most of the refugees lived, the Bedouin were faced with the choice between becoming wage-earners or leading a gipsy life on the edge of the cultivations. The temptation to return to their country, where they were used to a life of freedom and plenty, was too great for many of them, in spite of Italian occupation. It was, as they say, *yakhtar akhaf al-dararain*, the choice of the lighter of two evils. Between 5,000
and 10,000 must have returned by the middle of 1940. Besides [728]
a general amnesty to induce the refugees to return, pardon was granted to almost all political prisoners, and by 1939 only a very few remained in jail or enforced exile. Instructions were given for this fact to be made widely known to neutralize anti-Italian propaganda in Arab countries.

It was possible to adopt a milder policy because the Bedouin 175*
had been disarmed and were unable to cause further trouble. 648*
It had long been recognized that while they possessed arms 728
they would use them against the Italians if given an opportunity. As early as August 1912, in the very premature *Norme Sommarie* for Political Officers, it was stressed that the Bedouin regard rifles as essential as horses and that no amount of persuasion would make them part with either, especially as 'there is not an Arab in the country who, in asking himself why we have come, does not reply to himself and to others, "To take our lands, our beasts, our women" '. Because of the strong feelings of the Bedouin on an issue which touched their manhood no very determined attempt was made to disarm those tribal sections which submitted to the Italians till the second Italo-Sanusi war was well advanced, and it was not till Graziani was made Vice-Governor in March 1930 that total disarmament of the civilian population was aimed at.

3:Evans-Pritchard E-4, 5 (1942-1944) 1949 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9
(1837-1942) Sanusi

*175 *648 ● 727 In 1932 the Bedouin were released from the concentration camps into which they had been herded in 1930 and were allowed to return to their tribal territories. In spite of their losses in manpower, stock, and arms, it was felt that the closest watch must still be kept on them. Local officials were, therefore, instructed to keep detailed lists of distribution of tents, and soldiers were posted to picket the camps and prevent any movement without a permit from an Italian official. Any breach of the regulation, which was in force till 1938, was punished with imprisonment. This supervision by what amounted to a strict pass system was finally given up by Balbo, as it was found that it irritated the Bedouin without serving any useful purpose.

*175 *648 Like other governments that have had dealings with nomads, the Italian bureaucrats in charge of the administration could not abide that they should live free from their interference. It was held that it was wicked to be a nomad and that it was the duty of an administration to compel them to settle. Graziani declared that the nomads are 'enemies, and destroyers, of agriculture. Everywhere, in fact, the nomad has passed he has destroyed woods, trees and fields.' Therefore, 'the nomads have no justification and no right to claim to stay in areas of assured development, such as those of the Cyrenaican plateau, rich in promise of tree and cereal culture, but ought to be excluded from it for ever, leaving room for thousands and thousands of Italian arms which are stretched out there, anxious to begin again to till and make fruitful this ancient Roman earth'. Graziani held, furthermore, that not only must the Bedouin be kept off the fertile plateau, but must be stabilized in the country on the edge of the steppe where, in his opinion, they had sufficient and suitable land for pasturing and sowing. They would there find themselves in an environment perfectly responding '*alla loro natura di rapsodi del deserto*'. Here their every move, every halt, every camp ought to be under rigid supervision by government officials. Braida adds that by 1935 Graziani's plan had been put into operation in its main proposals.[1] The plateau was reserved for metropolitan colonization and the steppe for the Bedouin, who were subject to such rigorous control that it might be regarded as a prelude to

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[113] [1] Graziani, op. cit., p. 123; Vittorino Braida, *Memoria per l'Ufficiale dei Reparti indigeni della Cirenaica*, 1935, pp. 61–3.

mon symbol which stood for their common interests. Faced 175*
with amorphous, but seemingly ineradicable, opposition from 648*
the Bedouin the Italians more and more directed their hostility 795*
to the Sanusiya Order as a tangible head to the resistance which 619
could be destroyed. Failing to crush opposition they were forced
to come to terms with it, but they could not come to terms with [793]
a tribal system—only with an organization and through a
person, the Head of the Order, who could speak for that
organization and for the tribes which it represented. Both in
fighting the tribes and in trying to come to terms with them,
the Italians thus threw the Sanusiya organization into political
relief, and the *tariqa*, the religious Order, began to speak of
itself as a ***hakuma***, government. The peace negotiations, there-
fore, centred round a contradiction. The Italians attempted to 175*
exact recognition of sovereignty and this implied recognition of 648*
the right of the Head of the Order to surrender sovereignty,
which he could do only if he were in a position analogous to 728 •
that of the Head of the Italian State, a status the Italians would 795*
not concede. Nevertheless they were compelled, in order to 793
establish relations with the tribes, to grant the Head of the 554
Order the title of Amir, and implicitly to recognize him as not
only the Shaikh of a religious Order, but the Head of a political
organization. As will be seen, the dilemma led to much equivocation and finally to a second Italo-Sanusi war. In this
second war the Sanusiya was entirely destroyed as an organization, political, economic, and religious. It persisted nevertheless
as a sentiment, and the Head of the Order in exile in Egypt still
retained the allegiance of the Bedouin who saw in his freedom
the hope of their own.

When the last European war broke out and Cyrenaica became 175*
a battlefield of first importance it was in the interests of each 648*
side to ensure that the local population would be favourable 795*
to it. The Italians, having destroyed the Order, the one
organization through which they might have made effective
propaganda among the Bedouin, were confronted in the country
with an unimpressionable mass of sullen resentment which
could in no way be influenced to their advantage. The British,
on the other hand, who sought to rouse the Bedouin to renewed [793]
rebellion, at any rate up to the point at which they gave what [554]
assistance to British arms they were capable of, had a ready

Cyrenaica itself; while if the Italians were too greedy, they 175*
could break off negotiations and limit their further participa- 648*
tion in the Sanusi war to defensive action along the Egyptian 795*
frontier, leaving the Italians to validate their claim to sovereignty by force of arms. Italian diplomatic strength lay in the agreement by which England had bound herself that she would not conclude a separate peace with the Sanusi. They knew that the British were eager—Col Talbot was always trying to expedite the discussions—to end their military commitments in this theatre and they were, therefore, able to bring pressure on Sayyid Idris through them. The Sayyid's strength lay in his weakness. To obtain an effective truce, the Allies would have to back him personally, and they could only do this by making concessions.

Dummy, Sayyid Idris's absent partner in this game, was his [793]
cousin Sayyid Ahmad. Till recently Sayyid Ahmad had been undisputed leader of the Sanusi, and were he to appear on the scene again, the Bedouin would probably follow him. As neither he nor the Italians were prepared to negotiate with one another, and as the British also had no wish to negotiate with him, his reappearance would mean renewal of the fighting. The only way in which it could be prevented was by making a success of the discussions with Sayyid Idris. The Allied Mission felt the presence of this uncompromising man at the conference of al-Zuwaitina, although he was far away in the oasis of al-Kharja.

II

Peace was so clearly in the interests of all that the temporary 175*
breakdown of the talks at al-Zuwaitina did not lead to further 648*
hostilities on either side, and was regarded by both as an inter- 795*
lude between two phases in the negotiations. The talks were 728
resumed in the Marmarica in January 1917. The Allied Mission lived at Tubruq and the Sayyid at 'Akrama, about 40 km. distant. The Idrisis of Luxor, father and son, were again present and, as before, flitted between the two parties. The Italians were represented by Col. De Vita and Com. Pintor. Sayyid Ahmad was at Siwa.

The talks began well and by 27 March the exchange of Italian and Sanusi prisoners was at last effected. In return for the

*175 Sayyid's goodwill in this matter the Allies conceded in principle
*648 the reopening of the markets to the famished Bedouin. The
*795 programme of al-Zuwaitina then began to repeat itself. The
Italians pressed for the acceptance of terms substantially the
● 728 same as those they put forward the year before and which
became known as *modus vivendi* No. 1. They were unacceptable to the Sayyid, whose position had not deteriorated to any extent in the interval, and he replied with what became known as *modus vivendi* No. 2, in which he asked the Italians to make all the concessions he desired while deferring for future discussion the points in which they were chiefly interested. On the basis of the Sayyid's counter-proposals the Italians produced a *modus vivendi* No. 3 which gave the Sayyid almost all he had asked for, being in fact No. 2 with slight alterations and additions. To this the Sayyid replied with a *modus vivendi* No. 4, which altered or omitted several of the clauses in No. 3. Col. Talbot now felt that the ball had been patted backwards and forwards long enough, that the Sayyid's last effort was unnecessary, as the terms of the latest Italian proposals were practically the same as those put forward by the Sayyid himself, and that therefore No. 3 should be accepted as it stood without modifications. The Sayyid accepted it on the promise that when he did so the markets would forthwith be reopened.

At this point the Italian delegates, who were only empowered to negotiate *ad referendum*, declared, to Col. Talbot's consternation, that the Sayyid's acceptance of *modus vivendi* No. 3 was inadequate and that he must also accept No. 1 'on general lines'. It could hardly have seemed otherwise to the Sayyid than that the Italians were increasing their demands. However, he once again took Col. Talbot's advice and agreed to accept No. 1 'on general lines' on the Colonel's assurance that an acceptance of so general a nature would not fetter his future action; although the Italian interpretation of 'on general lines' was that it referred to the time and manner of implementation and not to the substance of the agreement. In the end, therefore, the Sayyid accepted No. 3 for immediate application and No. 1 on the understanding that it was to be put into force later, gradually, and subject to agreement between the parties. In reality he committed himself to very little. He had already consented to sign the terms placed before him by the British.

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He signed the agreements with both Powers, with England on 14 April and with Italy on 17 April; and Col. Talbot returned to Cairo to report to Sir Reginald Wingate.

The main clauses in *modus vivendi* No. 3, for immediate application, were: hostilities were to cease at once; social intercourse and commerce were to be free between the parts of Cyrenaica occupied by Italy and those held by the Sanusiya; each party was to be responsible for security in its own territory; and neither was to create new military posts or to encroach on the territory of the other. The population was to be disarmed at a later date, it being impossible to effect this at the time; and fomentors of disorder were to be removed. Further clauses stipulated that the lodges of the Sanusiya Order occupied by the Italians were to be restored to the Order, though the Italians were to remain in those being used by them for military purposes till peace was established; that the properties of the Order were to be free from taxation as in Turkish times; that the Italians were to pay salaries to Shaikhs of the lodges, nominated by the Sayyid with Italian approval, within their zone; and that in the interior Shaikhs of lodges were to act as intermediaries should it be necessary for the Italians to have dealings with the tribes. Muslim personal law and koranic teaching were safeguarded in the courts and schools in the area under Italian control.

Modus vivendi No. 1, accepted by the parties in principle and for future application, differed from No. 3 in three particulars: the Sanusi armed camps were to be broken up and their garrisons dispersed; the tribes were to be progressively disarmed within a year; and the Italian Government was to nominate, on the Sayyid's presentation of three names, Shaikhs of lodges in their zone.

By the British-Sanusi (Talbot-Idris) agreement, to the general terms of which Sayyid Idris had assented at al-Zuwaitina, all British, Allied, and Egyptian subjects were to be handed over; all Turkish and other enemy officers and agents were to be either handed over or sent out of Africa; and no armed Sanusi were to remain in Egyptian territory, or armed gatherings to be held near the frontier. Al-Sallum was to be opened for trade, but Alexandria–al-Sallum was to be the only route by which goods, in limited quantities, might enter Cyrenaica from Egypt, and

*175 only on condition that nothing reached Turco-German hands.
*648 No Sanusiya lodges were to exist on Egyptian soil (they had
*795 already been razed to the ground in the Marmarica), though
728 alms might be collected from Egyptian adherents to the Order.
Sayyid Idris's property in Egypt was to be respected. Jaghbub oasis, though in Egypt, was to be administered by the Sayyid.

The agreement signed at 'Akrama settled affairs between the Sanusi and the British. The British got the military security

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

The disposition of Italian and Sanusi positions in October 1916.

*175 they needed. The terms were very favourable to the Sanusi.
*648 The *status quo* was preserved, the Italians being left in control
*795 of those parts of Cyrenaica in which they had established them-
selves—the coastal towns and a few inland posts—and the
728 Sanusiya Order retaining the rest of the country. The Sayyid
[793] had saved the organization of the Order his grandfather had
founded in Cyrenaica, and though he was not formally recognized as more than the Head of a religious Order he was, in fact and of necessity, treated as though he were, as indeed he was, also the secular ruler of an independent people. The accords were signed without consultation with the Turks and without their consent, so whereas Sayyid Ahmad had fought the Italians and British as representative of the Sultan, his cousin made peace with them in his own right.

The least satisfied party were the Italians. They had embarked on a colonial war and had not been successful in waging

it. The Sanusi attack on the British was a godsend to them, 1757*
since it not only diverted Sanusi forces but brought to their 648*
side a powerful ally who, they hoped, would win their colonial 795*
war for them or, at any rate, exact from the enemy the fruits 728
of a successful campaign. All they got from the truce was what their arms were able to maintain. Nothing in the agreements was said about their claim to sovereignty, round which there had been so much discussion during the negotiations. Some Fascist writers later blamed the Government of the day for signing 'the *modus vivendi* of Acroma', but it could not have wrung more from the Sayyid than verbal concessions, because it had not the military power to exact more. Nevertheless, the best Italian commentators have pointed out that the accord at least gave peace to Cyrenaica in the troubled years of European war and was the basis of those later accords which were to preserve it during the dangerous years of civil discord in Italy. It also gave the Italians the opportunity to spread their influence among the tribes through propaganda, subsidies, and trade. More immediate fruits were the rounding up of the Turkish and pro-Turkish elements and the widening of the breach between the Arabs of Tripolitania and those of Cyrenaica.

In the end, however, there cannot be two competing political sovereignties in the same country. The accord was a truce of convenience, on the basis, as Mondaini says,[1] of the *uti possidetis*, entered into by Italians and Sanusi because both were exhausted by the ordeal. It was 'the product of a situation particularly delicate for both',[2] and a situation which could not last.

III

The *modus vivendi* of Acroma was, as the title implies, a truce rather than a treaty. It brought military action to a close, but left political questions for future settlement. The accord embodied a fundamental ambiguity: Italy did not renounce her claim to sovereignty and the Sanusiya did not concede it to her or renounce, either explicitly or implicitly, 'the dominion which in plain fact it exercised, not only over the oases of the interior, but even over the Cyrenaican plateau

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[1] Op. cit., p. 386.

[2] Serra, op. cit., pp. 103–4.

*175 *648 *795 • 728 itself, excepting the parts of it occupied by the Italians'.[1] In some respects the Sayyid found himself in much the same position *vis-à-vis* the Italian Government as previous heads of the Order had been *vis-à-vis* the Turkish Government. The authority of the Italians was limited, as that of the Turks had been, to the coastal towns and a few inland posts, and the rest of the country came under Sanusiya administration. The Order recognized their *de facto* control of the towns and they recognized the *de facto* rule of the Order in the country.

It must again be emphasized that the Sayyid signed a truce with the British and Italians without consulting the Turks and that he signed a truce with the British in his own right and not as under Italian suzerainty. Furthermore, he was defending the western frontier of Cyrenaica on behalf of the Allies, and with his own army, against possible incursions from Tripolitania. To prevent Ramadan al-Shtaiwi and his supporters making a drive into Cyrenaica, Sayyid Idris recruited a new army from the Bedouin and established a *khatt al-nar*, a line of fire, as the Arabs called it, across the Sirtica. To aid him to maintain these frontier defences the Italians had provided him with 2,000 rifles, a battery of mountain artillery, and funds. They deeply resented that later the force armed by themselves, the '*armati idrisiti*', was turned against Italy. In these circumstances it was clear that the Accord of 'Akrama would have to be supplemented by further agreements.

*175 *648 Domestic confusion made the task of the local Italian commanders and administrative officers very difficult. Those who had hoped that when the European war ended they would be able to give greater attention to their Libyan colonies had underestimated the moral deterioration in Italy, where disunity in the years of war was nothing to the chaos of the years which followed it. An attempt to renew the colonial war in Libya during these troubled years of 1918–22 would have created such an outcry in Italy that none of the post-war Administrations, which were always up to their ears in difficulties, could have faced the extra embarrassment. Had the Italians been able to act with promptness and decision in Libya when the war in Europe ended they would probably have met with little resistance. They had at hand men and material in plenty to

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[1] Mondaini, op. cit., p. 388.

reconquer Tripolitania and Cyrenaica, but they lacked the will 175*
to action. Instead, they vacillated between threats of force on 648*
the one side and appeasements and diplomatic surrenders on
the other.

Considerable reinforcements were indeed sent to Tripolitania, [728]
but when there were assembled there 80,000 men ready for the
reconquest of the country, the Government signed with the
Arab leaders the humiliating pourparlers of Kallet al-Zaituna
in the spring of 1919. The agreement was supplemented on 175*
1 June 1919 by a constitution giving to the Arabs a parliament, 648*
Italian citizenship, exemption from taxation, &c. The Arabs 642
were more than ever convinced of Italian impotence. In theory,
an Arab republic, the *Jumhuriya al-Trabulsiya*, founded in the
previous year under Turco-Germanic influence, now ruled the
country through its Committee of Reform at Misurata under
the leadership of Ramadan al-Shtaiwi. In fact, there was little
order of any kind. Quarrels broke out between tribes and [578]
between tribal leaders, anyone powerful enough set himself up
as overlord of his district, the Arabs raided the Berbers, outside
the narrow coastal region held by their troops Italian
officials were little more than consular agents, and when Italian
forces took part in Arab disputes they did so rather as mercenaries
or allies than as rulers of a colony responsible for peace
and security in it. Meanwhile the Committee of Reform made 175*
preparations to achieve the complete independence of Tripolitania 648*
from Italian rule by securing agreement in principle to a
Tripolitanian Amirate from an assembly of notables at Ghariyan
in November 1921. The deputation which carried this resolution
to Rome, though it received no official encouragement,
found much support among Communists, Socialists, and troublemakers
of all kinds. Its leader, Muhammad Khalid al-Qarqani,
went on to attend the Muslim Revolutionary Congress in
Moscow. Such a state of affairs could not last, and in the midst
of it Count Giuseppe Volpi was nominated Governor of Tripolitania.
He was an energetic man prepared to act on his own
responsibility, and by March 1922 he had recaptured Misurata
and the whole coastal region between that town and Tunisia
and had commenced operations in the Sirtica.

During this period there was peace in Cyrenaica, the fruit of
the Accord of 'Akrama. At first the Italians did no more than

*175 as well as Italy, had been forced to compromise. Critics of the
*648 Fascist period were later to complain that the pact was a blow
631 to Italian prestige in that it virtually recognized 'the existence
*795 of two distinct Governments',[1] and Macaluso goes so far as to
793 say that the making of the Sayyid into an Amir 'was the ratification of the undisputed sovereignty of the Sanusiya in Cyrenaica'.[2] Even those who defended the agreement had to admit that the Order was not being treated as a purely religious body, but as a politico-religious fraternity and that there was, therefore, doubt about what its relations with the Italian Government were supposed to be. 'Amir' to the Italians meant Honorary Prince but it had a very different sense to the Arabs. It was, moreover, uncertain whether a seat at Ajadabiya implied that the warlike Magharba tribe of the *barqa* and the Sirtica came within the Sayyid's political orbit or not. On the whole one can say that the Sayyid, or rather the Amir, as we can now call him, bargained autonomy of the oases and the hinterland for his armed camps and administrative posts on the plateau. As he did not, in fact, disband these he may be said to have had the better of the bargain. After the Accord of al-Rajma was signed the Amir visited Rome.

The accord was supplemented by a further agreement known as *Sistemazione definitiva delle zauie* of 16 August 1921 by which nomination, suspension, and transfer of Shaikhs of Sanusiya lodges were to be in the hands of the Amir, but he had to give notice of these acts to the Government, and he promised to remove Shaikhs who embittered relations between the Government and the people. The Government undertook to pay the
[434] Shaikhs of lodges (in two categories of L. 900 and L. 600 a
[728] month), to hand back to the Order all lodges in its occupation, except those being used as forts, and to pay the sum of L. 500,000 as indemnity for lodges destroyed during the war.[3]

IV

The Italians pretended afterwards that 'Umar al-Kakhiya, who closely followed political events in Italy, had in bad faith, believing that the Socialists were in the ascendant and that

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[1] Agostino Gaibi, op. cit., p. 463.

[2] Macaluso, op. cit., p. 102.

[3] *L'Occupazione di Cufra*, 1931, pp. 62–3. On 16 August 1921 the Lira was 84 to the Pound Sterling.

*175 captured, against 2 Italian officers, 5 airmen, and 61 native
*648 troops dead. The 'Abid and Bara'asa, the two tribes which
*795 from the beginning were the most tenacious supporters of Sidi
[727] 'Umar, were the most severely hit. The 1927 summer campaign
left the Patriots dispersed and they had now clearly lost the
initiative in the more open country. They still held out, however,
in the more broken and wooded area of the *jashsha* in the
neighbourhood of Bir Qandula, Shnaishan, and the Wadi
Mahajja, and to the south of Jardis al-'Abid, where they could
more easily escape detection from the air and disperse before
superior forces. Here Sidi 'Umar reorganized his guerrilla bands.
His difficulties and casualties were becoming formidable. Indeed,
in the summer of 1928 Teruzzi could speak with some justice of
the war on the plateau as large-scale police action. In evidence
of his success in the work of pacification he cites that between
May 1927 and February 1929 he recovered 3,755 rifles from the
Bedouin. Fighting still went on, it is true, and raids against the
submitted sections, particularly against the Hasa tribe, even
became fiercer, but the area of guerrilla activities was more
restricted. On the last day of March 1928 the Patriots suffered
[727] an unusually severe defeat in the southern steppe country, in
which they lost 200 dead, 70 prisoners, and 1,500 camels and
[728] 20 horses killed. Sidi 'Umar was forced, for the first time, to
make contact with the Italians and treat with them for a truce.

*175 The development of operations in Tripolitania had pointed
*648 to greater co-ordination between the forces attempting to crush
Arab resistance in that country and those attempting the same
*795 in Cyrenaica, so at the end of 1928 the two colonies were placed
728 under the single direction of Badoglio, and early in 1929 Teruzzi
was replaced in Cyrenaica by Siciliani with the rank of Vice-Governor.
Badoglio marked his appointment with a flamboyant
proclamation offering the Arabs the choice between unconditional
surrender and extermination. Its tone defeated its end,
if peace was its end, though Italian writers assume that it
influenced Sidi 'Umar in making his approach to the Italians in
June 1929, together with the noted guerrilla leader Sidi Fadil
bu 'Umar and Sayyid al-Hasan al-Rida, a boy of the Sanusi
family who accompanied the guerrilla forces on the plateau. A
truce was agreed to by both sides and continued for five months
while negotiations for peace dragged on. The Arab and Italian

accounts of these negotiations are very different and in many 175*
particulars contradictory. Graziani's account is certainly 648*
tendentious and I see no reason to doubt the Arab statements 795*
that Sidi 'Umar would not sign terms unless they were witnessed 728
by observers from Egypt and Tunisia and agreed to by Sayyid
Idris. As he was thus claiming to be the representative of the
Head of a sovereign State the Italians would not agree to these
conditions and discussions broke down. The Italians, however,
prevailed on the boy al-Hasan to sign an agreement in their
favour, and greatly to his own personal advantage, at Banghazi.
This agreement was at once repudiated by Sidi 'Umar, and
Sayyid al-Hasan deserted him, followed by most of the Bara'asa-
Darsa band, which Sidi 'Umar's followers nicknamed 'The Army
of Flour', chiding them for selling themselves for rations. Fight- 175*
ing broke out again in November and on 8 January 1930 Sayyid 648*
al-Hasan's followers, who had been kept under supervision, 795*
resisted the Italian attempt to disarm them and 80 of them were
killed while another 100, including the Sayyid, surrendered.
Ten days later Sidi 'Umar's own force was beaten on the Wadi
Mahajja, he himself being wounded and barely escaping with
his life. From February 1929 the Patriots had lost another 800 [727]
men killed, 2,000 camels, and a vast number of sheep and goats.
About 2,000 Bedouin had fled with their animals and goods into
Egypt. Against these losses the Italians had lost only 6 officers,
6 other nationals, and 102 native troops.

VI

It is here necessary to leave Sidi 'Umar fighting his desperate guerrilla fight on the plateau to note developments in the Sirtica, which Teruzzi had decided to clean up in 1927. After their drive on Ajadabiya at the commencement of hostilities in 1923 the Italians had been content to sit in the village, leaving the Bedouin in control of the country around it. But operations in Tripolitania had drawn Italian forces slowly farther away from their coastal bases towards the south and east and were now being held up because the Tripolitanian elements which still resisted were able to retire into the Sirtica and its hinterland, where they were difficult to contact and could rely on recruits and supplies from their Cyrenaican kinsmen. The

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The *modus vivendi* of 'Akrama of 1917 declared that the Sanusiya lodges occupied by the Italians were to be restored to the Order, together with their properties, which would be exempt from taxation. The Italians were also to pay salaries to the Shaikhs of the lodges. On 29 July 1919 the Governor of Cyrenaica, Giacomo De Martino, issued a proclamation in which he spoke of the '*Venerabile Confraternità dei Senussi*' from which the Government sought co-operation for the moral and economic advancement of the country and for the maintenance of security, and of the '*Venerabili Zauie e i loro Capi*' to whom were confirmed their traditional privileges and full freedom to exercise their beneficial functions.[1] The Accord of al-Rajma, which replaced the truce of 'Akrama in 1920, re-affirmed the right of the Order to its endowments. On 16 August 1921 a further agreement, the *Sistemazione definitiva delle zauie*, again reaffirmed it, and the Italians promised to pay an indemnity for lodges destroyed by their action during the war and again undertook to pay the salaries of the Shaikhs of the lodges.

In 1919 the Government of Cyrenaica, in order to put into execution Article 5 of the *modus vivendi* of 'Akrama, had nominated a Mixed Commission presided over by the Head of the Land Registry at Banghazi, Judge Colucci. Sayyid Idris appointed a representative on this Commission, and the Shaikhs of the lodges were co-opted when the lands of their lodges were being registered. The terms of reference limited the duties of this Commission to registration of lands indicated by the Shaikhs as belonging to their lodges, examination of documents relating to these properties, and interrogation of tribal Shaikhs representing those sections which had made the endowments. Moreover, the Commission was to register the immobile properties of only fourteen of the Sanusiya lodges, those which the *modus vivendi* recognized as being in the Italian area of occupation.

In 1922 the new Fascist Government at Rome decided to crush the Sanusiya Order once and for all and to seize its lands and colonize them with its own nationals. Gen. Bongiovanni's declaration of 1 May 1933, rendering invalid all accords and conventions entered into with the Sanusiya, revoked by implication the guarantees of inviolability of the estates of the Order. Even

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[1] *Bollettino Ufficiale*, Bengasi, Jan.–Feb. 1919.

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so, to avoid offence to Muslim opinion outside the Order, he was careful to announce in the same proclamation that the Sanusiya Order would be free to function as an Islamic fraternity.[1]

When Bedouin resistance had been overcome, except for its final guerrilla spasms in the more inaccessible parts of the plateau, the Italians no longer hesitated to grasp the prize they had aimed at for so long. By the Royal Decree of 22 December 1930 the articles of the various pacts between the Italians and the Sanusi which recognized the property rights of the Order were formally revoked and the closure of its lodges and sequestration of their goods were ordered. The Head of the Cyrenaican Land Registry was instructed to register without delay the properties of the Order in the name of the Colony. This Royal Decree set out to destroy the economic foundations of the Order as completely as military operations had destroyed its political foundations.

In execution of the decree Judge Valenzi was instructed in 1931 to complete the registration of as many of the Sanusiya lodges as political circumstances permitted and to inscribe their properties as patrimony of the colony. A technical survey and, therefore, final registration, were completed for only eighteen of the lodges. The disturbed state of the country, in which guerrilla bands were still operating, forced the Government to be content with compiling inventories of the properties of the remaining lodges from depositions made by tribal Shaikhs in concentration camps. It was intended to make a technical survey of these when circumstances allowed, but the work does not seem to have been done. During Italo Balbo's Governorship of Libya, from 1 January 1934, the Italians took what they wanted of the Sanusiya estates for their colonists and for other purposes, and the Shaikhs of the lodges on their return from captivity, or anyone else who wished to do so, cultivated on what was not immediately required by the State, though all the land belonged to the Colony and would eventually have been taken over by the Government without compensation whenever it suited its purpose.

The confiscated lands of the Order were given, when suitably placed, to Italian colonists under the *Ente* scheme of demo-

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[1] Op. cit., pp. 7–8; also the Governor's speech on 6 Mar. 1923 at the opening of the spring session of the Cyrenaican Parliament.

graphic settlement. Some of the richest arable lands in Cyrenaica, 175*
forming part of the endowments of the plateau lodges, were used 648*
for this purpose, and the lands of a number of other lodges came 795*
within the area marked out for future metropolitan coloniza- 728
tion. The lands of yet other lodges lying outside this area were earmarked for Arab agricultural settlement schemes. The only Sanusiya lands which were not to be colonized were those in the less-favoured parts of the country. The date-palms and gardens of the Order in the oases were also confiscated.

As soon as the Italians had been powerful enough to seize the endowments of the Order they had seized them. Their action can only be called theft. It was a violation of the Shari'a law, repeatedly proclaimed inviolable by the Italians, and of the constitution they drew up for Cyrenaica in 1919. Their plea that the Order had opposed them in both political and military fields and had fomented rebellion in the Colony would have carried more weight if they had not seized the lands for their own nationals, for they could quite as effectively have broken the Order by using its revenues for general religious and charitable purposes. Some Italians were, indeed, troubled about such barefaced robbery, but their lawyers were able to fall back on the specious argument, so often used before to excuse similar expropriations, that the State has unlimited powers and must use them for its own safety and the welfare of the community regardless of the traditional rights of individuals and associations, and of God.

II

The elimination of the Sanusiya deprived the Bedouin of the 175*
leaders they had learned to follow but it did not make them any 648*
more favourably disposed towards the Italians. The efforts of [795]*
the Administration to overcome this dull hostile turning away from their conquerors, to their acceptance of them only in resignation to the will of God, had only from 1932 to 1940 to become effective, and it was so little successful that I do not consider a detailed account of Italian native policy and measures
to be required. I shall endeavour nevertheless to indicate [128]
briefly in the present section the general lines of their policy from 1911 to the entry of Italy into the last war and to illustrate its development by describing briefly in the following sections

common effort to reconstruct the life of the country. The first 175*
object of the Government was now to increase the Bedouin 648*
population, not to destroy it, for the country could never be
prosperous in its present depopulated state. At least 20,000 [722]
refugees had taken refuge during the war in Egypt and elsewhere [727]
and they could not be expected to return unless a more
conciliatory policy were pursued.

Selected Arab officials were attached to the Italian Consulates 175*
in Egypt to do propaganda among the refugees, and those who 648*
returned were given food, clothing, and beasts. This policy met 727
with some success. In Egypt, where most of the refugees lived, the Bedouin were faced with the choice between becoming wage-earners or leading a gipsy life on the edge of the cultivations. The temptation to return to their country, where they were used to a life of freedom and plenty, was too great for many of them, in spite of Italian occupation. It was, as they say, *yakhtar akhaf al-ḍararain*, the choice of the lighter of two evils. Between 5,000
and 10,000 must have returned by the middle of 1940. Besides [728]
a general amnesty to induce the refugees to return, pardon was granted to almost all political prisoners, and by 1939 only a very few remained in jail or enforced exile. Instructions were given for this fact to be made widely known to neutralize anti-Italian propaganda in Arab countries.

It was possible to adopt a milder policy because the Bedouin 175*
had been disarmed and were unable to cause further trouble. 648*
It had long been recognized that while they possessed arms 728
they would use them against the Italians if given an opportunity. As early as August 1912, in the very premature *Norme Sommarie* for Political Officers, it was stressed that the Bedouin regard rifles as essential as horses and that no amount of persuasion would make them part with either, especially as 'there is not an Arab in the country who, in asking himself why we have come, does not reply to himself and to others, "To take our lands, our beasts, our women" '. Because of the strong feelings of the Bedouin on an issue which touched their manhood no very determined attempt was made to disarm those tribal sections which submitted to the Italians till the second Italo-Sanusi war was well advanced, and it was not till Graziani was made Vice-Governor in March 1930 that total disarmament of the civilian population was aimed at.

245 blossoms of the tree are stripped away by these winds before
177 the fruit can mature.

178 Traditional values affect the Bedouins' perception of
517 their new life. Men are fond of gathering for their ritual
272 three cups of mint tea and recalling "the good old days." In
[829] those days, they say, men only had to ride, shoot, and drink
233 tea. In the past, there was a great deal of security in
178 owning animals which are not as dependent on the rains as
422 is agriculture. During a year of bad rains, a Bedouin could
233 always move his flock to Libya or to the Nile Valley: "When
731 we have a bad year, we take our animals to the grass of our
166 relatives. When they have a bad year, they come here." In
167 the drought year of 1960, 20,000 Egyptian Bedouins migrated
to Libya in search of pasturage. This caused an international
[648] conflict and King Idris of Libya, for a short time, closed the
border to Bedouins. The conflict was finally resolved, and
the Bedouins were given permission to use the pastures of
Cyrenaica. None of the Bedouins of al-Qasr were involved in
this movement.

233 The Bedouins who have settled in the *'izba* sector of
al-Qasr also prefer to keep some sheep. The security which
they represent is worth the time and expense of maintaining
233 them and paying a shepherd to look after them. The Bedouins,
178 in the past, paid their shepherds one sheep for every ten
465 sheep that he tended. Payment was made twice a year. Today,

407 the lack of spare parts. Three of the tractors were Russian-
built, and two were Egyptian made. The Bedouins say that the
Russian tractors are the better.

407 In 1964, the Western Desert received its heaviest
241 rainfall since 1947. To take advantage of this, local govern-
654 ment officials of the reclamation project requested an additional
[132] fifty tractors for plowing on the coastal zone. They received
only six additional tractors. In that year, the thirty-nine
tractors used in the entire Western Desert were able to plow
15,240 acres of land. During this period of economic change,
●731 a bad barley crop causes a fodder shortage for the animals,
233 and seldom is the aid program able to compensate for this.
[654] Consequently, there is a need to ship sheep to the Nile Valley,
[166] or to seek permission to take them to the pastures of Cyrenaica.
Both situations create tremendous difficulties for both the
Bedouins and the government. A third alternative for the
[432] Bedouin is to buy barley on the black-market. In doing this,
[435] he must pay six times the normal cost of grain, and risk
reprisals.

177 Prior to 1960, change in al-Qasr might be characterized
657 as a steady and endogenous process of sedentarization. It had
been taking place for about a century and a half. Exogenous
change, social and economic, may be identified with the desire
of the government to reclaim land in al-Qasr for agricultural
use, and to integrate the Bedouin into the national economy.

613 Written agreements such as the above are becoming more common in
675 the area. The need to have the responsibility of the vengeance group
[178] or the Amar recorded and the names of its members listed stems from the
[361] increase in the geographical mobility of individuals and separate house-
[464] holds seeking jobs with the government organizations in the area or with
the various industries in the towns and cities outside the Western Desert.
233 The uncertainty of pastoral nomadism and the delicate balance which exists
178 between pastures, animal population, and human population is pushing an
182 ever-increasing number of people to abandon the way of life which they
had lived for generations. Animals are extremely important to sustain
233 the pastoral life of Awlad Ali. Once the balance between the pasture and
182 the animal population is upset by a draught, a segment of the human popu-
731 lation has to make new adjustments. This adjustment is first made by
166 moving with one's flocks to areas in the Delta or in the Cyrenaica region
of Libya. This is a short-term adjustment, however, and cannot be con-
tinued for long periods of time. Pastures in the Delta have to be pur-
chased, and in most cases the owner of the herd has to sell part of his
[619] herd to feed the rest. The Cyrenaica pasture is very limited and re-
stricted by the strong tribal control of the Cyrenaica Bedouins, who in
general are not friendly with many of the tribal segments living in the
233 Egyptian Western Desert. If the draught continues beyond a certain time,
731 the individual owner of a herd may find himself forced to sell the herd
464 434 and seek other modes of subsistence in the form of part-time or full-time
182 employment as a semi-skilled or unskilled worker with the government or
industrial organizations. Such jobs are usually viewed as a temporary
source of income to help the individual and his immediate family live

233 through a hard year and to help him replace the herd he has lost. In
731 464 many cases a dry year is followed by another and many of these employed
434 find themselves depending more and more on their income from the jobs.
182 The security of the employment is often compared favorably with the uncertainty
of nomadic existence, and many decide to abandon the pastoral
life on a more or less permanent basis. But even when one makes such a
decision, he usually retains a strong affiliation with his original way
613 of life. He retains an active interest in the affairs of his Amar, especially
182 those from which he can benefit in one way or another. One important
682 gain he might get is through sharing in the receipt of bloodmoney
for the killing of any member of the Amar, and having the Amar paid in
his behalf. But while asserting their membership in the Amar at the time
of such distribution, very few, if any, would show themselves when the
membership of the Amar is called upon for the collection of bloodmoney
which the Amar has to pay for a murder committed by one of its members.
613 It is known in the area that members of one bait of the Aggary Amar (Bait
682 Ahmad) have never paid their share of the bloodmoney of the last twenty
578 years, but always claim their share in the distribution of bloodmoney.
Many members of that Bait claim that the Bait has long been separated from
the Aggary Amar, although this claim is denied by the rest of the Amar as
well as by those members of Bait Ahmad who claim their share in the receipt
of bloodmoney.

613 Disputes such as these, which are not limited to the Aggarty, led
675 many Amars to attempt to make comprehensive lists of all members of the
578 Amar and to require a written agreement in case of separation of a given
Bait from the Amar.

243 They could not sow a better crop. There are wild varieties of
barley in Cyrenaica and the country is in every way suited to
its culture. It is very hardy, stands up to drought, and easily
holds its own against the grasses, which are ploughed in with
[251] the seed on the plateau. When the barley and wheat have
been reaped, the grain is stored in *kuf*. On the plateau these
are ancient tomb-caves; elsewhere they are holes dug in the
ground.

[731] In a bad year, and even more in a succession of bad years,
the Bedouin have experienced famine, but in most years the
barley, and to a lesser extent the wheat, give an abundant
[433] yield. Bedouin have told me that they expect from sowing in
the beds of wadis up to a hundredfold of barley and in the
barqa up to fiftyfold. On the plateau the yield is smaller and
in the Marmarica and Sirtica much smaller. In Turkish times
[439] there was a large export of grain from Cyrenaica. Mondaini says
that it was to the mean annual value of 40,000 Lire Sterling
for the years 1885 to 1900.[1] Much of this surplus was bought
by English brewers.

433 The Bedouin way of life is well adapted to their environment.
182 Given the inconstancy of the rainfall and the distribution of
water supplies they would be foolish indeed were they not, at
any rate in part, shepherds. They are not, of course, in all
433 respects self-supporting. They make their winter tents and a
439 good part of their equipment, carpets, sacks, and so forth, from
182 the wool of their beasts, but some things the Bedouin regard as
[237] necessities have to be imported, notably tea, sugar, some rice,
and cloth, especially the *jird*, the woollen cloak of the country.
They trade these with surplus stock on the hoof, skins, wool,
clarified butter, surplus barley, and honey and wax, so that
they are in an economic sense self-supporting.

433 Cyrenaica is a rich country for Bedouin, a poor country for
182 Europeans. Bedouin generally have no overhead expenses in
[556] production. I say generally, because rich men sometimes
[233] employ shepherds, though this is usually the practice of urban
[464] merchants engaged in the sheep trade. Bedouin use their own
labour and that of their families and animals. What is perhaps
[511] more important is that they are prepared to live on what

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[1] G. Mondaini, *Manuale di Storia e Legislazione Coloniale del Regno d'Italia*. 1927, p. 308.

175 residence of the Pasha to a garden ; and that the town possessed
632 only one machine for grinding corn.[1] The population increased
considerably in the last decades of Turkish rule, reaching the
175 figure of 16,500 in 1911.[2] In 1922 the population was 22,740,
162 the great majority of whom were Arabs from the Maghrib,
632 though some were immigrants into the town from the more
sedentary Bedouin of the neighbourhood. It included also over 2,000 *qulaughla*, descendants of Turkish officials and troops and Arab women, and a large number of *shawashna*, descendants of Arab men and Negresses, with a sprinkling of *'abid*, full-blooded Negroes. There were also about 3,000 Jews and about 3,600 Europeans, almost all Italians. These elements, except for the Italians who left during the late war, are found in all the towns of Cyrenaica. There are also a few Cretans, the remnant of a small community exiled by the Italians.

Darna stands on the site of the Greek town of Darnis, from which the Arab name is presumably derived. It seems that it continued to be occupied throughout the Arab period, but was given new life through the settlement there of Muslim refugees from Spain at the end of the fifteenth century. According to tradition, towards the end of the seventeenth century the town was developed by a certain Muhammad Bey who organized irrigation and other public works there. The population was much increased by the settlement of merchants from the coastal towns of Tripolitania and of other countries of the Maghrib,
either by direct migration or from Banghazi. When Della Cella
[731] visited the town in 1816 the population had been reduced by
pestilence from 7,000 to 500.[3] In 1911 it was about 9,500[4] and in 1922 it was about 9,700 (not counting Italians) of whom 250 were Jews and the rest Muslims.

Al-Marj, the Italian Barce, was the site of the ancient city of Barke, famous in Greek times and to Arab historians of the first centuries after the Arab conquest of Cyrenaica. It fell into decay after the Hilalian invasion and was only a heap of ruins till 1842, when the Turkish administration built a fort there, a Sanusiya zawiya being constructed shortly afterwards. In 1922
175 the population, of very mixed origins, was 1,540. The other
632 centres in Cyrenaica are no more than villages around admini-
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[1] Op. cit., pp. 52 and 59.

[2] Coro, op. cit., p. 99.

[3] Op. cit., p. 177.

[4] Coro, op. cit., p. 102.

*175 *648 zone of al-Marj there was also heavy fighting. Here the Italians were on the defensive and the Arabs attacking in a way very costly to themselves. There was also fighting in the Darna zone.

The total result of these operations in all parts of the country was that by mid-July all the principal Turco-Arab camps in central and western Cyrenaica had been occupied: al-ʿArqub, Marawa, Taknis, al-Shlaidima, and Ajadabiya. The Bedouin forces had been compelled to withdraw to south of the Wadi al-Farigh, to the southern slopes of the plateau, and to the Marmarica. They continued, nevertheless, especially from the southern slopes of the plateau, to conduct improvised attacks on caravans and advanced posts. It was therefore decided to expel them from their new refuges on these slopes, and with this end in view Italian columns penetrated into the desert-scrub country to the south of the plateau in pursuit of the enemy. The Bedouin bands withdrew eastwards under the pressure of these attacks and formed concentrations at Khawalan and in the Marmarica. They were being hard pressed and had to face at the same time enemies more lethal and demoralizing than Italian arms: plague, smallpox, typhus, and drought and locusts [931] bringing famine in their train. The crops had failed for two years in succession in Cyrenaica and Tripolitania; and local markets were in the hands of the Italians. The only source of [439] supplies open to the Bedouin were the Egyptian ports, chiefly al-Sallum, and the markets of the Delta, and from these points large, but insufficient, quantities of food, particularly flour, poured in a steady stream across the frontier.

Bedouin mortality was certainly high. Lo Bello reckoned that by the end of 1914 nearly two-thirds of the population of Cyrenaica had died, 300,000 in 1911 being reduced to 120,000 in 1915.[1] One must agree, however, with Mondaini,[2] that Lo Bello's figure is exaggerated, for the casualties were almost entirely among the Bedouin and had they been as high as he puts them the long resistance of the Bedouin against the Italians in the second Italo-Sanusi war would have been impossible. In spite of their heavy losses and the great hardships they had to endure they kept up the struggle in a succession of

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[1] 'Le Vicende politico-militari dei primi dodici Anni di Occupazione Italiana in Cirenaica', *Rivista Coloniale*, 1925, p. 126.

[2] Op. cit., p. 374.

173 Telescoping of names, and fusion of names, taken together,
178 can account for the fixity of the genealogy to a large extent. In
551 addition, lines which showed every sign of normal development
613 at one time, have petered out completely, even after they have
sometimes assumed the status of tertiary segments. Conditions
173 under which this is likely to happen are not difficult to envisage.
178 If hearsay evidence is correct, disease, when it strikes in the
551 desert, might rage in a camp like wild fire, bringing death to
613 many, but not spreading to other camps, because the camps are
731 so far apart. Even in springtime when men and beasts are together
361 in the pastures, and the larger summer camp has split into
four or five smaller ones, the distance between camps may still be
[221] a few miles. In summer, when camps are concentrated on the
large watering points, the distances between them are considerably
more. Disease, therefore, does not spread from camp to camp
as rapidly as one might expect in such primitive conditions of
living. In 1949 a number of men of a small camp died within a
[761] few days of each other. Bedouin opinion attributed these deaths
[784] to an allegedly false oath sworn by the deceased a year earlier.
Medical opinion ascribed them to filth in a well which the deceased
had been cleaning before their illness. In any event, a
thriving line of a lineage was wiped off the genealogy. The portion
173 of the Dawwas genealogy shown on this page shows a
178 similar process at work. Again, to give another example, the Nasr
613 section of the Magharba tribe once included six tertiary sections,
not four as are now given. Two of these six sections are now represented by only four men of whom two are too old and decrepit to have heirs any longer, and are unmarried in any case; a third, whose wife has long passed child-bearing age, had two sons, but both died before marriage; and the fourth, a very poor and old man, has only one daughter, and is a widower. Three of the four now live with their collateral tribal section, Madhkur, and count themselves members of this group. That they once belonged to two different groups might have passed unnoticed were it not that two elders of the Madhkur section insisted that they should be correctly placed and their entire genealogies be recorded. The younger men argued that although they were aware that the two groups named Farjiani and al-Khadhar at one time

173 cline in the total population of a tribe, then, the extinction of
178 lines does not affect any order of segmentation superior to the
613 tertiary. In this respect, the Cyrenaican genealogy differs fundamentally
621 from those collected from the Nuer by Evans-Pritchard.
In the quotation from his work on Nuer genealogies (1951), he
[171] asserts that telescoping occurs 'from the founder of the minimal lineage further up the line of ascent to the founder of the clan'. This major difference has serious implications for any discussion of lineage proliferation, but these must be left until the conditions under which proliferation is likely to occur have been analysed.

178 While it is true that the processes discussed are of importance
613 in retaining the general shape of the genealogy, what is assumed
so far is that the Cyrenaican population has been stable over long
621 periods. Stability of population is not an unreasonable assumption
161 to make for a people who live on the margin of subsistence
182 in a country where extended periods of drought are not infrequent,
[173] though seldom leading, it is true, to actual famine conditions,
[731] but producing periodic and local food and water shortages. Disease, following quickly in the trail of shortage, it can be assumed, kept the relationship of total population to the natural resources fairly constant. What evidence there is does not support
[726] even this very general assumption, since it is known that there have been large-scale tribal wars in the past, and a certain
[167] amount of movement of tribes, some being displaced and others pushed eastwards into Egypt. Unless these shifts were caused by increases in the aggregate population and the consequent pressure on land and water, it is difficult to account for them. This consideration of possible overall increases in population in the past poses interesting problems related to lineage structure which cannot be adequately treated here. For the moment it is proposed to neglect possible increases in the total population during past periods in the history of Cyrenaica. The historical depth of the view now to be discussed is about seventy years, and for this period I have no evidence of any large-scale increases in population. It is reasonable, therefore, to assume a general stability of
[132] population for this period. But the vagaries of the Cyrenaican climate are such that, in a given year, one area might be well drenched with rain, giving excellent pastures for animals and good crops, while a nearby territorial strip might suffer a partial

685 • The Geneishat selected the tomb of the saint where the oath was to
627 be administered. According to the customary law of Awlad Ali, the plain-
778 tiff is the one to decide which saint is to be sought for the taking of
695 [671] the oath by the defendant. Each saint has his own reputation and some
[776] are said to be more effective in certain kinds of disputes. The saint
selected in this case was Sidi Dmain. Sidi Dmian's tomb is in the
Beheira province some 60 miles east of the area of Burg el-Arab. He is
[732] known to cause the blindness of those who dare to swear falsely by him,
[784] and at least four cases of blindness in the area have been attributed to
[671] false oaths at Sidi Dmain. Also according to the law, it is the plain-
tiff who selects the persons from the defendant's kin unit who are to
685 support him in the oath. Following this rule, the Geneishat, with the
627 help of Hadi, selected the fourteen men from bait Asabei to swear with
695 Rabbu. The number of men that were required in this case was considered
613 very conservative. The usual practice in estimating the number of sup-
[803] porters in any case is done by establishing the value of the damage or
compensation and dividing it by ten. The result is the number of men
needed to give the oath. If there were not enough adult males in a given
kinship unit to fulfill the number needed, some or all the men would
have to be sworn twice or three times and each time a person takes the
oath he is considered as a separate person until the number needed is met.

Following this rule, and since the value of the property confiscated in the above case was over three thousand pounds, 300 persons should have been sworn in support of Rabbuh. Since this would have complicated the matter greatly, it was agreed that fifteen men were enough. Taieb gave the justification for limiting the number to 15 that trade and, as

*613 must come because he, himself, was a Libyan and a member of
619 no tribe in Egypt. Al-Sanusi's petition was two-fold: he
578 said the cousin should be punished for violating his right of
582 privacy and property, and the question concerning the cousin's
793 right to the girl should be settled. The *'awaaqil* decided
683 that al-Sanusi should be awarded a *kubaara* of 1000 L.E. from
692 the tribes of the area, and that the girl should be permitted
to marry no man of the Qinaishat tribe. Al-Sanusi refused to
accept the *kubaara*, and this was the correct thing to do since
the *kubaara*, especially a large one, is only offered ritualistically.
The *'awaaqil* took note of the cousin's rights to his
bint 'amm: they said that since the girl refused to marry him
it would not be right if she married anyone else from the tribe.
*613 Furthermore, the *'awaaqil*, on the basis of the cousin's behavior
619 in this matter, decided that the cousin was insane and should
•734 be committed to an asylum. They informed the police in Marsa
[648] Matruh of this diagnosis and decision, and the police came and
transported the boy to the mental hospital in Cairo where he
is today. The uncles of the boy signed the papers which committed
him.

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593 The contractual nature of marriage is most clearly manifested in the case of the wife's adultery. Since the woman belongs to her agnatic group, her behavior has direct effect on the honor of that group. It is, therefore, the responsibility of her closest kin to keep an eye on her. If the woman commits adultery, it is her father or her male kin who is supposed to avenge the honor of the family by taking drastic actions, including killing, against the adulteress and/or her partner. But the marriage usually takes the woman away from the close watch of her family and puts her under the supervision of her husband who becomes entrusted with the duty of guarding her, and therefore partially responsible for her action. His responsibility is enhanced by the fact that although the wife's behavior does not affect him or his family, it has a definite effect on the honor and reputation of his children (Abou-Zeid, 1965).

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[522] The gravest insult that one can direct to a person in the area is to describe his mother of being of disrepute. In their joking relations, young men usually refer to eachother's father as being a dog or a theif or a cheat, but none could refer to the mother. A woman of questionable reputation affects the reputation of her family in general and her children in particular. Any reference to the mother in the form of an accusation is supposed to be cleaned only by blood. Not only does this apply to the woman's voluntary behavior, but also to her physical and mental condition. If a woman loses her mind, the news is usually kept a secret, especially by her children.

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593 The responsibility for retaliation in the case of adultery, then, is divided between her nearest kinsman and her husband. This gives both sides a vague and undetermined right of revenge. This division of the right of revenge explains the infrequency

342 costs to make or buy. In the 'izba sector, most of the Bedouin
have a summer tent which they place next to their stone house
for the hot months. According to the governmental community
[657] development program, in order to own land and register it
properly one must build at least one room upon it. The one-
• [735] room house (daar) is not common in al-Qasr: it is a symbol
of poverty. The multi-roomed house (duwaar) is common. It is
[333] built of large pieces of cut sandstone which are quarried in
[316] al-Qasr. Those who can afford it build the duwaar and surround
342 it with a wall in compound fashion. Only one man in al-Qasr
556 is rich enough to afford two of these compound-type houses.
The size and style of a house reflect status. Traditionally,
[184] a man furnished a tent for each wife and for each married son.
Although this is still the custom in parts of the desert, in
al-Qasr the private room (daar) in a duwaar has replaced the
private tent.

596 The basic residential unit is called naja' (literally, "hamlet"). It is composed of the father, his wife (wives), his unmarried children, and married sons and their families. The naja' takes the name of the father who is called the shaib ("elder," literally, "white-haired one") of the group. In the naja', the word of the shaib is law, and the members' chief duty is unquestionable obedience. The average naja' in al-Qasr consists of about three or four houses or tents.

657 177 474 661 [435] sale of goods on the black-market. Tribal leaders, or members of a "status group," in whose hands the operation of the cooperative society had been placed, confiscated more than their share of food and fodder and resold it either in the Nile Valley or to their own tribesmen for whom it had originally been intended. The government could not really prosecute the guilty parties for fear of jeopardizing the entire program. Nor could they convince the cheated tribesmen that they had been treated unfairly by their leaders. For one thing, the [673] Bedouins did not consider that their leaders were committing a wrong; furthermore, any Bedouin who would go to the government to inform on another Bedouin would be subjected to a [577] trial by Bedouin justice. It is still the traditional codes of Bedouin law and honor, and not the modern judiciary system, which prevail in al-Qasr.

474 The cooperative society in al-Qasr is one of thirteen in the general area of Marsa Matruh. It began with a membership of twenty-five, twenty-two of these were from the 'Aishaibat tribe. Today, the enrollment is 139 official, and another 195 "unofficial" members. The unofficial members represent unregistered branches of the al-Qasr cooperative. The Bedouins [735] explain that they cannot allow any members of the tribe to go hungry, and, therefore, they will distribute food to all those who need it (Zein, n.d.). This, of course, shows that those [661] cooperative officers who do profiteer are not entirely oblivious

156 159 draw al-Qasr into the Egyptian political community. He has 554 committed himself to work hand-in-hand with the Governor of 177 Marsa Matruh in introducing changes connected with economics 178 and education into al-Qasr. He does not conceal this fact. 124 829 When I spoke with him about helping me with my study of [571] changing attitudes in al-Qasr, he said: "I might have the time to do this, but before I decide you will have to bring me a letter from the Governor stating that he wishes me to cooperate with you." The identity and responsibility which Hajj 'Ali feels for his role of agent of change is indicated in his remark to me that he had heard "there were others in the desert who feel and think the way I myself do."

156 Hajj 'Ali is discretely aware of the status difference 159 between himself, as a member of the "status group," and the 554 others of al-Qasr. As Weber would say, he perceives the 571 574 difference in "style of life." I was invited to Hajj 'Ali's 796 house for *'iid al-fitr*, the feast marking the end of Ramadan. 123 I thought that this would be a good opportunity to observe the "leaders" of al-Qasr together. I was very much surprised to find present no members of the "status group" but only [656] their exact opposites. On the occasion of this feast it is ● [735] the custom that the rich treat the poor. As an additional surprise, we had a very simple meal of bread, dates, peanuts, and tea. Hajj 'Ali explained to me: "My neighbors do not have my economic advantages, and I do not think it is proper

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praise of which many poems have been written by Brothers of 793
the Order. The Grand Sanusi forbad music, dancing, and sing- 784
ing in the recitations of the Order, but in this he was at one with 114
all the official spokesmen of Islam. Most reformist movements [272]
in Islam tend towards asceticism. [533]

Far from being extreme ascetics, however, the Sanusi [536]
Brothers eat and dress well, even using scent, and are amiable 795*
and merry companions. The Tunisian scholar and traveller 157
Muhammad 'Uthman al-Hashaishi, who travelled in 1896 via [785]
Malta, Tripoli, and Banghazi to Kufra to visit al-Sayyid al-Mahdi and met the leading Brothers of the time, remarks that 'they are fond of diversions, honest jesting. I have visited many of their zawiyas and I have made the acquaintance of many of their notables: I have seen only cheerful and smiling faces, welcoming me with benevolence and kindness. May God reward them!'[1]

The Grand Sanusi discouraged the trappings of poverty by 795*
his example, his exhortations, and his insistence on the Brothers 793
being self-supporting. Although the Heads of the Sanusiya 735
Order, like the Wahhabi leaders, encouraged settlement on the land, they can hardly have hoped to have greatly influenced the Bedouin to this end; but they insisted on the lodges of the Order supporting themselves by agriculture supplemented by stock-raising, and thereby took a stand against *ittikal*, the dependence for livelihood on alms and not on labour which some mendicant Orders have advocated.

The Order has always been, in fact, conventional as well as 795*
orthodox. In its early period it was essentially a missionary 797
Order with the limited aim of bringing by peaceful persuasion the Bedouin Arabs and the peoples of the Sahara and the Sudan to a fuller understanding of the beliefs and morals of Islam, while giving them at the same time the blessings of civilization: justice, peace, trade, and education. Its principles were, as Shaikh Muhammad 'Uthman says, simply 'to do good and avoid evil'.[2]

The accusation of fanaticism is not borne out by either the 795*
character of the Bedouin adherents of the Order or by its actions.

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[1] Mohammed ben Otsmane el-Hachaichi, *Voyage au Pays des Senoussia à travers La Tripolitaine et les Pays Touareg*, 1912, p. 128 (1st ed., 1903). [113]

[2] Ibid., p. 86.

absolutely obligatory and sinful to omit. I very much doubt 771
whether many of the Bedouin know how to pray in the pre- [782]
scribed manner. As I have mentioned earlier, the Bedouin used [794]
to give alms to their zawiyas and in doing so they carried out [735] •
one of the five major duties of a Muslim, but they regarded these [431]
alms as charity rather than legal dues. I have never met an
ordinary Bedouin who had been to Mecca, or who even con-
templated going there. Nevertheless, however lax they may [785]
be in other things, all Cyrenaican Bedouin keep the fast of
Ramadan, and in this annual fast is summed up for them, more
than in anything else, the obligations and privileges of Islam
and its unity and strength. Moreover, although they are [829]
negligent Muslims themselves they respect piety in others.
Brothers of the Sanusiya Order and religious men in general
ought to pray regularly. That is their business and it is very
necessary for the well-being of the community and worthy of
liberal support, but the Bedouin is an unlettered man, a
shepherd, and a warrior, and he has his own affairs to see to.
Perhaps the Bedouin make up for their shortcomings by their
enthusiasm for the *jihad*, holy war against unbelievers. They [798]
consider that they have fulfilled their obligation under this [648] *
head in ample measure by their long and courageous fight,
formally declared a holy war by the Caliph of Islam, against
the Italians, the French, and the British. A Bedouin once
said to me when I remarked how rarely I had seen Bedouin
at prayer: '*nasum wa najhad*', '(but) we fast and we wage
holy war'.

It must also be said that it would be an error to suppose that Islam had not, long before the time of the Grand Sanusi, strongly affected the character and custom of the Sulaimid Bedouin. This question, which is far from simple, need not be discussed in the present account and it is only necessary to note that the Bedouin assume that their customs are Muslim customs. It would also be a questionable judgement to assert that the Bedouin of Cyrenaica are not religious because they do not pay the same attention to outward ritual as do townspeople and peasants, for piety and holiness, as we have often been admonished, are not the same. The Bedouin certainly have a profound faith in God and trust in the destiny He has prepared for them and this faith and trust enhance that superb dignity

593 tegral part of "the one body"; events which affect a man in this context lie 613 outside a father's field of jurisdiction. The political authority vested in a corporation acts to circumscribe the authority of persons in other fields.

Other rights stem from political membership. As a person with a defined position in a lineage corporation, a man has the right to use the natural resources of its territory. His father, although he instructs his son where to plough and when to water the animals, cannot deny him access to wells, pastures and ploughland. Economically, a son is independent to this extent, although his ability to exploit his right to the natural resources is restricted by his father's control of animals. Ultimately, however, this restriction cannot amount to stultification, because a man has the right to 613 demand food. In practice, a poor man staves off hunger with donations from 422 this or that individual, and superficially it appears that he is dependent on •735 the personal charity of his fellowmen. This is not so, for what is implicit is that the parcels of wealth controlled by individuals are the possessions of the corporation. It is not accidental that poor people do not go hungry. During my entire stay among the Bedouin I never saw one of them beg or [556] suffer hunger, however marginal the diet of many. Clearly, those with a surplus can and do use it for personal advantage, but the extent to which they can do so is circumscribed by the legal claims which members of a corporation have on the parcels of moveable property held by each of them.

613 Control over the wealth, whether it be animals or the procreative functions 421 of women, rests, in the final analysis, in a corporation. Inheritance laws 428 specify that women are not legal heirs,[8] and that all male children are [562] equal heirs. Women do, in fact, come to control property, and it is rare that wealth is equally divided among male heirs. The precise details of inheritance [593] may partly be decided by a father, but he is limited in his actions. Most of the time inheritance disputes are not of the kind which require action by the corporate group; a case which occured while I was resident with the Bedouin did, however, invoke immediate action. A man, who had left the desert to live in a village on the plateau, had only one daughter. He made it known that he intended to will his entire property to his daughter. When the news was brought to the camps of his fellow agnates, there was great consternation, because, as became clear in their lengthy discussions, the threat now existed that a substantial parcel of property would be removed from the group, a threat made real by the proposed marriage of the daughter [584] to a man of another tribe. The court would have to recognise the daughter's right to some of the property, and the members of the group reluctantly had to concede that there was little they could do about this, but they had one [593] action left to them — they decided that her nearest agnate should demand [584] her in marriage. Usually, the choice of husband for a daughter is a decision

[771] **[8] The Bedouin are Sunni Muslims, and, as Samusi, belong to the Maliki school in [795] legal matters. According to court law, women are heirs. However, actual Bedouin practice is contrary to law. For, if women were permitted to inherit, since many marry [671] outside the corporation into which they were born, they could alienate its resources.**

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Libyan Bedouin MT9

[For information on the establishment of schools and medical clinics in Libya by the Italian government for the benefit of the Bedouins, see Categories 175 and 648.]

634 which result in permanent bodily harm. Reporting such cases is a fairly
554 minor proceeding since such cases come to the knowledge of the authori-
657 ties through other channels, mainly from talks involved in the mediation
674 for the bloodmoney or from the hospital to which serious assault cases
● [743] are usually taken. Besides, reporting a crime does not mean convicting the offender. This latter depends on evidence which, in case the dispute has been settled by tribal proceedings, is hard for the police authorities to find.

634 While the government demands do not impose serious conflicts of
554 loyalty on the part of the omda, if successful, his position with the
657 government can bring to his tribal segments great benefits. These benefits are usually in the form of various social and economic aids including fodder for the animals and food and clothing for the people during the dry years. Other benefits including providing the tribal population with olive trees and helping them clear many of the old Roman wells and establishing wind mills for nominal fees. Not everyone in the area can have such benefits. Some do not even know they exist. A successful omda could manipulate the administration to get as many benefits for
[871] his tribal segment as possible.. Some successful omdas were able to have
[474] the government build schools in their districts, establish cooperative units to market local products such as wool, sheep, and olive oil.

634 This should not lead us, however, to conclude that the position of
554 the omda in the Western Desert does not involve any kind of conflicting
657 loyalty or that he is always supported by his people or even trusted by
578 them. One informant said that the omda of his biat is "...government man, not ours....He would sell us all if this pleases his masters in the

Loans Almost no rural person deals as an individual with a bank for small amounts, as he is embarrassed to deal with strangers and has a tradition of distrust of city people in general. The small 'moai' is the mark of a rather stable agricultural community. Between the 'moai' and the city bank operates the individual loan shark, catering to people who need money desperately---either because of ill health or family troubles---or because with a little capital the borrower hopes to "make a killing" in some enterprise. These needy people are quite willing to contract to repay at the exorbitant interest rate of ten per cent per month. As might be expected, many persons default on repayment of these loans, to the intense and very vocal indignation of the lender. 452

Almost every 'son' has a credit cooperative, or 'Shin'yō Kyōdo Kamiai'. These are operated by the 'son' office, and when the money involved filters down to individuals the amount concerned is much less than one can obtain through a 'moai'. Amounts available for loan generally range from ¥10,000 to ¥15,000 for each village. Then the amount is divided according to the number of households in the 'han', or ward, of the village. Bigger 'han' can borrow about ¥3,000 while smaller ones may borrow ¥2,000. The money is borrowed by the 'han' and then sub-borrowed by individuals or by groups of two or three men. A person may but seldom does borrow directly from the 'son' office as an individual. However, repayment is always made on an individual basis, rather than through the 'han' and village. The village headman, or 'kucho', is the person responsible ('sekinin-sha') for the operation of the fund in his bailiwick. [632]

One Nanahan man has moved temporarily to Itoman. He obtained a GARIOA-subsidized bank loan for ¥360,000 ($3,000) to buy a truck. His success in finding customers in the Naha port area assures that the loan will not be defaulted. 453

'Son' Relief At the end of 1952 there were 335 persons, representing 114 households, who were receiving relief from the 'son' office. Details are presented below: 746 [632]

Class of Aid	From Prewar		Due to War		Postwar		Total	
	Houses	Persons	Houses	Persons	Houses	Persons	Houses	Persons
Orphans	--	--	8	15	--	--	8	15
Aged persons	23	28	14	29	4	5	41	62
Widows	--	--	15	76	12	60	27	136
Sick persons	3	10	5	12	7	26	15	48
Disabled	8	13	3	7	1	5	12	25
Other	1	4	4	18	6	27	11	49
TOTAL	35	55	49	157	30	123	114	335

To obtain relief, old people must fulfill the usual requirements of living alone, being propertyless, ill, and without familial support. In the

474 of the needs of their tribesmen; that, in fact, the patronage
661 system is relative to the traditional situation. Unavoidably,
474 the al-Qasr cooperative society is dominated by one tribe:
619 107 of its members are from the 'Aishaibat, while only 32 are
from other tribes. This relationship between traditional and modern structures is common throughout the Western Desert. When a new coopérative is organized within the boundaries of a certain tribal *mintaqa*, members of the local tribe will resign from other cooperatives to join "their own." Thus, when a new cooperative was founded in Marsa Matruh, twenty members of the Jum'iat tribe left the al-Qasr branch to join the new chapter which catered largely to the needs of the Jum'iat in the town.

474 The World Food Program of the Food and Agriculture
747 Organization (F.A.O.) of the United Nations operates through
433 the cooperative society. It has had an impact on the economy
177 of the Bedouins of al-Qasr. In 1963, this organization, with
the cooperation of the U.A.R. government, proposed to stabilize economic conditions in the Western Desert by providing 4,000 Bedouin families (20,000 persons) with enough food and fodder to help them through the three dry summer months. The program was designed to encourage mixed and settled farming through the reclamation of 20,000 acres of arid desert land, while its range improvement project was to furnish pasturage for 500,000 sheep throughout the Northwestern Coastal Zone. In al-Qasr,

747 177 this number included pasturage for 11,000 sheep (Abu-Zeid
433 n.d.: 19-27).

[474] F.A.O. has encountered a number of serious problems and the program has received setbacks. The program, as an agent of social change, failed to take proper measure of the structural and ideological aspects of the Bedouin traditional system. Range improvement projects were carried out with disregard for existing tribal boundaries (the _mintaqa_) in the desert. In one case, the Bedouins removed fences on _their_ property, and allowed sheep to destroy an entire experimental range area. Food distribution has fallen short because polygyny as a structural feature of marriage and the Bedouin family was not taken into account. The government estimated five persons per family, and planned to distribute food to 4,000 families. They were only able to subsidize 3,281 families. Aid officials failed to consider the strength of Bedouin values. To qualify
747 for government aid, a Bedouin must belong to his local coopera-
177 tive society. Some Bedouins wish to remain independent of
474 426 government business, and others ~~cannot~~ afford the 50 piasters
membership dues. A man may borrow money from another, of course, but in al-Qasr a "debt" is actually a particular kind of social relation which, like all others, carries with it a set of specific rights and obligations. A debt among Bedouins is a
[571] complex relationship: it may draw two parties together, or it may be, as it is with the Kachins of Burma (Leach 1954:153),

747 the basis of conflict. Bedouins may be unwilling to contract
177 such a potentially significant relationship for the 50 piasters
474 426 it takes to join the cooperative society. In yet another area,
571 program administrators concerned with nutritional improvement
747 have ignored the culturally important areas of food preferences
177 and, more seriously, food prohibitions. The Bedouins, who
262 subsist mainly on their own animal products, barley bread, and
a few fresh vegetables, are extremely hesitant to accept what
they consider ritually "unclean meat from foreigners," powdered
milk, dried fish, and Kraft cheese. They are willing to
747 accept grain, flour, and the cottonseed cakes which are used
177 as fodder. In other words, the Bedouins seem to be presented
[178] with poor alternatives which may tend to reinforce choices
[433] related to the traditional productive organization, i.e.,
pastoralism. The exogenous stimuli to change are so culturally
objectionable that they actually generate conflict situations
and misunderstanding between agents and recipients of change.

747 Government programs have aimed at one aspect of
177 Bedouin society, the economic structure. They have ignored
433 the cultural underpinning of social organization, the system
of meanings in terms of which social action takes place
(Geertz 1957:32-54). The relationship between social and
economic behavior is, of course, an extremely important one.
But the economic structure cannot be transformed independently
of a specific cultural structure.

654 crop, until five to seven years after planting. To alleviate
245 the difficulties of this period of apprehension, which the
177 Governor of the desert province refers to as "the dangerous
433 ● [749] period," the United Nations F.A.O. aid program was designed
and put into operation in al-Qasr.

654 A Bedouin may purchase an olive seedling from the
245 government for the price of two piasters (about six cents).
177 This same seedling costs the government 26 piasters. Once
433 through "the dangerous period," a Bedouin can expect a yield
435 of 120 to 150 kilos of olives from one tree. Olives sell for about 15 piasters per kilo. Or, at a cost of 5 piasters per kilo, the olives can be converted into oil. One ton of olives will render about 23 per cent oil. Olive oil is now considered a luxury item in Egypt, and the market price is very high. But only the Bedouin with a large harvest of olives finds it profitable to sell his product on the oil market. These conditions have made many Bedouins willing to convert from horticulture and sedentary pastoralism to arboriculture.

654 Between 1960 and 1964, the government reclamation
245 program has planted a total of 9,514 olive trees on land
177 registered to 124 individuals. The average distribution of trees, about seventy-six per man, is indicative of one of the problems related to change in al-Qasr and about which we have spoken earlier. Most of the trees have gone to men who, before

685 such, deviates from the normal pattern of cases dealt with by the
627 customary law in the conventional way. The men selected by the Geneishat
695 included, in addition to Rabbu and his father Hakim, Shei'eb and his
613 three brothers, Hakim's cousin Samsoun and his four brothers and Hakim's
uncle Sheikh Qudura and his sons. The date of the oath was set for June
tenth. Two days before, the two parties involved in the dispute invited
a number of the important people of other tribal segments in the area to
[492] be witnesses to the oath. All involved started to travel to the tomb of
[494] Sidi Dmain, some on donkeys, others by bus or train. At six o'clock on
[497] the morning of the oath everybody gathered in the courtyard outside the
[778] tomb of the saint. The granddaughter of the saint works as a mediator
[787] between the spirit of her grandfather and his followers announced that
[776] the saint was ready for the oath and everybody went inside preparing for
the oath. Before the oath was taken the Geneishat asked Hakim if his son
and the fourteen men they had chosen were present and Hakim said they
were. Since the Geneishat were from a different tribal segment and
lived outside the area, they had no personal knowledge of most of the
[212] men who were to take the oath. Knowing the reputation of Hakim they
asked the men to present their identification cards to check them against
[747] the list they had. At that time Hakim said that some of the men didn't
have identification cards because they had not applied for aid from the
World Food Program. Then the Geneishat demanded that those without cards
should be identified by members of other tribal segments who had come as
witnesses. Hakim refused and then admitted that one of the men was absent and that he had put another in place of him. But when the Geneishat
learned that the one to be absent was Sheikh Qudura, they insisted that

562 such compensation. In forfeiting her rights of inheritance, a woman
428 secures for herself and her children the continuous support of her
593 kin-group and the protection of her rights. This support was denied
in the few cases I was able to collect in which the woman demanded her
share of inheritance. The following is one of these cases. The material
159 presented is a summary of the life history of Fatma, who at the time of
562 428 the study, was a shopkeeper managing the small general store she owned
593 near the railroad station of Burg el-Arab, some fifty miles west of
[444] Alexandria. She also practiced healing and midwifery on a part-time
[759] basis.

Fatma was the only daughter with four sons of sheikh El-Asi, who
at one time was the aqila of bait Hussein of the Sanagrah tribal segment
[627] in the area. He was also known as a mardi and was frequently sought in
● [755] mediation of disputes. He was believed to have supernatural power which
he used to cure people for a certain amount of money. During his life-
[454] time, he had acquired a sizable sum of money which he invested in live-
[233] stock. At the time of his death his herd, which numbered more than 900
[422] sheep and goats, was considered the finest in the area. He had no barley
[423] lands because his camp was deep in the desert, but he had fine grazing
land.

Throughout the area the four sons were known for being arrogant and irresponsible. Three of them were employed by one of the irrigation projects carried on by the government in the area as construction workers; the fourth looked after the herd of his father. All four were known as chasers of women, and they frequently went to Alexandria to visit prostitutes and drink liquor.

[444] Fatma was first married when she was eighteen to a man from
Alexandria who had opened a general store in the area where her father

safe place when on seasonal moves. Often a shrine, sometimes 778
the shrine of a very famous saint, is no more than a wall of 776
stones, with perhaps a stick, with pieces of cloth tied to it, 792
erected over the grave, and this is the usual form in the steppe
grazing-grounds. There are generally cemeteries around the [764]
tombs.

All these shrines are visited by the Bedouin from time to time,
when they are passing by or when they have some request to
make of the holy man. Many of them are cult centres, an annual [796]
ceremony, one of the chief events of the Bedouin year, being [619]
held at them; and when they are near the border between tribes,
or between tribal sections, this is an occasion for intertribal, or
intersectional, gatherings. There is no saint whose tomb is much [789]
visited by the Bedouin who has not performed miracles, some [755]
of them very remarkable miracles, and there is probably none
who has not at some time or other cured the sick or given an heir.

The tombs of these holy men, Sidi this, Sidi that, and Sidi
the other, are found in profusion over the whole of inhabited
Cyrenaica. The historically best known are those of Sidi Rafa',
one of the Companions of the Prophet, near al-Zawiya al-Baida
on the plateau, of Sidi 'Abdalla, one of the Prophet's standard-
bearers, in the oasis of Aujila, and of the founder of the Sanusiya
Order, Sidi Muhammad bin 'Ali al-Sanusi, at Jaghbub oasis.
The shrines belong to the tribes and tribal sections in whose [619]
earth the Marabouts are buried and the Marabouts are looked [423]
upon as tribal and sub-tribal patrons. Like the Sanusiya Order,
they have become part of tribal life.

I have earlier reproduced Col. De Agostini's map of the Hasa 778
tribe to serve as an example of the territorial distribution of 619
lineages. The same map serves to illustrate the distribution of 792
shrines in a tribal territory. It can be seen from this map, which 776
shows only the best-known Marabout tombs, that all the different sections of the tribe have their shrines, and I would draw attention to an interesting feature of the distribution which I have also noted in other tribal areas: how often these sacred spots are near a tribal boundary, or near the boundary between one tribal section and another. This may not be pure chance, for the Marabouts in their lifetimes were regarded as standing outside the tribal system, to which indeed, being foreigners from the west, they did not belong, and their chief political role was

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[For information on the establishment of schools and medical clinics in Libya by the Italian government for the benefit of the Bedouins, see Categories 175 and 648.]

593 cerned with his own and his group's status in marriage arrange-
[584] ments. One informant said that a rich man must marry into a
[581] rich group. The Bedouin have a saying which is relevant here:
*[613] "Your bait is equal to the bait into which you marry." Before
her marriage the girl's duty toward her father is to respect
and obey him. After her marriage "her only duty is that she
•[958] must visit him from time to time. If he becomes sick, and
he has no wife, she must care for him and nurse him."

593 It was a common sight to see a Bedouin father fondle
834 his daughter of age six years or younger, but beyond this
age physical intimacy ceases. The Bedouin say that a father should not kiss or hold on his knee a daughter over the age of eleven. After the girl marries, a definite avoidance custom characterizes the father-daughter role relationship. The Bedouin say that the father will not see the face of his daughter after her marriage. This means that the married daughter remains veiled before her father, and even before her older brothers. This type of avoidance custom is rare by comparison with the cross-cultural data (Driver 1966).

593 A wife obeys her husband concerning all matters:
"she does not even leave the house without his permission." A woman may go and complain to her father if her husband does not provide for her, i.e., with food and clothing, or if he unjustly beats her or continually threatens to beat her. On the other hand, if a woman is in the wrong "it is

562 428 593 such compensation. In forfeiting her rights of inheritance, a woman secures for herself and her children the continuous support of her kin-group and the protection of her rights. This support was denied in the few cases I was able to collect in which the woman demanded her share of inheritance. The following is one of these cases. The material 159 562 428 593 presented is a summary of the life history of Fatma, who at the time of the study, was a shopkeeper managing the small general store she owned near the railroad station of Burg el-Arab, some fifty miles west of [444] Alexandria. She also practiced healing and midwifery on a part-time [759] basis.

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[444) Fatma was first married when she was eighteen to a man from Alexandria who had opened a general store in the area where her father

173 Telescoping of names, and fusion of names, taken together,
178 can account for the fixity of the genealogy to a large extent. In
551 addition, lines which showed every sign of normal development
613 at one time, have petered out completely, even after they have
sometimes assumed the status of tertiary segments. Conditions
173 under which this is likely to happen are not difficult to envisage.
178 If hearsay evidence is correct, disease, when it strikes in the
551 desert, might rage in a camp like wild fire, bringing death to
613 many, but not spreading to other camps, because the camps are
731 so far apart. Even in springtime when men and beasts are together
361 in the pastures, and the larger summer camp has split into
four or five smaller ones, the distance between camps may still be
[221] a few miles. In summer, when camps are concentrated on the
large watering points, the distances between them are considerably
more. Disease, therefore, does not spread from camp to camp
as rapidly as one might expect in such primitive conditions of
living. In 1949 a number of men of a small camp died within a
[761] few days of each other. Bedouin opinion attributed these deaths
[784] to an allegedly false oath sworn by the deceased a year earlier.
Medical opinion ascribed them to filth in a well which the deceased
had been cleaning before their illness. In any event, a
thriving line of a lineage was wiped off the genealogy. The portion
173 of the Dawwas genealogy shown on this page shows a
178 similar process at work. Again, to give another example, the Nasr
613 section of the Magharba tribe once included six tertiary sections,
not four as are now given. Two of these six sections are now
represented by only four men of whom two are too old and decrepit
to have heirs any longer, and are unmarried in any case;
a third, whose wife has long passed child-bearing age, had two
sons, but both died before marriage; and the fourth, a very poor
and old man, has only one daughter, and is a widower. Three
of the four now live with their collateral tribal section, Madhkur,
and count themselves members of this group. That they once belonged
to two different groups might have passed unnoticed were
it not that two elders of the Madhkur section insisted that they
should be correctly placed and their entire genealogies be recorded.
The younger men argued that although they were aware
that the two groups named Farjiani and al-Khadhar at one time

[facing P. 16]



THE TOMB OF THE GRAND SANUSI (HASANAIN PASHA)

3:Evans-Pritchard E-4, 5 (1942-1944) 1949 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9
(1837-1942)
Sanusi

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*795 from Algeria and the other countries of the Maghrib on his
793 travels backwards and forwards to Arabia. He found in
159 Cyrenaica a tribal structure of a simple kind on which it was
*175 possible to build a missionary organization, but not out of
which it could be built. He brought this organization with him
to Cyrenaica, a band of devoted followers whose allegiance had
been tried by many vicissitudes. It must be remembered also
that these intimates of the Grand Sanusi were foreigners to the
Bedouin of Cyrenaica, with whom they had no ties of kinship,
so that they stood always outside the tribal system and were
not involved in the ancient loyalties and feuds inherent in
Bedouin society. The missionary organization, the Sanusiya
*795 Order, was separate from the tribal system, and by centring
793 it in the distant oasis of Jaghbub the Grand Sanusi prevented it
797 from becoming identified with any one tribe or section of the
159 country, as it might have become had it been centred in Cyrenaica
*175 proper. As we will see, it was the local attachment of the tribes
to the zawiyas in their territories, and the attachment of the
Shaikhs of these zawiyas to the Head of the Order, which made
the Order so effective a missionary Body, and eventually
enabled it to become a political force.

The Grand Sanusi died at Jaghbub on 7 September 1859 and
*795 was buried there. Later a magnificent shrine, furnished with
793 ornate trappings, was erected over his bones and was sur-
159 mounted with a white cupola, which gleams several miles away
*175 as one approaches the oasis. The shrine is of Egyptian craft-
764 manship and seems incongruous in its desert surroundings and
[177] unfamiliar among a simple people.

There can be no gainsaying that al-Sayyid Muhammad bin
*795 Ali al-Sanusi was a great man and his life's work a great
793 achievement. He is said to have been tall and of a distinguished
159 appearance, an eloquent speaker, and a wise teacher.[1] His
religious personality may be estimated by the fact that many
Algerians, Tunisians, and Moroccans were so inspired by his
teaching and example that they left their homes and followed
him on his travels and at his orders went as missionaries into
new lands, and by the fact that the Bedouin of Arabia and
Libya, who are a reserved and unheeding people, accepted him
as their guide in things both spiritual and temporal.

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[1] Adams, op. cit., p. 10.

sections of a tribe may be opposed to one another they regard 619
themselves as an undivided group in opposition to neighbouring
tribes, and are so regarded by their neighbours. Thus a Qalbati
is only a Qalbati in Hasa country. In 'Abaidat or Bara'asa
country he is a Hasi. Likewise a Darsi or an 'Abidi in contrast
to members of other tribes regards the whole of the Darsa or the
'Abid as his people, his tribal brothers.

Each tribe in this commonly accepted sense has its *watan*, its 619
homeland, its soil, its arable, its pastures, and its wells; and 421
each has its camel-brand which is also carved on the tombstones [764]
of its dead. The tribal lands are vested in the tribe, which
has residual rights in them. They cannot, therefore, be alienated
to other tribes without the consent of the whole tribe. A tribe 619
is conceived of as a huge family descended from a common 614
ancestor, from whom the tribe generally takes its name. Hence
its segments can be figured either as a series of political sections
or as genealogical branches of a clan.

A tribe is divided into several, generally two or three, 619
primary divisions, or sub-tribes, which own well-defined portions 613
of the tribal territory, in most cases running in strips unbroken
by intrusive elements. These primary divisions are of the same pattern as the tribe of which they form part. Each division has its *watan*, which its members own and defend collectively. They believe that they are descended from a common ancestor, who is generally a son of the ancestor of the tribe. Primary tribal divisions split into secondary divisions, and secondary divisions into tertiary divisions, and so on. Each of the smaller divisions is a replica of the larger ones and has the same preferential and exclusive rights in its lands, an encroachment on which by another division will lead to fighting. Each has within the tribal brand its special lineage markings. The members of each division also consider that they are descended from a common ancestor who, in his turn, is descended from the ancestor of the larger division of which they form [illegible] section. The further the sub-division the more the resultant groups take on the complexion of kinship aggregates, rather than of political aggregates.

These kinship aggregates or extended family groups are the
basic units of tribal life. They are called *biyut* (sing. *bait*). The [423]
tribe may be the residual owner of land and water but the
biyut are the owners in use. Their members live in the same

safe place when on seasonal moves. Often a shrine, sometimes 778
the shrine of a very famous saint, is no more than a wall of 776
stones, with perhaps a stick, with pieces of cloth tied to it, 792
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*175 is not to be built till the zawiya is completed. There will be
*795 builders and carpenters among the Brothers and all that is
793 required of the tribal Shaikhs is selection of the site and supervision of the work. He points out to them that the work is for their benefit, in that they and their sons will receive in the zawiya an education, especially in the Koran and in the laws of Islam, and will be able to worship there. The Grand Sanusi then cites passages from the Koran and the *Hadith* commending religious benefactions. Finally he prays God to assist those engaged in the building and those who have made themselves responsible for the upkeep of the zawiya. God helps those who help others. A man reaps what he sows.

*795 Some of the Cyrenaican lodges were larger than others but they all had the same features, a straggling warren of stone
346 buildings comprising a mosque, schoolrooms, guest-rooms, apartments for the Shaikh of the zawiya and his family, rooms for teachers and pupils, and houses for the Brothers, clients,
[241] and servants, and their families. Many had small gardens near-
[764] by and the local cemetery was usually adjacent to a lodge.
● Jaghbub, where several hundred persons lived, was the largest
[792] of such communities. The ruins of Dariyana and al-'Azziyyat are also extensive and must have housed several hundred persons, but the average lodge probably housed only some fifty to a hundred persons, including wives and children, though there were often *Marabtin* families attached to the zawiya living nearby, sometimes in caves dating from classical times. The importance of a lodge was not to be estimated so much by the number of its occupants as by its tribal position and the number of its Bedouin adherents.

*795 The Shaikh of a new zawiya would point out to the local
793 tribesmen that he and his companions had no means of supporting themselves or of maintaining the zawiya. The various
425 sections nearby then gave to the lodge the lands adjoining it, this estate surrounding a lodge being known as its *haram*. On the plateau the lodges were generously endowed with arable, in the steppe with wells, and in the oases with date-palms and springs. Later, further gifts of arable, wells, springs, and date-palms, or part use of these, would sometimes be made, especially when there was a dispute between two sections about ownership of property and neither would give way to the other,

571 between man and man, although the various cereal dishes which constitute
231 their regular meals are said to have a similar effect.

264 The son who continues to eat with his father "as he always had been
182 doing," also continues to accept his authority. Indeed he could do little else
593 at this stage, for he lacks the economic means to cut away. Neither at marriage
585 nor after is there any transfer of wealth from father to son. The new
182 tent recently pitched is no more than a dormitory to which the young couple
[425] retire at night. During the daytime the son is still to be seen in his father's
[556] tent, and, in the male quarters, things appear to be much the same as before.
In the female quarters, the only superficial change is the more frequent appearance
among the women of one who, before marriage, often sat among
them if she had been a close neighbour or a close cousin previously; or of
an additional helper if she had come from afar. On the surface things remain
"as they always have been," although in fact, a whole set of changes
have been initiated.

857 *Rites de passage* are few among the Bedouin. A man's progress in life is
881 ceremonially marked by only four events: his birth, circumcision, marriage
764 and burial. His development into manhood is not marked by clearly defined
stages. About the age of seven, the henna markings on the front of a boy's
858 shirt for protection from the evil eye are not renewed, the cowrie shell stitched
789 to the front of his cap as a kind of talisman against the evil eye is removed
and he is no longer permitted free access to the women's quarters. As he
857 grows older, he will be instructed in goat-herding, and later taught to follow
233 the sheep. In his late teens he will have to undertake the more arduous and
883 responsible task of herding the camels. Coincident with camel-herding, he
233 may be given a gun by his father. Shortly afterwards he must undertake the
[431] stringent test of manhood, a journey to a distant oasis for dates. These
[411] changes are not marked off by a *rite de passage*. The rites a man undergoes
[484] during the course of a lifetime are minimal, and in the sense that they are
[885] concerned with only the basic events in a man's life anywhere (save for
852 circumcision, which is a minor celebration anyway), they are irreducible.
88 Moreover, the rituals which exist do not comprehend the same multiplicity of
796 relationships as rituals which occur in many other African societies.[4] It is
[771] true that the ceremonies referred to in this chapter by no means include
all the Bedouin rituals. It is also true that the events mentioned vary in
[554] elaboration, and in the number of symbols present in them, but they are
not multiplied or reduced for different people.

[613] In this context it is important to stress that we are here dealing with a
lineage society where social differentiation is not built up into differences
[554] of rank, where the roles to which a man succeeds are almost wholly captured
[602] by his kinship relationships with other men and which are sociologically
to be distinguished from the roles a man enters into by acquisition of office,

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[4] See, for example, the elaboration of rituals discussed in M. Gluckman (Ed.), *Essays on the Ritual of Social Relations.* Manchester: University of Manchester Press, 1962.

membership of associations and so on. The statuses a Bedouin achieves de- 796
pend not on an ordered acquisition through the inheritance of roles or elec- 852
tion to them, but on his personal manipulation of linkages in his jockeying 88
with others. Rites are minimal because there are few defined statuses an 554
individual can predictably acquire. The equalitarianism of the desert denudes 602
the Bedouin of ritual riches. Complimentarily, rites which do occur are 613
thrown into exaggerated relief by the absence of others, and in their isolation, [557]
become not merely a "passage" but a cataclysmic change. Marriage and
burial both comprehend limited fields of relations, but accompanying cere- 585
monies may bring several hundred people together, people who otherwise 764
rarely gather in these numbers to meet one another as kinsmen and neigh- 796
bours, and it is suggested that the emphasis given to the events dramatises the 602
significance of the changes they produce. In the discussion of the changes 182
brought about by marriage, the Bedouin view of what is entailed will be
considered first.

The Bedouin View of Marriage

After marriage, the Bedouin argue, a son has a tent of his own, a woman 585
over whom he has authority and soon children to make him a father. Mar- 581
riage causes split, branching. A new family is created, holding the poten- [613]
tial of a new lineage. The separation is so painful a matter for the father
that he cannot contemplate it, hence his pretence that he has no knowledge of [593]
wedding festivities, and his subsequent attitude that nothing has happened.

Interestingly, there are two other occasions when this attitude is to be 682
observed. When a man kills within his corporate group,[5] he may flee his 613
tribe or he may be compelled to leave; later he is likely to return and, when 221
he does, he is received with a minimum of show. Every attempt is made to
suppress knowledge of the event.

Again, if incest occurs, the memory of it must somehow be suppressed, and 835
it is an ever-present danger. Men, permitted four wives simultaneously and 561
also able to engage in a plurality of marriages through divorce or death of [595]
spouses, may have children showing an age difference of two or three gen-
erations. Thus it comes about that a man may be of an age in relation to his
father's sister which permits them as children to behave as if they were
first paternal cousins. As an adult, the preferred spouse for a man is a [582]
father's brother's daughter. In terms of relationships between adolescents
the situation in which a man is of the same age generation as his father's
sister is fraught with danger. In one such case, between a man and his
father's sister, the male child of the union was put out in the desert to be [684]

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[5] Bedouin are disposed in groups which, in summer, usually constitute a single community, around or near a watering point. The men of this group are interlinked by reference to an ancestor four or five ascending generations, reckoning from the generation of men of about 20 years. When, elsewhere in this chapter reference is made to corporations, it will be to groups of this kind.

613 621 602 [312] to one well, and the remainder to the other. It is usually an easy matter to predict, at least in a general fashion, how the group will divide, as long as the details of kinship are known; the camps will be composed of members of two sets of patri-lines in the tertiary segment, who will also represent two discrete clusters of cognatic kindred. If, therefore, a tertiary group increases in numbers to the point where a split in the lineage is inevitable, here then is the line of split, along a line, that is, of kinship cleavage and lineage differentiation. 'Men make the tribe; women divide it,' is an oft-quoted saying among the Bedouin, but this, like most sayings, tells only part of the truth, as we shall see.

613 621 It is possible to show where on the genealogy change takes place, and it is possible to indicate the lines cleavages will follow, but the proliferation of a lineage does not occur merely because the possibility exists for it to do so. A group must, clearly, break up if the number of its members significantly exceeds that which can be supported by the available natural resources; water is the prime cause of the proliferation of lineages. Granting this, a group remains an undifferentiated corporation until occasion arises when its members, or some of them, can demonstrate unequivocally that they are no longer bound by its conditions of membership. There is a number of occasions when this can be done, some of which are discussed below.

613 621 672 682 The test, *par excellence*, of corporate affiliation is the acceptance of the responsibility to pay blood-money. Refusal to accept this is the same as renouncing membership of the group. Individuals are sometimes excluded from membership in this way. There are occasions too, when the payment of blood-money involves renunciation by more than one or two individuals. If membership of a section has increased to the point of splitting, and should a homicide occur within it, one of the kin clusters within the group might demand blood-money from the other. Nothing could make the statement of split clearer than this. The most impelling condition of membership of the tertiary group is that 'we pay as one and receive as one', a condition which, of course, excludes payment within the group. Any two groups between which the demand for blood-money has been made are, therefore, by definition, separate tertiary groups.

613 621 765 When a member of a group or his wife dies, there are specific

days on which kin of various sorts should attend the mourning 613
ceremonies, which extend over a period of a week. Allowance is 621
made for those who may be away temporarily, although they are 765 •
expected to hasten to the mourning camp as quickly as possible.
Agnatic kin are expected not only to be present on the appropriate 613
day, but are required to offer gifts consistent with their 621
relationship to the bereaved; agnates of the tertiary segment are 765
expected to offer a sheep, while some cognates ought to bring a 431
goat and others a quantity of sugar and tea. At one funeral in a
camp where I was resident, soon after the death occurred, the
main concern of its inhabitants was whether or not certain men
of their section would attend the mourning rites and bring
appropriate gifts with them. These men lived at the time in
another camp a few miles away, as they had been doing for
several years past. They did not come when they were expected,
and when they finally arrived at the end of the week they brought
with them gifts of sugar and tea only—gifts which were totally
inappropriate for agnates of the group. They were, in fact,
now no longer members of it, and my neighbours were able to
tell me, 'They have branched off from us. We will never live together
again.' The lineage had proliferated and this was the first
occasion for showing it.

Wide-spread in Cyrenaica is a cult of saints. The number of 794
saints' tombs varies from tribe to tribe, there being fewer among 776
the camel herders of the semi-desert than among the cow- 778
herding, almost sedentary, folk of the plateau area. Whatever [788]
the number, the members of the group that venerates a particular
saint make an annual pilgrimage to his tomb, and sometimes
more frequent pilgrimages are made. In one area there were two 794
men, accepted by their respective kin groups as leaders, who vied 554
against each other for the leadership of their section. One of them [648]
had been a famous warrior during the Italian wars and, after
being injured, fled to Egypt where he lived for seventeen years,
until he returned to his homeland in 1947. The other had also
fought against the Italians, failed to win renown, was a captive
for a time, later released, and subsequently appointed leader of
his section by the Italian authorities. The first, during his period
of exile, had become impoverished. The second during his
years of freedom had prospered. As far as their personalities

One of my in-
595 124 formants, a wealthy man and a poet, said that since he could not love two women equally he would never take a second wife. He also said that he was unwilling to give his daughter to a man who refused to promise him that she would be his only wife.

593 Throughout his life, the father is dominant and his washuun is subjective. He is the master of his naja' and the [596] social behavior of his wife and offspring toward him has both a moral and a pragmatic aspect. They show respect and obed- • [768] ience because "it is the decent thing to do;" further, just as he provides for their material needs while he is alive, so the property which he leaves them will sustain them after 428 his death. As we have already noted, in theory, the daughters [562] inherit one-half of the shares which the sons receive; in fact, females inherit only if they are the sole survivors of the male. But the surviving wife, or wives, will take a cash amount equal to their brideprice from the husband's estate. The Bedouins say that this price will be paid before any other inheritance shares are distributed. In addition, the 768 wife has the right to remain in her husband's house or tent, and it is the duty of the eldest son to look after her. She may remain at home until death, provided she never brings a man who may be considered a prospective husband into the house.

593 The rights and duties involved in the father-washuun relationship show that the ideal authority structure of the

586 judicious. Another issue which enters here is the desire on
829 the part of the individual to maintain his privacy--especially
where an infringement of it could result in a change of his
tax status. The Bedouins think that it is wise to keep the
government uninformed about the exact size of their family.
586 When I first asked a question concerning divorce, I was
829 politely taken aside and told that I do not speak about
123 divorce to a man, and especially when his sons are present.

586 Two cases of divorce took place while I was in the
field. In the one, the wife claimed that her husband was
impotent. She took this complaint to her father who then
confronted the husband with it; the result was a divorce.
Although the man denied that he was sterile, this was his
second childless marriage and he felt it wise not to contest
the case. It becomes very important to know, in the case of
Bedouin divorce, which partner cannot meet the requirements
of the marriage. If it is the woman, she will return to
her father's house and the father must then return the price
of mahr (brideprice). If it is the husband, when his wife
returns to her father's house he must pay her (not her father,
in this case) a sum, called mu'akhkhir al-sadaaq ("the balance
of the marriage contract"), which is equal to that of the
original mahr. Actually, there are three times when a mahr
[583] price may be paid in al-Qasr: the original mahr is paid at
[768] the time of the marriage; the mu'akhkhir al-sadaaq is paid
[595]

586 [583] [768] [595] at the time of divorce (if the husband is in fault), and also at the time of the husband's death; and, sadaaq al-musaama ("price of friendship") is paid to the wife when her husband takes a second, third or fourth wife.

586 158 The second divorce case which happened while I was in al-Qasr involved, what seems to be, an instance of psychotic behavior. A girl, who had married shortly before I arrived in the field, would fall into a deep sleep every time she entered her husband's house. Each time her father would come for her and take her home until she had recovered. But upon her return, three different times, she became ill again. Finally, her father and the husband agreed that this marriage would not work, and the father returned the mahr to the man. This case lasted over the period of almost a year while I lived in al-Qasr. I suggested to the father that perhaps his daughter did not wish to be married to this man but he assured me that "she loved him very much."

586 If the girl's father is dead, so that she cannot return to his house at the time of divorce, she will go to live with the brother who needs her services. 586 587 [593] [583] It then becomes the duty of the brother to make another marriage for his sister, and in the case that he does it becomes his right to claim the mahr for himself. The Bedouins say that virginity, or the lack of it, in the case of the divorced woman is no issue; just so a man knows "she is from a good family."

586 women in the Western Desert, and that the women usually have no
562 difficulty in finding another husband.

586 While the right of "throwing herself" offers the wife some
562 guarantee of her rights, her main guarantee is derived from the security
593 she gets from retaining membership in her father's family. After the
768 death of the father, the woman's claims extend to the households of her
brothers. She acquires in them the same rights she had in her father's
household, and the brothers take the responsibility of their father in
[428] protecting and defending their sister. The woman achieves this
continuation of support partially through forfeiting her rights of inheritance
to her brothers.

562 Awlad Ali recognize the right of the daughters to inherit in their
428 father's estate. They accept the system of inheritance specified in
[779] the Koraan which gives the woman half the share of her brother. In
practice, this is usually side-stepped. Only sons inherit their father's
[233] property. The justification given for the non-inheritance of women is
[311] that the main items of inheritance in the Western Desert, livestock and
the right of land use, require certain protection and care which are
beyond the culturally defined roles of women. Livestock require moving
233
562 from one grazing ground to another, almost always crossing tribal lands
428 belonging to various tribal segments, some of whom might be hostile.
It also requires the ability to protect the herds from predators and
from raids, especially in earlier times. Similarly, land requires
preparation and protection against trespassers, especially when the barley
is growing.

562 Women, however, are supposed to be compensated by their brothers
428
593 for their shares. But very few would actually ask their brothers for

While the Bedouins
795 respect the Sanusi family they, nevertheless, wear their
•771 religion lightly. An informant, speaking of the merits and
829 demerits of the conservative Muslim Brethern Association, said
that "you should never listen to a holy man, for he will lead
you straight to hell!" But upon meeting any member of the
[576] Sanusi family, all Bedouins greet him by kissing his hand.
[778] Besides a show of deference, this ritual act, in theory,
transfers baraka from al-Sanusi to the layman.

648 The citizenship exemptions granted the Bedouins by
641 Muhammad 'Ali have been rescinded by Abd al-Nasser. This
has been one aspect of his program to imbue the Bedouin with
political consciousness and promote participation in the
nation-state. The Bedouins say that this is the way it should
be: they want the right to own land and to accept the
responsibility of defending the homeland. But they still do
[651] not pay land taxes, and they feel justified in this because
the desert "is very poor soil, and not like that of the Nile."
Nor do they always heed the call to military duty, though they
insist that they do.

648 Egyptian land reform laws would be impractical, or
179 impossible to apply, in al-Qasr. In the Nile Valley, such
423 laws were necessary. The majority of the Egyptian peasants
can survive on less than one acre of land, and farms of
under five acres comprise 44 per cent of the agricultural
land area in the Nile Valley (Warriner 1962:204). Plots this

695 784 below will show how a "bad oath" can work directly on the false witness.

784 626 626 681 Divine sanctions enter into other aspects of the Bedouin judicial process and function to maintain social control in al-Qasr. If we can speak of a standard, or minimal sanction, in Bedouin law it would be the dhabiiha and 10 L.E. In any case, however small the offence might be, the litigant found to be in the wrong will have this judgment made against him. But in almost every case "the [788] [292] party who takes his rights" will refuse the dhabiiha and 10 L.E. and insist instead upon a ritual three cups of tea. An individual refuses the dhabiiha as an act of brotherhood and thanksgiving that the quarrel has been settled. The Bedouins point out the practical factor that very few men in al-Qasr can afford to part with even one lamb. On the 626 681 682 264 other hand, in more serious cases, such as homicide, which occur in the external sphere of political relations and threaten to disintegrate the political community, the parties involved will actually eat a whole meal together. In this case, the dhabiiha is accepted, for the act of commensality is deemed necessary for reconciliation.

626 182 771 But whether or not conflict is concluded by a simple ritual or a large feast, the prevailing mood is one of gratitude that the secular bonds of brotherhood and a pre-ordained sacred order have been maintained. The Bedouin

626 process of conflict regulation is ritually sanctioned and
182 the political order sacralized in a public way at the con-
•771 clusion of litigation when the parties involved and the
'aqila read the Fatiha (the first sura of the Quran). For
671 the Bedouins, the 'awaiyid is the enactment of the word of
771 God, and the man who follows the 'awaiyid follows the command-
771 ments of God. One 'aqila speaking of the final authority which
776 directs Bedouin society said this:

> 577 God knows all things. God made the world and gave man a brain with which to think. Therefore, he gave man two choices: the good, and the bad. If a man follows the good, he does not steal, kill, or lie. God gave us Muhammad the Messenger, and he taught the ignorant to follow the word of God. You are an educated man, and so you must choose the good path and follow it. I do not read but I follow the Quran.

577 It follows, then, that "the good man" represents an
183 important Bedouin cultural ideal which is legitimated by
771 reference to the sacred. The practice of this ideal leads
[829] to "the good society." Another 'aqila, in reply to my
question concerning the definition of a "good man," answered:

> A good man should follow God, and through this he will be a perfect man because such a man could make no mistakes. You could find no better person than this. The good man fasts, prays, makes the pilgrimage, and helps the poor. He avoids stealing and lying; these are the most important things to avoid . . . All men aim to do good. Some men think that they are doing good, but they cannot tell good from bad: this is the origin of badness . . . A man aims to do good so that the Arabs will thank him for it. The Arabs (i.e. the man's fellow Bedouins) will say that he is doing good and that he is following the good path.

577 According to this 'aqila, the "good man" is the "good Muslim"
771 who observes the pillars of Islam (fasting, praying, making
183 the pilgrimage, and alms-giving). Also, the "good man" does
not steal or lie, and this leads, importantly enough, to social
accord.

121 In light of the preceding discussion of authority and
681 law, we can now offer a description of the Bedouin judicial
process in action. Southall (1956:121-151) has drawn the
121 distinction between internal and external delicts on the
681 bases of kinds of sanctions rendered, and whether or not
114 chiefly authority mediates conflict. Such a distinction can
be only partially applied in the case of the Bedouins of the
Western Desert. The kind of sanctions operating in the internal
political system do differ from those applied in the external
political system, though not to the same degree which is true
121 of Southall's Alurland. On the other hand, since Bedouin
681 society, lacking political centralization, cannot be character-
692 ized as a segmentary state with distinct spheres of authority
[642] at successive levels of the lineage structure, the intervention
or non-intervention of chiefly adjudication and decision-
making cannot serve as a basis for differentiating political
* [613] action. Rather, the lone political office of the 'aqila
[627] involves itself in all arbitration which cannot be successfully
concluded by the mechanism of familial authority. There are
[648] just two exceptions which apply to this latter statement:

554 The *rajal khair*, then, is a broker in social relationships,
571 a manipulator of loyalties. As a member of the "status
627 group," he can afford to spend time and money in courting his
fellow tribesmen, and, as a result, can accrue prestige and
loyalty. This role, like that of the *'aqila*, is a secular
[681] one. The sanctions which it controls are as economical as
those of the *'aqila's* are political. In this sense, they
are differentiated from the role of *rajal saalih* whose
sanctions are sacred in nature.

554 The traditional role which we define as that of the
792 *rajal saalih*, "the holy man," was probably much more important
[178] in the past than it is today. In al-Qasr, there are only two
rajal saalih who share in traditional power: the one is a
resident of al-Qasr proper, and the other, a member of the
prestigious Sanusi family, lives near Marsa Matruh.

The *rajal saalih* of al-Qasr, i.e. the local "holy
man," is assured of status because he is an *ashraf*, one who
claims descent from the family of the Prophet. He is also a
[561] member of the elder age-set, and while he is not rich, he
cannot be considered poor. Though the "holy man" al-Sanusi
[793] lives near Matruh, he participates in the authority structure
of al-Qasr and is a member of the "status group." He is
sometimes referred to as *rajal saalih kabir*, "a great holy
man," by virtue of his Sanusi heritage.

• [771] The relative unimportance of this role as compared
to that of the *rajal khair* in conflict regulation is a function

554 of the Bedouin attitude, or lack of it, toward religion.
792 Since the time of Muhammad, the Bedouins have been considered
771 notoriously bad Muslims. Today, the Bedouins tend to joke
about their lack of zeal, and often point out that "holy
619 men" are not to be trusted.[2] This is seen in Sa'adi behavior
771 toward the Marabtin tribes who are their vassals. Theoretically,
792 the Marabtin who trace descent to the Prophet and might be
554 considered "sacred Tribes" should be respected by the "secular"
[778] Sa'adi tribes. But the Sa'adi of al-Qasr tend to deride the
554 Marabit. For instance, the "holy man" of al-Qasr, 'Amm Salih,
792 is a Marabit and well-known for his ability to successfully
627 mediate in conflict situations. But one informant, pointing
619 out this gift which 'Amm Salih possesses, said: "Amm Salih
is a good man, he is not a Marabit." But 'Amm Salih identifies
himself as a "rajal saalih" and a "Marabit"; he sees no role
conflict here.

771 The Bedouins also joke about the manner in which they
[522] practice the "pillars of Islam." Especially, they make light
of the fact that they are irregular in mosque attendance.
They say, with a slight smile, "we pray in the desert." A
[124] common way for an interview to end was by an informant rising
and saying: "Now I must wash for prayers." This happened

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[184] [2] Professor Abou-Zeid also notes this trait in his study of the Bedouin near Sallum, on the Libyan border (1966:248).

771 at any time of the day! As one Bedouin put it: "According to the idea of goodness (salih), we are not good. This is because we do not pray, we are part-timers in prayer."

554 792 778 A good rajal saalih is considered by the Bedouin to have a special "blessing" (baraka), a concept somewhat equivalent to that of mana. Someone such as 'Amm Salih is thought to have baraka, and this type of power naturally increases his influence and enhances his status. The following [124] informant's account brings this out and shows something of the magico-religious element at work in Bedouin power relations.

> [539] Hajj 'Ali does not believe in magic but he respects the "holy man" like anyone else. He owns a field from which are taken stones for building houses. One day he saw some men taking stones from this field. They were digging near a well so that the well would not be able to hold water after they had finished. Hajj 'Ali told the men to stop digging. One man answered: "I am cutting these stones for the Jaraira family (the family of 'Amm Salih), and only a few more and we will be finished." Hajj 'Ali replied: "For the Jaraira as for anyone else, we don't favor anyone, so stop the work now." Then Hajj 'Ali went home, never thinking that they would cause any trouble for him, and he was afraid of no harm. He slept and he had a dream. [787] In the dream he saw three of the Jaraira family, all of whom were dead and whom he had known in life. In the dream they only watched him and spoke no words. In the morning Hajj 'Ali went to the co-operative society's office and there he met 'Amm Salih. He said to him: "'Amm Salih, I want to tell you something." Then he related the whole story to him, and said: "I had no fear that you would do me any harm. But last night I saw your relatives in my dream; I had not even thought of them yesterday, so they are not the cause of the dream. [828] (The Bedouins believe that dreams reflect, and are connected with, what you saw or did during the day). So come and take all of the stones that you want, even if you are going to build a palace."

121 advanced" and is assumed "to have authority"; that the
"great tradition" is represented in the writings and public
actions of the political elite; and that "social prestige is
dependent on its adoption (or at least on its profession)"
(1962:69). Implicit in von Grunebaum's analysis, and also
contained in Redfield's model, is the employment of reference
group theory to understand human behavior in society. In
121 the al-Qasr case, I have tried to show that "status group"
177 members repudiate many of the traditional ways of life while
571 at the same time identifying more and more with the Egyptian
181 "status group," the bureaucrats of Marsa Matruh. The implication here is that the Bedouin "status group" is in the
process of taking on the values of a new reference group to
which they do not yet belong but to which they seek admission.

The bureaucrats of Marsa Matruh, like those of Cairo
and Alexandria described by von Grunebaum, represent the
"great tradition." The "status group" of al-Qasr while
aspiring to the "great tradition" emulate certain of the
behavioral traits and expectations of the elite group. For
[771] instance, they are conspicuous for their regular attendance
at Friday mosque services in Matruh. Merton, who has developed
reference group theory, points out that "men frequently orient
themselves to groups other than their own in shaping their
behavior and evaluations" (1957:234). This type of behavior,
or "anticipatory socialization," is the process of taking on

795*

or swaying into convulsions. Indeed, it is noticeable that the [793]
Orders which permit such practices, notably the 'Arusiya, [786]
'Isawiya, Rifa'iya, and Sa'adiya, so popular in the towns of [157]
Libya, have made no converts among the true Bedouin.

It is unnecessary to discuss further the mystical side to the 795*
Sanusiya for another reason. The Bedouin of Cyrenaica with 771 ●
whom this book is concerned have only the slightest knowledge
of either the religious teachings or the ritual of the Order, and
are interested in neither. They belong to the illiterate class of
the *Muntasabin*, the simple adherents of the Order who follow
its Shaikh personally and politically. It is very seldom, if ever, [789]
that the Bedouin know the special prayers and litanies of the [212]
Order, and their use of them, if any, is restricted to getting a
scribe to write them on paper so that they can sew them up in
leather and tie them to their bodies. It is only a tiny educated
minority who regularly recite the prayer formulas and litanies.
These are the *Ikhwan*, the Brothers of the Order. They live in 795*
the lodges of the Order and hold prayer-meetings there. Among
the Brothers are some who have been raised to the position of
Shaikhs of lodges, generally, in past times, after special training
at the University of the Order at Jaghbub oasis, where they have
received a diploma from the Head of the Order or from one of
his family or inner circle. This inner circle, the *Khawass*, consists
vaguely to-day of a few senior members of the Sanusi
family and two or three learned Brothers and does not function
as a Body, but in the past it was, according to Sayyid Muhammad
Idris, an official Council controlling the affairs of the Order
and was composed of four Shaikhs of the Order, who were not
of the Sanusi family, under the presidency of the Head of the
Order, who had to be a member of the founder's family. As [178]
Dr. Adams points out,[1] the fact that this inner circle is no longer
a determinate Body indicates a change in the character of
the Order, a development of its political, to the detriment
of its religious, functions. This development has favoured the
interests of the Sanusi family to the disadvantage of the Order
as a whole.

The *Shaikh al-Tariqa*, Head of the Order, advised in past 795*
times by his Council, appoints the Shaikhs of the lodges and 793
these Shaikhs can ordain Brothers and the Brothers can receive

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[1] C. C. Adams, 'The Sanusiya Order', *Handbook on Cyrenaica*, 1944, p. 31. [113]

[p.62]

CHAPTER III

THE SANUSIYA AND THE TRIBES

I

793 WHEN the Grand Sanusi came to preach in Cyrenaica he found
619 the kind of society I have outlined: a congeries of tribes without
law or effective government, for the Turks had little control
over the interior, but with like values and habits and a community
of life which crossed tribal boundaries. The Bedouin to
[181] whom he preached were simple people living the austere and
monotonous life of the tents, with that savage character which
has been so often portrayed, but also with those noble qualities
which have seldom failed to evoke admiration from those who
[177] have lived among them. They were profoundly ignorant about
the outside world and also—which is what touched the heart of
[797] the Grand Sanusi—about the faith of their fathers, and to this
matter I must now return, since the Sanusiya was a missionary
Order and can only be understood as such.

771 Though the Bedouin professed Islam before the Grand Sanusi
[797] influenced them by his teaching, they were almost totally
ignorant of its doctrinal content, rites, or ritual and moral
duties, and it is safe to assume that they did not obey its precepts.
It is safe to assume this because even to-day, after a
century of Sanusiya instruction, the Bedouin perform their
religious duties in a very perfunctory way, if at all, and when
Muslim law is at variance with tribal custom they follow tribal
custom. In saying that they are lax, I do not suggest that they
[186] are not very sincere, Muslims. They are proud of being Muslims
and consider themselves greatly superior to Christians, while
they are contemptuous of Jews. Nevertheless, though they
would not belittle, the Cyrenaican Bedouin feel no embarrassment
at neglecting, the duties obligatory on every Muslim.
The Confession of Faith is known to all and implicitly accepted
by all. It imposes no irksome restrictions or tiresome duties.
[782] But they almost completely neglect—I speak of the more
nomadic sections whom I know best, but it is probably true of
most Cyrenaican Bedouin—their daily prayers, a duty which is

absolutely obligatory and sinful to omit. I very much doubt 771 •
whether many of the Bedouin know how to pray in the prescribed [782]
manner. As I have mentioned earlier, the Bedouin used [794]
to give alms to their zawiyas and in doing so they carried out [735]
one of the five major duties of a Muslim, but they regarded these [431]
alms as charity rather than legal dues. I have never met an ordinary Bedouin who had been to Mecca, or who even contemplated going there. Nevertheless, however lax they may [785]
be in other things, all Cyrenaican Bedouin keep the fast of Ramadan, and in this annual fast is summed up for them, more than in anything else, the obligations and privileges of Islam and its unity and strength. Moreover, although they are [829]
negligent Muslims themselves they respect piety in others. Brothers of the Sanusiya Order and religious men in general ought to pray regularly. That is their business and it is very necessary for the well-being of the community and worthy of liberal support, but the Bedouin is an unlettered man, a shepherd, and a warrior, and he has his own affairs to see to. Perhaps the Bedouin make up for their shortcomings by their [798]
enthusiasm for the *jihad*, holy war against unbelievers. They [648] *
consider that they have fulfilled their obligation under this head in ample measure by their long and courageous fight, formally declared a holy war by the Caliph of Islam, against the Italians, the French, and the British. A Bedouin once said to me when I remarked how rarely I had seen Bedouin at prayer: '***nasum wa najhad***', '(but) we fast and we wage holy war'.

It must also be said that it would be an error to suppose that Islam had not, long before the time of the Grand Sanusi, strongly affected the character and custom of the Sulaimid Bedouin. This question, which is far from simple, need not be discussed in the present account and it is only necessary to note that the Bedouin assume that their customs are Muslim customs. It would also be a questionable judgement to assert that the Bedouin of Cyrenaica are not religious because they do not pay the same attention to outward ritual as do townspeople and peasants, for piety and holiness, as we have often been admonished, are not the same. The Bedouin certainly have a profound faith in God and trust in the destiny He has prepared for them and this faith and trust enhance that superb dignity

• 771 which often contrasts so strikingly with their poverty and rags and what Paolo Della Cella describes as their 'excessive and habitual filth'.[1]

771 It is important that it should be understood that the Bedouin
797 of Cyrenaica were Muslim, at any rate by allegiance if not by
instruction, before the Grand Sanusi propagated the faith among
793 them, because otherwise it would be difficult to account for
*795 their ready acceptance of his guidance. He was not appealing to a pagan people to embrace Islam, but to a Muslim people to show in their lives the faith they professed. It was his achievement to have given their religion organized form and direction, and by so doing to have exercised a persistent and transformative influence on their morals; for if the Bedouin neglect religious duties to-day and are by peasant and urban standards ignorant, loud, and lawless, it can be imagined that they were troublesome indeed before the Grand Sanusi and Sayyid al-Mahdi had taught them something of the duties of their faith and had softened the harshness of their customs. That the Sanusiya made a big difference to their way of life cannot be doubted. Shaikh Muhammad 'Uthman tells us of the Bedouin of Cyrenaica that 'They are very good-natured and of a cheerful disposition. They have a profound reverence for the Shaikh Sidi al-Mahdi, and they fear God and His Prophet. One is in perfect security among them; a stranger, an explorer, has he even loads of gold or silver, has nothing to fear from them.' He also says, and for the same reason, that there were peace and security for caravans in the Wadai and in those parts of the Sahara where the Sanusiya was established; and he adds that Sayyid al-Mahdi had achieved these remarkable results by the exercise of spiritual authority only, and not by force, 'as an Amir or Sultan would have done'. As for the citizens of Banghazi, of whom the Tunisian traveller had a very poor opinion, he says that they were proud, inhospitable, and lazy, and would still have been plunged in ignorance and without a vestige of civilization or of religious education 'if the goodness of God had not sent them the Sanusiya fraternity, which contributed much to their moral regeneration'.[2] Even Italian authors have to admit that the Sanusiya did much for the people

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[1] Op. cit., p. 109.

[2] Op. cit., pp. 52, 59, 62, and 116-17.

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II

The Bedouin the Grand Sanusi found in Cyrenaica were not 771
only Muslims but also inveterate devotees of saints, the 792
Marabtin (sing. *Marabat*) or Marabouts, as they are called in 793
European accounts of North Africa, and the Grand Sanusi was 776
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have touched on the matter in Chapter I, I need not excuse myself for treating it again in its Cyrenaican context, for Bedouin attachment to the Sanusiya springs from their personal devotion to the Grand Sanusi and his family, and not the other way round, and the Grand Sanusi derived his sanctity, and thereby his power, from the fact that he was a Marabout. The Bedouin are familiar with saints and ignorant of Orders. To them the Grand Sanusi was a saint and wonderworker, and a man with *baraka*, an ample measure of God's grace which flowed through him to ordinary folk; but there was nothing extraordinary about him. They knew his kind of old. When he died his tomb became a shrine, the largest and richest in Cyrenaica it is true, but only one among very many, dating from the Companions of the Prophet Muhammad, through the Martyrs who were killed fighting for the faith in Cyrenaica, to the pious and learned
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kinship with him, and in virtue of their spiritual legacy from him, became heirs to his *baraka*; and so, to a lesser degree, have the heirs of the other religious teachers who came to Cyrenaica from the west, who died and were buried there, and whose descendants are the *Marabtin bil baraka* lineages of to-day. The authority the Grand Sanusi had over the Bedouin of Arabia and North Africa can be parallelled by the careers of many holy

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[1] Giuseppe Macaluso, *Turchi, Senussi e Italiani in Libia*, 1930, p. 32; Giglio, [113]
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771 men in North Africa whose families still retain much wealth and
792 influence. It was this Marabout status of the Grand Sanusi in
793 the eyes of the Bedouin which won him their respect: it was the
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778 Marabouts did not have, which enabled him to turn this respect into a theocracy.

*175 There is more than one explanation of the origin of the word
792 '*Marabat*'. That generally accepted is that it derives from the root RBT, to bind, and hence from '*ribat*', a fortified convent,
619 inhabited by warrior-monks, found on the marches of Islam in
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[613] tribal disputes. Sometimes, as we have seen, these men founded lineages which, dwelling under the shadow of their saintly forbears, became nuclei of social agglomerations which have developed in course of time into tribal groups, thus taking the shape of the tribal society in which they lived. The word
[192] '*Marabtin*' thus came to mean holy men (and their tombs) and then, in addition, tribes tracing their descent, or supposed descent, from these holy men and also, finally, in Cyrenaica, tribes who are clients of the great *Sa'adi* tribes which own the earth and water.

778 Some of the better known of the Cyrenaican saints, but by
776 no means all, have gleaming white cupolas, supported by four
792 walls, erected over their tombs, and inside the walls is a *tub*, a wooden box, over the grave, and this is covered with coloured cloth on which are inscribed passages from the Koran. Inside also are often a few pages from sacred books, occasionally a few small coins given by the local Bedouin, and any property, such as tents or ploughs, the Bedouin have wished to deposit in a

593 tegral part of "the one body"; events which affect a man in this context lie
613 outside a father's field of jurisdiction. The political authority vested in a
corporation acts to circumscribe the authority of persons in other fields.

Other rights stem from political membership. As a person with a defined
position in a lineage corporation, a man has the right to use the
natural resources of its territory. His father, although he instructs his son
where to plough and when to water the animals, cannot deny him access
to wells, pastures and ploughland. Economically, a son is independent to this
extent, although his ability to exploit his right to the natural resources is
restricted by his father's control of animals. Ultimately, however, this restriction
cannot amount to stultification, because a man has the right to
613 demand food. In practice, a poor man staves off hunger with donations from
422 this or that individual, and superficially it appears that he is dependent on
735 the personal charity of his fellowmen. This is not so, for what is implicit is
that the parcels of wealth controlled by individuals are the possessions of
the corporation. It is not accidental that poor people do not go hungry.
During my entire stay among the Bedouin I never saw one of them beg or
[556] suffer hunger, however marginal the diet of many. Clearly, those with a
surplus can and do use it for personal advantage, but the extent to which
they can do so is circumscribed by the legal claims which members of a
corporation have on the parcels of moveable property held by each of them.

613 Control over the wealth, whether it be animals or the procreative functions
421 of women, rests, in the final analysis, in a corporation. Inheritance laws
428 specify that women are not legal heirs,[a] and that all male children are
[562] equal heirs. Women do, in fact, come to control property, and it is rare that
wealth is equally divided among male heirs. The precise details of inheritance
[593] may partly be decided by a father, but he is limited in his actions. Most
of the time inheritance disputes are not of the kind which require action by
the corporate group; a case which occured while I was resident with the
Bedouin did, however, invoke immediate action. A man, who had left the
desert to live in a village on the plateau, had only one daughter. He made
it known that he intended to will his entire property to his daughter. When
the news was brought to the camps of his fellow agnates, there was great
consternation, because, as became clear in their lengthy discussions, the
threat now existed that a substantial parcel of property would be removed
from the group, a threat made real by the proposed marriage of the daughter
[584] to a man of another tribe. The court would have to recognise the daughter's
right to some of the property, and the members of the group reluctantly had
to concede that there was little they could do about this, but they had one
[593] action left to them — they decided that her nearest agnate should demand
[584] her in marriage. Usually, the choice of husband for a daughter is a decision

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● [771] [a] The Bedouin are Sunni Muslims, and, as Samusi, belong to the Maliki school in
[795] legal matters. According to court law, women are heirs. However, actual Bedouin
practice is contrary to law. For, if women were permitted to inherit, since many marry
[671] outside the corporation into which they were born, they could alienate its resources.

Chapter XVI

THE WESTERN BEDOUIN (EL MUGHARBA)[1]

"*The Moor is of a free and open nature.*"—Othello.

General Remarks—The Arab and the Libyan—The Sa'adi Tribes and the Murabitin—Bedouins of the Northern Littoral—Awlad 'Ali—Jawabis—Jumei'at—Samalus—Shiheibat. 000

Sinai has been called an "epitome of Arabia", and the pilgrim certainly feels well on the way to Mecca as soon as he crosses the Suez Canal, but it is equally true that Algiers is not so very far west of the "Arab's Gate" at Alexandria. The skies of Mariut are coloured with much the same blue as those of Andalusia, and, though the Sierras are lacking, the historian instinctively begins to look for the Alhambra as soon as he crosses the causeway to Amriya. The reason [167] is not so very far to seek, there is more of the Libyan than the Arab in the tribes that hardly a century ago flooded back into Egypt from Cyrenaica. Yet in spite of numerous resemblances, [771] these two races are divided as the goats from the sheep by this essential difference that while the "Berbers"[2] are religious and often superstitious (traits of a converted race), his religion sits so lightly on the Arab that he has almost reverted to his early paganism. But though this is true, it is far from obvious, and a traveller will not find anyone in the Western Desert to admit that he is not of pure Arab descent.

This snobbishness was evident so long ago as the time of Ibn Khaldun (1332–1406), who found it advisable to represent the Tuareg, as descended from a respectable but mythical Arab conqueror, Ifrikias ibn Sufi. Ibn Khaldun asserts that when Ifrikias himself returned to Arabia, the Ketama and Sanhaja tribes remained behind and became absorbed in the people of the country. All this is pure

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[1] Mugharba means literally "westerners", and is used in Egypt to denote generally all the Bedouin west of the Nile. But there is a tribe in Cyrenaica who content themselves with this simple title, and so confuse the issue. [101]

[2] All the indigenous races of North Africa are lumped together under this barbarian title by the Arab historians.

626 process of conflict regulation is ritually sanctioned and
182 the political order sacralized in a public way at the con-
771 clusion of litigation when the parties involved and the
'aqila read the _Fatiha_ (the first _sura_ of the Quran). For
671 the Bedouins, the _'awaiyid_ is the enactment of the word of
771 God, and the man who follows the _'awaiyid_ follows the command-
771 ments of God. One _'aqila_ speaking of the final authority which
776 directs Bedouin society said this:
577

> God knows all things. God made the world and gave man a brain with which to think. Therefore, he gave man two choices: the good, and the bad. If a man follows the good, he does not steal, kill, or lie. God gave us Muhammad the Messenger, and he taught the ignorant to follow the word of God. You are an educated man, and so you must choose the good path and follow it. I do not read but I follow the Quran.

577 It follows, then, that "the good man" represents an
183 important Bedouin cultural ideal which is legitimated by
771 reference to the sacred. The practice of this ideal leads
[829] to "the good society." Another _'aqila_, in reply to my
question concerning the definition of a "good man," answered:

> A good man should follow God, and through this he will be a perfect man because such a man could make no mistakes. You could find no better person than this. The good man fasts, prays, makes the pilgrimage, and helps the poor. He avoids stealing and lying; these are the most important things to avoid . . . All men aim to do good. Some men think that they are doing good, but they cannot tell good from bad: this is the origin of badness . . . A man aims to do good so that the Arabs will thank him for it. The Arabs (i.e. the man's fellow Bedouins) will say that he is doing good and that he is following the good path.

121 external system, however, the law recognizes retaliation, a
681 life for a life. Still, even in this case, Bedouin values
682 expressed through the 'awaiyid try to avert bloodshed and
[182] feuding by showing "the good path" and providing the means
[671] for settlement through compensation.

Just as the Bedouin accepts the 'awaiyid as a set of
681
682 of ideals calculated to regulate conflict, he paradoxically
182 claims the right to impose retaliatory sanctions as a just
[671] conclusion to conflict. One Bedouin said that the greatest
[673] sin which a man or group can commit is to accept the diiya
and then take his blood-revenge and return the money. Presumably,
a person or group commits no outrage if they refuse
the diiya with the understanding that blood-revenge will be
[626] taken. In al-Qasr, retaliation and the 'awaiyid are mechanisms
[671] of social control and dispute settlement. A political office
* [613] exists, i.e. the 'aqila which functions over the total range
[692] of political action, and the process of adjudication and
compensation in the form of indemnity payment represents an
institutionalized alternative to retaliation. In all cases
of dispute, ritual or religious sanctions back up social
● [776] sanctions. God is a third party to all conflict, and this is
[695] made manifest in the reading of the Fatiha or the oath-taking
128 ceremony. In order to describe how authority and sanctions
68 operate in Bedouin society, a number of examples are presented
[124] below. Some of the cases are the statements of informants about
[114]

685 627 The Geneishat selected the tomb of the saint where the oath was to
778 be administered. According to the customary law of Awlad Ali, the plaintiff
695 is the one to decide which saint is to be sought for the taking of
[671] the oath by the defendant. Each saint has his own reputation and some
[776] are said to be more effective in certain kinds of disputes. The saint
selected in this case was Sidi Dmain. Sidi Dmian's tomb is in the
Beheira province some 60 miles east of the area of Burg el-Arab. He is
[732] known to cause the blindness of those who dare to swear falsely by him,
[784] and at least four cases of blindness in the area have been attributed to
[671] false oaths at Sidi Dmain. Also according to the law, it is the plaintiff
who selects the persons from the defendant's kin unit who are to
685 support him in the oath. Following this rule, the Geneishat, with the
627 help of Hadi, selected the fourteen men from bait Asabei to swear with
695 Rabbu. The number of men that were required in this case was considered
613 very conservative. The usual practice in estimating the number of supporters
[803] in any case is done by establishing the value of the damage or
compensation and dividing it by ten. The result is the number of men
needed to give the oath. If there were not enough adult males in a given
kinship unit to fulfill the number needed, some or all the men would
have to be sworn twice or three times and each time a person takes the
oath he is considered as a separate person until the number needed is met.

Following this rule, and since the value of the property confiscated in the above case was over three thousand pounds, 300 persons should have been sworn in support of Rabbuh. Since this would have complicated the matter greatly, it was agreed that fifteen men were enough. Taieb gave the justification for limiting the number to 15 that trade and, as

685 such, deviates from the normal pattern of cases dealt with by the customary
627 law in the conventional way. The men selected by the Geneishat
695 included, in addition to Rabbu and his father Hakim, Shei'eb and his
613 three brothers, Hakim's cousin Samsoun and his four brothers and Hakim's
uncle Sheikh Qudura and his sons. The date of the oath was set for June
tenth. Two days before, the two parties involved in the dispute invited
a number of the important people of other tribal segments in the area to
[492] be witnesses to the oath. All involved started to travel to the tomb of
[494] Sidi Dmain, some on donkeys, others by bus or train. At six o'clock on
[497] the morning of the oath everybody gathered in the courtyard outside the
[778] tomb of the saint. The granddaughter of the saint works as a mediator
[787] between the spirit of her grandfather and his followers announced that
[776] the saint was ready for the oath and everybody went inside preparing for
the oath. Before the oath was taken the Geneishat asked Hakim if his son
and the fourteen men they had chosen were present and Hakim said they
were. Since the Geneishat were from a different tribal segment and
lived outside the area, they had no personal knowledge of most of the
[212] men who were to take the oath. Knowing the reputation of Hakim they
asked the men to present their identification cards to check them against
[747] the list they had. At that time Hakim said that some of the men didn't
have identification cards because they had not applied for aid from the
World Food Program. Then the Geneishat demanded that those without cards
should be identified by members of other tribal segments who had come as
witnesses. Hakim refused and then admitted that one of the men was absent
and that he had put another in place of him. But when the Geneishat
learned that the one to be absent was Sheikh Qudura, they insisted that

682 settlement is usually made after the parties have agreed to it,
627 yet, in certain instances where one of the parties later feels that
672 the settlement was not just or that he was coerced into accepting
695 it, he may ask for a second Mi'ad during which new procedures start
in the case. In the present case, although Mahdi had originally
accepted the judgment of the awaqil, as time passed and he realized that he was unable to pay the bloodmoney, he started to question the feasibility of the settlement. He discussed the matter
682 with Sheikh Suliman el-Gerery from the Murabiteen tribe of Gerera,
672 a tribe whose members are feared throughout the area for the belief
695 that they have certain supernatural powers. Sheikh Suliman himself
554 792 [776] is highly respected, and people believe that after his death he will
become "wali" or a saint. After hearing Mahdi's complaint, Sheikh
Suliman told him that the settlement was unjust and told him that he
would do something about it. The following Thursday, Sheikh Suliman
called on Mahdi and asked him to bring his donkey and follow him.
They rode to a small desert town called Bahig where the local market
613 is held every Thursday. On market day, the awaqil of various tribal
517 segments usually gather in front of the general store in the town
571 drinking tea and chatting until their sons or the younger members
443 576 of their families sell the sheep and buy the necessary items. Everyone passing by the gathering is expected to greet the gathering, getting off his donkey as a sign of respect to the prominent people.
[689] Failure to greet a fellow tribesman is considered a serious offense
liable to a fine of more than L. 50 and ten goats in certain cases.
[673] It is considered a very serious crime. One informant once told me,
000

*795 The desire to establish in North Africa conditions in which
793 Muslims might live by their own laws and under their own
798 government, as they did in Arabia under the first four Caliphs,
led the Grand Sanusi and his successors to oppose the Turkish
177 way of life and the influences and innovations of Western
Christendom, but their intransigence in these matters did not
imply intolerance, far less aggressiveness. Though some
writers have made assertions to the contrary, the Sanusi have
never shown themselves more hostile than other Muslims to
Christians and Jews, and the Grand Sanusi and Sayyid al-Mahdi
scrupulously avoided all political entanglements which
might bring them into unfriendly relations with neighbouring
States and the European Powers. The Brothers of the Order
*795 were discouraged from discussing political questions. Nor were
793 the Sanusi intolerant towards fellow Muslims who differed from
798 them. Shaikh Muhammed 'Uthman records of Sayyid al-Mahdi
that 'the persons he dislikes the most are those who speak ill
of Muslims'.[1] The leaders of the Sanusiya have always tolerated
other and rival Orders, even when they have disapproved of
their rites. The Grand Sanusi had himself been a member of a
succession of Orders before he started his own and he allowed,
as his successors have done, members of other Orders to belong
to the Sanusiya at the same time.

*795 The leaders of the Order have also been tolerant towards the
792 cult of saints, unlike the iconoclastic Wahhabi, who have
destroyed even the tombs of those nearest to the Prophet himself.
798 The view held by the doctors of orthodox Islam is that,
776 though intercession through a saint is unlawful and the only
778 mention of him during prayers at his tomb should be to ask the
mercy of God on his soul, it is permissible to show respect to his
tomb and his memory. The heads of the Sanusiya have, however,
always tolerated among their Bedouin followers a regard
for holy men and their tombs which goes beyond mere respect.
It is unlikely that they felt any repugnance to the cult, because
they counted among their forbears several saints and were
themselves brought up in North Africa where the cult of saints
is widespread and very near to the hearts of the common people;
and they could not have remonstrated with the Bedouin for
believing that holy men and their tombs are sources of *baraka*,

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[1] Op. cit., p. 121.

795*

divine blessing, since it was because the Bedouin believed the [792]
Sanusi family had the same virtue that they accepted their [798]
leadership. [776]

The resemblance often alleged between the Sanusi and the [778]
Wahhabi movements, on the grounds of like puritanism, 795*
literalism, and fanaticism, cannot be substantiated. It is 171
obvious that there must be resemblances between new religious (114)
movements: they usually claim to be a return to primitive faith and morals and they are generally missionary and enthusiastic. There is no great significance in such common characteristics of the two movements. Nor is there any reason to suppose that the Grand Sanusi was directly influenced by Wahhabi propaganda. A more significant comparison between the two might be made by tracing their developments from religious into political movements. Both started as religious revivals among backward peoples, chiefly Bedouin, the Wahhabi movement in the Nadj in the eighteenth century and the Sanusi movement first in the Hijaz and then in Cyrenaica in the middle of the nineteenth century; the *Ikhwan* organizations of the two movements have much in common; and both ended in the formation of Amirates, or small Islamic States.

Both movements have created States, the Wahhabi in Arabia and the Sanusi in Cyrenaica, based explicitly on religious particularism. In doing so they have only done what any movement of the kind is bound to do in a barbarous country if it is to continue to exist, namely, to create an administrative system which would ensure a measure of peace, security, justice, and economic stability. A religious organization cannot exist apart from a polity of a wider kind. But they did not create the sentiment of community which made the growth of governmental functions and the emergence of a State possible.

Religious divisions in Islam have commonly been the expres- 795*
sion of a sense of social and cultural exclusiveness. The support 182
given to the 'Alids in Persia and Arabia, to the Umayyads in 177
Africa and Spain, to the Fatimids in Egypt, to the Kharijites 171
by the Berbers in North Africa, and the adoption of extreme Shi'ite doctrines by the mountaineers of Syria and by the Kurds, and of Isma'ili teachings in parts of India, were all reactions against foreign domination as much as revolts against orthodoxy. The religious deviation was the expression of the intense desire

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founded lineages which, dwelling under the shadow of their saintly forbears, became nuclei of social agglomerations which have developed in course of time into tribal groups, thus taking the shape of the tribal society in which they lived. The word
[192] '*Marabtin*' thus came to mean holy men (and their tombs) and
then, in addition, tribes tracing their descent, or supposed descent, from these holy men and also, finally, in Cyrenaica, tribes who are clients of the great *Sa'adi* tribes which own the earth and water.

778 Some of the better known of the Cyrenaican saints, but by
776 no means all, have gleaming white cupolas, supported by four
walls, erected over their tombs, and inside the walls is a *tub*, a
792 wooden box, over the grave, and this is covered with coloured
cloth on which are inscribed passages from the Koran. Inside also are often a few pages from sacred books, occasionally a few small coins given by the local Bedouin, and any property, such as tents or ploughs, the Bedouin have wished to deposit in a

safe place when on seasonal moves. Often a shrine, sometimes 778
the shrine of a very famous saint, is no more than a wall of 776
stones, with perhaps a stick, with pieces of cloth tied to it, 792
erected over the grave, and this is the usual form in the steppe
grazing-grounds. There are generally cemeteries around the [764]
tombs.

All these shrines are visited by the Bedouin from time to time,
when they are passing by or when they have some request to
make of the holy man. Many of them are cult centres, an annual [796]
ceremony, one of the chief events of the Bedouin year, being [619]
held at them; and when they are near the border between tribes,
or between tribal sections, this is an occasion for intertribal, [illegible]
intersectional, gatherings. There is no saint whose tomb is much [789]
visited by the Bedouin who has not performed miracles, some [755]
of them very remarkable miracles, and there is probably none
who has not at some time or other cured the sick or given an heir.

The tombs of these holy men, Sidi this, Sidi that, and Sidi
the other, are found in profusion over the whole of inhabited
Cyrenaica. The historically best known are those of Sidi Rafa',
one of the Companions of the Prophet, near al-Zawiya al-Baida
on the plateau, of Sidi 'Abdalla, one of the Prophet's standard-bearers,
in the oasis of Aujila, and of the founder of the Sanusiya
Order, Sidi Muhammad bin 'Ali al-Sanusi, at Jaghbub oasis.
The shrines belong to the tribes and tribal sections in whose [619]
earth the Marabouts are buried and the Marabouts are looked [423]
upon as tribal and sub-tribal patrons. Like the Sanusiya Order,
they have become part of tribal life.

I have earlier reproduced Col. De Agostini's map of the Hasa 778
tribe to serve as an example of the territorial distribution of 619
lineages. The same map serves to illustrate the distribution of 792
shrines in a tribal territory. It can be seen from this map, which 776
shows only the best-known Marabout tombs, that all the different
sections of the tribe have their shrines, and I would draw
attention to an interesting feature of the distribution which I
have also noted in other tribal areas: how often these sacred
spots are near a tribal boundary, or near the boundary between
one tribal section and another. This may not be pure chance,
for the Marabouts in their lifetimes were regarded as standing
outside the tribal system, to which indeed, being foreigners from
the west, they did not belong, and their chief political role was

778 to act as mediators between tribes and between one tribal
619 section and another. Even to-day their tombs are regarded as
792 neutral points, as it were, and are often the place chosen for a
776 meeting between the Shaikhs of one tribe, or tribal section, and
those of an adjacent tribe, or section, when some matter has to be settled between them. It has sometimes happened also that when two tribes have disputed the ownership of territory, they have settled the dispute by allotting it to a Marabout, which means to his descendants, so that one then finds a *Marabtin* strip between two *Sa'adi* tribes or tribal sections. One of the best examples of this is the strip of country owned by the Aulad al-Shaikh tribe between the 'Awaqir and the 'Abid and 'Arafa tribal domains. In the same way tribes made gifts of disputed wells to dead saints. Where a *Marabtin* tribe has grown out of a Marabout family they will be found living in the area around their tombs. Thus the Aulad al-Shaikh territory spreads out from Sidi Mahiyus, part of the Masamir live near Sidi Nuh, the Mshaitat live around Sidi al-Mshaiti, and the Qat'an live near Sidi Hashim and Sidi Suliman al-Tair.

792 So, long centuries before the Grand Sanusi began his mission
776 in Cyrenaica, the Bedouin were used to the sight of an *'alim*, a
212 learned man—for anyone who can read and write is a learned
554 man to the Bedouin—coming from the west to heal their
children and beasts, break droughts, write talismans, and teach them the beliefs and law of Islam. Such a man was also a *muhakkam*, one who arbitrated in their disputes and said the *fatiha* at their settlements and undertakings to make them binding. He could arbitrate among them because he was not of them. He was not like them a tented son of the steppe, though his descendants may have learned to live as such, but a *Marabat*, a man who follows religion and not the rains. The Bedouin of Cyrenaica owe much to these holy men, for, ignorant and superstitious though they may have been, they taught the tribesmen to respect learning and religion and kept those twin lights burning, even if dimly, through centuries. The Bedouin do not forget them, or to say a prayer for them, when they pass their tombs; and they have given the freedom of their earth and water to their descendants. Without these forerunners the
[182] Grand Sanusi could not have planted his Order in the country.
[795] It is planted in their bones.

*795 find hereditary transmission of Shaikhship of lodges most
793 accentuated, such as the Bara'asa-Tamia section (al-Zawiya
613 al-Baida), the 'Awaqir-Sdaidi section (Msus zawiya), and the
428 'Abaidat-Ghaith section (Tart zawiya). In the same way the
[792] earlier Marabouts became, as has been noted, founders of lineages which were on the pattern of the branches of the Bedouin clans among whom they lived, and attached to them.

*795 Also it must be remembered that the lodges were tribal
778 institutions built by the local Bedouin so that they might
793 participate in the *baraka* of Sayyid Muhammad bin 'Ali al-Sanusi.
619 They participated in it through the Shaikhs of their
182 zawiyas who received their *baraka* direct from the hands of the Grand Sanusi himself, or from the hands of son Sayyid al-Mahdi, and passed it on to their sons. This *baraka* belonged to the tribe, or tribal section, which built a lodge just as the *shaukha*, the secular Shaikhship of the tribe, or tribal section, belonged to it and had to be kept in it. In both the continuity of family succession had to be maintained, unless there were good reasons for acting otherwise. Thus each tribal section emphasized its autonomy in its hereditary line of religious Shaikhs, through whom the *baraka* of the founder of the Order was transmitted to them, whilst proclaiming its membership of a tribal federation with common allegiance to the Head of the Order.

*795 As I have pointed out when speaking of the sacred *Marabtin*
793 tribes of Cyrenaica, it was customary for the descendants of a
778 Marabout to reside near his tomb. I have further mentioned
[776] that the Shaikh of a Sanusiya lodge, who is also called a *Marabat* by the Bedouin, might, if he had during life a reputation for piety, rather easily gained in Islam, be venerated as a saint when he was dead and his tomb become a shrine. This is another reason why Shaikhly families have tended to become hereditary directors of lodges.

*795 Just as almost all the Marabouts of Cyrenaica were foreigners
793 from the west, so were almost all the Shaikhs of the Sanusiya
554 lodges. The Dardafi and Isma'ili families came from Tripolitania,
[167] the Ghumari family from Morocco, the 'Ammur, Bu Jibali, and Khattab families came from Algeria, and so on. As a class they enjoyed, and still enjoy, a reputation for sanctity among the Bedouin on account of their knowledge of the Koran

days on which kin of various sorts should attend the mourning 613
ceremonies, which extend over a period of a week. Allowance is 621
made for those who may be away temporarily, although they are 765
expected to hasten to the mourning camp as quickly as possible.
Agnatic kin are expected not only to be present on the appropriate 613
day, but are required to offer gifts consistent with their 621
relationship to the bereaved; agnates of the tertiary segment are 765
expected to offer a sheep, while some cognates ought to bring a 431
goat and others a quantity of sugar and tea. At one funeral in a camp where I was resident, soon after the death occurred, the main concern of its inhabitants was whether or not certain men of their section would attend the mourning rites and bring appropriate gifts with them. These men lived at the time in another camp a few miles away, as they had been doing for several years past. They did not come when they were expected, and when they finally arrived at the end of the week they brought with them gifts of sugar and tea only—gifts which were totally inappropriate for agnates of the group. They were, in fact, now no longer members of it, and my neighbours were able to tell me, 'They have branched off from us. We will never live together again.' The lineage had proliferated and this was the first occasion for showing it.

Wide-spread in Cyrenaica is a cult of saints. The number of 794
saints' tombs varies from tribe to tribe, there being fewer among 776
the camel herders of the semi-desert than among the cowherding, 778
almost sedentary, folk of the plateau area. Whatever [788]
the number, the members of the group that venerates a particular
saint make an annual pilgrimage to his tomb, and sometimes
more frequent pilgrimages are made. In one area there were two 794
men, accepted by their respective kin groups as leaders, who vied 554
against each other for the leadership of their section. One of them
had been a famous warrior during the Italian wars and, after [648]
being injured, fled to Egypt where he lived for seventeen years, until he returned to his homeland in 1947. The other had also fought against the Italians, failed to win renown, was a captive for a time, later released, and subsequently appointed leader of his section by the Italian authorities. The first, during his period of exile, had become impoverished. The second during his years of freedom had prospered. As far as their personalities

648 about the lack of concern shown toward the Bedouins throughout
177 the history of their relations with the Nile Valley: they
829 complain that the Egyptians have no right to take over the desert and order their lives for them. They say that "the Egyptians know nothing about the desert"; that "they do not know how to live in the desert and should take our advice on these things." "They (the Egyptians) have given us nothing, we had all of this before they came. Jamal Abd al-Nasser did not invent socialism (*'ishtarikiyya*): the Bedouins have always had it. We have always shared and taken care of one another." The Egyptians are still "outsiders" to the Bedouins. They are referred to as "*fallahin*" or "peasants."

Interestingly enough, the Bedouins include President Nasser in their own in-group. They insist, in a half-serious way, that he is of the Awlad 'Ali because he is originally from Upper Egypt. One can compare the roles of Nasser and the Grand Sanusi in some ways. Both leaders made special
[778] efforts to bring the Bedouins into a new community, to share their "good fortune" with them; also, both leaders are considered to be possessors of charisma, or *baraka* ("blessing") by the Bedouins. One may hear unkind remarks about "holy men" or "government officials," but never about Nasser or the al-Sanusi family. One Bedouin said: "Jamal Abd al-Nasser works hard and tries to do good for the people, but his officials are
000 very lazy and do not care about us." While the Bedouins

While the Bedouins

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829 respect the Sanusi family they, nevertheless, wear their religion lightly. An informant, speaking of the merits and demerits of the conservative Muslim Brethern Association, said that "you should never listen to a holy man, for he will lead you straight to hell!" But upon meeting any member of the
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● [778] Sanusi family, all Bedouins greet him by kissing his hand. Besides a show of deference, this ritual act, in theory, transfers baraka from al-Sanusi to the layman.

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641 The citizenship exemptions granted the Bedouins by Muhammad 'Ali have been rescinded by Abd al-Nasser. This has been one aspect of his program to imbue the Bedouin with political consciousness and promote participation in the nation-state. The Bedouins say that this is the way it should be: they want the right to own land and to accept the responsibility of defending the homeland. But they still do
[651] not pay land taxes, and they feel justified in this because the desert "is very poor soil, and not like that of the Nile." Nor do they always heed the call to military duty, though they insist that they do.

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423 Egyptian land reform laws would be impractical, or impossible to apply, in al-Qasr. In the Nile Valley, such laws were necessary. The majority of the Egyptian peasants can survive on less than one acre of land, and farms of under five acres comprise 44 per cent of the agricultural land area in the Nile Valley (Warriner 1962:204). Plots this

671 I checked the contents of this document with
[124] my own informants who agreed that it was authentic and
represented the _'awaiyid_ as it should be practiced. Almost
[682] the whole of the _'awaiyid_ refers to the circumstances surrounding the occurrence of killing and the payment of the
[128] _diiya_. The case studies which I present below reflect the
'awaiyid as it was practiced in 1935.

682 Blood-money is calculated relative to three things:
whether or not a killing was premeditated or accidental; the
sex of the victim; and whether or not the victim was a freeman
or a slave. The full _diiya_ is paid in the case of intentional
killing, and three-fourths of this amount is due in the case
[562] of accidental killing. The _diiya_ for a woman is one-half
that for a man whether or not the killing is intentional.
[567] There are no slaves in al-Qasr, only their descendents who
are now freemen. In the case where a pregnant woman is killed,
the foetus will be examined and should it prove to be a male
then the full _diiya_ will be due.

578 An important mechanism for conflict regulation in
682 the Western Desert is the _nazaala_, i.e., "the act of taking
*613 refuge." If a killing is committed, the killer immediately
●778 seeks protection by going to the residence of a neutral third
party. The third party, who may or may not be an _'aqila_, and
his lineage give protection to the whole tertiary segment of
the killer. This may involve the actual relocation of the
killer's _bait_ to the residence of the protecting group for

578 the period of one year. During the period of sanctuary, it
682 is hoped that two things will happen: that the killed man's
*613 group will be placated and agree to compensation rather than
778 retaliation as a means of conflict regulation; and, that over this period of one year the killer's family will pay the diiya.

The practice of nazaala is one means of differentiating between internal and external political relations. Killing between tertiary groups of the same secondary lineage would never be mediated by the nazaala, rather, compensation would immediately be paid and the matter settled--or at least never again mentioned. The Bedouins believe that killings at any level should be forgotten for fear that hostile feelings, or even feuding, will re-emerge. This excerpt from my field notes shows this.

> Hajj Sabr asked if I would take him in the jeep to Ras Abu Laha. As we passed Umm al-Rakham, the territory of 'Ailit Amarik (Marabtiin affiliated with 'Ali Abyad) west of al-Qasr, he told me about a feud which took place there five years ago. The quarrel began, as most do, over the rights to a piece of land: 'Ailit Amarik and a lineage of the Qinaishat tribe both laid claim to a strip of land between their territories. One man from the Qinaishat was killed, and, in revenge, the Qinaishat killed three men and wounded four from 'Ait Amarik. The government intervened to stop the killing. It became settled when the 'awaaqil met at the zawiya of Umm al-Rakham. They ate together and resumed brotherly relations. Since Hajj Sabr was one of the third parties involved in this settlement, I asked him if I might read his copy of the document on this case. He replied: "Shame, shame! If you begin to ask about this case, it may start all over again. There are still bad feelings between the two tribes."

*613 •778 182 682 The *nazaala* as a regulatory mechanism functions only between secondary segments. This indicates that blood-revenge as a negative sanction is operative only in the external system of political relations. Political relations at this level, where the feeling of corporateness is relatively lacking, are in delicate balance. Therefore, once conflict is successfully mediated and the injury redressed, it is best forgotten, for it is unlikely that either party feels their rights have been completely restored.

683 Sanctions against personal injury, besides killing, are dealt out in terms of fines, the fines being figured as proportions of the *diiya*. Every part of the body has a price on it: the Bedouins say, "*Banu Adam kill-i-filuus*" ("The sons of Adam are all money"). A proportion of the *diiya* is due for injury to any of the following parts of the body: the beard, hair on the head and the nape of the neck, and eyelashes; wounds to any part of the body; fractures and dislocations of bones; the tongue and the teeth; the testicles and the breasts; and the loss of mind. Bodily injuries are [463] evaluated by a considered expert, the *nathaara* ("the keen-[305] eyed one"). If the services of a *nathaara* become necessary in al-Qasr, the barber in Marsa Matruh (the same person who performs most of the Bedouins' circumcisions) fills the role. [178] But the Bedouins say, "Now that we are educated we are able to make our own evaluations."

128 68 [124] [214] what happened; some of them are my translations of legal documents which informants permitted me to see; a few of the cases happened while I was in the field and represent my reporting of what happened. I have arbitrarily divided the cases into those involving personal injury and those concerning property rights. In each case, I indicate at which level of the authority structure the conflict and settlement has taken place.

Legal Cases Pertaining to Personal Injury

578 681 Two cases of killing have been discussed previously. Below are a number of cases dealing with personal injury which occurred in the external political system at the various levels of segmentation. *[613] [619] [648] The first three cases involve conflict between secondary lineage segments of the 'Aishaibat tribe; the next two cases take place at the primary and sub-tribal levels, but note that secondary segments are the actual functioning units involved; the final case, an unusual one, deals with conflict with "foreigners" at the tribal level. Note that the *[613] [182] ●[778] 'aqila as a corporate representative is active in these cases. The third case presented below is a translation of an actual document showing how the nazaala (discussed above) functions as a formal mechanism of conflict regulation.

578 be chosen by Shaikh Khalid Za'aluk, the first party. The text
685 691 of the oath which Khalid Idris will swear is: "By the truth
619 of the owner of this tomb (maqaam), and this book of God, I
695 swear that you (i.e. the 'Ailit Sulwatiyya represented by
[539] Shaikh Khalid Za'aluk) have neither work of hand nor a
grandfather's stake in this well." If any of the oath-takers are missing on the day of the oath, the well will be owned Khalid Za'aluk. And if they swear the oath, the well will be owned by 'Ailit Ma'fas.

The date of the oath will be the first Friday of month nine,
[778] 1964. The oath will be taken at the shrine of Sidi 'Awam, and
the swearing will deal with the well only. For the land which is west of the well belongs to Khalid Za'aluk and his family, and the land to the east of the well belongs to Khalid Idris and his family. And the water which is west of the well belongs to Khalid Za'aluk. The two parties agreed to this. (Each party, and five witnesses, i.e. rajal khair, for each party, signed the document.)

423 Date: 30 July 1964. I, Khalid Za'aluk, have decided to cancel
619 the oath which was supposed to have been sworn on 9 September
578 691 1964 at the shrine of Sidi Awam. Khalid Idris and the oath-
[695] takers were present and were stopped from taking the oath.
And the well named al-Halima which was the cause of the quarrel

554 tional symbol of wealth. A comparison of wealth between
571 the "status group" and "other members" of al-Qasr, and the
556 picture of stratification which emerges, are shown on Table 6.

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TABLE 6

COMPARATIVE DATA ON SOCIO-ECONOMIC STRATIFICATION IN AL-QASR[1]

Average Per Person	Status Group	Others
OLIVE - trees	661	86
SHEEP - head	402	30
LAND - acres	91	5

554 One most important way of accruing "status honor"
571 in al-Qasr is by acting the part of the third party in conflict
627
*613 situations. The role of the third party represents an effective
and acceptable way of bypassing formal litigation through the
●[778] office of *'aqila*. For instance, by mediating through the
process of *nazaala*, the third party prevents feuds.

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[1] This data is both approximate and partial. Some data are excellent and completely reliable, others are not so dependable. Factors which could conceivably change the picture here presented would be a count of land and animals outside al-Qasr which would be extremely difficult to obtain. Also, some land is not in the name of the owner but in the names of relatives. Of all the data, land data is the most unreliable. Nevertheless, the addition of new data, I feel, would only serve to substantiate the picture of socio-economic stratification shown here.

554 of the Bedouin attitude, or lack of it, toward religion.
792 Since the time of Muhammad, the Bedouins have been considered
771 notoriously bad Muslims. Today, the Bedouins tend to joke
about their lack of zeal, and often point out that "holy
619 men" are not to be trusted.[2] This is seen in Sa'adi behavior
771 toward the Marabtin tribes who are their vassals. Theoretically,
792 the Marabtin who trace descent to the Prophet and might be
554 considered "sacred Tribes" should be respected by the "secular"
[778] Sa'adi tribes. But the Sa'adi of al-Qasr tend to deride the
554 Marabit. For instance, the "holy man" of al-Qasr, 'Amm Salih,
792 is a Marabit and well-known for his ability to successfully
627 mediate in conflict situations. But one informant, pointing
619 out this gift which 'Amm Salih possesses, said: "Amm Salih
is a good man, he is not a Marabit." But 'Amm Salih identifies
himself as a "*rajal saalih*" and a "Marabit"; he sees no role
conflict here.

771 The Bedouins also joke about the manner in which they
[522] practice the "pillars of Islam." Especially, they make light
of the fact that they are irregular in mosque attendance.
They say, with a slight smile, "we pray in the desert." A
[124] common way for an interview to end was by an informant rising
and saying: "Now I must wash for prayers." This happened

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[184] [2] Professor Abou-Zeid also notes this trait in his study of the Bedouin near Sallum, on the Libyan border (1966:248).

771 at any time of the day! As one Bedouin put it: "According to the idea of goodness (salih), we are not good. This is because we do not pray, we are part-timers in prayer."

554 A good rajal saalih is considered by the Bedouin to
792 have a special "blessing" (baraka), a concept somewhat
778 equivalent to that of mana. Someone such as 'Amm Salih
is thought to have baraka, and this type of power naturally
increases his influence and enhances his status. The following
[124] informant's account brings this out and shows something of
the magico-religious element at work in Bedouin power relations.

> [539] Hajj 'Ali does not believe in magic but he respects
> the "holy man" like anyone else. He owns a field
> from which are taken stones for building houses.
> One day he saw some men taking stones from this
> field. They were digging near a well so that the
> well would not be able to hold water after they had
> finished. Hajj 'Ali told the men to stop digging.
> One man answered: "I am cutting these stones for
> the Jaraira family (the family of 'Amm Salih), and
> only a few more and we will be finished." Hajj
> 'Ali replied: "For the Jaraira as for anyone else,
> we don't favor anyone, so stop the work now."
> Then Hajj 'Ali went home, never thinking that they
> would cause any trouble for him, and he was
> afraid of no harm. He slept and he had a dream.
> [787] In the dream he saw three of the Jaraira family,
> all of whom were dead and whom he had known in life.
> In the dream they only watched him and spoke no words.
> In the morning Hajj 'Ali went to the co-operative
> society's office and there he met 'Amm Salih. He
> said to him: "'Amm Salih, I want to tell you something."
> Then he related the whole story to him, and said:
> "I had no fear that you would do me any harm. But
> last night I saw your relatives in my dream; I had
> not even thought of them yesterday, so they are not
> [828] the cause of the dream. (The Bedouins believe that
> dreams reflect, and are connected with, what you saw
> or did during the day). So come and take all of
> the stones that you want, even if you are going to
> build a palace."

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at this lineage level must bear collective responsibility in matters of compensation and blood-revenge. This principle, as we have seen, is extended until the whole _'aiela_ is included in a symbolic expression of corporate group solidarity. In order for this expression to persist, of course, the mechanism, or ideology, of blood-revenge must be maintained. [124] All of my informants, though they disagreed over the details of revenge, insisted that it was the inviolable right of the Arabs. But Hajj 'Ali took exception to the practice of blood-revenge for a number of reasons. He said:

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> The world changes. Before it was only the _'awaiyid Awlad 'Ali_ and the Border Guards which kept order. The government now enters into the matter of killings. Personally, I do not agree with the custom and the way it operates. In the case of killing, for instance, someone who is not worth anything, and has no brains, kills one from another tribe. Then the tribe of the killer asks for the _nazaala_, and a third party becomes involved. The third party agrees to guard the killer's _bait_ for twelve months and the business of all those involved must stop. A member of the third party's family must accompany each member of the killer's tribe. But even after the twelve months one must live in fear at his own home, for after the twelve months the tribe of the deceased will try to kill the best man in the killer's tribe. How many good ones do we have in one tribe? I have heard that in Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia the deceased man's family has the right to kill the killer only . . . (I then commented that perhaps blood-revenge functions to discourage killing in the desert.) But there are unbalanced people who actually commit murder just to tease their tribe: they have nothing to fear because no one is interested in killing them in retaliation.

•[778]

In challenging the Arabs' traditional right to blood-revenge, Hajj 'Ali--besides questioning a structural basis of

619 groups were expected to help. For these reasons the Sa'adi tribes competed
619 and even fought among themselves for the newcoming Murabiteen
721 groups which continued to migrate into the area, escaping the strong dominance of the Cyrenaica Bedouins..Many of the major tribal wars which occurred in the area before the turn of the century had as their major cause the competition over the Murabiteen.

619 As a vassal group the Murabiteen tribes are kept in an inferior
778 position. This inferiority has certain manifestation, the most obvious
184 of which is the deprivation of the Murabiteen of the right of "nazala"
682 or refuge. When a person is killed the killer and his kin unit seek refuge
778 at a neutral tribal segment, and for a period of twelve months they
613 are safe from the revenge of the victim's kin group. The victim's family
[871] cannot follow them to the refuge place, for to do this is to violate one of the basic principles of Awlad Ali law. The philosophy behind the rule of "nazala" is to give time for "the blood to cool off" as one of the informants described it. It also gives the host group a chance to start immediate negotiations with the victim's group to settle permanently the dispute. As soon as the murderer's group takes refuge, which is done either by moving along with their tents and flocks and settling in the locality of the host group or symbolically by having the head of the host group send one of his sons or male relatives to pitch his tent in the locality of the murderer's group, the head of the host group contacts the victim's group, informs them that he has been chosed by the murderer's group in accordance with the right of nazala, and asks for their permission to grant his protection to the murderer's group. To ask for the permission of the victim's group is a matter of formality since, by custom, they cannot refuse to grant this permission except on one single ground:

682 778 613 if the host group is genealogically close enough to the murderer's group as to be themselves part of the vengeance group. As soon as the permission is granted the head of the host group starts negotiations on behalf of the murderer. Since the basic reason for the nazala is to avoid the direct confrontation between the two opposing groups, the first task of the negotiations is to define which places and markets each group can go to during the year of the nazala. Once this has been agreed upon, the difficult task of settling the dispute begins. The success or failure of the negotiations depends on the skill of the negotiator and the weight his tribal segment has in the area. This makes it of extreme importance for the murderer to select the tribal segment which can affect such a settlement. In cases where the host group is not particularly powerful, the victim's group pretends to agree to a settlement in order to have the murderer and his group leave the locality of the host group and then takes revenge by killing the murderer. This cannot happen when the host group is powerful, since such an action would automatically make the host group enemies of the victim's group.

619 184 778 682 With very few exceptions which will be dealt with later, the right to offer refuge is limited to the Sa'adi tribes. No Murabiteen tribe can grant refuge to a murderer, although they themselve can seek refuge at a Sa'adi tribal segment if one of them is involved in murder.

619 184 [682] [582] Another less conspicuous manifestation of the inferior position of the Murabiteen relative to the Sa'adi is the fact that the bloodmoney for the Murabit is two-thirds that for the Sa'adi man. Also, until very recently, marriage of a Sa'adi to a member of the Murabiteen tribes was considered by the Sa'adi as a very poor choice and was discouraged.

619
184 In recent years this has changed, however. The increased importance
178 of wealth in the recently introduced money economy relaxed the en-
582
dogamous tendency that was characteristic of the Sa'adi tribes.

619 In discussing the position of the Murabiteen tribes it is worth
184 noting that not all the Murabiteen tribes in the area occupy the same
position. Some enjoy relatively higher positions than the others. Ac-
tually, there are two kinds of Murabiteen in the area: Mustaqillen (in-
dependent Murabiteen); and the dependent Murabiteen. The latter are
further subdivided into Murabiteen bil-baraka (with the blessing); and
Murabiteen bil-sadaqa (with the tribute). The only independent Murabi-
teen in the area is the Gemei'at tribe. These are the original settlers
[173] of the area. Because of their help to Awlad Ali against the Hanadi, the
latter were defeated and Awlad Ali were able to occupy the Western Desert.
For their part the Gemei'at tribe was granted its independence by Awlad
Ali and were given one-third of the total area as their homeland (watan).
619 In theory, the Gemei'at tribe occupies the same position and has the same
184 rights as the Sa'adi tribes, including the right to offer their protec-
778 tion which is denied to all other client groups. In practice, however,
682
this seems to be of no practical value. None of my informants could re-
member a single case in which a murderer has taken refuge at a segment
619 of the Gemei'at tribe. The importance of the nazala is not merely to be
778 safe from the pursuit of the victim's group but rather to provide the
184 mediators who undertake the crucial task of negotiation on behalf of the
682 murderer and his gorup. It is the ability to settle the dispute on a
627
628 permanent basis that offers the actual long-lasting protection, even
after the time of the nazala expires. To be successful in his pursuit,

619 the negotiator has to have behind him the full weight of his tribal segment.
778
184 Since the origin of the Gemei'at tribe as a Murabiteen tribe is
682 well known, any negotiator has to rely almost entirely upon his own skill
627
628 to affect any settlement; even if he is able to affect such a settlement,
there is no guarantee that it will be permanent.

619 The Murabiteen bil-baraka and Murabiteen bil-sadaqa occupy the same
792 position as vassal groups. The only difference between the two is that the first, the religious men, are much more respected than the latter. They are feared by the other tribes because of the belief that they have direct contact with the religious and spiritual world and can harm those who dare to offend them in one way or another. Because of this factor
[627] and of their neutral position with regard to the rest of the tribes, they
[628] play an important role in mediation and dispute settlement.

619 The origin of inferiority of the Murabiteen tribes in general is
184 hard to account for. Kenneth (1925) believes that hundreds of years ago
174 the Murabiteen were essentially the holymen. They learned to read and
792 write the Qoraan and grouped themselves around the "zawias' which were the centers of learning and religion. While indulging in their religious practices their flocks ere grazed miles away in the open desert under the charge of the Sa'adi shepherds, who originally were the poor paid workers of the Murabiteen. These shepherds, living out in the open, were busy fighting away the raiders attempting to steal their flocks. As time passed the Sa'adi shepherds became not only tough fighters but also wealthy. This latter end was achieved partly as a result of successful raids on neighboring tribes. Later when the Sa'adi planned a large raid, they entrusted their flocks to the Murabiteen, who by that time had become dependent upon the Sa'adi for their protection from the raids of other tribes.

685 The Geneishat selected the tomb of the saint where the oath was to
627 778 be administered. According to the customary law of Awlad Ali, the plain-
695 tiff is the one to decide which saint is to be sought for the taking of
[671] the oath by the defendant. Each saint has his own reputation and some
[776] are said to be more effective in certain kinds of disputes. The saint
selected in this case was Sidi Dmain. Sidi Dmian's tomb is in the
Beheira province some 60 miles east of the area of Burg el-Arab. He is
[732] known to cause the blindness of those who dare to swear falsely by him,
[784] and at least four cases of blindness in the area have been attributed to
[671] false oaths at Sidi Dmain. Also according to the law, it is the plain-
tiff who selects the persons from the defendant's kin unit who are to
685 support him in the oath. Following this rule, the Geneishat, with the
627 help of Hadi, selected the fourteen men from bait Asabei to swear with
695 Rabbu. The number of men that were required in this case was considered
613 very conservative. The usual practice in estimating the number of sup-
[803] porters in any case is done by establishing the value of the damage or
compensation and dividing it by ten. The result is the number of men
needed to give the oath. If there were not enough adult males in a given
kinship unit to fulfill the number needed, some or all the men would
have to be sworn twice or three times and each time a person takes the
oath he is considered as a separate person until the number needed is met.

Following this rule, and since the value of the property confiscated in the above case was over three thousand pounds, 300 persons should have been sworn in support of Rabbuh. Since this would have complicated the matter greatly, it was agreed that fifteen men were enough. Taieb gave the justification for limiting the number to 15 that trade and, as

685 such, deviates from the normal pattern of cases dealt with by the cus-
627 tomary law in the conventional way. The men selected by the Geneishat
695 included, in addition to Rabbu and his father Hakim, Shei'eb and his
613 three brothers, Hakim's cousin Samsoun and his four brothers and Hakim's
uncle Sheikh Qudura and his sons. The date of the oath was set for June
tenth. Two days before, the two parties involved in the dispute invited
a number of the important people of other tribal segments in the area to
[492] be witnesses to the oath. All involved started to travel to the tomb of
[494] Sidi Dmain, some on donkeys, others by bus or train. At six o'clock on
[497] the morning of the oath everybody gathered in the courtyard outside the
[498] tomb of the saint. The granddaughter of the saint works as a mediator
[787] between the spirit of her grandfather and his followers announced that
[776] the saint was ready for the oath and everybody went inside preparing for
the oath. Before the oath was taken the Geneishat asked Hakim if his son
and the fourteen men they had chosen were present and Hakim said they
were. Since the Geneishat were from a different tribal segment and
lived outside the area, they had no personal knowledge of most of the
[212] men who were to take the oath. Knowing the reputation of Hakim they
asked the men to present their identification cards to check them against
[747] the list they had. At that time Hakim said that some of the men didn't
have identification cards because they had not applied for aid from the
World Food Program. Then the Geneishat demanded that those without cards
should be identified by members of other tribal segments who had come as
witnesses. Hakim refused and then admitted that one of the men was ab-
sent and that he had put another in place of him. But when the Geneishat
learned that the one to be absent was Sheikh Qudura, they insisted that

622 His main function is to manage the affairs of the village, apprehend
554 criminals, report and register births and deaths, collect taxes and
represent the government in all matters involving the relationship be-
tween the government and his village. Because of his position as the
[661] representative of the govrernment, he usually enjoys a considerable
amount of power which, over the years, many omdas have used it to obtain
personal benefits.

361 In 1958 the committee appointed for the examination of the possi-
631 bility of applying the system to Awlad Ali noticed that villages in the
sense of a compact settlement similar to that existing in the rural area
simply do not exist in the Western Desert region. There are a few
settled communities in the area but they are scattered homes or a few
stores. These communities have no identifiable boundaries or adminis-
631 trative existence. The area as a whole is divided into ten adminis-
634 trative districts, each having a police station. These districts cor-
[625] respond to the old Senusia Zawyas which played an important role in
[795] maintaining order in the era until the First World War. Until that time
[175] the area was divided into fourteen zones each of which was under the
795 jurisdiction of one of the zawyas. The zawyas were mainly religious
175 centers, or shrines, inhabited and directed by a member of the Senusi
[793] order of Cyrenaica. The role of the head of the zawya was to teach the
Qoraan and spread the teachings of the Senusi order. One of the ways
[794] the zawyas attracted followers was through distribution of food and
clothing to those who joined it. The zawyas also provided places of
[778] refuge for those who needed protection since no one could force his way
into the sacred zawyas. Because of their religious position which put

581 are necessary for the validation of the marriage contract. Modern
585
671 legal systems which took as their basis the Islamic law of marriage
675 and the family further required the registration of the marriage contract
for the marriage to be legal.

584 The request and necessary response forming the marriage are supposed
585 to be carried on by the parties involved. However, if either the
429 groom or the bride is not of age, or is mentally unqualified, the transaction
593 is carried on by his or her guardian, or "wakil." The wakil is
the father, unless he is dead or an invalid, in which case the brothers
[604] become the wakils. If the person has no brothers, then the uncles become
[184] the wakil in the order stated. According to certain Sunni sects
in Islam, a woman marrying for the first time is always represented by
her wakil, even if she is of age. The assumption is that a woman who
has never been married does not have the experience that enables her to
enter into any kind of legally binding relationship such as marriage.

585 Following the original Islamic idea, marriage among Awlad Ali is
675 an oral agreement between the groom or his father and the guardian
593
429 (wakil) of the bride-to-be (her father, if alive, or her closest male
[604] kin in the following order: her brothers, her uncles, her grandfather).
585 A religious man is sometimes asked to perform the marriage, although it
792 is not required. Some persons might invite a member of the Murabiteen
[619] tribe or holy men to witness the marriage on the basis that his presence
[778] gives "baraka," or blessing, to the marriage. Before the application of
585 the State legal system to the area, marriage contracts were not registered.
656
177 In recent years, however, and with the increased mobility of
[675] the tribal populations, more and more marriages are being registered in
[634] the administrative districts. Still, according to the unofficial estimates,

586 the man she chooses. She informs him before she enters his house that
562 she is the wife of so and so and the daughter of so and so and that she
574 is throwing herself on him to protect her from her husband with whom
she no longer wishes to live. Like the right of refuge, the man cannot
● [778] refuse to let her in; and from this moment until her dispute with her
husband is resolved, she is considered as his house guest and is
entitled to all the hospitality a guest receives. If he refuses to
[627] extend that hospitality or refuses to take her in, she can ask for a mi'ad
[681] and is entitled to kabara from him. There has been no reported incidents
in which a man refused that right to a woman. As soon as she settles
down in the host's house, the latter takes immediate measures to find
the husband and to convince him to let his wife go. In doing this, the
man uses all the power of persuasion. The man selected for this purpose
586 is usually a respected man who can put pressure upon the husband.
562 Sometimes he has to bribe the husband to release the wife, paying from his
574 own money. The man has to have money, not only to be able to support
554 [556] the wife during her stay in his house and to bribe the husband, but also
because in certain instances he has to pay the husband the mahr that the
father of the wife had taken in order to free her. The next step after
getting the agreement of the husband to divorce his wife is to contact
the father of the wife or her guardian and convince him to pay the mahr
to the husband. If the father does not agree, or if he is financially
unable to do so, the man on whom the woman has thrown herself is supposed
to pay from his own money. In cases where the woman left the husband to
be married to another man with whom she had had a relationship, the
respected man tries to have the future husband pay the present husband the
mahr he is supposed to pay the woman after she is divorced from her

683
682 feet after that and left." It seems that later the wound got in-
672 fected. Six months after the incident, Selouma was taken to the
[578] hospital with an infected wound, and three days later he died from
that infection. Selouma's son, Ali, demanded that Muftah pay a
full bloodmoney (L.E. 400) for the death of his father, since the
death was directly caused by the wound inflicted by Muftah. Muftah
denied the charges and claimed that the infected wound which caused
683 the death of Selouma was not the one inflicted by the stone. Media-
682 tions continued for some time, and when no agreement was achieved,
672 the aqilas of the two baits to which the parties belonged declared
695 that the decision should be made by the oath which Muftah had to
613 take if he insisted on his claims that the wound was not caused by
his action. Since the case involved the life of a man, Muftah had
to be supported in his oath by fifty-five adult male members of
[671] his 'amar, or 'eila. In accordance with the Daraieb, the selection
[778] was done by members of Selouma's Bait who also selected the tomb of
the saint where the oath would be undertaken. On the date the oath
was to be taken, the disputing parties, as well as all the notables
of friendly tribal segments who were invited to witness the oath,
went to the tomb of the saint. As they started with the procedures,
[784] two of Muftah's cousins who were to support him in the oath and his
uncle refused to swear on the grounds that they were not sure that
Muftah was telling the truth and therefore could not subject them-
selves to the supernatural hazards of taking a false oath. Attempts
by other members who were to support Muftah were made to force the
three men to swear, since their refusal meant that the bloodmoney

682
672 In practice, Awlad Ali do look at actual circumstances to assess the intention of the offender. Although compensation is always required, the readiness of the victim's kin group to accept a financial settlement and the final amount to be paid in a given situation is affected by the presence or absence of an intention on behalf of the offender. In assessing the actual intention of the offender in each case, the mediators rely on the circumstances of the crime as well as on the past history of the relationships between the offender and the victim. Although this actual intention of the offender does not change the payment of bloodmoney, the deceased's kin are more agreeable to the acceptance of the financial settlement if the killing is unintentional than if it is intentional and the possibility of revenge is much less imminent. Unintentional killing, regardless of the weapon used never results in blood feuds. The possibility, on the other hand, is much greater in the cases where the circumstances of the offense indicate an intention on the part of the killer to take the life of the victim. It is for this reason that the right of [178] nazala, or refuge, discussed in an earlier chapter, is resorted to only in the case of intentional killing. Of all the cases described in the chapter only in the case of the trespasser did the killers' kin group seek refuge by moving to another area where they were protected until the dispute was solved by another neutral tribal segment. It is important to note that killing in the above case was not done by a lethal weapon but by sticks, and as such was defined by the tribal law as "unintentional" as far as the formal amount of compensation required was concerned. Not all cases where the intention of the offender to kill [671] the victim is clear carried with it the threat of revenge. The tribal law takes into consideration certain mitigating circumstances, such as the role of the victim in initiating the act of the offender.

*795 The desire to establish in North Africa conditions in which
793 Muslims might live by their own laws and under their own
798 government, as they did in Arabia under the first four Caliphs,
led the Grand Sanusi and his successors to oppose the Turkish
177 way of life and the influences and innovations of Western Christendom, but their intransigence in these matters did not imply intolerance, far less aggressiveness. Though some writers have made assertions to the contrary, the Sanusi have never shown themselves more hostile than other Muslims to Christians and Jews, and the Grand Sanusi and Sayyid al-Mahdi scrupulously avoided all political entanglements which might bring them into unfriendly relations with neighbouring States and the European Powers. The Brothers of the Order
*795 were discouraged from discussing political questions. Nor were
793 the Sanusi intolerant towards fellow Muslims who differed from
798 them. Shaikh Muhammed 'Uthman records of Sayyid al-Mahdi that 'the persons he dislikes the most are those who speak ill of Muslims'.[1] The leaders of the Sanusiya have always tolerated other and rival Orders, even when they have disapproved of their rites. The Grand Sanusi had himself been a member of a succession of Orders before he started his own and he allowed, as his successors have done, members of other Orders to belong to the Sanusiya at the same time.

*795 The leaders of the Order have also been tolerant towards the
792 cult of saints, unlike the iconoclastic Wahhabi, who have
destroyed even the tombs of those nearest to the Prophet himself.
798 The view held by the doctors of orthodox Islam is that,
776 though intercession through a saint is unlawful and the only
778 mention of him during prayers at his tomb should be to ask the mercy of God on his soul, it is permissible to show respect to his tomb and his memory. The heads of the Sanusiya have, however, always tolerated among their Bedouin followers a regard for holy men and their tombs which goes beyond mere respect. It is unlikely that they felt any repugnance to the cult, because they counted among their forbears several saints and were themselves brought up in North Africa where the cult of saints is widespread and very near to the hearts of the common people; and they could not have remonstrated with the Bedouin for believing that holy men and their tombs are sources of *baraka*,

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[1] Op. cit., p. 121.

795*

divine blessing, since it was because the Bedouin believed the [792]
Sanusi family had the same virtue that they accepted their [798]
leadership. [776]

The resemblance often alleged between the Sanusi and the [778]
Wahhabi movements, on the grounds of like puritanism, 795*
literalism, and fanaticism, cannot be substantiated. It is 171
obvious that there must be resemblances between new religious [114]
movements: they usually claim to be a return to primitive faith and morals and they are generally missionary and enthusiastic. There is no great significance in such common characteristics of the two movements. Nor is there any reason to suppose that the Grand Sanusi was directly influenced by Wahhabi propaganda. A more significant comparison between the two might be made by tracing their developments from religious into political movements. Both started as religious revivals among backward peoples, chiefly Bedouin, the Wahhabi movement in the Nadj in the eighteenth century and the Sanusi movement first in the Hijaz and then in Cyrenaica in the middle of the nineteenth century; the *Ikhwan* organizations of the two movements have much in common; and both ended in the formation of Amirates, or small Islamic States.

Both movements have created States, the Wahhabi in Arabia and the Sanusi in Cyrenaica, based explicitly on religious particularism. In doing so they have only done what any movement of the kind is bound to do in a barbarous country if it is to continue to exist, namely, to create an administrative system which would ensure a measure of peace, security, justice, and economic stability. A religious organization cannot exist apart from a polity of a wider kind. But they did not create the sentiment of community which made the growth of governmental functions and the emergence of a State possible.

Religious divisions in Islam have commonly been the expres- 795*
sion of a sense of social and cultural exclusiveness. The support 182
given to the 'Alids in Persia and Arabia, to the Umayyads in 177
Africa and Spain, to the Fatimids in Egypt, to the Kharijites 171
by the Berbers in North Africa, and the adoption of extreme Shi'ite doctrines by the mountaineers of Syria and by the Kurds, and of Isma'ili teachings in parts of India, were all reactions against foreign domination as much as revolts against orthodoxy. The religious deviation was the expression of the intense desire

*795 of a people to live according to their own traditions and institutions.
182 To-day this desire is expressed in the political language
177 of nationalism. In the past it was expressed in religious movements.
171 Arab nationalism is not a new phenomenon. Only its
[668] dress is new.

As will be seen in the chapters which follow, conditions in
*795 Cyrenaica were particularly favourable to the growth of a
182 politico-religious movement such as the Sanusiya became. It was cut off by deserts from neighbouring countries, it had a homogeneous population, it had a tribal system which embraced common traditions and a strong feeling of community of blood, the country was not dominated by the towns, and the Turkish administration exercised very little control over the interior. It was, as will be seen, the tribal system of the Bedouin which furnished the Order with its political foundations just as it was the tribesmen of the country whose hardiness and courage enabled it to stand up to the succession of defeats it had to endure.

*795 The reasons for the political success of the Sanusiya Order in
793 Cyrenaica will appear in the course of this account, and here I
wish to draw attention to one of them only. It has been said
182 that its rites and teachings were, like the Bedouin character,
[792] austere without being fanatical, and that it tolerated the cult
of saints to which the Bedouin were accustomed, the Grand
[798] Sanusi becoming, in fact, a kind of national saint; but it must be added that the acceptability of its teachings and the fact that the Grand Sanusi could at once be placed by the Bedouin in the familiar category of *Marabtin*, holy men coming to preach and settle in Cyrenaica from the west, cannot alone account for the remarkable success of the Sanusiya movement. The Bedouin of Cyrenaica had heard similar teachings before from similar teachers and had paid them the same degree of attention as they paid to the Grand Sanusi, but these earlier missionaries won only a personal and local following for themselves and their descendants, whereas the Grand Sanusi established himself and his family as leaders of a national movement, a position they have now held for three generations.
Leaving aside the remarkable personality of the Grand Sanusi
[792] and without here discussing whether the time at which he
[798] taught was particularly favourable to the growth of the move-

ment to which his teachings led, it may be said that the great 795*
difference between the Grand Sanusi and the earlier holy men 793
whose tombs are homely landmarks all over Cyrenaica was that, 182
while they were, all of them, in the eyes of the Bedouin, Mara- [792]
bouts, the Grand Sanusi was also the head of an Order which [778]
gave to him and his successors an organization. Moreover, unlike the Heads of most Islamic Orders, which have rapidly disintegrated into autonomous segments without contact and common direction, they have been able to maintain this organization intact and keep control of it. This they were able to do by co-ordinating the lodges of the Order to the tribal structure.

III

The more recent Islamic Orders are to be found principally 795*
in North and West Africa. The Sanusiya is one of the most 793
recent of them. Its founder was an Algerian scholar, al-Sayyid 159
Muhammad bin 'Ali al-Sanusi al-Khattabi al-Idrisi al-Hasani, 175*
a very remarkable man, mystic, missionary, and Marabout. The Sayyid Muhammad bin 'Ali al-Sanusi is usually spoken of in Cyrenaica as *al-Sanusi al-Kabir*, the Grand Sanusi, and I generally refer to him thus in this book.

The Grand Sanusi was born of a distinguished family of Sharifs at a village near Mustaghanim in Algeria about 1787. Early in life he became noted for his intelligence, piety, and profound learning, considered fitting ornaments to his noble birth. He studied first at Mustaghanim, then at Mazun, and later at the famous mosque school at Fez in Morocco, where he learnt theology, jurisprudence, exegesis of the Koran, and the other usual subjects of a Muslim student of the time. There he seems to have developed an interest in mysticism, having come under the influence of the Moroccan Order of the Tijaniya Darwishes. He left Fez when in the early thirties in order to make the pilgrimage to Mecca, though a Turkish biographer says that one of his reasons for leaving Morocco was to avoid possible unpleasantness with the authorities, who were alarmed lest his propaganda for the greater unity of Islam, his life's aim, might have political consequences.[1] They had small cause for alarm as his efforts seem to have made little impression on the

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[1] Salim bin 'Amir, *Majallat 'Umar al-Mukhtar*, No. II, 1943-4, p. 2.

619 spond different social statuses. Some are classed as *Marabtin bil baraka*, 'client tribes with the blessing' or *Marabtin al-Fatha*,
619 'client tribes of the prayer', and they often claim to be Sharifs.
778 These 'sacred' tribes, such as the Aulad al-Shaikh and most of

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
TUNISIA
Tarabulis
Masallata
Misurata
Al-Rujban
Al-Qal'a
AL-AMAMRA
Al-Haraba
Bani Walid
AL-MASHASHA
Mizda
AL-HARABA
AL-RUJBAN
URFALLA
Sirt
AL-QADHADHFA
Al-Naufiliya
Sinawin
Ghadamis
Darj
AL-ZINTAN
Al-Tabaqa
AULAD BUSAIF
SULIMAN
AL ZAWIYA
AL-MAGHARBA
AL-MAQARHA
RIYAH
AL-JAMA'AT
Saukna
Hun
Waddan
AL-HARABA
Zalla
AULAD
Al-Fuqha
Birqin
AL-HUTMAN
AL-HASAUNA
Sabha
Tamassa
Ghudwa
Umm Al-Aranab
Zuwila
Murzuq
Taghaghan
Dlaim
Wau Al-Kabir
Wau Al-Namus
Ghath
Al-Qatrun
AL-HARABA → Names of Tribes
Al-Haraba → Sanusiya Zawiyas
Boundary Lines
Scale
0 50 100 150 200 400 kms.

The Chief Sanusi Bedouin Tribes of Tripolitania.

619 the Masamir and Farjan, live among the *Sa'adi* as equals in
778 virtue of the prestige they derive from their descent, or supposed descent, from saints, though the free tribes do not regard
[173] them as quite like themselves. Their ancestors are almost invariably believed to have come from the west, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, or Tripolitania. This move of pious men to

the east began in the middle of the thirteenth century and has 619
lasted to the present day. It is intimately bound up with the 778
pilgrimage to the sacred towns of Islam. Round these pious [173]
men and round their tombs gathered for sanctuary the simple [788]
and oppressed, and from these and from the children of the holy men have sprung the *Marabtin bil baraka* tribes. The other 619
client tribes have no sacred associations and are known as 651
Marabtin al-sadqan because they pay *sadaqa*, a fee, to a free tribe for protection and for the privilege of using the earth and water. Some small broken-up fragments of this category on the plateau, such as the 'Awwama, Alauna, Hasanna, and some of the Qat'an and Sa'it, even to-day have a very inferior social position and are forced to make payments to, and to perform services for, the free tribes among whom they live. Other 619
tribes of this second category live, as already mentioned, on territory which is to all intents and purposes their own and have long since ceased to pay a fee. This is especially the case to the east, in 'Abaidat tribal territory, where such client tribes as the Minifa, Qat'an, Taraki, and Huta live with independent status. In the west also the Fawakhir and Zuwaya are too powerful and warlike to accept overlordship. Also, the more nomadic groups in Cyrenaica are mostly client tribes and, like all nomads, resent any control or authority. Whatever the free tribes may say about them, they regard themselves as independent.

The provenance of the *Sa'adi* tribes and of some of the 619
Marabtin tribes is shown together with the distribution of the 162
Sanusiya lodges on the map facing page 35, and the approximate numbers of these tribes, and of a few others not shown on the map, are listed below.

Sa'adi	
al-'Abaidat	30,450
al-'Awaqir	27,500
al-Bara'asa	21,000
al-Darsa	18,850
al-Magharba	13,000
al-'Arafa	9,300
al-'Abid	6,850
al-Hasa	6,500
'Ailat Fayid	100
Marabtin	
al-Qat'an	5,850
al-'Awwama	3,800
al-Zuwaya	3,700
al-Shwa'ir	3,400
al-Fawakhir	3,300
al-Sa'it	2,900
al-Majabra	2,500
al-Minifa	2,500
al-Masamir	2,400
al-Awajila	2,300
Aulad al-Shaikh	1,650
al-'Aqail	1,400
al-Shahaibat	1,350
al-Sarahna	1,250
al-Qabail	1,150
al-Huta	1,150

and of the consistency between lineages of a clan and segments 619
of a tribe. In explanation of it a few words must first be said 614
about the terms *qabila*, *'aila*, and *bait*. *Qabila* is the word 613
generally used to denote a tribe or primary tribal division.


MASAMIR
MARABTIN
AL-DARSA
AL-SHABARQA
AL-BAKHAYIT
AL-QALABTA
Balrabat
Al-Sleidikh
Al-Mahamda
'At Brahim
'At al-Mzatal
AL-MUASA
Al-Aqta'
AL-BARA'ASA
AL 'ABAIDAT
'AILAT FAYID
Tribal Boundaries
1st Subdivision
2nd Subdivision
3rd Subdivision
Al-Aqta' 4th Subdivision
Sanusiya Zawiya:–
Built
Not completed
Marabout Tomb
Scale
0
1
2
3
4 kms.

102
131
619
778 ●
795*
613

The Divisions of the Hasa Tribe.

'Ailat are the lineages into which a clan is divided and hence 619
the sections of a tribe of various sizes in which these lineages are 614
found and after which they take their names. *Biyut* are small 613
lineages, or extended families, with a depth of five or six generations from the present day to their founders. It must be noted, however, that all these terms are relative and are used in a more or less comprehensive sense according to the context.

of Cyrenaica.[1] The Bedouin remember with gratitude, as I have 771
often heard them declare, the moral and cultural benefits 797
brought to them by the Order. If they have fallen from the low 793
religious and literary standards to which the Sanusiya raised a 795*
fraction of them it is due to the virtual extinction of its teaching office during their long struggle with the Italians.

II

The Bedouin the Grand Sanusi found in Cyrenaica were not 771
only Muslims but also inveterate devotees of saints, the 792
Marabtin (sing. *Marabat*) or Marabouts, as they are called in 793
European accounts of North Africa, and the Grand Sanusi was 776
in the long tradition of these holy men. Therefore, although I 778
have touched on the matter in Chapter I, I need not excuse myself for treating it again in its Cyrenaican context, for Bedouin attachment to the Sanusiya springs from their personal devotion to the Grand Sanusi and his family, and not the other way round, and the Grand Sanusi derived his sanctity, and thereby his power, from the fact that he was a Marabout. The Bedouin are familiar with saints and ignorant of Orders. To them the Grand Sanusi was a saint and wonderworker, and a man with *baraka*, an ample measure of God's grace which flowed through him to ordinary folk; but there was nothing extraordinary about him. They knew his kind of old. When he died his tomb became a shrine, the largest and richest in Cyrenaica it is true, but only one among very many, dating from the Companions of the Prophet Muhammad, through the Martyrs who were killed fighting for the faith in Cyrenaica, to the pious and learned
men of yesterday and the day before. His successors, by their [613]
kinship with him, and in virtue of their spiritual legacy from
him, became heirs to his *baraka*; and so, to a lesser degree, have the heirs of the other religious teachers who came to Cyrenaica from the west, who died and were buried there, and whose descendants are the *Marabtin bil baraka* lineages of to-day. The authority the Grand Sanusi had over the Bedouin of Arabia and North Africa can be parallelled by the careers of many holy

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[1] Giuseppe Macaluso, *Turchi, Senussi e Italiani in Libia*, 1930, p. 32; Giglio, op. cit., p. 22; and Arcangelo Ghisleri (quoting Andrea Pedretti), *Tripolitania e Cirenaica dal Mediterraneo al Sahara*, 1912, p. 132. [113]

771 men in North Africa whose families still retain much wealth and
792 influence. It was this Marabout status of the Grand Sanusi in
793 the eyes of the Bedouin which won him their respect: it was the
776 organization of the Sanusiya Order, an organization the earlier
● 778 Marabouts did not have, which enabled him to turn this respect
into a theocracy.

*175 There is more than one explanation of the origin of the word
792 '*Marabat*'. That generally accepted is that it derives from the
root RBT, to bind, and hence from '*ribat*', a fortified convent,
619 inhabited by warrior-monks, found on the marches of Islam in
[192] its early days of expansion by arms. The word later became
attached to the tribes which settled in Andalousia under the
leadership of the Saharan tribe of the Sanhaja and was corrupted
into the European 'Almoravides'. After the fall of the Sanhaja
dynasty in the twelfth century part of the *Marabtin* tribes fell
back into central and southern Morocco, whence many individuals
moved eastwards. Some settled in Cyrenaica,
generally on their return from the pilgrimage to Mecca, and
their fanaticism, asceticism, ability to read and write, and thaumaturgic
powers, impressed the simple Bedouin, who accepted
them as holy men and magicians and used them to write charms,
to perform religious rites, and to act as mediators in inter-
[613] tribal disputes. Sometimes, as we have seen, these men
founded lineages which, dwelling under the shadow of their
saintly forbears, became nuclei of social agglomerations which
have developed in course of time into tribal groups, thus taking
the shape of the tribal society in which they lived. The word
[192] '*Marabtin*' thus came to mean holy men (and their tombs) and
then, in addition, tribes tracing their descent, or supposed
descent, from these holy men and also, finally, in Cyrenaica,
tribes who are clients of the great *Sa'adi* tribes which own the
earth and water.

778 Some of the better known of the Cyrenaican saints, but by
776 no means all, have gleaming white cupolas, supported by four
792 walls, erected over their tombs, and inside the walls is a *tub*, a
wooden box, over the grave, and this is covered with coloured
cloth on which are inscribed passages from the Koran. Inside
also are often a few pages from sacred books, occasionally a few
small coins given by the local Bedouin, and any property, such
as tents or ploughs, the Bedouin have wished to deposit in a

safe place when on seasonal moves. Often a shrine, sometimes 778
the shrine of a very famous saint, is no more than a wall of 776
stones, with perhaps a stick, with pieces of cloth tied to it, 792
erected over the grave, and this is the usual form in the steppe
grazing-grounds. There are generally cemeteries around the [764]
tombs.

All these shrines are visited by the Bedouin from time to time,
when they are passing by or when they have some request to
make of the holy man. Many of them are cult centres, an annual [796]
ceremony, one of the chief events of the Bedouin year, being [619]
held at them; and when they are near the border between tribes,
or between tribal sections, this is an occasion for intertribal, or
intersectional, gatherings. There is no saint whose tomb is much [789]
visited by the Bedouin who has not performed miracles, some [755]
of them very remarkable miracles, and there is probably none
who has not at some time or other cured the sick or given an heir.

The tombs of these holy men, Sidi this, Sidi that, and Sidi
the other, are found in profusion over the whole of inhabited
Cyrenaica. The historically best known are those of Sidi Rafa',
one of the Companions of the Prophet, near al-Zawiya al-Baida
on the plateau, of Sidi 'Abdalla, one of the Prophet's standard-bearers, in the oasis of Aujila, and of the founder of the Sanusiya
Order, Sidi Muhammad bin 'Ali al-Sanusi, at Jaghbub oasis.
The shrines belong to the tribes and tribal sections in whose [619]
earth the Marabouts are buried and the Marabouts are looked [423]
upon as tribal and sub-tribal patrons. Like the Sanusiya Order,
they have become part of tribal life.

I have earlier reproduced Col. De Agostini's map of the Hasa 778
tribe to serve as an example of the territorial distribution of 619
lineages. The same map serves to illustrate the distribution of 792
shrines in a tribal territory. It can be seen from this map, which 776
shows only the best-known Marabout tombs, that all the different sections of the tribe have their shrines, and I would draw attention to an interesting feature of the distribution which I have also noted in other tribal areas: how often these sacred spots are near a tribal boundary, or near the boundary between one tribal section and another. This may not be pure chance, for the Marabouts in their lifetimes were regarded as standing outside the tribal system, to which indeed, being foreigners from the west, they did not belong, and their chief political role was

778 619 792 776 to act as mediators between tribes and between one tribal section and another. Even to-day their tombs are regarded as neutral points, as it were, and are often the place chosen for a meeting between the Shaikhs of one tribe, or tribal section, and those of an adjacent tribe, or section, when some matter has to be settled between them. It has sometimes happened also that when two tribes have disputed the ownership of territory, they have settled the dispute by allotting it to a Marabout, which means to his descendants, so that one then finds a *Marabtin* strip between two *Sa'adi* tribes or tribal sections. One of the best examples of this is the strip of country owned by the Aulad al-Shaikh tribe between the 'Awaqir and the 'Abid and 'Arafa tribal domains. In the same way tribes made gifts of disputed wells to dead saints. Where a *Marabtin* tribe has grown out of a Marabout family they will be found living in the area around their tombs. Thus the Aulad al-Shaikh territory spreads out from Sidi Mahiyus, part of the Masamir live near Sidi Nuh, the Mshaitat live around Sidi al-Mshaiti, and the Qat'an live near Sidi Hashim and Sidi Suliman al-Tair.

792 776 212 554 So, long centuries before the Grand Sanusi began his mission in Cyrenaica, the Bedouin were used to the sight of an *'alim*, a learned man—for anyone who can read and write is a learned man to the Bedouin—coming from the west to heal their children and beasts, break droughts, write talismans, and teach them the beliefs and law of Islam. Such a man was also a *muhakkam*, one who arbitrated in their disputes and said the *fatiha* at their settlements and undertakings to make them binding. He could arbitrate among them because he was not of them. He was not like them a tented son of the steppe, though his descendants may have learned to live as such, but a *Marabat*, a man who follows religion and not the rains. The Bedouin of Cyrenaica owe much to these holy men, for, ignorant and superstitious though they may have been, they taught the tribesmen to respect learning and religion and kept those twin lights burning, even if dimly, through centuries. The Bedouin do not forget them, or to say a prayer for them, when they pass their tombs; and they have given the freedom of their earth and water to their descendants. Without these forerunners the Grand Sanusi could not have planted his Order in the country. It is planted in their bones. [182] * [795]

Marabouts of the kind I have described were still coming to 792
Cyrenaica from the west up to the time when the Grand Sanusi 793
began his preaching in the country. Two of them whom he 795*
found there, already living among the Bedouin, the one on the
western and the other on the eastern part of the plateau, teaching
them and settling their disputes, became his followers: Sidi
Ahmad bin 'Abdalla al-Sakkuri, a late arrival from the west
whose descendants became Shaikhs of the zawiya of al-Marj,
and Sidi al-Martadi Farkash, of an old *Marabtin* family of
Cyrenaica, whose descendants became Shaikhs of the lodges at
Umm al-Razam, Bishara, and Martuba. But the great majority
of the Grand Sanusi's helpers were men who had come with him
from the west, chiefly from Algeria. Other *Ikhwan* families, [613]
mostly of the Khattabi lineage, of which the Sanusi family are
a branch, came later, also from Algeria, in the time of Sayyid
al-Mahdi. To the Bedouin they were all Marabouts and when
they had in their lifetimes a reputation for piety or learning [778] ●
their tombs in the Sanusiya lodges in which they resided became
places of cult like those of their forerunners all over Cyrenaica.
But unlike the earlier Marabouts these Sanusiya Brothers were
not only holy men. They were also members of a fraternity, of
an organization. The Sanusiya Order was thus not only heir 795*
to the accumulated capital of the Marabouts, but was able to 182
exploit it as a corporation. It incorporated a number of isolated
cults into a single wider cult, fractionized, it is true, by tribal
particularisms, but, all the same, brought under a common
organization. Each lodge of the Order was a cult centre, but it
was something more: it was part of a general cult directed
through the lodges towards the Head of the Order. The tribes 619
of Cyrenaica became through the Order linked from above in a 182
common, if loose, organization under a single, sacred, Head. 795*
This was possible only because a tribal system already existed 793
uniting the different tribes, in spite of their feuds and enmities,
into a society which, though lacking political unity, rested on
common sentiments, a common way of life, and a common
lineage structure.

What gave stability to this new relationship between the [648]*
Bedouin tribes and the Sanusiya Order, turning the sacred Head
into a secular leader and the religious organization into a
government, and changed a loose federation of tribes into a

*795 find hereditary transmission of Shaikhship of lodges most
793 accentuated, such as the Bara'asa-Tamia section (al-Zawiya
613 al-Baida), the 'Awaqir-Sdaidi section (Msus zawiya), and the
428 'Abaidat-Ghaith section (Tart zawiya). In the same way the
[792] earlier Marabouts became, as has been noted, founders of lineages which were on the pattern of the branches of the Bedouin clans among whom they lived, and attached to them.

*795 Also it must be remembered that the lodges were tribal institutions built by the local Bedouin so that they might
778 participate in the *baraka* of Sayyid Muhammad bin 'Ali al-
793 Sanusi. They participated in it through the Shaikhs of their
619 zawiyas who received their *baraka* direct from the hands of the
182 Grand Sanusi himself, or from the hands of son Sayyid al-Mahdi, and passed it on to their sons. This *baraka* belonged to the tribe, or tribal section, which built a lodge just as the *shaukha*, the secular Shaikhship of the tribe, or tribal section, belonged to it and had to be kept in it. In both the continuity of family succession had to be maintained, unless there were good reasons for acting otherwise. Thus each tribal section emphasized its autonomy in its hereditary line of religious Shaikhs, through whom the *baraka* of the founder of the Order was transmitted to them, whilst proclaiming its membership of a tribal federation with common allegiance to the Head of the Order.

*795 As I have pointed out when speaking of the sacred *Marabtin*
793 tribes of Cyrenaica, it was customary for the descendants of a
778 Marabout to reside near his tomb. I have further mentioned
[776] that the Shaikh of a Sanusiya lodge, who is also called a *Marabat* by the Bedouin, might, if he had during life a reputation for piety, rather easily gained in Islam, be venerated as a saint when he was dead and his tomb become a shrine. This is another reason why Shaikhly families have tended to become hereditary directors of lodges.

*795 Just as almost all the Marabouts of Cyrenaica were foreigners
793 from the west, so were almost all the Shaikhs of the Sanusiya
554 lodges. The Dardafi and Isma'ili families came from Tripolitania,
[167] the Ghumari family from Morocco, the 'Ammur, Bu Jibali, and Khattab families came from Algeria, and so on. As a class they enjoyed, and still enjoy, a reputation for sanctity among the Bedouin on account of their knowledge of the Koran

tion were compelled to pay taxes and furnish supplies, and how 175*
forty-five of the Shaikhs of the Jawazi tribe were treacherously 648*
murdered and many of their followers massacred.[1] Generally, however, it may be said that Cyrenaica has no history, other than Bedouin traditions of inter-tribal wars, from 1051 to 1835, in which year the Turks regained control of Libya from the Caramanlis. On their return they instituted a more systematic administration than had been exercised during their earlier occupation.

The Turks returned to Cyrenaica about the time the Grand 175*
Sanusi first visited the country and eight years after their 648*
reoccupation he founded his first zawiya on the plateau. As 795*
the Sanusiya Order gained the confidence of the Bedouin and [793]
became accepted as their spokesmen, it was necessary for the
Ottoman authorities to take it into consideration in their dealings
with the tribes of the interior. The Order made it possible 175*
for the different tribes to express themselves politically as a 648*
unit for the first time in their relations with the outside world. 182
The tribes provided the Order with a social system, and the 795*
Order gave to that system a political organization at a time when it was beginning to be brought into more direct contact with political forces outside tribal society.

The Sanusiya is known to have been given a Charter about 175*
1856 by Sultan ʻAbd al-Majid I. His firman was brought from 648*
Istanbul by Sidi ʻAbd al-Rahim al-Maghbub, later Shaikh of 795*
the Sanusiya zawiya at Banghazi, who had been sent to Istanbul [793]
for the purpose and had the utmost difficulty, as was often the
case with visitors to the Ottoman capital, in obtaining an
audience with the Sultan. Whatever other privileges the firman [794]
conferred on the Order—I have not seen the document—it
certainly exempted its properties from taxation and permitted [651]
it to collect a religious tithe from its followers. A second firman was issued later by Sultan ʻAbd al-Majid's brother, Sultan ʻAbd al-ʻAziz, and was brought from Istanbul to the Governor of Tripoli by Sidi Abu al-Qasim al-ʻIsawi, ʻAbd al-Rahim's successor in the Banghazi lodge. There is in the Land Registry at Banghazi a letter from the Governor of Tripoli to the Governor
of Banghazi giving the essence of this firman. It confirms the [778]
privileges granted by the earlier firman and adds to them that

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[1] Op. cit., *passim* and p. 220 seq.

*175 *648 *795 of the right of sanctuary within the precincts of the lodges of the Order. It is complimentary and written in the fulsome language of such documents.[1]

[778] Nevertheless, the Turks were under no illusion. They did not believe that the Sanusi loved them, but they knew that if it came to a decision the Order and the Bedouin would support them against any of the Christian Powers of Europe. This is evident from the correspondence found in the archives of Tripoli by the Italians when they captured the town in 1911.[2] Shaikh Muhammad 'Uthman, writing in 1896, says frankly that the Turks were ill disposed towards the Sanusiya and would have liked to have taken Sayyid al-Mahdi to Istanbul and there given him a palace, the Turkish equivalent for *résidence forcée*, as they had done with Abu al-Huda, the Head of the Rifa'iya Order, and Shaikh Dafir, the Head of the Madaniya Order; and he adds that the Sayyid, on his side, had no liking for the Turks. When the Shaikh was in Banghazi the Shaikh of the Sanusiya lodge there was dismissed from his post by the Sayyid because he had allowed himself to be corrupted by the Turkish Authorities.[3]

The Ottoman Government was not much concerned about the exact juridical status of the Sanusiya Order, a question which greatly exercised Italian writers at a later date when this had become an important issue in their dealings with the Order. There were hundreds of Bedouin tribes and dozens of religious Orders in the Ottoman Empire and the Turks were matter-of-fact people who wisely left such questions alone. In the mosques under the Order's control the name of the Sultan was proclaimed at Friday prayers, but this means very little. Doubtless the Grand Sanusi and his successors took the view that the Caliphate had been usurped by the Ottoman Sultans—they could hardly have taken any other view—but it had long been in Ottoman hands and Turkey was the only independent Muslim Power capable of protecting Muslim interests. In practice also they accepted the secular authority of the Sultan as ruler of the Ottoman Empire.

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[1] Salim bin 'Amir, op. cit., May 1944.

[113] [2] Published in 1912 with the title *Relazione fra Turchi e Senussi. Documenti rinvenuti nell' Archivio di Tripoli* (Ufficio Politico Militare). Quoted by Macaluso, op. cit.

[3] Op. cit., pp. 65-6 and 106.

3:Evans-Pritchard E-4, 5 (1942-1944) 1949 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9
(1837-1942) Sanusi

175*

1912 for the same purpose by British sympathizers with the Arab cause and Indian Muslims. 648*

V

On 13 April 1913 Gen. d'Alessandro attacked the Turco-Arab camp at Banina and after 10 hours' heavy fighting took it by assault, killing 200 men and capturing about 50 prisoners and much equipment. The Turco-Arabs from this time onwards abandoned any further attempt to hold a line and organized resistance gave way to the kind of guerrilla warfare the country, inferiority in numbers and arms, and lack of military training of the Arabs indicated as the most appropriate tactics. The Italians were therefore able to advance rapidly in column in the grand style and to defeat Arab bands wherever they met them by superiority in numbers and fire power. They occupied Bu Mariyam, al-Abyar, Taukra, al-Baniya, and Jardis al-'Abid. While this column, the 2nd Division under Gen. d'Alessandro, was advancing on Jardis al-'Abid a second column, the 4th Division under Gen. Tassoni, disembarked at Talmaitha after a sharp engagement, and from there advanced on al-Marj and took the village. The two Divisions then met at Jardis al-'Abid. From there the 4th Division moved eastwards and in mid-May took without much opposition Marawa, Slanta, Shahhat, Marsa Susa, and other points. The ease with which they were able to march through the country and the way in which the Bedouin bands nine times out of ten gave way to them on the field, made the Italians take too optimistic a view of the campaign. They had yet to learn that marching from point to point and occupying the points does not make any great impression on an enemy for whom places have little significance, and that it is one thing to force Bedouin bands to give ground and quite a different thing to conquer a hardy and elusive people scattered over a wild and rugged country. The whole country was up in arms [793]
and the general will to resistance was now strengthened by the [795]*
arrival on the field of Sayyid Ahmad al-Sharif from Jaghbub [778]
and a Turco-Arab victory shortly afterwards, an event the Bedouin naturally attributed to the Sayyid's *baraka*. This victory was in the Darna sector.

After the fighting in the autumn on the periphery of the town

days on which kin of various sorts should attend the mourning 613
ceremonies, which extend over a period of a week. Allowance is 621
made for those who may be away temporarily, although they are 765
expected to hasten to the mourning camp as quickly as possible.
Agnatic kin are expected not only to be present on the appro- 613
priate day, but are required to offer gifts consistent with their 621
relationship to the bereaved; agnates of the tertiary segment are 765
expected to offer a sheep, while some cognates ought to bring a 431
goat and others a quantity of sugar and tea. At one funeral in a camp where I was resident, soon after the death occurred, the main concern of its inhabitants was whether or not certain men of their section would attend the mourning rites and bring appropriate gifts with them. These men lived at the time in another camp a few miles away, as they had been doing for several years past. They did not come when they were expected, and when they finally arrived at the end of the week they brought with them gifts of sugar and tea only—gifts which were totally inappropriate for agnates of the group. They were, in fact, now no longer members of it, and my neighbours were able to tell me, 'They have branched off from us. We will never live together again.' The lineage had proliferated and this was the first occasion for showing it.

Wide-spread in Cyrenaica is a cult of saints. The number of 794
saints' tombs varies from tribe to tribe, there being fewer among 776
the camel herders of the semi-desert than among the cow- 778
herding, almost sedentary, folk of the plateau area. Whatever [788]
the number, the members of the group that venerates a particular
saint make an annual pilgrimage to his tomb, and sometimes
more frequent pilgrimages are made. In one area there were two 794
men, accepted by their respective kin groups as leaders, who vied 554
against each other for the leadership of their section. One of them [648]
had been a famous warrior during the Italian wars and, after
being injured, fled to Egypt where he lived for seventeen years, until he returned to his homeland in 1947. The other had also fought against the Italians, failed to win renown, was a captive for a time, later released, and subsequently appointed leader of his section by the Italian authorities. The first, during his period of exile, had become impoverished. The second during his years of freedom had prospered. As far as their personalities

794 were concerned, there was little doubt who was leader—the
554 name of the former was known throughout the land. Now when
the warrior returned from his Egyptian exile, his rival offered
794 him a sheep as a gift. This act was wholly appropriate. Subse-
554 quently they continued to compete fiercely, but it soon became
578 clear that the returned warrior was winning the greater support.
In the face of this, the rival, in 1948, decided to break with tradi-
[788] tion by staying away from the annual pilgrimage to the tomb of
[175] the local saint. Instead, he and his followers made their pilgrim-
age to a different tomb in the vicinity of their camp, and later
built a low wall round the tomb, whitewashed it, and made it
known that henceforward they would regularly use it for pilgrim-
[613] ages. The two kinship groups of a tertiary section now had their
[778] separate saint's tomb. Some months later, the rival decided to
move with his small group to an area in which they had not pre-
794 viously resided. It is the custom among the Bedouin when they
554 pitch their tents in a place for the first time, that the people of
578 the neighbourhood should bring them gifts to mark the event.
431 The returned warrior, who had now become a close neighbour
[166] of his rival was obliged, like others, to offer the latter a gift; he
was also obliged to return the gift of a sheep that he had been
given on rejoining his section in 1947. He brought a gift within a
few hours of his rival's arrival, but it was a goat.[14] The rival and
his followers were furious, and the argument that the warrior was
too poor to give more was dismissed summarily. This was the
final insult. The donor, in return, had been given less than he had
presented. The reciprocity of gift exchanges had not only been
arrested, it had been reversed. From then onwards the two groups
made no attempt to conceal their hostility and went their sepa-
rate ways.

613 Disputes stemming from circumstances such as these are the
578 occasions which mark the proliferation of groups, although in
all three cases cited, difficulties over water supplies had pre-
ceded the outbreaks of quarrelling.

613 In this discussion of the ways in which proliferation of seg-
602 ments takes place, the emphasis had been put on the tug of war
121 between the interests of people in their agnatic connexions and

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[14] A goat is inferior to a sheep in gift exchanges.

1950, but his kind of tyranny was absent from the Cyrenaica of that period. From the 795
mid-nineteenth century until the Italian invasion of 1911, the Sanusi Order estab- 175
lished itself, spread its lodges throughout the tribes and in other more remote lands [613]
until it became what Evans-Pritchard speaks of as a theocratic empire.[1] The lodges [778]
served as areas of sanctuary and their staffs adjudicated disputes. Leaders of the [793]
Order had the power to coerce and the Bedouin obeyed. They obeyed out of personal
regard for some of them in 1950, but the religious authority previously used by the
leaders had given way to the political power they now exercised as functionaries in
a state system. In the meantime, the country had been ravaged by the long Italo- [648]
Sanusi wars. Throughout the nineteen-thirties after suffering terrible privations and
reduction in numbers through slaughter in war, death in concentration camps, and
exile, the Bedouin were ruled by the Italians. During the Second World War the
armies of three major contestants fought their battles where the Bedouin now tend
their flocks and herds. After the war they were left to fend for themselves, with a
minimum of administrative interference.

In the light of all this the conception of an equilibrium system is of little heuristic value, still less its derivative concept of a repetitive system. This does not mean, however, that an account of part of the social life of the Bedouin as it existed in 1950 must be nothing more than a disconnected piece of history, unrelated to a prior state of things and wholly useless for the understanding of the contemporary oil-producing cum mixed pastoral–agricultural economy. It would be little more than a piece of social historiography if the analysis was based on the concept of a total social structure of functionally interconnected parts, forming what Leach describes as 'a delicately balanced mechanism rather like the various parts of a wrist watch'.[2] Such a viewpoint would effectively exclude any possible comprehension of changes save those present as part of the dynamics of a system; its only answer to change is an account of a different system. If, instead, attention is focused on the analysis of a field of components arranged in a specific fashion to meet the interests of men at a particular time, it then becomes possible to see how a shift in their positions, the addition of new components, or the elimination of others produces this or that effect. It can make intelligible what has gone before, and if the future cannot be anticipated it can be demarcated within rough limits. 121

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modern territory of his tribe. See also Hamilton, 1856.

[1] Evans-Pritchard, 1949. In this book a brilliant account is given of the development of the Order, and how it came to unify and provide centralized political leadership for the tribes. [175] [795] [613]

[2] Leach, 1961, p. 6.

The Meaning of Marriage

581 Until marriage the changes in a man's life have been in the nature of
585 an ordered sequence of development from a child to be cared for — the only
342 time in his life when a father, without inhibition, showers on him his love
[593] and affection — to one who, by degrees, makes an increasing contribution to
a production unit. Marriage necessitates that a man pitch a tent for himself.
With a tent he becomes a potential host and protector of others. The local
idiom for marriage is "to set up a tent." It would be quite improper to use
[196] the verb "to marry" when inquiring whether a marriage has taken place
since this verb also has the meaning of "to have sexual intercourse." In-
[195] stead the euphemism, "Have you pitched a tent?" is used. The Arabic word
for a tent in this context is *Bait*. It is not used to refer to a military tent, nor
to the small tent which shelters only a widow. It is reserved for the Bedouin
tent, which usually has a wool top, and, most importantly, holds the promise
of the continuation of life, whether it shelters a newly married couple, a
mature family or young unmarried people. (The word *Bait* represents a
complex concept, and it would be too much of a diversion here to discuss
the various points of its significance. It is essential to understand that its
● [778] meaning is not confined to a tent in the physical sense.) Its top has *Baraka*
(divine goodness) in it; the quality of *Haram*, which makes it possible for the
tent to be used as a sanctuary, is associated with it and this quality of *Haram*
extends, moreover, to the ropes of the tent, so that anyone who clutches them
comes under the protection of the owner. In it, the wife must permanently
reside and her husband has the legal right to insist on this. In it too, he
has the legal right of sexual access to a woman, his wife. Any children
born in it he can claim as his own. With the erection of a tent the son
[885] reaches adulthood, and it is in this sense that he can be said to have acquired
a domain of his own.

581 Marriage gives a son greater freedom and less dependence on his father
585 in another sense. A second euphemism used for marriage is "making a
[593] relationship," specifically an affinal one. Relationships between a man and
[195] his father-in-law are diverse and are used in various ways in different situa-
tions. Here, the particular aspect which needs to be stressed is that a man
606 can cajole his father-in-law, and (through his wife) wealth, in the form
425 of animals, may pass from the former to the latter. Reciprocal gifts are passed
556 between affines on certain occasions, but in addition small amounts may
pass which are not connected with the formal occasions of exchanges. Debt
583 lies between them. It begins with the initiation of marriage negotiations,
584 when the suitor's kinsmen take a prescribed number of sheep to present to
606 the girl's father if negotiations are successful. They promise to transfer
bride-wealth[9] to the girl's father. A few weeks after the marriage, the hus-

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[171] [9] I use the word "bride-wealth" because it has become so familiar in the literature,
but the only similarity between the *Sahiba* of the Bedouin and the bride-wealth of

maintained to this day in the desert between the last two 619
and the Sa'adi, though they are relaxed in the cultivation. 651

The Jumei'at, who used to be "Murabitin" to the
Beni 'Una, are now nominally so to the Awlad 'Ali, but are
not required to pay tribute. Other tribes, such as the 619
Jawabis and 'Awarma, are in an intermediate stage between
the Sa'adi and the Murabitin. The Awlad 'Abd es-Sallam,
the Samalus ed-Diminat, and perhaps the Fawakhir, call [778]
themselves "Murabitin bil Baraka", a priestly caste which,
in Tripoli, used to receive special privileges from the
Turkish Government.

Though the Sa'adi tribes despise the Murabitin as serfs, [186]
they respect them for their piety and resort to them for
the writing of charms.

While the Murabitin tribes generally may be suspected to contain more Libyan blood than the Sa'adi, there are other tribes such as the 'Amayim, the Jahama, and the Tarhuna, who have come to Egypt from further west than any of the above, and who seem to be quite definitely "Berber", though, of course, none of them will admit it. These are known euphemistically as 'Arab el-Gharb.

Even some of the Juheina, settled east of the Nile in Sharqiya, are scorned by Klippel as "d'origine berbère, se pretendant section d'une tribu d'Arabie".[1]

Awlad 'Ali.—This tribe, by far the most important of [131]
the Western Bedouin, occupies with its vassals the whole
north coast of Egypt from Salum to Alexandria. Like the 619
others, they claim descent from the Beni Suleim, alleging 173
their ancestor 'Ali, son of 'Aqar, to be a grandson of that
Dib, or Abu Dib, mentioned by Ibn Khaldun. Their enemies,
however, allege that he was a Jew. "When the Arabs
occupied the north coast of Africa, there was a notable, a
Jew, who owned property at Saqiet el-Hamra in
Morocco. This man welcomed and entertained the Arab
sheikh Ez-Zanati. He became very popular with the
sheikh, who gave him his daughter named Sa'ada, on condition
that he embraced Islam before the marriage contract was
made out."[2] Another version calls the Jew Yana, and says
that he had two daughters. Of these Sa'ada was the

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[1] E. Klippel, "Etudes sur le folklore Bédouin de l'Egypte," *Bull. Soc. Khédiv. de Géogr.*, vii, 10, Cairo, 1911. [113]

[2] From information collected by Muhammad Bey Wasfi.

593 not considered bad for a man to beat his wife." In the case
593 of ill-treatment by the husband, her father may take the
*613 matter to the corporate head. Traditionally, the corporate
[792] head would order the husband to move his tent next to the
tend of the "holy man" or some other third party, so that
he would be dissuaded against such behavior. Another reason
[586] for this is so that the girl might have witnesses to support
her petition for divorce should the husband continue to beat
her. I heard of no wife-beating while I was in al-Qasr.

595 The Quran states that a man may lawfully take four
● [779] wives, but that if he feels he cannot treat each of them
equally, he should take only one (Sura IV:3 and 129). The
Bedouins are conscientious in practicing this rule, though
595 perhaps not for religious reasons. If a man has more than
593 one wife, he must spend an equal amount of time with each.
Conflict between co-wives is lessened by the fact that a man
will have separate tents, or rooms in the case of a house,
for each wife. A man will not buy a dress or a piece of jewelry
for one wife without buying a copy of it for all other wives.
595 On a trip to the Siwa Oasis, I was accompanied by a man who
593 had three wives and wished to bring them a gift of basketry
114 upon his return. He was successful in buying two baskets
which were similar but could not find a comparable third in
[431] the oasis market. In dismay, he made a gift of the baskets
to me and returned with no souvenirs at all. One of my in-

554 One *'aqila* claimed that the *rajal khair* is a person
627 who shares in his own authority and presides when he is
*613 away, but he separated the "rights" of the two roles. The
[779] *'aqila* is able to force two parties in conflict to read the
[578] *Fatiha*, the first *sura* of the Quran, in order to terminate
the problem; this is beyond the rights of the *rajal khair* whose
influence is not directly supported by sacred sanctions. But
[784] the role of *rajal khair* does have its "sacred" aspects, for
all Bedouins know that "you should never harm a *rajal khair*
or God will punish you for this." I never heard this same
thing said about the *'aqila*.

554 Historically, it was perhaps the case that the *rajal*
627 *khair* was the person of high status who represented the authority
*613 of an absent *'aqila*. The role never became institutionalized
182 but functioned as a support and substitute role in a structure
dominated by that of the *'aqila*. In a segmentary society
627 where the various structures exist in opposition to one
628 another, it is important that an institution, such as a third
182 non-partisan element, exists to facilitate communication
578 between parties for the purposes of conflict regulation.
Besides the *rajal khair*, an example of this would be the
traditional case of the wife from an outside tribe who alone
was permitted freedom of passage between the two warring
parties. Her purpose, it was assumed, was that of peace-making.

> 554 Suppose the donkey of A (a man present at the interview)
> 792 gets into the barley of B (another man present). This is
> 627 actually a serious matter since it could conceivably lead
> to a big fight between A's 'aiela and B's 'aiela. First,
> I separate them and make each go to his home. Then I
> get A's three brothers (his father is dead), we take a
> dhabiiha (lamb) and go to B's place and all eat together.
> • [779) After the meal, we read the Fatiha (opening sura of the
> Quran) together to show that all is forgiven. After the
> Fatiha has been read no trouble will start because this
> is done in the presence of the Jaraira.

[784) He explained that reading the Fatiha in bad faith would bring
the same curse from God that a bad oath would bring. He also
* [613) claimed that only he and the 'aqila have the authority to
command men to read the Fatiha.

554 'Amm Salih says that he uses the 'awaiyid as a guide
792 in solving problems, and that it is necessary because
627 "quarrels spread like fire, it is like fire; they spread to
671 killing and war." He was the only person in al-Qasr who
554 tried to conceptualize the difference between the 'awaiyid
792 Awlad 'Ali and the Sharii'a. 'Amm Salih said that it is
627 wrong to lie, according to both the secular and the sacred
671 authority codes: "One who lies exceeds the word of God,
779 and God will punish him for this. No one can know how this
577 punishment will take place, only God will know this . . .
[784) Sometimes a car goes off the road and people will say that it
is the punishment of God. But you never know because the
554 punishment of God comes in the after-life." I asked him:
792 "If this is so, why may the rajal khair lie in trying to
627 settle quarrels?" He replied:
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> Lying is bad (haram), but this is "the lie of a peace-maker" (kadhib musaalih). For instance, if you have a quarrel with Yunis here, then I have words with both of you. I use different words with each of you. I use different words than those which you used in the quarrel--I use good words. This is to bring you two together again. Maybe I see that you are going to kill, or I hear bad words from you; I do not go and tell him what you said.

'Amm Salih said that it is his "duty" to mediate disputes, and that he never hesitates "because God will reward me later." He did not want the quarrels to grow into wars. He also bases his pleas for conciliation upon moral discoure, the method used by the other traditional authorities.[3] 'Amm Salih said that in trying to solve a problem, "I give priority to the elder. I go to the younger man and tell him that he should make peace with the elder because no one cares more for him than his antagonist, and that he really cares more for his antagonist than for any other." The rajal saalih mediates but does not arbitrate: he attempts to redress the balance of good relations but does not impose judgements.

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● [779]

This approach to conflict regulation is not that of the 'aqila in his formal role, but it is similar to what the rajal khair would use. The main procedural difference between the two informal roles (i.e. rajal khair and rajal saalih) is that, in each case, the rajal saalih reads the Fatiha with

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[3] The approach which I used in my interviews with 'Amm Salih derives from the work of John Ladd as presented in his book, The Structure of a Moral Code, 1957.

554 the disputants. As noted, the rajal saalih shares this right
792 with the 'aqila. The rajal khair does not have recourse
627 to this mechanism which amounts to divine approval of the
*613 binding decision of the "third party." 'Amm Salih in his
779 discussion of the Bedouin moral code corroborated this
point: "Any 'aqila can read the Fatiha. In this way, he and the two parties involved terminate the quarrel. This is a way to show that all agree on the settlement. Originally, only the rajal saalih did this, but now the 'awaaqil do it in all cases." It would be interesting to know if in Cyrenaica both roles perform this function or if it belongs only to the role of rajal salih.

554 I cannot generalize concerning this role for the whole
184 of the Western Desert. Sayyid al-Sanusi and 'Amm Salih seem
627 to be special men. On the other hand, the 'aqila and the
792 rajal khair are roles which we would expect to find all over
*613 the desert, and in Libya also. The 'aqila is the focus of
institutionalized traditional authority structure, and the rajal khair and "status group" represent the power structure.
554 This attempt to differentiate between authority and power
121 is essentially one which deals with the more general problem
of leadership. Any study of the structure of authority must have reference to the notion of leadership. Role analysis seems the best method of dealing with leaders and their functions. Role analysis together with the conceptualization of institution as a process is an adequate way of dealing with the tendency

628 683 613 the area. He caught him and slapped him and ordered him not to do it again. After a short while the boy returned with his two older brothers who protested Sheikh Mughaieb's hitting their younger brother. The argument developed into a fight during which the two brothers hit Mughaieb with a heavy stick over his head making him unconscious.

The Mi'ad was held two weeks after the incident. When I arrived at Sheikh Mughaieb's house, the meeting was being held in the guest room in the back of the house. Present at the meeting were Sheikh Mughaieb, his father, two distant relatives of Mughaieb who were visiting the area at the time; Sheikh Mutair, the Aqila of the powerful bait of Mutair located some twenty miles east of Mughaieb; the two assailants, their father who at the same time was the Aqila of their bait, and two neighbors of Sheikh Mughaieb.

For the first half Hour or so nothing was said. People were sitting [576] silently except for occasional greetings of "how are you?" and the response of "thank God for everything". Tea was served frequently. Then [779] Sheikh Mutair addressed the gathering and read the "fatha" or the beginning passage of the Qoraan (which appeals to God to show his right ways to the believers and to guide them to wisdom). He then said, "In the blessed presnece of all these honorable guests and with the help of God and his prophet we will clear the hearts of those concerned of the grudges caused by the shameful and unfortunate incident in which the devil has played a major role." Then Sheikh Karim, the Aqila of the bait to which the accused belonged, continued the speech saying that this shameful thing should never have happened and that his sons must [867] have been possessed by the devil to have done it. After all, they have been brought up to respect their elders and especially Sheikh Mughaieb, who was like a second father to him.

156 equipment from the government projects and from smuggling sheep and merchandise
[685] [439] across the Libyan border. Although some of these stories might
be exaggerated, they all point to the fact that Hakim, despite his wealth,
is not the most popular or reputable individual in bait Asabei', and that
although Shei'eb is not a popular individual either, he definitely comes
up the winner in any popularity contest between the two. The question is
156 why Hakim was selected by the Awaqil to replace Shei'eb. The case involved
613 more than Shei'eb's inability to collect the money from members of
558 682 his bait. Shei'eb's ineffectiveness seemed to have been taken as an excuse
683 rather than as the direct cause. Many Aqaqil, before Shei'eb, had
failed in collecting money from their own bait without being subject to
direct challenge. What seems to be involved is more than a challenge to
a particular member, Shei'eb. It is a challenge to the whole principle
by which Shei'eb acquired his position as Aqila of bait Asabei': patrilineal
succession.

156 Shei'eb is the youngest of four sons of the former Aqila of bait
159 Asabei', Sheikh Elewa. For more than fifty years Sheikh Elewa was the
613 undisputed Aqila of bait Asabei'. He also had considerable influence
463 683 among other tribal segments throughout the whole of the Western Desert
554 by virtue of his position as "nazzar", that is, the expert who assesses
the amount of compensation for wound inflicted in a liable case. The
[428] position of nazzar is a hereditary one and had been handed down from
[779] father to son. The basis for his assessment of wounds are a number of
old books believed to be obtained from Mecca and contain all the judgments
of famous Islamic leaders in their assessments of wounds.

[428] Eleven years ago when Sheikh Elewa became blind and too old to

156 exercise his functions, he invited all the important people in the area
159 into a large gathering during which he announced that he was handing the
613 463 sacred books to Shei'eb, who was to become the nazzar and also to succeed
683 him as the Aqila of bait Asabei'. Although at that time Shei'eb was
554 428 fairly young, twenty-six, nobody questioned Sheikh Elewa's decision.
(079) "He is the Aqila," said one informant, "and he has the right to decide
which of his sons is to succeed him. After all, he knows his sons better
than anybody else and knows which one is best for the job." Most people
156 159 thought that Sheikh Elewa, being still alive and with clear thinking,
613 would help Shei'eb in performing his duties as Aqila. A few months after
554 Shei'eb took over his father's position, it became apparent that he was
578 too immature for the job. He tried to use his position to take money
[661] from members of his bait and when they refused to give him any money, he
entered into fights with a number of them. Rumors spread that he took
bribes from the disputing parties who came to him for him to assess the
legal compensation for wounds to raise or lower his estimate. But still
people within bait Asabei' as well as outside it respected Sheikh Elewa's
decision and did not challenge Shei'eb openly. But as time passed the
dissatisfaction with Shei'eb grew. This dissatisfaction came mainly from
members of the Amar who were affected directly by Shei'eb's actions, especially those actions which resulted in the payment of compensation for
wounds inflicted in fights.

PHASE II

439 On the evening of May 16, 1966, two members of the Geneishat tribe of Matruh area came to Burg-el-Arab with a large shipment of smuggled cigarettes to leave with their partner in the area, Hadi, from the

593 595 cooperation between the wives in household activities difficult. The
584 wives have to have reasonable grounds for their objection to the new
[431] bride. But even then, the husband could still marry the woman of his
choice, although in this case he has to bring gifts to the other wives
as "nasafa," or making-up present.

584 If the family has no objections to the marriage, the proceedings
593 start. The initial proceedings are undertaken by the women on both
sides. The groom's mother or a female relative of his mother's generation or older visits the mother of the prospective bride and tells her
of her son's intention to marry the latter's daughter. The bride's
mother then discusses the matter with the girl's father who has the
[429] final say in the matter. If the father is dead, then the authority on
giving the girl in marriage goes to her brother or closest male kin in
the order specified before. The girl has no say in the matter of marriage and cannot refuse to complete the marriage, although after marriage
she can resort to a certain practice which helps her to terminate the
marriage without the consent of her guardian, as will be seen later in
584 the chapter. From this moment until the conclusion of the marriage
[583] negotiations are done by the men of both families. The first thing to
be discussed is the amount of bridewealth, a "mahr." If the two families
agree on the marriage, a small ceremony is held. This ceremony is called
[779] "el-fatha" in reference to reading the first "sura" of the Koraan known
as el-fatha, or "the beginning." The ceremony includes members of the
[675] two families and very few friends. After the fatha is read, the agreement
is achieved. This is considered as an engagement and means that the girl
is spoken for and therefore no other man can ask to marry her.

To break the fatha agreement, the father of the prospective bride

582 time of the study. I have no information about the marital history of
[114] the men included in the genealogies. This is particularly important if
[586] we realize that the frequency of divorce in the area is quite high and
that there is a certain prohibition against ever marrying within a certain degree of relationship of his first wife.

582 According to the Koraan, a man is forbidden to marry certain
779 classes of women. Some of these women are permanently prohibited and others are only temporarily so. Marriage is forbidden with what are called the "maharem" (sing. mahram or non-marriageables). They are one's female ascendants and descendants; the former wives of one's ascendants or desendants; one's sister and the female descendants of one's sister and brother; one's paternal and maternal aunts and the sisters and aunts of the ascendants; one's mother-in-law and all female ascendants of one's wife. Marriage with the first cousin and the half-brother's half-sister (from another marriage) is therefore permitted. The second category of
[853] forbidden women are those related to the man by nursing. The wet nurse takes the place of the mother, and her relatives are treated as if she was the actual mother of the person in question.

In addition to the above, there is the prohibition of the simultaneous marriage of two women who are related to each other to the extent that had one of them been male and the other female, they would have come to the forbidden degree in marriage. This latter prohibition is not a permanent one and is restricted to the marriage of the two women at the same time. As soon as the marriage with one of them is dissolved, there is no prohibition on marrying the other one. Yet, although aware of the lecense given by the Islamic law to such marriage,

582 779 and although they are not considered wrong or sinful, there is a general feeling of distaste among the tribal population to such marriages. They usually attribute this distaste to the fact that if the marriage with the first sister did not work out, there is no reason to expect the marriage with the second to be successful.* Although this might account, in part, for the low rate of cousin marriage in the group when present wives of the individuals are taken into consideration, yet, the effect of that practice should not be exaggerated. For although that prohibition might curb the marriage with the cousin who is the sister of a previous wife, it does not restrict the marriage with another cousin who is a cousin, rather than a sister of the first wife.

584 431 During the period that follows and until the marriage is final, the groom is supposed to bring gifts to the bride. These gifts are usually a wide silver bracelet that is used as an engagement ring. Also gifts of clothes and jewelry are quite customary. Such gifts become the private property of the bride and are to be returned only if the engagement is broken for fault on the part of the bride or any member of her family. In such cases, her father has to return all the gifts his daughter has accepted as well as the expenses that the groom's visitations have cost him.

585 583 779 431 The marriage is affected and finalized by the payment of the bridewealth. In Islamic law the bridewealth is supposed to be paid to the bride herself as a gift and not to her father, which had been a significant departure from the pre-Islamic practice where two types of bridewealth were paid: the sadaqa paid to the father of the bride or her

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[587] * This does not apply to cases where the first wife dies. In such cases, it is not objectionable to marry her sister, although the incidences of sororate are rare among the population.

585 legal guardian and considered a bride price to compensate the father or
583 the legal guardian of the bride. In earlier times the bride received
779 431 none of the mahr, although she usually got a sadaq or bridal gift for
[178] herself. In Islamic Arabia, the mahr and the sadaq became indistin-
[171] guishable and were given to the woman and took the form of a legal gift
[178] for affecting the marriage. The Koraan no longer contains the concept
of the purchase of the wife, and the mahr becomes a compensation which
the woman has to claim in all cases. The Koraan demands a bridal gift
for a legal marriage: "And give them whom ye have enjoyed their reward
as a wedding gift" (Sura, iv. 24), and again, "And give the women their
[586] dowries voluntarily" (Sura, iv. 3). According to the Koraan, the mahr
remains the property of the wife and remains her own even if the marriage
is dissolved by divorce. But although it took the form of a gift, the
mahr remained in Islamic law a prerequisite for the legalization of the
marriage. It is only upon the giving of the mahr that the marriage is
considered valid. No marriage is legal, according to the Islamic law,
unless that transfer of the mahr is affected. Mutual consent of the
two parties to forfeit the mahr does not change that rule, and the mar-
58 riage is considered void. According to Muslim jurisprudence, marriage
675 is a contract ('acd) made betweeen the bridegroom and the bride or her
184 wali or guardian. An essential element in that contract is the mahr.
The jurists themselves are not sure about the nature of the mahr. Some
regard it as practically a purchase money or as an equivalent ('iwad)
for the possession of the woman and the rights over her, so it is like
a price paid in a contract of sale; while other jurists see in the mahr
a legal symbol, a mark of honor and a proper legal security of property
for the woman.

593 went to see Muftah and his company. Half an hour later the religious
574 man came and took Hemeida aside and talked to him in a very low voice,
606 586 then left the tent again. A few minutes more had passed; everyone
629 returned to the tent; Muftah was not angry anymore. The religious man
792 read the fatha, or the beginning sura of the Koraan, then said that the
[779] souls were now pure and that Hemeida was considered as a son of Muftah
and that disagreements such as this should not alter the good relations
between the two. He said that the devil had found his way into the souls
of the two people, but now, thanks to God and the good people present,
they both had come back to their senses. Hemeida then rose and went to
where his father-in-law was sitting and shook hands with him. Then he
[681] handed the religious man ten pounds which the latter passed to Muftah
and promised to send him a goat as a gift to his daughter. Muftah left
the tent and went to the tent of the women. When he came back he announced
that a goat had been slaughtered and that everyone was invited to eat.
Everybody then left and Muftah promised to return his daughter to her
husband the following day.

593 While the right of the father to take his daughter away from her
606 husband constitutes a check on the authority of the latter and insures
557 the wife good treatment by her husband and her in-laws, not infrequently
586 that right has been invoked for personal or individual interest on the
part of the woman's father or her closest male kin. Several cases have
[429] been cited in the area where the father or guardian had invoked the right
to force the husband to concede to certain demands of the wife's guardian,
even when the wife objected to those demands or disagreed with her
guardian. One of these is the case of Mabroka who is married to a distant

593 606 The case persisted for more than two months with no sign that either
557 party was willing to give into the demands of the other. I left the
586 area before any solution to the case was achieved.
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584 Another relevant case is one which involved a dispute between
578 Hassan Hassanein from the Sanagrah tribe and the father-in-law of his
606 daughter who was also from the same tribe and who lived in the same
area. The case started when Hassanein was visited by a friend from the
[574] Esheibat tribe in Matruh, an old man of 60 or 70 years. During the night
that this guest spent at Hassanein's house, they got to talking about
marriage and the fact that although his guest was a wealthy and re-
[595] spected man, he had only one wife. After a lengthy talk, it seemed
that the old man was convinced that he should have a second wife and
asked Hassanein if he knew of a suitable girl to marry. Hassanein sug-
584 gested his daughter's sister-in-law. Hassanein took the prospective
583 groom to the tent of his daughter's father-in-law and discussed the
578 606 matter with the father of the prospective bride who agreed to marry his
daughter to Hassanein's guest if he paid the sume of 200 pounds, in ad-
dition to slaughtering a number of goats and presenting him with the
[779] appropriate presents. When the man agreed to the terms, the fatha was
read to signify the agreement between the two parties. Hassanein left
the man to spend the night in the camp of his future in-laws. In the
morning the groom told the bride's father that he must go to nearby
Alexandria to bring the money for the bride price. When he came back
late that afternoon, he paid the money and set a date for the wedding
the next Thursday and then left for Matruh to prepare for the arrival
of the new wife.

585 586 593 627 [114] [778] case its return to the husband would have caused great financial inconvenience for the wife's family.

(583) 581 585 562 593 [586] Corresponding to the second right, the husband's right to his wife's domestic work, is the wife's right to maintenance. The husband has to support his wife. This includes providing her and her children with adequate food and proper clothing. If the husband fails to do so because of poverty, sickness, crop failure or unexpected disaster, the wife's brother or father provides her and her children with the necessary food and clothing. If the husband's failure to fulfill his duties is due to neglect, the wife can leave him and go to her father or brother who talks the matter over with the husband who, in turn, either agrees to their demands or has to divorce his wife and forfeit his mahr.

593 562 [779] Finally, corresponding to the husband's right to his wife's obedience is the wife's right to fair treatment by her husband. There are a number of ways in which the wife is mistreated. One is excessive punishment; although the right of the husband to punish his wife is provided in the Koraan, the punishment must be excessive or severe. Awlad Ali draw a line between acceptable and severe punishment. A punishment is severe if it results in something that other people can see or hear. If the husband insults his wife or her family and others hear the action, or if he beats her and this results in visible traces, then the punishment is severe.

593 595 562 A wife considers herself mistreated if the husband, when married to more than one, treats any of the other wives better than he treats her. Although the wife cannot deny her husband the right to have additional wives, he must give them all equal treatment. This includes

593 595 providing them with the same kind of food and clothing.* It also includes
562 dividing his time equally between them, spending one night in
each wife's tent. The first wife, being the chief one, has certain privileges: her tent is the guest house, food is brought to her residence, and she is the one to divide it among the other wives, and her house is the place for the husband to stay if he becomes sick and unable to move every night from one tent to another. Other than the exceptions given to the first wife, the husband has to treat all his wives equally.

593 Normally, such cases of mistreatment do not result in divorce unless
[586] they are persistent. In most cases, if the wife is mistreated, she
goes to her father's or brother's house or sends for them to come and
593 take her. For the husband to bring her back to his tent, he must pay
431 her "nasafa." This is a gift given by the husband to his wife as an acknowledgement of guilt and as a form of apology for not giving her fair treatment. In some cases the nasafa is equal to what the husband originally paid as mahr.

581 These are some of the rights that marriage gives both men and women
585 in the tribal society of Awlad Ali. These rights, however, are useless
626 unless they are backed by certain means of enforcing them. The husband's
586 rights are guaranteed by his ability to dissolve the marriage at will.
626 593 According to Islamic law, a man can divorce his wife by simply pronouncing the sentence "I divorce you" in the presence of credible witnesses.
● [779] No justification for divorce is demanded from the husband according to
[562] the Koraan. No such privilege is given to the wife. She can obtain a

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* With provision for wives with more children.

586 626 divorce only under specific circumstances in the absence of which the
593 husband can force her to live with him. Following the Koraanic rules,
[562] Awlad Ali give men the right to dissolve the marriage at will and with-
[779] out any necessary justification; however, they differentiate between cases where divorce is justified and those in which it is not. In a case of justifiable divorce, the husband can take back the mahr and possibly all other marriage expenses. In the case of unjustifiable divorce, the husband forfeits his right to regain the mahr. Divorce is justified whenever one or more of the husband's rights are violated by the wife or members of her family. Not all degrees of violation are considered as justification for divorce, however. Only intolerable violations can be considered as such. In deciding whether or not an act constitutes an
[183] intolerable violation, Awlad Ali judge it against the standard of the reasonable man, the customary man, and what he would have tolerated in a similar situation.

586 What constitutes reasonable behavior does not only vary according
183 to the situation and the manner in which the actions are taken, but also
554 with the relative position in the social structure of the parties involved and their initial relations to one another. In the case of divorce, what constitutes grounds for justifiable divorce in one case may not be sufficient grounds for justifiable divorce in another. In one of
586 183 the cases I witnessed during the year of study, a man who divorced his
554 wife because of her insistence that he buy her meat from the market
511 every day of the week, was forced to forfeit his right to redeem the
[114] mahr on the basis that the wife's actions had not established a basis for justifiable divorce. In the negotiations that followed, the position of the husband, as well as that of the family of the wife, were discussed.

586 women in the Western Desert, and that the women usually have no difficulty
562 in finding another husband.

586 While the right of "throwing herself" offers the wife some guarantee
562 of her rights, her main guarantee is derived from the security
593 she gets from retaining membership in her father's family. After the
768 death of the father, the woman's claims extend to the households of her
brothers. She acquires in them the same rights she had in her father's
household, and the brothers take the responsibility of their father in
[428] protecting and defending their sister. The woman achieves this continuation
of support partially through forfeiting her rights of inheritance
to her brothers.

562 Awlad Ali recognize the right of the daughters to inherit in their
428 father's estate. They accept the system of inheritance specified in
● [799] the Koraan which gives the woman half the share of her brother. In practice,
this is usually side-stepped. Only sons inherit their father's
[233] property. The justification given for the non-inheritance of women is
[311] that the main items of inheritance in the Western Desert, livestock and
the right of land use, require certain protection and care which are beyond
233 the culturally defined roles of women. Livestock require moving
562 from one grazing ground to another, almost always crossing tribal lands
428 belonging to various tribal segments, some of whom might be hostile.
It also requires the ability to protect the herds from predators and
from raids, especially in earlier times. Similarly, land requires preparation
and protection against trespassers, especially when the barley
is growing.

562 Women, however, are supposed to be compensated by their brothers
428 593 for their shares. But very few would actually ask their brothers for

585 [684] probably by pricking himself, and will wipe it on the toga.

About two weeks after the wedding, the bride and
585 groom take a lamb or a goat and go to spend a few days with
606 [574] the bride's parents. The Bedouin say that the relationship
between the groom and his in-laws is extremely important.
The man should treat his wife's mother and father as if they
were his own. "When a man's father-in-law and mother-in-law
come to visit him, he must slaughter a lamb for them. He
must respect both of them. Remember, this man and woman are
the grandparents of his children."

585 The marriage, then, is only the first step in the
571 ritualization of new group bonds established between the
182 families of the bride and groom. Bonds are subsequently in-
[574] tensified through a process of visitation, gift-exchange and
[431] sacrifice. The most important factor linking the two groups
● [782] is the actual presence of the bride in the midst of her hus-
*[613] band's group, for she remains, in terms of the patrilineal
principle, a member of her father's lineage. This is made
585 *613 perfectly clear by the fact that she is referred to, never
551 by her name but, by the name of her tribal grouping if she is
571 other than 'Aishaibi. If she is of the 'Aishaibat tribe,
182 she will be referred to as *bint* of so-and-so. Hence the
[193] Bedouins stress the importance of extra-group bonds by re-
ferring to the women in their residence group as al-Qinaishiyya
or al-Kamailiyya, for instance (-iyya is the Arabic feminine
marker).

[P.62]

CHAPTER III

THE SANUSIYA AND THE TRIBES

I

793 619 WHEN the Grand Sanusi came to preach in Cyrenaica he found the kind of society I have outlined: a congeries of tribes without law or effective government, for the Turks had little control over the interior, but with like values and habits and a community of life which crossed tribal boundaries. The Bedouin to [181] whom he preached were simple people living the austere and monotonous life of the tents, with that savage character which has been so often portrayed, but also with those noble qualities which have seldom failed to evoke admiration from those who [177] have lived among them. They were profoundly ignorant about the outside world and also—which is what touched the heart of [797] the Grand Sanusi—about the faith of their fathers, and to this matter I must now return, since the Sanusiya was a missionary Order and can only be understood as such.

771 Though the Bedouin professed Islam before the Grand Sanusi influenced them by his teaching, they were almost totally [797] ignorant of its doctrinal content, rites, or ritual and moral duties, and it is safe to assume that they did not obey its precepts. It is safe to assume this because even to-day, after a century of Sanusiya instruction, the Bedouin perform their religious duties in a very perfunctory way, if at all, and when Muslim law is at variance with tribal custom they follow tribal custom. In saying that they are lax, I do not suggest that they [186] are not very sincere, Muslims. They are proud of being Muslims and consider themselves greatly superior to Christians, while they are contemptuous of Jews. Nevertheless, though they would not belittle, the Cyrenaican Bedouin feel no embarrassment at neglecting the duties obligatory on every Muslim. The Confession of Faith is known to all and implicitly accepted by all. It imposes no irksome restrictions or tiresome duties. But they almost completely neglect—I speak of the more [782] nomadic sections whom I know best, but it is probably true of most Cyrenaican Bedouin—their daily prayers, a duty which is

absolutely obligatory and sinful to omit. I very much doubt 771
whether many of the Bedouin know how to pray in the pre- [782] •
scribed manner. As I have mentioned earlier, the Bedouin used [794]
to give alms to their zawiyas and in doing so they carried out [735]
one of the five major duties of a Muslim, but they regarded these [431]
alms as charity rather than legal dues. I have never met an
ordinary Bedouin who had been to Mecca, or who even con-
templated going there. Nevertheless, however lax they may [785]
be in other things, all Cyrenaican Bedouin keep the fast of
Ramadan, and in this annual fast is summed up for them, more
than in anything else, the obligations and privileges of Islam
and its unity and strength. Moreover, although they are [829]
negligent Muslims themselves they respect piety in others.
Brothers of the Sanusiya Order and religious men in general
ought to pray regularly. That is their business and it is very
necessary for the well-being of the community and worthy of
liberal support, but the Bedouin is an unlettered man, a
shepherd, and a warrior, and he has his own affairs to see to.
Perhaps the Bedouin make up for their shortcomings by their
enthusiasm for the *jihad*, holy war against unbelievers. They [798]
consider that they have fulfilled their obligation under this [648]*
head in ample measure by their long and courageous fight,
formally declared a holy war by the Caliph of Islam, against
the Italians, the French, and the British. A Bedouin once
said to me when I remarked how rarely I had seen Bedouin
at prayer: '*nasum wa najhad*', '(but) we fast and we wage
holy war'.

It must also be said that it would be an error to suppose that Islam had not, long before the time of the Grand Sanusi, strongly affected the character and custom of the Sulaimid Bedouin. This question, which is far from simple, need not be discussed in the present account and it is only necessary to note that the Bedouin assume that their customs are Muslim customs. It would also be a questionable judgement to assert that the Bedouin of Cyrenaica are not religious because they do not pay the same attention to outward ritual as do townspeople and peasants, for piety and holiness, as we have often been admonished, are not the same. The Bedouin certainly have a profound faith in God and trust in the destiny He has prepared for them and this faith and trust enhance that superb dignity

583 554 556 expected. The price is set by the corporate group but can vary, and usually does, from one tertiary segment to another. The wealthier tertiary segments tend to have higher bride-prices. This is explained by the fact that they occupy a "higher status" on the prestige scale, and also, by the fact that they wish to carefully control and maintain this status.

[435] For instance, "between cousins" of 'Ailit Ma'fas the mahr is fixed at 60 Egyptian pounds, but "a man can pay more out of generosity if he wishes." Hence, a member of the Ma'fas lineage can increase his prestige within and without his family by paying beyond that which is expected of him. In this case, "generosity" is the variable related to a man's
583 554 556 435 place on the scale of prestige. On the other hand, in another "poorer" lineage, 'Ailit Zagharat, the mahr is 30 L.E. to members of the in-group but "the stranger will pay 60 to 80 L.E., according to the father's wealth." The largest and most famous mahr payment in the area was made by the wealthiest man in al-Qasr who paid seven camels (each worth about 150 L.E.) for his son's wife. The highest fixed mahr in al-Qasr was that of Bait Bu Tarram of 'Ailit Lazumi. It was 100 L.E. for members of 'Ailit Lazumi and, accordingly, much more for strangers. This mahr is in contrast to the average for the area which is about 30 L.E. within the secondary group.

586 521 784 Divorce is a forbidden topic of conversation in al-Qasr. Any talk about one's wife, mother, or sister is considered injudicious.

*613 concepts of what is desirable and undesirable. "Every structural
571 arrangement," Raymond Firth has said, "has its moral
attributes of obligation" (1961:212). This is most essential
in an uncentralized system, such as that of al-Qasr, where
no institutions exist outside of the corporate group for the
introduction of new principles of organization and association.

181 Among the Bedouins, the conceptualization of an authority
578 structure in the role of *'aqila* relates to the high value which
577 they place upon a peaceful and orderly world. Children in al-Qasr
*[613] are taught that one of their serious duties in life is
[571] to mediate conflicts, especially, when they are potentially
[554] situations which may lead to protracted conflict. And, in a
segmentary society where a member's status links him to many
different groups in differing degrees of importance, all
quarrels are potential group wars. The Bedouin child knows
that his elders, and God, want him to follow "the path of the
good" (*tariiq al-khair*). Mainly, this involves helping others
to follow "the path of the good" by "bringing them back together"
when they are in conflict. When two individuals
quarrel and refuse to return to "the path of the good," this
brings *'aib* ("shame") to each of the persons. When two individuals
*[613] quarrel, setting off a group conflict, this brings
'ar ("shame") to the respective corporate groups of the individuals
[626] (Abou-Zeid 1966). Against individuals who persist
●[784] in the ways which cause *'aib* to himself, or *'ar* to his group,

181 578 certain sanctions of both a secular and sacred nature may be
577 imposed: expulsion from the group and the curse of God are
626 ultimate coercive interventions in the process of conflict
•784 regulation.

*613 The role of *'aqila* presents the corporate group as
181 "one person" in opposition to other similarly defined groups.
182 Thus, Fortes says (1953:25), "the way a lineage system works
571 depends on the kind of legal institutions found in the society,"
and this is a function of its political organization. The Bedouin political organization is characterized by two aspects: the internal political system, and the external political system. Both systems are regulated by the same values and norms. Authority relations within the corporate level are founded on values inculcated in the socialization process, and prescribe political behavior for all who come under the jurisdiction of the respective *'aqila*. Authority relations outside the corporate level are conducted through the *'aqila*. This political role as a functional part of the lineage structure operates in terms of kinship values; politics at the external level are characterized by no new principles.

*613 Politics in al-Qasr, and elsewhere for that matter, is
571 a process of problem-solving and conflict regulation between
182 individuals and groups. Political action occurs at different
levels of the lineage structure, and each is demarcated as a focus or sphere of authority. But all authority stems from

*613 578 619 681 cases of homicide and one case of wounding) one was at the tribal level; three at the primary level; three at the secondary level; and two at the tertiary level. Of the thirteen cases dealing with property rights over land, water, or women, none took place at the tribal level; four were at the primary level; seven at the secondary level; and one at the tertiary level. One case dealing with marriage rights took place within a tertiary segment and concerned the legitimacy of a man to claim his bint 'amm. Twelve of the twenty-two cases occurred within the 'Aishabat tribe. Of the ten cases of conflict involving units from outside the 'Aishaibat, six cases were between primary units, three cases were between secondary units, and one case involved the 'Ali Ahmar with the Harabi of Libya.

In almost every case involving primary units and tribal units, the two opposing authority groups were actually secondary groups who had the backing of their primary groupings. The case in which the 'Ali Ahmar mobilized to deal with a problem in Libya probably represents an atypical case in history. It is unlikely that tribal groups of this size [648] could mobilize in time of war or peace, and in this particular case the good international relations of Egypt and Libya were at stake.

•784 695 681 There is another realm of sanctions which can be invoked in cases concerning homicide, wounding, theft, and

695 602 613 671 untruthfulness and he loses his claim. According to the *'awaiyid*, the number of supporters required in a homicide or wounding case is fifty; in a case involving the rightful ownership of land or a well the required number is twenty-five; in a case of conflicting claims over a camel, five relatives must swear in support of the claimant; and in matters concerning smaller animals, such as sheep, the number of supporters will depend upon the number and price of the animals. But, of course, the number of supporters will always be relative to the size of the groups involved, and so the *'awaiyid* is not always followed to the letter of the law.

695 (692) The time and place of the oath is fixed by the *'awaaqil* adjudicating the given case. It is administered either at the tomb of a "holy man," or at the mosque in Marsa Matruh, and always on a Friday, the Muslim Sabbath. There is a standard text to the oath and this is given in the instructions of the *'awaaqil* to the litigants. 695 784 The Bedouins, with few exceptions, believe in the effectiveness of the oath of God. The rationale is that no man is willing to lie and suffer the wrath of God. The curse which results from a "bad oath" usually takes the form of an accident or misfortune to the swearer or a member of his family. The Bedouins believe that divine sanction operates not only against the one who makes a bad oath, but also against the one who bears false witness against another and causes him to take the oath.

695 •784 124 The following excerpt from my field notes concerning Bedouin law will show the earnestness with which informants upheld the function of the oath as a legal sanction.

> I know that you want to find out whether or not the oath will prove the guilt or innocence of a person. Well, it will. First of all, if a man is known to be a liar, those of his relatives who are supposed to support him will refuse to swear the oath. And, if they do take the oath and know that the person is lying, then definitely something bad will happen to both him and them. I will give you a case which will prove what I say. Years ago, there was a quarrel between an 'aiela of Awlad Kharuf ('Ali Abyad) and 'Ailit Abu Qarasa of the 'Aishaibat over the rightful ownership of a Roman well in the desert. The well originally belonged to our family (i.e. 'Ailit Abu Qarasa). The Abu Qarasa requested that the oath be used to settle the matter, and that twenty-five of the Awlad Kharuf swear that the well belonged to them. They swore the oath and the case was finished: the well went to the Awlad Kharuf. The Abu Qarasa could say nothing more since the oath had been taken. But listen to this: within one month's time of taking the oath, seven of the twenty-five Awlad Kharuf swearers were buried. At the present time, only three of the original swearers are still living. One of these three begot only girls, and when these girls married all of their marriages ended in divorce. Another of the three survivors has a son who lost an eye and an arm in an accident. And the third man, he has not married yet. Some of these men who died were very young at the age of death. You see, if I steal 10 L.E. and swear that I did not, then God will punish me ten-fold. God's punishment may strike my animals, my family, or my money; God will take his vengeance through these three means. You should always remember that the life of one man is worth one-hundred wells.

695 784 *[613] The man who swears the oath places himself and his group in ritual danger. The above description of the oath and its possible consequences show that the Bedouins believe divine punishment can work indirectly. One case-study presented

695 below will show how a "bad oath" can work directly on the
784 false witness.

784 Divine sanctions enter into other aspects of the
626 Bedouin judicial process and function to maintain social
626 control in al-Qasr. If we can speak of a standard, or
681 minimal sanction, in Bedouin law it would be the *dhabiiha*
and 10 L.E. In any case, however small the offence might
be, the litigant found to be in the wrong will have this
judgment made against him. But in almost every case "the
[788] party who takes his rights" will refuse the *dhabiiha* and
[272] 10 L.E. and insist instead upon a ritual three cups of tea.
An individual refuses the *dhabiiha* as an act of brotherhood
and thanksgiving that the quarrel has been settled. The
Bedouins point out the practical factor that very few men
in al-Qasr can afford to part with even one lamb. On the
626 other hand, in more serious cases, such as homicide, which
681 occur in the external sphere of political relations and
682 threaten to disintegrate the political community, the parties
264 involved will actually eat a whole meal together. In this
case, the *dhabiiha* is accepted, for the act of commensality
is deemed necessary for reconciliation.

626 But whether or not conflict is concluded by a simple
182 ritual or a large feast, the prevailing mood is one of
771 gratitude that the secular bonds of brotherhood and a preordained sacred order have been maintained. The Bedouin

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578 said: "I did not take anything." The _'awaaqil_ of both parties
685 met and told the accused: "If you have anything give it to
*613 us; if you do not have anything then swear the oath to this
695 fact." Members of 'Ailit Ma'fas said that the boy was innocent
[571] and told the _'awaaqil_ that the boy should have his rights
[692] according to the _'awaiyid_ (i.e. he should be allowed to swear
the oath to establish his innocence). The boy accused of the
theft, his father, and two other members of 'Ailit Ma'fas
selected by the accusers swore the oath and the problem was
619 over. Two months later, the accuser from the Kamailat lost
578 his eye in an accident, because swearing the oath has con-
685 sequences for both parties. A bad oath will work against the
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•784 one who makes it; there will be a curse upon him, his children,
and his money. And the bad effects of an oath will also work
against the one who falsely accuses another making him swear
the oath.

582 The final two cases deal with marriage rights. The
562 first illustrates a number of things which I have touched on
*613 in the previous discussion of marriage: that a man may choose
792 to ignore the jural structures of the lineage group where the
desires of his offspring are concerned; that the female is
not the totally subjugated person which one might expect to
find in the strongly patrilineal Bedouin society; and that the
role of "holy man" functions in the marital area of authority
relations.

554 One *'aqila* claimed that the *rajal khair* is a person
627 who shares in his own authority and presides when he is
*613 away, but he separated the "rights" of the two roles. The
[779] *'aqila* is able to force two parties in conflict to read the
[578] *Fatiha*, the first *sura* of the Quran, in order to terminate
the problem; this is beyond the rights of the *rajal khair* whose
influence is not directly supported by sacred sanctions. But
● [784] the role of *rajal khair* does have its "sacred" aspects, for
all Bedouins know that "you should never harm a *rajal khair*
or God will punish you for this." I never heard this same
thing said about the *'aqila*.

554 Historically, it was perhaps the case that the *rajal*
627 *khair* was the person of high status who represented the authority
*613 of an absent *'aqila*. The role never became institutionalized
182 but functioned as a support and substitute role in a structure
dominated by that of the *'aqila*. In a segmentary society
627 where the various structures exist in opposition to one
628 another, it is important that an institution, such as a third
182 non-partisan element, exists to facilitate communication
578 between parties for the purposes of conflict regulation.
Besides the *rajal khair*, an example of this would be the
traditional case of the wife from an outside tribe who alone
was permitted freedom of passage between the two warring
parties. Her purpose, it was assumed, was that of peace-making.

> 554 Suppose the donkey of A (a man present at the interview)
> 792 gets into the barley of B (another man present). This is
> 627 actually a serious matter since it could conceivably lead
> to a big fight between A's *'aiela* and B's *'aiela.* First,
> I separate them and make each go to his home. Then I
> get A's three brothers (his father is dead), we take a
> *dhabiiha* (lamb) and go to B's place and all eat together.
> [779] After the meal, we read the *Fatiha* (opening *sura* of the
> Quran) together to show that all is forgiven. After the
> *Fatiha* has been read no trouble will start because this
> is done in the presence of the Jaraira.

• [784] He explained that reading the *Fatiha* in bad faith would bring
the same curse from God that a bad oath would bring. He also
* [613] claimed that only he and the *'aqila* have the authority to
command men to read the *Fatiha*.

554 'Amm Salih says that he uses the *'awaiyid* as a guide
792 in solving problems, and that it is necessary because
627 "quarrels spread like fire, it is like fire; they spread to
671 killing and war." He was the only person in al-Qasr who
554 tried to conceptualize the difference between the *'awaiyid
792 Awlad 'Ali* and the *Sharii'a*. 'Amm Salih said that it is
627 wrong to lie, according to both the secular and the sacred
671 authority codes: "One who lies exceeds the word of God,
779 577 and God will punish him for this. No one can know how this
[784] punishment will take place, only God will know this . . .
Sometimes a car goes off the road and people will say that it
is the punishment of God. But you never know because the
554 punishment of God comes in the after-life." I asked him:
792 "If this is so, why may the *rajal khair* lie in trying to
627 settle quarrels?" He replied:
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> Another thing which I do not like about our old ways is the idea of swearing the oath. For instance, if I steal 1,000 L.E. from you, then you will accuse me. The 'aqila will then come to me and say: "If you did not steal the money, swear the oath." Some of my family will support me in this, swearing that I did not steal the money. The swearing of the oath will take place at a tomb, in the presence of the Quran. This tomb belongs to a dead man, and they tell you that he is a saint. First of all, the thief will swear the oath and then they will believe him; and, secondly, what is the sense of swearing in front of a dead body?

●[784] Hajj 'Ali made no mention of God or of the Bedouin belief that misfortune will be visited upon the one who swears the oath in bad faith. There is an Arabic proverb which Hajj 'Ali repeated here which says in effect that "the thief will always swear."

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Hajj 'Ali actively challenges the traditional basis of the Bedouin moral and political community. Striving to do away with prescribed cousin-right in marriage and the mechanisms of blood-revenge and the oath as means of supporting law and order in al-Qasr is a course which we might expect from an Egyptian official who seeks to integrate the Bedouins into national society. And, in fact, these are all customs which the Governor believes must eventually be eradicated. It is not surprising that Hajj 'Ali's son believes that "it is not civilized" to lay claim to his cousin for, like his father, he also is redefining morality vis a vis "civilization."

It appears obvious in all that he says, including his comments at the Governor's reception, that Hajj 'Ali has

685 627 The Geneishat selected the tomb of the saint where the oath was to
778 be administered. According to the customary law of Awlad Ali, the plain-
695 tiff is the one to decide which saint is to be sought for the taking of
[671] the oath by the defendant. Each saint has his own reputation and some
[776] are said to be more effective in certain kinds of disputes. The saint
selected in this case was Sidi Dmain. Sidi Dmian's tomb is in the
Beheira province some 60 miles east of the area of Burg el-Arab. He is
[732] known to cause the blindness of those who dare to swear falsely by him,
[784] and at least four cases of blindness in the area have been attributed to
[671] false oaths at Sidi Dmain. Also according to the law, it is the plain-
tiff who selects the persons from the defendant's kin unit who are to
685 support him in the oath. Following this rule, the Geneishat, with the
627 help of Hadi, selected the fourteen men from bait Asabei to swear with
695 Rabbu. The number of men that were required in this case was considered
613 very conservative. The usual practice in estimating the number of sup-
[803] porters in any case is done by establishing the value of the damage or
compensation and dividing it by ten. The result is the number of men
needed to give the oath. If there were not enough adult males in a given
kinship unit to fulfill the number needed, some or all the men would
have to be sworn twice or three times and each time a person takes the
oath he is considered as a separate person until the number needed is met.

Following this rule, and since the value of the property confiscated in the above case was over three thousand pounds, 300 persons should have been sworn in support of Rabbuh. Since this would have complicated the matter greatly, it was agreed that fifteen men were enough. Taieb gave the justification for limiting the number to 15 that trade and, as

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682 feet after that and left." /It seems that later the wound got infected.
672 Six months after the incident, Selouma was taken to the
[578] hospital with an infected wound, and three days later he died from
that infection. Selouma's son, Ali, demanded that Muftah pay a
full bloodmoney (L.E. 400) for the death of his father, since the
death was directly caused by the wound inflicted by Muftah. Muftah
denied the charges and claimed that the infected wound which caused
683 the death of Selouma was not the one inflicted by the stone. Mediations
682 continued for some time, and when no agreement was achieved,
672 the aqilas of the two baits to which the parties belonged declared
695 that the decision should be made by the oath which Muftah had to
613 take if he insisted on his claims that the wound was not caused by
his action. Since the case involved the life of a man, Muftah had
to be supported in his oath by fifty-five adult male members of
[671] his 'amar, or 'eila. In accordance with the Daraieb, the selection
[778] was done by members of Selouma's Bait who also selected the tomb of
the saint where the oath would be undertaken. On the date the oath
was to be taken, the disputing parties, as well as all the notables
of friendly tribal segments who were invited to witness the oath,
went to the tomb of the saint. As they started with the procedures,
[784] two of Muftah's cousins who were to support him in the oath and his
uncle refused to swear on the grounds that they were not sure that
Muftah was telling the truth and therefore could not subject themselves
to the supernatural hazards of taking a false oath. Attempts
by other members who were to support Muftah were made to force the
three men to swear, since their refusal meant that the bloodmoney

*795 into the Order ordinary members. This is done simply by the
[793] two persons concerned shaking hands and reciting the *fatiha*, the opening verse of the Koran, together. These categories can hardly be regarded as grades and I can cite the authority of Sayyid Muhammad Idris to support the opinion that they have never meant more than that some persons were recognized as more learned than others and therefore better qualified to recite the longer and more advanced religious exercises.

II

*795 The Grand Sanusi's desire to create around him a society
793 living the life of primitive Islam and his missionary zeal gave an impression, enhanced by the austerity of his Bedouin followers and the remoteness of the Sahara, of excessive puritanism and fanaticism; and some writers have compared the Sanusi movement to the Wahhabi movement on account of these supposed traits. Duveyrier's account,[1] used very uncritically by other
114 writers, is largely to be blamed for the exaggerated stories of
*795 the secrecy, puritanism, fanaticism, power, and numbers of
648 the Order that were current at the end of the last century and in the first decade of the present century and which much prejudiced it in the eyes of European Powers with interests in North Africa. With Duveyrier it was an axiom that any foolhardy European who got himself killed in North and Central Africa had been assassinated by Sanusi agents and that any setback to French interests was due to their propaganda.

*795 It is true that the Grand Sanusi, like the founder of the
793 Wahhabi movement, aimed at restoring what he conceived to
be the original society of the Prophet. Neither was peculiar in
784 doing so, for every Muslim preacher must have the same aim.
114 The Grand Sanusi forbad the drinking of alcohol and the taking
[273] of snuff and at first, though not absolutely, smoking. But all
[276] Muslims are forbidden alcohol and many who are neither
Sanusi nor Wahhabi think that smoking is best avoided. It is
[272] untrue, as has been asserted, that the Sanusi are forbidden
coffee. The Bedouin of Libya do not drink coffee, only tea, in

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[1] H. Duveyrier, *La Confrérie Musulmane de Sidi Mohammed ben 'Alî es Senoûsî et son Domaine géographique en l'Année 1300 de l'Hégire = 1883 de notre ère*, 1884.

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Far from being extreme ascetics, however, the Sanusi [536]
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The Grand Sanusi discouraged the trappings of poverty by 795*
his example, his exhortations, and his insistence on the Brothers 793
being self-supporting. Although the Heads of the Sanusiya 735
Order, like the Wahhabi leaders, encouraged settlement on the land, they can hardly have hoped to have greatly influenced the Bedouin to this end; but they insisted on the lodges of the Order supporting themselves by agriculture supplemented by stock-raising, and thereby took a stand against *ittikal*, the dependence for livelihood on alms and not on labour which some mendicant Orders have advocated.

The Order has always been, in fact, conventional as well as 795*
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The accusation of fanaticism is not borne out by either the 795*
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[2] Ibid., p. 86.

173 Telescoping of names, and fusion of names, taken together,
178 can account for the fixity of the genealogy to a large extent. In
551 addition, lines which showed every sign of normal development
613 at one time, have petered out completely, even after they have
sometimes assumed the status of tertiary segments. Conditions
173 under which this is likely to happen are not difficult to envisage.
178 If hearsay evidence is correct, disease, when it strikes in the
551 desert, might rage in a camp like wild fire, bringing death to
613 many, but not spreading to other camps, because the camps are
731 so far apart. Even in springtime when men and beasts are to-
361 gether in the pastures, and the larger summer camp has split into
four or five smaller ones, the distance between camps may still be
[224] a few miles. In summer, when camps are concentrated on the
large watering points, the distances between them are considerably more. Disease, therefore, does not spread from camp to camp as rapidly as one might expect in such primitive conditions of living. In 1949 a number of men of a small camp died within a
[961] few days of each other. Bedouin opinion attributed these deaths
to an allegedly false oath sworn by the deceased a year earlier.
[784] Medical opinion ascribed them to filth in a well which the deceased had been cleaning before their illness. In any event, a
thriving line of a lineage was wiped off the genealogy. The por-
173 tion of the Dawwas genealogy shown on this page shows a
178 similar process at work. Again, to give another example, the Nasr
613 section of the Magharba tribe once included six tertiary sections, not four as are now given. Two of these six sections are now represented by only four men of whom two are too old and decrepit to have heirs any longer, and are unmarried in any case; a third, whose wife has long passed child-bearing age, had two sons, but both died before marriage; and the fourth, a very poor and old man, has only one daughter, and is a widower. Three of the four now live with their collateral tribal section, Madhkur, and count themselves members of this group. That they once belonged to two different groups might have passed unnoticed were it not that two elders of the Madhkur section insisted that they should be correctly placed and their entire genealogies be recorded. The younger men argued that although they were aware that the two groups named Farjiani and al-Khadhar at one time

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EILAT AGGARY AND ITS CONSTIUENT BAITS

BAIT	NUMBER OF ADULT MALES (Sayems)[1]	AQILA
Eweidha (El-Burg)*	28	Ta'eb
Eweidha (El-Alamein)*	31	Selouma
Yusef**	30	Suliman
Helleis	22	Hussein
El-Asabei'	56	Shei'eb
Abdel Hamid*	20	Haj Musa
Risq**	30	Yadem
Afash	25	Nayer
Daghas**	25	Daghash
Bul-Yazid*	21	Haj Shousha
Makhyum**	23	Abdel fattah
Hussein**	17	Masri
El-Ramly**	25	Salem
Rashwan**	30	Rashwan
Attya*	31	Masu'd
Abdella*	22	Abdel Galil

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[1] Numbers are taken from the Amar list which is used to distribute the amount of bloodmoney on the various baits. An adult male or "sayem" is anyone 15 years of age or older. The word "sayem" means fasting individual and the age of 15 is when a child is forced to observe the duties of fasting.

[885]
[785]
[619]

** Refers to adopted tribal segments (Muktatibeen).

* Baits of doubted origin. Some claim these baits are adopted, while others insist that they are Awlad Ali proper.

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absolutely obligatory and sinful to omit. I very much doubt 771
whether many of the Bedouin know how to pray in the pre- [782]
scribed manner. As I have mentioned earlier, the Bedouin used [794]
to give alms to their zawiyas and in doing so they carried out [735]
one of the five major duties of a Muslim, but they regarded these [431]
alms as charity rather than legal dues. I have never met an
ordinary Bedouin who had been to Mecca, or who even con-
templated going there. Nevertheless, however lax they may [785] •
be in other things, all Cyrenaican Bedouin keep the fast of
Ramadan, and in this annual fast is summed up for them, more
than in anything else, the obligations and privileges of Islam
and its unity and strength. Moreover, although they are [829]
negligent Muslims themselves they respect piety in others.
Brothers of the Sanusiya Order and religious men in general
ought to pray regularly. That is their business and it is very
necessary for the well-being of the community and worthy of
liberal support, but the Bedouin is an unlettered man, a
shepherd, and a warrior, and he has his own affairs to see to.
Perhaps the Bedouin make up for their shortcomings by their
enthusiasm for the *jihad*, holy war against unbelievers. They [798]
consider that they have fulfilled their obligation under this [648]*
head in ample measure by their long and courageous fight,
formally declared a holy war by the Caliph of Islam, against
the Italians, the French, and the British. A Bedouin once
said to me when I remarked how rarely I had seen Bedouin
at prayer: '*nasum wa najhad*', '(but) we fast and we wage
holy war'.

It must also be said that it would be an error to suppose that Islam had not, long before the time of the Grand Sanusi, strongly affected the character and custom of the Sulaimid Bedouin. This question, which is far from simple, need not be discussed in the present account and it is only necessary to note that the Bedouin assume that their customs are Muslim customs. It would also be a questionable judgement to assert that the Bedouin of Cyrenaica are not religious because they do not pay the same attention to outward ritual as do townspeople and peasants, for piety and holiness, as we have often been admonished, are not the same. The Bedouin certainly have a profound faith in God and trust in the destiny He has prepared for them and this faith and trust enhance that superb dignity

furthermore scented heresy in them. To protect himself against 795* accusations of doctrinal irregularities, it was customary for the founder of a new Order or sub-Order to demonstrate in his initial treatise, as the Grand Sanusi did, his orthodoxy by showing how his teachings followed those of some famous theologian whose orthodoxy was acknowledged by all. The Orders also aroused the enmity of the religious aristocracy of the Sharifs, descendants, or supposed descendants, of the Prophet Muhammad, who saw the common people looking to the Shaikhs and Brothers of the Orders for the blessing they had considered their exclusive privilege; and of the secular rulers, often themselves Sharifs, whose duty it was to support the clergy in the preservation of orthodoxy and who, on their own account, mistrusted popular movements of any kind, especially when, as was often the case with the Darwish Orders, they were associated with particularist aspirations. Opposition from these sources has not lessened—it has probably increased—the popularity of the Orders among the masses, who, rather dumbly but quite rightly, are irritated by governments and meddlers of all kinds. The humble have always sympathized with the Orders and have supported them as they support all those who, standing on common ground, can yet point the way to Heaven, and a brighter way than that offered by the cold learning of the official clergy.

For an Islamic Order is a way of life, and so it is called in Arabic a *tariqa*, a road, a path, a way. The various Orders counsel their followers to take different paths, stressing the role of reason or intuition, and differing from one another in the means they advocate of reaching the goal, but the paths lead to the same end, the identification of the soul with God by the elimination of all worldly desires and distractions.

The followers of an Order are aided to reach the desired state 795* in which the body sheds its corporeal garment of the senses by 786 ● the recitation of a *dhikr*, a religious formula, often accompanied, but not among the Sanusi, by violent rhythmic jerkings of the body and, in certain of the Orders, by music. According to Sufi teachings it should be repeated until even the words no longer make any impression on the senses and nothing but the form of the Divine Name is left. There results a completely passive, or empty, state, known to mystics of all religions, in

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[113]

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795*

or swaying into convulsions. Indeed, it is noticeable that the [793]
Orders which permit such practices, notably the 'Arusiya, [786] ●
'Isawiya, Rifa'iya, and Sa'adiya, so popular in the towns of [157]
Libya, have made no converts among the true Bedouin.

It is unnecessary to discuss further the mystical side to the 795*
Sanusiya for another reason. The Bedouin of Cyrenaica with 771
whom this book is concerned have only the slightest knowledge
of either the religious teachings or the ritual of the Order, and
are interested in neither. They belong to the illiterate class of
the *Muntasabin*, the simple adherents of the Order who follow
its Shaikh personally and politically. It is very seldom, if ever, [789]
that the Bedouin know the special prayers and litanies of the [212]
Order, and their use of them, if any, is restricted to getting a
scribe to write them on paper so that they can sew them up in
leather and tie them to their bodies. It is only a tiny educated
minority who regularly recite the prayer formulas and litanies.
These are the *Ikhwan*, the Brothers of the Order. They live in 795*
the lodges of the Order and hold prayer-meetings there. Among
the Brothers are some who have been raised to the position of
Shaikhs of lodges, generally, in past times, after special training
at the University of the Order at Jaghbub oasis, where they have
received a diploma from the Head of the Order or from one of
his family or inner circle. This inner circle, the *Khawass*, consists
vaguely to-day of a few senior members of the Sanusi
family and two or three learned Brothers and does not function
as a Body, but in the past it was, according to Sayyid Muhammad
Idris, an official Council controlling the affairs of the Order
and was composed of four Shaikhs of the Order, who were not
of the Sanusi family, under the presidency of the Head of the
Order, who had to be a member of the founder's family. As [178]
Dr. Adams points out,[1] the fact that this inner circle is no longer
a determinate Body indicates a change in the character of
the Order, a development of its political, to the detriment
of its religious, functions. This development has favoured the
interests of the Sanusi family to the disadvantage of the Order
as a whole.

The *Shaikh al-Tariqa*, Head of the Order, advised in past 795*
times by his Council, appoints the Shaikhs of the lodges and 793
these Shaikhs can ordain Brothers and the Brothers can receive

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[1] C. C. Adams, 'The Sanusiya Order', *Handbook on Cyrenaica*, 1944, p. 31. [113]

685 such, deviates from the normal pattern of cases dealt with by the cus-
627 tomary law in the conventional way. The men selected by the Geneishat
695 included, in addition to Rabbu and his father Hakim, Shei'eb and his
613 three brothers, Hakim's cousin Samsoun and his four brothers and Hakim's
uncle Sheikh Qudura and his sons. The date of the oath was set for June
tenth. Two days before, the two parties involved in the dispute invited
a number of the important people of other tribal segments in the area to
[492] be witnesses to the oath. All involved started to travel to the tomb of
[494] Sidi Dmain, some on donkeys, others by bus or train. At six o'clock on
[497] the morning of the oath everybody gathered in the courtyard outside the
[778] tomb of the saint. The granddaughter of the saint works as a mediator
● [787] between the spirit of her grandfather and his followers announced that
[776] the saint was ready for the oath and everybody went inside preparing for
the oath. Before the oath was taken the Geneishat asked Hakim if his son
and the fourteen men they had chosen were present and Hakim said they
were. Since the Geneishat were from a different tribal segment and
lived outside the area, they had no personal knowledge of most of the
[212] men who were to take the oath. Knowing the reputation of Hakim they
asked the men to present their identification cards to check them against
[747] the list they had. At that time Hakim said that some of the men didn't
have identification cards because they had not applied for aid from the
World Food Program. Then the Geneishat demanded that those without cards
should be identified by members of other tribal segments who had come as
witnesses. Hakim refused and then admitted that one of the men was ab-
sent and that he had put another in place of him. But when the Geneishat
learned that the one to be absent was Sheikh Qudura, they insisted that

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695 below will show how a "bad oath" can work directly on the
784 false witness.

784 Divine sanctions enter into other aspects of the
626 Bedouin judicial process and function to maintain social
626 control in al-Qasr. If we can speak of a standard, or
681 minimal sanction, in Bedouin law it would be the dhabiiha
and 10 L.E. In any case, however small the offence might
be, the litigant found to be in the wrong will have this
judgment made against him. But in almost every case "the
● [788] party who takes his rights" will refuse the dhabiiha and
[272] 10 L.E. and insist instead upon a ritual three cups of tea.
An individual refuses the dhabiiha as an act of brotherhood
and thanksgiving that the quarrel has been settled. The
Bedouins point out the practical factor that very few men
in al-Qasr can afford to part with even one lamb. On the
626 other hand, in more serious cases, such as homicide, which
681 occur in the external sphere of political relations and
682 threaten to disintegrate the political community, the parties
264 involved will actually eat a whole meal together. In this
case, the dhabiiha is accepted, for the act of commensality
is deemed necessary for reconciliation.

626 But whether or not conflict is concluded by a simple
182 ritual or a large feast, the prevailing mood is one of
771 gratitude that the secular bonds of brotherhood and a pre-
ordained sacred order have been maintained. The Bedouin

613 it was impossible to verify the actual facts or to know what exactly
682 683 happened. But since the parties involved are still alive and since these
672 events are closely related to present-day happenings, the case is still
558 alive in the minds of the parties involved as well as those of outsiders.
(124) Naturlaly, each party tries to present the facts in such a way as to
613 682 support his own claims. Shei'eb, for example, insists that Hakim had
683 bribed members of bait Asabei' to refuse to pay their share in order to
156 embarrass him and make him appear as unable to perform his duties as
558 Aqila. "Hakim always had his eyes on becoming the Aqila of bait Asabei',"
said Shei'eb, "but he had no business becoming the Aqila, so he had to
make me look bad to the other Awaqil.... He likes to be looked up to as
a big man, but it wouldn't work." While other members of bait Asabei'
deny that Hakim had bribed them, they agree with Shei'eb that Hakim is a
156 dishonest man. In fact, Hakim's reputation is so widespread in the area
551 that it has earned him the nickname of "the thief". The nickname was
● 788 given to him a few years ago when he went to Mecca for a pilgrimage with
685 another fellow tribesman. The latter told the story that while in Mecca
Hakim had found a purse with two hundred pounds in it. He was supposed
to return the purse to the authorities or it would be considered as
stealing if he kept it. Stealing in Mecca is not only a crime but also
a great sin which makes the holy trip void for the offender. Hakim told
his companion that he had given the purse to the authorities. But later,
on their way back from Mecca, the friend found the purse hidden in Hakim's
luggage. When the story was known in the area, he was referred to as
156 "the thief". Other accounts of Hakim's dishonesty are told throughout
685 439 the area, including stories of how he acquired his wealth through stealing

The mere physical achievement of the man was remarkable. 795*
He had studied assiduously since he was a small boy in the 793
Koranic school of his home and in other schools of North Africa 159
and Arabia, and was still acquiring and sifting knowledge in his 175*
library at Jaghbub up to his death. He had taught in the schools in Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Tripolitania, Cyrenaica, Egypt, the Hijaz, and the Yaman. Months of his life had been spent in travelling by the slow camel caravans of those days. He had [788]
thrice made the pilgrimage to Mecca. In spite of these activities he had found time to write a number of treatises. He had started his career as the head of a new missionary Order late in life—he was about 50 years of age when he founded his first zawiya in Arabia, and in the next twenty years he had made the Sanusiya the dominant Order in western Arabia and in North Africa from the Nile Valley to the borders of Tunisia and from the Mediterranean to the Sahara. When he died it was still intensifying its activities in the areas where it was already dominant, building everywhere new lodges, and was still expanding, mainly into the Sahara and the Sudan.

IV

When the Grand Sanusi died his two surviving sons, al-Sayyid Muhammad al-Mahdi and al-Sayyid Muhammad al-Sharif, were minors, so a regency of ten Shaikhs was appointed to control the affairs of the Order till the elder, Muhammad al-Mahdi, was old enough to take over their direction. When he did so he dealt primarily with the general affairs of the Order, leaving religious instruction in the hands of his brother.

The Grand Sanusi had been typical of the great itinerant teachers of his day: international in outlook and intent on the pursuit of holiness and learning rather than guided by secular distractions and ambitions. Mecca was the centre of his world and to it he tended always to gravitate. The Sayyid al-Mahdi was more definitely a Cyrenaican. Born in 1844 in a cave at Massa, near the Cyrenaican Mother Lodge of al-Baida, he was brought up among the religious families of the country and among the Bedouin. He studied under his father, the erudite Moroccan Sidi Ahmad al-Rifi, Sidi 'Ali bin 'abd al-Maula, Sidi 'Umran bin Baraka, and others of his father's circle of pupil-

[TEXT CONTINUED ON PAGE 21]

the east began in the middle of the thirteenth century and has 619
lasted to the present day. It is intimately bound up with the 778
pilgrimage to the sacred towns of Islam. Round these pious [173]
men and round their tombs gathered for sanctuary the simple [788]
and oppressed, and from these and from the children of the
holy men have sprung the *Marabtin bil baraka* tribes. The other 619
client tribes have no sacred associations and are known as 651
Marabtin al-sadqan because they pay *sadaqa*, a fee, to a free
tribe for protection and for the privilege of using the earth and
water. Some small broken-up fragments of this category on the
plateau, such as the 'Awwama, Alauna, Hasanna, and some of
the Qat'an and Sa'it, even to-day have a very inferior social
position and are forced to make payments to, and to perform
services for, the free tribes among whom they live. Other 619
tribes of this second category live, as already mentioned, on
territory which is to all intents and purposes their own and have
long since ceased to pay a fee. This is especially the case to the
east, in 'Abaidat tribal territory, where such client tribes as the
Minifa, Qat'an, Taraki, and Huta live with independent status.
In the west also the Fawakhir and Zuwaya are too powerful and
warlike to accept overlordship. Also, the more nomadic groups
in Cyrenaica are mostly client tribes and, like all nomads, resent
any control or authority. Whatever the free tribes may say
about them, they regard themselves as independent.

The provenance of the *Sa'adi* tribes and of some of the 619
Marabtin tribes is shown together with the distribution of the 162
Sanusiya lodges on the map facing page 35, and the approximate
numbers of these tribes, and of a few others not shown on the
map, are listed below.

Sa'adi	
al-'Abaidat	30,450
al-'Awaqir	27,500
al-Bara'asa	21,000
al-Darsa	18,850
al-Magharba	13,000
al-'Arafa	9,300
al-'Abid	6,850
al-Hasa	6,500
'*Ailat* Fayid	100
Marabtin	
al-Qat'an	5,850
al-'Awwama	3,800
al-Zuwaya	3,700
al-Shwa'ir	3,400
al-Fawakhir	3,300
al-Sa'it	2,900
al-Majabra	2,500
al-Minifa	2,500
al-Masamir	2,400
al-Awajila	2,300
Aulad al-Shaikh	1,650
al-'Aqail	1,400
al-Shahaibat	1,350
al-Sarahna	1,250
al-Qabail	1,150
al-Huta	1,150

days on which kin of various sorts should attend the mourning 613
ceremonies, which extend over a period of a week. Allowance is 621
made for those who may be away temporarily, although they are 765
expected to hasten to the mourning camp as quickly as possible.
Agnatic kin are expected not only to be present on the appro- 613
priate day, but are required to offer gifts consistent with their 621
relationship to the bereaved; agnates of the tertiary segment are 765
expected to offer a sheep, while some cognates ought to bring a 431
goat and others a quantity of sugar and tea. At one funeral in a
camp where I was resident, soon after the death occurred, the
main concern of its inhabitants was whether or not certain men
of their section would attend the mourning rites and bring
appropriate gifts with them. These men lived at the time in
another camp a few miles away, as they had been doing for
several years past. They did not come when they were expected,
and when they finally arrived at the end of the week they brought
with them gifts of sugar and tea only—gifts which were totally
inappropriate for agnates of the group. They were, in fact,
now no longer members of it, and my neighbours were able to
tell me, 'They have branched off from us. We will never live together again.' The lineage had proliferated and this was the first
occasion for showing it.

Wide-spread in Cyrenaica is a cult of saints. The number of 794
saints' tombs varies from tribe to tribe, there being fewer among 776
the camel herders of the semi-desert than among the cow- 778
herding, almost sedentary, folk of the plateau area. Whatever [788]
the number, the members of the group that venerates a particular
saint make an annual pilgrimage to his tomb, and sometimes
more frequent pilgrimages are made. In one area there were two 794
men, accepted by their respective kin groups as leaders, who vied 554
against each other for the leadership of their section. One of them
had been a famous warrior during the Italian wars and, after [648]
being injured, fled to Egypt where he lived for seventeen years,
until he returned to his homeland in 1947. The other had also
fought against the Italians, failed to win renown, was a captive
for a time, later released, and subsequently appointed leader of
his section by the Italian authorities. The first, during his period
of exile, had become impoverished. The second during his
years of freedom had prospered. As far as their personalities

794 were concerned, there was little doubt who was leader—the
554 name of the former was known throughout the land. Now when
794 the warrior returned from his Egyptian exile, his rival offered
him a sheep as a gift. This act was wholly appropriate. Subsequently
554 they continued to compete fiercely, but it soon became
578 clear that the returned warrior was winning the greater support.
[788] In the face of this, the rival, in 1948, decided to break with tradition
by staying away from the annual pilgrimage to the tomb of
[175] the local saint. Instead, he and his followers made their pilgrimage
to a different tomb in the vicinity of their camp, and later
built a low wall round the tomb, whitewashed it, and made it
known that henceforward they would regularly use it for pilgrimages.
[613] The two kinship groups of a tertiary section now had their
[778] separate saint's tomb. Some months later, the rival decided to
794 move with his small group to an area in which they had not previously
resided. It is the custom among the Bedouin when they
554 pitch their tents in a place for the first time, that the people of
578 the neighbourhood should bring them gifts to mark the event.
431 The returned warrior, who had now become a close neighbour
[166] of his rival was obliged, like others, to offer the latter a gift; he
was also obliged to return the gift of a sheep that he had been
given on rejoining his section in 1947. He brought a gift within a
few hours of his rival's arrival, but it was a goat.[14] The rival and
his followers were furious, and the argument that the warrior was
too poor to give more was dismissed summarily. This was the
final insult. The donor, in return, had been given less than he had
presented. The reciprocity of gift exchanges had not only been
arrested, it had been reversed. From then onwards the two groups
made no attempt to conceal their hostility and went their separate
ways.

613 Disputes stemming from circumstances such as these are the
578 occasions which mark the proliferation of groups, although in
all three cases cited, difficulties over water supplies had preceded
the outbreaks of quarrelling.

613 In this discussion of the ways in which proliferation of segments
602 takes place, the emphasis had been put on the tug of war
121 between the interests of people in their agnatic connexions and

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[14] A goat is inferior to a sheep in gift exchanges.

Cases

584 Prior to the wedding festivities, the
593 father will have participated in negotiations, although even in these he will
have remained silent, leaving an affine, as a rule, to arrange the details with
the girl's father and his kinsmen. The father feigns aloofness from the start
of negotiations until after the wedding celebrations have ended. Before inquiring into this seemingly odd behaviour, a few further details of marriage
ceremonies need to be mentioned briefly.

585 The bride is carried to the nuptial tent on a camel, seated in a cagelike
342 structure placed on the camel's back, this canopy covered over with carpets
[492] and at least one long blanket — later to be used to divide her tent into male
and female quarters — which constitute part of the goods given to a woman
• [788] on marriage. On her arrival, while she is still seated in her canopy, the
camel is led round the tent seven times by a small boy. She then descends
and is hustled into the tent by a number of women who make a show of their
attempts to conceal her from view. Inside the tent the bride is enclosed in
one corner in a kind of cubicle partitioned off by a length of blanket.

585 In the meantime, the groom has affected to escape, but is "caught," while
[533] running away, by his fellows, who "compel" him to return to the nuptial tent,
to the accompaniment of their lewd songs telling of the sexual pleasures
[831] awaiting him. Much of this is horseplay, but the young men carry it out
brazenly and the groom is required to show reluctance to continue with the
ceremonies. His entry into the nuptial tent is marked by an expectant hush
that falls over the crowd of men gathered, as they await the result of the
virginity test the groom is about to perform, which he does by wrapping part
of his toga round one of his fingers to pierce the hymen. Sharp shrieks from
[202] the bride give the signal that the test has been undertaken; not a stir moves
the crowd until evidence of its success has been publicly displayed, which is
given by the groom hoisting the blood-stained portion of the toga through
the corner of the tent on a pole, followed by firing three shots from his rifle.
Jubilantly, the men gathered fire volley after volley from their rifles just over
the nuptial tent, and the seven-day celebrations begin.

585 A full descriptive account of a marriage, or many of the ritual details
589 woven into it need not be given here. What is included is intended to illustrate certain relationships between father and son, and between one
[593] generation and another. In this connection two further points are appropri-
[561] ate. First, during the week of festival, young men gather outside the nuptial
[535] tent each night to encourage a maiden in her dancing, clapping their hands
to the point of injury "so that we will have a wife soon." The celebrations
[533] belong to the bachelors, and they are the only ones to engage in the singing
and hand clapping. It is they too who stop the bridal camel on its way to
[538] the nuptial tent to recite obscene rhymes to the bride, and they also shout
[831] their rather dubious consolations to the bride who, during the virginity test,
crying out for her mother, is assured by them that the night holds promise
585 for her which her mother could never extend. The married men, particularly
602 the close senior agnates of the groom, stay away from it all, discussing mat-
521 ters unconnected with the affair.

554 seen" at any such function. It would appear that the mechanism
571 at work here is not simply a device to provide the younger
182 generation with a tension-release situation, but also a
561 symbolic expression of the difference between the possessors
[154] and the non-possessors of authority, a confirmation of the
political order.

[578] The avoidance practice, or separation, between the
old and the young in the "party" situation is a structural
fact of Bedouin society, and, though it may ultimately be
defined as a conflict control or legitimating mechanism, in
the context of culture change new aspects and meanings attach
554 to the phenomenon. The "status group" is an agent of change
571 in al-Qasr; its members can afford to gamble in the market
178 economy of Marsa Matruh since they possess the reserve capital
[471] (in the form of sheep) and the social prestige which permits
[439] this. The "status group," with business and social relations
[179] in Marsa Matruh, enjoys both the benefits of associational
ties with the Egyptians and the communal ties with their
fellow Bedouins. They see themselves as being different from
their fellow tribesmen, and they tend to face more towards
Marsa Matruh than al-Qasr. In short, they are the "cultural
brokers" who support an ideology of change, they extol the
benefits of a new way of life over and against the old.

● [789] One repudiation of tradition which constitutes an
[796] attempt to define the style of life of the "status group"

554 concerns magic. Each August there is a celebration in honor
571 of al-Qasr's local saint. At these celebrations, the darwish
178
789 performs his special skills such as putting a red-hot iron
796 to his tongue, or standing on a skin drum held high by his two assistants. No member of the "status group" attends these affairs because the darwish and his magic "belong totally to the old way of life." This is a restriction on social intercourse. It may also be a rejection of the saint's sacred power, or reluctance on the part of the "status group" to
554 share authority. The ideology which the "status group" in
571 al-Qasr has developed embodies attitudes of cooperation and
183 patience with induced programs of change. These attitudes are invoked in varying degrees corresponding to motives of economic gain, desire for power, and altruistic concern. But the result is a "status group" mood which may be described as one of disdain for the old way of life. Ideology and discontent in al-Qasr are mainly evident among the members of the "status group."

554 The pool from which the members of the "status group"
556 are recruited consists of the "status honor" possessors of
571 three lineages (two Sa'adi and one Marabit). These have been,
* [613] traditionally and presently, the wealthiest and most influential in al-Qasr. Wealth in al-Qasr is defined in terms of three things: sheep, land, and olives. Olives are becoming the measure of wealth in the modern al-Qasr: sheep are the tradi-

795*

or swaying into convulsions. Indeed, it is noticeable that the [793]
Orders which permit such practices, notably the 'Arusiya, [786]
'Isawiya, Rifa'iya, and Sa'adiya, so popular in the towns of [157]
Libya, have made no converts among the true Bedouin.

It is unnecessary to discuss further the mystical side to the 795*
Sanusiya for another reason. The Bedouin of Cyrenaica with 771
whom this book is concerned have only the slightest knowledge
of either the religious teachings or the ritual of the Order, and
are interested in neither. They belong to the illiterate class of
the *Muntasabin*, the simple adherents of the Order who follow
its Shaikh personally and politically. It is very seldom, if ever, [789]
that the Bedouin know the special prayers and litanies of the [212]
Order, and their use of them, if any, is restricted to getting a
scribe to write them on paper so that they can sew them up in
leather and tie them to their bodies. It is only a tiny educated
minority who regularly recite the prayer formulas and litanies.
These are the *Ikhwan*, the Brothers of the Order. They live in 795*
the lodges of the Order and hold prayer-meetings there. Among
the Brothers are some who have been raised to the position of
Shaikhs of lodges, generally, in past times, after special training
at the University of the Order at Jaghbub oasis, where they have
received a diploma from the Head of the Order or from one of
his family or inner circle. This inner circle, the *Khawass*, consists
vaguely to-day of a few senior members of the Sanusi
family and two or three learned Brothers and does not function
as a Body, but in the past it was, according to Sayyid Muhammad
Idris, an official Council controlling the affairs of the Order
and was composed of four Shaikhs of the Order, who were not
of the Sanusi family, under the presidency of the Head of the
Order, who had to be a member of the founder's family. As [178]
Dr. Adams points out,[1] the fact that this inner circle is no longer
a determinate Body indicates a change in the character of
the Order, a development of its political, to the detriment
of its religious, functions. This development has favoured the
interests of the Sanusi family to the disadvantage of the Order
as a whole.

The *Shaikh al-Tariqa*, Head of the Order, advised in past 795*
times by his Council, appoints the Shaikhs of the lodges and 793
these Shaikhs can ordain Brothers and the Brothers can receive

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[1] C. C. Adams, 'The Sanusiya Order', *Handbook on Cyrenaica*, 1944, p. 31. [113]

safe place when on seasonal moves. Often a shrine, sometimes 778
the shrine of a very famous saint, is no more than a wall of 776
stones, with perhaps a stick, with pieces of cloth tied to it, 792
erected over the grave, and this is the usual form in the steppe
grazing-grounds. There are generally cemeteries around the [764]
tombs.

All these shrines are visited by the Bedouin from time to time,
when they are passing by or when they have some request to
make of the holy man. Many of them are cult centres, an annual [796]
ceremony, one of the chief events of the Bedouin year, being [619]
held at them; and when they are near the border between tribes,
or between tribal sections, this is an occasion for intertribal, or
intersectional, gatherings. There is no saint whose tomb is much [789]
visited by the Bedouin who has not performed miracles, some [755]
of them very remarkable miracles, and there is probably none
who has not at some time or other cured the sick or given an heir.

The tombs of these holy men, Sidi this, Sidi that, and Sidi
the other, are found in profusion over the whole of inhabited
Cyrenaica. The historically best known are those of Sidi Rafa',
one of the Companions of the Prophet, near al-Zawiya al-Baida
on the plateau, of Sidi 'Abdalla, one of the Prophet's standard-bearers,
in the oasis of Aujila, and of the founder of the Sanusiya
Order, Sidi Muhammad bin 'Ali al-Sanusi, at Jaghbub oasis.
The shrines belong to the tribes and tribal sections in whose [619]
earth the Marabouts are buried and the Marabouts are looked [423]
upon as tribal and sub-tribal patrons. Like the Sanusiya Order,
they have become part of tribal life.

I have earlier reproduced Col. De Agostini's map of the Hasa 778
tribe to serve as an example of the territorial distribution of 619
lineages. The same map serves to illustrate the distribution of 792
shrines in a tribal territory. It can be seen from this map, which 776
shows only the best-known Marabout tombs, that all the different
sections of the tribe have their shrines, and I would draw
attention to an interesting feature of the distribution which I
have also noted in other tribal areas: how often these sacred
spots are near a tribal boundary, or near the boundary between
one tribal section and another. This may not be pure chance,
for the Marabouts in their lifetimes were regarded as standing
outside the tribal system, to which indeed, being foreigners from
the west, they did not belong, and their chief political role was

571 between man and man, although the various cereal dishes which constitute
231 their regular meals are said to have a similar effect.

264 The son who continues to eat with his father "as he always had been
182 doing," also continues to accept his authority. Indeed he could do little else
593 at this stage, for he lacks the economic means to cut away. Neither at marriage
585 nor after is there any transfer of wealth from father to son. The new
182 tent recently pitched is no more than a dormitory to which the young couple
[425] retire at night. During the daytime the son is still to be seen in his father's
tent, and, in the male quarters, things appear to be much the same as before.
[556] In the female quarters, the only superficial change is the more frequent appearance
among the women of one who, before marriage, often sat among
them if she had been a close neighbour or a close cousin previously; or of
an additional helper if she had come from afar. On the surface things remain
"as they always have been," although in fact, a whole set of changes
have been initiated.

852 *Rites de passage* are few among the Bedouin. A man's progress in life is
881 ceremonially marked by only four events: his birth, circumcision, marriage
764 and burial. His development into manhood is not marked by clearly defined
stages. About the age of seven, the henna markings on the front of a boy's
858 shirt for protection from the evil eye are not renewed, the cowrie shell stitched
789 to the front of his cap as a kind of talisman against the evil eye is removed
and he is no longer permitted free access to the women's quarters. As he
857 grows older, he will be instructed in goat-herding, and later taught to follow
233 the sheep. In his late teens he will have to undertake the more arduous and
883 responsible task of herding the camels. Coincident with camel-herding, he
233 may be given a gun by his father. Shortly afterwards he must undertake the
[431] stringent test of manhood, a journey to a distant oasis for dates. These
[411] changes are not marked off by a *rite de passage*. The rites a man undergoes
[484] during the course of a lifetime are minimal, and in the sense that they are
[885] concerned with only the basic events in a man's life anywhere (save for
852 circumcision, which is a minor celebration anyway), they are irreducible.
88 Moreover, the rituals which exist do not comprehend the same multiplicity of
796 relationships as rituals which occur in many other African societies.[4] It is
[771] true that the ceremonies referred to in this chapter by no means include
all the Bedouin rituals. It is also true that the events mentioned vary in
[554] elaboration, and in the number of symbols present in them, but they are
not multiplied or reduced for different people.

In this context it is important to stress that we are here dealing with a
[613] lineage society where social differentiation is not built up into differences
[554] of rank, where the roles to which a man succeeds are almost wholly captured
[602] by his kinship relationships with other men and which are sociologically
to be distinguished from the roles a man enters into by acquisition of office,

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[4] See, for example, the elaboration of rituals discussed in M. Gluckman (Ed.), *Essays on the Ritual of Social Relations*. Manchester: University of Manchester Press, 1962.

619 'Ali tribe. There is one lineage, the Sulwatiyya shown in
*[613] Figure 7a, which does not claim descent from Sa'ada and hence are no relations of the Awlad 'Ali Bedouin. Nor are any serious ideological claims for tribal membership provided by them or their Awlad 'Ali neighbors. The first social differentiation found in al-Qasr, then, is between those who belong to the Sa'adi tribes and those of the Marabit tribes. In terms of Bedouin social ideal types, the Sa'adi tribesmen are warriors, known for their courage and generosity; the Marabit tribesmen are weak and dependent on the protection
●[992] which the Sa'adi offers them. The Marabit tends to specialize
[171] in the role of "holy man." The dichotamy here is a reflection of the structural differentiation, common to North Africa, between sacred and secular tribes, or client and protector tribes.

619 The Sa'adi-Marabit division in al-Qasr is defined
173 geographically, in name, and in Bedouin tradition and myth.
539 Here is the way in which the Marabit "holy man" of al-Qasr conceives of the difference between the two types and its origin:

> They are brothers and there is no difference. The Sa'adi is always one step in front of the Marabit, he handles things for the Marabit and helps him. In political matters the Sa'adi is more advanced . . . When the Marabit is in trouble, the Sa'adi will defend him. They are two different groups because the Sa'adi are from one mother. Once Sa'ada was riding in a caravan through the desert.

593 not considered bad for a man to beat his wife." In the case
593 of ill-treatment by the husband, her father may take the
*613 matter to the corporate head. Traditionally, the corporate
● [792] head would order the husband to move his tent next to the
tend of the "holy man" or some other third party, so that
he would be dissuaded against such behavior. Another reason
[586] for this is so that the girl might have witnesses to support
her petition for divorce should the husband continue to beat
her. I heard of no wife-beating while I was in al-Qasr.

595 The Quran states that a man may lawfully take four
[779] wives, but that if he feels he cannot treat each of them
equally, he should take only one (Sura IV:3 and 129). The
Bedouins are conscientious in practicing this rule, though
595 perhaps not for religious reasons. If a man has more than
593 one wife, he must spend an equal amount of time with each.
Conflict between co-wives is lessened by the fact that a man
will have separate tents, or rooms in the case of a house,
for each wife. A man will not buy a dress or a piece of jewelry
for one wife without buying a copy of it for all other wives.
595 On a trip to the Siwa Oasis, I was accompanied by a man who
593 had three wives and wished to bring them a gift of basketry
114 upon his return. He was successful in buying two baskets
which were similar but could not find a comparable third in
[431] the oasis market. In dismay, he made a gift of the baskets
to me and returned with no souvenirs at all. One of my in-

585 room, until he arrives for the test of her virginity. The
groom, "takes blood with his finger," wipes it on the white
toga which his bride had been veiled with, and hands it to
the older women waiting outside the tent. In the meantime,
• [792] the two fathers have met with the _faqiih_ ("holy man") who
[675] witnesses the agreement on the _mahr_ payment. They read the
Fatiha of the Quran together and conclude the marriage contract.
The old women, carrying the toga with the virginal
blood on it--a symbol of honor to both of the groups concerned
with the marriage--parade around the guests' tent
showing it, while all the time letting out shrill victory
cries (_zaghaariid_ = "trilling cries of joy"). The toga is
then pinned-up on the side of the guests' tent for all to
585 see. Animals are slaughtered and the feast begins. The
574 central activity of the feast takes place in the guests'
tent, the tent of the male guests. The groom's father, in
[576] the traditional role of host, does not sit down to eat with
his guests but directs the seating and feeding of them.

585 Should it happen that the girl is not a virgin, the
684 wedding would end on the spot, and the girl would be sent
away or killed by her father. My informants said that this
has never happened in al-Qasr. One key informant told me
that such a thing never happens because the groom would never
permit it to be known that "his cousin was not a virgin." In
other words, the groom will get the blood from somewhere,

Law and Political Order: 'Awaiyid Awlad 'Ali

671 [792] A "holy man" in al-Qasr, who has intimate knowledge of both the Quran and Bedouin law, has this to say on the subject of the 'awaiyid Awlad 'Ali:

> 671 171 The Sharii'a (Islamic Law) was given by God, and it guides man concerning what is good and what is bad: it is for all Muslims. The 'awaiyid was made by man for the Bedouins: it is for settling problems and evaluating damages. The 'awaiyid is natural, made by man and the Awlad 'Ali for settling the problems of the Bedouins. It is different from the Sharii'a. The Awlad 'Ali made the 'awaiyid, not the ashraaf ("holy men"); but the "holy men" approved it. The 'awaiyid agrees with the Sharii'a, but not in everything for it is not from the Sharii'a. Shari'it Muhammad ("the law of the Prophet") is one thing and the 'awaiyid is another. The Sharii'a says an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth, and a life for a life: the 'awaiyid also says an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth, and a life for a life, but in a different way: the 'awaiyid involves money. The 'awaiyid judges a situation; the dhabiiha ("blood sacrifice," usually a lamb as an expiatory fee) and the fine are paid and the problem is solved . . . The 'aqila is better than the government for settling problems in the desert. The government may put a man [672] in prison, and if he dies there you will be responsible to his father and brothers. There is a more liberal judgment here in al-Qasr, and God prefers that we [673] settle our problems through peace . . . If a man dies in prison, it is no sin before God but the Bedouins consider it a sin.

671 At the present time, the customary law of the Awlad 'Ali prevails in al-Qasr, and, I suspect, this body of legal and moral norms will be the basis for Bedouin social and political action for some time in the future. In any case, it furnishes us with a base-line from which any future studies of social

619 578 said: "I did not take anything." The _'awaaqil_ of both parties
685 met and told the accused: "If you have anything give it to
*613 us; if you do not have anything then swear the oath to this
695 [571] fact." Members of 'Ailit Ma'fas said that the boy was innocent
[692] and told the _'awaaqil_ that the boy should have his rights according to the _'awaiyid_ (i.e. he should be allowed to swear the oath to establish his innocence). The boy accused of the theft, his father, and two other members of 'Ailit Ma'fas selected by the accusers swore the oath and the problem was
619 over. Two months later, the accuser from the Kamailat lost
578 his eye in an accident, because swearing the oath has con-
685 695 sequences for both parties. A bad oath will work against the
784 one who makes it; there will be a curse upon him, his children, and his money. And the bad effects of an oath will also work against the one who falsely accuses another making him swear the oath.

582 The final two cases deal with marriage rights. The
562 first illustrates a number of things which I have touched on
*613 in the previous discussion of marriage: that a man may choose
792 to ignore the jural structures of the lineage group where the desires of his offspring are concerned; that the female is not the totally subjugated person which one might expect to find in the strongly patrilineal Bedouin society; and that the role of "holy man" functions in the marital area of authority relations.

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562 The second, rather complex, case occurred while I was in the field. Once again, the role of the "holy man" is shown to operate in cases dealing with women. Shown here also is an interesting example of the cultural definition of abnormality.

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792 No Date. Case: Quarrel between 'Ailit al-Abaidi ('Ali Abyad) and 'Ailit al-Afrad ('Ali Abyad) over marriage rights. A man from al-Abaidi agreed that his daughter could marry a man but the rest of the 'aiela did not approve of this marriage. Since the man could not go to his 'aqila, who disapproved of the marriage, he took his problem to a "holy man." The "holy man" decided that the girl should marry the man she wanted to marry, but he was afraid that this would cause trouble in the 'aiela. [586] The "holy man" decided to marry the man and woman, and then to divorce them for a period of one year so that the conflict would abate. The girl's father knew of this marriage but the other members of the 'aiela did not. After a period of one year, the groom went to the "holy man" and said: "Decide anything that I can do, but I must have the girl." [681] [684] The "holy man" decided to make him pay a kubaara (expiation) fee of 100 L.E. to the girl's 'aiela, and he married them again.

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582 Date: 1965. Case: Quarrel within a tertiary segment of the Qinaishat tribe concerning marriage rights. A girl from the Qinaishat tribe had refused to marry her paternal cousin, but he was insistent upon his right to have her.

554 process of nazaala, the third party prevents feuds. In this
571 sense, the third party is a legitimate moral and political
627 influence, but not formalized to the degree as that of the
*[613] 'aqila. A discussion of the authority structure in al-Qasr, then, requires that the allocation of authoritative action in terms of the loci, or roles, of political influence be designated.

•[792] The central place of the third party role in the Bedouin political structure is manifested in the many laudable terms which refer to it: rajal khair ("good man") is the most general and often used referent; rajal saalih ("pious man") refers almost always to a "holy man," a specialized role in al-Qasr; quwaal al-khair ("the speaker of good"); and fa'aal al-khair or 'amaal al-khair ("the doer of good"). The latter three roles are approximately equivalent to that of rajal khair, though some informants argued that rajal khair is especially designated because he mediates quarrels while the fa'aal al-khair or 'amaal al-khair help a man when he is in financial difficulties.

554 The functioning of the third party in conflict media-
571 tion is formal to the degree that two parties agree on his
627 intervention and to abide by his decision; but the structuring
*613 of the third party is informal by comparison with the in-
182 stitutionalized role of 'aqila. However, the existence of the third party role, and its various expressions in al-Qasr

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571 politics, and the fact that it is differentiated from the
627 role of *'aqila*, are the bases for conceptualizing a structural
*613 [182] division of political duties and authority distribution.

554 Role differentiation in the authority structure may be
591 discussed from two points of view: the degree of difference
between authoritative decision-making roles and the other roles,
and, the way in which one authoritative role differs from
another. These refer to the different degrees of specialization
characterized by any one role as compared to another. I
have already discussed the way in which the role of *'aqila*
differs from other social roles (such as the kinship roles)
in the authority structure of al-Qasr. In the following
[128] discussion, I focus on role differentiation in the non-
institutionalized aspect of the authority structure, on power
and influence.

Societies differ from culture to culture in the complexity of role differentiation. Within any one culture it
554 may differ from social domain to social domain. The political
571 system in al-Qasr is from this point of view structurally
627 simple, the assignment of duties in the traditional authority
*[613] structure being divided between the *'aqila* and the third party.
What legitimate influence is possessed by the third party is
derivative from the "status honor" of its members. The
● [792] exception to this is the *rajal saalih* who derives his power
or influence as a result of his special relationship with God.

554 The rajal khair, then, is a broker in social relation-
571 ships, a manipulator of loyalties. As a member of the "status
627 group," he can afford to spend time and money in courting his
fellow tribesmen, and, as a result, can accrue prestige and
loyalty. This role, like that of the 'aqila, is a secular
[681] one. The sanctions which it controls are as economical as
those of the 'aqila's are political. In this sense, they
are differentiated from the role of rajal saalih whose
sanctions are sacred in nature.

554 The traditional role which we define as that of the
•792 rajal saalih, "the holy man," was probably much more important
[178] in the past than it is today. In al-Qasr, there are only two
rajal saalih who share in traditional power: the one is a
resident of al-Qasr proper, and the other, a member of the
prestigious Sanusi family, lives near Marsa Matruh.

The rajal saalih of al-Qasr, i.e. the local "holy
man," is assured of status because he is an ashraf, one who
claims descent from the family of the Prophet. He is also a
[561] member of the elder age-set, and while he is not rich, he
cannot be considered poor. Though the "holy man" al-Sanusi
[793] lives near Matruh, he participates in the authority structure
of al-Qasr and is a member of the "status group." He is
sometimes referred to as rajal saalih kabir, "a great holy
man," by virtue of his Sanusi heritage.

[771] The relative unimportance of this role as compared
to that of the rajal khair in conflict regulation is a function

554 •792 of the Bedouin attitude, or lack of it, toward religion.
771 Since the time of Muhammad, the Bedouins have been considered
notoriously bad Muslims. Today, the Bedouins tend to joke
about their lack of zeal, and often point out that "holy
619 men" are not to be trusted.[2] This is seen in Sa'adi behavior
771 toward the Marabtin tribes who are their vassals. Theoretically,
792 the Marabtin who trace descent to the Prophet and might be
554 [778] considered "sacred Tribes" should be respected by the "secular"
Sa'adi tribes. But the Sa'adi of al-Qasr tend to deride the
554 Marabit. For instance, the "holy man" of al-Qasr, 'Amm Salih,
792 is a Marabit and well-known for his ability to successfully
627 mediate in conflict situations. But one informant, pointing
619 out this gift which 'Amm Salih possesses, said: "Amm Salih
is a good man, he is not a Marabit." But 'Amm Salih identifies
himself as a "rajal saalih" and a "Marabit"; he sees no role
conflict here.

771 The Bedouins also joke about the manner in which they
[522] practice the "pillars of Islam." Especially, they make light
of the fact that they are irregular in mosque attendance.
They say, with a slight smile, "we pray in the desert." A
[124] common way for an interview to end was by an informant rising
and saying: "Now I must wash for prayers." This happened

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[184] [2] Professor Abou-Zeid also notes this trait in his study of the Bedouin near Sallum, on the Libyan border (1966:248).

771 at any time of the day! As one Bedouin put it: "According
to the idea of goodness (*salih*), we are not good. This is
because we do not pray, we are part-timers in prayer."

554 A good *rajal saalih* is considered by the Bedouin to
792 have a special "blessing" (*baraka*), a concept somewhat
778 equivalent to that of *mana*. Someone such as 'Amm Salih
is thought to have *baraka*, and this type of power naturally
increases his influence and enhances his status. The following
[124] informant's account brings this out and shows something of
the magico-religious element at work in Bedouin power relations.

> [539] Hajj 'Ali does not believe in magic but he respects
> the "holy man" like anyone else. He owns a field
> from which are taken stones for building houses.
> One day he saw some men taking stones from this
> field. They were digging near a well so that the
> well would not be able to hold water after they had
> finished. Hajj 'Ali told the men to stop digging.
> One man answered: "I am cutting these stones for
> the Jaraira family (the family of 'Amm Salih), and
> only a few more and we will be finished." Hajj
> 'Ali replied: "For the Jaraira as for anyone else,
> we don't favor anyone, so stop the work now."
> Then Hajj 'Ali went home, never thinking that they
> would cause any trouble for him, and he was
> afraid of no harm. He slept and he had a dream.
> [787] In the dream he saw three of the Jaraira family,
> all of whom were dead and whom he had known in life.
> In the dream they only watched him and spoke no words.
> In the morning Hajj 'Ali went to the co-operative
> society's office and there he met 'Amm Salih. He
> said to him: "'Amm Salih, I want to tell you something."
> Then he related the whole story to him, and said:
> "I had no fear that you would do me any harm. But
> last night I saw your relatives in my dream; I had
> not even thought of them yesterday, so they are not
> [828] the cause of the dream. (The Bedouins believe that
> dreams reflect, and are connected with, what you saw
> or did during the day). So come and take all of
> the stones that you want, even if you are going to
> build a palace."

554 It is interesting to note that Hajj 'Ali is one of the most
[571] powerful members of the "status group" in al-Qasr. He is
[178] also a leading proponent of social change and a critic of
the old way of life which includes belief in magic. One can
• [792] see how 'Amm Salih's influence and status might work in other
areas of social action.

554 Although it is conceivable that a _rajal salih_ can
792 be asked to intervene in any type of conflict, it is more
627 likely that he will preside at cases involving marriage and
[695] divorce. The _rajal saalih_ may also be asked to serve as a
[691] witness or consultant in litigation cases. The Bedouins
* [613] point out that the "holy man," like the _rajal khair_, is apt
[829] to be more trustworthy than the formal authority, the _'aqila_.

> Sanusi is a good man and the people should listen to him. He is a _rajal khair_, a _rajal saalih_, not an _'aqila_. He is better than an _'aqila_--he is our brother. He is much better than the _'umda_ because he never changes the truth. The _'umda_ may go and accuse me wrongly to the government but Sanusi would never do this.

554 It is, of course, difficult to decide whether Sanusi's
792 charisma stems from the fact that he is a _rajal salih_, or the
facts of his wealth and family. Most probably it is a little of both, the sacred as well as the secular. 'Amm Salih, on the other hand, is neither wealthy nor from a particularly prestigious family by economic standards of al-Qasr: he derives his influence and status from the sacred aspects of

554 792 his role.

The people of al-Qasr identify 'Amm Salih as the "holy man" in the area. In my interviews, when I asked for the name of a party, besides the '_aqila_, who solves the Bedouins' problems, the answer was either Hajj 'Ali, the _rajal khair_, or "the Jaraira family." (This refers to 'Amm Salih and his brother.) When I asked for the name of a man who could tell me "how the Bedouin should act," the only name mentioned was that of 'Amm Salih. [124] [627]

554 792 627 'Amm Salih says that he solves many problems, not all of which deal with marriage and divorce. He claimed that he could settle conflicts over land and water. Just as a man may choose to go to the _rajal khair_, so also might he go to the _rajal salih_. Often enough, the selection of a "third party" will be determined by his propinquity. One '_aqila_ told me: "Salih Jaraira is a good man . . . If two men wish to accept Jaraira's decision, and if he lives near them, it is all right. If Jaraira cannot solve the problem, then they will return to the '_aqila_. The '_aqila_ can solve it or he can call in other '_awaqil_ who can solve it." * [613] [571]

[114] When I asked 'Amm Salih for case studies of problems which he has handled, he said that he would not reveal them because they are private affairs. He was willing, however, to describe the method in which he solves a problem.

> 554 Suppose the donkey of A (a man present at the interview)
> •792 gets into the barley of B (another man present). This is
> 627 actually a serious matter since it could conceivably lead
> to a big fight between A's _'aiela_ and B's _'aiela._ First,
> I separate them and make each go to his home. Then I
> get A's three brothers (his father is dead), we take a
> _dhabiiha_ (lamb) and go to B's place and all eat together.
> [779] After the meal, we read the _Fatiha_ (opening _sura_ of the
> Quran) together to show that all is forgiven. After the
> _Fatiha_ has been read no trouble will start because this
> is done in the presence of the Jaraira.

[784] He explained that reading the _Fatiha_ in bad faith would bring
the same curse from God that a bad oath would bring. He also
*[613] claimed that only he and the _'aqila_ have the authority to
command men to read the _Fatiha_.

554 'Amm Salih says that he uses the _'awaiyid_ as a guide
792 in solving problems, and that it is necessary because
627 "quarrels spread like fire, it is like fire; they spread to
671 killing and war." He was the only person in al-Qasr who
554 tried to conceptualize the difference between the _'awaiyid
792 Awlad 'Ali_ and the _Sharii'a_. 'Amm Salih said that it is
627 wrong to lie, according to both the secular and the sacred
671 authority codes: "One who lies exceeds the word of God,
779 577 and God will punish him for this. No one can know how this
[784] punishment will take place, only God will know this . . .
Sometimes a car goes off the road and people will say that it
is the punishment of God. But you never know because the
punishment of God comes in the after-life." I asked him:
554 792 "If this is so, why may the _rajal khair_ lie in trying to
627 settle quarrels?" He replied:
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> 554 •792 627 [577] Lying is bad (haram), but this is "the lie of a peace-maker" (kadhib musaalih). For instance, if you have a quarrel with Yunis here, then I have words with both of you. I use different words with each of you. I use different words than those which you used in the quarrel--I use good words. This is to bring you two together again. Maybe I see that you are going to kill, or I hear bad words from you; I do not go and tell him what you said.

'Amm Salih said that it is his "duty" to mediate disputes, and that he never hesitates "because God will reward me later." He did not want the quarrels to grow into wars. He also bases his pleas for conciliation upon moral discoure, the method used by the other traditional authorities.[3] 'Amm Salih said that in trying to solve a problem, "I give priority to the elder. I go to the younger man and tell him that he should make peace with the elder because no one cares more for him than his antagonist, and that he really cares more for his antagonist than for any other." The rajal saalih mediates but does not arbitrate: he attempts to redress the balance of good relations but does not impose judgements.

554 792 627 *613 [779] This approach to conflict regulation is not that of the 'aqila in his formal role, but it is similar to what the rajal khair would use. The main procedural difference between the two informal roles (i.e. rajal khair and rajal saalih) is that, in each case, the rajal saalih reads the Fatiha with

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[114] [3] The approach which I used in my interviews with 'Amm Salih derives from the work of John Ladd as presented in his book, The Structure of a Moral Code, 1957.

554 the disputants. As noted, the *rajal saalih* shares this right
•792 with the *'aqila*. The *rajal khair* does not have recourse
627 to this mechanism which amounts to divine approval of the
*613
779 binding decision of the "third party." 'Amm Salih in his
discussion of the Bedouin moral code corroborated this
point: "Any *'aqila* can read the *Fatiha*. In this way, he
and the two parties involved terminate the quarrel. This is
a way to show that all agree on the settlement. Originally,
only the *rajal saalih* did this, but now the *'awaaqil* do it
in all cases." It would be interesting to know if in Cyrenaica
both roles perform this function or if it belongs only to the
role of *rajal salih*.

554 I cannot generalize concerning this role for the whole
184 of the Western Desert. Sayyid al-Sanusi and 'Amm Salih seem
627 to be special men. On the other hand, the *'aqila* and the
792 *rajal khair* are roles which we would expect to find all over
*613 the desert, and in Libya also. The *'aqila* is the focus of
institutionalized traditional authority structure, and the
rajal khair and "status group" represent the power structure.
554 This attempt to differentiate between authority and power
121 is essentially one which deals with the more general problem
of leadership. Any study of the structure of authority must
have reference to the notion of leadership. Role analysis seems
the best method of dealing with leaders and their functions.
Role analysis together with the conceptualization of institution
as a process is an adequate way of dealing with the tendency

554 121 toward legitimacy and the phenomenon of change in the political structure. Peters (1967:271-279), in a long awaited discussion of the political aspect of Cyrenaican Bedouin society, adumbrates this problem of differentiating between instituted authority and the distribution of power:

> In order to discuss this adequately, a lengthy diversion into an analysis of the distribution of power would be necessary . . . there are men who wield power over groups of varying populations, and the extent of their domains cannot be understood by reference to orders in the lineage. Perhaps it is for this reason--because, that is to say, lineage theory effectively blocks the exercise--that relatively little has been written about the problem of leadership in these societies (i.e. lineage societies).

554 178 792 571 [795] Foci of power and authority change and at times irrespectively of the lineage structure. The role of the rajal saalih was more influential during the days of the Sanusiiya movement than it is today. At that time, "holy men" controlled economic, and thus political, relations through the zawiya system: they were in a position to command respect and obedience and could be considered a "status group" in their own right. Today, "holy men" are rarely found among the members of the "status group." As one informant phrased it: "They used to solve problems more in the past than now. People in the old days were not educated as they are today: the mind of the son is larger than that of the father. In the past, the "holy man" was so important that were he to ask

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554 178 [792] you for your cloak, you would have immediately given it to him. God was pleased with them at that time."

128 This notion of changing foci of authority and power cannot be divorced from the related political phenomena of the tendency toward legitimacy and the role institutionalization process. In the next chapter, I will attempt to show how such a conceptual framework can be utilized in an analysis of culture and political change.

Modern Legal Roles

634 554 [648] [177] The roles of _'umda_ and _shaikh_ were created and imposed upon the Bedouins by Muhammad 'Ali sometime during the early part of the nineteenth century in order to facilitate administration, maintain security in the desert, and protect the Western frontier.

[619] Both of these roles are representative offices at the primary level of the tribal structure. The 'Aishaibat have an _'umda_ and a _shaikh_ who reside in Marsa Matruh and work in close relation with the Governor. In terms of a chain of command, these offices receive demands which may originate either with the Governor in Matruh or with Bedouins in al-Qasr. But these offices are subservient to both the Governor and the Bedouins since no decision-making powers of any consequence resides with them. [571] [635] With reference to the two authority structures, the Egyptian and the Bedouin, the _'umda_ and the

619 778 the negotiator has to have behind him the full weight of his tribal segment.
184 Since the origin of the Gemei'at tribe as a Murabiteen tribe is
682 well known, any negotiator has to rely almost entirely upon his own skill
627 628 to affect any settlement; even if he is able to affect such a settlement,
there is no guarantee that it will be permanent.

619 The Murabiteen bil-baraka and Murabiteen bil-sadaqa occupy the same
792 position as vassal groups. The only difference between the two is that the first, the religious men, are much more respected than the latter. They are feared by the other tribes because of the belief that they have direct contact with the religious and spiritual world and can harm those who dare to offend them in one way or another. Because of this factor
[627] and of their neutral position with regard to the rest of the tribes, they
[628] play an important role in mediation and dispute settlement.

619 The origin of inferiority of the Murabiteen tribes in general is
184 hard to account for. Kenneth (1925) believes that hundreds of years ago
174 the Murabiteen were essentially the holymen. They learned to read and
792 write the Qoraan and grouped themselves around the "zawias' which were the centers of learning and religion. While indulging in their religious practices their flocks ere grazed miles away in the open desert under the charge of the Sa'adi shepherds, who originally were the poor paid workers of the Murabiteen. These shepherds, living out in the open, were busy fighting away the raiders attempting to steal their flocks. As time passed the Sa'adi shepherds became not only tough fighters but also wealthy. This latter end was achieved partly as a result of successful raids on neighboring tribes. Later when the Sa'adi planned a large raid, they entrusted their flocks to the Murabiteen, who by that time had become dependent upon the Sa'adi for their protection from the raids of other tribes.

619 184 174 792 [651] The picture was reversed then with the poor Sa'adi shepherds becoming the masters, acquiring great wealth and prestige because of their fighting ability, and the holymen becoming the shepherds and clients of the Sa'adi fighters. In the old inter-tribal wars, the Murabiteen stood a very limited chance so the Sa'adi tribes adopted them and in return for a yearly tribure guaranteed theprotection of the Murabiteen from external aggression.

As time passed, the main difference between the Sa'adi and Murabiteen tended to diminish. One or two outstanding Murabiteen tribes fought their own battles without seeking the protection of the Sa'adi and remained independent, while a few others rose up and fought on with the protector against a common foe (the case of the Gemei'at tribe is an example) and in return were emancipated from the stigma of serfdom and accepted by the Sa'adi as almost equals. Other Murabiteen tribes remained attached to their Sa'adi protector as client groups.

Ibn Khaldoun also saw the inferiority of the Murabiteen tribes as stemming from a mode of tribal relations adapted to inter-tribal warfare (1845).

613 The Eila

The Eila represents the next level of tribal segmentation among the Awlad Ali. The Eila is the most important political unit. Although the Eila lacks any formally recognized leadership, its importance stems from the fact that it constitutes the vengeance group or Amar El-Dam (unity of 613 672 682 the blood). This means that it bears a corporate responsibility for the actions of its members. Anyone of its members can be killed in vengence for a homocide committed by any other, and the duty of revenge for any

581 are necessary for the validation of the marriage contract. Modern
585 671 legal systems which took as their basis the Islamic law of marriage
675 and the family further required the registration of the marriage contract for the marriage to be legal.

584 The request and necessary response forming the marriage are sup-
585 posed to be carried on by the parties involved. However, if either the
429 groom or the bride is not of age, or is mentally unqualified, the trans-
593 action is carried on by his or her guardian, or "wakil." The wakil is
the father, unless he is dead or an invalid, in which case the brothers
[604] become the wakils. If the person has no brothers, then the uncles be-
[184] come the wakil in the order stated. According to certain Sunni sects
in Islam, a woman marrying for the first time is always represented by
her wakil, even if she is of age. The assumption is that a woman who
has never been married does not have the experience that enables her to
enter into any kind of legally binding relationship such as marriage.

585 Following the original Islamic idea, marriage among Awlad Ali is
675 an oral agreement between the groom or his father and the guardian
593 429 (wakil) of the bride-to-be (her father, if alive, or her closest male
[604] kin in the following order: her brothers, her uncles, her grandfather).
585 A religious man is sometimes asked to perform the marriage, although it
● 792 is not required. Some persons might invite a member of the Murabiteen
[619] tribe or holy men to witness the marriage on the basis that his presence
[778] gives "baraka," or blessing, to the marriage. Before the application of
585 the State legal system to the area, marriage contracts were not regis-
656 177 tered. In recent years, however, and with the increased mobility of
[675] the tribal populations, more and more marriages are being registered in
[634] the administrative districts. Still, according to the unofficial estimates,

593 spent the night inside. In the morning Muftah ordered his daughter to
574 pack her clothes because she was to leave with him. He refused to give
606 586 her husband any explanation as to why he was taking his daughter away.
The husband could not prevent him from taking her away because, as he
said, "He is her father and has the right to take her away with him at
any time."

When the wife did not return for two weeks, her husband went to her
father's house to take her, but her father refused to let her go. Hemeida
593 574 then went to a religious man in the area and asked him to intervene in
606 the matter and see why Muftah had taken away his wife. He also asked him
586 to arrange a mi'ad with Muftah to discuss the matter.

627 792 The religious man was selected in this case because he was a close
friend of Muftah and was believed to have influence over him. He was
also known throughout the area to be fair and of sound opinion. It is
important in the cases of disputes that the person selected as a mardi
is known as a wise and fair man. It is only then that he is able to
mediate between the two parties without being accused of taking sides.
792 The religious men, members of the Murabiteen tribes in the area, by their
619 relative position outside the formal tribal organization of the Sa'adi
627 tribes, are the most likely candidates for such activity. Yet, this is
554 not always the case. For this aspect of assumed impartiality is frequently
balanced off by the fact that these religious men lack the support
of a powerful tribal segment behind them. To be effective, the mardi
has to be respected, not only for his personal qualities, but also for
being a member of a respectable tribal segment whose power lends authority
to the mardi's decision. This is not usually the case with the client
000 tribes of Murabiteen. Wealth in many cases is also considered an important

Wealth in many cases is also considered an important
792 requirement for the selection of the mardi. This does not mean that
627
554 religious men in the area have no role in dispute settlement, for they
[556] do. It simply means that the mardi is selected according to a number of criteria that vary from case to case, and that in some of these cases sound wisdom and fairness characteristic of religious men are not enough basis for their selection as mardis. This means that the religious men have no special mediatory role based on their religious nature alone. In certain cases religious men offer the best possibility for mediation; in others, a non-religious person might offer a better chance for settling the dispute. In cases of women seeking
[586] divorce from their husbands, the wealth of the mediator, more than any-
[556] thing else, seems to determine the selection of the man whom the woman asks to negotiate on her behalf, a point to which I will return later in the chapter.

593 The Mi'ad was held in the house of Muftah. Present at the mi'ad
574 were Muftah, his son-in-law, Hemeida, the heads of households in Muftah's
606
586 camp (one of them was his brother and the other five were members of
627 different tribal segments), my driver (who was a member of the neighbor-
792 ing Sanagrah tribal segment), myself, and the religious man. After the tea was served, the religious man said that the discussion should start. He reminded the gathering that this case is a family one and should not develop into a larger dispute. "After all, the daughter's husband is a son, and the case is actually a misunderstanding between a father and a son and should be viewed in that context." Then he turned to Muftah and said that in that spirit he was asking him why he had taken his daughter away from her husgand. Muftah said that he had taken his daughter away

Muftah said that he had taken his daughter away
593 to punish Hemeida for what he thought was disrespectful behavior. He
574 606 then proceeded to descirbe how Hemeida, after bringing the blanket out
586 for Muftah, went inside and spent the night with his wife, defying the
627 792 basic rule of not showing intimacy in the presence of older people,
888 especially the parents or parents-in-law. For, to show such intimacy
is a sign of disrespect. He demanded that Hemeida pay him "kabara"
[681] for his injured pride. The term kabara refers to the adjective "kebir"
[558] (lit. respected or big man). Kabara is the fine paid for belittling
someone by word or deed. Muftah insisted that he would not allow his
daughter to return to her husband until Hemeida had paid that kabara.
Hemeida conceded the fact that intimacy constitutes an insult; but he
insisted that his action did not constitute an act of intimacy with his
wife, but was a matter of convenience and necessity, since he had only
593 two blankets, and the only one left was that inside the tent. Muftah
574 606 became angry and started shouting at Hemeida, who, in turn, started
586 shouting back; it became impossible to follow what was being said.
627 The religious man interfered in the discussion, trying to stop the argu-
792 ment between Muftah and Hemeida. The others attending the mi'ad also
[578] interfered. The religious man and two neighbors took Muftah outside
the tent while Muftah's brother tried to calm Hemeida down. The other
members of the group also calmed Hemeida, reminding him that he was the
younger person and must be more tolerant of older people. They also re-
minded Hemeida that Muftah was his father-in-law and had the right to take
his daughter away any time he chose. They urged him to "defeat the devil"
[681] and to apologize to his father-in-law and pay him kabara. He seemed
convinced but insisted that all he was going to pay was five pounds and
a goat. Muftah's brother and one of the neighbors then left the tent and

593 went to see Muftah and his company. Half an hour later the religious
574 man came and took Hemeida aside and talked to him in a very low voice,
606 586 then left the tent again. A few minutes more had passed; everyone re-
627 turned to the tent; Muftah was not angry anymore. The religious man
792 read the fatha, or the beginning sura of the Koraan, then said that the
[779] souls were now pure and that Hemeida was considered as a son of Muftah and that disagreements such as this should not alter the good relations between the two. He said that the devil had found his way into the souls of the two people, but now, thanks to God and the good people present, they both had come back to their senses. Hemeida then rose and went to where his father-in-law was sitting and shook hands with him. Then he
[281] handed the religious man ten pounds which the latter passed to Muftah and promised to send him a goat as a gift to his daughter. Muftah left the tent and went to the tent of the women. When he came back he announced that a goat had been slaughtered and that everyone was invited to eat. Everybody then left and Muftah promised to return his daughter to her husband the following day.

593 While the right of the father to take his daughter away from her
606 husband constitutes a check on the authority of the latter and insures
557 the wife good treatment by her husband and her in-laws, not infrequently
586 that right has been invoked for personal or individual interest on the
part of the woman's father or her closest male kin. Several cases have
[429] been cited in the area where the father or guardian had invoked the right to force the husband to concede to certain demands of the wife's guardian, even when the wife objected to those demands or disagreed with her guardian. One of these is the case of Mabroka who is married to a distant

586 his wife. The husband agreed but insisted that she pay him L.E. 300
562 (this included the mahr and the marriage expenses). The Omda tried to
574 reduce the amount but could not. He then tried to get the father to
554 pay, but the father refused. He had to pay the husband L.E. 200 of
634 his own money and promised that the rest would be paid when the woman remarried (it would be paid from the mahr). The husband divorced Haida. One week later she was married to her lover. I have no information about whether or not the 100 pounds was paid.

586 In another example, Sabha was forced by her father to marry her
562 cousin (ibn 'amm). She could not live with him, so she threw herself
574 on one of the holy men in the area. The holy man convinced the hus-
554 band to divorce Sabha and then went to her father and convinced him to
792 pay back the mahr to the husband, and the case was settled. People say
[626] that both the husband and the father agreed to the demands of the holy man because they were afraid of his supernatural curse. Sabha went back to her father's house.

586 It is obvious from these and similar cases that the success or
562 failure of the procedure depends on the careful selection of the man
593 on whom a woman throws herself. It is also apparent from the above
(554) examples that his right of refuge is resorted to only in cases where the
(574) woman cannot go to her father or to her closest kin to help her get a divorce because he is either unable or unwilling to help her. A father is unable to help if the husband is powerful or if he is the woman's ibn 'amm (father's brother's son) who has, according to the tribal law, the undisputed right to marry his bint 'amm (father's brother's daughter). The father is usually unwilling to help his daughter if he is the one

682 settlement is usually made after the parties have agreed to it,
627 yet, in certain instances where one of the parties later feels that
672 the settlement was not just or that he was coerced into accepting
695 it, he may ask for a second Mi'ad during which new procedures start
in the case. In the present case, although Mahdi had originally
accepted the judgment of the awaqil, as time passed and he realized that he was unable to pay the bloodmoney, he started to question the feasibility of the settlement. He discussed the matter
682
672 with Sheikh Suliman el-Gerery from the Murabiteen tribe of Gerera,
695 a tribe whose members are feared throughout the area for the belief
554 that they have certain supernatural powers. Sheikh Suliman himself
792 is highly respected, and people believe that after his death he will
[776] become "wali" or a saint. After hearing Mahdi's complaint, Sheikh
Suliman told him that the settlement was unjust and told him that he
would do something about it. The following Thursday, Sheikh Suliman
called on Mahdi and asked him to bring his donkey and follow him.
They rode to a small desert town called Bahig where the local market
613 is held every Thursday. On market day, the awaqil of various tribal
517 segments usually gather in front of the general store in the town
571 drinking tea and chatting until their sons or the younger members
443
576 of their families sell the sheep and buy the necessary items. Everyone passing by the gathering is expected to greet the gathering, getting off his donkey as a sign of respect to the prominent people.
[689] Failure to greet a fellow tribesman is considered a serious offense
liable to a fine of more than L. 50 and ten goats in certain cases.
[673] It is considered a very serious crime. One informant once told me,
000

124 One informant once told me,
576 "If you don't greet me, this means that you hate me, and if you
829 hate me, there is no limit to the kind of harm you can do me and
my family. One who hates you can kill you, and none can walk
safely anywhere if he fears that he will be killed."

682 As Sheikh Suliman and Mahdi reached the general store, everyone
689 was gathering there as usual, including the two awaqil who
672 were involved in the original settlement. Sheikh Suliman told
695 554 Mahdi not to dismount his donkey and not to say the customary
792 greeting as they passed by the gathering. When they passed the
576 gathering, everyone stood to greet Sheikh Suliman who ignored them
and left with Mahdi. No one believed that Sheikh Suliman, who
should be the guard of the tribal tradition, should commit such an
unforgivable violation of the norms of the people. The next morning
682 the whole area was talking about a big Mi'ad to "take the right"
689 from Sheikh Suliman and Mahdi, who had insulted the gathering. The
672 Mi'ad was held a week after the incident. During the Mi'ad, Sheikh
695 554 Suliman was asked to explain his behavior, and his answer was, "How
792 do you want me to greet all those people who were sitting in front
576 of the store? There were more than thirty men in that gathering,
627 and I was afraid that if I said the customary greeting, I might
have startled some of them causing them to harm themselves, leaving
me with the payment of so many bloodmoneys." Immediately, the
attendants of the Mi'ad knew what Sheikh Suliman was referring to,
and that his action was to prove that the settlement reached in
the case of Mahdi was wrong and that it set a very dangerous precedent
which would cause people to avoid greeting one another, "and
hatred will prevail among brothers and nobody will be safe in his
own home."

*795 The desire to establish in North Africa conditions in which
793 Muslims might live by their own laws and under their own
798 government, as they did in Arabia under the first four Caliphs,
led the Grand Sanusi and his successors to oppose the Turkish
177 way of life and the influences and innovations of Western
Christendom, but their intransigence in these matters did not
imply intolerance, far less aggressiveness. Though some
writers have made assertions to the contrary, the Sanusi have
never shown themselves more hostile than other Muslims to
Christians and Jews, and the Grand Sanusi and Sayyid al-
Mahdi scrupulously avoided all political entanglements which
might bring them into unfriendly relations with neighbouring
States and the European Powers. The Brothers of the Order
*795 were discouraged from discussing political questions. Nor were
793 the Sanusi intolerant towards fellow Muslims who differed from
798 them. Shaikh Muhammed 'Uthman records of Sayyid al-Mahdi
that 'the persons he dislikes the most are those who speak ill
of Muslims'.[1] The leaders of the Sanusiya have always tolerated
other and rival Orders, even when they have disapproved of
their rites. The Grand Sanusi had himself been a member of a
succession of Orders before he started his own and he allowed,
as his successors have done, members of other Orders to belong
to the Sanusiya at the same time.

*795 The leaders of the Order have also been tolerant towards the
792 cult of saints, unlike the iconoclastic Wahhabi, who have
798 destroyed even the tombs of those nearest to the Prophet himself.
The view held by the doctors of orthodox Islam is that,
776 though intercession through a saint is unlawful and the only
778 mention of him during prayers at his tomb should be to ask the
mercy of God on his soul, it is permissible to show respect to his tomb and his memory. The heads of the Sanusiya have, however, always tolerated among their Bedouin followers a regard for holy men and their tombs which goes beyond mere respect. It is unlikely that they felt any repugnance to the cult, because they counted among their forbears several saints and were themselves brought up in North Africa where the cult of saints is widespread and very near to the hearts of the common people; and they could not have remonstrated with the Bedouin for believing that holy men and their tombs are sources of *baraka*,

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[1] Op. cit., p. 121.

795*

divine blessing, since it was because the Bedouin believed the [792]
Sanusi family had the same virtue that they accepted their [798]
leadership. [776]

The resemblance often alleged between the Sanusi and the [778]
Wahhabi movements, on the grounds of like puritanism, 795*
literalism, and fanaticism, cannot be substantiated. It is 171
obvious that there must be resemblances between new religious [114)
movements: they usually claim to be a return to primitive faith and morals and they are generally missionary and enthusiastic. There is no great significance in such common characteristics of the two movements. Nor is there any reason to suppose that the Grand Sanusi was directly influenced by Wahhabi propaganda. A more significant comparison between the two might be made by tracing their developments from religious into political movements. Both started as religious revivals among backward peoples, chiefly Bedouin, the Wahhabi movement in the Nadj in the eighteenth century and the Sanusi movement first in the Hijaz and then in Cyrenaica in the middle of the nineteenth century; the *Ikhwan* organizations of the two movements have much in common; and both ended in the formation of Amirates, or small Islamic States.

Both movements have created States, the Wahhabi in Arabia and the Sanusi in Cyrenaica, based explicitly on religious particularism. In doing so they have only done what any movement of the kind is bound to do in a barbarous country if it is to continue to exist, namely, to create an administrative system which would ensure a measure of peace, security, justice, and economic stability. A religious organization cannot exist apart from a polity of a wider kind. But they did not create the sentiment of community which made the growth of governmental functions and the emergence of a State possible.

Religious divisions in Islam have commonly been the expression 795*
of a sense of social and cultural exclusiveness. The support 182
given to the 'Alids in Persia and Arabia, to the Umayyads in 177
Africa and Spain, to the Fatimids in Egypt, to the Kharijites 171
by the Berbers in North Africa, and the adoption of extreme Shi'ite doctrines by the mountaineers of Syria and by the Kurds, and of Isma'ili teachings in parts of India, were all reactions against foreign domination as much as revolts against orthodoxy. The religious deviation was the expression of the intense desire

*795 of a people to live according to their own traditions and institu-
182 tions. To-day this desire is expressed in the political language
177 of nationalism. In the past it was expressed in religious move-
171 ments. Arab nationalism is not a new phenomenon. Only its
[668] dress is new.

*795 As will be seen in the chapters which follow, conditions in
Cyrenaica were particularly favourable to the growth of a
182 politico-religious movement such as the Sanusiya became. It was cut off by deserts from neighbouring countries, it had a homogeneous population, it had a tribal system which embraced common traditions and a strong feeling of community of blood, the country was not dominated by the towns, and the Turkish administration exercised very little control over the interior. It was, as will be seen, the tribal system of the Bedouin which furnished the Order with its political foundations just as it was the tribesmen of the country whose hardiness and courage enabled it to stand up to the succession of defeats it had to endure.

*795 The reasons for the political success of the Sanusiya Order in
Cyrenaica will appear in the course of this account, and here I
793 wish to draw attention to one of them only. It has been said
182 that its rites and teachings were, like the Bedouin character,
[792] austere without being fanatical, and that it tolerated the cult
of saints to which the Bedouin were accustomed, the Grand
[798] Sanusi becoming, in fact, a kind of national saint; but it must be added that the acceptability of its teachings and the fact that the Grand Sanusi could at once be placed by the Bedouin in the familiar category of *Marabtin*, holy men coming to preach and settle in Cyrenaica from the west, cannot alone account for the remarkable success of the Sanusiya movement. The Bedouin of Cyrenaica had heard similar teachings before from similar teachers and had paid them the same degree of attention as they paid to the Grand Sanusi, but these earlier missionaries won only a personal and local following for themselves and their descendants, whereas the Grand Sanusi established himself and his family as leaders of a national movement, a position they have now held for three generations.
[772] Leaving aside the remarkable personality of the Grand Sanusi
and without here discussing whether the time at which he
[778] taught was particularly favourable to the growth of the move-

ment to which his teachings led, it may be said that the great 795*
difference between the Grand Sanusi and the earlier holy men 793
whose tombs are homely landmarks all over Cyrenaica was that, 182
while they were, all of them, in the eyes of the Bedouin, Mara- [792] •
bouts, the Grand Sanusi was also the head of an Order which [778]
gave to him and his successors an organization. Moreover, unlike the Heads of most Islamic Orders, which have rapidly disintegrated into autonomous segments without contact and common direction, they have been able to maintain this organization intact and keep control of it. This they were able to do by co-ordinating the lodges of the Order to the tribal structure.

III

The more recent Islamic Orders are to be found principally 795*
in North and West Africa. The Sanusiya is one of the most 793
recent of them. Its founder was an Algerian scholar, al-Sayyid 159
Muhammad bin 'Ali al-Sanusi al-Khattabi al-Idrisi al-Hasani,
a very remarkable man, mystic, missionary, and Marabout. 175*
The Sayyid Muhammad bin 'Ali al-Sanusi is usually spoken of in Cyrenaica as *al-Sanusi al-Kabir*, the Grand Sanusi, and I generally refer to him thus in this book.

The Grand Sanusi was born of a distinguished family of Sharifs at a village near Mustaghanim in Algeria about 1787. Early in life he became noted for his intelligence, piety, and profound learning, considered fitting ornaments to his noble birth. He studied first at Mustaghanim, then at Mazun, and later at the famous mosque school at Fez in Morocco, where he learnt theology, jurisprudence, exegesis of the Koran, and the other usual subjects of a Muslim student of the time. There he seems to have developed an interest in mysticism, having come under the influence of the Moroccan Order of the Tijaniya Darwishes. He left Fez when in the early thirties in order to make the pilgrimage to Mecca, though a Turkish biographer says that one of his reasons for leaving Morocco was to avoid possible unpleasantness with the authorities, who were alarmed lest his propaganda for the greater unity of Islam, his life's aim, might have political consequences.[1] They had small cause for alarm as his efforts seem to have made little impression on the

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[1] Salim bin 'Amir, *Majallat 'Umar al-Mukhtar*, No. II, 1943-4, p. 2.

of Cyrenaica.[1] The Bedouin remember with gratitude, as I have 771
often heard them declare, the moral and cultural benefits 797
brought to them by the Order. If they have fallen from the low 793
religious and literary standards to which the Sanusiya raised a 795*
fraction of them it is due to the virtual extinction of its teaching office during their long struggle with the Italians.

II

The Bedouin the Grand Sanusi found in Cyrenaica were not 771
only Muslims but also inveterate devotees of saints, the 792
Marabtin (sing. *Marabat*) or Marabouts, as they are called in 793
European accounts of North Africa, and the Grand Sanusi was 776
in the long tradition of these holy men. Therefore, although I 778
have touched on the matter in Chapter I, I need not excuse myself for treating it again in its Cyrenaican context, for Bedouin attachment to the Sanusiya springs from their personal devotion to the Grand Sanusi and his family, and not the other way round, and the Grand Sanusi derived his sanctity, and thereby his power, from the fact that he was a Marabout. The Bedouin are familiar with saints and ignorant of Orders. To them the Grand Sanusi was a saint and wonderworker, and a man with *baraka*, an ample measure of God's grace which flowed through him to ordinary folk; but there was nothing extraordinary about him. They knew his kind of old. When he died his tomb became a shrine, the largest and richest in Cyrenaica it is true, but only one among very many, dating from the Companions of the Prophet Muhammad, through the Martyrs who were killed fighting for the faith in Cyrenaica, to the pious and learned
men of yesterday and the day before. His successors, by their [613]
kinship with him, and in virtue of their spiritual legacy from him, became heirs to his *baraka*; and so, to a lesser degree, have the heirs of the other religious teachers who came to Cyrenaica from the west, who died and were buried there, and whose descendants are the *Marabtin bil baraka* lineages of to-day. The authority the Grand Sanusi had over the Bedouin of Arabia and North Africa can be parallelled by the careers of many holy

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[1] Giuseppe Macaluso, *Turchi, Senussi e Italiani in Libia*, 1930, p. 32; Giglio, op. cit., p. 22; and Arcangelo Ghisleri (quoting Andrea Pedretti), *Tripolitania e Cirenaica dal Mediterraneo al Sahara*, 1912, p. 132. [113]

771 men in North Africa whose families still retain much wealth and
• 792 influence. It was this Marabout status of the Grand Sanusi in
793 the eyes of the Bedouin which won him their respect: it was the
776 organization of the Sanusiya Order, an organization the earlier
778 Marabouts did not have, which enabled him to turn this respect
into a theocracy.

*175 There is more than one explanation of the origin of the word
792 '*Marabat*'. That generally accepted is that it derives from the
root RBT, to bind, and hence from '*ribat*', a fortified convent,
619 inhabited by warrior-monks, found on the marches of Islam in
[192] its early days of expansion by arms. The word later became attached to the tribes which settled in Andalousia under the leadership of the Saharan tribe of the Sanhaja and was corrupted into the European 'Almoravides'. After the fall of the Sanhaja dynasty in the twelfth century part of the *Marabtin* tribes fell back into central and southern Morocco, whence many individuals moved eastwards. Some settled in Cyrenaica, generally on their return from the pilgrimage to Mecca, and their fanaticism, asceticism, ability to read and write, and thaumaturgic powers, impressed the simple Bedouin, who accepted them as holy men and magicians and used them to write charms, to perform religious rites, and to act as mediators in inter-
[613] tribal disputes. Sometimes, as we have seen, these men founded lineages which, dwelling under the shadow of their saintly forbears, became nuclei of social agglomerations which have developed in course of time into tribal groups, thus taking the shape of the tribal society in which they lived. The word
[192] '*Marabtin*' thus came to mean holy men (and their tombs) and then, in addition, tribes tracing their descent, or supposed descent, from these holy men and also, finally, in Cyrenaica, tribes who are clients of the great *Sa'adi* tribes which own the earth and water.

778 Some of the better known of the Cyrenaican saints, but by
776 no means all, have gleaming white cupolas, supported by four
walls, erected over their tombs, and inside the walls is a *tub*, a
792 wooden box, over the grave, and this is covered with coloured cloth on which are inscribed passages from the Koran. Inside also are often a few pages from sacred books, occasionally a few small coins given by the local Bedouin, and any property, such as tents or ploughs, the Bedouin have wished to deposit in a

safe place when on seasonal moves. Often a shrine, sometimes 778
the shrine of a very famous saint, is no more than a wall of 776
stones, with perhaps a stick, with pieces of cloth tied to it, 792
erected over the grave, and this is the usual form in the steppe
grazing-grounds. There are generally cemeteries around the [764]
tombs.

All these shrines are visited by the Bedouin from time to time,
when they are passing by or when they have some request to
make of the holy man. Many of them are cult centres, an annual [796]
ceremony, one of the chief events of the Bedouin year, being [619]
held at them; and when they are near the border between tribes,
or between tribal sections, this is an occasion for intertribal, or
intersectional, gatherings. There is no saint whose tomb is much [789]
visited by the Bedouin who has not performed miracles, some [755]
of them very remarkable miracles, and there is probably none
who has not at some time or other cured the sick or given an heir.

The tombs of these holy men, Sidi this, Sidi that, and Sidi
the other, are found in profusion over the whole of inhabited
Cyrenaica. The historically best known are those of Sidi Rafa',
one of the Companions of the Prophet, near al-Zawiya al-Baida
on the plateau, of Sidi 'Abdalla, one of the Prophet's standard-
bearers, in the oasis of Aujila, and of the founder of the Sanusiya
Order, Sidi Muhammad bin 'Ali al-Sanusi, at Jaghbub oasis.
The shrines belong to the tribes and tribal sections in whose [619]
earth the Marabouts are buried and the Marabouts are looked [423]
upon as tribal and sub-tribal patrons. Like the Sanusiya Order,
they have become part of tribal life.

I have earlier reproduced Col. De Agostini's map of the Hasa 778
tribe to serve as an example of the territorial distribution of 619
lineages. The same map serves to illustrate the distribution of 792
shrines in a tribal territory. It can be seen from this map, which 776
shows only the best-known Marabout tombs, that all the different
sections of the tribe have their shrines, and I would draw
attention to an interesting feature of the distribution which I
have also noted in other tribal areas: how often these sacred
spots are near a tribal boundary, or near the boundary between
one tribal section and another. This may not be pure chance,
for the Marabouts in their lifetimes were regarded as standing
outside the tribal system, to which indeed, being foreigners from
the west, they did not belong, and their chief political role was

778 to act as mediators between tribes and between one tribal
619 section and another. Even to-day their tombs are regarded as
• 792 neutral points, as it were, and are often the place chosen for a
776 meeting between the Shaikhs of one tribe, or tribal section, and
those of an adjacent tribe, or section, when some matter has to be settled between them. It has sometimes happened also that when two tribes have disputed the ownership of territory, they have settled the dispute by allotting it to a Marabout, which means to his descendants, so that one then finds a *Marabtin* strip between two *Sa'adi* tribes or tribal sections. One of the best examples of this is the strip of country owned by the Aulad al-Shaikh tribe between the 'Awaqir and the 'Abid and 'Arafa tribal domains. In the same way tribes made gifts of disputed wells to dead saints. Where a *Marabtin* tribe has grown out of a Marabout family they will be found living in the area around their tombs. Thus the Aulad al-Shaikh territory spreads out from Sidi Mahiyus, part of the Masamir live near Sidi Nuh, the Mshaitat live around Sidi al-Mshaiti, and the Qat'an live near Sidi Hashim and Sidi Suliman al-Tair.

792 So, long centuries before the Grand Sanusi began his mission
776 in Cyrenaica, the Bedouin were used to the sight of an *'alim*, a
212 learned man—for anyone who can read and write is a learned
554 man to the Bedouin—coming from the west to heal their
children and beasts, break droughts, write talismans, and teach them the beliefs and law of Islam. Such a man was also a *muhakkam*, one who arbitrated in their disputes and said the *fatiha* at their settlements and undertakings to make them binding. He could arbitrate among them because he was not of them. He was not like them a tented son of the steppe, though his descendants may have learned to live as such, but a *Marabat*, a man who follows religion and not the rains. The Bedouin of Cyrenaica owe much to these holy men, for, ignorant and superstitious though they may have been, they taught the tribesmen to respect learning and religion and kept those twin lights burning, even if dimly, through centuries. The Bedouin do not forget them, or to say a prayer for them, when they pass their tombs; and they have given the freedom of their earth and water to their descendants. Without these forerunners the
[182] Grand Sanusi could not have planted his Order in the country.
*[795] It is planted in their bones.

Marabouts of the kind I have described were still coming to 792 ●
Cyrenaica from the west up to the time when the Grand Sanusi 793
began his preaching in the country. Two of them whom he 795*
found there, already living among the Bedouin, the one on the
western and the other on the eastern part of the plateau, teaching
them and settling their disputes, became his followers: Sidi
Ahmad bin 'Abdalla al-Sakkuri, a late arrival from the west
whose descendants became Shaikhs of the zawiya of al-Marj,
and Sidi al-Martadi Farkash, of an old *Marabtin* family of
Cyrenaica, whose descendants became Shaikhs of the lodges at
Umm al-Razam, Bishara, and Martuba. But the great majority
of the Grand Sanusi's helpers were men who had come with him
from the west, chiefly from Algeria. Other *Ikhwan* families, [613]
mostly of the Khattabi lineage, of which the Sanusi family are
a branch, came later, also from Algeria, in the time of Sayyid
al-Mahdi. To the Bedouin they were all Marabouts and when [778]
they had in their lifetimes a reputation for piety or learning
their tombs in the Sanusiya lodges in which they resided became
places of cult like those of their forerunners all over Cyrenaica.
But unlike the earlier Marabouts these Sanusiya Brothers were
not only holy men. They were also members of a fraternity, of
an organization. The Sanusiya Order was thus not only heir 795*
to the accumulated capital of the Marabouts, but was able to 182
exploit it as a corporation. It incorporated a number of isolated
cults into a single wider cult, fractionized, it is true, by tribal
particularisms, but, all the same, brought under a common
organization. Each lodge of the Order was a cult centre, but it
was something more: it was part of a general cult directed
through the lodges towards the Head of the Order. The tribes 619
of Cyrenaica became through the Order linked from above in a 182
common, if loose, organization under a single, sacred, Head. 795*
This was possible only because a tribal system already existed 793
uniting the different tribes, in spite of their feuds and enmities,
into a society which, though lacking political unity, rested on
common sentiments, a common way of life, and a common
lineage structure.

What gave stability to this new relationship between the [648]*
Bedouin tribes and the Sanusiya Order, turning the sacred Head
into a secular leader and the religious organization into a
government, and changed a loose federation of tribes into a

*175 is not to be built till the zawiya is completed. There will be
*795 builders and carpenters among the Brothers and all that is
required of the tribal Shaikhs is selection of the site and super-
793 vision of the work. He points out to them that the work is for
their benefit, in that they and their sons will receive in the
zawiya an education, especially in the Koran and in the laws of
Islam, and will be able to worship there. The Grand Sanusi then
cites passages from the Koran and the *Hadith* commending
religious benefactions. Finally he prays God to assist those
engaged in the building and those who have made themselves
responsible for the upkeep of the zawiya. God helps those who
help others. A man reaps what he sows.

Some of the Cyrenaican lodges were larger than others but
*795 they all had the same features, a straggling warren of stone
346 buildings comprising a mosque, schoolrooms, guest-rooms,
apartments for the Shaikh of the zawiya and his family, rooms
for teachers and pupils, and houses for the Brothers, clients,
[241] and servants, and their families. Many had small gardens near-
by and the local cemetery was usually adjacent to a lodge.
[764] Jaghbub, where several hundred persons lived, was the largest
of such communities. The ruins of Dariyana and al-'Azziyyat
[792] are also extensive and must have housed several hundred
persons, but the average lodge probably housed only some fifty
to a hundred persons, including wives and children, though
there were often *Marabtin* families attached to the zawiya
living nearby, sometimes in caves dating from classical times.
The importance of a lodge was not to be estimated so much by
the number of its occupants as by its tribal position and the
number of its Bedouin adherents.

*795 The Shaikh of a new zawiya would point out to the local
tribesmen that he and his companions had no means of support-
793 ing themselves or of maintaining the zawiya. The various
425 sections nearby then gave to the lodge the lands adjoining it,
this estate surrounding a lodge being known as its *haram*. On
the plateau the lodges were generously endowed with arable,
in the steppe with wells, and in the oases with date-palms and
springs. Later, further gifts of arable, wells, springs, and date-
palms, or part use of these, would sometimes be made, espe-
cially when there was a dispute between two sections about
ownership of property and neither would give way to the other,

*795 find hereditary transmission of Shaikhship of lodges most
793 accentuated, such as the Bara'asa-Tamia section (al-Zawiya
613 al-Baida), the 'Awaqir-Sdaidi section (Msus zawiya), and the
428 'Abaidat-Ghaith section (Tart zawiya). In the same way the
● [792] earlier Marabouts became, as has been noted, founders of
lineages which were on the pattern of the branches of the Bedouin clans among whom they lived, and attached to them.

*795 Also it must be remembered that the lodges were tribal
institutions built by the local Bedouin so that they might
778 participate in the *baraka* of Sayyid Muhammad bin 'Ali al-
793 Sanusi. They participated in it through the Shaikhs of their
619 zawiyas who received their *baraka* direct from the hands of the
182 Grand Sanusi himself, or from the hands of son Sayyid al-
Mahdi, and passed it on to their sons. This *baraka* belonged to the tribe, or tribal section, which built a lodge just as the *shaukha*, the secular Shaikhship of the tribe, or tribal section, belonged to it and had to be kept in it. In both the continuity of family succession had to be maintained, unless there were good reasons for acting otherwise. Thus each tribal section emphasized its autonomy in its hereditary line of religious Shaikhs, through whom the *baraka* of the founder of the Order was transmitted to them, whilst proclaiming its membership of a tribal federation with common allegiance to the Head of the Order.

*795 As I have pointed out when speaking of the sacred *Marabtin*
793 tribes of Cyrenaica, it was customary for the descendants of a
778 Marabout to reside near his tomb. I have further mentioned
that the Shaikh of a Sanusiya lodge, who is also called a *Mara-*
[776] *bat* by the Bedouin, might, if he had during life a reputation for piety, rather easily gained in Islam, be venerated as a saint when he was dead and his tomb become a shrine. This is another reason why Shaikhly families have tended to become hereditary directors of lodges.

*795 Just as almost all the Marabouts of Cyrenaica were foreigners
793 from the west, so were almost all the Shaikhs of the Sanusiya
554 lodges. The Dardafi and Isma'ili families came from Tripoli-
[167] tania, the Ghumari family from Morocco, the 'Ammur, Bu
Jibali, and Khattab families came from Algeria, and so on. As a class they enjoyed, and still enjoy, a reputation for sanctity among the Bedouin on account of their knowledge of the Koran

bers of an undivided group. It is erroneous to suppose that because the different 621
orders of sections are homologous in their structural aspects they do not differ; they 613
do, because the interests associated with the various orders are different.[1] 628

Collateral tertiary segments are associated with different tracts of territory. Each [682]
has its own watering rights as a group, and although groups may share a grain store, [423]
it is divided on group lines. Members of these different groups do not gather together
in summer to form a single community, though at some of the very big watering
points they are near each other. Social relationships between them are, however,
intense. Visits are frequent. They meet to exchange news, or to inquire after the [574]
sick. They exchange greetings during the major festivals, and members of one group attend the funerals and weddings of the others, taking gifts. They also meet at the grain stores. Herdsmen, as they pursue straying animals, wander freely in their neighbours' territory. Relationships of this sort, some of them urgently necessary for survival, do not permit the feuding relationships to be described presently. Permanent hostility which characterizes the feud would seriously disrupt everyday economic activities, limit the pastoral movements of the Bedouin beyond endurance, and sever lines of communication which they always strive to keep open.

A homicide, when it involves two collateral tertiary groups must, therefore, be 621
resolved quickly. This can be effected in two ways. Vengeance may be exacted immediately. 613
This is always referred to as a vengeance killing or *thār*, and is to be distinguished 628
from a superficially similar act within a tertiary group, since *thār* carries 682
with it the implication that it is premeditated. A *thār* between two tertiary sections is considered to be the best way of settling the affair and, after an appropriate lapse of time, a peace meeting is held at which it is accepted that the killings have cancelled each other out. The deliberations at this meeting are followed by a meal at which all present 'eat around the one bowl'; the meal over, they all pray together. A life had been taken for a life and the way is now open for the restoration of normal peaceful relationships. Vengeance needs to be distinguished from feud, for while retaliatory killings provide the propulsive force in the feud a vengeance killing may be the means whereby a settlement of hostilities is made possible.

An end to hostilities may also be brought about by a promise to pay blood money 621
or *diya*, and its acceptance by the victim's group. Arrangements for blood-money 613
discussions are made by a category of persons known as *marabtin bi'l baraka*, or 628
' clients of the goodness ', men who, by virtue of descent and origin, stand outside
the descent lines of the noble tribes, and who are accredited with divine goodness. 682
They tend the sick, write amulets, and are always present at a peace meeting to give 792 ●
it the weight of their baraka. Soon after the homicide has occurred they act as intermediaries
to bring the hostile groups together at a peace meeting.[2] Ostensibly, the 621
first part of the proceedings at these meetings is to settle the amount of the blood 613
money, and how and when it is to be paid. Agreement on these counts will have been 628
reached, however, before the large peace gathering is assembled, for there is a gener- 682

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[1] This statement requires more documentation than I am able to give to it in this paper, but the descriptive details given hereafter give it some substance. See also Smith, 1956.

[2] It is necessary to add here that these clients do not assume coercive powers. They are granted the power to curse, but the curse that is feared is the curse of their dead when an oath is given at a saint's tomb. When they know that groups wish to make peace they assist as messengers in bringing people together, but they do not use their power to curse as a pressure.

first successes in Senegal, the Beni Hilal and the Beni Suleim 175 619 were being despatched by the Caliph Mustansir billah against Mu'izz ibn Badis, his rebellious viceroy in Tripoli. They sang of their conquest : [539]

> "Great was the king, son of Badis, a mighty man of war !
> Yet we routed his thirty thousand men !
> We were but three thousand, yet the victory was ours, and ours the spoil !
> Their hearts were as water, not a man was in their ranks !
> We routed them and they fled far and wide !"

These Beni Hilal, now extinct, are famous wherever Arabic is spoken for the exploits of their legendary hero Abu Zeid, while the Beni Suleim had helped the Prophet at the battle of Hunein, and are said by Hogarth to be the ancestors of the great modern tribe of Harb.[1]

The confusion of these two invasions caused the races of North Africa to become inextricably mixed. Both Arabs and Berbers spent their lives in the desert herding their flocks, and both were warlike. So it is natural that the intermarriages of a few generations should have made one people of them, and it is also natural that the conquered should claim relationship with the conquerors and not vice versa. But this aspiration of the Berbers has flooded their genealogies with so many lies that it is difficult to disentangle the truth.

The descendants of the original colonists, much mixed [792] with Berber blood, still preserve their title of Murabitin, though no longer living in *ribat*, which soon lost their military character and were turned into *Zawia* "monasteries", where the more peacefully inclined of the sect retired for religious teaching and contemplation. Later, when the *ribat* came to be deserted, the peaceful Murabitin, ill-fitted by their monastic habits for the resumption of an active nomadic life, sank into dependence on their warlike brethren the Sa'adi, and, among a primitive race, dependence means inferiority. Thus in Arabia any tribe that pays tribute to another [186] is despised as Hiteim. And so the once proud title of "Murabitin" has simply come to mean "vassal" and nothing more.

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[1] *History of Arabia*, 38.

to Dib by Ibn Khaldun, who calls Dib a descendant of 619
Ka'b, the great-grandson of Suleim.[1] If this be true, the 173
Jumei'at must be an elder branch than any of the Sa'adi tribes, among whom the Awlad 'Ali are included. But in actual fact, the Awlad 'Ali do not consider the Jumei'at as of Sa'adi origin, that is, descendants of Abu Dib and his wife Sa'ada, but despise them as Murabitin or vassals, though they pay no tribute.

All this may be interpreted to mean that they are among the oldest inhabitants of Western Egypt. They have been in Egypt "seven hundred years" according to one of their sheikhs, Sa'ad Bey el-Masri, and a pedigree given me by another, Sheikh 'Ilwani Suleiman, who lives near Sidi 'Abd el-Rahman, runs :



The Jumei'at of Mariut are all descended from El-Ashtar, while the offspring of the other five sons are settled in Beheira, Gharbiya, and at Ramla near Alexandria.

It is, of course, possible that their eponymous ancestor, 619
Jumei'a, was an Arab of Beni Suleim descent, who returned to 173
Egypt from the "Green Mountain", soon after the Beni Suleim 174
invasion, and whose descendants became Murabitin by forming themselves into a religious community. But such religious fervour is not a Bedouin characteristic, but smacks rather of the fanaticism of the recently-converted, so I suspect the Jumei'at, in spite of their descent from Ka'b, to be mainly a remnant of the earlier Libyan population of the coast.

Prior to the arrival of the Awlad 'Ali, they were "Mrabit" 619
to the Beni 'Una, and engaged in constant conflict with the 175
Hanadi. Upon the rout and annihilation of the Beni 'Una, 726
the Jumei'at were stirred up to revolt against the Hanadi 792
by one of their holy men called Baqush. Outraged by their

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[1] The more ignorant Awlad Suleiman have forgotten Ka'b's paternity, and confused him with the famous Arab poet Ka'b ibn Zuheir. See p. 287 for their version. And yet another Jumei'i version gives as their ancestor the Saint Ka'b el Ahbar.

[2] The "Friends" of the Prophet.

619 oppression, he gathered his people and delivered a fiery
175 denunciation of his religion, during ~~which~~ he smashed his
726 rosary into pieces and mixed it with ~~his~~ horse's fodder;
● 792 Baqush then invited their kinsmen (?) the Awlad 'Ali, to
come over from the "Green Mountain" and help them. To entice the Awlad 'Ali, he is said to have sent them samples of salt desert water and Nile water sweetened with sugar to illustrate the difference between the hardships of the desert and the comforts of the Rif.[1]

619 As recounted earlier, the Awlad 'Ali completely routed the
175 Hanadi and their allies, and drove them from the desert.
726 In the division of the conquered territory, the Jumei'at
received a third, and, although they were still considered Murabitin, were released from the payment of tribute. They
[131] now live intermingled with the free sections of the Awlad
'Ali, all along the north coast of Egypt, and are numerous in Beheira, especially near Abu Hummus.

619 *Samalus.*—The Samalus are found scattered among the
[131] Awlad 'Ali on the northern coast and stranded among many
of the Egyptian provinces. They once possessed a head sheikh Abu Sala at Minya, and colonies are recorded from Faiyum, Beheira, Menufiya, Gharbiya, and Sharqiya. An
[175] old paper from the Recruiting Department gives from
[162] seventeen villages in the Faiyum 775 mounted Samalus
[231] and 1,400 on foot, possessing 1,760 camels and 11,400
sheep. Two important groups of wells, both called "Sawani
[312] es-Samalus" exist on the north coast, one about 50 kilometres east of Salum, and the other 20 kilometres south of Dhab'a.

[173] They say they came to Egypt, 400 strong, about 200
years ago, from the Wadi Samalus in the Jebel Akhdar, and their ancestor twelve generations ago was Nasr el-Hasani, of course an "Arab from Beni Suleim".

[175] In the *Description de l'Egypte*, P. D. Martin relates how
[726] in 1800 the Samalus of Faiyum were raided by a party of
Ferjan, 200 strong, from Beheira.

619 *Shiheibat.*—These are a "Mrabit" tribe from the west with
186 an unenviable reputation, living near the Wadi Natrun.
Sayed Idris, the former Senussi leader, says of them: "Most

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[1] Dumreicher, 16. This is probably the "Sheik Abdall Gawyal Bagooshi" who wrote to Sir Sydney Smith in March, 1801, warning him of the approach of the French from Damanhur. Wilson, *History of the British Expedition in Egypt*, 371. (Rif = cultivated area.)

175 posts were established there, and Marsa Matruh became the
648 capital town. The Western Desert was administered by British officers who had under their command a garrison of Egyptian soldiers. Their assignment was to secure the colonial borders. This task included keeping the Awlad 'Ali within the boundaries of Egypt. The policy of the British provincial government was to avoid interfering with the Bedouin process of law and conflict regulation unless it threatened the peace and security
[124] of the desert. My informants said that the British interfered with Bedouin justice only under the threat of large-scale tribal warfare.

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[619] The political relationship which the Bedouins of the Awlad 'Ali tribe had with the Sanusi Order of Islam in Libya was historically not so important compared to that of the other Cyrenaican tribes. The Sanusi Order, classified as a Sufi *tariiqa* ("mystic order"), was actually quite orthodox in its attitudes and practices. This is a function of the socio-religious conditions of its origin during the 18th-19th century revival of orthodoxy in Islamic Arabia (Gibb 1955:
[793] 127-145). Muhammad bin 'Ali al-Sanusi founded his order, al-Sanusiyya, near Mecca around the year 1837. The Sanusi doctrine may be considered orthodox, or secularly oriented, in that it rejects the fundamental goal of Sufism, mystical union with God.

The Sanusi Order, from the very beginning, strove for a return to pure Islam. It made its greatest headway among

175 the Bedouins of the Hijaz area. This Sanusi success aroused
795 the jealousy and animosities of the orthodox 'ulama ("clergy")
[798] of the Mecca area. Al-Sanusi was forced to flee the Arabian
[793] peninsula, and in 1843 he founded his first zawiya ("lodge"),
[346] al-zawiya al-baida, in Cyrenaica. The Sanusi doctrine was as
acceptable to the Bedouins of Cyrenaica as it had been to the
[793] tribes of the Hijaz. The person and teachings of al-Sanusi
al-kabir ("the grand Sanusi"), as he came to be known, fit
into the "holy man" religious tradition of Cyrenaica and even
spread beyond into the Sudan and Lake Chad area. The Order
[993] showed primary concern for the people of the desert: the
[346] Sanusi shaikh ("holy man") cared for the poor, and the zawiya
[485] became rest stops, storehouses, and religious centers where
[794] Bedouin children were taught their Quranic lessons. Through
175 the zawiya, the Sanusiyya became a political and economic
795 integrating factor in the desert, and al-Sanusi became the
346 legitimate authority of the Bedouins. The zawiya became a
182 [793] very important part of the traditional desert economic system.
Today one zawiya remains near al-Qasr but it is scarcely used.
The Bedouins say: "Before, when Alexandria was far away by
camel, we could get what we wanted at the zawiya. Now that we
have trucks and trains no one goes to the zawiya."

175 The fortunes of the Bedouin became linked with those
795 of the Order. When the Sanusi became involved in full-scale
648 conflict with the Italian colonial power, the Bedouins bore

*613 he was insistent upon his right to have her. She went to
619 578 see the "holy man," al-Sanusi, who lives near al-Qasr. (Al-
582 Sanusi is a descendent of "the Great Sanusi," the founder of
793 al-Sanusiyya, who now lives in Egypt after having been exiled
from Libya.) Al-Sanusi decided to keep the girl at his farm
*613 until he could decide a course of action. One night, the
619 girl's cousin secretly came to the Sanusi farm and found her
578 582 room. The girl was sleeping. The cousin struck a match, the
793 girl awoke and was frightened. She jumped from her bed and
683 began to run, in so doing she fell down a flight of stairs
and suffered a rupture. This was a serious offense which the
cousin had committed, and al-Sanusi decided that he should call
all of the 'awaaqil of the area to inform them of this. In the
meantime, he sent the girl back to her home and the cousin
continued to bother her concerning his rights over her.
[584] The cousin went so far as to "offer the blood-sacrifice for
her," a stage in the marriage process which signifies that the
union has been consented to by both families. The girl's
father was dead, and her brothers and uncles were unable to
keep the cousin away from the girl. (It may be assumed that
they were conscious of his rights to bint 'amm.) They had
even beaten him once. All of the 'awaaqil of 'Ali Ahmar and
[692] 'Ali Abyad, and the Marabtiin in the al-Qasr area came to meet
with al-Sanusi at his farm. He (al-Sanusi) said that they all

*613 must come because he, himself, was a Libyan and a member of
619 no tribe in Egypt. Al-Sanusi's petition was two-fold: he
578 said the cousin should be punished for violating his right of
582 privacy and property, and the question concerning the cousin's
•793 right to the girl should be settled. The *'awaaqil* decided
683 that al-Sanusi should be awarded a *kubaara* of 1000 L.E. from
692 the tribes of the area, and that the girl should be permitted to marry no man of the Qinaishat tribe. Al-Sanusi refused to accept the *kubaara*, and this was the correct thing to do since the *kubaara*, especially a large one, is only offered ritualistically. The *'awaaqil* took note of the cousin's rights to his *bint 'amm*: they said that since the girl refused to marry him it would not be right if she married anyone else from the tribe.
*613 Furthermore, the *'awaaqil*, on the basis of the cousin's behavior
619 in this matter, decided that the cousin was insane and should
734 be committed to an asylum. They informed the police in Marsa
[648] Matruh of this diagnosis and decision, and the police came and transported the boy to the mental hospital in Cairo where he is today. The uncles of the boy signed the papers which committed him.

554 571 627 The rajal khair, then, is a broker in social relationships, a manipulator of loyalties. As a member of the "status group," he can afford to spend time and money in courting his fellow tribesmen, and, as a result, can accrue prestige and loyalty. This role, like that of the 'aqila, is a secular [681] one. The sanctions which it controls are as economical as those of the 'aqila's are political. In this sense, they are differentiated from the role of rajal saalih whose sanctions are sacred in nature.

554 792 [178] The traditional role which we define as that of the rajal saalih, "the holy man," was probably much more important in the past than it is today. In al-Qasr, there are only two rajal saalih who share in traditional power: the one is a resident of al-Qasr proper, and the other, a member of the prestigious Sanusi family, lives near Marsa Matruh.

The rajal saalih of al-Qasr, i.e. the local "holy man," is assured of status because he is an ashraf, one who claims descent from the family of the Prophet. He is also a [561] member of the elder age-set, and while he is not rich, he cannot be considered poor. Though the "holy man" al-Sanusi [793] lives near Matruh, he participates in the authority structure of al-Qasr and is a member of the "status group." He is sometimes referred to as rajal saalih kabir, "a great holy man," by virtue of his Sanusi heritage.

[771] The relative unimportance of this role as compared to that of the rajal khair in conflict regulation is a function

622 His main function is to manage the affairs of the village, apprehend
554 criminals, report and register births and deaths, collect taxes and
represent the government in all matters involving the relationship between
the government and his village. Because of his position as the
[661] representative of the govrernment, he usually enjoys a considerable
amount of power which, over the years, many omdas have used it to obtain
personal benefits.

361 In 1958 the committee appointed for the examination [illegible] the possibility
631 of applying the system to Awlad Ali noticed that villages in the
sense of a compact settlement similar to that existing in the rural area
simply do not exist in the Western Desert region. There are a few
settled communities in the area but they are scattered homes or a few
stores. These communities have no identifiable boundaries or administrative
631 existence. The area as a whole is divided into ten administrative
634 districts, each having a police station. These districts correspond
[625] to the old Senusia Zawyas which played an important role in
[795] maintaining order in the era until the First World War. Until that time
[175] the area was divided into fourteen zones each of which was under the
795 jurisdiction of one of the zawyas. The zawyas were mainly religious
175 centers, or shrines, inhabited and directed by a member of the Senusi
[793] order of Cyrenaica. The role of the head of the zawya was to teach the
Qoraan and spread the teachings of the Senusi order. One of the ways
[794] the zawyas attracted followers was through distribution of food and
clothing to those who joined it. The zawyas also provided places of
[798] refuge for those who needed protection since no one could force his way
into the sacred zawyas. Because of their religious position which put

795 Because of their religious position which put
175 them outside the tribal structure, the leaders of the zawyas played a
627 significant role in mediation and settling disputes between various tribal
● 793 segments. At their disposal was their ability to ostracize anyone
[626] who did not abide by their decision from the zawyas, which meant depriving
him from all the benefits, social as well as religious, that membership
in the zawyas offered.

795 After the First World War when the British replaced the Turks as
175 governors of the area, the zawyas were closed and the religious leaders
177 [648] ordered to leave. The zoning established by the zawyas existed, however,
[631] and was used as the basis for the redistricting of the area. Police
[625] stations replaced the religious centers. From the standpoint of the tribal
619 634 population itself, the districts have no psychological or political
[795] reality. The zawyas were originally established in the areas of tribal
[361] concentrations. But the area itself did not have any political identity.
The only reality from the standpoint of the inhabitants was the tribal
reality and affiliation which cut across many of these districts. Many
of the tribal segments inhabiting one district were and still are hostile
177 to one another. To transform the zones into administrative districts and
634 to establish one office of leadership for the whole district was to impose
619 a political unity nonexistent among the tribal segments inhabiting
[622] the district. To avoid this difficulty, the government supplemented the
territorial principle of the omda system in the rural area with the principle
of tribal representation and came up with a system which seems to
suite the situation in the Western Desert. For each of the districts,
a list of all tribal segments which habitually occupy the area and whose
tribal land is located within the district, is made. The most powerful

*795 which the soul experiences God. It is suffused with knowledge:
786 not with *'ilm*, intellectual and traditional knowledge, but with
ma'rifa, gnosis, wisdom. The Grand Sanusi and his successors
[785] very strongly disapproved of external aids to this end, such as
processions, music, movements of the body inducing convulsions,
piercing the flesh with sharp implements, and such other
means as are used by some Orders, and steered a middle course
between the illuminative, or intuitive, school of Sufi writers and
*795 the rational, or intellectual, school. Thus Sayyid Ahmad al-Sharif,
his grandson, has in his writings, as Moreno points out,[1]
exhorted followers of the Order not to depart from the rational,
the chief aim of the Sanusiya being to make a man a good
Muslim rather than a good mystic. Mysticism is something
added to orthodox faith and morals, not a substitute for them.

*795 It is for this reason that, as Sayyid Ahmad insists, perfection
787 is to be sought through spiritual identification with the Prophet
Muhammad rather than with God, at any rate for ordinary
people. This is to be attained by contemplation of the essence
of the Prophet and by an inner knowledge of him through
constant imitation of his actions, attention to his words, and
blessing him. The contemplation should be so intense that
veneration of the Prophet pervades the adept till at last he hears
only his name and has only his form before the eyes of the intellect.
Then the Prophet becomes his sole guide and counsellor.

*795 As this is not a treatise on Sufism there is no need to give
further details about the mystical content of the Sanusiya. It
should, however, be stressed that the rigorous orthodoxy of the
Order, and especially its insistence on conformity to the original
teachings of the Prophet, meant that the faith and morals which
the Prophet preached to the Bedouin of his day, and which they
accepted, were equally suited to the Bedouin of Cyrenaica, who
in all essentials were leading, and still lead, a life like to that of
the Bedouin in Arabia in the seventh century. In particular,
• [793] the refusal of the Grand Sanusi to allow the more demonstrative
forms of ecstasy, which, together with lack of organization and
[786] direction, characterize so many of the Sufi Orders of North
[157] Africa, enabled the Bedouin to adopt his teachings and ritual,
for Bedouin are an undemonstrative people and it is difficult to
imagine them piercing their cheeks with skewers, eating glass,

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[113] [1] M. M. Moreno, *Brevi Nozioni d'Islam*, 1927, p. 58.

795*

or swaying into convulsions. Indeed, it is noticeable that the [793] Orders which permit such practices, notably the 'Arusiya, [786] 'Isawiya, Rifa'iya, and Sa'adiya, so popular in the towns of [157] Libya, have made no converts among the true Bedouin.

It is unnecessary to discuss further the mystical side to the 795* Sanusiya for another reason. The Bedouin of Cyrenaica with 771 whom this book is concerned have only the slightest knowledge of either the religious teachings or the ritual of the Order, and are interested in neither. They belong to the illiterate class of the *Muntasabin*, the simple adherents of the Order who follow its Shaikh personally and politically. It is very seldom, if ever, [789] that the Bedouin know the special prayers and litanies of the [212] Order, and their use of them, if any, is restricted to getting a scribe to write them on paper so that they can sew them up in leather and tie them to their bodies. It is only a tiny educated minority who regularly recite the prayer formulas and litanies. These are the *Ikhwan*, the Brothers of the Order. They live in 795* the lodges of the Order and hold prayer-meetings there. Among the Brothers are some who have been raised to the position of Shaikhs of lodges, generally, in past times, after special training at the University of the Order at Jaghbub oasis, where they have received a diploma from the Head of the Order or from one of his family or inner circle. This inner circle, the *Khawass*, consists vaguely to-day of a few senior members of the Sanusi family and two or three learned Brothers and does not function as a Body, but in the past it was, according to Sayyid Muhammad Idris, an official Council controlling the affairs of the Order and was composed of four Shaikhs of the Order, who were not of the Sanusi family, under the presidency of the Head of the Order, who had to be a member of the founder's family. As [178] Dr. Adams points out,[1] the fact that this inner circle is no longer a determinate Body indicates a change in the character of the Order, a development of its political, to the detriment of its religious, functions. This development has favoured the interests of the Sanusi family to the disadvantage of the Order as a whole.

The *Shaikh al-Tariqa*, Head of the Order, advised in past 795* times by his Council, appoints the Shaikhs of the lodges and 793 these Shaikhs can ordain Brothers and the Brothers can receive

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[1] C. C. Adams, 'The Sanusiya Order', *Handbook on Cyrenaica*, 1944, p. 31. [113]

*795 into the Order ordinary members. This is done simply by the ● [793] two persons concerned shaking hands and reciting the *fatiha*, the opening verse of the Koran, together. These categories can hardly be regarded as grades and I can cite the authority of Sayyid Muhammad Idris to support the opinion that they have never meant more than that some persons were recognized as more learned than others and therefore better qualified to recite the longer and more advanced religious exercises.

II

*795 The Grand Sanusi's desire to create around him a society 793 living the life of primitive Islam and his missionary zeal gave an impression, enhanced by the austerity of his Bedouin followers and the remoteness of the Sahara, of excessive puritanism and fanaticism; and some writers have compared the Sanusi movement to the Wahhabi movement on account of these supposed 114 traits. Duveyrier's account,[1] used very uncritically by other *795 writers, is largely to be blamed for the exaggerated stories of 648 the secrecy, puritanism, fanaticism, power, and numbers of the Order that were current at the end of the last century and in the first decade of the present century and which much prejudiced it in the eyes of European Powers with interests in North Africa. With Duveyrier it was an axiom that any foolhardy European who got himself killed in North and Central Africa had been assassinated by Sanusi agents and that any setback to French interests was due to their propaganda.

*795 It is true that the Grand Sanusi, like the founder of the 793 Wahhabi movement, aimed at restoring what he conceived to be the original society of the Prophet. Neither was peculiar in 784 doing so, for every Muslim preacher must have the same aim. 114 The Grand Sanusi forbad the drinking of alcohol and the taking [273] of snuff and at first, though not absolutely, smoking. But all [276] Muslims are forbidden alcohol and many who are neither Sanusi nor Wahhabi think that smoking is best avoided. It is [272] untrue, as has been asserted, that the Sanusi are forbidden coffee. The Bedouin of Libya do not drink coffee, only tea, in

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[1] H. Duveyrier, *La Confrérie Musulmane de Sidi Mohammed ben 'Alî es Senoûsî et son Domaine géographique en l'Année 1300 de l'Hégire = 1883 de notre ère*, 1884.

795*

praise of which many poems have been written by Brothers of 793
the Order. The Grand Sanusi forbad music, dancing, and singing 784
in the recitations of the Order, but in this he was at one with 114
all the official spokesmen of Islam. Most reformist movements [272]
in Islam tend towards asceticism. [533]

Far from being extreme ascetics, however, the Sanusi [535]
Brothers eat and dress well, even using scent, and are amiable 795*
and merry companions. The Tunisian scholar and traveller 157
Muhammad 'Uthman al-Hashaishi, who travelled in 1896 via [785]
Malta, Tripoli, and Banghazi to Kufra to visit al-Sayyid al-Mahdi and met the leading Brothers of the time, remarks that 'they are fond of diversions, honest jesting. I have visited many of their zawiyas and I have made the acquaintance of many of their notables: I have seen only cheerful and smiling faces, welcoming me with benevolence and kindness. May God reward them!'[1]

The Grand Sanusi discouraged the trappings of poverty by 795*
his example, his exhortations, and his insistence on the Brothers 793
being self-supporting. Although the Heads of the Sanusiya 735
Order, like the Wahhabi leaders, encouraged settlement on the land, they can hardly have hoped to have greatly influenced the Bedouin to this end; but they insisted on the lodges of the Order supporting themselves by agriculture supplemented by stock-raising, and thereby took a stand against *ittikal*, the dependence for livelihood on alms and not on labour which some mendicant Orders have advocated.

The Order has always been, in fact, conventional as well as 795*
orthodox. In its early period it was essentially a missionary 797
Order with the limited aim of bringing by peaceful persuasion the Bedouin Arabs and the peoples of the Sahara and the Sudan to a fuller understanding of the beliefs and morals of Islam, while giving them at the same time the blessings of civilization: justice, peace, trade, and education. Its principles were, as Shaikh Muhammad 'Uthman says, simply 'to do good and avoid evil'.[2]

The accusation of fanaticism is not borne out by either the 795*
character of the Bedouin adherents of the Order or by its actions.

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[1] Mohammed ben Otsmane el-Hachaichi, *Voyage au Pays des Senoussia à travers La Tripolitaine et les Pays Touareg*, 1912, p. 128 (1st ed., 1903). [113]

[2] Ibid., p. 86.

*795 The desire to establish in North Africa conditions in which
● 793 Muslims might live by their own laws and under their own
798 government, as they did in Arabia under the first four Caliphs,
led the Grand Sanusi and his successors to oppose the Turkish
177 way of life and the influences and innovations of Western Christendom, but their intransigence in these matters did not imply intolerance, far less aggressiveness. Though some writers have made assertions to the contrary, the Sanusi have never shown themselves more hostile than other Muslims to Christians and Jews, and the Grand Sanusi and Sayyid al-Mahdi scrupulously avoided all political entanglements which might bring them into unfriendly relations with neighbouring States and the European Powers. The Brothers of the Order
*795 were discouraged from discussing political questions. Nor were
793 the Sanusi intolerant towards fellow Muslims who differed from
798 them. Shaikh Muhammed 'Uthman records of Sayyid al-Mahdi that 'the persons he dislikes the most are those who speak ill of Muslims'.[1] The leaders of the Sanusiya have always tolerated other and rival Orders, even when they have disapproved of their rites. The Grand Sanusi had himself been a member of a succession of Orders before he started his own and he allowed, as his successors have done, members of other Orders to belong to the Sanusiya at the same time.

*795 The leaders of the Order have also been tolerant towards the
792 cult of saints, unlike the iconoclastic Wahhabi, who have destroyed even the tombs of those nearest to the Prophet him-
798 self. The view held by the doctors of orthodox Islam is that,
776 though intercession through a saint is unlawful and the only
778 mention of him during prayers at his tomb should be to ask the mercy of God on his soul, it is permissible to show respect to his tomb and his memory. The heads of the Sanusiya have, however, always tolerated among their Bedouin followers a regard for holy men and their tombs which goes beyond mere respect. It is unlikely that they felt any repugnance to the cult, because they counted among their forbears several saints and were themselves brought up in North Africa where the cult of saints is widespread and very near to the hearts of the common people; and they could not have remonstrated with the Bedouin for believing that holy men and their tombs are sources of *baraka*,

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[1] Op. cit., p. 121.

*795 of a people to live according to their own traditions and institu-
182 tions. To-day this desire is expressed in the political language
177 of nationalism. In the past it was expressed in religious move-
171 ments. Arab nationalism is not a new phenomenon. Only its
[668] dress is new.

As will be seen in the chapters which follow, conditions in
*795 Cyrenaica were particularly favourable to the growth of a
182 politico-religious movement such as the Sanusiya became. It was cut off by deserts from neighbouring countries, it had a homogeneous population, it had a tribal system which embraced common traditions and a strong feeling of community of blood, the country was not dominated by the towns, and the Turkish administration exercised very little control over the interior. It was, as will be seen, the tribal system of the Bedouin which furnished the Order with its political foundations just as it was the tribesmen of the country whose hardiness and courage enabled it to stand up to the succession of defeats it had to endure.

The reasons for the political success of the Sanusiya Order in
*795 Cyrenaica will appear in the course of this account, and here I
● 793 wish to draw attention to one of them only. It has been said
182 that its rites and teachings were, like the Bedouin character,
[792] austere without being fanatical, and that it tolerated the cult
of saints to which the Bedouin were accustomed, the Grand
[798] Sanusi becoming, in fact, a kind of national saint; but it must be added that the acceptability of its teachings and the fact that the Grand Sanusi could at once be placed by the Bedouin in the familiar category of *Marabtin*, holy men coming to preach and settle in Cyrenaica from the west, cannot alone account for the remarkable success of the Sanusiya movement. The Bedouin of Cyrenaica had heard similar teachings before from similar teachers and had paid them the same degree of attention as they paid to the Grand Sanusi, but these earlier missionaries won only a personal and local following for themselves and their descendants, whereas the Grand Sanusi established himself and his family as leaders of a national movement, a position they have now held for three generations.
Leaving aside the remarkable personality of the Grand Sanusi
[792] and without here discussing whether the time at which he
[798] taught was particularly favourable to the growth of the move-

ment to which his teachings led, it may be said that the great 795*
difference between the Grand Sanusi and the earlier holy men 793•
whose tombs are homely landmarks all over Cyrenaica was that, 182
while they were, all of them, in the eyes of the Bedouin, Marabouts, [792]
the Grand Sanusi was also the head of an Order which [778]
gave to him and his successors an organization. Moreover, unlike the Heads of most Islamic Orders, which have rapidly disintegrated into autonomous segments without contact and common direction, they have been able to maintain this organization intact and keep control of it. This they were able to do by co-ordinating the lodges of the Order to the tribal structure.

III

The more recent Islamic Orders are to be found principally 795*
in North and West Africa. The Sanusiya is one of the most 793
recent of them. Its founder was an Algerian scholar, al-Sayyid 159
Muhammad bin 'Ali al-Sanusi al-Khattabi al-Idrisi al-Hasani,
a very remarkable man, mystic, missionary, and Marabout. 175*
The Sayyid Muhammad bin 'Ali al-Sanusi is usually spoken of in Cyrenaica as *al-Sanusi al-Kabir*, the Grand Sanusi, and I generally refer to him thus in this book.

The Grand Sanusi was born of a distinguished family of Sharifs at a village near Mustaghanim in Algeria about 1787. Early in life he became noted for his intelligence, piety, and profound learning, considered fitting ornaments to his noble birth. He studied first at Mustaghanim, then at Mazun, and later at the famous mosque school at Fez in Morocco, where he learnt theology, jurisprudence, exegesis of the Koran, and the other usual subjects of a Muslim student of the time. There he seems to have developed an interest in mysticism, having come under the influence of the Moroccan Order of the Tijaniya Darwishes. He left Fez when in the early thirties in order to make the pilgrimage to Mecca, though a Turkish biographer says that one of his reasons for leaving Morocco was to avoid possible unpleasantness with the authorities, who were alarmed lest his propaganda for the greater unity of Islam, his life's aim, might have political consequences.[1] They had small cause for alarm as his efforts seem to have made little impression on the

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[1] Salim bin 'Amir, *Majallat 'Umar al-Mukhtar*, No. II, 1943–4, p. 2.

*795 people of Fez, but, if the story is true, the suspicion of those in
• 793 authority would have been his first experience of the kind of
159 opposition he was later to encounter in Cairo and Mecca.

*175 He went from Fez to southern Algeria and thence to Qabis, Tripoli, Misurata, and Banghazi, preaching everywhere on his way. He had already gathered around him his first disciples (*Ikhwan*), mostly Algerians, and in their company he made his way to Egypt by the coastal route from Banghazi and stayed there a few weeks. He had intended to study at al-Azhar, but he seems to have aroused the jealousy of the Shaikhs of the University and to have irritated them by his reforming zeal and his speculations, and so departed for Mecca. Short though his stay in Cairo had been it is probable that the independence of the Khedive Muhammad 'Ali and the cultural and intellectual revival going on there left their mark on his mind.[1]

He remained in the Hijaz for about six years, studying under a number of Shaikhs at Mecca and al-Madina. He is said to have returned to Mustaghanim in about 1829 and not to have visited the Hijaz again till 1833. On this second visit, which lasted for eight years, he was accompanied by a considerable number of disciples from the west. He continued his reformist agitation and his studies under learned Shaikhs at Mecca. The man who influenced him most, and whose favourite pupil he became, was Sayyid Ahmad bin Idris al-Fasi, the fourth Head of the Moroccan Order of the Khadiriya or Khidriya Darwishes, a branch of the Shadhiliya Order, and later the founder of a new sub-Order of his own, the Idrisiya or Khadiriya-Idrisiya. Sayyid Ahmad Idris had aroused the hostility of the doctors of the Maliki rite at Mecca, by whom he was regarded as unorthodox, and went into exile into the Yaman, where he was accompanied for two years by the Grand Sanusi. On Sayyid Ahmad Idris's death in the Yaman, his two chief disciples organized his followers into two new sub-Orders, the Mirghaniya and the Sanusiya, the latter being organized and led by the Grand Sanusi, who established its headquarters at Mt. Abu Qubais, near Mecca, in 1837. This year is regarded as the official date of the foundation of the Order.

It will have been noted that the Grand Sanusi was influenced by a wide range of Sufi tradition and had affiliated himself to a

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[1] Salim bin 'Amir, *Majallat 'Umar al-Mukhtar*, No. I, p. 12.

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number of Orders before he founded his own. It has been recorded that he was influenced by the Moroccan Tijaniya Order and that at Mecca he became the favourite pupil of the founder of the Idrisiya Order, which derived its tenets from the basic Shadhiliya Order. In his student days he became a member of other Orders: Shadhiliya, Nasiriya, Qadariya, and perhaps others.[1] His catholicism was not peculiar among the Sufis, and in his case he seems to have joined a large variety of Orders with the deliberate intention of learning their rites and doctrines at first hand so that he could combine all that was best in each of them in a new Order which would be the crown of Sufi thought and practice. It must not be supposed that on this account his teaching was a mere amalgam of the tenets of earlier Orders. Original it was not, but it was a consistent and carefully thought out way of life.[2]

The new Sanusiya Order made such rapid progress, especially among the Bedouin of the Hijaz,[3] that it excited the jealousy and fear of the various authorities in Mecca, the *'Ulama*, the Sharifs, and the Turkish Administration. There can be little doubt that the real objections to the Order were that it threatened the prestige and privileges of these authorities, but they were framed in less revealing language. It seems to have been held against the Order that it lowered Sufi standards to accommodate itself to Bedouin laxity in religious matters, and that it verged on heresy. [798]

Faced with serious opposition the Grand Sanusi did what his teacher Sayyid Ahmad Idris had done in similar circumstances: he left the Hijaz, in about 1841, accompanied by many of his disciples, to return to his native land. After spending some months in Cairo, he continued his journey westwards to Siwa oasis, where he was taken sick and spent several weeks recuperating and instructing the people of the oasis in the faith. In the following year he reached Tripoli by the desert route. On his way to Qabis from that town he heard of the new French advances in his homeland and decided in view of them to return to Tripoli and thence to Banghazi. It would appear therefore

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[1] Ibid., p. 6; Adams, op. cit., p. 22.

[2] Carlo Giglio, *La Confraternità Senussita dalle sue Origini ad Oggi*, 1932, p. 17.

[3] A. Le Chatelier, *Les Confréries Musulmanes du Hedjaz*, 1887, *passim.*

*795 that he did not choose Cyrenaica as his field of labour but was
• 793 compelled to settle in Libya for a time because the road to the
159 west was closed by the French and the road to the east by the
*175 authorities in Cairo and Mecca. The Grand Sanusi was a
cosmopolitan, a townsman, and more at home in the schools and libraries of Fez, Cairo, and Mecca than amid the lentisk and juniper of the Cyrenaican plateau or the thyme and wormwood of its rolling plains. Even after founding in 1843 what has become the Mother Lodge of the Order, al-Zawiya al-Baida, on the central Cyrenaican plateau, not far from the ancient city of Cyrene, and while the Sanusi movement was still young in the country, he returned in 1846 to Mecca and stayed there till 1853. Altogether he spent only about ten years of his teaching life in Cyrenaica, whereas he spent some twenty years in the Hijaz.

On his return to Cyrenaica he seems to have felt the need for greater solitude. He was then nearing seventy years of age and doubtless felt that what was left to him of life should be given
*[648] to contemplation, prayer, and study. It may be true also, as is
commonly stated in books written by Europeans, that he desired to place a wide stretch of desert between himself and the Turkish authorities who, as the Sanusiya movement grew, began to take greater interest in it. He therefore first went to live for a short while at al-'Azziyyat on the southern edge of the plateau, where he built a zawiya, and afterwards at Jaghbub, about 160 km. from the sea.

[873] Jaghbub, now to become the centre of the Order and the seat of an Islamic University second only in Africa to al-Azhar, was till 1856, when the Grand Sanusi made it his seat, an uninhabited oasis, in which the water was brackish, highly sulphurous, and insufficient to irrigate more than a small area of gardens. It was not a place for luxurious living, though it seems to have been healthy and, unlike Siwa, free from malaria; but it had certain political advantages. It was out of reach of
*[648] the Turkish, French, or Egyptian governments, it was on the
[487] main pilgrimage route from North-west Africa through Egypt
to Mecca, and this pilgrimage route bisected at the oasis one of the trade routes from the coast to the Sahara and the Sudan. Moreover, since Cyrenaica is a peninsula, it was the most central point he could have chosen at that time to be in equal

touch with the lodges of his Order in Cyrenaica, Tripolitania, the Western Desert of Egypt, and the Sudan.

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
Scale
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500
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Italian expansion into Tripolitania and Cyrenaica
1911 – 1932
TUNISIA
TRIPOLITANIA
CYRENAICA
MOROCCO
ALGERIA
Al-Baida (1843)
Mizda
Al-Tabaqa
Saukna
Jaghbub (1856)
Jalu
British line of defence 1914-1917
French expansion into the Sahara
1902 – 1914
Wau-al-Kabir
Kufra (1895)
FEZZAN
EGYPT
Kawar
TIBESTI
Qiru (1899)
ANGLO EGYPTIAN SUDAN
BORKU
ENNEDI
KANEM
FRENCH SAHARA
CHAD
WADAI
DARFUR
Thin arrows indicate Sanusiya expansion
Thick arrows indicate movements of European Powers

The Spread of the Sanusiya in North Africa.

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In moving the seat of his Order to Jaghbub, the Grand Sanusi was probably most influenced by his decision to direct his missionary propaganda southwards. It is understandable that he should have made this decision. His was a missionary mind and the Order he had founded a missionary Order, and the pagan and semi-pagan countries of the Sahara and the Sudan, and of Equatorial Africa beyond them, offered endless scope for conversion to the faith. Moreover, his Order was already reaching the limits of its expansion in North Africa. It had won over the nomad and semi-nomad Bedouin tribes of Cyrenaica, Tripolitania, and Egypt, and the oases folk under their influence, but was not making, and was not even in its heyday to make, much impression on the peasants and townsmen up against whom it now found itself in Northern Tripolitania and the Nile Valley. Dammed to west and east the Order

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[facing P. 16]



THE TOMB OF THE GRAND SANUSI (HASANAIN PASHA)

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*795 poured its vitality southwards along the trade routes to the
793 interior of Africa, into Fazzan and the various regions that are
797 to-day called the French Sahara and French Equatorial Africa.
159 Until France opened up the Atlantic seaboard, much of the
*175 Central African trade found its way along the oases-routes to
the ports of Cyrenaica and Tripolitania and there were, therefore, well-established social connexions running from the Bedouin tribes of Cyrenaica and southern Tripolitania through the oases-dwellers to the tribes of the interior, for the nomads of Libya controlled the routes and to a large extent supplied the transport for the caravans. These connexions allowed an easy ingress to the Sanusiya. The two Cyrenaican tribes who chiefly traded with the Sahara, the Majabra and the Zuwaya of the oases of Jalu and al-Jikharra, had already been won over to the Order. The Zuwaya, who had date groves in the distant oasis archipelago of Kufra, over 700 km. to the south of Jaghbub, had already promised the Grand Sanusi a liberal donation of palms and water if he would build a zawiya there, and he had sent one of his followers to supervise the erection at al-Jauf of a lodge which became known as Zawiyat al-Ustad. Also, the Order had gained a foothold in the Wadai. While still a student at Mecca the Grand Sanusi had made friends with Muhammad Sharif, a prince of the Wadai, who in 1838 became Sultan of that country and furthered the interests of the Order there. It is said also that the Grand Sanusi bought a caravan of slaves on its way from the Wadai through Jaghbub to the coast and, having freed and educated them, sent them back to the Wadai as his missionaries.[1] The Order was also infiltrating from Mizda in southern Tripolitania, where a lodge was founded in 1845, and from the lodges in the oases of the Sirtican hinterland into Fazzan.

*795 In Jaghbub oasis the Grand Sanusi set about the construc-
793 tion of his headquarters, a large mass of stone buildings, some
of them two-storied, enclosing a mosque and school which were,
159 for Cyrenaica, on an imposing scale. Around these central
*175 buildings and courts were the houses of the *Ikhwan*, many of
346 them teachers in the school, of the students, of whom Shaikh
Muhammad 'Uthman says that there were over 300,[2] and of the Sayyid's family. There were also guest-rooms, quarters for the

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[1] Duveyrier, op. cit., pp. 18–19.

[2] Op. cit., p. 88.

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slaves, kitchens, and wells. The oasis depression was studded 793 •
with date palms and just outside the main entrance to the village 159
were small irrigated gardens and wind-mills. The people had 175*
to use the brackish water for ordinary purposes, but sufficient [346]
fresh water for tea was obtained from infrequent showers by [241]
hollowing out cisterns in the rocks at the top of the western [379]
escarpment of the oasis. [312]

The Grand Sanusi was not only a very learned man and a [217]
writer of distinction but also a bibliophile with a fine library of some 8,000 volumes,[1] mostly works on Islamic law and jurisprudence, mysticism, philosophy, history, koranic exegesis, poetry, and astronomy and astrology. Round him were many men capable of making good use of this substantial library. Indeed, it would have been difficult to have found anywhere in the Islamic world at that time, outside Cairo, a circle of better scholars. Poetry was one of the arts most cultivated at the oasis and I have been told by Arabs that it reached a high level of excellence. Shaikh Muhammad 'Uthman, himself a poet, wrote that at Jaghbub one meets 'literary men of distinction, whose writings eclipse those of the poets of Iraq and of Andalousia'.[2]

The whole community at Jaghbub may have numbered round about 1,000, but it is not possible to make more than a guess at the figure. As the oasis produces little except dates, the supply problem must have been considerable, and we know that the Grand Sanusi kept herds of camels to the west of the oasis, where there is scrub grazing, and at al-'Azziyyat, to transport supplies from the coast. The community lived very largely on the surplus revenues, mostly goods in kind, sent annually by all the zawiyas of Cyrenaica.

The community was centred round the University. It was, [873]
in fact, almost purely a University society, and its importance as such in the history of the Sanusiya Order is very considerable. Here, under his personal supervision and the supervision of his disciples, far from worldly distractions, the Grand Sanusi was able to train the future leaders of the Order. The Shaikhs of the lodges of the Order were appointed by him from among his intimate circle of disciples, many of whom had followed him

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[1] Duveyrier, op. cit., p. 24; Muhammad bin 'Uthman, op. cit., p. 88; Sir Richard Burton, *Personal Narrative of a Pilgrimage to al-Madinah and Meccah* (Memorial Edition), 1893, vol. ii, pp. 24–5.

[2] Op. cit., p. 88.

*795 from Algeria and the other countries of the Maghrib on his
● 793 travels backwards and forwards to Arabia. He found in
159 Cyrenaica a tribal structure of a simple kind on which it was
*175 possible to build a missionary organization, but not out of
which it could be built. He brought this organization with him
to Cyrenaica, a band of devoted followers whose allegiance had
been tried by many vicissitudes. It must be remembered also
that these intimates of the Grand Sanusi were foreigners to the
Bedouin of Cyrenaica, with whom they had no ties of kinship,
so that they stood always outside the tribal system and were
not involved in the ancient loyalties and feuds inherent in
Bedouin society. The missionary organization, the Sanusiya
*795 Order, was separate from the tribal system, and by centring
793 it in the distant oasis of Jaghbub the Grand Sanusi prevented it
797 from becoming identified with any one tribe or section of the
159 country, as it might have become had it been centred in Cyrenaica
*175 proper. As we will see, it was the local attachment of the tribes
to the zawiyas in their territories, and the attachment of the
Shaikhs of these zawiyas to the Head of the Order, which made
the Order so effective a missionary Body, and eventually
enabled it to become a political force.

The Grand Sanusi died at Jaghbub on 7 September 1859 and
*795 was buried there. Later a magnificent shrine, furnished with
793 ornate trappings, was erected over his bones and was sur-
159 mounted with a white cupola, which gleams several miles away
*175 as one approaches the oasis. The shrine is of Egyptian craft-
764 manship and seems incongruous in its desert surroundings and
[177] unfamiliar among a simple people.

There can be no gainsaying that al-Sayyid Muhammad bin
*795 'Ali al-Sanusi was a great man and his life's work a great
793 achievement. He is said to have been tall and of a distinguished
159 appearance, an eloquent speaker, and a wise teacher.[1] His
religious personality may be estimated by the fact that many
Algerians, Tunisians, and Moroccans were so inspired by his
teaching and example that they left their homes and followed
him on his travels and at his orders went as missionaries into
new lands, and by the fact that the Bedouin of Arabia and
Libya, who are a reserved and unheeding people, accepted him
as their guide in things both spiritual and temporal.

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[1] Adams, op. cit., p. 10.

The mere physical achievement of the man was remarkable. 795*
He had studied assiduously since he was a small boy in the 793 •
Koranic school of his home and in other schools of North Africa 159
and Arabia, and was still acquiring and sifting knowledge in his 175*
library at Jaghbub up to his death. He had taught in the schools
in Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Tripolitania, Cyrenaica, Egypt,
the Hijaz, and the Yaman. Months of his life had been spent
in travelling by the slow camel caravans of those days. He had [788]
thrice made the pilgrimage to Mecca. In spite of these activities
he had found time to write a number of treatises. He had started his career as the head of a new missionary Order late in life—he was about 50 years of age when he founded his first zawiya in Arabia, and in the next twenty years he had made the Sanusiya the dominant Order in western Arabia and in North Africa from the Nile Valley to the borders of Tunisia and from the Mediterranean to the Sahara. When he died it was still intensifying its activities in the areas where it was already dominant, building everywhere new lodges, and was still expanding, mainly into the Sahara and the Sudan.

IV

When the Grand Sanusi died his two surviving sons, al-Sayyid Muhammad al-Mahdi and al-Sayyid Muhammad al-Sharif, were minors, so a regency of ten Shaikhs was appointed to control the affairs of the Order till the elder, Muhammad al-Mahdi, was old enough to take over their direction. When he did so he dealt primarily with the general affairs of the Order, leaving religious instruction in the hands of his brother.

The Grand Sanusi had been typical of the great itinerant teachers of his day: international in outlook and intent on the pursuit of holiness and learning rather than guided by secular distractions and ambitions. Mecca was the centre of his world and to it he tended always to gravitate. The Sayyid al-Mahdi was more definitely a Cyrenaican. Born in 1844 in a cave at Massa, near the Cyrenaican Mother Lodge of al-Baida, he was brought up among the religious families of the country and among the Bedouin. He studied under his father, the erudite Moroccan Sidi Ahmad al-Rifi, Sidi 'Ali bin 'abd al-Maula, Sidi 'Umran bin Baraka, and others of his father's circle of pupil-

[TEXT CONTINUED ON PAGE 21]

[P.20]
*795
● 793
*175


al-Sayyid Muhammad bin 'Ali al-Sanusi (1787–1859)
al-Sayyid Muhammad al-Mahdi (1844–1902)
al-Sayyid Muhammad al-Sharif (1846–1896)
al-Sayyid Muhammad Idris (1889–)
al-Sayyid Muhammad al-Rida (1890–)
al-Sayyid Ahmad al-Sharif (1873–1933)
al-Sayyid Muhammad 'Abid (1881–1939)
al-Sayyid 'Ali al-Khattab (1888–1918)
al-Sayyid Muhammad Hilal (1893–1929)
al-Sayyid Muhammad Safi al-Din (1895–)
al-Sayyid al-Saddiq (1908–)
al-Sayyid al-Hasan (1913–1938
al-Sayyid Shams al-Din (1908–)
al-Sayyid al-Hasan (1913–)

savants, and later at Mecca. He is said to have been an eloquent 795*
and inspiring leader and he was evidently an able organizer. 793 •
Unlike his father the Grand Sanusi and his nephew Sayyid 159
Ahmad al-Sharif he has left no writings behind and he seems 175*
to have had less interest than they in literature and speculation.
He lived an austere life and was considered by his followers to
have been a saint and worker of miracles as great, or greater,
than his father.

The Order expanded considerably under Sayyid al-Mahdi's
leadership, particularly into the Sahara and the Sudan, and its
greatly extended missionary enterprises demanded his personal
attention. The conversion of the heathen and semi-heathen [797]
tribes of these regions created political problems and the trading
activities of the Order required organization. The trade routes [487]
through the Libyan oases to the coast had increased in importance
since the rise of the Sudanese Mahdi in 1881 had closed
the Nile route. Personal direction was difficult from Jaghbub,
so in 1895 Sayyid al-Mahdi moved the seat of the Order to
Kufra, a more central position than Jaghbub in the theocratic
empire being slowly built up. He first went to live at the
zawiya of al-Ustad but shortly afterwards built a new zawiya,
in which he resided, on a site which became known as al-Taj.
He departed from Jaghbub amid the lamentations of his
followers, only some of whom he was able to take with him to
Kufra, leaving the rest behind at Jaghbub, with his nephew al-Sayyid
Muhammad 'Abid as his titular representative there. 175*

There are few places in the world so remote as Kufra oasis, 795*
but it was at the centre of the Sanusi empire and the meeting- 793
place of a number of important desert routes. Before Sayyid 159
al-Mahdi made it the seat of his Order, Kufra had been little 487
more than a watering place for caravans and the centre for the 437
wandering Tibbu tribes of the region, though the Zuwaya of [361]
al-Jikharra went there each year to collect dates. It now became
an emporium through which caravans were constantly passing
and exchange was carried on. The Sanusiya profited both
by directly engaging in trade and transport and through
customs dues.

The little village of mud and palmwood houses at al-Taj also 795*
became a centre of religious life and propaganda. The mis- 793
sionary efforts of the Order intensified all over Fazzan and into 159
175*
[797]

*795 the territories of Kawar, Tibesti, Borku, Ennedi, Darfur,
793 Wadai, Kanem, Chad, the Azger, the Air, and Baghirmi. Its
797 teachings were spread as far as Senegal. The work of organizing
159 this propaganda fell largely to Sayyid al-Mahdi's two principal
*175 lieutenants. Sidi Muhammad al-Barrani operated in Kanem,
where he founded a lodge at Bir Alali on the route to Chad and
*795 organized bands among the Aulad Suliman, Zuwaya, Majabra,
793 Tibbu, and especially the Tuwariq, to oppose the advance of
159 the French into Central Africa; and afterwards in the Borku.
Muhammad al-Sunni, and his son al-Mahdi, operated in Bornu
*175 and Baghirmi, where he entered into relations, politically un-
*648 fruitful, with the Sultans of those countries, and in the Wadai,
where he strengthened the good relations existing between the
Sultan of that country and Sayyid al-Mahdi. In 1899 Sayyid
al-Mahdi transferred the seat of his Order to Qiru (or Quru)
oasis, between Borku and Tibesti, to direct better its propaganda,
to administer the extensive regions won to it, and to organize
resistance to the French.

It is sometimes said in European books that one reason why
[114] Sayyid al-Mahdi went from Jaghbub to Kufra was his desire
to increase the distance between himself and the Turkish
Administration of Cyrenaica, but I have not found any evidence
to support this view. On the other hand there can be no doubt
that he was alarmed by the military and political activities of
the French, about which he seems to have been well informed.
The French were hastening to reach the limits of the sphere
allotted to them by the agreements with England of 1898 and
1899 about the partition of Central Africa. In January 1902
they seized Bir Alali (Kanem) and destroyed the Sanusiya
zawiya there. At the end of May, or at the beginning of June,
in the same year Sayyid al-Mahdi died. His brother, Sayyid
Muhammad al-Sharif, had predeceased him at Jaghbub in
1896.

*795 In general the energies of the Sayyid al-Mahdi had been
793 directed to the Sahara and the Sudan and the main events during
159 his headship of the Order took place off the Cyrenaican stage.
I have not thought it necessary, therefore, to give more than a
*175 brief summary of his career and of the political history of the
Order in Central Africa. He saw the Order his father had
founded rise under his direction to the height of its expansion

and political importance. Except for two or three lodges 795*
founded after his death the distribution of the lodges shown on 793
the map—two in Algeria, and some elsewhere which were not 159
completed, are not marked—is that of 1902. All the Bedouin 175*
of Cyrenaica and of the Sirtica, and most of those in the Western Desert of Egypt followed the Order and there was no part of these regions which had not established in it a Sanusiya lodge; and even in the towns of Cyrenaica it had an influential following in the more cultured administrative and commercial circles. In southern Tripolitania the Order had slowly increased its authority and advanced it to the west, while it was the dominant power in Fazzan and in the central Sahara. It had retained a powerful following among the Bedouin of the Hijaz.

After Sayyid al-Mahdi's death the fortunes of the Order 795*
declined. This was chiefly due to the attack on it by the powers 793
of Europe whose greed for possessions in Africa and Asia was 159
bringing them rapidly to disaster. For his part Sayyid al-Mahdi 175*
showed himself anxious to avoid any action which might enable 648*
these powers to accuse him of political designs. He wished only to be left alone to worship God according to the teachings of his Prophet, and when in the end he fought the French it was in defence of the religious life as he understood it. In its remarkable diffusion in North and Central Africa the Order never once resorted to force to back its missionary labours. Shaikh Muhammad 'Uthman says of Sayyid al-Mahdi that the only orders he gave his followers were to pray and to obey God and His Prophet, that he avoided making any show of his power, considerable though it was, and that he held himself apart from political questions, fleeing from all considerations of that kind.[1] The Sanusiya Order co-operated with the Turks in the administration of Cyrenaica, although the Sanusi family and the Brothers of the Order disapproved of their way of life, but it resisted Turkish demands for assistance in their war of 1876–8 against the Russians. It refused the aid asked for by 'Arabi Pasha in Egypt in 1882, and by the Sudanese Mahdi in 1883, against the British. Sayyid al-Mahdi likewise rejected diplomatic overtures by the Italians and Germans. But when the French invaded its Saharan territories and destroyed its religious houses, and when later the Italians, also without

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[1] Op. cit., pp. 118–19.

[TEXT CONTINUED ON PAGE 26]

*795

*175 provocation, did the same in Cyrenaica, the Order had no
[159] choice but to resist.

• [793] But though it was attacks from the outside which destroyed
*[648] the theocratic empire of the Sanusiya, it may be considered doubtful whether in any case such extensive territories could have been maintained under single direction. The economic and political organization of the Order was crude, even when elaborated in the days of Sayyid al-Mahdi in response to increased trading activities and to the need of maintaining peace in the petty and barbarous states that had come under its influence. Its administrative machinery was at no time adequate for effective control over such wide domains, with their poor communications and their manifold tribal, racial,
[578] and cultural divergencies. To these weaknesses must be added, after Sayyid al-Mahdi's death, personal rivalries within the Sanusi family on the lines of which cracks began to appear in the loose empire, and it is probable that even if it had not been attacked by the Powers of Europe it would have broken up into a number of principalities, or spheres of religious influence, ruled by various members of the family. It might indeed be
*[648] possible to sustain the thesis that it was the Italian occupation
[182] of Libya which prevented the complete break-up of the Order by rallying the outraged sentiment of the Bedouin to its side as the symbol of their common resistance to conquest and alien rule.

The administrative organization of the Order in the time of Sayyid al-Mahdi was simple indeed. Each lodge of the Order
[794] lived on its own revenues, derived from endowments, tithes, contributions of money, goods, transport, and labour, and sent its surplus to Jaghbub and Kufra for the maintenance of the University and of the Sanusi family and for the general purposes
[628] of the Order. The Shaikh of each lodge arbitrated in disputes in the district in which it was situated and could generally wield spiritual sanctions sufficiently weighty to compel acceptance of his awards. The Shaikh of a lodge was appointed by the head of the Order and was responsible to him. There was, however, so little centralized planning that new lodges seem occasionally to have been founded by the initiative of influential families without the head of the Order hearing of the new foundation till its completion. In the more distant parts

the lodges were largely autonomous, or came under the control 795*
of a local Mother Lodge, such as Mizda in Tripolitania and Abu 175*
Qubais in Arabia. After the death of Sayyid al-Mahdi, a member
of the Sanusi family sometimes installed himself as local
director of the affairs of the Order, as Sayyid Muhammad 'Abid
did in Fazzan. Without going into further detail it may be
said that though central control existed it was cumbersome
and that though there was an organization it was inadequate
to deal with situations such as that which faced the Order
on the death of Sayyid al-Mahdi, which demanded a rapid
marshalling of its dispersed resources.

V

The dynastic situation which had formed after the death of 795*
the Grand Sanusi formed again after the death of Sayyid al- 793 ●
Mahdi: his surviving sons, Sayyid Muhammad Idris and Sayyid 175*
Muhammad al-Rida, were minors. The leadership of the Order
therefore passed to Sayyid Ahmad al-Sharif, son of Sayyid
Muhammad al-Sharif, Sayyid al-Mahdi's younger brother;
though for the first few years its political direction seems to
have been largely in the hands of the experienced old Shaikh
Ahmad al-Rifi, the last of the intimates of the Grand Sanusi
and the principal adviser of Sayyid al-Mahdi.

Sayyid Ahmad al-Sharif's leadership of the Order falls into 795*
three periods, from 1902 to 1912 when he was resisting the 793
French in the Sahara, from 1912 to 1918 when he was in 175*
Cyrenaica directing the Bedouin against the Italians and the 159
British, and from 1918, when he went into exile, to 1933, the 648*
year of his death at al-Madina in Arabia. It is only the second
period with which this book is directly concerned and I will [128]
therefore summarize very briefly the events in the Sahara,
leaving to a future chapter a more detailed account of the events
in Libya which led to the Sayyid's appearance in Cyrenaica at
the head of the Sanusiya Militant.

The French advance continued. After the loss of Bir Alali in 795*
1902 Sayyid Ahmad moved his headquarters from Qiru back 175*
to Kufra, where he was protected by an immense desert and 648*
diplomatic immunity, since the British took the view that the [159]
oasis belonged to Turkey. In 1906 the French took Kawar and [793]

The Turkish Administration was centred in the towns but operated, 632
as will be explained later, through the contacts of its local 648*
officials, who were generally Arabs of the country, with the leading 571
tribal Shaikhs, with whom they made friends. These officials 369
were townsmen or sons of Bedouin who had received an urban
education and they acted as links between the citizen communities
and the Bedouin. Through Bedouin relations with
town merchants and officials what was happening in the world
outside Cyrenaica percolated to the most distant tents. Another 795*
channel of political and cultural infiltration was the network of 571
Sanusiya lodges. The Shaikh of the Sanusiya lodge at Banghazi 648*
was regarded as the ambassador of the head of the Order to the 177
Governor of Cyrenaica and he was chosen for qualities which 632
fitted him for this role. He was consulted by the Governor on 793
matters in which the tribes were involved, and through him 369
and the Brothers of the lodges of the towns news of the outside
world reached the Head of the Order in the distant oasis of
Kufra and the Heads of the local lodges, whose relations with
the Bedouin in their localities were intimate. Thus, as will be
seen, the Bedouin had a general idea of what the revolution of
the 'Young Turks' meant and were aware of the impending crisis
long before the Italian attack on their country was delivered.
But though maintaining communications with the towns, 632
neither the tribal Shaikhs nor the Sanusiya allowed themselves 571
to be subordinated to them or identified themselves with urban 795
interests. The Bedouin Shaikh did not, like the Syrian landowner, 369
feel any need to have a town house, and the Sanusiya
ever remained a country and Bedouin Order and directed its
affairs from the desert.

Town and country kept apart, with the towns dependent on 632
the country and not the country on the towns, because there 369
was in Cyrenaica no client peasantry bound by debt, need of 565
protection, and trade monopoly to the towns. The Bedouin
did not settle on the land where they would be an easy prey to
the usurer, overseer, and tax collector. Those who were defeated [167]
in the great tribal wars of the past and in the inter-tribal and
inter-sectional fighting of more recent times migrated to Egypt
and settled there as *fallahin*, and not in Cyrenaica. In Cyrenaica 565
there is not the spur of adverse climatic conditions or the lash 167
of land shortage to drive them to depart from their ancient

565 Arabian ways. In Egypt necessity has slowly subjugated the
167 exiles to the peasant yoke. They long resisted but, like the
Bedouin nomads coming from the Sinai Peninsula, had in the
end to submit or perish. The absence of a substantial peasantry
in Cyrenaica is one of the characteristics which most distinguish
it from the Arab societies of Palestine, Syria, Iraq, Egypt, and
565 the Maghrib. The peasant can be dominated. He is fixed to the
earth and can be made to surrender it and till it for others. The
Cyrenaican Bedouin is fixed to no place and cannot be forced to
sell his birthright by bad seasons or intimidation. This has
565 meant that there have not been in Cyrenaica any social enclaves
632 attached to the towns through which the towns and administrative
centres could lord it over the Bedouin. Outside the towns
*[648] all is Bedouin and the Turkish Administration, and afterwards
[619] the Italian Administration, found that they could not get a
grip on the Bedouin of Cyrenaica as they could on the peasantry
of Tripolitania.

632 Nevertheless the towns and the Turkish, and later the Italian,
*648 Administration in them affected the tribal system by acting as
619 a pull on those tribal segments which lived nearest to them, so
that the tribes which lay between the towns and the steppe
were attracted towards one or other of these poles. The political
structure of Cyrenaica as a whole exercised in this way a significant
influence on the segmentary tribal system.

IV

619 The Bedouin who became followers of the Sanusiya Order
178 and whose country and way of life I have described are divided
into tribes and tribal sections owning different tracts of the
country. This tribal system existed in Cyrenaica long before
• [793] the Grand Sanusi preached there and it continued to exist after
*[795] his grandson Sayyid Muhammad Idris had fled the country
and the Sanusiya Order had been abolished and its lodges
destroyed by the Italians. It is the fundamental structure of
Bedouin society which the Sulaimid tribes brought with them
from Arabia.

619 The Bedouin of Cyrenaica are Arabs. The Arabian tribes
101 who conquered the country and settled in it mixed with the
144 indigenous Berbers, as is evident in their physical features to-

619 The figures for the free tribes include attached client groups,
162 for the principal of which estimates are also given separately.
[127] The figures are taken from Col. De Agostini's monograph. The
provenance of the chief Bedouin tribes of Tripolitania and of the fringes of Fazzan who are Sanusi, or sympathetic to the Sanusiya, is shown, likewise in relation to the distribution of Sanusiya lodges, on the map on page 52.

VI

619 Although there were in the past intertribal wars and feuds
[671] which have lasted into the present time, and in spite of the
difference in status between free and client tribes, there were
[574] laws of the tents which gave every Bedouin the freedom of the whole country, and there was much coming and going between the tribes and exchange of hospitality, especially in the grazing grounds where sections with distinct territories on the plateau shared common pasturage to the south of it, and where the necessities of Bedouin life, watering at wells in transit, the crossing of another tribe's territory on the way to markets, the pursuit of straying camels, and the need to sow where rain fell, imposed a recognition of individual rights without regard to tribal affiliations or social status. Had it not been so, the Grand
● [793] Sanusi could not have built on the tribal system his inclusive organization, for there would have been no foundations in
*[795] culture, social structure, and sentiment, on which to build.

128 My inclinations as an anthropologist are to discuss at some length the tribal and kinship systems and the life of the tents,
619 but I refrain from giving more than a bare outline of the tribal system, and I neglect altogether kinship and the life of the tents, because, however interesting detail about these matters might be to the ethnologist, a knowledge of them is, I think, unnecessary for an understanding of the development of the Sanusiya Order in Cyrenaica. I discuss the structure of the Cyrenaican tribe therefore only in so far as it is relevant to this general theme.[1]

619 Use of the term 'tribe' in Cyrenaica, even if it be restricted to the big free tribes, is always to some extent arbitrary for the political structure is highly segmentary. Nevertheless, though

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[1] For a more general account see Savarese, op. cit., Pt. II, *passim*.

[P.62]

CHAPTER III

THE SANUSIYA AND THE TRIBES

I

793 WHEN the Grand Sanusi came to preach in Cyrenaica he found
619 the kind of society I have outlined: a congeries of tribes without
law or effective government, for the Turks had little control
over the interior, but with like values and habits and a community
of life which crossed tribal boundaries. The Bedouin to
[181] whom he preached were simple people living the austere and
monotonous life of the tents, with that savage character which
has been so often portrayed, but also with those noble qualities
which have seldom failed to evoke admiration from those who
have lived among them. They were profoundly ignorant about
[177] the outside world and also—which is what touched the heart of
[797] the Grand Sanusi—about the faith of their fathers, and to this
matter I must now return, since the Sanusiya was a missionary
Order and can only be understood as such.

771 Though the Bedouin professed Islam before the Grand Sanusi
influenced them by his teaching, they were almost totally
[797] ignorant of its doctrinal content, rites, or ritual and moral
duties, and it is safe to assume that they did not obey its precepts.
It is safe to assume this because even to-day, after a
century of Sanusiya instruction, the Bedouin perform their
religious duties in a very perfunctory way, if at all, and when
Muslim law is at variance with tribal custom they follow tribal
custom. In saying that they are lax, I do not suggest that they
[186] are not very sincere, Muslims. They are proud of being Muslims
and consider themselves greatly superior to Christians, while
they are contemptuous of Jews. Nevertheless, though they
would not belittle, the Cyrenaican Bedouin feel no embarrassment
at neglecting, the duties obligatory on every Muslim.
The Confession of Faith is known to all and implicitly accepted
by all. It imposes no irksome restrictions or tiresome duties.
But they almost completely neglect—I speak of the more
[782] nomadic sections whom I know best, but it is probably true of
most Cyrenaican Bedouin—their daily prayers, a duty which is

771 which often contrasts so strikingly with their poverty and rags and what Paolo Della Cella describes as their 'excessive and habitual filth'.[1]

791 It is important that it should be understood that the Bedouin
797 of Cyrenaica were Muslim, at any rate by allegiance if not by instruction, before the Grand Sanusi propagated the faith among
● 793 them, because otherwise it would be difficult to account for
*795 their ready acceptance of his guidance. He was not appealing to a pagan people to embrace Islam, but to a Muslim people to show in their lives the faith they professed. It was his achievement to have given their religion organized form and direction, and by so doing to have exercised a persistent and transformative influence on their morals; for if the Bedouin neglect religious duties to-day and are by peasant and urban standards ignorant, loud, and lawless, it can be imagined that they were troublesome indeed before the Grand Sanusi and Sayyid al-Mahdi had taught them something of the duties of their faith and had softened the harshness of their customs. That the Sanusiya made a big difference to their way of life cannot be doubted. Shaikh Muhammad 'Uthman tells us of the Bedouin of Cyrenaica that 'They are very good-natured and of a cheerful disposition. They have a profound reverence for the Shaikh Sidi al-Mahdi, and they fear God and His Prophet. One is in perfect security among them; a stranger, an explorer, has he even loads of gold or silver, has nothing to fear from them.' He also says, and for the same reason, that there were peace and security for caravans in the Wadai and in those parts of the Sahara where the Sanusiya was established; and he adds that Sayyid al-Mahdi had achieved these remarkable results by the exercise of spiritual authority only, and not by force, 'as an Amir or Sultan would have done'. As for the citizens of Banghazi, of whom the Tunisian traveller had a very poor opinion, he says that they were proud, inhospitable, and lazy, and would still have been plunged in ignorance and without a vestige of civilization or of religious education 'if the goodness of God had not sent them the Sanusiya fraternity, which contributed much to their moral regeneration'.[2] Even Italian authors have to admit that the Sanusiya did much for the people

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[1] Op. cit., p. 109.

[2] Op. cit., pp. 52, 59, 62, and 116-17.

of Cyrenaica.[1] The Bedouin remember with gratitude, as I have 771
often heard them declare, the moral and cultural benefits 797
brought to them by the Order. If they have fallen from the low 793•
religious and literary standards to which the Sanusiya raised a 795*
fraction of them it is due to the virtual extinction of its teaching office during their long struggle with the Italians.

II

The Bedouin the Grand Sanusi found in Cyrenaica were not 771
only Muslims but also inveterate devotees of saints, the 792
Marabtin (sing. *Marabat*) or Marabouts, as they are called in 793
European accounts of North Africa, and the Grand Sanusi was 776
in the long tradition of these holy men. Therefore, although I 778
have touched on the matter in Chapter I, I need not excuse myself for treating it again in its Cyrenaican context, for Bedouin attachment to the Sanusiya springs from their personal devotion to the Grand Sanusi and his family, and not the other way round, and the Grand Sanusi derived his sanctity, and thereby his power, from the fact that he was a Marabout. The Bedouin are familiar with saints and ignorant of Orders. To them the Grand Sanusi was a saint and wonderworker, and a man with *baraka*, an ample measure of God's grace which flowed through him to ordinary folk ; but there was nothing extraordinary about him. They knew his kind of old. When he died his tomb became a shrine, the largest and richest in Cyrenaica it is true, but only one among very many, dating from the Companions of the Prophet Muhammad, through the Martyrs who were killed fighting for the faith in Cyrenaica, to the pious and learned
men of yesterday and the day before. His successors, by their [613]
kinship with him, and in virtue of their spiritual legacy from him, became heirs to his *baraka* ; and so, to a lesser degree, have the heirs of the other religious teachers who came to Cyrenaica from the west, who died and were buried there, and whose descendants are the *Marabtin bil baraka* lineages of to-day. The authority the Grand Sanusi had over the Bedouin of Arabia and North Africa can be parallelled by the careers of many holy

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[1] Giuseppe Macaluso, *Turchi, Senussi e Italiani in Libia*, 1930, p. 32 ; Giglio, op. cit., p. 22 ; and Arcangelo Ghisleri (quoting Andrea Pedretti), *Tripolitania e Cirenaica dal Mediterraneo al Sahara*, 1912, p. 132. [113]

771 men in North Africa whose families still retain much wealth and
792 influence. It was this Marabout status of the Grand Sanusi in
793 the eyes of the Bedouin which won him their respect: it was the
776 organization of the Sanusiya Order, an organization the earlier
778 Marabouts did not have, which enabled him to turn this respect
into a theocracy.

*175. There is more than one explanation of the origin of the word
792 '*Marabat*'. That generally accepted is that it derives from the
root RBT, to bind, and hence from '*ribat*', a fortified convent,
619 inhabited by warrior-monks, found on the marches of Islam in
[192] its early days of expansion by arms. The word later became
attached to the tribes which settled in Andalousia under the
leadership of the Saharan tribe of the Sanhaja and was corrupted
into the European 'Almoravides'. After the fall of the Sanhaja
dynasty in the twelfth century part of the *Marabtin* tribes fell
back into central and southern Morocco, whence many individuals
moved eastwards. Some settled in Cyrenaica,
generally on their return from the pilgrimage to Mecca, and
their fanaticism, asceticism, ability to read and write, and thaumaturgic
powers, impressed the simple Bedouin, who accepted
them as holy men and magicians and used them to write charms,
to perform religious rites, and to act as mediators in inter-
[613] tribal disputes. Sometimes, as we have seen, these men
founded lineages which, dwelling under the shadow of their
saintly forbears, became nuclei of social agglomerations which
have developed in course of time into tribal groups, thus taking
the shape of the tribal society in which they lived. The word
[192] '*Marabtin*' thus came to mean holy men (and their tombs) and
then, in addition, tribes tracing their descent, or supposed
descent, from these holy men and also, finally, in Cyrenaica,
tribes who are clients of the great *Sa'adi* tribes which own the
earth and water.

778 Some of the better known of the Cyrenaican saints, but by
776 no means all, have gleaming white cupolas, supported by four
792 walls, erected over their tombs, and inside the walls is a *tub*, a
wooden box, over the grave, and this is covered with coloured
cloth on which are inscribed passages from the Koran. Inside
also are often a few pages from sacred books, occasionally a few
small coins given by the local Bedouin, and any property, such
as tents or ploughs, the Bedouin have wished to deposit in a

Marabouts of the kind I have described were still coming to 792
Cyrenaica from the west up to the time when the Grand Sanusi 793 •
began his preaching in the country. Two of them whom he 795*
found there, already living among the Bedouin, the one on the
western and the other on the eastern part of the plateau, teaching
them and settling their disputes, became his followers: Sidi
Ahmad bin 'Abdalla al-Sakkuri, a late arrival from the west
whose descendants became Shaikhs of the zawiya of al-Marj,
and Sidi al-Martadi Farkash, of an old *Marabtin* family of
Cyrenaica, whose descendants became Shaikhs of the lodges at
Umm al-Razam, Bishara, and Martuba. But the great majority
of the Grand Sanusi's helpers were men who had come with him
from the west, chiefly from Algeria. Other *Ikhwan* families, [613]
mostly of the Khattabi lineage, of which the Sanusi family are
a branch, came later, also from Algeria, in the time of Sayyid
al-Mahdi. To the Bedouin they were all Marabouts and when [778]
they had in their lifetimes a reputation for piety or learning
their tombs in the Sanusiya lodges in which they resided became
places of cult like those of their forerunners all over Cyrenaica.
But unlike the earlier Marabouts these Sanusiya Brothers were
not only holy men. They were also members of a fraternity, of
an organization. The Sanusiya Order was thus not only heir 795*
to the accumulated capital of the Marabouts, but was able to 182
exploit it as a corporation. It incorporated a number of isolated
cults into a single wider cult, fractionized, it is true, by tribal
particularisms, but, all the same, brought under a common
organization. Each lodge of the Order was a cult centre, but it
was something more: it was part of a general cult directed
through the lodges towards the Head of the Order. The tribes 619
of Cyrenaica became through the Order linked from above in a 182
common, if loose, organization under a single, sacred, Head. 795*
This was possible only because a tribal system already existed 793
uniting the different tribes, in spite of their feuds and enmities,
into a society which, though lacking political unity, rested on
common sentiments, a common way of life, and a common
lineage structure.

What gave stability to this new relationship between the [648]*
Bedouin tribes and the Sanusiya Order, turning the sacred Head
into a secular leader and the religious organization into a
government, and changed a loose federation of tribes into a

619

182 nation, was common hostility to outside interference, an ingre-
*795 dient supplied in measured quantities by the Turks and copiously
793 by the Italians.

*[648]

III

The rudiments of Islam which the Grand Sanusi found in Cyrenaica made his teachings acceptable, delivered as they were without embellishments, to the Bedouin of the country, and the Marabout tradition which he also found there made him
[578] personally acceptable to them. His chief difficulty must have been the rivalries between tribe and tribe and between tribal section and tribal section down to the smallest sections. This
[361] difficulty was overcome by transferring the centre of the Order to desert oases, where it could not become identified with any particular tribe, and by distributing its lodges impartially throughout the tribal territories.

*795 Of the forty-five zawiyas belonging to the tribes of Cyrenaica
793 proper (including al-Naufiliya and excluding the Kufra lodges)
*175 probably twenty-one were founded before 1860 or during the lifetime of the Grand Sanusi, twenty-two during the lifetime of Sayyid al-Mahdi, and two when Sayyid Ahmad al-Sharif was Head of the Order.

*795 A high proportion of the lodges of the Order in the time of the
361 Grand Sanusi were along the line of oases on the 29th parallel,
[175] for to the lodges of the Cyrenaican oases on that line must be added those in the oases of the Sirtica, Zalla, Saukna, Hun, and Waddan, all founded round about 1855, and probably that in al-Fuqha also. Lodges were early planted in the oases partly on account of their importance as caravanserai and trading centres, partly because the oases-folk were more tractable than the Bedouin, and partly because the stability of these centres gave greater opportunity for corporate religious life. The Sanusiya certainly made a deeper religious impression on the peoples of the oases than on the Bedouin.

*795 It will have been noticed also how few of the Sanusiya lodges
632 were founded in the towns of North Africa. There are no lodges
361 in the towns of Egypt and though the Order counts many
[175] followers in the towns of Cyrenaica and is politically dominant in them it has only one zawiya in each, Banghazi, Darna, and al-Marj; and that at Banghazi, the capital of the country, was

tribe. In the oasis of Jalu, where there was not the same tribal 795*
solidarity as in the neighbouring oases of Aujila and al-Jikharra, 619
the two lodges were almost next door to each other. This was because the oasis was split into two opposed villages, each occupying about half of it with a strip of waste ground in between. A similar lack of unity in the Egyptian oasis of Siwa accounts for the building of several Sanusiya lodges there.

IV

Starting from the foundation of al-Zawiya al-Baida in 1843 [175]*
the Order spread itself throughout Cyrenaica until it embraced in its network of lodges the entire tribal system of the country. It seeded itself, as it were, in the crevasses between tribes and between tribal sections, and its points of growth were thus also the points of convergence in tribal and lineage structure.

A tribal zawiya seems generally to have been founded in the 795*
following manner. A tribe or tribal section saw with envy that 793 •
a neighbouring tribe or section had a zawiya. They sent a 619
deputation to the Head of the Order and asked him for a Shaikh to teach their children, cater for their religious needs, settle their disputes, and so forth. The Head of the Order granted them their request and sent them a Shaikh chosen from among the learned and pious men who surrounded him at Jaghbub. The Shaikh probably took with him one or two companions, *Ikhwan*, Brothers of the Order, to help him start the new lodge which the tribesmen built in the most favoured spot in their territory. Simple structures though these zawiyas were, they took many years to complete, being added to when further accommodation was required, in the leisurely Arab way. Most [172]
of them were built on Graeco-Roman foundations so that the tribesmen who constructed them found stone ready to hand.

Through the kindness of Shaikh Muhammad al-Tayyib al- 175*
Ashhab I have seen the letter sent in 1855 by al-Sayyid Muham- 795*
mad Ibn 'Ali al-Sanusi al-Khattabi al-Hasani al-Idrisi to his 793
virtuous sons, some of the Shaikhs of the Sdaidi section of the 'Awaqir tribe, about the building of the zawiya of Msus. He says that he is sending to them Brothers to construct the buildings and that he has instructed them to build an annex which he can use as a resthouse when he visits the zawiya, though this

*175 is not to be built till the zawiya is completed. There will be
*795 builders and carpenters among the Brothers and all that is
required of the tribal Shaikhs is selection of the site and super-
• 793 vision of the work. He points out to them that the work is for
their benefit, in that they and their sons will receive in the zawiya an education, especially in the Koran and in the laws of Islam, and will be able to worship there. The Grand Sanusi then cites passages from the Koran and the *Hadith* commending religious benefactions. Finally he prays God to assist those engaged in the building and those who have made themselves responsible for the upkeep of the zawiya. God helps those who help others. A man reaps what he sows.

Some of the Cyrenaican lodges were larger than others but
*795 they all had the same features, a straggling warren of stone
346 buildings comprising a mosque, schoolrooms, guest-rooms,
apartments for the Shaikh of the zawiya and his family, rooms
for teachers and pupils, and houses for the Brothers, clients,
[241] and servants, and their families. Many had small gardens near-
by and the local cemetery was usually adjacent to a lodge.
[764] Jaghbub, where several hundred persons lived, was the largest
of such communities. The ruins of Dariyana and al-'Azziyyat
[792] are also extensive and must have housed several hundred
persons, but the average lodge probably housed only some fifty to a hundred persons, including wives and children, though there were often *Marabtin* families attached to the zawiya living nearby, sometimes in caves dating from classical times. The importance of a lodge was not to be estimated so much by the number of its occupants as by its tribal position and the number of its Bedouin adherents.

*795 The Shaikh of a new zawiya would point out to the local
tribesmen that he and his companions had no means of support-
793 ing themselves or of maintaining the zawiya. The various
425 sections nearby then gave to the lodge the lands adjoining it,
this estate surrounding a lodge being known as its *haram*. On the plateau the lodges were generously endowed with arable, in the steppe with wells, and in the oases with date-palms and springs. Later, further gifts of arable, wells, springs, and date-palms, or part use of these, would sometimes be made, especially when there was a dispute between two sections about ownership of property and neither would give way to the other,

for they might then settle the matter by surrendering their 795*
claims to the zawiya.[1] Another way in which a lodge obtained 793 ●
rights in land was by asking permission of its owners to sow it. 425
Constant repetition of this favour eventually gave the zawiya
rights of use in it in perpetuity.

The tribesmen also assisted the Shaikh of the lodge in the 795*
cultivation of the lands, though most of the work was done by 793
241
476



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795*
491
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423

Sanusiya Estates of the Zawiyas of Shahhat, Tart, al-Fayidiya, and al-Zawiya al-Baida.

the zawiya community itself. At sowing time the Shaikh would 795*
pitch his tent near the area to be cultivated and prepare a communal 793
meal, taking with him some sacks of rice for the purpose. 241
The local Bedouin then came with their draught animals and 476
sowed and ploughed for a couple of days on behalf of the
zawiya. The same procedure took place at harvest time.
Besides gifts of land and voluntary service in cultivating, the [794]
Bedouin were expected to pay a tithe to the lodge at harvest
time and after lambing. No doubt many of them paid annual
dues but it is unlikely that any strict record was kept or that
payment could have been enforced had they been averse to
making it.

That it was expected that the Bedouin might promise services 175*
more readily than perform them is suggested by an interesting 795*
document, dated 1307 A.H., found by the Italians at the 794

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[1] Savarese, op. cit., p. 193.

*175 Taukra zawiya and given in an Italian translation by Judge
*795 Colucci.[1] In it the tribal sections of the Baraghtha, Tursh,
794 Dinal, and Shilmani place themselves under obligation, through
the signatories to the deed, to pay the zawiya of Taukra alms on flocks and crops, to supply camels to carry supplies to Jaghbub, and to help the zawiya in sowing, building, excavations, and other works. Subject to the penalty of paying double alms they will not, without the permission of the Shaikh of the zawiya, render like services to other zawiyas. They promise also to defend the zawiya and to respect those who live in it, or who are its guests, and agree that those who fail to do so may be punished in body or in estate. Each will be for the zawiya and the zawiya for each. God is greater than any man. Those who are obedient will be recompensed by Him. Peace be to those who follow the right path.

*795 The estates of the Sanusiya Order were *waqf* (called in
423 Cyrenaica *habus*), inalienable endowments made in love of God
by tribal sections and sometimes by individuals. They belonged to the various lodges to which they were donated, with the Order as a whole as residuary, and not to the family of the Grand Sanusi or to the Shaikhs of the lodges.[2] It was understood that when Bedouin donated tracts of country round a lodge they could continue to pasture and sow on any land not being used by the resident Brothers and to use the wells when
there was sufficient water in them. The Shaikh of a zawiya was
● [793] the legal administrator of its properties. The Head of the Order
had no direct say in the administration of the estates, and in all
probability only knew roughly of their extent. The revenues of
[434] one lodge could not be used for the upkeep of another, but any
surplus over the expenses of a lodge were paid into a central
*795 pool. The members of the Sanusi family and the teachers and
794 administrative officials of the Order lived in the distant oases
of Jaghbub and Kufra, which produced little but dates, and had to be supplied from the lodges of the coastal region. Supplies were sent by caravan partly in local produce, such as skins,
wool, grain, butter, honey, and meat, and partly in money or
[431] imported goods: rice, tea, sugar, and cloth. These gifts were

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[1] Op. cit., pp. 434-5.

[2] Fernando Valenzi, 'La Senussia in Cirenaica ed il suo Patrimonio', *Rivista delle Colonie Italiane*, 1932, pp. 432-3.

*795 opportunity to worship in a mosque, and that by charity to their
794 lodges they might earn recompense hereafter.

182 Each lodge had its Shaikh, who represented the Head of the
*795 Order. He arbitrated between the Bedouin, led the tribesmen
● 793 to holy war, acted as intermediary between the tribe or section
and the Turkish administration, dispensed hospitality to travellers, supervised the collection of tithe, directed cultivation of grain and care of stock, dispatched surplus revenues to the Headquarters of the Order, acted as prayer-leader on Fridays, and assisted in preaching and teaching. There were
[794] besides a number of other functionaries among the Brothers:
the Shaikh's deputy, the *imam* to lead the daily prayers and to teach the Koran and canon law, the *mu'allim* to teach reading, writing, and arithmetic in the zawiya school, and perhaps a special *muadhdhin* to call the faithful to prayer, though any of the Brothers could do that.

V

*795 In principle, as we have noted, the lands attached to lodges
793 belonged, like the lodges themselves, to the Order, and more
423 particularly to the lodge to which they were donated, and not
to any particular individual or family. In practice certain
*795 Shaikhly families tended to gain an hereditary interest in them.
793 What happened in the early days of the Order was that a Shaikh
was sent by its Head to found a lodge and when it was estab-
423 lished he was translated to a fresh missionary field. Shaikhs
428 of lodges were in this way moved fairly frequently at first, but
602 it later became the practice to leave a Shaikh in charge till his
death and then to nominate his successor from among his kinsmen, with the approval of the tribe and on the advice of Shaikhs of neighbouring lodges. What mostly seems to have happened was that the tribal sections concerned asked for a son or brother of the last Shaikh to be appointed director of their lodge and the Head of the Order confirmed their choice. As one Darsi tribesman put it: 'The Shaikh of our zawiya must be a man favoured by the hearts of the people.' In course of time the tendency for the Shaikhship of a lodge to be regarded as hereditary became very marked, it being understood that if there was a suitable candidate from the family already established in the lodge he would be appointed, a view with which the later Heads of the

Order concurred. Thus we find charge of a zawiya continuing 795*
in the hands of a single family to the point at which Muhammad 793
Yahiya bin al-Sanusi bin 'Umar al-Ashhab was appointed by 423
Sayyid Ahmad al-Sharif to succeed his father as Shaikh of Msus 428
at the age of sixteen. Some of these families sent their roots so 602
deep that not only did they obtain what amounted to hereditary rights to a particular lodge, but controlled several lodges. Such were the influential families of Ghumari, Kalili, Farkash, and Ashhab, and the Khattabi families.

Hence we find to-day that many of the lodges are in hereditary charge of a family of Shaikhs who consider that they have a pre-emptive claim to its directorship and to enjoyment of its revenues, a claim backed by tribal opinion and by the acquiescence of the present Head of the Order. Thus the Dardafi family may be said to own the Shahhat lodge, the Isma'ili family to own the Fayidiya lodge, the 'Ammur family to own
the Qafanta lodge, and so on. So much is this the case that [578]
disputes now sometimes arise, as in 1942 at Qafanta and Mirad
Mas'ud, between members of a family about which of its members should succeed to the directorship of a lodge and control of its revenues.

This development is not surprising. Poor communications 795*
and the troubled times since 1911 have encouraged local auto- 793
nomy in the Sanusiya organization. The Shaikh of a lodge 428
brought up his family in it and his sons had no other home than the lodge and no other friends than the Bedouin around it and
the families of Shaikhs in nearby lodges. Tribesmen dislike [178]
change and prefer to have for the Shaikhs of their lodges
members of families they know and who share their local
interests. But the tendency towards hereditary succession is 795*
also related to the fundamental lineage structure of the tribes 793
among whom the lodges are distributed, for it is noticeable that
whereas hereditary succession became customary in the Bedouin, 613
or tribal, lodges, it has been by comparison lacking in the urban 428
lodges of Banghazi and Darna and in those oases where tribal [369]
structure has become obscured by village life. This would seem to suggest that *Ikhwan* families tend the more easily to become stabilized as lines of hereditary Shaikhs the more closely they are associated with tribal structure. It is precisely in the most powerful, numerous, and integrated tribal sections that we

*795 find hereditary transmission of Shaikhship of lodges most
● 793 accentuated, such as the Bara'asa-Tamia section (al-Zawiya
613 al-Baida), the 'Awaqir-Sdaidi section (Msus zawiya), and the
428 'Abaidat-Ghaith section (Tart zawiya). In the same way the
[792] earlier Marabouts became, as has been noted, founders of
lineages which were on the pattern of the branches of the Bedouin clans among whom they lived, and attached to them.

*795 Also it must be remembered that the lodges were tribal
778 institutions built by the local Bedouin so that they might
793 participate in the *baraka* of Sayyid Muhammad bin 'Ali al-Sanusi.
619 They participated in it through the Shaikhs of their zawiyas who received their *baraka* direct from the hands of the
182 Grand Sanusi himself, or from the hands of son Sayyid al-Mahdi,
and passed it on to their sons. This *baraka* belonged to the tribe, or tribal section, which built a lodge just as the *shaukha*, the secular Shaikhship of the tribe, or tribal section, belonged to it and had to be kept in it. In both the continuity of family succession had to be maintained, unless there were good reasons for acting otherwise. Thus each tribal section emphasized its autonomy in its hereditary line of religious Shaikhs, through whom the *baraka* of the founder of the Order was transmitted to them, whilst proclaiming its membership of a tribal federation with common allegiance to the Head of the Order.

*795 As I have pointed out when speaking of the sacred *Marabtin*
793 tribes of Cyrenaica, it was customary for the descendants of a
778 Marabout to reside near his tomb. I have further mentioned
[776] that the Shaikh of a Sanusiya lodge, who is also called a *Marabat*
by the Bedouin, might, if he had during life a reputation for piety, rather easily gained in Islam, be venerated as a saint when he was dead and his tomb become a shrine. This is another reason why Shaikhly families have tended to become hereditary directors of lodges.

*795 Just as almost all the Marabouts of Cyrenaica were foreigners
793 from the west, so were almost all the Shaikhs of the Sanusiya
554 lodges. The Dardafi and Isma'ili families came from Tripolitania,
[167] the Ghumari family from Morocco, the 'Ammur, Bu Jibaii, and Khattab families came from Algeria, and so on. As a class they enjoyed, and still enjoy, a reputation for sanctity among the Bedouin on account of their knowledge of the Koran

and of reading and writing, and of their strict performance of 795*
religious duties. This reputation was doubtless enhanced by 793 •
their foreign origin, for the Bedouin of Cyrenaica were ac- 554
customed to look to the west for piety.

At one time many, perhaps all, the Shaikhs of lodges were fairly well educated in such subjects as theology, canon law, [212] and commentaries on sacred texts. To-day most of these alumni of Jaghbub University are dead and their successors, brought up in the bitter years since 1911, are for the most part very ignorant, some being almost as illiterate as the Bedouin themselves. The Bedouin regard them with a curious mixture of respect and condescension. They look up to them as learned and pious men who possess *baraka*, they kiss their hands, they call them '*Sidi*', and they listen respectfully to their admonishments and arbitraments. At the same time they look down on them for not being tribesmen and Bedouin, children of the tents. The Bedouin harmonize these conflicting attitudes by saying that a *Marabat* is a different kind of person from a Bedouin and cannot be expected to behave in the same way or to have the same outlook. He has been brought up to read books, pray, wash, and to do other things the Bedouin finds unnecessary in his own life. He has not been reared in the roving life of the tents nor learned the shepherd's art. Since [582] they regard the *Ikhwan* as a different kind of people, the Bedouin do not intermarry with them nor with the Sanusi family, who belong to the same category. The *Ikhwan* families 795* marry among themselves. The Sanusi family marry the 582 daughters of *Ikhwan*, but do not give their daughters to persons outside their own kin.

The importance of the *Ikhwan* families in the history of the 795* development of the Sanusiya is evidently very great. From the 554 foundation of al-Zawiya al-Baida in 1843 to the appearance of Sayyid Ahmad al-Sharif in Cyrenaica in 1912 the Heads of the Order were absent from the country, either in Arabia or in distant oases, and its direct influence on the tribes was exercised by the Shaikhs of its lodges in their midst. Their ritual position within the tribal system combined with their structural position outside it enabled them to settle disputes and to unite and lead the various sections which had sponsored their lodges when the Order required their support. It was they who roused the [648]*

*795 which have a Maghribi origin and those which were founded in Iraq. Egyptian Orders are not represented in Cyrenaica. These facts are explained when it is pointed out that the Orders found in Cyrenaica to-day were introduced by urban immigrants from the west who settled in Banghazi and Darna as traders and
[369] artisans. Whence follows the most important feature of the non-Sanusiya Orders, their urban character. With the exception of the Madaniya and a single lodge of the 'Arusiya, these Orders are represented only in the towns. Occasionally one of their lodges was built with aid from local tribesmen, as the 'Arusiya lodges at al-Marj and Tubruq, but such examples are rare and in no way invalidate the statement that the Sanusiya alone has considerable following among the Bedouin. The adherents of the single 'Arusiya lodge at Bu Zaid are Bedouin of the Aulad al-Shaikh, immigrants from Tripolitania who regard themselves as direct descendants of Sidi 'Abd al-Salam, the founder of the Order whose rite they follow. The only competitor of the Sanusiya among the Bedouin was the Madaniya, which still retains its hold on the Fawakhir of the *barqa*, a tribe ill disposed towards any authority, and a few *Marabtin* fragments elsewhere, though these Bedouin now follow Sanusiya leadership in other than purely religious matters.
[798] There was at one time tension between the two Orders, complicated by tribal rivalries in the *barqa*, but it has now been for the greater part resolved. Apart from the opposition of the Sanusiya, the loss of influence of the Madaniya was hastened by its too close attachment to the fortunes of the declining Ottoman Caliphate, dissensions between the descendants of its founder, and a split in the Order itself.

*795 798 The Sanusiya has always shown marked tolerance towards other Orders and it must, moreover, be noted that there are no doctrinal differences between the Orders, that members of different Orders worship together in the same mosques, and that sometimes a man is a member of several orders at the same
• [793] time. We have seen that the Grand Sanusi in his early period joined a number of different Orders and our Tunisian friend Shaikh Muhammad 'Uthman seems to have made a hobby of joining them.[1] Furthermore, the founders of all the Orders are revered as saints by the common people everywhere, regardless

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[1] Op. cit., pp. 64-6 and 251.

tion were compelled to pay taxes and furnish supplies, and how 175*
forty-five of the Shaikhs of the Jawazi tribe were treacherously 648*
murdered and many of their followers massacred.[1] Generally,
however, it may be said that Cyrenaica has no history, other
than Bedouin traditions of inter-tribal wars, from 1051 to 1835,
in which year the Turks regained control of Libya from the
Caramanlis. On their return they instituted a more systematic
administration than had been exercised during their earlier
occupation.

The Turks returned to Cyrenaica about the time the Grand 175*
Sanusi first visited the country and eight years after their 648*
reoccupation he founded his first zawiya on the plateau. As 795*
the Sanusiya Order gained the confidence of the Bedouin and [793]
became accepted as their spokesmen, it was necessary for the
Ottoman authorities to take it into consideration in their dealings with the tribes of the interior. The Order made it possible 175*
for the different tribes to express themselves politically as a 648*
unit for the first time in their relations with the outside world. 182
The tribes provided the Order with a social system, and the 795*
Order gave to that system a political organization at a time
when it was beginning to be brought into more direct contact
with political forces outside tribal society.

The Sanusiya is known to have been given a Charter about 175*
1856 by Sultan 'Abd al-Majid I. His firman was brought from 648*
Istanbul by Sidi 'Abd al-Rahim al-Maghbub, later Shaikh of 795*
the Sanusiya zawiya at Banghazi, who had been sent to Istanbul
for the purpose and had the utmost difficulty, as was often the [793]
case with visitors to the Ottoman capital, in obtaining an
audience with the Sultan. Whatever other privileges the firman
conferred on the Order—I have not seen the document—it [794]
certainly exempted its properties from taxation and permitted [651]
it to collect a religious tithe from its followers. A second firman
was issued later by Sultan 'Abd al-Majid's brother, Sultan 'Abd
al-'Aziz, and was brought from Istanbul to the Governor of
Tripoli by Sidi Abu al-Qasim al-'Isawi, 'Abd al-Rahim's successor in the Banghazi lodge. There is in the Land Registry at
Banghazi a letter from the Governor of Tripoli to the Governor
of Banghazi giving the essence of this firman. It confirms the
privileges granted by the earlier firman and adds to them that [778]

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[1] Op. cit., *passim* and p. 220 seq.

The local Turkish officials were content for the most part to 175*
sit in the towns, many of them no doubt regretting that they 648*
had ever been sent to Cyrenaica, where their salaries were low 795*
and often in arrears, and to let the Sanusiya control the interior so long as taxes were paid and no overt act was committed against the Sultan's authority which might bring them to the notice of the Court; and the Central Government for its part was quite prepared to forget that Cyrenaica formed part of the Sultan's dominions so long as there was peace there and it sent annual tribute to Istanbul. The Turks were indifferent otherwise to what happened in Libya, which was a poor province, particularly the Cyrenaican part of it, where their administration was even less efficient than in Tripolitania, where it was happy-go-lucky enough. They had quite enough troubles elsewhere without alienating to no purpose a powerful Islamic Order and the warlike Bedouin who supported it. They therefore left
the Sanusiya to perform many of the functions of government [651]
in the interior—education, justice, the maintenance of security, [794]
and even to some extent the collection of taxes, though in the matter of tribute there were difficulties, for Bedouin do not willingly pay taxes to anyone, and since they already paid a tithe to the Sanusiya, with a grace which contrasted with their reluctance to pay taxes to the Turkish Administration, they
were disinclined to pay twice. When any question arose which 175*
required direct contact between the Head of the Order and the 648*
local Governor it was established through the Shaikh of the 793 ●
lodge at Banghazi, or a special messenger was sent from Jaghbub 795*
or Kufra to the Turkish Governor at Banghazi, or he sent a messenger to the Head of the Order in his oasis seat. From time to time the Central Government sent an envoy to the Head of the Order with gifts and instructions to report on what was going on in the Sahara, and on such occasions he was received handsomely and returned with the blessings of the *Shaikh al-Tariqa* on the Sultan. Sometimes, as we have seen, the Head of the Order sent a deputation to Istanbul.

The payment of taxes and the maintenance of peace and com- 175*
munications, the only two functions of government the Turkish 648*
officials bothered their heads about, were intimately connected. 651
Minor quarrels among the Bedouin themselves little interested them, but armed resistance to taxation was certain to earn

*175 Arabs, to assess and collect taxes, to maintain security, and to
*648 control the few police allotted to them. In this task they
651 expected co-operation from the local Shaikhs of the tribal
634 sections and the Shaikhs of the Sanusiya lodges.

[619] It is remarkable that the Bedouin paid any taxes at all, for
[793] the mudirs had not sufficient force at their command, nor had
the Governor at Banghazi, to compel the Bedouin to pay if they
were determined not to do so. The mudir of Slanta had only 50
[701] to 60 soldiers in his sub-district and the Bara'asa whom he
administered could have annihilated this force with ease, as
[625] could the 'Awaqir the 50 soldiers and the handful of police
*175 stationed at Suluq. That taxes were collected at all, and all the
more that they were collected without constant disturbance, is
*648 to be accounted for partly by the recognition by the Shaikhs of
651 the tribal sections, with whom the mudirs were careful to keep
634 on good personal terms, that there was a moral obligation to
619 pay them; but there were also sanctions if they were not paid.
If the Shaikh of a tribal section did not collect the taxes due
from that section, he was held responsible and action could be
taken against him personally. The mudir, accompanied by a
small armed force, went a round of the tribal sections attached
to his sub-district each year, generally in springtime, and sent
out other tax-collecting parties in other directions. Sometimes
special tax commissions appointed by the Governor also toured
the country. A favourite device was for such parties to quarter
themselves in the camp of a recalcitrant Shaikh and to reside
there as his guests, for the soldiers and police carried few provisions,
till the tax was paid. The Shaikhs, on the other hand,
were made partners in the undertaking by, besides investment
with an official robe and status, receiving a percentage of the
taxes collected, the mudir himself also taking a percentage.
Moreover, each Shaikh whose section paid the tax was determined
that the other sections should not escape paying as well. A
Shaikh was able to divide up the assessment on his section
among the minor Shaikhs, and the minor Shaikhs among yet
smaller ones. It was in the interest of each Shaikh to see that
the smaller ones did not escape their share and leave him with
the responsibility for a deficit. Responsibility was in this way
*175 passed down the tribal structure. On the whole the system
*648 worked well and the Turkish officials and the Bedouin did not
651

get on badly together. Each understood the other. Also there 175*
was much elasticity in the taxes which appealed to the Bedouin, 648*
who prefer to pay a heavy tax one year and lightly or not at all 651
another year, rather than to pay a regular and inevitable tax.
The assessments were seldom revised and often had little relation to the capacity of a tribal section to pay. The result was that taxes were always in arrears and in some years, or for some sections, remitted altogether. Those sections nearest the Turkish posts paid the more easily because they were the more vulnerable. Some of the more nomadic Bedouin escaped payment altogether, or at any rate for years at a stretch. It is, I think, safe to assume that the taxes actually collected over a number of years were light. Otherwise the Bedouin would not have paid them.

Perhaps the chief reason why taxes were collected without 175*
constant rebellion was the support given to the administration 648*
in this matter by the Sanusiya. The Turks held the coastal 651
towns and a few inland posts outside which their direct control 795*
of the country was restricted to those Bedouin who lived a fairly stable life in the immediate vicinity of these centres. The rest of the country was left to the Sanusiya and its own devices, though, as we have seen, the Turks sent occasional patrols into
the interior. Sporadically, without much enthusiasm or per- 175*
severance, the Administration at one time tried to extend its 648*
effective control into the hinterland by nominating to official
posts, and giving arms and money to, selected tribal chiefs, such 651
as the Shaikhly families of Hadduth, Lataiwish, and Saif al- 795*
Nasir. Bu Bakr bin Hadduth of the Bara'asa was made 793*
qaimaqam of al-Qaiqab, where he had a castle; 'Ali Lataiwish 619
of the Magharba was made *qaimaqam* of Sirt, where he, also, 634
had a castle; and the fierce old warrior chieftain of the Aulad Suliman, Saif al-Nasir, was made mudir of Bu Njaim. This procedure resulted in brigandage rather than in good administration and was in the main discarded. Instead the mudirs worked directly through the Shaikhs of the tribal sections and, especially when dealing with intertribal and intersectional affairs, through the Shaikhs of the Sanusiya zawiyas. Some of the older notables of Banghazi have told me that the Pasha, as the Governor was often called, would never have succeeded in collecting taxes among the Bedouin had it not been for the co-operation of the

*175 *648 651 *795 ●793 [619] [634] Heads of the Sanusiya lodges, who often accompanied the mudirs and tax commissions to the Shaikhs of the tribal sections attached to their lodges. It was to the common interest of the Turkish Administration and of the Sanusiya that there should be order, security, justice, and trade in the country, and they co-operated to maintain them.

The Turkish officials did their utmost to remain on good terms with the Sanusiya Shaikhs and to this end, and doubtless also because they found no difficulty in accepting, as educated men, its exalted teachings, some of them affiliated themselves to the Order. Membership of it gave them prestige in the eyes of the Bedouin as great, if not greater, than their official status gave them. Likewise the more prosperous merchants who had dealings [556] with the Bedouin tribes or sent caravans to the Sahara and Sudan found it advisable to be received into the Order. It is for this reason that in all the towns of Libya we find a small body of the richer and more cultured citizens ascribed to the Order, while the common people belong to other or no Orders.[1]

*175 *648 651 *795 But though the administration of Cyrenaica might be called at this period a Turco-Sanusi condominium there was an undercurrent of jealousy on both sides which occasionally gave rise to open conflict. A sure occasion was any effort on the part of the Administration to tax the Sanusiya estates. Although these had been exempted from taxation by the Sultan's firman, the local administration made rare and unsuccessful efforts to exact taxation on them. When in 1908 they tried to tax the crops of the Sanusiya holdings a tribal meeting, attended by 150 Shaikhs headed by 'Umar bu Rqaia of the Darsa tribe, met at the zawiya of al-Haniya and decided not to pay any more tribute to the Turkish Government till it revoked the tax. The Government then dropped the matter, though the trouble continued till 1910. Earlier, the Governor Ahmad Pasha Zuhadi (1904–5), acting on instructions from Istanbul, had tried to impose a tax on the crops of tribesmen and zawiyas alike. The Bedouin round al-Marj had thereupon attacked a Turkish detachment charged with collecting the tax and sent them back to Banghazi stripped of everything they possessed. The outcome was that the Governor was relieved of his office.

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[1] Capt. Emilio Canevari, *Zauie ed Ichuan Senussiti della Tripolitania*, 1917, *passim.*

mon symbol which stood for their common interests. Faced 175*
with amorphous, but seemingly ineradicable, opposition from 648*
the Bedouin the Italians more and more directed their hostility 795*
to the Sanusiya Order as a tangible head to the resistance which 619
could be destroyed. Failing to crush opposition they were forced [793] ●
to come to terms with it, but they could not come to terms with
a tribal system—only with an organization and through a
person, the Head of the Order, who could speak for that
organization and for the tribes which it represented. Both in
fighting the tribes and in trying to come to terms with them,
the Italians thus threw the Sanusiya organization into political
relief, and the *tariqa*, the religious Order, began to speak of
itself as a *hakuma*, government. The peace negotiations, therefore,
centred round a contradiction. The Italians attempted to 175*
exact recognition of sovereignty and this implied recognition of 648*
the right of the Head of the Order to surrender sovereignty,
which he could do only if he were in a position analogous to 728
that of the Head of the Italian State, a status the Italians would 795*
not concede. Nevertheless they were compelled, in order to 793
establish relations with the tribes, to grant the Head of the 554
Order the title of Amir, and implicitly to recognize him as not
only the Shaikh of a religious Order, but the Head of a political
organization. As will be seen, the dilemma led to much equivocation
and finally to a second Italo-Sanusi war. In this
second war the Sanusiya was entirely destroyed as an organization,
political, economic, and religious. It persisted nevertheless
as a sentiment, and the Head of the Order in exile in Egypt still
retained the allegiance of the Bedouin who saw in his freedom
the hope of their own.

When the last European war broke out and Cyrenaica became 175*
a battlefield of first importance it was in the interests of each 648*
side to ensure that the local population would be favourable 795*
to it. The Italians, having destroyed the Order, the one
organization through which they might have made effective
propaganda among the Bedouin, were confronted in the country
with an unimpressionable mass of sullen resentment which
could in no way be influenced to their advantage. The British,
on the other hand, who sought to rouse the Bedouin to renewed [793]
rebellion, at any rate up to the point at which they gave what [554]
assistance to British arms they were capable of, had a ready

*175 means of influencing them to this end in the exiled Head of the
*648 Order and many influential Shaikhs of tribes who recognized his
*795 authority. But the British Government, which in the past had
consistently refused to admit that Sayyid Muhammad Idris was
• 793 more than the Head of a religious Order, were in the new
554 circumstances compelled to accept his offer of help as coming from a person who could act in a political sense and for the whole population of Cyrenaica. The Sayyid had, therefore, to be recognized as an Amir and to be permitted to recruit his own army under the Sanusiya flag. The Bedouin of Cyrenaica could only take part in a world struggle between states as a unit within their structure, as a political unit of the same order as the other allied countries, which were autonomous states acting through their own governments in their relations with the British Government and Armed Forces. The recognition of Sayyid Muhammad Idris as a political leader was easier for the British in that in war national sentiment is at a high pitch and those engaged in the struggle are particularly sensitive to national aspirations and sympathetic towards them. They are then anxious to placate national movements in their own empires and to encourage those in the empires of their opponents.
*175 To the British all the people of Cyrenaica were Sanusi
*648 and they so spoke of themselves in their dealings with British
*795 troops, and not as members of particular tribes or as citizens of particular towns. Through the long years of struggle Bedouin and townsmen alike had come to identify their interests with those of the Sanusiya Order, and to see in the Order the symbol of their particularist aspirations. 'Sanusi' had become a word which could be translated 'Cyrenaican'. It had ceased to have a religious content and had acquired a purely political one.

II

*175 This is a history of the Sanusi of Cyrenaica and not of Italy
*648 so that there is no need to record the domestic and international circumstances in which Italy went to war with Turkey. Nor is it necessary to narrate the reasons the Italians gave for their declaration of war. Italy had certain historic claims to a sphere of influence in Libya and her strategic interests in the coast of Africa opposite her shores are obvious. It is easy to understand

*175 equipped. Coro says that at the end of May 1911 they had, not
*648 counting officers, 3,010 men in Tripolitania and 1,200 men in
Cyrenaica.[1] The Italian expeditionary force consisted of 34,000 men, 6,300 horses, 1,050 wagons (*carri*), 48 field guns, and 24 mountain guns; and the Italians counted on being able to ship to Africa all the reserves and modern equipment that might be required were resistance to prove stronger than was expected. At the height of the campaign, when Italy entered the Great War, she had about 60,000 troops in Libya. It looked therefore as though the Turks had no chance of putting up more than a token resistance, and the Italians certainly expected a walkover and were surprised, then alarmed, at the resistance they had to overcome. They were dilatory and over-cautious after their main landing at Tripoli, hanging about in the town instead of pushing on into the interior before the Turks had time to organize resistance and attract Arab volunteers. In Cyrenaica also they delayed too long their advance into the interior and gave the Bedouin time to come to the assistance of the Turks and for some adventurous young Turkish officers, among them men who were later to make names for themselves in world history, to reach the field from Turkey. The Italians also underestimated the skill and pluck of the Turkish soldiers and they misjudged—the worst of their miscalculations—the attitude of the Arab population of Libya to the war. They believed that the Arabs were so irate with the Turks that they would not assist them and might even turn against them. Indeed, so confident were the Italians of Bedouin support that, according to local statements, they were themselves supplying them with arms in Cyrenaica for some months before the outbreak of war.

Looking back it is easy to see that another blunder was made
*175 in taking it for granted that the Sanusiya Order was hostile to
*648 the Turks to the point of being willing to remain outside the
*795 dispute or even to co-operate with a Christian Power to be rid
• 793 of them. If the Head of the Order—'*Il famoso papa nero*', as
the Italian press, most inappropriately, used to call him—wanted to create for himself an independent kingdom in North Africa, as it was supposed that he did, it seemed likely that he would have been glad to see the Turks driven out of Libya. But, apart from the fact that the Sanusiya and the Ottoman

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[1] Coro, op. cit., p. 121.

Governors had generally, in spite of occasional disagreements, 175 *
managed to rub along together in a spirit of live and let 648 *
live, it is difficult to understand how the Italians could have 795 *
imagined that the Sanusiya Shaikhs would have preferred them [793]
to the Turks who, after all, were Muslims, if not very good ones, and sometimes personal friends as well; especially in view of the low opinion the Arabs of the Near East generally had formed of Italians in comparison with other Europeans. Also, if they had hoped for help or neutrality from the tribes and the Sanusiya, and they undoubtedly did hope for it, one might have expected that they would have prepared for it by making direct contact earlier with the persons of chief influence among the parties. That they did not do so may be attributed in part to over-confidence and in part to over-estimation of the assurances of such crafty citizens of Banghazi as 'Uthman al-'Anaizi and 'Umar al-Kakhiya. Mansur al-Kakhiya was indeed sent in 1912 to Kufra to bribe Sayyid Ahmad, without result, and there were some further vague semi-official efforts made in 1913 and 1914 to get into touch with the head of the Order, but they also came to nothing.

III

War was declared on Turkey on 29 September 1911 and 175*
opened with the bombardment of Darna town on the follow- 648*
ing day and of Tripoli town a few days later. During October the Italians occupied Tripoli, Tubruq, Darna, Banghazi, and Khums. The disembarkation at Banghazi was against a rough sea and stiff opposition. After this initial resistance the Turkish garrison withdrew to the interior, as did their garrisons in the other coastal towns of Libya, since they could be shelled from Italian warships without being able to reply, their few coastal guns having a very restricted range. The garrison made Banina, about 12 km. to the east of Banghazi, their headquarters and here they were quickly joined by contingents of all the Bedouin tribes of western Cyrenaica with the Shaikhs of the Sanusiya lodges at their head. The Turkish garrison had from the begin-
ning been in consultation with Shaikh Ahmad al-'Isawi, the [795]*
Sanusiya representative at Banghazi and the Head of its zawiya [793]
there; and he wrote to all the Shaikhs of the tribal lodges in the

3:Evans-Pritchard E-4, 5 (1942-1944) 1949 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9
(1837-1942) Sanusi

*175 neighbourhood asking them to recruit volunteers for war.[1] In
*648 doing so he was, according to local information, acting on
*795 instructions received from Sayyid Ahmad al-Sharif who, though
[793] he was in distant Kufra, seems to have been well, aware, as
indeed was everyone concerned, of Italian intentions. The tribal bands, following the Sanusiya Shaikhs, poured into Banina and put heart into the small Turkish garrison. Strengthened daily by tribal reinforcements the Turco-Arab force on the Banghazi front was able to contain the Italians in the town till 'Aziz Bey al-Masri (later Inspector-General of the Egyptian Army) arrived to direct operations. The Turkish garrison at Darna, which had also retired behind the town, was reinforced in the same way by the tribes of eastern Cyrenaica, roused and led by the Shaikhs of the tribal lodges of the Sanusiya in that part of the country. When Enver Bey (later Turkish Minister for War) arrived by camel from Egypt he took charge of the Darna sector, where he was assisted by Mustafa Kamal (Ata Turk, later the first President of the Turkish Republic). A third camp was established in the Marmarica near Tubruq under command of another young Turkish officer, Adham Pasha al-Halabi. Here
[793] also the Turkish garrison was joined by the local tribes and the
Shaikhs of their lodges. The Turkish Commanders always took the Shaikhs of the tribes and lodges into consultation.

Without these tribal reinforcements the Turks certainly could not have continued for long to resist. As it was, resistance not only became possible, but the whole character of the war changed, both in Cyrenaica and in Tripolitania, where the Bedouin also flocked to the Turkish standards. It ceased to be a war in which a foreign power was trying to seize its colonies from a tired empire, and became a colonial war in the traditional sense of a European power attempting to deprive a native people of their liberty and their land. In Cyrenaica it became, in fact, more and more an Italo-Sanusi, rather than an Italo-Turkish, war and ended as a simple struggle of the Bedouin of Cyrenaica under Sanusiya leadership for freedom from a foreign yoke.

*175 Enthusiastic though they were, the Bedouin who poured into
*648 the Turkish camps were in no sense soldiers. Full of spirit,
courageous to the point of recklessness, their one aim was to

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[1] Muhammad al-Akhdar al-'Isawi, *Rafu' al-Sitar*, pp. 13–18.

*175 as the Sultan's representative. If the Head of the Sanusiya
*648 Order could have been mistaken in the early stages of the war
for no more than a benevolent spectator whose real attitude
*175 was unknown, the illusion was now dispelled. After Enver's
*648 visit to Jaghbub all official correspondence and documents from
*795 the Headquarters of the Order were stamped '*al-Hakuma al-*
● 793 *Sanusiya*', the Sanusiya Government. The Order now claimed
the status of a government of a semi-autonomous State and as
such it led the resistance to Italian arms.

The small Turkish garrisons thus had behind them all the
*175 Bedouin of the country—the townsmen were sympathetic, but
*648 soft and of little account one way or the other—and behind the
*[795] Bedouin the Sanusiya Order. They were fortified also by the
knowledge that behind the Sanusiya was the moral backing of the whole Arab and Muslim world, and even of peoples who were neither Arab nor Muslim. Throughout the Near East in particular, but also everywhere in the world where coloured peoples were articulate, the struggle was seen to have a deeper significance than a mere transfer of territories from Turkey to Italy, or the mere acquisition of another bit, one of the few remaining bits, of Africa by a European Power. Like a great octopus, Europe had stretched out its tentacles to seize and exploit the whole of Africa and Asia. The tentacle which now held Tripolitania and Cyrenaica in its grip belonged to the same beast which held half the world in its clutches. It was not the future of a handful of Bedouin which was being decided, but the future of Europe.

The Muslim world could do little to help their fellow Muslims, but they showed their indignation. The Arab and Muslim press railed against the Italians. The Bedouin boys sent by Enver from Cyrenaica to be educated in Turkey were everywhere on their journey received with acclamation as the sons of the brave Libyan *mujahidin*, the fighters for the faith. A Sanusi mission to Istanbul to do homage to the Caliph, though not received by him for diplomatic reasons, found plenty of support, especially in 'Young Turk' circles. Committees to collect funds for the war were formed in Egypt, Turkey, Syria, the Hijaz, and other parts of the Near East. An Egyptian Red Crescent Society was formed to look after the Libyan sick and wounded. A British Red Crescent Society was also founded in

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1912 for the same purpose by British sympathizers with the Arab cause and Indian Muslims. 648*

V

On 13 April 1913 Gen. d'Alessandro attacked the Turco-Arab camp at Banina and after 10 hours' heavy fighting took it by assault, killing 200 men and capturing about 50 prisoners and much equipment. The Turco-Arabs from this time onwards abandoned any further attempt to hold a line and organized resistance gave way to the kind of guerrilla warfare the country, inferiority in numbers and arms, and lack of military training of the Arabs indicated as the most appropriate tactics. The Italians were therefore able to advance rapidly in column in the grand style and to defeat Arab bands wherever they met them by superiority in numbers and fire power. They occupied Bu Mariyam, al-Abyar, Taukra, al-Baniya, and Jardis al-'Abid. While this column, the 2nd Division under Gen. d'Alessandro, was advancing on Jardis al-'Abid a second column, the 4th Division under Gen. Tassoni, disembarked at Talmaitha after a sharp engagement, and from there advanced on al-Marj and took the village. The two Divisions then met at Jardis al-'Abid. From there the 4th Division moved eastwards and in mid-May took without much opposition Marawa, Slanta, Shahhat, Marsa Susa, and other points. The ease with which they were able to march through the country and the way in which the Bedouin bands nine times out of ten gave way to them on the field, made the Italians take too optimistic a view of the campaign. They had yet to learn that marching from point to point and occupying the points does not make any great impression on an enemy for whom places have little significance, and that it is one thing to force Bedouin bands to give ground and quite a different thing to conquer a hardy and elusive people scattered over a wild and rugged country. The whole country was up in arms [793] ● and the general will to resistance was now strengthened by the [795] * arrival on the field of Sayyid Ahmad al-Sharif from Jaghbub [778] and a Turco-Arab victory shortly afterwards, an event the Bedouin naturally attributed to the Sayyid's *baraka*. This victory was in the Darna sector.

After the fighting in the autumn on the periphery of the town

*175 there had been little activity on this front till late in the spring *648 of 1913. The Turco-Arab camp was at Sidi 'Aziz, where they had some thousands of men, mostly tribal volunteers, and a few cannon and machine-guns. The Darna command decided to destroy this force in order to link up with the Tassoni column driving towards the town from the west. On 16 May 1913 the Italians launched an attack with some 5,000 men, three batteries of field guns, and a machine-gun section, under Gen. Mambretti. The fighting went against the Italians who lost their nerve and fled in disorder, losing 10 officers and 60 men besides 400 wounded, missing, or taken prisoner. They also lost a battery of guns and much equipment. The battle of Sidi al-Qarba', or of the *yaum al-juma'*, the Friday, as the Bedouin generally speak of it, prevented the further advance eastwards of the Tassoni column and the planned pincer movement between this column and the Darna force. It also threw Sayyid Ahmad into • [793] relief as the head of the resistance. At this point the Turks began to fade into the background and the Sanusiya Order and *[795] its Head to take responsibility for the direction of resistance. The defeat of Friday also involved the Tassoni column in a series of indecisive actions conducted from their forts during the summer months, in which the Turco-Arabs had the initiative, though they usually suffered heavier casualties than the Italians through inferior fire power and drill. Nevertheless, Italian losses were not negligible, their heaviest casualties in a single engagement being 100 dead, including 6 officers, when one of their units was surprised at Safsaf. Meanwhile in western Cyrenaica Suluq and Qaminis were occupied. On the whole plateau what for a colonial war may be regarded as heavy fighting and large-scale engagements continued to take place throughout the late summer and the autumn of 1913: the Turco-Arab force in a fight at 'Ain bu Shimal, 10 km. to the south-west of 'Ain Mara, on 6 October, was said to have numbered as many as 3,000 men. The Italian success at 'Ain bu Shimal enabled them to effect a junction between their forces in the Shahhat and Darna zones. *[795] Under this pressure Sayyid Ahmad al-Sharif withdrew to the west, where he made Msus and its neighbourhood his head- [793] quarters from October 1913 till he moved to the Marmarica to take part in the closing scenes of the first Italo-Sanusi war.

By the end of 1913 the campaign had broken up into a series

3:Evans-Pritchard E-4, 5 (1942-1944) 1949 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9
(1837-1942) Sanusi



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THE SAYYID AHMAD AL-SHARIF (MACALUSO)

[facing p. 128]

*175 was left to it in these regions was the isolated oasis of Kufra.
*648 He had by his foolish attack on the British brought about the
*795 destruction of the lodges of the Order and of its political
influence in the Western Desert of Egypt. Tripolitania had also been lost to the Sanusiya, though it was by this time almost entirely free from Italian domination. Ramadan al-Shtaiwi of Misurata barred its way into Old Tripolitania. Fazzan was in a state of anarchy. All that remained to the Order was its original North African core—the tribes of Cyrenaica and its Cyrenaican lodges—for in spite of all their defeats and miseries the Bedouin of the country still remained loyal to the Order whose interests were their own. The Italians were very far from having conquered these Bedouin and the history of the Order from the time of Sayyid Ahmad's departure is identical with the history of their continued resistance to the Italians under its leadership, first by diplomacy, then again by arms. With its empire and its dependence on the Sultanate the Order lost also its religious character and became, through its exclusive identification with the interests of the people of Cyrenaica, an almost purely political movement.

*175 Although there were for many years rumours, greeted with
*648 great enthusiasm by the Bedouin and with nervous appre-
● 793 hension by the Italians, of Sayyid Ahmad's impending return
to Cyrenaica he never again set foot on the African continent.
159 Born in 1873, Sayyid Ahmad al-Sharif was still in the early
forties when he left for Turkey. He was described at this time
[142] as a man of medium height, stout, for an Arab on the dark side, with a firm and determined face adorned with a small moustache, close-cut whiskers on the upper jaw, and close-cut beard.[1] The Sayyid was obstinate, impulsive in his judgements and impetuous in his actions, and he seems to have been proud, quarrelsome, and fanatical. He was not prepared to compromise, and the British and Italians were in entire agreement that no understanding could be reached with him. But he was a pious Muslim and a brave and loyal man, tenacious of his beliefs, stubborn in his upholding of them against overwhelming odds, and dignified in their defeat. There was a certain wildness in his schemes and recklessness in his execution of them which compel admiration.

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[1] Admiralty War Staff, Intelligence Division, 26 May 1915.

After his departure from North Africa, Sayyid Ahmad con- 175*
tinued to lead an adventurous life. His wars against France, 159
Italy, and Great Britain had made him a world figure, and in 793 •
the eyes of Muslims one of the foremost fighters for Islam of his
time. He was much sought after by the pan-Islamists of
Istanbul, who wished to use his name in their propaganda
directed to bringing Turks and Arabs more closely together. In
April 1921 he was designated King of Iraq at the Assembly of
Angora, but Faisal, backed by the British, had the advantage
of him in this project. He and his name played a big part in
persuading the Muslim minorities of Turkey to throw in their
lot with Mustafa Kamal. After Mustafa Kamal's victories
Sayyid Ahmad returned to Istanbul, where he tried to re-
establish the Caliphate, a project for which Mustafa Kamal
showed less enthusiasm. Early in 1922 we find him at Urfa
making peace between the great Bedouin tribes of Shammar and
‘Anaza. We then find him at Marsina trying to reunite Syria to
Turkey. From there he went to live at Damascus. The French
found his presence in Syria embarrassing and expelled him from
the country in December 1924. Thence he went to the Hijaz,
where he remained till his death at al-Madina on 10 March 1933.
During the last years of his life he took less interest in politics.
He seems to have won the personal respect of King Ibn Sa‘ud,
and he was called upon to settle local disputes, the most notable
of his achievements as peacemaker being a settlement of the
quarrel between the Amir Idris of ‘Asir, the descendant of the
Grand Sanusi's teacher at Mecca, and the Imam Yahiya of
the Yaman, but he mainly lived in retirement among his books.
He lived just long enough to see the Sanusi cause to all [795]*
appearances as finally extinguished in Cyrenaica as it had been
elsewhere.

CHAPTER VI

THE PERIOD OF THE ACCORDS (1917–23)

I

*175 *648 SAYYID Idris's approaches to the allied powers eventually led to the British High Commissioner in Egypt, Sir Henry McMahon, sending Col. Milo Talbot, a man of integrity and with a considerable knowledge of North African affairs, to represent his country in the negotiations. Col. Talbot, accompanied by his Egyptian secretary Ahmad Muhammad Hasanain (later the famous explorer of the Libyan Desert), left Alexandria on 25 May 1916 and after preliminary discussions at Rome joined the Italian delegates, Col. Villa and Com. Piacentini, at al-Zuwaitina; and there also awaited him the Idrisis of Luxor, descendants of that Sayyid Ahmad bin Idris al-Fasi who had been the Grand Sanusi's teacher at Mecca. They had been sent to Cyrenaica at Sayyid Idris's request to assist him in the negotiations. Sayyid Idris himself was camped some miles away in the interior with his counsellors and supporters.

*175 *648 *795 ●793 Discussions between Italy and England about the Sanusi had begun in February 1915 and an understanding had been reached on 31 July 1916, adhered to by France in March 1917, by which each undertook not to sign an agreement with the Sanusi without the consent of the other and to recognize Sayyid Idris as Head of the Sanusiya Order. It was clearly stipulated that the Sayyid should not be afforded recognition as an autonomous ruler, though the possibility of allowing him, under the sovereignty of the occupying State, administrative autonomy of some of the oases might be examined. On this point the Italians had earlier shown themselves to be very sensitive and the British Government had felt it expedient to assure them that it did not favour Sayyid Ahmad's claims to independence, pointing out to them that the recognition of Sayyid Ahmad as a secular ruler would be harmful to England as well as to Italy since it would involve the British Government in awkward frontier questions in the Marmarica.[1] Col. Talbot's instructions

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[1] Bruno Aglietti, 'La Confraternita Senussita', *Oriente Moderne*, Jan.–June, 1946, pp. 6–9.

in the negotiations state explicitly that Sayyid Idris was to be 175*
regarded as a spiritual leader and not as a temporal leader. 648*

Sayyid Idris had his first meeting with the Allied Mission on 795*
25 July 1916 and the three-cornered discussions were spread 793
out over the months of August and September. Between the Sanusi and the British there were easy relations from the beginning. Sayyid Idris had made friends with the British in Cairo, trusted them, and desired that the trust might be mutual. The British, for their part, were far from unsympathetic towards the Sanusi, and those who had met him respected the sincerity of their leader. Col. Talbot, while remaining on excellent terms with the Italian delegates, kept the confidence of the Sayyid, although he had sometimes, on behalf of the Italians, to press him to accept demands of which he personally disapproved and which could in no way serve British interests. He found little difficulty in obtaining the release of the British crew of the *Coquet*, who had for some time been prisoners in Sanusi hands.

Italo-Sanusi relations were very different. Sayyid Idris disliked the Italians and he thoroughly distrusted their intentions. The Italians suspected that Sayyid Ahmad and Sayyid Idris were in collusion, though pretending to be at variance, and aimed only at obtaining a temporary truce which would ensure entry into the country of supplies destined for a renewal of the struggle later; and they were resentful of the British, who, they thought, intended to relieve themselves of an embarrassment at the expense of Italy. It was soon evident that there was little hope of a permanent settlement, so a *modus vivendi* was sought which would at least give both sides a chance to recuperate.

At the beginning of the discussions the Italians said that they could only continue them if their prisoners were released, but the Sayyid had no intention of giving them up without a *quid pro quo* and adopted his usual delaying tactics when faced with demands of this kind, pleading that he would first have to ask permission of Sayyid Ahmad who had taken the prisoners, since he could not give one set of instructions and his cousin contrary
ones. As Sayyid Ahmad was still at al-Kharja oasis, consulta- [205]
tion by camel-mail could be relied on to delay the issue for some weeks. However, largely owing to Col. Talbot, agreement on this point was achieved, only to be overruled by the Italian Government at Rome, which considered its terms humiliating,

*175 on the grounds that its delegates had not been empowered to
*648 sign it. They were recalled and replaced by Maj. Riccardi and
• 793 Gen. Ameglio, who were to continue the negotiations from
*795 Banghazi. Sayyid Idris thought that he had been deliberately tricked and wanted to know whether any future engagements entered into with the Italians might be revoked in the same way. Col. Talbot was also irritated at Rome's action, since it was he who had persuaded the Sayyid to sign the agreement. Negotiations were thereupon broken off for some months and Col. Talbot and his staff returned in October to Cairo to report to the High Commissioner.

Interference of this kind from Rome and Banghazi was one of the difficulties which beset the negotiations. Another difficulty was Sayyid Idris's diplomatic technique, simple and effective, but none the less fatiguing. When faced with a demand he did not wish to accept but was unable to refuse outright he pleaded, often justly, that it would be useless for him to agree to terms his followers would reject. If this plea failed he raised all sorts of difficulties and delays on one pretext or another, and if hard pressed, pleaded ill health, or lapsed into phlegmatic indifference. This technique of attrition—what one Italian writer called his '*esasperante tattica temporeggiatrice*'[1]—was perhaps the best the Sayyid could have employed in the circumstances.

The discussions at al-Zuwaitina had not, however, been wasted. They had enabled Col. Talbot to know the Sayyid and, by a survey of the military situation at first hand and an initial assessment of the major problems, better to advise his Government. The discussions had made it clear that the Sayyid would agree neither to the release of the Italian prisoners nor to any further proposal unless the Allied Mission met him on the question of al-Sallum. The Sanusi received most of their supplies through this port, and if the British continued their blockade of it they would starve. Col. Talbot knew he could exact compliance in other matters in return for this concession, but he also knew that if the Sayyid did not obtain it for his people they might follow the intransigent Sayyid Ahmad, and the whole point of the negotiations was to prevent this. He felt, therefore, that he should urge the Italian delegates to meet

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[1] Serra, op. cit., p. 93.

the Sayyid's wishes in this matter, both to uphold the Sayyid's 175*
prestige among his own people and to make him keep to his 648*
promises, particularly about the Allied prisoners and the 795*
Turkish officers, under threat of closing the port should he 793
recant. There were in Cyrenaica still many Turkish officers urging the Bedouin to continue the struggle and Sayyid Idris had promised to round them up should al-Sallum be opened to trade. The question of the Turks was bound up with the al-Sallum issue because, as the Sayyid pointed out, Turkey had kept his people supplied by submarine, and while the Allies continued their blockade he could not afford to break with her.

Another problem was the immediate dispersal of the Sanusi 175*
fighting bands, or 'dors' (*adwar*), on which the Italian delegates 648*
insisted. It would have been foolish for the Sayyid to have 701
disbanded his forces while discussions were proceeding, since it
was their presence in the field which compelled the Allies to 795*
negotiate. He urged that it would be useless for him to agree to the dispersal of the bands, because they had no intention of dispersing and he had no means of forcing them to do so. The only result would be the loss of his prestige among his followers, who would say that he had become 'Italianized'. These bands continued to be a bone of contention between the Sanusi and the Italians for the next six years, and the issue was only settled by the military subjugation of the whole of Cyrenaica in 1932.

It was a question of importance to the Italians, because the 175*
answer to it was also the answer to what they regarded as the 648*
fundamental question of sovereignty. On this point the Sayyid 795*
was unyielding. He argued that his family, like the Arab princes of Arabia, had never accepted such demands as the Italians made, even from the Turks, fellow Muslims ruled by the Caliph of Islam; and he insisted that the British, who had everywhere shown themselves to be friends to the Arabs, should not press those of Cyrenaica to accept Italian sovereignty, which was the issue of the war and could only be imposed on a defeated people. The British regarded the question of sovereignty as a theoretical one and could not understand why the Italians attached so much importance to it.

Col. Talbot thought they should be content with the occupation of the ports and other centres, as the British were in Egypt,

Cyrenaica itself; while if the Italians were too greedy, they 175*
could break off negotiations and limit their further participa- 648*
tion in the Sanusi war to defensive action along the Egyptian 795*
frontier, leaving the Italians to validate their claim to sovereignty by force of arms. Italian diplomatic strength lay in the agreement by which England had bound herself that she would not conclude a separate peace with the Sanusi. They knew that the British were eager—Col. Talbot was always trying to expedite the discussions—to end their military commitments in this theatre and they were, therefore, able to bring pressure on Sayyid Idris through them. The Sayyid's strength lay in his weakness. To obtain an effective truce, the Allies would have to back him personally, and they could only do this by making concessions.

Dummy, Sayyid Idris's absent partner in this game, was his [793]
cousin Sayyid Ahmad. Till recently Sayyid Ahmad had been undisputed leader of the Sanusi, and were he to appear on the scene again, the Bedouin would probably follow him. As neither he nor the Italians were prepared to negotiate with one another, and as the British also had no wish to negotiate with him, his reappearance would mean renewal of the fighting. The only way in which it could be prevented was by making a success of the discussions with Sayyid Idris. The Allied Mission felt the presence of this uncompromising man at the conference of al-Zuwaitina, although he was far away in the oasis of al-Kharja.

II

Peace was so clearly in the interests of all that the temporary 175*
breakdown of the talks at al-Zuwaitina did not lead to further 648*
hostilities on either side, and was regarded by both as an inter- 795*
lude between two phases in the negotiations. The talks were 728
resumed in the Marmarica in January 1917. The Allied Mission lived at Tubruq and the Sayyid at 'Akrama, about 40 km. distant. The Idrisis of Luxor, father and son, were again present and, as before, flitted between the two parties. The Italians were represented by Col. De Vita and Com. Pintor. Sayyid Ahmad was at Siwa.

The talks began well and by 27 March the exchange of Italian and Sanusi prisoners was at last effected. In return for the

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THE SAYYID MUHAMMAD IDRIS

[facing p. 144]

*175 only on condition that nothing reached Turco-German hands.
*648 No Sanusiya lodges were to exist on Egyptian soil (they had
*795 already been razed to the ground in the Marmarica), though
728 alms might be collected from Egyptian adherents to the Order. Sayyid Idris's property in Egypt was to be respected. Jaghbub oasis, though in Egypt, was to be administered by the Sayyid.

The agreement signed at 'Akrama settled affairs between the Sanusi and the British. The British got the military security
*175 they needed. The terms were very favourable to the Sanusi.
*648 The *status quo* was preserved, the Italians being left in control
*795 of those parts of Cyrenaica in which they had established themselves—the coastal towns and a few inland posts—and the
728 Sanusiya Order retaining the rest of the country. The Sayyid
[793] had saved the organization of the Order his grandfather had founded in Cyrenaica, and though he was not formally recognized as more than the Head of a religious Order he was, in fact and of necessity, treated as though he were, as indeed he was, also the secular ruler of an independent people. The accords were signed without consultation with the Turks and without their consent, so whereas Sayyid Ahmad had fought the Italians and British as representative of the Sultan, his cousin made peace with them in his own right.

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

The disposition of Italian and Sanusi positions in October 1916.

The least satisfied party were the Italians. They had embarked on a colonial war and had not been successful in waging

*175 hold their posts. In 1919 they began to establish civil govern-
*648 ment in the territory under their control and to extend their
influence farther afield. On 31 October of that year Cyrenaica
*175 was given a constitution similar to that given to Tripolitania,
*648 and its parliament first met in April 1921 under the unlikely
642 presidency of Sayyid Safi al-Din, the old enemy of the Italians
[646] in the Sirtica. The tribesmen, of course, elected their own
Shaikhs. It held altogether five sessions up to March 1923, when it was closed down. From the Italian point of view the best that could be said for the constitution was that it implied a tacit acceptance of sovereignty and that a parliament brought their officials into personal touch with tribal leaders. Writers of the Fascist period, when the Wilsonian sentiments which inspired the Libyan constitutions were regarded with disfavour, strongly criticized the Government of the day for granting them. Thus Gaibi says that they were bound to bear evil fruit and that 'the Government thought to present itself as a magnanimous conqueror, and the Libyans thought it a beaten coward'.[1] The Bedouin certainly distrusted and despised the Italians and cared as little for their authority in Cyrenaica as their brothers cared for it in Tripolitania. About 100 of their Shaikhs met at Ajadabiya, where they issued a manifesto declaring that, constitution or no constitution, they would not tolerate the Italians outside the coastal towns, and there only as traders. To this insult the Government lamely responded by opening new
*175 conversations. After long discussions between the Colonial
*648 Governor, Giacomo de Martino, and 'Umar Pasha al-Kakhiya,
*795 representing Sayyid Idris, and an exploratory visit by Sayyid
al-Rida to Rome, it was agreed that the *modus vivendi* of 'Akrama should be superseded by a new pact, the Accord of al-Rajma of 25 October 1920.

*175 By this new agreement Sayyid Idris was given the hereditary
*648 title of 'Sanusi Amir' with the honorific address of Highness
*795 and was created Head of the autonomous administration of the
oases of Jaghbub, Aujila, Jalu, and Kufra, with the right of
631 using Ajadabiya as the seat of his administration. He was
• 793 granted a personal monthly allowance of L. 63,000 (on the day
[434] of the signing of the accord the Lira was 92 to the Pound

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[1] Agostino Gaibi, *Manuale di Storia politico-militare delle Colonie Italiane*, 1928, p. 531.

Sterling) and was allowed his own flag, the first place of honour 175*
after the Governor on official occasions, a salute of guns on 648*
official visits, and the use of an official steamer. Sums of money 795*
amounting to L. 93,000 were to be paid in monthly allowances 631
to members of his family. In addition the Government under- 793 ●
took to pay the police and military necessary to maintain order [434]
within the area under the Amir's administrative control, and a further L. 2,600,000 to meet the Amir's general expenses, of which L. 300,000 was to be in gold, and half this sum, including the gold portion, was to be paid on the signing of the accord and the other half on the suppression of the armed Sanusi camps. The Italians also subsidized tribal Shaikhs and zawiya Shaikhs and they paid stipends to the Members of Parliament. Notables, zawiya officials, qadis, scribes, chiefs of irregular bands, political counsellors, and informers, were all on the Italian pay-roll. The Italians were, in fact, bribing the whole country to keep quiet. The Italian Government further undertook to act in agreement with the Amir in making appointments to posts within the territory entrusted to his administration; recognized his right to move about freely; permitted the oases to send representatives to the local parliament; allowed the population to keep their arms; and guaranteed exemption of the Sanusiya lands from taxation. It specifically and solemnly declared that it had no intention of expropriating Arab lands, privately or collectively owned, or endowments of the Order, in favour of colonists. On his side the Sayyid promised to aid the Government in the application of the new constitution; to suppress within eight months the camps and posts and other Sanusi organizations of a political, administrative, or military character in the territory not entrusted to his administration; to keep his army to 1,000 men, subject to increase by mutual agreement; to encourage trade and communications; and not to tax the population other than by collection of religious tithes without coercion.

It was felt by the Italian Government that though in this new pact it had to make considerable concessions it had gained in return a more definite acceptance of its claim to sovereignty over the whole of Cyrenaica, which was henceforth divided into two zones, Cyrenaica proper under direct Italian administration and the oases under Sanusiya administration. The Sanusiya,

*175 as well as Italy, had been forced to compromise. Critics of the
*648 Fascist period were later to complain that the pact was a blow
631 to Italian prestige in that it virtually recognized 'the existence
*795 of two distinct Governments',[1] and Macaluso goes so far as to
● 793 say that the making of the Sayyid into an Amir 'was the ratification of the undisputed sovereignty of the Sanusiya in Cyrenaica'.[2] Even those who defended the agreement had to admit that the Order was not being treated as a purely religious body, but as a politico-religious fraternity and that there was, therefore, doubt about what its relations with the Italian Government were supposed to be. 'Amir' to the Italians meant Honorary Prince but it had a very different sense to the Arabs. It was, moreover, uncertain whether a seat at Ajadabiya implied that the warlike Magharba tribe of the *barqa* and the Sirtica came within the Sayyid's political orbit or not. On the whole one can say that the Sayyid, or rather the Amir, as we can now call him, bargained autonomy of the oases and the hinterland for his armed camps and administrative posts on the plateau. As he did not, in fact, disband these he may be said to have had the better of the bargain. After the Accord of al-Rajma was signed the Amir visited Rome.

The accord was supplemented by a further agreement known as *Sistemazione definitiva delle zauie* of 16 August 1921 by which nomination, suspension, and transfer of Shaikhs of Sanusiya lodges were to be in the hands of the Amir, but he had to give notice of these acts to the Government, and he promised to remove Shaikhs who embittered relations between the Government and the people. The Government undertook to pay the
[434] Shaikhs of lodges (in two categories of L. 900 and L. 600 a
[728] month), to hand back to the Order all lodges in its occupation, except those being used as forts, and to pay the sum of L. 500,000 as indemnity for lodges destroyed during the war.[3]

IV

The Italians pretended afterwards that 'Umar al-Kakhiya, who closely followed political events in Italy, had in bad faith, believing that the Socialists were in the ascendant and that

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[1] Agostino Gaibi, op. cit., p. 463.

[2] Macaluso, op. cit., p. 102.

[3] *L'Occupazione di Cufra*, 1931, pp. 62–3. On 16 August 1921 the Lira was 84 to the Pound Sterling.

Italy would therefore withdraw from her colonial adventure, 175*
advised the Amir to sign the Accord of al-Rajma in the hope 648*
that he would not have to carry out its terms. He was later to 631
spend over 16 years in exile in Italy for his alleged duplicity. 795*
The Italians did not at this time charge the Amir with more 793 ●
than weakness when, after the stipulated eight months had [712]
passed, he had failed to carry out the terms of the accord, especially
in the matter of the armed Sanusi camps.

These camps were supply points garrisoned by the remnants 175*
of the Sanusi army of 1917. Through them and from them the 648*
Sanusiya was exercising political control over the country and 712
administering the tribes. The chief camps in 1917 were Ajada- 631
biya, al-Shlaidima, Marawa, Khawalan, al-Abyar, Taknis, and 795*
'Akrama. Each was under a *qaimaqam* and had its com- 701
mandant of troops, its qadi for judicial proceedings, and its
tithe collectors who collected from the Bedouin a tax on crops
and flocks. With the development of the political functions of
the Order alms had been transformed into taxes. Ajadabiya and
al-Shlaidima had as their *nazir*, inspector, 'Ali Pasha al-'Abdiya.
Al-Abyar and Taknis came under Sidi 'Umar al-Mukhtar, and
Marawa, Khawalan, and 'Akrama came under Sayyid Safi
al-Din.

When asked why these camps had not been broken up the 175*
Amir said that the accord had been very badly received by the 648*
Bedouin and that were it to be enforced hastily serious dis- 712
turbances might ensue. He counselled caution. In addition to 701
the continuance of the armed camps in defiance of the accord, 795*
the Italians also complained of concerted passive resistance, 793
on the part of the Shaikhs of Sanusiya lodges and the Shaikhs 631
of tribes, to collaboration with their officials; but either because [668]
they were not yet ready to use force or because they were con-
vinced that the Amir was unable to dictate to his followers,
and probably for both reasons, they continued to temporize.

By the further Accord of Bu Mariyam of 11 November 1921 175*
the dissolution of the armed camps was confirmed, but it was 648*
agreed that until the Italians had strengthened their admini- 712
strative control and political influence in the country the still- 701
existing Sanusi camps should be held jointly. There were to 631
be four so-called '*Campi Misti*', at al-Abyar, Taknis, Slanta, 795*
and 'Akrama, manned by Italian and Sanusi troops in the

in the hands of the Order. Nevertheless, the Rome Government 175*
at the time thought, or pretended to think, that the develop- 648*
ment of events was in their favour and that their propaganda 795*
was rapidly costing the Amir and his family their popularity 631
in the country. They constantly, as the Bedouin say when speaking of this period, pushed a stick under the pot to keep it hot till they wanted it to boil over.

The situation at this time in Cyrenaica could not, in any case, 175*
have lasted for long. It became clear to all, even before the 648*
Fascists gained control in October 1922, that hostilities would 793 ●
sooner or later break out again and matters were being brought 795*
to a head by the Amir's attitude on the Tripolitanian issue. The Arabs of Tripolitania, finding themselves in difficulties, sought to extend their front against the Italians by reaching an agreement with the Sanusi, with whom in the past their relations, as we have seen, had not always been cordial. Their leaders held a meeting, at which Sanusi representatives from Cyrenaica were present, at Sirt at the end of 1921 which carried the decisions of the Assembly of Ghariyan a step farther by sending a deputation to Sayyid Idris at Ajadabiya in April 1922 to offer him the Amirate of all Libya. The Sayyid refused to commit himself one way or the other, for he was aware that the Tripolitanian notables who made him the offer had for the most part little regard for his person or for his Order and were merely trying to create a diversion which might draw off some of the Italian forces operating against them. To have replied 'Yes' would have brought him into conflict with Italy. To have replied 'No' would have alienated from him those Tripolitanian Arabs who genuinely sympathized with the Sanusiya. Faced with this dilemma he pleaded ill health early in 1922 and requested the Italian Government to permit him to visit Egypt for two years for rest and treatment. He also, according to Giglio,[1] made the strange request that Sayyid Ahmad be allowed to return to Cyrenaica. Both requests were refused. So was his offer, repeatedly made, to mediate between Italy and the Arabs of Tripolitania, and he was informed, in more forcible terms than he had been accustomed to expect from the Colonial Government, that any interference on his part in the affairs of Tripolitania would be considered a breach of the

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[1] Giglio, op. cit., p. 98.

*175 Accord of al-Rajma. But the Italians were not yet ready to
*648 break with him finally, not wishing to compromise the opera-
*795 tions they were carrying out in Tripolitania. They therefore
793 started new discussions, conducted in person by Amendola,
the Minister for the Colonies, who, on his return to Italy, expressed satisfaction with the talks and confidence in the Amir, neither of which he could have felt. In Mondaini's opinion the Government's policy of continuing to treat with the Sanusiya at so late a stage was consistent and, in the circumstances, wise, for it was believed that the greed for lucre and honours so unashamedly displayed by members of the Amir's family would bring them into disrepute among the Arabs, while the Government would be able to organize under its administration the zone of the plateau nearest its coastal bases and thus prepare for its penetration into the interior. In defence of Amendola's policy, later subjected to much criticism,[1] Mondaini further observes that the Fascist Government itself delayed action till the spring of 1923 when the Tripolitanian rebellion had been crushed.[2]

Concessions certainly did not lessen tension. The Italians
712 felt that the Sanusiya was using the 'Mixed Camps' as a medium
for anti-Italian propaganda, as indeed they were, not only
701 through their official representatives in the camps but also
182 through persons not officially recognized, such as the Sanusiya
Shaikhs 'Umar al-Mukhtar, Salih al-'Awwami, and Khalid al-Humri; and they suspected that Shaikh 'Abd al-Aziz al-'Isawi had been sent by the Amir into the Misurata region to act as his liaison with the insurgents there. The Amir had selected for his personal advisers the most recalcitrant of the zawiya Shaikhs. They further accused the Order of responsibility for certain incidents which happened in the late summer of 1922: an attack on an Italian postal car near al-Zawiya al-Baida and the firing of some Italian property at al-Zuwaitina. Rome, said to have been misled by 'Umar Pasha al-Kakhiya, blamed the local government for these incidents and appointed a new Governor who made a further, and as it turned out final, gesture of conciliation by paying to the Amir the remainder of the money owing to him under the Accord of al-Rajma. But nothing could brake the wheels now. Already in August the Committee elected

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[1] Giglio, op. cit., p. 99.

[2] Mondaini, op. cit., p. 475.

by the Assembly of Sirt had forwarded to Sayyid Idris the 175*
madbata, dated 28 July 1922, formally investing him with the 648*
Amirate of Tripolitania. 795*

Sayyid Idris still hesitated. Before giving a reply he wished 793
to consult Bedouin opinion, for it was on the Bedouin he would have to count were hostilities to break out. To this purpose he called, in October 1922, a large tribal gathering at Jardis al-'Abid. In the following month, under great pressure from his advisers, and still hesitating in his own mind, he accepted the Amirate. It must by this time have been apparent to him that the Italians intended to make war whatever course he took and that he might, in that case, just as well have the Tripolitanian Arabs as allies. In his reply to the Committee he entrusted Tripolitanian affairs to them, under their President Ahmad al-Marayid, until such time as a National Assembly could meet to draw up a constitution. Then, realizing that the fable of the wolf and the lamb was about to be enacted, he fled by caravan to Jaghbub in December 1922 and thence to Egypt, where he had long made financial preparation for this eventuality out of the Italian subsidies. He may also have felt that he had compromised himself so deeply with the Italians over a number of years that his presence in the country could only be an embarrassment to the Bedouin whose martial spirit he could understand but not emulate. He left his brother Sayyid Muhammad al-Rida and his cousin Sayyid Safi al-Din to represent him in Cyrenaica.

Sayyid Idris did not return to Cyrenaica till the third British 175*
occupation of the country during the late war (1943), though 648*
he continued in Egypt to represent the forces of resistance and, 795*
in so far as he could do so without compromising his position as 793
a guest of a country whose Royal House was so intimately bound 159
to the Royal House of Italy, to direct them. At the time of his flight he was 33 years of age. He gave the impression of being tall and rather portly, very unlike the slight and delicate figure he presents to-day. Nurtured, as were all the Sanusi family, in piety and learning in oasis retreats and accustomed to a refined and sedentary life, he has never been a man of action or of a hardy constitution. Though he assisted Sayyid Ahmad in organizing the Sanusi bands at Ajadabiya after the Treaty of Losanna in the first Italo-Sanusi war, he early showed that his

*175 *648 ● 793 *795 159 talents lay in diplomacy rather than in the field. It is evident from the part he played in the events leading up to the truce and during the period of the truce that he is astute and a man of sound political judgement. That he is often vacillating and evasive cannot be denied, and though these characteristics may sometimes have been a wise response of the weak negotiating with the strong, and may often have served him well in the difficult circumstances in which he took over direction of the Sanusiya Order from Sayyid Ahmad, they seem to be weaknesses to which he is temperamentally prone and to have become an aversion to directness in either thought or action. Italian writers, who are, with some justification, scathing in their comments on most members of the Sanusi family, speak of Sayyid Idris with respect. They admit that he is intelligent, religious, and gifted with a profound moral sense and political intuition. He is firm in decisions once he has taken them and keeps his promises.

*175 *648 At the end of 1922 the Fascist revolution culminated in the march on Rome and the new Government at once made up its mind to reconquer by arms Tripolitania and Cyrenaica. It continued to temporize in Cyrenaica, partly because its position at home was not yet secure, and partly because it intended to finish operations in Tripolitania first. The Fascists felt that their prestige was at stake. The days of *socialdemocrazia* were over and military conquest, domination, and colonization were the order of the day. The ancient Roman provinces were once again to be peopled by the sons and daughters of Rome.

On 6 March 1923 the Italians, without delivering an ultimatum or declaration of war, carried out their secret and long-prepared plan to seize the 'Mixed Camps' and the Sanusi camp of Khawalan, taking about half the Sanusi soldiers prisoners. By this surprise they put out of action a considerable part of the Amir's regular forces. In a proclamation of 1 May 1923 the new Governor of the Colony, Gen. Luigi Bongiovanni—soldiers had replaced civil administrators—declared null and void all accords and conventions made between the Government and the Sanusiya. On the following day the Amir was informed of the step taken by a letter from the Italian Minister in Cairo. War had broken out again in Cyrenaica.

than in Tripolitania, and they had learned the reason for this: 175*
'Inasmuch as in Cyrenaica the opposition to our rule was not 648*
fractionized and enfeebled by the personal ambitions and 795*
rivalries of numerous chiefs, but was retrenched and assembled 619
around a single will, the Sanusiya, which manipulated it as it pleased.'[1] They started the war afresh in 1923 with this conclusion firmly fixed in their minds: *delenda est Sanusiya*. But they still believed, not understanding the place of the Order in tribal life, that the attachment of the Bedouin to it was superficial, that it was some kind of parasitic growth which could be cut out of the tribal system. They further believed that their incessant propaganda had already undermined the hold of the Order on the Bedouin.

The Sanusi family, as will be seen, played an inconspicuous 175*
and inglorious part in the resistance. Italian writers confess 648*
surprise that the Bedouin should have continued to show 795*
devotion to persons whose character displayed so few of those 793 •
qualities Bedouin admire. The Bedouin may indeed have 554
expected a higher standard of conduct than some members of the family lived up to, but they did not suppose that they would distinguish themselves as military leaders. They knew that the descendants of the Grand Sanusi had been brought up in the oases to a sedentary and bookish life and not in the hard way of their own children and that they were unsuited to the frugal and exhausting life of a guerrilla. Their duty, in most cases little in evidence in fulfilment, was to pursue holiness and learning that their presence among the people might bring down on them God's blessing. In the eyes of the Bedouin they lacked in full measure the manly qualities of courage and endurance that Bedouin demand in their own folk, but they were credited with the scholarship and sanctity of the religious, which Bedouin admire in their spiritual guides rather than seek to emulate in their own lives. Italian writers sometimes refer to a member of the family accompanying the guerrilla bands, as did Sayyid al-Hasan and Sayyid Saddiq, as having the role of a standard (*insegna*), a word which well describes their peculiar position in the resistance. Where in a man the qualities of *marabat*, holy man, and of *mujahid*, fighter for the faith, were combined, as in Sayyid Ahmad al-Sharif and Sidi 'Umar al-Mukhtar, the

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[1] Agostino Gaibi, *Storia delle Colonie Italiane*, 1934, p. 344.

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SIDI 'UMAR AL-MUKHTAR (GRAZIANI)

[facing p. 168]

*175 Bedouin followed them at great sacrifice. They were combined
*648 in many of the Sanusiya Brothers.

*795 The Shaikhs and Brothers of the Order, with few exceptions,
● 793 played a prominent part in the war, both in the field and by
554 keeping the Bedouin, submitted and unsubmitted alike, in a
ferment. The Italian soldiers and administrators constantly
*175 complained that whenever the Bedouin were tiring of the
*648 struggle the Brothers of the Order urged them to continue it.
619 It was their example and exhortations which made it something
793 more than the usual piecemeal resistance of a barbarous people
794 to colonial conquest or more than a succession of raids of the
kind Bedouin have enjoyed for so many centuries. Their participation
*795 made it both a national and a religious movement. It did much also to establish the Sanusiya in the hearts of the Bedouin. Some of the best-known names of the resistance, like Salih Lataiwish, 'Abd al-Hamid al-'Abbar, Saifat and Muhammad bu Farwa, Husain al-Juwaifi, Brahim al-Fallah, Fadil al-Mahashash, and Qtait bu Musa, were those of Bedouin Shaikhs, but most of the leading figures were Sanusiya *Ikhwan*, men like 'Umar al-Mukhtar, Yusif bu Rahil, Khalid al-Humri, Sharif al-Mailud, 'Abd al-Qadir Farkash, Fadil bu 'Umar, Salih al-'Awwami, and Muhammad bu Najwa al-Masmari.

*175 The indomitable Sidi 'Umar al-Mukhtar was the soul of the
*648 resistance and the struggle is always associated with his name
*795 as similar struggles against French aggression in Algeria and
793 Morocco are associated with the names of 'Abd al-Qadir and
159 'Abd al-Karim. Sidi 'Umar, 'our irreducible enemy, the faithful and able servant of Idris, the heart and soul of the Cyrenaican rebellion', as Graziani called him,[1] was that rare combination of Bedouin and Sanusiya Shaikh. He was born about 1862 of the *'Ailat* Farhan of the Braidan section of the Minifa tribe of the Marmarica and was educated first at the Sanusiya school at Janzur and afterwards at Jaghbub. He was nominated by Sayyid Ahmad al-Sharif Shaikh of al-Qasur lodge among the stubborn 'Abid tribe but only performed his duties there for two years before being summoned to Kufra to serve against the French in the Wadai. He returned to al-Qasur about 1906 and later took a prominent part in the first Italo-Sanusi war and in obstructing Italian penetration in the years of peace which

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[1] Op. cit., p. 235.

followed it. In 1923, when he was called to take the foremost 175*
part in the struggle, he was already over sixty years of age. 648*
He was a simple man, religious, courageous, contemptuous of 795*
worldly honours and success, and with singular tenacity and 793●
powers of physical endurance. It may well be true that, as is 159
reported, Sayyid al-Mahdi said 'If we had ten men like 'Umar we would not need any more'.

IV

All the *adwar*, or guerrilla bands, on the plateau came under 175*
Sidi 'Umar's command and he signed himself *al-Naib al-'Amm*, 648*
the Representative-General (of the Sanusiya). Each Bedouin 795*
tribe, as in Enver's day, maintained its own guerrilla band, some 793
100 to 300 men strong. Towards the end of the war the guerrillas 701
never numbered, all told, more than 600 to 700. Only a certain 619
number of men could maintain themselves on the country and move through it with speed and secrecy. As in other guerrilla wars, the actual fighting was done by small bands of enthusiasts, whose success nevertheless depended on the goodwill of the whole population. The bands suffered very heavy casualties, but were maintained at strength by a constant stream of adventurous spirits from submitted and unsubmitted sections alike. Though each band was named after a tribe and its members were chiefly recruited from that tribe and fought in its territory, they were not entirely recruited from it and they might fight anywhere. In each tribal band there were a good number of volunteers from other tribes and a sprinkling of *Ikhwan*, Sudanese, and Tripolitanians. The 'Awaqir and Magharba had separate bands while the other tribal bands usually fought in pairs, Hasa–'Abaidat, Bara'asa–Darsa, and 'Abid–'Arafa. A Misuratan contingent formed a small band of its own which greatly distinguished itself in the fighting. Each band had a simple organization: a commander, a *qaimaqam* for civil affairs, a qadi for religious and legal purposes, a commissariat agent, and a number of officers, some of whom had been trained
in Turkish regular units. Sidi 'Umar maintained discipline in [703]
the bands, and acts of pillage or personal vendetta were severely punished. Those of the guerrillas who possessed horses rode
them. The rest went on foot. Each band had its Sanusi flag. [186]

*175 *648 *795 701 619 [722] When things were quiet members of a band would have their families and herds with them and live in their own tents, but when pressed they left their women and children and beasts in the tents of the submitted population and the only non-combatants in their camps would then be a few female cooks. Before the end of the war many of the Patriots, including Sidi 'Umar, had sent their families to Egypt so that they could act more freely.

*175 *648 *795 793 701 619 [651] There was also a general administration for all the bands and this came directly under Sidi 'Umar. They maintained inter-communication and worked to a common strategy. Guerrilla headquarters had also to arrange for the collection of a tithe from the entire population to help pay for the expenses of the campaign. Throughout the war Sidi 'Umar's tax-collectors were taking tithes from the submitted population, not always without trouble, and were giving written receipts for the payments. The tithe paid by each tribe went to support its own band. Sidi [705] 'Umar had also to arrange for caravans to bring supplies from Egypt, and to supervise their distribution to the armed forces and the payment of customs dues on what went to the civilian population. Sidi 'Umar also kept up correspondence with Sayyid Idris and Sanusi elements and sympathizers in Egypt.

*175 *648 *795 The guerrilla bands were in constant contact with the enemy. One of the most striking features of the campaign was the frequency of the fighting. At some point or other on the plateau a skirmish or larger engagement took place every few days for nearly nine years during the spring and summer months. In the account of the campaign which follows I mention but few of these fights, those which had exceptional importance for the campaign as a whole or as examples of the scale of the fighting. The few mentioned are therefore no indication of the amount of fighting. Its frequency may be judged by Gen. Graziani's statement that in the final year of the war, when resistance, compared with earlier years, was feeble and sporadic, there took place 53 engagements (*combattimenti*) and 210 skirmishes (*conflitti*).[1]

This incessant fighting cannot, as I have already said, be described in the language of text-book logistics in terms of manœuvring, objectives, and battles. Indeed, the Italians had

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[1] *Rivista delle Colonie Italiane*, vol. vi (I), 1932, pp. 52–3.

*175 *648 *795 situation which had developed there in 1915 seemed likely to develop again. Concerted operations from Cyrenaica and Tripolitania were, therefore, planned. To facilitate them from the Cyrenaican side the Italian line was advanced in March 1927 from Qaminis–Tailimun–Suluq–al-Shlaidima to Ajadabiya–Sawunnu–Msus; and Teruzzi, always an advocate of combining political with military action, decided to try what diplomacy could do to ease the task of the soldiers. He had [793] [619] some success, with the aid of the treacherous Sanusiya Shaikh Sharif al-Ghariyani, in that he was able to arrange a meeting in June in the *barqa al-baida* with a number of tribal Shaikhs and to persuade 13 of those belonging to the Magharba Shammakh to make submission. This pacification of the Magharba near Ajadabiya, indispensable to operations in the Sirtica, had an immediate result in the uncontested occupation of al-Qatafiya towards the end of September and of al-'Aqaila a few days later. Sayyid Saddiq al-Rida collected a small force to the south of the Wadi al-Farigh to prevent a further advance but neither he nor his father, a man lacking both vigour and spirit, had the character of the Bedouin and both were wavering. The son entered into correspondence with the Italians and the father

[102]



The Italian conquest of Cyrenaica.

*175 thirty-two holdings, for the Bedouin showed no inclination to
*648 work as serfs the lands they had worked as freemen: 'In their
[167 daily attitude coldness and scepticism were apparent so that
563] the part they took in collaborating was purely formal.'[1] A pastoral village, furnished with veterinary and stud services and offices for the collection, classification, and weighing of wool, was built at Nahiba (Jardis al-ʿAbid) and another was planned to be built at Verde (Jardis al-Jarrari). Some may consider that these measures are evidence of Balbo's sincerity. The Bedouin believed that he intended to destroy them by guile as surely as Graziani had destroyed them with machine-gun and bomb.

V

When Giolitti landed troops in Cyrenaica and Tripolitania in 1911 he started his country on the road to ruin. The first Libyan war was from 1911 to 1917. In the midst of it Italy was involved, from 1915 to 1918, in the first Great War. From 1921 to 1932 she was again engaged in prosecuting her colonial war in Libya, first in Tripolitania, then in Cyrenaica also. From 1934 to 1936 she participated in the Spanish civil war. In 1935 and 1936 she conquered Ethiopia. In 1939 she seized Albania. From 1940 to 1944 she was engaged in the second Great War. It was appropriate that disaster should overcome the Italians in Cyrenaica, that the Bedouin of that country who had suffered so much at their hands should witness their humiliation, and that it should fall on the head of Graziani, who became Governor of Libya when Balbo was killed at Tubruq on 28 June 1940.

As the day of retribution drew near the Italians showed some uneasiness about the situation in Cyrenaica and, as I have recorded, they made belated attempts to conciliate the Arabs.
*175 Their uneasiness was partly due to the presence of the Sanusi
*648 leader Sayyid Idris and of a number of notable Cyrenaican and
*795 Tripolitanian Shaikhs in exile in Egypt. It could hardly be
● 793 doubted that they would approach the British with offers of assistance should Italy enter the war on the side of Germany. This is what happened. In October 1939, when Italy's participation seemed imminent, the Cyrenaican and Tripolitanian

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[113] [1] Giuseppe Palloni, *The Action of the Italian Government in Favour of the Lybian Agriculture*, 1945, p. 31.

Shaikhs met at Alexandria and informed the British Ambassador 175*
in Cairo that they recognized Sayyid Idris as their Amir and that 648*
he could speak on their behalf. At a second meeting of these 795*
Shaikhs in Cairo on 9 August 1940, after Italy had declared war, [793]
it was decided to form a Libyan force to co-operate with the British army in the Western Desert. Though some of the Tripolitanian notables refused to associate themselves with this offer, wishing to make a separate offer on their own account, it was gladly accepted by the British authorities, and the British-Arab Force, later known as the Libyan Arab Force, was recruited from among the Sanusi exiles in Egypt and later also from Sanusi prisoners of war, who had taken the first opportunity of surrendering to the British. It was officered by British and Arabs, including some of the veterans of the Italo-Sanusi wars, and at its maximum strength consisted of five battalions and a depot. The force was not trained and equipped for the kind of fighting which took place in the Western Desert, but it performed useful ancillary duties to which Mr. Eden paid a tribute in the House of Commons on 8 January 1942, when he declared that His Majesty's Government was determined that the Sanusi should not come again under Italian domination. It took part in the first and subsequent occupations of Cyrenaica by British troops, and two battalions served in the defence of Tubruq in 1941. The little Sanusi army fought under its own flag and Arab [701]
commissions in it were in the name of the Amir. The Bedouin of Cyrenaica also rendered services to the British army as guides and agents and in assisting escaped prisoners of war and men detached from their units during our two withdrawals to Egypt. They gave further assistance by their eager co-operation with the three British Military Administrations of their country, although those who were known to have rendered the British special assistance were shot by the Italians on our withdrawals.

When in 1943 Sayyid Idris visited Cyrenaica for the first time 175*
since his hurried departure from it in 1922 and was received 648*
with wild enthusiasm by the whole country, it was just a century 795*
after his grandfather had founded his first zawiya in it. During 793
that century the Sanusiya Order had seen many changes and had itself changed. Even in the Grand Sanusi's time it had some political functions. The best Italian historian of the Order, Carlo Giglio, could write that at the death of its founder the

*175 Order was 'not a true and proper State but something very
*648 similar'.[1] We have seen how these political functions were
*795 further developed under the rule of Sayyid al-Mahdi and how
under the rule of Sayyid Ahmad al-Sharif what may justly
• 793 be called an embryonic State came into being. The Head of the Order was by this time less the religious Head of an Islamic fraternity than the leading representative of a nascent nationalism which became increasingly conscious of itself in the long struggle against the Italians under Sanusiya leadership. In this struggle the Order became more and more a political organization which directed, administratively, economically, and militarily, the entire Bedouin population, and morally the entire population of Cyrenaica, Bedouin and townsmen alike, against the common enemy. When truce was made in 1917, whatever the Italians and British may have asserted to the contrary, they had, in fact, to treat with Sayyid Idris not only as the Head of a religious Order, but also as the Head of a political organization which represented, and alone represented, the political aspirations of a people. As events turned out, the Italians, by destroying the Sanusiya organization, cut out the intervening structure of lodges and Shaikhs and made more evident the political status of the Head of the Order.

105 What has happened during the century which has passed
*175 since the first Brothers of the Order began to build the lodge
and till the soil at what is now al-Zawiya al-Baida must be
*648 viewed in relation to Bedouin tribal structure. A man coming
*795 from outside and with religious authority established himself
·793 as Head of the acephalous Bedouin society of Cyrenaica, and circumstances in which that whole society was forced to act for a long period of time against external enemies transformed his religious fraternity into a political organization. The Sanusiya Order from the first identified itself with the Bedouin and laboured to bring about tribal unity under its aegis. Under
[668] Turkish rule nationalist tendencies, as distinct from, and overriding, tribal loyalties, were latent, and the role of the Sanusiya within the frame of the Ottoman Empire was still predominantly religious rather than political; but when the Italians sought to subjugate the Bedouin their resistance, in the very clear moral issue presented to them, manifested itself

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[1] Op. cit., p. 11.

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as a nationalist movement, with a corresponding effect on the 175*
character of the Sanusiya Order and on the status of its Head. 648*
The final stage in the transformation of a religious revival into 795*
a political movement was brought about by the clash of Euro- 793
pean arms. Amid the roar of planes and guns the Bedouin learnt [668]
to see themselves more clearly as a single people, the Sanusi of
Cyrenaica, in a wider world, and came to be regarded as such by
those engaged in the struggle.

5: Peters E-5 (1948-1950) 1967 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9
Cyrenaica

1950, but his kind of tyranny was absent from the Cyrenaica of that period. From the 795
mid-nineteenth century until the Italian invasion of 1911, the Sanusi Order estab- 175
lished itself, spread its lodges throughout the tribes and in other more remote lands [613]
until it became what Evans-Pritchard speaks of as a theocratic empire.[1] The lodges [778]
served as areas of sanctuary and their staffs adjudicated disputes. Leaders of the [793]
Order had the power to coerce and the Bedouin obeyed. They obeyed out of personal
regard for some of them in 1950, but the religious authority previously used by the
leaders had given way to the political power they now exercised as functionaries in
a state system. In the meantime, the country had been ravaged by the long Italo- [648]
Sanusi wars. Throughout the nineteen-thirties after suffering terrible privations and
reduction in numbers through slaughter in war, death in concentration camps, and
exile, the Bedouin were ruled by the Italians. During the Second World War the
armies of three major contestants fought their battles where the Bedouin now tend
their flocks and herds. After the war they were left to fend for themselves, with a
minimum of administrative interference.

In the light of all this the conception of an equilibrium system is of little heuristic 121
value, still less its derivative concept of a repetitive system. This does not mean, however, that an account of part of the social life of the Bedouin as it existed in 1950 must be nothing more than a disconnected piece of history, unrelated to a prior state of things and wholly useless for the understanding of the contemporary oil-producing cum mixed pastoral–agricultural economy. It would be little more than a piece of social historiography if the analysis was based on the concept of a total social structure of functionally interconnected parts, forming what Leach describes as 'a delicately balanced mechanism rather like the various parts of a wrist watch'.[2] Such a viewpoint would effectively exclude any possible comprehension of changes save those present as part of the dynamics of a system; its only answer to change is an account of a different system. If, instead, attention is focused on the analysis of a field of components arranged in a specific fashion to meet the interests of men at a particular time, it then becomes possible to see how a shift in their positions, the addition of new components, or the elimination of others produces this or that effect. It can make intelligible what has gone before, and if the future cannot be anticipated it can be demarcated within rough limits.

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[175]
[795]
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modern territory of his tribe. See also Hamilton, 1856.

[1] Evans-Pritchard, 1949. In this book a brilliant account is given of the development of the Order, and how it came to unify and provide centralized political leadership for the tribes.

[2] Leach, 1961, p. 6.

175 the Bedouins of the Hijaz area. This Sanusi success aroused
795 the jealousy and animosities of the orthodox *'ulama* ("clergy")
[798] of the Mecca area. Al-Sanusi was forced to flee the Arabian
[793] peninsula, and in 1843 he founded his first *zawiya* ("lodge"),
[346] *al-zawiya al-baida*, in Cyrenaica. The Sanusi doctrine was as
acceptable to the Bedouins of Cyrenaica as it had been to the
tribes of the Hijaz. The person and teachings of *al-Sanusi*
[793] *al-kabir* ("the grand Sanusi"), as he came to be known, fit
into the "holy man" religious tradition of Cyrenaica and even
spread beyond into the Sudan and Lake Chad area. The Order
showed primary concern for the people of the desert: the
[793] Sanusi *shaikh* ("holy man") cared for the poor, and the *zawiya*
[346] [485] became rest stops, storehouses, and religious centers where
[794] Bedouin children were taught their Quranic lessons. Through
175 the *zawiya*, the Sanusiyya became a political and economic
795 integrating factor in the desert, and al-Sanusi became the
346 182 legitimate authority of the Bedouins. The *zawiya* became a
[793] very important part of the traditional desert economic system.
Today one *zawiya* remains near al-Qasr but it is scarcely used.
The Bedouins say: "Before, when Alexandria was far away by
camel, we could get what we wanted at the *zawiya*. Now that we
have trucks and trains no one goes to the *zawiya*."

175 The fortunes of the Bedouin became linked with those
795 of the Order. When the Sanusi became involved in full-scale
648 conflict with the Italian colonial power, the Bedouins bore

622 His main function is to manage the affairs of the village, apprehend
554 criminals, report and register births and deaths, collect taxes and
represent the government in all matters involving the relationship
between the government and his village. Because of his position as the
[661] representative of the govrernment, he usually enjoys a considerable
amount of power which, over the years, many omdas have used it to obtain
personal benefits.

361 In 1958 the committee appointed for the examination of the
631 possibility of applying the system to Awlad Ali noticed that villages in the
sense of a compact settlement similar to that existing in the rural area
simply do not exist in the Western Desert region. There are a few
settled communities in the area but they are scattered homes or a few
stores. These communities have no identifiable boundaries or
631 administrative existence. The area as a whole is divided into ten
634 administrative districts, each having a police station. These districts
[625] correspond to the old Senusia Zawyas which played an important role in
[795] maintaining order in the era until the First World War. Until that time
[175] the area was divided into fourteen zones each of which was under the
795 jurisdiction of one of the zawyas. The zawyas were mainly religious
175 centers, or shrines, inhabited and directed by a member of the Senusi
[793] order of Cyrenaica. The role of the head of the zawya was to teach the
Qoraan and spread the teachings of the Senusi order. One of the ways
[794] the zawyas attracted followers was through distribution of food and
clothing to those who joined it. The zawyas also provided places of
[778] refuge for those who needed protection since no one could force his way
into the sacred zawyas. Because of their religious position which put

*795

*175 provocation, did the same in Cyrenaica, the Order had no
[159] choice but to resist.

[793] But though it was attacks from the outside which destroyed
*[648] the theocratic empire of the Sanusiya, it may be considered
doubtful whether in any case such extensive territories could
have been maintained under single direction. The economic
and political organization of the Order was crude, even when
elaborated in the days of Sayyid al-Mahdi in response to
increased trading activities and to the need of maintaining
peace in the petty and barbarous states that had come under
its influence. Its administrative machinery was at no time
adequate for effective control over such wide domains, with
their poor communications and their manifold tribal, racial,
[578] and cultural divergencies. To these weaknesses must be added,
after Sayyid al-Mahdi's death, personal rivalries within the
Sanusi family on the lines of which cracks began to appear in
the loose empire, and it is probable that even if it had not been
attacked by the Powers of Europe it would have broken up
into a number of principalities, or spheres of religious influence,
ruled by various members of the family. It might indeed be
*[648] possible to sustain the thesis that it was the Italian occupation
[182] of Libya which prevented the complete break-up of the Order
by rallying the outraged sentiment of the Bedouin to its side as
the symbol of their common resistance to conquest and alien
rule.

The administrative organization of the Order in the time of
Sayyid al-Mahdi was simple indeed. Each lodge of the Order
● [794] lived on its own revenues, derived from endowments, tithes,
contributions of money, goods, transport, and labour, and sent
its surplus to Jaghbub and Kufra for the maintenance of the
University and of the Sanusi family and for the general purposes
[628] of the Order. The Shaikh of each lodge arbitrated in disputes
in the district in which it was situated and could generally
wield spiritual sanctions sufficiently weighty to compel
acceptance of his awards. The Shaikh of a lodge was appointed
by the head of the Order and was responsible to him. There
was, however, so little centralized planning that new lodges
seem occasionally to have been founded by the initiative of
influential families without the head of the Order hearing of the
new foundation till its completion. In the more distant parts

absolutely obligatory and sinful to omit. I very much doubt 771
whether many of the Bedouin know how to pray in the pre- [782]
scribed manner. As I have mentioned earlier, the Bedouin used [794]
to give alms to their zawiyas and in doing so they carried out [735]
one of the five major duties of a Muslim, but they regarded these [431]
alms as charity rather than legal dues. I have never met an
ordinary Bedouin who had been to Mecca, or who even con-
templated going there. Nevertheless, however lax they may [785]
be in other things, all Cyrenaican Bedouin keep the fast of
Ramadan, and in this annual fast is summed up for them, more
than in anything else, the obligations and privileges of Islam
and its unity and strength. Moreover, although they are [829]
negligent Muslims themselves they respect piety in others.
Brothers of the Sanusiya Order and religious men in general
ought to pray regularly. That is their business and it is very
necessary for the well-being of the community and worthy of
liberal support, but the Bedouin is an unlettered man, a
shepherd, and a warrior, and he has his own affairs to see to.
Perhaps the Bedouin make up for their shortcomings by their
enthusiasm for the *jihad*, holy war against unbelievers. They [798]
consider that they have fulfilled their obligation under this [648]*
head in ample measure by their long and courageous fight,
formally declared a holy war by the Caliph of Islam, against
the Italians, the French, and the British. A Bedouin once
said to me when I remarked how rarely I had seen Bedouin
at prayer: '*nasum wa najhad*', '(but) we fast and we wage
holy war'.

It must also be said that it would be an error to suppose that Islam had not, long before the time of the Grand Sanusi, strongly affected the character and custom of the Sulaimid Bedouin. This question, which is far from simple, need not be discussed in the present account and it is only necessary to note that the Bedouin assume that their customs are Muslim customs. It would also be a questionable judgement to assert that the Bedouin of Cyrenaica are not religious because they do not pay the same attention to outward ritual as do townspeople and peasants, for piety and holiness, as we have often been admonished, are not the same. The Bedouin certainly have a profound faith in God and trust in the destiny He has prepared for them and this faith and trust enhance that superb dignity

for they might then settle the matter by surrendering their 795*
claims to the zawiya.[1] Another way in which a lodge obtained 793
rights in land was by asking permission of its owners to sow it. 425
Constant repetition of this favour eventually gave the zawiya
rights of use in it in perpetuity. 795*

The tribesmen also assisted the Shaikh of the lodge in the 793
cultivation of the lands, though most of the work was done by 241
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

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Sanusiya Estates of the Zawiyas of Shahhat, Tart, al-Fayidiya, and al-Zawiya al-Baida.

the zawiya community itself. At sowing time the Shaikh would 795*
pitch his tent near the area to be cultivated and prepare a communal 793
meal, taking with him some sacks of rice for the purpose. 241
The local Bedouin then came with their draught animals and 476
sowed and ploughed for a couple of days on behalf of the
zawiya. The same procedure took place at harvest time.
Besides gifts of land and voluntary service in cultivating, the [794] ●
Bedouin were expected to pay a tithe to the lodge at harvest
time and after lambing. No doubt many of them paid annual
dues but it is unlikely that any strict record was kept or that
payment could have been enforced had they been averse to
making it.

That it was expected that the Bedouin might promise services 175*
more readily than perform them is suggested by an interesting 795*
document, dated 1307 A.H., found by the Italians at the 794

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[1] Savarese, op. cit., p. 193.

*175 Taukra zawiya and given in an Italian translation by Judge
*795 Colucci.[1] In it the tribal sections of the Baraghtha, Tursh,
● 794 Dinal, and Shilmani place themselves under obligation, through
the signatories to the deed, to pay the zawiya of Taukra alms
on flocks and crops, to supply camels to carry supplies to
Jaghbub, and to help the zawiya in sowing, building, excavations, and other works. Subject to the penalty of paying double alms they will not, without the permission of the Shaikh of the zawiya, render like services to other zawiyas. They promise also to defend the zawiya and to respect those who live in it, or who are its guests, and agree that those who fail to do so may be punished in body or in estate. Each will be for the zawiya and the zawiya for each. God is greater than any man. Those who are obedient will be recompensed by Him. Peace be to those who follow the right path.

*795 The estates of the Sanusiya Order were *waqf* (called in
423 Cyrenaica *habus*), inalienable endowments made in love of God
by tribal sections and sometimes by individuals. They belonged to the various lodges to which they were donated, with the Order as a whole as residuary, and not to the family of the Grand Sanusi or to the Shaikhs of the lodges.[2] It was understood that when Bedouin donated tracts of country round a lodge they could continue to pasture and sow on any land not being used by the resident Brothers and to use the wells when there was sufficient water in them. The Shaikh of a zawiya was
[793] the legal administrator of its properties. The Head of the Order
had no direct say in the administration of the estates, and in all probability only knew roughly of their extent. The revenues of
[434] one lodge could not be used for the upkeep of another, but any
surplus over the expenses of a lodge were paid into a central
*795 pool. The members of the Sanusi family and the teachers and
794 administrative officials of the Order lived in the distant oases
of Jaghbub and Kufra, which produced little but dates, and had to be supplied from the lodges of the coastal region. Supplies were sent by caravan partly in local produce, such as skins, wool, grain, butter, honey, and meat, and partly in money or
[431] imported goods: rice, tea, sugar, and cloth. These gifts were

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[1] Op. cit., pp. 434–5.

[2] Fernando Valenzi, 'La Senussia in Cirenaica ed il suo Patrimonio', *Rivista delle Colonie Italiane*, 1932, pp. 432–3.

sadaqa, freewill gifts, though if a lodge did not send them its 795*
Shaikh was reminded of his obligations. The lodges dealt with 794 •
certain trading houses at Banghazi, giving them import orders [431]
against future sales of local produce. [439]

This practice worked well enough during the lifetime of the
founder and his sons but, as so often happens in Islamic Orders,
later descendants began to demand individual shares in the
wealth of the Order. While Sayyid Ahmad al-Sharif was its 795*
third Head it began to be the custom, a few years before the 794
Italian invasion, to earmark the surplus revenues of particular 602
lodges for particular members of the Sanusi family, and these [434]
members became regarded as patrons of the lodges which
supplied them and responsible for their supervision. The
territories in which the Order was dominant began to fall into
spheres of influence controlled by individual members of the
family, the allocation of spheres tending to be determined by
the maternal kinship of various members with *Ikhwan* families
occupying lodges in them. Sayyid Muhammad 'Abid and his
brother Sayyid 'Ali al-Khattab had a lien on the *barqa al-baida*
and Fazzan, where their maternal relatives the Ashhab family
were influential Shaikhs of lodges; Sayyid Safi al-Din on the
barqa al-hamra, where his maternal kinsmen the Mahajib family
were predominant; Sayyid Muhammad Hilal on the Marmarica
where his maternal kinsmen of the Sharifian Tursh lineage
had considerable influence; and Sayyid Idris and his brother
Sayyid al-Rida on the Cyrenaican plateau, where they had
maternal ties with the important Bu Saif and Ghumari
families. Sayyid Ahmad al-Sharif had a lien on Tripolitania,
where lived his maternal kinsmen the powerful Fawatir tribe
of Zlitin territory.

The endowments of the Order in Cyrenaica ran into thousands 795*
of hectares.[1] Several lodges had each more than 1,000 hectares 423
attached to them. The fourteen lodges whose lands were
technically registered in 1919 by a mixed Italo-Sanusi commission
possessed more than 50,000 hectares. The total lands
of the Order may well have been more than 200,000 hectares,
or somewhere in the neighbourhood of 500,000 acres. Much of [311]
the land was of use only for grazing, but much was valuable
agricultural country on the plateau. Wherever there were

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[1] An *Ettaro* is 10,000 sq. metres or 2·471 acres.

states that the total annual revenue of the lodges of the Order, 795*
excluding those at Jaghbub and Kufra, was calculated at more 434
than 200,000 Lire.[1]

The Italian figures appear to include all sources of revenue, agricultural produce, increase in stock, and the gifts received in beasts, cereals, honey, skins, mats, carpets, and butter. At the time there could have been no adequate assessment and an estimate of revenue in money is an inappropriate measure in what was for the most part a subsistence economy. The zawiya community lived partly by its own labour, largely that of servants and slaves, assisted, as explained, by the Bedouin of
the vicinity at seed-time and harvest. The produce of its cultiva- 795*
tions and gardens and of its flocks and herds was supplemented 794
by contributions in kind from the Bedouin. In theory such contributions were an annual tithe, but in practice it is more likely that the Bedouin brought presents of beasts, butter, honey, &c., to the zawiya when they happened to visit it, or when its Shaikh let it be known that he was in need of something; and that now and again there was a general whip-round for a caravan to Jaghbub or Kufra. That is the Bedouin way of doing things.

Bedouin are hard-headed people and they expect a return for 795*
their labour and gifts. The neighbouring tribesmen considered 794
that they were adequately rewarded for their support of their 182
zawiya by the services it rendered, for, like the Christian [157]
monasteries of Europe in the Dark Ages, Sanusiya lodges served many purposes besides catering for religious needs. They were schools, caravanserai, commercial centres, social centres, forts, courts of law, banks, store houses, poor houses, sanctuary, and burial grounds, besides being channels through which ran a generous stream of God's blessing. They were centres of culture and security in a wild country and amid a fierce people, and they were stable points in a country where all else was constantly on the move. A Bedouin camp might be anywhere. A zawiya was fixed to the earth and its community with it. But the chief benefits the lodges conferred on the Bedouin were, as the Grand Sanusi told them in the letter quoted earlier, that they and their children might learn from scholarly and pious men the faith and precepts of Islam, that they might have the

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[1] *Cirenaica Pacificata*, 1932, p. 125.

*795 opportunity to worship in a mosque, and that by charity to their
● 794 lodges they might earn recompense hereafter.

182 Each lodge had its Shaikh, who represented the Head of the
*795 Order. He arbitrated between the Bedouin, led the tribesmen
793 to holy war, acted as intermediary between the tribe or section
and the Turkish administration, dispensed hospitality to travellers, supervised the collection of tithe, directed cultivation of grain and care of stock, dispatched surplus revenues to the Headquarters of the Order, acted as prayer-leader on Fridays, and assisted in preaching and teaching. There were
[794] besides a number of other functionaries among the Brothers:
the Shaikh's deputy, the *imam* to lead the daily prayers and to teach the Koran and canon law, the *mu'allim* to teach reading, writing, and arithmetic in the zawiya school, and perhaps a special *muadhdhin* to call the faithful to prayer, though any of the Brothers could do that.

V

*795 In principle, as we have noted, the lands attached to lodges
793 belonged, like the lodges themselves, to the Order, and more
423 particularly to the lodge to which they were donated, and not
to any particular individual or family. In practice certain
*795 Shaikhly families tended to gain an hereditary interest in them.
793 What happened in the early days of the Order was that a Shaikh
was sent by its Head to found a lodge and when it was estab-
423 lished he was translated to a fresh missionary field. Shaikhs
428 of lodges were in this way moved fairly frequently at first, but
602 it later became the practice to leave a Shaikh in charge till his
death and then to nominate his successor from among his kinsmen, with the approval of the tribe and on the advice of Shaikhs of neighbouring lodges. What mostly seems to have happened was that the tribal sections concerned asked for a son or brother of the last Shaikh to be appointed director of their lodge and the Head of the Order confirmed their choice. As one Darsi tribesman put it: 'The Shaikh of our zawiya must be a man favoured by the hearts of the people.' In course of time the tendency for the Shaikhship of a lodge to be regarded as hereditary became very marked, it being understood that if there was a suitable candidate from the family already established in the lodge he would be appointed, a view with which the later Heads of the

tion were compelled to pay taxes and furnish supplies, and how 175*
forty-five of the Shaikhs of the Jawazi tribe were treacherously 648*
murdered and many of their followers massacred.[1] Generally,
however, it may be said that Cyrenaica has no history, other
than Bedouin traditions of inter-tribal wars, from 1051 to 1835,
in which year the Turks regained control of Libya from the
Caramanlis. On their return they instituted a more systematic
administration than had been exercised during their earlier
occupation.

The Turks returned to Cyrenaica about the time the Grand 175*
Sanusi first visited the country and eight years after their 648*
reoccupation he founded his first zawiya on the plateau. As 795*
the Sanusiya Order gained the confidence of the Bedouin and
became accepted as their spokesmen, it was necessary for the [793]
Ottoman authorities to take it into consideration in their deal-
ings with the tribes of the interior. The Order made it possible 175*
for the different tribes to express themselves politically as a 648*
unit for the first time in their relations with the outside world. 182
The tribes provided the Order with a social system, and the 795*
Order gave to that system a political organization at a time
when it was beginning to be brought into more direct contact
with political forces outside tribal society.

The Sanusiya is known to have been given a Charter about 175*
1856 by Sultan 'Abd al-Majid I. His firman was brought from 648*
Istanbul by Sidi 'Abd al-Rahim al-Maghbub, later Shaikh of 795*
the Sanusiya zawiya at Banghazi, who had been sent to Istanbul
for the purpose and had the utmost difficulty, as was often the [793]
case with visitors to the Ottoman capital, in obtaining an
audience with the Sultan. Whatever other privileges the firman
conferred on the Order—I have not seen the document—it [794]
certainly exempted its properties from taxation and permitted [651]
it to collect a religious tithe from its followers. A second firman
was issued later by Sultan 'Abd al-Majid's brother, Sultan 'Abd
al-'Aziz, and was brought from Istanbul to the Governor of
Tripoli by Sidi Abu al-Qasim al-'Isawi, 'Abd al-Rahim's suc-
cessor in the Banghazi lodge. There is in the Land Registry at
Banghazi a letter from the Governor of Tripoli to the Governor
of Banghazi giving the essence of this firman. It confirms the
privileges granted by the earlier firman and adds to them that [778]

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[1] Op. cit., *passim* and p. 220 seq.

The local Turkish officials were content for the most part to 175*
sit in the towns, many of them no doubt regretting that they 648*
had ever been sent to Cyrenaica, where their salaries were low 795*
and often in arrears, and to let the Sanusiya control the interior
so long as taxes were paid and no overt act was committed
against the Sultan's authority which might bring them to the
notice of the Court; and the Central Government for its part
was quite prepared to forget that Cyrenaica formed part of the
Sultan's dominions so long as there was peace there and it sent
annual tribute to Istanbul. The Turks were indifferent other-
wise to what happened in Libya, which was a poor province,
particularly the Cyrenaican part of it, where their administra-
tion was even less efficient than in Tripolitania, where it was
happy-go-lucky enough. They had quite enough troubles else-
where without alienating to no purpose a powerful Islamic Order
and the warlike Bedouin who supported it. They therefore left
the Sanusiya to perform many of the functions of government [651]
in the interior—education, justice, the maintenance of security, [794]
and even to some extent the collection of taxes, though in the
matter of tribute there were difficulties, for Bedouin do not
willingly pay taxes to anyone, and since they already paid a
tithe to the Sanusiya, with a grace which contrasted with their
reluctance to pay taxes to the Turkish Administration, they
were disinclined to pay twice. When any question arose which 175*
required direct contact between the Head of the Order and the 648*
local Governor it was established through the Shaikh of the 793
lodge at Banghazi, or a special messenger was sent from Jaghbub 795*
or Kufra to the Turkish Governor at Banghazi, or he sent a
messenger to the Head of the Order in his oasis seat. From time
to time the Central Government sent an envoy to the Head of
the Order with gifts and instructions to report on what was
going on in the Sahara, and on such occasions he was received
handsomely and returned with the blessings of the *Shaikh al-Tariqa* on the Sultan. Sometimes, as we have seen, the Head
of the Order sent a deputation to Istanbul.

The payment of taxes and the maintenance of peace and com- 175*
munications, the only two functions of government the Turkish 648*
officials bothered their heads about, were intimately connected. 651
Minor quarrels among the Bedouin themselves little interested
them, but armed resistance to taxation was certain to earn

*175 Bedouin followed them at great sacrifice. They were combined
*648 in many of the Sanusiya Brothers.

*795 The Shaikhs and Brothers of the Order, with few exceptions,
793 played a prominent part in the war, both in the field and by
554 keeping the Bedouin, submitted and unsubmitted alike, in a
ferment. The Italian soldiers and administrators constantly
*175 complained that whenever the Bedouin were tiring of the
*648 struggle the Brothers of the Order urged them to continue it.
619 It was their example and exhortations which made it something
793 more than the usual piecemeal resistance of a barbarous people
793 to colonial conquest or more than a succession of raids of the
● 794 kind Bedouin have enjoyed for so many centuries. Their parti-
*795 cipation made it both a national and a religious movement. It did much also to establish the Sanusiya in the hearts of the Bedouin. Some of the best-known names of the resistance, like Salih Lataiwish, 'Abd al-Hamid al-'Abbar, Saifat and Muhammad bu Farwa, Husain al-Juwaifi, Brahim al-Fallah, Fadil al-Mahasḥash, and Qtait bu Musa, were those of Bedouin Shaikhs, but most of the leading figures were Sanusiya *Ikhwan*, men like 'Umar al-Mukhtar, Yusif bu Rahil, Khalid al-Humri, Sharif al-Mailud, 'Abd al-Qadir Farkash, Fadil bu 'Umar, Salih al-'Awwami, and Muhammad bu Najwa al-Masmari.

*175 The indomitable Sidi 'Umar al-Mukhtar was the soul of the
*648 resistance and the struggle is always associated with his name
as similar struggles against French aggression in Algeria and
*795 Morocco are associated with the names of 'Abd al-Qadir and
793 'Abd al-Karim. Sidi 'Umar, 'our irreducible enemy, the faith-
159 ful and able servant of Idris, the heart and soul of the Cyrenaican rebellion', as Graziani called him,[1] was that rare combination of Bedouin and Sanusiya Shaikh. He was born about 1862 of the '*Ailat* Farhan of the Braidan section of the Minifa tribe of the Marmarica and was educated first at the Sanusiya school at Janzur and afterwards at Jaghbub. He was nominated by Sayyid Ahmad al-Sharif Shaikh of al-Qasur lodge among the stubborn 'Abid tribe but only performed his duties there for two years before being summoned to Kufra to serve against the French in the Wadai. He returned to al-Qasur about 1906 and later took a prominent part in the first Italo-Sanusi war and in obstructing Italian penetration in the years of peace which

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[1] Op. cit., p. 235.

*175 *648 Muslim hospice at al-Madina for the pilgrims. They ensured that the meat of their Muslim troops was prepared in the prescribed manner. In 1937 Balbo, at the request of some of the Muslim notables, forbade the sale of alcoholic drinks in the month of Ramadan. Exhibitions of fakirism by the ecstatic religious Orders were prohibited in 1935 to please the *'Ulama* who regarded them as an undesirable innovation. Mussolini thought, like Napoleon, that it was good policy to build up for himself a reputation of being the defender of Islam. The supreme moment of this burlesque was when the notables of Tripoli presented him on his visit to Libya with 'The Sword of Islam', an event commemorated by a huge equestrian statue in the middle of the town.

*175 *648 829 The Bedouin was not impressed with this Islamic propaganda, which even the more impressionable townsman thought highly ridiculous, especially the building of mosques by Christians. Those the Italians built outside the towns were neglected, for the Bedouin preferred to use his own prayer-places or the mosques of the Sanusiya lodges, where these had not been destroyed, when he felt the need to pray at all. Government qadis were of little interest to him, for in law and custom he followed tribal tradition, and such priestly services as he required were performed by his faqihs and zawiya Shaikhs. If the Italians liked to restore the tombs of his saints he was unconcerned. If they liked to encourage the pilgrimage, so much the better for those who felt the need, unfelt by himself, to
*[795] make it. The Bedouin was a Sanusi and the Italians had driven the revered Heads of his Order into exile and had plundered and abolished the Order itself. He could hardly be expected to feel, and certainly did not feel, that the Italians were sincere in their professed respect for Islam.

*175 *648 The Italians based their claim to Arab regard on two considerations, their respect for Islam and their social services. I shall not describe in detail Italian measures designed to raise the standard of culture and living among the Bedouin, for their efforts in this direction were little advanced by 1940, but it is necessary to refer briefly to their educational policy. The Turks had provided instruction only in the towns, only during the last
*[795] years of their rule, and only on a very modest scale. The only
● [794] schools in the Bedouin districts were those of the Sanusiya lodges.

days on which kin of various sorts should attend the mourning 613
ceremonies, which extend over a period of a week. Allowance is 621
made for those who may be away temporarily, although they are 765
expected to hasten to the mourning camp as quickly as possible.
Agnatic kin are expected not only to be present on the appropriate 613
day, but are required to offer gifts consistent with their 621
relationship to the bereaved; agnates of the tertiary segment are 765
expected to offer a sheep, while some cognates ought to bring a 431
goat and others a quantity of sugar and tea. At one funeral in a camp where I was resident, soon after the death occurred, the main concern of its inhabitants was whether or not certain men of their section would attend the mourning rites and bring appropriate gifts with them. These men lived at the time in another camp a few miles away, as they had been doing for several years past. They did not come when they were expected, and when they finally arrived at the end of the week they brought with them gifts of sugar and tea only—gifts which were totally inappropriate for agnates of the group. They were, in fact, now no longer members of it, and my neighbours were able to tell me, 'They have branched off from us. We will never live together again.' The lineage had proliferated and this was the first occasion for showing it.

Wide-spread in Cyrenaica is a cult of saints. The number of 794
saints' tombs varies from tribe to tribe, there being fewer among 776
the camel herders of the semi-desert than among the cow- 778
herding, almost sedentary, folk of the plateau area. Whatever [788]
the number, the members of the group that venerates a particular
saint make an annual pilgrimage to his tomb, and sometimes
more frequent pilgrimages are made. In one area there were two 794
men, accepted by their respective kin groups as leaders, who vied 554
against each other for the leadership of their section. One of them [648]
had been a famous warrior during the Italian wars and, after
being injured, fled to Egypt where he lived for seventeen years, until he returned to his homeland in 1947. The other had also fought against the Italians, failed to win renown, was a captive for a time, later released, and subsequently appointed leader of his section by the Italian authorities. The first, during his period of exile, had become impoverished. The second during his years of freedom had prospered. As far as their personalities

794 were concerned, there was little doubt who was leader—the
554 name of the former was known throughout the land. Now when
the warrior returned from his Egyptian exile, his rival offered
794 him a sheep as a gift. This act was wholly appropriate. Subsequently
554 they continued to compete fiercely, but it soon became
578 clear that the returned warrior was winning the greater support.
In the face of this, the rival, in 1948, decided to break with tradition
[788] by staying away from the annual pilgrimage to the tomb of
[175] the local saint. Instead, he and his followers made their pilgrimage
to a different tomb in the vicinity of their camp, and later
built a low wall round the tomb, whitewashed it, and made it
known that henceforward they would regularly use it for pilgrimages.
[613] The two kinship groups of a tertiary section now had their
[778] separate saint's tomb. Some months later, the rival decided to
move with his small group to an area in which they had not previously
794 resided. It is the custom among the Bedouin when they
554 pitch their tents in a place for the first time, that the people of
578 the neighbourhood should bring them gifts to mark the event.
431 The returned warrior, who had now become a close neighbour
[166] of his rival was obliged, like others, to offer the latter a gift; he
was also obliged to return the gift of a sheep that he had been
given on rejoining his section in 1947. He brought a gift within a
few hours of his rival's arrival, but it was a goat.[14] The rival and
his followers were furious, and the argument that the warrior was
too poor to give more was dismissed summarily. This was the
final insult. The donor, in return, had been given less than he had
presented. The reciprocity of gift exchanges had not only been
arrested, it had been reversed. From then onwards the two groups
made no attempt to conceal their hostility and went their separate
ways.

613 Disputes stemming from circumstances such as these are the
578 occasions which mark the proliferation of groups, although in
all three cases cited, difficulties over water supplies had preceded
the outbreaks of quarrelling.

613 In this discussion of the ways in which proliferation of seg-
602 ments takes place, the emphasis had been put on the tug of war
121 between the interests of people in their agnatic connexions and

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[14] A goat is inferior to a sheep in gift exchanges.

175 648 posts were established there, and Marsa Matruh became the capital town. The Western Desert was administered by British officers who had under their command a garrison of Egyptian soldiers. Their assignment was to secure the colonial borders. This task included keeping the Awlad 'Ali within the boundaries of Egypt. The policy of the British provincial government was to avoid interfering with the Bedouin process of law and conflict regulation unless it threatened the peace and security [124] of the desert. My informants said that the British interfered with Bedouin justice only under the threat of large-scale tribal warfare.

175 795 [619] The political relationship which the Bedouins of the Awlad 'Ali tribe had with the Sanusi Order of Islam in Libya was historically not so important compared to that of the other Cyrenaican tribes. The Sanusi Order, classified as a Sufi _tariiqa_ ("mystic order"), was actually quite orthodox in its attitudes and practices. This is a function of the socio-religious conditions of its origin during the 18th-19th century revival of orthodoxy in Islamic Arabia (Gibb 1955: [793] 127-145). Muhammad bin 'Ali al-Sanusi founded his order, al-Sanusiyya, near Mecca around the year 1837. The Sanusi doctrine may be considered orthodox, or secularly oriented, in that it rejects the fundamental goal of Sufism, mystical union with God.

The Sanusi Order, from the very beginning, strove for a return to pure Islam. It made its greatest headway among

175 the Bedouins of the Hijaz area. This Sanusi success aroused
795 the jealousy and animosities of the orthodox *'ulama* ("clergy")
[798] of the Mecca area. Al-Sanusi was forced to flee the Arabian
[793] peninsula, and in 1843 he founded his first *zawiya* ("lodge"),
[346] *al-zawiya al-baida*, in Cyrenaica. The Sanusi doctrine was as
acceptable to the Bedouins of Cyrenaica as it had been to the
[793] tribes of the Hijaz. The person and teachings of *al-Sanusi*
al-kabir ("the grand Sanusi"), as he came to be known, fit
into the "holy man" religious tradition of Cyrenaica and even
spread beyond into the Sudan and Lake Chad area. The Order
[793] showed primary concern for the people of the desert: the
[346] Sanusi *shaikh* ("holy man") cared for the poor, and the *zawiya*
[485] became rest stops, storehouses, and religious centers where
[794] Bedouin children were taught their Quranic lessons. Through
175 the *zawiya*, the Sanusiyya became a political and economic
795 integrating factor in the desert, and al-Sanusi became the
346 legitimate authority of the Bedouins. The *zawiya* became a
182 very important part of the traditional desert economic system.
[793] Today one *zawiya* remains near al-Qasr but it is scarcely used.
The Bedouins say: "Before, when Alexandria was far away by
camel, we could get what we wanted at the *zawiya*. Now that we
have trucks and trains no one goes to the *zawiya*."

175 The fortunes of the Bedouin became linked with those
795 of the Order. When the Sanusi became involved in full-scale
648 conflict with the Italian colonial power, the Bedouins bore

175 the brunt of the war. With Bedouin warriors, the Sanusiyya
795 religious order became a political force for the Italians to
648 reckon with.

From 1911 until the start of the world war in 1914, the Sanusi Bedouin army fought the Italians in the desert and harrassed them in the coastal area. In November, 1914, the Turks entered the war on the side of the Germans, and in May, 1915, Italy joined the Allies. As a result of the declaration of alliances and the expansion of the war, the Sanusi army was sent into Egypt against the British. This move brought the Awlad 'Ali into contact with the Sanusi army. Before this, they had had little involvement in the war. This relative inactivity of the Awlad 'Ali can hardly be explained by the notion that they were "an unwarlike peoples," as Evans-Pritchard (1954:127) has characterized them. The Awlad 'Ali were not in the mainstream of Sanusi war activities in Libya. Also, the British exerted a great deal of control over them in contrast to that which the Italians were able to gain over the Cyrenaican Bedouin.

In 1915, the Sanusi army captured the British Libyan outpost at Sallum, and in January of 1916 they were threatening the town of Marsa Matruh. But within a month's time, by the end of February 1916, the British had routed the Sanusi army, and the following month had retaken Sallum.

During the Marsa Matruh campaign, some of the 'Aishai-

175 •795 648 bat from al-Qasr joined the Sanusi army. The importance of their contribution to the Sanusi effort is vague, even though most of my informants claimed that their fathers "fought the British." Some of the al-Qasr activity was on a part-time [124] basis. One informant, whose father was the paramount leader of the 'Aishaibat tribe in 1916, told me that his father "used to take his rifle and ride out every morning to join the troops of Sayyid Ahmad al-Sharif (the grandson of *al-Sanusi* *al-kabiir*), and there he would kill many British soldiers. Then he would come home again at night." There was at least one group of al-Qasr Bedouins who joined the Sanusi in Libya before the start of the war. After the end of the fighting, this group returned to Egypt and asked to be pardoned by the British. They appealed to the Governor of Marsa Matruh that there should be no reprisals taken against them since the Turks had actually forced them to fight for the Sanusi. The British Governor, who was fluent in the Bedouin dialect and considered a great man by the Bedouins, replied to them in the form of a famous Bedouin proverb: "The ropes can be stretched far enough for forgiveness."

175 177 554 631 648 Traditionally, the Bedouins of the Marsa Matruh area were held in check by an officially created political structure which dated from the time of Muhammad 'Ali. This structure depended upon two political roles for the control of the Awlad 'Ali, the *'umda* and the *shaikh*, neither of which had previously existed in the Bedouin authority system.

While the Bedouins

795 respect the Sanusi family they, nevertheless, wear their
771 religion lightly. An informant, speaking of the merits and
829 demerits of the conservative Muslim Brethern Association, said
that "you should never listen to a holy man, for he will lead
[576] you straight to hell!" But upon meeting any member of the
[778] Sanusi family, all Bedouins greet him by kissing his hand.
Besides a show of deference, this ritual act, in theory,
transfers baraka from al-Sanusi to the layman.

648 The citizenship exemptions granted the Bedouins by
641 Muhammad 'Ali have been rescinded by Abd al-Nasser. This
has been one aspect of his program to imbue the Bedouin with
political consciousness and promote participation in the
nation-state. The Bedouins say that this is the way it should
be: they want the right to own land and to accept the
responsibility of defending the homeland. But they still do
[651] not pay land taxes, and they feel justified in this because
the desert "is very poor soil, and not like that of the Nile."
Nor do they always heed the call to military duty, though they
insist that they do.

648 Egyptian land reform laws would be impractical, or
177 impossible to apply, in al-Qasr. In the Nile Valley, such
423 laws were necessary. The majority of the Egyptian peasants
can survive on less than one acre of land, and farms of
under five acres comprise 44 per cent of the agricultural
land area in the Nile Valley (Warriner 1962:204). Plots this

554 toward legitimacy and the phenomenon of change in the
121 political structure. Peters (1967:271-279), in a long
awaited discussion of the political aspect of Cyrenaican Bedouin society, adumbrates this problem of differentiating between instituted authority and the distribution of power:

> In order to discuss this adequately, a lengthy diversion into an analysis of the distribution of power would be necessary . . . there are men who wield power over groups of varying populations, and the extent of their domains cannot be understood by reference to orders in the lineage. Perhaps it is for this reason--because, that is to say, lineage theory effectively blocks the exercise--that relatively little has been written about the problem of leadership in these societies (i.e. lineage societies).

554 Foci of power and authority change and at times
178 irrespectively of the lineage structure. The role of the
792 rajal saalih was more influential during the days of the
571 Sanusiiya movement than it is today. At that time, "holy
● [795] men" controlled economic, and thus political, relations
through the zawiya system: they were in a position to command respect and obedience and could be considered a "status group" in their own right. Today, "holy men" are rarely found among the members of the "status group." As one informant phrased it: "They used to solve problems more in the past than now. People in the old days were not educated as they are today:
554 the mind of the son is larger than that of the father. In
178 the past, the "holy man" was so important that were he to ask
792

622 His main function is to manage the affairs of the village, apprehend
554 criminals, report and register births and deaths, collect taxes and
represent the government in all matters involving the relationship between the government and his village. Because of his position as the
[661] representative of the govrernment, he usually enjoys a considerable
amount of power which, over the years, many omdas have used it to obtain personal benefits.

361 In 1958 the committee appointed for the examination of the possi-
631 bility of applying the system to Awlad Ali noticed that villages in the sense of a compact settlement similar to that existing in the rural area simply do not exist in the Western Desert region. There are a few settled communities in the area but they are scattered homes or a few stores. These communities have no identifiable boundaries or adminis-
631 trative existence. The area as a whole is divided into ten adminis-
634 trative districts, each having a police station. These districts cor-
[625] respond to the old Senusia Zawyas which played an important role in
● [795] maintaining order in the era until the First World War. Until that time
[175] the area was divided into fourteen zones each of which was under the
795 jurisdiction of one of the zawyas. The zawyas were mainly religious
175 centers, or shrines, inhabited and directed by a member of the Senusi
[793] order of Cyrenaica. The role of the head of the zawya was to teach the
Qoraan and spread the teachings of the Senusi order. One of the ways
[794] the zawyas attracted followers was through distribution of food and
clothing to those who joined it. The zawyas also provided places of
[798] refuge for those who needed protection since no one could force his way
into the sacred zawyas. Because of their religious position which put

795 Because of their religious position which put
175 them outside the tribal structure, the leaders of the zawyas played a
627 significant role in mediation and settling disputes between various tribal
793 segments. At their disposal was their ability to ostracize anyone
[626] who did not abide by their decision from the zawyas, which meant depriving
him from all the benefits, social as well as religious, that membership
in the zawyas offered.

795 After the First World War when the British replaced the Turks as
175 governors of the area, the zawyas were closed and the religious leaders
177 [648] ordered to leave. The zoning established by the zawyas existed, however,
[631] and was used as the basis for the redistricting of the area. Police
[625] stations replaced the religious centers. From the standpoint of the tribal
619 634 population itself, the districts have no psychological or political
[795] reality. The zawyas were originally established in the areas of tribal
[361] concentrations. But the area itself did not have any political identity.
The only reality from the standpoint of the inhabitants was the tribal
reality and affiliation which cut across many of these districts. Many
of the tribal segments inhabiting one district were and still are hostile
177 to one another. To transform the zones into administrative districts and
634 to establish one office of leadership for the whole district was to impose
619 a political unity nonexistent among the tribal segments inhabiting
[622] the district. To avoid this difficulty, the government supplemented the
territorial principle of the omda system in the rural area with the principle
of tribal representation and came up with a system which seems to
suite the situation in the Western Desert. For each of the districts,
a list of all tribal segments which habitually occupy the area and whose
tribal land is located within the district, is made. The most powerful

795

[For information on the origin, development and expansion of the Sanusi Order and its relationship to various foreign powers, notably the Italians and Turks, see Category 116, pp. 1-28, 45-46, 54, 57, 64-65, 68-93, 97-99, 102-110, 115-118, 122-123, 126-195, 204, and 226-229.]

The
Turkish Administration was centred in the towns but operated, 632
as will be explained later, through the contacts of its local 648*
officials, who were generally Arabs of the country, with the lead- 571
ing tribal Shaikhs, with whom they made friends. These officials 369
were townsmen or sons of Bedouin who had received an urban
education and they acted as links between the citizen com-
munities and the Bedouin. Through Bedouin relations with
town merchants and officials what was happening in the world
outside Cyrenaica percolated to the most distant tents. Another 795*
channel of political and cultural infiltration was the network of 571
Sanusiya lodges. The Shaikh of the Sanusiya lodge at Banghazi 648*
was regarded as the ambassador of the head of the Order to the 177
Governor of Cyrenaica and he was chosen for qualities which 632
fitted him for this role. He was consulted by the Governor on 793
matters in which the tribes were involved, and through him 369
and the Brothers of the lodges of the towns news of the outside
world reached the Head of the Order in the distant oasis of
Kufra and the Heads of the local lodges, whose relations with
the Bedouin in their localities were intimate. Thus, as will be
seen, the Bedouin had a general idea of what the revolution of
the 'Young Turks' meant and were aware of the impending crisis
long before the Italian attack on their country was delivered.
But though maintaining communications with the towns, 632
neither the tribal Shaikhs nor the Sanusiya allowed themselves 571
to be subordinated to them or identified themselves with urban 795
interests. The Bedouin Shaikh did not, like the Syrian land- 369
owner, feel any need to have a town house, and the Sanusiya
ever remained a country and Bedouin Order and directed its
affairs from the desert.

Town and country kept apart, with the towns dependent on 632
the country and not the country on the towns, because there 369
was in Cyrenaica no client peasantry bound by debt, need of 565
protection, and trade monopoly to the towns. The Bedouin
did not settle on the land where they would be an easy prey to
the usurer, overseer, and tax collector. Those who were defeated [167]
in the great tribal wars of the past and in the inter-tribal and
inter-sectional fighting of more recent times migrated to Egypt
and settled there as *fallahin*, and not in Cyrenaica. In Cyrenaica 565
there is not the spur of adverse climatic conditions or the lash 167
of land shortage to drive them to depart from their ancient

day, but even ethnically the Bedouin are more Arabian than 619
the people of Egypt, the Sudan, and Tripolitania, while 101
culturally they are as completely Arab as any people in the [144]
world, proud Tamim and Quraish not excepted. In essentials
their language is that of the Hilalian invasion of the eleventh 197
century and no foreign language competes with it. The Berber- [191]
speakers are a handful in the distant oasis of Aujila, and even
there they are bilingual, and the insignificant fractions of Jews
and Cretans in the towns speak Arabic, the Cretans being
Muslims as well. The Italian immigrants left the country of 619
their own accord during the late war. Thus the obstacles to [167]
complete Arabization in the Maghrib (Tripolitania, Tunisia,
Algeria, and Morocco), a Berber culture, large Jewish colonies,
and European colonization are to-day all absent in Cyren-
aica. In all essential matters also the Bedouin of Cyrenaica
are like Bedouin tribesmen elsewhere in the Arab world: they [184]
have the same tented, pastoral, way of life, the same social
organization, the same laws and customs and manners, and the
same values.

The people of Cyrenaica are linked to the classical Arab 177
world of the east, to Egypt and the Jazirat al-'Arab (Arabia,
Palestine, Iraq, and Syria) rather than to the Maghrib; to the
sacred towns of Islam and to Umayyad Damascus, 'Abbasid
Baghdad, and Fatimid Cairo. More particularly they are linked
to Egypt, with which their country has had political ties from
the earliest times, and which is their natural market. The [133]
desert comes down to the sea at the Gulf of Sirte and separates
Cyrenaica from Tripolitania and these two countries have always gone each its own way. Cyrenaica was linked to Graeco-Egypt, Tripolitania to Phoenician Carthage. Cyrenaica went with Byzantium, Tripolitania with Rome. Indeed, as Despois says: 'The Greater Syrtis is without dispute one of the most decided frontiers, natural and human, to be found anywhere in the world.'[1]

During the last few decades this separation has been brought [195]
into relief again by the rise of the Sanusiya Order, for whereas
almost to a man the Cyrenaicans follow the Order politically,
the Tripolitanians, except for the Bedouin tribes, have shown a
lively animosity towards it. Moreover tribal ties between the 619

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[1] Op. cit., p. 45.

their rights in it, and this presented no more difficulty to the 175*
lawyers than the discovery of a formula to cover confiscation of 648*
the Sanusiya properties had done. 167

Ancient rights in the lands of Cyrenaica rested with the 175*
Sa'adi tribes and whatever tribal fragments they permitted to 648*
reside there by grace. Disputes about ownership had been 423
settled either by war or through discussion between the groups 619
concerned in them, sometimes with the aid of Turkish officials [795]
or Marabouts, particularly of the Shaikhs of Sanusiya lodges [578]
after the Order had become established in the country. In 1858 the Ottoman Government, under pressure of Western ideas, promulgated a land code in all parts of the empire, and to put it into effect in Cyrenaica the Governor, Khalil Sami Pasha (1863–8), appointed a committee which declared the lands round Banghazi and Darna to be for the use of these towns and the rest of the country for the use of the tribes in occupation of it, except for barren hills and deserts which, like woods and roads, were regarded as the natural demesne of the State. The tribal boundaries of to-day were finally fixed by this committee, though the fixing of them was less an adjudication than a recording of existing conditions.

The new Turkish land code operated in the towns and just outside them and was not applied to tribal lands and grazing grounds, and the tribes were not asked to acquire a title to their lands by registration of them. This would have been an impossible task, and the Turks were in any case too wise to meddle with Bedouin lands, knowing that the Bedouin would not have consented to change or interference of any kind. Nevertheless the State claimed all tribal lands not bearing buildings or plantations as *miri*, public demesne, and from a legal point of view it was in virtue of this absolute and residuary ownership that it taxed the tribal occupiers and users of the land. This was a legal formalism which made no difference to anyone since the Government had neither the wish nor the power to exploit the lands and accepted that the tribes had rights of use, the *tassaruf*, in them in perpetuity. The Italian Land Registry, created in 1913 on the basis of the Turkish registers, followed Turkish practice in this matter, classing tribal lands as State demesne in which the occupiers had rights of use, and also in allowing tribal disputes to be settled by tribal custom, which

121 sections constituting the combinations which makes the facts of feud intelligible.
613 Furthermore, several different types of power structures exist which serve the different
[571] interests of the people composing them, and these are interlinked in combinations
[578] of superior span. But the formation of these structures and the modes in which they
combine are quite unlike the articulations in a lineage system. Characteristically, the
segments in a lineage system are conceived of as building up hierarchically to span
what is spoken of as a total society, the apex of the system affording a spectacular and
fixed definition of its boundaries. Had I been using this concept in this paper the
[173] founding ancestress of the nine Cyrenaican tribes, Sa'ada as named by the Bedouin,
would have served this purpose and would have been given inappropriate prominence.
121 The views presented here have the consequences of retreating from a concept
of a total society. The people to whom the facts given are related are the camel-
184 herding tribes only. Some of them have relations of many kinds with the cow-herding
233 folk who inhabit the northern plateau area, and these relations are also significant
619 for the analysis of a wide range of problems; genealogically both cow and camel
herders are seen as part of a single structure, but the differences between them with
regard to their economy, the size, composition, and distribution of their residential
units, their political and ritual life is so great that to conceive of them as a single social
121 structure is not useful. Moreover, the far western tribal sections have relationships
619 of such urgency with their neighbours in Tripolitania (who are excluded from Cyrenaican
genealogies) that to cut off these relationships as lying outside Cyrenaican society
would be quite unwarranted. The same can be said of the relationships of the tribal
sections in the eastern part of Cyrenaica with their genealogical cousins, the Aulad
'Ali of Egypt, who, although residing across a national border, are closely linked to
some of the Cyrenaican Bedouin. Some tribes also have to rely on the people of the
southern oases for an item of diet and an outlet for surplus wool, and the net of kinship
is spread out to include them. In these cases they come into contact with other
[177] ethnic groups such as Berbers and Tibu, and through the oases they extend their lines
of communication southwards to Wadai, Chad, and Bornu. As an indication of the
effectiveness of these links, it is only necessary to add that people inhabiting Cyrenaica
make periodic and regular visits to these far southern places, and that in 1948 a
shaikh, living near Ajadabiya in south-western Cyrenaica, collected blood-money
contributions from kinsmen in Wadai. A single structure cannot possibly include,
for analytical purposes, these sorts of relationships.

121 Finally, it must be stressed that the facts given here refer to the period 1948 to
114 1950. Since then oil has been discovered in large quantities near the territory of a
[315] tribe where I spent most of my time while resident in the country, and where there
was one tin shack in 1950 there is now a modern port with roads extending southwards
from it into the wilderness. I see no reason to assume that social relations as
I observed them are present today or that they were the same at any time in the past
175 either. Before the advent of the Sanusi Order in the early eighteen-forties, it is known
795 that one lineage at least was dominantly powerful and that its leader tyrannized a
613 large part of Central Cyrenaica.[1] His descendants constituted a powerful group in

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[1] Smith and Porcher, 1864. These two archaeologists met this leader and continued their archaeological researches around Cirene only with his goodwill, although the site is not on the territory of his tribe as I knew it in 1950. They also speak of him as inhabiting a castle which also lies outside the

1950, but his kind of tyranny was absent from the Cyrenaica of that period. From the 795
mid-nineteenth century until the Italian invasion of 1911, the Sanusi Order established 175
itself, spread its lodges throughout the tribes and in other more remote lands [613]
until it became what Evans-Pritchard speaks of as a theocratic empire.[1] The lodges [778]
served as areas of sanctuary and their staffs adjudicated disputes. Leaders of the [793]
Order had the power to coerce and the Bedouin obeyed. They obeyed out of personal
regard for some of them in 1950, but the religious authority previously used by the
leaders had given way to the political power they now exercised as functionaries in
a state system. In the meantime, the country had been ravaged by the long Italo- [648]
Sanusi wars. Throughout the nineteen-thirties after suffering terrible privations and
reduction in numbers through slaughter in war, death in concentration camps, and
exile, the Bedouin were ruled by the Italians. During the Second World War the
armies of three major contestants fought their battles where the Bedouin now tend
their flocks and herds. After the war they were left to fend for themselves, with a
minimum of administrative interference.

In the light of all this the conception of an equilibrium system is of little heuristic 121
value, still less its derivative concept of a repetitive system. This does not mean, however, that an account of part of the social life of the Bedouin as it existed in 1950 must be nothing more than a disconnected piece of history, unrelated to a prior state of things and wholly useless for the understanding of the contemporary oil-producing cum mixed pastoral–agricultural economy. It would be little more than a piece of social historiography if the analysis was based on the concept of a total social structure of functionally interconnected parts, forming what Leach describes as 'a delicately balanced mechanism rather like the various parts of a wrist watch'.[2] Such a viewpoint would effectively exclude any possible comprehension of changes save those present as part of the dynamics of a system; its only answer to change is an account of a different system. If, instead, attention is focused on the analysis of a field of components arranged in a specific fashion to meet the interests of men at a particular time, it then becomes possible to see how a shift in their positions, the addition of new components, or the elimination of others produces this or that effect. It can make intelligible what has gone before, and if the future cannot be anticipated it can be demarcated within rough limits.

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modern territory of his tribe. See also Hamilton, 1856.

[1] Evans-Pritchard, 1949. In this book a brilliant account is given of the development of the Order, and how it came to unify and provide centralized political leadership for the tribes. [175] [795] [613]

[2] Leach, 1961, p. 6.

593 tegral part of "the one body"; events which affect a man in this context lie
613 outside a father's field of jurisdiction. The political authority vested in a corporation acts to circumscribe the authority of persons in other fields.

Other rights stem from political membership. As a person with a defined position in a lineage corporation, a man has the right to use the natural resources of its territory. His father, although he instructs his son where to plough and when to water the animals, cannot deny him access to wells, pastures and ploughland. Economically, a son is independent to this extent, although his ability to exploit his right to the natural resources is restricted by his father's control of animals. Ultimately, however, this restriction cannot amount to stultification, because a man has the right to
613 demand food. In practice, a poor man staves off hunger with donations from
422 this or that individual, and superficially it appears that he is dependent on
735 the personal charity of his fellowmen. This is not so, for what is implicit is that the parcels of wealth controlled by individuals are the possessions of the corporation. It is not accidental that poor people do not go hungry. During my entire stay among the Bedouin I never saw one of them beg or
[556] suffer hunger, however marginal the diet of many. Clearly, those with a surplus can and do use it for personal advantage, but the extent to which they can do so is circumscribed by the legal claims which members of a corporation have on the parcels of moveable property held by each of them.

613 Control over the wealth, whether it be animals or the procreative functions
421 of women, rests, in the final analysis, in a corporation. Inheritance laws
428 specify that women are not legal heirs,[8] and that all male children are
[562] equal heirs. Women do, in fact, come to control property, and it is rare that wealth is equally divided among male heirs. The precise details of inherit-
[593] ance may partly be decided by a father, but he is limited in his actions. Most of the time inheritance disputes are not of the kind which require action by the corporate group; a case which occured while I was resident with the Bedouin did, however, invoke immediate action. A man, who had left the desert to live in a village on the plateau, had only one daughter. He made it known that he intended to will his entire property to his daughter. When the news was brought to the camps of his fellow agnates, there was great consternation, because, as became clear in their lengthy discussions, the threat now existed that a substantial parcel of property would be removed from the group, a threat made real by the proposed marriage of the daughter
[584] to a man of another tribe. The court would have to recognise the daughter's right to some of the property, and the members of the group reluctantly had to concede that there was little they could do about this, but they had one
[593] action left to them — they decided that her nearest agnate should demand
[584] her in marriage. Usually, the choice of husband for a daughter is a decision

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[771] [8] The Bedouin are Sunni Muslims, and, as Samusi, belong to the Maliki school in
[795] legal matters. According to court law, women are heirs. However, actual Bedouin practice is contrary to law. For, if women were permitted to inherit, since many marry
[671] outside the corporation into which they were born, they could alienate its resources.

554 It would be considered "wrong" for the members of
571 this group to present themselves at an al-Qasr wedding party,
[577]
[585] or the annual celebration held in honor of a local saint of
[796] the area. When I inquired about the conspicuous absence of
[124] some of my chief informants from such gatherings, I was told
[431] that "they will send their gifts," or that "it is not decent
554 that they come to something such as this." In terms of
571 Bedouin social structure, there are a number of plausible
182 explanations for this "status separation." Fathers should
561
[593] not attend public affairs at which their sons may be "performing," i.e., young men should be allowed to play a public role outside the confines of the father-son authority structure. By virtue of the extension of the father role, and its corresponding authoritarian attitude, every member of the elder age-set commands certain rights and obligations which would prevent the free expression that is the hallmark of Bedouin parties. Conversely, and at the more general level, members of the "status group" who wish to remain members of this circle accept certain restrictions on social
[114] intercourse. At the five different Bedouin "parties" which
I attended, there were "elders" present, but none of them could be classified as members of the "status group." Bedouins plainly state that elders should not attend parties, but, on the other hand, they show much more concern and emotion when they say that a member of the "status group" should not "be

554 seen" at any such function. It would appear that the mechanism
571 at work here is not simply a device to provide the younger
182 generation with a tension-release situation, but also a
561 symbolic expression of the difference between the possessors
[154] and the non-possessors of authority, a confirmation of the
political order.

The avoidance practice, or separation, between the
[578] old and the young in the "party" situation is a structural
fact of Bedouin society, and, though it may ultimately be
defined as a conflict control or legitimating mechanism, in
the context of culture change new aspects and meanings attach
554 to the phenomenon. The "status group" is an agent of change
571 in al-Qasr; its members can afford to gamble in the market
178 economy of Marsa Matruh since they possess the reserve capital
[471] (in the form of sheep) and the social prestige which permits
[439] this. The "status group," with business and social relations
[177] in Marsa Matruh, enjoys both the benefits of associational
ties with the Egyptians and the communal ties with their
fellow Bedouins. They see themselves as being different from
their fellow tribesmen, and they tend to face more towards
Marsa Matruh than al-Qasr. In short, they are the "cultural
brokers" who support an ideology of change, they extol the
benefits of a new way of life over and against the old.

[789] One repudiation of tradition which constitutes an
[796] attempt to define the style of life of the "status group"

554 concerns magic. Each August there is a celebration in honor
571 of al-Qasr's local saint. At these celebrations, the darwish
178 performs his special skills such as putting a red-hot iron
789 to his tongue, or standing on a skin drum held high by his
• 796 two assistants. No member of the "status group" attends these
affairs because the darwish and his magic "belong totally to
the old way of life." This is a restriction on social inter-
course. It may also be a rejection of the saint's sacred
power, or reluctance on the part of the "status group" to
554 share authority. The ideology which the "status group" in
571 al-Qasr has developed embodies attitudes of cooperation and
183 patience with induced programs of change. These attitudes
are invoked in varying degrees corresponding to motives of
economic gain, desire for power, and altruistic concern. But
the result is a "status group" mood which may be described
as one of disdain for the old way of life. Ideology and
discontent in al-Qasr are mainly evident among the members of
the "status group."

554 The pool from which the members of the "status group"
556 are recruited consists of the "status honor" possessors of
571 three lineages (two Sa'adi and one Marabit). These have been,
* [613] traditionally and presently, the wealthiest and most influential
in al-Qasr. Wealth in al-Qasr is defined in terms of three
things: sheep, land, and olives. Olives are becoming the
measure of wealth in the modern al-Qasr: sheep are the tradi-

156 draw al-Qasr into the Egyptian political community. He has
159 554 committed himself to work hand-in-hand with the Governor of
177 Marsa Matruh in introducing changes connected with economics
178 and education into al-Qasr. He does not conceal this fact.
124 829 When I spoke with him about helping me with my study of
[571] changing attitudes in al-Qasr, he said: "I might have the
time to do this, but before I decide you will have to bring
me a letter from the Governor stating that he wishes me to
cooperate with you." The identity and responsibility which
Hajj 'Ali feels for his role of agent of change is indicated
in his remark to me that he had heard "there were others in
the desert who feel and think the way I myself do."

156 Hajj 'Ali is discretely aware of the status difference
159 between himself, as a member of the "status group," and the
554 others of al-Qasr. As Weber would say, he perceives the
571 difference in "style of life." I was invited to Hajj 'Ali's
574 house for *'iid al-fitr*, the feast marking the end of Ramadan.
•796 123 I thought that this would be a good opportunity to observe
the "leaders" of al-Qasr together. I was very much surprised
to find present no members of the "status group" but only
[556] their exact opposites. On the occasion of this feast it is
[735] the custom that the rich treat the poor. As an additional
surprise, we had a very simple meal of bread, dates, peanuts,
and tea. Hajj 'Ali explained to me: "My neighbors do not
have my economic advantages, and I do not think it is proper

156 to serve other than what they eat." Hajj 'Ali is not only
159 conscious of social stratification in his society, but he also
554
571 has a great deal of empathy with the less endowed, a
574 prerequisite of a traditional Bedouin leader and an advantageous
796 one for a modern leader.

123 He is aware of most traditional institutions and how
156 they relate to conditions of modernity. Hajj 'Ali, whose own
159 marriages speak for his political acumen, sees only disadvantages
554
829 in the cousin-right marriage custom of the Bedouins. His
582 interest in getting on with the business of change, so to
speak, has led him to question a basic right contained in the
Bedouin principle of lineage structure and corporate membership.

> A thing which I do not like about our customs is the idea that a man has a right to his uncle's daughter. The man binds his cousin and in the end he might not marry her and will be the cause of her never marrying. He gives himself the authority to decide whom she may or may not marry. If he knows she desires to marry a certain man, he says: "She can marry anyone but not that one."

[562] Here he challenges the traditional right of the individual
male in Bedouin society, favoring the rights of the female.
[177] The emancipation of the female, especially in rights and
[178] duties concerned with the marriage contract, is an element
[562] of the modernization process in Egyptian society and the
Middle East in general.

*613 The bait, as a political group, is in part structurally
602 defined by the corporate principle which states that blood-kin
571
682

safe place when on seasonal moves. Often a shrine, sometimes 778
the shrine of a very famous saint, is no more than a wall of 776
stones, with perhaps a stick, with pieces of cloth tied to it, 792
erected over the grave, and this is the usual form in the steppe
grazing-grounds. There are generally cemeteries around the [764]
tombs.

All these shrines are visited by the Bedouin from time to time,
when they are passing by or when they have some request to
make of the holy man. Many of them are cult centres, an annual [796]
ceremony, one of the chief events of the Bedouin year, being [619]
held at them; and when they are near the border between tribes,
or between tribal sections, this is an occasion for intertribal, or
intersectional, gatherings. There is no saint whose tomb is much [789]
visited by the Bedouin who has not performed miracles, some [755]
of them very remarkable miracles, and there is probably none
who has not at some time or other cured the sick or given an heir.

The tombs of these holy men, Sidi this, Sidi that, and Sidi
the other, are found in profusion over the whole of inhabited
Cyrenaica. The historically best known are those of Sidi Rafa',
one of the Companions of the Prophet, near al-Zawiya al-Baida
on the plateau, of Sidi 'Abdalla, one of the Prophet's standard-
bearers, in the oasis of Aujila, and of the founder of the Sanusiya
Order, Sidi Muhammad bin 'Ali al-Sanusi, at Jaghbub oasis.
The shrines belong to the tribes and tribal sections in whose [619]
earth the Marabouts are buried and the Marabouts are looked [423]
upon as tribal and sub-tribal patrons. Like the Sanusiya Order,
they have become part of tribal life.

I have earlier reproduced Col. De Agostini's map of the Hasa 778
tribe to serve as an example of the territorial distribution of 619
lineages. The same map serves to illustrate the distribution of 792
shrines in a tribal territory. It can be seen from this map, which 776
shows only the best-known Marabout tombs, that all the different
sections of the tribe have their shrines, and I would draw
attention to an interesting feature of the distribution which I
have also noted in other tribal areas: how often these sacred
spots are near a tribal boundary, or near the boundary between
one tribal section and another. This may not be pure chance,
for the Marabouts in their lifetimes were regarded as standing
outside the tribal system, to which indeed, being foreigners from
the west, they did not belong, and their chief political role was

571 231 between man and man, although the various cereal dishes which constitute
264 their regular meals are said to have a similar effect.
The son who continues to eat with his father "as he always had been
182 doing," also continues to accept his authority. Indeed he could do little else
593 at this stage, for he lacks the economic means to cut away. Neither at mar-
585 riage nor after is there any transfer of wealth from father to son. The new
182 tent recently pitched is no more than a dormitory to which the young couple
[425] retire at night. During the daytime the son is still to be seen in his father's
[556] tent, and, in the male quarters, things appear to be much the same as before.
In the female quarters, the only superficial change is the more frequent appearance among the women of one who, before marriage, often sat among them if she had been a close neighbour or a close cousin previously; or of an additional helper if she had come from afar. On the surface things remain "as they always have been," although in fact, a whole set of changes have been initiated.

852 *Rites de passage* are few among the Bedouin. A man's progress in life is
881 ceremonially marked by only four events: his birth, circumcision, marriage
764 and burial. His development into manhood is not marked by clearly defined
stages. About the age of seven, the henna markings on the front of a boy's
858 shirt for protection from the evil eye are not renewed, the cowrie shell stitched
789 to the front of his cap as a kind of talisman against the evil eye is removed
and he is no longer permitted free access to the women's quarters. As he
857 grows older, he will be instructed in goat-herding, and later taught to follow
233 the sheep. In his late teens he will have to undertake the more arduous and
883 responsible task of herding the camels. Coincident with camel-herding, he
233 may be given a gun by his father. Shortly afterwards he must undertake the
[431] stringent test of manhood, a journey to a distant oasis for dates. These
[411] changes are not marked off by a *rite de passage*. The rites a man undergoes
[484] during the course of a lifetime are minimal, and in the sense that they are
[885] concerned with only the basic events in a man's life anywhere (save for
852 circumcision, which is a minor celebration anyway), they are irreducible.
88 Moreover, the rituals which exist do not comprehend the same multiplicity of
796 relationships as rituals which occur in many other African societies.[4] It is
[771] true that the ceremonies referred to in this chapter by no means include
all the Bedouin rituals. It is also true that the events mentioned vary in
[554] elaboration, and in the number of symbols present in them, but they are
not multiplied or reduced for different people.

In this context it is important to stress that we are here dealing with a
[613] lineage society where social differentiation is not built up into differences
[554] of rank, where the roles to which a man succeeds are almost wholly cap-
[602] tured by his kinship relationships with other men and which are sociologically
to be distinguished from the roles a man enters into by acquisition of office,

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[4] See, for example, the elaboration of rituals discussed in M. Gluckman (Ed.), *Essays on the Ritual of Social Relations*. Manchester: University of Manchester Press, 1962.

membership of associations and so on. The statuses a Bedouin achieves de- 796
pend not on an ordered acquisition through the inheritance of roles or elec- 852
tion to them, but on his personal manipulation of linkages in his jockeying 88
with others. Rites are minimal because there are few defined statuses an 554
individual can predictably acquire. The equalitarianism of the desert denudes 602
the Bedouin of ritual riches. Complimentarily, rites which do occur are 613
thrown into exaggerated relief by the absence of others, and in their isolation, [557]
become not merely a "passage" but a cataclysmic change. Marriage and
burial both comprehend limited fields of relations, but accompanying cere- 585
monies may bring several hundred people together, people who otherwise 764
rarely gather in these numbers to meet one another as kinsmen and neigh- 796
bours, and it is suggested that the emphasis given to the events dramatises the 602
significance of the changes they produce. In the discussion of the changes 182
brought about by marriage, the Bedouin view of what is entailed will be
considered first.

The Bedouin View of Marriage

After marriage, the Bedouin argue, a son has a tent of his own, a woman 585
over whom he has authority and soon children to make him a father. Mar- 581
riage causes split, branching. A new family is created, holding the poten- [613]
tial of a new lineage. The separation is so painful a matter for the father
that he cannot contemplate it, hence his pretence that he has no knowledge of [593]
wedding festivities, and his subsequent attitude that nothing has happened.

Interestingly, there are two other occasions when this attitude is to be 682
observed. When a man kills within his corporate group,[5] he may flee his 613
tribe or he may be compelled to leave; later he is likely to return and, when 621
he does, he is received with a minimum of show. Every attempt is made to
suppress knowledge of the event.

Again, if incest occurs, the memory of it must somehow be suppressed, and 835
it is an ever-present danger. Men, permitted four wives simultaneously and 561
also able to engage in a plurality of marriages through divorce or death of [595]
spouses, may have children showing an age difference of two or three gen-
erations. Thus it comes about that a man may be of an age in relation to his
father's sister which permits them as children to behave as if they were
first paternal cousins. As an adult, the preferred spouse for a man is a [582]
father's brother's daughter. In terms of relationships between adolescents
the situation in which a man is of the same age generation as his father's
sister is fraught with danger. In one such case, between a man and his [684]
father's sister, the male child of the union was put out in the desert to be

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[5] Bedouin are disposed in groups which, in summer, usually constitute a single community, around or near a watering point. The men of this group are interlinked by reference to an ancestor four or five ascending generations, reckoning from the generation of men of about 20 years. When, elsewhere in this chapter reference is made to corporations, it will be to groups of this kind.

795*

praise of which many poems have been written by Brothers of 793
the Order. The Grand Sanusi forbad music, dancing, and sing- 784
ing in the recitations of the Order, but in this he was at one with 114
all the official spokesmen of Islam. Most reformist movements [272]
in Islam tend towards asceticism. [533]

Far from being extreme ascetics, however, the Sanusi [535]
Brothers eat and dress well, even using scent, and are amiable 795*
and merry companions. The Tunisian scholar and traveller 157
Muhammad 'Uthman al-Hashaishi, who travelled in 1896 via [785]
Malta, Tripoli, and Banghazi to Kufra to visit al-Sayyid al-Mahdi and met the leading Brothers of the time, remarks that 'they are fond of diversions, honest jesting. I have visited many of their zawiyas and I have made the acquaintance of many of their notables: I have seen only cheerful and smiling faces, welcoming me with benevolence and kindness. May God reward them!'[1]

The Grand Sanusi discouraged the trappings of poverty by 795*
his example, his exhortations, and his insistence on the Brothers 793
being self-supporting. Although the Heads of the Sanusiya 735
Order, like the Wahhabi leaders, encouraged settlement on the land, they can hardly have hoped to have greatly influenced the Bedouin to this end; but they insisted on the lodges of the Order supporting themselves by agriculture supplemented by stock-raising, and thereby took a stand against *ittikal*, the dependence for livelihood on alms and not on labour which some mendicant Orders have advocated.

The Order has always been, in fact, conventional as well as 795*
orthodox. In its early period it was essentially a missionary 797
Order with the limited aim of bringing by peaceful persuasion the Bedouin Arabs and the peoples of the Sahara and the Sudan to a fuller understanding of the beliefs and morals of Islam, while giving them at the same time the blessings of civilization: justice, peace, trade, and education. Its principles were, as Shaikh Muhammad 'Uthman says, simply 'to do good and avoid evil'.[2]

The accusation of fanaticism is not borne out by either the 795*
character of the Bedouin adherents of the Order or by its actions.

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[1] Mohammed ben Otsmane el-Hachaichi, *Voyage au Pays des Senoussia à* [113]
travers La Tripolitaine et les Pays Touareg, 1912, p. 128 (1st ed., 1903).

[2] Ibid., p. 86.

795*

touch with the lodges of his Order in Cyrenaica, Tripolitania, 793 159
the Western Desert of Egypt, and the Sudan. 175*

In moving the seat of his Order to Jaghbub, the Grand 795*
Sanusi was probably most influenced by his decision to direct 797●
his missionary propaganda southwards. It is understandable 793
that he should have made this decision. His was a missionary 159 175*

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
Scale
0
500
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1,500 kms.
Italian expansion into Tripolitania and Cyrenaica
1911 – 1932
MOROCCO
ALGERIA
TUNISIA
TRIPOLITANIA
CYRENAICA
Al-Baida (1843)
Mizda
Al-Tabaqa
Saukna
Jaghbub (1856)
Jalu
British line of defence 1914-1917
French expansion into the Sahara
1902 – 1914
Wau-al-Kabir
Kufra (1895)
FEZZAN
EGYPT
Kawar
TIBESTI
Qiru (1899)
BORKU
ENNEDI
KANEM
ANGLO EGYPTIAN SUDAN
FRENCH SAHARA
CHAD
WADAI
DARFUR
Thin arrows indicate Sanusiya expansion
Thick arrows indicate movements of European Powers

The Spread of the Sanusiya in North Africa.

mind and the Order he had founded a missionary Order, and 795* 793
the pagan and semi-pagan countries of the Sahara and the 797
Sudan, and of Equatorial Africa beyond them, offered endless 159
scope for conversion to the faith. Moreover, his Order was 175*
already reaching the limits of its expansion in North Africa. It had won over the nomad and semi-nomad Bedouin tribes of Cyrenaica, Tripolitania, and Egypt, and the oases folk under their influence, but was not making, and was not even in its heyday to make, much impression on the peasants and townsmen up against whom it now found itself in Northern Tripolitania and the Nile Valley. Dammed to west and east the Order

*795 poured its vitality southwards along the trade routes to the
793 interior of Africa, into Fazzan and the various regions that are
• 797 to-day called the French Sahara and French Equatorial Africa.
159 Until France opened up the Atlantic seaboard, much of the Central African trade found its way along the oases-routes to
*175 the ports of Cyrenaica and Tripolitania and there were, therefore, well-established social connexions running from the Bedouin tribes of Cyrenaica and southern Tripolitania through the oases-dwellers to the tribes of the interior, for the nomads of Libya controlled the routes and to a large extent supplied the transport for the caravans. These connexions allowed an easy ingress to the Sanusiya. The two Cyrenaican tribes who chiefly traded with the Sahara, the Majabra and the Zuwaya of the oases of Jalu and al-Jikharra, had already been won over to the Order. The Zuwaya, who had date groves in the distant oasis archipelago of Kufra, over 700 km. to the south of Jaghbub, had already promised the Grand Sanusi a liberal donation of palms and water if he would build a zawiya there, and he had sent one of his followers to supervise the erection at al-Jauf of a lodge which became known as Zawiyat al-Ustad. Also, the Order had gained a foothold in the Wadai. While still a student at Mecca the Grand Sanusi had made friends with Muhammad Sharif, a prince of the Wadai, who in 1838 became Sultan of that country and furthered the interests of the Order there. It is said also that the Grand Sanusi bought a caravan of slaves on its way from the Wadai through Jaghbub to the coast and, having freed and educated them, sent them back to the Wadai as his missionaries.[1] The Order was also infiltrating from Mizda in southern Tripolitania, where a lodge was founded in 1845, and from the lodges in the oases of the Sirtican hinterland into Fazzan.

*795 In Jaghbub oasis the Grand Sanusi set about the construc-
793 tion of his headquarters, a large mass of stone buildings, some
of them two-storied, enclosing a mosque and school which were,
159 for Cyrenaica, on an imposing scale. Around these central
*175 buildings and courts were the houses of the *Ikhwan*, many of
346 them teachers in the school, of the students, of whom Shaikh
Muhammad 'Uthman says that there were over 300,[2] and of the Sayyid's family. There were also guest-rooms, quarters for the

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[1] Duveyrier, op. cit., pp. 18–19.

[2] Op. cit., p. 88.

*795 from Algeria and the other countries of the Maghrib on his
793 travels backwards and forwards to Arabia. He found in
159 Cyrenaica a tribal structure of a simple kind on which it was
*175 possible to build a missionary organization, but not out of
which it could be built. He brought this organization with him to Cyrenaica, a band of devoted followers whose allegiance had been tried by many vicissitudes. It must be remembered also that these intimates of the Grand Sanusi were foreigners to the Bedouin of Cyrenaica, with whom they had no ties of kinship, so that they stood always outside the tribal system and were not involved in the ancient loyalties and feuds inherent in Bedouin society. The missionary organization, the Sanusiya
*795 Order, was separate from the tribal system, and by centring
793 it in the distant oasis of Jaghbub the Grand Sanusi prevented it
• 797 from becoming identified with any one tribe or section of the
159 country, as it might have become had it been centred in Cyrenaica
*175 proper. As we will see, it was the local attachment of the tribes
to the zawiyas in their territories, and the attachment of the Shaikhs of these zawiyas to the Head of the Order, which made the Order so effective a missionary Body, and eventually enabled it to become a political force.

The Grand Sanusi died at Jaghbub on 7 September 1859 and
*795 was buried there. Later a magnificent shrine, furnished with
793 ornate trappings, was erected over his bones and was sur-
159 mounted with a white cupola, which gleams several miles away
*175 as one approaches the oasis. The shrine is of Egyptian craft-
764 manship and seems incongruous in its desert surroundings and
[177] unfamiliar among a simple people.

There can be no gainsaying that al-Sayyid Muhammad bin
*795 'Ali al-Sanusi was a great man and his life's work a great
793 achievement. He is said to have been tall and of a distinguished
159 appearance, an eloquent speaker, and a wise teacher.[1] His
religious personality may be estimated by the fact that many Algerians, Tunisians, and Moroccans were so inspired by his teaching and example that they left their homes and followed him on his travels and at his orders went as missionaries into new lands, and by the fact that the Bedouin of Arabia and Libya, who are a reserved and unheeding people, accepted him as their guide in things both spiritual and temporal.

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[1] Adams, op. cit., p. 10.

savants, and later at Mecca. He is said to have been an eloquent 795*
and inspiring leader and he was evidently an able organizer. 793
Unlike his father the Grand Sanusi and his nephew Sayyid 159
Ahmad al-Sharif he has left no writings behind and he seems 175*
to have had less interest than they in literature and speculation.
He lived an austere life and was considered by his followers to
have been a saint and worker of miracles as great, or greater,
than his father.

The Order expanded considerably under Sayyid al-Mahdi's
leadership, particularly into the Sahara and the Sudan, and its
greatly extended missionary enterprises demanded his personal
attention. The conversion of the heathen and semi-heathen [797]
tribes of these regions created political problems and the trading
activities of the Order required organization. The trade routes [487]
through the Libyan oases to the coast had increased in importance since the rise of the Sudanese Mahdi in 1881 had closed
the Nile route. Personal direction was difficult from Jaghbub,
so in 1895 Sayyid al-Mahdi moved the seat of the Order to
Kufra, a more central position than Jaghbub in the theocratic
empire being slowly built up. He first went to live at the
zawiya of al-Ustad but shortly afterwards built a new zawiya,
in which he resided, on a site which became known as al-Taj.
He departed from Jaghbub amid the lamentations of his
followers, only some of whom he was able to take with him to
Kufra, leaving the rest behind at Jaghbub, with his nephew al-Sayyid Muhammad 'Abid as his titular representative there. 175*

There are few places in the world so remote as Kufra oasis, 795*
but it was at the centre of the Sanusi empire and the meeting- 793
place of a number of important desert routes. Before Sayyid 159
al-Mahdi made it the seat of his Order, Kufra had been little 487
more than a watering place for caravans and the centre for the 437
wandering Tibbu tribes of the region, though the Zuwaya of [361]
al-Jikharra went there each year to collect dates. It now became
an emporium through which caravans were constantly passing
and exchange was carried on. The Sanusiya profited both
by directly engaging in trade and transport and through
customs dues.

The little village of mud and palmwood houses at al-Taj also 795*
became a centre of religious life and propaganda. The mis- 793
sionary efforts of the Order intensified all over Fazzan and into 159
175*
[797]

*795 the territories of Kawar, Tibesti, Borku, Ennedi, Darfur,
793 Wadai, Kanem, Chad, the Azger, the Air, and Baghirmi. Its
*797 teachings were spread as far as Senegal. The work of organizing
159 this propaganda fell largely to Sayyid al-Mahdi's two principal
*175 lieutenants. Sidi Muhammad al-Barrani operated in Kanem,
where he founded a lodge at Bir Alali on the route to Chad and
*795 organized bands among the Aulad Suliman, Zuwaya, Majabra,
793 Tibbu, and especially the Tuwariq, to oppose the advance of
159 the French into Central Africa; and afterwards in the Borku.
Muhammad al-Sunni, and his son al-Mahdi, operated in Bornu
*175 and Baghirmi, where he entered into relations, politically unfruitful,
*648 with the Sultans of those countries, and in the Wadai,
where he strengthened the good relations existing between the Sultan of that country and Sayyid al-Mahdi. In 1899 Sayyid al-Mahdi transferred the seat of his Order to Qiru (or Quru) oasis, between Borku and Tibesti, to direct better its propaganda, to administer the extensive regions won to it, and to organize resistance to the French.

[114] It is sometimes said in European books that one reason why Sayyid al-Mahdi went from Jaghbub to Kufra was his desire to increase the distance between himself and the Turkish Administration of Cyrenaica, but I have not found any evidence to support this view. On the other hand there can be no doubt that he was alarmed by the military and political activities of the French, about which he seems to have been well informed. The French were hastening to reach the limits of the sphere allotted to them by the agreements with England of 1898 and 1899 about the partition of Central Africa. In January 1902 they seized Bir Alali (Kanem) and destroyed the Sanusiya zawiya there. At the end of May, or at the beginning of June, in the same year Sayyid al-Mahdi died. His brother, Sayyid Muhammad al-Sharif, had predeceased him at Jaghbub in 1896.

*795 In general the energies of the Sayyid al-Mahdi had been
793 directed to the Sahara and the Sudan and the main events during
159 his headship of the Order took place off the Cyrenaican stage.
I have not thought it necessary, therefore, to give more than a
*175 brief summary of his career and of the political history of the
Order in Central Africa. He saw the Order his father had founded rise under his direction to the height of its expansion

[P.62]

CHAPTER III

THE SANUSIYA AND THE TRIBES

I

793 619 WHEN the Grand Sanusi came to preach in Cyrenaica he found the kind of society I have outlined: a congeries of tribes without law or effective government, for the Turks had little control over the interior, but with like values and habits and a community of life which crossed tribal boundaries. The Bedouin to [181] whom he preached were simple people living the austere and monotonous life of the tents, with that savage character which has been so often portrayed, but also with those noble qualities which have seldom failed to evoke admiration from those who [177] have lived among them. They were profoundly ignorant about the outside world and also—which is what touched the heart of [797] the Grand Sanusi—about the faith of their fathers, and to this matter I must now return, since the Sanusiya was a missionary Order and can only be understood as such.

771 Though the Bedouin professed Islam before the Grand Sanusi [797] influenced them by his teaching, they were almost totally ignorant of its doctrinal content, rites, or ritual and moral duties, and it is safe to assume that they did not obey its precepts. It is safe to assume this because even to-day, after a century of Sanusiya instruction, the Bedouin perform their religious duties in a very perfunctory way, if at all, and when Muslim law is at variance with tribal custom they follow tribal custom. In saying that they are lax, I do not suggest that they [186] are not very sincere, Muslims. They are proud of being Muslims and consider themselves greatly superior to Christians, while they are contemptuous of Jews. Nevertheless, though they would not belittle, the Cyrenaican Bedouin feel no embarrassment at neglecting, the duties obligatory on every Muslim. The Confession of Faith is known to all and implicitly accepted by all. It imposes no irksome restrictions or tiresome duties. [782] But they almost completely neglect—I speak of the more nomadic sections whom I know best, but it is probably true of most Cyrenaican Bedouin—their daily prayers, a duty which is

771 which often contrasts so strikingly with their poverty and rags and what Paolo Della Cella describes as their 'excessive and habitual filth'.[1]

771 It is important that it should be understood that the Bedouin
797 of Cyrenaica were Muslim, at any rate by allegiance if not by
instruction, before the Grand Sanusi propagated the faith among
793 them, because otherwise it would be difficult to account for
*795 their ready acceptance of his guidance. He was not appealing to a pagan people to embrace Islam, but to a Muslim people to show in their lives the faith they professed. It was his achievement to have given their religion organized form and direction, and by so doing to have exercised a persistent and transformative influence on their morals; for if the Bedouin neglect religious duties to-day and are by peasant and urban standards ignorant, loud, and lawless, it can be imagined that they were troublesome indeed before the Grand Sanusi and Sayyid al-Mahdi had taught them something of the duties of their faith and had softened the harshness of their customs. That the Sanusiya made a big difference to their way of life cannot be doubted. Shaikh Muhammad 'Uthman tells us of the Bedouin of Cyrenaica that 'They are very good-natured and of a cheerful disposition. They have a profound reverence for the Shaikh Sidi al-Mahdi, and they fear God and His Prophet. One is in perfect security among them; a stranger, an explorer, has he even loads of gold or silver, has nothing to fear from them.' He also says, and for the same reason, that there were peace and security for caravans in the Wadai and in those parts of the Sahara where the Sanusiya was established; and he adds that Sayyid al-Mahdi had achieved these remarkable results by the exercise of spiritual authority only, and not by force, 'as an Amir or Sultan would have done'. As for the citizens of Banghazi, of whom the Tunisian traveller had a very poor opinion, he says that they were proud, inhospitable, and lazy, and would still have been plunged in ignorance and without a vestige of civilization or of religious education 'if the goodness of God had not sent them the Sanusiya fraternity, which contributed much to their moral regeneration'.[2] Even Italian authors have to admit that the Sanusiya did much for the people

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[1] Op. cit., p. 109.

[2] Op. cit., pp. 52, 59, 62, and 116–17.

of Cyrenaica.[1] The Bedouin remember with gratitude, as I have 771
often heard them declare, the moral and cultural benefits 797
brought to them by the Order. If they have fallen from the low 793
religious and literary standards to which the Sanusiya raised a 795*
fraction of them it is due to the virtual extinction of its teaching office during their long struggle with the Italians.

II

The Bedouin the Grand Sanusi found in Cyrenaica were not 771
only Muslims but also inveterate devotees of saints, the 792
Marabtin (sing. *Marabat*) or Marabouts, as they are called in 793
European accounts of North Africa, and the Grand Sanusi was 776
in the long tradition of these holy men. Therefore, although I 778
have touched on the matter in Chapter I, I need not excuse myself for treating it again in its Cyrenaican context, for Bedouin attachment to the Sanusiya springs from their personal devotion to the Grand Sanusi and his family, and not the other way round, and the Grand Sanusi derived his sanctity, and thereby his power, from the fact that he was a Marabout. The Bedouin are familiar with saints and ignorant of Orders. To them the Grand Sanusi was a saint and wonderworker, and a man with *baraka*, an ample measure of God's grace which flowed through him to ordinary folk; but there was nothing extraordinary about him. They knew his kind of old. When he died his tomb became a shrine, the largest and richest in Cyrenaica it is true, but only one among very many, dating from the Companions of the Prophet Muhammad, through the Martyrs who were killed fighting for the faith in Cyrenaica, to the pious and learned
men of yesterday and the day before. His successors, by their [613]
kinship with him, and in virtue of their spiritual legacy from him, became heirs to his *baraka*; and so, to a lesser degree, have the heirs of the other religious teachers who came to Cyrenaica from the west, who died and were buried there, and whose descendants are the *Marabtin bil baraka* lineages of to-day. The authority the Grand Sanusi had over the Bedouin of Arabia and North Africa can be parallelled by the careers of many holy

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[1] Giuseppe Macaluso, *Turchi, Senussi e Italiani in Libia*, 1930, p. 32; Giglio, op. cit., p. 22; and Arcangelo Ghisleri (quoting Andrea Pedretti), *Tripolitania e Cirenaica dal Mediterraneo al Sahara*, 1912, p. 132. [113]

175 the Bedouins of the Hijaz area. This Sanusi success aroused
795 the jealousy and animosities of the orthodox *'ulama* ("clergy")
•[798] of the Mecca area. Al-Sanusi was forced to flee the Arabian
[793] peninsula, and in 1843 he founded his first *zawiya* ("lodge"),
[346] *al-zawiya al-baida*, in Cyrenaica. The Sanusi doctrine was as
acceptable to the Bedouins of Cyrenaica as it had been to the
[793] tribes of the Hijaz. The person and teachings of *al-Sanusi*
al-kabir ("the grand Sanusi"), as he came to be known, fit
into the "holy man" religious tradition of Cyrenaica and even
spread beyond into the Sudan and Lake Chad area. The Order
showed primary concern for the people of the desert: the
[793] Sanusi *shaikh* ("holy man") cared for the poor, and the *zawiya*
[346] became rest stops, storehouses, and religious centers where
[485] Bedouin children were taught their Quranic lessons. Through
[794] the *zawiya*, the Sanusiyya became a political and economic
175 integrating factor in the desert, and al-Sanusi became the
795 legitimate authority of the Bedouins. The *zawiya* became a
346 very important part of the traditional desert economic system.
182 Today one *zawiya* remains near al-Qasr but it is scarcely used.
[793] The Bedouins say: "Before, when Alexandria was far away by
camel, we could get what we wanted at the *zawiya*. Now that we
have trucks and trains no one goes to the *zawiya*."

175 The fortunes of the Bedouin became linked with those
795 of the Order. When the Sanusi became involved in full-scale
648 conflict with the Italian colonial power, the Bedouins bore

3:Evans-Pritchard E-4, 5 (1942-1944) 1949 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9
(1837-1942) Sanusi

[P.1]

CHAPTER I

ORIGIN AND EXPANSION OF THE SANUSIYA (1837–1902)

I

THE Sanusiya is an Order of Sufis or, as they are sometimes 795* called, Darwishes. They are Sunni or orthodox Muslims. This means that in faith and morals they accept the teachings of the Koran and the *Sunna*, a collection of traditions about the life and habits of the Prophet, whose example in all matters should be followed by believers. Most orthodox Muslims recognize two further doctrinal sources, *ijma'*, general agreement among those of the faithful capable of holding an opinion on such matters, and *qiyas*, determination of what should be believed or done by analogy with the teachings and life of the Prophet. The founder of the Sanusiya Order, like other teachers of some of the more rigidly orthodox groups, such as the Wahhabi, rejected both, though, in practice, he made use of what amounts to analogy. Of the four canonical rites of orthodox Islam the Sanusi of Cyrenaica, like the founder of their Order, follow the Maliki, the rite dominant throughout North Africa.

The Sanusiya is, therefore, a highly orthodox Order. It is not 795* a sect, but a fraternity. The enemies of its founder were never 798● able to convince any disinterested person that he was guilty of heresy, though they attempted to do so; and it was only in very small matters that they were able to accuse him of departing from the Maliki rite. Even its Sufism is conventional and austere. The Wahhabi, those stern and ruthless critics of the sects and Orders of Islam, found in it no *bid'a*, innovation, which in the eyes of these fanatics amounts to heresy, and, alone among the Sufi Orders, they have tolerated its presence in the Hijaz.

Sufism is Islamic mysticism. Orthodox Islam tends to be a 795* cold and formalistic religion. The gulf between God and man, spanned by the bridge of the Imams among the Shi'ites, is too wide for simple people, and its rules and regulations deprive it of warmth and colour. The need for personal contact and tenderness finds expression in the cult of saints, in Sufi

*795 The desire to establish in North Africa conditions in which
793 Muslims might live by their own laws and under their own
798 government, as they did in Arabia under the first four Caliphs,
led the Grand Sanusi and his successors to oppose the Turkish
177 way of life and the influences and innovations of Western
Christendom, but their intransigence in these matters did not imply intolerance, far less aggressiveness. Though some writers have made assertions to the contrary, the Sanusi have never shown themselves more hostile than other Muslims to Christians and Jews, and the Grand Sanusi and Sayyid al-Mahdi scrupulously avoided all political entanglements which might bring them into unfriendly relations with neighbouring States and the European Powers. The Brothers of the Order
*795 were discouraged from discussing political questions. Nor were
793 the Sanusi intolerant towards fellow Muslims who differed from
798 them. Shaikh Muhammed 'Uthman records of Sayyid al-Mahdi
that 'the persons he dislikes the most are those who speak ill of Muslims'.[1] The leaders of the Sanusiya have always tolerated other and rival Orders, even when they have disapproved of their rites. The Grand Sanusi had himself been a member of a succession of Orders before he started his own and he allowed, as his successors have done, members of other Orders to belong to the Sanusiya at the same time.

*795 The leaders of the Order have also been tolerant towards the
792 cult of saints, unlike the iconoclastic Wahhabi, who have
destroyed even the tombs of those nearest to the Prophet him-
798 self. The view held by the doctors of orthodox Islam is that,
776 though intercession through a saint is unlawful and the only
778 mention of him during prayers at his tomb should be to ask the
mercy of God on his soul, it is permissible to show respect to his tomb and his memory. The heads of the Sanusiya have, however, always tolerated among their Bedouin followers a regard for holy men and their tombs which goes beyond mere respect. It is unlikely that they felt any repugnance to the cult, because they counted among their forbears several saints and were themselves brought up in North Africa where the cult of saints is widespread and very near to the hearts of the common people; and they could not have remonstrated with the Bedouin for believing that holy men and their tombs are sources of *baraka*,

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[1] Op. cit., p. 121.

795*

divine blessing, since it was because the Bedouin believed the [792]
Sanusi family had the same virtue that they accepted their [798]
leadership. [776]

The resemblance often alleged between the Sanusi and the [778]
Wahhabi movements, on the grounds of like puritanism, 795*
literalism, and fanaticism, cannot be substantiated. It is 171
obvious that there must be resemblances between new religious [114)
movements: they usually claim to be a return to primitive faith and morals and they are generally missionary and enthusiastic. There is no great significance in such common characteristics of the two movements. Nor is there any reason to suppose that the Grand Sanusi was directly influenced by Wahhabi propaganda. A more significant comparison between the two might be made by tracing their developments from religious into political movements. Both started as religious revivals among backward peoples, chiefly Bedouin, the Wahhabi movement in the Nadj in the eighteenth century and the Sanusi movement first in the Hijaz and then in Cyrenaica in the middle of the nineteenth century; the *Ikhwan* organizations of the two movements have much in common; and both ended in the formation of Amirates, or small Islamic States.

Both movements have created States, the Wahhabi in Arabia and the Sanusi in Cyrenaica, based explicitly on religious particularism. In doing so they have only done what any movement of the kind is bound to do in a barbarous country if it is to continue to exist, namely, to create an administrative system which would ensure a measure of peace, security, justice, and economic stability. A religious organization cannot exist apart from a polity of a wider kind. But they did not create the sentiment of community which made the growth of governmental functions and the emergence of a State possible.

Religious divisions in Islam have commonly been the expres- 795*
sion of a sense of social and cultural exclusiveness. The support 182
given to the 'Alids in Persia and Arabia, to the Umayyads in 177
Africa and Spain, to the Fatimids in Egypt, to the Kharijites 171
by the Berbers in North Africa, and the adoption of extreme Shi'ite doctrines by the mountaineers of Syria and by the Kurds, and of Isma'ili teachings in parts of India, were all reactions against foreign domination as much as revolts against orthodoxy. The religious deviation was the expression of the intense desire

*795 of a people to live according to their own traditions and institutions.
182 To-day this desire is expressed in the political language
177 of nationalism. In the past it was expressed in religious movements.
171 Arab nationalism is not a new phenomenon. Only its
[668] dress is new.

*795 As will be seen in the chapters which follow, conditions in Cyrenaica were particularly favourable to the growth of a
182 politico-religious movement such as the Sanusiya became. It was cut off by deserts from neighbouring countries, it had a homogeneous population, it had a tribal system which embraced common traditions and a strong feeling of community of blood, the country was not dominated by the towns, and the Turkish administration exercised very little control over the interior. It was, as will be seen, the tribal system of the Bedouin which furnished the Order with its political foundations just as it was the tribesmen of the country whose hardiness and courage enabled it to stand up to the succession of defeats it had to endure.

*795 The reasons for the political success of the Sanusiya Order in
793 Cyrenaica will appear in the course of this account, and here I wish to draw attention to one of them only. It has been said
182 that its rites and teachings were, like the Bedouin character,
[792] austere without being fanatical, and that it tolerated the cult of saints to which the Bedouin were accustomed, the Grand
[798] Sanusi becoming, in fact, a kind of national saint; but it must be added that the acceptability of its teachings and the fact that the Grand Sanusi could at once be placed by the Bedouin in the familiar category of *Marabtin*, holy men coming to preach and settle in Cyrenaica from the west, cannot alone account for the remarkable success of the Sanusiya movement. The Bedouin of Cyrenaica had heard similar teachings before from similar teachers and had paid them the same degree of attention as they paid to the Grand Sanusi, but these earlier missionaries won only a personal and local following for themselves and their descendants, whereas the Grand Sanusi established himself and his family as leaders of a national movement, a position they have now held for three generations.
[792] Leaving aside the remarkable personality of the Grand Sanusi and without here discussing whether the time at which he
[798] taught was particularly favourable to the growth of the move-

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number of Orders before he founded his own. It has been 793
recorded that he was influenced by the Moroccan Tijaniya 159
Order and that at Mecca he became the favourite pupil of the 175*
founder of the Idrisiya Order, which derived its tenets from the basic Shadhiliya Order. In his student days he became a member of other Orders: Shadhiliya, Nasiriya, Qadariya, and perhaps others.[1] His catholicism was not peculiar among the Sufis, and in his case he seems to have joined a large variety of Orders with the deliberate intention of learning their rites and doctrines at first hand so that he could combine all that was best in each of them in a new Order which would be the crown of Sufi thought and practice. It must not be supposed that on this account his teaching was a mere amalgam of the tenets of earlier Orders. Original it was not, but it was a consistent and carefully thought out way of life.[2]

The new Sanusiya Order made such rapid progress, especially among the Bedouin of the Hijaz,[3] that it excited the jealousy [798] ● and fear of the various authorities in Mecca, the *'Ulama*, the Sharifs, and the Turkish Administration. There can be little doubt that the real objections to the Order were that it threatened the prestige and privileges of these authorities, but they were framed in less revealing language. It seems to have been held against the Order that it lowered Sufi standards to accommodate itself to Bedouin laxity in religious matters, and that it verged on heresy.

Faced with serious opposition the Grand Sanusi did what his teacher Sayyid Ahmad Idris had done in similar circumstances: he left the Hijaz, in about 1841, accompanied by many of his disciples, to return to his native land. After spending some months in Cairo, he continued his journey westwards to Siwa oasis, where he was taken sick and spent several weeks recuperating and instructing the people of the oasis in the faith. In the following year he reached Tripoli by the desert route. On his way to Qabis from that town he heard of the new French advances in his homeland and decided in view of them to return to Tripoli and thence to Banghazi. It would appear therefore

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[1] Ibid., p. 6; Adams, op. cit., p. 22.

[2] Carlo Giglio, *La Confraternità Senussita dalle sue Origini ad Oggi*, 1932, p. 17.

[3] A. Le Chatelier, *Les Confréries Musulmanes du Hedjaz*, 1887, *passim*.

absolutely obligatory and sinful to omit. I very much doubt 771
whether many of the Bedouin know how to pray in the pre- [782]
scribed manner. As I have mentioned earlier, the Bedouin used [794]
to give alms to their zawiyas and in doing so they carried out [735]
one of the five major duties of a Muslim, but they regarded these [431]
alms as charity rather than legal dues. I have never met an
ordinary Bedouin who had been to Mecca, or who even con-
templated going there. Nevertheless, however lax they may [785]
be in other things, all Cyrenaican Bedouin keep the fast of
Ramadan, and in this annual fast is summed up for them, more
than in anything else, the obligations and privileges of Islam
and its unity and strength. Moreover, although they are [829]
negligent Muslims themselves they respect piety in others.
Brothers of the Sanusiya Order and religious men in general
ought to pray regularly. That is their business and it is very
necessary for the well-being of the community and worthy of
liberal support, but the Bedouin is an unlettered man, a
shepherd, and a warrior, and he has his own affairs to see to.
Perhaps the Bedouin make up for their shortcomings by their [798] ●
enthusiasm for the *jihad*, holy war against unbelievers. They
consider that they have fulfilled their obligation under this [648] *
head in ample measure by their long and courageous fight,
formally declared a holy war by the Caliph of Islam, against
the Italians, the French, and the British. A Bedouin once
said to me when I remarked how rarely I had seen Bedouin
at prayer: '*nasum wa najhad*', '(but) we fast and we wage
holy war'.

It must also be said that it would be an error to suppose that Islam had not, long before the time of the Grand Sanusi, strongly affected the character and custom of the Sulaimid Bedouin. This question, which is far from simple, need not be discussed in the present account and it is only necessary to note that the Bedouin assume that their customs are Muslim customs. It would also be a questionable judgement to assert that the Bedouin of Cyrenaica are not religious because they do not pay the same attention to outward ritual as do townspeople and peasants, for piety and holiness, as we have often been admonished, are not the same. The Bedouin certainly have a profound faith in God and trust in the destiny He has prepared for them and this faith and trust enhance that superb dignity

*795 which have a Maghribi origin and those which were founded in Iraq. Egyptian Orders are not represented in Cyrenaica. These facts are explained when it is pointed out that the Orders found in Cyrenaica to-day were introduced by urban immigrants from the west who settled in Banghazi and Darna as traders and [369] artisans. Whence follows the most important feature of the non-Sanusiya Orders, their urban character. With the exception of the Madaniya and a single lodge of the 'Arusiya, these Orders are represented only in the towns. Occasionally one of their lodges was built with aid from local tribesmen, as the 'Arusiya lodges at al-Marj and Tubruq, but such examples are rare and in no way invalidate the statement that the Sanusiya alone has considerable following among the Bedouin. The adherents of the single 'Arusiya lodge at Bu Zaid are Bedouin of the Aulad al-Shaikh, immigrants from Tripolitania who regard themselves as direct descendants of Sidi 'Abd al-Salam, the founder of the Order whose rite they follow. The only competitor of the Sanusiya among the Bedouin was the Madaniya, which still retains its hold on the Fawakhir of the *barqa*, a tribe ill disposed towards any authority, and a few *Marabtin* fragments elsewhere, though these Bedouin now follow Sanusiya leadership in other than purely religious matters. • [798] There was at one time tension between the two Orders, complicated by tribal rivalries in the *barqa*, but it has now been for the greater part resolved. Apart from the opposition of the Sanusiya, the loss of influence of the Madaniya was hastened by its too close attachment to the fortunes of the declining Ottoman Caliphate, dissensions between the descendants of its founder, and a split in the Order itself.

*795 798 The Sanusiya has always shown marked tolerance towards other Orders and it must, moreover, be noted that there are no doctrinal differences between the Orders, that members of different Orders worship together in the same mosques, and that sometimes a man is a member of several orders at the same [793] time. We have seen that the Grand Sanusi in his early period joined a number of different Orders and our Tunisian friend Shaikh Muhammad 'Uthman seems to have made a hobby of joining them.[1] Furthermore, the founders of all the Orders are revered as saints by the common people everywhere, regardless

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[1] Op. cit., pp. 64-6 and 251.

of their affiliations. Hence the Sanusiya does not oppose the 795*
other Orders in the towns on a religious plane, although it does 798 •
not approve of those which are convulsionary, and they do not
compete with it politically. It is only in the interior that the
Order will not permit a rival, because competition for the
allegiance of the Bedouin must be political. Italian efforts to [648]*
play off these Orders against the Sanusiya were founded on
ignorance of the nature of an Islamic *tariqa* and seem to have
been ineffectual.

Since almost all the non-Sanusiya lodges are urban it follows 795*
that the history of the growth and spread of the Orders is 369
part of the general history of the growth and spread of the
urban centres of Cyrenaica. Some of the older lodges in
Benghazi and Darna are over 150 years old, but most of them
and all those in the smaller administrative centres date from
late Turkish times or were built during the Italian occupation.
An urban lodge is generally a small, very simple, structure and
its members seldom total more than 50 to 100. It may be [575]
regarded as a kind of club, founded for religious exercises, for
the performance of good works, and for social insurance. It [485]
also serves as a resthouse for travelling members of the Order
and as a *malja*, a place of refuge for the poor and the sick. Few
of the lodges are endowed, and most are very poor.

I do not wish to underestimate the social and, in the broadest 795*
sense, political importance of the urban Orders in Cyrenaica. 182
They provide the only spontaneous and co-operative associations in the towns and thus fill a gap for ordinary people both in the town society and in a religion which pays little attention either to corporeal works or, outside the mosques, to corporate worship. Outside the lodges of the Orders there were in Turkish times no associations dispensing charity or giving education, and worship in the mosques within the wide society of Islam does not provide the intimacy and colour men need in acts of common devotion. The lodges give to their members a double attachment and a double security, membership of a welfare association, which gives them a feeling of material security, and membership of a devotional group, which gives them a feeling of spiritual security. Also, in spite of their lack of numbers and organization, the urban lodges are links in chains which, running through Islamic countries and cutting across natural

III

*175 *648 *795 What gave the Bedouin the courage to endure the hardships and bereavements of the struggle? Certainly those two great sentiments, patriotism and religion. I have said that the first Italo-Sanusi war began as a war against Turkey and slowly became transformed into a war against the Sanusiya. The war against the Sanusiya also became transformed slowly into a simple struggle of the Bedouin for survival, for their lands and their freedom to live their ancient way of life; and in this struggle they felt themselves, in spite of all their cleavages and feuds, to be at one against the intruder. Beneath the surface of political expressions the issue was the same in both wars: whether the Italians could deprive the Bedouin of their lands and colonize them. Whether the Bedouin fought in the name of the Sultan or of the Sanusiya, or just fought, they always realized, from the first days of the struggle, that the issue was their right to live by their own laws in their own land. In the first war the outer bark of Turkish administration was stripped. [619] In the second war the inner bark of Sanusiya organization was ripped off, leaving bare beneath it the hard wood of the tribal system.

*175 *648 *795 721 • 798 619 The war also, as wars have a way of doing, bared the religious content in the struggle. The Caliph had declared a religious war, but when the Caliphate no longer counted in Cyrenaica, or indeed anywhere else, the war continued to be fought in the name of a religious Order. With the destruction of the Sanusiya it still went on in the name of religion. It then became simply a war of Muslims to defend their faith against a Christian Power. Deep love of home and deep love of God nourished each other. In fighting for their lands and herds the Bedouin were fortified by the knowledge that they fought also for their faith. Without due appreciation of the religious feelings involved in the resistance it would, I think, be impossible to understand how it went on for so long against such overwhelming odds or how the tribes, with a long history of feuds dividing them, co-operated as much as they did under Sanusiya guidance.

*175 *648 *795 619 From their experiences in the first war the Italians had learned to expect that they would be more strongly resisted in Cyrenaica

685 The Geneishat selected the tomb of the saint where the oath was to
627 778 be administered. According to the customary law of Awlad Ali, the plaintiff
695 is the one to decide which saint is to be sought for the taking of
[671] the oath by the defendant. Each saint has his own reputation and some
[776] are said to be more effective in certain kinds of disputes. The saint
selected in this case was Sidi Dmain. Sidi Dmian's tomb is in the
Beheira province some 60 miles east of the area of Burg el-Arab. He is
[732] known to cause the blindness of those who dare to swear falsely by him,
[784] and at least four cases of blindness in the area have been attributed to
[671] false oaths at Sidi Dmain. Also according to the law, it is the plaintiff
who selects the persons from the defendant's kin unit who are to
685 support him in the oath. Following this rule, the Geneishat, with the
627 help of Hadi, selected the fourteen men from bait Asabei to swear with
695 Rabbu. The number of men that were required in this case was considered
613 very conservative. The usual practice in estimating the number of supporters
● [803] in any case is done by establishing the value of the damage or
compensation and dividing it by ten. The result is the number of men
needed to give the oath. If there were not enough adult males in a given
kinship unit to fulfill the number needed, some or all the men would
have to be sworn twice or three times and each time a person takes the
oath he is considered as a separate person until the number needed is met.

Following this rule, and since the value of the property confiscated in the above case was over three thousand pounds, 300 persons should have been sworn in support of Rabbuh. Since this would have complicated the matter greatly, it was agreed that fifteen men were enough. Taieb gave the justification for limiting the number to 15 that trade and, as

312 cisterns spread throughout the Western Desert. Many of them are still used by the Bedouins for watering their livestock. The southernmost part of the catchment area provides grazing for sheep. Northward near the coast, where the soil deposit permits, barley is cultivated.

311 823 [103] The Bedouins divide al-Qasr into "the good life" (*ma'isha simha*) on the coast, and "the bad life" (*ma'isha wihsha*) in the desert. *Ma'isha simha* consists of two zones: the *shatt* or *sahil* (i.e. "the coast," "as far as one can still see the sea"), and the area of *shaîr wi mar'a* ("the barley and pasture area"). *Ma'isha wihsha* is the zone beyond the plateau where nothing grows, the *daf'a* or *sibta* ("uncultivable land which is sandy and stoney"). 361 All of the Bedouins of al-Qasr are settled permanently either on the coast or just south in the barley and pasture area. Nomadic and semi-nomadic activity disappeared generations ago in this part of the desert.

823 103 131 When the Bedouins speak of al-Qasr, they are referring to an area which is traditionally defined. When the Egyptians speak of al-Qasr, they are referring to a "village" only recently incorporated. The difference is a substantial one and not merely a difference in dialect. The Bedouins use the term *mintaqit al-Qasr* ("the area, or territory, of al-Qasr"): the Egyptians say *qaryit al-Qasr* ("the village of al-Qasr").

000 As the Bedouins view it, the Western Desert is the *watan*

771 at any time of the day! As one Bedouin put it: "According to the idea of goodness (salih), we are not good. This is because we do not pray, we are part-timers in prayer."

554 A good rajal saalih is considered by the Bedouin to
792 have a special "blessing" (baraka), a concept somewhat
778 equivalent to that of mana. Someone such as 'Amm Salih is thought to have baraka, and this type of power naturally increases his influence and enhances his status. The following
[124] informant's account brings this out and shows something of the magico-religious element at work in Bedouin power relations.

> [539] Hajj 'Ali does not believe in magic but he respects the "holy man" like anyone else. He owns a field from which are taken stones for building houses. One day he saw some men taking stones from this field. They were digging near a well so that the well would not be able to hold water after they had finished. Hajj 'Ali told the men to stop digging. One man answered: "I am cutting these stones for the Jaraira family (the family of 'Amm Salih), and only a few more and we will be finished." Hajj 'Ali replied: "For the Jaraira as for anyone else, we don't favor anyone, so stop the work now." Then Hajj 'Ali went home, never thinking that they would cause any trouble for him, and he was afraid of no harm. He slept and he had a dream.
> [787] In the dream he saw three of the Jaraira family, all of whom were dead and whom he had known in life. In the dream they only watched him and spoke no words. In the morning Hajj 'Ali went to the co-operative society's office and there he met 'Amm Salih. He said to him: "'Amm Salih, I want to tell you something." Then he related the whole story to him, and said: "I had no fear that you would do me any harm. But last night I saw your relatives in my dream; I had not even thought of them yesterday, so they are not the cause of the dream.
> [828] (The Bedouins believe that dreams reflect, and are connected with, what you saw or did during the day). So come and take all of the stones that you want, even if you are going to build a palace."

121 recorded that which people said in formal and informal inter-
123 views, and hoped that events would materialize to corroborate,
in one way or another, that which I heard or suspected.

123 Since al-Qasr lacked the "space-time component of
communal living together" (Firth 1961:27), I was not able to
select a central vantage point from which I could view the
everyday life of the Bedouins. More importantly, since the
Bedouins interpret social structure in terms of a close
relationship between residence and group membership, by the
very fact that I chose to live in al-Qasr, and so had to live
in the territory of some one lineage, I threatened my own
objectivity and that of the Bedouins toward me.

123 In consideration of the time element, I made the
*613 decision to live with the most prestigious lineage in al-
Qasr. I felt that this association would give me more free-
dom of movement in the field, and would provide me with access
to more data in a shorter time. What I did not know at the
time of my entry into the field was that the Bedouins prize
neutrality and objectivity just as much as the anthropologist.
•[829] As the Bedouins often said: "A man should only speak about
the things he knows."

121 This is a study of the Bedouins of al-Qasr. They are
not nomads nor are they even primarily pastoralists. Various
degrees of nomadism and pastoralism exist in the Western Desert
of Egypt among the different units of the Awlad 'Ali tribe.
Therefore, while the Bedouins of al-Qasr may represent a case

648 important effects on contemporary al-Qasr. There remain about
727 11 million land mines in the ground between Marsa Matruh and
648 Sallum. Accidents connected with these mines take one thousand
727 Bedouin lives every year, and cause about 10,000 injuries
165 annually. (Reported in al-Ahram, January, 1965). This danger
164 limits the areas in which the Bedouins can use the tractor, and, as a result, a great deal of the coastal land must be plowed by hand. In al-Qasr, physical disfigurements resulting from mine mishaps were quite common, and most families have had members killed in this way. In one al-Qasr lineage, 'Ailit Ma'fas, there have been sixteen men killed by mines since 1943.

Change and Present Attitudes

648 Political and economic changes, begun at the turn of
177 the century, have continued into the present. The Bedouins of al-Qasr have been increasingly drawn into the political and economic life of the Egyptian national community. They have come to depend upon the national market for their products and upon governmental agricultural subsidies for their security. The net result of this process has been a sedentary Bedouin society which is not quite tribal and not quite peasant. Al-Qasr has this in-between quality--what Fallers (1961) has called the tertium quid quality.

It is difficult to gauge the feelings of the Bedouins
• [829] of al-Qasr about the social changes taking place. They complain

648 about the lack of concern shown toward the Bedouins throughout
177 the history of their relations with the Nile Valley: they
● 829 complain that the Egyptians have no right to take over the
desert and order their lives for them. They say that "the
Egyptians know nothing about the desert"; that "they do not
know how to live in the desert and should take our advice on
these things." "They (the Egyptians) have given us nothing,
we had all of this before they came. Jamal Abd al-Nasser did
not invent socialism (ishtarikiyya): the Bedouins have
always had it. We have always shared and taken care of one
another." The Egyptians are still "outsiders" to the Bedouins.
They are referred to as "fallahin" or "peasants."

Interestingly enough, the Bedouins include President
Nasser in their own in-group. They insist, in a half-serious
way, that he is of the Awlad 'Ali because he is originally
from Upper Egypt. One can compare the roles of Nasser and
the Grand Sanusi in some ways. Both leaders made special
[778] efforts to bring the Bedouins into a new community, to share
their "good fortune" with them; also, both leaders are considered to be possessors of charisma, or baraka ("blessing")
by the Bedouins. One may hear unkind remarks about "holy
men" or "government officials," but never about Nasser or the
al-Sanusi family. One Bedouin said: "Jamal Abd al-Nasser works
hard and tries to do good for the people, but his officials are
000 very lazy and do not care about us." While the Bedouins

While the Bedouins
795 respect the Sanusi family they, nevertheless, wear their
771 religion lightly. An informant, speaking of the merits and
829 demerits of the conservative Muslim Brethern Association, said
that "you should never listen to a holy man, for he will lead
you straight to hell!" But upon meeting any member of the
[576] Sanusi family, all Bedouins greet him by kissing his hand.
[778] Besides a show of deference, this ritual act, in theory,
transfers baraka from al-Sanusi to the layman.

648 The citizenship exemptions granted the Bedouins by
641 Muhammad 'Ali have been rescinded by Abd al-Nasser. This
has been one aspect of his program to imbue the Bedouin with
political consciousness and promote participation in the
nation-state. The Bedouins say that this is the way it should
be: they want the right to own land and to accept the
responsibility of defending the homeland. But they still do
[651] not pay land taxes, and they feel justified in this because
the desert "is very poor soil, and not like that of the Nile."
Nor do they always heed the call to military duty, though they
insist that they do.

648 Egyptian land reform laws would be impractical, or
177 impossible to apply, in al-Qasr. In the Nile Valley, such
423 laws were necessary. The majority of the Egyptian peasants
can survive on less than one acre of land, and farms of
under five acres comprise 44 per cent of the agricultural
land area in the Nile Valley (Warriner 1962:204). Plots this

245 blossoms of the tree are stripped away by these winds before
177 the fruit can mature.

178 Traditional values affect the Bedouins' perception of
517 their new life. Men are fond of gathering for their ritual
272 three cups of mint tea and recalling "the good old days." In
[829] those days, they say, men only had to ride, shoot, and drink
233 tea. In the past, there was a great deal of security in
178 owning animals which are not as dependent on the rains as
422 is agriculture. During a year of bad rains, a Bedouin could
233 always move his flock to Libya or to the Nile Valley: "When
731 we have a bad year, we take our animals to the grass of our
166 relatives. When they have a bad year, they come here." In
167 the drought year of 1960, 20,000 Egyptian Bedouins migrated
to Libya in search of pasturage. This caused an international
[648] conflict and King Idris of Libya, for a short time, closed the
border to Bedouins. The conflict was finally resolved, and
the Bedouins were given permission to use the pastures of
Cyrenaica. None of the Bedouins of al-Qasr were involved in
this movement.

233 The Bedouins who have settled in the *'izba* sector of
al-Qasr also prefer to keep some sheep. The security which
they represent is worth the time and expense of maintaining
233 them and paying a shepherd to look after them. The Bedouins,
178 in the past, paid their shepherds one sheep for every ten
465 sheep that he tended. Payment was made twice a year. Today,

173 that in those days it was important "to have men to go to
*613 war; Hajj 'Ali came from the Sinai with many men and wrote
619 597 his name into the books of Lazumi." Today, in the Lazumi
genealogy Hajj 'Ali's name appears as the brother of Taram,
[114] both are claimed as sons of Mighawsiz. This kind of data is
difficult to uncover and I may have missed gathering other
cases of ideological kinship ties.

*613 The specific unilinear principle which operates in
[171] al-Qasr is partrilineality, common to the Middle Eastern
culture area. A corollary principle is the corporate group.
*613 Together, these two rules structure the social world of the
571 individual and effectively define a range of social choices
for him. The individual's social relations and social roles
are relative to the rights and obligations of the people
related to him through his father. In a sense, the social
world for the individual in al-Qasr is his father's group
and its network of relationships with other similar groups;
he would not think of leaving this group of his own free
will though, in reality, he could. The Bedouins believe
[181] that a man cannot be happy if he lives with strangers, i.e.,
● [829] outside his corporate group. This value holds up today to
the extent that a man will expect his son to return to the
desert even after his education as a merchant, a government
clerk, or an army officer.

Structural differentiation in al-Qasr is not solely

619 the bureaucratic principle. Here we are concerned with the
177 traditional situation.
[121]

The 'Aishaibi Bedouins of al-Qasr are a residence
619 group. Each sub-group of the tribe, i.e., the secondary and
*613 tertiary units, is assigned their own territory (mintaqa).
571 Kinship and residence are the primary determinants of group
differentiation; agnates who dwell together represent
concrete authority structures, or political groups. This
follows from the fact that patterns of political action, or
what we call political structures, most often deal with the
exercise of legitimate authority--as opposed to power. Power
relations do occur and when present complicate the situation.
In al-Qasr, power relations and structures emerge when the
principle of cognation or contracted alliance form groups
which crosscut the effectiveness of local, agnatic political
structures. But, in al-Qasr, as in most societies, political
action usually takes the form of the exercise of authority
(Southall 1965:120).

173 The genealogical map as an idological charter argues
114 against the formation of power relations. Genealogical re-
*613 lations represent a set of social relations each replete with
571 definite rights and obligations. Fallers (1956) has noted
the tendency in segmentary lineage societies to cast all
authority relations in a unilinear genealogical mould. The
*613
•829 Bedouin visualize their world, extending from Alexandria to
173
571

*613 Libya, as a territorially segmented one corresponding to the
•829 lineage divisions of the tribe. They say that every Bedouin
173
571 knows the owner of each centimeter of this world. Not only
does the genealogy represent a set of property relations, it
also represents and upholds a set of authority relations. In
*613 Cyrenaica also (Peters 1960), the Bedouin genealogical map
173 corresponds to the distribution of groups on the ground.
571 Kinship relations as social relations in Bedouin society may
be properly interpreted as property relations between groups.
Property relations as part of the Bedouin world view are an
essential premise upon which the social and political order
rests, although it is not the only premise.

619 The 'Aishaibat are identified with the al-Qasr portion
*613 of the Awlad 'Ali homeland. The 'Aishaibi segments are
separate and contiguous on the ground. Figure 3a[1] shows the
correspondence between the 'Aishaibi genealogical and territorial divisions at the secondary lineage level of segmentation.

121 That kinship as an organizing principle in segmentary
*613 societies cannot be considered apart from local contiguity
is an old and well-known fact. Sir Henry Maine (1917:76-79)
in analyzing the evolution of "political ideas" noted the
interrelationship between "the principle of local contiguity"
and the central principle of the "connexion in blood," how
they combine to become "the condition of community in political

[1] [See p. 66--Analyst]

582 "parallel cousin" (i.e. bint 'amm) is perfectly interchangeable
114 with the term "parallel-cousin once removed" (i.e. bint ibn
196 'amm, "daughter of the father's brother's son"). After I
[124] had familiarized myself with the genealogies of al-Qasr, I
began to realize that many of my informants were using the
term bint 'amm to refer to the parallel-cousin once, twice,
or even thrice removed. When I pointed this out to one of the
Bedouins, he replied: "So what, there is nothing f[illegible]den
about this type of marriage." Table 5 shows that this is
582 indeed the case. There are a number of cultural ideals
183 which influence the practice of marriage in al-Qasr: endogamy
182 is encouraged because it cements and intensifies corporate
ties; exogamy is desired because it widens the web of
kinship; men prefer younger women to older women and may
utilize their cousin-right privilege to realize this preference.

582 The Bedouins of al-Qasr define the bint 'amm over a
●829 wide range. One informant said that "all of the girls of the
Awlad 'Ali tribe are my bint 'amm, we are all one." Another
said to me, that "any girl of the 'Ali Ahmar is a man's bint
'amm." And yet another informed me that "a man of the
Qinaishat tribe will reserve his daughter for me before he
will give her to an outsider." Ideologically, a bint 'amm
seemed to be anything except the father's brother's daughter.
This is quite convenient for the Bedouins because an ideological
concept can be placed anywhere along the scale of actuality

582 depending upon the needs of the situation.

•829 But one is able to differentiate between the various
582 meanings of *bint 'amm* in al-Qasr. First of all, the Bedouins
196 make an initial dichotamy between the *bint 'amm daira* (*daira* =
*613 "homeland") and the *bint 'amm shaqiiqa* (*shaqiiqa* = "full sister"). The first term refers to any girl within the primary level of segmentation, i.e., the 'Aishaibat, and the latter term refers to the actual father's brother's daughter. Any marriage within the secondary group, i.e., 'Ailit Ma'fas, is referred to simply as a *bint 'amm* marriage--even if it is really a *bint ibn 'amm* marriage. A man has an actual moral claim upon his *bint 'amm shaqiiqa*: such a marriage is an agreement between their fathers who are brothers. A man cannot claim his *bint 'amm daira* but he might assume that if she is not claimed by her father's brother's son (*ibn 'amm*), his claim will be favored over that of an outsider.

582 The differentiation between these two types of cousin role is made in terms of rights and obligations which define social relations in al-Qasr. Social action is based upon these expectations of behavior. In al-Qasr, a man really does claim his *bint 'amm shaqiiqa*. If his claim is thwarted, he will attempt to do something about it, and whatever the consequences, his group is committed to back him in this
[182] matter. Parallel-cousin marriage may be an important basis
[578] for integration, or it may be the cause of bitter conflict.

> 582 her father was asking was too high. Salih was angry,
> 578 so angry that he swore to kill any man who tried to
> 159 take his bint 'amm. He went away to the Nile Valley
> to earn enough money to pay the high brideprice. In
> the meantime, the cousin of the brothers came and
> paid Aziz for the permission to marry the girl. Salih
> returned, but, of course, he could not kill his own
> paternal cousin. He became ill and went into a sleep
> which lasted for three days. Salih had always been
> known for his powerful voice but when he awoke he had
> a very weak voice. Salih never spoke to his brother
> again. He died seven years ago without every marrying.

582 This story has aprocryphal aspects which announce this to be
578 an important issue in Bedouin culture. The subject of parallel-
829 cousin marriage is a complex one surrounded by controversy and
contradiction. The older Bedouins say that the practice is a
[182] source of conflict, but they will usually insist that at
least one of their sons marry his bint 'amm to insure the
corporate link with the brother. In support of their com-
plaints, they say that bint 'amm marriage is not morally
sanctioned: "We do not like it and it is not right. But
if we try to stop our sons from taking their cousins they
will put a gun on their shoulder and go after her." On the
other hand, this is contrasted with the complaints of the
elders that their sons no longer respect their marriage habits,
that they are marrying anyone these days: "Our sons resent the
bint 'amm marriage because it is an agreement between fathers."
582 While I was in the field, three marriages took place; one was
with the bint 'amm, and the other two were outside the secondary
group but within the primary group, i.e., inter-lineage.

604 182 war.

The Bedouins of al-Qasr are conscious of the prac-
604 602 182 ticality of external kinship ties. The role of mother's brother becomes a significant symbol for the maintenance of these ties. Boys are supposed to respect their khal ("mother's brother") in order "to avoid wars which could end the world." The Bedouins claim vehemently that "no quarrel can happen between me and a member of that tribe because my brother has married into that tribe." They make the value
[181] of the mother's brother link very explicit: "Marriage into other tribes makes quarrels impossible."

There are many Bedouin proverbs pointing to the place
604 538 of the mother's brother in the social structure. Proverbs, in any culture, trace out areas of behavior which have become important. Kenneth Burke (1957:256) says of proverbs, that they are "strategies for dealing with situations. In so far as situations are typical and recurrent in a given social structure, people develop names for them and strategies for handling them. Another name for strategies might be attitudes." The Bedouins likewise look upon proverbs as tem-
● [829] plates for behavior. They say that "we should heed proverbs because they are the words of the elders; they are like a white flag which marks the way, and people should not go beyond these flags."

A most common proverb which elevates the mother's

000 kin groups of the parent who does not determine descent. A
182 corollary aspect of the filiation principle in al-Qasr is the
601 602 practice of collaterally extending the term, khal, to include
604 many others besides the real mother's brother. This usage
[114] of classificatory terminology, like that in the case of bint
'amm, leads to confusion for the fieldworker. When an in-
601 604 dividual marries into an outside group, or even within the
561 secondary group, the wife's brother becomes khal not only to
182 the offspring of the marriage, but to all the children (awlad)
at the same generation level as the offspring. All boys of
the age of sister's son will refer to his mother's brother
as khali ("my mother's brother"). Besides extending the web
of kinship, this practice also has the function of uniting
age-mates of the local descent group.

Throughout this discussion of mother's brother, I
604 582 have been stressing the fact that the sentiment which a
•[829] Bedouin develops toward this person is to be construed as a
political value, i.e., a behavioral disposition relevant to
the political process. It is patent then that the sister's
son-mother's brother relationship should be more crucial in
exogamous marriages, for in these cases cognation becomes the
principal mechanism for establishing authority relations and
effecting political alliance. In endogamous marriages, cog-
nation complements the other structural principles which
define the corporate group, and makes it the corporate group
par excellence.

000 *par excellence*.

604 The inculcation of political values is part of the
829 socialization process. A Bedouin boy is taught that his *khal*
867 is a very special person, and one whom he should admire. It
is commonplace in al-Qasr to hear small boys matching the
exploits and skills of their maternal uncles, bragging and
exaggerating about their *khal*: this one is a great horseman,
and that one is a great marksman with the rifle. On the other
hand, if the mother's brother is from within the local group,
rights and obligations toward him will be structured in terms
of other kinship roles which take precedence according to the
604 rule of descent. For instance, in the ideal-typical case of
602 *bint 'amm* marriage the mother's brother of sister's son would
582 also be the father's father's brother's son in relation to
ego. This would mean, in another way, that ego's mother's
[605] brother is also ego's father's parallel cousin. Male
parallel cousins "are like brothers," and so ego would be
expected to behave toward this person not as a "mother's
brother" but as a "father." Whereas the boy enjoys a certain
freedom of expression and comradeship with his exogamous
mother's brother, he would have to pay "father-like" respect
and obedience to his endogamous mother's brother.

604 The crucial importance of the *khal*, and the political
582 significance of the bonds which this role represents, is made
clear in the following statement of an informant who contrasted

604
582 the exogamous and endogamous mother's brother.

> If the khal is from outside the tribe, we can do no wrong to him if he does no wrong to us. If the khal is a member of the tribe, he is respected; but not like the khal from outside the tribe. The feeling between a man and his khal is much stronger if the khal is from outside the tribe. Within my own 'aiela (secondary group), I respect the maternal uncles of Bait so-and-so as much as I respect the maternal uncles of my own bait (tertiary group).

• [829] Ideas and sentiment about the mother's brother as they are related to complementary filiation should be interpreted as having a definite influence on marriage practice and politics in al-Qasr.

582
*613 A sample from the marriages of 'Ailit Ma'fas (see Figure 10 below) shows that endogamous marriages are no more frequent than those which function to bring a new member into the corporate group--although the man's spouse never really becomes a member of the lineage. [587] Only five of the seventeen marriages were within the 'aiela, and one of these was a case of sororate which acted to maintain an already established tie. Six of the marriages were with groups not belonging to the Awlad 'Ali tribe. In each of these cases, with the exception of one, the marriage represents the establishment of ties between groups who live in areas contiguous with one another. Four of the marriages shown in Figure 10 were within the primary segment, i.e., with other lineages of al-Qasr; three out of these four were contracted with

[TEXT CONTINUED ON PAGE 133]

586 judicious. Another issue which enters here is the desire on
829 the part of the individual to maintain his privacy--especially
where an infringement of it could result in a change of his
tax status. The Bedouins think that it is wise to keep the
government uninformed about the exact size of their family.
586 When I first asked a question concerning divorce, I was
829 politely taken aside and told that I do not speak about
123 divorce to a man, and especially when his sons are present.

586 Two cases of divorce took place while I was in the
field. In the one, the wife claimed that her husband was
impotent. She took this complaint to her father who then
confronted the husband with it; the result was a divorce.
Although the man denied that he was sterile, this was his
second childless marriage and he felt it wise not to contest
the case. It becomes very important to know, in the case of
Bedouin divorce, which partner cannot meet the requirements
of the marriage. If it is the woman, she will return to
her father's house and the father must then return the price
of mahr (brideprice). If it is the husband, when his wife
returns to her father's house he must pay her (not her father,
in this case) a sum, called mu'akhkhir al-sadaaq ("the balance
of the marriage contract"), which is equal to that of the
original mahr. Actually, there are three times when a mahr
[583] price may be paid in al-Qasr: the original mahr is paid at
[768] the time of the marriage; the mu'akhkhir al-sadaaq is paid
[595]

586 Naturally, according to the rule of patriliny, all
851 children from a marriage belong to the husband and become
* 613 members of his lineage. Should divorce occur while a woman
is nursing, she will take the child with her and it will be
returned after weaning. Sometimes the husband will permit the
wife to keep one child--always a girl--in order "to keep her
company."

587 The practice of the sororate has been noted. The
Bedouins also believe that "a man should marry his brother's
widow so that she will have someone to help her with the
children." But I have no data on the frequencies of these
12 practices. When I gathered my data on marriage, my informants
58 would give me only the name of the tribe or lineage into which
a man married, and never did I get the name of a man's wife.
•[829] (One lineage in al-Qasr, entirely refused to give me data
on genealogy or marriage because, as one leader said, "it is
not decent to speak of these things with people.") Sororal
595 polygny is forbidden (Quran IV:23), and the Bedouins say
that a man cannot marry more than one bint 'amm. Marriage
182 practices, such as sororate and levirate, I interpret as
[587] patterns which maintain structural continuity and political
advantage. The custom of permitting a man to marry only
[582] one of his father's brother's daughters may be seen as a
precaution against intensifying authority relations and the
degree of segmentation.

*613 He must pay the diiya with the shares which he collects from
682 the others. It makes no difference if the 'aqila must pay
554 with his own money. He is responsible for this matter before
571 the whole tribe."

*613 The collection of the diiya is only one aspect of the
554 process of conflict regulation, but it stands out as the funda-
682 mental manifestation of the office of 'aqila. In the course
[692] of office, an 'aqila will spend much more time arbitrating
disputes, but it is his responsibility concerning blood-money
which defines his position and his jurisdiction as corporate
682 ones. During the present period in al-Qasr, the practice of
178 blood-revenge has all but disappeared as a mechanism of social
[626] control. Nevertheless, the possibility of its happening is
not too remote. The payment of blood-money is the alternative
[619] to blood-revenge, and blood-revenge is a condition for all-out
[721] tribal warfare--something which the Bedouins look upon with
● [829] horror. One informant once likened a primary-level war between
the 'Aishaibat and the Kamailat (should it ever occur) to
*613 "the end of the world." The 'aqila as a representative of a
682 group can prevent war by preventing reciprocal homicides: by
554 presenting his share of the blood-money he regulates conflict
578 and promotes integration. The blood-money is usually paid
over a period of from one to two years. In this case, the
[571] notion of "debt" represents a contingent, institutionalized
social relationship for the purpose of maintaining political
order.

571
672 other than those dealing with blood-revenge too. For instance,
*613 in matters concerning personal debts incurred, the group is
571 not responsible for the individual. The Bedouins say that if
672 a man has the money he must repay his debts: if he does not
*613
426 have the money, then he must ask a rich relative to pay his
debts for him. He is then in debt to his relative and, out
of respect for him, should not borrow money or go into debt
[558] again. If he does, he will bring dishonor ('ar) to his
[681] family and they will, ultimately, banish him. There was dis-
682 agreement among my informants as to whether or not they
*613 should contribute to a diiya which was compensation for an
•829 intentional slaying. Some said that they would not question
124 the motives of their kinsman who has killed because "we are
together in the good and the bad, and I must pay for him
just as he must pay for me." But others held the opinion,
which I feel was a prevailing one, that one must take into
account the justifiability of the killing. This seems to
have been the case in the past, for the Bedouins say that
traditionally the bait of the killer had to pay one-half
of the diiya.

*613 All things political somehow relate to the payment
682 of blood-money. We have seen that the essential function
681 of the 'aqila, and even the condition of his taking office,
182 refers to the responsibility of collecting the diiya from
571 the members of his group. The criterion of being a member

626 process of conflict regulation is ritually sanctioned and
182 the political order sacralized in a public way at the con-
771 clusion of litigation when the parties involved and the
'aqila read the *Fatiha* (the first *sura* of the Quran). For
671 the Bedouins, the *'awaiyid* is the enactment of the word of
771 God, and the man who follows the *'awaiyid* follows the command-
771 ments of God. One *'aqila* speaking of the final authority which
776 directs Bedouin society said this:

577

> God knows all things. God made the world and gave man a brain with which to think. Therefore, he gave man two choices: the good, and the bad. If a man follows the good, he does not steal, kill, or lie. God gave us Muhammad the Messenger, and he taught the ignorant to follow the word of God. You are an educated man, and so you must choose the good path and follow it. I do not read but I follow the Quran.

577 It follows, then, that "the good man" represents an
183 important Bedouin cultural ideal which is legitimated by
771 reference to the sacred. The practice of this ideal leads
●[829] to "the good society." Another *'aqila*, in reply to my
question concerning the definition of a "good man," answered:

> A good man should follow God, and through this he will be a perfect man because such a man could make no mistakes. You could find no better person than this. The good man fasts, prays, makes the pilgrimage, and helps the poor. He avoids stealing and lying; these are the most important things to avoid . . . All men aim to do good. Some men think that they are doing good, but they cannot tell good from bad: this is the origin of badness . . . A man aims to do good so that the Arabs will thank him for it. The Arabs (i.e. the man's fellow Bedouins) will say that he is doing good and that he is following the good path.

423 each tribe. It was decided that the water which flows through
691 the _wadi_ after the rains should be divided equally between the
578 two tribes, and that no one should be stopped from using the
619 water. Had not the government intervened in this conflict,
648 and had not they collected all of the weapons from the Bedouins,
this problem would have resulted in the death of many men and
even greater problems.

674 Theft is condemned by the Bedouins: "Everything in
685 the desert is loose. We must punish the thief quickly and
severely." It is a fact that the man who goes to steal and
[682] accidentally kills in the act will have judged against him
● [829] the full _diiya_, i.e., the amount for intentional killing. On
the other hand, the people of al-Qasr insist that "Bedouins do
[671] not steal." But legal norms exist to sanction violations against
cultural ideals. The following case shows how social and ritual
sanctions operate to enforce ideals.

619 _Date: 1964_. Case: Quarrel between the tribe of Kamailat and
578 the tribe of 'Aishaibat over the theft of 16 L.E. Muhammad of
685 'Ailit Ma'fas was accused of stealing 16 L.E. which belonged
*613 to Ahmad of 'Ailit Idris, Kamailat. The theft occurred while
the two were residing at a hotel in Marsa Matruh. There were
twenty other persons in the hotel that night. The accused
said: "I did not take anything."

554 dhabiiha and 10 L.E. But Hajj 'Ali intervened and did not
571 let them pay the fine. Instead, he had them write a paper
627 declaring that should they reopen this matter, they would
have to pay the old fine plus a new fine of the same amount." Simmel (Wolff 1950) notes that the mediator saves group unity through his "intellectuality," but that he is also an exploiter of the situation. It is obvious that Hajj 'Ali could have increased his "status honor" in the eyes of both parties to this conflict. The rajal khair who is facile enough to salvage the honor of both parties in a dispute increases his chances for future mediation and, hence, the chance to further augment his "status honor." The minimal fine involved in most of Bedouin litigation indicates a concern, not with punishment *per se*, but with "taking one's rights" and lawful share of honor. Social harmony is viewed in terms of an equitable distribution of honor. The power which a rajal khair has over litigants, which derives from his status in the social structure, contributes to this social harmony necessary for the persistence of the community.

554 The Bedouins say that one goes to the rajal khair,
571 or rajal salih, because he knows that he will "get his
627 rights." Litigation is entered into with the understanding
829 that neither party will emerge a "loser." On the other hand,
[691] the 'aqila, who is expected to be dispassionate and totally
*[613] objective, must rule on the rightness or wrongness of an act;

554 hence the rajal khair represents a face-saving mechanicsm
571 627 and an alternative which is needed. The rajal khair may even
● [829] violate group norms in acting to restore the balance of
* [613] honor: he may lie with intent to deceive, behavior which at
[577] any other time would be considered "wrong" by the Bedouin.
An informant said that

> [539] the real rajal khair is a man who goes to men in a quarrel and asks them to be on good terms and to avoid the devil. He uses good judgement in quarrels. In this case, he may even have to lie. He goes to both parties and listens to them insult each other, but when he returns he tells each that the other is a good man and wishes to settle the quarrel. He tells them: 'Do not let the devil interfere.' He tells each that the other wants his friendship.

554 I pursued the detail that a rajal khair may lie to restore
571 peace, since other informants had made a point of this. My
577 informant then explained:

> 627 124 [539] I don't want to commit myself because no one knows if the rajal khair is really lying; the men at the time of the quarrel do not know that he is lying. Not all men are rajal khair: there are only a few. The rajal khair puts himself in trouble to help others, therefore, the people do not want to harm him (by thinking ill of him). The rajal khair must be a good man and help others, and he always speaks the truth. He lies but he is doing good, and the people do not want to harm him. When the rajal khair lies, a man does not lose his rights. A man tells the rajal khair this; he tells him that he does not want to lose his rights, and he does not care what he says as long as he does not lose his rights.

554 One *'aqila*, who is famous for the sharpness of his tongue in
571 dealing with litigants, was explicit about the authority of
*613 the *rajal khair* as compared to his own in matters of conflict
627 regulation:

[539]

> Both are one (i.e. the *'aqila* and the *rajal khair*), for the *rajal khair* can also finish a problem. The *rajal khair* tries to solve the problem, but only the *'aqila* judges (*yahkum*). The *rajal khair* worries about the feelings of the two men involved, but the *'aqila* cares only about justice and what is right . . . The *rajal khair* does not want the two men to lose one another. It is a friendly way to solve problems.

554 Bedouins of low status in al-Qasr who are economically
571 linked to the *rajal khair* in what resembles a patron-client
627 relationship permit this fact to influence their own inter-
•829 pretation of the authority structure. A common view of the
*613 *'aqila's* formal authority indicates that the Bedouins themselves
are conscious of a structural comparison of political roles,
but not of the underlying economic conditioners at work.

[539]

> There are good men and there are bad men: the *rajal khair* is the opposite of a bad man. The *rajal khair* is not responsible for his group, but the *'aqila* is. The *'aqila* is chosen from among the elders of the *bait* so that he is not always a good man. But when they want a man to solve problems, they get him from among the *rajal khair*. The *'aqila* is responsible before the *'umda* and *shaikh*, and he is responsible for collecting and receiving the *diya*.

554 The *rajal khair* represents a vital element in Bedouin
571
627 society. He is a symbol of security, the man to whom one
182

554 571 627 182 [181] [556] turns in times of need dealing with financial and personal problems. In view of the value stress which the Bedouins place upon generosity, manifest in the redistributive system of the lineage, the wealth of the rajal khair is the wealth of the community. Wealth divides, not only possessors from non-possessors, but also, seekers after security from power seekers. It is as Peters (1965:145) has noted in Cyrenaica: generosity, not being entirely altruistic, wins repute and repute is an important aspect of political power.

554 682 627 *613 •829 In an interview concerning the justice of blood-revenge, there was general agreement that if a man kills intentionally, then blood-revenge must be taken by the murdered man's bait against someone in the murderer's aila. But one prominent man (a rajal khair) protested that "the best man in the killer's family must not be harmed." This statement generated a rather heated debate. One man said: "The best man should be killed for this is right in the Bedouin type of justice." (This comment was made by a man who is the 'aqila of a low-status lineage in al-Qasr.) The first speaker's reply to the protest was this:

> Nevertheless, it all depends upon the character of the best man . . . if he is evil and on bad terms with your family, then he will be the first one to be killed. But if he is a good man, then you kill the murderer himself . . . You must never kill a rajal khair because he may do good in the future. [178] In the old days, the killing started right away, and all problems were big ones: today there is negotiation--people are improving.

554 It is interesting to note that Hajj 'Ali is one of the most
[571] powerful members of the "status group" in al-Qasr. He is
[178] also a leading proponent of social change and a critic of
the old way of life which includes belief in magic. One can
[792] see how 'Amm Salih's influence and status might work in other
areas of social action.

554 Although it is conceivable that a *rajal salih* can
792 be asked to intervene in any type of conflict, it is more
627 likely that he will preside at cases involving marriage and
[695] divorce. The *rajal saalih* may also be asked to serve as a
[691] witness or consultant in litigation cases. The Bedouins
point out that the "holy man," like the *rajal khair*, is apt
* [613] to be more trustworthy than the formal authority, the *'aqila*.
• [829]

> Sanusi is a good man and the people should listen to him. He is a *rajal khair*, a *rajal saalih*, not an *'aqila*. He is better than an *'aqila*--he is our brother. He is much better than the *'umda* because he never changes the truth. The *'umda* may go and accuse me wrongly to the government but Sanusi would never do this.

554 It is, of course, difficult to decide whether Sanusi's
792 charisma stems from the fact that he is a *rajal salih*, or the
facts of his wealth and family. Most probably it is a little
of both, the sacred as well as the secular. 'Amm Salih, on
the other hand, is neither wealthy nor from a particularly
prestigious family by economic standards of al-Qasr: he
derives his influence and status from the sacred aspects of

114 until sometime after my departure from the field.[5] Never-
634 666 theless, before I left the field I discussed the pending
114 election with some of my informants and members of the
634 "status group." The interviews reveal that the "status
666 group" still intends to dominate the area of power relations
124 •829 with the government. As one informant said: "The present
*[613] _'umda_ and the one before him were from Bait Bu Taram of
'Ailit Lazumi, and the next one will be from Bu Taram also."

The tenacity of traditional politics and the influence
634 571 of the "status group" are reflected in the affairs surrounding
666 the election of a new incumbent to the office of _'umda_. In
this situation, all Bedouins become concerned more with the
distribution of power than with the actual person who will
124 fill the authority role. One informant, an _'aqila_, gave
*613 indication that formal authorities support the "status group"
634 and the distribution of power which they represent and maintain.

571 666

> Mustafa, the brother of the _'umda_, takes his place while he is in Cairo attending Parliament. The _'umda_ told me that he was going to ask the _'awaaqil to_ sacrifice (i.e. slaughter a lamb) and write a paper making Mustafa the new _'umda_. (Here I told the informant that I had spoken with Mustafa about this, and he told me that he did not want to be the _'umda_).
> Even if Mustafa does not want to be the _'umda_, the _'awaaqil_ will force him to accept . . . It should remain in the same family, it would be a shame if the office went to another family. Mustafa's father and brother were _'umdas_ before him. If the office left the family,

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[5] Technically, the 'Aishaibat were without an _'umda_ while I was in the field. However, he spent enough time in Matruh that he was able to carry on his duties until his successor could be named.

156 159 and they sat on chairs inside the tent. I returned to
554 Marsa Matruh in the *'umda's* car (1964 Ford, highly polished)
635 537 with the *'umda* and the *shaikh*. They openly joked about Hajj
[634] 'Ali and his manner of presentation; they repeated some of
[122] his "stilted" phrases and laughed. Hajj 'Ali gave last year's
[522] reception speech also. This is because, his son says, Hajj
'Ali is considered a fine speaker by the Bedouins of al-Qasr.

121 We can see how these details carry larger implications
177 within the context of political and social structures under-
178 going change. It is the stuff which the anthropologist finds
important for an understanding of the process of change.

156 If I have established thus far that Hajj 'Ali is
159 politically active and representative in both the traditional
554 and the modern systems, then the attempt is now to prove that
177 he consciously seeks to change the traditional in the direction
178 of the modern for political and moral reasons, and for social
and personal reasons.

156 Hajj 'Ali, when he spoke with me, inevitably came
159 around to the subject of international politics, whether this
554 was the question of Israel or the image which America's racial
177 problems presented. Hajj 'Ali was the only man from the whole
178 124 Marsa Matruh area who was neither *shaikh* nor *'umda* to attend
829 the nomination of Jamal Abd al-Nasser in January of 1965. In
[577] all of this, I detect a move on the part of Hajj 'Ali to
identify himself with an Egyptian reference group and to

156 draw al-Qasr into the Egyptian political community. He has
159 554 committed himself to work hand-in-hand with the Governor of
177 Marsa Matruh in introducing changes connected with economics
178 and education into al-Qasr. He does not conceal this fact.
124 When I spoke with him about helping me with my study of
• 829 [571] changing attitudes in al-Qasr, he said: "I might have the
time to do this, but before I decide you will have to bring
me a letter from the Governor stating that he wishes me to
cooperate with you." The identity and responsibility which
Hajj 'Ali feels for his role of agent of change is indicated
in his remark to me that he had heard "there were others in
the desert who feel and think the way I myself do."

156 Hajj 'Ali is discretely aware of the status difference
159 between himself, as a member of the "status group," and the
554 others of al-Qasr. As Weber would say, he perceives the
571 difference in "style of life." I was invited to Hajj 'Ali's
574 796 house for *'iid al-fitr*, the feast marking the end of Ramadan.
123 I thought that this would be a good opportunity to observe
the "leaders" of al-Qasr together. I was very much surprised
to find present no members of the "status group" but only
[556] their exact opposites. On the occasion of this feast it is
[735] the custom that the rich treat the poor. As an additional
surprise, we had a very simple meal of bread, dates, peanuts,
and tea. Hajj 'Ali explained to me: "My neighbors do not
have my economic advantages, and I do not think it is proper

156 to serve other than what they eat." Hajj 'Ali is not only
159 conscious of social stratification in his society, but he also
554
571 has a great deal of empathy with the less endowed, a pre-
574 requisite of a traditional Bedouin leader and an advantageous
796 one for a modern leader.
123

He is aware of most traditional institutions and how
156 they relate to conditions of modernity. Hajj 'Ali, whose own
159 marriages speak for his political acumen, sees only disadvantages
554
• 829 in the cousin-right marriage custom of the Bedouins. His
582 interest in getting on with the business of change, so to
speak, has led him to question a basic right contained in the
Bedouin principle of lineage structure and corporate membership.

> A thing which I do not like about our customs is the idea that a man has a right to his uncle's daughter. The man binds his cousin and in the end he might not marry her and will be the cause of her never marrying. He gives himself the authority to decide whom she may or may not marry. If he knows she desires to marry a certain man, he says: "She can marry anyone but not that one."

[562] Here he challenges the traditional right of the individual
male in Bedouin society, favoring the rights of the female.
[177] The emancipation of the female, especially in rights and
[178] duties concerned with the marriage contract, is an element
[562] of the modernization process in Egyptian society and the
Middle East in general.

* 613 The bait, as a political group, is in part structurally
602 defined by the corporate principle which states that blood-kin
571
682

*613 at this lineage level must bear collective responsibility in
602 matters of compensation and blood-revenge. This principle,
571 as we have seen, is extended until the whole 'aiela is in-
682 cluded in a symbolic expression of corporate group solidarity.
In order for this expression to persist, of course, the
mechanism, or ideology, of blood-revenge must be maintained.
[124] All of my informants, though they disagreed over the details
of revenge, insisted that it was the inviolable right of the
156 Arabs. But Hajj 'Ali took exception to the practice of blood-
159 revenge for a number of reasons. He said:
554

> •829 The world changes. Before it was only the 'awaiyid
> 682 Awlad 'Ali and the Border Guards which kept order.
> The government now enters into the matter of killings.
> Personally, I do not agree with the custom and the
> way it operates. In the case of killing, for instance,
> someone who is not worth anything, and has no brains,
> kills one from another tribe. Then the tribe of the
> [778] killer asks for the nazaala, and a third party becomes
> involved. The third party agrees to guard the killer's
> bait for twelve months and the business of all those
> involved must stop. A member of the third party's
> family must accompany each member of the killer's tribe.
> But even after the twelve months one must live in fear
> at his own home, for after the twelve months the tribe
> of the deceased will try to kill the best man in the
> killer's tribe. How many good ones do we have in one
> tribe? I have heard that in Algeria, Morocco, and
> Tunisia the deceased man's family has the right to kill
> the killer only . . . (I then commented that perhaps
> blood-revenge functions to discourage killing in the
> desert.) But there are unbalanced people who actually
> commit murder just to tease their tribe: they have
> nothing to fear because no one is interested in killing
> them in retaliation.

In challenging the Arabs' traditional right to blood-revenge, Hajj 'Ali--besides questioning a structural basis of

156 the group--in effect questions a great deal about the whole
159 traditional authority structure. Blood-revenge functions as
554 a deterrent to social disorder in that it represents an
•829 automatic mechanism for restoring a balance of good relations
682 [182] in the society. Actually, Hajj 'Ali exaggerated to make a
point when he spoke of the existence of "unbalanced people."
682 A person would indeed be "unbalanced" who did not take into
672 consideration the repercussions of his acts with respect to
*613 the personal danger and the dishonor and shame it would bring
to his _'aiela_ and _bait_. Although the _'aiela_ members are
willing to share in the blood money for accidental or unpremeditated killings, it is wrong to suppose that the Bedouins
do not attempt to weigh the justifiability and culpability
[671] in matters of killing. The very existence of the _'awaiyid
Awlad 'Ali_ argues against this. Obviously, the dichotomy made
between killing in the _'awaiyid_, i.e., intentional and accidental,
and the concomitant gradation in compensation points to some
kind of reasonable consideration in cases of killing.

156 Hajj 'Ali is discontent with yet another aspect of
159 the traditional authority structure. He questions the logic
554 and authority represented in the oath as a sacred sanction.
695 This says something about the degree of secularization which
829 Hajj 'Ali has undergone. Although he does not say so, he
apparently favors a more secular and logical procedure for
determining a man's guilt or innocence.

> 156 159 554 695 829 Another thing which I do not like about our old ways is the idea of swearing the oath. For instance, if I steal 1,000 L.E. from you, then you will accuse me. The _'aqila_ will then come to me and say: "If you did not steal the money, swear the oath." Some of my family will support me in this, swearing that I did not steal the money. The swearing of the oath will take place at a tomb, in the presence of the Quran. This tomb belongs to a dead man, and they tell you that he is a saint. First of all, the thief will swear the oath and then they will believe him; and, secondly, what is the sense of swearing in front of a dead body?

[784] Hajj 'Ali made no mention of God or of the Bedouin belief that misfortune will be visited upon the one who swears the oath in bad faith. There is an Arabic proverb which Hajj 'Ali repeated here which says in effect that "the thief will always swear."

156 159 554 829 178 Hajj 'Ali actively challenges the traditional basis of the Bedouin moral and political community. Striving to do away with prescribed cousin-right in marriage and the mechanisms of blood-revenge and the oath as means of supporting law and order in al-Qasr is a course which we might expect from an Egyptian official who seeks to integrate the Bedouins into national society. And, in fact, these are all customs which the Governor believes must eventually be eradicated. It is not surprising that Hajj 'Ali's son believes that "it is not civilized" to lay claim to his cousin for, like his father, he also is redefining morality vis a vis "civilization."

It appears obvious in all that he says, including his comments at the Governor's reception, that Hajj 'Ali has

156 undertaken to transform his *rajal khair* role into an authority
159 which transcends the bounds of the local community. During
554 my talks with him, he never once insinuated that the people
•829
178 of al-Qasr, nor even the 'Aishaibat or 'Ali Ahmar (terms
he rarely ever used), owe anything to a larger entity or community known as "the Bedouin" or "the Awlad 'Ali." If Hajj 'Ali is to legitimate his own authority in a new political system, he must, at the same time, show the Bedouins the legitimacy of the new political community. The Bedouins
829
178 must feel a moral commitment toward the new national political
177 community or else it has no meaning or authority. Most of the
Bedouins of al-Qasr still take it for granted that the allocation of political values and distribution of power in terms of traditional and modern legal roles will be carried over into the modern community and its politics. Hence, if anyone should
[634] go on to Cairo to represent the Bedouin of the Western Desert,
[648] naturally it should be the *'umda* or the *shaikh* "who knew how
to deal with the Egyptians." The majority of the people of the al-Qasr area see change coming but do not conceptualize it as any threat to the traditional authority structure.

156
Hajj 'Ali anticipates the change as fundamental
159 enough to require a new sense of identity. I think this is
554 evident in the following statement in which he takes issue
829 with the traditional way of doing things and appears to be
178
177 preparing himself for a role in the readjustment process.

> 156 There is another objection which I have concerning
> 159 our customs. I mean the case of elections. For
> 554 instance, one from the 'Aishaibat and one from the
> •829 Sanagra, of the 'Ali Abyad, are nominated. Then,
> 666 each man must vote for the one from his own tribe.
> He must vote for the 'Aishaibi even if the other is the better man. But, we should consider that the best man is the man with the best qualifications. 'Umda Ibrahim, for instance, knows how to greet an official or a minister, but he does not know the *'awaiyid* nor the problems of the Bedouins. His brother (who will probably be the next *'umda*) is a good man and is educated, but he does not know the *'awaiyid* either.

829 This view contrasts sharply with the traditional stand
666 of most Bedouins in al-Qasr, including the members of the "status group." For instance, one *'aqila* voiced what is a prevalent opinion when he said:

> [619] If a man chooses to become a political candidate against a Bedouin, he must understand that the
> [186] members of the tribe should and would vote for their *'umda* because he is a member of their own tribe. Even if a man is crazy and his opponent has the highest college degree, the Bedouins must vote for the man from their own tribe.

156 Hajj 'Ali is modern in his evaluation of the political
159 situation here: a politician should know the problems of his
554 constituents rather than follow principles based on traditional
178 relationships. His motive is not to promote the *'awaiyid* as
177 a good way of life, for we know he does not think this to be
829 the case. Instead, Hajj 'Ali believes that in order to help
[671] the Bedouins through a period of change one must know what
they are changing from. Through his negative appraisal of

156 the *'umda*, Hajj 'Ali seems to imply that he himself is capable
159 of understanding and leading the Bedouins during this period.

554
178 Hajj 'Ali has formulated some positive and constructive
177 ideas relating to the period of transition which now faces
● 829 al-Qasr, and they are related to his analysis of the pressing
needs of the day.

> The Bedouins need many things: they need factories
> as there are in the Nile Valley. For the desert,
> here in particular, we need olive presses. This
> will raise the profits of the farmer . . . We need
> [244] a factory for canning tomatoes, for the whole desert
> plants them and the transportation is such that we
> [489] cannot get them to the market . . . The biggest
> change in the desert results from the presence of
> 12,000 government workers; there were only 20 or
> [871] 30 before the World War. There were no schools,
> now there a few. You cannot find a six year-old
> boy who does not go to school; about thirty per cent
> of the girls in al-Qasr go to school also . . .
> Another cause of change is due to the fact that
> everyone now watches his neighbor, he sees what he
> [207] does and he imitates him. Today, I listen to the
> radio and tomorrow my neighbor buys one. Evolution
> (*tatawwar*) is taking place, and the people here are
> [212] realistic about it. For instance, I do not know
> reading and writing, and sometimes I must dictate a
> letter to my son . . . My son knows better than I,
> and I know better than my father did, who lived in
> al-Qasr for thirty five years without knowing anything about the streets of Marsa Matruh.

156 Hajj 'Ali is both subjective and objective about
159 change, as we can note from the comment about the radio.
554
178 In a non-doctrinaire fashion, Hajj 'Ali stresses the great
177 value of education while being aware of his own deficiencies
in this area. However, as a counterbalance, he seems to

156 imply that one cannot be educated and know the 'awaiyid at
159 the same time--the attitude of a self-made man. Hajj 'Ali
554 realizes his marginal position between the new and the old,
178
177 and his attitude concerning change through education seems
to be that of an unselfish leader. Elaborating further on
156 the role of education, Hajj 'Ali showed insight into some of
159 the psychological aspects underlying social change:

554

> 178 As I said before, the people here are realistic about
> 177 change. There are now only about three or four of
> 829 us who send our sons to study at the university, the
> 871 rest of the people are waiting to see what these boys
> will amount to. The other day, one of our educated boys, an officer in the army, came to visit al-Qasr. All of the women are now hoping to see their sons become as successful as this. This is exactly like the first time we cultivated olives in the desert: the Bedouins mocked those who planted the olive. After the olive began to show profits, everyone regretted that they did not cultivate it. Time is changing, and the people are changing. Education is the basis of everything in any nation. Now the agricultural engineer directs me, telling me what to do and how to do it . . . and before 1952 (pre-Nassar regime) they knew nothing about us and we had nothing.

156 As culture and social change proceeds in al-Qasr, it
159 is evident that Hajj 'Ali and the national political community
554 are becoming legitimate authorities in the eyes of the Bedouins.
829 This is indicated by the following event. One month before
574 I left the field, the first vice-President of the Republic was
648 expected to visit the province of Marsa Matruh, and al-Qasr
was named as one of the places which he would tour. Hajj
'Ali took it upon himself to set up three tents in the tradi-

156 tional style of Bedouin hospitality--"as we used to do in
159 Cyrenaica"--and spent a total of 50 L.E. for the welcoming
554 ceremony. "This money was from his own pocket," as the
829 Bedouins of al-Qasr complained after it was learned that
574 the vice-President would not visit Matruh after all. As
648 a matter of fact, all of the Bedouin leaders who had been
invited to the reception by Hajj 'Ali refused to eat the
food, for they said that it had not been prepared for them.
[576] This act was taken as a show of respect for Hajj 'Ali and
anger with bureaucrats.

156 Hajj 'Ali is the representative of al-Qasr to the
159 Arab Socialist Union which meets in Marsa Matruh and has
554 cell meetings in al-Qasr. The socialist cell in al-Qasr
648 meets about three times a month. When I asked why Hajj 'Ali
668 was the man chosen to represent all of al-Qasr at section
[124] meetings of the Union, the reply was: "Because he is a member
[635] of the Majlis al-Muhafza." There was one section meeting
of the Union in Matruh while I was in the field. The theme
of the meeting was "The Meaning of Socialism." Hajj 'Ali
attended this meeting.

156 In sum, it seems not too far afield to say that Hajj
159 'Ali is prepared to take over the leadership of the Bedouins
554 in a much more sophisticated manner than one could possibly
expect from the traditional style of politics. Hajj 'Ali's
[634] comments about the _'umda_ and the _'umda_'s probable successor

124 One informant once told me,
576 "If you don't greet me, this means that you hate me, and if you
829 hate me, there is no limit to the kind of harm you can do me and
my family. One who hates you can kill you, and none can walk
safely anywhere if he fears that he will be killed."

682 As Sheikh Suliman and Mahdi reached the general store, every-
689 one was gathering there as usual, including the two awaqil who
672 were involved in the original settlement. Sheikh Suliman told
695 554 Mahdi not to dismount his donkey and not to say the customary
792 greeting as they passed by the gathering. When they passed the
576 gathering, everyone stood to greet Sheikh Suliman who ignored them
and left with Mahdi. No one believed that Sheikh Suliman, who
should be the guard of the tribal tradition, should commit such an
unforgivable violation of the norms of the people. The next morn-
682 ing the whole area was talking about a big Mi'ad to "take the right"
689 from Sheikh Suliman and Mahdi, who had insulted the gathering. The
672 Mi'ad was held a week after the incident. During the Mi'ad, Sheikh
695 554 Suliman was asked to explain his behavior, and his answer was, "How
792 do you want me to greet all those people who were sitting in front
576 of the store? There were more than thirty men in that gathering,
627 and I was afraid that if I said the customary greeting, I might
have startled some of them causing them to harm themselves, leaving
me with the payment of so many bloodmoneys." Immediately, the
attendants of the Mi'ad knew what Sheikh Suliman was referring to,
and that his action was to prove that the settlement reached in
the case of Mahdi was wrong and that it set a very dangerous prece-
dent which would cause people to avoid greeting one another, "and
hatred will prevail among brothers and nobody will be safe in his
own home."

absolutely obligatory and sinful to omit. I very much doubt 771
whether many of the Bedouin know how to pray in the pre- [782]
scribed manner. As I have mentioned earlier, the Bedouin used [794]
to give alms to their zawiyas and in doing so they carried out [735]
one of the five major duties of a Muslim, but they regarded these [431]
alms as charity rather than legal dues. I have never met an
ordinary Bedouin who had been to Mecca, or who even con-
templated going there. Nevertheless, however lax they may [785]
be in other things, all Cyrenaican Bedouin keep the fast of
Ramadan, and in this annual fast is summed up for them, more
than in anything else, the obligations and privileges of Islam
and its unity and strength. Moreover, although they are [829] •
negligent Muslims themselves they respect piety in others.
Brothers of the Sanusiya Order and religious men in general
ought to pray regularly. That is their business and it is very
necessary for the well-being of the community and worthy of
liberal support, but the Bedouin is an unlettered man, a
shepherd, and a warrior, and he has his own affairs to see to.
Perhaps the Bedouin make up for their shortcomings by their
enthusiasm for the *jihad*, holy war against unbelievers. They [798]
consider that they have fulfilled their obligation under this [648]*
head in ample measure by their long and courageous fight,
formally declared a holy war by the Caliph of Islam, against
the Italians, the French, and the British. A Bedouin once
said to me when I remarked how rarely I had seen Bedouin
at prayer: '*nasum wa najhad*', '(but) we fast and we wage
holy war'.

It must also be said that it would be an error to suppose that Islam had not, long before the time of the Grand Sanusi, strongly affected the character and custom of the Sulaimid Bedouin. This question, which is far from simple, need not be discussed in the present account and it is only necessary to note that the Bedouin assume that their customs are Muslim customs. It would also be a questionable judgement to assert that the Bedouin of Cyrenaica are not religious because they do not pay the same attention to outward ritual as do townspeople and peasants, for piety and holiness, as we have often been admonished, are not the same. The Bedouin certainly have a profound faith in God and trust in the destiny He has prepared for them and this faith and trust enhance that superb dignity

*175 Muslim hospice at al-Madina for the pilgrims. They ensured
*648 that the meat of their Muslim troops was prepared in the prescribed
manner. In 1937 Balbo, at the request of some of the
Muslim notables, forbade the sale of alcoholic drinks in the month
of Ramadan. Exhibitions of fakirism by the ecstatic religious
Orders were prohibited in 1935 to please the *'Ulama* who
regarded them as an undesirable innovation. Mussolini thought,
like Napoleon, that it was good policy to build up for himself
a reputation of being the defender of Islam. The supreme
moment of this burlesque was when the notables of Tripoli
presented him on his visit to Libya with 'The Sword of Islam',
an event commemorated by a huge equestrian statue in the
middle of the town.

*175 The Bedouin was not impressed with this Islamic propaganda,
which even the more impressionable townsman thought highly
*648 ridiculous, especially the building of mosques by Christians.
● 829 Those the Italians built outside the towns were neglected, for
the Bedouin preferred to use his own prayer-places or the
mosques of the Sanusiya lodges, where these had not been
destroyed, when he felt the need to pray at all. Government
qadis were of little interest to him, for in law and custom he
followed tribal tradition, and such priestly services as he
required were performed by his faqihs and zawiya Shaikhs. If
the Italians liked to restore the tombs of his saints he was unconcerned.
If they liked to encourage the pilgrimage, so much
the better for those who felt the need, unfelt by himself, to
*[795] make it. The Bedouin was a Sanusi and the Italians had driven
the revered Heads of his Order into exile and had plundered and
abolished the Order itself. He could hardly be expected to feel,
and certainly did not feel, that the Italians were sincere in their
professed respect for Islam.

*175 The Italians based their claim to Arab regard on two considerations,
their respect for Islam and their social services. I
*648 shall not describe in detail Italian measures designed to raise
the standard of culture and living among the Bedouin, for their
efforts in this direction were little advanced by 1940, but it is
necessary to refer briefly to their educational policy. The Turks
had provided instruction only in the towns, only during the last
*[795] years of their rule, and only on a very modest scale. The only
[794] schools in the Bedouin districts were those of the Sanusiya
lodges.

stretching across to the village of Ajadabiya in the east, topples 613
in undulations away into the flat expanses of the desert to the 619
south. At all these points of segmentation, the territories occu- 621
pied by the various sections are large and roughly defined, and 133
the population aggregates supported on these territories run from 182
over a thousand at one end to tens of thousands at the upper 131
limits. The tertiary sections are numerically much smaller, some of them numbering as few as a hundred souls in all, and the territories to which they are attached are correspondingly smaller. The relationship between the numbers in this order of section, and the precise amount of water available in the local wells is an intimate one. If the population of one of these groups increases, or if the number of animals rises, or if the springs show a decline in the volume of water they give forth, or if the winter rainfall has allowed the storage in wells of only a small quantity of water, a rearrangement of the group must be effected. A significant alteration of any one of these components must mean that the local group must split to enable a new adjustment to be made in the relationship of man and animals to water.

Whatever changes occur within groups of any size, since the 173
genealogy embraces the entire population, these must appear on 178
the genealogy in some way or other. Now a genealogy is as rigid 829
a framework, as fixed and final a pattern of grouping, as can be 613
imagined. The impression that they are thus rigid and fixed, ex- 551
cept for the addition of successive generations, is strengthened by the way in which the Bedouin use them. From their young boys to their old men, the Bedouin are expert genealogists, and the names of ancestors, for one reason or another, are never far
from their lips. Names are kept alive by constant use, since all [571]
references to inter-group relationships must be in terms of these
names. More than this, the Bedouin were proud to the point of 173
boastfulness of their genealogical knowledge, and, wherever I 829
travelled, the first request I had to comply with was to take down 613
a large portion of a tribal genealogy. In recording their endless 551
genealogies, one feature about them came to assume increasing 123
interest; while there was remarkable unanimity with regard to 126
most of the names given, there was one point of marked ambiguity—at the tertiary level of segmentation. I recorded genealogies in four tribes on an extensive scale, and in each tribe

173 ambiguity surrounding the actual names and their correct posi-
829 tion occurred at about the fifth ascending generation. Whenever
613 this point was reached in the recordings, arguments would flare
551 up over the names to be included or excluded and over the rela-
123 tion of these names to those above and below, with the result
126 that for several people of the same segment there would be sev-
eral versions of a genealogy which differed only at this one point. An example of this sort is given below from the genealogy of the Nasr section, which shows seven different versions of the arrangement of ancestors round about the fifth ascending generation from the living.

173 The confusion at and around the fifth ascending generation
829 appeared with such regularity in the genealogies that I feel justi-
613 fied in referring to it as 'the area of ambiguity'. It seems likely,
551 moreover, that in any society where the lineage structure is
closely tied to the territorial disposition of groups, since the genealogy is so rigid, there needs to be in it somewhere an area of ambiguity if it is to be related to reality. Without this ambiguity, the form of the genealogy is too rigid to comprehend changes which occur. This point in the genealogy came to assume critical significance as the point where adjustments in it are made. Other kinds of evidence point to the same conclusion.

[B01]


(1)
NASR*
UMBARAKA
HAIBA
MADHKUR
MUMEN
BIN NASR
MADHKUR
HAIBA
UMBARAKA
(3)
SA'AID
HASAIN
MADHKUR
HAIBA
(4)
SA'AID
(5)
HASAN
MADHKUR
HAIBA
SA'AD
MUMAN
(7)
HAIBA
MADHKUR
UMBARAKA
SA'AD
(2)
MUMEN
UMBARAKA
MADHKUR
HAIBA

FIG. 18-3 GENEALOGY 3. *There is another section, al-Dawwas, which belongs to this group, but to include this as well would greatly complicate the issue without giving any additional information.

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SOME STRUCTURAL ASPECTS OF THE FEUD AMONG THE CAMEL-HERDING BEDOUIN OF CYRENAICA[1]

E. L. PETERS

WHEN a Bedouin kills another in Cyrenaica, one of a number of consequences 682
ensues. According to the Bedouin, the particular consequence is determined by 571
the genealogical positions of the persons or groups concerned. In the first part of 829
this article an analysis of the disturbances in social relationships precipitated by 128
homicide is made, using a lineage model as a framework. In this part of the discussion
the arrangement of the information corresponds closely to the view the
Bedouin give of their relationships. Additional information is then presented to show [613]
that this lineage model neither covers several important areas of social relationships
nor enables an accurate prediction of events to be made. This raises the issue: can the 121
comprehensive power of the model be increased by complicating it, or does complexity 613
destroy its utility? The argument advanced is that the lineage model is not a 571
sociological one, but that it is a frame of reference used by a particular people to
give them a common-sense kind of understanding of their social relationships. For
sociological purposes this means that the lineage model, with its supporting theoretical [128]
presuppositions, must perforce be abandoned. In the latter part of this article [578]
some of the implications of adopting this position are discussed. Particular stress is

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[1] This study is based on field-work in Cyrenaica carried out over a period of twenty-seven months from January 1948 to December 1950. The field-work was made possible by the award of a Horniman Studentship and of a Treasury Senior Studentship in Oriental Languages and Cultures. I wish to express my thanks to both awarding bodies. The paper was presented in its first form to a seminar at Manchester University. Modified versions were read at Oxford and Cambridge and at University College London in 1963. In a Manchester seminar, Professor W. J. M. Mackenzie raised issues which led me to reconsider my mode of analysis. Professor Ely Devons read a draft of the article, and offered valuable suggestions. I also wish to thank Professor Gluckman for the many profitable discussions we have had on the institution of the feud. 12 [114] ← My interest in the feud stems directly from Evans-Pritchard's work on the institution among the Nuer. I am most grateful to him for his help and encouragement while I was pursuing my researches. Finally, anyone writing on the feud must acknowledge the contribution made to its understanding by Dr. Elizabeth Colson.

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degree and is ephemeral, so that the opportunity for the development of trade rela- 621
tions is absent.[1] Save for straying animals, a section has no urgent need to seek 371
relationships with others, as long as the rainfall is sufficient to permit the exploitation [619]
of local resources.

The tertiary section is also regarded as the corporate group *par excellence*, in which 621
'the one word does for all'. Corporate identity is conceptualized as 'one bone' 613
or 'one body'. An offence against one of its members is held to be an offence
against all; if one of its members is killed 'we all lose blood'. When one of its mem-
bers commits homicide the responsibility falls on all equally. Blood money, when [682]
received, is shared by all save for a special portion reserved for the 'owner of the [672]
blood', the nearest agnate of the victim. In opposite circumstances, all adult males accept the responsibility of contributing an equal share to the blood money. Rules of membership, simple in their brevity, express graphically this corporate identity: 'You must strike with us and be struck with us; you must pay with us and receive with us.' The group also bears a name, and there is never any doubt about the affiliation of any tribesman. That group of men—known as the *'amarā dam*—who are agreed on the obligation to exact vengeance, to pay blood money when necessary, to engage in common defence, and to accept the possibility of death in vengeance, is a fixed and clear-cut group, not one whose membership has to be calculated by reference to degrees of kinship in regard to a specific situation, as appears to be the case among other peoples.

Homicide within the *'amarā dam* brings about an impasse in relationships. A blood- 621
money payment is out of the question since the acceptance of blood money by one 613
part of a tertiary section from another of its parts is tantamount to a statement of 682
split. Only in conditions where relationships within the lineage have developed to the
point of political severance is it anticipated that a blood-money payment may be 627
demanded; but this problem is not the same as that at present under discussion.
Bedouin say that blood money cannot pass within the *'amarā dam* for those making
the payment would be the persons receiving it. This is spurious reasoning, since the [829]
'owner of the blood' is awarded more than any other members of the group as it is,
and arrangements could obviously be made to pay him separately. Blood money is
out of the question because it distinguishes relationships between people as belonging
to two distinct political communities, and not because of any difficulty of distribution.
In Bedouin thinking, an injury to 'the one body' is an injury to all its parts. Blood-
money payments by members of a corporation to one or more of its members is a [829]
contradiction in terms. In the same way vengeance is also excluded, for this merely doubles the original loss. A reprisal exacted in hot blood is always a possibility, but this is not referred to as *thār*, vengeance. Even if, at a later date, the closest kinsman of the victim should slay the offender, the act would not be referred to as *thār* and any connexion with earlier homicides would be denied.

Stultified in the field of political action, there is little else that can be done. Expul- 682
sion is a possible course of action—and expulsion has occurred. Records show, however, that exile is almost invariably voluntary.[2] Moreover, exile is terminated as

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[1] Many sections trade fleeces for dates with the folk of distant oases, but the sections do not trade among themselves.

[2] I recorded one case of a man who was expelled from his group and the tribes around were warned
that the rules of sanctuary were not to apply to him. [438]
He is said to have died from grief and hunger. The reason given for such drastic action is that he killed

682 To complete this general statement, two further circumstances are cited by the
602 Bedouin. If a man kills a related person who is not an agnate (it is expressed as killing
the mother's brother) the breach in relationships must be healed as quickly as possible.
The convention for dealing with this is that the offender, bound hand and foot,
mounted on a horse, is sent to the camp of ' the owner of the blood ', in the company
of a holy man, there to make an offer of his life, saying: ' Here is my knife, my life
is yours; here is my shroud, my life is yours.' No Bedouin would agree for a moment
to undertake this journey if he thought the offer might be accepted. In Bedouin
sentiments a life offered in this way cannot be taken. It is the convention which precedes
a peace meeting and blood money. Any other way of dealing with the confusion,
which spreads as a result of a homicide between cognates, is excluded.

682 Secondly, if a woman is killed, whatever the intersegmentary distance, the homicide
is said to be accidental, because a man never ' intends ' to kill a woman. Blood-
562 money arrangements are made as soon as possible, and the wealth—half that of a
613 man—passes to the deceased's father, not to her husband, for a woman's ' bone '
always belongs to her father. Obviously women cannot be allowed to enter into
[582] feud; since it is demographically compelling (apart from other reasons) for some of
[591] them to marry outside their natal groups, then they might well find themselves residents
in the enemy's camps, if they were to become involved in feuds.

121 This statement of the different means available for the regulation of homicide at
the several orders of tribal segmentation is the view the Bedouin themselves hold of
682 their relationships. An analysis of the facts presented thus far could bring out a
613 number of interesting points with regard to the relativity of morals, the typification
829 of acts by their social context, the significance of the orders of segmentation, and so
619 on. Rather than proceed along these lines, however, it is more urgently necessary
to reflect on the significance of the fact that the arrangement of the material in terms
of what is usually called the lineage structure coincides with the Bedouin ordering
of the same details. It is, of course, important to note that the account is not based
on mere hearsay evidence. Each statement made can be documented from known
homicides, and to this extent the model that has been used is consistent with reality.
The model, nevertheless, can only be a representation of what a particular people,
the Bedouin, conceive their social reality to be; it is a kind of ideology which enables
them, without making absurd demands on their credulity, to understand their field
of social relationships, and to give particular relationships their *raison d'être*. But, as
will be shown, it would be a serious error to mistake such a folk model for sociological
analysis. Such an error is difficult to avoid because the Bedouin, when defending their
view, are able to cite enough bits and pieces of reality to make their argument con-
121 vincing. The flaw in the reasoning is seen when it can be shown that its consequences
114 are absurd. As an example of what is meant, the statement that feud is attached to
groups at the secondary order of segmentation may be considered. If the statement
613 were true, if each and every secondary section were at feud one with the other (and
619 in a structural sense this ought to be so), then each tribe would be divided into small
829 mutually hostile groups, which completely lacked any possibility of movement, even
578 for pasturing purposes. Presented with this, the Bedouin would argue that this is not
in fact so, because secondary and primary sections are interlinked in many ways. That
is, they evoke what to them are contingencies to explain why they are at feud with one

121 part of a secondary section but not with another. Once contingencies are permitted
613 to enter in, the lineage model ceases to be of use, for what is implied is that at all
114 times some parts of sections structurally situated for feuding do not in fact feud.
[619] Other facts can be adduced to show that the structural view is inadequate but, before
[829] proceeding to examine these, some general objections to the lineage theory need to
[578] be raised. In the first instance, the corner stone in the theory of lineage systems is that they consist of parts which are in balanced opposition. It is no accident that the idiom generally used in discussing the segmentation of a lineage system is that segments bifurcate. Indeed bifurcation is necessary if lineage theory is to make sense, because if at any order there are more than two segments, then combinations can occur which are not comprehended by the theory. In the Cyrenaican lineage the number of segments at the tertiary order is haphazard, in some cases as few as two but in others as many as a dozen or so. Where there are many segments at this order it is rather pointless to speak in terms of balanced opposition. Moreover, at the secondary order of segmentation the number of segments are fairly consistent throughout the tribes, but they number more than two in all of them. It is also a fact that combinations occur and, moreover, these may be between the tertiary segments of two ' opposed ' secondary segments.

121 Secondly, in lineage theory groups come together to constitute larger segments in
613 opposition to like segments. Yet in lineage societies there is a lack of instituted
571 authority, there are no chiefs distributed throughout the land as heads of segments of the hierarchical orders. This being so, then it is not possible for all the sections of,
622 say, a secondary section to come together; there is no one to command the action.
114 In fact, sections combine in Cyrenaica, but not in the way they should according to the lineage structure. In order to discuss this adequately, a lengthy diversion into an analysis of the distribution of power would be necessary. The matter must rest here with the admittedly somewhat dogmatic assertion that there are men who wield power over groups of varying populations, and that the extent of their domains cannot be understood by reference to orders in the lineage. Perhaps it is for this reason—because, that is to say, lineage theory effectively blocks the exercise—that relatively little has been written about the problem of leadership in these societies.

121 Thirdly, all segments should be fairly equal in numbers of people and economic
613 resources, if the theory of lineage were to have substance in reality. In Cyrenaica
114 the population of one tertiary segment may be three times or more that of another.
[621] Both may be structurally equal in the sense that they are named groups segmenting as a pair of brothers from a common father. As political groups, however, this equality has little meaning. Further, with regard to economic resources, some sections possess several wells and a territory of such extent that it straddles two or even more of what might be called micro-ecological areas. With marked preponderance in numbers and superiority of resources, some groups have grown into dominance, and the evidence points to the existence of this dominance in the past also. However, ' like ' sections may appear on a lineage chart, in political action there is conspicuous
[619] disparity. Each tribe possesses one tertiary section or more with a claim to be the
[621] owners of the ' Golden Stirrup '; these are large tertiary groups with relatively plentiful resources, with allies in other groups, and, in sum, with the power to terrorize other tribal groups.

121 613 562 114 These three objections to the lineage theory as a useful model for examining the consequences of homicide are serious enough in themselves, but another objection renders it still less satisfactory. This fourth objection relates to the implication that lineage theory cannot take account of women. Indeed, in some of the accounts of the political organization of lineage societies, the impression is given that they are all-male societies: women belong only to the domestic and kinship realms. In terms of the theory, this must be so. Women, the marriage links they create, the forms of relationships that derive from marriage, the right of men to joke with others by virtue of a link through women, their rights to demand favours of men who are not their agnates, their right to expect contributions to bridewealth or blood money from maternal relatives—all these, and other forms of behaviour, have been dealt with as patterns of behaviour which interfere with or disturb agnation, or that cut 121 613 across lineage affiliations. Such metaphors can only be justified if it is accepted that precedence must be given to agnation, to what people say they think their lineage relationships to be, and that there is some kind of primacy about what have frequently been called jural rules which constitute the structure, while behaviour which is not governed by these rules is to be relegated to the position of secondary forms having the effect of intruding only. But these secondary forms of behaviour are as impelling, as persisting, and are as much a part of social life as any of the so-called jural rules. [582] It is possible to go further than this, and state that in societies where there is a high incidence of marriage among agnates of the local group, as occurs among the Bedouin, jural rules rarely appear in their ' pure ' form in behaviour, since, in groups of this sort, each and every person constitutes a bundle of roles by virtue of the fact that he is one of a very complex cognatic group; a particular role, it is true, may take precedence in a particular situation, but all roles are present in each situation and affect behaviour. Precedence can only be given to specific forms of behaviour in relation to situations. There is no such thing as a general primacy with regard to any form. The concept of agnation as the centre of all political problems, disturbed or disrupted by, say, matrilaterality, is as inadequate as saying that the nucleus which pulls all other components into position is matrilaterality with agnation as a disturbing element. In reality there are numerous components present in all situations, which should not be lumped together under such categorizing terms as agnation and matrilaterality, but which combine as separate components in a kaleidoscopic range of clusters.

121 613 682 674 ●829 [602] Some of the components of behaviour subsumed under the notion of matrilaterality are briefly given here in order to appreciate more fully the consequence of inter-group marriage. Of paramount importance is the fact that, in Bedouin sentiment, to kill a relative is as sinful an act as the killing of a close agnate. When such a homicide did occur, during my period of residence among them, the Bedouin response was to assert that the offender was out of his mind—it was inconceivable that he could have committed the offence otherwise. Their attitude was reminiscent of the horror they display when a man kills his father or a full brother, and represents a much stronger reaction than is manifested when a man kills an agnate of, say, the third or fourth degree. They have every reason to be disturbed by the killing of a mother's brother, [604] for, whatever personal affections may be involved, a crucial link is threatened. Their reasoning, however, is that relationships with the mother's brother are characteristically easy, that they are not demanding, that there is much joking in them, and that to

121 kill within this range is, in terms of the general pattern of behaviour, stupid. What is of
613 interest is that such killings do occur. I recorded three instances of men killing the
682 mother's brother in the contemporary population, not to mention many others
674 based on hearsay evidence only. Clearly, the relationship is more than a merely per-
829 missive one. The mother's brother may well be the only person who can help in
certain crises, and if he withholds his assistance the sister's son is left in a dilemma.
604 The form of behaviour in which demands are made is, as the Bedouin rightly say,
121 that of asking a favour, but this does not mean that it is any the less urgent than a
613 demand made against agnates. The range of favours is large, and only a few can be
604 detailed here. If a group has insufficient water to meet its needs a man first seeks help
from his mother's brother. The request has a number of aspects to it: it is a test of
[554] the relationship itself; it is a matter of pride and status that a man can 'call' on
another to help his group out of difficulties, it is an assurance that resources other than
those jealously guarded by his agnates are available to him, and if a man is seeking
to increase his power he must have available more than an agnate's share of local
[682] water resources to supply his flocks and herds. When a blood-money payment has to
be made, the mother's brother is expected to come forward—it is his right to give
[584] without being asked. If a man wants a wife, he is not permitted to approach his father
directly, but his mother's brother can put pressure on the father instead. If a man dies
[429] while his eldest son is still a minor, his brother may be required to act as guardian,
and in this role he controls the son's property; disputes frequently break out as a
result, with the son at a considerable disadvantage, for he cannot engage his father's
brother in hostilities—but his mother's brother can do so for him. Whenever men
[422] come to possess animals before the demise of their fathers or when the father's
brother is acting as guardian they mark them with the tribal and personal signs of their
[583] mothers' brothers. Men have the right to demand contributions for bridewealth
from their agnates if they lack wealth; in practice it comes not from them, but from
the mother's brother. Finally, in certain circumstances, if a man does not have male
heirs, his sister's son might inherit all his wealth.

121 Affinity also carries with it a large number of rights. A poor man may take up
613 residence in the camp of his father-in-law, and be kept by him. The latter may come
to his son-in-law's aid in many of his dealings with his father. Like the mother's
606 brother, the affine is a potential source of water-supply when rain has been insufficient
on the homeland. He also helps with blood money and bridewealth, and he is expected
to aid his daughter and her husband with gifts of food and wool.

121 The details given above by no means exhaust the list of rights a man possesses in
613 his matrilateral and affinal relatives. Obviously, these are not the only forms of
relationship either, and the other forms carry with them yet other claims of various
sorts. Enough detail has been given, however, to make clear the point that local
agnatic groups are so differentiated, and inter-group relationships are so important, that each aspect of homicide settlement previously described will require further examination, not in the sense that additional complications must be introduced, but with the question in mind, is not the structural presentation false? Before beginning this stage of the argument it is necessary to establish the fact that the links of affinity and matrilaterality which a group has with another are of a kind which necessitate their inclusion in an analysis of the arrangements for settling homicides.

121 teral secondary sections, with collateral primary sections, and long distances away
613 into other tribes. This spread can be interpreted as giving each tertiary group access
582 to resources of wide ecological diversity. What is of interest in the present context
is not the interpretation of the links but the effect they have on behaviour. Spread
means that a group can call for help from a number of differently situated groups.
121 Each one of these links not merely modifies the structural means for settling homicide,
613 but converts the homicide into a sociologically quite different sort of act. It can,
582 as the Bedouin like to think, be an act of merit for a man to kill another from a feuding
578 secondary section, but there is no merit whatsoever in it if the tertiary section of
that secondary section happens to contain affines or maternal relatives; this is a sinful
682 act. The Bedouin themselves recognize this when they add to their structural
explanation the rider that they do not feud with cognatic relatives. The difference
between their position and a sociological one is that they see this as a contingency not
as a persistent necessity; they are able to maintain their position because they see their
behaviour as explicable in terms of the simple ossified structure of their genealogical
relationships. What they fail to appreciate is that these ' contingencies ' are ecologically,
economically, demographically, and politically essential. They are able to maintain
their position also, because the model of a lineage structure they use, along with
the two riders previously mentioned (see p. 270) affords them a kind of explanation
for most occurrences. The argument is attractive both to Bedouin and to anthropologists
because it is comprehensive and neat in its logicality. The next stage in the
argument is to show that there is a far greater range of possible consequences to a
homicide than those summarized in the diagram (see p. 269) and that the additional
consequences are related, not to the lineage structure, but to the linkages which have
been discussed above.

121 I begin with a review of a homicide which involves two men of the same tertiary
613 section. Bedouin classify all homicides within this range—as they do for any of the
682 structural orders—as undifferentiated, but in each case, different sorts of relatives
829 are concerned in the ensuing hostilities, and the consequences are, therefore, different
also. Bedouin say that a man never kills his father or full brother. In the event of a
man killing another man acknowledged to be his father, the act itself proves that he
cannot possibly be his son. He is said to be illegitimate, thus making his mother an
adultress and relieving the males of the agnatic line of the responsibility and the
121 odium. If a maternal uncle of the agnatic group is killed, the offence is almost on a
613 par with that of patricide or fratricide. When, however, the homicide is between two
men who are agnatically distant, and not closely related cognatically either, but both
682 are members of the same local agnatic group, what follows will depend largely on the
size and stage of development of the group; if it is small, the homicide threatens to
wreck it, but if it is large and on the verge of splitting the homicide may be the
occasion for split taking place and being recognized publicly by a demand for blood
money. Threatened with wreckage, a small group meets a homicide by closing its
ranks for self preservation; a large group splits. The same event within the same
kind of structural unit results in two quite dissimilar consequences. The reason is
clear enough—the two groups are similar only in a general structural way, but
sociologically they are not comparable.

When a homicide occurs between tertiary segments the solution, it was said earlier,

121 613 682 is found in either a vengeance killing or a blood-money agreement which later becomes caught up in a wider set of debt relationships. Records show that this is true in some cases, but in others the blood money is paid in one instalment and immediately. The recognition of a debt and its liquidation among the Bedouin is tantamount to a declaration of hostility, since without a debt the means for smooth-running relationships is lacking. Such a blood-money payment was made between two tertiary groups in the absence of the 'owner of the blood'; when he returned he sought out his brother's killer, and took two lives for one. Subsequently, there was a further blood-money settlement but there remained 'a man left over'. In other circumstances an annual payment, called *sana'*, is demanded in addition to the prompt and full payment of the blood money. The attachment of the *sana'* to a settlement is an invidious condition since it is regarded as a fee by those who have to pay it, it is said to lower the status of a group and ' one day, it must be repudiated '.[1] It may, circumstances permitting, serve to cast off all pretence of friendly relationships. It is more likely that it will lead to a further outbreak of hostilities. When I witnessed the payment of the *sana'* the terms in which it was demanded were: ' You have a man on your backs. Are you going to repudiate this or are you going to give me *sana'*? If you repudiate, we must seek vengeance.' The payment, one in a long series, was made on that occasion but there were loud grumblings among the men of the camp against their leader for his acquiescence and one suggested that they terminate the payments forthwith by shooting the claimant. Of the three forms of blood money cited, this latter is the extreme to which groups can go short of open feud. Its opposite is a blood-money payment which is mainly left as a debt, and which is accompanied by the ' gift ' of a wife to the victim's group.[2] The wife is ' given ' as an earnest that the offender's group wishes the full restoration of relationships ruptured by the homicide. There are, therefore, four forms of blood-money payment. The Bedouin view of these is that they are variants of what is, in principle, the same thing. Their view cannot be accepted. Each of the four payments points to diverse kinds of social relationships between groups, and their consequences are wholly disparate. These various kinds of relationships between the tertiary sections of the same secondary section exist because the relationships between all sections cannot possibly be the same if they are more than a pair in number. A secondary section which spans ten tertiary sections is not the same type of unit as one which spans only three. The greater the number of tertiary sections the greater the possible permutations in their relationships. What the Bedouin think of as variations in the form of blood-money
[829] payment is related to the complexities that lie behind their simple lineage model. Bedouin can comprehend this complexity only by thinking in terms of a kind of average behaviour, regarding deviations from the average as fortuitous and explicable by the faulty reasoning that ' in this particular case, it just so happened ' that this, that, and the other were part of the situation, failing to appreciate that apparent aberrations are constants to the extent that some sort of specifics occur in all cases. There is no reason why Bedouin reasoning should be followed in sociological analysis.

[1] See Peters, 1966.

[581] [585] [2] A marriage is not legal unless at least a promise to hand over wealth has been made beforehand. In the case cited the amount promised would be no more than a token—a sheep or a goat.

south-west of the country. Most members of the two tertiary groups directly concerned 121
in the dispute were present. The agnates of the collaterally linked groups of 613
the principals were unrepresented; indeed collaterals of one of the principals made 571
it quite explicit that they were opposed to their genealogical allies and considered 628
their perusal of the matter tiresome. The bulk of the crowd present was made up of men linked to the principals in a variety of different and non-agnatic ways, and it
was they who provided most of the argument once the issue had been opened. It 121
follows, therefore, that an analysis of political organization and behaviour in Cyrenaica 613
which is based on lineage theory leads to a gross misrepresentation. For, what 114
I am arguing is not that the lineage model in its rarefied state is too simple, not that additional facts must be injected into it to complicate it, but that it does not provide an admissible basis for analysis.[1] The complication of something that is founded in error can only lead to complicated error, however many facts of real life are introduced in an attempt to give it substance. The Bedouin conception of their social
relationships in terms of a genealogical ordering of groups is a fact of their social [829]
life, and in relation to some problems it is an important fact. My objection to the use which has been made of a people's ideology of their relationships is that it has been elevated from its status as a component of social life to such a position of universal dominance in all sets of social relationships that 'every sociological problem', as Fortes writes of the Tallensi, 'hinges on the lineage system'.[2]

If the ordering of groups within the frame of the Bedouin genealogy is abandoned 121
as a basis for analysis, it does not follow that the only remaining view is that of small 613
groups of people distributed throughout the country enjoying relationships merely 571
as units. Regularity in relationships does exist, it is urgently necessary, and it persists; 578
but this regularity is not consistent with a lineage model. Ultimately, feud is a violent form of hostility between corporations which has its source in the competition for proprietory rights in land and water. This competition makes it necessary for groups to combine to prevent the encroachments of others in similar combinations and also to expand their resources whenever the opportunity arises. The significant groups in a discussion of the feud are these power groups, and it is their composition, the shifting alliances within them, the growth and diminution in the power of tertiary

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[1] Dr. Paul Bohannan has distinguished in his writings between what he calls folk systems and analytical systems. The distinction, as he sees it, is set out clearly in the statement 'a certain field of Nuer relationships is explained by Nuer in terms of an agnatic genealogy. This is the folk system. The same field is explained, in English, by Professor Evans-Pritchard, as a lineage system based on the principle of segmental opposition. This is an analytical system' (Bohannan, 1957, p. 5). What is the difference? Is it only a difference of language? Bohannan's analytical statement is little more than a generalisation of what is in the folk system. An analytical system, in his hands, is a sophistication of a folk system, for it is the latter which provides him with his analytical framework. The act of creativity on the part of the social anthropologist about which he writes (Bohannan, 1963, p. 14) is the revealing of a folk system through analysis. But he does not
depart from the framework set by informants—the 121
agnatic genealogy is the lineage, and the fission and
fusion of parts, the opposition of like segments and 613
so on is explained by informants in different languages 114
as adequately as it is explained by social 171
anthropologists in English. Bohannan's viewpoint is made clearer, perhaps, in his discussion on the arrangement of facts relating to Tiv law. Here he considers what he should do once he has elicited all the facts, and he argues against setting them out as an arrangement of the procedural law of Tiv courts because, 'The error would be that the arrangement is not part of *the Tiv way of looking at it*, and hence would be false' (Bohannan, 1957, p. 69. Italics mine). Why? The Tiv are not the social anthropologists. Is the test of an analytical model its consistency with a folk comprehension?

[2] Fortes, 1945, p. 30.

835 devoured by wild animals, the girl was "given"[6] to a close cousin who had
561 shot his sister. Both now reside with an enemy tribal section. The two acts
684 were equated. They were similar to the extent that both created a situation
which defied institutional resolution. The culprits were exorcised. The
girl's lover remains with his group — the odium for the male is incomparably
less than for the female, since, while maternity is easy to establish, paternity
is frequently shrouded in doubt — and during the months I lived with this
particular group, there was never a mention of the affair. It was as if "nothing
had happened."

• 829 If asked why these two events cause such profound distress, the answers
the Bedouin give are twofold: they can do nothing about them, and they
578 cause split. By split in this context they mean split in the lineage; split in
613 the case of homicide because it may lead to a demand for blood-money which
[682] is payable only between corporations, and split in the case of incest because
[684] it causes chaos in relationships. Marriage, in one sense, their reasoning
581 runs, is similar, for it too causes split. Whatever may be the analytic strength
of the arguments that homicide and incest precipitate splitting, the argument
829 that marriage does so is spurious. In what sense can marriage mean
613 split? Bedouin men marry "so that we may beget many sons, to make a
big lineage later on." The worst fate that can befall a man as a result of his
son's marriage is that he, in later generations, will become the focal point in
a series of branching descent lines. The alternative — that his sons remain
unmarried — can only mean that his name would disappear through want of
successors to carry it on, which is one of the greatest evils which can befall
a man, according to Bedouin sentiment: better split than oblivion. If the
key to the interpretation of the father's attitude to his son's marriage is not
581 that it causes split, it must lie elsewhere in their relationship. What marriage
585 does is alter the distribution of authority between father and son. In
593 order to pursue this, it is necessary first to clarify the types of authority involved,
and then assess them in a post-marital situation.

554

The Division of Authority Between the Family and the Corporation

851 Politically, a person's status is determined for him at birth. At this time
a man has the right to accept or deny paternity. Denial is tantamount to an
accusation of adultery by his wife. In practice, once a wife has given birth
to a male child, whatever doubts people may harbour regarding paternity,
the husband accepts the child as his. "The boy for the bed," is a saying often
heard among the Bedouin; but it remains the husband's prerogative to invest
the child with legitimacy, hence, political status. Only if a husband becomes
[837] aware that he is publicly considered a cuckold, or if he catches his wife and a
lover *in flagrante delicto,* is he at all likely to take action. Otherwise he may

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[585] [6] A marriage is illegal unless it is accompanied by an agreement to transfer wealth
[581] to the girl's father.

sorts of petty ways, listen to his grumbles about his agnates, interfere on his 604
behalf in petty camp quarrels, shield him from the disciplinarian father and 613
guard his property interests against the predatory father's brother; if the 428
mother's brother dies without heirs, the sister's son can reasonably expect at least a share of his wealth. When the mother's brother is a member of a different corporate group, a sister's son cannot possibly expect to inherit from him in any circumstance.

The mother's brother may reside in a camp too distant to be much effective 604
direct help in day-to-day living. His relative remoteness gives the relationship 591
other possible opportunities, however. Rainfall in the semi-desert area 312
of Cyrenaica is highly variable, both from year to year, and from place to 233
place in any given year. As a result this shallow saucer of a depression may 241
have sufficient rain to supply both the water needs of animals and crops, while an area a few miles distant will have inadequate water supplies for either. The mother's brother-sister's son link can mean water for animals and a crop of barley for both when, in successive years, the resources of one area or the other are inadequate.

The differences in the relations between men and their mother's brother 604
do not end with a characterisation of their antipodal forms. The demographic structure of a group may be such that one man may have a number of mother's brothers, another only one; one man may have to share with
several brothers, another may be an only son. Complications of this sort determine [613]
the precise relationships between men, but however intricate these
may be, each corporate group has its matrilateral links with a group occupying a slightly different ecological area, and it also has a plurality of matrilateral connections within it. Further, if a direct connection is not available [603]
to any particular individual he can use an indirect link (e.g. father's mother's
brother or mother's mother's brother) to satisfy his needs.

The Preference for Males

Thus far, the family and the social matrix in which it is embedded has 128
been discussed in general terms, most particularly in reference to several selected sets of relationships. I wish now to place these relationships in a more specific setting with a brief discussion of the composition of a small
camp of a group inhabiting the arid areas of central Cyrenaica. When the 829 •
Bedouin give their views on the structure of the family in Cyrenaica they 594
speak of it as consisting of a pair of spouses and about ten children, mainly 562
males. The emphasis on males is not mere sentiment, overwhelmingly though 858
it favours them against females. Additional males in a family increase the productive possibilities of a family in the sense that more herdsmen become available and larger ploughing commitments can be undertaken; an increase in the number of females has small effect on production since they are precluded from any direct participation in these activities. Both sexes, ranging in age from about seven years to mature adulthood, are necessary if a family

829 594 562 858 is to constitute a viable economic unit; and if it is to expand, the number of males must be increased disproportionately compared with females. Since the structure of this "ideal family" (which in the sentiments of the Bedouin is the only family) is based on the division of labour, some details of the tasks and their allocation among members of a family are included to estimate the importance of this notional "ideal family."

The Division of Labour, by Sex

462 286 The tasks women perform are almost entirely associated with the tent. They make the tent top, and the gaily coloured carpets which cover the sandy ground in the men's quarters. They also weave the material for making sacks, and nose bags for horses and camels. Throughout the year a piece of weaving is always on the loom waiting, and while any women of the tent may take a turn at weaving, the mother decides what is to be made, its pattern and colours and in general directs operations. 462 342 Women also pitch the tent when the camp is moved; they do so unaided by the men. It is a task which requires considerable strength and only grown girls and mature women can assist in this; younger girls scour the vicinity in search of stones to hold the sides of the tent on the ground after it has been erected. [356] As soon as pitching is complete, the floor of the tent is brushed clean before carpets are spread and the few articles of personal belongings placed in their proper position.

462 313 Next, brushwood must be fetched in large quantities for fires. Apart from cooking needs and winter warmth, the fire of each tent is in constant use for preparing the sickly sweet tea, almost the consistency of syrup, which is drunk several times a day regularly and which is made again for even the casual visitor. The task of fetching brushwood is performed daily, and each load takes a few hours of a woman's time to gather and bring back [412] to the tent. Bushes are uprooted with the aid of a long-handled adze and piled together, to be carried on her back for the homeward journey. The load is cumbersome and heavy; only girls in their late teens and mature women can cope with it.

462 252 412 All cooking is done by the women. Most meals consist of cereal dishes of various sorts, so that grinding, using heavy millstones, is a perpetual activity to satisfy the demands for large quantities of flour. Millstones are bought in the villages. In most small camps there only one or two sets, so they are passed round from one woman to another. The stones are very heavy but when they are carried from tent to tent men offer no assistance.

462 312 Each tent also requires large quantities of water for human consumption. If the camp is located near a well, water is drawn in small quantities, frequently. Young girls and boys take a donkey to the well, fill a couple of [492] jerry cans with water, wait for an older sister to load them on the donkey and then drive the beast back to camp. After a fall of rain, while puddles of water remain on the ground, mature women make haste to gather the

593 handling the potential conflict between father and son and
the successive generations which they represent; these are
mechanisms which preclude intimacy between the father and
593 the son. The social statuses of father and son are not
852 permitted to overlap by their being participants in, or
585 even present at, festive occasions, such as circumcision
●[831] and wedding parties, occasions which are marked by erotic
poems and lewd songs. It would be "wrong" for a father to
accompany his son to one of these parties. In the one instance
that I did observe a father and son together at a
wedding party, the Bedouins explained the rare occurrence
by pointing out that this was the man's only son, and so he
treated him "like a brother."

593 The Bedouins of al-Qasr recognize the aloofness of
866 the father from the son and justify it as a training period
to prepare the boy for the time when he will be on his own.
One young man explained the underlying rationale of the
father-son relationship in this way:

> There are different kinds of fathers. One wishes to make his son a man, to make his son self-dependent at an early age. Other fathers destroy the personalities of their sons. For instance, the first type of father gives his son the responsibility of selling something, or buying something, or of supervising a chore in his own place. But the second type of father is usually soft with his son; he doesn't depend on his son due to his young age. He is very cautious with him and will not send him anywhere, and if he does he will ask someone to look after him. Of course, the first type of father is good and the second type is bad.

Chapter

7

Aspects of the Family Among the Bedouin of Cyrenaica*

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Marriage and the Father-Son Relationship

When a marriage takes place among the Bedouin of Cyrenaica, a nuptial 585
tent is set up some distance away from that of the groom's father. There is 593
no particular significance about the nuptial tent itself, but it must be pitched
at a distance so that the father "will not see it" — although, obviously, in a
country of large level plains, it stands out conspicuously. This pretence
that the tent remains unseen by the father is pushed to the point of his deny-
ing any knowledge of what is afoot. A middle-aged or elderly man with a
family adopts a similar attitude to any marriage in which his son participates,
as groom or as guest. An elder, the father of three unmarried sons (one of [535]
whom, in his late twenties, was known to be getting impatient about mar-
riage), when I asked after his eldest son, insisted that he was away with the [831]
camels, although the son was conspicuous in a semicircle of young men en-
couraging a blindfolded maiden in the movements of her seductive dance
outside a wedding tent in his full view. Prior to the wedding festivities, the

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* I wish to express my gratitude to Mr. R. Werbner for reading this essay in manuscript. 128

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1948 to 1950, among the Cyrenaica Bedouin. I am indebted to the Trustees of the 122
Horniman Studentship Fund, and the Committee for Treasury Studentships in Oriental Languages and Cultures, for making the research financially possible.

Cases

584 Prior to the wedding festivities, the
593 father will have participated in negotiations, although even in these he will
have remained silent, leaving an affine, as a rule, to arrange the details with
the girl's father and his kinsmen. The father feigns aloofness from the start
of negotiations until after the wedding celebrations have ended. Before inquiring into this seemingly odd behaviour, a few further details of marriage
ceremonies need to be mentioned briefly.

585 The bride is carried to the nuptial tent on a camel, seated in a cagelike
342 structure placed on the camel's back, this canopy covered over with carpets
[492] and at least one long blanket — later to be used to divide her tent into male
and female quarters — which constitute part of the goods given to a woman
[788] on marriage. On her arrival, while she is still seated in her canopy, the
camel is led round the tent seven times by a small boy. She then descends
and is hustled into the tent by a number of women who make a show of their
attempts to conceal her from view. Inside the tent the bride is enclosed in
one corner in a kind of cubicle partitioned off by a length of blanket.

585 In the meantime, the groom has affected to escape, but is "caught," while
[533] running away, by his fellows, who "compel" him to return to the nuptial tent,
[831] to the accompaniment of their lewd songs telling of the sexual pleasures
awaiting him. Much of this is horseplay, but the young men carry it out
brazenly and the groom is required to show reluctance to continue with the
ceremonies. His entry into the nuptial tent is marked by an expectant hush
that falls over the crowd of men gathered, as they await the result of the
virginity test the groom is about to perform, which he does by wrapping part
of his toga round one of his fingers to pierce the hymen. Sharp shrieks from
[202] the bride give the signal that the test has been undertaken; not a stir moves
the crowd until evidence of its success has been publicly displayed, which is
given by the groom hoisting the blood-stained portion of the toga through
the corner of the tent on a pole, followed by firing three shots from his rifle.
Jubilantly, the men gathered fire volley after volley from their rifles just over
the nuptial tent, and the seven-day celebrations begin.

585 A full descriptive account of a marriage, or many of the ritual details
589 woven into it need not be given here. What is included is intended to illus-
[593] trate certain relationships between father and son, and between one
generation and another. In this connection two further points are appropri-
[561] ate. First, during the week of festival, young men gather outside the nuptial
[535] tent each night to encourage a maiden in her dancing, clapping their hands
[533] to the point of injury "so that we will have a wife soon." The celebrations
belong to the bachelors, and they are the only ones to engage in the singing
and hand clapping. It is they too who stop the bridal camel on its way to
[538] the nuptial tent to recite obscene rhymes to the bride, and they also shout
[831] their rather dubious consolations to the bride who, during the virginity test,
crying out for her mother, is assured by them that the night holds promise
585 for her which her mother could never extend. The married men, particularly
602 the close senior agnates of the groom, stay away from it all, discussing mat-
521 ters unconnected with the affair.

her father takes, but in certain critical situations he can be relieved of choice 593
if the interests of the group as a whole are at stake. [421]

Political authority is the preserve of a corporation, and its exercise leads [428]
to invasion of a man's authority in the field of domestic relations. This [584]
does not mean, however, that discrete areas of authority do not remain with
the father. In the tent his authority over his son is so overwhelming as to
keep the son in almost complete subordination. The son is referred to as a
slave, and in daily life he has to behave as one. He must obey every command, for, were he to rebel, he would find little or no support among his
agnates, whatever the extent of the provocation. Retreat from his father is [422]
hardly an alternative, since, while his father is alive, he has no animals of
his own, and to leave camp would only mean that he would have to move
outside his group to seek employment elsewhere as a shepherd. If he did [558]
this he would forfeit status, and almost certainly cut himself off from property [428]
which would fall to him after his father's death. A man who "denies"
his father looses too many privileges for the practice to become widespread.

Caught in this dilemma, a son's predicament is worsened by the fact that 593
he cannot initiate marriage negotiations — to be able to do so requires some 584
animals to offer a girl's father. Through his mother's brother he has the [431]
means of bringing pressure to bear on his father, but the latter can resist for [604]
years. Finally, a marriage is arranged for him. It is difficult to convey the
yearning of young Bedouin for marriage. They discuss it among themselves 581
ad nauseam. For the most part their talk is about the sexual aspect of marriage. 521
Premarital sex relations are strictly controlled, and the movements 831 ●
of each young girl are carefully guarded because, if on the day of her marriage 836
the test shows that she is not a virgin, she not only brings disgrace to [585]
her family, but the marriage may be revoked and her worth as a bride for
another man seriously diminished. Nevertheless premarital relations do [837]
occur, if not between youths and maidens to any extent, between young
men and married women.

The question still remains: why is marriage the occasion of such ebullient 581
celebration? The formal authority a father exercises over his son 593
changes little on marriage. Economically the son is still harnessed to the
father. The latter still shouts his orders at him, and obedience remains
unaltered. Any sign of an independent view on a matter is met with a gruff
rebuff. If the marriage turns out to be disagreeable to the father, he has
the authority — if not always the power — to break it. Marriage does not
mean a change in the general mode of behaviour between the two; the legal
relations remain unaltered, albeit modified in practice, as the married son
matures in age. But marriage does mean the acquisition of rights and status
previously denied a son. Henceforward, he has a domain of his own. This [554]
is high drama, indeed, for although every effort is made to give substance to
the expressed view that "nothing has happened," for the first time in his
life the son has seized publicly, amid the jubilations of his fellows, a status
which hitherto was the possession of the father.

band is required to take gifts to his mother-in-law in recognition of the fact 583
that she nourished his wife as an infant (the literal meaning of the word 584
used for this gift is "milk"). A return visit is made and gifts are given to 606
the daughter. When the first child is born an animal is presented by the
affines, and if the child is a male, the gift may be several sheep, or even a 851
few camels if the father-in-law is very wealthy. Formal exchange of gifts 425
continue, but, in addition, informal transfers are made. Moreover, if re- 606
lations between a man and his father-in-law develop favourably, it is not un- 606
common for a young husband, during the early years of marriage, to move 591
away from his father and pitch his tent alongside that of his father-in-law. 593
Marriage gives a son affinal relations of his own. Affinity can alleviate the
dead weight of paternal authority.

It is suggested that the crisis the marriage of a son assumes for a father 585
is the shift it entails in the distribution of authority. This is borne out by 561
other details in the marriage ceremony referred to earlier. Ordinarily, young 602
men dare not sing within earshot of their senior agnates. Far from allowing
obscenities, agnates of the ascending generation would not allow even a 533
mention of women to be made by young men, in their presence. In a group [593]
consisting of young men and an agnate, I chanced to use the noun for [123]
woman and immediately my tent was cleared of all but the senior agnate.
At a wedding the young men revel in their lewd songs and shout their [831]
obscenities for all to hear. The senior agnates stand aside and make a show of ignoring the proceedings. And well they may, for each marriage is a challenge to the exclusive authority they have enjoyed; each nuptial tent is an invasion of the domain of which they have been undisputed masters. Marriage is the only occasion when the men of one generation can clap and sing their defiance of an older one, and give warning of the changes which must be accommodated however great the pretence that nothing has happened.

Marriage ceremonies dramatise the clash between adjacent generations 561
over the distribution of certain forms of authority. If this authority is as 602
overwhelming as has been suggested, and if it is so deeply resented, how is it that life is endurable for juniors? Relationships between junior and senior agnates are so restrictive that they almost amount to what Professor Fortes has suggested I view as a form of avoidance relationships. Juniors must always defer, they must obey commands promptly, they serve their seniors, they must accept a lead when it is given and the restrictions on conversations exclude all reference to women, marriage or sex. These are not simply a set of general guides for behaviour, they are rigidly applied rules, deviation from which is countered with rebuke or greater severity. It would appear from this

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many African societies is that wealth is transferred. Obviously, in societies where the 583
rules of exogamy compel a dispersion of links outside a man's own clan, what is in- 584
volved in this transfer of wealth cannot be sociologically similar to one in which mar-
riage to the first cousin on either side is permitted. 606
171

582 of agnation on the members of a corporate group and give it a taproot of
583 diversity whence it derives its strength, and which makes of it "the one body,"
613 conspicuous, in comparison with other societies, as the corporate group
602 *par excellence*.

The Sister's Son-Mother's Brother Relationship

128 Previously the mode of relationships associated with agnation and affinity have been briefly discussed. In order to appreciate the effects of parallel-cousin marriage, some remarks concerning the sister's son-mother's brother
604 set of relationships must be included here. Bedouin contrast the mother's
[174] brother with the father's brother; their sayings and proverbs afford a wealth of verbal documentation on the contrast. With the mother's brother a man enjoys all the freedoms he is denied in his relationships with his father
[831] and father's brother. He is permitted to joke with him; they indulge in exchanges of obscenities. When the sister's son wishes to marry, he is permitted to discuss the matter with his mother's brother and can urge him to intercede with his father on his behalf. Two men thus related are readily recognised in the camps, because in their acts they are required to show affection by displays of innocent horseplay, pranks or mild practical jokes. Small boys pursue their mother's brother, feign to kick or strike him, and he takes it all in good part.

The external aspects of this behaviour is deceptive. Joking of this sort creates the image in which the relationships are conceived; what is equally striking in it is its compulsiveness. Obviously, mature men are not always in the mood to be teased, but if they are, they must respond appropriately. Their relationships are unmistakably onerous. This remark applies not only to the external forms of their behaviour, but also to the favours a man is
[602] permitted to ask of his mother's brother. A brief amplification will make the point clear. Demands can be made of agnates, but only in situations of serious contingency. Day-to-day needs are met, not by appeals to the rights of agnation, but from the expectations linked to the mother's brother. If these expectations are withheld, the sister's son may be left in a quandary. In-
604 terestingly, in the records of homicides I gathered, three (in the con-
682 temporary population) were concerned with the killings of mother's brothers by sister's sons. Homicide within this field of relationship is difficult to comprehend unless it is appreciated that expectations are as compulsive in the daily life and the general well-being of people as are the rights and duties associated with agnation.

604 These general remarks apply to the relationships irrespective of the lineage
613 origin of the mother's brother. The similarity ends there, since the nature of the expectations, their urgency at any given moment and the kind of favours which are granted vary with the group identity of the mother's
[428] brother. A mother's brother who is a member of ego's corporate group may be expected to give the sister's son small quantities of flour, favour him in all

462 them or any innate aptitude for them; this insistence is an index of the
424 jealousy with which she is prepared to guard her rights. Each right derived from this or that small task is an extension of her control over the male.

462 The force and significance of this control is, perhaps, best seen in a
424 woman's right to cook. At marriage a woman must have at least the minimum of cooking utensils, and one of the rights a man acquires in a woman is
252 that she cooks for him. This is something a man cannot do for himself.
[593] Therefore, when a man ill-treats his wife or threatens her with divorce, she can retaliate by refusing to cook, or leave the tent altogether to return to her father. A man bereft of this service is in a very sorry plight indeed. The legal dominance of the male, seemingly autocratic, is reduced at every point by the control a woman exercises through her exclusive right to perform tasks. The limits to the area of her coercive powers are significant.
562 They are confined almost wholly to domestic relationships. Legally, women suffer such disabilities that they are almost of the status of minors; in reality, their day-to-day living is far from intolerable because they are able to control males over a wide field of relationships.

462 Men, excluded in the main from domestic duties around the tent, per-
424 form tasks to which their legal rights are tied. While women have access
231 to wells for water used by human beings, the transport of larger quantities of water over longer distances, requiring the use of camels, is a task which falls to the men. Watering of animals is done by men. Only they can slaughter the animals for food. The meat of an animal slaughtered by a woman is not "free," in a ritual sense, for human consumption. In an extremity only, a woman can, in effect, kill an animal, but the knife which cuts its throat must be held in a male hand, even if it is the hand of a very
462 small boy. The exploitation of the land is also the male prerogative. They
[424] plough and sow the grain; incidental help may be provided by wives working
[241] alongside their husbands during the early part of reaping, but the main reaping is done entirely by men. Transportation of grain to the mounds is also carried out by men, and it is they only who have access to the grain stores when quantities are withdrawn for family use. Sheep-shearing is
[236] carried out entirely by males,[10] the fleeces are stacked by them and the
[432] distribution and sales of these is directed by the male head of the tent.

Additional to these major tasks which males undertake are a number of minor ones. Men sew strips of cotton together to make clothes for both sexes. They also make rope of grass, albeit in a desultory sort of way, by
[334] twisting together the strands between the palms of the hands. A number of other tasks fall to the men by virtue of the fact that the sexes are separated
[342] in the tent by a divider of blanket material, which may be taken down when only members of the elementary family are about, but which is put

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[461] [10] This work is reserved for the younger men and takes the form of a festival during
[533] which lewd songs are sung and poems with obscene themes or references are recited
[538] loudly and within the hearing of elders, in a manner not dissimilar to the behaviour of bachelors at a wedding.
[831]

indeed welcome unfaithfulness on his wife's part. If a man is very old, and 554
his wife very young, it is likely that she will entertain lovers; if a man leaves 851
camp for a long absence his wife may not remain chaste. In both cases, if 837
the liaisons lead to the birth of a child, particularly a male, the husband
greets the news with unrestrained enthusiasm — "praise be to God," as their
saying goes. Incapacity[7] to produce offspring, if a husband is convinced of
it, may lead him to delegate a kinsman to serve his wife for procreative purposes:
he has the legal authority, as husband, to do so, and to require his
wife to submit, for the only alternative, if he is not to die without "issue,"
is to "take" a son from his brother and fulfill the obligations towards this
boy required of a pater, namely, attend to his circumcision, provide him with
teaching in the Koran (a duty neglected by most) and give him the wealth
with which to marry.

Granting the acceptance of paternity, whatever the circumstances of conception, 593
a male child, *ipso facto*, acceeds to membership of a corporation, and 554
is subject to the authority of that group in a number of matters. In many [851]
situations it would appear that a son is under the father's political control. [613]
At a moot, the son, if he speaks at all, will do so only to corroborate his
father. Discussions among men in a small camp evoke a similar pattern of
behaviour. Until the father becomes senile or dies, a son cannot publicly
pursue an independent course, but he desists by virtue of his relationships
with his father *qua* pater, not because of his father's political power to
coerce. All men of a corporation, in any event, "speak with one word" at [613]
a moot, and a son, by his assent to the common view, also supports his
father; in so doing he yields to the political authority of his corporation, and
not that of his father.

Membership in the corporation invests a man with other privileges and 593
duties. Protection against external enemies comes within the corporation's 613
jurisdiction, although in a particular situation, the father may well be the
person who dispenses it. Complimentarily, if a man commits an offense [681]
against a person not of his group, whatever private thoughts his father may
have about the act, the responsibility lies not on his shoulders but on the
group, and he is compelled to share this responsibility equally with all other
members. For example, if a son commits a homicide the father bears the [682]
same legal responsibility for the act, and is under obligation to contribute the
same share of blood-money as he would be if the act had been perpetrated
by any male of the group other than his son. Even in a narrower field of
relations between father and son the group exercises its authority. Acting
as pater, a man may punish his son, physically or otherwise; he may not
do so to the point of injury, for personal injury comes within the legitimate
sphere of the corporation. A man's "bone" belongs to his group; he is an in-

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[7] Impotency is a special case, because it is dishonourable for a woman to remain [833]
wife to an impotent man. She cannot divorce him, but her father can insist on a
witnessed test of impotency and, if it is proven, the husband is compelled to divorce [586]
her. Barrenness, obviously, is a different matter.

593 cerned with his own and his group's status in marriage arange-
[584] ments. One informant said that a rich man must marry into a
[581] rich group. The Bedouin have a saying which is relevant here:
*[613] "Your bait is equal to the bait into which you marry." Before
her marriage the girl's duty toward her father is to respect
and obey him. After her marriage "her only duty is that she
[758] must visit him from time to time. If he becomes sick, and
he has no wife, she must care for him and nurse him."

593 It was a common sight to see a Bedouin father fondle
•834 his daughter of age six years or younger, but beyond this
age physical intimacy ceases. The Bedouin say that a father should not kiss or hold on his knee a daughter over the age of eleven. After the girl marries, a definite avoidance custom characterizes the father-daughter role relationship. The Bedouin say that the father will not see the face of his daughter after her marriage. This means that the married daughter remains veiled before her father, and even before her older brothers. This type of avoidance custom is rare by comparison with the cross-cultural data (Driver 1966).

593 A wife obeys her husband concerning all matters: "she does not even leave the house without his permission." A woman may go and complain to her father if her husband does not provide for her, i.e., with food and clothing, or if he unjustly beats her or continually threatens to beat her. On the other hand, if a woman is in the wrong "it is

462 them or any innate aptitude for them; this insistence is an index of the
424 jealousy with which she is prepared to guard her rights. Each right derived
from this or that small task is an extension of her control over the male.

462 The force and significance of this control is, perhaps, best seen in a
424 woman's right to cook. At marriage a woman must have at least the minimum
of cooking utensils, and one of the rights a man acquires in a woman is
252 that she cooks for him. This is something a man cannot do for himself.
Therefore, when a man ill-treats his wife or threatens her with divorce, she
[593] can retaliate by refusing to cook, or leave the tent altogether to return to her
father. A man bereft of this service is in a very sorry plight indeed. The
legal dominance of the male, seemingly autocratic, is reduced at every
point by the control a woman exercises through her exclusive right to perform tasks. The limits to the area of her coercive powers are significant.
562 They are confined almost wholly to domestic relationships. Legally, women
suffer such disabilities that they are almost of the status of minors; in
reality, their day-to-day living is far from intolerable because they are able
to control males over a wide field of relationships.

462 Men, excluded in the main from domestic duties around the tent, per-
424 form tasks to which their legal rights are tied. While women have access
231 to wells for water used by human beings, the transport of larger quantities
of water over longer distances, requiring the use of camels, is a task which
falls to the men. Watering of animals is done by men. Only they can
slaughter the animals for food. The meat of an animal slaughtered by a
woman is not "free," in a ritual sense, for human consumption. In an
extremity only, a woman can, in effect, kill an animal, but the knife which
cuts its throat must be held in a male hand, even if it is the hand of a very
462 small boy. The exploitation of the land is also the male prerogative. They
[424] plough and sow the grain; incidental help may be provided by wives working
[241] alongside their husbands during the early part of reaping, but the main
reaping is done entirely by men. Transportation of grain to the mounds is
also carried out by men, and it is they only who have access to the grain
stores when quantities are withdrawn for family use. Sheep-shearing is
[236] carried out entirely by males,[10] the fleeces are stacked by them and the
[432] distribution and sales of these is directed by the male head of the tent.

Additional to these major tasks which males undertake are a number of
minor ones. Men sew strips of cotton together to make clothes for both
sexes. They also make rope of grass, albeit in a desultory sort of way, by
twisting together the strands between the palms of the hands. A number of
• [334] other tasks fall to the men by virtue of the fact that the sexes are separated
[342] in the tent by a divider of blanket material, which may be taken down
when only members of the elementary family are about, but which is put

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[461] [10] This work is reserved for the younger men and takes the form of a festival during
[533] which lewd songs are sung and poems with obscene themes or references are recited
[538] loudly and within the hearing of elders, in a manner not dissimilar to the behaviour
of bachelors at a wedding.
[831]

462

in position immediately anyone else appears at the entrance to the tent.[11] [834] [342]
Women cook, but they do not serve the meal to males, nor are they responsible [264]
for the distribution of meat among them. Parts of an animal are 264
carefully specified, and the various portions distributed at a meal carry 574
with them a great deal of significance. A host can honour, flatter, disappoint 571
or even insult his guest, depending on the precise distribution of meat
he adopts. Designated portions should go to certain kinsmen if they are [602]
present, but this still leaves a wide margin of choice, and a host can use this choice as part of the many means at his disposal for directing his relationships with other men. A political link can be forged or another snapped by the distribution of portions of meat at the commensal meal.

The Bedouin Ideal Type of Family as a Unit of Production

This account of the division of labour is far from inclusive of all the tasks 594
carried out. The details given are only barely sufficient to provide some 183
indication of the necessary composition of a family. Referring again to the [462]
Bedouin sentiments about the matter, it is now possible to give it some numerical precision. The number of females should be a minimum of about three, including a mother, a teen-age daughter and a child of about
eight years. Males should number about six: a father, relieved of most [857]
chores to act as director; a son in his middle to late twenties, to plough; a [883]
second son, in his early to middle twenties, to herd the camels; a third, in [462]
his late teens to early twenties, to shepherd the sheep; a fourth, middle to [561]
late teens, to look after the goats; and a younger son to fetch, carry and
run errands about the camp. The family of the ordinary Bedouin, they say, [554]
shows this sex and age distribution, although they recognise that a politically
ambitious man with the wealth to match his aspirations would require more [556]
of both sexes — particularly women, since the burden of entertainment increases rapidly with a man's climb to power and fame.

Clearly, the basis of Bedouin sentiment concerning family structure is its 121
approximation to an ideal production unit. Some families display the features 183
of this ideal, but even they enjoy the productive benefits of this composition
for a very limited period only. The family, as described above, can only be an 594
ephemeral unit, since the age structure constantly changes, women are removed by marriage, men move away and death affects it at any point at any time. The Bedouin family is a fiction in the sense that it can be said to have a characteristic composition. The mistake they make is to conceive of it as a particular kinship structure related to production. The substance of what has been referred to as a fiction is that, if viewed as a productive unit, it
bears close consistency with reality. Freed of the need to examine it in terms [621]
of specifically limited kinship relationships, and no longer anchored to the inhabitants of a single tent, the distribution of people according to sex and

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[11] This is the general rule. In practice, the use of the divider can indicate an intimacy or distance in relationships, most subtly.

Had the Senussi been successful in the last war, they 175
would no doubt have brought in the 'Ibeidat or the 'Awaqir 619
from Cyrenaica to replace the Awlad 'Ali in Egypt.

At the present day the Awlad 'Ali, especially the eastern 619
sections near the Nile Valley, have almost ceased to be nomadic, 178
and only the old men have memories of their former warlike habits. They suffered considerably during the Great War, but are again becoming prosperous. They now own large comfortable tents, are beginning to build houses and clear out cisterns, and are also said to be increasing in numbers.[1] So civilized have they grown that my guides, one a Sinai Arab and the other an 'Abadi, concurred in calling them "green"—not real desert-worthy Bedouins.

Perhaps as a result of Libyan influence, or more probably 142
the better nurture and climate, they are taller, heavier, stronger, and lighter-complexioned than the lightly built Arabs of
Sinai and Hijaz. Also they are much franker and more 157
straightforward than their shifty and suspicious eastern cousins, 181
and altogether more trustworthy. Their women only veil 562
themselves to strangers, and talk quite naturally and cheerfully 834
to the men of their own tribe. 609

They cultivate as much barley as they can, using a 243
primitive plough drawn by camels, in the clayey hollows [492]
scattered over their very stony limestone desert, but, as the [132]
rainfall is very uncertain, a good crop only occurs every five
or six years. After harvest, they exchange some of their [437]
barley for maize, which the women grind to make bread
as required, and some for dried dates. The seed for next [251]
year is buried in a hole lined with straw and covered with
clay, and a year's forage for the animals is set aside. The [432]
rest of the crop goes to market, and for a short time the [426]
Arab has money to buy clothes for himself and his family and at utmost need to pay off some of the numerous debts he has inherited from his forefathers. Soon he is reduced again to the clothes he wears, the tent he sleeps in, and his animals grazing in the desert.

They are great breeders of camels and sheep, and a busy 436
traffic in these goes on weekly in the markets of Hammam, 178
'Amriya, and the Beheira. So they have got into the habit [438
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233]

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[1] At the 1927 census, the Western Desert Arabs, Awlad 'Ali, Jawabis, etc., numbered 38,928 souls exclusive of those settled in Beheira. But Pacho, 100 years ago, estimated them at 38,000 souls. [161]

membership of associations and so on. The statuses a Bedouin achieves de- 796
pend not on an ordered acquisition through the inheritance of roles or elec- 852
tion to them, but on his personal manipulation of linkages in his jockeying 88
with others. Rites are minimal because there are few defined statuses an 554
individual can predictably acquire. The equalitarianism of the desert denudes 602
the Bedouin of ritual riches. Complimentarily, rites which do occur are 613
thrown into exaggerated relief by the absence of others, and in their isolation, [557]
become not merely a "passage" but a cataclysmic change. Marriage and
burial both comprehend limited fields of relations, but accompanying cere- 585
monies may bring several hundred people together, people who otherwise 764
rarely gather in these numbers to meet one another as kinsmen and neigh- 796
bours, and it is suggested that the emphasis given to the events dramatises the 602
significance of the changes they produce. In the discussion of the changes 182
brought about by marriage, the Bedouin view of what is entailed will be
considered first.

The Bedouin View of Marriage

After marriage, the Bedouin argue, a son has a tent of his own, a woman 585
over whom he has authority and soon children to make him a father. Mar- 581
riage causes split, branching. A new family is created, holding the poten- [613]
tial of a new lineage. The separation is so painful a matter for the father
that he cannot contemplate it, hence his pretence that he has no knowledge of [593]
wedding festivities, and his subsequent attitude that nothing has happened.

Interestingly, there are two other occasions when this attitude is to be 682
observed. When a man kills within his corporate group,[8] he may flee his 613
tribe or he may be compelled to leave; later he is likely to return and, when 621
he does, he is received with a minimum of show. Every attempt is made to
suppress knowledge of the event.

Again, if incest occurs, the memory of it must somehow be suppressed, and 835
it is an ever-present danger. Men, permitted four wives simultaneously and 561
also able to engage in a plurality of marriages through divorce or death of [595]
spouses, may have children showing an age difference of two or three gen-
erations. Thus it comes about that a man may be of an age in relation to his
father's sister which permits them as children to behave as if they were
first paternal cousins. As an adult, the preferred spouse for a man is a [582]
father's brother's daughter. In terms of relationships between adolescents
the situation in which a man is of the same age generation as his father's
sister is fraught with danger. In one such case, between a man and his [684]
father's sister, the male child of the union was put out in the desert to be

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[8] Bedouin are disposed in groups which, in summer, usually constitute a single community, around or near a watering point. The men of this group are interlinked by reference to an ancestor four or five ascending generations, reckoning from the generation of men of about 20 years. When, elsewhere in this chapter reference is made to corporations, it will be to groups of this kind.

835 devoured by wild animals, the girl was "given"[6] to a close cousin who had
561 shot his sister. Both now reside with an enemy tribal section. The two acts
684 were equated. They were similar to the extent that both created a situation which defied institutional resolution. The culprits were exorcised. The girl's lover remains with his group — the odium for the male is incomparably less than for the female, since, while maternity is easy to establish, paternity is frequently shrouded in doubt — and during the months I lived with this particular group, there was never a mention of the affair. It was as if "nothing had happened."

829 If asked why these two events cause such profound distress, the answers
578 the Bedouin give are twofold: they can do nothing about them, and they
613 cause split. By split in this context they mean split in the lineage; split in
[682] the case of homicide because it may lead to a demand for blood-money which
[684] is payable only between corporations, and split in the case of incest because it causes chaos in relationships. Marriage, in one sense, their reasoning
581 runs, is similar, for it too causes split. Whatever may be the analytic strength
829 of the arguments that homicide and incest precipitate splitting, the argu-
613 ment that marriage does so is spurious. In what sense can marriage mean split? Bedouin men marry "so that we may beget many sons, to make a big lineage later on." The worst fate that can befall a man as a result of his son's marriage is that he, in later generations, will become the focal point in a series of branching descent lines. The alternative — that his sons remain unmarried — can only mean that his name would disappear through want of successors to carry it on, which is one of the greatest evils which can befall a man, according to Bedouin sentiment: better split than oblivion. If the key to the interpretation of the father's attitude to his son's marriage is not
581 that it causes split, it must lie elsewhere in their relationship. What mar-
585 riage does is alter the distribution of authority between father and son. In
593 order to pursue this, it is necessary first to clarify the types of authority involved, and then assess them in a post-marital situation.

554
The Division of Authority Between the Family and the Corporation

851 Politically, a person's status is determined for him at birth. At this time a man has the right to accept or deny paternity. Denial is tantamount to an accusation of adultery by his wife. In practice, once a wife has given birth to a male child, whatever doubts people may harbour regarding paternity, the husband accepts the child as his. "The boy for the bed," is a saying often heard among the Bedouin; but it remains the husband's prerogative to invest the child with legitimacy, hence, political status. Only if a husband becomes
[837] aware that he is publicly considered a cuckold, or if he catches his wife and a lover *in flagrante delicto*, is he at all likely to take action. Otherwise he may

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[585] [6] A marriage is illegal unless it is accompanied by an agreement to transfer wealth
[581] to the girl's father.

613

her father takes, but in certain critical situations he can be relieved of choice 593
if the interests of the group as a whole are at stake. [421]

Political authority is the preserve of a corporation, and its exercise leads [428]
to invasion of a man's authority in the field of domestic relations. This [584]
does not mean, however, that discrete areas of authority do not remain with
the father. In the tent his authority over his son is so overwhelming as to
keep the son in almost complete subordination. The son is referred to as a
slave, and in daily life he has to behave as one. He must obey every command,
for, were he to rebel, he would find little or no support among his
agnates, whatever the extent of the provocation. Retreat from his father is [422]
hardly an alternative, since, while his father is alive, he has no animals of
his own, and to leave camp would only mean that he would have to move
outside his group to seek employment elsewhere as a shepherd. If he did [558]
this he would forfeit status, and almost certainly cut himself off from property [428]
which would fall to him after his father's death. A man who "denies"
his father looses too many privileges for the practice to become widespread.

Caught in this dilemma, a son's predicament is worsened by the fact that 593
he cannot initiate marriage negotiations — to be able to do so requires some 584
animals to offer a girl's father. Through his mother's brother he has the [431]
means of bringing pressure to bear on his father, but the latter can resist for [604]
years. Finally, a marriage is arranged for him. It is difficult to convey the 581
yearning of young Bedouin for marriage. They discuss it among themselves 521
ad nauseam. For the most part their talk is about the sexual aspect of marriage. 831
Premarital sex relations are strictly controlled, and the movements
of each young girl are carefully guarded because, if on the day of her marriage 836●
the test shows that she is not a virgin, she not only brings disgrace to [585]
her family, but the marriage may be revoked and her worth as a bride for
another man seriously diminished. Nevertheless premarital relations do [837]
occur, if not between youths and maidens to any extent, between young
men and married women.

The question still remains: why is marriage the occasion of such ebullient 581
celebration? The formal authority a father exercises over his son 593
changes little on marriage. Economically the son is still harnessed to the
father. The latter still shouts his orders at him, and obedience remains
unaltered. Any sign of an independent view on a matter is met with a gruff
rebuff. If the marriage turns out to be disagreeable to the father, he has
the authority — if not always the power — to break it. Marriage does not
mean a change in the general mode of behaviour between the two; the legal
relations remain unaltered, albeit modified in practice, as the married son
matures in age. But marriage does mean the acquisition of rights and status
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indeed welcome unfaithfulness on his wife's part. If a man is very old, and 554
his wife very young, it is likely that she will entertain lovers; if a man leaves 851
camp for a long absence his wife may not remain chaste. In both cases, if 837
the liaisons lead to the birth of a child, particularly a male, the husband
greets the news with unrestrained enthusiasm — "praise be to God," as their
saying goes. Incapacity[7] to produce offspring, if a husband is convinced of
it, may lead him to delegate a kinsman to serve his wife for procreative purposes:
he has the legal authority, as husband, to do so, and to require his
wife to submit, for the only alternative, if he is not to die without "issue,"
is to "take" a son from his brother and fulfill the obligations towards this
boy required of a pater, namely, attend to his circumcision, provide him with
teaching in the Koran (a duty neglected by most) and give him the wealth
with which to marry.

Granting the acceptance of paternity, whatever the circumstances of conception,
a male child, *ipso facto*, accedes to membership of a corporation, and 554
is subject to the authority of that group in a number of matters. In many [851]
situations it would appear that a son is under the father's political control. [613]
At a moot, the son, if he speaks at all, will do so only to corroborate his
father. Discussions among men in a small camp evoke a similar pattern of
behaviour. Until the father becomes senile or dies, a son cannot publicly
pursue an independent course, but he desists by virtue of his relationships
with his father *qua* pater, not because of his father's political power to
coerce. All men of a corporation, in any event, "speak with one word" at [613]
a moot, and a son, by his assent to the common view, also supports his
father; in so doing he yields to the political authority of his corporation, and
not that of his father.

Membership in the corporation invests a man with other privileges and 593
duties. Protection against external enemies comes within the corporation's 613
jurisdiction, although in a particular situation, the father may well be the
person who dispenses it. Complimentarily, if a man commits an offense [681]
against a person not of his group, whatever private thoughts his father may
have about the act, the responsibility lies not on his shoulders but on the
group, and he is compelled to share this responsibility equally with all other
members. For example, if a son commits a homicide the father bears the [682]
same legal responsibility for the act, and is under obligation to contribute the
same share of blood-money as he would be if the act had been perpetrated
by any male of the group other than his son. Even in a narrower field of
relations between father and son the group exercises its authority. Acting
as pater, a man may punish his son, physically or otherwise; he may not
do so to the point of injury, for personal injury comes within the legitimate
sphere of the corporation. A man's "bone" belongs to his group; he is an in-

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[7] Impotency is a special case, because it is dishonourable for a woman to remain [833]
wife to an impotent man. She cannot divorce him, but her father can insist on a
witnessed test of impotency and, if it is proven, the husband is compelled to divorce [586]
her. Barrenness, obviously, is a different matter.

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surface water in jerry cans, bringing them back to the tents, one at a time, 462
on their backs. Clothes are kept clean in the desert, and the women do the [312]
washing. [296]

The care of children from birth until they are a few years old is the re- 462
sponsibility of the woman. Childbirth causes a minimum interruption in the 854
daily sequence of a mother's activities. The child is breastfed if the mother [844]
has milk; if not, a wet nurse is sought or goat milk is substituted. Other [853]
than the time given to feeding it, the infant does not take up much of the mother's time. It is placed in a hammock slung between the centre poles of the tent and rocked by the mother as she passes to and fro. If nursing in illness is required, the mother devotes herself to it; her other tasks must then be performed by another woman.

As children acquire mobility, and at a time when, perhaps, the mother 855
is pregnant again, they become so fractious one with the other that if help 462
was unavailable the nervous strain could seriously disrupt the normal routine
of work. During the early years of marriage, when daughters are still too 855
young to look after their small brothers and sisters, the grandmother's help 462
in child-rearing is invaluable. Too old for the arduous tasks of the daily 603
routine, she may assist in teasing and spinning the raw wool, but it is in her role as nursemaid that she assumes importance. Children of both sexes are given the comfort of suckling at her breast, receiving attention and care for which the young mother could not possibly afford the time.

Caring for children takes up little of a man's time, and is mostly in- 462
cidental. The woman, on the other hand, devotes relatively little of her 233
time to the animals. She does the milking in spring — of camels, sheep and [234]
goats — but herding is not her responsibility, save for partly tending goats. [857]
Goats, when they are in the vicinity of the camp, are looked after by boys and girls of about eight to ten years of age. In springtime when they have dropped their young, or if some of them have to be retained in the camp at night for various reasons, the woman makes a brushwood enclosure at the side of the tent and sees the goats safely inside before nightfall.

A catalogue of the tasks for which women are responsible may not seem 462
very impressive; the number of tasks is not excessive, but the persistence of the routine bends the backs of most women. Paradoxically, any suggestion that men should take over female tasks would strike them as absurd. Assistance from one of the same sex is always a welcome relief, but the abrogation of a particular task by men would be interpreted by women as the loss of a right. For, in the division of labour, it is not merely that tasks are allocated between the sexes for expedient reasons, or in consideration of the labour involved or because tasks which can be performed in the vicinity of the camp are left to women; division of labour would not make sense on these grounds, however strong they may be in Bedouin sentiments. Each task which [424]
falls to the lot of woman constitutes a right exclusive to her. Fetching firewood is not only a chore; it is a woman's prerogative. The insistence that only a woman can undertake certain tasks has nothing to do with her liking

683 was to be paid unconditionally and consequently would cost all
682 members of the amar; but all these attempts failed. At this point,
672
695 there was no doubt on the part of the attending crowd about Muftah's
613 responsibility for the death of Selouma. The question was, how much
had he to pay. The amount requested by Selouma's son was that for
"intentional" killing on the basis that Muftah had willfully thrown
the rock knowing that it might harm Selouma, especially considering
his age.

683 After long and intensive negotiations with the interested
682 parties, a Mi'ad was set in which it was announced that Muftah had
672 to pay the amount of L.E. 200. In his reasoning, he stipulated
627 that the wound which had caused the death of Selouma, although it
was intentional on the part of Muftah, was inflicted by a stone
which in itself is not a lethal weapon, and therefore the death
was an unintentional one for which the bloodmoney is customarily
estimated at L.E. 300. He also stated that in the excitement that
● [845] followed the death of Selouma, Muftah's pregnant wife had lost the
child. The bloodmoney for the still-born infant was estimated at
L.E. 100, which was deducted from the amount of bloodmoney that
Muftah had to pay.

CASE #3: The Case of the Trespasser

311 This case occurred during the year of the fieldwork which was
423 the second dry year the area experienced. Rain had not fallen ex-
613
[132] cept in a very few places. One of these places was near the small
town of Sidi Barrani in which the land belonging to Yadem and his
Bait was found. Yadem had sown his barley which at that time had
grown to about five feet high. Surrounding the cultivated land

> 619 could not afford to risk such large scale conflict
> 675 and so he withdrew his offer of marriage to the
> 578 brothers. After this, as a display of authority and
> *613 an attempt to maintain something of the alliance
> between their group and the Qit'an, the 'Aishaibi
> 626 leaders made the public announcement that the girl
> could marry anyone else, but not the son of 'Umda
> 582 Ziyad.

619 The various sets of authority relations operative in the al-
675 Qasr area are obvious from this account, but they will be
*613 better defined as the discussion proceeds. Here, I only
wanted to make clear that the relationship between Sa'adi
and Marabit is one based upon contract and local contiguity,
and reinforced by cognation. There is no unilinear basis
for the relationship and no attempt to fit it into a "unilinear
genealogical mould." The structural differentiation between
[582] Sa'adi and Marabit seems to reflect a dominant-subjective
relationship, in the sense discussed by Weber (1947) and
Southall (1956), but its possible class overtones are played
down by the fact that there are normally no objections to
intermarrying between groups. The Bedouin of al-Qasr say,
●[851] "what is the difference, the children from such a marriage
will be Sa'adi anyhow?"

The Sa'adi-Marabit differentiation is relatively
619 unimportant for a study of al-Qasr itself, since the Marabit
*613 number is so small--one lineage consisting of five brothers
and their families. The contrast between Sa'adi and Marabit,
secular and sacred tribes, becomes more important for a

593 The daughter and wife roles are also subject to the
dominant role of father in al-Qasr Bedouin society. The
father has virtually the right of life and death over his
daughter in certain situations. But in no case does he have
593 this right over his wife. The differentiation in right here
*613 is again a matter of the authority principle operating within
the framework of the lineage system. A man's daughter belongs
• [851] to his patrilineage or authority group while his wife belongs
to the authority group of her father. There is an obvious
[582] exception to this statement about Bedouin society, for given
the practice of parallel-cousin marriage a man and his wife
can belong to the same authority group, the same tertiary
593 group. Even so, only the father has the right of life and
death over the girl who is his daughter. The Bedouins say,
"The bones of the girl belong to the father." There are two
593 situations in which a father may rightfully put his daughter
684 to death: when she is found guilty of pre-marital intercourse
(loss of virginity), or if it is proved that she has had any
extra-marital sexual activity. In either case, if the husband
were to kill the girl he would be guilty of murder and his
group would have to forfeit blood-money or be threatened with
retaliation. I heard of no such actual cases.

593 The father's major duty toward his daughter is to
584 provide her with "a good marriage." This, of course, parallels
his duty toward his son and emphasizes that a father is con-

586 •851 *613 Naturally, according to the rule of patriliny, all children from a marriage belong to the husband and become members of his lineage. Should divorce occur while a woman is nursing, she will take the child with her and it will be returned after weaning. Sometimes the husband will permit the wife to keep one child--always a girl--in order "to keep her company."

587 The practice of the sororate has been noted. The Bedouins also believe that "a man should marry his brother's widow so that she will have someone to help her with the children." But I have no data on the frequencies of these practices. When I gathered my data on marriage, my informants 12 58 would give me only the name of the tribe or lineage into which a man married, and never did I get the name of a man's wife. [829] (One lineage in al-Qasr, entirely refused to give me data on genealogy or marriage because, as one leader said, "it is not decent to speak of these things with people.") Sororal 595 polygny is forbidden (Quran IV:23), and the Bedouins say that a man cannot marry more than one bint 'amm. Marriage 182 [587] practices, such as sororate and levirate, I interpret as patterns which maintain structural continuity and political advantage. The custom of permitting a man to marry only [582] one of his father's brother's daughters may be seen as a precaution against intensifying authority relations and the degree of segmentation.

835 devoured by wild animals, the girl was "given"[6] to a close cousin who had
561 shot his sister. Both now reside with an enemy tribal section. The two acts
684 were equated. They were similar to the extent that both created a situation
which defied institutional resolution. The culprits were exorcised. The girl's lover remains with his group — the odium for the male is incomparably less than for the female, since, while maternity is easy to establish, paternity is frequently shrouded in doubt — and during the months I lived with this particular group, there was never a mention of the affair. It was as if "nothing had happened."

829 If asked why these two events cause such profound distress, the answers
578 the Bedouin give are twofold: they can do nothing about them, and they
613 cause split. By split in this context they mean split in the lineage; split in
[682] the case of homicide because it may lead to a demand for blood-money which
[684] is payable only between corporations, and split in the case of incest because
581 it causes chaos in relationships. Marriage, in one sense, their reasoning
829 runs, is similar, for it too causes split. Whatever may be the analytic strength
613 of the arguments that homicide and incest precipitate splitting, the argument that marriage does so is spurious. In what sense can marriage mean split? Bedouin men marry "so that we may beget many sons, to make a big lineage later on." The worst fate that can befall a man as a result of his son's marriage is that he, in later generations, will become the focal point in a series of branching descent lines. The alternative — that his sons remain unmarried — can only mean that his name would disappear through want of successors to carry it on, which is one of the greatest evils which can befall a man, according to Bedouin sentiment: better split than oblivion. If the key to the interpretation of the father's attitude to his son's marriage is not
581 that it causes split, it must lie elsewhere in their relationship. What mar-
585 riage does is alter the distribution of authority between father and son. In
593 order to pursue this, it is necessary first to clarify the types of authority involved, and then assess them in a post-marital situation.

554
The Division of Authority Between the Family and the Corporation

•851 Politically, a person's status is determined for him at birth. At this time a man has the right to accept or deny paternity. Denial is tantamount to an accusation of adultery by his wife. In practice, once a wife has given birth to a male child, whatever doubts people may harbour regarding paternity, the husband accepts the child as his. "The boy for the bed," is a saying often heard among the Bedouin; but it remains the husband's prerogative to invest
[837] the child with legitimacy, hence, political status. Only if a husband becomes aware that he is publicly considered a cuckold, or if he catches his wife and a lover *in flagrante delicto,* is he at all likely to take action. Otherwise he may

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[585] [581] [6] A marriage is illegal unless it is accompanied by an agreement to transfer wealth to the girl's father.

indeed welcome unfaithfulness on his wife's part. If a man is very old, and 554
his wife very young, it is likely that she will entertain lovers; if a man leaves 851
camp for a long absence his wife may not remain chaste. In both cases, if 837
the liaisons lead to the birth of a child, particularly a male, the husband greets the news with unrestrained enthusiasm — "praise be to God," as their saying goes. Incapacity[7] to produce offspring, if a husband is convinced of it, may lead him to delegate a kinsman to serve his wife for procreative purposes: he has the legal authority, as husband, to do so, and to require his wife to submit, for the only alternative, if he is not to die without "issue," is to "take" a son from his brother and fulfill the obligations towards this boy required of a pater, namely, attend to his circumcision, provide him with teaching in the Koran (a duty neglected by most) and give him the wealth with which to marry.

Granting the acceptance of paternity, whatever the circumstances of conception, 593
a male child, *ipso facto,* acceeds to membership of a corporation, and 554
is subject to the authority of that group in a number of matters. In many [851]
situations it would appear that a son is under the father's political control. [613]
At a moot, the son, if he speaks at all, will do so only to corroborate his father. Discussions among men in a small camp evoke a similar pattern of behaviour. Until the father becomes senile or dies, a son cannot publicly pursue an independent course, but he desists by virtue of his relationships with his father *qua* pater, not because of his father's political power to coerce. All men of a corporation, in any event, "speak with one word" at
a moot, and a son, by his assent to the common view, also supports his [613]
father; in so doing he yields to the political authority of his corporation, and not that of his father.

Membership in the corporation invests a man with other privileges and 593
duties. Protection against external enemies comes within the corporation's 613
jurisdiction, although in a particular situation, the father may well be the person who dispenses it. Complimentarily, if a man commits an offense
against a person not of his group, whatever private thoughts his father may [681]
have about the act, the responsibility lies not on his shoulders but on the group, and he is compelled to share this responsibility equally with all other members. For example, if a son commits a homicide the father bears the
same legal responsibility for the act, and is under obligation to contribute the [682]
same share of blood-money as he would be if the act had been perpetrated by any male of the group other than his son. Even in a narrower field of relations between father and son the group exercises its authority. Acting as pater, a man may punish his son, physically or otherwise; he may not do so to the point of injury, for personal injury comes within the legitimate sphere of the corporation. A man's "bone" belongs to his group; he is an in-

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[7] Impotency is a special case, because it is dishonourable for a woman to remain [833]
wife to an impotent man. She cannot divorce him, but her father can insist on a witnessed test of impotency and, if it is proven, the husband is compelled to divorce [586]
her. Barrenness, obviously, is a different matter.

band is required to take gifts to his mother-in-law in recognition of the fact 583
that she nourished his wife as an infant (the literal meaning of the word 584
used for this gift is "milk"). A return visit is made and gifts are given to 606
the daughter. When the first child is born an animal is presented by the
affines, and if the child is a male, the gift may be several sheep, or even a 851
few camels if the father-in-law is very wealthy. Formal exchange of gifts 425
continue, but, in addition, informal transfers are made. Moreover, if re- 606
lations between a man and his father-in-law develop favourably, it is not un- 606
common for a young husband, during the early years of marriage, to move 591
away from his father and pitch his tent alongside that of his father-in-law. 593
Marriage gives a son affinal relations of his own. Affinity can alleviate the
dead weight of paternal authority.

It is suggested that the crisis the marriage of a son assumes for a father 585
is the shift it entails in the distribution of authority. This is borne out by 561
other details in the marriage ceremony referred to earlier. Ordinarily, young 602
men dare not sing within earshot of their senior agnates. Far from allowing 533
obscenities, agnates of the ascending generation would not allow even a
mention of women to be made by young men, in their presence. In a group [593]
consisting of young men and an agnate, I chanced to use the noun for [123]
woman and immediately my tent was cleared of all but the senior agnate.
At a wedding the young men revel in their lewd songs and shout their [831]
obscenities for all to hear. The senior agnates stand aside and make a show of ignoring the proceedings. And well they may, for each marriage is a challenge to the exclusive authority they have enjoyed; each nuptial tent is an invasion of the domain of which they have been undisputed masters. Marriage is the only occasion when the men of one generation can clap and sing their defiance of an older one, and give warning of the changes which must be accommodated however great the pretence that nothing has happened.

Marriage ceremonies dramatise the clash between adjacent generations 561
over the distribution of certain forms of authority. If this authority is as 602
overwhelming as has been suggested, and if it is so deeply resented, how is it that life is endurable for juniors? Relationships between junior and senior agnates are so restrictive that they almost amount to what Professor Fortes has suggested I view as a form of avoidance relationships. Juniors must always defer, they must obey commands promptly, they serve their seniors, they must accept a lead when it is given and the restrictions on conversations exclude all reference to women, marriage or sex. These are not simply a set of general guides for behaviour, they are rigidly applied rules, deviation from which is countered with rebuke or greater severity. It would appear from this

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many African societies is that wealth is transferred. Obviously, in societies where the 583
rules of exogamy compel a dispersion of links outside a man's own clan, what is in- 584
volved in this transfer of wealth cannot be sociologically similar to one in which mar- 606
riage to the first cousin on either side is permitted. 171

593 handling the potential conflict between father and son and
the successive generations which they represent; these are
mechanisms which preclude intimacy between the father and
the son. The social statuses of father and son are not
593 852 permitted to overlap by their being participants in, or
585 even present at, festive occasions, such as circumcision
[831] and wedding parties, occasions which are marked by erotic
poems and lewd songs. It would be "wrong" for a father to
accompany his son to one of these parties. In the one instance that I did observe a father and son together at a wedding party, the Bedouins explained the rare occurrence by pointing out that this was the man's only son, and so he treated him "like a brother."

593 The Bedouins of al-Qasr recognize the aloofness of
866 the father from the son and justify it as a training period
to prepare the boy for the time when he will be on his own. One young man explained the underlying rationale of the father-son relationship in this way:

> There are different kinds of fathers. One wishes to make his son a man, to make his son self-dependent at an early age. Other fathers destroy the personalities of their sons. For instance, the first type of father gives his son the responsibility of selling something, or buying something, or of supervising a chore in his own place. But the second type of father is usually soft with his son; he doesn't depend on his son due to his young age. He is very cautious with him and will not send him anywhere, and if he does he will ask someone to look after him. Of course, the first type of father is good and the second type is bad.

593 In al-Qasr it is a rare sight to see a father and his young
son together, and it is only slightly more common to see the
father with the grown son. The second case may simply be a
reflection of the division of labor since the son, once
grown, takes over the economic tasks of his father.

593 The most important duties of a father toward his
867 son are three: he must teach him generosity, courage and
584 courtesy; he must see that the boy learns the Quran; and he
872 must arrange a good marriage for his son. According to
593 Peters (1960:34), the Cyrenaican Bedouin father must attend
852 [872] to three things for his son, namely: his circumcision, his
[583] education in the Quran, and his bridewealth when he marries.
In al-Qasr, the Egyptian school teachers have succeeded in
[177] showing the Bedouin that circumcision is a private family
593 affair and not a public ritual. Although all fathers still
852 see to it that their sons are circumcised, the father is no
178 longer responsible for "making a circumcision party." In
[626] fact, the father who does insist on following the old ways
[431] by hiring a dancer and publicly marking his son's rite de
passage, will be ridiculed as one "who only wants to make
money from the ritual gift (naquut) given the boy."

593 The son recognizes the rights which the father has
over him through a show of respect and obedience. A boy
shows deference toward his father by not smoking, singing,
or reciting poetry of any kind in his presence. During the

173 Fusion of names appears in another context and for similar
178 reasons. Not only are lineal descendants given the name of deceased
551 ancestors, but a man may be given the name of any deceased
613 agnate of his tertiary section. Usually, this is only done
428 when a man passes on property to another who is not his direct
[553] heir. Commonly, this occurs when an agnate is also a mother's
brother, as often happens as a result of parallel cousin marriage,
and this mother's brother has no sons of his own. If he has a
sister's son, who is also his paternal nephew, he is likely to pass
[183] on his wealth to this nephew. A father, the Bedouin insist, ought
to perform three duties for his sons: attend to their circumcision,
[593] and their education in the Koran, and provide bride-wealth when
[852] they marry. All fathers attend to the circumcision of all their sons;
[871] few provide for the Koranic education of any of their sons; most
bear the burden of marrying off at least one of their sons. The
[583] performance of the latter duty is what makes the continuance
of the deceased's name an obligation, and whoever performs this
duty must have his name perpetuated in one male offspring of
the union which was brought about with his wealth. Wealth need
not take the form of bride-wealth; it can be a legacy willed by a
father, maternal uncle of the kind described above, or any other
agnate who has died without male issue. Conversely, if a man
dies without leaving any property, even his sons might not perpetuate
his name, and eventually it will drop out of the genealogy.[10]
There are instances of men inheriting the wealth of a
number of agnates, using each parcel of wealth to make a new
marriage and naming the sons of the various unions after the
several dead who had left wealth. The example given below is
taken from the genealogy of the Dawwas section of the Magharba
tribe. What happened here was that the two lines stemming
from Faraj and Sha'aban, after proliferating normally,
became extinct. As this happened, Ibrahim, the son of Miftah,
began to inherit wealth to which he was not a direct heir; and

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[588] [10] To avoid confusion, it ought to be made clear that this is not ghost marriage. As I understand ghost marriages from Evans-Pritchard's (1951) account, two main conditions must be satisfied: (i) that there should be inherited wealth to make a marriage, and (ii) that the wealth remaining after the ghost marriage has been made is inherited by the ghost children only. In Cyrenaica, wealth thus inherited becomes part of a man's total wealth and is not reserved for a ghost marriage and its issue.

571 231 between man and man, although the various cereal dishes which constitute
264 their regular meals are said to have a similar effect.
The son who continues to eat with his father "as he always had been
182 doing," also continues to accept his authority. Indeed he could do little else
593 at this stage, for he lacks the economic means to cut away. Neither at mar-
585 riage nor after is there any transfer of wealth from father to son. The new
182 tent recently pitched is no more than a dormitory to which the young couple
[425] retire at night. During the daytime the son is still to be seen in his father's
tent, and, in the male quarters, things appear to be much the same as before.
[556] In the female quarters, the only superficial change is the more frequent appearance among the women of one who, before marriage, often sat among them if she had been a close neighbour or a close cousin previously; or of an additional helper if she had come from afar. On the surface things remain "as they always have been," although in fact, a whole set of changes have been initiated.

852 *Rites de passage* are few among the Bedouin. A man's progress in life is
881 ceremonially marked by only four events: his birth, circumcision, marriage
704 and burial. His development into manhood is not marked by clearly defined
stages. About the age of seven, the henna markings on the front of a boy's
858 shirt for protection from the evil eye are not renewed, the cowrie shell stitched
789 to the front of his cap as a kind of talisman against the evil eye is removed
and he is no longer permitted free access to the women's quarters. As he
857 grows older, he will be instructed in goat-herding, and later taught to follow
233 the sheep. In his late teens he will have to undertake the more arduous and
883 responsible task of herding the camels. Coincident with camel-herding, he
233 may be given a gun by his father. Shortly afterwards he must undertake the
[431] stringent test of manhood, a journey to a distant oasis for dates. These
[411] changes are not marked off by a *rite de passage*. The rites a man undergoes
[484] during the course of a lifetime are minimal, and in the sense that they are
[885] concerned with only the basic events in a man's life anywhere (save for
852 circumcision, which is a minor celebration anyway), they are irreducible.
88 Moreover, the rituals which exist do not comprehend the same multiplicity of
796 relationships as rituals which occur in many other African societies.[4] It is
[171] true that the ceremonies referred to in this chapter by no means include
all the Bedouin rituals. It is also true that the events mentioned vary in
[554] elaboration, and in the number of symbols present in them, but they are
not multiplied or reduced for different people.

[613] In this context it is important to stress that we are here dealing with a
lineage society where social differentiation is not built up into differences
[554] of rank, where the roles to which a man succeeds are almost wholly cap-
[602] tured by his kinship relationships with other men and which are sociologically
to be distinguished from the roles a man enters into by acquisition of office,

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[4] See, for example, the elaboration of rituals discussed in M. Gluckman (Ed.), *Essays on the Ritual of Social Relations*. Manchester: University of Manchester Press, 1962.

membership of associations and so on. The statuses a Bedouin achieves depend 796
not on an ordered acquisition through the inheritance of roles or election 852
to them, but on his personal manipulation of linkages in his jockeying 88
with others. Rites are minimal because there are few defined statuses an 554
individual can predictably acquire. The equalitarianism of the desert denudes 602
the Bedouin of ritual riches. Complimentarily, rites which do occur are 613
thrown into exaggerated relief by the absence of others, and in their isolation, [557]
become not merely a "passage" but a cataclysmic change. Marriage and
burial both comprehend limited fields of relations, but accompanying ceremonies 585
may bring several hundred people together, people who otherwise 764
rarely gather in these numbers to meet one another as kinsmen and neighbours, 796
and it is suggested that the emphasis given to the events dramatises the 602
significance of the changes they produce. In the discussion of the changes 182
brought about by marriage, the Bedouin view of what is entailed will be
considered first.

The Bedouin View of Marriage

After marriage, the Bedouin argue, a son has a tent of his own, a woman 585
over whom he has authority and soon children to make him a father. Marriage 581
causes split, branching. A new family is created, holding the potential [613]
of a new lineage. The separation is so painful a matter for the father
that he cannot contemplate it, hence his pretence that he has no knowledge of [593]
wedding festivities, and his subsequent attitude that nothing has happened.

Interestingly, there are two other occasions when this attitude is to be 682
observed. When a man kills within his corporate group,[5] he may flee his 613
tribe or he may be compelled to leave; later he is likely to return and, when 621
he does, he is received with a minimum of show. Every attempt is made to
suppress knowledge of the event.

Again, if incest occurs, the memory of it must somehow be suppressed, and 835
it is an ever-present danger. Men, permitted four wives simultaneously and 561
also able to engage in a plurality of marriages through divorce or death of [595]
spouses, may have children showing an age difference of two or three generations.
Thus it comes about that a man may be of an age in relation to his
father's sister which permits them as children to behave as if they were
first paternal cousins. As an adult, the preferred spouse for a man is a [582]
father's brother's daughter. In terms of relationships between adolescents
the situation in which a man is of the same age generation as his father's
sister is fraught with danger. In one such case, between a man and his [684]
father's sister, the male child of the union was put out in the desert to be

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[5] Bedouin are disposed in groups which, in summer, usually constitute a single community, around or near a watering point. The men of this group are interlinked by reference to an ancestor four or five ascending generations, reckoning from the generation of men of about 20 years. When, elsewhere in this chapter reference is made to corporations, it will be to groups of this kind.

582 time of the study. I have no information about the marital history of
[114] the men included in the genealogies. This is particularly important if
[586] we realize that the frequency of divorce in the area is quite high and
that there is a certain prohibition against ever marrying within a certain degree of relationship of his first wife.

582 According to the Koraan, a man is forbidden to marry certain
779 classes of women. Some of these women are permanently prohibited and others are only temporarily so. Marriage is forbidden with what are called the "maharem" (sing. mahram or non-marriageables). They are one's female ascendants and descendants; the former wives of one's ascendants or desendants; one's sister and the female descendants of one's sister and brother; one's paternal and maternal aunts and the sisters and aunts of the ascendants; one's mother-in-law and all female ascendants of one's wife. Marriage with the first cousin and the half-brother's half-sister (from another marriage) is therefore permitted. The second category of
● [853] forbidden women are those related to the man by nursing. The wet nurse
takes the place of the mother, and her relatives are treated as if she was the actual mother of the person in question.

In addition to the above, there is the prohibition of the simultaneous marriage of two women who are related to each other to the extent that had one of them been male and the other female, they would have come to the forbidden degree in marriage. This latter prohibition is not a permanent one and is restricted to the marriage of the two women at the same time. As soon as the marriage with one of them is dissolved, there is no prohibition on marrying the other one. Yet, although aware of the lecense given by the Islamic law to such marriage,

surface water in jerry cans, bringing them back to the tents, one at a time, 462
on their backs. Clothes are kept clean in the desert, and the women do the [312]
washing. [296]

The care of children from birth until they are a few years old is the responsibility 462
of the woman. Childbirth causes a minimum interruption in the 854
daily sequence of a mother's activities. The child is breastfed if the mother [844]
has milk; if not, a wet nurse is sought or goat milk is substituted. Other [853]
than the time given to feeding it, the infant does not take up much of the
mother's time. It is placed in a hammock slung between the centre poles
of the tent and rocked by the mother as she passes to and fro. If nursing in
illness is required, the mother devotes herself to it; her other tasks must
then be performed by another woman.

As children acquire mobility, and at a time when, perhaps, the mother 855
is pregnant again, they become so fractious one with the other that if help 462
was unavailable the nervous strain could seriously disrupt the normal routine
of work. During the early years of marriage, when daughters are still too 855
young to look after their small brothers and sisters, the grandmother's help 462
in child-rearing is invaluable. Too old for the arduous tasks of the daily 603
routine, she may assist in teasing and spinning the raw wool, but it is in her
role as nursemaid that she assumes importance. Children of both sexes
are given the comfort of suckling at her breast, receiving attention and care
for which the young mother could not possibly afford the time.

Caring for children takes up little of a man's time, and is mostly incidental. 462
The woman, on the other hand, devotes relatively little of her 233
time to the animals. She does the milking in spring — of camels, sheep and [234]
goats — but herding is not her responsibility, save for partly tending goats. [857]
Goats, when they are in the vicinity of the camp, are looked after by boys and
girls of about eight to ten years of age. In springtime when they have
dropped their young, or if some of them have to be retained in the camp at
night for various reasons, the woman makes a brushwood enclosure at the
side of the tent and sees the goats safely inside before nightfall.

A catalogue of the tasks for which women are responsible may not seem 462
very impressive; the number of tasks is not excessive, but the persistence of
the routine bends the backs of most women. Paradoxically, any suggestion
that men should take over female tasks would strike them as absurd. Assistance
from one of the same sex is always a welcome relief, but the abrogation
of a particular task by men would be interpreted by women as the loss of a
right. For, in the division of labour, it is not merely that tasks are allocated
between the sexes for expedient reasons, or in consideration of the labour
involved or because tasks which can be performed in the vicinity of the
camp are left to women; division of labour would not make sense on these
grounds, however strong they may be in Bedouin sentiments. Each task which [424]
falls to the lot of woman constitutes a right exclusive to her. Fetching firewood
is not only a chore; it is a woman's prerogative. The insistence that
only a woman can undertake certain tasks has nothing to do with her liking

surface water in jerry cans, bringing them back to the tents, one at a time, 462
on their backs. Clothes are kept clean in the desert, and the women do the [312]
washing. [296]

The care of children from birth until they are a few years old is the responsibility 462
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As children acquire mobility, and at a time when, perhaps, the mother 855
is pregnant again, they become so fractious one with the other that if help 462
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of work. During the early years of marriage, when daughters are still too 855
young to look after their small brothers and sisters, the grandmother's help 462
in child-rearing is invaluable. Too old for the arduous tasks of the daily 603
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role as nursemaid that she assumes importance. Children of both sexes
are given the comfort of suckling at her breast, receiving attention and care
for which the young mother could not possibly afford the time.

Caring for children takes up little of a man's time, and is mostly incidental. 462
The woman, on the other hand, devotes relatively little of her 233
time to the animals. She does the milking in spring — of camels, sheep and [234]
goats — but herding is not her responsibility, save for partly tending goats. [857]
Goats, when they are in the vicinity of the camp, are looked after by boys and
girls of about eight to ten years of age. In springtime when they have
dropped their young, or if some of them have to be retained in the camp at
night for various reasons, the woman makes a brushwood enclosure at the
side of the tent and sees the goats safely inside before nightfall.

A catalogue of the tasks for which women are responsible may not seem 462
very impressive; the number of tasks is not excessive, but the persistence of
the routine bends the backs of most women. Paradoxically, any suggestion
that men should take over female tasks would strike them as absurd. Assistance
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of a particular task by men would be interpreted by women as the loss of a
right. For, in the division of labour, it is not merely that tasks are allocated
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camp are left to women; division of labour would not make sense on these
grounds, however strong they may be in Bedouin sentiments. Each task which [424]
falls to the lot of woman constitutes a right exclusive to her. Fetching firewood
is not only a chore; it is a woman's prerogative. The insistence that
only a woman can undertake certain tasks has nothing to do with her liking

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231 their regular meals are said to have a similar effect.
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182 doing," also continues to accept his authority. Indeed he could do little else
593 at this stage, for he lacks the economic means to cut away. Neither at marriage
585 nor after is there any transfer of wealth from father to son. The new
182 tent recently pitched is no more than a dormitory to which the young couple
[425] retire at night. During the daytime the son is still to be seen in his father's
[556] tent, and, in the male quarters, things appear to be much the same as before.
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them if she had been a close neighbour or a close cousin previously; or of
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"as they always have been," although in fact, a whole set of changes
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764 and burial. His development into manhood is not marked by clearly defined
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883 responsible task of herding the camels. Coincident with camel-herding, he
233 may be given a gun by his father. Shortly afterwards he must undertake the
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[484] during the course of a lifetime are minimal, and in the sense that they are
[885] concerned with only the basic events in a man's life anywhere (save for
852 circumcision, which is a minor celebration anyway), they are irreducible.
88 Moreover, the rituals which exist do not comprehend the same multiplicity of
776 relationships as rituals which occur in many other African societies.[4] It is
[771] true that the ceremonies referred to in this chapter by no means include
all the Bedouin rituals. It is also true that the events mentioned vary in
[554] elaboration, and in the number of symbols present in them, but they are
not multiplied or reduced for different people.

In this context it is important to stress that we are here dealing with a
[613] lineage society where social differentiation is not built up into differences
[554] of rank, where the roles to which a man succeeds are almost wholly captured
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in position immediately anyone else appears at the entrance to the tent.[11] [834]
Women cook, but they do not serve the meal to males, nor are they responsible [342]
for the distribution of meat among them. Parts of an animal are [264]
carefully specified, and the various portions distributed at a meal carry 264
with them a great deal of significance. A host can honour, flatter, disappoint 574
or even insult his guest, depending on the precise distribution of meat 571
he adopts. Designated portions should go to certain kinsmen if they are [602]
present, but this still leaves a wide margin of choice, and a host can use
this choice as part of the many means at his disposal for directing his relationships
with other men. A political link can be forged or another
snapped by the distribution of portions of meat at the commensal meal.

The Bedouin Ideal Type of Family as a Unit of Production

This account of the division of labour is far from inclusive of all the tasks 594
carried out. The details given are only barely sufficient to provide some 183
indication of the necessary composition of a family. Referring again to the [462]
Bedouin sentiments about the matter, it is now possible to give it some
numerical precision. The number of females should be a minimum of
about three, including a mother, a teen-age daughter and a child of about
eight years. Males should number about six: a father, relieved of most [857] •
chores to act as director; a son in his middle to late twenties, to plough; a [883]
second son, in his early to middle twenties, to herd the camels; a third, in [462]
his late teens to early twenties, to shepherd the sheep; a fourth, middle to [561]
late teens, to look after the goats; and a younger son to fetch, carry and
run errands about the camp. The family of the ordinary Bedouin, they say,
shows this sex and age distribution, although they recognise that a politically [554]
ambitious man with the wealth to match his aspirations would require more [556]
of both sexes — particularly women, since the burden of entertainment increases
rapidly with a man's climb to power and fame.

Clearly, the basis of Bedouin sentiment concerning family structure is its 121
approximation to an ideal production unit. Some families display the features 183
of this ideal, but even they enjoy the productive benefits of this composition
for a very limited period only. The family, as described above, can only be an 594
ephemeral unit, since the age structure constantly changes, women are removed
by marriage, men move away and death affects it at any point at any
time. The Bedouin family is a fiction in the sense that it can be said to have a
characteristic composition. The mistake they make is to conceive of it as a
particular kinship structure related to production. The substance of what
has been referred to as a fiction is that, if viewed as a productive unit, it
bears close consistency with reality. Freed of the need to examine it in terms
of specifically limited kinship relationships, and no longer anchored to the [621]
inhabitants of a single tent, the distribution of people according to sex and

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[11] This is the general rule. In practice, the use of the divider can indicate an intimacy or distance in relationships, most subtly.

571
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264 their regular meals are said to have a similar effect.
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sorts of petty ways, listen to his grumbles about his agnates, interfere on his 604
behalf in petty camp quarrels, shield him from the disciplinarian father and 613
guard his property interests against the predatory father's brother; if the 428
mother's brother dies without heirs, the sister's son can reasonably expect at least a share of his wealth. When the mother's brother is a member of a different corporate group, a sister's son cannot possibly expect to inherit from him in any circumstance.

The mother's brother may reside in a camp too distant to be much effective 604
direct help in day-to-day living. His relative remoteness gives the relationship 591
other possible opportunities, however. Rainfall in the semi-desert area 312
of Cyrenaica is highly variable, both from year to year, and from place to 233
place in any given year. As a result this shallow saucer of a depression may 241
have sufficient rain to supply both the water needs of animals and crops, while an area a few miles distant will have inadequate water supplies for either. The mother's brother-sister's son link can mean water for animals and a crop of barley for both when, in successive years, the resources of one area or the other are inadequate.

The differences in the relations between men and their mother's brother 604
do not end with a characterisation of their antipodal forms. The demographic structure of a group may be such that one man may have a number of mother's brothers, another only one; one man may have to share with several brothers, another may be an only son. Complications of this sort determine [613]
the precise relationships between men, but however intricate these may be, each corporate group has its matrilateral links with a group occupying a slightly different ecological area, and it also has a plurality of matrilateral connections within it. Further, if a direct connection is not available [603]
to any particular individual he can use an indirect link (e.g. father's mother's brother or mother's mother's brother) to satisfy his needs.

The Preference for Males

Thus far, the family and the social matrix in which it is embedded has 128
been discussed in general terms, most particularly in reference to several selected sets of relationships. I wish now to place these relationships in a more specific setting with a brief discussion of the composition of a small camp of a group inhabiting the arid areas of central Cyrenaica. When the 829
Bedouin give their views on the structure of the family in Cyrenaica they 594
speak of it as consisting of a pair of spouses and about ten children, mainly 562
males. The emphasis on males is not mere sentiment, overwhelmingly though 858
it favours them against females. Additional males in a family increase the productive possibilities of a family in the sense that more herdsmen become available and larger ploughing commitments can be undertaken; an increase in the number of females has small effect on production since they are precluded from any direct participation in these activities. Both sexes, ranging in age from about seven years to mature adulthood, are necessary if a family

Cases

829 is to constitute a viable economic unit; and if it is to expand, the number
594 of males must be increased disproportionately compared with females. Since
562 the structure of this "ideal family" (which in the sentiments of the Bedouin
•858 is the only family) is based on the division of labour, some details of the
tasks and their allocation among members of a family are included to estimate the importance of this notional "ideal family."

The Division of Labour, by Sex

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286 The tasks women perform are almost entirely associated with the tent. They make the tent top, and the gaily coloured carpets which cover the sandy ground in the men's quarters. They also weave the material for making sacks, and nose bags for horses and camels. Throughout the year a piece of weaving is always on the loom waiting, and while any women of the tent may take a turn at weaving, the mother decides what is to be made,
462 its pattern and colours and in general directs operations. Women also pitch
342 the tent when the camp is moved; they do so unaided by the men. It is a task which requires considerable strength and only grown girls and mature women can assist in this; younger girls scour the vicinity in search of stones to hold the sides of the tent on the ground after it has been erected.
[356] As soon as pitching is complete, the floor of the tent is brushed clean before carpets are spread and the few articles of personal belongings placed in their proper position.

462 Next, brushwood must be fetched in large quantities for fires. Apart
313 from cooking needs and winter warmth, the fire of each tent is in constant use for preparing the sickly sweet tea, almost the consistency of syrup, which is drunk several times a day regularly and which is made again for even the casual visitor. The task of fetching brushwood is performed daily, and each load takes a few hours of a woman's time to gather and bring back
[412] to the tent. Bushes are uprooted with the aid of a long-handled adze and piled together, to be carried on her back for the homeward journey. The load is cumbersome and heavy; only girls in their late teens and mature women can cope with it.

462 All cooking is done by the women. Most meals consist of cereal dishes of
252 various sorts, so that grinding, using heavy millstones, is a perpetual activity to satisfy the demands for large quantities of flour. Millstones are
412 bought in the villages. In most small camps there only one or two sets, so they are passed round from one woman to another. The stones are very heavy but when they are carried from tent to tent men offer no assistance.

462 Each tent also requires large quantities of water for human consumption. If the camp is located near a well, water is drawn in small quantities, fre-
312 quently. Young girls and boys take a donkey to the well, fill a couple of
[492] jerry cans with water, wait for an older sister to load them on the donkey and then drive the beast back to camp. After a fall of rain, while puddles of water remain on the ground, mature women make haste to gather the

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FIGURE 9 - USE OF MATERNAL APPENDAGE OR SUFFIX


WIFE FROM
KAMAILAT
TRIBE
ABD
AL-MALIK
WIFE FROM
QINAISHAT
TRIBE
YUNIS
ABD AL-MALIK
AL-KAMAILIYYA
JABRIL
ABD AL-MALIK
AL-QINAISHIYYA

604 The sister's son-mother's brother relationship re-
182 ceives a high degree of attention in al-Qasr. No other kin-
ship relationship except for that between the father and the
son is better defined. Peters (1965:135) sees the importance
of the sister's son-mother's brother relationship to be based
on the need for economic symbiosis. This factor, but also the
necessity for political cooperation, probably account for the
central significance of this relationship. One chief politi-
[181] cal value, i.e., one type of behavior valued by the group and
[867] relevant to the political process (see LeVine 1960), which
Bedouin children learn relates to the desire to avoid con-
•[865] flict, especially if it concerns their mothers' tribes.
Children are taught that any quarrel, however slight at
first, could conceivably grow to become a large-scale tribal
war.

593 handling the potential conflict between father and son and the successive generations which they represent; these are mechanisms which preclude intimacy between the father and the son. The social statuses of father and son are not 593 852 585 [831] permitted to overlap by their being participants in, or even present at, festive occasions, such as circumcision and wedding parties, occasions which are marked by erotic poems and lewd songs. It would be "wrong" for a father to accompany his son to one of these parties. In the one instance that I did observe a father and son together at a wedding party, the Bedouins explained the rare occurrence by pointing out that this was the man's only son, and so he treated him "like a brother."

593 866 The Bedouins of al-Qasr recognize the aloofness of the father from the son and justify it as a training period to prepare the boy for the time when he will be on his own. One young man explained the underlying rationale of the father-son relationship in this way:

> There are different kinds of fathers. One wishes to make his son a man, to make his son self-dependent at an early age. Other fathers destroy the personalities of their sons. For instance, the first type of father gives his son the responsibility of selling something, or buying something, or of supervising a chore in his own place. But the second type of father is usually soft with his son; he doesn't depend on his son due to his young age. He is very cautious with him and will not send him anywhere, and if he does he will ask someone to look after him. Of course, the first type of father is good and the second type is bad.

121 moral community, we cannot proceed to a discussion of the
571 internal and external systems of political relations.
554

577 As a result of the socialization process, and through
181 relations with other members of the family, an individual
[867] comes to recognize that his conduct is measurable by certain
standards of, what is considered by the group to be, good and
bad, right and wrong. In al-Qasr, such standards are intrinsically correct, or "decent" as the Bedouins say; obedience
to the authority representing these standards is interpreted
as a "duty." The authoritative aspect of the role of household
[596] head (shaib al-bait), and the moral obligations which it represents, emerge from and reinforce values and structural arrangements central to Bedouin social order, namely, respect for authority and devotion to social groups, the two basic elements of morality defined by Durkheim (Parsons 1937:382-385).

577 The value placed upon social order, and the structural
571 mechanisms for insuring its realization and extension--kinship,
181 residence and contract--inform an authority structure which
182 ranges between filial piety at the family level and a set of
legal norms at the level of the external political system.
The fact that the Bedouins of al-Qasr are interested in integrating a larger population into their authority structure means that a common value is operative in the range of it; also that one sphere of authority will tend to merge into another.
[593] Hence the father-son authority relation has importance for
[671] the strength of Bedouin customary law in the desert. The

593 In al-Qasr it is a rare sight to see a father and his young
son together, and it is only slightly more common to see the
father with the grown son. The second case may simply be a
reflection of the division of labor since the son, once
grown, takes over the economic tasks of his father.

593 The most important duties of a father toward his
867 son are three:. he must teach him generosity, courage and
584 courtesy; he must see that the boy learns the Quran; and he
872 must arrange a good marriage for his son. According to
593 Peters (1960:34), the Cyrenaican Bedouin father must attend
852 to three things for his son, namely: his circumcision, his
[872] [583] education in the Quran, and his bridewealth when he marries.
In al-Qasr, the Egyptian school teachers have succeeded in
[177] showing the Bedouin that circumcision is a private family
593 affair and not a public ritual. Although all fathers still
852 see to it that their sons are circumcised, the father is no
178 longer responsible for "making a circumcision party." In
[626] fact, the father who does insist on following the old ways
[431] by hiring a dancer and publicly marking his son's rite de
passage, will be ridiculed as one "who only wants to make
money from the ritual gift (naquut) given the boy."

593 The son recognizes the rights which the father has
over him through a show of respect and obedience. A boy
shows deference toward his father by not smoking, singing,
or reciting poetry of any kind in his presence. During the

593 family is a dominant-subjective one. But the rights and duties of the father have no legal sanctions. His authority grows out of the moral and mutual dependence, the common interests and value, which hold the family together. The
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authority relations learned in the family become the norms of behavior to be applied by the individual in a wider-scale network of social relations. The son learns the discipline-respect relationship which is the model of behavior between generations. The subjective role which the daughter plays in the father-daughter relationship prepares her for the role of wife.

Marriage and Kinship Relations

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The parallel-cousin, the father's brother's daughter, is the preferred mate in Bedouin marriage. Parallel-cousin marriage in al-Qasr is more of an ideal than a practice. In fact, parallel-cousin marriage is not practical in the case where social order depends upon the integration of a larger and clearly segmented population. Endogamy of this kind in this type of society works against survival in a double-edged way: economic security through cooperation with a larger group is discouraged, and political security through
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coalition is undermined. In the Middle East, as elsewhere, cross-cousin marriage is the normative practice which functions "as a counterweight to the tendency of unilineal descent group-

FIGURE 9 - USE OF MATERNAL APPENDAGE OR SUFFIX

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
WIFE FROM
KAMAILAT
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JABRIL
ABD AL-MALIK
AL-QINAISHIYYA

604
182 The sister's son-mother's brother relationship receives a high degree of attention in al-Qasr. No other kinship relationship except for that between the father and the son is better defined. Peters (1965:135) sees the importance of the sister's son-mother's brother relationship to be based on the need for economic symbiosis. This factor, but also the necessity for political cooperation, probably account for the central significance of this relationship. One chief politi-
[181] cal value, i.e., one type of behavior valued by the group and
•[867] relevant to the political process (see LeVine 1960), which
[865] Bedouin children learn relates to the desire to avoid conflict, especially if it concerns their mothers' tribes. Children are taught that any quarrel, however slight at first, could conceivably grow to become a large-scale tribal war.

7

000 *par excellence*.

604 The inculcation of political values is part of the
829 socialization process. A Bedouin boy is taught that his *khal*
867 is a very special person, and one whom he should admire. It
is commonplace in al-Qasr to hear small boys matching the
exploits and skills of their maternal uncles, bragging and
exaggerating about their *khal*: this one is a great horseman,
and that one is a great marksman with the rifle. On the other
hand, if the mother's brother is from within the local group,
rights and obligations toward him will be structured in terms
of other kinship roles which take precedence according to the
604 rule of descent. For instance, in the ideal-typical case of
602 *bint 'amm* marriage the mother's brother of sister's son would
582 also be the father's father's brother's son in relation to
ego. This would mean, in another way, that ego's mother's
[605] brother is also ego's father's parallel cousin. Male
parallel cousins "are like brothers," and so ego would be
expected to behave toward this person not as a "mother's
brother" but as a "father." Whereas the boy enjoys a certain
freedom of expression and comradeship with his exogamous
mother's brother, he would have to pay "father-like" respect
and obedience to his endogamous mother's brother.

604 The crucial importance of the *khal*, and the political
582 significance of the bonds which this role represents, is made
clear in the following statement of an informant who contrasted

628 683 613 the area. He caught him and slapped him and ordered him not to do it again. After a short while the boy returned with his two older brothers who protested Sheikh Mughaieb's hitting their younger brother. The argument developed into a fight during which the two brothers hit Mughaieb with a heavy stick over his head making him unconscious.

The Mi'ad was held two weeks after the incident. When I arrived at Sheikh Mughaieb's house, the meeting was being held in the guest room in the back of the house. Present at the meeting were Sheikh Mughaieb, his father, two distant relatives of Mughaieb who were visiting the area at the time; Sheikh Mutair, the Aqila of the powerful bait of Mutair located some twenty miles east of Mughaieb; the two assailants, their father who at the same time was the Aqila of their bait, and two neighbors of Sheikh Mughaieb.

[576] For the first half hour or so nothing was said. People were sitting silently except for occasional greetings of "how are you?" and the response of "thank God for everything". Tea was served frequently. Then [779] Sheikh Mutair addressed the gathering and read the "fatha" or the beginning passage of the Qoraan (which appeals to God to show his right ways to the believers and to guide them to wisdom). He then said, "In the blessed presnece of all these honorable guests and with the help of God and his prophet we will clear the hearts of those concerned of the grudges caused by the shameful and unfortunate incident in which the devil has played a major role." Then Sheikh Karim, the Aqila of the bait to which the accused belonged, continued the speech saying that this shameful thing should never have happened and that his sons must [867] have been possessed by the devil to have done it. After all, they have been brought up to respect their elders and especially Sheikh Mughaieb, who was like a second father to him.

156 administrative business took up most of the time at the
159 meeting, and only the Governor and the Egyptians took part
554 in the discussion. At the conclusion of the meeting, the
635 648 Governor asked if any present had comments to make. Hajj
[891] 'Ali rose, and delivered a formal and well-prepared speech
[537] on the inadequacies of the educational facilities in Matruh.
He noted that the Governor had promised the Bedouins that if
they sent their sons in from the desert for secondary schooling,
their material needs would be taken care of, but that in fact
the Governor had not kept his promise for there was not enough
space and beds for the boys. The Governor apologized for this
condition and said he was trying to correct it. I noted that
a few Egyptians found something amusing about this incident,
but that all of the Bedouins present were serious and nodded
in agreement with the points made by Hajj 'Ali.

156 We should note that Hajj 'Ali was the only Bedouin to
159 speak up at the meeting, that he spoke in the formal, tradi-
554 635 tional manner, and that he showed concern for the real problems
of the Bedouins. Hajj 'Ali is careful to protect his identity
as a Bedouin, and in this he differs from the _'umda_ and
most of the "status group."

121 In situations of induced change, the cultural problems
156 involved differ in their conception and immediacy as defined
159 554 by the agents and the recipients of change. Hajj 'Ali, who
177 635 is both an agent and a recipient of change, is intimate with

156 the _'umda_, Hajj 'Ali seems to imply that he himself is capable
159 of understanding and leading the Bedouins during this period.

554 178 Hajj 'Ali has formulated some positive and constructive
177 ideas relating to the period of transition which now faces
829 al-Qasr, and they are related to his analysis of the pressing
needs of the day.

> The Bedouins need many things: they need factories
> as there are in the Nile Valley. For the desert,
> here in particular, we need olive presses. This
> will raise the profits of the farmer . . . We need
> [244] a factory for canning tomatoes, for the whole desert
> plants them and the transportation is such that we
> [489] cannot get them to the market . . . The biggest
> change in the desert results from the presence of
> 12,000 government workers; there were only 20 or
> •[871] 30 before the World War. There were no schools,
> now there a few. You cannot find a six year-old
> boy who does not go to school; about thirty per cent
> of the girls in al-Qasr go to school also . . .
> Another cause of change is due to the fact that
> everyone now watches his neighbor, he sees what he
> [207] does and he imitates him. Today, I listen to the
> radio and tomorrow my neighbor buys one. Evolution
> (_tatawwar_) is taking place, and the people here are
> [212] realistic about it. For instance, I do not know
> reading and writing, and sometimes I must dictate a
> letter to my son . . . My son knows better than I,
> and I know better than my father did, who lived in
> al-Qasr for thirty five years without knowing anything about the streets of Marsa Matruh.

156 Hajj 'Ali is both subjective and objective about
159 change, as we can note from the comment about the radio.
554 178 In a non-doctrinaire fashion, Hajj 'Ali stresses the great
177 value of education while being aware of his own deficiencies
in this area. However, as a counterbalance, he seems to

156 159 554 178 177 imply that one cannot be educated and know the _'awaiyid_ at the same time--the attitude of a self-made man. Hajj 'Ali realizes his marginal position between the new and the old, and his attitude concerning change through education seems to be that of an unselfish leader. Elaborating further on the role of education, Hajj 'Ali showed insight into some of the psychological aspects underlying social change:

156 159 554 178 177 829 871

> As I said before, the people here are realistic about change. There are now only about three or four of us who send our sons to study at the university, the rest of the people are waiting to see what these boys will amount to. The other day, one of our educated boys, an officer in the army, came to visit al-Qasr. All of the women are now hoping to see their sons become as successful as this. This is exactly like the first time we cultivated olives in the desert: the Bedouins mocked those who planted the olive. After the olive began to show profits, everyone regretted that they did not cultivate it. Time is changing, and the people are changing. Education is the basis of everything in any nation. Now the agricultural engineer directs me, telling me what to do and how to do it . . . and before 1952 (pre-Nassar regime) they knew nothing about us and we had nothing.

156 159 554 829 574 648 As culture and social change proceeds in al-Qasr, it is evident that Hajj 'Ali and the national political community are becoming legitimate authorities in the eyes of the Bedouins. This is indicated by the following event. One month before I left the field, the first vice-President of the Republic was expected to visit the province of Marsa Matruh, and al-Qasr was named as one of the places which he would tour. Hajj 'Ali took it upon himself to set up three tents in the tradi-

634 554 657 674 [743] which result in permanent bodily harm. Reporting such cases is a fairly minor proceeding since such cases come to the knowledge of the authorities through other channels, mainly from talks involved in the mediation for the bloodmoney or from the hospital to which serious assault cases are usually taken. Besides, reporting a crime does not mean convicting the offender. This latter depends on evidence which, in case the dispute has been settled by tribal proceedings, is hard for the police authorities to find.

634 554 657 While the government demands do not impose serious conflicts of loyalty on the part of the omda, if successful, his position with the government can bring to his tribal segments great benefits. These benefits are usually in the form of various social and economic aids including fodder for the animals and food and clothing for the people during the dry years. Other benefits including providing the tribal population with olive trees and helping them clear many of the old Roman wells and establishing wind mills for nominal fees. Not everyone in the area can have such benefits. Some do not even know they exist. A successful omda could manipulate the administration to get as many benefits for ● [871] [474] his tribal segment as possible.. Some successful omdas were able to have the government build schools in their districts, establish cooperative units to market local products such as wool, sheep, and olive oil.

634 554 657 578 This should not lead us, however, to conclude that the position of the omda in the Western Desert does not involve any kind of conflicting loyalty or that he is always supported by his people or even trusted by them. One informant said that the omda of his biat is "...government man, not ours....He would sell us all if this pleases his masters in the

173 Fusion of names appears in another context and for similar
178 reasons. Not only are lineal descendants given the name of de-
551 ceased ancestors, but a man may be given the name of any de-
613 ceased agnate of his tertiary section. Usually, this is only done
428 when a man passes on property to another who is not his direct
[553] heir. Commonly, this occurs when an agnate is also a mother's
brother, as often happens as a result of parallel cousin marriage,
and this mother's brother has no sons of his own. If he has a
sister's son, who is also his paternal nephew, he is likely to pass
on his wealth to this nephew. A father, the Bedouin insist, ought
[183] to perform three duties for his sons: attend to their circumcision,
[593] and their education in the Koran, and provide bride-wealth when
[852] they marry. All fathers attend to the circumcision of all their sons;
[871] few provide for the Koranic education of any of their sons; most
bear the burden of marrying off at least one of their sons. The
[583] performance of the latter duty is what makes the continuance of the deceased's name an obligation, and whoever performs this duty must have his name perpetuated in one male offspring of the union which was brought about with his wealth. Wealth need not take the form of bride-wealth; it can be a legacy willed by a father, maternal uncle of the kind described above, or any other agnate who has died without male issue. Conversely, if a man dies without leaving any property, even his sons might not perpetuate his name, and eventually it will drop out of the genealogy.[10] There are instances of men inheriting the wealth of a number of agnates, using each parcel of wealth to make a new marriage and naming the sons of the various unions after the several dead who had left wealth. The example given below is taken from the genealogy of the Dawwas section of the Magharba tribe. What happened here was that the two lines stemming from Faraj and Sha'aban, after proliferating normally, became extinct. As this happened, Ibrahim, the son of Miftah, began to inherit wealth to which he was not a direct heir; and

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[588] [10] To avoid confusion, it ought to be made clear that this is not ghost marriage. As I understand ghost marriages from Evans-Pritchard's (1951) account, two main conditions must be satisfied: (i) that there should be inherited wealth to make a marriage, and (ii) that the wealth remaining after the ghost marriage has been made is inherited by the ghost children only. In Cyrenaica, wealth thus inherited becomes part of a man's total wealth and is not reserved for a ghost marriage and its issue.

593 In al-Qasr it is a rare sight to see a father and his young
son together, and it is only slightly more common to see the
father with the grown son. The second case may simply be a
reflection of the division of labor since the son, once
grown, takes over the economic tasks of his father.

The most important duties of a father toward his
593 son are three: he must teach him generosity, courage and
867 courtesy; he must see that the boy learns the Quran; and he
584 must arrange a good marriage for his son. According to
872 Peters (1960:34), the Cyrenaican Bedouin father must attend
593 to three things for his son, namely: his circumcision, his
852 education in the Quran, and his bridewealth when he marries.
[872] In al-Qasr, the Egyptian school teachers have succeeded in
[583] showing the Bedouin that circumcision is a private family
[177] affair and not a public ritual. Although all fathers still
593 see to it that their sons are circumcised, the father is no
852 longer responsible for "making a circumcision party." In
178 fact, the father who does insist on following the old ways
[626] by hiring a dancer and publicly marking his son's rite de
[431] passage, will be ridiculed as one "who only wants to make
money from the ritual gift (naquut) given the boy."

593 The son recognizes the rights which the father has
over him through a show of respect and obedience. A boy
shows deference toward his father by not smoking, singing,
or reciting poetry of any kind in his presence. During the

*613 with Bait Bu Taram of 'Ailit Lazumi. These marriages and
159 their resultant alliances enhance the political power and
581 social status of Hajj 'Ali within and without al-Qasr.
156

Although he has no education himself, and neither reads
159 nor writes, Hajj 'Ali has sent his son to the University of
156 Alexandria. Hajj 'Ali's son is the only boy from al-Qasr
873
[212] ever to attend the university. Hajj 'Ali desired that his
son study law at the university or enter the military academy
"and become an officer." But his son objected to this, saying:
"Either way I will be employed by the government and will not
be permitted to travel and see other countries." Hajj 'Ali did
not argue with this: he said that his son should study what
he wished. The son is now studying in the Faculty of Commerce
156 at Alexandria. Hajj 'Ali is also sending his daughters to
159 the primary school in al-Qasr. Not all of the Bedouins believe
•872
562 that girls should receive an education.

156 Hajj 'Ali places among the "status group" in terms
159 of wealth. Although he has now committed himself to olive-
554 farming as a way of life, he remains one of the biggest sheep
472 owners in al-Qasr. Therefore, he is identified with both traditional
and modern symbols of status. Hajj 'Ali differs in
156 one important way from other members of the "status group"
159 in that he owns three small general stores, two in al-Qasr
554
443 and one far to the west in Sallum. This fact has several
423 significant implications. Shops in al-Qasr (there are five
472
*[613]

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159 their resultant alliances enhance the political power and
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423 significant implications. Shops in al-Qasr (there are five
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*795 that he did not choose Cyrenaica as his field of labour but was
793 compelled to settle in Libya for a time because the road to the
159 west was closed by the French and the road to the east by the
*175 authorities in Cairo and Mecca. The Grand Sanusi was a
cosmopolitan, a townsman, and more at home in the schools and libraries of Fez, Cairo, and Mecca than amid the lentisk and juniper of the Cyrenaican plateau or the thyme and wormwood of its rolling plains. Even after founding in 1843 what has become the Mother Lodge of the Order, al-Zawiya al-Baida, on the central Cyrenaican plateau, not far from the ancient city of Cyrene, and while the Sanusi movement was still young in the country, he returned in 1846 to Mecca and stayed there till 1853. Altogether he spent only about ten years of his teaching life in Cyrenaica, whereas he spent some twenty years in the Hijaz.

On his return to Cyrenaica he seems to have felt the need for greater solitude. He was then nearing seventy years of age and doubtless felt that what was left to him of life should be given
*[648] to contemplation, prayer, and study. It may be true also, as is
commonly stated in books written by Europeans, that he desired to place a wide stretch of desert between himself and the Turkish authorities who, as the Sanusiya movement grew, began to take greater interest in it. He therefore first went to live for a short while at al-'Azziyyat on the southern edge of the plateau, where he built a zawiya, and afterwards at Jaghbub, about 160 km. from the sea.

[873] Jaghbub, now to become the centre of the Order and the seat
of an Islamic University second only in Africa to al-Azhar, was till 1856, when the Grand Sanusi made it his seat, an uninhabited oasis, in which the water was brackish, highly sulphurous, and insufficient to irrigate more than a small area of gardens. It was not a place for luxurious living, though it seems to have been healthy and, unlike Siwa, free from malaria; but it had certain political advantages. It was out of reach of
*[648] the Turkish, French, or Egyptian governments, it was on the
[487] main pilgrimage route from North-west Africa through Egypt
to Mecca, and this pilgrimage route bisected at the oasis one of the trade routes from the coast to the Sahara and the Sudan. Moreover, since Cyrenaica is a peninsula, it was the most central point he could have chosen at that time to be in equal

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slaves, kitchens, and wells. The oasis depression was studded 793
with date palms and just outside the main entrance to the village 159
were small irrigated gardens and wind-mills. The people had 175*
to use the brackish water for ordinary purposes, but sufficient [346]
fresh water for tea was obtained from infrequent showers by [241]
hollowing out cisterns in the rocks at the top of the western [379]
escarpment of the oasis. [312]

The Grand Sanusi was not only a very learned man and a writer of distinction but also a bibliophile with a fine library of [217] some 8,000 volumes,[1] mostly works on Islamic law and jurisprudence, mysticism, philosophy, history, koranic exegesis, poetry, and astronomy and astrology. Round him were many men capable of making good use of this substantial library. Indeed, it would have been difficult to have found anywhere in the Islamic world at that time, outside Cairo, a circle of better scholars. Poetry was one of the arts most cultivated at the oasis and I have been told by Arabs that it reached a high level of excellence. Shaikh Muhammad 'Uthman, himself a poet, wrote that at Jaghbub one meets 'literary men of distinction, whose writings eclipse those of the poets of Iraq and of Andalousia'.[2]

The whole community at Jaghbub may have numbered round about 1,000, but it is not possible to make more than a guess at the figure. As the oasis produces little except dates, the supply problem must have been considerable, and we know that the Grand Sanusi kept herds of camels to the west of the oasis, where there is scrub grazing, and at al-'Azziyyat, to transport supplies from the coast. The community lived very largely on the surplus revenues, mostly goods in kind, sent annually by all the zawiyas of Cyrenaica.

The community was centred round the University. It was, [873] ● in fact, almost purely a University society, and its importance as such in the history of the Sanusiya Order is very considerable. Here, under his personal supervision and the supervision of his disciples, far from worldly distractions, the Grand Sanusi was able to train the future leaders of the Order. The Shaikhs of the lodges of the Order were appointed by him from among his intimate circle of disciples, many of whom had followed him

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[1] Duveyrier, op. cit., p. 24; Muhammad bin 'Uthman, op. cit., p. 88; Sir Richard Burton, *Personal Narrative of a Pilgrimage to al-Madinah and Meccah* (Memorial Edition), 1893, vol. ii, pp. 24–5.

[2] Op. cit., p. 88.

571 between man and man, although the various cereal dishes which constitute
231 their regular meals are said to have a similar effect.

264 The son who continues to eat with his father "as he always had been
182 doing," also continues to accept his authority. Indeed he could do little else
593 at this stage, for he lacks the economic means to cut away. Neither at marriage
585 nor after is there any transfer of wealth from father to son. The new
182 tent recently pitched is no more than a dormitory to which the young couple
[425] retire at night. During the daytime the son is still to be seen in his father's
tent, and, in the male quarters, things appear to be much the same as before.
[556] In the female quarters, the only superficial change is the more frequent appearance
among the women of one who, before marriage, often sat among
them if she had been a close neighbour or a close cousin previously; or of
an additional helper if she had come from afar. On the surface things remain
"as they always have been," although in fact, a whole set of changes
have been initiated.

852 *Rites de passage* are few among the Bedouin. A man's progress in life is
881 ceremonially marked by only four events: his birth, circumcision, marriage
764 and burial. His development into manhood is not marked by clearly defined
stages. About the age of seven, the henna markings on the front of a boy's
858 shirt for protection from the evil eye are not renewed, the cowrie shell stitched
789 to the front of his cap as a kind of talisman against the evil eye is removed
and he is no longer permitted free access to the women's quarters. As he
857 grows older, he will be instructed in goat-herding, and later taught to follow
233 the sheep. In his late teens he will have to undertake the more arduous and
883 responsible task of herding the camels. Coincident with camel-herding, he
233 may be given a gun by his father. Shortly afterwards he must undertake the
[431] stringent test of manhood, a journey to a distant oasis for dates. These
[411] changes are not marked off by a *rite de passage.* The rites a man undergoes
[484] during the course of a lifetime are minimal, and in the sense that they are
[885] concerned with only the basic events in a man's life anywhere (save for
852 circumcision, which is a minor celebration anyway), they are irreducible.
88 Moreover, the rituals which exist do not comprehend the same multiplicity of
796 relationships as rituals which occur in many other African societies.[4] It is
[771] true that the ceremonies referred to in this chapter by no means include
all the Bedouin rituals. It is also true that the events mentioned vary in
[554] elaboration, and in the number of symbols present in them, but they are
not multiplied or reduced for different people.

[613] In this context it is important to stress that we are here dealing with a
lineage society where social differentiation is not built up into differences
[554] of rank, where the roles to which a man succeeds are almost wholly captured
[602] by his kinship relationships with other men and which are sociologically
to be distinguished from the roles a man enters into by acquisition of office,

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[4] See, for example, the elaboration of rituals discussed in M. Gluckman (Ed.), *Essays on the Ritual of Social Relations.* Manchester: University of Manchester Press, 1962.

membership of associations and so on. The statuses a Bedouin achieves depend 796
not on an ordered acquisition through the inheritance of roles or election 852
to them, but on his personal manipulation of linkages in his jockeying 88
with others. Rites are minimal because there are few defined statuses an 554
individual can predictably acquire. The equalitarianism of the desert denudes 602
the Bedouin of ritual riches. Complimentarily, rites which do occur are 613
thrown into exaggerated relief by the absence of others, and in their isolation, [557]
become not merely a "passage" but a cataclysmic change. Marriage and 585
burial both comprehend limited fields of relations, but accompanying ceremonies 764
may bring several hundred people together, people who otherwise 796
rarely gather in these numbers to meet one another as kinsmen and neighbours, 602
and it is suggested that the emphasis given to the events dramatises the 182
significance of the changes they produce. In the discussion of the changes
brought about by marriage, the Bedouin view of what is entailed will be
considered first.

The Bedouin View of Marriage

After marriage, the Bedouin argue, a son has a tent of his own, a woman 585
over whom he has authority and soon children to make him a father. Marriage 581
causes split, branching. A new family is created, holding the potential [613]
of a new lineage. The separation is so painful a matter for the father
that he cannot contemplate it, hence his pretence that he has no knowledge of [593]
wedding festivities, and his subsequent attitude that nothing has happened.

Interestingly, there are two other occasions when this attitude is to be 682
observed. When a man kills within his corporate group,[5] he may flee his 613
tribe or he may be compelled to leave; later he is likely to return and, when 621
he does, he is received with a minimum of show. Every attempt is made to
suppress knowledge of the event.

Again, if incest occurs, the memory of it must somehow be suppressed, and 835
it is an ever-present danger. Men, permitted four wives simultaneously and 561
also able to engage in a plurality of marriages through divorce or death of [595]
spouses, may have children showing an age difference of two or three generations.
Thus it comes about that a man may be of an age in relation to his
father's sister which permits them as children to behave as if they were
first paternal cousins. As an adult, the preferred spouse for a man is a [582]
father's brother's daughter. In terms of relationships between adolescents
the situation in which a man is of the same age generation as his father's
sister is fraught with danger. In one such case, between a man and his [684]
father's sister, the male child of the union was put out in the desert to be

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[5] Bedouin are disposed in groups which, in summer, usually constitute a single community, around or near a watering point. The men of this group are interlinked by reference to an ancestor four or five ascending generations, reckoning from the generation of men of about 20 years. When, elsewhere in this chapter reference is made to corporations, it will be to groups of this kind.

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[4] See, for example, the elaboration of rituals discussed in M. Gluckman (Ed.), *Essays on the Ritual of Social Relations*. Manchester: University of Manchester Press, 1962.

571 between man and man, although the various cereal dishes which constitute
231 their regular meals are said to have a similar effect.

264 The son who continues to eat with his father "as he always had been
182 doing," also continues to accept his authority. Indeed he could do little else
593 at this stage, for he lacks the economic means to cut away. Neither at mar-
585 riage nor after is there any transfer of wealth from father to son. The new
182 tent recently pitched is no more than a dormitory to which the young couple
[425] retire at night. During the daytime the son is still to be seen in his father's
[556] tent, and, in the male quarters, things appear to be much the same as before. In the female quarters, the only superficial change is the more frequent appearance among the women of one who, before marriage, often sat among them if she had been a close neighbour or a close cousin previously; or of an additional helper if she had come from afar. On the surface things remain "as they always have been," although in fact, a whole set of changes have been initiated.

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[834]

in position immediately anyone else appears at the entrance to the tent.[11] [342]
Women cook, but they do not serve the meal to males, nor are they re- [264]
sponsible for the distribution of meat among them. Parts of an animal are 264
carefully specified, and the various portions distributed at a meal carry 574
with them a great deal of significance. A host can honour, flatter, disap- 571
point or even insult his guest, depending on the precise distribution of meat
he adopts. Designated portions should go to certain kinsmen if they are [602]
present, but this still leaves a wide margin of choice, and a host can use
this choice as part of the many means at his disposal for directing his re-
lationships with other men. A political link can be forged or another
snapped by the distribution of portions of meat at the commensal meal.

The Bedouin Ideal Type of Family as a Unit of Production

This account of the division of labour is far from inclusive of all the tasks 594
carried out. The details given are only barely sufficient to provide some 183
indication of the necessary composition of a family. Referring again to the [462]
Bedouin sentiments about the matter, it is now possible to give it some
numerical precision. The number of females should be a minimum of
about three, including a mother, a teen-age daughter and a child of about
eight years. Males should number about six: a father, relieved of most [857]
chores to act as director; a son in his middle to late twenties, to plough; a [883]
second son, in his early to middle twenties, to herd the camels; a third, in [462]
his late teens to early twenties, to shepherd the sheep; a fourth, middle to [561]
late teens, to look after the goats; and a younger son to fetch, carry and
run errands about the camp. The family of the ordinary Bedouin, they say, [554]
shows this sex and age distribution, although they recognise that a politically
ambitious man with the wealth to match his aspirations would require more [556]
of both sexes — particularly women, since the burden of entertainment in-
creases rapidly with a man's climb to power and fame.

Clearly, the basis of Bedouin sentiment concerning family structure is its 121
approximation to an ideal production unit. Some families display the features 183
of this ideal, but even they enjoy the productive benefits of this composition
for a very limited period only. The family, as described above, can only be an 594
ephemeral unit, since the age structure constantly changes, women are removed by marriage, men move away and death affects it at any point at any time. The Bedouin family is a fiction in the sense that it can be said to have a characteristic composition. The mistake they make is to conceive of it as a particular kinship structure related to production. The substance of what has been referred to as a fiction is that, if viewed as a productive unit, it
bears close consistency with reality. Freed of the need to examine it in terms [621]
of specifically limited kinship relationships, and no longer anchored to the
inhabitants of a single tent, the distribution of people according to sex and

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[11] This is the general rule. In practice, the use of the divider can indicate an intimacy or distance in relationships, most subtly.

121 basis of an agreement "to share the good and the bad" by
621 571 all parties concerned. Once the integration is effected,
675 patrilineal ideology and legal fiction succeed in concealing
608 597 the jointure.

The concept which derives from ancient Arabia, and
621 571 which expresses fully the structural principles of Bedouin
*613 society is that of *'aqila*. The *'aqila*, in al-Qasr, is the
head of the corporate group, the tertiary unit or *bait*. A
• [884] person becomes part of the Bedouin jural body when he reaches
the age of 15, begins to keep the Ramadan fast, and is expected
to pay his share of the blood-money. At this time, a man
621 571 acquires rights over his corporate lineage-mates and they
*613 over him: they claim a share in the indemnity ("blood-
672 money" - *diiya*) of each other, and are under obligation to
[682] contribute equal shares to any *diiya* which becomes due from
the group as a whole. Further, each corporate member is
morally bound to support his lineage-mates by swearing the
oath (*yamiin*) on the behalf of any who are accused of falsehoods in the course of litigation. All of these rights and
obligations are guaranteed by the presence of an *'aqila*.

*613 The tertiary *bait* is the minimal corporate group.
It usually includes three to five generations of members.
Tertiary units which are descended from a common ancestor
combine through contractual relations into the maximal corporate
group, the secondary unit or *'aiela*. Beyond the secondary level

IN THE NAME OF GOD THE FORGIVER

613 675 539 The following Awaqil (sing. aqila, the leader of a bait) representing the various "buite" (sing. bait, the tribal segment below the level of eila) of the Aggary Family were witnesses to the treaty and their signatures signify their commitment and that of their respective buite to the content of this agreement.

(a list of the various awaqil)

The above signing awaqil agreed unanimously on the content of the document and all the conditions included. No objection by any of the above persons was noted at the meeting.

Article 1:

The content of this document should be kept as a secret of the Aggary Family. It constitutes the Aggary Amar in accordance with the customs and the Daraieb of Awlad Ali. The content of the document should be revealed only at the request of both parties of a dispute which involves a member of the Amar.

Article 2:

[627] Peace should exist between members of the Amar. No secret grudges or open disputes should be permitted between them. In case such an unfortunate situation exists, the other non-involved members of the Amar should intervene between the disputants, try to solve the dispute, and prevent it from damaging the solidarity of the Amar. They should investigate the facts of the case and force the guilty party to compensate his brother (the wronged party) without giving the former a chance to object.

Article 3:

[681] When the Amar is called upon because of obligation involving the payment of money, all the Awaqil should meet and decide the amount of money that should be collected from each Bait of the Aggary Family. It becomes then the responsibility of each Aqila to collect the amount from his Bait.

Article 4:

[681] [885] The share of each Bait is based upon the number of "Sayems", (literally, "fasting males", which is interpreted to mean 15 years of age or over), regardless of whether or not they have a source of income for themselves. The share of those without means of their own is distributed among the other members of the Bait.

613
675 Each Aqila is responsible for submitting to the Amar a list of the
539 Sayems in his bait, and this will be the basis for establishing the
[681] share of the bait in payment or receipt of the money.

[885] Article 5:

No Aqila can act on any matter involving loss or gain to the Amar without the presence of the other Awaqil of the Amar, unless an urgent matter occurs in which waiting for the rest of the Awaqil might jeopardize the interest of the Amar. In such cases the Awaqil present can act on behalf of the Amar as a whole.

Article 6:

[672] [673] The following acts should not involve the Amar as a whole and the offender is considered individually (or with his own Bait) responsible for them:

1. Theft and cheating.
2. Insult or disrespect of a younger member of the Amar to an older person whether from the Amar or not.
3. Entering someone's tent or home without permission.
4. Seduction of women (including rape and adultery).

[681] In all the above cases the individual has to bear the responsibility for his own actions. For to let the Amar pay for him in such circumstances is to encourage him and other such members of the Amar to commit more of such acts and bring disgrace to the Amar. If the offender is unable to pay for his crime, his nearest male kin should pay for him in accordance with the Awlad Ali Daraieb. Such payments are considered as personal debts which the offender has to pay back as soon as he is financially able.

Article 7:

[627] When an older person does injustice to a younger one, the latter should take his complaint to the Aqila of his own bait. The Aqila in turn should take the matter up with the Aqila of the older man or to all the awaqil of the Amar if the matter is serious enough. The awaqil must assess the facts and prevent the older man from doing any more injustice to the younger man and have the former compensate him for any damage he might have caused the younger man by his actions. If the awaqil fail to do this and if their failure resulted in the younger insulting or hurting the older, his acts become no longer an individual responsibility for which he has to pay alone, and the Amar should pay for him.

Article 8:

[627] No members of the Amar should take sides in disputes involving families or individuals outside the Amar unless the awaqil in the Amar investigate the matter and the reasons for the dispute and decide that the Amar as a whole should be on one side of the dispute or the other.

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EILAT AGGARY AND ITS CONSTIUENT BAITS

BAIT	NUMBER OF ADULT MALES (Sayems)[1]	AQILA
Eweidha (El-Burg)*	28	Ta'eb
Eweidha (El-Alamein)*	31	Selouma
Yusef**	30	Suliman
Helleis	22	Hussein
El-Asabei'	56	Shei'eb
Abdel Hamid*	20	Haj Musa
Risq**	30	Yadem
Afash	25	Nayer
Daghas**	25	Daghash
Bul-Yazid*	21	Haj Shousha
Makhyum**	23	Abdel fattah
Hussein**	17	Masri
El-Ramly**	25	Salem
Rashwan**	30	Rashwan
Attya*	31	Masu'd
Abdella*	22	Abdel Galil

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[1] Numbers are taken from the Amar list which is used to distribute the amount of bloodmoney on the various baits. An adult male or "sayem" is anyone 15 years of age or older. The word "sayem" means fasting individual and the age of 15 is when a child is forced to observe the duties of fasting.

[885]
[785]
[619]

** Refers to adopted tribal segments (Muktatibeen).
* Baits of doubted origin. Some claim these baits are adopted, while others insist that they are Awlad Ali proper.

571 between man and man, although the various cereal dishes which constitute
231 their regular meals are said to have a similar effect.

264 The son who continues to eat with his father "as he always had been
182 doing," also continues to accept his authority. Indeed he could do little else
593 at this stage, for he lacks the economic means to cut away. Neither at mar-
585 riage nor after is there any transfer of wealth from father to son. The new
182 tent recently pitched is no more than a dormitory to which the young couple
[425] retire at night. During the daytime the son is still to be seen in his father's
tent, and, in the male quarters, things appear to be much the same as before.
[556] In the female quarters, the only superficial change is the more frequent appearance among the women of one who, before marriage, often sat among them if she had been a close neighbour or a close cousin previously; or of an additional helper if she had come from afar. On the surface things remain "as they always have been," although in fact, a whole set of changes have been initiated.

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881 ceremonially marked by only four events: his birth, circumcision, marriage
764 and burial. His development into manhood is not marked by clearly defined
stages. About the age of seven, the henna markings on the front of a boy's
858 shirt for protection from the evil eye are not renewed, the cowrie shell stitched
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and he is no longer permitted free access to the women's quarters. As he
857 grows older, he will be instructed in goat-herding, and later taught to follow
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Cases

The Meaning of Marriage

581 Until marriage the changes in a man's life have been in the nature of
585 an ordered sequence of development from a child to be cared for — the only
342 time in his life when a father, without inhibition, showers on him his love
[593] and affection — to one who, by degrees, makes an increasing contribution to
a production unit. Marriage necessitates that a man pitch a tent for himself.
With a tent he becomes a potential host and protector of others. The local
idiom for marriage is "to set up a tent." It would be quite improper to use
[196] the verb "to marry" when inquiring whether a marriage has taken place
since this verb also has the meaning of "to have sexual intercourse." Instead
[195] the euphemism, "Have you pitched a tent?" is used. The Arabic word
for a tent in this context is *Bait*. It is not used to refer to a military tent, nor
to the small tent which shelters only a widow. It is reserved for the Bedouin
tent, which usually has a wool top, and, most importantly, holds the promise
of the continuation of life, whether it shelters a newly married couple, a
mature family or young unmarried people. (The word *Bait* represents a
complex concept, and it would be too much of a diversion here to discuss
the various points of its significance. It is essential to understand that its
[778] meaning is not confined to a tent in the physical sense.) Its top has *Baraka*
(divine goodness) in it; the quality of *Haram*, which makes it possible for the
tent to be used as a sanctuary, is associated with it and this quality of *Haram*
extends, moreover, to the ropes of the tent, so that anyone who clutches them
comes under the protection of the owner. In it, the wife must permanently
reside and her husband has the legal right to insist on this. In it too, he
has the legal right of sexual access to a woman, his wife. Any children
• [885] born in it he can claim as his own. With the erection of a tent the son
reaches adulthood, and it is in this sense that he can be said to have acquired
a domain of his own.

581 Marriage gives a son greater freedom and less dependence on his father
585 in another sense. A second euphemism used for marriage is "making a
[593] relationship," specifically an affinal one. Relationships between a man and
[195] his father-in-law are diverse and are used in various ways in different situations.
Here, the particular aspect which needs to be stressed is that a man
606 can cajole his father-in-law, and (through his wife) wealth, in the form
425 of animals, may pass from the former to the latter. Reciprocal gifts are passed
556 between affines on certain occasions, but in addition small amounts may
pass which are not connected with the formal occasions of exchanges. Debt
583 lies between them. It begins with the initiation of marriage negotiations,
584 when the suitor's kinsmen take a prescribed number of sheep to present to
606 the girl's father if negotiations are successful. They promise to transfer
bride-wealth[*] to the girl's father. A few weeks after the marriage, the hus-

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[191] [*] I use the word "bride-wealth" because it has become so familiar in the literature,
but the only similarity between the *Sahiba* of the Bedouin and the bride-wealth of

121 Here we are interested in the way in which roles and groups,
554 and a whole structure of authority, operate over a wide area.

In the previous section, I presented the 'aqila as a specialized political role in Bedouin political organization. As Radcliffe-Brown (1940:xviii-xxi) has pointed out, in the political analysis of segmentary societies it is necessary to isolate incipient authority roles which function to make decisions concerning rightness and wrongness in disputes and which represent the community, giving voice to public sentiment. The notion of society as a functional system of authority roles and authority groups is clear in Radcliffe-Brown's treatment of politics.

121 Local groups of political significance, i.e., authority
554 groups, are identified by the status position, or office, re-
571 ferred to as 'aqila. The political relations within a local
*[613] tertiary group, and between it and similar groups of a lineage
and tribe, must be seen as relationships between authority
roles.

554 In the domestic field of political relations, the
596 authority of the Bedouin 'aqila shades into the familial
*613 authority sphere of the household head (shaib). The shaib,
as senior agnate of his naja', is dominant over the other
males of his tertiary sub-unit, but not to the extent that he
can pre-empt any of their rights as members of the tertiary
● [888] corporate group. A shaib, by virtue of his age, is supposed
[578] to possess the wisdom which it takes to regulate
conflict.

Muftah said that he had taken his daughter away
593 to punish Hemeida for what he thought was disrespectful behavior. He
574 606 then proceeded to descirbe how Hemeida, after bringing the blanket out
586 for Muftah, went inside and spent the night with his wife, defying the
627 basic rule of not showing intimacy in the presence of older people,
792 888 especially the parents or parents-in-law. For, to show such intimacy
is a sign of disrespect. He demanded that Hemeida pay him "kabara"
[681] for his injured pride. The term kabara refers to the adjective "kebir"
[558] (lit. respected or big man). Kabara is the fine paid for belittling
someone by word or deed. Muftah insisted that he would not allow his
daughter to return to her husband until Hemeida had paid that kabara.
Hemeida conceded the fact that intimacy constitutes an insult; but he
insisted that his action did not constitute an act of intimacy with his
wife, but was a matter of convenience and necessity, since he had only
593 two blankets, and the only one left was that inside the tent. Muftah
574 606 became angry and started shouting at Hemeida, who, in turn, started
586 shouting back; it became impossible to follow what was being said.
627 The religious man interfered in the discussion, trying to stop the argu-
792 ment between Muftah and Hemeida. The others attending the mi'ad also
[578] interfered. The religious man and two neighbors took Muftah outside
the tent while Muftah's brother tried to calm Hemeida down. The other
members of the group also calmed Hemeida, reminding him that he was the
younger person and must be more tolerant of older people. They also re-
minded Hemeida that Muftah was his father-in-law and had the right to take
his daughter away any time he chose. They urged him to "defeat the devil"
[681] and to apologize to his father-in-law and pay him kabara. He seemed
convinced but insisted that all he was going to pay was five pounds and
a goat. Muftah's brother and one of the neighbors then left the tent and